(IJnrnpU ICatu ^rl|nnl IGibrary 
 
„_^ Cornell University Library 
 
 KF9305.W551907 
 
 The law of homicide, 
 
 3 1924 020 148 536 
 
Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of tiiis book is in 
 tine Cornell University Library. 
 
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 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924020148536 
 
THE T^J^^W OF 
 
 HOMICIDE 
 
 FRANCIS J^HARTON, LL. D., 
 
 Author of " A Treatise oh the Criminal Law of the United States," " A Treatise 
 ON the Confi,ict of Laws," etc. 
 
 THIRD EDITION 
 
 BY 
 
 FRANK H. BOWLBT 
 
 or THE Publishers' Editorial Staff 
 
 ROCHESTER, N. T. 
 
 THE LAWYERS CO-OPERATIVE PUBLISHING COMPANY 
 
 1907 
 
Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year elg-hteen hundred fifty-four, by 
 
 KAT & BROTHER, 
 
 In the Office of the Cleric of the District Court of the United States 
 
 In and for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
 
 Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year eighteen hundred seventy-five, by 
 
 KAY & BROTHER, 
 
 In the OflSce of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington, D. C. 
 
 Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year nineteen hundred seven, by 
 THE LAWYERS CO-OPERATIVE PUBLISHING COMPANY, 
 In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington, D. C. 
 
 E. R. AuDitKws PuiNTiNG CoMi'ANT, Rochester, N. Y. 
 
PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION. 
 
 In earlier times homicide was regarded as a mere subdivision of 
 tlie law of crimes. Its consideration was confined to general treatises 
 on criminal law; and, while the offense dates back to the earliest 
 history of man, generally speaking, the rules applied to it consisted 
 largely of applications of, and deductions from, general principles of 
 criminal law ; and up to a comparatively recent date the amount of 
 judicial consideration received by it from the higher courts was very 
 small. Even as recently as the dates of the earlier editions of this 
 work the decisions were so linaited in number that Dr. Wharton was 
 led to form many of his conclusions from deductions from general and 
 underlying principles of law, instead of basing them upon actual 
 judicial decisions. All this is now changed. A growing appreciation 
 of the value of human -life, and the enormity of the crime of taking 
 it, and of the deterrent effect of severe and certain punishment, and, 
 withal, of the deceptiveness of appearances and circumstances and tlie 
 proneness of the human mind to err, and the consequent need of 
 care to protect the innocent against mistaken or false accusation, has. 
 made homicide the most important branch of the criminal law, and 
 one of the foremost subjects in the whole field of jurisprudence. This 
 and other causes have led to a phenomenal growth of case law on the 
 subject, most of which has taken place since the issue of the previous 
 editions of this book ; and the wliole field of the law of homicide is 
 now covered in all its minutest ramifications by judicial determination. 
 These conditions have made it necessary in the preparation of this 
 edition to rewrite the whole work. In doing this, owing to the 
 wonderful growth of the subject, great condensation has been 
 necessary ; but the condensation has consisted of the more concise 
 statement of the same thing, as distinguislied from omission ; nothing 
 of value has been omitted. The plan of classification adopted in the 
 
 iii 
 
second edition is logical and scientific, and has been substantially 
 followed in the preparation of tliis edition, thongh changed conditions 
 have seemed to call for some sliglit alterations and modifications. But 
 the vast amount of new matter which has come to hand has 
 necessitated the addition of several new chapters, as well as an 
 extended amplification of the old ones along the same lines. Where 
 the earlier editions announced rules educed from general principles of 
 criminal law, this edition announces the same rules drawn from, and 
 supported by, judicial decisions ; and the rules announced in the earlier 
 editions have been applied to new and varying circumstances and 
 conditions, and many of the more general ones, though without 
 substantial change, have been segregated into more specific and highly 
 localized rules by the increasing complexity of the circumstances to 
 which they are applied. The intent has been to give the reader all 
 the substance of the previous editions, and all the new phases of the 
 subject which have been developed since the former editions were 
 written, and to bring the whole down to the date of writing this 
 edition ; to present all the scientific deductions and reasoning of the 
 learned author of the first and second editions used by him in develop- 
 ing and formulating the general principles of the subject, and in 
 suggesting and exemplifying their specific application to particular 
 questions, together with exactly what the courts have decided upon 
 the subject, so arranged as to facilitate ready reference and application 
 
 to the matter in hand. 
 
 FRANK H. BOWLTSY. 
 
 KocHESTEE, N. Y., Febkuary, 1907 
 
 IV 
 
PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION". 
 
 For some years after the exhaustion of the first edition of this 
 work, I declined to revise it for republication. The topic, so far as 
 concerns its general principles, was discussed in my Treatise on Crim- 
 inal Law ; and in the successive editions of that work the intermediate 
 changes of the law in this respect are noted. The period, however, 
 has now arrived, when, in view of the fact that the first edition of the 
 Homicide is still frequently cited in the courts, its revision and cor- 
 rection are imperative. The importance of the interest at stake 
 demands that the applicatory cases should be stated at large and crit- 
 ically scanned ; the changes which the last few years have wrought in 
 the juridical conception of the Law of Homicide are so fundamental 
 that it is proper not only that they should be correctly recapitulated, 
 but that they should be fully discussed. Of these changes the follow- 
 ing are the chief : — 
 
 1. That which treats malice and intent as inferences of fact, and 
 not as presumptions of law. 
 
 2. That which regards insanity as a condition susceptible of many 
 degrees, so that a man may be sane enough to be penallj' responsible; 
 and yet not sane enough to form a deliberate intent; and which would 
 therefore exact in such a case a conviction of such a grade of offense 
 as does not imply malice or deliberate intent. 
 
 3. That which holds that the defendant is to have the benefit of 
 reasonable doubt, not merely as to the fact of guilt, but as to all the 
 conditions essential to a conviction. 
 
 4. That which holds that, to sustain an averment of an intent to 
 kill the deceased, evidence of intent to kill a human being must be 
 produced ; rejecting herein the old doctrine that a collateral felonious 
 intent can be tacked to unintended homicide, so that a man who in 
 stealing a fowl accidentally kills the fowl's owner can be held guilty 
 of murder. 
 
5. That which brings out in full prominence, as the proper check 
 on the modification last stated, the doctrine that negligence in the use 
 of dangerous instruments is in itself a misdemeanor, and that conse- 
 quently he who, by the negligent use of a dangerous instrument, kills 
 another unintentionally, is guilty, not indeed of murder, as the old law 
 in certain cases assumed, but of manslaughter, which the old law some- 
 times overlooked. 
 
 6. That which adopts, as the test of " apparency of danger " in 
 cases of self-defense, the perceptions, not of an ideal reasonable man, 
 but of the defendant himself. 
 
 7. That which holds that between the defendant's malice and the 
 deceased's death there should be established a causal connection, con- 
 sisting of the sequence of ordinary and well-recognized physical laws. 
 
 In the first edition of the present work the law in these relations 
 was given as it then stood. Since then a more intelligent psychology 
 and a more humane conception of jurisprudence have not only vindi- 
 cated the modifications I have just specified, but these modifications, 
 with greater or less completeness, have been adopted by the courts. I 
 feel, therefore, that the time has now come when these modifications, 
 with the reason and authorities which sustain them, should be wrought 
 into the text of a systematic treatise. I am not content to accept them 
 in brief, with the small proportionate space that can be allotted to them, 
 in the current editions of my Criminal Law. I am still less content 
 that the first edition of my Homicide should continue to be cited as 
 sustaining doctrines now obsolete. I have therefore undertaken with 
 no little interest the preparation of the present volume, in which, 
 indeed, only partial fragments of its predecessor can be found. Since 
 1855, when the prior edition was published, not only have the greai 
 changes which I have noted been in progress, but the number of deci- 
 sions applicable to the entire topic has trebled. These decisions I have 
 incorporated in the text ; and I feel able to say that I have thus not 
 only given, as far as my ability permitted, the philosophy of the law, 
 but that I have presented on each point the rulings of the Courts of 
 England and of the United States down to within a few days of the 
 present date. 
 
 Cambeidge, Mat 10, 1875. 
 
 VI 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 OHAPTEE I. 
 
 GENERAL CLASSIFICATION AND DEFINITIONS. 
 
 L Homicide. 
 
 1. Definitions 1 
 
 II. MUBDEE. 
 
 2. Definitions and characteristics 2 
 
 3. Inconclusiveness 4 
 
 III. Manslaughter. 
 
 4. Definitions and cliaracteristies 5 
 
 5. Voluntary manslaughter 6 
 
 6. Involuntary manslaughter 7 
 
 IV. Excusable homicide. 
 
 7. Definition 9 
 
 V. Justifiable Homicide. 
 
 8. Definition 9 
 
 9. Distinction between excusable and justifiable homicide 
 
 now disregarded in practice 10 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 WHO MAY COMMIT HOMICIDE. 
 
 10. Application of general rules as to criminal responsi- 
 
 bility 11 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE SUBJECT OF THE CRIME— THE PERSON KILLED. 
 
 11. An existing life which was destroyed 14 
 
 12. Human beings 13 
 
 .13. Infants 15 
 
 14. Suicide 15 
 
 15. Slaves 15 
 
 16. Homicide of alien enemy 10 
 
 17. Time and place of consummation 17 
 
 18. Death within a year and a day from the injury 19 
 
 19. Consent as affecting criminality 20 
 
 vii 
 
aii TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 METHODS OP KILLING CONSTITUTING HOMICIDE. 
 
 20. General statement as to 22 
 
 21. Action through irresponsible agent 22 
 
 22. By action causing self -in jury in fright, or by force 24 
 
 23. By causing nervous irritation or shock 2& 
 
 24. Exposure of helpless person 28 
 
 25. Failure to rescue or prevent killing 29 
 
 26. Other methods 2<> 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 CAUSAL CONNECTION. 
 
 27. General rules 30 
 
 28. Conditions distinguished from causes 31 
 
 29. Theory of eminent German jurist 32 
 
 30. Omissions 33 
 
 31. Effect of interposition of independent, self-determin- 
 
 ing wills 33 
 
 32. Responsibility for act nearest to time of death 35 
 
 33. Responsibility for first or prior act 36 
 
 34. Disease or physical condition co-operating with injury 38 
 
 35. Intervening surgical or medical negligence as affect- 
 
 ing result 40 
 
 36. Negligence intervening, co-operating, or contributing 42 
 
 37. Effect of interposition of irresponsible intermediate 
 
 agent 44 
 
 38. Proof 45 
 
 39. Further consideration of the question 47 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 PARTICIPANTS IN THE CRIME. 
 
 I. Methods and effect of participation. 
 
 40. Different kinds defined and distinguished 49 
 
 41. Criminality of participation 40 
 
 II. Principals in the first degree. 
 
 42. Who are 52 
 
 43. Compelling or soliciting suicide 53 
 
 44. Joint participation 54 
 
 III. Principals in the second degree. 
 
 45. Who are, generally 55 
 
 46. Distinction between the two degrees; when important 06 
 
 47. Degrees of homicide to which applicable 56 
 
 48. Presence gj 
 
 49. Participation in the act 60 
 
TABLE OP CONTENTS. ix 
 
 50. Participation in criminal intent 64 
 
 51. Effect of relationship 67 
 
 52. Acts in concert under compulsion 68 
 
 53. Participation in dueling and prize fighting 68 
 
 54. Participation in suicide 60 
 
 55. Abandonment of purpose 71 
 
 56. Necessity of conviction of principal in the first de- 
 
 gree 71 
 
 57. Effect of statutes abolishing distinction between prin- 
 
 cipals and abetters 72 
 
 IV. Accessories before the fact. 
 
 58. Who are, generally 74 
 
 59. Degrees of homicide to which applicable 75 
 
 60. Sufficiency of solicitation or procurement 76 
 
 61. Concurrence of procurement and result 77 
 
 <i2. When conviction of principal a prerequisite 7S 
 
 63. Abortionist as an accessory before the fact 80 
 
 64. Encouraging or persuading suicide 80 
 
 65. Locus in quo of the offense 82 
 
 66. Effect of statutes abolishing distinction between prin- 
 
 cipal and accessory 8? 
 
 V. Accessories after the fact. 
 
 67. Who are, generally 8S 
 
 68. Constituent elements and character of the offense. ... 86 
 
 69. What relationship excuses 87 
 
 VI. Persons conspiring or combining to commit crime. 
 
 70. General consideration 87 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES AS TO MALICE. 
 
 71. Definition of malice and dolus 89' 
 
 72. Expositions of the Italian jurists: Decian 89 
 
 73. Early German jurists : Carpzov 90 
 
 74. Leyser 91 
 
 75. Nettlebladt 91 
 
 76. Recent German jurists : Gessler 92 
 
 77. Gessler's classification of dolus 93 
 
 78. Dolus determinatus 93 
 
 79. Dolus alternativus or eventualis 94 
 
 80. Views of English common-law writers 94 
 
 CHAPTEE VIII. 
 
 MALICE IN HOMICIDE, GENERALLY. 
 
 I. What constitutes. 
 
 81. Definitions and distinctions 90 
 
 82. Constituent elements 09 
 
X TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 83. Classification and elements of classes 102 
 
 84. Distinction unsound '■^'^ 
 
 II. Malice toward person killed. 
 
 85. How considered 105 
 
 86. Intent to kill 105 
 
 87. Intent to do bodily harm lOf) 
 
 88. Effect of existence of other intents lOS 
 
 III. Malice aimed at one when another is killed. 
 
 89. The established rule 108 
 
 IV. Malice toward the public in general, ob a particular bodt of 
 
 MEN. 
 
 90. Malice toward a class covers malice toward an indi- 
 
 vidual 110 
 
 91. Degree of culpability 112 
 
 V. Intent to commit collateral crime. 
 
 92. The general rule 112 
 
 VI. Inperencbs and presumptions as to malice. 
 
 93. Generally 115 
 
 94. Inference from the act itself 116 
 
 95. Inference from cruelty and barbarity lis 
 
 96. Inference from circumstances of case generally lilt 
 
 97. Inference from use of poison 122 
 
 98. Inference from character of weapon 124 
 
 99. Malice, when presumed 12H 
 
 100. Presumption with reference to use of deadly weapons 131 
 
 101. What weapons are deadly; general rules 135 
 
 102. Character of particular wea/pons 138 
 
 103. Presumption of continuance of malice 141 
 
 VII. Existence of, how determined. 
 
 104. A question for the jury 142 
 
 CHAPTEK IX. 
 
 MURDER GENERALLY, AND UNDER STATUTES DIVIDING HOMICIDE 
 
 INTO DEGREES. 
 I. Statutory changes. 
 
 105. Old English law indifferent to gradations of guilt 147 
 
 106. American legislation directed to the establishment of 
 
 degrees 147 
 
 107. Jurisdictions in which there are no degrees 161 
 
 108. Effect on common-law distinction between murder and 
 
 manslaughter 15 \ 
 
 II. Construction and application of statutory terms. 
 
 a. Murder by poison. 
 
 109. Meaning and scope of I53 
 
 b. Murder; lying in wait. 
 
 110. Meaning and scope of 15f5 
 
 c. Wilful; wilfully. 
 
 111. Meaning of jijc^ 
 
 d. Deliberate; deliberation. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. xi 
 
 1 12. Meaning and construction of 159 
 
 113. "Deliberate" to be regarded as qualifying "killing" 160 
 
 e. Premeditated; premeditation. 
 
 114. Meaning and construction of 161 
 
 115. The question of necessity of prior existence 164 
 
 f. Sxpress malice under the statutes. 
 
 116. Definition; scope 167 
 
 g. Extreme atrocity or cruelty. 
 
 117. What covered by 171 
 
 h. Homicide in the commission of felonious or unlawful acts. 
 
 1. General rules. 
 
 118. Effect of statute on common-law rules 173 
 
 119. General rule as to effect of felony or criminal act. . 174 
 
 120. Exceptions to general rule 176 
 
 2. The felonioiis or unlawful act. 
 
 121. Nature at common law and under general statutes 178 
 
 122. Nature under statutes naming particular felonies . . 180 
 
 123. Doctrine that rule is confined to independent felonies 181 
 
 3. The act of killing. 
 
 124. Criminality necessary 183 
 
 125. Methods of effecting death 183 
 
 4. Relationship between the felony and the killing. 
 
 126. General rules 184 
 
 127. Distinction between preparation and attempt 187 
 
 5. Abandonment of unlawful design. 
 
 128. Effect, generally 188 
 
 i. Dangerous acts evincing depraved mind regardless of human life. 
 
 1. What included in. 
 
 129. General rules 189 
 
 2., Particular cases. 
 
 130. Reckless use of firearms 191 
 
 131. Assaults 193 
 
 132. Derailing railway train 195 
 
 133. Dueling 196 
 
 j. Statutory malice aforethought. 
 
 134. Scope and meaning of 197 
 
 m. The different degrees. 
 
 a. Murder in the first degree. 
 
 135. What murder in the first degree includes 198 
 
 136. Necessity of intent to take life 203 
 
 137. Duration of intent to kill 204 
 
 138. Intent in cases of assault with intent to kill 206 
 
 b. Murder in the second degree. 
 
 139. What included in 207 
 
 140. Instances in particular classes of cases 211 
 
 141. Distinction between murder in the first and second 
 
 degrees 213 
 
 142. Murder in the second degree a compromise courts are 
 
 unwilling to disturb 214 
 
 c. Murder in the third degree. 
 
ii TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 143. What included in 215 
 
 IV. Degree in case of killing by confederate oe associate. 
 
 144. Aider or abetter "^"' 
 
 145. Accessory before the fact '^^° 
 
 146. Coconspirator ^'■°' 
 
 V. Pbbsumptions and inferences as to degrees and their chabactek- 
 
 ISTICS. 
 
 a. Presumptions. 
 
 147. Presumption when killing is shown to be malicious 
 
 and nothing more 218 
 
 148. Mitigation and excuse not presumed 221 
 
 149. Characteristics of murder in the first degree not 
 
 presumed 2^* 
 
 lb. Inferenfes. 
 
 150. General rules as to inference of characteristics of 
 
 murder in the first degree 224 
 
 151. Inferences from character of act 22.5' 
 
 152. Inference from use of deadly weapon 227 
 
 153. Inference from preparation 230 
 
 154. Inference from threats and expressions of ill-will. . . 232 
 
 155. Inference from prior acts and relations 234 
 
 VT. The determination as to degree. 
 
 a. Province of the jury. 
 
 156. General rules 236 
 
 157. Exception in case of confession or plea of guilty. . . . 240 
 
 b. Province of the court. 
 
 168. Determination of scope of issue and scope of instruc- 
 tion 241 
 
 159. Defining and explaining the crime 246 
 
 160. Immaterial omissions and errors in instructing. . . . 247' 
 
 CHAPTEE X. 
 
 MANSLAUGHTER GENERALLY AND UNDER THE STATUTE. 
 
 I. Constituent elements and general rijles. 
 
 161. At common law and under general statutes 252 
 
 162. Under statutes not adhering to common-law distinc- 
 
 tion 255 
 
 163. Manslaughter distinguished from murder 258 
 
 164. Assault with intent to commit manslaughter 261 
 
 165. Submission of the issue of manslaughter 262 
 
 II. VOLUNTAKT MANSLAUGHTER; PROVOCATION AND HOT BLOOD. 
 
 a. What included in voluntary manslaughter. 
 
 166. Definition; scope of subject 264 
 
 b. Provocation. 
 
 1. Generally. 
 
 167. Effect; scope 265 
 
 ". Existence of. 
 
 168. What constitutes generally 26S 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. xiii 
 
 169. Exercise of a legal right as provocation 207 
 
 170. Killing to redress a public wrong 26S 
 
 171. Assault upon, or indignity offered, another 269 
 
 3. Adequacy of. 
 
 172. General rules as to adequacy 271 
 
 173. Words and gestures generally 274 
 
 174. Insulting words or conduct toward female relative. . 279 
 
 175. Assaults 283 
 
 176. Excessive resistance as an assault 287 
 
 177. Interchange of blows induced by insulting words. . . . 288 
 
 178. Sudden mutual quarrels or combats 288 
 
 179. What constitutes mutual combat 291 
 
 180. Effect of taking undue advantage 292 
 
 181. Effect of seeking difficulty 294 
 
 182. Effect of disparity of strength or weapons 29.5 
 
 183. Assault upon relatives or friends as provocation .... 296 
 
 184. Personal restraint or coercion 29S 
 
 185. Illegal or improper arrest 299 
 
 186. Trespass 300 
 
 187. Breach of contract 303 
 
 188. Adultery by or with spouse or relative 303 
 
 189. Adultery as a provocation under special statutes .... 300 
 
 190. Attack on chastity of relative, dependent, or friend 308 
 
 191. Intent to chastise as affecting the question of ade- 
 
 quacy 309 
 
 192. Adequacy, by whom determined 310 
 
 c. Passion or hot blood. 
 
 193. General rules as to existence of, arising from provo- 
 
 cation 311 
 
 194. Of what passion may consist 313 
 
 195. Murder to kill in gratification of grudge 315 
 
 196. Presumption of continuance of old grudge 316 
 
 197. Threats as indicating cool blood 317 
 
 198. Seeking or provoking difficulty as indicating cool 
 
 blood 318 
 
 199. Disproportionate retaliation as indicating cool blood 319 
 
 200. Use of deadly weapon as indicating cool blood 320 
 
 201. Participation in duel as indicating cool blood 321 
 
 202. Test as to sufficiency of 322 
 
 203. Existence and sufficiency of, how determined 323 
 
 d. Cooling time. 
 
 204. Effect of, generally 324 
 
 205. General rules as to sufficiency of 325 
 
 206. Instances 327 
 
 207. Different combats or encounters 328 
 
 208. Sufficiency; how determined 330 
 
 €. Burden of proof of provocation. 
 
 209. Consideration of 331 
 
av TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 III. Involuntabt manslaughter; unintended killing in commission 
 
 OF MINOB UNLAWFUL ACT OR OF ACT UNLAWFULLY 
 PERFORMED. 
 
 a. What constitutes. 
 
 210. Defimtion and constituent elements 332 
 
 211. Involuntary manslaughter distinguished from other 
 
 classes of homicide 333 
 
 b. Classes of. 
 
 212. The division and disposition 335 
 
 c. Involuntary manslaughter in the commission of minor unlawful 
 
 act. 
 
 1. The preliminary unlawful act. 
 
 213. Nature of and unlawfulness generally 336 
 
 214. Preliminary act an ingredient of the killing 338 
 
 2. Application of rules to particular unlawful acts. 
 
 215. Assaults 339 
 
 216. Fights 341 
 
 217. Drawing or using dangerous weapons 342 
 
 218. Games, sports, and athletic performances 34.') 
 
 CHAPTEK XI. 
 
 JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE. 
 
 219. General rules; further consideration 348 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 HOMICIDE IN SELF-DEFENSE. 
 
 I. Nature, elements, and classification. 
 
 220. Definition and character as a defense 353 
 
 221. Criticism of the doctrine 354 
 
 222. Right to have issue submitted 356 
 
 223. Constituent elements generally 358 
 
 224. Classification 360 
 
 II. Danger and necessity. 
 
 a. General rules as to. 
 
 225. The foundation principle of self-defense 361 
 
 226. Apparent, as distinguished from real, danger and 
 
 necessity 305 
 
 227. Right to have particular issue submitted 369 
 
 228. Belief in danger and necessity 371 
 
 229. Effect of negligence in forming belief 373 
 
 h. Nature and extent of danger constituting necessity. 
 
 230. Danger of what 374 
 
 231. The imminence of the danger 37g 
 
 232. Danger, when deemed past 380 
 
 III. The basis oe foundation of apparent danger and necessity. 
 
 a. Scope of. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. xv 
 
 233. General statement as to 383 
 
 b. Sufficiency of particular acts or situations to create. 
 
 234. Previous ill-will or ill-usage 383 
 
 235. Opprobrious language or conduct 385 
 
 236. Assaults generally 386 
 
 237. Assault with deadly weapon 388 
 
 238. Trespass 390 
 
 239. Interference with marital rights 393 
 
 IV. Hostile demonsteations as an element of danger and NECESsiry. 
 
 240. The general rule 394 
 
 241. What overt acts or demonstrations are sufficient gen- 
 
 erally 397 
 
 V. Pakticulab situations and circumstances as affecting danger 
 and necessity. 
 
 a. Threats by deceased. 
 
 1. General rules. 
 
 242. As as excuse for killing 399 
 
 243. General inadmissibility in evidence 401 
 
 2. Exception in self-defense eases. 
 
 244. General rules 403 
 
 245. Proof of self-defense warranting admission 403 
 
 246. Necessity of charging as to 40(i 
 
 247. Knowledge or communication, when necessary 407 
 
 248. Proof of communication 409 
 
 249. Necessity of hostile demonstration 410 
 
 250. Proof of overt act 411 
 
 251. Sufficiency of overt act 412 
 
 3. Other exceptions. 
 
 252. Generally 414 
 
 4. Character of threats as affecting admissibility. 
 
 253. General rules 415 
 
 254. Effect of remoteness 417 
 
 255. Proof as to character and effect 418 
 
 5. Kelative functions of court and jury as to threats. 
 
 256. General, rules 420 
 
 b. Violent and dangerous character of the deceased. 
 
 1. General rules. 
 
 257. Not admissible generally 421 
 
 2. Exception in self-defense cases. 
 
 258. General rules 423 
 
 259. Proof of self-defense necessary to warrant admission 425 
 
 260. Necessity of hostile demonstration 426 
 
 261. Sufficiency of overt acts concurring with violent char- 
 
 acter 427 
 
 262. Order of proof 429 
 
 263. Knowledge of character by the accused 429 
 
 3. Other exceptions. 
 
 264. Existence of ; 43] 
 
 265. Cases of doubt as to nature of act 432 
 
 266. Admissibility for purpose of grading o.Tense 433 
 
^^i TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 4. Nature oi- kind of character provable. 
 
 267. General rules 434 
 
 268. Special traits and special circumstances 436 
 
 269. Character for peaceableness generally 438 
 
 270. Attack upon character which will open door 439 
 
 5. Methods of proving character. 
 
 271. General reputation; specific acts of violence 440 
 
 272. Exception as to specific acts known to slayer 442 
 
 273. Good character in rebuttal 444 
 
 274. Competency of witnesses 444 
 
 6. Admissibility and effect, how determined. 
 
 275. Application of general rules 445 
 
 c. Other situations and circumstances generally. 
 
 276. Opportunity to restrain by law 446 
 
 277. Opportunity to procure aid 447 
 
 278. Disproportionate strength 44K 
 
 279. Retreat, arming, and returning 451 
 
 280. Malicious or criminal intent of the deceased 452 
 
 281. Relationship of the parties 453 
 
 282. Intoxication 45:i 
 
 283. Effect of mistaken identity 454 
 
 VI. Standpoint of judgment as to danger and necessity. 
 
 284. Divergence of opinion 451 
 
 285. Rule that the jury are the judges 455 
 
 286. Rule that the slayer is the judge 455 
 
 287. Rule that standard is that of a reasonable man. . . . 45!) 
 
 288. "Reasonable man" standard criticized 462 
 
 289. Apparent approach toward reconciliation 463 
 
 VII. Resokt to othee means. 
 
 290. Nature of question and when considered 464 
 
 VIII. Duty to eeteeat. 
 
 a. Common-law rule. 
 
 291. Substance and application 467 
 
 b. The "flight" rule. 
 
 292. Substance of 469 
 
 293. Instructions as to 471 
 
 c. The "stand ground to prevent felony" rule. 
 
 294. Statements and application of 471 
 
 d. The "stand ground when in the right" rule. 
 
 295. General statement of 47;[ 
 
 296. Instructions as to 475 
 
 297. Effect of expectation of attack 477 
 
 298. "Stand ground" rule as affected by "necessity" rule 477 
 
 e. Exception in case of imperfect right of self-defense. 
 
 299. General rules 479 
 
 300. Sufficiency of retreat to revive self-defense 4S1 
 
 f. Increased or diminished risk as affecting duty to retreat. 
 
 301. General rules 482 
 
 302. Apparent, as distinguished from real, a\:uUibi]ity of 
 
 means of escape 434 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. xvii 
 
 303. What wa-rrants inference of increased peril 485 
 
 304. Eight to pursue adversary 487 
 
 g. Character of attack as affecting application of rules. 
 
 305. Miist be serious or felonious 488 
 
 h. Self-defense at or in dwelling or castle. 
 
 306. General rules 490 
 
 307. Instruction as to 493 
 
 308. Limited by necessity 494 
 
 309. What constitutes dwelling or castlo 494 
 
 i. Homicide in the performance of official duty. 
 
 310. Where treated 49(i 
 
 IX. Effect of usb of excessive fokoe. 
 
 311. General rules 49:') 
 
 312. Use of deadly weapon in repelling attack 498 
 
 313. Purstiing retreating adversary as indicating 501 
 
 314. Relative size and strength as affecting 501 
 
 X. Self-defense by the oeigihal aggressor. 
 
 a. Effect of aggression on liability. 
 
 315. The general rule 502 
 
 316. Necessity of instructing the jury as to 505 
 
 317. Reasons for the rule 507 
 
 318. "Reasonably" or "absolutely" free from fault 508 
 
 319. Effect of rules of law as to imperfect self-defense 510 
 
 320. Motive or intent as affecting 511 
 
 321. Application of rules to joint action 514 
 
 322. Application to single, as distinguished from distinct, 
 
 combats 515 
 
 b. What constitutes one an aggressor. 
 
 1. Generally. 
 
 323. Absence of general rule 516 
 
 2. Particular acts. 
 
 324. Preparation for difficulty or wrongful act 518 
 
 325. Seeking interview or going after interview 520 
 
 326. Insulting language or conduct 523 
 
 327. Threats 525 
 
 328. Assaults 526 
 
 329. Trespass 528 
 
 330. Preparation for, and seeking to renew, diificulty. . . . 531 
 
 331. Debauching spouse or relative 532 
 
 3. Application of rule to interference in behalf of another. 
 
 332. Governed by status of original combatant 534 
 
 4. Application of rule to mutual combat. 
 
 333. Both combatants aggressors 536 
 
 534. What constitutes mutual combat 538 
 
 c. Withdrawal from, or abandonment of, difficulty. 
 
 335. General rules 540 
 
 336. Reasons for, and to what applicable 543 
 
 337. Sufficiencj' of withdrawal or abandonment 544 
 
 338. Question of notice or knowledge of withdrawal 546 
 
 XI. The grade or degree when self-defense is asserted. 
 
 Horn. — li 
 
xviii TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 339. General rules 547 
 
 XII. BUBDEN or PBOOF AS TO SELF-DEFENSE. 
 
 340. Rule placing it with the prosecution 550 
 
 341. Rule placing it with the defense 551 
 
 342. Rule where necessity to take life appears 555 
 
 XIII. Questions as to^ how determined. 
 
 343. The rule as to self-defense generally 556 
 
 344. Determination as to duty to retreat 558 
 
 345. Determination as to aggression or freedom from fault 559 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 HOMICIDE FROM SUPERIOR DUTY OR OVERRULING NECESSIT'S. 
 
 I. SUPERIOE DUTY. 
 
 346. Risk of killing another in extreme eases to be pre- 
 
 ferred to certain death 561 
 
 347. Sacrifice of child's life in order to save the mother 561 
 
 II. OVEEETJLING NECESSITY. 
 
 348. Canon law 561 
 
 349. The common-law doctrine 562 
 
 350. Not barred by culpability 563 
 
 351. Application of doctrine to self-preservation in ship- 
 
 wreck 563 
 
 352. Repudiation of the doctrine in England 564 
 
 CHAPTEE XIV. 
 
 HOMICIDE BY MISADVENTURE. 
 
 353. Definition and requisites 566 
 
 354. Criminal liability for 567 
 
 355. Requisites enumerated 568 
 
 356. Absence of intention to do harm 568 
 
 357. Precaution to avoid mischief 569 
 
 358. Lawfulness of act 571 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 KILLING ONE BY UNLAWFUL ACT AIMED AT ANOTHER. 
 
 359. Criminal responsibility generally 574 
 
 360. When murder in the first degree 576 
 
 361. When murder in the second or a lower degree 577 
 
 362. When manslaughter gyg 
 
 363. When justifiable or excusable 58]^ 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. six 
 
 CHAPTEE XVI. 
 
 RIOTOUS HOMICIDE. 
 
 364. In war levied against government 583 
 
 365. Joint responsibility of rioters for. '. 584 
 
 366. Application of rules with reference to provocation 
 
 and hot blood 584 
 
 367. Killing third person or bystander 585 
 
 368. Killing by lynch law 586 
 
 369. Killing to suppress riot 586 
 
 CHAPTEE XVII. 
 
 SUICIDE. 
 
 370. A branch of the law of homicide 587 
 
 CHAPTEE XVIII. 
 
 INFANTICIDE. 
 
 371. Scope of subject 588 
 
 372. Injuries causing death before birth 588 
 
 373. Death after birth from injuries prior to birth 589 
 
 374. Injury and death during process of birth 589 
 
 376. Infanticide under the statutes 591 
 
 CHAPTEE XIX. 
 
 HOMICIDE BY ABORTION OR ATTEMPTED ABORTION. 
 
 I. Criminal liability generally. 
 
 376. Common-law and general rules as to 592 
 
 377. Theory that it is a killing in the commission of an 
 
 unlawful act 593 
 
 378. Theory that it is a killing in doing an act dangerous 
 
 to life 593 
 
 II. Grade or degree of the crime. 
 
 379. At common law 594 
 
 380. Under general statutes as to degree of homicide. . . . 594 
 
 III. Special statutory provisions as to criminality. 
 
 381. Substance of, generally 595 
 
 382. When common-law rules are superseded 596 
 
 IV. Justification or excuse. 
 
 383. Consent 597 
 
 384. That act was necessary to life or. health 598 
 
XX TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTEE XX. 
 
 HOMICIDE OF OFFICERS OF JUSTICE OR IN RESISTING ARREST. 
 
 I. Cbiminalitt generally. 
 
 385. The general doctrine 601 
 
 386. Express or premeditated malice 601 
 
 387. Implied malice 603 
 
 388. Mitigation and excuse 604 
 
 389. Duration of oflieer's protection 605 
 
 II. ClBCUMSTANCBS AND CONDITIONS NECESSAEY TO I'EOTECTIOX OF OF- 
 FICERS. 
 
 a. Generally. 
 
 390. Enumeration 606 
 
 b. Authority to act. 
 
 391. Qualification of officer 606 
 
 392. The warrant 608 
 
 393. Arrest for felony without a warrant 609 
 
 394. Arrest for misdemeanor without warrant 612 
 
 395. Criminal acts in presence of officer 613 
 
 396. Arrest by private person 614 
 
 397. Persons aiding officers '. IU7 
 
 398. Effect of innocence of charge 618 
 
 399. Authority in civil cases 619 
 
 c. Manner of execution of authority. 
 
 400. Force as provocation 620 
 
 401. Unnecessary force as warranting action in self-de- 
 
 fense 621 
 
 402. Limit of right of self-defense 622 
 
 1. Knowledge of authority and purpose. 
 
 403. General rules as to knowledge and notice 624 
 
 404. Sufficiency of notice 625 
 
 405. When notice may be dispensed with 627 
 
 406. Refusal to state authority on demand 629 
 
 III. Unlawful aeeest as affecting criminal responsibility. 
 
 407. As a provocation 629 
 
 408. Right to resist generally 631 
 
 409. Limits of right to resist 633 
 
 410. Effect of excessive resistance on degree 634 
 
 411. Application of rules to escape after submission 636 
 
 412. Officers taking opposite sides in difficulty 637 
 
 IV. Protection of assistants. 
 
 413. Extent of right 637 
 
 V. Resistance by third persons. 
 
 414. Criminal liability for 63g 
 
 VI. Escape from confinement. 
 
 415. Rules applicable to q^q 
 
 VII. Statutory protection to certain fedekat. officers. 
 
 416. Enrolment officers g^j 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. acxi 
 
 CHAPTEE XXI. 
 
 HOMICIDE IN CARRYING OUT CONSPIRACY TO DO UNLAWFUL ACT. 
 
 I. Scope of subject. 
 
 417. Distinction between conspiracy and aiding and abet- 
 
 ting, etc 644 
 
 II. Ceimiwax besponsibility. 
 
 418. General rules 644 
 
 III. Application of kules to particular acts. 
 
 419. The doing of personal violence 646 
 
 420. Breaches of the peace, riots, etc 647 
 
 421. Invasion of property rights 649 
 
 422. Escape from confinement : 650 
 
 IV. The conspiracy. 
 
 423. Necessity of, as an element of criminal responsibility 651 
 
 424. When and how formed 653 
 
 425. Accused must be party thereto 653 
 
 426. Necessity of unlawfulness 655 
 
 V. Homicide as a result of conspiracy. 
 
 a. Must be within scope of. 
 
 427. Limitation of liability 656 
 
 b. Measure of the scope. 
 
 428. General rules 657 
 
 429. Individual action from independent motive 659 
 
 430. Violent, dangerous, or homicidal conspiracies 660 
 
 431. Conspiracies not conducive to the use of dangerous 
 
 force 661 
 
 432. Proximate, as distinguished from collateral or inci- 
 
 dental, cause 663 
 
 433. Killing person not conspired against 664 
 
 434. Escape as part of combination 684 
 
 c. Abandonment of purpose. 
 
 435. Eflect of 665 
 
 VI. The degree op homicide. 
 
 436. The general rule and its reasons 666 
 
 437. In case of conspiracy to kill 667 
 
 438. In case of conspiracy to commit felony 668 
 
 439. In case of conspiracy to commit act dangerous to life 66!) 
 
 440. In case of conspiracy to commit misdemeanor or 
 
 minor criminal act 670 
 
 VII. The conspiracy, how established. 
 
 441. General rules 672 
 
 442. Joint acts of preparation 673 
 
 443. .Joint acts of execution 675 
 
 VIII. Alibi as a defense. 
 
 444. When competent 670 
 
:xu TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 OHAPTEE XXII. 
 
 NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. 
 
 I. Natuee and criminality. 
 
 445. Definition and nature 679 
 
 446. General rules as to criminal responsibility 680 
 
 447. Restrictions as to character of duty omitted or mis- 
 
 performed 682 
 
 448. Effect of wilfulness or illegality of act 683 
 
 449. Causal connection between the negligence and injury 684 
 II. Classification of subject-matter. 
 
 450. Enumeration of classes 685 
 
 II. Omission to perform duty. 
 
 451. General view 685 
 
 452. Of parent to care for child 686 
 
 453. Existence of the proper relationship 688 
 
 454. Of husband to care for wife 690 
 
 455. Of master to care for servant or apprentice 691 
 
 456. Of keepers or jailers to care for persons in charge. . 692 
 
 457. Omissions by those charged with dangerous agencies, 693 
 rv. Improper performance of duty. 
 
 a. In handling dangerous agencies. 
 
 458. Negligent use involves responsibility 695 
 
 459. Negligent use of firearms and explosives 69.> 
 
 460. Careless handling of deadly weapons 697 
 
 461. Negligent exposure or giving of poison 699 
 
 462. Loosing dangerous animals 700 
 
 b. In doing acts calculated to injure. 
 
 1. General rules; miscellaneous matters. 
 
 463. Application generally, and to particular acts 700 
 
 2. In the use of means of travel or transportation. 
 
 464. Highways and streets 701 
 
 465. Care is to be proportioned to danger 703 
 
 466. Railways, locomotives, etc 704 
 
 467. Vessels and navigation generally 70.5 
 
 468. Vessels, etc., under Federal statutes 707 
 
 3. In practising medicine, surgery, etc. 
 
 469. Differing rules as to 7 10 
 
 470. The English doctrine 7IO 
 
 471. The rule in the United States 712 
 
 V. COKBECTION BY PERSONS IN AUTHORITY. 
 
 472. The general rule as to criminal liability 715 
 
 473. Parent and child 7 j3 
 
 474. Persons in loco parentis 7 If; 
 
 475. Schoolmaster and pupil 717 
 
 476. Husband and wife 7I8 
 
 477. Master and servant 7I8 
 
 478. The question of degree 720 
 
 VI. Negligent homicide under the Texas Code. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. xxiii 
 
 479. Definition of, and liability under 721 
 
 VII. Necessity op pebsonal negligence. 
 
 480. Responsibility for the negligent acts of another 722 
 
 VIII. Application of doctrine of conteibutort negligence. 
 
 481. Negligence of third persons contributing 724 
 
 482. Negligence of the deceased contributing 725 
 
 CHAPTEE XXIII. 
 
 HOMICIDE BY OFFICERS OP JUSTICE. 
 
 I. Is obedience to warrant or official direction oe requirement. 
 
 483. In execution of death sentence 728 
 
 484. In the discharge of ordinary official duty 729 
 
 485. In the discharge of military duty in war 731 
 
 II. In preservation of the peace. 
 
 486. How far justifiable 734 
 
 III. In effecting an aeeest. 
 
 a. General rules. 
 
 487. As to criminal liability 735 
 
 488. As to effect of official character and action 735 
 
 b. Use of force in making arrest generally. 
 
 489. For felony. 737 
 
 490. For misdemeanor 737 
 
 491. Resistance as distinguished from mere avoidance.. .. 738 
 
 c. Use of force in checking flight. 
 
 492. In case of felony 740 
 
 493. In case of misdemeanor 741 
 
 d. Use of force in preventing escape or rescue. 
 
 494. In case of felony 742 
 
 495. In case of misdemeanor 743 
 
 e. Use of force in recapture. 
 
 496. Generally 744 
 
 497. Of escaped convicts 744 
 
 f. Limitations as to amount of force. 
 
 498. General rules 745 
 
 499. Self-defense as a test 747 
 
 500. When use of deadly weapon is justifiable 748 
 
 501. Appearance as a. test of the right of self-defense. . . . 750 
 
 502. Necessity a question for the jury 751 
 
 g. Effect of illegal or improper action. 
 
 503. General rule as to illegal action 752 
 
 504. Action by officer without warrant 753 
 
 505. Arrest by private citizen 755 
 
 506. Action outside of territorial jurisdiction 756 
 
 507. Negligent action 757 
 
 508. Action with improper or malicious motive 758 
 
 509. Failure to give notice of character and purpose 759 
 
 510. Further consideration 700 
 
 h. Rules in case of action by deputy or assistant. 
 
xiv TABLE OP CONTENTS. 
 
 511. Responsibility for. . , 760 
 
 512. Protection of deputy or assistant 761 
 
 i. Application of rules to arrest in civil eases. 
 
 513. Officer killing a person flying from civil arrest 
 
 chargeable with murder, if intending to kill 762 
 
 OHAPTEE XXIV. 
 
 HOMICIDE TO PREVENT CRIMINAL OR UNLAWFUL ACTS. 
 
 I. Cbiminal liability generally. 
 
 614. General rule and to what applicable 763 
 
 515. Justification limited to necessity 705 
 
 516. Apparent, as distinguished from real, danger as neces- 
 
 sity 767 
 
 517. Justification limited to prevention, as distinguished 
 
 from punishment 768 
 
 II. Application of rules to particular acts. 
 
 a. Personal aggression or force. 
 
 518. Attempts to kill or injure the slayer 770 
 
 519. Attempt to kill or injure others 770 
 
 520. Assault upon family and relations 773 
 
 521. Status of relative as afi'ecting right to interfere.... 776 
 
 522. What relationship warrants interference 777 
 
 b. Aggression upon public order. 
 
 523. Breaches of the peace 778 
 
 c. Aggression upon property rights. 
 
 524. Robbery and burglary 780 
 
 525. Larceny 782 
 
 526. Trespass on property generally 783 
 
 527. Trespass on, or appropriation of, personalty 785 
 
 528. Trespass on realty 786 
 
 529. Use of spring guns 780 
 
 530. Attack on dwelling 790 
 
 531. Attack in dwelling 793 
 
 532. Resisting expulsion 793 
 
 533. Who may defend and against whom 79 j 
 
 534. What constitutes dwelling or castle 795 
 
 !II. The question of degree. 
 
 535. Malice and improper performance as a test 797 
 
 CHAPTEE XXV. 
 
 INSANITY AND DRUNKENNESS. 
 
 I. Scope and contents of chapter. 
 
 536. The subject of criminal responsibility generally.... 80O 
 II. Insanity. 
 
 537. General rules 801 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. xxv 
 
 538. Common-law rule as to effect of partial insanity on 
 
 degree 802 
 
 539. The modern rule 803 
 
 540. Passion as a mitigating element in connection with ir- 
 
 resistible impulse 804 
 
 541. The law of self-defense as applied to insane persons 804- 
 III. Dktjnkenness. 
 
 542. General rules as to effect on responsibility 805 
 
 543. Use of to show noncommission 807 
 
 544. Intoxication as affecting intent 807 
 
 545. Degree necessary to affect intent 810 
 
 546. Intoxication as affecting deliberation and premedita- 
 
 tion SIX 
 
 547. Degree necessary to affect deliberation and premedi- 
 
 tation 813 
 
 548. Intoxication as affecting provocation and hot blood 814 
 
 549. Intoxication as affecting self-defense 816 
 
 550. Texas statute as to intoxication 816 
 
 551. Intoxication by way of preparation 817 
 
 CHAPTEK XXVI. 
 
 LIMITATION OF THE PROSECUTION. 
 652. Construction and application of statutes 819 
 
 CHAPTEE XXVII. 
 JURISDICTION. 
 
 I. Application of genekal kules op ckiminal law. 
 
 553. Generally applicable 822 
 
 II. Cause of death and result in diffebent jurisdictions. 
 
 554. General rules 822 
 
 555. Statutory provision as to 826 
 
 CHAPTEE XXVIII. 
 
 PLEADING, INFORMATION, AND INDICTMENT. 
 
 I. Application of general bules op cbiminal law. 
 
 556. Treatment limited to special matters 831 
 
 II. General eules as to effect of statutes on indictments. 
 
 557. Retention of common-law rules 831 
 
 III. Averment of fact of killing. 
 
 558. General rules 835 
 
 559. Time of act causing death 838 
 
 560. Time of death 840 
 
 561. Place of act causing death 842 
 
xxvi TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 562. Place of death 844 
 
 IV. AVEBMEWT OF MANNER OF KILLING. 
 
 563. General and common-law rules as to necessity of 840 
 
 564. Statutory rules 84!) 
 
 565. Description of instrument or means of death 851 
 
 566. Use of instruments or means of death 854 
 
 567. The question of variance 850 
 
 568. Description of wound or injury 858 
 
 V. Description of deceased. 
 
 569. Name and personal characteristics 861 
 
 VI. CONDITION OF MIND; MOTIVE. 
 
 570. Malice 86G 
 
 571. Intent to kill 869 
 
 572. Deliberation and premeditation 871 
 
 573. Wilfully, feloniously, and unlawfully 8?:; 
 
 VII. Homicide in commission of another crime. 
 
 a. General rules. 
 
 574. Necessity of charging collateral felony 87.5 
 
 575. Effect of charge of collateral felony 877 
 
 576. Unlawful acts not amounting to felony generally 87!) 
 
 b. Particular felonies or unlawful acts. 
 
 577. Resisting arrest or oflRcial action 881 
 
 578. Negligent homicide 881 
 
 579. Abortion or attempted abortion generally 883 
 
 580. Abortion under special statutory provisions 885 
 
 VIII. Participation in the act of another. 
 
 581. Aiders and abetters 887 
 
 582. Accessories 888 
 
 583. Coconspirators 891 
 
 CHAPTER XXIX. 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 I. Scope. 
 
 584. Confined to matters not included in general rules of 
 
 criminal evidence 895 
 
 II. Corpus delicti. 
 
 585. Application of rules to homicide 895 
 
 586. Necessity of proof of 895 
 
 587. Constituent elements 897 
 
 588. Proof of death generally 898 
 
 589. Particular items of proof of death 900 
 
 590. Criminal agency generally 903 
 
 591. Particular items of proof of criminal agency 905 
 
 592. Poisoning gog 
 
 593. Identity 9]^q 
 
 Til. Motive. 
 
 594. Limitation of subject 922 
 
 595. General rules as to admissibility and purpose 913 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. xivu 
 
 586. How determined and proved 916 
 
 597. Desire to acquire or tc acconipliah something 917 
 
 598. Removal of burden or obstacle 920 
 
 599. Revenge 924 
 
 600. Jealousy 930 
 
 IV. ClBCUMSTAlSfCES. 
 
 a. Threats by the accused. 
 
 601. Scope; general rules as to admissibility 931 
 
 602. Nature of threat as affecting admissibility 934 
 
 003. The question of application to the person killed 936 
 
 604. Connection of accused with threats by third persons 939 
 
 605. Determination as to admissibility and sufficiency... 940 
 
 b. Condition and surroundings of body. 
 
 606. General rule 941 
 
 607. Wounds 941 
 
 608. Marias 943 
 
 609. Position 944 
 
 610. Clothing, weapons, etc '. 944 
 
 611. Blood stains 947 
 
 612. Presence of poison 950 
 
 Y. Unlawfux acts resulting in homicide. 
 
 a. Felonies made controlling as to degree by statute. 
 
 613. Rules as to admissibility 950 
 
 614. Rules as to sufficiency 952 
 
 b. Other felonies and unlawful acts. 
 
 615. Criminal conspiracies generally 955 
 
 616. Acts and declarations of coconspirators 958 
 
 617. Resistance of official action generally; circumstances 960 
 
 618. Authority of officer 963 
 
 619. Negligence and minor unlawful acts 966 
 
 620. Abortion 968 
 
 \1. Dying declaeations. 
 
 a. Scope. 
 
 621. Wholly a homicide subject 971 
 
 b. Grounds for admissibility. 
 
 622. Reasons for rejecting general rule 973 
 
 c. Application of doctrine. 
 
 623. To what classes of cases 976 
 
 624. In favor of, as well as against, accused 978 
 
 625. With reference to person making them 979 
 
 d. Subject-matter as affecting admissibility. 
 
 626. The general rule 981 
 
 627. Confined to statements otherwise admissible 983 
 
 628. Antecedent and subsequent matters 984 
 
 629. Opinion and conclusion 986 
 
 630. Effect of presence of collaf«ral or inadmissible matter 989 
 
 e. Physical and mental condition as affecting admissibility. 
 
 1. Actually impending death. 
 
 631. Necessity of .. .■ 991 
 
 2. Sense of impending death. 
 
[vui TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 632. General rules 992: 
 
 633. Possession of mental faculties 997 
 
 3. How evidenced. 
 
 634. General rule 909' 
 
 635. Statements of the deceased 1000 
 
 636. Statements and surrounding circumstances 1004 
 
 637. Circumstances in the absence of statement 1006 
 
 638. Physicians' opinions 1009 
 
 639. Conclusions of nonexpert witnesses 1012 
 
 640. Sending for or obtaining priest 1013 
 
 641. Arranging business afTairs 1014 
 
 4. Belief in after-accountability. 
 
 642. EfTect and proof of 1015 
 
 f. Time when made as affecting admissibility. 
 
 643. General rules 1017 
 
 g. Matters of form and practice. 
 
 644. Preparation or construction of declaration 1018 
 
 645. Proof of substance and circumstances 1022 
 
 646. Effect of incompleteness 1023 
 
 647. Application of rules as to best and secondary evidence 1025 
 h. Determination as to competency and weight. 
 
 648. Competency usually a question of law 1028 
 
 649. Practice in determining competency 1031 
 
 650. Weight a question of fact for the jury 1033 
 
 i. Impeachment or contradiction of declaration. 
 
 651. Contradictory rules 1036- 
 
 CHAPTER XXX. 
 VERDICT. 
 
 652. Form and contents 1040' 
 
 653. Power to find lower or different degrees 1043 
 
 654. Necessity of negativing higher degrees 1045 
 
 655. Assessment of punishment and recommendation to 
 
 mercy IO45 
 
 656. Right of judge to direct verdict 1047 
 
 657. Concurrence of jurors necessary 1047 
 
 , CHAPTEE XXXI. .„ 
 
 JUDGMENT AND EXECTJtiON. . 
 
 I. Effect of conviction or acquittal on further prosecution. 
 
 658. Application of general rule 1049 
 
 II. Punishment. 
 
 659. The penalty U)5-2 
 
 660. Determination of penalty 1054 
 
 661. How inflicted 1059 
 
 662. Time of execution of death sentence lOGO- 
 
 663. How and by whom executed 1062 
 
TABLK OF CONTENTS. xxix 
 
 CHAPTER XXXII. 
 
 EFFECT ON RIGHT TO BUMaL. 
 
 664. Right coextensive with duty to bury 1063 
 
 CHAPTER XXXIII. 
 
 EFFECT ON DEVOLUTION OF PROPERTY. 
 
 I. Public policy docteine generally. 
 
 665. As applied to transfers by devise or operation of the 
 
 common-law rules 1064 
 
 666. As applied to life insurance 106.5 
 
 II, Exception in cases of transfer under positive statutory provi- 
 sions. 
 
 667. A question of statutory construction 1067 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Aaron v. State, 37 Ala. 106 862 
 
 V. State, 31 Ga. 167 581, 698 
 
 Abbott V. Com. 24 Ky. L. Eep. 148, 
 
 68 S. W. 124 933, 935 
 
 V. People, 86 N. Y. 460. . .140, 399 
 
 422, 427 
 Abernatby t. State, 129 Ala. 85, 29 
 
 So. 844 367,413,485, 489 
 
 Abernetby v. Com. 101 Pa. 322 . . 122, 422 
 
 434, 936 
 Abram t. State, 36 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 44, 35 S. W. 389 385, 537 
 
 Abrams t. Foshee, 3 Iowa, 274, 66 
 
 Am. Dec. 77 589 
 
 V. state (Tex. Crim. App.) 40 
 
 S. W. 798 ^90, 294 
 
 Acers v. United States, 164 TJ. S. 388, 
 41 L. ea. 481, 17 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Kep. 91... 116, 135, 136, 375 
 
 376, 378 
 
 Achey v. State, 64 Ind. 56 129, 224 
 
 Ackers v. State, 73 Ark. 262, 83 S. 
 
 W. 909 716 
 
 Adams t. Lancasbire & T. E. Co. 17 
 
 Week. Eep. 885 24 
 
 T. Moore, 2 Selw. N. P. 126. . . 767 
 
 V. People, 47 111. 376 459, 502 
 
 503, 511, 512, 979 
 V. People, 109 111. 444, 50 Am. 
 
 Eep. 617 25, 53, 99 
 
 T. People, 1 N. Y. 173 52 
 
 V. State, 133 Ala. 166, 81 So. 
 
 851 214, 259 
 
 V. State, 25 Ark. 405 205 
 
 V. State, 28 Fla. 511, 10 So. 
 
 106 223,224,236,846, 850 
 
 V. State, 72 Ga. 85 751, 771 
 
 V. State, 65 Ind. 565 5-7, 57 
 
 265, 334, 335, 698, 879, 1043 
 
 V. State, 29 Ohio St. 412 154 
 
 155, 236, 241, 244 
 V. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 285, 33 S. W. 354 . . 513, 522 
 V. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 366, 60 S. W. 47 273 
 
 T. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 64, 68 S. W. 270 373, 452 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 19 
 
 S. W. 907 1020 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 40 
 
 S. W. 590 268 
 
 xxxi 
 
 Adams t. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 64 
 
 S. W. 1055 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 84 
 S. W. 231 419, 
 
 Adcock V. State (Ark.) 83 S. W. 318. 
 
 Addington t. United States 165 U. S. 
 184, 41 L. ed. 679, 17 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 288 25&, 
 
 357 
 
 456 
 247 
 
 ,264 
 36.:t 
 
 Adklns V. Com. 26 Ky. L. Eep. 496, 
 
 82 S. W. 242 456, 485 
 
 Adwell T. Com. 17 B. Mon. 310 1004 
 
 .astna L. Ins. Co. v. Milward, 68 
 
 L.E.A. 285 901 
 
 Agee V. Com. 9 Ky. L. Eep. 272, 5 
 
 S. W. 47 377 
 
 Aiken v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Eep. 523, 68 
 
 S. W. 849 173, 242, 358 
 
 V. State, 58 Ark. 544, 25 S. 
 
 W. 840 540 
 
 T. State, 10 Tex. App. 610... 98 
 110,1125, 684, 721 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 64 
 
 S. W. 57 396, 403, 404 
 
 Ainswortb v. State, 8 Tex. App. 532 . . 465 
 
 466 
 V. United States, 1 App. D. C. 
 
 518 647,681,722,725, 882 
 
 Airbart v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 470, 76 Am. St. Eep. 736, 
 
 51 S. W. 214 512, 518, 
 
 Ake T. State, 30 Tex. 466.. 129, 130, 
 149, 159, 165, 168, 197, 
 
 Alarcon v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 83 S. W. 1115 
 
 Alberty v. United States, 162 U. S. 
 499, 40 L. ed. 1051, 16 
 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 864 393, 
 
 Albrigbt v. Territory, 11 Okla. 497, 
 
 69 Pac. 789 829, 844, 
 
 Alcorn, Ee, 7 Idabo, 101, 60 Pac. 561 
 Aldredge f. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 72 S. W. 843 
 
 Aldridge v. State, 59 Miss. 250.. 500, 
 
 Alexander v. Com. 105 Pa. 1 
 
 V. State, 25 Tex. App. 260, 8 
 Am. St. Eep. 438, 7 S. W. 
 
 867 403, 404, 448, 
 
 V. State, 3 Heisk. 475 8S4, 
 
 851, 
 
 T. State, 118 Ga. 26, 44 S. E. 
 
 851 ■. 449, 
 
 520 
 148 
 223 
 224 
 
 212 
 
 474 
 
 845 
 1043 
 
 406 
 519 
 441 
 
 511 
 
 850 
 859 
 
 777 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Alexander v. State, 40 Tex. Crlm. 
 Kep. 395, 49 S. W. 229, 
 50 S. W. 716 .. 49, CL', 66 
 217, 279, 516, 524, 586, 649 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 70 
 
 S. W. 748 365, 3G9, 485 
 
 v. United States, 138 U. S. 
 353, 34 L. ed. 954, 11 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 350 939 
 
 Alford V. Com. 84 Ky. 623, 2 S. W. 
 
 234 863 
 
 T. State, 8 Tex. App. 545.. 603 
 
 630 
 Alien V. Com. 10 Ky. L. Rep. 582, 
 
 9 S. W. 703 513, 525 
 
 V. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 808, 
 
 82 S. W. 589 958 
 
 T. Com. 86 Ky. 642, 6 S. W. 
 
 645... 503, 512, 517, 520, 521 
 523, 540 
 
 V. People, 77 111. 484 362, 498 
 
 V. State, 60 Ala. 19 459 
 
 T. State, 111 Ala. 80, 20 So. 
 
 400 433, 913 
 
 V. State, 37 Ark. 433 834 
 
 V. State, 70 Ark. 337, 68 S. W. 
 
 28 981, 986, 987, 992, 993 
 
 1039 
 T. State, 38 Fla. 44, 20 So. 
 
 807 425 
 
 V. State, 66 Miss. 385, 6 So. 
 
 242 504, 523, 531 
 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 66 
 
 S. W. 671.. 369, 765, 790, 791 
 V. State, 17 Tex. App. 637... 409 
 V. State, 24 Tex. App. 216, 6 
 
 S. W. 187 531, 532 
 
 V. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 205, 70 S. W. 85 279 
 
 T. State, 85 Wis. 22, 54 N. 
 
 W. 999 874 
 
 V. State, 5 Yerg. 453 284, 289 
 
 290 
 
 T. United States, 150 U. S. 
 
 551, 37 L. ed. 1179, 14 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 196... 456, 462 
 
 V. United States, 157 U. S. 
 
 675, 39 L. ed. 854, 15 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 720 519 
 
 V. United States, 164 U. S. 
 492, 41 L. ed. 528, 17 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 154 125, 205, 275 
 
 386, 469, 488 
 
 Allison V. Com. 99 Pa. 17 1010, 1027 
 
 V. State, 74 Ark. 444, 86 S. 
 
 W. 409 246, 267, 274, 373 
 
 458, 497, 549 
 T. United States, 160 U. S. 
 203, 40 L. ed. 395, 16 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 252 373, 397 
 
 402, 403, 412, 413 
 
 Ailsup V. State, 5 Lea, 362 383, 448 
 
 547 
 
 568 
 
 379 
 
 554 
 
 456 
 
 56 
 958 
 
 471 
 
 Alsop V. Com: 4 Ky. L. Rep. 547 008 
 
 634, 635, 881, 963 
 
 Alston V. State, 63 Ala. 178 939 
 
 Alvarez v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 58 S. W. 1013 206, 
 
 V. State, 41 Fla. 532, 27 So. 
 
 40 120, 365, 367, 
 
 459, 
 Amos V. Com. 16 Ky. L. Rep. 358. 
 
 28 S. W. 152 435, 
 
 V. State, 83 Ala. 1, 3 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 682, 3 So. 749 
 
 63, 162, 644, 673, 
 V. State, 96 Ala. 120, 11 So. 
 
 424 422, 
 
 Andersen v. United States, 170 U. S. 
 481, 42 L. ed. 1116, 18 
 
 Sup, Ct. Rep. 689 245, 328 
 
 843, 848, 849 
 Anderson v. State, 5 Ark. 444.. 866, 867 
 
 874 
 
 V. State, 79 Ala. 5 938, 1004 
 
 1021 
 T. State, 43 Conn. 514, 21 
 
 Am. Rep. 669 804 
 
 v. State, 24 Fla. 139, 3 So. 
 
 884 899, 900 
 
 V. State, 44 Fla. 413, 33 So. 
 
 294 870 
 
 V. State, 117 Ga. 255, 43 S. E. 
 
 835 461, 991 
 
 T. State, 119 Ga. 441, 46 S. 
 
 E. 639 64 
 
 T. State, 122 Ga. 161, 50 S. E. 
 
 46 1029 
 
 V. State, 3 Ileisk. 86.. 6, 133, 135 
 142, 222, 2C."i, 334 
 V. State, 26 Neb. 387, 41 N. 
 
 W. 951 190, 208 
 
 T. State, 1 Tex. App. 730.... 374 
 T. State, 27 Tex. App. 177, 3 
 L.R.A. 644, 11 Am. St. 
 Rep. 189, 11 S. W. 33 . . . 679 
 723, 724 
 
 V. State, 31 Tex. 440 165, 212 
 
 259 
 
 T. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 546, 53 Am. St. Rep. 722, 
 31 S. W. 673 
 
 V. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 275, 65 S. ^Y. 523.. 263, 
 
 903 
 
 382 
 516 
 
 V. Territory (Ariz.) 76 Pac. 
 
 636 554, 555 
 
 Andrews v. People, 33 Colo, 193, 79 
 
 Pac. 1031 175,650, 875 
 
 V. State, 118 Ga. 1, 43 S. E. 
 
 852 440 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crlm. App.) 76 
 
 S. W. 918 301, 430, 781 
 
 Angel V. Com, 14 Ky. L. Rep. 10, 18 
 
 S. W. 849 740 
 
TABLE 05" CASES CITED. 
 
 Angel T. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 135, 74 S. W. 553 
 
 Angell V. State, 36 Tex. 542, 14 Am. 
 
 Kep. 380.. .109, 574, 578, 
 
 139 
 
 612 
 613 
 
 Angling T. State, 137 Ala. 17, 34 So. 
 
 846 393 
 
 Ann V. State, 11 Humph. 159 9, 123 
 
 155, 156, 681, 700 
 Anonymous, J. Kelyng, 52.... 23, 52, 503 
 
 543 
 
 Anonymous, 8 Mod. 164 65 
 
 Anonymous, 1 East P. C. 201 720 
 
 Anthony v. State, Meigs, 265, 33 Am. 
 
 Dec. 143.. 153, 159, 164, 165 
 198, 201, 211, 254, 974, 1007 
 V. State, 13 Smedes & M. 263 105 
 Appletou T. People, 171 111. 473, 49 
 
 N. E. 708 554 
 
 V. State, 61 Ark. 590, 33 S. 
 
 W. 1068 621, 627 
 
 Archer v. State, 106 Ind. 426, 7 
 
 N. E. 225 182, 828 
 
 Archibn'.d v. State, 122 Ind. 122, 23 
 
 N. E. 758.. 981, 990, 991, 993 
 995 
 Argabright v. State, 56 Neb. 363, 
 
 76 N. W. 876.. 204, 231, 232 
 
 Armor v. State, 63 Ala. 176 809 
 
 Armsworthy v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 App.) 88 S. W. 215... 46, 254 
 406, 557 
 Arnett v. Com. 114 Ky. 593, 71 S. 
 
 W. 635 874, 1001 
 
 Arnold v. Com. 21 Ky. L. Eep. 1566, 
 
 55 S. W. 894 51, 249, 373 
 
 474, 475, 556 
 V. Com. 23 Ky. L. Rep. 182 
 
 62 S. W. 15 506 
 
 V. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1921, 
 
 72 S. W. 753 239 
 
 T. Steeves, 10 Wend. 514 626 
 
 Arnwlne v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 90 S. W. 39 263, 311 
 
 Arp V. State, 97 Ala. 5, 19 L.R.A. 
 357, 38 Am. St. Rep. 137, 
 
 12 So. 301 68 
 
 Arrellano v. State, 24 Tex. App. 43, 5 
 
 S. W. 526 . 289, ,294 
 
 Arthur v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 477, 80 S. W. 1017 529 
 
 v. Wells, 2 Mill, Const. 314. . . 742 
 
 Arwood T. State, 59 Ga. 391 274 
 
 Ashcraft v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 488, 
 
 68 S. W. 847 415, 773 
 
 Ashley t. State (Miss.) 37 So. 960.. 994 
 
 Ashton's Case, 12 Mod. 256 648 
 
 Case 2 Lewin, C. C. 147 981 
 
 1010, 1035 
 Askew v. State, 94 Ala. 4, 33 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 83, 10 So. 657 362 
 
 453, 454, 461, 494 
 Horn. — iii. 
 
 Asken v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 83 
 S. W. 706 406, 
 
 Aszman v. State, 123 Ind. 437, 8 
 L.R.A. 33, 24 N. E. 123. . 
 164, 805, 806, 808, 811, 
 
 Atkins V. State, 16 Ark. 568 126, 
 
 293, 294, 315, 341, 404, 
 
 537, 
 
 Atkinson v. State, 20 Tex. 522.. 153, 
 
 161, 1G2, 165, 211, 
 
 Attaway v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 395, 55 S. W. 45 354, 
 
 Aubrey v. State, 62 Ark. 368, 35 S. 
 
 W. 792 
 
 Augustine v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 
 
 Rep. 59, 96 Am'. St. Rep. 
 
 765, 52 S. W. 77 
 
 Austin T. Com. 19 Ky. Ij. Rep. 474, 
 
 40 S. W. 905 362, 
 
 V. Com. (Ky.) 91 S. W. 267. 
 
 v. State, 1-0 Ga. 748, 78 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 134, 36 S. E. 52. 
 
 f93, 697, 
 
 Aveson v. Kinnaird, 6 East, 188, 2 
 
 Smith, 286 971, 
 
 Aycoek t. State, 2 Tex. App. 381 
 
 Ayers v. State, 60 Miss. 700 . . . 528, 
 
 Ayres v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 26 
 S. W. 396 811, 
 
 785 
 
 162 
 813 
 814 
 230 
 498 
 934 
 159 
 22.S 
 
 355 
 
 873 
 
 646 
 
 1007 
 
 1029 
 
 478 
 
 192 
 
 698 
 
 972 
 914 
 530 
 786 
 
 813 
 
 Babb V. State, 12 Tex. App. 491 197 
 
 Babcock v. People, 13 Colo. 515, 22 
 
 Pac. 817 3, 120, 408, 417 
 
 473, 483, 555, 932 
 Babson v. Roekport, 101 Mass. 93 . . 24 
 Bailey v. Com. 2 Ky. L. Eep. 436.. 1026 
 V. Com. 15 Ky. L. Rep. 826, 
 
 25 S. W. 883 400, 412 
 
 V. State, 133 Ala. 155, 32 
 
 So. 57 189, 192, 193 
 
 V. State, 70 Ga. 617 93, 164 
 
 165, 204, 400 
 V. State, 104 Ga. 530, 30 S. E. 
 
 817 940 
 
 Baines v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 490, 66 S. W. 847 925 
 
 928, 946 
 Baker v. Com. 93 Ky. 302, 19 S. W. 
 
 975... 390, 392, 393, 472, 474 
 V. Com. 106 Ky. 212, 50 S. W. 
 
 54 982, 1008, 1015 
 
 V. State, 81 Ala. 38, 1 So. 
 
 127 504, 508 
 
 T. State, 122 Ala. 1, 26 So. 
 
 94 422 
 
 929 
 
XXXIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Baker v. State, 30 Fla. 41, 11 So. 
 
 492 30, 31, 38, 
 
 V. State, 121 Ga. 592, 49 S. B. 
 
 782 842, 865 
 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 81 
 
 S. W. 1215 127, 
 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 392, 77 S. W. 618 
 
 V. Tei-i'itoi-y (Okla.) 78 Pac. 81 
 Baldwin, Ex parte, 69 Iowa, 502, 29 
 
 N. W. 428 
 
 V. State, 111 Ala. 11, 20 So. 
 
 528 509, 524, 
 
 V. State, 120 Ga. 188, 47 S. E. 
 
 558 
 
 V. State, 12 Net. 61, 10 N. W. 
 
 463 
 
 Ball T. State, 29 Tex. App. 107, 14 
 
 S. W. 1012 399, 418, 
 
 904 
 
 250 
 
 932 
 253 
 
 1052 
 
 559 
 
 143 
 
 868 
 
 475 
 518 
 
 855 
 
 556 
 
 V. United States, 140 U. S. 
 
 118, 35 L. ed. 377, 11 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 761 840, 
 
 Ballard t. State, 31 Fla. 266, 12 So. 
 
 865 372, 
 
 Ballew V. United States, 160 U. S. 
 
 187, 40 L. ed. 388, 16 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 263 1045 
 
 Baltrip v. State, 30 Tex. App. 545, 17 
 
 S. W. 1106 209, 272: 
 
 330 
 474 
 474 
 
 132 
 357 
 
 S66 
 981 
 990 
 Barcus v. State, 49 Miss. 17, 19 Am. 
 
 Rep. 1 125 
 
 Bardin v. State, 143 Ala. 74, 38 So. 
 
 833 471,492,645, 646 
 
 Barfield v. Britt, 47 N. C. (2 Jones, 
 
 L.) 41, 62 Am. Dec. 190. 
 
 Barker v. State (Neb.) 103 N. W. 71 
 
 Bang V. State, 60 Miss. 571.. .365, 367, 
 Bankhead v. State, 124 Ala. 14, 26 
 
 So. 979 130, 
 
 Banks v. State (Ala.) 39 So. 921... 
 V. State, 24 Tex. App. 559, 7 
 
 S. W. 327 
 
 Barber, Ex parte, 16 Tex. App. 369 . . 
 
 973 
 199 
 
 871 
 
 V. Territory (Okla.) 7S Pac. 
 
 81 
 
 Barkman t. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 105, 52 S. W. 73 913, 
 
 871 
 
 927 
 944 
 
 Barnard v. Com. 10 Ky. L. Rep. 143, 
 
 8 S. W. 444 543 
 
 V. State, 88 Tenn. 183, 12 
 
 S. W. 431.. 157, 365, 368, 
 
 400, 
 
 T. State, 45 Tex. Crim'. Kep. 
 
 67, 73 S. W. 957 
 
 Barnes v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1143, 
 
 70 S. W. 827 
 
 V. Com. 110 Ky. 348, 61 S. W. 
 
 733 465, 478, 1003 
 
 371 
 461 
 
 031 
 
 937 
 
 Barnes v. State, 134 Ala. 36, 32 So. 
 
 670 342, 571, 935 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 59 
 
 S. W. 882 171 
 
 Barnett t. People, 54 111. 325 . . 986, 999 
 
 1002 
 v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 459, 80 S. W. 1013 58 
 
 Baron t. People, 1 Park. Crim. Rep. 
 
 246 78 
 
 Barrett's Case, Stephen's Dig. Crim. 
 
 Law, art. 224, p. 164 113 
 
 175 
 Barron v. State, 2.3 Tex. App. 462, 
 
 5 S. W. 237 367 
 
 Barstado v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 87 S. W. 344 520, 521 
 
 Bartay v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 67 S. W. 416 397, 398, 758 
 
 Bartholomew v. People, 104 111. 605, 
 
 44 Am. Kep. 97 807 
 
 Bartnett v. State, 100 Ind. 171.. 524, 526 
 Barton v. State, 96 Ga. 435, 23 S. E. 
 
 827 544 
 
 Baskett v. Com. 19 Ky. L. Eep. 1995, 
 
 44 S. W. 970 66, 217 
 
 Bass V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 65 
 
 S. W. 919 301 
 
 Basset's Case, 1 East. P. C. 259, 1 
 Hale, P. C. 440, 1 Hawk. 
 
 P. C. 128 340, 648, 671 
 
 Bassett v. State, 44 Fla. 12, 33 So. 
 
 262 150, 508, 511 
 
 Basye v. State, 45 Neb. 261, 63 N. W. 
 
 811.. 404, 424, 899, 943, 993 
 1029 
 Bateman v. State, 64 Miss. 233, 1 So. 
 
 172 913 
 
 Bates V. Com. 14 Ky. L. Etp. 177, 19 
 
 S. W. 928 449, 966, 974 
 
 Bateson v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 34, 80 S. W. 88. .521, 932, 987 
 1028 
 
 Battle V. State, 74 Ga. 101 975, 1037 
 
 V. State, 92 Ga. 465, 17 S. E. 
 
 861 291 
 
 T. State, 103 Ga. 53, 29 S. B. 
 
 491 377 
 
 Baxter v. People, 8 111. 368. . . .68, 82, 84 
 
 V. State, 15 Lea, 657 1005 
 
 1017, 1034 
 Baynes v. Brewster, 11 L. J. Mag. 
 Cas. N. S. 5, 2 Hale, P. 
 
 C. 88 612 
 
 Baysinger v. Territory (Okla.) 82 
 
 Pac. 728 395, 849, 1054 
 
 Seal's Case, 6 N. Y. City Hall Eec. 
 
 59 290, 342 
 
 Bean v. Mathieu, 33 Tex. 501 578 
 
 V. State, 17 Tex. App. 60 865 
 
 875 
 V. State, 25 Tex. App. 34u, 8 
 
 S. VV. 278 377, 452, 515 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Beard v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 2» 
 
 S. W. 770 
 
 V. State (Tex. CHm. Apt).) 81 
 
 S. W. 33 456, 512, 520, 
 
 V. United States, 158 U. S. 
 550, 39 L. ed. 1086, 15 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 962 361, 
 
 478, 479, 486, 786, 
 Bearden v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 83 S. W. 808 
 
 T. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 578, 73 S. W. 17 283, 
 
 380, 381, 392, 443, 467, 
 
 v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 144, 79 S. W. 37 310, 
 
 370, 381, 425, 506, 513, 
 Beasley v. People, 89 111. 571. . . .594, 
 
 V. State, 50 Ala. 140, 20 Am. 
 
 Rep. 292 
 
 V. State, 64 Miss. 518, 8 So. 
 
 234 287, 
 
 Beauchamp v. State, 6 BlacUt. 299. . . . 
 
 124, 129, 132, 165, 204, 
 
 275, 311-313, 
 
 Beaver v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 86 
 
 S. W. 1020 
 
 Beavers v. State, 54 Ark. 336, 15 S. 
 
 W. 1024 
 
 v. State, 103 Ala. 36, 15 So. 
 
 616 
 
 V. State, 58 Ind. 530 
 
 Bechtelheimer v. State, .54 Ind. 128. . 
 
 155, 177, 210, 255, 836, 
 
 870, 
 
 Beck V. State, 76 Ga. 452.. 106, 805, 
 
 Beckham v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 69 S. W. 534 244, 
 
 Becknell v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 82 S. W. 1039 
 
 Beers v. State, 24 Neb. 614, 39 N. W. 
 
 790 161, 199, 
 
 Beets V. State, Meigs, 106... 65, 217, 
 
 519 
 536 
 
 Belk V. People, 125 111. 584, 17 N. 
 
 E. 744 702, 
 
 Bell V. State, 48 Ala. 685, 17 Am. 
 
 Rep. 40 
 
 T. State, 115 Ala. 25, 22 So. 
 
 526 483, 484, 505, 
 
 T. State, 140 Ala. 57, 37 So. 
 
 281 124, 201, 208, 
 
 V. State, 69 Ark. 148, 86 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 188, 61 S. W. 
 
 918 
 
 V. state, 66 Miss. 195, 5 So. 
 
 389 407, 
 
 V. State, 72 Miss. 507, 17 So. 
 
 232. . .422 993, 994, 1000, 
 1005, 1007, 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 24 
 
 S. W. 644 
 
 474 
 
 788 
 
 444 
 
 311 
 494 
 495 
 
 311 
 521 
 875 
 887 
 
 805 
 
 291 
 
 .105 
 
 205 
 
 335 
 
 30 
 
 187 
 
 941 
 875 
 123 
 867 
 879 
 806 
 
 283 
 
 208 
 
 203 
 1025 
 1026 
 
 726 
 
 1049 
 
 509 
 
 243 
 
 404 
 
 408 
 
 1002 
 1031 
 
 939 
 
 Bell V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 77 S. W. 787 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 87 
 
 S. W. 1160 
 
 V. State, 17 Tex. App. 538... 
 
 130, 476, 
 
 T. State, 20 Tex. App. 445 . . . 
 
 457, 
 
 Belt V. People, 97 111. 461 
 
 Ben V. State, 37 Ala. 103 973, 984- 
 
 Benavldes v. State, 31 Tex. 579.... 
 975, 993, 994, 
 
 Benedict v. State, 14 Wis. 423 
 
 Benge v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1466, 
 
 71 S. W. 648... 56, 775, 
 
 V. Com. 92 Ky. 1, 17 S. W. 146 
 
 228 
 
 311 
 
 135 
 557 
 456 
 459 
 364 
 986 
 974 
 997 
 937 
 
 790 
 50 
 73 
 Benjamin >-. State, 121 Ala. 26, 25 
 
 So. 917 336 
 
 Bennett v. Com: i> Leigh, 745.. 153, 105 
 
 231 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 75 
 
 S. W. 314 581, 989 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 81 
 
 S. W. 30 1019 
 
 V. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 639, 48 S. W. 61 199, 242 
 
 V. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 241, 64 S. W. 254 60 
 
 Bennyfleld v. Com. 15 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 321, 22 S. W. 1020.. 253, 288 
 v. Com. 13 Ky. L. Rep. 446, 
 
 17 S. W. 271 523 
 
 Benson v. Offley, 2 Show. 510, 3 Mod. 
 
 121 72 
 
 V. state, 119 Ind. 488, 21 N. 
 
 E. 1109 914, 920 
 
 V. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 487, 43 S. W. 527 1001 
 
 Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U. S. 655, 
 39 L. ed. 845, 15 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 727 84!> 
 
 Bernhardt v. State, 82 Wis. 23, 51 
 
 N. W. 1009 814 
 
 Berry v. Com. 10 Bush, 15. .364, 376, 379' 
 y. State, 63 Ark. 382, 38 S. 
 
 W. 1038 987, 98S 
 
 V. State, 10 Ga. 511 52 
 
 Bertrong v. State, 2 Tex. App. 160. . 722 
 Bess v. Com. 116 Ky. 927, 77 S. W. 
 
 340 919 
 
 v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 839, 82 
 
 S. W. 576 925, 945 
 
 Bethune v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 90 S. W. 1014 405 
 
 Beverley's Case, 4 Coke, 125a 805 
 
 Bias V. United States, 3 Ind. Terr. 
 
 27, 53 S. W. 471 7, 8, 98 
 
 99, 151, 335, 340, 683 
 
 Bibb V. Hebert, 3 La. Ann. 132 782 
 
 V. State, 94 Ala. 31, 33 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 88, 10 So. 506. . . 67 
 
XXXVl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 943 
 895 
 
 976 
 093 
 293 
 437 
 981 
 
 Bibby v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 65 
 
 S. W. 193.. 64, 65, 648, 657 
 659, 6G0, 662, 676 
 Biemel v. State, 71 Wis. 444, 37 
 
 N. W. 244 557 
 
 Biggs V. State, 29 Ga. 723, 76 Am. 
 
 Dec. 630 297, 298, 304, 311 
 
 330, 769, 774, 776 
 Bilansliy v. State, 3 Minn. 427, Gil. 
 
 313 833, 1040 
 
 Billings v. State, 52 ArU. 303, 12 
 
 S. W. 574 938, 
 
 Biaes v. State, 68 L.R.A. 33 
 
 Binfieia T. State, 15 Neb. 484, 19 
 
 N. W. 607 409, 972, 
 
 981, 
 Bingham v. State, 6 Tex. App. 169. . 
 
 428, 
 
 Binns T. State, 46 Ind. 311 972, 
 
 984, 986, 987, 1025 
 T. State, 57 Ind. 46, 26 Am'. 
 
 Rep. 48 913 
 
 T. State, 66 Ind. 428 166, 167 
 
 913, 928 
 
 Bird V. Holbrook, 4 Bing. 628 789 
 
 V. State, 14 Ga. 43 124 
 
 V. State, 55 Ga. 317 268, 274 
 
 T. State, 77 Wis. 276, 47 N. 
 
 W. 1126 448 
 
 V. United States, 180 U. S. 
 356, 45 L. ed. 570, 21 
 
 Snp. Ct. Rep. 403 
 
 T. United States, 187 U. S. 
 118, 47 L. ed. 100, 23 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 42. .60, 
 Blrdwell v. State (Ttx. Crim. App.) 
 
 48 S. W. 583 139, 142 
 
 Bishop V. Com. 109 Ky. 558, 60 S. W. 
 
 190 263, 808, 961, 964, 
 
 T. Com. 109 Ky. 558, 60 
 ,S. W. 190, Reversing 22 
 Ky. L. Rep. 760, 58 
 
 S. W. 817 
 
 T. Com. 22 Ky. L. Rep. 760, 
 
 58 S. W. 817 
 
 V. State, 73 Aik. 568, 84 S. 
 
 W. 707 41, 
 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 35 
 
 S. W. 170 267, 284, 
 
 V. State, 62 Miss. 289 131, 
 
 Blssot V. State, 53 Ind. 408 148, 
 
 621, 766, 1052 
 
 Bivens v. State, 11 Ark. 455 124, 148 
 
 151, 152, 162, 165, 167, 198 
 224, 228, 334 
 
 Blzzell V. Booker, 16 Ark. 308 696 
 
 Black V. State, 1 Tex. App. 308. .974, 1032 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 65 
 
 S. W. 906 578 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 68 
 
 S. W. 683 248, 249 
 
 936 
 
 86, 557 
 
 965 
 
 604 
 
 263 
 
 480 
 
 287 
 134 
 186 
 
 Blackburn v. State, 86 Ala. 595, 6 So. 
 
 96 376, 469, 482 
 
 V. State, 98 Ala. 63, 13 So. 
 
 274 972, 981, 992, 993, 1010 
 
 T. State, 23 Ohio St. 146.. 24, 25 
 44, 52, 53, 69, 70, 81, 154, 909 
 Blackman t. State, 80 Ga. 785, 7 S. E. 
 
 626 1058 
 
 Blain v. State, 33 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 236, 26 S. W. 63 674 
 
 V. State, 30 Tex. App. 702, 18 
 
 S. W. 862.. 644, 045, 657. 674 
 Blair v. State, 69 Ark. 558, 64 S. W. 
 
 948 456, 504 
 
 Blake v. People 73 N. Y. 586 429 
 
 V. State, 3 Tex. App. 581 231 
 
 363, 496 
 Blalack v. State, 79 Miss. 517, 31 
 
 So. 105 365, 459, 460, 550 
 
 Blalock V. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Hep. 
 
 154, 49 S. W. 100.. 3, 9, 681 
 696, 698, 721 
 Blanco T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 57 S. W. 828 311 
 
 Blankenship v. Com. 23 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 1995, 66 S. W. 994.. 503, 852 
 853 
 Blanton v. State, 1 Wash. 265, 24 
 
 Pac. 439 '...198, 868, 871 
 
 Bledsoe v. Com. Ky. L. Rep. 1002, 
 7 S. W. 884 478, 490, 
 
 Blige V. State, 20 Fla. 742, 51 Am. 
 
 Rep. 628 136, 
 
 Blimm v. Com. 7 Bush, 320 808, 
 
 491 
 493 
 
 137 
 809 
 818 
 Bliss V. State, 117 Wis. 596, 94 N. 
 
 W. 325 172, 256, 334, 1055 
 
 Bloom V. State, 155 Ind. 292, 58 N. 
 
 B. 81 765, 782 
 
 Blume V. State, 154 Ind. 343, 56 N. 
 
 E. 771 23il, 914 
 
 Blyth T. Birmingham Waterworks Cu. 
 
 11 Exch. 781 566 
 
 Blythe t. State, 4 Ohio C. C. 435, Af- 
 ■ firmed in 47 Ohio St. 234, 
 
 24 N. E. 268 188, 953 
 
 Boatwright v. State, 89 Ga. 140, 15 
 
 S. E. 21 132, 274, 275 
 
 287, 523 
 Bohanan v. State, 15 Neb. 209, 18 
 
 N. W. 129 211, 259 
 
 Bohannon v. Com. 8 Bush, 481, 8 Am. 
 
 Rep. 474... 359, 380, 400, 401 
 
 413, 414, 474, 477, 503, 520 
 
 521 
 
 V. State, 14 Tex. App. 271 865 
 
 868 
 Bohlman v. State, 135 Ala. 45, 33 So. 
 
 44 929 
 
 Boles V. State, 9 Smedes & M. 284. . . Ill 
 
 ■•12, 247 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 xxxvn 
 
 BoUn T. State, 9 Lea, 516 1033 
 
 Boiling V. State, 54 Art. 588, 16 S. 
 
 W. 638 913 
 
 Bolzer v. People, 129 111. 112, i 
 
 L.R.A. 579, 21 N. E. 
 
 818 316-318, 560, 940 
 
 Bond V. State, 21 Fla. 738 400, 406 
 
 411, 423, 426 
 Bondurant v. State, 125 Ala. 31, 
 
 27 So. 775.. 3, 132, 165, 274 
 362, 371, 471 
 Bone V. State, 86 Ga. 108, 12 S. B. 
 
 205 354, 769 
 
 Boner t. Com. 19 Ky. L. Rep. 409, 
 
 40 S. W. 700 531 
 
 Bonnard t. State, 25 Tex. App. 173, 
 
 8' Am. St. Eep. 431, 7 
 
 S. W. 862.. 277, 278, 284, 294 
 511, 520, 539 
 Bonner v. State, 107 Ala. 97, 18 So. 
 
 226 937 
 
 V. State, 29 Tex. App. 223. 
 
 15 S. W. 821.. 262, 264, 271 
 272, 3r.7, 457, 507 
 Booher v. State, 156 Ind. 435, 54 
 
 L.R.A. 391, 60 N. E. 156 807 
 
 Boothe V. State, 4 Tex. App. 202 939 
 
 1055 
 Borden v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 648, 62 S. W. 1064 
 
 206, 272, 273, 
 Boren t. State, 32 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 637, 25 S. W. 775 
 
 Borrego v. Territovy. 8 ^^ JI. 446, 
 
 46 Pac. 349 841, 
 
 Bosse T. Com. 13 Ky. L. Rep. 217, 16 
 
 S. W. 713 57, 60, 
 
 Bostic V. State, 94 Ala. 45, 10 So. 
 
 602 514, 534, 
 
 Bostlck V. State, 3 Humph. 344 
 
 Boswell V. Com. 20 Gratt. 860. .812, 
 Boulden v. State, 102 Ala. 78, 15 
 
 So. 341 97, 131, 136, 
 
 165, 199. 537, 552, 1018, 
 Bourn v. State (Miss.) 5 So. 626.. 
 
 134 
 311 
 
 804 
 
 872 
 
 64 
 
 544 
 
 1039 
 
 813 
 
 162 
 
 1026 
 
 903 
 
 904 
 
 917 
 842 
 
 959 
 960 
 Bowens v. State, 106 Ga. 760, 32 
 
 S. E. 666 852, 859 
 
 Bower v. State, 5 Mo. 364, 32 Am. 
 
 Dec. 325... ..3, 158, 162, 203 
 
 205, 214 
 Bowers v. State, 122 Wis. 163, 99 
 
 N. W. 447 865 
 
 Bowles T. Com'. 103 Va. 816, 48 S. 
 
 E. 527.. 200, 253, 396, 398 
 
 440, 991, 993 
 
 V. State (Miss.) 40 So. 165.. 1055 
 
 Bowen t. State, 140 Ala. 65, 37 
 
 So. 233 
 
 T. State, 1 Or. 270 
 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 82 
 S. W. 520. .58, 645, 646, 
 
 Bowles V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 67 S. W. 103 451 
 
 V. State, 58 Ala. 335. .41, 422, 435 
 Bowling V. Com. 7 Ky. L. Rep. 821 . . 623 
 Bowlus V. State, 130 Ind. 227, 28 N. 
 
 E. 1115 438 
 
 Bowman v. Com. 96 Ky. 8, 27 S. W. 
 
 870 735, 738, 749, 750 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 20 S. W. 558 65, 75 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 21 
 
 S. W. 48 429, 781 
 
 Box V. Lanier 112 Tenn. 393, 64 
 L.R.A. 458, 79 S. W. 
 
 1042 1064, 1466 
 
 Boyd T. State, 7 Coldw. 69 861 
 
 V. State, 17 Ga. 194 72, 75 
 
 608, 618, 638, 865, 881 
 V. State, 84 Miss. 414, 36 So. 
 
 525 983, 1010 
 
 V. State, 14 Lea, 161 862 
 
 V. State, 28 Tex. App. 137, 12 
 
 S. W. 737.. 103, 116, 142, 197 
 363 
 V. United States, 142 U. S. 
 450, 35 L. ed. 1076, 12 
 
 Sup. Ct. Kep. 292 061, 952 
 
 Boyett V. State, 2 Tex. App. 93 . . 6, 275 
 
 285, 301 
 Boykin v. People, 22 Colo. 496, 45 
 
 Pac. 419... 176, 337, 473, 490 
 502, 511, 540, 555, 747, 750 
 V. State, 86 Miss. 481, 38 So. 
 
 725 389, 787 
 
 Boyle V. State, 97 Ind. 322 988 
 
 V. State, 105 Ind. 469, 55 Am. 
 
 Rep. 218, 5 N. E. 203.. 219 
 274, 981 
 V. State, 57 Wis. 472, 46 Am. 
 
 Eep. 41, 15 N. W. 827.. 178 
 256 
 V. State, 61 Wis. 440, 21 N. 
 
 W. 289 925 
 
 Boyleston v. Kerr, 2 Daly, 220 613 
 
 Boynton v. State, 115 Ga. 587, 41 S. 
 
 E. 995 946 
 
 Brabston T. State, 68 Miss. 208, 8 
 
 So. 326 65, 472, 536, 644 
 
 764, 771 
 Bracken v. State, 29 Tex. App. 362, 
 
 16 S. W. 192 272, 273 
 
 Bradburn v. United States, 3 Ind. 
 
 Terr. 604, 64 S. W. 550, 453 
 567, 573 
 Bradliam v. State, 41 Fla. 541, 26 
 
 So. 730 860 
 
 Bradley v. Banks, Yelv. 205 866 
 
 V. State, 31 Ind. 492 124, 133 
 
 Bradsbaw f. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 50 S. W. 359 835,1043 
 
 1054 
 Brady t. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 65 S. W. 521 3S;5 
 
TABLE OK CASES Crrii]). 
 
 Braham v. State (Ala.) 38 So. 919 
 
 Bi-akefleld v. State, 1 Sneed, 215 
 
 1007, 
 Bramlette v. State, 21 Tex. App. Oil, 
 
 57 Am. Rep. 622, 2 S. W. 
 
 765 
 
 Brancli v. State, 15 Tex. App. 96 ... . 
 
 436, 465, 466, 
 
 Brande v. State (Tex. Ci'im. App.) 
 
 45 S. W. 17 284, 994, 
 
 264 
 
 993 
 
 1014 
 
 99 
 430 
 536 
 
 1021 
 1025 
 
 Brandon v. State, 75 Miss. 904, 23 
 
 So. 517 128 
 
 Brandt v. Com. 94 Pa. 290 889 
 
 Brannigan v. People 3 Utah, 488, 24 
 
 Pac. 767 871, 872 
 
 Brantley v. State, 9 Wyo. 102, 61 
 
 Pac. 139 207 
 
 Brassfleld v. State, 55 Ark. 556, 18 
 
 S. W. 1040 20, 209, 842 
 
 845 
 
 Bratton v. State, 10 Humph. 103 148 
 
 153, 177, 578, 579 
 Brazzil v. State, 28 Tex. App. 584, 
 
 13 S. W. 1006.. 541, 542, 545 
 Breedlove t. State, 26 Tex. App. 445 
 
 9 S. W. 768 307, 578, 579 
 
 Breese v. State, 12 Ohio St. 146, 80 
 
 Am. Dec. 340 59 
 
 Brendendick v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 App.) 34 S. W. 115.. 379, 448 
 
 Brennan v. People, 15 111. 511 87, 88 
 
 584, 644, 645, 1049 
 Brewer v. State, 72 Ark. 145, 78 S. 
 
 W. 773 377, 378 
 
 Bridgewater v. State, 153 Ind. 500, 
 
 55 N. E. 737... 132, 228, 
 
 Briggs V. Com. 82 Va. 554.. 602, 630- 
 Brinkley v. State, 44 Fla. 418, 33 
 
 So. 296 
 
 V. State, 89 Ala. 34, 18 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 87, 8 So. 22 
 
 491, 493, 
 Brister y. State, 26 Ala. 107 50, 
 
 Bristow V. Com. 15 Gratt. 634 99, 
 
 253 
 254 
 632 
 
 870 
 
 490 
 793 
 73 
 887 
 121 
 315 
 Brittain v. State, 36 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 406, 37 S. W. 758.. 607, 699 
 721, 722 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 85 S. W. 278 375, 520 
 
 Brock V. Com. 92 Ky. 183, 17 S. W. 
 
 337 978, 1034 
 
 Brom V. People, 216 111. 148, 74 N. 
 
 E. 790 1003 
 
 Bromage v. Prosser, 4 Barn. & C. 
 
 255 97 
 
 Bromwich's Case, 1 Ley. 180, 1 Sid. 
 
 277 322 
 
 Bronn v. L. C. & L. R. Co. 7 Ky. L. 
 
 Rep. 96 972 
 
 Brooks V. Com. 100 Ky. 194, 87 S. 
 
 W. 1043 937 
 
 y. Com. 61 Pa. 352, 100 Am. 
 
 Dec. 645.. 268, 271, 299, 315 
 
 319, 322, 602-604, 615- 617 
 628, 630, 631, 737, 767 
 y. State, 114 Ga. 6, 39 S. B. 
 
 877 603, 611, 614, 627 
 
 y. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 56 
 
 S. W. 924 863 
 
 y. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 347, 60 S. W. 53 154, 1042 
 
 Brotherton y. People, 75 N. Y. 159, 
 
 Affirming, 14 Hun, 486. 1010 
 Brown, Ex parte, 65 Ala. 446... 164, 200 
 
 Re, 32 Cal. 48 1042 
 
 y. Com. 13 Ky. L. Rep. 372, 
 
 17 S. W. 220 193, 930 
 
 V. Com. 21 Ky. L. Rep. 245, 
 
 51 S. W. 171 528 
 
 y. Com. 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1582, 
 
 61 S. W. 4 263 
 
 V. Com. 25 Ky. L. Rep. 2076, 
 
 79 S. W. 1193 545 
 
 V. Com. 26 Ky. L. .Rep. 1269, 
 
 83 S. W. 645 969, 1006 
 
 y. Com. 117 Ky. 766, 78 S. 
 
 W. 1126 242 
 
 y. Com. 73 Pa. 321, 13 Am. 
 
 Rep. 708 974, 979 
 
 y. Com. 76 Pa. 319 247 
 
 V. Com. 86 Va. 466, 10 S. E. 
 
 745.. 253, 259, 260, 367, 483 
 541, 861 
 
 y. Perkins, 1 Allen, 89 55 
 
 y. State, 74 Ala. 478 376, 396 
 
 424, 480, 481 
 y. State, 83 Ala. 33, 3 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 685, 3 So. 8.37, 
 
 132, 362, 363, 409, 552, 555 
 V. State, 109 Ala. 78. 20 So. 
 
 103.. 238, 603, 624, 626, 627 
 1053, 1056 
 y. State, 142 Ala. 287, 38 
 
 So. 268 115, 310, 811 
 
 V. State, 55 Ark. 593, 18 S. 
 
 W. 1051... 84, 405, 407, 791 
 V. State (Del.) 61 Atl. 1077. 496 
 
 y. State, 18 Fla. 472 384, 837 
 
 859 
 y. State, 31 Fla. 207, 12 So. 
 
 640 356, 786, 1043 
 
 V. State, 28 Ga. 199.. 64, 66, 72 
 189, 194, 247, 602, 671 
 
 V. State 51 Ga. 502 925 
 
 y. State, 58 Ga. 212 523 
 
 y. Stato. 110 Ind. 486, 11 N. E. 
 
 447 8, 835, 880 
 
 V. State, 147 Ind. 28, 46 N. 
 
 E. 34 574, 577 
 
 V. State, 32 Miss. 4.33. . .97.'!, 993 
 994, 996, 1024, 1030 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 XXXIX 
 
 Brown v. State, 78 Miss. 637, 84 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. G41, 29 So. 519.. 
 V. State, 9 Neb. 157, 2 N. W. 
 
 378 117, 
 
 V. State, 62 N. J. L. 6C6, 42 
 
 Atl. 811.. 219, 221, 266, 
 
 362, 462, 497, 551-553, 
 
 611, 613, 614, 
 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 24 
 
 S. W. 509 
 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 50 
 
 S. W. 354. . .409,726,933, 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 78 
 
 S. W. 507 
 
 V. State, 38 Tex. 483 37, 40, 
 V. State, 4 Tex. App. 275. .810, 
 T. State, 32 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 110, 22 S. W. 596 224, 
 
 V. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 293, 65 S. W. 529 ..858, 
 
 T. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 139, 75 S. W. 33 2,54, 
 
 306, 
 
 V. United States, 159 U. S. 
 
 100, 40 L. ed. 90, 16 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 29 . . 616, 
 
 V. Weaver, 76 Miss. 7, 42 L. 
 
 R.A. 423, 71 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 512, 23 So. 388 .. 
 
 Brownell v. Pacific R. Co. 47 Mo. 239. 
 
 T. People, 38 Mich. 732 .. . 356, 
 
 378, 404, 424, 443, 447, 
 
 Brownlee v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 87 S. W. 1153... 125, 127, 
 
 295, 318, 319, 328, 456, 
 
 Bruce v. State, 68 Arlj. 310, 57 S. W. 
 
 1103 362, 624, 
 
 V. State, 99 Ga. 50, 25 S. 
 
 E. 760 
 
 V. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 27, 51 S. W. 954 . . 375, 
 
 451, 538, 
 
 Brucker v. State, 19 Wis. 539 
 
 Brumbacli v. Com. 7 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 443 
 
 Brumley t. State, 21 Tex. App. 222, 
 57 Am. Rep. 612, 17 S. W. 
 
 140 365, 366, 404. 
 
 Bruner v. State, 58 Ind. 159 . . 6, 7, 
 
 340, 835, 879, 
 
 v. United States, 4 Ind. Terr. 
 
 580, 76 S. W. 244 . . 358, 
 
 646, 
 
 Brunson v. State, 124 Ala. 87, 27 
 
 So. 410 
 
 Brush v. Blauchard, 18 111. 46 
 
 Bryan v. State, 19 Fla. 864 .. 73, 
 
 1015 
 
 143 
 
 324 
 610 
 618 
 
 279 
 
 935 
 
 312 
 
 42 
 812 
 
 233 
 
 234 
 
 937 
 
 270 
 307 
 
 617 
 
 741 
 
 972 
 375 
 448 
 451 
 
 294 
 532 
 
 625 
 
 1050 
 
 448 
 540 
 423 
 
 478 
 
 457 
 
 335 
 
 1043 
 
 644 
 667 
 
 922 
 689 
 858 
 860 
 
 Bryan v. State (Pla.) 34 So. 243 .. 262 
 
 Bryant v. State, 36 Ala. 270 803 
 
 T. State, 7 Baxt. 67 .. 130, 131 
 V. State, 80 Ga. 272, 4 S. E. 
 
 853 1031 
 
 T. State, 18 Tex. App. 107 . . 248 
 V. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 394, 33 S. W. 978, 36 S. 
 
 W. 79 996 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 47 
 
 S. W. 373 . . 374, 376 387 
 401, 450, 498 
 V. atate, 7 Wyo. 311, 51 Pac. 
 
 879, 56 Pac. 596 225 
 
 Bryne v. Com. 16 Ky. L. Rep. 410, 
 
 28 S. W. 481 387, 501 
 
 Buchanan y. State, 24 Ga. 282 274 
 
 Buck V. Com. 107 Pa. 486 79 
 
 Buckhannon t. Com. 86 Ky. 110, 5 
 
 S. W. 358 . . 806, 811, 812 
 Buckles V. Com. 113 Ky- 793, 68 S. 
 
 W. 1084 479, 608 
 
 Buckuer v. Com. 14 Bush, 601 . . 143, 835 
 
 1043 
 
 Buckuer's Case, Styles, 467 299 
 
 Buel T. New York C. R. Co. 31 N. 
 y. 314, 88 Am. Dec. 
 
 271 24 
 
 V. People, 78 N. Y. 402, 34 
 Am. Rep. 555, Affirming, 
 
 18 Hun, 487 149, 175 
 
 182, 184, 339 
 V. State, 104 Wis. 132, 80 N. 
 
 W. 78 . . 899, 905, 906, 939 
 Buford V. State, 132 Ala. 6, 31 So. 
 
 714 62 
 
 Bugg V. Com. 18 Ky. L. Rep. 844, 
 
 38 S. W. 684 305 
 
 Bull V. Com. 14 Gratt. 613 . . 200, 832 
 
 996, 1010 
 Bullock V. State, 65 N. J. L. 537, 
 86 Am. St. Rep. 668, 47 
 
 Atl. 62 604, 607, 608 
 
 621-623, 868, 872, 881 
 Burchet v. Com. 8 Ky. L. Rep. 258, 
 
 1 S. W. 423 574 
 
 Burchfleld v. State, 82 Ind. 580 992 
 
 Burden v. People, 26 Mich. 162 309 
 
 Burdick v. People, 58 Barb. 51 1047 
 
 Burgess v. Com. 2 Va. Cas. 483 . . 153 
 163, 203, 231, 931 
 T. State, 93 Ga. 304, 20 S. E. 
 
 331 648, 060, 675 
 
 Burke v. State, 71 Ala. 377 402 
 
 Burkhard v. State, IS Tex. App. 599 817 
 Burks T. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 167, 49 S. W. 389 .. 250 
 
 358, 398, 545 
 
 Burnett v. People, 204 111. 208, 66 
 
 L.R.A. 304, 9-8 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 206, 68 N. E. 505 . . 69 
 
 70, 80, 81, 438, 587 
 
X] 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Burnett v. State, 14 Lea, 439 . . 686, 834 
 
 858 
 7. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 116, 79 S. W. 550 . . 127, 500 
 
 Burnham t. State, 43 Tex. 322 . . 148 
 
 169, 170, 211, 214 
 
 Burns v. Erben, 40 N. Y. 46:! 767 
 
 V. People, 1 Park. Crim. Eep. 
 
 182 17 
 
 T. State, 49 Ala. 370 .. 407, 409 
 V. State, 2 Ohio Dec. Reprint, 
 
 97 167 
 
 V. State, 3 Oliio Dec. Reprint, 
 
 122 167 
 
 Burr, Re, 4 Crancli, 492 Appx. 2 L. 
 
 ed. 695 Appx 52, 79 
 
 Burrell v. State, 18 Tex. 713 . . 60, 61 
 67, 657, 974, 1007, 1010 
 Burris v. State, 38 Ark. 221 . . 223, 236 
 V. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 387, 30 S. W. 785 482 
 
 541, 544, 545 
 Burrouglis v. United States (Ind. 
 
 Terr.) 90 S. W. 8 331 
 
 405, 411, 986 
 Burrows v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 72 S. W. 848 210, 249 
 
 Burt V. State, 72 Miss. 408, 48 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 563, 16 So. 342 933 
 V. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 397, 39 L.R.A. 305, 40 S. 
 W. 1000, 43 S. W. 344 110 
 Burton v. Com. 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1315, 
 
 60 S. W. 526 289 
 
 T. Com. 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1915, 
 
 66 S. W. 516 .. 370, 472 
 764, 766, 778, 779 
 ,. Com'. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1162, 
 
 70 S. W. 831 1011, 1017 
 
 T. State, 107 Ala. 108, 18 So. 
 
 284 162, 923, 945, 946 
 
 V. State, 141 Ala. 32, 37 So. 
 
 435 842 
 
 V. State, 92 Ga. 449, 17 S. E. 
 
 99 193 
 
 Busby T. Watson, 2 W. BI. 1050 839 
 
 Bush V. Com. 78 Ky. 268 . . 31, 39 
 43, 142, 246, 263 
 V. Com'. 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 539, 51 S. ■W. 238 378 
 
 V. People, 10 Colo. 566, 16 
 
 Pac. 290 . . 502-504, 513, 524 
 534-536, 541, 542 
 V. State, 109 Ga. 120, 34 S. 
 
 B. 298 1030, 1031 
 
 V. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 539, 51 S. W. 238 . . 363, 374 
 378, 504, 509, 519 
 
 Buster t. State, 42 Tex. 315 1040 
 
 Butler V. Com. 2 Duv. 4;i5 60, 61 
 
 Butler V. People, 125 111. 641, 1 L. 
 E.A. 211, 8 Am. St. Rep. 
 423, 18 N. E. 338 . . 574, 576 
 644, 654, 656, 663, 668 
 V. State, 91 Ga. 161, 16 S. B. 
 
 984 927 
 
 T. State, 92 Ga. 601, 19 S. K. 
 
 51 580, 581 
 
 V. State, 102 Wis. 364, 78 N. 
 
 W. 590 836 
 
 Butolph V. Blust, 5 I.ans. 84 613 
 
 Byers v. State, 105 Ala. 31, 16 So. 
 
 716 919 
 
 Byrd T. Com. 89 Va. 536, 16 S. E. 
 
 727 289 
 
 V. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 609, 47 S. W. 721 285 
 
 Byrne v. Com. 16 Ky. L. Rep. 416, 
 
 28 S. W. 481 .. .. 385, 498 
 
 C. 
 
 Caddell v. State, 129 Ala. 57, 30 So. 
 
 76 922, 923, 938, 955 
 
 V. State, 136 Ala. 0, 34 So. 
 
 191 922 
 
 Cage V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 77 
 
 S. W. 806 234 
 
 Cabin V. People, 106 111. 021 614 
 
 Cahn V. State, 27 Tex. App. 709, 11 
 
 S. W. 723 . . 99, 106, 171 
 
 511, 996 
 Cain v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 210, 59 S. W. 275 .. 97, 197 
 
 645, 677 
 
 Caldwell v. State, 41 Tex. 86 . . 208, 213 
 
 741 
 990 
 
 v. State, 12 Tex. App. 306 . . 
 
 V. State, 28 Tex. App. 566, 
 
 14 S. W. 122 . . 836, 837 
 
 840, 841, 
 
 Callahan v. State, 21 Ohio St. 306 . . 
 
 839 
 843 
 109 
 575 
 T. State, 30 Tex. App. 275, 17 
 
 S. W. 257 197 
 
 Callicoatte v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 App.) 22 S. W. 1041 . . 301 
 Calton T. Utah, 130 U. S. 83, 32 L. 
 ed. 870, 9 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 
 435 1053-1055 
 
 1057 
 Camp V. State, 25 Ga. 689 . . 15, 16, 835 
 Campbell v. Com. 13 Ky. L. Rep. 17, 
 
 1(3 S. W. 127 547 
 
 V. Com. 88 Ky. 402, 21 Am. 
 St. Rep. 348, 11 S. W. 
 
 290 296, 297, 404, 771 
 
 V. Com. 84 Pa. 187 889, 920 
 
 V. People, 16 111. 17, 61 Am. 
 
 Dec. 49 . . 62, 63, 365, 403 
 404, 407, 408, 460 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 xli 
 
 Campbell v. People, 159 111. 9, 50 Am. 
 St. Eep. 134, 42 N. B. 
 
 123 897, 899 
 
 V. State, 133 Ala. 81, 91 Am'. 
 
 St. Rep. 17, 31 So. 802 . . 357 
 V. State, 38 Ark. 498 . . 440, 1033 
 V. State (Ga.) 52 S. B. 914 101 
 
 V. State, 11 Ga. 354 974, 991 
 
 1007, 1028, 1030, 1031 
 V. State, 123 Ga. 533, 51 S. K. 
 
 644 925 
 
 V. State, 124 Ga. 432, 52 S. E. 
 
 914 129 
 
 V. State, 15 Tex. App. 506 . . 961 
 T. State, 111 Wis. 152, 86 N. 
 
 W. 855 401, 573 
 
 Canada v. Territory, 12 Okla. 409, 
 
 72 Pac. 375 249 
 
 Canister v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 221, 79 S. W. 24 . . 280, 805 
 Cannon t. People, 141 111. 270, 30 
 
 N. B. 1027 .. 423, 424, 429 
 459, 903 
 V. State, 60 Ark. 564, 31 S. W. 
 
 150, 32 S. W. 128 . . 148, 198 
 
 871, 914 
 
 V. State, 57 Miss. 147 ..141-143 
 
 201 
 T. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 467, 56 S. W. 351 263 
 
 Garden v. State, 84 Ala. 417, 4 So. 
 
 823 924, 927 
 
 Cargen v. People, 39 Mich. 549 . . 832, 834 
 Carico v. Com. 7 Bush, 128 . . 403, 404 
 406, 484, 487 
 Carle v. People, 200 III. 494, 93 Am. 
 St. Rep. 208, 66 N. B. 
 
 32 245, 423 
 
 Carleton v. State, 43 Neb. 373, 61 
 
 N. W. 699 . . 164, 200, 359 
 360, 378, 424, 441, 445 
 Carlisle v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 537, 21 S. W. 358 . .' 50, 82 
 819 
 Carmouche v. Bonis, 6 La. Ann. 95, 
 
 54 Am. Dec. 558 . . 765, 782 
 Carnes v. Com. 27 Ky. L. Hep. 1205, 
 
 87 S. W. 1123 . . 389, 475 
 477, 506, 52S 
 Carpenter v. State, 58 Ark. 233, 24 
 
 S. W. 247 238 
 
 T. State, 62 Ark. 286, 36 S. 
 
 W. 900 50, 362, 472 
 
 473, 647, 763, 764, 766, 776 
 783, 784, 786 
 Carpenter's Appeal, 170 Pa. 203, 29 
 L.R.A. 145, 50 Am. St. 
 Rep. 765, 32 Atl. 637 . . 1068 
 
 Carr v. State, 43 Ark. 99 644, 645 
 
 740, 753 
 V. State (Fla.) 34 So. 892 . . 245 
 V. State, 14 Ga. 358 409 
 
 Carr v. State, 23 Neb. 749, 37 N. 
 
 W. 630 97, 
 
 V. State, 21 Ohio C. C. 43 
 
 124, 129, 359, 361, 362, 
 
 368, 370, 438, 440, 460, 
 
 503, 551, 
 
 T. State, 41 Tex. 544 
 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 87 
 S. W. 346 . . 206, 505, 
 
 Carrick v. State, 18 Ind. 409 
 
 Carrington v. People, 6 Park. Crim. 
 
 Rep. 336 87, 644, 
 
 Carroll v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 1083, 
 
 83 S. W. 552 770, 
 
 V. Com. 84 Pa. 107 
 
 V. State, 23 Ala. 28, 58 Am. 
 
 Dec. 282 259, 303, 
 
 390, 402, 409, 472, 490, 
 767, 768, 790, 791, 792, 
 
 T. State, 71 Ark. 403, 75 S. 
 
 W. 471 
 
 v. State, 3 Humph. 315 . .433, 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 56 S. W. 913 
 
 Carson v. State, 80 Ga. 170, 5 S. B. 
 
 295 98, 101, 
 
 V. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 265, 64 S. W. 1046 
 
 Carter r. People, 2 Hill, 317 , 
 
 V. State, 82 Ala. 13, 2 So. 
 
 766 469, 484, 
 
 V. State, 22 Fla. 553 .. 164, 
 236, 
 
 T. State, 2 Ind. 617 
 
 T. State, 12 Tex. 500, 62 Am. 
 
 Dec. 539 
 
 T. State, 18 Tex. App. 573 . . 
 V. State, 28 Tex. App. 355, 
 
 13 S. W. 147 
 
 V. State, 30 Tex. App. 551, 
 
 28 Am. St. Rep. 944, 17 
 
 S. W. 1102 . . 480, 508, 
 
 527, 541, 547, 548, 579, 
 752- 
 V. State, 37 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 403, 35 S. W. 378 . .290, 
 
 319, 
 
 V. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 345, 46 S. W. 236, 48 S. 
 
 W. 508 
 
 V. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 225, 47 S. W. 979, 49 S. 
 
 W. 74 619, 904, 905, 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 40 
 
 S. W. 498 
 
 Cartwright T. State, 14 Tex. App. 
 
 486 518, 520, 
 
 V. State, 8 Lea, 377 . . 811, 
 
 V. State, 12 Lea, 620. 
 
 936 
 
 120 
 365 
 502 
 552 
 925 
 
 506 
 516: 
 834 
 
 674 
 
 777 
 920 
 
 365 
 764 
 797 
 798 
 
 875 
 434 
 
 250 
 
 102 
 
 263 
 1039 
 
 506 
 166 
 629 
 853 
 
 80rv 
 401 
 
 511 
 580 
 -754 
 
 318 
 365 
 
 862 
 
 911 
 
 290 
 
 521 
 812 
 815 
 914 
 
xlii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Caruthers v. State, 13 Tex. App. 339 200 
 Caruthes v. State, 95 Ga. 343, 22 
 
 S. E 837 288 
 
 Carver v. United States, 160 U. S. 
 553, 40 L. ed. 532, 16 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 388 . . 904-996 
 V. United States, 1G4 U. S. 
 694, 41 L. ed. 602, 17 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 228 . . 1013, 1037 
 Carwile v. State (Ala.) 39 So. 
 
 220 915, 916, 918 
 
 Casat V. State, 40 Ai-lr. 511 . . 159, 201 
 
 232, 810 
 Casey v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 90 S. W. 1018 1044 
 
 Caslsey t. Com. 15 Ky. L. Rep. 257, 
 
 23 S. W. 368 534, 928 
 
 Casner v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 118, 57 S. W. 821, . . 365 
 466, 474, 513, 959 
 T. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 12, 62 S. W. 914 517 
 
 Casteel v. State, 73 Arl5. 152, 83 
 
 S. W. 953 566 
 
 V. State (Arl£.) 88 S. W. 
 
 1004 901 
 
 Castillo T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 69 S. W. 517 1022 
 
 Castle V. Duryea, 32 Barb. 480, 2 
 
 Keyes, 169 696 
 
 Castlin v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 57 S. W. 827 1044 
 
 Castro V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 40 S. W. 985 .. 284, 328 
 
 329, 331, 506 
 
 Cates V. State, 50 Ala. 166 . . 5, 201 
 
 289, 324, 328, 537 
 
 Cathcart v. Com. 37 Pa. 109 . . 554, 833 
 
 849, 854 
 Caton T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) .38 
 
 S. W. 192 230, 231 
 
 Cavaness v. State, 43 Ark. 331 . .897, 901 
 Cavil V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 25 
 
 S. W. 628 366 
 
 Cawley v. Slate, 133 Ala. 128, 32 So. 
 
 227 428, 558 
 
 Cay wood v. Com. 7 Ky. L. Rep. 224. . 713 
 Cecil V. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 450, 
 
 72 S. W. 197 51, 05 
 
 Chalk V. State, 35 Tex. Crim'. Rep. 
 
 116, 32 S. W. 534 381 
 
 389, 405 
 Chambers v. Com. 6 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 448 292, 313 
 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 61, 79 S. W. 572 C47 
 
 549, 774, 777 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 86 
 
 S. W. 752 .. 243, 249, 264 
 543, 668 
 Chamblesg v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 App.) 77 S. W. 2 387 
 
 Chandler v. State, 2 Tex. 306 .... 16 
 
 Channell v. State, 109 Ga. 150, 34 
 
 S. E. 353 103 
 
 Chapman v. Com. 12 Ky. L. Rep. 704, 
 
 15 S. W. 50 786 
 
 V. People, 39 Mich. 357, . . 19, 824 
 846, 850 
 V. State, 120 Ga. 855, 48 S. E. 
 
 350 8, 335 
 
 V. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 135, 57 S. W. 965 354 
 
 355, 403 
 V. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 328, 96 Am. St. Rep. 874, 
 
 65 S. W. 1098 62, 149 
 
 150, 172, 178, 185, 652, 662 
 951, 952, 956 
 f. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 479, 76 S. W. 477 . . 652, 684 
 958- 960 
 Charba v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 87 S. W. 829 . . 208, 301 
 Charge, Re, Newberry, Adm. 323, 
 
 Fed. Cas. No. 18.253 708 
 
 Charles v. State, 13 Tex. App. 658 . . 811 
 Charlon v. State, 106 Ga. 400, 32 
 
 S. E. 347 108 
 
 Chase v. State, 46 Miss. 683 . . 387, 422 
 423, 426, 498 
 V. State, 50 Wis. 510, 7 N. W. 
 
 376 851, 872, 874 
 
 Chatham t. State, 92 Ala. 47, 9 So. 
 
 607 809 
 
 Cheek v. State, 38 Ala. 227 863 
 
 V. State, 35 Ind. 492 ..306, 774 
 
 926 
 V. State, 4 Tex. App. 444. .365, 874 
 
 1049 
 Chelsey v. State, 121 Ga. 340, 49 
 
 S. E. 258 129, 577, 867 
 
 Cherrill v. State, 138 Ala. 3, 35 
 
 So. 129 774 
 
 Chestnut v. State, 112 Ga. 306, 37 S. 
 
 E. 384 274, 275, 283 
 
 Chichester's Case, Aleyn, 12, Keilw. 
 
 108 345 
 
 Childers v. State (Tex. App.) 13 S. E. 
 
 650 197 
 
 v. State, 30 Tex. App. 100, 28 
 Am. St. Rep. 899, 16 S. W. 
 
 903 424, 442 
 
 Childress v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 43 S. W. 100 496 
 
 Childs v. State, 55 Ala. 25 924 
 
 V. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 573, 34 S. W. 939 . . 211, 254 
 514, 518 
 Chism V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 78 
 
 S. W. 049 . . 255, 330, 365 
 369, 452, 520 
 Chittenden v. Com. 10 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 330, 9 S. W. 386 . . 978, 984 
 
 1022 
 
 Chlvarrlo v. State, 15 Tex. App. 330.. 838 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 xliii 
 
 Choice V. State, 31 Ga. 424 .. 116, 805 
 
 806, 925 
 ■Chrisman v. State, 54 Ark. 283, 26 
 Am. St. Eep. 44, 15 S. 
 
 W. 889 805, 807 
 
 Christian v. State, 96 Ala. 89, 11 
 
 So. 338 365, 490 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 62 
 
 S. W. 422 129 
 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 47, 79 S. W. 562 . . 459, 540 
 
 947 
 
 Chrystal v. Com. 9 Bush, 669 . . 680, 682 
 
 684, 697 
 Claris V. Com. Ill Hy. 443, 63 S. W. 
 
 740 . . 97, 100, 158, 592, 594 
 595, 885 
 V. Com. 123 Pa. 555, 16 Atl. 
 
 795 157, 247 
 
 V. Com. 90 Va. 360, 18 S. E. 
 
 440 41, 363, 480, 537 
 
 552 
 T. State, 105 Ala. 91, 17 So. 
 
 37 1006 
 
 T. State, 117 Ga. 254, 43 S. I-:. 
 
 853 193, 344 
 
 V. State, 8 Humph. 671 . .ir,:',, 201 
 
 230 
 V. State, 19 Tex. App. 495 . . 575 
 576, 578, 579, 581, 721 
 V. State, 29 Tex. App. 357, 16 
 
 S. W. 187 904 
 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 456, 76 S. W. 573 342 
 
 3arke v. People, 16 Colo. 511, 27 Pac. 
 
 724 970 
 
 v. State, 78 Ala. 474, 56 Am. 
 
 Eep. 45 574 
 
 V. State, 117 Ala. 1, 67 Am. 
 St. Rep. 157, 23 So. 
 671, . . 150, 209, 210, 241, 588 
 589, 718, 864, 865 
 V. State, 35 Ga. 75.. 124, 129, 219 
 
 Claxton T. State, 2 Humph. 181 386 
 
 Clay V. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 129, 
 
 69 S. W. 413 .. 475, 515, 539 
 541 
 Cleaver t. Mutual Reserve Fund Life 
 Asso. [1892] 1 Q. B. 
 
 147 1064-1066 
 
 Clem' V. Com. 11 Ky. L. Rep. 780, 13 
 
 S. W. 102 314, 959 
 
 Y. State, 31 Ind. 480 124, 133 
 
 T. State, 33 Ind. 419 60 
 
 T. State, 42 Ind. 420, 13 Am. 
 
 R«p. 369 22, 215, 838 
 
 Clements v. State, 50 Ala. 117 .. . 128, 
 
 740, 747, 748, 
 
 V. State, 123 Ga. 547, 51 S. E. 
 
 595 
 
 1049 
 739 
 759 
 
 263 
 
 Clemmons v. State, 43 Fla. 200, 30 
 So. 699 983, 909, 
 
 Clemens v. State (Fla.) 37 So. 647. . 
 
 135, 
 
 Cleveland v. State, 86 Ala. 1, 5 So. 
 426 . . 161-163, 165, 200, 
 403, 404, 409, 434, 470, 
 
 1001 
 
 1044 
 
 124 
 
 1045 
 
 362 
 555 
 809 
 
 ClilTora V. State, 60 N. J. L. 287, 37 
 
 Atl. 1101 275 
 
 V. State, 58 Wis. 477, 17 N. W. 
 
 304 125, 133, 164, 201 
 
 Clifton V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 84 S. W. 237 249 
 
 Cline V. State, 43 Ohio St. 332, 1 N. 
 
 E, 22 805 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 28 
 
 S. W. 684 466, 467, 506 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 71 
 
 S. W. 23 356, 406 
 
 Clingan v. State (Ark.) 91 S. W. 12. . 525 
 Clore V. State, 26 Tex. App. 624, 
 
 10 S. W. 242 275, 312 
 
 811, 817 
 
 Cloud V. Com. 7 Ky. L. Rep. 818 924 
 
 939 
 V. State, 81 Ga. 444, 7 S. E. 
 
 641 769, 
 
 Clough ». State, 7 Neb. 320 914, 
 
 Cluck V. State, 40 Ind. 263 . . 814, 
 844, 931, 
 
 Cluverius v. Com. 81 Ta. 787 
 
 Coal-Heavers' Case, 1 Leach, C. L. 66 
 Coates v. People, 72 111. 303 . . 73, 
 
 Cochran v. State, 113 Ga. 736, 39 S. 
 
 E. 337 
 
 V. State, 28 Tex. App. 422, 13 
 
 S. W. 651 271, 272, 
 
 365, 
 
 Cockerell v. State, 32 Tex. App. 585, 
 
 25 S. W. 421 . . 281, 283, 
 
 Cockrill V. Com. 95 Ky. 22, 23 S. W. 
 
 659 . . 366, 485, 532, 552, 
 
 Cockrum v. State, 24 Tex. 394 
 
 Coe V. Com. 94 Ky. 606, 23 S. W. 
 
 371 
 
 Coffee V. State, 3 Yerg. 288, 24 Am. 
 
 Dec. 570 . . 125, 129, 130, 
 
 770 
 915 
 842 
 932 
 832 
 58 
 82 
 854 
 
 889 
 
 311 
 458 
 
 917 
 
 748 
 750 
 258 
 
 868 
 
 205 
 238 
 
 Coffin V. United States, 156 U. S. 432, 
 
 39 L. ed. 481, 15 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Eep. 394 220 
 
 Coffman v. Com. 10 Bush, 495 . . 40, 42 
 
 267, 292 
 Cogburn v. State (Ark.) 88 S. W. 
 
 822 555 
 
 Cogdell V. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 178, 63 S. W. 645 553 
 
xliv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Cogswell V. Com. 17 Ky. L. Rep. 822, 
 
 32 S. W. 935 541, 545 
 
 Cohen v. State, 116 Ga. 573, 42 S. B. 
 
 781 1055 
 
 Coll T. State, 62 Neb. 15, 86 N. W. 
 
 925 460, 461, 1054 
 
 Colbath V. State, 2 Tex. App. 391 ... 812 
 
 1040 
 
 V. State, 4 Tex. App. 76 812 
 
 Cole V. State, 105 Ala. 76, 16 So. 762 1000 
 V. State, 59 Ai-k. 50, 26 S. W. 
 
 377 903 
 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 225, 75 S. W. 527 . . 
 
 774, 934, 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 88 
 
 S. W. 341 . . 297, 311, 
 
 393, 410, 442, 444, 450, 
 
 Coleman v. State, 121 Ga. 594, 49 S. 
 
 E. 716 243, 631, 
 
 T. State, 83 Miss. 290, 64 L.Ii. 
 A. 807, 35 So. 937 . . 828, 
 
 845, 1052 
 T. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 404, 33 S. W. 1083 
 
 V. State, 40 Tex. Ci'im. Eep. 
 
 137, 49 S. W. 92 .. 304, 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 25 
 
 S. W. 772 508, 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 88 
 
 S. W. 238 281, 370, 
 
 382, 403, 413, 
 v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 90 
 
 S. W. 499 136, 
 
 Collier v. State, 69 Ala. 247 
 
 V. State, 20 Ark. 36 1025, 1027 
 
 V. State, 39 Ga. 31, 99 Am. 
 
 Dec. 449 125 
 
 Collins T. Com. 12 Bush, 271 988 
 
 V. People, 194 111. 506, 62 N. 
 
 E. 902 1003, 
 
 V. State, 138 Ala. 57, 34 So. 
 
 993 64, 245, 645, 
 
 955, 958, 
 T. State, 88 Ga. 347 14 S. E. 
 
 474 50, 58, 
 
 T. State, 3 Heisk. i4 22, 
 
 44, 52, 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 83 
 
 S. W. 866 857 
 
 T. United States, 150 TJ. S. 62, 
 37 L. ed. 998, 14 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Eep. 9 297, 312 
 
 Collman v. State, 163 Ind. 503, 72 N. 
 
 B. 568 551 
 
 Colquit V. State, 107 Tenn. 381, 64 S. 
 
 W. 713 900, 901, 
 
 Colt V. People, 1 Park. Crim. Eep. 
 
 611 
 
 Colton T. State, 31 Miss. 504 
 
 Combs T. Com. 10 Ky. L. Rep. 553, 
 
 9 S. W. 655 391 I 
 
 254 
 947 
 
 324 
 947 
 
 634 
 
 844 
 
 11 
 
 305 
 
 527 
 
 381 
 500 
 
 557 
 266 
 
 1015 
 
 672 
 959 
 
 73 
 
 24 
 53 
 
 908 
 
 846 
 894 
 
 Combs V. Com. 14 Ky. L. Eep. 703, 
 
 21 S. W. 353 63, 676 
 
 Commander v. State, 60 Ala. 1 132 
 
 916, 927 
 
 Com. V. Abbott, 130 Mass. 472 416 
 
 939, 940 
 T. Adams, 114 Mass. 323, 19 
 
 Am. Rep. 362 336, 337 
 
 V. Aiello, 180 Pa. 597, 36 Atl. 
 
 1079 115, 143, 163, 205 
 
 224, 327 
 V. Ailstock, 3 Gratt. 650. .838, 840 
 
 841 
 V. Arnold, 83 Ky. 1, 4 Am. St. 
 
 Eep. 117 1050 
 
 V. Baker, 11 Phila. 631 . . 809, 812 
 
 T. Barker, 12 Cush. 186 839 
 
 V. Barnacle, 134 Mass. 215, 45 
 
 Am. Eep. 319 448 
 
 V. Earner, 199 Pa. 335, 49 
 
 Atl. 60 803, 804 
 
 V. Barnes, 13 Ky. L. Eep. 163, 
 
 16 S. W. 457 521 
 
 V. Bell, 164 Pa. 517, 30 Atl. 
 
 511 235, 907 
 
 V. Bell, Addison (Pa.) 156, 1 
 
 Am. Dec. 298 . . 116, 130, 266 
 275, 310, 311 
 V. Best, 180 Mass. 492, 62 N. 
 
 E. 748 226, 230 
 
 V. Beucher, 10 Pa. Co. Ct. 3 . . 1054 
 V. Bilderback, 2 Pars. Sel. Eq. 
 
 Cas. 447 ... 8, 707, 835, 877 
 879, 880, 966, 1044 
 
 V. Blron, 4 Dall. 125 5 
 
 T. Birriolo, 197 Pa. 371, 47 
 
 Atl. 355 . . 226, 235, 993, 997 
 1007, 1011, 1029 
 T. Bishop, 165 Mass. 148, 42 
 
 N. B. 560 993 
 
 V. Booker, 25 Ky. L. Eep. 1025, 
 
 76 S. W. 838 385 436 
 
 V. Boschino, 176 Pa. 103, 34 
 
 Atl. 964 157 
 
 T. Boston & L. E. Corp. 134 
 
 Mass. 211 13 
 
 V. Boston & M. E. Co. 129 
 Mass. 500, 37 Am. Eep. 
 
 382 13 
 
 V. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356, 7 Am. 
 
 Dec. 154 69, 70 
 
 V. Branham, 8 Bush, 387. .130, 138 
 V. Brewer, 164 Mass. 577, 42 
 
 N. B. 92 992, 1030 
 
 V. Breyessee, 160 Pa. 451, 40 
 Am. St. Eep. 729, 28 Atl. 
 
 824 363, 469, 574 
 
 T. Bright, 23 Ky. L. Eep. 1921, 
 
 66 S. W. 604 423 
 
 V. Brltton, 1 Legal Gaz. Eep. 
 
 513 993, 1007, 1030 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 xlv 
 
 Com. 
 
 Brown, 14 Gay, 419 
 
 887, 
 V. Brown, 193 Pa. 507, 44 Atl. 
 
 497 
 
 T. Brown, 7 Pa. Co. Ct. 640 . . 
 
 200, 209, 221, 224, 254, 
 
 V. Brown, 90 Va. 671, 19 S. 
 
 E. 447 . . 100, 133, 164, 
 228, 665, 
 
 V. Bruce, 16 Phila. 510 
 
 V. Buccieri, 153 Pa. 535, 26 
 
 Atl. 228 . . 102, 159, 166, 
 
 V. Bugbee, 4 Gray, 206 
 
 ■V. Bullock, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 78, 
 67 S. W. 992 
 
 V. Burgess, 2 Ta. Cas. 484 . . 
 
 T. Campbell, 7 Allen, 541, 83 
 Am. Dec. 705 . . 32, 62, 
 644, 654, 656, 657, 659, 
 
 ■V. Carey, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 404 
 V. Carey, 12 Cush. 246 . . 601, 
 616, 630, 
 V. Carver, 5 Rand. (Va.) 660 
 V. Casey, 11 Cush. 417, 59 Am. 
 Dec. 150 . . 998 1020, 
 
 T. Chance, 174 Mass. 245, 75 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 306, 54 N. 
 
 B. 551 
 
 V. Chapman, 11 Cush. 422 . . 
 
 860, 866, 868, 873, 887, 
 V. Cleary, 148 Pa. 26, 23 Atl. 
 
 1110 . . 203, 209, 214, 
 
 812, 
 
 y. Clegget, 3 Legal Gaz. 9 . . 
 
 T. Clemmer, 190 Pa. 202, 42 
 
 Atl. 675 
 
 T. Cook, 166 Pa. 193, 31 Atl. 
 
 56 157, 228, 
 
 ■V. Cook, 8 Pa. Co. Ct. 486 . . 
 
 705, 
 
 T. Cooley, 6 Gray, 350 . . 624, 
 
 T. Cooper, 5 Allen, 495, 81 Am. 
 
 Dec. 762 1017, 
 
 -V. Corrigan, 1 Pittsh. 292 . .2, 
 
 20, 102, 104, 165, 198, 
 
 T. Costley, 118 Mass. 1 ..36, 
 
 854, 859, 905, 
 
 T. Coy, 157 Mass. 200, 32 N. 
 
 E. 4 
 
 T. Cozine, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 412, 
 
 9 S. W. 289 
 
 T. Crane, 2 Wheeler, C. C. 587 
 
 V. Crause, 4 Clark (Pa.) 500. . 
 
 198, 208, 254, 
 
 T. Crossmire, 156 Pa. 304, 27 
 
 Atl. 40 247, 919, 
 
 885 
 969 
 
 934 
 
 6 
 
 363 
 
 551 
 
 205 
 668 
 976 
 
 231 
 849 
 839 
 
 786 
 233 
 
 88 
 663 
 957 
 456 
 612 
 974 
 
 16 
 
 1021 
 1036 
 
 112 
 
 859 
 
 805 
 813 
 601 
 603 
 
 919 
 
 230 
 682 
 724 
 626 
 
 1038 
 
 6 
 
 199 
 
 214 
 
 37 
 
 914 
 
 859 
 
 44 
 315 
 152 
 483 
 
 925 
 
 Com. V. Crowley, 26 Pa. Super. Ct. 
 
 
 134 747, 
 
 752 
 
 V. 
 
 Crozler, 1 Brewst. (Pa.) 
 
 
 
 349 208, 214, 275, 
 
 814 
 
 V. 
 
 Cutaiar, 5 Pa. Dist. K. 
 
 
 
 403 . . 219, 224, 225, 897, 
 
 904 
 
 
 905, 
 
 911 
 
 T. 
 
 Daley, 2 Clark (Pa.) 361 . . 
 
 124 
 
 
 148, 152, 153, 164, 198, 
 
 203 
 
 
 341, 647, 657, 659, 670, 
 
 764 
 
 
 769, 778, 
 
 779 
 
 V. 
 
 Danz, 211 Pa. 507, 60 Atl. 
 
 
 
 1070 .. 102, 198, 900, 
 
 906 
 
 
 909, 
 
 950 
 
 V. 
 
 Deacon, 8 Serg. & R. 47 . . 
 
 613 
 
 615 
 
 V. 
 
 Dennis, 105 Mass. 162 
 
 53 
 
 
 69, 
 
 70 
 
 V. 
 
 Densmore, 12 Allen, 535 . . 
 
 979 
 
 
 992, 
 
 994 
 
 V. 
 
 Desmarteau, 16 Gray, 1 . . 
 
 148 
 
 
 152, 172, 832, 
 
 862 
 
 V. 
 
 Devlin, 126 Ma.ss. 253 . . 
 
 118 
 
 
 171, 172, 
 
 718 
 
 V. 
 
 Dillen, 210 Pa. 579, 60 Atl. 
 
 
 
 263 
 
 174 
 
 T. 
 
 Donahue, 148 Mass. 529, 2 
 L.R.A. 623, 12 Am. St. 
 
 
 
 Rep. 591, 20 N. E. 171.. 
 
 780 
 
 781 
 
 V. 
 
 Dougherty, 7 Smith's Laws 
 
 
 
 (Pa.) 696 .. Ill, 112, 
 
 209 
 
 V. 
 
 Dougherty, 1 Browne (Pa.) 
 
 
 
 Appx. XVIII. . . 153, 335, 
 
 577 
 
 V. 
 
 Drew, 4 Mass. 391 . . 50, 
 
 64 
 
 
 124, 132, 300, 601, 606, 
 
 620 
 
 
 683, 785, 
 
 786 
 
 V. 
 
 Drum, 58 Pa. 9 . . 2, 5, 6, 
 
 100 
 
 
 106, 110, 115, 118, 130, 
 
 132 
 
 
 135, 148, 152, 164, 200, 
 
 203 
 
 
 205, 207, 209, 219, 221- 
 
 224 
 
 
 228, 236, 238, 254, 259, 
 
 260 
 
 
 266, 275, 276, 284, 285, 
 
 311 
 
 
 312, 314, 324, 363, 386, 
 
 387 
 
 
 394, 446, 456, 496, 498, 
 
 551 
 
 552 
 
 V. Dudash, 204 Pa. 124, 53 
 
 Atl. 756 812 
 
 V. Dudley, 6 Leigh, 614 69 
 
 V. Dunan, 128 Mass. 422 989 
 
 V. Duncan, 91 Ky. 592, 16 S. 
 
 W. 530 136, 137 
 
 V. Eagan, 190 Pa. 10, 42 Atl. 
 
 374 187, 188 
 
 V. Barle, 1 Whart. 525 870, 1040 
 
 1041 
 V. Eckerd, 174 Pa. 137, 34 Atl. 
 
 305 201, 228 
 
 V. Eisenhower, 181 Pa. 470, 59 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 670, 37 Atl. 
 
 ,521 42, 575 
 
xlvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Com. V. Ellenger, 1 Brewst. (Pa.) 
 
 352 209, 254, 206, 315 
 
 V. Epps, 103 Pa. 512, 44 Atl. 
 
 570 176, 953, 954 
 
 V. Farvell, 187 Pa. 408, 41 Atl. 
 
 382 935, 940, 951 
 
 T. Fellows, 212 Pa. 207, 61 
 
 Atl. 922 238, 1057 
 
 V. Peirigan, 44 Pa. 386 ...421, 923 
 
 V. Plan-agan, 7 Watts. & S. 415 173 
 
 832, 875 
 
 V. Flanigan, 8 Phlla. 430 580 
 
 V. Fox, 7 Gray, 585... 38, 39, 119 
 
 194, 835, 837, 846, 848 
 V. Fry, 198 Pa. 379, 48 Atl. 
 
 257 922 
 
 T. Gal)le, 7 Serg. & K. 423 152 
 
 335, 835, 1044 
 
 V. Gibson, 2 Va. Cas. 70 232 
 
 866, 867 
 V. Gibson, 211 Pa. 546, 60 Atl. 
 
 1086 133, 198, 249 
 
 V. Gilbert, 105 Mass. 45, 42 
 
 N. B. 336 172, 805, 806 
 
 T. Gray, 17 Ky. L. Eep. 354, 
 
 30 S. W. 1015 925 
 
 V. Green, 1 Ashm. (Pa.) 289.. 2 
 
 30, 38, 40, 41, 43, 102, 104 
 
 107, 129, 131, 152, 153, 201 
 
 203, 214, 228, 232, 233, 236 
 
 309, 326, 335 
 
 V. Greer, 20 Pa. Co. Ct. 535.. 741 
 
 747, 751 
 
 V. Grether, 204 Pa. 203, 53 
 
 Atl. 753 615, 962 
 
 V. Gumpert, 6 Luzerne Legal 
 
 Reg. 187 973,976, 981 
 
 V. I-Iackett, 2 Allen, 136... 38, 41 
 
 997 
 V. Hamilton, 26 Phila. Leg. 
 
 Int. 68 705 
 
 V. Haney, 127 Mass. 455 991 
 
 1017, 1018, 1021 
 V. Hanlon, 3 Brewst. (Pa.) 
 
 461, 8 Phila. 401 176, 905 
 
 V. Hare, 2 Clark (Pa.) 487.. 88 
 
 152, 210, 325, 328, 329, 386 
 
 451, 648, 670 
 
 T. Harman, 4 Pa. 269 14 
 
 V. Hart, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 546.. 806 
 
 812, 813 
 T. Hartwell, 128 Mass. 415, 35 
 
 Am. Rep. 301 704, 882 
 
 T. Hawkins, 3 Gray, 463.. 128, 332 
 
 815 
 
 V. Hearsey, 1 Mass. 137 683 
 
 T. Heath, 11 Gray, 303 332 
 
 T. Hendrie, 2 Gray, 503 863 
 
 V. Heroia, 5 Pa. Dlst. R. 623. . 8 
 
 148, 214, 363, 366, 386, 461 
 
 469 
 
 V. Hersey, 2 Allen, 173... 154, 870 
 
 Com. V. Herty, 109 Mass. 348.. 832, 
 
 1043, 
 T. Highland, 1 Pa. Co. Ct. 032 
 v. Hill, 11 Cush. 136... 52, 53, 
 
 V. Hill, 2 Gratt. 594 212, 
 
 T. Hilliard, 2 Gray, 294.. 267, 
 
 ,. Hollinger, 190 Pa. 155, 42 
 Atl. 548 247, 803, 
 
 V. Holmes, 157 Mass. 233, 34 
 Am. St. Rep. 270, 32 N. 
 
 1042 
 1049 
 1051 
 863 
 238 
 433 
 450 
 
 804 
 
 
 E. 6. . .925, 932, 940, 941, 
 
 943; 
 
 V 
 
 Homer, 153 Mass. 343, 26 
 
 
 
 N. E. 872 
 
 »77 
 
 V 
 
 Honeyman, Addison (Pa.) 
 
 
 
 147... 116, 124, 132, 152, 
 
 27(V. 
 311 
 
 V 
 
 Hoskins, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 59, 
 
 
 
 35 S. W. 284 416, 422, 
 
 506. 
 
 V 
 
 Hourigan, 89 Ky. 305, 12 S. 
 
 
 
 W. 550 
 
 275 
 
 V 
 
 Hughes, 183 Mass. 221, 66 
 
 
 
 N. B. 716.. 612, 632, 964, 
 
 965. 
 
 V. 
 
 Ibrahim, 184 Mass. 255, 68 
 
 
 
 N. B. 231 
 
 833 
 
 V. 
 
 Jackson, 15 Gray, 187. .592, 
 
 596 
 
 
 885- 
 
 - 887 
 
 V. 
 
 Johnson, 162 Pa. 63, 29 Atl. 
 
 
 
 280 
 
 899 
 
 V. 
 
 Johnson, 211 Pa. 640, 61 
 
 
 
 Atl. 246 
 
 198. 
 
 V. 
 
 Johnson, 213 Pa. 432, 02 
 
 
 
 Atl. 1064 464, 
 
 795 
 
 V. 
 
 Jones, 1 Lehigh, 598. . .148, 
 
 150 
 
 
 153, 155, 163, 199, 
 
 202 
 
 V. 
 
 Keene, 7 Pa. Super. Ct. 293 
 
 973 
 
 
 977, 
 
 981 
 
 f. 
 
 Kennard, 8 Pick. 133 
 
 785 
 
 V. 
 
 Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18, 48 
 
 
 
 N. B. 770 
 
 922 
 
 V. 
 
 Kern, 1 Brewst. (Pa.) 350. . 
 
 50- 
 
 T. 
 
 Kilpatrick, 204 Pa. 218, 53 
 
 
 
 Atl. 774 
 
 233 
 
 V. 
 
 Kirby, 2 Cush. 577 
 
 624 
 
 V. 
 
 Klose, 4 Kulp, 111 
 
 158 
 
 V. 
 
 Knapp, 9 Pick. 495, 20 Am. 
 
 
 
 Dec. 491... 59, 60, 62, 03, 
 
 84 
 
 V. 
 
 Knapp, 10 Pick. 484, 20 
 
 
 
 Am. Dec. 534 
 
 79 
 
 V. 
 
 Kovovic, 209 Pa. 465, 58 
 
 
 
 Atl. 857 
 
 238- 
 
 V. 
 
 Krause, 193 Pa. 306, 44 Atl. 
 
 
 
 454 228, 231, 234, 
 
 927 
 
 V. 
 
 Kuhn, 1 Pittsb. 13.. 8, 704, 
 
 966. 
 
 V. 
 
 Lawson, 25 Ky. li. Rep. 
 
 
 
 2187, 80 S. W. 206 
 
 1031 
 
 V. 
 
 Lenox, 3 Brewst. (Pa.) 249. 
 
 320 
 
 
 331, 402, 422, 943, 1034, 
 
 lu37 
 
 V. 
 
 Lewis, Addison (Pa.) 279.. 
 
 124 
 
 
 152, 189, 335, 346, 647, 
 
 648 
 
 T. 
 
 Linton, 2 Va. Cas. 205 
 
 19 
 
 
 823, 
 
 844- 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 xlvii 
 
 Com. V. Lloyd, Tried at Leesburg, 
 
 Oct. 30, 1872 
 
 V. Long, 17 Pa. Super. Ct. 641 
 740, 758, 
 
 T. Lucas, 2 Allen, 170 
 
 v. Lynch, 3 Pittsb. 412 2, 
 
 132, 158, 161, 200, 207, 
 
 224, 
 
 T. McAfee, 108 Mass. 408, 11 
 
 Am. Rep. 383 718, 
 
 V. M'Pall, Addison (Pa.) 255 
 
 148, 164, 214, 812, 
 
 V. McGowan, 189 Pa. 641, 69 
 
 Am. St. Eep. 836, 42 Atl. 
 
 365 363, 371, 458, 
 
 V. McLaughlin, 12 Cusb. 615.. 
 
 910 
 361 
 760 
 59 
 125 
 210 
 259 
 
 857 
 124 
 813 
 
 814 
 612 
 630 
 
 V. Macloon, 101 Mass. 1, 100 
 
 Am. Dec. 89 . . 18, 19, 22, 23 
 
 34, 44, 692, 823, 826, 837, 848 
 
 V. McMauus, 143 Pa. 64, 14 
 L.R.A. 89, 21 Atl. 1018, 
 
 22 Atl. 7H1 163, 930 
 
 T. McMillan, 6 Kulp, 281, 
 Affirmed in 144 Pa. 610, 
 
 22 Atl. 1029 226 
 
 T. McMurray, 198 Pa. 51, 82 
 Am. St. Rep. 787, 47 Atl. 
 
 952 243, 818 
 
 ,. M'Pike, 3 Cush. 181, 50 Am. 
 
 Dec. 727. . .6, 40, 41, 974, 997 
 
 v. Madan, 102 Mass. 1 930 
 
 V. Major, 198 Pa. 290, 82 Am. 
 
 St. Eep. 803, 47 Atl. 741. . 645 
 
 649, 650, 842, 932, 951, 952 
 
 961, 964 
 
 V. Manfredi, 162 Pa. 144, 29 
 
 Atl. 404 181, 188, 953 
 
 V. Martin, 7 Pa. Dist. R. 219. . 644 
 
 655, 656 
 
 V. Martin, 98 Mass. 4 608 
 
 V. Martin, 125 Mass. 394 847 
 
 T. Matthews, 89 Ky. 287, 12 S. 
 
 W. 333 572,680,682, 684 
 
 697, 698, 986, 989, 991, 993 
 1007 
 
 T. Max, 8 Phila. 422 739, 742 
 
 749, 753, 759 
 
 T. Mead, 12 Gray, 167, 71 Am. 
 
 Dec. 741 449, 450 
 
 V. Megary, 8 Phila. 607 743 
 
 T. Metropolitan R. Co. 107 
 
 Mass. 236 694 
 
 v. Mika, 171 Pa. 273, 33 Atl. 
 
 65 1004 
 
 T. Miller, 8 Kulp, 85 158 
 
 V. Miller, 4 Phila. 195 148, 644 
 
 050, 668 
 
 V. Miller, 1 Va. Cas. 310 832 
 
 V. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 25 
 
 Am. Rep. 109. . .8, 69, 70, 81 
 
 179, 338, 587 
 
 Com. V. Mitchell, 1 Va. Cas. 116 5 
 
 V. Mitchka, 209 Pa. 274, 58 
 
 Atl. 474 464 
 
 V. Moore, 2 Pittsb. 502... 206, 304 
 V. Moore, 28 Ky. L. Rep, 62, 
 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 719, 88 
 
 S. W. 1085 576,581, 654 
 
 V. Moran, 107 Mass. 239 608 
 
 V. Morrison, 193 Pa. 613, 44 
 
 Atl. 913... 133, 201, 237, 241 
 260 
 
 V. Mosler, 4 Pa. 264 295 
 
 T. Murphy, 11 Cush. 472 865 
 
 T. Murray, 2 Ashm. (Pa.) 41. 152 
 
 203, 229, 973, 974, 981, 993 
 
 1007, 1028, 1030 
 V. Neeley, 2 Chester Co. Rep. 
 
 191 1049 
 
 V. NeiUs, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 353 50 
 
 64, 71, 77, 148, 209, 210, 217 
 
 647, 659, 665, 067, 669 
 
 V. Norton, 2 Best. L. R. 241. . 123 
 
 V. O'Donohue, 8 Phila. 623 15 
 
 590, 896 
 
 V. O'Malley, 131 Mass. 423... 305 
 
 V. Onofri, 18 Phila. 436. .219, 223 
 
 T.Parker, 2 Pick. 550... 19, 823 
 
 826 
 
 T. Pemberton, 118 Mass. 36.. 148 
 
 149, 178 
 
 V. Perrier, 3 Phila. 229. .812, 813 
 
 V. Phillips, 16 Mass. 423 78 
 
 v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 52 
 Am. Rep. 264.. 679, 713, 
 
 ». Piatt, 11 Phila. 415. 
 
 714 
 
 883 
 
 ..807, 810 
 
 812 
 
 V. Pope, 103 Mass. 440... 944, 949 
 
 V. Power, 7 Met. 596, 41 Am. 
 
 Dec. 465 785 
 
 T. Quinn, 150 Mass. 401, 23 
 
 N. E. 54 940 
 
 T. Bailing, 113 Pa. 37, 4 Atl. 
 
 459 597 
 
 V. Randall, 4 Gray, 36 718 
 
 v. Randolph, 146 Pa. 83, 28 
 Am'. St. Rep. 782, 23 Atl. 
 
 388 54 
 
 V. Reed, 5 Phila. 528 973 
 
 T. Ehoades, 23 Pa. Super. Ct. 
 
 512 741 
 
 V. Rhoads, 23 Pa. Super. Ct. 
 
 512... 738, 739, 747, 748, 1010 
 V. Richards, 18 Pick. 434, 29 
 
 Am. Dec. 608 974 
 
 V. Riley, Thacher, C. C. 471.. 386 
 
 540 
 V. Roberts, 108 Mass. 296. .50, 37 
 73, 217, 218, 903 
 V. Robertson, Addison (Pa.) 
 
 246 289, 449, 793 
 
xlviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Com. T. Robertson, 162 Mass. 90, SS 
 N. E. 25 20, 84.'3, 850, 
 
 V. Robinson, 146 Mass. 571, 
 
 16 N. E. 452 
 
 V. Roby, 12 Pick. 503 
 
 V. Roddy, 184 Pa. 274, 39 Atl. 
 
 211 97.->, 982, 
 
 V. Rodes, 6 B. Mon. 174 
 
 T. Rudert, 109 Ky. 653, 60 S. 
 
 W 489 378, 
 
 V. Ryan, 134 Mass. 223. .900, 
 T. Salyards, 158 Pa. 501, 27 
 
 Atl. 993 233, 
 
 T. Schoeppe, 1 Legal Gaz. Rep. 
 
 433 154, 
 
 T. Scboeppe, Taylor's Med. Jur. 
 
 by Reese, 25 
 
 V. Seibert, Luzerne Co. 1852.. 
 T. Selfridge, Horr. & T. Cas. 
 
 19. .5, 254, 367, 464, 465, 
 
 484, 497, 503, 519, 524, 
 T. Sheets, 197 Pa. 69, 46 Atl. 
 
 753 238, 244, 
 
 V. Sherman, 13 Allen, 248 
 
 T. Silcox, 161 Pa. 484, 29 Atl. 
 
 105 208, 254, 997, 
 
 T. Skeels, 13 Pa. Co. Ct. 174. 
 V. Smith, 7 Smith's Laws 
 
 (Pa.) 696 228, 233, 
 
 T. Smith, 7 Smith's Laws 
 
 Appx. 2 Wheeler, C. C. 80 
 
 sr>4 
 859 
 
 nin 
 
 1049 
 
 1022 
 681 
 
 412 
 940 
 
 933 
 
 155 
 
 909 
 456 
 
 468 
 740 
 
 247 
 863 
 
 1035 
 1051 
 
 931 
 
 305 
 922 
 
 838 
 920 
 
 990 
 844 
 838 
 863 
 974 
 980 
 
 925 
 
 431 
 998 
 T. Sturtivant, 117 Mass. 122, 
 
 19 Am. Rep. 401 947, 948 
 
 T. Sullivan, 13 Phlla. 410 160 
 
 201, 202, 210, 221, 973, 1029 
 r. Sutton, 205 Pa. 605, 55 
 
 Atl. 781 247, 1057 
 
 T. Thompson, 6 Mass. 134... 613 
 
 713 
 T. Thompson, 159 Mass. 56, 
 
 33 N. E. 1111 977, 1000 
 
 T. Tompson, 2 Cush. 551 863 
 
 V. Tircinski, 189 Mass. 257, 2 
 L.R.A.(N.S.) 102, 75 N. 
 E. 261 429, 434 
 
 T. Snell, 189 Mass. 12, 3 L.R.A. 
 
 (N.S.) 1019, 75 N. E. 75 
 
 841, 845, 849, 852, 860, 
 
 T. Spahr, 211 Pa. 542, 60 Atl. 
 
 1084 
 
 T. Springfield, 7 Mass. 9 .... 
 T. Starr, 36 Pittsb. L. J. 334 
 
 T. Stoddard, 9 Allen, 280 
 
 ■V. Stoops, Addison (Pa.) 381. 
 
 979, 
 
 T. Storti, 177 Mass. 339, 58 
 
 N. E. 1021 
 
 T. Straesser, 153 Pa. 451, 26 
 
 Atl. 17 226, 422, 429, 
 
 Com. V. Totli, 145 Pa. 308, 22 Atl. 
 
 157 203, 647 
 
 V. Tucker, 189 Mass. 457, 76 
 
 N. E. 127 166 944 
 
 V. Twitchell, 1 Brewst. (Pa.) 
 
 552 918, 1047 
 
 T. Van Horn, 4 Lack. Legal 
 
 News, 63 1004 
 
 T. Ware, 137 Pa. 465, 20 Atl. 
 
 806 269,313,363, 469 
 
 V. ■Washington, 202 Pa. 148, 
 
 51 Atl. 759 245 
 
 v. ■Weathers, 7 Kulp, 1...367, 424 
 
 527, 544, 547, 739, 755, 760 
 V. "Weber, 167 Pa. 153, 31 Atl. 
 
 481 228, 231, 233 
 
 V. 'Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 52 
 
 Am. Dec. 711.. 2, 5, 6, 22, 27 
 
 97-100, 110, 116, 124, 132, 253 
 
 254, 266, 275, 283, 284, 288 
 
 289, 291, 331, 846, 847, 852 
 899, 900, 902, 004 
 T. Werbine, 12 Lane. Bar, 79 . . 1051 
 V. 'Werling, 164 Pa. 559, 30 
 
 Atl. 406 233 
 
 V. 'Whitler, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 
 
 388 304 
 
 V. 'Williams, 171 Mass. 461, 
 
 50 N. E. 103.J..899, 90G, 911 
 
 V. 'Williams, 2 Ashm. (Pa.) 69 131 
 
 203, 224, 974, 993, 1013 
 
 V. 'Wilson, 1 Gray, 337 407 
 
 V. 'Winkelman, 12 Pa. Super. 
 
 Ct. 497. . .993, 1000, 1007, 1029 
 1034 
 V. Wireback, 190 Pa. 138, 70 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 625, 42 Atl. 
 
 542 803 
 
 V. Woodward, 102 Mass. 155. . 373 
 859, 860, 874, 916 
 V. Yamell, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 144, 
 
 68 S. W. 136 140 
 
 V. York, 9 Met. 93, 43 Am. 
 
 Dec. 373.. 2, 5, 97, 116, 124 
 
 125, 130, 132, 239, 275, 331 
 332, 896 
 V. Zephon, MS. Phil. 1844... 231 
 Com', ex rel. Cbauncey v. Keeper of 
 
 Prison, 2 Ashm. (Pa.) 227 155 
 214, 592, 594, 595 
 Wadsworth v. Shortall, 206 Pn. 
 
 165, 65 L.R.A. 193, 98 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 759, 55 Atl. 9,j2. 732 
 Compton V. State, 110 Ala. 24, 20 So. 
 
 119. .3, 132 141, 142, 211, 213 
 
 243, 246, 469, 471, 509, 537 
 Conde v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rop. 98, 
 
 60 Am. St. Rep. 22, 34 
 
 S. W. 286.. 897, 903, 90S, 1050 
 Coney v. State, 90 Ga. 140, 15 S. E. 
 
 740 502, 556 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 xlix 
 
 Oonlngsmark's Case, 9 How. St. Tr. 
 
 77 61, 64 
 
 Conley v. Com. 98 Ky. 125, 32 S. W. 
 
 285 805, 808 
 
 Connaughty v. State, 1 Wis. 159, 60 
 
 Am. Dec. 370.. 49, 60, 61, 774 
 Connell v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 142, 75 S. W. 512... 284, 432 
 4.'!8, 442, 453, 466, 477 
 T. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 259, 81 S. W. 746 97, 124 
 
 126, 144, 246, 249, 255, 259 
 271, 310, 311, 9S3, 1001, 1051 
 
 Conner v. Com. 13 Busli, 714 152, 834 
 
 835, 1043, 1049 
 
 V. State (Miss.) 13 So. 934 389 
 
 474, 481, 484, 488, 500 
 V. State, 23 Tex. App. 378, 5 
 
 S. W. 189 246, 458 
 
 V. State, 4 Yerg. 137, 26 Am. 
 
 Dec. 217 124,13.3, 779 
 
 Connor v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 398, 
 
 81 S. W. 259 4, 479, 559 
 
 Conraddy v. People, 5 Parle. Crim. 
 
 Eep. 234... 737, 738, 742, 743 
 751, 754 
 
 Cook V. Com. 4 Ky. L. Rep. 31 285 
 
 V. Com. 10 Ky. L. Rep. 222, 8 
 
 S. W. 872 248, 274 
 
 V. Com. 24 Ky. L. Eep. 1731, 
 
 72 S. W. 283 255, 271, 272 
 
 479 
 V. Com. 86 Ky. 663, 7 S. W. 
 
 155 357, 365 
 
 T. State (Pla.) 35 So. 665... 199 
 200, 224, 246, 247, 809 
 
 V. State, 77 Ga. 96 100, 204 
 
 V. State, 93 Ga. 200, 18 S. B. 
 
 823 343 
 
 T. State, 119 Ga. 108, 46 S. E. 
 
 64 852 
 
 V. State, 3 Ohio Dec. Reprint, 
 
 136 367, 462 
 
 V. State, 85 Miss. 738, 38 So. 
 
 110 770 
 
 V. State, 22 Tex. App. 511, 
 
 3 S. W. 749 1013 
 
 V. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 182, 96 Am. St. Rep. 854, 
 
 63 S. W. 872 518 
 
 T. Territory, 3 Wyo. 110, 4 
 
 Pac. 887... 103, 221, 810, 812 
 1040 
 
 Cook's Case, Cro. Car. 537 620, 798 
 
 Coolman v. State, 163 Ind. 503, 72 
 
 N. E. 568 124, 1043, 1044 
 
 Coombe's Case, 1 East, P. C. 367, 1 
 
 Leach, C. L. 388 825 
 
 Cooper V. Martin, 4 East, 77 689 
 
 V. State, 47 Pla. 21, 36 So. 53 856 
 T. State, 80 Miss. 175, 31 So. 
 
 579 518 
 
 Horn. — iv. 
 
 Cooper T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 85 
 
 S. W. 1059 328, 389 
 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 89 
 
 S. W. 1068 328,395, 474 
 
 Cooper's Case, Cro. Car. 544.... 777, 795 
 Copeland t. State, 41 Fla. 320, 26 
 
 So. 319 435 
 
 T. State, 7 Humph. 479 201 
 
 211, 254, 315, 316, 367 
 Coratola v. United States, 24 App. 
 
 D. C. 229 840 
 
 Cordell v. State, 22 Ind. 5 836, 859 
 
 Cordova t. State, 6 Tex. App. 207 . . 918 
 
 Corey v. People, 45 Barb. 262.. 787, 795 
 Cornelius v. Com. 23 Ky. L. Rep. 771, 
 
 64 S. W. 412 536 
 
 V. Com. 15 B. Mon. 539 388 
 
 404, 403 
 Cornell y. State, 104 Wis. 527, 80 N. 
 
 W. 745 803 
 
 Cortez V. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 375, 66 S. W. 453 60, 632 
 
 V. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 169, 69 S. W. 536 630, 632 
 
 633, 634, 966 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 83 
 
 S. W. 812.. 249, 607, 610, 660 
 964 
 Cosgrove v. Schafer, 9 Ohio Dec. Re- 
 print, 550 973 
 
 Costley T. State, 48 Md. 175 931 
 
 Cotrell V. Com. 13 Ky. L. Rep. 304, 
 
 17 S. W. 149 274, 312 
 
 Cottell V. State, 12 Ohio, C. C. 467. . 804 
 Gotten V. State, 91 Ala. 106, 9 So. 
 
 287 505 
 
 Cotton T. State, 31 Miss. 504 .. . 127, 288 
 
 362, 363, 380, 424, 512, 518 
 
 519, 540, 543 
 
 V. Wood, 8 C. B. N. S. 571. . . 703 
 
 Coulter T. American Merchants' Union 
 
 Exp. Co. 5 Lans. 67 24 
 
 Courtney v. State (Tex. Crim'. App.) 
 
 57 S. W. 654.. 273, 379, 452 
 545 
 
 Coward v. State, 6 Tex. App. 59 927 
 
 Cox V. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 680, 69 
 
 S. W. 799 267 
 
 V. People, 19 Hun, 430.. 149, 175 
 
 183, 184, 875, 876, 878 
 
 V. People, 80 N. Y. 500 27, 149 
 
 175, 183, 184, 83^, 868, 870 
 
 872, 875 
 
 r. State, 5 Tex. App. 493. .168, 207 
 Coyle V. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 604, 21 S. W. 765 363 
 
 Coyles V. Hurtin, 10 Johns. 85.... 617 
 
 Craft V. State, a Kan. 4oU..2, 152, 151) 
 
 161, 165, 204, 1219, 223, 227 
 Craiger v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 88 S. W. 208 136, 139, 140 
 
 505 
 
1 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Crane v. Com. 12 Ky. L. Hep. 161, 
 13 S. W. 1079 
 
 Crayen v. State (Tex. dim. App.) 
 90 S. W. 311 981, 
 
 Craven's Case, 1 Lewln, C. C. 77 ... . 
 
 520 
 
 1002 
 1010 
 1018 
 
 Cravey v. State, 36 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 90, 61 Am. St. Rep. 833, 
 
 35 S. W. 658 832, 867 
 
 Crawford v. Com. 15 Ky. L. Rep. 356, 
 
 23 S. W. 592 526 
 
 T. People, 12 Colo. 290, 20 
 
 Pac. 769 246, 249, 291 
 
 V. State, 112 Ala. 1, 21 So. 
 
 214.. 482, 502, 509, 524, 526 
 520, 540, 545, 795 
 v. State, 86 Ala. 16, 5 So. 651 362 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 70 
 
 S. W. 548 388 
 
 v. State, 90 Ga. 701, 35 Am. 
 St. Eep. 242, 17 S. E. 
 628.. 302, 765, 781, 784, 785 
 799 
 Creek v. State, 24 Ind. 151. .330, 394, 460 
 
 462, 483 
 Creighton v. Com. 83 Ky. 142, 4 Am. 
 
 St. Eep. 143 390, 607, 608 
 
 630, 632, 634 
 T. Com. 84 Ky. 103, 4 Am. St. 
 
 Eep. 193 634 
 
 Ci-enshaw v. State, 70 Ark. 613, 
 
 Appx. 66 S. W. 196.. 253, 341 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 29 
 
 S. W. 787 847 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 85 
 
 S. W. 1147 466, 949 
 
 Creswell v. State, 14 Tex. App. 1. . . . 427 
 Crews V. People, 120 111. 317, 11 N. 
 
 E. 404 551 
 
 T. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 533, 31 S. W. 373 271, 280 
 
 Cribb V. State, 118 Ga. 316, 45 S. B. 
 
 396 805, 806 
 
 Cribbs v. State, 86 Ala. 613, 6 So. 
 
 109.. 2, 97, 98, 259, 471, 935 
 940 
 Crist V. State, 21 Tex. App. 361, 17 
 
 S. W. 260 511, 527 
 
 Crockett v. Com'. 100 Ky. 382, 38 S. 
 
 W. 674 271, 535 
 
 y. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 276, 77 S. W. 4. .366, 416, 1005 
 Crook v. State, 27 Tex. App. 198, 11 
 
 S. W. 444 171, 197 
 
 Crookham v. State, 5 W. Va. 510. . . . 973 
 
 981 
 Croom T. State, 85 Ga. 718, 21 Am. 
 St. Eep. 179, 11 S. E. 
 1035.. 603, 624, 626, 627, 638 
 Crosby v. People, 137 111. 325, 27 
 
 N. E. 49 66, 107, 110, 122 
 
 144, 207, 225, 269, 271, 274 
 275, 312, 322 
 
 Crosby v. People, 189 111. 298, 59 
 
 N. E. 546 60, 61, 6T 
 
 Cross V. State, 68 Ala. 476 101, 122- 
 
 571, 915 
 T. State, 55 Wis. 261, 12 N. W. 
 
 425 812: 
 
 Crow V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 88 
 
 S. W. 814 381, 443, 518 
 
 Crowder v. State, 8 Dea, 669 535 
 
 Crowell T. People, 190 111. 508, 60 
 
 N. E. 872 129, 243 
 
 Crum' V. State, 64 Miss. 1, 60 Am. 
 
 Eep. 45, 1 So. 1 43 
 
 Crump V. Com. 14 Ky. L. Eep. 450, 
 
 20 S. W. 390 1000 
 
 Cryer v. State, 71 Miss. 467, 42 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 473, 14 So. 261 259 
 299 
 Cudd T. State, 28 Tex. App. 124, 12 
 
 S. W. 1010 840, 841 
 
 Gumming f. State, 99 Ga. 662, 27, 
 
 S. E. 177 386, 413, 462 
 
 Cunningliam y. Neagle. See Neagle, 
 
 Re. 
 V. People, 195 111. 550, 63 N. 
 
 E. 517 25, 39, 44, 47, 
 
 V. State, 17 Tex. App. 89.... 
 
 513, 
 
 Cupps V. State, 120 Wis. 504, 102 
 
 Am. St. Eep. 996, 97 N. 
 
 W. 210, 98 N. W. 546 
 
 201, 
 
 Curry v. Com. 2 Busli, 67 
 
 Curtis V. Hubbard, 1 Hill. 336, 4 Hill. 
 
 437, 40 Am. Dec. 292 
 
 785, 
 
 V. State, 14 Lea, 502 991, 
 
 1005, 1007, 
 
 V. State, 22 Tex. App. 227, 58 
 
 Am. Eep. 635, 3 S. W. 86 
 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 59 
 
 S. W. 263.. 370, 372, 376, 
 
 Curtis's Case, Fost. C. L. 135.. 602, 
 
 628, 
 Cyrus V. State, 102 Ga. 616, 29 S. K. 
 917 309, 1053, 1055, 
 
 D. 
 
 Dabney t. State, 118 Ala. 38, 59 Am. 
 
 St. Eep. 92, 21 So. 211.. 199 
 204, 502, 519, 532, 928 
 Dacre's Case, 1 Hale, P. C. 439, F. 
 
 Moore, 86 649 
 
 Daily V. New York & N. I-I. R. Co. 
 
 32 Conn. 356, 87 Am. Dec. 
 
 176 972 
 
 Dains V. State, 2 Humph. 439 124, 15.", 
 
 205, 206. 223, ""- 
 Dakin's Case, 1 Lewln, C. C. 106. . . . 790 
 
 113 
 
 656 
 504 
 520 
 
 129 
 243 
 811 
 
 777 
 
 795 
 
 995 
 
 1014 
 
 722 
 967 
 
 413 
 608 
 640 
 
 1056 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 U 
 
 Dale V. State, 10 Xerg. 551 153, 164 
 
 165, 198, 203, 232 
 
 Daly V. People, 32 Hun, 182 210 
 
 Dancy v. State (Tex. Crlm. App.) 46 
 
 S. W. 247 231 
 
 Dantorth v. State, 44 Tex. Ci-im. Rep. 
 
 105, 69 S. W. 159 121, 140 
 
 255, 284, 855 
 
 Daniel v. State, 63 Ga. 339 905 
 
 V. State, 103 Ga. 202, 29 S. 
 
 B. 767 423,428,515, 928 
 
 V. State, 118 Ga. 16, 43 S. E. 
 
 861 1057 
 
 V. State, 10 Lea, 261 523, 537 
 
 540 
 Daniels v. State (Ark.) 88 S. W. 844 208 
 
 874 
 Darby v. State, 79 Ga. 63, 3 S. E. 
 663 362, 400, 461, 975, 
 
 Darden v. State, 73 Ark. 315, 84 S. 
 
 W. 507 134, 135, 266, 
 
 Darling v. Williams, 35 Ohio St. 58. . 
 Darlington v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. 
 
 Rep. 333, 50 S. W. 375 . . 
 
 669, 
 
 Darry v. People, 10 N. Y. 120 105, 
 
 V. People, 10 N. Y. 161 
 
 Daughdrill v. State, 113 Ala. 7, 21 
 
 So. 378 160, 162, 166, 
 
 205, 226, 
 Davids v. People, 192 111. 176, 61 
 
 N. E. 537 
 
 Davidson v. People, 4 Colo. 145 
 
 408, 420, 
 
 V. State, 9 Humpli. 455.. 202, 
 
 V. State, 135 Ind. 254, 34 N. 
 
 E. 972. .97, 98, 224, 232, 
 
 845, 899, 913, 918-920, 
 
 944 
 
 Davis V. Com. 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1426, 
 
 77 S. W. 1101 734, 
 
 T. Com. 95 Ky. 19, 44 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 201, 23 S. W. .585 . . 
 
 V. Com. 89 Va. 132, 15 S. E. 
 
 388 
 
 V. Goodenow, 27 Vt. 715 .... 
 
 v. People, 19 111. 74 861, 
 
 V. People, 88 111. 350 499, 
 
 V. People, 114 111. 86, 29 N. B. 
 
 192 247, 255, 323, 
 
 V. State, 92 Ala. 20, 9 So. 616 
 
 469, 488, 504, 522, 529, 
 
 V. State, 126 Ala. 44, 28 So. 
 
 617 101, 915, 931, 932, 
 
 V. State, 72 Ark. 569, 82 S. W. 
 
 167 
 
 V. State, 10 Ga. 101. .238, 239, 
 
 V. State, 114 Ga. 104, 39 S. E. 
 906 292, 
 
 986 
 987 
 
 1045 
 462 
 
 650 
 904 
 190 
 204 
 339 
 
 204 
 1023 
 
 373 
 407 
 429 
 206 
 
 234 
 941 
 945 
 
 736 
 
 979 
 
 601 
 
 689 
 862 
 500 
 
 902 
 376 
 530 
 
 948 
 
 207 
 241 
 243 
 
 675 
 
 Davis V. State, 120 Ga. 843, 48 S. E. 
 
 305 993 
 
 V. State, 152 Ind. 34, 71 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 322, 51 N. E. 928 499 
 500 
 
 V. State, 38 Md. 15 943 
 
 T. State, 39 Md. 355 832, 834 
 
 1043 
 V. State, 51 Neb. 301, 70 N. 
 
 W. 984... 3, 97, 143, 195, 208 
 
 209, 219, 916 
 
 V. State, 25 Ohio St. 369. .221, 813 
 
 V. State, 3 Tex. App. 91 73 
 
 V. State, 37 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 371, 35 S. W. 388 276 
 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 56 
 
 S. W. 53 937 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 83 
 
 S. W. 1112 248 
 
 V. United States, 16 App. D. C. 
 
 442 850 
 
 V. United States, 160 U. S. 
 469, 40 L. ed. 499, 16 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 353 220 
 
 V. Utah, 151 U. S. 262, 38 
 L. ed. 153, 14 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 328 833, 834 
 
 Davis's Case, 3 N. Y. City Hall 
 
 Rec. 45 590 
 
 Davison v. People, 90 111. 221 97, 98 
 
 102-104, 108, 124, 362, 390 
 783, 784, 790 
 
 Dawson v. State, 33 Tex. 492 400, 412 
 
 Deal v. State, 136 Ala. 52, 34 So. 23 486 
 V. State, 140 Ind. 354, 39 N. 
 
 E. 930 503, 537, 540 
 
 De Alberts v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. 
 
 Rep. 508, 31 S. W. 391... 817 
 Dean v. State, 105 Ala. 22, 17 So. 28 271 
 V. State, 116 Ga. 532, 42 S. B. 
 
 750 247, 334 
 
 V. State, 85 Miss. 40, 37 So. 
 
 501 59, 72, 650, 918 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 83 
 
 S. W. 816 248, 784, 785 
 
 De Arman v. State, 71 Ala. 351. .132, 249 
 
 358, 365, 367, 397, 398, 400 
 
 403, 423, 432, 435, 438, 486 
 
 502, 511, 513 
 
 V. State, 77 Ala. 10 362, 558 
 
 Debney v. State, 34 L.R.A. 851, 45 
 
 Neb. 856, 64 N. W. 446.. 17 
 19, 20 
 Deem v. Milliken, 6 Ohio C. C. 357, 
 Affirmed in 53 Ohio St. 
 
 668, 44 N. B. 1134 1008 
 
 De Forest v. State, 21 Ind. 23 403, 407 
 
 492, 468, 777, 793, 795 
 Deilks V. State, 141 Ind. 23, 40 N. B. 
 
 120 124, 373, 505, 547 
 
 Dejarnette v. Com. 75 Va. 867 804 
 
lii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 De la Garza v. State (Tex. Crlm. 
 
 App.) 61 S. W. 484 937 
 
 938, 946, 959 
 Delaney t. Com. 15 Ky. L. Rep. 797, 
 
 25 S. W. 830 655 
 
 V. Com. 18 Ky. L. Rep. 212, 35 
 
 S. W. 1037 514, 774, 776 
 
 V. State (Wyo.) sl Pac. 792.. 479 
 492, 493, 559 
 Delegal v. State, 109 Ga. 518, 35 S. 
 
 E. 105 467, 538 
 
 Delgado v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 157, 29 S. W. 1070 229 
 
 Denham v. State, 22 Pla. 664 150, 198 
 
 210, 214, 871, 1058 
 Dennis v. State, 118 Ala. 72, 23 So. 
 
 1002 135, 507, 509, 553 
 
 V. State, 93 Ga. 303, 20 S. E. 
 
 315 284 
 
 V. State, 103 Ind. 142, 2 N. 
 
 E. 349 847, 854 
 
 Dennison v. State, 13 Ind. 510.. 106, 253 
 
 254 
 Dent V. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Eep. 166, 
 
 79 S. W. 525 459, 537 
 
 Denton v. State, 1 Swan, 279 997 
 
 Dewberry v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 74 S. W. 307 307 
 
 Dexter t. Spear, 4 Mason, 115, Fed. 
 
 Cas. No. 3,867 125 
 
 Dlas V. State, 7 Blackf. 20, 39 Am. 
 
 Dec. 448 832, 836, 859- 861 
 
 863, 1046 
 
 Dick V. State, 3 Ohio St. 89 1040, 1042 
 
 Dickerson r. State, 121 Ga. 333, 49 
 
 S. E. 275 1041 
 
 Dickson y. State, 39 Ohio St. 73 415 
 
 Digby V. People, 113 111. 123, 55 Am. 
 
 Eep. 402 992, 1015 
 
 Dilger v. Com. 88 Ky. 550, 11 S. W. 
 
 651 604, 614, 738, 740, 745 
 
 747, 748, 881 
 Dill V. Board of Education, 47 N. J. 
 Eq. 421, 10 L.E.A. 276, 
 
 20 Atl. 739 490, 491 
 
 V. State, 25 Ala. 15 528, 737 
 
 763, 764 
 V. State (Miss.) 38 So. 37.. 199 
 
 T. State, 1 Tex. App. 278 913 
 
 Dillard t. State. 65 Ark. 404, 46 S. 
 
 W. 533 872 
 
 V. State, 58 Miss. 368... 1000, 1001 
 
 Dillin V. People, 8 Mich. 357 914, 925 
 
 Dillon V. Staite, 9 Ind. 408. .831, 859, 800 
 Dingler's Case, 1 Leach, C. L. 504, 
 
 note, 1 East, P. C. 356.. 994 
 Dittmer v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 103, 74 S. W. 34 488, 935 
 
 Dixon V. State, 128 Ala. 54, 29 So. 
 
 623 100, 132, 142, 164 
 
 V. State, 13 Pla. 636 133. 938 
 
 992, 1000, 1028 
 
 Dixon V. State, 79 Ga. 805, 5 S. B. 
 
 289 201, 202, 232 
 
 ,. State, 74 Miss. 271, 20 So. 
 
 839 575 
 
 Doan V. State, 26 Ind. 495 59 
 
 Dock V. Com. 21 Gratt. 909 315, 438 
 
 446, 489 
 Dodd V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 68 
 
 S. W. 992 513 
 
 Dodson V. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 200, 70 S. W. 969 442 
 
 V. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 571, 78 S. W. 940... 366, 448 
 729 
 Doe ex dem. Sutton v. Eidgway, 4 
 
 Barn. & Aid. 54 
 
 Doherty v. State, 84 Wis. 152, 53 N. 
 W. 1120.. 192, 256, 257, 
 
 Dolg, Re, 4 Fed. 193 19, 709, 
 
 Dolan T. People, 6 Hun, 493 149, 
 
 175, 186, 877- 
 
 V. People, 64 N. Y. 485.. 149, 
 
 877- 
 
 V. State, 81 Ala. 11, 1 So. 
 
 707 138, 363, 378, 
 
 V. State, 40 Ark. 4.j4 . . . 464, 
 Doles V. State, 97 Ind. 555.... 1029, 
 Domingus t. State, 94 Ala. 9, 11 So. 
 
 190 162, 356, 
 
 Donahue v. State (Ind.) 74 N. E. 
 
 Donald v. State, 21 Ohio C. C. 124.. 
 
 Done V. People, 5 Park. Crim. Eep. 
 
 364 1052, 
 
 Donellan's Case, Wills, Circumstan- 
 tial Ev. 187 
 
 Donnellan v. Com. 7 Bush, 676.. 100, 
 
 126, 205, 
 
 Donnelly v. State, 26 N. J. L. 463. . . 
 
 203, 205, 335, 974, 983, 
 
 986, 995, 997, 999, 1000, 
 
 1015, 1016, 1028, 1029, 
 
 1034, 1036- 
 
 V. State, 26 N. J. L. 601.. 974, 
 
 995, 1013, 1016, 
 
 Doolin V. Com. 16 Ky. L. Rep. 189, 
 
 27 S. W. 1 1000, 1001, 
 
 V. Com. 95 Ky. 29, 23 S. W. 
 
 663 367, 
 
 Doran v. State, 7 Tex. App. 385 
 
 Dorsey v. Com. 13 Ky. L. Rep. 359, 
 
 17 S. W. 183 50, 
 
 f. State, 107 Ala. 157, .18 So. 
 
 199 451, 470, 483, 
 
 V. State, 110 Ga. 331, 35 S. E. 
 
 651 132, 133, 288, 290, 
 
 311, 539, 
 
 V. State, 34 Tex. 651 428, 
 
 Doss V. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 551, 
 67 S. W. 321 280, 
 
 972 
 
 737 
 828 
 164 
 
 • 879 
 18? 
 
 ■ 879 
 
 490 
 
 489 
 
 1033 
 
 364 
 
 847 
 363 
 460 
 
 1059 
 
 909 
 
 106 
 
 274 
 
 164 
 
 985 
 
 1007 
 
 1032 
 
 1038 
 
 985 
 
 1036 
 
 1010 
 
 750 
 1046 
 
 217 
 
 944 
 
 291 
 532 
 928 
 
 621 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 liii 
 
 Doughdrill v. State, 113 Ala. 7, 21 
 
 So. 378 41, 42 
 
 Douglass V. State, 26 Tex. App. 109, 
 8 Am. St. Rep. 459, 9 S. 
 
 W. 489 858 
 
 Dove V. State, 3 Heisk. 348 125, 238 
 
 Dover v. State, 109 Ga. 485, 34 S. E. 
 
 1030 459,460,645, 656 
 
 746, 751, 758 
 Dowdy V. State, 96 Ga. 653, 23 S. E. 
 
 827 118, 253 
 
 Downey v. Com. 7 Ky. L. Rep. 676. . . 288 
 Downing v. State, 11 Wyo. 86, 70 Pac. 
 
 83'3, 73 Pac. 758 243, 249 
 
 V. State, 114 Ga. 30, 39 S. E. 
 
 927 41 
 
 Doyal V. State, 70 Ga. 134 321, 362 
 
 422, 426, 440 
 Doyle V. Com. 18 Ky. L. Rep. 518, 37 
 
 S. W. 153 272 
 
 Drake v. Com. 14 Ky. L. Rep. 677, 21 
 
 S. W. 36 515 
 
 v. State, 75 Ga. 413 947, 948 
 
 v. State, 145 Ind. 210, 41 N. 
 
 B. 799 874, 850 
 
 V. State, 5 Tex. App. 649. .936, 1054 
 v. State, 25 Tex. App. 298, 7 
 
 S. W. 868 1019, 1024-1026 
 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 273, 77 S. W. 7 355, 507 
 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Grim. Rep. 
 
 448, 80 S. W. 1005 509 
 
 Draper v. State, 4 Baxt. 246 125, 129 
 
 378 
 Dreessen v. State, 38 Neb. 375, 56 N. 
 
 W. 1024 896, 903 
 
 Drennan v. People, 10 Mich. 169.... 621 
 
 626, 629 
 Dresback v. State, 38 Ohio St. 365.. 154 
 
 714 
 Driver v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 65 
 
 S. W. 528 282, 358 
 
 Drummer v. State, 45 Fla. 17, 33 So. 
 
 1008 857, 858 
 
 Drury v. Territory, 9 Okla. 398, 60 
 
 Pac. 101 889 
 
 Drye v. State, 14 Tex. App. 185 846 
 
 847, 851, 852 
 Dryer y. State, 139 Ala. 117, 36 So. 
 
 38 618, 634, 965 
 
 Drysdale v. State, 83 Ga. 744, 6 
 L.R.A. 424, 20 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 340, 10 S. B. 358 305 
 
 532, 533 
 DuBose v. State, 120 Ala. 300, 25 
 
 So. 185 1010, 1033 
 
 Duebbc v. State, 1 Tex. App. 159 159 
 
 160, 165, 170, 202, 204, 227 
 
 DufEey's Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 194 659 
 
 663 
 
 Dukes V. State, 11 Ind. 557, 71 Am. 
 
 Dec. 370 3,417, 418, 424 
 
 425, 773, 776, 777, 834, 846 
 
 850, 852, 853, 859, 857, 041 
 
 Duling V. Johnson, 32 Ind. 155 972 
 
 Dumas v. State, 62 Ga. 58, 65 Ga. 
 
 471 1008, 1030 
 
 v. State, 63 Ga. 600 865 
 
 Dunaway v. People, 110 111. 333, 51 
 
 Am. Rep. 686 108, 110 
 
 Duncan v. Com. 4 Serg. & R. 449 844 
 
 V. Com. 11 Ky. L. Rep. 620, 12 
 
 S. W. 673 122 
 
 V. People, 134 111. 110, 24 N. 
 
 E. 765 221, 541, 542 
 
 V. State, 49 Ark. 543, 6 S. W. 
 
 164 362, 480, 483, 484 
 
 Dunn V. People, 172 111. 582, 50 N. 
 
 B. 137.. 1023, 1025, 1027, 1033 
 
 1037 
 
 V. State (Ala.) 39 So. 147... 100 
 
 165, 379, 401, 449, 929 
 
 V. State, 2 Ark. 229, 35 Am. 
 
 Dec. 54 924, 926, 931, 932 
 
 974, 992, 1006, 1009 
 V. State, 116 Ga. 515, 42 S. B. 
 
 772 568 
 
 V. State (Ind.) 67 N. E. 940 905 
 
 906 
 Duperrier v. Dautrive, 12 La. Ann. 
 
 664 742 
 
 Dupree v. State, 33 Ala. 380, 73 Am. 
 
 Dec. 422 363, 403, 408 
 
 424, 440, 441 
 
 Durham v. State, 70 Ga. 264 577 
 
 Duval V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 70 
 
 S. W. 543 248 
 
 Dwyer v. State, 12 Tex. App. 535... 833 
 Dyal V. State, 97 Ga. 428, 25 S. B. 
 
 319 61, 65 
 
 Dyer v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 83 
 
 S. W. 192 458 
 
 Dyson v. State, 26 Miss. 362 365, 461 
 
 767, 76S 
 
 v. State, 14 Tex. App. 454 . . 630 
 
 632, 77,4 
 
 B. 
 
 Banes v. State, 10 Tex. App. 421 
 
 Earl V. State, 124 Ga. 28, 52 S. B. 
 
 78 600, 
 
 Earles v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 85 S. W. 1 614, 630, 
 
 928, 938, 
 Earn V. People, 73 111. 329. .594-596, 
 
 Early v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1181, 
 
 70 S. W. 1061 20, 
 
 V. State, 9 Tex. App. 476 
 
 T. State, 16 Ohio C. C. 646.. 
 
 280 
 
 963 
 
 631 
 
 939 
 
 970 
 
 1044 
 
 456 
 918 
 165 
 167 
 
liv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Eason v. State, C Baxt. 431 1047 
 
 Easterwood ti. State, 34 Tex. Crim. 
 
 Rep. 400, 31 S. W. 294.. 924 
 Eastling r. State, 69 Ark. ISO, 62 
 
 S. W. 584 198, 211, 1045 
 
 East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. v. 
 
 Maloy, 77 Ga. 237, 2 S. 
 
 E. 941 972 
 
 Eastwood V. People, 3 Paik. Crim. 
 
 Rep. 25 815 
 
 Eatman t. State, 139 Ala. 67, 36 So. 
 
 16 236, 852 
 
 Eaton V. State, 162 Ind. 554, 70 N. 
 
 E. 814 880 
 
 Eby V. State (Ind.) 74 N. E. 890... 559 
 Edens v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 522, 55 S. W. 815 862 
 
 Edgar v. State, 43 Ala. 48 409 
 
 Edmonds v. State, 34 Ark. 720 847 
 
 863, 898, 899, 912 
 
 Edmondson v. State, 41 Tex. 496 19 
 
 30, 835, 840, 995 
 
 Edwards v. State, 25 Ark. 444 . . 101, 866 
 
 867, 874 
 
 V. State, 27 Ark. 493 68, 847 
 
 855 
 
 V. State, 39 Fla. 753, 23 So. 
 
 537 45, 46, 
 
 T. State, 53 Ga. 428 274, 
 
 T. State, 47 Miss. 581 
 
 Eggler V. People, 56 N. Y. 642.. 46, 
 
 908 
 275 
 277 
 400 
 441 
 943 
 
 Eiland v. State, 52 Ala. 322 143, 362 
 
 367, 376, 404, 422, 424, 426 
 435, 470, 540, 544, 557 
 Elder v. State, 69 Ark. 648, 86 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 220, 65 S. W. 938 374 
 485, 490, 491, 493, 494 
 Ellerbe v. State, 79 Miss. 10, 30 So. 
 
 57 474, 1054 
 
 Ellerson v. Westcott, 88 Hun, 389 
 
 34 N. Y. Supp. 813 1065 
 
 V. Westcott, 148 N. Y. 149, 
 
 42 N. E. 540 1065, 1067 
 
 Ellis V. State, 105 Ala. 72, 17 So. 
 
 119 471 
 
 v. State, 120 Ala. 333, 25 So. 
 
 1..97, 99, 141, 274, 276, 509 
 
 924 
 
 Elliston V. State, 10 Tex. App. 361.. 696 
 
 EUzey T. State (Miss.) 37 So. 837.. 389 
 
 Embry v. Com. 11 liy. L. Rep. 515, 12 
 
 S. W. 383 343 
 
 English V. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 190, 30 S. W. 233.. 613, 637 
 649, 965 
 Enlow V. State, 154 Ind. 664, 57 N. 
 
 E. 539 367, 403 
 
 Enright v. People, 155 111. 32, 39 N. 
 
 E. 561 355, 367, 370 
 
 Epperson v. State, 5 Lea, 291.. 118, 121 
 131, 1026, 1027 
 
 Epps V. State, 19 Ga. 102 571 
 
 V. State, 102 Ind. 539, 1 N. E. 
 
 491 19, 45, 853 
 
 Erb V. Com. 98 Pa. 347 913 
 
 lirnest v. State, 20 Fla. 383 162, 164 
 
 223, 236 
 
 Brrington's Case, 2 Lewin, C. C. 217 347 
 
 Case, 2 Lewin, C. C. 148.. 994 
 
 1003 
 Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 23 
 
 Am. Rep. 733 135, 253 
 
 260, 361, 472-474, 478 
 Estell V. State, 51 N. J. L. 182, 17 
 
 Atl. 118 336, 338 
 
 Estep V. Com. 86 Ky. 39, 9 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 260, 4 S. W. 820 490 
 
 491, 493, 771, 793 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 70 
 
 S. W. 966 248 
 
 Bstes V. State, 55 Ga. 30 811, 816 
 
 Etheridge v. State, 141 Ala. 29, 37 
 
 So. 337 556, 866 
 
 Ettinger t. Com. 98 Pa. 338 918 
 
 Evans v. Eyans, 1 Hagg. Consist. 
 
 Rep. 105 896 
 
 V. People, 49 N. Y. 86 15, 886 
 
 588- 591 
 T. State, 120 Ala. 269, 25 So. 
 
 175 368, 376 
 
 T. State, 109 Ala. 11, 19 So. 
 
 535... 484, 644, 645, 656, 657 
 661 
 
 V. State, 58 Ark. 47, 22 S. W. 
 
 1026 408, 854, 966, 
 
 V. State, 33 Ga. 4 
 
 V. State (Miss.) 40 So. 8.. 
 V. State, 44 Miss. 762 362, 
 
 368, 394, 400, 407, 455, 
 
 993 
 
 489 
 
 1053 
 
 363 
 
 539 
 
 544 
 
 T. State, 6 Tex. App. 513... 2, 98 
 
 102, 208 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 89 
 
 S. W. 974 590 
 
 Everett v. People, 216 111. 478, 75 
 
 N. E. 188 249 
 
 V. State, 62 Ga. 65 940 
 
 V. State, 30 Tex. App. 682, 18 
 
 S. W. 674 925 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 24 
 
 S. W. 505 208, 444, 1051 
 
 Evers, Ex parte, 29 Tex. App. 539, 
 
 16 S. W. 343 817 
 
 V. People, 3 Hun, 718 367 
 
 T. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 318, 18 L.R.A. 421, 37, 
 Am. St. Rep. 811, 20 S. 
 
 W. 744 278, 280, 422, 428 
 
 805, 816, 817 
 Eversole v. Com. 17 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 1259, 34 S. W. 231 478 
 
 492, 405, 794 
 V. Com. 95 Ky. 623, 26 S. W. 
 
 816 474, 479, 491, 495 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Iv 
 
 Ewert V. State, 48 Pla 36, 37 So. 
 
 334 837 
 
 Ewing V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 42 
 
 S. W. 381 276 
 
 Ezell r. State, 102 Ala. 101, 15 So. 
 
 810 207, 211, 244 
 
 F. 
 
 I'alinestoek v. State, 23 Ind. 231... 150 
 
 162, 164, 165, 205, 208, 210 
 
 214, 426, 435, 438, 440, 506 
 
 831, 832, 869 
 
 Tain v. Com. 78 Ky. 183, 39 Am. 
 
 Rep. 213 3, 458 
 
 Pair, Ee, 100 Fed. 149 729, 731, 734 
 
 Taire v. State, 58 Ala. 74 981, 992 
 
 1004, 1029, 1033 
 
 Fairlee v. People, 11 111. 1 26, 875 
 
 3'allin V. State, 86 Ala. 13, 5 So. 423 207 
 
 223, 469 
 
 Tariss v. State, 85 Ala. 1, 4 So. 679. 398 
 
 399 
 Tarmer v. State, 91 Ga. 720, 18 S. 
 
 E. 987 298, 769 
 
 Y. State, 112 Ga. 80, 37 N. B. 
 
 120 262, 340 
 
 Faner v. State, 42 Tex. 265 116, 125 
 
 159, 214, 223, 224 
 
 Tarris v. Com. 14 Bush, 382 128, 131 
 
 143, 236, 521 
 V. People, 129 111. 521, 4 
 L.E.A. 582, 16 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 283, 21 N. E. 821.. 922 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 56 
 
 S. W. 336 242 
 
 Tatheree, Ex parte, 34 Tex. Crim. 
 
 Rep. 594, 31 S. W. 403.. 595 
 
 997, 1033 
 Taulkner v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 311, 65 S. W. 1093 95] 
 
 Fearson v. United States, 10 App. 
 
 D. C. 536 913, 930 
 
 a?elder v. State, 23 Tex. App. 477, 
 59 Am. Rep. 777, 5 S. W. 
 
 145 1037 
 
 Felix T. State, 18 Ala. 720 274, 310 
 
 865, 921 
 3'elker v. State, 54 Ark. 489, 16 S. 
 
 W. 663 540 
 
 S"eltner v. Com. 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1110, 
 
 64 S. W. 959... 506, 987, 988 
 'Fendrick t. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 147, 45 S. W. 589 283, 312 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 56 
 
 S. W. 626 168, 169 
 
 255, 311, 916, 941 
 
 Fenton's Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 179.. 346 
 
 347 701 
 iFerguson v. State, 134 Ala. 63, 92 
 Am. St. Rep. 17, 32 So. 
 
 760 645, 647, 060, 673 
 
 Ferguson v. State, 141 Ala. 20, 37 So. 
 
 448 51, 955, 956 
 
 V. State, 49 Ind. 33 324 
 
 Ferguson's Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 181 712 
 
 Ferrel v. State, 43 Tex. 503 109, 170 
 
 578, 579, 806, 807 
 Ferrer's Case, Cro. Car. 371, Wm. 
 
 .Tones, 348 608 
 
 Fertig y. State, 100 Wis. 301, 75 
 
 N. W. 960 243, 245, 246 
 
 248, 301 
 Field V. Com. 89 Va. 690, 16 S. E. 
 
 865 363, 462 
 
 Fielding v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 87 S. W. 1044 413, 958 
 
 Fields y. State, 47 Ala. 603, 11 Am. 
 
 Rep. 771 433, 434, 1058 
 
 1059 
 V. State, 52 Ala. 348.. 2, 207, 208 
 211, 223, 224, 334, 1049 
 V. State, 134 Ind. 46, 32 N. 
 
 E. 780 363, 
 
 T. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 42, 19 S. W. 604 
 
 y. State, 1 Yerg. 156 15, 
 
 Finch y. State, 81 Ala. 41, 1 So. 
 
 565 141, 460, 461, 
 
 489, 
 y. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 70 S. W. 207 307, 
 
 Finn y. State, 5 Ind. 400. .866, 871, 
 
 Finney y. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 785, 
 
 82 S. W. 636 . . 271, 365, 
 
 473 
 
 953 
 16 
 
 471 
 927 
 
 313 
 
 872 
 
 Fisher y. People, 23 111. 283 . . 913, 
 
 V. State, 84 Ind. 435 
 
 V. State, 10 Lea, 151 34, 
 
 54, 133, 141, 158, 197, 
 
 537, 768, 866, 867, 
 
 V. State, 30 Tex. App. 502, 
 
 18 S. W. 90 
 
 Fitch V. State, 37 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 500, 36 S. W. 584 . . 113, 
 
 126, 133, 144, 
 
 Fitts y. State, 102 Tenn. 141, 50 S. 
 
 W. 756 
 
 Fitzgerald v. Com. 9 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 664, 6 S. W. 152 .. 542, 
 
 V. People, 49 Barb. 122, 37 N. 
 
 Y. 413 
 
 T. State, 112 Ala. 34, 20 So. 
 
 966 344, 571, 680, 
 
 V. State, 15 Lea, 99 . . 201, 
 
 y. State, 1 Leg. Rep. (Tenn.) 
 53 
 
 y. State, 11 Neb. 577, 10 N. 
 
 W. 495 . . 973, 993, 1007, 
 Fitzgerrold y. People, 37 N. Y. 413, 
 
 49 Barb. 122 . . 149, 872, 
 Fitzhugh V. State, 13 Lea, 258.. 404, 
 
 73(i 
 750 
 930 
 800 
 36 
 368 
 91-1 
 
 807 
 
 119 
 200 
 
 122 
 
 545 
 
 832 
 
 681 
 284 
 321 
 
 499 
 
 1017 
 
 1041 
 424 
 441 
 
Ivi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Fitzpatricl: v. Com. 81 Ky. 357 
 
 V. State, 37 Ark. 238 . . 203, 
 
 V. United States, 178 U. S. 
 
 304, 44 L. ed. 1078, 20 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 944 
 
 Flxmer v. People, 153 111. 123, 38 
 
 N. B. 667 
 
 Flanagan v. State, 46 Ala. 703 
 
 143, 272, 
 Flanigan v. People, 86 N. Y. 554, 40 
 
 Am. Eep. 556 805, 
 
 Fleetwood v. Com. 80 Ky. 1 . . 605, 
 Fletcher v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 1157, 83 S. W. 588 
 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 68 
 
 S. W. 173 903, 
 
 T. State, 122 Ga. 574, 50 S. E. 
 
 360 
 
 Flinchem v. Com. 28 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 653, 89 S. W. 1129 
 
 Plinn v. State, 24 Ind. 286 
 
 Flores t. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 38 
 
 S. W. 790 
 
 Floyd V. State, 82 Ala. 16, 2 So. 
 
 683 604, C05, 618, 
 
 V. State, 36 Ga. 91, 91 Am. 
 
 Dec. 760 
 
 V. State, 3 Heisk, 342 . . 157, 
 
 V. State, 29 Tex. App. 349, 
 
 16 S. W. 188 . . 60, 61, 
 
 iriynu V. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 407, 66 S. W. 551 . . 684, 
 
 722, 
 
 V. State, 97 Wis. 44, 72 N. W. 
 
 373 235, 
 
 Foley T. State, 11 Wyo. 464, 72 Pac. 
 
 627 354, 985, 1019, 
 
 Folks V. State (Tex. Crim'. App.) 58 
 
 S. W. 98 
 
 Follis V. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 202, 78 S. W. 1069 
 
 Fonyille v. State, 91 Ala. 39, 8 So. 
 
 688 807, 
 
 Ford v. State, 71 Ala. 385 .. 808, 
 T. State, 129 Ala. 16, 30 So. 
 
 27 362, 471, 
 
 V. State (Neb.) 98 N. W. 
 
 807 8, 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 56 
 
 S. W. 338 
 
 v. State, 12 Md. 514 
 
 V. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 280, 50 S. W. 350 
 
 Ford's Case, J. Kelyng, 51 
 
 Fore V. State, 75 Miss. 727, 23 So. 
 
 710 395, 
 
 Forster's Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 187 . . 
 
 743, 749, 750, 
 
 Forteuberry v. State, 55 Miss. 403.. 
 
 271 
 400 
 328 
 
 873 
 
 83 
 142 
 913 
 
 810 
 613 
 
 770 
 
 921 
 
 847 
 
 904 
 S36 
 
 925 
 
 634 
 
 387 
 239 
 
 248 
 
 721 
 1049 
 
 836 
 
 1026 
 
 262 
 
 901 
 
 808 
 938 
 
 505 
 
 342 
 
 207 
 1040 
 
 285 
 313 
 
 797 
 
 507 
 461 
 759 
 393 
 398 
 
 Forward v. Pittard, 1 T. R. 33 568 
 
 Foskey v. State, 119 Ga. 72, 45 S. E. 
 
 967 249 
 
 Foster v. People, 50 N. Y. 598 . . 182 
 
 202 
 
 V. State, 6 Lea, 214 131, 133 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 45 S. W. 803 838 
 
 T. State, 8 Tex. App. 248 536 
 
 V. State, 11 Tex. App. 105 . . 466 
 V, Territory, 6 Ariz. 240, 56 
 
 Pac. 738 473, 474, 490 
 
 502, 551, 552 
 Foutch V. State, 95 Tenn. 711, 45 
 L.R.A. 687, 34 S. W. 
 
 423 513, 519 
 
 T. State, 45 L.R.A. 687 502 
 
 Fonts V. State, 4 G. Greene, 500 . . 101 
 
 833, 834, 866, 871, 872 
 
 V. State, 8 Ohio St. 98 .. 150, 162 
 
 198, 203, 210, 214, 832, 833 
 
 869, 871 
 
 Fowler v. State, 3 Heisk. 154 838 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 22 S. W. 587 523 
 
 Francis T. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 246, 70 S. W. 751 . . 459, 856 
 Frank t. State, 94 Wis. 211, 08 N. 
 
 W. 657 . . 207, 210, 459, 527 
 
 541 
 
 V. State, 27 Ala. 37 . . 36, 269 
 
 644, 652, 656, 657, 659 
 
 Franklin v. Com. 92 Ky. 612, 18 S. 
 
 W. 532 925 
 
 V. State, 29 Ala. 14 . . 273, 424 
 
 440 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 48 S. W. 178 311, 323 
 
 T. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 286, 30 S. W. 231 510 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 82 
 
 S. W. 514 124 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 88 
 
 S. W. 357 557 
 
 V. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 625, 31 S. W. 643 356, 525 
 
 V. State, 37 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 113, 38 S. W. 802 . . 124, 126 
 V. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 21, 51 S. W. 951 982 
 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 470, 76 S. W. 473 60 
 
 V. State, 30 Tex. App. 628, 18 
 
 S. W. 468 . . 284, 508, 509 
 
 512, 514, 516, 520, 533 
 Franks v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 88 S. W. 923 328, 520, 521 
 
 Fraser v. State, 55 Ga. 325 . . 913, 021 
 
 022, 925 
 Fray's Case, 1 Hawk. P. C. chap. 31, 
 
 § 42 302 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Ivii 
 
 Frazier v. State, 112 Ga. 868, 38 S. 
 
 E. 349 370, 460 
 
 Freel v. State, 21 Ark. 212 68 
 
 Freeman v. State (Fla.) 39 So. 785.. 860 
 V. State, 70 Ga. 736 . . 124, 246 
 24 1', 292 
 V. State, 112 Ga. 48, 37 S. E. 
 
 172 263,377,467, 507 
 
 538, 990, 1019, 1025, 102ti 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 72 
 
 S. W. 185 370 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 77 S. W. 17 124 
 
 V. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 545, 46 S. W. 641, 51 S. 
 
 W. 230 496 
 
 T. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 318, 81 S. W. 953 273 
 
 Freese v. State, 159 Ind. 597, 65 
 
 N. B. 915 853 
 
 French t. Com. 28 Ky. L. Rep. 64, 
 
 88 S. W. 1070 568 
 
 Friday v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 79 S. W. 815 118, 249 
 
 697, 925, 936, 938 
 Friederich v. People, 147 111. 310, 
 
 35 N. E. 472 115, 132, 133 
 
 225, 274 
 Friedman v. Railroad Co. 7 Phila. 
 
 203 973 
 
 Friery v. People, 54 Barb. 319. . .810, 815 
 
 Frinlt v. Potter, 17 111. 406 24, 26 
 
 Frizzell v. State, 30 Tex. App. 42, 
 
 16 S. W. 751 944 
 
 Fry T. State, 81 Ga. 645, 8 S. E. 
 
 308 274, 278, 304, 1056 
 
 Fulcher v. State, 82 Miss. 630, 35 
 
 So. 170 389 
 
 T. State, 28 Tex. App. 465, 13 
 
 S. W. 750 1005 
 
 Fuller T. State, 115 Ala. 61, 22 So. 
 
 491 277, 302 
 
 V. State, 117 Ala. 36, 23 So. 
 
 688 899, 1004 
 
 V. State, 30 Tex. App. 559, 17 
 
 S. W. 1108 374, 1044 
 
 Furlough T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 65 S. W. 1069 634 
 
 Furlow V. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 12, 51 S. W. 938 934 
 
 Fussell V. State, 94 Ga. 78, 19 S. 
 
 E. 891 527 
 
 Putch T. State, 90 Ga. 472, 16 So. 
 
 102 . . 117, 131, 132, 220, 264 
 769 
 Fuqua v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 2204, 
 
 73 S. W. 782 . . 976, 992, 1010 
 1027 
 V. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 420, 
 
 81 S. W. 923 1004, 1019 
 
 Fy V. State, 81 Ga. 645, 8 S. B. 64 . . 1053 
 
 G. 
 
 GafEord v. State, 122 Ala. 54, 25 So. 
 
 10 . . 359, 487, 522, 558, 
 
 V. State, 125 Ala. 1, 28 So. 
 
 406 . . 200, 238, 242, 244, 
 
 Gaines v. Com. 88 V'a. 682, 14 S. C. 
 
 375 503, 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 53 S. W. 623 . . 11, 168, 
 
 V. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 202, 42 S. W. 389 . . 354, 
 
 926 
 
 247 
 264 
 
 522 
 
 169 
 
 938 
 
 355 
 934 
 
 Gainey v. People, 97 111. 271, 37 Am. 
 
 Rep. 109 362, 365, 372 
 
 544 
 
 Gaitan p. State, 11 Tex. App. 544 . . 815 
 
 Gale V. People, 26 Mich. 157 125 
 
 Gallaher v. State, 28 Tex. App. 247, 
 
 12 S. W. 1087 96, 102 
 
 103, 144 
 Gallegos v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 85 S. W. 1150 921, 925 
 
 Gallery v. State, 92 Ga. 463, 17 S. 
 
 E. 863 459 
 
 Galliard v. Laxton, 2 Best & S. 363. . 612 
 
 Galvin v. State, 6 Coldw. 283 . . 601, 604 
 
 615, 617, 620, 623, 633- 635 
 Gamblin v. State (Miss.) 29 So. 
 
 764 319, 359 
 
 Gaun V. State, 30 Ga. 67 254, 288 
 
 289, 322, 330 
 Garcia v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 57 S. W. 650 770 
 
 Gardiner v. People, 6 Park. Crim. 
 
 Eep. 155 941 
 
 V. State, (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 59 S. W. 1114 537 
 
 V. Thibodeau, 14 La. Ann. 
 
 742 782 
 
 Gardner 7. People, 4 111. 83 939 
 
 V. State, 90 Ga. 310, 35 Am. 
 St. Rep. 202, 17 S. E. 
 
 86 .. 248, 423, 427, 420, 433 
 
 435 
 923 
 
 V. State, 11 Tex. App. 265 . . 
 
 V. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 19, 48 S. W. 170 . . 262, 
 
 V. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 572, 73 S. W. 13 .. 39, 
 
 V. United States, 5 Ind. Terr. 
 
 150, 82 S. W. 704 
 
 Garello v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 56, 20 S. W. 179..387, 396, 
 Garlitz v. State, 71 Md. 293, 4 L.E.A. 
 
 601, 18 Atl. 39 . . 230, 
 
 Garmon v. Bangor, 38 Me. 443 .... 
 
 284 
 322 
 
 40 
 283 
 
 922 
 
 450 
 
 235 
 931 
 703 
 
Iviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Gamer v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 29 Am. 
 
 St. Eep. 232, 9 So. 835 . . 374 
 400, 402, 403, 412, 420- 422 
 424, 426, 428, 429, 435, 440 
 445, 446, 805-807, 811, 813 
 814, 818, 1050, 1058 
 V. State, 31 Fla. 170, 12 So. 
 
 638 430 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 24 
 
 S. W. 420 568 
 
 V. State, 34 Tex. Crlm. Rep. 
 
 356, 30 S. W. 782 . . 451, 452 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Kep. 
 
 308, 77 S. W. 797 . . 39, 199 
 285, 388 
 <Jarnett v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 60 S. W. 765 358 
 
 Garrett v. State, 76 Ala. 18 . . 924, 929 
 V. State, 97 Ala. 18, 14 So. 
 
 327 . . 46, 139, 440, 471, 551 
 T. State, 36 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 230, 36 S. W. 454 280 
 
 Garrison, Ex parte, 36 W. Va. 686, 
 
 15 S. E. 417 1053 
 
 Garvey v. People, 6 Colo. 559, 45 
 
 Am. Eep. 531 1041, 1059 
 
 Garza v. State, 3 Tex. App. 286 . . 1012 
 
 1023 
 V. State, 11 Tex. App. 345 . . 197 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 88 S. W. 231 512, 534, 770 
 
 V. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 358, 73 Am. St. Eep. 927, 
 
 46 S. W. 242 177 
 
 Oater v. State, 141 Ala. 10, 37 So. 
 
 692 135, 935, 974 
 
 Gatlin v. State, 5 Tex. App. 531 . . 125 
 
 243, 246 
 Gatling v. State (Tex. Crlm. App.) 
 
 76 S. W. 471 401, 403 
 
 Gavin v. State, 42 Fla. 553, 29 So. 
 
 405 207 
 
 Gay V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 69 
 
 S. W. 511 120 
 
 V. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 242, 49 S. W. 612 . . 181, 876 
 877, 896, 897, 904 
 V. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 450, 60 S. W. 771 897, 898 
 
 912, 918 
 Gedye v. People, 170 111. 284, 48 N. 
 
 E. 987 482,504,530, 545 
 
 Gehrke v. State, 13 Tex. 568 832, 866 
 
 875 
 
 758 
 
 1006 
 
 Georgia v. O'Grady, 3 Woods, 496, 
 Fed. Cas. No. 5,352 . . 730 
 
 Gerald v. State, 128 Ala. 6, 29 So. 
 614 
 
 Germolus v. Sausser, 83 Minn. 141, 
 85 N. W. 946 365, 
 
 Gibson y. Com. 2 Va. Cas. Ill . . 
 855, 850, 857, 991, 
 
 461 
 
 846 
 
 1013 
 
 Gibson v. Com. 106 Ky. 360, 90 Am. 
 St. Eep. 230, 50 S. W. 
 
 532 687 
 
 ■ V. State (Ala.) 16 So. 144 ... 509 
 V. State, 8 Ala. 121, 18 Am. 
 
 St. Eep. 96, 8 So. 98 .. 522 
 V. State, 89 Ala. 121, 18 Am. 
 
 St. Eep. 96, 8 So. 98 . . 2, 3 
 
 63, 132, 295, 507, 514, 524 
 544, 552, 555, 647, 806 
 V. State, 91 Ala. 64, 9 So. 
 
 171 534, 535, 559 
 
 V. State, 126 Ala. 59, 28 So. 
 
 673 505, 560, 992 
 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App ) 
 
 68 S. W. 174 415, 442 
 
 V. Territory (Ariz.) 68 Pac. 
 
 540 906 
 
 Giebel v. State, 28 Tex. App. 151, 12 
 
 S. W. 591 . . 197, 198, 684 
 859, 868, 968 
 Gilcrease v. State, 33 Tex. Crim. Kep. 
 
 619, 28 S. TV. 531 . . 298, 314 
 51:: 
 Giles V. State, 23 Tex. App. 281, 4 
 
 S. W. 886 177 
 
 V. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 561, 67 S. W. 411 307 
 
 Gilleland r. State, 44 Tex. 356 506 
 
 513, 520, 522, 520, 537 
 
 Gillett V. Camp, 27 Mo. 541 680 
 
 Glllooley v. State, 58 Ind. 182 810 
 
 Gillum T. State, 62 Miss. 547 .... 913 
 917, 927, 928 
 Gilmore v. People, 124 111. 380, 15 N. 
 
 B. 758 400 
 
 V. State, 126 Ala. 20, 28 So. 
 
 595 ... 3, 212, 214, 201, 357 
 364, 538, 814 
 V. State, 141 Ala. 51, 37 So. 
 
 359 212, 243, 274, 401 
 
 Gipe V. State (Ind.) 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 
 
 419, 75 N. E. 881 26, 857 
 
 999, 1004, 1007, 1030 
 Giskie v. State, 71 Wis. 612, 38 N. W. 
 
 334 834 
 
 Gittin's Case, 1 Plowd. 98 78 
 
 Givens v. State, 103 Tenn. 648, 55 
 
 S. W. 1107 889 
 
 Gladden v. State, 2 Tex. App. 508.. 73 
 V. State, 12 Fla. m2 . . 330, 358 
 362, 4i,9-461, 551, 552, 557 
 Glaze V. State (Tex, Crim. App.) 
 
 45 S. W. 903 381, 501 
 
 Glenewlnkel v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 App.) 61 S. W. 123 ... 436 
 443 
 Glenn v. State, 71 Ark. 80, 71 S. W. 
 
 254 264 
 
 Glover v. State, 105 Ga. 597, 31 S. 
 
 E. 584 538 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 lix 
 
 <31over v. State, 33 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 224, 26 S. W. Z04 . . 768, 
 
 Goaler v. State, 5 Baxt. 678 
 
 Codtrey v. Com. 15 Ky. L. Rep. 3, 
 
 21 S. W. 1047 
 
 <3odwin v. State, 38 Tex. Crlm. Rep. 
 
 460, 43 S. W. 336 . . 41 .j, 
 
 770 
 772 
 932 
 
 52f; 
 
 504 
 93S 
 V. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 404, 46 S. W. 226 . . .366, 530 
 V. State, 73 Miss. 873, 19 So. 
 
 712 131, 135, 366 
 
 •Goersen v. Com. 99 Pa. 388 . . 849, 850 
 T. Com. 106 Pa. 477, 51 Am. 
 
 Rep. 534 909 
 
 Goff V. Byby, 1 Ci-o. Eliz. pt. 2 p. 
 
 540 75 
 
 T. Prime, 26 Ind. 196 . . 5, 6, 57 
 
 77, 834 
 
 GotEe's Case, 1 Vent. 216 730 
 
 Goins V. State, 46 Oliio St. 457, 21 N. 
 
 B. 476 57, 60, 61, 67 
 
 72, 645, 892, 958 
 
 Golden v. State, 25 Ga. 527 . . 3, 277 
 
 359, 378, 459, 548, 811 
 
 V. State, 1 S. C. N. S. 292 . . 735 
 
 738, 745, 746, 751 
 
 Golding V. State, 26 Fla. 530, 8 So. 
 
 311 . . 189, 191, 193, 207, 210 
 Goldsmith v. State, 105 Ala. 8, 16 
 
 So. 933 422, 446, 471, 505 
 
 Gollilier v. Com. 2 Duv. 163, 87 Am. 
 
 Dec. 493... 110, 111, 193, 576 
 
 580, 696, 705, 808, 811, 812 
 Golson V. State, 124 Ala. 8, 26 So. 
 
 975 239, 505 
 
 Gonzales v. State, 31 Tex. 495. . .394, 400 
 
 V. State, 19 Tex. App. 394.. 177 
 
 953, 954 
 V. State, 28 Tex. App. 130, 12 
 
 S. W. 733 . . 99, 171, 398, 457 
 511 
 V. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 508, 21 S. W. 253 . . 817, 913 
 V. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 33, 29 S. W. 1091, 30 S. 
 
 W. 224 287, 200, 291 
 
 V. State, 30 Tex. App. 203, 
 
 16 S. W. 978 .. 1, 374, 466 
 467 
 Goodall V. State, 1 Or. 333, 80 Am. 
 
 Dec. 396 395, 414, 462 
 
 550, 1016 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 47 S. W. 359 926, 928 
 
 Goodman v. State, 122 Ga. Ill, 49 
 
 S. E. 922 . . 287, 290, 1045 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 83 S. W. 196 506 
 
 V. State, 4 Tex. App. 349 .. 299 
 
 630, 636, 966 
 
 Goodwin V. Harrison, 1 Root, 80 971 
 
 Goodwin v. State, 96 Ind. 550. .933, 941 
 V. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 466, 43 S. W. 336 416 
 
 Goodwin's Case, 6 N. Y. City Hall 
 
 Rec. 9 8, 341, 342 
 
 Goodwyn v. State, 4 Smedes & M. 
 
 520 857, 858 
 
 Ciorden v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 00 S. W. 636 679 
 
 Gordon v. State (Miss.) 29 So. 529 189 
 V. State, 129 Ala. 113, 30 So. 
 
 30 4S7, 558 
 
 V. State, 140 Ala. 20, 36 So. 
 
 1009 441, 444, 471 
 
 Gordon's Case, 1 East, P. C. 315 . . 62Q 
 
 Gore's Case, 9 Coke, 80b 109, 577, 681 
 
 699 
 Gossett V. State, 123 Ga. 431, 51 S. 
 
 B. 394 . . 246, i'^C, lir,, 
 Y. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 70 S. W. 319 
 
 Gourko V. United States, 153 U. S. 
 
 183, 38 L. ed. 680 231, 
 
 Grace v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 193, 69 S. W. 529 . . 70, 
 
 776 
 
 281 
 
 499 
 
 81 
 82 
 Graham v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 33 S. W. 537 526 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 61 
 
 S. W. 714 395, 398, 960 
 
 Grainger v. State, 5 Yerg. 459, 26 
 
 Am. Dec. 278 . . 287, 354, 456 
 458, 547, 549 
 Grant v. State, 62 Ala. 233 . . 125, 126 
 V. State, 118 Ga. 804, 45 S. 
 
 E. 603 1000 
 
 Gratz V. Com. 96 Ky. 162, 28 S. W. 
 
 159 832 
 
 Gravely v. State, 45 Neb. 878, 64 N. 
 
 W. 452 913 
 
 Graves v. People, 18 Colo. 170, 32 
 
 Pac. 63 973, 991, 993 
 
 V. State, 45 N. J. L. 203 . . 832 
 
 833 
 Gray v. Combs, 7 J. J. Marsh. 478, 
 
 23 Am. Dec. 431 789 
 
 V. Com. 101 Pa. 381, 47 Am. 
 
 Rep. 733 899 
 
 V. Goodrich, 7 Johns. 95 972 
 
 V. State, 63 Ala. 66 .. 913, 924 
 
 929 
 V. Statfe, 4 Baxt. 331 .. 129, 131 
 208, 209, 211, 260, 915 
 V. State, 44 Pla. 436, 33 So. 
 
 205 870 
 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 83 
 
 S. W. 705 277, 770, 913 
 
 Grayson v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 57 S. W. 808 .. 506 
 
 512 
 527 
 Green *■. Com. 13 Ky. L. Rep. 807, 
 
 18 S. W. 515 986, 992 
 
 993, 1007 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Green v. Com. 17 Ky. L. Rep. 943, 
 
 33 S. W. 100 923, 936 
 
 V. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 1221, 
 
 83 S. W. 638 . . 263, 264, 557 
 
 V. Com. 12 Allen, 155 . . 240, 832 
 
 871, 1041 
 
 V. Com. 83 Pa. 75 . . 166, 200 
 
 228, 233, 234, 804 
 
 V. State (Ala.) 39 So. 362 . . 166 
 
 421, 423, 427, 432, 433, 505 
 
 509, 555 
 
 V. State, 66 Ala. 40, 41 Am. 
 
 Rep. 744 .. 17, 823, 824, 826 
 
 828, 974 
 
 V. State, 69 Ala. 6 862, 394 
 
 401, 408 
 V. State, 96 Ala. 29, 11 So. 
 
 478 890 
 
 V. State, 97 Ala. 59, 12 So. 
 
 416, 15 So. 242 234 
 
 V. State, 98 Ala. 14, 13 So. 
 
 482 165, 224 
 
 V. State, 38 Ark. 304 101 
 
 V. State, 45 Ark. 281 . . 124, 219 
 V. State, 51 Ark. 189, 10 S. 
 
 W. 266 . . 164, 165, 198, 203 
 
 205, 647, 675 
 V. State, 71 Ark. 150, 71 S. 
 
 W. 665 399, 853, 872 
 
 V. State, 40 Fla. 191, 23 So. 
 
 851 72, 73, 890 
 
 V. State, 43 Fla. 552, 30 So. 
 
 798 ... 399, 993, 994, 1000 
 1028 
 
 V. State, 124 Ga. 343, 52 S. 
 
 B. 431 548, 
 
 T. State, 154 Ind. 655, 57 N. 
 
 E. 637 . . 852, 856, 1004, 
 
 553 
 
 V. State, 28 Miss. 687 . . 121, 
 
 125, 129, 130, 132, 133, 
 
 222, 
 
 T. State, 13 Mo. 382 49, 
 
 58, 115, 123, 205, 224, 
 
 1027 
 
 1038 
 
 124 
 
 221 
 
 293 
 
 52 
 
 974 
 
 1034 
 
 V. State, 12 Tex. App. 445 . . 511 
 
 Greene v. State (Ark.) 70 S. W. 
 
 1038 73 
 
 Greenland v. Chaplin, 5 Exch. 248 . . 566 
 Greenleaf t. Illinois C. R. Co. 29 
 Iowa, 47, 4 Am. Rep. 
 
 181 24 
 
 Greer v. Com. 27 Ky. L. Rep. 333, 85 
 
 S. W. 166 289, 389, 515 
 
 V. Com. Ill Ky. 93, 63 S. W. 
 
 443 6, 262 
 
 V. State (Ga.) 52 S. B. 884.. 263 
 v. State, 3 Baxt. 321 . . 1057, 1058 
 
 T. State, 6 Baxl. 629 375 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 45 S. W. 12 . . 323, 785, 799 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 65 S. W. 1075 264 
 
 Gregg V. State, 106 Ala. 44, 17 So. 
 
 321 
 
 Gregory v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 48 S. W. 577 .. 324, 
 
 T. State, 140 Ala. 16, 37 So. 
 
 259 453, 454, 1000, 
 
 GrescWa v. People, 53 111. 295.. 
 
 498, 
 Grey's Case, J. Kelyng, 64, 1 Bast, 
 
 p. C. 261 715, 718, 
 
 Griffln v. State, 90 Ala. 596, 8 So. 
 
 670 940, 
 
 V. State (Fla.) 37 So. 209 . . 
 V. State, 113 Ga. 279, 38 S. 
 
 W. 844 263, 356, 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 53 S. W. 848 126, 
 
 T. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 312, 76 Am. St. Rep. 718, 
 
 50 S. W. 366 .. 38, 39, 
 
 290, 
 
 Griffith V. State, 90 Ala. 583, 8 So. 
 
 812 866, 
 
 Griffith's Case, 1 Plowd. 97 
 
 Grimes v. State, 123 Ga. 754, 51 S. 
 
 E. 721 264, 
 
 Grimsinger v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. 
 
 Rep. 1, 69 S. W. 583 . . 
 
 59, 
 
 Grissom v. State, 62 Miss. 167 . . 
 
 r. State, 8 Tex. App. 386 . . 
 
 Grosvenor v. St. Augustine, 12 Bast, 
 
 244 
 
 Grubb V. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 72, 63 S. W. 314 .. 357, 
 
 Guedel v. People, 43 111. 226 
 
 Guerrero v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. 
 
 Rep. 662, 47 S. W. 655 
 GufEee v. State, 8 Tex. App. 187 . . 
 
 67, 216, 217, 536, 773, 
 Guice V. State, 60 Miss. 714 . . 134, 
 
 Guilford V. State, 24 Ga. 315 
 
 Gunter v. Patton, 2 Heisk. 261 
 
 Gustavenson v. State, 10 Wye. 300, 
 
 68 Pac. 1006 . . 212, 806, 
 
 812, 813, 850, 
 
 Gutlrrez v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 59 S. W. 274 
 
 Gwatkin v. Com. 9 Leigh, 678, 33 
 
 Am. Dec. 264 
 
 H. 
 
 Haacls v. Fearing, 5 Root, 528 696 
 
 Haas V. State, 13 Ohio C. C. 418 . . 160 
 Habel v. State, 28 Tex. App. 588, 13 
 
 S. W. 1001 509, 537 
 
 Hackett v. People, 8 Colo. 390, 8 
 
 Pac. 574 290, 1047 
 
 92J 
 
 673 
 944 
 
 1037 
 497 
 794 
 
 719 
 
 941 
 206 
 
 613 
 
 140 
 
 142 
 320 
 
 889 
 72 
 
 355 
 
 58 
 946 
 801 
 429 
 437 
 
 18 
 
 1021 
 
 858 
 
 196 
 66 
 774 
 384 
 402 
 676 
 17 
 
 80S 
 946 
 
 862 
 
 813 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Ixi 
 
 Hackett v. People, 54 Barb. 370 972 
 
 973, 979, 984 
 
 Hadley v. State, 55 Ala. 31 132 
 
 V. State, 58 Ga. 309 515 
 
 Hagan v. State, 10 Ohio St. 459 . . 57 
 
 203, 867, 871 
 Hagenow v. People, 188 III. 54S, 59 
 
 N. E. 242 1009, 1033 
 
 Hague T. State, 34 Miss. 616 . . 132, 219 
 
 Haile v. State, 1 Swan, 248 322 
 
 V. State, 11 Humph. 154 811 
 
 Halbert v. State, 3 Tex. App. 656 . . 1G5 
 
 168, 170, 171, 205, 248, 578 
 Halderman v. Territory, 7 Ariz. 120, 
 
 60 Pac. 876 .. 124, 125, 128 
 130 
 Hall v. Com. 94 Ky. 322, 22 S. W. 
 
 333 495, 796 
 
 T. Com. 89 Va. 171, 15 S. E. 
 
 517 996 
 
 V. Fearnley, 3 Ad. & El. N. S. 
 
 919 566 
 
 v. State, 40 Ala. 608 . . 200, 923 
 
 1040 
 V. State, 130 Ala. 45, 30 So. 
 
 422 385, 480, 487 
 
 T. State, 31 Fla. 176, 12 So. 
 
 449 1042 
 
 T. State, 132 Ind. 317, 31 N. 
 
 E. 536 983 
 
 T. State (Miss.) 1 So. 351 . . 499 
 T. State, 28 Tex. App. 146, 12 
 
 S. W. 739 875 
 
 V. State, 33 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 191, 26 S. W. 72 169 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 88 
 
 S. W. 244 932 
 
 V. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 257, 64 S. W. 248 . . 381, 520 
 938 
 V. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 479, 66 S. W. 783 380, 381 
 
 389, 458, 466, 467, 529 
 
 Hall's Case, Cro. Jac. 95 858 
 
 Halliburton v. State, 32 Tex. Crim. 
 
 Rep. 51, 22 S. W. 48 .. 280 
 
 312, 324 
 Halloway's Case, Cro. Car. 131, 1 
 
 Hale, P. C. 434 ..302, 310 
 
 Halsey v. Com. 1 Ky. L. Rep. 121 .. . 259 
 Hamblin v. State, 41 Tex. Crim'. 
 Rep. 135, 50 S. W. 1019, 
 
 5 S. W. 1111 914, 924 
 
 Hamby t. State, 72 Ark. 623, 83 S. 
 
 W. 322 47 
 
 V. State, 36 Tex. 523 . . 125, 129 
 
 169, 219, 223, 238, 840, 841 
 
 859, 860, 910, 918 
 
 Hamilton v. People, 71 111. 498 . . 240 
 
 1058 
 V. People, 113 111. 34, 55 Am. 
 
 Rep. 396 649 
 
 Hamilton v. State, 101 Tenn. 417, 47 
 
 S. W. 695 499, 519 
 
 V. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 644, 56 S. W. 926 ..206, 928 
 Hamlin v. Com. 11 Ky. L. Rep. 348, 
 
 12 S. W. 146 . . 506, 527 
 625, 638 
 
 V. State, 48 Conn. 92 1012 
 
 T. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 579, 47 S. W. 656 870 
 
 Hammil v. State, 90 Ala. 576, 8 So. 
 
 380 .. 199, 483, 1000, 1004 
 1005, 1013 
 Hammond v. People, 199 111. 173, 64 
 
 N. B. 980 . . 106, 127, 206 
 359, 473, 479 
 Hamp V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 60 S. W. 45 3 
 
 Hampton v. State, 45 Ala. 82 9, 117 
 
 143 
 T. State (Fla.) 39 So. 421 . . 714 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 65 S. W. 526 374 
 
 Hancock v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 83 S. W. 696 41, 311, 329 
 
 Handley v. State, 96 Ala. 48, 38 Am. 
 
 Rep. 81, 11 So. 322.. 132, 743 
 759, 761 
 Handly v. Com. 15 Ky. L. Rep. 736, 
 
 24 S. W. 609 125, 266 
 
 Handock v. Baker, 2 Bos. & P. 260. . 774 
 Handy v. State, 108 Ga. 749, 32 S. E. 
 
 665 995 
 
 Haney v. Com. 5 Ky. L. Rep. 203.. 456 
 973, 978, 982, 983, 986, 989 
 
 V. State, 34 Ark. 263 846, 855 
 
 Hanna v. People, 86 111. 243 644 
 
 Hannah v. State (Miss.) 39 So. 855.. 264 
 Hanoff V. State, 37 Ohio St. 178, 41 
 
 Am. Rep. 496 50, 73 
 
 Hans V. State (Neb.) 100 N. W. 
 
 419 540 
 
 Hanvey v. State, 68 Ga. 612 . . 133, 274 
 
 807, 810 
 Hanway v. Boultbee, 1 Moody & R. 
 
 14 614 
 
 Hanye v. State, 99 Ga. 212, 25 S. B. 
 
 307 121, 422 
 
 Harbolt v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 40 S. W. 983 1042 
 
 Harbour t. State, 140 Ala. 103, 37 
 
 So. 330 472, 557 
 
 Hardcastle v. State, 36' Tex. Crim. 
 
 Rep. 555, 38 S. W. 186.. 282 
 312 
 Hardin t. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 208, 49 S. W. 607 . . 605, 622 
 V. State, 4 Tex. App. 355 . . 19 
 20,' 840, 841 
 Hardison t. State (Tex. Crim. App,) 
 
 85 S. W. 1071 .. 370, 925 
 Hardy t. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 289, 20 S. W. 561 . . 572, 938 
 
Izii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Hardy v. State, 36 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 400, 37 S. W. 434 . . 135, 136 
 Harkness t. State, 129 Ala. 71, 30 So. 
 
 73 . . 132, 165, 200, 404, 417 
 
 503, 505 
 Harman v. State, 3 Head. 243 . . 422, 424 
 Harmanson v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 App.) 42 S. W. 995 292 
 
 Harmon v. State, 158 Ind. 37, 62 
 
 N. E. 630 399, 526, 792 
 
 Harper v. State, 79 Miss. 575, 56 
 
 L.R.A. 372, 31 So. 195 . . 995 
 996 
 Harrel v. State, 39 Miss. 702, 80 
 
 Am. Dec. 95 17, 85, 86 
 
 Harrell v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 204, 45 S. W. 581 . . 197, 370 
 410, 119 
 V. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 507, 55 S. W. 824 3, 169 
 
 V. State, 75 Ga. 842 . . 603, 638 
 
 962 
 Harrington v. State, 83 Ala. 9, 3 
 
 So. 425 7, 253, 255 
 
 Harris, Re, 93 Ga. 203, 18 S. E. 
 
 823 1047 
 
 T. Com. 25 Ky. L. Rep. 297, 
 
 74 S. W. 104<t . . 910, 926 
 
 931 
 V. People, 32 Colo. 211, 75 
 
 Pac. 427 . . 367, 371, 474 
 476, 480 
 v. State, 96 Ala. 24, 11 So. 
 
 255 368, 496, 767, 797 
 
 V. State, 123 Ala. 69, 26 So. 
 
 515 537 
 
 V. State, 34 Ark. 469 409 
 
 V. State, 36 Ark. 127 .. 199, 209 
 
 243 
 y. State, 109 Ga. 280, 34 S. 
 
 E. 583 937 
 
 V. State, 120 Ga. 167, 47 S. 
 
 E. 520 206 
 
 V. state, 155 Ind. 15, 56 N. 
 
 E. 916 97, 98 
 
 y. State, 155 Ind. 265, 58 N. 
 
 E. 75 97, 98, 115, 122, 320 
 
 V. State (Miss.) 10 So. 478.. 1055 
 y. State, 47 Miss. 318 . . 131, 402 
 407, 1047 
 V. Stnte, 72 Miss. 99, 16 So. 
 
 360 749, 761 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 89 
 
 S. W. 1064 262, 355 
 
 y. State, 8 Tex. App. 90 . . 97-99 
 219, 317, 374 
 V. State, 15 Tex. App. 629 . . 665 
 y. State, 28 Tex. App. 308, 
 
 19 Am. St. Rep. 837, 12 
 
 S. W. 1102 .. 15, 590, 897 
 903 
 V. State, 30 Tex. App. 549, 17 
 
 S. W. 1110 904 
 
 Harris v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 411, 20 S. W. 916 960> 
 
 V. State, 37 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 441, 36 S. W. 88.. 84,84 7, 852.' 
 V. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 8, 
 
 48 S. W. 502 304 
 
 y. United States, 8 App. D. C. 
 
 20, 36 L.R.A. 465 805 
 
 Harrison y. Com. 79 Va. 374, 52 Am. 
 
 Rep. 634 2, 103, 129, 143 
 
 421, 422, 441, 445, 507 
 y. State, 24 Ala. 67, 60 Am. 
 
 Dec. 450 300, 394, 395, 783 
 
 y. State, 78 Ala. 5 508 
 
 V. State, 79 Ala. 29 938 
 
 T. State (Ala.) 40 So. 57 .. 156- 
 
 941 
 V. State, 83 Ga. 129, 9 S. E. 
 
 542 5& 
 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 83 
 
 S. W. 699 .. 209, 283, 939^ 
 Hart V. Com. 85 Ky. 77, 7 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 576, 2 S. W. 673 . . 40T 
 y. State, 15 Tex. App. 202, 49 
 
 Am. Rep. 188 . . 901, 913, 92T 
 944 
 V. State, 38 Pla. 39, 20 So. 
 
 805 425, 428, 43.-j 
 
 Hartigan v. Territory, 1 Wash. Terr. 
 
 448 1015, 1016 
 
 Harvey v. State, 40 Ind. 516 .. 31, .39 
 Hasenfuss v. State, 156 Ind. 246, 59 
 
 N. E. 463 6, 261 
 
 Hash V. Com. 88 Va. 172, 13 S. 
 
 E. 398 . . 511-513, 528, 854 
 Hasson v. Com. 10 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 1054, 11 S. W. 286 416 
 
 Hatchard v. State, 79 Wis. 357, 48 
 
 N. W. 380 552, 596, 598 
 
 599, 884, 886, 969, 971 
 Hatchell v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 84 S. W. 234 . . 212, 250, 275 
 284, 285, 312 
 Hatcher v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 237, 60 S. W. 97 .. 194, 263 
 959 
 V. State, 116 Ga. 617, 42 S. 
 
 E. 1018 „ 
 
 Hatfield v. Com. 11 Ky. L. Rep. 468, 
 12 S. W. 309 . . 19, 59, 
 
 Hathaway v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 630, 82 S. W. 400 
 
 Haunstlne v. State, 31 Neb. 112, 47 
 
 N. W. 698 . . 159, 160, 
 
 Havens v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 706, 
 82 S. W. 369 . . 443, 750, 
 
 Haverly v. Com. 95 Ky. 33, 24 S. 
 W. 664 
 
 Hawes v. State, 88 Ala. 37, 7 So 
 302 
 
 334 
 
 61 
 
 825 
 
 247 
 
 164 
 224 
 
 758 
 
 378 
 
 200 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 1X111 
 
 FiiwWns v. State, 25 Ga. 207, 71 
 
 Am. Dec. 166 . . 120, 275, 276 
 
 324, 328, 373, 400 
 V. State, 98 Md. 355, 57 Atl. 
 
 27 977, 1000, 1002, 1003 
 
 T. State, 60 Neb. 380, 83 N. 
 
 W. 198 902 
 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 36 
 
 S. W. 443 512 
 
 Hawley v. Butler, 54 Barb. 490 767 
 
 T. Com. 75 Va. 847 889, 1050 
 
 Hawthorne v. State, 58 Miss. 778 . . 116 
 
 117, 128, 131, 133, 135, 152 
 
 161, 165, 222, 228 
 
 T. State, 61 Miss. 749 404 
 
 Hayden v. Com. 23 Ky. L. Rep. 399, 
 
 63 S. W. 20 358 
 
 V. State, 4 Blackf. 547 315 
 
 Hayes v. State, 58 Ga. 35 . . 225, 228 
 
 785 
 V. State, 112 Wis. 304, 87 N. 
 
 W. 1076 . . 35, 645, 652, 670 
 
 675, 900 
 Hayman v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 83 S. W. 204 . . 282, 328, 414 
 Hayner v. People, 213 111. 142, 72 N. 
 
 E. 792 . . 492, 790, 791, 1056 
 
 Haynes f. State, 17 Ga. 465 300, 490 
 
 496, 502, 787, 798 
 
 T. State (Miss.) 27 So. 601 .. 896 
 
 899, 903 
 Hays V. Com. 12 Ky. L. Eep. 611, 
 
 14 S. W. 833 . . 403, 524, 991 
 
 992, 998 
 V. State, 112 Ga. 193, 37 S. 
 
 E. 404 520 
 
 T. State, 40 Md. 633 985 
 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App ) 
 
 57 S. W. 835 263, 358 
 
 V. Territory (Okla.) 52 Pac. 
 
 950 480, 524 
 
 Head v. Martin, 85 Ky. 480, 3 S. W. 
 
 622 . . 738, 740, 741, 743, 745 
 
 747, 748, 762 
 
 V. State, 44 Miss. 731 .. 125, 127 
 
 129, 132, 134, 221 
 
 V. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 265, 50 S. W. 352 944 
 
 Heard t. State, 114 Ga. 90, 39 S. E. 
 
 909 365, 512 
 
 Heath v. Com. 1 Rob. (Va.) 735 . . 926 
 
 931 
 Hedricli v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 532, 51 S. W. 252 148, 177 
 
 186, 951, 953 
 Hefflngton ^. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 
 
 Eep. 315, 54 S. W. 755 . . 416 
 
 432, 441, 442, 938 
 Hellard v. Com. 26 Ky. D. Eep. 38, 
 
 80 S. W. 482 505 
 
 T. Com. 27 Ky. L. Eep. 115, 
 
 84 S. W. 329 . . 410, 545, 560 
 
 Helmerking v. Com. 100 Ky. 74, 37 
 
 S. W. 264 
 
 Helms V. United States, 2 Ind. Terr. 
 
 595, 52 S. W. 60 .. 530, 
 
 Helton V. Com. 27 Ky. L. Eep. 137, 
 
 84 S. W. 574 
 
 T. Com. 27 Ky. L. Eep. 1163, 
 
 87 S. W. 1073 383, 
 
 Hembree v. State (Ark.) 58 S. W. 
 
 350 
 
 Hempton v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 65 S. W. 526 
 
 V. State, 111 Wis. 127, 86 N. 
 
 W. 596 . . 246, 804, 808, 
 
 Henderson v. Com. 5 Ky. L. Eep. 
 
 244 981, 984, 985, 
 
 V. Com. 7 Ky. L. Eep. 745 . . 
 
 V. Com. 24 Ky. L. Eep. 1985, 
 
 72 S. W. 781 .. 246, 
 
 V. State, 98 Ala. 35, 13 So. 
 
 146 
 
 V. State, 120 Ga. 504, 48 S. 
 
 E. 167 
 
 V. State, 12 Tex. 52.'> 
 
 Hendricks v. State, 122 Ala. 42, 26 
 
 So. 242 471, 480, 483, 
 
 Hendrlckson v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 
 2173, 73 S. W. 764 
 
 838 
 541 
 913 
 
 388 
 
 1042 
 
 442 
 
 810' 
 
 993 
 1033 
 
 808 
 988 
 
 342 
 
 12» 
 429 
 
 484 
 553 
 
 1019 
 102O 
 V. Com. 26 Ky. L. Eep. 224, 
 
 81 S. W. 266 . . 259, 601, 602 
 60T, 613 
 V. Com. 85 Ky. 281, 7 Am. 
 St. Eep. 596, 3 S. W. 
 
 166 24, 26, 718. 
 
 V. People, 1 Park. Crim. Eep. 
 
 406 925 
 
 V. People, 10 N. Y. 13, 61 Am. 
 
 Dec. 721 913 
 
 Henning v. State, 106 Ind. 386, 55 
 Am. Eep. 756, 6 N. B. 
 
 803, 7 N. E. 4 309, 311 
 
 313, 324, 874 
 Henrie v. State, 41 Tex. 573 . . 866, 868 
 Henry v. People, 198 HI. 162, 65 N. 
 
 E. 120 . . 121, 236, 243, 245 
 
 362, 367, 497, 502, 503, 519 
 
 944, 945 
 
 V. State, 33 Ala. 389 .. 874, 1043 
 
 v. State, 79 Ala. 42 502 
 
 V. State, 33 Ga. 441 140 
 
 T. State, 51 Neb. 149, 66 Am. 
 St. Eep. 450, 70 N. W. 
 
 924 148, 183 
 
 T. State, 7 Tex. App. 388 . . 861 
 
 863 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 30 
 
 S. W. 802 248, 939 
 
 V. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 306, 42 S. W. 559 . . 126 136 
 13T 
 
Ixiv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Henry Clay, The, Fed. Cas. No. 
 
 6,375 708 
 
 Henson v. Com. 11 Ky. L. Rep. 314, 
 
 11 S. W. 471 314 
 
 V. State, 112 Ala. 41, 21 So. 
 
 79 509 
 
 V. State, 114 Ala. 25, 22 So. 
 
 127 481, 505, 555 
 
 V. State, 120 Ala. 316, 25 So. 
 
 23 362, 415, 1057 
 
 Herd v. State, 43 Tex. Ci-im. Rep. 
 
 575, 67 S. W. 495 . . 1027 
 1037, 1038 
 Herman v. State, 75 Miss. 340, 22 
 
 So. 873 128 
 
 Herren v. People, 28 Colo. 23, 62 
 
 Pac. 833 903 
 
 Herrin v. State, 33 Tex. 638 110 
 
 Herrington v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 63 S. W. 562 273, 379, 412 
 
 Hester v. Com. 85 Pa. 139 913 
 
 Hewitt V. State, 43 Fla. 194, 30 So. 
 
 795 83 
 
 Heydon's Case, 4 Coke. 41b 865 
 
 Hibler v. Com. 25 Ky. L. Rep. 277, 
 
 74 S. W. 1079 239 
 
 Hlcliam V. People, 137 111. 75, 27 
 
 N. B. 88 1053, 1054 
 
 Hickey t. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 297, 76 S. W. 920 . . 430 
 946 
 Hlcklin V. Territory (Ariz.) 80 Pac. 
 
 340 271, 544, 545 
 
 Hickory v. United States, 151 U. S. 
 
 303, 38 L. ed. 170, 14 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 334 456 
 
 Hicks V. State, 25 Fla. 535, 6 So. 
 
 441 116, 131, 143, 224 
 
 V. State, 105 Ga. 627, 31 S. E. 
 
 579 835, 852 
 
 V. State, 51 Ind. 407 372 
 
 T. United States, 150 U. S. 
 
 442, 37 L. ed. 1137, 14 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 144 . . 50, 
 
 58 
 64 
 
 High V. State, 26 Tex. App. 545, 8 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 488, 10 S. 
 
 W. 238 . . 125, 284, 285, 
 
 363, 374, 382, 388, 474, 
 
 900, 
 
 Highsmith v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 
 Rep. 32, 50 S. W. 723, 51 
 S. W. 919 409, 415, 
 
 Hilands v. Com, 114 Pa. 372, 6 Atl. 
 267 
 
 Hill V. Com. 2 Gratt. 594 . . 133, 
 221, 223, 224, 228, 974, 
 
 V. People, 1 Colo. 436 101, 
 
 124, 125, 128, 131, 134, 
 164, 205, 214, 231, 832, 
 
 287 
 896 
 907 
 
 1002 
 
 1051 
 219 
 1007 
 1028 
 116 
 143 
 871 
 872 
 
 Hill V. State, 41 Ga. 484 122, 
 
 247, 974, 
 
 V. State, 64 Ga. 453 . . 304, 
 
 324, 359, 
 
 V. State (Miss.) 16 So. 901 .. 
 
 T. State, 64 Miss. 431, 1 So. 
 
 494 
 
 V. State 42 Neb. 503, 60 N. W. 
 
 916 807, 811, 
 
 T. State, 5 Tex. App. 2 . . 279, 
 
 V. State, 11 Tex. App. 456 . . 
 
 V. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 583, 67 S. W. 506 391, 
 
 129 
 1034 
 306 
 769 
 402 
 
 1016 
 
 812 
 282 
 283 
 716 
 
 401 
 788 
 Hilmes v. Stroebel, 59 Wis. 74, 17 
 
 N. W. 539 55 
 
 Hilton's Case, 2 Lewin, C. C. 214 . . 32 
 
 37, 693, 695, 722 
 
 Hinch V. State, 25 Ga. 699 449 
 
 Hinchcliffe's Case, 1 Lewin, C. Co. 
 
 161 787 
 
 Hines v. Com. 90 Ky. 64, 13 S. W. 
 
 445 1025, 1026 
 
 V. State, 8 Humph. 597 832 
 
 Hinsou V. State, 66 Miss. 532, 6 
 
 So. 463 401, 413, 416 
 
 Plintdn V. State, 24 Tex. 454 . . 263, 312 
 
 394, 497, 524, 793 
 
 Ilirschman v. People, 101 111. 568 928 
 
 Hittner v. State, 19 Ind. 48 . . 482, 540 
 
 541, 544 
 Hjeronymus v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. 
 
 Rep. 157, 79 S. W. 313 521 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 83 
 
 S. W. 708 283, 579 
 
 Hobbs V. State, 16 Tex, App. 517 379 
 
 380 
 Hocker v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 936, 
 
 70 S. W. 291 1041 
 
 Hodge V. State, 97 Ala. 37, 38 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 145, 12 So. 164 924 
 T. State, 26 Fla. 11, 7 So. 
 
 593 846, 859, 932, 933 
 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 64 
 
 S. W. 242 249 
 
 Hodges V. State, 15 Ga. 117 544 
 
 Hoey V. Pelton, 11 C. B. N. S. 
 
 143 566 
 
 Hoffman v. State, 86 Wis. 166, 59 N. 
 
 W. 588 185 
 
 T. State, 88 Wis. 166, 59 N. 
 
 W. 588 178, 216 
 
 V. State, 97 Wis. 571, 73 N. 
 
 W. 51 255 
 
 Hogan V. State, 42 Fla. 562, 28 So. 
 
 763 869 
 
 V. State, 30 Wis. 428, 11 Am. 
 
 Rep. 575 . . 834, 849, 851 
 
 873, 1040 
 
 V. State, 36 Wis. 226 . . 150, 162 
 
 189, 191, 204, 209, 210, 214 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Ixv 
 
 Holcomb T. State, 8 Lea, 417 . . 487, 488 
 Holden v. State, 1 Tex. App. 238 . . 103 
 Holdom T. Ancient Oi-der U. W. 159 
 III. 619, 31 L.R.A. 67, 50 
 Am. St. Rep. 183, 43 N. 
 
 E. 772 1066 
 
 Holland v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 789, 82 S. W. 598 . . P05, 912 
 
 V. State, 12 Fla. 117 . . 95, 97 
 
 103, 116, 124-126, 130, 141 
 
 221, 317 
 
 V. State, 39 Fla. 178, 22 So. 
 
 298 899 
 
 Holler V. State, 37 Ind. 57, 10 
 
 Am. Rep. 74 . . 395, 408, 432 
 HoUey v. Mix, 3 Wend. 350, 20 Am. 
 
 Dec. 702 615 
 
 T. State, 39 Tex. Ci'im. Rep. 
 
 302, 46 S. W. 39 938 
 
 Hollis V. State, 8 Tex. App. 620 512 
 
 Holloway v. Com. 11 Bush, 344 . . 367 
 
 404, 408, 474, 487 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Grim. Rep. 
 
 303, 77 S. W. 14 .. 817, 937 
 Holly V. State, 55 Miss. 424 ..397, 401 
 
 402, 411-413, 413 
 
 V. State, 10 Humph. 141 209 
 
 Hollywood V. People, 2 Abb. App. 
 
 Dec. 376, 3 Keyes, 55.. 576 
 
 Holmes v. State, 23 Ala. 17 364 
 
 V. State, 88 Ala. 26, 16 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 16, 7 So 193 108 
 
 267, 271, 341, 571 
 V. State, 100 Ala. 80, 14 So. 
 
 864 . . 120, 140, 470, 471 
 504, 552, 553, 924 
 T. State, 124 Wis. 133, 102 
 
 N. W. 321 . . 249, 365, 306 
 
 368, 382, 461, 937 
 
 V. State, 11 Tex. App. 223 . . 197 
 
 Holsenbake t. State, 45 Ga. 43 . . 897 
 
 901, 903 
 Holt T. People, 23 Colo. 1, 45 Pac. 
 
 374 874 
 
 V. State, 89 Ga. 316, 15 S. 
 
 E. 316 193 
 
 V. State, 9 Tex. App. 571 .. 37S 
 
 939 
 T. Territory, 4 Okla. 76, 43 
 
 Pac. 1083 871 
 
 Holtz v. State, 76 Wis. 99, 44 N. 
 
 W. 1107 647, 667, 669 
 
 Honaker v. Com. 25 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 675, 76 S. W. 154 136 
 
 Honesty v. Com. 81 Va. 283 . . 504, 510 
 
 814 
 Honeycutt v. State,- 8 Baxt. 372 . . . 1057 
 V. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 129, 57 S. W. 806 . . 578, 579 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 63 
 S. W. 639 . . 98, 197, 
 
 273 
 
 287 
 
 Honeywell v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. 
 
 Rep. 199, 49 S. W. 486 . . 126 
 141 
 
 Honnard v. People, 77 III. 481 598 
 
 Hood V. State (Miss.) 27 So. 643.. 394 
 397, 399, 460 
 I-Ioofman v. State, 88 Wis. 166, 59 
 
 N. W. 588 150 
 
 Hooks T. State, 99 Ala. 166, 13 So. 
 
 767 303, 306, 311, 324 
 
 Hooper t. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 125, 100 Am. St. Rep. 
 845, 69 S. W. 149 . . 546 
 483, 489 
 Hoover v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 342, 33 S. W. 337 400 
 
 414, 527 
 Hopkins v. Com. 50 Pa. 9, 88 Am. 
 
 Dec. 518 110, 931, 937 
 
 V. Com. 25 Ky. L. Rep. 2117, 
 
 80 S. W. 156 38 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 50 
 
 S. W. 381 272 
 
 V. United States, 4 App. D. C. 
 
 430 43, 136, 139, 362 
 
 Ilopkinson v. People, 18 111. 264 540 
 
 Ilopt V. Utah, 104 U. S. 631, 26 
 
 L. ed. 873 812 
 
 Horbach v. State, 43 Tex. 242 . . 404 
 424, 425, 429, 435, 465 
 Horn V. State, 12 Wyo. 80, 73 Pac. 
 
 705 946 
 
 Hornsba v. Com. 14 Ky. L. Rep. 160, 
 
 19 S. W. 845 119 
 
 Hornsby v. State, 94 Ala. 55, 10 So. 
 
 522 . . 102, 131, 132, 162, 252 
 253, 851 
 Horton v. Com. 99 Va. 848, 38 S. 
 
 E. 184 . . 52, 57, 58 62, 229 
 955, 1041 
 V. State, 110 Ga. 739, 35 S. 
 
 B. 659 262, 928 
 
 T. State, 99 Va. 848, 38 S. 
 
 B. 184 50, 55 
 
 V. United States, 15 App. D. 
 
 C. 310 263, 803 
 
 Hotema v. United States, 186 U. 
 
 S. 413, 46 L. ed. 1225, 22 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 895 102 
 
 Housh V. State, 43 Neb. 163, 61 N. 
 
 W. 571 97, 462 
 
 Houston V. State (Fla.) 39 So. 468 852 
 V. State, 26 Tex. App. 657, 
 
 14 S. W. 352 817 
 
 Howard, Ex parte, 30 Ala. 43 719 
 
 V. Com. 96 Ky. 19, 27 S. W. 
 
 854 63, 652 
 
 V. Com. 110 Ky. 356, 61 S. 
 
 W. 756 50, 72, 73, 890 
 
 V. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 91, 67 
 
 S. W. 1003 479 
 
 V. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 612, 
 
 69 S. W. 721 364 
 
 Horn. — V. 
 
Ixvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Howard v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 950, 
 
 70 S. W. 295 945 
 
 T. Com. 24 Ky. h. Rep. 1301, 
 
 71 S. W. 446 121 
 
 V. Howard, 51 N. C. (6 Jones, 
 
 L.) 237 304 
 
 T. People, 185 HI. 553, 57 N. 
 
 E. 441 . . 598, 886, 971, 1044 
 V. State, 110 Ala. 92, 20 So. 
 
 365 469,471,509, 553 
 
 T. State (Tex. Crlm. App.) 33 
 
 S. W. 225 226 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 58 
 
 S. W. 77 100,169,205, 312 
 
 313, 579 
 V. State, 23 Tex. App. 265, 5 
 
 S. W. 231.. 271, 274, 280, 282 
 283, 322, 411 
 T. State, 25 Tex. App. 686, 8 
 
 S. W. 929 697, 721 
 
 Howell T. Com. 26 Gratt. 995 148, 202 
 
 203, 219, 223, 224, 233 
 
 v. State, 79 Ala. 283 524, 537 
 
 V. State, 5 Ga. 48 404, 407 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 60 
 
 S. W. 44 124, 784, 786 
 
 Howser v. Com. 51 Pa. 332 918 
 
 Hoye T. State, 39 Ga. 718 407, 408 
 
 Hronek t. People, 134 111. 139, 8 
 L.R.A. 837, 23 Am. St. 
 Rep. 652, 24 N. E. 861.. 82 
 
 Hubbard t. State, 72 Ala. 164 590, 591 
 
 V. State (Ark.) 91 S. W. 11.. 904 
 T. State, 37 Pla. 156, 20 So. 
 
 235 365, 552, 553 
 
 Hudgins v. State, 2 Ga. 173 410, 792 
 
 Hudson V. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 785, 
 
 69 S. W. 1079 515, 928 
 
 T. State, 34 Ala. 253 16 
 
 V. State, 3 Coldw. 355 972, 973 
 
 979 
 
 v. State, 40 Tex. 13 201 
 
 T. State, 6 Tex. App. 565, 32 
 
 Am. Rep. 593 280, 421, 423 
 
 V. State, 28 Tex. App. 323, 13 
 
 S. W. 388 924 
 
 V. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 420, 66 S. W. 668 280 
 
 V. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 251, 70 S. W. 764 792, 934 
 
 935 
 Huffman v. Com. 6 Rand (Va.) 685. . 56 
 Ilusgett's Case, J. Kelyng, 59.. 637, 639 
 Hughes V. People, 116 111. 330, 6 N. 
 
 E. 55 521, 522 
 
 V. State, 12 Ala. 458 51, 888 
 
 V. State, 117 Ala. 25, 23 So. 
 
 677 382 
 
 V. S'ate (Miss.) 38 So. 33... 385 
 V. State, 29 Tex. App. 565, 16 
 
 S. W. 548 227, 241 
 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 60 
 
 S. W. 562 847, 852 
 
 Hughes V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 82 
 
 S. W. 1039 481 
 
 V. State, 109 Wis. 397, 85 
 
 N. W. 333 998 
 
 Hughey v. State, 47 Ala. 97 400, 402 
 
 407 
 
 Huling V. State, 17 Ohio St. 583 584 
 
 Hull V. State, 6 Lea, 250 213, 378- 380 
 
 383, 547, 786, 798 
 
 Hull's Case, J. Kelyng, 40. .111, 700, 701 
 
 Hulse V. Tollman, 49 111. App. 490.. 400 
 
 461, 462, 557 
 
 Humphries v. State, 25 Tex. App. 126, 
 
 7 S. W. 663 501 
 
 Huunicutt V. State, 18 Tex. App. 498, 
 
 51 Am. Rep. 330 1000, 1021 
 
 V. State, 20 Tex. App. 632... 466 
 1008, 1038 
 Hunt V. State, 135 Ala. 1, 33 So. 
 
 329 247, 905 
 
 V. State, 72 Miss. 413, 16 So. 
 
 753 482, 511, 518-521, 546 
 
 V. State, 6 Tex. App. 663 136 
 
 V. State, 7 Tex. App. 212... 1055 
 
 1059 
 V. State, 33 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 252, 26 S. W. 206 476 
 
 Hunter v. State, 43 Ga. 483 930 
 
 V. State, 74 Miss. 515, 21 So. 
 
 305 3, 117 
 
 T. State, 40 N. J. L. 495.. 17, 824 
 
 829 
 V. State, 8 Tex. App. 75.. 862, 1046 
 V. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 599, 31 S. W. 674 896 
 
 Hurd V. State, 25 Mich. 405 302, 329 
 
 367, 424, 491, 767, 791, 974 
 995, 1037, 1038 
 Hurst y. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 378, 46 S. W. 635, 50 S. 
 
 W. 719 271, 326, 327 
 
 T. State, 25 Miss. 378, 59 Am. 
 
 Dec. 225 1049 
 
 Hussey t. Roundtree, 44 N. C. (Bus- 
 bee, L.) 110 689 
 
 V. State, 87 Ala. 121, 6 So. 420 424 
 439, 443, 992-994, 1001 
 Hutsell V. Com. 25 Ky. L. Rep. 262, 
 
 75 S. W. 225 371 
 
 Indianapolis, B. & W. R. Co. t. Carr, 
 
 35 Ind. 510 24 
 
 Ingram v. State, 67 Ala. 67. .362, 363, 379 
 
 1021 
 
 V. State, 62 Miss. 142 131, 365 
 
 Inman v. State, 72 Ga. 269 1056 
 
 Irby V. State, 32 Ga. 496 270, 763 
 
 V. State, 25 Tex. App. 203, 7 
 
 S. W. 705 1003, 1009 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Ixvii 
 
 Ireland v. Com. 22 Ky. L. Rep. 478, 
 57 S. W. 616 371, 556, 
 
 Irvine v. State, 104 Tenn. 132, 56 
 
 S. W. 845.. 503, 504, 517, 
 
 542, 543, 
 
 Irwin V. State, 43 Tex. 236 400, 
 
 947 
 
 528 
 647 
 402 
 412 
 .. State, 25 Tex. 174 . . 124, 238 
 451, 525 
 V. State, 36 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 505, 38 S. W. 40 73, 188 
 
 652, 661, 954 
 V. United States, 159 D. S. 
 487, 40 L. ed. 229, 16 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 51 899 
 
 Isbell V. State, 31 Tex. 138 1040 
 
 Isliam V. State, 38 Ala. 213 575, 1043 
 
 Ivory V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 87 
 
 S. W. 699 311, 329, 389 
 
 Jack V. Mutual Reserve Fund Life 
 
 Asso. 51 C. C. A. 36, 113 
 
 Fed. 49 
 
 Jaclsson V. Com. 100 Ky. 239, 66 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 336, 38 S. W. 422, 
 
 1091 14, 36, 73, 595, 
 
 889, 
 
 V. Com. 19 Gratt. 656 994, 
 
 V. Com. 97 Va. 762, 33 S. E. 
 
 547 219, 221, 
 
 V. Com. 98 Va. 845, 36 S. E. 
 
 487 422, 510, 
 
 V. People, 18 111. 269 2, 97, 
 
 842, 845, 
 
 V. State, 74 Ala. 26 5, 
 
 T. State, 77 Ala. 18 358, 
 
 444, 
 T. State, 81 Ala. 33, 1 So. 33 
 T. State, 106 Ala. 12, 17 So. 
 
 333 
 
 T. State, 136 Ala. 22, 34 So. 
 
 188 
 
 T. State, 136 Ala. 96, 33 So. 
 
 888 
 
 .. State, 45 Ga. 198 
 
 V. State, 56 Ga. 235 
 
 T. State, 76 Ga. 473 . . 334, 
 
 745, 746, 
 
 T. State, 82 Ga. 449, 9 S. E. 
 
 126 , 266, 
 
 T. State, 91 Ga. 271, 44 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 22, 18 S. K. 298, 
 
 305, 359, 363, 378, 
 
 V. State, 161 Ind. 36, 67 N. 
 
 B. 690 148, 174, 
 
 T. State, 66 Miss. 89, 14 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 542, 5 So. 690. . 
 
 741, 751, 752, 
 
 T. State, 79 Miss. 42, 30 So. 
 
 39 . . 100, 101, 357, 365, 
 
 973 
 
 825 
 
 921 
 
 1015 
 
 291 
 
 537 
 98 
 1055 
 259 
 438 
 507 
 524 
 
 240 
 
 545 
 539 
 1030 
 743 
 758 
 
 284 
 
 304 
 769 
 
 1055 
 
 740 
 
 758 
 
 367 
 
 Jackson v. State, 6 Baxt. 452 324, 413 
 
 418, 421 
 V. State, 28 Tex. App. 108, 12 
 
 S. W. 501 560 
 
 V. State, 29 Tex. App. 458, 16 
 
 S. W. 247.. 897, 898, 902, 903 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 90 
 
 S. W. 34 124 
 
 V. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 38, 28 S. W. 815 846 
 
 Jackson ex dem. Coe v. Kniffen, 2 
 
 Johns. 35, 3 Am. Dec. 390 972 
 Youngs V. Vredenbergh, 1 
 
 Jolins. 159 973 
 
 Jackson's Case, 1 Hale, P. C. 464 617 
 
 639 
 
 Jacob V. State, 3 Humph, 493 268 
 
 Jacobs V. State, 28 Tex. App. 79, 
 
 12 S. W. 408 103 
 
 Jahnke v. State, 68 Neb. 154, 94 N. 
 
 W. 158, 104 N. W. 154.. 50 
 919, 925 
 James v. State, 123 Ga. 548, 51 S. B. 
 
 577 263, 264, 507 
 
 V. State, 44 Tex. 314 603, 630 
 
 744 
 
 Jane v. Com. 3 Met. (Ky.) 18 840, 853 
 
 866 
 Jarvis v. State, 138 Ala. 17, 34 
 
 So. 1025.. 247, 274, 325, 328 
 505, 553, 931, 1010, 1027 
 V. State, 70 Ark. 613, Appx. 
 
 67 S. W. 76 803, 804 
 
 Jeff V. State, 39 Miss. 593.. 124, 125, 132 
 Jeffierds v. People, 5 Park. Crim. Rep. 
 
 522 933, 940 
 
 .Tefferson v. State, 52 Miss. 767 363 
 
 Jeffries v. Com. 84 Ky. 237, 1 S. W. 
 
 442 846, 852, 853 
 
 Jenkins v. Com. 8 Ky. L. Rep. 54, 1 
 
 S. W. 154 60 
 
 v. State, 82 Ala. 25, 25 So. 
 
 150 345 
 
 V. State, 35 Pla. 737, 48 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 267, 18 So. 182. . 895 
 T. State, 93 Ga. 1, 18 S. E. 992 807 
 
 808 
 V. State, 123 Ga. 523, 51 S. E. 
 
 598 246, 262 
 
 T. State, 80 Md. 72, 30 Atl. 
 
 566 401, 402, 441 
 
 V. State, 30 Tex. App. 379, 17 
 
 S. W. 938 138 
 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 173, 75 S. W. 312 658, 659 
 
 677; 955, 956 
 Jennings v. Com. 13 Ky. L. Rep. 79, 
 
 16 S. W. 348 66, 574, 647 
 
 667 
 833 
 
 T. State, 7 Tex. App. 350. .831, 
 
 V. United States, 2 Ind. Terr. 
 
 670, 53 S. W. 456 
 
 206 
 
Ixviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Jerome v. State, 61 Neb. 459, 85 N. 
 
 W. 394 917 
 
 Jerry v. State, 1 Blackf. 395 831, 875 
 
 Jetter v. New York & II. E. Co. 2 
 
 Keyes, 154 703 
 
 Jewell V. Territory, 4 Okla. 53, 43 
 
 Pac. 1075 8, 149, 182, 190 
 
 191, 832, 871 
 
 Jim V. State, 5 Humph. 146 232, 931 
 
 Jimmerson y. State, 133 Ala. 18, 32 
 
 So. 141 371, 394, 399, 419 
 
 438, 440, 461, 471, 927, 929 
 Johns V. State, 19 Ind. 421, 81 Am. 
 
 Dec. 408 827 
 
 T. State, 46 Pla. 153, 35 So. 
 
 71 933 
 
 John's Case, 1 East, P. C. 357. .1007, 1029 
 
 Johnson, Re, 57 Cal. 529 806 
 
 V. Com. 24 Pa. 386. .148, 175, 223 
 
 876, 1041 
 
 V. Com. 9 Bush, 224 938 
 
 V. Com. 81 Ky. 325 899, 900 
 
 V. Com. 94 Ky. 578, 23 S. W. 
 
 507 478, 512 
 
 V. Patterson, 14 Conn. 1, 35 
 
 Am. Dec. 96 785, 789 
 
 V. People, 33 Colo. 224, 80 
 
 Pac. 133 597, 886, 887 
 
 T. State, 17 Ala. 618 921, 925 
 
 926, 931, 981, 984, 986, 903 
 
 1002, 1004, 1040 
 
 T. State, 47 Ala. 9.. 972, 981, 1030 
 
 1033 
 
 V. State, 69 Ala. 253 527 
 
 V. State, 50 Ala. 456 981 
 
 V. State, 94 Ala. 35, 10 So. 
 667... 337, 342, 567, 572, 
 
 V. State, 102 Ala. 1, 16 So. 
 
 99 . . 274, 509, 991, 993, 
 T. State, 133 Ala. 38, 31 So. 
 
 951.. .208, 214, 255. 267, 
 T. State, 141 Ala. 37, 37 So. 
 
 456 
 
 T. State, 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 897, 
 
 142 Ala. 70, 38 So. 182 . . 
 
 922 
 981 
 
 996 
 
 312 
 
 558 
 
 22 
 23 
 T. State, 29 Ark. 31, 21 Am. 
 
 Rep. 154 1050 
 
 T. State, 58 Ark. 57, 23 S. W. 
 
 7 302, 378, 543, 544, 752 
 
 V. State, 24 Fla. 162, 4 So. 
 
 535.. 150, 202, 207, 209, 210 
 214, 215, 022 
 
 V. State, 30 Ga. 426 634, 964 
 
 V. State, 72 Ga. 679 377, 1031 
 
 ,. State, 92 Ga. 36, 17 S. B. 
 
 974 123 
 
 T. State, 105 Ga. 665, 31 S. 
 
 E. 399 385, 400, 414 
 
 V. State (Miss.) 27 So. 880.. 359 
 
 404 
 
 Johnson v. State, 54 Miss. 430. . .401, 
 
 404 
 407 
 V. State, 66 Miss. 189, 5 So. 
 
 95 407, 408 
 
 V. State, 78 Miss. 627, 29 So. 
 
 515 263, 1054, 1056 
 
 V. State, 80 Miss. 798, 32 So. 
 
 49 949 
 
 V. State, 85 Miss. 572, 37 So. 
 
 926 933 
 
 V. State, 66 Ohio St. 59, 61 
 L.R.A. 277, 90 Am. St. 
 Rep. 564, 63 N. E. 607. . S 
 
 338, 573, 678, 680 
 
 V. State, 26 Tex. 117 624 
 
 T. State, 27 Tex. 758 275, 400 
 
 412 
 331 
 
 T. State, 30 Tex. 748 157, 
 
 V. State, 43 Tex. 612 
 
 V. State, 5 Tex. App. 43 . .603, 
 614, 
 
 V. State, 18 Tex. App. 385 
 
 V. State, 22 Tex. App. 206, 2 
 
 S. W. 609.. 286, 311, 313, 
 V. State, 26 Tex. App. 631, 10 
 
 S. W. 235 .. 504, 511, 
 
 613 
 630 
 248 
 
 322 
 
 522 
 531 
 V. State, 28 Tex. App. 17, 11 
 
 S. W. 667 443 
 
 V. State, 29 Tex. App. 150, 15 
 
 S. W. 647 924 
 
 V. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 377, 60 S. W. 48 171 
 
 V. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 283, 65 S. W. 92 42 
 
 V. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 476, 66 S. W. 845 513 
 
 T. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 332, 71 S. W. 25 101, 174 
 
 249 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 453, 77 S. W. 15 74, 910 
 
 T. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 291, 81 S. W. 945 27;! 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 24 
 
 S. W. 285 15, 67 
 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 50 
 
 S. W. 343 488 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 59 
 
 S. W. 269 536 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 67 
 
 S. W. 412 239 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 84 
 
 S. W. 824 545, 775 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 88 
 
 S. W. 223 208 
 
 V. State, 11 Lea, 47. .275, 283, 285 
 
 319 
 T. State, 100 Tenn. 254, 45 S. 
 
 W. 436 357 
 
 V. State, 8 Wyo. 494, 58 Pac. 
 
 761 928 
 
 JohuBi^n's Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 164.. 40 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 bdx 
 
 Johnston v. State, 29 Fla. 558, 10 
 
 So. 686 400, 
 
 Johnston's Case, 5 Gratt. 660. .269, 
 
 501 
 779 
 780 
 
 Jolly V. Com-. 110 Ky. 190, 96 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 429, 61 S. W. 49 97 
 
 100, 263 
 
 V. State, 13 Smedes & M. 223 16 
 Jones, Ex parte, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 422, 20 S. W. 9S.3. . . .170, 202 
 
 212, 255, 260, 281, 312, 315 
 
 T. Com. 3C Pittsb. L. J. 423. . 132 
 T. Com. 20 Ky. L. Rep. 355, 
 
 46 S. W. 217 308, 988 
 
 901. 993, 1007 
 
 V. Com. 75 Pa. 403 203, 210 
 
 305, 804, 813, 1047 
 
 V. Gale, 22 Mo. App. 637 504 
 
 .512, 519 
 T. People, 6 Colo. iry^. 45 
 
 Am. Kep 526 427. 429 
 
 V. People, 23 Colo. 276, 47 
 
 Pac. 275 304 
 
 V. People, 166 111. 264, 46 
 
 N. E. 723 60 
 
 V. State, 76 Ala. 8.. 440, 490, 492 
 
 495. 783, 795, 796, 938 
 T. State, 137 Ala. 12, 34 So. 
 
 681 858, 946 
 
 V. State, 52 Ark. 345, 12 S. W. 
 
 704 979, 986, 987 
 
 T. State, 29 Ga. 594 808, 811 
 
 815 
 V. state, 87 Ga. .-525. 13 S. E. 
 
 591 287 
 
 T. State, 110 Ga. 252, 34 S. 
 
 E. 205 385 
 
 T. State, 117 Ga. 324, 43 S. E. 
 
 715 930 
 
 V. State, 35 Ind. 122 859 
 
 T. State, 64 Ind. 473... 913, 935 
 
 939 
 
 T. State, 71 Ind. 66 . . 985, 989 
 
 993, 1017, 1020 
 
 V. State, 57 Miss. 684 940 
 
 V. State, 70 Miss. 401, 12 So. 
 
 444 65, 1036 
 
 T. State, 79 Miss. 309, 30 So. 
 
 759 987 
 
 T. State, 84 Miss. 194, 36 
 
 So. 243 545 
 
 T. State, 14 Mo. 409 603, 606 
 
 631, 635 
 T. State, 51 Ohio St. 331, 88 
 
 N. E. 79 210, 436, 569 
 
 ▼. State, 14 Ohio C. C. 35 177 
 
 666, 888 
 V. State, 13 Tex. 168, 62 Am. 
 
 Dee. 550 75, 218 
 
 T. State, 3 Tex. App. 150 170 
 
 T. State, 4 Tex. App. 436 913 
 
 Jones T. State, 26 Tex. App. 1, 8 
 Am. St. Rep. 454, 9 S. 
 W. 53 . . 392, 549, 621, 
 
 630 
 631 
 
 V. State, 33 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 492, 47 Am. St. Rep. 46, 
 
 26 S. W. 1082.. 279-281, 324 
 V. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 87, 70 Am. St. Rep. 719, 
 
 40 S. W. 807, 41 S. W. 
 
 638 279, 280, 437 
 
 T. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rjp. 
 
 405, 71 S. W. 962 370, 380 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 38 S. W. 992 1010 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 51 
 
 S. W. 949 354 
 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 77 
 
 S. W. S02 786 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 85 
 
 S. W. .-1 283 
 
 V. Territory, 4 Ol5la. 45, 43 
 
 Pac. 1072 , .1043, 1054 
 
 .Torasco v. State, 6 Tex. App. 238. . . . 861 
 .Tordan v. ITiople, 19 Colo. 417, 36 
 
 rac. 218 228, 84i> 
 
 V. State, 79 Ala. 9 36, 60, 930 
 
 938, 1033 
 T. State, 81 Ala. 20, 1 So. 577 1000 
 
 1001 
 
 V. State, 82 Ala. 1, 2 So. 460. 34 
 
 50, 54, 63, 65, 1001 
 
 T. State (Fla.) 39 So. 155 192 
 
 V. State, 22 Ga. 545 121, 1040 
 
 V. State, 117 Ga. 405, 43 S. 
 
 E. 747 507, 
 
 V. State, 13 Ohio C. C. 471.. 
 389, 
 
 V. State, 10 Tex. 479 103, 
 
 19S, 224, 
 V. State, 11 Tex. App. 435... 
 
 537 
 386 
 552 
 165 
 226 
 365 
 366 
 
 Josef V. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 446, 30 S. W. 1067... 15, 590 
 
 896, 897 
 
 .Josephine v. State, 39 Miss. 613.. 51, 888 
 
 890, 913, 914 
 
 Joslin V. State, 75 Miss. 838, 23 So. 
 
 515 993 
 
 Jowell V. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 328, 71 S. W. 286 249 
 
 Joyce ¥. State, 2 Swan. 666.../.... 862 
 Judge V. State, 58 Ala. 406, 29 Am. 
 
 Rep. 757.. 152, 202, 236, 253 
 
 271, 274, 284, 286, 294, 318 
 
 320, 324, 388, 407, 408, 549 
 Juley V. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 391, 76 S. W. 468 138, 378 
 
 Justice V. Com. 20 Ky. L. Rep. 386, 
 
 46 S. \V. 499 836 
 
 V. State, 99 Ala. 180, 13 So. 
 
 6.58 992, 1001, 1003, 1008 
 
 1020, 1033 
 
Ixx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Kaln V. State, 8 Oblo St. 306. . . .832, 869 
 
 871 
 
 Kane v. Com. 109 Pa. 541 993 
 
 KaiT V. State, 100 Ala. 4, 46 Am. St. 
 
 Eep. 17, 14 So. 851 401 
 
 421, 423, 446, 490, 934 
 V. State, 106 Ala. 1, 17 So. 
 
 328 359, 491, 534-536, 77,') 
 
 Kastner v. State, 58 Neb. 767, 79 
 
 N. W. 713. .219, 246, 991, 993 
 
 994, 1034 
 Keady v. People, 32 Colo. 57, 66 
 
 L.R.A. 353, 74 Pac. 892. . 101 
 
 116, 117, 600, 606, 613, 620 
 
 623, 625, 881, 964 
 Kearney t. State, 101 Ga. 803, 65 
 Am. St. Rep. 344, 29 S. 
 
 E. 127 989 
 
 V. State, 68 Miss. 233, 8 So. 
 
 292 3, 117, 917 
 
 Keaton v. State, 99 Ga. 197, 25 S. B. 
 
 615 100, 360 
 
 V. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 621, 57 S. W. 1125... 24, 663 
 
 1004, 1052 
 
 Kee V. State, 28 Ark. 155 41 
 
 Keefe v. People, 40 N. Y. 348 832 
 
 834, 1043 
 Keenan v. Com. 44 Pa. 55, 84 Am. 
 
 Dec. 414.. 162, 164, 165, 203 
 204, 355, 805, 813- 815 
 
 V. State, 8 Wis. 132 256 
 
 Keener v. State, 18 Ga. 194, 63 Am. 
 
 Dec. 269 357, 373, 404 
 
 407-409, 417, 440, 783 
 Keeton v. Com. 92 Ky. 522, 18 S. 
 
 W. 359 807, 808 
 
 Kehoe t. Com. 85 Pa. 127 995, 1029 
 
 Keith V. State, 157 Ind. 376, 61 N. 
 
 E. 716 17, 822, 910, 932 
 
 944, 1060, 1062 
 V. State, 97 Ala. 32, 11 So. 
 
 914 367, 470, 555 
 
 Keithler v. State, 10 Smedes & M. 
 
 193 75, 76, 79 
 
 Kelley v. State, 53 Ind. 311.. 30, 34, 38 
 V. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 216, 20 S. W. 357 817 
 
 T. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 40, 62 S. W. 915... 523, 524 
 
 Kelly V. Com. 1 Grant, Cas. 484 126 
 
 152, 176, 182, 187, 229, 815 
 
 V. Georgia, 68 Fed. 652.. 729, 749 
 
 V. State, 52 Ala. 361 990, 1027 
 
 V. State, 39 Fla. 122, 22 So. 
 
 303 236 
 
 V. State, 3 Smedes & M. 518. . 16 
 
 719, 805, 808 
 V. State, 68 Miss. 343, 8 So. 
 
 745 127, 136, 288 
 
 Kelly V. State, 27 Tex. App. 562, 
 
 11 S. W. 627 479, 539 
 
 T. United States, 27 Fed. 616. 1000 
 
 Kelsoe v. State, 47 Ala. 573 913 
 
 Kemmler, Re, 136 U. S. 436, 34 L. 
 ed. 519, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 930 1053, 1060 
 
 Kendall v. State, 8 Tex. App. 569... 135 
 465-467, 783 
 
 Kendrick v. State, 55 Miss. 436 395 
 
 396, 402, 409, 462, 987 
 Kennedy v. Com. 14 Bush, 340.. 101, 378 
 
 398 
 
 V. People, 40 111. 488 645 
 
 V. People, 39 N. T. 24e..832, 871 
 
 918, 1041 
 
 V. State, 85 Ala. 326, 5 So. 300 124 
 
 219, 983 
 
 V. State, 140 Ala. 1, 37 So. 90 365 
 
 413, 440, 921 
 
 T. State, 6 Ind. 485 1040 
 
 V. State, 107 Ind. 144, 57 Am. 
 Rep. 99, 6 N. E. 305 . . 
 
 V. Way, Brightly (Pa.) 186... 
 
 Kenney v. People 27 How. Pr. 206.. 
 
 V. State, 124 Wis. 486, 102 
 
 N. W. 907 
 
 Kenny V. People, 31 N. Y. 330 
 
 Kent V. People, 8 Colo. 563, 9 Pac. 
 
 852 2, 3, 128, 143, 
 
 Kernau v. State, 65 Md. 25.3, 4 Atl. 
 
 124 
 
 Klbler v. Com. 94 Va. 804, 26 S. E. 
 
 858 
 
 Kidwell V. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 264, 33 S. W. 342 
 
 Kilgore V. State, 74 Ala. 1 148, 
 
 995, 
 
 V. State, 124 Ala. 24, 27 So. 4 
 
 158, 162, 362, 469, 553, 
 
 Killer v. Com. 124 Pa. 92, 16 Atl. 495 
 Killins V. State, 28 Fla. 313, 9 So. 
 
 711 
 
 Kilpatrick v. Com. 31 Pa. 198.. 124, 
 
 164, 202, 228, 254, 993, 
 
 V. Com. 31 Pa. 198.. 1-3, 102- 
 125, 132, 214, 260, 
 Kimball v. State, 112 Ga. 541, 37 
 
 S. E. 886 
 
 King T. Adey, 1 Leach, C. L. 206. . 
 
 T. Baker, 1 Leach, C. L. 112. . 
 
 V. Borthwlck, 1 Dougl. K. B. 
 207 56, 58, 
 
 V. Bridges, 5 Haw. 467... 363, 
 400, 421, 469, 
 
 T. Brown, 1 Leach, C. L. 148, 
 1 East, P. C. 231, 245, 
 274 574, 
 
 615 
 964 
 703 
 814 
 
 256 
 815 
 
 .214 
 
 913 
 
 832 
 
 273 
 
 174 
 1033 
 
 132 
 1053 
 1056 
 
 141 
 
 121 
 
 132 
 
 1000 
 
 1007 
 
 ■ 104 
 
 326 
 
 206 
 630 
 631 
 609 
 
 654 
 385 
 551 
 
 579 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Ixxi 
 
 King V. Callaghan, 1 MacNally, Ev. 
 
 385 993, 1026 
 
 V. Cary, 3 Bulst. 206 1043 
 
 V. Chandler, 1 Salk. 378, 
 
 Carth, 501, 5 Mod. 446, 
 
 1 Ld. Raym. 582 839 
 
 T. Clark, 2 Brod. & B. 473 853 
 
 V. Com. 2 Va. Cas. 78 5, 6, 153 
 
 228, 259, 289, 292, 579, 945 
 
 1004, 1022 
 
 V. Dingier, 2 Leacb, C. L. 561 . 1007 
 T. Drummond, 1 Leach, C. L. 
 
 337 980 
 
 T. Gordon, 1 Leach, C. L. 515. 52 
 
 74, 889 
 
 Y. Greenwell, 1 Haw. 146 38 
 
 V. Hazel, 1 Leach, C. L. 368. 143 
 
 309, 717 
 T. Hlndmarsh, 2 Leach, C. L. 
 
 569 841, 898, 899, 900 
 
 V. Hodgson, 1 Leach, C. L. 6 112 
 
 663 
 
 T. Lad, 1 Leach, C. L. 96 859 
 
 860 
 T. Macdaniel, 1 Leach, C. C. 
 
 44 37 
 
 y. Mead, 4 Dowl. & E. 120, 
 
 2 Barn. & C. 605, 26 Re- 
 vised Rep. 484 973, 981 
 
 T. Minton, 1 MacNally, Ev. 
 
 386 1013 
 
 Y. Moore, 1 Leach, C. L. 314. . 62 
 
 V. Morgan, 1 Bulst. 86 325 
 
 V. Oneby, 2 Ld. Raym. 1490 . . 2 
 
 102, 315, 320 
 T. Palmer, 1 Bos. & P. N. R. 
 
 96, 2 Leach, C. L. 978 53 
 
 V. Peace, 3 Barn. & Aid. 519. . 863 
 
 T. Plummer, 12 Mod. 627.. 57, 66 
 
 342, 648, 656, 659 
 
 V. Rice, 3 East, 581 321 
 
 V. Self, 1 Leach, C. L. 137, 1 
 
 East, P. C. 226 692, 719 
 
 T. Snow, 1 Leach, C. L. 151 . . 284 
 
 290, 373 
 T. State, 65 Miss. 576, 7 Am. 
 
 St. Eep. 681, 5 So. 87.. 436 
 441 
 
 T. State, 74 Miss. 576, 21 
 
 So. 235 3, 
 
 V. State (Miss.) 23 So. 766.. 
 
 222 
 500 
 521 
 
 v. State, 5 How. (Miss.) 730. 834 
 T. State, 89 Ala. 146, 7 So. 750 416 
 V. State, 90 Ala. 612, 8 So. 856 423 
 434, 435, 809, 810, 813 
 Y. State, 137 Ala. 47, 34 So. 
 
 683 848, 852 
 
 Y. State, 55 Ark. 604, 19 S. 
 
 W. 110 405 
 
 V. State, 21 Ga. 220 54, 226 
 
 v. State, 91 Tenn. 617, 20 
 
 S. W. 169 993, 1025 
 
 King V. State, 4 Tex. App. 54, 30 
 
 Am. Eep. 160.. 292, 293, 537 
 
 T. State, 13 Tex. App. 277... 360 
 
 361, 364, 466, 510, 511, 524 
 
 558, 944 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 64 
 
 S. W. 245 813 
 
 V. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 228, 29 S. W. 1086.. 1004, 1022 
 V. Taylor, 1 Leach, C. L. 360. . 72 
 
 V. Wheatley, 1 W. Bl. 273 683 
 
 V. Wier, 1 Barn. & C. 288 618 
 
 V. Wiggs, 1 Leach, C. L. 378, 
 
 note 309, 719 
 
 v. Woodcock, 1 Leach, C. L. 
 
 502, 1 East, P. C. 354.. 974 
 993, 995, 1026, 1029 
 King ex rel. Law v. Mead, 2 Barn. 
 
 & C. 608 976, 984 
 
 Smith V. Taylor, 3 Barn. & C. 
 
 502 838 
 
 King and Queen v. Blggleston, 1 Tre- 
 
 maine, P. C. 10 858 
 
 Kingen v. State, 45 Ind. 518 387, 499 
 
 547, 764 
 Kinglesmlth t. Com. 7 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 744 485 
 
 Kinman y. State, 73 Ark. 126, 83 
 
 S. W. 344 413, 538 
 
 Kinney v. People, 108 111. 519.. 367, 461 
 
 502, 540 
 Klpley v. People, 215 111. 358, 74 N. 
 
 E. 379 365, 369, 432, 443 
 
 554, 556, 557 
 Kipper t. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 613, 62 S. W. 420 181 
 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 377, 77 S. W. 611 63, 248 
 
 651, 958 
 
 Kirby t. State, 89 Ala. 63, 8 So. 110 374 
 
 514, 552, 981 
 
 V. State, 7 Yerg. 259 1040 
 
 V. State, 23 Tex. App. 13, 5 
 
 S. W. 163.. 88, 644, 647, 657 
 660, 669 
 Kirk V. Territory, 10 Okla. 46, 60 Pac. 
 
 797.. 474, 475, 478, 556, 558 
 559 
 Kirkham v. People, 170 111. 9, 48 N. 
 
 E. 465 865, 993, 1011 
 
 Kirkland t. State, 141 Ala. 45, 37 
 
 So. 352 471, 497 
 
 Kistler v. State, 54 Ind. 400 1058 
 
 Kitchen v. Wilkinson, 26 Pa. Super. 
 
 Ct. 75 1063 
 
 Kltts V. State, 70 Ark. 521, 69 S. W. 
 
 545 836 
 
 Klehn v. Territory, 1 Wash. 584, 21 
 
 Pac. 31 1028 
 
 Klyce T. State, 78 Miss. 450, 28 So. 
 
 827 127, 171 
 
 Knapp V. State, 25 Ohio C. C. 571.. 851 
 
Ixxii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Knight V. State, 42 Pla. 546, 28 So. 
 
 759 206, 
 
 T. State, 44 Fla. 94, 32 So. 
 
 110 
 
 V. State, 114 Ga. 48, 88 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 17, 30 S. E. 928. 
 
 Knight's Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 168. . . 
 
 Knowles v. State, 31 Tex. Crlm. Rep. 
 
 383, 20 S. W. 829 279, 
 
 Koei-ner v. State, 98 Ind. 7. .120, 164, 
 
 234, 
 KoUer v. State, 36 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 496, 38 S. W. 44 398, 
 
 521, 539, 
 Kota V. People, 136 111. 655, 27 N. B. 
 
 53 103, 130, 204, 221, 
 
 Krchnavy v. State, 43 Neb. 337, 61 
 
 N. W. 628 117, 
 
 Krebs v. State, 3 Tex. App. 348.. 973, 
 
 906, 
 V. State, 8 Tex. App. 1. .1022, 
 
 Kriel v. Com. 5 Bush. 363 3, 97, 
 
 132, 222, 254, 266, 807- 
 
 Kugadt V. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 081, 44 S. W. 989 . . 896, 
 Kuhn V. Kuhn, 125 Iowa, 449, 101 
 
 N. W. 151 1067, 
 
 Kunde v. State, 22 Tex. App. 65, 3 
 
 S. W. 325 924, 
 
 Kyle T. People, 215 111. 250, 74 N. 
 
 E. 146 121, 
 
 r^aBeau t. People, 34 N. T. 223, 6 
 Park. Crlm. Rep. 371 
 
 207 
 
 856 
 
 247 
 702 
 
 283 
 166 
 925 
 
 508 
 560 
 
 367 
 
 137 
 979 
 999 
 1025 
 1027 
 124 
 809 
 862 
 
 904 
 
 1068 
 
 927 
 
 247 
 
 931 
 933 
 
 Lacefield t. State, 34 Ark. 275, 36 
 
 Am. Rep. 8 109, 206, 576 
 
 Laeewell t. State, 95 Ga. 346, 22 S. 
 
 E. 546 383 
 
 Lacy V. State, 7 Tex. App. 403 754 
 
 Lamar v. State, 63 Miss. 265 134, 135 
 
 Lamb v. People, 96 111. 73. .645, 638, 662 
 
 Lamheth v. State, 23 Miss. 322.. 300, 302 
 
 783, 786, 797, 974, 980, 983 
 
 993, 1028, 1034 
 
 Lamma v. State, 46 Neb. 236, 64 N. 
 
 W. 956 737, 74^ 746 
 
 Lanahan v. Com. 84 Pa. 80. .102, 124, 126 
 
 224, 228, 230 
 Lancaster v. State, 71 Ark. 100, 71 
 
 S. W. 251 1042 
 
 V. State, 2 Lea, 575 813 
 
 V. State, 91 Tenn. 267, 18 
 
 S. W. 777 899, 1057 
 
 V. State, 36 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 16, 35 S. W. 105 918 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 31 
 
 S. W. 515 242, 917 
 
 Lanckton v. United States, 18 App. 
 
 D. C. 348. .101, 808, 843, 
 
 Lander t. Miles, 3 Or. 35 746, 
 
 V. State, 12 Tex. 462 157, 
 
 254, 260, 363, 394, 400, 
 Lane v. Com. 59 Pa. 371 148, 154, 
 
 174, 237, 238, 240, 1043, 
 
 915 
 
 751 
 
 201 
 
 414 
 
 155 
 
 1047 
 
 1057 
 
 V. State, 85 Ala. 11, 4 So. 730, 124 
 
 T. State, 151 Ind. 511, 51 N. 
 
 E. 1056 836, 990, 995, 1023 
 
 V. State, 44 Pla. 105, 32 So. 
 
 896.. 421, 460, 462, 472, 552 
 554, 764 
 T. State, 85 Ala. 11, 4 So. 730 116 
 V. State, 44 Fla. 105, 32 So. 
 
 896 365, 373 
 
 V. State, 151 Ind. 511, 51 N. 
 
 E. 1056 1027 
 
 V. State, 29 Tex. App. 310, 15 
 
 S. W. 827 281 
 
 Lanergan v. People, 6 Park. Crlm. 
 
 Rep. 209 807, 810 
 
 V. People, 39 N. r. 39 854 
 
 Lang V. State, 84 Ala. 1, 5 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 324, 4 So. 193 161 
 
 162, 199, 200, 422, 427 
 
 Langergan v. People, 50 Barb. 266.. 164 
 
 180, 205, 208, 808, 811 
 
 Langstaffe's Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 162 129 
 
 285 
 Lankster v. State (Tex. Crlm. App.) 
 
 72 S. W. 388 581 
 
 T. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 603, 56 S. W. 65 244, 578 
 
 581 
 V. State, 42 Tex. Crim'. Rep. 
 
 360, 59 S. W. 888 99, 101 
 
 36G 
 
 Lantz V. Frey, 14 Pa. 201 689 
 
 Lanure's Case, 1 I-Iale, P. C. 456. . . . 275 
 Lara v. State (Tex. Crlm. App.) 89 
 
 S. W. 840 284, 395, 406 
 
 Larkin v. State, 163 Ind. 375, 71 N. 
 
 E. 959 124, 498 
 
 Larson t. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 29 S. W. 782 261, 302, 329 
 
 331 
 LaRue v. State, 64 Ark. 144, 41 S. 
 
 W. 53 473, 833 
 
 Lawless v. State, 4 Lea, 173 128 
 
 Lawlor T. People, 74 111. 228 375, 461 
 
 Lawrence v. State, 45 B'la. 42, 34 
 
 So. 87 926 
 
 V. State, 36 Tex. Crlm. Rep. 
 
 173, 36 S. W. 90 170, 527 
 
 Laws V. State, 26 Tex. App. 643, 10 
 
 S. W. 220 783 
 
 Lax V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 65 
 
 S. W. 88 255 
 
 Lazier v. Com. 10 Gratt. 70S.. 841, 859 
 
 860 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Ixxiii 
 
 Leach .. People, 53 111. 311 
 
 V. State, 99 Tenn. 584, 42 S. 
 
 W. 195 68, 233, 
 
 Leake v. State, 10 Humph. 143.. 261, 
 
 Leal T. State, 46 Tex. Ciim. Rep. 334, 
 
 81 S. W. 961 135, 567, 
 
 Ledbetter v. State (Ala.) 39 So. 618 
 
 T. State, 23 Tex. App. 247, 5 
 
 S. W. 226 630, 
 
 v. State, 26 Tex. App. 22, 9 
 
 S. W. 60 302, 
 
 Lee v. State, 92 Ala. 15, 25 Am. St. 
 
 Hep. 17, 9 So. 407. .484, 
 
 491, 495, 
 
 T. State, 72 Ark. 436, 81 S. W. 
 
 385 366, 
 
 Y. State, 76 Ga. 498 
 
 v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 460, 72 S. W. 195 . . 126, 
 
 853, 
 
 y. State, 1 Coldw. 62 7, 
 
 684, 
 V. State, 21 Tex. App. 241, 17 
 
 S. W. 425 
 
 Legg's Case, J. Kelyng, 27 116, 
 
 928 
 
 1057 
 267 
 319 
 
 1057 
 117 
 363 
 
 998 
 
 784 
 
 490 
 796 
 
 405 
 903 
 
 720 
 
 855 
 
 8 
 
 701 
 
 466 
 325 
 327 
 Leggett V. State, 21 Tex. App. 382, 
 
 17 S. W. 159 579 
 
 Leibei- v. Com. 9 Bush, ll 973, 981 
 
 984, 985 
 
 Leigh V. People, 113 111. 372 . . 402, 405 
 
 414. 461, 1025, 1032, 1035-1037 
 
 LeightOD V. People, 88 N. Y. 117 166 
 
 Lemons v. State, 97 Tenn. 560, 37 S. 
 
 W. 552 46, 442, 1010 
 
 Lentz V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 85 
 
 S. W. 1068 248, 458 
 
 Leonard v. State, 66 Ala. 461 508 
 
 V. State, 110 Ga. 291, 34 S. E. 
 
 1015 250 
 
 V. Territory, 2 Wash. Terr. 
 
 381, 7 Pac. 872 . . 198, 869 
 871 
 Lesehi v. Territory, 1 Wash. Terr. 
 
 13 236, 832-834, 1040 
 
 Leslie v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 65, 57 S. W. 659 . . 57, 61 
 64, 217, 647, 654 
 Lester v. State, 37 Fla. 382, 20 So. 
 232 . . 994, 995, 1006, 
 
 V. State, 9 Mo. 666 . . 19, 838, 
 841, 846, 
 
 y. State, 2 Tex. App. 432 
 
 Levells v. State, 32 Ark. 585 . . 362, 
 
 1028 
 
 1039 
 
 840 
 
 848 
 
 16 
 
 464 
 
 1042 
 
 581 
 
 802 
 
 Levett's Case, Cro. Car. 538 . . 456, 
 
 780, 
 Levy T. State, 70 Ark. 610, 68 S. 
 
 W. 485 928, 1045 
 
 Levy V. State, 28 Tex. App. 203, 19 
 Am. St. Rep. 826, 12 S. W. 
 
 596 266, 282, 401, 40T 
 
 408, 522, 549, 944 
 
 Lewis, He, 83 Fed. 159 729 
 
 V. Com. 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1139, 
 
 42 S. W. 1127 36, 45 
 
 V. Com. 93 Ky. 238, 19 S. 
 
 W. 664 271, 272 
 
 V. Com. 78 Va. 732 . . 129, 130 
 
 507 
 V. State, 51 Ala. 1 . . 394, 398 
 522, 1046, 1050' 
 T. State, 88 Ala. 11, 6 So. 
 
 755 470, 508, 551 
 
 v. State, 96 Ala. 6, 38 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 75, 11 So. 
 
 259 255, 916 
 
 v. State, 120 Ala. 339, 25 So. 
 
 43 551, 552, 555- 
 
 T. State, 42 Fla. 253, 28 So. 
 
 397 834 
 
 V. State, 72 Ga. 164, 53 Am. 
 
 Rep. 835 683, 684, 689- 
 
 V. State, 90 Ga. 95, 15 S. E. 
 
 697 . . 98, 129, 130, 221, 274 
 
 862 
 
 V. State, 9 Smedes & M. 115. . 980' 
 
 994, 1003, 1016 
 
 T. State, 3 Head, 127 . . 165, 198 
 
 617, 618, 627, 628, 1057 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 65 
 
 S. W. 185 532 
 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 75 
 
 S. W. 788 358 
 
 7. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 89 
 
 S. W. 1073 262, 285, 1012 
 
 Lide V. State, 133 Ala. 43, 31 So. 
 
 953 324, 327 
 
 Lienpo v. State, 28 Tex. App. 179, 
 
 12 S. W. 588 286. 
 
 Lightfoot V. Com. 80 Ky. 516 . . 383, 504 
 
 858 
 v. State, 20 Tex. App. 77 . . 855 
 
 896 
 
 Lillie T. 
 
 State (Neb.) 100 N. W. 
 316 . . 101, 102, 914, 
 
 Lilly T. State, 20 Tex. App. 1 . . 782, 
 
 Lindle T. Com. Ill Ky. 866, 64 S. 
 
 W. 986 . . 739, 748, 755, 
 
 Lindsay v. State, 24 Ohio C. C. 1 . . 
 
 177, 
 Lindsey v. State, 38 Ohio St. 512.. 
 
 V. State, 69 Ohio St. 215, 69 
 N. E. 126 236, 
 
 T. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 164, 32 S. W. 768 . . 515, 
 
 Lineham v. State, 113 Ala. 70, 21 
 So. 497 ... 505, 551-553, 
 
 915 
 945- 
 
 784 
 
 758 
 175 
 238 
 18 
 825 
 
 867 
 
 542 
 543 
 
 556 
 
Ixxiv 
 
 TABLE or CASES CITED. 
 
 Liner v. State, 124 Ala. 1, 27 So. 
 
 438 11?, 644, 
 
 Lingo V. State, 29 Ga. 470 . . 267, 
 
 408, 409, 
 
 Llnnehan v. State, 116 Ala. 471, 22 
 
 So. 662 
 
 V. State, 120 Ala. 293, 25 So. 
 
 Lipscomb V. State, 75 Miss. 559, 23 
 
 So. 210 . . 972, 081, 982, 
 
 986, 988, 990, 993, 994, 
 
 1000, 1029, 
 
 Lister V. State, 3 Tex. App. 17 . . 
 
 T. State, 1 Tex. App. 739 
 
 Littell ». State, 133 Ind. 577, 33 
 
 N. E. 417 851, 
 
 Little T. State, 6 Baxt. 491 . . 408, 
 V. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 654, 47 S. W. 984 . . 239, 
 V. State, Hon-. & T. Cas. 487.. 
 V. State (Miss.) 40 So. 165 .. 
 T. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 654, 47 S. W. 984 . . 897, 
 
 Littiejohn v. State (Arlj.) 89 S. W. 
 
 463 
 
 Litton V. Com. 101 Va. 833, 44 S. B. 
 
 923 221, 
 
 Livingston v. Com. 14 Gratt. 592 . . 
 
 39, 42, 832, 834, 838, 
 
 Loeffner v. State, 10 Ohio St. 598 . . 
 
 Loew V. State, 60 Wis. 559, 19 N. W. 
 437 
 
 Lofton T. State, 79 Miss. 723, 31 So. 
 
 420 106, 
 
 Logan V. State, 17 Tex. App. 50 . . 
 V. State, 9 Humpli. 24 . . 995, 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 53 
 S. W. 694 .. 97, 98, 138, 
 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 573, 81 S. W. 721 ..389, 
 Logsdon V. Com. 19 Ky. L. Rep. 413, 
 
 40 S. W. 775 508, 
 
 Logiie V. Com. 38 Pa. 265, 80 Am. 
 
 Dec. 481 . . 367, 456, 503, 
 
 Lohman v. People, 1 N. Y. 379, 49 
 
 Am. Dec. 340 . . 596, 884, 
 
 V. People, 2 Barb. 216 . . 884, 
 
 Long V. State (Ark.) 91 S. W. 26 . . 
 
 Y. State, 72 Ark. 427, 81 S. W. 
 387 427, 
 
 T. State, 38 Ga. 491 
 
 V. State, 52 Miss. 23 . . 294, 
 363, 364, 367, 369, 383, 
 404, 460, 474, 519, 520, 797- 
 
 645 
 402 
 527 
 
 469 
 
 834 
 
 984 
 998 
 
 1036 
 397 
 436 
 
 1013 
 
 853 
 409 
 
 248 
 408 
 536 
 
 913 
 954 
 
 926 
 
 946 
 38 
 
 840 
 866 
 870 
 
 46 
 
 507 
 
 511 
 
 1007 
 
 1013 
 
 140 
 197 
 
 458 
 
 550 
 
 621 
 624 
 
 888 
 886 
 403 
 423 
 
 430 
 1058 
 358 
 396 
 799 
 
 Long V. State, 23 Neb. 33, 36 N. W. 
 
 310 857 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 88 
 
 S. W. 203 . . 916, 925, 932 
 937, 945, 999, 1026, 1027 
 Long's Case, 5 Coke, 120a, 121b, 
 
 122a 858 
 
 Longacre t. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 41 S. W. 629 512, 522 
 
 Longley v. Com. 99 Va. 807, 37 S. 
 
 E. 339 . . 219, 221, 224, 228 
 
 229, 805, 806 
 
 V. State, 3 Tex. App. 611 . . 859 
 
 868 
 Lord Cornwallls's Case, 2 St. Tr. 
 
 730 5 
 
 Lounder v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 121, 79 S. W. 552 249 
 
 Lovelady t. State, 14 Tex. App. 545, 
 
 17 Tex. App. 287 .. 895, 897 
 
 903, 904 
 Lovett T. State, 30 Fla. 142, 17 L. 
 
 R.A. 705, 11 So. 550 100 
 
 167, 199, 236, 371, 372, 508 
 509, 766-768, 1058 
 V. State, 31 Fla. 164, 12 So. 
 
 452 1042 
 
 Lowe V. State, 118 Wis. 641, 96 N. 
 
 W. 417 228, 1040 
 
 Lowenberg v. People, 27 N. Y. 336. . 1053 
 
 1059, 1061 
 Lowery v. State, 103 Ala. 50, 15 
 
 So. 641 559 
 
 Lowman v. State, 109 Ga. 501, 34 
 
 S. E. 1019 467 
 
 Lowry v. State, 12 Lea, 142 . . 1001, 1017 
 Loyd V. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 533, 81 S. W. 293 . . 63, 282 
 
 Luby Y. Com. 12 Bush. 1 . . 474, 487 
 
 488, 540, 543, 986 
 
 Lucas V. State, 19 Tex. App. 79 . . 903 
 
 904, 896 
 Y. State (Tex. Crim. App.j 
 
 90 S. W. 880 137, 284 
 
 288, 524 
 Luckinbill t. State, 52 Ark. 45, 11 S. 
 
 W. 963 382 
 
 Ludwig V. Com. 22 Ky. L. Rep. IIOS, 
 
 60 S. W. 8 3, 97 
 
 Luera v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 32 
 
 S. W. 898 227 
 
 Luker v. Com. 9 Ky. L. Eep. 385, 5 
 
 S. W. 354 . . 972, 973, 975 
 981, 992 
 Lund V. Tyngsboro, 11 Cusb. 563, 59 
 
 Am. Dec. 159 24 
 
 Lundy v. Lundy, 24 Can. S. C. 650, 
 
 Reversing 21 Out. App. 
 
 Rep. 560 and Affirming 24 
 
 Out. Rep. 133 1064 
 
 Y. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 87 
 
 S. W. 352 413 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Ixxv 
 
 Lutei- V. Hunter, 30 Tex. 700, 98 
 
 Am. Dec. 494 17 
 
 Luton V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 64 S. W. 1051 946 
 
 Lutz Y. Com. 29 Pa. 441 835, 837 
 
 Lyle v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 103, 
 
 19 S. W. 903 816 
 
 Lyles V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 86 
 
 S. W. 763 .. 975, 993, 1042 
 Lyman v. State, 89 Ga. 337, 15 S. 
 
 E. 467 142, 143 
 
 Lynch v. Com. 77 Pa. 205 . . 5, 6, 309-311 
 V. People, 33 Colo. 128, 79 
 
 Pac. 1015 276, 461 
 
 T. State, 24 Tex. App. 350, 5 
 Am. St. Eep. 888, 6 S. 
 
 W. 190 363, 412 
 
 T. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 510, 57 S. W. 1130 . . 613 
 624, 630, 631, 633 
 
 Lyon V. Hancock, 35 Cal. 372 408 
 
 V. State, 22 Ga. 399 . . 294, 315 
 
 793 
 Lyons v. People, 137 111. 602, 27 N. 
 
 E. 677 .. 359, 459, 551, 554 
 958 
 Y. State, 137 111. 602, 27 N. 
 
 B. 677 448 
 
 T. State, 9 Tex. App. 636 . . . 881 
 
 M. 
 
 Mabry v. State, 71 Miss. 716, 14 So. 
 
 267 929 
 
 McAdams v. State, 25 Ark. 405 . . 98 
 
 124, 165, 166, 199, 228, 832 
 
 834, 867, 872 
 McAlister v. Fair (Kan.) 3 L.R.A.(N. 
 
 S.) 726, 84 Pac. 112 1067 
 
 McAllister v. State, 17 Ala. 434, 52 
 
 Am. Dec. 180 . . 38, 40, 41 
 43 
 V. Territory, 1 Wash. Terr. 
 
 360 253, 312, 528 
 
 McAnally v. State, 74 Ala. 9 . . 924, 929 
 McAnear v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 518, 67 S. W. 117 . . 279, 282 
 
 928, 929 
 McBeth V. State, 122 Ga. 737, 50 
 
 S. E. 931 243 
 
 V. State, 50 Miss. 81 . . 31, 41, 42 
 McBride v. Com. 95 Va. 818, 30 S. 
 
 E. 454 913 
 
 V. People, 5 Colo. App. 91, 37 
 
 Pac. 953 . . 895, 897, 903, 928 
 
 972, 981, 986 
 
 McCaa v. State (Miss.) 38 So. 228 . . 106 
 
 227 
 McCahe t. Com. 3 Sadler (Pa.) 426, 
 
 8 Atl. 45 227, 941, 948 
 
 McCall V. McDowell, 1 Abb. (U. S.) 
 
 212, Fed. Cas. No. 8,673. . 731 
 
 McCall V. State (Miss.) 29 So. 1003.. 474 
 
 479 
 McCandless t. State, 42 Tex. Crim. 
 
 Eep. 58, 57 S. W. 672 . . 466 
 486, 506, 513, 516, 517 
 McCann v. People, 3 Park. Crim. Rep. 
 
 272 923, 924 
 
 T. People, 6 Park Crim. Rep. 
 
 629 199, 330 
 
 McCarty y. Com. 114 Ky. 620, 71 S. 
 
 W. 656 325, 1058 
 
 V. State, 4 Tex. App. 468 . . 811 
 
 813 
 
 T. State, 26 Miss. 299 58 
 
 McClain v. Com. 110 Pa. 263, 1 Ati. 
 
 45 227, 228 
 
 McClaine v. Territory, 1 Wash. 345, 
 
 25 Pac. 453 185, 878 
 
 McClellan v. State, 140 Ala. 99, 37 
 
 So. 239 362, 506 
 
 McClelland t. Kay, 14 B. Mon. 103 . . 782 
 McCloud T. State, 37 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 237, 39 S. W. 104 1057 
 
 McClurg T. Com. 17 Ky. L. Rep. 1339, 
 
 36 S. W. 14 . . 310, 474, 546 
 McComas t. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 72 S. W. 189 282 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 75 
 
 S. W. 533 279 
 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 81 
 
 S. W. 1212 281 
 
 McConkey v. Com. 101 Pa. 416 . . 918 
 McConnell v. State, 13 Tex. App. 
 
 390 578, 721, 722 
 
 V. State, 22 Tex. App. 354, 
 58 Am. Rep. 648, 3 S. W. 
 
 699 722, 831, 866, 941 
 
 McCormack v. State, 102 Ala. 156, 15 
 
 So. 438 12, 555 
 
 McCoy V. People, 175 111. 224, 51 N. 
 
 B. 777 . . 97, 98, 408, 421, 
 
 V. State, 8 Ark. 451 . . 793, 
 
 T. State, 40 Fla. 494, 24 So. 
 
 485 
 
 V. State, 25 Tex. 33, 78 Am. 
 
 Dec. 520 . . 97, 98, 109, 
 
 142, 159, 168, 170, 197, 
 
 225, 315, 317, 578, 
 
 v. State, 27 Tex. App. 415, 11 
 
 S. W. 454 
 
 McCrory T. State (Miss.) 25 So. 
 
 671 365, 
 
 McCue V. Com. 78 Pa. 185, 21 Am. 
 
 Rep. 7 .. 102, 133, 223, 
 
 237, 
 
 McCuUoch T. State, 48 InxJ. 109 . . 899- 
 
 McCullough V. State (Miss.) 28 So. 
 
 946 
 
 McCurley v. State (Ala.) 39 So. 
 
 1022 544, 
 
 McDaniel v. Com. 77 Va. 281 . . 164, 
 219, 224, 
 
 932 
 
 794 
 873 
 
 834 
 
 141 
 224 
 913 
 
 9.39 
 
 379 
 
 228 
 930 
 901 
 
 101 
 
 552 
 198 
 229 
 
Ixxvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 McDanlel t. State, 76 Ala. 1 . .30, 503, 555 
 T. State, 97 Ala. 14, 12 So. 
 
 241 469, 471 
 
 V. State, 100 Ga. 67, 27 S. 
 
 E. 158 932 
 
 T. State, 8 Smedes & M. 401, 
 
 47 Am. Dec. 93 116 
 
 129-131, 221, 222, 239, 300 
 
 301, 390, 780, 782, 785, 786 
 
 799, 972, 974, 993, 1001, 1007 
 
 1017, 1028 
 
 McDermott v. State, 89 Ind. 187 . . 132, 362 
 
 McDonald v. State, 46 Fla. 149, 35 
 
 So. 72 852 
 
 V. State, 78 Miss. 369, 29 So. 
 
 171 253 
 
 V. State, 89 Tenn. 161, 14 S. 
 
 W. 487 375 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 22 
 
 S. W. 403 231 
 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 4, 79 S. W. 542 58 
 
 McDonel v. State, 90 Ind. 320 . . 98, 944 
 McDonnall v. People, 168 111. 93, 48 
 
 N. B. 86 . . 362, 368, 430, 674 
 837 
 McDuffie T. State, 90 Ga. 786, 17 S. 
 
 E. 105 330, 400, 451 
 
 V. State, 121 Ga. 580, 49 S. B. 
 
 708 606, 946, 1045 
 
 McElroy v. State, 14 Tex. App. 235 . . 566 
 
 867 
 McBlvalne t. Brush, 142 U. S. 155, 
 35 L. ed. 971, 12 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 156 1060, 1062 
 
 McGee v. State, 8 Mo. 495 834, 1040 
 
 McGehee v. State, 62 Miss. 772, 52 
 
 Am. Rep. 209 574 
 
 McGinnis v. Com. 102 Pa. 66 812 
 
 McGlotlilln v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 53 S. W. 869 .. 391-393, 506 
 790 
 McGrath v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 413, 34 S. W. 127 .. 209-211 
 254, 264 
 McGregor's Case, 23 Am. Jour. Ins. 
 
 549 803 
 
 McGuffie V. State, 17 Ga. 498 1042 
 
 McHargess v. Com. 15 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 323, 23 S. W. 349 . . 982, 1007 
 
 McHugh V. State, 31 Ala. 317 . . 994, 999 
 
 1020, 1021, 1032 
 
 Mclntyre v. People, 38 III. 514 . . 806, 814 
 
 815 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 33 S. W. 347 79 
 
 Mack V. State, 48 Wis. 281, 4 N. W. 
 
 449 914, 922 
 
 Macljaley's Case, 2 Cro. Jac. 280 . . . 604 
 
 Mackalley's Case, 9 Coke, 65b . . 56, 116 
 
 603, 608, 622, 624, 625, 627 
 
 628, 739, 858, 865, 881, 888 
 
 M'Kee v. People, 36 N. Y. 113 91S 
 
 V. State, 82 Ala. 39, 2 So. 
 
 451 . . 107, 125, 132, 140, 274 
 471 
 
 McKenzie v. State, 26 Ark. 334 164 
 
 204, 228 
 McKeone v. People, 6 Colo. 346 . . 441 
 
 442 
 Mackin v. People, 214 111. 232, 73 N. 
 
 B. 344 365, 370, 541 
 
 McKlnney v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 565, 82 S. W. 263 . . 372, 375 
 490, 491 
 
 V. State, 8 Tex. App. 626 96 
 
 103 233, 234, 255, 916 
 T. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 372, 50 S. W. 708 781 
 
 V. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 434, 55 S. W. 341 169 
 
 McKinnon t. Lundy, 24 Ont. Rep. 
 
 132 1067 
 
 Macklin's Case, 2 Lewin, C. C. 
 
 225 . . 290, 296, 319, 645. 657 
 659, 66.% 66T 
 Mackmasters \. State, 81 Miss. 374, 
 
 33 So. 2 933 
 
 McLain v. Com. 99 Pa. 86 102 
 
 McLaurin v. State, 64 Miss. 529, 1 So. 
 
 747 297 
 
 McLean v. State, 16 Ala. 672 . . 974, 981 
 
 1007, 1024 
 T. State (Miss.) 12 So. 
 
 905 991-995 
 
 McLeroy v. State, 120 Ala. 274, 25 
 
 So. 247 357, 805, 807 
 
 Mcliin V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 90 S. W. 1107 138, 212 
 
 McMahon ■/. People, 189 111. 222, 59 
 
 N. E. 584 . . 618, 645, 649 
 665, 668 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 540, 81 S. W. 296 . . 57, 60 
 62, 488, 506, 526, 936 
 
 McManus v. Com. 91 Pa. 57 913 
 
 T. State, 36 Ala. 285 . . 7, 8, 151 
 255, 265, 334, 339 
 McMaster v. State (Miss.) 29 So. 
 
 522 528 
 
 McMeen v. Com. 114 Pa, ;500, 9 Atl. 
 
 878 154, 156, 914 
 
 McNamee v. State, 34 Neb. 288, 51 N. 
 
 W. 821 896 
 
 McNeeley, Ex parte, 36 W. Va. 84, 
 15 L.R.A. 226, 32 Am. 
 St. Rep. 831, 14 S. B. 
 
 436 17, 19, 823, 824, 826 
 
 827 
 
 McNeezer v. State, 63 Ala. 169 537 
 
 McNeill T. State, 102 Ala. 121, 48 
 Am. St. Rep. 17, 15 So. 
 
 352 303, 304, 325 
 
 McNevins v. People, 61 Barb. 307 . . 834 
 
 1043, 1047 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Ixxvii 
 
 McPhay v. State (Miss.) 40 So. 17. . . 602 
 
 McPherson v. State, 29 Ark. 225 . . 362 
 
 402, 464, 483, 834 
 
 V. State, 22 Ga. 478 .. 188, 387 
 
 540, 542, 580, 581, 764, 780 
 
 793, 986, 989 
 
 V. State, 9 Yerg. 279 1037 
 
 McQueen v. State, 94 Ala. 50, 10 So. 
 
 433 1000 
 
 V. State, 103 Ala. 12, 15 So. 
 
 824 207, 243, 509, 524, 539 
 
 1008 
 
 V. State, 1 Lea, 283 212 
 
 V. State, 28 Ky. L. Rep. 20, 
 
 88 S. W. 1047 774 
 
 McSpatton v. State, 30 Tex. App. 617, 
 
 18 S. W. 298 546 
 
 McTJin T. United States, 17 App. D. C. 
 
 323 930, 932 
 
 McVey v. State, 57 Neb. 471, 77 N. 
 
 W. 1111 835 
 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 81 
 
 S. W. 740 283, 414 
 
 M'Whlrt's Case, 3 Gratt. 594, 46 Am. 
 
 Dec. 196 2, 5, 6, 100 
 
 102-104, 116, 119, 129, 130 
 
 238, 248, 259, 310, 319, 320 
 
 324, 325, 327 
 Maddy's Case, 1 Vent. 158, T. Raym. 
 
 212 304, 315 
 
 Madison v. Com. 13 Ky. L. Rep. 313, 
 
 17 S. W. 164 938 
 
 Magness v. State, 67 Ark. 594, 50 
 
 S. W. 554 502 
 
 Mahaffey v. Territory, 11 Okla. 213, 
 
 66 Pac. 342 . . 367, 474, 555 
 Mahany v. People, 31 Colo. 365, 73 
 
 Pac. 26 1042 
 
 Maher v. People, 24 111. 241 . . 365, 460 
 T. People, 10 Micli. 212, 81 
 
 Am. Dec. 781 .. 2, 128, 143 
 
 144, 253, 254, 304, 311, 322 
 
 325, 330 
 
 Maiden v. State (Miss.) 11 So. 488.. 475 
 
 Maile v. Com. 9 Leigh, 661 866, 867 
 
 Main V. Com. 13 Ky. L. Rep. 346, 17 
 
 S. W. 206 294, 529 
 
 Maine v. People, 9 Hun, 113, 43 N. 
 
 E. 80 . . 969, 970, 977, 989 
 
 994, 1021, 1028, 1029, 1037 
 Maines v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 109, 31 S. W. 667 . . 364, 507 
 Malcek v. State, 33 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 14, 24 S. W. 417 . . 905, 026 
 
 Malone v. State, 77 Ga. 767 . . 100, 204 
 
 254, 359, 375 
 
 V. State, 49 Ga. 210 . . 121, 274 
 
 275, 807 
 
 Manger v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 69 S. W. 145 603 
 
 Manier v. State, 6 Baxt. 595 64, 65 
 
 664 
 
 Manis V. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 614, 58 S. W. 81 . . 359, 363 
 Mann v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 723, 82 
 
 S. W. 438 624 
 
 V. State, 134 Ala. 1, 32 So. 
 
 704 . . 357, 363, 364, 450, 471 
 553, 558, 559, 925, 928 
 
 T. State, 22 Fla. 601 1058 
 
 Manning v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 85 S. W. 1149 . . 212, 267, 311 
 T. State, 79 Wis. 178, 48 N. 
 
 W. 209 423 
 
 Mansell's Case, 2 Dyer, 128b . . 650, 664 
 Marable v. State, 89 Ga. 425, 15 S. E. 
 
 453 917 
 
 March v. State, 3 Tex. App. 107 . . 932 
 Marchan v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 212, 75 S. W. 532 937 
 
 Marcum v. Com. 8 Ky. L. Rep. 418, 
 
 1 S. W. 727 982 
 
 V. Com. 9 Ky. L. Rep. 253, 4 
 
 S. W. 786 474 
 
 MargraTes v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 50 S. W. 1016 307 
 
 Maria v. State, 28 Tex. 698 . . 211, 246 
 254, 255, 297, 311, 322 
 Marks v. Borum, 1 Baxt. 87, 25 Am. 
 
 Rep. 764 782 
 
 Marler t. State, 67 Ala. 55, 42 Am. 
 
 Rep. 95 921, 924, 939 
 
 Marlow v. State (Fla.) 38 So. 653 . . 249 
 
 512 
 Marnoch v. State, 7 Tex. App. 269 . . 366 
 384, 924, 929 
 Marshall v. Chicago & G. E. R. Co. 
 48 111. 475, 95 Am. Dec. 
 
 561 972 
 
 V. State, 32 Fla. 462, 14 So. 
 
 92 207, 215 
 
 V. State, 59 Ga. 154 811 
 
 V. State, 74 Ga. 26 129, 130 
 
 T. State, 40 Tex. 200 323 
 
 Marshall's Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 76.. 816 
 Martin v. Com. 93 Ky. 189, 19 S. W. 
 
 580 120, 397, 924 
 
 V. Com. 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1928, 
 
 78 S. W. 1104. .253, 365, 1028 
 1039 
 V. State, 89 Ala. 115, 18 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 91, 8 So. 23 647 
 
 V. State, 90 Ala. 602, 24 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 844, 8 So. 858 . . 12 
 435, 490, 492 
 V. State, 119 Ala. 1, 25 So. 
 
 255 .. 6, 99, 162, 201, 259 
 V. State, 136 Ala. 32, 34 So. 
 
 205 658, 672 
 
 V. State, 5 Ind. App. 453, 32 
 
 N. E. 594 526 
 
 T. State, 17 Ohio C. C. 406. . . 456 
 458, 503, 556, 922, 1028, 1031 
 T. State, 70 Ohio St. 219, 71 
 
 N. E. 640 344, 572 
 
Jxxviu 
 
 tablp: of cases cited. 
 
 Martin v. State, 36 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 632, 36 S. W. 58T, 38 S. 
 
 W. 194 
 
 V. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 144, 58 S. W. 112 . . 300, 
 
 240 
 
 301 
 
 1051 
 
 V. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 279, 70 S. W. 973 59 
 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 83 
 
 S. W. 390 169, 248 
 
 Martinez v. State, 30 Tex. App. 129, 
 
 28 Am. St. Rep. 895, 16 
 
 S. W. 767 . . 96, 97, 102, 103 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 57 
 
 S. W. 838 250 
 
 V. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 88 
 
 S. W. 234 534, 773 
 
 Y. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 89 
 
 S. W. 642 289 
 
 Marts V. State, 26 Oliio St. 162 . . 367, 424 
 Marzen v. People, 173 111. 43, 50 N. E. 
 
 249 . . 100, 160, 166, 204, 205 
 
 Mask V. State, 32 Miss. 405 927 
 
 V. State, 36 Miss. 77 .. 124, 125 
 
 131 
 Mason's Case, 1 East, P. C. 232. .294, 315 
 
 503, 515 
 
 Case, Fost. C. L. 132 315 
 
 Massie v. Com. 15 Ky. L. Rep. 562, 
 
 24 S. W. 611 397, 927 
 
 T. Com. 16 Ky. L. Rep. 790, 
 
 29 S. W. 871 . . 276, 277, 
 
 V. Com. 18 Ky. L. Rep. 367, 
 36 S. W. 550 232, 
 
 V. State, 30 Tex. App. 64, 16 
 
 S. W. 770 307, 
 
 Mathedy v. Com. 14 Ky. L. Rep. 182, 
 19 S. W. 977 156, 
 
 Mathews v. State, 136 Ala. 47, 33 So. 
 
 838 371, 
 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 77 
 
 S. W. 218 1021, 
 
 Mathis V. State, 45 Fla. 46, 34 So. 
 
 287 75, 
 
 Y. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 39, 28 S. W. 817 . . 531, 
 T. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 549, 47 S. W. 464 . . 835, 
 Mathley v. Com. 27 Ky. L. Hep. 785, 
 
 86 S. W. 988 
 
 Matlnez v. State, 30 Tex. App. 120, 
 
 28 Am'. St. Rep. 895, 16 
 
 S. W. 767 
 
 Matthews t. State, 42 Tex. Crim. 
 
 Rep. 31, 58 S. W. 86 . . 
 
 516, 
 
 Mattox V. United States, 146 V. S. 
 
 140, 36 L. ed. 917, 13 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 50 978, 903, 
 
 532 
 560 
 
 234 
 
 312 
 
 986 
 
 1008 
 
 378 
 1028 
 845 
 938 
 853 
 930 
 
 168 
 
 376 
 
 518 
 
 999 
 1018 
 
 Maury v. State, 68 Miss. 605, 24 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 291, 9 So. 445. . 3 
 
 392 
 Maxwell v. State, 129 Ala. 48, 29 So. 
 
 981 419, 425, 503 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 56 
 
 S. W. 62 280 
 
 May V. State, 55 Ala. 39 992, 1002 
 
 V. State, 94 Ga. 76, 20 S. E. 
 
 251 264 
 
 V. State, 120 Ga. 135, 47 S. 
 
 E. 548 25!) 
 
 V. State, 6 Tex. App. 191 462 
 
 490 
 V. State, 22 Tex. App. 595, 3 
 
 S. W. 781 243 
 
 v. State, 23 Tex. App. 146, 4 
 
 S. W. 591 474- 476 
 
 Mayes v. People, 106 111. 306, 46 Am. 
 
 Rep. 698 . . 3, 107, 108, 194 
 846 
 Mayfield v. State, 110 Ind. 591, 11 
 
 N. E. 618 407 
 
 V. State, 101 Tenn. 673, 49 S. 
 
 W. 742 46 
 
 Mays V. State, 88 Ga. 399, 14 S. E. 
 
 560 304, 306 
 
 Meade's Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 184... 300 
 404, 461, 783, 790, 791 
 Mealer v. State, 32 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 102, 22 S. W. 142 402 
 
 Medina v. State, 43 Ttx. Crim. Rep. 
 
 52, 63 S. W. 331 . . 981, 982 
 984, 986 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 49 S. W. 380 . . 883, 925, 967 
 Medlock v. State, 114 Ala. 6, 22 So. 
 
 112 505, 525 
 
 Meiers f. State, 56 Ind. 336 ..837, 859 
 Mell V. State, 112 Ga. 78, 37 S. E. 
 
 121 500, 507, 765 
 
 Melton V. State, 24 Tex. App. 47, 5 
 
 S. W. 652 282, 204 
 
 V. State, 30 Tex. App. 273, 17 
 
 S. W. 257 141 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 83 
 
 S. W. 822 . . 127, 279, 280 
 438, 938, 949 
 Mendez v. State, 29 Tex. App. 6U8, 
 
 16 S. W. 766 . . 177, 876, 954 
 Menly v. State, 26 Tex. App. 274, 8 
 Am. St. Rep. 477, 9 S. 
 
 W. 563 396 
 
 Mercer v. State, 41 Fla. 279, 26 So. 
 
 317 509, 540 
 
 Mercersmith v. State, 8 Tex. App. 
 
 211 . . 64, 647, 649, 653, 655 
 
 662 
 
 Meridlth t. Com. 18 B. Mon. 49 . . 367 
 
 455, 456 
 
 Merrick v. State, 63 Ind. 327 865, 869 
 
 Merrill v. State, 58 Miss. 65 . ■. . . 981, 985 
 Merrltt v. State, ,52 Ga. 82 . . 1054, 1058 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Ixxix 
 
 Mesmer v. Com. 26 Gratt. 976 739 
 
 Messer v. Com. (Ky.) 90 S. W. 
 
 955 355, 358 
 
 V. Com. 25 Ky. L. Rep. 700, 76 
 
 S. W. 331 342, 697 
 
 V. Com. 27 Ky. L. Rep. 527, 
 
 85 S. W. 722 568 
 
 V. State, 43 Tex. Crim, Rep. 
 
 97, 63 S. W. 643 .. 273, 279 
 281, 324 
 Metcalfe v. Com. 27 Ky. L. Rep. 704, 
 
 86 S. W. 534 . . 152, 312, 314 
 
 831, 873 
 Meuly V. State, 26 Tex. App. 274, 8 
 Am. St. Rep. 477, 9 S. 
 W. 563 . . 299, 313, 322, 324 
 367, 511, 516, 518, 521, 541 
 548, 549, 630 
 Meurer v. State, 129 Ind. 587, 29 N. 
 
 E. 302 382 
 
 Meyers v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 500, 46 S. W. 817 303 
 
 Michael v. State, 40 Pla. 265, 23 
 
 So. 944 846, 850 
 
 Michell V. State, 22 Ga. 211, 68 Am. 
 
 Dec. 493 765 
 
 Mickey v. Com. 9 Bush, 593 64, 65 
 
 217, 1043 
 Middleton v. Holmes, 3 Port. (Ala.) 
 
 424 , 742 
 
 V. Middleton, 31 Iowa, 151 .. 972 
 V. State, 80 Miss. 393, 31 So. 
 
 809 381 
 
 MIera t. Territory (N. M.) 81 Pac. 
 
 586 249, 925 
 
 MIers V. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 161, 53 Am. St. Rep. 705, 
 29 S. W. 1074 . . 438, 631-633 
 636, 962, 964 
 Mlkel v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 615, 68 S. W. 512 . . 138, 232 
 Miles V. State, 18 Tex. App. 156 .. 249 
 
 254, 272 
 Miller v. Com. 5 Ky. L. Rep. 427.. 216 
 
 217 
 V. Com. 89 Ky. 653, 10 S. W. 
 
 137 407 
 
 V. State (Ala.) 40 So. 47 . . 119 
 
 198, 207, 263 
 
 T. State, 54 Ala. 155 . . 164, 165 
 
 1054 
 T. State, 107 Ala. 40, 19 So. 
 
 37 130, 132, 164 
 
 T. State, 130 Ala. 1, 30 So. 
 
 379 946, 955, 957, 964 
 
 T. State, 37 Ind. 432 . . 35, 36, 45 
 134, 253 
 
 V. State, 74 Ind. 1 473, 490 
 
 V. State, 68 Miss. 221, 8 So. 
 
 273 920, 922, 923 
 
 V. State, 32 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 319, 20 S. W. 1103 . . 317 
 610, 613, 623, 630 
 
 Miller v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 38 
 
 S. W. 791 
 
 V. State, 15 Tex. App. 125 . . 
 
 63, 65, 647, 659, 667, 
 
 T. State, 27 Tex. App. 63, 10 
 
 S. W. 445 271, 280, 
 
 290 
 
 62 
 
 669 
 
 419 
 1001 
 
 T. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 609, 37 Am. St. Rep. 836, 
 
 21 S. W. 925 . . 266, 300, 311 
 
 602, 631, 633, 634, 636, 93S 
 
 V. State, 25 Wis. 384 .. 68, 88 
 
 645, 655, 661, 857, 973, 974 
 V. State, 106 Wis. 156, 81 N. 
 
 W. 1020 231, 249 
 
 Million V. Com. 16 Ky. L. Rep. 17, 
 
 25 S. W. 1059 996 
 
 Milontree v. State, 30 Tex. App. 151, 
 
 16 S. W. 764 861, 862 
 
 iiilrainey t. State, 33 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 577, 28 S. W. 537 ..302, 357 
 
 510, 511, 519, 520 
 Milton V. State, 134 Ala. 42, 32 So. 
 
 653 1000 
 
 V. State, 40 Pla. 251, 24 So. 
 
 60 836, 837 
 
 V. State, 6 Neb. 136 . . 129, 130, 14S 
 
 150, 159, 161, 198, 199, 203 
 
 219, 223 
 
 Mimms v. State, 16 Ohio St. 221 931 
 
 Minniard v. Com. 87 Ky. 213, 8 
 
 S. W. 269 621 
 
 Minton V. Com. 79 Ky. 461 . . 193, 374 
 
 696 
 
 Mitchell V. Com. 33 Gratt. 845 52 
 
 516, 650, 669 
 V. Com. 12 Ky. L. Rep. 458, 
 
 14 S. W. 489 . . 972, 973, 980 
 V. Com. 78 Ky. 204, 39 Am. 
 
 Rep. 229 588 
 
 V. State, 60 Ala. 26 . . 148, 150 
 
 174, 175, 189, 190, 192, 193 
 
 195, 198, 202, 203, 211, 508 
 
 516 
 
 V. State, 129 Ala. 23, 30 So. 
 
 348 . . 99, 132, 401, 423, 505 
 
 534, 535, 537, 776 
 V. State, 133 Ala. 65, 32 So. 
 
 132 . . 247, 438, 444, 471, 480 
 
 502, 506 
 V. State, 43 Fla. 188, 30 So. 
 
 803 . . 472, 764, 766, 774, 778 
 779 
 V. State, 22 Ga. 211, 68 Am. 
 
 Dec. 493 . . 514, 534, 764, 770 
 
 772, 773, 779 
 
 V. State, 71 Ga. 128 .. 973, 974 
 
 991-993, 999, 1030, 1031 
 
 V. State, 1 Tex. App. 195 . . 876 
 
 v. State, 36 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 278, 33 S. W. 367, 36 S. 
 
 W. 456 . . 244, 314, 645, 647 
 
 662, 670 
 
Ixxx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Mitchell V. State, 38 Tex. Crlm. Rep. 
 
 170, 41 S. W. 816, . . 289, 368 
 
 376, 539, 773, 944 
 
 V. State, 5 Yerg. 340 . . 133, 153 
 
 164, 198, 214, 236, 238, 239 
 
 832 
 
 T. State, 8 Yei-g. 514 871, 872 
 
 Mitchum v. State, 11 Ga. 615 . . 124, 205 
 
 861, 862, 896, 899 
 Mixon T. State, 123 Ga. 581, 107 Am. 
 St. Eep. 126, 51 S. E. 
 
 580 361 
 
 Mize V. State, 36 Ark. 653 400 
 
 Mobley t. State, 41 Fla. 621, 26 So. 
 
 732 930 
 
 Mockabee v. Com. 78 Ky. 380... 613, 996 
 Moeck V. People, 100 111. 242, 39 Am. 
 
 Eep. 38 979 
 
 Mottatt V. State, 35 Tex. Ci-im. Rep. 
 
 257, 33 S. W. 344 . . 269, 270 
 289 
 
 llohun's Case, 12 How. St. Tr. 1026. . 217 
 Monk V. State, 27 Tex. App. 450, 11 
 
 
 S. W. 460 
 
 904 
 
 Monroe v. State, 5 Ga. 85 . . 404, 407, 
 
 422 
 
 
 424, 783, 
 
 924 
 
 Monson 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim, App.) 
 
 
 
 63 S. W. 647 . . 43, 449, 
 
 777 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 
 
 426, 76 S. W. 570 
 
 121 
 
 ^lontag 
 
 V. People, 141 111. 75, 30 N. 
 
 
 
 E. 337 
 
 806 
 
 Montgomery v. Com; 23 Ky. L. Eep. 
 
 
 
 732, 63 S. W. 747 . . 262, 
 
 716 
 720 
 
 V. 
 
 Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 356, 
 
 
 
 81 S. W. 264 253, 
 
 697 
 
 V. 
 
 Com. 99 Va. 833, 37 S. E. 
 
 
 
 841 452, 787, 
 
 788 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 80 Ind. 338, 41 Am. 
 
 
 
 Rep. 815 . . 596, 597, 972, 
 
 978 
 
 
 981, 983-985, 
 
 989 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 11 Ohio, 424 974, 
 
 991 
 
 
 993, 
 
 1022 
 
 y. 
 
 State, 43 Tex. Crlm. Rep. 
 304, 55 L.E.A. 866, 65 S. 
 
 
 
 W. 537 
 
 624 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 
 
 373, 77 S. W. 788 . . 632, 
 
 633 
 
 Moody V 
 
 Com. 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1198, 
 
 
 
 43 S. W. 209 
 
 474 
 
 f. 
 
 Osgood, 60 Barb. 644 
 
 703 
 
 V. 
 
 State (Tex. Crlm. App.) 59 
 
 
 
 S. W. 894 
 
 366 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 30 Tex. App. 422, 18 
 
 
 
 S. W. 94 
 
 197 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 6 Coldw. 299 . . 179, 
 
 644 
 
 
 645, 649, 
 
 659 
 
 Moon V. 
 
 State, 68 Ga. 687 . . 132, 
 
 228 
 
 
 808, 
 
 946 
 
 Mooney v. State (Tex. Crlm. App.) 
 
 
 
 65 S. W. 926 . . 262, 300, 
 
 613 
 
 
 630- 
 
 632 
 
 Moore, Ex parte, 30 Ind. 197 ..2, 3, 129 
 
 203, 254, 330, 266 
 V. Com. 18 Ky. L. Eep. 129, 
 
 35 S. W. 283 140 
 
 T. People, 26 Colo. 213, 57 
 
 Pac. 857 . . 512, 524, 539 
 
 937, 1044 
 V. People, 146 111. 600, 35 N. 
 
 E. 166 5, 206, 225, 262 
 
 vT. State, 12 Ala. 764, 46 Am. 
 
 Dec. 276 . . 974, 978-980, 992 
 
 995, 1029, 1033, 1036, 1039 
 
 V. State, 18 Ala. 532 189 
 
 V. State, 2 Ohio St. 500 931 
 
 V. State, 86 Miss. 160, 38 So. 
 
 504 249, 398 
 
 V. State, 96 Tenn. 209, 33 S. 
 
 W. 1046 375, 1004 
 
 V. State, 31 Tex. 573 168 
 
 T. State, 15 Tex. App. 1 . .365, 422 
 
 424, 429 
 T. State, 26 Tex. App. 322, 9 
 
 S. W. 610 298, 311 
 
 V. State, 33 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 351, 26 S. W. 404 281 
 
 V. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 439, 50 S. W. 942 . . 602, 622 
 
 T. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 526, 72 S. W. 595 . . 673, 
 
 965 
 
 935 
 959 
 
 v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 45, 68 S. W. 279 185, 657 
 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 54, 79 S. W. 565 438 
 
 Mora V. People, 19 Colo. 255, 35 
 
 Pac. 179 1061 
 
 Moran v. State, 120 Ga, 846, 48 S. E. 
 
 324 246 
 
 Morelock v. State, 90 Tenn. 528, 18 
 
 S. W. 258 1037 
 
 Morely's Case, 7 St. Tr. 421 325 
 
 Morgan v. Com. 14 Bush, 106 939 
 
 T. Durfee, 69 Mo. 469, 33 Am. 
 
 Eep. 508 , . 421, 430, 547, 796 
 T. State, 119 Ga. 566, 46 S. 
 
 E. 836 450 
 
 T. State, 120 Ga. 294, 48 S. E. 
 
 9 73 
 
 V. State, 31 Ind. 193 . . 986, 991 
 1002, 1006, 1007 
 V. State, 51 Neb. 672, 71 N. 
 
 W. 788 . . 148, 174, 879, 906 
 
 953 
 
 V. State, 13 Smedes & M. 242 . . 869 
 
 V. State, 3 Sneed, 475 458 
 
 T. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 222, 29 S. W. 1092 . . 482, 512 
 546, 558 
 V. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 543, 67 S. W. 420 . . 382, 488 
 V. Territory, 7 Ariz. 224, 64 
 
 Pac. 421 212, 355, 367 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Ixxxi 
 
 loriarty v. State, 62 Miss. 654 . .400, 412 
 426, 427, 441 
 Morrell v. State, 136 Ala. 44, 34 So. 
 
 208 400, 426, 435 
 
 Morris v. Com. 10 Ky. L. Rep. 1004, 
 
 11 S. W. 295 63, 66 
 
 V. Com. 20 Ky. L. Rep. 402, 
 
 46 S. W. 491 896 
 
 V. Com. 27 Ky. L. Rep. 145, 
 
 84 S. W. 560 35, 506 
 
 V. Piatt, 32 Conn. 75 . . 454, 581 
 T. State, 35 Tex. Ciim. Rep. 
 
 313, 33 S. W. 539 . . 702, 703 
 966 
 247 
 766 
 776 
 
 T. State (Ala.) 39 So. 608 .. 
 
 24G, 321, 471, 535, 557, 
 
 773, 775, 
 
 Morrisett v. People, 21 How. Pr. 
 
 203 877, 
 
 Morrison v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 2493, 67 L.R.A. 529, 74 
 
 S. W. 277 ..402, 423, 763, 
 
 772, 773, 777, 
 
 V. State, 84 Ala. 405, 4 So. 
 
 402 120, 469, 808, 
 
 T. State, 42 Fla. 149, 28 So. 
 
 97 . . 239, 250, 460, 834, 
 
 1037, 
 
 T. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 519, 47 S. W. 369 . . 307, 
 
 v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 473, 51 S. W. 358 . . 853, 
 
 Morton v. Bradley, 30 Ala. 683 . . 739, 
 
 880 
 
 770 
 922 
 
 813 
 
 1023 
 1044 
 
 325 
 
 856 
 875 
 742 
 761 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 71 
 
 S. W. 281 697, 722 
 
 Mosby, Ex parte, 31 Tex. 566, 98 Am. 
 
 Dec. 547 157 
 
 Mose v. State, 35 Ala. 421 . . 972, 973 
 
 981, 985 
 Moseley v. State, 107 Ala. 74, 17 So. 
 
 932 446 
 
 Motes V. United States, 178 D. S. 458, 
 44 L. ed. 1150, 20 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 993 1053, 1050 
 
 Moultrie v. State, 112 Ga. 121, 37 S. 
 
 E. 122 506, 507, 765 
 
 Mow T. People, 31 Colo. 351, 72 Pac. 
 
 1069 50, 645, 647, 667 
 
 Moynalian v. People, 3 Colo. 367 861 
 
 Moynihan f. State, 70 Ind. 126, 36 
 
 Am. Rep. 178 148, 175 
 
 Mozee v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 51 
 
 S. W. 2S0 518, 521, 559 
 
 MulUns V. Com. 23 Ky. L. Rep. 2433, 
 
 67 S. W. 824 . . 239, 369, 1057 
 
 Munday v. Com. 81 Ky. 233 367 
 
 V. State, 26 Ohio C. C. 712.. 204 
 
 210 
 Munden v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 64 S. W. 239 523 
 
 V. State, 37 Tex. 353 . 
 Horn.- — vi. 
 
 Mundine v. State, 37 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 5, 38 S. W. 619 . . 300, 311 
 324, 331, 517, 518, 612 
 
 Murdoek v. Murdock, 7 Cal. 511 689 
 
 Murphy v. Com. 15 Ky. L. Rep. 215, 
 
 22 S. W. 649 . . 344, 697, 967 
 T. People, 9 Colo. 435, 13 Pac. 
 
 528 . . 118, 119, 126, 137, 222 
 
 V. People, 37 111. 447 . . 116, 124 
 
 130, 132, 499, 764, 1007, 1013 
 
 1036 
 
 V. People, 63 N. Y. 590 024 
 
 V. State, 37 Ala. 142 . . 128, 132 
 
 142 
 V. State, 108 Ala. 10, 18 So. 
 
 557 574 
 
 V. State, 31 Ind. 511 . . 6, 103, 124 
 
 210, 253, 254, 260, 265, 274 
 V. State, 31 Fla. 166, 12 So. 
 
 453 1042 
 
 Murray v. Com. 79 Pa. 311 . . 224, 317 
 
 307, 940 
 
 T. State, 1 Tex. App. 417 . . 133 
 
 169, 223, 317, 1059 
 T. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 400, 78 S. W. 927 248 
 
 V. State, 36 Tex. 642 . . 294, 315 
 
 531 
 Muscoe T. Com. 86 Va. 443, 10 
 
 S. E. 534 .. 607, 612, 630 
 Musick V. State, 21 Tex. App. 69, 
 
 18 S. W. 95 57G, 578 
 
 Musser v. State, 157 Ind. 423, 61 N. 
 
 E. 1 918 
 
 Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 
 U. S. 591, 9 L. ed. 997, 6 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 877 . . 1065, 1066 
 Myers, Ex parte, 33 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 204, 26 S. W. 196 1006 
 
 V. State, 62 Ala. 599 395 
 
 T. State, 62 Ala. 599 . . 2, 209, 253 
 
 255, 396, 401, 513, 523, 525 
 V. State, 43 Fla. 500, 31 So. 
 
 275 112, 890 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 33 
 
 S. W. 865 501 
 
 T. State, 33 Tex. 525 . . . 400, 407 
 
 N. 
 
 Nabors v. State, 120 Ala. 323, 25 So. 
 
 529 .. 362, 371, 461, 509, 833 
 Nairn v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 45 
 
 S. W. 703 396, 537 
 
 Nalley v. State, 30 Tex. App. 456, 17 
 
 S. W. 1084 366, 474 
 
 Nantz V. Com. 14 Ky. L. Rep. 592, 
 
 20 S. W. 1096 515 
 
 Nash V. State, 73 Ark. 399, 84 S. W. 
 
 497 247, 290, 521 
 
 T. State, 2 G. Greene, 286 .. 401 
 844, 859 
 
Ixxxii 
 
 TABLE OF OASES CITED. 
 
 Naugher v. State, 105 Ala. 26, 17 So. 
 
 24 . . 358, 420, 490, 493, 507 
 552, 553, 555 
 Neagle, Re, 135 U. S. 1, 34 L. ed. 
 
 55, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 658. . 729 
 730, 771 
 Re, 5 L.R.A. 78, 14 Sawy. 232, 
 
 39 Fed. 833 . . 729, 730, 750 
 771 
 
 Neal V. Farmer, 9 Ga. 555 15 
 
 Nelms T. State, 13 Smedes & M. 500, 
 
 53 Am. Dec. 94 . . 1022, 1037 
 1038 
 V. State, 123 Ga. 575, 51 S. E. 
 
 588 263, 264 
 
 Nelson t. State, 6 Baxt. 418 6, 699 
 
 v. State, 17 Fla. 195 819, 820 
 
 V. State, 32 Fla. 244, 13 So. 
 
 361 440, 1042 
 
 V. State, 7 Humph. 542 . . 973, 081 
 984, 983, 903, 1007 
 V. State, 10 Humph. 518.. 12, 268 
 272, 287, 310, 315 
 V. State, 1 Tex. App. 41 . .839, 860 
 V. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 353, 67 S. W. 320 . . 673, 909 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 58 
 
 S. W. 107 384, 441, 442 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 81 S. W. 713 246 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 87 
 
 S. W. 143 . . 281, 520, 574 
 
 958 
 
 Nesbit V. State, 43 Ga. 238 . . 930, 991 
 
 992, 1016, 1037 
 
 Nettles, Ex parte, 58 Ala. 268 . . 138, 151 
 
 202, 321, 913, 916, 993 
 
 Nevling v. Com. 98 Pa. 322 . . 247, 803 
 
 807, 814 
 New T. Territory, 12 Okla. 172, 70 
 
 Pac. 198 263 
 
 Newberry v. State, 68 Ark. 355, 58 S. 
 
 W. 351 . . 973, 989, 992, 1004 
 1030, 1034-1036 
 Newby v. People, 28 Colo. 16, 62 
 
 Pac. 1035 117, 125, 302 
 
 Newcomb v. State, 37 Miss. 383 . . 394 
 402, 407, 409, 849, 850 
 Newell V. State, 115 Ala. 54, 22 So. 
 
 572 290, 847 
 
 Newman t. State, 60 Ga. 609 767 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 69 
 
 S. W. 519 . .520, 522, 556, 560 
 929 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 70 
 
 S. W. 951 397, 458 
 
 Newport v. State, 140 Ind. 299, 39 
 
 N. E. 926 132, 143 
 
 Newsome v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 75 S. W. 296 413 
 
 Newton t. Slate, 92 Ala. 33, 9 So. 
 
 404 937 
 
 New York L. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 96 
 Va. 737, 44 L.R.A. 305, 
 
 32 S. E. 475 1066 
 
 Neyland v. State, 13 Tex. App. 549.. 322 
 Nicholas v. Com. 91 Va. 741, 21 S. 
 
 E. 364 ... 231, 233, 235, 925 
 
 Nichols V. Allen, 3 Car. & P. 36.. 089 
 
 T. Com. 11 Bush, 575 . . 97, 99 
 
 100, 103, 205, 312, 932, 933 
 
 T. People, 23 Hun, 165 . . 424, 441 
 
 V. State, 46 Miss. 284 . . 832, 833 
 
 834 
 
 V. State, 8 Ohio St. 435 808 
 
 V. Winfrey, 79 Mo. 544 365 
 
 Nicholson v. State, 117 Ala. 32, 23 
 
 So. 792 50, 61 
 
 Nicholson's Case, 1 East, P. C. 346 . . 866 
 
 888 
 Nickles v. State, 48 Fla. 46, 37 So. 
 
 312 946 
 
 Nicks V. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 241, 
 
 79 S. W. 35 306, 529 
 
 Nilan v. People, 27 Colo. 206, 60 Pac. 
 
 485 2, 3, 143, 354, 571 
 
 Nite V. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 340, 54 S. W. 763 . . 181, 652 
 
 657, 669, 675, 838, 875, 878 
 
 912, 956 
 Nix V. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 504, 
 
 78 S. W. 227 397, 452 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 74 
 
 S. W. 764 .. 311, 395, 397 
 787 
 Nixon T. People, 3 111. 267, 35 Am. 
 
 Dec. 107 22, 28 
 
 Noble V. Com. 11 ICy. L. Rep. 867, 13 
 
 S. W. 429 854 
 
 V. State, 75 Ark. 246, 87 S. W. 
 
 120 . . 287, 294, 295, 318, 1045 
 Nobles V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 68 S. W. 989 895 
 
 Noftsinger v. State, 7 Tex. App. 
 
 302 60, 61 
 
 Noles V. State, 26 Ala. 31, 62 Am. 
 
 Dec. 711 . . 302. 371, 390, 404 
 
 601, 602, 630, 631, 634, 766 
 
 768, 783 
 
 T. State, 24 Ala. 672 . . 610, 834 
 
 1041, 1046 
 
 Nolly T. State (Ga.) 52 S. E. 19 .. 342 
 
 Nordan v. State (Ala.) 39 So. 406.. 154 
 
 853, 924, 950 
 
 Nordgren v. People, 211 111. 425, 71 
 
 N. E. 1042 . . 919, 983, 984 
 
 1034, 1035,' 1039 
 Norfleet v. Com. 17 Ky. L. Rep. 1137, 
 
 33 S. W. 938 992 
 
 V. State, 4 Sneed, 345 .. 811, 813 
 
 Norkott's Case, 14 How. St. Tr. 
 
 1324 943 
 
 Norman v. State, 26 Tex. App. 221, 9 
 
 S. W. 606 271, 279, 312 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Ixxxiii 
 
 Norman v. United States, 20 App. D. 
 C. 494 
 
 Norris v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 64 
 
 S. W. 1044 
 
 T. State, 42 Tex. CrIm. Rep. 
 559, 61 Pac. 493 . . 262, 
 289, 290, 365, 399, 416, 
 
 Noi-tli T. People, 139 111. 81, 28 N. E. 
 966. . .556, 621, 881, 972, 
 994, 995, 1017, 1021, 1029, 
 
 North Carolina v. Gosnell, 74 Fed. 
 734 . . 141, 148, 198, 207, 
 228, 234, 278, 318, 737, 
 741, 745, 748-750, 758 
 
 V. Klrkpatrick, 42 Fed. 689 . . 
 
 Norton T. People, 8 Cow. 137 
 
 V. State, 98 Ind. 347 
 
 Nowacryk v. People, 139 111. 336, 28 
 
 N. E. 961 . . 151, 201, 
 
 322, 327, 
 
 Nutt y. State, 63 Ala. 180 113, 
 
 209, 211, 
 
 Nye v. People, 35 Mich. 16 . . 6, 
 
 152, 198, 205, 214, 253, 
 
 O. 
 
 Oakley v. Com. 10 Ky. L. Rep. 885, 
 
 11 S. W. 72 456, 
 
 T. Portsmouth & R. Steam 
 
 Packet Co. 11 Exch. 618. . 
 Oates V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 86 
 
 S. W. 769 181, 877, 
 
 Obier v. Neal, 1 Houst. (Del.) 449 . . 
 O'Boyle t. Com. 100 Va. 785, 40 
 
 S. B. 121 .. 921, 993, 
 
 O'Brien v. Com. 89 Ky. 354, 12 S. 
 
 W. 471 913, 
 
 V. Com. 115 Ky. 608, 74 S. W. 
 
 666 
 
 T. People, 48 Barb. 274 . . 160, 
 
 25 
 
 946 
 
 271 
 505 
 576 
 
 981 
 1032 
 1036 
 
 208 
 
 739 
 
 -761 
 
 940 
 
 655 
 
 749 
 
 78 
 
 6 
 
 254 
 1059 
 174 
 274 
 99 
 260 
 295 
 
 507 
 
 566 
 
 878 
 535 
 
 1010 
 1026 
 
 921 
 
 952 
 
 812 
 
 862 
 
 O'Connell T. State, 18 Tex. 343. .838, 840 
 
 O'Connor v. State, 64 Ga. 125, 37 Am. 
 
 Rep. 58 744, 752, 753 
 
 Oden V. State (Miss.) 27 So. 992 . . 402 
 
 Oder V. Com. 80 Ky. 32 400, 462 
 
 519, 521 
 Odette V. State, 90 Wis. 258, 62 N. 
 
 W. 1054 379 
 
 Ogden V. State, 15 Tex. App. 454 . . 865 
 O'Grady v. State. 36 Neb. 320, 54 N. 
 
 W. 556 805, 808, 818 
 
 O'Kelly V. Territory, 1 Or. 51 833 
 
 Olds V. State, 44 Fla. 452, 33 So. 296 
 
 274, 322, 
 
 Olive V. State, 11 Neb. 1, 7 N. W. 444 
 
 Oliver V. State, 17 Ala. 587 132, 
 
 300, 333, 362, 365, 460, 
 
 737, 764, 767, 768, 774, 
 
 972, 974, 981, 1004, 
 
 O'Mara v. Com. 75 Pa. 424 116, 
 
 219, 220, 222, 224, 238, 
 
 Omer v. Com. 95 Ky. 353, 25 S. W. 
 
 594 60, 61, 64, 67, 
 
 O'Neal V. Com'. 27 Ky. L. Rep. 547, 
 
 85 S. W. 745 
 
 O'Neil V. State, 48 Ga. 66 
 
 Opinion ot .Justices, 9 Allen, 585 
 
 Orange v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 83 S. W. 385 307, 
 
 Orman v. State, 22 Tex. App. 604, 
 
 58 Am. Hep. 662, 3 S. W. 
 
 468. .280, 281, 466, 467. 
 V. State, 24 Tex. App. 495, 6 
 
 S. W. 544 
 
 Orpen, Ee, 86 Fed. 760.. 1007, 1013, 
 Orta V. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 393, 
 
 71 S. W. 755 355, 380, 
 
 Osborn v. Com. 6 Ky. L. Rep. 47 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 26 
 
 S. W. 625 
 
 Osborne v. State, 140 Ala. 84, 37 So. 
 
 105 
 
 V. State, 23 Tex. App. 431, 5 
 
 S. W. 251 157, 
 
 Osburn v. State, 164 Ind. 262, 73 N. 
 
 E. 601 213, 289, 423, 
 
 Ouidas V. State, 78 Miss. 622, 29 So. 
 
 525 
 
 Overby v. State, 115 Ga. 240, 41 S. E. 
 
 609 8, 333, 338, 
 
 Owens T. Com. 22 Ky. L. Rep. 514, 
 
 58 S. W. 422.. 334, 981, 
 
 213 
 461 
 
 847 
 255 
 483 
 783 
 1010 
 125 
 948 
 949 
 
 217 
 
 387 
 861 
 240 
 
 434 
 
 479 
 
 272 
 1014 
 
 381 
 40 
 
 806 
 
 375 
 
 158 
 
 803 
 945 
 
 922 
 
 1043 
 
 986 
 997 
 
 V. Owens, 100 N. C. 240, 6 S. 
 
 E. 794 1067, 1068 
 
 V. State, 59 Miss. 547.. 1028, 1033 
 V. State, 80 Miss. 499, 32 So. 
 
 152 938 
 
 v. State, 82 Miss. 18,- 33 So. 
 
 718 .M 659, 1041 
 
 v. United States, 64 C. C. A. 
 
 525, 130 Fed. 279 366 
 
 P. 
 
 Pace v. Com. 89 Ky. 204, 12 S. W. 271 981 
 986, 991- 993 
 
 Packer v. People, 8 Colo. 361 834 
 
 Padgett V. State, 40 Fla. 451, 24 So. 
 
 145 502, 856 
 
 Padron v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 548, 55 S. W. 827 1041 
 
Ixxxiv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Page T. State, 61 Ala. 16 861 
 
 V. State, 69 Ala. 229 537 
 
 v. State, 141 Ind. 236, 40 N. 
 
 E. 745 473,480,. 549 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 24 
 
 S. W. 420 126 
 
 Painter v. People, 147 III. 444, 35 
 
 N. B. 64 918, 931, 948 
 
 PalUs V. State, 123 Ala. 12, 82 Am. 
 
 St. Eep. 106, 26 So. 339. . 686 
 687 
 Palmer v. People, 138 111. 356, 32 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 146, 28 N. E. 130 2 
 
 15, 602, 609, 839, 841, 845 
 
 835, 865, 932, 935, 938 
 
 961- 963 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 83 
 
 S. W. 202 774 
 
 y. State; 9 Wyo. 40, 87 Am. St. 
 
 Eep. 910, 59 Pac. 793 359 
 
 474, 478, 487, 490, 491 
 
 Palmore v. State, 29 Ark. 248 116, 127 
 
 131, 144, 174, 199, 221, 246 
 
 247, 362, 404, 409, 418, 424 
 448 
 Palmour v. State, 116 Ga. 269, 42 S. 
 
 B. 512 767 
 
 Panton v. People, 114 111. 505, 2 N. 
 
 E. 411 365 
 
 Parker v. State, 88 Ala. 4, 7 So. 98. . 505 
 
 508, 542, 544 
 V. State, 95 Ga. 482, 22 S. E. 
 
 276 852 
 
 V. State, 136 Ind. 285, 35 N. 
 
 B. 1105 938 
 
 V. State, 55 Miss. 414 249, 462 
 
 f. State, 31 Tex. 132 309, 766 
 
 778 
 T. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 119, 49 S. W. 80 181 
 
 Parker's Case, 2 Dyer, 186a 588 
 
 Parks V. State, 105 Ga. 242, 31 S. B. 
 
 580 344, 538, 972, 975, 981 
 
 V. State, 3 Ohio St. 101 1040 
 
 Parnell v. State, 129 Ala. 6, 29 
 
 So. 860 249, 255 
 
 Parrish v. Com. 81 Va. 1 764, 767, 775 
 
 780, 781, 796 
 V. State, 14 Neb. 60, 15 N. W. 
 
 337 470, 480, 537 
 
 V. State, 18 Ne&. 405, 25 N. 
 
 W. 573 246 
 
 Parsons v. Com. 78 Ky. 102 . . 378, 412 
 V. People, 218 111. 380, 75 N. 
 
 E. 993 . . 97-99, 221, 357, 569 
 
 T. State, 21 Ala. 300 40- 42 
 
 Passmore v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 64 S. W. 1040 206 
 
 Pate V. State, 94 Ala. 14, 10 So. 663 922 
 Patillo V. State, 22 Tex. App. 586, 3 
 
 S. W. 766 458 
 
 Paton, Ee, 2 Broun, Justie. 525 . . 681 
 
 Patten v. People, 18 Mich. 314, 100 
 
 Am. Dec. 173 458, 
 
 547, 550, 
 Patterson v. Com. 99 Ky. 610, 5 S. W. 
 
 765 
 
 V. People, 46 Barb. 625... 367, 
 407, 
 
 V. State, 46 Barb. 626 
 
 V. State (Ga.) 52 S. E. 77 
 
 V. State, 66 Ind. 185 . . 47, 148, 
 
 T. State, 75 Miss. 670, 23 So. 
 647 513, 518, 519, 521, 
 
 465 
 792 
 
 834 
 394 
 551 
 552 
 73 
 207 
 253 
 
 525 
 540 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 56 
 
 S. W. 59 1040 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 60 
 
 S. W. 557 97, 913, 920, 965 
 
 Patterson's Case, 3 N. Y. City Hall 
 
 Rec. 145 341 
 
 Paulin V. State, 21 Tex. App. 436, 1 
 
 S. W. 453 306 
 
 Paulson V. State, 118 Wis. 89, 94 N. 
 
 W. 771 905 
 
 Payne t. Com. 20 Ky. L. Rep. 475, 46 
 
 S. W. 704 43 
 
 v. Com. 1 Met. (Ky.) 370 239 
 
 310, 362, 423, 424, 764 
 
 v. State, 60 Ala. 80 400 
 
 V. State, 61 Miss. 161 976, 981 
 
 986, 988 
 T. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 564, 78 S. W. 934 974 
 
 Peak T. State, 50 N. J. L. 179, 12 
 
 Atl. 701... 993, 994, 1000, 1011 
 Pearl v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 189, 66 S. W. 1013.. 243, 954 
 
 Pearson's Case, 2 Lewin, C. C. 216 . . 303 
 
 Peck V. State, 5 Tex. App. 611 . . 384, 401 
 
 404 
 
 Peden v. State, 61 Miss. 267 644, 645 
 
 647, 672 
 Pedro T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 88 
 
 S. W. 233 513 
 
 Peel T. State (Ala.) 39 So. 251.. 311, 318 
 
 357 
 Pena v. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 333, 42 S. W. 991 581 
 
 Pence v. Com. 21 Ky. L. Rep. 500, 51 
 
 S. W. 801.. 106, 152, 266, 276 
 
 339, 794 
 
 Penland v. State, 19 Tex. App. 365. . 198 
 
 365, 394, 401, 446, 447 
 
 Pennington v. Com. 21 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 542, 51 S. W. 818 624 
 
 V. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 321, 
 
 68 S. W. 451.. 456, 793, 986 
 
 988, 1004, 1007, 1010 
 Pennsylvania v. Blron, 4 Dall. 125, 1 
 
 L. ed. 769 288 
 
 V. Lewis, Addison (Pa.) 279.. 5 
 
 Penrod v. People, 89 111. 150 862 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Ixxxv 
 
 People T. Abbott (Cal.) 4 Pac. 769.. 993 
 
 1014, 1033 
 v. Abbott, 116 Mich. 263, 74 
 
 N. W. 529.. 337, 592, 596- 598 
 
 886, 969 
 V. Adams, 3 Denlo, 190, 45 
 
 Am. Dec. 468. .18, 22, 44, 824 
 825 
 T. Adams, 85 Cal. 231, 24 Pac. 
 
 629.. 222, 376, 395, 736, 737 
 
 747, 749, 751, 754 
 V. Adams, 137 Cal. 580, 70 
 
 Pac. 662 395, 414, 444 
 
 V. Ah Cboy, 1 Idaho, 317 872 
 
 V. Ah Dat, 49 Cal. 652 993 
 
 V. Ah Fat, 48 Cal. 61. .35, 49, 82 
 
 887 
 
 ,. Ah Fung, 16 Cal. 137. .896, 902 
 
 V. Ah Fung, 17 Cal. 377 915 
 
 T. Ah Gee Yung, 86 Cal. 144, 
 
 24 Pac. 860 125, 128, 130 
 
 V. Ah Hop, 1 Idaho, 698. .890, 891 
 
 V. Ah Luck, 62 Cal. 503 37 
 
 T. Ah Ping, 27 Cal. 489 61 
 
 T. Aikin, 66 Mich. 460, 11 Am. 
 
 St. Eep. 512, 33 N. W. 
 
 821 896, 908 
 
 V. Alivtre, 55 Cal. 263 407 
 
 V. Alviso, 55 Cal. 230 836, 899 
 
 V. Amaya, 134 Cal. 531, 66 
 
 Pac. 794 1035 
 
 T. Anderson, 39 Cal. 703. .404, 435 
 
 V. Anderson, 44 Cal. 65 367 
 
 T. Anderson, 131 Cal. 352, 63 
 
 Pac. 668 685 
 
 T. Anderson, 2 Wheeler, C. C. 
 
 390 993, 994, 1029 
 
 V. Antony, 146 Cal. 124, 79 
 
 Pac. 858 917, 948 
 
 V. Arnold, 15 Cal. 476 221, 222 
 
 331, 400, 403, 407, 408, 415 
 551- 553 
 V. Aro, 6 Cal. 207, 65 Am. 
 
 Dec. 503 19, 835, 837, 839 
 
 840, 844, 846, 855 
 V. Ascher, 126 Mich. 637, 86 
 
 N. W. 140 919 
 
 V. Austin, 1 Park. Crim. Rep. 
 
 154.. 150, 203, 205, 210, 258 
 
 261, 455, 461, 462, 569 
 V. Balkwell, 143 Cal. 259, 76 
 
 Pac. 1017 98,209, 597 
 
 V. Barberi, 149 N. T. 256, 52 
 
 Am. St. Eep. 717, 43 N. 
 
 E. 635 163, 199, 203, 223 
 
 234, 914 
 V. Barone, 161 N. T. 451, 55 
 
 N. E. 1083 230 
 
 V. Barry, 31 Cal. 357 124, 127 
 
 152, 199, 296, 359 
 V. Barthlcman, 120 Cal. 7, 52 
 
 Pac. 112 925, 926, 934 
 
 People V. Batchelder, 27 Cal. 69, 85 
 
 Am. Dec. 231 359, 362, 447 
 
 461, 540, 556 
 V. Batting, 49 How. Pr. 392 . . 124 
 125, 213, 811 
 V. Bawden, 90 Cal. 195, 27 
 
 Pac. 204 4, 1046 
 
 V. Bealoba, 17 Cal. 389.. 148, 164 
 175, 203, 224, 228, 334 
 
 V. Bearss, 10 Cal. 68 72, 78 
 
 79, 82 
 T. Beckwith, 4 N. Y. Crim. 
 
 Rep. 335 228 
 
 V. Beckwith, 103 N. Y. 360, 8 
 
 N. Y. 662.. 160, 166, 237, 258 
 
 V. Beckwith, 45 Hun, 422 224 
 
 230, 910, 911 
 V. Beckwith, 108 N. Y. 67, 15 
 
 N. E. 53.. 230, 232, 898, 902 
 
 904, 911 
 
 V. Belencia, 21 Cal. 544 . .219, 237 
 
 808, 811- 814 
 
 V. Bemis, 51 Mich. 422, 16 N. 
 
 W. 794 849, 851, 914, 925 
 
 926 
 T. Bemmerly, 87 Cal. 117, 25 
 
 Pac. 266 1006 
 
 V. Benham, 160 N. Y. 402, 55 
 
 N. E. 11 897,898,903, 904 
 
 913, 923, 925 
 V. Bennett, 49 N. Y. 137. .896- 898 
 V. Bernard, 125 Mich. 550, 65 
 L.R.A. 559, 84 N. W. 
 
 1092 608, 796 
 
 V. Best, 39 Cal. 690 803 
 
 V. Beverly, 108 Mich. 509, 66 
 
 N. W. 379 975, 1018, 1020 
 
 1032, 1034 
 V. Bezy, 67 Cal. 223, 7 Pac. 
 
 643 438, 936 
 
 V. Bliven, 112 N. Y. 79, 8 Am. 
 St. Eep. 701, 19 N. B. 
 
 638 83 
 
 V. Boggiano, 179 N. Y. 267, 72 
 
 N. E. 101 166, 199 
 
 V. Boling, 83 Cal. 380, 23 Pac. 
 
 421 4, 554, 557 
 
 V. Bonilla, 38 Cal. 699... 832, 86S 
 
 868 
 v. Borgetto, 99 Mich. 336, 58 
 
 N. W. 328 98, 259 
 
 V. Botkin, 132 Cal. 231, 84 
 Am. St. Eep. 39, 64 Pac. 
 
 286 829 
 
 V. Bowers (Cal.) 82 Pac. 553 923 
 
 950 
 T. Bowman, 81 Cal. 566, 22 
 
 Pac. 917 198, 203, 236 
 
 T. Breen, 181 N. Y. 493, 74 
 
 N. E. 483 198 
 
 V. Brooks, 131 Cal. 311, 03 
 
 Pac. 464... 739, 745, 748, 750 
 758, 1054 
 
Ixxxvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 People V. Brown, 59 Cal. 345 645, 963 
 
 V. Brown, 76 Cal. 573, 18 Pac. 
 
 678 924 
 
 V. Brown, 130 . Cal. 591, 62 
 
 Pac. 1072 922 
 
 V. Bruggy, 93 Cal. 476, 29 Pac. 
 
 26 245, 271, 312, 366, 374 
 
 S75, 469, 502, 522, 542, 548 
 v. Buchanan, 145 N. Y. 1, 39 
 
 N. E, 846 919, 920 
 
 T. Buddensiecli:, 24 N. Y. Week- 
 ly Dig. 82 258, 679 
 
 V. Buddensieck, 103 N. Y. 487, 
 
 57 Am. Eep. 766, 9 N. E. 
 
 44 701, 883, 967 
 
 V. Burt, 170 N. Y. 561, 62 N. 
 
 B. 1099 100, 236 
 
 V. Burt, 51 App. Div. 106, 64 
 
 N. Y. Supp. 417. .236, 250, 1000 
 1010 
 T. Burt, 51 Mich. 199, 16 N. 
 
 W. 378 630, 819, 820 
 
 T. Bush, 4 Hill. 133 52 
 
 V. Bush, 65 Cal. 129, 3 Pac. 
 
 590 196, 197, 324, 326 
 
 V. Bush, 71 Cal. 602, 12 Pac. 
 
 781 116, 128, 130 
 
 V. Bushton, 80 Cal. 160, 22 
 
 Pac. 127 125, 130, 132, 554 
 
 555 
 
 V. Butler, 8 Cal. 435 274 
 
 V. Butler, 3 Park. Crim. Eep. 
 
 377 8, 182, 339, 832 
 
 V, Button, 106 Cal. 628, 28 
 
 L.E.A. 591, 46 Am. St. 
 
 Eep. 259, 39 Pac. 1073... 503 
 540, 541, 546, 547 
 V. Callaghan, 4 Utah, 49, 6 
 
 Pac. 49 73, 116, 130, 161 
 
 164, 236, 246, 1021 
 V. Callego, 133 Cal. 295, 65 
 
 Pac. 572 896, 902 
 
 V. Calton, 5 Utah, 451, 16 Pac. 
 
 902 2, 5-7, 102, 104, 200 
 
 254, 322, 807 
 V. Campbell, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 
 
 307 189-191, 261 
 
 V. Campbell, 30 Cal. 312.. 362, 364 
 
 394, 461, 764 
 
 V. Campbell, 40 Cal. 129.. 82, 84 
 
 1040 
 
 Campbell, 59 Cal. 243 
 Am. Eep. 257 
 
 Cantor, 71 App. Div. 
 75 N. Y. Supp. 688. . . 
 
 Carlton, 115 N. Y. 618 
 N. E. 257 138, 
 
 Carnel, 2 Edm. Sel. Cas 
 Carter, 96 Mich. 583, 
 
 N. W. 79 
 
 Casey, 53 Cal. 360 
 
 Cassiano, 30 Hun, 388. 
 
 , 43 
 400, 
 185, 
 
 22 
 
 275, 
 
 622, 
 
 200 
 
 56 
 
 63, 
 
 402 
 
 355 
 
 387 
 625 
 205 
 
 06 
 131 
 808 
 
 People V. Chase, 79 Hun, 296, 29 N. 
 
 Y. Supp. 376 994, 
 
 1004, 1007, 1017, 
 V. Chaves, 122 Cal. 134, 54 
 
 Pac. 596 232, 234, 
 
 V. Chew Sing Wing, 88 Cal. 
 268, 25 Pac. 1099 236, 
 
 1002 
 1018 
 
 247 
 
 237 
 
 244 
 
 Childs, 90 App. Div. 58, 85 
 
 N. Y. Supp. 627 945 
 
 Chin Hane, 108 Cal. 599, 
 
 41 Pac. 697 917 
 
 Chin Mock Sow, 51 Cal. 597 1016 
 
 Choiser, 10 Cal. 310... 846, 852 
 Clark, 84 Cal. 573, 24 Pac. 
 
 313 928 
 
 Clark, 7 N. Y. 385 124, 160 
 
 161, 165, 166, 200, 205, 229 
 
 258, 261, 872 
 Clarke, 130 Cal. 642, 63 
 
 Pac. 138 926 
 
 Cochran, 61 Cal. 548 514 
 
 Cole, 1 Cent. L. J. 377 304 
 
 Cole, 2 N. Y. Crim. R«p. 108 149 
 
 175, 333, 877 
 
 Cole, 4 Park. Crim. Eep. 35 362 
 
 365, 767, 770, 772, 773, 779 
 
 780, 783, 798 
 
 Colt, 3 Hill. 432 858 
 
 Colvin, 118 Cal. 349, 50 
 
 Pac. 539 924, 929 
 
 Comstock, 49 Mich. 330, 13 
 
 N. W. 617 140 
 
 Conklin, 111 Cal. 616, 44 
 
 Pac. 314 506 
 
 Conklin, 175 N. Y. 333, 67 
 
 N. E. 624 1017 
 
 Conkllng, 111 Cal. 616, 44 
 
 Pac. 314 488, 505, 529, 543 
 
 787, 924, 929 
 Conroy, 2 N. Y. Crim. Eep. 
 
 247 811 
 
 Conroy, 33 Hun, 119 211 
 
 226, 229, 804 
 
 Conroy, 97 N. Y. 62 125, 129 
 
 149, 159, 161, 166, 190, 226 
 
 228, 231, 236, 237, 870 
 Constantino, 153 N. Y. 24, 
 
 47 N. E. 37 165, 166, 358 
 
 362, 469, 556 
 
 Cook (Cal.) 83 Pac. 43 395 
 
 517, 917, 930 
 Cook, 39 Mich. 236, 33 Am. 
 
 Rep. 380 40, 76* 
 
 Corey, 157 N. Y. 332, 51 
 
 N. E. 1024 . . 231, 232, 974 
 
 1035 
 
 231 
 
 958 
 
 V. Cornetti, 92 N. Y. 85.. 102, 
 
 V. Cotta, 49 Cal. 166 105, 
 
 V. Coughlin, 13 Utah, 58, 44 
 Pac. 94.. 607, 615, 628, 
 
 961 
 965 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED, 
 
 Ixxxvii 
 
 People V. Coughlin, 65 Mich. 704, 32 
 
 N. W. 905 550 
 
 T. Coughlin, 67 Mich. 466, 35 
 
 N. W. 72 459, 490, 
 
 ,. Cowan (Cal.) 82 Pac. 339. . 
 
 900 
 647 
 674 
 Cox, 67 App. Div. 344, 73 
 
 N. Y. Supp. 774 1049 
 
 Cox, 9 Cal. 32 831, 838, 840 
 
 842, 844 
 Cox, 76 Cal. 281, 18 Pac. 
 
 332 103, 198^ 
 
 Craig, 111 Cal. 460, 44 Pac 
 
 186 929, 937 
 
 Crews, 102 Cal. 174, 36 Pac. 
 
 367 996, 1010 
 
 Cronin, 34 Cal. 191 831, 832 
 
 837, 847, 850- 852 
 Crowe, 2 Bdm. Sel. Cas. 152 256 
 
 Crowey, 56 Cal. 36 259, 
 
 Curtis, 52 Mich. 616, 18 N. 
 
 W. 385 419, 437, 523, 
 
 585, 764, 932, 
 Davis, 73 Cal. 355, 15 Pac. 
 
 8 831, 866, 873, 
 
 Davis, 56 N. Y. 95 596, 
 
 854, 859, 969, 972, 974, 
 
 219 
 
 938 
 
 260 
 
 535 
 933 
 
 832 
 597 
 976 
 981 
 Davis, 8 Utah, 412, 32 Pac. 
 
 670 J 869 
 
 Deacons, 109 N. Y. 374, 16 
 
 N. E. 676.: 180,901, 905 
 
 Deelier, 157 N. Y. 186, 51 
 
 N. E. 1018 166, 232, 234 
 
 236, 932 
 DeGarmo, 73 App. Div. 46, 
 76 N. Y. Supp. 477.. 258, 
 
 716 
 903 
 De La Cour Soto, 63 Cal. 
 
 165 833 
 
 Delflno, 139 N. Y. 625, 34 
 
 N. B. 1059 235 
 
 De Los Angeles, 61 Cal. 188 767 
 768 
 340 
 
 Denomme (Cal.) 56 Pac. 98 
 De Witt, 68 Cal. 584, 10 
 
 Pac. 212 371, 
 
 Dice, 120 Cal. 189, 52 Pac. 
 
 477 144, 932, 933, 
 
 Divine, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 594 
 
 232, 300, 783, 
 
 Dobbins, 138 Cal. 694, 72 
 
 Pac. 339 362, 1010 
 
 Doe, 1 Mich. 451.. 152, 862, 497 
 764, 834 
 
 Dolan, 9 Cal. 576 831, 
 
 834, 866, 
 Donaldson, 2 Edm. Sel. Cas. 
 
 78 
 
 Donguli, 92 Cal. 607, 28 
 
 Pac. 782 362, 367, 
 
 Donlan, 135 Cal. 489, 67 
 
 Pac. 761 914 
 
 461 
 
 935 
 189 
 798 
 
 833 
 872 
 
 256 
 
 371 
 
 People V. Donnolly, 143 Cal. 394, 77 
 
 Pac. 177 072, 074, 921, 955 
 
 V. Dowd, 127 Mich. 140, 86 N. 
 
 W. 546 441 
 
 V. Dowling, 1 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 
 
 529 821 
 
 V. Downs, 123 N. Y. 558, 25 
 
 N. E. 988 128, 222 
 
 V. Downs, 56 Hun, 5, 8 N. Y. 
 
 Supp. 521 128, 143, 222 
 
 V. Doyell, 48 Cal. 85 103, 104 
 
 161, 189, 207, 259, 260 
 V. Drake, 65 Hun, 331, 20 N. 
 
 Y. Supp. 228 936 
 
 V. Druse, 103 N. Y. 655, 8 N. 
 
 E. 733 426, 441 
 
 V. Dunne, 80 Cal. 34, 21 Pac. 
 
 1130 390 
 
 V. Durfee, 62 Mich. 487, 29 
 
 N. W. 109 638, 961 
 
 V. Durrant, 116 Cal. 179, 48 
 
 Pac. 75 101, 913, 944 
 
 V. Easton (Cal.) 82 Pac. 840 930 
 
 V. Eastwood, 14 N. Y. 562 808 
 
 V. Ebanks, 120 Cal. 626, 52 
 
 Pac. 1078 1061, 1062 
 
 V. Edwards, 41 Cal. 640 422 
 
 V. Elder, 100 Mich. 515, 59 
 
 N. W. 237 31, 35, 37 
 
 V. Eldridge, 147 Cal. 782, 82 
 
 Pac. 442 651 
 
 V. Elliott, 80 Cal. 296, 22 Pac. 
 
 207 222,391,554, 555 
 
 V. Enoch, 13 Wend. 159, 27 
 
 Am. Dec. 197... 174, 178, 872 
 1041, 1061, 1062 
 V. Enwright, 134 Cal. 527, 66 
 
 Pac. 726 915 
 
 V. Epaslii, 57 App. Div. 91, 67 
 
 N. Y. Supp. 1033 550, 551 
 
 V. Euhrig, 127 Cal. 412, 59 
 
 Pac. 693 1014 
 
 v. Evans, 40 Hun, 492 1003 
 
 V. Farley, 124 Cal. 594, 57 
 
 Pac. 571 407,416, 508 
 
 540, 544 
 V. Farmer, 77 Cal. 1, 18 Pac. 
 
 800 984, 1006 
 
 V. Farrell, 137 Mich. 127, 100 
 
 N. W. 264 443 
 
 V. Fay, 70 Mich. 421, 38 N. 
 
 W. 296 65 
 
 V. Ferraro, 161 N. Y. 365, 55 
 
 N. B. 931 160, 166, 167 
 
 V. Ferris, 55 Cal. 588 806 
 
 V. Filippelli, 173 N. Y. 509, 
 
 66 N. E. 402.. 502, 512, 531 
 V. Fish, 125 N. Y. 136, 26 N. 
 
 E. 319 101, 102, 125, 129 
 
 198, 223, 226, 810, 814 
 V. Fitchpatrick, 106 Cal. 286, 
 
 39 Pac. 605 365 
 
Ixxxviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 People v. Fitzslmmons, 69 N. Y. S. E. 
 
 191, 34 N. Y. Supp. 1102. 333 
 
 337, 340 
 T. Fitzthum, 137 N. Y. 581, 
 
 33 N. E. 322 224 
 
 V. Flahave, 58 Cal. 249.. 3,64, 540 
 V. Flanagan, 60 Cal. 2, 44 Am. 
 
 Eep. 52 362, 360, 360, 390 
 
 392, 393, 550 
 T. Flanlgan, 174 N. Y. 356, 60 
 
 N. E. 988.. 149, 651, 669, 876 
 V. Flannelly, 128 Cal. 83, 60 
 
 Pac. 670 544 
 
 T. Fong Ah Sing, 70 Cal. 8, 11 
 
 Pac. 323 981 
 
 V. Poren, 25 Cal. 361 151, 152 
 
 198, 203, 207, 209, 214. 236 
 V. Frank (Cal. App.) 83 Pac. 
 
 578 901 
 
 V. Freel, 48 Cal. 436 253, 260 
 
 T. Freeland, 6 Cal. 96 271, 274 
 
 322, 862 
 V. French, 69 Cal. 169, 10 
 
 Pac. 378 913, 1046 
 
 V. Fuearino, 104 App. Div. 
 
 437, 93 N. Y. Supp. 689. . 208 
 
 362, 363, 395 
 V. Fuhrig, 127 Cal. 412, 59 
 
 Pac. 693 993, 1005 
 
 V. Fuller, 2 Park. Crim. Eep. 
 
 16 696, 697, 812 
 
 V. Fuqua, 58 Cal. 245 138 
 
 V. Galmari, 176 N. Y. 84, 68 
 
 N. E. 112 404, 419, 442 
 
 V. Gallagher, 75 App. Dlv. 39, 
 
 78 N. Y. Supp. 5 439, 920 
 
 V. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9, 97 Am. 
 
 Dec. 162 400,401,422, 805 
 
 T. Garcia, 63 Cal. 19 1022 
 
 V. Garretson, 2 Wheeler, C. C. 
 
 347 .. 141, 142, 266, 647, 659 
 670 
 
 V. Gatewood, 20 Cal. 147 362 
 
 V. Geoghan, 138 N. Y. 677, 34 
 
 N. B. 399 228 
 
 T. Giancoli, 74 Cal. 642, 16 
 
 Pac. 510 537 
 
 V. Giblin, 115 N. Y. 196, 4 
 
 L.E.A. 757, 21 N. E. 1062 870 
 876 
 
 ,. Gibson, 17 Cal.. 283 221, 223 
 
 236 
 V. Gibson, 106 Cal. 458, 39 
 
 Pac. 864 161, 924, 929 
 
 V. Gill, 6 Cal. 637 17 
 
 V. Gilmore, 4 Cal. 376, 60 Am. 
 
 Dec. 620 1049 
 
 V. Gleason, 1 Nev. 173 342 
 
 V. Glenn, 10 Cal. 32 . . 973, 975 
 
 1027, 1037 
 V. Glover, 141 Cal. 233, 74 
 
 Pac. 745 460, 461, 503, 522 
 
 541, 983, 995, 1000 
 
 People V. Gonzales, 71 Cal. 569, 12 
 
 Pac. 783... 365, 367, 372, 459 
 473, 477, 479, 557 
 V. Gordon, 100 Mich. 518, 59 
 
 N. W. 322 149, 578 
 
 V. Gosch, 82 Mich. 22, 46 N. 
 
 W. 101 606, 608, 961, 963 
 
 V. Goslaw, 73 Cal. 323, 14 
 
 Pac. 788 118 
 
 V. Gray, 61 Cal. 164, 44 Am. 
 
 Eep. 549 993, 1006, 1014 
 
 V. Green, 1 Denio, 614, 1 Park. 
 
 Crlm. Eep. 11 979, 080 
 
 1020, 1034 
 V. Greenwall, 115 N. Y. 520, 
 
 22 N. B. 180 182 
 
 V. Grimer, 124 Cal. 19, 56 Pac. 
 
 625 440 
 
 V. Grimes, 132 Cal. 30, 64 Pac. 
 
 101.. 211, 397, 547, 556, 765 
 780, 785 
 V. Gross, 123 Cal. 389, 55 Pac. 
 
 1054 937, 938 
 
 V. Grunzig, 1 Park. Crim. Hep. 
 
 299 1001, 1007 
 
 V. Grunzig, 2 Bdm. Sel. Cas. 
 
 236 916, 994 
 
 V. Guance, 57 Cal. 154 198 
 
 T. Hall, 94 Cal. 595, 30 Pac. 
 
 7 972, 981 
 
 V. Hall, 48 Mich. 482, 42 Am. 
 
 Eep. 477, 12 N. W. 665.. 154 
 155. 896 
 V. Halliday, 5 Utah, 467, 17 
 
 Pac. 118 298, 402 
 
 V. Hamblin, 68 Cal. 101, 8 Pac. 
 
 687 128, 200, 214 
 
 V. Hammill, 2 Park. Crim. Eep. 
 
 223 808. 811 
 
 T. Hand, 4 Alb. Ij. J. 91 953 
 
 V. Harper, 1 Bdm. Sel. Cas. 
 
 180 300. 469 
 
 V. Harris, 29 Cal. 678 807 
 
 v. Harris, 95 Mich. 87, 54 N. 
 
 W. 648 441, 442 
 
 V. Harris, 136 N. Y. 423, 33 N. 
 
 E. 65 904, 922 
 
 V. Haun, 44 Cal. 96 2, 151, 152 
 
 819 
 V. Hawes, 98 Cal. 648, 33 Pac. 
 
 791 944, 1010 
 
 V. Hawkins, 109 N. Y. 408, 17 
 
 N. B. 371 160, 236 
 
 V. Hayes, 1 Bdm. Sel. Cas. 582 190 
 
 191 
 v. Heart (Cal.) 81 Pac. 1018. . 452 
 V. Hecker, 109 Cal. 451, 30 
 
 L.R.A. 403, 42 Pac. 307.. 383 
 
 390, 473, 479, 483, 487, 497 
 
 498, 502, 504, 510, 531. 338 
 539, 540, 542. 543 
 
 V. Henderson, 28 Cal. 465 407 
 
 415, 928 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED 
 
 Ixxxix 
 
 People V. Herbert, 61 Cal. 544.. 367, 473 
 V. Hess, 8 App. Div. 143, 40 
 
 N. Y. Supp. 486 401. 422 
 
 T. Higgins, 127 Mich. 291, 86 
 
 N. W. 812 945 
 
 V. Hill, 116 Cal. 562, 48 Pac. 
 
 711 931 
 
 V. Hill (Cal.) 82 Pac. 398 301 
 
 919 
 V. Hite, 8 Utah, 461, 33 Pac. 
 
 254 521, 541 
 
 T. Hobson, 17 Cal. 424 804 
 
 V. Hoch, 150 N. Y. 291, 44 N. 
 
 E. 976 224, 235 
 
 ,. Hoagdon, 55 Cal. 72, 36 Am. 
 
 Rep. 30 1001 
 
 T. Hodge (Mich.) 104 N. W. 
 
 599 969, 971 
 
 T. Holmes, 118 Cal. 444, 50 
 
 Pac. 675... 189, 337, 659, 661 
 904 
 V. Holmes, 111 Mich. 364, 69 
 
 N. W. 501 253, 271, 272 
 
 311, 324, 330, 934 
 
 T. Hong Ah Duck, 61 Cal. 387 130 
 
 221, 222, 830, 853, 859, 933 
 
 940, 948, 1058, 1059 
 
 V. Hongshell, 10 Cal. 83 340 
 
 V. Horton, 4 Mich. 67 304, 306 
 
 778, 783 
 V. Howard, 112 Cal. 135, 44 
 
 Pac. 464 362, 430, 438 
 
 V. Hubbard, 24 Wend. 369, 35 
 
 Am. Dec. 628 785 
 
 T. Hunt, 59 Cal. 430 166, 167 
 
 508 
 T. Huntington, 138 Cal. 261, 
 
 70 Pac. 284 1044 
 
 V. Hurley, 8 Cal. 390 362, 459 
 
 461, 489 
 
 V. Hurtado, 63 Cal. 288. . .271, 304 
 
 401, 803 
 T. Hyndman, 99 Cal. 1, 33 Pac. 
 
 782 359, 374, 449, 833 
 
 850, 940 
 
 V. lams, 57 Cal. 115 158, 400 
 
 409, 438 
 
 V. Irving, 95 N. Y. 541 138 
 
 V. Irwin, 77 Cal. 494, 20 Pac. 
 
 56 945 
 
 V. Jackson, 111 N. Y. 362, 19 
 
 N. E. 54 838 
 
 V. Jackson, 182 N. Y. 66, 74 
 
 N. E. 565 113,918, 948 
 
 V. Jamarillo, 57 Cal. 111.. 50, 57 
 
 63, 204 
 V. Johnson, 110 N. Y. 134, 17 
 N. E. 684, Affirming 46 
 
 Hun, 667 179,640, 881 
 
 V. Johnson, 139 N. Y. 358, 34 
 
 N. E. 920 101, 228, 362 
 
 447, 461, 469, 483, 516, 541 
 
 V. Jones, 2 Edm. Sel. Cas. 88. 811 
 
 People V. Jones, 99 N. Y. 667, 2 N. 
 
 B. 49 226, 228, 232, 234 
 
 235, 913, 916, 932.' 
 
 V. Josephs, 7 Cal. 129 152 
 
 V. Judd, 10 Cal. 313 837, 859- 
 
 T. Judson, 11 Daly, 1 676 
 
 V. Kamaunu, 110 Cal. 609, 42 
 
 Pac. 1090 1056 
 
 V. Keating, 61 Hun, 260, 16 N. 
 
 Y. Supp. 748 63 
 
 V. Keefer, 65 Cal. 232, 3 Pac. 
 
 818 77, 85, 662 
 
 V. Kelly, 6 Cal. 210.. 19, 838, 840 
 
 861 
 
 V. Kelly, 113 N. Y. 647, 7 N. 
 
 Y. Crim. Rep. 40, 21 N. 
 
 E. 122 275, 296, 
 
 T. Kelly, 35 Hun, 295 179, 
 
 329 
 236 
 244 
 T. Kemmler, 119 N. Y. 580, 
 
 24 N. E. 9 . . 809, 925, 1053 
 1059, 1060 
 V. Kennedy, 51 N. Y. S. R. 811, 
 
 22 N. Y. Supp. 267 258^ 
 
 V. Kennedy, 159 N. Y. 346, 70 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 557, 54 N. E. 
 
 51 200, 234-237, 360, 362 
 
 451, 469, 913, 926 
 V. Kennett, 114 Cal. 18, 45 
 
 Pac. 994 502, 509, 541 
 
 V. Kent, 41 Misc. 191, 83 N. 
 
 Y. Supp. 948 80' 
 
 T. Kern, 61 Cal. 244 913 
 
 V. Kernaghan, 72 Cal. 609, 14 
 
 Pac. 566 253, 259, 260- 
 
 T. Kerrigan, 147 N. Y. 210, 41 
 
 N. E. 494 324, 328, 3ol 
 
 V. Kerrigan, 9 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 
 
 469 904 
 
 V. Kesler, 3 Wheeler, C. C. 18 1:^3 
 T. Keuhn, 93 Mich. 619, 53 N. 
 
 W. 721 49.*. 
 
 V. Kiernan, 3 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 
 
 247 164, 166, 233 
 
 y. Kiernan, 101 N. Y. 618, 4 
 
 N. E. 130.. 164, 166, 167, 233 
 V. Kilvl'ngton (Cal.) 36 Pac. 13 684 
 757, 758 
 ». Kilvington, 104 Cal. 86, 43 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 73, 37 Pac. 
 
 799 753-755, 757 
 
 V. King, 27 Cal. 507, 87 Am. 
 
 Dec. 95 808, 812, 835, 850- 
 
 859 
 V. Kirby, 2 Park. Crim. Rep. 
 
 28 98, 105, 116, 124 
 
 T. Kirst, 168 N. Y. 19, 60 N. 
 
 E. 1057 806 
 
 V. Kloss, 115 Cal. 567, 47 Pac. 
 
 459 808- 
 
 T. Knapp, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 177 1034 
 1037, 1039' 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 People V. Knapp, 71 Cal. 1, 11 Pac. 
 
 793 . . 130, 198, 200, 203, 219 
 221, 222, 226, 944 
 
 V. Knapp, 26 Mich. 112 62, 656 
 
 663, 665, 671, 978, 1027, 1037 
 1049 
 V. KnicUerbocker, 1 Park. 
 
 Crim. Rep. 302 076, 3007 
 
 1034 
 V. Koenig, 180 N. Y. 155, 72 
 
 N. B. 993 166 
 
 V. Kohler, 49 Mich. 324, 13 N. 
 
 W. 608 200 
 
 V. Kraft, 148 N. Y. 631, 43 N. 
 E. 80, Affirming 91 Ilun, 
 474, 36 N. y. Supp. 1034 1034 
 1036 
 
 V. Krist, 168 N. T. 19, 60 N. 
 
 B. 1057 
 
 T. Lagroppo, 90 App. Div. 219, 
 
 86 N. Y. Supp. 116.. 143, 
 
 645, 647, 902, 905, 
 
 V. Lamar (Cal.) 83 Pac. 993.. 
 
 818 
 
 358 
 945 
 431 
 437 
 V. Lamb, 2 Abb. Pr. N. S. 148 455 
 V. Lamb, 2 Keyes, 360, 2 Abb. 
 
 Pr. N. S. 160 199, 461 
 
 T. Lamb, 17 Cal. 323 . . 502, 508 
 T. Lamb, 54 Barb. 342, 2 
 Keyes, 373, 2 Abb. Pr. N. 
 
 S. 160 362, 366, 367, 394 
 
 422, 462 
 V. Lanagan, 81 Cal. 142, 22 
 
 Pac. 482 30, 554, 986 
 
 T. Landman, 103 Cal. 577, 37 
 
 Pac. 518 225 
 
 V. Lane, 100 Cal. 379, 34 Pac. 
 
 856 808, 809 
 
 V. Langton, 67 Cal. 427, 7 
 
 Pac. 843 813 
 
 T. Larubia, 140 N. Y. 87, 35 
 
 N. B. 412 928, 929 
 
 V. Lawrence, 21 Cal. 368 1037 
 
 V. Lawrence, 143 Cal. 148, 
 
 68 L.R.A. 193, 76 Pac. 893 644 
 645, 650, 653, 672, 673, 955 
 T. Leary, 105 Cal. 486, 39 Pac. 
 
 24 1058 
 
 V. Lee (Cal.) 81 Pac. 969 .. 759 
 770, 772 
 T. Lee, 17 Cal. 76. . .974, 1013, 1047 
 V. Lee Look, 137 Cal. 590, 70 
 
 Pac. 660 865 
 
 T. Lee Sare Bo, 72 Cal. 623, 14 
 
 Pac. 310 992, 1006, 1020 
 
 V. Lelth, 52 Cal. 251 61, 655 
 
 T. Lem Deo, 132 Cal. 199, 64 
 
 Pac. 265 992, 1004, 1010 
 
 V. Lemperle, 94 Cal. 45, 29 
 
 Pac. 709 362, 554 
 
 T. Lennon, 71 Mich. 298, 15 
 Am. St. Rep. 259, 38 N. 
 W. 871 456, 458 
 
 People V. Leonardi, 143 N. T. 380, 
 
 38 N. E. 372 808, 814 
 
 V. Lewis, 3 Abb. App. Dec. 535 309 
 
 T. Lewis, 36 Cal. 531 806, 809 
 
 V. Lewis, 117 Cal. 186, 59 Am. 
 
 S. Rep. 167, 48 Pac. 1088 473 
 
 490, 491 
 V. Lewis, 124 Cal. 551, 45 
 
 L.R.A. 783, 57 Pac. 470 31 
 
 34-37, 54 
 V. Lewis, 115 N. Y. 663, 21 
 
 N. E. 1062 157 
 
 V. Lilley, 43 Mich. 521, 5 N. 
 
 W. 982 5, 115, 118, 201 
 
 259, 261, 319, 322 
 
 V. Lilly, 38 Mich. 270 490, 491 
 
 V. Lloyd, 9 Cal. 54 831, 832 
 
 834, 835, 859 
 
 V. Lockwood, 6 Cal. 205 862 
 
 V. Lehman, 2 Barb. 216 884 
 
 ,. Lombard, 17 Cal. 316.. 400, 404 
 
 407 
 
 V. Long, 39 Cal. 694 148, 161 
 
 165, 198, 199, 209 
 V. Lonsdale, 122 Mich. 388, 
 
 81 N. W. 277 970, 1009 
 
 V. Lopez, 2 Edm. Sel. Cas. 262 165 
 V. Lopez, 135 Cal. 23, 66 Pac. 
 
 965 135 
 
 V. Lynch, 101 Cal. 229, 35 
 
 Pac. 860... 354, 394, 400, 420 
 
 460, 475 
 V. Lyons, 110 N. Y. 618, 17 
 
 N. B. 391 385, 925 
 
 V. Macard, 73 Mich. 15, 40 
 
 N. W. 784 362, 474, 483 
 
 486, 503 
 V. McCarthy, 110 N. Y. 309, 
 
 18 N. E. 128 551, 750, 754 
 
 V. McCarthy, 47 Hun, 491 . . 754 
 
 V. McClure (Cal.) 83 Pac. 437 554 
 V. McCurdy, 68 Cal. 576, 10 
 
 Pac. 207 944 
 
 V. McDonnell, 92 N. Y. 657.. 832 
 
 834 
 V. McDowell, 63 Mich. 229, 30 
 
 N. W. 68 969 
 
 V. McParlane, 138 Cal. 481, 
 81 L.R.A. 245, 71 Pac. 
 
 568, 72 Pac. 48 1050 
 
 V. McGrath, 47 Hun, 325 386 
 
 524 
 V. M'Kay, 122 CaJ. 628, 55 
 
 Pac. 594 929, 1058 
 
 V. McKeon, 31 Hun, 449.. 191, 258 
 
 339, 340 
 
 V. McLaughlin, 44 Cal. 435... 978 
 V. McLeod, 1 Hill, 377, 37 Am. 
 
 Dec. 328, 25 Wend. 483.. 124 
 
 132, 360, 394, 503, 513, 541 
 
 731, 733 
 
TABLE OP CASES CITED. 
 
 xci 
 
 People V. McNulty, 93 Cal. 427, 26 
 
 Pac. 597, 29 Pac. 61 
 
 836, 
 V. McEoberts (Cal. App.) 81 
 
 Pac. 734 97, 
 
 V. Mahatch (Cal.) 82 Pac. 779 
 
 236, 
 
 V. Maine, 51 App. Div. 142, 64 
 
 N. Y. Supp. 579 
 
 T. Majone, 12 Abb. N. C. 187. 
 V. Majone, 91 N. Y. 211.. 166, 
 
 T. Majors, 65 Cal. 138, 52 Am. 
 Rep. 295, 3 Pac. 597.. 22, 
 
 v. Mangano, 29 Hun, 259. .11, 
 
 15 
 
 865 
 
 98 
 224 
 941 
 
 868 
 224 
 224 
 235 
 
 838 
 944 
 163 
 167 
 V. Manning, 146 Cal. 100, 79 
 
 Pac. 856 567 
 
 T. March, 6 Cal. 543 116, 130 
 
 133 
 T. Martell, 138 N. T. 595, 33 
 
 N. E. 838 930 
 
 T. Martin, 47 Cal. 101 852 
 
 T. Martinez, 66 Cal. 278, 5 
 
 Pac. 261 143, 236 
 
 V. Mather, 4 Wend. 299, 21 
 
 Am. Dec. 122 51, 83, 819 
 
 1050 
 V. Matthai, 135 Cal. 442, 67 
 
 Pac. 694 357, 551, 
 
 T. Matthews (Cal.) 58 Pac. 
 
 371 752 
 
 V. Melendrez, 129 Cal. 549, 62 
 
 Pac. 109 244, 
 
 T. Melius, 1 N. y. Crim. 
 
 Rep. 39 694, 
 
 T. Mendenhall, 135 Cal. 344, 
 63 Pac. 675, 67 Pac. 325. . 
 
 552 
 
 758 
 
 582 
 
 704 
 
 206 
 261 
 y. Methever, 132 Cal. 326, 64 
 
 Pac. 481 805, 807- 809 
 
 V. Meyer, 162 N. Y. 357, 56 N. 
 
 E. 758 875 
 
 Y. Miles, 55 Cal. 207 156, 158 
 
 V. Miles, 143 N. Y. 389, 38 N. 
 
 E. 456 183, 577 
 
 V. Milgate, 5 Cal. 127 238, 239 
 
 T. Millard, 53 Mich. e.H, 18 N. 
 
 W. 562 156, 896 
 
 V. Miller, 12 Cal. 2t,x 820 
 
 T. Miller, 121 Cal. 343, 53 
 
 Pac. 816 180, 194 
 
 ■V. Miller, 49 Mich. 23, 12 N. 
 
 W. 895 422, 503, 535 
 
 V. Miller, 91 Mich. 639, 52 N. 
 
 W. 65 124 
 
 V. Mills, 98 N. Y. 176 809, 812 
 
 V. Milton, 145 Cal. 169, 78 
 
 Pac. 549 175 
 
 V. Minisci, 12 N. T. S. R. 719 102 
 
 124. 127 
 
 People V. Mitchell, 100 Cal. 328, 34 
 
 Pac. 698 
 
 V. Moan, 65 Cal. 532, 4 Pac. 
 
 545 38, 
 
 V. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264, 
 
 62 L.E.A. 193, 61 N. B. 
 
 286 3, 101, 102. 106, 
 
 V. Montgomery, 176 N. Y. 
 
 68 N. E. 258 
 
 V. Mooney, 2 Idaho, 17, 2 
 
 876 
 
 V. Moore, 8 Cal. 90 
 
 219, 
 
 928 
 39 
 
 109 
 225 
 
 922 
 
 Pac. 
 
 
 .173 
 
 162, 
 
 lO.'i 
 
 205, 
 
 221 
 
 .) 1 
 
 617 
 
 , 77 
 
 
 634, 
 
 946 
 
 Pac. 
 
 
 938, 
 
 956 
 
 
 977 
 
 V. Moore, 2 Dougl. (Mich 
 V. Morales, 14.S Cal. 550, 
 
 Pac. 470 623, 
 
 T. Moran, 144 Cal. 48, 77 
 
 777 56, 673, 675, 
 
 V. Morgan, 124 Mich. 527. 83 
 
 N. W. 275 917, 919 
 
 V. Morine, 61 Cal. 367 461 
 
 V. Morine, 138 Cal. 626, 72 
 
 Pac. 166 50 
 
 T. Muldoon, 2 Park. Crim. Rep. 
 
 13 624 
 
 V. Mulvey, 2 Edm. Sel. Cas. 
 
 246 205, 335 
 
 V. Munn, 65 Cal. 211, 3 Pac. 
 
 650 339 
 
 T. Murbaclj, 64 Cal. 369, 30 
 
 Pac. 608 274 
 
 T. Murphy, 39 Cal. 52 850, 831 
 
 832 
 V. Murphy, 146 Cal. 502, 80 
 
 Pac. 709 958 
 
 V. Murphy, 179 N. Y. 595, 72 
 
 N. E. 1146 837, 842 
 
 V. Murphy, 93 App. Div. 383, 
 
 87 N. Y. Supp. 786 837 
 
 840- 842 
 T. Murray, 10 Cal. 309... 421, 424 
 432, 833, 871 
 V. Neary, 104 Cal. 373, 37 
 
 Pac. 943 227 
 
 V. Neufeld, 165 N. Y. 43, 58 
 
 N. E. 786 944, 948, 953 
 
 V. Newberry, 20 Cal. 440 ..72, 79 
 V. Newcomer, 118 Cal. 263, 
 
 50 Pac. 405 106, 128, 130 
 
 239, 359, 473, 480, 490, 523 
 
 554 555 
 
 T. Nichol, 34 Cal. 211 148, 165 
 
 198, 204, 205, 214, 236, 238 
 805, 808, 811, 813, 835 
 V. Nolan, 115 N. Y. 660, 21 
 
 N. E. 1060 1060 
 
 •■'. O'Brien, 78 Cal. 41, 20 
 
 Pac. 359 944 
 
 T. O'Brien, 18 Mont. 1, 43 
 
 Pac. 1091, 44 Pac. 399. . . 930 
 
xcu 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Feople T. O'Connell, 78 Hun, 323, 29 
 
 N. Y. Supp. 195 
 
 V. Odell, 1 DaU. 197, 46 N. W. 
 
 601 805, 806, 
 
 T. Olmstead, 30 Mich. 431 
 
 881, 880, 969, 978, 981, 
 V. Olsen, 80 Cal. 122, 22 Pac. 
 
 125 113, 148, 173, 175, 
 
 V. Olscn, 4 Utah, 413, 11 Pac. 
 
 577 275, 312, 386, 
 
 V. Osmond. 138 N. T. 80, 33 
 
 N. E. 739.. 832, 913, 917, 
 
 V. Outeveras, 48 Cal. 19.. 889, 
 V. Owens, 132 Cal. 469, 64 
 
 Pac. 770 
 
 V. Palmer, 96 Mich. 580, 55 
 
 N. W. 994 
 
 V. Palmer, 105 Mich. 568, 63 
 
 N. W. 656 
 
 V. Palmer, 109 N. Y. 110, 4 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 423, 16 N. 
 
 E. 529 897, 904, 905, 
 
 V. Parmelee, 112 Mich. 291, 70 
 
 N. W. 577 904, 
 
 V. Patrick, 182 N. Y. 131, 74 
 
 N. E. 843 75, 672, 
 
 907, 
 V. Pavlik, 7 N. T. Crim. Eep. 
 
 30 
 
 V. Payne, 8 Cal. 341. .764, 785, 
 V. Pearce, 2 Edm. Sel. Cas. 76 
 V. Pearne, 118 Cal. 154, 50 
 
 Pac. 376 337, 702, 703, 
 
 T. Perdue, 49 Cal. 425 
 
 V. Perry, 8 Abb. Pr. N. S. 
 
 27 994, 
 
 V. Phelan, 123 Cal. 551, 56 
 
 Pac. 424 419, 
 
 V. Place, 157 N. Y. 584, 52 N. 
 
 E. 576 160, 224, 230, 
 
 234, 897, 898, 904, 914, 
 V. Piper, 112 Mich. 644, 71 N. 
 
 W. 174 
 
 V. Pool, 27 Cal. 573.. 98, 163, 
 
 203, 224, 241, 362, 626, 
 
 650, 957, 958, 
 
 V. Pope, 108 Mich. 361, 66 
 
 N. W. 213 917, 
 
 T. Potter, 5 Mich. 1, 71 
 
 Am. Dec. 763.. 2, 148, 152, 
 V. Powell, 87 Cal. 348, 11 
 
 L.R.A. 75, 25 Pac. 481,. 
 
 416, 426, 440, 
 
 T. Pugh, 167 N. Y. 524, 60 N. 
 
 B. 770 228, 
 
 V. Pullerson, 159 N. Y. 339, 53 
 
 N. E. 1119 
 
 V. Quimby, 134 Mich. 625, 96 
 N. W. 1061 
 
 45 
 
 808 
 850 
 998 
 
 181 
 644 
 
 387 
 
 926 
 931 
 890 
 
 101 
 
 286 
 
 236 
 
 912 
 
 914 
 
 904 
 909 
 
 948 
 786 
 256 
 
 879 
 1043 
 
 292 
 
 1007 
 
 546 
 
 231 
 930 
 
 386 
 174 
 627 
 965 
 
 919 
 
 223 
 
 128 
 936 
 
 231 
 
 227 
 
 950 
 
 People V. Eaffo, 180 N. Y. 434, 73 X. 
 
 E. 225 224 
 
 y. Eaher, 92 Mich. 165, 31 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 675, 52 N. W. 625 110 
 111 
 V. Ramirez, 73 Cal. 403, 15 
 
 Pac. 33 992: 
 
 V. Randall, 1 Wheeler, C. C. 
 
 258, 5 N. Y. City Hall Rec. 
 
 141 601, 622 
 
 V. Eaten, 63 Cal. 421 130, 222- 
 
 227, 551, 552, 615, 616 
 V. Eector, 19 Wend. 569.. 182, 339 
 367, 404, 407, 790> 
 V. Eegan, 107 App. Div. 608, 
 
 94 N. Y. Supp. 841 775- 
 
 V. Repke, 103 Mich. 459, 61 
 
 N. W. 861 50, 68, 156, 157 
 
 V. Eiordan, 117 N. Y. 71, 22 
 
 N. E. 455 550' 
 
 V. Robertson, 67 Cal. 646, 8 
 
 Pac. 600 121, 524, 531, 548. 
 
 V. Robinson, 17 Cal. 363.. 842, 843 
 T. Eoblnson, 2 Park. Crim. 
 
 Eep. 235 811, 994, 1001 
 
 T. Eockwcll, 39 Mich. 503.... 31 
 V. Eodawald, 177 N. Y. 408, 
 
 70 N. E. 1 408, 442, 462 
 
 T. Eodrigo, 69 Cal. 601, 11 
 
 Pac. 481 221, 222: 
 
 V. Eoemer, 114 Cal. 51, 45 
 
 Pac. 1003 509, 541 
 
 V. Rogers, 13 Abb. Pr. N. S. 
 
 370 115, 124, 259 
 
 V. Eogers, 18 N. Y. 9, 72 Am. 
 
 Dee. 484 807, 815. 
 
 T. Eomero, 143 Cal. 458, 77 
 
 Pac. 163 38T 
 
 T. Boss, 134 Cal. 256, 66 Pac. 
 
 229 1056: 
 
 V. Eoss, 66 Mich. 96, 33 N. 
 
 W. 30 126 
 
 v. Eugg, 98 N. Y. 537 1040' 
 
 V. Eulloff, 3 Park. Crim. Eep. 
 
 401 896 
 
 T. Samario, 84 Cal. 484, 24 
 
 Pac. 283 991, 1004 
 
 V. Samsels, 66 Cal. 99, 4 Pac. 
 
 1061 115, 259, 363, 387 
 
 V. Sanchez, 24 Cal. 17 165, 173 
 
 175, 198, 203, 207, 293, 325 
 993, 1006, 1007, 1021, 1043 
 
 V. Santord, 43 Cal. 29 835, 836 
 
 840, 1012, 1016 
 V. Schlavl, 96 App. Dht. 479, 
 
 89 N. Y. Supp. 564 . 4|^. . 978. 
 
 V. Schmidt, 63 Cal. 28 2, 866 
 
 V. Schmidt, 168 N. Y. 568, 61 
 
 N. B. 907.. 166, 226, 236, 23T 
 V. Schryver, 42 N. Y. 1, 1 Am. 
 
 Eep. 480 222, 550, 551, 897 
 
 V. Scoggins, 37 Cal. 676.. 121, 400- 
 404, 407-409, 413. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 People V. Scott, 69 Cal. 69, 10 Pac. 
 
 188 530 
 
 T. Scott, 6 Mich. 287 115, 152 
 
 206 
 T. Scott, 153 N. T. 40, 46 N. 
 
 E. 1028 102, 231, 234, 922 
 
 Y. Seaman, 107 Mich. 348, 61 
 
 Am. St. Eep. 326, 65 N. 
 
 W. 203 093, 885, 970 
 
 V. Sehovn, 116 Cal. 503, 48 
 
 Pac. 495 913 
 
 T. Sessions, 58 Mich. 594, 26 
 
 N. W. 291 593, 594, 887 
 
 T. Shanley, 49 App. Diy. 56, 
 
 63 N. Y. Supp. 449. . .550, 551 
 T. Sharkey, 178 N. Y. 584, 70 
 
 N. B. 1104, Affirming 87 
 
 App. Div. 532, 84 N. Y. 
 
 Supp. 780 339 
 
 T. Shay, 4 Paris. Crim. Eep. 
 
 344 228, 498 
 
 -T. Shears, 133 Cal. 154, 65 
 
 Pac. 295... 122, 362, 36G, 370 
 T. Shorter, 4 Barb. 460, 2 N. 
 
 Y. 197, 51 Am. Dec. 286. . 407 
 T. Simpson, 48 Mich. 474, 12 
 
 N. W. 662. .925, 928, 992, 994 
 
 995, 1007 
 
 T. Sljeehan, 49 Barb. 217..191, 194 
 
 339 
 T. Slack, 90 Mich. 448, 51 N. 
 
 W. 533 343 
 
 T. Sliney, 137 N. Y. 570, 33 
 
 N. E. 150 102, 230 
 
 T. Smith, 59 Cal. 601 222 
 
 V. Smith, 104 N. Y. 491, 58 
 
 Am. Eep. 537, 10 N. E. 
 
 873 1028, 1029 
 
 T. Smith, 172 N. Y. 210, 64 N. 
 
 E. 814 946, 984, 995 
 
 T. Solani (Cal.) 83 Pac. 281.. 359 
 V. Southern, 120 Cal. 645, 53 
 
 Pac. 214 979 
 
 V. Sowell, i45 Cal. 292, 78 
 
 Pac. 717 984 
 
 T. Steveuton, 9 Cal. 273... 19, 859 
 
 T. Stock, 1 Idaho, 218 421, 422 
 
 V. Stokes, 2 N. Y. Crim. Rep! 
 
 382 123, 156 
 
 V. Stonecifer, 6 Cal. 405 . . 315, 331 
 
 926 
 V. Stout, 3 Park. Crim. Eep. 
 
 «78 367 
 
 ^*Strfbenvoll, 62 Mich. 329, 
 
 28 N. W. 883 343 
 
 V. Suesser, 142 Cal. 354, 75 
 
 Pac. 1093.. 164, 576, 875, 924 
 V. Sullivan, 7 N. Y. 396.. 124, 201 
 
 202, 205, 313, 326, 330, 366 
 446, 469 
 
 People v. Sullivan, 173 N. Y. 122, 63 
 
 L.E.A. 353, 93 Am. St. 
 
 Eep. 582, 65 N. E. 989... 
 
 602, 603, 832, 877, 961, 
 
 V, Sutherland, 154 N. Y. 345, 
 
 48 N. E. 518 913, 920, 
 
 930, 
 V. Sweeney, 41 Hun, 332.. 182, 
 
 187 
 962 
 
 921 
 937 
 993 
 994 
 V. Swetland, 77 Mich. 53, 43 
 
 N. W. 779 896 
 
 V. Taing, 53 Cal. 602 400 
 
 V. Tamkin, 62 Cal. 468. .274, 363 
 382, 400, 403, 407, 527 
 V. Tannan, 4 Park. Crim. Eep. 
 
 514 196, 197, 857 
 
 y. Tarm Poi, 86 Cal. 225, 24 
 
 Pac. 998 555 
 
 V. Taylor, 92 App. Div. 29, 86 
 
 N. Y. Supp. 996 555 
 
 V. Taylor, 36 Cal. 255. .97, 98, 121 
 
 924 
 
 V. Taylor, 59 Cal. 640 981, 985 
 
 986, 992, 1006 
 V. Taylor, 138 N. Y. 398, 34 
 
 N. B. 275 802 
 
 V. Taylor, 177 N. Y. 237, 69 N. 
 
 E. 534 
 
 y. Thomas, 3 Alb. L. J. 210. 
 
 V. Thomas, 67 N. Y. 218 
 
 V. Thompson, 122 Mich. 411, 
 
 81 N. W. 344 695, 966- 
 
 V. Thompson, 41 N. Y. 1 
 
 V. Thomson, 92 Cal. 506, 28 
 
 Pac. 589... 391, 405, 924, 
 V. Thomson, 145 Cal. 717, 79 
 
 Pac. 4.35... 367, 369, 538, 
 
 404 
 149 
 182 
 438 
 
 968 
 1043 
 
 929 
 
 1031 
 1034 
 V. Thorn, 21 Misc. 130, 47 N. 
 
 Y. Supp. 46 825, 828, 892 
 
 V. Tidwell, 4 Utah, 506, 12 
 
 Pac. 61 220- 222 
 
 V. Totterman, 181 N. Y. 385, 
 
 74 N. E. 222 226 
 
 V. Travers, 88 Cal. 233, 26 
 
 Pac. 88 807 
 
 V. Travis, 56 Cal. 251 407, 409 
 
 535 
 V. Trezza, 125 N. Y. 740, 26 
 
 N. E. 933 102 
 
 V. Tuczkewitz, 149 N. Y. 240, 
 
 43 N. E. 548 201 
 
 V. Tuhi, 2 Wheeler, C. C. 242 201 
 
 y. Turley, 50 Cal. 469 247, 274 
 
 V. Tyler, 7 Mich. 161, 74 Am. 
 
 Dec. 703 824 
 
 V. Ung Ting Bow, 142 Cal. 
 
 341, 75 Pac. 899 873 
 
 v. Urias, 12 Cal. 320 866, 867 
 
 V. Valencia, 43 Cal. 552 83, 199 
 
 236, 854, 888, 889 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 People V. Valliere, 123 Cal. 576, 56 
 
 Pac. 433.. 120, 135, 137, 140 
 924 
 T. Van Brunt, 108 N. Y. 656, 
 
 15 N. E. 435 201 
 
 V. Vance, 21 Cal. 400 834, 835 
 
 866, 867 
 V. Van Steenburgh, 1 Park. 
 
 Crlm. Eep. 39 178 
 
 V. Vasquez, 49 Cal. 560.. 645, 650 
 V. Vernon, 35 Cal. 49, 95 Am. 
 
 Dec. 49 1005, 1010,1027 
 
 T. Vincent, 95 Cal. 425, 30 
 
 Pac. 581 812 
 
 T. Walker, 38 Mich. 156 807 
 
 V. Wallace, 9 Cal. 30 831, 838 
 
 840, 842, 844, 846 
 
 V. Walsh, 43 Cal. 447 790, 791 
 
 792, 795 
 
 V. Walter, 1 Idaho, 386.. 219, 236 
 
 V. Waltz, 50 How. Pr. 204 205 
 
 V. Walworth, 4 N. Y. Crim. 
 
 Rep. 355 163, 164, 167, 199 
 
 203, 208-210, 224, 228, 236 
 
 367, 403, 408, 421, 453, 462 
 
 523, 767, 768, 772, 775 
 V. Wardrip, 141 Cal. 229, 74 
 
 Pac. 744 186 
 
 V. Wasson, 65 Cal. 538, 4 Pac. 
 
 555 987 
 
 V. Waysmau (Cal.) 81 Pac. 
 
 1087 97, 259, 461 
 
 V. Weaver, 47 Cal. 106... 850, 851 
 
 1017 
 V. Weher, 66 Cal. 392, 5 Pac. 
 
 679 54 
 
 v. Webster, 59 Hun, 398, 13 
 
 N. Y. Supp. 414 244 
 
 V. Webster, 68 Hun, 11, 22 
 
 N. Y. Supp. 634 226, 258 
 
 V. Webster, 139 N. Y. 73, 34 
 
 N. E. 730 393, 440, 448 
 
 451, 916, 926 
 
 T. Welch, 49 Cal. 177 .. 245, 1046 
 T. Welch, 141 N. Y. 266, 24 
 
 L.E.A. 117, 38 Am. St. 
 
 Eep. 793, 36 N. E. 328, 
 
 Affirming 74 Hun, 474, 26 
 
 N. Y. Supp. 694 710 
 
 V. West, 49 Cal. 610 220 
 
 V. Westlake, 62 Cal. 303. .362, 363 
 
 371, 400, 502, 508, 540, 544 
 556 
 V. Wheelock (Cal.) 68 Pac. 
 
 579 113, 953 
 
 V. White, 22 Wend. 167, 24 
 
 Wend. 520 866, 900 
 
 V. White, 24 Wend. F30 223 
 
 V. Willett, 102 N. Y. 251, 6 
 
 N. B. 301.. 179, 831, 877, 878 
 
 V. Williams, 17 Cal. 142 404 
 
 V. Williams, 32 Cal. 280.. 459, 461 
 
 496, 555 
 
 People T. Williams, 43 Cal. 344. .118, 164 
 806, 811- 814 
 V. Williams, 73 Cal. 531, 15 
 
 Pac. 97 198, 203, 244 
 
 V. Williams, 3 Park. Crim. 
 
 Eep. 84 923, 926 
 
 V. Willson, 109 N. Y. 345, 16 
 
 N. E. 540 914 
 
 V. Wilson, 55 Mich. 506, 21 
 
 N. W. 905 610, 627 
 
 V. Wilson, 141 N. Y. 185, 36 
 
 N. E. 230.. 611, 636, 962, 964 
 V. Wilson, 145 N. Y. 628, 40 
 
 N. E. 392.. 646, 651, 653, 660 
 669, 673-675, 956 
 V. Wilson, 3 Park. Crim. Eep. 
 
 199 835, 898, 899, 912 
 
 V. Wise, 163 N. Y. 440, 57 N. 
 
 B. 740 910, 954 
 
 V. Wolf, 95 Mich. 625, 55 N. 
 
 W. 357 124, 132 
 
 V. Wong Chuey, 117 Cal. 624, 
 
 49 Pac. 833 981, 1032 
 
 V. Wood, 145 Cal. 659, 79 Pac. 
 
 367 645, 905, 938 
 
 T. Wood, 2 Edm. Sel. Cas. 71 97S 
 974, 991, 994, 1030 
 ■V. Woods, 147 Cal. 265, 81 Pac. 
 
 652 198, 245, 604 
 
 610, 920 
 
 V. Woody, 45 Cal. 289 55, 61 
 
 V. Worthington, 122 Cal. 583, 
 
 55 Pac. 396 272, 326, 329 
 
 331 
 V. Wright, 144 Cal. 161, 77 
 
 Pac. 877 450 
 
 V. Wright, 89 Mich. 70, 50 N. 
 
 W. 792 941, 943, 944, 1053 
 
 V. Ybarra, 17 Cal. 166 835, 974 
 
 1004, 10.34 
 V. Ye Park, 62 Cal. 204 . . 120, 372 
 473, 489 
 T. Yokum, 118 Cal. 437, 50 
 
 Pac. 686 929, 1000, 1006 
 
 T. Young, 96 App. Div. 33, 88 
 
 N. Y. Supp. 1063 241 
 
 V. Young (Cal.) 63 Pac. 837.. 432 
 V. Young, 102 Cal. 411, 36 Pac. 
 
 770 808, 913, 921 
 
 V. Zachello, 168 N. Y. 35, 60 
 
 N. B. 1051 229 
 
 T. Zigouras, 163 N. Y. 250, 57 
 
 N. E. 465 406 
 
 People ex rel. Terry t. Bartlett, 14 
 
 Cal. 651 196, 197 
 
 Kemmler v. Durston, 119 N. Y. 
 
 569, 7 L.E.A. 715, 16 Am. 
 
 St. Eep. 859, 24 N. B. 6, 
 
 Affirming 55 Hun, 64, 7 
 
 N. Y. Supp. 813 1059, 1060 
 
 McMahon v. Sheriff, 1 Park. 
 
 Crlm. Eep. 659 706 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 I'eople ex rel. McMahon v. West- 
 chester County, 1 Park. 
 Crlm. Rep. 639 190, 
 
 Peoples T. Com. 87 Ky. 487, 9 S. W. 
 
 509 106, 506, 592, 594- 
 
 598, 885, 973, 984, 991, 
 
 883 
 
 596 
 993 
 1007 
 T. State (Miss.) 33 So. 289.. 371 
 
 Peri T. People, 65 111. 17 116, 119, 143 
 
 164, 204, 226 
 Perkins v. State, 124 Ga. 6, 52 S. E. 
 
 17 117 
 
 V. state, 78 Wis. 551, 47 N. 
 
 W. 827 256, 257, 366 
 
 474- 476 
 V. Territory, 10 Okla. 506. 63 
 
 Pac. 860 873 
 
 Perrin y. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 560, 78 S. W. 930 255 
 
 Perry v. State, 43 Ala. 21 6, 199 
 
 V. State, 94 Ala. 25, 10 So. 
 
 650 421, 42.3^25, 470, 486 
 
 495 
 V. State, 102 Ga. 365, 30 S. E. 
 
 903 99, 121, 131, 164, 201 
 
 231, 260, 298, 772, 984, 991 
 1020, 1033, 1053, 1056, 1058 
 V. State, 110 Ga. 234, 36 S. B. 
 
 781 221, 651, 936 
 
 V. State, 117 Ga. 719, 45 S. E. 
 
 77 324 
 
 V. State, 44 Tex. 473 197, 211 
 
 868 
 Perryman v. State, 114 Ga. 545, 40 
 
 S. E. 746 124, 276 
 
 V. State, 36 Tex. 321 865, 916 
 
 Perrymore v. State, 73 Ark. 278, 83 
 
 S. W. 909 289, 290 
 
 Perugi V. State, 104 Wis. 230, 76 Am. 
 St. Rep. 865, 80 N. W. 
 
 593 161, 162, 164, 165, 201 
 
 256, 257, 450, 766 
 Peter v. State, 23 Tex. App. 684, 5 
 
 S. W. 228 . . 510, 527, 541 
 580, 752 
 Peterson v. State, 41 Fla. 285, 26 
 
 So. 709 855 
 
 V. State, 47 Ga. 524 852 
 
 V. State, 50 Ga. 142 407, 409 
 
 V. State, 12 Tex. App. 650 . . 833, 850 
 Petrie v. Cartwriglit, 114 Ky. 103, 
 59 L.R.A. 720, 102 Am. 
 St. Rep. 274, 70 S. W. 
 
 297 735, 741, 742 
 
 Pettiford v. Mayo, 117 N. C. 27, 23 
 
 S. E. 252 972 
 
 Pettis V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 81 
 
 S. W. 312. . .415, 426, 438, 439 
 Pettit V. State, 135 Ind. 393, 34 N. 
 
 E. 1118 929 
 
 Petty V. Com. 12 Ky. L. Rep. 919, 
 
 15 S. W. 1059 292 
 
 Petty V. State (Ark.) 89 S. W. 465.. 
 274, 278, 
 
 V. State, 6 Baxt. 610 
 
 Pew's Case, Cro. Car. 183 .. 627, 
 Plomer v. People, 4 Park. Crim. Rep. 
 
 558 237, 462, 
 
 Pharr v. State, 7 Tex. App. 472.. 
 175, 177, 183, 
 
 Phelps T. State, 75 Ga. 571 
 
 Philips V. Com. 2 DuT. 328, 87 Am. 
 
 Dec. 499 367, 380, 
 
 484, 
 Phillips V. State, 68 Ala. 469 .. 
 
 214 
 534 
 209 
 628 
 
 536 
 148 
 365 
 275 
 
 483 
 487 
 857 
 899, 913 
 V. State, 62 Ark. 119, 34 S. W. 
 
 539 225, 932 
 
 V. State, 22 Tex. App. 139, 2 
 
 S. W. 601 923, 931, 935 
 
 V. State, 26 Tex. App. 228, 8 
 Am. St. Rep. 471, 9 S. 
 W. 357 . . 59, 83, 84, 645, 666 
 
 T. Trull, 11 Johns. 486 764 
 
 Philpot V. Com. 86 Ky. 595, 6 S. 
 
 W. 453 136, 141 
 
 Phipps V. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 560, 31 S. W. 397 . . 395, 396 
 430 
 
 Pickens v. State, 61 Miss. 52 356 
 
 V. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 Rep. 554, 21 S. W. 362.. SOT 
 Pierce v. State, 21 Tex. App. 669, 3 
 
 S. W. Ill 83T 
 
 Pierson v. People, 79 N. Y 424,. 35 
 
 Am. Rep. 524 923 
 
 T. State, 12 Ala. 149 . . 239, 326 
 386, 387, 470, 496, 498 
 V. State, 18 Tex. App. 524 . . 1021 
 V. State, 21 Tex. App. 14, 17 
 
 S. W. 468 1010 
 
 Pigman v. State, 14 Ohio, 555, 45 
 
 Am. Dec. 358 . . 803-807, 811 
 Pinder v. State, 27 Fla. 370, 26 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 75, 8 So. 837.. 2, 108 
 356, 460, 462, 557, 578, 579 
 581 
 535 
 813 
 366 
 804 
 Pitman v. State, 22 Ark. 354 
 
 404, 408, 415, 931 
 Pitt Packet, The, 4 Boston, L. J. 
 
 369 631 
 
 Pitts T. State, 140 Ala. 70, 37 So. 
 
 101 . . 120, 384, 518, 995, 1001 
 
 1005, 1008 
 
 V. State, 43 Miss. 472 . . 897, 899 
 
 903, 907, 909- 
 
 V. State, 29 Tex. App. 374, 16 
 
 S. W. 189 206, 282, 322 
 
 Plasters v. State, 1 Tex. App. 673.. 170 
 739, 747, 7S9, 760 
 
 Pinson v. State, 23 Tex. 579 
 
 Pirtle V. State, 9 Humph. 663 811, 
 
 Pistorius t. Com. 84 Pa. 158 . . 359, 
 
xevi 
 
 TABLK OF CASES CITED. 
 
 aPlew V. State (Ter. Crim. App.) 35 
 
 S. W. 366 522 
 
 PUemllng v. State, 46 Wis. 516, 1 N. 
 
 W. 278 . . 150, 184, 185, 215 
 953 
 Plummer v. Com. 1 Bush, 76 . .58, 60, 61 
 V. State, 135 Ind. 308, 34 N. 
 
 E. 968 344, 621 
 
 T. State, 6 Mo. 231 834 
 
 Pocket V. State, 5 Tex. App. 567 . . 103 
 
 Poe T. State, 87 Ala. 65, 6 So. 378. . 371 
 
 420, 469, 471, 486 
 
 V. State, 32 Tex. 65 248 
 
 Poer V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 67 
 
 S. W. 500 443, 523 
 
 Pointer v. United States, 151 U. S. 
 396, 38 L. ed. 208, 14 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 410 . . 3, 101, 129 
 131, 915 
 
 Pollt V. State, 62 Ala. 237 913 
 
 V. State, 30 Tex. App. 657, 
 
 18 S. W. 466 . . 513, 517, 526 
 549 
 T. State, 35 Tex. Ci-im. Itep. 
 
 495, 34 S. W. 633 1009 
 
 Pollard V. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 121, 73 S. W. 953 . . 244, 248 
 520 
 Polly V. Com. 15 Ky. L. Rep. 502, 
 
 24 S. W. 7 57, 1010 
 
 Pond V. People, 8 Micli. 150 . . 354, 361 
 
 366, 367, 373, 394, 480, 489 
 
 490, 737, 756, 763-765, 774 
 
 778, 779, 784, 790, 791, 795 
 
 796 
 
 Pool V. State, 87 Ga. 526, 13 S. B. 
 
 556 191-193 
 
 Poole v. State, 2 Baxt. 288 871 
 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 348, 76 S. W. 565 . . 365, 397 
 404, 410, 419, 444, 929 
 Porez V. State, 29 Tex. App. 618, 16 
 
 S. W. 750 616 
 
 Porter v. State, 135 Ala. 51, 33 So. 
 
 694 232 
 
 V. State, 140 Ala. 87, 37 So. 
 
 81 803 
 
 V. State, 124 Ga. 297, 2 L.R.A. 
 
 (N.S.) 730, 52 S. B. 283. . 612 
 Posey V. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 190, 78 S. W. 689 126 
 
 Poteete v. State, 9 Baxt. 261, 10 Am. 
 
 Rep. 90 609, 979 
 
 Potsdamer v. State, 17 Fla. 895 834 
 
 1050 
 Potter v. People, 18 Mich. 314, 100 
 
 Am. Dec. 173 365 
 
 V. State, 162 Ind. 213, 64 L. 
 R.A. 942, 102 Am. St. 
 Rep. 198, 70 N. E. 129. .336-338 
 V. State, 85 Tenn. 88, 1 S. 
 
 W. 614 406, 408 
 
 Pound T. State, 43 Ga. 88 792, 928 
 
 Powell f. State, 19 Ala. 577 .. 407, 409 
 
 V. State, 52 Ala. 1 404 
 
 T. State, 74 Ark. 355, 85 S. 
 
 W. 781 875, 876 
 
 V. State, 101 Ga. 9, 65 Am. 
 St. Rep. 277, 29 S. B. 
 309 . . 361, 377, 426, 43-5, 440 
 444, 467, 472, 537, 764 
 V. State, 67 Miss. 119, 6 So. 
 
 646 . . 715, 716, 718-720, 721 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 59 
 
 S. W. 1114 568, 927 
 
 v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 70 
 
 S. W. 218 581, 925 
 
 V. State, 13 Tex. App. 244 ... 38 
 39, 42, 907, 927 
 V. State, 28 Tex. App. 303, 13 
 
 S. W. 599 96 
 
 Power V. People, 17 Colo. 178, 28 Pac. 
 
 1121 199, 228, 236 
 
 Powers V. Com. IlO Ky. 386, 53 L. 
 
 R. A. 245, 61 S. W. 735.. 77 
 78, 83, 648, 656-659, 661, 671 
 889, 891, 956 
 V. Com. 114 Ky. 237, 70 S. W. 
 
 644, 1050, 71 S W. 494.. 654 
 
 673, 956-958, 960 
 
 V. People, 42 III. App. 427 .. 301 
 
 V. State, 80 Ind. 77 855 
 
 V. State, 74 Miss. 777, 21 So. 
 
 657 1020, 1025 
 
 f. State, 23 Tex. App. 42, 5 S. 
 
 W. 153 920, 925 
 
 Pratt V. State, 75 Ark. 350, 87 S. W. 
 
 651 767, 774, 775 
 
 Presley v. State, 59 Ala. 98 195 
 
 Presser t. State, 77 Ind. 274 . . 513, 537 
 Preston v. State, 25 Miss. 383 . . 275, 290 
 
 310, 312 
 
 T. State, 4 Tex. App. 186 939 
 
 Preuit V. People, 5 Neb. 377 219 
 
 Price V. People, 131 111. 223, 23 N. 
 
 E. 639 362, 367, 400 
 
 v. State, 72 Ga. 441 . . 450, 786 
 
 1032 
 
 V. State, 36 Miss. 531, 72 Am. 
 
 Dec. 195 . . 121, 124, 293, 
 
 T. State, 18 Tex. App. 474, 
 
 51 Am. Rep. 322 .. 304, 
 
 V. State, 36 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 403, 37 S. W. 743 . . 279, 
 
 Pridgen v. State, 31 Tex. 421 . . 400, 
 
 420, 421, 
 
 Priester v. Augley, 5 Rich. L. 44 . . 
 
 Primus v. State, 2 Tex. App. 369.. 
 
 170, 
 Prince of Wales Asso. Co. v. Palmer, 
 
 25 Beav. 605 
 
 Prine v. State, 73 Miss. 838, 19 So. 
 
 711 407, 499, 
 
 32] 
 
 307 
 308 
 
 775 
 401 
 556 
 782 
 785 
 168 
 203 
 
 1005 
 
 503 
 
TABLE OP CASES 
 
 553 
 559 
 
 765 
 
 992 
 
 507 
 
 Prior V. State, 77 Ala. 56 . . 5, 254, 259 
 276, 277, 329 
 V. State, 118 Ga. 756, 45 S. E. 
 
 598 249 
 
 Pritchett v. State, 22 Ala. 39, 58 
 
 Am. Dec. 250.. 400, 403, 404 
 408, 421-424 
 Pryor V. State (Miss.) 39 So. 1012 .. 1004 
 V. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 643, 51 S. W. 375 913 
 
 Puckett V. Com. 13 Ky. L. Rep. 466, 
 
 17 S. W. 335 . . 888, 890, 1061 
 
 Pngh V. State, 132 Ala. 1, 31 So. 
 
 727 . . 372, 469, 471, 484, 
 
 556, 
 
 y. State, 114 Ga. 16, 39 S. E. 
 
 875 506, 
 
 PuUlam V. State, 88 Ala. 1, 6 So. 
 839 . . 933, 972, 981, 991, 
 
 1002, 1017 
 Pulpus T. State, 82 Miss. 548, 34 So. 
 
 2 
 
 V. State, 84 Miss. 49, 36 So. 
 
 190 958, 959 
 
 Puryear v. Com. 83 Va. 51, 1 S. E. 
 
 512 853, 1004 
 
 V. State, 28 Tex. App. 73, 11 
 
 S. W. 929 . . 864, 898, 902, 912 
 Pyke T. State, 47 Fla. 93, 36 So. 
 
 577 306. 854, 855, 870 
 
 Quarles v. State, 1 Sneed. 407. .246. 253 
 
 260. 323 
 Qu*en V. Bird, Temple & M. C. C. 
 437, 2 Den. C. C. 94, 5 
 Cox, C. C. 11, ir. .Tur. 
 
 193 847 
 
 T. Brooks, 1 Cox, C. C. 6 1001 
 
 1010 
 V. Brownlow, 11 Ad. & VA. 
 
 119 840 
 
 T. Bnice, 2 Cox, C. C ..262. 572 
 V. Cavendish, Ir. Rep. 8 C. 
 
 L. 178 «8], 702 
 
 V. Cleary, 2 Fost. & F. 850... -577 
 992-994, 1008 
 V. Curtley, 27 U. C. Q. B. 
 
 613 58, 61, 674 
 
 T. Dadson, 2 Den. C. C. 35 . . 638 
 
 735 
 V. Dalloway, 2 Cox, C. C. 
 
 273 7, 111, 703 
 
 V. Dalmas, 1 Cox, C. C. 95. . 991 
 
 995 
 
 T. Daniell, 6 Mod. 99 683 
 
 T. Dudley, L. R. 14 Q. B. 
 Div. 273, 15 Cox, C. C. 
 
 624 565 
 
 T. Eagle, 2 Fost. & F. 827 . . 331 
 Horn. — vii. 
 
 CITED. xcvii 
 
 Queen v. Franz, 2 Fost. & F. 580 ... 113 
 
 175, 953 
 V. Geering, 18 L. J. Mag. Cas. 
 
 N. S. 215 909 
 
 V. Great West Laundry Co. 3 
 
 Can. Crim. Cas. 514 ..12, 13 
 V. Gregory, 8 Q. B. 508, 15 L. 
 J. Mag. Cas. N. S. 38, 10 
 
 Jur. 385 901 
 
 V. Howell, 1 Cox, C. C. 151, 1 
 Den. C. C. 1, 1 Car. & K. 
 
 689 994 
 
 T. Hughes, 26 L. J. Mag. Cas. 
 N. S. 202, 7 Cox, C. C. 
 301, Dears & B. C. C. 248, 
 
 3 .lur. N. S. 696 684 
 
 V. Hunt, 2 Cox, C. C. 2.39 .. 1007 
 V. Instan, 62 L. J. Mag. Cas. 
 N. S. 86 [1893] 1 Q. B. 
 450, 41 Week. Rep. 368, 
 
 17 Cox, C. C. 602 690 
 
 V. .Tenkins, L. E. 1 C. C. 187 . . 972 
 
 1028 
 
 V. Ledger, 2 Fost. & F. 857 . . 34 
 
 ."..J, 37, 54, 725 
 V. McDowell, 25 U. C. Q. B. 
 
 108 331 
 
 V. Mclntyre, 2 Cox, C. C. 
 
 379 34, 126, 838 
 
 T. McNaughten, 14 Cox, C. C. 
 
 576 648, 660 
 
 V. Marsden, L. R. 1 C. C. 131 612 
 
 1 . Mnrpliv. 1 Cox, C. C. 108 . . 853 
 
 f. Pelliam, 8 Q. B. 959 . . 685 
 
 689, 693, 841 
 
 \. Pinhorn, 1 Cox, C. C. 70.. 687 
 
 882 
 1. Pocock, 17 Q. B. 34, 5 Cox, 
 
 C. C. 172 682, 683 
 
 , . Porter, 12 Cox, C. C. 444. . 602 
 
 604, 605, 617 
 
 V. Pym, 1 Cox. C. C. 339 . . 991 
 
 994 
 \. Ryland, L. R. 1. C. C. 99, 
 
 10 Cox, C. C. 569 . . 687. 689 
 
 , . Saunders, 2 Plowd. 473a . . 23 
 
 52, 74, 77, 574 
 
 V. Simpson, 10 Mod. 248 .... 839 
 
 T. Smith, 2 Cox, C. C. 233. . . 76 
 1. Sparham. 25 V. C. C. P. 
 
 143 1026 
 
 \. Spence, 1 Cox. C. C. 352.. 694 
 
 706 
 V. Spilling, 2 Moody & E. 
 
 107 711 
 
 ,■. Taylor, L. R. 2 C. C. 147. . 654 
 
 659 
 
 V. Thomas, 1 Cox, C. C. 52 . . 995 
 
 1008. 1014 
 
 V. Tooley, 11 Mod. 242 036 
 
 y. Tooley. 2 Ld. Raym. 1296. . 601 
 
 630, 631, 6,39 
 
XCVIU 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Queen r. Union Colliery Co. 3 Can. 
 
 Cilm. Cas. 523 13 
 
 V. Ward, L. R. 1 C. C. 360 . . 95 
 V. Waters, 1 Den. C. C 356, 
 
 2 Car. & K. 864, Temple 
 
 & M. C. C. 57, 18 L. J. 
 
 May Cas. N. S. 53, 13 
 
 Jur. 130 689, 882 
 
 V. West, 2 Car. & K. 786 . .588, 589 
 V. Williamson, 1 Cox, C. C. 
 
 97 25, 705, 726, 966 
 
 Qnesenberry v. State, 3 Stew. & P. 
 
 (Ala.) 308 422, 432 
 
 Qulnn T. Com. 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1302, 
 
 63 S. W. 792 938 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 20 
 
 S. W. 1108 49 
 
 R. 
 
 R. T. Campbell, 4 Boston L. Rep. 
 
 131 275 
 
 V. Christie, Car. Crim. Law, 
 
 232, O. B. 1821, 1 Lewin, 
 
 C. C. 78, note 1011, 1012 
 
 V. Fray, 1 East, P. C. 236 . . 194 
 v. Goodwin, 1 Rusb. C. & M. 
 
 563 865 
 
 V. Harris, 3 Russell, Crimes, 
 
 621 608 
 
 V. Higglns, 14 Lond. Med. Gaz. 
 
 896 909 
 
 V. Lord Byron, 11 St. Tr. 
 
 1177 289 
 
 V. Phillips, Woodhull's Trials, 
 
 80 942 
 
 y. Russell, Taylor's Med. Jur. 
 
 by Reese, 99 910 
 
 V. Sawwell, Wills, Circumstan- 
 tial Ev. 180 908 
 
 V. Somerset, 19 St. Tr. 804 . . 78 
 V. Thomas, 1 Russell, Crimes, 
 
 614 732 1 
 
 V. Wllloughby, 1 Bast. P. C. 
 
 288 300 
 
 Kadfoid V. Com. 9 Ky. L. Rep. 378, 
 
 5 S. W. 343 368 
 
 V. State, 33 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 520, 27 S. W. 143 979 
 
 RaCterty v. People, 72 111. 37 . . 601, 630 
 
 962 
 
 V. People, 69 111. Ill, 18 
 Am. Rep. 601 . . 603, 630, 
 
 Ragland v. State, 125 Ala. 12, 27 
 
 So. 983 
 
 V. State, 111 Ga. 211, 36 S. 
 E. 682 . . 285, 364, 377, 
 461, 467, 472, 473, 480, 
 
 Ragsdale v. State, 134 Ala. 24, 32 So. 
 674 166, 249, 
 
 Railing V. Com. 110 Pa. 100, 1 Ati. 
 314 973, 975, 
 
 963 
 331 
 
 392 
 538 
 
 402 
 976 
 
 Raines v. State, 81 Miss. 489, 33 
 
 So. 19 .. 117, 126, 127, 928 
 935 
 Rainey v. Com. 19 Ky L. Rep. 390, 
 
 40 S. W. 682 68 
 
 V. State, 20 Tex. App. 455 . . 608 
 Rains v. State, 88 Ala. 92, 7 So. 
 
 , 315 509 
 
 Rakes v. People, 2 Neb. 157 993 
 
 1007, 1017 
 Rambo v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 69 S. W. 163 242, 934 
 
 Ramon v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 68 S. W. 987 61 
 
 Ramploj's Case, 1 East, P. C. 267 698 
 Ramsey v. State, 92 Ga. 53, 17 S. 
 
 B. 613 . . 268, 739, 755, 760 
 Randell v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 64 S. W. 255 170 
 
 Eapp V. Com. 14 B. Mon. 614 .. 274 
 275, 367, 403, 404. 407 
 
 Rasniek v. Com. 2 Va. Cas. 356 56 
 
 Rather v. State, 25 Tex. App. 623, 9 
 
 S. W. 69 817, 868 
 
 Ratteree t. Stale, 53 Ga. 570 989 
 
 Rawlins v. State, 124 Ga. 31, 52 S. 
 
 E. 1 925, 937 
 
 Rawls T. State (Ga.) 52 S. E. 72 .. 249 
 Ray T. Com. 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1217, 
 
 43 S. W. 22J. 362, 400 
 
 V. State, 15 Ga. 223 .. 229, 274 
 288, 291, 293 
 V. State, 108 Tenn. 282, 67 
 
 S. W. 553 855, 925, 1057 
 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 511, 81 S. W. 737 279 
 
 Rayburn v. State, 69 Ark. 177, 63 S. 
 
 W. 356 877 
 
 Rea V. State, 8 Lea, 356 ..926, 927, 931 
 
 Real V. People, 42 N. Y. 270 ..860, 906 
 
 V. People, 55 Barb. 551 . .384, 394 
 
 402 
 Red V. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 667, 
 73 Am. St. Rep. 965, 47 
 
 S. W. 1003 22, 44, 49 
 
 52, 55, 73, 217, 218 
 
 Redd V. State, 68 Ala. 492 938, 940 
 
 V. State, 69 Ala. 255 856 
 
 V. State, 63 Ark. 457, 40 S. 
 
 W. 374 897, 908 
 
 \. State, 99 Ga. 210, 25 S. E. 
 
 268 367, 461, 1039 
 
 Reddick v. Com. 17 Ky. L. Rep. 1020, 
 
 33 S. W. 416... 176, 926, 951 
 Redmond v. Com. 21 Ky. L. Rep. 331, 
 
 51 S. W. 565 493, 494, 982 
 
 Rediis V. People, 10 Colo. 208, 14 Pac. 
 
 323 453, 849, 860, 872 
 
 Reed -. Com. 98 Va. 817, 36 S. E. 
 
 399 219, 221, 224, 229, 322 
 
 V. Northfleld, 13 Pick. 98, 23 
 
 Am. Dec. 662 24 
 
 V. State, 16 Ark. 499 863, 865 
 
TAJ3LE OF CASES CITED 
 
 XCIX 
 
 Reed V. State, 8 Ind. 200 
 
 V. State (Tex. Ci-im. App.) 20 
 
 S. W. 709 
 
 V. State, 11 Tex. App. 509, 
 
 40 Am. Rep. 795 337, 
 
 503, 509, 511, 533, 547, 
 
 Reese v. State, 90 Ala. 624, 8 So. 818 
 
 276, 298, 312, 313, 
 
 ,. State, 135 Ala. 13, 33 So. 
 
 672 537, 
 
 Reeves v. State, 34 Tex. Crlm. Rep. 
 
 483, 31 S. W. 382... 408, 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 83 
 
 S. W. 803 
 
 V. Territory, 10 Okla. 194, 61 
 
 Pac. 828... 83, 149, 651, 
 
 669, 
 
 Reg. V. Alison, 8 Car. & P. 418.. 70, 
 
 V. Allen, 17 L. T. N. S. 222 . . 
 
 608, 626, 637, 
 
 V. Anderson, 1 Russell, Crimes, 
 
 731 290, 
 
 V. Archer, 1 Fost. & P. 351. 
 
 340, 584, 696, 783, 785, 
 V. Ashman, 1 Fost. & F. 88. . 
 v. Barrett, 3 Oar. & K. 243 . . 
 
 693, 
 T. Bedingfleld, 14 Cox, C. C. 
 
 341, 28 Moak, Eng. Rep. 
 587 
 
 V. Benge, 4 Fost. & P. 504 .... 
 
 V. Bennett, 8 Cox, C. C. 74, 
 28 L. J. Mag. Cas. N. S. 
 27, Bell, C. C. 1..32, 683, 
 
 T. Bentley, 4 Cox, C. C. 406. . 
 V. Bernadotti, 11 Cox, C. C. 
 
 316 1017- 
 
 T. Bernard, 1 Fost. & F. 240 . . 
 
 T. Birchall, 4 Fost. & F. 1087 
 705, 722, 723, 
 
 T. Biss, 8 Car. & P. 773 
 
 T. Blackburn, 6 Cox, C. C. 333 
 V. Bradshaw, 14 Cox, C. C. 83 
 
 V. Brennan, 27 Ont. Rep. 659. . 
 V. Bubb, 4 Cox, C. C. 455 
 
 T. Bull, 2 Fost. & F. 201. .711, 
 V. Bull, 9 Car. & P. 22.. 363, 
 766, 
 V. Burton, 3 Fost. & F. 772.. 
 T. Campbell, 1 Car. & K. 82. . 
 T. Canniff, 9 Car. & F. 359. . 
 
 V. Catou, 12 Cox.V C. 624.. 
 
 654, 659, 662, 663, 
 
 V. Chamberlain, 10 Cox, C. C. 
 
 486 7, 699, 710, 
 
 V. Chandler, Dears. C. C. 453 
 
 848 
 
 403 
 
 360 
 548 
 274 
 863 
 
 538 
 
 458 
 
 930 
 
 658 
 890 
 81 
 602 
 640 
 
 293 
 7 
 799 
 107 
 681 
 694 
 
 1008 
 723 
 724 
 
 697 
 724 
 627 
 
 1019 
 664 
 673 
 683 
 725 
 864 
 76 
 345 
 346 
 268 
 686 
 689 
 712 
 765 
 792 
 801 
 863 
 341 
 342 
 647 
 671 
 
 711 
 
 687 
 689 
 
 Reg. V. Chandler, 6 Cox, C. C. 519.. 
 
 V. Chapman, 12 Cox, C. C. 4 
 
 630, 
 
 T. Cheverton, 2 Fost. & F. 833 
 
 V. Clarke, 2 Fost. & P. 2. . . . 
 V. Clifford, 2 Car. & K. 202. . 
 
 V. Conde, 10 Cox, C. C. 547 
 
 V. Cook, 62 J. P. 712, 58 Alb. 
 
 L. J. 232 
 
 V. Crick, 1 Post. & F. 519. . 
 
 T. Crook, 1 Post. & P. 521 . . . 
 V. Crumpton, Car. & M. 597.. 
 848, 
 V. Cruse, 8 Car. & P. 541. .55, 
 66, 
 V. Crutchley, 7 Car. & P. 814 
 V. Cuddy, 1 Car. & K. 209. .68, 
 V. Curran, 3 Car. & P. 397. . . 
 V. Curtis, 15 Cox, C. C. 746.. 
 V. Dadson, 4 Cox, C. C. 358, 2 
 
 Den. C. C. 35, 14 Jur. 
 
 1051 
 
 V. Dant, Leigh & C. C. C. 567, 
 
 10 Cox, C. C. 102 23, 
 
 V. Davies, 1 Russell, Crimes, 
 
 491 
 
 T. Davis, 15 Cox, C. C. 174. . . 
 V. Davis, Leigh & C. C. C. 64 
 
 V. Devett, 8 Car. & P. 639 
 
 V. Dixon, 11 Cox, C. C. 341.. 
 
 810, 
 
 V. Doherty, 16 Cox, C. C. 306 
 
 V. Donovan, 4 Cox, C. C. 399 
 
 V. Dossett, 2 Car. & K. 306 . . 
 
 y. Downes, 13 Cox, C. C. Ill, 
 
 L. R. 1 Q. B. Div. 25, 
 
 45 L. J. Mag. Cas. N. S. 
 
 8, 33 L. T. N. S. 675, 24 
 
 Week. Rep. 278 687, 
 
 V. Dngal, 4 Quebec, L. R. 350 
 
 v. Edwards, 12 Cox, C. C. 230 
 
 V. Edwards, 8 Car. & P. 611. . 
 
 686, 688, 692, 693, 
 
 V. Elliott, 16 Cox, C. C. 710. 
 
 682, 
 
 V. Ellis, 2 Car. & K. 470. .712. 
 
 836, 848, 
 
 V. Evans, 8 Car. & P. 765 
 
 V. Fallon, 9 Cox, C. C. 242.. 
 
 V. Farrow, Dears. & B. C. C. 
 
 164, 3 Jur. N. S. 107, 5 
 
 Week. Rep. 269 
 
 V. Pinney, 12 Cox, C. C. 625 
 
 V. Fisher, 8 Car. & P. 182... 
 308, 32S, 
 
 687 
 
 612 
 
 631 
 
 22 
 
 910 
 
 1010 
 
 52 
 
 53 
 
 686 
 
 689 
 
 687 
 710 
 712 
 711 
 692 
 882 
 64 
 206 
 590 
 321 
 614 
 693 
 
 758 
 
 700 
 
 692 
 41 
 626 
 639 
 840 
 805 
 811 
 679 
 683 
 28 
 910 
 
 688 
 27 
 997 
 682 
 882 
 681 
 704 
 714 
 883 
 864 
 51 
 
 595 
 681 
 725 
 304 
 331 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 liegr. V. Forester, 4 Fost. & F. 857, 
 
 10 Cox, C. C. 368 
 
 V. Franklin, 15 Cox, C. C. 163 
 
 V. Fraser, 1 Moody, C. C. 419 
 
 A . Fretwell, Leigh & C. C. C. 
 
 443, n Cox, C. C. 471. . 
 
 \. Fretwell, 9 Cox, C. C. 145. 
 LeiKh & C. C. C. 161, 31 
 L. .T. Mas. Cas. N. S. 145, 
 8 Jur. N. S. 466. 6 L. T. 
 N. S. n:V.\. 10 Week. Rep. 
 1045 80. 
 
 V. Gamlen, 1 B'ost. & F. flO , . 
 
 V, Gardner, 1 Fost. & F. 06!). . 
 
 V. Garner, 4 Fost. & F. 346.'. 
 
 V. Gaylor, 7 Cox, C. C. 253, 
 Dears. & B. C. C 2SS. 40 
 Eng. L. & Eq. ,Soi;. . . .80, 
 
 V. Gloster. 16 Cox. C. C. 471 
 
 r. Goddard, 15 Co.x. (" ('. 7. 
 
 V. Gray. 4 Fost. & F. 1098.. 
 694, 722, 
 
 V. Greenwood, 7 Cox, C. C. 
 404 114, 143, 179, 
 
 V. Gregory, 2 Fost. & F. 153. . 
 
 f. Griffln. 11 Cox, C. C. 402. . 
 V. Grout, 6 Car. & P. 029. . . . 
 V. Hagan. 8 Car. & P. 167.. 
 V. Hagan, 12 Cox, C. C. 357. . 
 V. Haines, 2 Car. & K. r.es. . 
 6Si. 686. 693, 694. 
 V. Handley. 13 Cox. C. C. 79. 
 y. Harrington, 5 Cox, C. C. 
 
 231 
 
 V. Harrington, 10 Cox, C. c. 
 
 370 260, 297. 
 
 V. Harrington. Taylor's Med. 
 
 .Tur. by Reese. 7th Am. ed. 
 
 289 
 
 V. Hayward, 6 Car. & P. 157. 
 T. Heesom. 14 Cox, C. C. 40 
 
 V. Hendershott, 26 Ont. Rep. 
 
 078 
 
 V. Hirks. 2 Moody & R. .■!02. . 
 T. Hind, 8 Cox, C. C. 300, 
 
 Bell, C. C. 253, 29 L. J. 
 
 Mag. Cas. N. S. 147. 6 
 
 .Tur. N. S. r)14. 2 I,. T. N. 
 
 S. 253, 8 Week. Rep. 
 
 421 97.3. 976, 981. 
 
 T. Hogaii. .". Ung. 1,n\v & Eq. 
 
 r>r>a, 2 Den. r, c. 277, 3 
 
 Cox. C. C. 255 
 
 T. Hogg, 2 Moody & R. 380 . . . 
 
 v. Holland, 2 Moody & R. 351. 
 
 V. Hopkins, 8 Car. & P. 591 . . 
 
 898, 
 
 993 
 113 
 
 176 
 614 
 
 110 
 111 
 
 81 
 .S08 
 .S16 
 
 33 
 707 
 909 
 
 592 
 1006 
 1004 
 
 685 
 
 1043 
 7117 
 722 
 715 
 703 
 61 3 
 
 .'.4 
 72+ j 
 687 
 
 647 
 
 774 
 
 947 
 
 1011 
 
 914 
 
 919 
 
 919 
 864 
 
 984 
 
 688 
 864 
 43 
 896 
 903 
 
 Reg. V. Hopley, 2 Fost. & F. 202 
 
 717, 
 T. Horsey, 3 Fost. & F. 287.. 
 
 T. Howell, 9 Car. & P. 437.. 
 87, 88, 645, 647, 
 T. Howell, 1 Den. C. C. 1, 1 
 
 Car. & K. 6S9 
 
 V. Howlett. 7 Car. & P. 274 
 
 309, 
 
 V. Hubbard, 14 Cox, C. C. 565 
 
 V. Hughes, Dears. & B. C. C. 
 
 248, 7 Cox, C. C. 301. .. 
 
 693, 
 
 v. Hughes, 7 Cox, C. C. 301.. 
 
 V. Hutchinson, 9 Cox, C. C. 
 
 555 
 
 T. Jackson, 7 Cox, C. 0. 357. . 
 
 650, 
 
 T. Jenkins, 11 Cox, C. C. 250. 
 
 38 L. J. Mag. Cas. N. S. 
 
 82 
 
 T. Jessop. 10 Crim. L. Mag. 
 
 862 70, 
 
 V. Johnson, 2 Car. & K. ::54. . 
 
 V. Jones, 22 L. T. N. S. 217, 
 11 Cox. C. C. 544.. 702, 
 
 V. Jones, 12 Cox, C. C. 628. . 
 V. Kelly, 2 Car. & K. 814 
 
 V. Kew, 12 Cox, C. C. 355. . . . 
 Y. Kirkham. 8 Car. & P. 115. . 
 315. 
 T. Knights, 2 Fost. *t F. 46.. 
 V. Knock, 14 Cox, C. C. 1... 
 v. Leddington, 9 Car. & P. 79 
 T. Lee. 4 Fost. & F. 6.". . . .41. 
 175, 645, 66.:. 668. 
 1-. Leggett. 8 Car. & P. 191.. 
 \. Lewis. 7 Cox, C. C. 277... 
 v. Light, Dears. & B. ('. C. 332 
 V. Lockley. 4 Post. & F. l.-)5. . 
 
 \. Longhottom. :; Cox. ('. C. 
 
 439 24. 43, is:;. 
 
 ,'. Lowe, :i Car. & K. 123, 4 
 
 • 'ox. C. C. 449 7. 681, 
 
 693-695. 
 
 V. Ln<-k. :; Fost. & F. 483 . . 
 
 639, 656, 659. 671, 
 
 V. Miililii.it, 5 Cox, C. C. 339. . 
 
 T. Mabel. Car. & P. 494 ... . 
 f. Mttchokeqnonabo, 28 Od(. 
 
 Rep. 309 
 
 T. Maekny, 11 ( mx, C. C. 148 
 
 T. Macleod. 12 Cox, C. C. 7>:'A 
 
 715 
 718 
 113 
 185 
 61 
 663 
 
 1008 
 
 310 
 993 
 996 
 
 848 
 694 
 
 696 
 645 
 669 
 
 1003 
 
 997 
 725 
 
 72(; 
 
 34S 
 304 
 305 
 725 
 312 
 324 
 689 
 503 
 81 
 113 
 675 
 692 
 827 
 612 
 612 
 635 
 
 72.-1 
 
 686 
 705 
 623 
 675 
 
 687 
 689 
 613 
 
 102 
 993 
 994 
 710 
 711 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Eeg. V. Manning, 2 Car. & K. 887. . . 55 
 
 67, 76, 83, 87 
 
 V. Markuss, 4 Fost. & F. 356 710 
 
 711 
 V. Marriott, 8 Car. & P. 425 . . 682 
 
 V. Martin, 3 Car. & P. 211 700 
 
 v. Martin, 11 Cox, C. C. 136. . 28 
 
 38, 688 
 
 V. Mastin, 6 Car. & P. 396 . . 702 
 
 V. Mawgridge, J. Kelyng, 121. 2 
 
 5, 95, 97, 99, 116, 302, 322 
 
 498 
 
 V. Mazeau, 9 Car. & P. 676 . . 52 
 
 V. Megson, 9 Car. & P. 418.. 1003 
 
 T. Michael, 9 Car. & P. 356, 2 
 
 Moody, C. C. 120 23, 32 
 
 44, 52, 53, 888 
 T. Middlesliip, 5 Cox, C. C. 
 
 275 591, 687 
 
 v. Minnocic, Craw. & D. (Ir.) 
 
 537 41 
 
 V. Mitchell, 17 Cox, C. C. 503 993 
 994, 1011, 1021, 1022 
 >. Monkhouse, 4 Cox, C. C. 55 806 
 808, 815 
 V. Mooney, 5 Cox, C. C. 318.. 1008 
 V. Morby, 15 Cox, C. C. 35, 
 L. R. 8 Q. B. Div. 571, 
 46 L. T. N. S. 288, 51 
 L. J. Mag. Cas. N. S. 85. 
 30 Week. Rep. 613, 46 
 
 
 J. p. 422 
 
 688 
 
 T 
 
 Morgan, 14 Cox, C. C. 337 
 
 1008 
 
 . 
 
 Most, 14 Cox, C. C. 583. . 
 
 76 
 
 T 
 
 Murphy, 2 Craw. & D. (Jr.) 
 
 
 
 20 
 
 782 
 
 V. 
 
 Murray, 5 Cox, C. C. 509. 
 
 7 
 703 
 
 V. 
 
 Murton, 3 Fost. & F. 492. . 
 
 27 
 
 
 38, 39, 
 
 43 
 
 V. 
 
 Newton, 1 Fost. & F. 641 . . 
 
 972 
 976 
 
 T. 
 
 Nlcholls, 13 Cox, C. C. 75.. 
 
 687 
 689 
 
 V. 
 
 Nicolas, 6 Cox, C. C. 120.. 
 
 1003 
 
 T. 
 
 Noakes, 4 Fost. & P. 920 
 
 699 
 700 
 
 V. 
 
 Noon, 6 Cox, C. C. 137... 
 
 121 
 
 
 205, 275, 
 
 568 
 
 V. 
 
 O'Brian, 1 Den. C. C. 9, 
 
 
 
 2 Car. & K. 115 853, 
 
 854 
 
 
 857, 
 
 888 
 
 T. 
 
 Osman, 15 Cox, C. C. 1, 31 
 
 
 
 Moak, Eng. Rep. 739 
 
 974 
 
 
 993, 
 
 994 
 
 T. 
 
 Packard, Car. & M. 246.. 
 
 337 
 
 
 347, 671, 
 
 700 
 
 V. 
 
 Palmer, Taylor Med. Jur. by 
 
 
 
 Reese, 101 
 
 909 
 
 V. 
 
 I'argeter, 3 Cox, C. C. 191. 
 
 7 
 
 
 694, 
 
 883 
 
 V. 
 
 Peel, 2 Fost & F. 21.... 
 
 994 
 
 
 1010, 
 
 1012 
 
 612 
 863 
 
 686 
 
 848 
 722 
 
 693 
 50 
 657 
 667 
 993 
 
 Eeg. V. Peltier, 4 Lower Can. Rep. 3. 972 
 V. Perkins, 9 Car. & P. 395 . . 980 
 991, 992, 994, 1010 
 T. Phelps, 1 Car. & M. 180, 2 
 
 Moody, C. C. 140 601, 
 
 614, 617, 
 T. Phillpot, 20 Eng. Law & 
 
 Eq. 591, 6 Cox, C. C. 140 
 
 V. Pitts, Car. & M. 284 24-27 
 
 53, 133 
 T. Plummer, 1 Car. & K. 600, 
 
 8 Jur. 921 690, 691, 
 
 V. Pocock, 5 Cox, C. C. 172. . 
 1. Porter, Leigh & C. C. C. 
 
 394, 9 Cox, C. C. 449... 
 V. Price, 8 Cox, C. C. 96.. 35, 
 
 60, 106, 615, 618, 647, 
 
 660, 662, 
 
 I. Quaiter, 6 Cox, C. C. 357 
 
 994, 1002 
 Y. Reancy, 40 Eng. L. & Eq. 
 
 552, Dear. & B. C. C. 151, 
 
 7 Cox. C. C. 209... 1012, 1017 
 1028 
 V. Reaney, 7 Cox, C. C. 209, 3 
 
 Jur. N. S. 191 1001, 1029 
 
 V. Reeves, 9 Car. & P. 25 . . 590 
 V. Roberts, 4 Cox, C. C. 145. . 608 
 \'. Rose, 15 Cox, C. C. 540.. 775 
 .. Rothwell, 12 Cox. C. C. 
 
 145 275, 
 
 Y. Rugg, 12 Cox, C. C. 16, 24 
 
 L. T. N. S. 192 
 
 V. S. 5 Cox, C. C. 279 691, 692 
 
 V. Salmon, 14 Cox, C. C. 494, 
 
 L. R. 6 Q. B. Div. 79, 43 
 
 L. T. N, S. 573, 29 Week. 
 
 Rep. 246, 23 Alb. L. J. 
 
 273, 50 L. J. Mag. Cas. 
 
 N. S. 25, 45 J. P. 270, 29 
 
 Moak, Eng. Rep. 503 . . 671 
 V. Sandys, Car. & M. 345, 5 
 
 Moody, C. C. 227 836 
 
 277 
 
 687 
 
 680 
 
 837 
 861 
 
 Selton. 11 Cox, C. C. 674. 295 
 316, 321 
 
 Seme. 16 Cox, C. C. 311. . 
 
 114 
 179 
 
 294 
 
 Setten, 11 Cox. C. C. 674. 
 
 Shepherd, 9 Cox, C. C. 12:;, 
 Leigh & C. C. C. 147. 31 
 L. J. Mag. Cas. N. S. 102, 
 8 Jur. N. S. 418, 5 L. T. 
 N. S. 687, 10 Week. Rep. 
 297 688 
 
 Sherwood, 1 Car. & K. 556 277 
 
 Skeet, 4 Fost. & P. 931... 59 
 61, 652, 656, 663 
 
 Smith, 8 Car. & P. 153 ... 290 
 
 293, 315, 318, 461, 483, 503 
 
 519, 541, 691, 692 
 
 Smith, 8 Cox, C. C. 27. . . . 
 
 55 
 
Cll 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Reg. v. Smith, 10 Cox, C. C. 82, 
 Leigh & C. C. C. 607, 34 
 L. J. Mag. Cas. N. S. 153, 
 11 Jur. N. S. 695, 12 L. 
 T. N. S. 609, 13 Week. 
 
 Rep. 816 689, 691, 
 
 991, 993, 994, 1021, 
 T. Smith, 11 Cox, C. C. 210. . 
 
 V. Smith, 16 Cox, C. C. 170.. 
 
 V. Smith, Dears. C. C. 559, 33 
 
 Eng. L. & Eq. 567 
 
 V. Smith, 4 Fost. & P. 1066. . . 
 
 V. Smith, 23 U. C. C. P. 312. . 
 
 ». Spencer, 10 Cox, C. C. 525 
 
 V. Steele, 12 Cox, C. C. 168.. 
 
 V. Stormonth, 61 J. P. 729... 
 V. Stroud, 1 Car. & K. 187. . . 
 
 7. SuIUvan, Car. & M. 209. . 
 
 T. Swlndall, 2 Car. & K. 230, 
 
 2 Cox, C. C. 141 7, 43, 
 
 702, 703, 
 V. Taylor, 3 Cox, C. C. 84.. 
 
 V. Taylor, 9 Car. & P. 672 .... 
 
 722, 
 
 T. Thurhorn, 1 Den. C. C. 387 
 
 T. Towers, 12 Cox, C. C. 530 
 
 38, 
 
 V. Trainer, 4 Fost. & F. 105. . 
 
 V. Trilloe, 1 Car. & M. 650.. 
 
 V. Turner, 4 Fost. & F. 339.. 
 
 57, 341, 663, 
 
 V. Tyler, 8 Car. & P. 616.. 23, 
 
 56, 68, 338, 647, 648, 
 
 V. Vann, 8 Eng. Law & Eq. 
 
 596, 2 Den. C. C. 325 
 
 V. Wagstafle, 10 Cox, C. C. 530 
 V. Walker, Dears. C. C. 358.. 
 V. Wallis, 1 Salk. 334 72, 
 
 692 
 
 1029 
 
 7 
 
 682 
 
 998 
 
 109 
 277 
 
 1010 
 712 
 996 
 
 1023 
 70 
 863 
 £64 
 785 
 794 
 
 680 
 725 
 996 
 1017 
 705 
 723 
 394 
 457 
 
 27 
 340 
 705 
 590 
 
 35 
 670 
 
 52 
 670 
 
 V. Walters, Car. & M. 164. .28, 
 
 686 
 
 688 
 
 612 
 
 645 
 
 648 
 
 29 
 
 687 
 
 V. Wardroper, 8 Cox, C. C. 284 55 
 
 V. Warman, 2 Car. & K. 195. . 853 
 
 V. Waters, Temple & M. C. 
 
 C. 57, 1 Den. C. C. 356, 2 
 
 Car. & K. 862.. 864, 865, 688 
 
 V. Welsh, 11 Cox, C. C. 336.. 271 
 
 275, 276, 321 
 
 V. Weston, 14 Cox, C. C. 346 342 
 
 404, 498, 499 
 
 ,. Whitehead, 3 Car. & K. 202 680 
 
 710- 712 
 
 V. Whitworth, 1 Fost. & P. 
 
 382 995 
 
 V. Williams, 1 Car. & K. 589, 
 
 1 Den. C. C. 39 52 
 
 V. WIIUs, Car. & K. 722 864 
 
 Reg. V. Wilson, Dears. & B. C. C. 
 127, 26 L. J. Mag. Cas. 
 N. S. 18, 2 Jur. N. S. 1146, 
 5 Week. Rep. 70, 7 Cox, 
 
 C. C. 190 80 
 
 V. Wright, 9 Car. & P. 754 . . 15 
 
 589, 590 
 V. Wyeherley, 8 Car. & P. 
 
 262 591 
 
 V. Young, 8 Car. & P. 644 .... 69 
 
 196, 197, 321, 346 
 
 V. Young, 10 Cox, C. C. 371 346 
 
 Regan v. State (Miss.) 39 So. 1012. 371 
 
 382, 395 
 Regnier v. Territory (Okla.) 82 Pac. 
 
 309 263 
 
 Reid V. State, 50 Ga. 556 276 
 
 Eeins V. People, 30 111. 206 375 
 
 791, 793 
 Reneau v. State, 2 Lea, 720, 31 Am. 
 
 Rep. 626 743, 748 
 
 Renfro v. Slate, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 393, 56 S. W. 1013.. 927, 932 
 Renner v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 347, 65 S. W. 1102.. 64, 655 
 
 657, 662, 958, 959 
 Rentfrow v. State, 123 Ga. 539, 51 S. 
 
 E. 596 313, 322 
 
 Respublica v. Bob, 4 Dall. 145, 1 L. 
 
 ed. 776 124, 132, 152, 164 
 
 165, 198, 204, 228, 233, 938 
 V. Honeyman, 2 Dall. 228, 1 
 
 L. ed. 359 846, 868, 874 
 
 V. Langeake, 1 Yeates, 415 . . . 983 
 
 V. Montgomery, 1 Yeates, 421. 764 
 
 Eeuck V. McGregor, 3 N. J. L. 70 615 
 
 Revel V. State, 26 Ga. 275 231 
 
 Eew's Case, J. Kelyng, 26 38, 43 
 
 Rex V. Abbott, 67 J. P. 151 70, 1003 
 
 Y. Allen, 7 C-ar. & P. 153 694 
 
 707, 722, 723 
 
 V. Ayes, Russ. & R. C. C. 166 289 
 y. Babcock, Russ. & R. C. C. 
 
 249 5!) 
 
 V. Baker, 2 Moody & R. 53.. 980 
 
 971, 972 
 
 V. Ball, 1 Moody, C. C. 330.. 616 
 
 623 
 V. Berrlman, 5 Car. & P. 601, 
 
 6 Cox, C. C. 388 862 
 
 V. BIngley, Russ. & R. C. C. 
 
 446 59 
 
 V. Bonner, 1 East, P. C. 355 1007 
 
 V. Bonner, 6 Car. & P. 386. . . 995 
 
 1004, 1007, 1014, 1017 
 
 V. Booth, Russ. & E. C. C. 47 693 
 
 V. Bourne, 5 Car. & P. 120 267 
 
 756, 766 
 
 V. Brain, 6 Car. & P. 349 590 
 
 V. Briggs, 1 Moody, C. C. 318 857 
 
 858 
 
 V. Bright, 4 Carr. & P. 387. . 612 
 
 614 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 ciu 
 
 Rex V. Burridge, 3 P. Wms. 475 . . 
 
 V. Burton, 1 Strange, 481.... 
 
 T. Carr, 8 Car. & P. 163 
 
 V. Carroll, 7 Car. & P. 145.. 
 
 T. Cheeseman, 7 Car. & F. 435 
 717, 
 
 V. Christie, Car. Crlm. I^aw, 
 232, 1 Lewin, C. C. 78, 
 note 
 
 v. Clark, Euss. & R. C. C. 358 
 
 v. Clewes, 4 Car. & P. 221.. 
 
 T. CoUison, 4 Car. & P. 565 
 
 V. Conner, 7 Car. & P. 438.. 
 
 716, 
 
 T. Cooper, 5 Car. & P. 535. . . 
 
 y. Cox, Russ. & R. C. C. 362. . 
 
 V. Crockett, 4 Car. & P. 544 
 
 994, 
 
 V. CulWn, 5 Car. & P. 121 
 
 853, 857, 858, 
 
 V. Curran, 3 Car. & P. 397 
 
 616- 
 T. Curvan, 1 Moody, C. C. 132 
 612, 630, 636, 
 V. Dale, 1 Moody, C. C. 5.. 
 
 V. Davis, 7 Car. & P. 785 
 
 T. DaTis, Russ. & R. C. C. 113 
 T. Dyson, Russ. & R. C. C. 523 
 
 V. Edmeads, 3 Car. & P. 390. . 
 V. Edwards, 6 Car. & P. 401. . 
 
 v. Else, Russ. & R. C. C. 142 
 
 T. Enoch, 5 Car. & P. 539 
 
 V. Pagent, 7 Car. & P. 238.. 
 
 T. Flnnucane, Craw. & D. (Ir.) 
 1 
 
 T. Fletcher, 1 Russell, Crimes, 
 507 
 
 V. Ford, Russ. & R. C. C. 329 
 610, 
 
 V. Freeman, 1 Russell, Crimes 
 & Misdemeanors, 518 .... 
 
 v. Friend, Russ. & R. C. C. 20 
 688, 
 
 T. Gay, 7 Car. & P. 230 
 
 V. Giles, 1 Moody, C. C. 166. . 
 V. Gogerly, Russ. & R. C. C. 
 
 343 
 
 V. Green, 7 Car. & P. 156 
 
 707, 
 
 T. Greenacre, 8 Car. & P. 35 . . 
 
 86, 115, 130, 
 
 T. Grindley, 1 Russell, Crimes, 
 
 2d Am. ed. *S 
 
 85 
 86 
 696 
 697 
 694 
 81:: 
 813 
 133 
 720 
 
 994 
 
 864 
 
 896 
 
 61 
 
 663 
 
 579 
 
 720 
 
 76 
 
 78 
 
 107 
 
 993 
 
 995 
 
 ■847 
 
 887 
 
 618 
 
 299 
 
 637 
 
 855 
 
 635 
 
 59 
 
 69 
 
 71 
 
 665 
 
 858 
 
 860 
 
 59 
 
 590 
 
 1006 
 
 1021 
 
 740 
 
 39 
 608 
 611 
 
 296 
 310 
 686 
 848 
 1025 
 52 
 
 58 
 694 
 709 
 
 85 
 890 
 
 812 
 
 Rex V. Grounsell, 7 Car. & P. 788 
 
 853, 857, 
 
 V. Grout, 6 Car. & F. 629 
 
 V. Hagan, 8 Car. & P. 167. . . 
 V. Haines, 2 Car. & K. 368 
 
 V. Hargrave, 5 Car. & P. 170. . 
 346, 824, 
 
 V. Harley, 4 Car. & P. 369 
 
 V. Hayward, 6 Car. & P. 157. . 
 232, 254, 324, 325, 328, 
 
 Y. Hems, 7 Car. & P. 312 
 
 V. Hickman, 5 Car. & P. 151. . 
 
 .. Holt, 7 Car. & P. 519 
 
 v. Howarth, 1 Moody, C. C. 
 
 207 446, 627, 741, 
 
 V. Hubson, 1 East, P. C. 258. . 
 
 V. Hucks, 1 Starkie, 523 .... 
 V. Huggins, 2 Ld. Raym. 1574, 
 2 Strange, 882. .693, 730, 
 T. Hughes, 5 Car. & P. 126. . 
 V. Hunt, 1 Moody, C. C. 93.. 
 
 V. Hutchinson, 2 Barn. & C. 
 
 608, note 972, 973, 
 
 V. Jackson, 1 East, P. C. 298 
 
 V. Jarvis, 2 Moody & R. 40. . . 
 T. Jennings, Russ. & R. C. C. 
 
 388 
 
 V. Keate, Comb. 408 
 
 V. Kelte, 1 Ld. Raym. 138 .. 
 
 636, 
 
 V. Keily, 1 Moody, C. C. 113.. 
 
 T. Kessal, 1 Car. & P. 437 . . 
 
 V. Kew, 12 Cox, C. C. 355, 1 
 Green, Crim. L. R. 95.. 
 
 V. King, Russ. & E. C. C. 
 332 
 
 852 
 
 858 
 
 111 
 
 702 
 
 740 
 
 35 
 
 43 
 
 17 
 
 843 
 
 52 
 
 201 
 
 993 
 
 1005 
 
 620 
 
 26 
 
 574 
 
 766 
 
 648 
 
 660 
 
 1028 
 
 761 
 857 
 615 
 618 
 
 981 
 615 
 665 
 109 
 
 lOSO 
 295 
 630 
 719 
 857 
 290 
 331 
 
 43 
 
 61 
 
 V. Light, 7 Cox, C. C. 389 613 
 v. Lloyd, 1 Car. & P. 301 .. 847 
 V. Lioyd, 4 Car. & P 233 . . 973 
 V. Lockett, 7 Car. & P. 300. . 62 
 .710-712 
 966 
 
 V. Long, 4 Car. & P. 398 
 
 V. longden, Russ. & R. C. C. 
 
 228 . . 267, 446, 490, 741, 
 
 V. Lynch, 5 Car. & P. 324 . . 
 
 324, 327, 
 
 V. M'Makln, Russ. & R. C. C. 
 
 333, note 61 
 
 v. Mann, 6 Cox, C. C. 461 . . 746 
 V. Manners, 7 Car. & P 801 . . 59 
 T. Marriott, 8 Car. & P. 425 
 V. Martin, 3 Car. & P. 211 . 
 
 768 
 285 
 329 
 
 693 
 123 
 
 133, 347 
 
 v. Martin, 5 Car. & P. 128 
 
 853, 
 
 38 
 857 
 
eiv 
 
 TABLE 
 
 OJJ' C 
 
 Rex. T. 
 
 Mead, 2 Starkie, 205 ... 
 
 609 
 963 
 
 V. 
 
 Meakin, i Car. & P. 297 . . 
 
 811 
 
 V. 
 
 Mears, 1 Bost. L. Ilep. 
 
 
 
 205 
 
 53 
 
 V. 
 
 Megson, 9 Car. & P. 418.. 
 
 1017 
 
 V. 
 
 Mosley, 1 Moody, C. C. 97, 
 
 
 
 1 Lewln, C. C. 79 . . 859, 
 
 860 
 
 
 996, 997, 1010, 1012, 
 
 1017 
 
 V. 
 
 Murphy, 6 Car. & P. 103 . . 
 
 61 
 
 
 65, 69, 346, 659, 663, 664, 
 
 667 
 
 V. 
 
 Norton, Russ. & R. C. C. 
 
 
 
 510 
 
 862 
 
 V. 
 
 Oneby, 2 Strange, 766, 2 
 
 
 
 Ld. Raym. 1485 
 
 327 
 
 V. 
 
 Owen, 1 Moody, C. C. 96 . . 
 
 58 
 
 V. 
 
 Passey, 7 Car. & P. 282 . . 
 
 62 
 
 V. 
 
 Patience, 7 Car. & P. 775 . . 
 
 601 
 
 
 617, 
 
 638 
 
 \ 
 
 Payne, 1 Moody, C. C. 
 
 
 
 378 
 
 627 
 
 V. 
 
 Perkins, 4 Car. & P. 537 
 
 69 
 
 ^'■ 
 
 Pike, 3 Car. & P. ."lOS . . 
 
 980 
 993 
 
 V. 
 
 Plant, 7 Car. & P. 575 ... 
 
 889 
 
 V. 
 
 Plummer, J. Kelyng, 109, 
 
 
 
 12 Mod. 627 .. 113, 114, 
 
 184 
 
 
 574, 576, 654, 659, 
 
 664 
 
 V. 
 
 Poulton, 5 Car. & P. 329 . . 
 
 589 
 590 
 
 V. 
 
 Price, 7 Oar. & P. 178 
 
 300 
 
 V. 
 
 Rankin, Euas. & R. C. C. 
 
 
 
 43 284, 
 
 289 
 
 V. 
 
 Reason, 16 How. St. Tr. 
 
 
 
 1 971, 975, 
 
 1026 
 
 V. 
 
 Reason, 1 Strange, 499 . . 
 
 499 
 
 
 750, 975, 1026, 
 
 1027 
 
 V. 
 
 Ridley, 2 Campb. 050 . . 
 
 691 
 
 882 
 
 V. 
 
 Roberts, 1 Campb. 400 
 
 926 
 
 \. 
 
 Russell, 1 Moody, C. C. 
 
 
 
 356 80, 
 
 81 
 
 Saunders, 7 Car. & P. 277 . . 
 
 688, 
 
 Sawyer, 1 Russ. Cromp. & 
 
 M. 528 
 
 Scaire, 1 Moody & R. 551, 
 
 848 
 
 69 
 
 2 Lewin, C. C. 150 .... 
 
 978 
 
 Scully, 1 Car. & P. 319 . . 
 
 300 
 
 456, 766, 
 
 782 
 
 Sellers, O. B. 1796, Car. 
 
 
 Crim. Law, 233 . . 983, 
 
 986 
 
 
 1038 
 
 Sellia, 7 Car. & P. 850 . . 
 
 590 
 
 Senior, 1 Moody, C. C. 
 
 
 .346 589, 710, 
 
 711 
 
 Senior, 1 Lewin, C. C. 
 
 
 183, note 
 
 712 
 
 Sbaw, 8 Oar. & P. 372 .. 
 
 113 
 
 319, 
 
 320 
 
 Sheen, 2 Car. & P. 634 .. 
 
 864 
 
 Sheriff, 20 Cox, C. C. 334 
 
 613 
 
 Rex T. Smith, 2 Car. & P. 44» ... 689 
 
 693 
 
 y. Smith, 65 .7. P. 426. . 1003, 1019 
 v. Smith, 1 Moody, C. C. 402, 
 
 6 Car. & P. 151 864 
 
 V. Smith, 3 Russell, Crimes, 
 
 6th ed. 132 741 
 
 T. Scares, Russ. & E. C. C. 
 
 25 59 
 
 V. Spiller, 5 Car. & P. 333 . . 710 
 
 711, 888 
 
 V. Spilsbury, 7 Car. & P. 187. . 993 
 
 1014 
 V. Squire, 1 Russell, Crimes, 
 
 6th ed. 151 692 
 
 V. Squire, 3 Russell, Crimes, 
 
 6th ed. p. 13 686 
 
 y. Standley, Russ. & R. C. 
 
 C. 305 62 
 
 V. Stewart, Russ. & R. C. C. 
 
 363 53 
 
 V. Sullivan, 7 Car. & P. 641 . . 347 
 
 701 
 
 T. Taylor, 5 Burr. 2793 268 
 
 331 
 
 T. Thomas, 7 Car. & P. 817 . . 284 
 320, 814-816 
 V. Thompson, 1 Moody, C. C. 
 
 80 601, 630, 632 
 
 v. Thompson, 1 Moody, C. C. 
 
 139 , 857 
 
 T. Timmins, 7 Car. & P. 499. . 7 
 
 111, 702 
 
 V. Tin Ah Chin, 3 Haw. 90 . . 649 
 
 650 
 V. Tomlinson, 6 Car. & P. 
 
 370 859, 860 
 
 V. Towie, Russ. & E. C. C. 
 314, 3 Price, 145, 2 Marsh, 
 
 466 72 
 
 V. Tye, Russ. & R. C. C. 345. . 846 
 
 853, 856, 858 
 >. Van Butchell, 3 Car. & P. 
 
 629 712, 993, 995, 1001 
 
 1028 
 V. Voke, Russ. & R. C. C. 
 
 531 926 
 
 V. Walker, 1 Car. & P. 320 . . 43 
 
 702, 725 
 V. Warner, 1 Moody, C. C. 
 
 380 635. 639 
 
 V. Warren, Russ. & R. C. C. 
 
 48 693 
 
 v. Waters, 1 Moody, C. C. 
 
 457 864 
 
 T. Waters, 6 Car. & P. 328 . . 26 
 
 707 
 
 V. Waters, 7 Car. & P. 250 . . 853 
 
 857, 858 
 
 V. Webb, 2 Lewin, C. C. 196. . 711 
 
 V. Webb, 1 Moody & R. 405 . . 38 
 
 42, 710, 711 
 
 V. Whalley, 7 Car. & P. 245 638 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED, 
 
 Rex V. White, Rubs. & R. C. C. 
 
 90 61, 665 
 
 V. Whlthorne, 3 Car. & P. 
 
 394 636, 639, 661, 665 
 
 V. Williams, 1 Moody, C. C. 
 
 387 446, 741, 766 
 
 V. Williamson, 3 Car. & P. 
 
 635 710, 712 
 
 V. Wllloughby, 1 East, P. C. 
 
 288 319 
 
 V. Woolmer, 1 Moody, C. C. 
 
 334 618, 626, 627 
 
 Heyes v. State (Fla.) 38 So. 257 .. 1042 
 r. State (Tex. Ciim. App.) 88 
 
 S. W. 245 206 
 
 V. State, 10 Tex. App. 1 876 
 
 Reynolds v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 949, 
 
 82 S. W. 978 292 
 
 V. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 540, 
 
 82 S. W. 233 288 
 
 V. Com. 114 Ky. 912, 72 S. W. 
 
 277 370, 396 
 
 V. People, 17 Abb. Pr. 413 . . 424 
 
 V. State, 68 Ala. 502 . . 972, 975 
 
 981, 982, 990, 1017 
 
 V. State, 1 Ga. 222 834 
 
 Rhea V. State, 63 Neb. 461, 88 N. 
 
 W. 789 . . 148, 164, 166, 174 
 175, 177, 1042 
 Rhinehart v. Whitehead, 64 Wis. 42, 
 
 24 N. W. 401 55 
 
 Rhodes v. Com. 48 Pa. 396 . . 154, 155 
 237, 242, 244, 1057 
 V. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 332, 45 S. W. 1009 . . 58, 67 
 270, 674, 959 
 
 Rice V. State. 8 Mo. 561 713 
 
 Richard v. State, 42 Fla. 528, 29 So. 
 
 413 . . 249, 472, 764-767, 772 
 774, 778, 779, 973, 981, 990 
 991, 994, 995, 1021, 1029 
 Richards v. State, 114 Ga. 834, 40 S. 
 
 B. 1001 243 
 
 V. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 38, 30 S. W. 805 .. 177, 576 
 578, 579, 581, 684, 721 
 v. State, 82 Wis. 172, 51 N. W. 
 
 652 .. 366, 370, 503. 948, 992 
 
 1036 
 
 Richardson v. State, 133 Ala. 78, 32 
 
 So. 249 
 
 V. State (Miss.) 28 So. 817 .. 
 
 206, 
 
 V. State, 7 Tex. App. 488 . . 
 
 365, 767, 773, 784, 
 
 V. State, 28 Tex. App. 216, 12 
 
 S. W. 870 3, 
 
 Kicharte v. State, 5 Tex. App. 359 . . 
 
 Riclcs V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 87 S. W. 1036 235, 
 
 Riddle V. State, 3 Heisk. 401 . . 866, 
 Rigby V. Hewitt, 5 Exch. 243 
 
 364 
 137 
 328 
 348 
 790 
 
 282 
 
 ler 
 
 24r 
 327 
 
 874 
 566 
 
 Riggs T. Com. 17 Ky. L. Rep. 1015 
 33 S. W. 413 
 
 y. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506, 5 L 
 R. A. 340, 12 Am. St. Rep 
 819, 22 N. E. 188 
 
 1. State, 3 Coldw. 85, 91 Am. 
 Dec. 272 731 
 
 V. State, 26 Miss. 51 .. 827, 
 
 V. State, 30 Miss. 635 ..103, 
 
 141, 316, 819, 820, 932, 
 
 Rigmaidon's Case, 1 Lewln, C. C. 
 
 180 . . 7, 111, 695, 700, 
 
 Riley v. Com. 94 Ky. 266, 22 S. W. 
 
 222 . . 425, 429, 474, 477, 
 
 507, 553, 
 
 V. State,, 9 Humph. 646 . .153, 
 
 824, 
 
 V. State (Tex. ^rim. App.) 
 
 81 S. W. 711 
 
 Ringer v. State, 74 Ark. 262, 85 S. 
 W. 410 .. 8, 192, 193, 
 243, 265, 569, 574, 576, 
 
 Riots of 1844, Re, 2 Clark (Pa.) 
 275 . . 603, 648, 734, 739, 
 
 Rippy V. State, 2 Head, 217 . . 363, 
 424, 458, 503, 509, 541, 
 
 Riptoe V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 42 S. W. 381 . . 286, 302, 
 
 398, 834, 
 
 Ritchey v. People, 23 Colo. 314, 47 
 Pae. 272, 384 . . 375, 376, 
 
 Ritter v. People. 130 111. 255, 22 N. 
 
 E. 605 355, 
 
 Ritzman v. People, 110 111. 362 ..50, 
 
 Roach V. People, 77 III. 30 
 
 y. State, 34 Ga. 78 . . 544, 
 1-. State, 8 Tex. App. 479.. 875- 
 V. State, 21 Tex. App. 249, 
 
 17 S. W. 464 511, 
 
 Roark t. State, 105 Ga. 736, 32 S. E. 
 
 125 288, 290, 291, 
 
 Robbins v. State, 8 Ohio St. 131.. 8, 
 
 148, 154-156, 176, 177, 
 
 238, 337, 596, 597, 713, 
 
 974, 991, 993, 
 
 Roberson t. State (Pla.) 34 So. 294. . 
 
 v. State, 53 Ark. 516, 14 S. W. 
 
 902 502, 527, 
 
 V. State, 42 Pla. 212, 28 So. 
 
 427 845, 
 
 V. State, 43 Fla. 156, 52 L.R.A. 
 
 751, 29 So. 535 .. 299, 
 
 324, 630, 631, 632, 634, 
 
 Roberts v. Com. 10 Ky. L. Rep. 433, 
 
 8 S. W. 270 
 
 V. People. 19 Mich. 401 . . 225, 
 810, 
 
 138 
 
 1067 
 
 -733 
 844 
 845 
 133 
 940 
 
 852 
 
 488 
 556 
 157 
 
 844 
 
 262 
 
 241 
 581 
 681 
 
 778 
 400 
 544 
 
 547 
 
 385 
 872 
 
 473 
 476 
 
 547 
 
 82 
 
 649 
 
 365 
 
 824 
 -877 
 
 521 
 
 540 
 IS 
 210 
 824 
 994 
 115 
 
 752 
 
 859 
 
 300 
 635 
 
 924 
 803 
 8il 
 
CVl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Roberts v. State, 68 Ala. 156 . . 132, 365 
 400, 402, 407-409, 424 
 V. State, 112 Ga. 542, 37 S. E. 
 
 879 193 568 
 
 V. State, 123 Ga. 146, 51 S. B. 
 
 374 120, 925, 945 
 
 V. State, 14 Mo. 143, Sb Am. 
 
 Dee. 97 . . 299, 300, 601, 603 
 
 t>06, 631, 635 
 
 V. State, 5 Tex. App. 141 . . 247 
 
 422, 983, 986, 988. 1022 
 
 V. State, 30 Tex. App. 291, 17 
 
 S. W. 450 542, 545 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 88 S. W. 221 . . 367, 388, 389 
 398, 523, 1001, 1002 
 V. United States, 61 C. C. A. 
 
 427, 126 Fed. 897 . . 253, 334 
 Robertson v. Com. (Va.) 20 S. E. 
 
 362 176, 860, 876, 951 
 
 V. State, 42 Ala. 509 . . 1040, 1042 
 V. State, 43 Fla. 156, 5L' 'j.B. 
 
 A. 751, 29 So. 535 . . 601, 602 
 T. State, 2 Lea, 239, 31 Am. 
 
 Rep. 602 . . 7, 9, 343, 344, 571 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 441, 80 S. W. 1000 389 
 
 Robins v. State, 9 Tex. App. 666 .... 721 
 Robinson v. Com. 10 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 914, 11 S. W. 81 506 
 
 V. State, 43 Fla. 175, 29 So. 
 
 625 869 
 
 V. State, 93 Ga. 77, 44 Am. 
 St. Rep. 127, 18 S. E. 
 
 1018 624, 625, 627, 629 
 
 637, 638 
 V, State, 114 Ga. 56, 39 S. B. 
 
 862 920 
 
 V. State, 118 Ga. 198, 44 S. E. 
 
 985 101, 274 
 
 V. State (Neb.) 98 N. W. 
 
 694 101, 164 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 63 S. W. 869 246 
 
 V. State, 16 Tex. App. 347 . . 903 
 904, 927 
 Roclia >'. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 169, 63 S. W. 1018 . .857, 868 
 Eoclimore v. State, 91 Ga. 97, 16 
 
 S. B. 305 226 
 
 V. State, 93 Ga. 123, 19 S. B. 
 
 32 327, 859, 860 
 
 Roden v. State, 97 Ala. 54, 12 So. 
 
 419 362, 469. 551 
 
 Rodgers v. State, 50 Ala. 102 . . 848, 857 
 Rodrifiuez t. State, 32 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 250, 22 S. W. 978 224 
 
 Roe T. Com. 6 Ky. L. Rep. 364 777 
 
 Roesei f. State, 62 N. J. L. 216, 41 
 
 Ati. 408 645, 650, 669 
 
 Rogers, Ex parte, 138 Fed. 981 1054 
 
 T. People, 3 ParlJ. Crim. Kep. 
 
 633 8(J0 
 
 Rogers v. State, 62 Ala. 170 . . 365, 400 
 V. State, 60 Arlt. 78, 31 L.K. 
 A. 465, 46 Am. Rep. 154, 
 29 S. W. 894 . . 36, 376, 377 
 501 
 V. State, 82 Miss. 479, 34 So. 
 
 320 541 
 
 V. State, 95 Tenn. 448, 33 S. 
 
 W. 563, . . 451, 503, 504, 508 
 523, 531 
 V. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 350, 71 S. W. 18 169 
 
 Roller V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 44 S. W. 496 527 
 
 Roman v. State, 41 Wis. 312 201 
 
 Hone V. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1174, 
 
 70 S. W. 1042 249, 925 
 
 Rosenbarger v. State, 134 Ind. 425, 
 
 56 N. E. 514 853, 856 
 
 Ross V. Com. 10 Ky. L. Rep. 558. n 
 
 S. W. 707 62, 66 
 
 V. Com. 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1344, 
 
 55 S. W. 4 .. 265, 334, 415 
 535, 774, 913, 926 
 
 V. State, 62 Ala. 224 806 
 
 r. State, 59 Ga. 248 . . 206, 274 
 275, 330 
 T. State, 10 Tex. App. 455, 38 
 
 Am. Rep. 643 . . 392, 475, 548 
 632, 633, 635 
 1'. State, 23 Tex. App. 689, 5 
 
 S. W. 184 304 
 
 v. State, 8 Wyo. 351, 57 Pac. 
 
 924 . . 182, 164, 202, 227, 249 
 402, 417, 460 
 Roten V. State, 31 Fla. 514, 12 So. 
 
 910 ..429, 736, 992, 1000, 1029 
 Rothschild V. State, 7 Tex. App. 
 
 519 861, 863 
 
 Routt V. State, 61 Ark. 594, 34 S. 
 
 W. 262 1045 
 
 Rowan v. State, 30 Wis. 129, 11 
 
 Am. Rep. 559 . . 3, 8, 256, 333 
 339, 849 
 Rowbotham, Re, 2 Irvine, Justlc. 89. . 681 
 Rowe V. United States, 164 U. S. 
 546, 41 L. ed. 547, 17 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 172 . . 474, 475, 541 
 545, 560 
 Rowland v. State, 83 Miss. 483, 35 
 
 So. 826 304 
 
 Rowley's Case, 12 Rep. 87 320 
 
 Rowsey v. Com. 116 Ky. 617, 76 
 
 S. W. 409 ... 365, 373, 456 
 459, 464, 930, 1004 
 
 Roy V. State, 2 Kan. 405 834 
 
 Royley's Case, Cro. Jae. 296, Godb. 
 
 182 320 
 
 Case, 1 Hale, P. C. 453, Fost, 
 
 C. L. 294, 295 310 
 
 Ruble T. People, 67 111. App. 438 . . 266 
 
 311 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 cvn 
 
 Riicker *. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 40 S. W. 991 355, 
 
 T. State, 7 Tex. App. 549 . . 
 
 Uufer v. State, 25 Ohio St. 464 .. 
 
 955, 958, 
 
 lUiis V. State, 43 Fla. 186, 30 So. 
 
 802 
 
 Ruiz *. Territory, 10 N. M. 120, 61 
 
 Pac. 126 
 
 EulotC V. People, 18 N. Y. 170 .. 896 
 
 504 
 838 
 927 
 672 
 960 
 
 869 
 
 875 
 
 898 
 
 900 
 
 V. People, 45 N. Y. 213 . . 88, 584 
 
 644, 645, 653, 665, 667, 675 
 
 764, 772, 7t3, 945, 955 
 
 Runnels t. State, 42 Tex. Crlm. Hep. 
 
 555, 61 S. W. 479 . . 262, 289 
 Runyan t. Price, 15 Ohio St. 1, 86 
 
 Am. Dec. 459 1037 
 
 V. State, 57 Ind. 80, 26 Am. 
 
 Rep. 52 .. 473, 474, 486, 503 
 Rupe V. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 477, 61 S. W. 929 . . 123, 149 
 154, 155, 181, 187 
 Rush V. State (Tex. Crlm. App.) 76 
 
 S. W. 927 932 
 
 Russell V. State, 88 Ga. 297, 14 S. B. 
 
 583 288 
 
 y. State. 66 Neb. 497, 92 N. 
 
 W. 751 242, 1042 
 
 V. State, 11 Tex. App. 288 .. 404 
 418, 439, 915 
 T. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 590, 44 S. W. 159 . . 192, 697 
 Rutherford v. State, 11 Lea, 31 . . . 862 
 Hutledge v. State, 88 Ala. 85, 7 So. 
 
 335 . . 401, 402, 471, 483, 531 
 
 929 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 33 
 
 S. W. 847 
 
 Ryan v. State, 100 Ala. 105, 14 
 
 So. 766 
 
 V. State, 115 Wis. 488, 92 N. 
 
 W. 271 .. 241, 322, 370, 
 
 Rye V. State, 8 Tex. App. 163 . . 168, 
 
 515 
 
 929 
 
 573 
 911 
 912 
 
 S. 
 
 Saens v. State (Tex. Orim. App.) 20 
 
 S. W. 737 504, 511 
 
 Saffold 7. State, 76 Miss. 258, 24 So. 
 
 314 137, 139, 460 
 
 Sase v. State, 91 Ind. 141 .. 803, 804 
 V. State, 127 Ind. 15, 26 S. E. 
 
 667 51, 78, 85, 923 
 
 St. Clair v. United States, 154 U. S. 
 134, 38 L. ed. 936, 14 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1002 ..898, 899 
 
 St. Louis V. State, 8 Neb. 405, 1 N. 
 
 W. 371 922 
 
 Salisbuiy v. Com. 79 Ky. 425 . . 143, 891 
 
 Salisbury's Case, 1 Plowd. 101 . . 54, 269 
 
 575, 1043 
 Sampson v. Com, 26 Ky. L. Rep. C61, 
 
 82 S. W. 384 247 
 
 Sams V. State, 124 Ga. 25, 52 S. E. 
 
 18 54.^) 
 
 Samuel v. State, 14 Lea, 439 38, 119 
 
 Sanchez v. People, 22 N. Y. 147 859 
 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 179, 78 S. W. 504 888 
 
 Sanders v. Com. 13 Ky. L. Rep. 820, 
 
 18 S. W. 528 . . 384, 547, 929 
 V. State, 105 Ala. 4, 16 So. 
 
 936 193, 343 
 
 V. State, 131 Ala. 1, 31 So. 
 
 564 121 
 
 ». State, 134 Ala. 74, 32 So. 
 
 654 . . ,3, 120, 362, 363, 537 
 538. 645, 776. 929 
 V. State, 113 Ga. 267, 38 S. B. 
 
 841 243. 245 
 
 V. State, 41 Tex. 306 246 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 83 
 
 S. W. 712 498, 524 
 
 V. State, 143 Ala. 78, 39 So. 
 
 370 442, 773, 920, 98!> 
 
 Sarah v. State, 28 Miss. 267, 61 Am. 
 
 Dec. 544 866 
 
 Sargent v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 325, 33 S. W. 364 . . 311, 365 
 456, 458, 494, 501 
 
 Saunders v. State, 37 Tex. 710 942 
 
 Saunders's Case, 7 Car. & P. 277. . 686 
 
 Case, 3 Dyer, 332a 22, 52 
 
 Sayage v. State, 18 Fla. 909 60, 64 
 
 160, 203, 236, 981 
 Savary y. State, 62 Neb. 166, 87 N. 
 
 W. 34 166, 233, 324 
 
 Sawyer v. State, 35 Ind. 80 .. 304, 305 
 
 325 
 Sawyers v. Com. 18 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 657, 38 S. W. 136 
 
 Sayres v. Com. 88 Pa. 291 . . 913, 
 
 Scales V. State, 96 Ala. 69, 11 So. 
 
 121 498, 500, 
 
 Schatfer v. State, 22 Neb. 557, 3 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 274, 35 N. W. 
 
 384 203, 866, 
 
 Schaller v. State, 14 Mo. 502 
 
 Schauer y. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 60 S. W. 249 . . 277, 385, 
 Schlect y. State, 75 Wis. 486, 44 N. 
 
 W. 509 
 
 Schlencker v. State, 9 Nei>. 300, 2 
 
 N. W. 710 .. 132, 158, 
 
 219, 223, 806, 
 
 Schmidt V. Northern Life Asso. 112 
 
 Iowa, 41, 51 L.R.A. 141, 
 
 84 Am. St. Rep. 323, 83 N. 
 
 W. 800 
 
 T. State, 124 Wis. 516, 102 N. 
 
 W. 1071 25G, 497, 
 
 274 
 918 
 925 
 
 1000 
 
 869 
 815 
 
 507 
 256 
 
 199 
 811 
 
 1066 
 680 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Schnler v. People, 23 111. 17 . . 407, 364 
 
 455, 547 
 Schrader v. State, 84 Miss. 593, 36 
 
 So. 385 512 
 
 Schrelner v. High Court, C. O. of F. 
 
 35 111. App. 576 ..1065, 1066 
 Scogglns V. State, 120 Ala. 369, 25 
 
 So. 180 471, 505, 521 
 
 Scott V. Com. 16 Ky. L. Rep. 702, 
 
 29 S. W. 977 530 
 
 V, People, 63 111. 508 . . 990, 992 
 993, 995, 1010 
 V. Scott, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 536, 81 S. W. 294 64 
 
 V. State, 37 Ala. 117 106 
 
 .. State, 133 Ala. 112, 32 So. 
 
 623 357, 382, 471, 512 
 
 1. State, 141 Ala. 1, 37 So. 
 
 357 850, 900 
 
 .. State (Ark.) 86 S. W. 
 
 1004 254, 385, 580 
 
 V. State, 7 Lea, 232 862 
 
 V. State, 56 Miss. 287 . . 365, 394 
 
 462 
 \. State (Tex. Crlm. App.) 47 
 
 S. W. 531 906 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crlm. App.) 
 
 81 S. W. 47 304 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 85 
 
 S. W. 1060 . . 567, 571, 680 
 741 
 808 
 
 V. State, 12 Tex. App. 31 
 
 V. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 363, 20 S. W. 755 
 
 T. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 591. 68 S. W. 177 . . 249, 
 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 85, 79 S. W. 543 . . 552, 
 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 305, 81 S. W. 950 . . 138, 
 
 866 
 
 273 
 
 789 
 
 770 
 773 
 
 389 
 
 500 
 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 536, 81 S. W. 294 568 
 
 Scribner v. Beach, 4 Denio, 448, 47 
 
 Am. Dec. 265 . . 390, 472, 764 
 Scroggins v. State, 32 Tex. Crim. 
 
 Rep. 71, 22 S. W. 45 295 
 
 Scruggs V. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 622, 34 S. W. 951 211 
 
 Seaborn v. Com. 25 Ky. L. Eep. 2203, 
 
 80 S. W. 223 . . 437, 808 
 944 
 
 V. State, 20 Ala. 15 124 
 
 Seals Y. State, 3 Baxt. 459 .. 99, 134 
 277, 311, 321, 322, 323 
 Seams v. State, 84 Ala. 410, 4 So. 
 
 521 236, 603 
 
 Sears v. Dennis, 105 Mass. 310 .... 24 
 Sebastian v. State, 41 Tex. Crlm. Rep. 
 
 248, 53 S. W. 875 937 
 
 Seeley v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 66, 63 S. W. 309 . . 364, 395 
 396 
 Selby V. Com. (Ky.) 89 S. W. 296 344 
 V. Com. 25 Ky. L. Rep. 2209, 
 
 80 S. W. 221 697 
 
 Self T. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 455, 
 
 47 S. W. 26 932 
 
 Sellers v. State, 99 Ga. 689, 59 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 253, 26 S. E. 
 
 484 301 
 
 Sellick's Case, 1 N. Y. City Hail. Rec. 
 
 185 102, 123 
 
 Relvidge v. State, 30 Tex. 60 59 
 
 Semayne's Case, 5 Ccke, 91a . . 777, 790 
 
 795 
 Serpentine t. State, 1 How. (Miss.) 
 
 260 839 
 
 Shafer v. Com. 10 Ky. L. Rep. 285, 
 
 5 S. W. 761 531 
 
 Shaffner v. Com. 72 Pa. 60, 13 Am. 
 
 Eep. 649 .. 154, 238, 244, 105'? 
 Slmnnahan v. Com. 8 Bush, 464, 8 
 
 Am. Rep. 466 . . 116, 805, 808 
 809 
 Shannon v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 2, 60 Am. St. Rep. 17, 
 
 28 S. W. 687 518, 521 
 
 Sharp T. Cropsey, 11 Barb. 224 689 
 
 V. State, 51 Ark. 147, 14 Am. 
 St. Rep. 27, 10 S. W. 
 
 228 31, 41 
 
 V. State, 190 Ohio, 387 774 
 
 V. State, 29 Tex. App. 211, 
 
 15 S. W. 176 60 
 
 Sharpe v. State, 17 Tex. App. 487.. 103 
 168, 169, 868, 875, 876 
 Sharwin's Case, 1 East P. C. 341 . . 846 
 Shaw V. People, 3 Hun, 275, 5 Thomp. 
 
 6 C. 439 987 
 
 V. State, 60 Ga. 246 913 
 
 V. State, 102 Ga. 660, 29 S. 
 
 E. 477 195 
 
 V. State, 79 Miss. 21, 30 So. 
 
 42 936 
 
 V. State, 34 Tex. Crlm. Rep. 
 
 435, 31 S. W. 361 . . 118, 126 
 129, 139 
 
 Shay V. People, 22 N. Y. 317 84G 
 
 Shell V. State, 88 Ala. 14, 7 So. 
 
 40 483, 498, 975, 1037 
 
 Shellenberger v. Ransom, 31 Neb. 01, 
 
 10 L.R.A. 810, 28 Am. St. 
 
 Eep. 500, 47 N. W. 700.. 1007 
 . . Ransom, 41 Neb. 631, 25 
 
 L.R.A. 564, 59 N. W. 
 
 935 1067 
 
 Shelton v. State, 1 Stew. & P. (Ala.) 
 
 208 838 
 
 Shenkenberger v. State, 154 Ind. 630. 
 
 57 N. E. 519 988, 1020 
 
 Shepherd v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 698, 
 
 82 S. W. 378 1045 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Shepherd v. People, 72 111. 480 . . 862, 863 
 
 V. State, 54 Ind. 25 . . 851, 855 
 
 Sheppard v. State, 17 Tex. App. 74 . . 15 
 
 591, 846, 847, 896, 897 
 
 Sherar v. State, 30 Tex. App. 349, 
 
 17 S. W. 621 817, 928 
 
 Sherrill v. State, 138 Ala. 3, 35 So. 
 
 129 200, 246, 776 
 
 Sherwood, Ex parte, 29 Tex. App. 334, 
 
 15 S. W. 812 630 
 
 Shipley v. Edwards, 87 Iowa, 310, 
 
 54 N. W. 151 526, 540 
 
 Shoemaker v. State, 12 Ohio, 43 165 
 
 Short V. Com. 9 Ky. L. Rep. 255, 4 
 
 S. W. 810 376 
 
 Shorter v. People, 2 N. Y. 193, 51 
 
 Am. Dec. 286 . . 362, 367, 374 
 394, 455, 461, 498, 501 
 Shows V. State, 1 Miss. Dec. 43, 23 
 
 So. 1021 906 
 
 Shufflin V. People, 62 N. Y. 229, 20 
 
 Am. Rep. 483, . . 201, 208, 212 
 258-260, 306 
 
 V. People, 4 Hun, 16 258, 259 
 
 Shulze T, State, 28 Tex. App. 316, 
 
 12 S. W. 1084 . . 897, 898, 904 
 Shumate v. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 266, 42 S. W. 600 774 
 
 Siberry t. State, 133 Ind. 677, 33 
 N. E. 681, 149 Ind. 688, 
 39 N. E. 936. 47 N. E. 
 
 458 913 
 
 ., State, 149 Ind. 684, 39 N. 
 
 E. 936. 47 N. E. 458 . . 1, 8 
 
 203, 335, 343, 344, 879, 880 
 Siebert v. People, 14.i III. 571, 32 N. 
 
 E. 431 62. 123 
 
 Sierra v. State. ;!7 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 430, 35 S. W. 982 . . 619, 637 
 sugar v. People, 107 111. 563 . . 286, 303 
 Silvus V. State, 22 Ohio St. 90 , . 221, 222 
 Simmerman v. State, 14 Net. 568, 17 
 
 N. W. 115 . . 1^9, 161, 199 
 198, 632 
 V, State, 16 Neb. 615, 21 N. 
 
 W. 387 610 
 
 Simmons v. State, 32 B'In. 387. 13 So. 
 
 896 871 
 
 T. State, 79 Ga. 696, 4 S. E. 
 
 894 377, 413, 676 
 
 V. State. 23 Tex. App. 653, 
 
 5 S. W. 208 282 
 
 Simms v. State, 10 Tex. App. 131 ... 889 
 Simons V. People, 1.50 III. 66, 36 
 
 N. B. 1010 914. 993 
 
 Simpson T. State, 59 Ala. 1, 31 Am. 
 
 Rep. 1 . . 390, 783, 789. 790 
 V. State. 56 Ark. 19, V,> S. W. 
 
 99 223. 641, 1045 
 
 V. State, 92 Ga. 41, 22 L.R.A. 
 248. 44 Am. St. Rep. 75, 
 17 S. H. 984 18 
 
 Simpson y. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 87 S. W. 826 . . 367, 381, 
 
 Simpson's Case, 1 Lewln, C. C. 78 . . 
 
 Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 172 . . 
 
 Sims V. Com. 12 Ky. L. Rep. 215, 13 
 
 S. W. 1079 . . 108, 580, 
 
 V. State, 139 Ala. 74, 101 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 17, 36 So. 138 . . 
 
 443, 991, 996, 1027, 1028, 
 
 V. State, 9 Tex. App. 586 . . 
 
 403, 408, 
 
 V. State, 36 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 154, 36 S. W. 256 . . 788, 
 
 V. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 637, 44 S. W. 522 . . 438. 
 
 Sinclair y. State (Miss.) 2 L.R.A. (N. 
 
 S.) 553, 39 So. 522 ..407, 
 
 Sindram v. People, 1 N. Y. Ciim. 
 
 Rep. 448 803, 
 
 Singleton v. Joanson, 8 Mees. & W. 
 
 67 
 
 V. State, 71 Miss. 782, 42 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 488, 16 So. 295 . . 
 
 801, 926, 
 
 v. State, 1 Tex. App. 501 . . 
 
 168, 169, 177, 228, 
 
 Siple T. State, 154 Ind. 647, 57 N. 
 
 B. 544 
 
 Sissinghurst's Case, 1 Hale P. C. 
 
 4G2 
 
 Skaggs V. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 563, 21 S. W. 257 . . 423, 
 
 Skidmore v. State, 2 Tex. App. 20 . . 
 
 Slade V. State, 29 Tex. App. 381. 16 
 
 S. W. 253 
 
 Slater, Ex parte, 72 Mo. 102 
 
 Slaughter v. Com. 11 Leijjli, IWI, 37 
 
 Am. Dee. 638 . . 153, 215, 
 
 315, 317, 
 
 1. State, 6 Hi>mph. 410 .... 
 
 Sloan V. Com. 15 Ky. L. Rep. 4.!7. 
 
 23 S. W. 676 
 
 Sloane, Ex parte, 95 ,\Ia. 22, 11 So. 
 
 14 212, 213, 236, 
 
 Small V. Com. 91 Pa. 304 . . 131, 
 
 229, 271, 326, 996, 
 
 Smalls V. State, 101 Ga. 570, 40 L. 
 
 R. A. 369. 28 S. E. 981 . . 
 
 Smith V. Brazelton. 1 Heisk. 44, 2 
 
 \^. 
 
 Com. 
 
 1 Duv. 
 
 224 
 
 . 125, 
 
 V. 
 
 Com 
 
 21 Gratt 
 
 . 809 
 
 . . 896, 
 900, 
 
 V. 
 
 Com. 
 
 9 Ky. L 
 
 Rep. 
 
 215, i 
 
 
 S. 
 
 W. 798 . . 
 
 
 
 V. 
 
 Com 
 
 13 Ky. 
 
 L. Rep. 31. 
 
 
 16 
 
 S. W. 13 
 
 7 . . . 
 
 
 410 
 996 
 1010 
 155 
 711 
 
 846 
 
 46 
 
 1033 
 
 401 
 
 418 
 
 988 
 1010 
 
 439 
 
 788 
 
 408 
 
 804 
 
 865 
 
 11 
 927 
 148 
 876 
 
 853 
 
 608 
 
 444 
 743 
 
 937 
 827 
 
 259 
 
 321 
 
 1049 
 
 62 
 
 274 
 
 148 
 
 1010 
 
 900 
 
 17 
 808 
 818 
 897 
 904 
 
 935 
 
 506 
 
ex 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Smith V. Com. 13 Ky. L. Rep. 612, 
 
 17 S. W. 868 989 
 
 V. Com. 15 Ky. L. Kep. 357, 
 
 23 S. W. 588 58 
 
 V. Com. 16 Ky. L. Eep. 112, 
 
 26 S. W. 583 .. 415, 490 
 492, 790 
 V. Com. 17 ICy. L. Eep. 439, 
 
 31 S. W. 724 227 
 
 T. Com. 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1073, 
 
 42 S. W. 1138 454 
 
 V. Com. 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1848, 
 
 50 S. W. 241 547 
 
 V. Com. 93 Ky. 318, 20 S. W. 
 
 229 699 
 
 V. Com. 113 Ky. 19, 67 S. W. 
 
 32 996, 1000, 1003 
 
 V. Com. 14 Serg. & R. 70 . . 20 
 V. People, 1 Colo. 121 . . 63, 271 
 
 322, 644, 670, 675 
 V. People, 142 111. 117, 31 N. 
 
 E. 599 . . 5, 200, 221, 222 
 253 
 
 State, 
 
 68 Ala. 424 . . 7, 
 
 189 
 
 
 199, 207, 
 
 228 
 
 State, 
 
 83 AIn. 26, 3 So. 
 
 
 551 
 
 2, 
 
 32? 
 
 State, 
 
 86 Ala. 28, 5 So. 
 
 
 478 
 
 
 207 
 
 State, 
 
 88 Ala. 73, 7 So. 
 
 
 52 . 
 
 . 202, 292, 423, 434, 
 
 440 
 
 445 
 
 V. state, 103 Ala. 4, 15 So. 
 
 843 . . 212, 213, 242, 274, 277 
 312, 328 
 V. State, 130 Ala. 95, 30 So. 
 
 432 241, 357, 988 
 
 V. State, 136 Ala. 1, 34 So. 
 
 168 62, 1000 
 
 V. State, 137 Ala. 22, 34 So. 
 
 396 955 
 
 V. State, 142 Ala. 14, 39 So. 
 
 329 . . 357, 422, 435, 441, 509 
 848, 852, 856, 1043 
 v. State, 50 Ark. 545, 8 S. W. 
 
 941 30, 31, 35, 38, 45 
 
 y. State, 59 Ark. 132, 43 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 20, 26 S. W. 
 
 712 . . 367, 373, 738, 743, 747 
 748 
 V. state, 50 Conn. 193 . . 833, 873 
 T. state, 25 Fla. 517, 6 So. 
 
 482 . . 157, 367, 400-402, 460 
 462 
 V. State, 48 Fla. 307, 37 So. 
 
 573 842, 927 
 
 T. State, 49 Ga. 482 . . 313, 330 
 V. State, 73 Ga. 79 . . 274, 275 
 288, 334, 344 
 V. State, 106 Ga. 673, 71 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 286, 32 S. E. 
 
 851 300, 467, 537, 538 
 
 771, 779 
 
 Smith V. State, 110 Ga. 255, 34 S. B. 
 
 204 1031 
 
 V. State, 118 Ga. 61, 44 S. B. 
 
 817 291, 1028, 1030 
 
 V. State, 119 Ga. 564, 46 S. 
 
 E. 846 378 
 
 V. State (Ga.) 52 S. E. 329 192 
 V. State, 9 Humph. 9 . . 995, 1007 
 
 1029 
 V. State, 142 Ind. 288, 41 N. 
 
 E. 595 498, 550 
 
 V. State, 1 Kan. 365 .. 198, 203 
 869, 871 
 
 V. State, 8 Lea, 402 537 
 
 v. State, 33 Me. 48, 54 Am. 
 
 Dec. 607 . . 112, 592, 593, 595 
 597, 885, 977 
 
 V. State, 58 Miss. 867 313 
 
 V. State, 75 Miss. 542, 23 
 
 So. 260 100, 231, 424 
 
 V. State, 4 Neb. 277 809--811 
 
 V. State, 61 Neb. 296, 85 N. 
 
 W. 49 915 
 
 T. State, 105 Tenn. 305, 60 S. 
 
 W. 145 . . 519, 535, 764, 777 
 
 v. State, 43 Tex. 643 .. 46, 233 
 
 234, 859 
 
 V. State, 15 Tex. App. 338 . . 525 
 
 V. State, 23 Tex. App. 358, 
 
 59 Am. Rep. 773, 5 S. W. 
 
 219 60, 61 
 
 V. State, 31 Tex. Crlm. Rep. 
 
 14, 19 S. W. 252 . . 148, 186 
 197, 198, 780, 868 
 V. State, 33 Tex. Crlm. Rep. 
 
 513, 27 S. W. 137 .. 40, 477 
 V. State, 40 Tex. Crlm. Rep. 
 
 391, 50 S. W. 938 . . 248, 250 
 401 
 V. State, 44 Tex. Ciim. Rep. 
 
 53, 68 S. W. 267 
 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Crlm. Rep. 
 
 552, 78 S. W. 694 . . 214, 
 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Crlm. Rep. 
 
 267, 81 S. W. 712, ..138 
 
 655, 668, 957-959, 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crlm. App.l 87 
 
 S. W. 151 506, 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crlm. App.) 89 
 
 S. W. 817 .. 266, 623, 
 653, 955, 
 
 V. State, 1 Yerg. 228 
 
 V. Territory, 11 Okla. 656, 69 
 
 Pac. 803 . . 575, 872, 914, 
 V. United States, 161 U. S. 85, 
 
 40 L. ed. 620, 16 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 483 424, 
 
 T. United States, 1 Wash. Terr. 
 
 262 
 
 Smith's Case, 1 Lewln, C. C. 81 . . 
 
 924 
 
 241 
 312 
 
 622 
 962 
 
 520 
 
 628 
 958 
 321 
 
 917 
 
 446 
 
 427 
 1010 
 1022 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 czi 
 
 SmuiT V. State, 88 Ind. 504 810 
 
 7. Stnte, 105 Ind. 125, 4 N. 
 
 B. 445 535, 774 
 
 Sneed v. People, 38 Mich. 248 849 
 
 V. State, 47 Ark. 180, 1 S. 
 
 W. 68 202 
 
 Snell V. State, 50 Ind. 516 831 
 
 V. State, 29 Tex. App. 236, 
 25 Am. St. Rep. 723, 15 
 S. W. 722 . . 64, 67, 773, 774 
 996, 1039 
 Snelling v. State (Fla.) 37 So. 917.. 464 
 
 479 
 V. State, 87 Ga. 51, 13 S. E. 
 
 154 615 
 
 Snodgrass v. Com. 89 Va. 679, 17 S. 
 
 E. 238 938 
 
 Snow V. Housatonlc R. Co. 8 Allen, 
 
 441, 85 Am. Dec. 720 .. 24 
 
 Snyder v. State, 59 Ind. 105 869 
 
 Solomon v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 65 S. W. 915 264 
 
 Somers v. State, 116 Ga. r,?.r,. 42 
 
 S. E. 779 50 
 
 Son V. Territory, 5 Okla. 526, 49 
 
 Pac. 923 917 
 
 Souey T. State, 13 Lea, 472 403 
 
 South V. People, 98 111. 261 905 
 
 Souther v. Com. 7 Gratt. 673 . . 155, 173 
 
 719 
 
 Spain V. State, 59 Miss. 19 1046 
 
 Spangler v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 424, 55 S. W. 326 . . 281, 441 
 424 
 T. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 233, 61 S. W. 314 . . 97, 212 
 221, 273, 405 
 Sparks v. Com. 3 Bush, 111, 96 Am. 
 
 Dec. 196 . . 106, 110, 696, 697 
 V. Com. 12 Ky. L. Rep. 402, 
 
 14 S. W. 417 328 
 
 V. Com. 89 Ky. 644, 20 S. W. 
 
 167 407, 416, 790 
 
 v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 77 
 
 S. W. 811 249, 578 
 
 Spatz v. Lyons, 55 Barb. 476 972 
 
 Spaulding v. State, 162 Ind. 297, 70 
 
 N. E. 243 534, 776 
 
 Spearman v. State, 23 Tex. App. 224, 
 
 4 S. W. 586 .. 365, 369, 458 
 511 
 Spears v. State. 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 527, 56 S. W. 347 . . 227, 235 
 Spencer t. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 90 S. W. 638 357 
 
 V. State, 77 Ga. 155, 4 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 74, 3 S. E. 661 . .65, 389 
 498, 514 
 V. People, 122 III. 1, 3 Am. 
 St. Rep. 320, 12 N. E. 
 865, 17 N. E. 898 . . 2, 50 
 63, 66, 75, 82, 99, 232, 634 
 644, 645. 647, 649, 653, 656 
 672, 887, 888 
 
 Spivey v. State, 58 Miss. 858 . . 435, 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 496, 77 S. W. 444 . . 127, 
 Spraggins v. State, 139 Ala. 93, 35 
 
 So. 1000 
 
 Sprlggs V. Com. 113 Ky. 724, 68 S. 
 
 W. 1087 
 
 Springfield v. State, 96 Ala. 81, 38 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 85, 11 So. 
 
 250 . . 354, 391, 395, 
 
 454, 469, 552, 553, 558, 
 
 Squire v. State, 87 Ala. 114, 6 So. 
 
 303 
 
 Stabler t. Com. 95 Pa. 318, 40 Am. 
 
 Rep. 653 
 
 Stacey v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 33 
 
 S. W. 348 . . 290, 504, 
 
 Stacy V. Graham, 14 N. Y. 492 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 86 
 
 S. W. 327 ..286, 388, 456, 
 
 Statford t. State (Pla.) 39 So. 106 . . 
 
 Stanley v. Com. 86 Ky. 440, 9 Am. 
 St. Rep. 305, 6 S. W. 
 
 155 534, 767, 770, 
 
 V. State, 82 Miss. 498, 34 So. 
 
 360 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 44 S. W. 519 389, 
 
 Stanley's Case, J. Kelyng, 86 . . 639, 
 
 462 
 
 201 
 
 931 
 
 1050 
 
 399 
 816 
 
 379 
 
 53 
 
 511 
 1037 
 
 503 
 624 
 416 
 464 
 
 773 
 
 909 
 
 488 
 640 
 645 
 Stanton v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 269, 59 S. W. 271 925 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 29 
 
 S. W. 476 770 
 
 Stanton's Case, 2 N. Y. City Hall 
 
 Rec. 164 38, 448 
 
 Stapleton v. Com. 9 Ky. L. Rep. 643, 
 
 6 S. W. 275 362 
 
 Starke v. State, 81 Ga. 593, 7 S. B. 
 
 807 143, 925 
 
 Starkey v. People, 17 III. 17 . . 992 999 
 1006, 1015, 1016, 1022, 1028 
 1029, 1033, 1039 
 Starks v. State, 137 Ala. 9, 34 So. 
 
 687 .. 59, 175, 186, 675, 1000 
 V. State (Miss.) 6 So. 843.. 1003 
 Starr v. Com. 97 Ky. 193, 30 S. W. 
 
 397 . . 981, 992, 997, 1010 
 1018 
 
 V. State, 160 Ind. 661, 67 N. 
 E. 527 249. 
 
 T. United States, 153 U. S. 
 614, 38 L. ed. 814, 14 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 919 . . 609, 
 
 State V. Abarr, 39 Iowa, 185 
 
 5-8, 
 462, 
 
 V. Abbatto, 64 N. J. L. 658, 
 47 Atl. 10 • • 
 
 937 
 
 624 
 629 
 441 
 469 
 
 922 
 
ex 11 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 i5tate y. Abbott, 8 W. Va. 741 . . 236, 238 
 
 241, 371, 399, 401, 404, 408 
 421, 553 
 I Abrams, 11 Or. 169, 8 Pac. 
 
 327 230, 875 
 
 V. Aekles, 8 Wasb. 462, 36 
 
 Pac. 597 925 
 
 V. Adams, 78 Iowa, 292, 4S N. 
 
 W. 194 236, 1277, 303 
 
 I Adams, 76 Mo. .•!5.") . . 9:i:i, 935 
 
 941 
 V. Adams, 1 N. C. pt, 1, p. 21 
 
 (Martin, pt. 1, p. 30) . . 842 
 V. Adams, 115 N. C. 775, 50 
 
 S. E. 722 188 
 
 T. Adams, 138 N. C. 688, 50 
 
 S. B. 765 102 
 
 1 . Adams, 68 S. C. 421, 47 S. 
 
 E. 676 259, 929 
 
 A'. AdiD, 7 Ohio Dec. Reprint, 
 
 25 219, 221, 223 
 
 A . Adler, 146 Mo. 18, 47 S. W. 
 
 794 . . 482, .500. 513, 541, 543 
 V. Ah Chuey, 14 iSev. 79, 33 
 
 Am. Rep. 530 899 
 
 V. Ah Lee, 7 Or. 239 1030 
 
 V. Ah Lee, 8 Or. 214 . . 159, 162 
 
 224, 227, 1016 
 
 y. Ah Mool£, 12 Nev. 369 . . 159 
 
 160, 165, 202, 208, 211, 254 
 T. Albright, 144 Mo. 638, 46 
 
 S. W. 620 ... 268, 603, 604 
 T. Alcorn, 7 Idaho, 599, 97 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 252, 64 Pac. 
 
 1014 ... 20, 595, 897, 899 
 968, 969, 1044 
 V. Alder, 146 Mo. 18, 48 S. 
 
 W. 794 546 
 
 y. Aldrich, 50 Kan. 666, 32 
 
 Pac. 408 993, 997, 1010 
 
 T. Alexander, 66 Mo. 148 132 
 
 134, 243, 400 402, 403, 407 
 V. Alexander, 30 S. C. 74, 
 
 14 Am. St. Rep. 879. 8 
 
 S. E. 440 .. 100. 113, 116, 117 
 131, 133 
 
 V. Alford, 31 Conn. 40 931 
 
 V. Alford, 80 N. C. 44.", 624 
 
 y. Allen, 47 Conn. 121 . . 640. 651 
 666, (!09 
 V. Allen, 111 La. 154, :!.-. So. 
 
 495 460 
 
 V. Allen. 23 Mont. 118, 57 Pac. 
 
 725 941 
 
 V. Anderson, 1 Hill, L. 327 . . 615 
 
 627, 628, 735. 741, 742. 762 
 V. Anderson, I-Ioiiat. Crim. 
 
 Rep. (Del.) 38 .. 293. 321 
 V. Anrlcrson, 86 Mo. 309.. 239, r,2S 
 v. Anderson, 89 Mo. .•il2, 1 S. 
 
 W. 135 . . 50, 63, 72, 73 
 226, 232, 892 
 
 State V. Anderson, 98 Mo. 461, 11 S. 
 
 W. 981 . . 219, 224, 231, 304 
 305, 859, 928 
 T. Anderson, 126 Mo. 542, 29 
 
 S. W. 576 . . 196, 228, 230 
 
 341 
 
 \. Anderson, 4 Nev. 265 ..275, 285 
 
 836, 840, 928 
 
 V. Ander.gon, 10 Or. 448 .... 226 
 
 V. Anderson, 2 Overt. 6, 5 
 
 Am. Dee. 648 129, 153 
 
 164, 205, 219 
 . . Anderson, 30 Wash. 14, 70 
 
 Pac. 104 137, 838 
 
 V. Andrew, 76 Mo. 101 . . 212, 213 
 
 313 
 >•. Andrews, 84 Iowa, 88, 50 
 
 N. W. 549 871 
 
 \ . Andrews, 76 Mo. 101 163 
 
 V. Angel, 29 N. C. (7 I red. L.) 
 
 27 861-863 
 
 A . Appleton, 70 Kan. 217, 78 
 
 Pac. 445 461, 613 
 
 V. Archer, 69 Iowa, 420. 29 N. 
 
 W. 333 461, 528 
 
 V. Ariel. 38 S. C. 221, 16 S. 
 
 B. 779 117, 143, 364, 374 
 
 552 
 V. Arnewine, 126 Mo. 567, 29 
 
 S. W. 602 859, 887, 873 
 
 V. Arnold, 35 N. C. (13 Ired. 
 
 L.) 184 974, 986, 988 
 
 1. Arnold, 107 N. C. 861, 11 
 
 S. E. 990 873 
 
 ,. Ashcraft, ITO Mo. 409, 70 
 
 S. W. 89.S 248, 249 
 
 ^ . Ashley. 45 La. Ann. 1036, 
 
 13 So. 7.18 . . 205, 313. 809 
 818 
 y. Ashworth, 50 La. Ann. 94, 
 
 23 So. 270 . . 978, 1000, 1020 
 1021, 1025 
 V. Aspara, 113 La. 940, 37 
 
 So. 883 945. 946 
 
 \ . Atchley, 186 .Mo. 174, 84 S. 
 
 W. 984 275 
 
 V. Atliinson. 6 Ohio N. P. 
 
 232 180. 641 
 
 ^ . Anghtry, 49 S. C. 285, 26 
 
 S. E. 619. 27 S. E. 199.. 922 
 ^. Avery. 113 Mo. 475, 21 S. 
 
 W. 193 148, 175 
 
 > . Avery, 64 N. C. 608 304 
 
 V. Avery, 44 N. H. 392 . . 809, 812 
 > AyorK. 8 Baxt. 96 . . 74. 77 
 
 82 
 ^ . Baber, 11 Mo. App. 585 
 
 Appx. . . 97, 101, 159, 161 
 165, 211 
 
 1. Bailey, 21 N. II. 185 681 
 
 V. Bailey. 94 Mo. 311, 7 S. W. 
 
 4-.',-. 408 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 cxiii 
 
 State V. Bsilley, 190 Mo. 257, 88 S. 
 
 W. 733 . . 507, 526, 837, 937 
 r. Baker, 30 La. Ann. 1134 . . 819 
 V. Balcer, 146 Mo. 379, 48 S. 
 
 W. 475 226, 241 
 
 V. Baker, 13 Mont. 160, 32 
 
 rac. 647 207, 236, 328 
 
 V. Baker, 46 N. C. (1 Jones, 
 
 L.) 267 .. 42, 43, 838, 840 
 841 
 V. Baker, 63 N. C. 276 . . 854, 1042 
 7. Baker, 33 W. Va. 319, 10 S. 
 
 E. 639 944 
 
 V. Baldwin, 79 Iowa, 714, 45 
 
 N. W. 297 . . 834, 884, 885 
 
 869, 889, 978, 981, 984- 986 
 992, 1007, 1029 
 V. Baldwin, 36 Kan. 1, 12 Paic. 
 
 318 123, 154, 907 
 
 V. Baldwin, 15 Wash. 15, 45 
 
 Pac. 650 . . 829, 845, 974, 984 
 1005, 1010 
 T. Ballou, 20 E. I. 607, 40 Atl. 
 
 861 360, 474, 475, 503 
 
 T. Banister, 35 S. C. 290, 14 
 
 S. E. 678 . . 973, 981, 991 
 
 994, 1017, 1018, 1030 
 
 V. Banks, 10 Mo. App. Ill . . 132 
 
 V. Banks, 73 Mo. 592 . . 134, 916 
 
 1. Banks, 55 W. Va. 388, 47 
 
 S. B. 142 291 
 
 V. Bantley, 44 Conn. 537, 26 
 
 Am. Rep. 486 43 
 
 V. Baptiste, 105 La. 661, 30 
 
 So. 147 574, 581 
 
 V. Baptiste, 108 La. 234, 32 
 
 So. 371 900 
 
 y. Barfleia, 29 N. C. (7 Ired. 
 
 L.) 299 316, 936 
 
 V. Barfleld, 30 N. C. (8 Ired. 
 
 L.) 344 275, 285, 433 
 
 V. Barker, 28 Ohio St. 583 . . 597 
 
 885 
 V. Barker, 68 N. J. L. 19, 
 
 52 Atl. 284 207 
 
 \. Barnes, 34 La. Ann. 395 . . 41 
 T. Barnett, 3 Kan. 250, 87 
 
 Am. Dee. 471 839 
 
 V. Barnwell, 80 N. C. 466 .. 142 
 316 321 
 V. Barr, 11 Wash. 481, 29 L. 
 
 R.A. 154, 48 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 890, 39 Pac. 1080 . . 789, 790 
 T. Barrett, 40 Minn. 77. 41 N. 
 
 W. 463 645, 650, 675 
 
 V. Barrett, 132 N. C. 1005, 43 
 
 S. E. 832 . . 222, 246, 365 
 v. Barry (N. D.) 103 N. W. 
 
 637 1049 
 
 V. Bartlett, 170 Mo. 658, 59 
 
 L.R.A. 756, 71 S. W. 
 
 148 . . 470, 474, 475, 500, 508 
 523 
 Horn. — viii. 
 
 State V. Bartley, 34 La. Ann. 147.. 849 
 
 831, 8.^3 
 V. Bartmess, 33 Or. 110, 54 
 
 Pac. 167.. 220, 405, 793, 796 
 V. Baum, 51 La. Ann. 1112, 28 
 
 So. 67 426 
 
 ■r. Bean, 77 Vt. 384, 60 Atl. 
 
 807 930, 946 
 
 V. Beatty, 51 W. Va. 2K2, 41 
 
 S. E. 430 .. 209, 214, 254 
 315, 324, 327, 331, 1055 
 V. Beaudet, 53 Conn. 536, 54 
 
 Am. Rep. 155, 4 Atl. 
 
 237 939 
 
 V. Beck, 46 La. Ann. 1419, 16 
 
 So. 368 420 
 
 V. Becker, 9 Houst (Del.) 411, 
 
 33 Atl. 178 . . 2, 132, 134, 783 
 794 
 V. Beckham, 24 S. C. 283 516, 542 
 V. Beekwlth, 1 Stew. (Ala.) 
 
 318, 18 Am. Dec. 46 838, 839 
 V. Bectsa, 71 N. J. L. 322, 
 
 58 Atl. 933 577 
 
 V. Behm, 72 Iowa, 533, 34 N. 
 
 W. 319 687 
 
 \ . Beird, 118 Iowa, 474, 92 N. 
 
 W. 694 . . 383, 432, 437, 442 
 
 V. Belcher, 13 S. C. 459 . . 980 
 
 995, 1018 
 
 \. Bell (Del.) 62 Atl. 147 ..2, 111 
 
 129, 149, 168, 192, 207, 253 
 
 259, 274, 386, 574, 854. 858 
 
 V. Bell, 65 N. C. 313 862 
 
 V. Bellard, 50 La. Ann. 594, 
 
 09 Am. St. Rep. 461, 23 
 
 So. 504 868 
 
 V. Belton, 24 S. C. 185, 58 
 
 Am. Rep. 245 937, 985 
 
 994, 1002 
 V. Belyea, 9 N. D. 353, 83 N. 
 
 W. 1 . . 506, 597, 886, 887 
 1044 
 V. Benham; 23 Iowa, 154, 92 
 
 Am. Dec. 417 341, 343 
 
 362, 374, 386-389, 448, 503 
 521, 547, 570, 571 
 V. Bennett (Iowa) 105 N. W. 
 
 324 495 
 
 y. Bennett, 14 La. Ann. 661.. 1030 
 V. Bennett, 40 S. C. 308, 18 
 
 S. E. 886 . . 1047, 1054, 1055 
 %. Benton, 19 N. C. (2 Dev. 
 
 & B. L.) 222 267, 574 
 
 V. Berger, 121 Iowa, 581, 96 
 
 N. W. 1094 49 
 
 \ . Berkley, 92 Mo. 53, 4 S. W. 
 
 24 288, 295, 512 
 
 ^. Berkley, 109 Mo. 665, 19 S. 
 
 W. 192 .. 275, 303, 461, 462 
 
 > . Berkshire, 2 Ind. 207 6Si. 
 
 V. Bertoch (Iowa) 79 N. W. 
 
 378 154, 155, 238 
 
cxiv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 State y. Bertrand, 3 Or. 61 . . 124, 132 
 
 134, 332 
 V. Biagas, 105 La. 503, 29 So. 
 
 971 1048 
 
 T. BUllngs. 81 Iowa, 99, 46 N. 
 
 W. 862 903, 904 
 
 V. Blrdwell, 36 La. Ann. 859. . 400 
 
 426, 932 
 
 <r. Bishop, 131 N. C. 733, 42 , 
 
 S. E. 836 219, 223 
 
 r. Black, 42 La. Ann. 861, 8 
 
 So. 594 . . 972, 981, 986, 1007 
 V. Blackburn, 80 N. C. 471 . , 1004 
 1010 1039 
 V. Blackman, 35 La. Ann. 
 
 483 51, 55 
 
 ' V. Blakeney, 33 S. C. Ill, 11 
 
 S. E. 637 844, 845 
 
 V. Blan, 69 Mo. 317 -.73, 848, 855 
 856, 859 
 
 V. Blan, 7 Mo. App. 582 856 
 
 V. Bland, 97 N. C. 438, 2 S. 
 
 E. 460 751 
 
 V. Blevins, 138 N. C. 668, 60 
 
 S. E. 763 . . 364, 472, 474 
 478, 489 
 V. Blunt, 110 Mo. 322, 19 S. 
 
 W. 650 17, 824 
 
 V. Bodie, 33 S. C. 117 11 
 
 S. B. 624 . . 395, 408, 551 
 553, 914, 927 
 V. Boggan, 133 N. C. 761, 46 
 
 S. E. Ill 248, 1010 
 
 T. Bogue, 52 Kan. 79, 34 Pac. 
 
 410 79 
 
 T. Bohan, 15 Kan. 407 979 
 
 V. Bohan, 19 Kan. 28 . . 362, 45.T 
 45 J, 402 
 
 V. Bohanan, 76 Mo. 562 143 
 
 V. Boice, Houst. Crlm. Rep. 
 
 (Del.) 355 150, 174 
 
 V. Bolden, 107 La. 116, 90 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 280, 31 So. 393 360 
 T. Bonar (Kan.) 81 Pac. 484. . 990 
 
 1000 
 
 V. Bonds, 2 Nct. 265 932 
 
 V. Bone, 114 Iowa, 537, 87 N. 
 
 W. 507 . . 121, 212, 249, 298 
 460, 464, 531, 550 
 V. Bonoflgllo, 67 N. J. L. 239, 
 91 Am. St. Rep. 423, 52 
 
 Atl. 712 :!75, 871 
 
 V. Booker, 123 N. C. 71;-!, 31 
 
 S. E. 376 . . 124, 148, 150 
 163, 200, 219, 223, 224, 231 
 V. Boon, 82 N. C. 637 . . 119, 172 
 T. Bordelon, 113 La. 690, 37 
 
 So. 603 1005 
 
 T. Botha, 27 Utah, 289, 75 
 
 Pac. 731 298, 308, 569 
 
 T. Botson, 26 Mont. 305, 67 
 
 Pac. 938 74 
 
 State V. Bowen, 16 Kan. 475 ..17, 824 
 
 845 
 V. Bowen, Houst. Crlm. Rep. 
 
 (Del.) 91 814 
 
 V. Bowers, 65 S. C. 207, 95 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 795, 43 S. 
 
 E. 656 254, 354 
 
 V. Bowker, 26 Or. 309, 38 Pac. 
 
 124 72, 970, 971 
 
 V. Bowles, 146 Mo. 6, 69 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 598, 47 S. W. 
 
 892 . . 124, 125, 130, 132, 133 
 
 136, 138, 165, 205, 208, 219 
 284, 448, 853, 981, 994 
 V. Bowman, 80 N. C. 432 .... 222 
 1'. Bowser, 42 La. Ann. 936, 
 
 8 So. 474 415, 928 
 
 V. Boyce, 24 Wash. 514, 64 
 
 Pac. 719 143, 201, 236 
 
 V. Boyle, 28 Iowa, 522 871 
 
 V. Brabson, 38 La. Ann. 144. . 861 
 
 803 
 
 y. Bradford, 33 La. Ann. 
 
 921 867, 
 
 V. Bradford, 156 Mo. 91, 56 
 
 S. W. 898 
 
 V. Bradley, 6 La. Ann. 554 . . 
 V. Bradley, 34 S. C. 136, 13 
 
 S. E. 315 . .973, 981, 991, 
 
 V. Bradley, 67 Vt. 465, 32 
 Atl. 238 925, 
 
 V. Brandon, 53 N. C. (8 Jones, 
 L.) 463 300, 
 
 V. Brannon, 45 Mo. 329 
 
 V . Branstetter, 65 Mo. 149 . . 
 
 868 
 
 870 
 394 
 
 994 
 1007 
 
 932 
 
 783 
 
 1010 
 
 283 
 
 286 
 
 V. Brewer, 98 N. C. 607, 3 S. 
 
 E. 819 13S 
 
 V. Bridges, 29 Kan. 138 870 
 
 v. Brien, 10 La. Ann. 453 . . 422 
 V. Briggs (W. Va.) 52 S. E. 
 
 218 574 
 
 V. Brinte, 4 Penn. (Del.) 551, 
 
 58 Atl. 258 . . 2, 5, 97, 103 
 
 104, 129, 149, 198, 207, 223, 
 
 226, 228, 231 
 
 V. Briscoe, 30 La. Ann. 433 . . 45 
 
 V. Brittain, 89 N. C. 481 . . 132 
 
 134, 222, 291, 504, 535, 551- 
 553, 776 
 T. Brock, 61 Kan. 857, 58 Pac. 
 
 972 1041 
 
 y. Brodnax, 61 N. C. (Phil, 
 
 L.) 41 284 
 
 T. Bronstine, 147 Mo. 520, 
 
 49 S. W. 512 835, 859 
 
 V. Brooks, 39 La. Ann. 817, 2 
 
 So. 498 402 
 
 V. Brooks, 99 Mo. 137, 12 S. 
 
 W. 633 496 
 
 V. Brooks, 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint, 
 
 407, . . 8, 176, 195, 259 333 
 
TABLE OP CASES CITED. 
 
 State T. Broussard, 107 La. 189, 31 
 
 So. 637 870 
 
 c Brown, 67 Iowa, 289, 25 N. 
 
 W. 248 136, 140 
 
 T. Brown, 21 Da. Ann. 347 . . 148 
 
 173, 878 
 V. Brown, 111 La. 696, 35 So. 
 
 818 409, 997, 1030 
 
 T. Brown, 7 Or. 186 . . 148, 175 
 
 186 
 V. Brown, 4 Penn. (Del.) 120, 
 
 53 Atl. 354 .. 460, 469, 574 
 
 575, 582 
 V. Brown, 5 Harr. (Del.) 
 
 505 613 
 
 V. Brown, 2 Marv. (Del.) 380, 
 
 36 Atl. 458 209 
 
 ,. Brown, 106 N. C. 645, 10 
 
 S. E. 870 850 
 
 V. Brown, 34 S. C. 41, 12 S. 
 
 E. 662 552 
 
 V. Brown, Houst. Crim. Rep. 
 
 (Del.) 539 .. 7, 149, 150, 189 
 192, 195, 210, 679-681 
 T. Brown (Del.) 61 Atl. 
 
 1077 ..3, 97, 129, 132, 149 
 
 168, 208, 209, 253, 271, 354 
 
 461, 498, 551 
 
 V. Brown, 21 Kaa. 38 .. 854, 869 
 
 871 
 
 V. Brown, 22 Kan. 222 409 
 
 V. Brown, 1 Mo. App. 86 .... 896 
 
 V. Brown, 63 Mo. 439 . . 512, 521 
 
 V. Brown, 64 Mo. 367 . . 130, 141 
 
 275, 276, 418, 504, 505, 551 
 V. Brown, 119 Mo. 527, 24 S. 
 W. 1027, 25 S. W. 200.. 
 
 State 
 
 118 
 
 220 
 
 Y. Brown, 168 Mo. 449, 68 S. 
 W. 568 . . 847, 861, 866, 
 
 915 
 947 
 
 198 
 215 
 
 228 
 
 T. Brown, 12 Minn. 538, Gil. 
 
 448 . . 124, 130, 150, 159, 
 
 207, 208, 
 
 V. Brown, 41 Minn. 319, 43 N. 
 
 W. 69 .. 130, 132, 164, 
 9. Brown, 181 Mo. 192, 79 S. 
 
 W. 1111 812 
 
 T. Brown, 188 Mo. 451, 87 S. 
 
 W. 519 ..224 284, 931, 988 
 1000, 1004 
 V. Brownfleld, 60 S. C. 509, 39 
 
 S. E. 2 369, 621 
 
 V. Brunetto, 13 La. Ann. 45. . 1012 
 1016, 1020 
 
 V. Bryant, 14 Mo. 340 803 
 
 V. Bryant, 55 Mo. 75, . .404, 432 
 V. 'Bryant, 102 Mo. 24, 14 
 
 S. W. 822 511, 516, 524 
 
 V. Bryant, 65 N. C. 327 .. 737 
 741, 746, 760 
 V. Bryson, 60 N. C. (2 Winst. 
 
 L.) 86 *59 
 
 800 
 387 
 846 
 
 987 
 
 247 
 
 T. Bucbanan, Houst Crim. 
 
 Eep. (Del.) 79 . . 2, 152, 1G8 
 211, 214, 1006 
 V. Bufflngton (Kan.) 81 Pac. 
 
 465 363 
 
 V. Buffington, 66 Kan. 706, 72 
 
 Pac. 213 246 
 
 v. Bulling, 105 Mo. 204, 15 S. 
 
 W. 367, 16 S. W. 830 .. 201 
 272, 276, 304 
 T. Bullock, 13 Ala. 413 . . 806, 814 
 T. Bundy, 24 S. C. 439, 58 Am. 
 
 Rep. 263 805 
 
 V. Burbage, 51 S. C. 284, 28 S. 
 
 B. 937 79, 218, 
 
 V. Burke, 30 Iowa, 331.. 374, 
 
 V. Burke, 54 N. H. 92 
 
 V. Burnett, 47 W. Va, 731, 
 
 35 S. B. 983 983, 986, 
 
 V. Burns, 124 Iowa, 207, 99 
 
 N. W. 721 154, 
 
 T. Burns, 33 Mo. 483 1030 
 
 V. Burns, 148 Mo. 167, 71 Am. 
 St. Rep. 588, 49 S. W. 
 1005.. 202, 260, 304, 868, 872 
 V. Burt, 41 La. Ann. 787, 6 
 
 L.B.A. 79, 6 So. 631 1037 
 
 1039 
 V. Burton, 63 Kan. 602, 66 
 
 Pac. 633 431. 
 
 V. Burton, 65 Kan. 704, 70 
 
 Pac. 640 
 
 V. Busse, 127 Iowa, 318, 100 
 
 N. W. 536 
 
 .. Butler, 25 L.R.A. 437 
 
 T. Byers, 100 N. C. 512, 6 S. 
 
 B. 420 132, 134, 
 
 V. Byrd, 121 N. C. 684, 28 S. 
 
 B. 353 130, 131, 222, 
 
 415, 422, 429, 433 
 V. Byrd, 52 S. C. 480, 30 S. 
 
 B. 482 266, 274, 
 
 V. Byrd, 72 S. C. 104, 51 S. 
 
 B. 542 97, 133, 
 
 V. Cable, 117 Mo. 380, 22 S. 
 
 W. 953 511-513, 
 
 V. Cadotte, 17 Mont. 315, 42 
 
 Pac. 857... 460, 461, 911, 
 
 ,. Caesar, 31 N. C. (9 Ired. 
 
 L.) 391 284 
 
 \ . Cain, 20 W. Va. 679 219 
 
 221, 223, 224, 228, 229, 367 
 
 394, 398, 455, 456, 474, 503 
 
 511, 538, 541, 551, 556, 768 
 
 959 
 
 V. Calder, 23 Mont. 504, 59 
 
 Pac. 903 902, 904, 912 
 
 ,. Caldwell, 115 N. C. 794, 20 
 
 S. E. 523 826, 827, 1011 
 
 V. Caldwell, 129 N. C. 682, 40 
 
 S. E. 85 201, 208 
 
 921 
 
 442 
 
 247 
 
 74 
 
 222 
 
 401 
 
 385 
 
 610 
 
 543 
 
 946 
 
cxvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 State v. Callaway, 154 Mo. 91, 53 S. 
 
 W. 444 201, 227, 228, 232 
 
 241 
 
 V. Calllgan, 17 N. H. 253 262 
 
 >. Cameron, 2 Chand. (Wis.) 
 
 172, 2 Pinney (Wis.) 490 888 
 
 973, 974, 981, 991, 993, 1028 
 
 1030, 1036 
 T. Campbell, 107 N. C. 948, 
 
 12 S. E. 441 753 
 
 V. Campbell, 35 S. C. 28, 14 
 
 S. E. 292 933 
 
 V. Campbell, 24 Utah, 103, 66 
 
 Pac. 771 872 
 
 7. Campbell, 25 Utah, 342, 71 
 
 Pac. 529 926 
 
 7. Canclenne, 50 La. Ann. 847, 
 
 24 So. 134.. 2G6, 304, 303 533 
 540 
 V. Cannon, 49 S. C. 550, 27 
 
 S. B. 526 649, 657 
 
 V. Cannon, 52 S. C. 452, 30 
 
 S. E. 589 459, 793 
 
 T. Cantieny, 34 Minn. 1, 24 
 
 N. W. 458 614, 634, 636 
 
 1013, 1029 
 V. Capps, 134 N. C. 622, 46 
 
 S. E. 730 124, 126, 129 
 
 193, 219 
 
 V. Carland, 90 N. C. 668. .130, 132 
 
 134, 552 
 
 V. Can-, 53 Vt. 37... 152, 164, 201 
 
 237 
 V. Carrington, 15 Utah, 480, 
 
 50 Pac. 526 . . 885, 973, 981 
 
 983, 986, 989, 1019 
 T. Carter, 45 La. Ann. 1326, 
 
 14 So. 30 426 
 
 T. Carter, 106 La. 407, 30 So. 
 
 895 : 1019 
 
 ^. Carter, 107 La. 792, 32 So. 
 
 183 973, 989 
 
 V. Carter, 27 N. J. L. 499 17 
 
 18, 824, 827 
 
 V. Carter, 76 N. C. 20 275 
 
 V. Carter, 15 Wash. 121, 45 
 
 Pac. 745 370, 376, 476 
 
 V. Carver, 22 Or. 602, 30 Pac. 
 
 315 150, 162, 219, 22,'), 224 
 
 V. Cassady, 12 ICan. 550.. 82, 85 
 V. Castello, 62 Iowa, 404, 17 
 
 N. W. 605 30, 38, 39, 362 
 
 521, 547 
 V. Castle, 133 N. C. 769, 46 
 
 S. E. 1 243, 284, 366, 369 
 
 474, 553 
 V. Cater, 100 Iowa, 501, 69 
 
 N. W. 880 130 
 
 V. Cather, 121 Iowa, 106, 96 
 
 N. W. 722 438, 808 
 
 T. Center, 35 Vt. 378 7, 107 
 
 340, 695, 973, 981, 994, 1003 
 
 1006, 1017, 1024, 1029 
 
 State V. Chambers, 87 Mo. 406.. 981, 980 
 V. Champoux, 33 Wash. 339, 
 
 74 Pac. 557 . . 841, 842, 869 
 V. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 
 
 52 Am. Dec. 599 366, 421 
 
 V. Chapin, 17 Ark. 561, 65 Am. 
 
 Dec. 452 18, 824 
 
 IT. Charles, 111 La. 933, 36 
 
 So. 29 103S 
 
 V. Chase, 68 Vt. 405, 35 Atl. 
 
 336 922 
 
 V. Chavis, 80 N. C. 353 . .422, 496 
 V. Chenoweth, 163 Ind. 94, 71 
 
 N. E. 197 68S 
 
 V. Cherry, 7 N. C. (3 Mnrph.) 
 
 7 83a 
 
 V. Chevallier, 36 La. Ann. 81 . . 409 
 438, 9tS 
 V. Chiles, 44 S. C. 338, 22 
 
 S. E. 339 38, 40 
 
 V. Chiles, 58 S. C. 47, 36 S. 
 
 E. 496 304, 305 
 
 V. Chittem, 13 N. C. (2 Dev. 
 
 L.) 57 72, 79 
 
 V. Chopin, 10 La. Ann. 458. . . 377 
 387, 462 
 V. Christian, 44 La. Ann. 950, 
 
 11 So. 589 44.« 
 
 V. Christian, 66 Mo. 138.. 100, 512 
 V. Clark, 100 Iowa, 47, 69 N. 
 
 W. 257 87C 
 
 T. Clark, 69 Kan. 576, 77 Pac. 
 
 287 241, 541 
 
 ,. Clark, 147 Mo. 20, 47 S. 
 
 W. 886 575, 576, SC6 
 
 V. Clark, 134 N. C. 698, 47 S. 
 
 E. 36 238, 370, 397, 472 
 
 489, 490, 552 
 V. Clark, 51 W. Va. 457, 41 S. 
 
 E. 204 300, 390, 401, 47: 
 
 474, 480, 489, 786 
 V. Clayton, 113 La. 782, 37 So. 
 
 754 423 
 
 V. Clemons, 51 Iowa, 274, ] N. 
 
 W. 546 98! 
 
 V. Cleveland, 58 Me. 564 104C 
 
 1042 
 V. Clifford (W. Va.) 52 S. E. 
 
 981... 143, 144, 164, 246, 264 
 313, 404, 417, 567, 574, 57! 
 V. Cohb, 65 S. C. 324, 95 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 801, 43 S. E. 654 16J 
 1. Cobbs, 7 La. Ann. 107. .819, 82( 
 V. Cobley (Iowa) 103 N. W. 99 5( 
 V. Cochran, 147 Mo. 504, 49 
 
 S. W. 558.. 230, 241, 342. 931 
 .. Cockman, 60 N. C. (2 
 
 Winst. L.) 95 73, 88' 
 
 V. Coella, 8 Wash. 512, 36 
 
 Pac. 474 208, 94 
 
 V. Coit, 8 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 
 
 62 7;(1, 783, 743. 7* 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED 
 
 cxvii 
 
 State V. Cole, 63 Iowa, 695, 17 N. 
 
 W. 183 913 
 
 T. Cole, 132 N. C. 1069, 44 S. 
 
 E. 391 124,132,164, 199 
 
 228, 577, 872, 1057 
 ,•■ Coleman, 86 Mo. 151, 69 
 
 L.R.A. 381, 84 S. W. 
 
 978 736, 739, 741 
 
 753, 758, 933 
 
 V. Coleman, 5 Port (Ala.) 32. 57 
 
 58 
 
 V. Coleman, 27 La. Ann. 691 . . 805 
 V. Coleman, 111 La. 303, 35 
 
 So. 560 120, 865, 925 
 
 V. Coleman, 6 S. C. N. S. 185 131 
 
 v. Coleman, 8 S. C. N. S. 237 152 
 
 ,. Coleman, 17 S. C. 473 844 
 
 V. Coleman, 17 S. D. 594, 98 
 
 N. W. 175 919 
 
 T. Coley, 114 N. C. 879, 19 S. 
 
 B. 705 296 
 
 Y. Collins, 32 Iowa, 36. .267, 367 
 
 407, 432, 436, 437, 461 
 
 V. Collins (Del.) 62 Atl. 224.. 129 
 
 149, 208, 210, 253 
 
 v. Collins, 30 N. C. (8 Ired. 
 
 L.) 407 137 
 
 Y. Colomb, 108 La. 253, 32 So. 
 
 351 856 
 
 T. Compagnet, 48 La. Ann. 
 
 1470, 21 So. 46. .417, 423, 481 
 T. Conerly, 48 La. Ann. 1564, 
 
 21 So. 192 274 
 
 V. Conley, 39 Me. 78. .2, 149, 207 
 
 208, 835, 837, 838, 840, 859 
 860 
 Y. Conly, 130 N. C. 683, 41 S. 
 
 E. 534 233 
 
 V. Connally, 3 Or. 69 332, 472 
 
 488, 490, 494, 551- 553, 764 
 
 767-770, 790, 791, 703 
 
 794 
 
 V. Connell, 49 Mo. 282 11 
 
 V. Cook, 3 Ohio Dec. Reprint, 
 
 142 424 
 
 T. Cooper, 112 La. 281, 104 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 447, 36 So. 
 
 350 297, 330 
 
 T. Cooper, 71 Mo. 436 211 
 
 V. Cooper, 13 N. J. L. 361, 25 
 
 Am. Dec. 490 112, 113 
 
 148, 575, 1049, 1052 
 T. Cooper, 22 N. J. L. 52, 51 
 
 Am. Dec. 248 588, 591 
 
 V. Copeland, 106 Iowa, 102, 
 
 76 N. W. 522 ., 386 
 
 f. Corley, 43 S. C. 127, 20 S. 
 
 E. 989 363, 469 
 
 V. Cornisli, 5 Harr. (Del.) 502 1004 
 
 1028 
 T. Corrivau, 93 Minn. 38, 100 
 
 N. W. 638 384, 809- 811 
 
 State V. Cosgrove, 42 La. Ann. 753, 
 
 7 So. 714 402, 412 
 
 T. Costen, Houst. Crlm. Rep. 
 
 (Del.) 340 201, 213 
 
 V. Cottrill, 52 W. Va. 363. 43 
 
 S. E. 244 552 
 
 V. Countryman, 57 Kan. 815, 
 
 48 Pac. 137 786 
 
 V. Covington, 117 N. C. 834, 
 
 23 S. E. 337 173, 229, 876 
 
 878 
 
 V. Cox, 65 Mo. 29 55, 60 
 
 V. Crabtree, 111 Mo. 136, 20 
 
 S. W. 7 283, 416, 937, 991 
 
 993 
 V. Crabtree, 170 Mo. 642, 71 
 
 S. W. 127 101 
 
 Y. Craft, 164 Mo. 631, 65 S. 
 
 W. 280 263, 628, 640, 881 
 
 V. Crafton, 89 Iowa, 109, 56 
 
 N. W. 257 913 
 
 V. Craig, 190 Mo. 332, 88 S. 
 
 W. 641 1011 
 
 Y, Craine, 120 N. C. 601, 27 
 
 S. B. 72 1017 
 
 f. Crane, 95 N. C. 619 287 
 
 V. Crank, 2 Bail. L. 66, 23 Am. 
 
 Dec. 117 79, 217, 859, 860 
 
 V. Craton, 28 N. C. (6 Ired. 
 
 L.) 164 . . 137, 267, 299, 310 
 769, 774 
 V. Crawford, 68 Iowa, 318, 23 
 
 N. W. 684 368, 460 
 
 V. Crawford, 99 Mo. 74, 12 
 
 S. W. 354 935, 939 
 
 V. Crawford, 115 Mo. 620, 22 
 
 S. W. 371 132, 213, 219 
 
 362, 504, 523, 531, 580, 937 
 V. Crawford, 31 Wash. 260, 71 
 
 Pac. 1030 366, 436, 925 
 
 935, 945, 1036, 1038 
 V. Crea, 10 Idaho, 88, 76 Pac. 
 
 1013 274, 450, 483 
 
 V. Crenshaw, 32 La. Ann. 406 866 
 ,'. Crittenden, 191 Mo. 17, 
 
 89 S. W. 952 50 
 
 V. Crockett, 39 Or. 76, 65 Pac. 
 
 447 242 
 
 V. Cronin, 64 Conn. 293, 29 
 
 Atl. 536 1022 
 
 V. Ci'oss, 72 Conn. 722, 46 Atl. 
 
 148 173 
 
 \. Cross, 68 Iowa, 180, 26 N. 
 
 W. 62 156, 384, 385, 431 
 
 448, 499, 501, 502, 550 
 
 V. Cross, 27 Mo. 332 806 
 
 ^. Cross, 42 W. Va. 253, 24 S. 
 
 B. 996 128, 222, 568, 806 
 
 V. Crowley, 33 La. Ann. 782. . 018 
 
 V. Cro/ier, 12 Nev. 300. .266., 275 
 
 321, 871 
 
 V. Culler, 82 Mo. 623 512, 816 
 
cxviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 State V. Cummlngs, 5 La. Ann. 330 
 
 V. Cummlngs, 189 Mo. 626, 
 
 88 S. W. 706 208, 248, 
 
 V. Cunningham, 111 Iowa, 233, 
 
 82 N. W. 775 242, 
 
 Y. Cunningham, 72 N. C. 469. 
 V. Curry, 46 N. C. (1 Jones, 
 
 L.) 280 290, 315, 
 
 V. Curtis, 70 Mo. 594 101, 
 
 159, 200, 207, 209, 211, 
 
 253, 
 
 T. Cushenberry, 157 Mo. 168, 
 
 56 S. W. 737 604, 
 
 V. Cushing, 14 Wash. 527, 53 
 
 Am. St. Eep. 883, 45 Pac. 
 
 145.. 405, 408, 474, 788, 
 V. Cushing, 17 Wash. 544, 50 
 
 Pac. 512 
 
 V. Cutshall, 110 N. C. 538, 16 
 
 L.R.A. 130, 15 S. E. 261. 
 
 823 
 
 844 
 
 932 
 
 864 
 1062 
 
 321 
 133 
 224 
 
 257 
 
 610 
 
 944 
 402 
 
 824 
 826 
 
 y. Dale, 108 Mo. 205, 18 S. W. 
 
 976 163, 872 
 
 V. Dame, 11 N. H. 271, 35 Am. 
 
 Dec. 495 857 
 
 V. Dandy, 1 Brey. 395 839 
 
 T. Daniel, 31 La. Ann. 91 1017 
 
 1034 
 Y. Daniel. 1.39 N. C. 549, 51 
 
 B. 858 164 
 
 ». Daniels, 49 La. Ann. 954, 
 
 22 So. 415 274 
 
 V. Daniels, 115 La. 59, 38 So. 
 
 894 993, 1009, 1011 
 
 Y. Daniels, 134 N. C. 671, 46 
 
 S. E. 991 155 
 
 V. Darper, Houst. Crim. Rep. 
 
 (Dei.) 291 103 
 
 V. David, 131 Mo. 380. 33 S. 
 
 W. 28... 3, 101, 102, 159, 913 
 V. David, 49 N. C. (4 .Tones, 
 
 L.) 353 l:;" 
 
 v. Davidson, 95 Mo. 155, 8 S. 
 
 W. 413 289, 294, 504, .511 
 
 y. Davidson, 30 "Vt. 377, 73 
 
 Am. Dec. 312 896 
 
 y. Davis, 9 Houst. (Del.) 407, 
 
 33 Atl. 55. .100, 132, 813, 81-1 
 T. Davis, Houst. Crim. Kep. 
 
 (Del.) 13 288 
 
 Y. Davis, (i Idaho, 159, 53 
 
 Pac. 678 932 
 
 V. Davis, 48 Kan. 1, 28 Pac. 
 
 1092 896 
 
 y. Davis. 29 Mo. 391.. 50, 51, 56 
 
 y. Davis. L4 Nev. 407 130, 137 
 
 v. Davis, 87 N. C. 514 665 
 
 v. Davis, 134 N. C. 633, 48 
 
 S. E. 722 1012. 1034, 1036 
 
 ▼. Davis, 14 E. I. 281 86 
 
 State v. Davis, 50 S. C. 405, 62 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 837, 27 S. E. 
 
 905 118,275,312,322, 506 
 
 615- 617 
 Y. Davis, 53 S. C. 150, 69 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 845, 31 S. E. 62. . 605 
 616, 623, 680 
 V. Davis, 104 Tenn. 501, 58 
 
 S. W. 122 12, 358, 567 
 
 V. Davis, 52 W. Va. 224, 43 
 
 S. E. 9» .158, 453, 812 
 
 V. Day, 4 Wash. 104, 29 Pac. 
 
 984 836, 865 
 
 ,'. Dean, 72 S. C. 74, 51 S. 
 
 E. 524 380, 395, 441, .506 
 
 540 
 V. Dearing, 65 Mo. 530... 198, 199 
 V. Decl£iotts, 19 Iowa, 447.. 3, 106 
 
 124, 129, 132, 152, 203, 204 
 
 208, 209, 214, 254, 302, 330 
 > . Dee, 14 Minn. 35, Gil. 27 . . 403 
 V. Demareste, 41 La. Ann. 617, 
 
 6 So. 136 402 
 
 V. Dennis, 119 Iowa, 688, 94 
 
 N. W. 235. .226, 676, 958, 1004 
 T. Dennison, 44 La. Ann. 135, 
 
 10 So. 590 164, 165 
 
 V. Deschamps, 42 La. Ann. 567, 
 
 21 Am. St. Rep. 392, 7 So. 
 
 703 113, 117, 124, 128, 129 
 
 151, 175, 219, 916 
 V. Desmond, 5 La. Ann. 398.. 51 
 74, 75 
 V. Dettmer, 124 Mo. 426, 27 
 
 S. W. 1117 141, 317, 469 
 
 478, 501, 925 
 V. Diclsey. 46 W. Va. 319, 33 
 
 S. E. 231 284, 311 
 
 Y. DiclJey, 48 W. Va. 325, 37 
 
 S. B. 695 6, 129. 556 
 
 V. Dickinson, 41 Wis. 299.... 594 
 069, 973, 974, 977, 981 
 
 1. Dickson, 78 Mo. 438 230- 232 
 
 248, 897, 899, 910, 911 
 V. Dieckman, 11 Mo. App. 538, 
 
 Affirmed in 75 Mo. 570.. 202 
 211, 236, 254, 834. 034 
 V. Dierberger, 90 Mo. 369, 2 
 
 S. W. 286, 96 Mo. 666, 9 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 380, 10 S. 
 
 W. 168 736, 761 
 
 V. Dierberger, 96 Mo. 666, 9 
 
 Am. St. Eep. 380, 10 S. 
 
 W. 168 211, 220, 735, 738 
 
 V. Diets!, 50 Kan. 576, 53 Pac. 
 
 870 753 
 
 y. Di Guglielmo, 4 Penn. 
 
 (Dei.) 336, 55 Atl. 350.. 99 
 115, 168, 211, 807 
 y. Dill, 48 S. C. 249, 26 B. B. 
 
 567 441 
 
 y. Dillahunt, 8 Harr. (Del.) 
 
 551 807 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 cxiz 
 
 State v. Diller, 170 Mo. 1, 70 S. 
 
 W. l.SO 248 
 
 V. Dillon, 71 Iowa, 653, 38 N. 
 W. 525 329, 547, 550, 
 
 V. Dislcin, 35 La. Ann. 46.... 
 
 V. Dixon, 75 N. C. 275. .472, 
 
 489, 
 
 V. Dixon, 131 N. C. 808, 42 S. 
 
 E. 944 245, 
 
 y. Dodsou, 4 Or. 64 404, 
 
 V. Doherty, 72 Vt. 381, 82 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 951, 48 Atl. 658. 106 
 
 166, 289, 293, 296, 313, 314 
 416 
 
 ,. Dominique, 30 Mo. 585 994 
 
 T. Donahoe, 78 Iowa, 480, 43 
 
 N. W. 297 365, 367, 403 
 
 459, 550 
 T. Donnelly, 69 Iowa, 705, 58 
 
 Am. Rep. 234, 27 N. W. 
 
 369 372, 469, 559, 986 
 
 V. Donnelly, 130 Mo. 642, 32 
 
 S. W. 1124.. 50, 159, 225, 226 
 917, 954 
 T. Donovan, 61 Iowa, 3G9, 16 
 
 N. W. 206 806, 807 
 
 V. Dooley, 89 Iowa, 584, 57 N. 
 
 W. 414 156, 867, 868 
 
 T. Dooley, 121 Mo. 591, 26 S. 
 
 W. 558 783. 786 
 
 V. Dorsey, 118 Ind. 167, 10 
 
 Am. St. Rep. Ill, 20 N. 
 
 B. 777 259. 705 
 
 V. Douglass, 34 La. Ann. 523.. 58 
 y. Douglass, 28 W. Va. 297.. 59 
 98, 110, 126, 133, 814 
 T. Douglass, 41 W. Va. 537, 
 
 23 S. B. 724 833 
 
 T. Dowd, 19 Conn. 388... 151, 155 
 173, 236, 834, 1040 
 V. Dowden, 118 N. C. 1145, 24 
 
 S. B. 722 166, 167, 219 
 
 r. Downham, Houst. dim. 
 
 Rep. (Del.) 45 201, 231 
 
 v. Downing. 24 Wasli. 340, 64 
 
 Pac. 550 911 
 
 V. Downs, 91 Mo. 19, 3 S. W. 
 
 219 256,339,373,400, 402 
 
 404, 405. 432, 913 
 T. Draper, Houst. Crim. Rep. 
 
 (Del.) 291 102, 116. 168 
 
 209 
 T. Draper, Houst. Crim. Rep. 
 
 (Del.) 531 2. 6, 97, 98 
 
 115, 129, 130, 214, 259. 274 
 275 
 T. Draper, 65 Mo. 335, 27 Am. 
 
 Rep. 287 981, 984, 1010 
 
 t. Drumm, 156 Mo. 216, 56 
 
 S. W. 1086 137 
 
 555 
 
 V 
 
 846 
 
 
 821 
 
 V 
 
 474 
 
 
 558 
 
 
 1001 
 
 V 
 
 408 
 
 
 
 T 
 
 state V. Duestrow, 137 Mo. 44, 38 
 
 S. W. 554, 39 S. W. 266. . 118 
 922 
 DuCEy, 39 La. Ann. 419, 2 
 
 So. 184 900 
 
 Dugan, Houst. Crim. Rep. 
 
 (Del.) 563.. 97, 98, 108, 149 
 
 168, 170, 171, 574, 728, 729 
 
 737, 764, 790, 793, 794 
 Dull, 67 Kan. 793, 74 Pac. 
 
 235 101, 125 
 
 Dumphey, 4 Minn. 438, Gil. 
 
 340 422, 432, 434, 834 
 
 T. Duncan, 116 Mo. 288, 32 S. 
 
 W. 699 300 
 
 \. Duncan, 28 N. C. (6 Ired. 
 
 L.) 236 916, 935, 939 
 
 V. Duncan, 7 Wash. 336, 38 
 Am. St. Rep. 888, 35 Pac. 
 
 117 83, 84 
 
 y. Dunkley, 25 N. C. (3 Ired. 
 
 L.) 116 IT 
 
 y. Dunn, 116 Iowa, 219, 89 
 
 N. W. 984 873, 946 
 
 V. Dunn, 18 Mo. 421 164, 200 
 
 V. Dunn, 80 Mo. 681 125, 230 
 
 257, 294 
 V. Dunn, 179 Mo. 95, 77 S. W. 
 
 848 101, 906 
 
 v. Duvall, 26 Wis. 416... 866, 867 
 
 T. Earnest, 70 Mo. 520.. 148, 183 
 
 f. Eaton, 75 Mo. 586 160, 219 
 
 365, 400, 413, 841, 866 
 \. Eddon, 8 Wasli. 292, 36 
 
 Pac. 139 438,982, 989 
 
 1034-1036 
 T. Edgerton, 100 Iowa, 63, 69 
 
 N. W. 280 40. 41, 43 
 
 A . Edmonson, 131 Mo. 348, 
 
 33 S. W. 17 (168 
 
 y. Edmunds (S. D.) 104 N. 
 
 W. 1115 253, 850 
 
 T. Edmundson, 64 Mo. 398. . 859 
 
 860 
 
 T. Edwards, 34 La. Ann. 1012 913 
 
 931 
 
 y. Edwards, 70 Mo. 480.. 256, 861 
 
 Y. Edwards, 71 .\lo. 321.. 102. 193 
 
 806 
 ,. Edwards, 112 N. C. 901. 
 
 17 S. B. .jiil 544 
 
 V. Edwards, 126 N. C. 1051, 
 
 35 S. E. 540 50, 236, 652 
 
 V. Edwards, 68 S. C. 318, 47 
 
 S. E. 395 249 
 
 r. Elklns, 63 Mo. 159 405, 432 
 
 441, 443. 445 
 V. Elkins, 101 Mo. 344, 14 
 
 S. W. 116 983, 986, 1006 
 
 T. Elllck, 60 N. C. (2 Winst. 
 
 L.) 56, 86 Am. Dec. 442. . 124 
 
 132, 134, 196, 222. 290, 293 
 
 552 
 
CSX 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 State V. Elliott, 45 Iowa, 4SG 
 
 409, 1015, 1016, 
 >. Elliott, 90 Mo. 350, 2 S. W. 
 
 411 275, 
 
 V. Elliott, 98 Mo. 150, 11 S. 
 
 404 
 1038 
 
 S85 
 
 W. 566 .. 132, 219, 
 
 221, 
 
 256 
 
 275, 
 
 277, 
 
 386 
 
 Elliott, 11 Ohio Dee. 
 
 Re- 
 
 
 print, 332 276, 
 
 313, 
 
 327 
 
 Bills, 74 Mo. 207 
 
 .160, 
 
 163 
 
 211, 213, 236, 241, 
 
 272, 
 
 275 
 314 
 
 Ellis, 11 Mo. App. 
 
 586, 
 
 
 Appx. Affli-med in 74 
 
 Mo. 
 
 
 220 
 
 
 97 
 
 101, 159, 161, 165, 
 
 198, 
 
 226 
 276 
 
 V. Ellis, 101 N. C. 765, 9 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 49, 7 S. E. 704.. 319 
 T. Ellis, 30 Wash. 369, 70 
 
 Pac. 963 366, 414, 428 
 
 431, 436, 437 
 V. Emerich, 87 Mo. 110, 
 
 Affirming 13 Mo. App. 492 596 
 880, 886, 1043 
 V. Emery, 78 Mo. 77, 47 Am. 
 
 Rep. 92 684, 697 
 
 V. Emory (Del.) 58 Atl. 1036 5 
 
 129, 149, 164, 166, 198, 207 
 
 254, 274, 275, 321, 470 
 
 V. Eno, 8 Minn. 220, Gil. 190 1040 
 
 V. Erb, 74 Mo. 199 211 
 
 V. Estep, 44 Kan. 572, 24 Pac. 
 
 986 207, 241 
 
 V. Evans, 1 Marv. (Del.) 477, 
 
 41 Atl. 136 154, 171 
 
 V. Evans, 122 Iowa, 174, 97 
 
 N. W. 1008 405 
 
 V. Evans, 65 Mo. 574 132, 200 
 
 219, 223 
 V. Evans, 124 Mo. 397, 28 
 
 S. W. 8 130, 132, 219, 221 
 
 996, 1008 
 ». Evans, 128 Mo. 410, 31 
 
 S. W. 34... 511, 513, 518, 519 
 V. Evans, 158 Mo. 589, 59 S. 
 
 W. 994 101, 249, 312, 855 
 
 914 
 V. Evans, 161 Mo. 95, 84 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 660, 61 S. W. 
 
 590... 604, 607, 610, 613, 618 
 626 628 
 \. Evans, 33 W. Va. 417, 10 
 
 S. E. 792.. 367, 373, 403, 408 
 
 455, 456, 470, 474, 541, 556 
 V. Exum, 138 N. C. 599, 50 
 
 S. E. 283.. 121, 163, 224, 226 
 262, 289, 423, 932, 937 
 V. Faile, 43 S. C. 52, 20 S. E. 
 
 798 973, 981, 991, 994 
 
 T. Paino, 1 Marv. (Del.) 492, 
 
 41 Atl. 134 100, 254, 274 
 
 275, 285, 422, 807 
 
 State V. Pairlamb, 121 Mo. 137, 25 
 
 S. W. 895 125, 132, 
 
 200, 
 .. Peeley, 3 L.R.A.(N.S.) 351, 
 
 note 
 
 V. Pelker, 27 Mont. 451, 71 
 Pac. 668.. 214, 417, 776, 
 
 160 
 267 
 
 421 
 
 919 
 925 
 
 \ . Peltes, 51 Iowa, 501, 1 N. 
 
 W. 755 905 
 
 V. Ferguson, 26 Mo. App. 8.. 498 
 r. Ferguson, 9 Nev. 106.. 362, 364 
 409, 450, 507 
 V. Ferguson, 2 Hill, L. 619, 
 
 27 Am. Dec. 412.. 6, 254, 267 
 294, 315, 318, 617, 756, 996 
 V. Field, 14 Me. 244, 31 Am. 
 
 Dec. 52 . . .■ 422 
 
 V. Fields, 70 Iowa, 196, 30 N. 
 
 W. 480 717 
 
 V. Fields, 51 La. Ann. 1239, 
 
 26 So. 99 824 
 
 V. Piester, 32 Or. 254, 50 Pac. 
 
 561 835, 848, 935 
 
 V. Finley, 118 N. C. 1161, 24 
 
 S. E. 495.. 35, 45, 63, 65, 87 
 
 644, 645, 652, 672, 1004, 1010 
 1026 
 V. Finn, 43 La. Ann. 895, 9 
 
 So. 498 861 
 
 V. Fisher, 23 Mont. 540, 59 
 
 Pac. 919 68 
 
 V. Fiske, 63 Conn. 388, 28 
 
 Atl. 572 807 
 
 ^. Fitzgerald, 130 Mo. 407, 32 
 
 S. W. 1113.. 71, 82, 219, 233 
 241, 244, 938 
 
 V. Pitzhugh, 2 Or. 227 958, 973 
 
 979 
 v. Pitzporter, 93 Mo. 390, .6 
 
 S. W. 223 599 
 
 V. Flanagan, 26 W. Va. 116. . 833 
 896-898, 903, 904 
 
 V. Plannigan, 6 Md. 167 1043 
 
 V. Fleming, 2 Strobh. L. 464. . 15 
 
 IB 
 V. Fletcher, 24 Or. 295, .'S3 
 
 Pac. 575 1004 
 
 V. Fley, 2 Brev. 338, 4 Am. 
 
 Dec. 583 50, 56, 72, 73 
 
 888 
 V. Floienza, 28 La. Ann. 945 851 
 
 866 
 V. Floyd, 51 N. C. (6 Jones. 
 
 L.) 392 289, 321, 342 
 
 V . Foley, 12 Mo. App. 431 362 
 
 366 
 v. Fontenot, 48 La. Ann. 305, 
 
 19 So. Ill 4d2, 913 
 
 T. Fontenot, 50 La. Ann. 537, 
 
 69 Am. St. Rep. 455, 23 
 
 So. 634 441 
 
TAELE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 CXXl 
 
 stale r. Fooks, 29 Kan. 425 866 
 
 V. Foote, 58 S. C. 218, 36 
 
 S. B. 551 38, 39 
 
 V. Foot You, 24 Or. 61, 32 
 
 Pac. 1031, 33 Pac. 537.. 983 
 988, 1036 
 
 V. Ford, 37 La. Ann. 443 429 
 
 V. Ford, 3 Strobh. L. 517 417 
 
 T. Foi-d, 16 S. D. 228, 92 N. 
 
 W. 18 806 
 
 V. Forney, 24 La. Ann. 191.. 866 
 
 867 
 V. Forsha, 190 Mo. 296, 88 
 
 S. W. 746 59, 71 
 
 V. Forsythe, 89 Mo. 667, 1 S. 
 
 W. 834 783, 784, 788 
 
 V. Foster, 7 La. Ann. 255 . . 820 
 
 845 
 V. Foster, 8 La. Ann. 290, 58 
 
 Am. Dec. 678 17, 824, 826 
 
 V. Poster, 36 La. Ann. 857.. 1046 
 
 f. Foster, 61 Mo. 549 199, 219 
 
 223, 224, 241 
 r. Foster, 136 Mo. 653, 38 S. 
 
 W. 721 875- 877 
 
 V. Foster, 130 N. C. 666, 89 
 
 Am. St. Eep. 876, 41 S. B. 
 
 284 230-232,242,246, 932 
 
 T. Foster, 66 S. C. 469, 45 
 
 S. E. 1 133, 370 
 
 V. Foutch, 96 Tenn. 242, 34 S. 
 
 W. 1, 95 Tenn. 711, 45 
 
 L.R.A. 687, 34 S. W. 423 499 
 
 793 
 
 V. Fox, 25 N. J. L. 566.. 846, 857 
 
 T. France, 76 Mo. 681 304 
 
 V. Fraunburg, 40 Iowa, 555, 
 
 20 Am. Rep. 583 366, 459 
 
 1025, 1027 
 V. Frazier, Hoiist. Crim. 
 
 Rep. (Del.) 176.. 129, 130, 164 
 
 166, 200, 211, 254, 1000, 1039 
 V. Frazier, 109 La. 458, 33 So. 
 
 561 997, 1033 
 
 V. Frazier, 137 Mo. 317, 38 S. 
 
 W. 913 219, 242, 1043 
 
 T. Freeman, 17 La. Ann. 69 . . 820 
 T. Freeman, 3 Mo. App. 591.. 424 
 V. Freeman, 1 Speers, L. 57 . . 846 
 856, 988, 1002 
 V. Frierson, 51 La. Ann. 706, 
 
 25 So. 396 384, 402, 403 
 
 411, 426, 502 
 T. Fuentes, 5 La. Ann. 427. . 385 
 V. Fulterson, 61 N. C. (Phil. 
 
 L.) 233 109, 574, 577 
 
 T. Puller, 96 Mo. 165, 9 S. W. 
 
 583 604, 605 
 
 T. Puller, 125 Iowa, 212, 100 
 
 N. W. 1114 51, 231 
 
 V. Fuller, 114 N. C. 885, 19 
 
 S. B. 797 219, 223, 228 
 
 State V. Furgerson, 152 Mo. 92, 53 
 
 S. W. 427 836 
 
 V. Furgerson, 162 Mo. 668, 63 
 
 S. W. 101 228,248, 250 
 
 855, 874 
 V. Furney, 41 Kan. 115, 13 
 
 Am. St. Eep. 262, 21 Pac. 
 
 213 647, 652, 657, 670 
 
 993, 994, 1032 
 T. Gadberry, 117 N. C. 811, 
 
 23 S. B. 477 237, 238 
 
 V. Gallivan, 75 Conn. 326, 96 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 203, 53 Atl. 
 
 731 951 
 
 V. Gamble, 119 Mo. 427, 24 S. 
 
 W. 1030 504 
 
 V. Gardiner, Wright (Ohio) 
 
 392 98, 129, 130, 162, 225 
 
 226, 228, 861, 862 
 V. Gardner, 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 49 
 
 note 468, 469, 483, 486 
 
 V. Gardner, Houst. Crim. Kep. 
 
 (Del.) 146 170 
 
 V. Garie, 35 La. Ann. 970 364 
 
 366, 424 
 V. Garland, 138 N. C. 675, 50 
 
 S. E. 853 498, 504 
 
 •r. Garrand, 5 Or. 156 41 
 
 V. Garrand, 5 Or. 216... 41, 148 
 
 159, 160, 165, 198, 973, 981 
 985, 997, 1001, 1002 
 V. Garrett, 170 Mo. 395, 70 S. 
 
 W. 686 512 
 
 V. Garrett, 60 N. C. (1 Winst. 
 
 L.) 144 626, 638, 735 
 
 739-742, 751, 760 
 V. Garrington, 11 S. D. 178, 
 
 76 N. W. 326 952 
 
 V. Garrison, 147 Mo. 548, 49 
 
 S. W. 508 17, 277, 824 
 
 994, 995 
 V. Garth, 164 Mo. 553, 65 S. 
 
 W. 275 228, 232, 900, 996 
 
 V. Gartrell, 171 Mo. 489, 71 S. 
 
 W. 1045 248, 263, 267, 276 
 
 312, 928, 946 
 V. Garvey, 11 Minn. 154, Gil. 
 
 95 805, 807 
 
 V. Gaslsins, 93 N. C. 547 270 
 
 V. Gassert, 65 Mo. 352... 211, 219 
 V. Gassert, 4 Mo. App. 44.... 132 
 
 148, 198, 199, 203, 207, 209 
 219, 223, 254 
 V. Gates, 28 Wash. 689, 69 
 
 Pac. 385... 899, 905, 933, 938 
 V. Gatlin, 170 Mo. 354, 70 
 
 S. W. 885 673, 677, 958 
 
 V. Gay, 18 Mont. 51, 44 Pac. 
 
 411 627, 628, 961, 1010 
 
 V. Gaylord, 70 S. C. 415, 50 
 
 S. E. 20 50, 939 
 
 T. Geddes, 22 Mont. 68, 55 
 
 Pac. 919 927 
 
cxzii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITICD. 
 
 State V, Gee, 85 Mo. 647 98, 125, 158 
 
 160, 161, 200, 207, 211, 312 
 547 
 V. Gentry, 47 N. c. (2 Jones, 
 
 L.) 406 284 
 
 y. Gentry, 125 N. C. 733, 34 
 
 S. E. 706 372, 474, 481 
 
 483, 486, 489 
 V. German, 54 Mo. 526, 14 
 
 Am. Rep. 481 903, 910 
 
 T. Gessert, 21 Minn. 369.. 17, 824 
 
 845 
 T. Glanfala, 113 La. 463, 37 
 
 So. 30 259, 1006 
 
 y. Gibson, 43 Or. 184, 73 
 
 Pac. 333 135, 474 
 
 V. Gilchrist, 113 N. C. 673, 18 
 
 S. E. 319.. 156, 157, 200, 1040 
 V. Gile, 8 Wash. 12, 35 Pac. 
 
 417 714, 989 
 
 y. Gill, 14 S. C. 410. .994, 995, 1019 
 V. Gilliam, 66 S. C. 419, 45 
 
 S. E. 6 219, 283, 697, 925 
 
 T. Glllick, 7 Iowa, 287 102, 116 
 
 124, 132, 148, 152, 158, 203 
 
 209, 214, 219, 221, 224, 228 
 236, 992, 993, 1007 
 V. Oilman, 69 Me. 163, 31 Am. 
 
 Rep. 257 109 
 
 Y. Gllmore, 95 Mo. 554, 8 S. 
 
 W. 359 257, 359, 470 
 
 507, 512, 575, 576 
 T. Gin Pon, 16 Wash. 42j, 47 
 
 Pac. 961 164, 166 
 
 T. Giroux, 26 La. Ann. 582.. 1024 
 V. Glahn, 97 Mo. 679, 11 S. W. 
 
 260... 233, 249, 403, 417, 940 
 
 y. Glass, 5 Or. 73 593, 598, 968 
 
 969, 971 
 V. Gleason, 172 Mo. 259, 72 
 
 S. W. 676 211, 856 
 
 T. Gleim, 17 Mont. 17, 31 
 
 L.R.A. 294, 52 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 655, 41 Pac. 998. .79, 83 
 T. Goddard, 146 Mo. 177, 48 
 
 S. W. 82 295, 511, 512, 945 
 
 T. Goddard, 162 Mo. 198, 62 
 
 S. W. 697 263, 448, 502 
 
 922, 929, 1050 
 V. Godfrey, 17 Or. 300, 11 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 830, 20 Pac. 
 
 625 136- 138 
 
 V. Golden, 113 La. 791, 37 So. 
 
 757 428, 446, 465, 558 
 
 ,. Gonce, 87 Mo. 627 373, 462 
 
 V. Gooch, 94 N. C. 987.. 130, 293 
 
 422. 432, 433, 552. 644, 645 
 914 
 
 Goode, 132 N. r. 982, 43 S. 
 
 E. 502 35, 
 
 Goodley, 9 Houst. (Del.) 
 
 484, 33 Atl. 226 342, 
 
 45 
 
 343 
 
 State V. Goodrich, 19 Vt. 116, 47 
 
 Am. Dec. 6T6 408 
 
 V. Gordon, 3 Iowa, 410 834 
 
 V. Gordon, 191 Mo. 114, 89 
 
 S. W. 1025 275, 366, 373 
 
 504, 512, 523, 528, 540 
 V. Gosey, 111 La. 616, 35 So. 
 
 786 422 
 
 V. Gould, 90 N. C. 658.. 846, 857 
 
 858 
 
 y. Grady, 34 Conn. 118 824 
 
 V. Graham, 49 La. Ann. 1524, 
 
 22 So. 807 836 
 
 V. Grand Trunk R. Co. 58 Me. 
 
 176, 4 Am. Rep. 258 13 
 
 V. Grant, 76 Mo. 236 613, 625 
 
 V. Grant, 79 Mo. 113, 49 Am. 
 
 Rep. 218 611, 938. 964 
 
 V. Grant, 152 Mo. 57, 53 
 
 S. W. 432 140, 159, 160 
 
 >. Grant, 7 Or. 414 236, 834 
 
 V. Granville, 34 La. Ann. 1088 849 
 V. Gray, 116 Iowa, 231, 89 
 
 N. W. 987 50, 54, 57, 872 
 
 946, 1046 
 V. Gray. 19 Nev. 212, 8 Pac. 
 
 456 188, 238 
 
 V. Gray, 43 Or. 446, 74 
 
 Pac. 927 388, 1010 
 
 ,. Gray (Or.) 79 Pac. 53 264 
 
 525, 551 
 ■V. Grayor, 89 Mo. 600, 1 S. W. 
 
 365 139, 326, 327 
 
 V. Green, 35 Conn. 203. .923, 924 
 y. Green, Houst. Crim. Rep. 
 
 (Del.) 217 149, 288, 324 
 
 ». Green, 42 La. Ann. 644, 7 
 
 So. 793 834, 867 
 
 V. Green, 46 La. Ann. 1522, 
 
 16 So. 367 420, 429 
 
 V. Green, 37 Mo. 466 202, 315 
 
 V. Green, 66 Mo. 631 148, 178 
 
 181, B(I3, 626, 865 
 y. Green, 111 Mo. .is.-,. 20 S. 
 
 W. 304 859 
 
 V. Green, 4 Strobh. L. 128 51 
 
 56, 73, 86 
 V. Greenleaf, 71 N. H. 606, 54 
 
 Atl. 38 117, 124, 148, 167 
 
 175, 184. 186, 198, 208, 214 
 
 228, 253 955 
 
 V. Greer, 22 W. Va. SOO 130 
 
 133, 219, 221, 226, 229, 300 
 
 470. 535. .^36. 551, 552, 770 
 774, 777. 816 
 
 -. Gregor, 21 La. Ann. 473... 409 
 y. Gregory, 158 Mo. 139, 59 
 
 S. W. 89 363 
 
 V. Gregory, 178 Mo. 48, 76 S. 
 
 W. 970 101. 212, 242 
 
 V. Grotc, 109 Mo. 345, 19 S. 
 
 W. 93 342, 697 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 czxiit 
 
 State V. Gruff, 68 N. J. L. 287, 53 
 
 Atl. 88 214 
 
 v. Grugin, 147 Mo. 39, 42 
 
 L.R.A. 774, 71 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 533, 47 S. W. 1058. . 171 
 
 271, 277, 297, 311, 321, 322 
 325, 330, 759 
 T. G. S. 1 Tyler (Tt.) 295, 
 
 4 Am. Dec. 724 838 
 
 v. Gnillieri, 26 Nev. 31, 62 
 
 Pac. 497 211 
 
 T. Guillory, 44 La. Ann. 317, 
 
 10 So. 761 412 
 
 V. Gurley, 170 Mo. 429, 70 S. 
 
 W. 875 248 
 
 T. Gut, 13 Minn. 341, Gil. 315 17 
 298, 731, 732, 811 
 
 T. Guy, 69 Mo. 430 400, 938 
 
 T. Haab, 105 Da. 230, 29 So. 
 
 725 426, 806 
 
 T. Haddock, 3 N. C. (2 Hayw.) 
 
 162 863 
 
 T. Hagan, 164 Mo. 654, 65 S. 
 
 W. 249 835 
 
 -7. Hagan, 131 N. C. 802, 
 
 42 S. E. 901 358 
 
 T. Hager, 50 W. Va. 370, 40 
 
 S. E. 393 1042 
 
 T. Haines, 160 Mo. 555, 
 
 61 S. W. 621 212, 249, 681 
 
 699 
 
 V. Hall, 114 N. C. 909, 28 
 L.R.A. 59, 41 Am. St. Rep. 
 822, 19 S. E. 602.. 17-19, 
 
 824 
 825 
 
 T. Hall, 115 N. C. 811, 28 
 
 I..R.A. 289, 44 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 501, 20 S. B. 729.. 824 
 825 
 V. Hall, 168 Mo. 475, 68 S. 
 
 W. 344 226, 248 
 
 T. Hall, 9 Nev. .-.,s...326, 400, 402 
 403, 407, 409, 413, 459 
 T. Hall, 132 N. C. 1094, 44 S. 
 
 E. 553 698 
 
 T. Halliday, 111 La. 47, 35 
 
 So. 380 357, 787 
 
 T. Halliday, 112 La. 846, 36 
 
 So. 753 106, .394. 1045 
 
 T. Hambrlgit, 111 N. C. 707, 
 
 16 S. B. 411 :'.7. 43 
 
 T. Hamilton, Houst. Crim. 
 
 Rep. (Del.) 101 151, 276 | 
 
 T. Hamilton, 170 Mo. 377, 70 
 
 S. W. 876 931. 698, 942 | 
 
 T. Hamilton, 13 Nev. 386 59 j 
 
 T. Hamlin, 47 Conn. 95, 36 I 
 
 Am. Rep. 54 H?,?,. 889, 890 j 
 
 T. Hammer, 116 Iowa, 284, 89 ! 
 
 S. W. 1083 537 j 
 
 T. Hammond, 35 Wis. 315 150 1 
 178, 333, 1045 
 
 State V. Haney, 67 N. C. 467 
 
 840, 841, 
 V. Hanley, 34 Minn. 430, 26 
 
 N. W. 397 
 
 V. Hannah, 10 La. Ann. 131.. 
 
 y. Hansen, 25 Or. 391, 35 Pac. 
 
 976, 36 Pac. 296 236, 
 
 814, 
 V. Hardie, 47 Iowa, 647, 29 
 
 Am. Rep. 496 343, 683, 
 
 699, 
 V. Hardin, 19 N. C. (2 Dev. & 
 
 B. L.) 407 
 
 V. Hardlster, 38 Ark. 605, 42 
 
 Am. Rep. 5 712, 714, 
 
 V. Hardy, 95 Mo. 455, 8 S. W. 
 
 416 229, 421. 502, 
 
 V. Hargraves, 188 Mo. 337, 87 
 
 S. W. 491 789, 
 
 V. Harlan, 130 Mo. 381, 32 
 
 S. W. 997 937, 
 
 V. Harlow, 21 Mo. 446 
 
 V. Harman, 78 N. C. 515 
 
 490, 
 V. Harmon, 4 Penn. (Del.) 
 
 580, 60 Atl. 868 2, 97, 
 
 128-130, 203, 210, 292, 
 
 V. Harp, 31 Kan. 496, 3 Pac. 
 
 432 
 
 V. Harper, 35 Ohio St. 78, 
 
 35 Am. Rep. 596 973, 
 
 V. Harper, 69 Mo. 425 
 
 1. Harper, 149 Mo. 514, 51 S. 
 
 W. 89. 381. T,M. 766, 
 
 775, 
 V. Harrigan, 9 Hoost. (Del.) 
 
 369, 31 Atl. 1052 274, 
 
 T. Harrington, 9 Nev. 91 ... . 
 A . Harrington, 12 Nev. 125 . . . 
 371, 373, 400, 403, 412, 
 ,. Harris, 27 La. Ann. 572.. 
 ». Harris, 45 La. Ann. 842, 
 40 Am. St. Rep. 259, 13 
 
 So. 199 409, 
 
 V. Harris, 112 I^a. 937, 36 So. 
 
 810 972, 
 
 T. Harris. 59 Mo. 5.50 400, 
 
 404, 422. 
 ,. Harris, 7.3 Mo. 287 207, 
 
 V. Harris. 76 Mo. 361 
 
 162, 210, 211. 2)9, 
 V. Harris, 46 N. C. (1 Jones, 
 
 L.) 190 462, 763, 767, 
 
 V. Harris, 63 X. C. 1....715- 
 720, 
 .. Harrison, 111 La. 304, 35 
 So. 560 
 
 838 
 844 
 
 221 
 977 
 980 
 
 810 
 918 
 
 697 
 967 
 
 59 
 
 883 
 
 511 
 
 794 
 
 938 
 806 
 284 
 769 
 
 115 
 321 
 470 
 
 839 
 
 976 
 981 
 139 
 
 773 
 777 
 
 304 
 851 
 360 
 413 
 866 
 
 420 
 
 989 
 403 
 424 
 400 
 404 
 161 
 410 
 
 768 
 717 
 721 
 
 411 
 
CXXIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 State V. Harrod, 102 Mo. 590, 1.5 
 
 S. W. :nz 365, 403, 
 
 507, 
 
 V. Hart, 29 Iowa, 2G8 
 
 V. Hartley, 185 Mo. 660, 105 
 Ail. St. Kep. 608, 84 S. 
 W. 910 
 
 V. Hatch, 57 Kan. 420, 57 Am. 
 St. Rep. 337, 46 Pac. 708 
 447, 473, 480, 540, 543, 
 
 >. Hatfleld, 48 W. Va. 561, 37 
 S. E. 626. .502, 551, 552, 
 
 V. Hawkins, 18 Or. 476, 23 
 Pac. 475... 503, 504, 521, 
 
 V. Hawkins, 23 Wash. 289, 63 
 Pac. 258 162, 166, 
 
 V. Hawley, 63 Conn. 47, 27 
 Atl. 417 
 
 V. Haworth, 24 Utah, 398, 6S 
 Pac. 155 
 
 r. Hayden, 83 Mo. 198.. 404. 
 
 V. Hayes, 89 Mo. 2G2. 1 S. 
 
 W. 305 
 
 V. Hays, 23 Mo. 287 219, 
 
 394, 401, 407, 409, 503, 
 
 V. Hays, 67 Mo. 092 534, 
 
 7. Haywood, 61 N. C. (Phill. 
 
 L.) 376 
 
 V. Head, 60 S. C. 510, 39 S. E. 
 
 6 
 
 ». Headrick, 149 Mo. 390, 51 
 
 S. W. 99 
 
 V. Heinzman, 171 Mo. 029, 71 
 
 S. W. 1010 
 
 V. Helm, 97 Iowa, 378, 66 
 
 N. W. 751 913, 
 
 V. Henderson, 186 Mo. 473, 85 
 
 S. W. 570 248, 897- 
 
 902, 
 V. Hendricks, 32 Kan. 559, 4 
 
 Pac 1050 
 
 •■. Hendricks, 172 Mo. 654, 73 
 
 S. W. 194 1027, 1031, 
 
 V. Hendricks, 1 N. C. pt. 2, 
 
 p. 445 (Conference 369) 
 V. Henn, 39 Minn. 476, 40 N. 
 
 W. 572 
 
 V. Henry, 51 W. Vm. 283, 41 
 
 S. E. 439. .918, 946-948, 
 V. Hensley, 94 N. C. 1021 
 
 409, 422, 424, 425, 504, 
 
 V. Henson, 81 Mo. 384 
 
 V. Henson, 106 Mo. 66, 16 S. 
 
 W. 285 
 
 V. Hermann. 117 Mo. 020, 23 
 
 S. W. 1071 49, 7.-|, 
 
 448 
 932 
 805 
 
 596 
 
 446 
 559 
 560 
 
 939 
 
 522 
 541 
 
 809 
 
 939 
 
 872 
 424 
 426 
 
 605 
 315 
 512 
 516 
 535 
 
 222 
 
 1004 
 
 230 
 
 855 
 
 925 
 
 - 899 
 911 
 
 68 
 
 1036 
 1038 
 
 839 
 
 032 
 
 1040 
 402 
 521 
 859 
 
 680 
 
 82 
 
 State V. Herrell, 97 Mo. 105, 10 Am. 
 St. Rep. 289, 10 S. W. 
 
 387 199, 228, 230, 309, 359 
 
 511, 512, 521, 548, 874 
 V. Hertzog, 55 W. Va. 74, 46 
 
 S. E. 792 223, 812 
 
 t. Heusack, 189 Mo. 295, 88 
 
 S. W. 21 899, 910 
 
 A . Hewes, 60 Kan. 765, 57 Pac. 
 
 959 848 
 
 V. Hickam, 95 Mo. 323, 6 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 54, 8 S. W. 252 66 
 497, 509, 535, 536, 553 
 
 V. Hicks, 27 Mo. 588 152, 203 
 
 424, 432 
 v. Hicks, 92 Mo. 431, 4 S. W. 
 
 742 365,461,511,516, 547 
 
 1. Hicks, 178 Mo. 433, 77 S. 
 
 W. 539 248, 358, 769 
 
 V. Hicks, 125 N. C. 636, 34 S. 
 
 E. 247 219, 223 
 
 \-. Hlggerson, 157 Mo. 395, ."i7 
 
 S. W. 1014 523 
 
 V. Hildreth, 31 N. C. (9 Ired. 
 
 L.) 429, 51 Am. Dec. 364 29 
 
 60, 129, 143, 196, 239, 241 
 
 289, 290, 293. 296, 317, 932 
 V. Hill, 69 Mo. 451.. 158, 199, 203 
 207, 211 
 V. Hill, 65 N. J. L. 626, 47 
 
 Atl. 814 946 
 
 V. Hill, 20 N. C. 629 (4 Dev. 
 
 & B. L. 491) 34 Am. Dec. 
 
 396 287-289, 312, 315, 322 
 
 324, 331, 483, 497, 504, 513 
 544, 548 
 
 V. Hill, 72 N. C. 345 50 
 
 V. Hilton, 26 Mo. 199 639 
 
 V. Hing, 16 Nev. 307 866 
 
 V. Hinkle, 6 Iowa, 380 922 
 
 1. Hlihoka, 31 Mont. 455, 78 
 
 Pac. 965 872 
 
 1 . Hobbs, 33 La. Ann. 226 ... 840 
 y. Hobbs, 37 W. Va. 812, 17 
 
 S. E. 380.. 207, 219, 221, 224 
 >. Hockett, 70 Iowa, 442, 30 
 
 N. W. 742.. 129, 164, 266, 274 
 309, 321, 1046, 10.59 
 >•. Hogue, 51 N. C. (0 .Jones, 
 
 L.) 381 125, 292, 29:!, 422 
 
 V. Holcomb, 86 Mo. 371.. 602, 606 
 607, 614 
 V. HoUenscheit, 61 JIo. 302... 66 
 V. Holllngsworth, 150 Mo. 178, 
 
 56 S. W. 1087 . . 355, 356, 365 
 416 
 I. Hollis, Houst. Crlm. Rep. 
 
 (Del.) 24 378, 455, 469 
 
 V. IloUoway, 156 Mo. 222, 56 
 
 S. W. 734 803 
 
 V. Ilolloway, 161 Mo. 135* 61 
 
 S. W. 600 212, 249, 358 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 cxxv 
 
 state V. Holme, 54 Mo. 153 164, 
 
 205, 219, 221, 239, 274, 
 
 305, 
 
 V. Holmes, 12 Wash. 160, 40 
 
 Pae. 735, 41 Pac. 887 
 
 165 
 304 
 322 
 
 236 
 326 
 V. Holong, 38 Minn. 368, 37 
 
 N. W. 587 867 
 
 V. Hoover, 20 N. C. 500, 4 Dev. 
 & B. L. 365, 34 Am. Dec. 
 
 383 16, 107, 118, 719 
 
 V. Hopkins, 50 La. Ann. 1171, 
 
 24 So. 188 503, 559 
 
 V. Hoplsins, 15 S. C. 153... 131 
 .-. Hoplcii-k, 84 Mo. 278.. 113, 175 
 
 V. Hopper, 71 Mo. 425 148, 183 
 
 V. Hopper, 142 Mo. 478, 44 S. 
 
 W. 272 504, 511, 513 
 
 V. Horn, 116 N. C. 1037. 21 
 
 S. E. 694.. 316, 318, 935, 940 
 
 V. Home, 9 Kan. 119 141. 394 
 
 455 
 V. Horner, 139 N. C. 603, 52 
 
 S. E. 136 605 
 
 v. Hornsby. 8 Rob. (La.) 554. 
 
 41 Am. Dec. 305 859 
 
 V. Horskin, Houst. Crim. Hep. 
 
 (Del.) 116 . . 99, 168, 210 
 791, 792, 795 
 ». Horton, 139 N. C. 588, 1 
 L.R.A.(N.S.) 991, 51 S. 
 
 B. 945 336, 337. 573 
 
 V. Hossack, 116 Iowa, 194, 
 
 89 N. W. 1077 928 
 
 .. Hough, 138 N. C. 663, 50 
 
 S. E. 709.. 448, 452, 472, 474 
 489, 558 
 
 ». Houser, 26 Mo. 431 974 
 
 V. Houston, 19 Mo. 211 889 
 
 V. Howard, 14 Kan. 173 366 
 
 ,. Howard, 102 Mo. 142, 14 
 
 S. W. 937 275- 277 
 
 V. Howard, 112 N. C. 859, 17 
 
 S. E. 166 64. 662 
 
 V. Howard, 35 S. C. 197, 14 S. 
 
 E. 481 68, 400 
 
 V. Howard, 32 Vt. 380 972 
 
 V. Howard, 33 Wash. 250, 74 
 
 Pac. 382 174, 238 
 
 V. Howell, 31 N. C. (9 Ired. 
 
 L.) 485 124 
 
 V. Hoyt, 46 Conn. 330... 200, 203 
 204, 226, 932, 933 
 V. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 518, 36 Am. 
 
 Rep. 89 932, 938, 940 
 
 V. Hoyt, 13 Minn. 132, Gil. 
 
 125... 124, 201, 253, 256, 271 
 289, 293, 310-312, 320-322 
 324, 783, 787, 798, 857 
 V. Hubbard (S. D.) 104 N. W. 
 
 1120 262, 1042 
 
 V. Huber, 8 Kan 447.... 834, 1040 
 
 1043 
 
 State \. Hudson, 59 Mo. 135 207, 208 
 
 241, 245, 504, 523, 531 
 Y. Hudspeth, 150 Mo. 12, 51 
 
 S. W. 483.. 277, 385, 470, 474 
 475, 518 
 V. Hudspeth, 159 Mo. 178, 60 
 
 S. \V. 136 121 
 
 V. Huff, 11 Nev. 17... 19, 840, 842 
 V. Huggins, 12 Rich. L. 402 . . 841 
 T. Hundley, 46 Mo. 414. .805, 806 
 V. Hunt, 128 N. C. 584, 38 S. 
 
 E. 473 120 
 
 V. Hunt, 134 N. C. 684, 47 
 
 S. B. 49 99, 164, 198, 209 
 
 223, 230, 232-234, 236, 319 
 V. Hunter, 118 Iowa, 686, 92 
 
 N. W. 872 99, 312, 438 
 
 V. Hurley, Houst. Crim. Rep. 
 
 (Del.) 28 2, 102-104, 254 
 
 265, 815 
 V. Hutto, 66 S. C. 449, 45 S. 
 
 E. 13 358, 551-553, 555 
 
 V. Hyland, 144 Mo. 302, 46 S. 
 
 W. 195 126, 394 
 
 T. Hymer, 15 Nev. 49.... 148, 175 
 
 938 
 T. Hyndman, 99 Cal. 1, 33 
 
 Pac. 782 418 
 
 V. Ingold, 49 N. C. (4 .Tones, 
 
 L.) 216, 67 Am. Dec. 283 361 
 V. Ingram, 23 Or. 434, 31 
 
 Pac. 1049 924, 930 
 
 V. Inks, 135 Mo. 678, 37 S. W. 
 
 942 133, 230 
 
 X. Ireland, 7 N. J. L. 220 2 
 
 A. Irvin, 5 Blaekf. 343 863 
 
 V. Irwin, 2 N. C. (1 Hayw.) 
 
 112 124, 132 
 
 V. Jackson, 103 Iowa, 702, 73 
 
 N. W. 467 66 
 
 v. Jackson, 33 La. Ann. 1087 421 
 
 428 
 T. Jaekson, 37 La. Ann. 896. . 409 
 V. Jackson, 44 La. Ann. 160, 
 
 10 So. 600 362, 394, 395 
 
 V. Jackson, 17 Mo. 544, 59 
 
 Am. Dec. 281 407, 409, 418 
 
 422 
 V. Jackson, 95 Mo. 623, 8 S. 
 
 W. 749 918 
 
 V. Jackson, 96 Mo. 200, 9 S. 
 
 W. 624 228 
 
 V. Jaekson, 167 Mo. 291, 66 
 
 S. W. 938 231, 249, 250 
 
 T. Jackson, 32 S. C. 27, 10 
 
 S. E. 769 288, 394, 460 
 
 V. Jackson, 36 S. C. 487, 31 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 890, 15 S. 
 
 E. 559 124 
 
 V. Jacobs, 28 S. C. 29, 4 S. E. 
 
 799 254, 275, 324, 331 
 
 V. Jaggers, 71 N. J. L. 281, 58 
 
 Atl. 1014 101, 201 
 
cxxvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED, 
 
 State r. Jaggera, 58 S. C. 41, 36 S. 
 
 E. 434 991, 994, 1003, 1006 
 
 T. Janvier, 37 La. Ann. 644 . . 402 
 409, 420, 420, 446 
 T. .TaiTott, 23 N. C. (1 lied. 
 
 L.) 76 99, 119, 137, 172 
 
 259, 272, 275, 278, 284, 28'.) 
 315, 323, 719 
 V. Jefferson, 43 La. Ann. 995, 
 
 10 So. 199 384 
 
 V. Jefferson, 77 Mo. 136 972 
 
 931 
 V. Jefferson, 125 N. C. 712, 
 
 34 S. E. 648 986, 987 
 
 V. Jenkins, 14 Rich. L. 215, 
 
 94 Am. Dec. 132. .49, 66, 584 
 
 846, 847, 854, 857, 887, 888 
 
 801, S!)2 
 
 V. Jennings, 18 Mo. 435.. 164, 200 
 
 232 
 V. Jeswell, 22 R. I. 136, 46 
 
 Atl. 405 974, 995, 1001 
 
 .. Jimmerson, 118 N. C. 1173, 
 
 24 S. E. 494 652, 672 
 
 V. Joeclsel, 44 Mo. 234 207, 210 
 
 214, 241 
 V. Jolin, 172 Mo. 220, 95 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 513, 72 S. W. 525 211 
 
 V. John, 30 N. C. (8 Ired. L.) 
 
 330, 49 Am. Dec. 396... 
 
 304, 305, 805, 
 
 V. Jolinson, 40 Conn. 136.... 
 
 203, 334, 805, 808, 809, 
 
 260 
 922 
 148 
 811 
 812 
 
 v. Jolinson, 41 Conn. 584 220 
 
 805, 810 
 v. Jolinson, 102 Ind. 247, 1 N. 
 
 E. 377 114, 189, 3.39 
 
 V. Jobnson, 8 Iowa, 525, 74 
 
 Am. Dec. 321.. 2, 3, 152, 157 
 162, 164, 165, 198, 247, 866 
 v. Johnson, 72 Iowa, 393, 34 
 
 K. W. 177 186, 876, 877 
 
 1013, 1020 
 T. Johnson, 104 La. 417, 81 
 Am. St. Rep. 139, 29 So. 
 
 24 867 
 
 T. Johnson, 10 La. Ann. 
 
 457 900 
 
 V. Johnson, 51 La. Ann. 1647, 
 
 26 So. 437 870 
 
 V. Johnson, 37 Minn. 493, 35 
 
 N. W. 373 866 
 
 1. Johnson, 76 Mo. 121 365 
 
 603, 1014, 1029 
 V. Johnson, 118 Mo. 491, 40 
 Am. St. Rep. 405, 24 S. 
 
 W. 229, 976, 995, 1023 
 
 1024, 1029 
 V. Johnson, 191 Mo. 177, 90 S. 
 
 W. 89 847, 855 
 
 State V. Johnson, 23 N. C. (1 Ired. 
 
 L.) 364, 35 Am. Dec. 742 
 
 105, 141, 201, 311, 
 
 315- 
 
 V. Johnson, 47 N. C. (2 Jones, 
 
 L.) 247, 64 Am. Dec. 582 
 
 T. Johnson, 48 N. C. (3 Jones, 
 
 L.) 266 124, 130, 133, 
 
 V. Johnson, 7 Or. 210 574, 
 
 99 
 312 
 317 
 
 316 
 
 317 
 
 222 
 644 
 645 
 V. Johnson, 26 S. C. 152, 1 
 
 S. E. 510.. 973, 981, 991, 994 
 
 995, 1001, 1004, 1010 
 T. Johnson, 49 W. Va. 684, 39 
 
 S. E. 665 552 
 
 V. Jones, 8 Crim. L. Mag. 148 524 
 V. Jones, Houst. Crim. Rep. 
 
 (Del.) 21 152 
 
 V. Jones, 64 Iowa, 349, 17 N. 
 
 W. 911, 20 N. W. 470 124 
 
 V. Jones, 89 Iowa, 182, 56 N. 
 
 W. 427 362, 469, 982 
 
 y. Jones, 125 Iowa, 508, 99 N. 
 
 W. 179 370 
 
 T. Jones, 38 La. Ann. 792 828 
 
 992, 1017 
 V. Jones, 47 La. Ann. 1524, 18 
 
 So. 515 992, 993 
 
 V. Jones, 14 Mo. App. 589 243 
 
 916 
 
 V. Jones, 20 Mo. 58 134, 846 
 
 858, 859, 871, 872 
 
 ,. Jones, 78 Mo. 279 512 
 
 V. Jones, 79 Mo. 441 256, 257 
 
 359 
 T. Jones, 134 Mo. 254, 35 S. 
 
 W. 607 441 
 
 V. Jones, 71 N. J. L. 543, 60 
 
 Atl. 396 203, 370, 478 
 
 518, 551, 553, 765 
 
 v. Jones, 80 N. C. 415 916 
 
 V. Jones, 88 N. C. 671 . . 608, 609 
 T. Jones, 98 N. C. 651, 3 S. 
 
 B. 507 221, 246 
 
 V. Jones, 101 N. C. 719, 8 
 
 S. B. 147 80 
 
 T. .Tones, 2 Penn. (Del.) 573, 
 
 47 AtL 1006 1, 2, 5-8, 97 
 
 98, 103, 104, 124, 125, 149, 174 
 
 175, 208, 214, 225, 226, 232 
 
 254, 259, 311 
 V. Jones, 29 S. C. 201, 7 S. 
 
 E. 296 117, 128, 129, 131 
 
 220, 364, 391 
 
 V. Jones, Walk. (Miss.) 83 16 
 
 V. Jones, 20 W. Va. 764.. 133, 134 
 
 551, 552 
 V. Justus, 11 Or. 178, 50 Am. 
 
 Rep. 470, 8 Pac. 337 680 
 
 682, 684 
 T. Kale, 124 N. C. 816, .32 S. 
 
 B. 892 805 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 cxxvii 
 
 State V. Kearley, 26 Kan. 77 204 
 
 V. Keasling, 74 Iowa, 528, 38 
 
 N. W. 397 357, 365 
 
 V. Keefe, 54 Kan. 197, 38 Pac. 
 
 302 432 
 
 V. Keeler, 2R Iowa, 551 .. . 896, 899 
 
 V. Keenan, 38 La. Ann. 660.. 991 
 
 992, 1007 
 
 ,. Keene, 50 Mo. 357 404, 407 
 
 415, 424, 432 
 T. Keen, 29 Mont. 508, 101 
 
 Am. St. Eep. 579, 75 Pac. 
 
 362 836, 870 
 
 T. Keith, 9 Nev. 15 125 
 
 V. Kelley, 74 Vt. 278, 52 Atl. 
 
 434 '207 
 
 T. Kellison, 56 W. Va. 690, 47 
 
 S. E. i66 124 
 
 T. Kellogg, 104 La. 580, 29 
 
 So. 285 .. 400, 426, 503, 560 
 V. Kelly, 74 Iowa, 589, 38 N. 
 
 W. 503 60, 68 
 
 V. Kelly, 76 Me. 331, 49 Am. 
 
 Rep. 620 17, 824, 826 
 
 V. Kelly, 1 Nev. 224 192, 697 
 
 T. Kelly, 41 Or. 20, 68 Pac. 1 839 
 V. Kennade, 121 Mo. 405, 26 
 
 S. W. 347 421,430, 795 
 
 V. Kennedy, 8 Bob. (La.) 591 838 
 840-842, 844 
 
 V. Kennedy, 20 Iowa, 569 472 
 
 764, 766, 783 
 i. Kennedy, 177 Mo. 98, 75 
 
 S. W. 979.. 891, 926, 957- 960 
 
 V. Kennedy, 7 Nev. 374 ..476, 483 
 
 486, 541 
 
 v. Kennedy, 91 N. C. 572 .. 464 
 
 472, 483, 489 
 
 T. Kenyon, 18 E. I. 217, 26 
 
 Atl. 199 402, 444 
 
 T. Kessler, 15 Utah, 142, 62 
 
 Am. St. Eep. 911, 49 Pae. 
 
 293 981, 993 
 
 V. Kilgore, 70 Mo. 546 . . 156, 157 
 
 201, 224, 225, 911, 996, 1008 
 v. Kinder, 184 Mo. 276, 83 S. 
 
 W. ^964 126, 267 
 
 V. Kindle, 47 Ohio St. 358, 24 
 
 N. B. 485 974, 1019 
 
 V. Kindred, 148 Mo. 270, 49 
 
 S. W. 845 . . 199, 202, 224 
 
 228, 231 
 
 V. King, 22 La. Ann. 454 .. 115 
 
 394 
 v. King, 111 Mo. 576, 20 S. 
 
 W. 299 200 
 
 T. King, 9 Mont. 445, 24 Pac. 
 
 265 73, 83, 416 
 
 V. King, 2 Rice's Digest (S. C.) 
 
 106 217 
 
 V. King, 24 Utah, 482, 91 Am. 
 
 St. Eep. 808, 68 Pac. 
 
 418 . . 174, 645, 650, 875, 876 
 
 State V. Kirby, 62 Kan. 436, 63 
 
 Pac. 752 308, 836 
 
 V. Kirk, 10 Or. 505 73 
 
 V. Kloss, 117 Mo. 591, 23 S. W. 
 
 780 296, 374, 526 
 
 T. Knapp, 70 Ohio St. 380, 
 
 71 N. E. 705 897 
 
 V. Knight, 43 Me. 11 . . 129, 130 
 133, 332 
 V. Knoll, 69 Kan. 767, 77 Pac. 
 
 580 973, 974, 993, 1003 
 
 r. Knoll (Kan.) 83 Pac. 622.. 172 
 T. Knolle, 90 Mo. App. 238 . . 910 
 T. Knouse, 29 Iowa, 118 . . 86G 
 
 871 
 V. Koerner, 8 N. D. 292, 73 
 
 Am. St. Eep. 752, 78 N. W. 
 
 981 805, SOT 
 
 T. Kohne, 48 W. Va. 335, 37 S. 
 
 E. 553 937, 1054 
 
 . . KotoTsky, 74 Mo. 247 . . 160 
 
 162, 163, 211, 303, 324, 327 
 v. Kotovsky, 11 Mo. App. 
 
 584 80;; 
 
 T. Krause, 153 Mo. 474, 55 S. 
 
 W. 70 212 
 
 v. Kring, 64 Mo. 591 250 
 
 V. Krlng, 11 Mo. App. 92, Af- 
 firmed in 74 Mo. 612 .. 995 
 1004 
 T. Knehner, 93 Mo. 193, 6 S. 
 
 W. 118 924 
 
 T. Kuhn, 117 Iowa, 216, 90 
 
 N. W. 733 . . 919, 923, 988 
 
 992, 999, 1028, 1029 
 
 v. Labuzan, 37 La. Ann. 489 . . 399 
 
 409, 422 
 
 T. Lakey, 65 Mo. 217 . . 840, 841 
 
 846 
 v. Laliyer, 4 Minn. 308, Gil. 
 
 277 238, 896 
 
 T. Lamb, 28 Mo. 218 896 
 
 T. Lambert, 93 N. C. 619 .. 129 
 130, 916 
 V. Lamon, 10 N. C. (3 Hawks) 
 
 175 842-844 
 
 T. Landgraf, 95 Mo. 97, 6 Am. 
 
 St. Eep. 26, 8 S. W. 
 
 237 . . 41, 123, 132, 159, 
 
 Lane, 64 Mo. 319 .. 129, 
 207, 208, 223, 224, 236, 
 
 162 
 203 
 200 
 241 
 243 
 
 Lane, 158 Mo. 572, 59 S. W. 
 
 965 40, 41, 43, 314, 
 
 746, 747, 751, 
 Lane, 26 N. C. (4 Ired. L.) 
 
 113 294, 315, 
 
 Langford, 44 N. C. (Bnsbee, 
 
 L.) 436 923 
 
 Lapage, 57 N. H. 243, 24 
 
 Am. Eep. 69 952 
 
 735 
 752 
 
 318 
 
exxviil 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 state V. Laque, 41 La. Ann. 1070, 6 
 
 So. 787 939 
 
 v. Larkin, 11 Nev. 316 930 
 
 T. Larking, 5 Idaho, 200, 47 
 
 Pac. 945 225 
 
 V. Laudano, 74 Conn. 638, 51 
 
 Atl. 860 612, 633, 946 
 
 v. Lautenschlager, 22 Minn. 
 
 514 . . 125, 128, 130, 225, 834 
 857, 1060 
 T. Lavery, 35 Or. 402, 58 
 
 Pac. 107 870 
 
 V. Lawlor, 28 Minn. 216, 9 N. 
 
 W. 698 928 
 
 V. Lawry, 4 Ney. 161 267 
 
 V. Lay, 93 Ind. 341 851 
 
 v. Leak, 61 N. C. (Phlll. L.) 
 
 450 123, 700 
 
 y. Lee, 91 Iowa, 499, 60 N. W. 
 
 119 55, 72, 79, 956, 957 
 
 y. Lee, 66 Mo. 165 407 
 
 y. Lee, 58 S. C. 335, 36 S. E. 
 
 706 932, 933, 988 
 
 V. Leeper, 70 Iowa, 748, 30 N. 
 
 W. 501 . . 180, 595, 875, 884 
 887, 968, 1009 
 V. Lentz, 45 Minn. 177, 47 N. 
 
 W. 720 914, 921 
 
 y. Leonard, 6 La. Ann. 420 . . 275 
 400, 407 
 y. Lessing, 16 Minn. 75, Gil. 
 
 64 832, 834, 1049 
 
 V. Leuth, 5 Ohio C. C. 94 . . 879 
 897, 905 
 V. Leyelle, 34 S. C. 120, 27 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 799, 13 S. 
 
 E. 319 . . 5, 6, 99, 110, 119 
 125, 133, 179, 275, 578 
 ,-. Levlgne, 17 Ney. 435, 30 
 
 Pac. 1084 . . 138, 390, 391 
 518 
 
 V. Lewis, 80 Mo. 110 925 
 
 y. Lewis, 118 Mo. 70, 23 S. 
 
 W. 1082 . . 504, 511, 513, 525 
 <r. Lewis, 181 Mo. 235, 79 S. 
 
 W. 671 248 
 
 V. Lewis, 14 Mo. App. 191 . . 161 
 273, 279, 314 
 V. Lima, 48 La. Ann. 1212, 20 
 
 So. 737 367 
 
 T. Lincoln, 17 Wis. 579 . . 861, 862 
 \. Llndsey, 19 Ney. 47, 3 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 776, 5 Pac. 822. . 148 
 
 175, 237, 238, 242, 244, 699 
 V. Linhoff, 121 Iowa, 632, 97 
 
 N. W. 77 381, 487, 869 
 
 ,. Llnney, 52 Mo. 40 119, 315 
 
 503, 512, 535, 536 
 V. Lipscomb, 134 N. C. 689, 
 
 47 S. E. 44 . . 132, 144, 164 
 166, 219, 249 
 V. Llpsey, 14 N. C. (3 Dey. 
 
 L.) 485 205 
 
 State y. List, Hoiist. Crlm. Kep. 
 
 (Del.) 133 5, 620 
 
 T. Littlejohn, 33 S. C. 599, 
 
 11 S. E. 638 364 
 
 y. Lockett, 168 Mo. 480, 68 
 
 S. W. 563 540 
 
 V. Locklear, 118 N. C. 1154, 
 
 24 S. E. 410 . . 198, 219, 221 
 223 
 
 y. Lockwood, 119 Mo. 463, 24 
 S. W. 1015 
 
 y. Lodge, 9 Houst. (Del.) 542, 
 33 Atl. 312 . . 566, 595, 
 
 y. Lonsdale, 122 Mich. 388, 81 
 N. W. 277 
 
 V. Lopez, 15 Ney. 407 . . 106, 
 148, 163, 168, 175, 181, 
 
 V. Love, 66 Minn. 296, 68 N. 
 W. 1094 . . 190, 191, 216, 
 
 8 
 
 598 
 1037 
 
 973 
 113 
 
 209 
 
 691 
 882 
 ,. Lowe, 93 Mo. 547, 5 S. W. 
 
 889 ... 163, 805, 866, 867 
 V. Lucas, 55 Iowa, 321, 7 N. 
 
 W. 583 77 
 
 V. Lucas. 124 N. C. 825, 32 
 
 S. E. 962 208, 237 
 
 V. Lucey, 24 Mont. 295, 61 
 
 Pac. 994 . . 248, 918, 951, 952 
 V. Ludwig, 70 Mo. 412 . . 81, 256 
 y. Luke, 104 Mo. 563, 16 S. W. 
 
 242 840, 841 
 
 V. Lyons, 7 Idaho, 530, 64 Pac. 
 
 236 409 
 
 V. Lyons, 70 N. J. L. 635, 58 
 
 Atl. 398 953 
 
 V. McAfee, 148 Mo. 370, 50 S. 
 
 W. 82 179 
 
 V. McAnarney, 70 Kan. 679, 
 
 79 Pac. 137 . . 236, 237, 246 
 949 
 V. McCahill, 72 Iowa, 111, 30 
 
 N. W. 553, 33 N. W. 599. . 
 
 655, 661. 665. 666, 932, 
 
 >. McCann, 43 Or. 155, 72 
 
 Pac. 137 384, 
 
 V. McCann, 16 Wash. 249, 47 
 
 Pac. 443, 49 Pac. 216 . . 
 
 479, 503, 531, 
 
 V. McCanon, 51 Mo. 160 . . 
 
 994, 1034, 
 
 ,-. McCants, 1 Speers, L. 384. . 
 
 320, 325, 326, 328, 
 
 Y. McCarthy, 44 La. Ann. 323, 
 
 10 So. 673 
 
 \. McCollum, 119 Mo. 469, 24 
 S. W. 1021 . . 268, 276, 
 
 V. McConkey, 20 Iowa, 574 . . 
 
 y. McCord, 8 Kan. 232, 12 
 
 Am. Rep. 469 
 
 71 
 930 
 957 
 
 526 
 
 474 
 541 
 993 
 1035 
 296 
 815 
 
 839 
 
 385 
 526 
 863 
 
 1051 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 CXXIX 
 
 state V. McCormac, 116 N. C. 1033, 
 
 21 S. E. 693 . . 160, 164, 
 
 19'J, 203, 
 
 V. McCormick, 27 Iowa, 402 
 
 833, 869, 871, 873, 
 
 V. McCourry, 128 N. C. 594, 
 
 38 S. E. 883 .. 132, 219, 
 
 248, 
 
 V. McCoy, 29 La. Ann. 593 . . 
 
 V. McCoy, 8 Rob. (La.) 546, 
 41 Am. Dec. 301 . . 823, 
 
 166 
 
 224 
 
 223 
 
 1041 
 
 228 
 285 
 404 
 409 
 
 837 
 859 
 
 McDaniel, 6S S. C. 304, 102 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 661, 47 S. E. 
 
 384 116, 424, 437, 568 
 
 McDaniel, 115 N. C. 807, 20 
 
 S. E. 622 814 
 
 McDaniel, 94 Mo. 301, 7 S. 
 
 W. 634 . . 230, 513, 523, 838 
 841, &o3 
 McDonald, 67 Mo. 13 . . 395, 523 
 McDonald, 49 N. C. (4 
 
 Jones, L.) 19 . . 300, 783, 785 
 McDonald, 14 Utali, 173, 
 
 46 Pac. 872 870 
 
 McDonnell, 32 Vt. 491. .125, 128 
 205, 246, 286, 290 
 Mace, 118 N. C. 1244, 24 
 
 S. E. 798 1024, 1025 
 
 McEvoy, 9 S. C. N. S. 208. . 1010 
 McGaffln. 36 Kan. 315, 13 
 
 Pac. 560 866, 867 
 
 McGlnnis, 158 Mo. 105, 59 
 
 S. W. 83 876 
 
 McGIothlin (Tex. Crim. 
 
 App.) 53 S. W. 869 390 
 
 McGonigle, 14 Wash. 594, 
 
 43 Pac. 20 402, 577 
 
 McGowan, 66 Conn. 392, 
 
 34 Atl. 99 998, 1038 
 
 McGreer, 13 S. C. 464. .364, 455 
 McGuire, 87 Iowa, 142, 54 
 
 N. W. 202 253, 260, 262 
 
 Mcintosh, 39 S. C. 97, 17 
 
 S. E. 446 97, 102, 275 
 
 Mcintosh, 40 S. C. 349, 18 
 
 S. E. 1033 . . 250, 363, 552 
 553, 794 
 MelTer, 125 N. C. 645, 34 
 
 S. B. 439 426, 433 
 
 McKenzie, 177 Mo. 699, 76 
 
 S. W. 1015 .. 283, 355, 462 
 499 
 
 T. McKinley, 82 Iowa, 445, 48 
 
 N. W. 804 379, 
 
 T. McKinney, 31 Kan. 570, 3 
 
 Pac. 356 925, 
 
 T. McKinzie, 102 Mo. 620, 15 
 
 S. W. 149 63, 103, 
 
 132, 219, 256, 257, 
 T. McKnight, 119 Iowa, 79, 93 
 
 N. W. 63 
 
 Hom. — ix. 
 
 469 
 932 
 
 130 
 323 
 
 1002 
 
 State V. McLaughlin, 149 Mo. 19, 50 
 
 S. W. 315 131, 22 1 
 
 V. McLeod, 136 Mo. 109, 37 
 
 S. W. 828 970 
 
 V. McMahan, 103 N. C. 379, 9 
 
 S. E. 489 637, 963 
 
 V. McMulIin, 170 Mo. 608, 71 
 
 S. W. 221 . . 219, 235, 242 
 
 249, 1001 
 
 V. McNab, 20 N. H. 160 . . 8, 59:; 
 
 V. McNally, 87 Mo 644 ..407, 73-1 
 
 733, 737-73!) 
 
 V. McNamara, 100 Mo. 100, 
 
 13 S. W. 938 . ; 302 
 
 T. McNeely, 34 La. Ann. 
 
 1022 408 
 
 V. McNeill, 92 N. C. 812 . . 275 
 325, 320, 422, 433 
 
 V. McXinch, 90 N. C. 096 751 
 
 V. McPhail (Wash.) 81 Pac. 
 
 683 245, 254, 202 
 
 V. McPheison, 114 Iowa, 492, 
 
 87 N. W. 421 164, 872 
 
 V. Madison, 49 W. Va. 96, 38 
 
 S. E. 492 42.-; 
 
 V. Maguire, 69 Mo. 197 512 
 
 y. Mahan, 68 Iowa, 304, 20 N. 
 
 W. 449, 27 N. W. 249 . . 362 
 
 379, 447, 469, 469 
 
 V. Mahly, 68 Mo. 315 . . 75, 717 
 
 914 
 V. Mahon, 3 Harr. (Del.) 
 
 568 739 
 
 V. Malras 1 N. J. L. 453.. 56, 888 
 V. Maloy, 44 Iowa, 104 . . 60, 62 
 382, 409, 484, 488 
 v. Mandei-Tille, 37 Wash. 365, 
 
 79 Pac. 977 208 
 
 V. Mann, 2 N. C. (1 Hayw.) 
 
 4 74 
 
 V. Manns, 48 W. Va. 480, 37 
 
 S. B. 613 . . 142, 316, 437 
 532, 553 
 V. Marple, 15 Or. 205, 14 Pac. 
 
 521 834 
 
 V. Marsh, 171 Mo. 523, 71 S. 
 
 W. 1003 158 
 
 V. Marsh, 70 Vt. 288, 40 Atl. 
 
 836 915 
 
 V. Martin, 124 Mo. 514, 28 S. 
 
 W. 12 275, 276 
 
 V. Martin, 29 Mont. 273, 74 
 
 Pac. 725 203 
 
 V. Martin, 24 N. C. (2 Ired. 
 
 L.) 101 294, 319, 520 
 
 V. Martin, 4 N. J. L. J. 232, 
 
 3 Crim. L. Mag. 44 . . 805-807 
 809 
 
 V. Martin, 9 Ohio S. & C. P. 
 
 Dec. 778 . . 234, 362, 376, 
 
 447, 474, 480, 498. 502, 
 
 838, 854, 
 
 446 
 532 
 860 
 
ex XX 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 State V. Martin, 47 S. C. 67, 25 S. 
 
 E. 113 905, 910, 
 
 V. Martin, 30 Wis. 216, 11 Am. 
 Eep. 567 . . 275, 794, 990, 
 
 V. Marx, 78 Conn. 18, 60 Atl. 
 
 000 248, 
 
 V. Mason, 54 S. C. 240, 32 S. 
 
 E. 357 116, 
 
 V. Massage, 65 N. C. 480 . . 
 
 V. Matakovlch, 59 Minn. 514, 
 
 61 N. W. 677 851, 
 
 V. Mathes, 90 Mo. 571, 2 S. 
 
 W. 800 994, 
 
 T. Matheson (Iowa) 103 N. W. 
 
 137 568, 
 
 v. Matthews, 38 La. Ann. 
 
 795 35, 
 
 V. Matthews, 148 Mo. 185, 71 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 594, 49 S. 
 
 W. 1085 . . 302, 356, 359, 
 
 V. Matthews, 78 N. C. 523 .. 
 
 134, 144, 372, 404, 
 
 r. Matthews, 80 N. C. 418.. 
 
 673, 674, 932, 
 
 V. May, 142 Mo. 135, 43 S. 
 
 W. 637 . . 219, 227, 662, 
 
 V. May, 172 Mo. 630, 72 S. W. 
 
 918 248, 
 
 V. Mayfleia, 66 Mo. 125 . . 19, 
 
 V. Mazon, 90 N. C. 676 . . 130, 
 
 947 
 
 1022 
 1049 
 
 903 
 
 222 
 289 
 342 
 
 869 
 
 1035 
 
 946 
 
 36 
 
 395 
 
 477 
 54 
 425 
 647 
 955 
 
 960 
 
 1055 
 840 
 844 
 364 
 486 
 
 T. Meadows, 156 Mo. 110, 56 
 
 S. W. 878 248, 861 
 
 V. Medlicott, 9 Kan. 257 1003 
 
 V. Medlin, 60 N. C. (2 Winst. 
 
 L.) 99 491, 798 
 
 V. Melton, 67 Mo. 594 199 
 
 V. Melton, 102 Mo. 683, 15 S. 
 
 W. 139 534, 535 
 
 T. Melvern, 32 Wash. 7, 72 
 
 Pac. 489 223 
 
 V. Melvln, 166 Mo. 565, 66 
 
 S. W. 534 74 
 
 V. Merrill, 13 N. C. (2 Dev. 
 
 L.) 269 124, 132, 275 
 
 V. Merriman, 34 S. C. 40, 12 
 
 S. E. 619 363, 520 
 
 V. Metcalf, 17 Mont. 417, 43 
 
 Pac. 182 871 
 
 T. Meyer, 64 N. J. L. 382, 45 
 
 Atl. 779 977 
 
 V. Meyers, 99 Mo. 107, 12 S. 
 
 W. 516 174, 871, 875 
 
 V. Meyers, 174 Mo. 352, 74 S. 
 
 W. 862 676 
 
 T. Mlddleham, 62 Iowa, 150, 
 
 17 N. W. 446 . . 424, 440, 490 
 494 
 
 State V. Millaln, 3 Ner. 409 115, 160 
 
 165, 200, 204, 832, 833, 954 
 V. Miller, 9 Houst. (Del.) 564, 
 
 32 Atl. 137 .. 50, 129, 354 
 566, 896, 897, 902, 912 
 V. Miller, 35 Kan. 328, 10 Pac. 
 
 805 959, 960 
 
 V. Miller, 100 Mo. 606, 13 S. 
 
 W. 832, 14 S. W. 311 .. 50 
 73, 148 
 V. Miller, 156 Mo. 76, 55 S. 
 
 W. 907 644 
 
 V. Miller, 112 N. C. 878, 17 
 
 S. E. 167 . . 243, 284, 290, 316 
 T. Miller, 43 Or. 325, 74 Pac. 
 
 658 380 
 
 V. Mills, 91 N. C. 581 . . 996, 1010 
 V. Mims, 36 Or. 315, 61 Pac. 
 
 388 439, 441 
 
 T. Minard, 96 Iowa, 267, 65 
 
 N. W. 147 968 
 
 T. Mitchell, 41 La. Ann. 1073, 
 
 6 So. 785 426, 501 
 
 V. Mitchell, 64 Mo. 191 . . 132, 199 
 209, 224 
 V. Mitchell, 170 Mo. 633, 94 
 
 Am. St. Eep. 763, 71 S. 
 
 W. 175 1057 
 
 T. Moelchen, 53 Iowa, 310, 5 
 
 N. W. 186 925 
 
 V. Alollsse, 36 La. Ann. 920.. 093 
 
 1029 
 T. Mollineaux, 149 Mo. 646, 51 
 
 S. W. 462 230 
 
 V. Moody, 3 N. C. (2 Hayw.) 
 
 31, 2 Am. Dec. 616 . . 974 
 993-995 
 V. Moody, 7 Wash. 395, 35 
 
 Pac. 132 45 
 
 V. Moody, 18 Wash. 165, 51 
 
 Pac. 356 . . 162, 164, 984, 985 
 1033 
 V. Moore, 31 Conn. 479, 83 
 
 Am. Dec. 159 789 
 
 V. Moore, 39 Conn. 244 743 
 
 V. Moore, 25 Iowa, 128, 95 
 
 Am. Dec. 776 . . 104, 112, 189 
 208, 592, 593, 595, 598 
 T. Moore (Iowa) 100 N. W. 
 
 16 260, 725, 967, 1043 
 
 T. Moore, 67 Kan. 620, 73 Pac. 
 
 905 241, 915 
 
 V. Moore, 156 Mo. 204, 56 S. 
 
 W. 883 249 
 
 V. Moore, 168 Mo. 434, 68 S. 
 
 W. 358 947, 949 
 
 T. Moore, 69 N. C. 207 . . 32o, 331 
 T. Moore, 104 N. C. 743, 10 
 
 S. E. 183 849. 850, 925 
 
 V. Moore, 8 Ohio Dec. 674 . . 1011 
 
 V. Moran, 7 Iowa, 236 1040 
 
 V. Morea, 2 Ala. 275 .. 38, 835 
 
 848 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 CXXXl 
 
 state V. Morey, 25 Or. 241, 35 Pac. 
 
 655, 36 Pac. 573 . . 164, 
 
 237, 422, 423, 461, 
 
 V. Morgan, 25 N. C. (3 Ired. 
 
 L.) 186, 38 Am. Dec. 
 
 714 . . 300, 300, 394, 764, 
 
 783, 
 
 V. Morgan, 85 N. C. 581 . . 
 
 236 
 402 
 
 766 
 785 
 835, 
 841 
 
 573 
 
 175 
 645 
 965 
 
 209 
 943 
 
 550 
 
 696 
 
 228 
 423 
 848 
 
 V. Morgan, 40 S. C. 345, 18 S. 
 
 E. 037 569, 
 
 T. Morgan, 22 Utah, 162, 61 
 
 Pac. 527 148, 165, 
 
 201, 214, 607, 615, 616, 
 
 650, 924, 
 
 V. Morphy, 33 Iowa, 270, 11 
 
 Am. Eep. 122 . . 40^3, 
 
 213, 550, 942, 
 
 T. Morris (Iowa) 105 N. W. 
 
 213 356, 369, 
 
 V. Morrison (Ind.) 75 N. E. 
 
 968 1050 
 
 V. Morrison, 64 Kan. 669, 68 
 
 Pac. 48 ..993, 1010, 1020, 1021 
 V. Morrison, 104 Mo. 638, 16 
 
 S. W. 492 342, 
 
 V. Morrison, 49 W. Va. 210, 
 
 38 S. E. 481 . . 203, 209, 
 
 250, 422, 
 
 V. Morrissey, 70 Me. 401 . . . 
 
 849, 863-865 
 V. Mortensen, 26 Utali, 312, 
 
 73 Pac. 562, 633 920 
 
 V. Moses, 13 N. C. (2 Dev. 
 
 L.) 452 858-860 
 
 V. Mosley, 31 Kan. 355, 2 Pac. 
 
 782 79, 
 
 v. Motley, 7 Rich. L. 327 
 
 V. Mowry, 37 Kan. 369, 15 Pac. 
 
 282 615, 628, 807, 
 
 V. Mowry, 21 R. I. 376, 43 
 
 Atl. 871 1044 
 
 T. Moxley, 102 Mo. 374, 14 S. 
 
 W. 969, 15 S. W. 556.. 
 
 904, 
 
 T. Mullen, 14 La. Ann. 577 . . 
 
 407, 414, 
 
 T. Mnnchrath, 78 Iowa, 268, 
 
 43 N. W. 211 . . 84, 218, 
 
 647, 
 
 V. Munn, 134 N. C. 680, 47 
 
 S. B. 15 
 
 V. Munston, 35 La. Ann. 888.. 
 V. Murdy, 81 Iowa, 603, 47 N. 
 
 W. 867 . . 341, 375, 521, 
 
 82 
 899 
 
 811 
 
 896 
 941 
 400 
 815 
 
 644 
 955 
 
 249 
 849 
 
 522 
 1010 
 
 T. Murphy, 61 Me. 56 254 
 
 T. Uurphy, 118 Mo. 7, 25 S. 
 
 W. 95 
 
 V. Murphy, 9 Nev. 394 .. 46, 
 
 V. Murray, 15 Me. 100 
 
 806 
 990 
 991 
 639 
 
 State V. Murray, 126 Mo. 520, 29 S. 
 
 W. 590 148, 650, 669 
 
 V. Murrell, 33 S. C. 83, 11 S. 
 
 E. 682 505, 507, 1055 
 
 V. Mushrush, 97 Iowa, 444, 66 
 
 N. W. 746 50, 644, 645 
 
 V. Musick, 101 Mo. 260, 14 S. 
 
 W. 212 125, 131, 132 
 
 V. Nance, 25 S. C. 168 . . 529, 993 
 V. Napoleon, 104 La. 164, 28 
 
 So. 972 248, 429 
 
 V. Nargashian, 26 E. I. 299, 
 
 106 Am. St. Rep. 715, 58 
 
 Atl. 053 58, 62, 377 
 
 V. Nash, 7 Iowa, 347 . . 958, 960 
 
 974, 991, 992, 996, 1013, 1014 
 1017 
 
 V. Neal, 37 Me. 468 206 
 
 T. Neeley, 20 Iowa, 108 . . 105, 315 
 
 341, 368, 504, 513, 521, 523 
 531, 540, 556, 867 
 V. Neibekier, 184 Mo. 211, 83 
 
 S. W. 523 .• 862 
 
 V. Neil, Tappan (Ohio) 88 . . 203 
 214, 253 
 V. Nelson, 101 Mo. 464, 14 S. 
 
 W. 712 . . 211, 312, 993, 994 
 1014 
 T. Nelson, 166 Mo. 191, 89 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 681, 65 S. 
 
 W. 749 373, 378 
 
 V. Nelson, 181 Mo. 340, 103 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 602, 80 S. 
 
 W. 947 856 
 
 V. Nesenhener, 164 Mo. 461, 
 
 65 S. W. 230 896, 903 
 
 V. Nett, 50 Wis. 524, 7 N. W. 
 
 344 425 
 
 V. Nettlehush, 20 Iowa, 257.. 1023 
 
 1024 
 
 V. Neville, 51 N. C. (6 Jones, 
 L.) 432 . . 298, 304, 305, 
 
 V. Newherry, 26 Iowa, 467 . . 
 
 T. Newcomb, 1 Houst. Crim. 
 
 Eep. (Del.) 66 .. 362, 
 
 769 
 774 
 866 
 
 455 
 469 
 V. Newhouse, 39 La. Ann. 862, 
 
 2 So. 799 992, 1007 
 
 V. Newton, 28 La. Ann. 65 . . 259 
 
 315 
 V. Newton, 4 Nev. 410 . . 126, 203 
 
 V. Nichols, 8 Conn. 496 834 
 
 V. Niehaus, 188 Mo. 304, 87 
 
 S. W. 473 243 
 
 V. Nix, 111 La. 812, 35 So. 
 
 917 120, 932 
 
 V. Noakes, 70 Vt. 247. 40 Atl. 
 
 249 686, 690, 849, 923 
 
 T. Noble, 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint, 
 
 1 219, 474, 488, 547 
 
TABLE or CASES CITED. 
 
 State V. Nocton, 121 Mo. 537, 26 S. 
 W. 551 1000, 1007, 
 
 V. Noel (ICan.) 58 Pac. 990 
 T. Nolan, 92 Iowa, 491, 61 N. 
 
 W. 181 
 
 V. Nordstrom, 7 Wash. 506, 35 
 
 Pac. 382 
 
 V. Norris, 2 N. C. (1 Hayw.) 
 
 429, 1 Am. Den. 564 . . 
 
 329, 
 
 T. Northrup, 13 Mont. 522, 35 
 
 Pac. 228 834, 
 
 V. Norton, 69 S. C. 454, 48 S. 
 
 E. 464 
 
 V. Norwood, 115 N. C. 789, 44 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 498, 20 S. 
 
 E. 712 .. 132, 136, 141, 
 
 219, 
 
 V. Novak, 109 Iowa, 717, 79 
 
 N. W. 465 . . 899, 906, 
 
 V. Nueslein, 25 Mo. Ill . . 
 
 107, 132, 134, 137, 148, 
 
 V. Nugent, 8 Mo. App. 563, 
 
 Afflrmed in 71 Mo. 136.. 
 v. Oakes, 95 Me. 369, 50 Atl. 
 
 28 
 
 V. O'Brien, 81 Iowa, 88, 46 
 
 N. W. 752 38, 39, 
 
 V. O'Brien, 18 Mont. 1, 43 Pac. 
 
 1091, 44 Pac. 399 . . 491, 
 
 v. O'Brien, 32 N. J. L. 169.. 
 
 680, 684, 694, 
 
 V. O'Connor, 31 Mo. 389 
 
 r. O'Hara, 92 Mo. 59, 4 S. W. 
 
 422 . . 203, 211, 241, 
 
 254, 
 
 V. Oliver, 2 Houst. (Del.) 
 
 585 . . 601, 603, 617, 630, 
 
 738, 961, 974, 995, 1004, 
 
 1017 
 1018 
 ..872 
 
 235 
 
 102 
 
 260 
 330 
 
 873 
 
 675 
 
 199 
 228 
 
 911 
 106 
 203 
 
 925 
 
 238 
 
 991 
 1013 
 
 494 
 
 7 
 
 704 
 
 462 
 
 253 
 
 266 
 
 633 
 
 1017 
 1040 
 
 V. Oliver, 43 La. Ann. 1003, 10 
 
 So. 20 933 
 
 V. O'Neal, Houst. Crim. Rep. 
 
 (Del.) 58 .. 74, 293, 887, 889 
 V. O'Neil, 51 Kan. 651, 24 L. 
 
 R. A. 555, 33 Pac. 287.. 805 
 811, 848, 925 
 V. O'Neil, 58 Minn. 478, 59 N. 
 
 W. 1101 390, 557 
 
 V. O'Niel, Houst. Crim. Rep. 
 
 (Del.) 468 576, 577 
 
 V. Orrell, 12 N. C. (1 Dev. 
 
 L.) 139, 17 Am. Dec. 
 
 563 19, 838, 840, 844 
 
 V. Orrick, 106 Mo. Ill, 17 S. 
 
 W. 176 60, 66, 82 
 
 V. O'Shea, 60 Kan. 772, 57 
 
 Pac. 970 . . 972, 981, 984, 98G 
 V. Osnes, 14 Mont. 553, 37 Pac. 
 
 13 917 
 
 State V. Ostrander, 18 Iowa, 435.... 132 
 
 140 
 
 V. Ostrander, 30 Mo. 18 215 
 
 V. Outerbridge, 82 N. C. 617.. 843 
 V. Owen, 5 N. C. (1 Murph.) 
 
 452, i Am. Dec. 571. .839, 846 
 852, 855, 858, 860 
 V. Owen, 61 N. C. (PWU. L.) 
 
 42.5 204, 317, 522 
 
 V. Packwood, 20 Mo. 340 . . 199 
 512, 520 
 
 V. Pacquett, 75 Mo. 330 199 
 
 V. Pagels, 02 Mo. 300, 4 S. 
 
 W. 931 972 
 
 V. Pain, 48 La. Ann. 311, 19 
 
 So. 138 932 
 
 V. Palmer, 88 Mo. 568 497 
 
 V. Palmer, 65 N. H. 216, 20 
 
 Atl. 6 913, 932 
 
 V. Pankey, 104 N. C. 840, 10 
 
 S. Ji. 315 201, 312 
 
 V. Parham, 48 La. Ann. 1309, 
 
 20 So. 727 1019, 1032 
 
 V. Parker, 7 La. Ann. 83. .900, 908 
 V. Parker, 96 Mo. 382, 9 S. 
 
 W. 728 .. 511, 512, 981, 1026 
 V. Parker, 106 Mo. 217, 17 
 
 S. W. 180 .. 462, 512, 548 
 V. Parker, 172 Mo. 191, 72 S. 
 
 W. 650 ...158, 420, 983-985 
 1011, 1034 
 
 y. Parker, 65 N. C. 453 847 
 
 V. Parks, 115 La. 765, 40 So. 
 
 39 239, 243, 1043 
 
 V. Partlow, 90 Mo. 608, 59 
 Am. "Rep. 31, 4 S. W. 
 14 . . 484, 504, 509, 511, 512 
 526, 540, 543, 545, 549, 794 
 936, 994 
 V. Pasnau, 118 Iowa, 501, 92 
 
 N. W. 682 . . 654, 807, 808 
 V. Pate, 121 N. C. 659, 28 S. 
 
 E. 354 840, 850 
 
 V. Pate, 4 Obio Legal News, 
 
 403 8, 113 
 
 T. Pate, 5 Obio S. & C. P. 
 
 Dec. 732 . . 120, 124, 392, 601 
 621 
 
 V. Pate, 7 Ohio N. P. 543 115 
 
 V. Paterno, 43 La. Ann. 514, 
 
 7 So. 442 423 
 
 T. Patrick, 48 N. C. (3 Jones, 
 
 L.) 443 986 
 
 V. Patterson, 159 Mo. 560, 60 
 
 S. W. 1047 513, 541 
 
 V. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308, 12 
 
 Am. Rep. 200 . . 128, 332, 490 
 
 550, 790, 791, 1024. 1027 
 
 V. Patza, 3 La. Ann. 512 . . 924 
 
 V. Pauley, 12 Wis. 537 828 
 
 v. Paulson, 118 Wis. 89, 94 
 
 N. W. 771 902 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 CXXXIU 
 
 state V. Paxton, 126 Mo. 500, 29 
 
 S. W. 705 63, 216, 
 
 V. Payne, 86 N. C. 610 
 
 y. Payne, 10 Wash. 545, 39 
 
 Pac. 157 83, 219, 
 
 V. Payton, 90 Mo. 220, 2 S. 
 
 W. 394 .. 50, 73, 576, 
 
 887, 
 
 V. Peace, 46 N. C. (1 Jones, 
 
 L.) 251 
 
 V. Peak, 85 Mo. 190 504, 
 
 V. Pearce, 56 Minn. 226, 57 N. 
 
 W. 652, 1065 . . 976, 977, 
 
 V. Pearce, 15 Ney. 188 . . 423, 
 
 V. Peffers, 80 Iowa, 580, 46 
 
 N. W. 662 . . 211, 304, 
 
 V. Pembei-ton, 30 Mo. 376 . . 
 
 V. Penney, 113 Iowa, 691, 84 
 
 N. W. 509 . . 50, 216-218, 
 
 645, 
 
 T. Pennington, 146 Mo. 27, 47 
 S. W. 799 . . 365, 511, 
 
 514 
 132 
 
 220 
 
 854 
 890 
 
 1002 
 oi6 
 
 1009 
 
 1036 
 
 432 
 
 441 
 
 1055 
 
 863 
 
 247 
 652 
 
 512 
 
 547 
 
 V. Peo, 9 Houst. (Del.) 488, 
 
 33 Atl. 257 .. 132, 469, 545 
 V. Pepo, 23 Mont. 473, 59 Pac. 
 
 721 897, 904 
 
 V. Perigo, 70 Iowa, 657, 28 N. 
 
 W. 452.. 134, 503, 517, 528 
 834, 925 
 T. Perigo, 80 Iowa, 37, 45 N. 
 
 W. 399 . . 981, 984, 986, 992 
 V. Perioux, 107 La. 601, 31 So. 
 
 1016 402 
 
 T. Perrigo, 67 Vt. 406, 31 Atl. 
 
 844 390 
 
 V. Perry, 136 Mo. 126, 37 S. 
 
 W. 804 114 
 
 T. Peters, 2 Elce's Digest, 
 
 106 124, 133 
 
 V. Petsch, 43 S. C. 132, 20 S. 
 
 E. 993 .. 364, 395, 446, 460 
 503, 509, 539, 552, 989 
 T. Petteys, 65 Kan. 625, 70 
 
 Pac. 588 . . 374, 473, 488, 489 
 V. Pettit, 119 Mo. 410, 28 S. 
 
 W. 1014 257, 439 
 
 T. Petty, 21 Kan. 55 871 
 
 V. Phelps, 24 La. Ann. 493 . . 866 
 
 S67 
 T. Phelps, 5 S. D. 480, 59 N. 
 
 W. 471 83 
 
 T. Phillips (Iowa) 89 N. W. 
 
 1092 . . 249, 738, 743, 746 
 T. milllps, 118 Iowa, 660, 92 
 
 N. W. 876 . . 64, 228, 236, 237 
 
 610, 611, 619, 620, 625, 626 
 824, 962, 1003, 1033 
 
 T. 
 V. 
 
 V. 
 V. 
 
 V. 
 
 V. 
 V. 
 
 state V. Phillips, 119 Iowa, 652, 67 
 L.R.A. 292, 94 N. W. 
 
 229 . . 727, 738, 745-747, 750 
 751 
 
 Phillips, 24 Mo. 475.. 3, 72, 198 
 
 202, 203. 209, 234 
 Phillips, 117 Mo. 389, 22 S. 
 
 W. 1079 75, 217, 218 
 
 Phinney, 42 Me. 384 . . 625, 629 
 Pierce, 90 Iowa, 506, 58 N. 
 
 W. 891 938 
 
 Pike, 65 Me. Ill . . 861, 863 
 Pike, 49 N. H. 399, 6 Am. 
 
 Rep. 533 . . 148, 175, 203, 832 
 
 868, 876 
 Piver, 3 N. C. (2 Hayw.) 
 
 79 16, 283 
 
 Polite, 33 La. Ann. 1016 . . 838 
 Poll, 8 N. C. (1 Hawks) 
 
 442, 9 Am. Dee. 655 . . 993 
 
 1017, 1028 
 Pollard, 139 Mo. 220, 40 S. 
 
 W. 949 . . 243, 574, 575, 577 
 
 775, 797 
 Pool, 20 Or. 150, 25 Pac. 
 
 375 995 
 
 Port, 3 Fed. 124 739-741 
 
 Porter, 34 Iowa, 131 . . 942, 943 
 997 
 Porter, 32 Or. 135, 49 Pac. 
 
 964 370, 416, 911, 944 
 
 Posey, 4 Strob. L. 103 . . 12, 79 
 
 Potter, 16 Kan. 80 .. 329, 389 
 
 438, 1040 
 Potts, 100 N. C. 457, 6 S. 
 
 E. 657 . . 124, 130, 222, 805 
 
 Powell (Del.) 61 Atl. 966. . 98 
 
 129, 166, 285, 304, 305, 408 
 
 470, 551 
 
 Powell, 109 La. 727, 33 So. 
 
 748 S27 
 
 Powell, 1 Ohio Dee. Reprint, 
 
 38 210 
 
 Power, 63 L.R.A. 902 . . 592 
 
 593, 596, 714, 969, 1004, 1007 
 Powers, 10 Or. 145, 45 Am. 
 
 Rep. 138 932 
 
 Prater, 52 W. Va. 132, 43 S. 
 
 E. 280 . . 49, 50, 57, 62, 75 
 
 672, 955 
 P.att, Houst. Crim. Rep. 
 
 (Del.) 249 .. 2, 102-104, 130 
 
 132, 149, 151, 152, 160, 204 
 
 209, 214, 224, 228, 259, 304 
 
 305 
 
 Prendible, 165 Mo. 329, 65 
 
 S. W. 559 8.31 
 
 Preslar, 48 N. C. (3 Jones, 
 
 L.) 421 . . 26, 28, 43, 684, 691 
 882 
 
 Price, 6 La. Ann. 691 974 
 
 Price, 186 Mo. 140, 84 S. 
 W. 920 377, 383 
 
CXXXIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 State V. Pritchett, 106 N. C. 667, 
 
 11 S. E. 357 945 
 
 V. PriTitt, 175 Mo. 207, 75 
 
 S. W. 457 . . 249, 304, 839 
 856, 873 
 v. Prude, 76 Miss. 543, 24 So. 
 
 871 15, 588, 591, S86 
 
 Y. Punshon, 124 Mo. 448, 27 
 
 S. W. 1111 928, 940 
 
 V. Putnam, 18 S. C. 175, 44 
 
 Am. Rep. 569 57, 834 
 
 V. Quick, 15 Eicli. L. 342 . . 994 
 1004, 1029, 1034 
 V. Radford, 56 Kan. 591, 44 
 
 Pac. 19 880 
 
 V. Rainsbarger, 71 Iowa, 746, 
 
 31 N. W. 865 127, 132 
 
 v. Rainsl)arger, 74 Iowa, 196, 
 
 37 N. W. 153 913 
 
 V. Ramsey, 82 Mo. 133 . . 501, 806 
 
 859 
 V. Ramsey, 50 N. C. (5 Jones, 
 
 L.) 195 290, 299, 316 
 
 V. Ranlfin, 4 Coldw. 145 731 
 
 T. Rapp, 142 Mo. 443, 44 S. 
 
 W. 270 359, 503, 513 
 
 V. Rash, 34 N. C. (12 Ired. 
 
 L.) 382, 55 Am. Dec. 
 
 420 923, 926, 931 
 
 V. Raymo, 76 Vt. 430, 57 Atl. 
 
 993 498 
 
 V. Raymond, 11 Nev. 98 . . 6, 266 
 
 577, 579 
 
 V. Realsey, 1 Mo. App. 3 . . 840 
 
 841, 846, 871 
 
 V. Rector, 126 Mo. 328, 23 S. 
 
 W. 1074 . . 360, 846, 871, 874 
 
 T. Reddick, 7 Ran. 143 1040 
 
 V. Redman, 17 Iowa, 329 1040 
 
 v. Reed, 53 Kan. 767, 42 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 322, 37 Pac. 
 
 174 ... 365, 473, 895, 922 
 996, 1017 
 V. Reed, 117 Mo. 604, 23 S. 
 
 W. 886 163 
 
 V. Heed, 137 Mo. 125, 38 S. 
 
 W. 574 993, 997, 1029 
 
 1032 
 v. Reed, 154 Mo. 122, 55 S. 
 
 W. 278 495, 796, 857 
 
 T. Reed, 162 Mo. 312, 62 S. 
 
 W. 982 230, 232 
 
 V. Reeder, 72 S. C. 223, 51 S. 
 
 E. 702 253, 551, 552, 841 
 
 T. Regan, 8 Wash. 506, 36 Pac. 
 
 472 853 
 
 V. Renfi-ow, 111 Mo. 580, 20 
 
 S. W. 299 574. 575, 614 
 
 V. Reynoids, 42 Kan. 322, 16 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 483, 22 Pac. 
 
 410 713 
 
 V. Reynolds, 171 Mo. 552, 72 
 
 S. W. 39 515, 836 
 
 State V. Rheams, 34 Minn. 18, 24 N. 
 
 W. 302 469 
 
 V. Rhodes, Honst. Crlm. Rep. 
 
 (Dei.) 476 .. 2, 6, 149, 164 
 
 168, 169, 207, 209, 254, 362 
 496, 498 
 V. Rhyne, 124 N. C. 847, 33 
 
 S. B. 128 . . 132, 152, 198 
 199, 223 
 T. Rice, 7 Idaho, 762, 66 Pac. 
 
 87 918 
 
 V. Rice, 149 Mo. 461, 51 S. W. 
 
 78 875 
 
 V. Richardson, 47 S. C. 18, 24 
 
 S. E. 1028 267, 295 
 
 V. Richmond, 42 La. Ann. 299, 
 
 7 So. 459 863 
 
 V. Riddle, 20 Kan. 714 . . 421, 422 
 V. Riddle, 179 Mo. 287, 78 
 
 S. W. 606 . . 248, 839, 843 
 V. Rider, 90 Mo. 54, 1 S. W. 
 
 825 . . 395, 403, 424, 432, 521 
 1003 
 V. Rider, 95 Mo. 474, 8 S. W. 
 
 723 201, 231, 400, 534 
 
 v. Riley, 100 Mo. 493, 13 S. 
 
 W. 1063 807 
 
 V. Riuehart, 75 N. C. 58 835 
 
 V. Roach, 3 N. C. (2 Hayw.) 
 
 352, 2 Am. Dec. 626 839 
 
 V. Roan, 122 Iowa, 136, 97 N. 
 
 W. 997 . . 140, .387, 459, 805 
 808, 816 
 V. Roane, 13 N. C. (2 Dev. 
 
 L.) 58 . . 10, 347, 615, 740 
 759, 766, 767, 769 
 T. Roberts, 8 N. C. (1 Hawks) 
 
 34?j, 9 Am. Dec. 643 .. 269 
 289, 309, 550 
 V. Roberts (Nev.) 82 Pac. 
 
 100 982, 1001, 1007 
 
 V. Roberts, 63 Vt. 139, 21 Atl. 
 
 424 382, 485 
 
 V. Robertson, 30 La. Ann. 
 
 340 404, 422, 425, 859 
 
 V. Robertson, 50 La. Ann. 455, 
 
 23 So. 510 836 
 
 V. Robertson, 50 La. Ann. 92, 
 
 69 Am. St. Rep. 393, 
 
 23 So. 9 474, 483 
 
 V. Robertson, 178 Mo. 496, 77 
 
 S. W. 528 .. 204, 268, 335 
 837, 854 
 T. Robinson, 126 Iowa, 69, 101 
 
 N. W. 634 .. 154, 850, 876 
 V. Robinson, 73 Mo. 306 ..162, 211 
 
 246 
 V. Robinson, 117 Mo. 649, 23 
 
 S. W. 1066 229 
 
 V. Robinson, 20 W. Va. 713, 
 
 43 Am. Rep. 799 .. 142, 805 
 810, 812-814, 818 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 State V. Robinson, 12 Wash. 349, 41 
 
 Pac. 51 50, 75, 218 
 
 V. Rochester, 72 S. C. 194, 51 
 
 S. E. 685 . . 117, 131, 471 
 V. Rodman, 173 Mo. 681, 73 
 
 S. W. 605 384, 929 
 
 V. Rogers (Iowa) 105 N. W. 
 
 455 238 
 
 V. Rogers, 18 Kan. 78, 26 Am. 
 
 Rep. 754 . . 480, 503, 526, 540 
 543 
 362 
 556 
 900 
 
 V. Rogers, 93 N. C. 523 
 
 V. Roland, 38 La. Ann. 19 . . 
 V. RoUa, 21 Mont. 582, 55 Pac. 
 
 523 367, 474, 479 
 
 V. Rollins, 113 N. C. 722, 18 
 
 S. E. 394 .. 125, 433, 743 
 752, 759 
 V. Romano (Wash.) 83 Pac. 
 
 1 946 
 
 v. Ronk, 91 Minn. 419, 98 N. 
 
 W. 334 248, 441 
 
 V. Rosa, 72 N. J. I,. 462, 62 
 
 Atl. 695 933, 937, 1051 
 
 V. Rose, 30 Kan. 501, 1 Pac. 
 
 817 362, 378, 504 
 
 V. Rose, 14 Mo. App. 567 .... 288 
 V. Rose, 47 Minn. 47, 49 N. W. 
 
 404 433 
 
 V. Rose, 92 Mo. 201, 4 S. W. 
 
 733 375, 547 
 
 V. Rose, 142 Mo. 418, 44 S. 
 
 W. 329 . . 5, 6, 256, 257, 748 
 750 
 V. Rose, 129 N. C. 575, 40 S. 
 
 E. 83 157, 927, 
 
 V. Ross, 18 La. Ann. 340 .... 
 V. Ross, 29 Mo. 32 . . 50, 72, 
 
 T. Row, 81 Iowa, 138, 46 N. 
 W. 872 . . 361, 633, 900, 
 
 V. Rudolph, 187 Mo. 67, 85 S. 
 
 W. 584 
 
 V. Russell, 13 Mont. 164, 32 
 
 Pac. 854 1007, 
 
 V. Rutherford, 8 N. C. (1 
 
 Hawks) 457, 9 Am. Dec. 
 
 658 .. 10, 446, 616, 740, 
 
 766, 
 
 V. Rutten, 13 Wash. 203, 43 
 
 Pac. 30 
 
 V. Ryan, 13 Minn. 370, Gil. 
 
 343 17, 833, 
 
 V. Ryno, 68 Kan. 348, 64 L. 
 
 R.A. 303, 74 Pac. 1114 . . 
 V. Sadler, 51 La. Ann. 1397, 26 
 
 So. 390 .. 367, 371, 460, 
 
 992, 1007, 
 
 T. Sale, 119 Iowa, 1, 92 N. W. 
 
 680, 95 N. W. 193 . . 
 
 233, 430, 441, 443, 940, 
 
 935 
 1030 
 73 
 1049 
 
 958 
 959 
 
 760 
 
 1014 
 
 764 
 
 769 
 
 167 
 
 840 
 
 247 
 
 991 
 1017 
 
 209 
 989 
 
 State V. Sales, 30 La. Ann. 916 .... 
 V. Salter, 48 La. Ann. 197, 19 
 
 So. 265 109, 
 
 V. Samuel, 48 N. C. (3 Jones, 
 L.) 74, 64 Am. Dee. 596. . 
 
 834 
 
 304 
 305 
 V. Sanders, 76 Mo. 35 . . 857, 859 
 V. Sandford, 99 Me. 441, 59 
 
 Atl. 597 688 
 
 V. Sansone, 116 Mo. 1, 22 S. 
 
 W. 617 275 
 
 T. Saunders, 53 Mo. 234 210 
 
 V. Saunders, 14 Or. 302, 12 
 
 Pac. 441 . . 974, 975, 983, 989 
 
 y. Savage, 69 Me. 112 913 
 
 V. Savage, 78 N. C. 520 .... 275 
 V. Scates, 50 N. C. (5 Jones, 
 
 L.) 420 .. 32, 35, 36, 903 
 V. Schaetfer, 172 Mo. 335, 72 
 
 S. W. 518 242, 249 
 
 V. Scheele, 57 Conn. 307, 14 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 106, 18 Atl. 
 
 256 . . 201, 202, 602, 622, 632 
 635, 791, 798 
 V. Schieler, 4 Idaho, 120, 37 
 
 Pac. 272 . . 101, 390, 394 
 917 
 V. Schiller, 70 Ohio St. 1, 70 
 
 N. E. 505 
 
 V. Schmidt, 73 Iowa, 469, 35 
 
 N. W. 590 . . 1000, 1019, 
 
 V. Schmidt, 136 Mo. 644, 38 S. 
 
 W. 719 148, 
 
 V. Schnelle, 24 W. Va. 767 . . 
 
 219, 221, 228, 834, 849, 
 V. Schoenwald, 31 Mo. 147 . . 
 V. Schulz, 55 Iowa, 628, 39 
 
 Am. Rep. 187, 8 N. W. 
 
 469 
 
 V. Scossoni, 48 La. Ann. 1464, 
 
 21 So. 32 . . 382, 386, 
 V. Scott, 4 Penn. (Del.) 538, 
 
 57 Atl. 534 
 
 V. Scott, 12 La. Ann. 274. .41, 
 
 V. Scott, 38 La. Ann. 387 . . 
 V. Scott, 41 Minn. 365, 43 N. 
 
 W. 62 .. 409, 511, 513, 
 
 523, 
 
 V. Scott, 26 N. C. (4 Ired. L.) 
 
 409, 42 Am. Dec. 148.. 
 
 275, 293, 367, 394, 395, 
 
 462, 489, 
 
 V. Scott, 36 W. Va. 704, 15 
 
 S. E. 405 294, 319, 
 
 T. Seahorne, 8 Rob. (La.) 
 
 518 12, 16, 
 
 V. Seery (Iowa) 105 N. W. 
 
 511 . . 42, 137, 214, 231, 
 
 537, 945, 
 
 V. Senegal, 107 La. 452, 31 So. 
 
 867 248, 249, 
 
 1056 
 
 1034 
 1036 
 
 1053 
 
 148 
 
 877 
 
 97 
 
 713 
 
 446 
 
 206 
 
 974 
 
 1007 
 
 873 
 
 521 
 524 
 
 141 
 400 
 498 
 
 324 
 
 239 
 
 451 
 946 
 
 305 
 
CXXXVl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 State V. Senn, 32 S. C. 392, 11 S. E. 
 
 292 
 
 V. Sexton, 147 Mo. 89, 48 S. 
 W. 452 . . 148, 173, 981, 
 
 914 
 
 1029 
 1034 
 
 V. Sexton, 10 N. C. (3 Hawks) 
 
 184, 14 Am. Dec. 584 ... 839 
 V. Seymour, 94 Iowa, 699, 03 
 
 N. E. 661 913, 024, 925 
 
 V. Shackelfoi-a, 148 Mo. 493, 
 
 50 S. W. 105 . . 897, 904 
 906, 919 
 V. Shadwell, 22 Mont. 559, 57 
 
 Pac. 281 413, 443, 445 
 
 V. Shadwell, 26 Mont. 52, 66 
 
 Pac. 508 262, 405, 406 
 
 V. Shafer, 22 Mont. 17, 55 
 
 Pac. j26 199, 425 
 
 V. Shafer, 26 Mont. 11, 66 Pac. 
 
 463 247, 925 
 
 T. Shaffer, 23 Or. 555, 32 
 
 Pac. 545 ..993, 996, 1029, 1034 
 v. Shanley (S. D.) 104 N. W. 
 
 522 143, 574, 869 
 
 V. Sharp, 71 Mo. 218 . . 159, 198 
 
 246 
 T. Sharp, 183 Mo. 715, 82 S. 
 
 W. 134 503 
 
 V. Shaw, 64 S. C. 566, 60 
 L.R.A. 801, 92 Am. St. 
 Rep. 817, 43 S. E. 14 . . 119 
 715-717, 719, 720 
 V. Shaw, 73 Vt. 149, 50 Atl. 
 
 863 . . 604, 605, 610, 611, 618 
 
 627, 637, 640, 965 
 
 V. Shay, 30 La. Ann. 114 . . 843 
 
 851 
 
 V. Shelledy, 8 Iowa, 477 . . 5, 24 
 
 26, 29, 53, 644, 663, 668, 670- 
 
 672, 684, 724, 959 
 
 y. Shelton, 64 Iowa, 333, 20 
 
 N. W. 459 . . 366, 367, 461 
 866, 872 
 V. Shelton, 47 N. C. (2 Jones, 
 L.) 360, 64 Am. Dec. 
 
 587 972, 981, 984 
 
 V. Shepherd, 30 N. C. (8 Ired. 
 
 L.) 195 838, 841, 842 
 
 V. Sheppara, 49 W. Va. 582, 
 
 39 S. E. 676 833, 919 
 
 V. Sherman, 16 R. I. 631, 18 
 
 Atl. 1C40 474 
 
 V. Shields, 1 Ohio Dec. Re- 
 print, 17 . . 180, 261, 400, 403 
 530 
 V. Shippey, 10 Minn. 223, 88 
 
 Am. Dec. 70, Gil. 178. .11, 124 
 130, 133, 211, 275, 285, 300 
 312, 319-321, 362, 446, 461 
 402, 469, 496, 503, 522, 540 
 549, 783, 786 
 V. Shirley, 64 N. C. 610 567 
 
 State V. Shock, 68 Mo. 552 182, 203 
 
 717 
 V. Shockley, 29 Utah, 25, 80 
 
 Pac. 865 .. Ill, 188, 292, 482 
 
 503, 542, 545, 604, 615 
 
 T. Shoultz, 23 AIo. 128 . . 152, 164 
 
 200, 460, 504 
 
 V. Shreves, 81 Iowa, 61,'i, 47 
 
 N. W. 899 387, 460, 549 
 
 V. Shuff, 9 Idaho, 115, 72 Pac. 
 
 664 167, 870 
 
 V. Skunka, 116 Iowa, 206, 89 
 
 N. W. 977 120, 855 
 
 V. Sides, 64 Mo. 383 .... 19, 841 
 V. Sigman, 106 N. C. 728, 11 
 
 S. E. 520 ..739, 741, 744, 748 
 V. Silk, 145 Mo. 240, 44 S. 
 
 W. 764, 46 S. W. 959 . . 125 
 
 211, 219, 223, 855 
 V. Simmons, 51 N. C. (6 Jones, 
 
 L.) 21 584, 672 
 
 V. Simon, 50 Mo. 370 
 
 . 993, 1003 
 1029, 1034 
 
 V. Sims, 2 Bail. L. 35 
 
 V. Sisson, 3 Brev. 58 . . 124, 
 
 T. Sizemore, 52 N. C. (7 Jones, 
 
 L.) 206 286, 
 
 V. Skaggs, 159 Mo. 581, 60 
 
 S. W. 1048 314 
 
 V. Slagle, 83 N. C. 630 853 
 
 T. Sloan, 47 Mo. 604 . . 256, 339 
 
 367, 404, 407, 415, 459, 461 
 474, 834, 1044 
 V. Sloan, 22 Mont. 293, 56 Pac. 
 
 364 . . 201, 232, 253, 254, 
 
 260, 313-315, 317, 366, 
 
 932, 
 
 V. Sly (Idaho) 80 Pac. 1125.. 
 
 850, 856 
 
 V. Smith, 38 Conn. 398 . . 833, 834 
 
 V. Smith, 49 Conn. 376 . . 166, 
 
 808, 809, 811, 813, 
 
 T. Smith, 100 Iowa, 1, 69 N. 
 
 W. 269 51, 83, 365, 
 
 T. Smith, 102 Iowa, 656, 72 N. 
 
 W. 279 155 
 
 V. Smith, 73 Iowa, 33, 34 N. 
 
 W. 597 38, 1054 
 
 V. Smith, 127 Iowa, 528, 103 
 
 N. W. 769 1055 
 
 r. Smith, 127 Iowa, 534, 70 
 
 L.R.A. 246, 101 N. W. 110, 
 
 103 N. W. 944 765, 
 
 V. Smith (Iowa) 99 N. W. 
 
 579 480, 550, 
 
 V. Smith, 38 La. Ann. 301 . . 
 
 79 
 192 
 
 331 
 
 259 
 376 
 934 
 
 836 
 
 237 
 992 
 
 796 
 
 779 
 
 551 
 843 
 965 
 
 T. Smith, 48 La. Ann. 533, 19 
 
 So. 452 1004, 1010 
 
 V. Smith (La.) 40 So. 171.. 461 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 CXXXVlt 
 
 state T. Smith, 32 Me. 369, 54 Am. 
 
 Dec. 578 7, 113, 149, 
 
 208, 593, 594, 846, 857, 
 
 T. Smith, 65 Me. 257 . . 683, 
 
 690, 091, 882, 
 
 V. Smith, 78 Minn. 362, 81 N. 
 
 W. 17 870, 
 
 V. Smith, 66 Mo. 92 
 
 V. Smith, 53 Mo. 139 
 
 V. Smith, 114 Mo. 406, 21 S. 
 
 W. 827 354, 350, 
 
 T. Smith, 125 Mo. 2, 28 S. 
 
 W. 181 370, 507, 
 
 V. Smith, 164 Mo. 567, 65 S. 
 
 W. 270 . . 158, 159, 402, 
 
 V. Smith, 37 Mo. App. 137 . . 
 
 V. Smith, 10 Nev. 106 . . 30, 
 
 542, 
 
 T. Smith, 20 N. C. 115 (3 
 
 Dev. & B. L. 117) . . 303, 
 V. Smith, 61 N. C. (Phill. L.) 
 
 340 852, 
 
 V. Smith, 77 N. C. 488 . . 
 
 221, 222, 254, 266, 293, 
 
 178 
 885 
 969 
 0S4 
 883 
 
 874 
 
 700 
 
 1049 
 
 567 
 
 936 
 
 409 
 418 
 511 
 41 
 546 
 
 794 
 
 857 
 219 
 321 
 552 
 V. Smith, 125 N. C. 615, 34 S. 
 
 E. 235 235 
 
 V. Smith, 43 Or. 109, 71 Pac. 
 
 973, . . 362, 378, 400, 460, 462 
 
 V. Smith, 10 Rich. L. 341 6 
 
 V. Smith, 12 Rich. L. 430 .. 424 
 V. Smith, 2 Sti-obh. L. 77, 47 
 
 Am. Dec. 589 . . 99, 112, 120 
 
 124, 133, 192, 209, 574, 577 
 T. Smith, 9 Wash. 341, 37 Pac. 
 
 491 851, 905, 911 
 
 V. Sneed, 88 Mo. 138 800 
 
 V. Sneea, 91 Mo. 552, 4 S. W. 
 
 411 159, 248 
 
 V. Snelbaker, 8 Ohio Dec. Re- 
 print, 466.. 365, 372, 394, 403 
 458, 459, 474 
 V. Snell, 78 Mo. 240 .. 160, 162 
 835, 840, 859, 873 
 V. Snow, 3 Penn. (Del.) 259, 
 
 51 Atl. 607 805 
 
 V. So He Me, 1 Wash. 276, 24 
 
 Pac. 443 869 
 
 v. So Ho Ge, 1 Wash. 275, 24 
 
 Pac. 442 209, 869 
 
 V. Somnier, 33 La. Ann. 237.. 1009 
 
 1019 
 V. Sophei-, 70 Iowa, 494, 30 
 
 N. W. 917 . . . . 164, 812 
 V. Sorenson, 32 Minn. 118, 
 
 19 N. W. 738 . . 362, 376, 460 
 V. Sorter, 52 Kan. 531, 34 Pac. 
 
 1036 929 
 
 V. Spangler, 64 Kan. 661, OS 
 
 Pac. 39 43C 
 
 State T. Spaulding, 34 Minn. 361, 
 
 25 N. W. 793 . . 404, 602, 604 
 624-626, 634, 636, 962- 065 
 
 V. Spealis, 94 N. C. 863 137 
 
 V. Spears, 46 La. Ann. 1524, 
 
 16 So. 467 . . 537, 538, 545 
 
 546 
 
 T. Spell, 38 La. Ann. 20 .... 400 
 
 V. Spencer, 30 La. Ann. 362 . . 992 
 
 995, 1014 
 
 T. Spencer, 160 Mo. 118, 83 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 463, 60 S. 
 
 W. 1048 400, 407 
 
 V. Spencer, 21 N. J. L. 196 . . 113 
 
 123, 152, 153, 155, 165, 209 
 213 
 V. Spendlove, 44 Kan. 1, 24 
 
 Pac. 67 432 
 
 V. Spendlove, 47 Kan. 160, 28 
 
 Pac. 994 8, 256, 339 
 
 T. Spivey, 191 Mo. 87, 90 S. 
 
 W. 81 262, 833, 984 
 
 V. Spivey, 132 N. C. 989, 43 
 
 S. B. 475 ..164, 263, 267, 276 
 325 
 V. Spotted Hawlt, 22 Mont. 33, 
 
 55 Pac. 1026 12, 159, 160 
 
 162 
 
 V. Squaires, 2 Nev. 226 59 
 
 V. Stackhoiise, 24 Kan. 445 . . 873 
 V. Stacy, 103 Mo. 11, 15 S. W. 
 
 147 82 
 
 V. Stair, 87 Mo. 268, 56 Am. 
 
 Rep. 449 944 
 
 V. Staley, 14 Minn. 105, Gil. 
 
 75 232 
 
 V. Staley, 45 W. Va. 792, 32 
 
 S. E. 198 551, 552 
 
 V. Stancill, 128 N. C. 606, 38 
 
 S. E. 926 745 
 
 V. Standifer, 5 Port. (Ala.) 
 
 523 1049 
 
 V. Stanley, 33 Iowa, 526.. 521, 556 
 841, 865, 860, 872 
 
 V. Starr, 38 Mo. 270 153, 104 
 
 241, 275, 512 
 V. Steeley, 65 Mo. 218, 27 Am. 
 
 Rep. 271 845 
 
 V. Steeves, 29 Or. 85, 43 Pac. 
 
 947 75, 83, 85, 218, 1050 
 
 V. Steinemann, 162 AIo. 188, 
 
 62 S. W. 694 854 
 
 V. Stentz, 33 Wash. 444, 74 
 
 Pac. 588 682 
 
 V. Stephens, 96 Mo. 637, 10 S. 
 
 W. 172 . . 272, 354, 356, 567 
 1034 
 V. Sterrett, 68 Iowa, 76, 25 
 
 N. W. 936 460, 461 
 
 V. Sterrett, 80 Iowa, 609, 45 
 
 N. W. 401 139, 243, 569 
 
 V. Stewart, 26 S. C. 125, 1 
 
 S. E. 468 839, 843 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 State V. Stewart, 47 La. Ann. 410 
 16 So. 945.. 402, 410, 426, 
 
 V. Stewart, 9 Nev. 120 . . 97, 
 
 400, 402, 403, 
 
 V. Stiltz, 97 Mo. 20, IC S. 
 
 W. 614 256, 
 
 V. Stockhammer, 34 Wash. 
 
 262, 75 Pac. 810 . . 461, 
 
 V. Stockton, 61 Mo. 382 . .367, 
 
 427 
 429' 
 362 
 409 
 
 512 
 
 462 
 464 
 496 
 557 
 V. Stockwell, 106 Mo. 36, 16 
 
 S. W. 888 249, 284 
 
 V. Stoeckli, 8 Mo. App. 598 . . 164 
 200, 219, 224 
 V. Stoeckli, 71 Mo. 559 . . 209, 243 
 y. Stokely, 16 Minn. 282, Gil. 
 
 249 210, 221, 237, 834 
 
 V. Straub, 16 Wash. Ill, 47 
 
 Pae. 227 . . 162, 164, 166, 243 
 V. Strong, 153 Mo. 548, 55 S. 
 
 W. 78 42 
 
 T. Stuckey, 56 S. C. 576, 35 
 
 S. E. 263 987, 1037 
 
 T. Sullivan, 51 Iowa, 142, 50 
 
 N. W. 572. .129, 384, 408, 932 
 1027 
 v. Sullivan, 20 E. I. 114, 37 
 
 Atl. 673 . . 993, 996, 999, 1034 
 T. Sullivan, 43 S. C. 205, 21 
 
 S. E. 4 . . 360, 363, 395, 460 
 V. Sumner, 130 N. C. 718, 
 41 S. E. 803 . . 424, 436, 
 
 State V. Talhert, 41 S. C. 526, 19 S. 
 
 E. 852 990, 
 
 V. Talbott, 73 Mo. 347 . . 115, 
 
 228, 
 
 T. Talley, 9 Houst. (Del.) 417, 
 
 33 Atl. 181 .. 502, 512, 
 
 437 
 928 
 
 V. Sumner, 55 S. C. 32, 74 
 
 Am. St. Eep. 707, 32 S. 
 
 E. 771 . . 294, 318, 327, 469 
 V. Sundheimer, 93 Mo. 311, 6 
 
 S. W. 52 . . 835, 838-741, 843 
 844, 855, 868 
 T. Swanagan, 109 Mo. 233, 19 
 
 S. W. 220 499 
 
 V. Swayze, 30 La. Ann. 1323. . 129 
 
 131 
 
 V. Sweat, 16 S. C. 624 828 
 
 V. Swift, 57 Conn. 496, 18 Atl. 
 
 664 1013 
 
 V. Swift, 14 La. Ann. 839 ... 460 
 T. Symes, 20 Wash. 484, 55 
 
 Pac. 626 610, 618, 630 
 
 T. Symmes, 40 S. C. 383, 19 
 
 S. E. 16 . . 358, 366, 460, 944 
 V. Tabor, 95 Mo. 585, 8 S. 
 
 W. 744 . . 124, 132, 200, 221 
 
 223, 224, 357, 362, 551, 552 
 555 
 y. Ta-clia-na-tah, 64 N. C. 
 
 614 11, 315- 
 
 T. Tackett, 8 N. C. (1 Hawks) 
 
 210 . . 272, 275, 284, 286, 
 309, 380, 
 
 -317 
 
 296 
 434 
 
 1019 
 224 
 250 
 
 519 
 787 
 V. Talmage, 107 Mo. 543, 17 
 
 S. W. 990 . . 7, 256, 257, 504 
 
 511, 834 
 v. Tarter, 26 Or. 38, 37 Pac. 
 
 53 370, 391, 408 
 
 V. Tasby, 110 La. 121, 34 So. 
 
 300 402 
 
 V. Tate, 50 La. Ann. 1183, 24 
 
 So. 592 900 
 
 V. Tatro, 50 Vt. 483 . . 805, 811 
 
 814 
 V. Taylor, Houst. Crim. Eep. 
 
 (Del.) 436 846, 857, 896 
 
 V. Taylor, 44 La. Ann. 783, 
 
 11 So. 132 426 
 
 V. Taylor, 21 Mo. 477 . . 58, 841 
 
 888 
 
 V. Taylor, 64 Mo. 358 . . 401, 402 
 V. Taylor, 126 Mo. 531, 29 S. 
 
 W. 598 161-163, 856 
 
 V. Taylor, 143 Mo. 150, 44 
 
 S. W. 785 .. 490, 494, 764 
 
 783, 786 
 V. Taylor, 171 Mo. 465, 71 S. 
 
 W. 1005 267 
 
 V. Taylor, 82 N. C. 534 . . 793, 795 
 Taylor, 56 S. C. 360, 30 S. 
 
 E. 939 .. 992, 994, 1011, 1037 
 Taylor, 57 W. Va. 228, 50 
 
 S. E. 247 294, 517 
 
 Teaehey, 138 N. C. 587, 
 
 50 S. E. 232 . . 166, 223, 248 
 
 938, 988 
 
 Terrell, 12 Eich. L. 321 . . 980 
 
 Testerman, 68 Mo. 408 . . 219 
 
 223, 841, 846, 800, 929 
 Tettaton, 159 Mo. 354, 60 
 
 S. W. 743 .. 248, 249, 384 
 
 903, 920, 1054 
 Thawley, 4 Harr. (Del.) 
 
 562 407, 422, 974, 1030 
 
 Thibodeaiix, 48 La. Ann. 
 
 600, 19 So. 680 195 
 
 Thomas, Houst. Crim. Rep. 
 
 (Del.) 511 805 
 
 Thomas, 111 La. 804, 35 So. 
 
 914 402 
 
 Thomas, 29 La. Ann. 601 873 
 
 Thomas, 32 La. Ann. 349 . . 836 
 
 Thomas, 78 Mo. 327 . . 101, 158 
 
 159, 163, 400, 461 
 Thomas, 99 Mo. 235, 12 S. 
 
 W. 643 97, 101 
 
 Thomas, 138 Mo. 168, 39 S. 
 
 W. 459 400 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 CXXXIX 
 
 state V. Thomas, 98 N. C. 599, 2 
 Am. St. Rep. 351, 4 S. 
 
 E. 518 132, 134 
 
 V. Tbomas, 118 N. C. 1113, 24 
 
 S. B. 431 . . 160, 199, 203, 214 
 223, 228, 234, 236 
 T. Thomason, 46 N. C. (1 
 
 Jones, L.) 274 1039 
 
 V. Thompson, 9 Iowa, 188, 74 
 
 Am. Dec. 342 . . 461, 472, 483 
 489, 498, 764, 766 
 v. Thompson, 31 Iowa, 393 . . 871 
 V. Thompson, 71 Iowa, 503, 
 
 32 N. W. 476 387 
 
 V. Thompson, 109 La. 296, 33 
 
 So. 320 435 
 
 V. Thompson, 45 La. Ann. 969, 
 
 13 So. 392 .. 474, 487, 545 
 
 V. Thompson, 83 Mo. 257 304 
 
 V. Thompson, 12 Nev. 140 . . 805 
 806, 872 
 V. Thompson, 68 S. C. 133, 46 
 
 S. B. 941 460 
 
 Y. Thompson, 21 W. Va. 741 995 
 V. Thompson, Wright (Ohio) 
 
 617 97, 162, 200, 208, 209 
 
 214, 225, 232, 254, 579, 806 
 V. Thrailkill, 71 S. C. 136, 50 
 
 S. E. 551 . . 384, 417, 441, 443 
 552, 553 
 T. Thui-man, 66 Iowa, 693, 24 
 
 N. W. 511 866, 867, 884 
 
 V. Tickel, 13 Nev. 502 206 
 
 V. Tilghman, 33 N. C. (11 
 
 Ired. L.) 513 991, 993 
 
 996, 1012 
 V. Till, Houst. Crim. Rep. 
 
 (Del.) 233 . . 149, 209, 253 
 362, 806 
 V. Tilly, 25 N. C. (3 Ired. L.) 
 
 424 141, 294, 315-317 
 
 V. Tippet, 94 Iowa, 646, 03 N. 
 
 W. 445 342 
 
 V. Tolla, 72 N. J. L. 515, 3 
 L.R.A.(N.S.) 523, 62 Atl. 
 
 675 402 
 
 V. Toohey, 2 Rice's Dig. 104. . 205 
 T. Tooker, 188 Mo. 438, 87 S. 
 
 W. 487 362, 385, 502, 794 
 
 798 
 V. Tookey, 2 Rice's Dig. S. C. 
 
 104 5, 285 
 
 V. Town, Wrig'ht (Ohio) 75.. 59 
 
 97, 102, 103, 118, 123, 124 
 
 129, 130, 132, 162, 200, 208 
 
 221, 236, 604, 1040 
 
 T. Townseud, 5 Hair. (Del.) 
 
 487 626 
 
 V. Townsend, Houst. Crlm. 
 
 R«p. (Del.) 337 846, 855 
 
 857 
 
 State V. Townsend, 66 Iowa, 741, 24 
 
 N. W. 535 133, 134, 198 
 
 873, 874 
 V. Trammell, 40 S. C. 331, 42 
 Am. St. Rep. 874, 18 S. 
 
 E. 940 363, 469, 531 
 
 T. Tripp, 34 Minn. 25, 24 N. 
 
 W. 290 390, 503 
 
 V. Trivas, 32 La. Ann. 1086, 
 
 36 Am. Rep. 293 129, 131 
 
 807, 992, 1013, 1014, 1021, 1029 
 V. Trout, 74 Iowa, 545, 7 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 499, 38 N. W. 405 1046 
 V. Truesdale, 125 N. C. 696, 34 
 
 S. E. 646 2,34, 237 
 
 V. Trusty, 1 Penn. (Del.) 319, 
 
 40 Atl. 766 5-8, 274, 275 
 
 385, 1000 
 V. Tucker, 38 La. Ann. 536.. 540 
 545, 946 
 V. Turlington, 102 Mo. 642, 15 
 
 S. W. 141 236, 241, 243 
 
 640, 743, 1006 
 V. Turnage, 138 N. C. 566, 49 
 
 S. E. 913 246, 567 
 
 V. Turner, 29 S. C. 34, 13 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 706, 6 S. E. 891. . 237 
 
 354, 355, 422, 424, 556 
 
 V. Turner, Wright (Ohio) 20. 2 
 
 5, 7, 97, 98, 124, 162, 200, 203 
 
 208, 219, 238, 240 
 
 V. Turpin, 77 N. C. 473, 24 
 
 Am. Rep. 455... 404, 408, 409 
 422, 424, 432, 433 
 
 V. Tweedy, 11 Iowa, 350 834 
 
 1023, 1025, 1027 
 V. Twiggs, 60 N. C. (Winst. 
 
 L.) 142 1062 
 
 V. Tyler, 122 Iowa, 125, 97 N. 
 
 W. 983 156, 877 
 
 T. Umble, 115 Mo. 452, 22 S. 
 
 W. 378 87, 201, 1010 
 
 T. Umfried, 76 Mo. 404. .365, 366 
 368, 370 
 V. Underwood, 57' Mo. 40.. 131, 196 
 219, 224, 504, 512 
 V. Underwood, 75 Mo. 230 . . 634 
 V. Underwood, 35 Wash. 568, 
 
 77 Pac. 863 246, 249 
 
 1044 
 
 V. Upton, 20 Mo. 397 1040 
 
 V. Usher, 126 Iowa, 287, 102 
 
 N. W. 101 . . 128, 550, 555 
 945 
 V. Ussery, 118 N. C. 11(7, 24 
 
 S. E. 414 372, 441 
 
 V. Utley, 126 N. C. 997, 35 S. 
 
 B. 428 853 
 
 T. Utley, 132 N. C. 1022, 43 
 
 S. B. 820 203 
 
 V. Valentina, 71 N. J. L. 552, 
 
 60 Atl. 177 243 
 
cxl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 State V. Vallery, 47 La. Ann. 182, 
 
 49 Am. St. Rep. 363, 16 
 
 So. 745 422, 426 
 
 V. Vance, 17 Iowa, 138 8, 192 
 
 300, 302, 680, 696, 765, 782 
 785, 786, 798 
 V. Vance, 32 Lm. Ann. 1177.. 428 
 V. Vance, 29 Wash. 435, 70 
 
 Pae. 34 196, 293, 937 
 
 V. Vansant, 80 Mo. 67 . . 505, 512 
 974, 981 1035 
 V. Van Tassel, 103 Iowa, 6, 72 
 
 N. W. 497 153, 224, 870 
 
 V. Varney, 8 Boston, L. E. 542 1038 
 V. Vaughau, 141 Mo. 514, 42 
 
 S. W. 1080 504. 512, 540 
 
 V. Vaughan, 22 Nev. 285, 39 
 
 Pac. 733 99, 106, 144, 439 
 
 442, 1001, 1004 
 
 T. Vawter, 7 Blackf. 592 853 
 
 V. Verrill, 54 Me. 408 832, 849 
 
 1040 
 
 V. Viaux, 8 La. Ann. 514 1026 
 
 V. Victor, 36 La. Ann. 978 820 
 
 V. Vincent, 24 Iowa, 750, 05 
 
 Am. Dec. 753... 222, 890, 897 
 912 
 V. Vines, Houst. Crim. Rep. 
 
 (Del.) 424 362 
 
 V. Vines, 93 N. C. 493, 53 Am. 
 
 Rep. 466 192, 345 
 
 V. Vinso, 171 Mo. 576, 71 S. 
 
 W. 1034 248, 313 
 
 V. Vooi-liies, 115 La. 200, 38 
 
 So. 964 851 
 
 V. Vryson, 60 N. C. (2 Winst. 
 
 L.) 86 503 
 
 V. Wade, 161 Mo. 441, 61 S. W. 
 
 800 804 
 
 T. Wagner, 61 Me. 178... 842, 972 
 973, 997 
 V. Wagner, 78 Mo. 644, 47 Am 
 
 Rep. 131.. 123, 148, 1.54, 181 
 
 714 
 
 V. Waldron, 16 R. L 191, 14 
 
 Atl. 847 
 
 T. Waldrop (S. C.) 52 S. E. 
 
 796 417, 489, 
 
 T. Walltev, 9 Houst. (Del.) 
 
 464, 33 Atl. 227... 3, 125, 
 
 132. 274, 275, 354, 469, 
 V. Walker, 37 La. Ann. 560. .3, 
 V. Walker, 50 La. Ann. 420, 23 
 
 So. 967 271, 
 
 V. Walker, 98 Mo. 95, 9 S. W. 
 
 646, 11 S. W. 1133 50, 
 
 224, 644, 645, 658, 
 V. Walker, 1 Ohio Dec. Re- 
 print, 353 392, 
 
 V. Wallace, 2 Penn. (Del.) 402, 
 
 47 Atl. 621 115, 120, 
 
 159, 198, 209, 219, 221, 
 
 974 
 
 528 
 
 State V. Waller, 88 Mo. 402 842, 859 
 
 860 
 
 V. Walsh, 5 Nev. 315 936 
 
 V. Walters, 16 La. Ann. 401.. 839 
 V. Walton, 92 Iowa, 455, 61 
 
 N. W. 179 1000, 1023, 1027 
 
 V. Ward, 5 Harr. (Del.) 496.. 602 
 634- 636 
 
 V. Ward, 74 Mo. 253 840, 841 
 
 V. Warner, 100 Iowa, 260, 69 
 
 N. W. 546 362, 469, .549 
 
 V. Warren, 1 Marv. (Del.) 487, 
 
 41 Atl. 190 274, 275, 300 
 
 362, 460, 469, 502, 540, 786 
 787 
 v. Washington, 13 S. C. 453.. 10.35 
 T. Watkins, 9 Conn. 47, 21 
 
 Am. Dec. 712 922, 92:! 
 
 V. Watkins, 27 Iowa, 415.... 870 
 871, 873 
 V. Watson, 36 La. Ann. 148.. 42.1 
 Watson, 95 Mo. 411, 8 S. W. 
 
 383 257 
 
 Way, 38 S. C. 333, 17 S. 
 
 E. 39 288, ,321 
 
 Weakley, 178 Mo. 4i;i, 77 
 
 S. W. 525 256 
 
 Weaver, 57 Iowa, 730, 11 N. 
 
 W. 675 1003. 1010 
 
 Weaver, 3 N. C. (2 Hayw.) 
 
 54 2, 15 
 
 Weaver, 35 Or. 415, 58 Pac. 
 
 109 811. 813 
 
 Webster, 21 Wash. 63, 57 
 
 Pac. 361 224. 1033 
 
 Weddington, 103 N. C. 364, 
 
 9 S. E. 577 858, 947 
 
 Weeden, 133 Mo. 70, 34 S. 
 
 W. 473 97 
 
 Weems, 96 Iowa, 426, 05 N. 
 
 W. 387 669, 876 
 
 Weese, 53 Iowa, 92, 4 N. 
 
 W. 827 1040 
 
 Wehr, 6 Ohio N. P. 345 912 
 
 Weiners, 4 Mo. App. 492 233 
 
 Welch, 1 Bay, 172 16 
 
 Welch, 22 Mont. 92, 55 
 
 Pac. 927 927, 928 
 
 Welch, 36 W. Va. 690, 15 
 
 S. B. 419 133, 228, 236 
 
 Wellington, 43 Kan. 121, 
 
 23 Pac. 157 993 
 
 Wells, 61 Iowa, 629, 47 Am. 
 Rep. 822, 17 N. W. 90. . 123 
 148, 153, 155, 176, 640 
 Wells, 54 Kan. 161, 37 Pac. 
 
 1005 806 
 
 Wells, 1 N. J. L. 424, 1 Am. 
 
 Dec. 211 362, 386, 469 
 
 Welsor, 117 Mo. 570, 21 S. 
 
 W. 443 972, 990, 995 
 
 Wensell, 98 Mo. 137, 11 S. 
 W. 614 973, 974, 994 
 
 126 
 
 
 498 
 
 v. 
 
 115 
 
 v. 
 
 273 
 
 
 63 
 
 v. 
 
 913 
 
 V. 
 
 631 
 
 V. 
 
 143 
 
 V. 
 
 254 
 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 State >. Wentworth, 37 N. H. 196. .. 931 
 V. Wescott (Iowa) 104 N. W. 
 
 341 899 
 
 V. West, Houst. Crim. Rep. 
 
 (Del.) 382 101, 362, 469 
 
 913, 919 
 V. West, 45 La. Ann. 14, 12 
 
 So. 7 365, 394, 397, 462 
 
 487, 489 
 V. \A'est, 157 Mo. 309, 57 S. 
 
 W. 1071 805 
 
 ,. West, 51 N. C. (6 Jones, 
 
 L.) 50C 135-137. 
 
 V. Wcstfall, 49 Iowa, 328... 
 V. Westlake, 159 Mo. 669, Gl 
 
 S. W. 243 
 
 T. Weston, 98 Iowa, 125, 67 
 
 N. W. 84 746, 
 
 T. Wharton, Tayloi-'s Med. Jur. 
 
 by Reese, 25 
 
 T. Whitakev, 35 Kan. 731, 12 
 
 Pac. 106 
 
 V. White, 45 Iowa, 325... 262, 
 
 T. White, 14 Kan. 538 
 
 T. White, 189 Mo. 339, 87 
 
 S. W. 1188 208, 899, 
 
 V. White, 138 N. C. 704, 51 
 
 S. E. 44 51, 246, 
 
 T. White, 18 R. I. 473, 28 Atl. 
 
 9G8 503, 523, 
 
 T. White, 67 S. C. 320, 45 
 
 S. B. 210 
 
 V. White, 10 Wash'. 611, 39 
 
 Pac. 106, 41 Pac. 442. .65, 
 
 T. Whitnah (Iowa) 105 N. W. 
 
 432 837, 850 
 
 V. Whitson, 111 N. C. 695, 16 
 
 S. E. 332 130, 132, 
 
 228, 1027, 
 T. Whitt, 113 N. C. 716, 18 
 
 S. E. 715 50, 72, 983, 
 
 V. Whittle, 59 S. C. 297, 37 
 
 S. B. 923 756, 
 
 T. Whitworth, 26 Mont. 107, 
 
 66 Pac. 748 
 
 T. Wieners, 66 Mo. 13 ... . 97, 
 
 163. 207, 211, 
 
 T. Wilcox, 118 N. C. 1131, 23 
 
 S. E. 928.. 130, 134, 219, 
 T. Wilcox, 132 N. C. 1120, 44 
 
 S. E. 625 101, 
 
 T. Will, IS N. C. (1 Dev. & B. 
 
 L.) 121 16, 268, 272, 
 
 T. Williams, 122 Iowa, 115, 97 
 
 N. W. 992.. 574, 808, 811, 
 
 V. Williams, 30 La. Ann. 842 
 
 820, 838, 
 
 V. Williams, 37 La. Ann. 776. 
 
 V. Williams, 40 La. Ann. 168, 
 
 3 So. 629 408 i 
 
 State V. Williams, 46 La. Ann. 709, 
 
 15 So. 82 . .386, 394, 396, 399 
 421 
 V. Williams, 111 La. 205, 35 
 
 So, 521 796, 797 
 
 V. Williams, 69 Mo. 110 199, 236 
 V. Williams, 184 Mo. 261, 83 
 
 S. W. 756 863 
 
 V. Williams, 186 Mo. 128, 84 
 
 S. W. 924 . .200, 211, 236, 237 
 246, 278, 414 
 T. Williams, 191 Mo. 205, 90 
 
 S. W. 448 870 
 
 Williams, 52 N. C. (7 Jones, 
 L.) 446, 78 Am. Dec. 248 847 
 852, 898, 809, 945 
 Williams, 67 N. C. 12. .971, 987 
 
 Williams, 68 N. C. 62 1028 
 
 Williams, 129 N. C. 581, 
 
 40 S. E. 84 
 
 Williams (Nev.) 82 Pac. 353 
 
 140 
 
 
 979 
 
 V. 
 
 400 
 
 
 
 V. 
 
 757 
 
 V. 
 
 
 V. 
 
 909 
 
 
 
 V. 
 
 874 
 
 
 834 
 
 V. 
 
 809 
 
 
 
 V. 
 
 902 
 
 »• 
 
 522 
 
 V. 
 
 530 
 
 V. 
 
 66 
 
 V. 
 
 83 
 
 V. 
 
 84 
 
 
 Williams lUr.) 80 Pac. 655 
 
 134 
 
 
 1034 
 
 V. 
 
 1004 
 
 V. 
 
 757 
 
 V- 
 
 401 
 
 V. 
 
 160 
 
 
 230 
 
 V. 
 
 388 
 
 V. 
 
 249 
 
 T. 
 
 620 
 
 V. 
 
 812 
 
 
 819 
 
 V. 
 
 839 
 
 
 873 
 
 V. 
 
 874 
 
 
 
 V. 
 
 242 
 186 
 1020 
 S96 
 902 
 
 Williams, 36 Tex. 352 846 
 
 Williams, 13 Wash. 335, 43 
 
 Pac. 15 839 
 
 Williams, 36 Wash. 143, 78 
 
 Pac. 780 174, 912 
 
 Williamson, 4 Ohio L. 
 
 J. 279 833 
 
 Williamson, 65 S. C. 242, 
 
 43 S. E. 671 207 
 
 Willis, 63 N. C. 26 132, 134 
 
 222, 551, 552 
 Wilmbusse, 8 Idaho, 608, 70 . 
 
 Pac. 849 997, 1001, 1019 
 
 Wilson, 38 Conn. 126 268 
 
 273, 464, 586 
 Wilson (Del.) 62 Atl. 227 2 
 168, 208, 363, 395, 496, 500 
 Wilson, 24 Kan. 189, 36 
 
 Am. Rep. 257 . .975, 1013, 1027 
 Wilson, 23 La. Ann. 558. . . . 979 
 980, 1007, 1020 
 Wilson, 43 La. Ann. 840, 9 
 
 So. 490 401 
 
 Wilson, 114 La. 398, 38 So. 
 
 397 31 
 
 Wilson, 16 Mo. App. 550.. 136 
 202, 327 
 Wilson, 98 Mo. 440, 11 S. 
 
 W. 985 208, 211, 256, 257 
 
 289, 314, 362, 400 
 Wilson, 121 Mo. 434, 26 S. 
 
 W. 357 228, 232 
 
 994, 995, 1005, 1017 
 Wilson, 172 Mo. 420, 72 S. 
 
 W. 696 856, 953 
 
 Wilson, 104 N. C. 868, 10 S. 
 
 E. 315 805, 809 
 
 Wimbei-ly, 3 M'Cord, L. 
 190 835 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 State V. Windahl, 95 Iowa, 470, 
 
 64 N. W. 420 265, 334, 861 
 
 931 
 V. Wingo, 66 Mo. 181, 27 Am. 
 
 Eep. 329 222, 356, 55b 
 
 V. Winner, 17 Kan. 298.. 899, 958 
 V. Winter, 72 Iowa, 627, 34 
 
 N. W. 475 944 
 
 V. Wintlirop, 43 Iowa, 519, 22 
 
 Am. Rep. 257 15, 590 
 
 V. Wintzingerode, 9 Or. 159 . . 834 
 T. Witt, 34 Kan. 488, 8 Pac. 
 
 769 861, 862 
 
 v. Wong Fun, 22 Nev. 336, 40 
 
 Pac. 95 161, 198, 199, 203 
 
 V. Wong Gee, 35 Or. 276, 57 
 
 Pac. 914 937 
 
 T. Wood, 53 N. H. 484.. 852, 991 
 
 1023 
 V. Wood, 112 Iowa, 411, 84 N. 
 
 W. 520 31,38,41,237, 871 
 
 T. Wood, 53 Vt. 560 36, 985 
 
 V. Woods, 97 Mo. 31, 10 S. W. 
 
 157 328 
 
 V. Woodward, Houst. Crim. 
 
 Eep. (Del.) 455 300 
 
 T. Woodward, 84 Iowa, 172. 
 
 50 N. W. 885 537 
 
 T. Woodward, 191 Mo. 617, 90 
 
 S. W. 90 438, 871 
 
 V. Worlcman, 39 S. C. 151, 17 
 
 S. B. 694 102, 128, 247 
 
 275, 295 
 
 v. Worrell, 25 Mo. 205 875 
 
 V. Wright, 112 Iowa, 436, 84 
 
 N. W. 541 698, 983, 989 
 
 V. Wright, 46 La. Ann. 1403, 
 
 16 So. 366. .116, 128, 131, 143 
 V. Wright, 134 Mo. 404, 35 S. 
 
 W. 1145... 101, 158-160, 162 
 V. Wright, 141 Mo. 333, 42 S. 
 
 W. 934 501, 932, 933, 941 
 
 T. Wyckoff, 31 N. J. L. 65.. 51 
 824, 825 
 v. Wyse, 32 S. C. 45, 10 S. 
 
 E, 612 994 
 
 V. Wyse, 33 S. C. 582, 12 S. E. 
 
 556 362, 503, 509 
 
 V. Yandell, 34 Wash. 409, 75 
 
 Pac. 988 851 
 
 V. Tanz, 74 Conn. 177, 54 
 
 L.R.A. 780, 92 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 205, 50 At]. 37. .305, 306 
 V. Yarboroiigh, 39 Kan. 581, 
 
 18 Pac. 474 97, 208, 209 
 
 214, 249, 250, 325-327, 330 
 
 V. Yeargau, 36 L.R.A. 196 12 
 
 V. Tee Wee, 7 Idaho, 188, 61 
 
 Pac. 588 975, 991, 992 
 
 1009, 1017 
 V. Yordi, 30 Kan. 221, 2 Pac. 
 
 161 860 
 
 State V. Young, 104 Iowa, 730, 74 
 
 N. W. 693 356, 550, 1004 
 
 1010 
 V. Young, 55 Kan. 349, 40 
 
 Pac. 659 150, 210, 593, 596 
 
 V. Young, 99 Mo. 666, 12 S. W. 
 
 879 241 
 
 T. Young, 119 Mo. 495, 24 S. 
 
 W. 1038 199, 223 
 
 v. Young (N. J.) 56 Atl. 471. 8 
 V. Young, 67 N. J. L. 223, 51 
 
 Atl. 939 649, 668, 669 
 
 V. Young, 50 W. Va. 96, 88 
 Am. St. Rep. 846, 40 S. 
 
 B. 334 192, 193 
 
 V. Yourex, 30 Wash. 611, 71 
 
 Pac. 203 137, 1055 
 
 V. Zdanowicz, 69 N. J. L. 619, 
 
 55 Atl. 743 166 
 
 V. Zeibart, 40 Iowa, 169.. 124, 126 
 132, 143, 228, 604, 660, 665 
 961, 963 
 V. Zeigler, 40 W. Va. 593, 21 
 
 S. E. 763 363, 367, 403 
 
 474, 483, 489, 549, 554 
 
 V. Zellers, 7 N. J. L. 220.. 2, 5, 6 
 
 124, 129, 132, 300, 441, 786 
 
 787 
 
 T. Zorn, 22 Or. 591, 30 Pac. 
 
 317 811 
 
 State ex rel. Welch v. Sloan, 65 Wis. 
 
 647, 27 N. W. 616 849 
 
 851, 873 
 Kotilinic v. Swenson, 18 S. D. 
 
 196, 99 N. W. 1114 856 
 
 Atty. Gen. v. Tally, 102 Ala. 
 
 25, 15 So. 722 59, 76, 78 
 
 82, 84 
 Matthews v. Toomer, Cheves, 
 
 L. 106 844 
 
 Garvey v. Whitaker, 35 L.R.A. 
 
 561 1053, 1060 
 
 Staten v. State, 30 Miss. 619... 767, 769 
 
 774 
 
 Staup T. Com. 74 Pa. 458 238 
 
 Stedman's Case, Fost. C. L. 292 295 
 
 Steele v. State, 33 Fla. 348, 14 So. 
 
 841 401, 402, 427, 432 
 
 Steffy V. People, 130 111. 98, 22 N. E. 
 
 861 274 
 
 Stein V. State, 37 Ala. 123 685 
 
 Steiner v. People, 187 111. 244, 58 
 
 N. E. 383 262, 369 
 
 Steinmeyer v. People, 95 III. 383 365 
 
 367, 459 
 Stell V. State i.Tex. Crim. App.) 58 
 
 S. W. 75 364. 396, 397 
 
 Stephens v. Com. 20 Ky. L. Eep. 544, 
 
 47 S. W. 229 478, 740 
 
 741, 747, 757, 1001, 1010 
 V. People, 4 Park. Crim. Rep. 
 
 396 921, 931 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 cxliii 
 
 Stephens v. State, 105 Ga. 653, 31 S. 
 
 E. 400 
 
 V. State, 118 Ga. 762, 45 S. 
 
 E. 619 
 
 V. State, 42 Ohio St. 150.. 59, 
 
 177, 645, 650, 668, 
 
 Stephenson v. State, 110 Ind. 358, 
 
 59 Am. Eep. 261, 11 N. 
 
 E. 360 448, 
 
 Stevens v. Boxford, 10 Allen, 25, 87 
 
 Am. Dec. 616 
 
 T. State, 133 Ala. 28, 32 So. 
 
 270 534, 535, 647, 
 
 668, 776, 
 V. State, 138 Ala. 71, 35 So. 
 
 122 493, 495, 1008, 
 
 T. State, 91 Tenn. 726, 20 S. 
 
 W. 429 
 
 r. State, 42 Tex. Crlm. Eep. 
 
 154, 59 S. W. 545 97, 
 
 168, 661, 
 
 Stevenson v. State, 17 Tex. App. 618 . 
 
 217, 645, 
 
 V. United States, 162 U. S. 
 
 313, 40 L. ed. 980, 16 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 839 143, 286, 
 
 V. United States, 29 C. C. A. 
 600, 52 V. S. App. 647, 
 
 86 Fed. 106 541, 
 
 Stevenson's Case, 19 How. St. Tr. 846 
 
 Stevlson v. State (Tex. Crlm. App.) 
 
 89 S. W. 1072 
 
 Stewart v. Jessup, 51 Ind. 413, 19 
 
 Am. Rep. 739 
 
 V. State, 78 Ala. 436 
 
 v. State, 133 Ala. 105, 31 So. 
 
 944 357, 
 
 V. State, 137 Ala. 33, 34 So. 
 
 818 200, 355, 363, 
 
 697, 
 
 V. State, 66 Ga. 90 
 
 T. State, 2 Lea, 598 976, 
 
 1007, 
 
 V. State, 1 Ohio St. 66.. 120, 
 
 232, 315, 387, 446, 498, 
 
 521, 
 
 V. State, 19 Ohio, 302, 54 Am. 
 
 Dee. 426 387, 487, 
 
 V. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 649, 51 S. W. 907 
 
 Stiles v. State, 57 Ga. 183 121, 
 
 StlUwell V. State, 107 Ala. 16, 19 
 
 So. 322 140, 515, 
 
 Stlpp V. State, 11 Ind. 62 50, 59, 
 
 75, 
 
 Stitt V. State, 91 Ala. 10, 24 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 853, 8 So. 669 .. . 
 
 552, 924, 929, 
 
 475 
 
 355 
 
 87 
 
 669 
 
 451 
 
 24 
 
 652 
 1041 
 
 1010 
 
 261 
 
 98 
 667 
 216 
 657 
 
 287 
 324 
 
 938 
 622 
 636 
 
 122 
 
 827 
 929 
 
 551 
 
 569 
 1057 
 327 
 995 
 1011 
 230 
 511 
 932 
 
 559 
 
 396 
 372 
 515 
 
 544 
 
 62 
 
 644 
 
 451 
 932 
 
 Stoball V. State, 116 Ala. 454, 23 So. 
 
 162 97, 98, 223, 365, 
 
 471, 
 Stohart v. Dryden, 1 Mees. & W. 6] 5, 
 
 2 Gale, 146 972, 
 
 Stockdale's Case, 2 Lewin, C. C. 220. 
 
 35, 39, 
 
 Stocliing V. State, 7 Ind. 326 148, 
 
 899, 
 Stockley's Case, 1 East, P. C. 310. . 
 
 Stockton V. State, 25 Tex. 772 
 
 632, 
 Stoffer V. State, 15 Ohio St. 47, 86 
 
 Am. Dec. 470 315, 
 
 504, 541, 542, 
 Stokes V. People, 53 N. Y. 1G4, 13 
 
 Am. Rep 492 117, 118, 
 
 143, 220-223, 236, 407- 
 
 V. State, 71 Ark. 112, 71 S. 
 
 W. 248 
 
 V. State, 18 Ga. 17 
 
 V. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 169, 53 S. W. 106 
 
 Stone V. Carr, 3 Esp. 1 
 
 v. People, 33 111. 326 859, 
 
 V. State, 137 Ala. 1, 34 So. 
 
 629 925, 940, 
 
 V. State, 4 Humph. 27 923, 
 
 Stoneham v. Com. 86 Va. 523, 10 S. 
 
 E. 238 472, 764, 
 
 Stoneman v. Com. 25 Gratt. 887.... 
 
 394, 398, 767, 768, 776, 
 
 Storey v. State, 71 Ala. 329. .358, 362- 
 
 423, 461, 472, 486, 489, 
 
 508, 764, 765, 782, 783, 
 
 V. State, 99 Ind. 413 
 
 Storrs V. State, 3 Mo. 9 
 
 Storti V. Com. 178 Mass. 549, 52 
 
 L.R.A. 520, 60 N. E. 210. 
 
 1060, 
 
 Story V. State, 99 Ind. 413 538, 
 
 545, 
 V. State, 68 Miss. 609, 10 So. 
 
 47 101, 913, 914, 
 
 Stott V. Com. 17 Ky. L. Rep. 308, 
 
 29 S. W. 141 
 
 Stoughton V. State, 13 Smedes & M. 
 
 255 823, 826, 827, 
 
 Stout V. Com. 11 Serg. & R. 177 
 
 V. People, 4 Park. Crim. Rep. 
 
 71 
 
 V. State, 90 Ind. 1 1, 
 
 V. State, 76 Md. 317, 25 Atl. 
 
 299 17, 824, 
 
 Stovall V. Com. 4 Ky. L. Rep. 442. . . 
 
 V. State, 106 Ga. 443, 32 S. 
 
 B. 586 106, 132, 
 
 Strange v. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 280, 42 S. W. 551 
 
 469 
 487 
 
 973 
 29 
 848 
 184 
 900 
 602 
 609 
 631 
 634 
 
 503 
 546 
 
 128 
 409 
 432 
 
 922 
 6 
 
 74 
 689 
 860 
 
 965 
 925 
 
 781 
 366 
 790 
 ■ 364 
 490 
 785 
 482 
 840 
 
 1059 
 
 1061 
 
 544 
 
 944 
 
 929 
 
 279 
 
 844 
 839 
 
 922 
 
 6 
 
 826 
 254 
 311 
 
 192 
 
 938 
 
<xliv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Strickland v. State, 98 Ga. 84, 25 
 
 S. B. 908 448, 500 
 
 V. State, 81 Miss. 134, 32 So. 
 
 921 190, 623, 624, 635 
 
 V. State, 19 Tex. App. 518. .835- 837 
 Stricklin v. Com. 83 Ky. 566 922 
 
 V. State (Miss.) 13 So. 898... 
 
 Stringtellow v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. 
 Rep. 588, 61 S. W. 719.. 
 
 355 
 448 
 
 292 
 342 
 
 Stroud T. Com. 14 Ky. L. Rep. 179, 
 
 19 S. W. 976 939 
 
 Strutton V. Com. 23 Ky. L. Rep. 307, 
 
 62 S. W. 875 272 
 
 Stuart V. State, 1 Baxt. 178 863 
 
 Stubbs V. State, 110 Ga. 916, 36 S. 
 
 E. 200 467, 538 
 
 Studstill v. State, 7 Ga. 2 8, 72, 192 
 
 679, 842 
 Stutsman v. Territory, 7 Okla. 490, 
 
 59 Pac. 707. 852, 856 
 
 Suddutli V. State, 124 Ala. 32, 27 
 
 So. 487 1046 
 
 Sullivan v. Com. 93 Pa. 284, Af- 
 firming 13 Phila. 410 994 
 
 V. State (Miss.) 32 So. 2 557 
 
 V. State, 85 Miss. 149, 37 
 
 So. 1006 66, 67 
 
 T. State, 58 Neb. 796, 79 N. 
 
 W. 721 897, 904 
 
 V. State, 102 Ala. 135, 48 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 22, 15 So. 264.. 5 
 
 124, 125, 132, 211, 265, 292 
 320, 334, 469, 480, 489, 973 
 974, 981, 982, 984 
 V. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 486, 37 Am. St. Rep. 826, 
 
 20 S. W. 927 511 
 
 V. State, 100 Wis. 283, 75 N. 
 
 W. 956 161, 207, 922 
 
 Summers v. State, 5 Tex. App. 365, 
 
 32 Am. Rep. 573. . .168- 170 
 249 
 974 
 880 
 
 Summons v. State, 5 Obio St. 342 
 
 Surber v. State, 99 Ind. 71. .342, 843, 
 Surginer v. State, 134 Ala. 120, 32 
 
 So. 277 46, 423, 
 
 Surrency v. State (Fla.) 39 So. 575. 
 Sussex Peerage Case, 11 Clark & F. 
 
 95, 8 Jur. 793 
 
 SutclitEe v. State, 18 Ohio, 469, 51 
 
 Am. Dec. 459. ...5, 6, 83, 
 
 Sutton V. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 297, 20 S. W. 564 366 
 
 Swain v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 86 
 
 S. W. 335 246, 286, 412 
 
 419, 456 
 
 Swan V. State, 4 Humph. 136.. 153, 198 
 
 214, 228, 808, 811 
 Swann v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 310, 46 S. \Y. 36 273, 501 
 
 Swanner v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 58 S. W. 72 284, 311, 322 
 
 365, 370, 539 
 Sweat V. State, 107 Ga. 712, 33 S. 
 
 E. 422 989 
 
 Sweeney v. State, 35 Ark. 585.. 124, 199 
 Swisher y. Com. 26 Gratt. 963, 21 
 
 Am. Rep. 330 996 
 
 Syer's Case, 4 Coke, 43b 79 
 
 Sylvester v. State, 72 Ala. 201 124, 
 
 134-137, 996, 1051 
 
 V. State (Fla.) 35 So. 142.. 120 
 
 371, 372, 445, 460, 505, 506 
 
 V. State, 71 Ala. 17. .124, 135- 137 
 
 139, 973, 981 
 
 T. 
 
 776 
 460 
 
 992 
 
 834 
 880 
 
 Sutherland v. State, 121 Ga. 190, 48 
 
 S. B. 915 992 
 
 V. State, 121 Ga. 591, 49 S. 
 
 E. 781 842, 865 
 
 Sutherlln v. State, 148 Ind. 605, 48 
 
 N. E. 246 849 
 
 Sutterfield v. Com. 3 Ky. L. Rep. 474 458 
 
 547 
 Sutton T. State, 2 Tex. App. 342 1029 
 
 Taber v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 754, 
 82 S. W. 443 384, 387, 
 
 Tackett v. State, 3 Yerg. 392, 24 
 Am. Dec. 582 601, 609, 
 
 Talbert v. State, 8 Tex. App. 316 
 
 Tanks v. State. 71 Ark. 459, 75 S. 
 
 W. 851 135, 344, 571, 
 
 Tanner v. State, 92 Ala. 1, 9 So. 
 
 613 64, 67, 644, 645, 
 
 656, 
 
 Tardy v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 214, 78 S. W. 1076. .513, 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 83 
 
 S. W. 1128 249, 
 
 Tarver v. State, 137 Ala. 29, 34 So. 
 
 627 355, 358, 
 
 Tarvers v. State, 90 Tenn. 485, 16 
 
 S. W. 1041 150, 192, 
 
 233, 756, 
 
 Tate V. State, 46 Ga. 148 288, 
 
 V. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 231, 33 S. W. 121.. 239, 
 
 1045 
 
 630 
 404 
 415 
 
 698 
 
 652 
 657 
 
 517 
 
 524 
 
 1028 
 
 210 
 758 
 291 
 
 505 
 506 
 Tatum V. State, 131 Ala. 32, 31 So. 
 
 369 918 
 
 Tayloe, Ex parte, 5 Cow. 51 5, 6 
 
 Taylor v. Com. 9 Ky. L. Rep. 257, 5 
 
 S. W. 46 206 
 
 V. State, 48 Ala. 180 274, 385 
 
 V. State, 72 Ark. 613, 82 S. 
 
 W. 495 582, 1045, 1046 
 
 V. State (Fla.) 38 So. 380 262 
 
 V. State, 105 Ga. 746, 31 S. 
 
 E. 764 98 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 cxl\r 
 
 Taylor v. State, 108 Ga. 384, 3-1 S. 
 
 E. 2 136, 220, 
 
 V. State, 120 Ga. 857, 48 S. 
 
 E. 301 
 
 V. State, 121 Ga. 348, 49 S. E. 
 
 303 400, 403, 419, 
 
 V. State, 6 Lea, 234 311, 
 
 V. State, 11 Lea, 708 
 
 V. State. 35 Tex. 97 910- 
 
 V. State, 3 Tex. App. 387 
 
 V. State, 14 Tex. App. 340 
 
 y. State, 38 Tex. Ci-im. llep. 
 
 552, 43 S. W. 1019 
 
 489, 515, 521, 525, 974, 
 994, 998, 
 V. State, 41 Tex. Ci-im. Rep. 148, 
 
 51 S. W. 1106 ..43, 450, 
 V. State, 41 Tex. Grim. Rep. 
 
 564, 55 S. W. 961 24, 
 
 V. State, 44 Tex. Grim. Rep. 
 
 547, 72 S. W. 396 858, 
 
 V. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 26 
 
 S. W. 627 
 
 V. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 
 
 57 S. W. 812 
 
 Taylor's Case, 2 Lewin, C. C. 215.. 
 
 Teagiie v. State, 120 Ala. 309, 25 
 
 So. 209 230, 274, 
 
 Teal V. State, 22 Ga. 75, G8 Am. 
 
 Dec. 482 
 
 Teasley v. State, 104 Ga. 738, 30 S. 
 
 B. 938 467. 506, 
 
 Teat V. State, 53 Miss. 439, 24 Am. 
 
 Rep. 703 
 
 Teel T. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 69 
 
 S. W. 531 308, 
 
 V. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 73 
 
 S. W. 11 698, 
 
 Tempe v. State, 40 Ala. 350.... 124, 
 
 320, 863, 
 
 Temple v. People, 4 Lans. 119. . . .73, 
 
 V. State, 15 Tex. App. 304, 49 
 
 Am. Rep. 200 
 
 Templeton v. People, 27 Micli. 501.. 
 
 Tenorio y. Territory, 1 N. M. 279. . . . 
 
 834, 
 Terrell v. Gom. 13 Bush, 246 543, 
 
 Terrill v. State, 74 Wis. 278, 42 
 
 N. W. 423.. 150, 178, 182, 
 
 V. State, 95 Wis. 276, 70 N. 
 
 W. 356 256, 
 
 Territory t. Anderson, 4 N. M. 213, 
 18 Pac. 21 228, 231, 
 
 V. Baker, 4 N. M. 236, 13 
 Pac. 30 315, 358, 
 
 T. Bannigan, 1 Dak. 451, 46 
 N. W. 597. .261, 326, 327, 
 
 283 
 
 979 
 
 462 
 323 
 832 
 912 
 578 
 927 
 
 467 
 
 093 
 
 1021 
 
 720 
 
 663 
 
 937 
 
 103 
 
 716 
 
 254 
 284 
 
 423 
 
 459 
 
 765 
 
 22 
 
 569 
 
 721 
 127 
 864 
 442 
 795 
 
 1014 
 923 
 930 
 
 832 
 
 853 
 
 545 
 
 1001 
 
 215 
 
 257 
 
 232 
 276 
 
 377 
 
 331 
 
 872 
 
 Territory 
 
 V. Burgess, 8 Mont. 57, 1 
 
 
 
 L.R.A. 808, 19 I^ac. 558.. 
 
 395 
 
 
 398. 400, 
 
 461 
 
 V. 
 
 Gampbell, 9 Mont. 16, 22 
 
 
 
 Pac. 121 384, 
 
 402 
 
 V. 
 
 Chamberlain, 8 N. M. 538, 
 
 
 
 45 S. W 1181 < . . . 
 
 211 
 
 y. 
 
 Davis, 2 Ariz. 59, 10 Pac. 
 
 
 
 359 
 
 814 
 
 V. 
 
 Drennan, 1 Mont. 41 . . . 268, 
 
 301 
 
 V. 
 
 Evans, 2 Idaho, 425, 17 
 
 
 
 I^ac. 139 
 
 866 
 
 V. 
 
 Franklin, 2 N. M. 307 
 
 805 
 
 
 800, 
 
 814 
 
 V. 
 
 Friday, 8 N. M. 204, 42 
 
 
 
 Pac. 62 
 
 200 
 
 V. 
 
 Godas, 8 Mont. 347, 21 Pac. 
 
 
 
 26 835, 837, 
 
 870 
 
 V. 
 
 Gonzales, 11 N. M. 301, 68 
 
 
 
 Pac. 925 506, 
 
 1043 
 
 V. 
 
 Grlego, 8 N. M, 133, 42 
 
 
 
 Pac. 81 1054, 
 
 1055 
 
 V. 
 
 Guillen, 11 N. M. 194, 66 
 
 
 
 Pac. 527 
 
 242 
 
 V. 
 
 Gntierez (N. M.) 79 Pac. 
 
 
 
 716 120, 134, 
 
 739 
 
 V. 
 
 Halliday, 5 Utah, 467, 17 
 
 
 
 Pac. 118 
 
 401 
 
 T. 
 
 Harper, 1 Ariz. 399, 25 
 
 
 
 Pac. 528 
 
 422 
 
 V. 
 
 Hart, 7 Mont. 489 
 
 132 
 
 V. 
 
 Hicks, 6 N. M. 596, 30 Pac. 
 
 
 
 872 
 
 826 
 
 T. 
 
 Johnson, 9 Mont. 30, 22 
 
 
 
 Pac. 346 226, 228, 230, 
 
 834 
 
 T. 
 
 Lucero, 8 N. M. 543, 46 Pac. 
 
 
 
 18 2, 3, 60, 99, 104, 
 
 117 
 
 
 128, 
 
 131 
 
 V. 
 
 McAndrews, 3 Mont. 158.. 
 
 130 
 
 
 176, 
 
 870 
 
 V. 
 
 McGinnis, 10 N. M. 269, 61 
 
 
 
 Pac. 208 55, 73, 179, 
 
 209 
 
 
 625, 627, 646, 653, 665, 
 
 955 
 
 957 
 
 V. Manton, 7 Mont. 162, 14 
 
 Pac. 637 213,690, 866 
 
 V. Manton, 8 Mont. 95, 19 Pac. 
 
 387 681, 690, 805, 883, 925 
 
 V. Munroe, 2 Ariz. 1, 6 Pac. 
 
 478 896 
 
 V. O'Donnell, 4 N. M. 196, 12 
 
 Pac. 743 834 
 
 V. Roberts, 9 Mont. 12, 22 Pac. 
 
 132 933 
 
 V. Romine, 2 N. M. 114.. 1040, 1045 
 V. Rowand, 8 Mont. 110, 19 
 
 Pac. 595 128, 130, 574, 575 
 
 V. Rowand, 8 Mont. 432, 20 
 
 Pac. 688, 21 Pac. 19 203 
 
 V. Scott, 7 Mont. 407, 17 Pac. 
 
 627 244, 932 
 
 V. Stears, 2 Mont. 325 148, 150 
 
 207, 832, 834, 870 
 
 Horn. — X. 
 
cxlvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Territory v. Thomason, 4 N. M. 154, 13 
 
 rac. 223 401, 402 
 
 V. Vialpanao, 8 N. M. 211, 42 
 
 Pae. 64 832, 872 
 
 T. Watson (N. M.) 78 Pac. 504 138 
 
 557 
 
 V. Webb, 2 N. M. 149 1045 
 
 V. West, 4 Ariz. 212, 36 Pac. 
 
 207 137 
 
 V. Yarberry, 2 N. M. 391. .50, 1040 
 V. Yee Dan, 7 N. M. 430, 37 
 
 Pac. 1101 41 
 
 V. Young, 5 Mont. 242, 5 Pac. 
 
 248 833, 846, 854, 870, 873 
 
 Terry v. State, 118 Ala. 79, 23 So. 
 
 776 ., 852, 941 
 
 ,. State, 120 Ala. 286, 23 So. 
 
 176 835, 852 
 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 264, 76 S. W. 928... 305, 369 
 927 
 
 Tesney v. State, 77 Ala. 33 124, 132 
 
 134, 358, 444, 521 
 Tessymond's Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 169 680 
 683, 699, 700 
 Testard v. State, 26 Tex. App. 260, 
 
 9 S. W. 888 1000 
 
 Tetterton v. Com. 28 Ky. L. Rep. 146, 
 
 89 S. W. 8 409 
 
 Thaclser v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1584, 
 
 71 S. W. 931 365,464, 773 
 
 774, 929 
 Thames v. State, 82 Miss. 667, 35 
 
 So. 171 206 
 
 Tharpe v. State, 13 Lea, 138 64 
 
 Thayer v. Lombard, 165 Mass. 174, 
 52 Am. St. Rep. 507, 42 
 
 N. B. 563 973 
 
 V. State, 138 Ala. 39, 35 So. 
 
 406... 163, 265, 318, 386, 505 
 
 Theal v. Queen, 7 Can. S. C. 397 925 
 
 Thetstone v. State, 32 Ark. 179 843 
 
 Thiede v. Utah, 159 U. S. 510, 40 
 L. ed. 237, 16 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 62 907, 914 
 
 Thomas v. Com. 14 Ky. D. Rep. 288, 
 
 20 S. W. 226 858, 900, 925 
 
 T. Com. 25 Ky. L. Rep. 201, 
 
 74 S. W. 1062 528 
 
 V. Com. 27 Ky. L. Rep. 794, 
 
 86 S. W. 694 340 
 
 V. Kinlcead, 55 Arlf. 502, 15 
 L.R.A. 558, 29 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 68, 18 S. W. 854 738 
 
 740-743, 747 
 V. People, 2 Colo. App. 513, 
 
 31 Pac. 349 681-684, 723 
 
 V. People, 67 N. Y. 218 11, 129 
 
 133, 228, 410, 1053 
 V. State, 103 Ala. 18, 16 So. 4 137 
 139, 319, 417, 559 
 V. State, 106 Ala. 19, 17 So. 
 
 4C0 367 
 
 Thomas v. State, 124 Ala. 48, 27 So. 
 
 315 63, 646 
 
 V. State, 126 Ala. 4, 28 So. 591 247 
 
 263, 274, 298, 312 
 V. State, 130 Ala. 62, 30 So. 
 
 391 50, 56 
 
 V. State, 139 Ala. 80, 36 So. 
 
 734 40, 246, 254 
 
 V. State, 74 Ark. 431, 86 S. 
 
 W. 404 249, 464, 475, 478 
 
 479 
 
 V. State (Fla.) 36 So. 161 249 
 
 ■ 230, 421, 426, 809 
 
 T. State, 67 Ga. 460 897 
 
 V. State, 71 Ga. 44 840, 841 
 
 843, 850, 852, 835 
 V. State, 89 Ga. 479, 13 S. B. 
 
 537 1047, 1056 
 
 V. State, 91 Ga. 204, 18 S. E. 
 
 305 626, 630 
 
 T. State, 121 Ga. 331, 49 S. E. 
 
 273 1041 
 
 V. State, 61 Miss. 60 196 
 
 V. State, 73 Miss. 46, 19 So. 
 
 195 1043 
 
 V. State, 40 Tex. 39 1049 
 
 V. State, 11 Tex. App. 314... 401 
 
 990 
 V. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 386, 50 S. W. 70 284 
 
 T. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 20, 96 Am, St. Rep. 834, 
 
 62 S. W. 919 1042 
 
 V. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 344, 72 S. W. 178 140 
 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 Ill, 74 S. W. 36 208, 212 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 51 
 
 S. W. 1109. .512, 318, 520, 521 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 85 
 
 S. W. 1154 290 
 
 Thompkins v. Com. 28 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 642, 90 S. W. 221 575 
 
 Thompson v. Com. 20 Gratt. 724.. 832 
 
 875, 877 
 
 V. Com. 1 Met. (Ky.) 13.. 50, 59 
 
 84, 887 
 
 V. State, 25 Ala. 41 269 
 
 V. State, 131 Ala. 18, 31 So. 
 
 725 249, 345, 702 
 
 V. State, 26 Ark. 323 855, 1040 
 
 V. State, 24 Ga. 297. .376, 991, 993 
 
 V. State, 55 Ga. 47 768 
 
 V. State, 84 Miss. 758, 36 So. 
 
 389 929 
 
 ». State (Miss.) 9 So. 298.. 519 
 
 521 
 
 V. State, 36 Tex. 326 855 
 
 V. State, 24 Tex. App. 383, 6 
 
 S. W. 296 321, 355 
 
 V. State, 32 Tex. Crim. Eep. 1, 
 
 22 S. W. 50 286 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 cxlvii 
 
 Thompson v. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 335, 42 S. W. 974 290, 906 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) G2 
 
 S. W. 919 250 
 
 V. Territory, 1 Wasli. Terr. .548 093 
 V. United States, 155 U. S. 271, 
 39 L. ea. 146, 15 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep.. 73 401, 432. 510 
 
 Thornton v. Com. 24 Gratt. 657 853 
 
 v. State, 113 Ala. 43, 50 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 07, 21 So. 356.. 945 
 V. Slate, 107 Ga. 683, 33 S. E. 
 
 673 25, 31, 440 
 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 65 
 
 S. W. 1105 62, 130, 356 
 
 505, 513, 546, 574, 575, 944 
 Thrawley v. State, 153 Ind. 375, 55 
 
 N. E. 95, 439 
 
 Thumm v. State, 24 Tex. App. 667, 
 
 7 S. W. 236 507, 511 
 
 512, 537 
 Thurman v. State, 4 Ohio C. C. 141 324 
 
 441 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 86 
 
 S. W. 1014 208, 240, 501 
 
 Thuston V. State, 21 Tex. App. 245. 
 
 17 S. W. 474 511 
 
 Tickle V. State, 6 Tex. App. 623. .835, 837 
 
 Tidwell V. State, 70 Aia. 33 9, 35, 36 
 
 108. 384, 515, 574, 800 
 V. State, 84 Miss. 475, 36 So. 
 
 303 460 
 
 Tiffany v. Com. 121 Pa. 165, 6 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 775, 15 Ati. 462 200 
 
 222, 300, .300, 436, 553, 786 
 
 787 
 
 Tignor V. State (Ark.) SO S. W. 06. . .•!:',2 
 
 554, 555 
 Tillery v. State, 24 Tex. App. 251, 5 
 Am. St. Rep. 882, 5 S. W. 
 
 .S42 385, 406, 413, 457 
 
 450, 555 
 Tilley V. Com. 80 Va. 136, 15 S. E. 
 
 526 054 
 
 Timmeran v. Territory, 3 Wash. 
 
 Terr. 445, 17 Pac. 624 .. . 896 
 800, 1040 
 
 Timms v. State, 4 Coldw. 138 862 
 
 Tinelcler's Case, 1 East, P. C. 354.. 594 
 
 1005 
 Case, 1 East, P. C. 230, Fost. 
 C. L. 261, 1 Haie, P. C. 
 
 420 
 
 Tiner v. State, 44 Tex. 128 603, 
 
 Tingle v. Com. 11 Ky. L. Rep. 224, 11 
 S. W. 812 478, 490, 
 
 Tippett V. State, 37 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 186. 30 S. W. 120 
 
 Tipton V. State, 140 Ala. 39, 37 So. 
 
 231 
 
 504 
 621 
 627 
 
 401 
 
 403 
 
 817 
 932 
 
 Tipton ». State, 119 Ga. 304, 46 S. 
 
 E. 436 120 
 
 Titus V. State, 117 Ala. 16, 23 So. 77 200 
 
 1003 
 V. State, 40 N. J. L. 36, 7 Ati. 
 
 621 876, 877 
 
 Todd V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 44 
 
 S. W. 1006 306, 458 
 
 Tolbert v. State, 71 Miss. 179, 42 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 454, 14 So. 462. . 651 
 V. State, 75 Miss. 170, 42 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 454, 14 So. 462. . 628 
 Tolbirt T. State, 110 Ga. 070, 47 S. 
 
 E. 544 243 
 
 Tolirer v. Com. 104 Ky. 760, 47 S. 
 
 W. 1082 1008 
 
 Tollett T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 55 S. W. 573 230, 287 
 
 314, 511, 512, 514, 549 
 Tompitins v. Com. 28 Ky. L. Rep. 642, 
 
 00 S. W. 221 o'A 
 
 V. State, 117 Ky. 138, 77 S. W. 
 
 712 465 
 
 Tomson's Case, J. Kelyng, 66 104 
 
 Tooney v. State, 5 Tex. App. 163.. 103 
 140, 154, 155, 168, 170, 107 
 Townseii v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 78 S. W. 038 282 
 
 Townsend v. Wathen, East, 277. . . . 780 
 Trabue v. Com. 23 Ky. L. Rep. 2135, 
 
 66 S. W. 718 241, 290, .581 
 
 Trabune v. Com. 13 Ky. L. Rep. 343, 
 
 17 S. W. 186 430, 431 
 
 Tracy v. People, 07 111. 101 1015 
 
 Travers v. United States, 6 App. D. 
 
 C. 450 170, 422 
 
 Traverse v. State, 61 Wis. 144, 20 
 
 N. W. 724 022 
 
 Traylor v. State, 101 Ind. 65 885, 068 
 
 Treeve's Case, 2 East, P. C. 821.... 603 
 
 Trent Nav. v. Wood, 3 Esp. 131 566 
 
 Trevino v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 41 S. W. 000 211 
 
 Trice v. State, 80 Ga. 742, 15 S. E. 
 
 648 370 
 
 Triggs V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 53 
 
 S. W. 104 865 
 
 Trijo V. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 127, 74 S. W. .546 242 
 
 Trim v. Com. 18 Gratt. 083, 08 Am. 
 
 Dec. 765 675 
 
 Trimble T. Com. 78 Ky. 176 143, 334 
 
 335 
 Trogdon v. State, 133 Ind. 1, 32 N. E. 
 
 725 372, 550 
 
 True V. Com. 00 Ky. 651, 14 S. W. 
 
 684 50, 60, 61, 73 
 
 Trumble v. Territory, 3 Wyo. 280, 6 
 
 L.R.A. 384, 21 Pac. 1081 135 
 222, 863 
 
'xlviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Trusty v. Com. 19 Ky. L. Rep. 706, 
 41 S. W. 766 782, 
 
 Tubbs V. Com. 22 Ky. L. Eep. 481, 
 57 S. W. 623 479, 536, 
 
 932 
 
 775 
 868 
 
 Tucker v. State (Tex. Crlm. App.) 
 
 50 S. W. 711 280, 283 
 
 V. United States, 151 U. S. 
 164, 38 L. ed. 112, 14 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Eep. 299 809 
 
 Tudor V. Com. 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1039, 
 
 43 S. W. 187 55, 63, 217 
 
 Tully v. People, 6 Mich. 273 1040 
 
 Turley v. State (Neb.) 104 N. W. 934 477 
 
 529 
 Turner v. Com. 89 Ky. 78, 1 S. W. 
 
 475 157, 378, 413, 503 
 
 580, 581 
 V. State, 97 Ala. 57, 12 So. 
 
 54 ,63, 65, 644, 645 
 
 654, 659, 858 
 
 v. State, 70 Ga. 765 444, 924 
 
 V. State, 28 Miss. 684 826, 827 
 
 V. State, 89 Tenn. 547, 15 S. 
 
 W. 838 523, 541, 941, 1019 
 
 1026 
 V. State, 33 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 103, 25 S. W. 635 395, 927 
 
 V. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 329, 54 S. W. 579 259 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 4e 
 
 S. W. 830, 51 S. W. 366. . 277 
 
 409, 410, 523, 933 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 8!) 
 
 S. W. 975 238, 918 
 
 V. Territory (Okla.) 82 Pac. 
 
 650 459, 1051 
 
 Turner's Case, Comb. 407, 1 Ld. 
 
 Eaym. 143 310 
 
 Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 177.... 860 
 
 869 
 
 Turns v. Com. 6 Met. 225.. 839, 843, 855 
 
 Turpln T. State, 80 Ind. 148 844, 845 
 
 V. State, 55 Md. 462 400, 402 
 
 409 
 Tutt V. Com. 104 Ky. 299, 46 S. W. 
 
 675 101 
 
 Tuttle V. People, 70 L.E.A. 33 901 
 
 Tweedy v. State, 5 Iowa, 433... 332, 483 
 
 486, 550, 5,n2 
 
 Tylei- v. People, 8 Mich. 320.. 18, 19, 152 
 
 823, 824, 826, 827 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 90 
 
 S. W. 33 266, 328 
 
 Tyner v. State, 5 Humph. 383 896 
 
 U. 
 
 Ubillos V. Territory (Ariz.) 80 Pac. 
 
 363 199 
 
 Udderzoob v. Com. 76 Pa. 340 905 
 
 TJhl V. People, 5 Park. Crim. Rep. 
 
 410 365, 366, 496 
 
 Ullman v. State, 124 Wis. 602, 103 
 
 N. W. 6 
 
 Underwood v. Com. 27 ICy. L. Eep. 8, 
 
 84 S. W. 310 
 
 V. State, 25 Tex. Supp. 389.. 
 United States v. Armstrong, 2 Curt. 
 
 C. C. 446, Fed. Cas. No. 
 
 14,467 18, 115, 118, 
 
 128, 131, 143, 285, 286, 
 V. Ball, 163 U. S. 662, 41 L. 
 
 ed. 300, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 
 
 1192 841, 
 
 125 
 
 547 
 331 
 
 125 
 
 823 
 
 845 
 
 V. Barber, 9 Mackey, 79 . . 835, 836 
 
 V. Beacham, 29 Fed. 284 706 
 
 708, 843, 882 
 
 V. Boyd, 45 Fed. 851 2, 49, 97 
 
 111, 113, 115, 151, 158, 566 
 
 658, 669, 952 
 V. Brown, Fed. Cas. No. 
 
 14,656a 899 
 
 V. Carr, 1 Woods, 480, Fed. 
 
 Cas. No. 14,732 2, 5, 6 
 
 100, 102, 103, 107, 275, 572 
 
 731-733, 1043 
 
 V. Clark, 31 Fed. 710 731, 732 
 
 734, 742, 743 
 
 T. Claypool, 14 Fed. 127.. 806, 818 
 V. Collyer, Fed. Cas. No. 
 
 14,838 708- 710 
 
 V. Cornell, 2 Mason, 91, Fed. 
 
 Cas. No. 14,868.. 98, 99, 118 
 
 119, 125, 133, 205, 228, 806 
 V. Crow Dog, 3 Dak. 106, 14 
 
 N. W. 437 130- 132 
 
 T. Davis, 2 Sumn. 482, Fed. 
 
 Cas. No. 14,932 18, 825 
 
 V. Demarchi, 5 Blaeht. 84, 
 
 Fed. Cas. No. 14,944... 843 
 v. Densmore (N. M.) 75 Pac. 
 
 31 63, 248, 441 
 
 V. Douglass, 2 Blatchf. 207, 
 
 Fed. Cas. No. 14,989 887 
 
 V. Farnham, 2 Blatchf. 528, 
 
 Fed. Cas. No. 15,071 681 
 
 706, 708, 709, 724, 967 
 V. Forbes, Crabbe, 558, Fed. 
 
 Cas. No. 15,129 806, 807 
 
 V. Freeman, 4 Mason, 505, 
 
 Fed. Cas. No. 15,162.-25, 29 
 
 681, 692 
 V. Frye, 4 Cranch, C. C. 539, 
 
 Fed. Cas. No. 15,173 391 
 
 392 
 V. Furlong, 5 Wheat. 184, 5 L. 
 
 ed. 64 825 
 
 V. Gibert, 2 Sumn. 19, Fed 
 
 Cas. No. 15,204 899 
 
 V. Gleason, Woolw. 75, Fed. 
 
 Cas. No. 15,215 641, 881 
 
 V. Gleason, Woolw. 128, Fed. 
 
 Cas. No. 15,216 619, 641 
 
 642, 1034, 1036 
 
 v. Green, 6 Mackey, 5G2 296 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 cxlix 
 
 United States v. Guiteau, 1 Mackey, 
 
 498, 47 Am. Rep. 247 
 
 823, 
 V. Hamilton, 4 Mackey, 446.. 
 V. Hanway, 2 Wall. Jr. 144, 
 Fed. Cas. No. 15,299. . . . 
 V. Harding, 1 Wall. Jr. 127, 
 Fed. Cas. No. 15,301... 
 T. Hartwell, 3 Cliff. 221, Fed. 
 
 Cas. No. 15,318 40, 
 
 T. Heath, 9 Mackey, 272.. 254, 
 
 549, 
 
 V. Herbert, 2 Hayw. & H. 210, 
 
 Fed. Cas. No. lo,354a 
 
 483, 
 
 V. Hewsou, 7 Best. L. Rep. 361 
 
 V. Hewson, Brunner, Co. Cas. 
 
 532, Fed. Cas. No. 15,360 
 
 17 
 
 824 
 367 
 
 584 
 
 1051 
 
 373 
 981 
 
 469 
 485 
 590 
 
 14 
 
 896, 899 
 
 V. Holmes, 104 Fed. 884.. 562- 564 
 
 707, 708, 847 
 
 T. Holtzhauer, 40 Fed. 76 . . . 709 
 
 710, 880 
 
 V. Houston, 4 Craneh, C. C. 
 
 267, Fed. Cas. No. 15,398. 1049 
 
 V. Keller, 19 Fed. 663 708, 709 
 
 T. King, 34 Fed. 302. . .2, 104, 105 
 
 254, 259, 366, 472, 485, 680 
 
 681, 772, 816 
 V. Knowles, 4 Sawy. 517, Fed 
 
 Cas. No. 15,540 14 
 
 681-684, 706 
 V. Lancaster, 10 L.E.A. 333, 44 
 
 Fed. 896 646, 673 
 
 V. Lee, 4 Mackey, 489, 54 Am. 
 
 Rep. 293 803 
 
 V. Leighton, 3 Dak. 29, 13 N. 
 
 W. 347 402 
 
 V. Lewis, 111 Fed. 630 151 
 
 V. Libby, 1 Woodb. & M. 221, 
 
 Fed. Cas. No. 15,597 56 
 
 V. M'Gill, 4 Dall. 426, 1 L. 
 
 ed. 894, Fed. Cas. No. 
 
 15,676 823, 825 
 
 V. McGlue, 1 Curt. C. C. 1, 
 
 Fed. Cas. No. 15,679 125 
 
 205, 805 
 V. McGurk, 1 Cranch, C. C. 
 
 71, Fed. Cas. No. 15,680 973 
 T. Mackenzie, 1 N. Y. Legal 
 
 Obs. 371 732 
 
 V. Matthews, Fed. Cas. No. 
 
 15,741a 899 
 
 V. Maunier, 1 Hughes, 412, 
 
 Fed. Cas. No. 15,746 859 
 
 V. Meagher, 37 Fed. 875.. 2, 5- 7 
 
 97, 98, 102, 103, 143, 205, 335 
 
 567, 572, 695, 808, 809, 83-. 
 V. Mingo, 2 Curt. C. C. 1, 
 
 Fed. Cas. No. 15,781. .125, 133 
 
 290, 341, 503 
 V. Murphy, 3 Wall. 653, 18 
 
 L. ed. 218 642 
 
 United States v. Neverson, 1 Mackey, 
 152 50, 61, 103, 204, 
 
 V. Outerbridge, 5 Sawy. 620, 
 Fed. Cas. No. 15,978... 5, 
 130, 147, 151, 259, 354, 
 378, 385, 386, 401, 412, 
 
 932 
 940 
 
 116 
 363 
 
 472 
 764 
 T. Ramsay, Hempst. 481, Fed. 
 
 Cas. No. 16,115 52 
 
 T. Rice, 1 Hughes, 560, Fed. 
 
 Cas. No. 16,153 404, 749 
 
 759, 760 
 V. Romero, 4 Ariz. 193, 35 Pac. 
 
 1059 3 
 
 V. Ross, 1 Gall. 624, Fed. Cas. 
 
 No. 16,196 88, 110, 118 
 
 584, 645, 650, 663, 668, 672 
 
 V. Schneider, 21 D. C. 381 132 
 
 269, 313, 973, 993 
 V. Scott, 3 Wall. 642, 18 L. ed. 
 
 218 151, 185, 642 
 
 V. Sickles, 2 Hayw. & H. 319. . 130 
 V. Small, 2 Cart. C. C. 241, 
 
 Fed. Cas. No. 16,314. .136, 137 
 V. Taylor, 4 Cranch, C. C. 338, 
 
 Fed. Cas. No. 16,436 978 
 
 1014 
 V. Taylor, 5 McLean, 242, Fed. 
 
 Cas. No. 16,441 681, 705 
 
 708, 709, 967 
 V. Travers, 2 Wheeler, C. C. 
 
 490, Fed. Cas. No. 16,537 5 
 
 112, 129, 130, 275, 552, 
 
 603, 606, 613, 630, 632, 
 
 740, 756, 
 
 V. Veitch, 1 Cranch, C. C. 115, 
 
 Fed. Cas. No. 16,614 
 
 V. Warner, 4 McLean, 463, 
 
 Fed. Cas. No. 16,643 
 
 25, 38, 41, 44, 707-709, 
 
 V. Williams, 1 Cliff. 5, Fed. 
 
 Cas. No. 16,707 899, 
 
 V. Williams, 2 Cranch, C. C. 
 
 439, Fed. Cas. No. 16,710. 
 
 785, 
 
 V. Williams, 103 Fed. 938... 
 
 V. Wilson, Baldw. 78, Fed. Cas. 
 
 No. 16,730 49, 138, 
 
 V. Wiltberger, 3 Wash. C. C. 
 
 515, Fed. Cas. No. 16,738 
 
 9, 45, 228, 259, 275, 363, 
 
 377, 378, 385-387, 455, 
 
 764, 
 
 V. Woods, 4 Cranch, C. C. 485, 
 
 Fed. Cas. No. 16,760 
 
 39, 
 
 j'nited States ex rel. Weeden, 2 Flipp. 
 
 76, Fed. Cas. No. 14,412. 
 
 Roberts v. Fayette County 
 
 Jailer, 2 Abb. (U. S.) 265, 
 
 Fed. Cas. No. 15,463 
 
 739, 
 
 602 
 634 
 764 
 
 986 
 
 24 
 
 725 
 726 
 
 900 
 
 302 
 
 799 
 
 1050 
 
 139 
 
 5 
 
 367 
 472 
 906 
 
 38 
 1009 
 
 730 
 
 729 
 742 
 
cl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Upstone V. People, 109 111. 1G0..805, 806 
 Upthegrove v. State, 37 Ohio St. 662 424 
 Usselton v. People, 149 111. 612, 36 
 
 N. E. 952.. 49-51, 55 
 
 74, 78, 79, 82- 84 
 Utterback v. Com. 22 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 1011, 59 S. W. 5:5, 60 
 
 S. W. 15 91.1, 931, 
 
 V. Com. 105 Ivy. 723, 88 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 329, 49 S. W. 
 
 479 300, 391, 
 
 932 
 
 Vaiden v. Com. 12 Gratt. 717 315, 
 
 Valentine t. State, 77 Ga. 470..]05:j, 
 
 537 
 
 503 
 1055 
 1056 
 
 219 
 
 Vance v. Com. (Va.) 19 S. B. 785 
 
 V. State, 70 Ai-k. 272, 68 S. 
 
 37 276, 398, 1045, 1058 
 
 Van Houton v. People. 22 Colo. 53. 
 
 43 Pac. 137 159, 167, 198 
 
 224 
 Vann v. State. 83 Ga. 44, 9 S. E. 
 
 945 124, 132, 221, 815 
 
 V. State. 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 434, 107 Am. St. Rep. 997, 
 
 77 S. W. 813 293, 450, 506 
 
 512, 602, 605, 620, 621 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 85 
 
 S. W. 1064 198 
 
 Vai-nedoe v. State, 75 Ga. 181, 38 
 
 Am. Rep. 465 1030. 1031 
 
 Varnell t. State, 26 Tex. App. 56, 9 
 
 S. W. 65 504, 511 
 
 Vass V. Com. 3 Leigli, 786, 24 Am. 
 
 Dec. 695 1021, 1023-1025 
 
 Vasser v. State, 75 Ark. 373, 87 S. 
 
 W. 635. .50, 226, 647, 871, 872 
 Vauglian v. Com. 86 Ky. 431, 6 S. W. 
 
 153 992, 994. 989, 1017 
 
 Vauglin V. State, 130 Ala. 18, 30 
 
 So. 669 822, 912, 949 
 
 \'aux's Case, 4 Coke, 44b 32 
 
 Case, J. Kelyng, 52 69, 81 
 
 Veatch v. State, 56 Ind. 584, 26 Am. 
 
 Rep. 44 846, 851, 855 
 
 T. State, 60 Ind. 291 1046 
 
 Vela V. State, 33 Tex. Crim. Rep. 322, 
 
 26 S. W. 306 97 
 
 Velvln V. State (Ark.) 90 S. W. 851 323 
 
 Venable v. State, 1 Oblo C. C. 301 474 
 
 Venters v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 83 S. W. 832 249, 262. 283 
 
 949 
 VUIereal v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 61 S. W. 715 014 
 
 Voght V. State, 145 Ind. 12, 43 N. B. 
 
 1049 124, 366 
 
 Vollmer v. State, 24 Neb. 838, 40 N. 
 
 W. 420 97, 220, 236, 366 
 
 Von Gundy v. Com. 11 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 052, 12 S. W. 386 8, 63 
 
 217, 218 
 Von PoUnltz v. State, 92 Ga. 16, 44 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 72, 18 S. B. 
 
 301 248, 
 
 314 
 
 W. 
 
 Waddell v. State, 1 Tex. App. 720.. 535 
 Waddle v. State, 112 Tenn. 556, 82 
 
 S. W. 827 1042 
 
 Wade V. Com. 106 Ky. 321, 50 S. W. 
 
 271 141, 407, 925 
 
 V. State, 71 Ind. 535 60, 62 
 
 82, 84, 86 
 
 V, State, 25 Ohio C. C. 279 994 
 V. State, 23 Tex. App. 308, 4 
 
 S. W. 896 865 
 
 Wadlington t. State, 19 Tex. App. 266 278 
 Waggoner t. State, 155 Ind. 341, 80 
 Am. St. Rep. 237, 58 N. 
 
 B. 190 847 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 55 
 
 S. W. 491 226 
 
 Wagoner v. Territory, 5 Ariz. 175, 51 
 
 Pac. 145 992 
 
 Waite, Re, 81 Fed. 359 729 
 
 Wakeman v. Robinson, 1 Bing. 215.. 566 
 Waldele v. New York C. & H. R. R. 
 
 Co. 61 How. Pr. 350 972 
 
 Walker v. Com. 5 Ky. L. Rep. 861. . . 100 
 V. People, 133 111. 110, 24 N. 
 
 B. 424 365, 403, 424, 445 
 
 V. State, 52 Ala. 192 1011 
 
 V. State, 63 Ala. 105 923, 924 
 
 T. State, 91 Ala. 76, 9 So. 87 810 
 V. State, 139 Ala. 56, 35 So. 
 
 1011 948, 995, 998 
 
 v. State, 39 Ark. 221 980, 983 
 
 1033 
 V. State, 34 Fla. 167, 43 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 186, 16 So. 80.. 859 
 T. State, 97 Ga. 350, 23 S. E. 
 
 992 377 
 
 V. State, 100 Ga. 60, 25 S. B. 
 
 918 108 
 
 V. State. 116 Ga. 537, 67 
 
 L.R.A. 420, 42 S. B. 787. . 33 
 
 45, 51 
 T. State, 118 Ga. 10, 43 S. E. 
 
 856 60 
 
 V. State, 124 Ga. 440, 52 S. 
 
 E. 738 35, 36, 45, 846 
 
 V. State, 8 Ind. 290 lOS 
 
 V. State, 136 Ind. 663, 36 N. 
 
 E. 356 115, 124 
 
 V. State, 46 Neb. 25, 64 N. W. 
 
 357 1057 
 
 V. State, 37 Tex. 366 1034, 1035 
 
 V. State, 6 Tex. App. 576 939 
 
 y. State, 14 Tex. App. 609 836 
 
 846, 847, 898, 912 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 ell 
 
 Walker v. State, 28 Tex. App. 503, 
 
 13 S. W. 860 106, 422, 426 
 
 V. State, 44 Tex. Ci-lm. Eep. 
 
 569, 72 S. W. 99T 924 
 
 ■Wall V. State, 51 Ind. 453 3, 99, 159 
 
 367, 861 
 T. State, 18 Tex. 682, 70 Am. 
 
 Dec. 302 832, 876 
 
 Wallace v. People, 159 111. 446, 42 
 
 N. E. 771 1060, 1061 
 
 V. State, 90 Ga. 117, 15 S. E. 
 
 700 1031 
 
 V. State, 7 Tex. App. 570.. 588 
 
 589 
 
 T. State, 10 Tex. App. 255.. 15 
 
 590, 591 
 
 V. State, 20 Tex. App. 360 610 
 
 640 
 T. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 341, 81 S. W. 966 958, 960 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 87 S. W. 1041 673, 959 
 
 V. United States, 18 App. D. 
 
 C. 152 522, 524 
 
 v. United States, 162 U. S. 
 466, 40 L. ed. 1039, 16 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 859 360, 404 
 
 412, 519 
 Waller v. People, 209 111. 284, 70 N. 
 
 E. 681 370, 908 
 
 V. State, 89 Ala. 79, 8 So. 153 471 
 
 537 
 V. State, 100 Ga. 320, 28 
 
 S. E. 77 288- 290 
 
 Walrath v. State, 8 Neb. 80 888 
 
 Walston V. Com. 16 B. Mon. 15.. 972- 974 
 981, 991, 1033 
 
 v. State, 54 Ga. 242 1047 
 
 Walters v. Com. 44 Pa. 135 335, 835 
 
 1044 
 V. People, 6 Park. Crim. Eep. 
 
 15 926 
 
 v. State, 37 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 388, 35 S. W. 652 136, 506 
 
 537 
 r. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 40 
 
 S. W. 794 292, 458, 538 
 
 Waiters's Case, 12 How. St. Tr. 113. 289 
 Walton v. State, 79 Ga. 446, 5 S. E. 
 
 203 1031 
 
 V. State, 57 Miss. 533 1046 
 
 Ward V. State, 78 Ala. 441 973- 975 
 
 1033 
 V. State, 96 Ala. 100, 11 So. 
 
 217 866 
 
 V. State, 8 BlacM. 101.. 854, 1022 
 
 V. State, 19 Tex. App. 664 817 
 
 V. State, 30 Tex. App. 687, 18 
 
 S. W. 793 771 
 
 Ward's Case, 1 East, P. C. 270. .345, 346 
 
 Warden v. Bailey, 4 Taunt. 77 732 
 
 Wareham v. State, 25 Ohio St. 601.. 574 
 
 575 
 
 Warner v. Com. 27 Ky. L. Eep. 219, 
 
 84 S. W. 742 275, 384 
 
 T. State, 114 Ind. 137, 16 N. 
 
 E. 189 854 
 
 T. State, 56 N. J. L. 686, 44 
 Am. St. Eep. 415, 29 Atl. 
 
 505 811 
 
 Warren v. Com. 99 ICy. 370, 35 S. 
 
 W. 1028 334, 567 
 
 V. Com. 37 Pa. 45 164 
 
 T. State, 4 Coldw. 130 97, 98 
 
 153, 189, 244 
 T. State, 9 Tex. App. 619, 35 
 
 Am. Eep. 745 973, 981 
 
 984, 985, 987, 1020 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 68 
 
 S. W. 275 240 
 
 Warrick, Ex parte, 73 Ala. 57 . . . 132, 259 
 
 260 
 Warthan t. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 385, 55 S. W. 55 725 
 
 Wasden v. State, 18 Ga. 264 240 
 
 Washburn v. People, 10 Mich. 372.. 914 
 Washington t. State, 60 Ala. 10, 31 
 
 Am. Eep. 28 150, 189, 192 
 
 193 
 V. state, 125 Ala. 40, 28 So. 
 
 78 . . 244, 336, 380, 1055, 1056 
 
 V. State, 36 Ga. 222 584, 1041 
 
 V. State, 1 Tex. App. 647 . . 640 
 V. State, 25 Tex. App. 387, 8 
 
 S. W. 642 175, 177, 953 
 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 184, 79 S. W. 811 932 
 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 184, 79 S. W. 811 . . 449, 935 
 Watkins v. State, 89 Ala. 82, 8 So. 
 
 134 494, 495, 944 
 
 V. State, 133 Ala. 88, 32 So. 
 
 627 363, 505, 509, 1041 
 
 V. United States, 1 Ind. Terr. 
 
 364, 41 S. W. 1044 . . 142, 365 
 383, 458, 523 
 Watson V. Com. 85 Va. 867, 9 S. E. 
 
 418 219, 224, 228 
 
 V. Com. 87 Va. 608, 13 S. E. 
 
 22 .. 201, 212, 270, 324, 325 
 778 
 V. State, 82 Ala. 10, 2 So. 
 
 455 213, 274, 491, 508 
 
 V. State, 63 Ind. 548 1004 
 
 V. State, 5 Mo. 497 834 
 
 V. State, 28 Tex. App. 34, 
 
 12 S. W. 404 60, 73 
 
 Watt V. People, 126 111. 9, 1 L.E.A. 
 
 403, 18 N. E. 340 828 
 
 Watts V. Brains, 1 Cro. Eliz. pt. 2, p. 
 
 778 275 
 
 V. State, 5 W. Va. 533 .. 77, 925 
 V. Territory, 1 Wash. Terr. 
 
 409 4oiJ, 459 
 
 Waybright v. State, 56 Ind. 122 . . 54 
 
 773, 777 
 
clii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Weatherfoi-d v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. 
 
 Rep. 530, 37 Am. St. Eep. 
 
 82S, 28 S. W. 251 
 
 Weathevman v. Com. (Va.) 19 S. E. 
 
 778 201, 228, 
 
 Weathersby t. State, 29 Tex. App. 
 
 278, 15 S. W. 823 . . 267, 
 
 Weayer v. State, 24 Olilo St. 584 . . 
 
 V. State, 19 Tex. App. 547, 53 
 
 Am. Eep. 389 . . 765-767, 
 
 772, 788, 
 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 76 
 
 S. W. 764 
 
 T. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 607, 81 S. W. 39, 43 Tex. 
 
 Crim. Rep. 340, 65 S. W. 
 
 534 914, 
 
 Webb v. State, 100 Ala. 47, 14 So. 
 
 865 .. 124, 136, 138-140, 
 
 V. State, 135 Aia. 36, 33 So. 
 
 487 
 
 «. State, 73 Miss. 456, 19 So. 
 
 238 
 
 Webb's Case, 2 Lewin, C. C. 196, 
 
 1 Moody & R. 405 
 
 Webster v. State, 47 Fla. 108, 36 So. 
 
 584 
 
 V. State, 49 Fia. 131, 38 So. 
 
 514 
 
 Webster Case, Bemis's Kep. 75, 76, 
 
 479 809, 
 
 Case, Bemis's, 421 
 
 Weelis V. State, 79 Ga. 36, 3 S. 
 
 B. 323 .. 46, 124, 132, 
 
 Weighorst v. State, 7 Md. 445 . . 152, 
 
 Weightnovel v. State, 46 Fla. 1. 35 
 
 So. 856 865, 885 
 
 W'elbourn's Case, 1 East, P. C. 358, 
 
 1 Leach. C. L. 503, note 993 
 994 
 Welch V. State, 124 Ala. 41, 27 So. 
 
 307 . . 378, 469, 471, 483, 509 
 V. State, 50 Ga. 128, 15 Am. 
 
 Eep. 690 1041 
 
 V. State, 104 Ind. 347, 3 N. 
 
 B. 850 '. 854 
 
 Wellar v. People, .10 Mich. 16 . . 45, 106- 
 
 108, 113, 126, 133, 137, 176 
 
 189, 210, 253, 896, 914 
 
 Weller v. State, 19 Ohio C. C. 166. . 8 
 
 338, 573, 698, 967 
 
 Wells V. Territory, 14 Okla. 436, 78 
 
 Pac. 124 . . 236, 303, 367, 382 
 
 502, 925 
 Wesley t. State, 37 Miss. 327, 75 Am. 
 
 Dec. 62 . . 362, 367, 378, 441 
 
 455. 462, 503 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) Go 
 
 , S. W. 904 355 
 
 606 
 
 872 
 
 260 
 273 
 221 
 222 
 
 770 
 790 
 
 785 
 
 922 
 
 509 
 555 
 
 166 
 
 913 
 
 856 
 
 858 
 
 871 
 
 902 
 920 
 
 204 
 
 261 
 
 1045 
 
 West V. Com. 15 Ky. L. Rep. 386, 
 
 23 S. W. 368 454 
 
 V. State, 76 Ala. 98 995, 1033 
 
 T. State, 79 Ga. 773, 4 S. E. 
 
 325 1047 
 
 V. State, 121 Ga. 364, 49 S. E. 
 
 266 567 
 
 V. State, 48 Ind. 483 . . 835, 837 
 858, 859 
 
 V. State, 59 Ind. 113 452 
 
 V. State, 2 Tex. App. 460 . . 274 
 287, 291, 321. 487 
 
 V. State, 7 Tex. App. 150 989 
 
 V. State, 18 Tex. App. 640 . . 409 
 427, 432 
 WestbrooU v. People, 128 III. 81, 18 
 
 N. E. 304 . . 934, 992, 1)93 
 1007, 1012, 1028, 1029 
 Westmoreland v. United States, 155 
 U. S. 5i5, 39 L. ed. 25.5, 
 
 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 43 8.^3 
 
 Weston T. Com. Ill Pa. 251, 2 Atl. 
 
 191 . . 50, 88, 338, 644, 645 
 
 660 
 
 W^yrich v. People, 89 111. 90 . . 913, 917 
 
 923 
 
 Wharton v. State, 73 Ala. 366 923 
 
 What ley v. State, 91 Ala. 108, 9 
 
 So. 236 534, 535, 774 
 
 V. State, 116 Ga. 86, 42 S. 
 
 E. 403 262 
 
 Wheatley v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 436, 
 
 81 S. W. 687 . . 6, 253, 576 
 Wheatly v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 39 S. W. 672 3 
 
 Wheeler v. Com. 27 K.v. L. Rep 1090, 
 
 87 S. W. 1106 57, 58, 74 
 
 247, 408, 409, 503, ."ill. 5.'!" 
 540 
 V. State, 112 Ga. 43, 37 S. B. 
 
 126 467, 507, 53S 1001 
 
 V. State, 158 Ind. 687, 63 N. E. 
 
 975 101, 916, 937 
 
 Wheelis v. State, 23 Tex. App. 238 
 
 5 S. W. 244 403, 414 
 
 Whelchell v. State, 23 Ind. 89 859 
 
 Whit V. State, 74 Ark. 489, 86 S. W. 
 
 284 551 
 
 Whltaker v. State, 79 Ga. 87, 3 S. 
 
 E. 403 1003, 1031 
 
 White V. Com. 9 Bush. 178 831, 846 
 
 V. Com. 6 Binn. 183, 6 Am. 
 
 Dec. 443 832, 834, 855 
 
 V. Conly, 14 Lea, 51, 52 Am. 
 
 Eep. 157 65 
 
 V. Maxcy, 64 Mo. 552 512 
 
 V. People, 81 111. 333 60, 85 
 
 V. State, 84 Ala. 421, 4 So. 
 
 598 680, 705 
 
 V. State, 103 Ala. 72, 16 
 
 So. 03 807, 809 
 
 V. State (Ark.) 86 S. W. 296.. 208 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 cliii 
 
 White T. State, 100 Ga. 659, 28 S. 
 
 E. 423 . . 983, 984, 986, 
 V. State, 118 Ga. 787, 45 S. E. 
 
 595 .330, 490, 
 
 V. State, 70 Miss. 253, 11 Ko. 
 
 632 OJO, 
 
 T. State, 16 Tex. 206 . . 148, 
 
 v. State, 4 Tex. App. 488 .. 
 
 V. State, 23 Tex. App. 154, 3 
 S. W. 710 .. 504, 508, 
 
 T. State, 30 Tex. App. 652, 18 
 
 S. W. 462 157, 403, 
 
 1021, 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 42 
 
 S. W. 303 
 
 V. State (Tex. Ci-lm. App.) 63 
 
 L.R.A. 660, 68 S. W. 
 
 689 528, 578- 
 
 V. State, 32 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 625, 25 S. W. 784 
 
 V. State, 34 Tex. Ciim. Eep. 
 
 153, 29 S. W. 1094 
 
 V. State, 42 Tex. Ciim. Rep. 
 
 567, 62 S. W. 575 
 
 V. State, 44 Tex. Ci-ira. Rep. 
 
 346, 63 L.R.A. 660, 72 S. 
 
 W. 173 ..35, 42, 212, 243, 
 
 V. Territory, 3 Wash. Terr. 
 397, 19 Pac. 37 . . 403, 
 503, 519, 547, 555, 787, 
 
 989 
 
 501 
 
 964 
 832 
 873 
 819 
 
 821 
 
 oil 
 512 
 
 925 
 1037 
 
 872 
 
 580 
 931 
 
 272 
 273 
 
 263 
 
 249 
 284 
 
 408 
 834 
 932 
 
 Whiteford v. Com. 6 Rand. (Va.) 
 721, 18 Am. Dec. 771 . . 
 153, 163-166, 202, 209, 
 
 150 
 210 
 213 
 
 Whitehurst v. Com. 79 Va. 556 901 
 
 Whiteley's Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 173. . 289 
 
 290, 293 
 Whiteneck v. Com. 21 Ky. L. Kep. 
 1625, 55 S. W. 916, 56 S. 
 
 W. 3 250, 1046 
 
 Wliitley V. State, 38 Ga. 50 . . 981, 983 
 
 986 
 Whitney v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Eep. 2524, 
 
 74 S. W. 257 952 
 
 Whitsett V. State, 115 Ga. 203, 41 S. 
 
 E. 699 206 
 
 Whittaker v. Com. 13 Ky. L. Eep. 
 
 504, 17 S. W. 358 937 
 
 Whitten v. State, 29 Tex. App. 504, 
 
 16 S. W. 296 782 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 86 
 
 S. W. 1134 . . 209, 283, 939 
 
 Wicks V. Com. 2 Va. Cas. 387 832 
 
 Wiggins V. State, 23 Fla. 180, 1 
 
 So. 693 198. 871 
 
 V. Utah, 93 U. S. 467, 23 L. 
 
 ed. 942 405, 408, 409 
 
 Wilcox T. State, 94 Tenn. 106, 28 S. 
 
 W. 312 805 
 
 Wilcoxen v. Com. 15 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 261, 23 S. W. 195 506 
 
 Wild's Case, 2 Lewin, C. C. 214 . . 340 
 Wiley V. State, 99 Ala. 146, 13 So. 
 
 424 443 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 05 
 
 S. W. 190 284, 318, 322 
 
 Wilkerson v. Com. 88 Ky. 29, 9 S. 
 
 W. 836 806, 808 
 
 V. State, 91 Ga. 729, 17 S. E. 
 
 990 534. 983, 984 
 
 V. State, 2 Tex. App. 255 . . 859 
 V. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 86, 19 S. W. 003 922 
 
 V. State (Tex. Trim. App.) 
 
 57 S. W. 9.30 50 
 
 V. Utah, 99 U. S. 130, 25 L. 
 
 ed. 345 1062 
 
 Wilkins v. State, 98 Ala. 1, 15 So. 
 
 312 . . 132, 200, 204, 358, 371 
 448, 449, 469, 483, 506, 552 
 555, 556 
 V. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 525, 34 S. W. 627 . . 224, 953 
 Willey V. State, 46 Ind. 363 . . 8, 599 
 851, 879, 887 
 Williams v. Bryant, 5 Mees. & W. 
 
 447 864 
 
 V. Com. 80 Ky. 313 286 
 
 V. Com. 90 Ky. 596, 14 S. 
 
 W. 595 ; . 373 
 
 T. Com. 21 Ky. L. Eep. 612, 
 
 52 S. W. 843 937 
 
 V. Com. 23 Ky. L. Rep. 2046, 
 
 66 S. W. 401 355, 503 
 
 V. Com. 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1504, 
 
 78 S. W. 134 242, 380 
 
 V. Com. 85 Va. 607, 8 S. E. 
 
 470 945, 962, 964, 965 
 
 V. Hutchinson, 3 N. Y. 312, 
 
 53 Am. Dec. 301 689 
 
 V. People, 54 111. 422 .. 88, 3S5 
 
 404, 407 
 
 V. Richards, 3 Car. & K. 82.. 703 
 
 V. State, 44 Ala. 41.. 621, 632- 634 
 
 741, 746, 751 
 
 V. State, 74 Ala. 18 400, 424 
 
 V. State, 81 Ala. 1, 60 Am. 
 
 Rep. 133, 1 So. 179 . . 136 
 
 645, 647, 658, 672, 958, 960 
 V. State, 83 Ala. 16, 3 So. 
 
 616 8, 128, 471 
 
 V. State, 130 Ala. 107, 30 So. 
 
 484 157, 245, 982, 986 
 
 V. State, 140 Ala. 10, 37 So. 
 
 228 259, 340, 4B1, 537 
 
 T. State, 34 Fla. 217, 15 So. 
 
 760 333, 591 
 
 V. State, 45 Pla. 128, 34 So. 
 
 279 867 
 
 V. State, 57 Ga. 478. . 716, 905 
 
cliv 
 
 TABIE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Williams V. State, 69 Ga. 11. .62, 901, 
 
 924 
 929 
 V. State, 107 Ga. 721, 33 S. 
 
 IC. 648 362 
 
 V. State, 120 Ga. 870, 48 S. 
 
 B. 368 246, 377, 459 
 
 T. State, 123 Ga. 138, 51 S. 
 
 E. 322 120 
 
 V. State, 64 Md. 384, 1 Atl. 
 
 887 899, 925 
 
 V. State, 6 Neb. 334 221, 222 
 
 V. State, 35 Ohio St. 175 849 
 
 V. State, 3 Heisk, 37 834 
 
 V. State, 3 Heisk. 376 ... 124 
 
 141, 241, 275, 277, 363, 368 
 394, 400, 426, 458, 720 
 V. State, 1 Tex. App. 465, 3 
 
 Tex. App. 123 859 
 
 V. State, 2 Tex. App. 271.. 30, 44 
 
 356, 401, 421, 459 
 
 V. State, 3 Tex. App. 123 . . 863 
 
 V. State, 7 Tex. App. 396 ... 287 
 
 311 
 V. State, 14 Tex. App. 102, 
 
 46 Am. Rep. 237 422 
 
 T. State, 22 Tex. App. 497, 4 
 
 S. W. 64 404, 466, 467 
 
 V. State, 22 Tex. App. 332, 3 
 
 S. W. 226 465 
 
 V. State, 24 Tex. App. 637, 
 
 7 S. W. 333 280 
 
 V. State, 25 Tex. App. 521, 
 
 8 S. W. 653 224 
 
 T. State, 25 Tex. App. 76, 7 
 
 S. W. 661 811, 816 
 
 V. State, 25 Tex. App. 216, 7 
 
 S. W. 666 511, 537 
 
 V. State, 30 Tex. App. 429, 17 
 
 S. W. 1071 474 
 
 V. State, 30 Tex. App. 354, 17 
 
 S. W. 408 177, 195, 878 
 
 V. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 497, 51 S. W, 220 .. 938, 989 
 T. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 365, 54 S. W. 759 744 
 
 V. State, 42 Tex. 392 73 
 
 V. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 115, 69 S. W. 415 . . 517, 521 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 53 S. W. 859 817, 862 
 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 218, 75 S. W. 859 . . 568, 698 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 04 
 
 S. W. 1042 . . 174, 242, 875 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 65 
 
 S. W. 1059 .. 898, 901, 903 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 70 
 
 S. W. 756 384, 404 
 
 V. State, 61 Wis. 281, 21 N. 
 
 W. 56 897, 906 
 
 V. United States, 4 Ind. Terr. 
 
 269, 69 S. W. 871 . . 127, 367 
 
 397, 398, 400, 404, 412, 413 
 418, 421 
 
 Williams's Case, Wm. Jones, 432, J. 
 
 Keiyng, 131 574 
 
 Williamson v. State, 2 Olilo C. C. 
 
 292 344, 566, 568, 572 
 
 Wiiliford V. State, 121 Ga. 173, 48 S. 
 
 E. 962 130, 610, 640 
 
 V. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 393, 42 S. W. 972 363, 365 
 
 367, 368, 456, 497, 518 
 Willingham v. State, 130 Ala. 35, 30 
 
 So. 429 378 
 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 22 
 
 S. W. 925 363 
 
 Willis v. Com. 32 Gratt. 929 804, 806 
 
 812, 813, 815, 818 
 V. Com. 20 Ky. L. Rep. 368, 
 
 46 S. W. 699 479 
 
 V. Kern, 21 La. Ann. 749.. 972 
 
 V. State, 73 Ala. 363 508 
 
 V. State, 74 Ala. 21 . . 575, 580 
 V. State, 43 Neb. 102, 61 N. 
 
 W. 254 . . 202, 470, 474, 400 
 796 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 74 
 
 S. W. 543 3.-)7 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 75 
 
 S. W. 790 .. 279, 281, 
 
 297, 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 90 
 
 S. W. 1100. . 35, 277, 282, 
 
 441, 
 
 Willougbby, Ex parte, 14 Nev. 451.. 
 
 Wills V. State, 74 Ala. 21 995, 
 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 22 
 
 S. W. 969 546, 652, 
 
 Wilson V. Boerem, 15 Johns. 286 . . 
 
 V. Com. 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1251, 
 
 60 S. W. 400 . . 594, 595, 
 
 885, 993, 
 
 T. Com. 23 Ky. L. Rep. 743, 
 
 63 S. W. 738 
 
 V. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 185, 
 68 S. W. 121 ... 364, 
 
 T. People, 4 Park. Crim. Rep. 
 
 619 . . 203, 223, 225, 226, 
 
 339, 
 
 V. People, 94 111. 299 . . 400, 
 
 522, 
 
 V. State, 128 A'a. 17, 29 So. 
 
 509 471, 505, 
 
 V. State, 140 Ala. 43, 37 So. 
 
 93 . . 133, 274, 402, 403, 
 
 901, 
 
 V. State, 30 Fla. 234, 17 L. 
 
 R. A. 054, 11 So. 536 . . 
 
 401, 407, 40S, 420, 421, 
 
 502, 
 
 V. State, 69 Ga. 224 129, 
 
 V. State, 11 Lea, 310 . . 601, 
 618, 
 
 282 
 298 
 
 389 
 
 1008 
 
 71) 
 
 1033 
 
 939 
 972 
 
 884 
 996 
 
 481 
 
 477 
 488 
 
 278 
 943 
 512 
 548 
 
 944 
 
 505 
 907 
 
 362 
 461 
 790 
 131 
 616 
 619 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 civ 
 
 Wilson V. State, 60 N. J. L. 171, 37 
 
 Atl. 954, 38 Atl. 428 . . 808 
 
 810 
 
 V. State, 4 Tex. App. 637 . . 289 
 
 293 
 
 V. State, 29 Tex. 240 719 
 
 720 
 
 V. State, 41 Tex. 320 900, 912 
 
 V. State, 43 Tex. 472 . . 224, 233 
 234, 905, 910 
 V. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 179, 53 S. W. 122 970 
 
 v. State, 46 Tex. dim. Eep. 
 
 023, 81 S. W. 34 545 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 24 
 
 S. W. 409 . . 34, 35, 54, 65 
 899 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 36 
 
 S. W. 587 519, 520 
 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 55 
 
 S. W. 489 954 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 58 
 
 S. W. 1009 970 
 
 V. State (TeT, Crim. App.) 
 
 90 S. W. 312 . . 104, 139 
 957, 993 
 V. United States, 5 Ind. Terr. 
 
 610, 82 S. W. 924 .. 71, 666 
 Winfrey v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 538, 56 S. W. 919 . . 984, 1000 
 1001 
 Winston v. United States, 172 U. S. 
 303, 43 L. ed. 456, 19 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Eep. 212 1046, 1056 
 
 Winter ,. State, 123 Ala. 1, 26 So. 
 949 38, 139, 249, 
 
 423 
 
 449 
 
 Winters v. State, 37 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 582, 40 S. W. 303 . . 512, 
 
 518 
 520 
 Wise V. State, 2 Kan. 419, 85 Am. 
 
 Dec. 595 . . 379, 422, 424, 451 
 
 499, 550, 860 
 
 Wlthers's Case, 1 East, P. C. 233.. 300 
 
 Witt V. State, 6 Coldw. 5 . . 219, 223 
 
 238, 857, 866, 874 
 
 Wolf V. State, 19 Ohio St. 248 . . 626, 638 
 
 735, 760, 849 
 
 WoUfoIk V. State, 85 Ga. 69, 11 S. 
 
 E. 814 120, 122 
 
 Womaelf v. State, 7 Coldw. 508 838 
 
 Wood V. State, 128 Ala. 27, 86 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 71, 29 So. 557. . 206 
 
 535, 777, 929 
 V. State, 119 Ga. 426, 46 S. 
 
 E. 658 233 
 
 T. State, 92 Ind. 269 . . 403, 835 
 
 837 
 V. State, 81 Miss. 408, 33 So. 
 
 285 190, 364 
 
 V. State, 28 Tex. App. 14, 11 
 
 S. W. 678 60 
 
 V. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 571, 21 S. W. 602 283 
 
 Woodard v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 51 S. W. 122 929 
 
 Woodrich t. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 90 S. W. 882 773 
 
 Woodrlng v. State, 33 Tex. Crim. 
 
 Rep. 26, 24 S. W. 293 . . 709 
 V. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 419, 30 S. W. 1060 273 
 
 Woods V. State, 81 Miss. 164, 32 So. 
 
 998 244 
 
 Woodsides v. State, 2 How. (Miss.) 
 
 655 . . 124, 132, 205, 841, 888 
 974 
 Woodward v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. 
 
 Eep. 188, 58 S. W. 135 . . 928 
 Woolfolk V. State, 81 Ga. 551, 8 S. 
 
 E. 724 939 
 
 Woolweaver v. State, 50 Ohio St. 
 
 277, 40 Am. St. Eep. 667, 
 
 34 N. E. 352 . .60, 61, C4, 67 
 Wooten V. State, 99 Tenn. 189, 41 S. 
 
 W. 813 36, 38 
 
 V. Wilkins, 39 Ga. 223, 90 Am. 
 
 Dec. 456 972 
 
 Wortham t. State, 70 Ga. 336 ..219, 221 
 274, 276, 359, 461 
 Worthan v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 65 S. W. 526 248 
 
 Worthlngton v. State, 92 Md. 222, 
 
 56 L.R.A. 353, 84 Am. 
 
 St. Eep. 506, 48 Atl. 355. . 
 
 594, 884, 886, 971, 1001, 
 
 1022, 
 
 Wray, Ex parte, 30 Miss. 673 . . 102, 
 
 106, 125-127, 292, 
 
 Wright T. Com. 33 Gratt. 880 ..166, 
 
 V. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1838, 
 
 72 S. W. 340 
 
 V. Com. 85 Ky. 123, 2 S. W. 
 
 904 .. 490-493, 612, 632, 
 
 V. State, 18 Ga. 383 881, 
 
 V. State, 41 Tex. 246 103, 
 
 V. State, 44 Tex. 645 . . 574, 
 
 744- 
 
 V. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 447, 50 S. W. 940 . . 384, 
 
 401, 414, 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 90 S. W. 36 
 
 T. State, 9 Yerg. 342 . . 206, 
 
 Wright ex dem. Clymer v. Littler, 3 
 
 Burr, 1244, 1 W. Bl. 
 
 345 
 
 Wrlgley's Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 127 . . 
 
 Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 171 . . 
 
 Wroe V. State, 20 Ohio St. 460 . .988, 
 
 Wrye v. State, 99 Ga. 34, 25 S. E. 
 
 610 126, 
 
 Wyatt V. Com. 8 Ky. L. Rep. 55, 
 
 1 S. W. 196 . . 994, 1028, 
 
 1036, 
 
 Wynn v. State, 63 Miss. 260 . . 61, 
 
 593 
 1007 
 1025 
 103 
 519 
 229 
 
 806 
 
 791 
 792 
 865 
 973 
 578 
 • 746 
 
 394 
 959 
 
 124 
 421 
 
 971 
 
 857 
 
 903 
 
 1037 
 
 132 
 
 1034 
 
 1038 
 
 66 
 
 82 
 
clvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 Wynne v. State (Tex. Crlm, App.) 51 
 
 S. W. 909 366, 378, 395 
 
 T. 
 
 Yancey v. State, 45 Ter. Crlm. Rep. 
 
 366, 76 S. W. 571 945 
 
 Yancy v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 87 S. W. 693 . . 322, 329, 330 
 
 Yates T. People, 32 N. Y. 509 ..624, 961 
 V. State, 26 Fla. 484, 7 So. 
 
 880 131, 142, 224 
 
 Yelm Jim v. Territory, 1 Wasb. Terr. 
 
 63 17, 733 
 
 Yoe V. People, 49 III. 410 51 
 
 Yong's Case, 4 Colce, 40a . . 603, 604, 628 
 
 638, 858 
 
 Yorls T. Com. 82 Ky. 360 . . 7, 8, 697 
 
 756 
 Yorlse v. Com. 17 Ky. L. Rep. 1243, 
 
 34 S. W. 228 35 
 
 Young V. Com. 6 Bush, 312 . . 380, 484 
 
 487, 996 
 V. State, 95 Ala. 4, 10 So. 
 
 913 991-993, 1009 
 
 V. State, 70 Ark. 156, 66 S. 
 
 W. 658 986, 989 
 
 V. State, 114 Ga. 849, 40 S. 
 
 E. 1000 991, 1007, 1030 
 
 Young V. State, 11 Humph. 2(50.. 322, 374 
 
 375 
 V. State (Neb.) 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 
 
 66, 104 N. W. 867 ... 490, 
 493, 494, 496, 765, 790, 791 
 797 
 V. State, 41 Tex. Crlm. Rep. 
 
 442, 55 S. W. 331 . . 295, 29T 
 925. 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 69 
 
 S. W. 153 280, 312. 
 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 84 
 
 S. W. 822 220 
 
 Youtsey v. United States, 38 C. C. A. 
 
 562, 97 Fed. 937 804 
 
 Yundt V. People, 65 111. 372 596 
 
 Yzagulrre v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 85 S. W. 14 138 
 
 Z. 
 
 Zaner v. State, 90 Ala. 651, 8 So. 
 
 698 522 
 
 Zell V. Com. 94 Pa. 258 899 
 
 Zimmerman v. State (Ala.) 30 So. 
 
 18 637, 963 
 
 Zipperian v. People, 33 Colo. 134, 79 
 
 Pac. 1018 143, 533, 927 
 
 1006, 1019, 1036 
 Zoldoske v. State, 82 Wis. .">80, 52 
 
 N. W. 778 89u, 897, 899 
 
HOMICIDE. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 GENERAL CLASSIFICATION AND DEFINITIONS. 
 
 I. Homicide. 
 
 1. Definitions. 
 
 II. MUBDER. 
 
 2. Definitions and characteristics. 
 
 3. Inconclusiveness. 
 III. Manslaughter. 
 
 4. Definitions and characteristics. 
 
 5. Voluntary manslaughter. 
 
 6. Involuntary manslaughter. 
 rv. Excusable homicide. 
 
 7. Definition. 
 
 V. Justifiable homicide. 
 
 8. Definition. 
 
 9. Distinctiou between excusable and justifiable homicide now disre- 
 
 garded in practice. 
 
 I. Homicide. 
 
 1. Definitions. — Homicide is the destroying the life or the killing 
 of any human creature ;^ the killing of one human being by another 
 or by others f~ or the destruction of the life of one human being by 
 the act, agency, procurement, or culpable omission of another.® It 
 embraces every mode by which the life of one person is taken by an- 
 other,* and does not necessarily import crime.® At common law 
 it is divided into the following heads: (I.) Murder; (II.) man- 
 slaughter; (III.) excusable homicide; (IV.) justifiable homicide. 
 
 14 Bl. Com. 177; State v. Jones, 2 4Siberry v. State, 149 Ind. 684. 39 N. 
 Penn. (Del.) 573, 47 Atl. 1006; Kilpat- E. 936, 47" N. B. 458. 
 rick V. Com. 3 Phila. 237. sibid. 
 
 2 Stout V. State, 90 Ind. 1. 
 
 sGonzalez v. State, 30 Tex. App. 203, 
 16 S. W. 978. 
 Horn.— 1. 
 
HOMICIDE. 
 
 [§ 2 
 
 II. MURDEK. 
 
 2. Definitions and characteristics — Murder, as usually defined, is 
 \vliere a person of sound memory and discretion unlawfully kills 
 any reasonable creature in being, in the peace of the commonwealth 
 or sovereign, with malice prepense or aforethought, either express or 
 implied.-^ It is the killing of any human being against the peace of 
 the commonwealth, with malice aforethought, either express or im- 
 plied by law, the word "malice" being used in its technical sense, 
 including not only anger, hatred, and revenge, but every other un- 
 lawful and unjustifiable motive.^ It is where a man of sound sense 
 unlawfully killeth another, with malice aforethought, either express 
 or implied.^ It is where a homicide is committed with a specific in- 
 tent to take life, deliberately formed and acted upon ; or where the 
 killing results from the reckless disregard of human life. * The distin- 
 guishing characteristic of murder is malice, and murder is homicide 
 with malice aforethought.'^' Malice is a necessary ingredient of the 
 crime of murder.'' To constitute murder at common law the hom- 
 icide must have been committed with some degree of deliberation and 
 
 13 Inst. 47, 51 ; King v. Oneby, 2 Ld. 
 Raym. 1487; 1 Hale, P. C. 425; 1 Hawk. 
 P. 0. ehap. 31, §§ 3, 8; Reg. v. Maw- 
 gridge, J. Kelyng, 127; Fost. C. L. 256; 4 
 Bl. Com. 198; Lewis, C. L. 394; Fields 
 V. State, 52 Ala. 348; People v. Schmidt, 
 63 Cal. 28 ; People v. Haun, 44 Cal. 96 ; 
 Kent V. People, 8 Colo. 563, 9 Pac. 852 ; 
 State V. Rhodes, Houst. Crira. Rep. 
 (Del.) 476; State v. Jones, 2 Penn. 
 (Del.) 573, 47 Atl. 1006; State v. Brinte, 
 4 Penn. (Del.) 551, 58 Atl. 258; State 
 V. Wilson (Del.) 62 Atl. 227; Jackson 
 V. People, 18 111. 269 ; Palmer v. People, 
 138 111. 356, 32 Am. St. Rep. 146, 28 N. 
 E. 130; Spios V. People, 122 111. 1, 3 
 Am. St. Rep. 320, 12 N. E. 865, 17 N. 
 E. 898 ; Craft v. State, 3 Kan. 451 ; State 
 V. Ireland (Kan.) 83 Pac. 1036: State v. 
 Conley, 39 Me. 78; People v. Potter, 5 
 Mich. 1, 71 Am. Dee. 763; State v. Zel- 
 lers, 7 N. J. L. 220; State v. Turner, 
 Wright (Ohio) 20; Com. v. Drum, 58 
 Pa. 9; Com. v. Green, 1 Aahm. (Pa.) 
 289; Kilpatrick v. Com. 3 Phila. 237; 
 Com. V. Corrigan, 1 Pittsb. 292 ; Com. v. 
 Lynch, 3 Pittsb. 412; M'Whirt's Case, 
 3 Gratt. 594, 46 Am. Dec. 196; United 
 States V. Carr, 1 Woods, 480, Fed. Cas. 
 No. 14,732; United States v. Meagher, 
 37 Fed. 875; United States v. King, 34 
 Fed. 302. 
 
 2Com. V. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 52 \m. 
 Dec. 711; People v. Haun, 44 Cal. 96; 
 
 State V. Johnson, 8 Iowa, 525, 74 Am. 
 Dec. 321; State v. Zellers, 7 N. J. L. 
 220 ; Territory v. Lucero, 8 N. M. 543, 46 
 Pac. 18; People v. Calton, 5 Utah, 451, 
 16 Pac. 902; M'Whirt's Case, supra. 
 
 SHarrison v. Com. 79 Va. 374, 52 Am. 
 Rep. 634. 
 
 4Myers v. State, 62 Ala. 599. 
 
 BCom. V. York, 9 Met. 93, 43 Am. Dec. 
 373; Smith v. State, 83 Ala. 26, 3 So. 
 551; Nilan v. People, 27 Colo. 206, 60 
 Pac. 485; State v. Buchanan, Houst. 
 Crim. Rep. (Del.) 79; State v. Pratt, 
 Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 249; State v. 
 Rhodes, Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 476; 
 Ex parte Moore, 30 Ind. 197; Maher v. 
 People, 10 Mich. 226, 81 Am. Dec. 781; 
 State V. Weaver, 3 N. C. (2 Hayw.) 
 54; Evans v. State, 6 Tex. App. 513; 
 M'Whirt's Case, 3 Gratt. 594. 46 Am. 
 Dec. 196 ; United States v. Boyd, 45 Fed. 
 851. 
 
 sPinder v. State, 27 Fla. 370, 26 Am. 
 St. Rep. 75, 8 So. 837 ; Cribbs v. State, 
 86 Ala. 613, 6 So. 109: Gibson v. State, 
 89 Ala. 121, 18 Am. St. Rep. 96. 8 So. 
 98; Kent v. People, 8 Colo. 563, 9 Pac. 
 852; State v. Jones, 2 Penn. (Del.) 573, 
 47 Atl. 1006 ; State v. Becker, 9 Houst. 
 (Del.) 411, 33 Atl. 17; State v. Hurley, 
 Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 28; State v. 
 Draper, Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 531; 
 State v. Harmon, 4 Penn. (Del.) 580, 60 
 Atl. 866; State v. Bell (Del.) 62 Atl. 
 
§ a] GENERAL CLASSIFICATION AND DEFINITIONS. 3 
 
 intelligence, and with the intention of doing some great bodily harm.'' 
 There must have been a violation of a public law by the killing of 
 a human being in the peace of the people, and in the killing there 
 must have been a union or joint operation of an act and an inten- 
 tion, and the deed must have been malicious to the extent of falling 
 within the term "malice aforethought," express or implied.* The 
 crime cannot be murder in any degree in the absence of malice." 
 Before conviction there must be proof of malice, express or implied.^** 
 And where malice is shown and is unrebutted by the circumstances 
 of the killing or by the other facts in evidence, there can properly 
 be no conviction for any degree of homicide less than murder.^* 
 A killing is murder when malice existed and the slayer was en- 
 deavoring to carry out his malicious purpose, though the act by which 
 death was caused was accidental,-*^ and though there was no intent 
 to kill.-** And the term "malice" should be defined to the jury in 
 all prosecutions for murder, the omission to do so being reversible 
 error.'* And when there is evidence of malice the court should in- 
 struct with reference to murder ;^^ though failure to define malice 
 aforethoiight is not error where the court defines both express and 
 implied malice. '^'^ And an erroneous instruction upon the subject 
 
 147; Mayes v. People, 106 111. 306, 46 v. Romero, 4 Ariz. 193, 35 Pac. 1059; 
 
 Am. Rep. 698; Dukes v. State, 11 Ind. Babcock v. People, 13 Colo. 515, 22 Pac. 
 
 557, 71 Am. Dee. 370; Wall v. State, 51 817; State v. Brown (Del.) 61 Atl. 
 
 Ind. 453; Ex parte Moore, supra; State 1077. 
 
 V. Johnson, 8 Iowa, 525, 74 Am. Dec. An instruction erroneous because un- 
 321; State v. Decklotts, 19 Iowa, 447; der it the jury might infer that the ae- 
 Kriel v. Com. 5 Bush. 362; Fain v. Com. cused could be found guilty of any of 
 78 Ky. 183, 39 Am. Rep. 213; King v. the grades of homicide, though not act- 
 State, 74 Miss. 576, 21 So. 235; Maury uated by any malice whatever, is not 
 V. State, 68 Miss. 605, 24 Am. St. Rep. cured by the fact that elsewhere the 
 291, 9 So. 445; Kearney v. State, 68 jury were told that malice is an essen- 
 Miss. 233, 8 So. 292; Hunter v. State, tial element of murder. Nilan v. Peo- 
 74 Miss. 515, 21 So. 305 ; State v. David, pie, 27 Colo. 206, 60 Pac. 485. 
 131 Mo. 380, 33 S. W. 28; Bower v. loState v. Walker, 9 Houst. (Del.) 
 State, 5 Mo. 364, 32 Am. Dec. 325; State 464, 33 Atl. 2Si7; Golden v. State, 25 
 V. Phillips, 24 Mo. 475 ; Davis v. State, Ga. 527. 
 
 51 Neb. 301, 70 N. W. 984; Territory v. nBondurant v. State, 125 Ala. 31, 27 
 
 Lucero, 8 N. M. 543, 46 Pac. 18; People So. 775. And see Sanders v. State, 134 
 
 V. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264, 62 L.R.A. Ala. 74, 32 So. 654. 
 193, 61 N. E. 286; Kilpatrick v. Com. 3 isWheatly v. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 
 
 Phila. 237; Blalock v. State, 40 Tex. 39 S. W. 672. 
 
 Crim. Rep. 154, 49 S. W. 100; Pointer isState v. Walker, 37 La. Ann. 560. 
 v. United States, 151 U. S. 396, 38 L. iiRichardson v. State, 28 Tex. Crim. 
 
 ed. 208, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 410. Rep. 216, 12 S. W. 870. And see Har- 
 
 7Rowan v. State, 30 Wis. 129, 11 Am. rell v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 507, 55 
 
 Rep. 559. S. W. 824. 
 
 sKent V. People, 8 Colo. 563, 9 Pac. iBLudwig v. Com. 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1108, 
 
 852. 60 S. W. 8. And see Gilmore v. State, 
 
 sG-ibson V. State, 89 Ala. 121, 18 Am. 126 Ala. 20, 28 So. 595. 
 St. Rep. 96, 8 So. 98; Compton v. State. iGHamp v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 60 
 
 110 Ala. 24, 20 So. 119; United States S. W. 45. 
 
4 HOMICIDE. [§ 2 
 
 of malice is not prejudicial error in a prosecution for homicide, in 
 which the conviction was for manslaughter only, ^ "' 
 
 3. InconclTisiveness, — So far as these definitions are distinctiye they 
 are inconclusive. Murder is distinguished from other kinds of killing 
 by the condition of malice ; but malice is a term which requires, as 
 will bo seen in a subsequent chapter, peculiar exposition and lim- 
 itation. It may, however, be here incidentally remarked that the 
 necessity of a further definition of the term "malice" is not obviated 
 by the use, in the definition before us, of the words "unlawful" 
 and "wicked;" for manslaughter may be "unlawful" and "wicked" 
 without amounting to murder. Nor do the words "prepense" or 
 "aforethought" relieve the definition from ambiguity. What is "pre- 
 pense" or "aforethought ?" Can the mental processes by which con- 
 clusions are reached be measured by the flow of time ? Have not the 
 courts agreed in holding that all acts exhibiting design are presumed 
 to have been intended; and does not intention itseK include prior 
 thought? Under these circumstances we must hold that the defini- 
 tion just given, authoritative as it is, does not exhaustively describe 
 the offense of murder. And we must reach, also, a second conclu- 
 sion: If the sagacity of our jurists working on this important topic 
 for so long a series of years has been unable to construct a terse, 
 satisfactory definition of homicide, this is because such a definition 
 cannot, from the nature of the thing to be defined, be constructed. 
 In order, therefore, to understand what murder is, we must study 
 the subject in the concrete. When each particular case is presented 
 to the jury, terms can readily be found, in aid of the common-law 
 or statutory definition, to reach the merits of such case. But a 
 definition which is large enough to cover all cases in advance must 
 be necessarily so general that each of its leading terms requires 
 a new definition to make it exact.^ 
 
 i7PeopIe V. Boling, 83 Cal. 380, 23 Pac. lOn this point, Bramwell, B., in his 
 
 421; Connor v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 398, tefitimony before the Homicide Amend- 
 
 81 S. W. 259. ment Committee (London, 1874), said 
 
 And an instruction in a, prosecution in substance: "A judge who knows his 
 
 for homicide that if the Jury found that business never troubles the jury with 
 
 the defendant murdered the deceased needless definitions, but he deals with 
 
 wilfully, deliberately, and with premedi- the particular case before him, and says, 
 
 tation, their verdict should be murder in for instance : 'The first question you 
 
 the first degree, is not erroneovis for have to consider is. Did the man die of 
 
 omitting the element of malice afore- the injuries which he received? The 
 
 thought, where the court had already in- next question is. Did the prisoner eom- 
 
 structed the jury that murder was the mit them? Now you have to consider 
 
 unlawful killing of a human being, with that if you are of opinion that he is at 
 
 malice aforethought, giving the statu- least guilty of having killed him, wheth- 
 
 tory definition of malice. People v. er it is murder; and that depends upon 
 
 Bawden, 90 Cal. 195, 27 Pac. 204. the extent of the blows, and where they 
 
§ 4] 
 
 GENERAL CLASSIFICATION AND DEFINITIONS. 
 
 III. Manslaughtee. 
 4. Definitions and characteristics. — Manslaughter is the unlawful 
 and felonious killing of another, without any malice, either express 
 or implied.^ It is the offense of killing a human being, without 
 malice, either express or implied, under such circumstances as cannot 
 render it wholly innocent or justifiable in law.^ Any unlawful and 
 mlful killing of a human being without malice is manslaughter; 
 and, thus defined, it includes also a negligent killing which is wil- 
 ful, that is wilfully done.^ Manslaughter differs fi'om murder in 
 this, — that, though the act which occasions the death be unlawful, or 
 likely to be attended with bodily mischief, yet the malice, either 
 express or implied, which is the very essence of murder, is presumed 
 to be wanting ; and, the act being imputed to the infirmity of human 
 nature, the punishment is proportionably lenient. * If there was mal- 
 ice the offense is murder, and not manslaughter. ® It is no defense to 
 an indictment for manslaughter that the homicide therein alleged ap- 
 pears by the evidence to have been committed with malice afore- 
 
 were directed to. If you think he in- 
 tended to kill him, and did, it matters 
 not what means he used; but suppose 
 he did not intend it, you must consider 
 whether the means used were likely to 
 do it.' If you observe, in that case you 
 lay down no definition ; you assume that 
 the jury and you both know what the 
 law is; or you tell them what the law 
 is in that particular case." And Mr. 
 Livingston, in his Report on the Louisi- 
 ana Penal Code, in commenting upon 
 Coke's description of the crime, also 
 argued against giving definitions to the 
 jury, basing his argument upon substan- 
 tially the same reasons. 
 
 11 Hale, P. C. 449; 1 Hawk. P. C. 
 chap. 30, § 2 ; 1 Bl. Com. 191 ; Gates v. 
 States, 50 Ala. 166; Sullivan v. State, 
 102 Ala. 135, 48 Am. St. Rep. 22, 15 So. 
 264; State v. Triisty, 1 Penn. (Del.) 
 319, 40 Atl. 766; State v. Jones, 2 Penn. 
 (Del.) 576, 47 Atl. 1006; State v. Em- 
 ory (Del.) 58 Atl. 1036; State v. 
 Brinte, 4 Penn. (Del.) 551, 58 Atl. 258; 
 Smith V. People, 142 111. 117, 31 N. E. 
 599; Moore v. People, 146 111. 600, 35 
 N. E. 166; State v. Shelledy, 8 Iowa, 
 477; State v. Abarr, 39 Iowa, 185; GoflF 
 V. Prime, 26 Ind. 197; State v. Ireland 
 (Kan.) 83 Pac. 1036; Com. v. Webster, 
 5 Cush. 295, 52 Am. Dec. 711; People v. 
 Lilley, 43 Mich. 526, 5 N. W. 982 ; State 
 V. Rose. 142 Mo. 418, 44 S. W. 329; 
 State V. Zellers, 7 N. J. L. 220; Sut- 
 
 eliflfe V. State, 18 Ohio, 469, 51 Am. Dec. 
 459; State v. Turner, Wright (Ohio) 
 20; Lynch v. Com. 77 Pa. 205; Com. v. 
 Drum, 58 Pa. 9; State v. Levelle, 34 S. 
 C. 120, 27 Am. St. Rep. 799, 13 S. E. 
 319; People v. Calton, 5 Utoh, 451, 16 
 Pac. 902 ; Jl'Whii-t's Case, 3 Gratt. 594, 
 46 Am. Deo. 196; United States v. Carr, 
 1 Woods, 480, Fed. Cas. No. 14,732; 
 United States v. Wiltberger, 3 Wash. 
 C. C. 515, Fed. Cas. No. 16,738; United 
 States V. Meagher, 37 Fed. 875. 
 
 2State V. List, Houst. Crim. Rep. 
 (Del.) 133. 
 
 sUnited States v. Meagher, supra. 
 
 <Ex parte Tayloe, 5 Cow. 51; United 
 States V. Travers, 2 Wlieelev. C. C. 506 ; 
 Adams v. State, 65 Ind. 565; Com. v. 
 York, 9 Met. 93, 43 Am. Dec. 373; Com. 
 V. Biron, 4 Dall. 125; Pennsylvania v. 
 Lewis, Addison (Pa.) 279; State v. 
 Tookey, 2 Rice S. C. Dig. 104; King v. 
 Com. 2 Va. Cas. 78; Com. v. Mitchell, 1 
 Va. Cas. 116; United States v. Outer- 
 bridge. :■) S:\\vv. i< 0. J'Vil. Cas. No. 
 15,978; Com. v. Self ridge, Horr. & T. 
 Cas. 19; 1 Hale, P. C. 449, 450, 466; 3 
 Inst. 55; 1 Hawk. P. C. chap. 30, § 2; 
 Reg. V. Mawgridge, J. Kelyng, 124 ; Fost, 
 C. L. 290; Lord Cornwallis's Case, 2 
 St. Tr. 730. 
 
 5 Jackson v. State, 74 Ala. 26 ; Prior v. 
 State, 77 Ala. 56; State v. Shelledy, 8 
 Iowa, 477. 
 
& HOMICIDE. [1 4 
 
 thought, and was, therefore, murder ; but the defendant in such case 
 may, notwithstanding, be properly convicted of the offense of man- 
 slaughter.® But to define manslaughter as including every unjustifi- 
 able and unlawful motive is improper as removing manslaughter from 
 the catalogue of homicides.^ Manslaughter, at common law, may be 
 voluntary, in a sudden heat of passion; or involuntary, in the com- 
 mission of an unlawful act.* 
 
 5. Voluntary manslaughter — Voluntary manslaughter at common 
 law is the unlawful killing of another, without malice, on a sudden 
 quarrel or in heat of passion. Where, upon a sudden quarrel, two 
 persons fight, and one of them kills the other, this is voluntary man- 
 slaughter; and so, if they, upon such occasion, go out and fight 
 in a field; for this is one continued act of passion. So, also, if a 
 man be greatly provoked by any gross indignity, and immediately 
 kills his aggressor, it is voluntary manslaughter, and not excusable 
 liomicide, not being se defendendo. In these and such like cases the 
 law, kindly appreciating the infirmities of human nature, extenuates 
 I he offense committed, and mercifully hesitates to put on the same 
 footing of guilt, the cool, deliberate act and the result of hasty 
 passion.^ It is where one kills another in the heat of blood usually 
 arising from fighting or from due provocation.^ To constitute 
 volimtary manslaughter there must have been an intent to kill, 
 or the act which caused death must have been voluntarily done in 
 a sudden heat, without malice.^ It must have been wilful or inten- 
 tional.* Voluntary manslaughter at common law includes all feloni- 
 
 6Com. V. M'Pike. 3 Cush. 181, 50 Am. 711; State v. Rose, 142 Mo. 418, 44 S. 
 
 Dec. 727. W. 329; State v. Zellers, 7 N. J. L. 220; 
 
 7Nye V. People, 35 Mich. 16. Ex parte Tayloe, 5 Cow. 51 ; State v. 
 
 sCom. V. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 52 Am. Raymond, 11 Nev. 98; Cora. v. Corrigan, 
 
 Dec. 711; Adams v. State, 65 Ind. 565; 1 Pittsb. 292; Com. v. Brown, 7 Pa. Co. 
 
 Goff V. Prime, 26 Ind. 197; Sutcliffe v. Ot. fUO ; Com. v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9 ; State v. 
 
 State, 18 Ohio, 469, 51 Am. Deo. 459 ; Smith, 10 Rich. L. 341 ; State v. Levelle, 
 
 Lynoli V. Com. 77 Pa. 205; M'Whirt's 34 S. C. 120, 27 Am. St. Rep. 799, 13 S. 
 
 Case, 3 Gratt. 594, 46 Am. Dec. 196; E. 319; State v. Ferguson, 2 Hill, L. 
 
 United States v. Carr, 1 Woods, 480, 619, 27 Am. Dec. 412; Johnson v. State, 
 
 Fed. Cas. No. 14,732; United States v. 43 Tex. 612; Boyett v. State, 2 Tex. 
 
 Meagher, 37 Fed. 875. App. 93 ; People v. Calton, 5 Utah, 451, 
 
 UHale, P. C. 449; 1 Bl. Com. 191; 1 16 Pac. 902; King v. Com. 2 Va. Cas. 
 
 Hawk. P. C. chap. 30, § 3; Perry v. 78. 
 
 State, 43 Ala. 21; Martin v. State, 119 zstate v. Jones, 2 Penn. (Del.) 573, 47 
 
 Ala. 1, 25 So. 255; State v. Trusty, 1 Atl. 1006; State v. Dickey, 48 W. Va. 
 
 Penn. (Del.) 319, 40 Atl. 766; Stokes 325, 37 S. E. 695. 
 
 V. State, 18 Ga. 17; Murphy v. State, sNorton v. State, 98 Ind. 347; State 
 
 31 Ind. 511; Stoui v. State, 90 Ind. 1; v. Draper, Houat. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 
 
 Bruner v. State, 58 Ind. 159 ; Hasenfuss 291 ; State v. Rhodes, Houst. Crim. Rep. 
 
 V. State, 156 Ind. 246, 59 N. E. 463; (Del.) 476; Anderson v. State, 3 Heisk. 
 
 State V. Abarr, 39 Iowa, 185; Greer v. 86; Nelson v. State, 6 Baxt. 418. 
 Com. Ill Ky. 93, 63 S. W. 443; Com. 4Wheatley v. Cora. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 V. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 52 Am. Dec. 436, 81 S. W. 687. 
 
§ 5] GENERAL CLASSIFICATION AND DEFINITIONS. 7 
 
 ous homicides less heinoiis than murder, which result directly from 
 any unlawful force aimed at, and applied to, the party slain. ^ To 
 constitute voluntary manslaughter, however, it is not necessary that 
 the perpetrator should have intended or willed the death of the per- 
 son killed; unlawful force intentionally directed against him is 
 sufficient to render the consummated act voluntary.® And one who 
 wilfully uses a deadly weapon upon a vital part of another will be 
 deemed to have intended the necessary and probable consequences 
 of his own act, and there can be no question of involuntary man- 
 slaughter in the case.^ But to render a slayer criminally responsible 
 the killing must have been unlawful as well as voluntary.^ 
 
 6. Involuntary manslaughter — Involuntary manslaughter is where 
 one doing an unlawful act, not felonious or tending to great bodily 
 harm, or doing a lawful act without proper caution or requisite 
 skill, undesignedly kills another.^ According to the old writers it 
 is where death results unintentionally, so far as the defendant is 
 concerned, from an unlawful act on his part, not amounting to felony, 
 or from a lawful act negligently performed.^ Hence, it is involuntary 
 manslaughter when the death of another occurs through the defend- 
 ant's negligent use of dangerous agencies,^ or through recklessly care- 
 less acts;* and so, where death incidentally, but unintentionally, 
 results in the execution of a trespass.® At common law it included 
 all those homicides which were below the grade of murder, and were 
 neither justifiable nor excusable, and which were the accidental re- 
 sult of some unlawful act less than a felony, not aimed at or di- 
 rected against the person slain.** But where death was caused by an 
 intentional application of force, — as, by striking with an instrument 
 
 BMcManus v. State, 36 Ala. 285. 3Reg. v. Murray, 5 Cox, C. C. 509 
 
 6Ibid. ; Harrington v. State, 83 Ala. 9, Reg. v. Chamberlain, 10 Cox, C. C. 486 
 
 3 So. 425. Rlgmaidon's Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 180 
 
 'State V. Talmage, 107 Mo. 543, 17 S. Rex v. Timmins, 7 Car. & P. 499; Queen 
 
 W. 990. V. Dalloway, 2 Cox, C. C. 273; Reg v. 
 
 sSmith V. State, 68 Ala. 424. Swindall, 2 Car. & K. 230; Reg. v. Par- 
 
 iState V. Trusty, I Penn. (Del.) 319, geter, 3 Cox, C. C. 191; Reg. v. Lowe, 
 
 40 Atl. 766; State v. Brown, Houst. 4 Cox, C. C. 449; Reg. v. Smith, 11 Cox, 
 
 Crim. Rep. (Del.) 539; State v., Jones, C. C. 210; State v. O'Brien. 32 N. J. 
 
 2 Penn. (Del.) 573, 47 Atl. 1006; Har- L. 169. 
 
 rington v. State, 83 Ala. 9, 3 So. 425; 4York v. Com. 82 Ky. 360. 
 
 Bruner v. State, 58 Ind. 159; State v. 51 Hale, P. C. 449; Post. C. L. 270; 
 
 Abarr, 39 Iowa, 185 ; Lee v. State, 1 Reg. v. Archer, 1 Fost. & F. 351 ; State v. 
 
 Coldw. 62; Robertson v. State, 2 Lea, Turner, Wright (Ohio) 20; State v. 
 
 239, 31 Am. Rep. 602; People v. Calton, Smith, 32 Me. 369, 54 Am. Dec. 578; 
 
 5 Utah, 451, 16 Pac. 902. State v. Center, 35 Vt. 378. 
 
 zUnited States v. Meagher, 37 Fed. eMcManus v. State, 36 Ala. 285. 
 
 875; Bias v. United States, 3 Ind. Terr. 
 
 27, 53 S. W. 471; Adams v. State, 65 
 
 Ind. 565. 
 
8 HOMICIDE. L'§ 6 
 
 capable of producing death, — -there can be no question as to iuvol- 
 untary manslaughter.'' So, involuntary manslaughter is defined by 
 numerous cases to be an unintentional killing in the commission of an 
 unlawful act.* And to consist of the killing of a human being, with- 
 out any intention to do so, but in the commission in an unlawful 
 manner, of an unlawful act, or of a laAvful act, which probably would 
 produce such consequences. ® And it has been said to be involuntary 
 manslaughter where a person doing an unlawful act not amounting 
 to a felony, by accident kills another ; or where one unintentionally 
 kills another without malice, either express or implied, while the 
 slayer is in the commission of some unlawful act not amounting to 
 a felony.-^" And also where neither death nor bodily harm was in- 
 tended, but death was accidentally caused by some unlawful act, or by 
 some act which, though perhaps not strictly unlawful in itself, was 
 done in an unlawful manner or without due caution. ^ ^ And it has 
 been held to involve the death of a person by reason of some gross 
 neglect upon the part of another with regard to a plain duty which 
 rested upon him under the law.^^ To constitute involuntary man- 
 slaughter the killing need not have been the result of an intentionally 
 unlawful act against the person killed, or any other person.^' It is 
 the killing of a person against or beside the will of the person who 
 kills him.^* An act of one person unintentionally causing the death 
 of another, however, without more, is not involuntary manslaughter ; 
 the act must have been unlawful, or done in an unlawful manner; 
 
 7 Von Gundy v. Com. 11 Ky. L. Rep. 766; State v. Jones, 2 Penn. (Del.) 573, 
 
 552, 12 S. W. 386; McManus v. State, 47 Atl. 1006; State v. Spendlove, 47 
 
 supra. Kan. 160, 28 Pao. !)94; State v, McNab, 
 
 sSiberry v. State, 149 Ind. 084, 39 N. 20 N. H. 160; People v. Butler, 3 Park. 
 
 E. 936, 47 N. E. 458; Brown v. State, Crim. Rep. 377; State v. Brooks, 1 
 
 110 Ind. 486, 11 N. E. 447; Willey v. Ohio Dec. Reprint, 407; Rowan v. State, 
 
 State, 46 Ind. 363; Com. v. Mink, 123 30 Wis. 129, 11 Am. Rep. 559. And 
 
 Mass. 422, 25 Am. Rep. 109; Goodwin's see Chapman v. State, 120 Ga. 855, 48 
 
 Case, 6 N. Y. City Hall Rec. 9; John- S. E. 350; Ford v. State (Neb.) 98 N. 
 
 son V. State, 66 Ohio St. 59, 61 L.R.A. W. 807. 
 
 277, 90 Am. St. Rep. 564, 63 N. E. 607; I'Lee v. State, 1 Coldw. 62; Williams 
 
 Weller v. State, 19 Ohio 0. 0. 166; State v. Slate, 83 Aln. 16, 3 So. 616; Overby 
 
 V. Pate, 4 Ohio Legal News, 403; Rob- v. State. 115 Ga. 240, 41 S. E. 609; 
 
 bins V. State, 8 Ohio St. 138; Jewell v. State v. Lockwood. 119 .Mo. 463, 24 S. 
 
 Territory, 4 Okla, 53, 43 Pac. 1075. W. 1015; Com. v. Bilderback, supra. 
 
 sStudstill V. State, 7 Ga. 14; Bias v. isState v. Young (N. J. L,) 56 Atl. 
 
 United States, 3 Ind. Terr. 27, 53 S. 471. 
 
 W. 471; State v. Lockwood, 119 Mo. 463, isStete v. Vance, 17 Iowa, 138. 
 
 24 S. W. 1015; Com. v. Bilderback, 2 14 York v. Com. 82 Ky. 360. 
 
 Pars. Sel. Eq. Cas. 447; Com. v. Herold, An unintentional killing througli care- 
 
 ~> Pa. Dist. R. 623; Com. v. Kuhn, 1 lessness, without intent or design, is in- 
 
 Pittsb. 13. voluntary manslaughter. Ringer v. 
 
 loState V. Abarr, .39 Iowa, 185; State State (Ark.) 85 S. W. 410. 
 V. Trusty, 1 Penn. (Del.) 319, 40 Atl. 
 
§ 6] GENERAL CLASSIFICATION AND DEFINITIONS. 9 
 
 if it was a mere accident, no criminal responsibility attaches.^' To 
 warrant a conviction there must have been either a criminal intent 
 or negligence so gross as to imply it/® 
 
 IV. Excusable homicide. 
 
 7. Definition. — Excusable homicide is of two lands: 1st. Where 
 a man doing a lawful act, without any intention to hurt, by acci- 
 dent kills another; as, for instance, where a man is hunting in 
 a park, and unintentionally kills a person concealed. This is called 
 homicide per infortuniam, or by misadventure, "id. 8e defendendo, 
 or in self defense, which exists where one is suddenly assaulted, and 
 in the defense of his person, where immediate and great bodily harm 
 would be the apparent consequence of waiting for the assistance of 
 the law, and there is no other probable means of escape, he kills the 
 assailant. By the older text writers, this species of homicide is 
 sometimes called chance medley or chaud medley, words of nearly 
 the same import. As will, in another chapter, be explained more 
 fully, the same right of self defense is extended to the relations of 
 master and servant, parent and child, and husband and wife; and 
 to those cases where homicide is unavoidably committed in the de- 
 fense of the possession of one's dwelling house against a trespasser. 
 Under the same general head of excusable homicide may also be enu- 
 merated that class of cases where two persons are reduced to the 
 alternative that one or the other or both must perish; as, where 
 cwo shipwrecked persons are on one plank which will not hold 
 them both, and one thrusts the other from it, so that he is drowned, 
 the survivor is excused.'' 
 
 V. Justifiable homicide. 
 
 8. Definition — Justifiable homicide is that which is committed, 
 either, first, by unavoidable necessity, without any will, intention, or 
 desire, or any inadvertence or negligence in the party killing, and, 
 therefore, without blame ; such as by an ofiicer executing a criminal, 
 pursuant to the death warrant, and in strict conformity to the law 
 in every particular; or, second, for the advancement of public jus- 
 tice; as, where an officer, in the due execution of his office, kills a 
 
 isRobertson v. State, 2 Lea, 239, 31 guilty of negligence or other fault in 
 
 Am. Rep. 602; Ann v. State, 11 Humph, the manner of doing the act. Blalock 
 
 159; Tidwell v. State, 70 Ala. 33. v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 154, 49 S. 
 
 One who does an act lawful in itself, W. 100. 
 from which death results to another, is isHampton v. State, 45 Ala. 82. 
 not ansM'erable therefor unless he was iSee infra, chapter XIII. 
 
10 HOMICIDE. [§ 8 
 
 person who assaults and resists him; or where a private person or 
 officer atterapts to arrest a man charged with felony and is resisted, 
 and in the endeavor to take him, kills him ; or if a felon flee from 
 justice, and in the pursuit he be killed, where he cannot otherwise be 
 taken ; or if there be a riot, or a rebellious assembly, and the officers 
 or their assistants, in dispersing the mob, kill some of them, where 
 the riot cannot be otherwise suppressed; or if prisoners, in jail or 
 going to jail, assaiilt or resist the officers, Avhile in the necessary 
 discharge of their duty, and the officers or their aids, in repelling 
 force by force, kill the party resisting; or, third, for the pre- 
 vention of any atrocious crime, attempted to be committed by force; 
 such as murder, robbery, housebreaking in the nighttime, rape, may- 
 hem, or any other act of felony against the person.'' 
 
 9. Distinction between excusable and justifiable homicide now dis- 
 regarded in practice. — The distinction, in result, between justifiable 
 and excusable homicide is now practically exploded. In former times, 
 in the latter case, as the law presumed that the slayer was not wholly 
 free from blame, he was punished, at least by forfeiture of goods. 
 But in this country such a rule is not known ever to have been 
 recognized; it having been the uniform practice here, as it now 
 is in England, where the grade does not reach manslaughter, for the 
 jury, under the direction of the court, to acquit.^ 
 
 13 Greenl. Ev. 115; 4 Bl. Ckjm. 178- per vim inferentem occidit, dimmitten- 
 180; 1 Russell, Crimes, 665, 670; United dum. L. 1, § 4. D. 48, 8. Si quis per- 
 States V. Wiltberger, 3 Wash. C. C. 515, cussorera ad se venientem gladio repu- 
 Fed. Cas. No. 16,738. And see State v. lerit, non ut homicida tenetur; quia de- 
 Rutherford, 8 N. C. (1 Hawks) 457; fensor proprise salutis in nullo pecaase 
 State V. Roane, 13 N. C. (2 Dev. L.) 58. videtur. Cod. lib. 9, tit. 16, 1. 3. In the 
 
 The Roman law recognized the same cases mentioned in the text, if the homi- 
 
 principles: Qui latronem oeciderit, non eide is committed with undue precipi- 
 
 tenetur, utique si aliter periculum ef- tancy, or the unjustifiable use of a 
 
 fugere non potest. Inst. lib. 4, tit. 3, deadly weapon, the slayer will be cul- 
 
 ^ 2. Furem nocturnum, si quis oc- pable. See Alison's Crim. Law of Scot- 
 
 ciderit, ita demum impune feret, si par- land, p. 100; Ibid. pp. 132-139. 
 
 cere ei sine periculo suo non potuit. L. iSee infra, chapter XXX. 
 9, D. 48, 8. Qui stuprum sibi vel suis 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 WHO MAY COMMIT HOMICIDE. 
 10. Application of general rules as to criminal responsibility. 
 
 10. Application of general rules as to criminal responsibility The 
 
 rule that laws for the punishment of crime are general, and apply 
 alike to all persons in the state with sufficient capacity to know right 
 from wrong, is applicable to homicide.^ Thus, though a convict is 
 civilly dead, he is corporeally alive and under the protection of the 
 law, and answerable the same as anyone else for breaking it by com- 
 mitting homicide. ^ And a criminal confined for a lesser offense, who 
 commits another and a greater crime, to which the law affixes a 
 severer penalty, cannot escape punishment for the latter crime because 
 of being confined for the first. ^ And he may be brought from the 
 prison or penitentiary into court to be tried for a subsequent homi- 
 cide.* Nor is the fact that his previous sentence and his present 
 offense are such that he cannot be further punished, of any effect.® 
 So, prima facie, Indians are subject to the criminal law with refer- 
 ence to homicide, as well as to other matters, and, if any exception ex- 
 ists, it must be shown.* And the fact that a person is an Indian, 
 maintaining tribal relations and occupying a reservation, does not 
 
 iThomas v. People, 67 N. Y. 218. would refuse to attend the trial and tes- 
 
 2SingIeton v. State, 71 Miss. 782, 42 tify in his behalf until it was too late 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 488, 16 So. 295; State v. to take her deposition, is entitled to a 
 
 Shippey, 10 Minn. 223, 88 Am. Dec. 70, continuance. Ibid. 
 
 Gil. 178; State v. Connell, 49 Mo. 282; BPeople v. Mangano, 29 Hun, 259. 
 
 Thomas v. People, 67 N. Y. 218; People The law recognizes no distinction on 
 
 V. Mangano, 29 Hun, 259; Coleman v. the question of the criminality of a 
 
 State, .35 Tex. Grim. Rep. 404, 33 S. W. homicide, between a felon confined in 
 
 1083. prison for life or otherwise, and a fre-j 
 
 sState V. Connell, 49 Mo. 282. person. Ibid. 
 
 ^Gaines v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 53 estate v. Ta-cha-na-tah, 64 N. C. 614. 
 
 S. W. 623. And a treaty between the United 
 
 A person charged with homicide, who States and a tribe of Indians, by which 
 was serving a term in the penitentiary the Indians are permitted to remain in 
 on another charge, and who was not in- a state and become citizens of it, sub- 
 formed that he would be tried for the jects the Indians to the criminal laws of 
 homicide until ten days before the trial, the state, rendering them liable for 
 and who thereafter used due diligence to homicide the same as other persons, 
 locate a material witness, but could not, Ibid, 
 and who did not inow that his wife 
 
 11 
 
12 HOMICIDE. [§ 10 
 
 prevent him from being triable in the state courts for homicide 
 committed while off the reservation.'^ Likewise a slave is a person 
 within the meaning of the common-law definition of murder, and is 
 
 ■^8 
 
 punishable for committing homicide the same as other persons.* And 
 a statute imposing punishment upon any person who shall there- 
 after commit manslaughter and be thereof convicted is of universal 
 application, and is not limited in its operation to manslaughter com- 
 mitted by free white persons.® And a slave amenable for a felony 
 may be an accessory to murder, whether his principal was his mas- 
 ter or another person. ^^ Likewise the common-law rule with ref- 
 erence to criminal responsibility generally, that until an infant 
 arrives at the age of seven years he cannot be convicted of a crim- 
 inal offense; and that between the ages of seven and fourteen 
 responsibility is conditioned on capacity, the presumption being that 
 the infant is incompetent, and the intensity of the proof necessary to 
 rebut such presumption varying with the age and other circum- 
 stances; and that when the age of fourteen arrives full criminal 
 responsibility attaches, — applies to homicide. ^^ And the question 
 whether a child under the age of fourteen is capable of entertaining 
 an intent to kill is one of fact, to be determined by the jury from 
 the evidence. ^^ The presumption of incapacity of a child tinder 
 fourteen years of age to commit the crime of homicide decreases with 
 the increase of years. ^ * And it may be rebutted by clear proof of 
 suificient knowledge and capacity.** So, though corporations can act 
 only through agents, and though it is a principle of law that a prin- 
 cipal cannot be held criminally liable for the acts of his agent, cor- 
 porations may, in certain cases, be held amenable to the criminal 
 law, and made criminally responsible for homicide. * ® And statutes 
 imposing penalties upon carrier corporations for injuries to pas- 
 sengers are designed in part to impose a punishment upon the cor- 
 
 ' State V. Spotted Hawk, 22 Mont. 33, teen years of age it could not enter- 
 
 5.5 Pae. 1026. tain such an intent, as matter of law, is 
 
 sNelaon v. State, 10 Humph. 518 ; erroneous. Ibid, 
 
 State V. Posey, 4 Strobh. L. 103, isMartin v. State, 90 Ala. 602, 24 Am. 
 
 sState V, Seaborne, 8 Eob. (La,) 518 St. Eep, 844, 8 So, 858, 
 
 lOState V. Posey, supra. i^Ibid, 
 
 iiMoCormaek v. State, 102 Ala, 156, A witness acquainted with a child 
 
 15 So, 438; State v. Davis, 104 Tenn. about fourteen years of age who had 
 
 501, 58 S, W, 122, committed a homicide may testify, in a 
 
 The general question of criminal lia-^ prosecution for the killing, that he was 
 
 bility of children is fully considered in a or was not of bright or quick mind, 
 
 note to State v, Yeargan, 36 L,R,A, 196. Ibid. 
 
 i2McCormack v. State, supra. isQueeu v. Great West Laundry Co. 3 
 
 And an instruction by the court that Can, Crim, Cas, 514, 
 if the child in question was xiuder four- 
 
I 10] WHO MAY COMMIT HOidCIDE. 13 
 
 poration or its servants/® and they include cases of injury re- 
 sulting in death. ^ " And it has been held that the terms "everyone" 
 and "person" in a statute making everyone, or every person, guilty of 
 an indictable offense who, by any unlawful act, causes grievous 
 bodily injury to any other person, include corporations, and the 
 statute applies to injuries immediately resulting in death;-'* though 
 a corporation is not a human being within the meaning of a stat- 
 ute defining homicide to be the killing of a human being by an- 
 other.*^ When a corporation is prosecuted by indictment for causing 
 death under a statute of this class, however, the same principles of 
 law and rules of evidence are applicable as in civil actions for dam- 
 ages for causing death,-'' though contributory negligence is not a 
 defense.-^ And a corporation is not subject to indictment upon a 
 charge of any crime the essence of which is either personal criminal 
 intent, or such a degree of negligence as amounts to a wilful in- 
 curring of the risk of causing injury to others.^^ 
 
 leCom. V. Boston & L. R. Corp. 134 islbid. 
 
 Mass. 211. And see Com. v. Boston & zoState v. Grand Trunk R. Co. 58 Me. 
 
 M. E. Co. 129 Mass. 500, 37 Am. Rep. 176, 4 Am. Rep. 258. 
 
 382. 2iCom. V. Boston & L. R. Corp. 134 
 
 i7Com. V. Boston & M. R. Co. 133 Mass. 211. 
 
 Mass. 383. 22Queen v. Great West Laundry Co. 
 
 isQueen v. Union Colliery Co. 3 Can. 3 Can. Crim. Cas. 514. 
 Grim. Cas. 523. 
 
CHAPTEE III. 
 
 THE SUBJECT OF THE CRIME— THE PERSON KILLED. 
 
 11. An existing life -which was destroyed. 
 
 12. Human beings. 
 1.3. Infants. 
 
 14. Suicide. 
 1.5. Slaves. 
 
 16. Homicide of alien enemy. 
 
 17. Time and place of consummation. 
 
 18. Death within a year and a, day from the injury. 
 
 19. Consent as affecting criminality. 
 
 11. An existing life which was destroyed. — It is essential in all 
 cases tO' show that the deceased was living at the time when the 
 alleged mortal blow was struck. Thus, where it was doubtful, in 
 a case where a mother was charged with throwing her child overboard, 
 whether it was living or dead at the time, it was held that it rested 
 on the government to show it was living at the time, it appearing that 
 the mother was laboring under jDuerperal fever, and the idea of 
 malice being thereby excluded.^ The presumption that a person 
 proved to have been alive at a particular time is still so, however, 
 holds until it is rebutted by the lapse of time, or other satisfactory 
 proof.^ And an accident or injury not probably or necessarily fatal 
 does not change the presumption of continuance of life.* These rules 
 apply also to cases of several distinct mortal wounds, and to mortal 
 wounds inflicted upon persons incurably diseased, and to injuries 
 aggravated by malpractice ; and to cases of several contributing causes 
 of death generally, questions with referpnee to which are elsewhere 
 considered. * 
 
 lUnited States v. Hewson, Brunner, then taken into another state where an- 
 Col. Cas. 532, Fed. Cas. No. 15,360, per other person cuts off her head for the 
 Story, J. purpose of preventing identification, a 
 
 2Com. V. Harman, 4 Pa. 269; Whar- verdict of conviction against the person 
 ton, Crim. Law, § 2634; United States cutting off her head is not authorized in 
 V. Knowles, 4 Sawy. 517, Fed. Cas. No. a prosecution for the homicide, unless it 
 15,540. appears that she was at that time, in 
 
 sUnited States v. Knowles, supra. fact, alive. Jackson v. Com. lOO Ky. 
 
 If a woman is given poison in one 239, 66 Am. St. Rep. 336, 38 S. W. 422, 
 state for the purpose either of killing 1091. 
 
 her or producing an abortion, and is 4See infra, chapter V., §§ 31-36. 
 
 14 
 
$ 12] THE SUBJECT OF THE CRIME. 15 
 
 12. Human beings. — The law of homicide applies universally to 
 human beings, and to human beings only, the common-law definition 
 and most of the statutory ones referring particularly to the killing 
 of a human being.^ 
 
 13. Infants — Within common-law rules an unborn child is not a 
 person, and, therefore, not a subject of homicide. ' And a young 
 infant at, or immediately after, birth is not a subject of homicide in 
 the absence of statutory provision therefor, unless the fact is estab- 
 'lished that it was fully born, and had an independent existence and 
 circulation ; prior to that event its life is substantially festal as distin- 
 guished from independent life.^ In order that a child be in existence 
 by actual birth within these rules, parturition must be complete, and 
 the body of the child must be entirely expelled from the body of 
 the mother.* This subject is more extensively considered in another 
 chapter.* 
 
 14. Suicide — Homicide may be committed by killing one's self 
 as well as by killing another person.-' But owing to the fact that 
 no appropriate punishment can be imposed for the accomplished 
 act, and that, as a general rule, at least in modern times, none is 
 imposed, the courts have had little occasion to declare the law on 
 this subject. The question of suicide is more extensively considered 
 elsewhere in this work.^ 
 
 15. Slaves — It has been asserted that pure and proper slavery 
 gives the master the power of life and death over the slave, ^ and that 
 homicide cannot be committed by killing a slave.^ But the con- 
 trary rule has been repeatedly asserted in this country, that "any 
 reasonable creature" or "another" the killing of whom is murder 
 
 iSee Palmer v. People, 138 111. 356, 32 i4 Bl. Com. Chase's ed. 937. 
 Am. St. Rep. 146, 28 N. E. 130; People 2See infra, chapter XVII., § 370. 
 V. McNulty, 93 Cal. 427, 26 Pac. 597, 29 i Fields v. State, 1 Yerg. 156. 
 Pae. 01. 2See Camp v. State, 25 Ga. 689; Neal 
 
 iState V. Prude, 76 Miss. 543, 24 So. v. Farmer, 9 Ga. 355. 
 871. So, in State v. Fleming, 2 Strobh. L. 
 
 2State V. Winthrop, 43 Iowa, 519, 22 404, it was held that the homicide of a 
 
 Am. Rep. 257; Evans v. People, 49 N. slave is a purely statutory offense and 
 
 Y. 86; Com. v. O'Donohue, 8 Phila. 023; an indictment therefor does not lie at 
 
 Harris v. State, 28 Tex. App. 308, 19 common law. 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 837, 12 S. W. 1102; Wal- And in State v. Weaver, 3 N. C. (2 
 laee V. State, 10 Tex. App. 255; Johnson Hayw.) 54, it was held that where a 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 24 S. W. slave refuses to obey the commands of 
 285 ; Josef v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. his master, and the master endeavors to 
 446, 30 S. W. 1067; Sheppard v. State, exact obedience by force, and the slave 
 17 Tex. App. 74; Reg. v. Wright, 9 offers resistance by force, and the mas- 
 Car. & P. 756. ter kills the slave, it is not murder, or 
 
 3Wallace v. State, supra. even manslaughter, but justifiable homi- 
 
 4See infra, chapter XVIII., §§ 371 et eide. 
 seq. 
 
16 ' HOMICIDE. [§15 
 
 or manslaughter at common law includes the villain, and the negro, 
 and the mulatto slave.^ And in states in which the system of slavery 
 is peculiar, and differs from the system as it existed among Jews, 
 Romans, and Greeks, and differs materially from the villainage of 
 ancient England, the felonious killing of a slave by his master is re- 
 garded as murder. * And, like the killing of a free white person, may 
 be either murder or manslaughter, according to the circumstances 
 of the case.^ Slaves have uniformly been treated as persons in 
 the contemplation of laws defining murder or manslaughter to be the 
 killing of a person.'' And under such provisions, it is immaterial 
 whether the killing is done by the lord or owner, or by a stranger.'' 
 And upon indictment for the murder of a slave the defendant may 
 be acquitted" of miirder and found guilty of manslaughter, just as 
 if the object of the homicide had been a free man.* Likewise, since 
 the abolition of slavery the law has properly made it a crime equal 
 in magnitude to kill a negro as to kill a white man, and imposes 
 punishment therefor without reference to race, color, previous con- 
 dition, or political consideration.® 
 
 16. Homicide of alien enemy. — The words, "in the peace of God and 
 the eommomvealth, then and there being," as used in the indictment, 
 
 sFields v. State, supra; Hudson v. So, a negro slave is a person upon 
 State, 34 Ala. 2.53 ; State v. Hoover, 20 whom a free white person may commit 
 jST. C. 500 (4 Dev. & B. L. 365), 34 Am. the offense of maliciously or unlawfully 
 Dee. 383; Chandler v. State, 2 Tex. 306. shooting, stabbing, etc., under a statute 
 ^Kelly v. State, 3 Smedes & M. 518; imposing a penalty upon whomsoever 
 Jolly V. State, 13 Smedes & M. 223; shall wilfully, maliciously, or purpose- 
 State V. Jones, Walk. (Miss.) 83. ly stab or shoot another. Com. v. Car- 
 Pure and proper slavery giving the ver, 5 Eand. (Va. ) 660. 
 master the power of life and death over 'Fields v. State, 1 Yerg. 156. 
 liis slave never existed in England, and So, killing a slave by undue or ex- 
 the lord or master might not kill or cessive correction falls within the con- 
 maim the slave, and for doing so he was demnation of a statute providing for the 
 indictable at the suit of the King, punishment of any person who shall 
 Fields V. State, 1 Yerg. 156. kill any slave in sudden heat and pas- 
 BState V. Seaborne, 8 Rob. (La.) 518. sion. State v. Fleming, 2 Strobh. L. 
 And see State v. Fleming, 2 Strobh. L. 464. And see State v. Welch, 1 Bay, 
 464. 172. 
 
 Both offenses were previously punish- s Fields v. State, supra; Hudson v. 
 
 able by the laws of Louisiana, and an State, 34 Ala. 253. 
 
 act subsequently passed, providing that In State v. Piver, 3 N. C. (2 Hayw.) 
 if any person whatsoever shall wilfully 79, however, it was held that the act of 
 kill his slave, or the slave of another, a boy in shooting a slave in resentment 
 he shall be tried and condemned accord- for a slight attack which he had pro- 
 ing to law, is designed merely for the voked is manslaughter, and that where 
 purpose of removing all doubt on the the statute providing for the malicious 
 subject. State v. Seaborne, supra. killing of a slave affixes no punishment 
 6 Chandler v. State, 2 Tex. 306; State to manslaughter, the boy should be ac- 
 V. Will, 18 N. C. (1 bev. & B. L.) 121; quitted in a prosecution for the kill- 
 State V. Hoover, 20 N. C. 500 (4 Dev. ing- 
 
 & B. L. 365), 34 Am. Dec. 383. And 'Lester v. State, 2 Tex. App. 432. 
 see Camp v. State, 25 Ga. 689. 
 
§ 16] THE SUBJECT OF THE CRIME. 17 
 
 and in the definition of murder, mean merely that it is not murder 
 to kill an alien enemy in time of war;^ at the same time, it must 
 be remembered that killing even an alien enemy, unless such killing 
 occur in the actual exercise of war, would be murder.^ This sub- 
 ject is further considered in another chapter.® 
 
 17. Time and place of consummation. ^ — The crime of homicide is 
 regarded as having been committed at the time when the fatal blow 
 or wound was inflicted, although the death occurs on a subsequent 
 date, so that the accused is to bo tried by the laws in force at the time 
 of the injuries.^ And independently of the statute a homicide is 
 committed and consummated where the mortal wound was inflicted, 
 though the victim dies, as a result of the wound, at another place.^ 
 In order to fix the guilt of a party charged as an accessory after the 
 fact, however, a homicide cannot be regarded as having been con- 
 summated, so that any aid or assistance rendered the slayer to enable 
 him to escape the consequences of his crime will make the person 
 aiding him such an accessory, until the actual death takes place.* 
 But the contrary rule, that a person who commits a homicide in one 
 county or state may be held liable in another county or state for 
 its continuous operation resulting in death in the latter county or 
 
 iWharton, Confl. L. § 911; Wharton, 317, 25 Atl. 299; State v. Gessert, 21 
 
 Crim. Law, 7th ed. 210q; 3 Inst. 50; 1 Minn. 369; State v. Garrison, 147 Mo. 
 
 Hale, P. C. 433; Smith v. Brazelton, 1 548, 49 S. W. 508; State v. Blunt, 110 
 
 Heisk. 44, 2 Am. Rep. 678; Gunter v. Mo. 322, 19 S. W. 650; Hunter v. State, 
 
 Patton, 2 Heisk. 261; Luter v. Hunter, 40 N. J. L. 514; State v. Carter, 27 N. 
 
 30 Tex. 700, 98 Am. Dee. 494. J. L. 499; Ex parte McNeeley, 36 W. 
 
 81 Hale, P. C. 433; 3 Inst. 50; State Va. 84, 15 L.R.A. 226, 32 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 V. Gut, 13 Minn. 341, Gil. 315; Yelm 831, 14 S. E. 436. 
 
 Jim V. Territory, 1 Wash. Terr. 67. And a statute authorizing a proseeu- 
 
 3 See infra, chapter XXIII., § 485. tion for murder in the county in which 
 
 iThe subject of the time when homi- the fatal blow was struck, though tln' 
 
 cide is deemed to be committed is ex- victim died in another place, is valid, 
 
 tensively considered in a note to Deb- Green v. State, CC Ala. 40, 41 Am. Rep. 
 
 ney v. State, 34 L.R.A. 851 ; and the sub- 744. 
 
 jeet of locality, where crime is commit- And a statute providing that in case^ 
 
 ted by shooting across state boundary, is of felonious homicide, where the assault 
 
 considered in a note to State v. Hall, 28 was committed in the state and the per- 
 
 L.R.A. 59. son assaulted died outside of the state. 
 
 2Debney v. State, 45 Neb. 856, 34 L. the offender shall be indicted and pun- 
 R.A. 851, 64 N. W. 446; People v. Gill, ished for the crime in the county where 
 6 Cal. 637; State v. Ryan, 13 Minn. 371, the assault was made, in the same man- 
 Gil. 343. And see Burns v. People, 1 ner as if the person assaulted had died 
 Park. Crim. Rep. 182; Rex v. Hargrave, within the state, creates no new offense 
 5 Car. & P. 170. and imposes no additional punishment, 
 
 sUnited States f. Guiteau, 1 Mackey, and an indictment for such killing need 
 
 498, 47 Am. Rep. 247 ; People v. Gill, not charge that the act was against the 
 
 sicpra; Keith v. State, 157 Ind. 376, 61 form of the statute. State v. Dunk- 
 
 N. E. 716; State v. Bowen, 16 Kan. 475; ley, 25 N. C. (3 Ired. L.) 116. 
 
 State V. Foster, 8 La. Ann. 290, 58 Am. 4Harrel v. State, 39 Miss. 702, 80 Am. 
 
 Dec. 678; State v. Kelly, 76 Me. 331, 49 Dec. 95. 
 Am. Rep. 620; Stout v. State, 76 Md. 
 Hom.— 2. 
 
18 HOMICIDE. [§ 17 
 
 state, has been asserted by excellent authority.^ Nor can a killing 
 be deemed to have been consummated at a place, unless the fatal 
 wound was inflicted at that place; and where a shot is fired in one 
 state at a person in another state, resulting in his death, the crime is 
 deemed to have been committed and consummated in the state where 
 the shot takes effect, and not in the one where it was fired." And 
 the rule is the same where the shot was fired in one county and 
 the death occurred in another.^ And where a gun is fired upon land 
 which kills a man at sea, the offense is committed at sea, so as to 
 be triable by tJie admiralty courts, and not by the courts of common 
 law.* And a shooting and killing by a person on a vessel of one 
 nation of a person on a vessel of another nation is a homicide on 
 the latter vessel.® Nor is the principle different where the shot fired 
 in one state or county misses the person shot at in the other state or 
 county, and in such case the crime of shooting at another would 
 be consummated in the latter place. ' " And though, in cases of this 
 class, the presence of the accused is deemed essential to make his 
 criminal act one which is deemed to have been done within the 
 state, his constructive presence is sufiicient; it need not De actual. ^^ 
 In such case, having put in motion an agency for the commission of 
 crime, the one doing so in legal contemplation accompanies it to the 
 place where it becomes effectual.*^ So, these rules apply to one who, 
 in one county or state, causes death in another county or state, through 
 the employment of an innocent agent, making him responsible in the 
 latter state.-*^ And a person in one state or jurisdiction may so 
 aid and abet a murder in another state or jurisdiction as to render 
 himself criminally responsible as principal in the latter state or 
 
 sCom. V. Maelooiij 101 Mass. 1, 100 Congress providing therefor, but he may 
 
 Am. Dec. 89. be convicted of an assault with a dan- 
 
 eState V. Hall, 114 N. C. 909, 28 L.E. gerous weapon. 
 
 A. 59, 41 Am. St. Rep. 822, 19 S. E. loSimpson v. State, 92 Ga. 41, 22 L.E. 
 
 602; State v. Carter, 27 N. J. L. 499; A. 248, 44 Am. St. Rep. 75, 17 S. E. 
 
 State V. Chapin, 17 Ark. 561, 65 Am. 984. 
 
 Dee. 452. iilbid. 
 
 TXyler v. People, 8 Mich. 320; People I2lbid. 
 
 V. Adams, 3 Denio, 190, 45 Am. Dec. i=Lindsey v. State, 38 Ohio St. 512. 
 
 468. Thu«, the guilty act of homicide by 
 
 sPeople V. Adams, supra. administering poison consists not sim- 
 
 sUnited States v. Davis, 2 Sumn. 482, ply in prescribing or furnishing the poi- 
 
 Fed. Cas. No. 14,932. And see Gros- son, but also in directing or causing it 
 
 venor v. St. Augustine, 12 East, 244. to be done, so that if the poison be pre- 
 
 So, United States v. Armstrong, 2 scribed and furnished in one state to a 
 Curt. C. C. 446, Fed. Cas. No. 14,467, person who carries it into another state 
 holds that one inflicting an unlawful and there takfs it, and is killed, the ad- 
 blow, upon the sea, without malice, fol- ministering is consummated in the coun- 
 lowed by the death of the person struck, ty where the person is poisoned. Kob- 
 upon the shore, is not punishable for bins v. State. 8 Ohio St. 131. 
 homicide in the absence of an act of 
 
§ 17] THE SUBJECT OF THE CRIME. 19 
 
 jurisdiction on the theory that he was constructively present.^* The 
 firing of a gun by a person in one place or jurisdiction at a person in 
 another place or jurisdiction, however, constitutes a consummated as- 
 sault with a deadly weapon, or with intent to kill, at the place from 
 which the shot was fired, irrespective of results. ^ ^' So, a statutory 
 provision that if a person be stricken or poisoned out of the state, 
 and die by reason thereof within the state, the offender shall be as 
 g-uilty as if the act causing death had been done at the place of death, 
 is not unconstitutional or invalid, the rule that a state or political 
 division cannot punish an act done outside of its territory not ap- 
 plying when the crime is done partly in one and partly in another 
 jurisdiction.^^ And such a provision makes the act of killing and 
 resultant death a homicide within the state. ^ '' So, a statute provid- 
 ing that designated persons who, by specified acts, destroy the life 
 of a person shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter, makes the de- 
 struction of human life the essence of the offense, and the offender 
 is guilty, not when the prohibited act is performed, but when it 
 bears fruit by causing the death of a human being. ^ * 
 
 18. Death within a year and a day from the injury. — By the English 
 common law the death must have occurred within a year and a day 
 from the date of the injury received ;^ and hence, an indictment which 
 does not aver the death to have occurred within this limit is fatally de- 
 fective.^ And these requirements are not abrogated by statutory pro- 
 visions as to homicide, where they are not, either directly or indirectly, 
 referred to.* Where the evidence shows that death did result within a 
 year and a day from the time of the act alleged to have caused it, how- 
 ever, it is unnecessary for the court, in stating the facts necessary to 
 conviction, to tell the jury that it must have so resulted. * And where 
 the fact appears in an indictment for homicide that death occurred 
 
 KHatfield v. Com. 11 Ky. L. Rep. 468, L.R.A. 851, 64 N. W. 446; State v. Or- 
 
 12 S. W. 309. ' rell, 12 N. C. (1 Dev. L.) 139, 17 Am. 
 
 "State V. Hall, 114 N. C. 909, 28 L.R. Dec. 563; Hardin v. State, 4 Tex. App. 
 
 A. 59, 41 Am. St. Rep. 822, 19 S. E. 355. 
 
 602. And see Com. v. Linton, 2 Va. 2State v. Orrell, supra; People v. Aro, 
 
 Cas. 205. 6 Cal. 207, 65 Am. Dec. 503; People v. 
 
 "Ex parte McNeeley, 36 W. Va. 84, 15 Kellv, 6 Cal. 210; People v. Steventon, 
 
 L.E.A. 226, 32 Am. St. Rep. 831, 14 S. 9 Cal. 273; Lester v. State, supra; State 
 
 E, 436; Com. v. Macloon, 101 Mass. 1, v. Mayfield, 66 Mo. 125; States v. Sides, 
 
 100 Am. Dee. 89. • supra; Edmondson v. State, 41 Tex. 496; 
 
 "Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 320. State v. Huff; Debney v. State; and 
 
 isRe Doig, 4 Fed. 193. Hardin v. State, — supra. 
 
 13 Inst. 53; Com. v. Parker, 2 Pick. sHardin v. State, supra. 
 
 557 ; Chapman v. People, 39 Mich. 357 ; ^Epps v. State, 102 Ind. 539, 1 N. E. 
 
 State V. Sides, 64 Mo. 383; Lester v. 491. 
 
 State, 9 Mo. 666; State v. Huff, 11 Nev. Omission to submit the question 
 
 17; Debney v. State, 45 Neb. 856, 34 whether the deceased died within a year 
 
20 HOMICIDE. [§ 18 
 
 within a year and a daj after the assault which caused it, it is suffi- 
 cient, and any more particular statement of time will be regarded as 
 an immaterial allegation which need not be proved as made,° a charge 
 of the assault and of immediate death being sufficient.® As is also 
 an allegation of the respective dates of the injury and of the death, 
 such dates being within a year and a day of each other. "^ And fail- 
 ure to charge that death took place within a year and a day can- 
 not be taken advantage of on motion to arrest judgment after con- 
 viction, no objection having been taken by demurrer.* But the 
 court should not assume that the death occurred within a year and 
 a day of the injury, but should leave this question for the determina- 
 tion of the jury upon the evidence.^ 
 
 19. Consent as affecting criminality — That consent of the deceased 
 is no bar to a prosecution for homicide is a general axiom acknowl- 
 edged by all schools of jurisprudence, and rests on the maxim. Jus 
 publicum privatorum voluntate mutari nequit. Of this we have a 
 remarkable illustration in a Pennsylvania case, in 1826, in which it 
 was held that an agreement not to bring a writ of error in a criminal 
 case, especially one of high degree, does not estop the defendant 
 from bringing such writ. The question arose after conviction of 
 burglary, where it was alleged that the defendant had agreed in writ- 
 ing not to bring a writ of error, and where a motion to quash the writ 
 was, on this ground, made. But Tilghman, Ch. J., in refusing the 
 motion, said: "What consideration can a man have received, ade- 
 quate to imprisonment at hard labor for life? It is going but one 
 step fui-ther to make an agreement to be hanged. I presume no one 
 would be hardy enough to ask the court to enforce such an agreement; 
 yet the principle in both cases is the same."^ But where one is as- 
 sailed by a fatal disease from which the only escape is a dangerous 
 siirgical operation, and under these circumstances he, undeceived, 
 gives his free and intelligent consent to take the risk of an operation 
 which in a large proportion of cases has proved fatal, but which is the 
 only method by which his disease can possibly be cured, and which, 
 
 and a day after being shot is not error blow was struck and the fact of death is 
 
 where the proofs show that he died not insufficient because of the absence of 
 
 within five minutes after receiving the an allegation of the date of death, where 
 
 wounds. Early v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. the date of the trial is within a year and 
 
 llSl, 70 S. W. 1001. a day of the giving of the fatal blow. 
 
 5Cora. v. Robertson, 162 Mass. 90, 38 Ibid. 
 
 N. E. 25. sState v. Alcorn, 7 Idaho, 599, 97 Am. 
 
 BHardin v. State, 4 Tex. App. 355. St. Rep. 252, 64 Pac. 1014. 
 
 TBvassfield v. State, 55 Ark. 556. 18 sDebney v. State, 45 Neb. 856, 34 L.R. 
 
 S. W. 1040. A. 851, 64 N. W. 446. 
 
 So. iin indictment in a homicide case iSmith v. Com. 14 Serg. & R. 70. 
 alleging the date upon which the fatal 
 
§ 19] THE SUBJECT OF THE CHIME. 21 
 
 if it succeeds, will restore him to health and vigor, it would not be 
 proper to punish the surgeon who should perform the operation, 
 though by performing it he might cause death, not intending to cause 
 death, but knowing himself likely to cause it. Again, if a person 
 attacked by a wild beast should call out to his friends to fire, though 
 with imminent hazard to himself, and they were to obey the call, we 
 do not con,ceive that it would be expedient to punish them, though 
 they might by firing cause his death, and though when they fired they 
 knew themselves to be likely to cause it.^ 
 
 2See infra, chapter, XIII., §§ 346 et 
 seq. 
 
CHAPTEK IV. 
 
 METHODS OF KILLING CONSTITUTING HOMICIDE. 
 
 20. General statement as to. 
 
 21. Action through irresponsible agent. 
 
 22. By action causing self-injury in fright, or by force. 
 
 23. By causing nervous irritation or shock. 
 
 24. Exposure of helpless person. 
 
 25. Failure to rescue or prevent killing. 
 
 26. Other methods. 
 
 20. General statement as to. — There may be a thousand forms ot 
 death by which human nature may be overcome.^ The manner of 
 causing the death of another with malice is, generally speaking, not 
 otherwise material on the question of criminal responsibility therefor, 
 except to the extent that the degree, of cruelty and deliberation may 
 enhance the guilt of the perpetrator." Two persons may be murdered 
 by the same act, in which case the one act constitutes two offenses, for 
 each of which a separate prosecution will lie; and a conviction or 
 acquittal in one case does not bar a prosecution in the other.* 
 
 21. Action through irresponsible agent.* — ^^^'^he^e an innocent or ir- 
 responsible agent commits a homicide at the instigation of his prin- 
 cipal the latter is criminally responsible therefor as principal in the 
 first degree, though no criminal responsibility can be attached to 
 the agent.^ This rule has been applied to one who knowingly lets 
 loose a dangerous beast, which kills a man. And to one who incites a 
 
 iNixon V. People, 3 111. 267, 35 Am. Am. Dee. 468; Com. v. Macloon, 101 
 
 Dec. 107. Mass. 1, 100 Am. Dee. 89; Collins v. 
 
 2Com. V. Webster. 5 Cush. 295, 52 Am. State, 3 Heisk. 14; Red v. State, 39 Tex. 
 
 Dec. 711. Crim. Rep. 667, 73 Am. St. Rep. 965, 47 
 
 sPeople V. Majors, 65 Cal. 138, 52 Am. S. W. 1003. 
 Rep. 295, 3 Pac. 597. And see Teat v. Thus, in Saunders'.s Case, 3 Dyer, 
 
 State, 5.3 Miss. 439, 24 Am. Rep. 708. 332a, it was held that a wife who con- 
 
 Contra, Clem v. State, 42 Ind. 420, 13 spires with a servant to kill her hus- 
 
 Am. Rep. 369. band is guilty of petit treason where the 
 
 iThe subject of homicide by acting husband is killed pursuant to the con- 
 through an irresponsible agent is fully spiracy, though the killing was in her 
 considered in a note to Johnson v. absence; but the rule would be differ- 
 State, 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 897. ent if she had conspired with a stran- 
 
 zPeoplo V. Adams, 3 Denio, 190, 45 ger. 
 
 22 
 
I 21] METHODS OF KILLING. 23 
 
 madinan, or a child not yet of years of discretion, to commit murder 
 in his presence, whereby a person is killed. ^ And to a commoner who 
 knowingly turns a vicious horse upon unfenced commons to pasture, 
 which kicks and kills a child on or near an open footpath across the 
 commons.* And where a person puts a sword in the hand of a mad- 
 man and bids him kill another with it, and then goes away, and the 
 madman kills the other as directed, tlie killing is such person's crimi- 
 nal act."' And one who, by interfering in aid of an innocent person, 
 whom officers are attempting to arrest, frees his hands and enables 
 him to kill one of the officers, is guilty of murder.® And, while one 
 cannot be convicted as an aider and abetter of one who is irresponsi- 
 ble, where an insane person collected a number of persons together, 
 who armed themselves, having a common purpose of resisting the 
 lawfully constituted authorities, and the others knew that the insane 
 person was dangerous, yet kept with him, aiding and abetting him 
 by their presence and concurrence in his acts, and the insane person 
 killed an officer who sought to arrest him, the others are guilty of 
 murder as principals in the first degree, however unconscious they 
 may have been of any particular purpose on his part, and however 
 blank his mind may have been as to any ulterior purpose at the time 
 they concerted together.'' So, where a person gives poison to another 
 to give to a third person, and the second, not knowing it to be poison, 
 gives it to the third, who takes it and dies of it, the second is guilty 
 of no offense, but the first who procured the poison to be taken is 
 guilty of murder.* And where a person procures poison for the pur- 
 pose of having it administered to another, and the poison is found 
 by an irresponsible child, and given by it to the intended victim, who 
 is killed, it is the criminal act of the person who procured the poison, 
 though he intended to accomplish it in a different way.® And an 
 indictment charging the procurement of poison, and the placing it 
 in the hands of an irresponsible person, advising and directing him 
 
 3Com. V. Macloon, supra, dictum. num and directed another, who had care 
 
 ■•Beg. V. Dant, 10 Cox, C. C. 102. of the child, to give it a teaspoonful 
 
 sAnonymous, J. Kelyng, 52. every night, with the intent that the 
 
 eJohnson v. State, 142 Ala. 70, 2 latter should aldminister it to the child 
 
 L.R.A. (N.S.) 897, 38 So. 182. and thereby produce its death; and that 
 
 7Reg. V. Tyler, 8 Car. & P. 616. the latter did not administer it, but 
 
 s Queen v. Saunders, 2 Plowd. 474; put the bottle in a place where it was 
 
 Anonymous, supra; Com. v. Macloon, 101 found by another child, who gave its 
 
 -Mass. 1, 100 Am. Dec. 89, dictum. contents to the child sought to be 
 
 And an indictment for the murder of killed, causing its death. Reg. v. Mi- 
 
 a child, charging that the accused gave chael, 9 Car. & P. 356, 2 Moody, C. C. 
 
 and administered a certain deadly poi- 120. 
 
 son, is supported by proof tliat the sReg. v. Michael, supra. 
 
 accused purchased a bottle of lauda- 
 
24 HOMICIDE. [§ 21 
 
 to administer it to a third person, sufficiently charges an attempt to 
 administer poison.^" So, where a person furnishes poison to an- 
 other for the purpose of enabling the latter to commit suicide with 
 it, and the purpose is accomplished, the killing is the criminal act of 
 the person furnishing the poison, where the person killed was pos- 
 sessed of a suicidal mania to such an extent as to idc criminally irre- 
 sponsible for the homicidal act.^^ 
 
 22. By action causing seK-injury in fright, or by force. — A person 
 may do an act from which his death results under such circumstances 
 as to render it not a voluntary act on his part, by reason of force 
 applied to his body or mind; under such circumstances it becomes 
 the guilty act of the person who compelled him to take the step. 
 Forcing a person to do an act which causes his death renders the death 
 the guilty deed of him who used the force -^ and it need not appear 
 that there was no other way of escape.^ This rule renders responsible 
 a person who so negligently or designedly drives a horse as to frighten 
 a passenger into jumping out of the carriage by reason of which his 
 neck is broken.* And where a person is so frightened by the negli- 
 gent or improper management of machinery by another as to lead 
 him to do an act which causes his death in an attempt to escape in- 
 jury, he cannot be regarded as a free, self-determining agent, and his 
 
 lOCoIlins V. state, 3 Heisk. 14. But where a person is sought to be 
 
 iiBlackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146. held guilty of the homicide of another 
 
 And the criminal responsibility of a through compelling him to self-destrue- 
 
 person who furnishes to another poison tion by threats of immediate violence. 
 
 with which to commit suicide is not af- the apprehension of immediate violence 
 
 feeted by the fact that, under the laws must have been well grovinded under the 
 
 of the state, suicide is no crime. Ibid, circumstances by which the deceased was 
 
 1 State V. Shelledy, 8 Iowa, 477; Hen- then surrounded; it must appear, not 
 
 drickson v. Com. 85 Ky. 281, 7 Am. St. that there was no other way of escape. 
 
 Rep. 596, 3 S. W. 166 ; United States v. but that the step taken was such a step 
 
 Warner, 4 McTvean, 463, Fed. Cas. No. as a reasonable man might take. Reg. 
 
 16,643 ; Reg. v. Pitts, Car. & M. 284. v. Pitts, supra. 
 
 Thus, train robbers who compelled a ^Reg. v. Longbottom, 3 Cox, C. C. 
 fireman on a train which they were rob- 430; Wharton, Neg. § 377; Frink v. 
 bing, with a view to carrying out their Potter, 17 111. 406; Indianapolis, B. & 
 purpose, to occupy a dangerous place W. R. Co. v. Carr, 35 Ind. 510; Green- 
 where he was liable to iSse his life, ^l ^- 4"'"°l«„C- R- Co. 29 Iowa 4,. 
 knowing that the place wa. dangerous ^ Am Rep 181; Snow v^Housaton.e 
 after which the fireman was killed in g^^^^^^ ^ ^oJorA, 10 Allen, 25, 87 Am. 
 an exchange of shots resulting from -^^ g^g j^und v. Tyngsbo^, il Cush. 
 the robbery, are crimmally responsible ggg^ gg ,^^ jj^^ 159; Reed v. North- 
 for the killing whether it was done by ggj^^ 13 pj^^. 93, 23 Am. Dec. 662 ; 
 one of the robbers, or by a passenger B^bson v. Rockport, 101 ilass. 93 ; Sears 
 upon the train who was resisting the y Dennis, 105 Mass. 310; Coulter v. 
 robbers. Taylor v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. American Merchants' Union Exp. Co. 5 
 Eep. 564, 55 S. W. 961 ; Keaton v. State, Lans. 67 ; Buel v. New York C. R. Co. 
 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 621, 57 S. W. 1125. 31 N. Y. 314, 88 Am. Dec. 271; Adams 
 2State v. Shelledy, and Hendriekson v. Lancashire & Y. R. Co. 17 Week. 
 V. Com. supra. Rep. 885. 
 
t 
 § m METHODS OF KILLING. 25 
 
 resulting death is imputable to the other.* And where a ferryboat 
 is carelessly overloaded with passengers, so that, in a sudden fright, 
 they rush to one side and upset the boat, in consequence of which a 
 passenger is drowned, the person responsible for overloading the 
 boat is responsible, and the act of the other passengers is no defense." 
 And where a seaman was in such a state of debility aad exhaustion 
 that he could not go aloft without danger of death or great bodily 
 injury, and the facts were known to the master of the vessel, who, 
 notwithstanding, compelled him by moral or physical force to go 
 aloft, and the seaman fell from the mast and was drowned, it is mur- 
 der in the master, or manslaughter, in the absence of malice.® So, if 
 a person, when pursued illegally, under reasonable apprehension of 
 danger casts himself or falls into a river or canal and is drowned, 
 his pursuer is chargeable with homicide;'' though if the pursuit is 
 legal, he is not responsible for the death. * And where one falls and 
 is killed in an effort to escape a felonious attack, the assailant is 
 guilty of the resulting death if the felonious attack was the primary 
 cause of the death. ® And where the deceased, from a well-grounded 
 apprehension of a further attack which would have endangered his 
 
 <Queen v. Williamson^ 1 Cox, C. C. man v. United States, 20 App. D. C. 
 
 97. 494. 
 
 And where a person attacked or in- A similar decision was given in June, 
 timidated by another leaps or jiunps 1860, by the supreme court of Prussia, 
 from a moving car, under circumstan- Bar, ut supra, p. 61. 
 ces which would have caused a prudent And it is not necessary that the pros- 
 man to do so, and the jump causes his ecution should show, or that the jury 
 death, the person who attacked or in- should believe, that the accused had the 
 timidated him is criminally responsible malicious intent actually to do bodily 
 for his death. Adams v. People, 109 harm to, or take the life of, the per- 
 III. 444, 50 Am. Rep. 617. 3°" killed. Norman v. United States, 
 
 sQueen v. Williamson, supra. supra. 
 
 And where there was a collision be- *See- infra, chapter XXIII., §§ 487 et 
 
 tween vessels at sea resulting from the ^^9- ,„» ~ „„ „ _ 
 
 mistake or unskilfulness of the sailing ^homton v. State, 107 Ga. 684, 33 S. 
 
 master of one of them, after which ■'i'- ^7d. . j. iv 
 
 nersona on board one of the vessels left ^^ * ^^°^ 8^^®" ^^ °°^ *° another so 
 persona on board one ot tne vessels leit ^^^^^^^^ ^j^g ^^^^^j. ^hat from the inju- 
 
 a secure position and resorted to means ^.^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^ ^^^ rendered un- 
 
 of saving themselves which resulted in ^^^^ ^^ ^^^^^ ^^ ^^jl ^^^ ^^ ^ ^^^_ 
 
 death, the negligent sailing maater is ggque„ee, fell, and death resulted from 
 
 criminally responsible therefor if they ^j,g f^jj^ ^^g ^y^^ jg ^^ i,e regarded as 
 
 acted with ordinary prudence and dis- ^jjg gj^^gg gf death, though it might not 
 
 cretion; but he is not responsible if gf jtself have proved fatal; and this 
 
 they acted unnecessarily, under the in- jg go though the person struck was re- 
 
 fluence of excessive alarm. United States duced in strength ; though it would be 
 
 V. Warner, 4 McLean, 463, Fed. Gas. different if his inability to stand arose 
 
 No. 16,643. from physical infirmities, or from intox- 
 
 eUnited States v. Freeman, 4 Mason, ication. Cunningham v. People, 195 
 
 505, Fed. Gas. No. 15,162. lU. 550, 63 N. E. 517. 
 
 'Reg. V. Pitts, Car. & M. 284; Nor- 
 
2ti HO.MlClDJi. [§ 22 
 
 life, endeavored to escape, and in so doing was fatally injured from 
 another cause, it is murder. ' " So, where one person causes another 
 to swallow poison and death results, the former is criminally re- 
 sponsible therefor whether force or fraud was the means by which 
 he effected his purpose. ^ ^ To render a person criminally responsi- 
 ble for the death of another under this rule, however, it must appear 
 that the steps taken to avoid the danger were such as a reasonable 
 man might take;^~ and that the apprehension was of immediate 
 violence or injury ;-'^* and the apprehension of violence must have 
 been well grounded ; -"^ * and the result must have been the natural 
 and probable consequence of the improper conduct.^® This view 
 has been properly held to govern where a woman, not convulsively, 
 or in fear, or through force, but of her own will, leaves her husband's 
 liouse at night and is frozen to death ;^'' where a traveler voluntarily 
 or negligently, and not in fear caused by the defendant, collides with 
 a railway car ; ^ ^ and where a person assaulted in a boat, not in fright 
 or in necessity, but as a means of steadying himself, seizes another 
 boat and is thus swept overboard ; ^ * and where a woman perished 
 from exposvire, having left her home through alleged fear of her 
 husband, where he was a cripple and she was stronger than he.** 
 And an indictment charging that a killing was accomplished by 
 physical violence will not support proof or instructions as to a homi- 
 r-ide committed by putting the person killed in fear, and thereby 
 leading him to perform an act from which his death results ; it being 
 necessary in such case to charge the particular acts and facts from 
 which death results. ^ " 
 
 23. By causing nervous irritation or shock — To justify a conviction 
 for homicide, the cause of death must have been corporal, not nervous 
 or sentimental; and therefore where a person, either by working 
 upon the fancy of another, or by harsh or unkind usage, puts him into 
 such a passion of grief or fear that he dies suddenly, or contracts 
 some disease which causes his death, the killing is not such as the 
 law can notice. * Murder must be committed by an act applied to, 
 
 lORex V. Hickman, 5 Car. & P. 151 ; i Estate v. Preslar, 48 N. C. (3 Jones, 
 
 Meg. V. Pitts, supra; Frink v. Potter. L.) 421. 
 
 17 111. 406; State v. Preslar. 48 N. C lestate v. Preslar, supra. 
 
 (3 .Tones, L.) 421. i7See Wharton. Neg. § 382. 
 
 iiBlackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146. isRex v. Waters, 6 Car. & P. 328. 
 
 i2Hendrickson v. Com. 85 Ky. 281, 7 isHendriekson v. Com. 85 Ky. 281, 7 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 596, 3 S. W. 166; State Am. St. Rep. 596, 3 S. W. 166. 
 
 V. Shelledy, 8 Iowa, 477. zoGipe v. State (Ind.) 1 L.R.A. (N.S.) 
 
 isState V. Shelledv, supra; Reg. v. 419, 75 N. E. 881. 
 
 Pitts, Car. & M. 284. iiHale, P. C. 427, 429; 1 East, P. C. 
 
 I'tReg. V. Pitts, and Hendrickson v. chap. 5, § 13, p. 225; Fairlee v. People, 
 Com. supra. 
 
§ 23] METHODS Oi'' KILLING. 27 
 
 or affecting, the person either directly or indirectly.^ Death caused 
 by grief or terror, in the absence of any convulsive action or physical 
 lesion, is not murder.^ Undoubtedly there is moral guilt in such 
 cases proportionate to the degree of malice. But there is no technical 
 guilt which the law can punish, for the reason that the law has no 
 test to measure the relation of cause and effect in matters purely 
 psychological How much of the terror or "broken-heartedness," for 
 instance, was due to the patient's own folly or wrong? What legal 
 proof is possible of such terror or "broken-heartedness?" How can 
 the death be, beyond reasonable doubt, traced to either ? Hence it is 
 that the law, when the case consists of these bald elements, declines 
 to interpose.'* We are not to assume, however, that there must bo 
 an actual touching by the defendant of the deceased. No such touch- 
 ing exists in cases of poisoning ; ® or where one acts through an irre- 
 sponsible agent;" or in case of self -injury in an effort to avoid 
 threatened injury. ^ And it has been held that where a person unlaw- 
 fully and violently assaulted a young girl, having in her arma a child 
 four and one half months old, which assault, together with the 
 screams of the girl, greatly alarmed the child, and caused it to have 
 convulsions, of which it died, the ease was different from other cases 
 of manslaughter, for here the child was not a rational agent, and it 
 was so connected with the girl that an injury to her became almost, 
 in itself, an injury to the child; and that the question would be 
 whether the deceased's death was a natural consequence of the defend- 
 ant's violence.* And where one person's violence so excites the 
 terror of another that he dies from fright, when he would not have 
 died but for the assault, this act is, in law, the cause of death.® A 
 difficult case is suggested in the testimony taken in England, in 1874, 
 before the Committee on the Homicide Bill. B., a sick man, is in 
 such a state of nervous prostration that any sudden shock is likely to 
 
 11 111. 1: Reg. V. Towers. 12 Cox, C. C. Where a woman dies of a broken 
 
 530. heart and from anguish at being turned 
 
 2Com. V. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 52 Am. °"t of her home, it is not manslaugh- 
 
 jjgg -J J ter; to constitute that crime there must 
 
 " ■ have been some physical or corporal in- 
 
 ^""'- jury, negative or positive, — as, a blow, 
 
 In lleg. V. Dugal, 4 Quebec, L. R. or the deprivation of necessaries, or the 
 
 350, however, it was held that death re- like. Reg. v. Murton, 3 Fost. & F. 
 
 suiting from fear caused by menaces 492. 
 
 of personal violence and assault, though sSee swpra, § 21. 
 
 without battery, is sufficient, in law, to sSee supra, % 21. 
 
 support an indictment for manslaugh- "See supra, § 22. And see remarks 
 
 ter. of Erskine, J;, in Reg. v. Pitts, Car. 
 
 ■tWharton, Crim. Law, 7th ed. § 941a. ^ }'^ ^84. r, r^ -,„ 
 
 See 1 Hale P. C. 429 1 East, P. C. '^'^S- ^- ^°T'' sn x?°^ %^- ^ 
 ^„r ' 9Cox. V. People, 80 Jn. Y. 500. 
 
28 HOMICIDE. L'§ 23 
 
 prove fatal to him. A., knowing B.'s condition, purposely bursts 
 into B.'s chamber, with such a noise and in such a way as to give B. a 
 fatal shock; and B. dies in consequence. In such a case we may 
 hold, malice being shown in A., that A. is guilty of murder ; or that 
 if A. bursts into the room negligently, he being bound, from the cir- 
 cumstances, to know B.'s condition, then the offense is manslaughter. 
 Or suppose that sleep is necessary to B.'s life, and A., either mali- 
 ciously or negligently, by noise or other modes of acting on B.'s ner- 
 vous system, keeps B. from sleeping, and B. in consequence dies ; cer- 
 tainly B.'s death is, under such a state of facts, legally imputable to A. 
 Conclusions such as these would be justified on the ground that the 
 death is the natural consequence of the defendant's misconduct. But 
 the instruments employed must be of such a character as to produce 
 effects which are the natural and ordinary physical consequence of 
 the employment of the instruments. When the agencies are merely 
 such as act on the moral system (e. g., marital unkindness, the prof- 
 ligacy of children) the law has no tests by which the fatal character 
 of the agencies can be determined.^'' 
 
 24. Exposure of helpless person. — It is clear that to put a helpless 
 person in a position of which death is a natural consequence is, in 
 case of death, culpable homicide.^ This principle has been applied 
 to cases where a boy, having been beaten by the defendant, was left 
 by him in a country lane during a frosty night in January ; ^ where 
 a lame person, incapable of moving, and without voice to cry for 
 help, was forced out of a wagon, in a place where he froze to death ;* 
 where a person carried his sick father, against his will, in a severe 
 season, from one town to another, by reason whereof he died ; * where 
 a woman being delivered of a child left it in an orchard covered only 
 with leaves, in which condition it was killed by a kite ; ® where a child 
 was placed in a hogsty, where it was devoured;® and where an infant 
 child was shifted by parish officers from parish to parish, till it died 
 for want of care and sustenance. "^ And such was held to be the law, 
 in a case already frequently cited, where a master, knowing a sea- 
 man's debility and incapacity to hold on, forced him to go aloft, 
 whereupon the seaman fell to the deck, and was killed ; and it would 
 
 loSee State v. Preslar, 48 N. C. (3 41 Hawk. P. C. chap. 31, § 4; 1 Hale, 
 
 Jones, L.) 421. P. C. 431, 432. 
 
 iReg. V. Walters, Car. & M. 164. 61 Hale, P. C. 431; ] Hawk. P. 0. 
 
 2Reg. V. Martin, 11 Cox, C. C. 136 (if chap. 31, § 6. 
 
 the exposure had been malicious, the gi East, P. C. chiip. 5, § 13, p. 226. 
 
 offense would have been murder) ; Reg. 'Palm. 545. 
 V. Donovan, 4 Cox, C. C. 399. 
 
 3Nixon V. People, 3 111. 267, 35 Am. 
 Dec. 107. 
 
I 24] METHODS OF KILLING. 29 
 
 not vary the case that moral force of the master to compel perform- 
 ance, instead of physical force, produced compliance with the order 
 on the part of the seaman, although the latter was sensible of his own 
 extreme debility. * So also when a woman, her child having been born 
 alive, dropped it on the side of the road without any clothing or cov- 
 ering to protect it from the inclemency of the weather, where it died 
 from the cold, she having wholly concealed the birth of the child till 
 she was apprehended, the crime amounts to murder, or manslaughter 
 if the circumstances were not such that she must have been aware that 
 the result would be death ; and it is for the jury to consider whether 
 the prisoner left the child in such a situation that to all reasonable 
 apprehension she must have been aware that the child must die, or 
 whether there v^ere circumstances that would raise a reasonable ex- 
 pectation that the child would be found by someone else, and pre- 
 served. ® 
 
 25. Failure to rescue or prevent killing — Mere failure upon the 
 part of a person having the opportunity to interfere to jjrevent an- 
 other person from committing a homicide does not make him a par- 
 ticipant in the crime. He may interfere, but is not bound to do so 
 at the peril of otherwise partaking of the guilt. ^ It is necessary, in 
 order to have that effect, that he should do or say something showing 
 his consent to the felonious purpose, and contributing to its execti- 
 tion.^ Indifference manifested by one person to the fate of another 
 in not offering to rescue him from drowning, however, when by rea- 
 sonable effort his life might have been saved, is a pregnant circum- 
 stance from which his intention may be inferred, and from which 
 the jury in a prosecution for homicide might lawfully assume that 
 he was actuated by malice or iU will. * 
 
 26. Other methods. — Questions with relation to killing by negli- 
 gence, and by compelling or persuading persons to kill themselves, 
 and by the hand or through the instrumentality of another, and with 
 relation to methods of effecting death in the commission of a felonious 
 or unlawful act, are elsewhere considered. ^ 
 
 8United States v. Freeman, 4 Mason, sState v. Hildreth, supra. 
 512, 514, Fed. Cas. No. 15,162. sState v. Shelledy, 8 Iowa, 477. 
 
 9Reg. V. Walters, Car. & M. 164. See iSee infra, chapters V., VI., IX., and 
 
 Stoekdale's Case, 2 Lewin, C. C. 220. XXII. 
 
 iState V. Hildreth, 31 N. C. (9 Ired. 
 L.) 429, 51 Am. Dee. 364. 
 
CHAPTEK V. 
 
 CAUSAL CONNECTION. 
 
 27. General rules. 
 
 28. Conditions distinguished from causes. 
 
 29. Theory of eminent German jurist. 
 
 30. Omissions. 
 
 31. Effect of interposition of independent, self -determining wills. 
 
 32. Responsibility for act nearest to time of death. 
 
 33. Responsibility for first or prior act. 
 
 34. Disease or physical condition co-operating with injury. 
 
 35. Intervening surgical or medical negligence as affecting result. 
 
 36. Negligence intervening, co-operating, or contributing. 
 
 37. Efifect of interposition of irresponsible intermediate agent. 
 
 38. Proof. 
 
 39. Further consideration of the question. 
 
 27. General rules. — ^As a general principle we may hold that, to 
 create criminal responsibility for homicide, the death must have re- 
 sulted from the malicious or negligent conduct of the defendant,, 
 through the ordinary agency of physical laws; and must not have 
 been caused by the interposition of an independent hiiman will not 
 acting in concert with the defendant, or by extraordinary casualties. ^ 
 It must have been either produced or accelerated by such acts or con- 
 duct. ^ And that it was so produced or accelerated by such wrongful 
 act of the accused must be plainly alleged in the indictment. ^ It is 
 not indispensable, however, that the injuries inflicted were necessarily 
 fatal and the direct cause of death ; if they caused the death indirect- 
 ly, through a chain of natural effects and causes unchanged by human 
 action, it is sufficient.* And one whose wrongful act hastens or ac- 
 celerates the death of another, or contributes to its cause, is guilty 
 
 iMcDaniel v. State, 76 Ala. 1 ; State convicted of murder in the second de- 
 
 V. Castello, 62 Iowa, 404, 17 N. W. gree, is erroneous in omitting the es- 
 
 fi05. sential element of death by reason of 
 
 aPeople v. Lanagan, 81 Cal. 142. 22 the choking. Beaver v. State (Tex. 
 
 Pac. 482; Smith v. State, 50 Ark. 545. Crim. App.) 86 S. W. 1020. 
 8 S. W. 941 ; Baker v. State. ,30 Fla. sEdmondson v. State, 41 Tex. 496. 
 41, 11 So. 492. 4Kelley v. State, 53 Ind. 311; State 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution v. Smith, 10 Nev. 106; Com. v. Green, 
 
 for homicide that, if the accused choked 1 Ashm. (Pa.) 301; Williams v. State, 
 
 the deceased with intent to kill or in- 2 Tex. App. 271. 
 fliet serious bodily harm, he should be 
 
 30 
 
! 27] ■ CAUSAL CONNECTION. 31 
 
 ul' homicide, though other causes co-operate.' And he is guilty if 
 his act was the cause of the cause of death ; if the relation was causal, 
 and the injured condition was not merely the occasion upon which 
 another cause intervened not produced by the first injury, or related 
 to it in any other than a casual way, then the person inflicting the 
 injury is guilty of homicide. " And where one person knocks another 
 into a ditch and the latter's neck is broken by the fall, producing 
 death, it is murder if the attack is the prima facie cause of 
 death, though it may have directly resulted from the fall.' But if 
 the injured condition oidy afforded an opportunity for an independent 
 killing, the one who caused it is not criminally i-esponsible. ^ Where 
 one person participates in inflicting an injury upon another calculated 
 to jeopardize his life, but it does not appear that his act was the cause 
 of death, he may be held guilty of assault with intent to kill. " 
 
 28. Conditions distinguished from causes, — To hold a person crimi- 
 nally responsible for a homicide, his act must have been the proximate 
 cause of the death as distinguished from the cause of a condition 
 affording an opportunity for the compassing of the death by some 
 other unconnected agency. ^ This is illustrated by the case of a work- 
 man who places on the roof of a house a tile which a stranger mali- 
 ciously tears up and throws into a crowded street, killing a passer-by. 
 ISTow the workman is a condition of the killing, but not its juridical 
 cause, unless the tile was placed so negligently on the roof as to make 
 its dislodgment a result of natural laws, or the stranger, who threw 
 it down, acted in concert with the workman. So also where the de- 
 fendant inflicts on the deceased a slight wound, in itself not dan- 
 gerous, which wound, by the maltreatment of a physician becomes 
 mortal.^ If, in consequence of some physical idiosyncrasies of the 
 deceased, the wound, which in ordinary cases would not be fatal, 
 
 sState V. Wood. 112 Iowa, 411, 84 N. iPeople v. Lewis, 124 Cal. 551, 45 
 
 W. 520; Sharp v. State, 51 Ark. 147, L.R.A. 783, 57 Pac. 470; Baker v. State, 
 
 14 Am. St. Rep. 27, 10 S. W. 228; State 30 Fla. 41, 11 So. 492; People v. Elder, 
 
 V. Wilson, 114 La. 398, 38 So. 397; Mc- 100 Mich. 515, 59 N. W. 237. 
 
 Beth V. State, 50 Miss. 81. And the mere fact that one person as- 
 
 sPeople V. Lewis, 124 Cal. 551, 45 saulted another and felled him to the 
 
 L.R.A. 783, 57 Pac. 470; Thornton v. floor, putting his body in such a. posi- 
 
 State, 107 Ga. 683, 33 S. E. 673. tion that he was helpless to protect him- 
 
 'Thornton v. State, supra. self from a third person who then as- 
 
 sPeople V. Lewis, supra. saulted him, and rendering it possible 
 
 One who knocks another down, when a for his second assailant to kick him, 
 
 horse tramples the latter to death, is does not render the first assailant re- 
 
 not guilty of his murder, though the sponsible for death resulting from the 
 
 deceased would not have been trampled kick. People v. Elder, supra. 
 
 if he had not been knocked down. Peo- sSee Harvey v. State, 40 Ind. 516. 
 pie v. Rockwell, 39 Mich. 503. 
 
 9 Smith V. State, 50 Ark. 545, 8 S. 
 W. 941; Bush v. Com. 78 Ky. 268. 
 
32 HOMICIDE. ' [§ 28 
 
 produces death, then the defendant is chargeable with the homicide, 
 for the result flowed from the defendant through the agency of natural 
 laws. But if the result is caused by the malpractice of the physician, 
 the wound not being in itself mortal, and the physician not acting in 
 concert with the defendant, then the defendant is not responsible, for 
 the wound, though a condition of the killing, is not its juridical 
 cause. ^ So, as in a case to be more fully discussed hereafter, where 
 the defendant places poison in such a position that it is, in the natural 
 course of events, swallowed by the deceased, here the defendant is 
 responsible for his malice or negligence, as the case may be.* But 
 he is not responsible for the acts of an assassin, who, independently 
 of him, takes and administers the poison to the deceased; for here 
 again, though the preparing of the poison is a condition of the kill- 
 ing, it is not its juridical cause. ^ So, where a person having charge 
 of a steam engine stopped it and went away, and another person came 
 and set it in motion, whereby a person was killed, the killing is not 
 the act of the person who went away, since his negligence did not 
 cause the death, and he is not criminally responsible, the death being 
 the consequence of the act of the person who set the engine in mo- 
 tion.'' And a person who kept fii*eworks in his house, which were 
 ignited by the negligent act of one of his servants, by reason of which 
 a rocket shot across the street setting fire to a house opposite, by which 
 the death of a person was caused, is not criminally responsible for the 
 death, since, though the act of keeping fireworks was unlawful, it 
 was disconnected with the negligence of the servant, which was the 
 proximate cause of the death, the death not being the necessary and 
 immediate consequence of such unlawful act. '' 
 
 29. Theory of eminent German jurist — An eminent German jurist' 
 lias stated this proposition somewhat differently. A man, he declares, 
 is in the eye of the law the cause of a phenomenon when he is the 
 condition by which the regular sequence of the phenomena of human 
 life is changed. This he vindicates by the following examples : That 
 iron should be shaped into weapons is an indispensable condition 
 of human life ; and so of the manufacturing and sale of weapons ; 
 and these acts fall within the range of the regular phenomena of human 
 life. Hence, neither the miner, nor the manufacturer, nor the mer- 
 
 sSee Reg. v. Cheveiton, 2 Fost. & F. sHilton's Case, 2 Lewin, C. C. 214. 
 «33. 7Reg. V. Bennett, 8 Cox, C. C. 74. 
 
 •iReg. V. Michael, 9 Car. & P. 356; 2 iBar, die Lehre von Causalziisam- 
 .\rood)% C. C. 120. menhange. Leipzig, 1871, p. 11. 
 
 5See State v. Scates, .50 N. C. (5 
 Jones, L. ) 420; Com. v. Campbell, 7 Al- 
 len, 541, 83 Am. Dec. 705. 
 
§ 29] CAUSAL CONNECTION. 33 
 
 chant is, without some additional element in the case, cause of the 
 killing. So it is in the regular course of life that children should 
 be procreated. But the parents are not the cause, hut the condition 
 or prerequisites of the acts of the children. The roof-coverer, who 
 regularly fastens a tile on a roof, is not the cause of a death which re- 
 sults from the hurling of the tile into the street by a gust of wind. 
 Of course the question here hinges on the meaning of the term "regu- 
 lar sequence," as given in the definition above. By Bar the term is 
 made generally convertible with the diligentia of a bonus pater- 
 familias, as used by the civilians. It may be possible, he reminds us, 
 that a greater measure of foresight might have avoided the calamity. 
 This alone does not involve penal responsibility for the consequences. 
 Life necessitates a certain amount of risk, and to multiply checks in- 
 definitely would destroy business enterprise. Negligence {cvlpa) 
 exists only when there is a neglect of precautions which can be readily 
 applied, or which are judicious when viewed in their relation to the 
 undertaking itself. 
 
 30. Omissions. — This topic is elsewhere noticed at large. ^ At pres- 
 ent it may be sufficient to observe, adopting the argument of a lead- 
 ing German jurist,^ that causal connection between the death and 
 the defendant's act is not severed when the defendant, after he has 
 put the external agency on the track of destruction, leaves it to its 
 natural action; as when, after putting poisoned food on his enemy's 
 table, he waits until the latter himself takes the food; or where a 
 skilful swimmer, by false representations and promises, entices. an- 
 other into deep water, and then quietly leaves him to drown ; or where 
 a midwife, after cutting the umbilical cord, does not bind it up, so 
 that the child bleeds to death. In all such cases of withdrawal of 
 action, after the destructive agency has been put in motion, there is 
 no question of mere omission. The actor brings his train of causes 
 just to the point where that train can be left to itself. It has been 
 held, however, that on an indictment for manslaughter by causing a 
 fire, it is necessary, in order to sustain the case by an exhaustive 
 process of proof, to show that the fire could not have arisen from any 
 other cause than that charged ; it is necessary to leave no considerable 
 interval of time in which some other cause might have acted. ® 
 
 31. Effect of interposition of independent, self -determining wills. ^ — 
 Of course, when the human will comes in as a factor, the degree of 
 
 iSee infra, chapter XXII., §§ 451 et from injuries by different persons act- 
 
 seg. ing independently is fully considered in 
 
 aBerner, Lehrbuch, 1871, p. 434. a note to Walker v. State, 67 L.R.A. 
 
 sReg. V. Gardner, 1 Fost. & F. 669. 426. 
 iThe subject of homicide resulting 
 Horn.— 3. 
 
34 HOMICIDE. B 31 
 
 certainty with which the future can be calculated is less definite than 
 when we look forward to a sequence of merely physical laws. When 
 the party originating an illegal plan employs others as accomplices 
 or agents, then he becomes accountable for their guilty acts so far as 
 these are within the scope of their employment, or, in other words, so 
 long as these acts are within the probable contemplation of the em- 
 ployer.^ But it is otherwise in regard to the acts of independent 
 parties performed on the object of the crime without his concert.' 
 In such case the general rule is that where two different persons in- 
 flict injuries upon another at different times by independent acts, 
 and death afterwards results, if the second injury aggravated the 
 first, and the first, thus aggravated, produced death, the one who in- 
 flicted it is criminally responsible therefor;* and if the last injury 
 produced death, and the first, though it supplied the occasion for the 
 second, did not contribute to death, the person who inflicted the sec- 
 ond injury is guilty. ° But it is not indispensable to a con\'iction that 
 the injuries inflicted were necessarily fatal and were the direct result 
 of death ; it is sufficient if they caused the death indirectly, through a 
 chain of natural effects and causes unchanged by human action." 
 And a person who inflicts an injury upon anotlaer is criminally re- 
 sponsible for his death resulting from a subsequent injury received 
 by him, where the second injury was caused by or resulted from the 
 first in the natural course of events. '' It is a familiar principle, how- 
 ever, that a person is not relieved from criminal responsibility for 
 his acts by the joint liability of others ; and, although a man cannot 
 be killed twice, two persons acting independently may so contribute 
 to his death that each will be guilty of homicide. * And a person may 
 
 2See infra, chapter VI.j § 41. whether or not it contributed mate- 
 
 3Queen v. Ledger, 2 Post. & F. 857. rially to the death. Wilson v. State 
 
 See Wharton, Neg. § 134. (Tex. Grim. App.) 24 S. W. 409. 
 
 A person cannot be convicted of man- sKelley v. State, 53 Ind. 311. 
 
 slaughter unless he did all of the acts 'People v. Lewis, 124 Cal. 551, 45 
 
 which occasioned the death, or aided or L.R.A. 783, 57 Pac. 470. 
 
 abetted the doing of such acts. Com. Thus, where a husband kicked his 
 
 V. Macloon, 101 Mass. 1, 100 Am. Dec. wife, injuring her, and a surgeon ad- 
 
 89. ministered brandy as a restorative, some 
 
 iPeople V. Lewis, 124 Cal. 551, 45 of which entered her lungs and caused 
 
 L.R.A. 783, 57 Pac. 470. her death, the husband is properly in- 
 
 slbid. dieted for, and convicted of, her murder. 
 
 And one who struck another upon where the blow rendered the applica- 
 
 the head with a rock, at the same time tion of the brandy necessary, and the 
 
 that a third person stabbed the person defective power of swallowing was the 
 
 struck, is entitled, where death results, consequence of the blow. Queen v. Mc- 
 
 to prove on a prosecution for the horai- Intyre, 2 Cox, C. C. 379. 
 
 cide the extent of the injury caused by sPeople v. Lewis, supra; .Jordan v. 
 
 the rock, as bearirg upon the question State, 82 Ala. 1, 2 So. 460; Fisher v. 
 
§ 31] CAUSAL CONNECTION. 35 
 
 be criminally responsible for homicide when death resulted from the 
 joint negligence of himself and another." But if two or more per- 
 sons conceive the intention at the same time of inflicting an injury 
 upon another, without previous concert, and one of them strikes a 
 blow from which death results, each is responsible for his own acts 
 only. ^ ** And where two persons inflict wounds upon another at dif- 
 ferent times, both cannot be held guilty of murdering him if they had 
 no connection with each other, and both wounds were not actually 
 operating to produce death when it occurred. ^ ^ Death must have 
 ensued as the result of the act of the person sought to be charged. ^ ' 
 And where a person is killed, and it cannot be ascertained which of 
 several persons did it, all must be acquitted. ^ ^ But that the death of 
 a person was not produced solely by the act of the person charged 
 with his murder cannot be raised as a defense in a prosecution there- 
 for for the first time on a petition for rehearing in the appellate 
 court. ^ * 
 
 32. Responsibility for act nearest to time of death. — One who causes 
 the death of a person is not relieved from guilt by the fact that the 
 person killed had previously been mortally wounded by another, pro- 
 vided his act accelerated death. ^ And this is so though the deceased 
 would not have died from the subsequent injury had not the previous 
 
 State, 10 Lea, 15L And see Rex v. Where a man receives a blow from 
 
 Haines, 2 Car. & K. 368. another, and the person struck and a 
 
 This rule would seem to apply to in- friend pursues the other, and the latter 
 
 dependent acts of the same person; and is knocked down, and one of them kicks 
 
 where a person inflicted wounds upon him with a heavy iron-shod boot, oaus- 
 
 another sufficient to cause death, after ing his death, but it cannot be told 
 
 which he immediately shot him, it is which of them did it, neither of them 
 
 not necessary in a prosecution for the are guilty of murder in the absence of 
 
 killing that the court should, in its in- a common design to kill or inflict griev- 
 
 structions, attempt to sever the inflic- ous bodily harm, but both are guilty 
 
 tion of the first wound from the subse- of manslaughter. Reg. v. Turner, 4 
 
 quent shooting. Willis v. State (Tex. Fost. & F. 339. 
 
 Crim. App.) 90 S. W. 1100. iiWhite v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 9Queen v. Ledger, 2 Fost. & F. 857; 346, 63 L.R.A. 660, 72 S. W. 173. 
 
 Rex V. Haines, supra. iPeople v. Ah Fat, 48 Cal. 61 ; Tid- 
 
 loWilson V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) well v. State, 70 Ala. 35; State v. Mat- 
 
 24 S. W. 409. thews, 38 La. Ann. 795; People v. El- 
 
 iiPeople v. Lewis, 124 Cal. 551, 45 der, 100 Mich. 515, 59 N. W. 237; State 
 
 L.R.A. 783, 57 Pac. 470; Wilson v. v. Scates, 50 N. C. (5 Jones, L.) 420; 
 
 State, supra. Fisher v. State, 10 Lea, 151 ; Wilson v. 
 
 tzWalker v. Stete (Ga.) 53 S. E. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 24 S. W. 409. 
 
 738. And see Yorke v. Com. 17 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 isState V Goode, 132 N. C. 982, 43 1243, 34 S. W. 228; Morris v. Com. 27 
 
 S. E. 502; State v. Finley, 118 N. C. Ky. L. Rep. 145, 84 S. W. 560; Stock- 
 
 1161, 24 S. E. 495; Miller v. State, 37 dale's Case, 2 Lewin, C. C. 220. 
 
 Ind. 432; Hayes v. State, 112 Wis. 304, If poison is given to a woman in one 
 
 87 N. W. 1076; Reg. v. Price, 8 Cox, state for the purpose either of killing 
 
 C. C. 96. But see Smith v. State, 50 her or of producing an abortion, and she 
 
 Ark. 545 8 S. W. 941. is taken into another state and her head 
 
36 HOMICIDE. [§ 32 
 
 one operated with it,^ and thougli the fact that death was accelerated 
 grew out of his condition when he received the second injury, ^ And 
 the rule is not limited to cases of conspiracy and concurrent injuries 
 inflicted by several persons, but applies to other contributing causes 
 of death of whatever nature. * One who fires a shot necessarily fatal, 
 in self-defense, however, is not guilty of homicide because he after- 
 wards fires another shot, which would also have been fatal, after the 
 other had abandoned the conflict, where the last shot does not con- 
 tribute to or hasten death, though he might be found guilty of as- 
 sault.^ And a person whose act hastens the death of another is not 
 criminally responsible for the homicide unless his act was unjustifi- 
 able and unlawful. ® 
 
 33. Responsibility for first or prior act — To constitute homicide one 
 person must have killed another, and, though a mortal wound is in- 
 flicted, if the act of another intervenes, and the death follows from 
 the latter act, the person inflicting the first injury is not, in law, a 
 murderer.^ And a statute providing that one put on trial for mur- 
 der may be acquitted of that and found guilty of manslaughter does 
 not apply to a case in which a person inflicted a mortal wound, and, 
 before death ensued, another killed the injured person by an inde- 
 pendent act.^ 'Not is a person responsible criminally for the death 
 of one upon whom he inflicted a mortal injury, where such person 
 afterwards committed suicide and died from his own act.^ And 
 where several wounds were inflicted upon a person by different per- 
 sons, and those which were mortal were inflicted in proper self-de- 
 fense, the person inflicting them should not be convicted of murder. * 
 And, to render one criminally responsible for a death ^^•hich was the 
 result of the joint negligence of himself and another, his neglect must 
 
 is there cut off by another person, the 79 Ala. 9; Frank v. State, 27 Ala. 37; 
 
 latter is criminally responsible if she People v. Lewis, 124 Cal. 551, 45 L.R.A. 
 
 was then alive, whether he intended to 783, 57 Pac. 470; Walker v. State (Ga.) 
 
 kill her, or merely did it for the purpose 52 S. E. 738; Com. v. Costley, 118 
 
 of destroying the chances of identifica- Mass. 1; State v. Scates, 50 N. C. (5 
 
 tion, supposing her to be already dead. Jones, L.) 420. 
 
 Jackson v. Com. 100 Ky. 239, 66 Am. Where one man inflicts a mortal 
 
 St. Rep. 336, 38 S. W. 422, 1091. wound, and afterwards a second kills 
 
 2State V. Matthews, supra. the wounded person by an independent 
 
 3Fisher v. State, supra. act, to say that the first killed him 
 
 estate V. Matthews, supra. would involve the absurdity of saying 
 
 sRogers v. State, 60 Ark. 76, 31 L.R.A. that the deceased was killed twice. 
 
 465, 46 Am. St. Rep. 154, 29 S. W. State v. Scates, supra. 
 
 894. 2State v. Wood, supra. 
 
 eWooten v. State, 99 Tenn. 189, 41 S. sLewis v. Com. 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1139, 
 
 W. 813. 42 S. W. 1127. 
 
 iState V. Wood, 53 Vt. 560; Tidwell iMiller y. Stote, 37 Ind. 432. 
 
 T, State, 70 Ala. 33; Jordan v. State, 
 
§ 33] CAUSAL CONNECTION. 37 
 
 have been, either wholly or in part, the proximate and efficient cause 
 of death, without the intervention between it and the fatal result of 
 any other person's negligence. ^ lior is a person who inflicts a wound 
 upon another responsible as for homicide, though the wound was 
 mortal, where the wounded condition merely afforded an opportunity 
 for another person, acting independently, to kill the wounded per- 
 son.® And a person cannot be indicted and convicted of murder in 
 procuring another to be executed by falsely charging him with a 
 crime of which he was innocent. ^ If, however, a wound is felonious- 
 ly inflicted in such a manner as to put life in jeopardy, and death 
 ensues as a consequence of that act, the fact that another injury was 
 afterwards inflicted by another person does not palliate or excuse the 
 first felonious act.® The test as to the guilt of the person inflicting 
 the first wound in such case is whether, when death occurred, the first 
 wound contributed to the event. If it did, although other independ- 
 ent causes also contributed, the causal relation between the unlawful 
 acts of the accused and the death is made out. If the life current 
 went out from both wounds, so that at the very instant of death the 
 first wound was contributing to the event, the one who inflicted it is 
 criminally responsible. * And if a wound is given by one person to an- 
 other, and afterwards another injury is inflicted by a third person 
 and death occurs, if the effect of the subsequent injury was merely 
 to prevent any recovery which might otherwise have taken place, or 
 to aggravate or to hasten the effect of the first wound, that wound 
 might still be considered the cause of the death and punishable as 
 such,^° though, of course, to render the act of inflicting the first in- 
 
 SQueen v. Ledger, 2 Fost. & F. 857; v. Hambright, 111 N. C. 707, 16 S. E. 
 
 Hilton'9 Case, 2 Lewin, C. C. 214. 411. 
 
 So, a station master who, negligently Where the mediate cause of the death 
 
 and in violation of the rules of his em- of a person was wounds inflicted upon 
 
 ployer, sent one train after another him, the fact that he was afterwards 
 
 into a tunnel at a shorter interval of thrown into water does not affect the 
 
 time than that prescribed, whose act guilt of the persons inflicting the 
 
 led to a confusion of signals upon the wounds. People v. Ah Luck, 62 Cal. 
 
 part of a person at work in the tunnel, 503. 
 
 from which a collision resulted and per- sPeople v. Lewis, 124 Cal. 551, 45 
 
 sons were killed, cannot be held guilty L.R.A. 783, 57 Pac. 470; State v. Ham- 
 
 of murder, since the confusion of sig- bright, supra. 
 
 nals, and not his act, was the direct The theory of common law, where in- 
 
 cause of the collision. Queen v. Ledger, juries have been inflicted by two diflter- 
 
 supra. silt persons, is that he who causes the 
 
 ePeople v. Lewis, 124 Cal. 551, 45 L.E. first injury should be held criminally 
 
 A. 783, 57 Pac. 470; People v. Elder, responsible for the result, upon the the- 
 
 100 Mieh. 515, 59 N. W. 237. ory that without the first injury no 
 
 'King v. Macdaniel, 1 Leach, C. C. other would have followed. Brown v. 
 
 44. State, 38 Tex. 483. 
 
 sCom. V. Costley, 118 Mass. 1; State loCom. v. Costley, supra. 
 
38 HOMICIDE. ['§ 33 
 
 jury a basis for criminal responsibility, it must have been unlawful, 
 and not justifiable.^ ^ 
 
 34. Disease or physical condition co-operating with injury. — Death 
 from sickness or disease resulting from a wound is imputable to the 
 wound, and the person inflicting it may be held criminally responsi- 
 ble therefor ; ^ and an indictment charging the wound or injury and 
 the resulting death is sufficient.^ And where an assault, or a severe 
 hurt or injury, is the efficient cause of death, it is a killing by means 
 of such assault, hurt, or injury for which the slayer is criminally re- 
 sponsible, though there was a predisposing condition of the body 
 without which it would not have been fatal. ^ That the injury ac- 
 celerated death is sufficient to cause criminal responsibility.* And 
 the fact that the injury was such that, if the person injured had been 
 a person of robust health, it would not have been attended with seri- 
 
 In Wooten v. State, 99 Tenn. 189, 41 astate v. Cliiles, supra. 
 S. W. 813, it was held that where a sKing v. Greenwell, 1 Haw. 146; Win- 
 person knocked a man down, so that ter v. State, 123 Ala. 1, 26 So. 949; 
 his head struck the pavement, and the State v. Morea, 2 Ala. 275; McAllis- 
 man afterwards died from aclot of blood ter v. State, 17 Ala. 434, 52 Am. Dec. 
 on the brain, the person knocking him 180; People v. Moan, 65 Cal. 532, 4 
 clown would be guilty of one of the de- Pac. 545; Baker v. State, 30 Fla. 41, 11 
 Srees of felonious homicide, though the So. 492; People v. Castello, 62 Iowa, 404, 
 deceased might have died from other 17 N. W. 605; State v. Smith, 73 Iowa, 
 causes, and would not have died from 32, 34 N. W. 597; State v. O'Brien, 81 
 this one had no other cause operated Iowa, 88, 46 N. W. 752; State v. Wood, 
 with it or hastened his death; the the- supra; Cora. v. Fox, 7 Gray, 585; Com. 
 ory of the defense being that after the v. Green, 1 Ashm. (Pa.) 289; GrifRn 
 blow deceased, while drunk, was thrown v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 312, 76 
 from a wagon so recklessly that his Am. St. Rep. 718, 50 S. W. 366; United 
 head struck the wheel and the flioor, Slates v. Warner, 4 McLean, 464, Fed. 
 producing the clot of blood. Cii«. No. 16,643; Rex v. Martin, 5 Car. 
 
 iiWooten V. State, supra. & P. 128; Rex v. Webb, 1 Moody & R. 
 
 n Hale, P. C. 428; Smith v. State, 50 405; Reg. v. Murton, 3 Fost. & F. 492; 
 
 Ark. 545, 8 S. W. 941; Kelley v. State, Reg. v. Martin, 11 Cox, C. C. 136; ReVs 
 
 53 Ind. 311; State v. Wood, 112 Iowa, Case, J. Kelyng, 26. 
 
 411, 84 N. W. 520; Com. v. Hackett, 2 And where a man unlawfully assaults 
 
 Allen, 136; State v. Chiles, 44 S. C. 338, a nurse girl having an infant in her 
 
 22 S. E. 339; State v. Foote, 58 S. C. arms, by which assault the infant is so 
 
 218, 36 S. E. 551 ; Powell v. State, 13 frightened that it has convulsions from 
 
 Tex. App. 244; Samuel v. State, 14 Lea, the effects of which it eventually dies, 
 
 439; Livingston v. Com. 14 Gratt. 592; though teething had something to do 
 
 United States v. Woods, 4 Cranch, C. with the convulsions, yet, if the man's 
 
 C. 485, Fed. Cas. No. 16,760. act brought them on, or brought them 
 
 And where a. blow was struck which on to a more dangerous extent, and 
 broke a person's skull, and a surgeon death would not have resulted other- 
 performed the operation of trepanning, wise, his act is manslaughter. Reg. v. 
 after which there viras every rational Towers, 12 Cox, C. C. 530. 
 prospect of recovery, but in fits of de- ^Winter v. State, and State v. Morea, 
 liriura the injured person tore open his supra; People v. Moan, 65 Cal. 537, 4 
 wound, and death resulted, the deli- Pac. 545; Baker v. State, 30 Fla. 70, 
 lium being the result of the blow on the 11 So. 492; King v. Greenwell, and 
 head the death will be deemed to have State v. Smith, supra; Hopkins v. Gom- 
 been occasioned by the blow. Stanton's 25 Ky. L. Rep. 2117, 80 S. W. 156 ; Liv- 
 Case, 2 N. Y. City Hall Rec. 164. ingston v. Com. 14 Gratt. 592; Rex v. 
 
g 34] CAUSAL CONNECTION. 39 
 
 ous consequences, does not affect the criminal responsibility.® Nor 
 is it affected by the fact that the person inflicting the injury was 
 ignorant of the physical condition, of the person injured, and of his 
 inability to resist violence.® And it is inadmissible in a prosecution 
 for homicide to prove that the injury inflicted by the accused would 
 not have caused death had it not been for the physical condition of 
 the deceased.'^ Nor is it material that the injuries inflicted merely 
 hastened death. ® If a person was ill with a disease apparently mortal, 
 and his death was hastened by injuries maliciously inflicted, the per- 
 son inflicting them is guilty of murder, since the offender cannot ap- 
 portion his own wrong. ® And in such case the infliction of the injury 
 may be laid in an indictment as the sole cause of death, without men- 
 tioning disease or physical condition. ^ " The application of this rule 
 has been questioned, however, in cases in which the injury was slight 
 and inflicted through negligence, and not through malice, on the 
 ground that in such case the death was not the ordinary consequence 
 of the negligence, and that there can be no imputability of guilt ; but 
 in any event it plainly applies where a person negligently uses a 
 dangerous instrument, since in such case he is to be held liable for 
 the result of his act, peculiar though it may be. But a person cannot 
 be held guilty of homicide because of the infliction of an injury upon 
 the deceased, when death resulted entirely from disease, and was 
 neither caused nor accelerated, either mediately or immediately, by 
 his act. ^ ^ And when a charge of homicide is defended upon this 
 theory the law with reference to it should be given in the charge to 
 the jury. -^^ And where death is occasioned partly by a blow and 
 partly by a predisposing circumstance, and it is impossible to appor- 
 
 Martin, 5 Car. & P. 128 ; Rex v. Fleteh- «State v. O'Brien, 81 Iowa, 88, 46 N. 
 
 er, 1 Russell, Crimes, 507. W. 752 ; State v. Castello, 62 Iowa, 404, 
 
 So, in Stockdale's Case, 2 Lewin, C. 17 N. W. 605; Cunningham v. People, 
 
 C. 220j which was a prosecution for supra. 
 
 homicide, it appeared that the deceased, 'Griffin v. State.. 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 who was a child, was found in a field 312, 76 Am. St. Rep. 718, 50 S. W. 
 
 alone with a contusion on its head, and 366. 
 
 that it died a few hours after; and the sCunningham v. People, supra. 
 
 court was of the opinion that if death sPowell v. State, 13 Tex. App. 244. 
 
 was only accelerated by the exposure, lOCom. v. Fox^ 7 Gray, 585. 
 
 charging it as the cause of death was nHarvey v. State, 40 Ind. 516; Bush 
 
 not supported; tut the case seems to v. Com. 78 Ky. 268; State v. Foote, 58 
 
 have been disposed of on the question S. C. 218, 36 S. E. 551 ; Livingston v. 
 
 of the sufficiency of the evidence to war- Com. 14 Gratt. 592 ; United States v. 
 
 rant the conviction. Woods, 4 Craneh, C. C. 484, Fed. Cas. 
 
 BPeople V. Moan, 65 Cal. 532, 4 Pae. No. 16,760; Reg. v. Murton. 3 Fost. & 
 
 545; Cunningham v. People, 195 111. F. 492. 
 
 550, 63 N. E. 517. And see Gardner v. izGarner v. State, 45 Tex. Grim. Rep. 
 
 State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 572, 73 S. 308, 77 S. W. 797. 
 W. 13. 
 
40 HOMICIDE. [§ 34 
 
 tion the operation of the several causes so as to be able to say with 
 certainty that death was immediately occasioned by one or by the 
 other, there should be an acquittal in a prosecution for the killing. ^ ^ 
 35. Intervening surgical or medical negligence as affecting result. — 
 Where, after a person has received a wound or injury, he is placed 
 under the charge of a surgeon, who causes his death, if the surgeon 
 followed the usual course of practice which good surgeons under the 
 circumstances are accustomed to adopt, then the person inflicting the 
 wound is chargeable with the death. For he who does an unlawful 
 act is responsible, as we have just seen, for all the consequences that 
 in the ordinary course of events proceed from the unlawful act. Now 
 it is one of the ordinary consequences of a wound that a surgeon 
 should be called in to treat it ; and it is one of the necessary incidents 
 of surgical practice that a patient should die under the knife. And 
 the person inflicting the wound is responsible for this, as one of the 
 consequences which, in the natural course of events, result from his 
 unlawful act. ^ It is no defense, in cases in which the deceased's 
 death is not shown to have been produced by his own negligence or 
 that of his medical attendant, that he might have recovered had a 
 higher degree of professional skill been employed. The law does not 
 exact from physicians the highest degree of professional skill, but only 
 such skill as men of their profession are, under the circumstances, ac- 
 
 isjohnson's Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 164. lister v. State, 17 Ala. 434, 52 Am. Dec. 
 
 But where it appears in a prosecution 180; Thomas v. State, 139 Ala. 80, Sri 
 
 for murder that the deceased was in So. 734; State v. Edgerton, 100 Iowa, 
 
 the last stages of Bright's disease, and 63, 69 N. W. 280; State v. Morphy, 33 
 
 that an injury received at the hands of Icwa, 270, 11 Am. Tiep. 122; Osborn v. 
 
 t)ie defendant rendered a surgical oper- Com. 6 Ky. L. Rep. 47 ; Coffman v. Com. 
 
 ation necessary, for which chloroform 10 Bus-h, 495; People v. Cook, 39 Mich, 
 
 had to be used, which paralyzed his 23G, 33 Am. Rep. 380; Com. v. M'Pike, 
 
 kidneys and caused death; and an in- 3 Cush. 181, 50 Am. Dec. 727; State v. 
 
 struction was given in accordance with Lane, 158 Mo. 572, 50 S. W. 965; Brown 
 
 a statute providing that a homicide v. State, 38 Tex. 483. 
 
 must have been complete by the act of And evidence that deceased was 
 
 the defendant, but, though the injuries wounded by the act of another, and was 
 
 causing death might have proved fatal carried to a hospital, and never got out 
 
 under other circumstances, yet, if the of bed for some two nr tliree weeks, an 3 
 
 said injuries were the cause of death, was attended by physicians, who sewed 
 
 it not appearing that there was gross up his wounds, one of them testifying 
 
 neglect or improper treatment of the to the nature and character of such 
 
 injured person, it is homicide, a further wounds, and that they were the cause 
 
 instruction that, if the injury inflicted of death, suggests nothing as to a su- 
 
 bv the defendant was not necessarily fa- pervening cause of death, and does 
 
 lal, and deceased died from a disease "ot require an instruction in aeco'danC^ 
 
 not connected with, or caused by, the Y'*!' , ?. statutory provision that the 
 
 injury, he should be acquitted, is prop- '^r\*''?''v""i^°* ^^^f """'* '"'"''* been com - 
 
 e, y refused. Gardner v. State, 44 Tex. V^'^"^ by the act or agency of the ac. 
 
 n • -c. ETo 11 a \xr 10 cused. Smith v. State, 33 Tex. Onm. 
 
 Crira. Rep. 572, 73 SW. 13 j^ g 3 37 g. w. 137. 
 
 iCom. v. Green, 1 Ashm. (Pa.) 289; f > 
 Parsons v. State, 21 Ala. 300; McAl- 
 
§ -35] CAUSAL CONNECTION. 41 
 
 customed to apply. ^ The true test is, Was the physician attending 
 the deceased guilty of negligence which was the direct cause pf death ? 
 If not, it is no defense that the deceased, under another form of treat- 
 ment, might have recovered.* A person who inflicts wounds upon 
 another, from which the latter dies, cannot avoid the consequences 
 of his act by the claim that the wounds were not treated according to 
 the best and most approved methods of medical and surgical treat- 
 ment for wounds of the character of those inflicted by him.* This 
 is the rule when the wound or injury contributed, mediately or im- 
 mediately, to the death of the injured person, though the injury was 
 neglected or mismanaged. ® To warrant the escape of the person in- 
 flicting the injury from responsibility for the killing, the subsequent 
 neglect or mismanagement must have been the sole cause of death.® 
 And evidence as to the propriety of medical treatment of a wound 
 is inadmissible in a prosecution for a homicide resulting from the 
 wound, where no attempt was made, and there was no offer, to show 
 that the sole cause of the death was malpractice of the wound, or 
 
 2Wharton, Neg. § 735; Bowles v. Bgtate v. Wood, 112 Iowa, 411, 84 N. 
 State, 58 Ala. 335; State v. Garrand, 5 W. 520; Daughdrill v. State, 113 Ala. 
 Or. 156; Clark v. Com. 90 Va. 360, 18 7, 21 So. 378; Parsons v. State, 21 Ala. 
 S. E. 440. 300; Sharp v. State, 51 Ark. 147, 14 Am. 
 
 And a post mortem discovery that a St. Rep. 27, 10 S. W. 228; Kee v. State, 
 surgical operation at the proper time 28 Ark. 155; Bishop v. State, 73 Ark. 
 would have saved the life of a person 568, 81 S. W. 707; State v. Barnes, 34 
 who Avas wounded is no defense to the La. Ann. 395; State v. Scott, 12 La. 
 person inflicting the wound in a prose- Tinn. 275; Com. v. Hackett, 2. Allen, 
 cution for causing such person's death. 136; McBeth v. State, 50 Miss. 81; 
 State V. Lane, supra. State v. Landgraf, 95 Mo. 97, 6 Am. St. 
 
 Where an injury «as inflicted on a Rep. 27, 8 S. W. 237; State v. Smith, 
 person by a blow, which rendered an 10 Nev. 106; Territoiy v. Yee Dan, 7 
 operation advisable, and as a prelimi- N. M. 439, 37 Pac. 1101; Clark v. Com. 
 nary to the operation chloroform was 90 Va. 360, 18 S. E. 440. 
 administered to the patient, who died And where death is caused by a dan- 
 through its administration, the person gerous wound, the person inflicting it is 
 causing the injury is criminally re- responsible for the consequences, though 
 sponsible for the death, though the pa- the deceased might have recovered with 
 tient would not have died but for the the exercise of more prudence and bet- 
 administration of the chloroform. Reg. ter nurses; and a charge in a prosecu- 
 V. Davis, 15 Cox, C. C. 174. tion for homicide is properly refused 
 
 8Reg. V. Lee, 4 Fost. & F. 63; Reg. where it tells the jury, without regard 
 v. Minnock, Craw. & D. ( Ir. ) 537 ; to the character of the wound, that the 
 McAllister v. State, 17 Ala. 434, 52 prisoner could not be convicted of mur- 
 Am. Dec. 180; Downing v. State, 114 der, though the wound was inflicted 
 Ga. 30, 39 S. E. 927 ; State v. Morphy, with malice aforethought, if the wound- 
 33 Iowa, 270, 11 Am. Rep. 122 ; State ed person died from the gross negligence 
 V. Scott, 12 La. Ann. 274; Com. v. of himself or his nurses. Bowles v. 
 Haekett,'2 Allen, 137; Com. v. M'Pike, State, 58 Ala. 335. 
 supra; Com. v. Green, 1 Ashm. (Pa.) estate v. Wood, supra; State v. Mor- 
 289; United States v. Warner, 4 Me- phy, 33 Iowa, 270, 11 Am. Rep. 122. 
 Lean, 464, Fed. Cas. No. 16,643. And see Hancock v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 4 State V. Edgerton, 100 Iowa, 63, 69 App.) 83 S. W. 696. 
 N. W. 280. 
 
42 HOMICIDE. ['§ 35 
 
 medicine administered to the patient.'^ Nor will the maltreatment 
 of a wound from which death ensues excuse the person who inflicted 
 it from full responsibility therefor, unless there is doubt as to whether 
 or not the wound was of such a character as to cause death.* And 
 refusal to allow counsel for the accused in a prosecution for homicide 
 to go into the question whether some particular form of surgical 
 operation might have saved the deceased's life is not error where there 
 was no evidence indicating any other cause of death than the act of 
 the accused.** And it rests with the defense to satisfy the jury that 
 death resulted from the malpractice of the surgeon, and not from 
 the wound, the person inflicting the first injury being held responsible 
 on the theory that, without the first, no other would have followed. ^ " 
 Nor can a person who inflicts a serious wound upon another, who 
 afterwards dies, escape responsibility for the death by showing that 
 it was the result of an accident occurring in an operation which his 
 felonious act made necessary. ^ ^ If death results solely from grossly 
 erroneous surgical or medical treatment, however, the original author 
 of the injury cannot be held criminally responsible.^^ And if the 
 death of the deceased was accelerated by the want of due skill and 
 competency of his physician, then the latter cannot defend himself 
 on the ground that the deceased was at the time laboring under a 
 mortal disease. ^^ But a person charged with murder of a person 
 injured by him may be held for, and convicted of, assault with intent 
 to kill, when the death appears to have resulted from improper treat- 
 ment, and not from his act. * * 
 
 36. Negligence intervening, co-operating, or contributing. — If a 
 wound or injury is inflicted which is adequate and calculated to cause 
 death, and death ensues as the result of the wound, the person who 
 inflicted it cannot exonerate himself from criminal liability by show- 
 ing that some conduct or negligence of the wounded or injured man 
 
 7 state V. Strong, 153 Mo. 548, 55 S. are disregarded the judgment should 
 
 W. 78. be reversed, provided the error is ex- 
 
 8 State V. Baker, 46 N. C. (1 .Jones, cepted to at the time of the trial. White 
 
 L.) 267. V. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Eep. 346, 63 
 
 9State V. Seery (Iowa) 105 N. \\. L.R.A. 660, 72 S. W. 173. 
 511. uCom. V. Eisenhower, 181 Pa. 470, 
 
 loBrown v. State, 38 Tex. 483; Powell 60 Am. St. Rep. 670, 37 Atl. 521. 
 V. State, 13 Tex. App. 244. i = Coffman v. Com. 10 Bush, 495; 
 
 That the evidence in a prosecution Parsons v. State, 21 Ala. 300; McBeth 
 
 for homicide did not show decedent's v. State, 50 Miss. 81 ; Johnson v. Stal^, 
 
 death to have resulted from the injury 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 283, 65 S. W. 92; 
 
 inflicted by the accused rather than from Livingston v. Com. 14 Gratt. 597. 
 improper medical treatment cannot be isRex v. Webb, 1 Moody & E. 405. 
 first asserted on motion for rehearing KDaughdrill v. State, il3 Ala. 7, 21 
 
 of an appeal, where the statute provides So. 378. 
 thnt where certain named requirements 
 
§ 36] CAUSAL CONNECTION. 43 
 
 or his attendants lessened the chances of his surviving his injuries, 
 and thus caused the death. ^ And the rule is the same though it 
 appears that the deceased might have recovered if he had taken proper 
 care of himself.^ It is no defense that the deceased or his compan- 
 ions, by their own negligence, contributed to the result, if the result 
 would not have happened without the misconduct of the accused." 
 ISTor will neglect to obtain proper medical treatment upon the part 
 of a person injured relieve the person injuring him from criminal 
 responsibility for the injury, where death results.* And where the 
 injured person is put in a condition in which he is forced under 
 circumstances of agitation and distress to decide between two courses, 
 as in case of a question of amputation or a surgical operation, the 
 person inflicting the injury is criminally responsible for the re- 
 sult, no matter how erroneous the choice of the injured person 
 may ultimately prove to have been.' Neither can the previous neg- 
 ligence of a person excuse one who afterwards injures him, upon 
 the theory that if it had not been for the previous negligence the 
 subsequent injury could have been avoided." If injuries are in- 
 flicted upon a person which are not sufiicient of themselves to cause 
 death, however, and the injured person voluntarily and of his own 
 accord so exposes himself as to produce death, the one who inflicted 
 the injuries is not guilty of the killing, even though the injuries 
 furnished the motive for the voluntary exposure.'' And where a 
 
 iState V. Hambright, 111 N. C. 707, & K. 368; Reg. v. Murton, 3 Fost. & 
 
 16 S. E. 411; Hopkins v. United States, F. 492. 
 
 4 App. D. C. 430; State v. Bantley, 44 iHopkins v. United States, 4 App. D. 
 
 Conn. 537, 26 Am. Rep. 486; State v. C. 430; Payne v. Com. 20 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 Edgerton, 100 Iowa, 63, 69 N. W. 280; 475, 46 S. W. 704. 
 
 State V. Morphy, 33 Iowa, 270, 11 Am. sReg. v. Holland, 2 Moody & R. 351. 
 Rep. 122; Crura v. State, 64 Miss. 1, 60 6Reg. v. Longbottom, and Reg. v. 
 
 Am. Rep. 45, 1 So. 1 ; State v. Lane, Swindall, supra. And see Rex v. Wal- 
 
 158 Mo. 572, 59 S. W. 965; State v. ker, supra; Wharton, Neg. § 355. 
 Baker, 46 N. C. (1 Jones, L.) 267; 'State v. Hambright, 111 N. C. 707, 
 
 Com. V. Green, 1 Ashm. (Pa.) 289. And 16 S. E. 411; State v. Preslar, 48 N. 
 
 see Taylor v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. C. ( 3 Jones, L. ) 421 ; Payne v. Com. 
 
 148, 51 S. W. 1106. supra; Bush v. Com. 78 Ky. 271; Crum 
 
 One who gives wounds to another, who v. State, 64 Miss. 1, 60 Am. Rep. 45, 1 
 
 neglects t6 eare for them, or who is so So. 1; Monson v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 disordered thereby as to be unable to App.) 63 S. W. 647. 
 do so, and dies as the result, is guilty And where passengers upon a dam- 
 
 of murder or manslaughter as the case aged and sinking steamboat were ap- 
 
 may be. Rew's Case, J. Kelyng, 26. prised by the persons in charge that 
 
 2 State V. Bantley, supra; McAllister they would be safe by remaining on the 
 
 V. State, 17 Ala. 434, 52 Am. Dec. upper deck, and those who remained 
 
 180. there were saved, but under the in- 
 
 3See Rex v. Kew, 12 Cox, C. C. 355, fluence of excessive alarm others un- 
 
 1 Green, Crim. L. R. 95 ; Reg. v. Long- necessarily and indiscreetly left the boat 
 
 bottom, 3 Cox, C. C. 439; Reg. v. Swin- on floats or rafts and were drowned, 
 
 dall, 2 Car. & K. 2.30; Rex v. Walker, the loss of their lives is not so eon- 
 
 1 Car. & P. 320 ; Rex v. Haines, 2 Car. nected with, and such a necessary result 
 
44 HOMICIDE. [§ 36 
 
 person's death resiilted from a fall upon the pavement, and the fall 
 resulted, not from a blow he then received, but from his physical in- 
 firmities or intoxication, his death will be attributed to natural 
 causes, and not to the criminal agency of the person who struck him. " 
 So, a statutory rule that if a person received an injury which might 
 not have proved fatal, and another wilfully failed and neglected to 
 call in a physician or procure nurses or other attendants, and the in- 
 jury caused the death of the person injured in consequence of such 
 failure or neglect, the person thus neglecting shall be deemed equally 
 gTiilty as if the injury were one which would inevitably lead to 
 death, is not inapplicable to a case in which the injured person was 
 shot down in the midst of his family and friends. ® 
 
 37. Effect of interposition of irresponsible intermediate agent An 
 
 unconscious agent, acting in such a way as might ordinarily be ex- 
 pected from the defendant's act, does not break the causal connec- 
 tion, even in malicious homicide. Thus, in an English case, a 
 woman bought a bottle of laudanum, intending to kill her infant 
 child, and directed the nurse to give the child a spoonful every night. 
 The nurse did not do so, but another child found the poison, and 
 gave part of it to the defendant's infant, who died therefrom. It 
 was held that the administering of the poison by the child was as 
 much an administering by the defendant as if she had administered 
 it with her own hand.^ The same rule applies to infants and ir- 
 responsible persons, and persons ignorantly obeying orders;" and 
 even in a case of the killing of the irresponsible agent by his own 
 act directed by another. * Such agents may be likened to messengers 
 carrying sealed orders, or to expressmen carrying packages. A man, 
 for instance, who sends an explosive machine by express is as much 
 responsible as he who sends a shell through a mortar. This, indeed, 
 results from the very nature of our proposition, which treats an in- 
 
 of, the collision causing the injury, train from which he died in a short 
 
 which was due to the negligence of the time, has no tendency to show that the 
 
 persons in charge, as that they could person who struck him caused his death, 
 
 he held responsible for such loss of life. Com. v. Cozine, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 412, 9 
 
 United States v. Warner, 4 McLean, 463, S. W. 289. 
 
 Fed. Cas. No. 16,643. swilliams v. State, 2 Tex. App. 271. 
 
 sCunningham v. People, 195 111. 550, iReg. v, ^Michael. !l Car. & P 356, 2 
 
 63 N. E. 517. Moody, C. C. 120. 
 
 And proof that one person struck an- 2See Com. v. Macloon, 101 Mass. 1, 
 
 other, who was intoxicated, a blow with 100 Am. Dec. 89; People v. Adams, 3 
 
 a good-sized stick, which did not knock Denio, 190, 45 Am. Dec. 468; Collins v. 
 
 him down, and that afterwards the per- State, 3 Heisk. 14 ; Red v. State, 39 Tex. 
 
 son who was struck rambled about in Crim. Rep. 667, 73 Am. St. Rep. 969, 47 
 
 the night by reason of his intoxication, S. W. 1003. 
 
 and went upon a railroad track where sBlackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 165. 
 he received injuries from a passing 
 
5 37] CAUSAL C02SnSfECTI0N. 45 
 
 termediate agency as diverting responsibility only when such inter- 
 mediate agency is self-determining.'' This subject is more definitely 
 and minutely considered in the chapter on "Methods of Ealling Con- 
 stituting Homicide."^ 
 
 38. Proof — Death following a wound from which death might en- 
 sue, inflicted with murderous intent, is presumed to have been caused 
 by such wound, and the burden rests with the party inflicting it to 
 show to the satisfaction of the jury that death did not result there- 
 from, but from some other cause. ^ But where several injuries are 
 inflicted by different persons, and it is uncertain which was the 
 mortal wound, or whether all were mortal, a person who inflicted one 
 of them should not be convicted of murder therefor;^ and where 
 the jury have a reasonable doubt as to which inflicted the injury 
 causing death, all should be acquitted.^ Nor should a man be con- 
 victed of murder where the jury have a reasonable doubt growing 
 out of the evidence as to whether his act caused death, instead of 
 the subsequent attempted suicide of the deceased.* But where one 
 seeks to evade the consequences of his criminal act by showing that 
 an injury inflicted by him did not cause death, the evidence should 
 be very plain to warrant the jury in agreeing with him;^ though, if 
 there is any evidence to sustain his theory, it must be submitted to the 
 jury under proper instructions.® itTor should it be assumed as a 
 fact that if a wound, though not mortal, contributed to the death 
 
 4See supra, § 31. er v. State, 116 Ga. 537, 67 L.R.A. 426, 
 
 BSee supra, chapter IV., §§ 20 et seq. 42 S. E. 787. 
 
 lEdwards v. State, 39 Fla. 753, 23 So. In United States v. Wiltberger, 3 
 
 537; State v. Briscoe, 30 La. Ann. 433; Wash. C. C. 515, Fed. Cas. No. 16,738, it 
 
 People V. O'Connell, 78 Hun, 323, 29 N. is held that, where several wounds are 
 
 Y. Supp. 195. But see Wellar v. People, inflicted and death follows, the burden 
 
 30 Mieh. 16. rests with the state in a prosecution for 
 
 And evidence that a person drew his the homicide to establish the claim that 
 
 revolver while standing- not more than death resulted from one of the injuries 
 
 6 feet from another, and presented it as distinguished from the others; but 
 directlv at him and fired, and that the that, if the injury was inflicted with a 
 latter immediately fell and expired in dangerous weapon and was followed by 
 the course of a few minutes, is suf- alarming symptoms, or early de^th, 
 ficient in a prosecution for the killing, the burden is shifted to the accused to 
 in tlie absence of any controversy show that death resulted from other 
 upon that question, to warrant the jury causes. 
 
 in finding that death was proved be- sState v. Goode, 132 N. C. 982, 43 S. 
 
 yond a reasonable doubt to have been E. 502; State v. Finley, 118 N. C. 1161, 
 
 caused by the shot, though in case of a 24 S. E. 495. 
 
 controversy on that question, it might 4Lewis v. Com. 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1139, 
 
 be necessary to show more fully the 42 S. W. 1127. 
 
 nature of the wound, and that it was sSmith v. State, 50 Ark. 545, 8 S. W. 
 
 such as would ordinarily result in death. 941. 
 
 State V. Moody, 7 Wash. 395, 35 Pac. sibid.; Walker v. State (Ga.) 52 S. 
 
 132. E. 738. 
 
 zMiller v. State, 37 Ind. 432; Epps v. Where there were two wounds upon 
 
 State, 102 Ind. 539, 1 N. E. 491 ; Walk- the head of a deceased person, one ap- 
 
46 HOMICIDE. R 3& 
 
 of the deceased, the person who inflicted it is guilty in some degree, 
 that being a question which should be submitted to the jury under 
 proper instructions.'^ And a statutory provision requiring that in 
 homicide the destruction of life must be brought about by the act 
 of another, and that it must be completed by that act, should be 
 charged in a prosecution for homicide in which it appeared that the 
 deceased lived nearly six months after being injured by the accused, 
 and that, within two months after the injury, he was up and able to 
 visit his neighbors.® It is not necessary, however, that it be shown 
 ■by expert testimony that death resulted from the injury or wound." 
 This may be shown by circumstances,^" or by nonexpert opinion 
 based on a description of the injuries ; ^ ^ and the opinion of a sur- 
 geon as to which of two wounds, either of which was necessarily 
 fatal, actually caused the death of the deceased is competent and ad- 
 missible in a prosecution for the killing, ' ^ as is also the opinion of 
 a physician as to whether or not a wound was fatal. -^'^ And an at- 
 tending physician called as an expert may testify that a whipping 
 received by a deceased person was the cause of her death from re- 
 sulting pneumonia, and this though he based his opinion in part 
 upon information given him by defendant, when he made his diag- 
 nosis, that the deceased had previously been in ordinary health.-'* 
 
 pareiitly inflicted in one way, and the i oMayfield v. State ; State v. Murphy; 
 other in another, it is not proper to in- and Loew v. State, — supra. 
 struct the jury in a prosecution for the That a man, apparently physically 
 killing that either of the wounds were sound, received a blow upon his head 
 produced in a particular way, or that which crushed his skull, leaving him 
 accused should be acquitted if death re- helpless and insensible, and that he re- 
 sulted from one of the wounds, and not mained unconscious three quarters of 
 from the other, since it is not the prov- an hour and then died, sufficiently 
 ii'ce of the court to locate the position shows that he died of the injury, in the 
 of either wound; it is sufficient to absence of any suggestion of any other 
 charge that, if death did not result cause of death. Loew v. State, supra. 
 from the wound inflicted by the accused, nEdwards v. State, supra. 
 but from other causes, the accused can- izEggler v. People, 56 N. Y. 642. 
 not be convicted. Weeks v. State, 79 isSims v. Stale. 139 Ala. 74, 101 Am. 
 Ga. 36. 3 S. E. 323. St. Rep. 17, 36 So. 138. 
 
 vGarrett v. State, 97 Ala. 18, 14 So. i4State v. Chiles. 44 S. C. 338, 22 S. 
 
 .327. E. 339. 
 
 sArmsworthy v. State (Tex. Grim. But where one person shot and wound- 
 
 -Vpp. ) 88 S. W. 215. ed each of three other persons, and 
 
 sLemons v. State, 97 Tenn. 560, 37 S. afterwards one of the wounded persons 
 
 W. 552; Mayiield v. State, 101 Tenn. had typhoid fever and died, the opinion 
 
 673, 49 S. W. 742; Edwards v. State, of a witness that the wound contribut- 
 
 39 Fla. 753, 23 So. 537 ; State v. Murphy, ed to his death is not competent evi- 
 
 9 Nev. 394; Smith v. State, 43 Tex. 643; dence in a prosecutfon against the per- 
 
 Lneiv A'. State, 60 Wis. 559, 19 N. W. son inflicting such wounds for an as- 
 
 437. sault with intent to kill upon another 
 
 In Edwards v. State, supra, however, of the persons wounded. Surginer v. 
 
 it is said that it would be better to btate, 134 Ala. 120, 32 So. 277. 
 have expert testimony. 
 
§ 3SJ CAUSAL CONNECTION. 47 
 
 But evidence that just previous to a homicide the deceased was much 
 intoxicated, and was going about endeavoring to pick a quarrel with 
 whomsoever he met, is too remote to authorize any fair inference by 
 the jury in a prosecution for the killing that the wounds which 
 caused his death were received as accidents of his drunken behavior. ^ " 
 Whether death resulted from injuries inflicted by the accused is a 
 question of fact where the evidence is conflicting, and a conviction 
 will not be reversed where it was fairly submitted to the jury, with 
 proper instructions. ^ " 
 
 39. Further consideration of the ciuestion — The question of the nec- 
 essary connection between an unlawful act and a homicide growing 
 out of its commission, and of that between a conspiracy to commit 
 an unlawful act and a homicide committed by one of the conspirators 
 in carrying out such conspiracy, is elsewhere fully considered. ^ 
 
 lOPatterson v. State, 66 Ind. 185. iSee infra, chapters IX., XXI. 
 
 leHamby v. State, 72 Ark. 623, 83 
 S. W. 322; Cunningham v. People, 195 
 111. 550. 63 N. E. 517. 
 
CHAPTEE VI. 
 
 PARTICIPANTS IN THE CRIME. 
 
 I. Methods and effect of participation. 
 
 40. Diflferent kinds defined and distinguished. 
 
 41. Criminality of participation. 
 II. Principals in the first degree. 
 
 42. Who are. 
 
 43. Compelling or soliciting suicide. 
 
 44. Joint participation. 
 
 III. Principals in the second degree. 
 
 45. Who are, generally. 
 
 46. Distinction between the two degrees; when important. 
 
 47. Degrees of homicide to which applicable. 
 
 48. Presence. 
 
 49. Participation in the act. 
 
 50. Participation in criminal intent. 
 61. Effect of relationship. 
 
 52. Acts in concert under compulsion. 
 
 53. Participation in dueling and prize fighting. 
 
 54. Participation in suicide. 
 
 55. Abandonment of purpose. 
 
 56. Necessity of conviction of principal in the first degree. 
 
 67. Effect of statutes abolishing distinction between principals i 
 abetters. 
 
 IV. Accessories before the fact. 
 
 58. Who are, generally. 
 
 59. Degrees of homicide to which applicable. 
 
 60. Sufficiency of solicitation or procurement. 
 
 61. Concurrence of procurement and result. 
 
 62. When conviction of principal a prerequisite. 
 
 63. Abortionist as an accessory before the fact. 
 
 64. Encouraging or persuading suicide. 
 
 65. Locus in quo of the offense. 
 
 66. Effect of statutes abolishing distinction between principal and 
 
 cessory. 
 V. Accessories after the fact. 
 
 67. Who are, generally. 
 
 68. Constituent elements and character of the offense. 
 
 69. What relationship excuses. 
 
 VT. Persons conspiring or combining to commit crime. 
 
 70. General consideration. 
 
 48 
 
§ 40] PARTICIPANTS IN THE CRIME. 49 
 
 I. Methods aistd effect of paeticipation. 
 
 40. Different kinds defined and distinguished. — A person may par- 
 ticipate in the commission of a homicide either as a principal or as 
 an accessory. A principal in homicide is one who was present, either 
 actually or constructively, at the place of the crime, and who either 
 aided, abetted, assisted, or advised in the commission of the crime, 
 or who was present for such purpose.^ Each person present con- 
 senting to the commission of the offense and doing any act which is 
 an ingredient in the crime, or imniediately connected with it, or 
 leading to its commission, is as much a principal as if he had, with 
 his own handj committed the whole offense. ^ Aiding in the commis- 
 sion of a homicide makes the aider a principal.* An accessory in 
 homicide is one who was not the chief actor in the offense, nor present 
 at its performance, but was in some way connected with it, either 
 before or after the commission of the act.* If a person does no 
 more than procure, advise, or assist, he is only an accessory.^ The 
 distinction between principal and accessory is that the principal is 
 the one who actually does the criminal act or participates in doing 
 it, whether actually or only constructively present, or who is actually 
 present at the time of doing it, aiding and abetting; while the ac- 
 cessory is one who has such connection with the crime by reason of 
 preparation, procurement, advice, encouragement, or assistance, as 
 to be deemed criminally liable therefor, though he does not partici- 
 pate in the actual commission of the crime, and is not present there- 
 at.® Principals in homicide are also divided into principals in the 
 first degree and principals in the second degree, or aiders and abet- 
 ters; and accessories are divided into accessories before the fact and 
 accessories after the fact, and there has also been a recognition of 
 accessories during the fact. 
 
 41. Criminality of participation. — ^Within the restrictions of gen- 
 eral rules with reference to malice and intent as applied to acces- 
 
 lUnited States v. Boyd, 45 Fed. 851; sPeople v. Ah Fat, 48 Cal. 61. 
 
 Usselton v. People, 149 111. 612, 36 N. estate v. Berger, 121 Iowa, 581, 96 N. 
 
 E. 952; State v. Jenkins, 14 Rich. L. W. 1094; State v. Prater, supra; Con- 
 
 215, 94 Am. Dee. 132; Alexander v. naughty v. State, 1 Wis. 159, 60 Am. 
 
 State, 40 Tex. Grim. Rep. 395, 49 S. W. Dec. 370; United States v. Hartwell, 3 
 
 229, 50 S. W. 716; State v. Prater, 52 Cliflf. 221, Fed. Cas. No. 15,318. 
 
 W. Va. 132, 43 8. E. 230. BUnited States v. Wilson, supra. 
 
 2Umted States v. Wilson, Baldw. 78, estate v. Prater, 52 W. Va. 132, 43 
 
 Fed. Cas. No. 16,730; Green v. State, S. E. 230; Usselton v. People, 149 111. 
 
 13 Mo. 383; Quinn v. State (Tex. Grim. 612, 36 N. E. 952; State v. Hermann, 
 
 App. 20 S. W. 1108; Red v. State, 39 117 Mo. 629, 23 S. W. 1071. 
 Tex. Grim. Rep. 667, 73 Am. St. Rep. 
 065, 47 S. W. 1003. 
 Hom. — 4. 
 
50 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 [« 41 
 
 series, aiders, and abetters, those who advise, encourage, aid, or abet 
 the killing of another are as guilty as though they took his life 
 with their own hands, they also being principals in the criminal act. ^ 
 To render one criminally responsible as a principal in a homicide 
 it is not necessary that he should inflict the mortal wound ; it is suffi- 
 cient that he was present, aiding or abetting the act;^ and this is 
 so though there was no common design to kill or injure." Nor is 
 there any difFerence between the criminality of, and the punishment 
 imposed upon, a principal in the first, and a principal in the second, 
 degree.* And this is especially the case where the facts are such 
 that the act by which the homicide was perpetrated is, on established 
 principles of law, to be imputed to the abetter, as committed by him- 
 self through the agency of another. ° And when two persons were 
 
 iSpies V. People, 122 111. 1, 3 Am. St. 
 Rep. 320, 12 N. E. 865, 17 N. E. 898: 
 Usselton v. People, supra; Jordan v. 
 State, 82 Ala. 1, 2 So. 460; Thomas v. 
 State, 130 Ala. 62, 30 So. 391 ; Brister v. 
 State, 26 Ala. 107; Carpenter v. State, 
 62 Ark. 286, 36 S. W. 900; People v. 
 Jamarillo, 57 Cal. Ill; People v. Morine, 
 138 Cal. 626, 72 Pac. 166; Mow v. Peo- 
 ple, 31 Colo. 351, 72 Pac. 1069; State v. 
 Miller, 9 Houst. (Del.) 564, 32 Atl. 137; 
 United States v. Neverson, 1 Maekey, 
 152; Somers v. State, 116 Ga. 535, 42 
 S. E. 779; Stipp V. State, 11 Ind. 62; 
 State V. Mushrush, 97 Iowa, 444, 66 N. 
 W. 746; Howard v. Com. 110 Ky. 356, 
 61 S. W. 756; Dorsey v. Com. 13 Ky. L. 
 Rep. 359, 17 S. W. 183; Com. v. Drew, 
 4 Maiisi. 391 ; People v. Repke, 103 Mich. 
 459, 61 N. W. 861; State v. Anderson, 
 89 Mo. 312, 1 S. W. 135; State v. Pay- 
 ton, 90 Mo. 220, 2 S. W. 394; State v. 
 Crittenden, 191 Mo. 17, 89 S. W. 952; 
 State V. Miller, 100 Mo. 606, 13 S. W. 
 832, 1051; Jahnke v. State, 68 Neb. 154, 
 94 N. W. 158, 104 N. W. 154; Territory 
 V. Yarberry, 2 N. M. 391; State v. 
 Whitt, 113 N. C. 716, 18 S. E. 715; 
 State V. Hill, 72 N. C. 345; Hanoff v. 
 State, 37 Ohio St. 178, 41 Am. Rep. 496; 
 Com. V. Kern, 1 Brewst. (Pa.) 350; 
 Com. V. Neills, 2 Brew.st. (Pa.) 553; 
 Weston V. Com. Ill Pa. 251, 2 Atl. 191 ; 
 State V. Fley, 2 Brev. 338, 4 Am. Dec. 
 583; Carlisle v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. 
 Eep. 537, 21 S. W. 358; Wilkerson v. 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 57 S. W. 956; 
 Horton v. State, 99 Va. 848, 38 8. E. 
 184; Hiekg v. United States, 150 U. S. 
 442, 37 L. ed. 1137, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 144. 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution 
 for homicide that the accused could be 
 
 convicted if an accomplice struck the 
 fatal blow in pursuance of a common 
 purpose, if erroneous, is harmless, even 
 in the absence of evidence that the blow 
 was struck by an accomplice. State v. 
 Donnelly, 130 Mo. 642, 32 S. W. 1124. 
 
 zThompson y. Com. 1 Met. (Ky.) 13; 
 True V. Com. 90 Ky. 651, 14 S. W. 684; 
 State y. Cobley (Iowa) 103 N. W. 99; 
 State y. Gaylord, 70 S. C. 415, 50 S. E. 
 20. And see State v. Gray, 116 Iowa, 
 231, 89 N. W. 987. 
 
 sReg. y. Price, 8 Cox, C. C. 96. And 
 see Vasser v. State (Ark.) 87 S. W. 
 635: State v. Prater, .52 W. Va. 132, 43 
 S. E. 220. 
 
 4C(Dllins v. State. 88 Ga. 347. 14 S. E. 
 474; Nicholson v. State, 117 Ala. 32. 23 
 So. 792; Ritzman v. People, 110 111. 362; 
 State v. Penney. 113 Iowa, 691, 84 N. 
 W. 509 ; State v. Ross, 29 Mo. 32 ; State 
 V. Davis, 29 Mo. 391 ; State v. Edwards, 
 126 N. C. 1051, 35 S. E. 540: Carlisle v. 
 State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 537, 21 S. W. 
 358. 
 
 And proof tending to show a con- 
 spiracy to kill does not make it the duty 
 of the jury in a prosecution for the kill- 
 ing to convict of murder in the first 
 degree, or to acquit, where there is also 
 proof tending to show that the accused 
 was present aiding and abetting what- 
 ever was done at the time of the homi- 
 cide, since that places him in the same 
 situation as though he had performed 
 the act causing the death. State v. 
 Robinson. 12 Wash. 491, 41 Pac. 884. 
 
 sCollins y. State, 88 Ga. 347, 14 S. 
 E. 474; Benge v. Com. 92 Ky. 1, 17 S. 
 W. 146; Com. v. Roberts, 108 Mass. 296; 
 State v. Fley, 2 Brev. 338, 4 Am. Dec. 
 583. 
 
§ 41] PARTICIPAN'HS IN THE CRIME. 51 
 
 acting together against another, a reasonable doubt as to which of 
 them did the act which caused the death of the other does not en- 
 title both to an acquittal.® And a person charged as principal in 
 the first degree in a homicide, if properly indicted, cannot take ad- 
 vantage of defective averments against those indicted as principals 
 in the second degree.'' So, while the common law made some dis- 
 tinction between the offense of a principal and that of an accessory, 
 it was chiefly with reference to the mode of proceeding against them ; 
 it did not attempt to classify the offense of an accessory differently 
 from that of the principal, or to make a difference in the punish- 
 ment imposed.® It merely required that one proceeded against as 
 principal must be charged as such, and one proceeded against as ac- 
 cessory must be charged as such; a person could not be indicted as 
 one and charged as the other.® And principals and aiders and abet- 
 ters and accessories are grouped together in the statutes with rela- 
 tion to homicide and other criminal acts, generally, without any 
 distinction as to their punishment or the nature of their offense.^" 
 The guilt of a person who aids or abets in the commission of a crime, 
 however, must be determined upon the facts which show the part 
 he had in it, and does not depend upon the degree of another's guilt. ^ ^ 
 And one cannot be held responsible for a homicide committed by an- 
 other in the absence of anything to show consent, connivance, or 
 knowledge. ^ ^ And a person aiding and abetting a homicide, acting 
 in sudden heat and passion, is gnailty of manslaughter only, though 
 the person who struck the fatal blow was actuated by malice, and 
 was, therefore, guilty of murder.^' And to commit murder or to 
 be an accessory to it are different and distinct offenses, and since 
 the courts of the United States are only authorized to try and pun- 
 ish such crimes as Congress, expressly or by necessary implication, 
 
 estate v. White, 138 N. C. 704, 51 loPeople v. Mather. 4 Wend. 229, 21 
 
 S. E. 44. Am. Dec. 122; Sage v. State, 127 Ind. 15, 
 
 TState V. Davis, 29 Mo. 391. 26 N. E. 667. 
 
 sPeople V. Mather, 4 Wend. 229, 21 The distinction between accessories 
 
 Am. Dec. 122; Usselton v. People, 149 before the fact and principals was re- 
 
 111. 612, 36 N. E. 952. tained in England up to a late date. 
 
 9State V. Blackman, 35 La. Ann. 483; Usselton v. People, 149 111. 612, 36 N. E. 
 
 State V. Desmond, 5 La. Ann. 398; 952. 
 
 Hughes V. State, 12 Ala. 458; Josephine iiState v. Smith, 100 Iowa,, 1, 69 N.^ 
 
 V. State, 39 Miss. 613; State v. Wyckoff, W. 269. 
 
 31 N. J. L. 65; Reg. v. Fallon, 9 Cox, C. i2Perguson v. State, 141 Ala. 20, 37 
 
 C. 242. Contra, Yoe v. People, 49 111. So. 448; State v. Fuller, 125 Iowa, 212, 
 
 410. 100 N. W. 1114; Cecil v. State, 44 Tex. 
 
 The distinction between principal in Crim. Rep. 450, 72 S. W. 197. 
 
 the first degree and principal in the sec- is Arnold v. Com. 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1566, 
 
 ond degree in homicide was merely one 55 S. W. 894. 
 of fact, and is no longer recognized. 
 State V. Green. 4 Strobh. L. 128. 
 
52 HOMICIDE. [1 41 
 
 has designated and to which it has affixed known and certain pen- 
 alties, in the absence of an act of Congress providing for the punish- 
 ment of an accessory before the fact to murder, an indictment there- 
 for will not lie, since the Federal courts have no common-law juris- 
 diction. ^ * 
 
 II. Pkincipals in the piest degeee. 
 
 42. Who are — A principal in the first degree is one who is the 
 actor or actual perpetrator of the deed,^ either acting personally, 
 or through an innocent agent. ^ It is not necessary that a principal 
 in the first degree in homicide should have committed the act with 
 his own hands, or been actually present when the offense was con- 
 summated ; for if one lay poison purposely for another, who takes it 
 and is killed, he who laid the poison, though absent when it was 
 taken, is a principal in the first degrea^ So it is with one who 
 turns out a wild beast with intent to kill anyone whom the animal 
 may attack.* Either actual or constructive presence is sufficient.^ 
 And if one acts through the medium of an innocent'^ or insane agent,'' 
 or a slave,* he is guilty as principal in the first degree. So, if a 
 child under the age of discretion, or any other instrument excused 
 from responsibility for his actions by defect of understanding, 
 ignorance of the fact, or other cause, be incited to the commission 
 
 iiUnited States v. Ramsay, Hempst. Reg. v. Mazeau, 9 Car. & P. 676; Reg. v. 
 481, Fed. Cas. No. 16,115. Michael, 9 Car. & P. 356, 2 Moody, C. 
 
 11 Hale, P. C. 233, 615; Red v. State, C. 120; Collins v. State, 3 Heisk. 14; 
 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 667, 73 Am. St. Rep. Com. v. Hill, 11 Mass. 136; Adams v. 
 965, 47 S. W. 1003; Horton v. Com. 99 People, 1 N. Y. 173. 
 Va. 848, 38 S. E. 184. Where one person gives poison to an- 
 
 2Red V. State, supra. other to give to a third person, and the 
 
 sVaux's Case, 4 Coke, 44 b; Fost. C. second, not knowing it to be poison, 
 L. 349 ; Rex v. Harley, 4 Car. & P. 369 ; gives it to a third, who takes it and dies 
 Re Burr, 4 Cranch, 492, Appx., 2 L. ed. of it, the second person is guilty of no 
 695, Appx. ; Anonymous, J. Kelyng, 52. offense, but the first who procured the 
 And see Green v. State, 13 Mo. 382; poison to be taken is a murderer. 
 Collins V. State, 3 Heisk. 14; People v. Queen v. Saunders, 2 Plowd. 474. 
 Bush, 4 Hill, 133; Reg. v. Williams, 1 71 Hale, P. C. 19; 4 Bl. Com. 23; Rex 
 Car. & K. 589, 1 Den. C. C. 39; Reg. v. v. Giles, 1 Moody, C. C. 166; Reg. v. 
 Michael, 2 Moody, C. C. 120. Tyler, 8 Car. & P. 616; Anonymous, J. 
 
 In Mitchell v. Com. 33 Gratt. 845, it is Kelyng, 52; Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio 
 held that one of three persons who went St. 165. 
 
 together to rob a store, who was posted sRerry v. State, 10 Ga. 511. 
 some distance therefrom to watch, while A wife who conspires with a servant 
 the other two obtained admittance and to kill her husband is guilty of petit 
 killed tlio owner and robbed the store, treason where the husband is killed pur- 
 is a principal in the first degree in the suant to the conspiracy, though the kill- 
 crime, where he shared the booty. ing was in her absence; but the rule 
 
 *Fost. C. L. 349 ; 1 Hale, P. C. 514. would be different if she had conspired 
 
 sKing v. Gordon, 1 Leach, C. L. 518. with a stranger. Saunders's Case. 3 
 
 6Reg. v. Clifford, 2 Car. & K. 202; Dyer, 332a. 
 
§ 42] PARTICIPANTS IN THE CRIME. 53 
 
 of murder, the inciter, though absent when the act "was committed, 
 is ex necessitate liable for the act of his agent, and a principal in 
 the first degree.® But if the instrument be aware of the conse- 
 quences of his act, he is a principal in the first degree, and the em- 
 ployer, if he be absent when the act is committed, is an accessory 
 before the fact.'^*' A nonresident principal, though at the time an 
 inhabitant of a foreign state, may be liable for his agent's criminal 
 acts in a particular jurisdiction.^^ 
 
 43. Compelling or soliciting suicide — Forcing a person to do an 
 act which causes his death renders the death the guilty deed of him 
 who compelled the deceased to do the act, making him a principal 
 in the first degree.^ Thus, forcing poison down one's throat, or 
 compelling him by force or violence to swallow it, is an administering 
 of poison rendering the person doing it guilty of murder as principal, 
 if death ensues.^ And this is the rule where he was present at 
 the time the poison was taken, participating by persuasion, force, 
 or threats in the taking, though he did not furnish it.^ Likewise, 
 if a person attacked by another throws himself, for escape, into a 
 river from an apprehension of immediate violence, which is well- 
 grounded and justified by the circumstances, and is drowned, the 
 person attacking him is guilty of murder as principal.* And the 
 rule ia the same where the person attacked or intimidated leaps or 
 jumps from a car while in motion, the circumstances being such as 
 would have caused a prudent man to do so, where the jump causes 
 his death. ® The reason to apprehend violence in such case, however, 
 must have been such that the step leading to death was one which 
 a reasonable man might take, though the circumstances need not 
 be such as to satisfy the jury that there was no other way of escape." 
 And merely soliciting another to commit a homicide or suicide, 
 where the solicitation was not complied with, is not indictable as an 
 attempt to kill, or to administer poison. ''^ But a direct solicitation 
 to commit a homicide, and an offer of money as a reward for its 
 
 9Fost. C. L. 340; 1 East, P. C. 118; 1 lAdams v. People, 109 111. 444, 50 
 
 Hawk, P. C. chap. 31 § 7 ; King v. Pal- Am. Eep. 617 ; State v. Shelledy, 8 Iowa, 
 
 mer, 1 Bos. & P. N. R. 96, 2 Leach, C. 477. 
 
 L. 978; Reg. v. Michael; Reg. v. Clif- sBlackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146. 
 
 ford; Com. v. Hill; and Collins v. State, 3 Ibid. 
 
 supra. And see Rex v. Mears, 1 Bost. 4Reg. v. Pitts, Car. & M. 284. 
 
 L. Rep. 205. BAdams v. People, 109 111. 444, 50 Am. 
 
 loRex V. Stewart, Russ. & R. C. C. Rep. 617. 
 
 363. Or, if he be present, a principal estate v. Shelledy, 8 Iowa, 477. 
 
 in the second degree. Fost. C. L. 349. 7Stabler v. Com. 95 Pa. 318, 40 Am. 
 
 11 Wharton, Crim. Law, 7th ed. § Rep. 653; Com. v. Dennis, 105 Mass. 162. 
 210m. 
 
64 HOMICIDE. [§ 43 
 
 commission, constitute an act done or a step taken in the direction 
 of the crime, and is an offense at common law, though the solicitation 
 was not complied with. * The general question of liability for doing 
 an act which causes another to do an act causing the latter's death 
 is cpnsidered in a previous chapter.** 
 
 44. Joint participation — Two persons acting independently may 
 contribute to the death of another, so that each will be guilty of the 
 homicide;' and one who, with a deadly weapon, attempts to strike 
 a person who is at the same time struck by another with a deadly 
 weapon, death resulting, is a joint principal in the offense.^ And 
 where a fight occurred between two persons, and a third took part 
 in it in favor of one of them, and both inflicted injuries upon the 
 other by blows and kicks, and the latter died, the cause of death 
 being a rupture of an artery in the head caused by the blows or 
 kicks received from them, both are to be regarded as equally guilty 
 of causing death. ^ So, a person may be criminally responsible as 
 principal for homicide when death resulted from the joint negli- 
 gence of himself and another.* And joint principals may be con- 
 victed of different degrees." Where two persons acted independent- 
 ly, however, each can be held responsible only for the result of his 
 o^vn acts, and unless such acts contributed to the death, the doer is 
 not responsible for the homicide.* Death must have ensued as the 
 result of the act of the person sought to be charged.'^ And though 
 two persons simultaneously assault another, and one of them causes 
 his death, the other is not criminally responsible where there was 
 no mutual understanding that they would injure the person killed, 
 and the slayer acted without the knowledge or participation of the 
 other.* And where two persons each shot at another at the same 
 moment, and the jury in a prosecution for the killing are doubtful 
 which of the two shots proved fatal, they cannot infer that the shot 
 
 sCom. V. Randolph, 146 Pa. 83. 28 Am. 24 S. W. 409; People v. Lewis, 124 Gal. 
 
 St. Rep. 782, 23 Atl. 388. o.'il , 45 L.R.A. 783, 57 Pac. 470. 
 
 9See sMpra, chapter IV., § 22. 7Walker v. State, 116 Ga. 537, 67 
 
 iPeople V. Lewis, 124 Cal. 551, 45 L.R.A. 426, 42 S. E. 787. 
 
 L.R.A. 783, 57 Pac. 470. Evidence that a third person cursed 
 
 2Kiiig V. State, 21 Ga. 220. And see the deceased, and said deceased had 
 
 Fisher v. State, 10 Lea, 151 ; Jordan v. sworn to a lie, and called upon the ae- 
 
 State, 82 Ala. 1, 2 So. 460; State v. cused to prove it, and that deceased 
 
 Gray, 116 Iowa, 231, 89 N. W. 987. knocked accused down and the third 
 
 sPeople V. Weber, 66 Cal. 392, 5 Pac. person threatened to kill deceased but 
 
 679. was prevented from shooting, and that 
 
 4Queen v. Lodger, 2 Post. & F. 857 ; accused then killed deceased, does not 
 
 Reg. V. Haines, 2 Car. & K. 368. show that accused and the third person 
 
 BSalisbury's Case, 1 Plowd. 100; were aiding and abetting each other. 
 
 Wharton, Crim. Laws, S§ 434, 3199. State v. Matthews, 78 N. C. 523. 
 
 sWilson v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) sWaybright v. State, 56 Tnd. 122. 
 
§ 44] PARTICIPANTS IN THE CRIME. 55 
 
 was fired by either one or the other of the two, or that the killing 
 was wilful, deliberate, and premeditated, constituting murder in 
 the first degree.® Biit a person actually present assisting to the ex- 
 t(!nt of his ability in the accomplishment of a homicide is gTiilty 
 as principal in the first degree, without reference to the extent or 
 effectiveness of the assistance rendered by him. ^ " 
 
 If a husband and wife jointly commit a murder, they have been 
 held to be coprincipals, as the doctrine of presumed coercion does 
 not apply to murder. ^ ^ And so she may be convicted as accessory 
 before the fact. ^ ^ But the better view is to require evidence to show 
 independent consent on the part of the wife. ^ ^ And where a husband 
 and wife commit a. homicide jointly, whether she is entitled to the 
 legal presumption of having been under his coercion or not, she is 
 not entitled to an acquittal on that ground, where the jury find a 
 verdict of assault only, since for an assault the wife is pvmishable 
 as well as the hiisband. ^* 
 
 III. Peincipals Tiy^ the second degree. 
 
 45. Who are, generally — Principals in the second degree are those 
 who are actually or constructively present, aiding and abetting in 
 the commission of the criminal act in question, but not actively par- 
 ticipating in it. ^ And anyone who is present at the time of the 
 commission of the act by another, encouraging or inciting the same 
 by words, gestures, looks, or signs, or who in any manner or by any 
 means countenances or approves the same, is, in law, deemed an 
 aider and abetter.^ And to aid and abet in the commission of a 
 crime consists in being present and doing some act which renders 
 aid to the perpetrator.^ To constitute principals in the second de- 
 gree there must be, in the first place, a participation in the act com- 
 
 sPeople V. Woody^ 45 Cal. 289. And an indictment charging that two 
 
 loTerritoiy v. MeGinnis, 10 N. M. men, while in the perpetration of a 
 
 269, 61 Pac. 208. felony, made a premeditated and mali- 
 
 I'lReg. V. Manning, 2 Car. & K. 903. (^'""^ assault upon a third person with 
 
 I2lbid deadly weapons with specific intent 
 
 i3See Reg. v. Smith, 8 Cox, C. C. 27; \^^^ "^^^ 1"^: ^"f *?** ^''^ ^?""^ 
 
 x, ii7„,j D n„„ n n oo/i which caused his death was inflicted 
 
 Reg V. Wardroper, 8 Cox, C. C 284. ^^.^^ .^^^^,. ^^ ^.,j ^^^ ^^ ^^^^ ^^^ 
 
 i4Reg. V. Cruse, 8 Car. & P. 541. ^.j^^^ ^.^^ ^^.^^^ ^^^^^ yres^nt aiding and 
 
 lUsselton v. People, 149 111. 612, 36 abetting, charges the latter as principal, 
 
 N. E. 952; Tudor v. Com. 19 Ky. L. Rep. ^nd not merely as accessory. State v. 
 
 1039, 43 S. W. 187; State v. Blackman, ^gg^ 91 jo^a, 499, 60 N. W."ll9. 
 
 35 La. Ann. 483; Brown v. Perkins, 1 2Brown v. Perkins, 1 Allen, 89; 
 
 Allen, 89; Red v. State, 39 Tex. Grim. Hilmes v. Stroebel, 59 Wis. 74, 17 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 667, 73 Am. St. Rep. 965, 47 S. 539: Rhinehart v. Whitehead, 64 Wis. 
 
 W. 1003; Horton v. State, 99 Va. 848, 42, 24 N. W. 401. 
 
 38 S. E. 184. N sstate v. Cox, 65 Mo. 29. 
 
56 HOMICIDE. 
 
 mitted; and, in the second place, presence, either actual or con- 
 structive, at the time of its commission.* To render one responsible 
 as a principal in the second degree, however, there must be a re- 
 sponsible principal in the first degree; one cannot be an aider or 
 abetter of an irresponsible principal; and if a principal in a trans- 
 action be not liable, another cannot be charged merely for aiding 
 and abetting him, unless the other does .acts himself which render 
 him liable as principal.^ There can be no aider or abetter to an 
 insane principal;*' for whoever acts with an insane principal in a 
 crime becomes himself principal.'^ Whether, in fact, violence re^ 
 suiting in death was done by one or more than one, and whether they 
 all acted together with a common purpose to do violence or to see 
 it done, or to aid and encourage the doing of it, or to lend assistance 
 should it become necessary, are all proper inquiries for the jury in 
 a prosecution for the homicide. ® 
 
 46. Distinction between the two degrees; when important. — .The dis- 
 tinction between principals in the first and second degree, it has 
 been said, is a distinction without a difference; and, therefore, it 
 need not be made in indictments. ^ Such is only the case, however, 
 where the punishment is the same for the two divisions. ^ But where, 
 by particular statute, the punishment is different, then principals 
 in the second degree must be indicted specially, as aiders and abet- 
 ters.* So far as concerns murder, however, it is to be noticed that 
 if in the indictment several be charged as principals, one as prin- 
 cipal perpetrator, and the others as aiding and abetting, it is not 
 material which of them be charged as principals in the first degree, 
 as having given the mortal blow; for the mortal injury given by 
 any one of those present is, in contemplation of law, the injury of 
 each and every one of them.* 
 
 47. Degrees of homicide to which applicable. — The position has been 
 taken that aiding and abetting a homicide involves conscious action 
 in aid of a predetermined act, and that a person cannot be held 
 
 4See infra, §§ 48, 49. 22 Hawk. P. 0. Chap. 25, § 64; 
 
 BUnited States v. Libby, 1 Woodb. & Mackalley's Case, 9 Coke 67b; Fost. C. 
 
 M. 221, Fed. Cas. No. 15,597; Benge v. L. 345. 
 Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1466, 71 S. W. 648. 31 East, P. C. 348, 350. See Easniok 
 
 6Keg. V. Tyler, 8 Car. & P. 616. v. Com. 2 Va. Cas. 356; Huflfman v. 
 
 7See supra, chapter IV., § 21. Com. 6 Rand. (Va.) 685. 
 
 8 Amos V. State, 83 Ala. 1, 3 Am. St. 4 State v. Mairs, 1 N. J. L. 453; Fost. 
 
 Rep. 682, 3 So. 749 ; Thomas v. State, 130 C. L. 551 ; State v. Fley, 2 Brev. 338, 4 
 
 Ala. 62, 30 So. 391; People v. Moran, Am. Dec. 583; King v. Borthwick, 1 
 
 144 Cal. 48, 77 Pac. 777. Dougl. K. B. 207, 1 East, P. C. 350. 
 
 iState V. Fley, 2 Brev. 338, 4 Am. Dec. 
 583; State v. Green, 4 Strobh. L. 128; 
 State V. Davis, 29 Mo. 391. 
 
§ 47] PARTICIPANTS IN THE CRIME. 57 
 
 responsible for a homicide resulting from tlie act of another unless 
 the act causing death was deliberate, and not done on a sudden im- 
 pulse.^ But it is now well settled that there may be principals in 
 the second degree in voluntary manslaughter,^ and an indictment 
 will lie for being present, aiding and abetting in manslaughter, as 
 well as in murder.^ And under an indictment for aiding and abet- 
 ting murder in the first degree, there may be a conviction of aiding 
 and abetting manslaughter.* And a conviction may be had for aid- 
 ing and abetting murder, though the principal was convicted of man- 
 slaughter only.® But to constitute a person guilty of voluntary man- 
 slaughter as aider or abetter the killing must have been wilfully and 
 feloniously committed by his associates or some of them in a sudden 
 affray, or in the sudden heat of passion without previous malice, 
 and not in their necessary, or apparently necessary, self-defense.^ 
 These rules apply solely, however, to voluntary manslaughter; there 
 can be no aider or abetter in the commission of involuntary man- 
 slaughter.'' A person will not be held responsible for the act of an- 
 other causing death, unless such act was designed, either directly or 
 consequentially, to hurt or injure someone. ® And where the homicide 
 was justifiable because committed in self-defense, or in defense of 
 others, or to prevent a breach of the peace, aid rendered in further- 
 ance of such purposes does not impose criminal responsibility as 
 principal in second degree upon the person rendering it.^ 
 
 48. Presence When previous complicity between the parties is 
 
 not established, to hold one responsible for a homicide committed by 
 
 iKing V. Plummer, 12 Mod. 627. sgtate v. Putnam, 18 S. C. 175, 44 Am. 
 
 And where a homicide is committed Rep. 569; State v. Gray, supra. 
 
 by one of several persons, and one of ^Goflf v. Prime; State v. Coleman; 
 
 them had reason and provocation which and Hagan v. State, — supra. 
 
 would reduce it to manslaughter, and it BGoins v. State, 46 Ohio St. 471, 21 
 
 cannot be shown which of them inflicted N. E. 476. 
 
 the fatal blow, neither of them can be ewheeler v. Com. 27 Ky. L. Rep. 1090, 
 
 convicted of murder without proof of a 87 S. W. 1106. 
 
 common design to kill, and neither can TAdams v. State, 65 Ind. 566. 
 
 be convicted of manslaughter without sKing v. Plummer, 12 Mod. 627. 
 
 proof of a common design to inflict un- But a person may be held responsible 
 
 lawful violence. Reg. v. Turner, 4 Fost. for a murder resulting from the act of 
 
 & F. 339. another, if the act was done with in- 
 
 2State' v. Prater, 52 W. Va. 132, 43 S. tent to commit a felonious act, though 
 
 E. 230; State v. Coleman, 5 Port. (Ala.) it was not directed against any par- 
 
 32- Goff V. Prime, 26 Ind. 196; State ticular person. Ibid. 
 
 V. Gray, 116 Iowa, 231, 89 N. W. 987; sBosse v. Com. 13 Ky. L. Rep. 217, 16 
 
 Polly v. Com. 15 Ky. L. Rep. 502, 24 S. S. W. 713; Goins v. State, 46 Ohio St. 
 
 W. 7; Com. V. Roberts, 108 Mass. 296; 471, 21 N. E. 476; Leslie v. State, 42 
 
 Hagan v. State, 10 Ohio St. 459. And Tex. Crim. Rep. 65, 57 S. W. 659; Mc- 
 
 see People v. Jamarillo, 57 Cal. Ill; Mahon v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 540, 
 
 Wheeler v. Com. 27 Ky. L. Rep. 1090, 87 81 S. W. 296. 
 S. W. 1106; Horton v. Com. 99 Va. 848, 
 38 S. E. 184. 
 
58 HOMICIDE. [§ 48 
 
 another, he must have been present participating in the act causing 
 death. ^ And a person who was not present, or in sight, during a 
 conflict between his brother and another, and who, upon arriving 
 at the scene and finding his brother mortally wounded, struck his 
 brother's assailant, who was also mortally wounded, a blow which was 
 not mortal, is not an aider or abetter, and is not guilty even of man- 
 slaughter, though he might be guilty of an assault.'"' And it cannot 
 be assumed without proof in a prosecution for aiding and abetting 
 a homicide that the accused was present or aided or assisted in the 
 act. ^ But while presence at the time and place of the homicide is 
 necessary to constitute one a principal in the second degree, it is 
 constructive, and not actvial, presence which is required.* And one 
 who is sufficiently near to encourage the principal actor by his pres- 
 ence, and assist him should assistance become necessary, is a prin- 
 cipal in the second degree.^ And this is so though his assistance 
 was not actually called into requisition.* So, if he be outside the 
 house, watching to prevent surprise, or the like, while his compan- 
 ions are in the house committing the felony, such constructive pres- 
 ence is sufficient to make him a principal in the second degree.^ 
 One who keeps guard while others act, thus assisting them, is, in 
 
 iRhodes v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. necessary condition of guilt as an aider 
 
 332, 45 S. W. 1009; McDonald v. State, and abetter, is favorable, and not pre.j- 
 
 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 4, 79 S. W. 542; iidicial to the accused. Harrison v. 
 
 Barnett v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. State, 83 Ga. 129, 9 S. E. 542. 
 459, 80 S. W. 1013; Bowen v. State sCollins v. State, supra; MeCartv v. 
 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 82 S. W. 520; Green State. 26 Miss. 299; State v. Nargash- 
 
 V. State, 13 Mo. 382; Queen v. Curtley. ian, 26 R. I. 299, 106 Am. St. Rep. 715, 
 
 27 U. C. Q. B. 613. And see Smith v. 58 Atl. 953; Grimsinger v. State, 44 Tex. 
 
 Com. 15 Ky. L. Rep. 357, 23 S. W. 588. Crim. Rep. 1, 69 S. W. 583; Hicks v. 
 
 sRhodea v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. United States, 150 U. S. 442, 37 L. ed. 
 
 332, 45 S. W. 1009. 1137, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 144. And see 
 
 sKing V. Borthwick, 1 Dougl. K. B. Wheeler v. Com. 27 Ky. L. Rep. 1090, 
 
 207. 87 S. W. 1106. 
 
 But an instruction in a prosecution The act of a husband in giving his 
 
 for homicide against several, that if two servant a pistol and showing him how 
 
 named persons, or either of them, were to use it, and directing him to go to the 
 
 present aiding or assisting in the kill- house and shoot his wife, which the 
 
 ing, the jury must convict, will be taken servant did, renders the husband at least 
 
 to mean that they must convict such as a, principal in the second degree, if not 
 
 were thus present assisting, and is not an actor or absolute perpetrator of the 
 
 subject to the objection that it declares crime, though he remained at a building 
 
 all guilty under the indictment if any about 50 yards from the house. Collins 
 
 one of them was present. State v. Tay- v. State, supra. 
 lor, 21 Mo. 477. sMcCarty v. State, supra. 
 
 4Collins V. State, 88 Ga. 347, 14 S. 7Fost. C. L. 347, 350. And see King 
 
 E. 474; Plummer v. Com. 1 Bush, 76; v. Borthwick, 1 Dougl. K. B. 207; The 
 
 State v. Douglass, 34 La. Ann. 523; Coal-Heavers' Case, 1 Leach, C. L. 66; 
 
 Horton v. Com. 99 Va. 848, 38 S. E. 184. 2 Hawk. P. C. chap. 29, «S 7, 8, 1 Rus- 
 
 And a charge to the jury in a prose- sell, Crimes, 31; 1 Hale, P. C. 555; Rex 
 
 cution for homicide, making presence at v. Gosrevly, Russ. & R. C. C. 343; Rex 
 
 the time and place of the homicide a. v. Owen, 1 Moody, C. C. 96; State v. 
 
§ 48] PAKTICIPANTS IN THE CRIME. 59 
 
 the eye of the law, present and responsible, as if actually present.* 
 And a person combining with others for the purpose of killing a 
 certain person, who was near enough at the time of the killing to 
 give aid and assistance should an attempt be made to rescue the per- 
 son sought to be killed, is a principal in the killing, though he was 
 upon the opposite side of a river from the place of the killing and 
 in a different state.® Nor is presence during the whole of the trans 
 action necessary.*" And an active participant in the common de- 
 sign, who was doing his part at the time for its furtherance, is a 
 principal though he was not present when the homicide was com- 
 mitted.'^ * And one who, pursuant to a previous arrangement to rob 
 a earri(>r on a road between two places, sigjialed his confederates 
 from a point many miles away when the carrier started out on his 
 trip, pursuant to which signal they attacked, and, in the attempt 
 to rob, killed him, is a principal in the homicide, at least in the 
 second degree.*^ Yet, although an act be committed in pursuance 
 of a previous concerted plan between the parties, those who are not 
 present, or so near as to be able to afford aid and assistance at the 
 time when the offense is committed, are not, subject to the above 
 qualifications, principals, but accessories before the fact."'* And to 
 be present aiding and abetting a homicide the abetter must be in a 
 
 Coleman, 5 Port. (Ala.) 32: Stipp v. And see Dean v. State, 85 Miss. 40, 37 
 
 State, 11 Ind. 62; State v. Walker, 98 So. 501. 
 
 Mo. 95, 9 S. W. 646, 11 S. W. 1133; So, one who, immediately after an- 
 
 Com. V. Knapp, 9 Peck. 496. 20 Am. other had sent his kinsman » telegram 
 
 Dec. 491: State v. Hardin. 19 JST. C. (2 warning him of his being pursued by 
 
 Dev. & B. L.) 407: Martin v. State. 44 armed men on horseback, sent a tele- 
 
 Tex. Crim. Eep. 279, 70 S. W. 973. gram to the operator who was to receive 
 
 This does not, however, apply where the message of warning, and whose duty 
 
 the common purpose is a mere mis- it was to deliver it at once, and who 
 
 deiMoiinor. I?eg. v. Skeet, 4 Fost. & F. was a personal friend of the sender of 
 
 931. the latter telegram, requesting delay in 
 
 s State V. Town. VVrighl (Ohio) 75: the delivery of the former message, 
 Stephens v. State, 42 Ohio St. 150; through such delay making the escape 
 Breese v. State, 12 Ohio St. 146, 80 Am. of the person to whom it was addressed 
 Dec. 340: Starks v. State, 137 Ala. 9, from the armed horsemen more difficult, 
 34 So 687; Doan v. State. 26 Ind. 495; and rendering more easy and certain 
 Thompson v. Com. 1 Met. (Ky.) 13; the accomplishment of the pursuers' in- 
 State v. Douglass, 34 La. Ann. 523: tent to kill him, which intention was 
 Com. V. Lucas, 2 Allen, 170 ; State v. known to the sender at the time of send- 
 Squaires 2 Nev. 226 ; Selvidge v. State, ing such telegram, is an aider and abet- 
 .30 Tex 60- Grimsinger v. State, 44 Tex. ter of the murder of the person warned, 
 Crim Rep' 1 69 S. W. 583. committed by the armed horsemen. 
 
 9Hatfield v. Com. 11 Ky. L. Rep. 408, State ex rel, Atty Gen. v. Tally, 102 
 
 12 S W 309. ■ -^la. 25, 15 So. 722. 
 
 loRex V Bingley, Russ & E. C. C. 440. isRex v. Soares, Russ. & R. C. C. 25; 
 
 See 2 East P C 768 Rex v. Davis, Russ & R. C. C. 113; Rex 
 
 iilhnHps v.'Stete, 26 Tex. App. 228, v. Else, Russ & R. C C. 142; Rex v. 
 
 8 Am. St. Rep. 471, 9 S. W. 557; State Badcock, Russ & f- CC 249; Rex v. 
 
 V. Forsha, 190 Mo. 296, 88 S. W. 746. Manners, 7 Car. & P. 801. 
 
 i2State V. Hamilton, 13 Nev. 386. 
 
60 HOMICIDE. n 48 
 
 position in -which he may actually aid the perpetrator; it is not 
 enough that he is at a place appointed, where the perpetrator er- 
 roneously supposes he might render aid. ^ * 
 
 49. Participation in the act ^Merely heing present at the time and 
 
 place of the offense does not constitute one a principal in the second 
 degree. There must have been knowledge of, and participation in, 
 the offense, at least to the extent of showing an intent to aid and 
 encourage the felonious purpose,^ particularly if the presence was 
 under restraint;^ though the presence of a person at a time and place 
 where a homicide was committed is a circumstance to he considered 
 in a prosecution for the homicide in determining whether or not 
 the accused was guilty of aiding and abetting it. * ]!Tor is mere con- 
 sent to, or approval of, the commission of the crime sufficient in the 
 absence of aid or encouragement;* nor is mere acquiescence or words 
 which amount to no more than a bare permission to commit it;^ 
 nor is a subsequent concealment of it ; ® nor the fact that the accused 
 engaged in an independent fight with others in company with the 
 
 14 Com. V. Knapp, 9 Pick. 496, 20 Am. denoe nor claim that the two acted to- 
 
 Dec. 491. gether in committing the offense. 
 
 iWatson V. State, 28 Tex. App. 34, Bennett v. State, 43 Tex. Grim. Rep. 
 
 12 S. W. 404; Wood v. State, 28 Tex. 241, 64 S. W. 254. 
 
 App. 14, 11 S. W. 678; Floyd v. State, sButler v. Com. 2 Duv. 435. And see 
 
 29 Tex. App. 349, 16 S. W. 188; Sharp McMahon v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 V. State, 29 Tex. App. 211, 15 S. W. 176; 540, 81 S. W. 296. 
 
 Walker v. State, 118 Ga. 10, 43 S. E. sgtate v. Maloy, supra; Burrell v. 
 
 856; Savage v. State, 18 Fla. 909; Cros- State, 18 Tex. 713. 
 
 by V. People, 189 111. 298, 59 N. E. 546; And his conduct at, and before, and 
 Wade V. State, 71 Ind. 535 ; State v. after, the commission of the act are eir- 
 Hildreth, 31 N. C. (9 Ired. L.) 440, 51 cumstanees from which his participa- 
 Am. Dec. 369; Jones v. People, 166 111. tion in the criminal Intent and design of 
 264, 46 N. E. 723; State v. Maloy, 44 his companions may be inferred. Bur- 
 Iowa, 104; Omer v. Com. 95 Ky. 353, 25 rell v. State, supra. 
 S. W. 594; Plummer v. Com. 1 Bush, 4State v. Orrick, 106 Mo. Ill, 17 S. 
 76; Jenkins v. Com. 8 Ky. L. Rep. 54, W. 176, 329; State v. Cox, 65 Mo. 29; 
 1 S. W. 154; Bosse v. Com. 13 Ky. L. Clem v. State, 33 Ind. 419; White v. 
 Rep. 217, 16 S. W. 713; Territory v. People, 81 111. 333; Jones v. People, 166 
 Lucero, 8 N. M. 543, 46 Pac. 18; Goins 111. 264, 46 N. E. 723; True v. Com. 90 
 V. State, 46 Ohio St. 457, 21 N. E. 476; Ky. 651, 14 S. W. 684; Omer v. Com. 
 Woolweaver v. State, 50 Ohio St. 277, 95 Ky. 353, 25 S. W. 594; Plummer v. 
 40 Am. St. Rep. 667, 34 N. E. 352; Com. 1 Bush, 76; Butler v. Com. 2 
 Cortez V. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 375, puy 435 
 
 66 S. W. 453; Connaughty v. State, 1 sFloyd v. State, 29 Tex. App. 349, 16 
 
 Wis. 159, 60 Am. Dec. 370; Reg. v. Price, g ^ ^gS; Smith v. State, 23 Tex. App. 
 
 8 Cox, C. C. 96. _ ggg 59 ^^ ^ 773 g g ^ 219; 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution TvT„if g:n„gy „ State 7 ' Tex Ann 302 • 
 
 for homicide treating the two defendants _ , , .= ;,,'", !, ^ m ' r^ ? t> ' 
 
 . ■ , .„ 4.. ° ;„„!„„ ^t (.!,„ Franklin v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 as principals in the commission of the ' i^ 
 
 offense, and directing the jury that if ^^^'ll.f^-^^\ „, ^,, „, ^ 
 they believe that one of them, under cir- «White v. People, 81 111. 333; Jones 
 
 cumstanees showing malice, killed the v- People, 166 111. 264, 46 N. E. 723; 
 
 deceased, either alone or acting with the State v. Kelly, 74 Iowa,, 589, 38 N. W. 
 
 other, to find him guilty of murder, is 503. And see Bird v. United States, 187 
 
 erroneous, where there was neither evi- U. S. 118, 47 L. ed. 100, 23 Sup. Ct. 
 
§ 49] PARTICIPANTS IN THE CRIME. 61 
 
 person killed. '^ And merely being present and failing to endeavor 
 to prevent a homicide or to apprehend the slayer, though highly 
 criminal, does not render one either a principal or an accessory;* 
 and the same rule applies to knowingly interfering to prevent others 
 from interfering to prevent a homicide," though if the surrounding 
 circumstances and the relations of the parties were such that mere 
 presence would afford aid and encouragement, it would be suffi- 
 cient.^" So, where one man shoots another, and two others are 
 with the one doing the shooting, it is murder in all, though the others 
 did nothing, where they came on purpose to countenance the evil 
 act. ^ ' But one cannot be held criminally responsible for a homicide 
 committed by another, where his only part in the difficulty consisted 
 in an effort to preserve the peace. ^ ^ So, the act must also be the 
 result of the confederacy; and if several are out for the purpose 
 of committing a felony, and, upon an alarm, run different ways, 
 and one of them maim a pursuer to avoid being taken, the others are 
 not to be considered principals in such act.^* Any participation, 
 
 Rep. 42; Floyd v. State; Noftsinger v. loLeslie v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 State; and Smith v. iState,— SMpra. 65, 57 S. W. 659; Omer v. Com. 95 Ky. 
 
 But evidence that the accused in a 353, 25 S. W. 594. 
 
 prosecution for homicide was the leader All persons who by their presence 
 
 of a band of men who captured others encourage a fight from which death en- 
 
 against whom they claimed a grievance ; sues to one of the combatants are 
 
 that the band afterwards killed one of guilty of manslaughter at least, al- 
 
 the captives; that the accused might though they neither said nor did any- 
 
 at any time have prevented the killing; thing. Rex v. Murphy, 6 Car. & P. 103. 
 
 that at the time it occurred he was nConingsmark's Case, 9 How. St. Tr. 
 
 across a river in another state, but near 77. 
 
 enough to give aid and assistance should i2Nicholson v. State, 117 Ala. 32, 23 
 
 an attempt be made to rescue the So. 792. 
 
 prisoners ; and that he afterwards ad- And one who believes another's life to 
 
 ministered an oath to each of the band be in danger from an attack threatened 
 
 that they would never reveal the action to be made on hiip by a third person 
 
 taken, — sufficiently shows his criminal has a right to procure a weapon for the 
 
 intent and his connection with the crime other with which to protect himself 
 
 as principal. Hatfield v. Com. 11 Ky. against such attack, and he has a right 
 
 L. Rep. 468, 12 S. W. 309. to go with him on the streets, and, in 
 
 iGoins V. State, 46 Ohio St. 457, 21 ease the other is attacked, he can act in 
 N. E. 476; Woolweaver v. State, 50 his defense, and if he does not par- 
 Ohio St. 277, 40 Am. St. Rep. 667, 34 ticipate with him in an attack upon the 
 N. E. 352. one who made the threats, he would not 
 
 sWynn v. State, 63 Miss. 260; People be guilty of any oflFense in case of the 
 
 v. Ah Ping, 27 Cal. 489; United States killing of such person by the person 
 
 V. Neverson, 1 Mackey, 152; Crosby v. threatened. Leslie v. State, 42 Tex. 
 
 People, 189 111. 298, 59 N. E. 546; Plum- Crim. Rep. 65, 57 S. W. 659. 
 
 mer v. Com. 1 Bush, 76; Butler v. Com. isRex v. White, Russ. & R. C. C. 99; 
 
 2 Dnv 435; True v. Com. 90 Ky. 651, 14 Rex v. Collison, 4 Car. &, P. 565: Reg. v. 
 
 S. W. 684; Burrell v. State, 18 Tex. Howell, 9 Car. & P. 437; Reg. v. Skeet, 
 
 713; Connaughty v. State, 1 Wis. 159, 4 Fost. & F. 931; Rex v. King, Russ. 
 
 60 Am. Dec. 370; Queen v. Curtley, 27 & R. C. C. 332; Rex v. M'Makm, Russ. 
 
 U C Q B 613 & R. C. C. 333, note; People v. Woody, 
 
 ■^Ramon V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 45 Cal. 289; People v. Leith 52 Cal. 
 
 68 S. W. 987. 251; Dyal v. State, 97 Ga. 428, 25 S. 
 
62 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 [§ 4» 
 
 however, in a general felonious plan, provided such participation be 
 concerted, and there be constructive presence, is enough to make a 
 man a principal in the second degree. ^ * And presence and partici- 
 pation are sufficient to warrant the admission in evidence of a con- 
 fession of the killing by the accused, unless something is shown 
 which exempts him from the rvile. ^ ^ And where the evidence tends 
 to convict a person as principal in the second degtee in homicide, 
 the fact that he had a lawful purpose in going to the place of the 
 killing at the time it occurred, though relevant and material in his 
 favor, is not conclusive of his innocence or of the absence of con- 
 spiracy on his part. ^ " Nor is it necessary that the aiding and abet- 
 ting should be confined to the act of inflicting the fatal blow; that 
 the alleged aider or abetter was engaged with the person who gave 
 the blow in a common illegal undertaking is sufficient. ^^ And his 
 subsequent acts are competent evidence of participation on his 
 part. '^^ And joining in the common design and being present for 
 the purpose of aiding if necessary to its accomplishment is all that 
 is required; actual participation is not essential.^® Nor is precon- 
 cert necessary to render one criminally responsible, where he was pres- 
 
 E. 319; Campbell v. People, 16 111. 17, 61 
 Am. Dec. 49 ; Com. v. Campbell, 7 Allen, 
 541, 83 Am. Dec. 705; People v. Knapp, 
 26 Mich. 112; Miller v. State, 15 Tex. 
 App. 125. 
 
 KKing V. Moore, 1 Leach, C. L. 314; 
 Rex V. Standley, Russ. & R. C. C. 305; 
 1 Russell, Crimes 24; Rex v. Passey, 7 
 Car. & P. 282; Rex v. Lockett, 7 Car. 
 & P. 300; Horton v. Com. 99 Va. 848, 38 
 S. E. 184; State v. Prater, 52 W. Va. 
 132, 43 S. E. 280. And see Thornton v. 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 65 S. W. 1105; 
 McMahon v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 540, 81 S. W. 296. 
 
 isWilliams v. State, 69 Ga. 11. 
 
 Instate V. Prater, supra. 
 
 iTStipp V. State, 11 Ind. 62; State v. 
 Maloy, 44 Iowa, 104; State v. Nargash- 
 ian, 26 R. I. 299, 106 Am. St. Rep. 715, 
 58 Atl. 953. And see Siebert v. People, 
 143 111. 571, 32 N. E. 431. 
 
 One who holds a candle while another 
 kills a third person with an ax in his 
 bed for the purpose of robbeiy is equally 
 a principal with the slaver, and a joint 
 indictment against the two is sufficient. 
 Ross V. Com. 10 Ky. L. Rep. 558, 9 S. 
 W. 707. 
 
 isWade v. State, 71 Ind. 535. 
 
 isState Y. Prater, 52 W. Va.. 132, 43 
 S. E. 230; Smith v. State, 136 Ala. 1, 34 
 
 So. 168i Buford v. State, 132 Ala. 6, 31 
 So. 714; Sloan v. Com. 15 Ky. L. Rep. 
 437, 23 S. W. 676; Chapman v. State, 
 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 328, 96 Am. St. Rep. 
 874, 65 S. W. 1098. 
 
 Proof of a conspiracy to kill, and 
 that one of the conspirators was in » 
 situation in which he might have given 
 aid to the perpetrator at the time of the 
 killing, raises a legal presumption that 
 he wa,s there to carry into effect the 
 preconcerted crime, easting upon him 
 the burden of proof to rebut the pre- 
 sumption by showing that he was there 
 for some other purpose. Com. v. 
 Knapp, 9 Pick. 495, 20 Am. Dee. 491. 
 
 And evidence in a prosecution for 
 homicide, that the accused grabbed at 
 the person who did the killing as he ad- 
 vanced upon the deceased, does not suf- 
 ficiently show an attempt to prevent 
 the homicide to overcome evidence tend- 
 ing to show malice on his part toward 
 the deceased, and that he conspired with 
 the slayer to bring on a difficulty, and 
 prepared for the occasion, so as to I'en- 
 der unjustified a holding by the jury 
 that he encouraged and abetted the 
 other in the attack. Alexander v. 
 State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 395, 49 S. W. 
 229, 50 S. W. 716. 
 
§ 49] PAKTICIPANTS IN THE CRliME. G3 
 
 eat aiding, abetting, encouraging, or sanctioning the unlawful act,^" 
 or ready to render assistance should it become necessary to the accom- 
 plishment of the desired end.^^ And that the alleged aider or abet- 
 ter took no part in the killing is immaterial where he provoked a 
 difficulty to the end that the killing might be accomplished. * * And 
 one may be held liable as a principal in homicide though he person- 
 ally took no part in the offense, when he purposely excited others 
 to commit it. ^ ^ So, a principal in a homicide need not be specifically 
 a ])arty to the killing if he is present consenting to the act by which 
 it is perpetrated in pursuance of his own design or the common de- 
 sign.^* And the fact that it is not known which of several persons 
 committed the fatal act is not material where it appears that the 
 person sought to be held responsible either did the act, or, being 
 present, advised, aided, or encouraged one of the others who did 
 it.^® And that the accused bought the weapon with which the killing 
 
 20Amos V. state, 83 Ala. 1, 3 Am. St. did the killing. Hicks v. United States, 
 Rep. 682, 3 So. 749; Jordan v. State, 82 150 U. S. 442, 37 L. ed. 1137, 14 Sup. 
 Ala. 1, 2 So. 460; Gibson v. State, 89 Ct. Rep. 144. 
 
 Ala. 121, 18 Am. St. Rep. 96, 8 So. 98; 22State v. Paxton, 126 Mo. 500, 29 S. 
 Thomas v. State, 124 Ala. 48, 27 So. 315; W. 705; Smith v. People, 1 Colo. 121 ; 
 Howard v. Com. 96 Ky. 19, 27 S. W. Miller v. State, 15 Tex. App. 125. 
 854; Combs v. Com. 14 Ky. L. Rep. 703, 23Spies v. People, 122 111. 1, 3 Am. St. 
 21 S. W. 353; Von Gundy v. Com. 11 Rep. 320, 12 N. E. 865, 17 N. E. 898: 
 Ky. L. Rep. 552, 12 S. W. 386; People United States v. Densmore (N. M.) 75 
 V. Carter, 96 Mich. 583, 56 N. W. 79; Pac. 31. 
 
 State V. Anderson, 89 Mo. 312, 1 S. W. But a direction to acquit a person en- 
 135. And see Loyd v. State, 46 Tex. gaged in a struggle with another when 
 Crim. Rep. 533, 81 S. W. 293 ; Kipper v. a bystander kills the other is properly 
 State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 377, 77 S. refused where it does not appear that 
 W. 6il. there was no prearrangement between 
 
 This rule is particularly applicable him and the bystander with reference to 
 in manslaughter, in which there need be the killing. Turner v. State, 97 Ala. 
 no appreciable time between the concur- 57, 12 So. 54. 
 
 ring of the intention to kill and the 2 4 Spies v. People, supra. And see 
 killing. People v. Jamarillo, 57 Cal. State v. MeKinzie. 102 Mo. 620, 15 S. 
 111. W. 149. 
 
 21 Amos V. State, supra; State v. Wal- But proof that a person conspired to 
 ker, 98 Mo. 95, 9 S. W. 646, 11 S. W. commit a murder subsequently perpe- 
 1133; People v. Keating, 61 Hun, 260, trated does not raise a legal presump- 
 16 N. Y. Supp. 748. tion of his having aided and abetted the 
 
 But while one who was present when murder, but is to be weighed as evidence 
 another committed a homicide, for the tending to prove that fact. Com. v. 
 purpose of aiding and abetting, advising, Knapp, 9 Pick. 495, 20 Am. Dee. 491. 
 or encouraging it, but who did not do 2 6Von Gundy v. Com. 11 Ky. L. Rep. 
 so because it was not necessary, the 552, 12 S. W. 386 ; Tudor v. Com. 19 Ky. 
 homicide having been committed with- L. Rep. 1039, 43 S. W. 187; Morris v. 
 out his assistance, would probably be Com. 10 Ky. L. Rep. 1004, 11 S. W. 295. 
 deemed guilty as an aider and abetter, But in the absence of proof of aiding 
 an instruction to that effect is errone- and abetting, or conspiracy, there must 
 ous in the absence of evidence of any be an acquittal. Campbell v. People, 16 
 previous conspiracy or arrangement be- 111. 17, 61 Am. Dee. 49; State v. Finley, 
 tween him and the person who actually 118 N. C. 1161, 24 S. E. 495. 
 
64 HOMICIDE. [§ 49 
 
 was done and delivered it to the slayer immediately before the kill- 
 ing is suificient. ^ * 
 
 50. Participation in criminal intent. — To hold a person responsible 
 for a homicide committed by another, as principal in the second de- 
 gree, or otherwise, it must appear that he participated not only in 
 the criminal act, but also in the criminal design of the person who 
 did the deed causing death ;^ or that, being aware of the malice or 
 criminal intent entertained by the principal in the first degree, he 
 aided, abetted, or encouraged him in the perpetration of the ojffense, 
 such abetting and encouraging, with knowledge, being equivalent to 
 legal malice or criminal intent on his part.^ His acts must have 
 been done with the intention of aiding, abetting, and encouraging 
 the homicide. ^ Presence and participation in the killing of a himian 
 being are not evidence of consent and concurrence in the perpetra- 
 tion of the act by a person charged with aiding and abetting in the 
 killing, unless he entertained or participated in the felonious design 
 of the person doing the killing.* And error in charging the jury 
 that a person connected with a homicide committed by another, but 
 not connected with the intent to kill, is guilty of murder, is ground 
 for a new trial, though the jury convicted him of manslaughter only. ^ 
 That he entertained an individual criminal intent, or intent to kill, 
 is not sufficient where he did no act which contributed to the killing.* 
 In every unlawful homicide the killing must be done by the party 
 charged or by another in complicity with him, or it must be the 
 
 26Collins V. state (Ala.) 34 So. 993. companies, not within the contemplation 
 
 iCom.v. Drew, 4 Mass. 391; Tanner V. of the parties, nor directly connected 
 
 State, 92 Ala. 1, 9 So. 613; Mickey v. with their unlawful act. Scott v. Scott, 
 
 Com. 9 Bush, 593; Bosse v. Com. 13 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 536, 81 S. W. 294. 
 Ky. L. Eep. 217, 16 S. W. 713; State v. sHicks v. United States, 150 U. S, 
 
 Howard, 112 N. C. 859, 17 S. E. 166; 442, 37 L. ed. 1137, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep, 
 
 Com. V. Neills, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 553; 144; Savage v. State, 18 Fla. 909; Wool- 
 
 Tharpe v. State, 13 Lea, 138; Leslie v. weaver v. State, 50 Ohio St. 277, 40 Am, 
 
 State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 65, 57 S. W. St. Rep. 667, 34 N. E. 352; Leslie v 
 
 659. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 65, 57 S. W, 
 
 2Mickey v. Com. and Tanner v. State, 659. 
 ■lupra; State v. Phillips, 118 Iowa, 660, If a gentleman has an affront given 
 
 !i2 N. W. 876; Snell v. State, 29 Tex. him which he does not resent, and one 
 
 App. 236, 25 Am. St. Rep. 723, 15 S. W. of his servants, without acquainting him 
 
 722; Renner v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. of his intention, procures a pistol and 
 
 Rep. 347, 65 8. W. 1102; Reg. v. Cruse, kills •the person giving the affront, the 
 
 8 Car. & P. 541. master not knowing of it, he is not 
 
 This refers to previous knowledge of criminally responsible for the act. 
 
 the intent to kill as distinguished from Coningsmark's Case, 9 How. St. Tr. 79. 
 present knowledge of the act of killing. 4Brown v. State, 28 Ga. 199; Bibby 
 
 Omer v. Com. 95 Ky. 353, 25 S. W. 594. v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 65 S. W. 193. 
 
 One who goes with another to arrest sBrown v. State, supra. 
 an alleged vagrant without lawful au- STharpe v. State, 13 Lea, 138; Manier 
 
 tbority is not an accomplice to a homi- v. State, 6 Baxt. 595 ; Anderson v. State, 
 
 cide committed by the person he ac- 119 Ga. 441, 46 S. E. 639; Mercersmith 
 
501 
 
 PARTICIPANTS IN THE CRIME. 
 
 65 
 
 natxtral and reasonable consequence of some unlawful or negligent 
 act in which the accused is at the time employed.^ One cannot be 
 held guilty of miirder as an aider and abetter where he acted upon 
 a sudden impulse, without malice on his part, and while wholly ig- 
 norant of malicious motives or felonious intent on the part of the 
 actual slayer. * It is a common design formed between two or more 
 men which renders one of them criminally responsible for a homicide 
 committed by the other, and not the independent resolutions of in- 
 dividuals acting alone and without agreement ; it is the same design 
 formed by both, and not by each for himself. ** And where two per- 
 sons engage in a fight, and another, without the knowledge, consent, 
 or connivance of either, inflicts a mortal wound upon one of them, 
 the other is not criminally responsible, where there was no arrange- 
 ment or conspiracy between him and the person doing the killing 
 at or before the time of the difficulty to do any wrongful act to the 
 deceased. ^ " And it is immaterial that the person sought to be held 
 criminally responsible was the aggressor in the original combat. ' ^ 
 To hold a person guilty as aider and abetter in homicide, therefore, 
 it is not only necessary that he should have aided or assisted in the 
 
 V. state, 8 Tex. App. 211; Miller v. 
 State, 15 Tex. App. 125; Wilson v. 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 24 S. W. 409; 
 Bowman v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 20 
 JS. W. 558. Contra, Beets v. State, 
 Meigs, 106. But this case was disap- 
 proved and in effect overruled in White 
 V. Conly, 14 Lea, 51, 52 Am. Rep. 157. 
 
 'Manier v. State, supra; Dyal v. 
 State, 97 Ga. 428, 25 S. E. 319. And 
 see SUte v. Finley, 118 N. C. 1161, 24 
 S. E. 495; People v. Fay, 70 Mich. 421, 
 38 N. W. 296. 
 
 sMickey v. Com. 9 Bush, 593. 
 9 Jones V. State, 70 Miss. 401, 12 So. 
 444; Cecil v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 450, 72 S. W. 197. And see Anonymous, 
 S Mod. 164. 
 
 And where a man attacks two others 
 and shoots and injures one of them, who 
 ■calls upon the other to shoot their as- 
 sailant, and the latter omits to shopt 
 but attempts to strike the assailant, 
 but is prevented from doing so by by- 
 standers, he does not by his conduct ren- 
 der himself responsible for the shooting 
 of such assailant done subsequently by 
 his wounded comrade after the assailant 
 had changed his position and was retir- 
 ing. Spencer v. State, 77 Ga. 155, 4 Am. 
 St. Rep. 74, 3 S. E. 661. 
 
 lOTurner v. State, 97 Ala. 57. 12 So. 
 54; Brabs.ton v. State, 68 Miss. 208, 8 
 Horn. — 5. 
 
 So. 326; Bibby v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 App.) 65 S. W! 193; State v. White, 10 
 Wash. 611, 39 Pac. 160, 41 Pac. 442; 
 Rex v. Murphy, 6 Car. & P. 103. 
 
 But evidence that one person cut an- 
 other with a knife, and almost im- 
 mediately a third person shot the in- 
 jured one with a pistol, and that both 
 wounds were inflicted in one rencounter. 
 and that the two persons were engaged 
 in the fight on the same aide, furnishes 
 some proof that the one using the knife 
 aided and abetted the other in the kill- 
 ing, and renders improper any charge 
 in a prosecution for the killing assum- 
 ing that either did or did not aid or 
 abet the other, or that the two acted 
 without a common purpose. Jordan v. 
 State, 82 Ala. 1, 2 So. 460. 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution 
 for homicide in which it appears that 
 the killing was done by a bystander 
 while the accused and the deceased were 
 engaged in a. struggle, that the accused 
 must have entered into the difficulty 
 with malice aforethought, with a pur- 
 pose deliberately formed after pre- 
 meditation to take the life of the de- 
 ceased should it become necessary, is 
 incomplete and confusing. Turner v. 
 State, supra. 
 
 HBrabston v. State, supra. 
 
66 HOMICIDE. [*§ 50 
 
 commission of the crime, but also that he should have had knowl- 
 edge of, and shared in the design of, the principal.*^ But where 
 one was intentionally present for the purpose of aiding another, and 
 knowingly assisted him, the conclusion is inevitable that the assist- 
 ance was rendered knowingly, intentionally, and with malice afore- 
 thought.** And knowledge ujDon the part of the alleged aider and 
 abetter as to the identity of the principal is not necessarj'. * * And 
 the guilt of the aider and abetter is not wholly dependent upon that 
 of the principal ; and if he goes into an affray to assist another with- 
 out previous concert, and the person assisted kills his adversary, the 
 amenability of the aider and abetter for the killing depends upon 
 his own acts and intent, and not upon the intent of the other, enter- 
 tained without his knowledge. ^ ® And the fact that a person intend- 
 ing to aid and abet in the killing of one person, by mistake aided 
 and abetted in the killing of another, does not affect his guilt,*® 
 The intent of a person aiding and abetting another may be in- 
 ferred from his conduct, and need not be shown by his statements. ' ^ 
 It is not necessary, however, that both of the persons charged with 
 assault with intent to kill should have entertained such intent in 
 order that either might be convicted.** The question whether the 
 
 1 2Reg. V. Cruse, 8 Car. & P. 541 ; King the jury that they must believe beyond- 
 
 V. Plummer, 12 Mod. 627 ; State v. Hick- a reasonable doubt that he was actuated 
 
 am, 95 Mo. 322, 6 Am. St. Rep. 54, 8 S. by malice is not prejudicial where the 
 
 W. 252. circumstances were such that the jury 
 
 isState V. Hollenseheit, 61 Mo. 302; could not possibly have acquitted the 
 
 State V. Jackson, 103 Iowa, 702, 73 N. accused or found him guilty of man- 
 
 W. 467. And see State v. Orrick, 106 slaughter only. Ross v. Com. 10 Ky. L.. 
 
 Mo. Ill, 17 S. W. 176, 329; State v. Rep. 558, 9 S. W. 707. 
 
 White, 67 S. C. 320, 45 S. E. 210; Alex- And the guilt of a person charged 
 
 ander v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 395, with aiding and abetting in a murder 
 
 49 S. W. 229, 50 S. W. 716. is not made wholly dependent upon the 
 
 But an instruction in a prosecution guilt of the principal by an instruction 
 
 for homicide is erroneous as to a per- that if the principal was guilty of niur- 
 
 Ron charged as principal in the second der, and the defendant was present at 
 
 degree, where it authorizes a presump- the time and place thereof, and wil- 
 
 tion of malice from the character of the fully, maliciously, and with malice 
 
 weapon used, without reference to the aforethought, and not in necessary or 
 
 other circumstances. Jordan v. State, apparently necessary self-defense, ad- 
 
 79 Ala. 9. vised the principal to do the shooting, 
 
 KSpies V. People, 122 111. 1, 3 Am. St. or in any way aided the principal there- 
 Rep. 320, 12 N. E. 865, 17 N. E. 898. in, he is guilty of murder. Baskett v. 
 
 iBGuffee V. State, 8 Tex. App. 187; Com. 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1995, 44 S. W. 970. 
 
 Sullivan v. State, 85 Miss. 149, 37 So. isWynn v. State, 63 Mias. 260; Jpn- 
 
 1006. And see Brown v. State, 28 Ga. nings v. Com. 13 Ky. L. Rep. 79, 16 S. 
 
 199; State v. Jenkins, 14 Rich. L. 215, W. 348. 
 
 94 Am. Dec. 132. . I'People v. Carter, 96 Mich. 583, 56 
 
 But while one who aids and abets a N. W. 79. And see Morris v. Com. 10 
 
 homicide must have been actuated by Ky. L. Rep. 1004, 11 S. W. 295. 
 
 malice to be guilty of murder, an in- is Crosby v. PeoplCj 137 111. 325, 27 
 
 struetion in a prosecution for such aid- N. E. 49. 
 ing and abetting which omits to tell 
 
I 30] PARTICIPANTS IN THE CRIME. 67 
 
 criminal intent of the principal in the first degree was participated 
 in by the alleged aider and abetter, and whether the alleged aider 
 and abetter knew that the principal acted with criminal intent, is 
 one of fact for the jury.^® And the existence of such knowledge or 
 intent need not be directly and positively proved, but may be in- 
 ferred from the circumstances. ^ " 
 
 51. Effect of relationship. — The fact that two persons are related 
 to each other does not affect their relationshiiJ as principal and aider 
 and abetter in a homicide between them ; and if one knowingly joins 
 another in the commission of the offense, or in the commission of 
 an unlawful act from which the offense results, he is a principal in 
 the second degree, no matter what degree of consanguinity exists 
 between them. ' And the fact that the father of an illegitimate child 
 of a woman was also her father does not make her his accomplice, 
 so as to render it necessary to corroborate her testimony in a prose- 
 cution against him for killing the child. ^ ivTor should a pierson be 
 held as an aider or abetter merely because a son or other kinsman 
 killed a person with whom he was engaged in a fight, where enga- 
 ging in the fight was all he did to incite the other's fatal act.* And 
 where one brother finding another engaged in an affray goes to his 
 assistance and takes part in the conflict, and the latter kills his 
 opponent, the amenability of the former to the law is dependent upon 
 his own acts and intent, and not upon the intent with which his 
 brother, without his knowledge, engaged in or prosecuted the diffi- 
 culty.* So, it has been asserted that the doctrine of presumed co- 
 ercion of a wife by her husband does not apply in cases of murder, 
 and that a wife is amenable as an accessory before the fact to a mur- 
 der committed by her husband.' But the more modern view would 
 seem to be that where a married woman aids or abets the commission 
 of a homicide by her husband, acting in his presence, the law pre- 
 
 isTanner v. State, 92 Ala. 1, 9 So. ^Gnffce v. State, 8 Tex. App. 187. 
 
 61.3; Burrell v. State, 18 Tex. 713. And see Sullivan v. State, supra. 
 
 20Omer v. Com. 95 Ky. 353, 25 S. W. And a brother of a person engaged in 
 
 595; Tanner v. State, supra. ^ combat with another, who Avas not 
 
 iGuffee V. State, 8 Tex. App. 187. present during the combat, in which 
 
 And see Crosby v. People, 189 111. 298, ^^^^ '•"^^^ mortally wounded, is not 
 
 59 N. E. 546; Snell v. State, 29 Tex. rendered responsible as if actually 
 
 App. 236, 25 Am. St. Rep. 723, 15 S. P'^^^^"^' /°'' f^ ^^^^ ^}^ *'F°"^'=;- ^''f 
 vif Y22 done before ne arrived, without ref- 
 
 * PrPHCfi XO lllS TDUrDOSG DV tllP ffl.fl' 'Hn t" 
 
 9.'^°w'°?«J' ^^^^^ ^'-^^''- *^"™- "^PP"' ^'^ ^""^ been nearby aid "hastened to his 
 
 , • ,• ^- brother's assistance. Rhodes v. State. 
 
 aWoolweaver v. State, 50 Ohio St. 39 ^ex. Grim. Rep. 332, 45 S. W. 1009! 
 2/7, 40 Am. St. Rep. 667, 34 N. E. 352. sReg. v. Manning, 2 Car. & K. 887; 
 
 And see Sullivan v. State, 85 Miss. 149, Bibb v. State, 94 Ala. 31, 33 Am. St. 
 
 37 So. 1006. Rep. 88, 10 So. 506. 
 
68 HOMICIDE. [§ 51 
 
 sumes, in tlie absence of evidence to the contrary, that she was co- 
 erced by him, and not criminally responsible therefor.^ But if she 
 exercised a free will and acted independently, the mere presence of 
 her husband at the time she did the criminal deed will not protect her 
 from its consequences. ^ 
 
 52. Acts in concert under compulsion. — One who acts in concert 
 with another, or who aids and abets him in a homicide, or in a crimi- 
 nal act out of which a homicide grows, through compulsion, having 
 reasonable cause to believe that his life would be immediately taken 
 unless he gave the required aid, is not criminally responsible for a 
 homicide committed by the person under whose compulsion he acted. ^ 
 But if, after the immediate danger passes, he continues to consent, 
 advise, aid, abet, or assist in such act, he is as guilty as if such 
 danger had never threatened him. ^ And a mere threat to take one's 
 life unless he commits a homicide, with nothing more, does not 
 amount to a sufficient excuse for committing such homicide.* If or 
 does a threat against one's life, vinless he aids in the commission of 
 a homicide, made several days before the act in question.* And 
 neither at common law nor under the statutes can a man excuse or 
 justify the killing of an innocent man under the plea that compul- 
 sion was exerted upon him at the time, and that he was forced to 
 the commission of the act, where he might have avoided the neces- 
 sity by escaping before that time.® And whether or not escape was 
 practicable is a question for the jury.* And he would be justified 
 in such case in taking the lives of the persons compelling him to 
 kill another if there was no other way open to enable him to avoid 
 the necessity of taking the life of an innocent man.'' 
 
 53. Participation in dueling and prize fighting. — Where two persons 
 go out to fight a deliberate duel, and death ensues, all persons who 
 are present on the occasion, encouraging or promoting that death, 
 will be guilty of abetting the principal offender. ^ Not only the prin- 
 
 sState V. Kelly, 74 Iowa, 589, 38 N. Rainey v. Com. 19 Ky. L. Rep. 390, 40 
 
 W. 503; State V. Hendricks, 32 Kan. 559, S. W. 682; State v. Fisher, 23 Mont. 
 
 4 Pac. 1050. And see Freel v. State, 540, 59 Pae. 919; Reg. \-. Tyler, 8 Car. 
 
 21 Ark. 212; Edwards v. State, 27 Ark. & P. G16. 
 
 493. And a person who entered into a con- 
 
 TState V. Kelly, supra; Miller v. spiracy with others to commit a homi- 
 
 State, 25 Wis. 385. cide cannot defend, where he committed 
 
 iBaxter v. People, 8 111. 368. it personally, upon the ground that had 
 
 3Ibid. he not committed it he would have been 
 
 sState V. Howard. 35 S. G. 197, 14 S killed by his coconspirators. Leach v. 
 
 E. 481 ; People v. Repke, 103 Mich. 45&, State, 99 Tenn. 584, 42 S. W. 195. 
 
 61 N. W. 861. 6Arp v. State, supra. 
 
 ^People V. Repke, supra. 'Ibid. 
 
 BArp V. State, 97 Ala. 5, 19 L.R.A. iReg. v. Cuddy, 1 Car, & K. 209. 
 357, 38 Am. St. Rep. 137, 12 So. 301 ; 
 
§ 53] PARTICIPANaiS IN THE CRIME. (59 
 
 cipals, but the seconds, in a deliberate duel, are guilty of homicide.^ 
 And with regard to other persons who are so present, the question 
 is, Did they give their aid and assistance by their countenance and 
 encouragement of the principals in the contest? Mere presence is 
 not sufficient; but if they sustain the principals by their advice or 
 presence, or if they go for the purpose of encouraging and forward- 
 ing the unlawful conflict, although they do not say or do anything, 
 yet if they are present, and assisting and encouraging at the moment 
 when the pistol is fired, they are guilty of murder. ^ So, all persons 
 present at a prize fight, having gone thither for the purpose of seeing 
 the prize fighters strike each other, are principals in the breach 
 of the peace ; * and all participants in a killing at such fight are guilty 
 of manslaughter.® 
 
 54. Participation in suicide. ^ — Both at common law and under ex- 
 isting systems of law suicide is considered as a crime against' the laws 
 of God and man, and one who persuades another to kill himself, 
 and is present when he does so, is guilty of murder as principal 
 in the second degree.^ The law does not require that a homicide 
 shall be committed against the will of the person killed; if a 
 man kills another with his consent, or by his desire, he is as guilty 
 as if he had killed him against his will.* Nor will the law 
 take into consideration the fact that the suicide was under sentence 
 of death, having but a few more hours to live.* And the act of a 
 woman in taking and swallowing poison in the presence and by the 
 direction of a man renders his the act of administering it, consti- 
 tuting it murder in the first degree, where death results.® So, if a 
 person takes poison and dies in the presence of the giver, but not 
 in the presence of the person who first procured it, while the first is 
 an accessory before the fact, the second is a principal in the second 
 degree in the murder.^ But if the agent acted innocently the act of 
 killing would not be his act, but the act of the person who caused or 
 procured his action; as, in case of an innocent person admin- 
 
 2Eeg. V. Young, 8 Car. & P. 644. E. 505 ; Com. v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 25 
 
 sJbid. Am. Rep. 109; Com. v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 
 
 *Eex V. Perkins, 4 Car. & P. 537 ; Rex 356, 7 Am. Dec. 154; Rex v. Dyson, 
 
 V. Miirphy, 6 Car. & P. 103; Reg. v. Russ. & R. C. C. 523; Rex v. Sawyer, 
 
 Young, 8 Car. & P. 645. See Com. v. 1 Russ. Cromp. & M. 528. 
 
 Dudley, 6 Leigh, 614; Wharton, Crim. sBlaekburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146. 
 
 Law, § 2674. 4 Com. v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 359, 7 Am. 
 
 5See infra, chapter X., § 218. Deo. 154; 2 Wheeler, C. C. 226. And 
 
 iThe subject of inciting or abetting see Com. v. Dennis, 105 Mass. 162. 
 
 suicide is fully considered in a note to sBlackburn v. State, supra; Vaux's 
 
 Burnett v. People, 66 L.R.A. 304. Case, J. Kelyng, 52. 
 
 2Burnett v. People, 204 111. 208, 66 eVaux's Case, supra. 
 
 L.R.A. 304, 98 Am. St. Rep. 206, 68 N. 
 
70 HOMICIDJl B 54 
 
 istering poison at the instance of another, not knowing it to be poi- 
 son. '' And a person doing an act causing death at the instance of an- 
 other cannot be regarded as a principal in the crime if he act under 
 compulsion, or if he was not a free moral agent, the act of the prin- 
 cipal done pursuant to the will of the accessory in such case being the 
 act of the accessory.^ Nor does the mere wish that another would kill 
 himself, accompanied by knowledge that he intends to do so, and 
 assent to the act, constitute murder, unless something is done to en- 
 courage, aid, or induce the act.® And in order to render guilty as 
 principal, a person persuading another to commit suicide, the per- 
 suasion must have been of some effect; he would not be guilty if 
 the act was not induced thereby.-^" So, where two people mutu- 
 ally agree to kill themselves together, and the means employed to 
 produce death takes effect upon one only, the survivor is guilty as 
 principal in the second degree of the murder of the one who dies. * ^ 
 The fact that a person intends to take his own life, and that his 
 attempt to do so is in pursuance of an agreement with another that 
 both will commit suicide, does not affect the guilt of the other, who 
 furnishes him with the means, for the purpose and with the intent 
 that he shall use them, where death results.^^ And in such case it is 
 not necessary that it should appear that the agreement upon the 
 part of each was that he would kill himself in consideration that 
 
 Tbid. to the husband, and not to the wife; 
 
 And evidence that a man and wo- she was acquitted of the charge of mur- 
 
 man had been criminally intimate, and der upon the ground that, being the 
 
 contemplated an elopement; that the wife of the deceased, she was under his 
 
 father and brothers of the woman sought control, andj inasmuch as the proposed 
 
 to take the life of the man, who was suicide had been first suggested by him, 
 
 rescued by his father; that the woman it was considered that she was not a 
 
 attempted to commit suicide, but was free agent, 
 
 rescued by the man and others; that he 9Burnett v. People, supra. 
 
 was given a revolver with which to de- loCom. v. Dennis, 105 Mass. 162; 
 
 fend himself against her father and Com. v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 359, 7 Am. Deo. 
 
 brothers, but laid it down without ap- 154. 
 
 parent purpose, when she possessed her- But the presumption of law is that 
 
 self of it and shot herself, — is not suf- advice has the influence intended by the 
 
 ficient to justify a charge of murder adviser, unless it is shown to have been 
 
 iigainst the man. Grace v. State, 44 otherwise; as, that the counsel was re- 
 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 193, 69 S. W. 529. ceived with seoif, or was manifestly re- 
 
 sBurnett v. People, 204 111. 208, 66 jected and ridiculed at the time it was 
 
 L.R.A. 304, 98 Am. St. Rep. 206, 68 N. given. Com. v. Bowen, supra. 
 
 10. 505. iiCom. V. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 25 
 
 In Reg. V. Alison, 8 Car. & P. 418, an Am. Rep. 109; Reg. v. Alison, supra; 
 
 old case is referred to in which a bus- Reg. v. Stormonth, 61 J. P. 729; Reg. 
 
 band declared his intention to end his v. Jessop, 10 Crim. L. Mag. 862; Rex 
 
 life, and the wife declared she would do v. Abbott, 67 J. P. 15. 
 
 the same, upon which he purchased poi- isBlackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146; 
 
 son and mixed it with drink of which Burnett v. People, 204 111. 208, 66 L.R.A. 
 
 they partook, the draft proving fatal 304, 98 Am. St. Rep. 206, 68 N. E. 505. 
 
§ 54] PARTICIPANTS IN THE CRIME 71 
 
 the other kill himself.** And where a man and woman throw them- 
 selves or fall into water, and the woman is drowned, he is guilty 
 of her murder as principal in the second degree if she did it by 
 his encouragement, or because she thought he had set her the ex- 
 ample in pursuance of a previous agreement.** But where a man 
 and woman fall or jump into water and the woman is drowned, the 
 man is not guilty of her murder if he only intended to drown him- 
 self, and did not intend that she should die with him.*' And the 
 rule is the same where it is uncertain whether the deceased really 
 committed suicide, or whether death resulted from accident before 
 the time when the two meant to destroy themselves. * ® 
 
 55. Abandonment of purpose. — "While the responsibility of a prin- 
 cipal in the second degree, as an aider and abetter of the acts done 
 by the principal offender in homicide, done in furtherance of the 
 common purpose, continues as long as he acts in concert with him,* 
 if his position as principal in the second degree arises out of a con- 
 cert of action simply, without any previous agreement or compact as 
 to its extent or purpose, his responsibility for the acts of the other 
 would cease when he abandoned the common purpose and withdrew 
 from any further concert, and withdrew his aid, countenance, and en- 
 couragement from the enterprise.^ And if he repented of and re- 
 linquished his purpose before the consummation of the crime, he could 
 not be convicted of any grade of homicide.^ But the act of one who 
 aids, abets, or encourages a homicide, of fleeing from the scene of 
 the difficulty just before the fatal shot is fired, is not an abandon- 
 ment or withdrawal which will relieve him of criminal responsi- 
 bility.* And a person aiding and abetting in a murder by another 
 is not entitled to an acquittal upon the ground that he abandoned the 
 conflict before the murder was committed, unless the principal had 
 notice of such abandonment.' 
 
 56. Necessity of conviction of principal in the first degree If the 
 
 actual perpetrator of a murder should escape by flight, or die, those 
 
 isReg. V. Jessop, supra. shall be guilty of manslaughter in the 
 
 i«Rex V. Dvson, Russ. & R. C. C. 523. first degree. State v. Fitzgerald, 130 
 
 islbid. " Mo. 407, 32 S. W. 1113. 
 
 islbid. iState v. MeCahill, 72 Iowa, 111, 30 
 
 So, evidence that a woman proposed N. W. 553, 33 N. W. 599 ; Com. v. Neills, 
 
 to commit suicide, and that a man asked 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 553. 
 
 her why she didn't, and that she asked 2State v. MeCahill, supra. 
 
 him if he would die with her, and upon 3Com. v. Neills, supra. 
 
 his aflirmative answer shot at him and 4State v. Forsha, 190 Mo. 296, 88 S. 
 
 then shot herseli, does not bring the case W. 746. 
 
 within a statutory provision that BWilson v. United States, 5 Ind. Terr. 
 
 every person deliberately assisting an- 610, 82 S. W. 924. 
 
 other in the commission of self-murder 
 
72 HOMICIDE, [§ 56 
 
 who were present abetting the commission of the crime may he indicted 
 as principals ; and though the indictment should state that the mortal 
 injury was committed by him who is absent or dead, yet if it be sub- 
 stantially alleged that those who were indicted were present at the 
 perpetration of the crime, and did kill and murder the deceased by the 
 mortal injury so done by the actual perpetrator, it shall be sufficient. ^ 
 So the party charged as principal in the second degree may be con- 
 victed, though the party charged as principal in the first degree is 
 acquitted.^ And the record of acquittal of the principal is in- 
 admissible in evidence, either in favor of or against an alleged aider 
 or abetter.* And the conviction of the principal is not evidence 
 against an aider or abetter.* So, on an indictment for murder, the 
 court may, in its discretion, try the principal in the second degree 
 before the principal in the first degree.^ And an acquittal or con- 
 viction of a lesser degree of homicide of one of several who were 
 aiding and abetting each other in the act does not operate as a bar 
 to a prosecution or conviction of another for homicide in a higher 
 degree.® And a person charged with murder as principal in the 
 second degree may be put on trial therefor after the person charged 
 as principal in the first degi-ee has been convicted of voluntary man- 
 slaughter. ^ 
 
 57. Effect of statutes abolishing distinction between principals and 
 abetters. — The statutes of many of the states abolish all distinction 
 between principals in homicide and aiders and abetters, and pro- 
 vide that aiders and abettei's may be, or shall be, tried, convicted, 
 
 1 State V. Fley, 2 Brev. 338, 4 Am. 4 State v. Bowker, 26 Or. 309, 38 Pac. 
 
 Dee. 583 : United States v. Hartwell, 3 124. Contra, Studstill v. State, 7 Ga. 2. 
 
 Cliflf. 221, Fed. Gas. No. 15,318. A record of conviction of a principal 
 
 2King V. Taylor, 1 Leach, C. L. 360; in a prosecution for homicide, if admis- 
 
 Benson v. Oifley, 2 Show. 510, 3 Mod. sible at all in a prosecution against an 
 
 121; Reg. v. Wallis, 1 Salk. 334; Grlf- alder and abetter, is so only as proof 
 
 fith's Case, 1 Plowd. 97; Rex v. Towle, of the fact of conviction; it is not ad- 
 
 Russ. & R. C. C. 314, 3 Price, 14'5, 2 mlsslble as evidence of the guilt of the 
 
 Marsh. 466 ; Archbold's C. P. 6 ; People abetter. People v. Bearss, supra. 
 
 V. Bearss, 10 Cal. 68; People v. New- So, the confession of a principal in 
 
 berry, 20 Cal. 440; Brown v. State, 28 the first degree is admissible to prove 
 
 Ga. 216; State v. Lee, 91 Iowa, 499, 60 his guilt in a prosecution of the prin- 
 
 N. W. 119; Howard v. Com. 110 Ky. clpal in the second degree in homicide, 
 
 356, 61 S. W. 756 ; Dean v. State, 85 but not to prove the participation of the 
 
 Miss. 40, 37 So. 501; State v. Ross, 29 latter therein. Studstill v. State, 
 
 Mo. 32; State v. Phillips, 24 Mo. 475; supra. 
 
 State V. Anderson, 89 Mo. 312, 1 S. W. 5Boyd v. State, 17 Ga. 194. 
 
 135; State v. Whitt, 113 N. C. 716, 18 sQreen v. State, 40 Fla. 191, 23 So. 
 
 S. E. 715. 851; State v. Lee, 91 Iowa, 499, 60 N. 
 
 sState V. Ross; State v. Phillips; W. 119; Goins v. State, 46 Ohio St 457, 
 
 People v. Bearss; and State v. Whitt, 21 N. E. 476. 
 
 —supra; State v. Chlttem, 13 N. C. (2 7Brown v. State, 28 Ga. 199. 
 Dev. L.) 57. 
 
§ 57] 
 
 PARTICIPANTS IN THE CE-IME. 
 
 73 
 
 and punished as principals in the first degree. Under such statutes 
 one indicted as a principal may be convicted on evidence charging 
 him as a principal in either degree, the second as well as the first. ^ 
 And an indictment for aiding and abetting homicide properly charges 
 the accused as principal.^ And although a homicide was committed 
 by an unknown person, if a known person was actually or construc- 
 tively present, aiding and abetting, the homicide may be charged in 
 an indictment against him as the act of the aider and abetter.^ 
 And the actual perpetrator of a homicide and one present aiding 
 and abetting him may be jointly indicted in the alternative, one as 
 principal, and the other as aider and abetter, and either may be 
 convicted as principal or as aider and abetter.* So, evidence that 
 a person was present aiding and encouraging a homicidal act by 
 another is competent in such case in a prosecution against the 
 former, in which he is charged as principal in the first degree.'' 
 And evidence that one person gave a mortal blow, and that two others 
 were present aiding and abetting him, is not a variance from an in- 
 dictment charging one of the aiders and abetters as principal, and the 
 other two parties as aiders and abetters.® And where several per- 
 
 iCollins V. State, 88 Ga. 347. 14 S. 
 E. 474; Morgan v. State, 120 Ga. 294, 
 48 S. E. 9; Patterson v. State (Ga.) 52 
 S. E. 77; Bryan v. State, 19 Fla. 864; 
 Coates V. People, 72 111. 303; True v. 
 Com. 90 Ky. 651, 14 S. W. 684; Howard 
 V. Com. 110 Ky. 356, 61 S. W. 756; Com. 
 V. Roberts, 108 Mass. 296; State v. Ross, 
 29 Mo. 32; State v. Anderson, 89 Mo. 
 312, 1 S. W. 135; State v. Payton, 90 
 Mo. 220, 2 S. W. 394; State v. Miller, 
 100 Mo. 606, 13 S. W. 832, 1051 ; Terri- 
 tory V. McGinnis, 10 N. M. 269, 61 Pac. 
 208; State v. Cockman, 60 N. C. (2 
 Winst. L.) 95; Hanoff v. State, 37 
 Ohio St. 178, 41 Am. Rep. 496; State v. 
 Kirk, 10 Or. 505; State v. Fley, 2 Brev. 
 338, 4 Am. Dee. 583; Williams v. State, 
 42 Tex. 392; Gladden v. State, 2 Tex. 
 App. 508; Davis v. State, 3 Tex. App. 
 91; Red v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 667, 73 Am. St. Rep. 965, 47 S. W. 1003; 
 Watson V. State, 28 Tex. App. 34, 12 S. 
 W. 404; People v. Callaghan, 4 Utah, 
 49, 6 Pae. 49. 
 
 2Temple v. People, 4 Lans. 119; 
 Greene v. State (Ark.) 70 S. W. 1038. 
 
 sState V. Green, 4 Strobh. L. 128. 
 
 4Howard v. Com. 110 Ky. 356, 61 S. 
 W. 756; Benge v. Com. 92 Ky. 1, 17 S. 
 W. 146; Jackson v. Com. 100 Ky. 239, 
 66 Am. St. Rep. 336, 38 S. W. 422, 1091 ; 
 
 Green v. State, 40 Fla. 191, 23 So. 851 ; 
 State V. Blan, 69 Mo. 317; State v. 
 King, 9 Mont. 445, 24 Pac. 265; State 
 V. Fley, 2 Brev. 338, 4 Am. Dec. 583. 
 
 So, where an indictment for murder 
 contains three counts, one charging ac- 
 cused as principal, another charging 
 him as accomplice with a named per- 
 son, and a third charging him as ac- 
 complice with some unknown person, ii 
 general verdict of guilty, without stat^ 
 ing the count upon which it is based. 
 Is sufficient, and will be applied to eith- 
 er of the counts which is sustained by 
 the evidence. Isaacs v. State, 36 Tex. 
 Crim. Rep. 505, 38 S. W. 40. 
 
 But, while a principal in the second 
 degree may be convicted under an indict- 
 ment charging him directly with the 
 actual commission of a, homicide, , if 
 the pleader, instead of proceeding under 
 a general indictment, does so under !i 
 special bill charging each of the defend- 
 ants with the particular acts done, or 
 part performed, by him respectively, 
 and the facts alleged as to some of them 
 are insufficient to show their guilt, the 
 indictment as to this is bad. Willi.^ma 
 V. State, 42 Tex. 392. 
 
 sDavis V. State, 3 Tex. App. 91 
 
 sBrister v. State, 26 Ala. 107. 
 
74 HOMICIDE. f§ 57 
 
 sons engaged in an assault upon another and the latter was killed, 
 it is sufficient in a prosecution for the killing to show that any one 
 of them inflicted the fatal wound, although it is alleged in the 
 indictment that one particular named person inflicted it.'' So, 
 where a statute provides that all persons aiding or abetting a crim- 
 inal act are principals, and punishable as such, an aider or abetter 
 must be indicted and punished as a principal, if at all.* These 
 statutes include as principals, not only aiders and abetters, but also 
 accessories before the fact, all being grouped together without dis- 
 tinction as to nature of punishment.® 
 
 IV. ACCESSOEIES BEFGEE THE FACT. ^ 
 
 58. Who are, generally — ^An accessory before the fact is one who, 
 though absent at the time of the commission of a murder, yet pro- 
 cures, counsels, commands, or abets another to commit such murder.^ 
 The meaning of the word "command" is where a person having 
 control over another, as a master over a servant, orders a thing to 
 be done.* To constitute a man accessory, it is necessary that he 
 should have been absent at the time when the felony was committed ; 
 if he was either actually or constructively present, he is, as has 
 been seen, principal.* The accessory is liable for all that ensues 
 upon the execution of the unlawful act commanded ; as, for instance, 
 if A. command B. to beat C, and he beat C, and he beat him so 
 that he dies, A. is accessory to the murder.' So, if A. command 
 B. to bum the house of C, and in doing so the house of D. is also 
 burnt, A. is accessory to the burning of D.'s house.® And if the 
 offense commanded be effected, although by different means from 
 those commanded, the accessory is liable ; as, for instance, if J. W. 
 
 'State V. O'Neal, Houst. Grim. Rep. evidence that the defendant advised and 
 
 (Del.) 68. And see State v. Melvin, 166 prepared the way for the murder and 
 
 Mo. 565j 66 S. W. 534. furnished the means, together with 
 
 sUsselton v. People, 149 111. 612, 36 cogent evidence showing his absence, the 
 
 N'. E. 952 ; State v. Desmond, 5 La. Ann. testimony tending to show his presence 
 
 398. being weak. Stokes v. State, 41 Tex. 
 
 9See infra, § 66. Crim. Rep. 169, 53 S. W. 106. 
 
 iThe question of solicitation to mur- 3 State v. Mann, 2 N. C. (1 Hayw.) 4. 
 (ler is considered in a note to State v. 41 Hale, P. C. 615; Usselton v. People, 
 
 Jjutler, 25 L.R.A. 437. and State v. Ayers, supra; Johnson v 
 
 21 Hale, P. C. 615; Usselton v. Peo- State, 45 Tex. Grim. Rep. 453, 77 S. W 
 
 pie, 149 111. 612, 36 N. E. 952; State v. 15; King v. Gordon, 1 Leach, C. L. 515, 
 
 Ayers, 8 Baxt. 96. And see State v. 1 East, P. G. 352. And see Wheeler v 
 
 Botson, 26 Mont. 305, 67 Pac. 938. Gom. 27 Ky. L. Rep. 1090, 87 S. W. 
 
 A conviction of being an accomplice 1106. 
 to a murder as distinguished from being 54 Bl. Com. 37; 1 Hale, P. C. 617. 
 a principal is justified by unquestioned cQueen v. Saunders, 2 Plowd. 475. 
 
§ 58] PARTICIPANTS IN THE CRIME. 75 
 
 hire J. S. to poison A., and instead of poisoning him he shoot him, 
 J. W. is nevertheless liable as accessory.^ It is not material that an 
 accessory should have originated the design of committing the 
 offense. If the principal had previously formed the design, and 
 the alleged accessory encouraged him to carry it out by stating false- 
 hoods, or otherwise, he is guilty as accessory before the fact.* And 
 one may be an accessory to an unknown principal in homicide.^ 
 And where a man confessed that he poisoned a vpealthy man at the 
 instigation of another, evidence that the alleged accessory was the 
 legatee of the deceased, and that upon learning of the death he 
 promptly appeared and appropriated moneys and securities in the 
 apartments of the deceased, and made efforts to raise money on forged 
 checks of the deceased in the handwriting of the principal and in- 
 dorsed by himself, and that he made extraordinary efforts to have 
 the body immediately cremated, and, failing in this, to have it 
 embalmed, is a sufficient corroboration of the confession of the prin- 
 cipal to connect the alleged accessory with the commission of the 
 crime, making the criminal agency a question for the jury. ^° 
 
 59. Degrees of homicide to which applicable There may, of course, 
 
 be accessories before the fact in all kinds of murder with deliberation, 
 or premeditation, or malice aforethought, including murder in the 
 second degree, which involves malice.^ But in manslaughter there 
 can be no accessories before the fact, since manslaughter is the 
 taking of life without deliberation or premeditation ; while being ac- 
 cessory before the fact involves previous consideration. ^ And where 
 on a charge of murder the principal criminal is found guilty of man- 
 slaughter only, a person charged as accessory before the fact must 
 Ije discharged.® But this rule does not apply under statutes abolish- 
 ing the distinction between principals in the first and second degrees 
 and accessories before the fact ; under them it is confined to wliat is 
 known as involuntary manslaiigbter at common law.* And it has 
 been asserted that the rule that there can be no accessory before 
 
 TFost. C. L. 369, 370. 117 Mo. 389, 22 S. W. 1079: State v. 
 
 sKeithler v. State, 10 Smedes & M. Steeves, supra; Bowman v. State (Tex. 
 
 192. Crim. App.) 20 S. W. 558; Jones v. 
 
 sSpies V. People, 122 III. 1, 3 Am. St. State, 13 Tex. 168, 62 Am. Dec. 5.50; 
 
 Rep. 322, 12 N. E. 865, 17 N. E. 898. State v. Robinson, 12 Wash. 349, 41 Pac. 
 
 loPeople V. Patrick, 182 N. Y. 131, 74 51, 902. But see Stipp v. State, 11 Ind. 
 
 N. E. 843. 62. 
 
 iSee State v. Steeves, 29 Or. 85, 43 sGoff v. Byby, 1 Cro. Eliz. pt. 2, p. 
 
 Pac. 947, and eases in following para- 540. 
 
 crraph 4State v. Hermann. 117 Mo. 629, 23 
 
 " 2State V. Prater. 52 W. Va. 132, 43 S. S. VV. 1071, Overruling State v. Phil- 
 
 E. 230; Boyd v. State, 17 Ga. 194; State lips, supra-, as to this point; Mathis v. 
 
 T. Desmond, 5 La. Ann. 398; State v. State (Fla.) 34 So. 287. 
 Mahly, 68 Mo. 315; State v. Phillips, 
 
76 HOMICIDE. L§59 
 
 the fact in manslaughter is applicable only to eases of killing bj 
 a sudden blow, and the like, and not to a case of poisoning, where 
 the two persons concerned had agreed to administer the poison to 
 the deceased, not to kill him, but for some less criminal purpose, — 
 such as making him sick and obliging him to remain at home in 
 the hope of reforming his habits. ^ 
 
 60. SuflBloiency of solicitation or procurement To constitute one an 
 
 accessory before the fact in homicide it is necessary that the solic- 
 itation be made, either directly or indirectly, to the person com- 
 mitting the homicide.^ And it is also necessary that the allied 
 accessory should have had knowledge of the design of the principal, 
 since he could not encourage a design of which he had no knowl- 
 edge;^ though it is not necessary that the principal should know 
 that steps have been taken to assist him.'"* But knowingly to in- 
 vite a person to a place so that he may be there murdered con- 
 stitutes, when he is murdered accordingly, the offense.* And the 
 publication and scattering broadcast in newspapers of an article de- 
 signed to persuade persons to murder foreign potentates is a sufficient 
 encouragement and persuading, within the meaning of a statute pro- 
 viding that all persons who shall encourage, or endeavor to persuade, 
 any person to murder any other person shall be guilty of a misde- 
 meanor.® Nor is it essential that there should have been any di- 
 rect communication between an accessory before the fact and a 
 principal felon in homicide ; it is enough if the accessory direct an in- 
 termediate agent to procure another to commit the crime ; and it is 
 sufficient, even if the accessory does not know the person to be pro- 
 cured, but merely directs the agent to employ some person. " 
 
 The mere concealment of the knowledge that a felony is to be 
 committed, however, will not make the party concealing it an acces- 
 sory before the fact;'' nor will a tacit acquiescence, or words which 
 amount to a bare permission, be sufficient to constitute this offense. ® 
 And the procurement must continue till the consummation of the 
 
 sParke, B., in Queen v. Smith, 2 Cox, him a month's board, if ho would kill a 
 
 C. C. 23.3. designated person, and that the person 
 
 iReg. V. Blackburn, 6 Cox, C. C. 333. so told immediately went out and did 
 
 sKeithler v. State, 10 Smedes & M. the killing, and upon being arrested was 
 
 193. rescued and taken to the saloon, from 
 
 sState ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Tally, 102 which he disappeared, is sufficient, in 
 
 Ala. 25, 15 So. 722. law, to warrant the conclusion that the 
 
 4Reg. V. Manning, 2 Car. & K. 903. saloon keeper was an accessory before 
 
 5Reg. V. Most, 14 Cox, 0. C. 583. the fact to the crime of mvirder. Ex 
 
 ellex V. Cooper, 5 Car. & P. 535. parte Willoughby, 14 Nev. 451. 
 
 Proof that a saloon keeper told a man ^2 Hawk, P. C. chap. 29, | 23. 
 
 that he would give him a month's whis- si Hale, P. C. 616. 
 
 ky, and another man named would give 
 
5 60] PARTICIPANTS IN THE CUIME. 77 
 
 offense; for if the procurer of a felony repent, and before the 
 felony is committed actually countermand his order, and the prin- 
 cipal, notwithstanding, commit the felony, the original instigator 
 ■will not be an accessory.® 
 
 61, Concurrence of procurement and result — The crime of the 
 accessory before the fact in homicide does not consist merely in 
 counseling, hiring, or commanding the crime to be committed, since 
 if the crime be not at last committed there is no offense ; the con- 
 nivance and the result aimed at must concur, and the latter must be 
 the effect of the former in order to complete the crime. ^ And 
 soliciting, counseling, or encouraging an act does not render the per- 
 son so doing an accessory before the fact to a homicide subsequently 
 committed by the person solicited or encouraged, unless the killing 
 was the natural and ordinary result of such solicitation or encour- 
 agement.^ Where two persons stand to each other in the relation 
 of principal and accessory, and the principal totally or substantially 
 departs from the instructions of the accessory and from the orig- 
 inal plan, and commits a different or additional offense, he stands 
 alone as to such diffei-ent or additional offense, and the other is not 
 responsible for it as accessory;'^ though if the principal commit the 
 same offense against B. by mistake, instead of A., it seems it would 
 be otherwise.* So, if the act encouraged was a mere misdemeanor, 
 or one from which death could not result, a subsequent killing 
 by the person encouraged cannot be regarded as incidental to it so 
 as to make the person encouraging or soliciting it an accessory.^ 
 And it is not sufficient to charge one with homicide that the killing 
 was in pursuance of his advice, counsel, or encouragement; it must 
 have been actually induced thereby,® or the encouragement or assist- 
 
 91 Hale, P. C. 618. See Goff v. Prime, his command, but happened accidentally 
 
 26 Ind. 196; Wharton, Crim. Law, 7th through the act of another. Queen v. 
 
 ed. § 2699; Com. v. Neills, 2 Brewst. Saunders, 2 Plowd. 475. 
 
 (Pa.) 553. iFost. 0. L. 370 et seq.; but see 1 
 
 1 State V. Ayers, 8 Baxt. 96. Hale, P. C. 687; 3 Inst. 51. 
 
 2People V. Keefer. 65 Oal. 232, 3 Pac. sPeople v. Keefer, 65 Cal. 232, 3 Pac. 
 
 818; State v. Lucas. 55 Iowa, 321, 7 N. 818. 
 
 W. 583. Where one encourages and aids an- 
 
 3Watts V. State, 5 W. Va. 533 ; State other in tying up a third person, and af- 
 
 V. Lucas, supra. terwards the person aided and encour- 
 
 If one person persuades another to aged kills the third person, the one en- 
 poison a third person, and the second couraging him cannot be held as an ac- 
 Mccordingly gives poison to the third, cessory to the killing, and the jury in 
 who takes part of it and gives the rest a prosecution therefor would not be au- 
 to a fourth, who is killed by it, the one thorized to find him guilty of murder or 
 using the persuasion is not accessory to of manslaughter. Ibid, 
 the murder of the fourth, because the ePowers v. Com. 110 Ky. 386, 53 L.R. 
 giving of the poison to, and the taking A. 245, 61 S. W. 735. 
 by, the fourth was not in pursuance of 
 
78 HOMICIDE. [1 61 
 
 ance must in fact have contributed to the killing.'^ It is not neces- 
 sary, however, that the killing should have been the direct and im- 
 mediate result of some act done by the accessory; it is sufficient if 
 death resulted from the felonious act of the principal by the counsel 
 or command of the accessory, either directly or indirectly.* Nor 
 is it material whether one or more than one person became the 
 medium through which the work was done;" and, if the pro- 
 curement was through an intermediate agent, it is not necessary 
 that the accessory should have named the person to be pro- 
 cured to do the act. ^ " Nor is it necessary that the assistance should 
 have so contributed to the result that but for it the killing would not 
 have been done; it is sufficient if it facilitated the result, though 
 it might have transpired without it. ^ ^ And this is the rule if the 
 act of the accused deprived the deceased of a single chance of life 
 which he otherwise might have had, though it cannot be shown that 
 he would have availed himself of that chance. ^^ 
 
 62. When conviction of principal a prerequisite. — At common law 
 the conviction of someone who has committed the crime itself must 
 precede that of one guilty only as accessory.' This rule has been 
 carried so far as to hold that an accessory before the fact in a cap- 
 ital case cannot be put upon trial without his consent, even when 
 the principal has died before conviction.^ And the record of the 
 principal's conviction is the highest and only legitimate evidence of 
 
 'State px rel. Atty. Gen. v. Tally, erroneously asserting that the killing 
 
 102 Ala. 25, 15 So. 722. should have been the direct and immedi- 
 
 sSage V. State, 127 Ind. 15, 26 S. E. ate effect of the act done by the alleged 
 
 667; Norton v. People, 8 Cow. 13T. accessory. Sage v. State, supra. 
 
 One who advises and counsels the kill- loRex v. Cooper, supra. 
 
 iiig of members of the legislature is "State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Tally, 
 
 guilty of murder without reference to 102 Ala. 25, 15 So. 722. 
 
 the question whether he engaged in a 12 Ibid. 
 
 conspiracy to procure the doing of some iBaron v. People, 1 Park. Crim. Rep. 
 
 other unlawful act, if, in pursuance of 246; People v. Bearss, 10 Cal. 68; Ussel- 
 
 such advice and counsel, and induced ton v. People, 149 111. 612, 36 N. E. 952. 
 
 thereby, a member is killed. Powers v. And where there are many principals 
 
 Com. supra. to a homicide, some of whom are pres- 
 
 sFost. C. L. 125; R. v. Somerset, 19 ent and some absent, and one is indicted 
 
 St. Tr. 804; Rex v. Cooper, 5 Car. & P. as an accessory to them all, his arraign- 
 
 535 ; Sage v. State, 127 Ind. 15, 26 N. E. ment must be stayed until he can be ar- 
 
 667. raigned as accessory to all at once. 
 
 And an instruction in a. prosecution Gittin's Case, 1 Plowd. 98. 
 
 for homicide that the concealment of But the principal and accessory may 
 
 the knowledge that a felony is to be be put on trial jointly. Usselton v. 
 
 committed, or tacit acquiescence in its People, supra. 
 
 commission, or words that amount to a 2Com. v. Phillips, 16 Mass. 423; Peo- 
 
 bare permission to commit a felony, will pie v. Bearss, supra. 
 
 make the defendant neither an acces- So, where a principal in homicide is 
 
 sory before the fact nor principal in the pardoned, or has his clergy before an at- 
 
 alleged crime, — is properly refused as tainder, the accessory cannot be ar- 
 
§ 62] PARTICIPANTS IN THE CRIME. 79 
 
 the fact/ It is conclusive of the conviction of the principal and 
 prima facie evidence of his guilt.* And a prisoner did not waive 
 his right to call for the record of such conviction by pleading. ° 
 And it was prima facie sufficient to warrant the trial of the accessory, 
 though it might be rebutted by evidence that the principal ought not 
 to have been convicted. ® By statutes, however, in force in England, 
 and in most of the United States, an accessory may now be tried for 
 the substantive offense, independently of the principal's conviction.'' 
 And in charging a person as accessory before the fact to homicide 
 under them, it is not necessary to allege the conviction of the prin- 
 cipal. ^ And an acquittal of the principal is not a bar to a prosecution 
 against an accessory before the fact, since he stands charged as 
 principal.* And even under the common-law rule, as well as under 
 the statutory one, it has been held that since the record of convic- 
 tion of the principal is only prima facie evidence against the ac- 
 cessory, a conviction of the principal for manslaughter does not 
 preclude a prosecution of the accessory for murder, since the state 
 may prove that the principal was in fact guilty of the higher crime. ^ " 
 But even under statutes abolishing the distinction between principal 
 and accessory, it is requisite on the trial of the accessory for the 
 prosecution to prove the guilt of the principal. ^^ And where the 
 statute merely provides for the trial of the accessory, whether or 
 not the principal has been previously tried and convicted, the coni- 
 
 raigned, since in such case there is no Mosley, 31 Kan. 355, 2 Pac. 782; Com. v. 
 
 principal and therefore there cannot be Knapp, supra; State v. Burbage, 51 S. 
 
 an accessory. Syer's Case, 4 Coke, 43b. 0. 284, 28 S. E. 937. 
 
 But an accessory is triable after the 'See Wharton, Crim. Law, 7th ed. § 
 
 attainder of his principal in homicide, 135; People v. Newberiy, 20 Gal. 440; 
 
 though he is pardoned or has his clergy Usseltou v. People, 149 111. 612, 36 N. 
 
 allowed. Ibid. E. 952; Buck v. Com. 107 Pa. 486. 
 
 sPeopIe V. Bearss, 10 Cal. 68; Com. sState v. Posev, 4 Strob. L. 103. 
 
 V. Knapp, 10 Pick. 484, 20 Am. Dee. 534; 9 State v. Bogiie, 52 Kan. 79, 34 Pac. 
 
 Keithler v. State, 10 Smedes & M. 192; 410; People v. Newberry, supra; Peo- 
 
 State V. Gleim, 17 Mont. 17, 31 L.R.A. pie v. Bearss, 10 Cal. 68; State v. Lee, 
 
 294, 52 Am. St. Rep. 655, 41 Pac. 998; 91 Iowa, 499, 60 N. W. 119. 
 
 State V. Crank, 2 Bail. L. 66, 23 Am. loState v. Burbage, 51 S. C. 284. 28 
 
 Dec. 117. S. E. 937; State v. Sims, 2 Bail. L. 35; 
 
 estate V. Chittem, 13 N. C. (2 Dev. State v. Crank, 2 Bail. L. 66, 23 Am. 
 
 L.) 49. Dec. 117; State v. Mosley, 31 Kan. 355, 
 
 This rule applies though the prinei- 2 Pac. 782. 
 
 pal felon was a negro and the accessory nBuck v. Com. 107 Pa. 486. 
 
 a white man, and though conviction was Evidence of the flight of a person who 
 
 procured upon the testimony of negroes killed another, immediately after the 
 
 incompetent as against the accessory, killing, is admissible in a prosecution 
 
 Ibid. for homicide to prove his guilt, so as 
 
 sFost. C. L. 360 ; 1 Hale, P. C. 623 ; to warrant the conviction of another as 
 
 Re Burr, 4 Cranch, 502, Appx., 2 L. ed. aider and abetter, ilelntyre v. State 
 
 700, Appx. (Tex. Crim. App.) 33 S. W. 347. 
 
 ePeople v. Bearss, supra; State v. 
 
80 HOMICIDE. [§ 62 
 
 mon-law rule that an acquittal of the principal is an acquittal of 
 the accessory still obtains. ^^ 
 
 63. Abortionist as an accessory before the fact. — The rule has 
 been asserted that one who abets or atempts an abortion, thereby 
 causing death, is an accessory before the fact to the killing, especially 
 when he was not present when the act was performed; and that, 
 being an accessory, he cannot be tried for the offense, since the 
 ]irincipal is dead and cannot be first tried. '^ This position was 
 avoided in one case by holding that the act of a woman in taking 
 drugs given her by another for the purpose of procui'ing an abortion, 
 whereupon her death resulted, constituted manslaughter, and that 
 the person giving her the drags for the purpose of procuring the 
 abortion could not escape conviction on the plea that he was only 
 an accessory before the fact, since, in law, there are no accessories 
 before the fact in manslaugliter.^ And it has been held that 
 where a person gives a drug for the purpose of procuring a mis- 
 carriage, and it accomplishes the object for which it was pro- 
 cured, and the woman's death results, he is criminally responsible, 
 though the taking was not in his presence.j.' And the abortionist 
 is almost, if not quite, universally held criminally responsible for 
 death resulting from his act, upon the ground that it amounts 
 to a killing in the commission of an unlawful act, or in the com- 
 mission of an act dangerous to human life. * 
 
 64. Encouraging or persuading suicide. ^ — Where a person encour- 
 ages or persuades another to commit suicide, and the other yields 
 to his persuasion, he is an accessory before the fact if absent when 
 the deed is done.^ And one who furnishes poison to a guilty agent 
 for use by or upon a third pei'son, is an accessory before 
 the fact in murder, where it is administered accordingly and 
 
 i2State T. Jones, 101 N. C. 719, 8 S. 2Rex v. Russell, 1 Moody, C. C. 356. 
 
 E. 147. And statements made to the coroner 
 
 iRex V. Russell, 1 Moody, C. C. 356 ; by accused in a prosecution for man- 
 Reg. V. Fretwell, n Cox. C. C. 152. slaughter in wilfully aiding, assisting. 
 Leigli & C. C. C. 161, 31 L. J. Mag. Cas. and encouraging another to commit sui- 
 X. 8. 145, 8 Jur. N. S. 466, 6 L. T. X. cide are admissible in evidence whether 
 S. 333, 10 Week. Rep. 1045. he was under the influence of drugs or 
 
 2Reg. V. Gaylor, 7 Cox, C. C. 253, not, and no preliminary examination is 
 
 Dears. & B. C. C. 288, 40 Eng. L. & necessary to determine his condition: 
 
 Eq. 556. and, if an examination is permitted, it 
 
 3Reg. V. Wilson, Dears. & B. C. C. is within the discretion of the court to 
 
 127, 26 L. J. Mag. Cas. N. S. 18, 2 Jur. permit it to be made in the presence of 
 
 N. S. 1146, 5 Week. Rep. 70, 7 Cox, C. the jury; and the admission of such evi- 
 
 C. 190. dence and permitting an examination 
 
 4 See infra, chapter XIX., §§ 377, 378. to be made are not a ground for a cer- 
 
 iThe subject of inciting or abetting tificate of reasonable doubt which will 
 
 suicide is fully considered in a note to stay execution. People v. Kent, 41 Miso 
 
 Burnett v. People, 66 L.B.A. 304. 191, 83 N. Y. Supp. 948. 
 
§ 04] PARTICIPANTS IN THE CRIME. 81 
 
 deatii results.^ If, in such case, however, the agent is an 
 innocent agent, — as, in case of poison given by a person v?ho received 
 it without knowing it to be poison, — the killing is not the 
 act of the agent, but that of the person who procured his action, 
 in which case the latter would be principal and not accessory;* 
 and the rule is the same where the agent acted under compulsion.® 
 And the common-law rule that an accessory before the fact can- 
 not be tried until the principal is first tried and convicted applies, 
 in the absence of statutory provision on the subject, to inciting 
 or encouraging another to commit suicide, so as to prevent 
 the trial and punishment of the accessory if the death of the 
 other resulted.® And it has been held that where suicide is not 
 a violation of any law, and the law does not expressly impose any 
 punishment upon those who furnish others with means with which to 
 commit suicide, one who furnishes such means cannot be held as 
 an accessory to such killing, or guilty of any violation of law.^ 
 But the general rule would seem to be that suicide does not cease 
 to be unlawful and criminal so as to make it unlawful and criminal 
 to incite another to commit it, because of the fact that the legislature, 
 either inadvertently or intentionally, has omitted to prescribe pen- 
 alties for the act, and left the attempt to commit suicide without 
 punishment because the completed act could not be punished.* 
 The whole subject, however, is regulated by statutory provision in 
 many of the states, under which deliberately assisting another in 
 the commission of self-murder is made either an independent crime 
 or a specified degree of murder.® But a provision that every per- 
 son who deliberately assists another in the commission of self-murder 
 
 But evidence as to a woman's repu- consistent with the supposition that he 
 
 tation for chastity is not admissible in hoped and expected she would change 
 
 behalf of the state upon the trial of a her mind, and not resort to it. Reg. v. 
 
 man who bad been criminally intimate Fretwell, Leigh & C. C. C. 161 ; Roscoe, 
 
 with her, for procuring her to commit Grim. Ev. 7th Am. ed. 776. 
 
 suicide, where her character in that re- sBurnett v. People, supra; Reg. v. 
 
 spect had not been attacked. Burnett Alison, 8 Car. & P. 418. 
 
 V. People, 204 111. 208, 66 L.R.A. 304, sReg. v. Leddington, 9 Car. & P. 79; 
 
 98 Am. St. Rep. 206, 68 N. E. 505. Reg. v. Fretwell, 9 Cox, C. C. 145; Rex 
 
 SBIackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146; v. Russell, 1 Moody, C. C. 356; Com. v. 
 
 Vaux's Case, J. Kelyng, 52. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 25 Am. Rep. 109. 
 
 ^Vaux's Case, supra. 7Graee v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 A man who procures corrosive subli- 193, 69 S. W. 529. 
 
 mate for a woman at her request and on sCom. v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 25 Am. 
 
 threat of self-destruction, which she Rep. 109; Burnett v. People, 204 111. 
 
 takes with the intent to procure a mis- 208, 66 L.R.A. 304, 98 Am. St. Rep. 206, 
 
 carriage, and dies of it, he neither ad- 68 N. E. 505. 
 
 ministering it nor causing her to take it, sSee State v. Ludwig, 70 Mo. 412; 
 
 will not be deemed an accessory before Grace v. State, supra. 
 the fact, since the facts of the case are 
 Horn.— 6. 
 
82 HOMICIDE. L§ 64 
 
 is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree does not apply where it 
 appears either that the deceased committed suicide, or that the ac- 
 cused shot her, and not that he assisted her in the commission of 
 self-murder/ " And a provision that if anyone by laying poison 
 where it may be taken, and with intent that it shall be taken, 
 or by preparing any other means by which a person may injure 
 himself, with an intent that he shall be thereby injured, or by any 
 other direct means to cause another to receive an injury, such of- 
 fender becomes a principal, is based upon the theory that the victim 
 is not cognizant of the intent of the accused in preparing the means 
 of injury, and does not apply where the accused directly or in- 
 directly furnished the means for deliberate suicide. ^ ^ 
 
 65. Locus in quo of the offense — The offense of the accessory before 
 the fact in homicide is complete, not upon his counseling, hiring, or 
 commanding the commission of the crime, but when the deed 
 is actually done pursuant to his command.^ Where, therefore, the 
 counseling or procuring was done in one jurisdiction and the killing 
 in another, the locus in qv-o of the offense is in the coimty in 
 which the killing was done, and not in that in which it was advised. ^ 
 And this is particularly the rule under statutes prescribing that an 
 accessory before the fact may be prosecuted and convicted for a 
 substantive felony whether the principal felon has, or has not, been 
 convicted, the offense being cognizable in any court having juris- 
 diction of the crime of the principal felon. ^ 
 
 66. Effect of statutes abolishing distinction between principal and 
 accessory — Under statutes existing in many of the states, provid- 
 ing that one who counsels, procures, or instigates another to com- 
 mit a felony, whether present at its commission or not, may be 
 tried, convicted, and punished as a principal, all distinction between 
 principals and accessories before the fact is abolished, and an acces- 
 sory before the fact can be tried and convicted as principal.^ And 
 an indictment thereunder may either charge the accused as being 
 
 lOState V. Fitzgerald, 130 Mo. 407, 32 People v. Ah Fat, 48 Cal. 61 ; People 
 
 S. W. 1113. V. Campbell, 40 Cal. 129; People v. 
 
 iiGrace v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. Bearss, 10 Cal. 68: Wade v. State, 71 
 
 193, 69 S. W. 529. Ind. 535; Spies v. People, 122 111. 1, 3 
 
 iState V. Ayers, 8 Baxi. 96. Am. St. Pep. 320. 12 N. E. 865, 17 X. 
 
 2Ibid. ; Carlisle v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. E. 898: Us^elton v. People. 149 111. 612, 
 
 Rep. 537, 21 S. W. 358. 36 K E. 952; Baxter y. People, 8 111. 
 
 3 State V. Ayers, supra. 368; Coates v. People, 72 111. 303; Ritz- 
 
 iState V. Stacy, 103 Mo. 11, 15 S. W. man v. People, 110 111. 362; Hronek v. 
 
 147; State v. Orriok, 106 Mo. Ill, 17 S. People, 134 111. 139, 8 L.R.A. 837, 23 Am. 
 
 W. 176, 329; State v. Hermann, 117 Mo. St; Rep. 652, 24 N. E. 861; State v. 
 
 629, 23 S. W. 1071; State ox rel. Atty. Mosley, 31 Kan. 355, 2 Pac. 782; State 
 
 Gen. V. Tally, 102 Ala. 25, 15 So. 722; v. Cassady, 12 Kan. 550; Wynn v. State, 
 
§ 66] PARTICIPANTS IN THE CRIME. 83 
 
 an accessory in the common-law form,^ or it may charge one as 
 principal and the other as accessory in one count, and the latter as 
 principal and the former as accessory in another count.* Nor need 
 the principal he named in the indictment to justify a conviction of an 
 accessory before the fact to the crime of murder.* And where 
 the statute declares all persons advising or procuring a criminal act 
 to be principals and punishable as such, an accessory before the 
 fact must be indicted and punished as a principal, if at all.® So, 
 statutory provisions abrogating the distinction between an acces- 
 sory before the fact and a principal, and making both principals, 
 change the crime to a substantive one, and make it so far independ- 
 ent that one who would have been an accessory at common law may 
 be dealt with as a principal without reference to the prosecution 
 of the principal, but they do not make the accessory necessarily 
 guilty of the same offense as that of the principal, the degree of 
 his guilt depending upon the part he took in the crime. ^ Principals 
 and accessories are grouped together in these statutes without any 
 distinction as to their punishment or the nature of the offense; 
 the killing is homicide, whether the person charged was the princi- 
 pal actor, an aider, or abetter, or an accessory.^ To be a principal 
 in, or to aid or abet the crime of, homicide under them it is nec- 
 essary that the assistance should be rendered either by acts or words 
 of encouragement or support; or, when no assistance is given, that 
 there should be presence, either actual or constructive, by prear- 
 rangement special or general, or at least, to the knowledge of the 
 principal, with the intent to render assistance should it become 
 
 63 Miss. 260; State v. King, 9 Mont, vietion, murder in the second degree be- 
 
 445, 24 Pac. 265; People v. Bliven, 112 ing a felony. Hewitt v. State, 43 Fla. 
 
 N. Y. 79, 8 Am. St. Rep. 701, 19 N. E. 194, 30 So. 795. 
 
 638; Reeves v. Territory, 10 Okla. 194, aState v. Gleim, 17 Mont. 17, 31 L.R. 
 
 61 Pae. 828: State v. Steeves, 29 Or. 85, A. 294, 52 Am. St. Rep. 655, 41 Pac. 
 
 43 Pac. 947; State v. Phelps, 5 S. D. 998. 
 
 480, 59 N. W. 471 ; Phillips v. State, 26 3 People v. Valencia, 43 Cal. 552. 
 
 Tex. App. 228, 8 Am. St. Rep. 471, 9 S. ^Powers v. Com. 110 Ky. 386, 53 L.R. 
 
 W. 557; State v. White, 10 Wash. 611, A. 245, 61 S. W. 735. 
 
 39 Pac. 160, 41 Pac. 442; State v. Payne, BUsselton v. People, 149 111. 612, 36 
 
 10 Wash. 545, 39 Pae. 157; State v. X. E. 952; Fixmer v. People, 153 111. 
 
 Duncan, 7 Wash. 336, 38 Am. St. Rep. 123, 38 N. E. 667. 
 
 888, 35 Pac. 117; Reg. v. Manning, 2 But a statement of the circumstances 
 
 Car. & K. 887. of the offense, as in the indictment of an 
 
 A person charged \\ith murder may be accessory at common law, will not ren- 
 
 convicted as an accessory before the fact der the indictment bad if it also charges 
 
 to murder in the second degree under the accused directly as principal. Fix- 
 
 a statute providing that whoever coun- mer v. People, supra. 
 
 sels, hires, or otherwise procures a fel- estate v. Smith, 100 Iowa, 1, 69 N. W. 
 
 ony to be committed may be convicted 269. 
 
 as an accessory before the fact, either TPeople v. Mather, 4 Wend. 229, 21 
 
 with the principal felon or after his con- Am. Dec. 122. 
 
84 HOMICIDE. [§ 66 
 
 necessary.* And they include accessories before the fact; and per- 
 sons advising, encouraging, or procuring the commission of a hom- 
 icide are regarded as aiders and abetters, the same as those pres- 
 ent assisting in the act.* And a person may be convicted under 
 an information or indictment charging him as principal, although 
 the evidence shows that he was not present at the time of the com- 
 mission of the criminal act, but that he advised and counseled it.^" 
 And statutory provisions with reference to accessories have no re- 
 lation to, and need not be charged on the trial of, a person indicted 
 as principal in a homicide. * ^ And evidence that the accused was 
 engaged in a conspiracy to commit a homicide is properly admitted 
 under a statute providing that those who aid and abet the commis- 
 sion of a crime, though not present, must be indicted, tried, and 
 punished as principals, though the indictment merely charged him 
 as principal and contained no allegations of a conspiracy. ^ ^ l^or 
 is it error to fail to instruct the jury in a prosecution for homicide 
 on the theory that the accused must have been an accomplice or an 
 accessory, where the evidence indicates that if there was any guilty 
 participation in the alleged homicide, it was as principal, and not 
 as accomplice or accessory. * '' Such statutes do not violate con- 
 stitutional provisions guaranteeing to persons accused of crime the 
 right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
 
 sState ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Tally, 102 and is not intended to abolish the dis- 
 
 Ala. 25j 15 So. 722; Usselton v. People, tinction between principals in the second 
 
 149 111. 612, 36 N. E. 952; Thompson v. degree and accessories. Com. v. Knapp, 
 
 Com. 1 Met. (Ky.) 13; Phillips v. State, 9 Pick. 496, 20 Am. Dec. 491. 
 
 26 Tex. App. 228, 8 Am. St. Rep. 471, And this rule does not apply to ac- 
 
 9 S. W. 557. cessories after the fact. Wade v. State, 
 
 sState ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Tally, 71 Ind. 535. 
 
 supra; Baxter v. People, 8 111. 368. lOState v. Duncan, 7 Wash. 336, 38 
 
 111. Grim. Code, div. 2, § 2, providing Am. St. Rep. 888, 35 Pac. 117. 
 
 that an accessory is one who stands by nBrown v. State, 55 Ark. 593, 18 S. 
 
 and aids, abets, or assists, or who, not W. 1051. 
 
 being present aiding, abetting, or assist- It has been held, however, that though 
 ing, has advised, encouraged, aided, or the statute abolishes all distinction in 
 abetted the perpetration of the crime, cases of felony between an accessory 
 includes those who are principals in the before the fact and a principal, in re- 
 second degree at common law, such as spect to the grade of the offense and its 
 those standing by. aiding and abetting, punishment, it is still necessary to state 
 as well as those who were not present, in an indictment for homicide the par- 
 but had advised and encouraged the per- ticular acts wliicli establish the fact that 
 petration of the crime. Usselton v. Peo- the accused aided and abetted the crime 
 pie, supra. and thus became a principal. People v' 
 
 But Mass. Stat. 1784, chap. 65, provid- Campbell, 40 Cal. 129. 
 
 ing that if any person shall aid, assist, izState v. Munehrath. 78 Iowa 208 
 
 abet, counsel, hire, command, or pro- 43 N. W. 211. 
 
 cure any person to commit the crime of i3Harris v. State, 37 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 murder, he shall be considered as an ac- 441, 36 S. W. 88. 
 
 eessory before the fact, refers to a per- In State v. White. 10 Wasli. 611 39 
 
 son not present aiding and assisting, Pac. 160, 41 Pac. 442, however it is 
 
§ 06] PARTICIPANTS IN THE CRIME. 85 
 
 them.^* And they make no changes in the law, except as to the 
 remedy, and do not take away the right of the state to prosecute 
 for a felony committed prior to their enactment, and are not, there- 
 fore, within the constitutional inhibition with reference to ex post 
 facto legislation.-^® 
 
 V. ACCESSOBIES AFTEE THE EACT. 
 
 67. Who are, generally. — An accessory after the fact is one who, 
 when knowing a felony to have been committed by another, shel- 
 ters, receives, relieves, comforts, or assists the felon, whether he be 
 a principal or an accessory before the fact merely.^ Any assistance 
 given to one known to be a felon, in order to hinder his apprehension, 
 trial, or punishment, is sufficient to make a man an accessory after 
 the fact; as, for instance, that he concealed him in his house ;^ 
 or shut the door against his pursuers, until he should have an 
 opportunity of escaping;* or took money from him to allow him to 
 escape ; or supplied him with money, a horse, or other necessaries, in 
 order to enable him to escape ; * or aided in concealing the body of 
 the person slain ;^ or concealed the fact of the commission of the 
 crime ; ® or that the principal was in prison, and the defendant, be- 
 fore conviction, bribed the jailer to let him escape, or supplied him 
 with materials to effect the same purpose.^ Merely suffering the 
 felon to escape, however, will not charge the party so doing, such 
 amounting to a mere omission.^ So, if a person supply a felon in 
 prison with victuals or other necessaries for his sustenance;" or 
 succor and sustain him if he be bailed out of prison;^" or profes- 
 sionally attend a felon sick or wounded, although he knew him to 
 
 held that an instruction in a prosecu- ^Hall's Sum. 218; 2 Hawk. P. C. 
 
 tion for homicide that, if the accused is chap. 29, § 26. 
 
 found to have fired the fatal shot, he ^People v. Keefer, 65 Cal. 232, 3 Pac. 
 
 may be found guilty, is improper and er- 818. 
 
 roneous, where the theory of the prose- eWhite v. People, 81 111. 333. 
 
 cution was that he procured, counseled, Where a person is charged as acces- 
 
 aided, and abetted the killing by others, sory after the fact to a murder the ques- 
 
 and did not do it himself, and the evi- tion for the jury is whether such person, 
 
 dence all tended to support that theory, knowing the offense had been committed, 
 
 Instate V. Steeves, 29 Or. 85, 43 Pac. was either assisting the murderer to 
 
 947; State V. Cassady, 12 Kan. 550. conceal the death, or in any way en- 
 
 isSage V. State, 127 Ind. 15, 26 N. E. deavoring to enable him to evade the 
 
 667. pursuit of justice. Rex v. Greenacre, 8 
 
 12 Hawk. P. C. chap. 29, § 1; Rex v. Gar. & P. 35. 
 
 Burridge, 3 P. Wms. 475; Barrel v. 71 Hale, P. C. 621; Hawk. P. C. b. 2, 
 
 State, 39 Miss. 702, 80 Am. Dec. 97. chap. 29, § 26; Archbold, by Jervis, 9. 
 
 2Dalt. 530, 531. slHale, P. C. 619. 
 
 31 Hale, P. 0. 619. See 4 Bl. Com. 91 Hale, P. C. 620. 
 
 37. loibid. 
 
86 HOMICIDE. ['§ 67 
 
 be a felon ; ^ ^ or speak or write in order to obtain a felon's pardon 
 or deliverance/^ or advise his friends to write to the witnesses not 
 to appear against him at his trial, and they write accordingly/* 
 or even if he himself agree, for money, not to give evidence against 
 the felon/* or know of the felony and do not discover it,^® — it 
 seems that these acts will not be sufficient to make the party an 
 accessory after the fact. 
 
 68. Constituent elements and character of the offense. — ^Two things 
 are laid down in the books as necessary to constitute a man accessory 
 after the fact to the felony of another. First, the felony must be 
 complete/ and aiding a guilty person to escape after he has given 
 another a mortal wound, but before death ensues, does not make the 
 person rendering such aid an accessory after the fact, since the 
 homicide is not consummated until death occurs. ^ And second, the de- 
 fendant must know that the felon is guilty/ and this, therefore, 
 is always averred in the indictment.* And though it seems to have 
 been doubted whether an implied notice of the felony will not, in 
 some cases, suffice, — as, where a man receives a felon in the same 
 county in which he has been attainted, which is supposed to have been 
 a matter of notoriety, — it seems to be the better opinion that some 
 more particular evidence is requisite to raise the presumption of 
 knowledge.^ One may be convicted as an accessory after the fact, 
 however, to a homicide committed by an unknown person. ® And the 
 offense of an accessory after the fact in homicide being distinctively 
 his own, and not that of his principal, a charge of homicide does not 
 include the ofEense of an accessory after the fact, even under statutes 
 abolishing the distinction between principals and accessories; and 
 a person indicted for homicide cannot be convicted of being an ac- 
 cessory after the fact. ^ Nor is he an accomplice, defined to be a per- 
 son who knowingly, voluntarily, and with common intent with 
 
 111 Hale, p. C. 332. ing him, knowing he had committed the 
 
 1226 Assizes, 47. murder, the latter may be convicted as 
 
 133 Inst. 139; 1 Hale, P. C. 620. an accessory after the fact, notwith- 
 
 14F. Moore, 8. standing that the former was found 
 
 161 Hale, P. C. 371, 618; Bird V. Unit- guilty of manslaughter only. Hex v. 
 
 ed States, 187 U. S. 118, 47 L. ed. 100, Greenacre, 8 Car. & P. 35. 
 
 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 42. 31 Hale, P. C. 622: Hawk. P. C. b. 
 
 iChitty, Crim. Law, 264; 1 Hale, P. 2, chap. 29, § 32; Cora. Dig. Justices, 
 
 ('. 622 ; 2 Hawk. P. C. chap. 29, § 35 ; T. 2. 
 
 Harrel v. State, 39 Miss. 702, 80 Am. 4Hawk. P. C. b. 2, chap. 29, § 33; 
 
 Dee. 95. State v. Davis, 14 R. I. 281. 
 
 2Harrel v. State, supra. eiHale, P. C. 323, 622; Rex v. Bur- 
 
 But where two persons are indicted, ridge, 3 P. Wms. 475. 
 
 one for a wilful murder, and the other estate v. Green, 4 Strobh. L. 128. 
 
 for receiving and harboring and assist- 'Wade v. State, 71 Ind. 535. 
 
§ 08] PARTICIPANTS IN THE CRIME. 87 
 
 the principal offender unites in the commission of a crime, whose 
 testimony against his principal is required by law to be corroborated. * 
 And the crime being one of much less magnitude than that of the 
 principal a different and milder punishment is usually imposed.® 
 
 69. What relationship excuses. — .The only relation which excuses 
 the harboring a felon is that of a wife to her husband, because she is 
 considered subject to his control, as well as bound to him by affec- 
 tion.^ Where the only part a wife takes in a homicide by her hus- 
 band consists in harboring and comforting him after the crime is 
 committed, she is not liable as an accessory.^ But at common law 
 no other ties, however near, will excuse; for if the husband protect 
 the wife, the father his son, or a brother his brother, they contract the 
 guilt, and are liable to the punishment of accessories to the original 
 felony. '' 
 
 VI. Persoits conspieing oe combining to commit ceime. 
 
 70. General consideration — Persons conspiring together for the 
 purpose of accomplishing some criminal act, which in the ordinary 
 course of events might naturally result in homicide, and combining 
 or acting together for the purpose of carrying their conspiracy into 
 effect, are all principals in a resultant killing, and it is immaterial 
 to inquire who struck the fatal blow. ^ Thus, all those who assemble 
 themselves together with an intent even to commit a trespass, the 
 natural execution whereof causes a felony to be committed, and who 
 continue together aiding and abetting one another till they have 
 actually put their design into execution, are principals in the 
 felony, as well as all those who are present when a felony is commit- 
 ted and abet the doing of it.' And where persons combine to stand 
 together in a breach of the peace, with a general resolution to re- 
 sist all opposers, and in the execution of their design a murder is 
 committed, all of the company are equally principals in the murder, 
 though at the time of the act some of them were at such a distance as 
 to be out of view, if the murder be in furtherance of the common de- 
 
 sState V. Umble, 115 Mo. 452, 22 S. other near relatives. Gen. Stat. chap. 
 
 W. 378. 168, § 6. 
 
 9Ibid. iState v. Finley, 118 N. C. 1161, 24 
 
 iHale, P. C. 621 ; 2 Hawk. P. C. chap. S. E. 495 ; Stephens v. State, 42 Ohio 
 
 29, § 34; 4 Bl. Com. 39; Com. Dig. St. 150; Phillips v. State, 26 Tex. App. 
 
 Jus. T. 2; Reg. v. Manning, 2 Car. & 228, 8 Am. St. Rep. 471, 9 S. W. 557. 
 
 K. 903. 2Fost. C. L. 351, 352; 2 Hawk. P. C. 
 
 2Reg. V. Manning, 2 Car. & K. 887. chap. 29, § 9; Reg. v. Howell, 9 Car. 
 
 31 Hale, P. C. 621 ; Hawk, P. C. b. 2. & P. 437; Brennan v. People, 15 111. 511; 
 
 chap. 29, § 34; 4 Bl. Com. 39. In Mas- Carrington v. People, 6 Park. Crim. Rep. 
 
 sachusetts this is expanded by statute to 336. 
 
88 HOMICIDE. LS '» 
 
 sign. ^ So, where divers persons resolve severally to resist all opposers 
 in the commission of a breach of the peace, and to execute it in such a 
 manner as naturally tends to raise tumults and affrays, leading to 
 bloodshed, and in doing so happen to kill a man, they are all guilty 
 of murder ; for they who unlawfully engage in such bold disturbances 
 of the public peace, in opposition to, and in defiance of, the justice 
 of the nation, must, at their peril, abide the event of their actions. 
 Malice, in such a killing, may be inferred as a presumption of fact 
 from the nature of the design and the character of the preparations. ■* 
 This subject is more specifically considered in another part of this 
 work. ^ 
 
 SDalt. J., chap. 161 ; 1 Hale, P. C. 624, Fed. Cas. No. 16,196. See, however, 
 
 439; 2 Hawk. P. C. chap. 29, § 8; Reg. remarks of Bigelow, Ch. J., in Com. v. 
 
 V. Howell, and Brennan v. People, supra; Campbell, 7 Allen, 541, 83 Am. Dec. 
 
 Williams v. People, 54 111. 423; Ruloff 705. 
 
 V. People, 45 N. Y. 213; Com. v. Hare, 4Kirby v. State, 23 Tex. App. 24, 5 
 
 2 Clark (Pa.) 467; Weston v. Com. Ill S. W. 165. And see infra, chapters VII., 
 
 Pa. 251, 2 Atl. 191; Miller v. State, 25 VIII. 
 
 Wis. 384; United States v. Ross, 1 Gall. Hiee infra, chapter XXI. 
 
CHAPTEE VII. 
 
 ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES AS TO MALICE. 
 
 71. Definition of malice and dolus. 
 
 72. Expositions of the Italian jurists: Decian. 
 
 73. Early GermoJi junists: Carpzov. 
 
 74. Leyser. 
 
 75. Nettlebladt. 
 
 70. Recent German jurists: Gessler. 
 
 77. Gessler's classification of dolus. 
 
 78. Dolus determinatus. 
 
 79. Dolus alternativus or eventualis. 
 
 80. Views of English common-law writers. 
 
 71. Definition of malice and dolus — Malice may be defined as evil 
 intent ; and may, for the purposes of this treatise, be regarded as con- 
 vertible with dolus. Dolus, indeed, includes the idea of fraud, which 
 in our present legal use is not expressed by malice ; but so far as con- 
 cerns injuries effected by force, dolus expresses whatever we are 
 accustomed to include under the term "malice." A wound, which by 
 our law would not be regarded as malicious, would not by the 
 Roman law be regarded as caused by dolus. A wound to whose au- 
 thor the Roman law does not impute dolus would not be regarded 
 by our law as malicious. Between dolus and culpa the line is drawn 
 in the Roman law in the same way as, in our own law, the line be- 
 tween malice and negligence. There is, however, this difference 
 between the two jurisprudences, — to dolus, as a psychological study 
 the Roman jurists devoted great attention ; to malice, as a psycholog- 
 ical study, our jurists have given but little attention, contenting them- 
 selves with dealing curtly with the subject in the concrete. Under 
 these circumstances, it may elucidate our conclusions if we examine 
 some of the expositions of Roman jurisprudence on this interesting 
 topic. 
 
 72. Expositions of the Italian jurists : Decian — Decian was a com- 
 mentator who wrote early in the sixteenth century,^ and who took 
 a prominent part in the jurisprudence and politics of Italy. He starts 
 
 iTraetatus Criminalism lib. I. chaps. 
 4, 6 et seq. 
 
 89 
 
90 HOMICIDE. [*§ 72 
 
 by distinguishing between mens, voluntas, and intentio, declaring the 
 latter to be an act of the will directed to a specific end, while under 
 propositum he includes the selection of means to effect such end. He 
 considers that dolus, in this sense, may be viewed in seven distinct 
 aspects : — 
 
 1. When the intention exists only in thought; in which case no 
 liability attaches: Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur. 
 
 2. When the actor proceeds to an attempt, without effecting 
 the object in view; when, if the attempt is part execution of the 
 intended crime, a penal offense is committed. 
 
 3. When he effects his object by the means which he designs, which 
 is dolus. 
 
 4. When, from the means he designs, an object aside from his 
 original purpose is effected; in which case no dolus is necessarily 
 imputed. 
 
 5. When an accident intervenes, to which dolus succeeds. 
 
 6. When the effect is produced by culpa. 
 
 7. When the effect is produced without either dolus or culpa. 
 Dolus is described as voluntatis vitium, or an error of the will ; 
 
 culpa as intellectus et memorice vitium, or error of the intellect and 
 memory. Dolus is ascribed to m,enti sceleratce et flagitioscej culpa 
 to menti imprudenti ac stolidw. Offenses marked by dolus are de- 
 scribed as vera maleficia; those marked by culpa, as quasi maleficia. 
 According to Decian, therefore, an iinintentional killing, even though 
 in performance of an illegal act, could not be charged to dolus. 
 Hence, to convict for a malicious homicide there must be a specific 
 intent to kill. For dolus is defined to be animi destinatio et propos- 
 iium ad certum delictum quoquo modo perpetrandum; in other 
 words, the malice, to sustain the charge of a malicious crime, must 
 have been directed to this particular crime. 
 
 73. Early German jurists: Carpzov. — Carpzov (159.5-1666) was a 
 leading Saxon jurist, being at the same time a judge, a professor of 
 jurisprudence in the University of Leipsic, and a privy councilor to 
 the King of Saxony. He disposes of the qixestion wliether, when 
 a death results from a wound the intention of which was only to 
 hurt, the crime is murder, by holding that if the means adopted by 
 the actor were likely to cause death, then the homicide is to be treated 
 as malicious. The assailant who, when inflicting a wound, knows, or 
 ought to know, that the wound may perhaps produce death (vulnera 
 ad mensuram dari non posse), premeditates the wound with all the 
 consequences it contingently involves, and therefore premeditates 
 
§ 73] ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES AS TO MALICK 91 
 
 the consequence of death. It is true that the will applies in such 
 case to the death only indirecte et per accidensj in the same way that 
 he who wills to drink wine immoderately indirectly wills to be 
 drunk. Hence, according to the reasoning of Carpzov, when death, 
 tho\igh not specifically intended, results from an intentional wound, 
 then the homicide is to he viewed as indirectly intended. No opinion, 
 however, is expressed on the question whether doliis is to be imputed 
 in cases where the death follows the wounding not per se, but per 
 accidens. 
 
 74. leyser. — .Leyser (1683-1752), a professor in Wittenberg, and 
 author of a valuable exposition of the Pandects,^ spent some years 
 of study in England, and discussed the question of dolus, no doubt 
 with a full knowledge of the old English doctrine of the tacking of 
 collateral felonious intent.^ He advances on the proposition of Oarp- 
 zov, by holding that to dolus generalis it is not essential that there 
 should be propositum vulnerandi aut corpus Iwdendi, but that it is 
 enough if there be animus quomodocunque Icedendi. 
 
 75. Nettlebladt.— ISTettlebladt (1719-1791), a professor at Halle, 
 published a Dissertatio juridica de Jiomicidio ex intentione indirecta 
 commisso, in which the immediate topic before us is minutely dis- 
 cussed.^ According to the view here propounded, guilt (Schuld), 
 in its general relations, is a defectus rectitudinis actionis {con- 
 cenienticB cum omnibus detsrminationihus Jwminis essentialibvs) 
 vincibilis. Culpa, in specie, is a defectus rectitudinis actionis quoad 
 intellectum vincibilis; while dolus is a def. rect. actionis quoad vol- 
 untaiem vincibilis. Culpa assumes inaction both as to knowing' and 
 willing ; dolus assumes that the act is done both knowingly and will- 
 ingly. In other words, negligence is a defect of the intellect ; malice, 
 a defect of the heart. N^egligence is lack of attention; malice, an 
 evil intention. Here, then, we strike upon the important distinction 
 between direct and indirect malice {dolus directus and dolus indi- 
 rectus.) Dolus directus is when the result is specifically intended; 
 as, when A. kills B., intending at the time to kill. Dolus indirectus 
 exists when the result is not specifically intended, but when 
 it results as naturally from the means adopted by him as would have 
 resulted that specifically willed; as, when A. wounds B., intending 
 only to wound him, but when death naturally follows the wound. 
 Anticipating the distinction of some of the American statutes, a 
 
 iMeditationes ad Pandectas, xi. vol., from the copious abstract in Gessler's 
 Leipzig, 1741. Dolus, Tubingen, 1860, not having ac- 
 
 2See infra, chapter VIII., § 92. cess to the original text. 
 
 il quote in this, as in prior instances, 
 
92 HOMICDE. [§ 75 
 
 lighter punishment is to be assigned to dolus indirectus, where there 
 is no specific intention to take life, than to dolus directus, where 
 there is a specific intention to take life. To dolus indirectus, the fol- 
 lowing conditions are requisite : — 
 
 1. The result should follow from a voluntary act or omission of 
 the assailant. 
 
 2. There must be an intention to hurt the individual killed, ex- 
 cluding, therefore, the cases where the intent is to commit a col- 
 lateral felony. ^ 
 
 3. On the other hand, a direct purpose to kill must not exist, for 
 then we would have dolu^ directus; yet such direct purpose is only 
 to be inferred when to the means of violence, as they are knowingly 
 and wilfully adopted by the assailant, death is to be imputed as an 
 unavoidable consequent. 
 
 4. There must exist a possibility that death should follow from 
 the violent act of the assailant in the same way that there existed a 
 possibility that the effect immediately designed would have fol- 
 lowed from the same violence. This happens when the assailant 
 uses a weapon, which ordinarily produces death, in such a way that 
 from its use death or wounding is equally probable. 
 
 76. Recent German jurists: Gessler — By recent German jurists 
 the topic before us has been largely discussed. As representing their 
 conflicting theories, reference is made to Gessler, whose judicious 
 work on dolus was published, as has been noticed, in 1860. Gessler 
 starts with the position that to dolus are essential, (1) the internal 
 will; (2) the external act; (3) the causal relation of the will to the 
 act. If the will is not brought into connection with the act, the act 
 is not to be considered as willed; yet we must remember that no 
 thoughtful man can insulate a particular act so as to cut that act off 
 from the consequences that naturally follow from it. And if shoot- 
 ing at B. necessarily involves the contingency of missing B. and hit- 
 ting C, then dolus in such case is to be imputed to the killing of C. 
 This brings up the famous distinction between Vorsatz and Ahsichi, 
 — ^a distinction which cannot be tersely expressed in our language. 
 Vorsatz is the purpose to use a particular instrument; Absicht is 
 the purpose to effect a particular end. Vorsatz, for instance, selects 
 the instrument of killing, knovnng that its use may kill C. as well as 
 B. ; Absicht selects B. as the person to be killed, indifferent as to 
 what means are to effect the end. Yet, nevertheless, Vorsatz (the 
 willing of the means) and Absicht (the willing of the end) stand in 
 
 2See infra, chapter VIII., § 92. 
 
§ 76] ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES AS TO MALICE. 93 
 
 necessary relationship to each other. On the one side the means 
 used are employed to effect a particular end. On the other side, the 
 end cannot be effected without the use of particular means. The 
 means employed, however, may result in a variety of ends, and the 
 linal intent (e. g., an intent to kill) may be consummated by various 
 instrumental intents. Hence it follows that to a crime there can be 
 no final intent (AhsicM) without an instrumental intent (Vorsatz), 
 and no instrumental intent without a final intent. It is true that 
 until there be an overt act, there can be an instrumental intent with- 
 out a final intent, or a final intent without an instrumental intent. 
 But the moment action begins, then there must be both instrumental 
 intent and final intent. There must be instrumental intent, because 
 action involves a specific instrument. There must be final intent, 
 because no reasoning being uses means without an end. Dolus is 
 therefore the consummation of an offense by an instrument specifi- 
 cally intended. Culpa consists in the consummation of an offense 
 not intentionally, but through the lack of such diligence as it was the 
 duty of the party to bestow. And it is sufficient to constitute dolus 
 (malice) that the fatal resvilt should only appear to the assailant as 
 a mere possibility. If the means adopted are such as cannot possibly 
 succeed, then there is no such connection between the instrumental 
 intent and the final intent as is essential to constitute guilt. But if 
 there be no such impossibility, and if the means adopted, improbable 
 as it would seem, have a fatal result, then the end is to be regarded 
 as having been intended. 
 
 77. Gessler's classification of dolus. — From the relation of instru- 
 mental intent to final intent (Vorsatz to Ahsicht), it follows that the 
 first must be directed to the use of a particular instrument, but that 
 this instrument may be used to effectuate one of several final in- 
 tents; e. g., a blow may be given with intent either to wound, or 
 maim, or disgrace, or kill; or a house may be set on fire with 
 the alternative intent either to destroy the owner's property, or to 
 take his life. In this view dolus may be regarded as either deter- 
 fninatus, alternativus, or eventualis. 
 
 78. Dolus determinatus. — Dolus determinatus exists when the in- 
 strument is intentionally used to effect a single purpose, — as, when a 
 deadly poison is intentionally given and the sole purpose is to kill. 
 It makes no difference whether or no the instrument will effect the 
 object with apparent certainty. The person whose life is attempted 
 may have warded off susceptibility to disease by antidotes. Or it 
 may happen that the assailant may be limited in carrying out his 
 
94 HOMICIDE. ['§ 78 
 
 plan to a single agency comparatively uncertain. In either way 
 dolv£ determinatus is established. 
 
 79. Dolus altemativus or eventualis. — It may happen that the in- 
 strument selected may have two or more distinct effects, and that of 
 the possibility of this the assailant is, or ought to be, aware. This 
 may occur in the f ollovsdng cases : — 
 
 1. The assailant has a primary object in view, and his final in- 
 tention is directed to effect this object ; but he recognizes a second ob- 
 ject as either the possible or probable result of the instrument he em- 
 ploys. Cases of this class are divided as follows : — 
 
 (a) Dolus eventualis. — ^When only the second object is criminal; 
 as, where A. shoots at a mark, seeing B. near the mark, and knowing 
 that a slight divergence may cause the shot to miss the mark and to 
 strike B. ; and when B. is struck and killed. 
 
 (b) Dolus determinatus et eventualis. — ^When both objects are 
 criminal; as, where A. shoots at B. and hits C, who is so near to B. 
 that the hitting of C. was or ought to have been within the contem- 
 plation of A. as probable. ^ 
 
 2. When the assailant is indifferent as to which of several prob- 
 able objects is effected by the instrument chosen by him. 
 
 (a) When only one of these objects is criminal, which is dolus 
 alternativus in its single sense. 
 
 (b) When all are criminal ; as, where a man shoots at a crowd, not 
 caring whom he hits; which is dolus alternativus in the ordinary 
 sense. 
 
 3. When the assailant desires to effect several criminal objects 
 simultaneously, which takes place. This brings a concurrence of sev- 
 eral doli determinati, which are to be tried severally. 
 
 4. The assailant has his intention fixed on a single criminal ob- 
 ject, but, while effecting such object, he accidentally and against his 
 will effects, by the instrument used, another criminal object. If so, 
 the first contingency involves only dolus; the second only culpa. 
 This covers the case, hereafter fully discussed, of a person who, when 
 shooting a tame fowl, accidentally, and against his will, kills the 
 owner of the fowl. ^ 
 
 80. Views of English common-law writers By the leadino' English 
 
 writers of the old school, malice is held to include not only special 
 malevolence toward the individual slain, but a generally wicked, de- 
 praved, and malignant spirit; a heart regardless of social d\ity, and 
 
 iSee infra, chapter VIII., § 89, chap- 2See infra, chapter VIII., § 02. 
 ter XVI. 
 
§ 80] ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES AS TO MALICE. 95 
 
 deliberately bent on mischief.^ And, in general,^ any formed de- 
 sign of doing mischief is by these authors called malice ; and, there- 
 fore, not only such killing as proceeds from premeditated hatred or 
 revenge against the person killed, but also, in many other cases, such 
 killing as is accompanied with circumstances that show the heart to 
 be perversely wicked, is adjudged to be of malice prepense^ and con- 
 sequently murder.^ Malice is where a person wilfully does that 
 which he knows will injure another in person or property.* ! 
 
 iFost. C. L. 256. 262. some considerable time before the eom- 
 
 21 Hawk. P. C. chap. 31, § 18; Fost. mission of the act. Envy, hatred, and 
 
 257; 1 Hale, P. C. 451-454; 1 Russell, malice are tliree distinct passions of the 
 
 Crimes, 510-520. mind. Reg. v. Mawgridge, J. Kelyng, 
 
 31 Hale, P. C. 451; 4 Bl. Com. 199. 127. 
 
 Malice in homicide is not a rancor of 4 Queen v. Ward, L. R. 1 C. 0. 360; 
 
 mind lodged in the person killing for Holland v. State, 12 Fla. 117. 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 MALICE IN HOMICIDE, GENERALLY. 
 
 I. What constitutes. 
 
 81. Definitions and distinctions. 
 
 82. Constituent elements. 
 
 83. Classification and elements of classes. 
 
 84. Distinction unsound. 
 II. Malice towaed pekson killed. 
 
 85. How considered. 
 
 86. Intent to kill. 
 
 87. Intent to do bodily harm. 
 
 88. Effect of existence of other intents. 
 
 III. Maucb aimed at one when anotheh is killed. 
 
 89. The established rule. 
 
 IV. Malice toward the public in genebal, or a particular body of men. 
 
 90. Malice toward a, class covers malice toward an individual, 
 
 91. Degree of culpability. 
 
 V. Intent to commit collateral crime. 
 
 92. The general rule. 
 
 VI. Inferences and presumptions as to malice. 
 
 93. Generally. 
 
 94. Inference from the act itself. 
 
 95. Inference from cruelty and barbarity. 
 
 96. Inference from circumstances of case generally. 
 
 97. Inference from use of poison. 
 
 98. Inference from character of weapon. 
 
 99. Malice, when presumed. 
 
 100. Presumption with reference to use of deadly weapons. 
 
 101. What weapons are deadly; general rules. 
 
 102. Character of particular weapons. 
 
 103. Presumption of continuance of malice. 
 VII. Existence of, how determined. 
 
 104. A question for the jury. 
 
 I. What constitutes. 
 81. Definitions and distinctions — Malice in connection with homi- 
 cide is defined to be the intentional doing of an unlawful act toward 
 another, without legal justification or excuse.^ It is a formed de- 
 
 iGallaher v. State, 28 Tex. App. 247, State, 30 Tex. App. 129, 28 Am St Rep 
 
 12 S. W. 1087; Powell v. State, 28 Tex. 895, 16 S. W. 767: McKinney v. State, 
 
 App. 393, 13 S. W. 599; Martinez v. 8 Tex. App. 626; Ellis v. State, 30 Tex. 
 
 96 
 
81] 
 
 MALICE IN HOMICIDE, GENERALLY. 
 
 97 
 
 sign of doing mischief to another. * It is a condition of mind which 
 shows a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on mischief, 
 the existence of which is inferred from acts committed or words 
 spoken.^ It consists of the dictates of a wicked, depraved, and malig- 
 nant heart, or a corrupt motive,* and includes anger, hatred, and re- 
 venge, and every other intent to do any unlawful act which may 
 probably deprive a person of life.® It means an intent to do such 
 bodily harm as may produce death, in the absence of mitigating facts 
 or justifying circumstances ; or a formed design to do such mischief as 
 may endanger life ; or an intent of the mind and heart which prompts 
 the doing of a wrongful act without justification, cause, or excuse, 
 in the absence of anything which reduces the grade of the crime.® 
 
 App. 60Ii 18 S. W. 139; MeCoy v. State, 
 25 Tex. 39, 78 Am. Dec. 520; Logan v. 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 53 S. W. 694; 
 Stevens v. State. 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 1S4, 59 S. W. 545; Cribbs v. State, 86 
 Ala. 613, 6 So. 109; Boulden v. State, 
 102 Ala. 78, 15 So. 341 ; Stoball v. State, 
 116 Ala. 454, 23 So. 162; People v. Tay- 
 lor, 36 Cal. 255; People v. MeRoberts 
 (Cal. App.) 81 Pac. 734; Holland v. 
 St'^te. 12 Fla. 117; Davison v. Peonle, 
 flO 111. 221; Nichols v. Com. 11 Bush, 
 575 ; Kiiel v. Com. 5 Bush, 362 ; Ludwig 
 v. Com. 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1108, 60 S. W. 
 8; Jolly V. Com. 110 Ky. 190, 96 Am. St. 
 Rep. 429, 61 S. W. 49; Clark v. Com. 
 Ill Ky. 443, 63 S. W. 740; Com. v. York, 
 <) Met. 93, 43 Am. Dec. 373; State v. 
 Wieners, 66 Mo. 14; State v. Thomas, 
 «9 Mo. 235, 12 S. W. 643; State v. Ba- 
 ber, II Mo. App. 585 Appx.; State v. 
 Ellis, 11 Mo. App. 586 Appx.; State v. 
 Weede", 133 Mo. 70, 34 S. W. 473; State 
 v. Thomas, 78 Mo. 327 ; State v. Schoen- 
 wald, 31 Mo. 147; Davis v. State, 51 
 Neb. 301, 70 N. W. 984; Housh v. 
 State, 43 Neb. 16,3, 61 N. W. 571; 
 «tate V. Stewart, 9 Nev. 120: State 
 V. Mcintosh, 39 S. C. 97, 17 S. E. 446; 
 United States v. Meagher, 37 Fed. 875 ; 
 Bromage v. Prosser, 4 Barn. & C. 255. 
 And see State v. Byrd, 72 S. C. 104, 51 
 S. E. 542; Spangler v. State, 42 Tex. 
 Crim. Rep. 233, 61 S. W. 314. 
 
 2Reg. v. Mawgridge, J. Kelyng. 121. 
 
 sMcCoy v. State, 25 Tex. 33, 78 Am. 
 Deo. 520; Martinez v. State, 30 Tex. 
 App. 129, 28 Am. St. Rep. 895, 16 S. W. 
 767; Ellis v. State, 30 Tex. App. 601, 
 IS S. W. 139; Harris v. State, 8 Tex. 
 App. 91 : Patterson v. Stite (Tex. Crim. 
 App.) 60 S. W. 557; Logan v. State 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 53 S. W. 694; Con- 
 Hom.-7. 
 
 nell V. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 259, 81 
 S. W. 746; Vela v. State, 33 Tex. Crim. 
 Rep. 322, 26 S. W. 396; Cain v. State, 
 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 210, 59 -S. W. 275; 
 State V. Dugan, Houst. Crim. Rep. 
 (Del.) 563; State v. Draper, Houst. 
 Crim. Rep. (Del.) 531; State v. Jones, 
 2 Penn. (Del.) 573, 47 Atl. 1006; State 
 V. Brinte, 4 Penn. (Del.) 551, 58 Atl. 
 258; State v. Brown (Del.) 61 Atl. 
 1077; State v. Yarborough, 39 Kan. 581, 
 18 Pac. 474; Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush. 
 295, 52 Am. Dec. 711; Vollmer v. State, 
 24 Neb. 838, 40 N. W. 420; Carr v. 
 State, 23 Neb. 749. 37 N. W. 630; State 
 v. Thompson, Wright (Ohio) 617; Unit- 
 ed States V. Meagher, 37 Fed. 875; 
 Davidson v. State, 135 Ind. 254, 34 N. 
 E. 972. 
 
 estate V. Turner, Wright (Ohio) 20; 
 State V. Towii, Wright (Ohio) 75; State 
 V. Harmon, 4 Penn. (Del.) 580, 60 Atl. 
 866; Warren v. State, 4 Coldw. 130; 
 Harris v. State, 155 Tnd. 15, 265, 56 N. 
 E. 916; Davidson v. State, supra. And 
 see Peonle v. Waysman (Cal. App.) 81 
 Pac. 1087. 
 
 5 Warren v. St'te. sunra: Parsons v. 
 People, 218 111. 386.' 75 N. E. 993; Mc- 
 Coy v. People, 175 111. 224, 51 N. E. 777 ; 
 Jackson v. People, 18 111. 269; Davidson 
 V. State, supra. 
 
 While malice does not necessarily 
 mean personal ill-will or hatred,, if the 
 sole purpose actuating one person to 
 stab another was to get revenge for some 
 wrong previously done him, whether real 
 or fancied, the act will be deemed to 
 have been malicious. Ellis v. State, 120 
 Ala. 333, 25 So. 1. 
 
 eanited States v. Boyd, 45 Fed. 851. 
 
 The intent with which a homicide 
 was committed is important in ascer- 
 
HOMICIDE. 
 
 [§ 81 
 
 It means that condition of the mind which prompts one person to 
 take the life of another without just cause or justification, signify- 
 ing a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on mischief.'' 
 And it includes, as a part of its definition, all those states of mind 
 in which the killing of the person takes place without any cause 
 which will, in law, excuse, or mitigate, or justify the act^ It has 
 a broader and more comprehensive meaning than enmity, or ill-will, 
 or revenge,* and it is not confined to cold blood, settled design, or 
 premeditation,^** or to particular ill-will toward the person in- 
 jured. ^ ^ It includes evil design in general, ^ ^ and general malignity 
 and reckless disregard of human life proceeding from a heart void 
 of a just sense of social duty, and fatally bent on mischief;*^ and is 
 implied from any deliberate or cruel act against another, however 
 
 taining the degree of guilt of the per- 
 son committing it. People v. Pool, 27 
 Cal. 573. 
 
 TState V. Gee, 85 Mo. 647; Cribba v. 
 State, 86 Ala. 613. 6 So. 109; Stoball v. 
 State, 116 Ala. 454, 23 So. 162; Lewis 
 V. State, 90 Ga. 95. 15 S. E. 697; Tay- 
 lor V. State, 105 Ga. 746, 31 S. E. 764; 
 Carson v. State, 80 Ga. 170, 5 S. E. 295; 
 Bailey v. State, 70 Ga. 617; Jackson v. 
 People, 18 111. 269; McCoy v. People, 
 175 111. 224, 51 N. E. 777; McDonel v. 
 State, 90 Ind. 320; Davidson v. State, 
 135 Ind. 254, 34 N. E. 972; Bias v. 
 United States, 3 Ind. Terr. 27, 53 S. 
 W. 471. 
 
 sHonevcutt. v. State (Tex. Crini. 
 Apt).) 63 S. W. 639. 
 
 sUnited States v. Meagher, 37 Fed. 
 875 ; People v. Taylor, 36 Cal. 255 ; Peo- 
 ple V. Balkwell, 143 Cal. 259, 76 Pac. 
 1017: Peonle v. McRoberts; (Cal. App.) 
 81 Pac. 734; Lewis v. State, 90 Ga. 95, 
 15 S. E. 607; Bailey v. State, supra; 
 Taylor v. State, 105 Ga. 746, 31 S. E. 
 764; Jackson v. People; McCoy v. Peo- 
 ple; McDonel v. State; and Davidson v. 
 State. — supra; Harris v. State, 155 Ind. 
 15, 265, 66 N. E. 916; Bias v. United 
 States, supra; Cora. v. Webster, 5 Cush. 
 295, 52 Am. Dec. 711; People v. Bor- 
 getto, 99 Mich. 336, 58 N. W. 328: State 
 V. Gee, 85 Mo. 647 ; McCoy v. State. 25 
 Tex. 33, 78 Am. Dec. 520; Evans v. 
 State, 6 Tex. App. 513; logan v. State 
 ,(Tex. Crim. App.) 53 S. W. 694. 
 
 But error in an instruction in a prose- 
 
 cittion for murder in limiting the mean- 
 ing of the term "malice" to hatred, ill- 
 will, or hostility, is not prejudicial, but 
 to the advantage of the accused, and is 
 not a. ground for reversal. Harris v. 
 State, 8 Tex. App. 90. 
 
 loUnited States v. Meagher, 37 Fed. 
 875: U-ited States v. Cornell, 2 Mason, 
 91, Fed. Cas. No. 14,868. 
 
 iiPeople V. Borgetto, supra; Me- 
 Adams v. State, 25 Ark. 405; State r. 
 Dugan, Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 563; 
 State V. Draper, Houst. Crim. Rep. 
 (Del.) 531; State v. Jones, 2 Penn. 
 (Del.) 573, 47 Atl. 1006; People v. Kir- 
 by, 2 Park. Crim. Rep. 28; State v. 
 Turner, Wright (Ohio) 20; State v. 
 Gardiner, Wright (Ohio) 392; Warren 
 V. State, 4 Coldw. 130 ; Stevens v. State, 
 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 154, 59 S. W. 545; 
 State v. Douglass, 28 W. Va. 297. 
 
 i2United States v. Meagher; State v. 
 Draper; and State v. Jones, — supra; 
 Jackson v. People, 18 111. 269; McCoy v. 
 People, 175 111. 224. 51 N. E. 777; Par- 
 sons v. People, 218 111. 386, 75 N. E. 
 993; McDo..el v. State, 90 Ind. 320; 
 Davidson v. State. 135 Ind. 254, 34 N. 
 E. 972; Bias v. United States, 3 Ind. 
 Terr. 27, 53 S. W. 471 ; People v. Bor- 
 getto, 99 Mich. 336, 58 N. W. 328; State 
 v. Gardiner, and Warren v. State, supra; 
 Honeyoutt v. State (Tex. Crim. Rep.) 
 63 S. W. 639; Aiken v. State, 10 Tex. 
 App. 610; Logan v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 App.) 53 S. W. 694. 
 
 isState V. Powell (Del.) 61 Atl. 966. 
 
§ 81] MALICE IN HOMICIDE, GENERALLY, SU 
 
 sudden.** It is something entirely different from intent to kill;*'' 
 intent to kill is not necessarily malicious, since it may be lawful; 
 as in a case of self-defense, or the proper execution of a death war- 
 rant. * ® And malice may coexist with sudden passion ; and in such 
 cases it, and not the sudden passion, characterizes the offense. * ^ An 
 injured person is not justified in taking vengeance into his own hands 
 and in deliberately seeking and slaying the person who injured 
 him. * ^ And if the killing was brutal it will be deemed to have been 
 malicious, though there was provocation.** Provocation does not 
 disprove malice ; it merely removes the presumption of malice which 
 the law raises without proof. ^^ And although there is legal provo- 
 cation a homicide is malicious, and therefore murder, when com- 
 mitted under such circumstances of cruelty as manifest a thoroughly 
 wicked heart. ^* 
 
 All unlawful and unjustifiable motives, however, cannot be classed 
 as malicious ; malice includes those only which are the more wicked.^ * 
 Mere anger is not necessarily malice,^ ^ and it requires something 
 more than a mere rash impulse to constitute malice.^* 
 
 82. Constituent elements. — Though malice in murder is called 
 malice aforethought, yet there is no particular period of time dur- 
 ing which it is necessary that it should have existed, or that the ac- 
 
 14 Com. T. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 52 S. W. 733; Wall v. State, 61 Ind. 453; 
 
 Am. Be". 711; State v. Horskin, Houst. Seals v. State, 3 Baxt. 4S9. 
 
 Crim. Rep. (Del.) 116; State v. Di "Martin v. State, 119 Ala. 1, 25 So. 
 
 Gno^IielTno. 4 Penn. (Del.) 336, 55 Atl. 255; State v. Jolmson, 23 N. C. (1 Ired. 
 
 350; Nichols v. Com. 11 Bush, 575; L.) 354, 35 Am. Dee. 742; Bristow v. 
 
 Davison v. People, 90 111. 221 ; Adams v. Com. 15 Gratt. 634. A-^d see Mitchell v. 
 
 People, 109 111. 444. 50 Am. Rep. 617; State, 129 Ala. 23, 30 So. 348. 
 
 Spies V. People, 122 111. 1, 3 Am. St. isPerry v. State, 102 Ga. 365, 30 S. 
 
 Rep. 320, 12 N. E. 865, 17 N. E. 898; E. 903. 
 
 Pnrsona v. Peorile, and Bias v. United While malice does rot necessarily 
 
 States, supra; State v. Smith, 2 Strobh. mean personal ill-will or hatred, yet if 
 
 L. 77, 47 Am. Dec. 589; State V. Levelle, the sola purpose which actuated the 
 
 34 S. C. 120, 27 Am. St, Rep. 799, 13 S. slayer was revenge for some wrong pre- 
 
 E. 319. viously done him, whether real or fan- 
 It extends to all cases of homicide, cied, the law will consider the act as 
 
 however sudden the occasion, when the done with malice. Ellis v. State, 120 
 
 act is done under such cruel circum- Ala. 333, 25 So. 1. 
 
 stRuees as are ordinarily symptoms of a instate v. Hunt, 134 N. C. 684, 47 S. 
 
 wicked, depraved, and malignait spirit. E. 49. 
 
 United States v. Cornell, 2 Mason, 91, 2oState v. Johnson, supra; Reg. v. 
 
 Fed. Cas. No. 14.868. Mawgridge, J. Kelyng, 121. 
 
 iBSta,te v. Vaughan, 22 Nev. 285, 39 aiState v. Jarrott, 23 N. C. (1 Ired. 
 
 Pac. 733; Territory v. Lucero, 8 N. M. L.) 76. 
 
 543, 46 Pac. 18; Adams v. People, supra. 22Nye v. People, 35 Mich. 16. 
 
 leCahn v. State, 27 Tex. App. 709, 11 saSee State v. Hunter, 118 iowa, 686, 
 
 S. W. 723; Bramlette v. State, 21 Tex. 92 N. W. 872. 
 
 App. 611, 57 Am. Rep. 622, 2 S. W. 765; 2 4Latikster v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. 
 
 Harris v. State, 8 Tex. App. 90; Gon- Rep. 360. 69 S. W. 888. 
 
 zales V. State, 28 Tex. App. 130, 12 
 
100 HOMICIDE. K 82 
 
 cused should have contemplated the homicide. * And an instruction 
 to that effect is not tantamouut to telling the jury that killing on 
 sudden impulse is premeditated murder.^ Malice may arise on 
 the instant.* It is implied from any deliberate or cruel act against 
 another, however sudden ; * and an instruction predicated on previous 
 malice, as distinguished from present malice, is erroneous." A 
 killing is murder if malice was in the mind of the slayer at the mo- 
 ment it was done, and if it moved him to do the killing." If the 
 killing was determined upon beforehand, and after reflection, for 
 however short a time, it was with malice aforethought, and the 
 slayer is guilty of murder.'' The existence of a fully formed intent 
 is a question of fact to be determined by the jury from all the facts 
 and circumstances in evidence.* And one who arms himself with a 
 gun and kills another is alike guilty of murder whether, when he 
 procured the gun, he then intended to do the killing, or whether, hav- 
 ing procured it for some other purpose, he afterwards conceived such 
 intention.® Of course, however, the premeditation must have been 
 of sufficient duration to enable the slayer, under the circumstances 
 of the case, to form a distinct and conscious intent to kill.^" De- 
 liberation is essential to malice aforethought, and an instruction 
 that an unlawful act intentionally done is done with malice afore- 
 thought is erroneous in omitting that idea.*^ And an instruction 
 that it is not necessary that the slayer should have had any enmity 
 against the deceased to constitute legal malice, and that if the homi- 
 cide be intentional, unlawful, and without excuse or justification, 
 no previous design to kill need be shown to constitute malice afore- 
 
 lUnited States v. Carr, 1 Woods., 480, But while an instruction that, if there 
 Fed. Cas. No. 14,732; State v. Davis, 9 was an interval between the assault or 
 Houst. (Del.) 407, 33 Atl. 55; State v. provocation given and the resulting 
 Faino, 1 Marv. (Del.) 492, 41 Atl. 134; homicide sufficient for the voice of rea- 
 Cook V. State, 77 Ga. 96 ; Marzen v. Peo- son and humanity to he heard, the kill- 
 pie, 173 111. 43, 50 N. E. 249; Nichols ing will be attributed to deliberate re- 
 V. Com. 11 Busli, 575; Donnellan v. venp-e is correct as a proposition of law. 
 Com. 7 Bash, 676; Jolly v. Com. 110 it should not be given without appro- 
 Ky. 190, 96 Am. St. Eep'. 429, 61 S. W. pxiate qualification and adjustment to 
 49; Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 52 the issues presented. Keaton v. State, 
 Am. Dec. 711; Jackson v. State, 79 99 Ga. 197, 25 S. E. 615. 
 Miss. 42, 30 So. 39; Howard v. State 'Punn v. State (Ala.) 39 So. 147; 
 (Tex. Cvim. App.) 58 S. W. 77 ; Com. v. Nichols v. Com. 11 Bush, 583; Clark 
 Brown, 90 Va. 671, 19 S. E. 447; v. Com. Ill Ky. 443, 63 S. W. 740. 
 M'Whirt's Case, 3 Gratt. 594, 46 Am. sCom. v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9; Lovett v. 
 Dee. 196. State, 30 Fla. 142, 17 L.R.A. 705, 11 
 
 2Com. v. Brown, supra. So. 550. 
 
 sDixon V. State, 128 Ala. 54, 29 So. sSmith v. State, 75 Miss. 542, 23 So. 
 
 «23. 260. 
 
 4Com. 7. Webster, supra. loLovett v. State, supra. 
 
 BWalkor v. Com. 5 Kv. L. Eep. 861, nJackson v. State, 79 Miss. 42, 30 
 
 sMaloiie v. State, 77"Ga. 767. So. 39. 
 
5 82] MALICE IN HOMICIDE, GENEEALLY. 101 
 
 thought, and that it may he a sudden rash impulse, is erroneous and 
 improper. * * Malice aforethought as an ingredient of murder is the 
 intent to do an evil deed, formed in and by the mind before the 
 doing of the deed is actually entered upon. ^ ^ Malice aforethought 
 is the equivalent of malice with premeditation. ^ * And it has been 
 held that the substitution of the word "maliciously" for "malice 
 aforethought" in an instruction as to what constitutes murder is 
 erroneous. ^^ So, physical presence or contact is not necessary to 
 the existence of malice. Malice may be exerted against a party in 
 his absence ; as, where A. lays poison for B. in his victuals, which B. 
 afterwards takes and dies. So, where A. procures an idiot or lunatic 
 to kill B., which he does. In both instances A. is guilty of the mur- 
 der as principal.^® And motive is the moving power which impels 
 to action for a definite result. ^ ^ And a malicious killing implies an 
 unlawful motive, and motive is a constituent element of malice and 
 a subject of proof as a means of establishing malice.^® The ques- 
 tion in homicide cases is. Was the motive a malicious one, or was it 
 not?^* Motive, however, is not an indispensable element of malice, 
 and malice may be established by other means ; it is not indispensable 
 to conviction that the particular motive for taking the life of the de- 
 ceased should be established.*" And though motive is usually an 
 
 i2Lankster v. State^ 42 Tex. Grim. E. 985; State v. Wilcox, 132 N. C. 1120, 
 
 Rep. 360, 59 S. W. 888. 44 S. E. 625. 
 
 isstate V. Baber, 11 Mo. App. 585 isStory v. State, 68 Miss. 609, 10 So. 
 
 Appx.; State v. Ellis, 11 Mo. App. 586 47; State v. Schieler, 4 Idaho, 120, 37 
 
 Appx. Pae. 272. 
 
 "State V. Wriglit, 134 Mo. 404, 35 S. 20Pointer v. United States, 151 U. S. 
 
 W. 1145; State v. Thomas, 99 Mo. 235, 396, 38 L. ed. 208, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 410; 
 
 12 S. W. 643; State v. Curtis, 70 Mo. Davis v. State, 126 Ala. 44, 28 So. 617; 
 
 694; State v. Thomas, 78 Mo. 327; Ed- Green v. State, 38 Ark. 304; People v. 
 
 wards v. State, 25 Ark. 444; Hill v. Durrant, 116 Cal. 182, 48 Pae. 75; Peo- 
 
 People, 1 Colo. 436; Jackson v. State, pie v. Owens, 132 Cal. 469, 64 Pae. 
 
 supra. And see Johnson v. State, 44 770; Keady v. People, 32 Colo. 57, 66 
 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 332, 71 S. W. 25. L.R.A. 353, 74 Pae. 892; Lanckton v. 
 
 isTutt V. Com. 104 Ky. 299, 46 S. W. United States, 18 App. D. C. 348; Camp- 
 675. And see Fonts v. State, 4 G. ''«" 7-.^*^!^^^'^^-JL^! o S" Si!= S?,''""," 
 Greene 500 ^- ^*^*^' ^^ ^^- ^^'^' ^ ^- ^- ^^^' Wheel- 
 Malice and forethought are both neees- er V. State, 158 Ind. 687 63 N E. 975; 
 sary to constitute murder, and instruc- State v. Dull 67 Kan. 793 74 Pae. 235; 
 tioJs in a prosecution for murder, other- |-ry ^-^^'^^P^^^J McCullough v. 
 wise proper, are not rendered erroneous ^^ j^g ^^^ gg „ g ^ 'g^ g^.^^^ 
 because the two words are defined sepa- ^ Gregory, 178 Mo. 48, 76 S. W. 970; 
 rately. Kennedy v. Com. 14 Bush, 340. g^.^^^ ^ ^avid, 131 Mo. 380, 33 S. W. 
 
 leWharton, Cnm. Law, 7th ed. 154, 28; State v. Crabtree, 170 Mo. 642, 71 
 
 210m, 965, 1075, 1114o. S. W. 127; State v. Evans, 158 Mo. 589, 
 
 ivPeople V. Molmeux, 168 N. Y. 264, gg g. w. 994; Robinson v. State (Neb.) 
 
 62 L.R.A. 193, 61 N. E. 286. 98 N. W. 694; Lillie v. State (Neb.) 
 
 isState V. West, Houst. Crim. Rep. lOO N. W. 316; State v. Jaggers, 71 N. 
 
 (Del.) 371; Cross v. State, 68 Ala. 476; J. L. 281, 58 Atl. 1014; People v. Fish, 
 
 Robinson v. State, 118 Ga. 198, 44 S. 125 N. Y. 136, 26 N. E. 319; People v. 
 
102 HOMICIDE. [I 82 
 
 important inquiry on the question of the commission of the crime, 
 it may be of little importance when it is otherwise established and 
 malice appears.^* Nor does the fact that no motive appears in a 
 prosecution for homicide necessarily show that the act was the result 
 of sudden heat and passion, rather than malice, premeditation, and 
 deliberation.^^ And the motive need not be in proportion to the 
 heinousness of the crime. Crime is rarely logical. The motive is 
 never correlative to the crime; never accurately proportioned to it. 
 When a powerful passion seeks gratification, it is no extenuation that 
 the act is illogical ; for when passion is once allowed to operate, reason 
 loosens its restraints.*® 
 
 83. Classification and elements of classes — With relation to homi- 
 cide there are two kinds of malice; express malice and malice im- 
 plied in law.^ Express malice is where one with a sedate, deliberate 
 mind and formed purpose kills another;* or where one, upon sudden 
 provocation, beats another in a cruel and unusual manner, and there- 
 Johnson, 139 N. Y. 358, 34 N. E. 920; accused is indisputably the perpetrator 
 People V. Trezza, 125 N. Y. 740, 26 N. of the alleged crime, there is no occasion 
 E. 9.'J3; People v. Cornetti, 92 N. Y. 85; for explaining the reasons for his act; 
 People V. Sliney, 137 N. Y. 570, 33 N. it is enough that the evidence does not 
 E. 150; State v. Adams, 138 N. C. 688, absolutely exclude the existence of mo- 
 50 S. E. 765; Com. v. Buceieri, 153 Pa. tive. People v. Minisci, 12 N. Y. S. 
 535, 26 Atl. 228; Com. v. Danz, 211 Pa. R. 719. 
 
 507, 60 Atl. 1070; State v. Workman, 39 22State v. Gilliek, 7 Iowa, 287. 
 S. C. 151, 17 S. E. 694; State v. Nords- 23See this well argued in London 
 trom. 7 Wash. 506, 35 Pac. 382; Hotema Spectator of November 17, 1874, page 
 V. United States, 186 U. S. 413, 46 L. 1426. And see Lillie v. State (Neb.) 
 ed. 1225, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 895. 100 N. W. 316. 
 
 A pagan Indian who believed in the 14 Bl. Com. 197; State v. Hurley, 
 existence of an evil spirit clothed in hu- Houst. Grim. Rep. (Del.) 28; Carson v. 
 man flesh or in human form, which State, 80 Ga. 170, 5 S. E. 295; Davidson 
 would eat human beings, and who, hav- v. People, 90 111. 221 ; Kilpatrick v. Com. 
 ing the impression that another was 3 Phila. 237; Gallaher v. State, 28 Tex. 
 such evil spirit, for his own protection App. 247, 12 S. W. 1087; People v. Cal- 
 and that of others shot and killed him, ton, 5 Utah, 451, 16 Pae. 902; M'Whirt's 
 is properly convicted of manslaughter. Case, 3 Gratt. 594, 46 Am. Dec. 190; 
 without reference to the motive with United States v. Meagher, 37 Fed. 875. 
 which he shot. Reg. v. Machekequonabe, 24BI. Com. 199; State v. Pratt, Houst. 
 28 Ont. Rep. 309. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 49; State v. Hurley, 
 
 2iPeople v. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264, nupra; State v. Draper. Houst. Crim. 
 62 L.R.A. 193, 61 N. E. 286; Sellick's Rep. (Del.) 291; Davison v. Peo. 
 Case, 1 N. Y. City Hall Rec. 185 ; Horns- pie, supra; Ex parte Wray, 30 Miss, 
 by v. State, 94 Ala. 55, 10 So. 522; Car- 673; State v. Town, Wright (Ohio) 75; 
 son V. State; State v. David; and Peo- Com. v. Green, 1 Ashm. (Pa.) 289; Kil- 
 ple v. Fish, — supra; People v. Scott, 153 patrick v. Com. supra; Com. v. Cor- 
 N. Y. 40, 46 N. E. 1028; McLain v. Com. rigan, 1 Pittsb. 292; Gallaher y. State, 
 99 Pa. 86; Lanahan v. Com. 84 Pa. 80; supra; Martinez v. State, 30 Tex. App. 
 McCue V. Coin. 78 Pa. 190, 21 Am. Rep. 129, 28 Am. St. Rep. 895, 16 S. W. 767 ; 
 7; State v. Mcintosh, 39 S. C. 97, 17 S. Evans v. State, 6 Tex. App. 513; People 
 E. 446. V. Calton, and United States v. Meagher, 
 
 Proof of motive in homicide is of more supra; United States v. Carr, 1 Woods, 
 or less importance in cases of purely 480, Fed. Cas. No. 14,732; King v. 
 circumstantial evidence, but where the Oneby, 2 Ld. Raym. 1489. 
 
5 83] 
 
 lilALICE IN HOMICIDE, GENERALLY. 
 
 103 
 
 by causes death, though unintentionally.* And a homicide will be 
 regarded as the result of express malice where it was from hatred, 
 not fear; for revenge, not provocation; or to redress a past alleged 
 wrong, and not to defend against a threatened or impending injury.* 
 Express malice in homicide consists, as we have seen, of a 
 sedate, deliberate purpose and a formed design to kill another,® and 
 such formed purpose or design is evidenced by external circum- 
 stances discovering the inward intention, as lying in wait, antecedent 
 menaces, former grudges, and concerted schemes to do the party some 
 Iwdily harm,® and by the deliberate selection and use of a deadly 
 weapon,^ or the preparation of poisons, etc.* And proof that two 
 men were enemies, one of them having seduced and lived with the 
 wife of the other for a year; that the husband had partially re- 
 gained his wife's affections, and that she had ceased to live with the 
 other, which enraged him; that he threatened to kill the husband, 
 and shot and killed him while secreted in the woman's house,-^shows 
 a homicide with express malice constituting murder in the first de- 
 gree.® Its existence is always a question of fact for the jury.^" Im- 
 plied malice is that which the law infers from, or imputes to, cer- 
 tain acta.** It is constructive malice, and not a fact to be proved 
 
 sM'Whirt's Case, 3 Gratt. 594, 46 Am. 
 Dee. 19e. 
 
 4Channell v. State, 109 Ga. 150, 34 S. 
 E. 353. 
 
 sstate V. Brinte, 4 Penn. (Del.) 551, 
 58 Atl. 253. 
 
 64 Bl. Com. Chase's ed. 945; People 
 V. Doyell, 48 Cal. 85; People v. Cox, 
 76 Cal. 281, 18 Pac. 332; State v. Pratt, 
 Eoust. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 249; State v. 
 Hurley, Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 28; 
 State V. Draper, Houst. Crim. Rep. 
 (Del.) 291; State v. Jones, 2 Penn. 
 (Del.) 573, 47 Atl. 1006; United States 
 V. Neverson, i Mackey, 152; Holland v. 
 State, 12 Fla. 117; Kota v. People, 136 
 111. 655, 27 N. E. 53; Davidson v. Peo- 
 ple, 90 111. 221 ; Murphy v. State, 31 Ind. 
 511; Nichols V. Com. 11 Bush, 575; Ex 
 parte Wray, 30 Miss. 673; Riggs v. 
 State, 30 Miss. 635; State v. McKinzie, 
 102 Mo. 620, 15 S. W. 149; State v. 
 Town, Wright (Ohio) 75; Kilpatriok v. 
 Com. 3 Phila. 237; Wright v. State, 41 
 Tex. 248; Jordan v. State, 10 Tex. 492; 
 Martinez v. State, 30 Tex. App. 129, 28 
 Am. St. Rep. 895. 16 S. W. 767; Galla- 
 her V. State, 28 Tex. App. 247, 12 S. W. 
 1087; Pocket v. State, 6 Tex. App. 567; 
 Sharpe v. State, 17 Tex. App. 486; 
 Holden v. State. 1 Tex. App. 238; Mc- 
 
 Kinney v. State, 8 Tex. App. 639; Cook 
 V. Territory, 3 Wyo. 110, 4 Pac. 887; 
 United States v. Meagher, 37 Fed. 875; 
 United States v. Carr, 1 Woods, 480, 
 Fed. Cas. No. 14.732. 
 
 And an instruction to the jury in a. 
 prosecution for homicide, defining ex- 
 press malice to be a sedate and deliber- 
 ate mind and formed design evidenced 
 by external circumstances discovering 
 that inward intention, as lying in wait, 
 etc., is not objectionable as a charge 
 upon the weight of evide ce, and as vir- 
 tually telling the jury that malice is 
 proved when any of the enumerated con- 
 ditions are shown to have existed. Gal- 
 laher v. State, supra. 
 
 'State v. Jones. 2 Penn. (Del.) 573, 
 47 Atl. 1006. 
 
 Elbid. 
 
 9Taylor v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 28 
 S. W. 627. 
 
 lOHarrison v. Com. 79 Va. 374, 52 Am. 
 Rep. 634. 
 
 liMartinez v. State, 30 Tex. App. 129, 
 28 Am. St. Rep. 895, 16 S. W. 767; 
 Boyd v. State, 28 Tex. App. 137, 12 S. 
 W. 737; Tooney v. State, 5 Tex. App. 
 163; Jacobs v. State, 28 Tex. App. 79, 
 12 S. W. 408; State v. Pratt. Houst. 
 Crim. Rep. (Del.) 249. 
 
104 HOMICIDE. [§ 83 
 
 specifically; it is an inference or conclusion of law founded upon 
 the facts and circumstances of the case as they are ascertained to 
 exist, ^ ^ or as found by the jury. ^ * It consists not in specific design 
 to kill, but in a wicked mind, or cool depravity of disposition; a 
 heart regardless of social duty, and fatally bent on mischief.'* 
 Malice is implied from any deliberate, cruel act committed by on© 
 person against another, however sudden; as, where a man kills an- 
 other suddenly without any, or without a considerable, provocation^ 
 and with a deadly weapon, it being a maxim based on ordinary ex- 
 perience that no person, unless under the influence of malice, would 
 be guilty of such an act upon a slight or no apparent cause. And, aa 
 will be seen presently, where one is killed in consequence of such a 
 wilful act as shows the person by whom it is committed to be an 
 enemy to all mankind, we are led, by the same processes of inductive 
 reasoning, to infer a general malice from such a depraved inclination 
 to mischief. ''' Express malice comprises and embraces implied 
 malice, just as a higher degree of a crime embraces a lower one ; and 
 where a person is charged with murder on implied malice alone, a 
 conviction may be had, though the evidence tends to establish express 
 malice as a fact. ' ® 
 
 84. Distinction unsound — It must be admitted that the distinction 
 between express and implied malice, approved as it is by the old 
 standards, is unsustained by sound reason. There is no case of homi- 
 cide in which the malice is not implied ; none in which it is not in-i 
 f erred from the circumstances of the case.* It may be proved that 
 the defendant said, "I intend to kill A. ;" and it may be proved that 
 he afterwards actually killed A. ; yet it is possible to suppose, as in 
 some cases has actually been proved, that the threat was braggadocio, 
 and the death accidental. We have no power to ascertain the cer- 
 tain condition of a man's heart. The best we can do is to infer his 
 intent, more or less satisfactorily, from his acts. There is no differ- 
 
 i2WilsoT V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) v. Calton, 5 Utah, 451, 16 Pac. 902; 
 
 00 S. W. 312. M'Whirt's Case, 3 Gratt. 694. 46 Am. 
 
 laState V. Biinte, 4 Penn. (Del.) 551, Dec. 197. 
 
 58 Atl. 258; State v. Jones, 2 Penn. Legil or implied malice in homicide 
 
 (Del.) 673, 47 Atl. 1006. means that the fact was attended with 
 
 i<Com. V. Conigxn, 1 Pittsb. 292. such circumstances as carry with them 
 
 isDavison v. People, 90 III. 221; Peo- the plain indication of a malevolent and 
 
 pie V. Doyell, 48 Cal. 85; State v. Pratt, diabolical spirit, which is inferred from 
 
 Houst. Ciim. Rep. (Del.) 249; State any deliberate, cool act committed by 
 
 V. ITurley, Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 28; one person against another. Com. v. 
 
 State V. Jones, supra; State v. Moore, Green, 1 Ashm. (Pa.) 289. 
 
 25 Iowa. 128, 95 Am. Dec. 776; Territory isWilson v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 V. Lucero, 8 N. M. 543, 46 Pac. 18; Kil- 90 S. W. 312. 
 
 Patrick v. Com. 3 Phila. 237; People i United States v. King, 34 Fed. 302. 
 
§ 84] MALICE IN HOMICIDE, GENERALLY. 105 
 
 ence in the nature or degree of malice intended, whether it he called 
 express or implied, when the terms are used in their appropriate 
 sense. ^ If properly applied they apply only to the evidence by which 
 the existence of the malice is established.^ Both alike mean actual 
 malice shown by proof to have really existed.* And it is, called im- 
 plied malice when it is inferred from the naked fact of homicide, 
 and express malice when it is established by other evidence.^ They 
 are appropriate terms to express different modes of proof, and are 
 habitually used for that purpose, but they are not adapted to the de- 
 scription of different degrees of malicious intent.® 
 
 II. Malice toward person killed. 
 
 85. How considered — ^Malice toward the person killed may be con- 
 sidered under the following heads : 1. Intent to kill. 2. Intent to 
 do bodily harm. 
 
 86. Intent to kill. — This head admits of no question in its primary 
 sense. Where there is a deliberate intent to kill, unless it be in the 
 discharge of a duty imposed by the public authorities, or in self-de- 
 fense, or in necessity, the offense must be murder at common law. 
 And, in such case, to constitute malice aforethought it is only neces- 
 sary that there be a formed design to kill ; ^ and that in the view of 
 the slayer his motive was a laudable one is immaterial.^ Nor is it 
 necessary that the intent to kill should have been formed previous 
 to the commencement of the difficulty in which the killing occurred ; 
 if it was formed without justification or excuse during the progress 
 of the fight it is sufficient* And where a deliberate purpose to kill 
 previously existed, an intervening provocation will be disregarded, 
 unless it is made to appear that the purpose was abandoned before 
 the killing was done.* Nor is it material from what the intent to 
 
 SDirry v. People, 10 N. Y. 120; Unit- question of the intent of the accused 
 
 cd States v. King, supra. upon a state of facts which, though 
 
 3Darry v. People, supra. true, would not exclude the conclusion 
 
 41bid. th-it he had in fact the intent is properly 
 
 Blbid. ; United States v. Kng, supra, refused. State v. Keeley, 20 Iowa, 108. 
 
 In Anthony v. State, 13 Smedes & M. 2 Where children were drowned to pre- 
 
 263, it was held that there is a plain vent their coming to wa'-t, the law im- 
 
 distinetion between express and implied plies malice from the illejrality of the 
 
 malice; that the one is characterized act. People v. Kirby, 2 Park. Crim. 
 
 by a sedate, deliberate inteition and Rep. 28. 
 
 formed design evidenced by external cir- sFranklin v. State (Ala.) 39 So. 979. 
 
 cumstances, while the other is the off- 4State v. Johnson, 23 N. C. (1 Ired. 
 
 spring of sudden impulse. L.) 364, 35 Am. Dec. 742. 
 
 en-irry v. People, supra. And an instruction in a prosecution 
 
 iBeauehamp v. State, 6 Blackf. 299. for homicide stating the rule of law ap- 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution plicable in case the slayer entered into 
 
 for homicide to acquit, basing the the affray in which death resulted, with 
 
108 HOMICIDK £8 8S 
 
 kill arose; a deliberate intent unlawfully to take human life con- 
 stitutes malice, whether it springs from hatred, ill-will, or revenge, 
 ambition or avarice, or a mere frenzy of drunkenness.^ Within the 
 meaning of these rules, intent is the purpose to use a particular 
 means to effect a given result.^ A mere intent to kill does not con- 
 stitute malice, however, since an intentional killing may be justifiable 
 in self-defense, or provoked by due provocation. "^ The intent should 
 be to murder, as distinguished from an intent to kill. * 
 
 87. Intent to do bodily harm — At common law the intent to do 
 "enormous" or "severe" bodily harm, followed up by homicide, con- 
 stitutes murder; though, as will be seen hereafter, such an offense 
 falls in this country, in those states where this distinction exists, 
 under the head of murder in the second degree. An intention to 
 kill is not necessary to the offense of homicide.* The grade of a 
 homicide is not reduced to involuntary manslaughter or otherwise 
 by the fact that the intent of the slayer was to wound or cripple, 
 and not to kill.* And where six men assault another, and in the 
 course of the assault one of them inflicts a wound upon the person 
 assaulted, which causes his death, he is guilty of murder, though he 
 did not intend to kill, but only to inflict bodily harm.* And if one 
 
 murderous intent, sufficiently protects 9 S. W. 509, 810; Sparks v. Cora. 3 
 him where it permits the jury to con- Bush, 111, 96 Am. Dec. 196; State v. 
 sider whether his design was altered Decklotts, 19 Iowa, 447; State v. Halli- 
 ■during the course of the affray, and to day, 112 La. 846, 36 So. 753; Wellar v. 
 determine the character of the homicide People, 30 Mich. 16; Ex parte Wray, 30 
 in accordance with an altered design. Miss. 673; State v. Nueslein, 25 Mo. 
 State V. Doherty, 72 Vt. 381, 82 Am. St. Ill; State v. Hoover, 20 N. C. 500 (4 
 Rep. 951, 48 Atl. 658. Dev. & B. L. 365) 34 Am. Dee. 383; 
 
 sBeck V. State, 76 Ga. 452. Cora. v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9; State v. Alex- 
 
 ePeople v. Molineux. 168 N. Y. 264, ander, 30 S. C. 74, 14 Am. St. Rep. 879, 
 «2 L.R.A. 193, 61 N. E. 286. 8 S. E. 440 ; Walker v. State, 28 Tex. 
 
 7State V. Vaughan, 22 Nev. 285, 39 App. 50.3, 13 S. W. 860. 
 Pac. 733; State v. Lopez, 15 Nev. 407; And an instruction in a prosecution of 
 People V. Newcomer, 118 Cal. 263, 50 a slave, under an indictment for murder 
 Pac. 405; Hammond v. People, 199 III. or voluntary manslaughter of a white 
 173, 64 N. E. 980; Dennison v. State, person, that if the jury believe the de- 
 13 Ind. 510; Donnellan v. Com. 7 Bush, fendant struck the deceased with no ex- 
 678; Cahn v. State, 27 Tex. App. 709, pect^tion or intention to kill him, and 
 11 S. W. 723. And see Lofton v. State, the blow did kill him, the death was ac- 
 79 Miss. 723, 31 So. 420. cidental and the defendant should be 
 
 An intent to kill is not necessarily an acquitted, is erroneous, since it assumes 
 intent to commit murder; it may be that the defendant would be entitled to 
 merely an intent to take the life of an- an acquittal although the blow was 
 other in self-defense, or upon a sudden given with the intention to do great 
 heat of passion, which will reduce the bodily harm. Scott v. State, 37 Ala. 
 crime of killing to manslaughter. Ham- 117. 
 mond V. People, supra. zStovall v. State, 108 Ga. 443, 32 S. 
 
 aMcCaa v. State (Miss.) 38 So. 228. E. 586. 
 
 iPence v. Com. 21 Ky. L. Rep. 500, 51 sReg. v. Price, 8 Cox. C. C. 95. 
 S. W. 801 ; Peoples v. Com. 87 Ky. 487, 
 
i 87] MALICE IN HOMICIDE, GENERALLY. 107 
 
 person violently assaults another in such a way as to endanger her 
 life to his knowledge, and her life is destroyed in that way, an actual 
 intention to kill would not be necessary, as, in such case, the death 
 was a result he might fairly be held to regard as likely ; though, in 
 case of such a killing, there would be room for a verdict of man- 
 slaughter.* Homicides of this character are numerous; and it is 
 easy to suppose a homicide in a duel that may be so ranked (e. g., 
 where the intention was to maim, not to kill). The distinction, in a 
 case of this kind, is often slight ; and when a statutory line is to be 
 followed, it has been held that when the damage intended was such 
 as would probably result in death, it is murder in the first degree, 
 even though death may have been but incidental to the offender's 
 purpose.® In all cases of such outrageous hurt as to make death a 
 natural consequence, we have a right to infer such an intent;® but it 
 is otherwise when the hurt is less serious, and the presumption of 
 an intent to kill less violent. '' Independently of the statutes, one who 
 beats another with an intention of doing him great bodily harm, and 
 kills him, is answerable for all the harm he does.® So, if a large 
 stone be thrown at one with a deliberate intent to seriously hurt, 
 though not to kill him, and by accident it kills hii^, or any other, this 
 is murder.® But the nature of the instrument, and the manner of 
 using it, as calculated to produce great bodily harm or not, will vary 
 the offense in such cases. If the intent be merely to inflict a slight 
 chastisement, and death arises from some peculiarity in the deceased's 
 constitution (e. g.^ inflammation from a scratch), then the offense is 
 but manslaughter; and so, where the injury is only mischievously 
 inflicted, with no intention seriously to hurt. * ® Generally the in- 
 tent with which he acted must have been equivalent in legal character 
 
 ♦Wellar v. People, 30 Mieh. 16. course with a girl, used artificial means, 
 
 6Com. V. Green, 1 Ashm. (Pa.) 289; with her consent, to make such connec- 
 
 State V. Nueslein, 25 Mo. Ill; State v. tion practicable, as a result of which the 
 
 Hoover, 20 N. C. 500 (4 Dev. & B. L. girl died, the killing was held but man- 
 
 365) 34 Am. Dec. 383; United States v. slaughter. State v. Center, 35 Vt. 378. 
 Carr, 1 WoodSj 480, Fed. Cas. No. 14,- This ease, supposing the girl was old 
 
 732. enough and intelligent enough to con- 
 
 SMayes v. People, 106 111. 306, 46 Am. sent, may be sustained on the ground of 
 
 Eep. 698; McKee v. State. 82 Ala. 32, volenti non fit injuria (see Wharton, 
 
 2 So. 451; State v. Nueslein, supra. Crlm. Law, 7th ed. 751f), but not other- 
 
 TMayes v. People, supra. wise, ilex v. Cox, Russ. & R. C. C. 362. 
 
 sFost. C. L. 259. And see Crosby v. For to constitute grievous bodily harm, 
 
 People, 137 111. 325, 27 N. E. 49. it is not necessary that the injury 
 
 91 Hale, P. C. 491. should be either permanent or danger- 
 
 loSee infra, chapter XXII., §§ 472 ous; if it is such as seriously to inter- 
 
 et seq. fi-re with comfort or health, the allega- 
 
 In Vermont, in a case showing pecu- tion is sustained. Reg. v. Ashman, 1 
 
 liar depravity of guilt, where a man, Fost. & F. 88. 
 in order to have unlawful sexual inter- 
 
108 HOMICIDE. re 87 
 
 to a criminal purpose aimed against life ; it must have been either 
 to commit a specific felony or an act involving all the wickedness 
 of a felony.*^ It is immaterial in cases of this class whether the 
 intent to do great bodily harm was directed toward the person killed 
 or some other person. ^ ^ 
 
 88. Effect of existence of other intents. — It need scarcely be said 
 that when a deliberate and unauthorized homicide is committed, it 
 is no defense that the defendant had other objects in view besides 
 killing the deceased. 1 The general principle of law is that, if, among 
 all the motives leading to a particular intentionally illegal act, one 
 motive is to violate the law, this is sufficient to lend to the act the 
 essential evil intent, no matter how strong may be other concurrent 
 intents.^ Thus, intending ultimate public good is no defense to an 
 indictment for nuisance;* intending to return the goods is no de- 
 fense to an indictment for embezzlement;* intending to return lost 
 goods on a reward is no defense to an indictment for larceny ;° in- 
 tending to rid the community of a bad man is no defense to an in- 
 dictment for homicide.® No matter what other intents existed, if 
 the intent to do the particular unlawful act is either proved or im- 
 plied, the offense, if committed, is complete. If the law were other- 
 wise, there would be few convictions of crime, for there are few 
 crimes in. which extraneous motives are not mixed up with the par- 
 ticular evil intent.^ 
 
 III. Malice aimed at one when another is killed. 
 
 89. The established rule. — Both at common law and under most of 
 the statutes with regard to homicide, where there is express malice 
 and intent to kill, or where the act of the accused is one implying 
 malice, the accidental killing of a person other than the one intended, 
 though without design, is murder in the first degree, the malice or 
 malicious intent of the unlawful act directed toward one person be- 
 ing transferred to the other and characterizing the result;^ though, 
 
 "Wellar v. People, 30 Mioli. 16. TSee Wharton, Crim. Law, 7th ed. § 
 
 izMayes v. People, 108 111. 306. 302. 
 
 iSee this point considered supra, iDavison v. People, 00 111. 221 ; Duna- 
 
 chapter VII, §§ 71 et seq. way v. People, 110 111. 333, 51 Am. Rep. 
 
 2See Wharton, Crim. Law, 7th ed. § 6S6: Tidwell v. State, 70 Ala. 33; 
 
 635f, and cases there cited. Holmes v. State, 88 Ala. 26, 16 Am. St. 
 
 sWharton, Crim. Law, 7th ed. §§ 2368, Rep. 17, 7 So. 193; State v. Dugan, 
 
 2372. Houst. Crim. Rep (Del.) 563; Pinder 
 
 4Wh«rton, Crim. Law, 7th ed. §§ v. Statt. 27 Fla. 370, 26 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 1935-1942. 75, 8 So. 837; Walker v. State, 100 Ga. 
 
 eWharton, Crim. Law, 7th ed. § 1796. 60, 25 S. E. 918; Charlon v. State, 
 
 eWharton, Crim. Law, 7th ed. § § 100 Ga. 400, 32 S. E. 347; Walker v. 
 
 1023-1027. State, 8 Ind. 290; Sims v. Com. 12 
 
g 89] JIALICE IN HOMICIDE, GENERALLY. 109 
 
 where express malice is required to constitute murder in the first 
 degree, such a killing will be regarded as murder in the second de- 
 gree.^ The contrary rule has been asserted, however, as to a charge 
 of assault with intent to kill in aiming a weapon at one and wound- 
 ing another.* And the above view was combated by Bar, in his 
 Treatise on Causalzusammenhange. He begins by insisting that the 
 doctrine of causation relates, not to the vague and unreal, but to the 
 concrete and actual. No one intends to kill an indefinite man, be- 
 cause there is no such thing as an indefinite man to be killed. It 
 is true that the mind of the assailant may fluctuate between two or 
 more persons, as to which he will kill; but the moment he acts he 
 has but a specific person before him. Nor does it alter the case 
 when he shoots into a crowd. He has in this case the crowd, con- 
 sisting of an ascertainable number of individuals, in view; and al- 
 though he leaves it to chance to determine who is to be struck, yet 
 the group to whom this chance is limited is as capable of positive 
 apprehension and of concrete intent as are the individuals of whom 
 the group is composed. We never, even in the latter case, say, "A. 
 murdered a man in the abstract;" it is always, "A. has murdered 
 B.," or "a particular man." So, suppose B., instead of accidentally 
 receiving A.'s shot, wilfully throws himself in its range in order to 
 commit suicide. A., on the view here contested, would be indictable 
 for the malicious murder of one who really murdered himself. And, 
 at all events, we have here the spectacle of an attempt, an ofl^ense 
 which has a milder punishment, visited with the severe punishment 
 of the consummated offense, simply because the defendant has ac- 
 cidentally committed a distinct offense. To attempts, a milder pun- 
 ishment is assigned, on the ethical ground that as a usual thing a 
 consummated crime supposes greater care in preparation, and great- 
 er firmness in execution, and therefore involves a higher degree of 
 criminality than does an unconsummated crime. If you meet this 
 by saying that in this ease the attempt on B. only accidentally failed, 
 then you make the doubt, instead of telling for, tell against the ac- 
 cused, and thus you violate the maxim in dubio mitius. . . . 
 The question is not to be confounded with that of dolus alternativus, 
 
 Ky. L. Kep. 215, 13 S. W. 1079; Stote Rep. 380; Gore's Case, 9 Col<e, 80b; Reg. 
 
 V. Salter, 48 La. Ann. 197, 19 So. 265; v. Smith, Dears. C. C. 559, 33 Eng. L. 
 
 State V. Gilman, 69 Me. 163. 31 Am. Eq. ."567; Re.'C v. Jarvis, 2 Moody & 
 
 Rep. 257; Peonle v. Molineux, 163 N. R. 40. 
 
 y. 264, 62 L.R.A. 193 61 N. E. 286; ZFerrell v. State, 43 Tex. 503; McCoy 
 
 State V. Fulkerson, 61 N. C. (Phill. L.) v. State, 25 Tex. 33. 78 Am. Dee. 5''0. 
 233; Callahan v. St^te. 21 Ohio St. 308; sLaoefield v. State, 34 Ark. 275, 36 
 
 Angell V. State, 36 Tex. 542, 14 Am. Am. Rep. 8. 
 
110 HOMICIDE. [§ 89' 
 
 ■which exists when A., intending to shoot either B. or C, shoots C. 
 This is clearly murder, for in snch case there is at once a killing and 
 an intent to kill the person killed. So far, however, as concerns the 
 class of cases immediately before us (those in which one person is 
 killed by a mortal blow designed for another), the doctrine of trans- 
 ferred imputation, or aberration, as it is called in the Roman law,, 
 is too firmly settled to be shaken. How far it can be sustained in 
 cases where homicide is committed accidentally, when the intent was 
 to perpetrate a felony other than murder, will be presently dis- 
 cussed;* as will also the general subiect of killing one by an act 
 aimed at another.® 
 
 IV. Malice towaed the public iw general^ ok a paeticulae 
 
 BODY OF MEN. 
 
 90. Malice toward a class covers malice toward an individual. — 
 When an action unlawful in itself is done with deliberation, and 
 with intention of killing or inflicting grievous bodily harm, though 
 the intention be not directed to any particular person, and death 
 ensue, it will be murder at common law. ^ It is sufficient if the 
 circumstances "were such as to show a heart regardless of social duly 
 and fatally bent on mischief.^ Express malice appears when the 
 circumstances show such a reckless disregard of human life as nec- 
 essarily to include a formed design against the life of the person 
 slain.* Malice within the law of homicide comprehends not only a 
 particular ill-will, but every case where there is a wickedness of 
 disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences, 
 and a mind regardless of social duty, although no particular person 
 may be intended to be injured.* And if a person, without aiming 
 at anyone in particular, unlawfully shoots into a room, or other place, 
 in which there are several persons, and one of them is killed, it 
 is murder or manslaughter according to the circumstances, regard- 
 
 *See infra, § 92; and chapter IX., §§ well, Leigh & C. C. C. 443, 9 Cox C. C. 
 
 118 et seq. 471. 
 
 eSee infra, chapter XVI. zState v. Douglass, 28 W. Va. 297; 
 
 11 Hawk. P. C. chap. 29, § 12; Com. State v. Levelle, 34 S. C. 120, 27 Am. 
 
 V. Drum, 58 Pa. 9; Hopkins v. Com. 50 St. Rep. 799, 13 S. E. 319. 
 
 Pa. 9, 88 Am. Dec. 518; Dunaway v. sBiirt v. State. 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 People, no 111. 333, 51 Am. Rep. 686; 397, 39 L.R.A. 305. 40 S. W. 1000, 43 
 
 Sparks v. Com. 3 Bush, 111, 96 Am. Dec. S. W. 344. 
 
 196; Gollilier v. Com. 2 Duv. 163. 87 Am. •iCom. v. Drum, supra; Com. v. Web- 
 Dec. 493; People v. Raher, 92 Mich. 165, ster, 5 Cush. 295, 52 Am. Dec. 711; 
 31 Am. St. Rep. 575, 52 N. W. 625; United States v. Rosa, 1 Gall. 624, 
 Herrin v. State, 33 Tex. 638; Aiken v. Fed. Cas. No. 16,196. 
 State, 10 Tex. App. 610; Reg. v. Fret- 
 
S SO] MALICE IN HOMICIDE, GENERALLY. Ill 
 
 less of hii intention or feelings toward the person killed." And even 
 though such an original intention does not appear, which is matter 
 of fact, and to be collected from circumstances given in evidence, and 
 the act was done heedlessly and incautiously, it will be manslaughter, 
 not accidental death; because the act upon which death ensued was 
 unlawful.* Thus, If a person, breaking in an unruly horse, wil- 
 fully ride him among a crowd of persons, the probable danger being 
 great and apparent, and a death ensue from the viciousness of the 
 animal, it is murder at common law. For how can it be supposed 
 that a person wilfully doing an act so manifestly attended with 
 danger, especially if he showed any consciousness of such danger 
 himself, should intend any other than mischief to those who might 
 be encountered by him?'' So, if a man recklessly and maliciously 
 throw from a roof into a crowded street, where persons are con- 
 stantly passing and repassing, a heavy piece of timber, calculated 
 to produce death to such as it might fall on, and death ensue, the 
 offense is murder at common law. ^ So, also, it is murder malicious- 
 ly to fire into a crowd.® And upon the same principle, if a man, 
 knowing that people are passing along the street, maliciously throw 
 a stone likely to do injury, or shoot over a house or wall with intent 
 to do hurt to people, and one is thereby slain, it is murder on account 
 of previous malice, though not directed against any particular in- 
 dividual ; it is no excuse that the party was bent upon mischief gen- 
 erally.** Where, however, the injury is inflicted negligently, with- 
 out such recklessness as implies malice, as, in negligently letting 
 a piece of timber fall from a roof, * * or in negligently driving in the 
 public streets,*^ or in negligently driving a locomotive engine,** 
 then the offense is but manslaughter. Homicide based upon malice 
 
 estate v. Bell (Del.) 62 Atl. 147. Leigh & C. C. C. 443, 9 Cox, C. C. 
 
 61 Rugasll, Crimea, 539; Fost. C. L. 471. 
 261 ; Golliher v. Com. 2 Duv. 163, 87 Am. And It is proper to refer to the shoot- 
 Dec. 493. i^S "f one person by another in a pros- 
 
 Every act producing death which is ecution against the latter for shoot- 
 outside of the definition of the word ing * third person, for the purpose of 
 "accident" is intentional in law, whether showing an abandoned and malignant 
 it grows out of a specific desigi to take ^^t^t upon the part of the accused, 
 ,.-° ,. ' ° , where the entire affray was one contm- 
 life or gross negligence or carelessness. ^^^^ transaction. s4te v. Shockley 
 United States v. Boyd, 45 Fed. 851. /tt+oV.\ sn T>o^ sfi^; 
 
 71 Hale, P. C. 476; 4 Bl. Com. 200; ^\r,Vl P C 475; 3 Inst. 57; 1 
 
 1 East, P. C. 231. j5ast^ p. c. 231. 
 
 sCom. V. Dougherty, 7 Smith's Laws uRg Hull. J. Kelyng. 40: Rigmai- 
 
 (Pa.) 696; Boles v. State, 9 Smedes & don's Case, 1 Lewin. C. C. 180. 
 
 M. 284. i2Rex v. Tiramin's, 7 Car. & P. 409; 
 
 sGolliher v. Com. supra; People v. Rejt v. Grout, 6 Car. & P. 629 ; Queen v. 
 
 Baher, 92 Mich. 165, 31 Am. St. Rep. Dalloway, 2 Cox, C. C. 273. 
 
 675, 52 N. W. 625; Reg. v. Fretwell, isSee infra, chapter XXII., § 466. 
 
112 HOMICIDE. B 90 
 
 of this class is considered generally, and with reference to statutory 
 re-enactments and variations of the common-law rule, in another part 
 of this work.'* 
 
 91. Degree of culpability — The lines of this species of homicide 
 it is very important to preserve intact, for, as has been pointedly 
 observed, "particular malice has the limited bounds of the person 
 who is the object of it, and who may be on his guard against it; 
 but general malice has a wider scope, and falls on the unsuspecting." 
 Is a man who fires a pistol at an individual against whom he has 
 ill-will more criminal than one who fires a pistol at a crowd of a 
 hundred people, against whom he has ill-will as a body, or as a part of 
 the community? The absence of the personal animosity really ag- 
 gravates the crime. In cases of particular malice, the sophistry of 
 the passions often gives the act the character of a wild retribution, 
 and the assassin persuades himself that he is getting rid of a mon- 
 ster who is a curse to society. This reasoning is perverse and dan- 
 gerous; but is the state of the mind less detestable in which no 
 wrongs, real, exaggerated, or imaginary, inflame the passions against 
 the individual, but in which the knife is driven home to his heart, 
 simply because he wears the form of a brother man ? Which would 
 argue the higher degree of depravity, the resolution, "I will kill 
 A. and B., who have insulted or injured me," or "I will kill the 
 first man I meet, be he who he may ?" ' 
 
 V. Intent to commit collateeal ceime. 
 
 92. The Efeneral rule. — It is declared by the old English text writ- 
 ers, as a general rule, that, if the act on which death ensue be malum 
 in se, it will be murder or manslaughter, according to the circum- 
 stances • if done in prosecution of a felonious intent, but death en- 
 sue against or beside the intent of the party, it will be murder ; but, 
 on the other hand, if the intent went no further than to commit a 
 bare trespass, it will be manslaughter. And frequently has this rule 
 been announced as unquestioned law by courts in the United States. * 
 Under this rule it is not necessary that the resulting deed should 
 
 i^See infra, chapter IX., §§ 129 et 48, 54 Am. Dec. 607; Com. v. Chance, 
 
 eeq. 174 Mass. 245, 75 Am. St. Eep. .W6, 54 
 
 lAIr. Fonblanque, in Examiner of May N. E. 551 ; State v. Cooper, 13 N. J. L. 
 
 11, 1850. See Boles v. State, 9 Smedea .361, 25 Am. Dee. 490; State v. Smith, 2 
 
 & M. 284. Strobh. L. 77, 47 Am. Dee. 589; United 
 
 iCom. V. Dougherty, 7 Smith's Laws State v. Travers, 2 Wheeler, C. C. 490, 
 
 (Pa.) 696; Myers v. State, 43 Fla. 500, Fed. Caa. No. 16,537; Kin^ v. Hodgson, 
 
 31 So. 275; State v. Moore, 25 Iowa, 128, 1 Leach, C. L. 6, 1 East, P. C. 258. 
 S5 Am. Dec. 776; Smith v. State, 33 Me. 
 
I 92] MALICE IN HOMICIDE, GENERALLY. 11? 
 
 be the one intended; it is sufficient if an unlawful or felonious act 
 was intended, and homicide resulted pursuant to such intent.^ And 
 if a man in the act of perpetrating, or attempting to perpetrate, arson, 
 rape, sodomy, robbery, burglary, or other felonious acts, kill another, 
 it is evidence of express malice, since such conduct evinces a depraved 
 mind and shows malice against all mankind.^ Every act that pro- 
 duces death which is not a mere accident is regarded as intentional 
 in law, whether it grows out of a specific design to take life, or 
 arises from a condition of mind that prompted the doer to engage 
 in some wrongful or criminal act, which from its nature or manner 
 of performance may reasonably or probably produce death.* A hom- 
 icide committed in the perpetration of a felony is murder, whether 
 there was any precedent intention of doing a malicious act or not; 
 the engaging in the perpetration of the felony supplying the place 
 of malice. ° And this rule applies with especial force if death was 
 the probable consequence of the felonious act.® And in order to 
 show that a killing was such as to constitute murder, it is competent 
 to show that it was done in the commission of, or attempt to com- 
 mit, a felony, whether such felony was committed or attempted as 
 the result of a conspiracy or not.'' An unlawful act which would 
 render a killing pursuant thereto murder, however, though done 
 without malice, should be such as to tend to the injury of another, 
 either immediately, or by necessary consequences.* It must be 
 equivalent in legal character to a criminal purpose aimed at life, 
 and either a felony, or an act involving the wickedness of a felony." 
 And the mere fact of a civil wrong committed by one person against 
 another ought not to be used as an incident which is a necessary 
 step in a criminal case for homicide committed in the perpetration 
 of an unlawful act.^" 'Not is a man answerable criminally for a 
 death which was not the natural and probable result of his own act. ^ ^ 
 
 zLiner V. state, 124 Ala. 1,27 So. 438; 24 Am. Dec. 490. And see People v. 
 
 Stute V. Smith, 32 Me. 369, 54 Am. Dec. Jackson, 182 N. Y. 66. 74 N. E. 565. 
 
 578; Wellar v. Peonle. 30 Mich. 16; sState v. Cooner: Nutt v. State; and 
 
 State V. Alexander, 30 S. C. 74, 14 Am. Cunningham v. People, — supra. 
 
 St. Eep. 879, 8 S. E. 440; Fiteh v. State, 'People v. Olsen. 80 Cnl. 122, 22 Pac. 
 
 37 Tex. Crim. Eep. 500, 36 S. W. 584. 125. And see People v. Wheelock (Cal.) 
 
 sState V. Spencer, 21 N. J. L. 196. 68 Pac. 579. 
 
 4United States v. Boyd, 45 Fed. 851 ; sRex v. Plummer, J. Kelyng, 109, 12 
 
 State V. Lopez, 15 Nev. 407. Mod. 627. 
 
 5Reg. V. Lee, 4 Fost. cfc F. 63; Queen sWellar v. People, 30 Mich. 16. And 
 
 V. Franz, 2 i'ost. & F. 580; Barrett's see State v. Pate, 4 Ohio Legal News, 
 
 Case, Stephen's Dig. Crim. Law, art. 403. 
 
 224. p. 164; Nutt V. State. 63 Ala. 180; lOReg. v. Franklin, 15 Cox, C. C. 
 
 Cunningham v. People, 195 111. 550. 63 163. 
 
 N. E. 517; State v. Hopkirk, 84 Mo. uReg. v. Horsey, 3 Fost. & F. 287. 
 
 278; State v. Cooper, 13 N. J. L. 361, Where death unintentionally ensues 
 Horn. — 8. 
 
114 HOMICIDE. [§ 92 
 
 And the suggestion has been made that the rule should be, not that 
 a killing in the perpetration of a felony is murder, but that a killing 
 in the perpetration of any act known to be dangerous to life, don© 
 for the purpose of committing a felony, is murder. * ^ So, it is open, 
 to the jury to ignore the doctrine of implied malice in such cases,, 
 and a verdict of manslaughter may be properly rendered in a prose- 
 cution for a killing done in the perpetration, or attempted perpetra- 
 tion, of a felony.** And to constitute murder the commission of 
 the felony or the doing of the unlawful act through which death 
 results must have been deliberate, and not on sudden provocation or 
 in a sudden affray, since in such case the killing is manslaughter 
 only. * * 
 
 Peremptory as has been the assertion of this principle, however^ 
 that an intent to commit larceny cannot be now used to prove an 
 intent to kill was emphatically declared by a learned English judge 
 (Blackburn, J.), in his testimony in 1874, before the Homicide 
 Amendment Committee. And it has been argued that this rule had 
 its inception when all felonies were punished capitally, so that it 
 was a matter of indifference to an offender as to which he was con- 
 victed of committing, since his punishment would be the same wheth- 
 er he was convicted of a minor theft, or of killing the owner of 
 property in carrying out an intent to steal it. But this reason, such 
 as it is, no longer exists. Larceny and murder have assigned to them 
 distinct punishments; and it is no longer a matter of indifference 
 to the defendant for which he is to be tried. Nor is it a matter of 
 indifference to juries. A jury must feel itself far more willing to 
 convict a man of larceny than to convict him of murder simply be- 
 cause he intended to steal. But, of course, when a legislature enacts 
 that an unintentional homicide, which occurs in the perpetration of 
 a collateral felony, shall be called murder, we have to accept the 
 definition. And in the light of the modern decisions the doctrine 
 above stated, that an intent to commit a felony conistitutes an in- 
 
 from acts or means which, under the One who^ for the purpose of obtain- 
 
 circumstances, could not have been sup- ing a few hundred dollars and a small 
 
 posed to injure human life, or inflict amount of personal property, decoys; 
 
 j'-reat bodily harm, the law will not im- three victims, one at a time, from their 
 
 ])ly malice, and the degree of the crime house to their stable a few yards dis- 
 
 will be reduced from murder to man- tnnt, under the pretense that one of 
 
 slaughter. State v. Johnson, 102 Ind. their horses is sick, and there assaults 
 
 247, 1 N. E. 377. and kills them with a weapon previously 
 
 i2Reg. V. Seme, 16 Cox, C. C. 311. prepared, is clearly guilty of murder 
 
 isReg. V. Greenwood, 7 Cox, C. C. for the purpose of robbery. State v, 
 
 404. Perry, 136 Mo. 126, 37 S. W. 804. 
 
 i4Rex V. Plummer, J. Kelyng, 109, 12 
 Mod. 627. 
 
§ 92] MALICE IN HOMICIDE, GENERALLY. 115 
 
 gredient of a resultant homicide, so as to import into it the element 
 of implied malice, must he deemed to he settled law.*® Homicide 
 hased upon malice of this class is considered generally, and with 
 reference to statutory re-enactments and variations of the common- 
 law rule, in another part of this work.^® 
 
 VI. Inferences and presumptions as to maxioe. 
 
 93. Generally. — ^Malice, whether express or implied, residing in 
 the mind and heart, is necessarily a circumstantial fact, and its 
 presence or absence may he established by circumstantial evidence. ^ 
 And the existence or nonexistence of malice, like any other fact, may 
 be logically inferred by the jury in a prosecution for homicide, from 
 the facta and circumstances of the case, such as the character of 
 the weapon used, the intention of the accused at the time, and his 
 previous acts and conduct.'' It need not be proved as a matter of 
 fact,* or established by direct evidence.* Nor need it be shown by 
 express utterance at the time of the killing," but it may be implied 
 from any deliberate, cruel act against another, however sudden.® 
 And the existence or nonexistence of an intent to kill may be in- 
 ferred from the character of the act of the accused, and the use or 
 absence of a deadly weapon, and the presence of excusing or pal- 
 liating facts or circumstances.^ So, abandonment of malice or a 
 purpose to kill may also be established, either by evidence, or by 
 
 iBSee infra, chapter IX., §§ 118 et supra; United States v. Armstrong, 2 
 
 seq. Curt. C. C. 446, Fed. Cas. No. 14,467. 
 
 inSee infra, chapter IX., §§ 118 et The fact that one during the early 
 
 seq. part of the day had acted as a friend of 
 
 lUnited States v. Boyd, 45 Fed. 851 ; another, and tried to prevent his being 
 
 Walker v. State, 136 Ind. 663, 36 N. E. hurt in his quarrels with others, is a 
 
 356; Rex v. Greenacre, 8 Car. & P. 35. circumstance to disprove malice in a 
 
 sPeople V. Samsels, 06 Oal. 99, 4 Pac. prosecution against him for killing such 
 
 1061 ; State v. Draper, Houst. Crim. Rep. person, to be submitted to the jury with 
 
 (Del.) 531; State v. Harmon, 4 Penn. the other evidence, but is not a rebut- 
 
 (Del.) 580, 60 Atl. 866; State v. Wal- tal of the evidence, as matter of law. 
 
 lace, 2 Penn. (Del.) 402, 47 Atl. 621; Com. v. Aiello, 180 Pa. 697, 36 Atl. 
 
 Roberson v. State (Fla.) 34 So. 294; 1079. 
 
 Walker v. State, 136 Ind. 663, 36 N. E. sState v. Walker, and State v. Tal- 
 
 356; Friederich v. People, 147 111. 310, bott, supra. 
 
 35 N. E. 472; State v. King, 22 La. Ann. 4 People v. Lilley; People v. Scott; 
 
 434; State v. Walker, 37 La,. Ann. 560; Friederich v. People; Walker v. State; 
 
 State V. Desehamps, 42 La. Ann. 667, and Com. v. Drum, — supra. 
 
 21 Am. St. Rep. 392, 7 So. 703; People BRoberson v. State (Fla.) 34 So. 
 
 V. Lilley, 43 Mich. 526, 5 N. W. 982; 204. 
 
 People V. Scott, 6 Mich. 296; Green v. «Harris T. State, 155 Ind. 2C5, 68 N. 
 
 State, 13 Mo. 382; State v. Talbott, 73 E. 75. 
 
 Mo. 347; State v. Pate. 7 Ohio N. P. 7Brown v. State, 142 Ala. 287, 38 So. 
 
 643; Com. v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9; State v. 268; State v. Di Guglielmo, 4 Penn. 
 
 Millain, 3 Nev. 409; People v. Rogers, (Del.) 336, 65 Atl. 350. 
 13 Abb. Pr. N. S. 370; Rex v. Greenacre, 
 
n'6 HOMICIDE. re 93 
 
 inference from the circumstances of the case.* A homicide is not 
 murder, however^ in the absence of malice, either express or implied, 
 and a conviction for that offense cannot be had unless it is estab- 
 lished by proof, or something appears in the case from which it may 
 be inferred.® 
 
 94. Inference from the act itself. — In accordance with the common- 
 law definition of implied malice the earlier cases laid down the rule 
 that the law implies malice from the mere fact of an intentional 
 or unlawful killing, which, though unquestionably erroneous when 
 literally construed, has been asserted and acted upon, so far as ap- 
 peared to be necessary, by a vast number of modern cases. ^ And the 
 implication thus made was held to take the place of proof, and may 
 be controlling in the absence of evidence bearing on the subject.* 
 Healizing, however, that injustice must result in many cases if the 
 inference of malice were to be regarded as one of law in the nature 
 of a conclusive presumption, an increasing number of the courts, 
 though maintaining the old rule, have modified it by holdiiig that 
 the inference of malice may be made from the homicidal act, by the 
 jury, as matter of fact, the surrounding circumstances not appear- 
 ing.* The malice requisite to the crime of murder is not an in- 
 
 sPalmore v. State, 29 Ark. 249. 3 Hicks v. State, 25 Fla. 543, 6 So, 
 sShannahan v. Com. 8 Bush, 463, 8 441 j Lane v. State, 85 Ala. 11, 4 So. 730; 
 Am. Rep. 465. Keady v. People, 32 Colo. 57, 66 L.R.A. 
 iCom. V. York, 9 Met. 93, 43 Am. 353, 74 Pac. 892; Hill v. People, 1 Colo. 
 Dee. 373; Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 436; State v. Draper, Houst. Crim. Rep. 
 52 Am. Dee. 711; Com. v. Bell, Addi- (Del.) 291; State v. Wright, 46 La. 
 son (Pa.) 156, 1 Am. Dec. 298; Com. Ann. 1403, 16 So. 366; People v. Kirby, 
 V. Ho:ieyman, Addison (Pa.) 147; Peo- 2 Park. Crim. Rep. 28; State v. Mc- 
 ple V. March. 6 Cal. 543 ; Holland v. Daniel, 68 S. C. 304, 102 Am. St. Rep. 
 State, 12 Fla. 117; Choice v. State, 31 061, 47 S. E. 384. And see State v. Ma- 
 Ga. 424; Murphy v. People, 37 111. 447; son, 54 S. C. 240, 32 S. E. 357. 
 Peri V. People, 65 111. 17; State v. Gil- The implication that a jury should, 
 lick, 7 Iowa, 287 ; Hawthorne v. State, 58 as a matter of law, infer malice or an 
 Miss. 778; McDaniel v. State, 8 Smedes intent to kill from the facts and cir- 
 & M. 401, 47 Am. Dec. 93; State v. cumstances which they might gather 
 Alexander, 30 S. C. 74, 14 Am. St. Rep. from instructions that, where the act 
 879, 8 S. E. 440; Boyd v. State, 28 Tex. is deliberate and likely to be dangerous, 
 App. 137, 12 S. W. 737; Farrer v. State, malice will be presumed; that when a 
 42 Tpx. 265; People v. Callaghan, 4 man deliberately uses a deadly weapon 
 Utah, 49, 6 Pac. 49; M'Whirt's Case, 3 in a manner likely to produce harm, he 
 Gratt. .'594, 46 Am. Dec. 196; United must be deemed to have intended to de- 
 States V. Outerbridge, 5 Sawy. 620, Fed. stroy life; and that, if he does an act 
 Cas. No. 15,978; Acers v. United States, which has a direct tendency to destroy 
 164 U. S. 388, 41 L. ed. 481, 17 Sup. Ct. life, the necessary conclusion is that 
 Rep. 91 ; Legg's Case, J. Kelyng, 27 ; he intended to do so, — is removed by 
 Mackalley's Case, 9 Coke, 67b; Reg. v. other i structions that the intent to 
 Mawgridge, J. Kelyng, 121. murder cannot be implied as matter of 
 2Com. V. Honeyman, supra; O'Mara v. law, but must be proved as matter of 
 Com. 75 Pa. 424; People v. Bush, 71 fact; and that malice is not inferred 
 Cal. 602, 12 Pap. 781; People v. March, from the use of a deadly weapon, but 
 supra. must be found by the jury from proof 
 
§ 94)' MALICE IN HOMICIDE, GENERALLY. 117 
 
 ference of law from the act of killing, but must be found by the jury 
 on competent evidence.* No such implication arises -where there 
 ■was evidence either of malice or of matters of extenuation ; it is only 
 in the absence of all explanatory evidence that it can be made. " And, 
 though the killing is admitted, if the admission is coupled with 
 declarations showing justification, no presumption of malice, or that 
 the homicide was murder, arises.® Where the facts and circum- 
 stances attending a homicide are disclosed in evidence in a prose- 
 cution therefor, so as to warrant a conclusion of malice as one of 
 fact, no presumption of malice arjses from the killing;^ though an 
 instruction that malice will not be inferred from the killing, Avhere 
 the facts attending it are shown, is erroneous, as tending to mislead, 
 where the evidence showed an intentional killing, without excuse or 
 justification.* And while the jury in a prosecution for homicide 
 are at liberty to infer an intent to kill from the act, if the circum- 
 stances warrant it, they are under no legal obligation to do so, the 
 test being one of logic, rather than of law.** And it has been held 
 that one cannot be held guilty of murder upon mere proof of kill- 
 ing ; ' " though an instruction that the jury might infer malice from 
 the killing, or the manner of killing, is not objectionable as telling 
 the jury that, as a matter of law, the inference should be drawn. ^^ 
 
 of facts and circumstances sufficient to And an instruction in a prosecution 
 
 warrant such implication. Keady v. for homicide in which the facts were 
 
 People, supra. in evidence, so that no presumption of 
 
 estate V. Greenleaf, 71 N. H. 608, 54 malice from the fact of the killing exist- 
 
 Atl. 38. ed, that if the accused intentionally 
 
 sFutch V. State, 90 Ga, 472, 16 S. killed the deceased, it was murder, is 
 E. 102 ; Hampton v. State, 45 Ala. 82 ; erroneous, and is not corrected by a sub- 
 Peri V. People, 65 111. 17; Hawthorne sequent charge as to manslaughter. 
 V. State, 58 Miss. 778; BrowT v. State, State v. Rochester, siipra. 
 9 Neb. 157, 2 N. W. 378; Territory v. sLedbetter v. State (Ala.) 39 So. 618. 
 Lueero, 8 N. M. 543, 46 Pac. 18; State SKrohnavy v. State, 43 Neb 337 61 
 V. Jones, 29 S. C. 201, 7 S. E. 296; Stite N. W. 628. 
 
 V. Ariel, 38 S. C. 221, 16 S. E. 779; And an instruction that the legal im- 
 
 State V. Alexander, 30 S. C. 74, 14 Am. plication from the act of killing, in the 
 
 St. Rep. 879, 8 S. E. 440. absence of proof of the circumstances 
 
 sPcrkins v. State, 124 Ga. 6, 52 S. E. of its perpetration, is that the act was 
 
 17. murder, casting upon the prisoner the 
 
 But malice may be inferred from an burden of showing that it was not, is 
 
 intentional killing where the jury, from erroneous. Stokes v. People, 53 N. Y. 
 
 the whole case before them, and beyond 164, 13 Am. Rep. 492. 
 
 a reasonable doubt, find the additional ' "Hunter v. State, 74 Miss. 515, 21 
 
 fart that no circumstances of juatifica- So. 305; Kearney v. State, 68 Miss. 
 
 tion or excuse appear; if there is a 239, 8 So. 292; State v. Deschamps, 42 
 
 reasonable doubt as to justification, La. Ann. 567, 21 Am. St. Rep. 392, 7 
 
 there is a reasonable doubt as to malice. So. 703. 
 
 Territory v. Lueero, supra. iiNewby v. People, 28 Colo. 16, 62 
 
 'State y. Rochester, 72 S. C. 194, 51 Pac. 1035. 
 S. E. 085 : Raines v. State, 81 Miss. 489, 
 33 So. 19. 
 
118 HOMICIDE. [I 94 
 
 So, from the fact of killing there is no such legal implication that 
 the act was murder as casts upon the accused the burden of showing 
 that it was not, under statutes classifying homicide, since the mere 
 fact that one was deprived of life entirely fails to show the class 
 to which the homicide belongs.*^ Nor is intentional killing in- 
 compatible with the absence of malice, and the court should not so 
 instruct the jury that, finding that a homicide was committed in- 
 tentionally, they must find that it was committed with malice.*' 
 And where death ensues from acts or means which, under the cir- 
 cumstances, could not have been supposed to endanger life or to 
 inflict great bodily injury, the law will not imply malice, because 
 it cannot be reasonably inferred that the party intended the conse- 
 quences which flowed from his act.** An instruction that malice 
 may be implied from an unlawful killing is not erroneous, however,, 
 where it is given in connection with a general charge defining im- 
 plied malice.*® Malice of this class is, of course, implied malice, 
 pure and simple, as distinguished from express malice shown by the 
 acts of the parties and the circumstances of the case, as is also malice 
 in case of homicide in the commission of unlawful acts, which sub- 
 ject will be considered in subsequent chapters of this work. 
 
 95. Inference from cruelty and barbarity. — ^When a homicide is 
 committed under circumstances of great cruelty and barbarity evinc- 
 ing a malignant disposition, such circumstances take the place of 
 malice, or warrant an inference of malice, so as to make the act one 
 of murder;* and in such case a claim by the accused that he did 
 not intend to kill is of no effect^ When a killing is thus effected 
 the law will imply malice, without reference to what was passing 
 
 i2Stokes V. People, 53 N. Y. 164, 13 C. 405, 62 Am. St. Rep. 837, 27 S. E. 
 
 Am. Rep. 492. 905 ; Epperson v. State, 5 Lea, 291 ; 
 
 isDowdy V. State, 96 Ga. 653, 23 S. Shaw v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 435, 
 
 E. 827. 31 S. W. 361; United SUtes v. Cor- 
 
 iiMurphy v. People, 9 Colo. 435, 13 nell, 2 Mason, 91, Fed. Cas. No. 14,808; 
 
 Pae. 528. And see United States v. Arm- United States v. Ross, 1 Gall. 624, Fed. 
 
 stron?, 2 Curt. C. C. 446, Fed. Cas. No. Cas. No. 16,196. 
 
 14,467. 2State v. Brown; Powell v. State; 
 
 isFriday v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) ard State v. Hoover, — supra. 
 
 79 S. W. 815. Where a feeble old man was assault- 
 
 iState V. Duestrow, 137 Mo. 44, 38 ed without provocation by a young man, 
 
 S. W. 554, 39 S. W. 266; State V. Brown, powerful bej'ond the average of men, 
 
 119 Mo. 527, 24 S. W. 1027, 25 S. VV. and struck eight cruel blows upon the 
 200; People V. Williams, 43 Cal. 344; head, from which he never recovered con- 
 Com. V. Devlin, 126 Mass. 253; People sciousness, any one of which was suf- 
 V. Lilley, 43 Mich. 521, 5 N. W. 082; ficient to produce death, it cannot be 
 Powell V. State, 67 Miss. 119, 6 So. 646; said in a prosecution for the killing 
 State V. Hoover, 20 N. C. 500 (4 Dev. that there was no evidence of intent to 
 & B. L. 365) 34 Am. Dee. 383; State v. kill. People v. Goslaw, 73 Cal 323, 
 Town, Wright (Ohio) 75; Com. v. 14 Pac. 788. 
 
 Drum, 58 Pa. 9; State v. Davis, 50 S. 
 
i 95] MALICE IN HOMICIDE, GENERALLY. 119 
 
 in the slayer's mind at the time.^ And an assault made with an 
 abandoned disregard of human life, under such circumstances as to 
 l)e likely to produce death, warrants an inference of malice and a 
 specific intent to take life. * And though the assault is in retaliation 
 far recent provocation, if it is outrageous, either in its manner or 
 •continuance, and out of proportion to the offense given, malice is 
 inferred.® And in such case the slayer is guilty of murder or man- 
 slaughter though the instrument or means used were not such as 
 would ordinarily produce death.* ISTor is the inference of the exist- 
 ence of malice affected by the fact that the motive was chastisement, 
 and not killing,'" or by the fact that not weapons, but the feet and 
 hands, were used,* when such use was cruel and excessive, and the 
 manifest design was to do great bodily harm. And evidence that a 
 father had exposed and neglected his child is admissible in a prose- 
 cution against him, under an indictment charging him with having 
 killed the child by blows, for the purpose of showing malice.® The 
 rule would be different, however, if the slayer did not know, or 
 have reasonable grounds to believe, that the conditions or circum- 
 stances were such that his actions would be liable to cause death. * " 
 And while cruelty in homicide is an inference of law, where no 
 more appears than that the accused struck the deceased several blows 
 with a stick of curled hickory of the ordinary size, with the larger 
 end of it, nothing appearing as to the nature of the blows, except 
 that one of them was mortal, there is not enough to render the 
 <luestion of cruelty one of lawful inference. ^ ^ What constitutes a 
 cruel, barbarous, or unusual method of killing is properly left to 
 the determination of the jury. ^ ^ 
 
 96. Inference from circumstances of case generally. — If the act 
 which produced death was attended with such circumstances as are 
 the ordinary symptoms of a wicked, depraved, and malignant spirit, 
 
 sstate V. Levelle, 34 S. C. 120, 27 United States v. Cornell, 2 Mason, 91, 
 
 Am. St. Eep. 799, 13 S. E. 319. Fed. Cas. No. 14,868. 
 
 The act of a father charged with sFitch v. State, 37 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 murdering his child by whipping it, 500, 36 S. W. 584. 
 
 «f sending the beaten and sick child to 'M'Whirt's Case, supra; Com. v. Fox, 
 
 its grandfather's, a distance of 18 miles, 7 Gray, 585; Powell v. State, 67 Mis3. 
 
 on a cold and rainy December day, at ]}^'^. ^°- ^^^'\ „^,*° „y.- f^^^A ^'^ ^■ 
 
 which place it died in a few days, is ^;/*'«' !> ^-\^- ^^l' ^2 Am. St. Eep. 
 
 admissible in evidence as bearing upon ii™,?: ,,'' ^' ,, 
 
 the question of malice Hornsba j. Com. p/^^ie^'^c'oL.'^sl: iTCf 5^8^^^'^ ^• 
 
 14 Ky. L. Eep. 106, 19 S. W. 845. 9Samuel v. State. 14 Lea, 439. 
 
 4Crosby V. People, 137 111. 325, 27 N. loCom. v. Fox, 7 Gray, 585. 
 
 E. 49. 11 State v. Jarrott, 23 N. C. (1 Ired. 
 
 5M'Whirt'8 Case, 3 Gratt. 594, 46 Am. L.) 76. 
 
 Dec. 196; State v. Boon, 82 N. C. 637; laState v. Linney, 52 Mo. 40. 
 
120 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 IS 96 
 
 the law will imply malice without reference to what was passing in 
 the mind of the slayer at the time of the fatal act.^ And ail the 
 circumstances surrounding a case which tend to show that the killing 
 was the outcome of a criminal intent, or of a cruel, wicked, and 
 depraved heart, and was wilfully or recklessly done, go to establish 
 malice.^ For the purpose of determining whether malice or an in- 
 tent to kill existed, therefore, the character of the instrument, the 
 manner in which it was used, and the purpose to be accomplished 
 are all to be considered,* as are also previous quarrels and bad feel- 
 ing between the parties, and other circumstances tending to show 
 ill-will;* including the previous conduct of the parties,^ and previous 
 threats made by the accused against the deceased,® and causes for 
 dislike or ill-will, as well as acts or circumstances demonstrating it.'' 
 And evidence of previous hatred and ill-will is admissible in a prose- 
 
 iState V. Smith, 2 Strobh. L. 77, 47 
 Am. Dec. 589. .\ncl see State v. David, 
 49 N. C. (4 Jones, L.) 353. 
 
 Evidence that a person repaired with 
 his friends to an appointed spot to 
 have a fair fight with another, ad that 
 the latter failed to keep his engigement, 
 but sent his father with a request to 
 let the matter drop, upon which the 
 former applied grossly insulting epi- 
 thets to the father and killed him upon 
 his attempt to resent them, sufficiently 
 shows a depraved mind regardless of 
 human life, to warrant a convictioi of 
 murder in the second degree. Alvarez 
 V. State, 41 Fk. 632, 27 So. 40. 
 
 2State v. Wallace, 2 Penn. (Del.) 
 402, 47 Atl. 621 ; Hawkins v. State, 25 
 Ga. 207, 71 Am. Dec. 166. And see 
 Williams v. State, 123 Ga. 138, 51 S. 
 E. 322; Roberts v. State, 123 Ga. 146, 
 51 S. E. 374; Henderson v. State, 120 
 Ga. 504. 48 S. E. 167; State v. Hunt, 
 128 N. C. 584, 38 S. E. 473. 
 
 aPeople v. Valliere, 123 Cal. 576, 56 
 Pac. 433; People v. Ye Park, 62 Cal. 
 204; Carr v. State, 21 Ohio C. C. 43. 
 And see Territory v. Gutierez (N. M.) 
 79 Pac. 710. 
 
 4Koerner v. State, 98 Ird. 7 ; Holmes 
 V. State, 100 Ala. 80, 14 So. 864; Syl- 
 vester V. State (Fla.) 35 So. 142; State 
 V. Coleman, 111 La. 303, 35 So. 560. 
 
 So, evidence in a prosecution for 
 homicide that the deceased had a. dilti- 
 culty with the brother of the accused 
 on the day previous to the killing is 
 adrri=sib1e as tending to show motive 
 for the killing, where the evidence tend- 
 ing to show the connection of the ac- 
 
 cused with the killing was circumstan- 
 tial. Sanders v. State, 134 AlA. 74, 32 
 So. 654. 
 
 And where a man and woman were 
 both killed at the same time, evidence 
 that the accused had said the woman 
 was the meanest woman in the world 
 is not rendered inadmissible as tending 
 to show motive for the killing by the 
 fact that the prosecution was for the 
 killing of the man, and not the woman. 
 Woolfolk V. State, 85 Ga^ 69, 11 S. E. 
 814. 
 
 6 State V. Pate, 5 Ohio S. & C. P. Dee. 
 732; Pitts V. State, 140 Ala. 70, 37 So. 
 101. 
 
 sStewart v. State, 1 Ohio St. 66; 
 State V. Pate, supra; Babcock v. Peo- 
 ple, 13 Colo. 515, 22 Pac. 817; State v. 
 Nix, in La. 812, 35 So. 917. And 
 see State v. Shunka, 116 Iowa, 206, 98 
 N. W. 977; Gay v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 App.) 69 S. W. 511. 
 
 'That a person charged with murder 
 had been indicted for robbery at the 
 instance of the person killed is compe- 
 tent in a prosecution for the murder, 
 not to prove the facts tending to estab- 
 lish the charge, but for the purpose of 
 showing motive. Martin v. Com. 93 
 Ky. 189, 19 S. W. 580. 
 
 And the fact that the accused had been 
 in the employ of a partnership of which 
 the deceased was a member, and of his 
 having been discharged by their foreman 
 shortly before the killing, is admissible 
 in evidence in a prosecution for the 
 killing as tending to show a motive for 
 the act. Morrison v. State, 84 Ala. 405, 
 4 So. 402. 
 
s 
 
 MALICE IN HOMICIDE, GENERAIiLY. 
 
 121 
 
 cution for homicide, as tending to prove active, present, and legal 
 malice at the time of the homicide;* as is also evidence of previous 
 threats.® So, preparing and concealing a knife or other weapon 
 before entering into a fight provoked by the person doing so, with 
 the determination to use it if necessary in the fight, is evidence of 
 malice.^" And so is arming one's self and returning to the scene 
 of a former difiiculty.* ^ And impeding the progress of the intended 
 victim, and sending for a deadly weapon and using it with fatal 
 effect, is suificient to go to the jury on the question of provoking a 
 difficulty. ^ ^ And the act of the slayer in trying to prevent the giv- 
 ing of aid to the deceased while in an injured and dying condition 
 is also evidence of malice. ^ * And malice may be inferred from the 
 act of provoking a difficulty with the apparent purpose of killing 
 the person provoked,^* as well as from a killing in the absence of 
 any appreciable provocation;^® and the subsequent return of the 
 slayer to the scene of the crime may be taken into consideration on 
 the question of his criminal intent.^® As may also subsequent ex- 
 
 sPeople V. Taylor, 36 Cal. 255; State 
 V. Exum, 138 N. C. 599, 50 S. E. 283. 
 And see Bristow v. Com. 15 Gratt. 634. 
 
 sPeopIe V. Sooggins, 37 Cal. 676 ; Peo- 
 ple V. Robertson, 67 fa' frlC, S ?ac. 
 600; Stiles v. State, 57 Ga. 183. 
 
 And evidence of persistent threats to 
 kill, and of the use of a deadly weapon, 
 ard of bravado immediately after the 
 killing, is sufficient to go to the jury on 
 the question of the existence of malice, 
 as tending to show that the crime was 
 murder, and not manslaughter. People 
 V. Kobertson, supra. 
 
 loPrice v. State, 36 Miss. 531, 72 Am. 
 Dec. 195; Gieen v. State, 28 Miss. 687; 
 Perry v. State, 102 Ga. 365, 30 S. E. 
 903. 
 
 And an instruction to this effect is 
 not subject to objection for failure to 
 state that the purpose for which the 
 weapons were provided should also be 
 considered. Perry v. State, supra. 
 
 And the conduct of a person in using 
 opprobrious and insulting language to 
 another, tending to cause a breach of 
 the nnqce, trd. upon the latter remon- 
 strating, of preparing for use a deadly 
 weapon, and then deliberately repeating 
 the offensive language, and of using 
 such weapon to kill the othpr, gives 
 rise to a legal presumption of malice, 
 which is not removed becnuse of a blow 
 lawfully given him in return for the 
 
 original provocation. Hanye v. State, 
 99 Ga. 212, 25 S. E. 307. 
 
 iiSanders v. State, 131 Ala. 1, 31 So. 
 564; State v. Bone, 114 Iowa, 537, 87 
 N. W. 507; State v. Hudspeth, 159 Mo. 
 178, 60 S. W. 136. 
 
 izHenry v. People, 198 111. 162, 65 
 N. E. 120. 
 
 13 Jordan v. State, 22 Ga. -545; Per- 
 ry V. State, 110 Ga. 234, 36 S. E. 781. 
 
 And evidence that the accused in a 
 prosecution for homicide, immediately 
 after the killing, shot at, chased, threat- 
 ened, and endeavored to kill the mother 
 of deceased, who was present and wit- 
 nessed the killing, is admissible as part 
 of the res gestat, and shows the animus 
 of the accused. Killins v. State, 28 Fla. 
 313, 9 So. 711. 
 
 i4Kyle V. People, 215 111. 250, 74 N. 
 E. 146. Ard see Monson v. State, 45 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 426, 76 S. W. 570. 
 
 i5Howard v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 
 1301, 71 S. W. 446; Reg. v. Noon, 6 
 Cox, C. C. 137. 
 
 The law will imply malice where one 
 person kills another without any con- 
 siderable provocation, the two being 
 strangers; and whether or not they 
 were strangers is a question of fact 
 for the jury. Malone v. State, 49 Ga. 
 210. 
 
 isDanforth v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. 
 Rep. 105, 69 S. W. 15B. 
 
122 HOMICIDE. [5 98 
 
 pressions by the accused of satisfaction with the result of his acts. * ^ 
 And deliberately shooting an antagonist a second time, after he was 
 already probably fatally wounded, and while he was staggering away, 
 may be considered in connection with the other circumstances of the 
 case as tending to show malice. ^ ® So, where there is no question as 
 to the fact of killing, absence of motive may give rise to an infer- 
 ence of malice,*® — especially where neither anger nor provocation 
 appears. '*" The mere fact that wounds inflicted were not such as 
 would usually result in death, however, does not establish the 
 fact that the assault in which they were inflicted was not one of a 
 character liable to produce death or great bodily harm.^* And the 
 accidental killing of another by the accused contemporaneously with 
 the killing of deceased, though a provable fact in a prosecution for 
 killing the latter, because a part of the res gestae, would not neces- 
 sarily show, or tend to show, that the killing of the deceased was 
 murder. ^^ And threats against a particular person with whom the 
 person making them had a quarrel are not competent in a prosecu- 
 tion against the latter on the question of malice or intent to kill in 
 a prosecution for killing another person, with whom he had no 
 quarrel.^* Nor are threats of a third person against the person 
 killed, made prior to a homicide, admissible in favor of the accused, 
 though taken with acts and declarations of such third person mani- 
 festing excitement and a desire to get away when interrogated on 
 the subject, and contradictory statements as to where he was on the 
 night in question, for the purpose of rendering the whole admis- 
 sible."* 
 
 97. Inference from use of poison — ^Where poison is administered 
 unlawfully and without a good intention, and death ensues, the law 
 infers or presumes that the killing was intentional and voluntary and 
 
 iTEvidence of a statement made by a other of smelling of the blood of the 
 
 man who had killed another, to the deceased is competent to go to the jury 
 
 wife and daughter of the deceased, to in a. prosecution for the killing on the 
 
 go on moaning, with an oath; that he question of malice. Duncan v. Com. 
 
 had killed the husband and intended to 11 Ky. L. Eep. 620, 12 S. W. 673. 
 
 kill the son, too, — is admissible in a isHarris v. State, 155 Ind. 265, 58 
 
 prosecution for the killing, as illsutrat- N. E. 75. 
 
 ing the malice of the accused. Fitts v. isCross v. State, 68 Ala. 476 
 
 State, 102 Tenn. 141, 50 S. W. 756. zoHill v. State, 41 Ga. 484. 
 
 And a declaration by the accused in siCrosby v. People, 137 111. 325, 27 
 
 a prosecution for homicide, made a few N. E. 49. 
 
 hours after the killing, that he cared 2 2Stevison v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 no more for it than for killing a jack 89 S. W. 1072. 
 
 rabbit, is admissible in evidence against 23Abernethy v. Com. 101 Pa. 322. 
 
 him as tending to show malice. People 24Woolfolk v. State, 85 Ga 69 11 S. 
 
 V. Shears, 133 Cal. 154, 65 Pac. 295. E. 814. 
 
 And the act of one who had killed an- 
 
S 97] IIALICE IN HOMICmB, GENERALLY. 123 
 
 with malice aforethought.^ And this is the rule where the poison 
 was administered unlawfully and with intent to do mischief, without 
 reference to whether there was an actual intent to kill.* And though 
 the killing was by accident or mistake and death was not intended, 
 malice is, nevertheless, inferred when the poison was given for th6 
 purpose of perpetrating a felony or accomplishing some unlawful 
 purpose, since the intent to accomplish the original wrong supplies 
 the intent as to the one actually committed.^ So, when a poison is 
 known to be deadly, administering it without proper medical advice 
 is strong proof of malice.* And a nurse who, knowing the deadly 
 effect of poison, administers to a child enough of it to kill, may be 
 properly convicted of murder,® though if the poison be administered 
 negligently, the case is manslaughter." So, a killing by poison, or 
 lying in wait, is evidence of express malice.^ The inference or pre- 
 sumption of malice from poisoning, however, is not conclusive, and 
 to convict of murder by poison there must be shown knowledge by 
 the accused of the dangerous character of the poison which produced 
 death.* And it may be shown that the poison was given for an in- 
 nocent purpose;* or in ignorance of the fact that it possessed any 
 poisonous or injurious qualities;^" or that it was heedlessly or in- 
 cautiously given without unlawful intention, in which case the kill- 
 ing could be no more than manslaughter. ^ ^ The guilt of the ac- 
 cused in a poisoning case, as in other cases, is a question of fact 
 for the jury, to be determined from all the facts and circumstances 
 in evidence in the case. ^ * And the question whether or not a sub- 
 stance is a poison is also one of fact for the jury. ^ * 
 
 iState V. Wells, 61 Iowa, 629, 47 Am. sRupe v. State, supra; State v. Wag- 
 Rep. 822, 17 N. W. 90; Johnson v. State, ner, 78 Mo. 644, 47 Am. Rep. 131. 
 «2 Ga. 36. 17 S. E. 974; State v. Bald- *2 Hale, P. C. 455; People v. Kes- 
 win, 36 kan. 1, 12 Pae. 318 ; State v. ler, 3 Wheeler, 0. C. 18 ; Green v. State, 
 Wagner, 78 Mo. 644, 47 Am. Rep. 131; 13 Mo. 382; Com. v. Norton, 2 Bost. 
 Selliek's Case. 1 N. Y. City Hall Ree. L- ^- 241. , „, „ „ „^.„ ^ , 
 185; State v. Town, Wright (Ohio) 75; ^^tate v. Leak, 61 N. C. (Phill. L.) 450. 
 Rupe V. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 477, *i^"° ^- ^^^^^' ^l H"'^P^ i?^' ^tate 
 61 S W 929 '"'• Wagner, supra; Rex v. Martin, 3 Car. 
 
 In Bechtelheimer V. State, 54 Ind. 128, "^ fgtfte v. Spencer, 21 N. J. L. 190; 
 
 It was heldthat a purposed killing by ^ ^ State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 477, 
 
 poison carries with it conclusive evi- gj g ^^ g29 
 
 deuce of premeditated malice. sp'eople v. Stokes, 2 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 
 
 2 State V. Wagner; State v. Baldwin; 334 
 
 and Rupe v. State, — supra. _ sAnn v. State, supra. 
 
 So, an assault with intent to kill 10 Ibid, 
 
 may be committed without using a iiState v. Wagner, 78 Mo. 644, 47 Am. 
 
 weapon; and though poison introduced Rep. 131. 
 
 through the stomach is not, accurately i2Siebert v. People, 143 111. 571, 32 
 
 speaking, a weapon, an assault with in- N. E. 431. 
 
 tent to kill may be thus committed. isState v. Baldwin, 36 Kan. 1, 12 Pae. 
 
 Johnson t. State, supra. 318. 
 
124: HOMICIDE. [i 98 
 
 98. Inference from character of weapon. — Malice or intent to kill 
 may be implied from such a use of a deadly weapon as is likely to 
 produce death. ^ A deadly weapon is an instrument designed to 
 effect death, and its use against a human being warrants an inference 
 that the person using it intended the ordinary and probable result 
 
 iMurphy v. State, 31 Ind. 511; Beau- 2 How. (Miss.) 655; Jeff v. State, 39 
 champ V. State, 6 Blackf. 299; Walker Miss. 593; State v. Tabor, 95 Mo. 585, 
 V. State, 136 Ind. 663, 36 N. E. .356; 8 S. W. 744; State v. Bowles, 146 Mo. 
 Deilks V. State, 141 Ind. 23, 40 N. E. 6, 69 Am. St. Eep. 598, 47 S. W. 892; 
 120; Voght V. State, 145 Ind. 12, 43 N. State v. Greenleaf, 71 N. H. 606, 54 
 E. 1049; Larkln v. State, 163 Ind. 375, Atl. 38; State v. Zellers, 7 N. J. L. 
 71 N. E. 959; Clem v. State, 31 Ind. 220; People v. Batting, 49 How. Pr. 
 480; Bradley v. State, 31 Ind. 492; 392; People v. Rogers, 13 Abb. Pr. N. 
 Coolman v. State, 163 Ind. 503, 72 N. S. 370; People v. Clark, 7 N. Y. 385; 
 E. 568; Kennedy v. State, 85 Ala. 326, People v. Sullivan, 7 N. Y. 396; People- 
 5 So. 300; Lane v. State, 85 Ala. 11, 4 v. Kirby, 2 Park. Crim. Eep. 28; Peo- 
 So. 730; Sullivan v. State, 102 Ala. 135, pie v. McLeod, 1 Hill, 377, 37 Am. Dec. 
 48 Am. St. Rep. 22, 15 So. 264; Sylves- 328; People v. Minisci, 12 N. Y. S. R. 
 ter v. State, 72 Ala. 201, 71 Ala. 17; 719; State v. Elliek, 60 N. C. (2 Winst. 
 Seaborn v. State, 20 Ala. 15; Tesney v. L.) 56, 86 Am. Dec. 442; State v. Book- 
 State, 77 Ala. 33; Tempe v. State, 40 er, 123 N. C. 713, 31 S. E. 376; State v. 
 Ala. 350; Webb v. State, 100 Ala. 49, Cole, 132 N. C. 1069, 44 S. E. 391; State 
 14 So. 865; Bell v. State, 140 Ala. 57, v. Howell, 31 N. C. (9 Ired. L.) 485; 
 37 So. 281; Halderman v. Territory, 7 State v. Potts, 100 N. C. 457, 6 S. E. 
 Ariz. 120, 60 Pac. 876; McAdams v. 657; State v. Capps, 134 N. C. 622, 4& 
 State, 25 Ark. 405; Sweeney v. State, S. E. 730; State v. Johnson, 48 N. C. 
 35 Ark. 585; Green v. State, 45 Ark. (3 Jones, L.) 266; State v. Irwin, 2 
 281; Bivens v. State, 11 Ark. 455; Peo- N. C. (1 Hayw.) 112; State v. Merrill, 
 pie V. Barry, 31 Cal. 357 ; Hill V. People, 13 N. C. (2 Dev. L.) 269; State v. 
 
 I Colo. 436; State v. Jones, 2 Penn. Town, Wright (Ohio) 75; State v. Tur- 
 (Del.) 573, 47 Atl. 1006; Holland v. ner, Wright (Ohio) 20; State v. Pate, 
 State, 12 Fla. 117; demons v. State 5 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 732; Carr v. 
 (Fla.) 37 So. 647; Weeks v. State, 79 State, 21 Ohio C. C. 43; State v. Ber- 
 Ga. 36, 3 S. E. 323; Vann v. State, 83 trand, 3 Or. 61; Lanahan v. Com. 84 
 Ga. 44, 9 S. E. 945; Freeman v. State, Pa. 80; Com. v. Daley, 2 Clark (Pa.) 
 70 Ga. 736; Ferryman v. State, 114 361 ; Com. v. Honeyman, Addison (Pa.) 
 Ga. 545, 40 S. E. 746; Mitehum V. State, 148; Com. v. M'Fall, Addison (Pa.) 
 
 II Ga. 615; Bird v. State, 14 Ga. 43; 257; Com. v. Lewis, Addisoi (Pa.) 282; 
 Clarke v. State, 35 Ga. 75; Davison v. Respubliea v. Bob, 4 Dall. 146, 1 L. edL 
 People, 90 111. 221; Murphy v. People, 777; Kilpatrick v. Com. 31 Pa. 198; 
 37 111. 447; State v. Zeibart, 40 Iowa, State v. Peters, 2 Rice's Digest, 103; 
 169; State v. Decklotts, 19 Iowa, 447; State v. Smith, 2 Strobh. L. 77, 47 
 State V. Jones, 64 Iowa, 349, 17 N. W. Am. Dec. 589; State v. Jackson, 36 S. 
 911, 20 N. W. 470; State v. Gillick, 7 C. 487, 31 Am. St. Rep. 890, 15 S. E. 
 Iowa, 287 ; Kriel v. Com. 5 Bush, 362 ; 559 ; State v. Sisson, 3 Brev. 58 ; Will- 
 State V. Deschamps, 42 La. Ann. 567, lams v. State, 3 Heisk. 376; Conner v. 
 21 Am. St. Rep. 392, 7 So. 703; Com. State, 4 Yerg. 137, 26 Am. Dec. 217; 
 V. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 52 Am. Dec. Dains v. State, 2 Humph. 439 ; Franklin 
 711; Com. v. York, 9 Met. 93, 43 Am. v. State, 37 Tex. Crim. Rep. 113, 38 S. 
 Dec. 373; Com. v. Drew, 4 Mass. 391; W. 802, 1016; Franklin v. State (Tex. 
 People v. Wolf, 95 Mich. 625, 55 N. W. Crim. App.) 82 S. W. 514; Connell v. 
 357; People v. Miller, 91 Mich. 639, 52 State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 259, 81 S. W. 
 N. W. 65; State V. Hoyt, 13 Minn. 132, 746; Freeman v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 Gil. 125; State v. Brown, 12 Minn. 538, App.) 77 S. W. 17; Howell v. State 
 Gil. 448; State v. Shippey, 10 Minn. 223, (Tex. Crim. App.) 60 S. W. 44; Wright 
 88 Am. Dec. 70, Gil. 178; Green v. v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 90 S. W. 
 State, 28 Miss. 687; Mask v. State, 36 36; Jackson v. Stote (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 Miss. 77; Price v. State, 36 Miss. 531, 90 S. W. 34; Isaacs v. State, 25 Tex. 
 72 Am. Dec. 195; Woodsides v. State, 174; State v. Kellison, 56 W. Va. 690, 
 
S 98] MALICE IN HOMICIDE, GENERALLY. 125 
 
 of his acts.* This is the rule where such a weapon is used against 
 an unarmed adversary, though there was reasonable provocation.^ 
 And one who prepares a deadly weapon with intent to use it if he 
 should get into a fight with another, and goes to a particular place 
 for the purpose of meeting the other and having a conflict with him, 
 and there kills him, is guilty of murder, and not manslaughter.^ 
 And this is so though he habitually carried a weapon. ^ The use of 
 a deadly weapon in committing a homicide is proof of malice for 
 which the accused must show excuse or mitigation,® unless the facts 
 and circumstances appearing in evidence show the contrary;^ and 
 that there was no actual intent to injure anyone is not suiHcient to 
 
 47 S. E. 166; Clifford v. State, 58 Wis. People v. Fish, 125 N. Y. 136, 26 N. E. 
 
 477, 17 N. W. 304; Ullraan v. State, 319; People v. Conroy, 97 N. Y. 62; 
 
 124 Wis. 602, 103 N. W. 6; Allea v. People v. Batting, 49 How. Pr. 392; 
 
 United States, 164 U. S. 492, 41 L. ed. Kilpatrick v. Com. 3 Phila. 237 ; Com. v. 
 
 528, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 154; United States Lynch, 3 Pittsb. 412; State v. Levelle, 
 
 V. Cornell, 2 Mason, 91, Fed. Cas. No. .34 S. C. 120, 27 Am. St. Rep. 799, 13 
 
 14,868; Dexter v. Spear, 4 Mason, 115, S. E. 319; Draper v. State, 4 Baxt. 246; 
 
 J'ed. Cas. No. 3,867; United States v. Aiken v. State, 10 Tex. App. 610; High 
 
 Mingo, 2 Curt. C. C. 1, Fed. Cas. No. v. State, 26 Tex. App. 545, 8 Am. St. 
 
 15,781; United States v. Armstrong, 2 Rep. 488, 10 S. W. 238; Farrer v. State, 
 
 Curt. C. C. 446, Fed. Cas. No. 14,467; 42 Tex. 265; Gatlin v. State, 5 Tex. 
 
 United States v. McGlue, 1 Curt. C. C. App. 531 ; State v. McDonnell, 32 Vt. 
 
 1, Fed. Cas. No. 15,679. And see Smith 492; United States v. McGlue, 1 Curt. 
 
 V. Com. 1 Duv. 224; Gale v. People, 26 C. C. 1, Fed. Cas. No. 15,679. Ard see 
 
 Mich. 157; Barcus v. State, 49 Miss. 17, Brownlee v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 19 Am. Rep. 1; State v. Keith, 9 Nev. 87 S. W. 1153. 
 
 16; O'Mara v. Com. 75 Pa. 424; Coffee And where one person kills another 
 V. State, 3 Yerg. 283, 24 Am. Dec. 570; with a deadly weapon, an instruction 
 Dove V. State, 3 Heisk. 348; Hamby v. in a prosecution therefor as to invol- 
 State, 36 Tex. 523. untary manslaughter is favorable to 
 2State V. Silk, 145 Mo. 240, 44 S. W. the accused. Handly v. Com. 15 Ky. L. 
 764, 46 S. W. 959; State v. Bowles, 146 Rep. 736, 24 S. W. 609. 
 Mo. 6, 69 Am. St. Rep. 598, 47 S. W. aHoUard v. State, 12 Fla. 117. 
 892; State v. Fairlamb, 121 Mo. 137, And the fact that a blow was struck 
 25 S. W. 895; State v. Dunn, 80 Mo. with a, stick picked up on the spur of 
 681; State v. Musick, 101 Mo. 260, 14 the moment, without previous selection 
 S.. W. 212; State v. Gee, 85 Mo. 647; or preparation, does not prevent the 
 Grant v. State, 62 Ala. 233; Sullivan v. jury in a prosecution for death result- 
 State, 102 Ala. 135, 48 Am. St. Rep. ing from the blow from presuming that 
 22, 15 So. 264; Halderman v. Territory, it was struck with malice, where it 
 7 Ariz. 120, 60 Pac. 876; People v. Ah appears that the stick was one which. 
 Gee Yung, 86 Cal. 144, 24 Pac. 860; from its size and weight, was likely to 
 People V. Bushton, 80 Cal. 160, 22 Pac. produce death. McKee v. State, 82 
 127, 549; Hill v. People, 1 Colo. 436; Ala. 32, 2 So. 451. 
 
 Newby v. People, 28 Colo. 16, 62 Pac. iState v. Hogue, 51 N. C. (6 Jones, 
 
 1035; State v. Walker, 9 Houst. (Del.) L.) 381; Ex parte Wray, 30 Miss. 673; 
 
 464, 33 Atl. 227; Holland v. State, 12 Green v. State, 28 Miss. 687. 
 Fla. 117; Collier v. State, 39 Ga. 31, eGreen v. State, supra. 
 99 Am. Dec. -449; State v. Dull, 67 estate v. Rollins, 113 N. C. 722, 18 
 
 Kan. 793, 74 Pac. 235; Com. v. York, S. E. 394; State v. Landgraf, 95 Mo. 
 
 9 Met. 93, 43 Am. Dec. 373; State v. 97, 6 AmTBt. Rep. 26, 8 S. W. 237. 
 Lautenschlager, 22 Minn. 514; Mask v. 'State v. Landgraf, supra; State v. 
 
 State, 36 Miss. 77; Head v. State, 44 Jones, 2 Penn. (Del.) 573,47 AtL 1006. 
 Miss. "'31; Jeff v. State, 39 Miss. 593; 
 
126 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 IS 98 
 
 rebut the inference of malice.* And deliberately shooting into an 
 occupied house gives rise to an inference of an intent to kill.® And 
 such intent inferred from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon 
 constitutes malice aforethought.^" If the weapon used in killing,, 
 however, was not a deadly one, a felonious intent must be clearly 
 shown to bring the crime above the degree of manslaughter. * * Some- 
 thing more than a mere blow with an instrument which might kill, 
 but which is not termed a deadly weapon, or a weapon intended to 
 kill, and ensuing death, are necessary to be shown to establish the 
 ingredients of murder; the intention to kill must also exist, *^ and 
 the manner in which such weapon was used must make it evident 
 that it was intended to kill or do great bodily harm;*^ though where 
 malice is otherwise shown, the character of the weapon and the man- 
 ner of its use are of no importance. ^ * And though a deadly weapon 
 was used the inference arising therefrom may be rebutted by cir- 
 cumstances tending to show absence of malice or intent to kill;*^ 
 
 sState V. CappSj 134 N. C. 622, 46 S. 
 E. 730. 
 
 sTipton V. State, 119 Ga. 304, 46 S. 
 E. 436; State v. Capps, supra. 
 
 1 estate V. Zeibart, 40 Iowa, 169; Hol- 
 land V. State, 12 Fla. 117. 
 
 nWellar v. People, 30 Mich. 16; Peo- 
 ple V. Ros-s, 60 Mich. 96, 33 N. W. 30; 
 Grant v. State, 62 Ala. 233; State v. 
 Walker, 9 Houst. (Del.) 464, 33 Atl. 
 227; Wrye v. State, 99 Ga. 34, 25 S. E. 
 610; Honeywell v. State, 40 Tex. Grim. 
 Rep. 199, 49 S. W. 486; Shaw v. State, 
 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 435, 31 S. W. 361; 
 Henry v. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 306, 
 42 S. W. 559; Poaey v. State, 46 Tex. 
 Crim. Rep. 190. 78 S. W. 689; Fiteh v. 
 State, 37 Tex. Crim. Rep. 500, 36 S. W. 
 684; Griffin v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 63 S. W. 848; Connell v. State, 46 Tex. 
 Crim. Rep. 259, 81 S. W. 746; State v. 
 Douglass, 28 W. Va. 297 ; Queen v. Me- 
 Intyre, 2 Cox. C. C. 379. 
 
 i2Lanahan v. Cora. 84 Pa. 80; Kelly 
 V- Com. 1 Grant, Cas. 484. 
 
 Evidence that a man went to the 
 house of another and was there given 
 food, after which he became offensive 
 in his actions, and stated his intention 
 to carry away the house owner's wife 
 and children, and picked up his little 
 girl and started off with her, when the 
 owner struck him on the head with a 
 stick causing his death, is not sufficient 
 to support a conviction of murder upon 
 express malice. Page v. State (Tex. 
 Crim. App.) 24 S. W. 420. 
 
 n Honeywell v. State; Shaw v. State; 
 
 Griffin v. State; and Posey v. State, — 
 supra; State v. Kinder, 184 Mo. 276,. 
 83 S. W. 964. And see Lee v. State 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 72 S. W. 195. 
 
 To constitute murder the weapon or 
 means used in committing a homicide 
 must have possessed the quality of what 
 is known as a deadly weapon, without 
 regard to the manrer in which it was 
 used; or, if not deadly, the manner of 
 its use must have shown an intention 
 to kill. Shaw v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. 
 Rep. 435, 31 S. W. 361. 
 
 Instate V. Hyland, 144 Mo. 302, 46 
 S. W. 195. And see Franklin v. State, 
 37 Tex. Crim. Rep. 113, 38 S. W. 802, 
 1016. 
 
 Under Colo. Crim. Code, chap. 25, § 
 21, providing that malice snail be im- 
 plied in homicide where no consider- 
 able provocation appears, or when the 
 circumstances of the killing show an 
 abandoned and malignant heart, the use 
 of a deadly weapon is rot a necessary 
 condition precedent to the implication; 
 and it would be implied where an as- 
 sault was made by a man upon a wom- 
 an with his hands and feet only, being 
 aware at the time that her condition 
 was such that such an assault might 
 prove fatal. Murphy v. People, 9 Colo. 
 435, 13 Pac. 528. 
 
 isSee Atkins v. State, 16 Ark. 568; 
 Ex parte Wray, 30 Miss. 673 ; Raines v. 
 State, 81 Miss. 489, 33 So. 19; Donnel- 
 len V. Com. 7 Bush, 676 j &iate v. New- 
 ton, 4 Nev. 410. 
 
§ 98] MALICE IN HOMICIDE, GENERALLY, 127' 
 
 such as that the killing was in the heat of passion induced by great 
 provocation,^" or that it was in self-defense.^'' And an instruction 
 as to the inference of malice from the use of deadly weapons should 
 not be given when misadventui-e is asserted, since it is only de- 
 liberate killing with a deadly weapon from which malice may be in- 
 ferred. ^ * Nor does the mere fact that a person committing a hom- 
 icide was armed with a deadly weapon raise an inference against 
 him, when by the law of the state he had a right to be so armed, un- 
 less it appears that he provided himself with weapons for the pur- 
 pose of using them against the person killed ; ^ * though the fact that 
 the law permits a man to bear arms for self-defense does not dimin- 
 ish or affect his responsibility for an improper use of them, and 
 does not affect the inference of malice arising from such use. * ** And 
 the act of a person who kills another in a mutual combat, of using 
 a weapon superior to the weapon used by the person killed, is not of 
 itself evidence from which malice may be inferred.^'- Nor do rules 
 of law with reference to inferences arising from the use qf weapons, 
 deadly or otherwise, apply where the killing is admitted or unques- 
 tioned, and insanity is set up as a defense. ^^ Statutory provisions 
 with reference to criminal liability in homicide committed with an 
 instrument not likely to produce death need not be given in charge to 
 the jury in a prosecution for homicide, in which it appears that a 
 deadly weapon was used. ^ ^ 
 
 Declarations of a person made at the And a man who is told by his wife 
 
 time of procuring weapons for an antic- of insulting conduct of a third person 
 
 ipated diflSculty, that he did not intend toward her has a right to seek for an 
 
 to use them unless other parties in- explanation and to ask a retraction, and 
 
 terfered, are sufficient to disprove ex- in so doing he has the right to arm hira- 
 
 press malice, where it appears that he self to resist any anticipated attack. 
 
 did not attempt to use them until he Melton v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 83 
 
 was so closely pressed and violently S. W. 822. 
 
 beaten by his antagonist that he might 20Head v. State. 44 Miss. 731. 
 be reasonably supposed to have acted ziPeople v. Barry, 31 Cal. 357. 
 as much from instinct as from reason. It is not the intent to use a deadly 
 
 Ex parte Wray, supra. weapon, but the intention to kill, of 
 
 Instate V. Rainsbarger, 71 Iowa, 746, which the use of the deadly weapon is 
 
 31 N. W. 865; Kelly v. State, 68 Miss, evidence, that constitutes the crime of 
 
 343, 8 So. 745. murder: and this distinction should 
 
 I'Tempe v. State, 40 Ala. 350; Ham- be made clear to the jury in the in- 
 
 mond v. People, 199 111. 173, 64 N. E. struction on this point. Palmore v. 
 
 980; Burnett v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. State, 29 Ark. 249. 
 116, 79 S. W. 550. 22Spivey v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 isRaines v. State, supra. 496, 77 S. W. 444. 
 
 lOCotton V. State, 31 Miss. 504; Klyce 23Brownlee v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 V, State, 78 Miss. 450, 28 So. 827. And App.) 87 S. W. 1153; Baker v. State 
 
 see Williams v. United States (Tnd. (Tex. Crim. App.) 81 S. W. 1215. 
 Terr.) 88 S. W. 334. Contra, People v. 
 Minisci, 12 N. Y. S. R. 719. 
 
128 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 [I 99 
 
 99. Malice, when presumed — While it is open to the Jury in a 
 prosecution for homicide to infer malice from the bare fact of kill- 
 ing, the circumstances not appearing, no presumption of malice 
 arises.^ The general rule of criminal law, that the law presumes a 
 person accused of crime to be innocent until the contrary is made 
 to appear, applies to homicide and its incident malice.^ And thp 
 presumption of innocence must be allowed to prevail over an infer- 
 ence of malice.* And the burden of proof as to malice, as well as 
 to the other ingredients of the offense of homicide, rests with the 
 prosecution.* And its existence must be established to the satisfac- 
 tion of the jury,* or, in some jurisdictions, beyond a reasonable 
 doubt," upon a consideration of all the evidence in the case. And 
 many of the cases hold that this burden does not shift, but rests 
 with the prosecution throughout the whole case.^ By a very large 
 number of the cases, however, the rule has been adopted that in the 
 absence of explanatory circumstances, or circumstances tending to 
 rebut such presumption, a presumption of malice or intent to kill 
 arises from an apparently intentional killing, ** or a killiug by acts 
 
 lUnited States v. Armstrong, 2 Curt. 
 C. C. 446, Fed. Cas. No. 14,467. 
 
 Innocence is presumed until the con- 
 trary is proved, but the intent of an act 
 may be inferred from the act. the in- 
 ference being one of fact to be drawn by 
 the jury, and not an implication of law 
 to be applied by the court. Stokea v. 
 People, 53 N. Y. 164, 13 Am. Rep. 
 492. 
 
 2Hawthorne v. State, 58 Miss. 778. 
 
 3 State V. McDonnell, 32 Vt. 491. 
 
 ^Territory v. Lucero. 8 N. M. 543, 
 46 Pac. 18 ; People v. Ah Gee Yung, 86 
 Cal. 144. 24 P^io. 860; Kent v. People, 
 8 Colo. 563, 9 Pac. 852 ; State v. Usher, 
 126 Iowa, 287, 102 N. W. 101; State v. 
 Wright, 46 La. Ann. 1403, 16 So. 366; 
 State V. Deschamps, 42 La. Ann. 567, 
 
 21 Am. St. Rep. 392, 7 So. 703; Maher 
 V. People, 10 Mich. 212, 81 Am. Dec. 
 781 ; State v. Lautenschlager, 22 Minn. 
 514; Herman v. State, 75 Miss. 340, 
 
 22 So. 873; State v. Jones, 29 S. C. 201, 
 7 S. E. 296; State v. Workman, 39 S. 
 C. 151, 17 S. E. 694; State v. Patterson, 
 45 Vt. 308, 12 Am. Rep. 200; State v. 
 Cross, 42 W. Va. 253, 24 S. E. 996. 
 
 And an instruction that, a homicide 
 having been established by the state, 
 unless its testimony also proves that 
 the offense was excusable or justifiable, 
 the burden of proof rests with the de- 
 fendant to show that the crime was only 
 
 manslaughter, or was justifiable, is er- 
 roneous as improperly casti-g the bur-: 
 den of proof on the accused. People v. 
 Powell, 87 Cal. 348, 11 L.R.A. 75, 25 Pac. 
 481. 
 
 sFarris v. Com. 14 Bush, 362; State 
 v. Wright, supra; Com. v. Hawkins, 3 
 Gray, 463. 
 
 6Murphy v. State, 37 Ala. 142; Peo- 
 ple V. Ah Gee Yung and Kent v. Peo- 
 ple, supra; Hill v. People, 1 Colo. 436; 
 State V. Harmon, 4 Penn. (Del.) 580, 
 60 Atl. 866; State v. Wright, 46 La. 
 Ann. 1403, 16 So. 366; State v. Jones, 
 supra; Lawless v. State, 4 Lea, 173; 
 State V. Patterson and State v. Cross,, 
 supra. 
 
 7I-lill V. People and Farris v. Com. 
 supra; State v. Usher, 126 Iowa, 287, 
 102 N. W. 101; Herman v. State, 75 
 Miss. 340, 22 So. 873; Brandon v. State, 
 75 Miss. 904, 23 So. 517; Territory v. 
 Rowand, 8 Mont. 110, 19 Pac. 595; Peo- 
 ple V. Downs. 123 N. Y. 558, 25 N. E. 
 988, Affirming 56 Hun, 5, 8 N. Y. Supp. 
 521. 
 
 sPeople V. Newcomer. 118 Cal. 263, 50 
 Pac. 405 ; People v. Bush, 71 Cal. 602, 12 
 Pac. 781; People v. Ah Gee Yung, 86 
 Cal. 144, 24 Pac. 860; People v. Ham- 
 blin, 63 Cal. 101, 8 Pac. 687; Williams 
 V. State, 83 Ala. 16, 3 So. 616; Clements 
 V. State, 50 Ala. 117; Haldennari v. 
 Territory, 7 Ariz. 120, 60 Pac. 876; 
 
i 90], MALICE IN HOMICIDE, GENERALLY. 129 
 
 the natural and ordinary result of which would be death.® And 
 this presumption is not affected by the fact that circumstantial evi- 
 dence is relied upon to establish both the corpus delicti and the 
 criminal agency of the accused.^** If the act of a person was such 
 that it was palpably calculated to take the life of another, it may 
 be presumed that he so intended, ' ^ unless circumstances of provo- 
 cation, alleviation, or excuse appear from the evidence establishing 
 the doing of the fatal act. * ^ And a homicide committed deliberate- 
 ly, or without adequate cause, is presumed to have been committed 
 maliciously, and the burden rests with the accused to show the con- 
 trary.*' And some of the cases hold to the common-law rule that 
 the act of killing raises a presumption of malice and intent to kill, 
 without reference to whether or not the killing appears to be inten- 
 
 State T. Frazier, Houst. Crim. Eep. United States v. Travers, 2 Wheeler, 
 
 (Del.) 176; State v. Collins (Del.) 62 C. C. 490, BruTiner, Col. Cas. 467, Fed. 
 
 Atl. 224; State v. Draper, Houst. Crim. Cas. No. 16,537; Langstaffe's Case, 1 
 
 Rep. (Del.) 631; State v. Emory (Del.) Lewin, C. C. 162. 
 
 58 Atl. 1036; State v. Brinte, 4 Penn. sAchey v. State. 64 Ind. 56: Beau- 
 
 (Del.) 551, 58 Atl. 258; State v. Miller, champ v. State, 6 Bl^ckf. 299; State v. 
 
 8 Houst. (Del.) 564, 32 Atl. 137; State Sullivan, 51 Iowa, 142, 50 N. W. 572; 
 
 V. Harmon, 4 Penn. (Del.) 580, 60 Atl. State v. Foekett, 70 Iowa, 442, 30 N. 
 
 868: Lewis v. State. 90 Ga. 95. 15 S. W. 742; Thomas v. People, 67 N. Y. 218; 
 
 E. 697; Chelsey v. State, 121 Ga. 340, People v. Fish, 125 N. Y. 136, 26 N. E. 
 
 49 S. E. 258; Marshall v. State, 74 319; People v. Conroy, supra; Carr v. 
 
 Ga. 26; Clarke v. State, 35 Ga. 75; State, 21 Ohio C. C. 43; Shaw v. State, 
 
 Hill V. State, 41 Ga. 484; Wilson v. 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 435, 31 S. W. 361; 
 
 State, 69 Ga. 225; Ex parte Moore, 30 Cro'well v. People, 190 111. 508. 60 N. 
 
 Ind. 197; State v. Deeklotts, 19 Iowa, E. 872: Stote v. Anderson, 168 Mo. 412, 
 
 447; State v. Deschamps, 42 La. Ann. 68 S. W. 347: Christian v. State (Tex. 
 
 567, 21 Am. St. Rep. 392, 7 So. 703; Crim. App.) 62 S. W. 4'?2; Hnrrison v. 
 
 State V. Trivas, 32 La. Ann. 1086. 38 Com. 79 Va. 374. 52 Am. Rep. 634; Lewis 
 
 Am. Rep. 293; State v. Swayze, 30 La. v. Com. 78 Va. 732; Cupns v. State. 120 
 
 Ann. 1323; State v. K-ight, 43 Me. 11; Wis. 504, 102 Am. St. Rep. 996, 97 N. 
 
 McDaniel v. State, 8 Smedes & M. 401, W. 210, 98 N. W. 546. 
 47 Am. Dec. 93; Green v. State, 28 A person who determi-es to take the 
 
 Miss. 687; Head v. State, 44 Miss. 731; life of another, and seizes a gun to 
 
 State V. Lane, 64 Mo. 319; Milton v. carry his intention into effect, not k"ow- 
 
 Btate, 6 Neb. 136; State v. Zellers, 7 ;„„ whether it is loaded or not, but 
 
 N. J. L. 220; State v. Lambert, 93 N. ^j^jj tj,g expectation and desire thf-t it 
 
 C 618; People V. Conroy 97 N. Y. 62; j j^ jj^ ^f „„rder in any killing 
 
 ^^^KV ^'^^''^^' 3„L^- ol i^ ^"^- ^-^ consequent upon its discharge. Com. v. 
 
 f^^'- l\ f'JiJi-- ^^l;.^^!-! ?*^** X- T?"^"' Green, 1 Ashm. (Pa.) 289. 
 I^"^?! £''J°' J^J ^^^^ "'■ ^^'■^'"^„^' toCampbell v. State, 124 Ga. 432, 52 
 
 Wright (Ohio) 392: State v. Jones, 29 „ „ qi/ 
 
 S. C. 201. 7 S. E. 296; Draper v. State, ,,;,„„■ Q.„t„ „„^„ . ot„f„ „ tt„, 
 t Ti I. 'c\ir> .-1 cij. i A T> i. iiCarr v. btate, supra; btate v. Har- 
 
 4 Baxt. 246; Gray v. State, 4 Baxt. ^ -d _ /t-,„i \ con en Aii oco 
 
 331; Coffee v. State, 3 Yerg. 283, 24 "i""' * Pe"n. (De'.) 580, 60 Atl. 866; 
 
 Am. Dec. 570; State v. Anderson, 2 f *^*« \- ^'"''"y^*! ^- I^- ^^MJ ^,- ^• 
 
 Overt. 6, 5 Am. Dee. 648; Epperson v. 69«- A"'^ ^^^^^^tate v. Capps, 134 N. C. 
 
 State. 5 Lea, 291; Ake v. State, 30 Tex. 622, 46 S. E. 730. 
 466; H-mbv v. State. 36 Tex. 525; isState v. Harmon, supra. 
 M'Whirt's Case. 3 Gratt. 594, 46 Am. isState v. Powell (Del.) 61 Atl. 988; 
 
 Dec. 196; I^wis v. Com. 78 Va. 732; State v. Harmon, supra; State v. Bell 
 
 Pninter V. Frite-l States, 151 U. S. 306, (Del.) 62 Atl. 147; State v. Brown 
 
 38 L. ed. 208, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 410; (Del.) 61 Atl. 1077; Cupps v. State, 120 
 Horn.— 8. 
 
130 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 [•§ 09 
 
 tional. * * And that where a killing appears the burden is shifted to^ 
 and rests with, the accused to show justification or extenuating cir- 
 cumstancs rebutting malice/' which in some jurisdictions must be 
 done by a preponderance of the evidence, ' " and in others to the satis- 
 faction of the jury. ^ '' And in some the presumption is rebutted by 
 evidence raising a reasonable doubt of malice or guilt. ^^ But if 
 
 Wis. 504, 102 Am. St. Eep. 996, 97 N. 
 W. 210, 98 N. W. 546. 
 
 And an instruction that a presump- 
 tion of malice arises on proof, in a 
 prosecution for homicide, of an un- 
 provoked killing is not subject to the 
 objection that it excludes consideration 
 of evidence introduced to show that the 
 homicide Avas to prevent the capture of 
 an escaped convict, without a warrant, 
 which would reduce the offense to man- 
 slaughter, as such a homicide is murder, 
 Williford v. State, 121 Ga. 173, 48 S. E. 
 982. 
 
 "State V. Evans, 124 Mo. 397, 28 S. 
 W. 8, Overruli g State v. McKinzie. 102 
 Mo. 620, 15 S. W. 149; State v. Bowles, 
 146 Mo. 6, 69 Am. St. Rep. 598, 47 S. 
 W. 892; State v. Brown, 41 Minn. 319, 
 43 X. W. 69: State v. Brown, 12 Minn. 
 538, Gil. 448; State v. Lautenschlager, 
 22 Minn. 514; State v. Shippey, 10 
 Minn. 223, 88 Am. Dec. 70, Gil. 178. 
 
 isTerritorj' v. McAndrews, 3 Mont. 
 167; Bankhead v. State, 124 Ala. 14, 26 
 So. 979 ; Halderman v. Territory, 7 Ariz. 
 120, 60 Pac. 876; People v. March, 6 Cal. 
 543; People v. Bush, 71 Cal. 602, 12 Pac. 
 781 ; People v. Bushton, 80 Cal. 160, 22 
 Pac. 127, 549; People v. Ah Gee Yung, 
 86 Cal. 144, 24 Pac. 860; United States 
 v. Crow Dog, 3 Dak. 106, 14 N. W. 437 ; 
 State v. Pratt, Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 
 249; State v. Harmon, 4 Penn. (Del.) 
 580, 60 Atl. 866 ; State v. Frazier, Houst. 
 Grim. Rep. (Del.) 176; State v. Draper. 
 Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 531; Holland 
 V. State, 12 Fla. 117; Lewis v. State, 90 
 Ga. 95, 15 S. E. 697; Marshall v. State, 
 74 Ga. 26; Kota v. People, 136 111. 655, 
 
 27 N. E. 53; Murphy v. People, 37 111. 
 447; State v. Knight, 43 Me. 11; Com. 
 v. York, 9 Met. 93, 43 Am. Dec. 373; 
 State v. Shippey, supra; Green v. State, 
 
 28 Miss. 687; McDaniel v. State, 8 
 Smedes & M. 401, 47 Am. Dec. 93; State 
 V. Brown, 64 Mo. 367 ; State v. Bowles, 
 supra; Milton v. State, 6 Neb. 136; 
 State V. Potts, 100 N. C. 457, 6 S. E. 657; 
 State V. Whitson, 111 N. C. 695, 16 S. 
 E. 332; State v. Mazon, 90 N. C. 676; 
 State V. Lambert, 93 N. C. 618; State 
 
 V. Byrd, 121 N. C. 684, 28 S. E. 353; 
 State V. Gooch, 94 N. C. 987; State v. 
 Johrson, 48 N. C. (3 Jones, L.) 266; 
 State V. Gardiner, Wright (Ohio) 392; 
 State V. Town, Wright (Ohio) 75; Com. 
 V. Bell, Addison (Pa.) 156, 1 Am. Dec. 
 298; Com. v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9; Coffee v. 
 State, 3 Yerg. 283, 24 Am. Dec. 970; 
 Bryant v. State, 7 Baxt. 67; Ake v. 
 State, 30 Tex. 466; M'Whirt's Case, 3 
 Gratt. 594, 46 Am. Dec. 196; Lewis v. 
 Com. 78 Va. 732; State v. Greer, 22 W. 
 Va. 800; United States v. Outerbridge, 
 5 Sawy. 620, Fed. Cas. No. 15.978; 
 United States v. Sickles, 2 Hayw. & H. 
 319; United States v. Travers, Brunner, 
 Col. Cas. 467, Fed. Cas. No. 16,537; Rex: 
 V. Greenacre, 8 Car. & P. 35. 
 
 But an instruction in a prosecution 
 for homicide that it devolves upon the 
 perpetrator to rebut by evidence the pre- 
 sumption against him arising from the 
 act, and if he fails to do this, he is 
 a murderer, is improper where the real 
 and only defense was suicide, as tend- 
 ing to confuse the jury and divert their 
 minds from the real issue. State v. 
 Cater, 100 Iowa, 501, 69 N. W. 880. 
 
 16 Cora. V. York, 9 Met. 93, 43 Am. 
 Dec. 373; United States v. Crow Dog, 3 
 Dak. 106, 14 N. W. 437 ; People v. Cal- 
 laghan, 4 Utah, 49, 6 Pac. 49. A'-d see 
 People V. Knapp, 71 Cal. 1, 11 Pac. 793. 
 
 i7Holl.ind V. State, 12 Fla. 117; Green 
 V. State, 28 Miss. 687; State v. Wilcox, 
 118 N. C. 1131, 23 S. E. 928; State v. 
 Potts, 100 N. C. 457, 6 S. E. 657 ; State v. 
 Byrd, 121 N. C. 684, 28 S. E. 353; State 
 v. Gooch, 94 N. C. 987 ; State v. Garland, 
 90 N. C. 668. Overruli-g State v. John- 
 son, 48 N. C. (3 Jones, L.) 266; United 
 States V. Sickles, supra. 
 
 isPeople V. Ah Gee Yung, 86 Cal. 144, 
 24 Pac. 860; Peowle v. Newcomer, 118 
 Cal. 263, 50 Pac. 405; People v. Bushton, 
 80 Cal. 160, 22 Pac. 127, 549, Overrul- 
 ing People v. Hong Ah Duck, 61 Gal. 395, 
 and People v. Raten, 63 Cal. 422; Miller 
 V. State, 107 Ala. 40, 19 So. 37: Terri- 
 tory V. Rowand, 8 Mont. 110, 19 Paa 
 595. 
 
§ 99] 
 
 MAUCE IN HOMICIDE, GENERALLY. 
 
 131 
 
 the attendant circumstances appear the character of the killing is 
 to be determined hy considering them, and it is then not a matter 
 of presumption wliich operates in the absence of explanatory evi- 
 dence, but one for determination from the circumstances shown in 
 evidence ; ^ * and il is not material from which side the explanatory 
 evidence comes. ^ " The question is one of logic, not of formal law,^ ^ 
 and the true rule is that all the facts of the case, taken together, are 
 to be considered, and from these the question to be decided is wheth- 
 er the defendant acted maliciously.^^ The previous good reputa- 
 tion of the accused in a prosecution for homicide may be relied upon 
 by him as tending to rebut the presumption of malice arising from 
 the killing, its weight being a question for the jury.^^ 
 
 100. Presumption with reference to use of deadly weapons — ^Death 
 is the natural and ordinary result of the use of a deadly weapon, 
 and the rule is well supported that proof of the deliberate or inten- 
 
 Under this rule the proof need not be 
 to the satisfaction of the jury. Bishop 
 V. State, 62 Miss. 289 ; Ingram v. State, 
 62 Miss. 142, Overruling Harris v. State, 
 47 Miss. 318. 
 
 But it is not sufficient to warrant an 
 acquittal in a prosecution for homicide 
 for the accused to raise a reasonable 
 doubt as to whether the killing was 
 justifiable or excusable; the determina- 
 tion of reasonable doubt in such a case 
 should be applied to the whole proofs 
 and the whole case, the proofs, and pre- 
 sumptions and inferences arising there- 
 from, should all be taken into account. 
 United States v. Crow Dog, 3 Dak. 106, 
 14 N. W. 437. 
 
 isHawthorne v. State, 58 Miss. 778; 
 Mask V. State, 36 Miss. 77; Godwin v. 
 State, 73 Miss. 873, 19 So. 712; Mc- 
 Daniel v. State, 8 Smedes & M. 401, 47 
 Am. Dee. 93; Hornsby v. State, 94 Ala. 
 55, 10 So. 522; Boulden v. State, 102 
 Ala. 78, 15 So. 341; Hill v. People, 1 
 Colo. 436; Futch v. State. 90 Ga. 472, 
 16 S. E. 102; Farris v. Com. 14 Bush, 
 362; State v. Trivas, 32 La. Ann. 1086, 
 36 Am. Rei. 293; State v. Swayze, 30 
 La. Ann. 1323; State v. Wright, 46 La. 
 Ann. 1403, 16 So. 366; State v. Alex- 
 ander, 30 S. C. 74, 14 Am. St. Rep. 879, 
 8 S. E. 440: Stite v. Jones, 29 S. C. 201, 
 7 S. E. 296; State v. Coleman, 6 S. C. 
 N. S. 185; State v. Hopkins, 15 S. C. 
 153; State v. Rochester (S. C.) 51 S. E. 
 685; Foster v. State, 6 Lea, 214; Gray 
 V. State. 4 Bixt. 331 ; Bryant v. State, 7 
 Baxt. 67; United States v. Armstrong, 
 2 Curt. C. C. 446, Fed. Cas. No. 14,467. 
 
 An instruction in a prosecution for 
 homicide, that where killing is proved 
 the burden of proving circumstances of 
 justification devolves upon the accused, 
 imless they are developed by proof upon 
 the part of the state, should be ac- 
 companied by a definition of the degrees 
 of homicide. Palmore v. State, 29 Ark. 
 249. 
 
 20 Mask V. State, and McDaniel v. 
 State, supra; Perrv v. State, 102 Ga. 
 365, 30 S. E. 903; Wilson v. State, 69 
 Ga. 224; Epperson v. State. 5 Lea, 292; 
 State V. Byrd, 121 N. C. 684, 28 S. E. 
 353. 
 
 21 Small V. Com. 91 Pa. 304; Pointer 
 V. U-ited States, 151 U. S. 396, 38 L. 
 ed. 208, 14 Sup. Ot. Rep. 410. 
 
 22Com. V. Green, 1 Ashm. (Pa.) 289; 
 Yates V. State, 26 Fla. 484, 7 So. 880; 
 Hicks V. State, 25 Fla. 535, 6 So. 441; 
 State V. McLaughlin, 149 Mo. 19. 50 S. 
 W. 315; State v. Underwood. 57 Mo. 40; 
 State V. Musick, 101 Mo. 260, 14 S. W. 
 212; Territory v. Lueero, 8 N. M. 543, 
 46 Pae. 18. 
 
 Proof of secret malice between two 
 persons, and that one of them was found 
 pierced through a vital part, with 
 enough life left in him to tell by whom 
 he had been injured, together with his 
 dying declarations that the other did it, 
 is sufficient to warrant a holding of the 
 existence of an intent to kill. Com. v. 
 Williams. 2 Ashm. (Pa.) 74. 
 
 23Peopie V. Casey, 53 Cal. 360. 
 
132 HOMICIDE. [S 100 
 
 tional use of a deadly weapon in effecting a homicide raises a pre- 
 sumption of malice, and shifts the burden of proof to repel the in- 
 ference of malice to the accused, unless evidence proving the killing, 
 or the proof already given, sh,^ws its absence.* A man cannot de^ 
 liberately seek a difficulty with another and then shoot him, and then 
 
 iHarkness v. State, 129 Ala. 71, 30 So. v. York, 9 Met. 93, 43 Am. Dec. 373; 
 73; Mitchell v. State, 129 Ala. 23, 30 Kriel v. Com. 5 Hush, 302; Com. v. Web- 
 So. 348; Bankhead v. State, 124 Ala. 14, ster, 5 Cush. 295, 52 Am. Dec. 711; Com. 
 26 So. 979; Handley v. State, 96 Ala. v. Drew, 4 Mass. 391 ; People v. Wolf. 95 
 48, 38 Am. St. Rep. 81, 11 So. 322; Gib- Mich. 625, 55 N. W. 357; State v. Brown, 
 son V. State, 89 Ala. 121, 18 Am. St. 41 Minn. 319, 43 N. W. 69; Green v. 
 Eep. 98, 8 So. 98; Compton v. State, 110 Stnte, 28 Miss. 687; Hague v. State, 34 
 Ala. 24, 20 So. 119; Commander v. State, Miss. 616; Woodsides v. State, 2 How. 
 60 Ala. 1; Hadley v. State, 55 Ala. 31; (Miss.) 656; Head v. State, 44 Miss. 
 Murphy v. State, 37 Ala. 142; Oliver v. 735; Jeff v. State. 39 Miss. 593; State 
 State, 17 Ala. 587 ; Roberta v. State, 68 v. Bowles, 146 Mo. 6, 69 Am. St. Rep. 
 Ala. 156 ; Hornsby v. State, 94 Ala. 55, 508, 47 S. W. 892 ; State v. Musick, 101 
 10 So. 522; McKee v. State, 82 Ala. 32, Mo. 260, 14 S. W. 212; State v. Tabor, 
 
 2 So. 451; Brown v. State. 83 Ala. 33, 95 Mo. 585. 8 S. W. 744; State v. Mc- 
 
 3 Am. St. Rep. 685, 3 So. 857; Sullivan Kinzie, 102 Mo. 620, 15 S. W. 149; State 
 V. State, 102 Ala. 135, 48 Am. St. Rep. v. Fairlamb, 121 Mo. 137, 25 S. W. 895; 
 22, 15 So. 264; Miller v. State, 107 Ala. State v. Nueslein, 25 Mo. Ill; State v. 
 40, 19 So. 37; Kilgore v. State, 124 Ala. Evans, 124 Mo. 411, 28 S. W. 8; State v. 
 24, 27 So. 4; Bondurart v. State, 125 Mitchell, 64 Mo. 191; State v. Evans, 65 
 Ala. 31, 27 So. 775; Dixon v. State, 128 Mo. 574; State v. Alexander, 66 Mo. 
 Ala. 54, 29 So. 623; Tesney v. State. 77 148; State v. Landgraf, 95 Mo. 97, 6 Am. 
 Ala. 33; De Arman v. State, 71 Ala. 351 ; St. Rep. 26, 8 S. W. 237 ; State v. Elliott, 
 Wilkins v. State, 98 Ala. 1, 13 So. 312; 98 Mo. 150, 11 S. W. 508; State v. 
 Ex parte Warrick, 73 Ala. 57; State Crawfoid, 115 Mo. 620, 22 S. W. 371; 
 V. Peo, 9 Houst. (Del.) 488, 33 Atl. 257; State v. Gassert, 4 Mo. App. 44; State 
 State V. Walker, 9 Houst. (Del.) 464. 33 v. Banks, 10 Mo. App. HI; Territory v. 
 Atl. 227; State v. Davis, 9 Houst. (Del.) Hart, 7 Mont. 489; Schlencker v. State, 
 407, 33 Atl. 55; State v. Becker, 9 9 Neb. 300, 2 N. W. 710; State v. Zellers, 
 Houst. (Del.) 411, 33 Atl. 178; State v. 7 N. J. L. 220; People v. McLeod, 1 Hill. 
 Pratt, Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 249; 379, 37 Am. Dec. 328; State v. Rhy e. 
 State v. Brown (Del.) 61 Atl. 1077; 124 N. C. 847. 33 S. E. 128; State v. 
 United States V. Schneider, 21 D. C. 381 ; Whitson, 111 k. C. 695, 16 S. E. 322; 
 People V. Bushton. 80 Cal. 160, 22 Pnc. State v. Merrill, 13 N. C. (2 Dev. L.) 
 127, 549; United States v. Crow Dog, 269; State v. McCourry, 128 N. C. 594, 
 3 Dak. 103, 14 \<l. W. 437; Wrye v. State, 38 S. E. 883; State v. Cole, 132 N. C. 
 99 Ga. 34, 25 S. E. 610; Weeks v. State, 1069, 44 S. E. 391; State v. Norwood, 
 79 Ga. 30, 3 S. E. S^S: Vann v. State, 115 N. C. 789, 44 Am. St. Rep. 498, 20 
 83 Ga. 44. 9 S. E. 945; Boatwright v. S. E. 712; State v. Lipscomb, 134 N. C. 
 State, 89 Ga. 140, 15 S. E. 21; Dorsey 689, 47 S. E. 44; State v. Byers, 100 N. 
 V. Si.ate, 110 Ga. 331. 35 S. E. 651; C. 512, 6 S. E. 420; State v. Thomas, 98 
 Futch V. State, 90 Ga. 472, 16 S. E. 102; N. C. 599, 2 Am. St. Rep. 351, 4 S. E. 
 Moon V. State. 68 Ga. 687; Stovall v. 518; State v. Irwin, 2 N. C. (1 Hayw.) 
 State, 106 Ga. 443, 32 S. E. 588 ; Murphy 112; State v. Carlnnd, 00 N. C. 675; 
 V. People, 37 HI. 447; Friederieh v. State v. Brittain, 89 N. C. 502; State v. 
 People, 147 111. 310. 35 N. E. 472: Beau- Payne, 86 N. C. 610; State v. Willis, 63 
 champ V. State, 6 Blackf. 299; McDer- N. C. 27; State v. Ellick, 60 N. C. (2 
 mott v. State, 89 Ind. 187; Newport v. Winst. L.) 56, 86 Am. Dec. 442; State v. 
 State, 140 Ind. 299, 39 N. E. 926; Town, Wright (Ohio) 75; State v. Bert- 
 Brids;ewater v. State. 153 Ind. 560, 55 rand, 3 Or. 61 ; Respublica v. Bob, 4 
 N. E. 737; State v. Gillick, 7 Iowa, 311; Dall. 146, 1 L. ed. 777; Com. v. Honey- 
 State v. Decklotts, 19 Iowa, 447; State man, Addison (Pa.) 148; Kilpntrick v. 
 V. Ostrander, 18 Iowa, 435; State v. Com. 3 Phila. 237; Com. v. Lynch, 3 
 Zeibart, 40 Iowa, 169: State v. Rains- Pittsb. 412; Jones v. Com. 30 Pittsh. L. 
 barger, 71 Iowa, 746, 31 N. W. 865; Com. J. 423 j Com. v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9j Kil- 
 
100] 
 
 MALICE IN HOailCIDE, GENEKALLY. 
 
 133 
 
 claim that he did not design to kill him.'' While the law presumes 
 a person innocent until the contrary is made to appear, where it ia 
 shown that he killed a person with a deadly weapon, the presump- 
 tion of innocence yields to specific proof, and the law infers that 
 the killing, if unexplained, was malicious.^ And the presumption 
 arising from the act of one person in violently assaulting another 
 with a dangerous weapon, likely to kill, not in self-defense or in 
 sudden heat of passion, is that death was intended, and not great 
 bodily harm.* The use of a deadly weapon in an unusual manner, 
 not calculated to produce death, however, does not give rise to the 
 presumption of an intent to kill.^ And to raise the presumption of 
 malice the use must have been deliberate and intentional; the mere 
 fact of the use of a deadly weapon is insufficient." And this, like 
 the inference or presumption arising from the unexplained act of 
 killing, is not conclusive,^ but is subject to rebuttal by a showing of 
 
 Patrick v. Com. 31 Pa. 198; Com. v. 
 Worriaon, 193 Pa. 013. 44 Atl. 913; Mc- 
 Oue V. Com. 78 Pa. 185. 21 Am. Rep. 7; 
 Com. V. Gibson, 211 Pa. 546, 60 Atl. 
 1086; State v. Alexander, 30 S. C. 74, 
 14 Am. St. Rep. 879, 8 S. E. 440 ; State 
 V. Smith, 2 Strobh. L. 77, 47 Am. Dec. 
 589; State v. Peters. Rice's Digest, 103; 
 State V. I^ivelle, 34 S. C. 120, 27 Am. St. 
 Rep. 799, 13 S. E. 319; State v. Byrd, 
 72 S. C. 104, 51 S. E. 542; State v. Fos- 
 ter. C6 S. 0. 409, 45 S. E. 1 ; Foster v. 
 State, 6 Lea, 214; Conner v. Stnte, 4 
 Yerg. 137, £6 Am. Deo. 217; Fisher v. 
 State, 10 Lea, 151; Murray v. State, 1 
 Tex. App. 417; Fitch v. State, 37 Tex. 
 Crim. Rep. 600, 36 S. W. 584; Hill v. 
 Com. 2 Gratt. 594; Com. v. Brown. 90 
 Va. 071, 10 S. E. 447; State v. Douglass, 
 28 W. Va. 297: State v. Welch, 36 W. 
 Va. 090, 15 S. E. 419; State v. Greer. 22 
 W. Va. 800; State v. Joi.ea, 20 W. Va. 
 764; United States v. Cornell, 2 Mason, 
 91, Fed. Cas. No. 14, 868; Rex v. Martin, 
 3 Car. & P. 211; Rex. v. Shaw, 6 Car. & 
 P. 372; Rex v. Cheeseman. 7 Car. & P. 
 455; Reg. v. Pitts, Car. & M. 284: Fost. 
 C. L. 255; 1 East, P. C. 340. And see 
 People V. March, 6 Cal. 543; Dixon v. 
 State, 13 Fla. 636; State v. Knight, 43 
 Me. 11; State v. Shippey, 10 Minn. 224, 
 88 Am. Dec. 70, Gil. 178; Riggs v. Stnte, 
 30 Miss. 635; Green v. State, 28 Misa. 
 687; State v. Johnson, 48 N. C. (3 
 Jones, L.) 266; Mitchell v. State, 5 Yerg. 
 340; United States v. Mirgo, 2 Curt. C. 
 C. 1, Fed. Cas. No. 15,781. 
 
 But while an instruction in a prose- 
 cution for homicide that, if a party use 
 
 a deadly weapon, and kill, he is pre- 
 sumed to have intended to take life, is 
 correct as an abstract proposition, it is 
 erroneous as calculated to mislead the 
 jury, where the questio i in the ease was 
 whether or not the pistol in question 
 went off accidentally or by design. 
 Anderson v. State, 3 Heisk. 88. 
 
 2 State V. Inks, 136 Mo. 678, 37 S. 
 W. 942. 
 
 And an instruction as to a presump- 
 tion of malice arising from an intention- 
 al killing is proper in a prosecution for 
 homicide, where it appears that the ac- 
 cused shot the deceased intentionally, 
 at close range with a shotgun, killing 
 him almost instantly. Dorsey v. State, 
 110 Ga. o31, 35 S. E. 651. 
 
 sHawtliorne v. State. 58 Miss. 778. 
 
 ^Clifford V. State, 58 Wis. 479, 17 S. 
 W. 304. 
 
 BHanvey v. State, 68 Ga. 612. 
 
 The presumption of an intention to 
 kill arises from the use of a deidly 
 weapon in the usual and natural manner 
 in which such weapons would produce 
 that result. Ibid. 
 
 6Friederich v. People, 147 111. 310, 35 
 N. E. 472. 
 
 But the jury in a prosecution for 
 homicide should not be told that they 
 cannot presume a formed design of the 
 accused to take the life of the deceased 
 from the use of a deadly weanon. Wil- 
 son V. State, 140 Ala. 43, 37 So. 93. 
 
 iThomas v. People, 67 N. Y. 218; 
 Bradley v. State, 31 Ind. 492: Clem t. 
 State, 31 Ind. 480; State v. Townsend, 
 66 Iowa, 741, 24 N. W. 535; Wellar v. 
 
134 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 fl 100 
 
 facts and circumstances.* And the presumption may be rebutted 
 by a showing of circumstances of mitigation, as well as excuse," — 
 such as that the fatal blow was struck under adequate provocation ; ^ " 
 or that the weapon was used to disable an adversary in the very act 
 of making a murderous and malicious assault on the slayer. * ^ And 
 it may be rebutted by other evidence than that which proves the 
 killing;*^ evidence raising a reasonable doubt of guilt being sufiS- 
 cient in some states,^* and evidence suiEcient to satisfy the jury as 
 to the truth of the matter offered in mitigation being required in 
 others,^* and a preponderance of the evidence in others.^' And 
 where the attending circumstances are sho^vn in detail, some of 
 which tend to disprove the presence of malice or purpose to kill, the 
 mere fact that death was caused by the use of a deadly weapon does 
 not raise a presumption of malice ; in such case its presence must be 
 
 People, 30 Mich. 16; State v. Nuesleln, 
 25 Mo. 111. 
 
 But the presumption of malice from 
 the use of deadly weapons is conclusive 
 ill a prosecution for homicide, unless 
 the accused can show that it was purely 
 accidental, or excusable on the ground 
 of self-defe"se or defense of one's habi- 
 tal/on, or done in the heat and excite- 
 ment of uncontrollable passion. State 
 V. Becker, 9 Houst. (Del.) 411, 33 Atl. 
 17; Sylvester v. State, 72 Ala. 201. 
 
 So, in Hill v. People, 1 Colo. 436, it 
 is held that it is the duty of the court 
 in a prosecution for homicide to call the 
 attention of the jury to the presumption 
 of fact which the law authorizes them to 
 deduce from evidence of the use of a 
 deadly weapon ; and it is the duty of the 
 jury to yield to its force and conclusive- 
 ness. 
 
 sState V. Townsend, supra; State v. 
 Perigo, 70 Iowa, 657, 28 N. W. 452. 
 
 9Miller v. State, 37 Ind. 432. 
 
 loSeals V. State, 3 Baxt. 459; Darden 
 V. State, 73 Ark. 315, 84 S. W. 507. 
 
 Evidence in a, prosecution for homi- 
 cide tending to show that the accused 
 was knocked down by the deceased, and 
 that the deceased attempted to stamp 
 upon him, and that the accused arose 
 and stabbed and killed him, sufficiently 
 rebuts the presumption of malice arising 
 from the fact of killing. State v. Mat- 
 thews. 78 N. C. 523. 
 
 iiHead v. State, 44 Miss. 731; Borden 
 V. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 648, 62 S. 
 W. 1064. 
 
 isTesney v. State. 77 Ala. 33. 
 
 The presumption of an intent to kill 
 
 arising from the deliberate use of a 
 deadly weapon aimed at a vital part 
 may be rebutted by the testimony of 
 the accused that he did rot intend to 
 kill. State v. Jones, 20 Mo. 58; State 
 V. Banks, 73 Mo. 592. 
 
 isState V. Alexander, 66 Mo. 148; 
 Lamar v. State, 63 Miss. 265; Bishop v. 
 State, 62 Miss. 289; Territory v. Gut- 
 ierez (N. M.) 79 Pac. 716. 
 
 The apparently contrary holding in 
 Guice V. State, 60 Miss. 714, is dis- 
 tinguished and explained in Lamar v. 
 State, supra, it appearing that In the 
 former case the decision was rendered 
 upon an entirely different point, and 
 that the question of the measure of 
 proof did not arise in the case. 
 
 An instruction in a prosecution for 
 homicide that the defendant shall over- 
 come the presumption arising from the 
 use of a deadly weapon by evidence to 
 the satisfaction of the jury, though im- 
 proper, is rot fatal where the other in- 
 stuctions liberally declared the law as to 
 reasonable doubt, the burden of proof, 
 and the measure of proof required of the 
 state. Bishop v. State, supra. 
 
 i4State V. Elliek, 60 N. C. (2 Winst. 
 L.) 56, 86 Am. Dec. 442; Stite v. Wil- 
 lis, 63 N. C. 26; State v. Garland, 90 N. 
 C. 675; State v. Brittain, 89 N. C. 481; 
 State V. Thomas, 98 N. C. 599, 2 Am. St. 
 Rep. 351, 4 S. E. 518; State v. Byers, 
 100 N. C. 512, 6 S. E. 420; State v. 
 Whitson, 111 N. C. 695, 16 S. E. 332; 
 .''tatp V. Wilcox, 118 N. C. 1131, 23 S. 
 E. 928. 
 
 iBfetate V. Bertrand, 3 Or. 61; State 
 V. Jones, 20 W. Va. 764. 
 
§ 100] MALICE IN HOMICIDE, GENERALLY. 135 
 
 ■determined from all the circumstances proved, including, of course, 
 the character of the weapon. ^ " So, statutes declaring that the intent 
 to murder is conclusively presumed from the deliberate use of a 
 deadly weapon causing death within a year apply in all cases in which 
 no circumstances of mitigation or excuse appear in evidence ; but when 
 such circumstances appear the presumption is a rebuttable one, and 
 the question of the intent to murder is for the jury, to be determined 
 from a consideration of all the circumstances shown in evidence, the 
 burden of proof remaining with the state throughout the whole pro- 
 ceeding. ^ ^ And a special charge with reference to the presumption 
 •of an intent to kill from death caused by the use of an instrument 
 the natural and probable consequence of the use of which would be 
 death is improper, where the same ground had been covered by a 
 general charge, as tending to give undue prominence to the presump- 
 tion arising from the character of the weapon and the manner of 
 its use. * ® So, the deliberate use of a deadly weapon, without excuse, 
 gives rise to a presumption of capacity to form and entertain an in- 
 tent to take life, * ® and the burden rests with the accused to rebut the 
 presumption by raising a reasonable doubt of such capacity. " " 
 
 101. What weapons are deadly; general rules. — A deadly weapon 
 from the use of which malice will be inferred is any weapon or in- 
 strument used upon a person, which, from its nature and the manner 
 of its use, would probably produce death. ^ A weapon is deadly in 
 the contemplation of the law when it is such that death would be 
 
 isErwin v. State^ 29 Ohio St. 186, 23 is error for the court to ignore in its 
 
 Am. Rep. 733; Darden v. State, 73 Ark. charge a statutory provision that in 
 
 315, 84 S. W. 507; Tanks v. State, 71 such a case the law presumes that the 
 
 Ark. 459, 75 S. W. 851 ; Godwin v. design of the accused was to murder or 
 
 State, 73 Miss. 873, 19 So. 712; Haw- maim. Kendall v. State, 8 Tex. App. 
 
 thome V. State, 58 Miss. 778 ; Lamar v. 569. 
 
 State, 63 Miss. 265; Anderson v. State, isGater v. State, 141 Ala. 10, 37 So. 
 
 3 Heisk. 86; Trumble v. Territory, 3 692. 
 Wyo. 280, 6 L.R.A. 384, 21 Pac. 1081. solbid. 
 And see Com. v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9. iSylvester v. State, 71 Ala. 17, 72 Ala. 
 
 But it is improper to charge that 201 ; State v. Bowles, 146 Mo. 6, 69 Am. 
 
 there is no presumption of malice from St. Rep. 599, 47 S. W. 892; People v. 
 
 the use of a deadly weapon in a, prose- Valliere, 123 Cal. 576, 56 Pac. 433; 
 
 •cution for homicide in which it appears State v. West, 51 N. C. (6 Jones, L.) 
 
 that accused shot and killed deceased 508 ; Hardy v. State, 36 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 while the latter was lying in bed, un- 400, 37 S. W. 434. And see Clemons v. 
 
 •conscious of the deadly purpose. Dennis State (Fla.) 37 So. 647: People v. 
 
 V. State, 118 Ala. 72, 23 So. 1002. Lopez, 135 Cal. 23, 66 Pac. 965; Leal v. 
 
 Instate V. Gibson, 43 Or. 184, 73 Pac. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 334, 81 S. W. 
 
 333. 961 ; Accrs v. United States, 164 U. S. 
 
 isBell V. State, 17 Tex. App. 538. 388, 41 L. ed. 481, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 91. 
 
 But where it appears from the facts The Kentucky statute with relation 
 
 ■of a case that the purpose of a person to wilfully and maliciously cutting, 
 
 assaulting another was to murder or stabbing, or striking another with a 
 
 maim by the use of a deadly weapon, it knife, sword, or other deadly weapon 
 
136 HOMICIDE. [§ 101 
 
 the natural, reasonable, or probable consequence of the iise of it* 
 The question whether or not a weapon is deadly depends upon the 
 manner of its use, rather than upon the intrinsic character of the 
 instrument itself.^ And that a weapon is deadly may be inferred 
 from the fact that it produces death, though there is no evidence as 
 to its quality or dimensions.* Though the bare fact that a killing 
 resulted from the use of a weapon does not establish the fact that 
 it is a deadly weapon, from ^the use of which malice or an intent 
 to kill will be inferred,® the question always is as to whether the weap- 
 on, used as it was, would probably produce death or great bodily 
 harm.® So, the character of a weapon as to deadliness may also 
 be inferred from the nature of the wounds inflicted by it.^ But 
 the mere fact that a wound inflicted by a weapon produced death is 
 not conclusive that the weapon was a deadly one.® Nor does it 
 warrant the deduction that the instrument was of a character calcu- 
 lated ordinarily, when so used, to produce death or serious bodily in- 
 jury.* An instrument may be a deadly weapon, though not specially 
 designed for offensive or defensive purposes,^" or for the destruc- 
 tion of life or the infliction of injury. ' ^ And the fact that a weapon 
 is not an unlawful one docs not prevent it from being a deadly weap- 
 on, from the use of which malice may be inferred.'^ And an in- 
 
 has refere"cc to instruments capable of to do with the question whether it is a 
 
 being used for cutting, thrusting, or deadly weapon. State v. Davis, supra. 
 
 stabbing a person, and which might be <State v. Bowles, 146 Mo. 6, 69 Am. 
 
 dangerous to his life if used for that St. Rep. 5!)8, 47 S. W. 892; State v. 
 
 purpose; and also to any instrument Wilson, 16 Mo. App. 650; Honkins v. 
 
 capable of being used for the purpose of United States, 4 App. D. C. 430: State 
 
 striking a person, ard which might be v. West, 51 N. C. (6 Jones, L.) 606. 
 
 dagerous to his life if used for that sTaylor v. State, 108 Ga. 384, 34 S. 
 
 pu-pose. Plulpot V. Com. 86 Ky. 595, E. 2 ; Kelly v. State, 68 Miss. 343, 8 So. 
 
 S. W. 465. 745. 
 
 2WiHi<ims v. State, 81 Ala. 1, 60 Am. SKelly v. State, svnra. 
 
 Eep. 133, 1 So. 170, 83 Ala. 16, 3 So. 616; TBoul'den v. State, 'l02 Ala. 78, 15 So. 
 
 State V. Godfrey, 17 Or. 300, 11 Am. St. 341; State v. Bowles, supra. 
 
 Rep. 830. 20 Pac. 6''5. Evidence that one wound made with a 
 
 sState V. Norwood, 115 N. C. 789, 44 knife penetrated the lung, and another 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 498, 20 S. E. 712; State v. cut the muscles of the arm above the 
 
 West, and Sylvester v. State, supra; elbow entirely ii two, sufficiently mani- 
 
 St-'te V. Brown. 67 Iowa, 289, 25 N. W. fests the deadly character of the weapon. 
 
 248; Com. v. Duncan, 01 Ky. 592, 16 S. Walters v. Si-^te, 37 Xex. Grim. Rep. 
 
 W. 630; State v. Davis, 14 Nev. 407; 388, 35 S. W. 652. 
 
 Hunt V. State, Tex. App. 603; Hardy sCraiger v. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 
 
 V. Stnte, supra; Henry v. Stite, 38 88 S. W. 208; Coleman v. State (Tex. 
 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 306, 42 S. W. 559; Unit- Crim. App.) 90 S. W. 499. 
 
 e<l States v. Small. 2 Curt. C. C. 241, sBell v. State, 17 Tex. App. 538. 
 
 Fed. Cas. No. 16,314; Acers v. United lOBlige v. State, 20 Fla. 74^, 51 Am. 
 
 States, supra. And see Honaker v. Eep. 628; Com. v. Branham, 8 Bush, 387. 
 
 Com. 25 Ky. L. Rep. 675, 76 S. W. 154. lUbid. 
 
 But the purpose for which an instru- isWebb v. State, 100 Ala. 47, 14 So. 
 
 ment or article is carried has nothing 865. 
 
g 101] MALICE IN HOMICIDE, GENERALLY. 137 
 
 Btrument or means used in killing may be deadly, thongh not such 
 as would ordinarily produce death, where the circumstances or con- 
 dition of the person killed were such as to render the injury inflicted 
 upon him likely to prove fatal. * ^ 
 
 What is a deadly weapon is a question of law for the court ; ^ * and 
 assuming in an instruction that the weapon used was a deadly one 
 is not error if it was deadly per se. ' ^ But whether or not the partic- 
 ular weapon used was one which would fall within the legal defini- 
 tion of a deadly weapon is a question of fact for the jury,*" as is 
 also the question as to what instrument was used.' ^ And where the 
 weapon is not one exclusively designed to take life or inflict bodily in- 
 jury, the question of its deadly character, or the deadly character of 
 its use, is one of fact.'* If the question whether an instrument is 
 one likely to produce death depends upon the manner of its use and 
 the portion of the body upon which it is used, whether or not it is 
 a deadly weapon is a mixed question of law and fact, to be deter- 
 mined by the j'jry under proper instructions.'® So, what infer- 
 ences, if any, are to be drawn from the fact that the alleged slayer 
 was armed is a question of fact for the jury.^" Faihire of the court 
 to specifically define what constitutes a deadly weapon is not error 
 in a prosecution, in the absence of a specific request therefor. " ' But, 
 
 iSMiirphy v. Peonle, 9 Colo. 435, 13 isBIisre v. Stnte, 20 Fla. 745, 51 Am. 
 Pnc. .5'!8; Stite v. Norwood. 115 N. C. Rep. 638; Sylvester v. State. 71 Ala. 17; 
 789, 44 Am. St. Rep. 493, 20 S. E. 712; Thomas v. State, 103 Ala. 18, 16 So. 4; 
 State V. Jarrott, 23 N. C. (1 Ired. L.) Com. v. Runcan, 91 Ky. 692, 16 S. W. 
 76. 530; Safford v. State, 70 Miss. 258, 24 
 
 To hold one guilty of murder who So. 314; Krchnavy v. State, supra; 
 wilfully and violently kicks another in State v. Davis, 14 Nev. 407 ; State v. 
 such a way as he might know would en- Godfrey, supra; Henry v. St^te, 38 Tex. 
 danger life, when life is destroyed in Grim. Rep. 306, 42 S. W. 559; Ui ited 
 that way, an actual i tention to kill States v. Small, 2 Curt. C. C. 241, Fed. 
 will not be necessary, as, in such case, Gas. No. 10^314. 
 
 the de-'th is a result which he mi<rht The qup=tion whether a stick or club 
 fairly be held to regxrd as likely. Wei- used in killing a person was a weapon 
 lar V. People, 30 Mich. 16. likely to produce death or great bodily 
 
 uPtTte V. Collins. 30 N. C. (8 Ired. harm is one of fact in a prosecution for 
 L.) 407; State v. West, 51 N. C. (6 the killing, to be passed upon by the 
 Jones, L.) 606; State v. Craton. 28 N. jury. State v. Nueslein, 25 Mo. 111. 
 C. (6 Ired. L.) 164; State v. Speaks, 94 And where an assault was a serious 
 N. C. 865; Sylvester v. State, 72 Ala. one and the i strument with which it 
 201. was done was before the jury in a prose- 
 
 i5Stats V. Drumm, 156 Mo. 216, 56 S. cution therefor, no further direct proof 
 W. 1086; Krchnavy v. State, 43 Neb. of its dddly chaneter is necessary. 
 337. 61 N. W. 6''8. State v. Drumm, 156 Mo. 216, 56 S. W. 
 
 isState v. Godfrey, 17 Or. 300, 11 Am. 1086. 
 St. rep. 830. "0 Pac. 6?5; St-te v. Jar- isPeople v. Valliere, 123 Cal. 576, 58 
 rott, supra; Lucas v. State (Tex. Crim. Pac. 433. And see Richardson v. State 
 App.) 90 S. W. 830; State v. Anderson, (Miss.) 28 So. 817. 
 30 Wash. 14. 70 Pac. 104. And see State zogtnte v. Yourex, 30 Wash. 611, 71 
 T. Seery (Iowa) 105 N. W. 611. Pac. 203. 
 
 I'State V. Spealcs, supra, «iTerritory v. West, 4 Ariz. 212, 36 
 
138 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 l§ 101 
 
 at least in a case of killing with a weapon, such an instruction should 
 be given on request. ^^ 
 
 102. Character of particular weapons — Guns, swords, knives, pis- 
 tols, and the like, when used within striking distance of the victim, 
 are so clearly deadly weapons that the court may declare them to 
 be such as a matter of law. ^ But all other weapons are deadly or not, 
 according to their capability of producing death Or great bodily 
 harm in the manner in which they are used.^ A pistol used to 
 strike with is not a deadly weapon;* nor is an unloaded gun in the 
 hands of a person not near enough to be able to use it for the purpose 
 of striking ; * nor is a gun so loaded as to be incapable of carrying with 
 effect the required distance. ® Nor is a gun discharged merely for the 
 
 Pac. 207 ; Mike! v. State, 43 Tex. Grim. 
 Rep. 615, 68 S. W. 512. 
 
 It is only neeeasary to charge in a 
 prosecution for homicide with reference 
 to the deadly character of the weapon 
 used, wheT the evidence leaves a doubt 
 as to whether the weapon used was a 
 deadly one, or one calculated to produce 
 death. Logan v. State (Tex. Crira. 
 App.) 53 S. W. 694. 
 
 2 2 People V. Fuqua, 58 Cal. 245. 
 
 iState V. Godfrey, 17 Or. 300, 11 Am. 
 St. Eep. 830, 20 Pac. 625; Ex par!." 
 Nettles, 58 Ala. 276; Webb v. State, 100 
 Ala. 47, 14 So. 865; State v. Bowles, 
 140 Mo. 0, 60 Am. St. Rep. 598, 47 S. 
 W. 892; Territory v. Watson (N. M.) 78 
 Pac. 504; State v. Levigne, 17 Nev. 435, 
 30 Pac. 1084: People v. Carlton, 115 N. 
 Y. 618, 22 N. E. 257 ; State v. Brewer, 98 
 N. C. 607, 3 S. E. 819; McLin v. State 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 90 S. W. 1107; 
 United States v. Wilson, Baldw. 78, 
 Ped. Cas. No. 16,730. And see Yza- 
 guirre v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 85 
 S. W. 14; Smith v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. 
 Rep. 267, 81 S. W. 712, 936; Juley v. 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 391, 76 S. 
 W. 468. 
 
 And a deadly weapon within the 
 meanine of a statute, with reference 
 to cutting or stabbing with such a 
 weapon, is any weapon with which a 
 person may be wounded by cutting or 
 stabbing, including a chisel; and is not 
 confined to weapons or instruments made 
 and designed for offensive or defensive 
 purposes, or for the destruction of life 
 ■or the infliction of bodily injury. Com. 
 V. Branham, 8 Bush, 387. 
 
 2State v. Godfrey, supra. 
 
 3Je-kins v. State. 30 Tex. App. 379, 
 17 S. W. 938. 
 
 But under Ky. Stat. § 1166, making it 
 an offense to wilfully or maliciously cut, 
 strike, or stab another with a knife, 
 sword, or other deadly weapon, a pistol 
 may be used as a deadly weapon in strik- 
 ing another with it, and the fact that it 
 could have been used in another way 
 which might have been more fatal in 
 its effects does not alter the case. 
 Riggs v. Com. 17 Ky. L. Rep. 1015, 33 
 S. W. 413. 
 
 And in People v. Irving, 95 N. Y. 541, 
 it is held that since a pistol is capable 
 of being used otherwise than by firing, 
 evidence as to a pistol in the hands of an 
 alleged assailant, not otherwise de- 
 scribed than by its name, and not pro- 
 duced, in connection with the character 
 of the wound inflicted, is sufficient to 
 carry to the jury the question whether 
 or not it was an instrument likely to 
 produce serious bodily harm. 
 
 estate V. Godfrey, 17 Or. 300, 11 Am. 
 St. Rep. 830, 20 Pac. 625. 
 
 6 Scott V. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 315, 81 S. W. 952. 
 
 But an instruction in u, prosecution 
 for homicide asserting, as matter of 
 law, that a gun loaded with small shot 
 is not a deadly weapon is properly re- 
 fused where a death in fact ensued al- 
 most instantly from a shot with it. 
 Dolan V. State, 81 Ala. 11, 1 So. 707. 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution 
 for homicide assuming, as matter of 
 fact, that a gun was loaded with small 
 shot, and therefore was not a deadly 
 weapon, is properly refused for failure 
 to submit to the jury the inquiry of 
 fact dependent upon oral testimony as 
 to the size or character of the shot. 
 Ibid. 
 
1 102] 
 
 MAMCE IN HOMICIDE, GENERALLY. 
 
 139 
 
 purpose of frightening a person a deadly weapon as a matter of lav/." 
 But a pistol with which a person threatens or offers to shoot another 
 will be presumed, in a prosecution for homicide, to have been loaded, 
 in the absence of evidence to the contrary.^ And a 22-caliber pistol 
 is a weapon dangerous to life when used at short range. * So, a brick- 
 bat is not a deadly weapon as a matter of law ; whether it is or is not 
 is a question of fact for the jury.* And the same rule applies to a 
 flexible oaken stick over 3 feet long and several inches in diameter, 
 used for the purpose of striking. ^ " Nor will a blacksmith's hammer 
 be regarded as a deadly weapon in the absence of evidence as to its 
 size and character. ^ * And a wooden chair used by a man of or- 
 dinary strength, and aimed, within striking distance, at the head of 
 another, is not a dangerous weapon as a matter of law, and an in- 
 struction in a prosecution for homicide that it is so is an invasion of 
 the province of the jury.^^ So, the knives which are per se deadly 
 weapons are those designed for stabbing or doing serious harm, such 
 as dirks, and bowie knives; ordinary pocket knives are not in- 
 cluded. 13 And an ax handle, ^^ or a shovel handle, or a stick re- 
 
 eAngel v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 135, 74 S. W. 553. 
 
 7U! ited States v. Wilson, Baldw. 78, 
 Fed. Cas. No. 16,730. 
 
 8 State V. Sterrett, 80 Iowa, 609, 45 N. 
 W. 401. 
 
 9 State V. Harper, 69 Mo. 425. 
 Whether or not a brickbat is a deadly 
 
 ■weapon depends largely upon the force 
 with which it is thrown and the part of 
 the body receiving the blow; and where 
 it does not appear whether it was a 
 half or a quarter of a brick, it will not 
 be presumed to be a deadly weapon from 
 the use of which malice could be pre- 
 sumed. Hopkins v. United States. 4 
 App. D. C. 430. 
 
 10 Winter v. State, 123 Ala. 1, 26 So. 
 949. 
 
 A stick about 1 inch in diameter and 
 2% feet in length is not such an instru- 
 ment as is ordinarily calculated to pro- 
 duce death, when used as a bludgeon. 
 Shaw V. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 435, 
 31 S. W. 361. 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution 
 for homicide laying down the law as to 
 the killing by 'means of the use of a 
 dangerous weapon, to wit, a wooden 
 club, is not objectionable as assuming 
 that the club used was a dangerous 
 weapon. State v. Grayor, 89 Mo. 600, 
 1 S. W. 365. 
 
 iiGarrett v. State, 97 Ala. 18, 14 So. 
 327. 
 
 isThomas v. State, 103 Ala. 18, 16 So. 
 4. 
 
 But evidence in a prosecution for 
 homicide that, in a sudden quarrel, one 
 person struck another with a common 
 chair, which from the manner of its use 
 was a deadly weapon, crushing his skull 
 and killing him, warrants a finding that 
 the slaver entertained an intent to take 
 life. Birdwell v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 App.) 48 S. W. 583. 
 
 isSylvester v. State, 71 Ala. 17; Webb 
 v. State, 100 Ala. 47, 14 So. 865; Saf- 
 fold V. State, 76 Miss. 258, 24 So. 314; 
 State V. Harper, 69 Mo. 425; Craiger v. 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 88 S. W. 208; 
 Thornton v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 65 
 S. W. 1105; Wilson v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 App.) 90 S. W. 312. 
 
 The jury should say, as matter of 
 fact, whether or not they are deadly. 
 Saffold v. State, a,nd State v. Harper, 
 supra. 
 
 And a statutory provision that the 
 instrument or means by which a homi- 
 cide was committed are to be taken into 
 consideration in judging of the intent of 
 the offender, and that, if the instrument 
 be one not likely to produce death, it is 
 not to be presumed that death was 
 designed, unless such intention appears 
 from the manner of its use, should be 
 given in a charge in a prosecution for 
 homicide in which the killing was done 
 with an old broken-handled pocket knife. 
 
140 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 IS 102 
 
 Bembling one/" is not necessarily a dangerous weapon, thongh death 
 might result from its use ; the question being one for the jury. And 
 the rule is the same with reference to a wrench used for striking. ^ ® 
 If a club or other instrument used for striking, however, is of such 
 size and weight, or of such character, that death would necessarily or 
 probably result from such use, it will be regarded as a deadly weap- 
 on from the use of which an inference of malice will arise. * ^ And 
 an ordinary penknife so used as to be likely to produce death is a 
 deadly weapon.** And a pocket knife capable of making a wound 
 2i/f> inches deep is deadly. * ® So, a bottle may be a deadly weapon, 
 whether it is so being a question for the jury.^" And an ax is a 
 deadly weapon when used for purposes of attack upon another;*' 
 
 used upon a sudden difficulty arising be- 
 tween the parties and after the person 
 usin? it had been struck by the other. 
 Craiger v. State, supra. 
 
 And ai instruction in a prosecution 
 for homicide, with reference to the law 
 of a CTse if the iury believe that the ac- 
 cused took the life of the deceased by 
 Btnbbing her with a knife; and that said 
 knife was a deadly weapon, is not ob- 
 jectionable as assuming that the knife 
 was a deadly weapon. State v. Grant, 
 152 Mo. ij?, as S. W. 432. 
 
 11 Moore v. Com. 18 Ky. L. Rep. 120, 
 35 S. W. 283; Henry v. State, 33 Ga. 441. 
 
 ir. People v. Comstoek, 49 Mich. 330, 
 13 N. W. 617; State v. Brown. 67 Iowa, 
 289, 25 N. W. 248. And see Da forth v. 
 Stite, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 105, 09 S. W. 
 159. 
 
 So, whether or not a hoe was of such 
 weight and stren^rth that it could have 
 killed a man within striking distance 
 is a question of fact for the jury, and 
 not one for a nonexpert witness. 
 Holmes V. State. 100 AU. 80, 14 So. 864. 
 
 IB Abbott V. People, 86 N. Y. 460. 
 
 17A hand-srike used ii carrying, col- 
 lecting, and rolling logs for burning is 
 an instrument likely to produce deith 
 when used for the purpose of striking. 
 McKee v. State, 82 Ala. 32, 2 So. 451. 
 
 And a sweet gum club about 4 f<»et 
 long, weighing 8 to 10 pounds, with 
 which a person was struck, maki g a 
 fracture of the skull which was neces- 
 sarily fatal, is a deadly weapon. Login 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 53 S. W. 
 694. 
 
 And an oaken staflT nearly 3 feet long 
 and I'/a to 2 inches in diameter, with 
 which three blows were struck unawares 
 upon the head of a man who was drunk. 
 
 shattering the bones of the head, and 
 rupturing the interior vessels of the 
 brain, is a deadly weapon, and the kill- 
 ing is murder. State v. West, 51 N. C. 
 (0 Jones, L.) 503. 
 
 And a poker used to strike one over 
 the head, causing his death., by a per- 
 son having previously attempted the 
 same thing, and who has followed the 
 deceased and succeeded on a seco d at- 
 tempt, is a. dendly weapon, and malice 
 and revenge will be inferred from the 
 act. Stillwell v. State, 107 Ala. 16, 19 
 So. 322. 
 
 And evidence as to whether or not a 
 man could be killed with a stocking 
 londed with salt and plaster, which had 
 been hardened by wetting, is compete t 
 in a prosecution for assault with intent 
 to kill, as bearing upon the question 
 whether or not it was a deadly weapon. 
 People v. Valliere, 123 Cal. 676, 56 Pac 
 433. 
 
 isState V. Roan, 122 lo^va, 136. 97 N. 
 W. 997. And see Thomas v. State, 44 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 344. 72 S. W. 178. 
 
 xsWebb v. State, 100 Ala. 47, 14 So. 
 805. 
 
 20 Com. v. Yarnell, 24 Ky. L. Eep. 144, 
 68 S. W. 136. 
 
 But a beer glass is not a deidly 
 weapon. Griffin v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 App.) 53 S. W. 848. 
 
 21 State v. Ostrander, 18 Iowa, 435. 
 
 And a statutory provision with ref- 
 erence to wilfully and maliciously cut- 
 ting, striking, or stabbing another with 
 a knife, swoid, or other deadly weapon 
 is not confined to such weapons as may 
 be used for the purpose of cutting, 
 thrusting, or stabbing, but includes a 
 sledge-hanuneT used for the purpose of 
 
5 102J MALICE IN HOMICIDE, GENERALLY. 141 
 
 but it is not one per se or necessarily.^'' And a rock is a deadly 
 ■weapon in a close combat.^* And pushing a pin down an infant's 
 throat, causing death, is a killing with a deadly weapon.^* 
 
 103. Presumption of continuance of malice ^Deliberate malice once 
 
 ascertained to exist is presumed to continue down to the perpetra- 
 tion of the meditated act, unless there is evidence to repel the pre- 
 sumption.^ And where malice is shown to have been harbored, and 
 a fresh provocation arises to the person cherishing the malice, the 
 provocation is to be disregarded, unless the murderous purpose is 
 shown to have been abandoned before the act was done.* And this 
 is so, though the parties met by chance.* And within this rule a 
 former difficulty between the deceased and the accused in a prosecii- 
 tion for homicide is admissible against the accused, as tending to 
 show malice.* But this presumption is not one of law to be applied 
 in all cases by the court, but is only one of fact, which the jury may, 
 or may not, deduce from the circumstances of the particular case.** 
 An act done in accordance with a purpose previously formed is not, 
 within the meaning of the law of homicide, necessarily an act done 
 
 striking. Philpot v. Com. 86 Ky. 595, CaTinon v. State, 57 Miaa. 147: Stqte v. 
 
 6 S. W. 455. Johnson, and State v. Tilly, supra; 
 So, evidence that a person was found Contra, Fisher v. Stnte, 10 T en, 151 ; Me- 
 
 lying as if asieep in his bed. with his Gov v. State, 25 Tex. 33, 78 Am. Dee. 
 
 skull crushed in by a blow from some 520; People v. Garretson, 2 Wheeler, C. 
 
 blunt instrument, a-d that his person C. 347. 
 
 was covered with a blanket to his neck. Where an antecedent grudge has been 
 
 and that a heavy iron sash weight was established in a prosecution for homi- 
 
 lying, blood-stained, at his shoulder, eide, and there is no satisfactory evi- 
 
 with which he had been killed, apparent- denee of the abandonment of the wicked 
 
 ly by one blow, sufficiently shows the purpose, it must clearly appear to the 
 
 weight to have been a deadly weapon, court and jury in a prosecution for 
 
 and poi ta clearly to a wilful, deliberate, homicide that the provocation ws great, 
 
 and brutal murder. Killer v. Com. 124 in order to warrant them in finding that 
 
 Pa. 92, 16 Atl. 495. the killing was on the recent provoea- 
 
 !2Melton V. State, 30 Tex. App. 273, tion. and not upon the old grudge. Hol- 
 
 17 S. W. 257. land v. State, supra. 
 
 ssNorth Carolina v. Gosnell, 74 Fed. sState v. Tilly, 25 N. C. (3 Ired. L.) 
 
 734. 424. 
 
 But a 21/^-pound stone is not per se 4 Finch v. State. 81 Ala. 41, 1 So. 505; 
 
 deadly, in the absence of evidence as to Ellis v. State, 120 AIi. 333. 25 Ko. 1; 
 
 its use. Honeywell v. State, 40 Tex. Wade v. Com. 106 Kv. 321. ."iO S. W. 271. 
 
 Crim. Eep. 199, "49 S. W. 586. And see State v. Home, 9 Kan. 119. 
 
 24State V. Norwood, 115 N. C. 789, And where a former difficulty between 
 
 44 Am. St. Eep. 498, 20 S. E. 712. the deceased and one of two defendants 
 
 iStnte v. Johnson, 23 N. C. (1 Tred. ii a prosecution for homicide is ad- 
 
 L. ) .354, 35 Am. Dee. 742; State v. Tilly, mitted in evidence for the purpose of 
 
 25 N. C. (3 Ired. L.) 424: State v. Scott, showing malice entertained by him 
 
 26 N. C. (4 Ired. L.) 409, 42 Am. Dee. against the deceased, his codefendant 
 148; Williams v. State, 3 Heisk. 376; cannot complain of its admission. 
 Compton y. State, 110 Ala. 24, 20 So. Finch y. State, supra. 
 
 119; Holland v. State. 12 Fla. 117. 6State v. Brown. 04 Mo. 367. 
 
 sState y. Dettmer. 124 Mo. 426, 27 S. 
 W. 1117; Rigga v. State, 30 Miss. 635; 
 
142 HOMICIDE. [§ 103 
 
 in pursuance of such previously formed purpose.® And evidence of 
 expressions of regret, and efforts to assist and save the person injured 
 after giving him the fatal blow, and other attendant circumstances, 
 may serve to rebut the presumption of the intent arising from the use 
 of a deadly weapon, and raise the issue of manslaughter.'' And a 
 mere grudge, or malice in its general sense, is not sufficient to bring 
 a case within the principle that when one having express malice to- 
 ward another kills him the killing is referable to the previous malice, 
 and not to the provocation at the time of the killing. To do this there 
 must be a particular and definite intent to kill, so that the provo- 
 cation is a mere collateral circumstance, the intent existing before 
 and independently of it* So, though there was previous malice, if 
 a subsequent reconciliation took place, after which there was a fresh 
 provocation, the law will refer the motive of the slayer to the 
 fresh provocation, and not to the antecedent malice, unless the spe- 
 cial circumstances of the case forbid it.* This subject is further 
 considered from the standpoint of the effect of malice or an old 
 grudge upon present provocation, as a ground of mitigation of a 
 homicide to a lower degree, in another part of this work.^". 
 
 VII. Existence of, how detebmined. 
 
 104. A question for the jury. — Whether there was malice on the part 
 of the accused in a prosecution for homicide is a question of fact, to 
 be determined by the jury from all the circumstances of the case.* 
 And whether or not previous malice on the part of the person 
 charged with homicide continued up to the time of the killing is not 
 
 estate v. Robinson, 20 W. Va. 713, 43 action to the new provocation unless it 
 
 Am. Rep. 799. clearly appears to have been based on 
 
 In McCoy v. State, 25 Tex. 33, 78 Am. the anteeede: t grudge. 
 Dec. 520, it is held that where some 7Boyd v. State, 28 Tex. App. 137, 12 
 
 of the facts of a case tend to establish S. W. 737; Birdwell v. State (Tex. 
 
 express, and others implied, malice, and Grim. App.) 48 S. W. 583; GrjfBn v. 
 
 fresh provocation intervenes between State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 312, 76 Am. 
 
 the preconceived malice and the death, St. Rep. 718, 50 S. W. 366; Lyman v. 
 
 it will not be presumed that the killing State, 89 Ga. 337, 15 S. E. 467; Ander- 
 
 was upon the antecedent malice, but it son v. State, 3 Heisk. 97. 
 may be proved to have actuated the per- sCannon v. State, 57 Miss. 147. And 
 
 son in the killing by the circumstances see State v. Manns, 48 W. Va. 480, 37 
 
 and facts in the case, notwithstanding S. E. 613. 
 such fresh provocation. 9 State v. Bam well, 80 N. C. 466; 
 
 And People v. Garretson, 2 Wheeler, Watkins v. United States, 1 Ind. Terr. 
 
 C. C. 347, holds that where several per- 364, 41 S. W. 1044. 
 sons entertain malice against another, lOSee infra, chapter X., §§ 195, 196. 
 and a subsequent provocation is given, iBusIi v. Com. 78 Ky. 268; Yates v. 
 
 and they attack and kill him, the of- State, 26 Fla. 484, 7 So. 880; Dixo'i v. 
 
 fense may be manslaughter or murder State, 128 Ala. 54, 29 So. 623; Murphy 
 
 according to the circumstances, and it v. State, 37 Ala. 142; Flanagan v. State, 
 
 is the duty of the jury to refer their 46 Ala. 703; Corapton v. State, 110 Ala. 
 
§ 104] 
 
 MALICE IN HOMICIDE, GENERALLY. 
 
 143 
 
 a fact to be proved by •witnesses, but an inference to be drawn by the 
 jury.'* Though malice may be implied from the circumstances, the 
 implication is to be drawn by the jury.* The inference is one of fact, 
 not of law, and the jury may properly be told that they are at liberty 
 to make it ; but they should not be told that there is a presumption 
 of malice.* And it is open to them to ignore the doctrine of con- 
 structive malice and find manslaughter, if they see fit.® The legal 
 effect of the inference or presumption may be explained, but the 
 oo^irt should not undertake to measure its force and weight as evi- 
 dence.® So, the weight to be given to evidence of malice is a question 
 for the jury,^ as is also the question of the use of an instrument 
 likely to produce death;* and it is for the jury to say whether a 
 killing proceeds from previous malice, when there are grounds from 
 which to infer it, or from a subsequent provocation ;^ and they are also 
 the judges as to its degree. ^ " Likewise the existen'e of a fully formed 
 intent to kill is a question for the determination of the jury from all 
 the facts and circumstances in evidence. ^^ And so is the question 
 
 24, 20 Po. 119; People v. Martinez, 66 
 Cal. 278. 5 Pac. 261; Kent v. People, 8 
 Colo. 563, 9 Pac. 852; Zipperian v. Peo- 
 ple. Z3 Colo. 134, 79 Pac. 1018; Hieks v. 
 State, 25 Fla. 545, 6 So. 441 ; Lyman v. 
 State, 89 Ra. 337, 15 S. E. 467; Peri v. 
 People, 65 111. 17; Farris v. Com. 14 
 Bush, 362; Salisbury v. Com. 79 Ky. 
 425; Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 81 
 Ath. Dee. 781 ; Davis v. State, 51 Neb. 
 301, 70 N. VV. 984; State v. Hildreth, 31 
 N. C. (9 Ired. L.) 429, 51 Am. Dec. 
 364; State v. Shanley (S. D.) 104 N. 
 W. 522: State v. Boyce, 24 Wash. 514, 
 64 Pac. 719; State v. Clifford (W. Va.) 
 52 S. E. 981 ; United States v. Meagher, 
 37 Fed. 875 : Stevenson v. United States, 
 162 V. S. 313, 40 L. ed. 980. 16 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 839 ; King v. Hazel, 1 Leach, C. L. 
 368. And see People v. Lagroppo, 90 
 App. Div. 219, 86 N. Y. Supp. 116. 
 
 2State V. Hildreth. supra. 
 
 3Kent V. People, 8 Colo. 563, 9 Pac. 
 852: Hill v. People. 1 Colo. 436: State 
 V. Wallace, 2 Penn (Del.) 402, 47 Atl. 
 621; Farris v. Com. Kupra; Buckner v. 
 Com. 14 Bush, 601; Trimble v. Com. 78 
 Kv. 176: State v. Wright, 46 La. Ann. 
 1403, 16 So. 366; Stokes v. People, 53 
 N. Y. 164. 13 Am. Rep. 492; People v. 
 Downs, 56 Hun, 5, 8 N. Y. Supp. 521 ; 
 State V. Hildreth, supra; United States 
 V. Armstronpr, 2 Curt. C. C. 446, Fed. 
 Cas. No. 14.467. 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution 
 for homicide explaining express malice 
 
 a-d stating what would constitute evi- 
 dence of such malice, detailing par- 
 ticular kinds, and directing the jury 
 that, if no such external evidences ap- 
 pear, they may imply malice from the 
 not itself, is improper, as calculated to 
 lead the jury to conclude that thev not 
 only might, but should, imply malice 
 from the act itself, in the absence of cir- 
 cumstances which had just been men- 
 tioned ns evidence of malice. State v. 
 Ariel, 38 S. C. 221, 16 S. E. 779. 
 
 iNilan v. People, 27 Colo. 206, 60 
 Pac. 485: Brown v. State, 9 Neb. 157, 
 2 N. W. 378. 
 
 In King v. Hazel, supra, however, it 
 is held that if malice arises from impli- 
 cation, it is matter of law, the entire 
 consideration of which resides with the 
 court; and this was reiterated in Har- 
 rison V. Com. 79 Va. 374, 52 Am. Rep. 
 634. 
 
 BReg. V. Greenwood, 7 Cox, C. C 404. 
 
 BNewport v. State, 140 Ind. 299, 39 N. 
 E. 926. 
 
 7 Starke v. State, 81 Ga. 593, 7 S. E. 
 807. 
 
 sState V. Zeibart, 40 Iowa, 169 ; Eiland 
 V. State, 52 Ala. 322; Hampton v. State, 
 45 Ala. 82; State v. Bohanan, 76 Mo. 
 562. 
 
 sCannon v. State, 57 Miss. 147. 
 
 loFlanagan v. State. 46 Ala. 703. 
 
 iiCom. V. Aiello, 180 Pa. 597, 36 Atl. 
 1079; Hill v. People, 1 Colo. 430; Bald- 
 win V. State, 120 Ga. 188, 47 S. E. 558. 
 
144 HOMICIDE. [I 104 
 
 ■whether an assault was of a character liable to produce fatal re- 
 sults in the ordinary course of events. ^^ But the question whether 
 the presumption of malice has been rebutted is one of law for 
 the court. ^^ And whether there was any evidence of malice, or 
 sufficient evidence of it to sustain the verdict, is a question for the 
 court. ^ * And whenever an issue of malice, whether express or im- 
 plied, arises in a prosecution for homicide, it must be defined to the 
 jury.*® And the right of the jury to draw inferences as to malice 
 should be explained to them in the instructions.'" In determining 
 as to the sufficiency of instructions as to malice, however, other por- 
 tions of the charge are to be taken into consideration, and, if good 
 as a whole, the charge will be sustained if not misleading.^' 
 
 The intent with which the act caus- isConnell v. State. 4fi Tex. Orirn. Pep. 
 
 ing death was done is a question of fact. 259, 81 S. W. 746; Maher v. People, 10 
 
 Crosby v. People, 137 111. 325, 27 N. E. Mich. 212. 81 Am. Dec. 781. 
 
 49. lePalmore v. State, 29 Mk. 249. 
 
 izTbid. i7GaIlaher v. State, 28 Tex. Apn. 247, 
 
 And a presumption that there waa an 12 S. W. 1087; People v. Dice, 120 Cal. 
 
 inte t to kill, arising from the use of a 189. 52 Pac. 477. 
 
 deadly weapon, is not conclusive ; wheth- But an error in prosecution for 
 
 er the intent existed is still a question homicide in improperly limiting and 
 
 for the jury. Fitch v. State, 37 Tex. defining malice aforethought is '•ot cured 
 
 Crim. Eep. 600, 36 S. W. 584. by another instruction correctly stating 
 
 isState V. Matthews, 78 N. C. 523. the law concerning it. Stnte v. 
 
 i4State V. Clifford (W. Va.) 52 S. E. Vaughan, 22 Nev. 285, 39 Pac. 733. 
 9S2; State v. Lipscomb, 134 N. C. C89, 
 47 S. £. 44. 
 
CI-IAPTEK IX. 
 
 MURDER GENERALLY, AND UNDER STATUTES DIVIDING HOMICIDE 
 
 INTO DEGREES. 
 
 I. Statutoey changes. 
 
 105. Old English law indifferent to gradations of guilt. 
 
 106. American legislation directed to the establishment of 
 
 degrees. 
 
 107. Jurisdictions in which there are no degrees. 
 
 108. Effect on common-law distinction between murder and 
 
 manslaughter. 
 II. Construction and application of statutobt terms. 
 
 a. Murder by poison. 
 
 109. Meaning and scope of. 
 
 b. Murder; lying in wait. 
 
 110. Meaning and scope of. 
 e. Wilful; wilfully. 
 
 111. Meaning of. 
 
 d. Deliberate; deliberation. 
 
 112. Meaning and construction of. 
 
 113. "Deliberate" to be regarded as qualifying "killing." 
 
 e. Premeditated; premeditation. 
 
 114. Meaning and construction of. 
 
 115. The question of necessity of prior existence. 
 
 f. Express malice under the statutes. 
 
 116. Definition; scope. 
 
 g. Extreme atrocity or cruelty. 
 
 117. What covered by. 
 
 h. Homicide in the commission of felonious or unlawful acts. 
 
 1. General rules. 
 
 118. Effect of statute on common-law rules. 
 
 119. General rule as to effect of felony or criminal act. 
 
 120. Exceptions to general rule. 
 
 2. The felonious or unlawful act. 
 
 121. Nature at common law and under general statutes. 
 
 122. Nature under statutes naming particular felonies. 
 
 123. Doctrine that rule is confined to independent felonies. 
 
 3. The act of killing. 
 
 124. Criminality necessary. 
 
 125. Methods of effecting death. 
 
 4. Relationship between the felony and the killing. 
 
 126. General rules. 
 
 127. Distinction between preparation and attempt. 
 
 Horn.— 10. 145 
 
14ft HOMICIDE. 
 
 5. Abandonment of unlawful design. 
 
 128. Effect, generally. 
 
 i. Dangerous acts evincing depraved mind regardless of human Ufa. 
 
 1. What included in. 
 
 129. General rules. 
 
 2. Particular cases. 
 
 130. Reckless use of firearms. 
 1.31. Assaults. 
 
 132. Derailing railway train. 
 
 133. Dueling. 
 
 j. Statutory malice aforethought. 
 
 134. Scope and meaning of. 
 III. The different degrees. 
 
 a. Murder in the first degree. 
 
 135. What murder in the first degree includes. 
 
 136. Necessity of intent to take life. 
 
 137. Duration of intent to kill. 
 
 138. Intent in cases of assault with intent to kill. 
 
 b. Murder in the second degree. 
 
 139. What included in. 
 
 140. Instances in particular classes of cases. 
 
 141. Distinction between murder in the first and second d^rees. 
 
 142. Murder in the second degree a compromise courts are un- 
 
 willing to disturb. 
 
 c. Murder in the third degree. 
 
 143. What included in. 
 
 rv. Degree in case of killing bt confederate or associate. 
 
 144. Aider or abetter. 
 
 145. Accessory before the fact. 
 
 146. Coconspirator. 
 
 V. Presumptions and inferences as to degrees and their chabacteristtcs. . 
 
 a. Presumptions. 
 
 147. Presumption when killing is shown to be malicious and 
 
 nothing more. 
 
 148. Mitigation and excuse not presumed. 
 
 149. Characteristics of murder in the first degree not presumed. 
 
 b. Inferences. 
 
 150. General rules as to inference of characteristics of murder 
 
 in the first degree. 
 
 151. Inferences from character of act. 
 
 152. Inference from use of deadly weapon. 
 
 153. Inference from preparation. 
 
 154. Inference from threats and expressions of ill-will. 
 
 155. Inference from prior acts and relations. 
 
 VI. The determination as to degree. 
 
 a. Province of the jury. 
 
 156. General rules. 
 
 157. Exception in case of confession or plea of guilty. 
 
§ 1063 MURDER. 147 
 
 b. Province of the court. 
 
 158. Determination of scope of issue and scope of instruction. 
 
 159. Defining and explaining the crime. 
 
 160. Immaterial omissions and errors in instructing. 
 
 I. Statutoey changes. 
 
 105. Old English law indifferent to gradations of gnilt At commou 
 
 law homicide was either murder or manslaughter, and there were 
 no degrees of murder. ^ Not only was it murder kill to another, though 
 the intent was merely to severely hurt, but homicide unintentionally 
 committed in pursuit of a felony was murder, and was punishable 
 with death. It is true that so long as death was the common punish- 
 ment for all felonies, its infliction in this instance attracted compara- 
 tively little attention. But in this country, when capital punishment, 
 generally speaking, was restricted to homicides, the injustice of tak- 
 ing life for what might, after all, be a mere species of misadventure, 
 early attracted attention. No objection was taken to the common-law 
 distinction between murder and manslaughter. The general view was 
 that it was proper that this should remain. The question was one 
 of punishment It was felt that there was a large class of cases 
 falling under the general head of murder, in which a jury ought 
 to be allowed to say whether there was an intent to take life or not, 
 and where no such intent was found, it seemed consistent with sound 
 jurisprudence that a sentence lighter than death should be inflicted. 
 And it was to meet this class that legislative action was invoked. 
 
 106. American legislation directed to the establishment of degrees. — 
 Among the most common of the statutory provisions adopted for 
 this purpose is one providing that all murder which shall be perpe- 
 trated by means of poison, or lying in wait, or by any other kind of 
 wilful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which shall be com- 
 mitted in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, 
 rape, robbery, or burglary, shall be deemed murder of the first de- 
 gree; and all other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder of the 
 second degree; and the jury before whom any person indicted for 
 murder shall be tried shall, if they find such person guilty thereof, 
 ascertain in their verdict whether it be murder of the first or second 
 degree. This provision, either in words or in substance, differing 
 sometimes by a variant enumeration of felonies, seems to have been 
 adopted by Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, 
 
 iTJnited States v. Outerbridge, 5 
 Sawy. 620, Fed. Cas. No. 15,978. 
 
148 HOMICIDE. [§ 106 
 
 Indlanaj Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, 
 Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, 
 Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and 
 West Virginia, and perhaps other states.^ In Missouri the words 
 ''or other felony" are added to the list of specific felonies.^ And it 
 is provided in Louisiana that any person in the perpetration of, or 
 attempt to perpetrate, any arson, rape, robbery, or burglary, who shall 
 shoot, stab, or thrust any person with a dangerous weapon, or with 
 intent to commit the crime of murder, shall, on conviction, be pun- 
 ished with death.* Massachusetts, followed by several other states, 
 makes murder in the first degree to consist of murder "with deliber- 
 ately premeditated malice aforethought ;" and of murder "in the com- 
 mission of, or in an attempt to commit, any crime punishable with 
 imprisonment for life, or committed with extreme atrocity or cru- 
 elty."* And several of the states include in the first degree murder 
 
 iSee Kilgore v. State, 74 Ala. 1; Com. v. Daley, 2 Clark (Pa.) 361; 
 
 Mitchell V. State, 60 Ala. 26; Bivens v. Johnson v. Com. 24 Pa. 386; Com. v. 
 
 State, 11 Ark. 455; Cannon v. State, 60 Drum, 58 Pa. 9; Lane v. Com. 59 Pa. 
 
 Ark. 564, 31 S. W. 150, 32 S. W. 128; 371; Com. v. Herold. 5 Pa. Dist. R. 623; 
 
 People V. Bealoba, 17 Cal. 389; People Small v. Com. 91 Pa. 304; Com. v. 
 
 V. Long, 39 Cal. 694; People v. Olsen, M'Fall, Addison (Pa.) 255; White v. 
 
 80 Cal. 122, 22 Pac. 125; People v. State, 16 Tex. 206; Ake v. State, 30 Tex. 
 
 Niehol, 34 CaL 211; State v. Johnson, 46G; Burnliam v. State, 43 Tex. 322: 
 
 40 Conn. 136; Stocking v. State, 7 Ind. 'Singleton v. 'State, 1 Tex. App. 501; 
 
 326; Bissot v. State, 53 Ind. 408; Pat- Pharr v. State, 7 Tex. App. 472; Smith 
 
 terson v. State, 66 Ind. 185; Moynihan v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 14, 19 S. 
 
 V. State, 70 Ind. 126, 36 Am. Rep. 178 ; W. 252 ; Hedrick v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. 
 
 Jackson v. State, 161 Ind. 36, 67 N. E. Rep. 532, 51 S. W. 252; State v. Morgan; 
 
 690; State v. Wells, 61 Iowa, 629, 47 22 Utah, 162, 61 Pac. 527; Bratton v. 
 
 Am. Rep. 822, 17 N. W. 90; State v. State, 10 Humph. 103; Howell v. Com. 
 
 Gillick, 7 Iowa, 287; State v. Nueslein, 26 Gratt. 995; Com. v. Jones, 1 Leigh, 
 
 25 Mo. Ill ; State v. Green, 66 Mo. 631; 598; State v. Schnelle, 24 W. Va. 767; 
 
 State V. Earnest, 70 Mo. 520; State v. North Carolina v. Gosnell, 74 Fed. 734. 
 
 Hopper, 71 Mo. 425; State v. Wagner, And see the statutes of the various 
 
 78 Mo. 644, 47 Am. Rep. 131; State v. states. 
 
 Gassert, 4 Mo. App. 44 ; People V. Potter, 2See State v. Schmidt, 136 Mo. 644, 
 
 5 Mich. 1, 71 Am. Dec. 763; Territory 38 S. W. 719; State v. Murray, 126 Mo. 
 
 V. Stears, 2 Mont. 324; Milton v. State, 526, 29 S. W. 590; State v. Avery, 113 
 
 () Neb. 136; Henry v. State, 51 Neb. 149, Mo. 475, 21 S. W. 193; State v. Miller, 
 
 66 Am. St. Rep. 450, 70 N. W. 924; ]00 Mo. 606, 13 S. W. 832, 1051, 14 S. 
 
 Morgan v. State, 51 Neb. 672, 71 N. W. W. 311 ; State v. Sexton, 147 Mo. 89, 48 
 
 789: Rhea v. State, 63 Neb. 461, 88 N. S. W. 452. 
 
 W. 789; State v. Hymer, 15 Nev. 49; sSee State v. Brown, 21 La. Ann. 347. 
 
 State v.' Lopez, 15 Nev. 407; State v. 4See Com. v. Pemberton, 118 Mass. 36; 
 
 Lindsey, 19 Nev. 47, 3 Am. St. Rep. 776, Com. v. Desmarteau. 16 Gray, 1. 
 
 5 Pac. 822; State v. Pike, 49 N. H. 399, The Massachusetts provision that 
 
 6 Am. Rep. 533; State v. Greenleaf, 71 murder committed in the commission of, 
 N. H. 606, 54 Atl. 38 ; State v. Cooper, or attempt to commit, any crime punish- 
 13 N. J. L. 361. 25 Am. Dec. 490: State able with death or imprisonment for 
 V. Booker, 123 N. (J. 713, 31 S. E. 376; life is murder in the first degree is 
 Robbins v. State, 8 Ohio St, 138; State broad enough to include every crime for 
 V. Garrand, 5 Or. 216; State v. Brown, which, on conviction, the guilty party 
 
 7 Or. 186; Com. v. Neills, 2 Brewst. is liable to imprisonment for life; and 
 (Pa.) 653; Com. V. Miller, 4 Phila. 195; the fact that in passing sentence for 
 
§ 106] MURDER. 149 
 
 by torture. '^ In Delaware murder with express malice aforethought, 
 or in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any crime pun- 
 ishable with death, is murder in the first degree.'' And Texas has 
 siibstituted express malice in the place of wilful, deliberate, and pre- 
 meditated killing.'' And in Maine the provision is with reference 
 to murder with express malice aforethought, or in perpetrating, or 
 attempting to perpetrate, any crime punishable with death or impris- 
 onment in the state's prison for life, or for an unlimited term of 
 years.* The 'New York provision, followed by that of Michigan, 
 Oklahoma, and perhaps other states, makes homicide murder in the 
 first degree when perpetrated without authority of law and with 
 a premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed, or 
 of any other human being; or when perpetrated by any act immi- 
 nently dangerous to others, evincing a depraved mind regardless of 
 human life, although without any premeditated design to effect the 
 death of any particular individual; and when perpetrated without 
 any design to effect death, by a person engaged in the commission of 
 a felony,® there being but one degree of murder in Oklahoma.^" 
 
 the crime of robbery the court has dis- Hun, 487; Cox v. People, 80 N. Y. 500, 
 cretion to reduce the extreme penalty to Affirming 19 Hun, 430; People v. Conroy, 
 a term of years does not take it out of 97 N. Y. 63; People v. Flanigan, 174 N. 
 the general description of a crime Y. 357, 66 N. E. 988; People v. Cole, 2 
 punishable with imprisonment for life, N. Y. Grim. Rep. 108; People v. GfOrdon, 
 so as to make the crime of killing in its 100 Mich. 518, 59 N. W. 322; Jewell v. 
 perpetration less than murder in the Territory, 4 Olda. 53, 43 Pae. 1075: 
 first degree. Com. v. Pemberton, supra. Reeves v. Territory, 10 Okla. 194, 61 Pac. 
 
 sSee Chapman v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. 828. 
 Rep. 328, 96 Am. St. Rep. 874, 65 S. W. Under the New York statute existing 
 1098. previous to 1862 a killing was murder 
 
 6 See State v. Green, Houst. Crim. when perpetrated without design to ef- 
 Eep. (Del.) 217; State v. Rhodes, Houst. feet death by a, person engaged in the 
 Crim. Rep. (Del.) 476; State v. Till, commission of a felony, but the act of 
 Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 233; State v. 1862 changed the law so that such a kill- 
 Pratt, Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 249; ing was murder in the first degree only 
 State V. Brown, Houst. Crim. Rep. when perpetrated in committing the 
 (Del.) 539; State v. Dugan, Houst. crime of arson in the first degree; and 
 Crim. Rep. (Del.) 463; State v. Jones, 2 the crime of murder in the second de- 
 Penn. (Del.) 573, 47 Atl. 1006; State v. gree was created, consisting of a killing 
 Emory (Del.) 58 Atl. 1036; State v. without a design to effect death of a 
 Brinte, 4 Penn. (Del.) 551, 58 Atl. 258; person engaged in the commission of a 
 State V. Bell. (Del.) 62 Atl. 147; State felony other than arson. Fitzgerrold v. 
 V. Colling (Del.) 62 Atl. 224; State v. People, and Dolan v. People, supra; 
 Brown (Del.) 61 Atl. 1077. People v. Thomas, 3 Alb. L. J. 210. 
 
 TSee Ake v. State, 30 Tex. 466; Tooney But the statute of 1873 removed the 
 V. State, 5 Tex. App. 163; Rupe v. State, limitation as to specified felonies, and 
 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 477, 61 S. W. 929. made the killing murder in the first 
 
 sSee State v. Conley, 39 Me. 78 : State degree if done by one engaged in the 
 V. Smith, 32 Me. 369, 54 Am. Dec. 578. comuiission of any felony. Dolan v. 
 
 9See Fitzgerrold v. People, 37 N. Y. People, -supra. 
 413; Dolan v. People, 64 N. Y. 485, Af- lo See Jewell v. Territory, and Reeves 
 firming 6 Hun, 493; Buel v. People, 78 v. Territory, supra. 
 N. Y. 492, 34 Am. Rep. 555, Affirming 18 
 
150 HOMICIDE. f§ 106 
 
 The statutes of "New Hampshire, Texas, North Carolina, Montana, 
 and Virginia contain a provision making murder by starving, mur- 
 der in the first degree/^ And the Nebraska statute includes pro- 
 curing the execution of an innocent person by wilful or corrupt per- 
 jury, or subornation of perjury. ^^ And Alabama, as -well as New 
 York and a number of the other states, includes in the first degree 
 homicides perpetrated by any act greatly dangerous to the lives of 
 others, and evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life, 
 though there was no preconceived purpose to deprive any particular 
 person of life. ^* The prevailing statutory provision as to murder 
 in the second degree is, as has been seen, "all other kinds of murder," 
 excepting those previously defined and declared to be murder in the 
 first degree, though in a number of the states it is defined to be hom- 
 icide committed purposely and maliciously, but without deliberation 
 and premeditation. ^ * And killing perpetrated by any act imminent- 
 ly dangerous to others, evincing a depraved mind regardless of human 
 life, although without any premeditated design to effect death, has 
 been specifically declared to be murder in the second degree in at 
 least a few instances. ^ ^ And, of course, such a killing is a malicious 
 one and murder in the second degree, in the absence of any statutory 
 provision making it murder in any other degree. * ® And in at least 
 one state killing in the commission or attempt to commit any felony 
 other than rape, arson, robbery, or burglary is declared to be mur- 
 der in the second degree. ^ ^ 
 
 So, in Florida, Minnesota, and Wisconsin a third degree is added, 
 consisting of a killing perpetrated without design to effect death by 
 a person engaged in the commission of a felony. ^ * The object of the 
 
 iilSee Chapman v. State, 43 Tex. Grim. 671; Tarvers v. State, 90 Tenn. 485, 18 
 
 Rep. 328, 96 Am. St. Rep. 874, 65 S. W. S. W. 1041 ; Whiteford v. Com. 6 Rand. 
 
 1098; Com. v. Jones, 1 Leigh, 598; State (Va.) 721, 18 Am. Deo. 771. 
 V. Booker, 123 N. C. 713, 31 S. E. 376; "This provision exists in Oregon. 
 Territory v. Stears, 2 Mont. 324. So, in Delaware, if one kills another, 
 
 1 2See Milton v. State, 6 Neb. 136. not intending to deprive him of life, 
 
 i3See Washington v. State, 60 Ala. 10, but while engaged in any felonious and 
 
 31 Am. Rep. 28; Mitchell v. State, 60 ""lawful act not punishable with death, 
 
 j^^ 26 ^"'^" ^* ^n attempt to rob him, or the 
 
 i4See State v. Young, 55 Kan. 349, 40 "'^,«> j'^ ^^ guilty of murder in the sec- 
 
 Pac. 659; Fahnestock v. State. 23 Ind. ond^ degree. State v. Boice, and State 
 
 231; People v Austin 1 Park. Grim. ''• i8Denharv'^"state, 22 Fla. 664; Bas- 
 
 ^To V !°"*' "• ^of!'®oS 1^, -nfo' sett V. State, 44 Fla. 12, 33 So. 262; 
 
 iBSee Johnson v. State 24 Fla 162, g^ate v. Brown, 12 Minn. 538, Gil. 448;. 
 
 4 So. 535; Hogan v. State, 36 Wis. 226. PHemling v. State, 46 Wis. 516, 1 N. W. 
 
 16 State V. Boice, Iloust. Grim. Rep. 278; State v. Hammond, 35 Wis. 315; 
 
 (Del.) 355; State v. Brown, Houst. Terrill v. State, 74 Wis. 278, 42 N. W. 
 
 Grim. Rep. (Del.) 539; Clarke v. State, 243; HofTman v. SUte, 88 Wis. 166, 5!> 
 
 117 Ala. 1, 67 Am. St. Rep. 157, 23 So. N. W. 588. 
 
,^ 1061^ MURDER. 151. 
 
 foregoing summary of statutory provisions is merely to show, in a 
 general way, the foundation upon which American case law upon 
 this subject is based. It is not complete, and as statutes are liable 
 to be changed it may not be accurate. For statutory authority in a 
 particular case the reader is referred to the current statutes of the 
 state in which it arises. 
 
 107. Jurisdictions in wMcli there are no degrees. — The Federal stat- 
 utes providing for the punishment of murder and manslaughter fail 
 to define them, and the common-law definitions must be resorted to ; * 
 and they do not divide homicide into degrees, but simply provide 
 for the crime of wilful murder and attach to it the punishment of 
 ■death. ^ And under them there can be but two crimes growing out of 
 the taking of human life, — ^murder and manslaughter;^ and to consti- 
 tute murder the killing must have been done wilfully and with malice 
 aforethought* So, in Louisiana there are no degrees in the crime 
 of murder, ^ nor are there in Illinois. ® And it is the same in Colo- 
 rado, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ehpde Island, and 
 South Carolina.'^ It is held in Illinois, however, that though the 
 statute recognizes no degrees in the crime of murder, its design is that 
 punishment shall be proportioned to the turpitude of the offense ; and 
 -evidence directly and legitimately bearing upon that question is ad- 
 missible in a prosecution for murder to enable the jury to fix the 
 punishment justly and understandingly. * So, the common-law rule 
 is still retained in England. ® 
 
 108. Effect on common-law distinction between murder and man- 
 slaughter. — ^The practical working of the statutes has been to divide 
 murder, as limited by the common law, into two classes, leaving 
 the original boundaries between murder and manslaughter unal- 
 tered.* And they do not alter the original common-law definition 
 
 lUnited States v. Boyd, 45 Fed. 851 ; «Ibid. 
 
 United States v. Lewis, 111 Fed. 630. estate v. Deschamps, 42 La. Ann. 567, 
 
 sUnited States v. Outerbridge, 5 21 Am. St. Rep. 392, 7 So. 703. 
 
 Sa\vy. 620, Fed. Cas. No. 1 5,978 ; Bias eNowacryk v. People, 139 111. 336, 28 
 
 ■V. tfnited States, 3 Ird. Terr. 27, 53 S. N. E. 961. 
 
 W. 471. And see United States v. 'See the statutes of those states. 
 
 Scott, 3 Wall. 642, 18 L. ed. 218. sNowacrylc v. People, supra. 
 
 And the jury in a prosecution for 921 Am. & Eng. Ene. Law, 2d ed. p. 
 
 homicide cannot, by their verdict of 156, citing Stephen's Digest Crim. Law, 
 
 guilty, find the degree of a murder, but art. 223. 
 
 must find either that the defendant is iPeople v. Foren, 25 Oal. 361 ; People 
 
 guilty of murder, or of murder without v. Haun, 44 Cal. 96 ; Ex parte Nettles, 
 
 capital punishment; and in such a 58 Ala. 268; MeManus v. State, S3 Ala. 
 
 prosecution a refusal to instruct the 285; Bivens v. State, 11 Ark. 455: State 
 
 jury as to the different degrees of mur- v. Dowd, 19 Conn. 388; State v. Hamil- 
 
 der" is not error. Bias v. United States, ton, Houst. Crim. Rep. (DeJ.) 101; 
 
 supra. State v. Pratt, Houst. Crira. Rep. (Del.) 
 
 sUnited States v. Boyd, supra. 249; State v. Johnson, 8 Iowa, 525, 74 
 
152 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 !■§ 10® 
 
 of murder ; ^ nor render the offense in the minor degree anything les& 
 than murder. ^ IsTo new statutory crime is created. * And statutory 
 provisions defining or enumerating instances of murder in the first 
 degree, and providing that every other murder is murder in the 
 second degree, cover the whole field, and an instruction in a prose- 
 cution for murder under such statutes that the enumerated cases are 
 only instances of murder, and that the crime is not limited to a killing 
 under enumerated circumstances, is erroneous.® 
 
 The statutes, it has been held, in requiring murder in the first 
 degree to be deliberate, do not change the common-law doctrine in 
 that respect with regard to murder, the degree of deliberation requi- 
 site in both degrees being the same. The distinctive peculiarity 
 attached by the statutes to murder in the first degree, however, is. 
 that it must necessarily be accompanied with a premeditated inten- 
 tion to take life. The "killing" must be "premeditated."® "Wherever,, 
 then, in cases of deliberate homicide, there is a specific intention to 
 take life, the offense, if consummated, is murder in the first degree^ 
 if there is not a specific intention to take life, it is murder in the 
 second degree. '^ To constitute murder of the first degree the intent 
 
 Am. Dec. 321; State v. Gillick, 7 Iowa, 
 287 ; Pence v. Com. 21 Ky. L. Rep. 500, 
 51 S. W. 801 ; State v. Spencer, 21 N. J. 
 L. 196; Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 320; 
 People V. Potter, 5 Mich. 1, 71 Am. Dec. 
 763; Com. v. Desmarteau, 16 Gray, 1. 
 
 zHawthorne v. State, 58 Miss. 778; 
 Bivens v. State; People v. Haun; and 
 People V. Foren, — supra; State v. Jones, 
 Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 21; State v. 
 Pratt, and Pence v. Com. supra; Conner 
 V. Com. 13 Busii, 719; Com. v. Des- 
 marteau, supra; Nye v. People, 35 Mich. 
 16; People V. Doe, 1 Mich. 451; People 
 V. Scott, 6 Mich. 287; State v. Ehyne, 
 124 N. C. 847, 33 S. E. 128; State v. 
 Carr, 53 Vt. 37. 
 
 And where a statutory provision with 
 relation to murder and manslaugliter 
 employs familiar terms of fixed legal 
 import at common law, without defi- 
 nition or qualification of their meaning, 
 they will be deemed to have been used 
 in the same sense in which they were 
 employed at common law. State v. 
 Buchanan, Houst. Crim. Eep. (Del.) 79. 
 
 sPeople V. Haun, 44 Cal. 96; People 
 V. Foren, 25 Cal. 361 ; State v. Decklotts, 
 19 Iowa, 447; Weighorst v. State, 7 Md. 
 442 ; Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 337. 
 
 4 Metcalfe v. Com. 27 Ky. L. Rep. 704, 
 86 S. W. 534. 
 
 A statute defining murder as under- 
 
 stood at common law and fixing the 
 punishment therefor does not change the 
 offense from a common-law offense to a 
 statutory one. State v. Coleman, 8 S. 
 C. N. S. 237. 
 
 BJudge V. State, 58 Ala. 406, 29 Am. 
 Rep. 757. 
 
 estate v. Spencer, 21 N. J. L. 196; 
 State v. Gillick, 7 Iowa, 287; People v. 
 Potter, 5 Mich. 1, 71 Am. Dec. 763; Peo- 
 ple V. Scott, 6 Mich. 287. 
 
 Homicide, in all eases except those of 
 homicide in the commission of the 
 felonies enumerated in the statute, 
 must, to be murder in the first degree, 
 involve criminal intent directed against 
 the life of a human being. Com. v. 
 Green, 1 Ashra. (Pa.) 289. 
 
 7Respublica v. Bob, 4 Dall. 146, 1 L. 
 ed. 777 ; Com. v. Honeyman, Addison 
 (Pa.) 148; Com. v. Lewis, Addison 
 (Pa.) 283; Com. v. Green, supra; Com- 
 v. Murray, 2 Ashm. (Pa.) 41; Com. v. 
 Daley, 2 Clark (Pa.) 361; Com. v. Hare, 
 2 Clark (Pa.) 467; Com. v. Crause, 4 
 Clark (Pa.) 500; Com. v. Gable, 7 Serg. 
 & R. 428; Kelly v. Com. 1 Grant, Cas. 
 484 ; Com. v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9 ; People v. 
 Josephs, 7 Cal. 129; People v. Barry, 31 
 Cal. 357; Craft v. State, 3 Kan. 451; 
 People V. Potter, supra; State v. 
 Shoultz, 25 Mo. 128; State v. Hicks, 27 
 
§ 108] MURDER. 152 
 
 of the party killing must have been to take life;* whereas, by the 
 common law, if the mortal blow is malicious and death ensues, tht 
 perpetrator is guilty of murder, whether such an intention doe^^ 
 or does not appear to have existed in his mind. The injury being ma- 
 licious, the common law holds the offender responsible for all the 
 consequences following his unlawful act. The first inquiry, there- 
 fore, after a felonious and malicious homicide is established, not com- 
 mitted by means of poison, or lying in wait, or in the perpetration of 
 one of the felonies enumerated in the act, is whether the mortal blow 
 was given with an intent to take life, or merely to do great bodily 
 harm. If the former is proved by the evidence, the crime is murder 
 in the first degree; if such an intent does not satisfactorily appear, 
 the jury should return a verdict of murder in the second degree.* 
 
 11. CONSTEUCTION AND APPLICATION OP STATUTOBT TEEMS. 
 
 a. Murder by poison. 
 
 109. Meaning and scope of — Under statutes providing that all mur- 
 der which is perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait, or by 
 any other kind of wilful, deliberate, and premeditated killing is mur- 
 der in the first degree, murder committed by the administering 
 of poison, unlawfully and without a good intention, presupposes the 
 elements of malice, premeditation, and deliberation, the adminis- 
 tering of the poison constituting the required deliberation and pre- 
 meditation evincing a design to kill, which makes the crime murder 
 in the first degree.^ And this is the rule where the poison was ad- 
 Mo. 588; State v. Starr, 38 Mo. 270; murder into degrees, except in case of 
 State V. Spencer, supra; State v. Ander- homicide in the perpetration of the 
 son, 2 Overt. 6, 5 Am. Dec. 648 ; Mitchell named felonies, is that to constitute mur- 
 V. State, 5 Yerg. 340; Dale v. State, 10 der in the first degree the intent of the 
 Yerg. 551 ; Anthony v. State, Meigs, 265, party must have been to take life, 
 33 Am. Dec. 143; Dains v. State, 2 whereas by the common law, if the mor- 
 Humph. 439; Swan v. State, 4 Humph, tal blow was malicious, and death en- 
 1.36; Clark v. State, 8 Humph. 671; sued, the perpetrator was guilty of mur- 
 Riley v. State, 9 Humph. 646; Bratton der, whether or not such intention ap- 
 V. State, 10 Himiph. 103; Warren v. peared to have existed in his mind. 
 State, 4 Coldw. 130; Com. v. Jones, 1 Com. v. Daley, supra. 
 Leigh, 610; Bennett v. Com. 8 Leigh, sCom. v. Green, supra. 
 745; Slaughter v. Com. 11 Leigh, 681, 37 "King, P. J., in Com. v. Daley, 2 
 Am. Dee. 638; King v. Com. 2 Va. Cas. Clark (Pa.) 361. See criticism on this 
 78; Burgess v. Com. 2 Va. Cas. 483; definition in Atkinson v. State, 20 Tex. 
 Whiteford v. Com. 6 Rand. (Va.) 721, 522, where, under a similar statute, it 
 18 Am. Dee. 771; Com. v. Dougherty, was held that, to constitute murder in 
 1 Browne (Pa.) Appx.; XVIIL the first degree, some degree of prior de- 
 
 The only modification of the common liberation must be shown, 
 law with reference to murder introduced iState v. Wells, 61 Iowa, 630, 47 Am. 
 by the statutory provisions dividing Rep. 822, 17 N. W. 90; State v. Van 
 
1S4 
 
 HOiMICIDE. 
 
 [§109 
 
 ministered with intention to do mischief, and for an unlawful pur- 
 pose, without reference to whether an actual intent to kill existed.* 
 And in charging murder by poison it is not necessary to allege that 
 the poison was administered with an intent to kill.* Nor is it material 
 whether a person taking the poison took it willingly, intending 
 thereby to commit suicide, or was overcome by force, or overreached 
 by fraud; purposely and maliciously to kill a human being by ad- 
 ministering poison is murder, irrespective of the wishes or the 
 condition of the party to whom it is administered, or the manner 
 in which, or the means by which, it is administered.* And where the 
 evidence shows that the death was effected by intentional and ma- 
 licious poisoning, it is the duty of the court to tell the jury that 
 the offense is murder in the first degree. ® And in such case the jury 
 needs neither definition nor instruction in regard to any other kind 
 of homicide,* though when a court addresses a jury authoritatively, 
 and requires of them a verdict of murder in the first degree, it is 
 orror under a statute providing that in all trials for homicide the 
 jury shall ascertain the degree;'' and under such provisions the 
 
 Tassel, 103 Iowa, 6, 72 N. W. 497; State 
 V. Bertoeh (Iowa) 79 N. W. 378; State 
 V. Kobinson, 126 Iowa, 69, 101 N. W. 
 034; Nordan v. State (Ala.) 39 So. 406; 
 State V. Evans, 1 Marv. (Del.) 477, 41 
 Atl. 136; State v. Baldwin. 36 Kan. 1, 
 12 Pac. 318; People v. Hall, 48 Mich. 
 482, 42 Am. Eep. 477, 12 N. W. 665; 
 McMeen v. Com. 114 Pa. 300, 9 Atl. 878; 
 Com. V. Schoeppe, 1 Legal Gaz. Rep. 
 433; Rupe v. State, 42 Tex. Grim. Rep. 
 477, 61 S. W. 929. 
 
 Though in Texas express malice is 
 made by statute an ingredient of mur- 
 der in the first degree, a homicide com- 
 mitted with malice aforethought, and by 
 means of poison, is murder in the first 
 ■degreej whether the malice was express 
 or implied. Tooney v. State, 5 Tex. App. 
 163; Rupe v. State, supra. 
 
 2State V. Wagner, 78 Mo. 644, 47 Am. 
 Rep. 131 ; State v. Burns, 124 Iowa, 207, 
 09 N. W. 721; State v. Baldwin; Com. 
 V. Schoeppe ; and Rupe v. State, — supra. 
 
 3Com. V. Hersey, 2 Allen, 173. 
 
 4Blaekburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146. 
 
 eShaflfner v. Com. 72 Pa. 60, 13 Am. 
 Rep. 649; McMeen v. Com. 114 Pa. 300, 
 9 Atl. 878; People v. Hall, 48 Mich. 482, 
 42 Am. Rep. 477, 12 N. W. 665; Tooney 
 V. State, 5 Tex. App. 163. 
 
 And where on a trial for murder in 
 the first degree charging the accused 
 with purposely killing another by ad- 
 
 ministering poison, the evidence tends 
 to show no other grade of offense, the 
 jury should not be charged that their 
 duty will be fulfilled by convicting the 
 accused, if they find him guilty, of mur- 
 der in the second degree, or of man- 
 slaughter; and where a verdict Is re- 
 turned for a grade of homicide lower 
 than murder in the first degree, a new 
 trial should be granted where it appears 
 from evidence that a verdict of acquittal 
 might have been rendered had the jury 
 been properly instructed. Dresback v. 
 State, 38 Ohio St. 365. 
 
 «McMeen v. Com. supra. 
 
 But a statement by the court to the 
 jury in a prosecution for homicide by 
 poison, that in common parlance chloro- 
 form is classed among the poisons, is 
 not error where by public law the legis- 
 lature had published and declared chlo- 
 roform to be a virulent poison, and the 
 court coupled with the statement the di- 
 rection that it would still be necessary 
 for the jury to find from the evidence 
 that chloroform is a poison before they 
 could convict. State v. Baldwin, 36 
 Kan. 1, 12 Pae. 318. 
 
 'ShafTner v. Com. supra; Adams v. 
 State, 29 Oliio St. 415; Eobbins v. State, 
 8 Ohio St. 131. And see Rhodes v. Cora. 
 48 Pa. 396; Lane v. Com. 59 Pa. 371; 
 Brooks V. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 347. 
 60 S. W. 53. 
 
i 109i MURDER. 155 
 
 jury should not be told that certain facts show premeditation, as a 
 matter of law.* A homicide by poison, however, is not necessarily 
 murder at common law, and, if it is not, it is not murder in the first 
 degree under the statutes." To be murder in the first degree it 
 must have been wilful, deliberate, and premeditated.^* And 
 the jury on an indictment for murder by poison may find the 
 accused guilty of murder in the second degree, and the punishment 
 for that offense may be inflicted, where deliberation and premedita- 
 tion do not appear. * * And this is so, independent of the common-law 
 presumption of malice. ^ ^ And the administration of poison without 
 criminal intent, but heedlessly and incautiously, whereby death is 
 caused, constitutes manslaughter, not murder. * ^ And in such cases, 
 as well as in others, the degree of criminality is to be determined by 
 the jury, as a question of fact. * * So the statute refers to poison in- 
 tentionally used as such, and does not include murder by noxious 
 substances not used for the purpose of poisoning, or by harmless 
 drugs that by accident, or mistake in the manner of their use, may 
 produce death, ^® or murder by poison administered without knowl- 
 
 But an instruction in a prosecution loState v. Dowd, supra; Bechtelhei- 
 for murder in the first degree by means mer v. State, 54 Ind. 128 ; State v. 
 of poison, that in that kind of a case Smith, 102 Iowa, 656. 72 N. W. 279; 
 murder is not of different degrees, and State v. Spencer, 2] N. J. L. 196; Rob- 
 that, therefore, if they find the defend- bins v. State, supra; Tooney v. State, 5 
 ant guilty as he stands charged in the Tex. App. 163. 
 
 indictment, they must return a veidiet n State v. Dowd, supra. Contra, 
 
 of murder in the first degree, is not ob- State v. Bertoch, supra. 
 
 jectionable as an invasion by the court izState v. Spencer, supra. 
 
 of the province of the jury, since the isAnn v. State, 11 Humph. 159. 
 
 other degrees of homicide are left open And one who administers a poison to 
 
 to them. Adams v. State, supra. another without Icnowing or taking 
 
 sState V. Daniels, 134 N. C. 671, 46 pains to find out what its effect will be, 
 
 S. E. 991. or who, knowing the effect, prescribes 
 
 SState V. Dowd, 19 Conn. 388; Rob- it without giving adequate and proper 
 
 bins V. State, 8 Ohio St. 138: Com. ex directions as to its use, is guilty of eul- 
 
 rel. Chauncey v. Keeper of Prison, 2 pable negligence and liable for man- 
 
 Ashm. (Pa.) 227. See Rhodes v. Com. slaughter if death results therefrom, 
 
 and Lane v. Com.. supra; Com. v. Jones, Reg. v. Chamberlain, 10 Cox, C. C. 486. 
 
 1 Leigh, GIG; Souther v. Com. 7 Gratt. i4State v. Dowd, 19 Conn. 388. 
 
 678. Contra, State v. Bertoch (Iowa) 79 Though the statute provides that mur- 
 
 N. W. 378. der by poison shall be murder in the 
 
 The meaning of the Iowa statute pro- first degree, if the jury in a prosecu- 
 
 viding that if the killing of a human be- tion for such killing do not find that 
 
 ing is perpetrated by means of poison, the murder is in the first degree, the 
 
 or any wilful, deliberate, and preraedi- judge may not punish the offense as if 
 
 tated killing, then it is murder in the it were such. People v. Hall, 48 Mich, 
 
 first degree, is that the administration 482, 42 Am. Rep. 477, 12 N. W. 665. 
 
 of poison constitutes the required de- isRupe v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 liberation and premeditation, and evin- 477, 61 S. W. 929; Com. v. Sohoeppe, 1 
 
 ces an intent to kill, provided it is un- Legal Gaz. Rep. 433. And see Simpson's 
 
 lawfully administered and without a Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 172. 
 
 good in!tention. State v. Wells. 61 Iowa, A violation by a person in charge of 
 
 629, 47 Am. Rep. 822, 17 N. W. 90. a child, of ier master's orders, in giv- 
 
156 HOMICIDE. ['i 10& 
 
 edge of its presence or dangerous nature. ^ ® And tlie previous rela- 
 tions of the parties may be skown as bearing upon the question of the 
 intent with which the poison was administered.^^ Under these 
 rules homicide by administering poison is not murder in the first 
 degree where the intent was to cause abortion, and not to kill.-'* 
 And while, in a prosecution for homicide by poison, the symptoms 
 and appearances during the last illness become controlling facts in 
 determining whether the death was from poison or from disease, 
 the charge is not made out unless the prosecution negatives every- 
 thing but poison as the cause of death ; and this can only be done by 
 showing affirmatively that the combined symptoms, and the abso- 
 lutely certain facts with which they are associated, are inconsistent 
 with any other disease or ailment. ^ ® 
 
 b. Murder; lying in wait. 
 
 110. Meaning and scope of. — The ordinary meaning of lying in wait, 
 as the term is used in the law with reference to homicide, is lying 
 in ambush or concealment.^ Concealing one's self for the pur- 
 pose of killing another unawares is lying in wait. ^ And a charge 
 of lying in wait is sustained by proof of standing with a club pre- 
 pared to strike;^ and evidence of bunched tracks at a nearby hiding 
 place is competent as tending to establish lying in wait.* If an in- 
 tentional homicide by lying in wait be proved, then such homicide 
 is, ordinarily, murder in the first degree.® In such case the fact of 
 lying in wait is, of itself, evidence of a wilful, deliberate, malicious, 
 
 ing the child laudanum to sooth it, is picions of poisoning during the sick- 
 
 Bimply an offense against the private ness, and at no time toolc any steps to 
 
 authority of the master, cognizable and deal with the case as involving poison, is 
 
 punishable alone in the domestic forum, a subject for consideration by the jury 
 
 and is not an unlawful act in the sense in a prosecution for homicide of the pa- 
 
 of the rule that causing death, though tient by poison. Ibid. 
 
 contrary to intention, by an unlawful iState v. Cross, 68 Iowa, 180, 26 N. 
 
 act is murder. Ann v. State, 11 Humph. W. 62. 
 
 159. The statutory phrase "lying in wait," 
 
 1 sMathedy V. Com. 14 Ky. L. Rep. 182, though in some sense a legal one, has 
 
 19 S. W. 977. no meaning in law different from that 
 
 Mere knowledge of the accused in a attached to it in common use, and an 
 
 prosecution for homicide by poison, that instruction in a prosecution for homicide 
 
 the article administered was not entirely committed by lying in wait is not er- 
 
 harmUss, is not sufficient to warrant a roneous because the phrase "lying in 
 
 conviction of murder. People v. Stokes, wait" is not explained to the jury. 
 
 2 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 382. State v. Kilgore, 70 Mo. 546. 
 
 i7McMeen v. Com. 114 Pa. 300, 9 Atl. 2People v. Miles, 55 Cal. 207. 
 
 B78. sState v. I>ler, 122 Iowa, 125, 97 N. 
 
 isRobbins v. State, 8 Ohio St. 131. W. 983. 
 
 isPeople V. Millard, 53 Mich. 63, 18 ^Harrison v. State (Ala.) 40 So. 57. 
 
 N. W. 562. sPeople v. Repke, 103 Mich. 459, 61 
 
 That physicians who attended a case N. W. 861 ; State v. Dooley, 89 Iowa, 584, 
 
 af alleged poisoning betrayed no sus- 57 N. W. 414; State v. Gilchrist, 113 n! 
 
5 110] MtTEDER. 157 
 
 and premeditated killing, and all proof as to wilfulness or intention 
 is irrelevant. ® And this is so though the person killed had threatened 
 the slayer's life.'' And if a lying in wait appears, it is proper to 
 instruct the jury that, if the accused is guilty at all^ he is guilty of 
 murder in the first degree;* and in such case a conviction may be 
 had on proof of the lying in wait and the killing, though it was 
 not alleged in the indictment, since the lying in wait is not, of it- 
 •self, a means of taking life, but merely evidence to prove the ma- 
 terial allegation of deliberation and premeditation. ® Nor is lying in 
 wait and slaying an adversary justified by the fact that the adver- 
 sary had previously threatened the slayer and attacked him with a 
 deadly weapon, ^ " though such previous threats are admissible in evi- 
 •dence in a prosecution for the killing, as tending to throw light upon 
 the animus of the parties. ^ ^ And a killing by lying in wait is not re- 
 duced to a lower degree of homicide by the fact that the person killed 
 had threatened to kill the slayer, and went around armed with deadly 
 weapons hunting for him for that purpose, and that, owing to the prox- 
 imity of their residences, they could not reasonably be expected to fail 
 soon to encounter each other, and there was reason to believe that the 
 threats would be carried into execution. ^ ^ A killing or an assault with 
 intent to kill by lying in wait, however, is not deliberate and premed- 
 itated as a matter of law ; the lying in wait is evidence of deliberation 
 and premeditation, but their existence is not a conclusion of law, 
 but a question of fact. ^ ^ Murder committed while lying in wait is 
 not per se murder in the first degree. ^ * A man may lie in wait for 
 another merely to commit a trespass, and, if so, in ease of an acci- 
 
 C. 673, 18 S. E. 319; Com. v. Cook, 166 74 Am. Dee. 321; State v. Gilchrist, 113 
 
 Pa. 193, 31 Atl. 56; Com. v. Boschino, N. C. 673, 18 S. E. 319; State v. Kose, 
 
 176 Pa. 103, 34 Atl. 964; Riley v. State, 129 N. C. 575, 40 S. E. 83; Clark v. Com. 
 
 9 Humph. 646; Barnard v. State, 88 123 Pa. 555, 16 Atl. 795. 
 
 Tenn. 183, 12 S. W. 431; White v. State, And a refusal to instruct as to murder 
 
 30 Tex. App. 652, 18 S. W. 462; Ex in the second degree is not error. White 
 
 parte Mosby, 31 Tex. 566, 98 Am. Dec. v. State, 30 Tex. App. 652, 18 S. W. 
 
 547. And see Williams v. State, 130 462. 
 
 Ala. 107/30 So. 484. sState v. Kilgore, 70 Mo. 546. 
 
 cRiley v. State, supra; State v. Kil- loTurner v. Com. 89 Kv. 78, 1 S. W. 
 
 gore, 70 Mo. 540; People v. Lewis, 115 475; Smith v. State, 25 Fla. 517, 6 So. 
 
 N. Y. 663, 21 N. E. 1062. 482 ; Barnard v. State, 88 Tenn. 1 83, 12 
 
 Under the Texas statute making ex- S. W. 431 ; Ex parte Mosby, 31 Tex. 566, 
 
 press malice an element of murder in 98 Am. Dee. .'^47. 
 
 •the first degree, lying in wait is evi- nWhlte v. State, 30 Tex. App. 652, 18 
 
 denee of express malice. Johnson v. S. W. 462. 
 
 State, 30 Tex. 748; Osborne v. State, 23 izLander v. State, 12 Tex. 462. 
 
 Tex. App. 431, 5 S. W. 251. isFlovd v. State, 3 Heisk. 342; Os- 
 
 7Smith V. State, 25 Fla. 517, 6 So. borne v. State, 23 Tex. App. 431, 5 S. W. 
 
 482. 251. 
 
 sPeopIe V. Repke, 103 Mich. 459, 61 N. l^Osborne v. State, supra. 
 W. 861; State v. Johnson, 8 Iowa, 525, 
 
158 HOMICIDE. £§ 110 
 
 dental killing, the offense being only manslaughter at common law 
 is only manslaughter under our statutes. ^° And "concealed" and 
 "lying in wait" are not synonymous ; and the act of killing another 
 by a person who was concealed may be justifiable where, from the 
 circumstances, he, in good faith, entertained the belief that the 
 person killed was about to execute a previous threat to kill him, 
 though he may have been mistaken in his belief, and though 
 there were no demonstrations or hostile acts at the time.^® And 
 if the intent was not to kill but merely to do great bodily harm, there 
 cannot be a conviction of murder in the first degree. ^ ^ 
 
 c. Wilful; wilfully. 
 
 111. Meaning of. — ^Whether an unintended act can be said to be 
 
 wilful is a question upon which there exists some conflict of authority. 
 Keeping in view the severity which the construction of a penal stat- 
 ute requires, and recollecting that the term, as used in this case, was 
 meant to be restrictive, the better view seems to be that, in order 
 to bring a homicide within the act, it must have been specifically 
 willed by the perpetrator. It is difficult to see how, if an unintended 
 homicide be within the terms of the act, any other kind of murder 
 with a collateral felonious intent can be excluded. And it has been 
 held that wilful means designed, and not by accident ; ^ and that the 
 word "wilful" is included in the words "maliciously," "deliberately," 
 and "'premeditatedly;"^ and that a killing was wilful if the inten- 
 tion was to take life ; * and that an instruction as to wilful killing is 
 not rendered improper by the omission to use the word "intention- 
 al."* And that in determining as to the degree of a homicide the 
 words "wilfully, premeditatedly, and of malice aforethought" include 
 "feloniously."^ Wilfulness and deliberation, however, are entirely 
 different, and an instruction declaring wilful killing to be murder 
 in the first degree is erroneous as ignoring the element of delibera- 
 tion.® And the word "wilfully" is not the equivalent of the word 
 
 iBSee Osborne v. State, supra. sFisher v. State, 10 Lea, 151; Com. ▼. 
 
 lePeople v. Miles, 55 Cal. 207. Lynch, 3 Pittsb. 412. And see State v. 
 
 I'Com. V. Klose, 4 Kulp, 111. Marsh, 171 Mo. 523, 71 S. W. 1003. 
 
 iBower v. State, 5 Mo. 364, 32 Am. sCom. v. Miller, 8 Kulp, 85; State v. 
 
 Dec. 325; State v. Thomas, 78 Mo. 327; Gilliek, 7 Iowa, 287. 
 
 State V. Gee, 85 Mo. 647; State v. 4State v. Smith, 164 Mo. 567, 65 S. 
 
 Wright, 134 Mo. 404, 35 S. W. 1145; Kil- W. 270. 
 
 gore V. State, 124 Ala. 24, 27 So. 4 ; Peo- estate v. Parker, 172 Mo. 191, 72 S. 
 
 pie V. lams, 57 Cal. 115; Clark v. Com. W. 650. 
 
 Ill Ky. 443, 63 S. W. 740; Schlencker estate v. Hill, 69 Mo. 453. 
 f. State, 9 Neb. 300, 2 N. W. 710; 
 United States v. Boyd, 45 Fed. 851. 
 
S 111] MURDER. 159 
 
 "maliciously ;" a wilful killing does not necessarily constitute a ma- 
 licious one.'' Nor are "intentionally" and "with premeditated de- 
 sign" synonymous expressions; the latter involving a greater degree 
 of deliberation and forethought than the former. * 
 
 d. Deliberate; deliberation. 
 
 112. Meaning and construction of. — Deliberate or deliberately, as 
 used in statutes defining murder in the first degree, means that the 
 manner of the homicide was determined upon after examination 
 and reflection; that the consequences, chances, and means were 
 weighed, carefully considered, and estimated.^ It means something 
 more than, and different from, intentionally and purposely done." 
 Deliberate means not sudden or rash.* To deliberate is to carefully 
 consider the probable consequences of a step.* By the word "delib- 
 erately" is meant in a cool state of the blood, as distinguished from 
 that heated state which the law denominates passion produced by 
 reasonable provocation.^ The design must have originated in, or re- 
 sulted from, a sedate, deliberate mind,® though the length of time 
 of deliberation is immaterial.'' If there is thought, if there is reflec- 
 tion on the act, and if there is a choice and a determination as the 
 
 But an instruction in a prosecution after deliberation, rather than with de- 
 fer homicide that, if the accused wilful- liberation. Casat v. State, 40 Ark. 
 ly killed the deceased, he is guilty of 511. 
 
 murder, which then proceeds to define 2State v. Sharp, 71 Mo. 218. 
 
 wilfully as meaning intentionally, is not SAtkinson v. Stiite, 20 Tex. 522. 
 
 subject to the objection that it fails to 4lbid.; Duebbe v. State, 1 Tex. App. 
 
 state that an intention to kill must exist Ion. 
 
 in order to constitute murder in the sec- s State v. Baber, 11 Mo. App. 585; 
 
 ond decree. State v. Smith, supra. State v. Landgraf, 95 Mo. 97, 6 Am. St. 
 
 'Wall V. State, 51 Ind. 453. Kep. 26, 8 S. W. 237 ; State v. Thomas. 
 
 sstate V. Brown, 12 Minn. 538, Gil. 7'' Mo. 327; State v. Ellis, U Mo. App. 
 
 448. 586 Appx. Affirmed in 74 Mo. 220; 
 
 The omission of the word "wilful" in State v. Curtis, 70 Mo. 594; State v. 
 
 chargi'-g as to murder in the first de- Sharp, 71 Mo. 218; State v. Sneed, 01 
 
 gree, in recapitulating the substance of Mo. 552, 4 S. W. 411 ; State v. Donnelly, 
 
 the charge, is not ground for reversal in 130 Mo. 642, 32 S. W. 1124; State v. 
 
 a prosecution for homicide, where the David, 131 Mo. 380, 33 S. W. 28; Stato^ 
 
 court has, previously, fully and ac- v. Wright, 134 Mo. 404, 35 S. W. 1145: 
 
 ciu-ately defined murder in the first de- State v. Grant, 152 Mo. 57, 53 S. W. 
 
 gree. Com. v. Buccieri, 153 Pa. 535, 26 432; State v. Spotted Hawk. 22 Mont. 
 
 Ati. 228. 33, .55 Pac. 1026; People v. Conroy, 97 
 
 1 Craft V. State, 3 Kan. 450; Milton N. Y. 63; State v. Garrand, 5 Or. 216. 
 
 V. State, 6 Neb. 136; Simmerman v. And see Haunstine v. State, 31 Neb. 112, 
 
 State, 14 Neb. 568, 17 N. W. 115; State 47 N. W. 698. 
 
 v. Ah Mook, 12 Nev. 369; State v. Ah sFarrer v. State, 42 Tex. 271; Ake v. 
 
 Lee, 8 Or. 214; State v. Carver, 22 Or. State, 30 Tex. 466; McCoy v. State, 25 
 
 602, 30 Pac. 315. Tex. 33, 78 Am. Dec. .520; Duebbe v. 
 
 It is a more accurate expression of State, supra. 
 
 law, and less liable to mislead, to de- 'Anthony v. State, Meigs, 265, 33 Am. 
 
 scribe murder in the first degree in a Dec. 143; "Van Houton v. People, 22 
 
 pioseeution for homicide as an act done Colo. 53, 43 Pac. 137; State v. Wallace, 
 
160 HOMICIDE. Pi U2 
 
 result of such mental actions, then there is sufficient deliberation.^ 
 Deliberate does not mean to brood over or consider for any stated 
 period of time, but means to consider and deliberate, not under the 
 influence of violent passion amounting to a temporary dethronement 
 of reason, but to gratify a desire for revenge, or to accomplish some 
 other unlawful purpose.® A murder is deliberate vyhere it proceeds 
 from deep malignity of the heart, or is prompted by motives of revenge 
 or gain. ^° In law, deliberation is premeditation in a cool state of the 
 blood ; it is premeditation prolonged beyond the period within which 
 there is time for the blood to cool. ^ ^ And that a homicide was com- 
 mitted for the purpose of covering up and escaping punishment for 
 another crime committed by the perpetrator does not prevent it from 
 being a deliberate act. ■'• ^ An incorrect definition of deliberation does 
 not warrant a reversal where the conviction was not for murder in 
 the first degree. ^ ^ 
 
 113. "Deliberate" to be regarded as qualifying "killing." — That 
 species of homicide which is the result of justly provoked passion 
 falls at common law under the head of manslaughter, and, of course, 
 is out of the question here. But there are many cases of murder 
 
 •2 Penn. (Del.) 402, 47 Atl. 621; State for murder that only such murders are 
 
 V. Pratt, Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 249: deliberate as proceed from deep malig- 
 
 IVJarzen v. People, 173 111. 43, 50 N. E. nity of heart and are prompted by mo- 
 
 249 ; Haunstine v. State, supra; State v. tives of revenge and gain is improper, in 
 
 Millain, 3 Nev. 410; State v. Ah Mook, the substitution of the word "and" for 
 
 12 Nev. 369; People v. Clark, 7 N. Y. "or." Ibid. 
 
 393; O'Brien v. People, 48 Barb. 274; uState v. Kotovsky, 74 Mo. 247. 
 
 State v. Garrand, supra; Com. v. Sul- To define "deliberate" as meaning in a 
 
 livan, 13 Phila. 410; Duebbe v. State, cool state of the blood, however, stop- 
 
 1 Tex. App. 159. ping there, is improper. State v. Fair- 
 
 A killing may be deliberate and pre- lamb, supra; State v. Eaton, 75 Mo. 
 
 meditated in the sense of the law, and 586; State v. Grant, supra. 
 
 vet, in a sense, be sudden and rash. i2Haas v. State, 13 Ohio C. C. 418; 
 
 baughdrill v. State, 113 Ala. 7, 21 So. People v. Place, 157 N. Y. 584, 52 N. E. 
 
 378. 576. 
 
 sPeople V. Hawkins, 109 N. Y. 408, 17 So, where a blow is given with a 
 X. E. 371 ; O'Brien v. People, supra; knife in the heat of an affray, without 
 People V. Ferraro, 161 N. Y. 365, 55 N. a purpose to kill, which blow ended the 
 E. 931; Savage v. State, 18 Fla. 909; struggle and disabled the person receiv- 
 Marzen v. State, supra; State v. ing it, upon which the other, fearing 
 Thomas, 118 N. C. 1113, 24 S. E. 431; that he had killed him, and for the pur- 
 State V. McCormac, 116 N. C. 1033, 21 pose of mutilating and destroying the 
 S. E. 093. hody, and to escape detection, obtained 
 
 sState V. Wieners, 66 Mo. 13; State an ax and with it ended the other's 
 V. Gee, 85 Mo. 647 ; State v. Fairlamb, life, the blow with the ax will be re- 
 121 Mo. 137, 25 S. W. 895; State v. garded as having been struck with a de- 
 Wright, 134 Mo. 404, 35 S. W. 1145; sign to effect death, and a sufficient de- 
 State v. Grant, 152 Mo. 57, 53 S. W. gree of premeditation and deliberation 
 432; State v. Spotted Hawk, 22 Mont, is shown to warrant a conviction of 
 33, 55 Pac. 1026. murder in the first degree. People v. 
 
 loState V. Ellis, 74 Mo. 207. Beckwith, 103 N. Y. 360, 8 N. E. 662. 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution isState v. Snell, 78 Mo. 240. 
 
§ 113] MURDER. 161 
 
 at common law which are indeliberate. Putting aside homicides 
 perpetrated in pursuance of a collateral felonious intent, we have 
 those cases where the intellect is so confused by drink or stimulus or 
 by undue, and yet not homicidal, passion, as to be incapable of de- 
 liberation. These cases are all murder at common law, but it would 
 seem that they want the essential features of deliberation to make 
 them murder under the statutes before us. Under these statutes 
 the deliberation must be "to take life." Deliberate necessarily refers 
 to the state of the mind at the time of the killing, and indicates, not 
 the sudden rash conception of an enraged mind, but the action 
 of one sufficiently cool and self-possessed to consider and contemplate 
 the nature of the act about to be done. ' 
 
 e. Premeditated; premeditation. 
 
 lU. Meaning and construction of — Premeditated or premedita- 
 tedly as used in the statutes defining murder in the first dearree 
 means planned, contrived, or schemed beforehand.* The adjectives 
 "wilful," "deliberate," and "premeditated" as used in such statutes 
 mean something over and above malice aforethought,^ and something 
 different from intent to kill.^ Nor is a formed design to take 
 
 lAtkinson v. State, 20 Tex. 522. common-law definition of murder mean 
 1 Craft V. State, 3 Kan. 450; Cleve- the same as the words "premeditated de- 
 land V. State, 86 Ala; 1, 5 So. 426; Lang sign" and "deliberate desifrn" employed 
 V. State, 84 Ala. 1, 5 Am. St. Rep. 324, in Miss. Codes 1857, 1871, defining niur- 
 4 So. 193; State v. Baber, 11 Mo. Anp. der. 
 
 585 Appx.; State v. Harris, 76 Mo. 361 : And People v. Clark, 7 N. Y. 385. holds 
 State V. Ellis, 11 Mo. App. 586 Appx.; that the degree of premeditation re- 
 state V. Gee, 85 Mo. 647; Milton v. quired under statutes miking homicide 
 State, 6 Neb. 136; Simmerman v. State, murder when perpetrated from a pre- 
 14 Neb. 568, 17 N. W. 115; Beers v. meditated design to effect the denth of 
 State, 24 Neb. 614, 39 N. W. 790; People the person killed, or of any huma being, 
 V. Conroy, 97 N. Y. 63; Peonle v. Cal- is not different from that required by 
 laghan, 4 Utah, 49, 6 Pac. 49 ; Com. v. the common law. 
 
 Lynch, 3 Pittsb. 4i2; Perugi v. State, And where the court in a prosecution 
 
 104 Wis. 230, 76 Am. St. Rep. 865, 80 for murder clearly states the law as to 
 
 N. W. 593. muider in the first degree, emphasi.iing 
 
 But while "premeditatedly" is not that the intent to kill mu=t have been a 
 
 properly defined as "thought over," such result of premeditation and deliber-'tion, 
 
 a definition is not a ground for reversal mere omissio ' of the elements of pre- 
 
 in a prosecution for homicidp, where meditation and deliberation in a, clause 
 
 there is no evidence of any dec;ree of of the instruction., so as to erroneously 
 
 homicide other than murder in the first convey in that clause the thought that 
 
 degree. State v. Lewis, 14 Mo. Apn. 191 if the killing was with malice afore- 
 
 «State V. Wong Fun, 22 Nev. 336. 40 thought it would be murder in the first 
 
 Pac. 95; People v. Long, 39 Cal. 694; degree, is not prejudici''l to the dpfend- 
 
 People V. Doyell, 48 Cal. 85. But see ""t and is not a ground f-'r- reversal. 
 
 State V. Taylor, 126 Mo. 531, 29 S. W. Peonle v. Gibson, 108 Cal. 458, 39 Pac 
 
 608. 864. 
 
 In Hawthorne v. Stat«. 58 Miss. 778, sPulUvan v. State. 100 Wis. 283. 75 
 
 however, it was held that the words N. W. 95G. 
 "malice aforetliought" as used in the 
 Horn.— 11. 
 
162 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 li 11* 
 
 life the equivalent of the deliberation and premeditation which are- 
 elements of murder in the first degree, since the design may have- 
 been formed under circumstances of justification or excuse. * And it 
 is npt the death itself, but tlie act causing death, that must have been 
 premeditated or thought of beforehand.^ To meditate is to deliber- 
 ate, and to premeditate implies an act or state of mind going before 
 meditation or deliberation; it meauH to meditate or deliberate be- 
 fore concluding to do the deed; to contrive by previous meditation ;* 
 thought of beforehand, any length of time, however short.' That 
 the homicide was detennined upon beforehand, and purpdsfely com- 
 mitted after reflection, with malic«, however, is the equivalent of 
 the wilfulness, deliberation, malice, and premeditation required by 
 the statute.® And if a person had time to think, and did think,, 
 and, after having thought, he struck the blow as the result of a deter- 
 mination produced by the operation of the mind, that would be a 
 sufficient deliberation and premeditation.'"' Nor does the fact that the- 
 deliberate and premeditated intent to take life was an alternative one, 
 
 4Horns'oy v. State, 94 Ala. 55. 10 So. 
 522; Domingus v. State. 94 Ala. 9, 11 
 So. 190; Burton v. State. 107 Ala. 108, 
 18 So. 284; Martin v. State, 119 Ala. 1, 
 25 So. 285, Overruling Amos v. State, 
 83 Ala. 1, 3 Am. St. Rep. 682, 3 So. 
 749 ; Lang v. State, 84 Ala. 1, 5 Am. St. 
 Kep. 324, 4 So. 193. 
 
 sState V. Kobinson, 73 Mo. 306. 
 
 But the deliberation and premedita- 
 tion T-ecessary to constitute murder in 
 the first degree are not upon the intent, 
 but upon the killing: it is premeditation 
 and deliberation enough to form the in- 
 tent to kill, and not upon the itent 
 after it has been formed, that makes the 
 act murder in the first degree. Keenan 
 V. Com. 44 Pa. 55, 84 Am. Dec. 414. 
 
 estate v. Johnson, 8 Iowa, 525, 74 
 Am. Dec. 321 ; Fouts v. State, 8 Ohio St. 
 98; Bivens v. State, 11 Ark. 455; Ernest 
 V. State, 20 Fla. 383; Fahnestoek v. 
 Stnte, 23 Ind. 231 ; Aszman v. State, 123 
 Ind. 347, 8 L.R.A. 33, 24 N. E. 123; 
 State V. Ah Lee, 8 Or. 214; State v. 
 Carver, 22 Or. 60% 30 Pao. 315: Atkin- 
 son V. State, 20 Tex. 522; State v. 
 Straub, 11 Wash. 116, 47 Pae. 227; State 
 V. Moodv. 18 Wash. 165. 51 Pac. 356; 
 Ross v. State, 8 Wyo. 351, 57 Pao. 924. 
 And see Ernest v. Stite, 20 Fla. 385; 
 State V. Taylor, 126 Mo. 531, 29 S. W. 
 598. 
 
 7Rtate V. Kotovsky, 74 Mo. 247; State 
 V. Harris, 76 Mo. 381 ; State V. Wright, 
 134 Mo. 404, 35 S. W. 1145; State v. 
 
 Rnell. 78 Mo. 240; State v. Landgraf^ 
 95 Mo. 97. 6 Am. St. Rep. 20. 8 S. W. 
 237: State v. Spotted Hawk. 22 Mont. 
 33, 55 Pac. 1026; Stnte v. Turner,. 
 Wright (Ohio) 20: Rtjte v. Tovim, 
 Wright (Ohio) 75: Sta,te v. G-irdiner,. 
 Wright (Ohio) 392; State v. Hawkins, 
 23 Wash. 289, 63 Pac. ?58: Perugi v. 
 State, 104 Wis. 230, 76 Aw. St. Rep. 865, 
 80 N. W. 593. 
 
 The words "premeditated design to ef- 
 fect death" in statutory definitions of 
 murder in the first degree signify an in- 
 tent to kill, and do not exclude a sud- 
 den intent. Hogan v. State, SO Wis. 
 226. 
 
 sBoulden v. Stat«, 102 Ala. 78, 15 So.. 
 341 ; Slate v. Thomp.son, Wright (Ohio) 
 617. 
 
 And evidence that one man insulted 
 ay-other and attempted to draw his 
 pistol, but was prevented from u.sing it, 
 and that he then sat down in a store 
 with the pistol in his hand expressing 
 the belief that the other would return, 
 and his intention to shoot him if he did,, 
 and that he did shoot him upon his re- 
 turn, without waiting for a word or a 
 hostile demonstration, is sufTicient to 
 warrant the jury in finding that the 
 killing was wilful, deliberate, and pre- 
 meditated. People V. Moore, 8 Cal. 00. 
 
 sCleveland v. State. 86 Ala. 1, 3 .So.. 
 426; Kilgore v. State, 124 Ala:. 24, 27 
 So. 4; Daughdrill v. State, 113 Ala. 
 7, 21 So. 378; Bower v. State, 6 Mo. 
 
J 114] MUKDER. 163 
 
 and that the slayer hoped to make an arrangement with his victim 
 not involving murder, affect the question of degree ; it is enough that 
 he entertained the intent to kill if he could not consummate the de- 
 sired arrangement.'" And where the law mentions certain kinds of 
 homicide .which are per se murders in the first degree, and then fur- 
 ther provides that any other kind of wilful, deliberate, and premed- 
 itated killing shall also constitute murder in the first degree, it is 
 not necessary, in order to convict of murder in the first degree in the 
 latter class of cases, that the same d^i-ee of deliberation and pre- 
 meditation should have existed as would have been necessary in 
 the former class of cases, since in the former class deliberation and 
 premeditation are presumed, while in the latter they must be proved. * * 
 So, the proposition has been asserted that the words "deliberate" 
 and "premeditate" as used in these statutes are of similar import, 
 each implying the other, and that it makes no difference on this 
 question whether they are used conjunctively or disjunctively.^* 
 But the rule is well supported that the two words are not synonymous, 
 and that the word "deliberation" implies a cool state of the blood, 
 and is intended to characterize cold-blooded murder prompted by 
 motives of revenge or gain, while premeditation may exist, though 
 the mind is in an excited state ; ' ^ and that "deliberation" is a gen- 
 eric term including both "premeditation" and "malice afore- 
 thought"** In instructing the jury, however, language including 
 both ideas is sufficient; the court need not define each word sepa- 
 rately.*'' 
 
 364, 32 Am. Dec. 325 j People v. Bar- v. Wieners, 66 Mo. 13; State v. Ellis, 
 
 beri, 149 N. Y. 256. 52 Am. St. Rep. 717, 74 Mo. 207; State v. Kotovsky, 74 Mo. 
 
 43 N. E. 635; Com. v. Aiello, 180 Pa. 247; State v. Andrews, 76 Mo. 101; 
 
 597, 36 Atl. 1079. People v. Mangano, 29 Hun, 259. And 
 
 lOPeople V. Walworth, 4 N. Y. Grim, see Thayer v. State, 138 Ala. 39, 35 So. 
 
 Rep. 355; State v. Cobb, 65 S. C. 324, 406. 
 
 95 Am. St. Rep. 801, 43 S. E. 654. instate v. Reed, 117 Mo. 604, 23 S. 
 
 iiState V. Booker, 123 N. C. 713, 31 S. W. 886; State v. Dale. 108 Mo. 205, 18 
 
 E. 376; Com. v. McManus, 143 Pa. 64, S. W. 976; State v. Taylor, 126 Mo. 531, 
 
 14 L.R.A. 89, 21 Atl. 1018, 22 Atl. 761; 29 S. W. 598; State v. Lowe, 93 Mo. 
 
 Whiteford v. Cora. 6 Rand. (Va.) 721, 547. 5 S. W. 889; State v. Thomas, 78 
 
 18 Am. Dec. 771; Burgess v. Com. 2 Mo. 327. 
 
 Va. Gas. 483; Cora. v. Jones, J Leigh, In State v. Ellis, supra, it was held 
 
 610. that defining the word "premeditatedly" 
 
 i2State V. Lopez, 15 Nev. 407; Cleve- as meaning thought of, in the sense of 
 
 land V. State, 86 Ala. 1, 5 So. 426. thought over, is improper in a prose- 
 
 The phrases "wilful killing," "de- cution for homicide as giving premedi- 
 
 libcrate killing," and "premeditated kill- tation an element of deliberation which 
 
 ing" are synonymous with relation to does not belong to it, there being a dis- 
 
 the offense of murder, each embracing tinetion between the two terms, 
 
 essentiallv the legal idea of the other. iBState v. Exum, 138 N. C. 599, 50 
 
 People v."Pool, 27 Cal. 573. S. E. 283. 
 
 laState v. Curtis, 70 Mo. 594; State 
 
ISl 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 [§ 115 
 
 115. The question of necessity of prior existence — To constitute 
 murder in the first degree under provisions requiring deliberation 
 and premeditation, it has been said that a positive previous intent 
 to take life must be shown;' but this opinion has since been re- 
 called by the court that delivered it,^ and is opposed to the weight of 
 authority elsewhere. There is a general concurrence of authority 
 on the general meaning of premeditation. It involves a prior inten- 
 tion to do the act in question.* But it is not necessary that this 
 intention should have been conceived for any particular period of 
 time. * It is as much premeditation, if it enter into the mind of the 
 
 iMitohell V. State, 5 Yerg. 340. 
 
 sRtate V. Anderson, 2 Overt. 6, 5 Am. 
 Dee. 648; Dale v. State, 10 Yerg. 551. 
 
 3Com. V. Drtim, 58 Pa. 16; Respublica 
 V. Bob, 4 Dall. 145, 1 L. ed. 776; Green 
 V. State, 51 Ark. 189, 10 S. W. 266; Ern- 
 est V. State, 20 Fla. 383; Koerner v. 
 State, 98 Ind. 7; Fahnestock v. State, 
 23 Ind. 231 ; Aszman v. State, 123 Ind. 
 437, 8 L.R.A. 33, 24 N. E. 123; State v. 
 McPherson, 114 Iowa, 492, 87 N. W. 421 ; 
 People V. Walworth, 4 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 
 355: State v. MeCormac, 116 N. C. 1033, 
 21 S. E. 693; State v. Spivey, 132 N. C. 
 989, 43 S. E. 475; State v. Gin Pon, 16 
 Wash. 425, 47 Pac. 961 ; Stite v. Straub. 
 16 Wash. Ill, 47 Pae. 227; State v. 
 Moody, 18 Wash. 165, 51 Pac. 356; Ross 
 V. State, 8 Wvo. 351, 57 Pac. 924. And 
 see Rhea v. State, 63 Neb. 461, 88 N. W. 
 789. 
 
 And a verdict of murder in the first 
 degree is unsupported by evidence that 
 the stabs causing death were given in a 
 conflict, while the slayer was excited by 
 intoxicating liquors, where there was an 
 entire absence of evidence tending to 
 show that, after the conflict begin and 
 before the stabbing, there could h<ive 
 been an instant of time for deliberation 
 and prenieditition. State v. Sopher, 70 
 Iowa, 494, .30 N. W. 917. 
 
 4Whiteford v. Com. 6 Rand. (Va.) 
 721. 18 Am. Dec. 771; McDaniel v. Com. 
 77 Va. 281 ; Miller v. State, 107 Ala. 40, 
 19 So. 37; Dixon v. State, 128 Ala. 54, 
 29 So. 623; Ex parte Brown, 65 Ala. 
 446: Miller v. Stnte, 54 Ala. 155; Mc- 
 Kenzie v. State, 26 Ark. 334; Green v. 
 Stnte, supra; i?eople v. Williams, 43 
 Cal. 344; People v. Suesser. 142 Cal. 
 354. 75 Pac. 1093; People v. Bealoba, 17 
 Cal. 389 ; State v. Rhodes, Houst. Crim. 
 Rep. (Del.) 476; State v. Frazier, 
 Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 176; State 
 v. Emory (Del.) 58 Atl. 1036; Ernest 
 
 v. Stite, supra; Carter v. Stite, 22 
 Fla. 553; Perry v. State, 102 6a. 
 365, 30 S. E. 903; Bailey v. State, 
 70 Ga. 617; Peri v. People, 65 111. 
 17; State v. .lohnson, 8 Towa, 5^5, 
 74 Am. Dee. 321 ; State v. Hockett, 70 
 Iowa, 442. 30 N. W. 742; State v. Den- 
 nison, 44 La. Ann. 135, 10 So. 599 ; State 
 V. Brown, 41 Minn. 319, 43 N. W. 69; 
 State V. Dun", 18 Mo. 419; State v. 
 Jennings, 18 Mo. 435; State v. Holme, 
 .54 Mo. 153; State v. Shoultz. 25 Mo. 128; 
 State V. Starr, 38 Mo. 270; State v. 
 Stoeekli, 8 Mo. App. 598; Haunstine v. 
 State, 31 Neb. 112, 47 N. W. 698; Robin- 
 son V. State (Neb.) 93 N. W. 694; 
 Carleton v. State, 43 Neb. 373, 61 N. 
 W. 699; Donnelly v. State, 26 N. J. L. 
 463; State v. Lipscomb, 134 N. C. 689, 
 47 S. E. 44; State v. Daniel, 139 N. C. 
 549, 51 S. E. 858; State v. Cole. 132 N. 
 C. 1069, 44 S. E. 391; State v. Spivey, 
 132 N. C. 989, 43 S. E. 475; Lanergan 
 V. People, 50 Barb. 266 : Dolan v. People, 
 6 Hun, 493 ; People v. Kierran, 3 N. Y. 
 Crim. Rep. 247, AlTirmed in 101 N. Y. 
 618. 4 N. E. 130: State v. Hunt. 134 N. 
 C. 684, 47 S. E. 49; State v. Morey, 25 
 Or. 241, 35 Pac. 655, 36 Pac. 573; Kee- 
 nan v. Com. 44 Pa. 55, 84 Am. Dee. 414; 
 Warren v. Com. 37 Pa. 45; Kilpatrick 
 V. Com. 31 Pa. 198: Com. v. M Kail, 
 Addison (Pa.) 255; Com. v. Daley, 2 
 Clark fPa.) 361; Anthony v. State, 
 Meigs, 265, 33 Am. Dec. 143; People v. 
 Callaghan, 4 Utah, 49, 6 Pac. 49: State 
 V. Carr, 53 Vt. 37; Com. v. Brown. 90 
 Va. 671, 19 S. E. 447 : State v. Clifford 
 (W. Va.) .52 S. E. 981; Clifford v. 
 State, 58 Wis. 477, 17 N. W. ,304; Peru- 
 gi V. State, 104 Wis. 230, 76 Am. St. Rep. 
 865. 80 N. W. 593. And see Hill v. 
 People. 1 Colo. 436. 
 
 In Indiana the statute is construed 
 to require that a prior conception sliould 
 be proved or inferred to have been 
 
§ 115] MURDER, 165 
 
 guilty agent a moment before the act, as if it entered ten years 
 before." And the reason of this is obvious. In the first place, if, 
 in order to make murder in the first degree, it be necessary the idea 
 should be proved to have been conceived a week or a day ahead, there 
 ■will be no murder in the first degree at all, for the guilty party will 
 take care that the conception be concealed iintil the limitation is 
 passed. In the second place all psychological investigation shows 
 that the process of mental conception lies beyond the scrutiny of 
 exact observation. Hence, judges have generally united in holding 
 that while there must be some sort of premeditation {i. e., the blow 
 must not be the incident of mania or a sudden paroxysm of passion, 
 such as suspends the intellectual powers), a moment is as sufficient 
 to complete the offense as a year. 
 
 If time enough elapsed after the conception of the intent to kill 
 and before the act causing death, to permit consideration and the 
 formation of a definite purpose, it is immaterial how brief the space 
 
 formed by the defendant prior to the 209; Ptate v. JoTinson, 8 Towa, fi25, 74 
 act (Fahrestock v. State, 23 Ind. 231) ; Am. Dee. 321; Craft v. State, 3 Kan. 
 but this does not differ from the view 451 ; Stnte v. Denni=!onj 44 La. Ann. 135, 
 of the text. In lexas, the view of the 10 So. 590; Hawthorne v. State, 58 Miss, 
 text is vijrorously coinbated. Anderson 778: State v. Holme. 54 Mo. 153; Stite 
 V. State, 31 Tex. 440; Ake v. State, 30 v. Bowles, 146 Mo. 6, 69 Am. St. Rep. 
 Tex. 466, 31 Tex. 416. 608, 47 S. W. 892; State v. B^ber, 11 
 
 The act of the judge in a proseeu- Mo. App. 585 Appx. ; State v. Ellis, 11 
 tion for homicide of taking out his Mo. App. 586 Appx.; State v. Spencer, 
 watch and illustrating to the jury the 21 N. J. L. 198; State v. Ah Mook, 12 
 Ien?'h of p minut'> of time, on in isane Nev. 309; State v. Millain, 3 Nev. 410; 
 as to whether sufficient time for delib- Shoemaker v. State, 12 Ohio, 43; Early 
 eration and premeditation which would v. Ptat'*, 16 Ohi'^ C. C. 646; State v. 
 constitute murder in the first degree Garrand. 5 Or. 216; Keenan v. Com. 
 had expired, is not error as against the 44 Pa. 15, 84 Am. Dec. 414; Com. v. 
 accused, where the proofs show that Corriga", 1 Pfttsb. 292; Anthony v. 
 there was an opportunity for such de- State, Meigs, 265, 33 Am. Dee. 143; Dale 
 liberation and premeditation of from v. State, 10 Yerg. 551 ; Lewis v. State, 3 
 one half minute to two minutes in du- Head, 127; Duebbe v. St^te. 1 Tex. App. 
 ration. People v. Constantino, 153 N. 159; Jordan v. St-^te, 10 Tex. 479; At- 
 y. 24, 47 N. E. 37. kinson v. State, 20 Tex. 522 ; Halbert v. 
 
 BPeople V. Clirk, 7 N. Y. 385; Boul- State. 3 Tex. App. 656; State v. Morgan, 
 den V. State, 102 Ala. 78. 15 So. 341; 22 Utah, 162, 61 Pae. 527: Bennett v. 
 Bondurant v. State. 125 Ala. 31, 27 So. Com. 8 Lei<?h, 745; Whiteford v. Com. 
 775; Harkness v. S'tatA 129 Ala. 71. 30 6 Rand. (Va.) 721, 18 Am. Dee. 771; 
 So. 73; Dunn v. State (Ala.) 39 So. Perugi v. State. 104 Wis. 230, 76 Am. 
 147; Green v. State, 98 Ala. 14. 13 So. St. Rep. 865, 80 K. W. 593; Respublica 
 482; Miller v. State, 54 Ala. 155: Cleve- v. Bob, 4 Dall. 146, 1 L. ed. 777. 
 land V. State, 86 Ala. 1, 5 So. 4''6: Mc- But more care and caution should be 
 Adams v. State, 25 Ark. 405; Bivens v. used by the jury in a prosecution for 
 St^te. II Ark. 455: Green v. State, 51 homicide where the intent to kill is 
 Ark. 189, 10 S. W. 266; People v. Moore, charged to have been formed on the in- 
 8 Cal flO- Peonle v. .Sanf'ie^. 24 Cal. stant of the infliction of the fatal wound, 
 17; Peonle v. Cotta, 49 Cal. 103: Peo- than where it is inflicted by acts mani- 
 ple V. NTie'ol, 34 C'l. 211; Pponle v. festing deliberation. People v, Lopez, 
 Lon<r. 39 Cal. 694; Bailey v. St^te, 70 2 Edm. Sel. Cas. 262. 
 Ga. 617; Beauchamp v. State, 6 Blackf. 
 
I6S 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 fS 115 
 
 was.® If the killing was not the instant effect of impulse; if there 
 was hesitation or douht to be overcome; a choice made as the result 
 of thought, however short the struggle between the intention and the 
 act, — it is sufficient to characterize the crime as deliberate and pre- 
 meditated murder.^ If a slayer had any time to think, however 
 short, and did think, and then struck the blow which caused death 
 as the result of an intention to kill produced by such momentary- 
 operation of the mind, it is a premeditated killing constituting mur- 
 der in the first degree.® There need not have been time and opportu- 
 nity to ponder upon the act and its consequences, and determine upon 
 its commission before, and disconnected from, the act itself, so that 
 the purpose to kill would be something apart from its entertainment 
 at the time of the killing, kept in, or called to, mind at that time.® 
 Nor need the preconceived purpose to kill have been formed at 
 a time anterior to the meeting of the slayer and his victim, when 
 it was carried into effect.^" A person who forms a purpose in his 
 mind to kill another, and announces his intention to his victim, and 
 then carries it into effect, must be deemed to have had time enough 
 for the deliberation and premeditation necessary to murder in the 
 
 «People V. Majone, 01 N. Y. 211; 
 Leighton v. People, 88 N. Y. 117; Peo- 
 ple V. Conroy, 9.7 N. Y. 63; People v. 
 Decker, 157 N. Y. 186, 51 N. E. 1018; 
 People V. Constantino. 153 N. Y. 24, 47 
 N. E. 37; People v. Ferraro, 161 N. Y. 
 365, 55 N. E. 931; People v. Schmidt, 
 168 N. Y. 568, 61 N. E. 907; People v. 
 BoRgiano, 179 N. Y. 267, 72 N. E. 201 ; 
 Com. V. Tucker, 189 Mass. 457, 76 N. 
 E. 127; State v. Teachey, 138 N. C. 587, 
 50 S. E. 232; Daughdrill v. State, 113 
 Ala. 7, 21 So. 378; State v. Smith, 49 
 Conn. 389; State v. Frazier, Houst. 
 Crim. Rep. (Del.) 176; State v. Powell 
 (Del.) 61 Atl. 966; State v. Emory 
 (Del.) 58 Atl. 1036; Carter v. State, 22 
 Fla. 553; Binns v. State, 66 Ind. 428; 
 Koerner v. State, 98 Ind. 7 ; State v. 
 Zdanowicz, 69 N. J. L. 619, 55 Atl. 743; 
 State V. McCormac, 116 N. C. 1033, 21 
 S. E. 693; State v. Dowden, 118 N. O. 
 1145. 24 S. E. 722; Com. v. Buceien, 
 153 i?a. 535, 26 Atl. 228; Green v. Com. 
 83 Pa. 75. 
 
 The time taken by a person in walk- 
 ins; smartly a distance of some 15 or 
 20 feet may be sufficient for the forma- 
 tion of a premeditated determination to 
 kill. State v. Doherty, 72 Vt. 381, 82 
 Am. St. Rep. 951, 48 Atl. 658. 
 
 VLeighton v. People, 88 N. Y. 117; 
 
 People V. Beckwith, 103 N. Y. 360, 8 
 N. E. 662; People v. ClarK, 7 N. Y. 393; 
 People V. Constantino, 153 N. Y. 24, 47 
 N. E. 37; People v. Kiernan. 3 N. Y. 
 Crim. Rep. 247, Affirmed in 101 N. Y. 
 618, 4 N. E. 130; Daughdrill v. State, 
 supra; People v. Hunt, 59 Cal. 430; 
 Wright V. Com. 33 Gratt. 880; State v. i 
 Straub, 16 Wash. Ill, 47 Pac. 227; State 
 V. Gin Pon, 16 Wash. 425, 47 Pac. 961; 
 State V. Hawkins, 23 Wash. 289, 63 Pac. 
 258. And see Webb v. State, 135 Ala. 36, 
 33 So. 437. 
 
 Premeditation may be as quick as 
 thought in the mind of man. State v. 
 Straub, supra. 
 
 sGreen v. State (Ala.) 39 So. 302; 
 Ragsdale v. State, 134 Ala. 24, 32 So. 
 674; Franklin v. State (Ala.) 39 So. 
 979; Savary v. State, 62 Neb. 108. 87 
 N. W. 34; State v. Lipscomb, 134 N. C. 
 689, 47 S. E. 44. And see Rhea v. 
 State, 63 Neb. 461, 88 N. W. 789. 
 
 sDaughdrill v. State. 113 Ala. 7, 21 
 So. 378; McAdams v. State, 25 Ark. 405; 
 Marzen v. People, 173 111. 4.3, 50 N. E. 
 249. And see People v. Koenig, 180 N. 
 Y. 155, 72 N. E. 993. 
 
 lostate V. McCormac, 116 N. C. 1033, 
 21 S. E. 693; Whiteford v. Com. 6 
 Rand. (Va.) 721. 13 Am. Dec. 771. 
 
^ 115] 
 
 MURDER. 
 
 167 
 
 rfirst degree.** And it has been held that the formation of the 
 intent to kill and the killing may be as instantaneous as successive 
 thoughts.*" But when the intent to kill is formed simultaneously 
 with the act of killing, there is not such deliberation and premedi- 
 tation as constitutes murder in the first degree. * ^ The design to kill 
 must precede the killing by some appreciable space of time. * * And 
 in charging as to deliberation and premeditation it is improper to 
 state that. they may take place in a moment, or in any particular period 
 ■of time,*^ though the jury may be told that deliberation and pre- 
 meditation for a moment are suiEcient. * ** 
 
 The true view is that intent and deliberation are to be inferred 
 from facts ; that they are not to be negatived because there is no di- 
 rect proof of their existence prior to the fatal blow ; and that the 
 -character of the weapon used, if it is used coolly and intelligently, 
 is sufficient to give rise to inferences by which the nature of the intent 
 can be determined. * ^ 
 
 f. Express malice under the statutes. 
 
 116. Definition; scope. — The terms "express malice" or "express 
 malice aforethought," used in statutory provisions as a necessary in- 
 
 iiPeople V. Kieman, 101 N. Y. 618, 4 
 N. E. 130. 
 
 And an interval of time, after the 
 formation of an intent to l<ill, sufficient 
 to permit tlie slayer to draw a razor 
 from an inside pocket of his coat or vest, 
 and open it, ard place his hand upon 
 •the deceased's shoulder, is not so short 
 as to negative an inference of premedi- 
 tation and deliberation. People v. Fer- 
 raro, 161 N. Y. 365, 55 N. E. 931. 
 
 izBinns v. State, 66 Ind. 428; Peo- 
 ple v. Hunt, 59 Cal. 430; Van Houton 
 V. People, 22 Colo. 53, 43 Pac. 137; 
 State V. Shuflf, 9 Idaho, 115, 72 Pac. 
 664. 
 
 isState V. Dowden, 118 N. C. 1145, 
 24 S. E. 722; Bivens v. State, 11 Ark. 
 455. ♦ 
 
 And evidence of an affray between two 
 persons in which accused used a broom, 
 after which they were separated by a 
 third person who thrust the accused 
 away, when he immediately took up a 
 knife which he had been using in his 
 work and inflicted a fatal blow upon 
 his opponent, the whole affray lasting 
 only from two to five minutes, and there 
 having been no previous dispute or ill- 
 feeling, is insufficient to warrant a find- 
 ing in a prosecution for the homicide 
 
 that it was done with deliberate and 
 premeditated design rendering the kill- 
 ing murder in the first degree. People 
 V. Mangano, 29 Hun, 259. 
 
 i4State V. Greenleaf, 71 N. H. 606, 
 54 Atl. 38; State v. Rutten, 13 Wash. 
 203, 43 Pac. 30. 
 
 The deliberate and premeditated de- 
 sign to effect death necessary to mur- 
 der in the first degree is something dif- 
 ferent from the actual presence of an 
 intention formed at the instant of strik- 
 ing the blow or firing the shot; there 
 must have been some actual predelibera- 
 tion and premeditation in the mind of 
 the accused in respect to the subject- 
 matter of the offense before the actual 
 occurrence of the act constituting the 
 crime. People v. Walworth, 4 N. Y. 
 Crim. Rep. 355. 
 
 isBurns v. State, 2 Ohio Dec. Re- 
 print, 97; Early v. State, 16 Ohio, C. 
 G. 646; Burns v. State, 3 Ohio Dee. 
 Reprint, 122. 
 
 16 Early v. State, supra; Lovett v. 
 State, 30 Fla. 142, 17 L.R.A. 705, 11 So. 
 550. 
 
 In such ease the court does not at- 
 tempt to tell the jury how long a time 
 it would take one to deliberate and pre- 
 meditate. Early v. State, supra. 
 
 i7See in/'ro, § 150. 
 
leS HOMICIDE. P5 118 
 
 gredient of murder in the first degree, not having been defined by 
 statute have been given the common-law definition : "When one with 
 a sedate and deliberate mind, and formed design, doth kill another, 
 which formed design is evidenced by external circumstances dis- 
 covering that inward intention, as lying in wait, antecedent menaces, 
 former grudges, and concerted schemes to do him some btdily harm ;'" 
 and a sedate and deliberate mind implies a mental condition sufficient^ 
 ly composed to admit of reflection on the design, and to comprehend 
 the nature and probable consequences of the designed act.^ And to 
 warrant a verdict of murder in the first degree under such provi- 
 sions the killing must have been the consummation of a previously 
 formed design to take the life of the deceased, and the design to 
 kill must have been formed deliberately and with a sedate mind.^ 
 An actual and deliberate intention to take the life of another, or to 
 do him some great bodily harm from which death might probably 
 result, constitutes express malice.* The statutory term means ex- 
 press malice aforethought as it existed at common law, as distin- 
 guished from implied malice. ° It necessarily renders any murder 
 of the first degree;^ and it may be inferred from the circumstances 
 attending the act of killing, '^ and is proved by circumstances evi- 
 dencing a sedate, deliberate purpose and formed design to kill an- 
 other.^ And it may be established by proof of the cool deportment 
 and bearing of the accused when the killing was done, and immedi- 
 ately preceding and subsequent thereto, and by his apparent freedom 
 
 iMcCoy V. Stnte, 25 Tex. 33.. 78 Am. constitute the express malice required 
 Dec. 520; Halbeit v. State, 3 Tex. App. by the Texas statute to constitute mur- 
 656; Ake v. Stat", 30 Tex. 468; Single- d'er in the first degree, unless it origi- 
 ton V. St^te, 1 Tex. App. 501; Rye v. tinted in, or resulted from, a sedate, de- 
 State, 8 Tex. App. 163; Cox v. State, 5 liberate mind. Primus v. State, su- 
 Tex. App. 493; Summers v. State, 5 pra. 
 
 Tex. App. 365, 32 Am. Rep. 573 ; Mar- ^Tooney v. State, 5 Tex. App. 163. 
 
 tinez V. Stnte, 30 Tex. App. 129, 28 Am. BState v. Buchnnan, Houst. Crim. Rep. 
 
 St. Rep. 895, 16 S. W. 767; Gaines v. (Del.) 79; Stnte v. Draper, Houst. 
 
 State (Tex. Crim. Apn.) 53 S. W. 623; Crim. Rep. (Del.) 291. 
 
 Fendrick v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) sSt-^te v. Lopez, 15 Nev. 407; State 
 
 56 S. W. 626: btate v. Horskin, Houst. v. Dugim, Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 
 
 Crim. Rep. (Del.) 116; State v. Bell 563: Cox v. State, 5 Tex. App. 493. 
 
 (Del.) 62 Atl. 147; State v. Brown 'State v. Rhodes, Houst. Crim. Rep. 
 
 (Del.) 61 Atl. 1077. And see Moore v. (Del.) 476. 
 
 State, 31 Tex. 573. An instruction in a prosecutio-i for 
 
 zTrimus v. State, 2 Tex. App. 369; hojnieide that express malice may be 
 
 Ake V. State; Cox v. State; and Gaines evidenced by external circumstances, 
 
 V. St-te. — supra; Stevpns v. State, 42 that being a part of the statutory def- 
 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 154, 59 S. W. 545. inition of express malice, is not objec- 
 
 sFenflrick v. State, supra. tionable as a charge upon the weight of 
 
 But a design to kill or inflict great evidence. Sharpe v. State, 17 Tex. App. 
 
 bodily harm, though without lawful ex- 486. 
 
 cuse or justification, and though fully sState v. Di Guglielmo, 4 Penn. 
 
 formed ar.d fixed in the mind, does not (Del.) 336, 55 Atl. 360; State v. Wil- 
 
iiej 
 
 MURDER. 
 
 169 
 
 from passion or excitement, and the absence of any known cause to 
 disturb his mind or cause his passion. * And robbery of the deceased 
 and his subsequent killing to destroy evidence of the crime is cogent 
 evidence of express malice.^" But express malice is never implied 
 solely from the act done, or the means used in doing it; it must be 
 proved aliunde like any other part of the case. * ' And the mere fact 
 that a deadly weapon was used does not establish express malice,^ ^ 
 though its deliberate selection and use might be sufficient. ' * But, 
 though it is called express malice, it need not be declared in words. ^ * 
 And a killing is not murder in the first degree, and, therefore, not 
 on express malice, though it may be murder in the second degree, 
 when at the time the mind of the slayer was disturbed by passion, 
 though it was not a "sudden transport of passion without adequate 
 cause," within a statutory definition of murdir in the second de- 
 gree. ' " 
 
 To constitute express malice, however, the mind need not be abso- 
 lutely calm, or unruffled, or self-possessed.'* And however sudden 
 a killing may be, if the means used, or the manner of doing it, or 
 other external circumstances attending it, indicate a sedate and de- 
 
 801 (Del.) 6? Atl. 227; Hairell v. Stote, 
 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 507, 55 S. W. 8M; 
 Fendriek v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 56 S. W. 626. 
 
 Where it is a part of the statutory 
 definition of express malice that it may 
 be evidenced by external circurastinces, 
 a charge to that effect is not objection- 
 able in a prosecution for homicide, as 
 being upon the weight of evidence. 
 Sharpe v. State, supra. 
 
 sHoward v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 58 S. W. 77. 
 
 lOMartin v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 83 S. W. 390. 
 
 iiRieharte v. State, 5 Tex. App. 359; 
 Murray v. State, 1 Tex. App. 417; 
 Hamby v. State, 36 Tex. 523. 
 
 Express malice necessary to consti- 
 tute miirder in the first degree must be 
 evidenced by the nature and character 
 of the act done, the instrument used, 
 and the deliberation shown in preparing 
 it, as well as by the manner in which 
 the killing was don*. Singleton v. 
 State. I Tex. App. 501. 
 
 laSumraers v. State, 5 Tex. App. 365, 
 32 Am. Ren. 673. And see Rogers v. 
 State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 350, 71 S. 
 W. 18. 
 
 13 State V. Rhodes, Houst. Crim. Rep. 
 (Del.) 476. 
 
 J^Pingleton v. State, supra. 
 
 isQaines v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 53 S. W. 623; McKinney v. State, 41 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 434, 55 S. W. 341. 
 
 Proof that two men were struggling 
 for the possession of a pistol, and that 
 it was discharged, striking one of them, 
 and that the other started away, tak- 
 ing a few steps, but immediately re- 
 turned and shot the iniured man, and 
 th'it either wound would have caused 
 deith, does not show the express malice 
 necessary to murder in the first degree 
 under the Texas statute. Burnham v. 
 State, 43 Tex. 322. 
 
 lellall V. State. 33 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 191. 26 S. W. 72. 
 
 And evidence in a prosecution for 
 homicide that the accused entertained 
 an apprehension that his paramour was 
 trying- to get rid of him, and tKnt he 
 procured a pistol, bought ammunition, 
 and went to her house, and, because of 
 her evident desire not to make up with 
 him. deliberately slew her. w^rr^nts a 
 finding that he planned and carried out 
 the killinff in a calm and deliberate 
 mind, and that it was upon express mal- 
 ice constituting the act murder in the 
 first degree. McKinney v. State, supra. 
 
170 HOMICIDE. [§ 116 
 
 liberate mind and formed design to kill, it is upon express malice./ ^ 
 No period of time has been settled as necessary to elapse within ■which 
 a sedate and deliberate purpose can be formed which is evidence of 
 express malice. ^ ® It is only necessary that at the time of the fatal 
 blow the perpetrator must have acted with a deliberate purpose to 
 take life, or to do great bodily harm. ^® A homicide may be on 
 express malice constituting murder in the first degree under such a 
 statute, though there was no design to take the life of the deceased, 
 where there was a design to do him serious bodily harm by an 
 unlawful act.^** The questions for determination in such case are 
 whether the external facts and circumstances at the time of the 
 killing, or before or after that time, having connection with it or 
 related to it, furnish satisfactory evidence of the existence of a 
 sedate and deliberate mind upon the part of the person at the time 
 he does the act;^' or whether they show a formed design to take the 
 life of the person slain, or to do him some serious bodily injury 
 which, in its necessary or probable consequences, may end in his 
 death ;^^ or whether they show such general reckless disregard of 
 human life as necessarily includes a formed design against the life 
 of the person slain ;^* and the external circumstances indicating 
 the design may transpire at the time of the killing as well as at any 
 other time. ^ * 
 
 The malice must be directed toward the person killed, however. 
 It is not such as to form an ingredient of murder in the first degree 
 under such statutes when directed toward another ;^^ and the killing, 
 
 iTTravers v. United States, 6 App. T). ters v. State, 1 Tex. App. 681; Srnnnm- 
 
 C. 450; Ex parte Jones, 31 Tex. Crim. v. State, 5 Tex. App. 381, 32 Am. Rep. 573. 
 
 Rep. 422, 20 S. W. 983. 2iMcCoy v. State, 25 Tex. 33, 78 Am. 
 
 Where one of two persons engaged in Dec. 520; Jones v. State, 3 Tex. App. 
 
 a mutual combat suddenly seizes one of 150. 
 
 a nurrber of weapons near at hand, ex- 2 2MeCoy v. State, supra; Ferrell v. 
 
 hibiting sufficient thought, reflection. State, 43 Tex. 503; Tooney'v. State, 5 
 
 and discrimination to select the most Tex. App. 163: Jones v. State, supra. 
 
 dangerous and deadly, and kills the And see Randell v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 other with it, his action furnishes suffi- App.) 64 S. W. i55. 
 
 cient evidence of express malice afore- asMcCoy v. State; Jones v. State ; and 
 
 thought to make the killing murder in Duebbe v. State, — supra. 
 
 the first degree, especially where cool- The very fact that a killing was with- 
 
 ing time had elapsed. State v. Gardner, out cause indicates motive or intent 
 
 Houflt. Orim. Rep. (Del.) 146. and a heart devoid of social duty, and 
 
 isBurnhara v. Stite, 43 Tex. 322; fatally bent on mischief, within the 
 
 Halbert v. State, 3 Tex. App. 656 ; Law- meani'ng of the Texas definition of mui-- 
 
 rence v. St<ite, 36 Tex. Crim. Rep. 173, der in "the first degree. Lawrence v. 
 
 30 S. W. 90 : State v. Dugan, Houst. State, 36 Tex. Crim. Rep. 173, 36 S. W. 
 
 Crim. Rep. (Del.) 563. 90. 
 
 Instate V. Dugan, supra. 2 4McCoy v. State, supra. 
 
 zoPrimus v. State, 2 Tex. App. 369; 2 5Duebbe v. State, 1 Tex. App. 159; 
 
 Duebbe v. State, 1 Tex. App. 159; Plas- Ferrell v. State, 43 Tex. 503; McCoy 
 
I IIB] MURDER. 171 
 
 though with a deliberate and sedate mind, must be an unlawful 
 and unjustifiable killing to be murder in the first degree.^® The 
 wilful preparation and giving of poison to a human being, intend- 
 ing to kill, constitutes express malice aforethought*^'' But an at- 
 tempted killing of one person with malice aforethought resulting in 
 the unintended killing of another person is a killing on impilied mal- 
 ice, amounting only to murder in the second degree.*® 
 
 g. Extreme atrocity or cruelty. 
 
 117. What covered by. — Under statutory provisions making a mur- 
 der committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty murder in the first 
 degree, something more than the ordinary incidents of the crime of 
 murder must exist to justify a finding in that degree; the atrocity 
 and cruelty must be peculiar and extreme, something implying more 
 than the ordinary crime. ^ And homicide by means of a shotgun at 
 close range is not necessarily brutal and atrocious.^ And evidence 
 of killing by striking the victim over the head with a hoe, claimed 
 ■ by the accused to have been done in self-defense, does not show cruelty 
 which will warrant conviction of murder or manslaughter, within 
 the meaning of a statutory provision for such a conviction where 
 the circumstances of the homicide show a cruel disposition, though 
 the instrument or means used was not such as would ordinarily 
 produce death.* Nor is killing a person by shooting him, while 
 the person shot, who was the larger and more powerful man of the 
 two, was choking the slayer, a killing in a cruel and unusual manner 
 within the meaning of a statutory provision with reference to such a 
 killing.* And though a killing may be cruel it is not unusual with- 
 in the meaning of these terms, where nothing appears other than the 
 application of unaided bodily strength and energy used according to 
 
 V. State, supra. Contra, in Delaware. And where the statute provides that 
 
 See State v. Dugan, Houst. Crim. Rep. if the weapon used is one not likely to 
 
 (Del.) 663. produce death under ordinary eircum- 
 
 2 6 Crook V. State, 27 Tex. App. 198, stances, but the injury is inflicted in 
 
 lis. W. 444; Gonzales v. State, 28 Tex. a cruel manner, the homicide may be 
 
 App. 130, 12 S. W. 733; Cahn v. State, manslaughter or murder according to 
 
 27 Tex. App. 709, 11 S. W. 723. the facts of the case, whenever it .be- 
 
 27State V. Evans, 1 Marv. (Del.) comes a question whether or not there 
 
 477, 41 Atl. 136. was an intention to kill, suggested by 
 
 28Halbert v. State, 3 Tex. App. C56. the character of the weapon not being 
 
 iCom. V. Devlin, 126 Mass. 253. deadly, the court in a prosecution for 
 
 2State V. Grugin, 147 Mo. 39, 42 L.R. homicide should submit the issue of 
 
 A. 774, 71 Am. St. Rep. 553, 47 S. W. manslaughter. Johnson v. State, 42 
 
 1058. Tex. Crim. Rep. 377, 60 S. W. 48. 
 
 sBarnes v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) iKlyce v. State, 78 Miss. 450, 28 So. 
 
 59 S. VV. 882. 827. 
 
172 HOMICIDE. B 117- 
 
 the common custom of fighting men.® But where the extreme atro- 
 city or cruelty required by the statute appears, it is not necessary 
 that such atrocity and cruelty should have been premeditated. " And 
 ■where the intelligence and mental capacity requisite to the commis- 
 sion of murder are found to exist, special knowledge of the character 
 of the act is not an element entering into the statutory description; 
 and it is not necessary that the accused should have been aware 
 that his act was atrocious or cruel. ^ Nor does provocation reduce 
 murder to manslaughter where the killmg was atrocious and cruel,* 
 or where the violence was out of all proportion to the provocation.* 
 
 Where all the facts from which cruelty is to be inferred appear, 
 its existence is a question for the court ^ " But as a general rule the 
 nature of the question whether or not an act resulting in death was 
 extremely cruel and atrocious is such that it must be largely left to 
 the determination of the jury in a prosecution for the killing. ^ * Proof 
 that the accused, after forcibly ravishing a girl under eight years of 
 age, inflicted severe wounds upon her, and threw her into a river, 
 thereby causing her death, warrants a finding of murder committed 
 with extreme atrocity and cruelty. ^^ And such a finding is also 
 warranted by evidence of killing a woman by stamping and jumping 
 upon her prostrate person, and by blows and kicks inflicted with 
 great violence, and repeated during an afternoon and evening, from 
 which her death resulted after prolonged agony. ^^ So, killing a 
 person with a lighted kerosene lamp filled with oil is both a cruel and 
 unusual means of killing. ^ * And one who, either alone or as prin- 
 cipal with others, poured turpentine or other inflammable liquid 
 upon the person of the deceased and ignited the same, or was present 
 when it was done, whereby the deceased was burned to death, is guilty 
 of murder by torture under a statute making such a killing murder 
 in the first degree ; and an instruction to that effect is not objection- 
 able as assuming that, if death resulted, the killing would be murder 
 by torture, where the court told the jury of what murder by torture 
 consisted, and the evidence raises the issue of such murder. ^ " 
 
 So in Virginia, where "wilful and excessive whipping" is among 
 
 BState V. Knoll (Kan.) 83 Pae. 622. isCom. v. Desmarteaii, supra. 
 
 •Com. V. Desmarteau, 16 Gray, 1. isCom. v. Devlin, supra. 
 
 'Com. V. Gilbert, 165 Mass. 45, 42 kBHss v. State, 117 Wis. 590, 94 N. 
 
 N. E. .336. W. 325. 
 
 sState V. Jarrott, 23 N. C. (1 Ired. isChapman v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. 
 
 L.) 76. Eep. 328. 96 Am. St. Kep. 874. 05 S. W. 
 
 9State V. Boon, 82 N. C. 037. 1098. 
 
 10 State V. Jarrott, supra. 
 
 iiCom. V. Devlin, 126 Mass. 253; Cora. 
 V. Desmarteau, 16 Gray, 1. 
 
S 1171 MURDEE. 173 
 
 the enumerated instances, a verdict of murder in the first degree was 
 sustained against a master for whipping a slave to death, though it 
 was maintained that the intent was to do only bodily harm. It should 
 be observed that in the Virginia act the term "other" is omitted be- 
 fore the phrase "kind of wilful, etc., killing," so that to some degree 
 the bearing of the latter definition on the enumerated instances is 
 weakened. ^ ® 
 
 h. Homicide in the commission of felonious or unlavsrful acts. 
 
 1. General rules. 
 118. Effect of statute on common-law rules. — JJo new offenses are 
 created by statutes with relation to murder in the perpetration of, 
 or attempt to perpetrate, a felony or named felonies; the common- 
 law offense remains the same, having been divided into degrees only. ^ 
 They only prescribe a severer punishment when murder is committed 
 in the attempt to perpetrate a felony, on account of the enormity 
 of the offense,^ and fix absolutely the degree of the offense, usually as 
 murder in the first degree.* And it has been held that where it ap- 
 pears that a homicide was committed in the perpetration of, or at- 
 tempt to perpetrate, a felony the accused must be guilty either of 
 murder in the first degree under a statute making such a killing 
 murder in the first degree, or he must have been innocent of any crime 
 whatever, and that an instruction as to murder in the second degree 
 would be improper.* And that the rule that where a homicide was 
 committed, and no one saw it, the court ought to instruct the jury 
 on all the degrees of the offense, as well as on the law of self-defense, 
 has no application to a case in which it is evident that the house in 
 which the deceased was, was broken into and the inmates robbed and 
 murdered in the nighttime, the only question in such case bsing 
 whether the accused did the deed.^ The rule, however, that where 
 the jury are authorized to find the degree of a homicide they have 
 
 i6?outlier V. Com. 7 Gratt. 678. with death. State v. Brown, 21 La. Ann. 
 
 iCom. V. Flanagan, 7 Watts & S. .S47. 
 
 415; State v. Cross. 72 Conn. 722, 46 sPeople v. Olsen, supra; State v. 
 
 Atl. 148; People v. Olsen, 80 Cal. 122, Dowd, 19 Conn. 388. 
 
 25 Pac. 126. 3See State v. Coving<-n, 117 N. C. 
 
 But while neither the offense of rob- 834, 23 S. E. 337; People v. Monney, 2 
 
 bery nor of stftHbiTig in the perpetration Idaho, 17, 2 Pac. 876. 
 
 of a robbery within the meining of the iStite v. Sexton, 147 Mo. 89. 48 S. 
 
 Louisiana statute is in itself capital, W. 453. And see People v. Sanchez, 24 
 
 yet when a (.tabbing with a dangerous Cal. 17. 
 
 weapon with intent to murder is done 5Aiken v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 523, 
 
 In the perpetration of a robbery, there 68 S. W. 849. 
 results a compound crime punishable 
 
174 HOMICIDE. [§ llff 
 
 the power to fix a lower degree to the crime than that which the 
 statute provides, and that the circumstance that the facts of the case 
 make it one of murder in the first degree under the statute does not 
 warrant a peremptory direction to find that degree, is well sus- 
 tained.^ And where it is provided that, on conviction, the accused 
 may suffer death or be imprisoned for life,, in the discretion of the 
 jury, the jury are the sole judges as to what punishment shall be 
 inflicted.^ But an instruction in a prosecution for homicide alleged 
 to have been committed in the perpetration of a robbery^- that the 
 jury have power to find the accused guilty of murder in the first 
 degree, murder in the second degree, or manslaughter, or not guilty, 
 but that the law makes all murder committed in the perpetration of, 
 or attempt to perpetrate, robbery murder in the first degree, is not 
 objectionable as amounting to an instruction that the killing was 
 murder committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, a 
 robbery, and was for that reason murder in the first degree.* 
 
 119. General rale as to effect of felony or criminal act. — Where a 
 person is killed by another in perpetrating, or attempting to perpe- 
 trate, a felony or criminal act calculated to cause death, the pre- 
 meditated intent to commit a felony or other criminal act is, by im- 
 plication of law, transferred from that offense to the homicide 
 actually committed, so as to make the latter offense a killing with 
 malice aforethought constituting murder in the first degree.^ In 
 such case the turpitude of the criminal act supplies the place of de- 
 liberate and premeditated malice and is its legal equivalent, and the 
 purpose to kill is conclusively presumed from the intention which is 
 of the essence of the criminal act intended.* And such a murder is 
 
 6Lane v. Com. 59 Pa. 371. And see 60 Atl. 263; Williams v. State (Tex. 
 
 Johnson v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. Crim. App.) 64 S. W. 1042. 
 
 332, 71 S. W. 25; Nutt v. State, 63 Ala. 2Rbea v. State, 63 Neb. 461, 88 N. W. 
 
 180. 789; Morgan v. State, 51 Neb. 672, 71 
 
 So, in State v. Howard, 33 Wash. N. W. 788; Kilgore v. State, 74 Ala. 
 
 250, 74 Pac. 382, it is held that, when 1; Mitchell v. State, CO Ala. 26; Pal- 
 
 the evidence tends to show that the kill- more v. State, 29 Ark. 248 ; State v. 
 
 ing was done in the actual commission Boice, Houst. Crim. Rep. (P"^!.) 355; 
 
 of a rape, it is not erroneous for the Stste v. -Tones. 2 Penn. (Del.; 573, 47 
 
 court to instruct that the charge in- Atl. 1006; State v. Meyers, 99 Mo. 
 
 eludes both murder in the second degree 107, 12 S. W. 516; State v. King, supra. 
 
 and manslaughter, and that a eo-'vlc- But see State v. Williams, 36 Wash, 
 
 tion may be had for either, as well as 143, 78 Pac. 780. 
 
 for murder in the first degree. And an instruction in a prosecution 
 
 T.Tackson v. State, 161 Ind. 36, 67 N. for murder that, if the accused shot 
 
 E. 6fl0. and killed the deceased for the purpose 
 
 sPeople V. Pool, 27 Cal. 573. of robbing him, then such shooting and 
 
 iPeople V. Enoch, 13 Wend. 159, 27 killing wb done wilfully, deliberately. 
 
 Am. Dec. 197; State v. King, 24 Utah, premeditatedly, and with malice afore- 
 
 482, 91 Am. St. Rep. 808, .68 Pac. 418. thought, and constitutes murder in the 
 
 And see Com. v. Dillen, 210 Pa. 579, fi.rat degree, is not subject to objection, 
 
§ 11&] MURDER. 175 
 
 a murder in the first degree under such statutes, though it is casual 
 and unintentional.^ And it is unnecessary in an indictment for 
 murder in the first degree, so committed, to aver an intent to kill.* 
 The term "murder" as used in such statutes includes all kinds of 
 unlawful killing which constituted murder at common law, and is 
 not confined to such as were committed with a deliberate and pre- 
 meditated design to kill.^ The question whether the killing was 
 wilful, deliberate, and premeditated is answered by the statute in 
 the affirmative." These rules apply to maliciously setting fire to a 
 
 thougli it assumes that there was evi- as rape or sodomy. State v. Deschamps, 
 denee that the deceased was shot and 42 La. Ann. 567, 21 Am. St. Rep. 392, 
 killed for the purpose of robbing him. 7 So. 703. 
 
 State V. Avery, 113 Mo. 475, 21 S. W. 4Co.x v. People, 80 N. Y. 500, Affirm- 
 193. ing 19 Hun, 430. 
 
 3 Cox V. People, 80 N. Y. 500, Af- But where an indictment merely 
 firming 19 I-Iun, 430; Buel v. People, 78 charges that murder was committed fe- 
 N. Y. 492, 34 Am. Rep. 555, Affirming loniously, wilfully, and with malice 
 18 Hun, 487; Dolan v. People, 6 Hui, aforethought, not charging that it wa» 
 493; People v. Cole, 2 N. Y. Crim. Rep. done in perpetration of, or attempt to 
 108; Kilgore v. State, supra; Mitchell perpetrate, any of the felonies e umer- 
 V. State, 60 Ala. 26; People v. Milton, ated in the statute, and the accused is 
 145 Cal. 169, 78 Pac. 549; People v. 01- found guilty, the judgment and sentence 
 sen, 80 Cal. 122, 22 Pac. 125; People v. must be for murder in the second de- 
 Bealoba, 17 Cal. 389; Andrews v. Peo- gree, and not for murder in the first dc- 
 ple, 33 Colo. 193, 79 Pac. 1031 ; State gree. Johnson v. Com. 24 Pa. 386. 
 V. Jones, 2 Penn. (Del.) 573, 47 Atl. estate v. Pike, 49 N. H. 399, 6 Am. 
 1006; Moynihan v. State, 70 Ind. 126, Rep. 533. 
 
 36 Am. Rep. 178; State v. Hopkirk, 84 estate v. Lirdsey, 19 Nev. 47, 3 Am. 
 Mo. 278; Rhea v. State, 63 Neb. 461, 88 St. Rep. 776, 5 Pac. 822; People v. 
 N. W. 789; State v. Greenleaf, 71 N. Sanchez, 24 Cal. 17; State v. Hymer, 15 
 H. 606, 54 Atl. 38; State v. Lopez, 15 Nev. 49. 
 
 Nev. 407; Lindsay v. State, 24 Ohio C. Where a murder is charged in an in- 
 C. 1; State v. Brown, 7 Or. 186; Stite dictment as having been committed in 
 V. Morgan, 22 Utah, 162, 61 Pac. 527 ; the perpetration of, or attempt to perpe- 
 Reg. V. Lee, 4 Fost. & F. 63 ; Quee i trate, one of the felonies named in th& 
 V. F""i7.. '^ T<'o=t. & F. 580: 1 Hawk. P. statute, while it may be essential to 
 C. 127; 2 Hawk. P. C. 442; Barrett's prove it as charged, the proof, when 
 Case, Stephen's Digest, Crim. Law, art. made, is but evidence of malice afore- 
 224, p. 164. thought, a^d the omission or failure to 
 
 The law makes the killing of another instruct the jury upon the law of 
 while engaged in the commission of a murder when committed in the perpetra- 
 felony, murder in the first degree, in- tion of such felonies is not reversible 
 dependent of all questions of motive, error. Washington v. State, 25 Tex. 
 and the person who kills another while App. 387, 8 S. W. 642. 
 engaged in committing a felony cannot In Pharr v. State, 7 Tex. App. 472, 
 escape conviction for murder in the first however, it was held that an instruction 
 degree, by showing that his intent was in a prosecution for homicide that, if 
 not to kill, but to dpfe"d his own life the killing was unlawful and was com- 
 er person, or to . escape arrest, or to mitted in the perpetration of, or attempt 
 avoid pursuit or death. Cox v. People, to perpetrate, one. of the felonies named 
 19 Hun, 430, Affirming 80 N. Y. 500; in the statute, the accused should b& 
 Starks v. State, 137 Ala. 9, 34 So. 687. found guilty of murder in the first de- 
 
 The absence of a premeditated or pre- gree, is improper in not placing and 
 conceived design to kill will not reduce keeping before the minds of the jury the 
 a homicide to manslaughter where it disti etion between murder done on ex- 
 was committed in the perpetration of, press malice, and murder committed in 
 or attempt to perpetrate, a felony, such the perpetration or attempted perpetra- 
 
176 HOMICIDE. B 119 
 
 building causing the death of a person therein, though unintended, 
 such killing being murder in the first degree.^ And i. homicide per- 
 petrated in the attempt to commit a rape is murder in the first de- 
 gree, whether the killing was by accident or design;* and so with a 
 killing occurring in the perpetration of a robbery.® And the giving 
 of poison by convicts to a guard in sufficient quantities to cause 
 death establishes the required deliberation and premeditation to ren- 
 der the killing murder in the first degree, without reference to their 
 actual intent. ^ " But while it is not always necessary that a person 
 causing the death of another must have intended a personal injury 
 to such person, it is necessary that the intent with which he acted 
 should be equivalent in legal character to a criminal purpose aimed 
 against life generally ; it must have been to commit either a specific 
 felony, or an act involving all the wickedness of a felony. ' ^ And 
 where a wrongful act, from which death resulted, was not felonious 
 or calculated to cause death, but a mere misdemeanor, this fact is 
 properly shown by way of defense, as bearing upon the degree of the 
 homicide, and as tending to show that it was manslaughter only, and 
 not murder. * ^ And the mere fact that a civil wrong was committed 
 by one person against another cannot be used as an incident of a 
 homicide committed in the perpetration of an unlawfui act.** 
 
 120. Exceptions to general rule — The rule has been asserted in 
 Ohio that, although in homicide committed in an attempt to perpo- 
 trate certain felonies named in the statute the turpitude of the 
 felonious act is made to supply the place of deliberate and premedi- 
 tated malice requisite to murder in the first degree, yet the purposn 
 to kill expressed in the statute applies to each of the several classes of 
 murder in the first degree, and an involuntary or unintentional homi- 
 cide cannot, in any instance, constitute murder in the first degree.' 
 Even there, however, the purpose to kill may be justly presumed from 
 acts which would necessarily or naturally destroy life, such as the 
 derailing, or attempt to derail, a railway passenger train ;^ or such 
 
 tion of a felony, so as to prevent them 158; Robertson v. Com. (Va.) 20 S. E. 
 
 from confounding the two views of the 362. 
 
 case in determining the question of guilt logtate v. Wells, 61 Iowa, 629, 47 Am. 
 
 or innocence of the accused under the Rep. 822, 17 N. W. 90. 
 
 proof. iiWellar v. People, 30 Mich. 16. 
 
 'Reddiek v. Com. 17 Ky. L. Rep. 1020, isBoykin v. People, 22 Colo. 496, 45 
 
 33 S. W. 416. Pac. 419. 
 
 sKelly V. Com. 1 Grant, Cas. 484; isReg. v. Franklin, 15 Cox, C. C. 163. 
 
 Com. V. Hanlon, 3 Brewst. (Pa.) 461, 8 iRobbins v. State, 8 Ohio St. 138. 
 
 Phila. 401. 2Statp v. Brooks, 1 Ohio Dec Re- 
 
 sCom. V. Epps, 193 Pa. 512, 44 Atl. print, 407. 
 570; Territory v. McAndrews, 3 Mont. 
 
S 120] MURDER. 177 
 
 as an intentional killing by means of administering poison;^ and 
 premeditation in such case is not essential.* So, in Tennessee and 
 Indiana it has been held, under statutes of this class, that to con- 
 stitute murder in the first degree there must exist in the mind of the 
 person who kills another a specific intent to take the life of the person 
 slain; and if a person, without premeditated intent to kill, slays 
 one person believing him to be another, it is not murder in the first 
 ■degree.^ And the rule has been asserted in Texas that malice is not 
 an indispensable requisite in all murder, and that if a homicide was 
 committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, one of 
 the crimes named in the statute, having the necessary ingredient of 
 malice, whether express or implied, it would be murder in the first 
 degree ; biit it would not be so in the absence of such malice. ® The 
 rule is stated in a subsequent case, however, though without men- 
 tioning the former, that while, to constitute murder in the first de- 
 ^ee, there must be express malice aforethought, when such malice 
 aforethought is evidenced by the fact that the crime was committed in 
 the perpetration of one of the statutory crimes, there can be no ques- 
 tion of the degree of the murder, it being made ipso facto murder in 
 the first degree by the statute.'^ And it has been squarely held in 
 numerous cases, in accordance with the general rule, that all murder 
 under the Texas statute, committed in the perpetration, or attempted 
 perpetration, of one of the named felonies, is murder in the first de- 
 gree, the malice being shown by the murderer in the act of killing 
 for such purpose. * 
 
 sEobbins v. State, 8 Ohio St. 138. sSingleton v. State, 1 Tex. App. .501 ; 
 
 4Liiidsay v. State, 24 Ohio C. C. 1 ; Gonzales v. State, 19 Tex. App. 304; 
 
 Stephens v. State, 42 Ohio St. 150; Mendez v. State, 29 Tex. App. 608, 16 S. 
 
 Jones V. State, 14 Ohio C. C. 35. W. 766 ; Williams v. State, 30 Tex. App. 
 
 In Rhea v. State, 63 Neb. 461, 88 N. 354, 17 S. W. 408: Garza v. State, 39 
 
 W. 789, the court in construing the Tex. Grim. Rep. 358, 73 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 Nebraska statute, which is similar to 927, 46 S. W. 242 ; Giles v. State, 23 Tex. 
 
 that of Ohio, refused to follow the con- App. 281, 4 S. W. 886; Hedrick v. State, 
 
 struetion which Ohio courts put upon 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 532, 51 S. W. 252; 
 
 the Ohio statute in Robbins v. State, 8 Richards v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep 
 
 Ohio St. 138, holding that any person 38, 30 S. W. 805. 
 
 committing a homicide in the perpetra- And evidence that a person accused of 
 
 tion of, or attempt to perpetrate, one homicide, eitlier alone, or as a principal 
 
 of the felonies named in the statute was with others, stole or was present at the 
 
 .guilty of murder in the first degree, stealing of property from the person of 
 
 basing the refusal on a slight difference the deceased, and poured inflammable 
 
 in the statute, and the fact that the liquid upon his person, or was present 
 
 statute had been altered since the Ohio when it was done, and ignited such 
 
 construction. liquid or was present when it was done, 
 
 sBratton v. State, 10 Humph. 103; and that the deceased was burned to 
 
 Bechtelheimer v. State, 54 Ind. 128. death, establishes murder in the first 
 
 sPharr V. State, 7 Tex. App. 472. degree, and does not call for an in- 
 
 7 Washington v. State, 25 Tex. App. struetion as to murder in the second 
 
 387, 8 S. W. 642. degree, or as to negligent homicide. 
 Hum. — 12. 
 
178 HOMICIDE. [S 12i 
 
 2. The felonious or unlawful act 
 
 121. Nature at common law and under general statutes The term 
 
 "felony" as used at common law and under statutes with reference 
 to the killing of a human being, without design to effect death, by 
 a person engaged in the commission of a felony, means an offense 
 punishable by imprisonment in the state's prison.-' And an offense 
 in regard to which there is a discretion vested in the court to punish 
 it either by imprisonment in the state's prison, or otherwise, is a 
 felony within the meaning of a statute defining a felony to be an 
 offense for which the offender, on conviction, shall be liable by law 
 to be punished by death, or imprisonment in the state's prison.^ If 
 an offense is charged which might be punished either as a felony or 
 as a misdemeanor a felony is charged within the meaning of a statute 
 providing that every murder which shall be committed in the per- 
 petration of a felony shall be deemed murder in the first degree.* 
 And the character of a crimiual act, as to whether or not it is a 
 felony within the meaning of these rules, does not depend upon the 
 sentence which the court may pronounce; the rule that the killing 
 will be either murder or manslaughter according as the intended 
 offense is a felony or only a misdemeanor having reference, not to 
 the punishment, but to such gradation of crimes as might from time 
 to time obtain.* So, where the legislature creates new felonies out 
 of offenses which were only misdemeanors at common law the rule 
 applies, and a new class of murders is created in the case of the kill- 
 ing of a human being by a person engaged in the perpetration of one 
 of such newly created felonies. * And the rule is the same where the 
 legislature abolishes an offense which previously was a felony, or 
 
 Chapman v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. sPeople v. Van Steenburgh, 1 Park. 
 
 328, 96 Am. St. Rep. 874, 65 S. W. 1098. Crim. Rep. 39. 
 
 iTerrill v. State, 74 Wis. 278, 42 N. sgtate v. Green, supra. 
 
 W. 243; State v. Hammond, 35 Wia. Tlie conviction of being armed and 
 
 315; Hoffman v. State, 88 Wis. 166, 59 disguised while engaged in a riot in 
 
 N. W. 588; State v. Smith, 32 Me. 369, resisting the execution of legal process 
 
 54 Am. Dec. 578; State v. Green, 66 Mo. as defined in N. Y. Act January 28, 
 
 631. 1845, § 7, is a felony which brings the 
 
 Where one person committed an as- offender within the statutory definition 
 
 sault upon another and death acci- of murder committed in the perpetra- 
 
 dentally ensued, the killing would be tion of a felony. People v. Van Steen- 
 
 murder if the assault was committed burgh, supra. 
 
 with intent to do great bodily harm, <State v. Smith, 32 Me. 369, 54 Am. 
 
 since in such case the assault would be r)sc- 578. And see Com. v. Pemberton, 
 
 a. felonv, but it would be manslaughter US Mass. 36. 
 
 in the first degree only, under the Wis- ^People v. Enoch, 13 Wend. 159, 27 
 
 consin statute, where such an intent did ^^^- I^P- 197. 
 not exist. Bovle v. State, 57 Wis. 472, 
 i6 Am. Rep. 41, 15 N. W. 827. 
 
§ 121] MURDER. 179 
 
 reduces it to the grade of a misdemeanor, so that a killing by a per- 
 son engaged in such an offense will no longer be murder, but man- 
 slaughter.® Within these rules rape is a felony from which malice 
 wiU be implied in case of a killing in the perpetration thereof.'' 
 And an indictment charging the larceny of a sum greater than $25 
 sufficiently alleges a felony, and is not subject to the objection that 
 it was not charged as grand larceny.* So, one who, with others, 
 was engaged in committing a burglary is criminally responsible as 
 principal for the killing of one who interfered with their project 
 while they were actually engaged in carrying it out, whether he or 
 one of the others fired the fatal shot.* And an instruction with 
 reference to holding up a train properly refers to an attack upon the 
 train and the forcible detention thereof with intent to rob, as dis- 
 tinguished from a mere assault upon it without felonious intent. ^ " 
 Likewise, escape from, or attempt to escape from, lawful confine- 
 ment is usually a felony within the meaning of these rules, where 
 the custody or confinement was upon a charge, arrest, commitment, 
 or conviction for felony. ^ * And setting a house on fire in order to 
 cheat a company insuring it is an attempt to commit a felony ren- 
 dering a killing thereby caused a wilful murder.*^ So, suicide is 
 an unlawful act making it murder to accidentally kill another in 
 an attempt to commit suicide, ^^ though this would not be the case 
 under a statute providing that no crime shall be regarded as a felony, 
 except such as are punishable by death or imprisonment^* And 
 the entrance of a tramp into a house without permission, and his 
 persistence in his intrusion after being notified to depart, and barring 
 the way of the owner to prevent the calling of help, raises the ques- 
 
 *Ibid. And the fact that a person knew that 
 
 'Reg. V. Greenwood, 7 Cox, C. C. 404. another was going to attempt to rob 
 
 sPeople V. Willett, 102 N. Y. 251, 6 him as he went toward his home fur- 
 
 N. E. 301. nishes no element of consent to the 
 
 Taking money from the pocket of a robbery, which will affect the degree of 
 
 person's vest, which hung up in hia the murder in case he is slain in the 
 
 bedroom, does not amount to a felony, perpetration of such robbery. State v. 
 
 and a killing committed in doing so McAfee, 148 Mo. 370, 50 S. W. 82. 
 
 would not support a conviction for a loTerritory v. McGinnis, 10 N. M. 
 
 killing while engaged in the com- 269, 61 Pae. 208. 
 
 mission of a felony. People v. Kelly, uPeople v. Johnson, 110 N. Y. 134 
 
 35 Hun, 295. 17 N. E. 684, Afiirming 46 Hun, 667;' 
 
 So. where one person kills another Miller v. State (Ala.) 40 So. 47; State 
 
 for the purpose of getting him out of v. Turlington, 102 Mo. 642, 15 S. W. 141. 
 
 the way, so that the former could l^Reg. v. Serne, 16 Cox, C. C. 311. 
 
 subsequently commit a larceny, the case isState v. Levelle, 34 S. C. 12C, 27 
 
 falls within the definition of a de- Am. St. Rep. 799, 13 S. E. 319. 
 
 liberate and premeditated design to ef- KCom. v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 25 
 
 feet death, the larceny being the motive Am. Rep. 109, explained and distin- 
 
 for the crime. Ibid. guiahed in State v. Levelle, supra. 
 •Moody V. State, 6 Coldw. 299. 
 
180 HOMICIDE. B 121 
 
 tion whether or not the subsequent killing of the owner was not mur- 
 der in the commission of a felony, under a statute making it a felony 
 for a tramp to enter a building against the will of the occupant, 
 under circumstances not amounting to burglary, and do or threaten 
 any injury to the person or personal property of another. ^ ® And evi- 
 dence of such entry and behavior is sufficient to warrant a jury in 
 finding a threat of personal injury, within the meaning of a statute 
 making a threat of personal injury by a tramp a felony. ^^ 
 
 122. Nature tinder statutes naming particular felonies — Where the 
 statute provides that killing or murder in the perpetration of, or at- 
 tempt to perpetrate, particular named felonies is murder in the first 
 degree, the general rule is that all other felonies not named are ex- 
 cluded, and that killing or murder in the perpetration of, or attempt 
 to perpetrate, such other felonies could be, at most, but murder in 
 the second degree ; and the fact that a homicide was committed by a 
 felon in an attempt to escape from a penitentiary does not obviate 
 the necessity of proving deliberation and premeditation to make the 
 crime murder in the first degree, where attempts to escape are not 
 enumerated in the statutory list of felonies.^ And the killing of a 
 human being in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, an 
 abortion is murder in the second degree only, where that offense is 
 not one of the enumerated ones.^ Entering a house for the purpose 
 of killing a person therein is burglary, however, under a statute pro- 
 viding that everyone who enters a house with intent to commit any 
 felony is guilty of burglary, so that the killing pursuant thereto would 
 be a killing in an attempt to perpetrate a burglary. * And where per- 
 sons attempting to commit a burglary kill a person who attempts to 
 interfere with their action, it is murder in the first degree.* But 
 the act of several soldiers in proceeding to a city jail for the purpose 
 of liberating one of their comrades confined therein, and demanding 
 his release, whereupon a controversy arose in which a person was 
 killed, does not constitute a burglary in the perpetration of which a 
 killing would be murder in the first degree. In order to constitute 
 
 isPeople V. Deacons, 109 N. Y. .374, duet, such person had reasonable 
 
 16 N. E. 676. grounds to believe. Ib'd. 
 
 lelbid. iState v. Atkinson, 6 Ohio N. P. 
 
 Threatening words are not necessary 232; Lanergan v. People, 50 Barb. 266. 
 
 to constitute a threat of personal in- 2 State v. Leeper, 70 Iowa, 748, 30 
 
 jury within the meaning of an act mak- N. W. 501. 
 
 ing the threatening of a personal in- sPeople v. Miller, 121 Cal. 343, 53 
 
 jury by a tramp a felony; conduct or Pac. 816. 
 
 actions may constitute a threat as well iState v. Shields, 1 Ohio Dec. Ee- 
 
 as words, and the question is not what print, 17. 
 
 the person threatened inferred, but And where murder in the commission, 
 
 what, from the intruder's acts and con- of a robbery is murder in the first, de- 
 
§ 122] MURDER. 181 
 
 a burglary, the breaking in must be by force, threats, or fraud, with 
 intent to commit a felony.® So, the administration of drugs or 
 poisons, not with intent to kill, but with the intent to facilitate the 
 obtaining of the victim's property, from which death ensues, is mur- 
 der in the first degree committed in the perpetration, or attempted 
 perpetration, of a robbery;® and in such case no charge need be given 
 as to murder in the second degree. ^ But the taking of money from 
 the person of another is not necessarily robbery, and an instruction 
 in a prosecution for murder, under a statute making homicide in 
 the commission of a robbery murder in the first degree, that killing 
 in the attempt to take money is murder in that degree is inaccurate 
 and improper. * And killing a person for the purpose of being able 
 to assert thereafter an established title to property owned by him 
 is not killing in the perpetration of a robbery.® It has been held, 
 however, that where a killing is the result of the commission of, or 
 attempt to commit, a felony the law attaches the felonious intent ac- 
 companying the crime contemplated to the act of the killing and 
 constitutes it murder, whether it be one of the crimes named in the 
 statute or not ^ " But it is to be observed that the Missouri statute, 
 under which one of the cases holding the above rule was decided, 
 does not stop at naming certain felonies, but adds the words "or 
 other felonies."^ ^ The terms "robbery," "burglary," or "rape," as 
 Tlsed in the statute with reference to murder in the first degree, do 
 not so far differ in their technical sense from that of their popular 
 use as to make them need specific definition when they are used in 
 an indictment, not in describing the offense charged, but only the at- 
 tempt, as an element of the crime of murder. ^ ^ 
 
 123. Doctrine that rule is confined to independent felonies. — The 
 prevailing rule is that statutes providing that every murder which 
 shall be committed in the attempt to perpetrate a felony, or certain 
 named felonies, shall be deemed murder in the first degree refer to 
 
 gree an instruction defining robbery in accused had not explained where he was 
 
 a prosecution for such a homicide, stat- at the time of the robbery, such allu- 
 
 ing that robbery committed by firearms sion not being to his failure to testify, 
 
 may be a capital felony, is not er- Nite v. State, 41 Tex. Grim. Rep. 340, 
 
 roneous. Gates v. State (Tex. Grim. 54 S. W. 763. 
 
 App.) 86 S. W. 769. 7 Parker v. State, 40 Tex. Grim. Rep. 
 
 eKipper v. State, 42 Tex. Grim. Rep. 119, 49 S. W. 80. 
 
 613, 62 S. W. 420. sState v. Lopez, 15 Nev. 407. 
 
 sRupe V. State, 42 Tex. Grim. Rep. 9 Gay v. State, 40 Tex. Grim. Rep. 
 
 477, 61 S. W. 929 ; State v. Wagner, 78 242, 49 S. W. 612. 
 
 Mo. 644, 47 Am. Rep. 131. loPeople v. Olsen, 80 Gal. 122, 22 
 
 And it is not error for the proseeut- Pac. 125; State v. Green, 66 Mo. 631, 
 
 ing eouT'sel in a prosecution for mur- uSee supra. § 106. 
 
 der committed in the perpetration of a i2Com. v. Manfredi, 162 Pa. 144, 29 
 
 robbery to allude to the fact that the Atl. 404. 
 
182 HOMICIDB. [§ 123 
 
 some collateral felony constituting an independent substantive crime, 
 and not to those acts of personal violence to the deceased which are 
 necessary and constituent elements of a homicide, and axe therefore 
 merged in it, and do not, when consummated, constitute an offense 
 distinct from the homicide.^ Within this rule forcibly seizing and 
 binding a man for the purpose of carrying into effect a preconceived 
 plan, finally accomplished, to kill him, is an initial step in the kill- 
 ing, and not a distinct criminal act.*' And where one person shoots 
 another and there is nothing to show that he intended some result 
 other than killing, he should be convicted of murder in the first de- 
 gree, and not in the third degree, under a statute making the killing 
 of a human being, without design to effect death, murder in the third 
 degree.® So, where a person intentionally gives another a blow with 
 a dangerous weapon with a force likely to fracture his skull, which 
 does crush it, it cannot be claimed that he intended to break the skull 
 of such person without producing death, upon the theory that such 
 an act would be mayhem, and that, therefore, he caused death while 
 in the commission of an independent felony.* On the other hand, 
 where a man commits a rape upon a woman and in doing it causes 
 her death, the rape is a separate and distinct offense from the kill- 
 ing, and the killing is effected in the commission of a felony, within 
 the meaning of such statutes.® It has been held, however, that 
 statutes making a killing murder in the first degree when perpetrated 
 by a person engaged in the commission of a felony are aimed against 
 any killing while engaged in any felony known to the law, whether 
 the felony is a constituent element of the killing or not.® And a 
 statutory provision that the killing of any person, without design to 
 effect death, by a person engaged in the commission of, or an attempt 
 to commit, a feloiiy, either upon or affecting the person killed, or 
 otherwise, is murder in the first degree is intended to make the kill- 
 ing of any human being while engaged in the commission of any 
 felony murder in the first degree, whether the felony was committed 
 upon or affected any person, or concerned property only.'' And the 
 
 1 State V. Shock, 68 Mo. 552; Jewell 4 Foster v. People, 50 N. Y. 598. 
 r. Territory, 4 Okla. 53, 43 Pae. 1075 ; BBuel v. People, 78 N. Y. 492, 34 Am. 
 People V. Thomas, 3 Alb. L. J. 210; Eep. 555, Affirming 18 Hun. 487. 
 People V. Rector, 19 Wend. 569; Kelly eBuel v. People, 78 N. Y. 492. 34 Am. 
 V. Com. 1 Grant, Cas. 484; Terrill v. Eep. 555, Affirming 18 Hun, 487, Over- 
 State, 74 Wia. 278, 42 N. W. 243. And ruling Puople v. Rector, 19 Wend. 569, 
 see People v. Butler, 3 Park. Grim, and People v. Butler, 3 Park. Grim. 
 Rep. 377. Eep. 377, so far as they hold to the 
 
 zArcher v. State, 106 Ind. 426, 7 N. contrary. 
 
 E. 225. TPeople v. Greenwall, 115 N. Y. 520, 
 
 sTerrill v. State, supra. And see Peo- 22 N. E. 180. 
 pie V. Sweeney, 41 Hun, 332. 
 
5 123] MURDER. 183 
 
 word "otherwise" in sucli a statute relates not only to felonies 
 against property, but also to felonies upon or against a person other 
 than the one killed, so that shooting one, intending to wound or kill 
 another, is murder in the first degree. ® 
 
 3. The act of killing. 
 
 124. Criminality necessary. — .Where the statutory provision is that 
 any murder committed in the perpetration, or attempted perpetra- 
 tion, of a felony, or of specified felonies, is murder in the first de- 
 gree, the act of killing must have been murder, as distinct from 
 homicide ; it must have been an act which would have been murder at 
 common law, in order to constitute murder in the first degree under 
 the statute.* The statute recognizes as possible the commission of 
 a homicide in the attempt to perpetrate a felony or a named crime, 
 that might be less than murder in the first degree, and an instruc- 
 tion that a homicide committed with intent to perpetrate a robbery 
 is murder is improper;^ though such an instruction is not reversible 
 error where the slayer was guilty of murder without reference to 
 any design to perpetrate a robbery. ^ If the statutory provision refers 
 to any killing in the perpetration of a felony, or of specified felonies, 
 as distinguished from any murder, the rule is different in such case 
 if the homicide was committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to 
 perpetrate, a felony, or one of the named felonies; it is murder in 
 the first degree whether the killing was such as to constitute murder 
 or manslaughter.* 
 
 125. Methods of eflfecting death — If a killing was the direct result 
 of a felonious act it is murder, both under the rules of common law 
 and under the various statutory provisions, without reference to the 
 manner or method in which it was effected, or whether it was caused 
 immediately by the act of the accused, or was merely the result of 
 his acts; it is not necessary in order to convict him of murder that 
 his actual and personal violence was the sole cause of death.* And 
 where a person sets fire to a building and a person therein is killed 
 the person setting the fire is guilty of murder whether the other was 
 
 sPeople v. Miles, 143 N. Y. 383, 38 iCox v. People, 80 N. Y. 500, Affirm- 
 
 N. E. 456. ing 19 Hun, 430. 
 
 iState V. Hopper, 71 Mo. 425; Pharr And when death ensues from inju- 
 
 T. State, 7 Tex. App. 472. rif'S inflicted by parties engaged in anv 
 
 aState v. Earnest, 70 Mo. 520. i"«S^l ^"t' Tv. '^'^1^*'"^"* ""'V'^ ^''°"Sl' 
 
 It appears that the deceased matenal- 
 
 ^^0^^- ly contributed to his death by his own 
 
 4Henry v. State, 51 Neb. 149, 66 Am. negligence. Reg. v. Longbottom, 3 Cox, 
 
 St Rep. 450, 70 N. W. 924. C. C. 439. 
 
184 HOMICIDE. R 125. 
 
 killed by other means before the fire reached him, or burned to death 
 by the fire.^ And a man engaged in the commission of rape, from 
 which death ensues, is guilty of murder under such statutes whether 
 the woman came to her death by strangulation or by means of any 
 other force or violence employed by him for the purpose of accom-^ 
 plishing his object.* So, a man attempting to rob the house of a. 
 woman, from which her death results, is properly charged with her 
 murder, whether her death was the result of his personal violence, 
 or of fright and terror caused by his acts, where she would not 
 otherwise have died.* And in such case the possibility of death from 
 any other cause than the act of the accused would not require the- 
 jury, in a prosecution against him, to acquit, if they were satisfied, 
 that his act caused her death, either directly or indirectly.^ 
 
 4. Relationship between the felony and the killing. 
 
 126. General rules — To render a killing without malice murder 
 in the first degree under statutes making it murder in the first de- 
 gree to kill in the perpetration of a felony, or of specified felonies, 
 it must have been done in pursuance of the unlawful act, and not 
 collateral to it. ^ The killing must have had an intimate relation and 
 close connection with the felony, and not be separate, distinct, and 
 independent from it; and when the act constituting the felony is in 
 itself dangerous to life, the killing must be naturally consequent to- 
 the felony.^ The death must have occurred as a result or outcome 
 of the attempt to commit the felony.* It is not enough that it oc- 
 curred soon or presently after the felony was attempted or com- 
 mitted; there must have been such a legal relationship between the- 
 two that it could be said that the killing occurred by reason of, or 
 as a part of, the felony, or that it occurred bsfore the felony was at 
 an end, and was concurrent with it, or at least a part of it in an 
 
 2Stoeking v. State, 7 Ind. 326. Mod. 627; Pliemling v. State, 46 Wia. 
 
 sBuel V. People, 78 N. Y. 492, 34 Am. 516, 1 N. W. 278. 
 
 Rep. 553, Affirming 18 Hun, 487. 2PHemlirg v. State, supra. 
 
 4Cox V. People, supra. sState v. Greenleaf, 71 N. H. 606, 54 
 
 And a, person engaged in burglarizing Atl. 38. 
 
 the house of another, who causes the To make a party guilty tf murder 
 
 latter's death through terror and fright under an act of Congress making it 
 
 excited by his acts, may properly be murder to cause the death of any ol- 
 
 convicted under an indictment char- ficer or other person engaged in making 
 
 ging an assault, and that in some way or aiding to make an enrolment, his as^ 
 
 and manner, and by the use of some sault and resistance of such an officer,. 
 
 means and instruments to the jury un- from which dealh resulted,- must have 
 
 known, he deprived her of life. Ibid. been an assiult in resistance of a per- 
 
 slbid. son engaged in making an enrolmeit,. 
 
 iRex V. Plummer, J. Kelyng, 109, 12 and not of a person engaged in th» 
 
126] 
 
 MURDER. 
 
 185 
 
 actual and material sense.* And where a person sets fire to a stack 
 of straw and another is burned to death thereby, he is not guilty of 
 the murder unless the person was there when he set fire to the 
 stack ; if he came afterwards, so that his own act intervened between 
 death and the act of the accused, it is not murder.® So, where a 
 woman and her children were burned to death in their dwelling house, 
 it is not to be inferred that the deed was done by a person engaged in 
 the commission of rape upon, or adultery with, the mother, since the 
 rape or adultery has no relation to the killing, as a consequence of, 
 or in close connection with, it, so as to make it possible to impute the 
 felonious intent of rape to the killing. " And a person is not rendered 
 guilty of murder in the perpetration of a robbery by the fact that he 
 joined with others in pouring turpentine upon the person of the 
 deceased, and was present when someone else set fire to him, where 
 he did not adopt the intent to rob, or agree to the unlawful act.'^ 
 itTor can the death of a person be imputed to one who joined with 
 others in an attempt to rob him, where he was alive at the time they 
 left him, and died or was killed subsequently. * 
 
 service in relation to the draft. United 
 States V. Scott, 3 Wall. 642, 18 L. ed. 
 218 
 
 4'Hoffman V. State, 86 Wis. 166, 59 
 N. W. 588. 
 
 Where one person assaults another 
 and a third person interferes and is 
 killed, the assailant having wholly de- 
 sisted from his demonstration against 
 the person first assaulted and turned 
 around to face the person interferi g, 
 ■who had taken from him a chair with 
 which he had attempted to strike the 
 person first assaulted, when he made 
 motions manifesting an intention to 
 fight with, or defend himself against, 
 the person thus interfering, at a time 
 when it does not appear that anyone 
 was threatening or assaulting the per- 
 son first assaulted, when the person 
 interfering spra-g forward and struck 
 the original assailant a heavy blow 
 felling him to the floor, after which be 
 got up and engaged in a struggle with 
 his assailant, during which the wound 
 was given which caused the latter's 
 death, the original assault must be 
 deemed to have terminated a-d been 
 at an end at the time of the killing, so 
 that he could not be held guilty of mur- 
 (Itr in the third degree, consisting of 
 the killing of a human being by a per- 
 son engaged in the commission of a, 
 felony. Ibid. 
 
 BReg. V. Horsey, 3 Fost. & F. 287. 
 
 So, knowledge that a person was in a 
 house to which fire was set within the 
 meaning of a statute defining the crime 
 of arson and providing that, should the 
 death of any person ensue therefrom, 
 known to be occupying or present in 
 said premises at the time they were 
 wilfully set fire to, the offender shall be 
 deemed guilty of murder in the first 
 degree, is knowledge at the time the 
 house was set on fire, and not knowl- 
 edge that he was there some other time 
 during the progress of the fire. Mc- 
 Claine v. Territory, 1 Wash. 345, 25 
 Pac. 453. 
 
 ePliemling v. State, 46 Wis. 516, 1 
 N. W. 278. 
 
 'Chapman v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. 
 Rep. 328, 96 Am. St. Rep. 874, 65 S. W. 
 1098. 
 
 sMoore v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Ren. 
 45, 68 S. W. 279. '^ 
 
 But an instruction in a prosecution 
 for murder in the first degree, to the 
 effect that if the person killed was 
 robbed at the time he received the in- 
 juries from which he died, an inference 
 arises that the assault was made lor 
 the purpose of robbery, is not objection- 
 able as authorizing the jury to infer 
 that the injuries were inflicted for the 
 purpose of robbery, though it should not 
 be found that the assault and robbery 
 
186 HOMICIDE. [5 126 
 
 Where a homicide is committed within the res gestm of a felony, 
 however, it is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to per- 
 petrate, a felony within the meaning of such statutes.® That the at- 
 tempt to commit the felony was not far advanced does not lessen 
 the offense.**' And a burglar who breaks into a building, or who 
 shoots a person who discovers him in an effort to escape, cannot avoid 
 punishment for murder in the first degree, upon the theory that the 
 burglary consisted in breaking in, and was consummated before the 
 killing. * * A burglar may be said to be engaged in the commission 
 of the crime of burglary while making away with the plunder, and 
 while engaged in securing it. *^ So, a robbery within the meaning 
 of a rule that a homicide committed in the perpetration of a robbery 
 is murder in the first degree is not necessarily concluded by the re- 
 moval of the goods from the presence of the o^vner; and it is not 
 necessary that the homicide should be committed at the precise time 
 and place of the robbery.^* As in the case of burglary, the robber 
 may be said to be engaged in the commission of the crime while he is 
 endeavoring to escape and make away with the goods taken. * * And 
 a homicide committed immediately after a robbery, apparently for 
 the purpose of preventing detection, is within the rule. * ® So, where 
 a person was present at the time morphine was administered to an- 
 other for the purpose of robbing him, though absent at a subsequent 
 time when chloral was given to him, he is not entitled to a direction 
 
 was committed by the same person, killed a person who approached, the one 
 
 State V. Johnson, 72 Iowa, 393, 34 N. inside is not entitled to an acquittal on 
 
 W. 177. a charge of murder in the first degree, 
 
 sBissot V. State, 53 Ind. 408. even in the absence of any showing of 
 
 And one who goes into a saloon and a conspiracy to kill. Starka v. State, 
 
 aims a pistol at people inside, com- 137 Ala. 9, 34 So. 687. 
 
 manding them to throw up their hands, i2Dolan v. State, 64 N. Y. 485, Affirm- 
 
 and directs the proprietor to open the ing 6 Hun, 493; Hedrick v. State, 40 
 
 safe, and takes the money and watches Tex. Crim. Rep. 532, 51 S. W. 252. And 
 
 of the persons in the room, when he see Bissot v. State, 53 Ind. 408. 
 
 and the proprietor shoot at each other lastate v. Brown, 7 Or. 186. 
 
 and the proprietor is killed, is guilty KIbid. 
 
 of murder in the first degree perpe- iBState v. Williams (Neb.) 82 Pac. 
 
 trated in the commission of a robbery, 353. 
 
 without reference to which of the two And an instruction that murder com- 
 
 fired the first shot. Smith v. State, 31 mitted after the perpetration of, or at- 
 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 14, 19 S. W. 252. tempt to perpetrate, a burglary, and 
 
 loState V. Greenleaf, 71 N. H. 6Q6, 54 when the party is in flight, is not done 
 
 Atl. 38. in such perpetration of, or attempt to 
 
 iiBissot V. State, supra. But see perpetrate, within the meaning of the 
 
 People V. Wardrip, 141 Cal. 229, 74 statute, is not applicable to evidence 
 
 Pae- 744. showing that if the accused did the 
 
 So, where two persons were engaged killing it was done in immediate con- 
 in burglarizing a store, and one was nection with the burglary and before 
 inside and the other outside keeping flight. People v. Wardrip, 141 Cal. 229, 
 watch, and the one outside shot and 74 Pae. 744. 
 
5 126] MURDER. 187 
 
 that, unless it appears that death resulted from the morphine, he must 
 be acquitted. ^ * 
 
 127. Distinction between preparation and attempt. — ^An attempt in 
 general is an overt act done in pursuance of an intent to do a specific 
 thing, tending to the end, but falling short of complete accomplish- 
 ment of it, the overt act being sufficiently approximated to the in- 
 tended crime to form one of the natural series of acts which the in- 
 tent requires for its full execution. * And where one's acts are con- 
 fined to preparation only, and can be abandoned before any trans- 
 gression of the law or of others' rights, they are within the sphere of 
 intent, and do not amount to an attempt within the meaning of laws 
 defining homicide in an attempt to commit some other crime. ^ And 
 to constitute an act an attempt to commit a crime, a specific intent 
 to commit it must have existed at the moment of the performance of 
 the act, and not have been formed afterwards. * Thus, a mere intent 
 to commit a rape is of no effect upon the grade of a subsequent kill- 
 ing, unless accompanied by overt acts directed toward its accomplish- 
 ment and" indicating the intent and purpose.* And an entry into 
 a house in which there was a woman is not an attempt to commit a 
 rape upon her, where the intent to do so was formed after the entry." 
 And an attack upon a father for the purpose of gaining access to his 
 daughter, the attacking parties retiring on meeting with resistance, 
 is not an attempt to commit a rape, which would render their subse- 
 quent return and killing of the father murder in the first degree.® 
 Nor does the act of a man in going to the house of a woman whom he 
 had seduced, for the purpose of carrying her away in order that he 
 might further degrade her, deprive him of the right to urge that he 
 acted in self-defense in shooting her brother, nothing else being shown 
 in the way of an attempt on his part to carry out his purpose. ^ So, 
 the act of a person in going to another person's house and watching 
 it, and preparing a rope with which to tie him, pursuant to an intent 
 
 icRupe V. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. during which the daughter attempted 
 
 477, 61 S. W. 929. to leave the house to call assistance, 
 
 iCom. V. Eagan, 190 Pa. 10, 42 Atl. when one of them caught her by her 
 
 374; People v. Sullivan, 173 N. Y. 122, limb, and when she defended herself, he 
 
 63 L.R.A. 353, 93 Am. St. Rep. 582, 65 let her go; and when she returned her 
 
 N. E. 989. father was found with his skull frac- 
 
 2Ibid. tured, and the intruders were gone, — a 
 
 SKelly V. Com. 1 Grant, Cas. 484. question for the jury in a prosecution 
 
 4lbid. for the killing is raised as to whether 
 
 Bibid. the death of the father was produced in 
 
 6Ibid. an attempt to commit a rape, and they 
 
 But where two men attacked a father should be told what acts are necessary 
 
 for the purpose of gaining access to his to constitute an attempt. Ibid. 
 
 daughter, but were repulsed, and after- 7l?eavers v. State, 54 Ark. 336, 15 S. 
 
 wards returned and a scuiBSe ensued, W. 1024. 
 
188 HOMICIDE. [1 127 
 
 to rob him, does not amount to an attempt to rob within the meaning 
 of laws of this class, but is mere preparation.* The rule would be 
 different, however, if he attacked such person and assisted in gagging 
 and binding him for the purpose of disabling him from resisting an 
 entry into the house, the transaction amounting to an attempt in such 
 case.® And one who enters a house by a window and puts out a 
 light, and shoots the owner upon being grappled by him, kills him 
 in an attempt to commit a robbery or burglary, as distinguished from 
 a mere intent. ' " Nor can several men who have ridden a long dis^ 
 tance, armed and prepared for traveling, and who surround a depot 
 for the purpose of robbing an agent of money shipped there that day, 
 firing upon and killing him upon his asking them to stop, escape pun- 
 ishment for a murder in an attempt to commit a robbery, upon the 
 theory that there was merely a preparation to rob, and no more.^^ 
 And evidence that a person took the property of another after killing 
 him, and appropriated it to his own use, is sufficient to sustain a con- 
 viction of murder in an attempt to commit a robbery, though no 
 previous purpose to rob appears ; since his act raises a strong presump- 
 tion that he intended to do what he afterwards voluntarily did. * * 
 
 5. Abandonment of unlawful design. 
 
 128. Effect, generally — ^Where one intending to commit a felonious 
 or unlawful act abandons his intent, and afterwards accidentally kills 
 the person, he is not guilty of murder, or even of involuntary man- 
 slaughter in the commission of an unlawful act.^ But it would be 
 otherwise if the process of execution of the felony or unlawful act 
 had attained such a condition that it would proceed along its natural 
 course without the offender's agency, until it either succeeded or 
 miscarried;^ or where the abandonment was caused by fear of de- 
 tection or of capture.^ And declarations of the accused in a prose- 
 cution for homicide in the commission of a robbery, to the effect that 
 previous to the crime he had made a mental reservation in respect to 
 killing the person robbed, are not competent as proof of a subsequent 
 abandonment of the design on his part. * 
 
 sCom. V. Eagan, 190 Pa. 10, 42 Atl. 268. And see State v. Adams, 115 N. 
 
 374. C. 775, 50 S. E. 722. 
 
 sibid. iMcPherson v. State, 22 Ga. 478; 
 
 loCom. V. Manfredi, 162 Pa. 144, 29 State v. Gray, 19 Nev. 212, 8 Pac. 456. 
 
 Atl. 404. 2State v. Gray, supra. 
 
 iilsaaes v. State, 36 Tex. Crim. Eep. sibid. 
 
 505, 38 S. W. 40. 4State v. Shockley, 29 Utah, 25, SO 
 
 i2Blvthe V. State, 4 Ohio C. C. 435, Pac. 865. 
 Affirmed in 47 Ohio St. 234, 24 N. E. 
 
S 1U9J MURDER. 189 
 
 i. Dangerous acts evincing depraved mind regardless of human life. 
 
 1. What included in. 
 
 129. General rules. — ^Under statutes providing that the killing of 
 a human being without authority of law, when perpetrated by an act 
 imminently dangerous to others, evincing a depraved mind regard- 
 less of human life, is murder or is murder in the first degree, as well 
 as under the common-law rule that malice is implied from acts evin- 
 cing a depraved mind regardless of human life, such a killing falls 
 within the statute though there was no deliberation, premeditation, 
 or intent to kill. ^ While malice is an essential element in the crime 
 of murder, either at common law or under these statutes, it is not 
 necessarily confined to an intention to take the life of the person 
 killed, but includes an intent to do any unlawful act which may 
 probably deprive a person of life, malice being implied from such 
 act.^ The qualities of acts imminently dangerous and evincing a 
 depraved mind regardless of human life, within the meaning of such 
 provisions, are to be found in the acts themselves and the circum- 
 stances of their commission.* And where a person does such an act 
 and death results, he is chargeable with knowledge of the probable 
 consequences of such act and with responsibility therefor.* The 
 malice thus implied is spoken of as universal malice ; ® and is usiially 
 illustrated by a case of recklessly throwing down a billet of wood 
 from a house top onto the sidewalk, where persons are constantly pass- 
 ing;^ and an illustration is also furnished by the firing of a gun or 
 
 iGordon v. State (Miss.) 29 So. 529; without a premeditated design to kill, 
 
 Mitchell V. State, 60 Ala. 26; Smith v. shoots and kills another, he is guilty 
 
 State, 68 Ala. 424; Bailey v. State, 133 of murder, is not inconsistent with an- 
 
 Ala. 155, 32 So. 57 ; People v. Doyell, 48 other instruction in reference to mur- 
 
 Cal. 85; People v. Holmes, 118 Cal. 444, der deliberately and wilfully committed 
 
 50 Pac. 675; State v. Brown, Houst. with malice aforethought. Gordon v. 
 
 Crim. Rep. (Del.) 539; Golding v. State, supra. 
 
 State, 26 Fla. 530. 8 So. 311 ; Brown v. sHogiin v. State, 36 Wis. 226. 
 
 State, 28 Ga. 199;" State v. Johnson, 102 4 Washington v. State, 60 Ala. 10, 31 
 
 Ind. 247, 1 N. E. 377 ; Wellar v. People, Am. Rop. 28. 
 
 30 Mich. 16; Com. v. Lewis, Addison Evidence that the previous life of a 
 
 (Pa.) 279. And see People v. Divine, man had been peaceable and quiet is 
 
 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 594; People v. Camp- competent and of great importance in 
 
 bell, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 307. a prosecution against him for homicide, 
 
 2 Warren v. State, 4 Coldw. 130; Com. on the question of the existence of a 
 
 V. Lewis, supra; State v. Moore, 25 depraved mind regirdless of human life 
 
 Iowa, 128, 95 Am. Dee. 776. within the meaning of the New York 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution statute as to murder in the first de- 
 fer homicide, that if the accused in the gree. People v. Campbell, 1 Edm. Sel. 
 commission of an act imminently dan- Cas. 307. 
 
 ,gerous to others, evincing a depraved sMitchell v. State, 60 Ala. 26. 
 
 heart regardless of human life, though eMoore v. State, 18 Ala. 532. 
 
190 HOMICIDE. [I 129 
 
 missile into a crowd ;^ and by the derailing of a railway train. * An 
 intention to do bodily barm, however, is an essential element in the 
 crime of murder under a statute providing that the killing of a human 
 being without authority of law, when perpetrated by an act immi- 
 nently dangerous to others, evincing a depraved mind regardless of 
 human life, although without premeditated design for the death of 
 any particular individual, is murder.* And such a statutory provi- 
 sion embraces only such acts as result in death, imperiling indis- 
 criminately the lives of many persons or other persons, but which are 
 not aimed at any particular person ; and do not include a killing by 
 an act imminently dangerous to, or directed specifically against, the 
 person killed. ^ " Thus, the rule that it is murder to kill a person in 
 the commission of an act imminently dangerous to others, evincing 
 a depraved heart regardless of human life, though without premedi- 
 tated design to effect the death of any particular person, is not ap- 
 plicable where a person shot one of several who approached him with- 
 out showing a warrant, declaring they came to arrest him, and de- 
 manding submission. ^ ^ And no such issue arises from evidence 
 showing either a malicious killing by shooting into a crowd of persons 
 with whom the shooter had had a difficulty, or a killing for self-pro- 
 tection. * ^ Cases intended to be embraced within the statutory pro- 
 vision are those in which the acts by which the homicide is com- 
 mitted are directed against no particular person, but against a num- 
 ber of persons ; or where the act is imminently dangerous to a num- 
 
 7See infra, next section. is carried on upon the theory that the 
 sSee infra, § 132. killing was done with a deliberate, pre- 
 sPeople ex rel. McMahon v. West- meditated design to effect death, and 
 Chester County, 1 Park. Crim. Rep. 659. the jury weie instructed to find a ver- 
 Death caused by the burning of a diet of not guilty, unless they concluded 
 steamboat resulting from the making that the killing was done with such de- 
 of excessive fires for the purpose of sign to effect death, the court of ap- 
 ereating excessive steam in order to peals will not reverse a judgment of the 
 outraee another boat is not homicide general term reversing a conviction by 
 effected by an act imminently danger- the trial court upon the ground that the 
 ous to others, evincing a depraved mind evidence authorized the jury to con- 
 regardless of human life, under a New vict of a killing by an act imminently 
 York statute making such homicide dangerous to others, and evincing a de- 
 murder in the first degree, because of praved mind regardless of human life, 
 the absence of the intent to do bodily though without a premeditated design 
 harm to anyone. Ibid. to effect death, since the question of 
 loDarry v. People, 10 N. Y. 120; Hit- fact involved had not been submitted to 
 ehell V. State, 60 Ala. 26; State v. the jury or passed upon by the general 
 Lowe, 66 Minn. 296, 68 N. W. 1094; term. People v. Conroy, 97 N. Y. 62. 
 Jewell v. Territory, 4 Okla. 53, 43 Pac. "Strickland v. State, 81 Miss. 134, 
 1075. But see contra, People v. Haves, 32 So. 921. 
 
 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 582; People v. Cainp- laWood v. State, 81 Miss. 408, 33 So. 
 
 bell, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 307. 285. 
 But where a prosecution for homicide 
 
S 129] MDRDEE. 191 
 
 ber of persons, but directed against none. * ® And it must have been 
 imminently dangerous to more than the person killed. ^ * 
 
 It has been held, however, that the words, "any act imminently 
 dangerous to others," in such statutes mean any act imminently dan- 
 gerous to any person or persons other than the one committing it. 
 And stabbing another for a fancied, but groundless, cause has been 
 held to be an act imminently dangerous to others and evincing a de- 
 praved mind regardless of human life, which would justify a verdict 
 of murder in the first degree where death results, ^ ^ though the rule 
 is different where death was not the natural and probable result of 
 the act of the accused, or where it was not an act naturally calcu- 
 lated to destroy life ; and striking a woman a blow with the clenched 
 fist, causing premature labor and convulsions, which caused death, 
 does not constitute murder either under the statute or at common 
 law. ^ '' And the negative terms, "although without any premeditated 
 design to effect the death of any particular individual," do not ex- 
 clude from the definition of murder cases of constructive malice 
 against a particular individual; the definition should be construed 
 as though the words were, "although without premeditated design to 
 effect the death of any person." ^ ^ 
 
 2, Particular cases. 
 
 130. Reckless use of firearms — The question whether the uninten- 
 tional killing of one person by another with firearms resulted from a 
 dangerous act evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life, 
 and is, therefore, murder, or merely involuntary manslaughter in the 
 commission of an unlawful act, depends upon whether the act was a 
 reckless, or only a negligent, shooting.^ And one who intentionally 
 and recklessly fires a pistol into a private residence and kills a per- 
 son is guilty of murder in the first degree, and not merely of negli- 
 
 Evidence' establishing the fact of a is Jewell v. Territory, 4 Okla. 53, 43 
 
 killing occurring in a personal dif- Pao. 1075. 
 
 liculty between the parties, and show- i4Ibid.; State v. Lowe, 66 Minn. 296, 
 
 ing actions indicating an intention of 68 N. W. 1094. 
 
 the slayer to kill the other, does not leHogan v. State, 36 Wis. 226. And 
 
 tend to establish murder in the second see People v. Hayes, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 
 
 degree, defined by statute to be the kill- 582; People v. Campbell, 1 Edm. Sel! 
 
 ing of a human being without author- Cas. 307. 
 
 ity of law, when perpetrated by an act lePeople v. Skeehan, 49 Barb. 217. 
 
 imminently dangerous to others, and l7People v. McKeon, 31 Hun, 449! 
 
 evincing a depraved mind regardless of isHogan v. State, 36 Wis. 227. 
 
 human life, although without premedi- iPool v. State, 87 Ga. 526, 13 S. K 
 
 tated design to effect the death of any 556. 
 particular individual. Golding v. State, 
 26 Fla. 530. 8 So. 311. 
 
192 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 [1 130 
 
 gent homicide ; * and this is so though there was no actual intent to 
 kill or injure anyone;^ and so of one who recklessly shoots into a 
 crowd causing death. * So, where one voluntarily fires a loaded fire- 
 arm toward another, without excuse or justification, and kills him, 
 the act is reckless and malice is presumed, and he will be held re- 
 sponsible for the consequences, and the grade of the offense will not 
 be reduced to manslaughter, though there was no intent to hit him;® 
 and such a case does not call for a charge on involuntary man- 
 slaughter.* And one who deliberately shoots at another and kills 
 him cannot escape responsibility on the plea that the distance was so 
 great that he did not suppose the ball would reach its object, and that, 
 therefore, there was no intent to kill.^ So, the pointing of a loaded 
 firearm incautiously and recklessly at another shows such a high 
 degree of wilful recklessness as to make one guilty of murder, where 
 it goes off and kills the former, though there was no intent to kill.* 
 And evidence of pointing and snapping a pistol at several persons 
 without provocation, when it went off and killed one of such persons, 
 warrants a conviction for murder, as against a claim that the shoot- 
 
 zRussell V. state, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 590, 44 S. W. 159; State v. Capps, 134 
 N. C. 622, 66 S. E. 730. 
 
 And in such a, case, that the person 
 shooting was on friendly terms with 
 the family living in the house is not ad- 
 missible in evidence in behalf of the 
 defense. State v. Capps, supra. 
 
 3 Ibid. 
 
 •iMitchell V. State, 60 Ala. 26; Wash- 
 ington V. State, 60 Ala. 10, 31 Am. 
 Eep. 28; Bailev v. State, 133 Ala. 155, 
 32 So. 57; Ringer v. State (Ark.) 85 
 S. W. 410; State v. Brown, Houst. 
 Crim. Rep. (Del.) 539; Smith v. State 
 (Ga.) 52 S. E. 329; State v. Young, 50 
 W. Va. 96, 88 Am. St. Eep. 846, 40 S. 
 E. 334. And see State v. Bell (Del.) 
 62 Atl. 147. 
 
 And an instruction in a. prosecution 
 for homicide that one who fires into a. 
 crowd out of mere wantonness, upon a 
 sudden notior, is as guilty as if he had 
 lain in wait for his victim, is not sub- 
 ject to objection as prejudicial to the 
 accused, where it was used by the court 
 in citing a hypothetical case in defining 
 the crime with which he was charged, 
 and not as a direction to determine 
 whether the facts of the case canstitut- 
 ed such a crime. State v. Kelly, 1 Nev. 
 224. 
 
 Killing a person by firing a gun or 
 pistol recklessly into a crowd is murder 
 
 in the second degree in Missouri. State 
 v. Edwards, 71 Mo. 312. 
 
 eStovall V. State, 106 Ga. 443, 32 S. 
 E. 586; Austin v. State, 110 Ga. 748, 78 
 Am. St. Rep. 134, 36 S. E. 52; Bailey 
 V. State, supra; State v. Vance, 17 
 Iowa, 138; State v. Sisson, 3 Brev. 58; 
 Doherty v. State, 84 Wis. 152, 53 N. 
 W. 1120. And see Jordan v. State 
 (Fla.) 39 So. 155. 
 
 One who shot at another merely for 
 the purpose of frightening his horse 
 and making him throw his rider, think- 
 ing he had elevated his pistol enough to 
 avoid hitting such rider, but who hit 
 and killed him, is guilty of murder, and 
 not merely of manslaughter. State v. 
 Smith, 2 Strobh. L. 77, 47 Am. Dec. 589. 
 
 6Stovall V. State, supra. 
 
 It is not error on tha trial of a case 
 of homicide from the reckless use of 
 firearms to decline a request to charge 
 the jury in the language of the statute, 
 if the homicide was by misadventure. 
 Pool v. State, 87 Ga. 526, 13 S. E. 556. 
 
 7Studstill V. State, 7 Ga. 14. 
 
 sPool V. State, supra; State v. Kelly, 
 1 Nev. 224; State v. Vines, 93 N. C. 493, 
 53 Am. Rep. 466; Tarvers v. State, 90 
 Tenn. 485, 16 S. W. 1041. 
 
 But it is improper to charge the jury 
 on the trial of a person accused of 
 murder, who set up in defense that the 
 gun with which the fatal shot was fired 
 
§ 130] MURDER. 193 
 
 ing was accidental.* Nor does the rule differ where a person, with- 
 out lawful excuse, intentionally fires a loaded firearm into a crowd 
 •of people, not with a design of killing anyone but for his own diver- 
 sion ; and where one of the crowd is killed he is guilty of murder ; ^ " 
 and in such case there is no call for a charge on involuntary man- 
 slaughter. ^ ^ And one of the questions in grading a homicide is 
 whether a firearm with which the killing was done was recklessly 
 fired with criminal indifference to the consequences. It is not neces- 
 sary to constitute the crime of murder that the accused should have 
 been engaged in an unlawful act at the time. ^ ^ 
 
 An unintentional killing by the use of firearms, however, is not 
 necessarily murder, but may be manslaughter in the commission of 
 an unlawful act; in order to make it murder it must appear that 
 there was an intention on the part of the slayer to discharge the fire- 
 arm, and that the circumstances wftre su.''.h that an act of that char- 
 acter would naturally tend to destroy life. ^ ^ And where two persons 
 enter into a conflict, after the discontinuance of which a pistol in the 
 hands of one of them is accidentally fired killing a third person, re 
 -suiting from his carelessness in handling it, he is guilty of man- 
 slaughter, and not murder. ^ * Nor is there any criminality in shoot- 
 ing in order to frighten away one whom a person believes to be about 
 to assault him. * ' 
 
 131. Assaults. — While death resulting from an ordinary assault 
 and battery, there being no intent to kill, wonld be involuntary man- 
 slaughter only, if the assault and battery were of such a character as 
 to be likely to produce death it evinces a heart devoid of social duty, 
 and a depraved mind regardless ot human life, and the killing is 
 
 was accidentally discharged, that if loMitehell v. State, 60 Ala. 26; 
 
 they believed from the evidence that Washington v. State, 60 Ala. 10, 31 Am. 
 
 the killing of deceased was the result of Rep. 28; Bailey v. State, 133 Ala. 155, 
 
 •criminal negligence in handling the gun, 32 So. 57; Ringer v. State (Ark.) 85 
 
 it would constitute the offense of mur- S,. W. 410; Golding v. State, 26 lia. 
 
 der. Roberts v. State, 112 Ga. 542, 37 530, 8 So. 311; Brown v. Cora. 13 Ky L 
 
 S. E. 879. Rep. 372, 17 S. W. 220; Golliher v. Com. 
 
 9Holt V. State, 89 Ga. 316, 15 S. E. 2 Duv. 163, 87 Am. Dec. 493; Stnte v. 
 
 316. Edwards, 71 Mo. 312; State v. Young, 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution 50 W. Va. 96, 88 Am. St. Rep. 846, 40 
 
 for murder against one who pointed a S. E. 334. 
 
 gun at another, when it was discharged n Clark v. State, 117 Ga. 254, 43 S. 
 
 killing the latter, that the defendant E. 853. 
 
 is entitled to an acquittal if there is 12P00I v. State, 87 Ga. 526, 13 S. E. 
 
 reasonable doubt as to whether or not 556. 
 
 the shooting was accidental, is improper, isAustin v. State, 110 Ga. 748, 78 
 
 since the shooting might be accidental Am. St. Rep. 134, 36 S. E. 52; Burton 
 
 and still the fatal shot might have v. State, 92 Ga. 449, 17 S. E. 99. 
 
 been fired in the course of the unlawful KMinton v. Com. 79 Kv. 461. 
 
 act of presenting the gun at the person i°Ringer v. State(Ark.)85 S. W. 410. 
 -of the deceased. Sanders v. State, 105 
 Ala. 4. 16 So. 936. 
 Horn.— 13. 
 
194 HOMICIDE. [S 131 
 
 murder within rules of law with reference to killing by such acts.' 
 And it is murder for one person to thrust another upon a bar of iron, 
 by which the latter's ribs are broken causing death. ^ And the com- 
 mission of an assault and battery upon another, death resulting, with 
 knowledge that the person assaulted was in such a feeble condition 
 that the attack would probably endanger life, or inflict great bodily 
 harm, or hasten death, warrants the implication of malice and con- 
 stitutes murder, though it would not if the assailant was unaware 
 of the other's condition.* Nor is it necessary that the evil intent or 
 the act calculated to cause death should have been directed toward 
 the per son killed, and where a person attempts to kill another, and 
 a third person interferes and is killed by him, the evil intent with 
 which the first person was assaulted will be deemed to have entered 
 into the purpose with which the second assault was made.* And 
 where a man threw a missile, which struck a person, breaking a lamp 
 which she was carrying and igniting her clothing, whereupon she 
 was burned to death, he is guilty of murder whether he intended the 
 missile should strike her or another, or whether he had any specific 
 intent or acted solely from general malicious recklessness." So, 
 where several persons, pursuant to a conspiracy to beat and rob an- 
 other, continue their beating until he is dead, a charge of man- 
 slaughter is not called for in a prosecution for the killing, upon the 
 theory that the object was to rob, and not to murder. ® Where the act 
 or nssault is in itself lawful, however, or, if unlawful, not dangerous 
 in chai-acter, the rule is different, since in such case the result is ac- 
 cidental and therefore not presumed to be within the contemplation 
 of the person doing the act. '^ And one who seizes another who is at- 
 tempting to pick his pocket and throws him into an adjoining pond, 
 intending to avenge the vsrrong by ducking him, is guilty of man- 
 slaughter only, where the thief is drowned.^ Nor is the stabbing of 
 another for a fancied, though groundless, cause murder in the sec- 
 ond degree within a statutory definition that murder in the second 
 degree consists of the killing of a human being by a person engaged 
 in the commission of any felony, where it is not murder in the first 
 degree, or one of the different degrees of manslaughter, or justifiable 
 or excusable homicide.® 
 
 iBrown v. State, 28 Ga. 199; Mayes SMayeg v. People, 106 111. 306, 46 Am. 
 
 v. People, 106 111. 306, 46 Am. Rep. 698. Rep. 698. 
 
 sTomson's Case, J. Kelyng, 66. sHat^-her v. State, 43 Tex. Grim. Rep> 
 
 3Com. V. Fox, 7 Gray, 585. 237, 65 S. W. 97. 
 
 ^People V. Miller, 121 Cal. 343, 53 'Mayes v. People, supra. 
 
 Pac. 816. 8R V. Fray, 1 East, P. C. 236. 
 
 9 People V. Skeehan, 49 Barb. 217. 
 
! 132] MURDER. 1«5 
 
 132. Derailing railway train — 'So act can be more naturally de- 
 signed to destroy life than the derailing of a railway train, and no 
 act evince a more depraved mind regardless of human life ; and if a 
 railway train is derailed by an obstruction placed upon the track, 
 and a human being is killed, the person committing the act is giiilty 
 of murder in the first degree. ^ And the rule is the same though he 
 did not intend to derail the train, but intended afterwards to signal 
 it to stop, in the hope that for his conduct he would receive a re- 
 ward.^ Nor is it essential, where a- railway train is wrecked and 
 death ensues, that the persons accused of the crime should have been 
 convicted of the crime of wrecking the train, before indictment for 
 the murder of a person who met death in such wreck.* And it is 
 proper on the trial of an indictment for a homicide resulting from 
 such wrecking for the trial judge to charge the jury as to the offense 
 of murder, as defined generally by statute. * And it is competent to 
 prove the wrecking of the train upon the indictment for murder, as 
 the means by which the accused produced death. " So, a statute pro- 
 viding for the punishment by imprisomuent, etc., of any person ob- 
 structing a railway train, providing, however, that, if any person 
 shall by the commission of such an offense cause the death of any 
 person or persons the offender shall be deemed guilty of murder in 
 the first degree, or manslaughter, according to the nature of the of- 
 fense, creates no new offense except in its first provisions, and leaves 
 the crimes of murder and manslaughter to be governed by the same 
 rules that pertain to other cases. ® 
 
 iPresley v. State^ 59 Ala. 98; Mit- to the objection that its only effect 
 
 ehell V. State,_ 60 Ala. 26; State v. would be to inflame the minds of the 
 
 Brown, Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 539; jury against the accused and prevent 
 
 Davis V. State, 51 Neb. 301, 70 N. W. them from giving proper conaideration 
 
 984; Williams v. State, 30 Tex. App. to the real questions made in the case. 
 
 354, 17 S. W. 408. Ibid. 
 
 2Davis V. State, supra. Contra, estate v. Thibodeaux, supra. 
 
 State V. Brown, supra. And testimony showing hostile feel- 
 
 The malicious intent is presumed in ings of the accused and continued acts 
 
 a case of killing by derailing a railway of hostility by him toward a railway 
 
 train from the wilful and malicious act are to be considered in a prosecution 
 
 of placing an obstruction on the track, against him for homicide in placing an 
 
 since the natural and ordinary conae- obstruction upon the track and throw- 
 
 quences of so doing are to cause death, ing a train of ears therefrom, causing 
 
 State V. Brown, supra. the death of a passenger, both to show 
 
 3 State y. Thibodeaux, 48 La. Ann. that he is the person who placed the 
 
 600, 19 So. 680. obstruction on the track and to show 
 
 4Shaw V. State, 102 Ga. 660, 29 S. the malice which prompted the act, but 
 
 E- 477. _ _ the commission of the offense must be 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution clearly shown by other 'testimony. 
 
 for homicide resulting from wrecking a State v. Brooks, 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint 
 
 train, as to the offense of murder as 407. ' 
 
 defined by the statute, is not subject sibid. 
 
196 HOMICIDE. [§ 133 
 
 133. Dueling. — Dueling constitutes an act naturally tending to de- 
 stroy life, and involves deliberation and premeditation, and, inde- 
 pendently of statutory enactment as to dueling, one who kills another 
 in a duel, whether formal or suddenly improvised, and however fairly 
 conducted, is legally a murderer.* And seconds are equally guilty; 
 and so are friends if they give their aid, assistance, and encourage- 
 ment to the contest" And where a party arranges with his ad- 
 versary hours before the fight, that it shall take place, or authorizes 
 his friend to make such arrangements for him, it is not a sudden 
 combat within the meaning of a statute declaring a homicide to be 
 excusable when committed in a sudden combat, without any undue 
 advantage being taken, and without any dangerous weapon being 
 used, and not done in a cruel and unusual manner.^ So, one who 
 enters into a contest dangerously armed, and fights with an unfair 
 advantage, killing his opponent, is guilty of murder and not of man- 
 slaughter, though mutual blows pass.* And the same rule applies 
 where, at the beginning of a conflict, one of the parties prepares a 
 deadly weapon so as to have it ready for use, and afterwards kills 
 the other party with it.® And where two men fight with deadly 
 weapons as the result of a sudden quarrel, and one strikes the other 
 a mortal blow before the latter is prepared to use his weapon, the 
 killing is murder. ® Proof that two persons had an altercation, how- 
 ever, and that one of them insisted that they retire and settle the mat' 
 ter, and that the other went with him though protesting that he did 
 not want to fight, and that he killed the other in the fight, does not 
 show that prearrangement to fight with deadly weapons which would 
 constitute a duel within the meaning of a statutory provision that if 
 either of the combatants in a duel be killed, the survivor shall be 
 deemed guilty of murder in the first degree.^ And mere presence 
 at the time and place of fighting a duel is not sufiicient to render a 
 person guilty of murder of one of the persons in the duel, if he did 
 not sustain the principal either by advice or assistance, and did not 
 
 iThomas v. State, 61 Miss. 60; Peo- estate v. Ellick, 60 N. C. (2 Winst. 
 
 pie V. Bush, 65 Cal. 129, 3 Pac. 590; L.) 56, 86 Am. Dec. 442. 
 
 People ex rel. Terry v. Bartlett, 14 Cal. TQuerrero v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. 
 
 651; State v. Underwood, 57 Mo. 40; Rep. 662, 47 S. W. 655. 
 
 Reg. V. Young, 8 Car. & P. 644. Where two persons arrange to fight 
 
 2Reg. V. Young, supra. each other, and It is claimed on a prose- 
 
 sPeopIe V. Tannan, 4 Park. Crim. cution for tne killing of one by the 
 
 Rep. 514. other that it was done in a sudden com- 
 
 <State V. Hildreth, 31 N. C. (9 Ired. bat, and was therefore excusable, it is 
 
 L.) 429, 51 Am. Dec. 364: St<ite v. for the jury to say from the evidence 
 
 Anderson, 126 Mo. 542, 29 S. W. 576. whether the accused made the previous 
 
 sState V. Christian, 66 Mo. 138; State arrangements for the fight, or whether 
 
 V. Vance, 29 Wash. 435, 70 Pac. 34. they were made by his friends in his be- 
 
§ 133] MUKDER. 197 
 
 go to the place for the purpose of encouraging the unla-wf ul conflict. * 
 A duel has been held to be a special offense, however, under a statute 
 providing that if any person shall, by previous arrangement or agree- 
 ment, j&ght a duel, and in so doing shall kill his antagonist, or any 
 person or persons, or shall inflict such wounds that the party injured 
 shall die therefrom within a year, the offender shall be imprisoned 
 not exceeding five years; and a person so fighting a duel and killing 
 his antagonist is not subject to indictment and prosecution for mur- 
 der." 
 
 j. Statutory malice aforethought 
 
 134. Scope and meaning of. — In Texas and, perhaps, in other 
 states malice aforethought, either express or implied, is made a neces- 
 sary ingredient of murder in either degree by express statutory en- 
 actment* Under such provisions malice aforethought includes all 
 those states of mind under which a killing takes place without any 
 cause which will, in law, justify, excuse, or extenuate the homicide.^ 
 And it is the imperative duty of the court in homicide cases to in- 
 struct the jury as to the meaning of malice aforethought, which is 
 not complied with by merely defining express and implied malice.^ 
 It has been suggested, however, if not directly held, that "malice 
 aforethought" as used in the statutes, and "malice" as the term is 
 used at common law, are convertible terms.* And express malice 
 has been held to be sufliciently alleged by the use of the words "malice 
 aforethought"'* And murder in the first degree is sufficiently charged 
 
 half without his knowledge. People v. sCrook v. State, 27 Tex. App. 198, 11 
 
 Tannan. 4 Park. Criin. Rep. 514. S. W. 444; Childera v. State (Tex. 
 
 sReg. V. Young, 8 Car. & P. 644. App.) 13 S. W. 650; Moody v. State, 
 
 sPeople ex rel. Terry v. Bartlett, 14 30 Tex. App. 422, 18 S. W. 94; Calla- 
 
 Cal. 651. han v. State, 30 Tex. App. 275, 17 S. 
 
 But in People v. Bush, 65 Cal. 129, 3 W. 257; Boyd v. State, 28 Tex. App. 
 
 Pac. 590, it was held that the fact that 137, 12 S. W. 737; Babb v. State, 12 
 
 a mutual encounter between two per- Tex. App. 491; Holmes v. State, 11 Tex. 
 
 sons with deadly weapons comes within App. 223; Garza v. State, 11 Tex. App. 
 
 the statute agiinst dueling does not 345. 
 
 render erroneous a prosecution and con- 4Harre]l v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 viction under the general law as for 204, 45 S. W. 581 ; Cain v. State, 42 
 
 homicide, without making any ref- Tex. Crim. Rep. 210.. 59 S. W. 275; 
 
 erence to the prior case of People ex rel. Honeycutt v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 Terry v. Bartlett, supra, holding the 63 S.' W. 639. And see Fisher v. State, 
 
 contrary rule. 10 Lea, 151. 
 
 iSee Ake v. State, 30 Tex. 466. ePerry v. State, 44 Tex. 473; Gielal 
 
 2JicCoy V. State, 25 Tex. 33, 78 Am. v. State, 28 Tex. App. 151, 12 S. W. 591 ; 
 
 Dec. 620; Tooney v. State, 5 Tex. App. Smith v. State, 31 Tex. Crim Rep 14' 
 
 163: Logan v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 19 S. W. 252. ' 
 
 63 S. W. 694. 
 
19S 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 (I 134 
 
 in an indictment by an allegation that it was committed with malice 
 aforethought* 
 
 m. The diffeeent degeees. 
 a. Murder in the first degree. 
 135. What murder in the first degree includes. — .To constitute mur- 
 der in the first degree under the statutes the deed must have been per- 
 petrated by means of poison, or lying in wait, or in the perpetra- 
 tion of, or attempt to perpetrate, a felony, or some of the named 
 crimes, except under certain special provisions; or there must have 
 been wilf jir^osiJ, deliberation, and premeditation upon the part of 
 the guilty agent. ^ It is not sufficient that the killing was merely wil- 
 ful and malicious; it must have been deliberate and premeditated.^ 
 Unless the homicide was committed in the perpetration, or attempt 
 to perpetrate, one of the named felonies, it must have been com- 
 mitted not only with malice, but also with a deliberate, premeditated, 
 
 6Smith V. State and Giebel v. State, 
 supra; Penland v. State^ 19 Tex. App. 
 365. 
 
 iState V. Johnson, 8 Iowa, 525, 74 
 Am. Dec. 321; Fouta v. State, 8 Ohio 
 St. 98; State v. Townsend, 66 Iowa, 
 741, 24 N. W. 535; Mitchell v. State, 60 
 Ala. 26; Miller v. State (Ala.) 40 So. 
 47; Green v. State, 51 Ark. 189, 10 S. 
 W. 266; Bivens v. State, 11 Ark. 455; 
 People V. Knapp, 71 Cal. 1, 11 Pac. 793; 
 People V. Sanchez, 24 Cal. 17 ; People 
 V. Bowman. 81 Cal. 566, 22 Pac. 917; 
 People V. Cox, 76 Cal. 282, 18 Pac. 332; 
 Van Houton v. People, 22 Colo. 53. 43 
 Pac. 137; State v. Wallace, 2 Penn. 
 (Del.) 402, 47 Atl. 621; State v. Emory 
 (Del.) 58 Atl. 1036; State v. Brinte, 4 
 Penn. (Del.) 551, 58 Atl. 258; Smith v. 
 State, 1 Kan. 365: State v. Sharp, 71 
 Mo. 218; State v. iPhillips, 24 Mo. 475; 
 State V. Gassert, 4 Mo. App. 44; State 
 V. Ellis, 11 Mo. App. 587 Appx. ; Sim- 
 merman V. State, 14 Neb. 568, 17 N. W. 
 115: Milton V. State, 6 Neb. 133; State 
 V. Wong Fun, 22 Nev. 336, 40 Pac. 95; 
 State V. Greenleaf, 71 N. H. 606, 54 Atl. 
 38; People v. Fish, 125 N. Y. 136, 26 
 N. E. 319: State v. I-ocklear, 118 N. C. 
 1154, 24 S. E. 410; State v. Rhyne, 124 
 N. C. 847, 33 S. E. 128; State v. Gar- 
 rand, 5 Or. 216: Com. v. Crause, 4 Clark 
 (Pa.) 600; Com. v. Daley, 2 Clark 
 (Pa.) 361; Com. v. Corrigan, 1 Pittsb. 
 292; Mitchell v. State, 5 Yerg. -350; 
 Dale V. State, 10 Yerg. 551 ; Jordan v. 
 
 State, 10 Tex. 479; McDaniel v. Com. 
 77 Va. 281; Blanton v. State, 1 Wash. 
 265, 24 Pac. 439 ; Leonard v. Territory, 2 
 Wash. Terr. 381. 7 Pac. 872; Respublica 
 V. Bob, 4 Dall. 145, 1 L. ed. 776; North 
 Carolina v. Gosnell, 74 Fed. 734. And] 
 see People v. Woods, 147 Cal. 265, 81 
 Pac. 652; People v. Breen, 181 N. Y. 
 493, 74 N. E. 483; State v. Hunt, 134 ¥. 
 C. 684, 47 S. E. 49; Com. v. Danz, 211 
 Pa. 507, 60 Atl. 1070; Com. v. Gibson, 
 211 Pa. 546, 60 Atl. 1086; Com. v. 
 Johnson, 211 Pa. 640, 61 Atl. 246; Vann 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 85 S. W. 
 1064. 
 
 And error in an instruction in a 
 homicide case authorizing a verdict of 
 murder in the first degree, without 
 finding deliberation or premeditation, 
 is not cured by another instruction cor- 
 rectly defining the offense. State v. 
 DearinfT, 65 Mo. 530. 
 
 sAnthony v. State, Meigs, 265, 33 
 Am. Dec. 143; Lewis v. State, 3 Head, 
 127; Swan v. State, 4 Humph. 137; 
 Eastliiig V. State, 69 Ark. 189, 62 S. 
 W. 584; Cannon v. State, 60 Ark. 584, 
 31 S. W. 150, 32 S. W. 128; People v. 
 Sanchez, 24 Cal. 17; People v. Long, 39 
 Cal. 694; People v. Nichol, 34 Cal. 211; 
 People V. Foren, 25 Cal. 361 ; People v. 
 Williams, 73 Cal. 531, 15 Pac. 97; Peo- 
 ple V. Guance, 57 Cal. 154; Wiggins v. 
 State, 23 Fla. 180, 1 So. 693; Denham v. 
 State, 22 Fla. 664; Nye v. People, 35 
 Mich. 16; State v. Bro^vn, 12 Minn. 53S, 
 
5 135] MURDER. 199 
 
 preconceived design to take life.^ The elements of the crime of 
 murder must exist as at common law, together with the additional 
 ones of premeditation and deliberation.* And an instruction as to 
 murder in the first degree, ignoring the elements of deliberation and 
 premeditation, is erroneous and a ground for reversal on appeal, 
 though the offense was correctly described in another instruction.^ 
 The homicide must have been purposely committed after reflection, 
 with malice, and must have been determined ixpon beforehand.® It 
 must have been wilful, deliberate, and premeditated, as well as with 
 malice aforethought.^ A mere intentional killing, without more, is 
 not murder in the first degree.® A person may intentionally take 
 
 Cfil. 448; state v. Foster, 61 Mo. 549; not authorize a conviction of murder, 
 State V. Mitchell, 64 Mo. 191; State the necessary element of premeditated 
 V. Bearing, supra; State v. Melton, 67 design being absent. MeCann v. Peo- 
 Mo. 594; State v. Hill, 69 Mo. 451; pie, 6 Park. Grim. Hep. 629. 
 State V. Pacquett, 75 Mo. 330; State v. iState v. Cole, 132 N. C. 1089, 44 S. 
 Kindred, 148 Mo. 270, 49 S. W. 845; E. 391. 
 
 State V. (iassert, 4 Mo. App. 44; Mil- estate v. Mitchell, 64 Mo. 191; State 
 ton V. State, 6 Neb. 136; Simmerman v. v. Hill, 69 Mo. 451. 
 
 State, 14 Neb. 568, 17 N. W. 115; Beers eBouIden v. State, 102 Ala. 78, 15 So. 
 V. State, 24 Neb. 614. 39 N. W. 790; 341; Lang v. State. 84 Ala. 1, 5 Am. St. 
 Anderson v. State, 26 Neb. 387, 41 N. Rep. 324. 4 So. 193; Hammil v. State, 
 W. 951; State v. Wong Fun, 22 Nev. 90 Ala. '577, 8 So. 380; State v. Pack- 
 336, 40 Pac. 95; People v. Walworth, 4 wood, 26 Mo. 340; State v. McCormac, 
 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 355; State v. Rhyne, 116 N. C. 1033, 21 S. E. 693; Cora v 
 124 N. C. 847, 33 S. E. 128; Com. v. Corrigan, 1 Pittsb. 292 ; Garner v. State, 
 Jones, 1 Leigh, 610. , 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 308, 77 S. W. 797. 
 
 But a charge in a prosecution for TPower v. People, 17 Colo. 178, 28 
 homicide defining malice as it is ordi- Pac. 1121; Perry v. State, 43 Ala. 21; 
 narily defined by the authorities, and Smith v. State, 68 Ala. 424; Palmoro v. 
 then stating that an act is done mali- State, 29 Ark. 248; McAdams v. State, 
 ciously when done on purpose and with 25 Ark. 405; Sweeney v. State, 35 Ark! 
 evil intent, is not erroneous and is 585; People v. Valencia, 43 Cal. 552; 
 not to be taken as qualifying a previous State v. Pacouett, 75 Mo. 330 ; Bennett 
 instruction to the effect that to consti- v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 639, 48 S. 
 tvite murder in the first degree there W. 61. And see Ubillos v. Territory 
 must be a killing, without authority (Ariz.) 80 Pac. 363; Dill v. State 
 of law, from a premeditated design to (Miss.) 38 So. 37; Barker v. State 
 effect the death of the person killed. (Neb.) 103 N. W. 71. 
 Lovett V. State, 30 Fla. 142, 17 L.R.A. And an instruction in a prosecution 
 705, 11 So. 550. for homicide that it is only necessary 
 
 sPeople V. Long, 39 Cal. 694; Dabney that the act of killing be preceded by a 
 V. State, 113 Ala. 38, 59 Am. St. Rep. concurrence of will, deliberation, and 
 92, 21 So. 211; Schlencker v. State, 9 premeditation on the part of the slayer 
 Neb. 300, 2 N. W. 710; People- v. Lamb, to make it murder in the first degree is 
 2 Keyes, 360; People v. Barberi, 149 defective and improper as omitting and 
 N. Y. 256, 52 Am. St. Rep. 717, 43 N. precluding the element of malice afore- 
 E. 635; People v. Boggiano, 179 N. Y. thought. State v. Shafer, 22 Mont 17 
 267, 72 N. E. 101; State v. Norwood, 55 Dec. 526. 
 
 115 N. C. 789, 44 Am. St. Rep. 498, 20 sState v. Young, 119 Mo 495 24 S 
 S. E. 712; State v. Thomas, 118 N. C. W. 1038; State v. Herrell 97 Mo 10^' 
 1113, 24 S. E. 431. 10 Am. St. Rep. 289, lo' S. W 387 
 
 And evidence tending to show that a State v. Williams, 69 Mo 110- Harris 
 homicide was committed by stabbing v. State, 36 Ark. 127; People v Barry 
 with a knife in immediate retaliation of 31 Cal. 357; Cook v. State (Fla ) 35 So 
 insulting words and a violent blow does 665; Bennett v. State, supra And see 
 
200 HOMICIDE. R 135 
 
 human life without being guilty of murder or of any other crime,, 
 and an instruction in a prosecution for homicide making the inten- 
 tion to kill the distinguishing feature of murder is improper.® There 
 must have been a deliberate purpose to take life or to do some great 
 bodily harm. ^ "^ If the killing was done in the heat of passion, with- 
 out a deliberate and premeditated intent to take life, it is not mur- 
 der in the first degree. ^ * And unless express malice affirmatively ap- 
 pears the accused cannot be guilty of murder in the first degree, 
 though there is no evidence tending to reduce the crime to man- 
 slaughter, or show that it was justifiable or excusable. ^ ^ 
 
 Homicide is murder in the first degree, however, when the person 
 doing the killing had the opportunity and the capacity to deliberate 
 upon the act, and to form a specific and distinct intention to kill 
 from such deliberation, and did so deliberate and intend. ^ * Wilful, 
 deliberate, and premeditated murder is murder in the first degree ; ^ * 
 
 People V. Kohler, 49 Mich. 324, 13 N. i2People v. Knapp, 71 Cal. 1, 11 Pae. 
 
 W. 608. 793. 
 
 sSmith V. People, 142 111. 117, 31 N. isPeople v. Calton, 5 Utah, 451, 18 
 
 E. 599. Pae. 902; Harkness v. State, 129 Ala. 
 
 But an instruction in a prosecution 71, 30 So. 73; State v. Lane, 64 Mo. 
 
 for homicide that a killing may have 319 ; State v. Millain, 3 Nev. 410 ; Green 
 
 been wilful, deliberate, and premedi- v. Com. 83 Pa. 76; Com. v. Drum, 58 
 
 tated, and done with a deadly weapon Pa. 9. 
 
 used for the purpose of killing the de- ^People v. Clark, 7 N. Y. 387; People 
 
 ceased, and still be lawful, is confusing v. Kennedy, 159 N. Y. 346, 70 Am. St. 
 
 and misleading, and properly refused. Kep. 557, 54 N. E. 51; Cleveland v. 
 
 Gafford v. State, 125 Ala. 1, 28 So. 408. State, 86 Ala. 1, 5 So. 426; Lang v. 
 
 loState V. Evans, 65 Mo. 574; Cook State, 84 Ala. 1, 5 Am. St. Rap. 324, 
 
 V. State (Fla.) 35 So. 665. 4 So. 193; Hawes v. State, 88 Ala. 37, 
 
 Where a homicide was not committed 7 So. 302; Stewart v. State, 137 Ala. 33, 
 
 in the perpetration of any felony, and 34 So. 818; Wilkins v. State, 98 Ala. 1, 
 
 the acts indicated no evil or cruel dis- 13 i^o. 312; Ex parte Brown, 65 Ala. 
 
 position upon the part of the accused, ^46; Sherrill v. State, 138 Ala. 3, 35 
 
 to render the killing murder or man- So. 129; People v. Hamblin, 68 Cal. 101, 
 
 slaughter there must have been intent ^„F^%^^^'^ ' ^H^*' X' '^°y^> *^ ^'*""- 
 
 to kill, under the Texas statute. Fitch ^S^^ f^^^e y Frazier, Houst. Crim. 
 
 v. State. 37 Tex. Crim. Rep. 500, 36 S. ?f^- A? 'J. J ' c^''*^^ "l?'i'/'^^' J^ 
 •^Y gg^ *^ ' Mo. 435; State v. Shoultz, 25 Mo. 128; 
 
 iiBowles V. Com. 103 Va. 816, 48 ^^fAl/Vn^Mn' 41 ^^vT' ^p^*^ ^k 
 S. E. 527; Territory v. Friday, 8 N. M. ?,"' fii? «^; S^*' ^*^*« J" ,^f' f 
 904 d9 Vio R9 ^^°- ^*^; State V. Fairlamb, 121 Mo. 
 
 AtiH »^ fn«+r;,pfm« ,-„ » „r^a»„„+i«,. 137, 25 S. W. 895; State v. Williams, 
 Ana an instruction in a prosecution ,„„ ,,„ ,„„ oa i txj noA ci. i 
 
 against a husband for killing his wife Zo^%''^o. sk's I ^^^1^ 
 
 that, if she was found dead in her bed ^. gto'.^kn g Mo. App. 598; Oarleton v. 
 
 with her throat cut, the jury were auth- state, 43 Neb. 373, 61 N. W. 699: State 
 
 orized to find the existence of all the le- y. Millain, 3 Nev. 409; State v. Booker, 
 
 gal requisites of murder in the first de- 123 N. C. 713, 31 S. E. 376; State v. 
 
 gree, is erroneous, as excluding from Gilchrist, 113 N. C. 673, 18 S. E. 319; 
 
 their consideration the questions wheth- state v. Turner, Wright (Ohio) 20; 
 
 er the death was the result of suicide, or State v. Thompson, Wright (Ohio) 617; 
 
 whether it resulted from a conflict State v. Town, Wright (Ohio) 75; 
 
 or provocation which would reduce the Com. v. Brown, 7 Pa. Co. Ct. 640; Com. 
 
 degree. Hall v. State, 40 Ala. 698. v. Lynch, 3 Pittsb. 412; Com. v. Sul- 
 
§ 135] 
 
 MURDER. 
 
 201 
 
 and this is so thongli no motive for the killing appears/^ and 
 though there was an intermediate provocation;"^® and though there 
 was a precedent provocation, when time for cooling had elapsed, 
 there being no such thing in the law of homicide as coexisting malice 
 and passion. ^ ® And this is the rule though the act was committed 
 in a fit of uncontrollable anger or passion ; ^ * and though there were 
 
 livan, 13 Phila. 410; Com. v. Corrigan, 
 1 Pittsb. 292; Anthony v. State, Meigs, 
 26.6, 33 Am. Dee. 143; Lander v. State, 
 12 Tex. 462; Spivey v. State, 45 Tex. 
 Crim. Rep. 496, 77 S. W. 444; State v. 
 Morgan, 22 Utah, 162, 61 Pae. 527; 
 State V. Carr, 53 Vt. 37; State v. 
 Boyce, 24 Wash. 514, 64 Pac. 719. And 
 see Hudson v. State, 40 Tex. 13; Bell 
 V. State, 140 Ala. 57, 37 So. 281 ; State 
 V. Caldwell, 129 N. C. 682, 40 S. E. 85 j 
 Perugi V. State. 104 Wis. 230, 76 Am. 
 St. Rep. 865, 80 N. W. 593; Cupps v. 
 State, 120 Wis. 504, 102 Am. St. Rep. 
 996, 97 N. W. 210, 98 N. W. 546. 
 
 So, shooting a person with deliberate 
 intent to kill, causing his death, is 
 murder with express malice constitut- 
 ing murder in the first degree under the 
 Delaware statute. State v. Costen, 
 Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 340. 
 
 IE State V. Jaggers, 71 N. J. L. 281, 
 58 Atl. 1014. 
 
 isClark v. State, 8 Humph. 671; 
 Casat V. State, 40 Ark. 51 1 ; State v. 
 Scheele. 57 Conn. 307, 14 Am. St. Rep. 
 106, 18 Atl. 256; Dixon v. State, 79 Ga. 
 805, 5 S. E. 289; Cannon v. State, 57 
 Miss. 147; State v. Sloan, 22 Mont. 293, 
 56 Pac. 364; Shufflin v. People, 62 N. 
 Y. 229, 20 Am. Rep. 483; People v. 
 Tuhi, 2 Wheeler, C. C. 242; Fitzgerald 
 V. State, 15 Lea, 99; Clifford v. SUte, 
 58 Wis. 477, 17 N. W. 304. 
 
 Provocation which precedes an act of 
 killing is to be disregarded in a prose- 
 cution for the killing, where a deliber- 
 ate purpose to kill oi the part of the 
 prisoner is aseertai-'ed, unless it can be 
 shown that the purpose was abandoned 
 before the act was done. State v. John- 
 son, 23 N. C. (1 Ired. L.) 354, 35 Am. 
 Dec. 742; State v. Sloan, 22 Mont. 296, 
 56 Pac. 364. 
 
 i7Nowacryk v. People, 139 111. 336, 28 
 N. E. 961; Cates v. State, 50 Ala. 166; 
 Stnte V. Down ham, Houst. Crim. Rep. 
 (Del.) 45; People v. Lilley, 43 Mich. 
 521, 5 N. W. 982; State v. Bulling, 105 
 Mo. 204, 15 S. W. 367, 16 S. W. 830; 
 State V. Kilgore, 70 Mo. 546; State v. 
 Hoyt, 13 Minn. 132, Gil. 125; People v. 
 
 Sullivan, 7 N. Y. 396; People v. Van 
 Brunt, 108 N. Y. 656, 15 N. E. 435; 
 State V. Pankev, 104 N. C. 840, 10 S. E. 
 315; Cora. v. Morrison, 193 Pa. 619, 44 
 Atl. 913; Com. v. Green, 1 Ashm. (Pa.) 
 289; Copeland v. State, 7 Humph. 494; 
 Watson V. Com. 87 Va. 608, 13 S. E. 
 22: Roman v. State, 41 Wis. 312; Clif- 
 ford V. State, 58 Wis. 477, 17 N. W. 
 304; Rex v. Hay ward, 6 Car. & P. 157. 
 
 And evidence that a woman warned 
 another against supplanting her in the 
 affections of a man, and afterwards 
 armed herself with a deadly weapon, 
 and started in search of the man, ap- 
 parently anticipating finding him with 
 her rival, and upon finding them to- 
 gether assaulted her rival, when the 
 man held her until he supposed her 
 rival had time to get out of danger, 
 when he released her, upon which she 
 pursued ard overtook her rival, and de- 
 liberately killed her, establishes mur- 
 der in the first degree, there having 
 been ample time for her passion to cool. 
 State V. Umble, 115 Mo. 452, 22 S. 
 W. 378. 
 
 But the question of cooling time can- 
 not arise, and the law of voluntary 
 manslaughter has no application, in a, 
 case in which the slayer premeditated 
 the homicide, made careful preparations 
 to commit it, and after hunting his vic- 
 tim down deliberately slew him. Perry 
 V. State, 102 Ga. 365, 30 S. E. 903. 
 
 18 State V. Sloan, 22 Mont. 293, 56 N. 
 W. 364. 
 
 laPeople v. Tuczkewitz, 149 N. Y. 
 240, 43 N. E. 548; People v. Van Brunt, 
 108 N. Y. 656, 15 N. E. 435; Com. v. 
 Eckerd, 174 Pa. 137, 34 Atl. 305; State 
 v. Callaway, 154 Mo. 91, 55 S. W. 444; 
 State V. Rider, 95 Mo. 474, 8 S. W. 723; 
 Weatherman v. Com. (Va.) 19 S. E. 
 778. 
 
 Homicide may be committed in the 
 heat of passion suddenly aroused by a 
 blow, and yet be done maliciously; and 
 when this is the case the homicide is not 
 reduced to manslaughter by reason of 
 the passion. Martin v. State, 119 Ala. 
 1, 25 So. 255. 
 
202 HOMICIDE. [| 135 
 
 circumstances of justification ; ^ " and although committed in mutual 
 combat ; ^ ^ and though committed in resisting an assault, when such 
 assault was used as a pretext for the killing ;^^ or provoked for the 
 purpose of furnishing such pretext. ^^ And the rule is the same 
 though the intent was to kill some other person than the one actually 
 killed.^* Nor can one who deliberately, premeditatedly, and in- 
 tentionally uses a deadly weapon upon another in a manner calcu- 
 lated to kill him, and which does kill him, reduce his guilt from mur- 
 der in the first degree by a plea that his intent was to maim, and not 
 to kill.^® And where a homicide was committed, and there was a 
 deliberate and premeditated intent to do the act, and no circum- 
 stances of excuse, justification, or extenuation recognized by law, it 
 is murder in the first degree. ^^ And jealousy or a desire for revenge 
 furnishes no such excuse, justification, or extenuation.^'' Nor is the 
 criminal responsibility of a person who inflicts wounds with a wil- 
 ful, deliberate, and premeditated intention to kill affected by the fact 
 that he afterwards changed his intention and determined not to kill, 
 since his offense was complete before the change.^* So, where the 
 statute defines murder in the first degree to be all murder by poison, 
 or lying in wait, or by torture, or by any other kind of wilful, de- 
 liberate, or premeditated killing, wilful, deliberate, and premeditated 
 murder is not confined, in order to be murder in the first degree, to 
 the character of killing or murder specified in the previous statutory 
 enumeration.^® Murder in the first degree by killing in the commis- 
 
 aoState v. Seheele, 57 Conn. 307, 14 zsState v. Phillips, 24 Mo. 475; State 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 106, 18 Atl. 256; State v. v. Wilson, 16 Mo. App. 550; Kilpatriek 
 
 Kindred, 148 Mo. 270, 49 S. W. 845; v. Com. 31 Pa. 198; Com. v. Sullivan, 
 
 Davidson v. State, 9 Humph. 455. 13 Phila. 410; State v. Ah Mook, 12 
 
 21 State V. Green, 37 Mo. 466; State Nev. 369; Ross v. State, 8 Wyo. 351, 57 
 
 V. Dieekman, 11 Mo. App. 538, Af- Pac. 924. 
 
 firmed in 75 Mo. 570; Smith v. State, And an instruction that intentionally 
 
 88 Ala. 73.. 7 So. 52; Ex parte Nettles, killing arother with a deadly weapon, 
 
 58 Ala. 268; Sneed v. State, 47 Ark. like a pistol, is murder in the first 
 
 180, 1 S. W. 68; Dixon v. State, 79 Ga. degree, when such killing is neither 
 
 805, 5 S. E. 289; People v. Sullivan, 7 justifiable nor excusable, though errone- 
 
 N. Y. 396; Ross v. State, 8 Wyo. 351, 57 ous in the omission of the element of 
 
 Pac. 024. malice, is not reversible error, where 
 
 2 2 Judge v. State, 58 Ala. 406, 29 Am. the jury had been instructed that de- 
 Rep. 757. liberation and premeditated malice was 
 
 2 3Mitehell v. State, 60 Ala. 26. a necessary element of murder in that 
 
 24Johnson v. State, 24 Fla. 162, 4 So. degree. Willis v. State, 43 Neb. 102, 61 
 
 535; Mitchell v. State, supra. N. W. 254. 
 
 25Foster v. People, 50 N. Y. 598. 27State v. Burns, 148 Mo. 167, 71 Am. 
 
 Murder in the first degree may exist gt. Rep. 5S8, 49 S. W. 1005; Ex parte 
 
 under the Texas statute where the de- Jones, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 422, 20 S. W. 
 
 sign of the slayer was either to kill the 983. 
 
 deceased or do him some serious bodily 2 8Howell v. Com. 26 Gratt. 995. 
 
 injury which results in his death. 29Com. v. Jones, 1 Leigh/ 598; 
 
 Duebbe v. State, 1 Tex. App. 159. Whiteford v. Com. 6 Rand. (Va.) 721, 
 
S 135] 
 
 MURDER. 
 
 203 
 
 sion of a felony, or of certain named felonies/" and by acts evincing 
 a depraved mind regardless of human life,^^ is considered in an- 
 other part of this work. 
 
 136. Necessity of intent to take life — ^Where the statute provides 
 ■that all murder or killing perpetrated by a wilful, deliberate, and pre- 
 meditated killing, or perpetrated in the attempt to commit a felony, 
 or certain named felonies, is murder in the first degree, it must have 
 been committed, except in the enumerated cases, with malice and an 
 intent to take life. ^ The words "deliberate and premeditated" used 
 in the statutes mean something different from malice aforethought 
 construed in its legal signification, and confine murder in the first 
 degree to killing with a clear intent to take life resulting from de- 
 liberation and premeditation.^ The intent to take life is the final 
 criterion of murder in the first degree, and the deliberation and pre- 
 meditation required are not upon the formed intent, but in the f orma- 
 
 18 Am. Deo. 771 ; Burgess v. Com. 2 Va. 
 Cas. 483; State v. Harmon, 4 Penn. 
 (Del.) 580, 60 Atl. 86G. 
 
 soSee supra, §§ 118 et seq. 
 
 siSee svpra, §§ 129 et seq. 
 
 iCom. V. Daley, 2 Clark (Pa.) 361; 
 Com. V. Murray, 2 Ashm. (Pa.) 41; 
 Cora. V. Green, 1 Ashm. (Pa.) 289; 
 Com. V. Williams, 2 Ashm. (Pa.) 69; 
 Com. V. Toth, 145 Pa. 308, 22 Atl. 157 ; 
 Keenan v. Com. 44 Pa. 55, 84 Am. Deo. 
 414; Com. v. Cleary, 148 Pa. 26, 23 Atl. 
 1110; Mitchell v. State, 60 Ala. 26; 
 «reen v. State, 51 Ark. 189, 10 S. W. 
 266; People v. Knapp, 71 Cal. 1, 11 Pae. 
 793; People v. Bowman, 81 Cal. 566, 22 
 Pao. 917; People v. Bealoba, 17 Cal. 
 389; People v. Pool, 27 Cal. 572; State 
 V. lioyt, 46 Conn. 336 ; State v. Johnson, 
 40 Conn. 136; Savage v. State, 18 Fla. 
 909; State v. Gillick, 7 Iowa, 287; 
 State v. Decklotts, 19 Iowa, 447; Ex 
 parte Moore, 30 Ind. 197; Smith v. 
 State, 1 Kan. 365; State v. Landgraf, 95 
 Mo. 97, 6 Am. St. Rep. 26, 8 S. W. 237 ; 
 Bower v. State, 5 Mo. 364. 32 Am. Dee. 
 325; State v. Phillips, 24 Mo. 475; State 
 V. Hicks, 27 Mo. 588; State v. Shook, 
 68 Mo. 552, Overruling State v. Nues- 
 lein, 25 Mo. Ill ; State v. Gassert, 4 Mo. 
 App. 44; Territory v. Rowand, 8 Mont. 
 432, 20 Pac. «88, 21 Pao. 19; Schaffer 
 V. State, 22 Neb. 557, 3 Am. St. Rep. 
 274, 35 N. W. 384; Beers v. State, 24 
 Neb. 614, 39 N. W. 790; Milton v. 
 J?tate, 6 Neb. 136; State v. Newton, 4 
 Nev. 410; Donnelly v. State, 26 N. J. L. 
 464; People v. Austin, 1 iPark. Crim. 
 
 Rep. 154; Wilson v. People, 4 Park. 
 Crim. Rep. 619; Hagan v. State, 10 
 Ohio St. 459; State v. Neil, Tappan 
 (Ohio) 88; State v. Turner, Wright 
 (Ohio) 20; Dale v. State, 10 Yerg. 551; 
 Primus v. State, 2 Tex. App. 369 ; How- 
 ell V. Com. 20 Gratt. 995; State v. Mor- 
 rison, 49 W. Va. 210, 38 S. E. 481. And 
 see Siberrv v. State, 149 Ind. 684, 39 
 N. E. 936, 47 N. E. 458; State v. Jones, 
 71 N. J. L. 543, 60 Atl. 396. 
 
 It is essential under the Ohio statute 
 that an indictment for murder in the 
 first degree shall contain a, specific aver- 
 ment of the purpose or intention to in- 
 flict a mortal wound, and an averment 
 of an assault and battery committed 
 with deliberate and premeditated malice 
 resulting in death is insufficient. 
 Fonts v. State, 8 Ohio St. 98; Hagan v. 
 State, supra. 
 
 2State V. Pike, 49 N. H. 399, 6 Am. 
 Rep. 533; Fitzpatriek v. State, 37 Ark. 
 238; People v. Sanchez, 24 Cal. 30; 
 People V. Foren, 25 Cal. 361 ; People v. 
 Williams. 73 Cal. 531, 15 Pac. 97; State 
 V. Hill, 69 Mo. 451 ; State v. Martin, 29 
 Mont. 273, 74 Pac. 725; Milton v. State, 
 6 Neb. 136; State v. Wong Fun, 22 Nev 
 336, 40 Pac. 95; People v. Walworth, 4 
 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 355 ; People v. Barberi 
 149 N. Y. 256, 52 Am. St. Rep. 717, 43 
 N. E. 635; State v. McCormar'. 116 N 
 C. 1033, 21 S. E. 693; State v. Thomas 
 118 N. C. 1113, 24 S. E. 431; Jones v. 
 Com. 75 Pa. 403; Com. v. Drum, 58 
 Pa. 9. 
 
204 HOMICIDE. f§ 13tt 
 
 tion of the intent.^ But the fact that the intent to kill was condition- 
 al, and designed to be carried into effect only on the happening of a 
 particular event, or the performance or nonperformance of a par- 
 ticular act, does not affect it as an ingredient of murder in the first 
 degree. * And the intent to kill need not have been clear and specific ; 
 it is enough that it actually existed. ° And cases of general malice 
 are included, as well as those of a particular nature ; if the intent to 
 kill existed, it need not have been an intent to kill any particular 
 person;' though statutes making the killing of a human being, un- 
 less excusable or justifiable, murder in the first degree when com- 
 mitted from a deliberate or premeditated design to effect the death 
 of the person killed, or of another, were intended to provide solely 
 for cases in which the premeditated design, although not aimed at 
 the person actually killed, was, nevertheless, directed toward some 
 particular individual, and do not include cases in which it was aimed 
 indiscriminately at a multitude of persons, or at human life in gen- 
 eral.'' There must be an intent to kill, however, as distinguished 
 from a mere intent to do the act which causes death. ^ Questions 
 with relation to an intent to kill, or an unlavsrful intent toward one 
 person resulting in the killing of another, are elsewhere considered.* 
 137. Duration of intent to kill — No particular time need intervene 
 between the formation of the purpose to kill and its execution ; it is 
 enough if the design was fully conceived and purposely executed.* 
 To constitute murder in the first degree there must have been time 
 and opportunity for deliberate thought after the conception of the 
 thought of taking life, and a deliberate determination formed to do 
 the act; that being done, it is immaterial how soon the fatal resolve 
 
 sKeenan v. Cora. 44 Pa. 55, 84 Am. 7Darry v. People, 10 N. Y. 120. 
 
 Dec. 414; Eespublica v. Bob, 4 Dall. 146, To constitute murder in the first de- 
 
 1 L. ed. 777 ; State v. Miiiain, 3 Nev. gree under the Texas statute the malice 
 
 409. And see State v. Hoyt, 46 Conn, must have been directed toward the per- 
 
 330. son killed. Duebbe v. State, 1 Tex. 
 
 Although murder in the first degree App. 159. 
 
 is confined by statute to the wilful, de- sMunday v. State, 26 Ohio C. C. 712. 
 
 liberate, and premeditated killing of 'See infra, chapter XV. 
 
 another, yet the intention remains as iWeeks v. State, 79 Ga. 36, 3 S. E. 
 
 raucli as ever the criterion of the crime. 323: Malone v. State, 77 Ga, 767; Cook 
 
 Eespublica v. Bob, supra. v. State, 77 Ga. 96; Bailey v. State, 70 
 
 4State V. Kearley, 26 Kan. 77; Wil- Ga. 617; McKenzie v. State, 26 Ark. 
 
 kins V. State, 98 Ala. 1. 13 So. 312; 334; People v. Niohol, 34 Cal. 211; Peo- 
 
 Dabney v. State, 113 Ala. 38, 59 Am. St. pie v. Jamarillo, 57 Cal. Ill; State v. 
 
 Rep. 92, 21 So. 211; State v. Robertson, Pratt, Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 249; 
 
 178 Mo. 496, 77 S. W. 528; Argabright United States v. Neverson, 1 Mackey, 
 
 y. State, 56 Neb. 363, 76 N. W. 876; 152; Kota v. People, 136 111. 655, 27 N. 
 
 State V. Owen, 61 N. C. (Phill. L.) 425. E. 53; Marzen v. People, 173 Til. 43, 50 
 
 sDaughdrill v. State, 113 Ala. 7, 21 N. E. 249; Peri v. People, 65 111. 17; 
 
 S. E. 378. Beauchamp v. State, 6 Blackf. 299; 
 
 sHogan v. State, 36 Wis. 226. State v. Decklotts, 19 Iowa, 447; Craft 
 
§ 137] 
 
 MURDER. 
 
 205 
 
 is carried into execution. ^ An intent to kill resulting from thinking 
 of the matter is sufficient ; the jury need not go further into a meta- 
 physical inquiry as to whether the intention was clear and specific.^ 
 If a killing was with a malicious intent to kill, the case is one of 
 murder, though the malicious intention was formed at the moment 
 of striking the fatal blow.* But an intent to kill must have been 
 in actual existence at the very time of, or prior to, the deed.^ It is 
 not enough that the defendant formed the intent coincidentally with 
 the blow, for this we have no way of determining. What is meant 
 is that, even where we have no other proof of intent prior to the 
 blow, from the blow itself we may infer the intent.® When a homi- 
 cide is committed by weapons indicating design, then it is not nec- 
 essary to prove that such design existed at any definite period before 
 the fatal blow. From the very fact of a blow being struck, we have a 
 right to infer (as a presumption of fact, but not of law) that the 
 blow was intended prior to tl^e striking, although it may be at a 
 period of time inappreciably distant.'' The subject of the constit- 
 uent elements of malice aforethought,® and of the necessity of prior 
 
 V. State, 3 Kan. 451; Nichols v. Com. 11 
 Bush, 575; Donnellan v. Com. 7 Bush, 
 678 ; State v. Ashlev, 45 La. At-ii. 1036, 
 13 So. 738; Nye v. PeopK 35 Mich. 16; 
 Green v. State, 13 Mo. 382; People v. 
 Clark, 7 N. Y. 385; People v. Waltz, 
 50 How. Pr. 204; People v. Camel, 2 
 Edm. Sel. Cas. 200; People v. Mulvey, 
 2 Edra. Sel. Cas. 246; People v. Austin, 
 1 Park. Crim. Rep. 154; Com. v. Aiello, 
 180 Pa. 597, 36 Atl. 1079; State v. 
 Anderson, 2 Overt. 6, 5 Am. Dec. 648; 
 Halbert v. State, 3 Tex. App. 656; How- 
 ard V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 58 S. 
 W. 77; State v. Bowles, 146 Mo. 6, 69 
 Am. St. Rep. 598, 47 S. W. 892; Don- 
 nelly V. State, 26 N. J. L. 463 ; State v. 
 McDonnell, 32 Vt. 491; United States 
 V. Meagher, 37 Fed. 875; Allen v. 
 United States. 164 U. S. 492, 41 L. ed. 
 528, 17 Sup. C't. Rep. 154. 
 
 2Fahnestoek v. State, 23 Ind. 231. 
 
 sDaughdrill v. State, 113 Ala. 7, 21 
 So. 378. 
 
 estate V. Ashley, 45 La. Ann. 1036, 
 13 So. 738; Beauchamp v. State, 6 
 Blackf. 299. 
 
 They may be as instantaneous as suc- 
 cessive thoughts. People v. Nichol, 34 
 Cal. 211. 
 
 6Bower v. State, 5 Mo. 364, 32 Am. 
 Dec. 325; Green v. State, 51 Ark. 189, 
 ID S. W. 268; Marzen v. People, 173 HI. 
 43, 50 N. E. 249. 
 
 6See People v. Clark, 7 N. Y. 385; 
 United States v. Cornell, 2 Mason, 91, 
 Fed. Cas. No. 14,868; People v. Moore, 
 8 Cal. 90; Fahnestock v. State, 23 Ind. 
 231; State v. Holme, 54 Mo. 153; Com. 
 V. Drum, 58 Pa. 9. 
 
 7Reg. V. Noon, 6 Cox, C. C. 137; 
 Adams v. State, 25 Ark. 405; People v. 
 Moore, supra; Mitchum v. State, 11 Ga. 
 615; Fahnestock v. State, supra; Wood- 
 sides V. State, 2 How. (Miss.) 656; 
 Green v. State, 13 Mo. 382; People v. 
 Clark, 7 N. Y. 385; People v. Sullivan, 
 7 N. Y. 396; Lanergan v. People, 50 
 Barb. 266; State v. Lipsey, 14 N. C. (3 
 Dev. L.) 485; Com. v. Drum, supra; 
 State v. Toohey, 2 Rice's Dig. 104; 
 Dains v. State, 2 Humph. 439; Coffee 
 V. State, 3 Yerg. 288, 24 Am. Dec. 570; 
 Com. V. Brown, 90 Va. 671, 19 S. E. 
 ■''7; United States v. Cornell, supra; 
 I nited States v. McGlue, 1 Curt. C. C. 
 1, Fed. Cas. No. 15,679. 
 
 The act of a person after a quarrel 
 with another of goi"g away and arming 
 himself, and returning to the scene of 
 the combat intending to renew the quar- 
 rel, or to place himself in the presence 
 of his opponent for the purpose of pro- 
 voking him to renew it, , and of using 
 his weapon to kill his opponent in re- 
 pelling an assault, sufficiently shows 
 the Intention on his part to take the 
 other's life. Hill v. People, 1 Colo. 436. 
 
 sSee supra, chapter VIII., § 82. 
 
206 HOMICIDE. [§ IZT 
 
 existence of deliberation and premeditation,® should be considered in 
 connection with the subject of this section. 
 
 138. Intent in cases of assault with intent to kill While this work 
 
 is confined to homicide as distinguished from assault, the intent to 
 kill required in cases of assault with intent to kill or to murder does 
 not differ from that required in murder in the first degree under the 
 statutes. The question of intent in such cases is therefore here con- 
 sidered. Whenever an assault with intent to kill is committed, and 
 the circumstances are such that if death had ensued the killing would 
 have constituted murder at common law, the offense, assault with 
 intent to murder, under the statute, is complete.^ And an assault 
 pursuant to an original plan and intent to kill is an assault with 
 intent to commit murder in the first degree, though at the time the 
 deceased was assaulting and attempting to kill the assailant.^ And 
 deliberate and premeditated action is not necessary to assault with 
 intent to murder.* A specific intent to kill, however, is necessary 
 to complete the offense, statutory or otherwise, of assault with in- 
 tent to kill.* And without a specific intent to kill there can be no 
 assault with intent to murder;® and this is the rule though intent 
 to kill is not necessary to constitute murder. ® And the intent charged 
 must be specifically proved ;'' and it must have been attended with 
 malice aforethought;^ though the intent need not be express, and 
 may be inferred from acts the probable consequence of which would 
 
 oSee supra, § 115. St. Eep. 71, 29 So. 557; Griffin v. State 
 
 iPeople V. Scott, 6 Mich. 287; Lace- (Fla.^ 37 So. 209; State v. King, 111 
 
 field V. State, 34 Ark. 275, 36 Am. Rep. Mo. 576, 20 S. W. 299; Wright v. SUte, 
 
 8; Pyke v. State (Fla.) 36 So. 577; 9 Yerg. 342; Hamilton v. State, 41 Tex. 
 
 Hammond v. People, 199 III. 173, 64 N. Grim. Rep. 644, 56 S. W. 926. And 
 
 E. 980; State v. Neal, 37 Me. 468; see State v. Tickel, 13 Nev. 502; Jen- 
 
 Riehardson v. State (Miss.) 28 So. 817; nings v. United States, 2 Ind. Terr. 670, 
 
 Dains v. State, 2 Humph. 439 ; Avarez v. 53 S. W. 456. 
 
 State (Tex. Grim. App.) 58 S. W. 1013; 4Moore v. People, 146 111. 600, 34 N. 
 
 Reg. V. Cruse, 8 Car. & P. 541. And E. 166. 
 
 see Whitsett v. State, 115 Ga. 203, 41 S. sReyes v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 E. 699; Passmore v. State (Tex. Crim. 88 S. W. 245; Knight v. State, 42 Fla. 
 
 App.) 64 S. W. 1040. 546, 28 So. 759; Kimball v. State, 112 
 
 But an instruction in a prosecution Ga. 541, 37 S. E. 886. And see Taylor 
 
 for assault with intent to kill, that, if v. Com. 9 Ky. L. Rep. 257, 5 S. W. 46; 
 
 it would have been murder had the per- Thames v. State, 82 Miss. 667, 35 So. 
 
 son assaulted died, then, death rot hav- 171 ; Caruthers v. State, 13 Tex. App. 
 
 ing ensued, the crime is an assault with 339. 
 
 intent to kill, is objectionable as a ePeople v. Mendenhall, 135 Cal. 344, 
 
 strong expression of opinion on the 63 Pac. 675, 67 Pac. 325. 
 
 facts by the court, prohibited by stat- 7 State v. Neal, 37 Me. 468. 
 
 ute. Ross V. State, 59 Ga. 248. And sCarr v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 87 
 
 see Harris v. State, 120 Ga. 167, 47 S. S. W. 346; State v. Scott, 4 Penn. 
 
 E. 520. (Del.) 538, 57 Atl. 634. And see Bor- 
 
 zDavidson v. State, 9 Humph. 455. den v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 648, 62 
 
 sWood V. State, 128 Ala. 27, 86 Am. S. W. 1064. 
 
§ 138] 
 
 MURDEK. 
 
 207 
 
 be death,® such as the use of a deadly weapon,* " and the intent must 
 be such that if death had ensued the crime would have been murder, * * 
 though it is sufficient if it would have been murder in the second 
 degree. * * 
 
 b. Murder in the second degree. 
 
 139. What included in. — ^By many of the statutes murder in the 
 second degree includes all common-law murder not included in the 
 statutory definitions of murder in the first degree, all other murders 
 being designated as murder in the second degree.* By others the 
 acts going to constitute murder in the second degree are expressly 
 enumerated.* The two classes of statutes, however, are practically 
 the same in substance, the one consisting of a negative, and the other 
 of a positive, statement of the same matter. And generally, under 
 either class of statutes, murder in the second degree is the wrongful 
 killing of a human being with malice aforethought, but without de- 
 liberation or premeditation.^ And where the fact of an unlawful 
 killing appears, and nothing tends to show express malice on the 
 one hand, or circumstances of justification, mitigation, or excuse on 
 
 9 Crosby y. People, 137 111. 325, 27 S. 
 E. 49; State v. Kelley, 74 Vt. 278, 52 
 Atl. 434. 
 
 10 Ford V. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 
 66 S. W. 338; Brantley v. State, 9 Wyo. 
 102, 61 Pac. 139. 
 
 11 Crosby v. People, supra; Davis v. 
 State, 72 Ark. 569, 82 S. W. 167; State 
 V. Williamson, 65 S. C. 242, 43 S. E. 
 671. But see State v. Barker, 68 N. 
 J. L. 19, 52 Atl. 284. 
 
 izKnight V. State, 42 Fla. 546, 28 So. 
 759. 
 
 iSee Ezell v. State, 102 Ala. 101, 15 
 So. 810; Fields v. State, 52 Ala. 348; 
 Smith V. State, 68 Ala. 424; People v. 
 Doyell, 48 Cal. 85; People v. Sanchez, 
 24 Cal. 17; State v. Rhodes, Houst. 
 Crim. Rep. (Del.) 476; State v. Con- 
 ley, 39 Me. 78 ; State v. Hudson, 59 Mo. 
 135; State v. Joeckel, 44 Mo. 234; Terri- 
 tory V. Stears, 2 Mont. 324; Com. v. 
 Drum, 58 Pa. 9; Com. v. Lynch, 3 
 Pittsb. 412; Cox V. State, 5 Tex. App. 
 493; State v. Hobbs, 37 W. Va. 812, 17 
 S. E. 380; Sullivan v. State, 100 Wis. 
 283, 75 N. W. 956; North Carolina v. 
 Gosnell, 74 Fed. 734. 
 
 Defining murder in the second degree 
 in the language of the statute, "all 
 other kinds of murder shall be deemed 
 
 murder in the second degree," without 
 further explanation, however, is errone- 
 ous in a prosecution for homicide in 
 not distinguishing it from murder in 
 the first degree. State v. Baker, 13 
 Mont. 160, 32 Pac. 647. 
 
 2See Johnson v. State, 24 Fla. 162, 
 4 So. 535; Goldirg v. State. 26 Fla. 530, 
 8 So. 311; Marshall v. State, 32 Fla. 
 462, 14 So. 92; State v. Estep, 44 Kan. 
 572, 24 Pac. 986; State v. Brown, 12 
 Minn. 538, Gil. 448; Frank v. State, 94 
 Wis. 211. 68 N. W. 657. 
 
 s State V. Wieners, 66 Mo. 13; State 
 V. Curtis, 70 Mo. 594; State v. Harris, 
 73 Mo. 287 ; State v. Fairlamb, 121 Mo. 
 137, 25 S. W. 895; State v. Lane, 64 Mo. 
 319; State v. Gee, 85 Mo. 647; State v. 
 Hill, 09 Mo. 451 ; State v. Gassert, 4 Mo. 
 App. 44; Fallin v. State, 83 Ala. 5, 3 
 So. 525; Ezell v. State, 102 Ala. 101, 15 
 So. 810; Miller v. State (Ala.) 40 So. 
 47; McQueen v. State, 103 Ala. 12, 15 
 So. 824; Fields v. State, 52 Ala. 348; 
 Smith V. State, 86 Ala. 28, 5 So. 478; 
 People V. Doyell, 48 Cal. 85; People v. 
 Foren, 25 Cal. 361; State v. Emory 
 (Del.) 58 Atl. 1036; State v. Bell 
 (Del.) 62 Atl. 147; State v. Brinte, 4 
 Penn. (Del.) 551, 58 Atl. 258; Gavin v. 
 State, 42 Fla. 553, 29 So. 405; Patter- 
 
208 HOMICIDE. B 139 
 
 the other, the law Implies malice and the offense is murder in the 
 second degree.* Intentional killing not amounting to murder in 
 the first degree is murder in the second degree ; ® as in case of killing 
 purposely, but without premeditated design.^ In murder in the 
 second degree the purpose or intent to kill is followed immediately 
 by the act, the time and circumstances being such as not to permit 
 deliberate thought.'' The intent to kill is the result of the instan- 
 taneous action of the mind from some cause arising at the moment, 
 the act of killing immediately following the thought.* 
 
 son V. State, 66 Ind. 185; State v. Am. St. Eep. 598, 47 S. W. 892; State 
 
 Decklotts, 19 Iowa, 447; State v. Moore, v. Wilson. 98 Mo. 440, 11 S. W. 985; 
 
 25 Iowa, 128, 95 Am. Dee. 776 ; State v. State v. Lane, 64 Mo. 319 ; Com. v. Sil- 
 
 Yarborough, 39 KaTi. 581, 18 Pac. 474; cox, 161 Pa. 484, 29 Atl. 105; Evans v. 
 
 State V. Smith, 32 Me. 369, 54 Am. Dec. State, 6 Tex. App. 513 ; Becknell v. 
 
 578; State v. Ah Mook, 12 Nev. 369; State (Tex. Crira. App.) 82 S. W. 1039. 
 
 Shufflin V. People, 62 N. i. 229, 20 Am. And see State v. Coefta, 8 Wash. 512, 
 
 Rep. 483; People v. Walworth, 4 N. Y. 36 Pac. 475. 
 
 Crim. Eep. 355; Lanergan v. People, 50 In State v. Lucas, 124 N. C. 825, 32 
 
 Barb. 266; State v. Turner, Wright S. E. 962, it was held that, where a 
 
 (Ohio) 20; State v. Thompson, Wright killing with a deadly weapon is shown 
 
 (Ohio) 617; State v. Town, Wright or admitted, and the accused fails to 
 
 (Ohio) 75; Com. v. Crause, 4 Clark show anything in extenuation or excuse, 
 
 (Pa.) 500; Com. v. Crozier, 1 Brewst. either by his own or the state's evidence, 
 
 (Pa.) 349; Gray v. State, 4 Baxt. 334; the question then is whether the crime 
 
 Caldwell v. State, 41 Tex. 86 ; North was murder in the first degree or in the 
 
 Carolina v. Gosnell, 74 Fed. 734. And second degree. 
 
 see State v. Brown, 12 Minn. 538, Gil. 5State v. Hudson, 59 Mo. 135; State 
 
 448; Bell V. State, 140 Ala. 57, 37 So. v. Conley, 39 Me. 78. And see Daniels 
 
 281; Johnson v. State, 133 Ala. 38, 31 v. State (Ark.) 88 S. W. 844; State v. 
 
 So. 951; White v. State (Ark.) 86 S. Cummings, 189 Mo. 626, 88 S. W. 706. 
 
 W. 296; People v. Balkwell, 143 Cal. And an instruction it a prosecution 
 
 259, 76 Pac. 1017; State v. White, 189 for murder that murder in the second 
 
 Mo. 339, 87 S. W. 1188; People v. degree includes those cases of construc- 
 
 Fucarino, 104 App, Div. 437, 93 N. Y. tive murder which are not accompanied 
 
 Supp. 689; Everett v. State (Tex. Crim. by an intent to take life, but are coni- 
 
 App.) 24 S. W. 505; Charba v. State mitted with gross carelessness in at- 
 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 87 S. W. 829; John- tempting to commit some crime other 
 
 aon V. State ^Tex. Crim. App.) 88 S. than arson, rape, burglary, or robbery, 
 
 W. 223; Thurman v. State (Tex. Crim. and that the jury cannot convict of 
 
 App.) 86 S. W. 1014; Thomas v. State, murder in the second degree if they 
 
 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. Ill, 74 S. W. 36: believe the killing was malicious, or 
 
 State v. Manderville, 37 Wash. 365, 79 was committed in the commission of, 
 
 Pac. 977. or attempt to commit, some other crime 
 
 Murder in the second degree is proved than those specified, is properly re- 
 
 where malice is established but it is fused as calculated to mislead the jury 
 
 not satisfactorily shown that the kill- into the supposition that no other horai- 
 
 ing was done with a deliberately formed cides than those specifically enumerat- 
 
 design to take life, or in perpetrating, ed are murders in the second degree, 
 
 or attempting to perpetrate, any crime Fields v. State, 52 Ala. 348. 
 
 punishable with death. State v. Jones, estate v. Greenleaf, 71 N H 606 5* 
 
 2 Penn. (Del.) 573, 47 Atl. 1006. Atl. 38. And see St^te v. Caldwell, 129 
 
 4Davis V. State, 51 Neb. 301, 70 N. N. C. 682, 40 S. E. 85. 
 
 W. 984 ; Anderson v. State, 26 Neb. 387, TFahnestock v. State, 23 Ind. 231. 
 
 41 N. W. 951; State v. Collins (Del.) sPeople v. Walworth, 4 N Y. Crim. 
 
 62 Atl. 224; State v. Wilson (Del.) 62 Rep. 355. 
 
 Atl. 227; State v. Brown (Del.) 61 Atl. An intent to kill or inflict great bod- 
 
 1077; State v. Bowles, 146 Mo. 6, 69 ily injury, though formed but a moment 
 
§ 139] MURDER. 209 
 
 Malice is a necessary element of murder in the second degree, 
 towever, as well as of murder in the first degree,® though it is im- 
 plied and not express malice. Express malice necessarily renders 
 any murder one in the first degree.^" And unless otherwise pro- 
 vided by statute murder in the second degree also includes those con- 
 structive murders known to the common law where there was no 
 intent to kill and where the malice was implied ;^^ such as cases 
 ■of killing in which the intent was only to do great bodily harm,^^ 
 or in which the character of the act shows a cruel, abandoned, and 
 malignant heart, ^* or a cruel and reckless indifference to human 
 
 tefore striking the fatal blow, is suf- Houst. Grim. Rep. (Del.) 233; State 
 
 ficient to render the offense murder in v. Draper, Houst. Grim. Rep. (Del.) 
 
 -the second degree. State v. Sale, 119 291; State v. Brown (Del.) 61 Atl. 
 
 Iowa, 1, 92 N. W. 680, 95 N. W. 193. 1077; Johnson v. State, 24 Fla. 162, 4 
 
 sState V. Mitchell, 64 Mo. 191 ; State So. 535 ; State v. Decklotts, 19 Iowa, 
 
 V. Gurtis, 70 Mo. .594; State V. Stoeckli, 447. state v. Gillick, 7 Iowa, 287; 
 
 71 Mo. 559; State v. Gassert, 4 Mo. state v. Morphy, 33 Iowa, 270, 11 Am. 
 
 App. 44; People v. Foren, 25 Gal. 361; R^p 122 ; State v. Spencer, 21 N. J. L. 
 
 State V. Wallace, 2 Penn. (Del.) 402 ^gg (^^^ ^ bleary, 148 Pa. 26, 23 Atl. 
 
 U ^^l-J^}^ ^^^^^Z- 1^''^^°''^''^? 1110; Baltrip v. State, 30 Tex. App. 
 
 Kan 581, 18 Pac 474; People v. Wal- g^g j^ g W 1106; State v. Beatty, 51 
 
 worth supra; State v. Thompson, ^'^ ^' 
 
 Wright (Ohio) 617; Tiffany v. Com. „. , „„ ^. „„„ ' « 
 
 121 Pa. 165, 6 Am. St. Rep. 775, 15 Atl. i^tate, db wis. z.ib. 
 
 462; Petty V. State, 6 Baxt. 610; Gray ,J° J*'^,\«, !,-«""^'., ^ ^'"ll ^^^H 
 V State, 4 Baxt. 331 ; Holly v. State, ^80, 36 Atl. 458, murder m the second 
 10 Humph. 141; MoGrath v. State, 35 degree was defined to be where a man 
 Tex. Grim. Rep. 413, 34 S. W. 127, 941 ; kills another without any, or any con- 
 Harrison V. State (Tex. Grim. App.) siderable, provocation, or when the kill- 
 «3 S. W. 699; Whitten v. State (Tex. i^g is done, or the mortal wound is in- 
 Grim. App.) 86 S. W. 1134; State v. So flicted, with a deadly weapon, or arises 
 Ho Gc, 1 Wash. 275, 24 Pac. 442, 1 from an unlawful act of violence from 
 Wash. 276, 24 Pac. 443. which the law raises the presumption 
 
 But an instruction defining murder in of malice, 
 
 the second degree omitting therefrom i2Whiteford v. Gom. 6 Rand. (Va.) 
 
 any reference to tne element of malice 721, 18 Am. Dec. 771 ; Nutt v. State, 63 
 
 is not erroneous where the court in its Ala. 180; Brassfield v. State, 55 Ark. 
 
 charge had previously specifically in- 556, 18 S. W. 1040; People v. Long, 39 
 
 structed the jury that all murder was Cal. 694; State v. Decklotts; State v. 
 
 the unlawful killing of a human being O'Hara; and State v. Gassert, supra; 
 
 with malice aforethought, either ex- State v. Hunt, 134 N. G. 684, 47 S. E. 
 
 press or implied. Territory v. McGin- 49; Com. v. Dougherty, 7 Smith's 
 
 nis, 10 N. M. 269, 61 Pac. 208. Laws (Pa.) 696; Com. v. Drum, 58 Pa. 
 
 loState V. Lopez, 15 Nev. 407. 9; Com. v. Ellenger, 1 Brewst. (Pa.) 
 
 Implied malice is a distinguishing 352; Com. v. Neills, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 
 
 ingredient of murder in the second de- 553; Com. v. Brown, 7 Pa. Go. Ct. 640; 
 
 gree. Clarke v. State, 117 Ala. 1, 67 State v. Smith, 2 Strobh. L. 79, 47 Am. 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 157, 23 So. 671. Dee. 589; State v. Morrison, 49 W. Va. 
 
 iiState V. Phillips, 24 Mo. 475; State 210, 38 S. E. 481. 
 
 V. O'Hara, 92 Mo. 59, 4 S. W. 422; But a mere intent to frighten is not 
 
 State V. Gassert, 4 Mo. App. 44; Nutt sufficient. People v. Walworth, 4 N. Y. 
 
 V. State, 63 Ala. 180; Myers v. State, Grim. Rep. 355. 
 
 «2 Ala. 599; Titus v. State, 117 Ala. 16, isPeople v. Foren, 25 Cal. 361; State 
 
 23 So. 77; State v. Rhodes, Houst. Grim. v. Wallace, 2 Peim. (Del.) 402, 47 Atl. 
 
 Rep. (Del.) 476; State v. Pratt, Houst. 621; Harris v. State, 36 Ark. 127; 
 
 Crim. Rep. (Del.) 249; State v. Till, Davis v. State, 51 Neb. 301, 70 N. W. 
 Horn.— 14. 
 
210 HOMICIDE. [§ 139 
 
 life. ^ * And to cock and discharge a loaded shotgun in a small room, 
 containing a number of people scattered about, evinces a depraved 
 mind regardless of human life within the meaning of a statutory 
 definition of murder in the second degree, ^ ® And there may, also, 
 be cases where death ensues during a riotous affray, under circum- 
 stances which would constitute murder at common law, but which, 
 in consequence of the want of a specific intent to take life being 
 shown, amount but to murder in the second degree. ^ ® But to con- 
 stitute murder in the second degree the killing must be unlawful, — 
 that is, without justification or legal excuse; and it must be done 
 purposely and maliciously.^^ And in determining whether a per- 
 son who has killed another is guilty of murder or manslaughter, 
 the nature and extent of the wrong which was actually intended is 
 usually of controlling importance.^* The use of the words "pur- 
 posely and maliciously killed" in a statutory definition of murder 
 in the second degree, however, renders an intent to kill a necessary 
 ingredient of that crime, which must be alleged and proved. ^ ® And 
 where murder in the second degree is defined to be killing intention- 
 ally, but without deliberation and premeditation, an intent to kill 
 is also a necessary ingredient of the crime. ^ ** So, the rule has been 
 asserted in Missouri under the provision "all other murder is murder 
 
 984; Com. V. Lynch, 3 Pittsb. 412; Com. To establish murder in the second de- 
 
 V. Drum, supra. gree perpetrated by an act immi-ently 
 
 Where a beating is inflicted upon a dangerous to one or more persons, 
 
 pregnant woman, which is unlawful and evincing a depraved mind regardless of 
 
 dangerous to her life, malice is implied, life, it is not necessary to also establish 
 
 and if such beating causes the death of that the killing was without design to 
 
 her child after its birth, the person in- effect death. State v. Stokely, 16 Minn, 
 
 flicting it is guilty of murder In the 282, Gil. 249. 
 
 second degree. Clarke v. State, 117 is Frank v. State, 94 Wis. 211, 68 N. 
 
 Ala. 1, 67 Am. St. Eep. 157, 23 So. 671. W. 657. 
 
 Instate V. Wallace, supra; State v. isCom. v. Hare, 2 Clark (Pa.) 467. 
 
 Harmon, 4 Penn. (Del.) 580, 60 At!. And see Jones v. Com. 75 Pa. 403. 
 
 866; State v. Horskin, Houst. Crim. I'Murphy v. Stat6, 31 I"d. 511 ; State 
 
 Rep. (Del.) 116; State v. Brown, Houst. v. Harris, 76 Mo. 361; McGrath v. State, 
 
 Crim. Rep. (Del.) 539; State v. Collins 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 413, 34 S. W. 127, 
 
 (Del.) 62 Atl. 224; Clarke v. State, 941. 
 
 supra; Denham v. State, 22 Fla. 664; isWellar v. People, 30 Mich. 16. 
 
 Johnson v. State, 24 Fla. 162, 4 So. 1 9 State v. Young, 55 Kan. 349, 40 
 
 535; Golding v. State, 26 Fla. 530, 8 Pac 659; Fahnestock v. State, 23 Ind. 
 
 So. 311; State v. Joeckel, 44 Mo. 235; 231; Bechtelheimer v. State, 54 Ind. 
 
 State V. Snunders, 53 Mo. 234; Tarvers 128; Fonts v. State, 8 Ohio St. 98; 
 
 V. State, 90 Tenn. 485,, 16 S. W. 1041 ; Robbins v. State, 8 Ohio St. 131 ; Jones 
 
 Whiteford v. Com. 6 Rand. (Va.) 721, v. State, 51 Ohio St. 331, 38 N. E. 79; 
 
 18 Am. Dec. 771; Hogan v. State. 36 State v. Powell, 1 Ohio Dee. Reprint, 
 
 Wis. 226. And see Burrows v. State 38; Munday v. State, 26 Ohio C. C. 712. 
 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 72 S. W. 848. zoPeople v. Austin, 1 Park. Crim. 
 
 This is murder in the first degree Rep. 154; People v. Walworth, 4 N. Y. 
 
 under some of the statutory provisions. Crim. Rep. 355; Daly v. People 32 Hun, 
 
 See supra, § 129. 182. 
 
139] 
 
 MURDER. 
 
 211 
 
 in the second degree," that an intent to kill is an essential element 
 of murder in any degree including murder in the second degree.^* 
 But this position has been reconciled with the general rule on the sub- 
 ject by holding that murder in the second degree includes all murders 
 at common law not declared by statute to be murder in the first degree 
 or manslaughter, including cases in which the act done was malicious 
 and manifestly dangerous to human life and produced death, al- 
 though the intent may have been only to do great bodily harm, the 
 law conclusively presuming the intent to kill in such case."^ And 
 on the theory that the malice aforethought necessary to constitute 
 murder at common law and premeditation are the same thing, the 
 rule is adopted in that state that premeditation is a necessary ele- 
 ment of murder in the second degree ;^ * and that a killing committed 
 with premeditation and malice, but without deliberation, is murder 
 in the second degree.^* 
 
 ;140. Instances in particular classes of cases. — ^Murder committed 
 with intent to kill, or with malice conceived in a heat of passion 
 arising from insufficient provocation, before the passion has had time 
 to cool, is murder in the second degree.^ Where the provocation 
 
 21 State V. Gassert, 65 Mo. 352; State 
 V. Wieners, 66 Mo. 13; State v. Wilson, 
 98 Mo. 440, 11 S. W. 985. 
 
 22State V. Wilson, supra; State v. 
 O'Hara, 92 Mo. 59, 4 S. W. 422; State 
 V. Wieners, supra. 
 
 2 3 State V. Curtis, 70 Mo. 594; State 
 V. Harris, 76 Mo. 361 ; State v. Cooper, 
 71 Mo. 436 ; State v. Lewis, 74 Mo. 222 ; 
 State V. Erb, 74 Mo. 199; State v. Rob- 
 inson, 73 Mo. 306. 
 
 2 4 State V. Curtis, supra; State v. 
 Dierberger, 96 Mo. 666, 9 Am. St. Rep. 
 380, 10 S. W. 168; State v. Nelson, 101 
 Mo. 464, 14 S. W. 712; State v. Gee, 85 
 Mo. 647; State v. Baber, 11 Mo. App. 
 686 Appx. 
 
 To be murder in the second degree a 
 homicide need not have been committed 
 without deliberation and in the heat of 
 passion; it is sufBcient if it was with- 
 out deliberation. State v. Hill, 69 Mo. 
 453. 
 
 iState V. Wieners, 66 Mo. 13; State 
 V. Kotovsky, 74 Mo. 247; State v. Wil- 
 son, 98 Mo. 440, H S. W. 985; State v. 
 Ellis, 74 Mo. 207; State v. Lewis, 
 supra; State v. Williams, 186 Mo. 128, 
 84 S. W. 924; State v. Silk, 145 Mo. 240, 
 44 S. W. 764, 46 S. W. 959; State v. 
 Dieekman, 11 Mo. App. 538, Affirmed 
 in 75 Mo. 570 ; State v. Gleason, 172 Mo. 
 ,259, 72 S. W. 676; State v. John, 172 
 
 Mo. 220, 95 Am. St. Rep. 513, 72 S. W. 
 525; Compton v. State, 110 Ala. 24, 20 
 So. 119; Sullivan v. State, 102 Ala. 135, 
 48 Am. St. Rep. 22, 15 So. 264; Ezell v. 
 State, 102 Ala. 101, 15 So. 810; Nutt v. 
 State, 63 Ala. 180; Mitchell v. State, 
 60 Ala. 26; Fields v. State, 52 Ala. 348; 
 Eastling v. State, 69 Ark. 189, 62 S. 
 W. 584; People v. Grimes, 132 Gal. 30, 
 64 Pac. 101 ; State v. Buchanan, Houst. 
 Crim. Rep. (Del.) 79; State v. Frazier, 
 Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 176; State 
 V. Di Guglielmo, 4 Penn. (Del.) 336, 55 
 Atl. 350 ; State v. PefFers, 80 Iowa, 580, 
 46 N. W. 662; State v. Shippey, 10 
 Minn. 223, 88 Am. Dec. 70, Gil. 178; 
 Bohanan v. State, 15 Neb. 209, 18 N. W. 
 129; State v. Ah Mook, 12 Nev. 386; 
 State v. Guilieri, 26 Nev. 31, 62 Pac. 
 497; Territory v. Chamberlain, 8 N. M. 
 538, 45 S. W. 1181; People v. Conroy, 33 
 Hun, 119; Anthony v. State, Meigs. 265, 
 33 Am. Dec. 143; Graj v. Staite, 4 Baxt. 
 331; Copeland v. State, 7 Humph. 494; 
 Perry v. State, 44 Tex. 473; Maria v. 
 State, 28 Tex. 698; Burnham v. State, 
 43 Tex. 322; Atkinson v. State, 20 Tex. 
 522; Scruggs v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. 
 Rep. 622, 34 S. W. 951 ; Childs v. State, 
 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 573, 34 S. W. 939; 
 McGrath v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 413, 34 S. W. 127, 941; Trevino v. 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 41 S. W. 609; 
 
212 HOMICIDE. [| 140 
 
 is of such a character as to provoke sudden resentment, and the 
 homicide is traceable solely to the influence of such passion or re- 
 sentment, the killing is not deliberate and premeditated, but is mur- 
 der in the second degree.^ And this is so though there was an old 
 grudge, and no new or sufficient provocation for the killing, where 
 it resulted from malice suddenly produced without premeditation.^ 
 And where a husband catches his wife in the act of committing 
 adultery, or under circumstances justifying him in concluding that 
 she has committed adultery, and kills her under such circumstances 
 in the heat of passion produced by the discovery, without a pre- 
 meditated design to effect her death, his offense is murder in the 
 second degree. * And one who, upon receiving a blow from another, 
 which knocked him to the floor causing pain and bloodshed, passed 
 out of the house where it was given, but returned and shot into the 
 open doorway through which he had emerged and struck and killed 
 a woman therein, not by mistake, supposing that she was the one 
 who struck him, but intentionally while laboring under such passion 
 as to deprive him of the power at the time he formed the intent to 
 kill her to do so with a considerate, deliberate mind, would be guilty 
 of murder in the second degree.^ But the killing must have been 
 due solely to passion, and not for the purpose of revenge.' And 
 while the provocation need not have been adequate to reduce the 
 killing to manslaughter, it is not sufiicient if it was without reason- 
 able or material cause ;^ there must have been just cause of provo- 
 cation calculated to arouse passion, short of lawful provocation,* 
 
 Spangler v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 2Ex parte Sloane, 95 Ala. 22, 11 So. 
 
 2.33, 61 S. W. 314; Ex parte Jones, 31 14; Gilmore v. State, 126 Ala. 20, 28 
 
 Tex. Crim. Re,p. 422, 20 S. W. 983; So. 595; Morgan v. Territory, 7 Ariz. 
 
 Manning v. State {Tex. Crim. App.) 224, 64 Pae. 421; Anderson v. State, 
 
 85 S. W. 1149; White v. State, 44 Tex. 31 Tex. 440; Hatchell v. State (Tex. 
 
 Crim. Rep. 346, 63 L.R.A. 66, 72 S. Crim. App.) 84 S. W. 234; Thomas v. 
 
 W. 173; Watson v. Com. 87 Va. 608, 13 State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. HI, 74 S. 
 
 S. E. 22. And see State v. Krause, 153 W. 36. And see State v. Bone, 114 
 
 Mo. 474, 55 S. W. 70; State v. Hollo- Iowa, 537, 87 N. W. 507. 
 
 way, 161 Mo. 135, 61 S. W. 600; State sMcQueen v. State^ 1 Lea, 285. 
 
 V. Haines, 160 Mo. 555, 61 S. W. 621; ^Shufflin v. People, 62 N. Y. 229, 20 
 
 Gilmore v. State, 141 Ala. 51, 37 So. Am. Rep. 483. 
 
 359; Alarcon v. State (Tex. Crim. BWhite v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 App.) 83 S. W. 1115; Gustavenson v. 346, 63 L.R.A. 660, 72 S. W. 173. 
 
 State, 10 Wyo. 300, 68 Pae. 1006. 6Ex parte Jones, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 But an instruction in a prosecution 422, 20 S. W. 983. 
 
 for murder in the second degree that 'Smith v. State, 103 Ala. 4, 15 So. 
 
 the act must have been with implied 843; State v. Andrew, 76 Mo. 101. 
 
 malice is not subject to objection by sstate v. Gregory, 178 Mo. 48, 76 S. 
 
 the accused because of failure to add W. 970. 
 
 "without adequate cause." McLin v. The mere fact that one person pur- 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 90 S. W. sued another is not sufficient to arouse 
 1107. against the pursuer the paasioa of » 
 
§140] MURDER. 213 
 
 such as grievous and degrading words of reproach. ® And where a 
 homicide is traceable solely to the influence of passion kindled by 
 insulting or offensive words, calculated to engender passion and pro- 
 yoke resentment, the killing is not murder in the first degree, be- 
 cause not wilful, deliberate, and premeditated, but is murder in the 
 second degree.-^" Nor is a killing. in a combat which engenders hot 
 blood murder in the second degree unless the element of purpose and 
 malice concur in the act. ^ ^ But a verdict of murder in the second 
 degree in a prosecution for homicide is justified by evidence that 
 the accused provoked a fight with the barkeeper in a saloon by in- 
 sulting epithets and refusal to pay for liquor, and after exchanging 
 blows withdrew to the rear door, where, with no one pursuing him, 
 he drew his revolver and began firing as he returned, and shot a 
 spectator who had taken no part in the difiiculty. ^ ^ And if there 
 was no necessity either real or apparent for killing, the slayer may 
 be guilty of murder in the second degree although he entered into 
 the combat preceding the killing without an intent to kill. ^ ^ Like- 
 wise an intentional killing without express malice in the perform- 
 ance of a legal duty, under a mistaken idea as to the extent of the 
 slayer's right to act in the premises, is murder in the second de- 
 gree.^* And so is shooting a person with intent to disable him, 
 causing his death. ^® And homicide perpetrated through criminal 
 carelessness, but not from wilful design to effect death, is also murder 
 in the second degree.^® 
 
 141. Distinction between murder in the first and second degrees 
 
 The distinction between murder in the first degree and murder in the 
 second degree is that, in the former, the intent to take life is de- 
 liberate, while in the latter, though the intent may exist, it is with- 
 out deliberation and coolness ; ^ or the intent ia merely to do. some 
 
 third person seeing it, in no way re- So. 119. And see Olds v. State, 44 Ma. 
 
 lated to the person pursued, so as to re- 452, 33 So. 296. 
 
 duce his crime of killing the pursuer to iiOsburn v. State, 164 Ind. 262, 73 
 
 murder in the second degree. Ibid. N. E. 601. 
 
 sState V. Ellis, 74 Mo. 207; State v. i2State v. Crawford, 115 Mo. 620, 22 
 
 Andrew and State v. Smith, supra. S. W. 371. 
 
 Mere words may be sufficient to re- is State v. Morphy, 33 Iowa, 270, 11 
 
 duce a killing to murder in the second Am. Rep. 122. 
 
 degree. Ex parte Sloane, 95 Ala. 22, i4Caldwell v. State, 41 Tex. 86; Hull 
 
 11 So. 14; Watson v. State, 82 Ala. 10, v. State, 6 Lea, 249. 
 
 2 So. 455. iBState v. Costen, Houst. Crim. Rep. 
 
 But instructions assuming the suf- (Del.) 340. 
 
 ficiency of words used to excite passion leWhiteford v. Com. 6 Rand. (Va.) 
 
 which would reduce a homicide to mur- 721, 18 Am. Dee. 771 ; Territory v. Man- 
 
 der in the second degree are properly ton, 7 Mont. 162, 14 Pac. 637; State v. 
 
 refused. Smith v. State, supra. Spencer, 21 N. J. L. 196. 
 
 loCompton v. State, 110 Ala. 24, 20 iPeople v. Batting, 49 How. Pr. 392; 
 
214 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 [S 141 
 
 great bodily harm,^ the malice being implied as distinguished from 
 express, according to the common-law definition of those terms.* 
 The presence or absence of a deliberate and premeditated intent to 
 take life is the distinguishing feature between murder in the first 
 degree and murder in the second degree. * That which distinguishes 
 murder in the first degree from any other kind of homicide is the 
 existence of a settled purpose and fixed design upon the part of the 
 slayer to cause death. ^ Though a murder was malicious, it is not 
 murder in the first degree unless it was also deliberate and premedi- 
 tated,® the distinction lying between malevolence breaking forth un- 
 intentionally through some unexpected incident and prompting the 
 deed on the spur of the moment on the one hand, and deliberate and 
 premeditated action with a view to destroy the object of the malev- 
 olence upon the other hand.^ In charging as to homicide the court 
 should show the distinction between the two degrees of murder; 
 merely defining them without showing such distinction is not suffi- 
 cient. ® 
 
 142. Murder in the second degree a compromise courts are unwilling 
 to disturb. — The general result of the authorities is that whenever the 
 deliberate intention is to take life, and death ensues, it is murder 
 
 Johnson v. State, 133 Ala. 38, 31 So. 
 951; Gilmore v. State, 126 Ala. 20, 28 
 So. 595; People v. Foren, 25 Cal. 361; 
 Denham v. State, 22 Fla. 664; Johnson 
 V. State, 24 Fla. 162, 4 So. 535 ; Fahne- 
 stock V. State, 23 Ind. 231 ; Nye v. Peo- 
 ple, 35 Mich. 16; State v. Phillips, 24 
 Mo. 489; Bower v. State, 5 Mo. 364, 32 
 Am. Dee. 325; State v. Thomas, 118 N. 
 C. 1113, 24 S. E. 431; State v. Thomp- 
 son, Wright (Ohio) 617; Kilpatrick v. 
 Com. 3 Phila. 237; Com. v. Crozier, 1 
 Brewst. (Pa.) 349; Com. v. Herold, 5 
 Pa. Dist. R. 623; Com. v. Corrigan, 1 
 Pittsb. 292; Mitchell v. State, 5 Yerg. 
 340; Farrer v. State, 42 Tex. 271; Burn- 
 ham V. State, 43 Tex. 322; State v. 
 Morgan, 22 Utah, 162, 61 Pac. 527. And 
 see Adams v. State, 133 Ala. 166, 31 So. 
 851; State v. Seery (Iowa) 105 N. W. 
 511. 
 
 2Kilpatrick v. Com. swpra; State v. 
 Joeckel, 44 Mo. 234; Hogan v. State, 36 
 Wis. 226. 
 
 Murder in the first degree and mur- 
 der in the second degree are distin- 
 guished in that in the former a specific 
 intent to take life must be shown, while 
 in the latter it is not necessary to prove 
 such an intent. Petty v. State (Ark.) 
 89 S. W. 465. 
 
 3Com. V. M'Fall, Addison (Pa.) 255; 
 Com. V. Corrigan, supra; State v. Bu- 
 chanan, Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 79; 
 State V. Pratt, Houst. Crim. Rep. 
 (Del.) 249; State v. Jones, 2 Penn. 
 (Del.) 573, 47 Atl. 1006; State v. Drap- 
 er, Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 531; State 
 V. Neil, Tappan, (Ohio) 88; Smith v. 
 State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 552, 78 S. W. 
 694; Hogan v. State, supra. And see 
 State V. Beatty, 51 W. Va. 232, 41 S. E. 
 434. 
 
 4 Com. V. Green, 1 Ashm. (Pa.) 289; 
 Com. ex rel. Chauncey v. Keeper of 
 Prison, 2 Ashm. (Pa.) 231; People v. 
 Hamblin, 68 Cal. 101, 8 Pac. 687; Peo- 
 ple V. Nichol, 34 Cal. 211; Kent v. Peo- 
 ple, 8 Colo. 563, 9 Pac. 852; Hill v. 
 People, 1 Colo. 436; State v. Decklotts, 
 19 Iowa, 447; State v. Gillick, 7 Iowa, 
 287 ; State v. Greenleaf, 71 N. H. 606, 54 
 Atl. 38. 
 
 BSwan V. State, 4 Humph. 136; Com. 
 V. Cleary, 148 Pa. 26, 23 Atl. 1110. 
 
 6Fouts V. State, 8 Ohio St. 98. 
 
 7 Ibid. : State v. Yarborough, 39 Kan. 
 581, 18 Pao. 474. 
 
 sstate V. Felker, 27 Mont. 451, 71 
 Pac. 668. And see State T. Gruff, 68 
 N. J. L. 287, 53 Atl. 88. 
 
I 142] MURDER. 215 
 
 in the first degree; wherever it is to do serious bodily harm, and 
 death ensues, it is murder in the second degree; while the common- 
 law definition of manslaughter remains unaltered. This distinction, 
 however, it is difficult practically to preserve. In those jurisdictions 
 where the juries are entitled to take control of the law, it of course 
 gives way to other tests more agreeable to the prejudices of the par- 
 ticular case. And even where the court is at liberty to assume its 
 proper province, and where it lays down the law with precision and 
 fulness, a jury is very apt to seize upon murder in the second de- 
 gree as a compromise, when they think murder has been committed, 
 but are unwilling, in consequence of circumstances of mitigation, to 
 expose the defendant to its full penalties. In such cases courts are 
 not disposed to disturb verdicts, but permit them to stand, th5ugh 
 technically incorrect.^ 
 
 c. Murder in the third degree. 
 
 143, What included in — The statutes of some of the states have 
 provided for murder in the third degree, consisting of an unlawful 
 killing perpetrated without design to effect death by a person en- 
 gaged in the commission of any felony, or in the commission of a 
 felony other than those enumerated in the statute as an ingredient 
 of murder in the first degree.^ The distinction between murder in 
 the second degree and murder in the third degree under these statutes 
 is that murder in the third degree rests upon a felony that is not 
 aggravated by imminent danger to others, and by a depravity of mind 
 regardless of human life. ^ But the felony attempted or committed, 
 resulting in death, must have been such that the killing was a natural 
 consequence.* And where an assault is made upon one person and 
 another interferes, and afterwards the assailant kills the latter, if 
 the first assault was at an end before the killing occurred, so that 
 the latter act had no legal connection with, or relation to, the assault, 
 and it can be said that the killing did not occur during such assault, 
 
 1 Slaughter v. Com. 11 Leigh, 682, 37 But one who shoots a revolver, aiming 
 
 Am. Dec. 638. See State v. Ostrander, it at a stove, from which the ball acci- 
 
 30 Mo. 18. See, however, Clem v. State, dentally glances and hits a person in 
 
 42 Ind. 420, 13 Am> Rep. 369. the same room, cannot be held guilty 
 
 iMarshall v. State, 32 Fla. 462, 14 So. of murder in the third degree under a 
 
 92: Johnson v. State, 24 Fla. 162, 4 So. statute making an intent to do deceased 
 
 535; State v. Brown, 12 Minn. 538, Gil. great bodily harm an ingredient of the 
 
 448; Miller V. State, 25 Wis. 385; Pliem- crime. Terrill v. State, supra. 
 
 ling v. State, 46 Wis. 516, 1 N. W. 278 ; 2 Johnson v. State, supra. 
 
 Terrill ▼. State. 74 Wis. 278, 42 N. W. sPllemling v. State, and Terrill v. 
 
 423. State, supra. 
 
216 HOMICIDE. [•§ 145 
 
 the person doing the killing ought not to be convicted of murder in 
 the third degree, consisting of the killing of a human being without 
 design to effect death by a person engaged in the commission of a 
 felony.* It will be seen that cases falling within this rule are the 
 same as those falling within the provisions by which the intent of 
 the felony or unlawful act is made to take the place of premeditated 
 intent to kill, constituting an element of murder in the first degree,^ 
 or under which implied malice, constituting an element of murder 
 in the second degree, is conclusively presumed, questions with re- 
 lation to which are elsewhere considered.^ 
 
 So, in at least one state, the killing of a human being, perpetrated 
 by an act imminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved 
 mind regardless of human life, though without a premeditated de- 
 sign to effect the death of any individual, is murder in the third 
 degree.* And under such a provision it is not necessary that more 
 than one person was, or might be, put in jeopardy by the reckless 
 act of the accused, though it is necessary that the act was committed 
 without special design upon the particular person or persons with 
 whose murder the accused is charged. '^ This provision merely makes 
 the presumption of malice arising from the character of the act con- 
 clusive in designated instances, and applies to cases which in other 
 jurisdictions are cases of murder usually in the second degree, on 
 the theory that malice is implied from the character of the killing", 
 or where the act causing death was, itself, illegal, on the theory 
 that it was a homicide in the commission of an unlawful act, which 
 subjects are elsewhere considered. * 
 
 IV. DeGEEE in case of killing by confederate OB ASSOCIATE. 
 
 144. Aider or abetter — As a general rule the degree of the crime 
 of the principal in the second degree, or aider or abetter, is the same 
 as that of the principal in the first degree, and if the killing was the 
 result of premeditation or previous agreement or understanding be- 
 tween the parties, the aider or abetter is guilty of murder in the 
 first degree, though the fatal act was committed by another.* The 
 guilt of the aider or abetter is measured by that of the principal 
 
 iHofTman v. State, 88 Wis. 166, 69 N. iMiller v. Com. 5 Ky. L. Rep. 427; 
 
 W. 588. State v. Penney, 113 Iowa, 691, 84 N. W. 
 
 sSee supra, §§ 118 et seq. 509; State v. Paxton, 126 Mo. 500, 29 
 
 estate v. Lowe, 66 Minn. 296, 68 N. S. W. 705; Com. v. Neills, 2 Brewst. 
 
 W. 1094. (Pa.) 553; Stevenson v. State, 17 Tex. 
 
 7Ibid. App. 618; Guflfee v. State, 8 Tex. App. 
 
 8See supra, §§ 118, 129 et seq. 187. 
 
§ 144] MtTRDER. 217 
 
 when both were actuated by the same intent.^ But if the intent of 
 the aider or abetter differed from that of the principal, he is guilty 
 according to the intent with which he performed his part of the act. ^ 
 And where the aider or abetter acted with malice, he is guilty of 
 murder, though the principal in the first degree struck without mal- 
 ice, and under circumstances rendering him guilty of manslaughter 
 only; the guilt of the aider or abetter not depending entirely upon 
 that of the principal in the first degree. * And where he acted with- 
 out malice he may be guilty of manslaughter only, though the prin- 
 cipal in the first degree acted with malice.^ If, for instance, two 
 men fight on a former grudge and of settled malice, and with intent 
 to kill, of which the spectators are innocent, and they of a sudden 
 take sides with the combatants and encourage them by words, and 
 death ensue, it will not be murder in such persons.® Nor does the 
 degree of the guilt of the aider or abetter depend upon mere knowl- 
 edge on his part of malice on the part of the principal in the first 
 degree. '^ So, if the common design was not to take life, but to do 
 great bodily harm, and death resulted, then the offense of the aider 
 or abetter would be murder in the second degree;^ and the rule is 
 the same where the homicide was upon implied malice,® or when it 
 was committed with intent to kill, but without the deliberation nec- 
 essary to murder in the first degree. ■^'' And if the aid was given 
 without malice and without premeditation, in the heat of passion or 
 in a sudden affray, the offense of the aider would be manslaughter 
 only.*^ And this would appear to be the rule though the offense 
 of the principal might be of a higher degree. ^ ^ But it can be noth- 
 ing less than manslaughter; there can be no question of assault and 
 
 2Red V. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Eep. 667, sStevenson v. State, 17 Tex. App. 618; 
 73 Am. St. Rep. 965, 47 S. W. 1003. Guffee v. State, 8 Tex. App. 187. 
 
 sibid. ; Leslie v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. lo Guffee v. State, supra. 
 Rep. 65, 57 S. W. 659; Beets v. State, nutate v. Penney, 113 Iowa, 691, 84 
 Meigs, 106. And see Com. v. Roberts, N. W. 509; Miller v. Com. 5 Ky. L. Rep. 
 108 Mass. 296. 427; Von Gundy v. Com. 11 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 4Mickey v. Com. 9 Bush, 593; Tudor 552, 12 S. W. 386; Tudor v. Com. 19 Ky. 
 V. Com. 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1039, 43 S. W. L. Rep. 1039, 43 S. W. 187; Alexander 
 187; State v. Crank, 2 Bail. L. 66, 23 v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 395, 49 S. 
 Am. Dec. 117. W. 229, 50 S. W. 716; Guffee v. State, 
 
 BGuffee V. State, 8 Tex. App. 187. supra. 
 
 estate v. King, 2 Rice's Digest (S. In State v. Phillips, 117 Mo. 389, 29 
 C.) 106. S. W. 1079, however, it was held that 
 
 7Dorsey v. Com. 13 Ky. L. Rep. 359, one indicted for aiding and abetting 
 17 S. W. 183; Omer v. Com. 95 Ky. 353, another in the commission of a murder 
 25 S. W. 594; Leslie v. State, 42 Tex. cannot be convicted of manslaughter. 
 Crim. Rep. 65, 57 S. W. 659; Mohun's i2See Mickey v. Com. 9 Bush, 593; 
 Case, 12 How. St. Tr. 1026. Tudor v. Com. supra; Baskett v. Com. 
 
 sCom. V. Neills, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 553. 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1995, 44 S. W. 970. 
 
218 HOMICIDE. t§ 144 
 
 battery. ^ ' The intent of an actor or an aider or abetter in homicide, 
 and the consequent degree of the offense, are questions of fact for 
 the jury. ^ * 
 
 145. Accessory before the fact. — It may be stated as a general rule 
 that, since procuring, commanding, or encouraging another to commit 
 homicide involves malice and an intent to cause death, the crime of 
 an accessory before the fact must necessarily be murder in some de- 
 gree, and not manslaughter, not involving malice, deliberation, or 
 premeditation. ^ And one charged as an accessory before the fact to 
 murder cannot be properly convicted of manslaughter where the evi- 
 dence shows that he was not present at the commission of the homi- 
 cidal act.^ But when the procuring, encouraging, or command- 
 ing is not to commit homicide, but to commit some violent outrage, 
 or some act liable to cause serious bodily harm, and death results 
 from the performance of such act, malice is imputed to the slayer 
 only because of the commission of an act causing death, and will not 
 he imputed to the accessory, who in such case may be found guilty 
 of manslaughter only.* Murder in the second degree as well as 
 murder in the first admits of accessories before the fact, since it 
 can only be committed with malice.* 
 
 146. Coconspirator — Homicide in carrying out a conspiracy to do 
 an unlawful act is made the subject of a separate chapter of this 
 work, and in it the subject of the degree of the crime of the cocon- 
 spirator of the actual slayer is fully considered. ^ 
 
 v. Peesumptions and inferences as to degeees aotj theie 
 
 CHAEACTEEISTICS. 
 
 a. Presumptions. 
 
 147. Presumption when killing is shown to be malicious and noth- 
 ing more. — ^As we have seen, malice is presumed from an apparent- 
 
 isState V. Penney, supra; State v. 41 Pac. 51, 902; State v. Phillips, 117 
 
 Munchrath, 78 Iowa, 268, 43 N. W. 211; Mo. 389, 22 S. W. 1079. 
 
 Von Gundy v. Com. supra. In State v. Burbage, 51 S. C. 288. 28 
 
 In Com. V. Roberts, 108 Mass. 296, S. E. 937, however, it was held that 
 
 however, it was held that where several since a person indicted for murder may 
 
 are jointly indicted for committing man- be convicted of manslaughter, a, person 
 
 slaughter, they may be found guilty of indicted as accessory to the crime of 
 
 different degrees on such indictment, murder may be convicted of being ac- 
 
 3ome of them for manslaughter, and eessory after the fact to the crime of 
 
 others only for assault. manslaughter. 
 
 KRed v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 667, 3 State v. Steeves, supra. 
 
 73 Am. St. Rep. 965, 47 S. W. 1003. 4 Jones v. State, 13 Tex. 168, 62 Am. 
 
 iSee State v. Steeves, 29 Or. 85, 43 Deo. 550. 
 
 Pac. 947. iSee infra, chapter XXI., |§ 436 et 
 
 zState V. Robinson, 12 Wash. 349, seq. 
 
8 147] 
 
 MUEDER. 
 
 219 
 
 ly intentional killing or from a killing by acts evincing a depraved 
 mind regardless of human life.^ An intentional killing, therefore, 
 stripped of all its incidents and surrounding circumstances, is pre- 
 sumed to be murder in the second degree.^ And some of the cases 
 hold that the mere killing is enough to raise the presumption of mur- 
 der in the second degree, though it may not be shown to have been in- 
 tentional.* Murder in the second degree rests upon implied malice, 
 and the jury in a prosecution therefor may find the existence of mal- 
 ice, though the condition of the accused at the time was such as to 
 
 iSee supra, chapter VIII., §§ 94, 95. 
 
 2Hill V. Com. 2 Gratt. 595; Vance v. 
 Com. (Va.) 19 S. E. 785; Reed v. Com. 
 98 Va. 817, 36 S. E. 399; McDaniel v. 
 Com. 77 Va. 281 ; Kennedy v. State. 85 
 Ala. 326, 5 So. 300; Green v. State, 45 
 Ark. 281; People v. Cox, 76 Cal. 281, 18 
 Pac. 332; People v. Knapp, 71 Cal. 1, 
 11 Pac. 793; People v. Belencla, 21 Cal. 
 644; State v. Wallace, 2 Penn. (Del.) 
 402, 47 Atl. 621 ; Wortham v. State, 70 
 Ga. 336; Clarke v. State, 35 Ga. 75; 
 People V. Walter, 1 Idaho, 386 ; Boyle v. 
 State, 105 Ind. 469, 55 Am. Rep. 218, 
 5 N. E. 203; State v. Gillick, 7 Iowa, 
 287; Craft v. State, 3 Kan. 450; State 
 V. Deschamps, 42 La. Ann. 567, 21 Am. 
 St. Rep. 392, 7 So. 703; Hague v. State, 
 34 Miss. 616; State v. Foster, 61 Mo. 
 649; State v. Testerman, 68 Mo. 408; 
 State V. Gassert, 65 Mo. 352; State v. 
 Bowles, 146 Mo. 6, 69 Am. St. Rep. 598, 
 47 S. W. 892; State v. Underwood, 57 
 Mo. 40; State v. Gassert, 4 Mo. App. 
 44; State v. Harris, 76 Mo. 361; State 
 V. Eaton, 75 Mo. 586; State v. Anderson, 
 98 Mo. 461, 11 S. W. 981; State v. Craw- 
 ford, 115 Mo. 620, 22 S. W. 871; State 
 V. Evans, 65 Mo. 574; State v. Fitz- 
 gerald, 130 Mo. 407, 32 S. W. 1113; 
 State V. May, 142 Mo. 135, 43 S. W. 637 ; 
 State V. Elliott, 98 Mo. 158, 11 S. W. 
 666; State v. Silk, 145 Mo. 240, 44 S. 
 W. 764, 46 S. W. 959; State v. McMul- 
 lin, 170 Mo. 608, 71 S. W. 221 ; State v. 
 Frazier, 137 Mo. 317, 38 S. W. 913; State 
 V. McKinzie, 102 Mo. 620, 15 S. W. 149; 
 State V. Evans, 124 Mo. 411, 28 S. W. 
 8; State V. Holme, 54 Mo. 153; State v. 
 Hays, 23 Mo. 287; State v. Stoeekli, 8 
 Mo. App. 598; Preuit v. People, 5 Neb. 
 377; Schlencker v. State, 9 Neb. 300, 2 
 K. W. 710; Milton v. State, 6 Neb. 136; 
 Davis V. State, 51 Neb. 301, 70 N. W. 
 984; Kastner v. State, 58 Neb. 767, 79 
 N. W. 713; State v. Wilcox, 118 N. C. 
 1131, 23 S. E. 928; State v. Norwood, 115 
 N. C. 789, 44 Am. St. Rep. 498, 20 S. E. 
 
 712; State v. Dowden, 118 N. C. 1145, 24 
 S. E. 722; State v. Locklear, '.18 N. C. 
 1154, 24 S. E. 410; State v. Hicks, 125 N. 
 C. 636, 34 S. E. 247 ; State v. McCourry, 
 128 N. C. 594, 38 S. E. 883; State v. 
 Fuller, 114 N. C. 885, 19 S. E. 797; State 
 V. Bishop, 131 N. C. 733, 42 S. E. 836; 
 State V. Smith, 77 N. C. 488; State v. 
 Capps, 134 N. C. 622, 46 S. E. 730; State 
 V. Lipscomb, 134 N. C. 689, 47 S. E. 44; 
 State V. Booker, 123 N. C. 713, 31 S. E. 
 376; Brown v. State, 62 N. .T. L. 666, 
 42 Atl. 811; State v. Adin, 7 Ohio Dec. 
 Reprint, 25; State v. Turner, Wright 
 (Ohio) 20; State v. Noble, 1 Ohio Dee. 
 Reprint, 1; State v. Carver, 22 Or. 602, 
 30 Pac. 315; O'Mara v. Com. 75 Pa. 424; 
 Com. V. Drum, 58 Pa. 9; Com. v. Onofri, 
 18 Phila. 436; Com. v. Sullivan, 13 
 Phila. 410; Com. v. Cutaiar, 5 Pa. Dist. 
 R. 403; State v. Anderson, 2 Overt. 6, 
 5 Am. Dec. 648 ; Witt v. State, 6 Coldw. 
 5; Hamby v. State, 36 Tex. 525; Harris 
 V. State, 8 Tex. App. 90; Com. v. Hill, 2 
 Gratt. 594; Howell v. Com. 26 Gratt. 
 995 ; Watson v. Com. 85 Va. 867, 9 S. E. 
 418; Jackson v. Com. 97 Va. 762, 33 So. 
 547; Longley v. Com. 99 Va. 807, 37 S. 
 E. 339; State v. Payne, 10 Wash. 545, 39 
 Pac. 157; State v. Hobbs, 37 W. Va. 812, 
 17 S. E. 380; State v. Schnelle, 24 W. 
 Va. 767; State v. Cain, 20 W. Va. 679; 
 State V. Greer, 22 W. Va. 800. And see 
 State V. Gilliam, 66 S. C. 419, 45 S. E. 6. 
 
 But while mere proof of killing with- 
 out proof of the circumstances shows 
 murder in the second degree, a case will 
 not be reversed because the jury were 
 instructed that it was murder, without 
 stating the degree, where a correct in- 
 struction had been given them. State 
 V. Hays, 23 Mo. 287. 
 
 3 State V. Bowles, 146 Mo. 6, 69 Am. 
 St. Rep. 599, 47 S. W. 892; State v. 
 Evans, 124 Mo. 397, 28 S. W. 8, Over- 
 ruli"g State v. McKinzie, 102 Mo. 620, 
 15 S. W. 149, and State v. Harris, 76 Mo. 
 361. 
 
220 HOMICIDE. [§ UT 
 
 disprove express malice.^ This presumption, however, is not con- 
 clusive.^ And the rule that malice is presumed and that the killing 
 will be deemed murder in the second degree applies only when the 
 killing alone appears. When all the circumstances connected with 
 the killing are shown, malice cannot be implied from the killings 
 but must be found by the jury, like any other fact ; ® the implication 
 of malice being considered as a part of the evidence upon the one 
 hand,'' and the presumption of innocence being given due weight 
 upon the other. ^ And the presumption of murder in the second de- 
 gree from the simple act of killing does not arise in a prosecution for 
 murder, in which the issue is whether the accused, as an officer, re- 
 sorted to extreme measures in making an arrest, and thereby unneces- 
 sarily killed the deceased, in which case the burden rests with the 
 state to show the use of such extreme measures, and all the circum- 
 stances surrounding the killing should be looked at in determining 
 the question. ' And the rule that the intent to kill may be inferred 
 from the act of killing is, in principle, an inference of fact to be 
 drawn by the jury in a prosecution for homicide, and not an im- 
 plication of law to be applied by the court. ^ "^ And mere proof that 
 a person has been deprived of life utterly fails to show criminal 
 homicide under a statute by which homicide is made justifiable or 
 excusable, murder in the first or second degree, or manslaughter in 
 
 4State V. Johnson, 41 Conn. 584. Davis v. United States, 160 U. S. 469, 40 
 
 estate v. Bartmess, 33 Or. 110, 54 Pac. L. ed. 499, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 353. 
 
 167. 9State v. Dierberger, 96 Mo. 666, 9 
 
 But an erroneous instruction that an Am. St. Eep. 380, 10 S. W. 168. 
 intent to murder is conclusively pre- An instruction in a prosecution for 
 sumed from the deliberate use of a dead- homicide, which is erroneous in direct- 
 ly weapon causing death, if not done in ing that the law implies murder from 
 self-defense, is corrected by subsequent proof of the act of killing, is not cured 
 modification to the effect that this does by correct instructions as to the facts 
 not raise a presumption of murder in necessary to constitute the crime of 
 the first degree, and cannot create a murder, and that the prosecution must 
 presumption of murder in the second prove all the facts necessary to authorize 
 degree. Ibid. a jury to convict for that crime. Stokes 
 
 eVollmer v. State, 24 Neb. 838, 40 N. v. People, 53 N. Y. 164, 13 Am. Rep. 492. 
 
 W. 420; People v. West, 49 Cal. 610; loStokes v. People, supra. But see 
 
 Futch V. State, 90 Ga. 472, 16 So. 102; O'Mara v. Com. 75 Pa. 424. 
 
 State V. Jones, 29 S. C. 201, 7 S. E. 296. And an instruction to the jury that 
 
 In State v. Payne, 10 Wash. 545, 39 upon proof of the killing the accused 
 
 Pac. 157, it was held that the presump- should be found guilty of murder in the 
 
 tion that a homicide proved to have first degree, unless he had given evidence 
 
 taken place was murder in the second satisfying them that it was manslaugh- 
 
 degree must be given force unless there ter or excusable homicide, is erroneous 
 
 was something in the case to rebut it. as withdrawing from the jury the right 
 
 'People V. Tidwell, 4 Utah, 506, 12 to make the inference. Stokes t. Peo- 
 
 Pac. 61. pie, supra. 
 
 sSee Coffin v. United States, 156 U. S. 
 432, 39 L. ed. 481, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 394; 
 
S 147] MURDER. 221 
 
 one of several degrees, determinable by the intention and circum- 
 stances of its perpetration. ^ ^ 
 
 148. Mitigation and excuse not presumed. — An. intentional homi- 
 cide being deemed to be murder in the second degree in the absence of 
 evidence as to the surrounding circumstances and conditions, such a 
 homicide cannot be mitigated, justified, or excused unless it is made 
 to appear that it was done without malice.^ When the evidence 
 shows a deliberate and intentional killing, no presumption of provo- 
 cation or other mitigating circumstance can be indulged in; their 
 existence must be established by the evidence in the case.^ And, as 
 a general rule, the burden of proving justification or mitigation of a 
 homicide is regarded as resting with the accused, unless the proof 
 already in the case sufficiently manifests it* The state in a prose- 
 cution for murder in the second degree is not called upon to prove 
 affirmatively that there were no circumstances of justification or ex- 
 tenuation, to warrant a conviction.* And though mitigating facta 
 be shown in a prosecution for homicide which will reduce the crime 
 to manslaughter, the burden still rests with the accused to show such 
 further facts as will excuse the homicide, before he is entitled to 
 
 iimd. N. C. 651, 3 S. E. 507; Silvus v. State, 
 
 iPeopIe V. Moore, 8 Oal. 90; People 22 Ohio St. 90; Weaver v. State, 24 
 
 V. Gibson, 17 Cal. 283; State v. Smith, Ohio St. 584; Davis v. State, 25 Ohio 
 
 77 N. C. 488. St. 369; State v. Adin, 7 Ohio Dec. Ee- 
 
 2 State V. Hanley, 34 Minn. 430, 26 print, 25; Com. v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9; Com. 
 
 N. W. 397. V. Brown, 7 Pa. Co. Ct. 640; Com. v. 
 
 3Vann v. State, 83 Ga. 44, 9 S. E. 945; Sullivan, 13 Phila. 410; People v. Tid- 
 
 Lewis V. State, 90 Ga. 95, 15 S. E. 697; well, 4 Utah, 506, 12 Pac. 61; State v. 
 
 Wortham v. State, 70 Ga. 336; Palmore Town, Wright (Ohio) 75; Jackson v. 
 
 V. State, 29 Ark. 248; People v. Knapp, Com. 97 Va. 762, 33 S. E. 547; Reed v. 
 
 71 Cal. 1, 11 Pac. 793; People v. Rodrigo, Com. 98 Va. 817, 36 S. E. 399; Longley 
 
 69 Cal. 601, 11 Pac. 481; People v. Hong v. Com. 99 Va. 807, 37 S. E. 339; Litton 
 
 Ah Duck, 61 Cal. 387 ; People v. Arnold, v. Com. 101 Va. 833, 44 S. E. 923 ; Hill 
 
 15 Cal. 482; People v. Gibson, supra; v. Com. 2 Gratt. S94; State v. Schnelle, 
 
 State V. Wallace, 2 Penn. (Del.) 404, 47 24 W. Va. 767; State v. Hobbs, 37 W. 
 
 Atl. 621; Holland v. State, 12 Fla. 117; Va. 812, 17 S. E. 380; State v. Cain, 20 
 
 Smith v. People, 142 111. 117, 31 N. E. W. Va. 679; State v. Greer, 22 W. Va. 
 
 599; Kota v. People, 136 111. 655, 27 N. 800; Cook v. Territory, 3 Wyo. 110, 4 
 
 E. 53; Duncan v. People, 134 111. 110, 24 Pac. 887. 
 
 N. E. 765; Parsons v. People, 218 111. 4.State v. Stokely, 16 Minn. 282, Gil. 
 
 386, 75 N. E. 993; State v. Gilliek, 7 249. 
 
 Iowa, 287; Head v. State, 44 Miss. 731; And an instruction in a prosecution 
 
 Green v. State, 28 Miss. 687; McDaniel for murder defining ' manslaughter, and 
 
 V. State, 8 Smedes & M. 401, 47 Am. Dec. directing that to convict of that of- 
 
 93; State v. Tabor, 95 Mo. 585, 8 S. W. fense the jury must find the necessary 
 
 744; State v. Elliott, 98 Mo. 150, 11 S. facts beyond a reasonable doubt, is not 
 
 W. 566; State v. Holme, 54 Mo. 153; objectionable as changing the burden of 
 
 State V. Evans, 124 Mo. 41 1, 28 S. W. 8; proof and requiring the accused to prove 
 
 Williams v. State, 6 Neb. 334; Brown manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt 
 
 V. State, 62 N. J. L. 667, 42 Atl. 811; before the jury can acquit him of mur- 
 
 Stokes v. People, 53 N. Y. 164, 13 Am. der. Spangler v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. 
 
 Rep. 492; State v. Loeklear, 118 N. C. Rep. 233, 61 S. W. 314. 
 1154, 24 S. E. 410; State v. Jones, 98 
 
222 HOMICIDE. (§ 148 
 
 an acquittaL" And the mitigating or excusing facts and circum- 
 stances must be made to appear, in some jurisdictions, to the satis- 
 faction of the jury, ® and in others by a preponderance of the evi- 
 dence.'' But the prevailing rule which seems to come nearest 
 to reconciling all of the cases, and which has been substantially 
 adopted even in states in which the burden of proof is regarded as 
 shifting to the accused on proof of an intentional killing, is that, 
 if the whole proof, though establishing the homicide, leaves a reason- 
 able doubt in the minds of the jury as to whether the killing is 
 murder, manslaughter, or excusable homicide, the accused is en- 
 titled to the benefit of that doubt. ® And under this rule an instruc- 
 tion in a prosecution for homicide that, in the absence of evidence 
 of deliberation and premeditation, the killing is presumed to be 
 murder in the second degree, and the burden then falls upon the 
 accused to show that it was justifiable or excusable, or that it was 
 mitigated to manslaughter, is erroneous as disregarding the presump- 
 tion in favor of the innocence of the accused, which requires the 
 prosecution to prove every averment of the crime beyond a reason- 
 able doubt.® But an instruction that where a homicide is proved 
 beyond reasonable doubt the presumption is that it is murder in the 
 second degree, and if the state would elevate it to murder in the 
 first degree it must prove the characteristics of that crime, and if 
 the accused would reduce it to manslaughter the burden is on him, 
 
 BState V. Byrd, 121 N. C. 684, 28 S. sSmith v. People, 142 111. 117, 31 N. 
 
 E. 353. E. 599 ; People v. Elliott, 80 Cal. 296, 
 
 estate v. Byers, 100 N. C. 512, 6 S. E. 22 Pac. 207; People v. Adams, 85 Cal. 
 
 420; State v. Potts, 100 N. C. 457, 6 S. 231, 24 Pac. 629; Murphy v. People, 9 
 
 E. 657; State v. Barrett, 132 N. C. 1005, Colo. 435, 13 Pac. 528; Kriel v. Com. 5 
 
 43 S. E. 832 ; State v. Brittain. 89 N. Bush, 362 ; King v. State, 74 Miss. 576, 
 
 C. 481; State v. Bowman, 80 N. C. 432; 21 So. 235; State v. Wingo, 66 Mo. 181, 
 
 State V. Smith, 77 N. 0. 488; State v. 27 Am. Rep. 329; Stokes v. People, 
 
 Willis, 63 N. C. 26; State v. EUick, 60 supra; People v. Downs, 123 N. Y. 558, 
 
 N. C. (2 Winst. L.) 56, 86 Am. Dec. 442: 25 N. E. 988, Affirming 56 Hun, 5, 
 
 State V. Johnson, 48 N. C. (3 Jones, L.) 8 N. Y. Supp. 521; Tiffany v. Com. 121 
 
 266; State v. Haywood, 61 N. C. (Phill. Pa. 165, 6 Am. St. Rep. 775, 15 Atl. 462; 
 
 L.) 376; Green v. State, 28 Miss. 6S7; State v. Mason, 54 S. C. 240, 32 S. E. 
 
 Williams v. State, 6 Neb. 334. 357; Anderson v. State, 3 Heisk. 86; 
 
 'Silvus V. State, 22 Ohio St. 90; People v. Tidwell, supro; State v. Cross, 
 
 Weaver V. State, 24 Ohio St. 584; People 42 W. Va. 253, 24 S. E. 996. And see 
 
 V. Knapp, 71 Cal. 1, 11 Pac. 793; People People v. Smith, 59 Cal. 601. 
 V. Hong Ah Duck, 61 Cal. 387; People Hawthorne v. State, 58 Miss. 778, also 
 
 V. Raten, 63 Cal. 422; People v. Rodrigo, holds this rule, following and approv- 
 
 69 Cal. 601, 11 Pac. 481; People v. Ar- ing McDaniel v. State, 8 Smedes & M. 
 
 nold, 15 Cal. 482; State v. Vincent, 24 401, 47 Am. Dec. 93, and apparently 
 
 Iowa, 570, 95 Am. Dec. 753; People v. overruling earlier Mississippi cases 
 
 Schryver, 42 N. Y. 1, 1 Am. Rep. 480; previously cited to support an apparent- 
 
 Stokes V. People, 53 N. Y. 164, 13 Am. ly opposing rule. 
 
 Rep. 492; Com. v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9; sTrumble v. Territory, 3 Wyo. 280, 6 
 
 O'Mara v. Com. 75 Pa. 424; People v. L.R.A. 384, 21 Pac. 1081. 
 Tidwell, 4 Utah, 500, 12 Pac. 61. 
 
148] 
 
 MURDER. 
 
 223 
 
 is not objectionable as placing on the accused the burden of proving 
 that he was not guilty of murder in the second degree. ^ " This sec- 
 tion should be read and considered with the subject of presumptions 
 and burden of proof of self-defense, elsewhere treated. ^ ^ 
 
 149. Characteristics of murder in the first degree not presumed 
 
 While a malicious killing is presumed to be murder in the second 
 degree, the deliberation and premeditation or other characteristics 
 necessary to murder in the first degree are not presumed, but must 
 be proved.' Nor will it be assumed from the mere fact of killing 
 that it was perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait, or 
 in the perpetration of any of the felonies mentioned in the statute 
 as ingredients of murder in the first degree.^ And the burden rests 
 with the prosecution to show such other facts, as, in addition to 
 the killing, will make the offense murder in the first degree imder 
 the statute.* And this, like the general question of guilt, must be 
 
 lOState V. Melvern, 32 Wash. 7, 72 
 Pac. 489. 
 
 iiSee infra, chapter XII., §§ 340 et 
 seq. 
 
 1 State V. Lane, 64 Mo. 319; State v. 
 Foster, 61 Mo. 549: State v. Young, 119 
 Mo. 495, 24 S. W. 1038; State v. Evans, 
 65 Mo. 574; State v. Gassert, 4 Mo. 
 App. 44; Fallin v. State, 83 Ala. 5, 3 So. 
 525; Fields v. State, 52 Ala. 348; Sto- 
 ball V. State, 116 Ala. 454, 23 So. 102; 
 Buiris V. State, 38 Ark. 221 ; Simpson 
 V. State, 56 Ark. 8, 19 S. W. 99; People 
 V. Gibson, 17 Cal. 283; State v. Brinte, 
 4 Penn. (Del.) 551, 58 Atl. 258; Ernest 
 V. State, 20 Fla. 383; Adams v. State, 
 28 Fla. 511, 10 So. 106; State v. Mc- 
 Cormick, 27 Iowa, 402; Craft v. State, 
 3 Kan. 450; Schlencker v. State, 9 Neb. 
 300, 2 N. W. 710; Milton v. State. 6 Neb. 
 136; Stokes v. People, 53 N. Y. 164, 13 
 Am. Rep. 492; People v. White, 24 
 Wend. 530; State v. Hicks, 125 N. C. 
 636, 34 S. E. 247; State v. Thomas, 118 
 N. 0. 1113, 24 S. E. 431 ; State v. Rhyne, 
 124 N. C. 847, 33 S. E. 128; State v. 
 Loeklear, 118 N. C. 1154, 24 S. E. 410; 
 State V. Hunt, 134 N. C. 684, 47 S. E. 49 ; 
 State V. Carver, 22 Or. 602, 30 Pac. 315; 
 McCue V. Com. 78 Pa. 185, 21 Am. Rep. 
 7; Com. v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9; Com. v. 
 Onofri, 18 Phila. 436; Dains v. State, 2 
 Humph. 439; Witt v. State, 6 Coldw. 5; 
 Ake v. State, 30 Tex. 466; Hamby v. 
 State, 36 Tex. 524; Farrer v. State, 42 
 Tex. 266 ; Murray v. State, 1 Tex. App. 
 417; Hill v. Com. 2 Gratt. 594; Howell 
 V. Com. 26 Gratt. 995 ; State v. Melvern, 
 32 Wash. 7, 72 Pac. 489; State v. Cain, 
 
 20 W. Va. 679; State v. Hertzog, 55 W. 
 Va. 74, 46 S. E. 792. 
 
 The act of the court in a prosecution 
 for homicide in assuming, without sup- 
 port of evidence, that the accused acted 
 with premeditation, and not upon a sud- 
 den or uncontrollable impulse, entitles 
 the accused to a new trial, if convicted 
 of murder in the first degree. People v. 
 Barberi, 149 N. Y. 256, 52 Am. St. Rep. 
 717, 43 N. E. 635. 
 
 2 Witt v. State, supra. 
 
 Murder by drowning not being one of 
 the modes of destroying life enumerated 
 in the statute as constituting murder in 
 the first degree though there was no in- 
 tent to kill is not necessarily murder in 
 the first degree, unless deliberation, 
 prfimeditation, and an intent to kill ap- 
 pear; and a verdict of murder by 
 drowning, as charged, warrants a con- 
 viction of murder in the second degree 
 only. Johnson v. Com. 24 Pa. 386. 
 
 s'People V. Potter, 5 Mich. 1, 71 Am. 
 Dec. 763; State v. Tabor, 95 Mo. 585, 8 
 S. W. 744; State v. Silk, 145 Mo. 240, 
 44 S. W. 764, 46 S. W. 959; State v. 
 Testenman, 68, Mo. 408; People v. Fish, 
 125 N. Y. 136, 26 N. E. 319; Wilson v. 
 People, 4 Park. Crim. Rep. 619; State v. 
 Booker, 123 N. C. 713, 31 S. E. 376; 
 State V. Rhyne, 124 N. C. 847, 33 S. E. 
 128; State v. Fuller, 114 N. C. 885, 19 
 S. E. 797; State v. Bishop, 131 N. C. 
 733, 42 S. E. 836; State v. Loeklear, 113 
 N. C. 1154, 24 S. E. 410; State v. 
 Teaehey, 138 N. C. 587, 50 S. E. 232; 
 State V. Hunt, 134 N. C. 684, 47 S. E. 
 49; State v. Adin, 7 Ohio Dec. Reprint, 
 
224 HOMICIDE. [§ 14» 
 
 established affirmatively to the satisfaction of the jury, beyond a 
 reasonable doubt.* 
 
 b. Inferences. 
 
 150. General rules as to inference of characteristics of murder in the 
 first degree. — Deliberation and premeditation, intent to kill, and 
 other elements of murder in the first degree may be shown, like other 
 facts, either by direct proof, or by circumstances from which their 
 existence may be inferred.^ ISTo rule can be laid down as to the 
 character or amount of proof necessary to show deliberation and 
 premeditation; each case must depend upon its own facts. ^ A pre- 
 meditated design to kill may be inferred from the facts. ^ And that 
 a malicious killing was murder in the first degree may be shown by 
 
 25; Com. v. Brown, 7 Pa. Co. Ct. 640; State, 25 Fla. 535, 6 So. 441; Achey 
 
 Com. V. Williams, 2 Ashm. (Pa.) 69; v. State, 64 Ind. 56; Davidson v. State, 
 
 Lanahan v. Com. 84 Pa. 80; Murray v. 135 Ind. 254, 34 N. E. 972; State v. Gil- 
 
 Com. 79 Pa. 311; Com. v. Drum, 58 Pa. lick, 7 Iowa, 287; State v. Van Tassel, 
 
 9; O'Mara v. Com. 75 Pa. 424; Com. v. 103 Iowa, 6, 72 N. W. 497; Haunstine v. 
 
 Aiello, 180 Pa. 597, 36 Atl. 1079; Ake State, 31 Neb. 112, 47 N. W. 698; People 
 
 V. State, 30 Tex. 466 ; Longley v. Com. v. Hoch, 150 N, Y. 291, 44 N. E. 976 ; 
 
 99 Va. 807, 37 S. E. 339; Reed v. Com. People v. Walworth, 4 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 
 
 98 Va. 817, 36 S. E. 399; Watson v. 355; People v. Majone, 12 Abb. N. C. 187, 
 
 Com. 85 Va. 867, 9 S. E. 418; Hill v. Affirmed in 91 N. Y. 211; People v. 
 
 Com. 2 Gratt. 594; McDaniel v. Com. 77 Beekwith, 45 Hun, 422; People v. Place, 
 
 Va. 281; State v. Hobbs, 37 W. Va. 812, 157 N. Y. 584, 52 N. E. 576; People v. 
 
 17 S. E. 380; State v. Cain, 20 W. Va. Pitzthum, 137 N. Y. 581, 33 N. E. 322; 
 
 679. State v. Booker, 123 N. C. 713, 31 S. E. 
 
 4Com. V. Cutaiar, 5 Pa. Dist. R. 403; 376: State v. McCormac, 116 N. C. 1033, 
 
 State v. Curtis, 70 Mo. 594. And see 21 S. E. 693; State v. Exum, 138 N. 
 
 State V. Brown, 188 Mo. 451, 87 S. W. C. 599, 50 S. E. 283 ; State v. Ah Lee, 
 
 519: Farrer v. State, 42 Tex. 265. 8 Or. 214; State v. Carver, 22 Or. 602, 
 
 iState V. Mitchell, 64 Mo. 191; State 30 Pac. 315; Lanahan v. Com. 84 Pa. 
 
 V. Foster, 61 Mo. 549; State v. Tabor, 80; Com. v. Lvnch, 3 Pittsb. 412; Mc- 
 
 95 Mo. 585, 8 S. W. 744; State v. Kil- Coy v. State, 25 Tex. 33, 78 Am. Dec. 
 
 gore, 70 Mo. 546; State v. Underwood, 520; Wilson v. State, 43 Tex. 472; 
 
 57 Mo. 40; Green v. State, 13 Mo. 382; Brown v. State, 32 Tex. Crim. Rep. 119, 
 
 State V. Talbott, 73 Mo. 347 ; State v. 22 S. W. 596 ; Rodriquez v. State, 32 Tex. 
 
 Lane, 64 Mo. 319; State v. Walker, 98 Crim. Rep. 259, 22 S. W. 978; Ake v. 
 
 Mo. 95, 9 S. W. 646, 11 S. W. 1133; State, 30 Tex. 466; Williams v. State, 
 
 State V. Anderson, 98 Mo. 461, 11 S. W. 25 Tex. App. 521, 8 S. W. 653; Jordan v. 
 
 981; State v. McLaughlin, 149 Mo. 19, State, 10 Tex. 479; Wilkins v. State, 35 
 
 .50 S. W. 315; State V. Kindred, 148 Mo. Tex. Crim. Rep. 525, 34 S. W. 627; 
 
 270, 49 S. W. 845; State v. Stoecldi, 8 Howell v. Com. 26 Gratt. 995; State v. 
 
 Mo. App. 598; Fields v. State, 52 Ala. Webster, 21 Wash. 63, 57 Pac. 361. 
 348; Green v. State, 98 Ala. 14, 13 So. And this is the rule though the stat- 
 
 482; Bivens v. State, 11 Ark. 455; Peo- ute makes the presumption of an intent 
 
 pie v. Bealoba, 17 Cal. 389; People v. to murder, arising from the use of a 
 
 Mahatch (Cal.) 82 Pac. 779; People v. deadly weapon, conclusive. State v. 
 
 Pool, 27 Cal. 573 ; Van Houton v. People, Carver, supra. 
 
 22 Colo. 53, 43 Pac. 137; State v. Pratt, 2People v. Walworth, 4 N. Y. Crim. 
 
 Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 249; Yates Rep. 355; People v. Raffo, 180 N. Y. 434, 
 
 V. State, 26 Fla. 484, 7 So. 880; Adams 73 N. E. 225. 
 v. State, 28 Fla. 511, 10 So. 106; Hioks v. sQook v. State (Fla.) 35 So. 665. 
 
5 150] MURDER. 225 
 
 circumstantial evidence.'* Tlie question is one for the jury to deter- 
 mine upon a consideration of all the surrounding circumstances tend- 
 ing to show the relations of the parties to each other, ^ and the animus 
 of the accused toward the deceased. ® Premeditation or other elements 
 •of murder in the first degree will not be inferred, however, from the 
 bare fact of killing. '' Their existence may be inferred from the cir- 
 ■cimistances, but not presumed ; in this sense the words "inferred" and 
 "presumed" are not synonymous. ® Intent to kill and other character- 
 istics of murder in the first degree are matters of fact which cannot be 
 implied as matters of law, but may be inferred from the nature of the 
 weapon used, or from acts of malice which, in the usual course of 
 "things, would cause death, or great bodily harm.^ And in arriving at 
 the intention regard should be had to what transpired at the time of 
 the killing, as well as to what transpired before and after that time. ^ " 
 So, in case of assault with intent to kill, the intent is as necessary 
 to be proved as the act itself;^ ^ but it is unnecessary to prove the 
 specific intent by direct, positive, and independent evidence ; it may 
 be inferred from other facts in evidence. ^^ And in determining 
 the question as to the existence of intent the jury may take into 
 •consideration the previous conduct and declarations of the accused, 
 his temper or disposition, the nature of his acts constituting the 
 assault, the character of the instrument used, and all other circum- 
 stances tending to throw light upon the subject. -^^ 
 
 151. Inferences from character of act. — The existence of the nec- 
 essary elements of murder in the first degree, — i. e., the intent to 
 
 4 Com. V. Cfutaiar, 5 Pa. Dist. R. 403. the deceased and striking her with a, 
 
 BPhillips V. State, 62 Ark. 119, 34 S. hatchet or stone hammer, thereby caus- 
 
 W. 539; State v. Jones, 2 Penn. (Del.) ing her death. State v. Lautenschlager, 
 
 573, 47 Atl. 1006; Moore v. People, 146 supra. 
 
 111. 600, 35 N. E. 166; Wilson v. People, sCrosby v. People, 137 111. 325, 27 N. 
 
 4 Park. Crim. Rep. 619; State v. E. 49. 
 
 •Gardiner, Wright (Ohio) 392; State v. lOHayes v. State, 58 Ga. 35; McCoy v. 
 
 Thompson, Wright (Ohio) 617. State, 25 Tex. 33, 78 Am. Dec. 520. 
 
 sPhillips V. State, supra; State v. But evidence of another murder com- 
 
 Larkins, 5 Idaho, 200, 47 Pac. 945. mitted by similar means, but for a dif- 
 
 Evidence in a prosecution for homicide ferent cause, is not admissible in a 
 
 tending to show robbery as a, motive prosecution for homicide to establish 
 
 warrants an instruction on murder in intent to kill, where such intent con- 
 
 the first degree. State v. Donnelly, 130 clusively appears from attending cir- 
 
 Mo. 642, 32 S. W. 1124. cumstances. People v. Molineux, 168 N. 
 
 'State V. Lautenschlager, 22 Minn. Y. 264. 62 L.R.A. 193, 61 N. E. 286. 
 514. "Bryant v. State, 7 Wyo. 311, 51 Pac. 
 
 sState V. Kilgore, 70 Mo. 546. 879, 56 Pac. 596; Friederich v. People, 
 
 But an instruction in a prosecution 147 111. 310, 35 N. E. 472; Roberts v. 
 
 for homicide that the law presumes a People, 19 Mich. 401. 
 premeditated design from the naked fact i2Bryant v. State, supra; People v. 
 
 of the killing is not materially errone- Landman, 103 Gal. 577, 37 Pac. 518; 
 
 ous, where the record discloses a homi- Roberts v. People, supra. 
 •cide committed by the accused without islbid. 
 provocation, by suddenly springing upon 
 Horn.— 15. 
 
226 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 R 15S 
 
 kill, deliberation and premeditation, — 'may be inferred from the cir- 
 cumstances p.nd character of the act of killing itself, in the absence 
 of surrounding circumstances clearly repelling the idea, ^ Where the 
 intent to kill appears from the circumstances preceding or connected 
 "with the homicide there can be no question of implied malice.^ And 
 it has been held that an act the natural consequence of which is death, 
 when unexplained, is evidence in itself of the preconceived intention 
 and deliberation necessary to constitute murder in the first degree.* 
 Ajid one who, upon little or no provocation, gives another a fatal 
 wound with a deadly weapon is prima facie guilty of wilful, de- 
 liberate, and premeditated killing,* and tlie burden rests with him 
 of showing extenuating circumstances ; and he will be held guilty of 
 murder in the first degree unless he shows such circumistances, or 
 they appear in the case made by the state.® Though evidence that 
 two men who were personal acquaintances and friends met accident- 
 ally and exchanged a few words, when one of them killed the other, 
 does not justify finding premeditation and deliberation in the ab- 
 sence of any showing as to former grudges, threats, or planning, 
 the manner and immediate circumstances of the killing might 
 
 iPeople V. Conroy, 97 N. Y. 62, Af- 
 firming 33 Hun, 119; People v. Schmidt, 
 168 N. Y. 568. 61 N. E. 907; People v. 
 Fish, 125 N. Y. 136, 26 N. E. 319; Peo- 
 ple V. Jones, 99 N. Y. 667, 2 N. E. 49; 
 State V. Hoyt, 46 Conn. 330; State v. 
 Brinte, 4 Penn. (Del.) 551, 58 Atl. 258; 
 State V. Jones, 2 Penn. (Del.) 573, 47 
 Atl. lOOB; King v. State, 21 Ga. 220; 
 Eockmore v. State, 91 Ga. 97, 16 S. E. 
 305; Com. V. Best, 180 Mass. 492, 62 N. 
 E. 748; State v. Baker, 146 Mo. 379, 48 
 S. W. 475; State v. Anderson, 89 Mo. 
 312, 1 S. W. 135; People v. Webster, 68 
 Hun, 11, 22 N. Y. Supp. 634; Wilson v. 
 People, 4 Park. Crim. Rep. 619; State 
 V. Gai!liner, Wright (Ohio) 392; State 
 V. Anderson, 10 Or. 448; Com. v. Mc- 
 Millan, 6 Kulp. 281, Affirmed in 144 Pa. 
 610, 22 Atl. 1029; Com. v. Birriolo, 197 
 Pa. 371, 47 Atl. 355. 
 
 And where, in a prosecution for homi- 
 cide, there is evidence of hatred and re- 
 peated threats extending down to the 
 time of the homicidal act, and endeavors 
 to prepare a deadly weapon, and finally 
 a covert attack on the object of the 
 threats, the slayer stabbing him in the 
 back, and plying his knife until he is 
 forced back by others, the circumstances 
 are so peculiarly atrocious and brutally 
 malignant as to warrant a refusal to 
 give an Instruction as to murder in the 
 
 second degree. State v. Brown, 119 Mo. 
 527, 24 S. W. 1027, 25 S. W. 200. 
 
 zPcople V. Knapp, 71 Cal. 1, 11 Pac. 
 793. 
 
 sjordan v. State, 10 Tex. 479. And 
 see Com. v. Straesser, 153 Pa. 452, 26 
 Atl. 17. 
 
 4 State V. Ellis, 11 Mo. App. 587 
 Appx. ; State v. Donnelly, 130 Mo. 642, 
 32 S. W. 1124; State v. Hall, 168 Mo. 
 475, 68 S. W. 344; Daughdrill v. State, 
 113 Ala. 7, 21 So. 378; Peri v. People, 
 65 111. 17; State v. Dennis, 119 Iowa,. 
 688, 94 N. W. 235; Territory v. John- 
 son. 9 Mont. 21, 22 Pac. 346; People v. 
 Fish, 125 N. Y. 136, 26 N. E. 319; Peo- 
 ple V. Totterman, 181 N. Y. 385, 74 N. 
 E. 222; State v. Exum, 138 N. C. 599, 5» 
 S. E. 283; Howard v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 App.) 33 S. W. 225; Waggoner v. State 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 55 S. W. 491 ; Young 
 v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 84 S. W. 822. 
 
 And evidence that the accused and 
 others went from one place to another, 
 and made a deadly onslaught upoi an- 
 other without provocation, and killed 
 him, warrants an argument of the prose- 
 cuting attorney that the action was de- 
 liberate, premeditated, and previously 
 planned. Vasser v. State (Ark.) 87 
 S. W. 635. 
 
 estate v. Greer, 22 W. Va. 800. 
 
S 151] 
 
 MURDER. 
 
 227 
 
 justify a finding of malice.® So, a deliberate and premeditated in- 
 tent to kill may be inferred from the nature of the wound inflicted ; '' 
 or from the manner or method of killing. * And evidence that a person 
 came to her death by force applied to the neck, rupturing the trachea 
 and shutting the air out of the lungs, is sufficient to go to the jury 
 in a prosecution for homicide on the question of deliberation and 
 premeditation.® So, killing under circumstances of great atrocity 
 warrants an inference of malice, premeditation, and deliberation. * ** 
 And the law may infer premeditation from the bare fact of killing, 
 when there was inherent cruelty and barbarity in the commission of 
 the deed. ^ ^ So, a withdrawal from a difficulty where continuing in 
 it and killing the opposing combatant would have been practicable 
 goes to negative an intent to kill. ^^ 
 
 162. Inference from use of deadly weapon. — The unjustifiable, in- 
 tentional, and deliberate use of a deadly weapon, or a use of such 
 weapon from which death would be liable to result, gives rise to an 
 inference of the deliberate and premeditated intent to take life nec- 
 
 eCraft v. State, 3 Kan. 450. 
 
 'People V. Neary, 104 Cal. 373, 37 Pac. 
 943; McCa.be v. Com. 3 Sadler (Pa.) 
 426, 8 Atl. 45; McClain v. Com. 110 Pa. 
 263, 1 Atl. 45. 
 
 SEvidence that three men, all armed 
 with deadly weapons, nade a simul- 
 taneous attack upon another and killed 
 him, one of them having approached him 
 from behind, and without saying a word 
 struck him a deadly blow on the head 
 with a hatchet, while the others each 
 fired a shot into his body in rapid suc- 
 cession, warrants the jury in a prose- 
 cution for the killing in concluding that 
 it was preconcerted, and that the design 
 to take the life of the deceased was 
 formed in cold blood. State v. Ah Lee, 
 8 Or. 214. 
 
 And proof that two men were to- 
 gether in a room early in the night, and 
 that one of them was in bed and asleep, 
 and that at midnight the latter was 
 dead in the same bed, killed by a ball 
 from the other's pistol, which had 
 perforated the bed clothing carrying its 
 fibers into the wound, the former being 
 still in the same room, suflSciently shows 
 a deliberate killing, constituting murder 
 in the first degree. Smith v. Com. 17 
 Ky. L. Rep. 439, 31 S. W. 724. 
 
 ^People V. Pullerson, 159 N. Y. 339, 
 53 N. E. 1119. 
 
 loHughes V. State, 29 Tex. App. 565, 
 16 S. W. 548; Luera v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 App.) 32 S. W. 898- Duebbe v. State, 
 1 Tex. App. 159; Spears v. State, 41 Tex. 
 Crim. Rep. 527, 56 S. W. 347; State v. 
 Callaway, 154 Mo. 91, 55 S. W. 444. 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution 
 for homicide that malice is implied from 
 any deliberate and cool act done against 
 another, however sudden, which shows 
 an abandoned and malignant heart, and 
 that where one person assaulted another 
 with a deadly weapon in such a manner 
 as was likely to cause his death, al- 
 though he had no previous malice or ill- 
 will against him, he is presumed, in law, 
 to have such malice at the moment of 
 the assault, and, if death results, it is 
 murder, is not objectionable as warrant- 
 ing a conviction of murder in the first 
 degree in the absence of premeditated 
 malice. Ross v. State, 8 Wyo. 351, 57 
 Pac. 924. 
 
 iiState V. May, 142 Mo. 135, 43 S. W. 
 637; McClain v. Com. 110 Pa. 263, 1 Ati. 
 45. 
 
 And where the question of malice in 
 a prosecution for homicide is submitted 
 to the jury under proper directions, and 
 a, verdict of conviction rendered, it will 
 not be interfered with on the claim that 
 to constitute murder in the first degree 
 express malice must be proved aliunde, 
 and not inferred alone from the act done, 
 or the r'oais used in doing it. People 
 V. Rate . 63 Cal. 421. 
 
 isMcCaa v. State (Miss.) 38 So. 228. 
 
228 HOiMlCIDE. t5 15iJ 
 
 essary to make a resultant killing murder in the first degree. * And 
 this is so notwithstanding the fact that no motive appears;^ and the 
 necessity rests with the slayer of showing extenuating circumstances. 
 But the use of the deadly weapon must have heen deliberate; the 
 mere use, with nothing more, raises an inference of malice only ; to 
 raise an inference of premeditation, deliberation and premeditation 
 must appear in the manner of the use.* And use in defending 
 against an assault by one with whom the user had had a previous 
 
 iKilpatriok v. Com. 31 Pa. 198; Com. jone, 12 Abb. N. C. 187, Affirmed in 91 
 
 V. Krause, 193 Pa. 306, 44 Atl. 454; Me- N. Y. 211; People v. Pugh, 167 N. Y. 
 
 Clain V. Com. 110 Pa. 263, 1 Atl. 45; 524, 60 N. E. 770; State v. Whitson, 111 
 
 Com. V. Drum, 58 Pa. 9; Com. v. Green, N. C. 695, 16 S. E. 332; State v. Nor- 
 
 1 Ashm. (Pa.) 289; Com. v. Weber, 167 wood, 115 N. C. 789, 44 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 Pa. 153, 31 Atl. 481; Lanahan v. Com. 498, 20 S. E. 712; State v. Gardiner, 
 
 84 Pa. 80; Green v. Com. 83 Pa. 75; Wright (Ohio) 392; Swan v. State, 4 
 
 Com. V. Brown, 90 Va. 671, 19 S. E. 447; Humph. 139; Atkinson v. State, 20 Tex. 
 
 Com. V. Cook, 166 Pa. 193, 31 Atl. 56; 522; Bell v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 77 
 
 Com. V. Eckerd, 174 Pa. 137, 34 Atl. 305; S. W. 787; King v. Com. 2 Va. Cas. 78; 
 
 Com. V. Smith, 7 Smith's Laws (Pa.) Hill v. Com. 2 Gratt. 594; Weatherman 
 
 696; McCue v. Com. 78 Pa. 185, 21 Am. v. Com. (Va.) 19 S. E. 778; Statev.Mor- 
 
 Rep. 7; Smith v. State, 68 Ala. 424; rison, 49 W. Va. 210, 38 S. E. 481 ; State 
 
 MeKenzie v. State, 26 ^rk. 334; Mc- v. Welch, 36 W. Va. 690, 15 S. E. 419; 
 
 Adams v. State, 25 Ark. 405; Bivens v. State v. Cain, 20 W. Va. 679; State v. 
 
 State, 11 Ark. 455; People v. Bealoba, Schnelle, 24 W. Va. 767; Respublica v. 
 
 17 Cal. 389; Jordan v. People, 19 Colo. Bob, 4 Dall. 145, 1 L. ed. 776; United 
 
 417, 36 Pae. 218; State v. Brinte, 4 Penn. States v. Cornell, 2 Mason, 91, Fed. Cas. 
 
 (Del.) 551, 58 Atl. 258; State v. Pratt, No. 14,868; United States v. Wiltberger, 
 
 Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 249; Moon v. 3 Wash. C. C. 515, Fed. Cas. No. 16,738. 
 
 State, 68 Ga. 687; Hayes v. State, 58 And see Power v. People, 17 Colo. 178, 
 
 Ga. 35; Bridgewater v. State, 153 Ind. 28 Pac. 1121; Lowe v. State, 118 Wis. 
 
 560, 55 N. E. 737; State v. Gillick, 7 641, 96 N. W. 417. 
 
 Iowa, 287; State v. Zeibart, 40 Iowa, zPeople v. Johnson, 139 N. Y. 358, 34 
 
 169; State v. Brown, 41 Minn. 319, 43 N. E. 920. 
 
 N. W. 69; Hawthorne v. State, 58 Miss. 3 State v. Cain, and State v. Schnelle, 
 
 778; State v. Talbott, 73 Mo. 347; State supra; Longley v. Com. 99 Va. 807, 37 
 
 V. Kindred, 148 Mo. 270, 49 S. W. 845; S. E. 339. 
 
 State V. Jackson, 96 Mo. 200, 9 S. W. iState v. Fuller, 114 N. C. 885, 19 S. 
 
 624; State v. Herrell, 97 Mo. 105, 10 Am. E. 797; State v. Thomas, 118 N. C. 111.3, 
 
 St. Rep. 289, 10 S. W. 387 ; State v. 24 S. E. 431 ; State v. McCourry, 128 N. 
 
 Anderson, 126 Mo. 542, 29 S. W. 576; C. 594, 38 S. E. 883; State v. Cole, 132 
 
 State V. Wilson, 121 Mo. 434, 26 S. W. N. C. 1069, 44 S. E. 391 ; State v. Phil- 
 
 357; State v. Callaway, 154 Mo. 91, 55 lips, 118 Iowa, 660, 92 N. W. 876; Dains 
 
 S. W. 444; State v. Garth, 164 Mo. 553, v. State, 2 Humph. 439; Singleton v. 
 
 65 S. W. 275 ; State v. Furgerson, 162 State, 1 Tex. App. 501 ; Watson v. Com. 
 
 Mo. 668, 63 S. W. 101 ; Territory v. John- 85 Va. 867, 9 S. E. 418; North Carolina 
 
 son, 9 Mont. 21, 22 Pao. 346; State v. v. Gosnell, 74 Fed. 734. 
 Greenleaf, 71 W. H. 606, 54 Atl. 38; If the act be wanting in any one or 
 
 Territory v. Anderson, 4 N. M. 213, 13 more of the qualities of wilfulness, de- 
 
 Pac. 21; Thomas V. People, 67 N. Y. 218; liberation, malice, or premeditation, it 
 
 People V. Walworth, 4 N. Y. Crim. Rep. will be murder in the second degree. 
 
 355 ; People v. Beekwith, 4 N. Y. Crim. Smith v. State, 68 Ala. 424. 
 Rep. 335; People v. Conroy, 97 N. Y. While malice is presumed from the 
 
 63; People v. Johnson, 139 N. Y. 358, use of a deadly weapon, nothing else 
 
 34 N. E. 920; People v. Geoghan, 138 K. appearing, it is implied, and not express^ 
 
 Y. 077, 34 N. E. 399 ; People v. Jones, 99 malice, making the crime murder in the 
 
 N. Y. 667, 2 N. E. 49; People v. Shay, second degree only. State v. McCourry, 
 
 4 Park. Grim. Rep. 344; People v. Ma- supra. 
 
i 152} MUKDER;« 229 
 
 difficulty does not establish murder in the first degree," Nor is an 
 actual intent to kill established beyond controversy by a killing with 
 a weapon caught up hastily by the slayer, who had not previously 
 prepared it or placed it within reach.® A use of a deadly weapon 
 with little or no provocation, however, is sufficient."^ And so is de- 
 liberate procurement or preparation of the weapon, and its use pur- 
 suant thereto. * Nor is it necessary, to warrant a conviction of murder 
 in the first degree, that the instrument should be such as would 
 necessarily produce death; and where the weapon was a small club 
 a verdict of murder in the first degree is justified where it appears 
 that the blow was induced by a deliberate intention to take life;* 
 though the rule would be different where the weapon, though deadly, 
 was suddenly caught up. ^ " And proof of a tussle between two per- 
 sons in which no blow was struck or injury received, and that one 
 of the persons engaged in it, without manifesting any unusual ex- 
 citement, withdrew, and a few minutes afterwards met his recent 
 opponent, when, without a word or act of an irritating or insulting 
 character from his victim, he shot and killed him, furnishes in- 
 dubitable evidence of a wilful, deliberate, and premeditated intent 
 to murder. ^ * And the act of a person engaged in a fight with an- 
 other, of dravdng his pistol and firing twice at the other and killing 
 him, is murder upon express malice, where he did it because the 
 other was getting the best of him in the fight. ^ ^ And a person who, 
 while attempting to steal the property of another, encounters the 
 ovTner having a revolver, and wrenchec it from him and shoots him 
 three times, is guilty of murder in the first degree, committed with 
 deliberation and premeditation, where the second and third shots 
 were the fatal ones.^^ So, omission to use a deadly weapon in a 
 
 eMcDaniel v. Com. 77 Va. 281. 9 Com. v. Murray, 2 Ashm. (Pa.) 57; 
 
 eTaylor v. State, 108 Ga. 384, 34 S. People v. Clark, 7 N. Y. 393. 
 E. 2. lOKelly v. Com. 1 Grant, Cas. 484; 
 
 'State V. Cain, 20 W. Va. 679; State Ray v. State, 15 Ga. 223. 
 V. Greer, 22 W. Va. 800 ; State v. Robin- The act of a person in firing a pistol, 
 son, 117 Mo. 649, 23 S. W. 1066; Horton without mental concentration upon any 
 V. Com. 99 Va. 848, 38 S. E. 184; Long- individual object, but recklessly and in 
 ley V. Com. 99 Va. 807, 37 S. 13. 339; utter disregard of human life, or upon 
 Reed v. Com. 98 Va. 817, 36 S. E. 399. a sudden impulse to strike terror into 
 
 And evidence that one person was a crowd from which he fears an attack, 
 beating another when the ^n of the lat- furnishes no indication of a deliberate 
 ter came up and inquired the reason purpose upon his part. People v. Con- 
 of the beating, whereupon the other roy, 33 Hun, 119. 
 seized a deadly weapon and killed him, n Small v. Com. 91 Pa. 304. 
 warrants a finding of murder in the first i2Delgado v. State, 34 Tex. Grim. Rep. 
 degree. Wright v. Com. 33 Gratt. 880. 157, 29 S. W. 1070. 
 
 sPeople V. Zachello, 168 N. Y. 35. 60 laState v. Covington, 117 N. 0. 834, 23 
 N. E. 1051 ; State v. Hardy, 95 Mo. 455, S. E. 337. 
 8 S. W. 416. 
 
230 HOMICIDE. ['§ 152 
 
 difficulty in which there was opportunity to do so is evidence of ab- 
 sence of wilfulness and premeditation. * * A deliberate use of a dead- 
 ly weapon within the meaning of these rules is an intentional use, 
 a use that is the result of a resolution, purpose, or design formed in 
 the mind and reflected upon, and not done in self-defense; it is 
 only necessary that it be the act of the mind when the mind has had 
 time to act without heat or passion. ^^ 
 
 153. Inference from preparation l^I"othing couid indicate delibera- 
 tion and premeditation more strongly than previous preparation; 
 and deliberation and premeditation upon the part of a person who 
 killed another may be inferred as a matter of fact, where he arranged 
 a convenient opportunity to do the deed,^ or where he provoked an 
 affray for the apparent purpose of taking his antagonist's life,'* or 
 where he made preparations for flight,* or for the destruction or con- 
 cealment of the body. * But subsequent flight alone has no tendency to 
 show deliberation or premeditation ; ® though the act of a person after 
 killing another, of effecting his escape, and taking the life of a third 
 person to enable him to do so, and attempting to shoot others, is 
 competent in a prosecution for the killing, both to establish his guilt 
 
 Instate V. Hunt, 134 N. C. 684, 47 S. rell, 97 Mo. 105, 10 Am. St. Rep. 289, 10 
 
 B. 49. S. W. 387 ; State v. Dunn, 80 Mo. 681 ; 
 
 iBState V. Abrams, 11 Or. 169, 8 Pac. State v. Anderson, 126 Mo. 542, 29 S. 
 
 327. W. 576; State v. Inks, 135 Mo. 678, 37 
 
 iGarlitz v. State, 71 Md. 293, 4 L.R.A. S. W. 942; Territory v. Johnson, 9 Mont. 
 
 601, 18 Atl. 39; State v. Reed, 162 Mo. 21, 22 Pac. 346; Stewart v. State, 1 Ohio 
 
 312, 62 S. W. 982; State v. Cochran, 147 St. 66; Clark v. State, 8 Humph. 671. 
 Mo. 504, 49 S. W. 558; State v. Head- But the fact that a person accused 
 
 rick, 149 Mo. 396, 51 S. W. 99; People of murder went to the house of the de- 
 
 V. Sliney, 137 N. Y. 570, 33 N. E. 150; ceased for the purpose of having a dif- 
 
 People V. Barone, 161 N. Y. 451, 55 N. ficulty with him, during which he liilled 
 
 E. 1083. him with a deadly weapon, would not. 
 
 And evidence in a prosecution for regardless of all other circumstances 
 
 homicide that the accused walked into attending the difficulty, make the homi- 
 
 the pijwsnte of the deceased with a cide a murder. Atkins v. State, 16 Ark. 
 
 paper bag over his hand, raised his arm "''*'S- 
 
 on the table and pointed his hand, cov- ^^eague v. State, 120 Ala. 309, 25 So. 
 
 ered with the bag, toward the deceased; 209; Territory v Johnson, supra; Peo- 
 
 that a flash w^s seen and a report heard, E^e v- Place 157 NY. 534, 53 N E 576; 
 
 and the deceased said that accused had ^oni- v. Cook, 166 Pa. 193 31 Atl. 56. 
 
 shot him, the latter immediately run- .^^"'^r??!'^^^^, ^^f' *^°"^i' "°* ^^'' 
 
 as ■ L-i 1. 4.1 J. u J dence ot the degree of a murder, gives 
 
 ningaway, sufficiently shows that he de- ^j^^ eircumstancl of the case st^efglh, 
 
 liberately, and with malice aforethought, ^^^ ^he circumstances indicate the de- 
 shot the deceased with intent to kill. Lanahan v. Com. 84 Pa. 80 
 State V. Yee Wee, 7 Idaho, 188, 61 Pac. 4People v. Beekwith, 108 N. Y. 67 15 
 
 588. N. E. 53, Affirming 45 Hun, 422; State 
 
 2Tollett V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) v. Dickson, 78 Mo. 438. And see Com. 
 
 55 S. W. 573; Caton v. State (Tex. Crim. v. Best, 180 Mass. 492, 62 N. E. 748. 
 App.) 38S. W. 192; btate V. Mollineaux, estate v. Foster, 130 N. C. 666, 89 
 
 149 Mo. 646, 51 S. W. 462; State v. Am. St. Rep. 876, 41 S. E. 284. 
 Wieners, 66 Mo. 13; State v. McDaniel, 
 94 Mo. 301, 7 S. W. 634; State v. Her- 
 
f 1531 
 
 MURDER. 
 
 231 
 
 and to show tlie animus with which the deed was perpetrated. * So the 
 same rule applies where a grave has been prepared a short time before 
 the homicide, though the deceased was not ultimately placed in it, the 
 whole plan of action being changed ; '^ or where the accused lays a train 
 ■of circumstances which may be calculated to break the surprise, or 
 baffle the curiosity, which would naturally be occasioned by the act ; * 
 or makes misrepresentations to account for the disappearance of the 
 person killed. ® The same view was taken where the defendant deliber- 
 ately procured a butcher's knife and sharpened it, or otherwise armed 
 himself, for the avowed purpose of killing the deceased ; ^ " or other- 
 wise prepared to do the deed ; ^ ^ or where he concealed a dirk in his 
 breast, stating, shortly before the attack, that he knew where the seat 
 of life was ; ^ ^ though the fact that a person who killed another previ- 
 ously deliberately armed himself does not authorize a conviction for 
 murder, where he rightfully so armed himself for purposes of self-de- 
 fense. ■'^ So, a display upon the part of one who killed another of 
 thought, contrivance, and design in possessing himself of the weapon 
 with which the killing was done, and in replacing it immediately 
 after the blow was struck, indicates the presence of judgment and 
 
 BRevel V. State, 26 Ga. 275. And see 
 Blake v. State, 3 Tex. App. 581. 
 
 7Com. V. Zephon„ MS. Phil. 1844. 
 
 8 People V. Conroy, 97 N. Y. 63 ; Peo- 
 ple V. Place, 157 N. Y. 5b4, 52 N. E. 576; 
 McDonald v. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 
 22 S. W. 403. 
 
 sState V. Dickson, 78 Mo. 438. 
 
 lOBurgess v. Com. 2 Va. Cas. 483; 
 Nicholas v. Com. 91 Va. 741, 21 S. E. 
 364; Hill V. People, 1 Colo. 437; State 
 V. Downham, Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 
 45; Perry v. State, 102 Ga. 365, 30 S. 
 E. 903; State v. Fuller, 125 Iowa, 212, 
 100 N. W. 1114; State v. Seery (Iowa) 
 105 N. W. 511; State v. Kindred, 148 
 Mo. 270, 49 S. W. 845; Argabright v. 
 State, 56 Neb. 363, 76 N. W. 876; Terri- 
 -tory V. Anderson, 4 N. M. 213, 13 Pac. 
 21; People V. Cornetti, 92 N. Y. 85; 
 People V. Pugh, 167 N. Y. 524, 60 N. E. 
 770; State v. Booker, 123 N. C. 713, 31 
 S. E. 376; Com. v. Weber, 167 Pa. 153, 
 31 Atl. 481; Com. v. Buccieri, 153 Pa. 
 535, 26 Atl. 228; Com. v. Krause, 193 
 Pa. 306, 44 Atl. 454; Caton v. State 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 38 S. W. 192; Dancy 
 T. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 46 S. W. 247. 
 
 And evidence that two persons en- 
 gaged in a scuffle, after which one of 
 them went around the house and pro- 
 cured an ax, and returned with it to 
 the second story of the house and re- 
 
 newed the conflict in which he killed his 
 opponent, sufficiently shows, in a prose- 
 cution for the killing, an opportunity 
 for the formation of a premeditated de- 
 sign to kill, before the fatal blow was 
 struck. Miller v. State, 106 Wis. 156, 
 81 N. W. 1020. 
 
 iiPeople V. Scott, 153 N. Y. 40, 46 N. 
 E. 1028; State v. Anderson, 98 Mo. 462, 
 11 S. W. 981; State v. Jackson, 167 Mo. 
 291, 66 S. W. 938; State v. Rider, 95 Mo. 
 474, 8 S. W. 723; State v. Brinte, 4 
 Penn. (Del.) 551, 58 Atl. 258; State v. 
 Foster, 130 N. C. 666, 89 Am. St. Rep. 
 876, 41 S. E. 284. 
 
 But while the act of a man in arming 
 himself with a deadly weapon, before 
 making a fatal assault, points strongly 
 toward a deliberate and premeditated 
 design to effect the death of the person 
 killed, if he first makes an assault with 
 his fist, and during the struggle that 
 follows seizes a weapon ready to his 
 hand and at once inflicts a mortal wound 
 with it, it is much less probable that he 
 acted with the deliberation necessary to 
 constitute murder in the first degree. 
 People V. Corey, 157 N. Y. 332, 51 N. E. 
 1024. 
 
 i2Bennett v. Com. 8 Leigh, 749. 
 
 laGourko v. United States, 153 U. S. 
 183, 38 L. ed. 680, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 806 ; 
 Smith y. State, 75 Miss. 542, 23 So. 260. 
 
232 HOMIOliDB. [§ 155 
 
 reason, rather than of the heat and ungovernable passion which 
 would reduce the crime to manslaughter.^* And malice and de- 
 liberation are properly inferred against one who manufactured a 
 bomb or other implement with the intent that it should be used in 
 killing another, although he did not know by, nor upon, what par- 
 ticular individual it might be used, if the intent was that it should 
 be used by some member of a particular class of persons upon some- 
 member of another class of persons. ^ ^ 
 
 154. Inference from threats and expressions of ill-will. — An infer- 
 ence of deliberation and premeditation and intent to kill, or of other 
 characteristics of murder in the first degree, is drawn with great 
 force from expressions of ill-will and a declared purpose of the- 
 accused to injure or kill the person afterwards slain. ^ Threats and 
 a subsequent killing in apparent execution thereof indicate express, 
 malice.^ And where one person threatened another afterwards 
 killed, or declared his intent to kill him, an inference of the existence- 
 of the characteristics of murder in the first degree, such as a de- 
 liberate and premeditated design to take life, or of express malice,, 
 as a presumption of fact, is warranted in the absence of any showing 
 to the contrary.* So, evidence that a person engaged in an affray 
 with another drew a pistol and declared his intention to kill his an- 
 tagonist, but was induced by a bystander to put it up, and that sub- 
 sequently, during the same altercation, he drew it again, and, upon. 
 interference by a bystander, reached over his shoulder and shot 
 his antagonist, sufficiently shows deliberation, premeditation, wilful- 
 
 ifRex V. Hayward, 6 Car. & P. 157. 3Dale v. State, 10 Yerg. 551 ; Jim v. 
 
 15 Spies V. People, 122 111. 1, 3 Am. State, 5 Humph. 145; Casat v. State, 40 
 
 St. Rep. 320, 12 N. E. 865, 17 N. E. 898. Ark. 511; People v. Chaves, 122 Cal. 134, 
 
 iStewart v. State, 1 Ohio St. 66; State 54 Pac. 596; Dixon v. State, 79 Ga. 805, 
 
 V. Thompson, Wright (Ohio) 617; Por- 5 S. E. 289; Davidson v. State, 135 Ind. 
 
 ter V. State, 135 Ala. 51, 33 So. 694; 254, 34 N. E. 972; Massie v. Com. IS 
 
 Com. V. Green, 1 Ashm. (Pa.) 289; Ky. L. Rep. 367, 36 S. W. 550 ; State v. 
 
 State v. Jones, 2 Penn. (Del.) 573, 47 Sloan, 22 Mont. 293, 56 Pac. 364; State- 
 
 Atl. 1006; State v. Dickson, 78 Mo. 438; v. Calla-way, 154 Mo. 91, 55 S. W. 444; 
 
 State V. Hunt, 134 N. C. 684, 47 S. E. State v. Wilson, 121 Mo. 434, 26 S. W. 
 
 49; State V.Foster, 130 N.C. 666, 89 Am. 357; State v. Reed, 162 Mo. 312, 62 
 
 St. Rep. 876, 41 S. E. 284. S. W. 982; State v. Anderson, 89 Mo. 
 
 2Mikel V. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 312, 1 S. W. 135; State v. Jennings, 1» 
 
 615, 68 S. W. 512. And see State v. Mo. 435 ; Territory v. Anderson, 4 N. M 
 
 Garth, 164 Mo. 553, 65 S. W. 275. 213, 13 Pac. 21; Argabright v. State, 58 
 
 And evidence that several men en- Neb. 363, 76 N. W. 876 ; People v. Deck- 
 gaged in an attempt to rob another, and er, 1.57 N. Y. 186, 51 N. E. 1018; People- 
 that -while doing so one made the state- v. Jones, 99 N. Y. 667, 2 N. E. 49; Peo- 
 ment, to which the others assented, that pie v. Divine, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 594; Peo- 
 "dead men tell no tales," and that the pie v. Beckwith, 45 Hun, 422, Affirmed 
 person sought to be robbed was killed in in 108 N. Y. 67, 15 N. E. 53; People v. 
 the transaction, is sufficient to show a Corey, 157 N. Y. 332, 51 N. E. 1024: 
 premeditated design to eflfect death. State v. Foster, 130 N. C. 666, 89 Am 
 State v. Staley, 14 Minn. 105, Gil. 75. St. Rep. 876, 41 S. E. 284; Stewart v 
 
f 1S41' 
 
 MURDER, 
 
 233 
 
 ness, and malice.* And a conviction for murder in the first degree 
 is sustained by evidence that the accused predicted the killing o£ 
 the deceased in the mode actually pursued ; that he was in possession 
 of the gun with which the fatal shot was fired shortly before the deed, 
 and was loitering in the vicinity of the pathway usually taken by the 
 deceased ; and that he fled and concealed himself before being ac- 
 cused, and afterwards confessed the crime, though the confession was 
 made while under the influence of liquor and afterwards denied.^ 
 So, subsequent declarations by the accused of the existence at the 
 time of an intent upon his part to kill the deceased, or expressions 
 of satisfaction because he had done it, warrant an inference of de- 
 liberation, premeditation, and express malice.® 
 
 Proof that a homicide was committed, and that the person charged 
 with committing it had made previous threats against the deceased, 
 however, is not alone sufficient to warrant a conviction for the mur- 
 der; there must be some other evidence connecting the accused with 
 the crime;'' though past ill-treatment of the accused by the deceased, 
 and that there was no other apparent cause for the killing, in con- 
 nection with such threats, would appear to be sufficient.* Where 
 previous threats appear in a prosecution for homicide, the jury 
 
 State, 1 Ohio St. 66; Com. v. Smith, 7 
 Smith's Laws (Pa.) 697; Com. v. Weber, 
 167 Pa. 153, 31 Atl. 481; Com. v. Kil- 
 patrick, 204 Pa. 218, 53 Atl. 774; Green 
 V. Com. 83 Pa. 75; Tarvers v. State, 90 
 Tenn. 485, 16 S. W. 1041; Brown v. 
 State, 32 Tex. Crim. Rep. 119, 22 S. W. 
 596; McKinney v. State, 8 Tex. App. 
 626; Nicholas v. Com. 91 Va. 741, 21 S. 
 E. 364; Howell v. Com. 26 Gratt. 995; 
 Com. V. Burgess, 2 Va. Cas. 484; Res- 
 publiea v. Bob, 4 Dall. 146, 1 L. ed. 777. 
 
 And an instruction on murder in the 
 first degree is warranted in a prosecu- 
 tion for homicide in which it is claimed 
 by the accused that the deceased shot 
 him and then committed suicide, and 
 there was testimony to the effect that 
 the accused had previously said that he 
 would kill somebody and then kill him- 
 self. State V. Fitzgerald, 130 Mo. 407, 
 32 S. W. 1113. 
 
 < State V. Weiners, 4 Mo. App. 492; 
 Com. V. Salyards, 158 Pa. 501, 27 Atl. 
 993. 
 
 And evidence that two persons, in a 
 room together, indulged in a dispute, 
 and that one was heard to say "one of 
 us must die,'' and that the report of a 
 pistol followed, and that the other was 
 killed from a pistol shot, suflBciently 
 
 indicates a deliberate design upon the 
 part of the former to take the other's 
 life. People v. Kiernan, 3 N. Y. Crim. 
 Rep. 247, Affirmed in 101 N. Y. 618, 4 
 N. E. 130. 
 
 BLeach v. State, 99 Tenn. 584, 42 S. 
 W. 195. 
 
 6Com. V. Werling, 164 Pa. 559, 30 
 Atl. 406; Com. v. Green, 1 Ashm. (Pa.) 
 298; Blume v. State, 154 Ind. 343, 66 N. 
 E. 771; State v. Sale, 119 Iowa, 1, 92 
 N. W. 680, 95 N. W. 193; Savary v. 
 State, 62 Neb. 166, 87 N. W. 34; State 
 v. Hunt, 134 N. C. 684, 47 S. E. 49; 
 State V. Conly, 130 N. C. 683, 41 S. E. 
 534; Wilson v. State, 43 Tex. 472; Smith 
 V. State, 43 Tex. 643. 
 
 And evidence that a person after hav- 
 ing inflicted injuries upon another from 
 which death afterwards resulted stated 
 that he was not hurt as bad as he ought 
 to be, and that he ought to have kilkd 
 him, is sufficient to warrant a, submis- 
 sion to the jury in a prosecution for 
 homicide, of the question of guilt of 
 accused of murder in the first degree. 
 State V. Sale, supra. 
 
 7 State V. Glahn, 97 Mo. 679, 11 S. W. 
 260. 
 
 sWood V. State, 119 Ga. 426, 46 S. E. 
 658. 
 
234 HOMICIDE. tS 15* 
 
 should consider all the surrounding facts and circumstances to de- 
 termine whether they were called forth by sudden and temporary 
 passion aroused by immediate provocation, or whether they were the 
 result of an antecedent fixed purpose to kill. ' And proof of previous 
 threats to kill, and an assault, does not establish intent to kill beyond 
 controversy, it not appearing that the weapon used was a deadly 
 one. ^ " And threats upon the part of a husband, while quarreling with 
 his wife, to knock her in the head, and to take something and kill her 
 if she did not stop crying, and evidence that shortly afterwards her 
 neck was found broken, does not show a specific intent on his part 
 to take her life in the absence of any showing of the use of a deadly 
 weapon. ^ * 
 
 155. Inference from prior acts and relations ^A deliberate and pre- 
 meditated intent to take life, constituting a killing murder in the 
 first degree, may be inferred as a presumption of fact from evidence 
 standing by itself, of prior relations of the parties, tending to show 
 motive for the killing,-^ such as previous quarrels and difficulties,^ 
 or a design to revenge real or fancied wrongs.* And evidence of 
 threats against the deceased upon the part of the accused, and of 
 frequent quarrels between them, and the admission of the accused 
 that he killed the deceased, sufficiently shows motive for the crime.* 
 So, evidence of previous difficulties between the parties, together 
 with the subsequent procurement of the weapon with which the kill- 
 
 SNorth Carolina v. Gosnell, 74 Fed. in the neighborhood, and that previously 
 
 734. the accused and deceased were traveling 
 
 loCage V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 77 along that road engaged in an angry 
 
 S. W. 806. altercation, and that accused was fa- 
 
 iiState V. Thomas, 118 N. C. 1113, miliar with the country around the 
 
 24 S. E. 431. place where the derd was committed, is 
 
 iPeople V. Barber!, 149 N. Y. 256, 52 admissible in a prosecution for the 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 717, 43 N. E. 635; People killing on the question whether or not 
 
 V. Jones, 99 N. Y. 667, 2 N. E. 49; Peo- he had previously formed a desion to 
 
 pie V. Scott, 153 N. Y. 40, 46 N. E. 1028; take the life of the deceased. Green v 
 
 State v. Truesdale, 125 N. C. 696, 34 S. State, 97 Ala. 59, 12 So. 416, 15 So 242 
 
 E. 646; Com. v. Krause, 193 Pa. 306, 44 ^Brown v. State, 32 Tex. Crim Rep 
 
 Atl. 454; Green v. Com. 83 Pa. 75; 119, 22 S. vV. 596; McKinney v. State 
 
 People V. Chaves, 122 Cal. 134, 54 Pac. 8 Tex. App. 626; Smith v. State, 43 Tex' 
 
 ■596. 643; Wilson v. State, 43 Tex. 472; David- 
 
 And error upon the part of the court son v. State, 135 Ind. 254, 34 N. E. 972- 
 
 in excluding the testimony of third per- Koerner v. State, 98 Ind. 7 ; Massie v. 
 
 sons as to the prior relations of the Com. 1.8 Ky. L. Rep. 367, 36 S. W. 550- 
 
 parties to a homicide, in a prosecution State v. Hunt, 134 N. C. 684 47 S e' 
 
 therefor, is ground for a new trial, 49; State v. Martin^ 9 Ohio S. & C. P. 
 
 though the accused herself was permitted Dec. 778. 
 
 to testify fully on that subject, unless sl'eople v. Place, 157 N. Y. 584 52 
 
 the truth of her testimony is conceded. N. E. 576; People v. Kennedy i59 N. Y 
 
 People V. Barberi, supra. 346, 70 Am. St. Rep. 557, 54 N. E. 51 
 
 And evidence that a murder was com- 4Peoplo v. Decker, 157 N. Y 186 61 
 
 mitted near a neighboring road, in the N. E. 1018. " ' 
 most obscure and secreted spot of ground 
 
§ 155] MURDER. 235 
 
 ing was shortly afterwards done, justifies a finding of deliberation 
 and premeditation or express malice which will support a charge 
 of murder in the first degree. ® And the rule is the same where there 
 were previous difficulties and little or no provocation," and where 
 there had been a previous continuous course of brutal treatment of 
 the deceased by the accused, and the killing was deliberate.'' And 
 the act of a man of mature years of pressing his attentions upon a 
 very young girl, and, finding them opposed by her family and re- 
 jected by the girl, of deliberately taking her life, with a careful 
 regard for the secrecy of his deed, and of preparations for it, shows 
 «learly that he designedly killed her.® So, previous attempts to kill 
 the person afterwards killed warrant an inference of express malice 
 or deliberation and premeditation in the killing, as a presumption 
 of fact which will sustain a conviction of murder in the first degree.* 
 And, on the other hand, opprobrious epithets addressed by the person 
 killed to the slayer immediately before the killing are evidence of the 
 absence of wilfulness and premeditation.^" 
 
 Previous grievances, though considered with threats and the fact 
 that the killing was of a fleeing antagonist, are not conclusive of a 
 premeditated design to effect death, where there were mutual re- 
 criminations and a mutual combat engendering hot blood. ^ ^ And a 
 verdict of murder in the first degree is not sustained by evidence of 
 previous grievances and an unexplained killing, when, between the 
 grievances and the killing, there had been a reconciliation.^" itfor 
 can malice, hatred, and premeditation be inferred from evidence 
 directly establishing abject terror and fear upon the part of an al- 
 leged slayer for his own personal safety. ^ * 
 
 sPeople V. Kennedy, supra; Rieka v. L.R.A. 601, 18 Atl. 39; Com. v. Birriolo, 
 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 87 S. W. 1036. 197 Pa. 371, 47 Atl. 355; Nicholas v. 
 
 eppople V. Majone, 91 N. Y. 211. Com. 91 Va. 741, 21 S. E. 364. 
 
 TSpears v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. And proof of previous efforts to kill 
 
 527, 56 S. W. 347. the deceased, and of the subsequent 
 
 sPeople V. Hoch, 150 N. Y. 291, 44 N. flight of the accused, and that death re- 
 
 B. 976. suited from strangulation or the appli- 
 
 So, evidence that a man made im- cation of powerful external force, suf- 
 
 proper proposals to a woman, and that ficiently indicates deliberation and pre- 
 
 his advances were repulsed, and that meditation. Com. v. Bell, 164 Pa. 517, 
 
 he entered her house, after he had been 30 Atl. 511. 
 
 requested not to do so, and that she for lOState v. McMuUin, 170 Mo. 608, 71 
 
 a second time declined to entertain his S. W. 221. 
 
 proposals, whereupon he shot and killed iiFlynn v. State, 97 Wis. 44, 72 N. W. 
 
 her, sufficiently shows a murderous in- 373. 
 
 tent warranting a conviction of murder i2State v. Nolan, 92 Iowa, 491, 61 N. 
 
 in the first degree. People v. Delfino, W. 181. 
 
 139 N. Y. 625, 34 N. E. 1059. is'-'t-lp v. Smith, 125 N. C. 615, 34 
 
 SPeople V. Jones, 99 N. Y. finr " ■•■ : "-. SCf). 
 E. 49; Garlitz v. State, 71 Y 1 :. I 
 
236 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 [S 15G 
 
 VI. The deteemination as to degeee. 
 
 a. Province of the jury. 
 
 156. General rules — It is the exclusive province of the jury to 
 determine the degree of a homicide in a prosecution therefor, with- 
 in the limits fixed by the evidence and the circumstances of the case ; * 
 and its determination will not be interfered with on appeal.^ And 
 where there is evidence of malice and deliberation and premeditation 
 the court cannot withdraw from the jury the consideration of the 
 question of murder in the first degree.^ Whenever the evidence 
 leaves the question of the grade of the crime in doubt, it is proper 
 to submit it to the jury, under proper instructions defining the dif- 
 ferent grades to which the proof applies. * Under such circumstances 
 it is the province of the jury to pass upon the whole case, and de- 
 cide as to the degree of guilt, as well as to the guilt itself. ' This rule 
 includes the question whether sufficient time for deliberation and 
 
 iPeople V. Mahtaeh (Cal.) 82 Pac. 
 779; Lovett v. State, 30 Fla. 142, 17 
 L.II.A. 705, 11 So. 550; Ernest v. State, 
 20 Fla. 383; Adams v. State, 28 Fla. 511, 
 10 So. 106; Carter v. State, 22 Fla. 553; 
 Savage v. State, 18 Fla. 909; Kelly v. 
 State, 39 Fla. 122, 22 So. 303; People v. 
 Valencia, 43 Cal. 552; People v. Gibson, 
 17 Cal. 283; Power v. People, 17 Colo. 
 178, 28 Pac. Il21; People v. Chew Sing 
 Wing, 88 Cal. 268, 25 Pac. 1099; State 
 V. Gillick, 7 Iowa, 287; State v. Phil- 
 lips, 118 Iowa, 660, 92 N. W. 876; Peo- 
 ple V. Palmer, 105 Mich. 568, 63 N. W. 
 656; State v. Williams, 69 Mo. 110; 
 People V. Kennedy, 159 N. Y. 346, 70 Am. 
 St. Rep. 557, 54 N. E. 51; People v. 
 Walworth, 4 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 355; Peo- 
 ple V. Conroy, 97 N. Y. 63; People v. 
 Decker, 157 N. Y. 186, 51 N. E. 1018; 
 People V. Schmidt, 168 N. Y. 568, 61 N. 
 E. 907; People v. Kelly, 35 Hun, 295; 
 People V. Burt, 51 App. Div. 106, 64 N. 
 Y. Supp. 417 ; People v. Hawkins, 109 N. 
 Y. 408, 17 N. E. 371 ; State v. Hunt, 134 
 N. C. 684, 47 S. E. 49 ; State v. Thomas, 
 118 N. C. 1113, 24 S. E. 431; State v. 
 Town, Wright (Ohio) 75; State v. 
 Morey, 25 Or. 241, 35 Pac. 655, 36 Pac. 
 573; State v. Hansen, 25 Or. 391, 35 Pac. 
 976, 36 Pac. 296. And see Henry v. 
 People, 198 111. 162, 65 N. E. 120; People 
 V. Burt, 170 N. Y. 561, 62 N. E. 1099, 
 Affirming 51 App. Div. 106, 64 N. Y. 
 Supp. 417. 
 
 zstaie v. Williams, 186 Mo. 128, 84 
 S. W. 924; State v. Holmes, 12 Wash. 
 160, 40 Pac. 735, 41 Pac. 887. 
 
 aState v. Boyce, 24 Wash. 514, 64 
 Pac. 719. 
 
 estate V. Lane, 64 Mo. 319; State v. 
 Turlington, 102 Mo. 642, 15 S. W. 141; 
 State V. Ellis, 74 Mo. 207; State v, 
 Dieckman, 11 Mo. App. 538, Affirmed in 
 75 Mo. 570; Ex parte Sloane, 95 Ala. 
 22, 11 So. 14; Judge v. State, 58 Ala. 
 406, 29 Am. Rep. 757 ; Burris v. State, 38 
 Ark. 221; Seams v. State, 84 Ala. 410, 
 4 So. 521 ; People v. Foren, 25 Cal. 361 ; 
 People V. Nichol, 34 Cal. 211; People 
 V. Bowman, 81 Cal. 566, 22 Pac. 917; 
 People V. Gibson, 17 Cal. 283; People v. 
 Martinez, 66 Cal. 278, 5 Pac. 261 ; State 
 V. Dowd, 19 Conn. 388; People v. Walter, 
 1 Idaho, 388 ; State v. Adams, 78 Iowa, 
 297, 43 N. W. 194; State v. MeAnarney, 
 70 Kan. 679, 79 Pac. 137; Farris v. Com. 
 14 Bush, 362; State v. Baker, 13 Mont. 
 160, 32 Pac. 647; Stokes v. People, 53 
 N. Y. 164, 13 Am. Rep. 492; State v. 
 Edwards, 126 N. C. 1051, 35 S. E. 540; 
 Adams v. State, 29 Ohio St. 412; Lind- 
 .sey v. State. 69 Ohio St. 215, 69 N. E. 
 126; Wells v. Territory, 14 Okla. 436, 
 78 Pac. 124; State v. Grant, 7 Or. 414; 
 Com. V. Green, 1 Ashm. ( Pa. ) 296 ; Com. 
 V. Drum, 58 Pa. 9; Mitchell v. State, 5 
 Yerg. 340; People v. Callaghan, 4 Utah, 
 49, 6 Pac. 49; State v. Welch, 36 W. Va. 
 690, 15 S. E. 419; Leschi v. Territory, 
 1 Wash. Terr. 14; State v. Abbott, 8 W. 
 Va. 741. And see Eatman v. State, 139 
 Ala. 67, 36 So. 16. 
 
 eVollmer v. State, 24 Neb. 838, 40 N. 
 W. 420; Washington v. State, 125 Ala. 
 
I 156] MURDER. 237 
 
 premeditation elapsed between the conception of the intent to kill 
 and its execution. ® And it is within the province of the jury to pass 
 upon the credibility of evidence with reference to the degree of the 
 tomicide.'' And where the charge to the jury invades their province 
 in determining a question of fact as to the degree of a murder, the 
 appellate court will not weigh the testimony on appeal for the pur- 
 pose of determining whether the verdict was right. ^ Even under a 
 statute providing that when judgment is for death the court of appeals 
 may order a new trial if satisfied that the verdict was against the 
 weight of evidence, or against the law, or that justice requires a 
 new trial, a new trial will not be ordered where the evidence is such 
 that conflicting inferences as to premeditation and deliberation may 
 be drawn.* And though an appellate court does not agree with the 
 <;ourt below on the question of .the sufficiency of the proof as to de- 
 liberation and premeditation, it will not grant a new trial upon that 
 ground unless absolutely necessary to prevent a failure of justice. ^ ** 
 Where the statute provides that the jury shall determine the degree 
 of the offense, these rules are particularly applicable, and a finding 
 of murder in the second degree will be upheld, though the act was 
 plainly murder in the first degree, or though conclusive evidence of 
 premeditation appears. ^ ^ And in such case it is error for the court 
 to direct the jury to find any specified degree of homicide, though 
 
 40, 28 So. 78; People v. Belencia, 21 Cal. Morey, 25 Or. 241, 35 Pac. 655, 36 Pao. 
 
 544; State v. MoAnarney, supra; State 573. 
 
 V. Williams. 186 Mo. 128, 84 S. W. 924; 7Com. v. Morrison, 193 Pa. 613, 44 
 
 People V. Beckwith, 103 N. Y. 360, 8 N. Atl. 913. 
 
 E. 662; People v. Conroy, 97 N. Y. 62; sPeople v. Chew Sing Wing, 88 Cal. 
 
 Pfomer v. People, 4 Park. Crim. Rep. 268, 25 Pac. 1099. And see State v. 
 
 558; McCue v. Com. 78 Pa. 185, 21 Am. Phillips, 118 Iowa, 660, 92 N. W. 876. 
 
 Rep. 7; State v. Carr, 53 Vt. 37. Where there is evidence in a prose- 
 
 The rule that the degree of a homi- cution for homicide tending to identify 
 
 eide is a question for the jury is par- the accused as the person who did the 
 
 ticularly applicable where the evide-ce killing, an instruction that it was mani- 
 
 in the case is circumstantial. State v. festly insufficient to satisfy them beyond 
 
 Wood, 112 Iowa, 411, 84 N. W. 520. a reasonable doubt is improper as usurp- 
 
 The degree of a homicide in any ing the province of the jury. State v. 
 
 special case depends upon the motive Stokely, 16 Minn. 282, Gil. 249. 
 which prompted the killing, and tne sPeople v. Schmidt, 168 N. Y. 568, 61 
 
 question as to what the motive was, is N. E. 907. 
 
 one of fact for the jury. State v. Tur- loPeople v. Conroy, 97 N. Y. 62; Peo- 
 
 ner, 29 S. C. 34, 13 Am. St. Rep. 706, pie v. Kennedy, 159 N. Y. 346, 70 Am. 
 
 6 S. E. 891. St. Rep. 557, 54 N. E. 51. 
 
 estate v. Smith, 49 Conn. 389. uState v. Lindsey, 19 Nev. 47, 3 Am. 
 
 When a cool state of mind at the time St. Rep. 776, 5 Pac. 822 ; State v. Gad- 
 
 of the act is conceded, however, the court berry, 117 N. C. 811, 23 S. E. 477; State 
 
 may properly instruct the jury that the v. Truesdale, 125 N. C. 696, 34 S. E. 646; 
 
 time necessary to be taken in going from State v. Lucas, 124 N. C. 827, 32 S. E. 
 
 one specified place to another is suf- 962; Rhodes v. Com. 48 Pa. 398; Lane 
 
 fleient to afford opportunity for deliber- v. Com. 59 Pa. 375. 
 ation and premeditation. State v. 
 
238 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 B 15ff 
 
 the evidence tends to show that degree only;*^ or to decline to in- 
 struct as to a particular degree, or except as to a particular degree. ^ * 
 And this rule applies to cases falling under statutes making killing 
 by poison, or lying in wait, or in the perpetration of specified fel- 
 onies, murder in the first degree, as well as to other cases ; ^ * and the 
 fact that there is apparently sufficient evidence of a felony in a prose- 
 cution for murder does not make it erroneous to submit to the jury 
 tho issue of murder in the second degree ; ^ ^ though it is not error 
 to instruct the jury that, if the killing was done in an attempt to 
 perpetrate a felony, they have no option but to find the perpetrator 
 guilty of murder in the first degree;^" or to refuse to charge on 
 murder in the second degree. ^^ 
 
 The rule of law with reference to crimes embracing two or more 
 degrees, that, if there is reasonable doubt as to which degree the 
 offense reaches, it is the duty of the jury to acquit of the higher and 
 convict of the lower degree, however, applies to homicide.-'^ And 
 where there is a reasonable doubt as to the degree of the crime in 
 a prosecution for homicide the accused should be given the benefit 
 
 12 State V. Gadberry, supra; State v. 
 Clark, 134 N. C. 698, 47 S. E. 36; 
 M'Whirt's Case, 3 Gratt. 594, 46 Am. 
 Dec. 196; Gafford v. State, 125 Ala. 1, 
 2S So. 406; State v. Cakes, 95 Me. 369, 
 50 Atl. 28; Robbins v. State, 8 Ohio St. 
 131; Lane v. Com. 59 Pa. 371; Com. v. 
 Sheets, 197 Pa. 69, 46 Atl. 753 ; Com. v. 
 Fellows, 212 Pa. 297, 61 Atl. 922; Shaff- 
 Tier V. Com. 72 Pa. 60, 13 Am. Rep. 649; 
 Com. V. Kovovic, 209 Pa. 465, 58 Atl. 
 857. And see Carpenter v. State, 58 
 Ark 233, 24 S. W. 247. 
 
 i3Brown v. State^ 109 Ala. 70, 20 So. 
 103. 
 
 I'l State V. Lindsey, supra; State v. 
 Gray, 19 Nev. 212, 8 Pac. 456; Lindsay 
 V. State, 24 Ohio C. C. 1 ; State v. How- 
 ard, 33 Wash. 250, 74 Pae. 382. 
 
 Contra, as to murder by poison. 
 State V. Bertoch (Iowa) 79 N. W. 378. 
 
 Where a homicide is claimed to be 
 murder in the first degree, because it is 
 "murder by lying in wait," it is for the 
 jury to determine from the circum- 
 stances and the evidence whether or not 
 the murder is "murder by lying in 
 wait." State v. Aobott, 8 W. Va. 741. 
 
 In People v. Nichol, 34 Cal. 211, it was 
 held that where a killing is done by 
 means of poison, lying in wait, torture, 
 or in the perpetration of, or attempt to 
 perpetrate, any arson, rape, robbery, 
 or burglary, the statute conclusively es- 
 
 tablishes that the crime is murder in the 
 first degree, and the jury is without 
 discretion, except in determining the 
 facts. 
 
 In State v. Bertoch, supra, it was held 
 that, under the statute, murder by 
 poison is always murder in the first 
 degree, and an instruction in a prose- 
 cution for such a killing as to murder 
 in the second degree, followed by a con- 
 viction of murder in that degree, is 
 prejudicial to the accused, since the jury 
 must have been in doubt of his guilt in 
 the first degree, in which case he would 
 have been entitled to acquittal. 
 
 15 State V. Rogers (Iowa) 105 N. W. 
 455. 
 
 Instate V. Gray, 19 Nev. 212, 8 Pac. 
 456 ; Shaflner v. Com. 72 Pa. 60, 13 Am. 
 Rep. 649. 
 
 "Turner v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 89 S. W. 97.5. 
 
 isMitchell v. State, 5 Yerg. 340; Witt 
 v. State, 6 Coldw. 5; Coffee v. State, 3 
 Yerg. 283, 24 Am. Deo. 570; Dove v. 
 State, 3 Heisk. 348; People v. Milgate, 
 5 Cal. 127; Davis v. State, 10 Ga. 101; 
 State v. Laliyer, 4 Minn. 368, Gil. 277 ; 
 State V. Turner, Wright (Ohio) 29; 
 Com. V, Drum, 58 Pa. ; Staup v. Com. 
 74 Pa. 458; O'Mara v. Com 75 Pa. 424; 
 Hamby v. State, 36 Tex. 623: Com. v. 
 Hill, 2 Gratt. 594. 
 
% 156] MUKDER. 239 
 
 of that doubt, and the lower degree should be found. ^® And the 
 jury should be so told. ^ ** When facts exist which are consistent only 
 ■with the hypothesis of murder in the first degree, then murder in 
 the first degree is to be inferred. "When facts exist which are con- 
 sistent only with the hypothesis of murder in the second degree, then 
 murder in the second degree is to be inferred. One point of law, 
 however, may be detached from the inferences of probable reasoning, 
 and that is that when there are doubts as to whether a case falls with- 
 in a higher or a lower grade, the jury, as a matter of law, are to incline 
 to the merciful side, and find for the lower grade. ^^ And where 
 the statute provides that if there be a reasonable doubt of the degree 
 of a homicide the accused shall be convicted of the lower degree onlvj 
 it is error, in a prosecution therefor, to omit so to instruct. ^^ And 
 such error is a ground for reversal, though no exception was taken 
 to it as given. ^ * But an instruction in a prosecution for murder that, 
 if the jury have reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant, 
 they are to acquit him, authorizes them to acquit of any degree of 
 murder, if they have reasonable doubt as to such degree; and a 
 specific charge as to reasonable doubt between the degrees is unnec- 
 essary.^* In Ohio, Judge Wright went so far as to say that where, 
 
 isState V. Anderson, 86 Mo. 309; pie v. Newcomer, 118 Oal. 263, 50 Pac. 
 Golson V. State, 124 Ma. 8, 26 So. 975; 405. 
 
 Payne v. Com. 1 Met. (Ky.) 370; Tate siFloyd v. State, 3 Heisk. 34'?.. And 
 V. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 231, 33 S. see Mitchell v. St-ate, 5 Yerg. 340; 
 W. 121. Pierson v. State, 12 Ala. 149; Per.ple v. 
 
 An indictment containing a single Milgate, 5 Cal. 127; Davis v. State, 10 
 count charging murder in the first de- Ga. 101; McDaniel v. State, S Smedes & 
 gree includes, and will support, a ver- M. 401, 47 Am. Dec. 93; State v. Holme, 
 diet of murder in the second degree. 54 Mo. 153; State v. Hildret);, 31 N. C. 
 Morrison ■••. State, 42 Fla. 149, 28 So. 97. (9 Ired. L.) 429, 51 Am. Dec. 364. 
 
 soMuUins v. Com. 23 Ky. L. Rep. The same rule is taken in respect to 
 2433, 67 S. W. 824. And see State v. murder and manslaughter. If the case 
 Parks (La.) 40 So. 39. is one of the two, and doubts exist as to 
 
 An instruction in a prosecution for the murder, the law presumes in favor 
 homicide that, if the jury are not satis- "f the milder grade. Com. v. York, 9 
 fied that the accused is not guilty of Met. 93, 43 Am. Dec. 373. 
 murder in either the first or second de- "ZArnoId v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1921, 
 gree, there must be an acquittal, is '-..^t^ ; ^ „- ^^ , „ 
 
 favornbletothe accused, and not subject .,/'™:„Ja °°™- ^^ ^^- ^- -^^P" ^"• 
 to objection by him. Johnson v. State '* °- 7-/"' J- ^, . . 
 (Tex; Crim. App.) 67 S. W. 412. ^ ^ ^*^*^"*^ authorizing a conviction 
 
 And an instruction that, should the ^Tt>,™m^'^^Mnt^ n°nt 1^?^'°" "^'''^"^ 
 
 jury entertain . reasonable doubt as to T ttfn^.l nrovuf.n 111-^^''%^ "°"" 
 
 1, • u r ii. J jr • ii_ T ^ 1 stitutional provision giving the ac- 
 
 whieh of the grades of crime the defend- ^^^^^ i„ ^ criminal case the right of 
 
 ant may be guilty of, they must give demanding the nature and cause of the 
 
 him the benefit of the doubt. and acquit accusation against him, since a charge 
 
 him of the higher offense, is not mis- of murder virtually includes a charge 
 
 leading in the use of the words "higher of manslaughter. State v. Seaborne, 8 
 
 offense," since the word "higher" will Rob. (La.) 518. 
 
 not be taken to have been used in any 2 4Little v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 other than its grammatical sense. Peo- 654, 47 S. W. 984. 
 
240 HOMICIDE. [§156 
 
 as in cases of homicide, the legislature had created degrees of guilt, 
 the doctrine of doubts did not apply to any but the higher grades.^" 
 It cannot be doubted, however, that, in making such a distinction, 
 the learned judge was in error. Doubts as to a defendant's guilt 
 are to weigh in his favor, because the law presumes him innocent 
 until he is shown to be guilty; and if such a presumption exists at 
 all, it exists in every case alike. ^^ The question, in fact, stands 
 simply as follows: If, on an indictment for an offense containing 
 several grades, the jury have reasonable doubts as to the higher 
 grade, they must acquit of the higher grade; and so, if they have 
 reasonable doubts as to the lower grade, they must acquit of the 
 lower grade. They can convict of no grade whatever if they have 
 reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt of such grade. 
 
 157. Exception in case of confession or plea of guilty. — ^^It is only 
 where there is a trial that the degree of a homicide is to be ascer- 
 tained by the jury; in case of confession, or a plea of guilty, it is 
 to be ascertained by the court. -^ And the court may proceed to 
 award sentence in a capital case upon a plea of guilty according to 
 law;^ and statutory provisions that the degree of murder shall bo 
 found by the jury do not apply in such case.* And a statutory 
 provision prohibiting the sentence of a person convicted of murder 
 to death, unless the jury have so returned as a part of their verdict, 
 does not prevent sentencing a person pleading guilty of murder to 
 imprisonment for life.* In Texas, however, the statute specifically 
 requires that the jury shall find whether a murder is of the first or 
 of the second degree, whether the plea be guilty or not guilty. * 
 And under it a jury must be impaneled to determine the degree of 
 a murder, though it is confessed, or a plea of guilty is made; and 
 evidence must be educed and a trial had, the same as on a plea of 
 not guilty. " And where a person accused of murder pleads giiilty, 
 and a jury is impaneled to determine the degree of his guilt, though 
 guilt of murder is not at issue, murder in the first and second de- 
 grees should be submitted to the jury with a charge that if the jury 
 are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused killed 
 the deceased with express malice, they must find him guilty of 
 murder in the second degree.^ 
 
 2 estate v. Turner, Wright (Ohio) ^Hamilton v. People, 71 111. 498. 
 
 29. SMartin v. State, 36 Tex. Grim. Rep. 
 
 2 6Wasden v. State, 18 Ga. 264. 632, 36 S. W. 587, 38 S. W. 194. 
 
 iLane v. Com. 59 Pa. 371. elbid. 
 
 zOpinion of Justices, 9 Allen, 585; 'Warren v. State (Tex. Crini. App.) 
 
 Green v. Com. 12 Allen, 155. 68 S. W. 275; Martin v. State, supra. 
 
 sibid. 
 
S 158] MURDER. 241 
 
 b. Province of the court, 
 158. Determination of scope of issue and scope of instruction. — 
 
 The province of the court on an issue as to the degree of a homi- 
 cide is to guide and direct the jury and keep them within proper 
 bounds; and it is its duty to determine whether competent evidence 
 has been introduced, which, if believed by the jury, would furnish 
 the elements or ingredients of any particular grade of homicide.^ 
 And it is for the court to decide what grade or grades of homicide 
 the evidence tends to establish, and it should confine itself, in in- 
 structing the jury, to such grade or grades.^ And the court may, in 
 a proper case, grant a new trial on the ground that the verdict is 
 ■contrary to the law and evidence.® A charge of murder in a higher 
 <iegree, however, includes the lower grades of homicide, and when 
 there is evidence tending to show the lower grades of the crime, the 
 -court must instruct the jury in reference thereto on request.* And 
 the unsupported evidence of the accused is sufficient to require the 
 submission to the jury of the question of a lower degree. ° ISTor is 
 the failure to submit such question excused by the omission of coun- 
 sel for the accused to formulate a theory on which it might be based. " 
 And since murder in the second degree is presumed from the mere 
 fact of killing, and since the jury may disbelieve the evidence as 
 
 iCom. V. Morrison, 193 Pa. 613, 44 sState v. Abbott, 8 W. Va. 741. 
 Atl. 913; State V. Ellis, 74 Mo. 207. iRinger v. State (Ark.) 85 S. W. 
 
 2 State V. Ellis, supra; State v. Fos- 410; State v. Clark, 69 Kan. 576, 77 
 -ter, 61 Mo. 549; State v. Lane, 64 Mo. Pac. 287; State v. Moore, 67 Kan. 620, 
 319; State v. Baker, 146 Mo. 379, 48 S. 73 Pac. 905; Trabue v. Com. 23 Ky. L. 
 W. 475; State v. Cochran, 147 Mo. 504, Rep. 2135, 66 S. W. 718; People v. 
 49 S. W. 558; State v. Callaway, 154 Mo. Young, 96 App. Div. 33, 88 N. Y. Supp. 
 •91, 55 S. W. 444; State v. Fitzgerald, 130 1063. And see Smith v. State, 45 Tex. 
 Mo. 407, 32 S. W. 1113; State v. Joeckel, Crim. Rep. 552, 78 S. W. 694; Smith v. 
 44 Mo. 234; State V. Hudson, 59 Mo. 135; State, 130 Ala. 95, 30 So. 432; Ryan v. 
 State V. O'Hara, 92 Mo. 59, 4 S. W. 422; State. 115 Wis. 488, 92 N. W. 271. 
 State V. Starr, 38 Mo. 270; State v. And where the defense in a prose- 
 Turlington, 102 Mo. 042, 15 S. W. 141 ; cution for homicide is justification, or 
 State V. Estep, 44 Kan. 572, 24 Pac. where the accused insists on an inferior 
 ■986: Clarke v. State, 117 Ala. 1, 67 Am. grade of homicide to tlmt charged, it is 
 St. Rep. 157, 23 So. 671 ; State v. Hild- the duty of the court to give to the jury 
 Teth, 31 N. C. (9 Ired. L. ) 429, 51 Am. the definition of each grade as defined 
 Dee. 364; Adams v. State, 29 Ohio St. by law, and then leave the jury to find 
 412; Williams v. State, 3 Heiak, 376; the accused guilty of such grade as the 
 Hughes V. State, 29 Tex. App. 565, 16 evidence will authorize, or find him not 
 S. W. 548. guilty, and an instruction excluding in- 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution voluntary manslaughter from consider- 
 
 for homicide that the jury have power ation is improper. Davis v. State, 10 
 
 to find the accused guilty of murder in Ga. 101. 
 
 the first degree, or in the second degree, estate v. Clark, supra; State v. 
 
 •or of manslaughter, or not guilty, is Young, 99 Mo. 666, 12 S. W. 879. 
 equivalent to telling them that it is « State v. Clark, supra. 
 their province so to find. People v. 
 Pool, 27 Cal. 573. 
 Horn.— 16. 
 
242 HOMICIDE. R 158- 
 
 to deliberation and premeditation, an instruction as to murder in 
 the second degree is proper in a prosecution for murder in the first 
 degree.'^ And failure to so instruct is a ground for reversal on 
 appeal, even in the absence of a request for such an instruction.* 
 And a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree does not sho-vr 
 that the accused was not prejudiced by a failure to instruct the jury 
 as to murder in the second degree. " And an instruction in a prose- 
 cution for murder in the first degree, that if the killing was done- 
 in the heat of passion the accused cannot be found guilty as charged,, 
 is properly refused as ignoring the lower degrees.^" So, the court, 
 should charge as to murder both in the first and second degrees in 
 a prosecution for homicide, where the evidence is purely circum- 
 stantial, so that the state of mind of the accused does not definitely 
 appear. ^^ In such case it is proper to instruct the jury upon 
 every phase of the law of homicide, ^^ and omission to instruct as 
 to any particular degree of homicide is error, though no such instruc- 
 tion was requested.-'® Though the rule is different under statutory 
 provisions that disregard by the court of regulations as to instruc- 
 tions shall not be cause for reversal, unless excepted to at the trial 
 or on motion for a new trial. ^ * 
 
 7State V. Frazier, 137 Mo. 317, 38 S. Tex. Grim. Eep. 127, 74 S. W. 546; Ben- 
 W. 913; State v. McMullin, 170 Mo. 608, nett v. State, 39 Tex. Grim. Kep. t539, 4» 
 71 S. W. 221 ; State V. SchaeflFer, 172 Mo. S. W. 61; State v. Gunningham, 111 
 335, 72 S. W. 518; State v. Williams, 129 Lowa, 23'3, 82 N. W. 775; Territory v. 
 N. G. 581, 40 S. E. 84; Rhodes v. Gom. Guillen, 11 N. M. 194, 66 Pac. 527. 
 48 Pa. 396. And see Russell v. State, i2Williams v. Com. 25 Ky L Rep 
 66 Neb. 497, 92 N. W. 751 ; Williams v. 1504, 78 S. W. 134. And see State v 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 64 S. W. 1042; Cicekett, 30 Or. 76, 65 Pac. 447. 
 Farris v. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 56 S. Where a homicide was committed and 
 W. 336. no one saw it, the court, on a prosecu- 
 
 This is the rule, though charging tion therefor, ought to instruct the jury 
 as to thfc effect of evidence is prohibit- on ali the degrees of the offense as- 
 ed, and though the jury are to determine well as on the law of self-defense, 
 the degree of the homicide. Gafford v. Aiken v. Com. 24 Ky. L Rep 523 68 S 
 State, 125 Ala. 1, 28 So. 406. W. 849. 
 
 Where by law a homicide is murder in i3Bro\vn v. Com. 117 Ky. 766 78 S> 
 the first degree, and the jury in a prose- W. 1126; Trijo v. State, supra. 
 cution therefor find it to be murder in In State v. Gregory, 178 Mo. 48 76 
 the second degree, the error is favorable S. W. 970, however, it'was held" that a 
 to the accused, and one of which the right to a review in a prosecution for 
 appellate court will not take cognizance, homicide for the failure of the court 
 State V. Lindsey, 19 Nev. 47, 3 Am. St. to instruct as to the lesser degrees of 
 Rep. 776, 5 Pac. 822. the crime is not given by a statute re- 
 
 sState V. Foster, 130 N. C. 666, 89 Am. quiring the court to instruct on all 
 St. Rep. 876, 41 S. E. 284. the law applicable to a criminal case 
 
 "Ibid. whether requested or not, where there- 
 
 lOSmith V. State, 103 Ala. 4, 15 So. was a neglect to except to such failure 
 843. "Rambo v. State (Tex. Grim. Add i 
 
 iiLancaster v. State (Tex. Grim. 69 S. W. 163. ^^ '^ 
 
 App.) 31 S. W. 515; Trijo v. State, 45 
 
§ 15S] MURDER. 243 
 
 The court should not distract the attention of the jury, however, 
 from the actual issues in the case. And it is error for it to instruct 
 the jury as to one grade of homicide, where, if the accused is 
 guilty of homicide at all under the evidence, it is of some other 
 grade. ^ ^ And where the evidence in a prosecution for homicide will 
 warrant a verdict of only one particular degree of homicide, it is 
 the duty of the court so to instruct the jury.^® And instructions in 
 a prosecution for homicide are properly limited to murder in the 
 first degree where the evidence shows a killing upon express malice 
 only, and negatives a homicide of a lower degree. ^ '^ And evidence 
 uncontradicted, except by the accused himself, that he deliberately 
 shot the deceased while the latter was asleep, warrants a refusal, in 
 a prosecution for the killing, to charge on murder in the second de- 
 gree. ^^ But the act of the court in a prosecution for murder in 
 the second degree of defining murder in the first degree to enable the 
 jury better to understand murder in the second degree is not rever- 
 sible error.'® And where a charge based upon the evidence has 
 been given that a killing is murder in the second degree when per- 
 petrated in a sudden transport of passion aroused without adequate 
 cause, it is error not to charge on manslaughter, defining adequate 
 
 1 estate v. Stoeckli, 71 Mo. 559; State Murray, 198 Pa. 51, 82 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 V. Turlington, 102 Mo. 642, 15 S. W. 787, 47 Atl. 952. 
 
 141 ; State v. Pollard, 139 Mo. 220, 40 And where the evidence in a prosecu- 
 S. W. 949; State v. Lane, 64 Mo. 319; tion for homicide shows cool, calm, de- 
 State V. Alexander, 66 Mo. 148; State liberate design to kill the deceased for 
 V. Jones, 14 Mo. App. 589; Compton v. the purpose of obtaining his property, a 
 State, 110 Ala. 24, 20 So. 119; Bell v. charge on murder in the second degree 
 State, 140 Ala. 57, 37 So. ",81; Harris is not necessary, though the evidence 
 V. State, 36 Ark. 127; McBeth v. State, was entirely circumstantial. Pearl v. 
 122 Ga. 737. 50 S. E. 931 ; Tolbirt v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 189, 63 S. W. 
 State, 119 Ga. 970, 47 S. E. 544; Cole- 1013. 
 
 man v. State, 121 Ga. 594, 49 S. E. iTMay v. State, 22 Tex. App. 595, 3 
 
 716; Gatlin v. State, 5 Tex. App. 531; S. W. 781; Gilniore v. State, 141 Ala. 
 
 State V. Castle, 133 N. C. 769, 46 S. E. 51, 37 So. 359; Ringer v. State (Ark.) 
 
 1. And see Richards v. State, 114 Ga. 85 S. W. 410; State v. Valentina, 71 
 
 834, 40 S. E. 1001; Davis v. State, 10 N. .T. L. 552, 60 Atl. 177. 
 Ga. 101; State v. Sterrett, 80 Iowa, 609, is State v. Niehaus, 188 Mo. 304, 87 
 
 45 N. W. 401. S. W. 473. 
 
 In Henry v. People, 198 111. 162, 65 Where the evidence in a prosecution 
 
 N. E. 120, however, it was held that for homicide tends to establish murder 
 
 an instruction in a prosecution for in the first degree, and that only, the 
 
 manslaughter, defining murder, was not court is not bound, even on request, to 
 
 error where there was no requirement instruct the jury as to lesser degrees 
 
 that the jury should find the crime of of homicide. Fertig v. State, 100 Wis. 
 
 murder. 301, 75 N. W. 960. 
 
 leCupps V. State, 120 Wis. 504, 102 isMcQueen v. State, 103 Ala. 12, 15 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 996, 97 N. W. 210, 98 N. So. 824; Chambers v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 W. 546; Sanders v. State, 113 Ga. 267, App.) 86 S. W. 752; White v. State, 44 
 
 38 S. E. 841. And see Crowell v. Peo- Tex. Crim. Eep. 346, 63 L.R.A. 660, 72 
 
 pie, 190 111. 508, 60 N. E. 872; State S. W. 173. And see Downing v. State, 
 
 T Parka (La.) 40 So. 39; Com. v. Mc- 11 Wyo. 86, 70 Pac. 833, 73 Pac. 758. 
 
244 HOMICIDE. l§ 158 
 
 cause. ^° And where the court charges that if the killing was done 
 with a deadly weapon in a sudden transport of passion aroused from 
 an inadequate cause, the slayer is guilty of murder in the second 
 degree, there being no charge as to manslaughter, it is error to 
 omit to define adequate cause. ^^ So, though a person has once been 
 tried and found guilty of murder in the second degree, the court 
 upon a new trial may charge upon the law of murder in the first 
 degree for the purpose of drawing a clear distinction between the 
 two degrees. ^^ And it has been held that instructing as to a lower 
 degree of homicide, as to which there is no evidence, is not preju- 
 dicial to the accused when there was a finding of a higher degree sup- 
 ported by the evidence.^* 
 
 So, the province of the court is limited to defining the issues; 
 it cannot determine them, and generally an instruction that the jury 
 must or must not find a specified degree of homicide is an improper 
 invasion of their province,^* and a violation of constitutional or 
 statutory prohibitions against charging upon the effect of evidence. ^ '' 
 The instructions as to degree in a prosecution for homicide should 
 point out to the jury their duty, but leave them free to act. ^ ^ And 
 an instruction that the accused is guilty of a specified degree of hom- 
 icide, or nothing, is a charge upon the effect of the evidence within 
 the meaning of a statutory prohibition against such a charge, except 
 
 2 0Pollard v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. der in the first degree, and the charge is 
 
 121, 73 S. W. 953. erroneous because the alleged facts do 
 
 2iBeekham v. State (Tex. Crim. not, as matter of law, constitute murder 
 
 App. ) 69 S. W. 534. in that degree, the error is not cured by 
 
 22Mitche]l V. State, 36 Tex. Crim. the fact that a full and correct deHni- 
 
 Eep. 278, 33 S. W. -367, 36 S. W. 456. tion of the offense had previously been 
 
 2 3State V. Fitzgerald, 130 Mo. 407, 32 given. People v. Williamsv 73 Cal. 531, 
 
 S. W. 1113; Lankster v. State, 41 Tex. 15 Pac. 97. 
 
 Crim. Eep. 603, 56 S. W. 65. 2 5Gafford v. State, 125 Ala. 1, 28 So. 
 
 2 4Ezell V. State, 102 Ala. 101, 15 So. 406; People v. Chew Sing Wing, 88 Cal. 
 
 810; Washington v. State, 125 Ala. 40, 268, 25 Pac. 1099. 
 
 28 So. 78; People v. Melendrez, 129 Cal. 26Com. v. Sheets, 197 Pa. 69, 46 Atl. 
 549, 62 Pac. 109; People v. Kelly, 35 753; Shaffner v. Com. 72 Pa. 60, 13 Am. 
 Hun, 295; People v. Webster, 59 Hun, Rep. 649; State v. Lindsey, 19 Nev. 47, 
 398, 13 N. Y. Supp. 414; Adams v. State, 3 Am. St. Rep. 776, 5 Pac. 822. 
 
 29 Ohio St. 412; Rhodes v. Com. 48 Pa. But an instruction that if the ac- 
 300 ; Warren v. State, 4 Coldw. 130. cused killed the deceased unlawfully 
 And see Woods v. State, 81 Miss. 164, and with malice aforethought, the jury 
 32 So. 998. must find him guilty of murder, and 
 
 And where the trial judge in a prose- should then determine the degree, is not 
 
 cution for homicide in charging the jury subject to objection that it authorizes 
 
 recites certain facts which there was the jury to find the accused guilty of 
 
 some evidence tending to prove, and then murder in the first degree on a defini- 
 
 tells the jury that if such facts are tion of murder in tlie second degree, 
 
 proved beyond a reasonable doubt they Territory v. Scott, 7 Mont. 407, 17 Pac. 
 
 must find the defendant guilty of mur- 627. 
 
§ 158] 
 
 MURDER. 
 
 245 
 
 upon request. ^^ But a mere statement that there is no evidence to 
 justify a verdict for a stated degree of homicide is not an uncon- 
 stitutional comment on the facts. ^ * And a direction that if a hypo- 
 thetical statement of facts were found the accused should be found 
 guilty of a named degree of homicide is not objectionable as a per- 
 emptory direction to find that degree.^® Nor is it improper vyhere 
 the sole question is whether or not the accused did the killing, to 
 direct the jury to find either murder or not guilty.*" Nor are 
 instructions as to particular classes of homicide erroneous as an 
 implication that the homicide in question was one belonging to one 
 of such classes. * ^ And merely defining a degree of homicide with- 
 out directing the jury to find that degree is not error. *^ Nor is 
 it error to charge the jury in a prosecution for homicide that there 
 is nothing before them which reduces the crime below the grade of 
 murder, where the evidence would not justify a verdict for any de- 
 gree of the crime lesa than murder.^* And where it appears to 
 the judge that in no aspect of the testimony, and under no inference 
 that can be fairly drawn from it, is the prisoner guilty of murder, 
 it is his duty, especially when requested to do so, to instruct the 
 jury that they must not return a verdict for any higher offense 
 than manslaughter.®* 
 
 2 7 Collins V. State, 138 Ala. 51, 34 So. 
 993. 
 
 2 8 State V. MePhail (Wash.) 81 Pae. 
 683; Carr v. State (Fla.) 34 So. 892. 
 
 29Carle v. People, 200 111. 494, 93 Am. 
 St. Kep. 208, 66 N. E. 32. And see Wil- 
 liams V. State, 130 Ala. 107, 30 So. 484; 
 People V. Bruggy, 93 Cal. 476, 29 Pac. 
 26. 
 
 aoState v. Dixon, 131 N. C. 808, 42 
 S. E. 944; Sanders v. State, 113 Ga. 267, 
 38 S. E. 841 ; Fertig v. State, 100 V\'is. 
 301, 75 N. W. 960. 
 
 So, in State v. Hudson, 59 Mo. 135, 
 it was held that where the evidence in 
 a prosecution clearly showed that it was 
 murder in either the first or second de- 
 gree, it is not improper for the court 
 in its instructions to confine the jury in 
 their verdict to the particular degree 
 shown by the evidence. 
 
 siPeople V. Woods, 147 Cal. 265, 81 
 Pac. 652; State v. Straub, 16 Wash. Ill, 
 47 Pac. 227. 
 
 So, an instruction in a prosecution 
 for homicide in which there was no evi- 
 dence tending to prove that the crime 
 was manslaughter, or that the killing 
 was excusable or justifiable, that if the 
 killing was wilful, deliberate, and pre- 
 
 meditated it was murder in the first de- 
 gree, otherwise it was murder in the 
 second degree, is not subject to objec- 
 tion as assuming a killing, and taking 
 away from the jury the question wheth- 
 er the deceased was killed by the ac- 
 cused. People V. Welch, 49 Cal. 174. 
 
 3 2Henry v. People, 198 111. 162, 65 
 N. E. 120. And see Com. v. Washington, 
 202 Pa. 148, 51 Atl. 759. 
 
 An instruction in a prosecution for 
 homicide, using the word "murder" in 
 speaking of the crime, will not be held 
 to have been intended to convey to the 
 jury the idea that the accused was 
 guilty of murder, and that it was their 
 duty so to return their verdict, where 
 the court had fully instructed as to tne 
 definition of manslaughter and stated 
 that, under the information and the 
 evidence, the accused could be convicted 
 of that offense. People v. Bruggy, 93 
 Cal. 476, 29 Pac. 26. 
 
 ssAndersen v. United States. 170 U. 
 S. 481, 42 L. ed. 1116, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 689. 
 
 3<State v. Miller, 112 N. C. 878, 17 
 S. E. 167. 
 
 So, an instruction in a prosecution for 
 homicide in which there was a strong 
 
246 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 [§ 169 
 
 159. Defining and explaining the crime. — ^As we have seen, it is 
 the duty of the court in a prosecution for homicide to give the jury 
 suitable instiuctions as to each grade or degree of the crime -which 
 might he found under the evidence.^ And it should also instruct 
 as to the distinctions between the different grades or degrees. ^ And 
 this it should do whether requested to do so or not, since if there 
 is a reasonable doubt as to the degree of the crime, it must be solved 
 by the jury, and not by the court. * And the court should inform the 
 jury what circumstances will, in law, reduce a homicide from miir- 
 der to manslaughter, or render it excusable or justifiable; but ii 
 should leave them to apply the law to the facts in proof.* The va- 
 rious statutory terms used in specifying the ingrediimts of murder 
 must be defined in a prosecution for murder in the instructions of 
 the court. ^ And where the court undertakes to give the statutory 
 definition of murder in any degree, it is error to substitute other 
 words or phrases in the place of those used in the statute.® And 
 
 chain of circumstances tending to show 
 that the accused choked his wife to 
 death, and threw her body into a river, 
 that if the fact of the Itilling is duly 
 established, the crime is murder or 
 nothing, is not subject to objection that 
 the ques^;ion of motive and malice was 
 improperly taken from the jury. State 
 V. Jones, as N. C. 651, 3 S. E. 507. 
 
 1 State V. Robinson, 73 Mo. 308; Jack- 
 son V. State, 136 Ala. 22, 34 So. 188; 
 Allison V. State (Ark.) 86 S. W. 409; 
 Crawford v. People, 12 Colo. 290, 20 Pao. 
 769; Freeman v. State, 70 Ga. 736; 
 Moran v. State, 120 Ga. 846, 48 S. E. 
 324; Williams v. State, 120 Ga. 870, 
 48 S. E. 368; State v. Buffington, 66 
 Kan. 706, 72 Pao. 213; Bush v. Com. 
 78 Ky. 268; State v. Barrett, 132 N. C. 
 1005, 43 S. E. 832; Quarles v. State, 1 
 Sneed, 407; Sanders v. State, 41 Tex. 
 303; Robinson v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 App.) 63 S. W. 869. And see Thomas 
 V. State, 139 Ala. 80, 36 So. 734; Hen- 
 derson V. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1985, 72 
 S. W. 781; State v. Foster, 130 N. C. 
 606, 89 Am. St. Rep. 876, 41 S. E. 284; 
 State v. Underwood, 35 Wash. 558, 77 
 Pac. 863: State v. Clifford (W. Va.) 
 52 S. E. 981. And see supra, last sec- 
 tion. 
 
 In Fertig v. State, 100 Wis. 301, 75 
 N. W. 960, however, it was held that 
 where the evidence in a prosecution for 
 homicide tends to prove murder in the 
 iirst degree, but would warrant a find- 
 ing of a lesser degree, an instruction 
 
 that the jury must find murder in the 
 first degree, or acquit, is favorable to 
 the accused, and not prejudicial. 
 
 2Kas.tner v. State, 58 Neb. 767, 79 N. 
 W. 713; Oompton v. State, 110 Ala. 24, 
 20 So. 119; Palmore v. State, 29 Ark. 
 248; Jenkins v. State, 123 Ga. 523, 51 
 S. E. 598; Gossett v. State, 123 Ga. 431, 
 51 S. E. 394; State v. Williams, 188 Mo. 
 128, 84 S. W. 924; State v. White, 138 
 N. C. 704, 51 S. E. 44; State v. Turnage. 
 138 N. C. 566, 49 S. E. 913; Connell v. 
 State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 259, 81 S. W. 
 746; State v. McDonnell, 32 Vt. 491. 
 And see Nelson v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 App.) 81 S. W. 713; Sherrill v. State, 
 138 Ala. 3, 35 So. 129; Hempton v. 
 State, 111 Wis. 127, 86 N. W. 596. 
 
 3 Sanders v. State, 41 Tex. 306; Con- 
 ner v. State, 23 Tex. App. 378, 5 S. W. 
 189. 
 
 ^People v. Callaghan, 4 Utah. 49, G 
 Pac. 49; State v. McAnarney, 70 Kan. 
 679, 79 Pac. 137; Parrish v. State, 18 
 Neb. 405, 25 N. W. 573; Gatlin v. State, 
 5 Tex. App. 531 ; Maria v. State, 28 Tex. 
 698; Swain v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 86 S. W. 335; State v. McDonnell, 
 supra. 
 
 estate v. Sharp, 71 Mo. 218; State v. 
 Foster, 130 N. C. 666, 89 Am. St. Rep. 
 876, 41 S. E. 284. 
 
 6 Cook v. State (Fla.) 35 So. 665. 
 
 And error in the omission in an in- 
 struction of the word "premeditated" in 
 defining and explaining murder in tho 
 first degree is not cured by tho fact 
 
I 159] MXJRDEE. 247 
 
 •charges intended to show what was necessary to constitute the crime 
 of murder, couched in the language of the statute, are improperly 
 refused.'' It is usually sufficient, however, to instruct the jury as 
 to the several degrees of homicide, and as to malice, express or im- 
 plied, giving clearly the statutory definitions. * And failure of the 
 court to define the difference in the degrees of homicide in a prose- 
 cution therefor is not a ground for reversal, where it read from the 
 statute to the jury the definition of the different degrees.^ But after 
 giving the statutory definition of a degree of homicide, it is not 
 improper further to explain the elements of the crime by illustrations 
 not inconsistent with the statutory definition. -^ " And where the 
 •evidence in a prosecution for homicide is such that the jury might 
 find a verdict for one of the different degrees of homicide, the jur^- 
 should not be left to draw the distinction between murder in the first 
 and murder in the second degree merely from general definitions, 
 and from a definition of murder in the second degree as including 
 all other kinds of murder not included in the definition of murder in 
 the first degree. ^^ 
 
 160. Immaterial omissions and errors in instructing ^Failure or 
 
 refusal to instruct the jury in a prosecution for homicide concern- 
 ing a particular degree of the crime, where the evidence shows con- 
 •clusively that there should be a conviction, if at all, of another de- 
 gree, and the jury are left free to fix the grade of the offense, is not 
 a ground for reversal. ^ The court need not charge in a prosecution 
 for homicide as to a degree of the crime concerning which there 
 
 that in other instructions the court 1025 ; Morris v. State (Ala.) 39 So. 608 ; 
 
 pointed out the distinction between mur- Gaflford v. State, 125 Ala. 1, 28 So. ■i06 ; 
 
 der in the first and second degrees and Thomas v. State, 126 Ala. 4, 28 So. 591 ; 
 
 manslaughter, where it does not appear Mitchell v. State, 133 Ala. 65, 32 So. 
 
 what the distinction pointed out was. 132; Hunt v. State, 135 Ala. 1, 33 So. 
 
 State V. Johnson, 8 Iowa, 525, 74 Am. 329; Adcock v. State (Ark.) 83 S. W. 
 
 Dec. 321. 318; Nash v. State, 73 Ark. 399, 84 S. 
 
 TBoles V. State, 9 Smedes & M. 284. W. 497; People v. Turley, 50 Cal. 469; 
 
 sRoberts v. State, 5 Tex. App. 141; Cook v. State (Fla.) 35 So. 665; Free- 
 People V. Chaves, 122 Cal. 134, 54 Pac. man v. State, 70 Ga. 736; Brown v. 
 596. State, 28 Ga. 199 ; Dean v. State, 116 Ga. 
 
 sPalmore v. State, 29 Ark. 249. 534, 42 S. E. 750; Hill v. State, 41 Ga. 
 
 lOState V. Workman, 39 S. C. 151, 17 484; Knight v. State, 114 Ga. 48, 88 Am. 
 
 S. E. 694. St. Rep. 17, 39 S. E. 928; Kyle v. Peo- 
 
 iiState V. Shafer, 26 Mont. 11, 66 Pac. pie, 215 111. 250, 74 N. E. 146; Davis v. 
 
 463. People, 114 111. 86, 29 N. E. 192; State 
 
 iCom. V. Sheets, 197 Pa. 69, 46 Atl. v. Burns, 124 Iowa, 207, 99 N. W. 721; 
 
 753; Com. V. Hollinger, 190 Pa. 155. State v. Busse, 127 Iowa, 318, 100 N. W. 
 
 42 Atl. 548; Com. v. Ciossmire, 156 Pa. 536; State v. Penney, 113 Iowa, 691, 84 
 
 304, 27 Atl. 40 ; Clark v. Com. 123 Pa. N. W. 509 ; State v. Ryno, 68 Kan. 348, 
 
 655, 16 Atl. 795; Nevling v. Com. 98 Pa. 64 L.R.A. 303, 74 Pac. 1114; VPheeler v. 
 
 322; Brown v. Com. 76 Pa. 319; Com. Com. 27 Ky. L. Rep. 1090, 87 S. W. 
 
 v. Sutton, 205 Pa. 605, 55 Atl. 781; 1106; Sampson v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 Jarvis v. State, 138 Ala. 17, 34 So. 661, 82 S. W. 384; Hathaway v. Com. 26 
 
248 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 [§ 160 
 
 is no evidence.^ And where the evidence in a prosecution for hom- 
 icide shows upon the one side a killing by striking, throwing down^ 
 and stamping upon the body of the deceased, without provocation 
 or cause, and that upon the other consists of a denial of any vio- 
 lence, no charge upon the law of manslaughter, either voluntary or 
 involuntary, need be given. ^ JSTor can error be predicated on failure 
 or refusal to instruct as to something adequate to reduce a homi- 
 cide to a lower degree, when the verdict was for the lower degree.* 
 And refusal of instructions, though asserting sound legal proposi- 
 tions with reference to murder, is not reversible error in a prosecution. 
 for homicide, where the verdict is for manslaughter.^ Nor can the 
 accused in a prosecution for homicide complain of an omission to 
 iell the jury that nine jurors might find a verdict of a specified de- 
 gree of homicide under a statute providing therefor, when twelve 
 jurors found that degree.® 
 
 Ky. L. Rep. 630, 82 S. W. 400; Cook v. 
 Com. 10 Ky. L. Rep. 222, 8 S. W. 872; 
 State V. Ronk, 91 Minn. 419, 98 N. W. 
 334; State v. Lucey, 24 Mont. 295, 61 
 Pac. 994; State v. Lewis, 181 Mo. 235, 
 79 S. W. 671; State v. Furgeraon, 162 
 Mo. 668, 63 S. W. 101 ; State v. Riddle, 
 179 Mo. 287, 78 S. W. 606; State v. 
 Diller, 170 Mo. 1, 70 S. W. 139; State 
 V. M..y, 172 Mo. 630, 72 S. W. 918; 
 State V. Asheraft, 170 Mo. 409, 70 S. 
 W. 898; State V. Gurley, 170 Mo. 429, 
 70 S. W. 875; State v. Vinso, 171 Mo. 
 576, 71 S. W. 1034; State v. Gartrell, 
 171 Mo. 489, 71 S. W. 1045; State v. 
 Hall, 1G8 Mo. 475, 68 S. W. 344; Stats 
 V. Meadows, 156 Mo. 110, 56 S. W. 878; 
 State V. Sneed, 91 Mo. 552, 4 S. W. 411 ; 
 State V. Henderson, 186 Mo. 473, 85 S. 
 W. 576; State v. Dickson, 78 Mo. 438; 
 State V. Hicks, 178 Mo. 433, 77 S. W. 
 539; State v. Tettaton, 159 Mo. 354, 60 
 S. W. 743; United States v. Densmore 
 (N. M.) 75 Pac. 31; State v. Teachey, 
 138 N. C. 587, 50 S. E. 232; State v. Bos- 
 gan, 133 N. C. 761, 46 S. E. Ill; State 
 V. McCourry, 128 N. C. 594, 38 S. E. 
 883; Duval v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 70 S. W. 543; Estep v. State (Tex. 
 Crim. App.) 70 S. W. 968; Pollard v. 
 State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 121, 73 S. 
 W. 953; Kipper v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. 
 Rep. 377, 77 S. W. Oil; Davis v. State 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 83 S. W. 1112; Little 
 V. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 654, 47 S. 
 W. 984; Lentz v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 App.) 85 S. W. 1068; Martin v. State 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 83 S. W. 390; 
 Worthan v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 65 
 
 S. W. 526 ; Floyd v. State, 29 Tex. App. 
 349, 16 S. W. 188; Bryant v. State, 18 
 Tex. App. 107; Dean v. State (Tex. 
 Crim. App.) 83 S. VV. 816; Johnson v. 
 ■State, 18 Tex. App. 385; Smith v. State, 
 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 392, 50 S. W. 938; 
 Halbert v. State, 3 Tex. App. 656; Poe 
 V. State, 32 Tex. 65; Murray v. State, 
 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 400, 78 S. W. 927; 
 M'Whirt's Case, 3 Gratt. 594, 46 Am. 
 Dec. 196; Fertig v. State, 100 Wis. 301, 
 75 N. W. 960. And see State v. Cum- 
 mings (Mo.) 88 S. W. 706; State ». 
 Marx, 78 Conn. 18, 60 Atl. 690. 
 
 2Gardner v. State, 90 Ga. 310, 35 Am. 
 St. Rep. 202, 17 S. E. 86. 
 
 And refusal to charge as to any de- 
 gree of murder except the first is not 
 error where the evidence shows that 
 the deceased was shot several times, 
 the bullets ranging downward, and that 
 he had been dragged some distance by 
 one apparently upon horseback, and 
 there was no evidence of a struggle ; and 
 tfstimony was given that after the first 
 shot the deceased had begged not to be 
 shot again; and the defense was failure 
 to identify the accused, and an alibi. 
 Henry v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 30 S. 
 W. 802. 
 
 3Von Pollnitz v. State, 92 Ga. 16, 44 
 Am. St. Rep. 72, 18 S. E. 301. 
 
 ■iState V. Senegal, 107 La. 452, 31 So. 
 867; Black v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 68 S. W. 683. '^ 
 
 BMorris v. State (Ala.) 39 So. 60S. 
 
 estate v. Napoleon, 104 La. 164. 28 So 
 972. 
 
S 160]' MUEDEE. 249 
 
 So, as a general rule, error in instructing in a prosecution for 
 homicide as to one degree thereof is not ground for reversal when the 
 evidence shows, and the conviction is for, another degree.'' And 
 the same rule applies to erroneous instructions as to any other issue 
 not arising in the case.* Thus, error in instructing as to a higher 
 degree of homicide is harmless where the conviction was for a lower 
 degree.® A conviction of a lower degree in a prosecution for hom- 
 
 'Winter v. State, 123 Ala. 1, 26 Po. v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 83 S. W. 
 
 949; Thompson v. State, 131 Ala. 18, 31 1128; Clifton v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 So. 725; Parnell v. State, 129 Ala. 6, 84 S. W. 237; Burrows v. State (Tex. 
 
 29 So. 860; Morris v. State, supra; De- Crim. App.) 72 S. W. 848; Johnson v. 
 
 Arman v. Stajte, 71 Ala. 358; Thomas v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Eep. 332, 71 S. W. 
 
 State (Ark.) 86 S. W. 404; Crawford v. 25; White v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 People, 12 Colo. 290, 20 Pac. 769; Rich- 346, 63 L.R.A. 660, 72 S. W. 173; Scott 
 
 ard V. State, 42 Fla. 528, 29 So. 413; v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 591, 68 S. 
 
 Thomas V. State (Fla.) 36 So. 161; Mar- W. 177; State v. Underwood, 35 Wash. 
 
 low V. State (Fla.) 38 So. 653; Prior 558, 77 Pac. 863; Holmes v. State, 124 
 
 V. State, 118 Ga. 756, 45 S. E. 598; Wis. 133, 102 N. W. 321; Ross v. State, 
 
 Foskey V. State, 119Ga. 72, 45 S. E. 967; 8 Wyo. 351, 57 Pac. 924; Downing v. 
 
 Starr v. State, 160 Ind. 661, 67 N. E. State, 11 Wyo. 86, 70 Pac. 833, 73 Pac. 
 
 527; State v. Bone, 114 Iowa, 537, 87 758. And see Moore v. State, 86 Miss.. 
 
 N. W. 507; State v. Phillips (Iowa) 89 160, 38 So. 504. 
 
 N. W. 1092; State v. Yarborough, 39 sCortez v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 83 
 
 Kan. 581, 18 Pac. 474; Rone v. Com. 24 S. W. 812; Jowell v. State, 44 Tex. 
 
 Ky. L. Rep. 1174, 70 S. W. 1042; State Crim. Rep. 328, 71 S. W. 286; Black v. 
 
 V. Senegal, 107 La. 452, 31 So. 867; Par- State (Tex. Crim. App.) 68 S. W. 683; 
 
 ker V. State, 55 Miss. 414; State v. Eagsdale v. State, 134 Ala. 24, 32 So.. 
 
 Glahn, 97 Mo. 679, 11 S. W. 260; State 674; Everett v. People, 216 111. 478, 
 
 V. Stockwell, 106 Mo. 36, 16 S. W. 888: 75 N. E. 188; State v. Privitt, 175 Mo. 
 
 State V. Holloway, 161 Mo. 135, 61 S. 207, 75 S. W. 457; State v. Edwards, 
 
 W. 600; State v. Haines, 160 Mo. 555, 68 S. C. 318, 47 S. E. 395. And see 
 
 61 S. W. 621 ; State v. Tettaton, ^59 Mo. Scott v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 591, 
 
 354, 60 S. W. 743; State v. Evans, 15S 68 S. W. 177; Rawls v. State (Ga.) 52 
 
 Mo. 589, 59 S. W. 994; State v. Moore, S. E. 72. State v. Lipscomb, 134 N. C. 
 
 156 Mo. 204, 56 S. W. 883; State v. 689, 47 S. E. 44. 
 
 McMullin, 170 Mo. 608, 71 S. W. 221; And an inadequate definition of the 
 
 State v. Ashcraft, 170 Mo. 409, 70 S. term "express malice" as used in the 
 
 W. 898; State v. Schaeffer, 172 Mo. 335, Texas statute is not prejudicial to the 
 
 72 S. W. 518; State v. Jackson, 167 Mo. accused in a, prosecution for homicide, 
 
 291, 66 S. W. 938; Miera v. State (N. where he was convicted of murder in the 
 
 M. ) 81 Pac. 586; State v. Munn, 134 N. second degree, and implied malice was 
 
 C. 680, 47 S. E. 15; State v. Wilcox, 132 properly defined. Summers v. State, 5 
 
 N. C. 1120, 44 S. E. 625; Canada v. Tex. App. 365, 32 Am. Rep. 573. 
 Territory, 12 Okla. 409, 72 Pac. 375; And while an ax, with which a homi- 
 
 Com. V. Gibson, 211 Pa. 546, 60 Atl. cide was committed by striking, is a 
 
 1086; Miles v. State, 18 Tex. App. 156; dangerous weapon, as matter of law. 
 
 Ricks v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 87 S. leaving the question to the jury is not 
 
 W. 1036; Lounder v. State, 46 Tex. error prejudicial to the accused, where 
 
 Crim. Eep. 121, 79 S. W. 552; Friday v. he was found guilty of murder in the 
 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 79 S. W. 815; first degree, under instructions to con- 
 
 Connell v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. sider and determine the question of pre- 
 
 259, 81 S. W. 746; Hodge v. State (Tex. meditation first, and to consider that of 
 
 Crim. App.) 64 S. W. 242; Chambers v. manslaughter only in case they found 
 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 86 S. W. 752; no premeditated design. Miller v. 
 
 Thurman v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 86 State, 106 Wis. 156, 81 N. W. 1020. 
 S. W. 1014; Sparks v. State (Tex. Crim. sChambers v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 App.) 77 S. W. 811; Venters v. State 86 S. W. 752; Thomas v. State (Ark.) 
 
 (Tex Crim. App.) 83 S. W. 832; Tardy 86 S. W. 404; Arnold v. Com. 21 Ky. L. 
 
250 HOMICIDE. t§ 160 
 
 icide operates as an acquittal of the charge of murder in a higher 
 degree, and alleged erroneous instructions as to the charge of murder 
 are immaterial on an appeal from such conviction.-^" And the 
 same rule applies to the erroneous submission of the higher degree 
 in such a case. * ^ And a verdict of murder in the first degree, sup- 
 ported by evidence, will not be reversed for error in instructing 
 the jury as to murder in the second degree, vphen there was no testi- 
 mony tending to prove that crime. ^ ^ Nor will a verdict of murder 
 in the second degree be set aside on the ground that the evidence does 
 not make out that degree of crime, if it would have supported a find- 
 ing of murder in the first degree. ^ * And an instruction erroneously 
 defining wilful intent to kill is not prejudicial error in a prose- 
 cution for homicide, where all the evidence in the case went to show 
 that the killing was premeditated and deliberate if the defendant was 
 sane, but the defense was based exclusively on his insanity.''* 
 I^or is error in instructing as to the degree of homicide found, 
 ground for reversal, where there was nothing in the case which could 
 in any way reduce the degree. ^ ^ And the accused cannot complain 
 of an instruction which submits the theory of a lower degree of 
 homicide than that which the evidence shows.-'® 
 
 Rep. 1566, 55 S. W. 894; State v. Morri- elude a. condition of mind showing the 
 
 son, 49 W. Va. 210, 38 S. E. 481. existence of a premeditated and delib- 
 
 loState v. Mcintosh, 40 S. C. 349, 18 erately formed desipTi on the part of the 
 
 S. E. 1033. slayer to do the killing is not ground 
 
 iiCarroll v. State, (Tex. Crim. App.) for reversal, though the jury were told 
 
 66 S. W. 913; Martinez v. State (Tex. that it was an essential element of mur- 
 
 Crim. App.) 57 S. W. 838; Smith v. der in the second degree, where the court 
 
 State, 40 Tex. Crira. Rep. 391, 50 S. W. correctly defined murder in the second 
 
 938. And see Leonard v. State, 110 Ga. degree, and the jury found the ac- 
 
 291, 34 S. B. 1015; Burks v. State, 40 cused guilty of that offense, since the 
 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 167, 49 S. W. 389. error was in favor of the accused. State 
 
 taState V. Talbott, 73 Mo. 347; Thom- v. Yarborough, 39 Kan. 581, 18 Pac. 
 
 as V. State (Fla.) 36 So. 161. 474. 
 
 isMorrison v. State, 42 Fla. 149, 28 leThompson v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 So. 97. App.) 62 S. W. 919; People v. Burt, 51 
 
 Instate V. Kring, 64 Mo. 591. App. Div. 106, 64 N. Y. Supp. 417. 
 
 i5State V. Jackson, 167 Mo. 291, 68 So, in Baker v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 S. W. 938; State v. Furgerson, 162 Mo. App.) 81 S. W. 1215, it was held that 
 
 668, 63 S. W. 101; Whiteneek v. Com. a person charged with murder cannot 
 
 (Ky.) 56 S. W. 3. _ complain of error in the action of the 
 
 And error in defining malice in a court in not limiting his right of self- 
 prosecution for murder in making it in- defense. 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 
 MANSLAUGHTER GENERAILLY AND UNDER THE STATUTES. 
 
 I. OoNSTrrnENT euements and general ettles. 
 
 161. At common law and under general statutes. 
 
 1G2. Under statutes not adhering to common-law distinction. 
 
 163. Manslaughter distinguished from murder. 
 
 164. Assault with intent to commit manslaughter. 
 
 165. Submission of the issue of manslaughter. 
 
 n. VOI.TJNTART MANSLAUGHTER; PROVOCATION AND HOT BLOOD. 
 
 a. What included in voluntary manslaughter. 
 
 166. Definition; scope of subject. 
 
 b. Provocation. 
 
 1. Generally. 
 
 167. Effect; scope. 
 
 2. Existence of. 
 
 168. What constitutes generally. 
 
 169. Exercise of a legal right as provocation. 
 
 170. Killing to redress a public wrong. 
 
 171. Assault upon, or indignity offered, another. 
 
 3. Adequacy of. 
 
 172. General rules as to adequacy. 
 
 173. Words and gestures generally. 
 
 174. Insulting words or conduct toward female relative. 
 
 175. Acsaults. 
 
 176. Excessive resistance as an assault. 
 
 177. Interchange of blows induced by insulting words. 
 
 178. Sudden mutual quarrels or combats. 
 
 179. What constitutes mutual combat. 
 
 180. Effect of taking undue advantage. 
 
 181. Effect of seeking difficulty. 
 
 182. Effect of disparity of strength or weapons. 
 
 183. Assault upon relatives or friends as provocation. 
 
 184. Personal restraint or coercion. 
 
 185. Illegal or improper arrest. 
 
 186. Trespass. 
 
 187. Breach of contract. 
 
 188. Adultery by or with spouse or relative. 
 
 189. Adultery as a, provocation under special statutes. 
 
 190. Attack on chastity of relative, dependent, or friend. 
 
 191. Intent to chastise as affecting the question of adequacy. 
 
 192. Adequacy, by whom determined. 
 
 251 
 
;!52 HOMICIDE. [8 101 
 
 c. Passion or hot blood. 
 
 193. General rules as to existence of, arising from prOYoeation- 
 
 194. Of what passion may consist. 
 
 195. Murder to kill in gratification of grudge. 
 
 196. Presumption of continuance of old grudge. 
 
 197. Threats as indicating cool blood. 
 
 198. Seeking or provoking difficulty as indicating cool blood. 
 
 199. Disproportionate retaliation as indicating cool blood.. 
 
 200. Use of deadly weapon as indicating cool blood. 
 
 201. Participation in duel as indicating cool blood. 
 
 202. Test as to sufficiency of. 
 
 203. E.xistenee and sufficiency of, how determined. 
 
 d. Cooling time. 
 
 204. Effect of, generally. 
 
 205. General rules as to sufliciency of. 
 
 206. Instances. 
 
 207. Different combats or encounters. 
 
 208. Sufliciency; how determined. 
 
 e. Burden of proof of provocation. 
 
 209. Consideration of. 
 
 III. Involuntary manslaughter; unintended killing in commissiow op" 
 
 MINOR UNLAWFUL ACT OR OP ACT UNLAWFULLY PERFORMED. 
 
 a. What constitutes. 
 
 210. Definition and constituent elements. 
 
 211. Involuntary manslaughter distinguished from other classes- 
 
 of homicide. 
 
 b. Classes of. 
 
 212. The division and disposition. 
 
 c. Involuntary manslaughter in the commission of minor unlawful act. 
 
 1. The preliminary unlawful act. 
 
 213. Nature of and unlawfulness generally. 
 
 214. Preliminary act an ingredient of the killing. 
 
 2. Application of rules to particular unlawful acts. 
 
 215. Assaults. 
 
 216. Fights. 
 
 217. Drawing or using dangerous weapon. 
 
 218. Games, sports, and athletic performances. 
 
 I. Constituent elements and general rules. 
 
 161. At common law and under general statutes Manslau"-hter as 
 
 it existed at common law is defined in a previous chapter.^ And 
 where the statute does not define manslaughter, we must look to the 
 common law for its definition;^ and manslaughter under general 
 statutes, as well as at common law, has been defined to ba the 
 
 iSee supra, chapter I., § 4. 
 2Hornsby v. State, 94 Ala. 55, 10 So. 
 
5 161] MANSLAUGHTER. 253 
 
 unlawful killing of a person or a human being, without malice.^ 
 Generally, every killing which is not murder and which is not excus- 
 able or justifiable is manslaughter.* So far as manslaiighter is con- 
 cerned, where the common-law division of manslaughter into volun- 
 tary and involuntary has been disturbed by statutes dividing it into 
 degrees, the different degrees have been made, as a general rule, 
 to substantially comply with common-law divisions.^ A voluntary 
 killing not done with specific intent to take life, or from a reckless 
 disregard of human life, , or with malice, is manslaughter. " And 
 where a weapon or implement used in killing a person is not one 
 likely to kill or maim, the killing is manslaughter, unless there was 
 an actual intent showing a felonious purpose.^ And a killing with- 
 out malice and without deliberation, though with a deadly weapon, 
 may be manslaughter only.* And it also includes the killing of 
 another in a sudden quarrel.® Though a killing was intentional, 
 it may still be manslaughter where the provocation was serious 
 enough to deprive the intentional killing of its malicious character.^" 
 In such case malict* is not implied from the act of killing. -^-^ And 
 
 sState V. Bell (Del.) 62 Atl. 147; 781 ; People v. Holmes, 111 Mich. 364, 69 
 
 State V. Collins (Del.) 62 Atl. 224; N. W. 501 ; People v. Freel, 48 Cal. 436 ; 
 
 State V. Brown (Del.) 61 Atl. 1077; People v. Kernaghan, 72 Cal. 609, 14 
 
 State V. Reeder, 72 S. C. 223, 51 S. E. Pac. 566; State v. Till, Houst. Crim. 
 
 702. Rep. (Del.) 233; Dowdv v. State, 96 
 
 Wilful killing without deliberation Ga. 654, 23 S. E. 827; Bridgewater v. 
 and without malice aforethought is man- State, 153 Ind. 560, 55 N. E. 737; Den- 
 slaughter. State V. Curtis, 70 Mo. 594. nison v. State, 13 Ind. 510; Murphy v. 
 
 4Barker v. Territory (Olda.) 78 Pac. State, 31 Ind. 511; Patterson v. State, 
 
 81. See also Martin v. Com. 25 Ky. L. 66 Ind. 185; State v. McGuire, 87 Iowa, 
 
 Rep. 1928, 78 S. W. 1104; State v.' Ed- 142, 54 N. W. 202; Com. v. Webster, 5 
 
 munds (S. D.) 104 N. W. 1115. Cush. 295, 52 Am. Dec. 711; State v. 
 
 6See Harrington v. State, 83 Ala. 9, Hovt, 13 Minn. 132, Gil. 125; McDonald 
 
 3 So. 425; Hornsby v. State, 94 Ala. 55, v. State. 78 Miss. 369, 29 So. 171; State 
 
 10 So. 522; State v. Hoyt, 13 Minn. v. Curtis, 70 Mo. 594; State v. O'Hara, 
 
 132. Gil. 125. 92 Mo. 59, 4 S. W. 422; State v. Sloan, 
 
 eMyers v. State, 62 Ala. 599. 22 Mont. 293, 56 N. W. 364; State v. 
 
 7WelIar V. People, 30 Mich. 16; Ben- Greenleaf, 71 N. H. 606, 54 Atl. 38; 
 
 nyfield v. Com. 15 Ky. L. Rep. 321, 22 Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 23 Am. 
 
 S. W. 1020. Rep. 733; Quarles v. State, 1 Sneed, 
 
 sSmith V. People, 142 111. 117, 31 N. 407; Brown v. Com. 86 Va. 466, 10 S. 
 
 E. 599; Miller v. State, 37 Ind. 432; E. 745 ; McAllister v. Territory, 1 Wash. 
 
 Bowles V. Com. 103 Va. 816, 48 S. E. Terr. 360. 
 
 537. And see Montgomery v. Com. 26 And an instru'-.tion in a prosecution 
 
 Ky. L. Rep. 356, 81 S. W. 264; Wheatley for homicide that the accused would 
 
 V. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 436, 81 S. W. be guilty of murder in the iirst degree 
 
 687 : Crenshaw v. State, 70 Ark. 613, 66 if he had time after the assault to form 
 
 S. W. 196; Roberta v. United States, 61 a conscious design of killing is erro- 
 
 C. C. A. 427, 126 Fed. 897. neous as eliminating the question wheth- 
 
 9 State V. Neil, Tappan (Ohio) 88; er or not the crime had been committed 
 
 Judge V. State, 58 Ala. 406, 29 Am. under the influence of passion arising 
 
 Rep. 757. from reasonable provocation. People v. 
 
 lONye V. People, 35 Mich. 16; Maher Holmes, 111 Mich. 364, 69 N. W. 501. 
 V. People, 10 Mich. 212, 81 Am. Dee. iiMurphy v. State, supra. 
 
254 HOMICIDE. [5 1«I 
 
 when death is caused by a person in a sudden transport of passion 
 or heat of blood, without malice, upon reasonable provocation^ 
 the crime is manslaughter, and not murder. ^^ And where the 
 provocation was sudden and unexpected, the law will presume that 
 the killing was the result of the provocation, and not of an old 
 grudge previously existing.^* Before a homicide can be deemed 
 manslaughter because of provocation, however, it must appear that 
 it was the result of such a sudden, violent passion as to be supposed 
 to be irresistible by any ordinary person.^* And while, in man- 
 slaughter, there may be an intention to kill arising from a sudden 
 transport of passion, it must be unaccompanied by malice. * ^ And 
 there must have been not only adequate cause for anger, but anger 
 rendering the slayer incapable of cool reflection, and depriving him 
 of power to comprehend the probable consequences of his act, must 
 
 i2State V. Deoklotts, 19 Iowa, 447; der v. State, 12 Tex. 462; Miles v. State, 
 Prior V State, 77 Ala. 56; Thomas v. 18 Tex. App. 156; Childs v. State, 35 
 State, laO Ala. 80, 36 So. 734; State v. Tex. Crim. Rep. 573, 34 S. W. 939; 
 Jones, 2 Penn. (Del.) 573, 47 Atl. 1006; Brown v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 139. 
 State V. Wallace, 2 Penn. (Del.) 402, 75 S. W. 33 ; Cole v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. 
 47 Atl. 621; State v. Hurley, Houst. Rep. 225, 75 S. W. 527; State v. Beatty, 
 Crim. Rep. (Del.) 28; State v. Faino, 51 W. Va. 232, 41 S. E. 434; United 
 1 Marv. (Del.) 492, 41 Atl. 134; State States v. King, 34 Fed. 302; Taylor's 
 V. Rhodes, Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) Case, 2 Lewin, C. C. 215. And see State 
 476; State v. Frazier, Houst. Crim. Rep. v. MePhail (Wash.) 81 Pac. 683; Scott 
 (Del.) 176; State v. Emory (Del.) 58 v. State (Ark.) 86 S. W. 1004; State v. 
 Atl. 103C; United States v. Heath, 9 Bowers, 65 S. C. 207, 95 Am. St. Rep. 
 Mackey, 272; ISlalone v. State, 77 Ga. 795, 43 S. E. 656; Armsworthy v. State 
 767; C4ann v. State, 30 Ga. 67; Ex parte (Tex. Crim. App.) 88 S. W. 215. 
 Moore, 30 Ind. 197; Murphy v. State, 31 And an instruction in a prosecution 
 Ind. 511; Kriel v. Com. 5 Bush, 362; for homicide that the killing of a person 
 Stovall V. Com. 4 Ky. L. Rep. 442; rashly and inconsiderately, upon a sud- 
 State V. Murphy, 61 Me. 56; Com. v. den impulse, where there was adequate 
 Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 52 Am. Dec. 711 ; cause to arouse the passion, is murder. 
 Com. V. Self ridge, 1 Horr. & T. Cas. 19; is not cured by a subsequent charge 
 Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 81 Am. that every voluntary killing of a human 
 Dee. 781; State v. O'Hara, 92 Mo. .59, being is murder in the second degrre, un- 
 4 S. W. 422; State v. Gassert, 4 Mo. less the circumstances attending it 
 App. 44; State v. Dieekman, 11 Mo. App. would reduce the offense to manslaugh- 
 538, Affirmed in 75 Mo. 570; State v. Ah ter, or would excuse or justify it, since 
 Mook, 12 Nev. 369; State v. Smith, 77 it might be taken by the jury that the 
 N. C. 488 ; State v. Thompson, Wright two charges described different kinds of 
 (Ohio) 617; Com. v. Brown, 7 Pa. Co. homicides. Miles v. State, supra. 
 Ct. 640; Kilpatrlok v. Com. 31 Pa. 198; isOopeland v. State, 7 Humph. 494. 
 Com. V. Crause, 4 Clark (Pa.) 500; KNowacryk v. People, 139 111. 336, 
 Com. V. Ellenger, 1 Brewst. (Pa.) 352; 28 N. E. 961; Bridgewater v. State 153 
 Cora. V. Silcox, 161 Pa. 484, 29 Atl. 105; Ind. 560, 65 N. E. 737; State v. Sloan, 
 State V. Ferguson, 2 Hill, L. 619, 27 Am. 22 Mont. 293, 56 Pac. 364; State v. 
 Dec. 412; State v. Jacobs, 28 S. C. 29, Smith, 77 N. C. 488; Com. v. Drum, 53 
 4 S. E. 799; Anthony v. State, Meigs, Pa. 9; People v. Calton, 5 Utah, 451, 18 
 265, 33 Am. Dec. 143; McGrath v. State, Pao. 902; Rex v. Hayward, 6 Car & P 
 35 Tex. Crira. Rep. 413, 34 S. W. 127, 157. 
 041; Maria v. State, 28 Tex. 698; Lan- leDennison v. State, 13 Ind. 610. 
 
§ 161] MANSLAUGHTER. 255 
 
 have, in fact, existed;*® though where such passion existed it is not 
 necessary that the killing should have been felonious in order to 
 be manslaughter. * ^ So, a voluntary or purposed killing may amount 
 only to manslaughter under a statute providing that manslaughter 
 shall consist in unlawfully killing any human being, without malice, 
 express or implied, either voluntarily upon a sudden heat, or in- 
 voluntarily, but in the commission of some unlawful act, where the 
 killing was unlawful, but perpetrated upon a sudden heat and 
 without malice. * ® And when the statute describes manslaughter as 
 voluntary and intentional homicide, it consists in voluntarily de- 
 priving a human being of life under circumstances that would make 
 the act manslaughter at common law.*® And where an act which 
 results in death is wilfully or voluntarily done, the killing is man- 
 slaughter, without regard to circumstances of provocation.^" But 
 there is no manslaughter if there was no intention to take life.^* 
 To constitute manslaughter there must have been either a positive 
 intention to kill, or an act of violence from which, in the usual 
 course of events, death or great bodily harm might result. ^^ And 
 an instruction as to manslaughter under such a statute is erroneous 
 if it omits the element of intent to kill. ^ * 
 
 162. Under statutes not adhering to common-law distinction. — In 
 some of the states manslaughter is divided by statute into degrees 
 differing entirely or materially from the common-law division into 
 voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. Thus, in Missouri, Kan- 
 sas, and Wisconsin, and formerly in New York, homicide not justi- 
 fiable or excusable, and not amounting to murder, is manslaughter 
 
 leFendrick v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) application of unlawful force, the slayer 
 56 S. W. 626; Maria v. State, 28 Tex. would have been guilty of voluntary 
 698; Ex parte Jones, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. manslaughter at common law, and is 
 422, 20 S. W. 983; Davis v. People, 1'14 guilty of manslaughter in the first de- 
 111. 86, 29 N. E. 192; Hoffman v. State, gree under the Alabama statutes, though 
 97 Wis. 571, 73 N. W. 51. the weapon used was not ordinarily cal- 
 
 To reduce an unlawful homicide from culated to produce death. McManus v. 
 murder to manslaughter, it is not suf- State, 36 Ala. 285. 
 
 fieient that it was done under the Im- 2iConnell v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 mediate influence of sudden passion 259, 81 S. W. 746; Perrin v. State, 45 
 rendering the mind incapable of cool Tex. Crim. Rep. 560, 78 S. W. 930; Lax 
 reflection; there must have existed an v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 65 S. W. 88; 
 adequate cause to produce such passion. Chism v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 78 
 McKinney v. State, 8 Tex. App. 626. S. W. 949. And see Danforth v. State, 
 
 IT Cook V. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1731, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 105, 69 S. W. 159. 
 72 S. W. 283. 2 2 Harrington v. State, 83 Ala. 9, 3 
 
 isBechtelheimer v. State, 54 Ind. So. 425; Lewis v. State, 96 Ala. 6, 38 
 128. Am. St. Rep. 75, 11 So. 259. And see 
 
 isOliver v. State, 17 Ala. 587. Johnson v. State, 133 Ala. 38, 31 So. 
 
 2 01bid. And see Myers v. State, 62 951; Parnell v. State, 129 Ala. 6, 29 So. 
 Ala. 599. 880. 
 
 If death ensues from the intentional 2 3Perrin v. State, supra. 
 
256 HOMICIDE. [§ 162 
 
 in the first degree when perpetrated without design to effect death, 
 by the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of a person engaged 
 in the perpetration of any crime or misdemeanor not amounting 
 to a felony, or in an attempt to perpetrate such crime or misdemeanor, 
 when such killing would have been murder at common law ; and it 
 is manslaughter in the second degree where it is perpetrated unnec- 
 ■essarily in resisting an attempt by the person killed to commit a 
 felony, or do any other unlawful act, or after such attempt has failed; 
 and it is manslaughter in the third degree when perpetrated in the 
 heat of passion, without design to effect death, with a dangerous 
 weapon; and it is manslaughter in the fourth degree when per- 
 petrated involuntarily in the heat of passion, without the use of a 
 deadly weapon, and without cruel or unusual means, or when per- 
 petrated in any other way which would have amounted to man- 
 slaughter at common law, and which is not included in any of the 
 statutory definitions of manslaughter in some other degree. And in 
 Missouri, killing a human being vdthout a design to effect death, 
 in a heat of passion, but in a cruel or tmusual manner, is also 
 manslaughter in the second degree. ^ Within these provisions a hom- 
 icide intentionally committed in self-defense, or while resisting as- 
 sault by the person slain, is not manslaughter in the second degree, 
 consisting of killing without design to effect death, in a cruel and 
 unusual manner in the heat of passion;^ though it might be man- 
 slaughter in the fourth degree, consisting of homicide not included 
 in any of the statutory definitions, and amounting to manslaughter 
 at common law, perpetrated in any other way.^ And where a kill- 
 
 iSee State v. Wilson, 98 Mo. 440, 11 State, 75 Wis. 486, 44 N. W. 509; Ter- 
 
 S. W. 985; State v. Elliott, 98 Mo. 150, rill v. State, 95 Wis. 276, 70 N. W. 350; 
 
 11 S. W. 566; State v. Sloan, 47 Mo. 604; Kenney v. State, 124 Wis. 486, 102 N. W. 
 
 State V. Downs, 91 Mo. 19, 3 S. W. 219; 907; Schmidt v. State, 124 Wis. 516, 102 
 
 State V. McKinzie, 102 Mo. 621, 15 S. W. N. W. 1071 ; Bliss v. State, 117 Wis. 596, 
 
 149; State v. Talmage, 107 Mo. 543, 17 94 N. W. 325. 
 
 S. W. 990 ; State v. Jones, 79 Mo. 441 ; In Minnesota, also, a killing not 
 State V. Edwards, 70 Mo. 480; State v. amounting to murder, unnecessarily, ex- 
 Rose, 142 Mo. 418, 44 S. W. 329; State cept by accident or misfortune, either 
 V. Weakley, 178 Mo. 413, 77 S. W. 525 ; while resisting an attempt by the person 
 State V. Spendlove, 47 Kan. 160, 28 Pac. killed to commit a felony, or after such 
 994; People v. Pearce, 2 Edm. Sel. Gas. attempt has failed, is manslaughter in 
 70; People v. Donaldson, 2 Edm. Sel. the second degree. State v. Hovt, 13 
 Cas. 78; People v. Crowe, 2 Edm. Sel. Minn. 132, Gil. 125. 
 
 Gas. 152; Boyle v. State, 57 Wis. 472, In Missouri it is manslaughter in the 
 
 46 Am. Rep. 41, 15 N. W. 827; Doherty first degree to deliberately assist an- 
 
 V. State, 84 Wis. 152, 53 N. W. 1120; other in the commission of self-murder. 
 
 Perkins v. State, 78 Wis. 551, 47 N. W. State v. Ludwig, 70 Mo. 412. 
 
 827; Perugi v. State, 104 Wis. 230, 76 2State v. Edwards, 70 Mo. 480; State 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 865, 80 N. W. 593; Rowan v. Stiltz, 97 Mo. 20, 10 8. W. 614. 
 
 V. State, .30 Wis. 129, 11 Am. Rep. 559; 3, Ibid. 
 Keenan v. State, 8 Wis. 132; Schlect v. 
 
5 162] MANSLAUG-HTER. 257 
 
 ing was involuntary and in the heat of passion produced by lawful 
 provocation, and without malice but not in self-defense, it is man- 
 slaughter in the third degree.* And a fight growing out of an al- 
 tercation is sufficient to inflame the passions and produce the heat 
 of blood required;" but an intentional or wilful killing is not in- 
 ■cluded.® And heat of passion is an essential element of manslaugh- 
 ter in both the third and fourth degrees. ^ A killing without malice 
 •or deliberation in a proper case, however, may be manslaughter 
 in the second degree, consisting of unnecessarily killing in resisting 
 an attempt to commit a felony, or to do any other unlawful act, 
 •or after such attempt has failed, though it was wilful and inten- 
 tional.^ And manslaughter in the fourth degree of the residuary 
 ■class may be committed in a proper case though the act was wilful, 
 or with intent to kill.® But if the slayer was the aggressor and 
 provoked the difficulty, and did the deed intentionally, it is not 
 manslaughter at common law, and, consequently, not manslaughter 
 in the fourth degree of this class ;-^'' and, of course, one cannot 
 be convicted of manslaughter of this kind if he could be convicted 
 of any other kind of homicide. ^^ In New York, manslaughter 
 is divided by a subsequent statute into two degrees, the first con- 
 sisting of an unintentional killing in the heat of passion, but in a 
 cruel or unusual manner, or by means of a dangerous weapon, or 
 ■by a person engaged in committing, or attempting to commit, a 
 
 ■*State V. MeKinzie, 102 Mo. 620, 15 tempt by such other to commit some 
 
 S. W. 149; State v. Wilson, 98 Mo. 440, unlawful act, where all the circum- 
 
 11 S. W. 985. stances show that the killing was not 
 
 BState V. Talmage, 107 Mo. 543, 17 S. clone in resisting such assault. Perugi 
 
 W. 990; Perkins v. State, 78 Wis. 551, v. State, supra.. 
 47 N. W. -827. 9 State v. McKinzie, 102 Mo. 620, 15 
 
 estate v. Pettit, 119 Mo. 410, 24 S. S. W. 149; State v. Curtis, supra; State 
 
 .W. 1014; State v. Watson, 95 Mo. 411, v. Eose, 142 Mo. 418, 44 S. W. 329. 
 8 S. W. 383 ; State v. Dunn. 80 Mo. 681 ; Although a person begins a quarrel 
 
 State V. Talmage, supra. or diificulty with, or offers a provoca- 
 
 'Perugi V. State, 104 Wis. 230, 76 tion to, another, yet if it is not done 
 
 Am. St. Eep. 865, 80 N. W. 593. with any felonious purpose, and the lat- 
 
 sState V. Curtis, 70 Mo. 594; Terrill ter attacks the former and compels hira, 
 
 T. State, 95 Wis. 276, 70 N. W. 356. in order to save his own life, to take 
 
 And in instructing the jury in such a that of the other, he will be guilty of 
 
 <?ase the court should distinguish be- manslaughter in the fourth degree only, 
 
 tween an intentional and unnecessary State v. Gilmore, 95 Mo. 554, 8 S. W. 
 
 killing and a deliberate and premeditat- 359, 912. 
 ed killing. Terrill v. State, supra. loState v. Dunn, 80 Mo. 681. 
 
 And the fact that just before a homi- A homicide is not manslaughter in 
 
 cide the deceased had tried to grab the the fourth degree under the Missouri 
 
 accused does not require a submission statute, unless it was involuntary, or 
 
 to the jury of the question whether there was a sudden heat or quarrel, 
 
 the killing was manslaughter in the sec- State v. Jones, 79 Mo. 441. 
 ond degree, consisting of unnecessarily iiDoherty v. State, 84 Wis. 152, 53 
 
 kimng another while resisting an at- N. W. 1120. 
 Horn.— 17. 
 
258' HOMICIDE. [§ 16? 
 
 misdemeanor affecting the person or property of the person killed, 
 or of another; and the second consisting of killing another without 
 the use of a dangerous weapon, or in a manner neither cruel nor 
 unusual, or in the commission of, or attempt to commit, a trespass 
 or other invasion of a private right, either of the person killed or 
 of another, not amounting to a felony.'^ Under th^-s statute any 
 killing without a design to effect death, unless it is justifiable or 
 excusable, is manslaughter. ' * And by it the various kinds of neg- 
 ligent hor; icide are also made manslaughter in the second degree. ^ * 
 But manslaughter does not include intentional killing. ^^ A hom- 
 icide is murder where there was an intent to take life. ^ ® In Texas 
 a homicide which would otherwise be manslaughter is made mur- 
 der by statute, when committed with a dagger or bowie knife. ^^ 
 And this act is not unconstitutional or in excess of legis- 
 lative power. ^® These provisions, however, do not affect the 
 inherent nature of manslaughter, but are designed, principally, if 
 not entirely, for the purpose of graduating the punishment accord- 
 ing to the nature of the act; and the cases in states adopting them 
 fall naturally under the head of voluntary and involuntary man- 
 slaughter, as in other states. 
 
 163. Manslaughter distinguished from murder. — The distinction be- 
 tween murder either in the iirst or in the second degree and man- 
 slaughter is that, in murder in either degree, malice is a necessary 
 
 i2See People v. Kennedy, 51 N. Y. S. finding her in the act of adultery; to re- 
 K. 811, 22 N. Y. Supp. 267; People v. duce the offense to the grade of man- 
 Webster, 68 Hun, 11, 22 N. Y. Supp. slaughter, it must have been committed 
 634; People v. McKeon, 31 Hun, 449; without design to effect death. Shufflin 
 People V. De Garrao, 73 App. Div. 46, v. People, 62 N. Y. 229, 20 Am. Rep. 483, 
 76 N. Y. Supp. 477. Affirming 4 Hun, 16. 
 
 Evidence that one person struck an- iTCockrum v. State, 24 Tex. 394; 
 
 other without using a weapon, and that Isaacs v. State, 25 Tex. 174. 
 the latter returned the blow by killing islt is competent for the legislature 
 
 his aasailart with a deadly weapon, to put all cases of manslaughter with 
 
 makes a case of manslaughter under the deadly weapons upon the same footi''g 
 
 New York statjite, consisting of killing with murder, leaving the jury to affix 
 
 in the heat of passion, but by means the degree of punishment according to 
 
 of a dangerous weapon. People v. Ken- their opinion of its atrocity. And the 
 
 nedy, supra. provision of the Texas Code that homi- 
 
 '- sPeople v. Austin, 1 Park. Crim. Rep. cide which would otherwise be man- 
 
 154. slaughter shall be deemed murder when 
 
 i^See People v. Buddensieck, 24 N. Y. committed with a bowie knife or dagger 
 
 Week. Dig. 82. is not a violation of the constitutional 
 
 i6Shufflin V. People, 62 N. Y. 229, 20 right of every citizen to bear arms in 
 
 Am. Rep. 483; People v. Beckwith, 103 lawful defense of himself or the state, 
 
 N. Y. 360, 8 N. E. 662. but is in restraint of an abuse growing 
 
 lePeople v. Clark, 7 N. Y. 385. out of such right, though the legislature 
 
 The act of a husband of killing his cannot affix such a, punishment to the 
 
 wife with a premeditated desigi to ef- abuse as would tend to deter the citi- 
 
 feet death is murder in the first degree, zen from its lawful exercise. Cockrum 
 
 though done under the provocation of v. State, supra. 
 
§ 163) MANSLiAUG-HTER. 259 
 
 ingredient, and the crime is attributable to a wicked, depraved, and 
 malignant spirit, while in manslaughter malice is wanting, and the 
 crime is imputed, by the benignity of the law, to human infirmity.* 
 If malice existed the crime is murder, and not manslaughter, though 
 sudden passion co-existed and the homicide was the product of both.^ 
 And in manslaughter malice is presumed to be, and is, absent,* 
 and error in charging, or refusing to charge, as to malice is not 
 material where the conviction was for manslaughter.* The distin- 
 guishing characteristics of manslaughter are absence of malice or in- 
 tent to kill and action while in the heat of passion, ' or an intent to 
 
 iSlaughter v. Com. 11 Leigh, 681, 37 motive powers, and an act of killing 
 Am. Dec. 638 ; M'Whirt's Case, 3 Gratt. which proceeds from the one cannot also 
 594, 46 Am. Dec. 196; King v. Com. 2 Va. proceed from the other. Brown v. Com. 
 Cas. 78; Cribbs v. State, 86 Ala. 613, 86 Va. 466, 10 S. E. 745. 
 6 So. 109; Ex parte Warrick, 73 Ala. 57; But refusal to instruct in a prose- 
 Carroll V. State.. 23 Ala. 28, 58 Am. Dec. cution for homicide that malice ex- 
 282; People v. Crowey, 56 Cal. 36; Peo- eludes passion, and paiiion presupposes 
 pie V. Samsels, 66 Cal. 99, 4 Pac. 1061 ; the absence of malice, and in law they 
 State V. Pratt, Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) cannot coexist, is not error where the 
 249; State v. Draper, Houst. Crim. Rep. court had already clearly defined the 
 (Del.) 531; State v. Jones, 2 Penn. crime of murder and charged that if the 
 (Del.) 573, 47 Atl. 1006; State v. Bell requisites of either express or implied 
 (Del.) 62 Atl. 147; State v. Sloan, 22 malice were absent the crime was re- 
 Mont. 293, 56 Pac. 364; State v. Brooks, duced to manslaughter. State v. New- 
 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint, 407 ; Com. v. ton, 28 La. Ann. 65. 
 
 Lynch, 3 Pitt&b. 412; Cora. v. Drum, 58 3People v. Borgetto, 99 Mich. 336, 58 
 
 Pa. 9; State v. Adams, 68 S. C. 421, 47 N. W. 328; Jackson v. State, supra; 
 
 S. E. 6('6; Turner v. State. 41 Tex. People v. Waysman (Cal.) 81 Pac. 1087; 
 
 Crim. Rep. 329, 54 S. W. 579; Connell Anderson v. State, 31 Tex. 440. 
 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 259, 81 S. 4Williams v. State, 140 Ala. 10, 37 So. 
 
 W. 746; United States v. Wiltberger. 3 228; May v. State, 120 Ga. 135, 47 S. E. 
 
 Wash. C. C. 515, Fed. Cas. No. 16,738; 548; Hendriekson v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 United States v. Outerbridge, 5 Sawy. 224,81 S. W. 266; State v. Gianfala, 113 
 
 620, Fed. Cas. No. 15,978; Addington v. La. 463. 37 So. 30. 
 
 United States, 165 U. S. 184, 41 L. ed. 5Prior v. State, 77 Ala. 56; Jackson 
 
 G79, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 288. And see v. State, 74 Ala. 26; Cribbs v. State, 86 
 
 Adams v. State, 133 Ala. 166, 31 So. 851. Ala. 613, 6 So. 109; State v. Dorsey, 118 
 
 In murder upon express malice, the Ind. 167, 10 Am. St. Rep. Ill, 20 N. E. 
 
 slayer is presumed to be actuated by an 777; Halsey v. C-om. 1 Ky. L. Rep. 121; 
 
 intent which may not exist; ii volun- Cryer v. State, 71 Miss. 467, 42 Am. St. 
 
 tary manslaughter, out of forbearance Rep. 473, 14 So. 261; State v. Sloan, 22 
 
 for the weakness of human nature, the Mont. 293, 56 Pac. 364; Bohanan v. 
 
 slayer is presumed not to be actuated State, 15 Neb. 209, 18 N. W. 129; Peo- 
 
 by an intent, although such intent may, p]e v. Rogers, 13 Abb. Pr. N. S. 370; 
 
 in fact, exist. People v. Doyell, 48 Cal. Hatehell v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 84 
 
 96; People V. Kernaghan, 72 Cal. 609, 14 S. W. 234; United States v. King, 34 
 
 Pac. 566. Fed. 302. 
 
 zMartin v. State, 119 Ala. I, 25 So. The distinction between homicide 
 2.o5 ; Carroll v. State, 23 Ala. 28, 58 Am. committed ^vith malice, constituting 
 Dec. 282; Jackson v. State, 74 Ala. 26; murder, ard that committed in a trans- 
 People V. Lilley, 43 Mich. 521, 5 N. W. port of passion, suddenly excited by 
 982; State \. Sloan, supra; Shufflin v. grievous provocation, constituting man- 
 People, 4 Hun, 16. Affirmed in 62 N. Y. slaughter, applies as well to the killing 
 229. 20 Am. Rep. 483 ; Slaughter v. Com. by a slave of a white man as to the kill- 
 supra. ing by a white man of an equal. State 
 
 Passion and malice are inconsistent v. Jarrott, 23 N. C. (1 Ired. L.) 76. 
 
260 HOMICIDE. [S 163 
 
 kill under provocation sufficiently serious to deprive the intentional 
 killing of its malicious character/ though the mere presence or ab- 
 sence of intent to kill is not the ttest, since there may be an in- 
 tent to kill under proper provocation in manslaughter. '' And a hom- 
 icide may be manslaughter though there was no express intent; it is 
 enough that there was negligent and reckless indifference to the lives 
 and safety of others. * While a person who kills another is presumed 
 to have intended the consequences of his act, if the intention and 
 act were the result of impulse and passion arising upon sudden and 
 adequate provocation, the idea of malice is repelled, and the kill- 
 ing is manslaughter only.® And while malice and a purpose to 
 kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon, whether a 
 killing was murder or manslaughter depends upon the intention 
 with which the act was done, and not upon the character of the 
 instrument used. ^° If the provocation is inconsiderable, the law 
 implies malice, and the homicide is murder; if it is great, malice 
 will not be inferred, and it will be deemed to be manslaughter 
 only. ^ ^ And homicide prompted by revenge or jealousy, as dis- 
 tinguished from provocation and hot blood, is mtirder. ■'^ Though 
 deliberation and premeditation are excluded by passion the killing 
 
 SNye V. People, 35 Mich. 16; Ex parte Malice aforethought implies a mind 
 
 Warrick, 73 Ala. 57; People r. Crowey, under the sway of reaaoUj wnereas pas- 
 
 56 Cal. 36; State v. Norris, 2 N. C. (1 sion implies dethronement of reason, 
 
 Hay^¥.) 429, 1 Am. Dec. 565; Brown v. rendering a man deaf to the voice of 
 
 Com. 86 Va. 406, 10 S. E. 745. reason so that, although the act of kill- 
 
 'People V. Freel, 48 Cal. 436; People ing was done with intent to kill, it was 
 
 V. Kernaghan, 72 Cal. 612, 14 Pac. 566; not the result of malignity of heart, but 
 
 People v. Doyell, 48 Cal. 96; Murphy impxitable to human infirmity. Brown 
 
 V. State, 31 Ind. 511 ; State v. Mc- v. Com. 86 Va. 466, 10 S. E. 745. 
 Guire, 87 Iowa. 142, 54 N. W. 202; isState v. Burns, 148 Mo. 167, 71 Am. 
 
 Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 23 Am. St. Rep. 588, 49 S. W. 1005; Perry v. 
 
 Eep. 733 ; Quarles v. State, 1 Sneed, 407 ; State, 102 Ga. 365, 30 S. E. 903 ; State 
 
 Lnnder v. State, 12 Tex. 462; Brown v. v. John, 30 N. C. (8 Ired. L.) 330, 49 
 
 Com. supra. Contra, under the New Am. Dee. 397; Com. v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9; 
 
 York statute, in Shufflin v. People, 62 Ex parte Jones, 31 Tex. Crim. Eep 422, 
 
 N. Y. 229, 20 Am. Rep. 483. 20 S. W. 983. 
 
 Malice cannot be inferred from a dead- So, evidence in a prosecution for homi- 
 ly intent in a case in which one wilfully cide that after a quarrel one person 
 kills another to save his own life, or knocked another down, and then walked 
 where the intent was produced by anger a, distance of some 10 or 12 feet, and 
 upon a sudden and reasonable provoca- stood leaning against the door, when 
 tion, and in such case a killing would the latter, after lying on the ground a 
 not be murder. Quarles v. State, supra, few minutes, arose, drew a knife with a 
 sState V. Moore (Iowa) 106 N. W. 16. blade 4 inches long, and advanced to- 
 sQuarles v. State, supra. ward the former with the knife in his 
 loPeople v. Crowey, 56 Cal. 36. right hand behind his back, and upon 
 liKilpatrick v. Com. 3 Phila. 237; reaching him stabbed and killed him 
 Gray v. State, 4 Baxt. 331 ; People v. with it, is suflicient to sustain a verdict 
 Kernaghan, 72 Cal. 609, 14 Pac. 566; of murder in the first degree. Com. v. 
 State V. Sloan, 22 Mont. 293, 56 Pac. Morrison, 193 Pa. 619, 44 Atl. 913. 
 364. 
 
§ 163] MAJ^SLAUGHTER. 261 
 
 is murder in the second degree, and not manslaughter, if it was 
 done with malice.^* But so far as the state of mind is concerned 
 in which is evolved the intent to take life, there is no difference 
 between murder in the second degree and manslaughter, the difference 
 being in the cause which superinduced the excitement or passion. ^ * 
 And to sustain a verdict of murder in the second degree the proof 
 must show that the homicide was committed with malice afore- 
 thought, either express or implied, and that it was not the result 
 of sudden heat upon adequate provocation.^^ Manslaughter and 
 murder are different cripies, however, and not different degrees of 
 the same crime, like murder in the first and in the second degree, 
 so that a conviction of manslaughter on an indictment for murder 
 must negative the murder.^® And the distinguishing feattire of 
 manslaughter under statutes like that of New York is the absence 
 of intent to kill; if there was an intent to take life the crime is 
 murder, and not manslaxighter ; ' '^ though it has been held that, 
 although the statute defines homicide to be manslaughter when 
 perpetrated without a design to effect death, still, if it was per- 
 petrated in the heat of passion engendered by sudden and sufficient 
 provocation, the law will interpose and say that there was no in- 
 tent or premeditated design such as is essential to constitute mur- 
 der, though the accused at the instant, in his frenzy, did intend to 
 take life. ^^ 
 
 164. Assault with intent to commit manslaughter — The rule has 
 been laid down that there can be no specific intent without delibera- 
 tion, and an act done on a sudden impulse, like manslaughter, 
 cannot be deliberate, and, therefore, there can be no such offense 
 as an, assault with intent to commit manslaughter.^ An assault 
 with intent to commit manslaughter, however, is comprehended 
 within the meaning of a statute imposing a specified penalty upon 
 
 isGilmore v. State, 126 Ala. 20, 28 on the instant or had been previously 
 
 So. 595. entertained. People v. Austin, supra. 
 
 i^Larson v. State (Tex. Crira. App.) isTerritory v. Bannigan, 1 Dak. 451, 
 
 29 S. W. 782. 46 N. W. 597. 
 
 iBLeake v. State, 10 Humph. 144. iPeople v. Lilley, 43 Mich. 521, 5 N. 
 
 leWeighorst v. State, 7 Md. 442. W. 082; State v. Shields, 1 Ohio Dec. 
 
 iTPeopIe V. Clark, 7 N. Y. 385; People Reprint, 17; Stevens v. State, 91 Tenn. 
 
 V. Campbell, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 307; Peo- 726, 20 S. W. 429. And see People v. 
 
 pie V. Austin, 1 Park. Crim. Rep. 154. Mendenhall, 135 Cal. 344, 63 Pae. 675, 
 
 And action under provocation, and the 67 Pac. 325. 
 
 fact that the passions have not had time In Hasenfuss v. State, 156 Ind. 246, 
 
 to cool, do not, under the Neve York stat- 59 K". E. 463, hovfever, it was held that 
 
 ute. mitigate killing with a, design to the jury in a prosecution for murder 
 
 effect death from murder to manslaugh- perpetrated by means of administering 
 
 ter. Such killing is murder, whether poison have power to find the accused 
 
 the design to effect death was formed guilty of voluntary manslaughter, al- 
 
262 HOMICIDE. {§ 164 
 
 any person committing an assault upon another with, intent to 
 commit any crime punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, 
 where manslaughter is so punishable.^ And an intent to commit 
 manslaughter is included in an assault with intent to commit mur- 
 der, and an indictment for the latter offense will sustain a con- 
 viction for the former.^ But" the term "other felony" in a statute 
 imposing a penalty for an assault with intent to commit murder, 
 rape, mayhem, robbery, larceny, or other felony, refers to other 
 felonies of the same nature, involving deliberation and premedita- 
 tion, and does not include an assault with intent to commit man- 
 slaughter, since in manslaughter there can be no deliberation or 
 premeditation. * 
 
 165. Submission of the issue of manslaughter. — ^An explicit instruc- 
 tion as to manslaughter should be given in a prosecution for homicide 
 whenever there is evidence from which a verdict for that offense might 
 be found. * Failure or refusal to charge on manslaughter in a prose- 
 cution for homicide, where the evidence of the state was such that 
 the crime might have been manslaughter, is error, though, under the 
 evidence of the defense, the accused was either guilty of murder 
 or innocent.^ And the fact that self-defense was sought to be 
 shown does not render unnecessary an instruction authorizing a 
 conviction for manslaughter.^ 'Not does the fact that an alibi was 
 sought to be shown.* Any evidence tending to show the absence of 
 malice entitles the accused to an instruction upon manslaughter, as, 
 
 though it may be difficult to conjecture Folks v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 58 S. 
 
 a case in which manslaughter can be W. 9S; Lewis v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 said to be committed by means of ad- App.) 89 S. W. 1073; State v. McPhail 
 
 ministering poison. (Wash.) 81 Pac. 683. And see Steiner 
 
 sState V. McGuire, 87 Iowa, 142, 54 v. People, 187 111. 244, 58 N. E. 383; 
 
 N. W. 202. And see Bryan v. State Farmer v. State, 112 Ga. 80, 37 S. E. 
 
 (Fla.) 34 So. 243; State v. Calligan, 17 120; Horton v. State, 110 Ga. 739, 35 
 
 N. H. 253. S. E. 659. 
 
 3State V. White, 45 Iowa, 235. And In State v. Exum. 138 N. C. 599. 50 
 
 see Taylor V. State (Fla.) 38 So. 380. S. E. 283, it was held that where the 
 
 4Moore v. People, 146 111. 600, 35 N. court in a prosecution for liomieide de- 
 
 E. 166. fines the crime of manslaughter as ap- 
 
 iState V. Shadwell, 26 Mont. 52, 66 plied to the facts in the case, it is not 
 
 Pac. 508; .Tenkins v. State, 123 Ga. 525, necessary that an abstract definition of 
 
 51 S. E. i>98; Greer v. Com. Ill Ky. 93, the crime he given. 
 
 63 S. W. 443; Montgomery v. Com. 23 ^Venters v. State (Tex. Crira. At)P.) 
 
 Ky. L. Rep. 732, 63 S. W. 747; State 83 S. W. 832: Riley v. State (Tex. O.im. 
 
 V. Spivev, 111 Mo. 87, 90 S. W. 81; App.) 81 S. W. 711; Whatley v. State, 
 
 State v.'Hubbard (S. D.) 104 N. W. 116 Ga. 80, 42 S. E. 403; Steiner v. Peo- 
 
 1120; Mooney v. State (Tex. Crim. pie, Kupra. 
 
 App.) 65 S. W. 926; Gardner v. State, 3 State v. Shadwell. 26 Mont. 52, 68 
 
 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 19, 48 S. W. 170; Pac. 508; Bonner v. State, 29 Tex. App. 
 
 Runnels v. State. 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 223. 15 S. W. 821. And see Harris v. 
 
 555, 61 S. W. 479; Norris v. State, 42 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 89 S. W. 1064. 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 559, 61 S. W. 493; 4Lewis v. State, supra. 
 
I 165] 
 
 MAI<rSLAUGHTEE. 
 
 263 
 
 for instance, evidence that the accused was drunk at the time of 
 the killing." And it is the duty of the court to instruct the jury 
 as to the law of involuntary manslaughter under an indictment for 
 murder or manslaughter, where there was evidence from which the 
 jury might find the existence of facts constituting involuntary man- 
 slaughter.® And where sudden passion or impulse is made an ele- 
 ment of manslaughter by statute, an instruction in a prosecution for 
 homicide defining manslaughter, which entirely omits that element, 
 is properly refused.'' So, where there were no eye witnesses to 
 the killing, except the slayer, instructions a.s to voluntary man- 
 slaughter are warranted.® But where in a prosecution for murder 
 there is evidence to support the charge, and no evidence tending to 
 show manslaughter in any degree, the defense being directed to justifi- 
 cation, it is not necessary for the court to instruct upon the law of 
 manslaughter.® And in such case a direction to find one of 
 several verdicts, of which manslaughter is one, is reversible error. ^^ 
 And the submission of the issue of guilt of manslaughter is error. ^ ^ 
 And where under the evidence in a prosecution for homicide the 
 accused is either guilty of murder, or not guilty by reason of 
 insanity, the court is under no duty to charge the law of man- 
 
 BEishop V. Com. 109 Ky. 558, 60 S. 
 \V. 190. 
 
 cBush V. Com. 78 Ky. 268. 
 
 Where two persons were charged with 
 homicide, and one admitted the com- 
 mission of the deed, and contended only 
 that his offT.se should be graded, and 
 the other stood squarely on a plea of 
 not guilty, and both joined in presenting 
 requests to charge as to involuntary 
 manslaughter, a refusal to give such a 
 charge entitles not only the one admit- 
 ting the commission of the homicide to 
 a new trial, but also the one denying 
 participation therein, where the only 
 theory upon which he tould lawfully 
 have been convicted was that there was 
 a conspiracy between the other and him- 
 self to murder the deceased, since such 
 a theory would necessarily be inconsist- 
 ent with the slayer's guilt of involun- 
 tary manslaughter only. Taylor v. 
 State, 108 Ga. 384, 34 S. E. 2. 
 
 vHinton v. State. 24 Tex. 454. 
 
 sGreen v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 1221, 
 83 S. W. 638; Arnwine v. State (Tex. 
 Crim. App.) 90 S. W. 39. 
 
 sNew V. Territory, 12 Okla. 172, 70 
 Pac. 198; Thomas v. State, 126 Ala. 4, 
 28 So. 691; Miller V. State (Ala.) 40 So. 
 
 47; Plorton v. United States, 15 App. 
 D. 0. 310: Griffin v. State. 113 Ga. 279, 
 38 S. E. 844; Freeman v. State, 112 Ga. 
 48, 37 S. E. 172; Greer v. State (Ga.) 
 52 S. E. 8S4; Nelms v. State. 123 Ga. 
 575, 51 S. E. 588; Clements v. Stite, 123 
 Ga. 547, 51 S. E. 595; State v. Gartrell, 
 171 Mo. 489, 71 S. W. 1045; State v. 
 Craft. 164 Mo. 631, 65 S. W. 280; State 
 V. Goddard, 162 Mo. 198. 62 S. W. 697; 
 State V. Spivey. 132 N. C. 989, 43 S. E. 
 475 : Bishop v. Com. 22 Ky. L. Rep. 760, 
 58 S. W. 817 ; Brown v. Com. 22 Kv. L. 
 Rep. 1582, 61 S. W. 4; Jolly v. Com. 
 110 Ky. 190, 96 Am. St. Rep. 429, 61 S. 
 W. 49"; Hatcher v. State. 43 Tex. Crim. 
 Rep. 237, 65 S. W. 97 : Cannon v. State, 
 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 467, 56 S. W. 351 ; 
 White v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 567, 
 62 S. W. 575; Ilaj-s v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 App.) 57 S. W. 835. And see Carson 
 V. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 265, 64 S. 
 W. 1046; Anderson v. State, 43 Tex. 
 Crim. Rep. 275, 65 S. W. 523. 
 
 10 Johnson v. State, 78 Miss. 627, 29 
 So. 515. 
 
 iiRegnier v. Territory (Okla.) 82 
 Pac. 509: James v. State, 123 Ga. 548, 
 51 S. E. 577. 
 
264 HOtMICIDB. t§ 165 
 
 slaughter. ^ ^ But where a homicide is either murder or justifiable 
 in self-defense it is not error for the court to charge on man- 
 slaughter.^^ At least, when a manslaughter case might be made 
 out of it by believing a part of the evidence and disbelieving the 
 rest. ^ * Nor is it error to fail to do so. ^ ® And though the case is- 
 apparently one of manslaughter, if there is any evidence tending- 
 to prove murder the court may also properly give instructions with 
 relation thereto.^® And an instruction that under the enumerated 
 facts the accused would be guilty of manslaughter, when the enu- 
 merated facts warrant a conviction for murder, furnishes the ac- 
 cused with no ground for objection. ^''^ Nor does an instruction 
 on involuntary manslaughter unsupported by the evidence in a 
 prosecution for murder;-'* and the same rule applies to unsup- 
 ported instructions as to self-defense in such a prosecution. ' ® And 
 a correct instruction as to voluntary manslaughter is not open to 
 objection on behalf of the accused on the ground that the court 
 should have also submitted the question of involuntary manslaugh- 
 ter.^" So, failure to instruct as to involuntary manslaughter in 
 a prosecution for homicide is not error when neither the evidence 
 nor the statement of the accused authorizes or requires such a 
 charge.^* 
 
 II. VOLUNTAEY MANSLAUGHTER; PEOVOCATIOIT AND HOT BLOOD. 
 
 a. What includtsd in voluntary manslaughter. 
 
 166. Definition; scope of subject — Voluntary manslaughter as it 
 existed at common law has been defined in a previous chapter.^ 
 The word "voluntary" in a statutory definition of manslaughter 
 
 isBraham v. State (Ala.) 38 So. 83 S. W. 638; Glenn v. State, 71 Ark. 
 
 919. 86, 71 S. W. 254. 
 
 isGafford v. State, 125 Ala. 1, 28 So. i9State v. Gray (Or.) 79 Pac. 53. 
 
 406; May v. State, 94 Ga. 76, 20 S. E. 2oGrimes v. State, 123 Ga. 754 51 
 
 251; Futoh v. State, 90 Ga. 472, 16 S. S. E. 721. 
 
 E. 102; Greer v. State (Tex. Grim. So, an instruction in a prosecution 
 
 App.) 65 S. W. 1075; McGrath v. State, fov homicide distinguishing between 
 
 35 Tex. Grim. Rep. 413, 34 S. W. 127, murder and manslaughter, stating that 
 
 941. Contra, James v. State, supra. the accused cannot be found guilty of 
 
 i4Grime3 v. State, 123 Ga. 754, 51 S. murder if the killing, though intention- 
 
 E. 721. al, WHS without malice, is not rendered 
 
 leSolomon v. State (Tex. Grim. App.) erroneous by failure to state that man- 
 
 65 S. W. 915; Greer v. State, supra; slaughter must be done unlawful^ and 
 
 Hannah v. State (Miss.) 39 So. 855. wilfully. Addington v. United States, 
 
 Instate V. Clifford (W. Va.) 52 S. 165 U. S. 184, 41 L. ed. 679, 17 Sup. 
 
 E. 981. Ot. Rep. 288. 
 
 iTChambers v. State (Tex. Grim. zi^Teims y. State, 123 Ga. 575, 51 S. 
 
 App.) 86S. W. 752. E. 588. 
 
 isGreen v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 1221, iSee supra, chapter I., § 5. 
 
S 166] MANSLAUGHTER. 265 
 
 means by. the free exercise of the will ; done by design ; purposely. ^ 
 Manslaughter is voluntary where the unlawful killing was done 
 by design or intentionally or purposely.^ This does not mean that 
 it must have been done with an actual intent to kill; manslaughter 
 may be voluntary though there was no intent to kill.* Though 
 no intention to cause death, or that the act done should cause death, 
 existed, if there was an intent to do the act which caused death, 
 and the act was one likely to endanger life, the killing is voluntary. ' 
 And the intentional application of unlawful force, whereupon death 
 ensues, though there may have been no specific intention to kill, 
 and though the weapon used was not ordinarily calculated to produce 
 death, is manslaughter in the first degree under the Alabama stat- 
 ute.® Voluntary manslaughter, therefore, consisting as it does of 
 a voluntary act directed against a person which causes his death, 
 necessarily includes any killing unnecessarily or in the exercise 
 of murderous force in self-defense, or in hot blood arising from ade- 
 quate provocation. Homicides which are manslaughter because com- 
 mitted in unnecessary or excessive self-defense are considered in 
 another part of this work.'^ Questions with relation to homicides 
 which are manslaughter because committed under provocation and 
 in hot blood are considered in the following sections of this chapter. 
 
 b. Provocation. 
 
 1. Generally. 
 
 167. Effect; scope — Where a homicide is suddenly committed in 
 the heat of blood or violent passion, on an adequate and sufficient 
 provocation to produce it in contemplation of law, the implica- 
 tion of malice is repelled and rebutted and a killing is manslaughter 
 only, and not murder.^ One who takes the life of another in 
 the heat of blood or passion upon a sudden quarrel and upon rea- 
 sonable provocation, without malice, express or implied, though 
 without lawful justification or excuse, is guilty of manslaughter if 
 
 zMnrphy v. State^ 31 Ind. 511. tary homicide, though he aimed at no 
 
 sAdams v. State, 65 Ind. 565; State one in particular, the grade of which 
 
 V. Windah], 95 Iowa, 470, 64 N. W. 420; is to be determined by the circumstances 
 
 Anderson v. State, 3 Heislc. 86. under which the shot was fired. Ringer 
 
 4Thayer v. State, 138 Ala. 39, 35 So. v. State (Arlc.) 85 S. W. 410. 
 
 406. sMcManus v. State, 36 Ala. 285; 
 
 BKoss V. Com. 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1344, Thayer v. State, supra. 
 
 55 S. W, 4; Sullivan v. State, 102 Ala. 'See infra, chapter XII., §§ 311 et 
 
 135, 48 Am. St. Rep. 22, 15 So. 264. seq. 
 
 And where a person fires a, shot know- i State v. Hurley, Houst. Crim. Rep. 
 
 ing that he must necessarily hit an (Del.) 28. 
 innocent person, he is guilty of volun- 
 
266 HOMICIDE. H 167 
 
 he is mentally accountable. ^ The indulgence which the law extends 
 to cases of this description is founded on the supposition that a 
 state of sudden and violent exasperation is generated in the affray, 
 so as to produce a temporary suspension of reason, and that the 
 transport of passion excludes the presumption of malice.^ It is 
 to be borne in mind in this connection, however, that, except urder 
 special statutes,* no provocation can justify or excuse a homicide; 
 its only effect is to mitigate murder to manslaughter.^ A killing 
 upon passion, especially where the passion was aroused without 
 adequate cause, is necessarily unlawful." In considering the sub- 
 ject of provocation and hot blood the questions for determination 
 are the existence and adequacy of the provocation leading to the 
 killing, and the existence and sufficiency of the passion or hot blood 
 induced thereby to exclude the idea of deliberation or malice, either 
 express or implied, and thus to reduce the degree of the crime. ^ 
 
 2. Existence of. 
 
 168. What constitutes generally. — The word "provocation" as used 
 in the law of homicide has no meaning different from that of common 
 acceptation, and it is defined by lexicographers to be a state of provo- 
 cation, vexation, or anger. ^ By provocation is meant, in law, that 
 treatment of one person by another which arouses anger or passion.^ 
 And whatever has conduced to arouse anger is proper to be proved 
 in a prosecution for homicide, as tending to show provocation.* 
 To constitute provocation, however, the facts of which it consists 
 must be known to the slayer; unknown facts, however aggravating, 
 neither excuse nor mitigate homicide.* And it is not every killing 
 in passion that the law mitigates to manslaughter ; there must have 
 
 2State V. Hoekett, 70 Iowa, 442, 30 v. State, 62 N. J. L. 666, 42 Atl. 81 J; 
 N. W. 742. ■ State v. Smith, 77 N. C. 488; Con,, y. 
 
 sPeople V. Garretson, 2 Wheeler, C. Drum, 58 Pa. 9; Com. v. Ellenger, 1 
 C. 347; Darden v. State, 73 Ark. 315, 84 Brewst. (Pa.) 352; Com. v. Bell, Addi- 
 S. W. 507. son (Pa.) 156, 1 Am. Deo. 298. 
 
 4See infra, § 189. Uluble v. People, 67 III. App. 439. 
 
 estate v. Crosier, 12 Nev. 300; State 2State v. Byrd, 52 S. C. 480 30 S E 
 V. Raymond, 11 Nev. 98; Collier v. State, 482. 
 
 69 Ala. 247 ; Handly v. Com. 15 Ky. L. sKuble v. People, supra. 
 Rep. 736, 24 S. W. 609; State v. Can- 4Levy v. State, 28 Tex. App. 203, 19 
 cienne, 50 La. Ann. 847, 24 So. 134; Com. Am. St. Eep. 826, 12 S. W. 596; Miller 
 V. Moore, 2 Pittsb. 502. v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 609, 37 
 
 sSmith V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) Am. St. Rep. 836, 21 S. W 925- Pitta 
 89 S. W. 817. v. State, 29 Tex. App. 374, 16 S. W. 139; 
 
 7 Jackson v. State, 82 Ga. 449, 9 S. E. Tyler v. State (Tex. Crim App ) 90 
 126; Ex parte Moore, 30 Ind. 197; Kriel S. W. 33. And see Pence v. Com. 21 
 V. Com. 5 Bush. 362; Com. v. Webster, Ky. L. Rep. 500, 51 S. W. 801. 
 5 Cush. 295, 52 Am. Dec. 711; State v. This rule applies to uncommunicated 
 O'Hara, 92 Mo. 59, 4 S. W. 422; Brown threats. Levy v. State, supra. 
 
S 168] MANSLAUGHTER. 267 
 
 been passion justly excited by legal provocation.® Homicide com- 
 mitted in a passion excited by an inadequate provocation is murder 
 in the second degree, and not manslaughter.® And the provocation 
 must be judged by the res gestae , and the evidence must be confined 
 to the facts and circumstances surrounding and preceding the kill- 
 ing. And that the deceased was a quarrelsome, fighting man of 
 great strength is inadmissible to prove provocation.'' But to render 
 the acts or conduct of one person toward another a provocation which 
 will reduce the killing by the latter of the former from murder to 
 manslaughter, it is not necessary that the slayer should have been 
 without fault,® or that he should have done nothing to bring on the 
 difficulty or conflict.® In the absence of anything in the evidence to 
 show provocation, no instructions based upon the theory that the 
 killing was done in hot blood need be given. ^ " But in such case an 
 instruction defining "deliberately" as being "a cool state of the 
 blood, not in a heat of passion caused by some just or lawful cause 
 of provocation to passion," is not erroneous. ^ ^ 
 
 169. Exercise of a legal right as provocation. — It should be re- 
 membered that the mere exercise of a legal right, no matter how 
 offensive, is no such provocation as lowers the grade of homicide.^ 
 And interposing to prevent a felonious or dangerous assault upon 
 another is not provocation which will prevent a killing on account 
 of such interposition from being murder.^ Nor is it a provocation 
 to separate one person from another whom he was beating,* though 
 the rule would be different if the peaceable intentions of the person 
 interfering were not known or annovmced.* So, refusal to furnish 
 financial relief or to otherwise relieve from difficulty, for the oc- 
 casion of which the person refusing is in no way responsible, is not 
 
 estate v. Smith, 10 Rich. L. 341; uState v. Taylor, 171 Mo. 465, 71 S. 
 
 Johnson v. State, 133 Ala. 38. 31 So. W. 1005. 
 
 951 ; State V. Collins, 32 Iowa, 36 ; State iSee State v. Craton, 28 N. C. (6 
 
 V. Kinder, 184 Mo. 276, 83 S. W. 964; Ired. L.) 164: State v. Spivey, 132 N. C. 
 
 State V. Spivey, 132 N. C. 989, 43 S. K. 989, 43 8. E. 475 ; Allison v. State 
 
 475. (Ark.) 86 S. W. 409; Lingo v. State, 
 
 sManning v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 29 Ga. 470; State v. Lawry, 4 Nev. 161; 
 
 85 S. W. 1149; State v. Gartrell, 171 Mo. Rex v. Longden, Russ. & R. C. C. 228. 
 
 489, 71 S. W. 1045. 2 Holmes v. State, 88 Ala. 26, 16 Am. 
 
 7Com. V. Billiard, 2 Gray, 294. St. Rep. 17, 7 So. 193; State v. Benton, 
 
 sCoflmanv. Com. 10 Bush, 496; Leake 19 N. C. (2 Dev. & B. L.) 196; 
 
 V. State, 10 Humph. 144; Bishop v. State Weathersby v. State, 29 Tex. App. 278, 
 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 35 S. W. 170. 15 S. W. 823. 
 
 sState V. Richardson, 47 S. C. 18, 24 aState v. Ferguson, 2 Hill, L. 619, 27 
 
 S. E. 1028. Am. Dec. 412. 
 
 loCox V. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 680, 69 *Rex v. Bourne, 5 Car. & P. 120. 
 8 W. 799. 
 
268 HOMICIDE. [§ ie» 
 
 a provocation to the person refused.® And proper chastisement 
 by a person having a right to inflict it, as in case of a master and 
 slave, affords no provocation to the person chastised,® though the 
 rule would be different in case of improper or excessive chastisement. "' 
 So, a legal and proper arrest of a guilty person constitutes no provo- 
 cation,* though it might if the force used by the ofEcer was unnec- 
 essary and excessive;® and serving papers upon, or bringing legal 
 proceedings against, a person is not a provocation within these rules. ^ ** 
 Nor is the proper removal of a trespasser, using no more force than 
 is necessary to accomplish the object, a provocation.-^^ But the 
 use of unnecessary force constitutes a provocation warranting an in- 
 struction as to manslaughter in a prosecution for a killing by the 
 trespasser. ^ ^ And a forcible attempt by an owner or occupant of 
 premises to eject another therefrom amounts to due provocation 
 when there had been no reqiiest and refusal to leave, ' * or when un- 
 necessary force was used. ^ * JSTor can acts of preparation to meet and 
 resist an aggressor be urged by the aggressor as provocation which 
 will mitigate his offense in killing the person thus prepared, from 
 murder to manslaughter.^® It is not necessary, however, that an 
 act should be an indictable offense in order to make it a provoca- 
 tion under the law of manslaughter. ^ ® 
 
 170. Killing to redress a public wrong. — Persons laboring under 
 a sense of wrongs, public or private, real or supposed, must apply 
 to the law for redress. If there is opportunity to apply for such 
 redress, he who supposes himself aggrieved is guilty of a criminal 
 offense if he undertakes to inflict violent punishment; and he is 
 guilty of murder if he deliberately and coolly kills the person by 
 whom he supposes himself aggrieved.^ Thus, on an indictment 
 against a convict for the homicide of his keeper, evidence offered for 
 the purpose of showing that the food supplied by the deceased to 
 the defendant was tainted and unwholesome is inadmissible.^ So, 
 
 estate v. Robertson, 178 Mo. 496, 77 iiSee infra, chapter XXIV., § 528 
 S. W. 528; State v. Utley, 132 N. C. 12 Adams v. State (Tex. Crlm App ) 
 
 1022, 43 S. E. 820. 40 S. W. 590; Rex v. Taylor, 5 Burr 
 
 6 Jacob V. State, 3 Humph. 493; Nel- 2793; 1 Hawk. P. C. chap. 31, § 39. 
 son V. State, 10 Humph. 518. isReg. v. Brennan, 27 Ont. Rep. 659 
 
 TState V. Will, IS N. C. (1 Dev. & B. i4Ibid. 
 L.) 121 ; Nelson v. State, supra. leBird v. State, 55 Ga. 317 
 
 sBrooks V. Com. 61 Pa. 352, 100 Am. loState v. Will, 18 N. C. (1 Dev & 
 
 Dec. 645: Ramsey v. State, 92 Ga. 53, B. L.) 121. 
 
 17 S. E. 6] 3; State v. Albright, 144 Mo. iSee State v. Wilson, 38 Conn 126 
 638, 46 S. W. fi20. 2ibid. See also Territory v. Drenniin 
 
 sRamsey v. State, supra. \ Mont. 41. * 
 
 lostate V. McCollum, 119 Mo. 469, 24 
 S. W. 1021. 
 
S 170] MANSL.AUGHTER. 269 
 
 a supposed public grievance will not excuse a riot undertaken for 
 its removal;* though, as has been seen, the excitement and tumult 
 produced by a movement of this class may be put in evidence for 
 the purpose of showing such a confusion of mind as prevented 
 the participants from entertaining a deliberate design to take life.* 
 Nor does the fact that a woman was a prostitute, and that she 
 Tented rooms adjoining those of the accused for purposes of assig- 
 nation, constitute a provocation affecting an assault upon her.® 
 
 171. Assault upon, or indignity offered, another The rule has 
 
 been asserted that to constitute a provocation the indignity must 
 have been offered by the person killed, and not by some other 
 person.* And the act of a person in intentionally killing another 
 without provocation is none the less murder because it was done 
 under a sudden impulse of anger, or in resentment because of a 
 third person's interference between them, or in revenge for being 
 attacked in the first instance by the third person.^ If two persons 
 fight and a friend of one of them comes in and takes part against 
 the other and kills him, however, it is only manslaughter in the 
 slayer, where he acted from passion aroused by the fight, and 
 not from malice, though there may have been malice between the 
 original parties.^ And the rule is the same where the killing was 
 done by the original combatant whom he sought to aid, though such 
 combatant would, himself, be guilty of murder;* though if he took 
 part coolly and knowingly, or with malice, it would be murder in 
 both. ® So, where one interferes in a difficulty between another and a 
 third person, in which the third person was the aggressor, and slays 
 such third person, he is guilty of manuslaughter where he acted from 
 passion, and not from malice, though he used more force than was 
 reasonably necessary to protect the person in whose behalf he in- 
 
 3 See infra, chapter XVI., § 364. behalf he acts. Bonner v. State, 29 
 
 4See infra, chapter XVI. ; chapter Tex. App. 223, 15 S. W. 821. 
 XXI., § 420; and chapter XXIX., § 615. -^Thompson v. State, 25 Ala. 41; Frank 
 
 5 Crosby v. People, 137 111. 325, 27 N. v. State, 27 Ala. 38; Moffatt v. State, 35 
 
 E. 49. Tex. Crim. Eep. 257, 33 S. W. 344; 
 
 iWeathersby v. State, 29 Tex. App. Salisbury's Case, 1 Plowd. 100. 
 278, 15 S. W."S23. estate v. Roberts; Thompson v. State; 
 
 2United States v. Schneider, 21 D. and Frank v. State, — supra; Com. v. 
 
 C. 381. Ware, 137 Pa. 465, 20 Atl. 806. 
 
 2 State V. Roberts, 8 N. C. (1 Hawks) One who volunteers in an affray be- 
 
 351, 9 Am. Dec. 643; Reg. v. Harrington, tween two others, when he had neither 
 
 10 Cox, C. C. 370. been threatened with, nor was in dan- 
 
 A person acting on behalf of another ger of, injury or molestation, and arms 
 
 to prevent such other from sustaining himself with a fatal weapon and kills 
 
 serious bodily injury is entitled to the one of the contestants, is guilty of mnr- 
 
 same justification or mitigation under der whether or not there was un old 
 
 the law as would be the person in whose grudge. Johnston's Case, 5 Gratt. 660. 
 
270 HOMICIDE. t? 171 
 
 terfered." And where two persons conspire to kill or inflict grave 
 bodily injury on a third person, and, in carrying out their purpose, 
 one of them fires a pistol at him, upon which he immediately pursues 
 tJiem and kills the one who did not fire at him, the killing is 
 manslaughter, not murder.'' The original combatants, however,, 
 must have been actually fighting together at the time of the inter- 
 ference of the third; if words only had passed between them, the- 
 killing of one by the person interposing would be murder, and not 
 manslaughter.* And the rule is the same when the interference 
 and killing occur after the original combatants have separated.® 
 A distinction may be taken between the interference of servants 
 and friends, and that of a mere stranger, and there may be cases, 
 in which a jury would properly infer hot blood in the interference 
 of a friend or servant, when there could be no such inference as 
 to the interference of a stranger. A stranger may interfere from 
 pity or a sense of fairness; a friend or servant, in addition to such 
 motives, from affection or duty. At the same time, it has been 
 properly observed that the nearer or more remote connection of 
 the parties with each other seems to be more a matter of observation 
 to the jury as to the probable force of the provocation, and the 
 motive which induced the interference, than as furnishing any pre- 
 cise rule of law grounded on such a distinction. ^ " That this defense 
 may be extended to all cases where one person is under a duty to 
 protect another is illustrated by an interesting case cited by Black- 
 burn, J., in his testimony, in 1874, before the Homicide Amendment 
 Committee: "Supposing a man is actually keeping company with 
 a young woman ; she cannot be called his sister or his ward, or even 
 under his protection ; and suppose a rufiian steps forward, and in 
 the presence of the other, pulls up her petticoats, and catches hold 
 of her, and the other struck him down, and the man died. A 
 similar case was tried before Mr. Justice Pattison, at York; some- 
 
 sMoffatt T. state, supra. er's assailant a blow which was not 
 
 'State V. Gaskins, 93 N. C. 547. mortal, is not guilty even of manslaugh- 
 
 si Russell, Crimes, 592. ter, though he might be guilty of an as- 
 
 9Com. V. Honeyman, Addison (Pa.) sault. 
 
 147. loSee infra, chapter XXIV., § 520; 1 
 
 In Rhodes V. State, 39 Tex. Grim. Rep. Russell, Crimes, 592; Irby v. State 32 
 
 332, 45 S. VV. 1009, however, it was held Ga. 496. 
 
 under the Texas statute that a person A person charged with murder, who 
 who was absent and out of sight of the admits the killing and claims he did it 
 combatants at the time the mortal blows on account of an insult to his wife by 
 were struck in a combat between his deceased, may properly be asked on 
 brother and another, in which both were cross-examination if the person insult- 
 mortally wounded, who afterwards ar- ed was his lawful wife. Watson v. Com. 
 rived at the scene and struck his broth- 87 Va. 608, 13 S. E. 22. 
 
§ 171] 
 
 MANSLAUGHTER. 
 
 271 
 
 how or other the jury and Mr. Justice Pattison contrived to ac- 
 quit him altogether. I think that was provocation that would 
 reduce it to manslaughter."^^ 
 
 3. Adequacy of. 
 
 172. General rules as to adequacy — .A provocation is deemed to 
 he adequate, so as to reduce the offense from murder to man- 
 slaughter, whenever it is calculated to excite the passions heyond 
 control.^ It must be of such a character as would, in the mind 
 of an average just and reasonable man, stir resentment likely to 
 cause violence endangering life,^ or as would naturally tend to 
 disturb and obscure the reason and lead to action from passion 
 rather than judgment,* or to create anger, rage, sudden resentment, 
 or terror rendering the mind incapable of reflection.* And that 
 the slayer was passionate, ignorant, or even weak-minded has no 
 effect upon the question of adequacy or amount of provocation re- 
 quired to reduce homicide to manslaughter, if it did not render 
 him incapable of knowing the nature and quality of his act.^ Nor 
 has the fact that he had no power to control his actions when aroused 
 or in a passion. ® And the same rule applies to a dazed condition of 
 
 11 See generally, infra, chapter XXIV., 
 § 522. 
 
 iLewis V. Com. 93 Ky. 242, 19 S. W. 
 664; Cook V. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1731, 
 72 S. W. 283; Crockett v. Com. 100 Ky. 
 382, 38 S. W. 674 ; Hicklin v. Territory 
 (Ariz.) 80 Pac. 340; People v. Free- 
 land, 6 Cal. 96; Crosby v. People, 137 
 111. 325, 27 N. E. 49; "Brooks v. Com. 
 61 Pa. 352, 100 Am. Dec. 645. And see 
 Norris v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 559, 
 61 S. W. 493. 
 
 In Colorado it is declared by statute 
 that in cases of voluntary manslaughter 
 there must be a serious and highly pro- 
 voking injury inflicted upon the slayer, 
 BufBcient to excite an irresistible pas- 
 sion in a, reasonable perso-i, or an at- 
 tempt by the person killed to commit 
 a serious personal injury upon him. 
 Smith V. People, 1 Colo. 121. 
 
 2Holme3 V. State. 88 Ala. 26, 16 Am. 
 St. Rep. 16, 7 So. 193; Judge v. State, 
 58 Ala. 406, 29 Am. Rep. 757 ; People v. 
 Bruggy, 93 Cal. 480, 29 Pac. 26; Finney 
 v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 785, 82 S. W. 
 636; People v. Holmes, 111 Mich. 364, 
 69 N. W. 501 ; State v. Grugin, 147 Mo. 
 39, 42 L.R.A. 774, 71 Am. St. Rep. 553, 
 47 S. W. 1058; Reg. v. Welsh, 11 Cox, 
 O. C. 336. 
 
 The use of the words "ordinary man" 
 instead of "reasonable man" in instruct- 
 ing in this connection is not prejudicial 
 to the accused. State v. Walker, 50 La. 
 Ann. 420, 23 So. 967. 
 
 3 State V. Hoyt, 13 Minn. 132, Gil. 
 125; State V. Brown (Del.) 61 Atl. 1077; 
 Cochran v. State, 28 Tex. App. 422, 13 
 S. W. 651. 
 
 4Norris v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 559, 61 S. W. 493; Miller v. State, 27 
 Tex. App. 63, 10 S. W. 445; Norman 
 V. State, 26 Tex. App. 221, 9 S. W. 606; 
 Howard v. State, 23 Tex. App. 265, 5 
 S. W. 231; Bonner v. State, 29 Tex. 
 App. 223, 15 S. W. 821 ; Connell v. St^te, 
 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 259, 81 S. W. 746. 
 
 sFitzpatrick v. Com. 81 Ky. 357 ; Peo- 
 ple V. Hurtado, 63 Cal. 288; Small v. 
 Com. 91 Pa. 304; Hurst v. State, 40 Tex. 
 Crim. Rep. 378, 46 S. W. 635, 50 S. W. 
 719. And see Dean v. State, 105 Ala. 
 22, 17 So. 28. 
 
 Refusal to charge the jury in a prose- 
 cution for homicide on the question of 
 insanity in connection with adequate 
 cause is not error. Crews v. State, 34 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 533, 31 S. W. 373. 
 
 6Fitzpatrick v. Com. and Hurst v. 
 State, supra. 
 
272 HOMICIDK. [& 172 
 
 the mind not unla-vvfuUy caused, and not amounting to insanity,' 
 though it has been held that different habits of feeling and modes 
 of thought may render inadequate a provocation offered to one, 
 when it would be adequate if offered to another.* But while an 
 ordinary assault and battery committed by a white man upon 
 a slave would not be a sufficient provocation to mitigate a homicide 
 of the former by the latter from murder to manslaughter, a battery 
 which endangers the slave's life is sufficient.® 
 
 In consideration of the question of the adequacy of provoca- 
 tion the words "legal," "lawful," "adequate," and "reasonable," 
 used as adjectives qualifying provocation, are synonymous,^" and the 
 term "reasonable provocation" is properly used. ^ ^ ISTor are the words 
 "considerable provocation" objectionable when the expression is de- 
 fined by enumerating such acts as would constitute sufficient provo- 
 cation. ^ ^ And when a number of conditions or circumstances tend- 
 ing, either singly or collectively, to constitute adequate cause exist, 
 all should be taken into consideration in determining its existence. ^ * 
 And in determining what is adequate provocation the jury should 
 view, not only the facts and circumstances immediately attending 
 the killing, but also such facts preceding the difficulty as tended 
 
 7PeopIe V. Worthington, 122 Cal. 583, 96 Mo. 637, 10 S. W. 172, Disapproving 
 65 Pac. 396. And see Flanagan v. State, State v. Ellis^ 74 Mo. 207, in which a 
 46 All. 703. distinction is drawn between "just 
 
 But such a condition might reduce provocation," and "lawful and reason- 
 the grade of the crime to murder in able provocation." And see Strutton v. 
 the second degree. People v. Worth- Com. 23 Ky. L. Kep. 307, 62 S. W. 875. 
 ington, supra. ii State v. Ellis, supra; Cook v. Com. 
 
 sNelson v. State, 10 Humph. 518; 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1731, 72 S. W. 283. 
 State V. Jarrott, 23 N. C. (1 Ired. L.) izDoyle v. Com. 18 Ky. L. Rep. 518, 
 76. And see People v. Holmes, 111 37 S. W. 153; Lewis v. Com. 93 Ky. 238, 
 Mich. 364, 69 N. W. 501. 19 S. W. 664._ 
 
 Matters which would be deemed in Perhaps ordinarily, however, it is best 
 lav.' a, sufficient provocation to free a not to use it. Lewis v. Com. supra. 
 white man, who had committed a horai- isCochran v. State, 28 Tex. App. 422, 
 cide in a moment of passion, from the 13 S. W. 651; Baltrip v. State, 30 Tex. 
 guilt of murder, will not have the same App. 545, 17 S. W. 1106; Miles v. State, 
 effect when the person slain is a white 18 Tex. App. 170; Orman v. State, 24 
 man and the offender a slave. There Tex. App. 495, 6 S. W. 544; Hopkins v. 
 may be words of reproach so aggravat- State (Tex. Crim. App.) 50 S. W. 381; 
 ing when uttered by a slave, as to excite Bonner v. State, 29 Tex. App. 223. 15 
 in a white man the temporary fury S. W. 821 ; Bracken v. State, 29 Tex. 
 which negatives the charge of malice; App. 362, 16 S. W. 192; White v. State, 
 and this rule holds good without regard 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 153, 29 S. W. 1094; 
 to the personal merit or demerit of the Borden v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 648, 
 white n.an. State v. Jarrott, supra. 62 S. W. 1064. 
 
 On this subject, see also State v. Tack- An act, standing alone, may not be 
 ett, 8 N. C. (1 Hawks) 210. sufficient provocation to reduce a homi- 
 
 8 State V. Jarrott, supra; State v. cide from murder to manslaughter, but 
 Will, 18 N. C. (1 Dev. & B. L.) 121. may be ample when one in a series of 
 
 loState V. Bulling, 105 Mo. 204, 15 S. similar acts, or when it has been pre- 
 W. 367, 16 S. W. 830; State v. Stephens, ceded by an insolent and aggravating 
 
3 1721 MANSLAUGHTER. 273 
 
 to show cause of provocation;^* though, where the statute provides 
 that a homicide, to be manslaughter, must have been committed un- 
 •der the immediate influence of sudden passion, the provocation must 
 arise at the time of the commission of the offense. ' ® But antecedent 
 •circumstances which would shed light upon the provocation then 
 given may be taken into consideration in determining as to its 
 ■existence.^® And a charge confining the jury to facts occurring 
 at the time and place of the homicide is not objectionable as too 
 restrictive, where nothing appears to indicate the existence of any 
 other cause of provocation,^'' or of anything which might charac- 
 terize or change the character, as a provocation, of any fact so oc- 
 curring,^® or where the inquiry is not limited to the very moment 
 of the killing but includes all that occurs during the transaction 
 which led up to it. ^ ^ 
 
 Provocation which would not naturally cause instant resentment, 
 however, but which would have to be thought and brooded over 
 after it is given, in order to produce rage or anger, is not, in con- 
 templation of law, a provocation sufficient to reduce an inteutional 
 Isilling from murder to manslaughter.^" And as a general rule a 
 
 ■course of conduct, whether or not simi- v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 366, 60 S. 
 lar to the act committed at the time of W. 47. 
 
 the homicide; and where such a state of And an instruction in a prosecution 
 affairs appears, the court should in- for homicide that the provocation must 
 struct the jury that they could and have arisen at the time of the killing, 
 should consider the antecedent facts and and not be the result of a former provo- 
 <:ircumstances in evidence in determin- cation, does not limit the inquiry to the 
 ing whether or not adequate cause exist- very moment of the killing, but includes 
 «d. Bracken v. State, supra. all that occurred during the transaction 
 
 14 Johnson v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. which led to the killing, and is not. 
 Rep. 291, 81 S. W. 945; Freeman v. therefore, objectionable as restrictive. 
 State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 318, 81 S. W. Courtney v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 57 
 «53 ; Messer v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. S. W. 654. 
 
 97, 63 S. W. 643. And see State v. 17 White v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 Lewis, 14 Mo. App. 191. 153, 29 S. W. 1094; Kidwell v. State, 
 
 The violent, turbulent character of the 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 264, 33 S. W. 342. 
 ■deceased may sometimes be looked to in isWoodrmg v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. 
 a prosecution for homicide in determin- Rep. 419, 30 S. W. 1060. 
 ing the amount of provocation, with a "Courtney y. State, supra. 
 vilw to fixing the degree of the homi- , ^^^ ^'^/^f.^^™^.*'"" '° ^ prosecution 
 .J T, ,1. c. i en li^ T r for homicide limiting the adequate cause 
 
 "^ t'.-w ft k'' ''■ «f ? 00 t''- a to a provocation arising at the time of 
 «,= ^^% w LI- I* !' ^ If-. PJo the killing is cured and rendered harm- 
 278, 15 S. W. 823; Borden v. State, 42 j j, ^ general charge that the jury 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 648, 62 S. W. 1064; ^ight look to all the evidence in the 
 Spangler v. State, 42 Tex, Crim. Rep. gase and find adequate cause; especially 
 233, 61 S. W. 314; Honeycutt v. State, ^-here, if manslaughter was in the case 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 63 S. W. 639; Her- at all, it was based on the provocation 
 rington v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 63 arising at the time. Swann v. State, 39 
 S. W. 562; Scott V. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Tex. Crim. Rep. 310, 46 S. W. 36. 
 Rep. 591, 68 S. W. 177. 20State v. Walker, 50 La. Ann. 420, 23 
 
 iBHoneycutt v. State; Herrington v. So. 967. And see State v. Wilson, 38 
 State; and Scott v. State, supra; Adams Conn. 127. 
 Horn.— 18. 
 
274 HOMICIDE. R 172- 
 
 provocation from which the law will infer that the person provoked 
 acted upon sudden impulse, so as to reduce a killing from murder 
 to manslaughter, must have occurred in the presence of the injured 
 party. ^' And it is erroneous aud misleading so to instruct the 
 jury on the question of adequacy of provocation as to restrict them 
 to a set of facts constituting an excuse for killing by way of self- 
 defense.^^ Statutory provisions naming certain acts constituting- 
 adequate provocation to reduce homicide from murder to man- 
 slaughter are to be regarded as merely giving instances or examples 
 of things by which the mind can be rendered incapable of cool re- 
 flection, and such enumeration is not conclusive, and does not pre- 
 vent other causes of provocation from being adequate. ^ * 
 
 173. Words and gestures generally — The nearly universal rule 
 is that, when the evidence shows an intent on the part of the de- 
 fendant to kill, no words of reproach, no matter how grievous 
 soever, are provocation sufficient to free the party killing from the- 
 guilt of murder;^ nor are indecent, provoking actions or gestures,. 
 
 2iState V. Holme, 54 Mo. 153. v. Walker, 9 Houst. (Del.) 464, 33 Atl. 
 
 2 2Doinellan v. Com. 7 Bush, 670; 227; State v. Warren, 1 Marv. (Del.) 
 State V. Crea, 10 Idaho, 88, 76 Pae. 1013; 487, 41 Atl. 190; State v. Falno, 1 Marv. 
 Howard v. State, 23 Tex. App. 265, 5 (Del.) 492, 41 Atl. 134; State v. Trustv, 
 S. W. 231. 1 Penn. (Del.) 319, 40 Atl. 766; State- 
 
 Provocation is rot an element in self- v. Draper, Houst. Crim. Eep. (Del.) 
 defense. State v. Byrd, 52 S. C. 484, 30 531; State v. Emory (Del.) 58 Atl. 
 S. E. 482 1036; State v. Bell (Del.) 62 Atl. 147-, 
 
 23West v. State, 2 Tex. App. 460. Olds v. State, 44 Fla. 452, 33 So. 296; 
 U Hale, P. C. 456; Fost. C. L. 290; Kay v. State, 15 Ga. 223; Buchanan v. 
 Taylor v. State, 48 Ala. 180; Judge v. State, 24 Ga. 282; Malone v. State, 4» 
 State, 68 Ala. 406, 29 Am. Rep. 757; Ga. 210; Edwards v. State, 53 Ga. 428; 
 Reese v. State, 90 Ala. 624, 8 So. 818; Bird v. State, 55 Ga. 317; Ross v. State, 
 Watson v. State, 82 Ala. 10, 2 So. 455; 59 Ga. 248; Arwood v. State, 59 Ga. 
 McKee v. State, 82 Ala. 39, 2 So. 451; 391; Wortham v. State, 70 Ga. 336; 
 Johnson v. State, 102 Ala. 1., 16 So. 99; Hanvey v. State, 68 Ga. 612; Smith v. 
 Ellis v. State, 120 Ala. 333., 25 So. 1; State, 73 Ga. 31; Fry v. State, 81 Ga. 
 Bondurant v. State, 125 Ala. 31, 27 So. 645, 8 S. E. 308; Boatwright v. State, 
 775; Teague v. State, 120 Ala. 309, 25 89 Ga. 140, 15 S. E. 21; Lewis v State, 
 So. 209; Smith v. State, 103 Ala. 4, 15 90 Ga. 95, 15 S. E. 697; Chestnut v. 
 So. 843; Wilson v. State, 140 Ala. 43, State, 112 Ga. 306, 37 S. E. 384; Robin- 
 37 So. 93; Nutt v. State, 63 Ala. 180; son v. State, 118 Ga. 198, 44 S. E. 985; 
 Jarvis v. State, 138 Ala. 17, 34 So. Steffy v. People, 130 111. 98, 22 N E. 
 1025; Thomas v. State, 126 Ala. 4, 28 8G1 ; Crosby v. People, 137 111. 325 27 
 So. 591; Felix v. State, 18 Ala. 720; N. E. 49; Friederieh v. People, 147' 111. 
 Ex parte Sloane, 95 Ala. 22, 11 So. 14; 310, 35 N. E. 472; Murphv v. State, 31 
 Compton V. State, 110 Ala. 24, 20 So. Ind. 511; Boyle v. State, 105 Ind. 469 55- 
 119; Gilmore v. State, 141 Ala. 51, 37 Am. Rep. 218, 5 N. E. 203; State v. 
 So. 359; Allison v. State (Ark.) 86 S. Hockett, 70 Iowa, 442, 30 N. W. 742; 
 W. 409; Petty v. State (Ark.) 89 S. W. Rapp v. Com. 14 B. Mon. 614; Cotrell 
 465; People v. Freeland, 6 Cal. 96; Peo- v. Com. 13 Ky. L. Rep. 305, 17 S. W. 
 pie V. Butler, 8 Cai. 435; People v. Tur- 149; Sawyers v. Com. 18 Ky L Rep' 
 ley, 50 Cal. 409; People v. Tamkin, 62 657, 38 S. W. 136; Cook v. Com. 10 Ky. 
 Cal. 469; People v. Murback, 64 Cal. L. Rep. 222, 8 S. W. 872; Donnellan v. 
 369, 30 Pac. 608; St-.te v. Harrigan, 9 Com. 7 Bush, 676; State v. Conerly 48 
 Houst. (Del.) 369, 31 Atl. 1052; State La. Ann. 1564, 21 So. 192- SUte v 
 
§ 173] MANSLAUGHTER. 275 
 
 expressive of contempt or reproach, without an assault upon the per- 
 son,^ especially when a deadly weapon is used in the killing;* and 
 this is so when retaliation for the provocation is by an act appar- 
 ently dangerous to life, though only slight punishment is intended.* 
 Nor are threats and menaces an adequate provocation,^ especially 
 
 Daniels, 49 La. Ann. 954, 22 So. 415; 778. And see Warner v. Com. 27 Ky. L. 
 Com. V. York, 9 Met. 93, 43 Am. Dec. Rep. 219. 84 S. W. 742; Com. v. Houri- 
 373; Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 52 gan. 89 Ky. 305. 12 S. W. 550. 
 Am. Dec. 711; State v. Shipley, 10 aPeople v. Olsen, 4 Utah, 413, 11 Pac. 
 Minn. 223, 88 Am. Dec. 70. Gil. 178; 577; State v. Walker, 9 Houst. (Del.) 
 Preston v. State. 25 Miss. 383; State v. 464, 33 Atl. 227; State v. Warren, 1 
 Howard, 102 Mo. 142, 14 S. W. 937; Marv. (Del.) 487, 41 Atl. 190; State v. 
 State V. Brown, 64 Mo. 367; State v. Faino, 1 Marv. (Del.) 492, 41 Atl. 134; 
 Starr, 38 Mo. 270; State v. Ellis, 74 State v. Trusty, 1 Penn. (Del.) 319, 40 
 Mo. 207, Affirming 11 Mo. App. 587; Atl. 766; State v. Draper, Hoast. Crim. 
 State V. Elliott, 98 Mo. 150. 11 S. W. Rep. (Del.) 531; State v. Emory (Del.) 
 566; State v. Berkley, 109 Mo. 665, 19 58 Atl. 1036; Maloie v. State, 49 Ga. 
 S. W. 192; State V. Sani^one, 116 Mo. 1, 210; Edwards v. State, 53 Ga. 428; 
 22 S. W. 617; State v. Martin, 124 Mo. Chestnut v. State. 112 Ga. 366. 37 S. E. 
 514, 28 S. W. 12; State v. AtcMey, 18G 384; Phelps v. State, 75 Ga. 571; Boat- 
 Mo. 174. 84 S. W. 984; Stnte v. Gor- wright v. State, 89 Ga. 140, 15 S. E. 21; 
 don, 191 Mo. 114, 89 S. W. 1025; State Crosby v. People, 137 111. 325, 27 N. E. 
 V. Anderson, 4 Nev. 265; State v. Cro- 49; Rapp v. Com. 14 B. Mob. 614; State 
 zier, 12 Nev. 300; Clifford v. State, 60 v. St<irr, 38 Mo. 270; State v. Elliott, 90 
 N. J. L. 287, 37 Atl. 1101; People v. Mo. 350. 2 S. W. 411; Com. v. Bell. Ad- 
 Kelly, 113 N. Y. 647, 7 N. Y. Crim. Rep. dison (Pa.) 156. 1 Am. Dee. 298; State 
 40, 21 N. E. 122; People v. Carlton, 115 v. Barfield, 30 IST. C. (8 Ired. L.) 344; 
 N. Y. 618. 22 N. E. 257; State v. Tack- State v. McNeill, 92 N. C. 812; Boyett 
 ett, 8 N. C. (1 Hawks) 210; State v. v. State, 2 Tex. App. 93; Lanure's (jase, 
 Merrill, 13 N. C. (2 Dev. L.) 269; 1 Hale. P. C. 456. 
 
 State V. Jarrott, 23 N. C. (1 Ired. L.) sState v. Davis, 50 S. C. 405. 62 Am. 
 
 76; State v. Carter, 76 N. C. 20; State St. Rep. 837, 27 S. E. 905; State v. 
 
 V. Barfield, 30 N. C. (8 Ired. L.) 344; Levelle, 34 S. C. 120, 27 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 State v. Savage, 78 N. C. 520; State v. 799, 13 S. E. 319; State v. Mcintosh. 39 
 
 McNeill, 92 N. C. 812; Com. v. Cro- S. C. 97, 17 S. E. 446; State v. War- 
 
 zier, 1 Brewst. (Pa.) 349; Com. v. ren and Malone v. State, supra; Smith 
 
 Drum, 58 Pa. 9 ; Cora. v. Bell, Addison v. State, 73 Ga. 31 : Beauehamo v. 
 
 (Pa.) 156, 1 Am. Dec. 298; State v. State, 6 Blackf. 299; Clifford v. State, 
 
 Jacobs, 28 S. C. 29, 4 S. E. 799; State 60 N. J. L. 287, 37 Atl. 1101; State v. 
 
 V. Workman, 39 S. C. 151, 17 S. E. 694; Elliott, 90 Mo. 350, 2 S. W. 411: Peo- 
 
 Williams v. State, 3 Heisk. 376; John- pie v. Kelly, 113 N. Y. 647, 7 N. Y. 
 
 son v. State, 11 Lea. 47; Johnson v. Crim. Rep. 40, 21 N. E. 122: People v. 
 
 State, 27 Tex. 758; Boyett v. State, 2 Olsen, 4 Utah, 413, 11 Pae. 577; United 
 
 Tex. App. 93; Clore v. State, 26 Tex. States v. Carr, 1 Woods, 480, Fed. Cas. 
 
 App. 624, 10 S. W. 242; Hatchell v. No. 14,7.32. 
 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 84 S. W. 234; The use of a dangerous weapon under 
 
 State V. Martin, 30 Wis. 216, 11 Am. the provocation of words only, or un- 
 
 Rep. 567; United States v. Wiltberger, der no provocation, is always evidence 
 
 3 Wash. C. C. 515, Fed. Cas. No. 16,738; of malice aforethought. Beauchamp v. 
 
 United States v. Travers, 2 Wheeler, C. State, supra. 
 
 C. 504, Fed. Cas. No. 16,537; Allen v. 4Boatwright v. State, 89 Ga. 140, 15 
 
 United States, 164 U. S. 492, 41 L. ed. S. E. 21. 
 
 528, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 154; United sEdwards v. State, 53 Ga. 428; Ross 
 
 States V. Carr, 1 Woods, 480, Fed. Cas. v. State, 59 Ga. 248; Hawkins v. State, 
 
 No. 14,732; R. V. Campbell, 4 Boston 25 Ga. 207, 71 Am. Dec. 166; Phelps v. 
 
 L. Rep. 131 ; Beg. v. Noon, 6 Cox, C. C. State. 75 Ga. 571 ; Chestnut v. State, 
 
 137; Reg. v. Welsh, 11 Cox, C. C. 336; 112 Ga. 366, 37 S. E. 384; State v. 
 
 Reg. V. Rothwell, 12 Cox, C. C. 145; Scott, 26 N. C. (4 Ired. L.) 409, 42 Am. 
 
 Watta V. Brains, 1 Cro. Eliz. pt. 2 p. Dec. 148; State v. Leonard, 6 La. Ann. 
 
276 HOMICIDE. [5 173 
 
 where the person killed was unarmed, and neither committing nor 
 attempting any violence upon the accused at the time of the killing. " 
 And the word "menace" is synonymous with the word "threat" as 
 used with reference to provocation in the law of homicide, and 
 is not distinguished from threat by word of mouth, upon being ap- 
 plied to a threat by act or demonstration.'' Nor is a libel or slander 
 or false accusation against a person or members of his family an 
 adequate provocation.* And the same rule obtains as to informa- 
 tion concerning the victim communicated by third persons." And 
 a statute making the use of opprobrious words or abusive language 
 an extenuation or justification for an assault brought on thereby 
 applies to assault and battery only, and not to homicide. ^ " In such 
 case provocation by words can only reduce the grade of the offense 
 of killing to murder in the second degree, ^ ^ and does not call 
 for an instruction on manslaughter. ^ ^ As a general rule it requires 
 an assault or personal violence to constitute adequate provocation.** 
 And these rules are not affected by the fact that the words or con- 
 
 420; State v. Browiij 64 Mo. 367; State kill, but to prevent attentions on the 
 
 V. Ellis, 11 Mo. App. 587 Appx., Affirmed part of the deceased to the wife of the 
 
 in 74 Mo. 207; State v. Howard, 102 accused, that deceased was a, bad man 
 
 Mo. 142, 14 S. W. 937; Territory v. An- after women, and had been seen taking 
 
 derson, 4 N. M. 213, 13 Pac. 21 ; Davis liberties with the wife of the accused, 
 
 V. State, 37 Tex. Crim. Rep. 371, 35 S. and that he had stated that he had 
 
 W. 388; Ewing v. State (Tex. Crim. criminal relations with her, is not ad- 
 
 App. ) 42 S. W. 381. missible, since such facts, if true, would 
 
 And evidence in a prosecution for not warrant accused in dealing deceased 
 
 homicide that the deceased had made a heavy blow which would be evidently 
 
 some remarks about the accused to the dangerous to human life. Pence v. Com. 
 
 effect that he h'-.d been abusing his 21 Ky. L. Rep. 500, 51 S. W. 801. 
 
 sister, and also some threats against 9Ellis v. State, supra. 
 
 him, is sufficient to warrant an instruc- loPrior v. State, 77 Ala. 5i8. 
 
 tion that no language used by the de- uState v. Gartrell, 171 Mo. 489, 71 
 
 ceased would justify the accused in tak- S. W. 1045. 
 
 ing his life. State v. McCollura, 119 i2lbid.; State v. Spivey, 132 N. C. 989, 
 
 Mo. 469, 24 S. W. 1021. 43 S. E. 475. 
 
 6Hawkins V. State, 25 Ga. 207, 71 Am. i3State v. Bulling, 105 Mo. 204, 15 
 
 Dec. 166. S. W. 367, 16 S. W. 830; State v. Ellis, 
 
 'Lynch v. People, 33 Colo. 128, 79 11 Mo. App. 586 Appx.; Reese v. State, 
 
 Pac. 1015. 90 Ala. 624, 8 So. 818; Vance v. State, 
 
 sState V. Elliott, 11 Ohio Dec. Re- 70 Ark. 272, 68 S. W. 37; Wortham v. 
 
 print, 332; Ellis v. State, 120 Ala. 333, State, 70 Ga. 336; Reg. v. Welsh, 11 
 
 25 So. 1 ; State v. Hamilton, Houst. Cox, C. C. 336. 
 
 Crim. Rep. (Del.) 101; Ferryman v. And refusal of the court in a prosecu- 
 
 State, 114 Ga. 545, 40 S. E. 746; Reid tior for homicide to submit to the jury 
 
 v. State, 50 Ga. 556; Cora. v. Drum, 58 the question of provocation by actual 
 
 i'a. 9. But see Massie v. Com. 16 Ky. violence in connection with provocation 
 
 L. Rep. 790, 29 S. W. 871. by opprobrious epithets is not error 
 
 And evidence in a prosecution for where there is no evidence of provoca- 
 homicide against a husband, claimed to tion caused by violence. State T. Mar- 
 have been committed without intent to tin, 124 Mo. 514i 28 S. VV. 12. 
 
i 173] MANSLAUGHTER. 277 
 
 duct in question were designed, or such as to evidence the belief that 
 they were designed, to provoke a difficulty. ^ * 
 
 Foul and opprobrious words in connection with vexatious acts and 
 conduct, however, have been held to be sufficient provocation to re- 
 duce a resultant killing from murder to manslaughter, if they are of 
 such a character as to excite the passions of the mass of men, so as to 
 enthrall their reason ;^^ the question whether or not they are suffi- 
 cient being one of fact for the jury under all the circumstances of 
 the case. ^® This is the rule with reference to abusive language ac- 
 companied by an advance with a drawn knife. ^ '^ And the same rule 
 applies to abusive language in connection with previous wrongs. ■^^ 
 And an assault, too slight in itself to be a sufficient provocation, may 
 become such by being coupled with insulting words. -^^ And where 
 several persons act together in ill-will toward another, insulting lan- 
 guage or conduct addressed to him by one of them is properly re- 
 garded as the act of both. ^ " So, insulting words upon which an as- 
 sault was made may be given in evidence in a prosecution therefor, 
 as tending to explain the acts of the assailant. ^ ^ And in such case 
 it is material to inquire who was the aggressor in the altercation in 
 which were spoken the abusive words which constituted the provoca- 
 tion.^^ And it is thought that a striking with an instrument not 
 
 i4Williams v. State^ 3 Heisk. 376. panied by the drawing of a knife, where 
 
 isState V. Grugin, 147 Mo. 39, 42 L. no attempt was made to use it. Ed- 
 
 K.A. 774, 71 Am. St. Rep. 553, 47 S. W. wards v. State, 53 Ga. 428. 
 
 1058; State v. Garrison, 147 Mo. 548, isBonnard v. State, 25 Tex. App. 173, 
 
 49 S. W. 508; Seals v. State, 3 Baxt. 8 Ara. St. Rep. 431, 7 S. W. 862; Fuller 
 
 466. And see Reg. v. Rothwell, 12 Cox, v. State, 115 Ala. 61, 22 So. 491. 
 
 C. C. 145; Schauer v. State (Tex. Grim. isReg. v. Smith, 4 Fost. & F. 1066; 
 
 App.) 60 S. W. 249. Reg. v. Sherwood, 1 Car. & K. 556; 
 
 In Massie v. Com. 16 Ky. L. Rep. 790, State v. Elliott, 98 Mo. 150, 11 S. W. 
 
 29 S. W. 871, it was held that the oir- 566; State v. Hudspeth, supra; State v. 
 
 culation of a scandalous report, repeated Howard, 102 Mo. 142, 14 S. W. 937. 
 
 to the person slandered, by which he was zoWillis v. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 
 
 charged with criminal relations with his 90 S. W. 1100. 
 
 cousins, who lived with him as members 2iState v. Elliott, supra; Turner v. 
 
 of his family, and of keeping a house of State (Tex. Crim. App.) 46 S. W. 830. 
 
 ill fame aided by his wife, constitutes And see State v. Grugin, 147 Mo. 39, 
 
 sufficient provocation to reduce the kill- 42 L.R.A. 774, 71 Am. St. Rep. 553, 47 
 
 ing of the slanderer by tne person slan- S. W. 1058. 
 
 dered from murder to manslaughter. Whether abusive language used in the 
 
 Instate V. Grugin, supra; State v. presencn of a person's family, and at his 
 
 Hudspeth, 150 Mo. 12, 51 S. W. 483 ; table, in connection with other vexatious 
 
 Prior v. State, 77 Ala. 56; State v. conduct, was sufficient to produce such 
 
 Adams, 78 Iowa, 292, 43 N. W. 194; excitement and passion as would miti- 
 
 Seals V. State, supra. gate the killing of the offender to man- 
 
 I'Gray v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 83 slaughter is a question of fact for the 
 
 S. W. 705. And see Golden v. State, 25 jury, to be determined tinder proper in- 
 
 Ga. 527. struetions. Seals v. State, 3 Baxt. 459. 
 
 But provocation by mere words is 2 2Smith v. State, 103 Ala. i, 15 So. 
 
 insufficient to reduce homicide from mur- 843. 
 der to manslaughter, though accom- 
 
278 HOMICIDE. [§ 173 
 
 likely to cause death or serious injury, on the spur of the moment, 
 resulting in death, would be manslaughter only, though the provoca- 
 tion for the blow consisted of nothing but words. ^ * 
 
 So, heat of passion within the meaning of a statutory provision 
 defining manslaughter in the fourth degree to be the involuntary 
 killing of another by any means neither cruel nor unusual, in the 
 heat of passion, in any other cases than those which are declared by 
 statute to be excusable homicide, affords the intended protection, 
 whether it was produced by words or acts of provocation, such as were 
 naturally calculated to produce it.^* And where the statute pro- 
 vides that any condition or circumstance which is capable of creat- 
 ing, and does create, sudden passion, such as anger, rage, sudden re- 
 sentment, or terror, rendering the mind incapable of cool reflection, 
 whether accompanied by bodily pain or not, is adequate cause; if a 
 person, on account of the abuse heaped upon him by another, volun- 
 tarily slays the latter in the sudden heat of passion engendered by the 
 abuse, taken in connection with previous wrongs done him by the de- 
 ceased, and the combined circumstances are of such a character as 
 to render the mind of the slayer incapable of cool reflection, the kill- 
 ing is manslaughter.^® And this rule is not affected by an express 
 statutory declaration that no insulting words or gestures unaccom- 
 panied by violence are adequate cause, since, though one of several 
 causes, alone and independent of others, may not be deemed adequate 
 cause, yet all combined and existing conjointly with each other may 
 be such adequate cause. ^® But to reduce homicide from mtirder to 
 manslaughter because of provocation by the use of insulting words, 
 the killing must have taken place immediately upon their utterance. '' '' 
 And when the statute expressly provides that provocation by words 
 or threats is not suificient to reduce a killing from murder to man- 
 slaughter, no words, however opprobrious, or passion caused thereby, 
 however great, can, when considered alone, have that effect. ^ * Words 
 or conduct which are not a legal provocation, however, but which are 
 well calculated to arouse, and do arouse, sudden passion will modify 
 a homicide to murder in the second degree. ^^ But the provocation 
 by words which will reduce the grade of a homicide from murder in 
 
 231 Hale, P. C. 455. And see State 2 7Evers v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Ren. 
 
 V. Jarrott, 23 N. C. (1 Ired. h.) 76. 318, 18 L.R.A. 421, 37 Am. St. Rep. 811, 
 
 2 4 Wilson V. People, 4 Park. Crim. 20 S. W. 744. 
 
 Rep. G19. 2 8Fry v. State, 81 Ga. 645, 8 S. E. 308. 
 
 2 5Bonnard v. State, 25 Tex. App. 173, asNorth Carolina v. Gosnell, 74 Fed. 
 
 8 Am. St. Rep. 431, 7 8. W. 862; Wad- 734; Petty v. State (Ark.) 89 S. W. 405; 
 
 lington V. State, 19 Tex. App. 266. State v. Williams, 186 Mo. 128, 84 S. 
 
 2 6Wadlington v. State, supra. W. 924. 
 
li 173] 
 
 MANSLAUGHTER. 
 
 270 
 
 the first to murder in the second degree must be caused by the words 
 of the victim, and not by rumors or reports. * " 
 
 174. Insulting words or conduct toward female relative. — Some of 
 the courts have made an exception to the rule that opprobrious 
 words or conduct do not constitute sufficient provocation to mitigate 
 a killing from murder to manslaughter, in case of words and con- 
 duct with reference to the wife of the slayer, tending to excite the 
 fiercest of passions;^ and in Texas, and perhaps other states, insult- 
 ing words or conduct of the person killed toward a female relative 
 of the slayer is made, by statute, adequate cause to reduce the offense 
 of killing from murder to manslaughter, if it takes place at the first 
 meeting after information concerning the insult.^ Under such a 
 provision, failure to submit the issue of manslaughter to the jury, 
 where there was evidence of insulting manner or conduct toward the 
 wife or other female relative of the accused, is error, as tantamount 
 to deciding upon the weight of evidence.* And that no insult was 
 actually offered is immaterial ; it is sufficient that the slayer honestly 
 believed that one had been offered. * And it is not necessary that the 
 female relative in question should have been herself insulted or af- 
 
 sostate V. Ijewis, 14 Mo. App. 191. 
 
 iStott V. Cora. 17 Kv. L. Rep. 308, 29 
 S. W. 141. 
 
 2 See Jones v. State, 33 Tex. Crim. 
 Rep. 492, 47 Am. St. Rep. 46, 26 S. W. 
 1082; Norman v. State, 26 Tex. App. 
 221, 9 S. W. 606; Hill v. State, 5 Tex. 
 App. 2; Allen v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. 
 Rep. 205, 70 S. W. 85; Knowles v. 
 State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 383, 20 S. 
 W. 829; Price v. State, 36 Tex. Crim. 
 Rep. 403, 37 S. W. 743; Ray v. State, 46 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 511, 81 S. W. 737; Wil- 
 lis V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 75 S. W. 
 790; Brown v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 139, 75 S. W. 33. 
 
 3 Jones V. State, supra; Alexander v. 
 State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 395, 49 S. W. 
 229, 50 S. W. 716. And see MeComas v. 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 75 S. W. 533. 
 
 4 Jones V. State, supra; Brown v. 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 24 S. W. 509; 
 Messer v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 97, 
 63 S. W. 643; Melton v. State (Tex. 
 Crim. App.) 83 S. W. 822; McAnear v. 
 State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 518, 67 S. W. 
 117. 
 
 And where a, husband seeks to reduce 
 a homicide committeu. by him to man- 
 slaughter, on the ground that it was 
 committed because of insulting words 
 
 and conduct by deceased toward his wife,^ 
 which she communicated to him, evi-' 
 dence that before the homicide she had 
 stated the facts to others is admissible 
 to support her testimony and show that 
 the husband believed her statements and 
 acted in consequence thereof, the theory 
 of the prosecution being that her testi- 
 mony was wrongfully fabricated solely 
 to aid in defense of her husband. Jones 
 V. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 87, 70 Am. 
 St. Rep. 719, 40 S. W. 807, 41 S. W. 638. 
 
 Aiid the general bad reputation of 
 the person killed as a, man of unchaste 
 habits toward women is admissible in 
 evidence upon the issue as to whether 
 or not the accused believed the infor- 
 mation received from his wife, and act- 
 ed on it. Ibid. 
 
 But a wife who has testified to in- 
 sulting conduct of a man toward her, 
 and to communicatirg it to her hus- 
 band, and that the man and her hus- 
 band were friends until sucli communica- 
 tion, cannot be called upon by the prose- 
 cution to testify on cross-examination, 
 as part of the res gestce, to matters re- 
 lating to the disposition of her property, 
 and the connection therewith of the psr- 
 son killed, or the squandering of her 
 pioperty by her husband. Ibid. 
 
280 HOMICIDK £3 174 
 
 fronted by the acts in question;^ where the conduct is toward her, 
 and it is calculated reasonably to impress the male relative interfering 
 that they are engaged in, or about to engage in, an immoral act, the 
 provocation is sufficient, though the conduct was not such as to afford 
 her any personal grievance.® Nor is there any question of cooling- 
 time up to the first meeting of the parties; the law prescribes no 
 limit to the subsistence of the passion engendered by informa- 
 tion received as to such insult up to that time. ^ And the killing need 
 not have immediately followed the utterance of the insulting words ; * 
 nor need it have taken place under the immediate influence of sud- 
 den passion;" and the jury should not be limited in their finding 
 to a provocation arising at the time of the difficulty. ^ " If the provo- 
 cation and the proper state of mind on the part of the slayer existed, 
 the length of the period of time intervening between apprisal of the 
 insult and the first meeting with the insulter is immaterial;^* and 
 the fact that the meeting was not casual, but that the slayer sought 
 out the offender, does not prevent the insult from mitigating the of- 
 fense, as a matter of law.-*^ ISTor is insulting language constituting 
 adequate cause limited to language used in the presence of the female 
 relative;*^ nor is it necessary that it should have been uttered in 
 the presence of the slayer. ■* * It is enough that he was informed of 
 its utterance and slew the utterer at their first meeting after receiv- 
 ing such information. ■* ^ And previous insults should be considered 
 
 6 Garrett v. State, 36 Tex. Crim. Rep. lOTiicker v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 230, 36 S. W. 454. 50 S. W. 711 ; Williams v. State, 24 Tex. 
 
 elbid.; Canister v. State, 46 Tex. App. 637, 7 S. W. 333; Maxwell v. 
 
 Crim. Eep. 221, 79 S. W. 24; Young v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 56 S. W. 62. 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 69 S. W. 153. nWilliams v. State, supra; Hudson 
 
 7jones V. State, 33 Tex. Crim. Rep. v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 420, 66 S. 
 
 492, 47 Am. St. Rep. 46, 26 S. W. 1082; W. 668. 
 
 Miller v. State, 27 Tex. App. 63, 10 S. izHalliburton v. State, 32 Tex. App. 
 
 W. 445 ; Crews v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. 51, 22 S. W. 48. 
 
 Rep. 533, 31 S. W. 373; Eanes v. State, isHudson v. State, 6 Tex. App. 565, 
 
 10 Tex. App. 421. 32 Am. Rep. 593. 
 
 But while cooling time has no applica- nOrman y. State, 22 Tex. App. 604, 
 lion to a case of murder in which the 58 Am. Rep. 662, 3 S. W. 468. 
 defense was insulting words and eon- iBHoward v. State, 23 Tex. App. 265, 
 duct toward a female relative, a charge 5 S. W. 231 ; Doss v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. 
 with reference to cooling time is harm- Eep. 551, 67 S. W. 321. 
 less error where a proper and perti- Where a charge of murder is defended 
 nent charge upon manslaughter, based on the ground that it was committed be- 
 upon such words and conduct, is given, cause of insulting conduct by the de- 
 Crews V. State, supra. ceased toward the wife of the accused, 
 
 sQrman v. State, 22 Tex. App. 604, 58 he may prove as original evidence that. 
 
 Am. Rep. 062, 3 S. W. 468; Melton v. prior to the killing, the wife communi- 
 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 83 S. W. 822. cated the facts of the insult to a witness, 
 
 But see Evers v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. who, in turn, communicated it to the 
 
 Rep. 318, 18 L.R.A. 421, 37 Am. St. husband. Jones v. State, 38 Tex Crim. 
 
 Eep. 811, 20 S. W. 744. Rep. 87, 70 Am. St. Rep. 719, 40 S. W. 
 
 sOrman v. State, supra. 807, 41 S. W. 638. 
 
1 174J MANSLAUGHTER. 281 
 
 in connection witli present ones in determining whether they were 
 the cause of the crime. ^ ® And an instruction as to insulting -words 
 or conduct toward the daughter and wife of the accused is not ob- 
 jectionable for failure to separately charge on insulting conduct 
 toward each.^'' E'er is the effect of the provocation altered by the 
 fact that the killing was of a person other than the one giving the 
 insult, where the intent was to kill him, and the killing of the other 
 resulted from accident or interference by him in behalf of the 
 other. ^ * 
 
 Such statutes would seem to apply to all relationships, however 
 remote, and a promised wife would seem to be a female relative or 
 relation within their meaning, ^ ® though it does not apply to insult- 
 ing language concerning a woman whom the slayer afterwards mar- 
 ried, spoken years before the marriage.^" And a woman is not a 
 relative of herself within the meaning of such a statute, vhere she 
 herself does the killing on account of insulting language addressed 
 to her. ^ ^ And in Texas the' statute is also made applicable to any 
 female under the protection of the accused. ^^ But where the female 
 insulted is not a relative, it must appear that both the insult and the 
 killing occurred during the continuance of the statutory relation ; if 
 she leaves the protection of the slayer before his first meeting with 
 the insulter the right is gone.^^ The fact that a woman is married 
 does not render the statutory provision with reference to insults to fe- 
 male relatives inapplicable to her with relationto the mitigation of 
 the crime of a brother in killing her husband for an insult offered 
 
 leMesser v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. isLane v. State, 29 Tex. App. 310, 15 
 
 97, 63 S. W. 643; Spangler v. State, 41 S. W. 827. 
 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 424, 55 S. W. 326; 2 0Cockerell v. State, 32 Tex. App. 
 
 Willis V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 75 585, 25 S. W. 421; Coleman v. State 
 
 S. W. 790; Gossett v. State (Tex. Crim. (Tex. Crim. App.) 88 S. W. 238. 
 
 App.) 70 S. W. 319. But where a homicide is sought to be 
 
 But to mitigate a homicide alleged to reduced to manslaughter by showing 
 
 have been committed because of insult- that the killing was caused by insulting 
 
 ing words or conduct by the deceased conduct by the deceased toward the wife 
 
 toward female relatives of the accused, of the accused, both prior and subse- 
 
 where th6 accused was not present and quent to the marriage of the accused, 
 
 did not hear the words or witness the evidence is admissible to show that the 
 
 conduct, it must appear that deceased deceased committed a rape upon the wife 
 
 used insulting words or conduct towa-rd of the accused prior to the marriage, 
 
 a female ' relative, and that before the Jones v. State, 33 Tex. Crim. Rep. 492, 
 
 homicide the accused was informed of 47 Am. St. Rep. 46, 26 S. W. 1082. 
 
 such insult, and that he did the kill- aiMoore v. State, 33 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 ing by reason of passion produced by the 351, 26 S. W. 404. 
 
 insult, and for no other cause. Orman 2 2Ex parte Jones, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 V. State, supra. 422, 20 S. W. 983. 
 
 i7MoComas v. State (Tex. Crim. zslbid. 
 App.) 81 S. W. 1212. 
 
 isNelson v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 S7 S. W. 143. 
 
282 HOMICIDE. [§ 174 
 
 her.^* Nor is ita application limited to living female relations; it in- 
 cludes, as well, insults offered to a female relative who was dead at the 
 time of the insult, or of its communication to the slayer. * ^ The act of 
 one man of calling another a son of a bitch, however, is not adequate 
 cause to reduce a killing of the former by the latter to manslaughter 
 under a statutory provision existing in some of the states, making 
 insulting words toward female relatives such adequate cause. ^ ® And 
 to reduce a homicide to manslaughter under such a provision the 
 killing must have taken place immediately upon the uttering of the 
 insulting words or the happening of the insulting conduct, or as soon 
 as the parties meet after knowledge of the insult.*'' And an insult 
 offered to a female relative in the actual presence and hearing of the 
 slayer is not an adequate provocation when not acted upon until some 
 time afterwards.^* And a provocation of this kind, not adequate 
 because not taken advantage of upon the first opportunity, cannot 
 be coupled with insulting language or conduct subsequently indulged 
 in, so as to constitute adequate cause. *^ iN^or can it be coupled with 
 insulting language or conduct toward another female relative for 
 that purpose. * " But though the killing was not at the first meeting 
 subsequent to knowledge of the insulting statements, when they were 
 repeated to the slayer upon his asking if it were true that they had 
 been made, the repetition constitutes a new and aggravated provoca- 
 tion, which may, in itself, be adequate.^ ^ And the fact that the 
 accused and tJ-.e deceased had met after the wife of the accused had 
 informed him that deceased had solicited intercourse with her, and 
 requested her to kiss him, does not prevent an acquittal, in a prose- 
 cution against the accused for killing deceased, of murder, and a 
 
 24Willi3 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) asTownsell v. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 
 
 75 S. W. 790. 78 S. W. 938. 
 
 26Ibid. 39Hardcastle v. State, supra. 
 
 26Levy. V. State, 28 Tex. App. 203, 19 soMcCoraas v. State (Tex. Grim. 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 826, 12 S. W. 598; Hay- App.) 72 S. W. 189. 
 
 man v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 83 S. And slanderous remarks made by a. 
 
 W. 204 ; Simmons v. State, 23 Tex. App. person concerning other young women 
 
 (J53, 5 S. W. 208; Driver v. State (Tex. are not admissible in evidence in a 
 
 Crim. App.) 65 S. W. 528. prosecution for homicide against a per- 
 
 2 7Pitts V. State, 29 Tex. App. 374, 16 son who killed him, claimed to have 
 
 S. W. 189; Hardcastle v. State, 36 Tex. been done because the deceased insulted 
 
 Crim. Rep. 555, 38 S. W. 186; Hill v. the slayer's daughter. Ibid. 
 
 State, 5 Tex. App. 2; Howard v. State, 31 Richardson v. State, 28 Tex. App. 
 
 23 Tex. App. 265, 5 S. W. 231; Melton 216, 12 S. W. 870; McAnear v. State, 
 
 V. State, 24 Tex. App. 47, 5 S. W. 652; 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 518, 67 S. W. 117; 
 
 Willis V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 90 S. Loyd v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 533, 
 
 W. 1100. 81 S. W. 293. 
 
 "Meet,'' within the meaning of this And where insulting conduct or Ian- 
 rule, means coming into such proxira- guage toward a relative upon the part 
 ity as to evable the parties to act. Pitts of a person who was killed is relied upon 
 V. State, supra. to reduce the killing to manslaughter. 
 
§ 174], MANSLAUGHTER. 283 
 
 -conviction of manslaughter, where the wife further informed the 
 accused subsequent to such meeting of an attempt of the deceased to 
 ravish her, and the killing occurred after the second communication, 
 since this would be a sufficient cause if the necessary passion was en- 
 gendered.^^ Nor is the mere fact that the insult was given sufficient 
 to mitigate the crime; it must have induced the requisite degree of 
 passion, ^^ and it must appear that the passion thus engendered was 
 the real cause of the killing;^* and that the slayer was informed of 
 the insult before the killing was done.^® And the general reputa- 
 tion of the female relative for chastity is a subject for consideration 
 by the jury on the question of the extent of the provocation,^® 
 though special acts showing a want of chastity are not to be con- 
 sidered.®'' 
 
 175. Assaults. — It has been asserted to be the general rule that the 
 moment one's person is touched with apparent insolence, then the 
 provocation is one which, reasonably speaking, reduces the offense 
 of killing the offender to manslaughter.^ And the crime of man- 
 slaughter, as well as murder and excusable homicide, should be de- 
 fined to the jury in a prosecution for homicide where there was evi- 
 dence tending to show that the deceased used personal violence toward 
 the accused, though the defense failed to ask for such instruction.^ 
 Any assault made with violence or under circumstances of indignity 
 upon a man's person, by one not greatly his inferior in strength, if 
 
 the accused is entitled to have the law il Hale, P. C. 455. And see John- 
 given to the jury in a prosecution there- son V. State, 11 Lea, 47; Chestnut v. 
 for, with reference to the condition of State, 112 Ga. 366. 37 S. E. 384; Com. 
 his mind at the time of the first meet- v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 52 Am. Dec. 
 ing between him and the person killed, 711; State v. Piver, 3 N. 0. (2 Hayw. ) 
 after he had learned of the insulting con- 79; State v. Gilliam, 66 S. C. 419, 45 
 duet or language, and at the time of a S. E. 6; Harrison v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 renewal of the statement, or an indorse- App.) 83 S. W. 699; Whitten v. State 
 ment of the former statement by the de- (Tex. Crim. App.) 86 S. W. 1134; 
 ceased. Tucker v. State (Tex. Crim. Hjeronymus v. State (Tex. Crim. 4pp.) 
 App.) 50 S. W. 711. 83 S. W. 708; Gardner v. State, 44 Tex. 
 
 32Venters v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) Crim. Kep. 572, 73 S. W. 13; Beckham v. 
 83 S. W. 832. " State (Tex. Crim. App.) 69 S. W. 534. 
 
 33KnowIes v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. zstate v. Branstetter,. 65 Mo. 149; 
 Rep. 383. 20 S. W. 829; Fendrick v. State v. McKenzie, 177 Mo. 699, 76 S. 
 State, 39" Tex. Crim. Rep. 147, 45 S. W. W. 1015; State v. Crabtree, HI Mo. 136, 
 589; Jones v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 20 S. W. 7. 
 85 S. W. 5. But an instruction in a prosecution 
 
 34Hill V. State, 5 Tex. App. 2. for homicide that an assault ard bat- 
 
 35Howard v. State, 23 Tex. App. 265, tery is adequate cause to reduce a homi- 
 5 S. W. 231 ; Cockerell v. State, 32 Tex. cide from murder to manslaughter is not 
 App. 585, 25 S. W. 421 ; McVey v. State erroneous because of failure to define 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 81 S. W. 740. an assault and battery, the assault not 
 
 3 6 Wood v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. being an element of the offense on trial. 
 671, 21 S. W. 602. Bearden v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 578, 
 
 37lbid. 73 S. W. 17. 
 
284 HOMICIDE. li 17S 
 
 it be resented immediately by tbe death of the aggressor, and it ap- 
 pear that the party acted in the heat of blood upon that provocation, 
 will reduce the crime to manslaughter.^ And an assault and battery 
 causing pain and bloodshed is sufficient;* and this is so though the 
 assault was made in anger excited in an interview sought by the 
 slayer, where his intentions were not hostile,® and though the person 
 who was slain had abandoned the fight at the time of the killing." 
 And hitting a man with a rock in the back and knocking him to his 
 hands and knees is not a slight provocation, as matter of law, and an 
 instruction in a prosecution for killing the man who threw the rock, 
 that if the accused, with a deadly weapon, upon slight provocation,, 
 gave him. a mortal wound, he is prima facie guilty of wilful, de- 
 liberate, and premeditated killing, is improper.'^ So, whenever force 
 is used upon the person of another under ericumstances amounting 
 to an indictable offense, such force is a legal provocation.* And 
 when a person was assatilted and immediately killed his assailant,, 
 the presumption is that the assault excited his passion beyond con- 
 trol, and that he acted upon sudden heat and passion, and not from 
 malice, and is, therefore, guilty of manslaughter only.® So, being^ 
 
 SRex V. Thomas, 7 Car. & P. 817 ; Tay- eused. State v. Castle, 133 N. C. 769, 
 lor's Case, 2 Lewin, C. C. 215; King v. 46 S. E. 1. 
 
 Snow, 1 Leachj C. L. 151; Kex v. Ran- iSwanner v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 kin, Russ. & R. C. C. 43 ; Judge v. 58 S. W. 72 ; Gardner v. State, 40 Tex. 
 State, 68 Ala. 406, 29 Am. Rep. 757; Crim. Rep. 19, 48 S. W. 170; Thomas v. 
 Dennis v. State, 93 Ga. 303, 20 S. E. 315; State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 386, 56 S. W. 
 Jackson v. State, 82 Ga. 449, 9 S. E. 126; 70; Castro v. State, supra; Franklin v. 
 Com. V. Webster, 5 Gush. 295, 52 Am. State, 30 Tex. App. 628, 18 S. W. 468; 
 Dec. 711 ; State v. Bowles, 146 Mo. 6, High v. State, 26 Tex. App. 545, 8 Am. 
 69 Am. St. Rep. 598, 47 S. W. 892; St. Rep. 488, 10 S. W. 238; Wiley v. 
 State V. Stockwell, 106 Mo. 36, 16 S. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 65 S. W. 190; 
 W. 888; State V. Brown, 188 Mo. 451, 87 Bishop v. State, (Tex. Crim. App.) 35 
 S. W. 519; State v. Tackett, 8 N. C. S. W. 170; Bonnard v. State, 25 Tex. 
 (1 Hawks) 210; State v. Brodnax, 61 App. 173, 8 Am. St. Rep. 431, 7 S. W. 
 N. C. (Phill. L.) 41; State v. Gentry, 862; Hatchell v. State (Tex Crim. 
 47 N. C. (2 Jones, L.) 406; State v. App.) 84 S. W. 234; Danforth v. State,. 
 Harman, 78 N. C. 515; State v. Jarrott, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 105, 69 S. W. 159. 
 23 N. C. (1 Ired. L.) 76; Cora. v. Drum, And see Connell v. State, supra; White 
 58 Pa. 9; Allen v. State, 5 Yerg. 453; v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 346, 63 L.R. 
 Brande V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 45 S. A. 660, 72 S. W. 173. 
 W. 17; Castro v. State (Tex. Crim. And an instruction to that effect is- 
 App.) 40 S. W. 985; Lara V. State (Tex. sufficient though it does not define what 
 Crim. App.) 89 S. W. 840; Connell v. constitutes an assault and battery. 
 State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 142, 75 S. Swanner v. State, supra. 
 W. 512; Lucas v. State (Tex. Crim. 6Bonnard v. State, supra. 
 App.) 90 S. W. 880. sFranklin v. State, supra. 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution 'State v. Dickey, 46 W. Va. 319, 33 S. 
 for homicide that if the provocation be E. 231. 
 
 great it is manslaugliter, and if it be sstate v. Caesar, 31 N. C. (9 Ired. 
 but slight it is murder in the second L. ) 391; State v. Miller, 112 N. C. 878, 
 degree, is erroneous where, if there was 17 S. E. 167. 
 
 any provocation, it consisted of a deadly SFitzgerald v. State, 15 Lea, 99. 
 assault by the deceased upon the ac- 
 
•I 175] MANSIAUGHTEE. 285 
 
 •present and aiding and encouraging another in an assault makes 
 the aider and abetter a principal in the assault, so that the act of the 
 person assaulted of killing him in hot blood induced by the assault 
 would be manslaughter only. ^ " And where a person is assaulted by 
 a mob, and kills a member thereof in passion induced by the assault, 
 the effect of the assault as a mitigation of the crime is not affected 
 by the fact that the slayer did not know the person killed. ^ ^ 
 
 An assault, however, is not necessarily a sufficient provocation to 
 mitigate homicide from murder to manslaughter ; to have this effect 
 there must have been an assault or battery of such force, or 
 inflicted under such circumstances, as is calculated to produce sudden 
 heat or passion, or a sudden outburst of anger. ^ ^ And an uninten- 
 tional and trivial assault, such as an accidental jostle of the slayer 
 or his wife by the person killed, is no palliation of a killing ; ^ * nor 
 is drawing a weapon without attempting to use it ; ^ * nor is throwing 
 a missile at the slayer without hitting him ; ^ ^ and a slight blow is 
 not necessarily so. ^ ® So, to constitute an assault there must be an 
 attempt or offer to strike by one within striking distance.^'' And 
 whether an advance by one man armed with a stick on another in the 
 nighttime, and his declining to stop when told to do so, constitute 
 circumstances equivalent to an assault, so as to authorize a homicide 
 to be reduced to voluntary manslaughter, is a question for the jury.^ ® 
 E'er is an assault and battery, so slight as to show no intention to 
 inflict pain or injury, an adequate cause to reduce a homicide of 
 the assailant by the person assaulted from murder to manslaughter, 
 under a statute requiring an assault causing pain or bloodshed;^® 
 the assault should at least be one which caused pain and bloodshed.^" 
 
 loByrd v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. And evidence in a prosecution for 
 
 609 47 S. W. 721. homicide that the deceased drew a razor 
 
 11 Lewis V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) on the accused and attempted to cut him, 
 
 89 S W 1073. I'll*' committed no assault causing pain 
 
 i2Cook V Com. 4 Ky. L. Kep. 31; or bloodshed, suggests the theory of self- 
 
 rnited States v. Armstrong, 2 Curt. 0. defense, but furnishes no predicate for a 
 
 C. 446, Fed. Gas. No. 14,467 ; Rex v. charge on manslaughter. Ford v. btate. 
 
 Lynch ' 5 Car. & P. 324. supra. 
 
 13 State V. Tooky, 2 Rice's Digest, 104; 15 State v. Shippey, 10 Minn. 223, 88 
 
 State V. Powell (Del.) 61 Atl. 966; Am. Dec. 70, 6il 178. 
 
 State V. Faino, 1 Marv. (Del.) 492, 41 1 6 Johnson v. State, 11 Lea 47 
 
 Atl 134; State v. Anderson, 4 Nev. 265; 17 State v. Barfield, 30 N. C. (8 Ired. 
 
 Com. V. Drum, 58 Pa. 9; Boyett v. L.) 344. on qr o 
 
 State, 2 Tex. App. 93; High v. State, 26 isRagland v. State, 111 Ga. 211, 36 S. 
 
 Tex. App. 545, 8 Am. St. Rep. 488, 10 E. 682. „, , ,rr n ■ a , 
 
 S W. 238; Rex v. Lynch, supra; Lang- isHatchell v. State (Tex Crim App.) 
 
 stafife's Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 162. 84 S. W. 234; Garner v. State, 45 Tex. 
 
 i4Ford V. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. Crim. Rep. 308, 77 S W 797 
 
 280 50 S W 350; State v. McCourry, 20 Ford v. State, 40 Tex. Cnm. Rep. 
 
 128 N. C. 594, 38 S. E. 883. 280, 50 S. W. 350. 
 
286 HOMICIDE. [I 175 
 
 And one who relies on an assault by the deceased as extenuating his 
 act in killing him must show such assault by satisfactory evidence; 
 the jury cannot conjecture, without evidence, that it must have been, 
 made,^^ the general rule being that the burden of proof of mitigate 
 ing circumstances in prosecutions for homicide rcots with the ac- 
 cused. ^ ^ Nor can one who has been assaulted, and who, under cover 
 of such assault as a pretext, and pursuant to a formed design, and 
 not in the reasonable defense of himself, slays his opponent with a 
 deadly weapon, escape the penalty of murder. ^ * 
 
 It is not alone the degree of the force of the assault, however, that 
 renders it a legal provocation; it is sufficient if there was an assault 
 which, under the attending circumstances, or by reason of its force, 
 is calculated to create, and does create, heat and passion.^* It is not 
 necessary that a blow, in order to amount to a legal provocation, 
 should be one that endangered the life of the slayer. ^ ^ And an as- 
 sault, though trivial, is suflScient provocation when it consists of, or 
 is accompanied by, personal indignity, such, for instance, ag pull- 
 ing one's nose,^" or spitting in one's face.^'^ And an apparent at- 
 tempt to make a deadly assault or an assault with a deadly weapon, 
 in connection with previous threats to kill, known to the person 
 threatened, is sufficient to require a charge on manslaughter, where 
 he kills the person apparently about to attack him.^* And so are 
 insults and threats of violence by the deceased immediately before 
 the killing, in connection with previous insults and threats directly 
 followed by assault and battery. ^ ^ And the same has been held with 
 reference to a demonstration as though to draw a pistol.^** And 
 an assault upon a person by firing or snapping a pistol or gun at him 
 is naturally calculated to excite either anger or terror, and should go 
 
 2lUnited States v. Armstrong, 2 Curt. The issue of manslaughter, as well as 
 
 C. C. 446, Fed. Cas. No. 14,467. those of murder and self-defense, should 
 
 2 2See supra. Chapter IX., § 148. he submitted to the jury where a homi- 
 
 2 3 Judge V. State, 58 Ala. 406, 29 Am. cide was committed by shooting im- 
 
 IJop. 757. mediately after the victim had entered 
 
 24Williams v. Com. 80 Ky. 313. tho room and fired at and missed the 
 
 26State V. Sizemore, 52 N. C. (7 accused, while the latter was laboring 
 
 Jones, L.) 206; State v. Taekett, 8 N. under great excitement resulting from 
 
 C. (1 Hawks) 210. an altercation just before, in which each 
 
 26State V. Branstetter, 65 Mo. 149. had threatened the life of the other. 
 
 27State V. McDonnell, 32 Vt. 491. Stevenson v. United States, 162 U. S. 
 
 2 8 Johnson v. State, 22 Tex. App. 208, 313, 40 L. ed. 980, 16 Sup. Ct Rep. 
 
 2 S. W. 609; Silgar v. People, 107 111. 839. 
 
 563; People v. Palmer, 96 Mich. 580, 55 2 9Lienpo v. State, 28 Tex. App 179, 
 
 X. W. 994; Stacy v. State (Tex. Grim. 12 S. W. 588. 
 
 Ajjp.) 86 S. W. 327; Swain v. State aoRiptoe v. State (Tex. Grim. App.V 
 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 86 S. W. 335. And -12 S. W. 381. 
 see Thompson v. State, 32 Tex. Crim. 
 Rep. 1, 22 S. W. 50. 
 
§ 175] MANSLAUGHTER. 287 
 
 to the jury on tte question of provocation.^* S/>, a homicide com- 
 mitted by a timid and cowardly man in imminent danger of a violent 
 atd instant assault and battery at the hands of the person killed, 
 ■when cut off from all chances of probable assistance, is manslanghter, 
 and not murder. ^ ^ 
 
 176. Excessive resistance as an assault. — ^Resistance to a simple as- 
 sault with violence entirely disproportionate to the original attack 
 renders the assaulted party the assailant, and the killing of the as- 
 saulted party by the other in a transport of rage excited by such un- 
 called for violence is manslaughter only. ^ And when great injury 
 is inflicted on the original aggressor, either by the use of a weapon 
 or of greatly superior strength, and the person inflicting it is killed, 
 the law of manslaughter should be given in the charge if the aggTes- 
 sion was not designed to bring about the conflict intending to kill 
 or seriously injure.^ Within this rule, where one person made an 
 attack upon another, which, in view of antecedent grudges and sur- 
 rounding circumstances, caused the latter to believe that he was in 
 immediate danger of death or i;erious bodily injury, and, acting on 
 such belief, he shot at the former, who then, in good faith, abandoned 
 the attack, but the latter continued to pursue and shoot at him not- 
 withstanding the abandonment, upon which the former, having been 
 rendered incapable of cool reflection by the assault and the circum- 
 stances of the former difiiculty, shot and killed him, he is not guilty 
 of murder in either degree; it is manslaughter only.^ The rule 
 would be different, however, if the original aggression was with the 
 intent to bring about a conflict for the purpose of furnishing the 
 aggressor with an opportunity to kill his antagonist* And where 
 the resistance is not disproportionate to the attack, as in case of a 
 policeman who merely drew his club to resist further aggression, it 
 cannot be regarded as a provocation.^ And instructions as to man- 
 slaughter predicated on a conflict in which great injury was inflicted 
 
 siStevenson v. United States, supra; Bishop v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 35 S. 
 
 Jones V. State, 87 Ga. 525, 13 S. E. 591 ; W. 170. 
 
 jBcasley v. State, 64 Miss. 518, 8 So. 2 Williams v. State, 7 Tex. App. 396; 
 
 234; State v. Crane, 95 N. C. 619; Gon- High v. State, 26 Tex. App. 545, 8 Am. 
 
 •zales V. State, 35 Tex. Grim. Rep. 33, 29 St. Rep. 488, 10 S. W. 238; Honeyctt 
 
 JS. W. 1091, 30 S. W. 224; West V. State, v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 63 S. W. 
 
 •2 Tex. App. 460. 639; Nelson v. State, 10 Humph. 518. 
 
 ssGrainger v. State, 5 Yerg. 459, 26 sTolIett v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 'Am. Dec. 278. 55 S. W. 573. 
 
 iState V. Hill, 20 N. C. 629 (4 Dev. 4High v. State, supra. 
 & B. L. 491) 34 Am. Dec. 396; Noble BGoodman v. State, 122 Ga. Ill, 49 S. 
 
 V. State (Ark.) 87 S. W. 120; Boat- E. 922. 
 ■wrjght V. State, 89 Ga. 140, 15 S. E. 21; 
 
288 HOMICIDE. » 176 
 
 Iby the person killed, though the slayer was the aggressor, is erroneous 
 ■where such facts were not shown by the evidence. ® 
 
 177. Interchange of blows induced by insulting words. — Though 
 slighting words or words of disdain or contumely will not of them- 
 selves constitute a provocation which will mitigate a killing to man- 
 slaughter, yet it seems that if A. use indecent language to B., and B. 
 thereupon strikes A., but not mortally, and then A. strikes B. again, 
 then B. kills A., this is but manslaughter. The stroke by A. is 
 deemed a new provocation, and the conflict a sudden falling out, and 
 on tliese grounds the killing is only manslaughter.* The rule that 
 words of reproach and contempt do not constitute adequate provoca- 
 tion does not apply when the parties become suddenly heated and en- 
 gage in a mutual combat, fighting on equal terms. ^ And where the 
 evidence in a prosecution for homicide tends to show that the killing 
 was the result of a sudden quarrel, an instruction should be given with 
 relation to the- grades of homicide lower than murder.^ And if a 
 killing is done, though without legal provocation, upon a sudden 
 falling out, but with an instrument not likely to produce death, the 
 jury may infer a want of malice, so that it would be regarded as 
 voluntary manslaughter only; but if it was done with a deadly 
 weapon, it would be murder, the weapon used being controlling as 
 to the intent and malicious motive.* 
 
 178. Sudden mutual quarrels or combats. — If, upon a sudden quar- 
 rel between two persons, they fight upon the spot, or presently agree 
 to fetch their weapons and fight, and one of them is killed, such 
 killing is but voluntary manslaughter, no matter who struck the first 
 blow.* And this is the rule though the original provocation causing 
 
 sLucas V. state (Tex. Crim. App.) 90 quarrel, believing his life to be in dan- 
 S. W. 880. ger, it is manslaughter and not murder, 
 
 11 Hale, P. C. 455; State v. Way, 38 is favorable to the accused^ and not sub- 
 S. C. 333, 17 S. E. 39. And see Benny- ject to obieetion by him. State v. Jack- 
 field V. Com. 15 Ky. L. Rep. 321, 22 S. son, 32 S.' C. 27, 10 S. E. 769. 
 W. 1020. iGann v. State, 30 Ga. 67; Ray v. 
 
 2 State V. Hill, 20 N. C. 629 (4 Dev. & State, 15 Ga. 223; Tate v. State, 46 Ga. 
 B. L. 491) 34 Am. Dec. 396; Caruthes 148; Russell v. State, 88 Ga. 297, 14 
 •V. State, 95 Ga. 343, 22 S. E. 837 ; Penn- S. E. 583 ; Carutlies v. State, 95 Ga. 343, 
 sylvania v. Biron, 4 Dall. 125, 1 L. ed. 22 S. E. 837 ; Waller v. State, 100 Ga. 
 769 320, 28 S. E. 77; Roark v. State, 105 Ga. 
 
 sState V. Berkley, 92 Mo. 41, 4 S. W. 736, 32 S. E. 125; Doraey v. State, 110 
 24. And see State v. Rose, 14 Mo. App. Ga. 331, 35 S. E. 651 ; State v. Green, 
 567. Iloust. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 217; State v. 
 
 4Smith V. State, 73 Ga. 31. Davis, Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 13; 
 
 An instruction in a prosecution for Downey v. Com. 7 Ky. L. Rep. 676; 
 homicide that, though the elements of Reynolds v. Com. 28 Ky. L. Rep. 540, 
 self-defense were not" present, yet if the 82 S. W. 233; Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush. 
 fatal shot was fired by the accused in 295, 52 Am. Deo. 711; Cotton v. State, 
 a, sudden heat of passion, or on a sudden 31 Miss. 504; Kelly v. State, 68 Miss. 
 
3 178] MANSLAUGHTER. 289 
 
 the fight was not sufficient to mitigate homicide to manslaughter, 
 since in such case the killing was the result of the mutual fight and 
 sudden heat of passion arising therefrom, rather than of the original 
 provocation.^ The sudden combat itself constitutes sufficient provo- 
 cation.* It is to be supposed, with regard to sudden rencounters, 
 that when they are begun, the blood, previously too much heated, 
 kindles afresh at every pass or blow ; and in the tumult of the pas- 
 sions, in which mere instinct of self-preservation has no inconsider- 
 able share, the voice of reason is not heard ; therefore the law, in con- 
 descension to the infirmities of flesh and blood, has extenuated the 
 offense.* A killing in a mutual combat which engenders hot blood 
 is not murder in any degree unless the elements of purpose and malice 
 concur in the act.® And where a homicide results from a sudden 
 quarrel or affray, the court, in a prosecution therefor, should instruct 
 as to the discriminating marks which establish the boundaries be- 
 tween murder and manslaughter, and as to what constitutes malice, 
 and as to the law with relation to mutual combat.® And in such 
 case merely reading to the jury statutory provisions relating to 
 
 343, 8 So. 745 ; Stnte v. Davidson, 95 zGann v. State, 30 Ga. 67. 
 Mo. 155, 8 b. W. 413; State v. Wilson, In State v. Doherty, 72 Vt. 381, 82 
 98 Mo. 440, 11 S. W. 985; State v. Rob- Am. St. Rep. 951, 48 Atl. 658, it was 
 «rts, 8 N. C. (1 Hawks) 349, 9 Am. held that an i'struction in a prosecu- 
 Dec. 643; State v. Floyd, 51 N. C. (6 tion for homicide that in mutual com- 
 Jones, L.) 392; State v. Massage, 65 N. bat the question of which give the first 
 C. 480; State v. Exum. 138 N. C. 599. blow is not important is favorable to the 
 50 S. E. 283; State v. Hill, 20 N. C. 629, aocused. 
 
 (4 Dev. & B. L. 491) 34 Am. Dec. 396; sState v. Hoyt, 13 Minn. 132, Gil. 125; 
 Com. V. Robertson, Addison (Pa.) 246; Ccm. v. Webster, 5 Gush. 295, 52 Am. 
 Norris v. State, 42 Tex. Grim. Rep. 559, Dec. 711; State v. Hildreth, 31 N. 0. 
 61 S. W. 493; Arrellano v. State, 24 (9 Ired. L.) 429, 51 Am. Dec. 384; Nor- 
 Tex. App. 43, 5 S. W. 526; Moffatt v. ris v. State, 42 Tex. Grim. Rep. 559, 61 
 State, 35 Tex. Grim. Rep. 257, 33 S. W. S. W. 493 ; Byrd v. Coij. 89 Va. 536, 
 S44; Alitchell v. State, 38 Tex. Grim. 16 S. E. 727. 
 Rep. 170, 41 S. W. 816; Runnels v. 4Fost. C. L. 138, 296. 
 fclate, 42 Tex. Grim. Rep. 555, 61 S. W. It has been held, however, that the 
 479; Wilson v. State, 4 Tex. App. 637; rule that where parties become suddenly 
 King v. Com. 2 Va. Gas. 78; Rex v. heated, and engage immediately in mor- 
 Ayes, Russ, & R. C. C. 166: Fost. G. L. tal conflict, fighting upon equal terms, 
 295; 1 Hale, P. C. 456; Whiteley's Case, and one kills the other, the homicide is 
 1 Le'vin, C. C. 173; R. v. Lord Byron, 11 mitigited to manslaughter, applies only 
 St. Tr. 1177; Walters's Case, 12 How. to equals, and not to the case of a white 
 St. Tr. 113; Rex v. Rankin, iiuss. & R. irar. and slave, if the slave kills the 
 C. C. 43. And see Martinez v. States white man while fighting under such 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 89 S. W. 6i2; Greer circumstances. State v. Jarrott, 23 N. 
 v. Com. 27 Ky. L. Rep. 333, 85 S. W. G. (1 Ired. L.) 76. 
 
 166; Burton v. Com. 22 Ky. L. Rep. sOsburn v. State. 164 Ind. 262, 73 N. 
 1315, 60 S. W. 526. E. 601 ; Perrymore v. State, 73 Ari. 278, 
 
 Where two persons fight upon a sud- 83 S. W. 909. 
 cen quarrel and one of them kills the sAllen v. State, 5 Yerg. 453; Waller 
 other, it is manslaughter in the first v. State, 100 Ga. 320. 28 S. E. 77. 
 degree in Alabama. Gates v. State, 50 A charge as to the law applicable to 
 Ala. 166. mutual combat in a prosecution for hom- 
 
 Hom.— 19. 
 
290 ■ HOMICIDE. [§ 178 
 
 mutual combat is not sufficient.'' Within these rules, when persons 
 fight on fair terms, and merely with fist*?, and life is not likely to be 
 at hazard, and the blows passing between them are not likely to cause 
 death, it is manslaughter if death ensues,* and the rule is the same 
 where weapons not likely to produce death are used.® So, if, on a 
 sudden quarrel, persons begin to fight by consent, without deadly 
 weapons, and, after blows pass, one of them uses a deadly weapon 
 in the heat of blood, and kills the other, it is manslaughter only, the 
 law making allowance for human frailty, though the slayer had com- 
 mitted a breach of the peace by entering into the fight willingly.'* 
 And though two persons fight by mutual consent, using deadly 
 weapons, and one kills the other, it is but manslaughter wheji they 
 fight on equal terms, and no undue advantage is taken, since the 
 fairness of the fight rebuts the implication of malice. '^ And the 
 rule is not affected by the fact that accidentally a person other than 
 the opposing combatant was killed;'^ though becauae two persons 
 fight willingly on sudden provocation it does not necessarily follow 
 that neither entertained malice toward the other, in such a way as to 
 reduce the killing of one of them by the other to manslaughter.*^ 
 Nor does the fact that one of the combatants had quit the combat, and 
 was endeavoring to retreat when killed, affect the adequacy of the 
 mutual combat as a provocation, when the killing was the result of 
 
 icide, though not required by the evi- Crim. App.) 40 S. W. 798; Norris v. 
 deuce, is liOt reversible error where the State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 659, 61 S. 
 accused was convicted of manslaughter W. 493; Carter v. State. 37 Tex. Crim. 
 only. Gonzales v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Eep. 403, 35 S. W. 378; Thomas v. State 
 Kep. 33, 29 S. W. 1091, 30 S. W. 224. (Tex. Crim. App.) 85 S. W. 1154; State 
 
 7WaMer v. State, supra. v. McDonnell, 32 Vt. 491 ; Reg. v. An- 
 
 8W liteley's Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 173; derson, 1 Russ. C. & M. 731; Rex v. 
 Macklin's Case, 2 Lewin, C. C. 225 ; Bull Kessal, 1 Car. & P. 437 ; Reg. V. Smith, 
 V. Com. 14 Gratt. 613. 8 Car. & P. 160; King v. Snow, 1 Leach, 
 
 sGriffin v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. C. L. 151 ; Whiteley's Case, 1 Lewin, C. 
 312, 76 Am. St. Rep. 718, 50 S. W. 366; C. 173. 
 
 i'errvmore v. State, 73 Ark. 278, 83 iiState v. Ellick, 60 N. C. (2 Winst. 
 S. VV. 909. L.) 56, 86 Am. Dec. 442; Waller v. State, 
 
 instate v. Ellick, 60 N. C. (2 Winst. 100 Ga. 320, 28 S. E. 77; Roark v. State, 
 L.l 56, 86 Am. Dec. 442; State v. Hil- 105 Ga. 736, 32 S. E. 125; Goodman 
 dveth, 31 N. C. (9 Ired. L.) 429, 51 Am. v. State, 122 Ga. 111. 49 S. E. 922; 
 Dec. 364 ; State v. Curry, 46 N. C. (1 United States v. Mingo, 2 Curt. C. C. 1, 
 Jones, L.) 280; State v. Ramsey, 50 N. Fed. Cas. No. 15,781; Whitelej a Case, 
 C. (5 Jones, L.) 195; State v. Miller, supra. And see Nash v. State, 73 Ark. 
 112 N. C. 878, 17 S. E. 167; Hackett v. 399, 84 S. W. 497. 
 
 People, 8 Colo. 390, 8 Pac. 574; Pres- JzTrabue v. Com. 23 Ky. L. Rep, 
 ten V. State, 25 Miss. 383; Seal's Case, 2135, 66 S. W. 718. 
 6 N. y. City Hall Rec. 59; Allen v. i3Newell v. State, 115 Ala. 64, 22 So. 
 iState, 5 Yerg. 453; Stacey v. State 572. 
 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 33 S. W. 348; Mil- The jury would be authorized to find 
 ler V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 38 S. W. &iich a killing to be murder. Dorsey v. 
 791; Carter v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) State, 110 Ga. 331, 35 S. E. 651. 
 40 S. W. 498; Abrams v. State (Tex. 
 
§ 178] MANSLAUGHTER. 291 
 
 passion provoked by it. * * And the same rule applies to the discon- 
 tinuance of the combat because of intervening causes, when it was 
 continued, and the killing was done, immediately upon the removal 
 of such caupes. ^ ^ And it is not necessary to retreat to the wall before 
 killing, in order to render mutual combat an adequate provocation 
 to reduce homicide from murder to manslaughter. ^ ® And to reduce 
 a homicide from murder to manslaughter it is not necessary for the 
 accused to show that before the mortal wound was given he had de- 
 clined further combat, and retreated as far as he could with safety ; 
 this would entitle him to acquittal, and not merely to mitigation. ^ '' 
 So, where two men fight upon a sudden quarrel and upon equal terms, 
 one of them upon provocation, and the other with a premeditated 
 intent to kill, the fact that the latter would be guilty of murder if 
 he slew his adversary cannot excuse the former if he be the slayer. ^ ® 
 179. What constitutes mutual combat When two meet not in- 
 tending to quarrel, and a conflict suddenly springs up, in which blows 
 are given on both sides without regard as to who is the assailant, it 
 is a mutual combat, within the meaning of the rules stated in the 
 foregoing section. ^ And evidence of an affray, during which violent, 
 profane, and angry words were used by both parties, and in which 
 they engaged in a physical rencounter of considerable duration, ex- 
 changing blows, and that one killed the other, in direct connection 
 with and as a part of the affray, renders necessary an instruction in 
 a prosecution for the killing with reference to the crime of man- 
 slaughter.* There need not be mutual blows to constitute a mutual 
 combat within these rules; it is sufEcient if there was a mutual in- 
 tent to fight, though but one blow was struck, which caused the death 
 in question.* And where one person voluntarily entered into a fight 
 with another for the purpose of settling a difficulty, and fought will- 
 
 14 West V. State, 2 Tex. App. 460; Gon- mer, and not a modification of it. Beas- 
 
 zales V. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 33, lev v. State, supra. 
 29 S. W. 1091, 30 R. W. 224; Beasley isBattle v. State, 92 Ga. 465, 17 S. E. 
 
 V. State, 64 Miss. 518, 8 So. 234. 861. 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution i«State v. Banks, 55 W. Va. 388, 47 
 
 for homicide that where one person S. E. 142. 
 
 shoots at another and misses him, and I'.Tackson v. Com. 97 Va. 762, 33 S. 
 
 the latter instantly turns and shoots E. 547. 
 
 him, the slayer is guilty of murder, is isPtate v. Brittai", 89 N. C. 481. 
 not cured by another instruction that iCom. v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 52 Am. 
 
 the killing is manslaughter and not mur- Dec. 711. And see Smith v. State, 118 
 
 der, if the evidence makes it doubtful Ga. 61, 44 S. E. 817. 
 whether the killi-g was pursuant to a 2Cra,wford v. People, 12 Colo. 290, 20 
 
 premerlitated design, or from sudden Pae. 769. 
 
 heat of passion aroused by being shot at, sTate v. State, 46 Ga. 148; Ray v. 
 
 since the latter instruction is contradie- State, 15 Ga. 223; Dorsey v. State. 110 
 
 tory of, and irreconcilable with, the for- Ga. 331, 35 S. E. 651; Roark v. State, 
 
292 HOMICIDE. [•§ 179 
 
 ingly, it is proper to instruct as to mutual combat, regardless of who 
 began the assault.* A combat which will effect a mitigation of a 
 homicide, however, must be not onlj mutual, but it must also be sud- 
 den ; if the parties made previous arrangements for the meeting and 
 combat, each intending to kill the other, the resulting homicide is not 
 reduced from murder to manslaughter. ° And the rule is the same 
 where the slayer acted upon a formed design to take life, though in 
 a mutual combat.® To reduce a homicide from murder to man- 
 slaughter where the killing takes place in a fight between the parties, 
 it must appear from all the circumstances that the killing was done in 
 a transport of passion, without malice, and without time for the pas- 
 sions to cool.^ So, the intent of the parties must have been merely 
 to engage in an ordinary personal encounter.® A homicide per- 
 petrated in a melee or promiscuous fight among several persons is 
 not reduced below the grade of murder. ® And the parties must have 
 stood on the same footing; the rules with reference to mutual combat 
 do not apply where one had the right to attack, and the other had no 
 right to resist ; as in the case of an officer seeking to make an arrest. * " 
 180. Effect of taking undue advantage. — A homicide committed 
 either in mutual combat or otherwise is not mitigated or reduced in 
 degree on the giving of provocation, where undue advantage of the 
 deceased was taken by the slayer.* Where death ensues in a mutual 
 combat, in order to reduce it from murder to manslaughter it must 
 
 105 Ga. 73B, 32 S. E. 125. But see King predietit of miirdeT. King v. State, 4 
 
 V. Com. 2 Va. Cas. 78. 'Jex. App. 54, 30 Am. Eep. 160. 
 
 And evidence that two persons who But where two persona quRrreled, and 
 
 were strangers met and engaged in a, o-e inrii.ed the other to go with him fito 
 
 game, and a quarrel arose between them, the street to settle the mTtter, and they 
 
 and one struck the other and immediate- went and a fight ensued in which the 
 
 ly ran and was pursued by the other, person requested to go was killed, the 
 
 but not overtaken and was soon after court, in instructing in a prosecution for 
 
 fourd dead nearby with a knife stab the killing, should not assume thnt the 
 
 in his breast, warrants and requires an going into the street voluntarily was 
 
 instruction as to mnnslaughter in a with a hostile intent. Coffman vl Com. 
 
 prosecution for the killing. Petty v. 10 Bush, 495. 
 
 Com. 12 Ky. L. Eep. 919, 15 S. W. eSulliv^n v. State, 102 Ala. 135, 48 
 
 1059. Am. St. Eep. 22, 15 So. 2B4; Freeman v. 
 
 4Walters v. State (Tex. Crim. Anp.) State, 70 Ga. 736; Stringfellow v. State, 
 
 40 S. W. 794. And see Eeynolds v. Com. 42 Tex. Crim. Eep. 58S. 61 S. W. 719. 
 
 26 Ky. L. Sep. 949, 82 S. W. 978. 7St-^te v. Harmon. 4 Penn. (Del.) 580, 
 
 BHarmansoT v. Stite (Tex. Crim. 60 At!. 866. 
 
 App.) 42 S. W. 995; Ex pqrte Wriv, 30 s.Strinofellow v. State, svvra. 
 
 Miss. 673; State v. Hogue, 51 N. C. sSmith v. State, 88 AIt. 73, 7 So. 52. 
 
 (0 Jones, L.) 381. But see Davis v. State, 114 Ga. 104, 39 
 
 A deliberate agreement to fight with fe. E. BOB. 
 
 deadly weapons, and the procurement loSt^te v. Shockley, 29 Utah, 25, 80 
 
 of the weapons, and resort to an agreed Pac. 865. 
 
 place of combat, are all evidence of that iPeople v. Perdue, 49 Cal. 425; Cham- 
 formed design which is an essential In- bers v. Com. 6 Ky. L. Eep. 448; Ex 
 
J 180] AIANSLAXTGHTER. 293 
 
 appear that it was waged upon equal terms, and that no undue ad- 
 vantage was sought or taken by the slayer.* And though two persons 
 fight with deadly weapons by mutual consent, if one has his weapon 
 ready, and takes his adversary at a disadvantage, and kills him, there 
 is no mitigation.* And the same rule applies when the slayer had 
 prepared himself in advance with a concealed deadly weapon, unbe- 
 known to his antagonist,* or when he killed his antagonist with a 
 weapon after leading him to believe that he only intended a fair 
 fight without weapons,^ or when the slayer entered into a contest 
 with his antagonist, who was unarmed, intending to avail himself of 
 a deadly weapon.® The mere possession of a deadly weapon at tha 
 commencement of a combat, however, is not sufficient to establish an 
 intent to take an unfair advantage by using it during the fight.'' 
 And one who kills another in a conflict with a deadly weapon is 
 guilty of manslaughter only, where he did not enter into the conflict 
 intending to use it, but only resorted to it in the heat of passion en- 
 gendered by the conflict;* or in a heat of passion engendered by the 
 attempted use of a deadly weapon by his antagonist;® though one 
 who kills another in a conflict with a deadly weapon is guilty of miir- 
 der where he intended from the flrst to use it, if necessary to enable 
 him to overcome his antagonist, though he habitually carried the 
 weapon. ^ " Nor is one who enters into a combat dangerously armed, 
 and slays his adversary, necessarily guilty of murder, unless it ap- 
 
 parte Wray, 30 Miss. 673; Bingham v. such weapon or other me^ins of i-'fliet- 
 
 State, 6 Tex. App. 169; Whiteley's Case, yiar great bodily harm. State v. Hoyt, 13 
 
 1 Lewin, C. C. 173; King v. State, 4 Tex. Minn. 132, Gil. 125. 
 
 App. 54, 30 Am. Eep. 160. BState v. Scott, supra; Wilson v. 
 
 2King V. State, and Bingham v. State, State, 4 Tex. App. 637 ; Reg. v. Ander- 
 
 supra. And see Atkins v. State, 16 Ark. son, 1 Russell, Crimes, 731. And see 
 
 66S. State v. Vance, 29 Wash. 435, 70 Pac. 
 
 sState V. Ellick, 60 N. C. (2 Winst. 34. 
 
 L.) 58, 86 Am. Dec. 442; State v. sReg. v. Smith, 8 Car. & P. 160; 
 
 Gooch, 94 N. 0. 987; People v. Sanchez, Green v. State, 28 Miss. 687. 
 
 24 Cal. 17; Price v. State, 36 Miss. 531, 'Reg. v. Smith, supra. 
 
 72 Am. Deo. 195; State v. Doherty, 72 sGreen v. State, supra; Ray v. State, 
 
 Vt. 381, 82 Am. St. Rep. 951, 48 Atl. 15 Ga. 223; Reg. v. Smith, supra. 
 
 658. Killing a person by drawing a revol- 
 
 ■»Price V. State, supra; State v. Smith, ver and fatally shooting him may be 
 
 77 N. C. 489; State v. Scott, 26 N. C. ma'-slaughter where the drawing and use 
 
 (4 Ired. L.) 409, 42 Am. Dec. 148; of the revolver was an afterthought. 
 
 State V. Hildreth.. 31 N. C. (9 Ired. L.) subsequent to an encounter between the 
 
 429, 51 .4m. Dec. 364; St<ite v. Ho^ue, parties, and was wholly due to nervous- 
 
 61 N. G. (6 Jones, L.) 381 ;Whiteley's ness, fear, anger, or cowardice. State 
 
 Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 173 ; Reg. v. Ander- v. Doherty, 72 Vt. 381, 82 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 son, 1 Russell, Crimes, 731. 951, 48 Atl. 658. 
 
 An intention to kill at the commence- sState v. Anderson, Houst. Crim. Rep. 
 
 ment of a combat may be inferred from (Del.) 38; State v. O'Neal, Houst. 
 
 the previous preparation, by a party to Crim. Rep. (Del.) 58. 
 
 it, of a deadly weapon for the purpose loQreen v. State, 28 Miss. 687. 
 of using it, when his adversary had no 
 
294 HOMICIDE. (§ 180 
 
 pears that the weapon had been procured for the purpose of the com- 
 bat, or that the accused provoked the difficulty, or entered into it 
 intending to use the weapon. ^ ^ And where evidence tending to show 
 antecedent malice and previous preparation for a combat is given in 
 a prosecution for a homicide, the accused may give evidence tending 
 to show that such preparation was made in anticipation of an intended 
 attack. * ^ 
 
 181. Effect of seeking difficulty The rule that a mutual combat 
 
 furnishes adequate provocation to reduce the killing of one of the 
 combatants by the other from murder to manslaughter applies only 
 when the slayer did not intend to provoke a difficulty with the de- 
 ceased, and when the interview in which the killing was done was 
 sought with no hostile intentions ; if the slayer sought to bring on the 
 difficulty, the provocation cannot be deemed adequate. ^ And this is 
 the rule though there was previous enmity between the parties, and 
 each had prepared for a hostile meeting, and determined to bring on 
 a difficulty when they should meet, with an intent of doing the other 
 serious bodily injury.^ The plea of provocation will not avail in 
 any case where it appears that the provocation was sought for and 
 induced by the act of the party in order to afford him a pretense for 
 wreaking his malice;* and it will presently be seen that even where 
 there may have been previous struggling or blows, such plea cannot 
 be admitted, where there is evidence of express malice ; and it must 
 appear, therefore, that when he did the act, he acted upon such provo- 
 cation, and not upon any old grudge.* The mere fact that a person 
 went to the house of another for the purpose of having a difficulty 
 with him, and that he slew him in such difficulty, however, is not, of 
 itself, sufficient to show a previously formed design to kill.* And 
 when an assault not intended or calculated to kill or do great bodily 
 harm is resented with violence beyond what is proportionate to the 
 
 uTjOng V. State, 52 Miss. 23. And v. State, 58 Ala. 406, 29 Am. Rep. 757; 
 
 see State v. Taylor, 57 W. Va. 228, 50 Atkins v. State, 16 Ark. 568; Lyon v. 
 
 S. E. 247. State, 22 Ga. 399; State v. Lane. 26 N. 
 
 i2Long V. State, swpra. C. (4 Ired. L.) 113; State v. Martin, 
 
 iBonnard V. State, 25 Tex. App. 173, 24 N. C. (2 Ired. L.) 101 ; State v. Tilly, 
 
 8 Am. St. Eep. 431, 7 S. W. 862; Arrel- 25 N. C. (3 Ired. L.) 424; State v. Fer- 
 
 lano V. State, 24 Tex. App. 43, 5 S. W. guson, 2 Hill, L. 619, 27 Am. Dec. 412; 
 
 526; Noble v. State (Ark.) 87 S. W. Murray v. State, 36 Tex. 642; Melton v. 
 
 120; Main v. Com. 13 Ky. L. Rep. 346, State, 24 Tex. App. 47, 5 S. W. 652; 
 
 17 S. W. 206 ; State V. Davidson, 95 Mo. Abrams v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 155. 8 S. W. 413; State v. Dunn, 80 Mo. 40 S. W. 798; Brownlee v. State (Tex. 
 
 681 ; State V. Sumner, 55 S. C. 32, 74 Am. Crim. App.) 87 S. W. 1153; Mason's 
 
 St. Rep. 707, 32 S. E. 771 ; State v. Case, 1 East, P. C. 239. 
 Scott, 36 W. Va. 704, 15 S. E. 405. 4 See Reg. v. Setten, 11 Cox, 0. C. 
 
 sBonnard v. State, supra. 674. 
 
 81 Russell, Crimes, 521, 585; Judge t Atkins v. State, supra. 
 
1 181] MANSLAUGHTER. 295 
 
 aggression, a killing before the expiration of time for the blood to 
 •cool, by the first aggressor, of the second aggressor, is manslavighter 
 •only.® And where the evidence as to -whether the accused provoked 
 the difiiculty is conflictng, an instruction on manslaughter should 
 be given.' Nor is one who slays another in a mutual combat neces- 
 sarily guilty of murder because his comrade was the first aggressor. ^ 
 So, when a person engages in a difficulty with another without feloni- 
 •ous intent, but with heat of passion, and slays his adversary in defense 
 ■of his own person, the law will consider his intent and the absence of 
 malice, and hold him guilty of manslaughter only. ® But this excep- 
 tion to the general rule that an intentional killing is murder does not 
 apply when the slayer seeks his adversary for the purpose of inflict- 
 ing punishment upon him. ^ *• A charge on provoking a difficulty in 
 this class of cases should explain what constitutes provoking a diffi- 
 culty.** And where it is a question of fact in a prosecution for 
 homicide as to which party made the first assault, the state must estab- 
 lish the fact as it proves other facts, beyond a reasonable doubt. * ^ 
 
 182. Effect of disparity of strength or weapons Violent acts of re- 
 
 ■sentment, bearing no proportion to the provocation or insult, par- 
 ticularly where there is a decided preponderance of strength on the 
 part of the party killing, are barbarous, proceeding rather from 
 brutal malignity than human frailty ; and barbarity will often imply 
 malice.* And if a strong man should kill a woman or child for a 
 slight blow, the provocation would be no justification,^ though the 
 rule might be different where the blow was struck by a woman with a 
 weapon, which made a wound and caused great pain and effusion 
 •of blood;' and it does not apply to prevent mitigation in case of a 
 hard blow given by one woman to another woman. * So, the same rule 
 has been applied to an attack by a strong man on a weak one, though 
 
 sNoble V. State (Ark.) 87 S. W. 120; where the accused was convicted of man- 
 
 Brownlee v. State, supra. slaugliter. State v. Richardson, 47 S. 
 
 7Vann v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Eep. C. 18, 24 S. E. 1028. 
 434, 107 Am. St. Eep. 997, 77 S. W. lOGibson v. State, 89 Ala. 121. 18 Am. 
 
 813. St. Rep. 96, 8 So. 98; Reg. v. Selten, 11 
 
 sNye V. People, 35 Mich. 16. Cox, C. C. 674. 
 
 sState V. Goddard, 146 Mo. 177, 48 iiVann v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 S. W. 82; State v. Berkley, 92 Mo. 53, 434, 107 Am. St. Rep. 997, 77 S. W. 
 
 4 S. W. 24; Young v. State, 41 Tex. 813. 
 Crim. Eep. 442, 55 S. W. 331. izState v. Workman, 39 S. C. 151, 17 
 
 But an instruction with reference to S. E. 694. 
 homicide committed in a mutual combat, iRex v. Keate, Comb. 408. 
 defining manslaughter, and specifying 2Com. v. Mosler, 4 Pa. 264. 
 that the accused must have been guilt- sStedman's Case, Fost. C. L. 292. 
 less of bringing on the conflict or diffi- ^Scroggins v. State, 32 Tex. Crim. 
 
 •culty, though erroneous, is harmless Rep. 71, 22 S. W. 45. 
 
290 HOMICIDE. [5 182 
 
 no weapon was used.° And a young and vigorous man who kicks 
 to death an old and feeble one, because he resented impertinent and 
 insulting questions with a movement as if to strike, is guilty of mur- 
 der, not manslaughter. ^ And when two parties engaged in an affray 
 are of unequal strength, there is no mitigation of the act of the 
 stronger one of seizing a nearby weapon and killing the weaker one^ 
 there being no reason to apprehend physical injury from him-^ So, 
 where a disparity exists as to means of attack and defense, the party 
 who takes life cannot defend himself on the ground of provocation^ 
 if unfair advantage of such disparity was taken, or if the weapon 
 was used otherwise than in sudden passion.* And where one person 
 throws another down and holds him while a comrade procures a 
 deadly weapon and kills him, the act is inconsistent with the legal 
 conception of killing in the heat of passion engendered by an en- 
 counter. " 
 
 The mere fact that a person took the life of another with a deadly 
 weapon superior to that used by the victim, in a mutual combat, how- 
 ever, is not, of itself, evidence from which malice can be inferred. ^ '^ 
 And an instruction in a prosecution for homicide which dwells with 
 undue emphasis upon the use of a deadly weapon, and ignores al- 
 together the question of the heat of blood that may have been excited 
 by a previous assault and conflict, as well as the question whether 
 cooling time might have intervened, is erroneous. ^ ^ Nor need rules 
 with reference to disparity of physical strength or health be referred 
 to in a charge as to killing with a iirearm. ' ^ So, if the intent was 
 only to chastise, then the inference of malice drawn from disparity 
 of weapons is greatly weakened. ^ ^ 
 
 183. Assault upon relatives or friends as provocation To mitigate 
 
 a homicide it is not necessary that the assault or other provocation 
 should have been made upon, or given to, the slayer ; an assault upon 
 a near relative may serve as an adequate provocation to reduce kill- 
 ing the assailant to manslaughter, as well as an assault upon the 
 slayer;^ and where an assault is made upon a woman, and the 
 I 
 
 BMacklin's Case, 2 Lewin. C. C. 225. mPeople v. Barry, 31 Cal. 357. 
 
 estate v. Kloss, 117 Mo. 591, 23 S. W. nUnited States v. Green, 6 Maokey, 
 
 780. 562. 
 
 'People V. Kelly, 113 N. Y. 647, 7 N. izStnte v. Dolierty, 72 Vt. 381, 82 
 
 y. Critn. Rep. 40, 21 N. E. 122. Am. St. Eep. 951, 48 Atl. 658. 
 
 sState V. Hildretli, 31 N. C. (9 Ired. i3=ee St'>te v. Tackett, 8 N. C. (1 
 
 '!..) 119: Stite V. McCants, 1 Speers, L. Hawks) 210; Eex v. Freeman, 1 Rus- 
 
 384; 1 TTawk. P. C. chap. 31, § 28; Fost. sell, Crimes & Misdemeanors, 518. 
 
 C. L. 295; 1 East, P. C. chap. 5, § 26, iCampbell v. Com. 88 Kv. 402 21 
 
 p. 243. Am. St. Eep. 348, U S. W. 290. 
 
 oStqte V. Coley, 114 N. C. 879, 19 S. 
 E. 705. 
 
5 183] MANSLAUGHTER. 297 
 
 woman's husband kills the assailant in the heat of passion caused by 
 such assault, the crime is manslaughter only.^ And the same rule 
 applies to the killing by a father of a person caught whipping his 
 child, if, in consequence thereof, the father was so enraged as to ba 
 incapable of cool reflection, and while so enraged struck the mortal 
 blow.^ And a father whose daughter was assaulted and abused by 
 her husband and ejected from her home by him has the right to pro- 
 tect his daughter, even against her own husband ; and if he goes to 
 the husband's premises for that purpose, and kills him in the heat of 
 passion, in an effort in good faith to protect his daughter, the crime 
 is manslaughter, and not murder. * Ncr would the shooting of a per- 
 son be anything more than manslaughter where it was done in a 
 moment of passion aroused by an assault upon, and wrongful treat- 
 ment of, the brother of the slayer.^ And an attempt by a husband 
 to poison his wife furnishes her brother with adequate provocation 
 for killing him.® And a husband has the right to the custody of his 
 wife and children, she consenting to go with him, and a third person, 
 though her own father, has no right to interfere with such custody, 
 and if he does interfere or attempt to gain possession of her, the hiis- 
 band has the right to resist such attempt and use all force necessary 
 to overcome such interference; and if his mind become excited be- 
 cause of such interference, and he is rendered incapable of cool reflec- 
 tion, and kills the person interfering, though not in his own neces- 
 sary or apparently necessary self-defense, his offense would be no 
 more than manslaughter. '^ So, the rape of his daughter may be suffi- 
 cient provocation to a father to reduce the killing of her assailant from 
 murder to manslaughter, when done before passion had time to cool. * 
 And where a husband or father shoots a person who commits, or at- 
 tempts to commit, a rape upon his wife or daughter, it is a question 
 for the jury whether the circumstances of aggravation were such 
 as to mitigate or justify the offense.'' 
 
 The mere fact that the person killed had killed a friend or relative 
 of the slayer, however, is not a sufficient provocation to reduce the 
 
 sMcLaurin v. State, 64 Miss. 523, 1 Tole v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 88 
 
 So. 747. S. W. 341. 
 
 sMaria v. State, 23 Tex. 698. sSt-te v. Orugin, 147 Mo. 39, 42 L. 
 
 4CamphelI v. Com. svnra: And B=e R.A. 774, 71 Am. St. Rep. 553, 47 S. W. 
 
 Ee?. V. Harrington, 10 Cox, C. C. 370. 10,'5S: State v. Cooper, 112 Li. 281, 104 
 
 BCollins V. United States 160 U. S. Am. Pt. Rep. 447, 36 So. 350. 
 
 62, 37 L. ed. 998, 14 Sun. Ct. Rep. 9; sBi-^s v. State, 29 Ga. 723, 76 Am. 
 
 Young V. Ft-'te, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 442, Dec. CSO. 
 55 P. W. 331. 
 
 tWillis V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 75 S. W. 790. 
 
208 HOMICIDE. R 183 
 
 grade of killing the first slayer, ^ ° though the rule would seem to be 
 different if the killing of the friend is in the slayer's presence, and if 
 his act is done in the excitement of the moment. ^ * And mere threats 
 and abusive language addressed to a brother or other relative, though 
 in the presence of the slayer, and though the killing v^as done on the 
 instant, is not an adequate provocation to reduce the grade of the 
 crime. * '^ And usage of a wife by her husband which, though brutal, 
 is within his marital rights, furnishes her brother with no adequate 
 cause for killing the husband which will reduce the crime to man- 
 slaughter.^* So, the act of a husband after learning of the defile- 
 ment of his wife, of waiting and deliberating, and then killing the 
 defiler, is not justifiable homicide within the meaning of a statute 
 providing that homicide is justifiable when committed by anyone in 
 a sudden heat of passion caused by the attempt of the offender to 
 commit a rape upon his wife, daughter, sister, or mother, or other 
 female relative, or to defile the same, or when defilement has actually 
 been committed ; but he is guilty of murder, and evidence of such de- 
 filement is not competent in favor of the accused in such a case.** 
 And such a provision applies only to a killing done in a sudden heat 
 of passion, and does not shield one who, because of certain rumors 
 or appearances, has sought out another and deliberately killed him. * ' 
 And mere knowledge that such a rape had been committed is not suffi- 
 cient, since the killing would be in revenge for a past wrong, and not 
 upon a present provocation.*" And if the woman assaulted was a 
 person of bad character for chastity, the act of a relative of killing 
 the assailant would be less justifiable, * '' and evidence as to her gen- 
 eral character for virtue and chastity is admissible in a prosecution 
 for the killing.*^ 
 
 184. Personal restraint or coercion — Interference by force to pre- 
 vent one from doing that which he has a perfect right to do is adequate 
 cause to reduce the killing by him of the person interfering, because 
 of the interference, to manslaughter, if it produced the requisite 
 passion.* And this is so, even though the illegal restraint is under 
 
 lOState v. Gut., 13 Minn. 341, Gil. 315; i estate v. Botha, 27 Utah, 289, 75 Pac. 
 
 Eeese v. State, 90 Ala. 624, 8 So. 818. 731. 
 
 iiState V. Grit, supra; Moore v. State, instate v. Neville, 51 N. C. (6 Jones, 
 
 20 T:x. App. 322, 9 S. W. 610. L.) 433; State v. Bone, 114 Iowa, 537, 
 
 i2Thomas v. State, 126 Ala. 4, 28 So. 87 N. W. 507. 
 
 591. "Biggs V. State, 29 Ga. 723, 76 Am. 
 
 isWillis V. State (Tex. Grim. App.) Dec. 630. 
 
 75 S. W. 790. 18 Ibid. 
 
 uPeople V. Halliday, 5 Utah, 467, iGilcrease v. State, 33 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 17 Pac. 118; Farmer v. State, 91 Ga. 619, 28 S. W. 531. 
 720, 18 S. E. 987 ; Perry v. State, 102 
 <Ja. 365. 30 S. E. 903. 
 
S 184] MANSLAUGHTER. 298 
 
 color of legal process.^ And illegally restraining a person of his 
 liberty is an adequate provocation to reduce a homicide committed in 
 attempting to regain it, or to prevent the restraint, from murder to 
 manslaughter.^ This rule applies where a creditor stood at the door 
 of his debtor with a drawn sword to prevent him from escaping while 
 he sent for a bailiff to arrest him.* And where two persons sought 
 to collect of a third a sum of money claimed to be due one of them, 
 announcing their intention not to permit him to leave the house until 
 he paid it, and he, being unable to pay as desired, procured a pistol 
 as a means of self-defense, when, their words and actions being such 
 as to arouse either anger or terror rendering his mind incapable of 
 cool reflection, he shot and killed one of them under the influence 
 thereof, his ofFense is manslaughter, and not murder. ** But where the 
 restraint is exerted only to prevent the doing of something which the 
 person interfering may lawfully resist, killing him because of such 
 restraint is murder.® And a husband has a right to use compulsion 
 if necessary to enable him to regain possession of his wife from one 
 in whose company he finds her, and who, he has good reason to believe, 
 either has committed, or is about to commit, adultery with her. '' And 
 while a person restrained of his liberty has the right to resist force 
 by force, unless the person interfering with him was at the time doing 
 some act which reasonably appeared to him to endanger his life or 
 threaten him with serious bodily injury, he has no right to kill his 
 antagonist; and if the assault is nonfelonious, he has no right to re- 
 sist with a deadly weapon. * 
 
 185. Illegal or improper arrest — An illegal or improper arrest of 
 an innocent person is a great provocation, and the general rule is 
 that if, in the frenzy of passion caused thereby, the person arrested 
 loses his self-control and kills his assailant, the law so far regards hig 
 infirmity that it acquits him of malicious homicide. ^ The mere fact, 
 however, that an officer or citizen attempting to make an arrest, and 
 who is slain in so doing, has exceeded his authority does not reduce 
 killing him in resistance of the arrest to manslaughter if the slayer 
 had no valid reason to believe himself in immediate danger of great 
 
 *Meuly V. State, 26 Tex. App. 274, 8 estate v. Craton, 28 N. C. (6 Ired. 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 477, 9 S. W. 563. L.) 164. 
 
 sGoodman v. State, 4 Tex. App. 349; Tibid. 
 
 Meuly V. State, supra; State v. Craton, sThompson v. State, 38 Tex. Grim, 
 
 28 N. C. (6 Ired. L.) 164; State v. Rep. 335, 42 S. W. 974. 
 
 Ramsey, 50 N. C. (5 Jones, L.) 195. iBrooks v. Com. 61 Pa. 352, 100 Am. 
 
 ^Buckner's Case, Styles, 467; Rex v. Dec. 645; Roberson v. State, 43 Fla. 
 
 Curvnn, 1 Moody. C. C. 132. 156, 52 L.R.A. 751, 29 So. 535; Cryer v. 
 
 6Meuly V. State, 26 Tex. App. 274, 8 State, 71 Miss. 467, 42 Am. St. Rep. 473, 
 
 Am. St Rep. 477, 9 S. W. 563. 14 So. 261; Roberts v. State, 14 Mo. 
 
300 HOMICIDE. [§ 185 
 
 bodily harm, and the homicide was in fact perpetrated, not in pas- 
 sion or sudden heat upon the provocation of the arrest, but with cool, 
 deliberate malice and premeditation.^ And it has been held that a 
 person charged with homicide, who defends upon the theory that he 
 killed an officer while resisting an unlawful arrest, is not entitled 
 upon the trial to an instruction on manslaughter, but is only entitled 
 to one as to self-defense.^ The question whether a homicide was com- 
 mitted in effecting an illegal arrest is one of fact for the jury.* This 
 subject is more fully considered in an independent chapter on homi- 
 cide in resisting arrest or official action.^ 
 
 186. Trespass. — .A bare trespass against the property of another, 
 not his dwelling, is not a sufficient provocation to warrant the owner 
 in using a deadly weapon in its defense, and if he does, and with it 
 kills the trespasser, it will be murder, and not manslaughter; and 
 this though the killing was actually necessary to prevent the tres- 
 pass.' No mere entry or trespass on lands or premises of another, 
 though against his command, and however wrongful, can justify 
 or excuse killing the trespasser, or resorting to the use of a deadly 
 weapon to prevent the trespass.^ And the provocation arising from 
 breaking open a shop door for the purpose of unlawfully entering is 
 not sufficient to reduce killing the trespasser below the degree of mur- 
 der, if it was done with a deadly weapon. * And the intentional kill- 
 
 13S, 55 Am. Dee. 97; Miller v. State, 186, 38 Am. Dec. 714; State v. Brandon, 
 
 31 Tex. Crim. Eep. 609. 37 Am. St. Rep. 53 N. C. (8 Jones, L.) 463; People v. 
 
 837. 21 S. W. 925; Mundine v. Stnte, Divine, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 594; Tiffany v. 
 
 37 Tex. Crim. Eep. 5. 38 S. W. 619; Com. 121 Pa. 165, 6 Am. St. Rep. 775, 
 
 Mooney v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 65 15 Atl. 462; State v. Clark, 51 W. Va. 
 
 S. W. 926; E V. Willoughby, 1 East, 457, 41 S. E. 204; Meade's Case, 1 Lew- 
 
 P. C. 288; Withers's Case, 1 East, P. in, C. C. 184. 
 
 C. 233. 2State v. Warren, 1 Marv. (Del.) 
 2Roberson v. State, supra. 487, 41 Atl. 190; State v. McDonald, 
 sState V. Duncan, 116 Mo. 288, 32 49 N. C. (4 Jones, L.) 10. 
 S. W. 699. But where a trespasser upon prem- 
 4Roberts v. State, 14 Mo. 138, 55 Am. ises is told to leave by the wife of the 
 Dec. 97. proprietor, and the trespasser uses in- 
 6See infra, chapter XX. suiting language or commits insulting 
 iRex V. Scully, 1 Car. & P. 319; Eex acts toward her, and the husband see- 
 V. Price, 7 Car. & P. 178; Oliver v. ing and hearing it goes out with his 
 Stnte, 17 Ala. 588; Harripon v. State, gun, and afterwards shoots the trespass- 
 24 Ala. G7, 60 Am. Deo. 450; Smith v. er, the jury ii a prosecution for the kill- 
 State, 106 Ga. 673, 71 Am. St. Rep. ing should consider his conduct in go- 
 286, 32 S. E. 851 ; State v. Woodward, ing into the yard with his gun, not 
 Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 455; State v. only in the light of the insulting Ian- 
 Vance, 17 Iowa, 138; Lambeth v. State, guage and acts, but also in the light of 
 23 Mi=!S. 322; Com. v. Drew, 4 Mass. other facts previously occurring a d im- 
 391 ; State v. Shippey, 10 Minn. 223, 88 mediately surrounding the difficulty. 
 Am. Dec. 70, Gil. 178; MoDaniel v. Martin v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 State, 8 Smedes & M. 401, 47 Am. Dec. 144, 58 S. W. 112. 
 93; State v. Zellers, 7 N. J. L. 220; 8 Com. v. Drew, supra. 
 State V. Morgan, 25 N. C. (3 Ired. L.) 
 
5 186] MANSLAUGHTER. 301 
 
 ing of a person with a deadly weapon because of a mere trespass to 
 property rights, or under circumstances where resisting the act of 
 the other would be unlawful, is not included in a statute making the 
 unnecessary killing of another while resisting the attempt of such 
 other to commit any felony, or other unlawful act, or after such at- 
 tempt shall have failed, manslaughter in the second degree.* Nor 
 is an injury to property, unaccompanied by violence, adequate cause 
 to reduce a homicide from murder to manslaughter.® And this rule 
 applies to the wrongful taking and making away with the personal 
 property of another, not amounting to a robbery.® And killing a 
 person because of the belief by the slayer that the other had, and re- 
 fused to return, a small amount of money belonging to him shows 
 an abandoned and malignant heart, and constitutes murder in the 
 first degree.'' Nor does the fact that property had been removed 
 without lawful authority justify the owner in attempting to retake 
 it with deadly weapons ; and where the attempt results in killing the 
 person taking it, it is murder.® So where there is an honest differ- 
 ence of opinion between persons in respect to their interests in prop- 
 erty, the fact that one of them proceeds, against the protest of the 
 other, to assert his rights according to his understanding of them does 
 not constitute a suificient provocation to the other for killing him, 
 and cannot be deemed sufficient to excite an irresistible outburst of 
 passion which will reduce the offense to voluntary manslaughter.® 
 And the degree of the guilt or innocence of the slayer is in no way 
 
 4rertig V. state, 100 Wis. 301, 75 N. TPeonle v. Hill (Cal.) 8"? Pac. 398. 
 
 W. 960. sCallicontte v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 sBoyett v. State, 2 Tex. App. 93. App.) 22 S. W. 1041. 
 
 The act of a person of shutting off oSellers v. State, 99 Ga. 689, 59 Am. 
 
 and wrongfully deprivin'? another in St. Eep. 253, 26 S. K. 484. And see 
 
 possession of a mining claim of water, Anrlrews v. State (Tex. Crira. App.) 
 
 and preventing him from working his 76 S. W. 918. 
 
 claim, does not justify or mitigate an But where it was understood between 
 
 assault with a deadly weapon by the a landlord and tenant as a part of their 
 
 owner upon the other. Territory v. agreement with reference to renting 
 
 Drennan. 1 Mont. 41. leased premises, that a. designated per- 
 
 eMcDaniel v. State, 8 Smedes & M. son should not be permitted to go upon 
 
 401, 47 Am. Dee. 93; Charba v. State them, it is a condition which the lessee 
 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 87 S. W. 829; Bass has a right to enforce; and an instruc- 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 65 S. W. tion in a prosecution against the tenant 
 
 819. for killing such person upon his refusal 
 
 The fact that a person was the station when ordered, to leave the premises, 
 
 agent of a railroad company, and had that he had a right to be o^ the prem- 
 
 lawful custody of a car of lumber, and ises, but that a belief upon the part of 
 
 that another had no right to move the the accused that he had a right to or- 
 
 lumber, but that he endeavored to take der him off should be taken into consid- 
 
 it by force, furnishes ro justification eration, is improper, as placing the case 
 
 or excuse for a murderous assault upon of the accused in an unfavorable light 
 
 him by the agent. Powers v. People, 42 before the jury. Martin v. State, 42 
 
 111. App. 427. Tex. Crim. Eep. 144, 58 S. W. 112. 
 
302 HOMICIDE. R 186 
 
 dependent upon the title to the property in dispute.^" If the object 
 of violence, however, is to drive off a trespasser, or prevent his re- 
 peating a trespass, or even to chastise him, and no blows likely to pro- 
 duce serious bodily harm are inflicted, the offense, if death ensues, is 
 but manslaughter. ^ * And if the circumstances show that the killing 
 was the result of a sudden, violent impulse of passion provoked by the 
 trespass, especially if accompanied by an assault, and it is acted upon 
 before the passion has had time to cool, the provocation will operate 
 to reduce the crime to manslaughter.^^ And invasion of another's 
 premises in the nighttime, and use of threatening and offensive lan- 
 guage by the invader toward the occupant, together with evidence of 
 previous ill-feeling, shows such adequate cause to excite the passion 
 of the occupant and render him incapable of cool reflection as to re- 
 quire an instruction with reference to manslaughter in a prosecution 
 against the occupant for killing the invader. ' ^ So, where a person, 
 whose pocket had been picked, encouraged by a concourse of people, 
 threw the pickpocket into an adjoining pond, in order to avenge the 
 theft by ducking him, but without any apparent intention to take 
 away his life, and the pickpocket was drowned, it was only man- 
 slaughter ; for though this mode of punishment is highly unjustifiable 
 and illegal, yet the law respects the infirmities and imbecilities of 
 human nature, where certain provocations are given. ^ * 
 
 Likewise, where a person forces his way into a dwelling house and 
 there assaults the owner, and the owner kills him, the forcible entry 
 and assault constitute a sufiicient provocation to reduce the killing 
 to manslaughter, where the act of killing was the result of excite- 
 ment and confusion caused by the entry and assault.*'' And the 
 question of manslaughter should be given to the jury when the kill- 
 ing resulted from a violent attack upon the residence of the slayer, 
 though no entrance was effected. * ® And a charivari, consisting of a 
 demonstration made under the windows of a dwelling house in the 
 middle of the night, directed against newly married occupants, which 
 
 loLambeth v. States 23 Miss. 322; Milrainey v. State, 33 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 Fuller V. State, 115 Ala. 61, 22 So. 577, 28 S. W. 537. And see Ncwby v. 
 
 491. People, 28 Colo. 16, 62 Pac. 1035; Unit- 
 
 iiFost. C. L. 291; Hawk. P. C. chap, ed States v. Williams, 2 Cranch, C. 0. 
 
 31, § 34; Reg. v. Mawgridge, J. Kelyng, 438, Fed. Cas. No. 16,710. 
 132; Halloway's Case, Cro. Car. 131, 1 isRiptoe v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 Hale, P. C. 454c, 473; State v. Vance, 42 S. W. 381. 
 17 Iowa, 138. 14 Fray's Case, 1 Hawk. P. 0. chap. 
 
 i2Crawford v. State, 90 Ga. 701, 35 31, S 42; Fost. C. L. 292. 
 Am. St. Rep. 242, 17 S. E. 628; State isHurd v. People, 25 Mich. 405; State 
 
 V. Matthews, 148 Mo. 185, 71 Am. St. v. Decklotts, 19 Iowa, 455. 
 Eep. 594, 49 S. W. 1085; Ledbetter v. leLarson v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 State, 26 Tex. App. 22, 9 S. W. 60; 29 S. W. 782. 
 
§ 186] MAJISLAUGHTER. 303 
 
 led to the killing of one of the parties making the demonstration by 
 an occupant, cannot be said to be an insufficient provocation to miti- 
 gate the crime to manslaughter, as matter of law ; whether it is suffi- 
 cient or insufficient is a question for the jury.^^ But mere civil 
 trespass upon a man's house unaccompanied by such force as to make 
 it a breach of the peace is not sufficient provocation to reduce the 
 killing of the trespasser to manslaughter, if committed under cir- 
 cumstances from which the law would imply malice.** And entry 
 into a man's house, after a warning not to enter, does not necessarily 
 constitute forcible trespass within this rule.*® If or does refusal to 
 leave a dwelling on request of the proprietor afford adequate cause 
 for a killing of the trespasser by the proprietor, or a friend, though 
 accompanied by insulting conduct.^"' Trespass as a provocation re- 
 ducing a resulting homicide from murder to manslaughter is further 
 considered in a subsequent chapter of this work. ^ * 
 
 187. Breach of contract — ^A mere refusal to perform a contract does 
 not constitute an adequate provocation for the reduction of a homicide 
 committed on account of such breach from murder to manslaughter. * 
 This rule applies to the refusal of a person to do work at the request 
 of another, for whom he had agreed to do it.^ And the rejection of 
 a suitor by a woman cannot be regarded as just cause for such heat of 
 passion as to reduce bis killing of her from murder to manslaughter.^ 
 
 188. Adultery by or with spouse or relative. — Whether a horaicide 
 committed by a man smarting under a sense of dishonor is murder 
 or manslaughter depends upon the question whether or not the kill- 
 ing was in the first transport of passion. In the latter case the offense 
 is murder; in the former, manslaughter. Thus, where a man finds 
 another in the act of adultery with his wife, and kills him or her* 
 in the first transport of passion, he is only guilty of manslaughter, 
 
 I'State V. Adams, 78 Iowa, 292, 43 X. was the first thing within his reach, 
 W. 104. and gave his adversary a blow, which 
 
 isCarroll v. State, 23 Ala. 28, 58 Am. caused his death, it is manslaughter 
 Dec. 282. and not murder. Silgar v. People, 107 
 
 islbid.; State v. Smith, 20 N. C. 111. 563. 
 115 (3 Dev. & B. L. 117). zoMeyers v. State. 39 Tex. Grim. Rep. 
 
 But where a person deliberately pre- 500, 46 S. W. 817. 
 pared an instrument of the most dead- 2iSee infra, chapter XXIV., §§ 526- 
 ly character, with which he declared, on 528, 
 
 several occasions to different persons, iState v. Berkley, 109 Mo. 665, 19 S. 
 that he intended to take the life of an- W. 192. And see Wells v. Territory, 14 
 other, which threats were communicat- Okla. 436, 78 Pac. 124. 
 ed to the latter; and he went to the 2State v. Berkley, supra. 
 house of the latter and made an unwar- agtate v. Kotovsky, 74 Mo. 247. 
 ranted entry, with weapon in hand, for iPearson's Case, 2 Lewin, C. C. 216; 
 the purpose of provokirg a quarrel, McNeill v. State, 102 Ala. 121, 48 Am. 
 when the latter seized a stick, which St. Rep. 17, 15 So. 352; Hooks v. State, 
 
304 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 [S 183 
 
 and that of a nature entitled to the lowest degree of punishment,^ 
 for the provocation is grievous, such as the law reasonably concludes 
 cannot be borne in the first transport of passion. But the killing of 
 an adulterer deliberately, and for revenge, would be murder.* And 
 evidence of the adultery is only admissible when the time of the hus- 
 band's discovery of it is brought so near to the homicide as not to 
 allow space for cooling.* And the guilty parties must have been 
 caught by the accused in the very act of adultery ; it is not sufficient 
 to mitigate the homicide that he merely believed that it was being, 
 or had been, committed. ® And though they are caught in the very act, 
 and the killing is done instantly, still it is not manslaughter, as a 
 matter of law; even in such case, whether the provocation was ade- 
 
 99 Ala. 16g, 13 So. 767; Jones v. Peo- 
 ple, 23 Colo. 276, 47 Pae. 275; State v. 
 Pratt, Houst. Grim. Rep. (Del.) 249; 
 Mays V. State, 88 Ga. 399, 14 S. E. 580 ; 
 State V. Cancienne, 50 La. Ann. 847, 
 24 So. 134; Rowland v. State, 83 Miss. 
 483, 35 So. 826 ; State v. Jolir^, 30 N. C. 
 (8 Ired. L.) 330, 49 Am. Dec. 396; State 
 V. Samuel, 48 N. C. (3 Jones, L.) 74, 64 
 Am. Dec. 596; Howard v. Howard, 51 
 N. C. (6 Jones, L.) 237; Com. v. Moore, 
 2 Pittsb. 502; State v. Chiles, 58 S. C. 
 47, 36 S. E. 496; Ross v. State, 23 Tex. 
 App. 089. 5 S. W. 184; Scott v. State 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 81 S. W. 47; Price 
 V. State, 18 Tex. App. 474, 51 Am. Rep. 
 322. 
 
 But while the act of a husband of kill- 
 ing his wife on the spot upon detecting 
 her in an act of adultery in his own 
 home is not murder, but manslaughter, 
 he does not stand justified in the act 
 and is not entitled to an acquittal. 
 State V. Cancienne, and Com. v. Moore, 
 supra. 
 
 2Maddy's Case, 1 Vent. 153, T. Raym. 
 212; People v. Horton, 4 Mich. 83; Ma- 
 her V. People, 10 Mich. 212, 81 Am. Dec. 
 781 ; State v. John, and State v. Sam- 
 uel, supra; State v. Neville, 51 N. C. 
 (6 Jones, L.) 433; Com. v. Whitler, 2 
 Brewst. (Pa.) 388. And see People v. 
 Cole, 1 Cent. L. J. 377. 
 
 50 a husband or father who shoots at 
 one who is attempting to commit a rape 
 upon his wife or daughter, and fails to 
 kill him, is rot liable to conviction and 
 imprisonment under a statute penaliz- 
 ing the offense of shooting at another, 
 except in his own defense. Bigafs v. 
 State, 29 Ga. 723, 76 Am. Dec. 630. 
 
 51 Russell, Crimes, 525; Reg. v. Fisher, 
 
 8 Car. & P. 182; McNeill v. State, 102 
 Ala. 121, 48 Am. St. Rep. 17, 15 So. 
 352; People v. Hurtado, 63 Cal. 288; 
 Jones V. People, 23 Colo. 276, 47 Pac. 
 275; State v. Powell (Del.) 61 Atl. 966; 
 Hill V. State, 64 Ga. 453; Jackson v. 
 State, 91 Ga. 271, 44 Am. St. Rep. 22, 
 IS S. E. 298; Sawyer v. State, 35 Ind. 
 80; State V. Anderson, 98 Mo. 461, 11 
 S. W. 981 ; State v. Burns, 148 Mo. 167, 
 71 Am. St. Rep. 588, 49 S. W. 1005; 
 State V. Privitt, 175 Mo. 207, 75 S. W. 
 457; State v. Samuel, 48 N. C. (3 Jones, 
 L.) 74, 64 Am. Deo. 596; State v. Holme, 
 54 Mo. 153; State v. Avery, 64 N. C. 
 608; Harris v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. 
 Rep. 8, 48 S. W. 502; Coleman v. State, 
 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 137, 49 S. W. 92. 
 
 4 Biggs V. State, 29 Ga. 725, 76 Am. 
 Dec. 630. 
 
 BState V. John, 30 N. C. (8 Ired. L.) 
 330, 49 Am. Dec. 396 ; State v. Samuel, 
 supra; State v. Neville, 51 N. C. (6 
 Jones, L.) 423; State v. Harrigan, 9 
 Houst. (Del.) 369, 31 Atl. 1052; State 
 V. Pratt, Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 249; 
 Fry V. State, 81 Ga. 645, 8 S. E. 308; 
 State V. Peffers, 80 Iowa, 580, 46 N. W. 
 682; State v. France, 76 Mo. 681; State 
 V. Holme, and State v. Avery, supra; 
 Reg. V. Kelly, 2 Car. & K. 814. 
 
 The fact that a wife refused to kiss 
 her husband upon request, and that he 
 believed her unfaithful to her marriage 
 vows, and that he had just been in- 
 formed that she had attended a disrep- 
 utable ball, dressed immodestly, and con- 
 ducted herself in an improper manner, 
 does not constitute just cause of provo- 
 cation which would affect nis offense in 
 killing her. State v. Bulling, 105 Mo. 
 204, 15 S. W. 367, 16 S. W. 830. 
 
i 188] 
 
 MANSLAUGHTER. 
 
 305 
 
 quate is a question for the jury." Nor is it siiiBcient that the husband 
 had knowledge that it had been committed, since in such case the 
 tilling would not be upon the present provocation, but in revenge 
 for a past wrong.'' And evidence that a wife who had deserted her 
 husband, about a week afterwards returned to their residence for the 
 purpose of removing some of its contents ; that upon being informed 
 of her approach he procured a pistol, went home and told her that 
 she could not take the things ; and that in the difficulty which ensued 
 he shot and killed her, — warrants a finding of a killing upon ex- 
 press malice, though he believed that she had gone off with another 
 man.* 
 
 It is sufficient provocation to mitigate the degree of the crime of 
 killing the paramour of the slayer's wife, however, when the husband 
 finds his wife and her paramour in so compromising a situation as to 
 reasonably induce the belief that adultery is taking place. ® And this 
 is the rule though he is, in fact, mistaken. ^ ** And when the parties 
 are caught, not directly in the act of adultery, but in a compromising 
 position under suspicious circumstances, whether the killing of one 
 of them by the husband was under sufficient provocation, and whether 
 the provocation was the cause of the killing, are questions of fact for 
 
 estate v. Senegal, 107 La. 452, 31 So. 
 «67. 
 
 'State V. Neville; State v. Samuel, 
 and State v. John, supra; State v. Pow- 
 ell (Del.) 61 Atl. 966; Jackson v. State, 
 91 Ga. 271, 44 Am. St. Rep. 22, 18 S. E. 
 298; Sawyer v. State, 35 Ind. 80; Bugg 
 V. Com. 18 Ky. L. Rep. 844, 38 S. W. 
 684; State v. Anderson, 98 Mo. 461, 11 
 S. W. 981; State ". Chiles, 58 S. C. 47, 
 36 S. E. 496; Reg. v. Kelly, 2 Car. & 
 K. 814. So also State v. Holme, 54 Mo. 
 153. 
 
 s Coleman v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 137, 49 S. W. 92. 
 
 sState V. Yanz, 74 Conn. 177, 54 L.R. 
 A. 780, 92 Am. St. Rep. 205, 50 Atl. 37 ; 
 State V. Pratt, Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 
 249; Drysdale v. State, 83 Ga. 744, 6 
 L.R.A. 424, 20 Am. St. Rep. 340, 10 S. 
 E. 358; Canister v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. 
 Rep. 221, 79 S. W. 24. 
 
 In a famous case tried in Philadel- 
 phia, in 1816 (Com. v. Smith, 7 Smith's 
 Law, [Pa.] Appx. 2 Wheeler, C. C. 80) 
 the deceased, after being married for 
 some years, left the country; and A., 
 his wife, not hearing from him for two 
 years, married the defendant, acting un- 
 der a Pennsylvania statute which pro- 
 Horn.— 20. 
 
 vided that persons so marrying should 
 not be indictable for adultery, although, 
 as it was afterwards held, the second 
 marriage was not in other respects valid. 
 The deceased returned, after a lapse of 
 a year from the second marriage, and 
 found A. living with the defendant, up- 
 on which a quarrel arose, which was par- 
 tially composed, but which ended in the 
 defendant deliberately shooting the de- 
 ceased at the house of A. This was 
 held murder in the first degree. But 
 the propriety of this ruling has since 
 been gravely questioned, on the ground 
 that Judge Rush, who presided, charged 
 that no prior intention to kill was nec- 
 essary to murder in the first degree 
 (Agnew, J., in Jones v. Com. 75 Pa. 
 403 ) . Another ground for exception is 
 that, as the defendant acted under legal 
 advice (mistaken thougu it was) that 
 his marriage was valid, and that as he 
 therefore, according to his own view, 
 was at the time of the conflict main- 
 taining his own rights in his own house, 
 the malice necessary to constitute mur- 
 der in the first degree was not imputable 
 to him. 
 
 instate T, YanZj supra. 
 
306 HOMICIDE. [^ 18» 
 
 the jury. ^ ^ And it has been held that the provocation may be re- 
 garded as suiRcient when the husband came upon the adulterer sud- 
 denly, and killed him in a rage on seeing him for the first time after 
 learning of the adulterous act. ^^ And it is competent for the de- 
 fendant to prove a conspiracy of late date to carry off his wife, which 
 had only come to his notice immediately before the homicide, the 
 deceased being concerned in the conspiracy. ^ * 
 
 Under the New York statute as to homicide, however, the presence 
 or absence of an intent to kill is the distinguishing feature between 
 murder and manslaughter, and under it the killing of a wife by her 
 husband with a premeditated design to effect death is murder in the 
 first degree, though done under the provocation of finding her in the 
 act of adultery.^* And an agent of a husband employed for the 
 purpose of hunting up evidence of the adultery of his wife does not 
 stand in the husband's position, so as to enable him to plead provoca- 
 tion when he kills the wife's paramour upon catching them in the 
 adulterous act. ^ ^ Nor is the mere act of a person of unlawfully in- 
 terfering to cause a wife to leave her husband an adequate provoca- 
 tion for killing him, where no illicit relations between him and the 
 wife appear. ^*'- 
 
 189. Adultery as a provocation under special statutes It is pro- 
 vided by statute in Texas that adultery of the person killed with the 
 wife of the person guilty of the homicide, provided the killing occurs 
 as soon as the fact of the illicit connection is discovered, is sufficient 
 to reduce the homicide from murder to manslaughter.^ Under this, 
 statute the same rule obtains as with reference to insulting words and 
 conduct toward a female relative.^ And the provocation is not re- 
 quired to arise at the time of the homicide ; it is sufficient if the kill- 
 
 iiHodlis V. state, 99 Ala. 166, 13 So. leged criminal intimacy with her, ut- 
 767 ; Nicks v. State, 48 Tex. Crim. Rep. tered after she had left the scene of the 
 241, 79 S. W. 35. murder, is admissible in evidence in fa- 
 
 Where a husband finds a man in his vor of the husband in a prosecution for 
 house under circumstances justifying the the killing, although she could not be 
 belief that he had recently committed compelled to become a witness in the 
 adultery with the former's wife, and he case. State v. Yanz, 74 Conn. 177, 54 
 shoots the man while he is attempting L.R.A. 780, 92 Am. St. Hep. 205, 50 Atl. 
 to run away, though he is not justified 37. 
 
 in the act, since it was rot necessary to uShufflin v. People, 62 N. Y. 229, 20 
 kiil him to prevent the adultery, the Am. Rep. 483. 
 
 provocation is such as to reduce the of- isPeople v. Horton, 4 Mich. 67. 
 fense from murder to manslaughter. leTodd v. State (Tex. Crim. Ap-" ) 44 
 Mays V. State, 88 Ga. 399, 14 S. E. 560. S. W. 1096. 
 
 i2HiIl v. State, 64 Ga. 453. iPaulin v. State, 21 Tex. App. 436, 1 
 
 isCheek v. State, 35 Ind. 492. S. W. 453; Brown v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. 
 
 The use by a wife of endearing ex- Rep. 1C9, 75 S. W. 33. 
 pressions with reference to a person zPaulin v. State, supra, 
 whom her husband had killed for al- 
 
§ 189] MANSLAUGHTER. 307 
 
 ing occurred as soon as the fact of the illicit connection was dis- 
 covered by the slayer,* or at the first meeting of the parties after the 
 discovery of such fact.* But the rule is otherwise where the killing 
 did not occur as soon as the fact was discovered, or at the first meeting 
 of the parties after such discovery ; ^ and the slayer must have acted 
 under the influence of sudden passion caused by the provocation ; if 
 the homicide was deliberate, and his mind was cool and sedate at the 
 time, it is murder. ® 
 
 So, an act of adultery with the wife of a man who kills the 
 adulterer therefor, provided the killing takes place before the parties 
 to the act of adultery have separated, is made by statute in Texas 
 not only a sufficient provocation to reduce the crime of killing to man- 
 slaughter, but a complete justification therefor.'' Within this statute 
 there is no mitigation or justification where the homicide was cora- 
 mitted upon information received that adultery had taken placo.* 
 And the slayer must have acted under the influence of sudden passion 
 induced by the act.^ But it is sufiicient if the parties were caught 
 tmder such circumstances as reasonably indicated that they had just 
 committed, or were about to commit, the adulterous act. * " And the 
 parties are still together within the meaning of the statute where 
 they are still in each other's company ; they need not be actually en- 
 gaged in the act. ^ ^ Nor is it material within the meaning of such a 
 provision where the parties to the adulterous act were found in its 
 commission, and an addition to a charge of the statutory provision, 
 of a proviso that it occurred in a decent house, is improper. * ^ And 
 adultery within the meaning of these acts is ecclesiastical, and not 
 
 sibid; Brown v. State, supra. And 'Price v. State, 18 Tex. App. 474, 
 
 see Finch v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 51 Am. Rep. 322; Massie v. State, 30 
 
 70 S. W. 207. Tex. App. 64, 16 S. W. 770. 
 
 ■iPiekens v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. sMassie v. State, supra. And see 
 
 554, 21 S. W. 362. Dewberry v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 sPickens v. State, supra; Margraves 74 S. W. 307. 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 50 S. W. sMassie v. State, supra. 
 
 1016; Orangey. State (Tex. Crim. App.) loPrice v. State, supra. 
 
 83 S. W. 385. iilbid. 
 
 Where a husband was standing in the Where a husband saw his wife and 
 
 dark about 30 steps away when his wife her paramour coming from a room to- 
 
 and a man came from a room in which gether after committing adultery, and 
 
 they had committed adultery, and as he immediately followed intending to 
 
 soon as they passed out he immediately beat his wife, and upon accosting them 
 
 pursued them, and the moment he came an altercation followed in which he shot 
 
 up with them an altercatioi ensued in and killed her paramour, the parties 
 
 which he killed the paramour, the kill- were still together within the meaning of 
 
 ing was upon the first meeting, within the statute. Morrison v. State, 39 Tex. 
 
 the meaning of this statute. Morrison Crim. Rep. 519, 47 S. W. 369. 
 
 v. State. 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 519, 47 S. izQiles v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 W. 369. 561, 67 S. W. 411. 
 
 sBreedlove v. State, 26 Tex. App. 445^ 
 9 S. W. 768. 
 
308 HOMICIDE. [J 189 
 
 statutory, adultery, referring to the violation of the marriage bed, 
 and not to habitual carnal intercourse.^* So, a statute like that of 
 Utah, providing that homicide is justifiable when committed in a 
 sudden heat of passion caused by the attempt by the deceased to defile 
 the wife or other female relative of the accused, or when such defile- 
 ment has actually been committed, only applies to a killing done in 
 a sudden heat of passion;** and does not shield one who, because of 
 mere rumors or appearances, has sought out another and deliberately 
 taken his life ; * ^ and evidence that a wife left her husband and was 
 found by him in a neighbor's house, where he shot her and the neigh- 
 bor, is not sufficient to warrant giving such a statutory provision in 
 charge. * ® 
 
 190. Attack on chastity of relative, dependent, or friend — ^Where 
 there is a legal right and natural duty upon the part of one person 
 to protect another, an assault ou the chastity of the ward (using this 
 term in its largest sense) will be a sufficient provocation to make hot 
 blood thus caused an element which will reduce the grade to man- 
 slaughter. That this is the law when a father is incensed at an un- 
 natural offense attempted on his son, and acts in hot blood, is con- 
 ceded.* There is no sound reason why a similar allowance should 
 not be made for a father's or a brother's indignation at a sexual out- 
 rage attempted on a daugh^'er or a sister. To impose a severer rule 
 would be a departure from the analogies of the law, and would bring 
 the court in conflict, not only with the jury, who under such circum- 
 stances never would convict of murder, but with the common sense 
 of the community. Supposing the injury to female chastity to be 
 avenged in hot blood by a brother, a father, or other person having 
 a right to protect the person injured, the offense is but manslaughter.'' 
 And where a father charged with homicide defends upon the ground 
 that information of the seduction of his daughter by the deceased 
 excited him to uncontrollable passion, and to an insane impulse to 
 kill the seducer, there is no probability that neighborhood gossip and 
 reputation as to the unchastity of the daughter would reach the father 
 so as to make evidence thereof receivable against him.* The rule 
 that when a husband suddenly comes upon his wife in the act of 
 adultery, and in a heat of passion aroused thereby instantly takes her 
 life, the homicide is voluntary manslaughter only, however, does not 
 
 isPriee v. State, 18 Tex. App. 474, iBJbid. 
 
 51 Am. Rep. 322. lEeg. v. Fisher, 8 Car. & P. 182. 
 
 i4State V. Botha, 27 Utah, 28D, 75 sSee infra, chapter XXIV., § S^'O. 
 
 Pac. 731. sState v. Kirby, 62 Kan. 436, 63 Pae. 
 
 islbid. 752. 
 
8 1901 MANSLAUGHTER. 309 
 
 apply to the killing by a man of his mistress for no other cause than 
 lewd and lascivious acts with another man, for which she betrayed 
 no regret* And while a betrothed wife would seem to stand in the 
 same position as a wife with reference to this rule,® where one kills 
 his betrothed wife upon discovering her infidelity, after time for de- 
 liberation, and for passion to subside, he is guilty of murder.® Nor 
 does mere reason to believe, upon the part of a person, that another 
 had been criminally intimate with his sister mitigate the offense of 
 killing him from murder to manslaughter. '' And adultery committed 
 with a married sister of the slayer, though discovery is made while 
 the act is in progress, does not amount to sufficient or legal provoca- 
 tion which will reduce the grade of the offense of killing the male 
 adulterer to manslaughter.* And the fact of adulterous intercourse 
 between the person killed and the mother of the slayer is no justifica- 
 tion or mitigation of the killing of the adulterer, when such inter- 
 course was had with the full knowledge of the son.® 
 
 191. Intent to chastise as affecting the question of adequacy. — A 
 large class of cases occur in practice where slight provocations have 
 been considered as extenuating the guilt of homicide, upon the ground 
 that the conduct of the party killing upon such provocations might 
 fairly be attributed to an intention to chastise, rather than to a cruel 
 and implacable malice.^ But, in cases of this kind, it must appear 
 that the punishment was not inflicted with brutal violence, nor greatly 
 disproportionate to the offense ; and the instrument must not be such 
 as, from its nature, was likely to endanger life.* And that chastise- 
 ment, and not killing, was intended will not reduce a homicide to 
 
 <Cynis V. state, 102 Ga. 616, 29 S. E. killed is competent. People v. Lewis, 
 
 917; Parker v. State, 31 Tex. 132. 3 Abb. App. Dec. 535. 
 
 cHennin? v. State, 106 Ind. 387, 55 2Fost. C. L. 291; 4 Bl. Com. 200: Reg. 
 
 Am. Rep. 756, 6 N. E. 803, 7 N. E. 4. v. Hewlett, 7 Car. & P. 274 ; King v. 
 
 «lbid. Wiggs, supra; State v. Taekett, 8 N. C. 
 
 'State V. Hoekett, 70 Iowa, 442, 30 N. (1 Hawks) 210; State v. Roberta, 8 N. 
 
 W. 742. C. n Hawks) 349, 9 Am. Dee. 643; Cora. 
 
 sLyneh v. Com. 77 Pa. 205. v. Green, 1 Ashm. (Pa.) 289. And see 
 
 9State V. Herrell, 97 Mo. 105, 10 Am. King v. Hazel, 1 Leach, C. L. 368; 1 
 
 St. Rep. 289, 10 S. W. 387. East. P. C. 236. 
 
 iFost. C. L. 291, 4 Bl. Com. 200; King Where a, man, who was sitting drink- 
 
 V. Wiggs, 1 Leach, C. L. 378. ing in an alehouse, upon being called by 
 
 Though, under the statute, an inten- a woman "a son of a whore," took up a 
 
 tional killing cannot be mitigated from broomstalT and threw it at her from a 
 
 murder to manslaughter by anything the distance, and killed her, a pardon was 
 
 slayer may have heard from a third per- adviseu, there being a doubt upon the 
 
 son. Where the intent to effect death re- ground that the instrument was not 
 
 mai"s to be proved, and the inquiry is such as could probably, at the given 
 
 as to such intent, that the slayer acted distance, have occasioned death or great 
 
 upon a reasonable provocation likely bodily harm. 1 Hale, P. C. 455, 456. 
 to induce him to chastise the person 
 
310 HOMICIDE. t§ 191 
 
 manslaughter when the manifest design -was to do great bodily harm,' 
 or when the act from which death resulted was cruel and dangerous. * 
 An aggravation, though not constituting a provocation which would 
 extenuate the giving of a deadly blow, however, may palliate the 
 giving of a moderate blow, though death results. ® And when a mas- 
 ter struck his servant, who was a lad, with one of his clogs, because 
 he had not cleaned them, it was held to be only manslaughter, be- 
 cause the master could not, from the size of the instrument he had 
 made use of, have had any intention to take away the boy's life.® 
 And where one, finding a trespasser on his land, in the first transport 
 of his passion beat him, and unluckily happened to kill him, it was 
 held manslaughter, where he beat him, not with a mischievous in- 
 tention, but merely to chastise for the trespass, and to deter him from 
 committing it again. ^ So, where a boy fought with another boy 
 and, being beaten, ran home to his father all bloody, and the father 
 presently took a cudgel, ran % of a mile, and struck the other boy 
 upon the head, upon which he died, the case was held to be man- 
 slaughter, on the ostensible ground of hot blood, but the authority is 
 only supportable on the ground that the accident happened by a sin- 
 gle stroke given in heat of blood, with a cudgel not likely to destroy, 
 and that death did not immediately ensue.* 
 
 192. Adequacy, by whom determined. — What is reasonable or suffi- 
 cient provocation is a fixed question of law based on established 
 rules, and to be decided by the court ;^ and it is the province of the 
 court to define what constitutes provocation.^ And the court in a 
 prosecution for homicide alleged to be voluntary manslaughter should 
 define adequate or legal provocation, and not leave the jury to deter- 
 mine as to its constituent elements for themselves.^ But this may be 
 done in general terms ; it is not necessary on a charge of provoca- 
 tion to collate the facts or circumstances which evidence the provo- 
 
 sM'Whirt's Case, 3 Gratt. 594, 46 Am. iCom. v. Bell, Addison (Pa.) 156, I 
 
 Dec. 190; Reg. v. Howlett, supra. Am. Dec. 208; Lynch v. Com. 77 Pa. 205; 
 
 4Halloway's Case, Cio. Car. 131, 1 Felix v. State, 18 Ala. 720; Payne v. 
 
 Hale, P. C. 434; 1 East, P. C. chap. 5, Com. 1 Met. (Ky.) 370; State v. Craton, 
 
 § 22, p. 237; Nelson v. State, 10 Humph. 28 N. C. (0 Ired. L.) 164. 
 
 518. 2State v. Hoyt, 13 Minn. 132, Gil. 125; 
 
 6Rex V. Freeman, 1 Russell, Crimes & Preston v. State, 25 Miss. 383. And 
 
 Misdemeanors, 518; Halloway's Case, see Brown v. State, 142 Ala. 287, 38 So. 
 
 supra. 268. 
 
 6Turner's Case, Comb. 407, 1 Ld. aMoClurg v. Com. 17 Ky. L. Rep. 1339, 
 
 Rayra. 143. 36 S. W. 14; Payne v. Com. supra; 
 
 7Fost. C. L. 291; 1 Hale, P. C. 473. Bearden v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 144, 
 
 sRoyley's Case, 1 Hale, P. C. 453, Fost. 79 S. W. 37 ; Connell v. State, 46 Tex. 
 
 C. L. 294, 205. Crim. Rep. 259, 81 S. W. 746. 
 
I 192] 
 
 MANSLAUGHTER. 
 
 311 
 
 «ation.* Adequacy of the provocation in a particular case to reduce 
 homicide from murder to manslaughter, however, is a question of 
 fact for the jury under all the evidence.^ And all the facts and cir- 
 cumstances of a case may be looked to by the jury in order to deter- 
 mine the cause of the criminal act;® and this rule applies to great 
 violence or injury to the original aggressor as provocation, as well 
 as to provocation by the original aggressor. '' 
 
 c. Passion or hot blood. 
 
 193. General rules as to existence of, arising from provocation. To 
 
 rebut the presumption of malice arising from the killing in homicide, 
 there must have been passion as well as provocation ; provocation and 
 passion must coexist;^ sudden passion arising from adequate provo- 
 
 ^Bearden v. State, supra. And see 
 Blanco v. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 57 S. 
 W. 828. 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution 
 for manslaughter, leaving the jury 
 :absolutely untrammeled in reviewing all 
 the evidence in the case in order to 
 determine adequate cause and ascertain 
 ■whether the mind of the accused was 
 influenced thereby, is sufficient, though 
 it does not designate the facts in evi- 
 dence which would constitute adequate 
 cause to excite passion sufficient to ren- 
 der the mind of the accused incapable 
 of cool reflection. Sargent v. State, 35 
 Tex. Grim. Rep. 325, 33 S. W. 364. 
 
 And an instruction erroneously pre- 
 senting things as adequate cause which 
 ara not so is not subject to objection on 
 the part of the accused, either as an in- 
 struction on the weight of evidence, or 
 otherwise, since such a charge is favor- 
 fVle to him. Bearden v. State, 44 Tex. 
 Grim. Rep. 578, 73 S. W. 17. 
 
 6 Ruble V. People, 67 111. App. 438; 
 Hooks V. State, 99 Ala. 166, 13 So. 767 ; 
 State V. Jones, 2 Penn. (Del.) 573, 47 
 All. 1006; Biggs V. State, 29 Ga. 723, 76 
 Am. Dee. 630; Stovall v. Com. 4 Ky. 
 L. Rep. 442; Maher v. People, ID Mich. 
 212, 81 Am. Dec. 781 ; People v. Holmes, 
 111 Mich. 364, 69 N. W. 501; State v. 
 Hoyt, 13 Minn. 132, Gil. 125; State v. 
 ■Gr.igin, 147 Mo. 39, 42 L.R.A. 774, 71 
 Am. St. Rep. 553, 47 S. W. 1058; Lvnch 
 V. Gom. 77 Pa. 205; Taylor v. State, 6 
 Lea, 234; Seals v. State, 3 Baxt. 459; 
 Williams v. State, 7 Tex. App. 396; 
 Eranklin v. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 48 
 S. W. 178; Cochran v. State, 28 Tex. 
 App. 422, 13 S. W. 651; Mundine v. 
 
 State, 37 Tex. Grim. Rep. 5, 38 S. W. 
 61 9 ; Johnson v. State, 22 Tex. App. 206, 
 2 S. W. 609; Moore v. State, 26 Tex. 
 App. 322, 9 S. W. 610; Hancock v. State 
 (Tex. Grim. App.) 83 S. W. 696; Arn- 
 wine V. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 90 S. 
 W. CO; State v. Dickey, 46 W. Va. 319, 
 33 S. E. 231. 
 
 And reading a section of the Code in 
 a prosecution for homicide, and stating 
 that it was given as especially applicable 
 in a case of mutual combat, isi improper 
 upon the part of the court, as amount- 
 ing to an intimation of the judge's 
 opinion on the facts of the case, that it 
 was one of mutual combat. Dorsey v. 
 State, 110 Ga. 331, 35 S. E. 651. 
 
 eSwanner v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 58 S. W. 72; Ivorv v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 App.) 87 S. W. 699; Manning v. State 
 (Tex. Grim. App.) 85 S. W. U49; Coch- 
 ran V. State, supTa; Bell v. State (Tex. 
 Grim. App.) 87 S. W. 1160; Cole v. State 
 (Tex. Grim. App.) 88 S. W. 341; Gon- 
 rell V. State, 46 Tex. Grim. Rep. 259, 81 
 S. W. 746; Nix V. State (Tex. Grim. 
 App. ) 74 S. W. 764 ; Borden v. State, 42 
 Tex. Grim. Rep. 648, 62 S. W. 1064. 
 
 'Williams v. State, 7 Tex. App. 396. 
 
 iGom. v. Bell, Addison (Pa.) 156, 1 
 Am. Dee. 298; Com. v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9; 
 Com. V. Honeyman, Addison (Pa.) 147; 
 Peel V. State (Ala.) 39 So. 251; Hen- 
 ning V. State, 106 Ind. 386, 55 Am. Rep. 
 756, 6 N. E. 803, 7 N. E. 4; Beauchamp 
 V. State, 6 Blackf. 299; State v. John- 
 son, 23 N. C. (1 Ired. L.) 354, 35 Am. 
 Dec. 742 : Miller v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. 
 Rep. 609, 37 Am. St. Rep. 836, 21 S. W. 
 925; Maria v. State, 28 Tex. 698; Fen- 
 drick V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 56 S. 
 
312 HOMICIDE. [§ 193 
 
 cation is a necessary element of the offense of voluntary man- 
 slaughter;^ and it is the passion, and not the provocation, which ex- 
 tenuates the crime. ^ It must appear that the slayer acted under the 
 smart of sudden passion and resentment. * The mere fact of provo- 
 cation by one person to another, after which the latter kills the former, 
 does not exclude the existence of malice so as to reduce the killing 
 from murder to manslaughter.^ And though sufficient ground of 
 provocation to reduce a homicide to manslaughter appear in a prose- 
 cution therefor, refusal to charge on manslaughter is not error where 
 the accused testified that his only purpose in shooting was to save his 
 own life, and the eyidence shows that he was cool, collected, and un- 
 moved by passion.* If there was a preconceived design to kill, a 
 homicide is murder, notwithstanding the fact that there was provo- 
 cation.'' If the intent to kill grew out of something other than pas- 
 sion on due provocation, there can be no question of mitigation;* 
 killing on provocation in the absence of passion being evidence of 
 malice, and an aggravating circumstance.® 
 
 So, the mere fact of passion will not reduce a homicide to man- 
 slaughter when there was a previous purpose to kill, ^ " or when there 
 
 W. 626; HatcTiell v. State (Tex. Crim. sions of the accused beyond control, in 
 
 App. ) 84 S. W. 234 ; Brown v. State order to convict, is not erroneous as re- 
 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 78 S. W. 507. And quiring of the jury an impossible 
 
 sec Smith v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. psychological task. Metcalfe v. Com. 
 
 552, 78 S. W. 694; State v. Hunter, 118 27 Kv. L. Rep. 704, 86 S. W. 534. 
 
 Iowa, 686. 92 N. W. 872 ; State v. Evans, 4People v. Bruggv, 93 Cal. 476, 29 
 
 158 Mo. 589, 59 S. W. 994. Pac. 26; Crosby v. People, 137 HI. 325, 
 
 2Hinton v. State, 24 Tex. 454; People 27 N. E. 49; Halliburton v. State, 32 
 
 r. Olsen, 4 Utah, 413, 11 Pac. 577; Thom- Te^^ Crim. Rep. 51, 22 S. W. 48. 
 
 as V. State, 126 Ala. 4, 28 So. 591 ; John- BMcAllister v. Territory, 1 Wash, 
 
 son V. State, 133 Ala. 38. 31 So. 951: Terr. 360; State v. Gartrell, 171 Mo. 
 
 Reese v. State, 90 Ala. 624, 8 So. 818; 489, 71 S. W. 1045; You g v. State 
 
 Nichols V. Com. 11 Bush, 575; Cotrell v. (Tex. Crim. App.) 69 S. W. 153. 
 
 Com. 13 Kv. L. Rep. 304, 17 S. W. 149; eHardcastle v. State, 36 Tex. Crim. 
 
 State v. Siiippey, 10 Minn. 223, 88 Am. Rep. 555, 38 S. W. 186. 
 
 Dec. 70, Gil. 178; Preston v. State, 25 TStite v. Nelson, 101 Mo. 464, 14 S. 
 
 Miss. 383; State v. Davis, 50 S. C. 405, W. 712; State v. Gee, 85 Mo. 647; State 
 
 62 Am. St. Rep. 837, 27 S. E. 905; Com. v. Pankey, 104 N. C. 840, 10 S. E. 315; 
 
 V. Drum, 58 Pa. 9; Clore v. State, 26 Howard v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 58 
 
 Tex. App. 624, 10 S. W. 242; Massie v. S. W. 77. 
 
 State, 30 Tex. App. 64, 16 S. W. 770; 8State v. Hoyt, 13 Minn. 132, Gil. 125; 
 
 Reg. V. Kirkham, 8 Car. & P. 115. Smith v. State, 103 Ala. 4, 15 So. 843; 
 
 The que&tion in a prosecution for Crosby v. People, 137 HI. 325, 27 N. E. 
 
 homicide is not merely as to whether 49; Nichols v. Com. 11 Bush, 575; State 
 
 there was anger, but also as to whether v. Hill, 20 N. C. 629 (4 Dev. & B. L. 491) 
 
 there was legal provocation to anger. 34 Am. Dec. 396; Norman v. State, 26 
 
 Benuehamp v. State, 6 Blackf. 299. Tex. App. 221, 9 S. W. 606. 
 
 sState V. Johnson, ?.3 N. C. (1 Ired. sEx parte Jones, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 L.) 354, 35 Am. Dec. .■42. 422, 20 S. W. 983; Fendrick v. Stite, 39 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution Tex. Crim. Rep. 147, 45 S. W. 589. 
 
 for manslaughter requiring the jury to loCollins v. United States, 150 U. S. 
 
 find beyond a reasonable doubt that a 62, 37 L. ed. 998, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 9. 
 provocation did, in fact, excite the pr.s- 
 
§ 193) MANSLAUGHTER. 313 
 
 was no adequate provocation. * ^ If the design to kill was formed with 
 a sedate and deliberate mind, the killing will be attributed to express 
 malice, though it was done while the slayer was under the influence 
 of passion or excitement. * ^ And if a person permits his passions to 
 be inflamed by something which is not a legal provocation, and, while 
 under the influence of such passion and moved thereby, he aids and 
 abets in the killing of another, he is guilty of murder.*^ So, to miti- 
 gate a homicide the act must have been directly caused by the passion 
 arising out of the provocation; it is not enough that the mind was 
 agitated by passion arising from some other provocation, or a provo- 
 cation given by some person other than the one killed. ^ * But a sud- 
 den, unintentional killing, though with a deadly weapon, by a person 
 in no way in fault, in immediate resentment of a gross provocation, 
 is prima facie a killing in the heat of blood, and manslaughter only. * ^ 
 So, passion which will mitigate a homicide from murder to man- 
 slaughter must be passion upon the part of the slayer, and the fact 
 that the person killed may have been actuated by violent passion, in 
 the absence of any demonstration by him against the slayer, has no 
 bearing upon the grade of the homicide. ^ ® 
 
 194. Of what passion may consist. — Passiou which will reduce hom- 
 icide from murder to manslaughter may consist of either anger, rage, 
 sudden resentment, or terror.^ Fear, fright, nervousness, and cow- 
 ardice upon the part of a slayer bear the same relation to the homi- 
 cide as do anger and heat of blood.'* And terror from a belief on 
 the part of the slayer that his life is in danger is sufficient, though 
 
 iiHenning v. State, 106 Ind. 400, 55 Mere passion and the heat of passion 
 
 Am. Rep. 750, 6 N. E. 803; Beauchamp necessary to reduce homicide from mur- 
 
 V. State, 6 BlacKf. 299; Reese v. State, der to manslaughter differ, and an in- 
 
 90 Ala 624, 8 So. 818; United States v. struction in a prosecution for homicide 
 
 Schneider, 21 JJ. C. 381; Chambers v. that, if the killing was prompted by 
 
 Com. 6 Ky. L. Rep. 448 ; State v. Ash- passion, it is manslaughter, is erroneous, 
 
 ley, 45 La. Ann. 1036, 13 So. 738; Smith in failing to distinguish between them. 
 
 V. State, 58 Miss. 867 ; State v. Andrew, State v. Sloan, 22 Mont. 293, 56 Pac. 
 
 76 Mo. 101 ; People v. Sulliva^, 7 N. Y. 304. 
 
 390; Com. v. Ware, 137 Pa. 465, 20 Atl. i4Finch v. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 
 
 806; Ford v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 70 S. W. 207; State v. Vinso, 171 Mo. 
 
 280. 50 S. W. 350. 576, 71 S. W. 1034. 
 
 The killing of a human being, even leState v. Clifford (W. Va.) 52 S. 
 
 in the heat of passion, is murder if the E. 981. 
 
 slayer had no just cause for his anger, leRentfrow v. State, 123 Ga. 539, 51 
 
 or if, after the provocation and before S. E. 596. 
 
 the killing, there was sufficient time for ijohnson v. State, 22 Tex. App. 206, 
 
 passion to cool and for reason to resume 2 S. W. 609; Meuly v. State, 26 Tex. 
 
 its sway. Smith v. State, 49 Ga. 482. App. 274, 8 Am. St. Rep. 477, 9 S. W. 
 
 i2Howard v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 563. 
 
 58 S. W. 77. 2 State v. Doherty, 72 Vt. 381, 82 Am. 
 
 JSState V. Elliott, 11 Ohio Dee. Re- St. Rep. 951, 48 Atl. 658. 
 print, 332. 
 
314 HOMICSIDE. [^ 194 
 
 his belief is not reasonable. ^ But when fear, fright, nervousness, or 
 cowardice upon the part of a slayer are without such provocation 
 as the law requires as sufficient justification for anger and heat of 
 blood, a homicide which, independently of these conditions, is mur- 
 der, is not thereby rendered manslaughter or justifiable.* And mere 
 excitement on the part of the slayer does not negative the idea of 
 deliberation. ° "fleat of passion" necessarily includes "without 
 previous malice,"® though the subs'jitution of the words "impulse 
 of the moment" for "sudden heat and passion" in an instruction as 
 to manslaughter is not prejudicial to the accused.'' Nor is the sub- 
 stitution of the word "riot" in a proper case.* The passion which 
 will reduce homicide to manslaughter consists of an excited state 
 of the mind produced by some lawful provocation.^ And the term 
 "heat of passion" refers to a mental condition, not a physical one. * " 
 Heat of passion, however, is not confined alone to cases where there 
 is a provocation, but may arise from fighting which was not pre- 
 concerted, but arose from a sudden quarrel. * ' An instruction as to 
 provocation and hot blood in a prosecution for manslaughter should 
 define the words "heat of passion," ^ ^ though failure to define those 
 words when vised in an instruction in a prosecution for homicide 
 is not error, where they were used in the ordinary, and not in thoir 
 technical, sense. ■' * And in determining whether or not a provocation 
 had produced passion, differences of habits of feeling and modes of 
 thought between different persons, classes, and races must be taken 
 
 sGilcrease v. State, 33 Tex. Crim. sClem v. Com. II Ky. L. Rep. 780, 13 
 
 Rep. 619, 28 S. W. 551. And see Com. v. S. W. 102. 
 
 Drum, 58 Pa. 9. But the expressions "quick anger" 
 
 Where one person assaulted another, and "sudden injury" are not synony- 
 
 and in the light of a previous and ante- mous, and an instruction defining heat 
 
 cedent grudge the latter had reason to of passion with reference to manslaugh- 
 
 believe that he was in immediate danger ter as meaning a condition of quick 
 
 of death or serious bodily injury, and anger or sudden injury is objectionable 
 
 shot at the former, when the former, in as misleading and confusing. State v. 
 
 good faith, abandoned the attack, and Sloan, 22 Mont. 293, 56 Pac. 364. 
 
 the latter afterwards killed him, he is sState v. Ellis, 74 Mo. 207; Von 
 
 not guilty of murder in either the first Pollnitz v. State, 92 Ga. 16, 44 Am. St. 
 
 or second degree, but manslaughter Rep. 72, 18 S. E. 301 ; Mitdiell v. State, 
 
 only, where his mind was rendered in- 36 Tex. Crim. Rep. 278, 33 S. W. 367, 36 
 
 capable of cool reflection by the assault S. W. 456. 
 
 and the circumstances of the former loState v. Sloan, supra. 
 
 difficultv. Tollett v. State (Tex. Crim. iiState v. Wilson, 98 Mo. 440, 11 S. 
 
 App.) 55 S. W. 573. W. 985. 
 
 estate V. Doherty, supra; State v. izState v. Skaggs, 159 Mo. 581, 60 S. 
 
 Lewis, 14 Mo. App. 191. W. 1048. 
 
 5 State V. Lewis, supra. isState v. Lane, 158 Mo. 572, 59 S. 
 
 6Metcalfe v. Com. 27 Ky. L. Rep. 704, W. 965. 
 86 S. W. 534. 
 
 7Henson v. Com. 11 Ky. L. Rep. 314, 
 11 S. W. 471. 
 
§ 19-1] MANSLAUGHTER. 315 
 
 into consideration, * * And the question whether or not the homicidal 
 act was done in the way in which passion prompts a man to act must 
 be taken into consideration.^' 
 
 195. Murder to kill in gratification of grudge — When a deliberate 
 purpose to kill or do great bodily harm is ascertained, and there is 
 a consequent unlawful act of killing, the provocation, whatever it 
 may be, which immediately precedes the act, is to be thrown out 
 ■of the case, and goes for nothing, if it appear that the killing was 
 the carrying out of the original intent.^ To reduce a killing from 
 murder to manslaughter, all the circumstances of the case must lead 
 to the conclusion that the act done, though intentional, was not the 
 result of cool, deliberate judgment, and previous malignity of heart, 
 but solely imputable to human infirmity.^ And omitting to charge 
 as to the effect of killing in the heat of passion in a prosecution for 
 homicide is not erroneous where the evidence shows deliberation.^ 
 Malice essential to murder in the first degree and passion essential 
 to manslaughter cannot coexist in law, and an instruction leaving the 
 jury to determine the degree of a homicide according as to whether 
 malice or passion predominates is erroneous.* And although there 
 be legal provocation, yet a homicide will be murder if committed 
 under such circumstances of cruelty as manifest a thoroughly wicked 
 heart.' But the fact that the slayer strikes again and again is not 
 
 l4NelsoTi V. State, 10 Humnh. 518. 587; State v. Hill, 20 N. C. 629 (4 Dev. 
 
 And see State v. Jarrott, 23 N. C. (1 & B. L. 491) 34 Am. Dec. 39G; State v. 
 
 Ired. L.) 76. Johnson, 23 N. C. (1 Ired. L.) 354, 35 
 
 In Nelson v. State, supra, which was Am. Dec. 742; State v. Tilly, 25 N. C. 
 
 a case of homicide of a white man by a (3 Ired. L.) 424; State v. Lane, 26 N. 
 
 slave, it was held that, owin^ to the dif- C. (4 Ired. L.) 113; State v. Ta-cha- 
 
 ferent habits of feeling and modes of ra-tqh, 64 N. C. 014; Stoffer v. State, 
 
 thought between the black and the white 15 Ohio St. 47, 86 Am. Dec. 470; Stewart 
 
 races, an act constituting provocation v. State, 1 Ohio St. 66; Com. v. Ellenger, 
 
 which would mitigate a homicide com- 1 Brewst. (Pa.) 352; State v. Ferguson, 
 
 mitted by n white man to manslaughter 2 Hill, L. 619, 27 Am. Dee. 412; Slaugh- 
 
 does not necessarily have a like effect ter v. Com. 11 Leigh, 681, 37 Am. Dee. 
 
 wheT the homicide is committed on a 638; Vaiden v. Com. 12 Gratt. 717; 
 
 white man by a slave. Bristow v. Cora. 15 Gratt. 634; Dock 
 
 1 estate v. Curry, 46 N. C. (1 Jones, v. Com. 21 Gratt. 912; Copeland v. 
 
 L.) 280. State, 7 Hu-nph. 479; McCoy v. Sta-e, 
 
 iMaddy's Case, 1 Vent. 159 : Mason's 25 Tex. 33, 78 Am. Dec. 520 ; Murray v. 
 
 Case, Fost. C. L. 132; King v. Oneby, State, 36 Tex. 642; Ex pnrte Jones, 31 
 
 2 Ld. Raym. 1490; Mason's Case, 'l Tex. Crim. Rep. 422, 20 S. W. 983. 
 East, P. C. 232; Reg. v. Smith, 8 Cir. zBrooks v. Com. 61 Pa. 352, 100 Am. 
 
 A P. 160; Reg. V. Kirkham, 8 Car. & P. Dec. 645. 
 
 115; Atkins v. State, 16 Ark. 568; Peo- sTerritory v. Baker, 4 N. M. 236, 13 
 
 pie V. Stoneeifer. 6 Cal. 405; Lyon v. Pac. 30. 
 
 State, 22 Ga. 399 ; Havden v. State, 4 4 State v. Sloan, 22 Mont. 295. 56 Pac. 
 
 Blackf. 547; State v. Neeley, 20 Iowa. 364: State v. Newton. 28 La. Ann. 65. 
 108: State v. Green, 37 Mo. 466: State estate v. Jarrott, 23 N. C. (1 Ir»d. 
 
 V. Havs, 23 Mo. 287; Stite v. Linnev, 52 L.) 76; State v. Beatty, 51 W. Va. 232, 
 
 Mo. 40; Com. v. Crane, 2 Wheeler, C. C. 41 S. E. 434. 
 
316 HOMICIDE. [§ 195 
 
 such evidence of the wilful use of excessive force as will warrant 
 an inference that the killing was prompted by malice, and not done 
 in the heat of passion, where he only continues to do so while pun- 
 ishment is being inflicted upon him. ® 
 
 198. Presumption of continuance of old g^rudge It has been said 
 
 that when the existence of deliberate malice in the slayer is once 
 ascertained, its continuance down to the perpetration of the meditat- 
 ed act must be presumed, unless there is evidence to repel it; and 
 that there must be some evidence to show that the wicked purpose had 
 been abandoned.^ If by this we are to understand that the defend- 
 ant is, in such case, to prove by witnesses that he had abandoned 
 his old grudge, the position cannot be sustained. It is otherwise, 
 however, if we understand the conclusion to be that the presumption 
 of the continuance of the old grudge may be met and overcome by 
 the presumption of its abandonment, which may be drawn from the 
 lapse of time, from the circumstances of the encounter, and from 
 the character of the parties. Thus it has been properly held that 
 a person who upon meeting unexpectedly his adversary, who had 
 intercepted him upon his lawful road, and in his lawful pursuit, ac- 
 cepts the fight where he might have avoided it by passing on, the 
 provocation being sudden and unexpected, the law will not presume 
 the killing to have been upon the ancient grudge, but upon the insult 
 given by stopping him on the way, and it will be manslaughter.'' 
 So, though there had been a quarrel between A. and B. and a recon- 
 ciliation between them, and afterwards, upon a new and sudden 
 falling out, A. kills B., this is not murder ; unless under the circum- 
 stances it appears that the reconciliation was but pretended or count- 
 erfeit, and that the hurt done was upon the score of the old malice.^ 
 And where a suiEcient legal provocation at the time to extenuate the 
 homicide is proved, it is not competent for the prosecution, in order 
 to show that the act of killing was not by reason of the immediate 
 provocation, but of a pre-existing malice, to prove that a year before 
 the prisoner declared his intention to kill two or three men, it being 
 admitted that the deceased was not one of the men referred to.* 
 
 eSUte V. Miller, 112 N. C. 878, 17 S. 247, 64 Am. Dee. 582. Ard see State v. 
 
 E. 167; State v. Ramsey, 50 N. C. (5 Manns, 48 W. Va. 480, 37 S. E. 613. 
 
 Jones, L.) 195. 31 Hale, P. C. 451 ; 1 Hawk. P. C. 27; 
 
 iStite V. Johnson, 23 N. C. (1 Ired. Bolzer v. People, 129 111. 112, 4 L.R.A. 
 
 L.) 354, 35 Am. Dee. 742; State v. Tilly, 579, 21 N. E. 818; State v. Horn, 116 N. 
 
 25 N. C. (3 Ired. L.) 424; Riggs v. State, C. 1037, 21 S. E. 694; State v. Johnson, 
 
 30 Miss. 635. supra; State v. Barnwell. 80 N. C. 466; 
 
 2Copeland v. State, 7 Humph. 479. Reg. v. Selten, 11 Cox, C. C. 674. 
 
 See State v. Ta-cha-natah, 64 N. C. 614; 4State v. Barfield, 29 N. C. (7 Ired. 
 
 State V. Johnson, 47 N. C. (2 Jones, L.) L.) 299. 
 
§ 1961 MANSLAUGHTER. 317 
 
 Where there was a definite intent to kill, however, existing before, 
 and independent of, the provocation, and the provocation is a mere 
 collateral circumstance, the motive of the homicide will be referred 
 to the previous malice, and not to the present provocation.® And 
 where there is no evidence that fresh provocation intervened between 
 preconceived malice of the accused toward the deceased and the 
 infliction of the mortal injury, it is not error to refuse an instruction 
 on that subject.® So, when an antecedent grudge has been proved, 
 and there is no satisfactory evidence to show that the wicked purpose 
 had been abandoned, a subsequent provocation must have been a 
 grievous one to warrant a finding that the homicide was on the 
 recent provocation, and not on the old grudge.^ And if a killing is 
 done with apparant deliberation, intention, and with a deadly weapon, 
 under circumstances not requiring its use, the inference is that mal- 
 ice, and not passion, impelled the blow.* And the rule that where 
 a fresh provocation has intervened between the original trouble and 
 the homicide, the killing will be attributed to the fresh provocation, 
 and not to previous malice, has no application to a case in which a 
 person, knowing he had violated the law and was subject to arrest, 
 coolly and deliberately killed the ofiicer seeking to make the arrest, 
 whether such arrest was legal or illegal.® The question whether a 
 homicide was committed from ungovernable passion excited by a re- 
 cent provocation, or for the purpose of gratifying previous malice, 
 is one for the jury to decide upon the facts of the case. ^ " 
 
 197. Threats as indicating cool blood. — -Threats are evidence of 
 malice in homicide.* But where provocation intervenes between a 
 threat and the killing, it is not a conclusive presumption of law that 
 the killing was in pursuance of the threat, and not iipon passion 
 produced by the provocation; whether it was or not being a ques- 
 tion for the jury.^ And the jnry have the right to take into con- 
 
 BStatc V. Johraon, 47 N. C. (2 Jones, eilarris v. State, 8 Tex. App. 90. 
 
 L.) 247, 64 Am. Deo. 582; State v. Owen, THoIland v. State, 12 Fla. 117; State 
 
 61 N. C. (Phill. L.) 425; State v. John- v. Dcttmer, 124 Mo. 426, 27 S. W. 1117. 
 
 son, 23 N. C. (1 Ired. L.) 354, 35 Am. sstate v. Sloan, 22 Mont. 293, 56 Pac. 
 
 Dee. 742; State v. Tilly, 25 N. C. (3 364. 
 
 Ired. L.) 424; State v. Ta-cha-na-tah, sMiller v. State, 32 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 64 N. O. 618. 319, 20 S. W. 1103. 
 
 While a killing will not be presumed loSlaughter v. Com. 11 Leigh, 681, 37 
 
 to be upon anteeedeit malice where a Am. Dee. 638; Bolzcr v. People, 129 III. 
 
 fresh provocation intervenes between 112, 4 L.R.A. 579, 21 N. E. 818; State 
 
 such malice and the killing, it may be v. Hildreth, 31 N. C. (9 Ired. L.) 429, 51 
 
 proved to have actuated the slayer by Am. Dec. 364; Murray v. Com. 79 Pa. 
 
 the circumstances and facts of the case, 311. 
 
 notwithstanding the fresh provocation. iSee infra, chapter XXIX., § 600. 
 
 Murray v. State, 1 Tex. App. 417; Mc- 2Bolzer v. People, supra. 
 Coy V. State, 25 Tex. 43, 78 Am. Dec. 520. 
 
318 HOMICIDE. R 197 
 
 sideration all the circumstances under which the threats were made^ 
 in determining the weight to be given them.' A threat to defend 
 one's self in the event of being attacked does not imply the same mal- 
 ice and evil intent, and does not have the same weight as indicating 
 a killing on malice, and not in hot blood, as a threat to kill unac- 
 companied by qualifying words.* Where one person makes threat* 
 against the life of another, but thereafter their relations are shown 
 to be friendly, and upon an immediate provocation the threatcner 
 kills the other, he should be convicted of manslaughter only, since 
 after the reconciliation the law would presume the crime to be due 
 to the new and sudden provocation, and not to previous malice.' 
 And when previous threats or malevolent conduct toward the de- 
 ceased appear, the jury must consider carefully all the attendant 
 facts and circumstances to determine whether they were called forth 
 by sudden passion aroused by some immediate provocation, or by 
 an antecedent and fixed purpose to kill.' 
 
 198. Seeking or provoking difficulty as indicating cool blood. — An 
 attack or a difficulty sought or incited by the slayer for the purpose 
 of furnishing himself with a pretext to slay one against whom he 
 has a grudge furnishes no provocation for killing such person, and 
 such a killing will be deemed to have been caused by the grudge, 
 and not by the attack or diificulty.^ And an instruction that one 
 who kills entirely from passion suddenly aroused cannot be convicted 
 of murder is properly refused when it leaves out of consideration 
 evidence that the slayer brought on the difficulty.^ If one seek 
 another, and enter into a fight with him, with the purpose, under 
 the pretense of fighting, to stab him, if a homicide ensue, it will be 
 clearly murder in the assailant, no matter what provocation was ap- 
 parently then given, or how high the assailant's passion rose during 
 the combat; for the malice is express.* So, if A., from previous 
 angry feelings, on meeting with B. strike him with a whip, with 
 the view of inducing B. to draw a pistol, or believing he will do so 
 in resentment of the insult, and determines if he does so to shoot B. 
 
 sibid. 55 S. C. 32, 74 Am. St. Rep. 707, 32 S. E. 
 
 4Ibid. 771 ; Carter v. State, 37 Tex. Crim. Rep, 
 
 sstate V. Horn, 110 N. C. 1037, 21 S. 403, 35 S. W. 378. 
 E. 694. 2 Peel v. State (Ala.) 39 So. 251. 
 
 sKorth Carolina v. Gosnell, 74 Fed. sReg. v. Smith, 8 Car. & P. 160; State 
 
 734. And see Wiley v. State (Tex. v. Lanp, 26 N. C. (4 Ired. L.) 113; 1 
 
 Crim. App.) 65 S. W. 190. Hale, P. C. 451; State v. Ferguson, 2 
 
 iBolzer V. People, 129 111. 112, 4L.R.A. Hill, L. 619, 27 Am. Dec. 412; Brownlee 
 
 579, 21 N. E. 818; Judgev. Stnte, 58 Ala. v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 87 S. W. 
 
 406, 29 Am. Rep. 757; Noble v. State 1153. And see Thayer v. State, 138 Ala. 
 
 (Ark.) 87 S. W. 120; State v. Sumner, 39, 35 So. 406. 
 
§ 198] MANSLAUGHTER. 319 
 
 as soon as he draws, and B. does draw, and A. immediately shoots and 
 kills B., this is murder.* But though one person provoked £. diffi- 
 culty with another, if there was no felonious intent in causing the 
 difficulty, and he was forced to kill to save his own life, the killing 
 is manslaughter.^ The question as to who provoked or encouraged 
 the difficulty is one of fact for the jury.® And an instruction by the 
 court in a prosecution for homicide that the accnsed did or did not 
 provoke the difficulty is properly refused as constituting a passing 
 upon the weight of evidence.'' 
 
 199. Disproportionate retaliation as indicating cool blood. — Where 
 retaliation for a recent provocation is disproportionate to the offense, 
 and outrageous, or cruel and unusual, either in its manner or con- 
 tinuance, and death results, malice is inferred, and the homicide will 
 be deemed to have resulted from that, and not from passion or hot 
 blood.* Blows will not mitigate a killing by deliberate cruelty.^ 
 A homicide will not be deemed to be mitigated from murder to 
 manslaughter by the fact that it occurred in retaliation for a blow, or 
 in a mutual combat, where excessive and disproportionate force was 
 used in resisting the assault, to such an extent that a rational man 
 would conclude that death woiild be liable to follow such dispro- 
 portionate resistance.^ And pursuing and killing a retreating ad- 
 versary in a mutual combat raises an issue as to whether the killing- 
 was with malice or in the heat of passion. * So, where one party, af tt^r 
 he has got the better of the other, holds him prostrate and defenseless,, 
 the reception of a prior blow will not reduce his killing to the grade 
 
 4State V. Martin, 24 N. C. (2 Ired. 7lbid. 
 
 L.) 101. iM'Whirt's Case, 3 Gratt. 594, 4e 
 
 BCarter v. State, 37 Tex. Grim. Rep. Am. Dee. 196; People v. Lilley, 43 Mich. 
 
 403, 35 S. W. 378; Brownlee v. State, 521, 5 N. W. 982; State v. Shippey, 10 
 
 supra. Minn. 223, 88 Am. Dec. 70, Gil. 178; 
 
 Where a man went to the house of a State v. Ellis, IGl N. C. 765, 9 Am. St. 
 
 woman, knowing that she had an irri- Rep. 49, 7 S. E. 704; State v. Hunt, 134 
 
 table, furious temper, for the purpose of N. 0. 684, 47 S. E. 49; Brooks v. Com. 
 
 provoking her, and she immediately 61 Pa. 352, 100 Am. Dec. 645; Johnson 
 
 made a violet, dangerous, and un- v. State, 11 Lea, 47; State v. Scott, 36- 
 
 justifiable assault upon him with a W. Va. 704, 15 S. E. 405. 
 
 dangerous and deadly weapon, with If the provocation for a homicide was 
 
 which she prostrated him, and continued slight, and the slayer used excessive 
 
 to attempt to injure him until he shot force, out of all proportion to the prov- 
 
 her, though he is not wholly excused, ocation, the killing will be murder, al- 
 
 beeause of acting in his own wrong, the though the slayer may rot previously 
 
 presumptio i of malice arising in law have formed a design to kill. State v. 
 
 from the killing avd irom the deadly Ellis, supra. 
 
 character of the weapon used is rebutted, 2Rex v. Shaw, 6 Car. & P. 372. See 
 
 and the killing will be held to have been also Rex v. Willoughty, 1 East, P. C. 
 
 the result of sudden heat and excited 288. 
 
 passion. Leake v. State, 10 Humph. 143. SMacklin's Case, 2 Lewin, C. C. 225. 
 
 eThomas v. State, 103 Ala. 18, 16 4GambIin v. State (Miss.) 29 So. 764. 
 So. 4. 
 
320 HOMICIDE. [§ 199 
 
 of manslaughter. This proposition, in fact, is a corollary of that 
 which makes a blow no mitigating provocation when there is a mani- 
 fest disparity of strength between the parties. For even where no 
 such disparity at first exists, the principle holds good when, by the 
 result of the conflict, one party is disarmed, or becomes otherwise 
 helpless.^ And deliberately shooting an antagonist a second time after 
 he was already probably fatally wounded, and while he was stagger- 
 ing away, may be considered in a prosecution for homicide in con- 
 nection with the other circumstances of the case, as tending to show 
 malice and cold blood. ^ But on this question the nature of the in- 
 strument is to be considered. And if the accident happened by a 
 single stroke with an instrument not likely to destroy life, and death 
 did not immediately ensue, and the stroke was given in heat of blood, 
 and not under any of the circumstances which import malice, the 
 killing may be manslaughter.^ And if the resistance, though ex- 
 cessive, be not greatly disproportionate to the assault, and death 
 ensue by misadventure, or if there be no evidence of previous malice, 
 or formed design, though the fatal blow was inflicted with a deadly 
 weapon, it is manslaughter only.^ And a homicide committed in 
 resentment of an unlawful assault, or assault and battery, if done in 
 the heat of blood caused thereby, before actual cooling time haa 
 supervened, and without any previously formed design, is man- 
 slaughter only, in the absence of evidence of previous malice, though 
 the retaliation was cruel and excessive.^ In inquiring whether the 
 indulgence of passion has been excessive, the standard of what is 
 reasonable in ordinary human nature is to be applied.^" 
 
 200. Use of deadly weapon as indicating cool blood The character 
 
 of the weapon used may properly be considered in homicide, though 
 there was provocation, for the purpose of determining whether the 
 killing was based on malice or intent to kill, or upon provocation.^ 
 
 BRex V. Shaw, supra. be instructed that, if the weapon used 
 
 6Harri3 v. State, 155 Ind. 265, 58 N. waa not likely to produce death, it 
 
 E. 75. cannot be presumed that death was de- 
 
 'Eowley's Case, 12 Rep. 87 ; 1 Hale, P. signed ; and before conviction can be had 
 
 C. 453; Eoyley's Case, Cro. Jac. 296, for any degree of culpable homicide, they 
 
 Godb. 182; Post. C. L. 294; King v. must believe from the manner in which 
 
 Oneby, 2 Ld. Raym. 1498; Rex v. Thom- the weapon was used that it was in- 
 
 as, 7 Car. & P. 817 ; Griffin v. State, 40 tended by the accused to take the life of 
 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 312, 76 Am. St. Rep. the deceased. Griffin v. State, supra. 
 
 718, 50 S. W. 366. And see M'Whirt's sjudge v. State, 58 Ala. 406, 29 Am. 
 
 Case, 3 Graft. 594, 46 Am. Dec. 196. Rep. 757 ; Terape v. State, 40 Ala. 350. 
 
 Where a homicide is committed upon sJudge v. State, supra. 
 
 a sudden quarrel by throwing a beer loState v. McCants, 1 Speers, L. 384. 
 
 glass with fatal effect at the person iState v. Hoyt, 13 Minn. 132. Gil. 125; 
 
 killed, after being first struck by him, State v. Shippey, 10 Minn. 223, 88 Am. 
 
 the jury in a prosecution therefor should Dec. 70, Gil. 178; Sullivan v. State, 102 
 
S 200] MANSLAUGHTER 321 
 
 And the act of a person of preparing himself with a deadly weapon 
 previous to a combat, and using it to effect death, raises an inference 
 that the killing was in revenge rather than in hot blood. ^ And 
 where a homicide was committed with a deadly weapon the provo- 
 cation must have been very great to lower the grade of the crime from 
 murder to manslaughter.^ It must have been accompanied by un- 
 lawful violence or an apparent intention to do great bodily harm.* 
 But if the instrument or means used was one not likely or intended 
 to cause death a less degree of provocation is sufficient;' and the 
 mere fact that a deadly weapon was used does not per se make the 
 blow malicious ; if the act was the result of passion induced by ade- 
 quate provocation, that a deadly weapon was used is immaterial.® 
 And a person charged with murder committed in a sudden mutual 
 affray may show that his adversary was a powerful, violent, and 
 dangerous man for the purpose of explaining the fact that when the 
 affray began he immediately resorted to the use of a deadly weapon. '' 
 In Texas, manslaughter must be a voluntary killing, and if a homi- 
 ■cide is committed under the influence of sudden passion, by the use 
 of means in their nature not calculated to produce death, and in 
 the absence of an intention to kill, the circumstances not showing 
 an evil or cruel disposition, it is not manslaughter.® 
 
 201. Participation in duel as indicating cool blood ^The deliberate 
 
 killing of another in a duel is murder, however grievous the provo- 
 cation which led to the duel. ^ Where there was original malice be- 
 tween parties one of whom killed the other, in a duel, the fact that 
 there was a previous interchange of blows does not mitigate the of- 
 
 Ala. 135, 48 Am. St. Eep. 22, 15 So. 264; <State v. Way, supra. 
 
 State V. Grugin, 147 Mo. 39, 42 L.R.A. BState v. Shippey, 10 Minn. 223, 88 
 
 774, 71 Am. St. Eep. 553, 47 S. W. 1058; Am. Dec. 70, Gil. 178. 
 
 Seals V. State, 3 Baxt. 459. eSeals v. State, 3 Baxt. 459; State v. 
 
 2State V. Hoyt, supra; Ex parte Net- Curry, 46 N. C. (1 Jones, L.) 280; State 
 ties, 58 Ala. 268 ; Price v. State, 36 Miss. v. Barnwell, 80 N. C. 466. 
 531, 72 Am. Dec. 195; State v. Smith, 77 Where two persons meet and engage 
 N. C. 488 ; Stite v. Barnwell, 80 N. C. in a contest in which one of them draws 
 466; Fitzgerald v. State, 15 Lea, 99; a deadly weapon and kills the other, 
 Slaughter v. Com. 11 Leigh, 681, 37 Am. whether the crime is murder or man- 
 Dee. 638. And see Morris v. State slaughter depends upon whether the 
 (.4.1a.) 39 So. 608. killing was done with miliee afore- 
 
 aState v. Hoyt and State v. Shippey, thought. Doyal v. State, 70 Ga. 134. 
 .sitpra; State V. Harmon, 4 Penn. (Del.) 7Stite v. Floyd, 51 N. C. (6 Jones, 
 
 580, 60 Atl. 866; State v. Anderson, L.) 392. 
 
 Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 38; State v. sThorapson v. State, 24 Tex. App. 383, 
 
 Emory (Del.) 58 Atl. 1036; State v. 6 S. W. 296. 
 
 Hoekett, 70 Iowa, 442. 30 N. W. 742; HCing v. Rice, 3 East. 581; Reg. v. 
 
 State V. Crozier, 12 Nev. 300; State v. Young, 8 Car. & P. 644; Reg. v. Cuddy, 
 
 ^^•av, 38 S. C. 333, 17 S. E. 39; Reg. 1 Oar. & K. 209; Reg. v. Selton, 11 Cox, 
 
 V. Welsh, 11 Cox, C. C. 336. C. C. 674; Smith v. State, 1 Yerg. 228. 
 Hom.— 21. 
 
322 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 [§ 201 
 
 fense.* If the meeting to fight be intentional, no subsequent hot 
 blood will be a defense.^ And evidence of a mutual willingness t» 
 fight on the part of the parties to the homicide authorizes an in- 
 struction on murder in the second degree.* 
 
 202. Test as to sufficiency of — To mitigate a homicide from murder 
 to manslaughter there must have been not only passion or hot blood 
 arising from provocation, but also such passion or hot blood as would 
 naturally destroy the sway of reason and render the mind of an 
 ordinary person incapable of cool reflection, and produce what, ac- 
 cording to human experience, may be called an uncontrollable im- 
 pulse to do violence. ^ It must have been such as to render the mind 
 incapable of cool reflection,^ and to tend to lead ordinary men of 
 fair average disposition to act rashly and without judgment.'^ The 
 passion which will mitigate a homicide from murder to manslaughter, 
 however, need not be such as entirely to dethrone reason, or entirely 
 shut out knowledge and volition.* And it need not be so great aa 
 to render the slayer entirely incapable of deliberation or premedita- 
 
 zReg. V. Mawgridge, J. Kelyng, 121. 
 
 31 H'.wk. P. C. chap. 31, § 22; 1 Hale, 
 P. C. 453. And see supra, chapter VI., 
 § 5?; Bromwich's Case, 1 Lev. 180, 1 
 Sid. 277; 7 St. Tr. 42. 
 
 For a valuable collection of cases on 
 this point, see Mr. Townsend's Modern 
 State Trials, i. 151 et seq. 
 
 4 Wiley V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 65 S. W. 190. 
 
 1 State V. Davis, 50 S. C. 405, 62 Am. 
 St. Rep. 837, 27 S. E. 905; People v. 
 Freeland. 6 Cal. 96; Smith v. People, 1 
 Colo. 147; Gann v. State, 30 Ga. 67; 
 Nowacryk v. People, 139 111. 336, 28 K 
 E. 961 ; Crosby v. People, 137 111. 325, 27 
 N. E. 49; State v. Hoyt, 13 Minn. 132, 
 Gil. 125; State v. Grugin, 147 Mo. 39, 42 
 L.R.A. 774, 71 Am. St. Rep. 553, 47 S. 
 W. 1058; State v. Holme, 54 Mo. 153; 
 Brooks V. Com. 61 Pa. 352, 100 Am. Dec. 
 645; Sen Is v. State. 3 Baxt. 459; S wan- 
 ner V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 58 S. W. 
 72. 
 
 Self control determines malice in 
 homicide, and as long as this exists the 
 crime is murder in the first or in the 
 seco-'d degree, to be determined by facts 
 other than the varying degi-ees of 
 provocation. Reed v. Com. 98 Va. 817, 
 36 S. E. 399. 
 
 zPitts V. State, 29 Tex. App. 374, 16 
 S. W. 189; Nevland v. State, 13 Tex. 
 App. 549: Howard v. State, 23 Tex. 
 App. 265, 5 S. W. 231 ; Johnson v. State, 
 22 Tex. App. 206, 2 S. W. 609 ; Maria v. 
 
 State, 28 Tex. 698; Yancy v. State (Tex. 
 Crim. App.) 87 S. W. 693; Meuly v. 
 State, 26 Tex. App. 274, 8 Am. St. Rep. 
 477, 9 S. W. 563; Olds v. State, 44 Fla. 
 452, 33 So. 296; Rentfrow v. State, 123 
 Ga. 539, 51 S. E. 596. 
 
 sMaher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 81 
 Am. Dec. 781 ; People v. Lilley, 43 Mich. 
 521, 5 N. W. 982; Ryan v. State, 115 
 Wis. 488, 92 N. W. 271. 
 
 But temper means a disposition of the 
 mind to give way to anger, resentment, 
 or the like; and courage means that 
 quality of the mind which enables o-e to 
 encounter dangers or difficulties with 
 firmness, or without fear; and in char- 
 ging as to homicide under a statute pro- 
 viding that adequate cause to reduce 
 homicide to manslaughter means such as 
 would commonly produce a degree of 
 anger, rage, resentment, or terror in a 
 person of ordinary temper sufficient to 
 render the mind incapable of cool re- 
 flection, it is not proper to substitute the 
 expression "person of ordinary temper 
 and courage." Gardner v. State, 40 Tex. 
 Crim. Rep. 19, 48 S. W. 170. 
 
 4State V. Davis, 50 S. C. 405, 62 Am. 
 St. Rep. 837, 27 S. E. 905; Smith v. 
 State, 83 Ala. 26, 3 So. 551; Maher v. 
 People, supra; State v. Hill, 20 N. C. 
 629, (4 Dev. & B. L. 491) 34 Am. Dee. 
 396: Haile v. State, 1 Swan, 248; Young 
 v. State, 11 Humph. 200; People v. Cal- 
 ton, 5 Utah, 451, 16 Pac. 902. 
 
§ 202] MANSLAUGHTER. 323 
 
 tion." It is sufficient though he was not deprived of all reason, so 
 so as to be incapable of purpose or intention, if, being greatly ex- 
 cited, he was impelled to do the act by a sudden motive of revenge.® 
 And an instruction defining manslaughter, and authorizing the jury 
 to review all the circumstances of the case connected with that issue, 
 and to find that offense if they believed that the circumstances were 
 adequate to engender passion and render the mind of the accused 
 incapable of cool reflection, sufficiently presents the issue of man- 
 slaughter.'' Though telling the jury they must believe the kill- 
 ing was done in sudden heat of passion, apparently irresistible, to 
 warrant a finding of voluntary manslaughter, is not subject to the 
 objection that it requires the accused to show the existence of a 
 passion absolutely irresistible.* 
 
 203. Existence and sufficiency of, how determined. — It is the prov- 
 ince and duty of the court in a prosecution for homicide, to inform 
 the jury to what extent the passion must be aroused and reason ob- 
 scured to reduce the grade of the offense to manslaughter. ^ It should 
 define the meaning of heat of passion which will reduce homicide 
 from murder to manslaughter.^ And when extenuating circum- 
 stances exist in a prosecution for homicide, it is the duty of the court 
 to declare, as matter of law, whether they are sufficient to mitigate 
 the offense; but when the case is such that the court cannot fore- 
 see what the jury may find the provocation to have been, a general 
 and hypothetical instruction should be given.* So, cruelty making 
 a homicide murder, notwithstanding a legal provocation, where the 
 facts from which it is to be inferred all distinctly appear, is an 
 inference of law which is to be drawn by the court.* And where 
 the evidence in a prosecution for homicide is conflicting on the ques- 
 tion of mitigation, the court should instruct the jury as to what 
 facts or combination of facts would mitigate the offense to a lower 
 degree, which might be embraced in the indictment.® But whether 
 a provocation given did render the mind of the provoked person in- 
 capable of cool reflection is a question of fact for the jury." And 
 whether a homicide was due to passion arising from adequate provo- 
 
 BSeala v. State, 3 Baxt. 459. sState v. McKinzie, 102 Mo. 620, 15 
 
 «Quarles V. State, 1 Sneed, 407; Seals S. W. 149. „„ , 
 
 V. State, supra. ^ ^Un'ted Sta^tes v. Armstrong 2 Curt. 
 
 „_ oi * /m rn ■ . , C. C. 446, Fed. Cas. No. 14,467. 
 
 J^^'^J 7;. ^^^^ ^^^"^ ^""- ^^PP-' estate V. Jarrott, 23 N. C. (1 Ired. 
 45 S. W. 12. L J 7g 
 
 sDavis V. People, 114 111. 86, 29 N. E. BMarshall v. State, 40 Tex. 200. 
 102. eFranklin v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 iTaylor v. State, 6 Lea, 234. 48 S. W. 178. 
 
324 HOMICIDE. K 203 
 
 cation is a question of fact for the jury;^ and so is the question 
 whether there was passion or evidence of passion.* And in deter- 
 mining as to the existence of the requisite passion, previous in- 
 dignities and insults may be taken into consideration in connection 
 with the present provocation." And the jury must consider all the 
 circumstances, — the time which elapses, the prisoner's previous con- 
 duct, the deadly nature of the weapon, the repetition of the blows; 
 'because, though the law condescends to human frailty, it will not 
 indulge human ferocity. It considers man to be a rational being, 
 and requires that he should exercise a reasonable control over his 
 passions. * " 
 
 d. Cooling time. 
 
 204. Effect of, generally — While the rule is generally stated to 
 be that to reduce a homicide to manslaughter the provocation must 
 arise at the time of the commission of the offense,^ it need not be 
 offered at the exact time of the killing; all that is necessary is that 
 it was so recent that there was not time for the blood to cool.^ But 
 however great the provocation may have been, if there be sufficient 
 time for the passion to subside and for reason to interpose, the homi- 
 cide will be murder.^ Thus, in the case already given of an adulter- 
 er, if the husband kill him deliberately and upon revenge, there 
 having been sufficient cooling time, the provocation will not avail 
 
 THooks V. State, 99 Ala. 166, 13 So. Bush, 65 Cal. 129, 3 Pa«. 590; State v. 
 
 767 ; Judge V. State, 58 Ala. 406, 29 Am. GreRn, Houst. Grim. Rep. (Del.) 217; 
 
 Rep. 757; Roberson v. State, 43 Fla. 156, Hawkins v. State, 25 Ga. 207, 71 Am. 
 
 52 L.R.A. 751, 29 So. 535; People v. Dee. 166; Hill v. State, 64 Ga. 453; 
 
 Holmes, 111 Mich. 364, 69 S. W. 501; Hen.-ing v. State, 106 Ind. 386, 55 Am. 
 
 Meuly V. State, 26 Tex. App. 274, 8 Am. Rep. 7?6, 6 N. E. 803, 7 N. E. 4; Fer- 
 
 St. Rep. 477, 9 S. W. 563 ; Jones v. State, guson v. State, 40 Ind. 3,3 ; State v. Hovt, 
 
 33 Tex. Orim. Rep. 492, 47 Am. St. Rep. 13 Minn. 132, Gil. 125; Savary v. State, 
 
 46, 26 S. W. 1082; Mundine v. State, 37 62 Neb. 166, 87 N. W. 34; Brown v. 
 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 5, 38 S. W. 619; Halli- State, 62 N. J. L. 666, 42 Atl. 811; Peo- 
 
 burton v. State, 32 Tex. App. 51, 22 S. pie v. Kerrigan, 147 N. Y. 210, 41 N. E. 
 
 W. 48; West v. State, 2 Tex. App. 460; 494; State v. Hill, 20 N. C. 629 (4 Dev. 
 
 State V. Scott, 36 W. Va. 704, 15 S. E. & B. L. 491) 34 Am. Deo. 396; Co7n. v. 
 
 405; Stevenson v. United States, 162 U. Drum, 58 Pa. 9; State v. Jacobs, 28 S. 
 
 S. 313, 40 L. ed. 980, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. C. 29, 4 S. E. 799; Gregory v. State 
 
 839. (Tex. Crim. App.) 48 S. W. 577; 
 
 sjackson v. State, 6 Baxt. 453. M'Wliirt's Case, 3 Gratt. 594, 46 Am. 
 
 sMesser v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. Dec. 196; Watson v. Com. 87 Va. 608, 
 
 97, 63 S. W. 643. 13 S. E. 22; Stite v. Beatty, 51 W. Va. 
 
 lOReg. V. Kirkham, 8 Car. & P. 115. 232, 41 S. E. 434; Rex v. Hayward, 6 
 
 iSee supra, § 172. Car. & P. 157; Rex v. Lynch, 5 Car. & 
 
 zThurraan v. State, 4 Ohio C. C. 141. P. 324. And see Cole v. State (Tex. 
 
 sState V. ICotovsky, 74Mo. 247; Judge Crim. App.) 88 S. W. 341; Perry v. 
 
 V. State, 58 Ala. 406, 29 Am. Rep. 757; State, 117 Ga. 719, 45 S. E. 77. 
 Cates V. State, 50 Ala. 166; Lide v. And failure to instruct the jury as 
 
 State, 133 Ala. 43, 31 So. 953; People v. to the several degrees of manslaughter 
 
S' 204] MANSLAUGHTER. 325 
 
 in alleviation of the guilt.* And where a father was informed that 
 a man had wantonly whipped his son, a small boy, and on the even- 
 ing of the next day he met the man, and then beat and stamped 
 him with his fist and feet, while he was unresisting, with so much 
 violence that the man died from the effects of the beating on the 
 next night, it was held that this was murder, there being evidence of 
 deliberation.® So, if upon a sudden quarrel the parties agree to 
 fight upon the spot, or if, not having their weapons there, they pres- 
 ently, without any other matter intervening, fetch them and go into 
 the field and fight, and one fall, the jury may properly infer hot 
 blood, and hold the case manslaughter ;** yet if they appoint to fight 
 the next day, or even upon the same day at such an interval of 
 time as that passion might have subsided, or if, before any blows 
 passed, or words of anger, they agree to fight at a more conven- 
 ient place, or the fight otherwise appear to be upon deliberation, 
 and death ensue, it will be murder. ^ Whenever an interval of time 
 elapses between the provocation, or knowledge thereof, and the homi- 
 cide, an instruction as to cooling time should be given in a prose- 
 cution for the killing.* And rules with reference to cooling time 
 apply to homicide after, and growing out of, mutual combat, as well 
 as to other kinds.® The doctrine of cooling time, however, applies 
 only when there has been a legal provocation. * " 
 
 205. General rules as to sufficiency of. — Cooling time is a question 
 of reasonable time, depending upon all the facts and circumstances 
 of the particular case.* The law assigns no limit to the period re- 
 in a prosecution for homicide, in which 7Fost. C. L. 297; 1 Hale, P. C. 453; 
 they found a verdict of murder in the Legg's Case, J. Kelyng, 27; 1 Hawk. P. 
 first degree, is rot prejudicial to the C. chap. 31, §§ 22, 29; 4 Bl. Com. 191; 
 accused, though there was a provocation, 3 Inst. 51; King v. Morgan, 1 Bulst. 86; 
 where cooling time had intervened, and Morely's Case, 7 St. Tr. 421 ; J. Kelyng, 
 there was evidence of preparation, de- 54; Cromp. 23; 1 Sid. 287. For a very 
 liberation, and express malice. State v. interesting collection of cases on tnis 
 Yarhorough, 39 Kan. 581, 18 Pac. 474. point, see Mr. Townsend's Modern State 
 
 4Fost. C. L. 296; McNeill v. State, 102 Trials, i. 151 et seq. 
 Ala. 121, 48 Am. St. Rep. 17, 15 So. SMorrison v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 3.'5'?: Sa-swer v. htate, 35 Ind. 80; Mc- 519, 47 S. W. 369. 
 Carty v. Com. 114 Ky. C20, 71 S. W. 656; sPeople v. Sanchez, 24 Cal. 17. 
 Watson V. Com. supra. loState v. McNeill, 92 N. C. 812; 
 
 BM'Whirt's Case, supra. State v. Spivey, 132 N. C. 989, 43 S. E. 
 
 So, if a father sees a person in the 475; Jarvis v. State, 138 Ala. 17, 34 So. 
 act of committing an unnatural offeTse 1025. 
 
 with his child and instantly kills him, iState v. Grugin, 147 Mo. 39, 42 
 the killing would be manslaughter only, L.R.A. 774, 71 Am. St. Rep. 553, 47 S. 
 and that of the lowest degree; but if he W. 1058; State v. Yarlc jugh, 39 Kan. 
 only hears of it, and goes in search of 581, 18 Pac. 474; Maher v. People, 10 
 the person and finds and kills him, it is Mich. 212, 81 Am. Dee. 781 ; State v. 
 murder. Reg. v. Fisher, 8 Car. & P. 182. Moore, 09 N. C. 267; State v. McCants, 
 
 sRex V. Hayward, 6 Car. & P. 157 ; 1 Speersj L. 384. 
 Com. V. Hare, 2 Clark (Pa.) 467; Ex 
 parte Moore, 30 Ind. 197. 
 
32fi HOMICIDE. [§ 205 
 
 quired for the passions to cool; every case must depend upon its 
 own circumstances,^ and upon the nature and degree of the provo- 
 cation.^ If, between the passion and the killing, there was a space 
 or interval of time sufficient for an ordinary man to cool, that may 
 be deemed a reasonable time within the meaning of the rule on this 
 subject.* And if, between the provocation and the inflicting of the 
 mortal wound, the mind of the slayer is directed to, and taken up 
 by, any other subject, not in any manner connected with the quarrel, 
 it may be reasonably supposed that his attention was called away 
 from the subject of the provocation, so that any subsequent killing 
 of his adversary, without provocation, would be murder.® So, if 
 the prisoner displayed thought, contrivance, and design in the mode 
 of possessing himself of the weapon, and again in replacing it after 
 the blow was struck, such exercise of contrivance and design may be 
 regarded as indicating rather the presence of judgment and reason 
 than of violent and ungovernable passion." And any signs of de- 
 liberation or reflection would be evidence of cooling. '^ 
 
 The question is, however, as to the sufficiency of the period of time 
 for the passions of a reasonable and ordinary man to cool, and not 
 as to whether, in point of fact, the passions of the slayer had cooled.* 
 And the question of peculiar character and disposition will not be 
 considered with a view of ascertaining whether or not one person 
 might be subject to continued and irresistible passion to a greater or 
 less extent than another.® Nor is this rule affected by evidence of 
 
 zPeopIe V. Bushj 65 Cal. 129, 3 Pae. fatally defective, is objectionable as un- 
 
 590; People v. Worthington, 122 Cal. necessarily narrowing the inter^-al in 
 
 583, 55 Pac. 396 ; Territory v. Bannigan, question. State v. Baker, 13 Mont. 160, 
 
 1 Dak. 451, 46 N. W. 597 ; State v. Yar- 32 Pac. 647. 
 
 borough, supra; State v, Grayor, 89 Mo. sKilpatriek v. Com. 31 Pa. 198; Com. 
 
 600, 1 S. VV. 365; State v. Hall, 9 Nev. v. Green, and Com. v. Lenox, supra. 
 
 58; Kilpatrick v. Com. 31 Pa. 198; State 7State v. MeCants, 1 Speers, L. 384. 
 
 V. McCants, supra. The fact that a person wiped a knife 
 
 3Territory v. Bannigan, and State v. with which fatal wounds were inflicted, 
 
 Yarborough, supra. after their infliction, is neither so con- 
 
 4People V. Bush; State v, Yarbor- trolling nor so insignificant as to war- 
 
 ough; State v. Hall; Kilpatrick v. Com. rant an instruction that it is not evi- 
 
 and State v. McCants, supra; Hurst v. dence of murder; but it is a fact evin- 
 
 State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 378, 46 S. W. cing coolness and self-possession, and, as 
 
 635, 60 S. W. 719. And see Jarvis v. such, proper to be left to the jury in 
 
 State, 138 Ala. 17, 34 So. 1025. connection with other circumstances of 
 
 epeople v. Bush, 65 Cal. 129, 3 Pac. the case on the question of the existence 
 
 690 ; Com. v. Green, 1 Ashm. ( Pa. ) 289 ; of malice or sudden heat of passion. 
 
 Com. V. I^nox, 3 Brewst. (Pa.) 249. Pierson v. State, 12 Ala. 149. 
 
 Where the statute defining man- sPeople v. Sullivan, 7 N. Y. 396; 
 
 slaughter uses the expression "time for State v. Hall, 9 Nev. 58; State v. 
 
 the passions to cool" on the question of Holmes, 12 Wash. 169, 40 Pac. 735, 41 
 
 cooling, an instruction with reference Pac. 887 ; State v. McCants, supra. 
 
 to "sufficient time for the voice of reason sSmall v. Com, 91 Pa. 304; Hurst v. 
 
 to be heard," though, perhaps, not State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 378, 46 S. W. 
 
J 205] MAJ^SLAUGHTER. 327 
 
 insanity of the slayer, when he is given the full benefit thereof as a 
 .ground of acquittal; as to provocation and hot blood, this does not 
 remove him from the plane of ordinary persons. ' " 
 
 2C6. Instances. — The rule that, -where there has been sufficient time 
 for the passions to subside and for reason to interpose, a homicide 
 ■cannot be mitigated from murder to manslaughter on the ground 
 of provocation has been applied to a period of about two months 
 elapsing between the provocation and the killing.^ And prepara- 
 tion to commit a homicide several days beforehand negatives the 
 idea of heat of passion, though the original provocation was suffi- 
 ■cient.^ And the lapse of some twenty-four hours between the provo- 
 cation and the killing, together with the fact that the act causing 
 ■death was cruel and designed to do great bodily harm, sufficiently 
 negatives a killing in hot blood.* Nor could a quarrel between the 
 parties to a homicide three days before the killing tend to reduce 
 the grade of the crime, and evidence of the quarrel is properly re- 
 jected in a prosecution for the killing. * And no provocation, however 
 ■great, offered the day before a homicide can have the effect of re- 
 ■ducing it from murder to manslaughter;^ and six hours, with no in- 
 tervening difficulty, has been held to be sufficient cooling time. ^ And 
 so has about two hours, when accompanied with evidences of thought, 
 contrivance, and deliberation, '^ or when events calculated to divert 
 thought had occurred in the meantime.^ And the same has been 
 held of a period of about one bour;® and refusal to charge that ten 
 or fifteen minutes is not sufficient for the blood to cool, or for passion 
 
 ■635, 50 S. W. 719. But see Territory v. perusal of an alleged libel and the kill- 
 
 Bannigan, 1 Dak. 451, 46 N. W. 597; ing of the libeler by the person whom 
 
 Eex V. Lynch, 5 Car. & P. 324. he libeled renders the slayer guilty of 
 
 But an instruction in a prosecution murder, there having been sufficient cool- 
 
 for homicide with reference to cooling ing time. State v. Elliott, 11 Ohio Dee. 
 
 time, makirg the statement tnat some Reprint, 332. 
 
 people do not cool, and some do not want 4State v. Wilson, 16 Mo. App. 550; 
 
 io cool, is not objectionable as conveying Rockmore v. State, 93 6a. 123, 19 S. E. 
 
 to the jury the impression made upon 32. 
 
 the mind of the court by the testimony, BXowacryk v. People, 139 111. 336, 28 
 
 where the court correctly defined man- N. E. 061 ; State v. Elliott, supra; 
 
 slaughter, including cooling time. State State v. Beatty, 51 W. Va. 232, 41 S. E. 
 
 V. Sumner, 55 S. C. 32, 74 Am. St. Rep. 430. 
 
 707, 32 S. E. 771. estate v. Grayor, 89 Mo. 600, 1 S. W. 
 
 lOHurst V. State, supra. 365. And Legg's Case, J. Kelyg, 27. 
 
 iStewart v. State, 66 Ga. 90. 'State v. Yarborough, 39 Kan. 581, 
 
 zState V. Kotovsky, 74 Mo. 247. 18 Pac. 474. And see Ricks v. State 
 
 sM'Whirt's Case, 3 Gratt. 594, 46 Am. (Tex. Crim. App.) 87 S. W. 1036. 
 
 Dec. 196. Ard see State v. Powell, 109 sCom. v. Aiello, 180 Pa. 597, 36 Atl. 
 
 La. 727, 33 So. 748; Lide v. State, 133 1079. 
 
 Ala. 43, 31 So. 953. 9Rex v. Oneby, 2 Strange, 766, 2 Ld. 
 
 And the expiration of over twenty- Raym. 1485. 
 
 four hours between the publication and 
 
328 HOMICIDE. [§ 20ft 
 
 to subside, has been upheld where there was evidence of preparation 
 and deliberation.^" So, a period of some four or five minutes elaps- 
 ing between the provocation and the killing has been held to require 
 a charge on cooling time. ^ ^ 
 
 207. Different combats or encotrnters In order to mitigate a hom- 
 icide committed in a second combat by what occurred at a previous 
 one, which had fairly begun on the sudden, both contests must be 
 considered as making one combat, or the first, as a separate combat^ 
 must be considered as a sufficient sudden provocation for either a 
 second combat, or for a subsequent attack producing a contest not 
 entitled to be called a mutual combat.^ In such case the crime is 
 murder or manslaughter according to the time intervening and the 
 opportunity for cooling.^ Where one of the parties to a combat re- 
 tires from it, goes some distance and arms himself, and returns and 
 kills his adversary the act may be attributed to revenge, and not 
 to provocation.* And the rule is the same where suiKcient time had 
 transpired, not only for the deceased to adjust himself after the 
 fight and walk deliberately 225 yards, but for the prisoner after- 
 wards to pass over the same ground.* So, evidence that after an 
 affray one of the parties to it retired to a remote comer of the room, 
 with the evident intention of avoiding the other, and that after an 
 opportunity to reflect the other seized a dangerous weapon and re- 
 newed the attack, is persuasive proof of a deliberate and determined 
 
 lostate V. Woods, 97 Mo. 31, 10 S. again, but after the second assault 
 
 W. 157. And see Hayraan v. State abandons the difficulty and flees, wnen 
 
 (Tex. Crim. App. ) 83 S. W. 204. the. latter shoots him after such abin- 
 
 uBrownlee v. State (Tex. Crim. donment, an instruction that if suf- 
 
 App.) 87 S. W. 1153. ficient time hpA elapsed for the passion 
 
 iState V. McCants, 1 Spears, L. 384; or emotion of the accused to subside and 
 
 Castro V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 40 his reason to resume its sway, then the 
 
 S. W. 985. question of sudden passion and ade- 
 
 zFitzpatrick v. State, 37 Ark. 238; quate cause should not be considered, is 
 
 Franks v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 88 improper as limiting adequate cause and 
 
 S. W. 9?3. cooling time to the first difficulty, and 
 
 sHawkins v. State, 25 Ga. 207, 71 foreclosing any consideration of ade- 
 Am. Dec. lOfi; Smith v. State, 103 Ala. quate cause upon the second difficulty. 
 4, 15 So. 843; (Jates v. State, 50 Ala. Cooper v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 89 
 166: Sparks v. Com. 12 Ky. L. Rep. 402, S. W. 1068. 
 14 S. W. 417; People v. Kerrigan, 147 4State v. McCants, supra. 
 N. Y. 210. 41 N. E. 494; Com. v. Hare, 2 And evidence of provocation or in- 
 Clnrk (Pa.) 467; Cooper v. State (Tex. juries received on a previous occasion 
 Crim. App.) 85 S. W. 1059; Tyler v. by the accused from the person whom 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 90 S. W. 33; he has killed is inadmissible in a prose- 
 Rex V. Hnyvrard, 6 Car. & P. 157. And cution for the killing, where the crime 
 see Richardson v. State (Miss.) 28 So. was committed without any circum- 
 817. stances tending to make out self-defense. 
 
 But where one person assaults another or to reduce the grade of the crime, 
 
 and the latter leaves, but afterwards Andersen v. Uniited Sta.tes, 170 U. S. 
 
 goes back, and the former assaults him 481, 43 L. ed. 1116, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 689. 
 
§ 207] MANSLAUGHTER. 329 
 
 purpose to inflict injury, as distinguished from action under provo- 
 cation of the previous affray.® And where a violent altercation in 
 ■words had taken place between two persons, who, after being sepa- 
 rated for between five and ten minutes, again came together, and, 
 after another altercation, one shot the other, the killing is murder, 
 and not manslaughter.® And where the accused and the deceased 
 had two affrays witJi an interval between of about an hour, during 
 which time they were out of sight and hearing of each other, though 
 traveling in the same direction on their way toward their respective 
 homes, the second affray is not a continuation of the first, so as to 
 render competent evidence of statements of the deceased or his com- 
 rades, made in such interval and in the absence of the accused, as to 
 what had happened, or what they thought the intentions of the ac- 
 cused were.'' 
 
 Where the whole transaction is single and continuous in its nature, 
 however, it cannot be treated as two distinct transactions with an 
 interval between, for the purpose of raising the question of cooling 
 time,^ and in such ease no charge as to cooling time is required;® 
 though even in such case the offense may be murder, since the slayer 
 may have been the aggressor or person in fault all the way through 
 the affair in question.^** So, where two persons quarrel and one 
 strikes the other, and they separate, but shortly afterwards again 
 meet and quarrel, and the person struck in the former quarrel kills 
 the other, no previous blow having been struck in the second quarrel, 
 the court in a prosecution for the killing should charge upon man- 
 slaughter predicated upon the first assault, and, in connection there- 
 with, upon cooling time. ^ ^ And though the slayer had gone away 
 and armed himself and returned, the killing may still be man- 
 slaughter, where the slayer was the weaker man and was severely 
 
 BPeople V. Kelly, 7 N. Y. Crim. Rep. passion engendered by the attack upon 
 
 40. the house to cool. Larson v. State 
 
 estate v. McNeill, 92 N. C. 812. (Tex. Crim. App.) 29 S. W. 782. 
 
 '■State V. Potter, 13 Kan. 414. sHurd v. People, 25 Mich. 412; People 
 
 So, where armed persons attacked a v. Worthington, 122 Gal. 583, 55 Pac. 
 
 house, using a;busive and violent Ian- 396 ; State v. Norris, 2 N. C. (IHayw.) 
 
 guage, by throwing missiles against the 429, 1 Am. Dec. 564. And see Prior v. 
 
 door and breaking a window, but after- State, 77 Ala. 56; Com. v. Hare, 2 Clark 
 
 wards desisted, upon which the pro- (Pa.) 467; Yancy v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 prietor went to the police station, after App.) 87 S. W. 693; Ivory v. State (Tex. 
 
 which they again attacked the house as Crim. App.) 87 S. W. 699; Rex v. Lynch, 
 
 before, and the son of the proprietor 5 Car. & P. 324 ; Hancock v. State, (Tex. 
 
 went out to see that no harm came to Crim. App.) 83 K. W. 696. 
 
 his father, and on the way met one of sivory v. Stote, supra. 
 
 the assaila-ts of the house, and after loState v. Dillon, 74 Iowa, 653, 38 S. 
 
 some controversy shot and killed him, it W. 525. 
 
 is a question for the jury whether suf- n Castro v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 ficient time had elapsed to allow the 40 S. W. 985. 
 
330 HOMICIDE. [§ 207 
 
 punished, and the interval between the ptinishment and the killing 
 was very small. ^ ' And the rule would appear to be the same where 
 the purpose of returning was not the unjustifiable one of gratifying 
 spite, or obtaining satisfaction, but the justifiable one of securing 
 property wrongfully withheld from him by the deceased. ^^ Nor 
 can a charge on former provocation be called for unless the state 
 relies on some former grudge or provocation, and some recent occur- 
 rence has transpired to cut off such former provocation; such a 
 charge is not called for where the parties had an altercation late 
 the evening before the night of the homicide in question, which 
 caused it or led up to it^* And where a husband catches a man 
 in the attempt to commit a rape upon his wife, and permits him 
 to escape, with threats of punishment if he should remain in the 
 city, and the next morning the culprit boldly and unblushingly re- 
 sumes his seat at table in the immediate neighborhood of the wife, 
 whereupon the husband shoots at him, the act of the culprit in 
 remaining and resuming his place near the wife is a renewed provo- 
 cation preventing the application of the rule with reference to cool- 
 ing time; and in a prosecution for the shooting the occurrences of 
 the preceding evening may properly be given in evidence.*® 
 
 208. Sufficiency; how determined — Whether there was sufficient 
 cooling time after a provocation to prevent a killing resulting there- 
 from from being done in hot blood, so as to reduce it from murder 
 to manslaughter, is a question of fact for the jury, to be determined 
 upon consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case in 
 hand.* And every part of the conduct of the prisoner, as well 
 words as acts, tending to show deliberation and coolness on the one 
 side, or continued anger and resentment on the other, should be con- 
 
 12 state V. Norris, 2 N. C. (1 Hayw.) issue is fundamental error. Baltrip v. 
 
 429, 1 Am. Dec. 564; McDuffie v. State, State, 30 Tex. App. 545, 17 S. W. 1106. 
 DO Ga. 786, 17 S. E. 105; Ex parte Moore, i^Biggs v. State, 29 Ga. 723, 76 Am. 
 
 30 Ind. 197. Deo. 630. 
 
 1 schism V. State (Tex. Grim. App.) iStete v. Grugin, 147 Mo. 39, 42 
 
 78 S. W. 949. L.R.A. 774, 71 Am. St. Rep. 553, 47 S. 
 
 HYaney v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) W. 1058; Gladden v. State, 12 Fla. 562; 
 
 87 S. W. 693. Smith v. State, 49 Ga. 482; Ga,nn v. 
 
 And where one person assaulted and State, 30 Ga. 67; Eoss v. State, 59 Ga. 
 
 abused and maltreated another, and de- 248; White v. State, 118 Ga. 787, 45 S. 
 
 sisted from his violent conduct only E. 595; Creek v. State, 24 Ind. 151; 
 
 when forced to do so by others, and upon State v. Decklotts, 19 Iowa, 447 ; State 
 
 their next meeting upon the same day v. Yarborough, 39 Kan. £S1, 18 Pac. 474; 
 
 used language and threats and made State v. Cooper, 112 La. 281, 104 Am. 
 
 demonstrations tending to show that he St. Rep. 447, 36 So. 350; Maher v. Peo- 
 
 waa about to renew his former provoea- pie, 10 Mich. 212, 81 Dee. 781 ; People 
 
 tion, upon which the other shot and v. Holmes, 111 Mich. 364, 69 N. W. 501; 
 
 killed him, an issue of manslaughter is McCann v. People, 6 Park. Crim. Rep. 
 
 presented, and a failure to submit such 629; People v. Sullivan, 7 N. Y. 396; 
 
§ 208] MANSLAUGHTER. 331 
 
 sidered, in order to conduct the jury to a proper result. ^ So, wheth- 
 er the immediate aflfray resulting in death may be considered as a 
 separate and distinct encounter, or whether the whole transaction 
 was single and continuous, is a question of fact for the jury.^ What 
 constitutes sufficient cooling time, however, is a question of law, and 
 not of fact, the court being required to decide it preliminarily to 
 the admission or exclusion of evidence offered in mitigation of a 
 homicide.* While the question of time is for the jury, the effect 
 of that time on the defendant is for the court.® And uncontradicted 
 evidence of repeated opportunities to resent the provocation not acted 
 upon, and of preparation to kill, and of deliberate action against an 
 unarmed and unwarned antagonist, will warrant an instruction that 
 the slayer had cooling time.® 
 
 e. Burden of proof of provocation. 
 
 209. Consideration of — In a prosecution for homicide in which a 
 deliberate killing amounting to murder has been established, in order 
 to reduce the killing to manslaughter, it is as essential to the accused 
 to prove provocation as it is, in self-defense, to prove that he was 
 not the aggressor.* And the existence of facts showing provocation, 
 does not necessarily involve the issue of guilt, and therefore may 
 be established by a preponderance of proof.'* But an instruction to 
 this effect shonld be accompanied by one that, on the whole case, the 
 guilt of the accused must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, so 
 
 People V. Kerrigan, 147 N. Y. 210, 41 N. the garden and over a brush fence and 
 
 E. 494; Com. v. Lenox, 3 Brewst. (Pa.) off of the premises, and stands there 
 
 249 ; State v. Jacobs, 28 S. C. 29, 4 S. daring the other to come out, and threat- 
 
 E. 799: Underwood v. State, 25 Tex. ening him if he does, and the other fol- 
 
 Supp. 389 ; Johnson v. State, 30 Tex. lows and kills him, the question whether 
 
 748; Larson v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) the heat of passion caused by the blow 
 
 29 S. W. 782; Mundine v. State, 37 Tex. and the kicking continued, so as to miti- 
 
 Crim. Rep. 5, 38 S. W. 619; State v. gate the offense, or whether the killing 
 
 Beatty, 51 W. Va. 232, 41 S. E. 434; was upon malice, is one of fact for the 
 
 Queen v. Eagle, 2 Fost. & F. 827 ; Rex v. jury in a prosecution therefor. Queen 
 
 Kessal, 1 Car. & P. 437; Rex v. Taylor, v. McDowell, 25 U. C. Q. B. 108. 
 
 6 Burr. 2793; Fost. C. L. 299. But see 4Ragland v. State, 125 Ala. 12, 27 So. 
 
 Territory v. Bannigan, 1 Dak. 451, 46 983 ; State v. Moore, 69 N. C. 267 ; State 
 
 N. W. 597. V. Sizemore, 52 N. C. (7 Jones, L.) 206; 
 
 zState V. Hill, 20 N. C. 629 (4 Dev. Reg. v. Fisher, 8 Car. & P. 182. 
 
 & B. L. 491 ) 34 Am. Dec. 396. 6Reg. v. Fisher, supra. 
 
 sPeople V. Worthington, 122 Cal. 583, eRagland v. State, supra. 
 
 55 Pac. 396; People v. Kerrigan, 147 N. iBurrows v. Urited States (Ind. 
 
 Y. 210, 41 N. E. 494. And see Castro v. Terr.) 90 S. W. 8; Com. v. York, 9 Met. 
 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 40 S. W. 985. 93, 43 Am. Dec. 373; Com. v. Webster, 
 
 And where a person is struck by an- 5 Cush. 295. 52 Am. Dec. 711. 
 
 other and kicked severely while lying on a See People v. Stonecifer, 6 Cal. 405; 
 
 the floor or ground, and afterwards the People v. Arnold, 15 CaL 476. 
 person making the assault goes across 
 
332 HOMICIDE. 18 209 
 
 that the jury may understand that it is sufficient for the accused to 
 show facts raising in their minds a reasonable doubt as to his guilt* 
 "Where there is any evidence tending to show excuse or extenuation, 
 it is for the jury to draw the proper inferences of fact from the 
 whole evidence, and decide the fact upon which the excuse or ex- 
 tenuation depends, according to the preponderance of evidence. Where 
 there is evidence on both sides, it is hardly possible to imagine a 
 case in which there will not be a preponderance of proof on one side 
 or the other. But if the case or the evidence should be in equilibrio, 
 the presumption of innocence will turn the scale in favor of the ac- 
 cused. * The fact of provocation must be shown by a preponderance 
 of proof; as to the inference of malice, a reasonable doubt must 
 acquit. ® We have seen, however, that proof of provocation is merely 
 a means of disproving malice. The burden of rebutting the infer- 
 ence or presumption of malice and of proving provocation, there- 
 fore, is necessarily the same, and what is here said with reference 
 to the burden of proof of provocation should be read and considered 
 in connection with what is said with reference to the burden of re- 
 butting the presumption of malice, and with reference to presump- 
 tions and inferences as to degrees and their characteristics in pre- 
 vious chapters. " And proof of self-defense being also a means of dis- 
 proving malice, the discussion of that subject in a subsequent chapter 
 might also be profitably considered in this connection.'' 
 
 III. InVOLUNTAEY MAliTSLAUGHTEE ; TrNINTENDED KILLING IN COM- 
 MISSION OF MINCE UNLAWFUL ACT CE CF ACT UNLAWFULLY PEE- 
 FOEMED. 
 
 a. What constitutes. 
 210. Definition and constitutent elements The common-law defi- 
 nition of involuntary manslaughter was given in a previous chapter 
 of this work.^ Under the various statutes dividing manslaughter 
 into degrees, involuntary manslaughter remains substantially un- 
 changed, their only effect, generally speaking, being to label it man- 
 slaughter in some particular degree, instead of involuntary man- 
 slaughter. Thus, manslaughter in the first degree under the New 
 
 aTignor v. State (Ark.) 89 S. W. 43 Me. 11; State v. Bertrand, 3 Or. 61; 
 
 96. State v. Conally, 3 Or. 69; State v. Pat- 
 
 4Com. V. York, 9 Met. 93, 43 Am. Dec. terson, 45 Vt. 308, 12 Am. Rep. 200. 
 373. See this case reported and reviewed sSee supra, chapter VIII., §§ 93 et 
 
 in 2 Bennett & H. Lead. Cases, 504. seq.; chapter IX., §§ 147 et seq. 
 
 eSee Com. v. Hawkins, 3 Gray, 463; 7 See infra, chapter XII., §§ 340 et 
 
 Com. V. Heath, 11 Gray, 303; Tweedy seq. 
 V. State, 5 Iowa, 434; State v. Kaight, iSee supra, chapter I., { & 
 
■S 210] MANSLAUGHTER. 333 
 
 York statute consists of homicide committed -without a design to 
 effect death, by a person committing, or attempting to commit, a mis- 
 demeanor affecting the person or property, either of the person killed 
 or of another.^ And manslaughter in the first degree in Wisconsin 
 is the killing of a human being without design to effect death, by the 
 act, procurement, or culpable negligence of another, while such other 
 is engaged in the perpetration of any crime or misdemeanor not 
 amounting to a felony ; but the killing must have been such as would 
 have been murder at common law.^ So, in Ohio, involuntary man- 
 slaughter is the unintentional destruction of life while the slayer is 
 in the commission of some unlawful act other than arson, rape, rob- 
 bery, or burglary.* Involuntary manslaughter in the commission of 
 a lawful act, however, is not punishable in Georgia, unless such 
 act was done without caution and circumspection.® And the crime 
 of manslaughter under the Florida statute, in wilfully killing an un- 
 born child by injury to the mother, is sufficiently made out where it 
 appears that the injury to the mother was inflicted by an unprovoked 
 use of a club of such dangerous dimensions as to render such death 
 probable, under such circumstances as would have made it murder 
 had the injury resulted in the death of the mother." And a per- 
 son committing an assault and battery upon another, from which 
 death results, may be convicted of manslaughter in the first degree 
 imder the Wisconsin statute, where such malice aforethought existed 
 as would make it murder at common law.'' 
 
 211. Involuntary manslaughter distinguished from other classes of 
 homicide. — The will concurring with, or directing, the act fixes the 
 grade of the crime of manslaughter, and furnishes the test as to 
 whether or not it is voluntary or involuntary, or manslaughter in 
 the first or second degree, under a statute substantially dividing man- 
 slaughter into degrees corresponding with the common-law division 
 into voluntary and involuntary manslaughter.^ Voluntary and in- 
 voluntary manslaughter differ from each other in that, in the first, 
 the unlawful killing is voluntary ; that is to say, the killing is done 
 by design, or intentionally or purposely; and in the second the kill- 
 ing is involuntary ; that is, done without any design, intention, or pur- 
 
 zPeople V. Cole, 2 N. Y. Crim. Eep. BOverby v. State, 115 Ga. 240, 41 S. 
 108; People v. Fitzsimmons, 69 N. Y. S. E. 609 „. . „ ^, 
 
 E. 191, 34 N. y. Supp. 1102. sWilliams v. State, 34 Fla. 217, 15 So. 
 
 sEowan v. State, 30 Wis. 129, 11 Am. .'^ow^n v. State, 30 Wis. 129, 11 Ara. 
 
 KeP- °°^- Eep. 559; State v. Hammond, 35 Wis. 
 
 4State V. Brooks, 1 Ohio Dec. Ee- 315. 
 
 print, 407. lOliver v. State, 17 Ala. 587. 
 
334 HOMICIDE. R 211 
 
 pose of killing, but in the commission of some unlawful act, or in the 
 improper performance of some lawful act.^ And the word "wil- 
 fully" in an indictment charging manslaughter to have been wilfully 
 done means intentionally and voluntarily, as distinguished from ac- 
 cidentally and involuntarily.' If one intended to do an act which 
 caused death, and the act was one likely to endanger life, the killing 
 is voluntary though he did not intend that the act shduld cause 
 death; but if he did not intend to do the act which caused death, 
 but did intend to do some other unlawful or improper act, and 
 the act causing death resulted accidentally and unintentionally there- 
 from, the killing is involuntary.* And one who kills another by 
 striking him with a knife for the purpose of causing him to release 
 his hold upon a third person, is guilty of voluntary, and not in- 
 voluntary, manslaughter, where death resulted, since his act is one 
 likely to endanger life.® There is a distinction between the unin- 
 tentional doing of an act which causes death and the intentional do- 
 ing of an act likely to endanger life, not intending to kill, but which, 
 through the accidental intervention of an independent force, re- 
 sults in death, the killing not being involuntary in the latter case." 
 And though the destroying of human life was unintentional, it may 
 be murder, and not manslaughter, if the act producing the death was 
 done intentionally, and was one likely to cause death; as, where a 
 blow with a deadly weapon was directly aimed at the deceased.^ 
 So, in involuntary manslaughter, unlike murder or voluntary man- 
 slaughter, there can, of course, be no intention to kill. * And error in 
 
 JAdams v. State, 65 Ind. 563; Ander- sWarren v. Com. 99 Ky. 370, 35 S. 
 
 son V. State, 3 Heisk. 86. W. 1028. 
 
 sState V. Windahl, 95 Iowa, 470, 64 N. And where the evidence in a prose- 
 
 W. 420. cntion for homicide shows that the ac- 
 
 iSee Warren v. Com. 99 Ky. 370, 35 cused either did not kill the deceased a'. 
 
 S. W. 1028; Trimble v. Com. 78 Ky. all, or killed him while defending him- 
 
 176; Owens v. Com. 22 Ky. L. Rep. 514, self against another, or while attempt- 
 
 68 S. W. 422; McManus v. State, 36 ing to kill another, and there is no 
 
 Ala. 285; Roberts v. United States, 61 evidence of a shooting with an intent 
 
 C. C. A. 427, 126 Fed. 897; Bliss v. to kill deceased, an instruction as to 
 
 State, 117 Wis. 596, 94 N. W. 325; Dean involuntary manslaughter, upon the 
 
 V. State, 116 Ga. 534, 42 S. E. 750; theory that there is no distinctinn in 
 
 Hntcher v. State, 116 Ga. 617, 42 S. E. principle between the unintentional dis- 
 
 1018. charge of a pistol, and the glancing of 
 
 The act of one person of cutting an- a bullet to a place where it could not 
 
 other with a knife 2% inches long, and have been expected to strike, is properly 
 
 causing his death, will not sustain a refused. Ibid. 
 
 charge as to involuntary manslaughter, 7iSullivan v. State, 102 Ala. 135, 48 
 
 though the slayer did not intend to kill Am. St. Rep. 22, 15 So. 264. 
 
 the deceased, since such a weapon is 8 Jackson v. State, 76 Ga. 473; Smith 
 
 one likely to endanger life. Ross v. v. State, 73 Ga. 79; Fields v. State, 52 
 
 Com. 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1344, 55 S. W. 4. Ala. 348; Bivens v. State, 11 Ark. 455; 
 
 5lbid. People v. Bealoba, 17 Cal. 389; State 
 
§ 211] MAiNSLAUGHTEK. 335 
 
 charging or admitting evidence as to murder or voluntary man- 
 slaughter is not ground for a reversal or a new trial when the con- 
 viction was for involuntary manslaughter.® It has been asserted, 
 however, that the distinction between voluntary and involuntary 
 manslaughter is now, so far as concerns the common law, obsolete. ^ ** 
 And, unless it should be required by statute, the terms "voluntary" 
 and "involuntary" are not now introduced either in indictment, 
 verdict, or sentence. In each of the cases just specified the offense is 
 simply charged as "manslaughter ;" and "manslaughter" is the term 
 used by the jury in case of conviction. But where a distinction is 
 made by statute, a person indicted for voluntary manslaughter can- 
 not be convicted of involuntary manslaughter. ^ ^ 
 
 So, involuntary manslaughter differs from homicide excusable by 
 misadventure in that misadventure always happens in consequence 
 of a lawful act, while involuntary manslaughter happens in conse- 
 quence of an unlawful one, or of a lawful act unlawfully or negli- 
 gently done. * * It is for the jury, and not for the court, in a prose- 
 cution for homicide, to determine whether the question of involuntary 
 manslaughter enters into the case.** 
 
 b. Classes of. 
 
 212. The division and disposition. —It is to be observed that in- 
 voluntary manslaughter at common law, as well as under most of 
 the statutes, is divided into two classes; first, homicide resulting 
 from the doing of a lawful act in an unlawful or negligent manner, 
 and second, homicide in the commission of a minor unlawful act. 
 This results naturally from the common-law definition of involuntary 
 manslaughter, and since the various statutes dividing involuntary 
 manslaughter into degrees have done little but give new names to 
 previously existing classes, the distinction will be found to exist un- 
 
 V. Johnson, 40 Coin. 136; Beauchamp sion of the court to instruct as to jn- 
 
 V. State, 6 Blaekf. 299; Siberry v. voluntary manslaughter cannot be first 
 
 State. 149 Ind. g84, 39 N. E. 936, 47 N. complained of on appeal. Adams v. 
 
 E. 45S; State v. Robertson, 178 Mo. 496, State, 65 Ind. 565. 
 
 77 S. W. 528; Donnelly v. State, 26 N. J. 9Chapman v. State, 120 Ga. 855, 48 
 
 L. 465; People v. Mulvey, 2 Edm. Sel. S. E. 350; Siberry v. State, supra. 
 
 Cas. 246; Com. v. Green, 1 Ashm. (Pa.) loUnited States v. Meagher, 37 Fed. 
 
 289 ; Keenan v. Com. 44 Pa. 55, 84 Am. 875. 
 
 Dec. 414; Com. v. Lewis, Addison (Pa.) nBruner v. State, 58 Ind. 159; Com. 
 
 279; Com. v. Dougherty, 1 Browne (Pa.) v. Gable, 7 Serg. & R. 423; Walters v. 
 
 Appx. XVIII. Cora. 44 Pa. 135. 
 
 But while an instruction in a prosecu- 12 Bias v. United States, 3 Ind. Terr, 
 tion for homicide ignoring the idea that 27, 53 S. W. 471; Trimble v. Com. 78 
 there could be a manslaughter without Ky. 176. 
 an intent to kill is erroneous, the omis- isBruner v. State, supra. 
 
336 HOMICIDE. [§ 212 
 
 der tbem between the corresponding degrees of the crime. Homicide 
 in the doing of a lawful act unlawfully or negligently is usually 
 designated in the cases, and soraetimes in the statutes, as negligent 
 homicide. This, owing to its scope and importance, has been made 
 the subject of a separate chapter of this work. ^ Involuntary man- 
 slaughter by unintentionally causing death in the commission of a 
 minor unlawful act is considered in the following subdivisions of 
 this chapter. 
 
 c. Involuntary manslaughter in the commission of minor unlawful 
 
 act. 
 
 1. The preliminary unlawful act. 
 
 213. Nature of and unlawfulness generally There is a distinction 
 
 on the question of homicide in the commission of misdemeanors and 
 acts not calculated to destroy life, between acts merely malum pro- 
 hibitum and acts malum in se, and to render a killing punishable 
 when the design was to do some other act, the designed act must 
 have been one which was bad in itself and done with an evil intent. * 
 And where an act is merely mahim, prohibitum, as, where an ordi- 
 nance declares it to be illegal, without reference to a wrong motive, 
 and it may be violated though there is an entire want of evil design, 
 its violation does not supply the intent to do another act which re- 
 quires a criminal intent, so as to render one punishable for a homicide 
 unintentionally resulting from such prohibited act.^ Acts malum 
 in se, in doing which one may be punished for another act done 
 without design, within these rules include, in addition to felonies, 
 all breaches of the public order, injuries to persons or property, out- 
 
 iSee infra, chapter XXII. lawful; such an act done in the exercise 
 
 Negligence is not necessarily a con- of due care is, at most, merely malum 
 
 stituent element of manslaughter in the prohibitum, arid the mere unlawfulness 
 
 second degree. Benjamin v. State, 121 of it does not per se render the doer of 
 
 Ala. 26j 25 So. 917. it liable criminally for undesigned and 
 
 iCom. V. Adams, 114 Mass. 323, 19 improbable consequences; to render him 
 
 Am. Rep. 362; Potter v. State, 162 Ind. liable it must also appear that he did 
 
 213, 64 L.R.A. 942, 102 Am. St. Rep. the unlawful act under conditions which 
 
 198, 70 N. E. 129; Estell v. State, 51 were dangerous to the toll-gate keeper, 
 
 N. J. L. 182, 17 Atl. 118; State v. Hor- such as that he drove through the gate 
 
 ton, 139 N. C. 588, 1 L.R.A. (N.S.) 991, at a rapid pace, or urged his team on 
 
 51 S. E. 945. after it had been seized by the keeper, 
 
 2Com. V. Adams, and State v. Hor- or when, from their known fractious- 
 ton, supra. ness, it was hazardous to stop them; 
 
 A person is not chargeable with the the criminality in such ease consisting 
 
 death of a toll gate keeper by reason of the two elements of the unlawfulness 
 
 of the fact that he attempts to pass of the act, and the unlawfulness and 
 
 through the toll-gate without paying his danger in the mode of its execution, 
 
 toll, on the theory that the act was un- Estell v. State, supra. 
 
5 213] MANSLAUGHTER. 337 
 
 rages upon the public decency or good morals, and breaches of official 
 duty, when done wilfully or corruptly.^ They are acts which are 
 naturally evil as judged by the sense of a civilized community.* And 
 acts malum prohibitum in doing which one may not be punished for 
 another act resulting therefrom, done without design or by mistake, 
 include any matter forbidden or commanded by statute, but not 
 otherwise wrong,® such as the carrying of a concealed weapon in 
 violation of law.® 
 
 But while homicide perpetrated in the commission of some unlaw- 
 ful act is manslaughter, though the death of the person killed was 
 not intended, yet the unlawful act must be wilful, and not a mere 
 misadventure.^ If the act is unlawful, but not a felony, and though 
 not directly dangerous, yet sufficiently so to come under the con- 
 demnation of the law, and an unintended death results from it, the 
 homicide is involuntary manslaughter.* And the fact that an act 
 which caused the death of a person was not a misdemeanor at com- 
 mon law does not prevent such homicide from being manslaughter 
 where the act is made a misdemeanor by statute." And it is not 
 necessary that the person doing the unlawful act should have intended 
 to violate the law, since the law presumes every person familiar 
 with its provisions, and he should have anticipated the consequences 
 , of his act. * " Within these rules an intent to hold possession of prop- 
 
 »Coni. V. Adams, supra. a human being, without malice, in the 
 
 <State V. Horton, supra. commission of an unlawful act not 
 
 Adultery under the Texas statute is a amounti g to a felony, or in the com- 
 
 misdemeanor, and if a man is caught in mission of a lawful act, which might 
 
 the act of adultery with the wife of produce death, in an unlawful manner, 
 
 another, and the husband assaults the or without due caution and circum- 
 
 adulterer, and in resisting the assault spection, against one who, while intoxi- 
 
 the adulterer takes the husband's life, cated, drove his team through the prin- 
 
 the act is manslaughter, since he was cipal street of a town in a reckless man- 
 
 <!Ommitti"g a misdemeanor which ner ard at an unusual rate of speed, 
 
 brought about the necessity for the kill- running over and killing a woman who 
 
 ing. Reed v. State, 11 Tex. App. 509, 40 attempted to cross the street, should rest 
 
 Am. Rep. 795. on the commission of an act done with- 
 
 6Com. V. Adams, 114 Mass. 323, 19 out due caution and circumspection, and 
 
 Am. Rep. 362. not upon the commission of a ■ unlawful 
 
 6 Potter V. State, 162 Ind. 213, 64 L.R. act in driving at a greater rate of speed 
 
 A. 942, 102 Am. St. Rep. 198, 70 N. B. than that allowed by law. People v. 
 
 129. Pearne. 118 Cal. 154, 50 Pac. 376. 
 
 So, the act of a person of joining with 7Kobbins v. State, 8 Ohio St. 138. 
 
 others for the purpose of drinking and sPeople v. Holmes, 118 Cal. 444, 50 
 
 of pressing another to drink is not per Pac. 675: Johnson v. State, 94 Ala. 35, 
 
 se an unlawful act, so that the result- 10 So. 667; Boykin v. People, 22 Colo, 
 
 ing death of the person urged to drink 496. 45 Pac. 419. 
 
 would be manslaughter. Reg. v. Pack- 9PeoT)le v. Abbott, 116 Mich. 263, 74 
 
 ard, Car. & M. 236. N. W. 529. 
 
 And a charge of involuntary man- loPeople v. Fitzsimraons, 69 N. Y. S. 
 
 slaughter under a statutory provision R. 191. 34 N. Y. Supp. 1105. 
 
 defining it to be the unlawful killing of And the apprehension of personal dan- 
 Hom.— 22. 
 
338 HOMICIDE. B 21» 
 
 erty by show of arms, though for intimidation only, is unlawful, and 
 renders the person thus acting criminally liable for a resulting kill- 
 ing. ^ ^ And to attempt suicide is an unlawful act, and where a per- 
 son attempts to shoot herself and accidentally shoots and kills another 
 who attempts to prevent the suicide in the struggle that ensues, the 
 killing is manslaughter.*^ And the repeal of a law prescribing a 
 penalty for suicide or an attempt to commit suicide does not prevent, 
 it from being an unlawful act, or prevent the killing of another who 
 attempts to prevent a suicide from being a homicide in the com- 
 mission of an unlawful act. * * To convict a person of manslaughter 
 for killing another unintentionally, while the slayer was in the com- 
 mission of some unlawful act, under the Ohio statute, however, the 
 latter act must be shown to be in violation of some statute of the 
 state.** It is not sufficient that the act is a crime at common law, 
 or that it is grossly negligent * ' And, in any event, all the statutorj^ 
 ingredients of the crime must be shown to have existed." So, ta 
 constitute involuntary manslaughter it must appear that the hom- 
 icide was the natural result of the unlawful act. And though carry- 
 ing a pistol is unlawful the killing of a person by the discharge of 
 a pistol thus carried is not involuntary manslaughter on the part 
 of the person carrying it when the discharge was accidental in a 
 friendly scuffle with the person killed, and in no way resulted from 
 the unlawful act of carrying the pistol. * ^ 
 
 214. Preliminary act an ingredient of the killing. — The rule has 
 been laid down that to convict a person of homicide in killing another 
 without design to effect death, while engaged in the perpetration of,: 
 or attempt to perpetrate, a crime or misdemeanor not amounting to 
 a felony, or in cases where such killing would be murder at common 
 law under statutes providing therefor, the accused must have been 
 guilty of some offense other than violence to the person killed; the' 
 
 ger in ease of refusal does rpt furnish leWhere one is indicted for involun- 
 an excuse for assistinj» in doinj; an act tary manslaughter in the commission of 
 which is illegil, so as to pi event a kill- an unlawful act under the Georgia static 
 ing done in the execution of such act ute, and the jury finds the defendant 
 from being manslaughter. Reg. v. Ty- guilty of involuntary manslnughter in 
 ler, 8 Car. & P. 016. the commission of a lawful act, the- 
 
 iiWeston V. Com. Ill Pa. 251, 2 Atl. judgment thereon should be arrested, 
 191. since the ingredient of the absence of 
 
 izCom. V. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 25 Am. due caution and circumspection is whol- 
 Eep. 100. ' Iv lacking in the fi-ding. Oyerby v. 
 
 isTbid. State. 115 Ga. 240. 41 S. E. 609. 
 
 i4WeIIer V. State, 19 Ohio C. C. 166; iTPotter v. State, 162 Ind. 213. «4 
 Johnson v. State, 66 Ohio St. 59, 61 L.R.A. 942, 102 Am. St. Rep. 198, 70 
 L.R.A. 277, 90 Am. St. Rep; 564, 63 N. N. E. 129. And see Estell v, SUte, 61 
 E. 607. N. J. L. 182, 17 AtU 118. 
 
 ' IB, Johnson v. State, supwi. ■ 
 
§ 214] MANSLAUGHTER. 339 
 
 crime or misdemeanor which he wag perpetrating, or attempting to 
 perpetrate, must have been one which was not a part or an in- 
 gredient of the offense charged.^ And this rule has been held to 
 apply to a case in whidi the accused struck the deceased a blow 
 which would not have produced death, but which caused temporary 
 insensibility, so that when he fell,, or was knocked, into water by its 
 force, he was unable to help himself, and was drowned.^ This rule 
 has been vigorously criticized, however,* and must be deemed to have 
 been repudiated in New York,* which, with other states, has adopted 
 the rule that it is not necessary to show that the accused was com- 
 mitting or attempting to commit some misdemeanor other than in- 
 tentional violence upon the person killed, and that the statute is 
 expressly applicable to all crimes or misdemeanors not amounting 
 to a felony, intentional violence upon the person killed not being 
 excluded. ° And the application to such crimes and misdemeanors 
 has been extensively made in cases in which, apparently, the question 
 of the propriety of the application was not raised.* 
 
 2. Application of rules to particular unlawful acts. 
 
 215. Assaults — One committing a minor assault upon another, not 
 intending to kill, but accidentally doing so, is guilty of involuntary 
 manslaughter, and not murder, the death resulting from an unlawful 
 act not amounting to a felony.^ In case of such killing the court 
 should instruct the jury in a prosecution therefor as to what con- 
 stitutes involuntary manslaughter, consisting of the killing of a per- 
 
 iState V. Downs, 91 Mo. 19, 3 S. W. Y. 161; and that Buel v. People, 78 N. 
 
 219; State v. Sloan, 47 Mo. 604; Mc- Y. 492, 34 Am. Rep. 555, Overruled the 
 
 Manus v. State, 36 Ala. 285; People v. Butler Case. 
 
 Rector, 19 Wend. 569; People v. Butler, 6Darry v. People; People v. MeKeon; 
 
 3 Park. Crim. Rep. 377; People v. Skee- State v. Spendlove; and Rowan v. State, 
 
 han, 49 Barb. 217 ; Wilson v. People, 4 — supra. 
 
 Park. Crim. Rep. 619. sSee infra, next section. 
 
 sWilson V. People, supra. iPeople v. Mun", 65 Cal. 211, 3 Pac. 
 
 3 See State v. Snendlove, 47 Kan. 160, 650; Pence v. Com. 21 Ky. L. Rep. 500, 
 
 28 Pao. 994; People v. McKeon, 31 Hun, 51 S. W. 801 ; State v. Johnson, 102 Ind. 
 
 449; Rowan v. State, 30 Wis. 129, 11 247, 1 N. E. 377; People v. Sharkey, 178 
 
 Am. Rep. 559. N. Y. 584, 70 N. E. 1104, Affirming 87 
 
 ^People V. McKeon, supra. App. i)iv. 532, 84 N. Y. Supp'. 780. 
 
 In People v. McKeon, supra, People And an instruction as to involuntary 
 
 V. Butler, supra, was criticized, the manslaughter is properly given in a 
 
 court saying that Judge Strong, who had prosecution against one who killed an- 
 
 expressed the views of the majority, other by striking him on the head with 
 
 cited no authority excepting the opinion a stick and stunning him, after which 
 
 of Bronson, J., in People v. Rector, he cut his throat, where there was evi- 
 
 ^upra, and that that was a dissenting dence from which it might be inferred 
 
 opinion and in conflict with the opinion that deceased migjht have come to hia 
 
 of Cowen, J., in the same case, and of death by the blow fronj the club, and not 
 
 Parker, J., in Darry v. People, 10 N. from the cutting immediately following 
 
3*0 HOMICIDE. [§ ai5 
 
 son in the performance of an unlawful act.'' And one who unlaw- 
 fully assaults a woman having an infant in her arms, and so fright- 
 ens the infant that it dies, is guilty of manslaughter if the assault 
 was the direct cause of death. ^ So, striking a person and killing 
 him, without intent to do so, in resentment of a fancied oflFense, is 
 manslaughter under a statute providing that a killing resulting from 
 an unlawful act, committed without due caution and circumspection, 
 is manslaughter.* And a killing thus effected is manslaughter in 
 the first degree under a statute defining that offense to he the caus- 
 ing of the death of a human being without design to effect death, 
 by culpable negligence in the perpetration of a crime or misdemeanor 
 not amounting to a felony.® And the killing of a person in an at- 
 tempt to forcibly eject him from premises of which he was in pos- 
 session is manslaughter, since the attempt to put him out is an un- 
 lawful act.® Nor is a kick a justifiable means of ejecting a tres- 
 passer from one's house, and if one is given for that purpose and 
 death results, the person giving it is guilty of involuntary man- 
 slaughter.'' And, where the defendant struck A.'s horse, which 
 started and killed B., the defendant was correctly held liable for the 
 manslaughter of B. * And an attempt by a person having the right 
 to possession of a gun to take it from another by force is unlawful, 
 and he is guilty of involuntary manslaughter in such case, where 
 the gun is accidentally discharged, killing the other." So, where a 
 man engages in a fight with another and kicks him, intending noth- 
 ing more than to administer a severe beating, and death results, 
 the offense is involuntary manslaughter within the meaning of a 
 statute defining it to be undesignedly killing a person while doing 
 an unlawful act, not felonious or tending to great bodily harm.*" 
 And a man who, in order to have sexual intercourse with a girl, used 
 artificial means, with her consent, to make such intercourse practic- 
 able, in consequence of which she died, was held guilty of man- 
 slaughter. * * A killing resulting from an assault by one person upon 
 another is a killing in the commission of an unlawful act, where, 
 
 it. Bias V. United States, 3 Ind. Terr. 'People v. Honahell, 10 Cal. 83; Bas- 
 
 27, 53 S. W. 471. set's Case, 1 East, P. C. 259, 1 Hale, P. 
 
 sBruner V. State, 58 Ird. 159; Farmer C. 440; 1 Hawk. P. C. chap. 31, § 47. 
 
 V. State, 112 Ga. 80, 37 S. E. 120; 'Wild's Case, 2 Lewin, C. C. 214. 
 
 Thomas v. Com. 27 Ky. L. Rep. 704. sRex v. Plumraer, J. Kelyng, 109; 1 
 
 86 g. W. 694. And see Williams v. Hale, P. C. 475; 1 Hawk. P. C. chap. 
 
 State, 140 Ala. 10, 37 So. 228. 29, § 11, chap. 31, § 41. 
 
 sReg. V. Towers, 12 Cox, C. C. 530. sReg. v. Archer, 1 Fost. & F. 351. 
 
 iPeople V. Denomme (Cal.) 56 Pac. loThomas v. Com. 27 Ky. L. Rep. 794, 
 
 98. 88 S. W. 694. 
 
 6 People y. McKeon, 31 Hun, 449. "State v. Center, 35 Vt. 378. 
 
§ 215] MANSLAUGHTER. 341 
 
 if the blow had not proved mortal, the assailant would have been 
 subject to prosecution for assault and battery. ^ * 
 
 216. Fights. — All struggles in anger, whether by fighting, or wrest- 
 ling, or any other mode, are unlawful, and if the death of one of the 
 contestants is occasioned by the act of the other, it is at least man- 
 slaughter.* And where death results from blows received in fight- 
 ing, however fair the fight may have been, all present and concerned 
 are equally guilty of manslaughter, it being enough that there was a 
 common design to do an unlawful act, from which death resulted.* 
 And where two persons enter into a combat without previous malice,, 
 and one of them kills the other with a deadly weapon, he is, at least, 
 guilty of manslaughter,^ though it is murder where he previously 
 prepared the weapon for use against an unarmed adversary.* And 
 where, in a personal encounter between two persons, a dagger falls 
 from the hand of one of them, and the other falls upon it and 
 receives a mortal wound, which fall is caused by a blow or violence 
 upon the part of the former, he, not being then in the act of defending 
 himself against loss of life or great bodily harm, or just apprehension 
 thereof, may be held guilty of manslaughter.' So, homicide in 
 riots, when there is no intent to kill, or to inflict serious bodily 
 harm, is in like manner manslaughter.® And, where an unlawful 
 assembly is unlawfully assailed and dispersed, and the persons com- 
 posing it arm themselves and reassemble and attack the assailants, 
 and the original assailants in the combat, without malice, kill one of 
 the parties so returning to the affray, they are guilty of manslaughter, 
 since they Tv>3re the first aggressors and occupy the position of parties 
 engaged in a mutual unlawful combat'^ Nor is one acting lawfully 
 where he seeks another with a view to provoking a quarrel, and in 
 such case he cannot avail himself of the plea of self-defense if he 
 kills the other in the difiiculty so sought, though the killing may be 
 necessary to preserve his life or his person from imminent danger.* 
 
 izPatterson's Case, 3 N. Y. City Hall scuffle incident to the interference he is 
 
 Rec. 145. ar-cidentally killed, though the killing 
 
 lEeg. V. Canniff, 9 Car. & P. 359. is accidental it cannot be claimed that 
 
 2Reg. V. Turner, 4 Fost. & F. 339. the heat of passion produced by the in- 
 
 sAtkina v. State, 16 Ark. 568; Cren- torferenee makes the homicide mnn- 
 
 shaw V. State, 70 Ark. 613 Appx., 66 slaughter. Holmes v. State, 88 Ala. 26, 
 
 S. W. 196; United States v. Mingo, 2 U Am. St. Rep. 17, 7 So. 193. 
 
 Curt. C. C. 1. Fed. Cas. No. 15,781. BGoodwin's Case, 6 N. Y. City Hall 
 
 4State V. Anderson, 126 Mo. 542, 29 Rec. 9. 
 S. W. 676. «See infra, chapter XVI.. § 366. 
 
 One who, after a difficulty with an- iCom. v. Daley, 2 Clark (7i.) 365. 
 other, arms himself and returns for the sState v; Murdy, 81 Iowa, 603, 47 N. 
 purDose of killing him, is engaged in an W. 837; State v. Benham, 23 Iowa, 154, 
 unlawful act, and where a third person 92 Am. Des. 417; State v. Neeley, 20 
 interferes to prevent it, and in the iowa, 108. 
 
342 HOMICIDE. K 215 
 
 And the act of a person in pointing a gun at another and uttering 
 abusive words to him amounts to a challenge to fight, and the return 
 of the other is an acceptance of the challenge, and if death ensue 
 to one of them during the affray, though not intended, the other is 
 guilty of manslaughter.® Where no unfair advantage is taken or 
 deadly weapon used in a mutual combat, however, the slayer can be 
 guilty of manslaughter only, and not murder. ^ ° And the rule is the 
 same where two men fight upon a sudden quarrel and one kills the 
 other, no undue advantage having been taken ; ^ * and this, with- 
 out reference to the question who made the first assault.*" And 
 a killing resulting from an amicable contest merely for the purpose 
 of seeing who is the better man is not even manslaughter. * ^ A fail- 
 ure to charge as to mutual combat in a prosecution for homicide is 
 not subject to objection by the accused, though there is evidence 
 warranting it, since such a charge would be against him. * * 
 
 217. Drawing or using dangerous weapons At common law one 
 
 who draws a firearm upon another unnecessarily is guilty of invol- 
 untary manslaughter where it goes off accidentally and kills the other, 
 though he had no intention of discharging it. * And where a statute 
 makes it a misdemeanor for any person to present at another any 
 firearm, whether loaded or unloaded, and one intentionally points 
 a firearm at another, though with-out any intention to take his life, 
 and by accident it is discharged producing death, he is guilty of man- 
 slaughter in the performance of an unlawful act.'* And this is 
 
 'Goodwin's Case, 6 N. Y. City Hall shot at any of the officers. King v. 
 
 Eec. 9. Plummer, 12 TMod. 627. 
 
 loState V. Cochran, 147 Mo. 504, 49 aBarnea v. State, 134 Ala. 36, 32 So. 
 
 S. W. 558; Beal's Case, 6 N. Y. City 670; Henderson v. State, 98 Ala. 35, 13 
 
 Hall Rec. 59; Stringfellow v. State, 42 So. 140; Johnson v. State, 94 Ala. 35, 
 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 588, 61 S. W. 719. 10 So. 667 j State v. Goodley, 9 Houst. 
 
 liState V. Massage, 65 N. C. 480; (Del.) 484, 33 Atl. 226; Noily v. State 
 
 State V. Floyd, 51 N. C. (6 Jones, L.) (Ga.) 52 S. E. 19; Surber v. State, 99 
 
 392. Ind. 71; State v. Tippet, 94 Iowa, 646, 
 
 X 2 State V. Floyd, supra. 63 N. W. 445; State v. Grote, 109 Mo. 
 
 isReg. V. CaTiniff, 9 Car. & P. 359. 345, 19 S. VV. 93; State v. Morrison, 104 
 
 i4Clark V. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. Mo. 638, 16 S. W. 492; Ford v. SUte 
 
 456, 76 S. W. 573. (Neb.) 98 N. W. 807. 
 
 iReg. V. Weston, 14 Cox, C. C. 340. And a statement by the court follow- 
 And see Messer v. Com. 25 Ky. L. Ren. ing' an instruction in a prosecution for 
 700, 76 S. W. 331. homicide defining . involuntary man- 
 Where several persons met together slaughter, that the drawing of a deidly 
 to do an unlawful act, and upon being weapon in a rude, angry, and threaten- 
 confronted with officers one of them ing manner, and rot in necessiry self- 
 fired a gun and killed one of his own defense, is an unlawful act within the 
 party, he will not be held guilty of mur- meaning of the statute, is not open to 
 del where it does not appear that he Iti- thi construction that such act would be 
 ii'-ded to shoot him, or that he shot not only unlawful, but also of a char- 
 with intent to kill any of the officers, acter to endarger human life. People v. 
 thoiish it would be different had he Gleason, 1 Nev. 173. 
 
1 2173' MANSLAUGHTER. 343 
 
 the rule though the person drawing the firearm did not know it was 
 loaded, and believed it to be unloaded.^ And the rule is not affected 
 by the fact that he did not intend to inflict injury, but merely to 
 frighten the person upon whom the weapon was drawn;* and applies 
 in all cases of pointing a firearm at another in which the person 
 pointing it would not have been justified in shooting.' Nor does the 
 fact that a person was voluntarily drunk when pointing a firearm 
 at another, which went off causing death, relieve him from respon- 
 sibility for involuntary manslaughter.® And the carrying of a 
 deadly weapon by a person knowing that he was in the habit of getting 
 intoxicated, and drawing it and pointing it toward people, is an 
 unlawful act which will render him guilty of manslaughter in case 
 of a resulting killing, though he unknowingly did the killing in a 
 state of intoxication. ^ And evidence that a person took a pistol from 
 a drawer for the purpose of frightening another, and that it was 
 <iischarged while in his hands, killing the other, warrants a convic- 
 tion of manslaughter. * And evidence that the accused pointed his 
 revolver at deceased, and then turned it toward the ground, and 
 afterwards raised it again, when it went off accidentally, killing 
 the other, requires an instruction as to involuntary manslaughter.* 
 To render a resultant killing manslaughter, however, it must appear 
 that tbe pointing of a firearm at the person killed was intention- 
 al.^* A statute making it a misdemeanor to draw, or threaten to 
 draw, deadly or dangerous weapons refers, within the meaning of 
 these rules, to drawing them in such a way that they may be used to 
 the injury of another, such as pointing the muzzle of a gun or re- 
 volver at him. ^ ^ And it is the drawing or threatening to draw which 
 
 sCook V. State, 93 Ga. 200, 18 S. E. in a prosecution for the killing is wheth- 
 
 S23; Reg. v. Jones, 12 Cox, C. C. 628. er shooting merely for the purpose of 
 
 But in Robertson v. State, 2 Lea, 239, intimidating him and without intent to 
 
 31 Am. Rep. 602, it was held that the kill or wound him was, or was rot, 
 
 negligent use of a loaded pistol by a criminal negligence. Sanders v. State, 
 
 person who believes it to be empty, with- 105 Ala. 4, 16 So. 935. 
 
 out any intention to do harm, but from estate v. Benham, 23 Iowa, 154, 92 
 
 which death results, is not sufficient to Am. Dec. 417 ; State v. Hardie, 47 Iowa, 
 
 transform an accidental killing into 647, 29 Am. Rep. 4.96. 
 
 voluntary manslaughter, though it cSurber v. State, 99 Ind. 71. 
 
 would be if it were done under such cir- 'People v. Slack, 90 Mich. 448, 51 N. 
 
 cumstances as to render it an assault. W. 533. 
 
 iPeopIe V. Stubenvoll, 62 Mich. 329, 28 sstate v. Hardie, supra. 
 
 N. W. 883. oEnibry v. Com. 11 Ky. L. Rep. 515, 
 
 Where an officer, seeing a supposed 12 S. W. 383. 
 
 thief running, shoots off his revolver, loState v. Goodley, 9 Houst. (Del.) 
 
 claiming to have intended to shoot over 484, 33 Atl. 226; Siberry v. Stcte, 149 
 
 such person's head for the purpose of Ind. 684, 39 N. E. 930,. 47 N. E. 458. 
 
 frightening him into stopping, but hits iiSiberry v. State, supra. 
 and kills him, the question for the jury 
 
344 HOMICIDCB. [S 217 
 
 is made criminal, and not the brandishing or flourishing of the -weap- 
 on;** though it is not necessary that there should have been an in- 
 tent to use or discharge the weapon, or to injure the person upon 
 whom it was drawn, to constitute a violation of the statute. * * But 
 an accidental shooting and killing is not manslaughter where it 
 occurred while handing a firearm over a counter to the deceased in 
 compliance with his request, the pistol not having been pointed at 
 him, or carelessly handled. * * And a conviction cannot be sustained 
 where the facts of the case leave it doubtful whether the act from 
 which death resulted was accidental or designed. *° Nor is it man- 
 slaughter where one unintentionally and nonnegligently kills an- 
 other by discharging firearms on his own premises.** And an ac- 
 cidental killing in a friendly tussle for the possession of a revolver 
 cannot be more than involuntary manslaughter. * ^ 
 
 A statute imposing a special penalty upon the aiming of any 
 firearm at or toward any person, or unintentionally discharging any 
 firearm so pointed or aimed, or maiming or injuring any person by 
 the discharge of any firearm so pointed, however, applies to cases 
 of maiming or injury which do not produce death, and does not 
 prevent the conviction for manslaughter of a person who caused the 
 death of another by unintentionally pointing a pistol at him.** 
 And where one voluntarily shoots at another and the latter is killed 
 by the shot, the homicide is not an involuntary one, but a voluntary 
 one. * ® And the rule is the same with reference to a killing result- 
 ing from the recklessly careless use of a loaded firearm.^" And 
 killing one of a crowd of people by wantonly shooting into it presents 
 no question of involuntary manslaughter.** 
 
 izPlummer v. State, 135 Ind. 308, 34 third person. Selby v. Com. (Ky.) 89 S. 
 N. E. 968. W. 296. 
 
 isSiberrvv. State, sMpra. isWilliamson v. State, 2 Ohio C. C. 
 
 "Fitzgerald v. State, 112 Ala. 34, 20 292. 
 So. 960. loSraith v. State, 73 Ga. 79. 
 
 iBEobertson v. State, 2 Lea, 239, 31 IJut where one person shoots another 
 Ara. Kep. 602. in the nighttime in his dooryard, and de- 
 
 icMartin v. State, 70 Ohio St. 219, 71 fends upon the ground that, having 
 N. E. 640. hailed and received no response, he be- 
 
 1 'Tanks v. State, 71 Ark. 459, 75 S. lieved the person killed to be a predatory 
 W. 851. animal when he shot, the law of involun- 
 
 And an instruction on involuntary tary, and not voluntary, ma' slaughter is 
 manslaughter is not warranted in a involved. Parks v. State, 105 Ga. 242, 
 prosecution for homicide by a showing 31 S. E. 580. 
 
 that accused carelessly handled a load- 20Murphy v. Com. 15 Ky. L. Rep. 215, 
 ed pistol while intoxicated, and that it 22 S. W. 649. 
 
 was exploded in a struggle to disarm 'iClark v. State, 117 Ga. 254, 43 S. 
 him, inflicting a fatal wound upon a E. 853. 
 
§ 218] MANSLiAUGHTER. 345 
 
 218. Games, sports, and athletic performances — ^Where a person en- 
 gaged in an unlawful and dangerous sport kills another, it is man- 
 slaughter, though the killing was an accident.^ And one of several 
 players engaged in a friendly game, who commits an unlawful act 
 by which the death of another is caused, is guilty of manslaughter.* 
 And no rules of practice of any game whatsoever can make that lawful 
 which is unlawful by the law of the land, so as to relieve the person 
 performing the unlawful act from criminal liability for the death of 
 a person caused thereby.* These rules apply to horse racing on a 
 public road, though the running is not reckless or furious or grossly 
 negligent* And the English custom of cock-throwing, at Shrovetide, 
 has been considered unlawful and dangerous ; and accordingly, where 
 a person throwing at a cock missed his aim, and killed a child who 
 was looking on, Mr. J. Foster ruled it to be manslaughter ; and, speak- 
 ing of the custom, he says : "It is a barbarous, unmanly custom, fre- 
 quently productive of great disorders, dangerous to the bystanders, 
 and ought to be discouraged."" So, throwing stones at another wan- 
 tonly in play, being a dangerous sport, without the least appearance 
 of any good intent, or doing any other such idle action as cannot but 
 tend to the bodily hurt of someone or other, and by such means killing 
 a person, will be manslaughter.® And playing at foils is not war- 
 ranted by law, and persons doing so act at their own peril; and 
 where, by accident, a person is thus killed the thrust is an assault 
 in law, and the offense is manslaughter. '' Nor can the latitude given 
 to athletic exercises, when conducted merely as a diversion, be ex- 
 tended to legalize prize fights, public boxing matches, and the like, 
 in which the exhibition given for the purpose of profit is calculated 
 to draw together numbers of idle, disorderly people; and where 
 death results in such case to one of the persons taking part, the 
 other is guilty of manslaughter.* Nor does provocation operate to 
 acquit. Thus, in a case of old date, where the prisoner had killed 
 his opponent in a boxing match, it was held that he was guilty of 
 
 1 State V. Vines, 93 N. 0. 493, 53 Am. giiilty of manslaughter, though the cut- 
 Rep. 466. ting was by misadve ture. Jenkins v. 
 
 2Eeg. V. Bradshaw, 14 Cox, C. C. 83. State, 82 Ala. 25, 25 So. 150. 
 
 The act of one of two persons engaged sReg. v. Bradshaw, supra. 
 in playing a chance game in attempt- 4Thompson v. State, 131 Ala. 18, 31 
 
 ing to snatch the hat from the head of So. 725. 
 the other in a rude and angry manner, sFost. C. L. 261. 
 because the other had picked up his slHawk. P. C. chap. 29, § 5. 
 nickel bet by him on the game, <^nsti- 'Chichester's Case, Aleyn, 12, Keilw. 
 
 tutes an assault and is a misdemeanor; 108. 
 
 and where he has a knife in his hand sWard's Case, 1 East, P. C. 270; Peo- 
 
 and the other is cut with it, from tho pie v. Fitzsimmons, 69 N. Y. S. R. 191, 
 
 effect of which he dies, the assailant is 34 N. Y. Supp. 1102; Fost. C. L. 260. 
 
346 HOMICIDE. K 218 
 
 manslaughter; thougli he had been challenged to fight by his ad- 
 versary for a public trial of skill in boxing, and was also urged to 
 engage by taunts, and the occasion was sudden.® And the persons 
 present at, and consenting to, a prize fight in which one of the 
 combatants is killed are guilty of manslaughter in the second degree 
 as principals, though they are not such accomplices as are required 
 to have their evidence confirmed when called upon as witnesses 
 against the other party. ' " 
 
 Sparring with gloves, however, is not dangerous or likely to kill, 
 and a death caused by such sparring is not manslaughter, unless 
 continued to such an extent that the parties are exhausted, so that 
 a dangerous fall, causing death, is likely to result from its contin- 
 uance.*^ And the question whether such a contest i? merely a 
 sparring exhibition or a prize fight, within the meaning of statutes 
 condemning prize fights as misdemeanors, is one of fact for the jury 
 in a prosecution for a resulting homicide.*^ And if a man plays a 
 friendly game according to the rules and practice of the game, and 
 his act causes the death of another, it may be inferred that he was 
 not actuated by any malicious motives or intention, and that he did 
 not act in such a manner as he knew would be likely to produce death 
 or injury, though the rule would be different if he intended to cause 
 serious injury, or was indifferent and reckless as to whether he did 
 so.** And though "if the death occurred from the fight itself, all 
 persons encouraging it by their presence are guilty of manslaughter, 
 if the death ensued from violence unconnected with the fight itself, 
 that is by blows given, not by the other combatant in the course of the 
 fight, but by persons breaking in the ring and striking with their 
 sticks, those who were merely present are not, by being present, 
 guilty of manslaughter."** 
 
 But where the death occurs, not as incident to a game whose risks all 
 the participants know in advance, but as the result of a practical 
 joke which was a surprise on the deceased, then, though there was 
 no malice, the defendant is responsible for manslaughter, when the 
 death is imputable to physical agencies put in motion by himself. In 
 accordance with this view it has been held manslaughter to cause 
 
 'Ward's Case, supra. 83. And see Com. v. LewiSj Addison 
 
 loRcx V. Hargrave, 5 Car. & P. 170; (Pa.) 279; Fenton's Case, 1 Lewin, C. 
 
 Rex V. Murphy, 6 Car. & P. 103. C. 179 ; Wharton, Crim. Law. 7th ed. 
 
 ■ iiKeg. V. Young, 10 Cox, C. C. 371. § 1012. 
 
 isPeople V. Fitzsimmons, 69 N. Y. S. i4Rex v. Murphy, 6 Car. &. P. 103; 
 
 R. 191, 34 N. Y. Supp. 1102. Reg. v. Young, 8 Car. & P. 644. 
 
 isReg. T. Bradahaw, 14 Cox, C. 0. 
 
i 218] MANSLAUGHTER. 347 
 
 death by ducking another;^" by building a fire round a drunken 
 man in order to frighten him, he afterwards rolling into the fire, 
 "which was not placed so near ".s to endanger him if he had lain 
 still;** by shooting with a gun, though for the mere purpose of 
 alarming;*^ by throwing stones into a coal pit in sport;** by up- 
 setting a cart as a joke;*® by administering, as a joke, excessive 
 quantities of intoxicating liquor.''*' 
 
 151 East, P. C. 230. times before by others; and in coise- 
 
 isErrington's Case, 2 Lewin, C. C. quenee of the trapstick having been 
 
 217. taken out, the cart tilted up, and the 
 
 iT.State V. Roane, 13 N. C. (2 Dev. deceased was thrown out on his back 
 
 Xi.) 53. on the stones, and the potatoes were 
 
 isFenton's Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 179. shot out of the sacks, and fell on and 
 
 lORex V. Sullivan, 7 Car. & P. 641. In covered him over, and he died in con- 
 
 this case a cartman was in the front sequence of the injuries then received. 
 
 part of a cart, loading it with sacks of It was held that, as the intent was to 
 
 potatoes, and a boy pulled the trap- commit a mere trespass, the boy was 
 
 stick out of the front of the cart, but guilty of manslaughter. 
 
 not with intent to do the man any 3 "Kex v. Martin, 3 Car. & P. 211 j Reg. 
 
 iiarm, aa Le had seen it doue several v. Packard, Car. & AL 246. 
 
CHAPTEK XL 
 
 JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSK 
 219. General rules; further consideration. 
 
 219. General rules ; further consideration We have seen that homi- 
 cide is justifiable when committed pursuant to the mandate of the 
 law, or for the advancement of public justice, or for the prevention 
 of f. felony or an atrocious crime;'- and that it is excusable when 
 necessarily committed for the purpose of defending or protecting the 
 slayer from death or great bodily harm, and when committed by ac- 
 cident or misadventure ; and, in some cases, when committed through 
 superior duty or overruling necessity.^ Justification for homicide 
 is not confined to self-defense, and an instruction in a prosecution 
 therefor directing the jury to ascertain if there was any fact or cir- 
 cumstance in the case to reduce the killing from murder to self-de- 
 fense or to manslaughter is improper.^ And in defining the several 
 degrees of homicide in a prosecution therefor, the court should gen- 
 erally give the exceptions mentioned in the statute, wherein the kill- 
 ing is declared to be justifiable or excusable,* though, since there is 
 no positive definition of justifiable homicide, and since the justifi- 
 cation is determinable by the circumstances of each particular case, 
 the mere enunciation of the statutory provisions on the subject is 
 frequently inadequate. ® It is to be observed, however, that rules with 
 reference to justification and excuse for homicide cover a number 
 of different classes of cases. They are applicable either to justify 
 or excuse, or to mitigate the criminality of homicide when committed 
 in defense of one's own person, or in defense of his property, or of 
 certain relatives, or dependents ; and homicide in executing judicial 
 decrees, and in exercising the powers and carrying out the mandates 
 of government, and in the exercise of official authority, — as, in case 
 of making arrests, preventing breaches of the peace, etc. ; and homi- 
 
 iSee supra, chapter I., § 8. lire to instruct the jury on the question 
 
 2See supra, chapter I., § 8. of justMable or excusable homicide, 
 
 sBrown v. State, 18 Fla. 472. where the testimony was such as to pre- 
 
 <Ibid. elude a conclusion that the killirg was 
 
 BEichardaon v. State, 7 Tex. Anp. 486. either justifiable or excusable. Brown 
 
 But a verdict in a prosecution for v. State, supra. 
 homicide should not be set aside for fail- 
 
 348 
 
S 219] JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE. 34& 
 
 cides from superior duty or overruling necessity also fall within their 
 scope ; as do also homicides to prevent the commission of a felony and 
 by misadventure. Owing to the wide scope of some of these subjects, 
 therefore, and to the fact that some of them are separated from others 
 by marked distinguishing features, a division along the line of such 
 distinguishing features has been attempted, and each subject or dis- 
 tinct class of subjects is considered in a separate chapter of this work.* 
 
 «See infra, chapter XII., "Homicide chapter XXIII., "Homicide by Officers of 
 in Self-Defense;" chapter XIII., "Homi- Justice;" and chapter XXIV., "Homi- 
 cide from Overruling Necessity;" chap- cide to Prevent Criminal or Unlawful 
 ter XIV., "Homicide by Misadventure;" Acta," 
 
CHAPTER XII. 
 
 HOMICIDE IN SELF-DEFENSK 
 
 I. Natuke, elements, and classification. 
 
 220. Definition and character as a defense. 
 
 221. Criticism of the doctrine. 
 
 222. Right to have issue submitted. 
 
 223. Constituent elements generally. 
 
 224. Classification. 
 II. Danger and necessity. 
 
 a. General rules as to. 
 
 225. The foundation principle of self-defense. 
 
 226. Apparent, as distinguished from real, danger and neces- 
 
 sity. 
 
 227. Right to have particular issue submitted. 
 
 228. Belief in danger and necessity. 
 
 229. Effect of negligence in forming belief. 
 
 b. Nature and extent of danger constituting necessity. 
 
 230. Danger of what. 
 
 231. The imminence of the danger. 
 
 232. Danger, when deemed past. 
 
 III. The basis ob foundation of apparent dangeb and necessity. 
 
 a. Scope of. 
 
 233. General statement as to. 
 
 b. Sufficiency of particular acts or situations to create, 
 
 234. Previous ill-will or ill-usage. 
 
 235. Opprobrious language or conduct. 
 
 236. Assaults generally. 
 
 237. Assault with deadly weapon. 
 
 238. Trespass. 
 
 239. Interference with marital rights. 
 
 IV. Hostile demonstbations as an element of danger and necessitt. 
 
 240. The general rule. 
 
 241. What overt acts or demonstrations are sufficient gen- 
 
 erally. 
 v. Pabticular situations and circumstances as affectinq dangeb and 
 necessity. 
 a. Threats by deceased. 
 1. General rules. 
 
 242. As an excuse for killing. 
 
 243. General inadmissibility in evidence. 
 
 350 
 
SELF-DEFENSE. 351 
 
 2. Exception in self-defense cases. 
 
 244. General rules. 
 
 245. Proof of self-defense warranting admission. 
 
 246. Necessity of charging as to. 
 
 247. Knowledge or communication, when necessary, 
 
 248. Proof of communication. 
 
 249. Necessity of hostile demonstration. 
 
 250. Proof of overt act. 
 
 251. Sufficiency of overt act. 
 
 3. Other exceptions. 
 
 252. Generally. 
 
 4. Character of threats as affecting admissibility.-; 
 
 253. General rules. 
 
 254. Effect of remoteness. 
 
 255. Proof as to character and effect. 
 
 6. Relative functions of court and jury as to threats. 
 
 256. General rules. 
 
 b. Violent and dangerous character of the deceased. 
 
 1. General rules. 
 
 257. Not admissible generally. 
 
 2. Exception in self-defense cases. 
 
 258. General rules. 
 
 259. Proof of self-defense necessary to warrant admission. 
 
 260. Necessity of hostile demonstration. 
 
 261. Sufficiency of overt acts concurring with violent character. 
 
 262. Order of proof. 
 
 263. Knowledge of character by the accused. 
 
 3. Other exceptions. 
 
 264. Existence of. 
 
 265. Cases of doubt as to nature of act. 
 
 266. Admissibility for purpose of grading offense. 
 
 4. Nature or kind of character provable. 
 
 267. General rules. 
 
 268. Special traits and special circumstances. 
 
 269. Character for peaceableness generally. 
 
 270. Attack upon character which will open door. 
 
 5. Methods of proving character. 
 
 271. General reputation; specific acts of violence. 
 
 272. Exception as to specific acts known to slayer. 
 
 273. Good character in rebuttal. 
 
 274. Competency of witnesses. 
 
 6. Admissibility and effect, how determined. 
 
 275. Application of general rules. 
 
 «. Other situations and circumstances generally. 
 
 276. Opportunity to restrain by law. 
 
 277. Opportunity to procure aid. 
 
 278. Disproportionate strength. 
 
 279. Retreat, arming, and returning. 
 
352 HOMICIDE. 
 
 280. Malicious or criminal intent of the deceased. 
 
 281. Relationship of the parties. 
 
 282. Intoxication. 
 
 283. Effect of mistaken identity. 
 
 VI. Standpoint of judgment as to dangeb and necessity. 
 
 284. Divergence of opinion. 
 
 285. Rule that the jury are the judges. 
 
 286. Rule that the slayer is the judge. 
 
 287. Rule that standard is that of n reasonable man. 
 
 288. "Reasonable man" standard criticized. 
 
 289. Apparent approach toward reconciliation. 
 VII. Resort to other means. 
 
 290. Nature of question and when considered. 
 VlII. Duty to beteeat. 
 
 a. Common-law rule. 
 
 291. Substance and application. 
 
 b. The "flight" rule. 
 
 292. Substance of. 
 
 293. Instructions as to. 
 
 c. The "stand ground to prevent felony" rule. 
 
 294. Statements and application of. 
 
 d. The "stand ground when in the right" rule. 
 
 295. General statement of. 
 
 296. Instructions as to. 
 
 297. Effect of expectation of attack. 
 
 298. "Stand ground" rule as affected by "'necessity" rule. 
 
 e. Exception in case of imperfect right of self-defense. 
 
 299. Grcneral rules. 
 
 300. Sufficiency of retreat to revive self-defense. 
 
 L Increased or diminished risk as affecting duty to retreat. 
 
 301. General rules. 
 
 302. Apparent, as distinguished from real, availability of 
 
 means of escape. 
 
 303. What warrants inference of increased peril. 
 
 304. Right to pursue adversary. 
 
 g. Character of attack as afleeting application of rules. 
 
 305. Must be serious or felonious. 
 h. Self-defense at or in dwelling or castle. 
 
 306. General rules. 
 
 307. Instructions as to. 
 
 308. Limited by necessity. 
 
 309. What constitutes dwelling or castle. 
 i. Homicide in the performance of official duty. 
 
 310. Where treated. 
 IX. Effect of use of excessive fobce. 
 
 311. General rules. 
 
 312. Use of deadly weapon in repelling attack. 
 
 313. Pursuing retreating adversary as indicating. • 
 
 314. Relative size and strength as affecting. 
 
§ 220] SELF-DEFENSE. 353 
 
 X. Sexf-defense by the obioinal aggeessob. 
 
 a. Effect of aggression on liability. 
 
 315. The general rule. 
 
 316. Necessity of instructing the jury as to. 
 
 317. Reasons for the rule. 
 
 318. "Reasonably" or "absolutely" free from fault. 
 
 319. Effect of rules of law as to imperfect self-defense. 
 
 320. Motive or intent as affecting. 
 
 321. Application of rules to joint action. 
 
 322. Application to single, as distinguished from distinct, 
 
 combats. 
 
 b. What constitutes one an aggressor. 
 
 1. Generally. 
 
 323. Absence of general rule. 
 
 2. Particular acts. 
 
 324. Preparation for difficulty or wrongful act. 
 
 325. Seeking interview or going after. 
 
 326. Insulting language or conduct. 
 
 327. Threats. 
 
 328. Assaults. 
 
 329. Trespass. 
 
 330. Preparation for, and seeking to renew, difficulty. 
 
 331. Debauching spouse or relative. 
 
 3. Application of rule to interference in behalf of another. 
 
 332. Governed by status of original combatant. 
 
 4. Application of rule to mutual combat. 
 
 333. Both combatants aggressors. 
 
 334. What constitutes mutual combat. 
 
 c. Withdrawal from, or abandonment of, diflBculty. 
 
 335. General rules. 
 
 336. Reasons for, and to what applicable. 
 
 337. Sufficiency of withdrawal or abandonment. 
 
 338. Question of notice or knowledge of withdrawal. 
 
 XI. The geade oe degree when self-defense is asserted. 
 
 339. General rules. 
 
 XII. BTJKDEN of PBOOF as to SELF-DErENSE. 
 
 340. Rule placing it with the prosecution. 
 
 341. Rule placing it with the defense. 
 
 342. Rule where necessity to take life appears. 
 XnL Questions as to, how detebmined. 
 
 343. The rule as to self-defense generally. 
 
 344. Determination as to duty to retreat. 
 
 345. Determination as to aggression or freedom from fault. 
 
 I. Nature, elements, and classification. 
 
 220. Eefinition and character as a defense — ^Homicide in self-de- 
 fense is one of the branches of justifiable or excusable homicide, and 
 Horn.— 23. 
 
354 HOMICIDE.' Pi 220 
 
 is defined to be homicide committed in defense of one's own life or 
 person, or that of his family, relatives, or dependents, within those 
 relations in which the law permits the defense of others as of one's 
 self. ^ As here considered, homicide in self-defense occurs when a 
 person kills another while being assaulted upon a sudden affray, 
 and in defense of his person, when certain and immediate suffering 
 would be the consequence of waiting for the assistance of the law, 
 and there is no other probable means of escape;^ or when he is sud- 
 denly assailed by another, without any fault on his part, and under 
 such circumstances as to give him just and reasonable ground to be- 
 lieve that he is in danger of losing life, or suffering some great or 
 enormous bodily harm.'^ Self-defense is the resistance of force, or 
 seriously threatened force, either actually pending or reasonably ap- 
 parent, by force sufficient to repel the actual or apparent danger, 
 and no more. * If one is in danger of death or great bodily harm from 
 another, or has reasonable grounds for thinking so, and kills such 
 other, it is a killing in self-defense.® And the right to oppose force 
 by force in such case is founded upon the law of nature, and is not 
 superseded by the law of society." Self-defense is an affirmative, 
 positive, intentional act, and does not include an accidental killing; 
 there can be no such thing as accidental self-defense.'' A claim of 
 self-defense, however, does not presuppose an intentional killing; 
 one may kill another in self-defense without any expectation of killing 
 him.® Nor can an act done in self-defense be an assault, since the 
 act is lawful, and an assault is necessarily unlawful.® 
 
 221. Criticism of the doctrine. — Self-defense has been severely 
 criticized as a defense on several occasions by trial courts.^ And it 
 has been designated as the "hip-pocket defense" which has been the 
 means of turning loose thousands of criminals.^ And it has been 
 
 iPond V. People, 8 Mich. 150. sUnited States v. Oiiterbridge, 6 
 
 Under the Georgia Code, self-defense Sawy. 620, Fed. Cas. No. 15,978. 
 is the same thing as justifiable homi- 'State v. Smith, 114 Mo. 406, 21 S. 
 
 cide. Bone v. State, 86 Ga. 108, 12 S. E. W. 827, Overruling State a Stephens, 98 
 
 205. Mo. 637, 10 S. W. 172; Nilan v. People, 
 
 zState V. Miller, 9 Houst. (Del.) 564, 27 Colo. 206, 60 Pac. 485. 
 32 Atl. 137; State v. Turner, 29 S. (!. sFoley v. State, 11 Wyo. 464, 72 Pac. 
 
 34, 13 Am. St. Eep. 706, 6 S. E. 891; 627. 
 
 State V. Bowers, 65 S. C. 207, 95 Am. St. sPeople v. Lynch, 101 Cal. 229, 35 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 793, 43 S. E. 656. 860. 
 
 sState V. Walker, 9 Houst. (Del.) i See Jones v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 464, 33 Atl. 227; State v. Brown (Del.) 51 S. W. 949; Gainea v. State, 38 Tex. 
 
 61 Atl. 1077. Crim. Eep. 202, 42 S. W. 389; Attaway 
 
 4Springfie!d v. State, 96 Ala. 81, 38 v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 395, 55 S. 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 85, 1 1 So. 250. W. 45 ; Chapman v. State, 42 Tex. Grim. 
 
 BGrainger v. State, 5 Yerg. 459, 26 Eep. 135, 57 S. W. 965. 
 Am. Dec. 278. 2Jones v. State, supra. 
 
§ 221] SiELF-DEFENSE. , 355 
 
 held that animadversions of this kind do not, of themselves, afford a 
 ground for the reversal of the cause. ^ But in reply thereto the ap- 
 pellate courts have characterized the law of self-defense as wise,* 
 and determined it to be a legitimate defense.® And an address by 
 a trial judge to a trial jury, severely criticizing and denouncing the 
 law of self-defense and reasonable doubt and arraigning it as sub- 
 versive of reason and right, and holding it up to ridicule and con- 
 tempt as affording a subterfuge and an excuse for acquitting guilty 
 parties, though made generally, and not in the course of a prosecu- 
 tion for homicide, has been asserted to be in violation of the spirit 
 of a statutory provision that it is beyond the province of the judge, 
 sitting in criminal cases, to discuss the facts, or use any argument in 
 his charge calculated to arouse the sympathy or excite the passions 
 of a jury." And the rule is general, if not universal, that where one 
 attempts to justify a homicide under the plea of self-defense, which 
 the evidence tends to sustain, he is entitled to have the jury fairly 
 instructed as to the law applicable to his theory of the case, and to 
 have them left free to determine the fact as to whether his conduct 
 was, or was not, warranted by the facts. ^ And this rule applies, 
 though the testimony tending to sustain that defense is that of him- 
 self only.^ And newly discovered evidence by persons present at the 
 scene of the homicide tending to show that the killing was in self- 
 defense is a good ground for a new trial, even in the absence of 
 
 3Gaine3 v. State, supra. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 89 S. W. 1064. 
 
 And remarks by the district attor- And see Stephens v. State, 118 Ga. 762, 
 
 ney in argument as to the facility with 45 S. E. 619; Stewart v. State, 137 Ala. 
 
 which the hip-pocket movement is re- 3.3, 34 So. 818; Tarver v. State, 137 Ala. 
 
 sorted to by those charged with homi- 29, 34 So. 627; Williams v. Com. 23 Ky. 
 
 cide, and, in connection therewith, reach- L. Eep. 2046, 66 S. W. 401 ; State v. Mc- 
 
 ing for his own hip pocket and drawing Kenzie, 177 Mo. 699, 76 S. W. 1015. 
 
 forth a plug of tobacco, is not preju- Ard an instruction as to self-defense 
 
 dicial in a prosecution for homicide, in a prosecution for homicide, which 
 
 Todd V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 44 S. maximizes every restriction of the right 
 
 W. 1096. of self-defense, and minimizes every 
 
 <Chnpman v. State, supra. right of the accused, is improper, and 
 
 BAttaway v. State, supra. should not be given in a case in which 
 
 nChapman v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. the slayer was assailed in his own stable 
 
 135, 57 S. W. 965. by a man nearly twice his size, from 
 
 7Ritte» v. People, 130 111. 255, 22 N. which he could not escape, his adver- 
 
 E. 605 ; Morgan v. Territory, 7 Ariz. 224, sary barring the only exit. State v. 
 
 64 Pae. 421 ; People v. Cantor, 71 App. Hollirgsworth, 156 Mo. 178, 58 S. W. 
 
 Div. 185, 75 N. Y. Supp. 688; State v. 1087. 
 
 Turner, 29 S. C. 34, 13 Am. St. Eep. sEnright v. People, 155 III. 32, 39 N. 
 
 706. 6 S. E. 891 ; Thompson v. State, 24 E. 561 : Grimes v. State, 123 Ga. 754, 
 
 Tex. App. 383, 6 S. W. 296; Rucker v. 51 S. E. 721; Messer v. Com. (Ky.) 90 
 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 40 S. W. 991; S. W. 95."); Stricklin v. State (Miss.) 
 
 Orta V. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 393, 13 So. 898; State v. McKenzie, supra; 
 
 71 S. W. 755; Wesley v. State (Tex. Drake v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 273, 
 
 Crim. App.) 65 S. W. 904; Harris v. 77 S. W. 7. 
 
356 HOMICIDE. [5 221 
 
 diligence in procuring it. ' So, a person charged with homicide may 
 rely upon the plea of self-defense, even though he had entered a plea 
 of not guilty, and though it was contrary to his testimony. * " And 
 a plea of self-defense in a prosecution for homicide does not deprive 
 the accused of his right to instructions based on a claim that the 
 killing was manslaughter.^^ And an instruction that the right to 
 strike and kill in self-defense, under circumstances hypothetically 
 stated, is not to be too readily inferred is improper as an invasion 
 of the province of the jury.^^ 
 
 222. Eight to have issue submitted As we have seen, one who at- 
 tempts to justify a homicide by a plea of self-defense, which the evi- 
 dence tends to sustain, is entitled to have the jury fairly instructed 
 as to the law applicable to his theory of the case, and to have them 
 left free to determine the fact as to whether his conduct was, or was 
 not, warranted by the facts. ^ Where the court undertakes to instruct 
 the jury in a prosecution for homicide as to the several degrees 
 thereof, and the facts which constitute each, as defined by statute, 
 it should also give to them the circumstances that constitute the excep- 
 tions mentioned in the statute with reference to justifiable or ex- 
 cusable homicide.^ And where the evidence warrants a charge on 
 self-defense, a clear, distinctive charge presenting that defense should 
 be given, unmingled with parts of charges relating to other matters.* 
 Instructions as to the law of manslaughter are not proper in a prose- 
 cution for homicide in which the evidence makes a case which is one 
 either of murder or justifiable homicide.* And an instruction on 
 the issue of self-defense should present the defendant's right in an 
 
 SClime V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 71 Mich. 732. And see State v. Morris 
 
 S. W. 23. (Iowa) 10.5 N. W. 213. 
 
 lostate V. Stephens, 96 Mo. 637, 10 S. And where the evidence for the prose- 
 
 W. 172. cution in a homicide case raises the 
 
 iiState V. Matthews, 148 Mo. 185, 71 question whether the accused was acting 
 
 Am. St. Kep. 594, 49 S. W. 1085. in self-defe.ise when he committed the 
 
 isDomingus v. State, 94 Ala. 9, 11 So. offense, an unqualified instruction that 
 
 190. if he wilfully killed the deceased he 
 
 But an instruction in a prosecution for should be found guilty of murder in the 
 
 homicide, after stating the rules of law second degree is improper. St'ite v. 
 
 applicable to self-defense, that juries Wingo, 66 Mo. 181, 27 Am. Rep. 329. 
 
 must exercise due caution in applying 4Williams v. State, 2 Tex. App. 271; 
 
 these rules is not objectionable as nul- Franklin v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 lifyi-g the instructions relating to self- C25, 31 S. W. 043; Griffin v. State, 113 
 
 d^'ense. State v. Young, 104 Iowa, 730, Ga. 279, 38 S. E. 844; Pickens v. State, 
 
 74 N. W. 693. 61 Miss. 52; State v. Smith, 114 Mo. 
 
 iSee supra, last section. 406, 21 S. W. 827; State v. Hollinga- 
 
 zPinder v. State, 27 Fla. 370, 26 Am. worth, 156 Mo. 178, 58 S. W. 1087. But 
 
 St. Rep. 75, 8 So. 837. see Brown v. State, 31 Fla. 207, 12 So. 
 
 sThornton v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 640. 
 65 S. W. 1105; Brownell v. People, 38 
 
S 222] SELF-DEFENSE. 357 
 
 affirmative, as distinguished from a negative, manner. * So, instruc- 
 tions in a prosecution for homicide in which an acquittal is sought 
 on the ground of self-defense must state the constituent elements of 
 self-defense ;" though they need not detail the facts transpiring at 
 the time of the homicide.^ Instructions as to justifiable homicide 
 in the language of the statute are sufficient, in the absence of request 
 for further explanation. ® But it is not sufficient -when the evidence 
 raises the issue of self-defense to instruct the jury to find the accused 
 guilty, unless he acted in his necessary, or apparently necessary, self- 
 defense;® the ingredient of self-defense should be set forth. ^^ And 
 limiting the right of self-defense by theories with reference to homi- 
 cide in the commission of a criminal act, or with reference to homi- 
 cide by the aggressor in the difficulty, is improper where there was 
 no evidence that the accused was engaged in a criminal act, or that 
 he provoked the difficulty, either with or without intent to kill.^^ 
 So, the accused in a prosecution for homicide in which there is any 
 evidence which would leave a doubt as to whether he acted with 
 malice, or with a view to self-preservation, is entitled to have the 
 jury instructed as to the different degrees of homicide, and as to 
 what constitutes each.*^ And an instruction is erroneous which 
 leaves the jury at liberty to find the accused guilty of some degree 
 of homicide, though he had made out a case of justifiable self-de- 
 fense.** 
 
 But where the evidence in a prosecution for homicide shows guilt 
 either of murder or manslaughter, an instruction on the law of self- 
 defense should not be given. ^ * Nor should one be given in the ab- 
 
 cBonner v. State, 29 Tex. App. 223, 15 64 S. W. 1055. And see Grubb v. State, 
 
 S. W. 821. 43 Tex. Grim. Eep. 72, 63 S. W. 314. 
 
 sStewart v. State, 133 Ala. 105, 31 sPeople v. Matthai, 135 Cal. 442, 67 
 
 So. 944; Campbell V. State, 133 Ala. 81, Pae. 694; Parsons v. People, 218 111. 
 
 91 Am. St. Eep. 17, 31 So. 802; Peel v. 386. 75 N. E. 993. 
 
 State (Ala.) 39 So. 251; Spiith v. State, 9Cook v. Com. 86 Ky. 663, 7 S. W. 155. 
 
 142 Ala. 14, 39 So. 329; Banks v. State lOMcLeroy v. State, 120 Ala. 274, 25 
 
 (Ala.) 39 So.. 921; Gilmore v. State, 126 So. 247. 
 
 Ala. 20, 28 So. 595; Smith v. State, 130 But where the court in a prosecution 
 
 Ala. 95, 30 So. 432; Scott v. State, 133 for homicide has given full and correct 
 
 Ala. 112; 32 So. 623; Mann v. State, charges upon the subject of self-defense, 
 
 134 Ala. 1, 32 So. 704. And see Jack- refusal of .further instructions is not er' 
 
 son V. State, 79 Miss. 42, 30 So. 39. ror. Johnson v. State, 100 Tenn. 254, 45 
 
 Where the court in a prosecution for S. W. 436. 
 
 homicide asserts both the right and the uMilrainey v. State, 33 Tex. Crim. 
 
 wrong rule of law with reference to the Eep. 577, 28 S. W. 537. 
 
 right to take life or to resort to the i2Keener v. State, 18 Ga. 194, 63 Am. 
 
 use of a deadly weapon in resistance of Dec. 269. 
 
 an assault, a verdict of guilty should be 1 3 State v. Halliday, 111 La. 47, 35 So. 
 
 set aside, since it cannot be known 380. 
 
 which rule the jury followed. State v. instate v. Tabor, 95 Mo. 585, 8 S. 
 
 Keasling, 74 Jowa, 528, 38 N. W. 397. W. 744; Willis v. State (Tex. Crira. 
 
 7 Adams v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) App.) 74 S. W. 543; Spencer v. State 
 
358 HOMICIDE. [§ 222 
 
 sence of anything in the case to show self-defense, ^ ^ though in such 
 a case the accused cannot complain of an error in an instruction or in 
 instructing as to self-defense.^^ And the rule requiring the court 
 in a prosecution for homicide, which no one saw, to instruct on all 
 the degrees of the offense as well as on the law of self-defense, does 
 not apply where it appears that a house was broken into and the in- 
 mates robbed in the night, and that the murder was committed in 
 connection therewith.^'' And the principle of law that one may 
 anticipate an attack, and slay his assailant when it is necessary to 
 save his own life, need not be invoked in a prosecution for homicide, 
 where it appears that the assailant was advancing upon the slayer 
 at the moment of the killing in a threatening attitude. ^ * 
 
 223. Constituent elements generally To justify homicide on the 
 
 ground that it was committed in self-defense, four things are neces- 
 sary: First, the slayer must have been reasonably without fault 
 in bringing on the difficulty ; second, he must believe at the time that 
 he is in such immediate danger of losing his own life, or of receiving 
 serious bodily harm, as renders it necessary to take the life of his 
 assailant to save himself therefrom; third, the circumstances must 
 have been such as to have warranted such a belief in the mind of a 
 man of ordinary reason and firmness; and fourth, there must have 
 been no other convenient or reasonable mode of escaping or retreat- 
 ing, or declining the combat* As we have seen, homicide in self- 
 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 90 S. VV. 638. And But giving an instruction as to the 
 
 see Territory v. Baker, 4 N. M. 236, 13 doctrine of reasonable doubt as applied 
 
 Pac. 30. to self-defense, in another part of the 
 
 It is within the province "of the court charge than that laying down the doc- 
 in a prosecution for homicide, after de- trine of self-defense, is not error in a 
 fining the different grades of the offense, prosecution for homicide. State v. Hut- 
 to restrict its charges to the point of to, 66 S. C. 449, 45 S. E. 13. 
 law arising upon the facts, being careful isHayden v. Com. 23 Ky. L. Rep. 399, 
 to give such instructions as cover all 63 S. W. 20; Messer v. Com. (Ky.) 90 
 reasonable deductions. Gladden v. State, S. W. 955; State v. Holloway, 161 Mo. 
 12 Fla. 562. 135, 61 S. W. 600; Burks v. State, 40 
 
 isTarver v. State, 137 Ala. 29, 34 So. Tex. Crim. Rep. 167, 49 S. W. 389. 
 627; Bruner v. United States, 4 Ind. 17 Aiken v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 523, 
 
 Terr. 580, 76 S. W. 244; State v. Ha- 68 S. W. 849. 
 gan, 131 N. C. 802, 42 S. E. 901; State isLong v. State, 52 Miss. 23. 
 V. Davis, 104 Tenn. 501, 58 S. W. 122; iState v. Symmes, 40 S. C. 383, 19 S. 
 
 Garnett v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 60 E. 16; State v. Hutto, 66 S. C. 449, 45 
 
 S. W. 765; Hays v. State (Tex. Crim. S. E. 13; Jackson v. State, 77 Ala. 18; 
 
 App.) 57 S. W. 835; Driver v. State Te-sney v. State, 77 Ala. 35; Wilkins v. 
 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 65 S. W. 528; Lewis State, 98 Ala. 1, 13 So. 312; Storey v, 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 75 S. W. State, 71 Ala. 329; DeArman v. State, 
 
 788; State v. Davis, 52 W. Va. 224, 43 71 Ala. 351; Naugher v. State, 105 Ala. 
 
 S. E. 99. But see State v. Hicks, 178 26, 17 So. 24; People v. ConsUntino. 
 
 Mo. 433, 77 S. W. 539; People v. La- 153 N. Y. 24, 47 N. E. 37. 
 groppo, 90 App. Div. 219, 86 N. Y. Supp. 
 116. 
 
1 223] SELF-DEFENSE. 359 
 
 ■defense is an afBrmative, positive, intentional act, and necessarily, 
 therefore, a voluntary one ; * and a design to kill prior to the killing 
 may properly exist in self-defense, as well as in unlawful homicide.^ 
 And the existence of an intent to kill upon the part of a person com- 
 mitting homicide does not prevent the act from being justifiable in 
 a proper case on the ground of self-defense,* the issue being the neces- 
 sity to kill, and not the intent to kill. ® The mere fact that a person 
 intended to kill another when he fired a shot at him is not sufiicient 
 to prove that his intent was malicious and murderous, since he may 
 have been acting in self-defense.® Nor does the fact that the slayer 
 intended, not to kill, but only to disable, make the killing man- 
 slaughter.'' And though a person killing another bore express 
 malice against him, he is not guilty of murder when he acted in self- 
 defense.* Previous ill-will or malice cannot take away the right of 
 self-defense,. or convert a justifiable homicide into a murder.® Self- 
 defense is lawful, and if a killing be in self-defense, it cannot be 
 malicious ; and, if malicious, it cannot be in self-defense ; malice and 
 justification cannot coexist. ^ " 
 
 If the motive of a homicide was revenge, however, and not fear of 
 death or great bodily injury, it is not justifiable.^* It must appear 
 that the person committing the homicide really acted under the 
 
 sState V. Eapp, 142 Mo. 443, 44 S. W. the accused where there was an issue 
 
 270; State v. Gilmore, 95 Mo. 554, 8 S. of self-defense, since if the killing was 
 
 W. 359, 012. in self-defense it might have been pre- 
 
 SManis v. State, 41 Tex. Crira. Rep. determined, and yet lawful. Bohannon 
 
 614, 58 S. W. 81; Palmer v. State, 9 v. Com. 8 Bush, 481, 8 Am. Rep. 474. 
 
 Wvo. 40, 87 Am. St. Rep. 910, 59 Pac. 'State v. Jo-es, 79 Mo. 441. 
 
 793. sstate v. Matthews, 148 Mo. 185, 71 
 
 ♦People V. Newcomer, 118 Cal. 263, 50 Am. St. Rep. 594, 49 S. W. 1085; State 
 
 Pac. 405; People v. Barry, 31 Cal. 357; v. Rapp, 142 Mo. 443, 44 S. W. 270; 
 
 People V. Solani (Cal.) 83 Pac. 281; Golden v. State, 25 Ga. 527. 
 
 Karr v. State, 106 Ala. 1, 17 So. 3^8 ; sPeople v. Hyndman, 99 Cal. 1, 33 Pac. 
 
 Johnson v. State (Miss.) 27 So. 880; 782; State v. Rapp, swpra. 
 
 Pistorius v. Com. 84 Pa. 158; Palmer loCarleton v. State, 43 Neb. 373, 61 
 
 V. State, supra. And see Carr v. State, N. W. 699. 
 
 21 Ohio C. C. 43; Gamblin v. State A killing, to constitute murder, must 
 
 (Miss.) 29 So. 764. be done unlawfully, and unless it be 
 
 BBurden v. People, 26 Mich. 162. unlawful it cannot be a billing done 
 
 An intentional killing is implied with malice aforethought, although it 
 
 where self-defense is claimed. Carr v. may be predetermined. Bohannon v. 
 
 Stat«, supra. Com. 8 Bush, 481, 8 Am. Rep. 474. 
 
 sHammond v. People, 199 111. 173. uPeople v. Batchelder, 27 Cal. 69, 85 
 
 64 N. E. 980. Am. Dec. 231 ; Gaiford v. State, 122 Ala. 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution 54, 25 So. 10; Wortham v. State, 70 Ga. 
 
 for homicide that by the term "malice 336; Jackson v. State, 91 Ga. 271, 44 
 
 aforethought" is meant a predetermina- Am. St. Rep. 22, 18 S. E. 298 ; Hill v. 
 
 tion to kill, however suddenly or re- State, 64 Ga. 463; Malone v. State, 77 
 
 cently formed in the mi-d of the per- Ga. 767; Lyons v. People, 137 111. 602, 
 
 son doing the killing, is improper and 27 N. E. 677 ; State v. Ilerrell, 97 Mo. 
 
 c-iI'itlTtpd to prejudice the rights of 105, 10 Am. St. Rep. 289, 10 S. W. 387; 
 
360 HOMICIDE. [§ 223 
 
 influence of such fears, and not in a spirit of revenge/^ though if 
 the homicide in question was committed in resistance of a felonious 
 assault actually being made, it is not essential to justification that 
 it should also appear that the killing was not done in a spirit of 
 revenge. ^ * And in view of the fact that a person assaulted had re- 
 treat? J, whether it was sufficient to render a killing of the assailant 
 justifiable is proper to be considered in a prosecution for the kill- 
 ing, in order to determine whether there was an intention to kill, or 
 merely a purpose to get free from overpowering violence. * * 
 
 Where the act of a principal in homicide is justifiable upon the 
 ground of self-defense, no criminal responsibility can attach to a 
 person charged with aiding and abetting him. '^ A statutory pro- 
 vision making it a crime to shoot with intent to kill does not cut off 
 the right of self-defense, or prevent any reasonable or lawful use of 
 firearms. * ® 
 
 224. Classification. — The right of self-defense in homicide may be 
 divided into two distinct classes, to wit, perfect and imperfpct.* A 
 perfect right of self-defense can only exist where the slayer acted 
 from necessity, a,nd was wholly free from wrong or blame. ^ If he 
 was in the wrong, or was himself violating, or about to violate, the law, 
 and on account of his own wrong was placed in a situation wherein it 
 became necessary for him to defend himself against attack, then his 
 right of self-defense is an imperfect one, and the law regulates the 
 criminality of his act according to the magnitude of his own wrong. ^ 
 By the earlier writers this distinction was recognized by dividing 
 self-defense in homicide into two classes, to wit, justifiable self-de- 
 
 State V. Harrington, 12 Nev. 125; Peo- of revenge, or for some unlawful pur- 
 ple V. MeLpod, 1 Hill, 377, 37 Am. Dee. pose, is not erroneous, where it is else- 
 328, 25 Wend. 483; People v. Kennedy, where stated that the taking of life 
 159 N. Y. 346, 70 Am. St. Rep. 557, 54 from motives of self defense based on 
 N. E. 51; Carleton v. State, supra; reasonable grounds of belief is not in 
 State V. Ballou, 2o R. I. 607, 40 Atl. pursuance of an unlawful purpose. 
 861. Carleton v. State, 43 Neb. 373, 61 N. W. 
 
 Where one man kills another with 609. 
 
 malice, under a previously formed in- 14 People v. Harper, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 
 
 te tion to do so, the offense is not miti- IbO. 
 
 gated or excused by the provocation giv- iBState v. Rector, 126 Mo. 328, 23 S. 
 
 en to him at the time of the homicide. VV. 1074. 
 
 State V. Sullivan, 43 S. C. 205, 21 S. E. isState v. Bolden, 107 La. 116, 90 
 
 4. Am. St. Rep. 280, 31 So. 393. 
 
 i2Keaton v. State, 99 Ga. 197, 25 S. iWallace v. Linited Sta-tes, 162 U. S. 
 
 E. 615. 46(>, 40 L. ed. 1039, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 isTbid. 859; King v. State, 13 Tex. App. 277; 
 
 An instruction in a prosecution for Reed v. State, 11 Tex. App. 509, 40 Am. 
 
 homicide that one cannot avail himself Rep. 795. 
 
 of the plea of self-defense where, after 2Ibid. 
 
 he had secured himself from danger, he aibid. 
 took the life of his assailant in a spirit 
 
§ 224] SELF-DEFENSE. 361 
 
 fense, and excusable self-defense.'* Justifiable self-defense was where 
 the slayer was absolutely blameless, and acted in defense of his per- 
 son, haliitation, or property against one who manifestly intended and 
 endeavored by violence or surprise to commit a known felony, such 
 as murder, rape, robbery, arson, burglary, and the like upon either.^ 
 And excusable self-defense was where the slayer was not himself free 
 from blame, but the killing was absolutely necessary to the preserva- 
 tion of his own life, after making every possible effort to escape.® 
 Homicide was justifiable when committed to prevent a felony or in 
 repelling a riotous attack or in resisting an attack with a felonious 
 design, in which case the slayer was regarded as promoting justice 
 and performing a public duty.^ And homicide se defendendo was 
 excusable at common law where it occurred in a sudden affray, or 
 in resisting an attack upon the slayer or one whom he was authorized 
 to defend, not made with a felonious design, such a homicide being 
 felonious, but pardonable;® the question whether a homicide in re- 
 sisting a personal assault was justifiable or excusable turning upon 
 whether it was made with a felonious design."* 
 
 The two words "justifiable" and "excusable" as used in connection 
 with self-defense, however, though perhaps not always of like mean- 
 ing, are synonymous, and may be used indiscriminately with refer- 
 ence to responsibility.^** An entire acquittal is required in case of 
 a finding of either. ^^ The two classes would appear to be distin- 
 guishable only with reference to what must be done by the slayer in 
 the way of endeavoring to escape before resorting to killing. ^ * 
 
 II. Dawgee and itecessitt, 
 a. General rules as to. 
 225. The foundation principle of self-defense — The law of self-de- 
 
 While primarily the right to kill in supra; State v. IngoM, 49 N. C. (4 
 
 ?elf defense exists only in him who acts Jc es, L.) 216, 67 Am. Dec. 283. 
 
 from reeessity, it is not wholly denied 'Pond v. People, 8 Mich. 150. 
 
 to him who, when detected in a wrong- slbid. 
 
 ful act, is assaulted by the person ag- '^^V^' _ 
 
 grieved, and kills the latter to save his „,"=*?* V ,?^' ol I°^\ ^^^' *^ ^• 
 
 Swn life. King v. State, supra. W. 872; Powell v. State, 101 Ga. 9 05 
 
 4Erwin V. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 2.S -'\'"- St. Rep 277, 29 S. E 309. And 
 
 A tj™ 795 T>J.,„Ti „ «M„t» im Pa ^co MixoH V. State, 123 Ga. 581, 107 Am. 
 
 Am. Rep. 733; Powell v. State, 101 Ga. g^ gj g 
 
 Q 65 Am St Eep 277, 29 S. E. .309; ^^^ ^^^ „f' ^^^ ^^^^ "^^^u^^" instead 
 
 ^.^^.^Z-oFTP^^.I^/^o Ifn' o^nT I' ''f "i^stify," with reference to hm.i- 
 
 United States, 158 U. b. 550, 39 L. ed. ^jde ,„ a prosecution therefor, does not 
 
 1086, 15 Sup. Ct. Eep. 962. constitute reversible error. Carr v. 
 
 BErwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 23 State, 21 Ohio C. C. 43. 
 Am. Eep. 733, quoting East, P. C. 271; nCom. v. Long, 17 Pa. Super. Ct. 
 
 ]*owell V. State; Pond v. People; and 641. 
 £eard v. United States, — supra. i2See Erwin v. State. 29 Ohio St. 186, 
 
 sErwin v. State, and Powell v. State, 23 Am. Eep. 733. 
 
362 HOMICIDE. R 225 
 
 fense is founded upon necessity, and it may be stated generally that, 
 before a homicide can be justified, it must appear that the slayer was 
 in great peril of death or serious bodily harm, or had reasonable 
 ground for believing, and did believe, that he was in such peril, and 
 that the killing was necessary to avert such peril, and that no other 
 reasonable means of avoiding it was open to him. * And an instruc- 
 
 1 People V. Constantino, 153 N. Y. 24, Houst. Crim. Eep. (Del.) 66; Hopkins 
 47 N. E. 37; People v. Kennedy, 159 v. United States, 4 App. D. C. 430; 
 N. Y. 346, 70 Am. St. Rep. 557, 54 N. Doyal v. State, 70 Ga. 134; Darby v. 
 E. 51 ; People v. Johnson, 139 N. Y. State, 79 Ga. 63, 3 S. E. 663 ; Wilson v. 
 358, 34 N. E. 920; Shorter v. People, 2 State, 30 Fla. 234, 17 L.R.A. 654, 11 So. 
 N. Y. 193, 51 Am. Deo. 286; People v. 556; Gladden v. State, 12 Fla. 562; Wil- 
 Lamb, 54 Barb. 342; Noles v. State, 26 liams v. State, 107 Ga. 721, 33 S. E. 648; 
 Ala. 31, 62 Am. Dee. 711; Crawford v. Price v. People, 131 111. 223, 23 N. E. 
 State, 86 Ala. 16. 5 So. 651; Eila-d v. 639; Allen v. People, 77 111. 484; Davi- 
 State, 52 Ala. 322; Cleveland v. State, son v. People, 90 III. 221; Gainey v. Peo- 
 86 Ala. 1, 5 So. 426; Green v. State, 69 pie, 97 111. 270, 37 Am. Eep. 109; llc- 
 Ala. 6; De Arman v. State, 77 Ala. 10; Donnall v. People, 108 111. 93, 48 N. E. 
 Brown v. State, 83 Ala. 33, 3 Am. St. 86; Henry v. People, 198 111. 162, 65 N. 
 Rep. 685, 3 So. 857; Storey v. State, E. 120; McDermott v. State, 89 Ind. 187; 
 71 Ala. 329; Ingram v. State, 67 Ala. State v. Mahan, 68 Iowa, 304, 20 N. W. 
 67; Oliver v. State, 17 Ala. 587; San- 449, 27 N. W. 249; State v. Benham, 23 
 •ders v. State, 134 Ala. 74, .n2 So. 654; Iowa, 154, 92 Am. Dee. 417; State v. 
 Roden v. State, 97 Ala. 54, 12 So. 419; Jones, 89 Iowa, 182, 56 N. W. 427; State 
 Bondurant v. State, 125 Ala. 31, 27 So. v. Warner, 100 Iowa, 260, 69 W. W. 546; 
 775; Ford v. State, 129 Ala. 16, 30 So. State v. Castello, 62 Iowa, 404, 17 N. W. 
 27; Henson v. State, 120 Ala. 316, 25 605; State v. Bohan, 19 Kan. 28; State 
 So. 23; McClellan v. State, 140 Ala. 99, v. Rose, 30 Kan. 501, 1 Pac. 817; Staple- 
 37 So. 239; Nabors v. State, 120 Ala. ton v. Com. 9 Ky. L. Rep. 643, 6 S. W. 
 323, 25 So. 529 ; Askew v. State, 94 Ala. 275 ; Austin v. Com. 19 Ky. L. Rep. 
 4, 33 Am. St. Rep. 83, 10 So. 657 ; Kil- 474, 40 S. W. 905 ; Ray v. Com. 19 Ky. 
 gore V. State, 124 Ala. 24, 27 So. 4; L. Rep. 1217, 43 S. W. 221; Payne v. 
 Johnson v. State, 58 Ark. 57, 23 S. W. Com. 1 Met. (Ky.) 373; State v. Jaok- 
 7; Palmore v. State, 29 Ark. 249; Me- son, 44 La. Ann. 160, 10 So. RW; Peo- 
 Pherson v. State, 29 Ark. 225; Levella pie v. Doe, 1 Mich. 451; People v. Ma- 
 V. State, 32 Ark. 585; Duncan v. State, card, 73 Mich. 15, 40 N. W. 784; State 
 49 Ark. 543, 6 S. W. 164; Carpenter v. v. Shippey, 10 Minn. 223, 88 Am. Dec. 
 Ktate, 62 Ark. 286, 36 S. W. 900; Bruce 70, Gil. 178; State v. Sorenson, 32 Minn. 
 V State, 68 Ark. 310, 57 S. W. 1103; 118, 19 N. W. 738; Evans v. State, 44 
 People V. Donguli, 92 Cal. 608, 28 Pac. Miss. 762; Cotton v. State, 31 Miss. 504; 
 782; People v. Batehelder, 27 Cal. 69, Wesley v. State, 37 Miss. 327, 75 Am. 
 85 Am. Dec. 231; People v. Hurley, 8 Dec. 62; State v. Crawford, 115 Mo. 
 Cal. 390; People v. Gatewood, 20 Cal. 620, 22 S. W. 371 ; State v. Tabor, 95 Mo. 
 14V; People v. Pool, 27 Cal. 573; People 585, 8 S. W. 744; State v. Wilso •, 98 
 V. Campbell, 30 Cal. 312; People v. Mo. 440, 11 S. W. 985; State v. Mo- 
 Flanagan, 60 Cal. 2, 44 Am. Rep. 52; Namara, 100 Mo. 100, 13 S. W. 938; 
 People V. Lemperle, 94 Cal. 45, 29 Pac. State v. Tooker, 188 Mo. 438, 87 S. W. 
 709; People v. Westlake, 62 Cal. 303; 487; State v. Foley, 12 Mo. App. 431; 
 People V. Howard, 112 Cal. 135, 44 Pac. State v. Stewart, 9 Nev. 120; State v. 
 464; People v. Shears, 133 Cal. 154, 65 Ferguson, 9 Nev. 106; State v. Wells, 
 Pac. 295; People v. Dobbins, 138 Cal. 1 N. J. L. 424, 1 Am. Dee. 211; Brown 
 694, 72 Pac. 339; State v. Warren, 1 v. State, 62 N. J. L. 666, 42 Atl. 811; 
 Marv. (Del.) 487, 41 Atl. 190; State v. People v. Fucarino. 104 App. Div. 437, 
 Till, Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 233; 93 N. Y. Supp. 689; People v. Cole, 4 
 State V. Vines, Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) Park. Crim. Rep. 35; State v. Rogers, 93 
 424; State v. Rhodes, Houst. Crim. Rep. N. C. 523; State v. Martin, 9 Ohio S. 
 (Del.) 476; State V. West, Houst. Crim. & c. P. Dee. 778; Carr v. State, 21 
 Kep. (Del.) 371; State v. Newcomb, Ohio C. C. 43; State v. Smith, 43 Or. 
 
I 2251 SELF-DEFENSE. 36a 
 
 tion omitting the element of necessity is properly refused. ^ And the 
 peril must have been, to all appearances, present, active, and im- 
 mediate,* and the necessity must have been such as, in the eye of the 
 law, excuses one for so grave an offense as the taking of human life. * 
 One who kills another, not for his own necessary or apparently neces- 
 sary protection, but to gratify a feeling of revenge or malice, is not 
 entitled to avail himself of the plea of self-defense. '^ 
 
 The circumstances under which an assaulted person is reqiiired to 
 make his defense, however, are often quite unfavorable to due de- 
 liberation, and to deny the right to act promptly and decisively in 
 determining as to the existence of danger and other means of avert- 
 ing or avoiding it would be to deny the right of self-defense;® and 
 he should not be held to the same cool and correct judgment that the 
 
 109, 71 Pac. 973; Com. v. Drum, 58 Pa. aPeople v. Fucarino, 104 App. Div. 437, 
 
 9; Com. v. Breyessee, 160 Pa. 451, 40 93 N. Y. Supp. 689; Stewart v. State, 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 739, 28 Atl. 824; Com. 137 Ala. 33, 34 So. 818; Watkins v. 
 
 V. McGowan, 189 Pa. 641, 69 Am. St. State, 133 Ala. 88, 32 So. 627; Sanders 
 
 Rep. 836, 42 Atl. 365; Com. v. Ware, 137 v. State, 134 Ala. 74, 32 So. 654; Led- 
 
 Pa. 465, 20 Atl. 806; Com. v. Herold, 5 better v. State (Ala.) 39 So. 618; State 
 
 Pa. Dist. E. 623; Com. v. Brown, 7 Pa. v. Gregory, 158 Mo. 139, 59 S. W. 89. 
 
 Co. Ct. 640; State v. Wyse, 33 S. C. And see Donald v. State, 21 Ohio C. C. 
 
 582, 12 S. E. 556; State v. Merriman, ]24. 
 
 34 S. C. 40, 12 S. E. 619; State v. Mcln- a'storev v. State, 71 Ala. 329; Dolan 
 
 tosh, 40 S. C. 349, 18 S. E. 1033; Stata v. State," 81 Ala. 11, 1 So. 707; Brown 
 
 V. Trammell, 40 S C. 331, 42 Am. St. ^ gt^.te, 83 Ala. 33, 3 Am. St. Eep. 685, 
 
 43 S. C. 127,20 SB 989; state y. Sul- 73 ^^ ^^ 43, ^^^^ ^ g^^^ j34 
 
 S.f lea^,'2T7;'V1ii?am'j v^Tatl; ^^,\ ^2 So^%^ ^-P'« -. Westlake, 
 3 Heisk. 376; Lander v. State, 12 Tex! ^^ Cah 303; People v. Tarn kin, 62 Cal 
 462; High V. State, 26 Tex. App. 545, 8 ^^S; People y. Samsels 66 Cal. 99, 4 
 Am. St. Eep. 488, 10 S. W. 238; Boyd l^c. 1061; Jackson v. State, 91 Ga. 271, 
 V. State, 28 Tex. App. 137, 12 S. W. 737; 44 Am. St. Rep. 22, 18 S. E. 298; Evans 
 Coyle V. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Eep. 604, v. State, 44 Miss. 767; Lo-g v. State, 
 21 S. W. 765; Williford v. State, 38 52 Miss. 23; Jefferson v. State, 52 Miss. 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 393, 42 S. W. 972; 767; Cotton v. State, 31 Miss. 504; Rlp- 
 Manis v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 614, py v. State, 2 Head, 217; Williams v. 
 53 S. W. 81 ; Bush v. State, 40 Tex. State, 3 Heisk. 376 ; Bush v. State, 40 
 Crim. Eep. 539, 51 S. W. 238; Willing- Tex. Crim. Rep. 539, 51 S. W.238; Lynch 
 ham V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 22 S. v. State, 24 Tex. App. 350, 5 Am. St. 
 W. 925; Lynch v. State, 24 Tex. App. Rep. 888, 6 S. W. 190; United States v. 
 350. 5 Am. St. Rep. 888, 6 S. W. 190; Wiltberger, 3 Wash. C. C. 515, Fed. Cas. 
 Bldke V. State, 3 Tex. App. 581 ; Clark No. 16,738. 
 
 V. Com. 90 Va. 360, 18 S. E. 440; Field The necessity which justifies the tak- 
 V. Com. 89 Va. 690, 16 S. E. 865; State Ing of human life must be present, im- 
 V. Zeigler, 40. W. Va. 593, 21 S. E. 763 ; perious, and impending, or must so ap- 
 King V. Bridges, 5 Haw. 467; United pear to the slayer. Ingram v. State, 
 States V. Wiltberger, 3 Wash. C. C. 515, 67 Ala. 67. 
 
 Fed. Cas. No. 16,738; United States v. 4State v. Sullivan, 43 S. C. 205, 21 
 Outerbridge, 5 Sawy. 620, Fed. Cas. No. S. E. 4 ; Jefferson v. State, supra. 
 15,978; Addington v. United States, 165 estate v. Wilson (Del.) 62 Atl. 227. 
 U. S. 184. 41 L. ed. 679, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. eFields v. State, 134 Ind. 46, 32 N. B. 
 288; Reg. v. Bull, 9 Car. & P. 22. And 780. 
 see State v. Bufiington (Kan.) 81 Pac. 
 465. 
 
364 HOMICIDE. [§ 225 
 
 jury are aUe to form.'' And it is not necessary that the jnry should 
 find that the killing was absolutely necessary beyond a reasonable 
 doubt; it is suiEcient if they find that the assault of the deceased 
 was of such a character as to excite the fears of the slayer, as a rea- 
 sonable man, that the deceased would inflict on him great bodily in- 
 jury.® Nor is it necessary that there should have been no other 
 possible means of escape, and an instruction requiring no other pos- 
 sible means is improper.® All that is required is that there should 
 have been no other reasonable or probable means of escaping the 
 threatened danger.*" So, where there is danger to a person, real or 
 apparent, of death or great bodily harm from more assailants than 
 one, acting together, he has the right to defend himself against any 
 or all of them, and the jury in a prosecution for killing in self-de- 
 fense should be so charged. * * And the rule requiring necessity and 
 imminent danger applies, though the deceased brought on the diffi- 
 culty for the very purpose of killing his antagonist, or doing him 
 great bodily harm. * * 
 
 The existence of necessity upon the part of one person to slay an- 
 other to save his own life, or to save himself from great bodily harm, 
 is a question of fact for the jury upon all the circumstances of the 
 case.*^ And so is the question whether other means could have 
 been resorted to, to prevent the injury.** And an instruction in a 
 prosecution for homicide that the jury may reasonably infer from the 
 facts stated that the accused was not in imminent danger is improper 
 as an invasion of the province of the jury. * ° "What in law constitutes 
 
 7Lon^ V. state, 52 Miss. 23. unavoidable necessity. State v. Fergu- 
 
 sPeopIe V. Campbell, 30 Cal. 312; Peo- son, 9 Nev. 106. 
 pie V. Flahave, 58 Cal. 249; Eiglard v. "Seelev v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 State, 111 Ga. 211, 36 S. E. 682. And 66, 63 S. W. 309; Stell v. Staite (Tex. 
 
 see Howard v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Hep. 612, Crim. App.) 58 S. W. 75. 
 69 S. W. 721. i2Berry v. Cora. 10 Bush, 15. 
 
 In instructing the jury in a prosecu- isStorey v. State, 71 Ala. 329; Holmes 
 
 tion for homicide as to the necessity to v. State, 23 Ala. 17; Richardson v. State, 
 
 kill to protect one's self, there is no es- 133 Ala. 78, 32 So. 249; Gilmore v. 
 
 sential differe 'ce between the expres- State, 126 Ala. 20, 28 So. 595; Schnier 
 
 sions "absolutely necessary" and "neces- v. People, 23 111. 17; Wilson v. Com. 24 
 
 sary." Belt v. People, 97 111. 461. Ky. L. Rep. 185, 68 S. W. 121; State 
 
 sState V. Jones. 29 S. C. 236, 7 S. E. v. Garie, 35 La. Ann. 970; State v. Ma- 
 
 296; State v. Petsch, 43 S. C. 132, 20 zon, 90 N. C. 676; State v. Blevins, 138 
 
 S. E. 993; King v. State, 13 Tex. App. N. C. 668, 50 S. E. 763; State v. Little- 
 
 277. John, 33 S. C. 599, 11 S. E. 638; State 
 
 loState V. Ariel, 38 S. C. 221, 16 S. E. v. McGreer, 13 S. C. 466. And see Wood 
 
 779 ; State v. Jones, supra. v. State, 81 Miss. 408. 33 So. 285 ; Mann 
 
 So, an instruction that to justify v. Stnte, 134 Ala. 1, 32 So. 704. 
 homicide it must appear that it was an uMaines v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 unavoidable necessity is improper and 100, 31 8. W. 667. 
 
 erro eous under a statute providing that i^Domingua v. State, 94 Ala. 9, 11 So. 
 
 justifiable homicide may also consist of 190. 
 
S 225] SELF-DEFENSE. 365 
 
 necessity, or reasonably apparent necessity, however, should not be 
 left to the determination of the jury in a prosecution for homicide; 
 and where the evidence tends to make out a case of self-defense the 
 accused is entitled to an instruction setting forth the law with relation 
 to it.^" Though failure to define "pressing necessity" is not error 
 in the absence of any request to charge with reference to it. ^ ^ 
 
 226. Apparent, as distinguished from real, danger and necessity. — 
 It is the apparent, and not the real, necessity to kill in self-defense 
 against death or great bodily harm which controls on the question of 
 justification ; in such cases one has the right to act on the reasonable 
 appearance of things.^ "Where one person makes a demonstration 
 
 isCook V. Com. 86 Ky. 663, 7 S. W. State, 00 Miss. 571; Dyson v. State, 26 
 
 155. Miss. 362; Ingram v. State, 62 Miss. 
 
 iTHolraes v. State, 124 Wis. 133, 102 142; Blalack v. State, 79 Miss. 517, 31 
 
 N. W. .'521. So. 105; McCrory v. State (Miss.) 25 
 
 iDe Arnian v. State, 71 Ala. 351 ; Car- So. 671 ; Jackson v. State, 79 Miss. 42, 
 
 roll V. State, 23 Ala. 28, 58 Am. Dee. 30 So. 39 ; State v. Eaton, 75 Mo. 591 ; 
 
 282; Oliver v. State, 17 Ala. 587; Rob- State v. Hollingsworth, 156 Mo. 178, 56 
 
 crts V. State, 68 Ala. 156; Christian v. S. W. 1087; State v. Pennington, 146 
 
 State, 96 Ala. 89, 11 So. 338; Rogers v. Mo. 27, 47 S. W. 799; State v. Johnson, 
 
 State, 62 Ala. 170; Stoball v. State, 116 76 Mo. 121; State v. Umfried, 76 Mo. 
 
 Ala. 454, 23 So. 162; Kennedy v. State, 404; State v. Harrod, 102 Mo. 590, 15 
 
 140 Ala. 1, 37 So. 90; People v. Gon- S. W. 373; State v. Hicks, 92 Mo. 431, 
 
 zales, 71 Cal. 569, 12 Pac. 783; Peo- 4 S. W. 742; Nichols v. Winfrey, 79 
 
 pie V. Fitehpatrick, 106 Cal. 286, 39 Pae. Mo. 544; tJhl v. People, 5 Park. Crim. 
 
 605; Hubbard v. State, 37 Fla. 156, 20 Rep. 410; People v. Cole, 4 Park. Crim. 
 
 So. 235; Alvarez v. State, 41 Fla. 532, Rep. 35; State v. Barrett, 132 N. C. 1005, 
 
 27 So. 40; Lane v. State, 44 Fla. 105, 32 43 S. E. 832; State v. Snelbaker, 8 Ohio 
 
 So. 896; Heard v. State, 114 Ga. 90, 39 Dec. Reprint, 406; Carr v. State, 21 Ohio 
 
 S. E. 909; Campbell v. People, 16 111. C. C. 43; Barnard v. State, 88 Te n. 
 
 17, 61 Am. Dec. 49; Walker v. People. 183, 12 S. W. 431; Jordan v. State, 11 
 
 133 111. 110, 24 N. E. 424; Gainey v. Tex. App. 435; Munden v. State, 37 Tex. 
 
 People, 97 111. 270, 37 Am. Rep. 109; 353; Spearman v. State, 23 Tex. App. 
 
 Maher v. People, 24 111. 241 ; Steinmeyer 224, 4 S. W. 586; Cheek v. State, 4 Tex. 
 
 V. People, 95 111. 383; Roach v. People, App. 444; Pharr v. State, 7 Tex. App. 
 
 77 111. 30: Panton v. People, 114 111. 505, 472; Richardson v. State, 7 Tex. App. 
 
 2 N. E. 411; Kipley v. People, 215 111. 486; Moore v. State, 15 Tex. App. 1; 
 
 558, 74 N. E. 379; Mackin v. People, 214 Penland v. State, 19 Tex. App. 365; 
 
 111. 232, 73 N. E. 344; Watkins v. Unit- Brumley v. State, 21 Tex. App. 222, 57 
 
 ed States, 1 Ind. Terr. 364, 41 S. W. Am. Rep. 612, 17 S. W. 140; Riptoe v. 
 
 1044: State v. Donahoe, 78 Iowa, 486, State (Tex. Crim. App.) 42 S. W. 381; 
 
 43 N. W. 297; State v. Keasling, 74 Cochran v. State, 28 Tex. App. 422, 13 
 
 Iowa, 528, 38 N. W. 397 ; State v. Smith, S. W. 651 ; Norris v. State, 42 Tex. 
 
 100 Iowa, 1, 69 N. W. 269; State v. Crim. Rep. 559, 61 S. W. 493; Williford 
 
 Reed, 53 Kan. 767, 42 Am. St. Rep. 322, v. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 393, 42 S. 
 
 37 Pac. 174; Finney v. Com. 26 Ky. L. W. 972; Carter v. State, 37 Tex. Crim. 
 
 Eep; 785, 82S. W. 636; Thacker V. Com. Rep. 403, 35 S. W. 378; Sargent v. 
 
 24 Kv. L. Rep. 1584, 71 S. W. 931 ; Mar- State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 325, 33 S. W. 
 
 tin v; Com. 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1928, 78 S. 364; Casner v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 W. 1104; Rowsey v. Com. 116 Ky. 617, 118, 57 S. W. 821; Chism v. State (Tex. 
 
 76 S. W. 409; State v. West, 45 La. Ann. Crim. App.) 78 S. W. 949; Swanner v. 
 
 14, 12 So. 7; Com. v. O'Malley, 131 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 58 S. W. 72; 
 
 Mass. 423; Potter v. People, 18 Mich. Alexander v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 314, 100 Am. Dec. 173; Germolus v. 70 S. W. 748; Poole v. State, 45 Tex. 
 
 Sausser, 83 Minn. 141, 85 N. W. 946; Crim. Eep. 348, 76 S. W. 565; Terry. v. 
 
 Scott V. State, 56 Miss. 287 ; Bang v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 264, 76 S. W. 
 
366 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 £? 226 
 
 against another tlie other has the right to act in self-defense, either 
 on actual or apparent danger.^ The right of self-defense does not 
 depend upon the correctness of the slayer's apprehension of apparent 
 danger. * It is sufficient that the slayer acted upon reasonable appear- 
 ances and belief of danger;* though, if the danger was real, failure 
 to charge on apparent danger is not error ;'' nor is it reversible errcvr 
 in such case to charge as to apparent danger;® and an actual attack 
 wich a deadly weapon constitutes real, and not apparent, danger 
 within this rule. ^ And when a person has reasonable ground for be- 
 lieving, and does believe, that danger of his being killed is imminent^ 
 he may act on appearances and kill, if he has reasonable ground to be- 
 lieve, and does believe, that such killing is necessary to save himself 
 from death or serious bodily harm, although it may turn out that the 
 
 928; Dodson v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. 
 Rep. 571, 78 S. W. 940; Stoneman v. 
 Com. 25 Gratt. 887; State v. Crawford, 
 31 Wash. 260, 71 Pac. 1030; State v. 
 Ellis, 30 Wash. 369, 70 Pac. 963; Per- 
 kins V. State, 78 Wis. 551, 47 N. W. 
 827; Richards v. State, 82 Wis. 172, 51 
 N. W. 652; Holmes v. State, 124 Wis. 
 13.3, 102 N. vv. 321; Owes v. United 
 States, 64 C. C. A. 525, 130 Fed. 279. 
 And see State v. Symmes, 40 S. C. 383, 
 19 S. E. 16; Voght V. State, 145 -Ind. 
 12, 43 N. E. 1049. 
 
 2 Wynne v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 51 S. W. 909; State v. Castle, 133 N. C. 
 769, 46 S. E. 1. 
 
 In State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 
 
 52 Am. Dec. 599, however, it was held, 
 substantially following Chief Justice 
 Parker in the Self ridge Case, that to 
 justify homicide on the plea of self- 
 defense there must have been actual dan- 
 ger at the time from the violence of the 
 deceased, and a reasonable belief that a 
 felony was intended. 
 
 sLankster v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 360, 59 S. W. 888; Marnoch v. State, 
 7 Tex. App. 269; Godwin v. State, 73 
 Mi.s8. 873, 19 So. 712; State v. Foley, 
 12 Mo. App. 431 ; People v. Lamb, 54 
 Barb. 342; Pistorius v. Com. 84 Pa. 
 158. 
 
 4 Jordan v. State, 11 Tex. App. 435; 
 Lee V. State, 72 Ark. 436, 81 S. W. 
 385; People v. Bruggy, 93 Cal. 4^6, 29 
 Pac. 26; People v. Flanagan, 60 Cal. 
 2, 44 Am. Rep. 52 ; State v. Fraunburg, 
 40 Iowa, 555; State v. Shelton, 64 Iowa, 
 333, 20 N. W. 459; State v. Howard, 14 
 Kan. 173; Cockrill v. Com. 95 Ky. 22, 
 25 S. W. 659; State v. Garie, 35 La. 
 
 Ann. 970; Pond v. People, 8 Mich. 150; 
 State V. Gordon, 191 Mo. 114, 89 S. W. 
 1025; State v. Sloan, 22 Mo t. 293, 56 
 Pac. 364; Vollnier v. State, 24 Neb. 
 838, 40 N. W. 420; People v. Sullivan, 7 
 N. Y. 400; Uhl v. People, 5 Park. 
 Crim. Rep. 410; Jordan v. State, 13 
 Ohio C. C. 471; Com. v. Herold, 5 Pa. 
 Dist. R. 623 ; Brumley v. State, 21 Tex. 
 App. 222, 57 Am. Rep. 612, 17 S. W. 
 140; Nallev v. State, 30 Tex. App. 456, 
 17 S. W. 1084; United States v. King, 
 34 Fed. 302. 
 
 6 Cavil V. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 25 
 S. W. 628; Godwin v. State, 39 Tex. 
 Crim. Rep. 404, 46 S. W. 226; Crockett 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 276, 77 S. 
 W. 4; Moody v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 59 S. W. 894. 
 
 6 Sutton V. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 207, 20 S. W. 564. 
 
 An instruction in a prosecution for 
 homicide as to actual and imminent dan- 
 ger as warranting killi-g in self-defense, 
 as distinguished from apparent danger, 
 is not objectionable, where there was no 
 evidence of apparent, but unreal, dan- 
 ger. People V. Shears, 133 Cal. 154, 65 
 Pac. 295. 
 
 'Godwin v. State, supra. 
 
 The ruje that it is apparent, as dis- 
 tinguished from real, danger which war- 
 rants action in self-defense has no ap- 
 plication, and instructions embodying it 
 should not be given, where the hostile 
 demonstration which induced the act 
 was made with a real, and not an ap- 
 parent, deadly missile or weapon, the 
 exact nature of which the person as- 
 saulted could see. State v. Umfried, 76 
 Mo. 404. 
 
226] 
 
 SELF-DEFENSE. 
 
 3G7 
 
 appearances •were false,* or although he may have been mistaken as 
 to the extent of the actual danger.® And a person charged with 
 murder may be excusable on the ground of self-defense, although 
 the person killed by him, if he had taken the life of the slayer, would 
 have also been excusable on that ground, since each might have acted 
 upon the apparent intention and been mistaken as to the real in- 
 tention of the other. ^'* Nor is the slayer bound in such case to 
 exercise care or circumspection as to the manner of killing. * * 
 
 To warrant killing another in self-defense, however, the danger 
 and necessity must have been real, or it must have been so manifestly 
 apparent as to create a reasonable belief of present impending peril 
 to life or limb.^^ The apparent necessity must be as pressing and 
 imminent as real necessity,^* though where real necessity existed, 
 
 sState V. Zeigler, 40 W. Va. .593, 
 21 &. E. 763; Keith v. State, 97 Ala. 
 32, 11 So. 914; Thomas v. State, 106 
 Ala. 19, 17 So. 460; Abernathy v. State, 
 129 Ala. 85, 29 So. 844; Morgan v. Ter- 
 ritory, 7 Ariz. 224, 64 Pae. 421; Smith 
 V. State, 59 Ark. 132, 43 Am. St. Rep. 
 20, 26 S. W. 712; People v. Anderson, 
 44 Gal. 65; People v. Herbert, 61 Gal. 
 544; People v. Donguli, 92 Gal. 607, 28 
 Pac. 782; Harris v. People, 32 Colo. 211, 
 75 Pae. 427; Smith v. State, 25 Fla. 
 517, 6 So. 482; Redd v. State, 99 Ga. 
 210, 25 S. E. 268; Steinmejer v. People, 
 95 111. 383; Enright v. People, 155 111. 
 32, 39 N. E. 561 ; Kinney v. People, 108 
 111. 519; Kota v. People, 136 111. 655, 27 
 N. E. 53; Enlow v. State, 154 Ind. 064, 
 57 N. E. 539; Wall v. State, 51 Ind. 471 ; 
 Williams v. United States, 4 Ind. Terr. 
 269, 69 S. W. 871 ; State v. Gollins, 32 
 Iowa, 36: State v. Donahoe, 78 Iowa, 
 486, 43 X. W. 297; Philips v. Gom. 2 
 Duv. 328, 87 Am. Dec. 499; Holloway v. 
 Gom. 11 Bush, 344; Rapp v. Com. 14 
 B. Mon. 614; Mu day v. Com. 81 Ky. 
 233; Meridith v. Com. 18 B. Mon. 49; 
 State V. Sadler, 51 La. Ann. 1397, 26 So. 
 390; Pond v. People, 8 Alich. 150; Hurd 
 V. People. 25 Mieh. 406; Wesley v. State, 
 37 Miss. 327, 75 Am. Dec. 62; Long v. 
 State, 52 Miss. 23; Bang v. State, 60 
 Miss. 571 ; Jackson v. State, 79 Miss. 42, 
 30 So. 39; State v. Stockton, 61 Mo. 
 384; State v. Sloan, 47 Mo. 604; State 
 V. Eolla, 21 Mont. 582, 55 Pac. 523; 
 Shorter v. People, 2 N. Y. 193, 51 Am. 
 Dee. 286; Patterson v. People, 46 Barb. 
 625; People v. Lamb, 54 Barb. 342, 2 
 Keves, 37.3, 2 Abb. Pr. N. S. 160; People 
 V. Walworth, 4 N. Y. Grim. Rep. 355; 
 Evers v. People, 3 Hun, 718; People v. 
 Stout, 3 Park. Orim. Rep. 678; People 
 
 V. Rector, 19 Wend. 569 ; State v. Scott, 
 26 N. C. (4 Ired. L.) 409, 42 Am. Dec. 
 148; Marts v. State, 26 Ohio St. 162; 
 Cook V. State, 3 Ohio Dec. Reprint, 136; 
 Wells V. Territory, 14 OkU. 436, 78 Pac. 
 124; Logue v. Com. 38 Pa. 265, 80 Am. 
 Deo. 481 ; Murray v. Com. 79 Pa. 311 ; 
 Gom. V. Weathers, 7 Kulp, 1 ; Copeland 
 V. State, 7 Humph. 479 ; Meuly v. State, 
 26 Tex. App. 274, 8 Am. St. Rep. 477, 9 
 S. W. 563 ; Barro i v. State, 23 Tex. App. 
 462,-5 S. W. 237; Simpson v. State 
 (Tex. Grim. App.) 87 S. W. 826; Rob- 
 erts V. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 88 S. 
 W. 221; Brown v. Gom. 86 Va. 466, 10 
 S. E. 745 ; State v. Cain, 20 W. Va. 679; 
 State V. Evans, 33 W. Va. 417, 10 S. E. 
 792; United States v. Wiltberger, 3 
 Wash. C. C. 515, Fed. Gas. No. 16,738; 
 United States v. Hamilton, 4 M<tckey, 
 446; Gom. v. Self ridge, Harr. & T.Cas.l9. 
 sMahaffey v. Territory, 11 Okla. 213, 
 66 Pac. 342; State v. Lima, 48 La. Ann. 
 1212, 20 So. 737; State v. Sadler, 51 La. 
 Ann. 1397, 26 So. 390. 
 
 The distinction made by law is be- 
 tween real and apparent dager, and 
 not between actual and apparent self- 
 defense. Henry v. People, 198 111. 162, 
 65 N. E. 120. 
 
 lODoolin V. Com. 95 Ky. 29. 23 S. W. 
 663. 
 
 iiPeople V. Thomson, 145 Cal. 717, 79 
 Pac. 435. 
 
 i2De Arman v. State, 71 Ala. 351; 
 Eiland v. State, 52 Ala. 322; People v. 
 Herbert, 61 Gal. 544; Alvarez v. State, 
 41 Fla. 532, 27 So. 40; State v. Shelton, 
 64 Iowa, 333, 20 N. W. 459. 
 
 isWilliford v. State, 38 Tex. Grim. 
 Rep. 393, 42 S. W. 972; People v. Gon- 
 zales, 71 Cal. 569, 12 Pac. 783: Price 
 V. People, 131 111. 223, 23 N. E. 639; 
 
368 HOMICIDE. U 226 
 
 rules witli reference to apparent, as distinguished from real, neces- 
 sity do not apply, and it is not necessary to define apparent ne- 
 cessity.^* And an instruction that the appearance of peril need not 
 be real is erroneous, since the peril must appear to be real.^' Ap- 
 parent danger or peril within the meaning of these rules consists 
 of such overt actual demonstration by conduct and acts of a design 
 to take life or do some great personal injury as would make the 
 killing apparently necessary to self-preservation. ^ " And an instruc- 
 tion requiring absolute necessity, or apparently absolute necessity, 
 is not erroneous.^'' JSTor does the word "actual" in an instruction 
 making the right to kill in self-defense depend upon the slayer hav- 
 ing been assaulted, and upon the fact that the danger was actual and 
 urgent, imply that the danger must have existed in fact; it means 
 merely that the danger must have been apparent to the slayer's com- 
 prehension. ^ * Where a necessity to kill in self-defense is so apparent 
 as to induce a belief of its existence in the mind of a reasonable 
 man, the killing is apparently necessary within the meaning of these 
 rules. ^* So, it is apparently safe, as distinguished from actually 
 safe, means of escape, the absence of which warrants action in self- 
 defense. ^ " And a person is excusable in acting upon well-grounded 
 apprehensions ; as, in case of self-defense under a statutory provision 
 that lawful resistance to the commission of a public offense m.ay be 
 made by the party about to be injured, or by others; and resistance 
 sufficient to prevent an offense against his person or to prevent an il- 
 legal attempt by force to take or injure property in his possession may 
 be made; and any other person in aid or defense of the person 
 about to be injured may make resistance sufficient to prevent the 
 offense. ^^ JSTor is the right of a person to act upon appearances in 
 
 Barnard v. State, 88 Tenn. 183, 12 S. But an instruction that life cannot 
 
 W. 4.31. be taken to arrest any other than a fel- 
 
 KWilliford V. State, supra; Mitchell onious assault or an attempt to commit 
 
 T. State, 38 Tex. Orim. Rep. 170, 41 S. a forcible felony is not subject to objec- 
 
 W. 816; State v. Unifried, 76 Mo. 404. tion that it authorizes self-defense only 
 
 i6Harris v. State, 96 Ala. 24, 11 So. to arrest actual danger of a felonious 
 
 255; Williams v. State, 3 Heisk. 376. nature, where the ju y were elsewhere 
 
 1 "Evans V. State, 44 Miss. 702. instructed that danger, to justify tak- 
 
 The word "seem" in an instruction in ing life to save life, need only be appar- 
 
 a prosecution for homicide, laying down ent. Evans v. State, 120 Ala. 269, 25 
 
 the law where it did not seem to the So. 175. 
 
 accused necessary, in the exercise of a isstate v. Neeley, 20 Iowa, 108. 
 reasonable judgment, to kill, is synony- isMcDonrall v. People, 168 111. 93, 
 
 mous with the word "appear," and its 48 N. E. 86; Holmes v. State, 124 Wis. 
 
 use does not affect the propriety of the 133, 102 N. W. 321. 
 instruction. Jones v. Com. 20 Ky. L. zoRadford v. Com. 9 Ky. L. Rep. 378, 
 
 Eep. 355. 46 S. W. 217. 5 S. W. 343; Carr v. State, 21 Ohio C. C. 
 
 17 State V. Crawford, 66 Iowa, 318, 23 43. 
 N. W. 684. 2iFisher v. State, 10 Lea, 151. 
 
§ 226] SELF-DEFENSE. ^ 369 
 
 killing another in alleged self-defense affected by a statute providing 
 that where a lawful act which might produce death is done without 
 due caution or circumspection, and the death of another is thereby 
 caused, involuntary manslaughter is committed.*^ 
 
 Whether appearances of danger were real, or apparently real, so as 
 to justify action in self-defense, is for the jury to decide. ^^ "Ap- 
 parent danger" is a legal term with a fixed, definite meaning, and 
 what circumstances constitute apparent danger is primarily a mixed 
 question of law and fact. ^ * But when all the facts are ascertained, 
 it is a question of fact alone. ^"^ 
 
 227. E,ight to have particular issue submitted ^A person charged 
 
 with homicide is entitled to have the jury instructed as to the law of 
 self-defense upon evidence of apparent danger and necessity to kill, 
 as well as of actual danger and necessity. ^ And an instruction mak- 
 ing the right of self-defense turn on necessity of the force used, 
 without reference to whether it really appeared to be necessary, is 
 erroneous.^ While a person unlawfully assaulted by another may 
 defend himself against threatened injury, and may use all neces- 
 sary force, a charge to that effect in a prosecution for homicide is 
 insufficient in failing to instruct specifically that if, acting on ap- 
 pearances, he committed the homicid? to save his own life or his 
 person from serious bodily harm, he is not guilty.* And an instruc- 
 tion, though in the exact language of a statute, which provides that 
 to justify a homicide in self-defense it must appear that the killing 
 of the other was absolutely necessary, is erroneous and reversible 
 error, as ignoring the doctrine of apparent necessity.* l^or is ai» 
 
 ssPeople V. Thomson, 145 Cal. 717, zState v. Castle, 133 N. C. 769, 46 S. 
 
 79 Pac. 435. E. 1; State v. Morris (Iowa) 105 N. W. 
 
 2 3People V. Flanagan, 60 Cal. 2, 44 213; Alexander v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 Am. Rep. 52. And see State v. Brown- App.) 70 S. W. 748. 
 
 field, 60 S. C. 509, 39 S. E. 2. And an instruction that homiciJe, to 
 
 2iLong V. State, 52 Miss. 23. be justifiable, must be in fact in self- 
 
 The court in a prosecution for homi- defense, and not merely colorably so, is 
 
 cide may sum up all the facts relied objectionable as calculated to cause the 
 
 upon by the state hypothetically, and jury to overlook and disregard the prin- 
 
 inforra the jury that, if they believe ciple of law that one who commits a 
 
 such facts are true, they do not consti- homicide is justified in so doing if he 
 
 tute what in law is apparent dangar, acts upon reasonable appearances of dan- 
 
 though a charge to this efl'ect is cal- ger of death or serious bodily injury, 
 
 culated to mislead, and should be rare- which reasonable appearances are to be 
 
 ly given. Ibid. considered and determined from his 
 
 86lbid. standpoint. Spearman v. State, 23 Tex. 
 
 iSteiner v. People, 187 111. 244, 58 N. App. 224, 4 S. W. 586. 
 
 E. 383; Mullins v. Com. 23 Ky. L. Kep. sAllen v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 65 
 
 2433, 67 S. W. 824; Chisni v. State (Tex. S. W. 671. 
 
 Crim. App.) 78 S. W. 949; Terry v. 4Kipley v. People, 215 111. 358, 74 N. 
 
 State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 264, 76 S. E. 379. 
 W. 928. 
 
 Horn.— 24. 
 
370 HOMICIDE. fS 22r 
 
 instruction in a prosecution for homicide whicli limits the right of 
 self-defense to actual danger rendered harmless by another inbtruc- 
 tion stating the law correctly. ° 
 
 The rule would appear to be different, however, when the correc- 
 tion and explanation are contained in the same instruction. ** And 
 while one may act upon appearances, although they turn out to be 
 baseless, the court in a prosecution for homicide is not required in 
 every instance to afiix that qualification to an instruction on self- 
 defense, but should only give it in a case in which it would apply 
 to the facts ; and where the court's instructions applied to every phase 
 of the evidence, and there was no appearance of any supposed danger 
 other than that on which the instructions were based, failure to affix 
 such qualification was not error.'' And failure to submit the ques- 
 tion of actual and of apparent danger in separate instructions in a 
 prosecution for homicide is not error where there was no actual 
 danger, and the question of apparent danger was fully covered.® So, 
 an instruction in a prosecution for homicide as to actual necessity 
 to take life in self-defense, as distinguished from apparert neces- 
 sity, is harmless where the case did not present the question of the 
 right of a man to take life under circumstances which were seeming- 
 ly, but not actually, necessary to preserve his own life, or save him 
 from great bodily harm.® And the right of a person to act in case 
 of apparent danger is sufficiently presented in a prosecution for homi- 
 
 sEnright v. People, 155 111. 32, 39 N. S. W. 185; Eyan v. State, 115 Wis. 488, 
 E. 561 ; Carr v. State, 21 Ohio C. C. 43. 92 N. W. 271. 
 
 And see Burton v. Com. 23 Ky. L. Rep. 'State v. Smith, 125 Mo. 2, 28 S. W. 
 1915, 66 S. W. 516. 181. 
 
 Nor is it cured by a subsequent in- sHarrell v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 struction explaining the kind of rea- 20i, 45 S. W. 581 ; Maekin v. People,, 
 sonable apprehension of death or great 214 111. 232, 73 N. E. 344. And see 
 bodily harm which would justify one in Coleman v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 88 
 acting on the facts and circumstances S. W. 238; Hardison v. State (Tex- 
 as they appeared to him. State v. Clark, Crim. App.) 85 S. W. 1071. 
 134 N. C. 698, 47 S. E. 36. sstate v. Jones, 71 N. J. L. 543, 60 
 
 eSee People v. Shears, 133 Cal. 154, Atl. 396; State v. Umfried, 76 Mo. 404. 
 65 Pnc. 295; Frazier v. State, 112 Ga. And an instruction in a prosecution 
 868, 38 S. E. 340 ; Waller v. People, 209 for homicide in self-defense, on actual 
 111. 284, 70 N. E. 681 ; State v. Jones, danger caused by an actual attack as^ 
 125 Iowa, 608, 99 N. W. 179; Reynolds distinguished from one o^ reasonable 
 V. Com. 114 Ky. 912, 72 S. W. 277; presumption of danger produced by an 
 State V. Tarter, 26 Or. 38, 37 Pae. 53; attitude as if about to attack, is proper 
 State V. Porter, 32 Or. 13', 49 Pao. where it appears that accused had 
 964; State v. Foster, 68 S. C. 469, 45 knocked deceased off a gallery because 
 S. E. 1 ; State v. Carter, 15 Wash. 121, of an alleged demonstration, and de- 
 45 Pac. 745; Richards v. State, 82 Wis. ceased had immediately, with his drawn 
 172, 51 N. W. 652; Curtis v. State (Tex. knife, rushed up upon the gallery at the- 
 Crim. App.) 59 S. W. 263; Swanner v. accused, who then shot him. Bearden v. 
 State (Tox. Crim. App.) 58 S. W. 72; State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 144, 79 S. W, 
 Freeman v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 72 37. 
 
i 227] SELF-DEFENSE. 371 
 
 cide by an instruction that' if he had reasonable grounds to believe, 
 and did in good faith believe, that he was in danger of losing his 
 life or suffering great bodily harm at the hands of the deceased, he 
 had a right to use such force as reasonably appeared to him to be 
 necessary to protect himself from such danger. * " And the right of a 
 person to act upon appearances or apparent danger in defending him- 
 self is not denied by an instruction that in the absence of malice the 
 killing would be manslaughter, unless done in necessary self-defense, 
 where it was followed by an instruction that he might act upon appear- 
 ances. ^ ^ Nor is it denied by an instruction that, to justify the taking 
 of life, it must appear that the slayer had reason to believe, and did be- 
 lieve, that he was in danger of his life, or of receiving great bodily 
 harm, and that to avoid such danger it was necessary for him to 
 take the life of the assailant ; ^ ^ or by the use of the term "well-found- 
 ed belief" in an instruction on that subject.*^ Nor by an in- 
 struction that a person assaulted by another must retreat unless 
 retreat would endanger his safety, and must refrain from taking 
 life if there is any other reasonable mode of escape ; in such case the 
 qualification, if desired, should be invoked by an explanatory 
 charge. * * 
 
 228. Belief in danger and necessity — Belief in danger or fear of 
 death or great bodily harm must have been actually entertained to 
 justify a homicide, and the homicidal act must have been done un- 
 der the controlling influence thereof ; ^ and the belief must have been 
 well-founded and honest* And "well founded" and "well ground- 
 ed" mean the same thing when used in an instruction for homicide, 
 with reference to fear, belief, and apprehension, under which a fatal 
 blow committed in self-defense is struck.* So, apprehension in this 
 
 lOTreTard v. Com. 22 Ky. L. Eep. 478, Com. 25 Ky. L. Eep. 262, 75 S. W. 
 
 57 S. W. (516. 225; Regan v. State (Miss.) 39 So. 
 
 iiHarris v. People, 32 Colo. 211, 75 1002. 
 Pac. 427. zwilkins v. State, 98 Ala. 1, 13 So. 
 
 izPeople V. DeWitt, 68 Cal. 584, 10 312; Bondurant v. State, 125 Ala. 31, 
 
 Pac. 212. 27 So. 775; Nabors v. State. 120 Ala. 
 
 i3People v. Donguli, 92 Cal. 607, 28 323, 25 So. 529. And see Peoples v. 
 
 Pac. 782. State (Miss.) 33 So. 289; State v. Ab- 
 
 i4Poe V. State, 87 Ala. 65, 6 So. 378. bott, 8 W. Va. 741. 
 
 iPeople V. Westlake, 62 Cil. 303; And any fact which ter-ds to show that 
 
 Jimmerson v. State, 133 Ala. 18, 32 So. at the time of killing another the slay- 
 
 141; Mathews v. State, 136 Ala. 47, 33 er knew that the person killed did rot 
 
 So. 838; Lovett v. State, 30 Fla. 142, intend to commit any felony upon him 
 
 17 Ij.U.A. 705, 11 So. 550; Sylvester v. or do him any great bodily harm, or to 
 
 State (Fla.) 35 So. 142; State v. Har- show his real motive for the killing, is 
 
 rington, 12 Nev. 125; State v. Sadler, competent evidence. Noles t. State, 26 
 
 51 La. Ann. 1397, 26 So. 390; Com. v. Ala. 31, 62 Am. Dec. 711. 
 McGowan. 189 Pa. 641, 69 Am. St. Rep. JBarnard v. State, 88 Tenn. 183, 12 
 
 836, 42 Atl. 365. And see Hutsell v. S. W. 431. 
 
372 HOMICIDE. £§ 223 
 
 connection is synonymous with belief, and not fear, and though the 
 required danger actually existed, killing is not justified where it was 
 not apparent, and the slayer was ignorant of its existence.* It is 
 not enough that the slayer had reason to apprehend death or serious 
 bodily injury; he must have actually apprehended it.® He must 
 have entertained such belief of danger of death or great bodily harm 
 at the hands of the person killed, and acted upon it.® And to 
 warrant a belief of necessity which will justify a killing in self- 
 defense, there must have been not only a seeming intent upon the 
 part of the deceased to kill or to do great bodily injury, but also 
 seeming capacity; and to determine this the presence and acts of 
 others at the time may be taken into consideration, together with the 
 place and its surroundings.'' 
 
 It must be assumed, however, that what a person has reasonable 
 ground to believe, he does believe, and, conversely, that for what 
 he does not believe, there is to his mind a lack of reasonable ground 
 for believing.* And reasonable belief upon the part of a person 
 assaulted that it was necessary to take the steps taken in order to 
 defend himself is sufficient; it is not required that he should have 
 deemed it necessary to kill his assailant ; if the death of his assailant 
 resulted from a reasonable defense of himself he is excusable wheth- 
 er or not he intended that consequence, or whether he believed that 
 result was necessary.® And when an assault is made upon two per- 
 sons a belief by both that they are in danger of losing their lives, or 
 of suffering great bodily harm, is not necessary to warrant a jury in 
 
 *Trogdon v. State, 133 Ind. 1, 32 N. that the right of a person to defend him- 
 
 E. 725. self or his home does not depend upon 
 
 estate v. Matthews, 78 N. C. 534; his belief, in the exercise of a reasonable 
 
 State V. Gentry, 125 N. C. 733, 34 S. E. judgment, that it was necessary for him 
 
 706. to use the force that he used ; his right 
 
 And refusal to give an instruction as of self-defense may exist perfectly with- 
 
 to the right of self-defense which will out reference to "his belief as to his 
 
 justify homicide, where there is such ap- danger, where such danger actually ex- 
 
 pearance of danger as would lead a rea- isted. 
 
 sonably prudent and cautious man to 7 State v. Snelbaker, 8 Ohio Dec. Ke- 
 
 believe the danger to exist, whether the print, 466. 
 
 accused so believed or not, is not error. And evidence that a person charged 
 
 Sylvester v. State (Fla.) 35 So. 142. with homicide coistantly avoided a 
 
 GPeople V. Gonzales, 71 Cal. 569, 12 meeting with the deceased previous to 
 
 Pac. 783; People v. Ye Park, 62 Cal. the killing is a mere conclusion, and not 
 
 204; Pugh V. State. 132 Ala. 1, 31 So. competent. Curtis v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 727; Lovett v. State, 30 Fla. 142, 17 App.) 59 S. W. 263. 
 
 L.R.A. 705, 11 So. 550; Ballard v. State, sState v. Donnelly, 69 Iowa, 705, 58 
 
 31 Fla. 206, 12 So. 805 ; Stiles v. State, Am. Rep. 234, 27 N. W. 369. 
 
 67 Ga. 183; Gainey v. People, 97 111. sHieks v. State, 51 Ind. 407. And see 
 
 270, 37 Am. Bep. 109. State v. Ussery, 118 N. C. 1177, 24 S. 
 
 In MoKinney v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. E. 414. 
 565, 82 S. W. 263, however, it was held 
 
§ 228] SELF-DEFENS'K 373 
 
 acquitting one of them on the ground of self-defense; in such case 
 either or both may be acquitted as warranted by the evidence.^" 
 
 It is competent for the accused to testify in a prosecution for 
 homicide as to his apprehension and belief of danger of death or 
 great bodily harm, the question of the existence of such belief be- 
 ing submitted to the jury/^ though the belief of a witness from 
 the conduct, countenance, and language of the deceased that it was 
 not his intention to kill the accused in a prosecution for homicide 
 is not competent evidence ; the witness must testify to facts. ^ ^ And 
 it is not the province of the coiirt to disparage such evidence or to 
 reflect upon its weight or sufficiency.-'^ But it is not proper in in- 
 structing in such a case to assume a state of face's upon which the 
 accused is supposed to have founded his belief. * * And witnesses in 
 a prosecution for homicide may testify as to the manner, language, 
 and tone of voice of the deceased just previous to the killing, but 
 they cannot give their opinion as to whether the slayer would have 
 cause to look for difficulty from such manner, language, or tone 
 of voice.*'' And the details of a previous difficulty between the 
 parties may be shown as a part of the res gestae ;^^ and so may the 
 feelings of the deceased and persons accompanying him toward the 
 accused.*'' Whether the accused believed that there was necessity 
 to kill the deceased to protect himself, and whether there were rea- 
 sonable grounds for such belief, are questions for the jury in a 
 prosecution for homicide.*® 
 
 229. Effect of negligence in forming belief. — ^If belief of danger 
 and necessity to kill is imputable to negligence, it does not justify 
 killing in self-defense, however honest it may be.* In Levett's Case,^ 
 for instance, which is the crucial case in this branch of the law, we 
 
 lOArnoId v. Com. 21 Ky. L. Key. 1566, E. 120. And see Adams v. State, 44 
 
 55 S. W. 894. Tex. Crim. Rep. 64, 68 S. W. 270. 
 
 iiState V. Harrington, 12 Nev. 125; isKeener v. State, 18 Ga. 194, 63 Am. 
 
 Deilks V. State, 141 Ind. 23, 40 N. E. Dec. 269. 
 
 120; Lane v. State, 44 Fla. 105, 32 So. isstate v. Nelson, 166 Mo. 191, 89 Am. 
 
 896; Williams v. Com. 90 Ky. 596, 14 St. Rep. 681, 65 S. W. 749; Davids v. 
 
 S. W. 595; Com. V.Woodward, 102 Mass. People, 192 111. 176, 61 N. E. 537. 
 
 135: State v. Evans, 33 W. Va. 417, I'Davids v. People, supra. 
 
 10 S. E. 792; Allison v. Ur'ited States, isRowsey v. Com. 116 Ky. 617, 76 S. 
 
 160 U. S. 204, 40 L. ed. 396, 16 Sup. Ct. W. 409; Stnte v. Gordon, 191 Mo. 114, 
 
 Rep. 252. Contra, State v. Gonee, 87 89 S. W. 1025. 
 
 Mo. 627 ; State v. Downs, 91 Mo. 19, 3 iSmith v. State, 59 Ark. 132, 43 Am. 
 
 S. W. 219. St. Rep. 20, 26 S. W. 712; Allison v. 
 
 >2Hawkins v. State, 25 Ga. 207, 71 State, 74 Ark. 444, 86 S. W. 409; Pond 
 
 Am. Deo. 166. v. People, 8 Mich. 150; United States 
 
 isAllison v. United States, 160 U. S. v. Heath, 9 Maekey, 272; Eost. C. L. 
 
 203, 40 L. ed. 395, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 262, 1 Hawk. P. C. chap. 31, § 44; King 
 
 252. v. Snow, 1 Leach, C. L. 151. 
 
 i4DeiIks V. State, 141 Ind. 23, 40 N. 2Cro. Car. 538. 
 
374 HOMICIDE. K 229 
 
 find a man who, suddenly aroused from sleep, under information 
 wholly false, kills another whom he supposes to be a burglar, ac- 
 quitted on the ground that in the circumstances he acted under 
 an innocent error of fact But Foster* tells us that "possibly it 
 [the case in question] might have better been ruled manslaughter 
 at common law, due circumspection not having been used." Judge 
 Bronson, in commenting on this passage,* says: "He [Foster] calls 
 it nothing more than a case of manslaughter, when, if a man may 
 not act upon appearances, it was a plain case of murder." In ether 
 words, when a man kills another in an honest error of fact, murder 
 is out of the question. The only issue is, Was this error negligent 
 or non-negligent? If negligent, the killing is manslaughter. If 
 non-negligent, excusable homicide. One who kills a prostrate an- 
 tagonist on the call of a third person that he was getting his gun 
 is not justifiable or excusable when he acted without even looking 
 to see if the statement was true.® The negligence which will pre- 
 vent a homicide from being justifiable, however, is negligence on the 
 part of the slayer in making his self-defense, and not some prior 
 negligence.® And being without fault, so as to justify homicide 
 in self-defense, consists in being without fault in commencing or 
 carrying on the assault or difficulty, and not of mere negligence or 
 careless conduct, but for which the slayer might have avoided the 
 difficulty.'' 
 
 b. Nature and extent of danger constituting necessity. 
 
 230. Danger of what — The danger or fear of danger which will 
 warrant the exercise of the right of self-defense includes reasonable 
 fear of great bodily harm, as well as such fear of death.* And 
 the right of the slayer is not confined to fear of an attempt to kill 
 or do great bodily harm with malice aforethought.^ The fact that 
 
 sFost. C. L. p. 299. 200; Cheek v. State, 4 Tex. App. 444; 
 
 4Shorter v. People, 2 N. Y. 193, 51 Harris v. State, 8 Tex. App. 90; Bush v. 
 
 Am. Deo. 286. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 539, 51 S. W. 
 
 estate v. Kloss, 117 Mo. 591, 23 S. W. 23S; High v. State, 26 Tex. App. 545, 8 
 
 780. Am. St. Rep. 488, 10 S. W. 238; An- 
 
 eElder v. State, 69 Ark. 648, 86 Am. derson v. State, 1 Tex. App. 730; Ful- 
 
 St. Rep. 220, 65 S. W. 938. ler v. State, 30 Tex. App. 559, 17 S. 
 
 7lhid. W. 1108; Bryant v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 iGarner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 29 Am. App.) 47 S. W. 373; Hampton v. State 
 
 St. Ttpp. 232, 9 So. 835; Kirby v. State, (Tex. Crim. App.) 65 S. W. 520. And 
 
 89 Ala. 63. 8 So. 110; State v. Benham, see Gonzalez v. State, 30 Tex. App. 203, 
 
 23 Towa, 154, 92 Am. Dec. 4l7 ; State v. 16 S. W. 978. 
 
 Burke, 30 Iowa. 331 ; State v. Petteys, 65 zPeopIe v. Bruggy, 93 Cal. 476, 29 Pac. 
 
 Kan. 625, 70 Pac. 588; Minton v. Com. 26; People v. Hyndman, 99 Cal. 1, 33 
 
 79 Ky. 461 ; State v. Ariel, 38 S. C. 221, Pae. 782. 
 16 S. E. 779; Young v. State, 11 Humph. 
 
■i 230] SELF-DEFENSE. 375 
 
 an assault was violent or reasonably appeared to put the person as- 
 saulted or some member of his family in real or apparent danger 
 of losing his life or of suffering great bodily harm gives rise to 
 a right on his part to defend himself or those in his home, without 
 reference to whether or not the assault was wilful.' Nor is the 
 bodily injury to prevent which homicide may be committed con- 
 fined to such injury as would cause the victim reasonable appre- 
 hension that his life was in immediate danger.* It includes every 
 serious bodily harm, like mayhem.® And a woman may defend 
 herself against rape by taking the life of her assailant, if necessary. " 
 And in this connection "enormous" is not synonymous with "great," 
 but is a word of stronger import.^ But using "serious" instead of 
 the statutory word "great" is not error,* though "great, serious 
 ■danger" is improper.® And so is "the most serious bodily harm." ^^ 
 Omission to charge upon self-defense based upon the appearance of 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution words "enormous bodily injury" and 
 for homicide confining the right to kill "dreadful injury" in charging as to self- 
 in self-defense to the state of facta in defense is not erroneous when such 
 which the deceased was endeavoring to words are used as the equivalent of 
 kill the accused or do him some great "great bodily harm." 
 bodily harm, is •lorroct and includes an SLawlor v. People, 74 111. 228; State 
 Attempt to kill either with or without v. Rose. 92 Mo. 201, 4 S. W. 733; Srit- 
 malice aforethought. People v. Bruggy, tain v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 85 S. 
 ^upra. W. 278. 
 
 sMcKinney v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. And an instruction in a prosecution 
 •565, 82 S. W. 263. for homicide with reference to fear of a 
 
 estate v. Bonofiglio, 67 N. J. L. 239, 91 deadly purpose upon the part of the de- 
 Am. St. Rep. 423, 52 Atl. 712; Young ceased, instead of fear of great bodily 
 V. State, 11 Humph. 200; Greer v. State, harm, is not prejudicially erroneous, 
 ■6 Baxt. 629; Bruce v. State, 41 Tex. where it is elsewhere stated in the in- 
 Crim. Rep. 27, 51 S. W. 954. struetion that such a fear is a justifiia- 
 
 sBrownell v. People, 38 Mich. 732. tion for homicide. Moore v. State, 96 
 
 But while the loss of an arm and in- Tenn. 209, 33 S. W. 1046. 
 jury to the other hand might justify 9jones v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 stabbing in self-dofense, or mitigate the 405, 71 S. W. 962. 
 
 Ctl'ense, it is not error to refuse to charge But an instruction in a prosecution 
 V' a prosecution for such a stabbing that for homicide that an apparent da ger, 
 it would be I-wful and reasonable for to justify self-defense, must be danger 
 the accused to use a pocket knife, if he to life or of deadly violence to the per- 
 believed at the time that it was neees- son, is not erroneous as limiting the de- 
 sary to protect his person, without also fense to such cases as show an intention 
 stating that any facts or reasons for the of the assailant to take life, where other 
 belief must appear, or that the facts parts of the charge show that what was 
 must show that a reasonable man might meant by deadly violence was simply 
 believe that it was necessary to use the groat violence. Acers v. Urited States, 
 knife. Malone v. State, 77 Ga. 767. 164 U. S. 388, 41 L. ed. 481, 17 Sup. 
 
 cOsborne v. State, 140 Ala. 84, 37 So. Ct. Rep. 91. 
 105. loReins v. People, 30 111. 256. 
 
 ^McDonald v. State, 89 Tenn. 161, 14 But the use of the expression "dread- 
 S. VV. 487; Ritchey v. People, 23 Colo, ful harm or severe calamity" in an in- 
 314. 47 Pao. 272, 384. struetioii in a prosecution for homicide. 
 
 In State v. Murdy, 81 Iowa, 603, 47 with reference to the right of self- 
 N. W. 867, it was held that using the defense, is not reversible error where the 
 
3ns HOMICIDE. [§ 230 
 
 serious bodily injury, however, is not error in a prosecution for 
 homicide in which, if an assault was made, it was with an inten- 
 tion to kill.*^ And the same rule applies to an instruction lim- 
 iting self-defense to the prevention of murder in such a case. * '^ And 
 evidence that the deceased made an assault on the accused with a 
 pistol, and that the accused shot him to save his own life, does not 
 require an instruction in a prosecution for the killing that the ac- 
 cused had a right to defend himself against danger of serious bodily 
 harm. * ^ 
 
 But the danger which will warrant an exercise of the right of 
 self-defense must be one of great injury to the person, that would 
 maim or be permanent in its character, or which might produce 
 death. ^* The danger must involve peril to life or limb,^® though 
 the injury feared need not necessarily be a forcible felony, or felo- 
 nious assault.^® "Great bodily injury" defines itself, and means 
 great bodily injury as distinguished from slight or moderate in- 
 jury. ^^ Fear or danger of slight personal injury, either at the 
 time or in the future, is not sufficient. ^ * And in charging the jury 
 on this subject the word "great" or its equivalent should be used. ^ * 
 So, serious personal injury means a bodily injury, as distinguished 
 from a personal affront or a personal wrong. ^ " And the act of killing 
 
 jury are elsewhere correctly charged to his ability to distinguish between 
 that one may invoke the law of self- felonies and misdemeanors. State v. 
 defense to protect his life or person from Sloan, 22 Mont. 293, 56 Pac. 364. 
 "great bodily harm." State v. Carter, But an instruction that life cannot 
 15 Wash. 121, 45 Pac. 745. be taken to arrest any other than a. 
 
 iiMitchell V. State, 38 Tex. Grim, felonious assault, or an attempt to com- 
 Eep. 170, 41 S. W. 816; Curtis v. State mit a forcible felony, is not pre- 
 (Tex. Grim. App.) 59 S. W. 263. judicially erroneous where it appears 
 
 izBryant v. State (Tex. Grim. App.) that, if any assault was made, it was 
 47 S. W. 373; People v. Adams, 85 Gal. a felonious and forcible one. Evans v. 
 231, 24 Pac. 629, State, supra. 
 
 isMatthews v. State, 42 Tex. Grim. I'Rogers v. State, supra. 
 
 Rep. 31, 58 S. W. 86. isBerry v. Com. 10 Bush, 15; Davis v. 
 
 KAcers v. United States, 164 U. S. State, 92 Ala. 20. 9 So. 616; Brown v. 
 
 388, 41 L. ed. 481, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 91. State, 74 Ala. 478; Eila^-d v. State, 52 
 
 i5Blackburn v. State, 86 Ala. 595, Ala. 322; State v. Martin, 9 Ohio S & 
 
 So. 96. G. P. Dee. 778. 
 
 ifiRr^ers v. State, 60 Ark. 76, 31 isShort v. Com. 9 Ky. L. Rep. 255, 4 
 L.R.A. 465, 46 Am. St. Rep. 154, 29 S. S. W. 810. 
 
 W. 894; Evans v. State, 120 Ala. 269, 2 0Thompson v. State, 24 Ga. 297. 
 25 So. 1 75 ; Ritohey v. People, 23 Colo. And where, in a prosecution for homi- 
 314. 47 Pac. 272, 384. cide, the defense is self-defense against 
 
 Reasonable apprehension of death or a, dangerous assault, proof of the per- 
 grent bodily harm warrants action in manent consequences upon the health 
 self defense, and an instruction in a and nervous system andi mental facul- 
 prosecutio' for homicide that the ao- ties of a-other upon whom the deceased 
 cused could not kill his assailant until had made a similar assault is not ad- 
 it appeared to him that he was about missible. State v. Sorenson, 32 Minn, 
 to commit a felony upon him is errone- 118, 19 N. W. 738. 
 ous as limiting the right of self-defense 
 
§ 230] SELF-DEFENSE. 377 
 
 must have been done because of fear or danger of deatb or great 
 bodily harm, as distinguished from some other fear or danger or 
 some other reason.^ ^ And when the statute justifies homicide only 
 when one manifestly intends and endeavors to commit a felony, 
 omitting all mention of intent to do bodily harm, the assault, to 
 be a justification, must amount to an attempt to commit a felony. * ^ 
 But it is justifiable when the assault was to commit a felony against 
 the person, as well as when it was to kill,^^ and the rule applies, 
 whatever may have been the grade of the attempted or intended 
 felony.^* Nor is a person's right of self-defense limited to danger 
 or apparent danger from the person killed alone, where the proof 
 discloses the presence and co-operation of others with the deceased, 
 and hostile demonstrations toward the slayer by them.^^ But to 
 sustain the plea of self-defense in such case it is necessary to make 
 out a case of a third person confederating with the first assailant, 
 or aiding and abetting him in the assault.^® And danger that a 
 third person will kill the slayer if he does not do the killing him- 
 self does not constitute such danger as will warrant a plea of self- 
 defense, where, to escape such danger, he kills a person, in the ab- 
 sence of a showing of reasonableness of the anticipation of the 
 danger and inability to avoid it.^^ 
 
 What constitutes a great bodily injury, and whether the circum- 
 stances in any case are such as to justify one in believing that such 
 an injury is about to be committed upon him, and in defending 
 himself against it, are matters which must be left, to a great ex- 
 tent, to the judgment of the jury.^* And a person who is assaulted 
 
 21 Walker v. State, 97 Ga. 350, 23 S. person was pointing a gun at the ac- 
 
 E. 992. eused at the same time, where it appears 
 
 22Simmon8 v. State, 79 Ga. 696, 4 S. that there was no danger therefrom. 
 
 E. 894; Battle v. State, 103 Ga. 53, 29 Agee v. Com. 9 Ky. L. Kep. 272, 5 S. 
 
 S. E. 491; Freeman v. State. 112 Ga. 48, W. 47. 
 
 37 S. E. 172; Johnson v. State, 72 Ga. 2 estate v. Chopin, 10 La. Ann. 458. 
 
 679: Williams v. State, 120 Ga. 870, 48 And an instruction in a prosecution 
 
 S. E. 368; Territory v. Baker, 4 N. M. for homicide that a person who believes 
 
 238, 13 Pac. 30; United States v. Wilt- his life to be assailed and in immediate 
 
 berger, 3 Wash. C. C. 515, Fed. Cas. No. danger from another is excusable in law 
 
 16,738. in resisting a third person who inter- 
 
 23Powell V. State, 101 Ga. 9, 65 Am. feres to disarm him forcibly, with a 
 
 St. Eep. 277, 29 S. E. 309. view to bringing about a fight without 
 
 24Ragland v. State, 111 Ga. 211, 36 S. weapons between the slayer and another, 
 
 E. 6S2; Powell v. State, supra. after being warned to stand off, is im- 
 
 2BBean v. State, 25 Tex. App. 346, 8 proper. Ibid. 
 S. W. 278; State v. Price, 186 Mo. 140, 27State v. Nargashian, 26 R. I. 299, 
 84 S. W. 920. 106 Am. St. Rep. 715, 58 Atl. 953; Brew- 
 But limiting an instruction in a prose- er v. State, 72 Ark. 145, 78 S. W. 773. 
 cution for homicide on the law of self- zsRogers v. State, 60 Ark. 76, 31 
 defense to danger or apparent danger L.R.A. 465, 46 Am. St. Rep. 154, 29 S. 
 at the hands of the deceased is not error, W. 894. 
 though there was evidence that another 
 
378 HOMICIDE. H 230 
 
 cannot, in the heat of the conflict, be required to draw very fine dis- 
 tinctions as to the extent of the injuries likely to be inflicted upon 
 him.=^» 
 
 231. The imminence of the danger. — The imminent danger which 
 will justify homicide in self-defense is immediate danger, such as 
 must be instantly met, or guarded against, and such as cannot be 
 met by calling on others for assistance, or for the protection of the 
 law.^ Mere fear or belief upon the part of one that another de- 
 signs to kill him does not warrant killing in self-defense without 
 waiting for an actual assault, where the danger was neither real 
 nor apparently imminent and urgent.^ And this is so though there 
 had been threats and previous assaults,* though the rule might be 
 different if there had been threats to kill, and actual attempts to 
 assassinate. * And an instruction in a prosecution for homicide with 
 reference to self-defense is erroneous where it pretermits the ele- 
 ment of the honest belief of the accused in imminency of the peril.® 
 The apprehension of danger must exist at the very moment the 
 deed is committed.® To justify killing in self-defense the danger 
 must be a present one as distinguished from a past one, or a danger 
 of future injury,'' though it be in the near future.® The right of 
 self-defense commences when necessity, real or apparent, begins, and 
 
 iiSBrownell v. People, 38 Mich. 732. sCom. v. Rudert, supra; Haverly v. 
 
 lUnited States v. Outerbridge, 5 Sawy. Com. 95 Ky. 33, 24 S. W. 664 ; Parsons 
 620, Fed. Cas. No. 15,978; United States v. Com. 78 Ky. 102; Turner v. Com. 89 
 V. Wiltberger, 3 Wash. C. C. 515, Fed. Ky. 78, 1 S. W. 475. And see Willing- 
 Cas. No. 16,738; Johnson v. State, 58 ham v. State, 130 Ala. 35. 30 So. 429; 
 Ark. 57, 23 S. W. 7; Jackson v. State, State v. Nelson, 166 Mo. 191, 89 Am. St. 
 91 Ga. 271, 44 Am. St. Rep. 22, 18 S. E. Rep. 681, 65 S. W. 749. 
 298. And see Smith v. State, 119 Ga. ^Kennedy v. Com. 14 Bush, 340. And 
 564, 46 S. E. 846. see infra, §§ 242 et seq. 
 
 On the question of opportunity to pro- BMathews v. State, 136 Ala. 47, 33 So. 
 cure assistance, see infra, § 277. 838; Welch v. State, 124 Ala. 41, 27 So. 
 
 zWesley v. State, 37 Miss. 327, 75 Am. 307. 
 Dec. 62; Brewer v. State, 72 Ark. 145, 6Hull v. State, 6 Lea, 259; Draper v. 
 78 S. W. 773; State v. Hollis, Houst. State, 4 Baxt. 246; Wynre v. State 
 Crim. Rep. (Del.) 24; Com. v. Rudert, (Tex. Crim. App.) 51 S. W. 909. 
 109 Ky. 653, 60 S. W. 489; Bush v. Com. TAcers v. United States, 164 V. S. 388, 
 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 539, 51 S. W. 238. 41 L. ed. 481, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 91; Dolan 
 And see State v. Smith, 43 Or. 109, 71 v. State, 81 Ala. 11, 1 So. 707; Golden 
 Pac. 973. V. State, 25 Ga. 527; Kennedy v. Com. 
 
 Where two persons engage in a con- 14 Bush, 340; Com. v. Rudert, 109 Ky. 
 flict and one kills the other, an instruo- 653, 60 S. W. 489; Carleton v. State, 43 
 tion in a prosecution for the killing that Neb. 373, 61 N. W. 699; Draper v. State, 
 one cannot attack and kill another be- supra; Bush v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 cause lie may fear injury at some future 539, 51 S. W. 238 ; Holt v. State, 9 Tex. 
 time contemplates as "future time" App. 571. And see Juley v. State, 45 
 some subseque t indefinite period after Tex. Crim. Rep. 391, 76 S. W. 468. 
 tlie final ending of the present conflict. sDolan v. State, 81 Ala. 11, 1 So. 707; 
 State V. Rose, 30 Kan. 501, 1 Pac. 817. Draper v. State, supra. 
 
■§ 231] SELF-DEFENSE. 379 
 
 •ends when it ceases.' And the apprehension of death or great bodily 
 harm is not confined to the time of the commencement of the diffi- 
 •culty in which the killing occurred; it includes the point of time 
 when the killing was actually done ; ^ " and if such apprehension was 
 •entertained then the defense may be complete, though there was no 
 such apprehension at the commencement of the affray, and it arose 
 from some occurrence during its continuance. ^ ^ And when the 
 ■deceased was shot and injured, it is error for the court to assume 
 that the shot disabled him, so that self-defense could not be predicat- 
 ed on subsequent acts and occurrences, whether it did so being a 
 •question of fact for the, jury. ^ ^ This rule will not warrant shoot- 
 ing a man armed with a knife at a distance of from 60 to 80 feet," 
 ■or a man 10 feet away who, with a knife in hand, was hesitatingly 
 advancing,** or who had stopped before the shot was fired,** or 
 because he took out his knife as the slayer, with whom he had been 
 quarreling, approached him with a gun. * ^ And that one person was 
 advancing to attack another with a stone in his hand does not justify 
 the latter in killing him, unless the stone was, or reasonably appeared 
 to be, a dangerous weapon.*'' And the same rule applies to killing 
 an antagonist advancing with a pair of brass knuckles in his hand, 
 while yet some distance away. * * Nor does the fact that an antag- 
 onist was believed to be taking steps to procure arms justify follow- 
 ing and killing him, if the peril could have been avoided by retreat. * * 
 And though one of two combatants is possessed of a deadly weapon, 
 the other is not justified in killing him at a time when he is out of 
 reach of such weapon.^" The danger may be apparent, imminent, 
 and existing, however, within the meaning of these rules, although 
 the greatest peril may precede the act of killing by a small but 
 appreciable interval of time;^* or though the real danger may only 
 follow in case of failure of the slayer to act by a small but ap- 
 
 sBrendendiek v. State (Tex. Crim. deemed to be in present imminent peril 
 
 App.) 34 S. W. 115; Hobbs. v. State, 16 of life or limb within the meaning of 
 
 Tex. App. 517. the law of self-defense, though the other 
 
 loBerry v. Com. 10 Bunh, 16. had an open knife in his hand. Ingram 
 
 iilbid. V. Stnte, 67 Ala. 67. 
 
 i2McCroiy v. State (Miss.) 25 So. leOdette v. State, 90 Wis. 258, 62 N. 
 
 «7]. W. 1054. 
 
 i3C!ourtneyv. State (Tex. Crim. App.) i^St^te v. Mahan, 68 Iowa, 304, 20 
 
 57 S. W. 654. N.W. 449, 27 N. W. 249. 
 
 ilAlvarez v. State, 41 Fla. 532, 27 So. isDunn v. State (Ala.) 39 So. 147. 
 
 40; Trice v. State, 89 Ga. 742, 15 S. E. isState v. McKiley, 82 Iowa, 445. 48 
 
 648. N. W. 804; Herrington v. State (Tex. 
 
 lewise T. State, 2 Kan. 419, 85 Am. Crim. App.) 63 S. W. 562. 
 
 Dec. 695. 20Squire v. State, 87 Ala. 114, 6 So. 
 
 One having a loaded gun pointed at 303. 
 
 another who is not advancing cannot be 21 Hull v. State, 6 Lea, 249. 
 
380 HOMICIDi;. 15 Z3i 
 
 preciable interval of time.^^ And an instruction ■with reference 
 to necessity, real or apparent, "at tlie time," is not too indefinite 
 as to the time referred to.^* And though the necessity for taking 
 life is not actual, present, and urgent the right of self-defense may 
 be exercised if the person assaulted has reasonable ground to believe, 
 and does in good faith believe, from existing conditions, that death 
 or the infliction of great bodily harm is imminent.^* A person may 
 anticipate an attack of an antagonist and justifiably kill him, if, 
 tmder all the circumstances of the case, such course seems necessary 
 to protect himself. ^ ^ And where one person reasonably apprehended 
 that another would take his life whenever he found an opportunity, 
 and that he was in constant danger from him of death or great 
 bodily harm, and that an escape would not secure safety, but would 
 leave the danger as great, or greater than before, killing him in 
 resisting an assault would be justifiable, though he had apparently 
 declined to continue the fight, and turned to leave. ^® So, while 
 one's right of self-defense ceases when the danger, real or apparent, 
 has ceased, if, in defending himself against a violent attack, or a 
 supposed violent attack, he becomes excited by passion to such an 
 extent as to render his mind incapable of cool reflection, and under 
 this state of excitement carries his right of self-defense too far, 
 and uses more force than is necessary to his protection, and shoots 
 at his antagonist after the danger has ceased, but before his mind 
 has had time to cool, and death results, it is not murder, but man- 
 slaughter. ^ '' 
 
 232. Danger, when deemed past. — ^A person put in danger, or ap- 
 parent danger, of death or great bodily harm by the act or assault 
 of another may act in self-defense to the extent of taking life, if 
 necessary, so long as from his standpoint the danger is imminent, 
 though the act which demonstrates the imminency has transpired.^ 
 And when a person is justified in shooting another to prevent the 
 latter from shooting him, he has the right to continue to shoot as long 
 as it reasonably appears to him that he is in danger from the as- 
 
 22lbid.; Philips v. Com. 2 Duv. 328, Bohannon v. Com. 8 Bush, 481, 8 Am. 
 
 87 Am. Dee. 499. Rep- 474. 
 
 zswilliams v. Com. 25 Ky. L. Eep. a'Hobbs v. State, 16 Tex. App. 517; 
 
 1504, 78 S. W. 134. Bearden v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 24State V. Miller, 43 Or. 325, 74 Pae. ^'^?' ^f ^- ^- ^J- ., ^ 
 fi=8 lOrta V. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 25Cotton V. State, 31 Miss. 504; State llt\^;„'^i7l'%^^'\v ?«'?V'«'^- 
 
 r Dean 70 S P 74 IT S F SPd ^"™- -^^P" *^^' ^^ ^- ^^- ^^^ ; Jones V. 
 
 ,„v ' ^ '„ I u o^o T,..,. S*'^*^' 4* Tex. Crim. Rep. 405, 71 S. W. 
 
 26Young V. Com. 6 Bush, 312; Philips 902; Washington v. State, 125 Ala. 40, 
 
 v. Com. 2 Duv. 328, 87 Am. Dee. 499; 28 So. 78. 
 
I 232] SELF-DEFENSE. 381 
 
 sault upon him.* And where one man assaulted another with a 
 deadly weapon, and the latter succeeded in taking it from his as- 
 sailant, and immediately killed him with it, it cannot be said that 
 the danger had passed, so as to deprive him of the right to kill in 
 self-defense, where the circumstances were such that he could not 
 know what other demonstrations were in progress against him.^ 
 Nor is a man precluded from pleading self-defense by the fact that 
 he killed his opponent after the latter's weapon had been knocked 
 out of his hand, and while he was struggling to regain it.* And 
 a statutory provision making it manslaughter to unnecessarily kill 
 another, while resisting an attempt by such other either to commit 
 felony, or do any other unlawftil act, after such attempt shall have 
 failed, applies only to attempts which have failed, and the act of a 
 son in shooting an assailant of his father does not fall within stich 
 provisions where the struggle between the assailant and the father 
 was going on at the time the shot was fired, and the deceased struck 
 the father a blow after the shot." So, where a man fires a shot in 
 proper self-defense, which takes effect, his right to acquittal is not af- 
 fected by the fact that he afterwards fires shots which do not take ef- 
 fect,^ though the rule would be different if a subsequent shot caused 
 the death.'' And where it is provided by statute that killing is justifi- 
 able if done to prevent maiming, and that the homicide may take 
 place at cny time while the offender is mistreating with violence the 
 person injured, though he may have completed the offense, if one 
 person struck another, and the latter shot and killed the former, and 
 the blow and the shooting appear to have been instantaneous acts, 
 
 2Hall V. State, supra. And see Crow that he was about to shoot either of 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 88 S. W. them, he would be justified in his act. 
 
 814; Coleman v. State (Tex. Crim. Glaze v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 45 S. 
 
 App.) 88 S. W. 238; Hall v. State, 43 W. 903. 
 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 257, 64 S. W. 248. Bgtate v. Harper, 149 Mo. 514, 51 S. 
 
 sOrta V. State, supra. W. 89. 
 
 40halk V. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Hep. sSimpson v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 116, 32 S. W. 534. 87 S. W. 826; iState v. Linhoff, 121 Iowa, 
 
 And where a man and his father-in- 632, 97 N. W. 77; Middleton v. State, 
 
 law were set upon by another, who at- 80 Miss. 393, 31 So. 809. 
 
 tempted to kill the father-in-law be- 'Bearden v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 cause he had, a short time previously, 578, 73 S. W. 17. 
 
 killed a brother of the assailant, and the And an instruction in a prosecution 
 
 son-in-law killed the assailant, but the for homicide that, if the accused was 
 
 evidence is conflicting as to whether he justified in firing the first shot, he had 
 
 did it before or after the assailant was a right to continue to fire, is improper 
 
 disarmed, the jury in a prosecution tor as calculated to mislead the jury as to 
 
 the killing should be charged that if, his right of self-defense, where it ap- 
 
 at the time of the killing, the assailant pears that the first shot was ai accident, 
 
 was endeavoring to shoot either of them, and the second was the first intentional 
 
 or the circumstances were such as to shot. Bearden v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. 
 
 cause the slayer reasonably to believe Rep. 144, 79 S. W. 37. 
 
382 HOMICIDE. [S 23^ 
 
 it is for the jury to determine whether there was any cessation of 
 active hostilities and violence which cwuld remove the killing from 
 the purview of the statute.* 
 
 When the danger ceases, however, the right to kill in self-defense 
 ceases with it.® The law of self-defense does not permit acis done 
 for retaliation or revenge,^** and though one has the right to inter- 
 fere and resist a felonious assault being made upon another, killing 
 one of the combatants interfered with after the other had been 
 rendered unconscious and the assault had been discontinued, and the 
 persons concerned had gone some distance from the injured com- 
 batant, is not justifiable.^^ And legal justification or excuse can- 
 not be claimed where the killing was done while the person killed 
 was fleeing from his antagonist, or endeavoring to retire from the 
 combat;*^ though a defense need not be suspended merely because 
 the assailant withdraws or retires for the apparent purpose of secur- 
 ing a position from which he may renew the combat with greater 
 effect. * * Nor is one man justified in killing another at an accident- 
 al meeting, because the other had assaulted and almost killed him 
 but a few minutes before, where his assailant had been arrested and 
 was in the hands of the officers of the law at the time of the killing. * * 
 And there is no justification for the act of a man in shooting one 
 who had challenged him to combat, as he was moving away to furnish 
 the other with an opportunity to arm himself, after being falsely 
 informed that he was unarmed.^® Nor is it justifiable to kill a 
 man 20 feet away, who had just thrown an ax at the slayer, and 
 was turning away at the time of the killing.*^ And one who kills 
 an assailant after he has abandoned his assault, not having recog- 
 nized the abandonment, is not entitled to an acquittal where he was 
 in fault in not having recognized it. * ^ 
 
 8H!?h V. Stnte, 26 Tex. Anp. 545, 8 cellar, where he instantly died, and it 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 488, 10 S. W. 238. appears that one bullet passed through 
 
 sColeman v. State (Tex. Crim. Ann.) his heart, and the wound was such as 
 
 88 S. W. 238: Holmes v. State, 124 Wis. to have caused almost instant death, it 
 
 133. 102 N. W. 321. is not error for the court to assume 
 
 ioWpIIs v. Territory, 14 Okla. 436, 78 that the last sihot was the one which 
 
 Pae. 124. caused death. Morgan v. State, 43 Tex. 
 
 iiState V. Maloy, 44 Iowa, 104; An- Crim. Rep. 543, 67 S. W. 420. 
 
 derson v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 275, isLuckinbill v. State, snpra. And 
 
 65 S. W. 523. see Regan v. State (Miss.) 39 So. 1012. 
 
 i2State V. Roberts, 63 Vt. 139, 21 Atl. uState v. Scossoni, 48 La. Ann. 1464, 
 
 424; Hughes v. State, 117 Ala. 25, 23 21 So. 32. 
 
 So. 677; Lueldnbill v. State, 52 Ark. lePeople v. Tamkin, 62 Gal. 468. 
 
 45, 11 S. W. 963. leMeurer v. State, 129 Ind. 687, 29 
 
 Where one person shot another first N. E. 392. 
 
 in the former's store, and again after I'Scott v. Stat^ 133 Ala. 112, 32 So. 
 
 he had run around the store and into the 623. 
 
§ 233] SELF-DEFENSE. 383 
 
 IIL TilE BASIS OE FOUNDATIOlSr OF APPABENT DANOEE AND NECES- 
 SITY. 
 
 a. Scope of. 
 
 233. General statement as to. — ^The foundation for an apprehension 
 of danger, justifying killing in self-defense, rests upon all the facts 
 and circumstances of the entire transaction taken as a series of 
 events.^ A person who is assaulted, in determining as to his right 
 to slay in self-defense, is not confined to a consideration of things 
 transpiring at the instant of killing.^ And evidence of occurrences 
 the same day as, but some hours before, a fatal affray is admissible 
 in a prosecution for homicide on the question of self-defense, where 
 they were a part of the same occurrences that culminated in the 
 killing, and tend to enlighten the jury as to the mental attitude of 
 the parties toward each other at the time of the affray.^ Nor is he 
 confined to the words, acts, and demonstrations of the person killed. * 
 And if the assault is by several the danger from each is to be taken 
 into consideration.*' And he is entitled to have the fiame of mind 
 of the deceased at and shortly before the time of killing taken into 
 consideration.® To justify or excuse a homicide on the groiind of 
 self-defense, however, the slayer must have acted with reference to 
 the facts appearing to him at the time of the killing, as distinguished 
 from action from malice, or some other motive or reason of discon- 
 nected and independent inception.^ And one claiming self -defence 
 in homicide should be tried in the light of surrounding circumstances 
 as they appeared to him, as distinguished from that of after-devel- 
 oped events.* 
 
 b. Sufficiency of particular acts or situations to create. 
 
 234. Previous ill-will or ill-usage — The mere fact that one person 
 bore ill-will against another does not, in the absence of threats or 
 hostile demonstrations, authorize the latter to infer danger to him- 
 
 lAllstip V. State, 5 Lea, 362; Hull v. 4Watkins v. United States, 1 Ind. 
 
 State, 6 Lea, 249; Watkins v. United Terr. 364 41 S. W. 1044. 
 
 States, 1 Ind. Terr. 364, 41 S. W. 1044; ^Helton v. Cora 27 Ky. L ReP 1163, 
 
 Lightfoot v.Com. 80 Ky. 516; Long v. ^^^^^^^s \^%J^^^ ^- ^"'^' ^^^ ^''• 
 
 State, 52 Miss. 23. e'stnte'v. Bdrd, 118 Iowa, 474, 92 N. 
 
 zAllsup V. State, and Lightfoot v. ^j 694 
 
 Com. supra. TLncewell v. State, 95 Ga. 346, 22 S. 
 
 sPeopIe V. Heeker, 109 Cal. 451, 30 e. 546. 
 
 L.R-A. 403, 42 I'ac. 307. 'sLong v. State, 52 Miss. 23. 
 
384 HOMICIDE. [5 234 
 
 self therefrom which would justify or excuse action by way of self- 
 defense.^ And former enmity between them is not admissible in 
 evidence as tending to show how the injured person felt toward the 
 accused.^ Nor do former hostile acts or attacks authorize the per- 
 son threatened or attacked to take the initiative and arm himself, 
 seek his enemy, and slay him.^ And evidence of a furious assault 
 by the deceased upon the accused is not admissible in a prosecution 
 for homicide, where the accused was the aggressor, for the purpose 
 of establishing his status, as acting in his own right and under 
 the belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily 
 harm.* Nor is homicide justified by previous ill-treatment or cruel 
 abuse by the deceased.® And a difficulty a short time previous to 
 a homicide, in which the deceased drew a pistol upon the other, can- 
 not be considered upon the question of self-defense in the absence 
 of a showing of hostile demonstrations.® And the particulars of 
 a previous assault, shooting, and wounding of the accused by the 
 deceased are not competent evidence on an issue of self-defense in 
 a prosecution for a subsequent killing.'^ Nor do facts proved tend- 
 ing to show a previous difficulty between the parties render admis- 
 sible evidence of hostility and threats by the deceased against the 
 accused.* A previous difficulty between the parties, however, is 
 competent evidence for the state, as tending to show the animus of 
 the homicide;® and it may be competent for the accused as ex- 
 planatory of his acts ; ^ " and the particulars of such a difficulty may 
 
 iState V. Sullivan, 51 Iowa, 142, 50 cTidwell v. State, 70 Ala. 33; Peck 
 
 N. W. 572. V. State, 5 Tex. App. 611. And see 
 
 That one person had testified against State v. MeCann, 43 Or. 155, 72 Pac. 137. 
 
 another before the grand jury in a cer- vSanders v. Com. 13 Ky. L. Rep. 820, 
 
 tain case is inadmissible in a prose- 18 S. W. 528; Taber v. Com. 26 Ky. L. 
 
 cution against the former for killing Rep. 754, 82 S. W. 443. And see Pitts 
 
 the latter, for the purpose of showing v. State, 140 Ala. 70, 37 So. 101. 
 
 the character and extent of the hos- sState v. Frierson, 51 La. Ann. 706, 
 
 tility of the deceased against the ac- 25 So. 396. 
 
 cused, and the character of the attack sMarnoch v. State, 7 Tex. App. 269; 
 
 made by the former upon the latter. Nelson v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 58 
 
 State V. Cross, 68 Iowa, 180, 26 N. W. S. W. 107. And see State v. Tettaton, 
 
 62. 159 Mo. 354, 60 S. W. 743. 
 
 2Territory v. Campbell, 9 Mont. 16, And evidence that the deceased was in- 
 
 22 Pac. 121; G-uice v. State, 60 Miss, formed of the shooting of his brother by 
 
 714. the father of the accused is competent 
 
 sWright V. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. in a prosecution for homicide as tending 
 
 449, 50 S. W. 940; State v. Jefferson, to enlighten the jury as to his feelings 
 
 43 La. Ann. 995, 10 So. 199; State v. toward the family of the accused, and 
 
 Corrivau, 93 Minn. 38, 100 N. W. 638; to interpret his action. State v. 
 
 State V. Rodman, 173 Mo. 681, 73 S. W. Thrailkill, 71 S. C. 136, 60 S. E. 551. 
 
 605. lOMarnoch v. State, supra; Williams 
 
 4 State v. Jefferson, supra. v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 70 S. W. 756. 
 
 BReal v. People, 55 Barb. 551 ; Warner 
 V. Com. 27 Ky. L. Rep. 219, 84 S. W. 742. 
 
§ 234] RELF-DEFKNSE. 385 
 
 be proved when they constituted the commencement of relations 
 which afterwards culminated in the homicide, ^ ^ though generally 
 it is the fact of a previous diificulty that the accused is entitled to 
 show, and not the particulars of it^* So, where the deceased had 
 previously assaulted the accused with a deadly weapon, and repeat- 
 edly heaped insults upon him, and entertained a feeling of intense 
 hostility toward him, an instruction in a prosecution for killing 
 in resenting a mere slap or kick, as to reasonable grounds to be- 
 lieve and belief of danger to life or of great bodily harm, should be 
 ^iven.^* And evidence of such previous insults and intense hos- 
 tility, and of a movement to draw a deadly weapon on being con- 
 fronted by his enemy, fairly raises the issue of self-defense. ^ * And 
 it has been held that evidence as to angry looks upon the part of the 
 ■deceased in a prosecution for homicide, just before overtaking the 
 accused and engaging in an encounter with him in which he was 
 killed, is competent on the issue of self-defense. ^ ° 
 
 235. Opprobrious language or conduct. — Neither words nor ges- 
 tures, however insulting or irritating, will justify killing the ag- 
 gressor.* Provocation is not an element in self-defense.^ While 
 words of abuse may be important to show the character of an overt 
 act, they do not alone constitute a hostile demonstration warranting 
 
 iiPeople V. Lyons, 110 N. Y. 618, 17 States v. Wiltberger, 3 Wash. C. C. 515, 
 
 N. E. 391. And see Com. v. Booker, 25 Fed. Oas. No. 16,738; Hall v. State, 130 
 
 Ky. L. Rep. 1025, 76 S. W. 838; Schauer Ala. 45, 30 So. 422; Taylor v. State, 48 
 
 V. State (lex. Crim. App.) 60 S. W. Ala. 180; Scott v. State (Ark.) 86 S. 
 
 249. W. 1004; State v. Trusty, 1 Penn. (Del.) 
 
 Where several persons were engaged 319, 40 Atl. 766; .Johnson v. State, 105 
 
 in a conspiracy to whip another company Ga. 665, 31 S. E. 399 ; Jones v. State, 
 
 -of men, and one of the latter company 110 Ga. 252, 34 S. E. 205; King -v. 
 
 killed one of the former, knowledge of Bridges, 5 Haw. 467; State v. Fuentes, 
 
 the conspiracy upon the part of the 5 La. Ann. 427; State v. McCollum, 119 
 
 slayer is competent evidence in a, prose- Mo. 469, 24 S. W. 1021 ; State v. Tooker, 
 
 <;ution for the killing, as tending to ex- 188 Mo. 438, 87 S. W. 387; State v. Huds- 
 
 plain the animus of the deceased, and peth, 150 Mo. 12, 51 S. W. 483; State v. 
 
 to enable the jury to determine whether Elliott, 90 Mo. 350, 2 S. W. 411 ; Abram 
 
 the accused was prompted by reasonable y. State, 36 Tex. Crim. Rep. 44, 35 S. 
 
 ■and well-grounded belief that he was in ^v_ 389. 
 
 danger of losing his life, or suffering '^.^^ ' evidence in a prosecution for 
 
 M^Hl 422 ■ ^V'"'^™^ '^^ ^^''P'^' homicide, showing that deceased had 
 
 1 oTT t ' c<i i /11/r- > 00 o n„ made remarks about the accused to the 
 isHughes v. State (Miss.) 38 So. 33. «. ^ i. j. t, v, j v . • . • 
 
 But see Schauer v. State, supra. ^^f^ *^^* \« ^""^ Y"" =^''"^'"8 ^^f 
 
 isByrne v. Com. 16 Ky. L. Rep. 416, sister, and had made some threats 
 
 28 S W 481 against him, is surhcient to warrant an 
 
 i4Tillery v! State, 24 Tex. App. 251, instruction that no language used by the 
 
 5 Am. St. Rep. 882, 5 S. W. 842. deceased would justify the accused in 
 
 iBState v. Cross, 68 Iowa, 180, 26 N. taking his life. State v. McCollum, 
 
 W. 62. supra. 
 
 lUnited States v. Outerbridge, 5 zstate v. Byrd, 52 G. C. 480, 30 S. E. 
 
 Sawy. 620, Fed. Gas. No. 15,978; United 482. And see Abram v. State, supra. 
 Horn.— 25. 
 
386 HOMICIDE. K 235 
 
 action in self-defense.* And killing a person using cpprobrioua 
 and abusive language in a drunken quarrel cannot be justilied where 
 the slajer was not closely pressed.* And expressions of regret, in 
 opprobrious terms, that an antagonist was still alive, accompanied 
 by shaking a clenched fist, do not warrant a belief in apparent 
 necessity to ward off an unlawful and violent attack, though taken 
 in connection with the fact that the person making them had almost 
 killed the other but a few minutes before.® Nor does the law recog- 
 nize the right of a person to assault or kill another bscause the latter 
 had accused him of committing a crime." And when a person so 
 accused arms himself with the evident purpose of compelling his ac- 
 cuser to withdraw the charge, and kills him, the law of self-defense 
 is not applicable, though the slayer thought that the other was mak- 
 ing a movement to draw a revolver at the time.^ This rule applies, 
 however, where the killing was solely for the purpose of resenting 
 the provocation given, and not where it grew out of fear in the mind 
 of the slayer. And opprobrious words and contemptuous gestures, 
 when accompanied with threats and menaces, may in some instances 
 be sufficient to arouse the fears of a reasonable man that his life is 
 in danger, or that a felony is about to be perpetrated upon him, and, 
 therefore, be sufficient to justify homicide.* And in such case the 
 motive with which the slayer acted, whether in a spirit of revenge 
 or under the fears of a reasonable man, is a question for the jury 
 to decide.® 
 
 236. Assaults generally. — A mere assault, not felonious, furnishes 
 no excuse for killing the assailant.* The retaliation must be pro- 
 portioned to the threatened danger.^ And killing a person of in- 
 ferior strength in resisting an assault without weapons is man- 
 slaughter, at least.* Nor will the bare fear of an assault justify 
 
 sState V. Williams, 46 La. Ann. 709, Bell (Del.) 62 Atl. 147; State v. Ben- 
 
 15 So. 82. ham, 23 Iowa, 154, 92 Am. Dec. 417; 
 
 4State V. Copeland, 106 Iowa, 102, 76 State v. Tackett, 8 N. C. (1 Hawks) 
 
 N. W. 522. 210; Com. v. Hare, 2 Clark (Pa.) 467; 
 
 oState V. Scossoni, 48 La. Ann. 1464, Com. v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9; Com. v. Herold, 
 
 21 So. 32. 5 Pa. Dist. R. 623; Claxton v. State, 2 
 
 sPeople V. Piper, 112 Mich. 644, 71 Humph. 181; Peop.e v. Olsen, 4 Utah, 
 
 N. W. 174. 413, 11 Pac. 577; United States v. Outer- 
 
 7lbid. bridge, 5 Sawy. 620, I'ed. Cas. No. 15,- 
 
 sCumming v. State, 99 Ga. 662, 27 S. 978; Allen v. United States, 164 U. S. 
 
 E. 177. 492, 41 L. ed. 528, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 154; 
 
 9Ibid. 1 East, P. C. 277. 
 
 As to this subject, see also discussion estate v. Elliott, 98 Mo. 160, 11 S. 
 as to the th rents of the deceased as af- W. 566. 
 
 fecting self-defense, infra, §§ 242 et seq. aState v. Wells, 1 N. J. L. 424, 1 Am. 
 iCom. V. Riley, Thacher, C. C. 471; Dec. 211; People v. McGrath, 47 Hun, 
 Pierson V. State, 12 Ala. 149; Thayer V. 3 '5; United Stntes v. Wiltberser 3 
 State, 138 Ala. 39, 35 So. 406; State v. Wash. C. C. 515, Fed. Cas No 16 738. 
 
I 236] SELF-DEFENSE. 387 
 
 homicide.* And even an assault with a club does not authorize the 
 assaulted person to shoot his assailant, unless he had reason to fear 
 death or great bodily harm.® So, an assault for a lawful and jus- 
 tifiable purpose, — ^as, to expel a trespasser, — does not justify the 
 exercise of the right of self-defense.* Nor will the wrong of a third 
 person who interferes in a fight between two others, not to prevent 
 it, but to encourage it, excuse either of the combatants for killing 
 him,^ though the rule would be different in case of a desperate as- 
 sault in defense of one who was in no danger. ^ And if the intent "be 
 only to commit a trespass, as, to beat the party," it will not justify the 
 killing of the aggressor. * 
 
 If, however, an intended beating is of a character to imperil 
 life, or to maim, then the intent is felonious, and the assailed person 
 is excused in taking life when necessary to repel the assault ' " And 
 a simple assault accompanied by other acts or circumstances rea- 
 sonably justifying the belief that it would be carried so far as to 
 imperil life justifies the taking of life in self-defense. * ^ And an 
 unprovoked and brutal assault by one of greatly superior strength, 
 who had already demonstrated his power and purpose to do great 
 bodily injury, recklessly and angrily persisted in, justifies the per- 
 son assaulted in killing him, when that reasonably appears to him 
 to be the only accessible means of stopping the assault.*^ Nor is 
 a person deprived of the right to kill in self-defense by the fact 
 that the attack upon him was with fists only, when he had already 
 received serious bodily injury from his assailant, and it reasonably 
 
 ^People V. Samsels, 66 Cal. 99, 4 Pac. S. W. 745; Com. v. Drum, 68 Penn. 9. 
 
 1061. And see Ohambless v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 6People V. Carlton, 115 N. Y. 618, App.) 77 S. W. 2. 
 22 N. E. 257. And the inte t with which a person 
 
 estate v. Roan, 122 Iowa, 136, 97 N. went with others to a place where ho 
 
 W. 997. was afterwards killed, on the night of 
 
 7State V. Chopin, 10 La. Ann. 458; the killing, is material and important 
 
 Taber v. ('om. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 754, 82 in a prosecution therefor, and to ascer- 
 
 S. W. 443. tain it, it is proper to ask one of the 
 
 STaher v. Com. supra. persons who accompanied him as to the 
 
 9United States v. Wiltberger, 3 Wash, conversation which took place among 
 
 C. C. 515, Fed. Cas. No. 16.738: St^te them while they were together, ad as 
 
 V. Shreves, 81 Iowa, 615, 47 N. W. 899. to their purpose in jroing to the place 
 
 And see Pierson v. State, 12 Ala. 149; of the homicide. Stewart v. State, 19 
 
 McPherson v. State, 22 Ga. 478; Floyd Ohio, 302, 53 Am. Dec. 426. 
 V. State, 36 Ga. 91, 91 Am. Dee. 760; nO'Neal v. Com. supra. And see 
 
 Chase v. St^te, 46 Miss. 683; Stewart v. People v. Romero, 143 Cal. 458, 77 Pac. 
 
 State, 1 Ohio St. 66; People v. Olsen, 163. 
 4 Utah, 413, 11 Pac. 557. izGarello v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 lostate V. Benham, 23 Iowa, 154, 92 56, 20 S. W. 179; Brynnt v. State (Tex. 
 
 Am. Dec. 417; State v. Burke, 30 Iowa, Crim. App.) 47 S. 'W. 373; State v. 
 
 331: Kingen v. State, 45 Ind. 518; Thompson, 71 Iowa. 503, 32 N. W. 476; 
 
 O'Neal V. Com. 27 Ky. L. Rep. 547, 85 Byrne v. Com. 16 Ky. L. Rep. 416, 23 
 
388 HOMICIDE. [§ 235 
 
 appeared to him that the combat was not over, and that his antago- 
 nist had the ability and was about to inflict further serious bodily 
 injury upon him, and that the danger was imminent. ^^ So, where 
 several persons participate in an assault, the acts of each are the 
 acts of all; and if a person is assaulted by one, and the appearances 
 are such as to cause a belief in his mind, as a reasonable man, that 
 another is about to participate in the assault upon him, he will 
 have the same right to defend himself against the latter as he would 
 have against the attack of his original assailant. * * And his right 
 of self-defense should not be confined by the instructions to danger, 
 real or apparent, at the hands of the person slain. ^® And where 
 there is proof of a combination between the person killed and others 
 to act in concert in any hostile meeting with the slayer, and at least 
 one of them was present aiding and encouraging him in his assault, 
 the law with reference to self-defense against a combined assault 
 should be given in charge,^® and what any of them said in regard 
 to the contemplated meeting is competent in evidence.*^ And if 
 such statements are brought out on the interrogation of the prose- 
 cution, the whole of the conversation at the time is competent for 
 the defense,'* though statements made at other times are not.'® 
 So, where death is inflicted in resisting an assault, and the resistance 
 is not greatly disproportioned to the assault, and the death ensues 
 by misadventure, the killing is justifiable as in self-defense.^" 
 
 237. Assault with deadly weapon — The nature of the weapon or 
 instrument used in an assault by one person upon another, and the 
 manner of its use, are important considerations for the jury in a 
 prosecution against the person assaulted for killing bis assailant, 
 in determining whether the slayer acted in necessary self-defense.' 
 And the attention of the jury should be called to circumstances of 
 
 S. W. 481; State v. Gray, 43 Or. 446, 74 1 4 Carter v. State, 37 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 Pae. 927. 403, 35 S. W. 378; Stacy v. State (Tex. 
 
 A verdict for murder in the second Crim. App.) 86 S. W. 327. 
 
 degree in a prosecution for homicide is iBHelton v. Com. 27 Ky. L. Rep. 1163, 
 
 not sufficiently sustained by evidence 87 S. W. 1073. And see Garner v. State, 
 
 that the deceased, without provocation, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 308, 77 S. W. 797. 
 
 made a sudden and violent attack oi isRoberts v. State (Tex. Crim. App.); 
 
 the accused with a deadly weapon, and 88 S. W. 221. 
 
 drove him 60 or 80 steps, and knoeked i 'Cornelius v. Com. 15 B. Mon. 539. 
 
 him down, and beat him with a club, isjbid. 
 
 when the latter shot from the ground, I9lbid. 
 
 whore he was lying prostrate, and killed zojudge v. State, 58 Ala. 406^ 29 Am. 
 
 his assailant. State v. Wilcox, 118 N. Rep. 757. And see Crawford v. State 
 
 C. 1131, 23 S. E. 928. (Tex. Crim. App.) 70 S. W. 548. 
 
 isHigh v. State, 26 Tex. App. 545, 8 iState v. Benham^ 23 Iowa, 154, 92 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 488, 10 S. W. 238. Am. Dec. 417. 
 
§ 237] SEIiF-DEFENSE. 389 
 
 this kind.^ An assault with a deadly weapon raises a presumption 
 of an intent to kill, which justifies the person assaulted in using a 
 deadly weapon in defending himself,* and requires a charge on 
 self-defense in a prosecution for a killing in such defense.* And an 
 instruction with reference to rules of law applicable to a case of 
 defending one's self against a malicious assault is improper where 
 it fails to define to the jury what is meant by the words "malicious 
 assault."® Nor can the right of self-defense of a person so assaulted 
 be impaired by proof that the firearm used was unloaded, when this 
 fact was unknown to accused.* And if a weapon used by a person 
 in assaulting another, or the manner of its use, was such as to be 
 reasonably calculated to produce death or great bodily harm, an in- 
 tent to do so, which will warrant killing in self-defense, is pre- 
 sumed.'' And where the statute provides that when homicide is 
 committed to prevent murder, maiming, etc., if the weapons used 
 by the aggressor are calculated to accomplish the purpose imputed 
 to him, it is to be presumed that he intended to inflict the injury, 
 the legal presumption that he intended to inflict the injury indicated 
 is binding on court and jury, and should be given in charge to the 
 jury.® Nor is it essential to the plea of seK-defense in this con- 
 nection that the person killed should actually have had a deadly 
 weapon; it is sufficient in that respect that his conduct was such 
 as to induce a reasonable belief upon the part of the slayer that ha 
 had one.® 
 
 iTbii. them and shot at them, hitting one of 
 
 But failure to charge in such a prose- them, upon which they also shot at him, 
 
 cution as to the presumption arising their act is justifiable. Spencer v. 
 
 from the use of a deadly weapon by the State, 77 Ga. 155, 4 Am. St. Rep. 74, 3 
 
 deceased is not error where the jury S. E. 661. 
 
 were instructed that if the deceased at- < Cooper v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 tacked the accused, and it reasonably 85 S. W. 1059; Robertson v. State, 46 
 
 appeared to the accused that he was in Tex. Crim. Rep. 441, 80 S. W. lOOO; 
 
 danger of death or serious bodily harm, Carnes v. Com. 27 Ky. L. Rep. 1205, 87 
 
 he had a right to kill him. Stanley v. S. W. 1123; Greer v. Com. 27 Ky. L. 
 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 44 S. W. 519. Rep. 333, 85 S. W. 168. And see Logan 
 
 sivory V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 87 v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 573, 81 S. 
 
 S. W. 699; Conner v. State (Miss.) 13 W. 721. 
 
 So. 934; Boykin v. State, 86 Miss. 481, 6 Jordan v. State, 13 Ohio C. 0. 471. 
 38 So. 725. And see Ellzey v. State eRoberts v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 (Miss.) 37 So. 837; Willis v. State 88 S. W. 221. 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 90 S. W. 1100. 'Chalk v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 Where the superintendent of a plan- 116, 32 S. W. 534; Hall v. State, 43 Tex. 
 
 tation, after profanely reprimanding two Crim. Rep. 479, 66 S. W. 783 ; Scott v. 
 
 of his laborers, went armed to the house State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 305, 81 S. W. 
 
 of one of them and discharged his gun 950. A"d see Fulcher v. State, 82 Miss, 
 
 into or by a window, frightening the 6.30, 35 So. 170. 
 
 laborer's wife and children, ar-d then, sHall v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 479, 
 
 upon seeing the two men walking away 66 S. W. 783. 
 toward the public road, probably going sState v. Potter, 13 Kan. 414. 
 to report the circumstances, pursued 
 
390 HOMICIDE. B 238 
 
 238. Trespass. — A mere trespass either upon the property, person, 
 or liberty of a person does not justify killing the trespasser, where 
 there was nothing to create a reasonable belief in the mind of the 
 slayer that any of the trespassers were about to commit a felony, or 
 do him serious bodily harm. ' And the duty to refrain from killing 
 a mere trespasser is not limited to cases in which the trespass is 
 committed in a peaceable manner.^ And though one has a right 
 to resist an unlawful attempt to restrain his liberty, he must not 
 kill in so doing, unless it is so persisted in, when lawfully resisted, 
 as to induce in his mind a reasonable belief that the trespasser is 
 about to commit a felony or do him great bodily harm.* So, an 
 owner of land has a right to order a trespasser therefrom, but he 
 has no right to follow him up until an attack is made upon himself, 
 so fierce as to compel him to take the trespasser's life in self-defense. * 
 And arming one's self to resist a mere civil trespass on land, or to 
 drive invaders away, and killing to accomplish the object, cannot 
 be justified as self-defense, or even mitigated to manslaughter. ° Nor 
 can a person killing another shield himself on a plea of self-defense, 
 if he had reason to believe, and did believe, that his assailant only 
 intended to commit a trespass, and did not intend to take life or 
 inflict great bodily harm.® One person is not justified in killing 
 another in order to enjoy his lawful rights of property, unless he 
 had reason to believe or did believe, as a reasonable man, at the 
 time of the killing, that he was in serious danger of receiving great 
 bodily injury or of losing his life, and that the killing was necessary 
 
 iNoles V. State, 26 Ala. 31, 62 Am. Evidence that a person resisting an 
 
 Dec. 711 ; Simpson v. State, 59 Ala. 1, 31 arrest made in a proper manner shot and 
 
 Am. Rep. 1 ; Carroll v. State, 23 Ala. killed the person assisting the officer in 
 
 28, 58 Am. Dec. 282 ; People v. Flanagan, making the arrest has no tendency to 
 
 60 Cal. 2, 44 Am. Eep. 52; People v. establish a right of self-defense on the 
 
 Dunne, 80 Cal. 34, 21 Pac. 1130; Haynes part of the slayer, though the arrest 
 
 V. State, 17 Ga. 465; State v. Schieler, was unlawful. State v. Perrigo, 67 Vt. 
 
 4 Idaho, 120, 37 Pac. 272; Davison v. 406, 31 Atl. 844. 
 
 State, 90 HI. 221 ; Baker v. Com. 93 Ky. ^Tiffany v. Com. 121 Pa. 165, 6 Am. 
 
 302, 19 S. W. 975; State v. Tripp, 34 St. Rep. 775, 15 Atl. 462. 
 Minn. 25, 24 N. W. 290; McDaniel v. sState v. O'Neil, 68 Minn. 478. 59 N. 
 
 State, 8 Smedes & M. 401, 47 Am. Dec. W. 1101 ; Utterback v. Com. 105 Ky. 723, 
 
 93 ; State v. Levigne, 17 Nev. 435, 30 88 Am. St. Rep. 329, 49 S. W. 479 ; State 
 
 Pac. 1084; Scribner v. Beach, 4 Denio, v. McGIothlin (Tex. Crim. App.) 53 S. 
 
 448, 47 Am. Dee. 265; State v. Morgan, W. 869. 
 
 25 N. C. (3 Ired. L.) 186. 38 Am. Dec. A bare trespass agaii-st the property 
 
 714; State v. Clark, 51 W. Va. 457, 41 of another, not his dwelling, is not suf- 
 
 S. E. 204. ficient provocation to warrant the owner 
 
 zPeople V. Hecker, 109 Cal. 451, 30 in using a deadly weapon in its defense. 
 
 L.R.A. 403, 42 Pac. 307. State v. Clark, 51 W. Va 457 41 S 
 
 sNoles V. State, 26 Ala. 31, 62 Am. E. 204. 
 Dec. 711 ; Creighton v. Com. 83 Ky. 142, «State v. Greer, 22 W. Va 800 
 4 Am. St. Kep. 143. » . ow. 
 
{ 238] SELF-DEFENSE. 391 
 
 to protect himself ; and in such case it is immaterial which lawfully 
 owned the property.'' And in the assertion of a disputed property 
 right a person is pot justified in arming himself and treating his 
 adversary as a lelonious trespasser, though the latter seeks to as- 
 sert his claim in the same way ; and where such is the case and one 
 of them is killed, an ordinary instruction on the subject of self- 
 defense should be given, and not one appropriate to the defense of 
 one's self in his own dwelling.* And the fact that an altercation 
 and difficulty, in which one of the parties was killed, grew out of 
 adverse claims to the possession of property, does not require a 
 ■charge in a prosecution for the killing involving the right of the 
 slayer to protect his claim to property against intrusion.® Nor 
 ^oes the mere taking or detention of one's personal property justify 
 killing the taker, the slayer not having been attacked or put in fear. * " 
 And felonies in resisting which one may justifiably take human life, 
 under a statute providing therefor, are such as robbery, larceny, 
 or the like, and do not include a taking or holding of property in 
 regard to the ownership of which there is a contention. * ' Nor 
 does a statutory provision justifying homicide in the protection of 
 property, when all other means have been resorted to without effect, 
 give the right to kill another simply because he was trespassing, 
 without first resorting to all other means possible to prevent the 
 trespass.** And a statutory provision justifying a homicide com- 
 
 TState V. Levigne, 17 Nev. 435, 30 Pac. sHill v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. RS3, 
 
 1034. 67 S. W. 506. And see State v. Jones, 
 
 And where a homicide is justified on 29 S. C. 201, 7 S. E. 296. 
 
 the plea of self-defense from a threat of loCombs v. Com. 10 Ky. L. Rep. 553, 
 
 per=oTi<il injury, and there is no auesrtion 9 S. W. 655. 
 
 •of defense of property or habitation in- A case of self-defense is not estab- 
 
 volved, evidence of the title of the de- lished by evidence showing that the 
 
 ceased to land on which the homicide slayer killed an assailant to avoid the 
 
 was committed is not admissible. Peo- necessity of turning loose a wild and 
 
 pie V. Thomson, 92 Cal. 506, 28 Pac. skittish mule which he was leadinsr. 
 
 589. Springfield v. State, 96 Ala. 81, 38 Am. 
 
 So, where it appears that a homicide St. Rep. 85, 11 So. 250. 
 
 ■was committed on premises occupied by And the mere act of one person of 
 
 the person accused of committing it, jumping on board a boat in the custody 
 
 which were invaded by the person killed, of another does not constitute an as- 
 
 -who had previously assaulted and beaten sault upon the latter, which will justify 
 
 the accused, no question is prese ted him in shooting the former in self- 
 
 as to the right of the deceased to reside defense, where he was 15 feet away 
 
 upon premises in the occupation of the from the deceased at the time of the 
 
 divorced wife of the accused, and tes- shooti g. United States v. Frye, 4 
 
 timony upon her part that he was there Cranch, C. C. 539, Fed. Cas. No. 15,173, 
 
 to protect her and her child against the uState v. Tarter, 26 Or. 38, 37 Pac. 
 
 accused is improper. People v. Elliott, 53. 
 
 SO Cal. 296, 22 Pac. 207. i2McRlothlin v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 sUtterback v. Com. 105 Ky. 723, 88 App.) 53 S. W. 869. 
 Am. St. Rep. 329, 49 S. W. 479. 
 
392 HOMICIDE. [§ 238 
 
 mitted in the protection of property, where there is legal and actual 
 possession, applies only to efforts made to repel the aggression and 
 prevent the taking of the property, and does not apply to acts done 
 in endeavoring to regain possession of the property after it had been 
 taken. 13 
 
 Where one's person or property is assailed, however, he is not 
 required to yield in the least, but may stand upon his rights, taking 
 care not to resort to a greater degree of violence than is necessary 
 to their protection.^* And for the purpose of defense and preven- 
 tion of felony one is entitled to use whatever force may be necessary, 
 even to the extent of taking the life of a felonious trespasser. ^ ^ And 
 homicide committed in preventing an arrest is justifiable, though 
 the attempted arrest was lawful, when the power to arrest was exer- 
 cised in such a wanton and menacing manner as to make it reason- 
 ably appear to the slayer that he was about to suffer loss of life or 
 serious bodily harm.^" And where several armed men go, late at 
 night, to the house of a person by whom one of their number had 
 been beaten a short time before, and search the premises for him, 
 without authority to arrest him, and he kills two of the attacking 
 party upon their approaching the place of his concealment, the 
 killing is either justifiable as done in self-defense, or manslaughter, 
 and not murder. ^ ^ So, if an armed man attempts to take the prop- 
 erty of another by force, and manifestly intends to kill the owner 
 if necessary to accomplish his purpose, but is killed by the owner, 
 or any other person acting in his behalf, this would be excusable 
 self-defense.^® And the same rule applies to a forcible attempt to 
 
 islbid. Where a person is liable to arrest. 
 
 And the fact that a person had agreed but the officers seeking to arrest him ex- 
 to deliver property in his possession to ceed the proper degree of force, they 
 another on the premises where the for- become assailants and may be resisted 
 mer resided, but that, after taking legal by the person sought to be arrested, the 
 advice prior to the time for delivery, same as other assailants. State v. Walk- 
 he decided not to surrender it, and re- er, 1 Ohio Deo. Reprint, 353. 
 mained thereafter in possession, does I'Maury v. State, 68 Miss. 605, 24 
 not affect his actual, lawful possession Am. St. Rep. 291, 9 So. 445. 
 thereof within the mea"ing of rules of So, jumping on board a boat in cua- 
 law with reference to homicide in de- tody of another after being warned not 
 fense of property in one's actual, lawful to do so, and with the intent to do the 
 possession. Ibid. latter somj great bodily harm, and 
 
 nEoss V. State, 10 Tex. App. 455, 38 actually assaulting him with such in- 
 Am. Rep. G43; Baker v. Com. 93 Ky. tent, and putting him in fear of such 
 302, 17 S. W. 975. bodily harm, excuses homicide upon the 
 
 lePeople v. Flanagan, 60 Oal. 2, 44 part of the latter in defending himself. 
 Am. Rep. 52; Ragland v. State, 111 Ga. United States v. Frye, 4 Cranch C C 
 211, 36 S. K 682; Bearden v. State, 44 530, Fed. Cas. No. 15,173. ' 
 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 579, 73 S. W. 17. isRoss v. State, 10 Tex. App 455 38 
 
 16 Jones V. State, 26 Tex. App. 1, 8 Am. Rep. 643. ' 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 454, 9 S. W. 53; State v. 
 Pate, 5 Ohio S. & C. P. Dee. 732. 
 
§ 238] SELF-DEFENSE. 393 
 
 take possession of the lands of another with a like intent.*® Nor 
 does justification depend upon a combination of intent and endeavor 
 to commit a felony, under a statute making homicide justifiable when 
 committed in defense of person or property against one who mani- 
 festly intends and endeavors by violence or surprise to commit a 
 felony ; in such case either an intent or an endeavor to execute such 
 a design is sufficient.^* 
 
 239. Interference with marital rights. — 'No insult, injury, or wrong 
 done by the deceased to the wife of the accused is available as a 
 justification in a prosecution for homicide.* And adultery by a 
 party to a marriage does not justify the other party to it in kill- 
 ing either the guilty party or the paramour ; such an act is mitiga- 
 tion, but not justification, for the homicide.^ But a man who finds 
 another trying to obtain access to his wife's room in the night by 
 opening a window may not only remonstrate with him, but may 
 employ such force as may be necessary to prevent his doing so, and 
 if the other threatens to kill him, and makes a motion as if to do so, 
 and puts him in fear of his life or of great bodily harm, he is not 
 bound to retreat, but may use such force as is necessary to repel 
 the assault.^ And a husband entitled to the custody of his wife, 
 who is interfered with in such custody, may use all force necessary 
 to overcome such interference, and if, in the struggle which ensues, 
 his life is put in danger, or his person in danger of serious bodily 
 harm, from an attack made or about to be made by the person inter- 
 fering with him, he has the right to slay such person.* The subject 
 of homicide to prevent rape upon a wife or other relative,* and of 
 homicide upon the first meeting with the paramour after learning 
 of an adultery with the slayer's wife, which is declared to be juiti- 
 fiable in at least one state, is elsewhere treated.® 
 
 i9Baker v. Ck)m. 93 Ky. 302, 19 S. iPeople v. Webster, 139 N. Y. 73, 34 
 
 W. 97.5. N. E. 730; Angling v. State, 137 Ala. 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution 17, 34 So. 846. 
 
 for homicide alleged to have been com- sstate v. Cancienne, 50 La. Ann. 847, 
 
 mitted by the lawful possessor of prem- 24 So. 134; Angling v. State, supra. 
 
 iaes in defense of his possession, on sAlberty v. United States, 162 U. S. ' 
 
 his rights if he was in peaceable, law- 499, 40 L. ed. 1051, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 864. 
 
 ful possession, should include a state- 4 Cole v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 88 
 
 ment as to what constitutes actual, law- S. W. 341. 
 
 ful possession. McGlothlin v. State eSee infra, chapter XXIV., § 520. 
 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 53 S. W. 869. sSee supra, chapter X., § 189. 
 
 aoPeople v. Flanagan, 60 Cal. 2, 44 
 Am. Rep. 52. 
 
394 HOMICIDE. R 240 
 
 IV. Hostile demonstrations as an element of dangee and ne- 
 
 cessity. 
 240. The general rule. — The mere belief or fear upon the part of 
 one person that another designs to kill him does not, as a general 
 rule, justify his killing the latter, or prevent such killing from be- 
 ing murder, unless the latter makes some attempt to execute his 
 suspected design, or at least is in an apparent situation to do so, and 
 the circumstances are such as to induce the former to reasonably 
 believe that he intends to do it immediately.^ And an instruction 
 on the law of self-defense is properly refused in a prosecution for 
 homicide, where there was no evidence tending to show any assault 
 on the accused by the deceased, or any reason why the accused 
 should have apprehended any design upon the part of the deceased 
 to kill or inflict any bodily harm upon him.^ And this is so though 
 there had been a previous deadly assault,^ or threats,* or both.® Nor 
 is it sufiicient to make out a case of self-defense in homicide that 
 at the time of the killing the deceased was advancing on the accused 
 with a hostile intent ; there must have been an intent on the part of 
 the deceased, coupled with a capacity, or seeming capacity, to take the 
 life of the slayer or inflict on him some great bodily harm; and 
 this intent must have been evidenced by some present act or demonstra- 
 tion inducing in the mind of the slayer a reasonable belief that the 
 danger to his life or person was imminent. ® And it is not enough to 
 warrant killing an antagonist in self-defense that he had at band the 
 
 1 State V. Scott, 26 N. C. (4 Ired. L.) Mo. 287; Real v. People, 55 Barb. 551; 
 
 409, 42 Am. Dee. 148 ; State v. Morgan, Shorter v. People, 2 N. Y. 193, 51 Am. 
 
 25 N. 0. (3 Ired. L.) 186, 38 Am. Dec. Dec. 286; People v. McLeod, 1 Hill, 420, 
 
 714; Jimmerson v. State, 133 Ala. 18, 37 Am. Dec. 328; People v. Lamb, 54 
 
 32 So. 141 ; Harrison v. State, 24 Ala. Barb. 342 ; Patterson v. People, 46 Barb. 
 
 67, 60 Am. Dec. 450; Green v. State, 69 625; State v. Scott, 26 N. C. (4 Ired. L.) 
 
 Ala. 6; Lewis v. State, 51 Ala. 1; Peo- 409, 42 Am. Dec. 148; State v. Snelbaker, 
 
 pie V. Lynch, 101 Cal. 229, 35 Pac. 860 ; 8 Ohio Dec. Reprint, 466 ; Com. v. Drum, 
 
 People V. Campbell, 30 Cal. 312; State 53 Pa. 9; Williams v. State, 3 Heisk. 
 
 V. Schieler, 4 Idaho, 120, 37 Pac. 272; 376 ; Wright v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 Creek v. State, 24 Ind. 151; State v. 447, 50 S. W. 940; Hinton v. State, 24 
 Home, 9 Kan. 120 ; State v. West, 45 Tex. 454 ; Penland v. State. 19 Tex. App. 
 La. Ann. 14, 12 So. 7; State v. Halli- 365; Lander v. State, 12 Tex. 462; Gon- 
 day, 112 La. 846, 36 So. 753; State v. zales v. State, 31 Tex. 495; Munden v. 
 King, 22 La. Ann. 454; State v. Wil- State, 37 Tex. 353; Stoneman v. Com. 
 liams, 46 La. Ann. 709, 15 So. 82; State 25 Gratt. 887; State v. Cain, 20 W. Va. 
 V. Jackson, 44 La. Ann. 160, 10 So. 600; 679; Reg. v. Thurbora, 1 Den. C. C. 387. 
 State V. Bradley, 6 La. Ann. 554 ; Pond aState v. Hyland, 144 Mo. 302, 46 S. 
 V. People, 8 Mich. 150; Scott v. State, W. 195. 
 
 66 Miss. 287; Newcomb v. State, 37 3 State v. Jackson, 32 S. C. 27, 10 S. 
 
 Miss. 383 ; Evans v. State, 44 Miss. 762 ; E. 709. 
 
 Colton V. State, 31 Miss. 504; Hood v. Ubid. 
 
 State (Miss.) 27 So. 643; State v. Bibid. 
 
 Thompson, 83 Mo. 257; State v. Hays, 23 eLewis v. State, 51 Ala. 1. 
 
S 240] SELF-DEFENSE. 395 
 
 means of effecting a deadly purpose with respect to his opponent; 
 it must also appear by some act or demonstration of the former that 
 he intended at the time of the killing to carry out such purpose, or the 
 circumstances must have been such as to create a reasonable belief in 
 the mind of the slayer that it was necessary to kill the deceased to 
 save himself from death or serious bodily harm.'' Nor is it sufficient 
 that the slayer thought hi^ antagonist was armed and that he might 
 intend to kill him,* though it is competent to prove possession of a 
 deadly weapon by the deceased a short time before the occurrence in 
 question.* And when it appears that a man shot at another twice, the 
 last time when he was fleeing, the fact that the latter had a knife 
 in his pocket is immaterial.*" And the bare fact that the person 
 killed presented a gun at the slayer before he discharged the fatal shot 
 does not necessarily excuse the homicide, as a matter of law. ' * 
 
 A person threatened with an attack, however, is not required to 
 wait until the attack is actually made, but may safely act upon ap- 
 pearances and make the first assault, and kill the other if this is 
 necessary, or apparently necessary, to avoid death or great bodily 
 harm apprehended by him from the person whom he kills. * * Such an 
 attack is in self-defense though the assailant was the aggressor, where 
 
 ^Sprin^eld v. State, 96 Ala. 81, 38 does not tend in any manner to excuse 
 Am. St. Eep. 85, 11 So. 250; Harrison v. or justify the accused in having previ- 
 State, 24 Ala. 67, 60 Am. Dee. 450; ously shot the deceased, and is not ad- 
 People V. Adams, 85 Cal. 231, 24 Pac. raissible in a prosecution for the killing. 
 629; State v. Jackson, 44 La. Ann. 160, Turner v. State, 33 Tex. Crira. Rep. 103, 
 10 So. 600 ; State v. Rider, 90 Mo. 54, 1 25 S. W. 635. 
 
 S. W. 825; Territory v. Burgess, 8 Mont. uState v. Bodie, 33 S. C. 117, 11 S. 
 
 57, 1 L.R.A. 808, 19 Pac. 558. E. 624. 
 
 sState V. Scott, 26 N. C. (4 Ired. L.) i2State v. Matthews, 148 Mo. 185, 71 
 
 409, 42 Am. Dec. 148. Am. St. Eep. 594, 49 S. W. 1085; State 
 
 sHoller v. State, 37 Ind. 57, 10 Am. v. McDonald, 67 Mo. 13; Myers v. State, 
 
 Kep. 74; People v. Cook (Cal.) 83 Pac. 62 Ala. 599; State v. Wilson (Del.) 62 
 
 43. And see Baysinger v. Territory Atl. 227 ; Fortenberry v. State, 55 Miss. 
 
 (Okla.) 82 Pac. 728. 404; Kendrick v. State, 55 Miss. 436; 
 
 But an instruction in a prosecution People v. Fucarino, 104 App. Div. 437, 
 
 for homicide on the issue of self-defense gg jj y. Supp. 689; Goodnll v. State, 1 
 
 is erroneous where it assumes that the Qj. 333^ gg ^^ jj^^ ggg. ^^^^ ^ j^ 
 
 accused was armed with a deadly 70 « c 74 ^\ R E 5^4- State v Petsch 
 
 weapon which he had provided with the 43 g ^ ^3 g^ g j, ggg pj^ ^; 
 
 ijtention of using It upon the deceased. 3^ ^ . ^ ^^ 
 
 Fore V. State, 75 Miss. 727, 23 So. 710. ci„„ „ Kn■„^^ hqti„„ A.,;™ u™ 
 
 And that deceased was unarmed, as ^f ' « L %oS t %? . ,t ^' 
 
 well as that he was armed, may be 66,. 03 S. W. 309; Lara v State (Tex. 
 
 shown in a prosecution for homicide as Crim. App.) 89 SW. 840; Cooper v. 
 
 bearing on the issue of self-defense. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 89 S. W. 1068; 
 
 People V. Adams, 137 Cal. 580, 70 Pac. Nix v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 74 S. 
 
 eg2. W. 764; Graham v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 loWvnne v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) App.) 61 S. W. 714; Brady v. State 
 
 51 S. W. 909. (Tex. Crim. App.) 65 S. W. 521. And 
 
 And the fact that the brother of the see State v. Sullivan, 43 S. C. 205, 21 
 
 deceased had a pistol after the killing S. E. 4; Regan v. State (Miss.) 39 So. 
 
396 HOMICIDE. [§ 240 
 
 no unreasonable force was used in repelling the impending assault. * * 
 And an instruction in a prosecution for homicide thac if, from any 
 word or words, or words coupled with acts of the deceased, the accused 
 believed he was in danger of losing his life or suffering great bodily 
 harm, his right of self-defense is perfect, is not objectionable as con- 
 fining the accused's right of self-defense to an actual attack then being 
 made upon him.^* The right to act in self-defense depends upon 
 apparent danger as distinguished from an actual attack. ^^ And to 
 some extent the overt act which would induce a man to act in self- 
 defense is measured by the known character of his antagonist for 
 quarrelsomeness and violence.^® But the principle of law that one 
 may anticipate an attack and slay his assailant when necessary to 
 save his own life is not applicable in a prosecution for homicide, 
 where it appears that the deceased was standing still at the time 
 at some distance from the slayer, with no weapon save a knife 
 in his hand, which was resting quietly at his side. ^ '' And it should 
 not be given in charge to the jury unless the evidence is calculated 
 to create the belief that, but for the timely action of the accused, 
 he would have been the victim of his adversary.^* So, where 
 several persons are acting together aggressively toward another, and, 
 because of their acts or the acts of either of them, it reasonably 
 appears to him that his life is in danger, or he is in danger of 
 great- bodily harm, he may slay any of such persons or all of them, if 
 it reasonably appears to him to be necessary so to do to protect him- 
 self from death or great bodily harm. ^ ® And when a person is called 
 
 1002 ; Brown v. St^te, 74 Ala. 478 ; Aiken But an instruction in a prosecution 
 V. State (Tex. Ciim. App.) 64 S. W. 57. for homicide that if the deceased pur- 
 One who shoots arother in order to sued and overtook the accused, and the 
 save himself from serious bodily harm, latter, believing that the former was 
 acting under an impression from the about to take his life or inflict serious 
 manner or actions of the person shot bodily injury upon his person, killed 
 that the latter was about to attack him, him, he would not be guilty, is not sub- 
 is not guilty of murder in the first de- ject to the objection that it restricted 
 
 R^P -^It"^^^^ ''' ^'""' ^"^ ^^' ^^^' ^^ *^^ accused's right of self-defense to his 
 
 •■oiT oj J. CO Ai cnn 'being pursued and overtaken, and did 
 
 Myers v. State, 62 Ala. 599 „^^ l^^^ l,j^ ^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^ ^^ ^ 
 
 i< Aiken v. State, supra. And see „„„. 4.. , r. at, . 
 
 Nairn v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 45 S. "^««t. ^\^ '^^Jl'i' T'l^'^ *!>« J"^ ^e™ 
 Y^^ yQ3 '^^ also instructed that the accused was jus- 
 
 iestewart v. SUte, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. \'^^^ " ^^^e act or acts and words of the 
 
 649, 51 S. W. 907; Phipps v. State, 34 deceased made it reasonably apparent to 
 
 Tex. Crim. Eep. 560, 31 S. W. 397. him that the deceased was about to take 
 
 "State V. Williams, 46' La. Ann. 709, Ws life or inflict serious bodily injury. 
 
 15 So. 82. Garello v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 56, 
 
 i7Long V. State, 52 Miss. 23. 20 S. W. 179. 
 
 isKendrick v. State, 55 Miss. 436. "Stell v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 58 
 
 And see Reynolds v. Com. 114 Ky. 912, S. W. 75; Seeley v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. 
 
 72 S. W. 277. Rep. 66, 63 S. W. 309; Menly t. State, 
 
^ 240] SELF-DEFENSE. 397 
 
 upon to act under such circumstances, he is not bound to decide as 
 to which one of the persons made the actual hostile demonstrations, 
 and refrain from injuring the others.*" 
 
 241. What overt acts or demonstrations are sufficient generally. — 
 What is or is not a suiScient overt hostile demonstration within the 
 meaning of the law of self-defense varies with the circumstances; 
 under some circumstances a slight movement may justify instant 
 action, because of reasonable apprehension of danger.^ No exact 
 definition of overt act can be given.* To require that menaces shall 
 be such as to show unequivocally an intent to use a dv,adly weapon, 
 or as to create a just apprehension of imminent danger, exacts too 
 high a standard.^ The hostile demonstration or overt act upon the 
 part of one person toward another, which will justify the latter 
 in acting in self-defense, may consist of anything which evidences 
 reasonably a present design upon the part of the former to take 
 the latter's life or do him great bodily harm;* it need not consist of 
 an actual attack.^ If one person presents a rifle at another, and 
 the latter, to save his own life, fires first and kills his antagonist, 
 the plea of self-defense is sustained.® And the act of a person of 
 angrily and insultingly advancing toward another, and moving his 
 hand to or in the direction of his pistol in such a manner as to indi- 
 cate to a reasonable mind that his purpose is to draw and fire, 
 warrants the other in anticipating him by firing first. '' And in such 
 
 26 Tex. App. 274, 8 Am. St. Rep. 477, And a charge as to the law of self- 
 
 9 S. W. 563. defense is warranted and required in ;l 
 
 20Stell V. State, supra. prosecution for homicide, where there 
 
 lAUison V. United States, 160 U. S. was evidence tending to prove that, 
 
 203, 40 L. ed. 395, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 252; shortly before the fatal rencounter, the 
 
 Holly V. State, 55 Miss. 424. accused saw deceased exhibit a pistol, 
 
 2HolIy V. State, supra. and that subsequently the accused shot 
 
 sState V. West, 45 La. Ann. 14, 12 So. the deceased while the latter was ad- 
 
 7. vancing on him in a threatening man- 
 
 4Hood V. State (Miss.) 27 So. C43; ner, with his right hand apparently in 
 
 Holly V. State, 55 Miss. 424. And see the pocket in which he had previously 
 
 State V. Clark, 134 N. C. 698, 46 S. E. 36. placed the pistol in the presence of the 
 
 sNix V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 74 accused. Lister v. State, 3 Tex. App. 
 
 S. W. 764. And see cases holding this 17. 
 
 principle cited supra, last section. But evidence of a marked peculiarity 
 
 sMartin v. Com. 93 Ky. 189, 19 S. W. upon the part of the deceased, in a 
 
 580. prosecution for the homicide, of resting 
 
 'DeArman v. State, 71 Ala. 351 ; Wil- his hand on his hip or in his hip pocket 
 
 liams v. United States, 4 Ind. Terr. 269, when walking or standing is admissible 
 
 69 S. W. 871 ; Massie v. Com. 15 Ky. L. in rebuttal, where it appears that he 
 
 Rep. 562, 24 S. W. 611; Newman v. State was shot while having his hand on his 
 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 70 S. W. 951 ; Poole hip pocket, as bearing upon the question 
 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 348, 76 S. as to whether there was any real danger 
 
 W. 765; Bartay v. State (Tex. Crim. to the accused, and whether he had a 
 
 App.) 67 S. W. 416. And see Nix v. reasonable apprehension of danger from 
 
 State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 504, 78 S. W. appearances. People v. Grimes, 132 Cal. 
 
 227. 30, 64 Pao. 101. 
 
398 HOMICIDE. l*J 2 
 
 case his rights are not affected by the fact that his assailant was, in 
 fact, unarmed,® though that fact may be given in evidence as one of 
 the circumstances of the case.® So, an approach by the deceased with 
 a deadly weapon in his hands is sufficient.^** It is not necessary to 
 the right of self-defense that the deceased should not only have drawn 
 his pistol, but also should have pointed it at the slayer. * * And an in- 
 struction as to self-defense is required where there was conflicting 
 evidence tending to show close advance by the person killed upon the 
 slayer, with a drawn deadly weapon designed for striking purposes. ^ * 
 And an instruction making the slayer's right of self-defense to depend 
 upon the actual presentation of a firearm is erroneous. * * Nor need 
 a person assaulted by one having a deadly weapon designed for strik- 
 ing wait until his antagonist is within striking distance from, or 
 upon equal terms with, himself before acting.^* He may justly use 
 the advantage which his own innocence and his assailant's rashness 
 have given him. * ® 
 
 To warrant killing, however, the overt act indicative of imminent 
 danger must have been such as, under all the circumstances, to con- 
 vince the jury that the slayer had reasonable grounds to believe, 
 and did believe, the danger imminent, and that the killing was 
 necessary to preserve his life or protect him from great bodily harm. ' * 
 There must have been acts, as distinguished from mere words and 
 gestures.'^ And it has been held that no demonstration of hos- 
 tility short of a manifest attempt to commit a felony, or to do great 
 bodily harm, justifies the extreme measure of taking life.** Thus, 
 merely advancing toward a person without striking, or offering 
 to strike, him does not justify such person in shooting the aggres- 
 sor,*® though if he held an open knife in his hand an instruction 
 
 sDeArman v. State, and Williams v. uRiptoe v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 United States, supra. And see Roberts 42 S. W. 381. 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 88 S. W. 221. i2BowIes v. Com. 103 Va. 816, 48 S. E. 
 
 sMoore v. State, 86 Miss. 160, 38 So. 527. 
 
 504. 13 Graham v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 loTerritory v. Burgess, 8 Mont. 57, 1 61 S. W. 714. 
 
 L.R.A. 808, 19 Pac. 558; Teel v. State 1 4 Fortenberry v. State, 55 Misa. 403. 
 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 69 S. W. 531; Bartay iBlbid. 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 67 S. W. i«State v. Cain, 20 W. Va. 679. And 
 
 416. see Burks v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 And where the evidence of the accused 167, 49 S. W. 389. 
 
 himself in a prosecution for homicide i 'Gonzales v. State, 28 Tex. App. 130, 
 
 makes a case of self-defense, the absence 12 S. W. 733. 
 
 of a witness who would testify that the isKennedy v. Com. 14 Bush, 340; 
 
 deceased advanced upon the accused with Stoneman v. Com. 25 Gratt. 887. 
 
 pistol in hand, declaring that he would isFariss v. State, 85 Ala. 1,4 So. 679; 
 
 kill the accused, is sufficient to require Lewis v. State, 51 Ala. 1. And see Vanca 
 
 a continuance. Roller v. State, 36 Tex. v. State, 70 Ark. 272 68 S W 37 
 
 Crim. Rep. 490, 38 S. W. 44. • • ■• 
 
S 241] SELF-DEFENSE. 399 
 
 on self defense ignoring this fact would be erroneous. ^ " And reach- 
 ing for a weapon designed for striking, when not within striking 
 distance, is not such a hostile demonstration as to warrant the exer- 
 cise of the right of self-defense.^^ Nor is such right conferred by 
 mere preparation for the perpetration of a wrongful act. ^ ^ And it 
 cannot be assumed, as matter of law, that the mere drawing of 
 a knife in a hostile manner, by one of two persons engaged in a 
 difficulty, creates a necessity upon the part of the other for slaying 
 him in self-defense.^* Nor does the mere presence of a person at 
 the time of a difficulty between others, and his act of advising one 
 of them to engage therein, warrant the other in shooting the person 
 so advising.^* And going to a person's place of residence to seek 
 an explanation from him is not such an act of hostility as will justify 
 taking his life. ^ ^ And the same rule applies to the act of one person 
 in mischievously throwing stones against the house of another.^® 
 So, the demonstration must have been one by the deceased himself, 
 and the fact that a person was seen with a gun watching around the 
 house of another does not justify the latter in subsequently killing 
 the brother of the watcher. ^^ The sufficiency of an overt act or 
 hostile demonstration to show a design, real or apparent, to do great 
 bodily harm, which will warrant acting in self-defense, is a matter 
 of fact for the jury, to be determined according to all the evidence.^* 
 The question of sufficiency of hostile demonstrations considered in 
 connection with threats and bloodthirsty character of the deceased 
 is elsewhere considered.^' 
 
 V. Paeticulae situations and cibcumstances as affecting dan- 
 gee AND necessity. 
 
 a. Threats by deceased.* 
 
 1. General rules. 
 
 242. As an excuse for killing — No one has a right to kill another 
 simply because he has made threats against him. * And the act of one 
 
 soFariss v. State, eupra. s'Green v. State, 71 Ark. 150, 71 S. 
 
 21 Abbott V. People, 86 N. Y. 460. W. 665. 
 
 22BaIl V. State, 29 Tex. App. 107, 14 2 8 Hood v. State (Miss.) 27 So. 643; 
 
 S. W. 1012. And see Green v. State, 43 state v. Abbott, 8 W. Va. 741. 
 
 Fla. 556, 30 So. 656. 29See infra, §§ 242 et seq., 257 et seq. 
 
 2 3Springfield V State 96 Ala. 81, 38 ifhe general subject of evidence in a 
 
 ,:xT ■'^' ai I Ao^ n ■ j> criminal ca.se of threats of accused, or 
 
 2<Norris v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. , . . , i -n j ■ .j j 
 
 559 61 Pac 493 person injured or killed, is considered 
 
 25State V. Williams, 46 La. Ann. 709, i" <^ °°te *" Wilson v. State, 17 L.R.A. 
 
 15 So. 82. 654. 
 
 26^Tfirmon v. State, 158 Ind. 37, 62 N. zState v. Labuzan, 37 La. Ann. 489; 
 
 E. 630. Jimmerson v. State, 133 Ala. 18, 32 So. 
 
400 HOMICIOE. K 242 
 
 whose life had Tbeen threatened by another, of arming himself 
 and going to the other's house and killing him because of the threats, 
 is murder, the threat being neither justification nor mitigation.* 
 Threats previously made do not justify taking the life of the 
 person uttering them on the plea of . self-defense, unless there was, 
 at least apparently, such a demonstration of an immediate inten- 
 tion to execute them as would naturally induce a reasonable belief 
 that the person threatened would lose his life or suffer serious 
 bodily harm if he did not immediately take the life of the person 
 making them.* Nor does the fact that one person had made threats 
 against the life of another, though taken in connection with the fact 
 that the threatener was of a violent and dangerous character, justify 
 or excuse an immediate resort to deadly weapons, resulting in killing 
 him, in the absence of some demonstration, real or apparent, of 
 
 141 ; Taylor v. State, 121 Ga. 348, 49 S. 1217, 43 S. W. 221 ; Bailey v. Com. 15 
 E. 303. Ky. L. Rep. 826, 25 S. W. 883 ; State v. 
 
 SHoover v. State, 35 Tex. Grim. Eep. Leonard, 6 La. Ann. 420; State v. Mul- 
 343, 33 S. W. 337. len, 14 La. Ann. 577 ; State v. Spell, 38 
 
 ^Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 29 Am. La. Ann. 20; State v. Birdwell, 36 La. 
 St. Rep. 232, 9 So. 835 ; Smith v. State, Ann. 859 ; State v. Kellogg, 104 La. 580, 
 25 Fla. 517, 6 So, 482; Bond v. State, 21 29 So. 285; Turpin v. State, 55 Md. 
 Fla. 738; Pritcliett v. State, 22 Ala. 39, 462; People v. Garbutt, 17 Mieh. 9, 92 
 58 Am. Deo. 250; Tolinston v. State, 29 Am. Dec. 162; Evans v. State. 44 Miss. 
 Fla. 558, 10 So. 686; Hughey V. State, 47 762; Edwards v. State, 47 Miss. 581; 
 Ala. 103; Roberts v. State, 68 Ala. 515; Moriarty v. State, 62 Miss. 654: State 
 Williams v. State, 74 Ala. 20; DeArman v. Downs, 91 Mo. 19, 3 S. W. 219; State 
 V. State, 71 Ala. 351; Payne v. State, 60 v. Harris, 73 Mo. 287; State v. Guy, 69 
 Ala. 80; Morrell v. State, 136 Ala. 44. 34 Mo. 430; State v. Eaton, 75 Mo. 586; 
 So. 208; Mize v. State, 36 Ark. 653; State v. Harris, 59 Mo. 550; State v. 
 People v. Taing, 53 Gal. 602; People v. Alexander, 66 Mo. 148; State v. Rider, 
 Westlake, 62 Cal. 303; People v. Camp- 95 Mo. 474, 8 S. W. 723; State v. Wilson, 
 bell, 59 Gal. 243, 43 Am. Rep. 257; Peo- 98 Mo. 440, 1) S. W. 985; State v. 
 pie V. Tamkin, 02 Cal. 468; People v. Thomas, 138 Mo. 168, 39 S. W. 459; 
 Lynch, 101 Cal. 229, 35 Pac. 860; Peo- State v. Westlake, 159 Mo. 669, 61 S. 
 pie V. lams, 57 Cal. 115; People v. Scog- W. 243: State v. Spencer, 160 Mo. 118, 
 gins, 37 Cai. 683; People v. Lombard, 17 83 Am. St. Rep. 463, 60 S. W. 1048; Ter- 
 Gal. 316; People v. Arnold, 15 Cal. 476; ritory v. Burgess, 8 Mont. 57. 1 L.R.A. 
 Bailey v. State. 70 Ga. 617; Darbv v. SOS, 19 Pac. 558; State v. Hall, 9 Nev. 
 State, 79 Ga. 63, 3 S. E. 663; McDuffie 58: State v. Harrington. 12 Nev. 125; 
 V. State, 90 Ga. 786, 17 S. E. 105; John- State v. Stewart, 9 Nev! 120; State v. 
 son V. State, 105 Ga. 66.5, 31 S. E. 399; Scott, 26 N. C. (4 Ired. L.) 409, 42 Am. 
 Hawkins v. State, 25 Ga. 207, 71 Am. Dec. 148; State v. Shields, 1 Ohio Dec. 
 Dec. 166; King v. Bridges, 5 Haw. 467; Reprint, 17; State v. Smith, 43 Or. 109, 
 Hulse v. Tollman, 49 111. App. 490; 71 Pac. 973: State v. Howard, 35 S. C. 
 Ellis v. State, 152 Ind. 326, 52 N. E. 82; 197, 14 S. E. 481; Williams v. State. 3 
 Gilraore V. People, 124 111. 380, 15 N. E. Heisk. 370; Hippy v. State, 2 Head, 
 758; Wilson v. People. 94 111. 299; Price 218; Barnard v. State, 88 Tenn 183 12 
 V. People, 131 HI. 223, 23 N. E. 639; S. W. 431; Gonzales v. State, 31 Tex. 
 Williams v. United States, 4 Ind. Terr. 495; Lander v. State. 12 Tex. 462; John- 
 269, 69 S. W. 871; Bohannon v. Com. 8 son v. State, 27 Tex. 758; Dawson v. 
 Bush, 481, 8 Am. Rep. 474; Fitzpatrick State, 33 Tex. 492, Overrulin" Prid^en 
 V. Com. 81 Ky. 357; Oder v. Com. 80 v. State, 3] Tex. 420: Mvers vrstater33 
 Ky. 35; Ray v. Com. 19 Ky. L. Rep. Tex. 525; Irwin v. State, 43 Tex. 236; 
 
§ 242] 
 
 SELF-DEFENSE. 
 
 401 
 
 an intent coupled with ability to take life." And if the slayer was 
 the aggressor, previous threats by the deceased should exert no in- 
 fluence upon the question of criminality, unless there was a present, 
 impending purpose, real or apparent, to carry out such threats.^ 
 Where a man has been threatened with a dangerous or serious attack, 
 however, he may arm himself for defense, and no inference of malice 
 can be drawn from the fact of preparation,^ though it is for the 
 jury to say, upon all the evidence, whether there was reasonable 
 ground to believe that such an attack would be made ; * and whether 
 threats are sufficient to establish reasonable fear is a question for 
 the jury. * And the fact that a man's life has been threatened does 
 'not interfere with his right to go wherever his legitimate basiness 
 calls him, though it does not justify him in lying in wait for, and 
 slaying, his adversary, and if he does so it is murder in the first 
 degree. ^ " 
 
 243. General inadmissibility in evidence. — As a general rule, threats 
 are not admissible in evidence for the purpose of justifying a homi- 
 cide, unless there is something in the evidence tending to make out a 
 case of self-defense.^ If the slayer was the aggressor, evidence of 
 threats by the deceased against him is incompetent in a prosecution for 
 
 Nash V. State, 2 Tex. App. 362; Thomas 
 V. State, 11 Tex. App. 315; Peck v. 
 State, 5 Tex. App. 611; Sims v. State, 9 
 Tex. App. 586 ; Carter v. State, 18 Tex. 
 App. 573; Penland v. State, 19 Tex. App. 
 565 ; Smith v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 391, 50 S. W. 938; Wright v. State, 40 
 Tex. Crim. Eep. 447, 50 S. W. 940; Hill 
 V. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 583, 67 S. W. 
 506; Gatling v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 76 S. W. 471; Brj'ant v. State (Tex. 
 Crim. App.) 47 S. W. 373; Territory v. 
 Halliday, 5 Utah, 467, 17 Pac. il8; 
 State V. Abbott, 8 W. Va. 741 ; Thomp- 
 son V. United States, 155 U. S. 271, 39 
 L. ed. 146, 15 Sup. Ct. Hep. 73; United 
 States V. Outerbridge, 5 Sawy. 620, Fed. 
 Cas. No. 15,978. 
 
 5Karr v. State, 100 Ala. 4, 46 Am. St. 
 Eep. 17, 14 So. 851; Williams v. State, 
 2 Tex. App. 271. 
 
 sMyers v. State, 62 Ala. 599; Mitchell 
 V. State, 129 Ala. 23, 30 So. 348; Wil- 
 son V. State, 30 Fla. 234, 17 L.E.A. 654, 
 11 So. 556; State v. Wilson, 43 La. 
 Ann. 840, 9 So. 490; State v. Whitworth, 
 26 Mont. 107, 66 Pac. 748; State v. 
 Hays, 23 Mo. 287; State v. Taylor, 64 
 Mo. 358; Levy v. State, 28 Tex. App. 
 203, 19 Am. St. Eep. 826, 12 S. W. 596. 
 
 7State V. Clark, 51 W. Va. 457, 41 
 Hom.— -26. 
 
 S. E. 204; Bohannon v. Com. 8 Bush, 
 481, 8 Am. Eep. 474. 
 
 8 State V. Clark, supra. 
 
 One who is told of threats made by 
 another against him is not entitled, as 
 a matter of law, to arm himself. Wheth- 
 er or not he was justified in doing so 
 and in using his arms upon meeting the 
 other is a question for the jury in a 
 prosecution against him for killing the 
 other. People v. Hurtado, 63 Cal. 288. 
 
 sPridgen v. State, 31 Tex. 421. 
 
 loSmith V. State, 25 Fla. 517, 6 So. 
 482; Bohannon v. Com. supra. 
 
 lEutledge v. State, 88 Ala. 85, 7 So. 
 335; Gilmore v. State, 141 Ala. 51, 37 
 So. 359; Dunn v. State (Ala.) 39 So. 
 147; Green v. State, 69 Ala. 6; Steele 
 V. State, 33 Fla. 348, 14 So. 841 ; Jen- 
 kins V. State, 80 Md. 72, 30 Atl. 566; 
 People V. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9, 97 Am. 
 Dec. 162; Hinson v. State, 68 Miss. 532, 
 6 So. 463; Johnson v. State, 54 Miss. 
 430; Holly V. State, 55 Miss. 424; Stats 
 V. Taylor, 64 Mo. 358; Territory v. 
 Thomason, 4 N. M. 154, 13 Pac. 223; 
 People V. Hess, 8 App. Div. 143, 40 N. Y. 
 Supp. 486; State v. Bvrd, 121 N. C. 684, 
 28 S. E. 353. And see'Carapbell v. State, 
 111 Wis. 152, 86 N. W. 855. 
 
402 HOMICIDE. 11 243; 
 
 the killing. ^ Threats by one person against another are inadmissible 
 in a prosecution against the latter for killing the former, to justify 
 it, where it is clear that they could have had no possible effect on 
 the mind of the person threatened by way of creating a fear of the 
 other, and that the assault was not made in self-defense.* And as a 
 general rale threats made by the deceased against the accused, whether 
 communicated or uncommunicated, unless accompanied or followed by 
 such a real or apparent demonstration of an immediate intention 
 to execute them as would naturally induce a reasonable belief that 
 the person threatened would lose his life or suffer serious bodily harm,, 
 are not admissible in evidence in a prosecution for a killing to justify 
 it, when not a part of the res gestae, there being no question as to who- 
 was the aggressor.* And they are properly excluded where it does 
 not appear that the deceased made an overt attack upon the accused, 
 or that the accused was in apparent danger from him;^ or where 
 it is clear from the evidence that the accused could have avoided 
 
 ^Morrison v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 257; Leigh v. People, 113 111. 372; Ling* 
 
 2493, 67 L.R.A. 529, 74 S. W. 277; Ragu- v. State, 29 Ga. 470; Ellis v. State, 152 
 
 dale V. State, 134 Ala. 24, 32 So. 674; Ind. 326, 52 N. E. 82; State v. Cosgrove, 
 
 Steele v. State, 33 Fla. 348, 14 So. 841; 42 La. Ann. 753, 7 So. 714; State v. 
 
 State V. Fontenot, 48 La. Ann. 3U5, 19 Brooks, 39 La. Ann. 817, 2 So. 498; State 
 
 So. Ill; Oden v. State (Miss.) 27 So. v. Janvier^ 37 La. Ann. 644; State v. 
 
 992; State v. Alexander, 66 Mo. 148, Tasby, 110 La. 121, 34 So. 300; State- 
 
 State V. Smith, 164 Mo. 567, 65 S. W. v. Demareste, 41 La. Ann. 617, 6 So. 136; 
 
 270; Territory v. Thomason, supra; State v. Stewart, 47 La. Ann. 410, 16 
 
 Mealer v. State, 32 Tex. Crim. Rep. 102, So. 945; State v. Frierson, 51 La. Ann. 
 
 22 S. W. 142. 706, 25 So. 398; SUte v. Thomas, 111 
 sState V. McGonigle, 14 Wash. 594, 45 La. 804, 35 So. 914; State v. Perioux, 
 
 Pac. 20; Com. V. Lenox, 3 Brewst. (Pa.) 107 La. 601, 31 So. 1016; Jenkins v. 
 249. State, 80 Md. 72, 30 Atl. 566; Turpin v. 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution State, 65 Md. 462; Kendrick v. State, 
 for homicide that if, at the time the de- 55 Miss. 436; Guice v. State, 60 Miss, 
 ceased was shot, he was unarmed and 714; Harris v. State, 47 Miss. 318; Hol- 
 had made no assault upon the accused, ly v. State, 55 Miss. 424; Newcomb v. 
 any evidence of prior threats of the de- State, 37 Miss. 383; Hill v. State- 
 ceased agiinst the accused should not be (Miss.) 16 So. 901; State v. Taylor, 64 
 considered, is not subject to objection Mo. 358; State v. Downs, 91 Mo. 19, 3 
 as ignoring the principle that the ac- S. W. 219; Territory v. Campbell, 9- 
 cused might act upon a reasonable ap- Mont. 16, 22 Pac. 121 ; State v. Hall, 9 
 prehension of danger. Ross v. State, 8 Nev. 58; State v. Stewart, 9 Nev. 120; 
 Wyo. 351, 57 Pac. 924. State v. ToUa, 72 N. J. L. 515, 3 L.R.A. 
 
 4Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 29 Am. (N.S.) 523, 62 Atl. 675; Real v. Peo- 
 St. Kep. 232, So. 835; Smith v. State, pie, 65 Barb. 551; State v. Hensley, 94 
 25 Fla. 517, 6 So. 482; Steele v. State, N. C. 1021; State v. Kenyon, 18 R. L 
 33 Fla. 348, 14 So. 841; Wilson v. State, 217, 26 Atl. 199; United States v. Leigh- 
 140 Ala. 43, 37 So. 93; Carroll v. State, ton, 3 Dak. 29, 13 N. W. 347; Irwin v. 
 
 23 Ala. 28, 58 Am. Dec. 282; Hughey v. State, 43 Tex. 236; People v. Halliday, 6- 
 State, 47 Ala. 97; Roberts v. State, 68 Utah, 467, 17 Pac. 118; State v. Cush- 
 Ala. 156; Burke v. State, 71 Ala. 377; ing, 17 Wash. 544, 50 Pac. 612; Allison 
 Rutledge v. State, 88 Ala. 85, 7 So. 335; v. United States, 160 U. S. 203, 40 L. ed.^ 
 McPherson v. State, 29 Ark. 231 ; Peo- 395, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 252. 
 
 pie V. Camjibell, 69 Cal. 243, 43 Am. Rep. estate v. Kenyon, supra. 
 
« 243] SELF-DEFENSE. 403 
 
 killing the deceased had he chosen to do so.* The only purpose for 
 which threats made hy the deceased against the accused may be con- 
 sidered in a prosecution for homicide is to determine whether the 
 deceased was making an attack upon the accused at the time of the 
 killing, or whether accused believed at the time that the other was 
 attempting to attack him.^ Threats by the deceased against the ac- 
 cused are inadmissible, unless it is proposed to show that they were 
 communicated to the accused, or that there was a question in the 
 case as to whether the deceased was the aggressor, or made hostile 
 demonstrations tending to induce the belief upon the part of the 
 accused that he was in peril of life or limb or grievous bodily 
 harm.* And the fact that the state had sought to prove a common 
 design of two persons charged as principals affords no ground for 
 admitting evidence of threats by the deceased.® 
 
 2. Exception in self-defense cases. 
 
 244. General rules. — Threats, taken with overt acts indicating hos- 
 tility, may be sufficient to impress upon the person threatened a 
 reasonable and honest conviction that killing the threatener is im- 
 mediately necessary to save himself from loss of life or grievous 
 bodily harm, and should be taken into consideration and weighed 
 in connection with such overt acts, in determining as to the exist- 
 ence of such a conviction. ^ And the same rule applies to threats and 
 
 eHays t. Com. 12 Ky. L. Eep. 611, Rider, 90 Mo. 64, 1 S. W. 825; State y. 
 
 14 S. W. 833. Alexander, 66 Mo. 148; State v. Har- 
 
 'Long V. State (Ark.) 91 S. W. 26. rington, 12 Nev. 125; State v. Stewart, 
 
 sWilson V. State, 140 Ala. 43, 37 So. 9 Nev. 130; State v. Hall, 9 Nev. 58; 
 
 93. People v. Walworth, 4 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 
 
 sState V. Frierson, 51 La. Ann. 708, 355; State v. Shields. 1 Ohio Dee. Re- 
 
 25 So. 396. print, 17; State v. Snelbaker, 8 Ohio 
 
 iDeArman v. State, 71 Ala. 351; Deo. Reprint, 466; Souey v. State, 13 
 
 Piitchett V. State, 22 Ala. 39, 58 Am, Lea, 472; Sims v. State, 9 Tex. App. 586; 
 
 Dec. 250; Dupree v. State, 33 Ala. 380, Alexander v. State, 25 Tex. App. 260, 8 
 
 73 Am. Dec. 422; Cleveland v. State, 86 Am. St. Rep. 438, 7 S. W. 867; Wheelis 
 
 Ala. 1, 5 So. 426; People v. Tamkin, 62 v. State. 23 Tex. App. 238, 5 S. W. 224; 
 
 Cal. 468; People v. Arnold, 15 Cal. 476; Chapman v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 Gamer v. State, 28 Fla. 114, 29 Am. St. 135. 57 S. W. 965; Reed v. State (Tex. 
 
 Rep. 232, 9 So. 835; Taylor v. State, 121 Crim. App.) 20 S. W. 709; Aiken v. 
 
 Ga. 348, 49 S. E. 303; Walker v. People, State (Tex. Crim. App.) 64 S. W. 57; 
 
 133 111. 110. 24 N. E. 424; Campbell v. White v. State, 30 Tex. Crim. Rep. 652, 
 
 People, 16 111. 17, 61 Am. Dee. 49; Enlow 18 S. W. 462; Coleman v. State (Tex. 
 
 V. State, 154 Ind. 664, 57 N. E. 539; Crim. App.) 88 S. W. 238; Gatling v. 
 
 Wood V. State, 92 Jnd. 269; DeForest v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 76 S. W. 471; 
 
 State, 21 Ind. 23; Rapp v. Com. 14 B. White v. Territory, 3 Wash. Terr. 397, 19 
 
 Mon. 614; Carico v. Com. 7 Bush, 124; Pac. 37; State v. Zeigler, 40 W. Va. 593, 
 
 State V. Dee, 14 Minn. 35, Gil. 27; State 21 S. E. 763; State v. Evans, 33 W. Va. 
 
 T. Glahn, 97Mo. 679, 11 S. W. 260; State 417, 10 S. E. 792; Allison v. United 
 
 V. Harrod. 102 Mo. 590, 15 S. W. 373; States, 160 U. S. 203, 40 L. ed. 395, 18 
 
 State V. Harris, 59 Mo. 550; State v. Sup. Ct. Rep. 252. And see State v. 
 
404 
 
 HOMICIDE, 
 
 [§ 244 
 
 hostile acts of a third person for whom the deceased was mistaken 
 by the slayer.* And threats by the deceased against the life of 
 the accused are admissible in evidence in a prosecution for homicide, 
 where the claim is that he killed the deceased to save his own life or 
 to save himself from great bodily harm. ^ Prior threats by a person 
 killed against his slayer are regarded as relevant evidence in a 
 homicide case, as a general rule, where, from any point of view the 
 jury can properly take of the circumstances, the belief of the slayer 
 that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm might 
 excuse his act, or reduce the crime from murder to manslaughter.* 
 And this has been held to be the rule without reference to overt 
 acts by the person killed.^ And when communicated to the slayer 
 they are admissible for the purpose of showing the animus of the de- 
 ceased, and the state of mind of the accused toward him;* and as 
 tending to rebut any inference of malice arising from the possession 
 of a deadly weapon by the accused.^ So, previous threats by the 
 
 Donahoe, 78 Iowa, 486, 43 N. W. 297; 
 Aiken v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 64 S. 
 W. 57. 
 
 2Cleveland v. State, 86 Ala. 1, 5 So. 
 42B. 
 
 sstate V. Hayden, 83 Mo. 198 ; Bell v. 
 State, 69 Ark. 148, 86 Am. St. Eep. 188, 
 61 S. W. 918; Basye v. State, 45 Neb. 
 e«J, 63 N. W. 811. 
 
 4WalIace v. United States, 162 U. S. 
 466, 40 L. ed. 1039, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 859; Eiland v. State, 52 Ala. 322; 
 Powell V. State, 52 Ala. 1; Ndeg y. 
 State, 26 Ala. 31, 62 Am. Dec. 711; 
 Pritchett v. State, 22 Ala. 39, 59 Am. 
 Dec. 250; Harkness v. State, 129 Ala. 71, 
 30 So. 73 ; Palmore v. State, 29 Ark. 248 ; 
 Atkins V. State, 16 Ark. 568; People v. 
 Anderson, 39 Cal. 703; People v. Lom- 
 bard, 17 Cal. 316; People v. Williams, 
 17 Cal. 142; People v. Scoggins, 37 Cal. 
 676; Keener v. State, 18 Ga. 194, 63 Am. 
 Dec. 269; Howell v. State, 5 Ga. 48; 
 Monroe v. State, 5 Ga. 85; Williams v. 
 People, 54 111. 422; Campbell v. People, 
 16 111. 17, 61 Am. Deo. 49; State v. HI- 
 liott, 45 Iowa, 486; Cornelius v. Com. 15 
 B. Mon. 539; Holloway v. Com. 11 Bush, 
 344; Campbell v. Com. 88 Ky. 402, 21 
 Am. St. Rep. 348, 11 S. W. 290; Rapp v. 
 Com. 14 B. Men. 614; Carico v. Com. 
 7 Bush, 124; State v. Robertson, 30 La. 
 Ann. 340; State v. McCoy, 29 La. Ann. 
 593; Brownell v. People, 38 Mich. 732; 
 State V. Spaulding, 34 Minn. 361, 25 N. 
 W. 793; Hawthorne v. State, 61 Miss. 
 749 ; Johnson v. State, 54 Miss. 430, 
 
 Johnson v. State (Miss.) 27 So. 880; 
 Long V. State, 52 Miss. 23; State v. 
 V. Harris, 59 Mo. 550; State v. Bryant, 
 Downs, 91 Mo. 19, 3 S. W. 219; State 
 55 Mo. 75 ; State v. Keene, 50 Mo. 357 : 
 State V. Sloan, 47 Mo. 604; State v. 
 Harris, 73 Mo. 287 ; People v. Rector, 19 
 Wend. 569; People v. Taylor, 177 N. Y. 
 237, 69 N. li. 534; State v. Matthews, 
 78 N. C. 523; State v. Turpin, 77 N. C. 
 473, 24 Am. Rep. 455; State v. Dodson, 
 4 Or. 04 ; Horbach v. State, 43 Tex. 242 : 
 Talbert v. State, 8 Tex. App. 316: Brum- 
 iey V. State, 21 Tex. App. 222, 57 Am. 
 Rep. 612, 17 S. W. 140; Alexander v. 
 State, 25 Tex. App. 260, 8 Am. St. Rep. 
 438, 7 S. W. 867; Williams v. State, 
 22 Tex. App. 497, 4 S. W. 64; Peck v. 
 State, 5 Tex. App. 611 ; Russell v. State, 
 11 Tex. App. 288; State v. Abbott, 8 W. 
 Va. 741; United States v. Rice. 1 
 Hughes, 560, Fed. Gas. No. 16,153; Reg. 
 V. Weston, 14 Cox, C. C. 346; Meade's 
 Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 184. 
 
 estate v. Abbott, supra; Pitman v. 
 State, 22 Ark. 354; Howell v. State, 5 
 Ga. 48 ; Monroe v. State, 5 Ga. 85 ; Wil- 
 liams V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 70 S. 
 W. 756. 
 
 6Fitzhugh V. State, 13 Lea, 258; Peo- 
 ple V. Gaiimari. 176 N. Y. 84, 68 N. E. 
 112; Poole v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 M8. 76 S. W. 565; State v. Clifford (W. 
 Va.) 52 S. E. 981. And see Williams 
 V. United States, 4 Ind. Terr. 2S9, 69 S. 
 W. 871. 
 
 estate V. Clifford, supra. 
 
§ 244] SELF-DEFENSE. 405 
 
 deceased against the accused are admissible in evidence in a prose- 
 cution for homicide as bearing upon the issue whether the deceased 
 or the accused was the aggressor in the difficulty in which the killing 
 occurred,* and as tending to show thkt the attack, or demonstra- 
 tion toward an attack, preceding the killing was made by the person 
 uttering the threats.® And where a person was violently attempting 
 to enter a house, and was killed by the occupant, evidence of threats 
 previously made by the former against the latter is admissible in 
 a prosecution for the killing.^" 
 
 When the overt act itself consists of an assault of such a murder- 
 ous character as to clearly justify homicide in self-defense, however, 
 previous threats are of no weight, and an error in an instruction 
 as to such threats would not be ground for reversal. ^ * And a charge 
 with relation to self-defense in a prosecution for homicide is not 
 erroneous because of failure to include an instruction on the doctrine 
 of threats, where, according to the evidence, the acts of the deceased 
 at the time were such as to give the slayer a perfect right of self-de- 
 fense, and the significance of such acts would not be intensified or 
 affected by considering such threats. ^ ^ 
 
 245. Proof of self-defense warranting admission. — The testimony of 
 the slayer in a prosecution for homicide that at the time of the killing 
 he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm is alone 
 sufficient to warrant the admission in evidence of threats previously 
 made by the deceased against him.^ And refusal to charge in such 
 a prosecution that the jury may consider, in determining as to 
 whether the accused had reasonable grounds for believing that he was 
 in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm from the deceased, 
 that the deceased, prior to the homicide, made threats to kill or 
 
 sPeople V. Thomson, 92 Cal. 506, 28 jeet to objection that its effect is to 
 I'ac. 589; Brown v. State, 55 Ark. 593, change the burden of proof and compel 
 18 S. W. 1051 ; Lee v. State, 72 Ark. the accused to establish his innocence, 
 436, 81 S. W. 385; Burroughs v. United where manslaughter was found, and if 
 States (Ind. Terr.) 90 S. W. 8; State v. they had not been considered the verdict 
 Downs, 91 Mo. 19, 3 B. W. 219; State would unavoidably have been murder. 
 V. Shadwell, 26 Mont. 52, 66 Pac. 508; Stite v. Bartmess, 33 Or. 110, 54 Pac. 
 Bethune v. (State (Tex. Crim. App.) 90 167. 
 
 S. W. 1014; Wiggins v. Utah, 93 U. S. sgtate v. Elkins, 63 Mo. 159; State v. 
 465, 23 L. ed. 941. Evans, 122 Iowa, 174, 97 N. W. 1008. 
 
 And while threats or a previous quar- lOKing v. State, 85 Ark. 604, 19 S. W. 
 rel have a bearing upon self-defense in 110. 
 
 homicide only where the deceased was uLeigh v. People, 113 111. 372; Chalk 
 the aiJTgressor, an instrviction that they v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 116, 32 S. 
 may be considered in case of doubt in W. 534. 
 
 regard to whether the accused acted in isSpangler v. State^ 42 Tex. Crim. 
 self-defense, for the purpose of aiding Rep. 233, 61 S. W. 314. 
 in determining wiho was the aggressor, is iState v. Gushing, 14 Wash. 527, 53 
 not prejudicial to the accused or sub- Am. St. Rep. 883, 45 Pac. 145. 
 
408 HOMICIDE. [§ 245 
 
 injure the accused, on the ground that there was no basis therefor in 
 evidence, is improper and reversible error where the accused had 
 testified to such threats, since such refusal might be understood by 
 the jury as an assertion that his testimony was not true. ^ A sufficient 
 predicate for the admission of evidence of previous threats by the 
 deceased against the accused is not formed, however, by a mere 
 statement of the accused as to an overt act by the deceased.* And 
 testimony by the accused in a prosecution for homicide that a person, 
 since dead, had told him shortly before the killing that the deceased 
 had armed himself to kill him is not legal evidence of the deceased's 
 arming himself to kill the accused.* 
 
 246. Necessity of charging as to — Where there is evidence of threats 
 by the deceased against the accused, together with overt acts indica- 
 ting hostility, the law applicable thereto should be given in charge 
 to the jury in a prosecution for homicide. * And error in an instruc- 
 tion in improperly limiting the right of the jury to take threats 
 of the deceased into consideration on an issue of self-defense is not 
 cured by a separate and independent correct instruction not refer- 
 ring to the incorrect ohe.^ And where there is evidence of threats 
 made by the deceased against the accused in a prosecution for hom- 
 icide, some of which were communicated, and it appears that the 
 deceased was a dangerous man and brought about the difficulty and 
 was in fault at the time of the killing, failure of the court to charge 
 the law applicable to such threats is erroneous and a ground fvr 
 reversal, though no such instructions were asked for.* Instructions 
 relating to such threats in a prosecution for homicide should form 
 a part of the instruction with reference to self-defense, and should 
 be given in immediate connection with that issue.* An instruction 
 on self-defense is not required, however, by evidence of uncommuni- 
 cated threats, introduced only to assist the jury on the issue as to 
 who commenced the difficulty.® And an instruction justifying hom- 
 icide if the slayer had reasonable grounds to believe, and did be- 
 lieve, from all the circumstances as they appeared to him, that the 
 deceased was about to take his life or inflict great bodily harm upon 
 
 aPeople v. Zigouras, 1G3 N. Y. 250, 57 S. W. 843; Cline v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 N. E. 465. App.) 71 S. W. 23. 
 
 sTJond V. State, 21 Fla. 738. aStnte v. Shadwell, 26 Mont. 52, 63 
 
 4Carico v. Com. 7 Bush, 124. Pac. 608. 
 
 iPottei V. State, 85 Tenn. 88, 1 S. W. sPotter v. State, supra. 
 
 614; Lara v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 89 ^Tillery v. State. 24 Tex. App. 251, 5 
 
 8. W. 840; Arrasworthy v. State (Tex. Am. St. Eep. 882, 5 S. W. 842. 
 
 Crim. App.) 88 S. W. 215. And see Al- BAskew v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 83 
 
 drfdge v. State (Tex. Crinu App.) 72 S. W. 700. 
 
i 246] 
 
 SELF-DEFENSE. 
 
 407 
 
 iiim, is not subject to objection as withdrawing from the considera- 
 tion of the jury threats previously made. " 
 
 247. Knowledge or communication, when necessary. — ^When threats 
 are sought to be introduced in evidence by a slayer as a justification 
 for thr? killing, he must show that he heard or had been informed 
 of them ; otherwise they can furnish no excuse for his conduct ; * but 
 when offered to prove a substantive fact, such as the state of feeling 
 entertained by the deceased toward him, they are competent testi- 
 mony whether a knowledge of them is brought home to the slayer 
 or not^ Thus, threate, though uncommimicated, are admissible in 
 evidence on an issue of fact as to whether the killing was malicious 
 or in self-defense,^ and upon the question of who began the difficulty,* 
 and as tending to show that the person uttering them was the aggres- 
 ® And though uncommunicated, threats may be given in evi- 
 
 sor. 
 
 sWade v. Com. 106 Ky. 321, 50 S. W. 
 271. 
 
 iKeener v. State, 18 Ga. 194, 63 Am. 
 Dec. 269. And see Powell v. State, 1.9 
 Ala. 577; People v. Henderson, 28 Cal. 
 465; People v. Lombard, 17 Cal. 316; 
 Hughey v. State, 47 Ala. 97; Hoye v. 
 ijtate, 39 Ga. 718; Peterson v. State, 50 
 Ga. 142; State v. Leonard, 6 La. Ann. 
 420; State v. Mullen, 14 La. Ann. 577; 
 Newcomb v. State, 37 Miss. 383; State 
 V. Jackson, 17 Mo. 544, 59 Am. Dec. 281 ; 
 Evans v. State, 44 Miss. 762; Har- 
 ris V. State, 47 Miss. 318; State v. Hays, 
 23 Mo. 287; State v. Hall, 9 Nev. 58; 
 Myers v. State, 33 Tex. 525. 
 
 And newly discovered evidence in a 
 prosecution for homicide that the de- 
 ceased had, a few days before the killing, 
 said he intended to kill the accused, and 
 had borrowed a pistol, expressing such 
 intent, is not a ground for a new trial 
 "where it does not appear that at the 
 time of the killing the accused had been 
 informed of such threats. Peterson v. 
 State, 50 Ga. 142. 
 
 2Keener v. State, 18 Ga. 194, 63 Am. 
 Deo. 269. 
 
 In People v. Arnold, 15 Cal. 476, how- 
 ever, it was held that threats by the de- 
 ceased must be shown to have been com- 
 municated to the accused before they are 
 admissible as evidence for him for any 
 purpose in -a, prosecution against him 
 for homicide. 
 
 sStokea v. People, 53 N. Y. 164, 13 Am. 
 Rep. 492. 
 
 4Roberts v. State, 68 Ala. 156; Peo- 
 ple V. Arnold, supra; Hart v. Com. 85 
 Ky. 77, 7 Am. St. Rep. 576, 2 S. W. 673; 
 
 Sparks v. Com. 89 Ky. 644, 20 S. W. 167 ; 
 Miller v. Com. 89 Ky. 653, 10 S. W. 
 137; Sinclair v. State (Miss.) 2 L.R.A. 
 (>J.S.) 653,-39 So. 522; State v. Alex- 
 ander, 66 Mo. 148; State v. Lee, 66 Mo. 
 165; Levy v. State, 28 Tex. App. 203, 
 19 Am. St. Rep. 826, 12 S. W. 596. 
 And see State v. Collins. 32 Iowa, 36; 
 State V. Thcwley, 4 Harr. (Del.) 562; 
 Monroe v. State, 5 Ga. 85; Howell v. 
 State, 5 Ga. 48; Campbell v. People, 16 
 111. 17, 61 Am. Dee. 49; Sohnier v. Peo- 
 ple, 23 111. 17; Williams v. People, 54 
 111. 422; DeForest v. State^ 21 Ird. 
 23; Eapp v. Com. 14 B. Mon. 615; Cora. 
 V. Wilson, 1 Gray, 337; State v. Sloan, 
 47 Mo. 604 ; State v. Keene, 50 Mo. 359 ; 
 People V. Shorter, 4 Barb. 460, 2 N. Y. 
 197, 51 Am. Deo. 286 ; Patterson v. Peo- 
 ple, 46 Barb. 625; People v. Rector, 19 
 Wend. 569. 
 
 estate v. McNally, 87 Mo. 644; Rob- 
 erts v. State, 68 Ala. 156; Burns v. 
 State, 49 Ala. 370; Brown v. State, 55 
 Ark. 593, 18 S. W. 1051; People v. 
 Alivtre, 55 Cal. 263; People v. Farley, 
 124 Cal. 594, 57 Pac. 571; People v. 
 Scoggins, 37 Cal. 676; People v. Timkin, 
 62 Ual. 468; People v. Arnold, 15 Cal. 
 476; People v. Travis, 66 Cal. 251; 
 Davidson v. People, 4 Colo. 145; Wilson 
 v. State, 30 Fla. 234, 17 L.R.A. 654, 11 
 So. 556 ; Mavfield v. State, 1 10 Ind. 591, 
 11 N. E. 618; Hart v. Com. 85 Ky. 77, 
 7 Am. St. Rep. 676, 2 S. W. 673; John- 
 son V. State, 66 Miss. 189, 5 So. 95; 
 Prine v. State, 73 Miss. 838, 19 So. 711; 
 Bell V. State, 66 Miss. 192, 5 So. 389; 
 Johnson v. State, 54 Miss. 430; State 
 y. Spencer, 160 Mo. 118, 83 Am. St. Rep. 
 
408 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 K 247 
 
 dence to show the quo animo of the demonstration or attack,® and 
 the disposition of the deceased toward the accused,'' and to corroborate 
 evidence of communicated threats. * So, such threats have been held 
 to be admissible upon the ground that the evidence tended to show 
 that an attempt to execute them would be probable when an opportu- 
 nity occurred. ® And they have also been admitted where the charac- 
 
 461, 60 S. W. 1048; State v. Bailey, 94 
 Mo. 311, 7 S. W. 425; People v. Wal- 
 worth, 4 N. Y. Crim. Eep. 355 ; People v. 
 Rodawald, 177 N. Y. 408, 70 N. E. 1; 
 State V. Turpin, 77 N. C. 473, 24 Am. 
 Rep. 455; State v. Tarter, 26 Or. 38, 37 
 Pac. 53; Little v. State, Baxt. 491; 
 Reeves v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 483, 
 Z\. S. W. 382; Wiggins v. Utah, 93 U. S. 
 465, 23 L. ed. 941. And see State v. Bodie, 
 33 S. C. 117, 11 S. E. 624; Keener v. 
 State, 18 Ga. 194, 63 Am. Dec. 269, Lim- 
 ited to eases of self-defense by Lingo v. 
 State. 29 Ga. 470 ; Hoye v. State, 39 Ga. 
 718; Pritehett v. State, 22 Ala. 39, 58 
 Am. Dee. 250; Pitman v. State^ 22 Ark. 
 354; Lyon v. Hancock, 35 Cal. 372; Peo- 
 ple V. Seoggins, 37 Cal. 677 ; Campbell v. 
 People, 16 HI. 17, 01 Am. Dec. 49; Hol- 
 ler V. State, 37 Ind. 57, 10 Am. Rep. 74; 
 Cornelius v. Com. 15 B. Mon. 539; State 
 V. Goodrich, 19 Vt. 116, 47 Am. Dec. 
 676 ; Little v. State, Horr. & T. Cas. 487. 
 
 It is doubtful who is the aggressor 
 within the meanii-g of the rules of law 
 with reference to the admissibility of 
 threats in a prosecution for homicide, 
 where there is a conflict of evidence up- 
 on the point. Johnson v. State, 66 Miss. 
 189, 5 So. 95. 
 
 sRoberts v. State, 68 Ala. 156; Green 
 V. State, 69 Ala. 6; Babcock v. People, 
 13 Colo. 515, 22 Pac. 817; Davidson v. 
 People, 4 Colo. 145; State v. Powell 
 (Del.) 61 Atl. 966; Keener v. State, 
 supia; McCoy v. People, 175 111. 224, 51 
 N. E. 777; Holler v. State; Cornelius 
 V. Com.; and Johnson v. State, — supra; 
 Bell v. State, 66 Miss. 195, 5 So. 389; 
 Stokes V. People, 53 N. Y. 164, 13 Am. 
 Rep. 492; State v. Turpin, 77 N. 0. 473, 
 24 Am. Rep. 455; State v. Dodson, 4 Or. 
 64; Little v. State, 6 Baxt. 493; Potter 
 V. State, 85 Tenn. 88, 1 S. W. 614; 
 State V. Evans, 33 W. Va. 417, 10 S. E. 
 792; State v. Abbott, 8 W. Va. 743; 
 White V. Territory, 3 Wash. Terr. 397, 
 19 Pac. 37. 
 
 'State V. Sullivan, 51 Iowa, 142, 50 N. 
 W. 572 ; Dupree v. State, 33 Ala. 380, 73 
 Am. Dec. 422; Davidson v. People, 
 supra; Keener v. State, 18 Ga. 194, 63 
 
 Am. Dec. 269; Sinclair v. State (Miss.) 
 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 553, 39 So. 522; People 
 v. Rodawald, 177 N. Y. 408, 70 N. E. 1 ; 
 State V. Gushing, 14 Wash. 527, 53 Am. 
 St. Rep. 833, 45 Pac. 145; State v. Ab- 
 bott, 8 W. Va. 741 ; Wiggins v. Utah, 93 
 U. S. 467, 23 L. ed. 942. And see Wheel- 
 er V. Com. 27 Ky. L. Rep. 1090, 87 S. W. 
 1106. 
 
 sRoberts v. State, 68 Ala. 156; David- 
 son V. People, 4 Colo. 145; Holler v. 
 State, 37 Ind. 57, 10 Am. Rep. 74; Cor- 
 nelius V. Com. 15 B. Mon. 539; State v. 
 Williams, 40 La. Ann. 168, 3 So 629; 
 State V. Turpin, 77 N. C. 473, 24 Am. 
 Eep. 455; Levy v. State, 28 Tex. App. 
 203, 19 Am. St. Rep. 826, 12 S. W. 596. 
 
 But where a person charged with mur- 
 der claimed to have killed the deceased 
 under the apprehension of mob violence 
 occasioned by overhearing threats made 
 by a third person, the making of which 
 such third person denied, it is not an 
 abuse of the discretion of the court, 
 after the testimony on both sides is 
 closed, to refuse permissioi to the ac- 
 cused to prove in substantiation of his 
 own testimony that the third person had 
 made such threats elsewhere in the hear- 
 ing of others, unless they had been com- 
 municated to the accused before the kill- 
 ing. Evans v. State, 58 Ark. 47, 22 S. 
 W. 1026. 
 
 sStokes V. People, 53 N. Y. 164, 13 
 Am. Rep. 492; Holloway v. Com. 11 
 Bush, 344; State v. McNeely, 34 La. 
 Ann. 1022. And see Sims v. State, 9 
 Tex. App. 586; Wilson v. State, 30 Fla. 
 234, 17 L.R.A. 654, 11 So. 556. 
 
 Where a conflict occurs between two 
 persons and one is killed, and there is 
 a conflict of evidence as to which of the 
 two commenced the affray, the fact that 
 one of the parties had previously pro- 
 cured a weapon for the avowed purpose 
 of using it against the other, the weapon 
 being found at the place of the affray, 
 is a circumstance tending to show that 
 the purpose was fulfilled, aid hence is 
 proper for the consideration of the jury. 
 People V. Arnold, 15 Cal. 476. 
 
§ 247] SELF-DEFENSE. 409 
 
 ter of tihe threatener for violence, and his enmity toward the person, 
 threatened, were notorious and well known. ' ** 
 
 The rule has been asserted, however, that where the threats had 
 not been communicated to the slayer they are admissible in a prose- 
 cution for homicide only where the evidence leaves a doubt as to 
 whether the slayer or the deceased was the aggressor at the time of the 
 homicide ; ^ ^ or where they constitute a part of the res gtstce. ^ ^ And 
 refusal to grant a continuance for absence of a witness to prove 
 uncommunicated threats by deceased against accused is not error 
 where the uncontradicted evidence shows that the deceased was the 
 aggressor. ^^ Nor does the existence of absent testimony as to un- 
 communicated threats warrant a continuance in a prosecution for 
 homicide, where such threats would not appreciably tend to inten- 
 sify an act which the accused claimed was a deadly assault upon 
 him.-'* And an instruction in a prosecution for homicide which 
 is erroneous in requiring that threats of the deceased against ac- 
 cused, to be of effect, must have been seriously made is harmless 
 where the evidence does not show that any threats were communicated 
 to the accused. ^ ® 
 
 248. Proof of comnmnication. — Where the admissibility of evidence 
 of a threat by the deceased against the accused in a prosecution for 
 homicide depends upon knowledge by the accused of the threat, com- 
 munication should be first proved.^ And while testimony of the 
 
 loWTieeler v. Com. 27 Ky. L. Eep. 15 Neb. 484, 19 N. W. 607; State v. 
 
 1090. 87 S. W. 1106. " Stewart, 9 Nev. 120; Stnte v. Ferguson, 
 
 liRoberts v. State, 68 Ala. 156; Car- 9 Nev. 106; State v. Hall, 9 Nev. 58; 
 
 roll V. State, 23 Ala. 28, 58 Am. Dee. Stokes v. People, 53 N. Y. 164, 13 Am. 
 
 282; Clevelnnd v. State, 86 Ala. 1, 5 Rep. 492; State v. Turpin, 77 N. C. 473, 
 
 So. 426; Eogers v. State, 62 Ala. 170; 24 Am. Rep. 455; State v. Hensley, 94 
 
 Harris v. State, 34 Ark. 469; Palmore N. C. 1021; Little v. State, 6 Baxt. 491; 
 
 v. State, 29 Ark. 248; People v. Travis, West v. State, 18 Tex. App. 640; Allen 
 
 56 Cal. 251; People v. Seosgins, 37 Cal. v. State, 17 Tex. App. 637; Wiggins v. 
 
 676: People v. lams, 57 Cal. 115; Lingo Utah, 93 U. S. 465, 23 L. ed. 941. And 
 
 V Sta.te, 29 Ga. 470; Peterson v. State, see Powell v. State, 19 Ala. 577; Edgar 
 
 50 Ga 142; Keener v. State, 18 Ga. 194, v. State, 43 Ala. 48; Burns v. State, 49 
 
 63 Am Dee 269; Carr v. State, 14 Ga. Ala. 370; Tetterton v. Com. 28 Ky. L. 
 
 358- State v. Lyons, 7 Idaho, 530, 64 Rep. 146, 89 S. W. 8; State v. McCoy, 
 
 Pac. 236; Ellis v. State, 152 Ind. 326. 52 29 La. An". 693; State v. Gregor, 21 
 
 N E. 82; State v. Maloy, 44 Iowa, 104; La. Ann. 473. 
 
 State V. Elliott, 45 Iowa, 488; State v. i2Carroll v. State, 23 Ala. 28, 58 Am. 
 
 Brown, 22 Kan. 222; State v. Jackson, Dec. 282. 
 
 37 La. Ann. 896; State v. Janvier, 37 La. isTurner v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 Ann 645 ; State v. Libuzai, 37 La. Ann. 46 S. W. 830. 
 
 489- State V Chevallier, 36 La. Ann. 81 ; KHighsmith v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 
 
 State v Brown. Ill La. 696, 35 So. 818; Rep. 32, 50 S. W. 723, 51 S. W. 919. 
 
 Turpin v State. 55 Md. 462; Newcomb iBBrown v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 V. State, 37 Miss. 383; Kendrick v. 50 S W. 354 
 
 State. 55 Miss. 438: State v. Hays, 23 iState v Scott, 41_ Minn. 365, 43 N. 
 
 Mo 287- State v. Jackson, 17 Mo. 544, W. 62; State v. Hams, 45 La. Ann 842, 
 
 59 Am. Dec. 281; State v. Smith, 164 40 Am. St. Rep. 259, 13 So. 199; State 
 Mo. 567, 65 S. W. 270; Binfield v. State, 
 
■*10 HOMICIDE. [5 248 
 
 slayer that he had been told by a person, since dead, that a threat was 
 made against him by the deceased is not competent to establish the 
 fact of the threat, it is competent to prove the fact that a threat was 
 communicated. ^ Evidence that the accused was told that the deceased 
 would kill him, however, is not competent as proof of the communi- 
 cation of a threat, it being nothing but the opinion of the witness.* 
 And a statement made by a person to the slayer of his opinion that 
 the person afterwards killed would kill the latter does not constitute 
 the communication of a threat to kill the latter, which can be given 
 in evidence in a prosecution for the homicide on the question of self- 
 defense.* Nor does evidence that a person had been told that an- 
 other "had it in for him, and would kill him if he did not mind," 
 authorize the state to show on cross-examination on an issue of self- 
 defense, the details of the conversation in which such threat was 
 communicated to the witness, where the accused had no knowledge 
 of it and was not present; and a cross-examination as to the actual 
 words used is not competent for impeachment purposes.' And 
 refusal to permit the witness to state that, in communicating the 
 threats, she also told the accused that the deceased was a bad and 
 dangerous man is not error. ^ So, threats made by the deceased against 
 the life of the accused, and referred to in the latter's brief on appeal 
 as uncommunicated, will be treated as such, though in an affidavit 
 for continuance the accused stated that prior to the homicide an 
 absent witness had communicated the threats to him.'' 
 
 249. Necessity of hostile demonstration. — The question of the ne- 
 cessity of hostile demonstrations by the deceased toward the accused 
 to render prior threats by the deceased a proper subject of considera- 
 tion in a prosecution for homicide on an issue of self-defense would 
 seem to turn upon the same point as the question whether knowledge 
 by, or communication to, the accused of the threat is necessary. We 
 have seen that threats do not justify taking the life of the threatener 
 unless there was, at least apparently, such a demonstration of an im- 
 
 V. Labuzan, 37 La. Ann. 489; State v. b Simpson v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 Stewart, 47 La. Ann. 410, 16 So. 945. 87 S. W. 826. 
 
 zState V. Harris, 76 Mo. 301. sHarrell v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Kep. 
 
 3Poole V. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 204, 45 S. W. 581. 
 
 348, 76 S. W. 565 ; Hellard v. Com. 27 Nor is it error to exclude evidence of 
 
 Ky. L. Rep. 115, 84 S. W. 329. the repetition to the accused of a threat 
 
 4Hudgins v. State, 2 Ga. 181. -n-hieh was made in his presence, where 
 
 So, that i. third person had stnted that there is no suggestion that he did not 
 
 deceased had threatened to kill the ac- hear the threat when made, or that he 
 
 cused is hearsay and inadmissible in had forgotten it. Thomas v. People, 67 
 
 evidence on an issue of self-defense. N. V. 218. 
 
 Cole V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 88 S. 'Turner v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 W. 341. 46 S. W. 830. 
 
f 249] SELF-DEFENSE. 411 
 
 mediate intention to execute them as would naturally induce a rea- 
 sonable belief that the person threatened wouM lose his life or suffer 
 great bodily harm if he did not immediately act in self-defense/ 
 and that threats are not admissible in evidence, to justify or excuse a 
 killing, unless accompaniod or followed by such demonstrations.* 
 And the court in an instruction in a prosecution for homicide which 
 has properly excluded evidence of +.Vireats by the deceased may prop- 
 erly decline to take such evidence into consideration as a basis for ex- 
 plaining to the jury what constitutes an attack or hostile demonstra- 
 tion.^ But threats previously made by the deceased are not rendered 
 inadmissible on an issue of self-defense or of mitigation, by the act of 
 the prosecution of introducing in evidence dying declarations of the 
 deceased to the effect that he had done no act of aggression.* And 
 where threats are offered in evidence in such a prosecution merely for 
 the purpose of proving a substantive fact, such as the state of feeling 
 of tlie deceased toward the accused, acts of aggression, like communi- 
 cation, could have no effect on their probative force ; such acts go only 
 to the state of mind of the accused. The rule that throats should 
 not be regarded as affording a justification for homicide, unless it 
 can be shown that the person killed, by some act then done, mani- 
 fested an intention to execute the threats, does not control *he ad- 
 missibility of the previous threats in evidence in homicide cases, 
 but only controls the effect of such evidence when the threats are re- 
 lied on to justify the homicide. Previous threats, therefore, are per 
 se admissible as independent evidence in homicide cases, and may 
 bfc proved without a predicate.' 
 
 250. Proof of overt act. — In a proper case there must be proof 
 of hostile demonstrations by the deceased against the accused before 
 evidence of threats of the deceased against the accused can be ad- 
 mitted in a prosecution for the killing.^ And when there is no pre- 
 tense of any hostile demonstration or overt act of violence by the 
 deceased against the accused, it is the duty of the court to exclude 
 evidence of previous threats of violence made by the deceased against 
 his slayer.^ Within these rules a statement of the accused as to 
 an overt act upon the part of the deceased is not such proof of the act 
 as to constitute, of itself, a predicate for the admission of evidence 
 of previous threats by the deceased against the accused. * And overt 
 
 ISee supra, § 242. b Howard v. State, 23 Tex. App. 265, 
 
 «See supra. § 243. 5 S. W. -231. 
 
 aState v. Frierson, 51 La. Ann. 706, iState v. Harrison, 111 La. 304, 35 So. 
 
 25 So. 396. 5G0. 
 
 4Burrou<rli3 v. United States (Ind. 2Holly v. State, 55 Miss. 4'?4. 
 
 Terr.) 00 S. W. 8. sBond v. State, 21 Fla. 738. 
 
■il2 HOMICIDE. R 250 
 
 acts by the deceased directed against, not the accused, but a third 
 person, do not warrant the admission ni evidence in a prosecution 
 for homicide of threats made by the deceased against the accused or 
 previous difficulties between them.* But in excluding evidence of 
 previous threats of violence because of the absence of any hostile dem- 
 onstration the court should proceed with caution in deciding that 
 nothing was done by the deceased which could reasonably have been 
 construed into an overt act.^ And the mere fact that the testimony 
 in a prosecution for homicide in regard to an overt act of violence by 
 the deceased is conflicting is not a ground for excluding evidence of 
 threats made by him.® 
 
 251. Sufficiency of overt act — What is or what is not a sufficient 
 overt demonstration accompanying or following threats to justify 
 homicide in self-defense varies with the circumstances of the case.^ 
 "Overt acts" in this connection are any acts which manifest to the 
 mind of a reasonable person a present intention to kill the person 
 against whom they are directed, or to do him great bodily harm.^ 
 They should not be limited to attempts to show and use a deadly 
 Aveapon with intent to kill or seriously injure.* To be sufficient 
 to justify killing the threatener in self-defense, they mnst be such as 
 are reasonably calculated to induce the belief that the execution of 
 the threatened act or attack has been actually commenced.'* Mere 
 acts of preparation to execute the threat at some other time, imme- 
 diate or remote, are not sufficient.^ They must show an immediate 
 intention to act. * And the overt act must have been directed against 
 the slayer, or the person against whom the threats were made, and 
 not against some other person. "^ Previous threats and attacks, though 
 
 4Moriarty v. State, 62 Miss. 654. v. State, .33 Tex. 492 ; Irwin v. State, 43 
 
 sHolly V. State, 55 Miss. 424. Tex. 2,36; United States v. Outprbridge, 
 
 6 Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 29 Am. 5 Siwy. 6?0, Fed. Cas. No. 15,978. 
 
 St. Rep. 232, 9 So. 835. Where there is evidence in a prosecu- 
 
 lAllison V. United States, 160 U. S. tion for homicide that the deceased, 
 
 203, 40 L. ed. 395, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 252; previous to the killing, had mide threats 
 
 Williams v. United States, 4 Ind. Terr against the slayer, and immediately be- 
 
 269. 69 S. W. 871. fore the killing made some demonstra- 
 
 2State v. Harrington, 12 Nev. 125; tion with his hand, declaring that hft 
 
 Holly V. State, 55 Miss. 4?4; Swain v. would kill the slayer, the latter may tes- 
 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 86 S. W. 335. tify as to what he believed the de- 
 
 sSwain v. State, supra. ceased was then about to do. Wallace v. 
 
 4Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 114, 29 Am. United States, 162 U. S. 466, 40 L. ed. 
 St. Rep. 232, 9 So. 835; Com. v. Rudert, 1039, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 859. 
 109 Ky. 053, 60 S. W. 489; Parse is v. eirwin v. State, supra. 
 Com. 78 Ky. 102; Bailey v. Com. 15 Ky. oLynch v. State, 24 Tex. App. 330, 5 
 L. Rep. 826, 25 S. W. 883; State v. Cos- Am. St. Rep. 888, 6 S. W. 190; Herring- 
 grove, 42 La. Ann. 75.3, 7 So. 714; State ton v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 63 S. W. 
 V. Guillory, 44 La. Ann. 317, 10 So. 761 ; 582. 
 Johnson v. State, 27 Tex. 758 ; Dawson 'Moriarty v. State, 62 Miss. 654. 
 
§ 251] SELF-DEFENSE. 413 
 
 with a deadly weapon and however violent, will not justify seeking 
 and killing the assailant.* And throwing rocks against the house 
 of a threatened person, and beating the door with a stick, announcing 
 the intention to break in and kill, is not sufficient.® Nor is it 
 sufficient to admit evidence of threats in a prosecution for homicide, 
 that the deceased, after slapping the accused, turned partly around 
 and threw his right hand somewhat behind him, when he was visibly 
 unarmed. ^ ** And the act of a person in going to the house of accused 
 after dark, and sending for the latter to come to his gate, following 
 threats and conduct indicating a purpose to take his life, is not alone 
 a sufficient demonstration to sustain a plea of self-defense.^^ 
 
 But while the slayer who has been threatened must have been either 
 actually assaulted or menaced in such a manner as to induce him as a 
 reasonable person to believe that he was in danger of death or great 
 bodily harm,^* slight movements may justify instant action because 
 of r'^asonable apprehension of danger, when considered with preced- 
 ing facts and circumstances.^^ The purpose to carry threats into 
 execution may be manifested by conduct falling short of personal vio- 
 lence, or an actual assault. ^* A movement to draw a deadly weapon 
 is sufficient when known ill-will and previous threats to kill appear. ^ ^ 
 And so is an attempt forcibly to get a firearm from a third person, 
 with an apparent intent to use it on the person threatened. ^ ® And 
 
 'Turner v. Com. 89 Ky. 78, 1 S. W. Previous threats of violence made by 
 
 475; Jackson v. State, 6 Baxt. 452. the deceased against the accused are ad- 
 
 The right to kill in self-defense is not missible in evidence in a prosecution for 
 
 shown by evidence of bad feeling be- homicide to enable the jury to ascer- 
 
 tween the parties and mutual threats tain whether the accused was prompted 
 
 made against each other, vi^here at the by malice, or believed that he was in 
 
 time of the killing the deceased was danger of great bodily harm, where it 
 
 standing on the opposite side of a room appeared that at the moment he killed 
 
 10 by 18 feet in size with twenty-five the deceased the latter had him against 
 
 or thirty people therein, with his hands a wall and was pushing a table against 
 
 in his pockets and his gun on the floor him. State v. Shadwell, 22 Mont. 559, 
 
 leaning against his side, and he was 57 Pac. 281. 
 
 making no movement, gesture, or threat KState v. Eaton, 75 Mo. 586; Cum- 
 
 agai st the accused. Simmons v. State, ming v. State, 99 Ga. 662, 27 S. E. 177; 
 
 79 Ga. 690, 4 S. E. 894. Williams v. United States, supra; Cur- 
 
 9Abernathy v. State, 129 Ala. 85, 29 tis v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 59 S. W. 
 
 So. 844. 263 ; Bohannon v. Cora. 8 Bush, 481, 8 
 
 lOHinson v. State, 66 Miss. 532, 6 Am. Ren. 474. And see Kinman v. 
 
 So. 463. State. 73 Ark. 126. 83 S. W. 344. 
 
 iiKennedy v. State, 140 Ala. 1, 37 isTillery v. State, 24 Tex. App. 251, 
 
 So. 90. 5 Am. St. Eep. 882, 5 S. W. 842; Lu-dy 
 
 laState v. Harrington, 12 Nev. 125; v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 87 S. W. 
 
 State V. Hall, 9 Nev. 58; People v. Scog- 352; Fielding v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 gins, 37 Cal. 683. 87 S. W. 1044. And see Coleman v. 
 
 isAIlison V. United States, 160 U. S. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 88 S. W. 238. 
 
 203, 40 L. ed. 395, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 252; leNewsome v. State (Tex. . Crim. 
 
 Williams v. United States, 4 Ind. Terr. App.) 75 S. W. 296. 
 269, 69 S. W. 871; Holly v. State, 55 
 Miss. 424. 
 
414 HOMICIDK K 251 
 
 SO is drawing a weapon used for cutting or striking, and rushing upon 
 the slayer/' It need not appear that the deceased had made 
 an attack upon the accused of such a character as would justify him 
 in using deadly weapons in repelling the same.^® Nor is it neces- 
 sary, when a person who has made threats appears with a deadly 
 weapon in hand, that the person threatened should wait until an 
 actual assault is made on him to justify killing his antagonist.** 
 Nor need the overt act be such that, standing alone, it indicated an 
 intent to kill or do great bodily harm ; it is sufficient if it indicated 
 such intent when considered with the threats.*" And when one's 
 life has been repeatedly threatened by a desperate and lawless man, 
 and an actual attempt has been made to assassinate, and members of 
 his family have been informed by the assailant that he is to be 
 killed on sight, he may lawfully arm himself to resist the threatened 
 attack. And he may leave his home for the transaction of his legit- 
 imate business, or for any lawful and proper purpose; and if, on 
 such an occasion, he casually meets his enemy, having reason to be- 
 lieve him armed and ready to execute his murderous intention, he 
 has the right to assume that the presence of his adversary puts his 
 life in imminent peril, and that he can secure his personal safety 
 in no other way than to kill him;** though he may not hunt his 
 enemy and shoot him down like a wild beast; nor has he the right 
 to bring about an unnecessary meeting in order to have a pretext 
 to slay him.** And no such threats will justify the person threat- 
 ened in lying in wait and killing the person making them.** So, 
 opprobrious words, threats, menaces, or contemptuous gestures may 
 be sufficient to arouse the fears of a reasonable man that his life 
 is in danger, whether they are so being a question of fact for the 
 jury.** 
 
 3. Other exceptions. 
 
 252. Generally. — As we have seen, it is asserted to be a general 
 rule that threats by the deceased against the accused in a prosecution 
 
 Instate V. Williams, 186 Mo. 128. 84 ziBohannon v. Com. 8 Bush, 481, 8 
 
 S. W. 924: Hnymon v. State (Tex. Crim. Am. Rpp. 474. 
 App.) 83 S. W. 204. 22Boliaiiiion v. Com. supra; Lander v. 
 
 isstate V. Ellis, 30 Wash. 369, 70 Pac. State, 12 Tex. 462; Hoover v. State. 35 
 
 063. Tex. Crim. Eep. 342, 33 S. W. 337; 
 
 ^9GoodaIl V. State, 1 Or. 333. 80 Am. Wright v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 447, 
 
 Dec. 396; State v. Mullen, 14 La. Ann. 50 S. W. 940. 
 677; MeVev v. StTte (Tex. Crim. App.) ssT^nder v. State, supra. 
 81 S. W. 740. And see People v. Adams, 24jo>inson v. State. 105 Ga. CSS. 31 
 
 137 Cfll. 580, 70 Pac. 662. S. E. 399. 
 
 20Wheelis v. State. 23 Tex. App. 238, 
 6 S. W. 244; Leigh v. People, 113 111. 372. 
 
§ 252] SiELF-DBFENSE. 415 
 
 for homicide can only be considered or admitted in evidence when an 
 issue of self-defense arises. * But it would seem that the cases assert- 
 ing this rule have done so with sole reference to the matter in hand. 
 It is well settled that threats against the accused, whether communi- 
 cated or uncommunicated, are admissible in evidence in a prosecu- 
 tion for killing the person making the threats, as part of the res 
 gestce, when made rc>J3ntly before, and continued uninterruptedly 
 down to the time of, the homicidal act;^ and when made at the time 
 of procuring a deadly weapon, in explanation of the use to which it 
 was to be put.^ And evidence of previous quarrels, altercations, and 
 menaces upon the part of the deceased toward the accused may be con- 
 sidered in a prosecution for the killing, for the purpose of ascertain- 
 ing whether any cause of provocation upon the part of the accused 
 existed, and how his mind was affected thereby.* So, that such 
 evidence may be admitted and considered in circumstantial oases has 
 (been inferred; and it has been held that threats by the deceased 
 against the accused are not admissible in evidence to show self-de- 
 fense, unless such threats were communicated to the accused, except- 
 ing in cases in which the evidence of the killing is entirely circum- 
 stantial. " 
 
 4. Character of threats as affecting admissibility. 
 
 253. General rules. — Vague, indefinite threats of the deceased, not 
 mentioning the accused, nor shown to have reference to him, are 
 inadmissible in evidence in a prosecution for homicide upon the 
 question of self-defense. ' And threats made by the deceased against 
 one person are not admissible in evidence in a prosecution against 
 another person for killing him.^ Nor are threats made by a person 
 against the accused admissible in evidence in a prosecution for 
 
 iSee supra, §§ 242, 243. zPeople v. Henderson, 28 Cal. 465; 
 
 aPitmai v. State, 22 Ark. 3j4; Eosa Ashoraft v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Eep. 488, 63 
 
 v. Com. 21 Ky. L. Eep. 1344, 55 S. W. P. W. 847; State v. Bow3er, 42 La. Ann. 
 
 4; State v. Sloan, 47 Mo. 604; State v. 936, 8 So. 474; Gibson v. State (Tex. 
 
 Keene, 50 Mo. 357; Dickson v. State, 39 Ciim. Aipp.) 68 S. W. 174. 
 
 Ohio St. 73. But see Holly v. State, 55 And threats mnde against or an at- 
 
 Miss. 424. tempt of the deceased to take the life 
 
 3People V. Arnold, 15 Cal. 476. of, the accused's brother should not be 
 
 4Pettis V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) called to the attentioi of the jury in an 
 
 81 S. W. 312. instruction on an issue as to minslnugh- 
 
 eState v. Byrd, 121 N. C. 684, 28 S. ter, where such facts had gone to the 
 
 E. 303. jury to enable them to determine wheth- 
 
 iHenson v. St^te, 120 Ala. 316, 25 So. er the accused acted under a belief that 
 
 23; Talbert v. State. 8 Tex. App. 316; his life or that of his brother was in 
 
 Godwin v. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 466, danger. Smith v. Com. 16 Ky. L. Eep. 
 
 43 S. W. 336. And see Highsmith v. 112, 26 S. W. 583. 
 State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 39, 50 S. W. 
 723, 51 S. W. 919. 
 
416 HOMICIDE. R 253 
 
 killing a friend or relative of the person uttering the threats.* 
 Threats made against the accused by a person other than the deceased, 
 who was not present at the homicide, and not shown to have acteJ 
 in concert with the deceased, cannot be proved to show that the ac- 
 cused acted in self-defense.* And evidence of a threat to kill the ac- 
 cused is inadmissible where it was made by a man whom the witness 
 did not know to be the deceased, except as he was informed by a 
 bystander.^ And the rule has been laid down that mere general 
 threats to kill someone are not admissible in evidence in a prosecution 
 for killing the threatener, where there is nothing to connect them 
 with the accused.® And it is not error to reject threats against a 
 class of persons of which the slayer was one, where direct threats 
 against him, subsequently made, had been admitted. '^ So, a threat 
 to get even with a person whom the threatener supposed had done 
 him an injury, but whom he afterwards found had not, cannot be 
 proved against him on a trial for killing another person, his ill Reel- 
 ing toward whom grew out of the same injury. * 
 
 Threats previously made by the person killed are admissible in 
 a prosecution against his slayer for the killing, however, though not 
 directed against the slayer in terms, where they plainly related to 
 him. ® And the fact that threats made by the deceased against the ac- 
 cused were to some extent conditional does not render them inadmis- 
 sible in a prosecution for homicide. * " So, where there is evidence of a 
 conspiracy, and the slayer had reasonable ground to believe that one 
 
 sCom. V. Abbottj 130 Mass. 472; State purpose of reducing the grade of the 
 
 V. Doherty. 72 Vt. 381, 82 Am. St. Rep. crime. Crockett v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. 
 
 951, 48 Atl. 658. Rep. 276, 77 S. W. 4. 
 
 4State V. Porter, 32 Or. 135, 49 Pac. 6King v. State. 89 Ala. 146, 7 So. 750; 
 
 964. People v. Farley, 124 Oal. 594, 57 Pac. 
 
 But where a person shot and wounded 571; Com. v. Hoskins, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 another, and immediately afterwards 59, 35 S. W. 284; Hinson v. State, 66 
 
 shot and killed a brother of the person Miss. 532, 6 So. 463; Heffington v. State, 
 
 wounded, if the wounded brother had 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 315, 54 S. W. 755. 
 
 made threats against the slayer to his A'^d see State v. Crabtree, 111 Mo. 138. 
 
 knowledge, and the deceased was pres- 20 S. W. 7; 
 
 ent, acting with him, the latter was 'Stafford v. State (Fla.) 39 So. 106. 
 
 bound by the threats, and they are avail- sPeople v. Powell, 87 Cal. 348, 11 L. 
 
 able to the slayer as a defense in a prose- R.A. 75, 25 Pac. 481. 
 
 cution for the killing. Norris v. State, aSparks v. Com. 89 Ky. 644, 20 S. W. 
 
 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 559, 61 S. W. 493. 167 : Goodwin v. State, 38 Tex. Crim. 
 
 BHasson v. Com. 10 Ky. L. Rep. 1054, Rep. 466, 43 S. W. 336. And see State v. 
 
 11 S. W. 286. King, 9 Mont. 445, 24 Pac. 265. 
 
 And the testimony of a witness as to loState v. Hollingsworth, 156 Mo. 178, 
 
 a conversation between unknown per- 58 S. W. 1087. 
 
 sons, in which one said to the other that A threat by a member of a secret so- 
 
 the person killed was going to kill the eiety of Good Templars that a saloon 
 
 accused, which fact he communicated to keeper must stop selling liquor or lose 
 
 the latter, is not competent in a prose- his life, or that he, the threatener, would 
 
 cution for killing the deceased for the lose his, is competent evidence in a, 
 
S 253] SELJT-DEFENSE. 417 
 
 •existed between the person killed and others to kill him or do him 
 ^eat bodily injury, and the killing was done in resisting an assault 
 by an alleged conspirator, threats made by others of the conspira- 
 tors than the deceased, communicated to the accused before the as- 
 sault, are admissible in evidence on the issue of self-defense. ^ ^ And 
 prior threats by the deceased against his wife are admissible in evi- 
 -dence in a prosecution against his wife's brother for killing him, on an 
 issue as to whether, at the time of the killing, the deceased was about 
 to assault his wife, or was so acting as to warrant her brother in be- 
 lieving he was about to do so. ' ^ 
 
 But in order to be admissible as evidence in a prosecution for homi- 
 cide a threat by the deceased should indicate an intention to take the 
 life of the person threatened, or to do him great bodily harm. ^ * And 
 a statement by a man that he had taken a pistol from the employee 
 of another, and that the latter had frequently sent for it, but he did 
 not intend he should have it, does not constitute a threat against the 
 latter, or show ill-will, within the meaning of the law of self-defense 
 in homicide. ^ * Nor is a threat by the deceased to attack the habita- 
 tion of the accused a threat against his person which can be taken into 
 consideration in a prosecution for homicide, on an issue of self-de- 
 fense. ^ ® But rules of law with reference to the effect of threats by 
 the deceased against the accused in homicide apply to threatening 
 conduct as well as to threatening words, and the rule of law excluding 
 particulars of a former difficulty, when offered to show malice, as 
 actuating the commission of a crime, or as biasing a witness, does 
 not apply to exclude them. * ® 
 
 254. Effect of remoteness — .The length of time between a threat 
 and the killing of the person uttering it does not destroy the com- 
 petency of the threat as evidence, though it might weaken its effect.^ 
 Though it has been held that evidence of previous threats made by 
 
 prosecution against the saloon keeper the deceased and the accused were rivals 
 
 for killing the Good Templar, on an is- in business, and the accused had stated 
 
 sue of self-defense. Dukes v. State, 11 that when they got through with the de- 
 
 Ind. 557, 71 Am. Dec. 370. ceased the town would not hold hira. 
 
 iiState V. Clifford (W. Va.) 52 S. E. Ross v. State, 8 Wyo. 351, 57 Pae. 924. 
 981 i4State v. Thrailkill, 71 S. C. 136, 50 
 
 i2State V. Felker, 27 Mont. 451, 71 S. E. 551. 
 Pac. 668. i5State v. Waldrop (S. C.) 52 S. E. 
 
 isState V. Compagnet, 48 La. Ann. 793. 
 1470, 21 So. 46. isHarkness v. State, 129 Aia. 71, 30 
 
 But a statement of a prosecuting at- So. 73. 
 tomey in argument in a prosecution for iBabcock v. People, 13 Colo. 515, 22 
 
 homicide that the defendant had threat- Pac. 817; Keener v. State, 18 Ga. 194, 63 
 
 ened to take the life of the deceased is Am. Dec. 269; State v. Glahn, 97 Mo. 
 
 not a ground for reversal as unsupport- 679, 11 S. W. 260; State v. Ford, 3 
 
 cd by the evidence, where it appears that Strobh. L. 517. 
 Horn.— 27. 
 
418 HOMICIDE. [§ 25* 
 
 the deceased to the accused is not admissible in a prosecution for 
 homicide, if sufficient time had elapsed for the blood to cool.^ Nor 
 does the fact that threats were uttered previous to a reconciliation 
 between the parties affect their force.* But in such case it will not 
 be presumed that the parties were moved by the old grudge, unless 
 that fact appears from all the circumstances. * And the fact that the 
 person killed had threatened to kill the slayer or do him great bodily 
 harm does not raise a presumption of law that the purpose con- 
 tinued down to the time of the killing, and that the deceased was then 
 present for its accomplishment.^ And the absence of a witness by 
 whom threats and denunciations by the deceased against the accused 
 might be proved is not sufficient to warrant a continuance, where the 
 time of their utterance is not stated.® 
 
 255, Proof as to character and effect. — "Where a plea of self-defense 
 is based upon threats made by the deceased against the accused to his 
 knowledge, the latter is entitled to lay before the jury all the circum- 
 stances which would go to show the character of the threats, the in- 
 tention with which they were made, and the grounds for fear upon 
 which he acted ; and previous affrays, difficulties, attacks, and threats 
 are admissible in evidence as bearing upon the question whether his 
 grounds for fearing death or serious bodily injury were reasonable.* 
 And previous hostile demonstrations upon the part of the deceased 
 toward the slayer, as well as previous threats, and the character of 
 the deceased, and everything which might illustrate how much im- 
 portance should be attached to the threats, are properly admissible 
 in evidence.* Where previous threats made by the deceased against 
 the accused appear, evidence as to the general character of the de- 
 ceased as a person of violent and dangerous character, or as one of an 
 inoffensive disposition, and such as might not reasonably be ex- 
 pected to execute such threats, is competent.* And remarks of the 
 
 zState V. Jacksoiij 17 Mo. 544, 59 Am. ened for killing the threatener. Dukes 
 
 Dec. 281. V. State, 11 Ind. 557, 71 Am. Dec. 370. 
 
 sPeople V. Hyndman, 99 Cal. 1, 33 2 Jackson v. State, 6 Baxt. 452; Pal- 
 
 Pac. 782. more v. State, 29 Aik. 248. 
 
 <Ibid. But refusal to hear evidence in a prose- 
 
 5State V. Brown, 64 Mo. 368. cution for homicide with respect to 
 
 SHighsmith v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. other and additional facts is not reversi- 
 
 Eep. 32, 50 S. W. 723, 51 S. W. 919. ble error, though a practice not to be 
 
 iBall V. State, 29 Tex. App. 107, 14 commended, where threats of violence 
 
 S. W. 1012; Williams v. State, 4 Ind. by the deceased against the accused at 
 
 Terr. 269, 69 S. W. 871; Russell v. State, different times and places had already 
 
 11 Tex. App. 288. been abundantly proved by numerous 
 
 The fact that a threat was made at a witnesses. State v. Smith, 164 Mo. 567, 
 
 meeting of a secret society rather in- 65 S. W. 270. 
 
 creases than weakers its force in a sSims v. State, 9 Tex. App. 687. 
 prosecution against the person threat- 
 
S 265] SELF-DEFENSE. 419 
 
 deceased accompanying the threats should also be received, with a 
 view to determining their purport.* The whole conversation in 
 which tl e threats were made should be given;® though declarations of 
 the accused, made after threats against him by deceased had been com- 
 municated to him, showing apprehension on his part, are not admis- 
 sible in evidence in a prosecution against him for killing the deceased, 
 since they constitute no part of the threats.® So, that the deceased 
 was drunk and angry at the time may be shown in explanation of 
 threats made by him.'' And while the threats of the deceased are 
 competent in evidence in a prosecution for homicide, and of special 
 importance where the accused claims that the homicide was excusa- 
 ble or justifiable, they should be considered with grea,t caution, since 
 idle threats or other words spoken under excitement are liable to be 
 misunderstood.^ And where threats are shown it is competent to 
 show that they made no impression upon the mind of the person 
 threatened, and for the purpose of showing this a statement by him 
 tha,t they did not amount to any more than those of an old woman 
 is competent evidence.® So, where it is plain that the deceased had 
 made threats against the accused, the latter may be asked on cross- 
 examination if he had not heard that deceased was going to leave the 
 neighborhood, as tending to show that he did not intend to execute 
 his threats. ' " And declarations by the deceased of a peaceful intent, 
 communicated to the accused, are admissible in rebuttal of evidence 
 of previous threats by the deceased against the accused. * ^ And the 
 state may ask witnesses in rebuttal whether the accused was a resident 
 of the place where the deceased lived when the killing occurred, for 
 the purpose of showing that there was no motive on the part of the 
 deceased to make threats against the accused. ^ ^ So, where previous 
 threats are shown, evidence that thereafter and precedent to the 
 homicide the defendant and the deceased were shooting together at a 
 
 4People V. Curtis, 52 Mich. 616, 18 N. sPeople v. Gaimari, 176 N. Y. 84, 68 
 
 W. 385. N. E. 112. 
 
 A witness testifying to threats made But the fact that threats made 
 
 by the deceased against the accused in a against a person were not serious does 
 
 prosecution for homicide should be per- not affect the latter's right of self-de- 
 
 mitted to testify to as much of the con- fense as against the threatener, if he 
 
 versation ii which they were made as believed them to be serious. Swain v. 
 
 may tend to show the true meaning and State (Tex. Crim. App.) 86 S. W. 335. 
 
 consequence of such threats. People v. sMiller v. State, 27 Tex. App. 63, 10 
 
 Phelan, 123 Cal. 551, 56 Pac. 424. S. W. 445. 
 
 GAdams v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) lojimmerson v. State, 133 Ala. 18, 32 
 
 84 S. W. 231. So. 141. 
 
 eHarrell v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. iiTaylor v. State, 121 Ga. 348, 49 S. 
 
 204, 45 S. W. 581. E. 303. 
 
 TPoole V. State, 45 Tex, Crim. Kep. laMaxwell v. State, 129 Ala. 48, 29 
 
 348, 76 S. W. 565. So, 981. 
 
420 HOMICIDE. B 255 
 
 mark is admissible as tending to show that there was no purpose upon 
 the part of the deceased to execute his previous threats, and that they 
 had become reconciled. ^ * But refusal to permit a witness to testify 
 as to what he thought was meant by threatening language used by the 
 deceased is not erroneous or improper. ^ * And that a person after- 
 wards killed had a weapon in his hands when he made threats against 
 the person who killed him is immaterial in a prosecution for the kill- 
 ing, where the slayer was not present at the time of the threats.^® 
 
 5. Relative functions of court and jury as to threats. 
 
 256. General rules — ^The question of the admissibility of evidence 
 of threats as tending to justify killing the threatener is one of law 
 for the court. ^ And it is for the court to determine whether there 
 was any evidence of a hostile act or movement upon the part of the 
 person killed warranting the admission of evidence of threats.^ 
 And such threats sliould be allowed to go to the jury, if there is any 
 evidence tending to prove a hostile demonstration which might be 
 reasonably regarded as placing the slayer in apparent imminent di.n- 
 ger of losing his life or sustaining great bodily harm,^ or if any 
 doubt exists as to whether the alleged demonstration, considered in 
 connection with the threats, would be sufficient to cause a man of 
 ordinary prudence to reasonably believe himself to be in such dan- 
 ger,* the function of the court being merely to decide whether, view- 
 ing the entire evidence in the case at the time the offer to prove the 
 threats is made, there is any doubt as to who began the encounter. ** 
 
 iSNaugher v. State, 105 Ala. 26, 17 46 La. Ann. 1419, 16 So. 363; State v. 
 
 So. 24. Green, 46 La. Ann. 1522, 16 So. 367; 
 
 i4People V. Lynch, 101 Cal. 229, 35 Pridgen v. State, 31 Tex. 421. 
 Pac. 860. sUarner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 29 Am. 
 
 And that the accused was afraid to St. Rep. 232, 9 So. 835. 
 work in a field alone or to go out about 4 ibid. 
 
 his premises after dark on account of Though some testimony may have been 
 
 threats made against him by the de- given in a prosecution tending to show 
 
 ceased is merely opinion evidence based a hostile demonstratioi, yet if it is im- 
 
 on conduct or declarations of the ac- probable and inconsistent with proved 
 
 cused himself, and is inadmissible in a facts and circumstances, and considered 
 
 prosecution for homicide on the plea of by the court as unworthy of credence, it 
 
 self-defense. Poe v. State, 87 Ala. 65, 6 is not bound to accept it as establishing 
 
 So. 378. the necessary foundation for the intro- 
 
 isState v. Parker, 172 Mo. 191, 72 S. duction of evidence of threats by the de- 
 
 W. 650. ceased; it is for the court to determine 
 
 iGarner v. State, 28 Fla. 114, 29 Am. whether such foundation has been laid, 
 
 St. Rep. 232, 9 So. 835 ; Wilso i v. State, and it is vested with discretion to ig- 
 
 30 Fla. 234, 17 L.R.A. 654, 1 1 So. 556. nore such testimony. State v. Janvier, 
 
 zDavidson v. People, 4 Colo. 145; 37 La. Ann. 644. 
 State V. Harris, 45 La. Ann. 842, 40 Am. cWilson v. State, 30 Fla. 234, 17 L.R 
 
 St. Rep. 259, 13 So. 199; State v. Beck, A. 654, 11 So. 556. 
 
§ 256] SELF-DEFENSE. 421 
 
 And the rejection of threats should not he made to depend upon the 
 jury's belief of the evidence of the overt act of the accused, but upon 
 their belief of the evidence of the threats themselves. ® 
 
 When such evidence of threats has been admitted, however, its 
 weight is for the determination of the jury, considering it in con- 
 nection with the other evidence;'' and it is for the jury to determine 
 whether the slayer had reasonable, or apparently reasonable, ground 
 for believing that he was in imminent danger f>f death or great bodily 
 harm at the time the killing was done.® ALd it is proper to leave 
 the whole case to the jury, vnth a proper statement of the law ap^ 
 plicable to it. * So, what constitutes such an overt act as will justify 
 a threatened person in killing the threatener is a question for the jury 
 in a prosecution for the homicide, to be determined from a considera- 
 tion of all the circumstances of each particular case. ^ " 
 
 b. Violent and dangerous character of the deceased. * 
 
 1. General rules. 
 
 257. Not admissible generally — One cannot take the law into his 
 own hands and kill a bloodthirsty rufiSan merely because he is one.^ 
 Nor does the fact that one is such a ruffian, though taken in connec- 
 tion with threats by him to take the life of another, justify the latter 
 in an immediate resort to deadly weapons in the absence of any 
 demonstration to carry out the threats.^ And the mode of a person's 
 life and the character of her business does not affect her right to kill, 
 if necessary to defend herself or her domicil against an armed and 
 turbulent intruder. * A person charged with murder, therefore, can- 
 
 eLane v. State, 44 Fla. 105, 32 So. Ann. 709, 15 So. 82; Pritchett v. State, 
 
 896. 22 Ala. 39, 58 Am. Dec. 250; Perry v. 
 
 ^Wilson V. State, supra. State, 94 Ala. 26, 11 So. 650; Green v. 
 
 sGarner v. State, 28 J^'la. 113, 29 Am. State (Ala.) 39 So. 362; People v. Mur- 
 
 St. Rep. 232, 9 So. 835; Karr v. State, rav, 10 Cal. 310; Thomas v. State (Fla.) 
 
 100 Ala. 4, 46 Am. St. Rep. 17, 14 So. 36 So. 161; People v. Stock, 1 Idaho, 218; 
 
 851; McCoy v. People, 175 111. 224, 51 State v. Riddle, 20 Kan. 711; State v. 
 
 N. E. 777; Williams v. United States, 4 Hardv, 95 Mo. 455, 8 S. W. 416; People 
 
 Ind. Terr. 269, 69 S. W. 871. v. Walworth, 4 N. Y. Grim. Rep. 355; 
 
 9King V. Bridges, 5 Haw. 467. Com. v. Ferrigan, 44 Pa. 386; Wright v. 
 
 10 Jackson v. State, 6 Baxt. 452; Wil- State, 9 Yerg. 342; Hudson v. State, 6 
 
 liams V. United States, supra; Pridgen Tex. App. 565, 32 Am. Rep. 593 ; Har- 
 
 V. State, 31 Tex. 421 ; State v. Abbott, 8 risoa v. Com. 79 Va. 374, 52 Am. Rep. 
 
 W. Va. 741. 634. 
 
 iThe subject of character and repu- sKarr v. State, 100 Ala. 4, 46 Am. St. 
 
 tation of the deceased as affecting homi- Rep. 17, 14 So. 851 j Williams v. State, 2 
 
 cide is fully considered in a note to Tex. App. 271. 
 State V. Feeley, 3 L.R.A.(N.S.) 351. estate v. Kennade, 121 Mo. 405, 1:6 S. 
 
 2State V. Chandler. 5 La. Ann. 489, W. 347; Morgan v. Durfee, 69 Mo. 469, 
 
 52 Am. Dec. 599 ; State v. Jackson, 33 33 Am. Rep. 608. 
 La. Ann. 1087 ; State v. Williams, 46 La. 
 
422 HOMICIDE. {§ 257 
 
 not introduce evidence of the quarrelsome or dangerous character of 
 the person killed in justification of the killing.® Nor can such evi- 
 dence be considered generally in determining as to the question of 
 the guilt or innocence of the accused. ® And the rule is general that 
 the reputation of the person killed as a violent and dangerous man is 
 not admissible in a prosecution for homicide.'^ Where a person killed 
 another when he was not, and did not believe himself to be, in im- 
 minent danger of death or great bodily harm from the latter, proof 
 of violent or bloodthirsty character upon the part of the latter fur- 
 nishes no excuse or palliation for his action.^ And the bad charac- 
 ter for peace and quietness of the person killed is not admissible in 
 evidence in the absence of a plea of self-defense, or of a showing of 
 justification or excuse. * Such evidence is only admissible as part of 
 the proof of self-defense, and as tending to show a bona fide belief 
 by the accused of the necessity of killing his assailant to save him- 
 
 BState V. Robertson, 30 La. Ann. 340. Eiland v. State, 52 Ala. 322; Baker v. 
 
 estate v. Morrison, 49 W. Va. 210, 38 State, 122 Ala. 1, 26 So. 194; Smith v. 
 
 S. E. 481; State v. Brien, 10 La. Ann. State, 142 Ala. 14, 39 So. 329; Bowles v. 
 
 453; State v. Gosey, 111 La. 616, 35 So. State, 58 Ala. 335; Territory v. Harper, 
 
 786. 1 Ariz. 399, 25 Pac. 528; People v. jid- 
 
 'State V. McNeill, 92 N. C. 812; State wards, 41 Cal. 640; McKeone v. People, 
 
 V. Turpin, 77 N. C. 473, 24 Am. Rep. 6 Colo. 346; Quesenberry v. State, 
 
 455; State v. Hogue, 51 N. C. (6 Jones, supra; State v. Thawley, 4 Harr. (Del.) 
 
 L.) 381; State v. Gooeh, 94 N. C. 987; 562; State v. Faino, 1 Marv. (Del.) 493, 
 
 Com. V. Hoskins, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 59, 35 41 Atl. 134; Travers v. United States, 6 
 
 S. W. 284; Chase v. State, 46 Miss. 634; App. D. C. 450; Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 
 
 Abernethy V. Com. 101 Pa. 322; Harman 113, 29 Am. St. Rep. 232, 9 So. 835; 
 
 V. State, 3 Head, 243 ; Moore v. State, 15 Hanye v. Sta+e, 99 Ga. 212, 25 S. E. 307 ; 
 
 Tex. App. 1. People v. Stock, 1 Idaho, 218; Wise v. 
 
 sState V. Morey, 25 Or. 241, 35 Pac. State, 2 Kan. 419, 85 Am. Dec. 595 ; State 
 
 65a, 36 Pac. 573; Lang v. State, 84 Ala. v. Vallery, 47 La. Ann. 182, 49 Am. St. 
 
 1, 5 Am. St. Rep. 324, 4 So. 193; Amos Rep. 363, 16 So. 745; State v. Labuzan, 
 
 V. State, 96 Ala. 120, 11 So. 424; Gold- 37 La. Ann. 489; State v. Field, 14 Me. 
 
 smith V. State, 105 Ala. 8, 16 So. 933; 244, 31 Am. Dec. 52; People v. Gtrbutt, 
 
 Quesenberry v. Sta.te, 3 Stew. & P. 17 Mich. 9, 97 Am. Dec. 162; People v. 
 
 (Ala.) 308; Monroe v. State, 5 Ga. 85; Miller, 49 Mich. 23, 12 N. W. 895; State 
 
 Doyal V. State, 70 Ga. 134; State v. v. Dumphey, 4 Minn. 438, Gil. 340 ; State 
 
 Riddle, 20 Kan. 714; State v. Harris, 59 v. Jackson, 17 Mo. 544, 59 Am. Dec. 281 ; 
 
 Mo. 550. State v. Chavis, 80 N. C. 353; State v. 
 
 And the character of the deceased, Hensley, 94 N. C. 1021 ; State v. Byrd, 
 
 whether for peace or violence, is not ad- 121 N.* C. 684, 28 S. E. 353 ; People v. 
 
 missible in evidence in a prosecution Hess, 8 App. Div. 143, 40 N. Y. Supp. 
 
 for homicide which appears to have 486; People v. Lamb, 54 Barb. 342; 
 
 taken place in a quarrel in which the Abbott v. People, 86 N. Y. 466; Com. v. 
 
 deceased advanced upon the accused with Straesser, 153 Pa. 451, 26 Atl. 17 ; Com. 
 
 an ax, and the accused retreated and v. Lenox, 3 Brewst. (Pa.) 249; Walker 
 
 picked up a piece of iron and struck the v. State, 28 Tex. App. 503, 13 S. W. 860; 
 
 deceased, and then took the ax from him Evcrs v. State, 31 Tex. Grim. Rep. 318, 18 
 
 and killed him with it. Bell v. State, 72 L.R.A. 421, 37 Am. St. Rep. 811, 20 S. 
 
 Miss. 507. 17 So. 232. W. 744 ; Williams v. State, 14 Tex. App. 
 
 9State V Turner, 29 S. C. 34, 13 Am. 102, 46 Am. Rep. 237 ; Roberts v. State, 
 
 St Rep. 706, G S. E. 891; Pritchett v. 5 Tex. App. 141; Harrison v. Com. 79 Va. 
 
 State, 22 Ala. 39, 58 Am. Deo. 250; 374, 52 Am. Rep. 634; Jackson v. Com. 
 
I 2571 SELF-DEFENSE. 423 
 
 self from death or great bodily harm. ^ " And neither the fact that 
 the deceased was of violent and turbulent character, nor knowledge 
 thereof by the accused, can be proved in a prosecution for homicide 
 •committed when the accused was armed and the deceased was un- 
 armed, and the accused knew it, and knew that he was in no dan- 
 ger. ^^ So, proof of violent or bloodthirsty character furnishes no 
 excuse or palliation for aggressive action, when the difficulty was 
 nought or brought on by the slayer. * ^ 
 
 2. Exception in self-defense cases. 
 
 258. General rules. — An overt act in the nature of an assault by a 
 violent and bloodthirsty person may justify more prompt action on 
 the part of the person against whom it is made, as a necessary means 
 of self-defense, than would be required if he were an ordinary per- 
 son ; and the character of the deceased for violence is, therefore, al- 
 ways a vital issue when self-defense is pleaded. ^ And where the de- 
 
 m Va. 845, 36 S. E. 487 ; State v. Madi- Teague v. State, 120 Ala. 309, 25 So. 209 ; 
 son, 49 W. Va. 96, 38 S. E. 492; Man- Mitchell v. State, 129 Ala. 23, 30 So. 348; 
 nirg V. State, 70 Wis. 178, 48 N. W. 209; Winter v. State, 123 Ala. 1, 26 So. 949; 
 Brucker v. State, 19 Wis. 539. Surginer v. State, 134 Ala. 120, 32 So. 
 
 In Com. V. Bright, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 277; Bond v. State, 21 Pla. 738; Gardner 
 1921, 66 S. W. 604, it was held, ap- v. State, 90 Ga. 310, 35 Am. St. Rep. 
 parently upon the ground of the absence 202, 17 S. K. 86; Cannon v. I'eople, 141 
 of any showing of self defense, that the 111. 270, 30 N. E. 1027; Carle v. People, 
 reputation of the deeeasid, who was a 200 111. ■:94, 93 Am. St. Rep. 208, 66 N. 
 colored man, of being domineering and E. 32; Osburn v. State, 164 Ind. 262, 73 
 overbearing among his own race, is in- N. E. 601 ; Morrison v. Com. 24 Ky. L. 
 competent in a prosecution against an- Rep. 2493, 67 L.R.A. 529, 74 S. W. 277; 
 other for killing him. State v. Paterno, 43 La. Ann. 514, 7 So. 
 
 ic State V. Morrison, 49 W. Va. 210, 38 442; State v. Watson, 36 La. Ann. 148; 
 S. E. 481; Green v. State (Ala.) 39 So. State v. Clayton, 113 La. 782, 37 So. 754. 
 362; King v. State, 90 Ala. 612, 8 So. But an instruction in a prosecution 
 856; Long v. State (Ark.) 91 S. W. 26; for homicide that the violent or blood- 
 Daniel V. State, 103 Ga. 202, 29 S. E. thirsty character of the deceased is im- 
 767; State v. Exum, 138 N. C. 599, 50 material where the accused was the 
 S. E. 283. aggressor in the fatal difficulty does not 
 
 So, evidence as to the character of the preclude the jury, after having found 
 deceased as a violent man, and his gre:it him guilty, from considering such evi- 
 fitrength, is inadmissible in a prosecution denee in measuring his punishment, 
 for homicide where it appears that the Winter v. State, 123 Ala. 1, 26 So. 949. 
 killing was in a quarrel engaged in by iStorey v. State, 71 Ala. 329 ; Karr v. 
 both the accused and the deceased, aid State, 100 Ala. 4, 46 Am. St. Rep. 17, 
 it does not appear that the accused had 14 So. 851; DeArman v. State, 71 Ala. 
 retreated as far as he could with safety, 351 ; Perry v. State, 94 Ala. 25, 10 So. 
 or that he was, at the time, in danger 650; Pritchett v. State, 22 Ala. 39, 58 
 of being killed or of suffering great Am. Dec. 250; Payne v. Com. 1 Met. 
 bodily harm. State v. Compagnet, 48 (Ky.) 370; Chase v. State, 46 Miss. 683; 
 La. Ann. 1470, 21 So. 46. State v. Pearce, 15 Nev. 188; State v. 
 
 iiSkaggs V. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. Morey, 25 Or. 241, 35 Pac. 655, 38 Pac. 
 563, 21 S. W. 257. 573; Hudson v. State, 6 Tex. App. 565, 
 
 i2De Arman v. State, 71 Ala. 351; -32 Am. Rep. 593. 
 Smith V. State, 88 Ala. 73, 7 So. 52; 
 
424 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 rS 25S 
 
 ceased was the aggressor in a difficulty in which he was killed, evi- 
 dence of his violent and dangerous character is competent in behalf 
 of the accused. ^ The known general character of the deceased, there- 
 fore, may be proved in a prosecution for homicide on an issue of self- 
 defense, where it will serve to explain the actions of the deceased at 
 the time of the killing.* And evidence of the known bad character 
 of the deceased for violence, treachery, and vindictiveness is admis- 
 sible in a prosecution against the person who killed him on an issue 
 of self-defense, as bearing upon the motive and character of the act 
 of the accused in killing him ; * and as tending to show that the cir- 
 cumstances were such as would have naturally caused a man of ordi- 
 nary prudence to believe that he was, at the time of the killing, in 
 imminent danger of losing his life or of suffering great bodily harm ;^ 
 and to show that the slayer was justified in believing himself in dan- 
 ger of losing his life or of sustaining serious bodily injury from the 
 deceased." So, such evidence is admissible, and should be weighed 
 by the jury on the question of the apparent imminency of danger to 
 
 zState V. Freeman, 3 Mo. App. 591. 
 
 3Moore v. State, 15 Tex. App. 1 ; Can- 
 non V. People, 141 lU. 270, 31 N. E. 1027. 
 
 iState V. Turner, 29 S. C. 34, 13 Am. 
 St. Rep. 706, 6 S. E. 891 ; State v. Smith, 
 
 12 Rich. L. 430; Eiland v. State, 52 Ala. 
 322; Roberta v. State, 68 Ala. 156; Wil- 
 liams V. State, 74 Ala. 18; Hussey v. 
 State, 87 Ala. 123, 6 So. 420; Perry v. 
 State, 94 Ala. 25. 10 So. 650; Palmore v. 
 State, 29 Ark. 248; People v. Murray, 
 10 Cal. 310: Monroe v. State, 5 Ga. 85; 
 State V. Middleham, 62 Iowa, 150, 17 N. 
 W. 446: Ilurd v. People, 25 Mich. 408; 
 Brownell v. People, 38 Mich. 732; Cot- 
 ton V. State, 31 Miss. 504; State v. Rider, 
 DO Mo. 54, 1 S. W. 825; Carleton v. 
 State, 43 Neb. 373, 61 N. W. 699 ; Basye 
 V. State, 45 Xeb. 261, 63 N. W. 811; 
 Nichols V. People, 23 Hun, 165; State v. 
 McDaniel, 68 S. C. 304, 102 Am. St. Rep. 
 681, 47 S. E. 384; State v. Turpin, 77 N. 
 C. 473, 24 Am. Rep. 455; State v. Hens- 
 lev, 94 N. C. 1021 ; Upthegrove v. State, 
 37' Ohio St. 002; Marts v. State, 26 Ohio 
 St. 162; Com. v. Weathers, 7 Kulp, 1; 
 Rippy V. State, 2 Head, 217; Harmtin v. 
 State, 3 Head, 243; Fitzhugh v. St^te, 
 
 13 Lea. 258; Childers v. State, 30 Tex. 
 App. 160, 28 Am. St. Rep. 899, 16 S. W. 
 U03; Spa'gler v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 
 Rep. 424, 55 S. W. 326; Horbach v. 
 State, 43 Tex. 242. 
 
 eGarner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 29 Am. 
 St. Rep. 232, 9 So. 835; Pritchett v. 
 
 State, 22 Ala. 39, ."iS Am. Deo. 250; 
 Franklin v. State, 29 Ala. 14 ; Dupree v. 
 State, 33 Ala. 380, 73 Am. Dec. 422; 
 Monroe v. State, 5 Ga. 85; Walker v. 
 People, 133 111. 110, 24 N. E. 424; Dukes- 
 V. State, 11 Ind. 557, 71 Am. Dee. 370; 
 Wise V. State, 2 Kan. 419, 85 Am. Dec. 
 595: Payne v. Com. 1 Met. (Ky.) 370; 
 State v.'Garie, 35 La. Ann. 970; Smith 
 V. State, 75 Miss. 542, 23 So. 260 ; State 
 V. Hicks, 27 Mo. 588; State v. Harris, 59 
 Mo. 550; State v. Keene, 50 Mo. 357; 
 State V. Hayden, 83 Mo. 198; Carleton 
 V. State, 43 Neb. 373, 61 N. W. 699; 
 Reynolds v. People, 17 Abb. Pr. 413; 
 State V. Sumner, 130 N. C. 718, 41 S. E. 
 803 ; State v. Cook, 3 Ohio Dec. Reprint, 
 142; Fitzhugh v. State, and Rippy v. 
 State, supra; Moore v. State, 15 Tex. 
 App. 1 ; Chil'der-j v. State, 30 Tex. App. 
 160, 28 Am. St. Rep. 899, 16 S. W. 903; 
 Smith V. United States, 161 U. S. 85, 40 
 L. ed. 626, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 483. 
 
 6Moore v. State, supra. 
 
 The bad character of the deceased and 
 past threats and hostile actions o i his 
 part toward the accused may be looked 
 to in connection with present d.imonstra- 
 tions in a prosecution for killing done in 
 a mutual personal combat with a deadly 
 weapon, in determining whether the 
 slayer had a just and reaso able appre- 
 hension of imminent peril to lite or 
 grievous bodily harm. Brown v. 6taie, 
 74 Ala. 478. 
 
S 258] SELF-DEFENSE. 425 
 
 the slayer and the practicability of retreat on his part.'' And it is 
 also admissible as tending to explain the character of the actions of 
 the deceased at the time of the killing. ® Where the fact that the de- 
 ceased was a dangerous and bloodthirsty man has already been estab- 
 lished, however, and is not disputed, refusal to admit additional proof 
 to that effect is not error.® And where the fact of bad character of 
 the deceased may not have been known to the slayer, evidence thereof 
 is of little weight.^" 
 
 259. Proof of self-defense necessary to warrant admission Any evi- 
 dence in a prosecution for homicide tending to show that the deceased 
 was the hostile party, or the aggressor in the difficulty resxilting in 
 death, is sufficient to warrant the admission of evidence of his char- 
 acter as a violent, dangerous, and bloodthirsty man, known to the 
 accnsed.^ And such evidence warrants the admission of evidence 
 of character for the purpose of palliating the offense, as well as ex- 
 cusing it.^ And where there is proof in a prosecution for homicide 
 that deceased had used threatening langTiage toward the accused, of 
 which the latter was informed, and had shot at him in anger, and the 
 prosecution had been allowed to show that the deceased had no pistol 
 on his person at the time of the fatal rencounter, it is competent to 
 show that deceased was a man of violent temper, and was in the habit 
 of carrying concealed weapons just prior to the shooting.* The 
 testimony of the accused alone, when sufficient in itself for that pur- 
 pose, may authorize the admission of proper evidence of the violent 
 and dangerous character of the deceased on an issue of self-defense.* 
 And after evidence has been given by the accused tending to show that 
 the homicide was committed in self-defense, he may follow it by 
 proof of the general reputation of the deceased for quarrelsomeness 
 
 7Perry v. State, 94 Ala. 25, 10 So. 650. 526; State v. Nett, 50 Wis. 524, 7 N. W. 
 
 sHorbach v. State, 43 Tex. 242; State 344. 
 V. Hensley, 94 N. C. 1021. Evidence as to the character of the de- 
 
 A charge on the relative strength ot ceased for violence should be received in 
 
 the parties and the disposition of the a prosecution for homicide in which it 
 
 deceased is authorized in a prosecution appears that he attacked the accused, 
 
 for homicide in vphich the proof brings causing him partly to fall on his hands, 
 
 home to the accused a knowledge of the and that the accused gave the wound 
 
 strength of the deceased and of his which caused death while he was on his 
 
 dangerous character. Bearden v. State, knees, or otherwise prostrate on the 
 
 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 144, 79 S. W. 37. ground. State v. Matthews, 78 N. C. 
 
 sMaxwell v. State, 129 Ala. 48, 25 So. 523. 
 981. 2 State v. Robertson, supra. 
 
 loDukes V. State, 11 Ind. 557, 71 Am. sRiley v. Com. 94 Ky. 266, 22 S. W. 
 
 Deo. 370. 222. 
 
 iState V. Robertson, 30 La. Ann. 340; 4Hart v. State, 38 Fla. 39, 20 So. 805; 
 
 State V. Shafer, 22 Mont. 17, 55 Pac. Allen v. State, 38 Fia. 44, 20 So. a07. 
 
426 HOMICIDE. IS 259 
 
 and violence." So, evidence of the bad character of the deceased 
 may be given in rebuttal in a prosecution for homicide, where the 
 killing is sought to be justified upon the ground that the deceased was 
 seeking to ruin the minor daughter of the slayer, and that he acted 
 for the purpose of protecting her. ^ 
 
 But a statement of the accused as to an overt act of the deceased 
 is not such proof of the act as to constitute, of itself, a predicate for 
 the admission of evidence and of the dangerous character of the 
 deceased. '' And evidence of previous ill-feeling between the parties, 
 and the testimony of the accused that, as he approached the deceased, 
 the latter stopped his work and looked quickly at a companion and 
 then at the accused, and that he placed his hand behind his back as 
 the accused advanced toward him, raises no question of self-defense.* 
 
 260. Necessity of hostile demonstration. — Character is a subject of 
 consideration in homicide cases only when it characterizes hostile acts 
 or demonstrations. "Where no overt act or hostile demonstration is 
 made by one person against another, the violent or bloodthirsty char- 
 acter of the former furnishes no excuse of palliation to the latter for 
 killing him.* Such evidence is not admissible unless it explains or 
 gives meaning, significance, or point to the conduct of the deceased 
 at the time of the killing.^ And it can be admitted only when it has 
 been shown that the deceased, at the time of the homicide, did some 
 act indicating his purpose then and there to kill the accused, or do 
 him serious bodily injury.* The purpose of evidence of turbulence 
 
 BPeople V. Druse, 103 N. Y. 655, 8 N. Mitchell, 41 La. Ann. 1073, 6 So. 785; 
 
 E. 733; State v. Hayden, 83 Mo. 198; State v. Taylor, 44 La. Ann. 783, 11 So. 
 
 State V. Mclver, 125 N. C. 645, 34 S. 132; State v. Kellogg, 104 La. 580, 29 
 
 a. 439. So. 285; State v. Haab, 105 La. 230, 29 
 
 eGossett v. State, 123 6a. 431, 51 S. So. 725; State v. Frierscn, 51 La. Ann. 
 
 E. 394. 708, 25 So. 396; State v. Uaum, 51 La. 
 
 TBond V. State, 21 11a. 738. Ann. 1112, 26 So. 67; State v. Carter, 45 
 
 sPettis V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 81 La. Ann. 1326, 14 So. 30; State v. 
 
 K. W. 312. Stewart, 47 La. Ann. 410, 16 So. 945; 
 
 Where the evidence in a prosecution State v. Birdwell, 36 La. Ann. 859 ; State 
 
 for homicide on an issue of self-defense v. Janvier, 37 La. Ann. 644; Morrell v. 
 
 shows that the accused was attacked State, 136 Ala. 44, 34 So. 208 ; Thomas v. 
 
 by the deceased, and in the encounter State ( Fla. ) 36 So. 161 ; Doyal v. State, 
 
 which followed the killing was done, evi- 70 Ga. 134; Moriarty v. State, 62 Miss, 
 
 dence that defendant had been warned 654; Williams v. btate, 3 Heisk. 394; 
 
 that deceased was a person of dangerous Evers v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 318, 
 
 character, of whom it was best to be- 18 L.E.A. 421, 37 Am. St. Rep. 811, 20 
 
 ware, is admissible to show that the ac- S. W. 744. 
 
 cused acted with reasonable caution and zGarner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 29 Am. 
 
 in a belief of imminent danger, though St. Rep. 232, 9 So. 835; Eiland v. State, 
 
 11 simple warning to look out for the de- 52 Ala. 322; Powell v. State, 101 Ga. 9, 
 
 ceased cannot be shown. People v. 65 Am. St. Rep. 277, 29 S. E. 309; 
 
 Powell, 87 Cal. 348, 11 L.R.A. 75, 25 Fahnestock v. State, 23 Ind. 231. And 
 
 Pac. 481. see Chase v. State, 46 Miss. 683. 
 
 1 State V. Vallery, 47 La. Ann. 182, 49 3 Walker v. State, 28 Tex. App 503 Irf 
 
 Am. St. Kep. 303, 16 So. 745; State v. S. W. 800; Evers v. State, 31 Tex Crim. 
 
§ 260] SELF-DEFENSE. 427 
 
 and violence on the part of the deceased is to show the honesty of the 
 helief of the accused of imminent peril.* And it is admissible only 
 where an assault by him on the accused is prima facie shown, and 
 that he was honestly seeking to defend himself against it at the time 
 when the homicide was committed.® In the absence of some overt 
 act on the part of the deceased calculated to impress his slayer with 
 the reasonable belief that he is in danger of suffering grievous bodily 
 harm or death, and that there is no reasonable mode of escape, the 
 character of the deceased for turbulence and violence is wholly 
 irrelevant* And evidence that the deceased was quarrelsome is only 
 admissible where it is shown that the assault had been committed or 
 threatened at the time of, or immediately preceding, the homicide.'^ 
 Nor is the general reputation of the deceased for going armed com- 
 petent unless it is auxiliary to, and explanatory of, some fact or facts 
 proved to have occurred at or in connection with the killing, which 
 tend to furnish a defense when thereby aided, by furnishing a reason- 
 able ground for the belief on the part of the slayer that he was then 
 in immediate and imminent danger of loss of life or of great bodily 
 injury at the hands of the person killed.* And the character of the 
 deceased for violence, when properly admitted, is limited in its con- 
 sideration by the jury to the determination of the meaning of his 
 overt act or demonstration. ® 
 
 261. Sufficiency of overt acts concurring^ with violent character 
 
 An overt act upon the part of the deceased which would warrant the 
 admission of evidence of his violent character in a prosecution against 
 another for killing him must consist of a hostile demonstration of 
 such a character as to impress upon the slayer an imminency of dan- 
 ger to life or of great bodily harm.* And the act of a person in 
 going unarmed to meet another upon the latter's invitation, given in 
 anger, is not such an attack as will render such evidence admis^ 
 sible.* Nor does an overt act by the deceased directed, not against 
 the accused, but against a third person, warrant the admission of such 
 evidence.' And a conditional threat upon the part of the deceased 
 
 Rep. 318, 18 L.R.A. 421. 37 Am. St. Kep. 7 Abbott v. People. 86 N. Y. 460. 
 
 811, 20 S. W. 744; West v. State, 18 Tex. sLong v. State, 72 Ark. 427, 81 S. W. 
 
 App. 640; Creswell v. State, 14 Tex. 387. 
 
 App. 1. 9 Green v. State, supra. 
 
 4Lang V. State. 84 Ala. 1, 5 Am. St. iSfcate v. Stewart, 47 La. Ann. 410, 
 
 Rep. 324, 4 So. 193. 16 So. 945. 
 
 sGardner v. State, 90 Ga. 310. 35 Am. zjones v. People, 6 Colo. 452, 45 Am. 
 
 St. Ren. 202, 17 S. E. 86; Smith v. Rep. 526. 
 
 United States, 1 Wash. Terr. 262. sMoriarty v. State. 62 Miss. 654. 
 
 6Green v. State (Ala.) 39 So. 362; 
 Steele v. State, 33 Fla. 348, 14 So. 841. 
 
428 HOMICIDE. K E«: 
 
 that if the accused continued to bother him about a designated mat- 
 ter he would kill him, communicated to the accused, is not a suffi- 
 cient foundation for the admission of evidence of the quarrelsome 
 and dangerous character of the deceased.* And threats and hostile 
 demonstrations upon the part of the deceased prior to, and discon- 
 nected from, the time of the killing furnish no foundation for thft 
 introduction of such evidence.® 
 
 Evidence that a man v?as of violent and dangerous character, and 
 one who might reasonably have been expected to execute his threats, 
 however, is made admissible by statute in Texas where threats by 
 him against the life of his slayer are shown." And an overt act or 
 ■demonstration which will warrant taking the bad character of the 
 person into consideration in a prosecution for killing him may be one 
 which would be regarded as innocent and harmless when considered 
 independently of his dangerous character, but would arouse an ex- 
 pectation of imminent peril to life or limb when considered in con- 
 nection with such character. '^ So, the accused in a prosecution for 
 homicide may testify that the deceased was in the habit of cariysng 
 a pistol, where it appears that at the time of the killing he put his 
 hand into his pocket, and moved as if to draw it out again, while ad- 
 vancing toward the accused.* And the rule is the same where the 
 deceased, upon slight provocation, placed his hand behind him and 
 advanced upon the accused, when the latter shot him.® And this is 
 so, whether he actually had a pistol at the time or not. ' " So, it is 
 sufficient in such case that the danger to be averted was apparently 
 imminent, and it is error to charge that the jury cannot consider the 
 dangerous character of the deceased unless he had committed some 
 overt act toward carrying his threats into execution, or had made an at- 
 tack upon the accused of such a character as would justify him in re- 
 pelling the same. ^ ^ In determining whether a proper foundation has 
 
 4State V. Vance, 32 La. Ann. 1177. prove prior difficulties, and that the de- 
 
 BState V. Jackson, 33 La. Ann. 1087. ceased was a dangerous and desperate 
 
 6Dorsey v. State, 34 Tex. 652. man, is sufficiently proved in a prosecu- 
 
 While the Texas statute has reference tion for homicide by evidence that, while 
 
 to cases of murder, the principle applies very angry, he started toward the ac- 
 
 with equal force in a proper case where cused, putting his hand in his pocket, 
 
 the trial is for an assault with intent to and that accused backed away to within 
 
 murder. Bingham v. State, 6 Tex. App. a few feet of a fence, warning him to 
 
 1C9. keep off, and, as he continued to ad- 
 
 'Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 2 Am. vance. he shot him. State v. Golden 113 
 
 St. Rep. 232, 9 So. 835; Hart v. State, 38 La. 791, 37 So. 757. 
 
 Fla. 39, 20 So. 805. a Daniel v. State, 103 Ga. 202, 29 S. E 
 
 sCawley v. State, 133 Ala. 128, 32 So. 767. 
 227. 10 Ibid. 
 
 And an overt act which will open the uState v. Ellis, 30 Wash. 369^ 70 Pac. 
 
 door to the admission of evidence to 963. 
 
§ 2611 SELF-DEFENSE. 429 
 
 been laid by proof of an overt act of attack for the introduction of 
 evidence of the dangerous character of the deceased, the trial court is 
 vested with the legal discretion of refusing to believe one or more of 
 the witnesses, and of ignoring their affirmative testimony, if, in its 
 opinion, not arbitrarily formed, the reverse is true. ^ ^ 
 
 262. Order of proof. — Violent and bloodthirsty character is ad- 
 mitted in evidence in homicide for the purpose of showing a ground 
 for belief in the mind of the slayer that an attack made upon him 
 was dangerous and felonious; hence, an attack or a hostile overt act 
 by the deceased against the accused must be first shown as a foimda- 
 tion for the admission of such testimony. ^ And such character can- 
 not be given in evidence until a proper foundation is laid by proof 
 that the deceased had made some hostile demonstration toward the 
 accused.^ And the exclusion of evidence of acts on the part of the 
 deceased showing that he was a dangerous and desperate man is not 
 error in the absence of a predicate laid for its introduction.^ It is 
 for the accused first to show an attack upon him, after which it is 
 competent for him to show violent and dangerous character of the 
 deceased as a ground for his belief that the attack was felonious.* 
 The question of allowing proof on cross-examination, that the de- 
 ceased was a dangerous and quarrelsome man, however, constituting 
 an introduction of a new subject as matter of defense, is one of order 
 of proof resting in the discretion of the court. ® 
 
 263. Knowledge of character by the accused — The character of the 
 deceased as a violent and dangerous man, offered in evidence for the 
 purpose of showing that the accused had reason to believe himself 
 to be in danger, is not material unless knowledge of such character 
 upon the part of the accused is shown. ^ Though a person has a 
 
 That the deceased was a man of vio- sState v. Napoleon, 104 La. 164, 28 
 
 lent temper, and was in the habit of So. 972; State v. Stewart, 47 La. Ann. 
 
 carrying concealed weapons, is compe- 410, 16 So. 945; Eoten v. State, 31 Fla. 
 
 tent in a prosecution for homicide, where 514, 12 So. 910. 
 
 it is shown that he had used threaten- sBowman v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 ing language toward the accused to the 21 S. W. 4S. 
 
 latter's knowledge, and there was some 4Davidson v. People, 4 Colo. 145; Can- 
 proof that he had shot at him in anger, non v. People, 141 111. 270, 31 N. E. 1027. 
 and the prosecution was allowed to BBlake v. People, 73 N. Y. 588. 
 show that he had no pistol on his person iGrissora v. State, 8 Tex. Aop. 386; 
 at the time of the fatal rencoun^ter. Henderson v. State, 12 Tex. 5'i5; State 
 Kiley v. Com. 94 Ky. 266, 22 S. W. 222. v. Byrd, 121 N. C. 684, 28 S. E. 353; 
 
 isState V. Ford, 37 La. Ann. 443. Com." v. Straesser, 153 Pa. 452, 26 Atl. 
 
 t.Tones v. People, 6 Colo. 452, 45 Am. 17. And see Com. v. Tireinski, 189 
 
 Rep. 526: Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, Mass. 257, 2 L.R.A. ( N.S. ) 102, 75 N. E. 
 
 29 Am. St. Rep. 232, 9 So. 835 ; Gardner 201. 
 
 V. State, 90 Ga. 310, 35 Am. St. Rep. 202, But the right of self defense should 
 
 17 S. E. 86; Stite v. Green, 46 La. Am. not be made to depend upon the knowl- 
 
 1522. It! So. 367; Horbach v. State, 43 edge of the accused of the character and 
 
 "Vex. 242; Moore v. State, 15 Tex. App. 1. disposition of the deceased in a prosecu- 
 
430 HOMICIDE. [§ 26a 
 
 reputation for being quarrelsome, evidence to that effect cannot be 
 received in a prosecution against another for killing him, unless it 
 was previously shown that the accused knew it, and therefore might 
 more reasonably apprehend danger from him.*^ And the gen- 
 eral reputation of the deceased for carrying concealed weapons can- 
 not be given in evidence, unless it appears that the slayer had knowl- 
 edge of the habit.* So, evidence of habits of deceased offered in 
 behalf of the state for the purpose of showing that an alleged hos- 
 tile demonstration was the result of habit, and not of an intent to 
 assault, is incompetent in the absence of evidence of knowledge of 
 such habit upon the part of the accused. * 
 
 Where a habit of a person of carrying a pistol was generally known, 
 however, it will be presumed in a prosecution against another for 
 killing him that the latter was aware of such habit. ' And the gen- 
 eral reputation of the deceased for going armed will be presumed to 
 have been known to the accused where they resided in the same com- 
 munity, though there is no such presumption where they resided in 
 different and distant communities. '* And information upon the part 
 of the accused that the deceased was a violent and turbulent man 
 accustomed to go about armed is admissible where it was gained from 
 a knowledge of his general reputation, or from personal observation 
 of his specific acts, such evidence being competent for the purpose of 
 
 tion for homicide, where it appears that as a violent and dangerous person fur- 
 
 the accused and the deceased were nishes sufficiet corroborating evidence 
 
 strangers to each other, not having met in a prosecution for homicide to af- 
 
 previous to the occasion of the killing, iirmatively prove the knowledge of the 
 
 Andrews v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 76 accused of such character. Trabune v. 
 
 S. W. 918. Cora. 13 Ky. L. Rep. 343, 17 S. W. 186. 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution 6Long v. State, 72 Ark. 427, 81 S. 
 
 for homicide on the issue of self-defense, W. 387. 
 
 qualifying the right by reference to the Where the reputation for peace and 
 
 knowledge of the accused of the char- quietness of the person killed was as- 
 
 aeter and disposition of the deceased, sailed in a prosecution for killing him, 
 
 and their relative strength, is errone- without objection on the ground that it 
 
 ous in the absence of evidence as to did not appear that the accused knew 
 
 such matters. Hiekey v. State, 45 Tex. his reputation, and it was assumed from 
 
 Crim. Rep. 297, 76 S. W. 920. evidence by court and counsel that the 
 
 2State V. Kennade, 121 Mo. 405, 26 reputation of deceased was known to 
 
 S. W. 347 ; Morgan v. Durfee, 69 Mo. 469, him, and the evidence tended to show 
 
 33 Am. Rep. 608; State V. Bale, 119 Iowa, such knowledge, the prosecution may 
 
 1, 92 N. W. 680, 95 N. W. 193. show in rebuttal that his reputation for 
 
 sGarner v. State, 31 Pla. 170, 12 So. peace and quietness was good, and such 
 
 638; .McUonnall v. reople, 168 111. 93, rebutting evidence is rot subject to ob- 
 
 48 N. E. 86. jeotion that it did not appear that the 
 
 *Phipps V. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. accused knew of the bad reputation of 
 
 560, 31 S. W. 397. deceased. People v. Howard, 112 Cal. 
 
 BBranch v. State, 15 Tex. App. 96. 136, 44 Pac. 464. 
 
 The general reputation of the deceased 
 
§ 263] SELF-DEFENSE. 431 
 
 determining the state of mind of the accused, and whether he was 
 induced to believe, in good faith, that he was in imminent danger.'' 
 But the accused is not entitled to evidence of the knowledge of 
 others as to the violent and dangerous disposition of the deceased as 
 corroborating his own knowledge thereof, unless he first testifies to 
 such knowledge. * And the testimony of the accused that deceased 
 pointed a revolver at a man with whom he had a difiiculty, and 
 threatened to shoot him, is not sufiicient to show knowledge on his part 
 that the general character of the deceased was that of a quarrelsome 
 and dangerous man, which would warrant the admission of evidence 
 of his quarrelsome nature.® And a mere general objection to evi- 
 dence of the reputation of deceased for a habit of using deadly 
 weapons in quarrels and fights does not raise the question whether a 
 proper foundation was laid by proof that the accused knew of such 
 reputation and habit * " 
 
 3. Other exceptions. 
 
 264. Existence of. — Many cases in which evidence of violent charac- 
 ter has been offered as a part of the proof of self-defense, and rejected 
 because there was no issue of self-defense, have held inferentially that 
 there are no exceptions other than the one with reference to self-de- 
 fense to the rule that the character for violenne of a person killed is 
 not admissible in evidence in a prosecution tor the killing.* Not- 
 withstanding this negative statement, however, these cases go no 
 further than to hold that the evidence of violent character of the de- 
 ceased cannot be given for the purpose of proving self-defense, where 
 the issue of self-defense is not made to appear by other evidence, and 
 the existence of such exceptions has been asserted with more or less 
 
 TState V. Burton, 63 Kan. 602, 66 sTrabune v. Com. 13 Ky. L. Rep. 343, 
 
 Pac. 633. 17 S. W. 186. 
 
 And evidence in a prosecution for And information given to a person 
 homicide tending to show that the ac- that another was much incensed against 
 cuscd was acquainted with the deceased, him, and was a powerful and quick- 
 had lived in a little town several years tempered man, and advice to prepare to 
 with him, was familiar with the places defend himself, is not competent evi- 
 whieh they both frequented, and that dence in a prosecution against the for- 
 they were mutually familiar with the mer for killinp; the latter in support of 
 same persons resorti g to them, and the theory of self-defense. State v. 
 that they had been drinking together Cross, 68 Iowa, 180, 26 N. W. 62. 
 several hours on the night of the homi- 9Com. v. Straesser, 153 Pa. 452, 26 
 cide, rai=es a presumption that the ac- Atl. 17. 
 
 cused had knowledge of the fact that the lOState v. Ellis, 30 Wash. 369, 70 Pac. 
 
 deceased was intoxicated, and establishes 963. 
 
 a sufficient foundation for the admission iSee supra, § 257. 
 of evidence of the latter's reputation 
 for quarrelsomeness when intoxicated. 
 l^eole V. Lamar (Cal.) 85 Pac. 993. 
 
432 HOMICIDE. B 264 
 
 force in cases of doubt as to the nature of the act, and as bearing 
 upon the grade of the offense. 
 
 265. Cases of doubt as to nature of act Doubt as to the nature of 
 
 the homicidal act furnishes an exception to the general rule that the 
 character of the deceased is not competent evidence, and the violent 
 and bloodthirsty character of deceased is admissible in a prosecution 
 for homicide on an issue of self-defense, where it is doubtful who was 
 the aggressor.' And that the deceased was turbulent, violent, and 
 desperate is competent where the homicide occurred under such cir- 
 cumstances as to render it doubtful whether the act was committed 
 maliciously, or from a well-grounded apprehension of danger;^ and 
 so is the general character of the deceased as a dangerous man.^ So, 
 it has been held that evidence of the turbulent and bloodthirsty char- 
 acter of the deceased is only admissible where there is testimony 
 tending to establish that the accused acted in self-defense, and that 
 some overt act "U'as done by the deceased calculated to impress the 
 slayer with a reasonable belief that he was in danger of suffering 
 death or grievous bodily harm, and that there was no reasonable mode 
 of escape, the purpose being to determine who was the aggressor.* 
 The rule that the vicious character of the deceased is admissible to 
 show who was the aggressor, however, does not apply where the evi- 
 dence concerning the homicide was positive, and there was a mere 
 conflict of witnesses as to the particulars of the difficulty. ^ 
 
 iDeArman v. State, 71 Ala. 351 ; Peo- quiet and peaceable man would do so. 
 pie V. Murray, 10 Cal. 310; Kipley v. People v. Young (Gal.) 63 Pac. 837. 
 People, 215 111. 358, 74 N. E. 379; Holler 2State v. Elkins, 63 Mo. 159; State v. 
 V. State, 37 Ind. 57, 10 Am. Rep. 74; Bryant, 55 Mo. 75; State v. Keene, 50 
 State V. Spe-dlove, 44 Kan. 1, 24 Pae. Mo. 357; State v. Hicks, 27 Mo. 588; 
 67; State v. Keefe, 54 Kan. 197, 38 Pac. State v. Downs, 91 Mo. 19, 3 S. W. 219; 
 302 ; State v. Dumphey, 4 Minn. 438, Gil. State v. Eider, 90 Mo. 54, 1 S. W. 825 ; 
 340; State v. Eider, 90 Mo. 54, 1 S. W. Quesenberry v. State, 3 Stew. & P. 
 825; Stokes v. People, 53 N. V. 164, 13 (Ala.) 308; State v. Pearee, 15 Nev. 
 Am. Eep. 492; State v. Turpin, 77 N. C. 188. 
 
 473, 24 Am. Rep. 455 ; West v. State, 18 sHeffington v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 
 Tex. App. 640. And see State v. Gooch, Rep- 315, 54 S. ,V. 755. 
 
 04 N. U. 987; State v. Beird, 118 Iowa, < Green v. State (Ala.) 39 So. 362; 
 
 474, 92 N. W. 694; State v. Collins, 32 Steele v. State, 33 Fla. 348, 14 So. 841; 
 Iowa 36 State v. Pearee, supra. 
 
 Evidence of bad character in u. prose- " is to be observed that this exception 
 
 cution for homicide is to be considered f™0'^»t« tp "o more than an extension of 
 
 by the .jury not as tending in any way ^2:^:tll^::[^:^^^r:^^ 
 
 to justify the slaying by the accused of eharacter of deceased is admissible in 
 
 the deceased, but only as a circumstance homicide only where there was self- 
 
 iljustrating the facts of the homicide, defense in the case; in this the rule is 
 
 ard indicating the aggressor and the na- that it is not admissible unless there is a 
 
 ture of the aggression ; it being more doubt as to its absence, 
 
 probable that a man of violent and dan- BConnell v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 gerous character would make an unpro- 142, 75 S. W. 512. 
 
 yoked and deadly assault than that a An instruction in a prosecution for 
 
I 265] SELF-DEFENSE. 433 
 
 So, the rule lias been asserted in some of the states that evidence 
 as to character is admissible in homicide cases where the evidence is 
 wholly circumstantial, and the character of the transaction is in 
 doubt ^ And under this rule evidence of mild and pacific temper 
 and habits is admissible as a circumstance tending to aid the jury, 
 as well as evidence of violent and dangerous character.'' And it has 
 teen held that, aside from self-defense cases, such evidence is compe- 
 tent only where the evidence of homicide is wholly circumstantial, 
 and the character of the transaction is in doubt.* Here, however, 
 unlike a case of self-defense, the admissibility of evidence of violent 
 or dangerous character does not depend upon knowledge thereof, and 
 «uuh evidence is not rendered inadmissible by its absence. ® 
 
 266. Admissibility for purpose of grading offense. — The question 
 whether evidence of the general character and habits of a deceased 
 person is admissible in a prosecution for killing him, on the question 
 of the grade of the offense, has given rise to an irreconcilable con- 
 flict of autnority. Upon the one hand the rule is asserted that whern 
 ■evidence of violent and bloodthirsty character of the person killed if 
 not admissible, either to justify or mitigate a crime, it is not ad- 
 missible for the purpose of grading a crime or fixing the punisK 
 ment;' and that the general bad character of the deceased for im- 
 morality, and instances of immorality on his part, are not admissible 
 in a prosecution for killing him on the question as to whether the 
 slayer was actuated by malice.^ And it has been held that the gen- 
 eral reputatiiu of the deceased as a violent and dangerous woti is 
 not admissible in a prosecui^^ion for manslaughter.' And that the 
 habits of the deceased were those of a quarrelsome and fi,s:htinjo; man 
 of great strength is inadmissible upon an iss"e of Drovocation. * 
 
 homicide that if there is doubt as to where the evidence of the homicide is not 
 
 who made the first overt act of attack, circumstantial, and it does not appear 
 
 or as to who was the aggressor, it is that accused knew of such character. 
 
 the duty of the jury to consider the vio- State v. Rollins, 113 N. C. 722, 18 S. E. 
 
 lent and dangerous character of the de- 304. 
 
 ceased in determining who was the ag- sgtate v. Byrd, 121 N. C. 684. 28 S. 
 
 gressor, is improper as giving undue E. 353. 
 
 prominence to evidence of deceased's bad iGardner v. 8tate, 90 Ga. 310, 35 Am. 
 
 character. Allen v. State, 111 Ala. 80, 20 St. Rep. 202, 17 S. E. 86; Green v. State 
 
 So. 490. (Ala.) 39 So. 362. 
 
 estate v. Turpin, 77 N. C. 473, 24 Am. Gardner v. State, supra, criticizes 
 Rep. 455; State v. Mclver, 125 N. C. Fields v. State, 47 Ala. 603, 11 Am. Rep. 
 645, 34 S S. 439; State v. Barfield, 30 771, holding that a statute authorizing 
 N. C. (8 Ired. L.) 344; State v. McNeill, the jury to determine the degree of the 
 ■92 N. C. 812. homicide renders such evidence admis- 
 
 TCarroU v. State, 3 Humph. 315. Bible. 
 
 sStatc v. Gooch, 94 N. C. 987. zState v. Rose, 47 Minn. 47, 49 N. W. 
 
 Evidence of the violent and turbulent 404. 
 chara,cter of the deceased is properly sState v. McNeill, 92 N. C. 812. 
 ■excluded in a prosecution for homicide 4Com. v. Hilliard, 2 Gray, 2J4. 
 Horn.— 28. 
 
i34 HOMICIDE. [§ 26ff 
 
 What wonld appear to be the prevailing mle, however, is that 
 violent, passionate, and quarrelsome habits and character on the part 
 of the deceased, known to the accused, may be given in evidence in 
 a prosecution for homicide as a circumstance tending to show the 
 nature of the provocation under which the slayer acted, and the in- 
 fluence it had on his mind. * And, under it, testimony proving or dis- 
 proving the character for violence or bloodthirstiness of the deceased 
 may be considered in determining the degree of the homicide, since 
 more prompt and decisive measures of defense are justified when the 
 assailant is of known violent and bloodthirsty character.® So, a 
 statute authorizing the jury in a trial for homicide to determine the 
 degree of the offense renders evidence of the character of the de- 
 ceased admissible.' And where the killing took place in a sudden 
 scuffle, evidence that the deceased was of quarrelsome disposition 
 has been held to be admissible as tending to show that the slayer 
 might have considered himself in some danger, and have resorted to- 
 the use of a weapon, not to kill, but to disable, his assailant.* 
 
 4. Nature or kind of character provable. 
 
 267. General rules — The character or reputation which may be 
 given in evidence on an issue of self-defense in a prosecution for 
 homicide consists of the e'^timation in which a person is held in the 
 commimity in which he lives;' and a violent and bloodthirsty dis- 
 position which may become a factor in the problem of self-defense is 
 a disposition to take advantage of an antagonist in a combat or diffi-^ 
 culty, and to cut or shoot him, or a h^ibit of fighting in a dangerous 
 way, as distinguished from a disposition to fight fairly, ^nd, if 
 worsted, to take the punishment.^ It is sufficient that the character 
 
 6Com. V. Tircinski, 189 Mass. 257, 2 'Fields v. State, 7 Ala. 603, II Am. 
 L.R.A.(N.S.) 102, 75 N. E. 261; State v. Rep. 771. 
 
 Dumphey, 4 Minn. 438, Gil. 340; State sAbernethy v. Com. 101 Pa. 3''2. 
 V. Tackett, 8 N. C. (1 H.iwks) 210. I" King v. State 90 Ala. 612, 8 So. 
 
 "Smith V. State, 88 Ala. 73, 7 So. 52. 856, it was held that the character of 
 And see C-Troll v. State. 3 Humph. 315. the deceased for turbulence, violence. 
 
 So, in Oranare v. State (Tex. Crin- •«nd revengefulness is only admissible in 
 App.) 83 S. W. 385, it was held that evidence in favor of the accused in ar 
 where a pprson charged with homicide prosecution for homicide where it tends 
 pleads provocation by adultery upon the to produce in the mind of the accused a 
 part of the deceased with his wife, for reasonable belief in imminent danger, or 
 the purpose of reducing the homicide to to aggravate the conduct of the deceased 
 murder in the second degree, he is en- into a provocation mitigating the offense 
 titleu to prove that deceased was u man to a lower degree, 
 of unchaste and immoral habits, as iend- iSmith v. State, 88 Ala. 73, 7 So. 52. 
 ing to show that he would be likely to zCleveland v. State, 86 Ala. 1, 6 So. 
 commit the offense charged. 426. 
 
5 267] SELF-DEFENSE. 435 
 
 of the deceased was bad for peacefulness ; it need not be made to ap- 
 pear that he was also bloodthirsty, quarrelsome, turbulent, revenge- 
 ful, and dangerous. * 
 
 Inquiry as to the character of the deceased on the question of self- 
 defense in a prosecution for homicide, however, should be limited 
 to such features thereof as have a tendency to throw light upon the 
 alleged apprehension of the accused from the acts of the deceased, 
 or to illustrate the conduct of the deceased as an assailant* And 
 that the deceased was overbearing, turbulent, and impetuous, as dis- 
 tinguished from violent, dangerous, and regardless of human life, is 
 not a proper subject of inquiry. ° Nor is the bad character of the 
 person killed admissible in evidence in a prosecution for homicide, 
 either on the issue of self-defense or otherwise, unless it explains or 
 gives meaning, significance, or point to his conduct at the time of the 
 killing. ® And the conduct of the deceased at the time of the killing, 
 to explain or give meaning to which such evidence is offered, must be 
 first shoviTi.'' And it must tend to illustrate the circumstances illus- 
 trating the homicide. ^ So, it is the reputation of the deceased as a 
 dangerous man, whose approach or presence one has cause to appre- 
 hend, which is admissible, and not his reputation for dishonesty, or 
 as being a thief or a gambler.^ And it is the reputation, and not 
 the fact, that he is a dangerous man which may be given in evi- 
 dence.*" And violent temper and bad character are not the same 
 thing, and proof that the deceased had a violent temper is not re- 
 butted by evidence that his character was good. ^ * But the gieneral 
 character of the deceased for vindictiveness and hostility toward a cer- 
 tain class of persons, of which the accused is a member, is competent 
 
 »DeArman v. State, 71 Ala. 351. 65 Am. St. Eep. 277, 29 S. E. 309; Pahne- 
 
 And a person charged v ith murder, stock v. State, 23 Ind. 231. 
 
 who had been permitted to prove that 7Garner v. Stfite. supra; Gardner v. 
 
 the reputation for peace of the person State, 90 Ga. 310.. 35 Am. St. Rep. 202, 
 
 killed was bad, and that he was violent 17 S. E. 86; Horbaeh v. State, 43 Tex. 
 
 and quarrelsome, is not prejudiced by 252. 
 
 the court's refusal to allow an answer sKing v. State, 90 Ala. 612, 8 So. 856. 
 
 to a questioT as to whether deceased was A claim upon the part of a person 
 
 a determined, dangerous man. Amos afterwards killed, that he had been 
 
 V. Com. 16 Ky. L. Rep. 358, 28 S. W. robbed, has no tendency to prove that he 
 
 152. was not a person of good character for 
 
 <Spivy v. State, 58 Miss. 858. peace and quiet, and is inadmissible in 
 
 Bibid. evidence in a prosecution for homicide 
 
 eGarner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 29 Am. for that purpose. Smith v. State, 142 
 
 St. Rep. 232, 9 So. 835; Hart v. State, Ala. 14, 39 So. 329. 
 
 iSS Fla. 39, 20 So. 805; Copeland v. sptnte v. Thompson, 109 La. 296, 33 
 
 State, 41 Fla. Z10. 26 So. 319; Eiland v. So. 320. 
 
 State, 52 Ala. 322; Bowles v. State, 58 loPeople v. Anderson, 39 Cal. 703. 
 
 Ala. 335; King v. State, 90 Ala. 612, 8 iiMartin v. State, 90 Ala. 602, is-l Am. 
 
 So. 856; Morrell v. State, 136 Ala. 44, St. Rep. 844, 8 So. 858. 
 
 84 So. 208; Powell v. State, 101 Ga. J», 
 
43a HOMICIDE. rS 267 
 
 in connection with knowledge of tlie accused of such character. ^ ^ 
 And where a person is assaulted by two and kills one of them, the 
 known reputation as a violent and dangerous man of the surviving 
 associate is admissible to the same extent as would be that of the de- 
 • ceased;^* though the bad character of the general associates of the 
 deceased, and the fact that while he was in a dying condition they at- 
 tempted to rob him, are not admissible in evidence in a prosecution 
 for causing his death. ^ * 
 
 268, Special traits and special circumstances. — Proof of the char- 
 acter of the deceased in a prosecution for homicide is not confined to 
 general character; his character under special and exceptional cir- 
 cumstances may be shovsm, where such circumstances appear to have 
 existed at the time of the affray in which the killing took place, * such 
 character being known to the accused.^ And the reputation of the 
 deceased as to a habit of carrying arms is admissible on an issue of 
 self-defense in a proper case, as affecting the motive by which the 
 slayer was actuated when he did the killing, and as bearing upon the 
 question of his apprehension of danger.* And where evidence that 
 the deceased was a violent and dangerous man has been adduced, and 
 threats and an overt act of assault by him are shown, they may be 
 followed up by testimony tending to show that he had habitually car- 
 ried concealed weapons, and that such fact was known to the ac- 
 cused and was a matter of general repute in the neighborhood in 
 which he lived.* And error in excluding evidence as to the general 
 reputation of the deceased as to resorting to the use of firearms when 
 engaged in quarrels is not cured by the fact that ample testimony as 
 to his reputation as an aggressive and dangerous man has been intro- 
 
 izState V. Spangler, 64 Kan. 661, 68 sState v. Sumner, supra. 
 Pac. 39. sState v. Crawford. 31 Wash. 260. 71 
 
 laTiffany v. Com. 121 Pa. 165, 6 Am. Pnc. lO.SO: Stnte v. Ellis, 30 Wash. .S69, 
 St. Rep. 775, 15 Atl. 462. 70 Pac. 963; Glenewinlfel v. State (Tex. 
 
 Where the killing of a son hy his Crim. App.) 61 S. W. 123; Com. v. Book- 
 father was claimed to have been acci- er, 25 Ky. L. Eep. 1025, 76 S. W. 838. 
 dentally do"e while the father was at- Evidence that the deeeispd was in the 
 tempting to reclaim his son, who had habit of carrying concealed weaTXins is 
 left him to associate with an immoral admissible where it is shown that at 
 woman, evidence of the character of the the time of the killing he was angry at 
 woman is competent in a prosecution for the accused, and was advancinff unon 
 the killing as reflecting upon the mo- him in a threatening man-'er for the pur- 
 tives of the father in seeking the son. po=e of engaging in a fieht, though the 
 Jones V. State, 51 Ohio St. 331, 38 N. E. evidence shows no act indicating that he 
 79. was then armed with such wcnons. and 
 
 KLister v. State, 3 Tex. App. 17. endeavoring to use them. Branch v. 
 
 iState V. Hunter, 118 Iow«,, 686, 92 State. 15 Tex. App. 96. 
 N. W. 872; State v. Collins, 32 Towa, 4King v. State, 65 Miss. 576, T Am. 
 36 ; State v. Sumner, 130 N. C. 718, 41 St. Rep. 681, 5 So. 97. 
 S. E. 803. 
 
§ 268] SELF-DEFENSE. 437 
 
 duced." So, the general reputation of the deceased that he was quar- 
 relsome when under the influence of liquor is competent on an issue 
 as to who was the aggressor, where it appears that shortly hefore the 
 affray he was under the influence of liquor.® And the dangerous 
 character of the deceased when drunk is material evidence where the 
 homicide was committed in a riotous affray among neighbors, ap- 
 parently in defense of a brother.'' Likewise the general reputation 
 of the deceased as a man of unchaste and lecherous habits is admis- 
 sible where the defense was insulting conduct toward the wife of 
 the accused, communicated to the husband, upon an issue as to 
 whether he believed what his wife had told him.^ And the reputa; 
 tion of the deceased, known to the accused, of being one who would 
 take advantage of another, pretending to be his friend for the pur- 
 pose of doing him some bodily harm, is admissible on an issue of self- 
 defense. ® 
 
 Violent and dangerous character of the deceased which will affect 
 an issue of self-defense, however, is not established by proof that he 
 usually carried a pistol, and was quarrelsome when intoxicated.*" 
 And where the defense is not restricted in showing the reputation of 
 the deceased for violence when drinking, and that he was drinking at 
 the time of the difficulty, his general reputation for drunkenness is 
 not relevant. * * Nor is one's general character when drunk, not di- 
 rected to any particular kind of character, relevant, especially when 
 
 5 state V. Ellis, supra. 'People v. Curtis, 52 Mieh. 616, 18 
 
 But where a witness in a prosecution N. W. 385. 
 
 for homicide was permitted to testify In State v. Manns, 48 W. Va. 480, 37 
 
 that he had known the deceased for S. E. 613, it was said with reference to 
 
 years, and that he was a very dangerous the refusal of the court below to permit 
 
 man, and had the reputation of general- the accused, charged with homicide, to 
 
 ly going armed, it is not error to refuse prove the dangerous character of the de- 
 
 to permit him to state whether he ceased when intoxicated, that it seems 
 
 thought the deceased would be likely, in hardly necessary to prove that a drunken 
 
 a difficulty, to use a weapon. Bingham man armed with a revolver and shooting 
 
 V. State, 6 Tex. App. 169. into the house of the accused was a per- 
 
 eState v. Beird, 118 Iowa, 474, 92 N. son of dangorous character when in- 
 
 W. 694; State v. Collins, 32 Iowa, 36; toxicated. 
 
 People v. Lamar (Cal.) 83 Pac. 993. 8 Jones v. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 87, 
 
 A preliminary statement by a witness 70 Am. St. Rep. 719, 40 S. W. 807, 41 S. 
 
 in a prosecution for homicide on cross- W. 638. 
 
 examination in behalf of the accused, sState v. Sumner, 130 N. C. 718, 41 S. 
 
 that the general reputation for peace and E. 803. 
 
 quiet of the deceased was good, does not loGrissom v. State, 8 Tex. App. 386. 
 
 conclude the accused from showing that iiState v. McDaniel, 68 S. C. 304, 102 
 
 the general reputation of the deceased Am. St. Rep. 661, 47 S. E. 384; Sea- 
 
 for peace and quiet when intoxicated born v. Com. 25 Ky. L. Rep. 2203, 80 S. 
 
 was bad, since a man may possess differ- W. 223, 
 ent characters or different reputations 
 adapted to different conditions. People 
 V. Lamar, supra. 
 
438 HOMICIDE. [§ 268 
 
 the deceased was not shown to have been intoxicated at the time.^" 
 And a continuance will not be granted in a prosecution for homicide, 
 because of the absence of a witness who would testify that the accused 
 and the deceased were in the habit of using rough language in con- 
 versation between them which did not show any animus, for the pur- 
 pose of qualifying and explaining the meaning of language appearing 
 to show animus. ^ ^ 
 
 269. Character for peaceableness generally The good character of 
 
 the deceased is not a subject of proof in a prosecution against another 
 for killing him, where his character had not been attacked by the 
 defense. * And evidence showing the character and reputation of the 
 deceased as a quiet and peaceable man cannot be given by the state 
 in i?uch a case in the first instance as a part of its case.^ 
 
 Where the defense in a prosecution for homicide puts the character 
 of the deceased as a violent and dangerous man in issue, however, 
 the state may support it by evidence that he was of good character, 
 or a peaceable, law-abiding man.* And that the deceaied was not 
 in the habit of carrying deadly weapons is relevant. * And that the 
 person killed was a quiet and peaceable man is competent on cross- 
 examination in such a prosecution on an issue of self-defense." But 
 it is the character of the deceased for peace and quietness at the time 
 of the tragedy that is a legitimate subject of inquiry in a prosecution 
 
 isFahnestock v. State, 23 Ind. 231. it was stricken out by the court. Sims 
 
 l3ConnelI v. State, 45 Tex. Grim. Kep. v. Stnte, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 637, 44 S. 
 142, 75 S. W. 512. W. 522. 
 
 iMiers v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Kep. sPettis v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 171, 53 Am. St. Rep. 705, 29 S. W. 1074; 81 S. W. 312; Jackson v. State, 77 Ala. 
 Moore v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 54, 18; Mitchell v. State, 133 Ala. 65, 32 
 70 S. W. 565; Melton v. State (Tex. So. 132; People v. lams. 57 Cal. 115; 
 Crim. App.) 83 S. W. 822; Jimmerson People v. Howard, 112 Cal. 135, 44 Pac. 
 V. State, 133 Ala. 18, 32 So. 141; People 464; Bowlus v. State. 130 Ind. 227, 28 
 V. Bezy, 67 Cal. 223, 7 Pac. 643; Carr v. N. E. 1115; State v. Woodward, 191 Mo. 
 State, 21 Ohio C. C. 43; State v. Eddon, 617, 90 S. W. 90; People v. Thomas, 67 
 8 Wash. 292, 36 Pac. 139. N. Y. 218. 
 
 And evide'ce as to the general reputa- estate v. Chevallier, 36 La. Ann. 81; 
 tion of a woman for chastity is not ad- State v. Gather, 121 Iowa, 106, 96 N. 
 missible in behalf of the state in a prose- W. 722. 
 
 cution against a man for inducing her BDeArman v. State, 71 Ala. 351. 
 to commit suicide, where her character A witness may be asked on cross-ex- 
 in that respect had not been attacked, ami^ation on an issue as to self defense, 
 Burnett v. People, 204 111. 208, 68 L.R.A. if he had not heard someone say that 
 304, 93 Am. St. Rep. 206, 68 N. E. 505. deceased was a person of good character, 
 
 2Carr v. State, supra; State v. Potter, that he was an obliging man, and a good 
 13 Kan. 414 ; Dock v. Com. 21 Gratt. 909. neighbor, but if the question was con- 
 
 The admission in evidence in a prose- fined to what the witness had ''leird 
 cution for homicide of deceased's char- men in the neighborhood of the deceased 
 acter for honesty and integrity ' in the say, it would be too narrow and re- 
 first instance, without objection, how- strioted. Jackson v. State, 77 Ala. 13. 
 ever, is not ground for reversal where 
 
I 269] SELF-DEFENSE. 439 
 
 for homicide on an issue of self-defense, and evidence as to snch 
 character years previous to the time of the killing is inadmissible.® 
 
 270. Attack upon character which will open door. — Evidence of 
 general reputation for violent or bad character upon the part of the 
 deceased is not essential in a prosecution for killing him, to con- 
 stitute an attack upon his character which will render admissible evi- 
 dence of his good character. * Good character of the deceased for peace 
 and quiet may be proved in such a case where the defense has proved 
 particular traits of his character, as, that he was quick-tempered, 
 violent, easily provoked, quarrelsome, vindictive, or likely to provoke 
 a difficulty, though no evidence of general reputation as to bad char- 
 acter had been given. " And where the statute makes the general char- 
 acter for violence of the deceased admissible where threats upon his 
 part appear, his general character need not be put in issue in order 
 to warrant evidence that he was a peaceable and inoffensive man, and 
 one not likely to execute threats. * So, evidence tending to prove that 
 the deceased had a quarrelsome, turbulent, and violent disposition, 
 and that he once wantonly shot at the accused, and that at the time 
 of the homicide he was making a murderous attack upon him, con- 
 stitutes such an attack upon his character as will authorize evidence 
 in rebuttal that his reputation for peace and quietness was good.* 
 And the testimony of the accused himself to the effect that the de- 
 ceased and another had told him of conduct which led him to believe 
 that the deceased was a violent and dangerous man is sufficient to 
 warrant the state in proving in rebuttal that his general reputation 
 was that of a peaceable, law-abiding man. ' 
 
 That deceased was quiet and peaceable, however, is not competent 
 
 estate v. Pettit, 119 Mo. 410, 28 S. sPettis v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 W. 1014. 81 S. W. .S12. 
 
 iPeople V. Gallajflier, 7a App. Div. 39, So, in Tlirawley v. State, 153 Ind. 
 78 N. Y. Supp. 5; Thrawley v. State, 153 375, 55 N. E. 95, it was held that the 
 Ind. 375j 55 N. E. 95. mere charge that the deceased was the 
 
 2PTussev V. Stnte, 87 Ala. 121, 6 So. aggressor constitutes such an attack on 
 420; People v. Gallagher, supra. his character as will authorize the in- 
 
 Where there is evidence in a prosecu- troduction of evide ce of his good char- 
 tion for homicide that deceased was in acter as a substantive fact, and that the 
 the habit of arming himself whenever he fact that no vi'itnesses as to reputation 
 had a quarrel, it may be shown in re- were produced to show that the char- 
 buttal that, to the best of the knowl- ac-ter of the deceased for peaceableness 
 edge of the witness, the deceased never was bad, and that the acoised did not 
 carried arms. State v. Mims, 36 Or. testify, does not render inadmissible e^'i- 
 315, 61 Pac. 888. oence that the deceased was a quiet and 
 
 sRussell V. Stite, 11 Tex. App. 288; peaceable man, where the killing by the 
 Sims V. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 637, 44 accused was admitted, but claimed to 
 S. W. 522. have been done in self-defense. 
 
 4Stite V. Vaughan, 22 Nev. 285, 39 
 Pac. 73D. 
 
440 HOMICID-E. C§ 270 
 
 evidence in behalf of the prosecution in rebuttal of proof by the de- 
 fense that he was a large and strong man.® And evidence that the 
 deceased had used violent and profane language when attacking the 
 accused does not warrant evidence in rebuttal to the effect that his 
 general character was good, and that he was a church member, and 
 not in the habit of using vulgar and profane language.' Nor does 
 testimony that the deceased said he had had quarrels with several 
 known persons warrant evidence in rebuttal of testimony that he was 
 not in the habit of going armed. * And evidence of threats against the 
 accused, and that the deceased had been guilty of improper or crimi- 
 nal conduct toward the wife or daughter of the accused, does not 
 authorize proof in rebuttal of his general good character, or of his 
 character for peace and quiet.® Nor does a refusal by the court to 
 admit evidence of general reputation of the deceased for peace and 
 quiet, and remarks to the effect that, whether he was a good or a bad 
 man, he was entitled to the protection of the law, constitute an at- 
 tack upon his character which will render admissible evidence to 
 sustain it. ■* ** And the same rule applies to disputing the truthfulness 
 of dying declarations of the deceased, such a dispute not involving his 
 general character. ^ ^ 
 
 5. Methods of proving character. 
 
 271. General reputation; specific acts of violence Proof of the 
 
 violent and dangerous character of the deceased can only be made 
 by evidence of his general reputation in the community for such char- 
 acter; evidence of specific acts or of general bad conduct is not ad- 
 missible,* Particular acts of the deceased not connected with the 
 homicide, and which had not been communicated to the accused or 
 shovTU to have operated upon his mind at the time of the killing, are 
 
 eCarr v. State, 21 Ohio C. C. 43. 97 Ala. 18, 14 So. 327; Dupree v. State, 
 
 'Bowles V. Com. 103 Va. 816, 48 S. E. 33 Ala. 380. 73 Am. Dee. 422; .Tones v. 
 
 527. State, 76 Ala. 8; Franklin v. State. 29 
 
 sPeople V. Powell, 87 Cal. 348, 11 L.R. Ala. 14; Campbell v. St vte, 38 Ark. 498; 
 
 A. 75, 25 Pae. 481. People v. Griner, 124 Cal. 19, 56 Pae. 
 
 sjiramerson v. State, 133 Ala. 18, 32 625; Nelson v. Stnte, 32 Fla. 244, 13 So. 
 
 So. 141 : Kennedy v. State, 140 Ala. 1, 361 ; Keener v. Statej 18 Ga. 194 63 Am 
 
 37 So. 90. Dec. 269; Powell v. State, 101 Ga. 9, 
 
 loPeople V. Webster, 139 N. Y. 73, 34 65 Am. St. Rep. 277, 29 S. E. 309; An- 
 
 N. E. 730. drews v. State, 118 Ga. 1, 43 S E 
 
 "Tbid. 852; Doyal v. State, 70 Ga. 134; Thorn- 
 
 iGarner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 29 Am. ton v. State, 107 Ga. 683, 33 S E. 
 
 St. Rep. 232, 9 So. 835; Smith V. State, 673; Fahnestock v. State, 23 Ind. 
 
 88 Ala. 73, 7 So. 52; Garrett v. State, 231; State v. Middleham, 62 Iowa, 
 
S 271] 
 
 SELF-DEFENSE. 
 
 Ul 
 
 not competent evidence in a prosecution for the killing. ^ And it is 
 not permissible to establish the character of the deceased in the first 
 instance by showing that he had been indicted for murder.'' Nor is 
 such an indictment admissible for the purpose of showing his dan- 
 gerous character, and knowledge thereof by the accused.* Nor is it 
 competent to show that the person killed was an escaped convict, as 
 affecting his character.^ Nor can the commission of other offenses 
 prior to the homicide in question, not connected with it, be shown.* 
 And the rule is the same with reference to quarrels and difficulties 
 between the deceased and third persons.^ And the particulars of 
 former difficulties are not admissible in behalf of the accused. * Nor 
 are specific acts of violence of the deceased, not toward the accused, 
 
 150, 17 N. W. 446; State v. Peffers, 80 
 Iowa, 580, 46 N. W. 662; State v. Abarr, 
 39 Iowa, 185; State v. Fontenot, 50 La. 
 Ann. 537, 69 Am. St. Rep. 455, 23 So. 
 634; Ki g V. State, 65 Miss. 576, 7 Am. 
 St. Rep. 611, 5 So. 97; State v. Ronk, 
 91 Minn. 419, 98 N. W. 334; Moriarty v. 
 State. 62 Miss. 654; State v. Elkins, 63 
 Mo. 159: State v. Jones, 134 Mo. 254, 35 
 S. W. 607; Carleton v. State, 43 Neb. 
 373, 61 N. W. 699; United States v. 
 Densmore { N. M. ) 75 Pac. 31 ; Eggler v. 
 People, 56 N. Y. 642; Nichols v. People, 
 23 Hun, 165; People v. Druse, 103 N. Y. 
 655, 8 N. E. 733; State v. Ussery, 118 
 N. C. 1177, 24 S. E. 414; Thurman v. 
 State, 4 Ohio C. C. 141 ; State v. Mims, 
 36 Or. 315, 61 Pac. 388; Alexander v. 
 Com. 105 Pa. 1; State v. Dean, 72 S. C. 
 74, 51 S. E. 524; State v. Dill, 48 S. C. 
 249, 26 S. E. 567; State v. Thrailkill, 71 
 S. C. 136. 60 S. E. 551; Heffington v. 
 State, 41 Tex. Grim. Rep. 315, 54 S. 
 W. 755 ; Spangler v. State, 41 Tex. Grim. 
 Rep. 424, 55 S. W. 326; Harrison v. 
 Com. 79 Va. 374, 52 Am. Rep. 635. 
 
 The general managemeiit of slaves on 
 a plantation as characterized by violence 
 and cruelty on the part of the manager, 
 and specific acts of severity while acting 
 in that capacity, cannot be proved in a 
 prosecution for homicide committed by 
 a slave upon the manager, as tending to 
 justify it. Wesley v. State, 37 Miss. 
 327, 75 Am. Dec. 62. 
 
 zSpangler v. State, 41 Tex. Grim. Rep. 
 424, 55 S. W. 326; State v. Sale, 119 
 Iowa, 1, 92 N. W. 680, 95 N. W. 193; 
 State V. Zellers, 7 N. J. L. 220 ; People v. 
 Dowd, 127 Mich. 140, 86 N. W. 546; 
 Fitzhugih V. State, 13 Lea, 258; Willis 
 V. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 90 S. W. 
 1100. 
 
 And the act of a prosecuting officer in 
 a prosecution for homicide of asking a 
 witness on cross-examination whether he 
 had ever heard that the deceased had 
 harmed anyone does not open the door 
 for the admission of testimony as to 
 particular acts of bad character of the 
 deceased for peace and quietness. State 
 V. Fontenot, 50 La. Ann. 537, 69 Am. St. 
 Rep. 455, 23 So. 034. 
 
 In People v. Harris, 95 Mich. 87, 54 
 N. W. 648, however, it was held that 
 specific acts of violence may be given in 
 evidence on the question of character of 
 the deceased on an issue of self-defense 
 in a prosecution for homicide, by a wit- 
 ness under whose personal observation 
 they occurred. 
 
 sNelson v. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 58 
 S. W. 107. 
 
 4 State V. Dill, 48 S. C. 249, 26 S. E. 
 5G7. 
 
 And a new trial will not be granted in 
 a prosecution for homicide on newly dis- 
 covered evidence that, some twenty-eight 
 years before, the deceased had been con- 
 victed of homicide, its only tendency be- 
 irg to show the quarrelsome character 
 of the deceased, of which the accused had 
 no knowledge. State v. Ronk, 91 Minn. 
 419, 98 N. W. 334. 
 
 sDupree v. State, 33 Ala. 380, 73 Am. 
 Dec. 422. 
 
 sHeffington v. State, 41 Tex. Grim. 
 Rep. 315, 54 S. W. 755. 
 
 7McKeone v. People, 6 Colo. 346; 
 Smith V. State, 142 Ala. 14, 39 So. 329 ; 
 .Jenkins v. State, 80 Md. 72, 30 Atl. 
 666. 
 
 sQordon v. State, 140 Ala. 29, 36 So. 
 1009. 
 
«2 HOMICIDE. [§ 271 
 
 or to his knowledge, but toward third persons or their property, ad- 
 missible in evidence in a prosecution for homicide on an issue of self- 
 defense.® And a statute authorizing proof of character of the de- 
 ceased in connection with threats made by him limits such proof to 
 the general character of the deceased as to whether he was a violent 
 and dangerous man, and excludes the substitution of any other evi- 
 dence of character in that respect.^" Acts of aggression toward 
 other persons, committed by the deceased a short time before, and 
 in the course of his progress toward the scene of, the affray, how- 
 ever, are competent in a prosecution for homicide as bearing upon 
 his frame of mind shortly before the encounter, though such acts were 
 not known to the slayer. ^ ^ 
 
 272, Exception as to specific acts known to slayer. — The rule that 
 bad character for violence and turbulence on the part of the deceased 
 can be established in a prosecution for homicide only by general 
 reputation of the deceased in the community has no application to 
 matters bearing upon such character, which appear to have been 
 within the knowledge of the accused.* And the accused testifying 
 in his own behalf is entitled to the benefit of his own testimony as to 
 specific instances of violence on the part of the deceased, coming 
 under his own observation or within his own. knowledge.^ And ihe 
 accused may rely on proof of the desperate character of the person 
 killed, and of special acts communicated by the latter to him indicat- 
 ing his dangerous character, as tending to show that he acted in self- 
 defense.^ So, violent conduct of the deceased just prior to the homi- 
 cide in question, toward others, in the presence of the accused, is ad- 
 
 sPeople V. Rodawald, 177 N. Y. 408, 70 sPeople v. Harris, 95 Mich. 87, 54 N. 
 
 N. E. 1; People v. Gaimari, 176 N. Y. W. 648; Temple v. People, 4 Lans. 11^; 
 
 84, 68 N. E. 112; Sanford v. State (Ala.) Nelson v. State (Tex. Crim. ApT).) 58 S. 
 
 .39 So. 370; Stqte v. Vaughan, 22 Nev. W. 107; Hempton v. SUte (Tex. Crim. 
 
 285, 39 Pac. 733; Lemons v. State, 97 App.) 65 S. W. 526. 
 
 Tenn. 560, 37 S. W. 552; Connell v. 3 Cole v. State (Tex. Crira. App.) 88 
 
 State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 142, 75 S. W. S. W. 341 ; Dodson v. State, 44 Tex. 
 
 512. Crim. Rep. 200, 70 S. W. 969. 
 
 A man charged with murdering his Evidence that before the commission 
 
 wife, and alleging self-defense, is not en- of a homicide the deceased was pointed 
 
 titled to evidence that a former husband out by witnesses to the accused aa a 
 
 had separated from her because of her stranger in the community, who, from 
 
 bad character, and her threat to kill his own account of himself, was a 
 
 him. Gibson v. State (Tex. Crim. dangerous and desperate character, is 
 
 App.) 68 S. W. 174. admissible in evidence on an issue of 
 
 loHeffington v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. self-defense to show that the accused 
 
 Rep. 315, 54 S. W. 755. acted, in repelling an assault upon him, 
 
 iiState v. Beird, 118 Iowa, 474, 92 N. under a reasonable apprehension of 
 
 W. 694. death or serious bodily harm. Childers 
 
 1 State V. Burton, 65 Kan. 704, 70 Pac. v. State, 30 Tex. App. 160, 23 Am St. 
 
 640. Rep. 899, 16 S. W. 903. 
 
3 272] SELF-DEFENSE. 443 
 
 missible in a prosecution therefor.* And the fact, known to the ac- 
 cused, that deceased had made assaults upon others under circum- 
 stances which indicated that he would become infuriated without 
 notice or reasonable cause, and make violent assaults, is admissible, 
 together with circumstances of the homicide, as tending to explain 
 prompt action on his part and the nature of the assault. ° Likewise, 
 that the accused knew of his own knowledge that the deceased made a 
 practice of carrying deadly weapons is admissible in evidence on an 
 issue of self-defense. ® And an indictment against the deceased charg- 
 ing him with an aggravated assault and battery upon the accused, 
 committed a short time previous to the killing, is competent on an 
 issue as to whether the accused had reasonable ground for fearing 
 death or serious bodily harm from the other. ^ 
 
 Particular conduct of the deceased which had come to the personal 
 knowledge of the accused, however, is not admissible on an issue of 
 self-defense, where the transaction referred to was at a remote time, 
 and had no tendency to show the state of mind of the deceased at the 
 time of the affray in which death resulted.^ And though the accused 
 may testify, as tending to support his plea of self-defense, that the 
 deceased was in the habit of carrying a pistol, which fact was known 
 to him, another witness cannot so testify where the fact is not traced 
 to the knowledge of the accused.® Nor are specific difficulties en- 
 gaged in by the deceased admissible in evidence in a prosecution for 
 homicide in rebuttal of evidence of good character. * ** And a person 
 accused of homicide cannot testify on an issue of self-defense that the 
 deceased had told him that he had run away from difficulties with 
 
 estate V. Shadwell, 22 Mont. 559, 57 eGlenewinkel v. State (Tex. Crlm. 
 Pac. 281. And see Stite v. Thrailkill, App.) 61 S. W. 123; Wiley v. State, 99 
 71 S. C. 136, 50 S. E. 551. Ala. 146, 13 So. 424. 
 
 Evidence tending to prove that the de- 'Johnpon v. State, 28 Tex. App. 17, 11 
 ceased, prior to his death called at the S. W. 667. 
 
 house of the accused when he was absent. But it is not error to refuse to admit 
 and abused the female members of his an indictme-t against the deceased in a 
 family, declarl g his intention to kill prosecution for homicide, offered for the 
 the accused, is pertinent in a prosecu- purpose of indicating the state of mind 
 tion against the latter for the killing, of the accused in dealing with a man he 
 for the purpose of showing that the at- knew to be under indictment, where the 
 tack or demonstration toward the attack accused was permitted to state fully his 
 was first made by the deceased. State knowledge of the alleged bad character 
 V Elkins, 63 Mo. 159. of the deceased. Kipley v. People, 215 
 
 BPoer V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 07 111. 358, 74 N. E. 379. 
 S. W. 500; Crow v. State (Tex. Crim. sState v. Sale, 119 Iowa, 1, 92 N. W. 
 App.) 88 S. W. 814; Bearden v. State, 680, 95 N. W. 193. 
 
 44 Tex. Crim. Eep. 578. 73 S. W. 17; sSims v. State, 139 Ala. 74, 101 Am. 
 Havens v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 708, 82 St. Rep. 17, 36 So. 138. 
 S. W. 369. But see People v. Farrell, lOHussey v. State, 87 Ala. 131, G So. 
 137 Mich. 127. 100 N. W. 264. 420. 
 
444 HOMICIDE. K 272 
 
 officers, without showing what the difficulties were, * ^ the details of 
 previous difficulties not being competent. ^ ^ 
 
 273. Good character in rebuttal — Proof of good character offered 
 in rebuttal of evidence of bad character of the deceased in a prosecu- 
 tion for homicide is not confined to general reputation, and negative 
 testimony of witnesses as to the reputation of the deceased for peace 
 and quiet, that they had lived in the same community with him, and 
 had not heard the question discussed, or his character questioned, is 
 competent in rebuttal of evidence of bad character.* And that the 
 deceased was courteous and polite to ladies is legitimate testimony in 
 rebuttal of evidence that he was brutal and insulting to the accused 
 and his family.^ So, that the deceased was an obliging man and a 
 good neighbor is admissible in rebuttal, where violent and blood- 
 thirsty character had been shown by the defense.^ And in such case 
 the state may show that the deceased was a fair average man.* And 
 where violent character is sought to be shown both by general reputa- 
 tion and by the personal knowledge of the accused, the state may show 
 that he was a delicate and sickly man, and prove the relative size of 
 the accused and the deceased.^ Evidence that the deceased shortly 
 before the homicide, however, had suffered an injury and looked 
 feeble is inadmissible on an issue of self-defense in the absence of a 
 showing that the accused had knowledge thereof. ® 
 
 274. Competency of witnesses. — A vntness who had long known the 
 deceased is competent to testify in a prosecution for homicide as to 
 whether the latter's character was violent and dangerous, or other- 
 wise. * But a witness in a prosecution for homicide cannot testify 
 as to the reputation of the deceased, where he did not know his repu- 
 tation in his lifetime, but acquired knowledge concerning it after his 
 death. ^ 'Sot is the character of the deceased in such a prosecution 
 a matter of opinion, and violent and dangerous character on his part 
 cannot be proved by opinions of witnesses based on their own observa- 
 
 iiCole V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 88 zEverett v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 S. W. 341. 24 S. W. 505. 
 
 laPoole V. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 3 Jackson v. State, 77 Ala. 18. 
 
 348, 76 S. W. 565. ^Mitchell v. State, 133 Ala. 65, 32 So. 
 
 iPeople V. Adams, 137 Cal. 580, 70 ^^% , oi. i. ,m ^ . . . 
 
 Pac. 662; Tesney v. State, 77 Ala. 33; o, .?TJ'^|" ''• ^*^*^ <^«^- C"™- ^PP-) 
 
 Powell V. State, 101 Ga. 9, 65 Am. St. ''''.°- r ■ '*"°:. , ,„ 
 
 Eep. 277. 29 S. E. 309. g W ul ' ^^'^ 
 
 ""And it is not improper in such case to ' iTurner v. State, 70 Ga 765 
 
 ask the witness if he had rot heard that 2Gordon v. State, 140 Ala 29 36 So 
 
 a short time before the killing the de- 1009; State v. Kenyon, 18 R I.'217 20 
 
 ceased had several rows and s-rapes in Atl. 199; Skaggs v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. 
 
 another county. Tesney v. State, supra. Rep. 563. 21 S. W. 257. 
 
f 274] SELF-DEFENSE. 445 
 
 tion.^. And the personal observation of a witness of specific acts of 
 violence toward a third person is not competent on the question of 
 his general reputation for quarrelsomeness.* While a witness testi- 
 fying to the character of the deceased in a prosecution for homicide 
 may take into account his own estimate of the reputation of such 
 person, he cannot take into consideration any facts of which he has 
 personal knowledge.^ Nor can the opinions of witnesses as to what 
 the deceased would be likely to do under stated circumstances be 
 given.® It has been held, however, that where self-defense is the 
 justification in a prosecution for homicide, it is proper to show per- 
 sonal qualities for peace, not capable of description, by opinions of 
 witnesses who are familiar with them and capable of judging.' 
 
 6. Admissibility and effect, how determined. 
 
 275. Application of general rules. — The universal rule that ques- 
 tions of admissibility of evidence are questions of law for the court 
 applies to evidence of violent and dangerous character of a person, 
 offered to justify killing him in alleged self-defense. ' And whether 
 a proper foundation has been laid for the introduction of evidence 
 of the dangerous character of the deceased is also a question for the 
 trial court, a ruling on which will not be reversed on appeal, unless 
 manifestly erroneous. ^ And it is for the judge, and not for the jury, 
 to determine whether an overt act of the deceased immediately preced- 
 ing the killing was sufficiently proved on the trial to open the door to 
 evidence of prior difficulties between him and the accused, and of the 
 
 sCarleton v. State, 43 Neb. 373, 61 since such question calls for his opinion 
 
 N. W. 699; Harrison v. Com. 79 Va. 374, instead of for facts. Walker v. People, 
 
 62 Am. Rep. 634. 133 111. 110, 24 N. E. 424. 
 
 4State V. Shadwell, 22 Mont. 559, 57 7Brownell v. People, 38 Mich. 732. 
 
 Pac. 281. iGarner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 29 Am. 
 
 6Smith V. State, 88 Ala. 73, 7 So. St. Rep. 232, 9 So. 835. 
 
 52. 2 State v. Christian, 44 La. Ann. 950, 
 
 The dangerous character of the de- 11 So. 589. 
 
 ceased cannot be shown in a prosecution And although some evidence may have 
 
 for homicide by testimony that the wit- beeT given in a prosecution for homicide 
 
 ness was not willing to work under him. tending to show a hostile demonstration, 
 
 Sylvester V. State (Fla.) 35 So. 142. yet if it is improbable and inconsistent 
 
 estate v. Elkins, 63 Mo. 159. with other proved facts and circum- 
 
 And a witness in a prosecution for stances of the case, and considered by 
 
 killing a dangerous man who had made the court as unworthy of credence, it 
 
 previous threats against his slayer, is not bound to accept it as establishing 
 
 though he detailed the difficulty leading the necessary foundation for the intro- 
 
 to the killing, stating what had been duction of evidence of bad character, 
 
 done both by the slayer and the de- but may ifrnore it. State v. Janvier, 37 
 
 ceased, cannot testify as to what he La. Ann. 644. 
 thought the deceased was about to do. 
 
448 rOMICIDE. [§ 275- 
 
 dangerous and desperate character of the deceased, known to tlie 
 accused. ^ 
 
 Where evidence of the violent and dangerous character of the de- 
 ceased is admitted in a prosecution for killing him to justify the act, 
 however, its weight and sufficiency is a question for the jury, to be 
 determined by a consideration of all the other evidence in the case.* 
 And an instruction to cast aside as worthless testimony of a designated 
 class of persons is erroneous as withdrawing the matter of the weight 
 of such testimony from the jury.® And where there is no evidence 
 on the subject of the character of the deceased in a prosecution for 
 homicide, the court cannot be required to instruct the jury as to the 
 weight to be given to character.* 
 
 c. Other situations and circumstances generally. 
 
 276. Opportunity to restrain by law — A man who believes his life 
 is in danger must, if he has access to a tribunal clothed with the ordi- 
 nary powers of a justice of the peace, apply to such tribunal to inter- 
 pose. If he has ground enough to excuse him in killing the person 
 from whom he believes himself in danger, he has ground enough to 
 have that person bound over to keep the peace, or committed in de- 
 fault of bail. And wherever this process can be applied, the endan- 
 gered party is not excused in taking the law into his own hands.' 
 Where the conflict can be avoided, the law must be resorted to for 
 redress.^ 
 
 But a person who is threatened with death or great bodily harm by 
 another does not lose his right of self-defense by failure to avail him- 
 
 sState V. Golden, 113 La. 791, 37 So. ferocious, and recently made, his armed 
 
 757 ; State v. Janvier, supra. entry upon the premises of another 
 
 The question of the sufficiency of the might readily be inferred aa being of so 
 
 evidence offered to prove an overt act in hostile a character as to place the latter 
 
 a pro?eeution for homicide in order to m immediate danger, is improper as a 
 
 open the door to evidence as to the dan- chiirge on the weight of tlie evidence, 
 
 gerous .character of the deceased is one Moseley v. State, 107 Ala. 74, 17 So. 
 
 which is subject to review on appeal. 932. 
 State V. Golden, supra. iRex v. Howarth, 1 Moody, C. C 207; 
 
 4Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 29 Am. Ilex v. Williams, 1 Moody, C. C. 387; 
 
 St. Rep. 232, 9 So. 835; Karr v. State, Eex v. Longden, Euss. & R. C. Co. 228; 
 
 100 Ala. 4, 46 Am. St. Rep. 17, 14 So. State v. Rutherford, 8 N. C. (1 Hawks) 
 
 851 : Goldsmith v. State, 105 Ala. 8. 10 457, 9 Am. Dec. 658; Stewart v. Stat", 1 
 
 So. 933; State v. Petseh, 43 S. C. 132, Ohio St. 66; Com. v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9; 
 
 20 S. E. 993. Dock v. State, 21 Gratt. 909; Penlana v. 
 sSmith v. United States, 161 U. S. 85, State, 19 Tex. App. 365. But see State 
 
 40 L. ed. 626, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 483. v. Hatch, 57 Kan. 420, 57 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 estate v. Scossoni, 48 La. Ann. 1464, S37, 46 Pac. 708. 
 
 21 So. 32. aPeople v. Sullivan, 7 N. Y. 398; State 
 And an instruction in a prosecution v. Shippey, 10 Minn. 223, 88 Am. Deo. 70, 
 
 for homicide that where the character of Gil. 178: State v. Martin, 9 Ohio S. & 
 a man is notoriously turbule-t and ag- C. P. Dec. 778. 
 gressive, and his threats are brutal. 
 
§ 276] SELF-DEFENSE.- 447 
 
 self of an opportunity to seek the protection of the law, though such 
 failure may be considered by the jury in a prosecution for killing his 
 antagonist, for the purpose of determinina: the true relations between 
 the parties, and the truth or falsity of the claim that he had cause to 
 fear death or great bodily harm from his assailant.* And where there 
 is no law to which one can appeal to have one who seeks his life re- 
 strained, he is entitled, in order to save his life, to take the law into 
 his own hands; though he does this at his own risk. On this prin- 
 ciple may be explained a remarkable case in California, where a 
 party of persons were on an island belonging to the United States, 
 engaged in gathering wild birds' eggs, and where another party at- 
 tempted to land for the same purpose. It was held that if the first 
 party resisted the landing by force, the second was justified in using 
 force, and that if one of the occupants was killed in the encounter, 
 this was excusable homicide. * 
 
 Evidence of a judge of a district court as to the inability of the 
 courts to enforce the penal laws on account of the condition of the 
 country, however, offered for the purpose of showing that when a 
 'homicide was committed the courts were destitute of machinery with 
 which to enforce the law, is irrelevant in a prosecution for homicide 
 in which self-defense was alleged, and the failure to apply to the 
 courts was sought to be explained, since the fact that the witness was 
 a judge, and that the accused was arrested and prosecuted for the 
 homicide, amply shows the exercise of such power upon the part of the 
 courts.' 
 
 277. Opportunity to procure aid — The prevailing rule is that a 
 person killing another cannot rely on self-defense as a justification 
 or excuse, where he might have secured protection or aid by appeal- 
 ing to a bystander, or otherwise.^ And under it a convict assaulted 
 by other convicts cannot escape responsibility for killing one of them, 
 where he could have reached the keepers, and they were competent 
 and willing to protect him. ^ But no presumption exists that the mere 
 presence of bystanders will prevent an assailant from inflicting seri- 
 ous bodily injury,* And while proved ability upon the part of a 
 person who resorts to a deadly weapon to defend himself against an 
 
 'State v. Martin, supra. And see defense, by Mr. Geo. T. Curtis, N. Y. 
 
 State V. Hatch, supra. Bal.-or & Voorliis, 1874. 
 
 4People V. Batchelder, 27 Cal. 69, 85 ^Penland v State, 79 Tex. Ann. 365 
 *™ TiL 091 iSt-'te V. Mnhan. R8 Iowa, 304, ^0 N. 
 
 Am. Dec. 231. ^ ^^5,^ ,7 jj ^ 249. 
 
 For further illustration of this doc- sivonle v. Johnson, 139 N. Y. 358, 34 
 trine see the case of the Virginius con- jf_ ]<;. 920. 
 sidered with reference to the law of self- sJJrownell v. People, 38 Mich. 732. 
 
448 HOMICIDE. [8 277 
 
 assailant, to protect himself by calling others to his aid, is a circum- 
 stance against him, of greater or less weight according to the facts, it 
 is not necessarily conclusive.* Upon the other hand it is asserted 
 that it is not the duty of an assaulted person to call upon bystanders 
 to restrain his assailant from making the threatened attack, before 
 making a personal resistance thereto, but the presence of bystanders 
 may be taken into consideration in determining the question whether 
 the person assaulted was justified in doing what he did in resistance 
 of the assault' 
 
 278. Disproportionate strength — The physical capacity of two per- 
 sons engaged in a diiSculty is an important consideration for the 
 jury in a prosecution against one for killing the other, in which self- 
 defense is set up, in determining whether the slayer acted within his 
 rights.* One who is assaulted under such circumstances as to 
 naturally induce him to believe that his assailant was capable of 
 doing him great bodily harm, and intended to do it, is excusable for 
 acting in self-defense.^ And it is competent to show the relative 
 strength and temper and other personal qualities of the parties;* and 
 that the accused seemed to be in fear of the deceased.* And shoot- 
 ing an unarmed assailant solely for the purpose of preserving one's 
 own life or limb is justifiable where the assailant was much the 
 stronger of the two, and came upon the slayer in a furious and threat- 
 ening manner, making such demonstrations as indicated a purpose 
 on his part to wrest the slayer's gun from him and use it upon him ; ^ 
 or in some other way to kill or seriously injure him.* So, the age of 
 the dieceased at the time of a difficulty resulting in his death is ma- 
 
 ^State V. Cross, 68 Iowa, 180, 26 N. Am. Rep. 261, 11 N. E. 360; Com. v. 
 
 W. 02. Barnacle, 134 Mass. 215, 45 Am. Rep. 
 
 sBird V. State, 77 Wis. 276, 47 N. W. 319; State v. Bowles, 146 Mo. 6, 69 Am. 
 
 1126. St. Rep. 598, 47 S. W. 892; State v. God- 
 
 iState V. Benham, 23 Iowa, 154, 92 dard, 162 Mo. 198, 62 S. W. 697. And 
 
 Am. Dee. 417; Palmore V. State, 29 Ark. see Brendendick v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 249; Strickland v. State, 98 Ga. 84, 25 App.) 34 S. W. 115. 
 
 S. E. 908; Lyons v. State, 137 111. 602, 27 ^Brownell v. People, supra. 
 
 N. E. 677; People v. Webster, 139 N. Y. BStricklin v. State (Miss.) 13 So. 898. 
 
 73, 34 N. E. 730. And see Bruce v. eStanton's Case, 2 N. Y. City Hall 
 
 State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 27, 51 S. W. I^«<:. 164. And see Alexander v. State, 
 
 <)54. 25 Tex. App. 260, 8 Am. St. Rep. 438, 7 
 
 And the attention of the jury should S. W. 867:_^State v. Harrod, 102 Mo. 590, 
 
 be called to a disproportion of this kind. 15 S. W . 573. 
 
 ' State V. Benham, supra. ^^^ where a drunken Indian, natural- 
 
 sState V. Hough, 138 N. C. 663, 50 S. ly ill-disposed, and armed with a knife, 
 
 E. 709. And see Dodson v. State, 45 when his nation and he, himself, were 
 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 571, 78 S. W. 940; All- under strong suspicion of hostility, at- 
 
 sup V. State, 5 Lea, 362. tacks a weaker man by kicking him, the 
 
 sBro-ivnell v. People, 38 Mich. 732; circumstances are sufficient to alarm 
 
 Wilkins v. State, 98 Ala. 1, 15 So. 312; the white man for his own safety and 
 
 Stephenson v. State, 110 Ind. 358, 59 warrant him in arming himself with a 
 
J 278] SELF-DEFENSE. 449 
 
 terial and relevant in a prosecution for the killing, where it appears 
 that the parties fought with their fists and with sticks.^ And that 
 the deceased was pregnant is admissible as original evidence of her 
 condition at the time of the killing.* Nor is it incompetent for the 
 state to show that there was no such disparity of strength and size of 
 the parties as to induce the slayer to believe that he was in greater 
 peril because of such disparity.® And evidence that the deceased was 
 a small, frail man is admissible in evidence in a prosecution for homi- 
 cide in disproof of a plea of self-defense by the accused, to enable the 
 jury to form a more satisfactory judgment upon the necessity of tak- 
 ing his life. ^ " So, when several at once attack a person with deadly 
 weapons, though they wait till he is on guard, he would be justified 
 in killing one of them in self-defense, because so unequal an attack 
 resembles more a degree of assassination than a combat. * ^ And 
 where two persons commit an assault upon one, if the latter had 
 reason to fear and did fear that his life was in imminent danger, or 
 that he was in danger of receiving great bodily harm, killing one of 
 his assailants under the influence of such fear is justifiable, without 
 reference to whether the two assailants entertained a preconceived 
 ■design to kill, or had agreed together to make the assault. ^ ^ 
 
 But while the jury in a prosecution for homicide may consider the 
 difference in size of the parties in determining whether there was 
 cause for reasonable fear of injury upon the part of the slayer, or 
 whether the homicide was justifiable, it is error for the court to in- 
 struct them that they must consider such disparity.^* And. the 
 physical condition of the accused is not admissible unless it is also 
 shown that he acted in self-defense. ^ * And the mere fact that a man 
 was of great muscular strength, or that he was practised in seizing 
 persons by the throat in a peculiar way, which would at once render 
 them helpless, has, when taken alone, no tendency to show provoca- 
 tion, or justification, or excuse for killing him; and it is not com- 
 petent evidence in a prosecution for such a killing on an issue of self- 
 defense.*^ So, when a large, powerful man attacks a smaller, 
 
 stick to avert the danger of the Indian's HI East, P. C. chap. 5, § 47, p. 276. 
 
 attack, and to save his own life by a. And see Bates v. Com. 14 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 stroke at the life of the other. Com. v. 177, 19 S. W. 928. 
 
 Eobertson, Addison (Pa.) 246. izPeople v. Hyndman, 99 Cal. 1, 33 
 
 ^Winter v. State, 123 Ala. 1, 26 So. Pac. 782. And see Monson v. State (Tex. 
 
 my. Crim. App.) 63 S. W. 647. 
 
 sWashington v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. isAlexander v. State, 118 Ga. 26, 44 
 
 Rep. 184, 79 S. W. 811. S. E. 851. 
 
 sWilkins v. State. 98 Ala. 1, 13 So. "Dunn v. State (Ala.) 39 So. 147. 
 
 312. iBCom. V. Mead, 12 Gray, 107, 71 Am. 
 
 lOHinch V. State, 25 Ga. 699. 
 Horn.— 29. 
 
450 HOMICIDE. ['§ 278 
 
 weaker one, without weapons, all other means except retreating, when 
 he was without fault, must be resorted to before the weaker man 
 would be justified in taking the other's life.^° Nor is a weak or 
 debilitated person justified in taking the life of a stronger, healthier 
 assailant, unless the circumstances of the assault were sufiicient to 
 eicite the fears of a reasonable man that he was in danger of death 
 or great bodily injury. ^ '' And debility of the deceased has been held 
 to bo of no effect, if not known to the accused. ^ * Nor is the fact ma- 
 terial that the arms of one of the combatants were defective, if not 
 known to the other. ^® So, the disparity of size or strength which 
 may be considered is confined to the time of the homicide.^" And 
 disparity of strength is unimportant where the weapons used were 
 repeating firearms. ^ ^ Nor is the reason for the disparity material or 
 relevant. ^^ And the disparity in size of the parties is important 
 with relation to self-defense only in determining what an ordinarily 
 prudent man in the position of the slayer would have done under the 
 circumstances ; and if these considerations have been fully submitted 
 to the jury, it is not error to refuse an instruction to the effect that 
 in the assault of a powerful man upon a weaker one the necessity of 
 taking life in self-defense will be more easily discoverable than in 
 case of an attack by a person of equal strength. ^ ^ Nor is refusal to 
 charge directly in a prosecution for homicide that the jury could 
 look to the greatly superior strength of the deceased as an element to 
 be considered on the question of self-defense erroneous, where the 
 jury were charged to look at the surroundings from the standpoint 
 of the accused.^* 
 
 Jlee. 741. And see Com. v. Hilliardj 2 for the murder of his eight-year-old step- 
 Gray, 204. dai'ghter, though its admission is not 
 C<Dm. V. Mead, supra, holds that evi- alone a ground for reversal. Taylor v. 
 dence tending to prove the great muscu- State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 148, 51 S. W. 
 lar strength of the deceased is ineom- 1106. 
 
 pefent in a prosecution for homicide, i^Cole v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 88 
 
 either for the purpose of showing provo- S. W. 341. 
 
 cation, or that the homicidal act was isPeople v. Wright, 144 Cal. 161, 77 
 
 committed in self-defense, or was other- "''• J' '• 
 
 wise excusahle or justifiable, the issue ,„,^, *^*^ ''• '^^^'^' ^^ ^'^^'^°' ^^' ^^ ^^''■ 
 being, not as to the strength and vio- „', ^, . ._ ™ „ . „ 
 
 lence which the deceased was capable of ^J'Y^"" ^- H^^^' ^^J^^'^" ^i'^V ^tS" 
 
 exerting, but as to the severit/of the 434 107 Am. St Rep 997, 77 S W 813. 
 
 assault which he actually did commit. ^gf ^'^^ ^- ^^^^' 1^4 Ala. 1. 32 So. 
 
 'V^T^^^- ^^""^ *^'''' ^"™- '^^^"' '"^T'^^^gi ^- State, 104 Wis. 230, 76 
 
 ,,i.w ^ n XT inn i^ir Am. St. Rep. 865, 80 N. W. 593. 
 
 iTState y. Ferguson, 9 Nev 106; Mor- .^aarello^. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 gan V. State, 119 Ga. 566, 46 S. E. 836. sg^ 20 S. W 179 
 
 So, evidence that a man was strong So, where the evidence in a prosecu- 
 and able-bodied and that his wife was a xlon for homicide shows that the de- 
 small woman is irrelevant and inadmis- ceased was of greatly, superior strength 
 eible in a prosecution against the man to the accused, it is not error for the 
 
§ 278] SELF-DEFENSE. 451 
 
 The comparative strength of the slayer and the deceased is better 
 proved by evidence of the occurrences at the time of the homicide, 
 such as the scuffle and the like, than by the opinion of witnesses. ^^ 
 And may be shown by giving the jury facts as to size, muscular de- 
 velopment, activity, apparent health, the results of tests of strength, 
 etc.^® And for the purpose of showing the physical characteristics 
 of the person slain a photograph of him is admissible in evidence.'*'' 
 But the opinions of nonexpert witnesses upon the question are not 
 competent *^ 
 
 279. Retreat, arming, and returning. — The plea of self-defense 
 rests on the natural right every man has to protect his own life against 
 an unlawful assault upon it by another ; and where persons who had 
 been assaulted retired to a place of safety, armed themselves, returned 
 to the scene of original violence, and without any necessity, so far as 
 the preservation of their lives was concerned, renewed the combat, 
 for the object of inflicting what they supposed was just chastisement 
 on their opponents, the doctrine of self-defense has no application.^ 
 Though a person attacked by another is not bound to retreat, yet, if 
 he does retreat, the law of self-defense will not permit him to arm 
 himself and return to the attack. ^ Nor does the mere fact that a per- 
 son who killed another was retreating when he did it show that there 
 was a pressing necessity to take life, or that he could not have further 
 retreated and avoided the difficulty with reasonable safety.^ 
 
 But where there was a retreat and a return, and the return was 
 speedy, and the person returning killed his antagonist upon a renewal 
 of the quarrel, all that occurred between the parties, though, strictly 
 speaking, not constituting one continuous transaction, is admissible 
 in evidence in a prosecution for the killing as a part of the res 
 gestcB.* And if a person has the right to defend himself when at- 
 tacked, without retreating, he may retreat until he can procure arms, 
 and then stand his ground and defend himself if still attacked by his 
 
 court to apply the law to the facts and iCom. v. Hare, 2 Clark (Pa.) 467; Mc- 
 
 limit the appellant's right of self-defense Duffie v. State, 90 Ga. 786, 17 S. E. 105; 
 
 to gieatly superior strength upon the State v. Seery (Iowa) 105 N. W. 511; 
 
 part of the deceased. Bruce v. State, 41 People v. Kennedy, 159 N. Y. 346, 70 Am. 
 
 Toi' Prim T?PTi 97 li^ S W q.'i4 St. Rep. 557, 54 N. E. 51 ; Rogers v. 
 
 't.;wrv S'tate? 2 Kan 419! 85 Am. State, /s Tenn. 448 33 S. W. 563 ;°Isaacs 
 
 S^''-,nt^"*"'^'°""'"^-'''°P''''' '^BowVs% Itat'e (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 Mich 732. „„ T ^ ,« 67 S. W. 103; Garner v. State, 34 Tex. 
 
 zestephenson v. State, 110 Ind. 358, ^^.^^ g ggg^ 30 g_ -^ ^gg 
 
 59 Am. Eep. 201, 11 N. E. 360. sDorsey v. State, 107 Ala. 157, 18 So. 
 
 27People V. Webster, 139 N. Y. 73, 34 igg_ 
 
 N. E. 7S0. 4'stitt V. State, 91 Ala. 10, 24 Am. St 
 
 28Stephenson v. State, suvra. Rep. 853, 8 So. 669. 
 
452 HOMICIDE. [§ 279 
 
 adversary.'' And when a person is assaulted, retreats, procures 
 arms, and kills his antagonist, he is not deprived of his right to plead 
 self-defense when there was no cessation of the conflict from the 
 time of the first assault to the killing;® or when his assailant had 
 not abandoned the attack upon him.''^ Nor does the mere fact that 
 a person who had been threatened armed himself and afterwards 
 killed the person who threatened him juatify the inference that the 
 arming was done for the purpose of attacking the deceased, and not 
 for the purpose of defending himself.* And a person who quar- 
 reled with another, and was threatened by him, does not lose his 
 right of self-defense against the other by arming himself and return- 
 ing to his home by a road which passed by the place where his an- 
 tagonist was, where that road was the proper and convenient one by 
 which to return.^ Nor are the rights of a person who carries a 
 weapon for the purpose of self-defense restricted or qualified to a 
 carrying without hostile intent. ^ " Whether a return to the scene of a 
 former difiiculty was for a justifiable purpose or to renew such diffi- 
 culty is a question of fact for the jury. ^ ^ 
 
 280. Malicious or criminal intent of the deceased. — A malicious or 
 criminal intent upon the part of the deceased is not necessary to the 
 exercise of the right of self-defense. If an attack and menaces are 
 made, of such a character as to convince a reasonable man that the 
 assailant intended to take life or inflict great bodily injury, and the 
 person assailed believed such to be the intention, he is justified in 
 using such means as are sufficient to defend himself, even to the 
 taking of the life of the assailant, although the assailant did not 
 intend either to take his life, or do him, or any member of his 
 family, any harm. ^ And evidence that the deceased was out on 
 a peaceful mission is immaterial on an issue of self-defense.* And 
 
 i 
 
 BCourtney v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) The fact that a person charged with a 
 
 57 S. W. 654; Bean v. State, 25 Tex. horaioide procured a pistol on the 
 
 App. 34l5, 8 S. W. 278. And see Chism v. morning of its commission is not conclu- 
 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 78 S. W. 949. sive evidence of an intent upon his part 
 
 6Bean v. State, supra. to nnlawfully use it if an emergency 
 
 TGarner v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. should arise, where it appears that the 
 
 356, 30 S. W. 782. deceased had threatened to kill him, and 
 
 So, where one person assaults another, was a much larger and stronger man 
 
 and the latter jumps back and warns than he. State v. Hough, 138 N. 0. 
 
 the former to desist or ho will shoot, he 663, 50 S. E. 709. 
 
 does not lose his right of self-defense by sThompson v. United States, supra. 
 
 failure to continue to retreat, since he lONix v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 has a right to pause to ascertain wheth- 504, 78 S. W. 227. 
 
 er or not his adversary hay heeded his uPeopIe v. Heart (Cal.) 81 Pac. 1018. 
 
 warning. Montgomery v. Com. 99 Va. iWest v. State, 59 Ind. 113. 
 
 83o, 37 S. E. 841. aAdams v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 sThompson v. United States, 155 U. 64, 68 S. W. 270. 
 S. 271. 39 L. ed. 146, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 73. 
 
§ 280] SELF-DEFENSIS. 453 
 
 the fact that the purpose of an attack is something other than the 
 infliction of personal iiijury is of no effect; and if a conductor and 
 trainman undertake to put a person off a train while in motion, 
 and he has reasonable cause to apprehend great personal injury to 
 himself therefrom, and shoots and kills one of them to avert such 
 apprehended injury, his act is justifiable.* Nor is it impossible, 
 as a matter of law, for two persons engaged in mutual combat to 
 each act in self-defense; it may appear to each that he is in danger 
 of death or great bodily harm at the hands of the other; and the 
 qnestion in a prosecution for the homicide is whether the accused 
 was acting in self-defense at the time of the homicide, regardless 
 of whether the deceased was in the same attitude.* 
 
 281. Relationship of the parties — The fact that two persons, one 
 of whom killed the other and claimed self-defense, were related to 
 each other is of no effect upon the question of his right to assert 
 that plea.^ And one accused of parricide is entitled to the same 
 protection in acting in self-defense against and upon his father as he 
 would be in acting against and upon any other individual.^ And 
 no less weight will be given to exculpatory evidence produced in 
 such case than would be given to the same evidence in a case in 
 which the deceased was a stranger." 
 
 282. Intoxication — The voluntary intoxication of a person assault- 
 ing another does not modify or affect the right of the latter to act 
 in self-defense.^ And testimony tending to show that the deceased, 
 when intoxicated, was a quarrelsome and dangerous man is not 
 material in a prosecution for homicide in determining the intent 
 with which the accused acted, unless at the time he had knowledge 
 of such character.^ And that the deceased was intoxicated stands 
 upon no higher plane than threats by the deceased against his slayer 
 in a prosecution for homicide, and is not admissible in evidence nn- 
 til some evidence has been adduced tending to show self-defense.^ 
 But intoxication upon the part of the deceased may be a circum- 
 stance to be considered by the jury in a prosecution for homicide, 
 in determining whether there was a present pressing necessity upon 
 the part of the accused to take the other's life to protect his own or 
 
 •State v. Dennison, 108 Mo. 541, 18 S. sPeopIe v. Walworth, supra. 
 
 W. 926. lAakew v. State, 94 Ala. 4, 33 Am. St. 
 
 iBradbnm v. United States, 3 Ind. Rep. 83, 10 So. 657. 
 
 Terr. 604, 64 S. W. 550. zRedus v. People, 10 Colo. 208, 14 Pac. 
 
 iPeople V. Walworth, 4 N. Y. Crim. 323. 
 
 Rep. .S65 ; Connell v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. sQregory t. State. 140 Ala. 16, 37 So. 
 
 Rep. 142. 75 S. W. 612. 260. 
 
 2Ibid. 
 
454 HOMICIDE. ['§ 282 
 
 to prevent great bodily harm.* And where the person assaulted 
 takes the life of his assailant in repelling the attack, the intoxication 
 of the latter may be taken into consideration by the jury in a prose- 
 cution therefor as a circumstance tending to aid in determining 
 whether there was an apparent present necessity for the killing to 
 save the slayer from death or great bodily harm.^ Nor is there 
 any principle of law which authorizes intoxication of the slayer to 
 be invoked as an excuse for homicide, or as a general ground for 
 enlarging the right of self-defense. * The question of intoxication 
 as affecting criminal responsibility is one of general criminal law, 
 and has been fully considered in another work.^ So far as it ap- 
 plies particularly to homicide it is considered in a subsequent chap- 
 ter of this work.* 
 
 283. Effect of mistaken identity ^Where one person kills another, 
 
 mistaking him for an enemy, if the mistake was an honest and non- 
 negligent one, his right to plead self-defense is the same as it would 
 have been had the person killed actually been the enemy whom he 
 was supposed to be.'' But recklessly killing one while unlawfully 
 pursuing another is murder.^ The general questions arising from 
 the killing of one person by an act aimed at another are considered 
 in a subsequent chapter of this work.^ 
 
 VI. Standpoint of judgment as to danger and necessity. 
 
 284. Divergence of opinion — On the question as to the standpoint 
 from which the existence of necessity to kill and danger of death or 
 great bodily harm is to be judged, there is a marked divergence of 
 judicial opinion. It is conceded on all sides that it is enough if 
 the danger which the slayer seeks to avert is apparently imminent, 
 irremediable, and actual. But apparently as to whom ? Here three 
 theories meet us, — the first, that the standpoint is that of the jury;^ 
 
 4Askew V. State, 94 Ala. 4, 33 Am. eSpringfield v. State, 96 Ala. 81, 38 
 
 St. Rep. 83, 10 So. 657. Am. St. Rep. 85, 11 So. 250. 
 
 sTbid. 7Wharton & S. Med. Jur. 5th ed. chap- 
 
 But evidence that the deceased had a ter IX. 
 
 jug of whiskey at his home on the day sSee infra, chapter XXV. 
 
 of the homicide, or that he carried one iWest v. Com. 15 Ky. L. Rep. 386, 23 
 
 home that day, does not tend to show S. W. 368; Smith v. Com. 19 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 that he was intoxicated when the dif- 1073, 42 S. W. 1138; Morris v. Piatt, 32 
 
 fioulty occurred, and is not competent as Conn. 75. 
 
 bearing upon the question of present 2Smith v. Com. supra. 
 
 pressing necessity upon the part of the sSee infra, chapter XV., § 363. 
 
 accused to take his life. Gregory v. iSee infra, § 285. 
 
 State. 140 Ala. 10, 37 So. 259. 
 
§ 284] SELF-DEFENSE. 455 
 
 the second, that it is that of the slayer himself;^ and the third, 
 that it is that of a reasonaWe )r..an of ordinary courage.^ 
 
 285. Eule that the jury are the judges — Tho theory of some of the 
 cases is that it is for the jury in a prosecution for homicide to 
 say, upon all the evidence, whether there was any intention, ap- 
 prrent or otherwise, on the part of the person slain to take the life 
 of the slayer, or to commit any known felony, and whether there 
 existed any known danger, real or apparent, which rendered neces- 
 sary the act of the slayer.^ Within this rule the slayer must, of 
 necessity, exercise his own judgment in the selection and use of means 
 of self-defense.^ But he acts at his peril, and if he goes beyond 
 what is necessary to accomplish the object, and violates the law, 
 he must suffer the consequences.^ He is not the final judge, Avhat- 
 «ver his apprehension or belief may have been of the reasonableness 
 of the grounds upon which he acted ; that is a question which the 
 jury alone are to determine.* 
 
 'No doubt, in a primary sense, this is correct. The jury must 
 judge whether the danger was apparent, but it is absurd to say 
 that it is necessary that the danger must have been such as to be 
 apparent to themselves as they deliberate finally on the case. If 
 this were true, an unloaded pistol would cease to be an apparent 
 danger, for the jury, when they come to decide the case, know that 
 the pistol was not loaded, and know that there was no real danger. 
 Hence, what the jury have to decide is not whether the danger was 
 apparent to themselves, but whether it was apparent by some other 
 standard. What is the other standard which the jury are thus to 
 apply? It will be seen by reference to the following sections that 
 this rule has been, in some instances, repudiated by later decisions 
 in states in which it had been previously acted upon. 
 
 286. Rule that the slayer is the judge — The rule has been asserted, 
 and is well supported, that when a person is assaulted and kills his 
 
 2 See infra, § 286. sibid. 
 
 sSee infra, § 287. The belief of imminent danger to the 
 
 iSee United States v. Wiltberger, 3 slayer, or his wife, or child, which will 
 
 Wash. C. C. 515, Fed. Cas. No. 16,738; warrant killing in self-defense, must 
 
 State V. Hollis, 1 Houst. Crim. Rep. have been sufficient to satisfy a reason- 
 
 (Del.) 24; State v. Newcomb, 1 Houst. able mind. Schnier v. People, 23 111. 
 
 ■Crim Rep. (Del.) 66: Schnier v. People, 17. 
 
 23 111. 17; State v. Bohan, 19 Kan. 28; ^Wesley v. State, 37 Miss. 327, 75 Am. 
 
 Meridith v. Com. 18 B. Mon. 49; People Dec. 62; Evans v. State, 44 Miss. 762; 
 
 V. Lamb, 2 Abb. Pr. N. S. 148; Shorter Schnier v. People, supra; State v. Bo- 
 
 V. People, 2 N. Y. 193. 51 Am. Dec. 286; han, 19 Kan. 28; People v. Austin, 1 
 
 State V. McGreer. 13 S. C. 464; State v. Park. Crim. Rep. 154; State v. Cain, 
 
 Cain, 20 W. Va. 679; State v. EvanSj 33 and State v. Evans, supra. And see 
 
 W. Va. 417. 10 S. E. 792. State v. Davis, 52 W. Va. 224, 43 S. E. 
 
 2Meridith r. Com. 18 B. Mon. 49. 99; State v. Home, 9 Kan. 120. 
 
456 HOMICIDE. [§ 28» 
 
 assailant in alleged self-defense, the question to be determined is 
 ■whether the slayer, under all the circumstances as they appeared to 
 him, honestly believed that he was in imminent danger of losing his. 
 life or of suffering great bodily harm, and that it was necessary 
 to do what he did in order to save himself from such apparent 
 threatened danger; and not whether a reasonable man, or a man 
 of reasonable courage, would have so believed;' nor whether th& 
 jury would so believe.^ And if the slayer acted in honest fear of 
 his life or great bodily harm, there is no question of reasonableness 
 or unreasonableness, or of courage or cowardice;* and it is imma- 
 terial whether he was a bold, strong man used to affrays and personal 
 encounters, or a weak, timid one unacquainted therewith, and lia- 
 ble to imagine danger which did not actually exist.* The leading 
 
 iPeople V. Lennon, 71 Mich. 298, 15 is entered and carried into execution- 
 Am. St. Rep. 2.59, 38 N. W. 871 ; Amos Allen v. United States, 150 U. S. 551^ 
 V. Cora. 16 Ky. L. Rep. 358, 28 S. W. 37 L. ed. 1179, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 196; 
 152; Eowsey v. Com. 116 Ky. 617, 76 Hickory v. United S'^tes, 151 U. S. 303, 
 S. W. 409 ; Meridith v. Com. 18 B. Mon. 38 L. ed. 170, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 334. 
 49; Haney v. Com. 5 Kv. L. Rep. 203; sPeople v. Lennon, 71 Mich. 298, 16. 
 Com. V. Carey, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 404; Am. St. Rep. 259, 38 N. W. 871; Mar- 
 Logue V. Com. 38 Pa. 265, 80 Am. Dec. tin v. State, 17 Ohio C. C. 406; Grain- 
 481; Com. v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9; Brownlee ger v. State, 5 Yerg. 459, 26 Am. Dee- 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 87 S. W. 278. 
 
 1153; Bell V. State, 20 Tex. App. 445; ^People v. Lennon, supra; Com. v. 
 Swain v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 86 S. Seibert, Luzerne Co. 1852. 
 W. 335; Watts v. Territory, 1 Wash. The principle of Com. v. Seibert was 
 Terr. 409; State v. Cain, 20 W. Va. 679; indorsed by Chief Justice Thompson in 
 State V. Evans, 33 W. Va. 417, 10 S. E. Logue v. Com. 38 Pa. 265, 80 Am. Dec. 
 792; Rex v. Scully, 1 Car. & P. 319; 481. Judge Conyngham admitted evi- 
 Levett's Case, Cro. Car. 538. And see dence, in order to determine the char- 
 Stacy V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 86 S. acter of the homicide, self-defense being- 
 W. 327; Williford v. State, 38 Tex. Crim. the issue, to show the general character 
 Rep. 393, 42 S. W. 972; Sargent v. and disposition of the deceased, as a 
 State. 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 325, 33 S. W. quarrelsome, fighting, vindictive, and 
 364 ; Blair v. State, 69 Ark. 558, 64 S. W. brutal man, of great physical strength,. 
 948; Early v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1181, rejecting, however, evidence of "particu- 
 70 S. W. 1061. lar instances of his brutality in fight- 
 
 zOakley v. Com. 10 Ky. L. Rep. 885, ing," etc. And hence, also, following 
 
 11 S. W. 72; Amos v. Com. supra; Ad- this same principle, he charged the jury 
 
 kins V. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 496, 82 S. as follows: "When you ascertain from 
 
 W. 242; Pennington v. Com. 24 Ky. L. the evidence the manner of the admitted 
 
 Rep. 321, 68 S. W. 451; Adams v. State killing, if you iind it to have been done^ 
 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 84 S. W. 231; Beard in defense of an attack by the deceased,. 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 81 S. W. 33; in deciding upon the character of the 
 
 Stacy V. State, supra. offense, you are called upon to examine 
 
 The questions whether a person who and review everything which goes to- 
 killed another was excusable on the explain the true situation of the par- 
 ground of self-defense, or whether he ex- ties at the time; their respective feelings- 
 ceeded the limits of his right, or acted and intentions, shown by their acts,, 
 upon unreasonable ground, or in the their threats, and menaces, as may be- 
 heat of passion, cannot be tested by the proved ; and you may consider, too, their 
 deliberation with which a judge ex- relative characters as individuals, in- 
 pounds the law to the jury, or the jury eluding their strength and physical abil- 
 determine the facts on which judgment ity. You may inquire, too, -whether the- 
 
286] 
 
 SEI/F-DEFENSE. 
 
 457 
 
 maxim on this point is one -which Mr. Broom, in his Legal Max- 
 ims, tells us Lord Erskine relied on as of controlling importance, 
 and which is adopted in a well-known opinion of Baron Parke :^ 
 "The rule of law founded on justice and reason is that, actus non 
 facit reum, nisi mens sit rea, the guilt of the accused must depend 
 on the circumstances as they appear to him." The correct rule is 
 that the slayer is justified, not because he acted upon an honest be- 
 lief of the existence of danger, but because it reasonably appeared 
 to him from his standpoint and from the surrounding circumstances 
 that danger existed.® And an instruction that if the accused com- 
 mitted the assault in question as a means of defense, believing that 
 he was in danger of losing his life or of serious bodily injury, he 
 should be acquitted, authorizes the jury to pass on the right of the 
 
 deceased, making, as is contended, the 
 first assault, was bold, strong, and of a 
 violent and vindictive character, and the 
 defendant much weaker and of a timid 
 disposition, and how far their power was 
 equalized by the weapons in the hands of 
 the latter. Legal rules are general, but 
 in their application they must, at times, 
 depend upon the special circumstances 
 of particular cases. In the assault of 
 a strong man upon a boy or female, of 
 a powerful individual upon a weaker, 
 the necessity of taking life in self- 
 defense under an ordina,ry attack will 
 be more easily discoverable, than in an 
 attack by one man upon another under 
 more equal circumstances. The prob- 
 able ability to defend without the fatal 
 resources must depend upon the means 
 and power of defense in the assaulted. 
 Moral power, too, is important in sus- 
 taining physical power. Timidity of dis- 
 position will never excuse rashness, and 
 will not justify the creation or sustain- 
 ing of Imaginary fears so as to excuse 
 the taking of the life of another; but 
 we say now, as we had occasion to say 
 in this court some years since, in the 
 trial of Joseph Davis, that the jury may, 
 in deciding upon the degree or kind of 
 homicide, the nature of the attack, and 
 the necessity of the defense, consider 
 this ingredient in the character of the 
 slayer as an adjunct to his proper physi- 
 cal power, or rather weakness. You are 
 to look at the parties in this unhappy 
 transaction in their relative knowledge 
 of each other's character and strength, 
 and to consider the circumstances at- 
 tendant upon the contest of Saturday, 
 their respective feelings, and all the 
 other circumstances as already called to 
 
 your notice; to inquire whether the de- 
 fendant, as the evidence shows him to 
 be, the man that he is and was, — not 
 as one of greater courage and strength 
 may be, but as he was when he did the 
 act, — had clear reason to believe that in 
 case of an attack upon him by the de- 
 ceased ( the man that the evidence shows 
 him to have been) , he would be in danger 
 of loss of life or of great bodily harm; 
 and if you so find, and further, that 
 an attack, apparently of such intent 
 and character, was made upon him, and 
 in .a room described as this has been, 
 with no other means of escapi g the eon- 
 test, as contended by the defendant's 
 counsel, under the evidence, but by tak- 
 ing the life of the assailant, he would be 
 excused in so doing, even though this, 
 to him, reasonable belief of the horrible 
 result of such a contest should be pro- 
 duced partially by the constitutional 
 timidity of his own character, doubly 
 excited by the comparative weakness of 
 his own bodily ability, proved in the 
 contest with the assailant of the day 
 previous. Look you into the heart of 
 the defendant at the time of the trans- 
 action; search out his motives, as his 
 acts and declarations show them; and 
 say whether he, constituted as nature 
 made him, a'd with all his means of de- 
 fense, had reason to believe, and did be- 
 lieve, that he was in the serious danger 
 spoken of." 
 
 6Eeg. v. Thurborn, 1 Den. C. C. 388. 
 
 cTillery v. State, 24 Tex. App. 251, 
 5 Am. St. Rep. 882, 5 S. W. 842; Bon- 
 ner V. State, 29 Tex, App. 223, 15 S. W. 
 821; Brumley v. State, 21 Tex, App. 
 222, 57 Am, Rep. 612, 17 S. W, 140; 
 Bell V. State, 20 Tex. App, 445; Gon- 
 
45S 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 [§ 286 
 
 accused to act in self-defense from his standpoint. '^ Within this 
 rule if a timid, cowardly man, much alarmed, in imminent danger 
 of a violent assault, and cut off from the chance of probable assist- 
 ance, as a result of the fear should kill the man from whom the 
 danger was anticipated, he is justified on the ground of self-defense, 
 if he was in danger of great bodily harm, or thought himself to 
 be so.® And it has been held that if a person killed another while 
 unconscious, or so nearly so that he did not know what he was doing, 
 or what was being done to him, and supposed he was being assault- 
 ed, and was resisting an attempt to take his life or do him great 
 bodily harm, he should be acquitted.® 
 
 Even under this rule, however, the physical and mental makeup 
 of the slayer, and his experience in danger, are to be considered 
 as bearing upon the honesty of the belief of personal danger upon 
 which he bases his right to act.-'" But the fact that he is weak, 
 timid, and cowardly by nature is to be weighed in his favor, and 
 not against him. ^ ^ And it must be made to appear that the fears 
 of the slayer were based upon some reasonable ground. ^^ It must 
 
 zales v.- state, 28 Tex. App. 130, 12 S. 
 W. 733; Cochran v. State, 28 Tex. App. 
 422, 13 S. W. 651; Sargent v. State, 35 
 Tex. Grim. Eep. 325, 33 S. W. 364; Hall 
 V. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 479, 66 S. 
 W. 783; Spearman V. State, 23 Tex. App. 
 224, 4 S. W. 586; PatlUo v. State, 22 
 Tex. App. 586, 3 S. W. 766; Lentz v. 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 85 S. W. 1068; 
 Dyer v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 83 S. 
 W. 192; Logan v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. 
 Rep. 573, 81 S. W. 721 ; Watkins v. Unit- 
 ed States, 1 Ind. Terr. 364, 41 S. W. 
 1044; SutterCeld v. Com. 3 Ky. L. Eep. 
 474; Patten v. People, 18 Mich. 314, 100 
 Am. Dee. 173; Martin v. State, 17 Ohio 
 C. C. 406; State v. Snelbaker, 8 Ohio 
 Dec. Reprint, 466. And see Newman v. 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 70 S. W. 951. 
 And an instruction making the justi- 
 fication of the accused to depend upon 
 whether he was justified in believing 
 that it was necessary to Itill is erroneous 
 as calculated to mislead the jury and 
 to require them to believe that the real, 
 as distinguished from the apparent, con- 
 duct of the deceased must have been of 
 that tangible character that would jus- 
 tify the belief of the accused of danger. 
 Reeves v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 483, 
 31 S. E. 382. 
 
 7 Walters v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 40 S. W. 794. 
 
 But failure to instruct that reason- 
 
 able appearances of danger must be 
 judged of from the standpoint of the 
 slayer is not reversible error where no 
 special charge to that effect was asked 
 for, and the charge given presented the 
 law applicable to the facts in proof. 
 Conner v. State, 23 Tex. App. 378, 5 S. 
 W. 189. 
 
 sGrainger v. State, 5 Yerg. 459, 26 
 Am. Dec. 278. 
 
 sPain v. Com. 78 Ky. 183, 39 Am. Rep. 
 213. This case holds that one who 
 shoots and kills another while uncon- 
 scious from somnambulism, or only par- 
 tially conscious, is excusable, where, up- 
 on being partially awakened, and find- 
 ing the person whom he shot shaking 
 Mm, he imagined he was being attacked, 
 and believed it necessary to take the 
 other's life to preserve his own, or his 
 person from great bodily harm; and in 
 such case it is immaterial whether he 
 had reasonable grounds for bis belief or 
 not. 
 
 loPeople V. Lennon, 71 Mich. 298, 15 
 Am. St. Rep. 259, 38 N. W. 871. 
 
 "Ibid. 
 
 i2Morgan v. State, 3 Sneed, 475; Rip- 
 py V. State, 2 Head, 219; Williams v. 
 State, 3 Heisk.-393; Allison v. State, 
 74 Ark. 444, 86 S. W. 409; Com. v. Mc- 
 Gowan, 189 Pa. 641, 69 Am. St. Rep. 
 836, 42 Atl. 365; Todd v. State (Tex. 
 Crim. App.) 44 S. W. 1096. And see 
 
§ 286] ' SELF-DEFENSE. 459 
 
 be a reasonable belief, as distinguished from his honest belief. ^^ 
 The slayer acts at his peril and cannot justify killing unless there 
 are circumstances which would induce a reasonable belief that the 
 required danger existed.^* The jurors in a prosecution for homi- 
 cide must place themselves in the position of the defendant at the 
 time of the act, and determine from all the facts as they appeared 
 to the defendant whether his apprehension or fear of death or seri- 
 ous bodily harm was reasonable.^® 
 
 287. Rule that standard is that of a reasonable man. — The rule 
 which seems to be the prevailing one is that the apprehension of 
 danger and belief of necessity which will justify killing in self- 
 defense must be a reasonable apprehension and belief, such as a 
 reasonable man of courage would, under the circumstances, have 
 entertained. ^ "A man threatened with danger must determine from 
 appearances and the actual state of things surrounding him as to 
 the necessity of resorting to self-defense; and if he acts from rea- 
 sonable and honest convictions, he will not be held responsible, crim- 
 inally, for a mistake as to the extent of the actual danger, where 
 other judicious men would have been alike mistaken."^ The fear 
 of death or great bodily harm which will justify the exercise of 
 the right of self-defense must be such as would be entertained, not 
 by a coward or drunken man, but by a reasonably self-possessed and 
 courageous man.* The law requires that sane men shall exercise 
 
 Francis v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. iBlalack v. State, 79 Miss. 517, 31 
 
 246, 70 S. W. 751. So. 105; People v. Bruggy, 93 Cal. 476, 
 
 isTillery v. State, 24 Tex. App. 251, 29 Pac. 26; People v. Williams, 32 Cal. 
 
 5 Am. St. Rep. 882, 5 S. W. 842. 280; People v. Gonzales, 71 Cal. 569, 12 
 
 i4See People v. Coughlin, 67 Mich. Pac. 783; Williams v. State, 120 Ga. 
 
 466, 3.5 N. W. 72; Rowsey v. Com. 116 870, 48 S. E. 368; Lyons v. People, 137 
 
 Ky. 617, 76 S. W. 409; Williams v. State, 111. 602, 27 N. E. 677; State v. Donahoe, 
 
 2 Tex. App. 271 ; Dent v. State, 46 Tex. 78 Iowa, 486, 43 N. W. 297 ; State v. 
 
 Crim. Rep. 166, 79 S. W. 525; Christian Fraunburg, 40 Iowa, 555; State v. Bo- 
 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 47, 79 S. W. han, 19 Kan. 28; State v. Hall, 9 Nev. 
 
 562; Watts v. Territory, 1 Wash. Terr. 58; State v. Bryson, 60 N. C. (2 Winst. 
 
 409. L.) 86; Turner v. Territory (Okla.) 82 
 
 And refusal to instruct the jury in a Pac. 650. 
 prosecution for homicide that they must 2 Adams v. People, 47 111. 376; Stein- 
 consider the reasonableness of the slay- meyer v. People, 95 111. 383; Cannon v. 
 er's belief that the deceased intended to People, 141 111. 270, 30 N. E. 1027; Al- 
 injure him, not from their own stand- varez v. State, 41 Fla. 532, 27 So. 40; 
 point, nor from that of an ideal man, State v. Sloan, 47 Mo. 604; State v. 
 but from defendant's standpoint, is not Cannon, 52 S. C. 452, 30 S. E. 589. But 
 error where the jury were properly in- see Allen v. State, 60 Ala. 19. 
 strurcted as to his right to act in self- 3 Teal v. State, 22 Ga. 75, 68 Am. Dec. 
 defense where he had reasonable ground 482; Dover v. State, 109 Ga. 485, 34 8. 
 for belief in danger. Frank v. State, 94 E. 1030; Price v. State, 72 Ga. 441; 
 Wis. 211, 68 N. W. 657. Gallery v. State, 92 Ga. 463, 17 S. E. 
 
 isBell V. State, 20 Tex. App. 445; 863; Golden v. State, 25 Ga. 527; Peo- 
 
 State V. Snelbaker, 8 Ohio Dec. Reprint, pie v. Hurley, 8 Cal. 390; Gladden v. 
 
 466; Rowsey v. Com. supra. State, 12 Fla. 562; State v. Roan, 122 
 
460 HOMICIDE. [| 28T 
 
 a mastery over their fears, as well as over tlieir passions.* And it 
 cannot give the accused the benefit of personal timidity or needless 
 fear;® though to deprive him of the benefit of fear existing on 
 his part, his personal timidity and the needlessness of his fear must 
 be shovirn beyond a reasonable doubt.® 
 
 The requirement is that the circumstances must have been such 
 as to justify the belief in the mind of a person of ordinary firmness 
 and reason and prudence-^ It is not a question as to what the 
 jurors would have done had they been in the shoes of the slayer at 
 the time.® Nor is it a question as to what a reasonably prudent 
 man of the age, condition of health, and temperament of the fJayer 
 would have done.^ The belief must have been a reasonable one 
 or one based on reasonable cause, ^^ and the fear must have been 
 
 Iowa, 136, 97 N. W. 997; State v. pie v. Glover, 141 Cal. 233. 74 Pac. 745 j 
 
 Shreves, 81 Iowa, 615, 47 N. W. 899; State v. Warren, 1 Marv. (Del.) 487. 
 
 State V. Crawford, 66 Iowa, 318, 23 N. 41 Atl. 190; State v. Brown, 4 Penn. 
 
 W. 684; Blalack v. State, 79 Miss. 517, (Del.) 120, 53 Atl. 354; Sylvester v. 
 
 31 So. 105; Coil v. State, 62 Neb. 15, State (Fla.) 35 So. 142; Morrison v. 
 
 86 N. W. 925. But see Surrency v. State, 42 Fla. 149, 28 So. 97; Smith v. 
 
 State (Fla.) 37 So. 575. State, 25 Fla. 517, 6 So. 482; Lane v. 
 
 And a charge that such fear must be State, 44 Fla. 105, 32 So. 896; Pinder 
 
 the fear of a brave man who wants to v. State, 27 Fla. 370, 26 Am. St. Eep. 
 
 do his duty and is trying to do it is not 75, 8 So. 837; Frazier v. State, 112 Ga. 
 
 ground for reversal. Dover v. State, 868, 38 S. E. 349; Campbell v. People, 
 
 supra. 10 111. 17, 61 Am. Dee. 49; Maher v. 
 
 4 Creek v. State, 24 Ind. 151; Glad- People, 24 111. 241; State v. Sterrett, 
 
 den V. State, supra. And see Tidwell v. 68 Iowa, 76, 25 N. W. 936 ; State v. Bone, 
 
 State, 84 Miss. 475, 36 So. 393. 114 Iowa, 537, 87 N. W. 507; State v. 
 
 6Saffbld V. State, 78 Miss. 258, 24 So. Allen, HI La. 154, 35 So. 495; Hood v. 
 
 314; Long V. State, 52 Miss. 23; Tid- State (Miss.) 27 So. 643; Carr v. State, 
 
 well V. State, supra; State v. Allen, 21 Ohio C. C. 43; Donald v. State, 21 
 
 111 La. 154, 35 So. 495; State v. Shoultz, Ohio C. C. 124; State v. Smith, 43 Or. 
 
 25 Mo. 128. 109, 71 Pac. 973. 
 
 And where the accused in a prose- But the inaccuracy in an instruction 
 
 cution for homicide in which self-de- in a prosecution for homicide in stat- 
 
 fense is alleged is shown to have been ing that the danger which will warrant 
 
 subject to a physical disability, it is action in self-defense must have been 
 
 not competent to show by physicians such as to reasonably appear to the ac- 
 
 that this disa,bility had a tendency to cused as a reasonable, prudent, coura- 
 
 produce a state of nervous sensibility geous, and cautious man is not ground 
 
 and mental cowardice and hasty appre- for reversal, where the rule applicable 
 
 liension of dangf^r which would not exist to self-defense is completely and aceu- 
 
 in a person having no such disability, rately stated in other parts of the 
 
 State V. Sorenson. 32 Minn. 118, 19 N. charge. State v. Shreves, 81 Iowa, 615, 
 
 W. 738. 47 N. W. 899. 
 
 eSaffold v. State, supra. sstate v. Wyse, and Hood v. State, 
 
 7State V. Wyse, 33 S. C. 582, 12 S. B. supra; Ross v. State, 3 Wyo. 351, 57 
 
 556; State v. Jackson, 32 S. C. 27, 10 Pac. 924. 
 
 S. E. 709; State v. Symmes, 40 S. C. sstate v. Sterrett, supra; State v. 
 
 383. 19 S. E. 16; State v. Petsch, 43 S. Sadler, 51 La. Ann. 1397, 26 So. 390; 
 
 C. 132, 20 S. E. 993; State v. Sullivan, State v. Cadotte, 17 Mont 315, 42 Pac 
 
 43 S. C. 205, 21 S. E. 4; State v. Thomp- 857. 
 
 son, 68 R. C. 133, 46 S. E. 941; People v. lo State v. Swift. 14 La. Ann. 839; 
 
 Lynch, 101 Cal. 229, 35 Pae. 860; Peo- Oliver v. State, 17 Ala. 587 j Finch v. 
 
I 287]] 
 
 SELF-DEFENSE. 
 
 461 
 
 the fear of a reasonable person, or a reasonable fear.^^ And it 
 must be well founded and honestly entertained.^* And the rule 
 that the circumstances must have been sufficient to excite the fears 
 ■of a reasonable man, not a coward, applies alike whether the slayer 
 is a woman or a man.*^ Mere belief alone is not sufficient; the 
 facts as they appeared to the slayer at the time must have been 
 such as to reasonably justify the belief. ^ * And an instruction that 
 if the circumstances attending the homicide were such as to cause in 
 the mind of a reasonable man the fear that deceased was attempting 
 to commit a felony upon his person, and accused shot under the 
 influence of such fear, then the homicide would be justifiable, is 
 not erroneous as restricting a statutory right of defending one's 
 
 State, 31 Ala. 41, 1 So. 565; Jimmerson 
 V. State, 133 Ala. 18, 32 So. 141 ; Glad- 
 den V. State, 12 Fla. 562 ; Olds v. State, 
 44 Fla. 452, 33 So. 296; Lawlor v. Peo- 
 ple, 74 111. 228; State v. Collins, 32 Iowa, 
 36; State v. Shelton, 64 Iowa, 333, 20 
 N. W. 459; State v. Shippey, 10 Minn. 
 223, 88 Am. Den. 70, Gil. 178; State v. 
 Sloan, 47 Mo. 607; State v. Thomas, 78 
 Mo. 340; State v. Hicks, 92 Mo. 431, 4 
 S. W. 742; State v. Berkley, 109 Mo. 
 '665, 19 S. W. 192; Coil v. State, 62 
 Neb. 15, 86 N. W. 925; Shorter v. Peo- 
 ple, 2 N. Y. 193, 51 Am. Dec. 286 ; Peo- 
 ple V. Johnson, 139 N. Y. 358, 34 N. E. 
 920 ; Com. v. Herold, 5 Pa. Dist. R. 623 ; 
 State V. Morey, 25 Or. 241, 35 Pac. 655, 
 36 Pac. 573; Barnard v. State, 88 Tenn. 
 183, 12 S. W. 431 ; State v. Stoekham- 
 mer 34 Wash. 262, 75 Pac. 810; Holmes 
 V. State, 124 Wis. 133, 102 N. W. 321 ; 
 Reg. V. Smith, 8 Car. & P. 160; Forster's 
 €ase, 1 Lewin, C. C. 187; Meade's Case, 
 1 Lewin, C. C. 184. 
 
 iiPeopIe V. Hurley, 8 Cal. 390; People 
 V. Campbell, 30 Cal. 312; People v. De 
 Witt, 68 Cal. 584, 10 Pac. 212; People 
 V. Glover, 141 Cal. 233, 74 Pac. 745; 
 People V. Williams, 32 Cal. 280; State 
 V. Brown (Del.) 61 Atl. 1077; Redd v. 
 State, 99 Ga. 210, 25 S. E. 268; Rag- 
 land V. State, 111 Ga. 211, 36 S. E. 682; 
 Darby v. State, 79 Ga. 63, 3 S. E. 663; 
 State V. Appleton, 70 Kan. 217, 78 Pac. 
 445; Territory v. Burgess, 8 Mont. 57, 
 1 L.R.A. 808, 19 Pac. 558; State v. 
 Cadotte, 17 Mont. 315, 42 Pac. 857; 
 Dyson v. State, 26 Miss. 362; Shorter 
 V. People, 2 N. Y. 193, 51 Am. Dec. 
 286; People v. Austin, 1 Park. Crim. 
 Rep. 154. And see People v. Waysman 
 (Cal.) 81 Pac. 1087 j State v. Smith 
 .(La.) 40 So. 171. 
 
 But apparent danger does not imply 
 more in an instruction in a prosecution 
 for homicide, in which self-defense was 
 alleged, than the fears of a reasonable 
 person of danger, and an instruction 
 making the right of self-defense to de- 
 pend upon apparent danger, without ref- 
 erence to whether the circumstances were 
 such as to excite the fears of a reason- 
 able person, is not subject to objection 
 by the accused. Leigh v. People, 113 
 111. 372. 
 
 12 Storey V. State, 71 Ala. 329; Peo- 
 ple V. Lamb, 2 Keyes, 373, 2 Abb. Pr. 
 N. S. 160. 
 
 Mere impressions are not enough. 
 People V. Lamb, supra. 
 
 It is a well-grounded fear of imminent 
 danger of great bodily injury which 
 justifies action in self-defense, as dis- 
 tinguished from mere fear of danger of 
 bodily injury. Lynch v. People, 33 Colo. 
 128, 79 Pac. 1015. 
 
 isAnderson v. State, 117 Ga. 255, 43 
 S. E. 835. 
 
 nGermolus v. Sausser, 83 Minn. 141, 
 85 N. W. 946; Askew v. State, 94 Ala. 
 4, 33 Am. St. Rep. 83, 10 So. 657 ; Finch 
 V. State, 81 Ala. 41, 1 So. 565; Na- 
 bors V. State, 120 Ala. 323, 25 So. 529; 
 Wilson V. State, 140 Ala. 43, 37 So. 93; 
 People V. Batchelder, 27 Cal. 69, 85 Am. 
 Dec. 231; People v. Morine, 61 Cal. 367; 
 People V. Williams, 32 Cal. 280; Peo- 
 ple V. Glover, 141 Cal. 233, 74 Pac. 745; 
 People V. Hurley, 8 Cal. 390; Wilson v. 
 State, 30 Fla. 234, 17 L.R.A. 654, 11 So. 
 556; Wortham v. State, 70 Ga. 336; 
 Kinney v. People, 108 111. 519; Hulse v. 
 Tollman, 49 111. App. 490; State v. 
 Thompson, 9 Iowa, 188, 74 Am. Dec. 342; 
 State V. Sterrett, 68 Iowa. 76, 25 N. W. 
 936; State v. Archer, 69 Iowa, 420, 29 
 
452 HOMICIDE. [§ 287 
 
 person by killing one who manifestly intended to commit a felony 
 upon liim.^° The person threatened with injury is to judge from 
 the circumstances by which he is surrounded, as they appear to him, 
 as to the necessity for his action, but he acts at his peril and cannot 
 justify killing, unless there are circumstances which would induce 
 a reasonably cautious man to believe that it was necessary to save 
 his own life, or to save himself from great personal injury. •"' 
 
 The reasonableness of an apprehension of death or great bodily 
 injury is a question of fact for the jury.^'^ And if the evidence 
 on that question is legally suiScient to support the verdict, it is not 
 the province of the court on appeal to weigh it. ' ^ 
 
 288. "Reasonable man" standard criticized The criticisms upon 
 
 the "reasonable man" standard may be summarized as follows : — Who 
 is the "reasonable man" who is thus invoked as the standard by 
 which the "apparent danger" is to be tested? What degree of 
 "reason" is he to be supposed to have ? If he is a man of peculiar 
 coolness and shrewdness, then he has capacities which we rarely 
 discover among persons fluttered by an attack in which life is as- 
 sailed; and we are applying, therefore, a test about as inapplicable 
 
 N. W. 333; Creek v. State, 24 Ind. 151; isTaylor v. State, 121 Ga. 348, 49 S. 
 
 State V. Shippey, 10 Minn. 223, 88 Am. E. 303. 
 
 Dec. 70, Gil. 178; Wesley v. State, 37 leSmith v. State, 25 Fla. 517, 6 So. 
 Miss. 327, 75 Am. Dec. 62; State v. Mc- 482; Pinder v. State, 27 Fla. 370, 26 Am. 
 Kenzie, 177 Mo. 699, 76 S. W. 1015; St. Kep. 75, 8 So. 837; Lane v. State, 
 People V. Rodawald, 177 N. Y. 408, 70 44 Fla. 105, 32 So. 896; State v. West, 
 N. E. 1 ; State v. Smith, 43 Or. 109, 71 45 La. Ann. 14, 12 So. 7. 
 Pac. 973; State v. Stoekhammer, 34 And to charge that the belief of dan- 
 Wash. 262, 75 Pac. 810; Parker v. State, ger must be well grounded is erroneous. 
 55 Miss. 414; Scott v. State, 56 Miss. State v. West, supra. 
 287; Kendrick v. State, 55 Miss. 436; iTEllis v. State, 152 Ind. 326, 52 N. 
 State V. Parker, 106 Mo. 217, 17 S. W. E. 82; Cumming v. State, 99 Ga. 662, 
 180; State v. O'Connor, 31 Mo. 389; 27 S. E. 177; Hulse v. Tollman, 49 111. 
 Housh V. State, 43 Neb. 163, 61 N. W. App. 490; State v. Abarr, 39 Iowa, 185; 
 571; State v. Stewart, 9 Nev. 120; State v. Bohan, 19 Kan. 28; Oder v. 
 Brown v. State, 62 N. J. L. 666, 42 Atl. Com. 80 Ky. 32 ; State v. Gonce, 87 Mo. 
 811; People v. Lamb, 54 Barb. 342; 627; State v. Berkley, 109 Mo. 665, 19 
 People V. Austin, 1 Park. Crim. E,ep. S. W. 192; People v. Austin, 1 Park. 
 154; Cook V. State, 3 Ohio Dec. Be- Crim. Rep. 154; Goodall v. State. 1 Or. 
 print, 136; Darling v. Williams, 35 Ohio 333, 80 Am. Dec. 396; Brown v.' State, 
 St. 58; State v. Morey, 25 Or. 241, 35 62 N. J. L. 666, 42 Atl. 811; People v. 
 Pac. 655, 36 Pac. 573; May v. State, 6 Walworth, 4 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 355; 
 Tex. App. 191; Field v. Com. 89 Va. Pfomer v. People, 4 Park. Crim. Rep. 
 690, 16 S. E. 865. And see State v. 558; Housh v. State, 43 Neb. 163, 61 N. 
 West, 45 La. Ann. 14, 12 So. 7. W. 571; State v. Scott, 26 N. C. (4 
 To be justified in taking the life of Ired. L.) 409, 42 Am. Dec. 148; State 
 another in self-defense the person doing v. Harris, 46 N. C. (1 Jones, L.) 190; 
 it must not only have believed himself Allen v. United States, 150 U. S. 551, 
 to be in danger of death or great bodily 37 L. ed. 1179, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 196. 
 harm, but must also have had reasonable And see Spivey v. State, 58 Miss. 858. 
 grounds for such belief. State v. Chop- isEllis v. State, 152 Ind. 326', 52 N. 
 in, 10 La. Ann. 458. E. 82. 
 
I 288] SELF-DEFENSE. 463 
 
 as would be that of the jury who deliberate on events after they 
 have been interpreted by their results. Or, if we reject this idea 
 of a man of peculiar reasoning and perceptive powers, the selection 
 is one of pure caprice, the ideal reasonable man being an undefinable 
 myth, leaving the particular case ungoverned by any fixed rule. 
 And that this ideal reasonable man is an inadequate standard is 
 shown by a conclusive test. Suppose the ideal reasonable man 
 would, at the time of the conflict, have believed that a gun aimed 
 by the deceased warf lOaded, whereas in point of fact the defendant 
 knew the gun was not loaded; would the defendant be justified in 
 shooting down an assailant approaching with a gun the defendant 
 knows to be unloaded, simply because the ideal "reasonable man" 
 would suppose the gun to be loaded? No doubt that in such case 
 no honest belief of the ideal reasonable man would be a defense to 
 the defendant who knew that the belief was false, and that he was 
 not really in danger of his. life. And if the belief of the ideal 
 reasonable man is not admissible to acquit, a fortiori is it inadmis- 
 sible to convict. So Berner, an authoritative German jurist,^ tells 
 us that "whether the defendant actually transcended the limits of 
 self-defense can never be determined without reference to his in- 
 dividual character. An abstract and universal standard is here im- 
 practicable. The defendant should be held irresponsible (of mali- 
 cious homicide), if he defended himself to the extent to which, ac- 
 cording to his honest convictions as affected by his particular in- 
 dividuality, defense under the circumstances appeared to be neces- 
 sary." 
 
 289. Apparent approach toward reconciliation. — Though there has 
 been some warmth in the support given by the advocates of each 
 of these rules to the favored one, and much earnestness in the at- 
 tack upon the repudiated ones, it is thought that in view of modem 
 modifications the ultimate results differ but little. Under the first 
 rule the jury judge as to necessity and danger from the standpoint 
 of things as they appeared to the slayer at the time, holding him 
 responsible for the reasonableness of the ground upon which he acts. 
 Under the second rule the slayer is to judge from his own stand- 
 point as to necessity and danger, and is justified or excused if he 
 acted in honest fear of death or great bodily harm. But even under 
 this rule as modified by modern decisions, he is held responsible for 
 the reasonableness of his belief, of which the jury are the judges. 
 And under the third rule the question of apparent necessity and 
 
 iLehrbuch d. Straf. 1871, p. 147. 
 
464 HOMICIDE. [§ 289 
 
 danger is to be judged by the standard of a reasonable man, the 
 reasonableness of an apprehension of death or great bodily injury 
 being a question of fact for the jury. The only difference, therefore, 
 ■which originally existed would seem to be the upholding upon the 
 one hand, and the repudiation upon the other, of the doctrine that 
 a person may justifiably kill in self-defense when he honestly feared 
 death or serious injury, though the fear was the unreasonable feai 
 of a cowardly or timid man and without foundation, and this doc- 
 trine, in principle at least, now seems to have been repudiated on 
 all hands. 
 
 VII. Eesoet to otheb means. 
 
 290. Nature of question and when considered, — The rule as gener- 
 ally stated is that, in order to justify homicide on the ground of 
 self-defense, the slayer must have eniployed all means within his 
 power, and consistent with his safety, to avoid the danger, and to 
 avert the necessity to kill in order to protect himself.^ A Corson 
 who kills another is guilty of manslaughter, at least, unless it ap- 
 pears that he had no other means of saving his life, or his person 
 from great bodily harm, which was apparently intended by the 
 person slain. ^ And though a person is in a place where he has a 
 right to be, and has a right to stand his ground when assaulted by 
 another, he has no right to take the latter's life without first warn- 
 ing him to desist from his attack, if he has time and opportunity to 
 give such warning.* And an instruction in a prosecution for homi- 
 cide on the subject of self-defense, though correct, is properly re- 
 fused where it does not include the proposition that the slayer, to 
 justify his acts on the ground of self-defense, must have used all 
 reasonable means within his power and consistent with his own 
 safety to avoid the danger and to avert the necessity of taking life.* 
 The apparently safe means of averting impending danger, however, 
 which one must choose rather than kill in self-defense must promise 
 absolute safety; it is not enough that it is apparently reasonably 
 
 iLevells v. State, 32 Ark. 585; Me- 62 Atl. 10G4. And see State v. Wilson, 
 
 Pherson v. State, 29 Ark. 225; Dolan v. 38 Conn. 126. 
 
 State, 40 Ark. 454; Thomas v. State, 74 2 Com. v. Self ridge, Horr. & T. Cas. 
 
 Ark. 431, 86 S. W. 404; Snelling v. 19; Com. v. Mitchka, supra; State v. 
 
 State (Fla.) 37 So. 917; State v. Bone, Kennedy, 91 N. C. 572; Rowsey v Com. 
 
 114 Iowa, 537, 87 N. W. 507; Thacker v. 116 Ky. 617. 76 S. W. 409. 
 
 Com. 24 Ky. L. Kep. 1584, 71 S. W. sstate v. Stoekhammer, -34 Wash. 
 
 931; Com. v. Mitehka, 209 Pa. 274, 58 262, 75 Pac. 810. 
 
 Atl. 474; Com. v. Johnson, 213 Pa. 432, ^Stafford v. State (Fla.) 39 So. 106. 
 
I 290] SELF-DEFENSE. 465 
 
 safe.^ And one who kills another under such circumstances that 
 his only resort for safety from the attack of the other was to take 
 his life is entitled to an acquittal, unless his previous conduct was 
 such as to deprive him of the privilege of pleading self-defense.® 
 So, one who believes from the circumstances of an assault by an- 
 ■other upon him that there is imminent danger of death or great 
 bodily harm to himself, or any member of his family, and has tried 
 all reasonable means which would, under the circumstances, natural- 
 ly occur to a humane man to repel the attack, may resort to such 
 forcible means, even with a dangerous weapon, as he believes to 
 be necessary for protection, and if such means result in the death 
 of the assailant, the homicide is excusable.^ Whether it was the 
 •duty of one who was threatened with death or great bodily harm to 
 resort to other means than killing for the preservation of his own 
 life or person is a question of fact for the jury in a prosecution 
 against him for killing the threatener.* Aside from statutory pro- 
 vision on the subject, the question whether one must resort to other 
 means before killing in self-defense depends upon whether, in view 
 •of the situation and circumstances, other means were available, and 
 whether, in view of the circumstances, or under the rules of law 
 prevailing in the jurisdiction in which the question arises, it is 
 the duty of the person assaulted or put in danger, to retreat. These 
 ■questions are fully considered in other portions of this chapter.® 
 Under the Texas statute, however, when at the time of the killing 
 some act has been done by the deceased showing an evident inten- 
 tion to murder or maim, or commit rape, robbery, larceny, or theft 
 at night, the party attacked need not resort to other means before 
 killing his assailant, because it is presumed in such case that the 
 party's safety depends upon his prompt action in killing his ad- 
 versary; but where any other unlawful or violent attack is 
 made the party assaulted is required to resort to other means be- 
 fore killing, because in such case it is presumed that there may be 
 time and opportunity to resort to other means. ^^ And the attack- 
 
 BTompkins v. State, 117 Ky. 138, 77 lOHorbach v. State, 43 Tex. 242; Ken- 
 
 S. W. 712. dall V. State, 8 Tex. App. 569; Ains- 
 
 6Com. V. Selfridge, Horr. & T. Cas. worth v. State, 8 Tex. App. 532; Wil- 
 
 19; Bames v. Com. 110 Ky. 348, 61 S. liams v. State, 22 Tex. App. 332, 3 S. 
 
 W. 733. W. 226; Branch v. State, 15 Tex. App. 
 
 7Patten v. People, 18 Mich. 314, 100 96. 
 Am. Dec. 173. Where the acts of an assailant, or 
 
 sstate V. Golden, 113 La. 791, 37 So. his words coupled with his acts, render 
 
 757. it reasonably apparent that his purpose 
 
 9See svpra, §§ 242 et seq., "Particu- is to murder, ravish, rob, maim, or dis- 
 
 lar Situations and Circumstances as Af- iigure the person assaulted, such person, 
 fecting Danger and Necessity;" and in- 
 fra, §§ 291 et seq., "Duty to Retreat." 
 Horn.— 30. 
 
466 HOMICIDE. [% 290 
 
 ing person is held to intend to inflict the injury the weapon he uses 
 is calculated to produce. ^ ' When any unlawful and violent attack 
 is made by one person upon another, which reasonably indicates ta 
 the person attacked that serious bodily injury is about to be inflicted 
 upon him, he may kill the assailant at once, without resorting to 
 other means for the prevention of such injury. ^^ And the right 
 to kill the assailant without first resorting to other means, except 
 retreat, is not restricted to the prevention of murder, maiming, or 
 disfiguring. ^ * It is only when the attack does not reasonably in- 
 dicate any such purpose that the person assaulted is required, be- 
 fore killing his assailant, to resort to other means of prevention.-'* 
 And the rule with reference to apparent, as distinguished from real, 
 danger is applicable here. ^® If the attack is murderous the slayer- 
 is not required to resort to other means to prevent the threatened 
 injury, ^^ or to do the killing while his adversary is in the very act 
 of making such attack,''^ in order to justify himself. And when 
 the deceased was in the very act of murdering the accused, it is- 
 error to charge the law with reference to self-defense against attack 
 other than with intent to murder.^* So, where-v^er a killing was 
 done in self-defense the statutory provision with reference to the 
 presumption of intent of the attacking party arising from the nature 
 
 or any other in his hehalf, may lawful- W. 978; King v. State, 13 Tex. App. 
 
 ly slay the aggressor while he is com- 277; Foster v. State, 11 Tex. App. 105. 
 mitting the offense, or when he has done Where the weapons or means used by 
 
 some act showing an evident intent to the aggressor in an assault were calcu- 
 
 comrait it. Kendall v. State, supra. lated to murder, maim, disfigure, or 
 
 iiCline V. State (Tex. Grim. App.) seriously injure, there is an absolute 
 
 28 S. W. 684. presumption of law under the Texas 
 
 isWilliams v. State, 22 Tex. App. statute that his design was to inflict the 
 
 497, 4 S. W. 64; Ainsworth v. State, injury indicated, which is imperative 
 
 and Branch v. State, supra; Hunnicut v. upon the juries as well as the- 
 
 State, 20 Tex. App. 642; Lee v. State, courts, and, when applicable, must be 
 
 21 Tex. App. 241, 17 S. W. 425; Casner given in charge to the jury. Kendall 
 
 V. State, 42 Tex. Grim. Rep. 118, 57 S. v. State, 8 Tex. App. 569. 
 W. 821; Grenshaw v. State (Tex. Grim. I70rman v. State, 22 Tex. App. 605,- 
 
 App.) 85 S. W. 1147. 58 Am. Rep. 662, 3 S. W. 468. 
 
 And where a person unlawfully as- " The right of a person assaulted by 
 saulted by another lawfully and justifi- another, where it reasonably appears by 
 ably commences to shoot in his own de- the acts of the assailant that he intend- 
 fense, he has the right to continue as ed to take the life of the person assault- 
 long as there is an appearance of dan- ed or do him some serious bodily harm, 
 ger to him. Hall v. State, 43 Tex. Grim, to kill him without resorting to other 
 Rep. 479, 66 S. W. 783. means to prevent the injury exists, not 
 
 13 Williams v. State, supra. only at the very time the attack is be- 
 
 14 Ainsworth v. State, 8 Tex. App. ing made, but also after some act is 
 
 532. And see Connell v. State, 45 Tex. done by the assailant showing an intent 
 
 Grim. Rep. 142, 78 S. W. 512. to take life. Foster v. State, supra. 
 
 iBGrenshaw v. State, supra. isCline v. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 
 
 leOrman v. State, 22 Tex. App. 604, 28 S. W. 684; McCandless v. State, 42 
 
 58 Am. Rep. 662, 3 S. W. 468; Gon- Tex. Grim. Rep. 58, 57 S. W. 672. 
 zalez V. State, 30 Tex. App. 203, 16 S. 
 
§ 290] SELF-DEFENSE. 467 
 
 of the weapon used should be given in charge ; ^ ® and this presump- 
 tion is imperative v^ith the jury, .as well as with the court. ^^ 
 
 Where the purpose or intent reasonably indicated by an unlawful 
 and violent attack is other than to murder, ravish, rob, maim, or 
 disiigure, however, before killing the aggressor the injured person, 
 or one interfering in his behalf, must resort to all other means of 
 protection, except retreat. ^ ^ And the killing must take place while 
 the person killed is in the very act of making the attack to justify 
 a plea of self-defense.^^ But the phrase "all other means," used 
 with reference to what must be done in order to justify a plea of 
 self-defense, does not import all possible means; it means reasonably 
 proper and effective under the circumstances. ^ * 
 
 So, under a statute like that of Georgia, declaring the killing of 
 another to prevent the latter from committing a felony upon the 
 slayer to be justifiable, the justification is not confined to cases in 
 which the danger seemed so urgent and pressing as to make it ap- 
 pear that it was necessary to kill the deceased in order that the slayer 
 might save his own life,^* the accompanying statutory provision 
 that if a person kills another in his defense it must appear that the 
 danger was so urgent and pressing at the time of the killing that 
 in order to save his own life the killing of the other was absolutely 
 necessary, and it must appear that the person killed was the assail- 
 ant, or that the slayer had really, and in good faith, endeavored to 
 decline any further struggle before the mortal blow was given, ap- 
 plying exclusively to mutual combats, and not being properly given 
 in charge in a case of self-defense against an attempt to commit a 
 felony. 2^ 
 
 VIII. Duty to eetebat.^ 
 a. Common-law rule. 
 
 291. Substance and application. — ^The rule with reference to "re- 
 
 isciine v. State, supra; Hall v. State, 24Stubbs v. State, 110 Ga. 917, 36 S. 
 
 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 479, 66 S. W. 783. E. 200; Delegal v. State, 109 6a. 5l8, 
 
 • 2 0Hall V. State, supra; Kendall v. 35 S. E. 105. 
 State, S Tex. App. 569. 2 6Delegal v. State, supra; Lowman 
 
 siKendall v. State, supra; Taylor v. v. State, 109 Ga. 501, 34 S. E. 1019; 
 
 State, 38 Tex. Crlm. Rep. 552, 43 S. W. Smith v. State, 100 Ga. 673, 71 Am. St. 
 
 1019; Gonzalez v. State, 30 Tex. App. Rep. 286, 32 S. E. 851; Stubbs v. State, 
 
 203, 76 S. W. 978; Orman v. State, 22 110 Ga. 916, 36 S. E. 200; Wheeler v. 
 
 Tex. App. 604, 58 Am. Rep. 662, 3 S. W. State, 112 Ga. 43, 37 S. E. 126; Free- 
 
 468; Williams v. State, 22 Tex. App. man v. State, 112 Ga. 48, 37 S. E. 172; 
 
 497 4 S. W. 64. And see Bearden v. Ragland v. State, 111 Ga. 211, 36 S. E. 
 
 Staite, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 578, 73 S. 682; Powell v. State, 101 Ga. 9, 65 Am. 
 
 W. 17. ■ St. Rep. 277, 29 S. E. 309; Teasley v. 
 
 220rman v. State, supra. State, 104 Ga. 741, 30 S. E. 938. 
 
 2 3Kendall v. State, 8 Tex. App. 569. iThe subject of retreat to the wall in 
 
468 HOMICIDE. [§ 291 
 
 treat to the wall" in. homicide, as announced by Blackstone and 
 other earlier common-law writers, is that "the person who kills an- 
 other in his own defense should have retreated as far as he con- 
 veniently or safely can to avoid the violence of the assault before he 
 turns upon his assailant.'"^ This is limited and qualified, however, 
 by another common-law rule stated by Foster to be that "in the 
 case of justifiable self-defense the injured party may repel force by 
 force in defense of his person, habitation, or property, against one 
 who manifestly intendeth and endeavoreth by violence or surprise 
 to commit a known, felony upon either. In these cases he is not 
 obliged to retreat, but may pursue his adversary till he findeth him- 
 self out of danger, and if in a conflict between them he happeneth 
 to kill, such killing is justifiable."* Construing these two rules 
 with relation to each other the duty of an assaulted person to re- 
 treat seems to depend upon whether or not killing the assailant 
 under the existing circumstances would be justifiable or merely ex- 
 cusable homicide, and killing in defense of life is excusable homi- 
 cide.* And a killing in advancement of public justice, or in obedi- 
 ence to the laws of the government, is justifiable homicide.^ So, 
 when all that is at stake is the life or property of the person as- 
 saulted, he must retreat to the wall before he can slay in self-de- 
 fense; but an officer charged with the execution of the law, or with 
 other public duties, cannot be required or permitted to retreat when 
 assaulted or opposed, and leave the would-be lawbreaker to work 
 his will, but must stand his ground and kill if necessary to the per- 
 formance of his duty; and it is the duty of all persons to uphold 
 the law and prevent the commission of felonious acts, and killing to 
 prevent, or in resistance of, such acts being in furtherance of, and 
 to sustain, the law, is justifiable, and no retreat is required. These 
 rules, subject to certain qualifications and restrictions, furnish the 
 basis for the rules of law applicable to cases of self-defense in the 
 United States, and have been adopted without change in some of 
 the states. The courts of some of the states, however, have adopted 
 the view that the rule giving the right to stand ground against one 
 attempting a felony applies to the resistance of a felonious assault, 
 as well as to resistance to collateral felonies, so that the right 
 to stand ground without retreat would exist where a person was 
 feloniously assaulted by another, as well as in cases of resistance 
 
 homicide 13 fully discussed in a note to 4 Com. v. Selfridee, Horr & T Cas. 
 
 State V. Gardner, 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 49. 19. ■ 
 
 24 Bl. Com. Chases's ed. 934. sibid, 
 SFost. C. L. a;3. 
 
§ 291] SEaiiF-DEFENSE. 469 
 
 of attempts at the commission of a collateral felony; and courts 
 of other states have taken the position that the common-law rule in 
 its entirety is not applicable to American conditions, and ha^e 
 extended the right to stand ground and resist without retreating 
 to all cases in which the person assaulted is without fault, and in 
 a place where he has a right to be, and doing what he has a right 
 to do; and the doctrine that one need not retreat if he is in the 
 right is now recognized in practically all the American states, ex- 
 cept those in which the original common-law doctrine of retreat to 
 the wall in all cases of excusable self-defense has been adopted. 
 
 b. The "flight" rule. 
 
 292. Substance of — The rule as adopted by courts holding to the 
 common-law doctrine of retreat to the wall in all cases of justifiable 
 self-defense is that a person assaulted, except in his own house, is 
 bound to retreat to the wall if he can do so without apparently in- 
 creased danger, whether the assault was felonious and dangerous, 
 or otherwise.^ There can be no necessity to kill if there is a way 
 
 iState V. Donnelly, 69 Iowa, 705, 58 120, 53 Atl. 354 ; State v. Hollis, Houst 
 Am. Rep. 234, 27 N. W. 369; State v. Crim. Eep. (Del.) 24; State v. New- 
 Abarr, 39 Iowa, 185; State v. Mahan, comb, Houst. Crim. Eep. (Del.) 66; 
 68 Iowa, 304, 20 N. W. 449, 27 N. W. State v. West, Houst. Crim. Ren. (Del.) 
 249; State v. McKinley, 82 Iowa, 445, 371; King v. Bridges, 5 Haw. 467; State 
 48 N. W. 804; State v. Jones, 89 Iowa, v. Eheams. 34 Minn. 18, 24 N. W. 302; 
 182, 56 N. W. 427; State v. Warner, 100 State v. Gardner (Minn.) 2 L.E.A.(]Sr. 
 Iowa, 260, 69 N. W. 546; Fallin v. S.) 49, 104 N. W. 971 ; State v. Shippey, 
 State, 86 Ala. 13, 5 So. 423; Blackburn 10 Minn. 223, 88 Am. Dec. 70, Gil. 70; 
 V. State, 86 Ala. 595, 6 So. 96; Poe v. State v. Wells, 1 N. J. L. 424, 1 Am. 
 State, 87 Ala. 65, 6 So. 378; Davis v. Dec. 211; People v. Sullivan, 7 N. Y. 
 State, 92 Ala. 20, 9 So. 616; Springfield 396; People v. Harper, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 
 V. State, 96 Ala. 81, 38 Am. St. Eep. 180; People v. Johnson, 139 N. Y. 358, 
 85, 11 So. 250; Roden v. State, 97 Ala. 34 N. E. 920; People v. Constantino, 
 54, 12 So. 419; Brown v. State, 83 Ala. 153 N. Y. 24, 47 N. E. 37; People v. 
 33, 3 Am. St. Rep. 685, 3 So. 857 ; Mc- Kennedy, 159 N. Y. 346, 70 Am. St. Rep. 
 Daniel v. State, 97 Ala. 14, 12 So. 241 ; 557, 54 N. E. 51 ; Com. v. Breyessee, 160 
 Wilkins v. State, 98 Ala. 1, 13 So. 312; Pa. 451, 40 Am. St. Rep. 729, 28 Atl. 
 Carter v. State, 82 Ala. 13, 2 So. 766; 824: Com. v. Ware, 137 Pa. 465, 20 Atl. 
 Morrison v. State, 84 Ala. 405, 4 So. 806; Com. v. Herold, 5 Pa. Dist. R. 
 402; Sullivan v. State, 102 Ala. 135, 623; State v. Summer, 55 S. C. 32, 74 
 48 Am. St. Rep. 22, 15 So. 264; Comp- Am. St. Rep. 707, 32 S. E. 771; State v. 
 ton V. State, 110 Ala. 24, 20 So. 119; Trammell, 40 S. C. 331, 42 Am. St. Rep. 
 Kilgore v. State, 124 Ala. 24, 27 So. 4; 874, 18 S. E. 940; State v. Corley, 43 S. 
 Welch V. State, 124 Ala. 41, 27 So. 307; C. 127, 20 S. E. 989; Allen v. United 
 Howard v. State, 110 Ala. 92, 20 So. States, 164 U. S. 492, 41 L. ed. 528, 17 
 365; Stoball V. State, 116 Ala. 454, 23 So. Sup. Ct. Rep. 154; United States v. 
 162; Linnehan v. State, 116 Ala. 471, 22 Herbert, 2 Hayw. & H. 210, Fed. Cas. 
 So. 662; Pugh V. State, 132 Ala. 1, 31 No. 15,354a. 
 
 So. 727; State v. Walker, 9 Houst. The rule that self-defense cannot be 
 (Del.) 464, 33 Atl. 227; State v. War- invoked by the accused in a prosecution 
 ren, 1 Marv. (Del.) 487, 41 Atl. 190; for homicide unless he retreated, if re- 
 State V. Peo, 9 Houst. (Del.) 488, 33 treat was practicable, has been assert- 
 Atl, 257 ; State V. Brown, 4 Penn. (Del.) ed by the Missouri courts. State v. 
 
470 HOMICIDE. [1 292 
 
 of retreat open to the slayer, available by the exercise of reason- 
 able prudence.^ This is the common-law rule.^ 
 
 Within this rule an unprovoked assault does not excuse failure 
 to retreat, or justify the person assaulted in standing his ground 
 and killing his assailant, unless the peril to life or limb is imminent 
 and there is no reasonable mode of escape.* And the duty to re- 
 treat if he can safely do so, or use such other means of escape as 
 are within his power to avoid killing, resting with a person as- 
 saulted by another, is not affected by .the fact that the attack upon 
 him was of such a character as to create in his mind a ''f^.^onable 
 belief that he was in danger of death or great bodily harm." To 
 justify the taking of human life on the ground of self-defense it 
 must appear that the slayer retreated as far as he could with safety, 
 or that he could not retreat without increasing his apparent danger, 
 unless he brings himself within the protection given by law to a 
 person attacked in his own dwelling or place of business.'' And 
 it must appear that he retreated in good faith, with an honest in- 
 tention to avoid the violence of the assault;'^ and that the only 
 purpose of the act which caused death was to save his o^vn life or 
 escape great bodily harm, and that the danger was real, imminent, 
 and impending.* So, except under circumstances involving the 
 right to repel a forcible and felonious attempt at a crime, a person ? 
 attacked is not, by reason of his own freedom from fault and of 
 imminent danger, absolved from the duty to retreat, if it reason- 
 
 Dettmer, 124 Mo. 426, 27 S. W. 1117; in his defense, he must likewise have re- 
 State V. Gilmore, 95 Mo. 554, 8 S. E. treated as far as he safely could before 
 359, 912. his brother would be justified in taking 
 
 But this rule may be deemed to have the life of his assailant in his defense, 
 
 been repudiated, and these cases seem to But see State v. Evans, 33 W. Va. 417, 
 
 have been overruled, by State v. Huds- 10 S. E. 792, which, with other subse- 
 
 peth, 150 Mo. 12, 51 S. W. 483, and quent West Virginia cases, adopts the 
 
 State V. Bartlett, 170 Mo. 658, 59 L.R.A. "stand ground" rule. 
 
 756, 71 S. W. 148. sHolmes v. State, 100 Ala. 80, 14 So. 
 
 So, in Parrish v. State, 14 Neb. 60, 864; Cleveland v. State, 86 Ala. 2, 5 So. 
 
 15 N. W. 357, it was held that, in a case 426; Lewis v. State, 88 Ala. 11, 6 So. 
 
 of a personal conflict resulting in death, 755; Keith v. State, 97 Ala. 32, 11 So. 
 
 in order to sustain a plea of self-defense, 914. 
 
 it mu.st appear that the slayer had en- sPierson v. State, 12 Ala. 149; Eiland 
 
 deavored by all reasonable means before v. State, 52 Ala. 322. 
 
 giving the fatal blow, to escape from the 'iDorsey v. State, 107 Ala. 157, 18 So. 
 
 scene of the difficulty. But see Willis 199. 
 
 V. State, 43 Neb. 102, 61 N. W. 254, BState v. Powell (Del.) 61 Atl. 960. 
 
 adopting the "stand ground" rule. cPerry v. State, 94 Ala. 25, 10 So. 
 
 And in State v. Greer, 22 W. Va. 650. 
 
 800, it was held that a, person who pro- 'State v. Harmon, 4 Penn. (Del.) 
 
 vokes an assault must retreat as far 580, 60 Atl. 866; State v. Emory (Del.) 
 
 as he safely can before he can take the 58 Atl. 1036. 
 
 life of his assailant in defense of his sState v. Emory, supra. 
 own; and where a brother interferes 
 
I 292] SELF-DEFENSE. 471 
 
 ably appears that by retreating he could avoid the danger.® And 
 the duty to retreat is not affected by the fact that the person as- 
 saulted was in a place where he had a right to be.**" ISTor is it 
 affected by the fact that it involved the necessity of temporarily 
 abandoning property to the possession of the person assaulted. ^ ^ 
 
 293. Instructions as to — Under the rule requiring retreat to the 
 wall as a preliminary to the right to kill in self-defense, the jury 
 in a prosecution for homicide should be informed as to this require- 
 ment, and an instruction as to self-defense, or real or apparent dan- 
 ger, is erroneous where it omits or ignores the element of the duty 
 to retreat.' And an instruction is erroneous under that rule where 
 it excludes all consideration of, or inquiry as to, the duty to retreat.^ 
 Xor is an instruction proper where it assumes that the slayer was 
 in imminent peril authorizing him to stand his ground, unless he 
 could have retreated with reasonable prospects of safety.^ 
 
 c. The "stand ground to prevent felony" rule. 
 
 294. Statements and application of — The rule is practically uni- 
 versal that in cases in which self-defense is justifiable, as distin- 
 
 sKirkland v. State, 141 Ala. 45, 37 31, 27 So. 775; Jimmerson v. State, su- 
 
 So. 352. pra; Mitchell v. State, 133 Ala. 65, 32 
 
 lostate V. Eochester, 72 S. C. 194, 51 So. 132; Finch v. State, supra; McKee 
 
 S. E. 685. V. State, 82 Ala. 32, 2 So. 451 ; Williams 
 
 If a 'person is attacked while on his v. State, 83 Ala. 16, 3 So. 616; Wal- 
 own premises by a person on the public ler v. State, 89 Ala. 79, 8 So. 153; Amos 
 highway, the former is bound to retreat v. State, 96 Ala. 120, 11 So. 424; Holmes 
 before taking the life of his adversary v. State, 100 Ala. 80, 14 So. 864; Thomas 
 if there is a probability of his being v. State, 103 Ala. 18, 16 So. 4; Gold- 
 able to escape without losing his life or smith v. State, 105 Ala. 8, 16 So. 933; 
 suffering grievous bodily harm, since he Compton v. State, 110 Ala. 24, 20 So. 
 has no right to attempt to eject his ad- 119; Howard v. State, 110 Ala. 92, 20 
 versary from a place where he has u. So. 365; Stoball v. State, 116 Ala. 454, 
 right to be. Ibid. 23 So. 162; Hendricks v. State, 122 Ala. 
 
 iiFinch V. State, 81 Ala. 41, 1 So. 42, 26 So. 242; Ford v. State, 129 Ala. 
 
 665. 16. 30 So. 27 : Scoggins v. State, 120 Ala. 
 
 iCribbs v. State, 86 Ala. 613, 6 So. 369, 25 So. 180. 
 109; Garrett v. State, 97 Ala. 18, 14 sPugh v. State, 132 Ala. 1, 31 So. 
 
 So. 327; Welch v. State, 124 Ala. 41, 727. 
 
 27 So. 307; Jimmerson v. State, 133 Ala. And an instruction in a prosecution 
 
 18, 32 So. 141 ; Scott v. State, 133 Ala. for homicide that the rule of law that 
 
 112, 32 So. 623; Gordon v. State, 140 a man must not fight willingly does not 
 
 Ala. 29, 36 So. 1009; Wilson v. State, mean that a man must not fight willing- 
 
 128 Ala. 17, 29 So. 569; Mann v. State, ly when he fights in self-defense is er- 
 
 134 Ala. 1, 32 So. 704; Bardin v. State roneous as misleading, since he cannot 
 
 (Ala.) 38 So. 833; Morris v. State fight willingly in self-defense unless he 
 
 (Ala.) 39 So. 608. is free from fault in bringing on the dif- 
 
 2PQe V. State, 87 Ala. 65, 6 So. 378; ficulty, and has no reasonable way of 
 Kutledge v. State, 88 Ala. 85, 7 So. retreat or escape without increasing his 
 335; McDaniel v. State, 97 Ala. 14, 12 peril, and the assault is of such a char- 
 So. 241 ;. Ellis v. State, 105 Ala. 72, 17 acter as to endanger his life, or im- 
 So. 119; Bondurant v. State, 125 Ala. press a reasonable man that to save hia 
 
472 HOanCIDE. IS 294 
 
 guished from excusable, a man may repel force by force in defense 
 of bis person, babitation, or property against one wbo manifestly 
 intends and endeavors by violence and surprise to commit a known 
 felony, sucb as murder, rape, robbery, arson, burglary, and tbe 
 like, upon either, and in sucb case be is not required to retreat,, 
 but may pursue bis adversary until be bas secured bimself from 
 all danger; and if be kills him in so doing, it is justifiable bomi- 
 cide. ^ Tbis rule applies, whatever may be tbe grade of tbe attempt- 
 ed felony.^ And botb at common law and under various statute* 
 on tbe subject, it is unquestionably applicable where tbe felony at- 
 tempted is a collateral one, such as robbery, or tbe forcibly taking 
 possession of another's property.^ And tbe courts of some of tbe 
 states have held, in opposition to tbe "flight" rule previously con- 
 sidered, that the rule that one may oppose another attempting the 
 perpetration of a felony, if need be to the taking of the felon's 
 life, and that be is under no obligation to fly, applies in case of a 
 person attacking another with a murderous or felonious intent di- 
 rected against the person himself. * And a person upon whom, with- 
 out fault on bis part, an assault with intent to kill is made, is not 
 required to retreat, but may stand his ground, and if, in his neces- 
 sary self-defense, be kills bis assailant, it is excusable homicide.® 
 Under this theory the rule that a person killing in his own defense 
 without retreat is excusable only when tbe danger was so urgent 
 
 life or himself from great bodily harm sStoneham v. Com. supra; Baker v. 
 
 it is necessary to kill. Harbour v. State, Com. 93 Ky. 302, 19 S. W. 975. 
 
 140 Ala. 103, 37 So. 330. 4State v. Dixon, 75 N. C. 275; State 
 
 lErwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 23 v. Kennedy, 91 N. C. 572; Erwin v. 
 Am. Rep. 733; btorey v. State, 71 Ala. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 23 Am. Rep. 
 329; Carroll v. State, 23 Ala. 28, 58 Am. 733; Ragland v. State, supra. 
 Dee. 282; Carpenter v. State, 62 Ark. If one person assaults another with a 
 286, 36 S. W. 900; Mitchell v. State, 43 deadly weapon, apparently meaning to 
 Fla. 188, 30 So. 803; Richard v. State, use it, or if, without such weapon, he 
 42 Fla. 528, 29 So. 413; Lane v. State, assaults him with threats of death or 
 44 Fla. 105, 32 So. 896; Powell v. State, serious bodily harm, or by any other 
 101 Ga. 9, 65 Am. St. Rep. 277, 2^ S. means indicating that it is his inten- 
 E. 309; State v. Thompson, 9 Iowa, 188, tion to inflict an injury of such a, char- 
 74 Am. Dec. 342 ; State v. Kennedy, 20 acter as to imperil life or inflict serious 
 Iowa, 569; Burton v. Com. 23 Ky. L. bodily harm, the latter may omit to re- 
 Rep. J 915, 66 S. W. 516; Brabston v. treat, and take life if necessary to repel 
 State, 68 Miss. 208, 8 So. 326; Scrib- the assault. United States v. King, 34 
 ner v. Beach, 4 Denio, 448. 47 Am. Dec. Fed. 302; State v. Clark, 134 N. C. 
 265; State v. Conally, 3 Or. 69; Stone- 698, 47 S. E. 36. 
 
 ham V. Com. 86 Va. 523, 10 S. E. 238; estate v. Elevins, 138 N. C. 668, SO S. 
 
 United States v. Outerbridge, 5 Sawy. E. 763; State v. Hough, 138 N. C. 663, 
 
 620, Fed. Cas. No. 15,978; United States 50 S. E. 709; State v. Clark, 51 W Va. 
 
 V. Wiltberger, 3 Vi'ash. C. C. 515, Fed. 457, 41 S. E. 204. 
 
 Cas. No. 16,738. And where a person was attempting 
 
 zRagland v. State, 111 Ga. 211, 36 to kill another or do him great bodily 
 
 S. E. 682. harm, if a third person had a well- 
 
§ 294] SELF-BEFENSE. 473 
 
 and pressing at the time of the killing that it was necessary to 
 save his own life applies to cases of mutual combat or-ly.^ The 
 abolition of the common-law rule of the forfeiture of goods in case 
 of an excusable homicide has no effect either upon the slayer's duty 
 to retreat or upon his right to stand ground. '^ 
 
 d. The "stand ground when in the right" rule. 
 
 295. General statement of. — The doctrine has been asserted by a 
 preponderance of American authority that the common-law rule re- 
 quiring retreat to the wall before killing in self-defense is inap- 
 plicable to American conditions; and the courts of a great many 
 of the states, including those which have adopted the rule that the 
 right to stand ground to prevent the commission of a felony includes 
 felonious attacks as well as collateral felonies, have adopted the 
 rule that a man unlawfully assaulted in a place where he has a right 
 to be, and when doing what he has a right to do, and put in danger, 
 real or apparent, of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm, 
 is not required to endeavor to escape from his assailant, but may 
 stand his j^TOund and repel force with force, even to the taking 
 of the life of the assailant, if necessary, or in good reason apparent- 
 ly necessary, for the preservation of his own life, or to protect him- 
 self from great bodily harm. * The common-law doctrine of retreat 
 to the wall is only applicable under this rule in all cases in which 
 the slayer voluntarily entered into a fight, or in which the par- 
 ties engaged in a mutual combat, or in which the slayer, being 
 
 grounded belief or apprehension that he N. E. 980; Foster v. Territory, 6 Ariz. 
 
 was attempting to do so, the third per- 240, 56 Pac. 738; La Rue v. State, 64 
 
 son had a right to interfere, and if, Ark. 144, 41 S. W. 53; Carpenter v. 
 
 while engaging in the act of interfer- State, 62 Ark. 286, 36 S. W. 900 ; People 
 
 ence, the assailant advanced upon him v. Lewis, 117 Cal. 186, 59 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 in such a manner as to induce him rea- 167, 48 Pac. 1088; People v. Newcom- 
 
 sonably to apprehend, and he did actual- er, 118 Cal. 263, 50 Pac. 405; People v. 
 
 ly apprehend, that he was about to be Ye Park, 62 Cal. 204; People v. Her- 
 
 killed or receive great bodily harm, he bert, 61 Cal. 544; People v. Gon- 
 
 is justified in taking the life of the as- zales, 71 Cal. 569, 12 Pac. 783; Peo- 
 
 sailant in order to save his own or pre- pie v. Hecker, 109 Cal. 451, 30 L.R.A. 
 
 vent great bodily harm to himself; and 403, 42 Pac. 307; Babcock v. People, 
 
 since the interference was but the per- 13 Colo. 515j 22 Pac. 817; Boykin 
 
 formance of a legal duty, he has the v. People, 22 Colo. 496, 45 Pac. 419; 
 
 right to stand and defend himself Ritchey v. People, 23 Colo. 314, 47 Pac. 
 
 against a threatened attack. State v. 272, 384; Fields v. State, 134 Ind. 46, 32 
 
 Clark, supra. N. E. 780; Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80, 
 
 fiRagland v. State, 111 Ga. 211, 36 S. 26 Am. Rep. 52; Miller v. State, 74 Ind. 
 
 E. 682. 1 ; Page v. State, 141 Ind. 236, 40 N. E. 
 
 7Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 23 745; State v. Petteys, 65 Kan. 625, 70 
 
 Am. Rep. 733. Pac. 588 ; State v. Reed, 53 Kan. 767, 42 
 
 iHammond v. People, 199 111. 173, 64 Am. St. Rep. 322, 37 Pac. 174; State v. 
 
474 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 [1 295 
 
 the assailant, does not endeavor in good faith to decline any fur- 
 ther struggle before doing the act which causes death. ^ And a 
 man having a right of self-defense from the standpoint of apparent 
 danger threatening him with death or serious bodily injury has a 
 legal right to stand his ground and slay, if necessary to protect him- 
 self, even though an assault had not been made upon him.^ ISTor 
 does the fact that a person violently attacked on his own premises, 
 without provocation, was outside of his dwelling render it necessary 
 for him to retreat, or consider whether he can retreat, before ex- 
 ercising his right of self-defense.* And this rule gives equal rights 
 
 Hatch. 57 Kan. 420, 57 Am. St. Eep. 337, 
 
 46 Pao. 70S; Holloway v. Com. 11 Bush, 
 344 ; Luby v. Com. 12 Bush, 1 ; Bohan- 
 non V. Com. 8 Bush, 481, 8 Am. Rep. 
 474 ; Mareum v. Com. 9 Ky. L. Rep. 253 
 4 S. W. 788; Riley v. Com. 94 Ky. 266, 
 22 S. W. 222; Eversole v. Com. 95 Ky. 
 623, 26 S. W. 816; MeClurg v. Com. 17 
 Ky. L. Rep. 1339, 36 S. W. 14; Moody 
 V. Com. 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1198, 43 S. W. 
 209; Arnold v. Com. 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1566, 
 55 S. W. 894 ; State v. Robertson, 50 La. 
 Ann. 92, 69 Am. St. Rep. 393, 23 So. 9 ; 
 State V. Thompson, 45 La. Ann. 969, 13 
 So. 392; People v. Macard, 73 Mich. 15, 
 40 N". W. 784; McCall v. State (Miss.) 
 29 So. 1003; Long v. State, 52 Miss. 23; 
 Bang V. State, 60 Miss. 571; Ellerbe v. 
 State, 79 Miss. 10, 30 So. 57; Conner v. 
 State (Miss.) 13 So. 934; State v. Sloan, 
 
 47 Mo. 604; State v. Bartlett, 170 Mo. 
 658. 59 L.R.A. 756, 71 S. W. 148; State 
 V. Hudspeth, 150 Mo. 12, 51 S. W. 483; 
 State V. Rolla, 21 Mont. 582, 55 Pac. 
 523; Willis v. State, 43 Neb. 102, 61 N. 
 W. 254; State v. Dixon, 75 N. C. 275; 
 State V. Gentry, 125 N. 0. 733, 34 S. E. 
 706 ; State v. Blevins, 138 N. C. 668, 50 
 S. E. 763; State v. Hough, 138 N. C. 
 663, 50 S. E. 709; State v. Castle, 133 
 N. C. 769, 46 S. E. 1 ; Erwin v. State, 29 
 ^hio St. 186, 23 Am. Rep. 733; State 
 V. Martin, 9 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 778: 
 State V. Noble, 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint, 1 ; 
 State V. Snelbaker, 8 Ohio Dee. Reprint, 
 466 ; Venable v. State, 1 Ohio C. C. 301 ; 
 Kirk V. Territory, 10 Okla. 46, 60 Pac. 
 797; Mahaffey v. Territory, 11 Okla. 213, 
 66 Pac. 342; State v. Gibson, 43 Or. 184, 
 73 Pac. 333; State v. Sherman, 16 R. I. 
 631, 18 Atl. 1040; State v. Ballon, 20 
 R. I. 607, 40 Atl. 881 ; High v. State, 26 
 Tex. App. 545, 8 Am. St. Rep. 488, 10 
 S. W. 238; Ross V. State, 10 Tex. App. 
 455. 38 Am. Rep. 643; Casner v. State, 
 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 118, 57 S. W. 821; 
 
 Williams v. State, 30 Tex. App. 429, 17 
 S. W. 1071; Baltrip v. State, 30 Tex. 
 App. 545, 17 S. W. 1108; Nalley v. State, 
 30 Tex. App. 456, 17 S. W. 1084; May v. 
 State, 23 Tex. App. 146, 4 S. W. 591; 
 State V. Clark, 51 W. Va. 457, 41 S. E. 
 204; State v. Evans, 33 W. Va. 417, 10 
 S. E. 792 ; State v. Cain, 20 W. Va. 679 ; 
 State V. Zeigler, 40 W. Va. 593, 21 S. E. 
 763; State v. Cushing, 14 Wash. 527, 
 53 Am. St. Rep. 883, 45 Pac. 145 ; State 
 V. McCann, 16 Wash. 249, 47 Pac. 443, 
 49 Pac. 216; Perkins v. State, 78 Wis. 
 551, 47 N. W. 827; Beard v. United 
 States, 158 U. S. 550, 39 L. ed. 1086, 15 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 962; Alherty v. United 
 States, 162 U. S. 499, 40 L. ed. 1051, 16 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 864; Eovve v. United 
 States, 164 U. S. 546, 41 L. ed. 547, 17 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 172. 
 
 While a person assavilted by another 
 must not take life except in case of ap- 
 parent necessity, he is not required to 
 avoid the necessity by retreating before 
 his assailant. Palmer v. State, 9 Wyo. 
 40, 87 Am. St. Rep. 910, 59 Pac. 793. ' 
 
 And evidence that a man disabled in 
 one arm procured c pistol to defend him- 
 self against a threatened assault by an 
 able-bodied man, and that he was after- 
 wards threatened by another person in 
 u public street while surrounded by a 
 crowd of excited people, and then strurlc 
 by a third person, whereupon he im- 
 mediately shot and killed the latter, 
 laises no question as to the duty of the 
 slayer to retreat. Runyan v. State, 57 
 Ind. 80, 26 Am. Rep. 52. 
 
 2Harris v. People, 32 Colo. 211, 75 
 Pac. 427. 
 
 3 Cooper v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 89 S. W. 1068. 
 
 4Beard v. United States, 158 U. S. 
 550, 39 L. ed. 1080, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 902; Foster v. Territory, 6 Ariz. 240, 56 
 Pac. 738; Baker v. Com. 93 Ky. 302, 19 
 
S 295] tJELF-DEFENSE 475 
 
 to all persons in public places.® And a man is not bound to retreat 
 before killing, when, without fault on his part, another attacks him 
 in a public highway,* or in a city street.^ Nor is he bound to re- 
 treat when, Y'ithoat fault on his part, another conamences an alter- 
 cation with him on a public highway, though at the time of the kill- 
 ing the participants in the altercation had left it.^ Nor is a guest 
 in the office of a hotel, who has a right to be there, required to 
 step aside when an assailant advances upon him with a deadly 
 weapon. He has the right to remain where he is and resist the 
 attack, and do whatever is necessary, or to him apparently nec- 
 essary, to save his life or protect himself from great bodily harm.® 
 And a person attacked by another may stand his ground and refuse 
 to retreat, under statutory provisions that in order to entitle a per- 
 son to the benfit of self-defense it must appear that the circumstances 
 were sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable man, and that the 
 party killing really acted under their influence, and not in a spirit 
 of revenge; but he should do what he could to avoid the necessity 
 for killing, and at the same time exercise his right to prevent the 
 threatened felony. ^ " 
 
 296. Instructions as to.— .Under the "stand ground when in the 
 right" rule as well as under the "retreat to the wall" rule, the con- 
 ditions under which retreat is necessary must be stated to the jury 
 in an instruction in a prosecution for homicide on an issue of self- 
 defense.^ And giving in charge the abstract doctrine of retreat to 
 the wall) and saying nothing about other and opposing doctrines ap- 
 
 S. W. 975; Kirk v. Territory, 10 Okla. not a ground for reversal in a proseeu- 
 
 46, 60 Pae. 797. tion for homicide by a person attacked 
 
 And where a person afterwards killed in a public street, since it is but another 
 
 began the altercation in which the kill- form of instructing that a person 
 
 ing took place, and was the aggressor in charged with crime is presumed to be 
 
 the difficulty, and at the time he was innocent until proved guilty. People v. 
 
 shot was advancing upon the accused, Lynch, 101 Cal. 229, 35 Pac. 860. 
 
 who was where he was employed to be, 'Clay v. State, 44 Tex. Grim. Eep. 129, 
 
 and was backing away from the deceased 69 S. W. 413; State v. Bartlett, 170 Mo. 
 
 w.arning him that he would shoot him if 658. .'59 L.E.A. 756, 71 S. W. 148. 
 
 he cnme on, the homicide is not murder. sMaiden v. State (Miss.) 11 So. 488. 
 
 Stephens v. State, 105 Ga. 653, 31 S. niowo v. United States, 164 U. S. 546, 
 
 E. *U0. 41 L. ed. 547, 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 172. 
 
 sCarnes v. Com. 27 Ky. L. Eep. 1205. lOThomas v. State, 74 Ark. 431, 86 S. 
 
 87 S. W. 1123. W. 404. 
 
 oState V. Hudspeth, 150 Mo. 12, 51 S. iPerkins v. State, 78 Wis. 551, 47 N. 
 
 W. 483 ; Arnold v. Cora. 21 Ky. L. Rep. W. 827 ; May v. State, 23 Tex. App. 146, 
 
 1566, 55 S. W. 894; Carnes v. Com. 4 S. W. 591 ; Ball v. State, 29 Tex. App. 
 
 supra ; State v. Ballon, 20 E. I. 607, 40 107, 14 S. W. 1012. 
 
 Atl. 861. Where the common-law requirement 
 
 And an instruction that a man walk- that an assaulted person must retreat 
 ing upon a public highway is presumed to the wall is changed by statutory in- 
 to have been there for a lawful purpose, novation, as in Texas, and an issue of 
 though perhaps not strictly correct, is self-defense arises in a prosecution for 
 
476 HOMICIDE. (.1 29© 
 
 plicable in cases in which the person killed was the assailant and 
 the slayer was not at fault, is erroneous where there was a conflict 
 of evidence as to who was the aggressor.* And a failure of the 
 court to instruct on an issue of self-defense that the accused was not 
 bound to retreat will be deemed to have weakened his plea of self- 
 defense and prejudiced his legal rights, so as to be a ground for 
 rever.sal, though not objected to, where it appears that it was with- 
 in the power of the slayer to have retreated, and thus to have avoid- 
 ed the necessity of killing. ^ Nor can the jury in such a prosecution 
 be confined by instructions on an issue of self-defense to the ques- 
 tion whether the accused had retreated as far as he safely could 
 before killing the deceased.* And an improper instruction as to 
 duty to retreat, given in short, quick sentences, is net "iired by a 
 subsequent instruction laying down the law correctly in long, in- 
 volved sentences.^ 
 
 An instruction in a prosecution for homicide implying that it 
 was the duty of the slayer to have retreated when assaulted, unless 
 it would have been more hazardous to do so, however, is not preju- 
 dicial where the jury were also charged that a person, being where 
 he had a right to be and without fault, may, without retreating, 
 repel force with force.® And an instruction as to when a person 
 who is assaulted is bound to retreat in order to avoid the necessity 
 of killing is unnecessary and irrelevant where it appears that the 
 slayer was in full retreat when he fired the fatal shot.^ Nor is it 
 necessary to charge the jury that the slayer must have resorted to 
 
 homicide, the jury should always be in- So, an instruction that a person ia 
 
 strueted that the assaulted party is not not compelled to flee from an adversary 
 
 bound to retreat in order to make per- who assaults him, but before he can 
 
 feet his right of self-defense. Bell v. justify homicide the assaiilt must be so 
 
 State, 17 Tex. App. 538. fierce as not to allow him to yield with- 
 
 2Harris v. People, 32 Colo. 211, 75 out manifest danger to his life or of 
 
 Pac. 427. enormous bodily harm, though in such 
 
 sBell V. State, supra. case, if there be no other way of saving 
 
 But the omission to instruct the jury his life or saving himself from great 
 
 in a prosecution for horaicide that the bodily harm, he may, in self-defense, kill 
 
 person assaulted in a place where he his assailant, is erroneous in failing to 
 
 had a right to be was not bound to re- discriminate between the classes of cases 
 
 treat, which omission was not excepted wherein the doctrine of retreat to the 
 
 to at the time, nor instructions asked wall is, and is not, applicable; and the 
 
 for supplying the omission, cannot be error is not cured by another instrue- 
 
 urged for the first time on a motion for tion by which the application of the 
 
 a new trial, unless injury to the accused doctrine to the facts of the case is cor- 
 
 on account of the omission is shown, rectly made. Ritchey v. People, 2S 
 
 Ifaunt V. State, 33 Tex. Crim. Rep. 252, Colo. 314, 47 Pac. 272, 384.' 
 20 S. W. 206. estate v. Carter, 15 Wash. 121, 45 
 
 < State V. Kennedy, 7 Nev. 374. Pac. 745. 
 
 BPerkins v. State, 78 Wis. 551, 47 N. 'May v. State, 23 Tex. App. 146, 45- 
 
 W. 827. S. W. 591. 
 
S 296] SEIiF-DEFENSE. 477 
 
 other means besides retreating before lie was authorized to act in 
 seK-defense, where it appears that the only means he could have 
 resorted to, except those adopted, was to retreat; and in such case 
 a charge that he was not bound to retreat does not infringe upon 
 his rights. * And while a person assaulted by another may stand 
 his ground and meet force with force, refusal to so instruct is not 
 reversible error where the instruction might induce the jury to sup- 
 pose that the slayer would be justified in killing the deceased, al- 
 though he had no reasonable grounds to believe that he was in 
 danger of serious injury.® Nor are instructions in a prosecution 
 for homicide on an issue of self-defense, as to the right to pursue, 
 proper in the absence of a showing of actual pursuit.^" 
 
 297. Effect of expectation of attack — The mere fact that a man ex- 
 pects to be attacked does not, under the "stand ground when in the 
 right" rule, deprive him of going to places where he has a right 
 to go; and going to such places with such knowledge does not de- 
 prive him of the right to plead self-defense, where he is attacked 
 and compelled to kill his assailant in order to save himself.^ And 
 a person whose life has been threatened is not required to remain 
 at home and abstain from transacting business or appearing in pub- 
 lic* Nor does one who rightfully goes to the house of another by 
 invitation lose his right of self-defense in going, because he might 
 he compelled to kill in self-defense.* And a threatened person is 
 not required to leave his home or secrete himself to avoid his foe.'* 
 
 298. "Stand ground" rule as affected by "necessity" rule The doc- 
 trine of necessity and danger, real or apparent, applies here as else- 
 where, and the taking of life cannot be justified or excused, except 
 
 sConnell v. State, 45 Tex. Grim. Rep. 222 ; Wilson v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 185, 
 
 142, 75 S. W. 512. 68 S. W. 121. 
 
 And an instruction that if the person iPeople v. Gonzales, 71 Cal. 569, 12 
 
 killed threw his hand behind him as if Pao. 783; State v. Matthews, 148 Mo. 
 
 to draw a weapon, and the slayer had 185, 71 Am. St. Rep. 594, 49 S. W. 1085. 
 
 reasonable ground to believe, viewed A person who goes to a store to pur- 
 
 from his standpoint, that he was in dan- chase supplies, and finds there one who 
 
 ger of his life or of serious bodily in- has threatened his life, is not under 
 
 jury, and acting from his standpoint, legal duty to avoid a diiBculty, and it 
 
 under such fear or apprehension, he is improper in a prosecution against him 
 
 killed his antagonist, his act was justi- for killing the threatener in a difficulty 
 
 fiable, is not subject to objection as fail- then arising, to permit the prosecutor 
 
 ing to tell the jury that he was not to ask why he did not leave the store 
 
 bound to retreat before killing in self- and go home. Games v. Gom. 27 Ky. 
 
 defense. Smith v. State, 33 Tex. Grim. L. Rep. 1205, 87 S. W. 1123. 
 
 Rep. 513, 27 S. W. 137. 2Ibid. 
 
 sTurley v. State (Neb.) 104 N. W. ^People v. Gronzales, supra. 
 
 934. 4Bohannon v. Com. 8 Bush, 482, 8 Am. 
 
 lORU^ T. Com. 94 Ky. 266, 22 S. W. Rep. 474. 
 
478 HOMICIDE. R 298 
 
 on the ground of necessity. ^ But in tliis class of cases the law does 
 not hold that there was no necessity, or that the necessity was brought 
 on by the slayer, merely because he failed to fly from his assailant 
 when he might safely have done so.^ A man can only kill in self- 
 defense from necessity, whether he has a right to stand his ground, 
 or it is his duty to retreat; but in the one case he can have that 
 necessity determined in view of the fact that he has a right to 
 stand his ground, and on the other hand he must show, as one feature 
 of the necessity, that he has retreated to the wall.* And an in- 
 struction authorizing an acquittal on the ground of self-defense only 
 where there appeared to the slayer, in the exercise of reasonable 
 judgment, no other safe means to avert the danger, is not objec- 
 tionable as requiring him to avoid danger by flight.* Nor does 
 an instruction on an issue as to self-defense, with reference to rea- 
 sonably apparent necessity to take life, in any way conflict with the 
 rules of law with reference to homicide done in resisting an attempt 
 to commit a robbery or murder, in which the slayer is not required 
 to resort to the use of other or less radical means than the killing 
 of his assailant in order to defeat the attempt, even though such 
 means might be resorted to with entire safety. ^ Even under statutes 
 providing that, to justify homicide, all other means to prevent threat- 
 ened injury must be first resorted to where an unlawful attack is 
 made, of such a nature that the person attacked has reasonable 
 grounds to believe, and does believe, that he is in immediate danger 
 of being killed or of receiving serious bodily injury, and something 
 has been done indicating an intention to commit a felony against 
 
 iKirk v.Territory, 10 Ok] a. 46, 60 Pac. And error in instructing in a prose- 
 797 ; Thomas v. State, 74 Ark. 431, 86 cution for homicide that there could not 
 S. W. 404; Bledsoe v. Com. 9 Ky. L. be an acquittal on the ground of self- 
 Rep. 1002, 7 S. W. 884; Erwin v. State, defense if the accused had any other 
 29 Ohio St. 186, 23 Am. Rep. 733. And safe, or apparently safe, means of escape 
 see State v. Dettmer, 124 Mo. 426, 27 S. or protection, the killing having taken 
 W. 1117. place on his premises, is not prejudicial 
 
 A person menaced by another with a error, where at the only time when he 
 
 gun is not justified in shooting the could have reasonably believed himself 
 
 other, if he could have prevented hira to be in danger there was manifestly nO| 
 
 from shooting by taking hold of the gun possible avenue of escape. Johnson v. 
 
 with his hands. Thomas v. State, Com. 94 Ky. 578, 23 S. W. 507. 
 sitpra. 3 State v. Blevins, 138 N. C. 668, 50 
 
 2Kirk V. Territory, supra; Brumback S. E. 763. 
 V. Com. 7 Ky. L. Rep. 443; Erwin v. ^Stephens v. Com. 20 Ky. L. Rep. 544, 
 
 State, supra; Palmer v. State, 9 Wyo. 47 S. W. 229; Austin v. Com. (Ky.) 91 
 
 40, 87 Am. St. Rep. 910, 59 Pac. 793; S. W. 267; Barnes v. Com. 110 Ky. 348, 
 
 Beard v. United States, 158 U. S. 550, 61 S. W. 733; State v. Jones, 71 N. J. 
 
 39 L. ed. 1086, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 962. L. 543, 60 Atl. 396. .Contra, Tingle v. 
 
 And see Eversole v. Com. 17 Ky. L. Rep. Com. 11 Ky. L. Rep. 224, 11 S. W. 812. 
 1259, 34 S. W. 231. estate v. Jones, supra. 
 
S 298] 
 
 SELF-DEFENSE. 
 
 479 
 
 him, it will be presumed that his safety depends upon his prompt 
 action in killing his assailant, and he is justified in acting promptly 
 in that direction, without resorting to other means of protection or 
 escape. " 
 
 An instruction in a prosecution for homicide that there cannot 
 be an acquittal unless there was no other safe, or apparently safe, 
 means of escape, however, is improper as tending to lead the jury 
 to believe that it was the duty of the slayer to retreat. '' The use of the 
 word "escape" in such case is improper and erroneous, as seeming 
 to imply that the accused must seek safety in flight, instead of de- 
 fending himself from impending danger.* But this objection does 
 not apply to the use of the word "retire," there being a difference 
 in meaning between the words "retire" and "retreat."^ And the 
 word "avoid" is proper, and an instruction with reference to no other 
 apparently safe means of avoiding the attack is not objectionable 
 as implying a duty to retreat to avoid the attack. ^ " 
 
 e. Exception in case of imperfect right of self-defense. 
 
 299. General rules — Rules of law with reference to the right of 
 a man engaged in the proper performance of his business, and who 
 
 «Kelly V. State, 27 Tex. App. 562, 11 
 S. W. 627; Orman v. State, 22 Tex. 
 App. 604, 58 Am. Rep. 662, 3 S. W. 
 468; Thomas v. State, 74 Ark. 431, 86 
 S. W. 404. 
 
 TTubbs V. Com. 22 Ky. L. Eep. 481, 57 
 S. W. 623; Willis v. Com. 20 Ky. L. Rep. 
 368, 46 S. W. 699; Buckles v. Com. 113 
 Ky. 795, 68 S. W. 1084; People v. 
 Hecker, 109 Cal. 451, 30 L.R.A. 403, 42 
 Pac. 307; People v. Gonzales, 71 Cal. 
 569, 12 Pac. 783; McCall v. State 
 (Miss.) 29 So. 1003; State v. Rolla, 21 
 Mont. 582. 55 Pac. 523; State v. Mc- 
 Cann, 16 Wash. 249, 47 Pac. 443, 49 Pac. 
 216; Beard v. United States, 158 U. S. 
 550, 39 L. ed. 1086, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 962. 
 
 sHoward v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 91, 
 67 S. W. 1003; Buckles v. Com. supra; 
 Eversole v. Com. 95 Ky. 623. 26 S. W. 
 816; Hammond v. People, 199 111. 173, 
 64 N. E. 980. 
 
 But while the use of the word "es- 
 cape" in an instruction that, to justify 
 the use of a deadly weapon by a person 
 ■who has been assaulted, the circum- 
 8ta.nces must appear to be such that 
 there was no other means of escape from 
 death or great bodily harm, is not 
 proper, it is not reversible error where 
 
 it appears that the accused was the ag- 
 gressor, and that, after firing the first 
 shot, he had retired to a less exposed 
 place, and the jury were also instructed 
 that one who is assaulted in his own 
 house, under such circumstances as to 
 induce the belief that he was in danger 
 of losing his life or suffering great 
 bodily harm, is not obliged to retreat, 
 but may pursue his adversary until he 
 has freed himself from danger. Delaney 
 V. State (Wyo.) 81 Pac. 792. 
 
 91bid. 
 
 loConnor v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 398, 
 81 S. W. 259; Cook V. Com. 24 Ky. L. 
 Rep. 1731, 72 S. W. 283. 
 
 So, an instruction in a prosecution 
 for homicide that, when the accused is 
 assaulted in a certain way, he is not 
 compelled to retreat before he can in- 
 voke his right of self-defense in justifi- 
 cation for killing his assailant, is not 
 neutralized as to the duty to retreat by 
 the addition thereto of a proviso that 
 he must have used all other reasonable 
 means in his power, consistent with his 
 own safety, to avert the danger, and to 
 •avoid the necessity of taking his assail- 
 ant's life. Snelling v. State (Fla.) 37 
 So. 917. 
 
480 HOMICIDE. I§ 299 
 
 is in a place where lie has a right to be, to stand his ground and 
 defend himself, even to killing his antagonist, do not apply to cases 
 of an imperfect right of self-defense; as, for instance, homicides 
 committed while resisting an assault upon a sudden or casual affray, 
 or in the course of a sudden brawl or quarrel, or in a combat be- 
 tween persons on a sudden quarrel in the heat of passion suddenly 
 aroused on the occasion.^ A person who provokes a difficulty with 
 another by an unlawful act must, under either of these rules, retreat 
 as far as the fierceness of the assault by the other will permit, 
 without danger of death or great personal injury, before he will 
 be justified in killing in self-defense. ^ And where the unlawful act 
 of the slayer provoked the difficulty, rules of law with reference to 
 the right of a person to stand his ground and meet force with force 
 need not be given in charging the jury in a prosecution for the kill- 
 ing.* Thus, one who provokes an assault by another by the use of 
 vile and opprobrious language must retreat from his assailant if he 
 can do so vrithout increasing his peril, in order to justify killing in 
 self-defense. * And where a person is a trespasser upon, or has been 
 invited to leave, the premises of another, he cannot refuse to retreat 
 and justifiably slay in self-defense."'' So, where a killing was done in 
 a mutual personal combat with deadly weapons, neither the bad char- 
 acter of the deceased, nor past threats and hostile actions, relieve the 
 other from the duty to retreat before killing, in order to excuse the 
 killing;® though they may be looked to in connection with present 
 
 iDuncan v. State, 49 Ark. 543, 6 S. W. resist if he can safely retreat. Pond v. 
 
 164; Biihop v. State, 73 Ark. 568, 84 S. People, 8 Mich. 150. 
 
 W. 707; Brown v. State, 74 Ala. 478; zState v. Hatch, 57 Kan. 420, 57 Am. 
 
 Sullivan v. State, 102 Ala. 135, 48 Am. St. Eep. 337, 46 Pac. 70S ; State v. Rog- 
 
 St. Rep. 22, 15 So. 264; Hendricks v. ers, 18 Kan. 78, 26 Am. Eep. 754; Mit- 
 
 State, 122 Ala. 42, 26 So. 242; State v. chell v. State, 133 Ala. 65, 32 So. 132; 
 
 Smith (Iowa) 99 N. W. 579; Parrish v. Page v. State, 141 Ind. 236, 40 N. E. 745. 
 
 State, 14 Neb. 60, 15 S. W. 357 ; State sCarter v. State, supra; Hendricks v. 
 
 V. Martin, 9 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 778; State, 122 Ala. 42, 26 So. 242; State v. 
 
 Carter v. State, 30 Tex. Aipp. 551, 28 Am. Martin, supra. 
 
 St. Rep. 944, 17 S. W. 1102; Clark v. In People v. Newcomer, 118 Cal. 263, 
 
 Com. 90 Va. 360, 18 S. E. 440. 50 Pac. 405, it was held that the doctrine 
 
 Self-defense is excusable as distin- that it is the duty of a person to flee 
 
 guished from justifiable at common rather than to kill only applies where 
 
 law, where it occurs in a sudden aflfray; he is the assailant. And the same was 
 
 and in such case the homicide is felo- held in Ragland v. State, 111 Ga. 211, 
 
 nious, though not punishable, and there- 30 S. E. 682; Harris v. People, 32 Colo, 
 
 fore can only be excused where the 211, 75 Pac. 427. 
 
 slayer does all that is reasonably within 4 Hays v. Territory (Okla.) 52 Pac. 
 
 his power to avoid the necessity of ex- 950. 
 
 treme resistance, by retreating where re- sHall v. State, 130 Ala. 45, 30 So. 
 
 treat is safe. The slayer is bound, if 422. 
 
 possible, to get out of his adversary's oErown v. State, 74 Ala. 478. 
 
 way, and has no right to stand up and And evidence as to the character of 
 
§ 299] SELF-DEFENSE. 481 
 
 Kiemonstrations in determining whether the slayer had a just and 
 reasonable apprehension of imminent peril to life, or grievous bodily 
 harm. ^ 
 
 Merely standing up and fighting instead of retreating when as- 
 saulted, however, when to do so is lawful, does not show such willing- 
 ness to fight as will constitute a mutual combat.* And the rule that 
 a person assaulted may stand his ground and defend himself, even 
 to killing his assailant, applies where the slayer overtook a man in 
 the public highway with whom he had recently had a difficulty, 
 who assaulted him because of a rude reply to a question.® And the 
 fact that the slayer had previously assaulted the person killed does 
 not affect his right to omit to flee and to pursue his antagonist so 
 long as it is apparently necessary to prevent great bodily injury 
 to himself, where his antagonist subsequently assaulted him and re- 
 tired from the combat for the purpose of procuring a deadly weap- 
 on v.'itK which to renew it. ^"^ 
 
 Under the "flight" rule, however, inability to retreat where re- 
 treat is required, or to otherwise escape, is a condition precedent to 
 an inquiry as to freedom from fault; if the slayer could have es- 
 caped the danger without killing, killing is not justifiable whether 
 he was free from fault in bringing on the difiiculty or not; and an 
 instruction in a prosecution for homicide authorizing an acquittal 
 on the ground of self-defense, where the slayer did not bring on the 
 difficulty, is improper and misleading, where the jury might have 
 found that no predicate for inquiry as to where the fault lay had 
 been made by the evidence of peril and inability to escape. ^ ^ 
 
 300. Sufficiency of retreat to revive self-defense — A retreat by a per- 
 son who had assaulted another, or who was engaged in a mutual 
 «ombat with him, which will revive his right of self-defense, must be 
 such as to clearly indicate an unequivocal intention to entirely 
 abandon it, and must not constitute a mere effort to protect himself 
 
 the deceased as a violent and dangerous But where the evidence in a prosecu- 
 
 man, and as to his strength, is inadmis- tion for homicide shows conclusively 
 
 sible in a prosecution for homicide, that at the time the deceased was shot 
 
 where it appears that the killing was in he lay upon the ground with a closed 
 
 a quarrel engaged in by both the accused knife in his hand, the doctrine of re- 
 
 and the deceased, and it does not appear treat is not involved, and a failure to 
 
 that the accused had retreated as far charge it is not error. Hughes v. State 
 
 as he could with safety, or that he was (Tex. Crim. App.) 82 S. W. 1039. 
 
 at the time in danger of being killed, or 9 State v. Gentry, 125 N. C. 733, 34 S. 
 
 of suffering great bodily harm. State E. 708. 
 
 V. Oompagnet, 48 La. Ann. 1470, 21 lOConner v. State (Miss.) 13 So. 934. 
 
 So. 46. iiHenson v. State, 114 Ala. 25, 22 So. 
 
 7Brown v. State, supra. 127. 
 
 sWilson v. Com. 23 Ky. L. Rep. 743, 
 63 S. W. 738. 
 
 Horn.— 31. 
 
482 HOMICIDE. R 30ft 
 
 under the shield of the law. * And the retreat of the aggressor must 
 have been as far as the fierceness of the assault by his antagonist 
 would permit.^ A mere retreat by the aggressor in a combat, and 
 firing back as he retreats, is not sufficient to revive his right of self- 
 defense.^ And one who walked away from an antagonist armed 
 with weapons designed for striking, a distance of about 30 yards, 
 and, on being followed, with a demand to settle the matter, shot 
 him, cannot be said 1o have retreated in good faith, so as to render 
 the shooting justifiable.* Nor is a retreat from a house into which 
 the aggressor had intruded, and from which he had been ordered, 
 upon which he turned and shot the owner who followed him to the 
 door, such a retreat as amounts to a withdrawal from the difficulty.® 
 And though a retreat was from danger, where it constitutes an ele- 
 ment in the carrying out of the original intention it is not sufficient.* 
 Where, however, a retreat unequivocally indicates an intention to en- 
 tirely abandon the difficulty, it is sufficient to revive his right of self- 
 defense, though the person retreating did not leave the scene of the 
 difficulty, but ran into a nearby building.'' And evidence that the 
 first aggressor in a fight retreated from it, and while so doing was 
 knocked down three times by his antagonist, whereupon be shot 
 him, is sufficient to raise the question of the abandonment of the diffi- 
 culty.* And an instruction in a prosecution for homicide as to 
 provoking a difficulty, unaccompanied by one as to the abandonment 
 thereof in good faith, is improper and erroneous where it appears 
 that after the first demonstration the accused started away, and the 
 deceased followed him some distance with a knife drawn in a 
 threatening manner.* 
 
 f. Increased or diminished risk as affecting duty to retreat 
 
 301. General rules — Eetreat may be impossible or perilous, and it 
 is not, therefore, always a condition which must precede killing in 
 
 iHittner v. State, 19 Ind. 48. sHunt v. State, 72 Miss. 413, 16 So. 
 
 sStory V. State, 99 Ind. 413. 753. 
 
 sBurris v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Hep. sMorgan v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 387, 30 S. W. 785; State v. Shockley, 29 222, 29 S. W. 1092. 
 
 Utah, 25, 80 Pac. 865. So, where one person approached 
 
 ^Blackburn v. State, 86 Ala. 595, 6 another, cursing and abusing him, then 
 
 So. 96. left him and mounted his horse to go 
 
 BCrawford v. State, 112 Ala. 1, 21 home, when the other left his carriage 
 
 So. 214. and advanced upon him, whereupon he 
 
 oGedye v. People, 170 111. 284, 48 N. sl-ot and killed the other as he advanced, 
 
 E. 987. there is a sufficient showing of abandon- 
 
 7State V. Adler, 146 Mo. 18, 47 S. W. ment of the difficulty to warrant the 
 
 704. court in a prosecution for the killing 
 
8 301] SELF-DEPENSE. 483 
 
 seU-defense. ^ And, under either rule, when an assault is so fierce 
 that the person assaulted helieves> and has reason to believe, that 
 he cannot yield a step without manifest danger to his life or of 
 great bodily harm, killing his assailant is justifiable, though the slayer 
 made no effort to retreat.^ And a person assaulted by another who 
 had threatened to kill him is not bound to run, and thus escape the 
 assault, where the danger is left still impending, and perhaps in- 
 creased, by the act of running. * And an instruction as to duty to re- 
 treat, omitting the qualification as to increase of peril, is improper. * 
 Where the assault is of such a character, there are no other prob- 
 able means of escape, or reasonable modes of escaping or avoiding the 
 combat, within the rule of law justifying homicide in self-defense 
 only when no other means of escape exist. ^ Even under the rule by 
 which retreat is required as an element of the means which one 
 must adopt to avert danger and avoid the necessity to kill, an as- 
 saulted person is under no duty to retreat unless he can do so with- 
 out increasing his peril.® "Retreat to the wall" is to be taken in 
 a figurative sense, as indicating a retreat to the limits of personal 
 safety.'' And to revive the right of self-defense in an aggressor 
 in a difficulty, or in a person engaging in a mutual combat, he is 
 not required to retreat !by way of withdrawing therefrom, where the 
 
 in charging the law with reference to 763; United States v. Herbert, 2 Hayw. 
 
 the right of the slayer to stand his & H. 210, Fed. Cas. No. 15,354a. 
 
 ground. Hooper v. State, 44 Tex. Cryi',. sPhilips v. Com. 2 Duv. 328, 87 Am. 
 
 Eep. 125, 100 Am. St. Rep. 845, 69 S. Dec. 499; State v. Robertson, supra; 
 
 W. 149. State v. Kennedy, 7 Nev. 374. 
 
 iCreek v. State, 24 Ind. 151 ; Shell v. ^Shell v. State, 88 Ala. 14, 7 So. 40. 
 
 State, 88 Ala. 14, 7 So. 40; Babcock v. And see State v. Robertson, 50 La. Ann. 
 
 People, 13 Colo. 515, 22 Pae. 817; State 92, 69 Am. St. Rep. 393, 23 So. 9. 
 
 V. Crea, 10 Idaho, 88, 76 Pae. 1013. And an instruction in a prosecution 
 
 2State V. Thompson, 9 Iowa, 188, 74 for homicide is insufficient and properly 
 
 Am. Dec. 342, Shell v. State, supra; refused where it pretermits the question 
 
 Rutledge v. State 88 Ala. 85, 7 So. 335; of the imminency of peril of the ae- 
 
 Hammil V. State, 90 Ala. 577, 8 So. 380; cused, and the absence of opiportunity 
 
 Wilkins v. State, 98 Ala. 1, 13 So. 312; to retreat, and postulates, in the place 
 
 Dorsey v. State, 107 Ala. 157, 18 So. 199; thereof, that he struck in self-defense. 
 
 Ben V. State, 115 Ala. 25, 22 So. 526; Welch v. State, 124 Ala. 41, 27 So. 307. 
 
 McPherson v. State, 29 Ark. 225; Dun- sHammil v. State, 90 Ala. 577, 8 So. 
 
 can V. State, 49 Ark. 543, 6 S. W. 164; 380. 
 
 People V. Hecker, 109 Cal. 451, 30 L.R.A. eHendricks v. State, 122 Ala. 42, 26 
 
 403, 42 Pae. 307 ; State v. Robertson, 50 So. 242. 
 
 La. Ann. 92, 69 Am. St. Rep. 393, 23 So. 7Fost. C. L. 273; 1 Hawk. P. C. chap. 
 9; People v. Macard, 73 Mich. 15, 40 N. 29, § 14; Reg. v. Smith, 8 Car. & P. 
 W. 784; State v. Gardner (Minn.) 2 160; 4 Bl. Com. 185; Oliver v. State, 17 
 L.R.A.(N.S.) 49, 104 N. W. 971; People Ala. 587; Tweedy v. State, 5 Iowa, 433; 
 V. Johnson, 139 N. Y. 358, 34 N. E. 920; State v. Thompson, 9 Iowa, 188, 74 Am. 
 State V. Gentry, 125 N. C. 733, 34 S. E. Dee. 342; State v. Hill, 20 N. C. 629 (4 
 706; State v. Kennedy, 91 N. C. 572; Dev. & B. L. 491 ) 34 Am. Dec. 396. 
 Com. V. Crause, 4 Clark (Pa.) 500; The phrases "retreat to the wall" or 
 Brown v. Cora. 86 Va. 466, 10 S. E. 745; "retreat to the ditch" are figurative ex- 
 State V. Zeigler, 40 W. Va. 593, 21 S. E. pressions of the rule that, in order to 
 
484 HOMICIDE. [| 301 
 
 p.ttack is so fierce that by retreating he will apparently expose him- 
 self to death or serious bodily harm.^ So, if a person has reason 
 to believe, and does believe, that though he may escape from an as- 
 sailant the latter will continue to seek opportunity to kill him, with 
 increased effort to succeed until he has accomplished his object, 
 he need not retreat, though for the time being he might escape, 
 but may pursue his adversary till he finds himself out of danger." 
 And he may pursue him in like manner, though he has withdrawn 
 from the combat, when he has reasonable ground to apprehend that 
 he will presently return and renew the assault.^" 
 
 The rule that an assaulted person is under no duty to retreat unless 
 he can do so without increasing his peril, however, means something 
 different from having no mode of escape without being subjected to 
 present impending danger, real or apparent, to life or limb. ^ ^ And 
 the rule is, at least under the common-law doctrine of retreat to 
 the wall, that to excuse a performance of the duty to retreat before 
 taking life in self-defense, it is not enough that the circumstances 
 were such that it would be hazardous to do so ; they must be such that 
 the peril would be increased beyond what it would be if the person 
 assaulted stood and faced his assailant, or such as to impress the 
 mind of a reasonable man that it would be increased;^* though 
 it has been held under the "stand ground when in the right" doctrine 
 that where the assault is so fierce as to make it apparently as dan- 
 gerous for the person assaulted to retreat as to stand, it is not his duty 
 to retreat, but he may stand his ground, and, if necessary to save 
 himself, slay his assailant. ^ * 
 
 302. Apparent, as distinguished from real, availability of means of 
 escape — To justify an assaulted person in taking the life of his as- 
 sailant, it must be apparent to him that he has no other means of 
 escape ; if he had means of escape, but they were unknown to him, 
 
 avoid the necessity of taking life, the weapon with which to renew the as- 
 combat must be declined so long as ave- sault, the person assaulted is not bound 
 nues of escape are open. Lee v. State, to flee, but may pursue the other so 
 92 Ala. 15, 25 Am. St. Rap. 17, 9 So. long as it is apparently necessary to 
 407. prevent a persona] injury to himself. 
 
 sState V. Partlovv, 90 Mo. 608, 59 Am. Conner v. State (Miss.) 13 So. 934. 
 
 Rep. 31, 4 S. W. 14; Duncan v. State, 49 nHendricks v. State, 122 Ala. 42, 26 
 
 Ark. 543, 6 S. W. 164. So. 242. 
 
 sPhilips V. Com. 2 Duv. 328, 87 Am. izBell v. State, 115 Ala. 25, 22 So. 
 
 Dec. 499; Carico v. Com. 7 Bush, 124; 526; Carter v. State, 82 Ala. 13, 2 So. 
 
 Young V. Com. 6 Bush, 312. 768; Evans v. State, 109 Ala. H, 19 So. 
 
 loYoung V. Com. supra; State v. 535; Pugh v. State, 132 Ala. 1, 31 So. 
 
 Maloy, 44 Iowa, 104. 727; Com. v. Self ridge, 1 Horr. & T. 
 
 Where a person who had assaiilfod Cas. 19. 
 
 another retired from the assault and at- isDuncan v. State, 49 Ark. 543, 6 S. 
 
 tempted to get a dangerous or deadly W. 164. 
 
S 302] SELF-DEFENSE. 485 
 
 or he did not know that he could avail himself of them, he is 
 justified in defending himself by force against the apparent danger; 
 it is only when there were means of escape that seemed available 
 to him that a man is obliged to retreat.^ And one who is assaulted 
 by another is not bound to retreat to avoid the necessity of killing 
 his assailant, but may stand his ground and repel force with force, 
 whether such danger really exists or appears to him to exist. ^ 
 And the rule that a person assaulted by another is entitled to act 
 upon appearances applies to the questions as to the time when he 
 should begin to retreat, and as to the limit to which his retreat 
 should be conducted.^ And in determining those questions the 
 jufy should put themselves in the place of the person assaulted, sur- 
 rounded by the circumstances and exposed to the influences to which 
 he was exposed.* So, the rule that one may act upon appearances 
 in determining the time when he should begin to retreat, and as to 
 the limit to which his retreat should be conducted, applies also where 
 one person intervenes in defense of another, who is assaulted by a 
 third person. ® 
 
 303. What warrants inference of increased peril — The mere fact 
 that an assault is sudden and violent does not, of itself, warrant an 
 inference of danger which will excuse the person assaulted from 
 endeavoring to retreat to avoid the necessity of taking life.^ Nor 
 does the fact that an assault was manifestly felonious in purpose and 
 forcible in its nature, when made elsewhere than in the habitation 
 of the person assaulted.^ And no hostile demonstrations) though 
 accompanied or preceded by threats, will justify killing without 
 resorting to retreat, when they do not actually or apparently justify 
 
 iState V. Roberts, 63 Vt. 139, 21 Atl. retreat within the meaning of the rules 
 
 424; Kinglesmith v. Com. 7 Ky. L. Rep. of law with reference to self-defense is 
 
 744. that at which the danger becomes ap- 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution parent; up to that time there is nothing 
 
 for homicide making the right of the from which to retreat. United States 
 
 accused to plead self-defense to depend v. Herbert, 2 Hayw. & H. 210, Fed. Cas. 
 
 upon the belief of the jury as to whether No. 15,3o4a. 
 
 he had other safe and available means lUnited States v. King, supra. 
 
 of retreating and of avoiding the danger Bibid. 
 
 is improper as a denial of the right of In Cockrill v. Com. 95 Ky. 22, 23 S. 
 
 the accused to act in the situation in W. 659, however, it was held that the 
 
 whicii he was placed, according to the duty to retreat is not imposed upon an 
 
 appearance of things to him at the time, assaulted person merely by the fact that 
 
 Adkins v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 496, 82 he had an apparently, as distinguished 
 
 S. W. 242. from an actually, safe means of escape. 
 
 2 Alexander v. State, (Tex. Crim. lEMer v. State, 69 Ark. 648, 86 Am. 
 
 App.) 70 S W. 748. St. Rep. 220, 65 S. W. 938. 
 
 . sUnited States v. King, 34 Fed. 302. 2Abernathy v. State, 129 Ala. 85, 29 
 
 . The moment when a man is bound to So. 844. 
 
486 HOMICIDE. (8 303 
 
 a reasonable apprehension of danger to life or great bodily harm.* 
 But a person not intending to provoke a difficulty may be relieved of 
 the duty to retreat in a proper case, by hostile demonstrations upon 
 the part of his antagonist.* And previous threats to kill, together 
 with such a demonstration as to justify the belief that the threatener 
 intended to carry out the threat, will justify a killing without re- 
 treating.^ And the character of the person killed as a violent and 
 dangerous man should be weighed by the jury in a prosecution for 
 killing him, where a hostile demonstration upon his part appears, 
 on the question of the practicability of retreat upon the part of 
 the slayer.® And it has been held that an assault with a firearm 
 warrants the person assaulted in believing that his death is in- 
 tended, and in acting accordingly, and relieves him from the duty 
 to retreat.'' And a person attacked by another with a deadly weap- 
 on is not obliged to retreat to the wall before his right of self- 
 defense accrues, where the circumstances are such as to reasonably 
 justify the conclusion that by retreating he will put himself at a dis- 
 advantage.® Such an attack warrants him in the belief that his 
 death is intended, and in acting accordingly.® 
 
 But the fact that a person was assaulted by another with a danger- 
 ous weapon, and was put in danger of loss of life or great bodily harm, 
 or had reason to believe himself so put in danger, does not alone, 
 
 sPoe V. State, 87 Ala. 65, 6 So. 378. 90 N. C. 676; McCandlesa v. State, 42 
 
 iDeArman v. State, 71 Ala. 351. Tex. Crim. Rep. 58, 57 S. W. 672; State 
 
 estate v. Kennedy, 7 Nev. 374. v. Clark, 51 W. Va. 457, 41 S. E. 204. 
 
 And where u, man disabled in one Where a, person kills another without 
 
 arm procured a pistol to defend himself retreating, when the latter is advanc- 
 
 against a threatened assault by an able- ing upon him with a raised blade 3 or 4 
 
 bodied man, and was afterwards threat- inches long, and when he is within a 
 
 ened by another person, and struck by a step or two of him, the homicide is 
 
 third while surrounded by an excited justifiable. State v. Gentryj 125 N. C. 
 
 crowd in a public street, whereupon he 733, 34 S. E. 706. 
 
 shot the third, the question for the de- And evidence that one person had 
 
 termination of the jury in a prosecution previously pursued another with a 
 
 for the shooting is whether the accused, drawn knife, and shortly thereafter, as 
 
 when assaulted, believed, and had the latter was passing the former, the 
 
 reasonable ground to believe, that the latter caught him by the collar and 
 
 use of a deadly weapon was necessary knocked him to his knees, whereupon 
 
 to his safety. Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. the former stabbed his assailant, en- 
 
 80, 26 Am. Rep. 52. titles the accused in a prosecution there- 
 
 sPerry v. State, 94 Ala. 25, 10 So. for to an instruction that, if he was free 
 
 650. from fault in bringing on the difficulty, 
 
 'Beard v. United States, 158 U. S. he was under no duty to retreat, unless 
 
 550, 39 L. ed. 1086, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 962; he could have done so without increas- 
 
 Tweedy v. State, 5 Iowa, 433; State v. ing his danger, or with reasonable. 
 
 Gardner (Minn.) 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 49, 104 safety. Deal v. State, 136 Ala. 52, 34 
 
 N. W. 971. So. 23. 
 
 sStorey V. State, 71 Ala. 329; Tweedy oBeard v. United States, 158 U. S. 
 
 V. State, supra; People v. Macard, 73 550, 39 L. ed. 1086, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 962. 
 Mich. 15, 40 N. W. 784; State v. Mazon, 
 
S 303] SELS'-D'KI'ENSE. 487 
 
 and without reference to other facts and circumstances, relieve him 
 from the duty to retreat, and permit him to kill his assailant without 
 retreating.^** Even in case of such an attack the person attacked 
 is under duty to retreat before killing, unless by doing so he would 
 thereby apparently place himself in greater peril ; * ^ whether or 
 not he would do so being a question of fact for the jury. ^ ^ And the 
 act of one party to a difficulty of withdrawing therefrom and going 
 away to procure arms opens a way of retreat to the other party, which 
 will prevent him from justifying on the ground of self-defense, 
 if he fails to' do so and kills his opponent upon his return. ^ * 
 
 304. Right to pursue adversary — The general rule is that a person 
 free from fault when attacked by another, who manifestly intends 
 T)y violence to take his life or do him great bodily harm, is not only 
 not obliged to retreat, but may pursue his adversary until he has se- 
 cured himself from danger; and if he kill him in so doing, it is 
 justifiable self-defense.^ The right to pursue, as well as to omit 
 to retreat, is essential to make perfect and complete the great nat- 
 ural right of self-defense, and its existence must be recognized by 
 the courts in all cases in which the evidence is of a character to make 
 it a legitimate subject of consideration by +V.e jury.^ But it has been 
 held to be real, and not merely apparent, danger from which one may 
 pursue an adversary until he has escaped.^ This rule applies to 
 the killing of one who threatened to take the life of the slayer, and 
 armed himself and went forth in search of his antagonist for the 
 purpose of executing his threat.* And it has been applied to one 
 who had been attacked and driven from his house, where he had rea- 
 son to apprehend, and did apprehend, that his assailant would take 
 his life or inflict great bodily harm upon him if he returned. ® And 
 to the pursuing and killing of an antagonist who was retiring for 
 
 lOState V. West, 45 La. Ann. 14, 12 iSHall v. State, 130 Ala. 45, 30 So. 
 
 So. 7. 422. 
 
 ilGordon v. State, 129 Ala. 113, 30 iLuby v. Com. 12 Bush. 1; Holloway 
 
 So. 30; Stoball v. State, 116 Ala. 454, 23 v. Cora. 11 Bush, 344; People v. Hecker, 
 
 :So. 162. 109 Cal. 451, 30 L.R.A. 403, 42 Pac. 307 ; 
 
 i2GafFord v. State, 122 Ala. 54, 25 So. State v. Thompson, 45 La. Ann. 969, 13 
 
 10; Gordon v. State, 129 Ala. 113, 30 So. So. 392; Holcomb v. State, 8 Lea, 417. 
 
 ^0. And see Philips v. Com. 2 Duv. 328, 87 
 
 Whether, when one man rushed upon Am. Dec. 499; Carico v. Com. 7 Bush, 
 another, there was time enough for the 128; Young v. Com. 6 Bush, 312; Pal- 
 latter to escape and get out of the way mer v. State, 9 Wyo. 40, 87 Am. St. 
 may be stated by a witness in a prose- Rep. 910, 59 Pac. 793. 
 cution for the killing of the former by 2Luby v. Com. supra. 
 the latter, since it is a matter which sState v. Linhoff, 121 Iowa, 632, 97 
 ^cannot well be proved to the jury by a N. W. 77. 
 
 statement of the facts. Stewart v. ^West v. State, 2 Tex. App. 460. 
 
 State, 19 Ohio, 302, 54 Am. Dec. 426. BYoung v. Com. 6 Bush, 312. 
 
488 HOMICIDE. [§ 304 
 
 the purpose of procuring a deadly -weapon for use in an intended 
 renewal of the combat,® or for the purpose of getting into a better 
 position for its prosecution.'' 
 
 The right to pursue and kill a retreating adversary, however,^ 
 even in the most extreme case, is one which ceases as soon as the 
 pursuer has reasonable ground to believe that the danger has ceased 
 to be immediate and impending.^ A person engaged in a combat 
 cannot pursue and kill his antagonist, who has abandoned the con- 
 flict and is fleeing, unless from the facts as presented to him he be- 
 lieves, and is justified in believing, that he is retiring or fleeing only 
 to gain a vantage ground from which he can renew the attack.* 
 And while one may use all necessary force to prevent a 
 forcible entry into his house, he has not the right to use unnecessary 
 force, and if he follows and shoots the person attempting the entry, 
 after he has ceased his endeavor to enter, the attempt forms no- 
 justification. ^ " Instructions as to the right to pursue aru improper 
 in the absence of a showing of actual pursuit. * ^ 
 
 g. Character of attack as affecting application of rules. 
 
 305. Must be serious or felonious — ^Rules with reference to re- 
 treat upon the part of a person assaulted by another are not af- 
 fected by the question whether the assault was dangerous to human 
 life; it is sufiicient if there was actual danger, or reasonable proba- 
 bility of great bodily harm, though there was no danger to life.^ 
 To establish a case of justification the assault must have been such 
 as to lead a reasonable man to believe that his life was in peril,, 
 or that he was in danger of great bodily harm.^ But where there 
 is no felonious intent accompanying an assault the person assaulted,, 
 before killing in self-defense, is bound to get out of his adversary's, 
 way if he can, and has no right to stand up and resist if he can 
 
 6 Johnson v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) sMorgan v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 50 S. W. 343; State v. Maloy, 44 Iowa, 543, 67 S. W. 420; McMahon v. State, 46. 
 
 104; Conner v. State (Miss.) 13 So. 934. Tex. Crim. Eep. 540, 81 S. W. 296; I'eo- 
 
 7Stanley v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) pie v. Oonkling, supra. 
 
 44 S. W. 519. lostate v. Conally, supra. 
 
 sLuby V. Com. 12 Bush, 1; People v. uRiley v. Com. 94 Ky 266 22 S W^ 
 
 Conkling, 111 Cal. 616, 44 Pae. 314; 222; Dittmer v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. 
 
 State V. Conally, 3 Or. 69 ; Holcomb v. Rep. 103, 74 S. W. 34. And see Wilson 
 
 State, 8 Lea, 417. v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 185, 68 S. W. 
 
 And the fact that a person has been 121. 
 
 assaulted and injured does not justify 'State v. Noble, 1 Ohio Dee. Repiint, 
 
 him in advancing into further peril, 1 ; State v. Petteys, 65 Kan. 625, 70' 
 
 where the way is open to him to re- Pac. 588. 
 
 treat from his assailant. Davis v. 2Allen v. United States, 164 U S 492 
 
 State, 92 Ala. 20, 9 So. 616. 41 L. ed. 528, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 158.' 
 
S 305] 
 
 SELF-DEFENSE. 
 
 48» 
 
 safely retreat or escape.* And in case of a mere assault or mutual 
 combat, when the attacking party has not the purpose to kill, the 
 right of self-defense does not accrue to the person assaulted until 
 he has availed himself of all proper means in his power to decline 
 the combat by retreat, provided there be a safe mode of escape.* 
 The rule that where one is attacked by another who intends to 
 murder him, he need not flee, but may, if need be, kill his assailant, 
 does not apply where the attack is a mere assault; in s\ich case the 
 person assaulted must not stand his ground and kill, if there be any 
 other way of escape, though he may repel force with force, and give 
 blow for blow.® And the rule is the same though a deadly weapon 
 was used." And if it is not apparent from the manner of the 
 assault, the nature of the weapon used, and the like, that the assaiilt 
 was felonious, and that the danger was imminent, the person assaulted 
 must retreat to the wall before he can justify homicide ; ^ though a 
 
 sPoTid V. People, 8 Mich. 150; People 
 V. Hi.rley, 8 Cal. 390; Evans v. State, 33 
 Ga. 4; State v. Gentry, 125 N. C. 733, 34 
 S. E. 706; State v. Dixon, 75 N. C. 275; 
 Dock V. Com. 21 Gratt. 909; State v. 
 Clark, 51 W. Va. 457, 41 S. E. 204. 
 
 Self-defense is excusable as dis- 
 tinguished from justifiable at common 
 law, where it occurs in repelling an at- 
 tack not made with a felonious intent; 
 and in such case the homicide is felo- 
 nious, though not punishable, and, there- 
 fore, can only be excused where the 
 slayer does all that is reasonably within 
 his power to avoid the necessity for ex- 
 treme resistance, by retreating where re- 
 treat is safe; he is bound, if possible, 
 to get out of his adversary's way, and 
 has no right to stand up and resist if 
 he can safely retreat. Pond v. People, 
 supra. 
 
 And while a person who is assaulted 
 without fault has the right, under the 
 law, to pursue his adversary until all 
 danger to his life or of serious bodily 
 Injury has passed, without jeopardizing 
 his right of self-defense, if his life was 
 not in danger or he was not in danger 
 of serious bodily injury, or if his an- 
 tagonist was not seeking to get some ad- 
 vantage by which he could take his life 
 or do him some great bodily injury, aftar 
 an apparent abandonment of the dif- 
 ficulty, the' law of manslaughter should 
 apply to that portion of the difficulty 
 which may have resulted fatally to the 
 deceased after such abandonment. 
 Hooper v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 125, 100 Am. St. Rep. 845, 69 S. W. 149. 
 
 4Rtorey v. State, 71 Ala. 329: Finch 
 v. State, 81 Ala. 41, 1 So. 565; Sullivan 
 v. State, 102 Ala. 135, 48 Am. St. iiep. 
 22, 15 So. 264; Dolan v. State, 40 Ark. 
 454; People v. Ye Park, 62 Cal. 204; 
 State v. Mahan, 68 Iowa, 304, 20 N. W. 
 449, 27 N. W. 249; State v. Scott, 26 N. 
 C. (4 Irod. L.) 409, 42 Am. Dec. 148; 
 State V. Hough, 138 N. C. 683, 50 S. E. 
 709; Taylor v. State, 38 Tex. Crim. 
 Rep. 552, 43 S. W. 1019; State v. Zeig- 
 ler, 40 W. Va. 593, 21 S. E. 763; State 
 V. Clark, supra. And see Abernathy v. 
 State, 129 Ala. 85, 29 So. 844; State v. 
 West, 45 La. Ann. 14, 12 So. 7. 
 
 r>State v. Kennedy, 91 N. C. 572; State 
 V. Waldrop (S. C.) 52 S. E. 793. 
 
 estate v. Blevins, 138 N. C. 668, 50 
 S. E. 763; State v. Kennedy, supra. 
 
 'State V. Thompson, 9 Iowa, 188, 74 
 Am. Dee. 342. 
 
 In State v. Clark, 134 N. C. 698, 47 S. 
 E. 36, however, it was held that to war- 
 rant a person assaulted by another in 
 standing his ground and defending him- 
 self, it is not necessary that the assault 
 should have been felonious or commit- 
 ted with a felonious intent; if the as- 
 sault was made with the purpose of in- 
 flicting great bodily harm, or even if the 
 accused had a reasonably well-grounded 
 apprehension that such was the fact, he 
 had the right to act in self-defense. But 
 this holding does not seeih to have been 
 necessary to the decision of the case and, 
 though not mentioned, it must be deemed, 
 to have been overruled by State v. 
 Hough, 138 N. C. 663, 50 S. E. 709. 
 
 And in State v. Petteys, 65 Kan. 625, 
 
490 EQMICIDE. C5 505 
 
 proviso that the assault was felonious should not be added to an 
 instruction as to the right of an assaulted person to omit to retreat, 
 without an explanation to the jury as to what was meant by felonious 
 intent. ^ 
 
 Under statutes providing that to justify homicide all other means 
 to prevent the threatened injury must be first resorted to before 
 killing, it is not necessary that the assault should have been made 
 with a murderous intent in order to relieve the person assaulted from 
 the duty to retreat.® And an officer assaulted by one whom he was 
 lawfully seeking to arrest is not required to retreat to the wall before 
 resorting to such defensive measures as may reasonably seem neces- 
 sary to protect himself against loss of life or great bodily injury. * " 
 
 h. Self-defense at or in dwelling or castle. 
 
 306. General rules — ^Where a person is attacked at or in his own 
 dwelling, he is not required to retreat, but may stand at bay and 
 turn and kill his assailant if this is necessary, or apparently neces- 
 sary, to save his own life or protect himself from great bodily 
 harm.^ An inmate of a dwelling which is attacked need not flee 
 therefrom to escape being injured, but may meet the assailant at 
 the threshold, and prevent him from breaking in by any means 
 rendered necessary by the exigency.^ And he may pursue his adver- 
 
 70 Pac. 588, it was held that a person 118 Cal. 263, 50 Pac. 405; People v. 
 
 unlawfully assaulted by another may Lewis, 117 Oal. 186, 59 Am. St. Eep. 167, 
 
 stand his ground and repel force by such 48 Pac. 1088 ; Haynes v. State, 17 Ga. 
 
 reasonable force as may, under all the 465 ; Miller v. State, 74 Ind. 1 ; State v. 
 
 circumstances of the case, appear neces- Middleham, 62 Iowa, 150, 17 N. W. 446; 
 
 Bary to successfully resist the attack Bledsoe v. Com. 9 Ky. L. Rep. 1002, 7 
 
 made, and is not required to retreat, no S. W. 884; Smith v. Com. 16 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 matter what the character of the attack 112, 26 S. W. 583; McKinney v. Cora, 
 
 may be. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 565, 82 S. W. 263; Tingle 
 
 8 State V. Clark, supra. v. Com. 11 Ky. L. Rep. 224, 11 S. W. 
 
 sElder v. State, 69 Ark. 648, 86 Am. 812; Wright v. Com. 85 Ky. 123, 2 S. W. 
 
 St. Rep. 220, 65 S. W. 938. 904; Estep v. Com. 86 Ky. 39, 9 Am. St. 
 
 lOBoykin v. People, 22 Colo. 406, 45 Rep. 260, 4 S. W. 820; Pond v. People, 
 
 Pac. 419. 8 Mich. 150; People v. Lilly, 38 Mich. 
 
 iJones V. State, 76 Ala. 8; Christian 270; People v. Coughlin, 67 Mich. 466, 
 
 V. State, 96 Ala. 89, 11 So. 338; Storey 35 N. W. 72; State v. Taylor, 143 Mo. 
 
 V. State, 71 Ala. 329; Dolanv. State, 81 150, 44 S. W. 785; Young v. State 
 
 Ala. 11, 1 So. 707; Lee v. State, 92 Ala. (Neb.) 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 66, 104 N. W. 
 
 15, 25 Am. St. Rep. 17, 9 So. 407; Martin 867; Willis v. State, 43 Neb. 102, 61 N. 
 
 V. State, 90 Ala. 602, 24 Am. St. Rep. W. 254; State v. Harman, 78 N. C. 515; 
 
 844, 8 So. 858; Brinkley v. State, 89 State v. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308, 12 Am. 
 
 Ala. 34, 18 Am. St. Rep. 87, 8 So. 22; Rep. 200; Palmer v. State, 9 Wyo. 40, 
 
 Karr v. State, 100 Ala. 4, 46 Am. St. 87 Am. St. Rep. 910, 59 Pac. 793. And 
 
 Rep. 17, 14 So. 851 ; Naugher v. State, see Rex v. Longden, Russ. & R. C. C. 
 
 105 Ala. 26, 17 So. 24; Foster v. Terri- 228. 
 
 tory, 6 Ariz. 240, 56 Pac. 738; Elder v. aState v. Patterson, supra; Carroll 
 
 State, 69 Ark. 648, 86 Am. St. Rep. v. State, 23 Ala. 28, 58 Am. Deo. 282; 
 
 220, 65 S. W. 938; People v. Newcomer, State v. Conally, 3 Or. 69. 
 
% 3061 SELF-DEFENSE. 491 
 
 sary imtil lie has freed himself from all danger.® And this is so, 
 though retreat could be safely made.* A man's house is his castle, 
 and when it is invaded he is deemed to be at the wall, and no 
 further retreat is necessary.^ And the justification is not depend- 
 ent upon the existence of no other safe, or apparently safe, means of 
 avoiding the danger. ® 'Not does the right of a person to defend him- 
 self when assaulted in his own dwelling depend upon the assailant's 
 having sought him out for the purpose, and with the intent, of 
 killing or seriously injuring him.'' And it is immaterial whether 
 the assailant intended to make a forcible attack, where he acted in 
 such a manner as to lead the other to believe that such an attack 
 was imminent.^ And if several armed men go to a dwelling house 
 in the nighttime for the purpose of seizing the owner, without 
 lawful authority, and one of them is killed in an eifort to prevent 
 the seizure, the killing is, at most, manslaughter.* Nor is a person 
 attacked in his own home bound to wait until his assailant has 
 secured a protected position, but may immediately use such force, 
 even to the taldng of life, as seems necessary in the exercise of 
 a reasonable judgment to avert the danger to himself or his family.^ " 
 And one who has reason to believe that another is about to invade 
 
 While the fact that a person is in necessary, or must have seemed to ac- 
 his own house when assaulted does not cused in the exercise of a reasonable 
 justify him in using more force than is judgment to be necessary, in order to 
 necessary in repelling the assault, or in avert or escape danger, real or apparent, 
 killing the assailant to prevent a mere is improper and misleading in a case in 
 minor assault, he has the right to repel which the accused was assaulted in his 
 force with force, and, without retreat- own dooryard and near his own dwell- 
 ing, to use such means as are reasonably ing. Eversole v. Com. 95 Ky. 623, 26 S. 
 necessary to protect himself from harm, W. 816. 
 
 even to the extent of taking life. Elder 7Estep v. Com. 86 Ky. 39, 9 Am. St. 
 
 V. State, 69 Ark. 648, 86 Am. St. Kep. Rep. 260, 4 S. W. 820. 
 
 220, 65 S. W. 938. sHurd v. People, 25 Mich. 405; People 
 
 sPalmer v. State, supra; People v. v. Lilly, 38 Mich. 270. 
 
 Lewis, 117 Cal. 186, 59 Am. St. Rep. 167, Where a large and strong man at- 
 
 48 Pac. 1088. tacks a smaller and weaker one just out- 
 
 iBrinkley v. State, 89 Ala. 34, 18 Am. side the latter's dwelling, and follows 
 
 St. Rep. 87, 8 So. 22; Karr v. State, 106 him up with the apparent intention of 
 
 Ala. 1, 17 So. 328; State v. O'Brien, 18 attacking him inside, where he retires, 
 
 Mont. 1, 43 Pac. 1091, 44 Pac. 399. the latter is justified in shooting his as- 
 
 BPalmer v. State, supra; Lee v. State, sailant if his acts and the circumstances 
 
 92 Ala. 15, 25 Am. St. Rep. 17, 9 So. 407. as they appeared to accused were such 
 
 eBledsoe y. Com. 9 Ky. L. Rep. 1002, as to render it necessary in his opin- 
 
 7 S. W. 884; Tingle v. Com. 11 Ky. L. ion, for the protection of his life, or to 
 
 Rep. 224, 11 S. W. 812; Wright v. Com. avoid grievous bodily harm. Hurd v. 
 
 85 Ky. 123, 2 S. W. 904. And see Wat- People, supra. 
 
 son V. State, 82 Ala. 10, 2 So. 455. 9 State v. Medlin, 60 N. C. (2 Winst. 
 
 The word "escape," used in an in- L.) 99. 
 
 struction that, in order to acquit of loMcKinney v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 homicide upon the ground of self- 565, 82 S. W. 263. 
 defense, the killing must have been 
 
492 HOMICIDE. [§ 305 
 
 the sanctity of his home for the purpose of taking his life, or that 
 of another within it, is not hound to flee or hide, but may act in 
 such a manner as to prevent the invasion- ' ^ So, a person in his own 
 house has the same right to stand his ground and kill in self-defense 
 when assaulted by a partner or cotenant as when assaulted by a 
 stranger. -^^ And rules of law with reference to abandonment of at- 
 tack by the assailant, and the owner becoming the aggressor by pur- 
 suing him, are not applicable unless the evidence of abandonment 
 and intent to leave the house without further aggression is plain 
 and apparent to the owner, and should not be given to the jury 
 where it was not apparent whether he was intending to abandon or 
 renew the attack. ^ ^ 
 
 But while one may defend himself in his own domicil without 
 retreating, if he has retreated therefrom, and attempts afterwards 
 to defend himself, the principle which excuses one from retreating 
 is no longer applicable, and he may not then strike with a deadly 
 weapon unless it reasonably appears to be necessary to save him- 
 self from death or grievous bodily harm.** And he cannot use 
 force to the taking of life in order to eject another from his premises, 
 at least in the first instance, where the latter was there as an invited 
 guest.*® In such case he stands in no different light before the 
 
 iiSmith V. Com. 16 Ky. L. Rep. 112, tacked him, and whom he killed, it can- 
 26 S. W. 583. not be said that the homicide was not 
 
 Where persons seeking to make an committed under circumstances excus- 
 illegal arrest break into a dwelling able as seli'-def ense ; but the case was 
 house, and, upon being resisted, retreat decided upon other grounds, 
 a short distance and prepare to shoot isHayner v. People, 213 111. 142, 72 
 into the house, the owner is not re- N. E. 792. 
 
 quired to retreat from his house, or to Evidence that after a conflict between 
 remain in it, but has the right, outside two persons one of them entered his 
 or inside, to use such force as may be, home and procured a revolver and re- 
 or reasonably appears to him to be, turned to the door, and that the other 
 necessary to protect himself, even after was then in a position from which he 
 the other party has fallen back, and to might have left the premises by another 
 prevent any further assault upon his way, but that he came to the door and 
 person or dwelling; and he is not respon- attempted to open it, when he was shot 
 sible for the killing of one of the at- by the owner, does not warrant an in- 
 tacking party because he came out of struction as to the law in » case in 
 his dwelling to do the shooting, which the person shot attacked the 
 Wright V. Com. 85 Ky. 123, 2 S. W. 904. owner, and afterwards abandoned the 
 12 Jones V. State, 76 Ala. 8. attack, when the owner became the ag- 
 
 So, in De Forest v. State, 21 Ind. 23, gressor and pursued and killed him. 
 it was .said that when a man, upon going Ibid. 
 
 home, found the door locked, and himself 1 4 Martin v. State, 90 Ala. 602, 24 Am. 
 locked out of his own house, those with- St. Rep. 844, 8 So. 858. 
 in refusing to open, and he got an ax iBEversole v. Com. 17 Ky. L. Rep. 
 and beat the door down, upon which he 1259, 34 S. W. 231 ; Delaney v. State 
 found an armed man inside who at- (Wyo.) 81 Pac. 792. 
 
5 306] SELF-DEFENSE. 493 
 
 law than one who commits an assault in the open, or upon the public 
 highway. ^ " 
 
 307. Instruction as to. — A person charged with murder, who pleads 
 self-defense and defense of his domicil, and introduces evidence tend- 
 ing to establish such position, is entitled to have the jury instructed 
 as to the law of such defense and with reference to the duty to re- 
 treat. ^ And an instruction in a prosecution for homicide making the 
 justification of the accused depend upon no other safe or apparently 
 safe means of avoiding the danger is improper where the accused 
 was attacked in his own house. ^ So, on the other hand, where the 
 uncontradicted evidence shows that the killing occurred either within 
 the slayer's dwelling house, or under the same protection as his castle, 
 there is no duty to retreat, and a charge ignoring such duty is not 
 error. ^ It has been held, however, that where the jury in a prose- 
 cution for homicide are instructed that the accused might use such 
 means as appeared to him necessary, or apparently necessary, to 
 protect himself from imminent danger, omission to instruct that, 
 "being in his own house, he had a right to stand his ground is not 
 error.'* And refusal to charge as to the right of a person attacked in 
 his own dwelling or place of business, and that in such case he is 
 not required to retreat, is proper in the absence of evidence that 
 he was at the time in such dwelling or place of business.® And an 
 instruction as to the right of a person to defend himself in his 
 own house against one who assaults him therein is inapplicable in 
 case of an assault upon one who was in the house by leave of the 
 ovsraer, and who was peaceably leaving it in obedience to the owner's 
 directions at the time of the assault.® 
 
 isDelaney v. State, supra. of the words "so fierce and violent" in 
 
 But where a person indulges in pro- an instruction that where an assault is 
 
 fanity and indecent behavior in the made, so fierce and violent as to lead the 
 
 house of another the latter is justified person assaulted to believe that he is in 
 
 in expelling him from the premises, and, danger of loss of life, or of suffering 
 
 upon ordering him out and his refusal great bodily harm, he is not bound to 
 
 to go, he is under no legal necessity of retreat, but has the right to act in his 
 
 avoiding an altercation by yielding the own defense until the danger is over, is 
 
 right in question as a mode of avoid- improper and misleading, where the as- 
 
 ing apprehended violence. Brinkley v. sault was made in the uwelling house 
 
 State, 89 Ala. 34, 18 Am. St. Kep. 87, 8 of the person assaulted. Elder v. State, 
 
 So. 22. 69 Ark. 658, 86 Am. St. Eep. 220, 65 S. 
 
 1 Young V. State (Neb.) 2 L.R.A. W. 938. 
 
 (N.S.) 66, 104 N. W. 867. sNaugher v. State, 105 Ala. 26, 17 So. 
 
 2Bledsoe v. Com. 9 Ky. L. Rep. 1002, 7 24. 
 
 S. W. 884; Tingle v. Com. U Ky. L. Rep. 4Redmond v. Com. 21 Ky. L. Rep. 331, 
 
 224, 11 S. W. 812; Wright v. Com. 85 51 S. W. 565. 
 
 Ky. 123, 2 S. W. 904; Estep v. Com. 86 BStevens v. State, 138 Ala. 71, 35 So. 
 
 Ky. 39, 9 Am. St. Rep. 260, 4 S. W. 820. 122. 
 
 So, the substitution of the words sDelaney v. State (Wyo.) 81 Pac. 792. 
 "with such murderous intent" in place 
 
494 HOMICIDE. p§ aof, 
 
 308. Limited by necessity — In defending one's self against at- 
 tack in his dwelling, as -well as elsewhere, the right to kill is limited 
 by necessity, and while a person so assaulted may stand his ground, 
 if he can in any way avoid the killing without increasing his danger, 
 it is his duty to do so. ^ Though a person assaulted in his own house 
 is not bound to retreat, he is not entitled to kill his assailant un- 
 less he honestly and non-negligently believes that he is in danger of 
 his life, or of great bodily harm from the assault, and that he can- 
 not be protected by any other means." And he is not justified in 
 killing unless he cannot otherwise arrest or repel the assault, and 
 unless the killing is, to all appearances,' necessary to preserve his own 
 life or prevent great bodily harm.* And if a person follows and 
 shoots another who attempted an entry into his house, after he 
 had ceased the endeavor, the attempt offers no justification.* Nor 
 can one turn his house into an arsenal for the purpose of offensive 
 effort against the lives of others; and if he leaves its shelter and 
 brings on a difficulty with another, when no difficulty would have 
 resulted had he remained within it, he cannot claim immunity on 
 the ground of self-defense, where he killed the person with whom 
 the difficulty was thus provoked.® And a person assaulted in his 
 own dwelling must use care to employ no more force than is sufficient 
 to repel the danger to his life, or the apprehension of grievous injury 
 to his person.® 
 
 309. What constitutes dwelling or castle. — ^The rule that a person 
 attacked in his own house need not retreat in order to justify the plea 
 of self-defense only applies to his business place or dwelling house, 
 vidth so much additional space as is generally used and occupied for 
 the purpose of the dwelling and customary outbuildings; it does 
 not authorize him to stand and shoot, merely because he is on 
 
 iRedmond v. Com. supra; Askew v. sState v. Middleham, 62 Iowa, 150, 17 
 
 State, 94 Ala. 4, 33 Am. St. Rep. 83, 10 N. W. 446. 
 
 So. 657; Young v. State (Neb.) 2 A person, though attacked in his own 
 
 L.E.A.(N.S.) 66, 104 N. W. 867. And house, has no right to kill, unless it be- 
 
 see Bearden v. State, 44 Tex. Grim. Rep. comes necessary to save his own life or 
 
 678, 73 S. VV. 17. prevent felonious destruction of his 
 
 2State V. O'Brien, 18 Mont. 1, 43 Pac. property, or the commission of a felony 
 
 1091, 44 Pac. 399 ; Elder v. State, 69 Ark. therein. State v. Taylor, 143 Mo. 150, 
 
 648, 86 Am. St. Rep. 220, 65 S. W. 938; 44 S. W. 785. 
 
 State V. Conally, 3 Or. 69. < State v. Conally, supra. 
 
 But an instruction authorizing a per- sWatkins v. State, 89 Ala. 82, 8 So. 
 
 son to slay another for intrusion into 134. 
 
 his home, after he has resorted to all cAskew v. State, 94 Ala. 5, 33 Am. St 
 
 other means, except retreating, to get Rep. 83, 10 So. 657. 
 rid of him, is not subject to objection 
 bv the accused. Sargent v. State, 35 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 325, 33 S. W. 364. 
 
§ 3091 SELF-DEFENSE. 495 
 
 his own land, to the exclusive possession of whicli he is entitled.^ 
 And it has no application where the assault was in the owner's 
 store, to which persons were invited, and in which the assailant 
 had a right to be.^ Nor does the fact that a person assaulted 
 was lawfully in the house of another relieve him from the duty of 
 retreating, if he can do so with reasonable safety, since this is not 
 an assault in his own castle.' And a person engaged in the service 
 of an employer in an open space in front of his employer's buildings 
 cannot claim the immunities and privileges which the law extends to 
 the actual business residence of a person, and when attacked while 
 so engaged, it is his duty to retreat, if retreat is practicable.* 
 
 If a person assaulted by another was on a portion of his premises 
 constituting a part of his home, however, the rule of law requiring 
 Ihim to retreat, if he safely can, before taking the life of an assailant 
 is not applicable.'' And a person assaulted in his own yard near his 
 dwelling may stand his ground, and is not required to flee.^ Nor is a 
 person assaulted upon the porch of his own house under any duty to 
 retreat.^ And one upon whose house an assault is made need not 
 go inside or lock the door before killing in defense of it, where 
 he was justified in believing that he was in imminent danger, which 
 could only be avoided by immediate killing.* Within the meaning 
 of these rules a man's place of business is deemed his dwelling, and 
 he need not retreat therefrom in order to invoke the benefit of the 
 doctrine of self-defense.^ And a room rented as a bedroom is the 
 castle of the occupant, from which he need not retreat when assaulted 
 therein and in which he has the right to stand his ground and de- 
 
 iLee V. State, 92 Ala. 15, 25 Am. St. apprehension of an attack, or even a 
 
 Rep. 17, 9 So. 407. threat, but may arm and prepare him- 
 
 2HalI V. Com. 94 Ky. 322, 22 S. W. self for defense against such appre- 
 
 333. hended or threatened attack and await 
 
 sBardin v. State (Ala.) 38 So. 833. developments. Perry v. State, supra. 
 
 4Perry v. State, 94 Ala. 25, 10 So. 650. estate v. Bennett (Iowa) 105 N. W. 
 
 So, evidence that the accused was 324. 
 
 flunkeying around a saloon, the owner eEversole v. Com. 95 Ky. 623, 26 S. 
 
 of which was operating gaming tables W. 816 ; Bearden v. State, 44 Tex. Grim, 
 
 in the basement where the killing oc- Rep. 578, 73 S. W. 17. 
 
 curred, does not show that he was an But where a man is assaulted in his 
 
 employee there, so as to entitle him to a own yard and can avoid the necessity of 
 
 charge that a person attacked in his killing his assailant by retreating into 
 
 place of business is not required to re- his house, he is required to do so, and 
 
 treat. Stevens v. State, 138 Ala. 71, 35 may not stand and kill. Watkins v. 
 
 So. 122. State, 89 Ala. 82, 8 So. 134. 
 
 But, while a person hitching a horse 7Everso)e v. Com. 17 Ky. L. Rep. 1259, 
 
 in an open space in front of his em- 34 S. W. 231. 
 
 ployer's stable cannot be deemed within sPeople v. Keuhn, 93 Mich. 619, 53 
 
 his actual or business residence within N. W. 721. 
 
 the meaning of the law of homicide with 9 Jones v. State, 76 Ala. 8; State v. 
 
 reference to retreat, he is not required Reed, 154 Mo. 122, 55 S. W. 278. 
 to leave his business on a mere fear or 
 
496 HOMICIDE. [§ 309 
 
 fend himself, even to the death of the assailant. ^ " And a box stall 
 at a fair ground, provided vyith inside fastenings to its doors, 
 prepared and used by a man as his office and sleeping apartment, 
 and in which he keeps his clothing, money, and other belongings, 
 is his home or domicil where he has no other place of abode. ^^ 
 Likewise, where two persons enjoy a common right to the use of a 
 well, and one of them went to it to procure water for his family, 
 not seeking a contest with the other, and was there met and assaulted 
 by him, he is not obliged to retreat therefrom and leave the well 
 in the possession of the other. '•^ What constitutes a dwelling or 
 castle is further considered with reference to one's right to kill in 
 defense of his dwelling or castle in another part of this work.-'* 
 
 i. Homicide in the performance of official duty. 
 
 310. Where treated. — A killing by an officer in the proper perform- 
 ance of his official duty is clearly a killing in advancement of jus- 
 tice or in obedience to the laws of the government, constituting jus- 
 tifiable homicide as distinguished from excusable homicide, with 
 reference to which no duty to retreat exists. This, however, falls 
 clearly within the subject of homicide by officers of justice, and 
 will be considered in its appropriate place. ^ 
 
 IX. Effect of use of excessive foece. 
 
 311. General rules — The right of self-defense must be exercised 
 within the limits of mere defense and protection, under an apparent 
 necessity to avert by force an unlawful and violent attack. -^ It must 
 not exceed the bounds of mere defense and prevention. ^ If a person 
 was justified in defending himself, but went further than was nec- 
 essary to his defense, and killed his antagonist, he is guilty of man- 
 slaughter in some degree.* And if he believed that he was in great 
 danger, when the belief was not warranted by the facts as they ap- 
 
 lOHarris v. State, 96 Ala. 24, 11 So. Freeman v. State, 40 Tex. Crim Rep. 
 
 255. 545, 40 S. W. 641, 51 S. W. 230; Child- 
 
 11 Young V. State (Neb.) 2 L.R.A. ress v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 43 S. 
 
 (N.S.) 66, 104 N. W. 867. W. 100. 
 
 i2Haynes V. State, 17 Ga. 465. zBiake v. State, 3 Tex. App. 581; 
 
 1 3 See infra, chapter XXIV., § 534. State v. Wilson (Del.) 62 Atl. 227; 
 
 iSee infra, chapter XXIII., §483. White v. State, 118 Ga. 787, 45 S. E. 
 
 iMay V. State, 6 Tex. App. 191 ; Peo- 595 ; State v. Scossoni, 48 La. Ann. 1469, 
 
 pie V. Williams, 32 Cal. 280; State v. 21 So. 32; State v. Brooks, 99 Mo. 137, 
 
 Rhodes, Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 476; 12 S. W. 633; Com. v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9. 
 
 State V. Shippey, 10 Minn. 223, 88 Am. SUM v. People, 5 Park. Crim. Rep. 
 
 Dec. '(0, Gil. 178; State v. Stockton, 61 410; Pierson v. State, 12 Ala. 149; 
 
 Mo. 382; State V. Chavis, 80 N. C. 353; Brown v. State (Del.) 61 Atl. 1077; 
 
I 311] SELJ'-DEFENSE. 497 
 
 peared to him, the killing is manslpughter or murder, according to the 
 circumstances. * And death through excessive resistance of an assault 
 is murder, if inflicted pursuant to a formed design, or if there be 
 satisfactory evidence of premeditation. ® Even though an assault was 
 ■one calculated to kill or inflict serious bodily injury the assaulted 
 person cannot kill if he can safely resort to other means of self- 
 defense. * Resistance to an assault, which is disproportionate in 
 Tfiolence to that of the attack, renders the person assaulted the as- 
 sailant.'' And an instruction in a prosecution for homicide is 
 ■erroneous which ignores the principle limiting the right of a person 
 acting in self-defense to the use of only so much force as may 
 reasonably seem necessary for such defense.* 
 
 A person who is assaulted, however, and who believes, and has good 
 reason to believe, that great bodily harm is about to be done him, 
 and who acts in a moment of seeming impending peril, need not 
 nicely gauge the quantum of force necessary to repel the assault." 
 The question in such case is whether, under all the circumstances, 
 he had reason to believe, and did believe, that the force exercised 
 was necessary to protect him from imp>jnding danger of great bodily 
 harm.*" And rules with reference to apparent, as distinguished 
 from actual, necessity are applicable. ^ * And death by excessive re- 
 sistance of an assault, though cruel, is manslaughter only, if the fatal 
 blow was inflicted in the heat of blood, and there was no evidence 
 of previous malice. -^^ The degree of force which may properly 
 Tdo employed in self-defense must depend upon the circumstances 
 of the case in hand.** And that an attempt to kill or inflict great 
 bodily harm was made in resisting a forcible trespass against per- 
 sonal property does not deprive the person assaulted of the right 
 to kill his assailant without retreating, or making known to his ad- 
 versary his desire to decline the strife, where the assault was so sud- 
 den and perilous as to render such action impossible. * * But since he 
 
 ■Greschia v. People, 53 111. 295; Williford sKirkland v. State, 141 Ala. 45, 37 So 
 
 V. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 393, 42 S. 352. 
 
 W. 972; Hinton v. State, 24 Tex. 454; ftState v. Hickam, 95 Mo. 323, 6 Am. 
 
 Bi-own V. State, 62 N. J. L. 666; 42 Atl. St. Rep. 54, 8 S. W. 252; State v. 
 
 811; 1 East, P. 0. 277. And see Henry Palmer, 88 Mo. 568. 
 
 V. People, 198 111. 162, 65 N. E. 120. lolbid. 
 
 4Allison V. State, 74 Ark. 444, 86 S. nSchmidt v. State, 124 Wis. 516, 102 
 
 W. 409. N. W. 1071. 
 
 B Judge V. State, 58 Ala. 406, 29 Am. i2.Judge v. State, 58 Ala. 406, 29 Am. 
 
 Rep. 757. Rep. 757. 
 
 6 Williford v. State, 38 Tex. Crim.. isPeople v. Doe, 1 Mich. 451. 
 
 Rep. 393, 42 S. W. 972; Com. v. Self- t4People v. Hecker, 109 Cal. 451, 30 
 ridge, Horr. & T. Cas. 19. L.R.A. 403, 42 Pac. 307. 
 
 7 State V. Hill, 20 N. C. 629 (4 Dev. 
 A B. L. 491), 34 Am. Dec. 396. 
 
 Horn.— 32. 
 
498 HOMICIDE. ' d 311 
 
 was the first wrongdoer he must retreat and decline the combat, if 
 possible, before resorting to killing. ^^ So, a common purpose 
 to defend themselves, formed suddenly in an emergency by two 
 persons, though with more force and violence than is necessary, 
 will not render one participant responsible for offensive acts done 
 by the other alone, after the defense has been accomplished, and 
 while the original assailant is retreating from the scene of the con- 
 flict. ^^ 
 
 312. Use of deadly weapon in repelling attack. — To justify the use 
 of a deadly weapon in self-defense, every means of escape or retreat 
 must have been first exhausted.^ And if the slayer uses a deadly 
 weapon, under such circumstances that he must have been aware 
 that death would be likely to ensue, the necessity, to excuse the 
 homicide, must have been great, and must have arisen from immi- 
 nent peril to life or of great bodily injury.^ If, in the absence 
 of such necessity, a deadly weapon is resorted to and death results, 
 though accidentally, and though there was no intention to use the 
 weapon, it is manslaughter.* And as a general rule the law will 
 not excuse one who repels a blow with the hand or fist by stabbing 
 his assailant or using a deadly weapon upon him.* Aud the same 
 rule applies to kicking, or blows with the feet,® and to blows with 
 a cane, unless it appears that the cane was a weapon which would 
 ordinarily and reasonably cause death or great bodily harm.® Nor 
 is it justifiable to use a deadly weapon to check a threatening advance 
 by a person entertaining hostile feelings.'' And using a deadly 
 
 I61bid. 2 N. Y. 193, 51 Am. Dee. 286; People v. 
 
 leSpencer v. State, 77 Ga. 155, 4 Am. Shay, 4 Park Crim. Rep. 351 ; Stewart v. 
 
 St. Rep. 74, 3 S. E. 661. State, supra; State v. Ferguson, 26 Mo. 
 
 iState V. Walker, 9 Houst. (Del.) App. 8; Com. v. Drum, supra; State v. 
 
 464, 33 Atl. 227; Pierson v. State, 12 Scott, 26 N. C. (4 Ired. L.) 409, 42 Am. 
 
 Ala. 149; Greschia v. People, 53 111. 295; Dee. 148; Sanders v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 Stewart v. State, 1 Ohio St. 66; Bryant App.) 83 S. W. 712; Reg. v. Mawgridge, 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 47 S. W. 373; J. Kelyng, 128. 
 
 1 East, P. C. 277. And this is particula,rly the case when 
 
 2Com. V. Drum, 58 Pa. 9; State v. the deadly weapon was concealed. Stew- 
 Brown (Del.) 61 Atl. 1077; State v. art v. State, 1 Ohio St. 66. 
 Raymo, 76 Vt. 430, 57 Atl. 993. The fact that one of the parties en- 
 
 3Reg. V. Weston, 14 Cox, C. C. 346. gaged in a personal combat was the as- 
 
 And see Judge v. State, 58 Ala. 406, 29 sailant, where he had no weapon, does 
 
 Am. Rep. 757. not justify the other in killing him with 
 
 <Smith V. State, 142 Ind. 288, 41 N. a knife, though it may reduce the of- 
 
 E. 595; Larkin v. State, 163 Ind. 375, fense to manslaughter. Shell v. State, 
 
 71 N. E. 959; Scales v. State, 96 Ala. 88 Ala. 14, 7 So. 40. 
 
 69, 11 So. 121; Atkins 7. State, 16 Ark. EChase v. State, and Byrne v. Com. 
 
 568; State v. Rhodes, Houst. Crim. Rep. supra. 
 
 (Del.l 476; State v. Thompson, 9 Iowa, estate v. Martin, 9 Ohio S. & C. P. 
 
 188, 74 Am. Dec. 342; Byrne v. Com. 16 Dec. 778. 
 
 Ky. L. Rep. 416, 28 S. W. 481; Chase v. 7Allen v. People, 77 111. 484; State v. 
 
 State, 46 Miss. 683; Shorter v. People, Garland, 138 N. C. 675. 50 S. E. 853. 
 
§ 312] SELF-DEFENSE. 490 
 
 weapon against an unarmed adversary, -who is retre^ing or being 
 driven back, is entirely inexcusable. * A person of ordinary strength 
 may not repel the attack of an unarmed man, not his superior 
 in physical power, by slaying him, since such an attack does not 
 furnish sufficient evidence to one of ordinary strength and cour- 
 age to anticipate either that his life will be taken, or that great 
 bodily harm will be done him.^ 'Not can it be said that a man doing 
 all in his power to take the life of another with a gun is justified in 
 so doing, because the other endeavored simply to dispossess him of 
 the weapon as a means of preserving his own life, although his 
 act may have contributed unintentionally to the discharge of the 
 gun.^ ° And it is not justifiable to shoot a man advancing with a 
 knife, but not at close quarters. ^ ^ So, the fact that a person who 
 killed another by shooting him shot at him repeatedly at the 
 time is sufficient to go to the jury on the question of excessive self- 
 'defense. *^ And where a person who is assaulted resorts to a 
 deadly weapon to defend himself, and kills his assailant, his proved 
 ability to protect himself by resistance or escape without resort- 
 ing to a deadly weapon is a circumstance against him, of greater or 
 less weight, according to the facts, though it is not necessarily con- 
 clusive. ^ ^ 
 
 But the mere fact that a deadly weapon was used to repel an attack 
 is not alone sufficient to prevent a resulting homicide from being 
 justifiable.** It is not true, as a matter of law, that. one is never 
 justified in resisting an assault with the hands with a deadly weap- 
 on. ' ^ Nor is it true, as a matter of law, that a person armed with a 
 concealed deadly weapon, and intending to kill another, and who 
 actually did kill him, is necessarily guilty of murder, without refer- 
 ence to whether the latter made the first assault with a deadly 
 
 sState V. Cross, 68 Iowa, 180, 26 N. L.R.A. 687, 34 S. W. 423; Fitzgerald v. 
 
 W. 62; State v. Swanagan, 109 Mo. 233, State, 1 Leg. Eep. (Tenn.) 53. 
 19 S. W. 220. isDavis v. People, 88 111. 350; Prine 
 
 sHall V. State (Miss.) 1 So. 351. ■'• State, 73 Miss. 838, 19 So. 711; Reg. 
 
 lOMurphy v. People, 37 111. 447. '^- Weston, 14 Cox, C. C. 346. 
 
 ilHamilton v. State, 101 Tenn. 417, 47 , ^""^ the fact that «. person deliberate- 
 
 S. W. 695; Wise V. State, 2 Kan. 419, 85 ^y ^'^^i^ ^'""^f^ previous to killing a 
 
 Am Dec SQS person does not authorize the jury in a 
 
 ,ooj. i' Hr ir ■ inn nr onn .70 prosecution for murder to find him guil- 
 
 ^ wfm^' ^''^^°''^' ^^^ ^°- ^^^' ^^ ty, provided he rightfully so armed 
 
 Vr,', y „ „„ ., „, „ himself for purposes of self-defense, and 
 
 isState V. Cross, 68 Iowa, 180, 26 N. jf^ independently of the fact of arming 
 
 "• ^^•' himself, the case, tested by what oo- 
 
 i4Kingen v. State, 45 Ind. 518; Davis curred on the occasion of the killing, 
 
 y. State, 152 Ind. 34, 71 Am. St. Rep. -syas one of manslaughter only. Gourko 
 
 322, 51 N. E. 928; State v. Foutch, 96 v. United States, 153 U. S. 183, 33 L. rid. 
 
 Tenn. 242, 34 S. W. 1, 95 Tenn. 711, 45 680, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 806. 
 
500 HOMICIDE. [§ 312 
 
 weapon.^® And if an assault was made by a strong man upon a 
 weak one, and the battery extended so far beyond the provoca- 
 tion as to amount to a felony, or as to endanger the life of the 
 person assaulted, he might be justified in using a deadly weapon 
 in resistance. ^ ^ So, one is justified in using a deadly weapon 
 to defend himself from a public whipping by one greatly his su- 
 perior physically.^* And where a man is assaulted by a mob of 
 angry and excited men, some of whom are armed, and he kills one of 
 them with a deadly weapon, an instruction is erroneous which limits 
 his right to defend himself to assaults made by the deceased only, 
 leaving out of consideration his right to use a weapon if necessary 
 to protect himself from impending harm at the hands of the mob.^* 
 Even a resort to a concealed deadly weapon may be justified where 
 the person resorting to it did so to protect his own life against 
 an adversary who struck the first blow, and resorted to such a weap- 
 on, provided he did not intend to use it unless necessary to overcome 
 his antagonist ^ " And where a person is assaulted, the assailant be- 
 ing armed with a deadly weapon which he intends to use if neces- 
 sary, the person assaulted has the right to resist with such force and 
 such weapons as are necessary for protection against the assault.^* 
 It is for the jury in a prosecution for homicide to say whether a 
 person assaulted with hands or fists could, under the circumstances of 
 the case, justifiably resist the assault with a deadly weapon. ^^ And 
 whether the use of such a weapon is justifiable in such a case depends 
 upon whether the person assaulted was in imminent danger of receiv- 
 ing great bodily injury, or had reasonable grounds so to believe, and 
 that such act was necessary to prevent it. ^ * And proof of previous 
 enmity and repeated threats and insults and assaults with a deadly 
 
 isKing V. State (Miss.) 23 So. 766. iTStriekland v. State, 98 Ga. 84, 25 
 
 And see Burnett v. State, 46 Tex. Grim. S. E. 908. And see Davis v. State, 152 
 
 Eep. 116. 79 S. W. 550. Ind. 34, 71 Am. St. Rep. 322, 51 N. E. 
 
 And a statutory provision that wheTi 928 ; State v. Wilson ( Del. ) 62 Atl. 227. 
 
 the killing in any sudden rencounter or isState v. Bartlett, 170 Mo. 658, 59 
 
 affray is caused by the assailant by the L.E.A. 756, 71 S. W. 148. 
 
 use of a deadly vpeapon, which vi^as con- isState v. Adler, 146 Mo. 18, 47 S. W. 
 
 cealed before the commencement of the 794. 
 
 fight, his adversary having no deadly 20AIdridge v. State, 59 Miss. 250. 
 
 weapon drawn, such killing is murder ziConner v. State (Miss.) 13 So. 934, 
 
 in the second degree, and may, according And see Coleman v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 to the circumstances, be murder in the App.) 88 S. W. 238; Scott v. State, 48 
 
 first degree, applies only to cases in Tex. Crim. Rep. 305, 81 S. W. 950. 
 
 M'hich the assailant perpetrates the 22Strickland v. State, 98 Ga. 84, 25 
 
 homicide, and has no application where S. E. 908. 
 
 the deceased, and not the accused, was 23Davis v. People, 88 111. 350. 
 the assailant. Scales v. State, 96 Ala. 
 69, 11 So. 121. 
 
5 312] SELF-DEFENSE. iiOl 
 
 ■weapon is sufScient to go to the jury on the question of reasonable 
 grounds to believe in the existence of imminent peril. ^ * 
 
 313. Pursuing retreating adversary as indicating. — As a general 
 rule, pursuing a retreating adversary and killing him is not justi- 
 fiable as done in self-defense, though the deceased brought on the 
 diiEculty or made the first assault.^ And an instruction as to self- 
 defense is entirely inapplicable when it appears that the deceased 
 was fleeing from the slayer at the time of the killing.^ And where 
 one person pursued another from 75 to 100 yards, and when he 
 fell repeatedly stabbed him, there is no question of self-defense.' 
 So, shooting and killing an assailant after he had been disarmed, 
 and while he was standing with his back to the slayer, is murder, 
 and not justifiable in self-defense.* So, if a person inflicted a 
 wound upon another while acting in self-defense, and afterwards 
 inflicted another after his antagonist had declined all further com- 
 bat and was fleeing from him, and each wound was sufficient to 
 have produced death, he may be adjudged guilty of murder in in- 
 flicting the last wound, if it contributed to the death, though had 
 it not been inflicted the deceased would have died from the wound 
 given him in necessary self-defense; but if the latter wound did 
 not contribute to death, he is not guilty of any degree of homicide. *" 
 The right of self-defense continues, however, so long as there is 
 actual or apparent danger of an attack, although the assailant is 
 under retreat." The right to pursue an assailant under retreat, 
 when retreat was for the purpose of renewal of an attack with in- 
 creased advantage, rather than withdrawal, is considered in an- 
 other part of this chapter.'' 
 
 314. Relative size and strength as affecting — ^Where one man kills 
 another in alleged self-defense, their relative size and strength is 
 
 24Bryne v. Com. 16 Ky. L. Eep. 416, aState v. Wright, 141 Mo. 333, 42 S. 
 
 28 S. W. 481. W. 934. 
 
 iShorter v. People, 2 N. Y. 193, 51 And that the deceased looked scared 
 Am. Dec. 286 ; Johnston v. State, 29 Fla. and as if he wanted to get away after an 
 558, 10 So. 686; White v. State, 118 Ga. encounter with the accused, and just be- 
 787, 45 S. E. 595; State v. Cross, 68 fore a second and fatal encounter, is ad- 
 Iowa, 180, 26 N. W. 62; State v. Dett- missible in evidence in a prosecution 
 mer, 124 Mo. 426, 27 S. W. 1117; Sar- for the killing. State v. Ramsey, 82 Mo. 
 gent V. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 325, 133. 
 
 33 S. W. 364; Humphries v. State, 25 < Glaze v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 45 
 
 Tex. App. 126, 7 S. W. 663; Myers v. S. W. 903. 
 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 33 S. W. 865; BRogers v. State, 60 Ark. 76, 31 L.R. 
 
 Swann v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 310, A. 465, 46 Am. St. Rep. 154, 29 S. W. 
 
 46 S. W. 36. 894. 
 
 2State V. Mitchell, 41 La. Ann. 1073, eSargent v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 6 So. 785; Thurman v. State (Tex. Crim. 325, 33 S. W. 364. 
 App.) 86 S. W. 1014. 'See supra, § 304. 
 
502 HOMICIDE. [% 31I4 
 
 a proper consideration in a prosecution for the killing on the ques- 
 tion as to whether the slayer used more force than was necessary 
 to defend himself against the threatened danger. ^ And that the de- 
 ceased was a small, weak, and frail man, and almost blind, and that 
 he was unarmed, is admissible in evidence in a prosecution for 
 killing him, as bearing upon the question whether the accused had 
 any reasonable cause to apprehend any great bodily harm from him.* 
 But the fact that a person killed had an infirmity, shown by his 
 wearing a truss, or otherwise, is immaterial for the purpose of 
 rebutting the theory of self-defense, where it does not appear that 
 the slayer had knowledge of such infirmity.* 
 
 X. Self-defense by the oeiginal aggeessoe. * 
 
 a. Effect of aggression on liability. 
 
 315. The general rule — The right of self-defense does not imply 
 the right of attack.^ A provoked attack is no defense.* And the 
 general, if not the universal, rule is that one who slays another, to 
 be justified or excused on the ground of self-defense, must have been 
 without fault in provoking the difficulty, and must not have been 
 the aggressor, and must not have provoked, brought on, or encour- 
 aged the difficulty, or produced the occasion which made it necessary 
 for him to do the killing.* "A man . . . has not the right to 
 provoke a quarrel and take advantage of it, and then justify the 
 
 iState V. Martin, 9 Ohio S. & 0. P. 4This proposition is laid down or 
 
 Dec. 778. acted upon by a large number of cases, 
 
 2State V. Goddard, 162 Mo. 198, 62 S. among which are: — ^De Arman v. State, 
 
 W. 697. 71 Ala. 351; Crawford v. State, 112 Ala. 
 
 sState V. Cross, 08 Iowa, 180, 26 N. W. 1, 21 So. 214; Dabney v. State, 113 Ala. 
 
 62. 38, 59 Am. St. Rep. 92, 21 So. 211; 
 
 iThe subject of self-defense set up by Mitchell v. State, 133 Ala. 65, 32 So. 
 
 the accused, who began the conflict, is 132; Foster v. Territory, 6 Ariz. 240, 
 
 extensively discussed in a note to Foutch 56 Pac. 738 ; Roberson v. State, 53 Ark. 
 
 V. State, 45 L.R.A. 687. 516, 14 S. W. 002; Magness v. State, 67 
 
 2Peopl3 V. Westlake, 62 Cal. 303; Peo- Ark. 594, 50 S. W. 554; People v. Lamb, 
 
 pie V. Bruggy, 93 Cal. 476, 29 Pac. 26; 17 Cal. 323; People v. Hecker, 109 Cal. 
 
 State V. Hardy, 95 Mo. 455, 8 S. W. 416; 451, 30 L.R.A. 403, 42 Pac. 307; People 
 
 Wells V. Territory, 14 Okla. 436, 78 Pac. v. Kennett, 114 Cal. 18, 45 Pac. 994; 
 
 124. Bush V. People, 10 Colo. 566, 16 Pac. 
 
 The necessity which will justify kill- 290; Boykin v. People, 22 Colo. 496, 45 
 
 ing in self-defense must not arise out of Pac. 419; State v. Warren, 1 Maiv. 
 
 the slayer's own misconduct. State v. (Del.) 487, 41 Atl. 190; State v. Talley, 
 
 Hatfield, 48 W. Va. 561, 37 S. E. 626. 9 Houst. (Del.) 417, S3 Atl. 181; Wil- 
 
 sHenry v. State, 79 Ala. 42; State v. son v. State, 30 Fla. 234, 17 L.R.A. 654, 
 
 Frierson, 51 La. Ann. 706, 25 So. 390; U So. 556; Padgett v. State, 40 Fla. 
 
 State V. Tooker. 188 Mo. 438, 87 S. W. 451, 24 So. 145; Haynes v. State, 17 Ga. 
 
 487; People v. Filippelli, 173 N. Y. 509, 465; Coney v. State, 90 Ga. 140, 15 S. 
 
 66 N. E. 402; Carr v. State, 21 Ohio E. 746; Adams v. People, 47 111. 376; 
 
 C. C. 43. Kinney V. People, 108 111. 519; Henry v. 
 
I 315 
 
 SELF-DEFENSE. 
 
 503 
 
 hoinicide."" "While a man may act safely on appearances, and 
 is not bound to wait until a blow is received, yet he cannot be the 
 stggressor and then shield himself on the assumption that he was 
 defending himself."® A plea in a prosecution for homicide that 
 the accused was really, or / to ordinary appearances, in imminent 
 peril of life or limb, from which he had no other reasonable means 
 of escape, is annulled and defeated by showing that he provoked and 
 encouraged the difficulty.'' This is the common-law rule, and it 
 has been affirmed by statutory enactment in some of the states.* 
 Even though a person who killed another was in his own house, or 
 in a place where he had a right to be, he cannot claim that he Avas 
 under no duty to retreat, or that he acted in self-defense, where 
 he was the aggressor.® And a right to defend or plead self-de- 
 fense is not conferred on the aggressor by the fact that the deceased 
 
 People, 198 111. 162, 65 N. E. 120; Eun- 
 yan v. State, 57 Ind. 80, 26 Am. Rep. 
 52; Deal v. State, 140 Ind. 354, 39 N. 
 E. 930; State v. Benham, 23 Iowa, 154, 
 92 Am. Dec. 417; State v. Perigo, 70 
 Iowa, 657, 28 N. W. 452 ; State v. Rogers, 
 18 Kan. 78, 26 Am. Rep. 754; Bohannon 
 V. Com. 8 Bush, 481, 8 Am. Rep. 474; 
 Turner v. Com. 89 Ky. 78, 1 S. W. 
 475; Wheeler v. Com. 27 Ky. L. Rep. 
 1090, 87 S. W. 1106; Williams v. Com. 
 23 Ky. L. Rep. 2046, 66 S. W. 401; 
 State V. Hopkins, 50 La. Ann. 1171, 24 
 So. 188; State v. Kellogg, 104 La. 580, 
 29 So. 285; People v. Miller, 49 Mich. 
 23, 12 N. W. 895; People v. Macard, 73 
 Mich. 15, 40 N. W. 784; State v. Ship- 
 pey, 10 Minn. 223, 88 Am. Dec. 70, Gil. 
 178; State v. Tripp, 34 Minn. 25, 24 N. 
 W. 290; Wesley v. State, 37 Miss. 327, 
 75 Am. Dec. 62 ; Prine v. State, 73 Miss. 
 838, 19 So. 711; State v. Hays, 23 Mo. 
 287; State v. Rapp, 142 Mo. 443, 44 S. 
 W. 270; State v. Sharp, 183 Mo. 715, 82 
 S. W. 134; People v. McLeod, 1 Hill, 
 377, 37 Am. Dec. 328, 25 Wend. 483; 
 State V. Bryson, 60 N. C. (2 Winst. L.) 
 86; Stoffer v. State, 15 Ohio St. 47, 86 
 .Am. Dec. 470; Martin v. State, 17 Ohio 
 C. C. 406; Carr v. State, 21 Ohio C. C. 
 43 ; State v. Hawkins, 18 Or. 476, 23 Pac. 
 475; Loguev. Com. 38 Pa. 268, 80 Am. 
 Dec. 481 ; State v. White, 18 R. I. 473, 
 28 Atl. 968; State v. Ballou, 20 R. I. 
 607, 40 Atl. 861; State v. Wyse, 33 S. 
 C. 583,12 S. E. 556; State v. Petsch, 43 
 S. C. 132, 20 S. E. 993: Rippy v. State, 
 2 Head, 217; Rogers v. State, 95 Tenn. 
 448, 33 S. W. 5d3; Irvine v. State, 104 
 
 Tenn. 132, 56 S. W. 845; Reed v. State, 
 11 Tex. App. 509, 40 Am. Rep. 795; 
 Stacy V. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 86 
 S. W. 327 ; Garter v. State, 37 Tex. Grim. 
 Rep. 403, 35 S. W. 378 ; State v. Shock- 
 ley, 29 Utah, 25, 80 Pac. 865; Vaiden 
 V. Com. 12 Gratt. 717; Gaines v. Com. 
 88 Va. 682, 14 S. E. 375; State v. Mc- 
 Cann, 16 Wash. 249, 47 Pac. 443, 49 Pac. 
 216; White v. Territory, 3 Wash. Terr. 
 397, 19 Pac. 37; State v. Cain, 20 W. Va. 
 679; Richards v. State, 82 Wis. 172. 51 
 N. W. 652; United States v. Mingo, 2 
 Curt. C. C. 1, Fed. Gas. No. 15,781; 
 Anonymous, J. Kelyng, 58; Reg. v. 
 Knock, 14 Cox, G. C. 1; Reg. v. Smith, 
 8 Car. & P. 160; Mason's Case, 1 East, 
 P. C. 239. 
 
 E Adams v. People, 47 111. 376: Allen 
 V. Com. 86 Ky. 642, 6 S. W. 645; Blank-: 
 enship v. Com. 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1995, 66 
 S. W. 994; Com. v. Self ridge, Horr. & 
 T. Gas. 19; People v. Glover, 141 Gal. 
 233, 74 Pac. 745; Henry v. People, 198 
 111. 162, 65 N. E. 120. 
 
 estate v. Linney, 52 Mo. 40. 
 
 'McDaniel v. State, 76 Ala. 1. 
 
 8See Bush v. People, 10 Colo. 566, 16 
 Pac. 290. 
 
 A statutory provision that an assail- 
 ant must in good faith endeavor to de- 
 cline any further struggle before he is 
 justified in taking life is simply a dec- 
 laration of the common law. People v. 
 Button, 106 Gal. 628, 28 L.R.A. 591, 46 
 Am. St. Rep. 259, 39 Pac. 1073. 
 
 sMaxwell v. State, 129 Ala. 48, 29 So. 
 981; Harkness v. State, 129 Ala. 71, 30 
 So. 73. 
 
504 HOMICIDE. [§ 315. 
 
 voluntarily engaged with him in a rencounter with deadly weapons. * * 
 And if one person so menaces and assaults another as to justify a 
 belief upon the part of the latter that the former intended to kill 
 him or do him great bodily harm, the latter has the right to de- 
 fend himself; and if, in making such defense, he is killed by the 
 former, the former is as guilty as he would have been if the latter 
 had made no effort to save his own life. ^ ^ 
 
 So, where the slayer brought on or provoked the difficulty in which 
 the killing took place, the extent of his danger or the nature of the 
 extremity to which he was reduced in the combat is of no consequence 
 in considering the question of self-defense.^^ No matter how im- 
 minent the danger or pressing the necessity of the aggressor in 
 the progress of the affray, if he himself has brought it on, or 
 provoked it, he cannot kill and plead self-defense.** And the sit- 
 uation is unaffected by the fact that he entered into the difficulty 
 without intent to kill, and the other resorted to a deadly weapon 
 before the killing. * * Nor can he justify his acts under the plea that 
 he attacked and killed the deceased for fear of injury at some future 
 time, as such a plea shows no necessity.*® This rule applies in all 
 cases in the absence of evidence showing that the slayer had made 
 
 loGodwin v. State, 38 Tex. Grim. Rep. Grim. App.) 20 S. W. 737; Cunningham 
 
 466, 43 S. W. 336. v. State, 17 Tex. App. 89; Varnell v. 
 
 ilLightfoot V. Com. 80 Ky. 516. State, 26 Tex. App. 56, 9 S. W. 65; 
 
 And the absence of a witness who White v. State, 23 Tex. App. 154; 3 S. 
 
 would testify that the accused was not W. 710; Honesty v. Com. 81 Va. 283. 
 the aggressor is a good ground for a isgtate v. Underwood, 57 Mo. 40; 
 
 continuance in a case in which self-de- State v. Brown, 64 Mo. 367; Baker v. 
 
 fense was the issue, and there was tes- State, 81 Ala. 38, 1 So. 127; Holmes v. 
 
 timony that he was the aggressor. Ruck- State, 100 Ala. 80, 14 So. 864; State v. 
 
 er V. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 40 S. W. Hensley, 94 N. C. 1021; State v. Brit- 
 
 991. tain, 89 N. C. 481 ; Irvine v. State, 104 
 
 izState V. Davidson, 95 Mo. 155, 8 S. Tenn. 132, 56 S. W. 845. And see Blair 
 W. 413; State v. Talmage, 107 Mo. 543, v. State, 69 Ark. 558, 64 S. W. 948. 
 17 S. W. 990; State v. Partlow, 90 Mo. i4Stacey v. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 
 608, 59 Am. Rep. 31, 4 S. W. 14; State 33 S. W. 348; Johnson v. State, 26 Tex. 
 V. Vaughan, 141 Mo. 514, 42 S. W. 1080; App. 631, 10 S. W. 235; Davis v. State, 
 State v. Gordon, 191 Mo. 114, 89 S. W. 92 Ala. 20, 9 So. 616; Gedye v. People, 
 1025; State v. Gamble, 119 Mo. 427, 24 170 111. 284, 48 N. E. 987; State v. 
 S. W. 1030; State v. Hopper, 142 Mo. Neeley, 20 Iowa, 109; Allen v. State, 66 
 478, 44 S. W. 272 ; State v. Peak, 85 Mo. Miss. 385, 6 So. 242 ; State v. Crawford, 
 190; Jones v. Gale, 22 Mo. App. 637; 115 Mo. 620, 22 S. W. 371; State v. Hud- 
 State v. Shoultz, 25 Mo. 128; State v. son, 59 Mo. 135; Rogers v. State, 95 
 Lewis, 118 Mo. 79, 23 S. W. 1082; Peo- Tenn. 448, 33 S. W. 563. 
 pie v. Hecker, 109 Cal. 451, 30 L.R.A. 4C3, Unless he, in good faith, endeavored 
 42 Pac. 307 ; Bush v. People, 10 Col :>. 566, to decline further struggle before the 
 16 Pac. 290; State v. Hill, 20 N. C. 629 mortal blow was given. Gedye v. Peo- 
 (4 Dev. & B. L. 491), 34 Am. Dee. 396; pie, supra. 
 
 State v. Garland, 138 N. C. 675, 50 S. E. iBState v. Rose, 30 Kan. 501, 1 Pac 
 
 853; Stoffer v. State, 15 Ohio St. 47, 86 817; Bush v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 Am. Deo. 470 ; State v. Hawkins, 18 Or. 539, 51 S. W. 238. 
 470, 23 Pac. 475; Saens v. State (Tex. 
 
§ 315] SELF-DEFENSE. 505 
 
 a bona fide retreat from the affray/" without reference to the de- 
 gree of passion aroused in him.^'^ And it has been held that the 
 party beginning the affray, or first in fault, forfeits to the other his 
 right to live, to the extent, at least, of the difficulty which he 
 has created, and that the plea of self-defense is foreclosed to him, 
 and his life is the penalty no matter what turn the affair may sub- 
 sequently take. ' * So, one who provokes a difficulty with, and makes 
 an unlawful assault upon, another, and while engaged therein kills 
 a third person, who interfered to defend the latter, is guilty of the 
 same degree of homicide as though he had killed the party attacked 
 by him. * ® 
 
 Inability to retreat where retreat is required, or to otherwise 
 escape, however, is a condition precedent to an inquiry as to free- 
 dom from fault ; if the slayer could have escaped the danger without 
 killing, killing is not justifiable whether he was free from fault 
 in bringing on the difficulty or not; and an instruction in a prose- 
 cution for homicide authorizing an accquittal on the ground of self- 
 defense where the slayer did not bring on the difficulty is improper 
 and misleading, where the jury might have found that no predicate 
 for an inquiry as tx> where the fault lay had been made by the 
 evidence of peril and inability to escape.^" 
 
 316. Necessity of instructing the jury as to — Under the rule that 
 the aggressor in a difficulty cannot plead self-defense, instructions in 
 a prosecution for homicide as to self-defense, ignoring evidence 
 tending to show that the slayer was the aggressor, are erroneous;^ 
 and so are charges invoking the doctrine of self-defense, ignoring or 
 omitting all reference to freedom from fault in provoking or bringing 
 on the difficulty.^ Instructions invoking the doctrine of self-de- 
 fense, but ignoring the question of fault on the part of the accused 
 
 leState v. Vansant, 80 Mo. 67. So. 569; Golson v. State, 124 Ala. 8, 2(> 
 
 1 7 State V. Brown, 64 Mo. 367. So. 975; Gibson v. State, 126 Ala. 59 
 
 isPeople V. Conkling, 111 Cal. 616, 44 28 So. 673; Gotten v. State, 91 Ala. 106, 
 
 Pac. 314. 9 So. 287; Linehan v. State, 113 Ala. 70, 
 
 isThornton V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 21 So. 497; Green v. State (Ala.) 39 So. 
 
 65 S. W. 1105; Norrjs v. State, 42 Tex. 362; Jarvis v. State, 138 Ala. 17, 34 So. 
 
 Crim. Rep. 559, 61 S. W. 493. 1025 ; Watkins v. State, 133 Ala. 88, 32 
 
 aoHenson v. State, 114 Ala. £5, 22 So. So. 627; Franklin v. State (Ala.) 39 So. 
 
 127. 979; Medlock v. State, 114 Ala. 6, 22 So. 
 
 iGoMsmith v. State, 105 Ala. 8, 16 So. 112; Harkness v. State, 129 Ala. 71, 30 
 
 933; Bell v. State, 115 Ala. 25, 22 So. So. 73; Wilson v. State, 140 Ala. 43, 37 
 
 526; Hellard v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 38, So. 93; Thayer v. State, 138 Ala. 39, 35 
 
 80 S. W. 482; Craiger v. State (Tex. So. 406; Parker v. State, 88 Ala. 4, 7 
 
 Crim. App.) 88 S. W. 208. So. 98; Sylvester v. State (Fla.) 35 So. 
 
 2Ford V. State, 129 Ala. 16, 30 So. 27; 142; Deilks v. State, 141 Ind. 24, 40 N. 
 
 Seoggins v. State, 120 Ala. 369, 25 So. E. 120; Tate v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. 
 
 180; Mitchell v. State, 129 Ala. 23, 30 Rep. 231, 33 S. W. 121; Carr v. Stats 
 
 So. 348; Wilson v. State, 128 Ala. 17, 29 (Tex. Crim. App.) 87 S. W. 346; State 
 
506 HOMICIDE. K 316 
 
 in bringing on the difficulty, are properly refused where there i? 
 some evidence tending to show that the accused was not free from 
 fault, although the preponderance of evidence is to the contrary.* 
 And where there is evidence on both sides of the question the court 
 may charge the jury that to make the plea of self-defense avail- 
 able the defendant must be without fault, without violating the 
 rule of law as to the burden of proof.* An instruction as to the 
 right of self-defense in a prosecution for homicide should contain the 
 qualification that the accused, to avail himself of that defense, must 
 not have been the aggressor.^ And provisions of law with reference 
 to the right to kill in good faith to prevent the perpetration of cer- 
 tain offenses do not qualify or limit the law of self-defense in 
 case of danger to life arising when both parties had been in fault; 
 and instructions as to the two separate branches of the law of homi- 
 cide should not confuse the one with the other. ® 
 
 Instructions as to the law applicable when the slayer provokes 
 the difficulty, not supported by the evidence, however, are unau- 
 thorized and objectionable as calculated to impair hi.s rights under 
 a plea of self-defense;'' and the rule is the same with reference to 
 
 V. Murrell, 33 S. C. 83, 11 S. E. 682; sPugh v. State, 114 Ga. 16, 39 S. E. 
 State V. Dean, 72 S. C. 74, 51 S. E. 524. 875; Teasley v. State, 104 Ga. 738, 30 S. 
 
 sCarter v. State, 82 Ala. 13, 2 So. 766. E. 938; Meil v. State, 112 Ga. 78, 37 S. 
 
 4Wilkins v. State, 98 Ala. 1, 13 So. E. 121; Moultrie v. State, 112 Ga. 121, 
 312. 37 S. E. 122. 
 
 6 Sylvester V. State (Fla.) 35 So. 142; TMcCandless v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. 
 Peoples V. State (Miss.) 33 So. 289; Rep. 58, 57 S. W. 672; Walters v. State, 
 Morris v. Com. 27 Ky. L. Rep. 145, 84 37 Tex. Crim. Rep. 388, 35 S. W. 652; 
 S. W. 560; Territory v. Gonzales, UN. Cline v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 28 S. 
 M. 301, 68 Pae. 925; Bearden v. State, W. 684; Tate v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. 
 46 Tex. Crim. Eep. 144, 79 S. W. 37. Rep. 231, 33 S. W. 121; McGlothlin v. 
 And see Goodman v. State (Tex. Crim. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 53 S. W. 869; 
 App.) 83 S. W. 196; McClellan v. State, Castro v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 40 S. 
 140 Ala. 99, 37 So. 239. W. 985; Grayson v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 But an instruction in a prosecution App.) 57 S. W. 808; Vann v. State, 45 
 for homicide that the defendant must Tex. Crim. Rep. 434, 107 Am. St. Rep. 
 come into court with clean hands, though 997, 77 S. W. 813; McMahon v. State, 46 
 inappropriate, is r^ot a ground for new Tex. Crim. Rep. 540,81 S. W. 296; Smith 
 trial, where from the whole evidence it v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 87 S. W. 
 is clear that what was meant was that 151; Carr v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 he who sets up the plea of self-defense 87 S. W. 346; Mitchell v. State, 133 Ala. 
 must have been without fault in bring- 65, 32 So. 132; People v. Conkling, lU 
 ing on the necessity for taking life. Cal. 616, 44 Pac. 314; Fahnestock v. 
 State V. Davis, 50 S. C. 405, 62 Am. St. State, 23 Ind. 231; Com. v. Hoskins, 18 
 Rep. 837, 27 S. E. 905. Ky. L. Rep. 59, 35 S. W. 284; Wilcoxen 
 
 And where the evidence shows that the v. Com. 15 Ky. L. Rep. 261, 23 S. W. 
 attack by the deceased,, to repel which 195; Robinson v. Com. 10 Ky. L. Rep. 
 the killing was done, was occasioned by 914, 11 S. W. 81 ; Smith v. Com. 13 Ky. 
 the wrongful act of the slayer, an iii- L. Rep. 31, 16 S. W. 137; Arnold v. 
 struction that the killing must be in Com. 23 Ky. L. Rep. 182, 62 S. W. 15; 
 fact in self-defense, and not colorably so, Carnes v. Com. 27 Ky. L. Rep. 1205, 87 
 in ?rder to be justifiable, is proper. S. W. 1123; Feltner v. Com. 23 Ky. L. 
 Gdlleland v. State, 44 Tex. 356. Rep. 1110, 64 S. W. 959; Hamlin v. Com. 
 
S 316] SELF-DEFENSE. 507 
 
 instructions as to the law applicable to mutual combat. * And it is 
 error to assume, in charging the jury as to self-defense, that the 
 slayer was without fault,* or that he was at fault.*" So, an in- 
 struction in a prosecution for homicide giving the rules of law 
 applicable to the state's theory, that the accused provoked the diffi- 
 culty, should also present the converse theory.** And the terms 
 "self-defense" and "bring on the difficulty," as used in the law of 
 homicide, are self-explanatory and need not be specifically defined 
 in instructions.*^ 
 
 317. Reasons for the rule. — The rule that to justify homicide on the 
 ground of self-defense the slayer must not have provoked or furnished 
 the occasion for the difficulty in which the killing occurred hinges 
 directly upon the doctrine that every man is presumed to intend the 
 natural, probable and necessary consequences of his own acts.* In 
 such cases the law imputes to the aggressor his own wrong and its 
 consequences. * And he must not be disregardf ul of the consequences 
 of any wrongful word spoken or act done by him.* And the rule 
 also arises from the fact that self-defense is a defensive, and not 
 an offensive, act, and must not exceed the bounds of mere defense and 
 prevention,* and that the necessity to kill which originates in a 
 
 II Ky. L. Rep. 348, 12 S. W. 146; Fore Wheeler v. State, 112 Ga. 43, 37 S. E. 
 
 V. State, 75 Miss. 727, 23 So. 710; 126; Freeman v. State, 112 Ga. 48, 37 S. 
 
 Pulpus V. State, 82 Miss. 548, 34 So. 2; E. 172; James v. State, 123 Ga. 548, 51 S. 
 
 State V. Smith, 125 Mo. 2, 28 S. W. 181 ; E. 577. 
 
 State V. Harrod, 102 Mo. 590, 15 S. W. 9 State v. Ferguson, 9 Nev. 106; State 
 
 373; State v. Bartlett, 170 Mo. 658, 59 v. Murrell, 33 S. C. 83, 11 S. E. 682. 
 
 L.E.A. 756, 71 S. W. 148. And see Lof- And an instruction that there is no 
 
 ton y. State, 79 Miss. 723, 31 So. 420. evidence in the ease that accused pro- 
 
 An instruction in a prosecution for voked or encouraged the diiSculty is im- 
 
 homicide that if the accused brought on proper and misleading in a prosecution 
 
 the conflict, and continued the shooting, for homicide in whicli it appears that 
 
 he could not plead self-defense, is im- the deceased was killed while lying in 
 
 proper and erroneous, where the only bed, unconscious of his danger. Dennis 
 
 question in the case was whether the v. State, 118 Ala. 72, 23 So. 1002. 
 
 fatal shot fired by the accused was the lORiley v. Com. 94 Ky. 266, 22 S. W. 
 
 first shot fired, or whether the accused 222. And see Drake v. State, 45 Tex. 
 
 was merely returning the fire of the de- Grim. Rep. 273, 77 S. W. 7. 
 
 Ceased. Oakley v. Com. 10 Ky. L. Eej>. nBonner v. State, 29 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 885, 11 S. W. 72. 223, 15 S. W. 821. 
 
 An instruction in a prosecution for isState v. Bailey, 190 Mo. 257, 88 S. 
 
 homicide ignoring the question of the W. 733. 
 
 Blayer being at fault in bringing on the i Lewis v. Com. 78 Va. 732; Harrison 
 
 difficulty is not erroneous, where there v. Com. 79 Va. 374, 52 Am. Rep, 034. 
 
 is an entire absence of evidence tending 2 Carter v. State, 37 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 to show that he was so in fault. Naugher 403, 35 S. W. 378. 
 
 V. State, 105 Ala. 26, 17 So. 24. sGibson v. State, 89 Ala. 121, 18 Am. 
 
 sMaines v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. St. Rep. 96, 8 So. 98; Jackson v. State, 
 
 109, 31 S. W. 607; Schauer v. State 77 Ala. 18. 
 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 60 S. W. 249; Jordan 4Thumm v. State, 24 Tex. App. 667, 7 
 
 V. State, 117 Ga. 405, 43 S. E. 747; Mell S. W. 236; State v. Gilmore, 95 Mo. 554, 
 
 V. State, 112 Ga. 78, 37 S. E. 121 ; Moul- 8 S. W. 359, 912. 
 trie V. State, 112 Ga. 121, 37 S. E. 122; 
 
508 HOMICIDE. [§ 31T 
 
 quarrel provoked by the slayer, or in a danger voluntarily brought 
 upon himself by his own misconduct, is not in law reasonable or 
 sufficient to support a well-grounded apprehension of imminent dan- 
 ger which will justify homicide." The plea of necessity is a shield 
 for those only who are without fault in causing it and acting under 
 it.* And though the slayer may have had reason to believe that 
 his own life was in danger, or that he was in danger of great 
 bodily harm, he is not justified where his act produced the occasion 
 for his fear.''' So, the law takes into consideration the fact that 
 the slayer's own wrongful act was in violation of law. * And neither 
 the law nor justice will allow a person to attempt to take the life of 
 another or inflict great bodily injury upon him, and then, because 
 the assaulted person imperils his life, allow him to kill his victim 
 and escape upon the plea of self-defense. ® The doctrine of provoking 
 a difficulty is in the nature of an estoppel, — ^that is, if the accused 
 provokes the difficulty and produces the occasion with intention to 
 kill the deceased, he is estopped from pleading or relying upon the 
 fact that his life was in danger. ^ " 
 
 318. "Reasonably" or "absolutely" free from fault — Some of the 
 earlier cases, most of them from Alabama, lay down the rule that 
 to justify homicide in self-defense it is sufficient that the slayer was 
 reasonably free from fault in provoking or bringing on the difficulty, 
 or producing the occasion for the killing.^ Within this rule the 
 question whether one was reasonably free from fault depends upon 
 whether his wrongdoing relates to the assault in resistance of which 
 his assailant was killed ; the , principle that the aggressor cannot 
 plead self-defense applies only to personal difficulties. ^ But this rule 
 would seem to have been inadvertently adopted, and must be deemed 
 to have been displaced by the general rule laid down in leading and 
 late cases, both in the state in which this rule found its inception) 
 
 BPeople V. Westlake, 62 Cal. 303 ; iLeonard v. State, 66 Ala. 461 ; Storey 
 
 People V. Farley, 124 Cal. 594, 57 Pac. v. State, 71 Ala. 331 ; Willis v. State. 73 
 
 571; Mitchell v. State, 60. Ala. 26; Ala. 363; Harrison v. State, 78 Ala. 5; 
 
 Rogers v. State, 95 Tenn. 448, 33 S. W. Watson v. State, 82 Ala. 10, 2 So. 455; 
 
 563. Parker v. State, 88 Ala. 4, 7 So. 98 ^ 
 
 ePeople v. Hunt, 59 Cal. 430. Lewis v. State, 88 Ala. 11, 6 So. 755; 
 
 'Coleman v. State (Tex. Grim. App.) Baker v. State, 81 Ala. 38, 1 So. 127; 
 
 25 S. W. 772; People v. Lamb, 17 Cal. Lovett v. State, 30 Fla. 142, 17 L.R.A. 
 
 J23. 705, 11 So. 550; Bassett v. State, 44 Fla. 
 
 sCarter v. State, 30 Tex. App. 551, 28 12, 33 So. 262. And see Carter v. State, 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 944, 17 S. W. 1102. 37 Tex. Crim. Rep. 403, 35 S. W. 378; 
 
 sLogadon v. Com. 19 Ky. L. Rep. 413, White v. State, 23 Tex. App. 154, 3 S. W. 
 
 40 S. W. 775. 710; Franklin v. State, 30 Tex. App. 628, 
 
 loKoller v. State, 36 Tex. Crim. Rep. 18 S. W. 468. 
 496, 38 S. W. 44. 2Bassett v. State, supra. 
 
1 3181 
 
 SELF-DEFENSE, 
 
 609 
 
 and in other states, that to warrant acquittal on the ground of self- 
 <iefense the slayer must have been wholly, and not merely reason- 
 ably, free from fault, and that he must not have provoked or en- 
 couraged the difficulty by word or act.' And it has been held that in- 
 structions in a prosecution for homicide that the slayer must be 
 reasonably free from fault are erroneous;* and that a charge which 
 demands an acquittal of the accused, although he had been at fault 
 in bringing on the difficulty, is properly refused.^ 
 
 Upon the question what constitutes absolute freedom from fault, 
 however, the rule has been laid down that a person may have a per- 
 fect right of self-defense, though he may not be wholly free 
 from blame, the question turning upon the nature of the blame or 
 wrong; and that if the wrong was not intended to produce the occa- 
 sion, and was not an act which, under the circumstances, was reason- 
 ably calculated to produce the occasion or provoke the difficulty, then 
 the right of self-defense would be complete, though the act was not 
 blameless ; but if the act was a violation of law, and was reasonably 
 calculated to produce the occasion, the right of self-defense would be 
 abridged.® The rule of law which gives the right of self-defense to 
 him only who acts from necessity, and is himself without fault, does 
 
 3Eaina v. State, 88 Ala. 92, 7 So. 315; 
 Compton V. State, 110 Ala. 24, 20 So. 
 119; McQueen v. State, 103 Ala. 12, 15 
 So. 824; Baldwin v. State, 111 Ala. 11, 
 20 So. 528; Crawford v. State, 112 Ala. 
 1, 21 So. 214; Dennis v. State, 118 Ala. 
 72, 23 So. 1002 ; Nabors v. State, 120 Ala. 
 323, 25 So. 529; Welch v. State, 124 Ala. 
 42, 27 So. 307; Green v. State (Ala.) 
 39 So. 362; People v. Kennett, 114 Cal. 
 18, 45 Pae. 994; People v. Eoemer, 114 
 Cal. 51, 45 Pac. 1003; Lovett v. State, 
 30 Fla. 142, 17 L.E.A. 705, 11 So. 550; 
 Mercer v. State, 41 Fla. 279, 26 So. 317 ; 
 State V. Partlow, 90 Mo. 620, 59 Am. 
 Rep. 31, 4 S. W. 14; State v. Hickam, 95 
 Mo. 323, 6 Am. St. Rep. 54, 8 S. W. 
 252; State v. Wyse, 33 S. C. 583, 12 S. 
 E. 556 ; State v. Petsch, 43 S. C. 142, 20 
 S. E. 993; Rippy v. State, 2 Head, 217; 
 Reed v. State, 11 Tex. App. 509, 40 Am. 
 Rep. 795; Habel v. State, 28 Tex. App. 
 588, 13 S. W. 1001; Bush v. State, 40 
 Tex. Grim. Rep. 539, 51 S. W. 238. 
 
 iMcQueen v. State, 103 Ala. 12, 15 So. 
 824; Johnson v. State, 102 Ala. 1, 16 So. 
 99; Crawford v. State, 112 Ala. 1, 21 
 So. 214; Howard v. State, llO Ala. 92, 
 20 So. 365; Watkins v. State, 133 Ala. 
 88, 32 So. 627; Smith v. State, 142 Ala. 
 14. 39 So. 329; Henson v. State, 112 
 
 Ala. 41, 21 So. 79 ; Nabors v. State, 120 
 Ala. 323, 25 So. 529; Gibson v. State 
 (Ala.) 16 So. 144. And see Drake v. 
 State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 448, 80 S. W. 
 1005. 
 
 But the use of the word "entirely" in 
 an instruction with reference to self- 
 defense exacts no higher degree of 
 freedom from fault than the simple ex- 
 pression "must be free from fault." 
 Ellis V. State, 120 Ala. 333, 25 So. 1. 
 
 5Webb V. State, 100 Ala. 47, 14 So. 
 865. 
 
 And where there is evidence in such 
 a prosecution tending to show that the 
 accused was not entirely free from fault 
 in bringing on the difficulty from which 
 the killing resulted, an instruction to the 
 jury ignoring this feature of the evi- 
 dence, and predicating the right of the 
 accused to strike upon the action of the 
 deceased creating an hone«t belief on 
 his part that the latter was about to 
 draw a pistol and fire, and that the sur- 
 roundings were such that to retreat 
 would increase his peril, is erroneous 
 and properlv refused. Bell v. State, 115 
 Ala. 25, 22 So. 526. 
 
 6 Franklin v. State, 30 Tex. App. 628, 
 18 S. W. 468. 
 
510 HOMICIDE. (5 318 
 
 not -wholly deny it to him who, when detected in a wrongful act, is 
 assaulted by the person aggrieved, and kills the latter to save his own 
 life.^ 
 
 319. Effect of rales of law as to imperfect self-defense. — The right of 
 self-defense, as we have seen, is divided into two general classes, per- 
 fect and imperfect. ^ A perfect right of self-defense can only obtain 
 and avail where the party pleading it acts from necessity, and is 
 wholly free from wrong or blame in occasioning and producing; the 
 necessity which requires his action. * But if he is in the wrong, and 
 is himself violating, or in the act of violating, the law, and on account 
 of his own wrong has placed himself in such a situation tiiat it be- 
 comes necessary for him to defend himself against attack which is 
 superinduced or created by his own wrong, the law limits his right 
 of self-defense, and regulates it according to the magnitude of his 
 wrong, and his right of self-defense is an imperfect one.^ And when- 
 ever one, by his own wrongful act, produces a condition of things 
 wherein it is necessary for his own safety that he shall take life or 
 do serious bodily harm, then the law imputes to him his own wrong 
 and its consequences, to the extent of considering them in determin- 
 ing the degree of the offense which, but for such acts, would never 
 have been occasioned.* And in a case of this class the court should 
 apply the law to the facts, and inform the jury as to what grade of 
 offense the accused would be guilty of in the supposed case.* 
 
 The application of these rules, therefore, gives rise to the rule that 
 if the act of aggression was a wrongful act, whether illegal or not, 
 and was done with intent to provoke a diiSculty with a view of taking 
 life, the right of self-defense is forfeited and the killing is murder, 
 though done to save the slayer's life ; and if the act was wrongful and 
 in violation of law, and reasonably calculated to produce the occa- 
 sion, then the right of self-defense is abridged, and not lost,, and the 
 offense is manslaughter; and if the act, though wrongful, was not 
 illegal, and was not intended to provoke a difficulty, nor reasonably 
 calculated to produce occasion and necessity for taking life, and the 
 aggressor kills to save himself, his right of self-defense remains per- 
 fect and complete.^ So, the question as to the existence of a limited 
 or imperfect right of self-defense on the part of one who was not 
 
 7King V. State, 13 Tex. App. 277. 5 S. W. 228; Reed v. State, 11 Tex. App. 
 
 iSee supra, § 224. 509, 40 Am. Eep. 795. 
 
 2King V. State, supra; Jackson v. <King v. State, 13 Tex. App. 277; 
 
 Com. 98 Va. 845, 36 S. E. 487. Jackson v. Com. supra. 
 
 sKlng V. State, supra; Milrainey v. 5 Franklin v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 State, 33 Tex. Grim. Rep. 577, 28 S. W. 286. 30 S. W. 231. 
 
 537; Peter v. State, 23 Tex. App. 684, elbid. 
 
i 319]. 
 
 SOELF-DEFENSE. 
 
 511 
 
 wholly and absolutely without fault in provoking the diiSculty seems 
 to depend upon the motive or intent with which he acted.'' And 
 where a person's right of self-defense depends upon the intent with 
 which he provoked a difficulty, and the intent is a fact to be found by 
 the jury, the court should instruct the jury as to the distinction be- 
 tween perfect and imperfect self-defense as applied to the particular 
 act of the slayer, and his liability, whenever the evidence creates any 
 doubt as to the character of such an intent. ^ 
 
 320. Motive or- intent as affecting — The rule that to justify to homi- 
 cide as committed in self-defense the slayer must not have been the 
 original aggressor, and must not have been at fault in bringing on the 
 diificulty, applies in cases where there was no felonious intent on his 
 part at the time he entered into or provoked the difficulty, as well as 
 where such intention existed. ^ And if the slayer provoked the com- 
 bat, or produced the occasion for it, in order to have a pretext for 
 killing his adversary or doing him great bodily harm, the killing will 
 be murder, no matter to what extremity he may be reduced.^ So, 
 if the slayer intended to provoke a difficulty, it is immaterial whether 
 
 TState V. Partlow, 90 Mo. 60S, 59 Am. 
 Eep. 31, 4 S. W. 14; State v. Goddard, 
 146 Mo. 177, 48 S. W. 82; Tollett v. 
 State (Tex. Crira. App.) 55 S. W. 573. 
 
 sMeuly v. State, 26 Tex. App. 274, 8 
 Am. St. Rep. 477, 9 S. W. 563. 
 
 1 Boy kin v. People, 22 Colo. 496, 45 
 Pae. 419; Bassett v. State, 44 Fla. 12, 
 33 So. 262; Adams v. People, 47 111. 376; 
 State V. Hicks, 92 Mo. 431, 4 S. W. 742; 
 State V. Smith, 37 Mo. App. 137 ; State 
 V. Parker, 96 Mo. 382, 9 S. W. 728; 
 State V. Cable, 117 Mo. 380, 22 S. W. 
 953; State v. Evans, 128 Mo. 408, 31 S. 
 W. 34; State v. Bryant, 102 Mo. 24, 14 
 S. W. 822; State v. Herrell, 97 Mo. 105, 
 10 Am. St. Eep. 289, 10 S. W. 387 ; State 
 V. Hardv, 95 Mo. 455, 8 S. W. 416; State 
 V. Davidson, 95 Mo. 155, 8 S. W. 413; 
 State V. Partlow, supra; State v. Tal- 
 mage, 107 Mo. 543, 17 S. W. 990; State 
 V. Lewis, 118 Mo. 79, 23 S. W. 1082; 
 State V. Hopper, 142 Mo. 478, 44 S. W. 
 272; Meuly v. State, 26 Tex. App. 274, 
 8 Am. St. Kep. 477, 9 S. W. 563; White 
 V. State, 23 Tex. App. 154, 3 S. W. 710; 
 Carter v. State, 30 Tex. App. 551, 28 Am. 
 St. Rep. 944, 17 S. W. 1102; Thusfn v. 
 State, 21 Tex. App. 245, 17 S. W. 474; 
 Varnell v. State, 26 Tex. App. 56, 9 S. 
 W. 65; Sullivan v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. 
 Eep. 486, 37 Am. St. Eep. 826, 20 S. W. 
 927 ; Carter v. State, 28 Tex. App. 355, 
 13 S. W. 147; Bonnard v. State, 25 Tex. 
 
 App. 173, 8 Am. St. Eep. 431, 7 S. W. 
 862; Logan v. State, 17 Tex. App. 50; 
 Cahn v. State, 27 Tex. App. 709, 11 S. 
 W. 723; Roach v. State, 21 Tex. App. 
 249, 17 S. W. 464; Williams v. State, 
 25 Tex. App. 216, 7 S. W. 668; Alex- 
 ander V. State, 25 Tex. App. 260, 8 
 Am. St. Eep. 438, 7 S. W. 867 ; Eeed v. 
 State, 11 Tex. App. 509, 40 Am. Eep. 
 795 ; Johnson v. State, 26 Tex. App. 631, 
 10 S. W. 235; Milrainey v. State, 33 
 Tex. Crim. Eep. 577, 28 S. W. 537; Sulli- 
 van V. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Eep. 486, 
 37 Am. St. Eep. 826, 20 S. W. 927 ; Car- 
 ter V. State, 37 Tex. Crim. Eep. 403, 35 S. 
 W. 378; Kingv. State, 13 Tex. App. 277; 
 Saens v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 20 S. 
 W. 737; Green v. State, 12 Tex. App. 
 445; Gonzales v. State, 28 Tex. App. 130, 
 12 S. W. 733 ; Spearman v. State, 23 Tex. 
 App. 224, 4 S. W. 586; Crist v. State, 
 21 Tex. App. 361, 17 S. W. 260; Thumm 
 V. State, 24 Tex. App. 667, 7 S. W. 236; 
 Staeey v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 33 
 S. W. 348; Hash v. Com. 88 Va. 172, 13 
 S. E. 398; State v. Cain, 20 W. Va. 679. 
 2State V. Partlow, 90 Mo. 608, 59 Am. 
 Eep. 3], 4 S. W. 14; State v. Penning- 
 ton, 146 Mo. 27, 47 S. W. 799; DeArman 
 V. State, 71 Ala. 351 ; Hunt v. State, 72 
 Miss. 413, 16 So. 753; State v. Scott, 41 
 Minn. 365, 43 N. W. 62; Stewart v. 
 State, 1 Ohio St. 66; Johnson v. State, 
 and Carter v. State, supra. 
 
512. 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 [§ 320 
 
 his acts were sucli as to be reasonably calculated to provoke one or 
 not.* And this is particularly the case where the intent was a de- 
 liberate and premeditated one.* A person will be considered as 
 provoking or bringing on a difficulty in all cases in which he seeks 
 another and brings on a difficulty with him for the purpose of wreak- 
 ing malice upon him.® And this is so though the intent was merely 
 to engage in an ordinary combat, and not to kill." 
 
 But if the slayer had no felonious intent, and did not intend to 
 provoke a difficulty, intending only slight punishment for some other 
 slight offense, the final killing in self-defense will be manslaughter on- 
 ly, the distinction being between the right of perfect, and of imperfect, 
 self-defense;^ and this is so though his acts were reasonably cal- 
 
 An intent to kill or seriously injure 
 upon the part of the accused in a prose- 
 cution for homicide sufficiently appears 
 in an instruction that the jury cannot 
 acquit upon the ground of self-defense if 
 they believe from the evidence that at 
 the time of the killing the defendant, 
 had brought on the difficulty with the 
 deceased and sought his life. Johnson 
 V. Com. 94 Ky. 578, 2.3 S. W. 507. 
 
 sMarlow v. State (Fla,) 38 So. 653. 
 
 4Morgan v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 222, 29 S. W. 1092; Winters v. State, 37 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 582, 40 S. W. 303 ; Air- 
 hart V. St^te, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 470, 76 
 Am. St. Rep. 736, 51 S. W. 214; White 
 V. State, 23 Tex. App. 154, 3 S. W. 710; 
 Carter v. State, 37 Tex. Crim. Rep. 403, 
 35 S. W. 378; Franklin v. State, 30 Tex. 
 App. 628, 18 S. W. 468; Thomas v. 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 51 S. W. 1109. 
 
 And where a person killing another 
 sought the combat in which the killing 
 occurred, with felonious intent, so that 
 a conviction for murder would be 
 proper, he cannot complain of a convic- 
 tion of manslaughter. Moore v. People, 
 26 Colo. 213, 57 Pac. 857. 
 
 estate v. Jones, 78 Mo. 279; White v. 
 Maxcy, 64 Mo. 552; State v. Christian, 
 66 Mo. 138; State v. Starr, 38 Mo. 270; 
 State V. Linney, 52 Mo. 40; State v. 
 Underwood, 57 Mo. 40; Jones v. Gale, 
 22 Mo. App. 637 ; State v. Culler, 82 Mo. 
 623; State v. Maguire, 69 Mo. 197; 
 State V. Parker, 106 Mo. 217, 17 S. W. 
 180; State v. Vaughan, 141 Mo. 514, 42 
 S. W. 1080; State v. Herrell, 97 Mo. 105, 
 10 Am. St. Rep. 289, 10 S. W. 387; 
 State V. Hays, 23 Mo. 287; State v. 
 Packwood, 26 Mo. 340 ; State v. Partlow, 
 90 Mo. 608, 59 Am. Rep. 31, 4 S. W. 14; 
 
 State V. Berkley, 92 Mo. 41, 4 S. W. 24; 
 State v. Gilmore, 95 Mo. 554, 8 S. W. 
 359, 912; State v. Parker, 96 Mo. 382, 9 
 S. W. 728; State v. Brown, 63 Mo. 439; 
 State v. Cable, 117 Mo. 380, 22 S. W. 
 953 ; State v. Vansant, 8U Mo. 67 ; Adams 
 V. People, 47 111. 376 ; Wilson v. People, 
 94 111. 299; Allen v. Com. 86 Ky. 642, 
 6 S. W. 645; Thumm v. State, 24 Tex. 
 App. 667, 7 S. W. 236; Hollis v. State, 
 8 Tex. App. 620. 
 
 sHawkins v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 36 S. W. 443. And see Scott v. State, 
 133 Ala. 112, 32 So. 623. 
 
 And an error in charging as to seeking 
 a difficulty with intent to do serious 
 bodily harm, where the only intent 
 shown by the evidence was an intent to 
 kill, is harmless. Longacre v. State 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 41 S. W. 629. 
 
 7State V. Partlow, 90 Mo. 608, 59 Am. 
 Rep. 31, 4 S. W. 14; State v. Gilmore, 95 
 Mo. 554, 8 S. W. 359, 912; State v. 
 Stiltz, 97 Mo. 20, 10 S. W. 014; State v. 
 Pennington, 146 Mo. 27, 47 S. W. 799; 
 State V. Goddard, 146 Mo. 177, 48 S. W. 
 82; State v. Gordon, 191 Mo. 114, 89 S. 
 W. 1025; State v. Garrett, 170 Mo. 395, 
 70 S. W. 680; Heard v. State, 114 Ga. 
 90, 39 S. E. 909; People v. Filippelli, 
 173 N. Y. 509, 66 N. E. 402; Grayson v. 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 57 S. W. 808; 
 Garza v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 88 S. 
 W. 231; Vann v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. 
 Rep. 434, 87 Am. St. Rep. 997, 77 S. W. 
 813; Tollett v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 55 S. W. 573; Hash v. Com. 88 Va. 172, 
 13 S. E. 398. And see Cotton v. State, 
 31 Miss. 504; Sehrader v. State, 84 
 Miss. 593, 36 So. 385 ; State v. Talley, 9 
 Houst. (Del.) 417, 33 Atl. 181; Beard v. 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) SI S. W. 33. 
 
1 320] SELF-DEFENSE. 513 
 
 ■culated to provoke a difficulty. * And the slayer must have willingly 
 and knowingly used language or done an act reasonably calculated to 
 lead to an affray or deadly conflict, in order to preclude him from 
 pleading self-defense; and unless the acts are clearly calculated or 
 intended to have that effect, the right to plead self-defense exists.® 
 And this is so though he intended to provoke a difficulty with intent 
 to kill; a mere purpose or intent unaccompanied by any overt act 
 is not enough. ^ ° So, a person committing a homicide should not be 
 •deprived of his right of self-defense, where the occasion for killing 
 Avas accidental, unintentional, or innocently produced. ^^ ISTor is a 
 person committing a homicide precluded from pleading self-defense 
 upon the ground that he was the aggressor, where the act which gave 
 offense and led to the difficulty was a lawful act. ^ ^ And the rule has 
 been asserted that to deny one who provokes a difficulty, in which his 
 adversary is killed, the right to plead self-defense, he must have pro- 
 voked it with intent to kill his adversary, or do him great bodily 
 larm, or to afford a pretext for wreaking malice upon him. ^ * 
 
 So, where one person assaults another, and the latter kills him in 
 alleged self-defense, the slayer's guilt or innocence must be deter- 
 mined and measured by his own intent and purpose actuating his 
 conduct, and not by that of the deceased ; and belief, or reason to be- 
 lieve, upon the part of the deceased that at the time of the assault 
 the slayer intended to immediately take his life, or do him great bod- 
 ily harm, is of no effect upon the question of guilt. ^* And an in- 
 struction with reference to provoking a difficulty with apparent in- 
 
 sThornton v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) i2Haah v. Com. 88 Va. 172, 13 S. E. 
 
 '65 S. W. 1105. 398; Patterson v. State, 75 Miss. 670, 23 
 
 sPeople V. McLeod, 1 Hill, 377, 37 Am. So. 647; Gilcrease v. State, 33 Tex. Crim. 
 
 Dee. 328, 25 Wend. 483; De Arman v. Rep. 619, 28 S. W. 531. 
 State, 71 Ala. 351; Myers v. State, 62 isFoutch v. State, 95 Tenn. 711, 45 
 
 Ala. 599; Bush v. People, 10 Colo. 566, L.R.A. 687, 34 S. W. 423; Allen v. Com. 
 
 16 Pac. 290; Presser v. State, 77 Ind. 10 Ky. L. Rep. 582, 9 S. W. 703; State 
 
 274; State v. Neeley, 20 Iowa, 108; State v. Adler, 146 Mo. 18, 47 S. W. 794; State 
 
 V. Scott, 41 Minn. 365, 43 N. W. 62; v. Rapp, 142 Mo. 443, 44 S. W. 270; 
 
 State V. MeDaniel, 94 Mo. 301, 7 S. W. State v. Hopper, 142 Mo. 478, 44 S. W. 
 
 634; State v. Hill, 20 N. C. 629 (4 Dev. 272; State v. Evans, 128 Mo. 406, 31 S. 
 
 A B. L. 491) 34 Am. Dec. 396; Adams v. W. 34; State v. Lewis, 118 Mo. 84, 23 S. 
 
 State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 285, 33 S. W. W. 1082; State v. Cable, 117 Mo. 380, 
 
 354; McCandless v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. 22 S. W. 953; State v. Patterson, 159 
 
 Rep. 58, 57 S. W. 672 ; Bearden v. State, Mo. 560, 60 S. W. 1047. 
 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 144, 79 S. W. 37. But see Polk v. State, 30 Tex. App. 
 
 10 Johnson v. Slate, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 657, 18 S. W. 466, holding that one is 
 
 476, 66 S. W. 845; Dodd v. State (Tex. responsible for the natural consequences 
 
 Crim. App.) 68 S. W. 992; Pedro v. of his acts, though he did not intend 
 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 88 S. W. 233; them. 
 
 Tardy v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 214, i4Casner v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 78 S. W. 1076. 118, 57 S. W. 821. 
 
 iiCunnmgham v. State, 17 Tex. App. 
 89; Gilleland v. State, 44 Tex. 356. 
 Hom.— 33. 
 
514 HOMICIDE. [■§ 320 
 
 tention to kill should not be given in a prosecution for homicide, 
 unless accompanied by another instruction as to the law applicable 
 in a case of provoking a difficulty without such apparent intention. ^ ^ 
 
 321. Application of rules to joint action. — The doctrine that the 
 original aggressor may not plead self-defense in homicide has equal 
 application in cases where several join together, conspire, or enter 
 into a design to kill another, or to do an unlawful act, and so become 
 aggressors, since in such case the act of one will be the act of all, 
 and the plea of self-defense will not avail any of them. ^ And it also 
 applies to one who acts in concert with another in bringing about a 
 difficulty, and takes part in the quarrel, and makes himself party to 
 it, and assists in bringing about the actual encounter.^ This is the 
 rule where the accused, as one of a mob riotously assembled for the 
 purpose of breaking into a jail to release and hang a prisoner, shot 
 and killed the officer in charge while in the performance of his duty 
 of guarding the jail.* And it applies to the case of a voluntary 
 helper of one who provokes the difficulty, so as to prevent his resist- 
 ing to extreme results an assault provoked by his companion.* And 
 one who provokes a difficulty for the purpose of killing another, or 
 seeks a pretext for so doing by provoking or bringing on a difficulty, 
 is equally guilty with those who do the act, though he may not have 
 actually participated in it, and is equally precluded from pleading 
 self-defense. ° 
 
 An instruction in a prosecution for homicide as to the responsi- 
 bility incurred by persons who participate in a common enterprise 
 or purpose to make an unlawful attack is erroneous, however, where 
 the evidence, fairly construed, furnishes no ground for any theory 
 of a common enterprise or purpose not defensive in its nature and 
 design." And the mere fact that some time previous to the killing 
 confederates of the slayer sought the deceased with intent to kill him, 
 or attacked him with such intent, does not preclude the slayer from 
 pleading rielf-defense. '' So, where a person voluntarily left a place 
 of safety, and with drawn pistol joined one of two parties engaged 
 
 isTollett V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) sMitchell v. State, 22 Ga. 211, 68 Am. 
 
 55 S. W. 573. Dec. 493 ; Kirby v. State, 89 Ala. 63, 8 
 
 iCarter v. State, 37 Tex. Grim. Rep. So. 110. 
 
 403, 35 S. W. 378; Childs v. State, 35 sPeople v. Cochran, 61 Cal. 548. 
 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 573, 34 S. W. 930; iBostic v. State, 94 Ala. 45, 10 So. 602. 
 
 Franklin v. State, 30 Tex. App. 628, 18 estate v. Paxton, 126 Mo. 500, 29 S. 
 
 S. W. 468; Gibson v. State, 89 Ala. 121, W. 705. 
 
 18 Am. St. Rep. 96, 8 So. 98; Wheeler v. sSpeneer v. State, 77 Ga. 155, 4 Am. 
 
 Com. 27 Ky. L. Rep. 1090, 87 S. W. 1106; St. Rep. 74, 3 S. E. 081. 
 
 State V. Paxton, 126 Mo. 500, 29 S. W. 7 Wheeler v. Com. 27 Ky. L. Rep. 1090, 
 
 705. And see Delanev v. Com. 18 Ky. L. 87 S. W. 1106. 
 Rep. 212, 35 S. W. 1037. 
 
§ 321] SELF-DEFENSE. 515 
 
 in fighting each other, and commenced firing his pistol indiscriminate- 
 ly at the other party, and was shot and killed by one of the other 
 party, though both parties were originally in the wrong, no member 
 of either party could be considered in the wrong as to the deceased 
 at that time; and if he was shot at a time when a member of the 
 party of the slayer was in real or apparent danger of death or great 
 bodily harm from the deceased, or a member of his party, then the 
 plea of self-defense is available to the persons charged with the 
 killing.® 
 
 822. Application to single, as distinguislied from distinct, combats. 
 — The rule that self-defense cannot be pleaded by one who provokes 
 the difficulty applies only to the difiiculty in which the killing in 
 question took place, and not to a previous difiiculty ; and the fact that 
 one person commenced a difiiculty with another does not render him 
 the aggressor in a second difiiculty between them, where there were 
 two distinct quarrels, and a total cessation of the one before the 
 other commenced. ^ And where there were two distinct and separate 
 conflicts between two persons, and one killed the other in the second 
 one, if the former was the aggressor in that conflict the fact that the 
 first conflict was brought on by the other does not relieve him from 
 the prohibition against pleading self-defense.^ And newly discov- 
 ered evidence that the deceased was the aggressor in a previous com- 
 bat is not a ground for a new trial in a prosecution against the ac- 
 cused for killing him in a subsequent combat.^ But where a difficulty 
 commenced in one groggery and terminated in another, on the same 
 night, and in the same village, all that transpired at both places is 
 admissible in evidence in a prosecution for a resulting homicide as 
 res gestae, though some time intervened between the beginning and 
 the ending of the rencounter.* And where two persons engaged in 
 
 sNantz v. Com. 14 Ky. L. Eep. 592, 20 cused on the previous occasion tended to 
 
 S. W. ]096. throw any light upon his motive in 
 
 iBean v. State, 25 Tex. App. 346, 8 S. subsequently taking the life of the de- 
 
 W. 278 ; Clay v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. ceased. Daniel v. State, 103 Ua. 202, 29 
 
 Rep. 129, 69 S. W. 413; Drake v. Com. S. E. 767. 
 
 14 Ky. L. Eep. 677, 21 S. W. 36; Greer zTidwell v. State. 70 Ala. 33; Stillvvell 
 
 V. Com. 27 Ky. L. Eep. 333, 85 S. W. 106; v. State, 107 Ala. 16, 19 So. 322; Hadley 
 
 Hudson v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Eep. 785, 69 S. v. State, 58 Ga. 309 ; Drake v. Com. 
 
 W. 1079. supra; Taylor v. Statf. 38 Tex. Crim. 
 
 And evidence that on a former occa- Eep. 552, 43 S. W. 1019; Lindsey v. 
 
 sion. remote in time from the day of the State, 35 Tex. Crim. Eep. 164, 32 S. W. 
 
 homicide, the accused had done an act 768; Eutledge v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 which incensed the deceased is not ad- App.) 33 S. W. 347; Mason's Case, 1 
 
 missible in a prosecution for homicide, East. P. C. 239. 
 
 where it does not appear that what oc- 3State v. Eeynolds, 171 Mo. 552, 72 
 
 curred on that occasion was followed up S. W. 39. 
 
 by any subsequent quarrels or diiScul+ieS < Stiles v. State, 57 Ga. 183. 
 between them, or that the act of the ac- 
 
510 HOMICIDE. [J 3ija 
 
 an assault upon a third, who was killed, an instruction in a prose- 
 cution for the killing making one assailant responsible for acts of 
 the other, done after deceased was disabled, is not erroneous when 
 the former commenced the difficulty and continued to participate in 
 it until the end. ® 
 
 b. What constitutes one an aggressor. 
 
 1. Generally. 
 
 323. Absence of general rule — There is no fixed rule applicable to 
 every case with reference to what constitutes one an aggressor, so as 
 to preclude his right to self-defense in homicide.^ And it is not 
 necessary to submit to the jury in a prosecution for homicide the 
 particular words or acts constituting the aggression ; the charge may 
 be couched in general terms. ^ But certain well-established principles 
 stand as guides for the acts of men, and as measures for the jury's 
 determination of their deportment. * And it may be stated generally 
 that any act in violation of law, and reasonably calculated to produce 
 the occasion for a killing, amounts to bringing on the difficulty, and 
 bars the right of the actor to plead self-defense. * Where any pretext, 
 design, contrivance, fraud, or excuse is resorted to, to bring on a diffi- 
 culty, or to provoke the occasion for one, the person using it will be 
 regarded as the aggressor therein.^ And any act of a person by 
 which he puts himself in the way of being assaulted, in order that, 
 when hard pressed, he may have a pretext for taking the life of his 
 assailant, amounts to bringing on a difficulty." Nor is it necessary 
 that the means used should have been such as were reasonably cal- 
 culated to provoke a difficulty ; if the accused intended to provoke a 
 difficulty, and used such means as he thought would provoke it, and 
 they did provoke it, it is all that is necessary. '^ And it has been held 
 
 I 
 
 sAnderson v. State, 43 Tex. Grim. Rep. 563 ; McCandless v. State, supra; Carr v. 
 
 275, 65 S. W. 523. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 87 S. W. 346. 
 
 iPeople V. Hecker, 109 Gal. 451, 30 A person whose action in trying to 
 
 L.R.A. 403, 42 Pac. 307. break jail brought on a fight, in which 
 
 zMcGandless v. State, 42 Tex. Grim, he killed one person and wounded others 
 
 Rep. 58, 57 S. W. 672; Alexander v. who were trying to subdue him and 
 
 State, 40 Tex. Grim. Rep. 395, 49 S. W. prevent his escape, will be deemed to be 
 
 229, 50 S. W. 716. the provoker of the difficulty. People 
 
 3 People V. Hecker, supra. v. Johnson, 139 N. Y. 358, 34 N. E. 920. 
 
 4 Franklin v. State, 30 Tex. App. 628, BMitchell v. State, 60 Ala. 26; People 
 18 S. W. 468; Garter v. State, 37 Tex. v. Hecker, 109 Gal. 451, 30 L.R.A. 403, 
 Grim. Rep. 403, 35 S. W. 378; State v. 42 Pac. 307. 
 
 Guller, 82 Mo. 623; State v. Hays, 23 estate v. Hicks, 92 Mo. 431, 4 S. W. 
 
 Mo. 287. And see State v. Beckham, 24 742; State v. Peak, 85 Mo. 190- Mitchell 
 
 S. G. 283; State v. Bryant, 102 Mo. 24, v. Com. 33 Gratt. 872. 
 14 S. W. 822; Meuly v. State, 26 Tex. TMatthews v. State, 42 Tex. Grim. 
 
 App. 305, 8 Am. St. Rep. 477, 9 S. W. Rep. 31, 58 S. W. 86. 
 
5 3.23J SELF-DEFENSE. 517 
 
 that, where one does an act the reasonable and natural consequence of 
 which is to provoke a difficulty, he is responsible for the result, though 
 he did not intend to do so. * 
 
 The wrong which will preclude a person from pleading self-de- 
 fense, however, must relate in some way to the assault in the resist- 
 ance of which the deceased was killed.^ And a person is not to be 
 deprived of his right of self-defense merely because he may have done 
 some trifling act that may have contributed to bringing on the diffi- 
 culty. * " So, the act must have been a hostile one. ^ ^ And it must 
 have been wrongful, and not accidental ; ^ ^ and mere intent and pur- 
 pose to provoke a difficulty as a pretext for killing, in the absence of 
 any act of aggression, is not enough. ^ ^ So, bringing on a difficulty 
 consists of some act upon the part of one person having a tendency 
 to lead another person to attack him, as distinguished from an actual 
 assault upon the other ; and where the evidence tends to show either 
 that the accused made an attack upon the other with intent to kill him, 
 or that he acted solely in self-defense against an attack by the other, a 
 charge upon provoking a difficulty is erroneous and should not be 
 given. ^ * And it has been held that an act of aggression which will 
 prevent one from defending his life against the deadly defensive act 
 of his adversary by taking the latter's life, without having restored 
 his right of self-defense by abandonment or withdrawal from the 
 contest, must be of a character reasonably calculated to produce, and 
 which does produce, fear or apprehension of death or great bodily 
 harm in the mind of his adversary. ^ ® 
 
 Where rules of law with reference to bringing on a difficulty are 
 charged, the court should define and state what character of acts on 
 the part of the accused would deprive him of the right of self- 
 defense. ^ ^ And where a prosecution for homicide is carried on on 
 the theory that the defendant provoked the difficulty in which the 
 killing was done, the character of the provocation, in connection with 
 the intent, should be set out and defined in separate and affirmative 
 
 sPolk V. State, 30 Tex. App. 657, 18 nMundine v. State, 37 Tex. Crim. 
 
 S. W. 466. Rep. 5, 38 S. W. 619. 
 
 The word "apparent" in an instruction 12 State v. Taylor, 57 W. Va. 228, 50 
 
 as to the law with reference to a dif- S. E. 247. 
 
 ficulty provoked with the apparent in- 1 3 Tardy v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 tention of taking life means evident, 214, 78 S. W. 1076. 
 
 obvious, and clear, and is not objection- 14 Williams v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. 
 
 able as signifying less than actual in- Eep. 115, 69 S. W. 415; Casner v. State, 
 
 tent or purpose. McCandless v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Eep. 12, 62 S. W. 914. 
 
 42 Tex. Crim. Eep. 58, 57 S. W. 672. iBlrvine v. State, 104 Tenn. 132, 56 
 
 sState v. Perigo, 70 Iowa, 657, 28 N. S. W. 845. And see People v. Cook 
 
 W. 452. (Cal.) 83Pac. 43. 
 
 lOAllen V. Com. 86 Ky. 642, 6 S. W. leMundine v. State, 37 Tex. Crim. 
 45. 
 
518 HOMICIDE. [^ 323 
 
 charges in behalf of the state. ^ "^ But the jury need not be told the 
 facts on which they can find that the accused provoked the difficulty ; 
 it is sufficient to state that if he provoked it with intent to kill he will 
 be guilty of murder, and if without such intent, then he will be 
 guilty of manslaughter only. ^ * 
 
 2. Particular acts. 
 
 324. Preparation for difficulty or wrongful act. — The mere fact that 
 a person made preparation for entering into a difficulty with an- 
 other, or for doing a wrongful act, is not alone sufficient to deprive 
 him of the right of self-defense, when unaccompanied by any demon- 
 stration indicating a wrongful purpose.^ And the act of a person 
 of arming himself, even for the purpose of a quarrel with another, 
 does not make him the aggressor, unless his acts were clearly calcu- 
 lated or intended to lead to an affray or deadly conflict.^ And evi- 
 dence of arming or otherwise preparing for a difficulty is not admis- 
 sible in a prosecution for homicide in the absence of any showing of 
 a wrongful purpose directed against the person killed.* The mere 
 fact that a man armed himself amounts to nothing, unless he did so 
 with a view of using his weapon, if necessary to overcome his ad- 
 versary.* And a man's right to arm himself in his own proper de- 
 fense, and go where he will after thus arming himself, is not abridged 
 
 Eep. 5, 38 S. W. 619; Childs v. State, 35 not reversible error in a prosecution for 
 
 Tex. Crim. Kep. 573, 34 S. W. 939; homicide, where there had been a quar- 
 
 State V. Levigne, 17 Nev. 435, 30 Pac. rel between the parties a short time 
 
 1034. previous to the killing, and each armed 
 
 And an abstract charge in a prosecu- himself, and hot words led to a, mutual 
 
 tion for homicide that a party provok- fight into which both readily entered, 
 
 ing a difficulty cannot avail himself of a and the killing resulted. State v. Jones, 
 
 necessity which he has knowingly 71 N. J. L. 543, 60 Atl. 396. 
 
 brought upon himself is erroneous in 2 Shannon v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 omitting to call attention to the char- 2, 60 Am. St. Rep. 17, 28 S. W. 687; 
 
 acter of the wrongful act, and the intent Mozee v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 51 S. 
 
 which must have actuated the accused W. 250; Crow v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 in doing it. Winters v. State, 37 Tex. 88 S. W. 814; Cook v. State, 43 Tex. 
 
 Crim. Eep. 582, 40 S. W. 303. Crim. Eep. 182, 96 Am. St. Eep. 854, 63 
 
 I'Ibid. S. W. 872; Airhart v. Staie, 40 Tex. 
 
 xsMatthews v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Crim. Rep. 470, 7G Am. St. Eep. 736, 51 
 
 Rep. 31, 58 S. W. 86; Williford v. State, S. W. 214; Thomas v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 38 Tex. Crim. Eep. 393, 42 S. W. 972. App.) 51 S. W. 1109; Meuly v. State, 
 
 iCartwright v. State, 14 Tex. App. supra; Patterson v. State, 75 Miss. 670, 
 
 486; Meuly v. State, 26 Tex. App. 274, 23 So. 647; Hunt v. State, 72 Miss. 413, 
 
 8 Am. St. Rep. 477, 9 S. W. 563; Ball v. 16 So. 753; Cotton v. State, 31 Mi3s. 504; 
 
 State, 29 Tex. App. 107, 14 S. W. 1012; Cooper v. State, 80 Miss. 175, 31 So. 579; 
 
 Mundine v. State, 37 Tex. Crim. Rep. State v. Hudspeth, 150 Mo. 12, 51 S. W. 
 
 5, 38 S. W. 619. 483; State v. Evans, 128 Mo. 410, 31 S. 
 
 But the use of the disjunctive "or" W. .34. 
 
 :n an instruction that, if the accused pre- sPitts v. State, 140 Ala. 70, 37 So. 101. 
 
 pared for or provoked the affray, he 4 Cotton v. State, supra. 
 jannot successfully plead self-defense is 
 
S 3JJ4] SELF-DEFENSE. 519 
 
 by the fact that he expected an attack." Nor is a man rendered 
 criminally responsible for a homicide merely by the fact that he 
 went armed for the purpose of preventing a trespass upon his prem- 
 ises, where he did the killing in defense of his own life.® And carry- 
 ing a pocket-knife is not unlawful, and no inferences may be drawn 
 therefrom against the person carrying it, unless he does so in con- 
 templation of a difficulty ; and he may legally use such knife in self- 
 defense against a murderous assault, when driven to it by the ag- 
 gressive action of his adversary. ^ 
 
 One who arms himself with a deadly weapon, however, and enters 
 into a difficulty with the intention of taking life, if necessary, will 
 be deemed to have brought on the difficulty, and cannot successfully 
 plead self-defense.* And the rule is the same where he does it in 
 order to wreak his malice.® And the act of a person of arming him- 
 self, taken in connection with other acts showing beyond question his 
 intention to make use of them immediately when opportunity occurs, 
 sufficiently shows him to be an aggressor. ^ " So, the same rule applies 
 to arming one's self with the purpose of using the arms if any conflict 
 should arise from an intended resistance to the exercise of a legal 
 right by another. ^ ^ Nor is it necessary to deprive a person of the 
 right of self-defense, who armed himself and entered into a difficulty 
 with another, to show that he intended to use his arms in killing his 
 
 Though a person who enters into a And the mere fact that a man armed 
 contest with another is possessed of a himself with a gun before going to order 
 deadly weapon, and kills the other with trespassers from his premises is not suf- 
 it, the homicide is justifiable where he fieient ground for excluding evidence of 
 did not intend to use it at the commence- prior threats against him, made by one 
 ment of the contest, and used it only to of the trespassers, who was killed in 
 protect his own life from such serious the affray which followed. Wallace v. 
 bodily harm as would give him a reason- United States, 162 U. S. 466, 40 L. ed. 
 able apprehension that his life might be 1039, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 859. 
 in immediate danger, when he had no 'Aldridge v. State, 59 Miss. 250. 
 other means of defense and no means of sDabney v. State, 113 Ala. 38, 59 Am. 
 escape. Reg. v. Smith, 8 Car. & P. 160. St. Rep. 92, 21 So. 211 ; (Jom. v. Selfiidge, 
 
 estate v. Evans, supra; Oder v. Com. Horr. & T. Cas. 19; Thompson v. State 
 80 Ky. 32; Com. v. Selfridge, Horr. & T. (Miss.) 9 So. 298; Ex parte Wray, 30 
 Cas. 19; Cotton v. State, supra; Thomp- Miss. 673; Smith v. State, 105 Tenn. 305, 
 son V. United States, 155 U. S. 271, 39 60 S. W. 145; Hamilton v. State, 101 
 L ed 146, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 73 ; Allen Tenn. 417, 47 S. W. 695 ; Bush v. State, 
 V. United States, 157 U. S. 675, 39 L. ed. 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 539, 51 S. W. 238. 
 854, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 720. And see And see Honesty v. Com. 81 Va. 283, 
 Foutch V. State, 95 Tenn. 711, 45 L.R.A. sjones v. Gale, 22 Mo. App. 637. 
 687, 34 S. W. 423. loBeard v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 eWilson v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 29 S. W. 770; Bush v. State, supra. 
 36 S. W. 587; Milrainey v. State, 33 Tex. And see Henry v. People, 198 111. 162, 65 
 Crim. Rep. 577, 28 S. W. 537 ; Long v. N. E. 120. 
 
 State, 52 Miss. 23; Patterson v. State, uState v. Talley, 9 Houst. (Del.) 417, 
 75 Miss. 670, 23 So. 647; Hunt v. State, 33 Atl. 181. 
 72 Miss. 413, 16 So. 753; White v. Terri- 
 tory, 3 Wash. Terr. 397, 19 Pao. 37. 
 
620 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 [| 324 
 
 antagonist ; it is enough that he armed himself and provoked the diiS- 
 eulty, intending to inflict great bodily harm, or commit any felony. ^ ^ 
 325. Seeking or going after interview. — One who remains in a place 
 where he has a right to be, and who is not engaged in an unlawful 
 enterprise, cannot be said to be the provoker of a difficulty because- 
 he seeks an interview or seeks to find a person between whom and 
 himself there is enmity or ill feeling, so long as he does nothing to 
 commence a quarrel. ^ The mere fact that one person went to a place 
 where another person was, and afterwards killed him, is not, of itself ^ 
 sufficient to deprive him of the right to plead self-defense. ^ And this 
 is the rule though the person seeking the other had reason to believe 
 that his presence might be offensive,^ and though his presence, while 
 not illegal, might be, in some sense, wrongful.* So, no *»:>!) tier what 
 the purpose of a person in seeking another was, seeking him does noi- 
 forfeit his right to plead self-defense, where he did nothing to pro- 
 voke the difficulty when he met him. ® And it is immaterial that the 
 slayer sought the deceased for the purpose of settling a previous 
 trouble with him,® or that he sought him for the purpose of provoking 
 a difficulty, the seeking of a person to bring on a difficulty not being 
 the gist of the offense, that consisting of the doing of the acts that 
 
 izHunt V. State, 72 Miss. 413, 16 So. 
 753. 
 
 iLong V. State, 52 Miss. 23; Crane v. 
 Com. 12 Ky. L. Rep. 161, 13 S. W. 1079; 
 Bohannon v. Com. 8 Bush, 481, 8 Am. 
 Rep. 474; State v. Merriman, 34 S. C. 
 40, 12 S. E. 619; Bonnard v. State, 25 
 Tex. App. 173, 8 Am. St. Rep. 431, 7 S. 
 W. 862. 
 
 2AlIen V. Com. 86 Ky. 642, 6 S. W. 645. 
 And see Cartwright v. State, 14 Tex. 
 App. 486 ; Cunningham v. State, 17 Tex. 
 App. 89; Gilleland v. State, 44 Tex. 356; 
 Wilson V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 36 S. 
 W. 587; Barstado v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 App.) 87 S. W. 344. And see Hall v. 
 State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 257, 64 S. W. 
 248. 
 
 sMilrainey v. State, 33 Tex. Crim. 
 Rep. 577, 28 S. W. 537. 
 
 4 Franklin v. State, 30 Tex. App. 628, 
 18 S. W. 468; State v. Packwood, 26 Mo. 
 340. 
 
 BAirhart v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 470, 76 Am. St. Rep. 736, 51 S. W. 214; 
 Franks v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 88 S. 
 W. 923; Barstado v. State, supra; 
 Smith V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 87 S. 
 W. 151; Brittain v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 App.) 85 S. W. 278. And see Chism v. 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 78 S. W. 949. 
 
 A person who seeks another and after- 
 wards kills him is to be tried, not merely 
 for his act of seeking him, but for hi» 
 act after he finds him. Airhart v. 
 State, supra. 
 
 And where the right of the accused' 
 in a prosecution for homicide to be in. 
 or at, or to go to, a certain place at 
 which he met the deceased is involved 
 the jury should not be instructed gen- 
 erally with reference to the law if the' 
 accused brought about a meeting be- 
 tween himself and the deceased, since 
 such instruction would be too general,, 
 and might lead the jury to believe that 
 he brought about a meeting, and that 
 his acts alone deprived him of his right 
 of self-defense, though after his arrival 
 he was not the aggressor. -Crane v. 
 Com. 12 Ky. L. Rep. 161, 13 S. W. 
 1079. 
 
 sThomas v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 51 S. W. 1109; Winters v. State, 37 Tex. 
 Crim. Rep. 582, 40 S. W. 303; Newman 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 69 S. W. 519; 
 Nelson v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 87 
 S. W. 143; Beard v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 App.) 81 S. W. 33; Pollard v. State, 45 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 121, 73 S. W. 953. And 
 see Hays v. State, 112 Ga. 193, 37 S. 
 E. 404. 
 
325] 
 
 SELF-DEFENSE. 
 
 521 
 
 produce or provoke the difficulty.'' Nor does the mere fact of seeking 
 anether for the purpose of bringing on a difficulty, and armiag in 
 preparation therefor, deprive the seeker of his right of self-defense, 
 if, upon finding him, his acts show no wrongful intent. * 
 
 Though one sought another with a lawful and friendly purpose, 
 however, if after finding him he did provoke a difficulty, the rules 
 of law with reference to provoking a difficulty apply.® And where 
 one seeks another with the intention of provoking a difficulty, or com- 
 mitting a felony, and carries his intention into effect, he cannot avail 
 himself of the right of self-defense.^" ITor can one who pursues 
 another and kills him, with malice and desire for revenge, and invites 
 and brings on an attack upon himself in order that he may have an 
 
 And a request by one man of another 
 for explanatioH of trouble between the 
 latter and the former's little brother is 
 not an act of aggression which will de- 
 prive the person making it of the right 
 of self-defense, where the other, angered 
 at the request, assaulted him with a 
 stick which was capable, in his hands, 
 of inflicting great bodily harm. King 
 V. State (Miss.) 23 So. 766. 
 
 'Mozee v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 51 
 S. W. 250; Thomas v. State, supra; Wil- 
 liams V. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 115, 
 69 S. W. 415; Barstado v. State (Tex. 
 Crim. App.) 87 S. W. 344; Hjeronymus 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 157, 79 S. W. 
 313; Franks v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 88 S. W. 923. 
 
 sCartwright v. State, 14 Tex. App. 
 486; Shannon v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. 
 Rep. 2, 60 Am. St. Rep. 17, 28 S. W. 687; 
 Meuly V. State, 26 Tex. App. 274, 8 Am. 
 St. Rep. 477, 9 S. W. 563; Nash v. State, 
 73 Ark. 399, 84 S. W. 497; State v. Cas- 
 tello, 62 Iowa, 404, 17 N. W. 605; Hunt 
 V. State, 72 Miss. 413, 16 So. 753. And 
 see Bateson v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 34, 80 S. W. 88; Patterson v. State, 75 
 Miss. 670, 32 So. 647. 
 
 And where it appears in a prosecution 
 for homicide that after the giving of an 
 offense by the deceased, the accused 
 went h<Hne and got his gun and returned, 
 it may he shown as part of the res gestw 
 that he stated when he started that he 
 did not intend to kill the offender, but 
 that he could not insult him as he had 
 done unless he would take it back, and 
 that he expected only to talk to him, and 
 not to kill him. Koller v. State, 36 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 496, 38 S. W. 44. 
 
 In State v. Hawkins, 18 Or. 486, 23 
 'Pao. 475, however, it was held that one 
 
 who arms himself and seeks another 
 with the intention of provoking a dif- 
 ficulty, which he expects may be deadly, 
 precludes himself from pleading self- 
 defense. 
 
 sThsmas v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 51 S. W. 1109; Scoggins v. State, 120 
 Ala. 369, 25 So. 180; State v. Murdy, 81 
 Iowa, 603, 47 N. W. 867. 
 
 lOTesney v. State, 77 Ala. 33; Hughes 
 V. People, 116 111. 330, 6 N. E. 55; State 
 V. Benham, 23 Iowa, 154, 92 Am. Dec. 
 417 ; State v. Neeley, 20 Iowa, 108 ; State 
 V. Stanley, 33 Iowa, 526; Allen v. Com. 
 86 Ky. 642, 6 S. W. 645; Oder v. Com. 
 80 Ky. 32; Bohannon v. Com. 8 Bush, 
 481, 8 Am. Rep. 474; Com. v. Barnes, 13 
 Ky. L. Rep. 163, 16 S. W. 457; Parris v. 
 Com. 14 Bush. 362; State v. Scott, 41 
 Minn. 365, 43 N. W. 62; Thompson v. 
 State (Miss.) 9 So. 298; State v. Brown, 
 63 Mo. 439; State v. Rider, 90 Mo. 54, 
 1 S. W. 825 ; State v. Herrell, 97 Mo. 105, 
 10 Am. St. Rep. 289, 10 S. W. 387; State 
 v. Hensley, 94 N. C. 1021; Stewart v. 
 State, 1 Ohio St. 66; State v. Hawkins, 
 18 Or. 476, 23 Pac. 475; Doss v. State, 
 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 551, 67 S. W. 321; 
 Roach V. State, 21 Tex. App. 249, 17 S. 
 W. 464; Taylor v. State, 38 Tex. Crim. 
 Rep. 552, 43 S. W. 1019; People v. Hite, 
 8 Utah, 461, 33 Pac. 254. 
 
 And evidence that the accused, upon 
 meeting the deceased, accosted him and 
 demanded to know why he had mistreat- 
 ed him on a previous occasion, and, upon 
 being told by the deceased that he 
 thought the matter was settled, after- 
 wards repeated his demand, then making 
 a demonstration as if about to attack 
 the deceased, warrants the court in sub- 
 mitting the issue of provoking a diffi- 
 culty on a casual meeting. Bearden v. 
 
522 HOMICIDE. [§ 326 
 
 opportunity to kill, avail himself of the plea of self-defense. ^ * And 
 this rule applies though the slayer pursued the deceased merely for 
 the purpose of chastising or beating him on account of some real or 
 imagined offense, ^ ^ or though he did it for the mere purpose of using 
 violence upon him, if he did not take back certain statements he had 
 made concerning him;"^* though, when the purpose was merely to 
 chastise, and not to inflict serious bodily harm, or to kill, and the 
 killing occurred in self-defense, it would be manslaughter only.^* 
 So, one who arms himself and seeks another for the purpose of an 
 affray or an altercation, and provokes and urges on a diiEculty to a 
 point where there is an appearance of an attempt to use deadly 
 weapons, provokes the difficulty and cannot plead self-defense against 
 apparent danger. ^ ^ And one who seeks to enforce the payment of an 
 illegal demand against another, arming himself with a firearm for 
 that purpose, cannot invoke the doctrine of self-defense merely be- 
 cause the person assaulted approached him with a pistol presented at 
 him, and did not stop, when ordered to stand back. ^ " 
 
 In all cases of this description the mere fact that the deceased 
 struck the first blow, or fired the first shot, or made a movement to 
 produce a deadly weapon, will not affect the position of the accused, 
 where his intention was to infiict injury. ■^'^ And in determining 
 whether a killing was in self-defense, where the invitation to a con- 
 flict came from the slayer, and the person killed was brought into his 
 
 State, 46 Tex. Grim. Rep. 144, 79 S. fioulty, and is precluded from pleading 
 
 W. 37. self-defense. Adams v. State, 35 Tex. 
 
 3 1 Wilson V. People, 94 111. 299; Zaner Grim. Rep. 28.5, 33 S. W. 354. 
 
 V. State, 90 Ala. 051, 8 So. 698; People "Newman v. State(Tex. Grim. App.) 
 
 V. Brnggj', 93 Gal. 476, 29 Pac. 26; Wal- 69 S. W. 519. 
 
 lace V. [Jnited States, 18 App. D. C. 152; But one who follows another with a 
 State V. Shippey, 10 Minn. 223, 88 Am. deadly weapon for the purpose of de- 
 Dec. 70, Gil. 178; Plew v. State (Tex. manding satisfaction for an insult 
 Grim. App.) 35 S. W. 366; Longacre v. given hira, intending to kill the other or 
 State (Tex. Grim. App.) 41 S. W. 629; do him some great bodily harm should 
 Gaines v. Gom. 88 Va. 682, 14 S. E. 375. the demand for satisfacticn be refused, 
 And see Hughes v. People, 116 111. 330, and who kills the other, cannot be held, 
 6 fT. E. 55 ; State v. Murdy, 81 Iowa, 603, as matter of law, to be guilty of man- 
 47 N. W. 867 ; State v. White, 138 N. G. slaughter only, and not murder, because 
 704, 51 S. E. 44. he killed the other to save his own life. 
 
 i2Gibson v. State, 8 Ala. 121, 18 Am. State v. Owen, 61 N. C. (Phill. L.) 42.5. 
 
 St. Rep. 96, 8 So. 98. And see Wallace instate v. Hawkins, 18 Or. 476, 23 
 
 V. United States, supra. Pac. 475; Lewis v. State, 51 Ala. 1. And 
 
 isGillelandv. State, 44 Tex. 356. see People v. Glover, 141 Gal. 233, 74 
 
 And one who coolly, deliberately, and Pac. 745. 
 
 avowedly seeks another, with the ex- isLewis v. State, supra. 
 
 press intention of killing him if the lat- i 'Adams v. State, 35 Tex. Crira. Rep. 
 
 ter should question his conduct in re- 285, 33 S. W. 354; Johnson v. State, 26 
 
 giird to a. certain matter with reference Tex. App. 631, 10 S. W. 235; Levy v. 
 
 to which he had a right to question it, State, 28 Tex. App. 203, 19 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 and afterwards kills him pursuant to 826, 12 S. W. 596; Davis v. State, 92 
 
 such purpose, is the provoker of the dif- Ala. 20, 9 So. 616 ; Gafford v. State, 122 
 
? 325] SELF-DEFENSE. 523 
 
 presence and there slain, no one else being present, and there being 
 enmity between them, the deceased having previously made threats 
 against the slayer, a careful inves,tigation by the jury is required to 
 determine vi^hether the slayer was in a position to plead self-de- 
 fense. ^ * 
 
 326. Insulting language or conduct. — Mere trivial remarks or acts, 
 made or done by one person and addressed to another as a joke, or 
 of a character not calculated to excite anger, though done for the 
 purpose of annoying, do not constitute provoking a difficulty, so as 
 t,o bar the person making or doing them from pleading self-defense, 
 where a difficulty results and he kills the other.-' And provoking 
 words and gestures might be used from heat of blood in a sudden 
 quarrel, which might lead to a fight, during which the combatant 
 using them would have the right to defend himself against impending 
 danger of death or great bodily harm.^ And this is so though such 
 remarks or acts may have contributed to some extent to the occasion. ^ 
 Nor will such language or acts constitute provoking a difficulty if 
 they are not such as to call for, or to justify, an assault by the de- 
 ceased.* Insulting remarks not sufficient to justify an assault can- 
 not be held to put a man in the wrong, so as to deprive him of all 
 defensive rights in an affray begun by the other.® Nor is the right 
 to defend one's self against an attack by another defeated by the cir- 
 culation of slander about relatives of the assailant,® or by the publica- 
 
 Ala. 54, 25 So. 10; Myers v. State, 62 W. 385; People v. Newcomer, 118 Cal. 
 
 Ala. 599; State V. Neeley, 20 Iowa, 109; 263, 50 Pae. 405; Watkins v. United 
 
 State V. Scott, 41 Minn. 365, 43 N. W. States, 1 Tnd. Terr. 364, 41 S. W. 1044; 
 
 62; Allen v. State, 68 Miss. 385, 6 So. State v. Higgerson, 157 Mo. 395, 57 S. 
 
 242; State v. Crawford, 115 Mo. 620, 22 W. 1014; Turner v. State, 89 Tenn. 547, 
 
 S. W. 371 ; State v. Hudson, 59 Mo. 135; 15 S. W. 838. 
 
 State V. McDaniel, 94 Mo. 301, 7 S. W. And a statement by a man, made in a 
 
 634; State v. McDonald, 67 Mo. 13; conversation with another leading up to 
 
 State V. White, 18JI. I. 473, 28 Atl. 908; an attack in which he was killed, that he 
 
 Rogers v. State, 9a Tenn. 448, 33 S. W. had whipped his daughter for going with 
 
 563. the other the night previous is inadmis- 
 
 isPeople V. Walworth, 4 N. Y. Crim. sible in evidence in a prosecution for the 
 
 Rep. 355. killing to rebut evidence that he ap- 
 
 iBennyfield v. Com. 13 Ky. L. Rep. proached the accused in a, mild manner, 
 
 440, 17 S. W. 271 ; Boatwright v. State, where he was the aggressor in the as- 
 
 89 Ga. 140, 15 S. E. 21; State v. Gordon, sault which resulted in his death. Tur- 
 
 191 Mo. 114, 89 S.W. 1025; Poer v. State ner v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 46 S. 
 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 67 S. W. 500. W. 830. 
 
 2Daniel v. State, 10 Lea, 261-; Fowler estate v. Bartlett, 170 Mo. 658, 59 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 22 S. W. L.R.A. 756, 71 S. W. 148; Kelley v. 
 
 587; Munden V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 40, 62 S. W. 
 
 64 S. W. 239. 915. And see Roberts v. State (Tex. 
 
 sAlIen V. Com. 86 Ky. 642, 6 S. W. Crim. App.) 88 S. W. 221. 
 
 645 ; Brown v. State, 58 Ga. 212. But where one person accused another 
 
 4 Brown v. State, supra. of sending a scurrilous valentine reflect- 
 
 sPeople V. Curtis, 52 Mich. 616, 18 N. ing upon the former's sisters, and a 
 
5^ 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 [| 32^ 
 
 tion and circulation of a libel concerning him.'' Nor does mere re- 
 fusal to believe a statement made by another constitute provoking a 
 difficulty. « 
 
 Words spoken by one person to another, however, which were fonl 
 and abusive and continued, with numerous repetitions and variations, 
 down to the fatal termination of the affray, are sufficient to constitute 
 provoking a difficulty, and to bar a plea of self-defen.se.® And so is 
 refusal, upon request, to leave a place where the slayer had no right 
 to be, in connection with abusive words used by him. ^ ° So, the same 
 rule applies to language not only calculated to provoke an alterca- 
 tion or angry discussion, but intended for that purpose. ^^ A-ud 
 where the words and conduct of the slayer were such as to goad the 
 other into committing an assault upon him, he is regarded as pro- 
 voking the difficulty, and precluded from pleading self-defense.^* 
 And this is so, whether he fought willingly or unwillingly.-'^ Nor 
 can one plead self-defense where he kills another after using offensive 
 language toward him, and advancing upon him in a threatening man- 
 
 quarrel ensued in which he was shot, the 
 valentine is admissible in evidence in 
 a prosecution for the shooting, where 
 there was evidence to show that the ac- 
 cused wrote itj or, knowing its con- 
 tents, urged it to be read at a party 
 where it was received. Kelley v. State, 
 supra. 
 
 'Corn. V. Selfridge, Horr. & T. Cas. 19. 
 
 Principles of honor and natural right 
 da not justify a person in killing an- 
 other, who intended to do him no great 
 bodily harm, but only to disgrace him. 
 Ibid. 
 
 sLucas V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 90 
 S. W. 880. 
 
 sstate V. Bryant, 102 Mo. 24, 14 S. 
 W. 822. 
 
 And where one man made an offensive 
 statement in the hearing of another, and 
 the latter expressed an intention to 
 strike him if he repeated the remark, 
 when the former made a demonstration 
 indicating an intention to speak, and 
 the latter struck him, upon which the 
 former gave him blows which caused his 
 death, the former will be deemed to have 
 invited or brought on the occasion for 
 the difficulty by showing a disposition to 
 repeat the offensive words. People v. 
 McGrath, 47 Hun, 325. 
 
 1 "People V. Robertson, 67 Cal. 646, 8 
 Pac. 600. And see Crawford v. State, 
 112 Ala. 30, 21 So. 214 ; Hinton v. State, 
 24 Tex. 454; King v. State, 13 Tex. App. 
 279. 
 
 11 Jackson v. State, 81 Ala. 33, 1 So. 
 33; Wallace v. United States, 18 App. 
 D. C. 152; State v. Scott, 41 Minn. 365, 
 43 N. W. 62; Hays v. Territory (Okla.) 
 52 Pac. 950; Alexander v. State, 40 Tex. 
 Crim. Eep. 395, 49 S. W. 229, 50 S. W. 
 716; Stacy v. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 
 86 S. W. 327. 
 
 i2Barnett v. State, 100 Ind. 171; 
 Baldwin v. State, 111 Ala. 11, 20 So. 528; 
 McQueen v. State, 103 Ala. 12, 15 So. 
 824; Gibson v. State, 89 Ala. 121, 18 
 Am. St. Eep. 96, 8 So. 98 ; Moore v. Peo- 
 ple, 26 Colo. 213, 57 Pac. 857; State v. 
 Jones, 8 Crim. L. Mag. 148; State v. 
 Scott, supra; Sanders v. State (Tex. 
 Crim. App.) 83 S. W. 712; Tardy v. 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 83 S. W. 1128. 
 
 One who banters another to fight in 
 order to get an opportunity of taking 
 his life, or doing him serious bodily in- 
 jury, provokes a diflBculty which will 
 prevent him from pleading self-defense. 
 Bush v. People, 10 Colo. 566, 16 Pac. 
 290. 
 
 And evidence that one person, with 
 gun in hand, met another, and stopped 
 and looked viciously at him for a half 
 minute or more, is sufficient in a 
 pi'oseoution for homicide to warrant an 
 instruction on the question of provok- 
 ing a difficulty with intent to kill. 
 Hays V. Com. 12 Ky. L. Eep. 611, 14 S. 
 W. 833. 
 
 i3Howell V. State, 79 Ala. 283. 
 
S 326] SELF-DEFENSE. 525 
 
 Tier, -with hostile demonstration ; ^ * or where he follows such language 
 "with seizing, drawing, or attempting to use a deadly weapon upon 
 the deceased. ^ ^ And the act of one person in ordering another away 
 from a dwelling to which he had a right to apply for admission should 
 go to the jury in a prosecution for homicide, under the "absolute free- 
 dom from fault" rule of Alabama, on the question as to whether the 
 former acted in his own wrong in ordering the other away, so as to 
 take away his right of self-defense. ^ ® 
 
 327. Threats — Threats made by one person against the life of 
 another, on account of which the latter attacked the former in such 
 a manner as to induce him to believe his life to be in danger, are not 
 alone suiScient to deprive the threatener of the right to plead self- 
 defense, where he killed the other. ^ To hold that antecedent threats 
 prove a homicide to have been committed on former grudges, and not 
 on fear of immediate danger, would be in violation of the rule that 
 the last provocation is presumed to be the moving cause. ^ If by 
 threats or otherwise, however, the person uttering them intended to 
 and did produce the occasion or difficulty, with a view of killing the 
 person threatened, his right of self-defense is gone.^ And evidence 
 ■of a threat made by one person against another shortly before killing 
 him, together with the fact that the slayer had gone armed to the 
 house of the deceased and begun an angry conversation, authorizes 
 an instruction as to the law applicable where the slayer brings on 
 the difficulty.* And a previously declared intention to kill or do 
 grievous bodily harm, together with provoking conduct when the 
 parties met, sufficiently show the person making the threats to have 
 been the aggressor, and the one bringing on the difficulty in a prose- 
 cution for killing the other. ^ So, where there is evidence of mutual 
 threats and ill-feeling, and that the slayer started to hunt the de- 
 ceased with the avowed purpose of using violence upon him unless 
 he should take back a charge made by him, and that a collision ensued 
 when each was seeking the other, the conditional nature of these 
 threats will not protect the slayer from the consequences of his de- 
 
 KMyers v. State, 62 Ala. 599; Isaacs aibid. And see Franklin v. State, 34 
 
 V. State, 25 Tex. 174. Tex. Crim. Rep. 625, 31 S. W. 643. 
 
 IB State V. McDonald, 67 Mo. 13; State ^ Smith v. State, supra; Patterson v. 
 
 V. Lewis, 118 Mo. 79, 23 S. W. 1082; State 75 Miss. 670, 23 So. 647. 
 
 Godfrey v. Com. 15 Ky. L. Eep. 3, 21 S. „ V^ ?n/\?^"^- ^° S^\ ^V ??\ ^^^' ^ 
 
 W. 1047; Taylor v. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Iv^l/^^^ ^^^^'^ ^- ^^^^ ^^'^-^ 90 S. 
 
 Rep. 552 43 S. W 1019 "^sGodfrey v. Com. 15 Ky. L. Kep. 3, 21 
 
 i6Medlock V. State, 114 Ala. 6, 22 So. g. v\'. 1047; State v. McDonald, 67 Mo. 
 
 112. 13. And see State v. Gray (Or.) 79 
 
 1 Smith V. State, 15 Tex. App. 338. Pac. 53. 
 
526 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 r§ 327 
 
 liberate act in killing the deceased.® And threats and expressed 
 intention of going to the house of the person threatened at a certain 
 time for the purpose of executing the threats are admissible in evi- 
 dence against the threatener in a prosecution for killing the other, as 
 tending to show his animus in going to the house of the deceased.'' 
 328. Assaults — Any direct personal assault in anger by one person 
 upon another, of course, renders the assailant the aggressor and pre- 
 cludes him from pleading self-defeuse, where he kills the person as- 
 sailed. ■^ And this is especially the case where both parties were 
 armed with deadly weapons, so that the assault would be liable to be 
 followed by dangerous, if not deadly, results ; ^ or where the assault 
 was made for the express purpose of leading the person assaulted to 
 resent it by drawing a weapon, and thus furnishing an excuse for 
 killing him ; * or where the person assaulted was peaceable and order- 
 ly, and made no demonstration and exhibited no hostility whatever 
 toward the assailant, either by word or act.^ And the rule is not af- 
 fected by the fact that the purpose of the assault was merely to pun- 
 ish or chastise for some slight offense ; ^ or by the fact that the assault 
 was provoked by insulting language or conduct, such language or 
 conduct not being sufficient to justify an assault. ® Within this rule 
 
 sGilleland v. State, 44 Tex. 356. 
 
 'State V. Partlow, 90 Mo. 608, 59 Am. 
 Rep. 31, 4 S. W. 14. 
 
 But an instruction in a prosecution 
 for homicide that the jury may look 
 to threats by the deceased against the 
 accused to aid them in determining who 
 was the aggressor is objectionable as 
 directing the jury's attention to a par- 
 ticular fact, to the exclusion of the evi- 
 dence in its entirety. Crawford v. 
 State, 112 Ala. 1, 21 So. 214. 
 
 iSee Martin v. State, 5 Ind. App. 453, 
 32 N. E. 594; Barnett v. State, 100 Ind. 
 171 : Shipley v. Edwards, 87 Iowa, 310, 
 54 N. W. 151 ; State v. Rogers, 18 Kan. 
 78, 26 Am. Rep. 754; State v. Kloss, 117 
 Mo. 591, 23 S. W. 780 ; State v. McCann, 
 43 Or. 155, 72 Pac. 137; Polk V. State, 
 30 Tex.- App. 657, 18 S. W. 466; Graham 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 33 S. W. 537; 
 McMahon v. State, 46 Tex. Crira. Rep. 
 540, 81 S. W. 296. 
 
 2 State V. Rogers, supra. 
 And an instruction in a prosecution 
 for homicide with reference to bringing 
 an the conflict by an attack with a pistol 
 is not subject to objection as failing to 
 indicate the manner or purpose of 
 aringing on tlie difficulty. Crawford v. 
 Com. 15 Ky. L. Rep. 356, 23 S. W. 592. 
 
 sState V. Martin, 24 N. 0. (2 Ired. 
 L.) 101. And see State v. Bailey, 190 
 Mo. 257, 88 S. W. 733. 
 
 An assault by one person upon an- 
 other, accompanied by impertinent and 
 insulting questions causing an angry 
 reply, and an apparent attempt to strike 
 upon the part of the deceased, followed 
 by a series of brutal assaults by the 
 other, amount to bringing on a difficulty, 
 and the circumstance that the attention 
 of the assailant was called to the fact 
 that the deceased was getting his gun 
 does not justify killing him. State v. 
 Kloss, 117 Mo. 591, 23 S. W. 780. 
 
 ^Martin v. State, 5 Ind. App. 453, 32 
 N. E. 594. And see Graham v. State 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 33 S. W. 537. 
 
 Where one person shot another, and 
 it appears that the latter was unarmed, 
 the court in a prosecution for the kill- 
 ing should submit to the jury the ques: 
 tion as to whether the defendant was the 
 aggressor, or whether or not he acted in 
 self-defense. State v. McCollum, 119 
 Mo. 469, 24 S. W. 1021. 
 
 BShipley v. Edwards, 87 Iowa, 310, 54 
 N. W. 151 ; State v. Rogers, 18 Kan. 78, 
 26 Am. Rep. 754. And see Harmon v. 
 State, 158 Ind. 37, 62 N. E. 630. 
 
 ePolk V. State, 30 Tex. App. 657, 18 S. 
 W. 466. 
 
§ 328] SELF-DBFENSE. 527 
 
 the act of one person of drawing a pistol upon another in anger will 
 preclude his plea of self-defense, where he kills the other ;'^ and so 
 will the act of raising a loaded gun toward one against whom ill-will 
 was entertained, and cocking it ; ^ and the rule is the same where one 
 person in anger starts for another, who was on the other side of the 
 street, where he shoots him upon the latter reaching toward his 
 breast pocket.® Nor is the drawing of a deadly weapon on another 
 affected, as an act of aggression, by the fact that it was done because 
 of a refusal, in offensive language, to explain a previous misunder- 
 standing. ^ " And the act of one person of trying to make another be- 
 lieve that he intended to kill him by holding his hands behind him 
 and causing the other to think that he had a pistol, thus exciting his 
 fears, amounts to bringing on a diiRculty, and bars his right to claim 
 self-defense. ^ ^ So, an illegal arrest is an act of aggression upon the 
 part of the officer making it, which will prevent justification upon his 
 part on the ground of self-defense in taking the life of the person 
 sought to be arrested. ^ ^ And the same rule applies in case of a law- 
 ful arrest, where the officer recklessly and wantonly abuses his pris- 
 oner, thus bringing on a conflict in which the prisoner is killed. ^^ 
 In such case the arrest constitutes an assault which precludes the plea 
 of self-defense. ^ * 
 
 Mere rough treatment in sport, however, though technically 
 amounting to an assault, does not constitute provoking a difficulty 
 which will prevent a plea of self-defense, especially when an apology 
 is made. ■' ® And voluntarily resisting an assault does not forfeit one's 
 
 TPeople V. Tamkin, 62 Cal. 468; John- uLingo v. State, 29 Ga. 470. 
 Bon V. State, 69 Ala. 253; Fussell v. izCom. v. Weathers, 7 Kulp, 1; Cole- 
 State, 94 Ga. 78, 19 S. E. 891; Coleman man v. State, 121 Ga. 594, 49 S. E. 716; 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 25 S. W. 772; Hamlin v. Com. 11 Ky. L. Rep. 348, 12 
 Crist V. State, 21 Tex. App. 361, 17 S. S. W. 146. 
 W. 260. But the rule is different where the per- 
 
 And the act of a person in entering son seeking to make the arrest does 
 
 another's place of business with a pistol nothing to put the person sought to be 
 
 in his hand, and accosting the latter in arrested in real or apparent danger, and 
 
 a rough manner, inducing him to make the attempt to arrest is met by drawing 
 
 a movement as if to obtain a pistol, and firing a deadly weapon at him. 
 
 amounts to provoking a difficulty, the Coleman v. State, supra. 
 
 latter's conduct being the natural result is Com. v. Weathers, supra. 
 
 of that of the former, and bars his right i^Eoberson v. State, 53 Ark. 516, 14 
 
 of self-defense where he kills hira. S. W. 902 ; Carter v. State, 30 Tex. App. 
 
 Hoover v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 342, 651, 28 Am. St. Rep. 944, 17 S. W. 1102; 
 
 33 S. W. 337. Peter v. State, 23 Tex. App. 684, 5 S. W. 
 
 sFrank v. State, 94 Wis. 211, 68 N. 228. 
 
 W. 657. isGrayson v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 sLawrence v. State, 36 Tex. Crim. 57 S. W. 808. 
 Rep. 173, 36 S. W. 90. 
 
 lORolIer V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 44 S. W. 496. 
 
528 HOMICIDE. [§ 328 
 
 right of self-defense. ^ ® l^^ov does a simple assault, or an assault and 
 Isattery attended with little or no violence, prevent one from defend- 
 ing himself against a return assault, even to the extent of taking his 
 adversary's life, if necessary to save his own, or to save himself from 
 serious bodily harm. ■'^'' And interference to protect another against 
 an unlawful assault does not constitute provoking a difficulty with 
 the assailant, which will prevent a plea of self-defense.^^ Nor does 
 interference to prevent the commission of a felony or unlawful act.^® 
 So, it would appear that a proper attempt to remove a trespasser, 
 though technically an assault, is not the provoking of a difficulty.^" 
 And a person who, seeing an object on his premises partly concealed, 
 not knowing what it is, fires a pistol to frighten it away, is not thereby 
 rendered an aggressor and deprived of his right of self-defense, where 
 it proves to be a man, who attacks him and puts his life in danger. ^ ' 
 
 So, though one person has committed an assault upon another and 
 brought on a difficulty with him, he may follow it up in such a man- 
 ner as not to justify the other in killing him, and in such case, if 
 the other attempts to kill him, his right of self-defense is not lost. ^ ^ 
 And the mere fact that the accused fired first in a difficulty result- 
 ing in the death of his antagonist is not alone sufficient to prevent his 
 being excused for the killing on the ground of self-defense. ^ * 
 
 329. Trespass — The mere fact that a slayer was committing a tres- 
 pass when he was attacked by the deceased does not necessarily con- 
 stitute him a wrongdoer in the matter of the assault, or preclude him 
 from making the defense of self-defense, — especially where violence 
 was used against him, and there was a seeming intention upon the 
 part of the deceased to take his life.^ And this is particularly the 
 
 isState V. Gordon, 191 Mo. 114, 89 S. aoSee Thomas v. Com. 25 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 W. 1025; McMaster v. State (Miss.) 29 201, 74 S. W. 1062; White v. State (Tex. 
 
 So. 522. Grim. App.) 68 S. W. 689. 
 
 I71rvine v. State, 104 Tenn. 132, 56 2iWhite v. State, supra. 
 
 S. W. 845; State v. Waldrop (S. C.) 52 22State v. Anderson, 86 Mo. 309. 
 
 S. E. 796. 23Carnes v. Com. 27 Ky. L. Rep. 1205, 
 
 isBrown v. Com. 21 Ky. L. Rep. 245, 87 S. W. 1123. 
 
 51 S. W. 171. iState v. Perigo, 70 Iowa, 657, 28 N. 
 
 isAyers v. State, 60 Miss. 709; Dill v. W. 452; State v. Archer, 69 Iowa, 420, 29 
 
 State, 25 Ala. 15. N. W. 333; Hash v. Com. 88 Va. 172, 13 
 
 And the failure or neglect of a citizen, S. E. 398. And see Thomas v. Com. 25 
 interfering to prevent the commission of Ky. L. Rep. 201, 74 S. W. 1062. 
 a felony about to be committed, to give One who had reason to believe that he 
 notice as to his purpose, does- not, of had authority to remove certain prop- 
 itself, reduce the offense of killing him, erty, and, while removing it pursuant 
 committed by the person whom he thereto, was approached by another who 
 sought to restrain, from murder in the fired at him, whereupon he shot liis as- 
 first degree to murder in the second de- sailant, is entitled to an instruction in 
 gree. McAllister v. Territory, 1 Wash, a prosecution therefor that if he 
 Terr. 360. believed he had permission to take the 
 
S 329] SELF-DEFENSE. 529 
 
 case where the trespass consisted merely of traveling over a disputed 
 road.* And where a man who had separated from his wife sought 
 admission, in a peaceful manner, for the purpose of seeing his chil- 
 •dren, to the premises of his father-in-law, where the wife was stay- 
 ing, and was there assaulted, his act does not deprive him of a right 
 of perfect self-defense ;^ and this without reference to whether he had 
 !been invited by his wife, or forbidden by her father.* If, after 
 separation of parents, however, one of them goes upon forbidden prem- 
 ises to see their children, intending to bring on a difficulty if neces- 
 sary to see them, and forces an entry into the premises, thus produc- 
 ing occasion for the other to resist such aggression, which results in a 
 difficulty in which the latter is killed, the right of self-defense is for- 
 feited ; and whether the killing was in self-defense or not the slayer 
 would be guilty of an aggravated assault, at least. ^ So, where a per- 
 son goes to the residence of another and undertakes to intimidate the 
 inmates with arms in hand, and compel obedience to his wishes, thus 
 inducing one of them to shoot at him, upon which he pursues and 
 kills his assailant, he cannot plead self-defense, and is guilty of 
 voluntary manslaughter.® And a midnight attack upon a house pre- 
 vents a plea of self-defense by one of the attacking party, who killed 
 a person who came out of the house to drive them away.^ And evi- 
 dence in a prosecution for homicide of the entry into the house of 
 another by a person between whom and the owner the relations and 
 feeling were such as to warn him that any attempt by him to enter 
 would be resented and resisted is sufficient to go to the jury upon the 
 question of his freedom from fault in bringing on a difficulty in which 
 the owner was killed. * So, unlawfully refusing to leave premises of 
 another when requested to do so, and resisting a forcible attempt at 
 removal, constitutes seeking and commencing a difficulty, and pre- 
 
 property, and acted in self-defense in session of premises on which he waa 
 ■the difficulty, he was not guilty, though killed is admissible in a prosecution for 
 he did not, in fact, have such permis- the killing on a plea of self-defense ; and 
 sion, the person giving it to him having a written lease conveying the right of 
 acted without authority. Arthur v. possession to him is proper evidence 
 State, 46 Tex. Grim. Rep. 477, 80 S. W. that he was so entitled. Turley v. 
 1017. State (Neb.) 104 N. W. 934. 
 
 zPeople V. Conkling, 111 Cal. 616, 44 TState v. Nance, 25 S. C. 168. 
 
 Pae. 314. And the mere fact that persons made 
 
 sHall V. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 479, no threat to do any violence does not 
 
 ■66 S. W. 783. prevent their acts from constituting the 
 
 4lbid. commencement of a difficulty, where they 
 
 5lbid. entered a house in a disorderly manner 
 
 eMain v. Com. 13 Ky. L. Rep. 346, 17 with pistols in their hands, which they 
 
 S. W. 206 ; Nicks v. State, 46 Tex. Grim, presented upon being told by a guest to 
 
 Rep. 241, 79 S. W. 35. leave or make known their business. 
 
 And that the deceased was, at the Crawford v. State, 112 Ala. 1, 21 So. 214. 
 
 time, in the lawful and peaceable pos- sDavis v. State, 92 Ala. 20, 9 So. 616. 
 
 Horn.— 34. 
 
530 HOMICIDE. R 329 
 
 eludes a plea of self-defense where injury is inflicted.® And an un- 
 lawful attempt by a landlord to evict a tenant by rendering the rented 
 premises uninhabitable warrants the tenant in resisting with force, 
 and constitutes the landlord an aggressor, who cannot plead self-de- 
 fense where he kills to protect himself against such force. ^ " Nor can 
 one who breaks and enters a store with intent to rob or steal justify 
 a killing therein on the ground of self-defense. ^ ^ 
 
 So, an attempt to unlawfully deprive another of his personal prop- 
 erty is an act of aggression against which the latter has a right to de- 
 fend himself, and renders tho former the aggressor in the absence of 
 evidence showing an attempt to withdraw before the killing. * * And 
 so is the act of a person in unlawfully removing an obstruction in a 
 hostile manner, and in violation of the peace. ^ * 
 
 The owner of property has the right on his own premises, however, 
 to evict a trespasser by force, and to restrain him from injuring his 
 person or property ; and, where he assaults a trespasser to protect hia 
 own person and property, such assault does not deprive him of his 
 right to defend himself against the violence of the trespasser induced 
 by such assault. ^ * And where two persons apparently attempting to 
 break into a building are directed by a person therein to wait until 
 the watch comes up, this is not an assault upon them which will 
 justify them, though innocent of the charge of attempting to break 
 in, in attempting such person's life.^® But a violent and forcible 
 taking of property by one person, who owned it jointly with another, 
 from the possession and premises of the latter, against his prohibition, 
 is sufficient to constitute provoking a difficulty which will prevent 
 
 sScott V. Com. 16 Ky. L. Eep. 702, 29 that his attempt would be desperately 
 
 S. W. 977. resisted. Ibid. 
 
 And one who, knowing that ill-feeling uState v. Shields, 1 Ohio Dec. Re- 
 exists between another and himself, goes print. 17. 
 
 to the house of the latter, contrary to his i2Helms v. United States, 2 Ind. Terr, 
 
 express orders, and upon being told not 595, 52 S. W. 60. 
 
 to enter persists in doing so, which leads But the act of a person engaged in 
 
 to a difficulty which results in the death gambling of removing his money from 
 
 of the latter, is the provoker of the dif- the gambling pot, or refusing to return 
 
 ficulty and is precluded from pleading it even after he had agreed to do so, does 
 
 self-defense. Davis v. State, supra. not change or modify his right to meet 
 
 loGedye v. People, 170 111. 284, 48 N. and repel a demonstration or citack on 
 
 E. 987. the part of a person with whom he was 
 
 And where a landlord attempted to gambling, within the meaning of the 
 
 evict his tenant by smoking him out, and law of self-defense. People v. Scott, 69 
 
 carrying away the window sash, and Cal. 69, 10 Pac. 188. 
 
 shot the tenant's son upon the tenant's isstate v. White, 18 R. I. 473, 28 AtL 
 
 resisting him, it is competent to prove 968. 
 
 that there was snow on the ground, and l4Ayer3 v. State, 60 Miss. 709. 
 
 that the tenant's youngest child was a isState v. Shields, I Ohio Dec. Ee- 
 
 mere baby, as tending to show that the print, 17. 
 landlord luiew, or should have known. 
 
i 328] SELF-DEFENSE. 531 
 
 the assertion of self-defense. ^ * And refusal of instructions as to the 
 right of a finder in respect to property found is reversible error in a 
 prosecution against him for murder, in which he pleads self-defense, 
 and the evidence shows that the killing occurred while he was at- 
 tempting to enforce a right of possession as against the owner, where 
 both men used firearms, since such instructions are necessary to en- 
 able the jury to determine which was first -in the wrong. ^ '' 
 
 330. Preparation for, and seeking to renew, difficulty. — A person 
 may provoke a difficulty by arming himself with a deadly weapon 
 and voluntarily seeking his antagonist, or returning to the place of a 
 former difficulty with him, so as to debar him of the right to plead 
 self-defense to a charge of killing him. ^ This is the rule where a per- 
 son who had engaged in a difficulty returned to the scene after it had 
 ended, for the purpose or with the intention -of renewing it, or pro- 
 voking another, with a preconceived intent to kill his adversary.^ 
 And the preconceived intent to kill is sufficiently shown by withdraw- 
 ing and opening a knife, and returning and using it;^ or by threats 
 to kill or to do great bodily harm on retiring from a former difficulty, 
 and subsequently returning and renewing the difficulty and causing 
 death. * And it has been held that the act of a person in voluntarily 
 going off and arming himself in order to renew a difficulty, and re- 
 turning, amounts to a provocation of a second difficulty;® and that 
 one who follows another and accosts him with relation to a previous 
 difficulty is the aggressor in the new difficulty thereby caused. * And 
 the act of a person in going to his home, loading his gun, and return- 
 
 i^Shafer v. Com. 10 Ky. L. Rep. 285, that the former returned to the scene 
 
 5 S. W. 761. of the difficulty and applied opprobrious 
 
 iTPeople V. Hecker, 109 Cal. 451, 30 epithets to the latter, and threatened 
 
 L.K.A. 403, 42 Pac. 307. to kill him in his hearing, though not 
 
 iState V. Neeley, 20 Iowa, 109 ; State in his immediate presence, the question 
 
 V. Bone, 114 Iowa, 537, 87 N. W. 507; as to what constitutes a wrong which 
 
 People V. Robertson, 67 Cal. 646, 8 Pac. will deprive the accused of the right to 
 
 600; Allen v. State, 66 Miss. 385, 6 So. plead self-defense should be explained to 
 
 242; State v. Crawford, 115 Mo. 620, 22 the jury without giving undue promi- 
 
 S. W. 371; State v. Hudson, 59 Mo. 135; nenee to the specific facts proved, or 
 
 State V. Trammell, 40 S. C. 331, 42 Am. attempted to be proved, for the purpose 
 
 St. Rep. 874, -18 S. E. 940; Rogers v. of showing the existence of the wrong. 
 
 State, 95 Tenn. 448, 33 S. W. 563; John- Boner v. Com. 19 Ky. L. Rep. 409, 40 S. 
 
 son V. State, 26 Tex. App. 631, 10 S. W. 700. 
 W. 235. 5Murray v. State, 36 Tex. 642; John- 
 
 2Johnson v. State, supra; State v. son v. State, 26 Tex. App. 631, 10 S. W. 
 
 McCarin, 16 Wash. 249, 47 Pac. 443, 49 235; Mathis v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 Pac. 216; Rogers v. State, supra. 39, 28 S. W. 817; People v. Filippeli, 173 
 
 sState V. Hudson, supra. N. Y. 509, 66 N. E. 402. 
 
 < State V. Crawford, supra. sRutledge v. State, 88 Ala. 86, 7 So. 
 
 If evidence in a prosecution for homi- 335; Allen v. State, 24 Tex. App. 216, 6 
 
 cide shows there had been difficulty be- S. W. 187. 
 tween the accused and the deceased, and 
 
532 HOMICIDE. [5 380 
 
 ing to the place of a former conflict has heen held to be an act of a:g- 
 gression, though the return was for the purpose of compromising a 
 difficulty which existed between the parties. '' 
 
 A mere return to the place of a former difficulty, however, solely 
 for the purpose, and with the honest intention, of demanding a return 
 of money, under an honest belief that it was due and had been wrong- 
 fully retained, does not preclude a plea of self-defense;* and the 
 same rule applies to a return for the purpose of asking for an explana- 
 tion concerning the previous attack.® And the act of one person in 
 looking up another who had made charges against him, and of pro- 
 ceeding some distance with him on the highway, and then killing 
 him, is not, of itself, sufficient to show that the occasion was brought 
 about by his wrongful act, his purpose being merely to •find out 
 whether the other had made the charges. ^ " So, a person engaged in 
 the performance of a legal duty, who is driven away, does not become 
 the aggressor or the provoker of a difficulty upon returning and re- 
 newing the attempt to perform his duty.^^ And an officer legally 
 seeking to make an arrest, who is compelled by force to retire, does 
 not lose his right of self-defense because he voluntarily returns and 
 renews the attempt.-'^ 
 
 331. Debauching spouse or relative. — Engaging in illicit sexual in- 
 tercourse with the wife or daughter of another constitutes provoking 
 a difficulty with the latter, and prevents the former from pleading 
 self-defense if he kills the latter upon being attacked by him;^ at 
 least, unless he retreated as far as he could, and avoided the conflict 
 by every available means which would not increase his danger.^ And 
 if a man seeking intercourse with the wife of another is interfered 
 with by the husband, and kills him during the course of such inter- 
 ference with a deadly weapon, with which he had armed himself wi& 
 intent to kill if necessary to save his own life upon being interfered 
 with, he is guilty of murder in the first degree. * And a husband may 
 attack another for improper conduct with his wife in his presence, 
 
 7Allen V. State, 66 Miss. 385, 6 So. State, 83 Ga. 744, 6 L.R.A. 424, 20 Am. 
 
 242. St. Rep. 340, 10 S. E. 358; State v. Mar- 
 
 sJohnson v. State, supra; Lewis v. tin, 9 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 778. 
 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 65 S. W. 185. And evidence that the deceased had at- 
 
 sBrownlee v. State (Tex. Grim. App.) tempted to kill his wife is immaterial, 
 
 87 S. W. 1153. irrelevant, and inadmissible in a prose- 
 
 loMassie v. Com. 16 Ky. L. Eep. 790, cution against one who killed him in re- 
 
 29 S, W. 871. sisting an assault provoked by his dis- 
 
 ilCockrill V. Com. 95 Ky. 22, 23 S. W. covery of the slayer engaged in improper 
 
 659. acts with his wife. Dabney v. State, 
 
 I2lbid. supra. 
 
 iDabney v. State, 113 Ala. 38, 59 Am. 2State v. Martin, supra. 
 
 St. Rep. 92, 21 So. 211; Drysdale v. SDabney v. State, suvra. 
 
i 331] SELF-DEFENSE. 533 
 
 raising a well-groTiiided belief that an act of criminal intimacy is just 
 over, or about to begin ; and in sucb case the adulterer, though in dan- 
 ger, has no right to defend himself by the use of a deadly weapon. * 
 So, where the husband finds a man engaged in acts of criminal in- 
 timacy with his wife, and attacks them indiscriminately, though he 
 is not justified in his attack and would not be excusable if death re- 
 sulted, it does not render him the aggressor, and cut him off from the 
 right to defend himself, where, in after phases of the difficulty, his 
 life becomes endangered by acts of his wife or her paramour. ^ 
 
 But where a man goes to the house of another for the purpose of 
 engaging in criminal intercourse with the latter's wife, and is found 
 there by the husband with his wife before the commission of any 
 criminal act by them, and the husband assaults the intruder and is 
 killed by him, the acts of the intruder having been wrongful, but not 
 illegal, he has an imperfect right of self-defense, and the killing is 
 manslaughter only.® And if he goes to the house of the other 
 for the innocent purpose of securing a place to sleep, and is as- 
 saulted by the husband on the supposition that improper conduct is 
 intended, his right of self-defense is perfect, and killing the husband, 
 if necessary to save himself, would be justifiable.'' So, though one 
 is actually caught in the act of adultery with the wife of another, 
 where adultery is only a misdemeanor, his right of perfect self-de- 
 fense is all that is lost to him ; he still retains his imperfect right of 
 self-defense, and is guilty of manslaughter only if he kills the hus- 
 band to save himself from death or great bodily harm. ^ And the fact 
 that killing the adulterer under such circumstances is made justifiable 
 homicide by statute does not affect the status of the offense, the 
 adulterer's right to resist an attack upon his life not being taken away 
 or affected by such a provision. ® And the killing of a husband by the 
 paramour of his wife is justifiable, where the husband deliberately 
 
 <Drysdale v. State, supra. eFranklin v. State, 30 Tex. App. 628, 
 
 estate v. Cancienne, 50 La. Ann. 847, 18 S. W. 468. 
 24 So. 134. 'Ibid. 
 
 And where a husband discovers his 'I^eed v. State, 11 Tex. App. 509, 40 
 
 wife in the act of committing adultery -^"'- Kep- 795. 
 
 and shoots indiscriminately at her and .^f^ wn^'^e adultery is regarded as a 
 
 at her paramour, and she seizes him and misdemeanor only, an instruction in a 
 
 calls upon her paramour to come and Prosecution for homicide that an adult- 
 
 1-11 I.- -J J. it. 1 i- erer caught in the act of adultery has no 
 
 kill him, evidence as to the relative ^j j^^ to° resist an attack made upon 
 
 strength of the wife and the husband IS j^j'^ ^y the husband is erroneous, te- 
 
 admissible in his behalf in a prosecution c^use it deprives the slayer absolutely 
 
 against him for killing his wife, for the ^nd entirely of all right of self-defense, 
 
 purpose of showing that his life was en- Reed v. State, 11 Tex. App. 510, 40 Am. 
 
 dangered by her act, in order to justify Rep. 795. 
 his act as done in self-defense. Ibid. 9Eeed v. State, supra. 
 
534 HOMICIDE. (5 331 
 
 laid a trap for the paramour, for the purpose of killing him if he 
 caught him in the guilty act, provided such killing was done by the 
 latter in defending himself against a deadly assault made by the hus- 
 band.^" 
 
 3. Application of rule to interference in behalf of another. 
 
 332. Governed by status of original combatant. — The doctrine of 
 freedom from fault in bringing on a difficulty as a condition precedent 
 to a plea of self-defense applies with equal force to a case in which 
 one person interferes in a difficulty between two others in behalf of, 
 or to protect, one of them ; and generally speaking a person who does 
 this will not be allowed the benefit of the plea of self-defense, unless 
 such plea would have been available to the person whose part he took 
 in case he himself had done the killing, since the person interfering 
 is affected by the principle that the party bringing on the difficulty 
 cannot take advantage of his own wrong. ^ If the person sought to be 
 protected provoked or brought on the difficulty, he must have clearly 
 manifested a desire and intention to retire from the conflict; and 
 even then the person interfering would not be justifiable if he struck 
 the fatal blow in pursuance of a previous design to assist his friend 
 in the event of a personal difficulty.^ And where one person inter- 
 feres in behalf of another who was the aggressor, and there is oppor- 
 tunity to retreat after the interference, and advantage is not taken of 
 it, the person interfering can claim no greater right than the other, 
 and neither of them can invoke the doctrine of self-defense.* Thus, 
 I 
 
 lOWilkerson v. State, 91 Ga. 729, 44 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 88 S. W. 234. 
 Am. St. Rep. 63, 17 S. H. 990. And see Stevens v. State, 133 Ala. 28, 
 
 The fact that the deceased had stated, 32 So. 270; Garza v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 some two weeks before he was killed, App.) 88 S. W. 231. 
 that he had maintained improper re- And one who interferes in a fight be- 
 lations with the wife of the accused, does tween others for the purpose of protect- 
 not tend to prove, in a prosecution for ing one of them must judge as to the ap- 
 t'le killing, that deceased first assaulted parent danger from what he himself 
 the accused when the killing occurred, sees when he reaches the scene of the 
 State V. Eider, 95 Mo. 474, 8 S. W. 723. struggle, and not from false statements 
 
 iBush V. People, 10 Colo. 568, 16 Pac. by others; and evidence that a father 
 290; Gibson v. State, 91 Ala. 64, 9 So. was told that his son and another were 
 171 ; Whatley v. State, 91 Ala. 110, 9 So. fighting, and that the latter had a pistol 
 236; Bostic V. State, 94 Ala. 45, 10 So. and would probably kill his son, is in- 
 602; Karr v. State, 108 Ala. 1, 17 So. admissible in a prosecution against the 
 328; Mitchell v. State, 129 Ala. 23, 30 father for killing the other in alleged 
 So. 348; Mitchell v. State, 22 Ga. 211, defense of his son. State v. Hays, 67 
 68 Am. Dec. 493 ; Spaulding v. State, Mo. 092. 
 
 162 Ind. 297, 70 N. E. 243; Caskey v. zBostic v. State, 94 Ala. 45, 10 So. 
 Cora. 15 Ky. L. Rep. 257, 23 S. W. 368; 602. 
 
 Stanley v. Com. 86 Ky. 440, 9 Am. St. swhatley v. State, 91 Ala. 110, 9 So. 
 Rep. 305, 6 S. W. 155; State v. Melton, 236. 
 102 Mo. 683, 15 S. VV. 139; Martinez v. 
 
332] 
 
 SELF-DEFENSE. 
 
 535 
 
 if a son fight in defense of his father, his act in doing so will receive 
 the same construction as that of the father, and if the latter was the 
 aggressor in bringing on the difficulty, and could not plead self-de- 
 fense, the same rule applies to the son.* And the son cannot rely 
 upon his own freedom from fault in bringing on the difficulty, as a 
 defense, where he knew the father had provoked the attack;^ both 
 must have been without fault in bringing it on.® Nor is a father 
 justified in killing the adversary of his son, where the son had pro- 
 voked and brought on the conflict in which he was placed in immi- 
 nent danger.'^ And the plea of self-defense cannot be interposed by 
 a father who kills an officer rightfully seeking to arrest his son, to 
 prevent such arrest.® Nor can one strike to relieve a brother from 
 peril unless the brother was free from fault in bringing on the diffi- 
 culty which placed him in peril. ® And if a person in whose defense 
 a brother engaged was in fault, and had not retreated or attempted 
 to retreat, the interference is not justifiable or excusable.^" 
 
 One has a right, however, to interfere in behalf of a near relative 
 engaged in a difficulty with others, and the mere act of interference 
 is not, therefore, an act of aggression ; ^ ^ and whether subsequent acts 
 
 <State V. Brittain, 89 N. C. 481 ; Karr 
 V. State, 106 Ala. 1, 17 So. 328; Morria 
 V. State (Ala.) 39 So. 608; Obier v. 
 Neal, 1 Houst. (Del.) 449; People v. 
 Miller, 49 Mich. 23, 12 N. W. 895; 
 Crowder v. State, 8 Lea, 669; Pinson v. 
 State, 23 Tex. 579; Waddell v. State, 1 
 Tex. App. 720. 
 
 And where a prosecution for homicide 
 is defended on the ground that the kill- 
 ing was done in defense of the slayer's 
 father, evidence is admissible that a few 
 moments before the difficulty the father 
 was searching for the person afterwards 
 killed, as bearing upon the question as 
 to who provoked the original difficulty. 
 Morris v. State, supra. 
 
 BKarr v. State, supra. 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution 
 for such a killing making the right of 
 the slayer to defend himself and to de- 
 fend his father dependent upon his own 
 freedom from fault in bringing on the 
 difficulty, excluding all reference to the 
 freedom of fault of the father, is errone- 
 ous. Ibid. 
 
 sMorris v. State, supra. 
 
 'State V. Linney, 52 Mo. 40; Mitchell 
 V. State. 129 Ala. 23, 30 So. 348 ; Bush 
 V. People, 10 Colo. 506, 16 Pac. 290. 
 
 sstate V. Hays, 67 Mo. 692. 
 
 sGibson v. State, 91 Ala. 64, 9 So. 171 ; 
 
 Wood V. State, 128 Ala. 27, 86 Am. St. 
 Rep. 71, 29 So. 557; People v. Travis, 56 
 Oal. 251 ; Crockett v. Cora. 100 Ky. 382, 
 38 S. W. 674; Eoss v. Com. 21 Ky. L. 
 Rep. 1344. 55 S. W. 4; State v. Melton, 
 102 Mo. 683, 15 S. W. 139; Smith v. 
 State, 105 Tenn. 305, 60 S. W. 143. And 
 see Stevens v. State, 133 Ala. 28, 32 So. 
 270. 
 
 While the general rule is that one 
 may defend his brother when in peril, 
 and, if need be, take life in such de- 
 fense, the rule does not apply where 
 both the brothers were in fault and 
 united in wrongfully bringing on the 
 fatal encounter. Smurr v. State, 105 
 Ind. 125, 4 N. E. 445. 
 
 lolbid. : Bush v. People, 10 Colo. 566, 
 16 Pac. 290; State v. Greer, 22 W. Va. 
 800. And see Whatley v. State, 91 Ala. 
 110, 9 So. 236. 
 
 In People v. Curtis, 52 Mich. 616, 18 
 N. VV. 385, however, it was held that in 
 case of a riotous affray one may inter- 
 fere in behalf of his brother, where the 
 latter is in personal danger, and neither 
 of them has opportunity to withdraw, 
 or started the affray, whether the 
 brother is to blame or not. 
 
 It State V. I-Iickam, 95 Mo. 323, 6 Am. 
 St. Rep. 54, 8 S. W. 252. And see State 
 V. Harper, 149 Mo. 514, 51 S. W. 89. 
 
536 HOMICIDE. [§ 332 
 
 can be regarded as acts of aggression depends upon the character and 
 the motive prompting them. ^ ^ I^or does the bare fact of aggression 
 deprive a near relative of the right to defend him; the aggression 
 must have been with means, and with the reasonably apparent intent, 
 to kill or do great bodily harm. ^ ^ So, if the act of a person in whose 
 behalf another engages in a diiEculty was lawful, the act of the latter 
 would also be lawful. ^ * And the rule has been stated to be that the 
 question whether one who interposes in behalf of another who is the 
 aggressor is justified in taking life upon the ground of a reasonable 
 expectation or fear of death or grievous bodily harm depends upon 
 his knowledge of the antecedent facts, and that his guilt must rest 
 upon his guilty knowledge and guilty intent.^® Nor does the fact 
 that one person was the aggressor in a difficulty with another make 
 him responsible for the act of a third person of interfering in the 
 difficulty and killing his antagonist, where there was no concert be- 
 tween him and the slayer. ^ ® And interfering in a pending difficulty 
 between two persons, to prevent one from killing or seriously injur- 
 ing the other, cannot be regarded as provoking an attack by the one 
 against whom the interference was designed to protect, or as a willing 
 entrance into a fight with him, and in a proper case a special charge 
 calling attention to these facts of the case should be given. ' '' Provok- 
 ing a difficulty with one person, however, does not prevent the pro- 
 voker from pleading self-defense where he kills a third person, who 
 interfered in behalf of the slayer's original antagonist. ^ ^ 
 
 The general question of homicide in defense of another is con- 
 sidered in another part of this work. ^® 
 
 4. Application of rule to mutual combat. 
 
 333. Both combatants aggressors. — If a person engages in a combat 
 with another, knowing that it might or would probably result in 
 death, or such serious bodily injury as might produce the death of his 
 adversary or himself, and kills his adversary in such conflict, he can- 
 
 laState v. Hickam. supra. State, IOC Ala. 1, 17 So. 328; Bush v. 
 
 i3Little V. State (Miss.) 40 So. 165. People supra; State v. Linney, 52 Mo. 
 
 KBush V. People, 10 Colo. 566, 16 Pac. 40. And see Johnson v. State (Tex. 
 
 290; Tubbs v. Cora. 22 Ky. L. Rep. 481, Crim. App.) 50 S. W. 269. 
 
 57 S. W. 623; Cornelius v. Cora. 23 Ky. leBrabston v. State, 68 Miss. 208, 8 
 
 L. Rep. 771, 64 S. W. 412. So. 326. 
 
 What one may do in behalf of him- I'Branch v. State, 15 Tex. App. 96. 
 
 self when threatened with death or great is Beard v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 bodily harm, he may do in behalf of a 81 S. W. 33. 
 
 brother. State v. Greer, 22 W. Va. 800. i9See infra, chapter XXIV., §§519 
 
 iBFoster v. State, 8 Tex. App. 248; et seq. 
 Guffee V. State, 8 Tex. App. 187; Karr v. 
 
! 333] 
 
 SELF-DEFENSE. 
 
 537 
 
 not plead that such killing was in his necessary self-defense ; in such 
 case the killing will be imputed to malice by reason of the wrongful 
 act which brought it about. ^ And where death ensues on sudden 
 provocation or quarrel, to excuse the offense it must appear that the 
 slayer acted from necessity or apparent necessity, and that he re- 
 treated as far as he could with safety, and declined further combat.^ 
 In such case there is a mutual combat and both combatants are ag- 
 gressors,* and neither can justify the taking of life without retreat- 
 ing ; * and the killing of one by the other will amount to manslaughter, 
 at least. ^ And where it appears in a prosecution for homicide that 
 there was a hostile meeting by agreement, in which one of the parties 
 was killed in combat, instructions on the question of self-defense are 
 unnecessary.® Nor have threats made by the deceased against the 
 accused any tendency to prove a killing in self-defense, where the de- 
 ceased and the accused armed themselves and met by agreement to 
 engage in a mutual combat.'' And where two persons fight upon a 
 sudden quarrel, and separate, afterwards renewing the fight after 
 sufficient cooling time has elapsed, and one kills the other, each being 
 armed with a deadly weapon, it is murder, and the slayer cannot 
 invoke the doctrine of self-defense, or claim immunity on account of 
 ill health or inferior size.* 
 
 iGilleland v. State, 44 Tex. 356; Habel 
 V. State, 28 Tex. App. 588, 13 S. W. 
 1001; Walters v. State, 37 Tex. Crlm. 
 Rep. 388, .35 S. W. 652; Williams v. 
 State, 25 Tex. App. 216, 7 S. W. 666; 
 Thumm v. State, 24 Tex. App. 667, 7 
 S. W. 236 ; Abram v. State, 36 Tex. Crim. 
 Rep. 44, 35 S. W. 389; King v. State, 4 
 Tex. App. 54, 30 Am. Rep. 160; Reese 
 V. State, 135 Ala. 13, 33 So. 672; Sand- 
 ers V. State, 134 Ala. 74, 32 So. 654; 
 Harris v. State, 123 Ala. 69, 26 So. 515; 
 Boulden v. State, 102 Ala. 78, 15 So. 341 ; 
 McNeezer v. State, 63 Ala. 169; Howell 
 V. State, 79 Ala. 284; Williams v. State, 
 140 Ala. 10. 37 So. 228; Presser v. 
 State, 77 Ind. 274; State v. Woodward, 
 84 Iowa, 172, 50 N. W. 885; State v. 
 Whitnah (Iowa) 105 N. W. 432; State 
 V. Seery (Iowa) 105 N. W. 511; Utter- 
 back V. Com. 105 Ky. 723, 88 Am. St. 
 Rep. 329, 49 S. W. 479 ; Wheeler v. Com. 
 27 Ky. L. Rep. 1090, 87 S. W. 1106. 
 And see Mitchell v. State, 129 Ala. 23, 
 30 So. 348; Page v. State, 69. Ala. 229; 
 Jordan v. State, 117 Ga. 405, 43 S. E. 
 747; Dent v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 166, 79 S. W. 625; Gardiner v. State 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 59 S. W. 1114. 
 
 aClark v. Com. 90 Va. 360, 18 S. E. 
 440; Jackson v. Com. 98 Va,. 845, 36 S. 
 E. 487; Waller v. State, 89 Ala. 79, 
 8 So. 153; Smith v. State, 106 Ga. 673, 
 71 Am. St. Rep. 286, 32 S. E. 851. 
 
 sState V. Spears, 46 La. Ann. 1524, 16 
 So. 467; Powell v. State, 101 Ga. 9, 65 
 Am. St. Rep. 277, 29 S. E. 309; Deal v. 
 State, 140 Ind. 354, 39 N. E. 930; Smith 
 V. State, 8 Lea, 402; Daniel v. State, 10 
 Lea, 263; Fisher v. State, 10 Lea, 152. 
 And see Compton v. State, 110 Ala. 24, 
 20 So. 119. 
 
 But omission to refer to the question 
 whether the accused was the assailant 
 in an instruction in a prosecution for 
 homicide is not erroneous where the evi- 
 dence shows that the accused was not the 
 assailant. People v. Giancoli, 74 Cal. 
 642, 16 Pac. 510. 
 
 4 Deal V. State, supra. 
 
 estate v. Spears, supra; Atkins v. 
 State, 16 Ark. 568; Parrish v. State, 14 
 Neb. 60, 15 N. W. 357. 
 
 BJSTairn v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 45 
 S. W. 703; McNeezer v. State, 63 Ala. 
 169. And see State v. Hammer, 116 
 Iowa, 284, 89 S. W. 1083. 
 
 'Nairn v. State, supra. 
 
 sCates V. State, 50 Ala. 166. 
 
6.18 HOMICIDE. l§ 333 
 
 Eules of law with reference to retiring from the conflict, however, 
 apply here as well as to cases of an assault without previous agree- 
 ment.^ And where, in case of a mutual combat, an encounter is so 
 sudden and perilous that no opportunity is given to decline the com- 
 bat, or to make known a willingness to decline, and there is no oppor- 
 tunity to retreat with reasonable safety, the greater wrong of the 
 deadly assault is upon the person making it, and the other will be 
 justified in slaying him forthwith in self-defense.^** But where 
 there is a quarrel between two persons and both are in fault, and a 
 combat results from such quarrel and death ensues, in order to make 
 it a killing in self-defense two things must appear from the evidence 
 and the circumstances of the case: First, that before the mortal 
 blow was given the accused declined further combat, and retreated as 
 far as he could with safety ; and second, that he necessarily killed the 
 deceased in order to preserve his own life or to protect himself from 
 great bodily harm. ^ ^ 
 
 A statutory provision like that of Georgia, that if a person kills 
 another in his defense it must appear that the danger was so urgent 
 and pressing at the time of the killing that in order to save his own 
 life the killing of the other was absolutely necessary; and that the 
 person killed was the assailant, or that the slayer had really, and in 
 good faith, endeavored to decline any further struggle before the 
 mortal blow was given, — applies exclusively to mutual combat. ^^ 
 And if there be evidence of mutual combat in a prosecution for homi- 
 cide, the provision should be given in charge. ^ ^ 
 
 334. What constitutes mutual combat. — One who enters willingly 
 into a combat and fights willingly, not for his o^vn protection, but to 
 gratify his passion by inflicting injury upon his adversary, engages 
 in a mutual combat, which will prevent him from invoking the doc- 
 trine of self-defense.^ And where one person applies opprobrious 
 epithets to another, and invites him to come out for the purpose of a 
 
 sSee State v. Spears, 46 La. Ann. E. 580; Freeman v. State, 112 Ga. 48, 
 
 1524, 16 So. 467; Story v. State, 99 Ind. 37 S. E. 172; Ragland v. State, 111 Ga. 
 
 413. 211, 36 S. E. 682. 
 
 loPeople V. Heoker, 109 Cal. 451, 30 isGlover v. State, 105 Ga. 597, 31 S. 
 
 L.II.A. 403, 42 Tac. 307. And see Peo- E. 584. 
 
 pie V. Thomson, 145 Cal. 717, 79 Pac. iSandors v. State, 134 Ala. 74, 32 So. 
 
 435. 654; Eeese v. State, 135 Ala. 13, 33 So. 
 
 iiStatev. Cain, 20 W. Va. 679. 672; Gilmore v. State, 126 Ala. 20, 28 
 
 i2DeIegal v. State, 109 Ga. 518, 35 S. So. 595; Walters v. State (Tex. Grim. 
 
 E. 105; Smith v. State, 108 Ga. 673, 71 App.) 40 S. W. 794; Bruce v. State, 41 
 
 Am. St. Eep. 286, 32 S. E. 851 ; Stubbs Tex. Crim. Rep. 27, 51 S. W. 954. And 
 
 V. State, 110 Ga. 916, 36 S. E. 200; see Kinman v. State, 73 Ark. 126, 83 S. 
 
 Wheeler v. State, 112 Ga. 43, 37 S. E. W. 344. 
 120; Parks v. State, 105 Ga. 242, 31 S. 
 
§ 334] SELF-DEFENSE. 539 
 
 settlement, and the two willingly engage iii a combat in which one of 
 them is killed, it is a killing in mutual combat, which will prevent 
 ihe survivor from pleading self-defense.^ The law of self-defense 
 does not apply to the case of one who enters willingly and voluntarily 
 into a combat which he knows may result in death or serious bodily 
 injury to one of the combatants. ^ If each of two persons had deter- 
 mined in his mind to bring on a difficulty with the other when they 
 should meet, in which each intended to kill the other, or inflict serious 
 bodily injury from which death might result, and a meeting occurs 
 and death ensues, there is no justification for the killing, no matter 
 which provoked the difficulty.* Nor is self-defense an available plea 
 to one who slays another in a prearranged duel. ® 
 
 The act of a person who had engaged in a personal conflict with 
 another, however, of remaining on the streets, where he had a right 
 to be, after being told by his antagonist that it was not over, until 
 his antagonist had armed himself and returned, does not subject him 
 to the law of mutual combat.® And where it is apparent that a per- 
 son who killed another engaged in the combat with him with felonious 
 intent with a deadly weapon, and under circumstances indicating 
 that persons on one side or the other might be killed, the law of im- 
 perfect self-defense predicated upon mutual combat does not apply. '^ 
 So, where one of two persons provoked or brought on a conflict and 
 the other killed him, acting upon real or apparent necessity, there 
 having been no previous understanding between them to fight, it 
 cannot be deemed a mutual combat within the meaning of the law 
 ■with relation to self-defense. ^ And if a contest is forced on a party 
 imder circumstances leaving him no volition, the combat cannot be 
 
 2Moore v. People, 26 Colo. 213, 57 Pac. 4Bonnard v. State, 25 Tex. App. 173, 8 
 
 =857 ; Evans v. State, 44 Misg. 762 ; State Am. St. Rep. 431, 7 S. W. 862. 
 
 V. Petseh, 43 S. C. 132, 20 S. E. 993; Where one person threatened another's 
 
 Godwin v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 404, life, and the latter went away and re- 
 
 46 S. W. 226 ; Koller v. State, 36 Tex. turned about twenty minutes afterwards 
 
 Crim. Rep. 496, 38 S. W. 44. and announced to the other that he was 
 
 sSwanner v. State (Tex. Urim. .App.) ready for him, and, when the other ad- 
 
 .58 S. W. 72. vanced upon him, pistol in hand, shot 
 
 Where parties went together, enter- him, he is, at least, guilty of voluntary 
 
 taining a mutual intent to fight, and manslaughter. Jackson v. State, 45 Ga. 
 
 armed for that purpose, and one of them 198. 
 
 was quicker than the other and fired ePeople v. Hecker, 109 Cal. 451, 30 
 
 first, and killed the latter, a verdict of L.R.A. 403, 42 Cal. 307. 
 
 murder is authorized, but the jury in sClay v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 euch case should be instructed upon the 129, 69 S. W. 413. 
 
 law of voluntary manslaughter as ap- 'Mitchell v. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 'plicable to cases of mutual combat. 170, 41 S. W. 816. 
 
 Dorsey v. State, 110 Ga. 331, 35 S. E. sKelly v. State, 27 Tex. App. 562, 11 
 
 .651. S. W. 627. 
 
540 HOMICIDE. [§ 334 
 
 called mutual ;® and this phase of the case should be given to the jury 
 where they are instructed as to the converse proposition as to effect of 
 a voluntary combat on the right to plead self-defense. ^ " 
 
 Questions with relation to mutual combat with reference to provo- 
 cation and hot blood are considered in another part of this work.*^ 
 
 c. Withdrawal from, or abandonment of, difficulty. 
 
 335. General rules — It is not true that the right of self-defense 
 can never arise at any stage of a difficulty, when one is defending 
 himself against dangers of any kind that he may have unlawfully 
 provoked. ^ Nor is it true, as matter of law, that a person who will- 
 ingly engages in a fight can never rely upon a plea of self-defense.^ 
 Even though a person may, in the first instance, have intentionally 
 brought on a difficulty, yet his right of self-defense will revive, and 
 his action will be deemed justifiable upon the ground of self-defense 
 where he had withdrawn from the conflict or difficulty in good faith 
 as far as he possibly could, and clearly and fairly announced his de- 
 sire for peace ; and in such case, if he is pursued by the other party 
 who again brings on a difficulty, and he kills him to save his own life 
 or avoid great bodily harm, his act is justifiable.* If there is reason 
 to believe that the accused in a prosecution for homicide, although 
 the aggressor in the first instance in the contest between the parties, 
 retreated or withdrew from the contest, he should be given the benefit 
 
 !>Bruce v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 419; State v. Warren, 1 Marv. (Del.) 
 
 27, 51 S. W. 954; Christian v. State, 46 487, 41 Atl. 190; Mereer v. State, 41 
 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 47, 79 S. W. 562. Fla. 279, 26 So. 317; McPherson v. 
 
 10 Christian v. State, supra. State, 22 Ga. 478; Roark v. State, 105 
 
 iiSee supra, chapter X., §§ 178, 179. Ga. 736, 32 S. E. 125; Hopkinson v. Peo- 
 
 iPatterson v. State, 75 Miss. 670, 23 pie, 18 111. 264; Kinney v. People, 108 
 
 So. 647; People v. Flahave, 58 Cal. 249; 111. 519; Hittner v. State, 19 Ind. 48; 
 
 Wheeler v. Com. 27 Ky. L. Rep. 1090, Deal v. State, 140 Ind. 354, 39 N. E. 930; 
 
 87 S. W. 1106; State v. Dean, 72 S. C. State v. Neelcy, 20 Iowa, 109; Shipley v. 
 
 74, 51 S. E. 524. And see Hans v. State Edwards. 87 Iowa, 310, 54 N. W. 151; 
 
 (Neb.) 100 N. W. 419. State v. Rogers, 18 Kan. 78, 26 Am. Rep. 
 
 2Daniel v. State, 10 Lea, 261. 754; State v. Hatch, 57 Kan. 420, 57 Am. 
 
 sThis rule is supported by a large St. Rep. 337, 46 Pac. 708; Luby v. Com. 
 
 number of cases; among them are: — 12 Bush, 5; Allen v. Com. 86 Ky. 642, 6 
 
 Eiland v. State, 52 Ala. 322; Crawford S. W. 645; State v. Tucker, 38 La. Ann. 
 
 V. State, 112 Ala. 1, 21 So. 214; Aiken 536; State v. Cancienne, 50 La. Ann. 
 
 V. State, 58 Ark. 544, 25 S. W. 840; 847, 24 So. 134; Com. v. Riley, Thach- 
 
 Felker v. State, 54 Ark. 489, 16 S. W. er, C. C. 471 ; State v. Shippey, 10 Minn. 
 
 663; People v. Batchelder, 27 Cal. 69, 223, 88 Am. Dec. 70, Gil. 178; Cotton 
 
 85 Am. Dec. 231 ; People v. Westlake, 62 v. State, 31 Miss. 504 ; Patterson v. 
 
 Cal. 303; People v. Button, 106 Cal. 628, State, 75 Miss. 670, 23 So. 647; State v. 
 
 28 L.R.A. 591, 46 Am. St. Rep. 259, 39 Partlow, 90 Mo. 608, 59 Am. Rep. 31, 4 
 
 Pac. 1073; People v. Hecker, 109 Cal. S. W. 14; State v. Lockett, 168 Mo. 480, 
 
 451. 30 L.R.A. 403, 42 Pac. 307; People 68 S. W. 563; State v. Gordon, 191 Mo. 
 
 V. Farley, 124 Cal. 594, 57 Pac. 571; 114, 89 S. W. 1025; State v. Vaughan, 
 
 Boykin v. People, 22 Colo. 496, 45 Pac. 141 Mo. 514, 42 S. W. 1080 ; State v. Ad- 
 
5 335] SELF-DEFENSE. 541 
 
 of sucli belief.* And where the evidence tends to show that a per- 
 son, after provoking a difficulty with another, withdrew therefrom, 
 and was thereafter assaulted by his antagonist, whom he killed, it is 
 the duty of the court to instruct the jury as to the effect of such with- 
 drawal,^ though a separate and independent instruction on that ques- 
 tion is sufficient ; and an instruction as to provoking a difficulty is not 
 improper because not combined- with one on withdrawal from it, 
 where an instruction on withdrawal is given elsewhere in the charge. ® 
 Nor is the theory that the accused, though the first aggressor, subse- 
 quently declined further quarrel eliminated from the consideration 
 of the jury by an instruction that to constitute voluntary manslaughter 
 there must have been adequate provocation, or an attempt by the per- 
 son killed to commit a serious personal injury upon the slayer.^ 
 This is the common-law rule, and it has been re-enacted by statute in 
 some of the states. * And in cases in which the slayer had retreated 
 from the difficulty in good faith, and in which he was pursued by the 
 deceased, who renewed the difficulty, the first difficulty has nothing 
 to do with the second, except as it illustrates the malice by which the 
 parties might have been actuated in engaging in the second encounter ; 
 and the question of provoking a difficulty should be expressly limited 
 to the acts and conduct of the parties in the last affray or encounter. ® 
 
 ler, 146 Mo. 18j 47 S. W. 794; State v. the ground that the plea was not avail- 
 Patterson, 159 Mo. 560, 60 S. W. 1047; able, but owing to the peculiar and 
 State V. Kennedy, 7 Nev. 374; People v. special form of the charge, which was 
 McLeod, 1 Hill, 377, 37 Am. Dec. 328, 25 one of shooting at a person without 
 Wend. 483; People v. Johnson, 139 N. Y. wounding him, the guilt in such case be- 
 358, 34 N. E. 920; Stoffer v. State, 15 ing established by the fact that he at- 
 Ohio St. 47, 86 Am. Dec. 470; State v. tacked his antagonist in the first in- 
 Hawkins, 18 Or. 476, 23 Pac. 475 ; Hippy stance and shot at him. 
 V. State, 2 Head, 217; Turner v. State, 4Hittner v. State, 19 Ind. 48. 
 89 Tenn. 547, 15 S. W. 838; Meuly v. 5 Stevenson v. United States, 29 C. C. 
 State, 26 Tex. App. 274, 8 Am. St. Rep. A. 600, 52 U. S. App. 647, 86 Fed. 106; 
 477, 9 S. W. 563; Burris V. State, 34Tex. Rogers v. State, 82 Miss. 479, 34 So. 
 Crim. Eep. 387, 30 S. W. 785 ; Clay v. 320. See also Mackin v. People, 214 111. 
 State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 129, 69 S. W. 232, 73 N. E. 344. 
 
 413; People V. Hite, StTtah, 461, 33 Pac. ePeople v. Glover, 141 Cal. 233. 74 
 
 254: Brown v. Cora. 86 Va. 466, 10 S. Pac. 745; People v. Roemer, 114 Cal. 51, 
 
 E. 745; State v. McCann, 16 Wash. 249, 45 Pac. 1003; People v. Kennett, 114 Cal. 
 
 47 Pac. 443, 49 Pac. 216; State v. Cain, 18, 45 Pac. 994. 
 
 20 W. Va. 679; State v. Evans, 33 W. 'Duncan v. People, 134 111. 110, 24 N. 
 
 Va. 417, 10 S. E. 792; Prank v. State, E. 765. 
 
 94 Wis. 211, 68 N. W. 657; Rowe v. sBush v. People, 10 Colo. 566, 16 Pac. 
 
 United States. 164 U. S. 546, 41 L. ed. 290; People v. Button, 106 Cal. 628, 28 
 
 547, 17 Sup. 'Ct. Rep. 172; Helms v. L.R.A. 591, 46 Am. St. Rep. 259, 39 Pac. 
 
 United States, 2 Ind. Terr. 595, 52 S. 1073. 
 
 W. 60; Reg. v. Smith, 8 Car. & P. 160. sBrazzil v. State, 28 Tex. App. 584, 13 
 
 In Cogswell v. Com. 17 Ky. L. Rep. S. W. 1006; Carter v. State, 30 Tex. App. 
 
 822, 32 S. W. 935, however, the right to 551, 28 Am. St. Rep. 944, 17 S. W. 1102; 
 
 plead self-defense after retiring from the Peter v. State, 23 Tex. App. 684, 5 S. 
 
 difficulty was denied, though not upon "W. 228. 
 
542 HOMICIDE. 'r 335. 
 
 And where there were two difficulties and the court instructed the 
 jury as to the law with reference to the accused provoking the diffi- 
 culty, it should further charge as to the effect of the abandonment of 
 the difficulty by the accused and the renewal thereof by the de- 
 ceased. ^ *• Nor is a person, though the original aggressor in a con- 
 flict with another, criminally responsible for killing him, where he had 
 abandoned his intention of inflicting injury upon him, and the latter 
 was afterwards killed by the accidental discharge of a pistol he was 
 taking from him. ^ ^ 
 
 A first felonious assailant, whose act was calculated to, and did, 
 produce fear of death or great bodily harm, cannot kill the person 
 assailed in defending himself against a deadly return assault by the 
 latter, however, until he has in good faith declined the strife and 
 fairly made known to the latter his willingness to do so, and the im- 
 minence of his danger does not relieve him from the necessity for so 
 declining before availing himself of the right of self-defense. * * This 
 is the rule though the return assault is so fierce as to prevent the first . 
 assailant from abandoning the contest, or from notifying the other 
 that he desires to abandon it. ^ ^ And the conduct of the slayer must 
 have been so marked in the matter of time, place, and circumstance 
 as not only clearly to evince his withdrawal in good faith from the 
 combat, ^ * but also such as to fairly advise his adversary that the dan- 
 ger has passed, and to make the latter's conduct thereafter the pursuit 
 of revenge rather than measures taken to repel the original assault. * ^ 
 And it must appear that the slayer ceased his attack upon the de- 
 ceased with the intention of withdrawing from the contest*® If, 
 
 loLindaey v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. ciition for homicide that if the accused 
 164, 32 S. W. 768. brought on the conflict he cannot claim 
 
 iiMePherson v. State, 22 Ga. 478. the right of self-defense, unless he aban- 
 
 i-Peijple V. Hecker, 109 Cal. 451, 30 doned it before the mortal blow was 
 L.R.A. 403, 42 Pac. 307; People v. Brug- given, might be objectionable as assum- 
 gy, 93 Cal. 476, 29 Pac. 56; Bush v. ing that the mortal blow was given by 
 People, 10 Colo. 566, 16 Pac. 290; Stoffer the accused, the error, ii any, is cured 
 V. State, 15 Ohio St. 47, 86 Am. Dec. 470 ; by the formal submission of that ques- 
 Irvine v. State, 104 Tenn. 132, 56 S. W. tion of fact to the jury in a 8ubsp;]uent 
 845 ; State v. Shockley, 29 Utah, 25, 80 cliarge. Duncan v. People, 134 111. 110, 
 Pac. 865. 24 N. E. 705. 
 
 The question of good or bad faith in isState v. Smith, 10 Nev. lOG; State 
 the retreating party in a prosecution for v. Beckham, 24 S. C. 283. 
 homicide is of the utmost importance, i^Stoffer v. State, 15 Ohio St. 47, 86 
 and should be submitted to the jury in Am. Dec. 470. 
 
 connection with the fact of retreating lelbid. ; Brazzil v. State, 28 Tex. App. 
 itself, especially where there is room for 584, 13 S. W. 1006; Roberts v. State, 30 
 conflicting inferences on this point from Tex. App. 291, 17 S. W. 450. 
 the evidence. Parker v. State, 88 Ala. leFitzgerald v. Com. 9 Ky. L. Rep. 
 4, 7 So. 98. 664, 6 S. W. 152. 
 
 And while an instruction in a prose- 
 
5 335] SELF-DEFENSE. 543 
 
 after abandoning the contest, he voluntarily renewed it for the pur- 
 pose of wreaking his malice, there is no self-defense in the case. ^ ^ 
 
 That a withdrawal from, or abandonment of, a difficulty wag at 
 the instance of a third person, however, does not affect it as an issue 
 in homicide. ^ ® And the duty of abandonment of the contest by the 
 aggressor, and of giving notice of the fact to his adversary, does not 
 apply where the act of aggression was not of a character reasonably 
 calculated to produce fear or apprehension of death or great bodily 
 harm in the mind of the person against whom it was directed, unless 
 it may be done without peril to the life or limb of the aggressor. ^ ^ 
 And one who provokes a difficulty may defend himself against vio- 
 lence on the part of the one provoked, if the violence is disproportion- 
 ate to the seriousness of the provocation, or greater in degree than 
 the law recognizes as justifiable under the circumstances.^'' 
 
 336. Reasons for, and to what applicable The doctrine that the 
 
 right of the aggressor or provoker of the difficulty in which a killing 
 occurs to plead self-defense revives upon his abandonment of, or 
 withdrawal from, the difficulty is based upon the principle that 
 though a man should be in the wrong in the first instance, yet space 
 for repentance is always open.-^ The true principle is that, where a 
 person has been feloniously assaulted, and the felon has desisted from 
 his attempt and taken flight, the right to pursue for the purpose of 
 private defense ceases as soon as, in the reasonable belief of the as- 
 sailed person, the danger has ceased to be imminent and impending. ^ 
 When the original aggressor has desisted from his attack, the right 
 of the other to employ force ceases ; and if he then attacks his original 
 assailant, the latter has the right to defend himself.^ And the doc- 
 trine is applicable whether the original intention of the assailant was 
 felonious or not;^ and the rule holds good whether or not the ac- 
 cused commenced the affray with intent to kill or inflict great bodily 
 harm.® And in either case the accused is justified in striking the 
 
 ivstate V. Adler, 146 Mo. 18, 47 S. W. sTerrell v. Com. 13 Bush, 246. 
 
 794. And see Lindsey v. State, 35 Tex. ^People v. Hecker, 109 Cal. 451, 30 
 
 Crim. Eep. 104, 32 S. W. 768. L.R.A. 403, 42 Pae. 307; Cotton v. State, 
 
 isChambers v. State (Tex. Crim. 31 Miss. .^04; Barnard v. Com. 10 Ky. 
 
 App.) 86 S. W. 752. L. Rep. 143, 8 S. W 444 
 
 islrvine v. State, 104 Tenn. 132, 56 In Anonymous, J. Kelyng, 58, how- 
 
 S. W. 845. ever, it was held that the accused in a 
 
 20Sams V. State, 124 Ga. 25, 52 S. E. prosecution for homicide may not avail 
 
 18. himself of the plea of self-defense, even 
 
 1 State V. Cable, 117 Mo. 380, 22 S. after he had retreated to the wall, 
 
 W. 953; State v. Partlow, 90 Mo. 608, 59 where he was actuated by malice in the 
 
 Am. Rep. 31, 4 S. W. 14; Johnson v. first instance, anl struck the first blow. 
 
 State, 58 Ark. 57, 23 S. W. 7. BState v. Hatch, 57 Kan. 420, 57 Am. 
 
 aPeople v. Conkling, 111 Cal. 616, 44 St. Eep. 337, 46 Pac. 708; State v. Rog- 
 
 Pae. 314; Luby v. Com. 12 Bush, 5. ers, 18 Kan. 78, 26 Am. Rep. 754. 
 
544, HOMICIDE. [§ 336 
 
 mortal blow, if he cannot otherwise escape. ® And a party renewing 
 a difficulty cannot invoke the doctrine of self-defense, but will be con- 
 sidered as an aggressor ab initio.'' So, the doctrine applies to cases 
 of mutual combat in which both parties are in the wrong,® and in such 
 case neither can right himself except by retreating to the wall ; and 
 where one, contrary to his original expectation, finds himself so hotly 
 pressed as to render the killing of the other necessary to save his own 
 life, he is guilty of a felonious homicide if he kills without first actual- 
 ly performing his duty of withdrawing.® Nor is an officer deprived 
 of his right to repel an attack upon him by a person he seeks to arrest, 
 by such force, even to the taking of life, as is necessary to save his 
 own, by the fact that the arrest was illegal, where he declined further 
 struggle and retreated as far as possible, and his adversary pursued 
 and again attacked him. ^ " And it also applies to persons who are 
 engaged with the actual slayer in the attack, as well as to the actual 
 slayer. ^ ^ And a conspirator is responsible to the same extent as if 
 he had done acts committed by any one of his co-conspirators, and to 
 reinstate his right of self-defense, he must not only have abandoned 
 the difficulty himself in good faith, but his co-conspirators must also 
 have abandoned it. -"^^ 
 
 337. Sufficiency of withdrawal or abandonment. — A withdrawal 
 from a confiict or difficulty which will revive the right of the person 
 withdrawing to plead self-defense if he should finally kill his antago- 
 nist must be such as to clearly indicate an unequivocal intention to 
 entirely abandon the difficulty.^ The abandonment must not be 
 merely colorable, or for the purpose of gaining fresh strength, or 
 taking some new advantage. ^ It must be a retreat or flight, and not 
 a mere effort to protect one's self under the shield of the law-^ The 
 aggressor must retreat as far as the fierceness of the other's assault will 
 
 ejohnson v. State, 58 Ark. 57, 23 S. 387, 30 S. W. 785. And see Gibson v. 
 
 W. 7; People v. Westlake, 62 Cal. 303; State, 89 Ala. 121, 18 Am. St. Rep. 96, 
 
 Rippy V. State, 2 Head, 217; Roach v. 8 So. 98. 
 
 State, 34 Ga. 78; Eiland v. State, 52 Ala. iBiirris v. State, and Bostic v. State, 
 
 322; Evans v. State, 44 Miss. 762; supra. And see MeCurley v. State 
 
 Gainey V. People, 97 111. 271, 37 Am. Rep. (Ala.) 39 So. 1022; Hicklin v. Terri- 
 
 109. ' tory (Ariz.) 80 Pac. 340; People v. 
 
 7Stillwell V. State, 107 Ala. 16, 19 So. Flannelly, 128 Cal. 83, 60 Pac. 670. 
 
 322; People v. Farley, 124 Cal. 594, 57 2 Johnson v. State, 58 Ark. 57, 23 S. 
 
 Pac. 571. W. 7; Parker v. State, 88 Ala. 4, 7 So. 
 
 sStoryv. State, 99 Ind. 413; Barton V. 98. And see Hodges v. State, 15 Ga. 
 
 State, 96 Ga. 435, 23 S. E. 827. 117: State v. Hill, 20 N. C. 629 (4 Dev. 
 
 »Story V. State, supra. &. B. L. 491) 34 Am. Dee. 396. 
 
 loCom. V. Weathers, 7 Kulp, 1. sHittner v. State, 19 Ind. 48. And 
 
 iiBostic V. State, 94 Ala. 45, 10 So. see State v. Edwards, 112 N. C. 901, 17 
 
 602. S. E. 521. 
 
 iJBurris v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
§ 337] SELF-rvEFENSE. 545 
 
 permit him,* and a mere retreat and firing back will not be suffi- 
 cient. ® Nor is a mere retreat from a house into which the aggressor 
 has illegally intruded, and from which he had been ordered, where 
 he shot the owner when he followed him to the door. ® And the same 
 rule applies when the retreat, though it was from danger, constituted 
 a step or an element in the carrying out of the original wrongful in- 
 tention.'' So, a cessation of hostilities by the aggressor, and an in- 
 vitation to fight it out in another place, which was accepted, constitutes 
 a mere change to a mutual conflict, and does not warrant his plea of 
 self-defense when he finally kills his antagonist;^ and the rule is 
 the same where he accepts a similar invitation from his antagonist. '■* 
 
 Nor is there any abandonment of the difficulty where there was a 
 continuous fight from the commencement to the finish. ^ " And where 
 a person fires a shot at another under circumstances not justifying 
 it, and this is immediately followed by another shot to prevent the 
 other from getting his pistol to renew an assault under circumstances 
 which would justify it, the whole is to be regarded as a continuing 
 transaction, and though the latter shot causes the death, the killing 
 cannot be held justifiable as in self-defense. ^ ^ 
 
 In withdrawing from a combat, however, one is not required to 
 retreat further when it cannot be done without probable death, and 
 when the only apparent means of escape is to turn back and attack 
 the pursuer. ^ ^ And he is not required to attempt to retreat where 
 the attack is so fierce that, by retreating, he will apparently expose 
 himself to death. ^ * And generally, where he has abandoned his in- 
 tention of inflicting injury upon his antagonist, and retreated, his 
 right to defend himself revives where his antagonist arms himself 
 with a deadly weapon and pursues him.-^* So, although a person 
 
 4Story V. State, 99 Ind. 413. App.) 57 S. W. 654; State v. Shockley, 
 
 BBurris v. State, 34 Tex. Grim. Rep. 29 Utah, 25, 80 Pac. 865. And see Hick- 
 
 387, 30 S. W. 785; Hellard v. Com. 27 lin v. Territory (Ariz.) 80 Pac. 340; 
 
 Ky. L. E«p. 115, 84 S. W. 329; State v. Clingan v. State (Ark.) 91 S. W. 12; 
 
 Shcckley, 29 Utah, 25, 80 Pac. 865. Burks v. State, 40 Tex. Grim. Kep. 167, 
 
 eCrawford v. State, 112 Ala. 1, 21 So. 49 S. W. 389. 
 214. And see Jackson V. State, 136 Ala. instate v. Partlow, 90 Mo. 608, 59 
 
 90, 33 So. 888. Am. Rep. 31, 4 S. W. 14. 
 
 7Gedye v. People, 170 111. 284, 48 N. islbid.; State v. Peo, 9 Houst. (Del.) 
 
 E. 987. 488, 33 Atl. 257. 
 
 sState V. Spears, 46 La. Ann. 1524, "Rowe v. United States, 164 U. S. 
 
 16 So. 467 ; Brown v. Com. 25 Ky. L. Rep. 546, 41 Ix ed. 547, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 172 ; 
 
 2076, 79 S. W. 1193. Cogswell v. Com. 17 Ky. L. Rep. 822, 
 
 sRoberts v. State, 30 Tex. App. 291, 17 32 S. W. 935; Fitzgerald v. Com. 9 Ky. 
 
 S. W. 450; Johnson v. State (Tex. Crim. L. Rep. 664, 6 S. W. 152; Terrell v. Com. 
 
 App.) 84 S. W. 824. 13 Bush, 246; State v. Thompson, 45 La. 
 
 iDWilson V. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. Ann. 969, 13 So. 392; State v. Tucker, 38 
 
 523, 81 S. W. 34. La. Ann. 536; Jones v. State, 84 Miss. 
 
 iiCourtney v. State (Tex. Crim. 194, 36 So. 243; Brazzil v. State, 28 Tex, 
 Horn.— 35. 
 
646 HOMICIDE. [^ 337 
 
 brought on a difficulty with another in the first instance, or voluntarily 
 entered into it for some unlawful purpose, where he abandoned the 
 conflict and ran into a store in good faith, and was pursued by his 
 antagonist when he afterwards came out, and by others acting in con- 
 cert with him, in such a manner as to give him good cause to be- 
 lieve, and as to make him believe, that they are about to do him great 
 bodily harm, he has the right to kill any of them if necessary to pro- 
 tect his person from such apprehended danger. ^^ And it has been 
 held that the question of the abandonment of the contest is involved 
 in a case in which the first aggressor retreated from the fight, and 
 while so doing was knocked down three times, when he shot his 
 antagonist ; ' ** and that where the aggressor quit the combat in good 
 faith, and sought to adjust the difficulty between himself and his 
 antagonist amicably, his right to defend himself revived, even upon 
 a mere hostile demonstration against him. ^ '' ITor does the fact that 
 a person who abandoned a difficulty intended subsequently to renew 
 it necessarily prevent it from being an abandonment in good faith, 
 \vhich will revive his right of self-defense. ^ * 
 
 338. ftuestion of notice or knowledge of withdrawal. — .The rule has 
 been laid down that an original aggressor in a difficulty to justify 
 killing his adversary must not only endeavor to really, and in good 
 faith, withdraw from the combat, but must also make known his in- 
 tention to his adversary.-' And one cannot rely upon self-defense 
 where he kills another whom he had assaulted in such a manner as to 
 render the latter incapable of understanding his intention of with- 
 drawing from the conflict, although such intention is bona fide, and 
 the other attempts to kill him with a deadly weapon.^ Nor is there 
 any question as to withdrawal from the difficulty where it appears 
 
 App. 584, 13 S. W. 1006; Wills v. State feeted so as to give him the right to kill 
 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 22 S. W. 969; Mc- the other if necessary in his own de- 
 
 Spatton V. State, 30 Tex. App. 617, 18 fense. Hooper v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. 
 
 S. W. 298 ; Morgan v. State, 34 Tex. Rep. 125, 100 Am. St. Rep. 845, 69 S. W. 
 
 Crim. Rep. 222, 29 S. W. 1092. And see 149. 
 
 McClurg V. Com. 17 Ky. L. Rep. 1339, leHunt v. State, 72 Miss. 413, 16 So. 
 
 36 S. W. 14. 753. 
 
 1 estate v. Adler, 146 Mo. 18, 48 S. E. instate v. Spears, 46 La. Ann. 1524, 
 
 794. 16 So. 467. 
 
 And where one person approached an- isThornton v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 other and cursed and abused him, and App.) 65 S. W. 1105. 
 
 then left him and mounted his horse to iteople v. Button, 106 Cal. 628, 28 
 
 go home, when the other left his carriage L.R.A. 591, 46 Am. St. Eep. 259, 39 Pac. 
 
 and advanced upon him in such a man- 1073; Citing Stoffer v. State, 15 Ohio 
 
 ner as to lead him to believe that the St. 47, 86 Am. Dec. 470 ; State v. Smith, 
 
 latter intejided to kill him or do him 10 Nev. 106; People v. Phelan, 123 Cal. 
 
 serious bodily harm, he must be deemed 55i, 56 Pac. 424. 
 
 to have abandoned the difficulty, iind his sPeople v. Button, and People v. Phe- 
 
 right of self-defense is revived and per- Ian, supra. 
 
§ MS] SELF-DEFENSE. 547 
 
 that the slayer shot the deceased from behind, before he had become 
 aware of the fact that the slayer was an antagonist. ^ In considering 
 the question whether a person is rendered incapable of receiving 
 notice of withdrawal, however, the person assaulted must be deemed 
 a man of ordinary understanding, — a reasonable man.* And a nat- 
 urally demented condition will not excuse him from seeing that his 
 assailant has withdrawn from the attack in good faith, nor will pas- 
 sion and cowardice, when a reasonable man would have seen it.^ And 
 it is STifficient if a combatant had reasonable grounds for believing 
 that his antagonist had withdrawn from the contest, though the fact 
 was not clearly evidenced. ® 
 
 XI. The geade oh degree when self-deeense is asserted. 
 
 339. General rules — Self-defense, when complete, excuses homicide 
 and has nothing to do in determining its degree, and, therefore, has 
 no place in the definition of manslaughter or any other degree of 
 homicide. ^ Killing in self-defense is an offense which can be divid- 
 ed into grades or degrees only in cases of excessive force in self- 
 defense, and of limited or imperfect right of self-defense; and in 
 such cases the grade or degree of the ofEense depends upon the 
 nature and character of the act the slayer was committing, and 
 which produced the necessity that he should defend himself.^ If 
 he was himself without fault, and reasonably apprehended death 
 or serious bodily harm to himself, unless he killed his assailant, 
 his right of self-defense was perfect and the killing is justifiable 
 homicide;^ and so, if he killed the other unintentionally in a quar- 
 rel forced upon him.* 
 
 slJnderwood v. Com. 27 Ky. L. Rep. Com. 13 Ky. L. Rep. 820, 18 S. W. 528; 
 
 8, 84 S. W. 310. Smith v. Com. 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1848, 50 
 
 •^People V. Button, su'pra. S. W. 241 ; Patten v. People, 18 Mich. 
 
 elbid. 314, 100 Am. Dec. 173; State v. Rose, 92 
 
 estate v. Dillon, 74 Iowa, 653, 38 S. Mo. 201, 4 S. W. 733; Morgan v. Durfee, 
 
 W 525 69 Mo. 469, 33 Am. Rep. 508; State v. 
 
 1 State V. Castello, 62 Iowa, 404, 17 N. Gee, 85 Mo. 647 ; State v. Hicks, 92 Mo. 
 
 W 605. 431, 4 S. W. 742; State v. Pennington, 
 
 2Reed v. State, 11 Tex. App. 509, 40 146 Mo. 27, 47 S. W. 799; Com. v. Weath- 
 
 Am. Rep. 795 ; Chambers v. State, 46 ers, 7 Kulp, 1 ; Grainger v. State, 5 Yerg. 
 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 61, 79 S. W. 572. 459, 26 Am. Dec. 278; Allsup v. State, 5 
 
 3Reed V. State, supra; Carter v. State, Lea, 362; Rippy v. State, 2 Head, 217; 
 
 30 Tex. App. 551, 28 Am. St. Rep. 944, Hull v. State, 6 Lea, 259; White v. Ter- 
 
 17 S. W. 1102; People v. Grimes, 132 Cal. ritory. 3 Wash. Terr. 397, 19 Pac. 37. 
 
 30, 64 Pac. 101 ; Schmier v. People, 23 A claim in a prosecution for homicide 
 
 111. 17; Ritter V. People, 130 111. 255, 22 that, if guilty, the crime was man- 
 
 N. E. 605 ; Kingen v. State, 45 Ind. 518 ; slaughter, and not murder, is not in- 
 
 Deilks V. State, 141 Ind. 23, 40 N. E. consistent with testimony introduced by 
 
 120; State v. Benham, 23 Iowa, ]?=4, the accused supporting the theory that 
 
 92 Am Dec. 417; Campbell v. Com. 13 he acted in self-defense. State v. Clark, 
 
 Ky. L. Rep. 17, 16 S. W. 127; Sutterfield 69 Kan. 576, 77 Pac. 287. 
 
 V." Com. 3 Ky. L. Rep. 474; Sanders v. <State v. Noble, 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint, 1. 
 
548 HOMICIDE. [§ 339 
 
 ■ But when the slayer's own original act was in violation of law 
 the law takes that fact into consideration in limiting his right of 
 defense and resistance while engaged in its perpetration.® And 
 if he was engaged in the commission of a felony, and to preveit 
 its commission a person seeing it, or about to be injured by it, 
 made a violent assault upon him calculated to produce great bodity 
 harm, and in resisting such attack he killed his assailant, the law 
 imputes the original wrong to the homicide and makes it murder;® 
 But if the original wrongful act was, or would have been, a mis- 
 demeanor only, then the homicide growing out of or occasioned by 
 it, though in self-defense from an assault made upon him, is man- 
 slaughter.'' So, where an illegal arrest is a misdemeanor only, 
 homicide in effecting it is manslaughter only.® And if an illegal 
 arrest is attempted with demonstrations indicating an apparent in- 
 tention to take life if necessary to accomplish the purpose, killing 
 to prevent it is justifiable, since the intent and attempt to take life 
 constitute a felony.® 
 
 So, if the slayer acted with malice aforethought, deliberately in- 
 tending to kill the deceased, the killing is murder, and no questioii 
 of self-defense can arise, no matter what the deceased may have 
 been doing at the instant of the killing;^" even though the killing, 
 owing to the violence of the resistance, was necessary to save his 
 own life.^,^ Though the mere fact that the slayer entertained mal- 
 ice against the deceased would not make him guilty of murder, where 
 the. latter was the aggressor, and the incentive to his whole action 
 was self-defense, and not malice. ■^^ 
 
 So, killing to save one's self, not from death or serious bodily 
 harm, but from some less violent battery or serious injury, is man- 
 slaughter, — ^as, for example, killing to prevent an illegal arrest of 
 
 5Reed v. State, 11 Tex. App. 509, 40 was attempting to commit a serious 
 
 Am. Rep. 795; Meuly v. State, 26 Tex. bodily injury upon the accused. Green 
 
 App. 274, 8 Am. St. Rep. 477, 9 S. W. v. State, 124 Ga. 343, 52 S. E. 431. 
 
 S63. 8 Carter v. State, 30 Tex. App. 551, 28 
 
 BReedv. State, supra. Am. St. Rep. 944, 17 S. W. 1102. 
 
 7Reed v. State, and Meuly v. State, sRoss v. State, 10 Tex. App. 455, 38 
 
 supra; State v. Parker, 106 Mo. 217, 17 Am. Rep. 643. 
 
 S. W. 180. loPeople v. Bruggy, 93 Cal. 476, 29 
 
 And the law of voluntary manslaugh- Pac. 26; People v. Robertson, 67 Cal. 
 
 ter may properly be given in charge to 646, 8 Pac. 600 ; Wilson v. People, 94 111. 
 
 the jury in a prosecution for homicide, 299; State v. Herrell, 97 Mo. 105, 10 
 
 where there were facts and ciroum- Am. St. Rep, 289, 10 S. W. 387. 
 
 stances in evidence which would have n State v. Hill, 20 N. C. 629 (4 Dev. 
 
 warranted the jury in finding that at & B. L. 491), 34 Am. Dec. 396. 
 
 the time of the homicide the deceased i2Golden v. State, 25 Ga. 527. 
 
§.339]. SELF-PEFENSE. 549 
 
 an ordinary character;-'^ and' so it is ^wliere the; slayer could have 
 saved; Mmself from death or great hodily harm with the use of less 
 force, and without killing.^* And this is so though the slayer in 
 good faith believed the force used to have been necessary, the be- 
 lief having, been negligently formed.^® And where excessive re- 
 sistance is made in self-defense, and death ensues, and the fatal 
 blow is inflicted in the heat of blood, although with a deadly weapon, 
 there being no previous malice or formed design, the crime is man- 
 slaughter.^® So, a killing done because the slayer believed him- 
 self to be in great danger, when the facts did not warrant such be- 
 lief, is murder or manslaughter according to the circumstances, 
 though there was no passion. •^'^ And evidence of the killing by 
 the infliction of numerous dangerous wounds, of a man who was 
 drunk and staggering, by one whom he sought to chastise with his 
 fists, and that the slayer appeared to have received no injury or 
 rough usage, warrants a verdict of manslaughter. ^ ® 
 
 Nor is a homicide anything less than manslaughter where the 
 slayer, with felonious intent, provoked the occasion which produced 
 the necessity to kill.-'* But if an assault was made with intent 
 to commit an assault and battery only, and the assault was resist- 
 ed with unnecessary violence, and the original assailant killed his 
 antagonist in self-defense, it cannot be more than manslaughter.^" 
 And it would be justifiable homicide if, intending to abandon the 
 conflict, the slayer had retreated as far as he could, but was mur- 
 
 isjones V. State, 26 Tex. App. 1, 8 Am. instate v. Zeigler, 40 W. Va. 593, 21 
 
 St. Eep. 454, 9 S. W. 53; Grainger v. S. E. 763; State v. Warner, 100 Iowa, 
 
 State, 5 Yerg. 459, 26 Am. Dec. 278. 260, 69 N. W. 546 ; State v. Shippey, 10 
 
 And where two men sought to collect Minn. 223, 88 Am. Dee. 70, Gil. 178. And 
 
 a sum of money claimed to be due one of see Page v. State, 141 Ind. 236, 40 N. E. 
 
 them from a third, and the latter be- 745. 
 
 lieved from their words and from the 1 6 State v. Shippey, supra; Allison v. 
 
 conduct of the one claiming the money. State, 74 Ark. 444, 86 S. W. 409; Unit- 
 
 in getting and putting a pistol upon his « States v. Heath, 9 Mackey 272. 
 
 person convenient for use" that they did ^^J^^ge v. State, 58 Ala. 406, 29 Am. 
 
 not intend he should leave the house .^J.;,- ox i 
 
 .., V -J it, J J.T. i 1. i7Allison V. State, supra. 
 
 until he paid the money, and that he ^.g^^^^ ^ ^^^^^^ ^^ ^ 
 
 was thus placed in restraint of his vj- ^rj^ „„„ ' 
 
 liberty; and knowing that he could not "isLevy v. State, 28 Tex. App. 203, 19 
 
 pay it, and believing they would decline ^j„ §<. j^gp §28, 12 S. W. 596; Polk v. 
 
 a check for it, and still refuse to let him state, 30 Tex. App. 657, 18 S. W. 466; 
 
 go, he shot one of them in order to effect United States v. Heath, 9 Mackey, 272. 
 
 his release from the illegal restraint And see Chambers v. State, 46 Tex. 
 
 thus imposed, — ^the offense would be Grim. Rep. 61, 79 S. W. 572. 
 
 manslaughter, and not murder. Meuly 20State v. Partlow, 90 Mo. 608,59 Am. 
 
 V. State, 26 Tex. App. 274, 8 Am. St. Rep. 31, 4 S. W. 14; Tollett v. State 
 
 Eep. 477, 9 S. W. 563. (Tex. Grim. App.) 55 S. W. 573. 
 
550 HOMICI]>E. R 339 
 
 derously pursued by his antagonists^ So, when one kills another 
 in a sudden quarrel to avoid great bodily harm, his act is not justi- 
 fied, but is manslaughter only.^^ 
 
 XII. BUEDEN OF PEOOE' AS TO SELF-DEFENSE, 
 
 340. Rule placing it with the prosecution -The rule is well sup- 
 ported that the burden rests with the state in a prosecution for homi- 
 cide to show that the killing was not justifiable or excusable by 
 reason of self-defense ; ^ and that it is sufficient if the evidence raises 
 in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt of his guilt. ^ Within 
 the purview of this rule, that the killing was not done in self- 
 defense is an element of the crime which must be proved by the 
 state beyond a reasonable doubt.* Nor is the accused limited to 
 the benefit of evidence educed on his behalf on this question; he 
 may avail himself of any evidence in the case tending to show that 
 the homicide was justifiable, and require a submission of the ques- 
 tion to the jury, whether introduced by him or by the prosecution.* 
 It is a reasonable doubt of guilt, however, to the benefit of which 
 the accused is entitled, and not a reasonable doubt upon any ma- 
 terial fact involved in the case.^ And an instruction is erroneous 
 where it applies the reasonable doubt to that particular element of 
 the proof, instead of requiring it to arise out of all the evidence in 
 
 siState V. Partlow, supra. sSmith v. State, 142 Ind. 288, 41 N. 
 
 2 2Statev. Roberts, 8 N. C. (1 Hawks) E. 595; State v. Usher, 126 Iowa, 287, 
 
 349, 9 Am. Dec. 643. 102 N. W. 101 ; People v. Epaski, and 
 
 iState V. Donahoe, 78 Iowa, 486, 43 N. People v. Shanley, supra. 
 
 W. 297; State v. Morphy, 33 Iowa, 270, An instruction in a prosecution for 
 
 11 Am. Rep. 122; State V. Cross, 68 Iowa, homicide in which the evidence shows 
 
 180, 26 N. W. 62; State v. Bone, 114 that the accused is guilty of murder in 
 
 Iowa, 537, 87 N. W. 507 ; State v. Dillon, the first or second degree, or of man- 
 
 74 Iowa, 653, 38 N. W. 525; State v. slaughter, and if not of one of these is 
 
 Usher, 126 Iowa, 287, 102 N. W. 101; entitled to an acquittal, that in order to 
 
 Trogdon v. State, 133 Ind. 1, 32 N. E. convict of one of these offenses it must 
 
 725; People v. Coughlin, 65 Mich. 704, be found beyond reasonable doubt that 
 
 32 N. W. 905; Blalack v. State, 79 Miss, the killing was not in self-defense, suf- 
 
 517, 31 So. 105; People v. Epaski, 57 ficiently indicates upon whom the bur- 
 
 App. Div. 91, 67 N. Y. Supp. 1033 ; Peo- den of proof on the issue of self-defense 
 
 pie v. Shanley, 49 App. Div. 50, 63 N. rests. State v. Young, 104 Iowa, 730, 74 
 
 Y. Supp. 449; Goodall v. State, 1 Or. N. W. 693. 
 
 333, 80 Am. Dec. 396; State v. Patter- iPeople v. Schryver, 42 N. Y. 1, 1 Am. 
 
 son, 45 Vt. 308, 12 Am. Rep. 200. And Rep. 480; People v. Shanley, 49 App. 
 
 see State v. Smith (Iowa) 99 N. W. Div. 56, 63 N. Y. Supp. 449; State v. 
 
 579. Morris (Iowa) 105 N. W. 313; Patten 
 
 2Trogdon v. State, supra; People v. v. People, 18 Mich. 314, 100 Am. Dec. 
 
 Flanagan, GO Cal. 2, 44 Am. Rep. 52; 173. 
 
 State v. Morphy, supra; Tweedy v. eWise v. State, 2 Kan. 419, 85 Am. 
 
 State, 5 Iowa, 433; People v. Coughlin, Deo. 595. Ajid see People v. Shanley, 
 
 supra; People v. Riordan, .117 N. Y. 71, supra. 
 22 N. E. 455; People v. Shanley, supra. 
 
§ 340] SELF-DEFENSE. 551 
 
 the case.* And an instruction that the burden of proof was on the 
 state to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did not 
 evince any disposition to withdraw or abandon the fight need not 
 add that a like burden rests with it to show that the assault was 
 made by the accused, where that matter was fully covered by other 
 portions of the charge.^ Nor is an instruction that an intent to 
 murder is conclusively presumed from the deliberate use of a dead- 
 ly weapon causing death, if not done in self-defense, or in the right- 
 ful and necessary defense of property, erroneous as imposing upon 
 the accused the burden of showing that the killing was in self- 
 defense. ^ 
 
 Here, however, as well as under the rule that the burden of proof 
 of justification or excuse rests with the accused, where the prosecu- 
 tion has made out a case which establishes his guilt beyond a rea- 
 sonable doubt, he is called upon to answer to prevent a conviction.* 
 He bears the burden of producing evidence tending to establish 
 justification which, considered with all the other evidence, operates 
 to create a reasonable doubt of guilt. '^^ But he is not required to 
 satisfy the jury of anything; if his proof fall short of justification, 
 it may be sufficient to establish a defense by creating a reasonable 
 doubt of guilt, thus entitling him to an acquittal. ^^ 
 
 341. Rule placing it with the defense. — The courts of many of 
 the states regard justification or excuse in homicide by way of self- 
 defense or otherwise as an affirmative defense, placing the burden 
 of establishing it upon the defense. ^ The theory is that, where one 
 
 eLyons v. People, 137 111. 602, 27 N. 442, 67 Pac. 694; People v. Raten, 63 
 
 E. 677; Crews v. People, 120 111. 317, 11 Cal. 421; People v. Arnold, 15 Cal. 476; 
 
 N. E. 404. State v. Powell (Del.) 61 Atl. 966; State 
 
 7State V. Smith (Iowa) 99 N. W. v. Brown (Del.) 61 Atl. 1077; Gladden 
 
 679. V. State, 12 Fla. 562 ; King v. Bridges, 5 
 
 sState V. Gray (Or.) 79 Pac. 53. Haw. 467; State v. Tabor, 95 Mo. 585. 8 
 
 sPeople V. Epaski, 57 App. Div. 91, S. W. 744; State v. Brown, 64 Mo. 387; 
 
 67 N. y. Supp. 1033. . Brown v. State, 62 N. J. L. 666, 42 Atl. 
 
 loPeople V. Shanley, 49 App. Div. 56, 811; State v. Jones, 71 N. J. L. 543, 60 
 
 63 N. Y. Supp.. 449. And see Coolman v. Atl. 390 ; People v. Schryver, 42 N. Y. 
 
 State, 163 Ind. 503, 72 N. E. 588; Peo- 1, 1 Am. Rep. 480; Patterson v. People, 
 
 pie V. McCarthy, 110 N. Y. 309, 18 N. E. 46 Barb. 626; State v. Brittain, 89 N. 
 
 128. C. 481; State v. Willis, 63 N. C. 26; 
 
 iiPeople V. Epaski, and People v. Carr v. State, 21 Ohio C. C. 43 ; State v. 
 
 Shanley, supra. Conally, 3 Or. 69; Com. v. Brown, 7 Pa. 
 
 iLewis V. State, 88 Ala. 11, 6 So. 755; Co. Ct. 640; Com. v. Drum. 58 Pa. 9; 
 
 Roden v. State, 97 Ala. 54, 12 So. 419: State v. Bodie, 33 S. C. 117, 11 S. E. 
 
 Garrett v. State, 97 Ala. 18, 18 So. 327; 624; State v. Hutto. 66 S. C. 449. 45 S. 
 
 Lewis V. State, 120 Ala. 339, 25 So. 43; E. 13; State v. Reeder, 72 S. C. 223, 51 
 
 Linehan v. State, 113 Ala. 70, 21 So. 497 ; S. E. 702 ; State v. Staley, 45 W. Va. 792, 
 
 Stewart v. State, 133 Ala. 105, 31 So. 32 S. E. 198; State v. Greer, 22 W. Va. 
 
 944; Foster v. Territory, 6 Ariz. 240, 56 800; State v. Hatfield, 48 W. Va. 561, 37 
 
 Pac. 738; Whit v. State, 74 Ark. 489, 86 S. E. 626; State v. Jones, 20 W. Va. 764; 
 
 B. W. 284; People v. Matthai, 135 Cal. State v. Cain, 20 W. Va. 679; United 
 
552 HOMICIDE. [| 341 
 
 intentionally tills another, he is guilty of murder, udless the evi- 
 dence shows a justifying or mitigating reason for doing the act.^. 
 And this is required to he shown in some of the states to the reason- 
 able satisfaction of the jury;* in others by a preponderance of the 
 evidence;* and in others by evidence raising a reasonable doubt 
 of guilt.® But it is not required to be shown beyond a reasonable 
 doubt.® And it may be shown by the evidence of the accused him- 
 self, or by the evidence educed by the prosecution, or by the cir- 
 cumstances arising out of the case.'^ Under this rule the burden 
 rests with the slayer in a prosecution for homicide alleged to have 
 been committed in self-defense, to show pressing necessity, actually 
 existing or reasonably apparent, to take the life of the deceased to 
 save himself from death or serious bodily harm,^ and to negative 
 the existence of a reasonable and safe avenue of escape ii-om the 
 danger which threatened him;® or to show that he could not havb 
 
 States V. Travers, 2 Wheeler C. C. 490, BLewis v. State, 120 Ala. 339, 25 So. 
 
 Fed. Cas. No. 16,537. 43; People v. Matthai, 135 Cal. 442, 67 
 
 Attention is called to the New York Pac. 694; Tweedy v. State, 5 Iowa, 433. 
 cases cited in the preceding section by sCorsey v. State, 110 Ga. 331, 35 S. 
 which the New York cases above cited E. 651 ; Lane v. State, 44 Fla. 105, 32 
 must be deemed to have been over- So. 896; Tweedy v. State, supra; Cock- 
 ruled, rill V. Com. 95 Ky. 22, 23 S. W. 659 ^ 
 
 2Kirby V. State, 89 Ala. 63, 8 So. 110; State v. Clark, 134 N. C. 698, 47 S. E. 
 
 Foster v. Territory, 6 Ariz. 240, 56 Pac. 36; State v. Ariel, 38 S. C. 221, 16 S. 
 
 758 ; State v. Tabor, 95 Mo. 585, 8 S. W. E. 779 ; State v. Brown, 34 S. C. 41, 12 
 
 744; United States v. Travers, supra. S. E. 662. And see Scott v. State, 46 
 
 sstate V. Tabor, supra; Gladden v. Tex. Crim. Eep. 85, 79 S. W. 543. 
 
 State, 12 Fla. 562; Brown v. State, 62 Tgtate v. Jones, supra; State v. Cot- 
 
 N. J. L. 666, 42 Atl. 811; Patterson v. trill, 52 W. Va. 363, 43 S. E. 244; State 
 
 State, 46 Barb. 626; State v. Brittain, v. Johnson, 49 W. Va. 684, 39 S. E. 665; 
 
 89 N. C. 481; State v. Clark, 134 N. C. State v. Manns, 48 W. Va. 480, 37 S. E. 
 
 698, 47 S. E. 36; State v. Willis, 63 N. 613. 
 
 C. 26; State v. Smith, 77 N. C. 488; sSpringfield v. State, 96 Ala. 81, 38 
 
 State V. Garland, 90 N. C. 668; State v. Am. St. Rep. 85, 11 So. 250; Gibson v. 
 
 Gooch, 94 N. C. 987; State v. Ellick, 60 State, 89 Ala. 121, 18 Am. St. Rep. 90, 
 
 N. C. (2 Winst. L.) 56, 86 Am. Dee. 8 So. 98; Stitt v. State, 91 Ala. 10. 24 
 
 442. Am. St. Rep. 853, 8 So. 669; Brown v. 
 
 4State V. Jones, 20 W. Va. 764 ; State .State, 83 Ala. 33, 3 Am. St. Rep. 685, 3 
 
 V. Greer, 22 W. Va. 800; State v. Staley, So. 857; Wilkins v. State, 98 Ala. 1, 13 
 
 45 W. Va. 792, 32 S. E. 198; State v. So. 312; Naugher v. State, 105 Ala. 26, 
 
 Johnson, 49 W. Va. 684, 39 S. E. 665; 17 So. 24; Linehan v. State, 113 Ala. 70, 
 
 People v. Arnold, 15 Cal. 476; People 21 So. 497; MeCurley v. State (Ala.) 39 
 
 V. Raten, 63 Cal. 421 ; Jordan v. State, So. 1022 ; Hubbard v. State, 37 Fla. 156,, 
 
 13 Ohio C. C. 471; Carr v. State, 21 Ohio 20 So. 235; Com. v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9; 
 
 C. C. 43 ; State v. Conally, 3 Or. 69 ; State v. Hutto, 68 S. C. 449, 45 S. E. 13 ; 
 
 State V. Mcintosh, 40 S. C. 349, 18 S. Clark v. Com. 90 Va. 360, 18 S. E. 440; 
 
 E. 1033; State v. Brown, 34 S. C. 41, 12 Hatehard v. State, 79 Wis. 357, 48 N. W. 
 
 S. E. 662 ; State v. Reeder, 72 S. C. 223, 380. 
 
 51 S. E. 702; State v. Petsch, 43 S. C. sStitt v. State, supra; Gibson v. 
 
 132, 20 6. E. 993; State v. Thrailkill, 71 State, 89 Ala. 121, 18 Am. St. Rep. 96, 8 
 
 S. C. 136, 50 S. E. 551; State v. Hat- So. 98; Holmes v. State, 100 Ala. 80, 14 
 
 field, 48 W. Va. 561, 37 S. E. 626; State So. 864; Boulden v. State, 102 Ala. 78, 15 
 
 v. Jones, 20 W. Va. 764. So. 341 ; Howard v. State, 110 Ala. 92, 20 
 
§ 341] SELF-DEFENSE. 55S 
 
 retreated -witkoiit apparently increasing his peril. ^** And where 
 the evidence is conflicting, a charge assuming that the slayer was in 
 imminent peril of death or great bodily harm is erroneous ; ^ ^ and 
 where there is an absence of evidence of a constituent element of 
 self-defense, or where it appears that the slayer provoked the diffi- 
 culty, a charge as to the right to acquittal in self-defense is proper- 
 ly refused. ^ ^ And though the evidence offered in a prosecution for 
 homicide to establish the case shows that the offense was not murder,, 
 it is still incumbent upon the accused to show circumstances of 
 justification, and if he fails to do this the offense is manslaughter. ^ * 
 But a person charged with homicide is entitled to rely on the 
 evidence of the state, if any, to mitigate or excuse the killing, as 
 well as upon his own,^* and the jury should not be told that the 
 burden rests with the slayer to justify or mitigate the crime, where 
 the only evidence going to prove it discloses circumstances of justi- 
 fication or mitigation.-^® And here, as elsewhere, the doctrine re- 
 quiring acquittal in case of reasonable doubt as to guilt upon the 
 whole case applies, ^^ and instructions as to self-defense should be 
 coupled with instructions as to reasonable doubt with reference to 
 the defensive matter.-^'' And error in instructing as to the measure 
 
 So. 365 ; Linehan v. State, supra; Hend- S. E. 1 ; State v. Manns, 48 W. Va. 480, 
 
 ricks V. State, 122 Ala. 42, 26 So. 242; 3T S. E. 613. 
 
 Jarvis v. State, 138 Ala. 17, 34 So. 1025; iBGreen v. State, 124 Ga. 343, 52 S. 
 
 State V. Hutto, supra. E. 431; State v. Castle, supra. 
 
 The absence of other means of escape leHubbard v. State, 37 Fla. 156. 20 
 
 is an essential element of the plea of So. 235; Dennis v. State, 118 Ala. 72, 23 
 
 self-defense, which must be shown by So. 1002; People v. Arnold, 15 Cal. 476; 
 
 the accused in a prosecution for homi- State v. Hickham, 95 Mo. 323, 6 Am. St. 
 
 cide by a preponderance of the evidence. Rep. 54, 8 S. W. 252 ; State v. Wingo, 66- 
 
 State V. Thrailkill, 71 S. C. 136, 50 S. Mo. 181, 27 Am. Rep. 329; Brown v. 
 
 E. 551. State, 62 N. J. L. 666, 42 Atl. 811; 
 
 loSpringfield v. State, 96 Ala. 81, 38 State v. Jones, 71 N. J. L. 543, 60 Atl. 
 Am. St. Rep. 85, 11 So. 250; Pugh v. 396; State v. Conally, 3 Or. 69; Tiffany- 
 State, 132 Ala. 1, 31 So. 727; Naugher v. v. Com. 121 Pa. 165, 6 Am. St. Rep. 775, 
 State, 105 Ala. 26, 17 So. 24. 15 Atl. 462; State v. Mcintosh, 40 S. C. 
 
 The burden of proof that an assaulted 349, 18 S. E. 1033; State v. Bodie, 33 S. 
 
 party had retreated before killing as far C. 117, 11 S. E. 624; State v. Abbott, 8; 
 
 as he could without apparently increas- W. Va. 741 ; State v. Manns, 48 W. Va... 
 
 ing his peril rests with the accused, ex- 480, 37 S. E. 613. 
 
 cept in cases where it affirmatively ap- To warrant a conviction in a prosecu- 
 
 ptars that there was no duty upon the tion for nomicide the jury must be sat- 
 
 accused to escape; as, where a person isfied of the existence of facts which 
 
 is assaulted in his own house, or within will deprive the defendant of the right 
 
 the curtilage or space usually occupied of self-defense beyond a reasonable 
 
 and used for the purposes of a house, doubt: it is not sufficient that they are 
 
 Naugher v. State, supra. established by a preponderance of the 
 
 iiPugh V. State, supra. evidence. Riley v. Com. 94 Ky. 266, 22 
 
 izKilgore v. State, 124 Ala. 24, 27 So. S. W. 222. 
 4: Mann v. State, 134 Ala. 1, 32 So. 704. iTCogdell v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 laState v. Brittain, 89 N. C. 481. 178, 63 S. W. 645; Zipperian v. People, 
 
 Instate V. Castle, 133 N. C. 769, 46 33 Colo. 134, 79 Pac. 1018. 
 
554 HOMICIDE. [<§ 341 
 
 of proof of self-defense is not cured by a correct general instruction 
 as to reasonable doubt of guilt, ^ * though it is not incumbent upon 
 the state to negative beyond a reasonable doubt defensive matter, 
 like self-defense, the burden of affirmatively showing -which is up- 
 on the defense.^® The rule of law that on proof of a killing in a 
 prosecution for homicide the burden of showing circumstances of 
 mitigation or excuse devolves upon the accused means, when taken 
 in connection with an instruction on reasonable doubt, nothing more 
 than that, when the killing is proved and the state introduces no 
 evidence mitigating the homicide, it devolves upon the accused to 
 do so; but that if any evidence in introduced, either by the state 
 or by the accused, which, taken in connection with other evidence 
 in the case, raises a reasonable doubt of guilt, the accused should 
 be acquitted.^" 
 
 This rule is established in some of the states by statutes provid- 
 ing that the burden of proving circumstances that justify or excuse 
 homicide devolves upon the slayer, unless the proof on the part of 
 the prosecution sufficiently manifests the justification or excuse.^* 
 Under such provisions an instruction that the burden rests with the 
 prosecution to show absence of justification or excuse is erroneous, 
 if given without the statutory qualification.^^ And error in giving 
 an instruction as to homicide requiring a greater degree of proof 
 for the establishment of matters of justification than the law re- 
 quires is not cured by other instructions requiring the prosecution 
 to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. ^^ But though the bur- 
 den of proof is thereby shifted to the accused, the circumstances of 
 justification and excuse may be proved in the same way as other 
 facts are proved ; they need not be proved to the satisfaction of the 
 jury,^* nor by preponderance of the evidence. ^^ It is only neces- 
 
 isLane v. State, 44 Fla. 105, 32 So. 21 See Lyons v. People, 137 111. 602, 27 
 896. N. E. 677; Appleton v. People, 171 111. 
 
 In Cathcart v. Com. 37 Pa. 108, how- 473, 49 N. E. 708 ; Kipley v. People, 215 
 ever, it was held that where the jury 111. 358, 74 N. E. 379; Anderson v. Ter- 
 in a prosecution for homicide have been ritory (Ariz.) 76 Pac. 636; People v. 
 charged that a homicide proved to have Elliott, 80 Cal. 296, 22 Pac. 207 ; People 
 been committed amounts to voluntary v. Newcomer, 118 Cal. 263, 50 Pac. 405; 
 manslaughter, and that the burden of People v. McClure (Cal.) 83 Pac. 437; 
 proving it excusable or justifiable rest5 Tignor v. State (Ark.) 89 S. W. 96. 
 with the accused, omission to add the 22Lyons v. People, and People v. El- 
 clause "unless the circumstances excus- liott,- sMpra; People v. Boling, 83 Cal. 
 ing the act arise out of the evidence 380, 23 Pac. 421 ; People v. Lemperle, 94 
 against him" is not error. Cal. 45, 29 Pac. 709. 
 
 isAlvarez v. State, 41 Fla. 532, 27 2 3 Appleton v. People, sMpro. 
 So. 40. 24lbid. 
 
 20Petty v. State (Ark.) 89 S. W. 2SPeople v. Lanagan, 81 Cal. 142, 22 
 465. And see State v. Zeigler, 40 W. Va. Pac. 482; People v. Bush ton, 80 Cal. 
 593, 21 S. E. 763. 
 
« 341] SELF-DEI-ENSB. 555 
 
 sary that he should introduce evidence sufficient to raise a reason- 
 able doubt as to his guilt. ^® And where a statute of this class is 
 given in charge it should be accompanied by an instruction that, 
 on the whole case, the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond 
 a reasonable doubt, so that the jury may understand that it is suffi- 
 cient for the accused to show facts raising in their minds a reason- 
 able doubt as to his guilt. ^'^ When the killing is admitted, and 
 the only issue is as to justification, or the grade of the offense, in- 
 structions as to reasonable doubt should be limited to that issue, 
 and not be framed so broad as to include the fact. ^ ^ 
 
 342. Rule where necessity to take life appears. — ^Where a real or 
 apparent pressing necessity to take life in self-defense appears in 
 a prosecution for homicide, justification is established, and the ex- 
 istence of fault upon the part of the slayer in bringing on the 
 difficulty is not presumed, so as to impose upon him the burden 
 of its disproof; in such case the burden rests with the state to show 
 that he was in fault in bringing on or provoking the difficulty, in 
 order to establish his guilt.-' And the rule is the same with refer- 
 ence to a claim that the slayer used more force than was necessary. ^ 
 And if the facts do not show that the slayer was the aggressor or 
 trespasser, a case is not made out against him.^ And where the 
 evidence does not show which was the aggressor, an instruction on 
 the law of self-defense as applied to the aggressor in a difficulty 
 is improper.* 
 
 This rule as to burden of proof, however, is not violated by an 
 
 160, 22 Pac. 127, 549; Cogburn v. State 22 So. 127; Cleveland v. State, 86 Ala. 
 
 (Ark.) 88 S. W. 822. 1, 5 So. 426; McCormack v. State, 102 
 
 zePeople v. Elliott, 80 Cal. 296, 22 Ala. 156, 15 So. 438; Lewis v. State, 120 
 
 Pae. 207; People v. Bushton, supra, Ala. 339, 25 So. 43; Green v. State 
 
 Overruling earlier California eases on (Ala.) 39 So. 362; State v. Dillon, 74 
 
 this point; People v. Tarm Poi, 86 Cal. Iowa, 653, 38 N. W. 525; State v. Usher, 
 
 225, 24 Pac. 998; People v. Newcomer, 126 Iowa, 287, 102 N. W. 101; Mahaffey 
 
 118 Cal. 263, 50 Pac. 405; Anderson v. v. Territory, 11 Okla. 213, 66 Pac. 342; 
 
 Territory (Ariz.) 76 Pac. 636; Bab- Tillery v. State, 24 Tex. App. 251, 5 Am. 
 
 cock V. People, 13 Colo. 515, 22 Pac. 817; St. Eep. 882, 5 S. W. 842. 
 
 Boykin v. People, 22 Colo. 496, 45 Pac. In State v. Hutto, 66 S. C. 449, 45 
 
 419. S. E. 13, however, it was held that the 
 
 27Tlgnor V. State (Ark.) 89 S. W. 96. burden of proof rests with the accused 
 
 zsPeople V. Williams, 32 Cal. 280. in a prosecution for homicide in which 
 
 iGibson v. State, 89 Ala. 121, 18 Am. self-defense is alleged, to show that he 
 
 St. Rep. 96, 8 So. 98 ; Naugher v. State, was without fault in bringing about the 
 
 105 Ala. 26, 17 So. 24; Webb v. necessity for the killing. 
 
 State, 100 Ala. 52, 14 So. 865 ; Holmes v. zPeople v. Taylor, 92 App. Div. 23, 
 
 State, 100 Ala. 80, 14 So. 864; Keith 86 N. Y. Supp. 996. 
 
 V. State, 97 Ala. 32, 11 So. 914; Wil- swhite v. Territory, 3 Wash. Terr. 
 
 kins V. State, 98 Ala. 1, 13 So. 312; Mo- 397, 19 Pac. 37. 
 
 Daniel v. State, 76 Ala. 5; Brown v. 4State v. Tabor, 95 Mo. 585, 8 S. W. 
 
 State, 83 Ala. 33, 3 Am. St. Rep. 685, 3 744. 
 So. 857; Henson v. State, 114 Ala. 25, 
 
656 HOMICIDE. fj 343 
 
 instruction that, in order to make a plea of self-defense available, 
 tlie accused must be without fault, especially where it is only a 
 part of the general charge, which clearly and correctly defines the 
 doctrine of self-defense and burden of proof. ^ And the burden is 
 not placed upon the prosecution to show that the accused was at 
 fault in bringing on the difficulty, unless and until the accused has 
 shown that he was in imminent peril of life or of great bodily harm, 
 and could not have retreated without increasing his peril;® though 
 it is sufficient that a reasonable doubt appears upon the question of 
 the slayer's right to stand and defend himself; that the facts were 
 such as to warrant such action need not be shown by a preponder- 
 ance of the evidence.'' And if a change of conduct or action on the 
 part of the accused, who was originally the aggressor, is alleged, 
 the burden of proof as to this rests with hiuL* And in such case 
 it must be made to appear tiat the slayer had really and in good 
 faith endeavored to decline any further struggle before the mortal 
 blow was given.® 
 
 XIII. Questions as to^ how determined. 
 
 343. The rule as to self-defense generally. — ^Whether a homicide was 
 justifiable or excusable on the ground of self-defense is a question 
 of fact for the jury in a prosecution therefor;^ and when the evi- 
 dence on the subject is conflicting, its weight and credibility are 
 questions for the jury.^ Where evidence has a tendency to show 
 self-defense, its weight is for the determination of the jury, however 
 
 BWilkins v. State, 98 Ala. 1, 13 So. sPeopIe v. Batchelder, 27 Cal. 69, 
 312. 85 Am. Dec. 231; State v. Neeley, 20 
 
 ePugh V. State, 132 Ala. 1, 31 So. 727; Iowa, 108; State v. Evans, 33 W. Va. 
 Lineham v. State, 113 Ala. 70, 21 So. 417, 10 S. E. 792; State v. Cain, 20 
 497. And see Etheridge v. State, 141 W. Va. 679. 
 Ala. 29, 37 So. 337. iState v. Turner, 29 S. C. 34, 13 Am. 
 
 'Eiley v. Com. 94 Ky. 266, 22 S. W. gt. Rep. 706, 6 S. E. 891 ; People v. 
 222; Arnold V. Com. 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1566, Grimes, 132 Cal. 30, 64 Pae. 101; Bal- 
 55 S. W. 894; Ireland v. Com. 22 Ky. L. lard v. State, 31 Fla. 266, 12 So. 865; 
 Rep. 478, 57 S. W. 616. Coney v. State, 90 Ga. 140, 15 S. E. 
 
 sState V. Stanley, 33 Iowa, 526; State 746; North v. People, 139 111. 81, 28 N. 
 V. Neeley, 20 Iowa, 109. E. 966; People v. Constantino, 153 N. 
 
 Where in a prosecution for homicide Y. 24, 47 N. E. 37; Pfomer v. People, 
 it does not appear that the slayer, who 4 Park. Crim. Rep. 558 ; State v. Rogers, 
 was the original aggressor, changed his 93 N. C. 523; Martin v. State, 17 Ohio 
 mind or conduct, or honestly endeavored C. C. 406; Kirk v. Territory, 10 Okla. 
 to escape from the combat, or that he 40, 60 Pac. 797 ; Pridgen v. State, 31 
 could not have escaped without striking Tex. 421 ; Newman v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 the mortal blow, it will be assumed, as App.) 69 S. W. 519; State v. Dickey, 
 a legal proposition, that he willingly 48 W. Va. 325, 37 S. E. 695. 
 continued the contest until he involved 2Martin v. State, supra. And see 
 himself in the necessity to kill. People Kipley v. People, 215 111. 358, 74 N. E. 
 T. Westlake, 62 Cal. 303. 376. 
 
I 3433 SELF-DEFENSE. 557 
 
 slight that tendency may be, and it cannot be excluded from them.' 
 And instructions as to self-defense should be given if there was any 
 evidence of self-defense.* And if there were no eye witnesses to 
 the- killing, except the slayer, such instructions are warranted.' And 
 all the surrounding facts and circumstances should be taken into 
 ■consideration by the jury in determining whether the killing was 
 in self-defense." So, the jury are the sole judges as to the degree 
 of force an assaulted person may use to prevent violence and in- 
 jury to himself.^ And it is a question for the jury whether from 
 the evidence the slayer had, apparent to his comprehension as a 
 reasonable man, the means at hand to avoid killing the deceased with- 
 out incurring imminent danger of losing his own life or of suffering 
 great bodily harm.* But it is for the jury to determine the ques- 
 tion of guilt or justification as a whole, in view of all the cir- 
 cumstances, and a charge singling out a particular act or isolated 
 expression of the deceased, and instructing the jury that that act 
 or expression cannot be invoked on the question of self-defense, is 
 an invasion of their province and necessarily erroneous.® 
 
 What facts excuse or justify homicide, however, is a question of 
 law.^** It is the province of the court to state what the rules of 
 law are,^ ^ and it is that of the jury to determine whether such facts 
 existed in the particular case. ^ ^ And it is strictly within the prov- 
 ince of the court to determine whether the evidence was sufficient 
 to establish legal justification on the ground of self-defense, and 
 to state its determination in its charge.^* Where an issue of self- 
 
 sMorris v. State (Ala.) 39 So. 608. court in a prosecution for homicide, and 
 
 And see Armsworthy v. State (Tex. not left to the jury. Harbour v. State, 
 
 Crim. App.) 88 S. W. 215. supra. 
 
 4Territ'ory v. Watson(N. M.) 78 Pac. uGladden v. State, supra; Pinder v. 
 
 504. State, 27 Fla. 370, 26 Am. St. Rep. 75, 
 
 6Green v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 1221, 8 So. 837. 
 
 83 S. W. 638. 12 Gladden v. State, supra. 
 
 ekipley v. People, 215 111. 358, 74 isState v. O'Neil. 58 Minn. 478, 59 N. 
 
 N. E. 379; Sullivan v. State (Miss.) W. 1101; Franklin v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 32 So.- 2; Bird v. United States, 187 App.) 88 S. W. 357. 
 
 U. S. 118, 47 L. ed. 100, 23 Sup. Ct. But evidence as to self-defense in a 
 
 Rep. 42. prosecution for homicide will not war- 
 
 'State V. Stockton, 61 Mo. 382 ; Hulse rant an appellate court in disturbing a 
 
 V. Tollman, 49 111. App. 490 ; Coleman v. verdict of guilty of manslaughter, un- 
 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 90 S. W. 499. less it clearly shows that the conviction 
 
 sPeople V. Gonzales, 71 Cal. 569, 12 was against all the evidence. People v. 
 
 Pac. 783. Boling, 83 Cal. 380, 23 Pac. 421. 
 
 sEiland v. State, 52 Ala. 322. So, in Biemel v. State, 71 Wis. 444, 
 
 loGl'adden v. Stq,te, 12 Fla. 562; Har- 37 N. W. 244, it was held that when the 
 
 hour v. State, 140 Ala. 103, 37 So. 330. accused in a prosecution for homicide 
 
 What constitutes lawful or unlawful admits the killing, and the only defense 
 
 killing is a question of technical legal is self-defense, the evidence would have 
 
 leurning, which should be defined by the to be very clearly in favor of' the accused 
 
658 HOMICIDE. H 343 
 
 defense arises, it is the right of the accused to have the law upon that 
 subject fully and correctly explained to the jury in all the phases 
 in which it might be applicable to the facts in evidence.'* And 
 this is so whether such instructions were requested or not.*® And 
 where the facts authorize a charge on provoking a difficulty, the 
 court should indicate from the evidence the act of provocation, and 
 define its effect and bearing upon the case, and state to what ex- 
 tent such act would limit or abridge the right of self-defense^ 
 the jury should not be left to speculation and conjecture as to the 
 nature and quality of the act, or the extent of the limitation and 
 abridgment which it would effect upon the slayer's rights.*® and 
 an instruction that if the jury believe the evidence of the accused 
 he would, at least, be guilty of manslaughter, excludes any idea of 
 self-defense, and is erroneous if an inference of self-defense might 
 have reasonably been drawn therefrom by the jury.*'' 
 
 344, Determination as to duty to retreat. — Whether a person as- 
 sailed by another could have retreated conveniently and safely, with- 
 out apparently putting himself at a probable disadvantage, is a 
 question of fact for the jury in a prosecution against him for kill- 
 ing his assailant* And it is also a question for the jury whether 
 he did so retreat.^ And the court has no right to assume that the 
 facts proved made it his duty to retreat,^ or to instruct peremptorily 
 that he was bound to retreat if he could do so without subjecting 
 
 to justify the appellate court in setting St. Eep. 85, 11 So. 250; Gafford v. State, 
 
 aside a verdict against the decision of 122 Ala. 5i, 25 So. 10; Gordon v. State, 
 
 the trial court refusing a new trial 129 Ala,. 113, 30 So. 30; Mann v. State, 
 
 upon that ground. 134 Ala. 1, 32 So. 704; State v. Dixon, 
 
 i4King V. State, 13 Tex. App. 277; 75 N. C. 275 ; Kirk v. Territory, 10 Okla. 
 
 Bell V. State, 17 Tex. App. 538. 46, 60 Pac. 797. 
 
 i6Bell V. State, supra. zstate v. Golden, 113 La. '791, 37 So. 
 
 But omission of the court in a prose- 757 ; Mann v. State, supra. 
 cution for homicide in which there was sKirk v. Territory, supra. 
 an issue of self-defense, to declare to the So, an instiTiction in a prosecution 
 
 jury all of the law applicable to that for homicide that, if the accused was 
 
 jijsue as made by the evidence, though free from fault in bringing on the diiB- 
 
 such declaration was not requested and culty in which the killing occurred, and 
 
 though the omission is not excepted to, the deceased advanced toward him mak- 
 
 and was first objected to on motion for ing a, movement indicating to a reason- 
 
 a new trial, is not a cause for a, new able mind that his purpose was to draw 
 
 trial unless it appears that the rights his pistol, and their proximity was such 
 
 of the accused have been probably in- as to render flight hazardous, the ac- 
 
 jured thereby. Ibid. cused is not required to attempt flight, 
 
 isMorgan v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. is erroneous as assuming the existence 
 
 222, 29 S. W. 1092; Johnson v. State, of imminent peril, and as invading the 
 
 141 Ala. 37, 37 So. 456. province of the jury. Cawley v. State, 
 
 iTState v. Hough, 138 N. C. 663, 50 133 Ala. 128, 32 So. 227. 
 S. E. 709. 
 
 iDe Arman v. State, 77 Ala. 10; 
 Bi)ringfield v. State, 96 Ala. 81, 38 Am. 
 
S 344] SELF-DEFENSE. 559 
 
 himself to the risk of death or great bodily harm. * Nor has it any 
 right to assume that the slayer was in imminent peril authorizing 
 him to stand his ground.^ So, except in cases of attack in one's 
 own dwelling, and a few other like cases, the question whether a 
 man should stand his ground when attacked, or give back, is one for 
 the jury, depending upon the circumstances of the case." And it is 
 for the jury, and not for the court, to determine whether a desig- 
 nated distance, which separated two combatants, constituted such 
 a perilous proximity as would have increased the danger of one of 
 them if he had attempted to avoid the combat by retreat.'^ And the 
 same rule applies to the question whether the deceased was fleeing 
 and endeavoring to escape at the time he was killed, so that there 
 was no justification' for the killing.* Nor is it proper to call for 
 the opinion of the accused in a prosecution for homicide as to 
 whether there was a reasonable method of escape without exposing 
 himself to great danger,* or as to whether he had retreated as far 
 as he could without exposing himself to great danger,^'' such ques- 
 tions being for the jury to determine upon the facts of the case, 
 and not for the witness. 
 
 345. Determination as to aggression or freedom from fault Wheth- 
 er the acts of the accused were of such a character as to provoke 
 a difficulty, and whether they did so provoke a difficulty, are ques- 
 tions of fact for the jury upon all the evidence.^ And in all cases 
 where the issue is raised as to who provoked the difficulty, the court 
 should lay before the jury the circumstances indicated by the evi- 
 dence raising such issue. ^ And where there is a conflict of evi- 
 dence, it is for the jury to determine which line of testimony they 
 will believe ; and the court, no matter what the disparity in numbers 
 or in the character of the opposing witnesses, is not charged with 
 the duty of deciding the controverted issue of fact.^ ISTor should 
 
 <Kirk V. Territory, supra; Connor v. statement of the facts. Stewart v. 
 
 Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 398, 81 S. W. 259. State, 19 Ohio, 302, 53 Am. Dec. 426. 
 
 BPugh V. State, 132 Ala. 1, 31 So. 727. loMann v. State, supra. 
 
 eConnor v. Com. supra. iBaldwin v. State, 111 Ala. 11, 20 So. 
 
 7Lowery v. State, 103 Ala. 50, 15 So. 528; McQueen v. State, 103 Ala. 12, 15 
 
 641. So. 824; Thomas v. State, 103 Ala. 18, 
 
 sDelaney V. State (Wyo.) 81 Pac. 792. 16 So. 4; State v. Hatch, 57 Kan. 420, 
 
 9Mann v. State, 134 Ala. 1, 32 So. 57 Am. St. Rep. 337, 46 Pac. 70S; Logs- 
 
 704; State v. Donnelly, 69 low'', 705, don v. Com. 19 Ky. L. Rep. 413, 40 S. 
 
 58 Am. Rep. 234, 27 N. W. 369. W. 775; State v. Hopkins, 50 La. Ann. 
 
 Whether, when one man rushed upon 1171, 24 So. 188. 
 another, there was time enough for the zMozee v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 51 
 
 latter to escape and get out of the way S. W. 250. 
 
 may be stated by a witness in a prosecu- sGibson v. State, 91 Ala. 64, 9 So. 
 
 tion for the killing of the former by the 171. And see Eby v. State (Ind.) 74 
 
 latter, since it is a matter which could N. E. 890. 
 not well be proved to the jury by a 
 
560 HOMICIDE. [§ 345 
 
 the court assume, where there is a question as to which party was in 
 the wrong, that one party or the other was first or chiefly in fault* 
 And a charge which makes the meeting between the slayer and the 
 deceased an unlawful act, or from which the jury could infer that 
 it was unlawful, is erroneous where the wrongful act might have 
 related to what subsequently transpired, and not to the act of the 
 slayer in meeting the deceased;^ though what constitutes an unlaw- 
 ful act and what constitutes provoking a difficulty should be ex- 
 plained to the jury." So, whether a homicide was cold-blooded mur- 
 der, a case of mutual combat, or one of self-defense, is also a ques- 
 tion for the jury.'^ And the question whether a person who had 
 sought a difficulty with another withdrew from the conflict in good 
 faith, or whether his withdrawal was a mere device to obtain ciome 
 advantage over his adversary, is for the jury.* And where there 
 was evidence tending to show abandonment, and a renewal by the 
 deceased, the jury should be instructed upon the law applicable to 
 abandonment.^ So, it is also a question for the jury whether the 
 circumstances of the difficulty in which the killing occurred were 
 such as to justify the plea of self-defense when considered by them- 
 selves, without reference to previous occurrences.^" Where the ac- 
 cused in a prosecution for homicide admits he began the attack re- 
 sulting in the killing, however, and offers no proof of facts necessary 
 to revive his right of self-defense, it is competent for the judge, as 
 preliminary to ruling on the admissibility of the evidence, to assume 
 the nonexistence of such facts, even though they bear upon the 
 question of guilt or innocence. ^ ^ And the rule is the same where 
 several facts are to be proved and the evidence offered does not tend 
 to prove all. ^ ^ But in such case the question whether such facts are 
 established should be submitted to the jury, together with evidence 
 the admissibility of which was dependent upon the determination 
 of such question. ^ * 
 
 estate V. Hatch, supra. And see Gib- 9 Jackson v. State, 28 Tex. App. 108, 
 
 son V. State, 126 Ala. 59, 28 So. 673. 12 S. W. 501; Newman v. State (Tex. 
 
 6Massie v. Com. 16 Ky. L. Eep. 790, Crim. App.) 69 S. W. 519. 
 
 29 S. W. 871. loBolzer v. People, 129 III. 112, 4 
 
 6Ibid. L.II.A. 579, 21 N. E. 818. 
 
 'Koller V. State, 36 Tex. Crim. Rep. uState v. Kellogg, 104 La. 580, 29 
 
 496, 38 S. W. 44; Hellard v. Com. 27 So. 285. 
 
 Ky. L. Rep. 115, 84 S. W. 329. izlbid. 
 
 sRowe V. United States, 164 U. S. 546, isibid. 
 41 L. ed. 547, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 172. 
 
CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 HOMICIDE FROM SUPERIOR DUTY OR OVERRULING NECESSITY. 
 
 T. SUPEBIOB DUTY. ^ 
 
 346. Risk of killing another in extreme cases to be preferred to certai'* 
 
 death. 
 
 347. Sacrifice of child's life in order to save the mother. 
 
 II. OVEERTJLINQ NECESSITT. 
 
 348. Canon law. 
 
 349. The common-law doctrine. 
 
 350. Not barred by culpability. 
 
 351. Application of doctrine to self-preservation in shipwreck. 
 
 352. Repudiation of the doctrine in England. ' 
 
 I. SUPEEIOE DUTY. 
 
 346. Risk of killing another in extreme cases to be preferred to cer- 
 tain death. — There are ca^es in "whicli a surgeon, when called upon 
 to determine whether a critical operation is to be performed, may 
 undertake such operation, though the prospects of success are slight, 
 if the alternative is a certain miserable death, in the natural progress 
 of the disease.'^ So also, as will presently be seen, when the alter- 
 native is the sacrifice in childbed of the life of a mother or that of 
 a child, the life of the child may be taken. So also, supposing that 
 the safety of a city requires that a house should be destroyed by 
 gunpowder, and supposing there be no time to rescue all the inmates 
 of the house, the killing of one of such inmates, under the circum- 
 stances, would be excusable. 
 
 347. Sacrifice of child's life in order to save the mother. — This is 
 one of the cases given by canonists and civilians as illustrating the 
 doctrine before us: — A woman is in such a state of labor that her 
 life can only be preserved by the sacrifice of the life of the child. 
 In this case it is not only the right, but the duty, of the attendants 
 to sacrifice the life of the child. In our own law this position is 
 indisputable. ^ 
 
 II. Oveeeulhstg necessity. 
 
 348. Canon law — The canon law, which lies at the basis of our 
 
 iSee infra, chapter XXII., §§ 469- iSee last section and infra, chapter 
 471. ■ XIX., § 384. 
 
 Hom.— 36. 561 
 
562 HOMICIDE. [§ 34& 
 
 jurisprudence in this respect, excuses the sacrifice of the life of one 
 person, when actually necessary for the preservation of the life of 
 another, and when the two are reduced to such extremities that one 
 or the other must die,^ — quoniam necessitas legem non habet.^ Si 
 quis propter necessitatem f amis, aut nuditatis furatus fuerit cibaria,. 
 vestem, vel pecus; poeniteat hebdomadas tres, et, si reddideritj non 
 cogatur ieiunare.^ Quod non est licitum in lege, necessitas facit 
 licitum. So, an eminent French jurist:* En un mot, I'acte ne 
 peut-etre excusable que lorsquft 1' agent cede a I'instinct de sa propre 
 conservation, lorsqu'il se trouve en presence d'un peril imminent, 
 lorsqu'il s' agit de la vie. In the same view leading German jurists. 
 unite. ^ But it should be remembered that necessity of this class 
 must be strictly limited. Hence it has been held by the canon 
 jurists that the right can only be exercised in extremity, and in 
 subordination to those general rules of duty to which even such a 
 necessity as that before us must be subordinate. Hence, when the 
 question is between an unborn infant's life and a mother's, the 
 mother is to be preferred; and between a sailor and a passenger, 
 supposing there are more than enough sailors for the purposes of 
 navigation, the passenger, as will presently be seen, must be pre- 
 ferred. So, where there is an opportimity to draw lots, lots must be 
 drawn. 
 
 349. The common-law doctrine. — The rule has been adopted by 
 many of the earlier text writers, and by an early American case, 
 that where two persons who owe no mutual duty one to the other 
 are, by accident not attributable to either, placed in a situation 
 where both cannot survive, neither is bound to save the other's life 
 by sacrificing his own; nor would either commit a crime in saving 
 his own life in the struggle for the only means of safety, thereby 
 causing the death of the other. ^ And it has been asserted that where 
 peril overtakes several persons, and the circumstances are such that 
 others can be saved only by the death of one or more of them, if 
 time exists to cast lots for the selection of the victim that method' 
 should be adopted.^ But in such case whether or not a case of ne- 
 cessity has arisen, or whether the law under which deatli has been in- 
 flicted has been so exercised as to hold the executioner harmless, 
 
 iCan. 11. Dist. I. de consecrat. Lehrbuch, II. 225; and an interesting 
 
 2Cap. 3. X. de furt. (5. 18.). compendium in Holtzendorflf, II. 180. 
 3Cap. 4. X. de reg. iur. (5. 41.) lUnited States v. Holmes, 1 Wall. Jr. 
 
 4Kossi, TraitiS II. p. 212. 1, Fed. Cas. No. 15,383. 
 BBerner, De impunitate propter sum- sibid. 
 mam necessitatem, etc. ( 1861 ) ; Geib, 
 
§ 3491 FROM SUPERIOR DUTY OR OVERRUMNG NECESSITY. S63 
 
 cannot depend upon his own opinion ; the jury must be convinced 
 of the necessity of the homicide.* And the burden rests with the 
 accused in such case to satisfy those who judicially scrutinize the 
 case that it really transcended ordinary rules, and that the killing 
 was necessary.* In applying the rule, however, we must look not 
 only to the jeopardy in which the parties were placed, but also to 
 the relations in which they stood; the slayer must have been under 
 no obligation to make his own safety secondary to the safety of that 
 of the other, and if he was charged with the duty to care for or pro- 
 tect the person killed, he can in no case claim exemption from crimi- 
 nal liability for the killing.® 
 
 350. Not barred by culpability — It has been sometimes said that 
 necessity can never be advanced as a defense when the necessity is 
 the result of the defendant's own culpable act. This, however, as 
 Berner^ demonstrates, cannot be accepted as universally true. Thus, 
 a person who negligently causes a house to catch fire will not, by this 
 negligence, be barred from setting up necessity as a defense, if, 
 in rushing from a burning chamber, he should crush another in 
 the throng; nor would a trespasser, who, upon stealing fish, should 
 fall overboard, and in his struggle to save himself should upset a 
 boat, be in like manner barred from setting up necessity, if life 
 should thereby be accidentally lost, because his act which put him 
 in this situation was wrongful. 
 
 351. Application of doctrine to self-preservation in shipwreck 
 
 Upon the great authority of Lord Bacon it has been held that where, 
 upon two persons being shipwrecked, and getting on the same plank, 
 one of them, finding it inadequate to save them both, thrust the 
 other from it, whereby he was drowned, it is excusable homicide. '^ 
 In this country this topic has undergone the test of a judicial in- 
 vestigation in a court, and under circumstances peculiarly favor- 
 able to its careful consideration. The ship William Brown left 
 Liverpool on the 13th day of March, 1841, having on board pas- 
 sengers and a crew. On the evening of the 19th of April, while 
 all were in their beds except the watch, consisting of seven persons, 
 among whom was the accused, the vessel struck an iceberg, and im- 
 mediately commenced leaking. The injury the vessel had received 
 rendered her loss inevitable, and the crew and passengers took ref- 
 uge in the boats at once. Afterwards the boats separated and one 
 
 aibid. 14 Bl. Com. 186; Rutherforth, Inst. 
 
 4Ibid. chap. 16, pp. 187-190; Puffendorf, Law 
 
 6 Ibid. of Nature, 204; Herbert, Legal Max- 
 
 iLehrbnch d. Strafrechts (1871), 140. ims, 7. 
 
564 HOMICIBE. [§ 351 
 
 of them, in which were both passengers and members of the crew, 
 and which was so loaded that tbfi gunwale was but a few inches 
 from tbe water, became leaky, and the sea became rough, and at 
 times washed over the sides of the boat. On the second night, not 
 much more than twenty-four hours after the abandonment of the 
 ship, the sea becoming more and more tempestuous, and the danger 
 of destruction imminent, the defendant, together with the remain- 
 ing sailors, proceeded to throw overboard those passengers whose 
 removal seemed necessary for the common safety. Kelief shortly 
 afterwards came, but great conflict of evidence existed as to whether 
 the boat could have held out in its original crowded state even dur- 
 ing that short period. The question, therefore, whether, with no 
 prospect of aid, acting under the circumstances which surrounded 
 the defendant at the time the act was committed, such necessity ex- 
 isted as would justify the homicide, was one of great doubt. But 
 a new principle was introduced into the case by the learned and 
 able judge who presided, holding that in such an emergency there 
 was no maritime skill required which would make the presence of a 
 sailor of more value than that of a passenger, and he maintained, 
 with great power of argument, that in such case, it being the stipu- 
 lated duty of the sailor to preserve the passenger's life at all hazards, 
 if a necessity arose in which the life of one or the other must go, 
 the life of the passenger must be preferred. If, on the other hand, 
 the crew was necessary, in its full force, for the management of the 
 vessel, the first reduction to be made ought to take place from the 
 ranks of the passengers.^ And it was decided that seamen, being 
 common carriers, and being under duty to protect and carry pas- 
 sengers, have no right beyond the number necessary to navigate the 
 boat, even in cases of extreme peril to their own lives, to sacrifice 
 the lives of the passengers for the sake of preserving their ov?n.* 
 
 352. Repudiation of the doctrine in England. — The doctrine assert- 
 ed by Lord Bacon, that a man may kill another to save his own life 
 where the circumstances are such that otherwise both must die, has 
 been repudiated in England. Thus, Lord Hale argued that a man 
 cannot ever excuse the killing of another who is innocent, under a 
 threat, however urgent, of losing his own life if he do not comply ; 
 so that if one man should assault another so fiercely as to endanger 
 his life, in order to compel him to kill a third person, this would 
 give no legal excuse for his compliance. ^ To this Mr. East remarks 
 
 aUnited States v. Holmes, 1 Wall. Jr. sibid. 
 1, Fed. Cas. No. 15,383. il Hale, P. C. chap. 28, § 26. 
 
§ 352] FROM SUPERIOR DUTY OR OVERRULING NECESSITY. 566 
 
 that if the commission of treason may be extenuated by the fear 
 of present death, and while the party is under actual compulsion,^ 
 there seems to be no reason why homicide may not also be mitigated 
 upon the like consideration of human infirmity; though, in case 
 the party might have recourse to other means for his protection in 
 his apparent necessity, his fears will certainly furnish no excuse 
 for killing.* And in an English case decided in 1884,* it was said 
 that if Lord Bacon meant to lay down the broad proposition that a 
 man may save his own life by killing, if necessary, an innocent and 
 unoffending neighbor, it certainly is not the law at the present day ; 
 and it was asserted that the necessity referred to by early writers, 
 which alone would justify homicide, was necessity in the ordinary 
 sense — ^the repelling of illegal violence ; and the rule was laid down 
 that one person may never, in order to save his own life, lawfully 
 take away the life of another, when the other is neither attacking 
 nor threatening him, nor guilty of any illegal act toward him or 
 anyone else. Ajid it was held, upon the theory that temptation, 
 however great, is no excuse for a criminal act, that where several 
 persons who were without food put another person to death upon 
 the chance of preserving their own lives by feeding upon his flesh 
 and blood after he was killed, they were guilty of wilful mtirder, 
 though the person killed was in a much weaker condition than they, 
 and likely to have died before them; and though there was no rea- 
 sonable prospect of relief, and every probability that unless they 
 then, or very soon, had food, they would die of starvation, and there 
 was an appreciable chance by killing some one for the others to eat. 
 
 21 East, p. C. chap. 2, § 15. 4Queen v. Dudley, L. R. 14 Q. B. Div. 
 
 aibid. chap. 5, § 61. 273, 15 Coz, C. C. 624. 
 
CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 HOMICIDE BY MISADVENTURE. 
 
 353. Definition and requisites. 
 
 354. Criminal liability for. 
 
 355. Requisites enumerated. 
 
 356. Absence of intention to do harm. 
 
 357. Precaution to avoid mischief. 
 
 358. Lawfulness of act. 
 
 353. Definition and requisites — ^Homicide by misadventare is the 
 accidental killing of another when the slayer is doing a lawful act 
 unaccompanied by any criminal carelessness or reckless conduct.^ 
 Misadventure, when applied to homicide, is the act of a man who, 
 in the performance of a lawful act, without any intention to do 
 harm, after using proper precautions to avoid danger, unfortunately 
 kills a person.^ And if a killing was unintentional, and the per- 
 petrator had no wrong purpose in doing the act causing death, and 
 it was done accidentally when he was engaged in no unlawful act, 
 
 1 State V. Miller, 9 Houst. (Del.) 564, 
 32 Atl. 137; State v. Lodge, 9 Houst. 
 (Del.) 542, 33 Atl. 313; Casteel v. State, 
 73 Ark. 152, 83 S. W. 953. 
 
 2Williamson v. State, 2 Ohio C. C. 
 292. 
 
 An accidental killing recognized in 
 the law of homicide is a killing that 
 oceiirs after the exercise of the care re- 
 quired by law to prevent its occurrence. 
 United States v. Boyd, 45 Fed. 851. 
 
 Accident or casus, with which misad- 
 venture may be regarded as convertible, 
 is sometimes defined to be an extraor- 
 dinary interruption of a natural law; 
 sometimes the interposition of a, condi- 
 tion not, under ordinary circumstances, 
 to be expected. Wharton, Neg. § 114; 
 Pollock, C. B., in Rigby v. Hewitt, 5 
 Exch. 243; cited by Byles, J., in Hoey 
 V. Felton, 11 C. B. N. S. 143, and Green- 
 land V. Chaplin, 5 Exch. 248. For the 
 consequences of such accident or casus 
 responsibility cannot be imputed. See 
 Wakeman v. Robinson, 1 Eing. 215; 
 Hall v. Fearnley, 3 Ad. & El. N. S. 919. 
 
 The "act of God," by which term 
 casus is sometimes described in Anglo- 
 American law, signifies, in legal phrase- 
 ology, any inevitable accident occurring 
 without the intervention of man, and 
 may, indeed, be considered to mean some- 
 thing in opposition to the act of man, 
 as storms, tempests, and lightning. Per 
 Ijord Mansfield, Ch. J., in Forward v. 
 Pittard, 1 T. R. 33; Bell, Diet. & Dig. 
 of Scotch Law, p. 11; Trent Nav. v. 
 Wood, 3 Esp. 131 ; Oakley v. Portsmouth 
 & R. Steam Packet Co. 11 Exch. 618; 
 Blyth V. Birmingham Waterworks Co. 
 11 Exch. 781. The above maxim may, 
 therefore, be paraphrased and explained 
 as follows: It would be unreasonable 
 that those things which are inevitable 
 by the act of God, which no industry 
 can avoid, nor policy prevent, should 
 be construed to the prejudice of any per- 
 son in whom there has been noilaches. 
 1 Rep. 97; Broom, Legal Maxims, 5th 
 ed. p. 230. 
 
 666 
 
3 3533 BY MISADVENTURE. 567 
 
 and not negligently, then the act of killing is a homicide by mis- 
 adventure.* Homicide by misadventure is distinguished from in- 
 voluntary manslaughter in that it happens in consequence of a law- 
 ful act, while involuntary manslaughter happens in consequence 
 ■of an unlawful one. * And evidence of an accidental killing does not 
 warrant instructions on manslaughter, voluntary or involuntary.' 
 Though the mere fact of the interposition of the defense of misad- 
 venture does not preclude the giving of instructions with relation to 
 any degree of homicide charged in the indictment, which the evi- 
 dence tends to prove.® 
 
 Nor can an acquittal in a prosecution for homicide on the ground 
 •of accidental killing be made to depend on self-defense.'' Homicide 
 by misadventure is an unintentional act, as distinguished from hom- 
 icide in self-defense, which is an affirmative, positive, and inten- 
 tional act, and misadventure is not included in self-defense.^ And 
 where self-defense is interposed in a prosecution for homicide, and 
 the accused requests a charge relating to self-defense, including an 
 imperfect definition of accidental killing, a modification of the charge 
 by leaving out the part relating to accident is not error. ^ 
 
 354. Criminal liability for — Under the general head of excusable 
 homicide the older text writers included homicide per infortuniam, 
 •or by misadventure, which is the subject of this chapter. The term 
 ■"excusable homicide" imports some fault in the party by whom it 
 has been committed, but of a nature so trivial that the law excuses 
 such homicide from the guilt of felony, though in strictness it deems 
 it to be deserving of some degree of punishment. "It appears that 
 the punishment inflicted for this offense was never greater than a 
 forfeiture of the goods and chattels of the delinquent, or a portion 
 
 'United States v. Meagher, 37' Fed. 'Bradbiirn v. United States, 3 Ind. 
 
 «75; State v. Turnage, 138 N. C. 566, 49 Terr. 604, 64 S. W. 550. 
 
 S. E. 913; Seott v. State (Tex. Crim. sState v. Smith, 114 Mo. 406, 21 S. 
 
 App.) 85 S. W. 1060. W. 827, Overruling State v. Stephens, 
 
 4 Johnson v. State, 94 Ala. 35, 10 So. 96 Mo. 637, 10 S. W. 172; People v. 
 
 "669, citing 4 Bl. Com. § 192. Manning, 146 Cal. 100, 79 Pac. 856. And 
 
 sWest V. State, 121 6a. 364, 49 S. E. see State v. Davis, 104 Tenn. 501, 58 
 
 266; Warren v. Com. 99 Ky. 370, 35 S. S. W. 122. 
 
 W. 1028. And an instruction in a prosecution 
 
 And an instruction in a, prosecution for homicide that if the accused fired 
 
 for homicide charged to have been com- at random the shot causing death, he 
 
 mitted while the accused was about to should be found not guilty upon the 
 
 do an unlawful act, which a third per- ground of self-defense, is erroneous and 
 
 son interfered to prevent and was killed, improperly given. State v. Smith, su- 
 
 is erroneous where it is broad enough pra, Overruling State v. Stephens, su- 
 
 ■to include accidental homicide. State pra. 
 
 V. Shirley, 64 N. C. 610. sBradburn v. United States, supra. 
 
 estate v. Clifford (W. Va.) 52 S. E. And see Leal v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 381. 334, 81 S. W. 961. 
 
568 HOMICIDE. [§ 35* 
 
 of them.^ ... At the present time, ... it is usual 
 for the judges to permit or direct a general verdict of 
 acquittal in cases where the death has notoriously happened 
 by misadventure or in self-defense."^ And in the United 
 States no penalty of any kind has ever been inflicted on excusable 
 homicide; it having been the invariable practice for the court to 
 direct the jury to acquit when this defense is made out.^ And where 
 there is evidence in a prosecution for homicide tending to show 
 misadventure, failure to instruct the jury as to the law with refer- 
 ence thereto is error, though no request was made for such instruc- 
 tion.* But where the main theory of the defense, based upon the 
 evidence, was that he shot and killed the deceased in self-defense,, 
 and the court charged fully as to this theory, failure to charge upon 
 the theory of misadventure is not error, where its only foundation 
 was the statement of the accused that it was an accident. ^ 
 
 A person charged with homicide pleading misadventure or acci- 
 dental killing is not required to establish his plea by a preponder- 
 ance of the evidence ; the state must overcome such plea beyond rea- 
 sonable doubt.® But a charge to acquit in case of reasonable doubt 
 as to whether the killing was accidental is not objectionable as shift- 
 ing the burden of proof to the accused.'' 
 
 355. Requisites enumerated — To constitute the defense of misad- 
 venture in homicide three requisites exist: First, there must have 
 Jjeen no intention to do harm ; second, proper precautions must have 
 been taken to avoid mischief; and third, the act from which death 
 resulted must have been lawful. 
 
 356. Absence of intention to do harm — A killing, though accidental,, 
 is murder if there was any malice in the matter. ^ And a claim that 
 
 ilRussell, Crimes,656; 4B1. Com. 188. And failure to present affirmatively 
 
 24 Bl. Com. 188; Fost. C. L. 288. And the issue of accidental homicide is not 
 
 see Reg. v. Noon, 6 Cox, C. C. 137. prejudicial error, where the entire trend 
 
 3 See Williamson v. State, 2 Ohio C. of the court's charge was that, if the- 
 
 C. 292; Messer v. Com. 27 Ky. L. Rep. accused intentionally or purposely killed 
 
 527, 85 S. W. 722. the deceased, he would be guilty either 
 
 Where a homicide was either murder of murder or manslaughter. Williams, 
 
 or excusable as accidental homicide v. State, 45 Tex. Grim. Rep. 218, 75 S. 
 
 there is no necessity, in a prosecution W. 859. 
 
 therefor, of instructing on the various « State v. McDaniel, 68 S. C. 304,. 
 
 grades and punishments of homicide, 102 Am. St. Rep. 661, 47 S. E. 384; 
 
 since if it was not murder the accused State v. Matheson (Iowa) 103 N. W. 
 
 should be acquitted. Garner v. State 137; State v. Cross, 42 W. Va. 253, 24 
 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 24 S. W. 420. S. E. 996. And see Scott v. State, 46 
 
 4Frenoh v. Com. 28 Ky. L. Rep. 64, Tex. Crim. Rep. 536, 81 S. W. 294. 
 88 S. W. 1070; Roberts v. State, 112 Ga. 'Alvarez v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 542, 37 S. E. 879. 58 S. W. 1013; Powell v. State (Tex. 
 
 6Dunn V. State, 116 Ga. 515, 42 S. E. Crim. App.) 59 S. W. 1114. 
 772. 11 Russell, Crimes, 657. 
 
S 366] BY MISADVENTURE. 569 
 
 a killing was accidental may be rebutted by proof of previous dis- 
 agreements and difficulties between the parties.^ The legal effect 
 of evidence tending to prove that a homicide was accidentally com- 
 mitted is simply to controvert the inference of an intent to kill, 
 'which might arise from proof of the killing; and such proof does 
 not affect the rule that an intent to kill is an essential element of 
 the crime of murder, and must be established beyond reasonable 
 doubt to authorize a verdict for murder in the first or second degree.^ 
 Thus a party, the head of whose hatchet accidentally flies off (it 
 having been properly secured), and kills another, is guilty only of 
 misadventure, unless there was intention to do harm ; in which latter 
 case it is murder.* But a killing by intentionally firing a pistol 
 into a crowd cannot be said to be by accident or misfortune. ^ And 
 one who strikes another with a pistol, which is accidentally dis- 
 charged killing the latter, is not entitled, as matter of law, to an 
 acquittal, but might be found guilty of manslaughter.® So, a ver- 
 dict of conviction of manslaughter is supported by evidence of a 
 statement by the accused that he shot the deceased because he was 
 abusing him, and because he would not let him up, though the gen- 
 eral evidence of the case shows an accidental killing of one school- 
 boy by another.'' And a claim that a killing was accidental is 
 untenable where it appears that the slayer afterwards expressed sat- 
 isfaction with the result of his act.* 
 
 357. Precaution to avoid mischief. — ^Where the diligence and care 
 usual with prudent persons under the circumstances are omitted in 
 the performance of any acts, and death results, it is not misadventure, 
 and liability for the consequences attaches.^ And where a person 
 was riding a horse, which, being whipped by some other person, 
 sprang out of the road and ran over a child and killed it, this was 
 held to be misadventure only in the rider, but manslaughter in the 
 
 sParsons v. People, 218 111. 386^ 75 accused was in the act of defending 
 
 N. E. 993. himself against the assault, using it 
 
 3Jones V. State, 51 Ohio St. 331, 38 as a bludgeon. Teel v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 N. E. 79. App.) 69 S. W. 531. 
 
 *1 Hawk. P. C. chap. 29, § 2. 'State v. Sterrett, 80 Iowa, 609, 45 
 
 ePeople v. Austin, 1 Park. Crim. Rep. N. W. 401. 
 
 154. sstate v. Botha, 27 Utah, 289, 75 Pac. 
 
 eStewart v. State, 137 Ala. 33, 34 So. 731. 
 
 818. 1 Where a person seeks to excuse him- 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution self for taking the life of another with 
 for homicide that if deceased was killed a deadly weapon on the ground of ac- 
 hy an accidental discharge of a pistol cident, it must appear that due care 
 the accused should be acquitted is er- was exercised in the handling of the 
 roneous where the evidence and theory weapon. State v. Morgan, 40 S. C. 345, 
 of the defense was to the effect that the 18 S. E. 937. And see Ringer v. State, 
 pistol was fired accidentally while the 74 Ark. 262, 85 S. W. 410. 
 
670 HOMICIDE. p§ 357 ' 
 
 person who wliipped the horse. ^ But generally speaking, where a 
 person driving a cart or other carriage happened to drive over an- 
 other and kill him, if the accident happened in such a manner that 
 no want of due care could be imputed to the driver, it will be ac- 
 cidental death, and the driver will be excused.^ And if workmen 
 throw stones, rubbish, or other things from a house in the ordinary 
 course of their business, by which a person underneath happens to 
 be killed, this will be misadventure only, if it was done in a retired 
 place where there was no probability of persons passing by, and 
 none had been seen about the spot before, or if timely and proper 
 warning were given to such as might be below. * So, where a master 
 sent his servant to watch in a field, giving him orders to shoot when 
 he heard any bustle in the corn by deer, and afterwards improvident- 
 ly rushed into the corn himself, and the servant, supposing it to 
 be the deer, shot and killed the master, it is misadventure, the serv- 
 ant having been misguided by his master's own direction; though if 
 the master had not given such direction, which was the occasion of 
 the mistake, it would have been manslaughter, because of the want 
 of due caution in the servant in shooting before he discovered his 
 mark.® Likewise, where a commander, coming upon a sentinel in 
 the night, in the posture of an enemy, to try his vigilance, is killed 
 by him as such, the sentinel not being able to distinguish his com- 
 mander, under such circumstances, from an enemy, it is but mis- 
 adventure. ® 
 
 And though, where one lays poison to kill rats, and another takes 
 it and dies, this is misadventure, yet it must be understood to have 
 been laid in such manner and place as not easily to be mistaken for 
 proper food, for that would betoken great inadvertence, and might 
 in some cases amount to manslaughter. '^ And where one person 
 points a loaded gun at another under circumstances which would not 
 have justified the former in shooting the latter, and the latter seizes 
 the gun to save himself from threatened injury, and in the struggle 
 it goes off, though accidentally, and kills the latter, the former can- 
 not escape upon the ground that the killing was by misadventure; 
 it would amount to manslaughter at least.* 
 
 21 Hawk. P. C. chap. 29, § 3. sgtate v. Benham, 23 Iowa, 154, 92 
 
 sFost. C. L. 263; 1 Hale, P. C. 476. Am. Dee. 417. 
 
 41 Hale, P. C. 472; Fost. C. L. 262; And where u person shot and killed 
 
 infi a, chapter XXII., § 446. another with a gun pointed at him, and 
 
 61 Hale, P. C. 476. intentionally discharged, and he de- 
 
 61 Hale, P. C. 42. clared immediately afterwards that he 
 
 71 Hale, P. C. 431; 1 East P. C. § did not know it was loaded, but it ap- 
 
 40, p. 266; infra, chapter XXII., § 446. pears that earlier in the day he knew 
 
i 357] BY MISADVENTURE. £71 
 
 The caution necessary to be used in this connection is such as 
 is usual and ordinary in similar cases; extreme and the utmost 
 caution cannot be insisted upon.® And where a man discharges a 
 loaded firearm by accident, when he has reason to believe it is un- 
 loaded, and kills another, it is misadventure- ^ ° And so it is where 
 a gun in the hands of a person scuffling with another was accidental- 
 ly discharged killing a third person, whose proximity was un- 
 known. ^^ And evidence that deceased in a playful mood attempted 
 to take a pistol from the pocket of the accused, and that in the 
 struggle the pistol was discharged, apparently by being caught in 
 the pocket, and that deceased was killed thereby, does not support 
 a conviction for murder. ^ ^ 
 
 358. lawfulness of act. — As we have seen, accidental killing, to 
 he wholly excusable, must have resulted from the doing of some 
 lawful act.^ If it resulted from the act of the slayer of unlawfully 
 pointing a firearm at the person killed, the killing is not by misad- 
 (venture.^ And the rule is the same where the killing, though ac- 
 cidental, resulted from an attack upon the person or property of the 
 person killed.* And one who is going to a place with a purpose 
 in view, intending to kill if necessary to accomplish his object, is 
 engaged in an unlawful act, and if another interferes and in the 
 scuffle incident to the interference the latter is accidentally shot 
 by the former and killed, though the shooting was a mere misad- 
 venture the killing is still a criminal act. * And though an act which 
 causes death is lawful, it becomes unlawful within the meaning of 
 the rule of law that to render homicide justifiable the act causing 
 death must have been lawful, where it is done in an unusual and 
 dangerous manner. ® ITor can one who strikes and kills another with 
 a bat excuse himself on the ground of misadventure under the claim 
 that in striking with the bat he was placing himself on an equality 
 with the person struck, so as to resist and prevent an assault and 
 battery upon him, which was a lawful act, and that in so doing, 
 and without any such intention, he accidentally killed him.^ And 
 
 it was loaded, the question whether the i State v. Benham, 23 Iowa, 154, 92 
 
 killing was intentional or accidental is Am. Deo. 417. 
 
 one of fact for the jury. Cross v. State, zBarnes v. State, 134 Ala. 36, 32 So. 
 
 68 Ala. 476. 670. 
 
 sFost. C. L. 265. And see Fitzgerald sEpps v. State, 19 Ga. 102. 
 
 V. State, 112 Ala. 34, 20 So. 966. ^Holmes v. State, 88 Ala. 26, 16 Am. 
 
 loPost. C. L. 265; Robertson v. State, St. Rep. 17, 7 So. 195. 
 
 2 Lea, 239, 31 Am. Rep. 602. 51 Hale, P. C. 475; Fost. C. L. 289. 
 
 iiScott V. State (Tex. Grim. App.) sNilan v. People, 27 Colo. 206, 60 Pac. 
 
 85 S. W. 1060. 485. 
 
 i2Tanks v. State, 71 Ark. 459, 75 S. 
 W. 851. 
 
572 HOMICIDE. [5 :>.-,; 
 
 this has been carried to the extent of holding that death occurring in 
 such sports and exercises as give strength, activity, and skill in the 
 use of arms, and which are entered into as private recreations among 
 friends, such as playing at cudgels, or foils, or wrestling by consent, 
 is manslaughter. '^ But the propriety of this application has been 
 denied.* And, as stated by a more recent writer, though it cannot 
 be said that they are altogether free from danger, yet they are 
 very rarely attended with fatal consequences, and each party has 
 friendly warning to be on his guard. Proper caution and fair play 
 should, however, be observed; and, though the weapons used be 
 not of a deadly nature, yet if they may breed danger, there should 
 be due warning given, that each party may start upon equal terms.* 
 So, the killing of a person by another by the accidental discharge 
 of a gun or pistol which the slayer did not intentionally point at 
 the deceased, and while lie was not engaged in any unlawful act, and 
 without any carelessness or negligence on his part, is homicide by 
 misadventure, and no crime. ^ " And a statute making the intention- 
 al pointing or aiming of any firearm a criminal offense, though there 
 was no malice, does not change the law as to the responsibility of 
 a person for homicide caused on his part by pure accident or mis- 
 adventure;^^ but the rule is different where the slayer intention- 
 ally pointed or snapped a firearm at another, and it went off and 
 killed the latter, though he did not intend to kill and supposed it was 
 not loaded, since in such case he was engaged in an unlawful act. * " 
 
 '1 Hale, P. C. 472; and supra, chap- deemed, in law, an accident and no 
 
 ter X., § 218. more. Queen v. Bruce, 2 Cox, C. C. 
 
 And a dying declaration by a person 262. 
 shot, that he and the accused were en- loUnited States v. Meagher, 37 Fed. 
 
 gaged in play and that the shooting was 875 ; United States v. Carr, 1 Woods, 
 
 an accident, is admissible in a prosecu- 480, Fed. Cas. No. 14,732; Williamson 
 
 tion for the homicide, as being in the v. State, 2 Ohio C. C. 292. And see 
 
 nature of a statement of fact, rather Martin v. State, 70 Ohio St. 219, 71 N. 
 
 than the giving of an opinion. Com. v. E. 640. 
 Matthews, 89 Ky. 287, 12 S. W. 333. nWilliamson v. State, supra. 
 
 sFost. C. L. 260; 1 East, P. C. chap. izjohnson v. State, 94 Ala. 35, 10 So. 
 
 5, § 41, p. 268. 667; Williamson v. State, supra. 
 
 91 East, P. C. chap. 25. And see su- AJnd a theory in a, prosecution for 
 
 pro, chapter X., § 218. homicide based on the testimony of the 
 
 And where an intoxicated man, in accused that the killing was accident- 
 fun and for a joke, put his arm around al, his revolver having been discharged 
 the neck of a boy and spun him around, accidentally while he was ascertaining 
 and the boy broke away, when the in- if the cartridges were of the proper 
 toxicated man staggered or fell against size, is properly discarded by the jury 
 a woman and knocked her down, from where two witnesses swore positively 
 the eflfects of which she died, it cannot to an intentional and deliberate kill- 
 be said, where the boy did not resist ing, and to immediate and rapid flight 
 and supposed the act was intended for of the slayer. Hardy v. State, 31 Tex. 
 a joke, that there was anything unlaw- Grim. Eep. 289, 20 S. W. 561. 
 ful in the act, and the killing will be 
 
5 358] BY MISADVENTURE. 573 
 
 Nor is it unlawful to repel an unlawful attack, although not a dead- 
 ly one, and if, in so doing, the assailant is killed, unintentionally 
 and without the use of excessive force, it is a killing while doing 
 a lawful act and is excusable.^* And mere violation of a statute 
 making it a misdemeanor to hunt on another's property without a 
 permit is not such an unlawful act as will render an accidental 
 homicide, committed while so doing, a criminal offense, the viola- 
 tion being malum prohibitum,, and not malum, in se. ^ * And where 
 the statute provides that homicide is excusable when committed by 
 accident or misfortune in the heat of passion on any sudden and 
 sufficient provocation, or in sudden combat without any undue ad- 
 vantage being taken, and without dangerous weapons being used, 
 a killing with a chair in resenting an assault may be aocidental with- 
 in the meaning thereof. ^ ^ And the rule is asserted in Ohio that to 
 Tender an act unlawful, so as to take a resulting killing out of the 
 <5lass of accidental homicides and make it involuntary manslaughter, 
 it is not sufficient that it was a crime at common law, or that it was 
 grossly or culpably negligent; it must have been one prohibited by 
 positive law.^® 
 
 isBradbum v. United States, 3 Ind. care in handling It. State v. Morgan, 
 
 Terr. 604, 64 S. W. 550; Ryan v. State, 40 S. C. 345, 18 S. E. 937. 
 
 115 Wis. 488, 92 N. W. 271. KState v. Horton, 139 N. C. 588, 1 
 
 And one who is attacked by another L.R.A.(N.S.) 991, 51 S. E. 945. 
 
 with an instrument which might do se- isCampbell v. State, 111 Wis. 152, 85 
 
 rious harm has a right to bring his gun N. W. 855. 
 
 into a position to defend himself against 16 Johnson v. State, 66 Ohio St. 59, 
 
 the attack, and if, under such circum- 61 L.R.A. 277, 90 Am. St. Rep. 5C4, 
 
 stances, the gun goes off accidentally 63 N. E. 607; Weller v. State, 19 Ohio 
 
 and kills his assailant, he would not be C. 0. 166. 
 guilty of any offense if he exercised due 
 
CHAPTEE XV. 
 
 KILLING ONE BY UNLAWFUL ACT AIMED AT ANOTHER. 
 
 359. Criminal responsibility generally. 
 
 360. When murder in the first degree. 
 
 361. When murder in the second or a lower degree. 
 
 362. When manslaughter. 
 
 363. When justifiable or excusable. 
 
 359. Criminal responsibility generally — The rule is nearly, if not 
 quite, universal that one who kills another, mistaking him for a 
 third person whom he intended to kill, is guilty or innocent of the 
 offense charged the same as if the fatal act had killed the person 
 intended to be killed ; •' and that one will be held guilty of murder or 
 manslaughter, as the case may be, where in the attempt to kill 
 one person he kills another by mistake, although there was no intent 
 or design to kill such other ; ^ and that the fact that a person supposed 
 he was shooting at one man when he killed another does not reduce 
 the offense from murder to manslaughter.* These rules are based 
 
 iClarke v. State, 78 Ala. 474, 56 Am. 
 Eep. 45; Tidwell v. State, 70 Ala. 33; 
 Murphy v. State, 108 Ala. 10, 18 So. 
 557; Jackson v. State, 106 Ala. 12, 17 
 So. 333; State v. Dugan, Houst. Grim. 
 Eep. (Del.) 563; Ringer v. State, 74 
 Ark. 262, 85 S. W. 410; State v. Brown, 
 4 Penn. (Del.) 120, 53 Atl. 354; Brown 
 V. State, 147 Ind. 28, 46 N. E. 34; State 
 V. Williams, 122 Iowa, 115, 97 N. W. 
 992; Thompkins v. Com. 28 Ky. L. Eep. 
 642, 90 S. W. 221 ; Jennings v. Com. 13 
 Ky. L. Rep. 79, 16 S. W. 348; State v. 
 Baptiste, 105 La. 661, 30 So. 147 ; State 
 V. Renfrow, 111 Mo. 589, 20 S. W. 299; 
 McGehee v. State, 62 Miss. 772, 52 Am. 
 Eep. 209; State v. Benton, 19 N. C. (2 
 Dev. & B. L.) 222; State v. Johnson, 
 7 Or. 210; Wareham v. State, 25 Ohio 
 St. 601 ; Com. v. Breyessee, 160 Pa. 451, 
 40 Am. St. Rep. 729, 28 Atl. 824; State 
 V. Smith, 2 Strobh. L. 77, 47 Am. Dec. 
 589; Wright v. State, 44 Tex. 645; An- 
 gell V. State, 36 lex. 542, 14 Am. Eep. 
 380; Thornton v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 App.) 65 S. W. 1105; Nelson v. State 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 87 S. W. 143; State 
 
 V. Clifford (W. Va.) 52 S. E. 981 ; State- 
 V. Briggs (W. Va.) 52 S. E. 218. And 
 see State v. Shanley (S. D.) 104 N. W.. 
 522. 
 
 2'Butler V. People, 125 111. 641, 1 
 L.R.A. 211, 8 Am. St. Eep. 423, 18 N. 
 E. 338; Gater v. State, 141 Ala. 10, 37 
 So. 692; State v. Bell (Del.) 62 Atl. 
 147; Territory v. Rowand, 8 Mont. 110, 
 19 Pac. 595; State v. Fulkerson, 61 N. 
 G. (Phill. L.) 233; Wareham v. State, 
 supra; Rex v. Plummer, J. Kelyng, 109, 
 12 Mod. 627; King v. Brown, 1 lieach, 
 C. L. 148; Rex v. Holt, 7 Car. & P. 
 519. 
 
 Where a man intending to kill his 
 wife gives her a poisoned apple, and she, 
 not knowing of the poison, gives it to a 
 child, who eats it and dies, the man is 
 the principal murderer though he had 
 no intent to harm the child, but his 
 wife is not guilty of any crime. Queen 
 V. Saunders, 2 Plowd. 473a. 
 
 3Burchet v. Com. 8 Ky. L. Rep. 258, 
 1 S. W. 423 ; State v. Pollard. 139 Mo.. 
 220, 40 S. W. 949. 
 
 574 
 
§ 353] KILUNU ONE BY UNLAWFUL ACT AIMED AT ANOTHER. 575 
 
 upon the theory that where a person is killed under a mistaken sup- 
 position that he is a different person, the intention of the perpetra- 
 tor to kill or injure the other person is transferred to the person 
 killed;* and that a shot fired or a blow struck at one person with 
 intent to wound or kill carries with it the ingredient of malice 
 which characterizes the fatal result, whoever may be the victim,^ 
 the purpose or intent necessary to murder being an intent to kill 
 another, and not an intent to kill any particular person.® So, the 
 rule is the same whether one or many are imperiled by the original 
 unlawful act;^ and whether the misadventure proceeded from the 
 misdirection of the blow, or from a mistake in the identity of the 
 victim. * And a charge that a murder was done wilfully, deliberately, 
 and premeditatedly, and with malice aforethought, is sustained by 
 proof that it was committed with a mind imbued with these quali- 
 ties, though they were directed against a person other than the one 
 killed. ^ So, .these rules apply to a case of the killing of a person who 
 lawfully interfered in the proper defense of a person attacked by 
 his slayer;^" and to that of a person shooting at one and missing 
 his mark and killing another ; ^ ^ and to that of a slave killing a white 
 person in the belief, justified by appearances, that he was a runaway 
 slave. ^ ^ 
 
 4Callahan v. State, 21 Ohio St. 306; s Territory v. Rowand, 8 Mont. 110, 19 
 State V. Renfrew, supra; State v. Gil- Pac. 595; Thompkins v. Com. 28 Ky. L. 
 more, 95 Mo. 554, 8 S. W. 359, 912; Rep. 642, 90 S. W. 221. 
 State V. Clark, 147 Mo. 20, 47 S. W. And where an indictment charges an 
 886 ; State v. Cooper, 13 N. J. L. 361 ; intent to kill the person killed, and the 
 Clark V. State, 19 Tex. App. 495. evidence shows an intent to kill another, 
 And where a person shoots at one and and the averment of the intent is ma- 
 kills another, it is competent for the terial only because made descriptive of 
 state in a prosecution for the killing to the oifense by the indictment, there is 
 introduce evidence to show his hostile no variance between the allegation and 
 feeling toward the person against whom proof, or if it is deemed a variance the 
 the shot was aimed. Dixon v. State, accused waives his right to object to 
 74 Miss. 271, 20 So. 839. it "by failing to object to the evidence at 
 BState V. Brown, 4 Penn. (Del.) 120, the time it was offered. Territory v. 
 53 Atl. 354 ; Wills v. State, 74 Ala. 21 ; Rowand, supra. 
 
 State V. Clark, 147 Mo. 20, 47 S. W. lOThomton v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 886; Smith v. Territory, 11 Okla. 656, App.) 65 S. W. 1105; Salisbury's Case, 
 
 69 Pac. 803. 1 Plowd. 101. 
 
 sWareham V. State, 25 Ohio St. 601. uState v. Pollard, 139 Mo. 220, 40 
 
 7CaIlahan v. State, 21 Ohio St. 306. S. W. 949. 
 
 sState V.Clifford (W.Va.) 52S.E.981. I21sham v. State, 38 Ala. 213. 
 A person who approaches another But where a slave kills a white per- 
 
 from behind and shoots him cannot son under the belief, justified by appear- 
 
 lessen his guilt or change the degree of ances, that he was a runaway slave, the 
 
 the crime by a claim that he mistook punishment would be that prescribed for 
 
 him for another, with whom he was on such homicide perpetrated by a slave on 
 
 unfriendly terms. Com. v. Eisenhower, a white person. Ibid. 
 181 Pa. 470, 59 Am. St. Rep. 670, 37 Atl. 
 521. 
 
576 HOMICIDE. • [■§ 359 
 
 An indictment for homicide in such case, however, must allege 
 the assault as made on the person killed. ^^ And where a person is 
 assaulted and shoots in self-defense, but misses his assailant, and 
 hits a third person not connected with the difficulty, the assailant 
 cannot be held responsible for the killing in the absence of anything 
 to show concert with the slayer.-'* And shooting at a person with 
 tent to kill him, and hitting another person by mistake, do not make 
 the one shooting guilty of shooting at the latter with intent to kill him 
 under a statute imposing a penalty therefor ; ^ ^ though in such case if 
 death resulted the accused might be convicted of the common-law 
 offense of firing at one and killing another. ^ ® So, where one person 
 shoots at another and fails to kill him, and a conflict ensues, and he 
 afterwards shoots and causes the death of a companion of the person 
 first shot at, his guilt or innocence must be judged from the criminal 
 intent he had at the time he fyrei the fatal shot, and not from the 
 intent which he entertained at the time of the first shot.^'^ 
 
 The question whether shooting at one person and hitting and 
 killing another was voluntary or involuntary homicide, or justifiable 
 self-defense, is one of fact for the jury in a prosecution for the 
 killing. i« 
 
 360. When murder in the first degree — At common law, if a person 
 shot or struck at another with malice, and by accident or mistake 
 killed a third person, the offense was murder.^ And under nearly 
 all the various statutory definitions of murder, one who shoots or 
 strikes with deliberate and premeditated intention to kill a particular 
 person, but fails in the particular intent and kills another, is, never- 
 theless, guilty of murder in the first degree.^ And an attempt to 
 
 isState V. Clark, 147 Mo. 20, 47 S. does not apply to prosecutions for kill- 
 
 W. 886. ing or for assaults with intent to kill. 
 
 i4Butler V. People, 125 111. 641, 1 L. Lacefield v. State, supra. 
 E.A. 211, 8 Am. St. Eep. 423, 18 N. E. isHollywood v. People, supra. 
 338; Com. v. Moore, 28 Ky. L. Eep. I'Norris v. State, 42 Tex. Grim. Rep. 
 
 62, 2 L.E.A.(N.S.) 719, 88 S. W. 1085. 559, 61 S. W. 493. 
 
 isHollywood v. People, 2 Abb. App. isRinger v. State, 74 Ark. 262, 85 S. 
 
 Dec. 376, 3 Keyes, 55 ; Lacefield v. State, W. 410. 
 34 Ark. 275, 36 Am. Eep. 8. iMusiek v. State, 21 Tex. App. 69, 18 
 
 So, a statute providing that if any S. W. 95; Eichards v. State, 35 Tex. 
 person of his own malice attempts to Crim. Eep. 38, 30 S. W. 805; Clark v. 
 shoot or do some bodily injury to some State, 19 Tex. App. 495; Eex v. Plum- 
 particular individual, and in such at- mer, J. Kelyng, 109, 12 Mod. 627. 
 tempt shall shoot or injure some third 2 state v. Pay ton, 90 Mo. 220, 2 S. W. 
 person against whom the offender had 394; State v. Gilmore, 95 Mo. 554, 8 S. 
 no evil design, he shall be held and ad- W. 359, 912; People v. Suesser, 142 Cal. 
 judged guilty in the same manner as if 354, 75 Pac. 1093; State v. O'Niel, Houst. 
 the injury had fallen on the person in- Crim. Eep. (Del.) 468; Golliher v. Com. 
 tended, applies to prosecutions for 2 Duv. 163, 87 Am. Dec. 493 ; Wheatley 
 maiming or bodily injure done, but v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Eep. 436, 81 S. W. 
 
I 360] KIlJLIiNG ONE BY UNLAWFUL ACT AIMED AT ANOTHER. 577 
 
 Mil one person and accidentally killing another in the attempt is 
 murder in the first degree, under a statute making a killing murder in 
 that degree when committed by a person engaged in the commission 
 of, or attempt to commit, a felony, either upon or affecting the person 
 killed or otherwise, the word "otherwise" relating to felonies against 
 a person other than the one killed,^ So, one who assaults another, 
 intending to do him great bodily harm, and while so engaged kills 
 a third person, is guilty of murder in the first degree.* And the 
 rule is the same where the slayer was engaged at the time in the 
 commission of an unlawful act directed against another, which in its 
 consequences naturally tends to destroy the life of a human being, ^ 
 or which indicates a wicked, depraved, and malignant spirit 
 from which malice is implied.® So, where a person prepares poison 
 for another, and a third person takes it by accident and death re- 
 sults, it is murder both in the principal and in the accessories be- 
 fore the fact.'^ And the rule is not affected by the fact that the 
 person who took the poison unconsciously did an act which rendered 
 its operation more forcible. ® Where one person kills another, intend- 
 ing to kill a third person, however, it is necessary in order to con- 
 stitute the crime of murder in the first degree to show that the ac- 
 cused intended to kill such third person, and that such third person 
 was, or might be, supposed to be at or near the spot at about the 
 time of the fatal deed.® 
 
 As to exceptions to the above rules in Tennessee and Texas, see 
 next section. 
 
 361. When murder in the second or a lower degree If the killing 
 
 of a person intended to be killed would be reduced by surrounding 
 
 «87; State v. Raymond, 11 Nev. 98; sPeople v. Miles, 143 N. Y. 383, 38 N. 
 
 State V. Bectsa, 71 N. J. L. 322, 58 Atl. E. 456. 
 
 a33; People v. Miles, 143 N. Y. 389, 4 State v. Raymond, 11 Nev. 98; State 
 
 38 N. E. 456; State v. Cole, 132 N. C. v. O'Niel, Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 
 
 1069, 44 S. E. 391; Com. v. Dougherty, 468; State v. Smith, 2 Strobh. L. 77, 47 
 
 1 Browne (Pa.) Appx. XVIII.; State Am. Dec. 589. 
 
 V. McGonigle, 14 Wash. 594, 45 Pac. 20; BState v. Raymond, supra. 
 
 Winthrop's Dig. of Opinions of Judge And one who, while engaged in a per- 
 
 Advocate General, p. 341. sonal difficulty with another, fires upon 
 
 And where a person shoots at another him with a pistol, and, as the latter 
 
 Tinder circumstances which would ren- runs away, again fires upon him but 
 
 der the killing murder in the first de- misses him and kills a third person who 
 
 gree, the fact that he missed his mark is near by, is guilty of murder, and not 
 
 and killed a third person does not jus- of involuntary manslaughter. Durham 
 
 tify an instruction as to murder in v. State, 70 Ga. 264. 
 the second degree. State v. Pollard, 139 sState v. Smith, supra. 
 Mo. 220. 40 S. W. 949. TState v. Fulkerson, 61 N. C. (Phill. 
 
 Nor in such case is the crime bailable L.) 233; Chelsey v. State, 121 Ga. 340, 
 
 liecause he missed his aim and hit and 49 S. E. 258; Gore's Case, 9 Coke, 81a. 
 killed another. Brown v. State, 147 Ind. sGore's Case, supra. 
 28, 46 N. E. 34. sQueen v. Cleary, 2 Fost. & F. 850. 
 
 Horn.— 37. 
 
578 HOMICIDE. [§ 361 
 
 circumstances to murder in the second or a lower degree, then the 
 unintentional or accidental killing of a bystander or another, re- 
 sulting from an act designed to take effect upon the intended victim,, 
 would be likewise reduced to the same degree of offense. ^ And where 
 the attempt to commit an unlawful act directed against one person,, 
 which resulted in the death of another, was such that the offense, if 
 completed as intended, might have been murder in either the first or 
 second degree, the degree of the offense is one for the jury under 
 appropriate instructions. ^ Within these rules, if a man with a deadly 
 weapon undertakes to take his own life, and by accident or mistake 
 takes the life of an innocent bystander, though unintentionally, 
 it is murder.^ So, it is held in Tennessee that to constitute murder 
 in the first degree there must have existed in the mind of the slayer 
 a specific intention to take the life of the person slain, and that, 
 therefore, a killing of one person by mistake with a premeditated 
 intent to kill another is murder, not in the first, but in the second, 
 degree.* And under the Texas statute requiring express malice 
 to constitute murder in the first degree, one who attempts to kill one 
 person, and by mistake kills another, is guilty of murder in the second 
 degree, since such killing is not with express malice.^ But the of- 
 fense in such case does not come within the definition of negligent 
 homicide, where the intention and the act resulting from it are pre- 
 cisely the same, but the act takes effect on a person other than the one 
 intended ; the crime is the same in all cases except in cases of murder 
 in the first degree, which is required to be upon express malice 
 toward the person killed, and is, therefore, murder in the second de- 
 gree upon implied malice.® And a general charge with reference to 
 a killing upon implied malice is not sufficient to direct the attention 
 
 iPinder v. State, 27 Fla. 370, 26 Am. Breedlove v. State, 26 Tex. App. 445, 9 
 
 St. Rep. 75, 8 So. 837; Ferrell v. State, S. W. 768; Lankster v. State, 41 Tex. 
 
 43 Tex. 603. Ciim. Eep. 603, 58 6. W. 65 ; White v. 
 
 2PeopIe V. Gordon, 100 Mich. 518, 59 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 63 L.R.A. 660, 
 
 N. W. 322. 68 S. W. 689; Sparks v. State (Tex. 
 
 sfitate V. Levelle, 34 S. C. 120, 27 Am. Crim. App.) 77 S. W. 811. And see 
 
 St. Eep. 799, 13 S. E. 319. Black v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 65 S- 
 
 4Bratton v. State, 10 Humph. 104. W. 906. 
 
 BMusick V. State, 21 Tex. App. 69, 18 But while an instruction that an ac- 
 
 S. W. 95; McConnell v. State, 13 Tex. cidental killing of one person in an at- 
 
 App. 390 ; Wright v. State, 44 Tex. 645 ; tempt to kill another is murder in the 
 
 Bean v. Mathieu, 33 Tex. 591 ; Honey- first degree is erroneous, such an instruc- 
 
 cutt V. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Eep. 129, 57 tion is not ground for reversal where 
 
 S. W. 806 ; Halbert v. State, 3 Tex. App. the accused was not convicted of murder 
 
 656; Taylor v. State, 3 Tex. App. 387; in the first degree. Taylor v. State, 
 
 Clark V. State. 19 Tex. App. 495; McCoy supra. 
 
 V. State, 25 Tex. 33, 78 Am. Dee. 520; eClark v. State, and MeConnell v. 
 
 Angell V. State, 36 Tex. 542, 14 Am. Rep. State, supra; Eiehards v. State, 35 Tex, 
 
 380, Ferrell v. State, 43 Tex. 503; Crim. Rep. 38, 30 S. W. 805. 
 
S 361] KILLING ONE BY UNLAWFUL ACT AIMED AT ANOTHER. 579 
 
 of the jury to the proper issue in the case; a charge presenting im- 
 plied malice predicated upon a killing, where the intent was to kill 
 one person, but another was slain, should be given.'' And there is 
 now a provision in the Texas Code that if one intending to commit 
 a felony, and in the act of preparing for or executing it, shall, through 
 mistake or accident, do an act which, if voluntarily done, would 
 be a felony, he shall receive the punishment affixed by law to the 
 offense actually committed, under which one who voluntarily, with 
 malice aforethought, attempts to kill one person, and by accident 
 kills another, is guilty of murder in the first degree.* 
 
 362. When manslaughter. — Where one kills another unintention- 
 ally, the latter being a different person from the one intended, 
 acting without malice, and while his mind is under the immediate 
 influence of sudden passion arising from adequate cause rendering it 
 incapable of cool reflection, the crime is voluntary manslaughter, 
 because the one intended would be voluntary manslaughter.^ Thus, 
 where two men are fighting and the brother of one of them attempts to 
 shoot the other, but by mistake shoots his brother, the jury should be 
 instructed both as to murder and as to voluntary manslaughter.^ Nor 
 will the grade of the offense be higher than manslaughter where a 
 husband assaults his wife with no intent to kill, and subsequently 
 kills his daughter in resisting an attack made by her in defense of 
 her mother.* And a mother who throws a missile at her child 
 with intent merely to frighten it. but misses the child at which it 
 was thrown, and strikes and kills another, is guilty of manslaughter.* 
 And a person who unnecessarily shoots at his assailant in resisting 
 an assault, and kills another person by bad shooting, is also guilty 
 
 'Howard v. State (Tex. Grim. App.) S. W. 689; Williams's Case, Wm. Jones, 
 
 58 S. W. 77. 432, J. Kelyng, 131. And see Bratton v. 
 
 SRichards v. State, supra; Carter v. State, 10 Humph. 103. 
 
 State, 30 Tex. Apn. 551, 28 Am. St. Rep. zKing v. Com. (Ky.) 55 S. W. 685. 
 
 944, 17 S. W. 1102. But a killing is not reduced to man- 
 
 iFerrell v. State, 43 Tex. 503; Breed- slaughter where a person, after having 
 
 love V. State, 26 Tex. App. 445, 9 S. W. been knocked down, and having started 
 
 768; Clark v. State, 19 Tex. App. 495; to leave the room, turned and fired 
 
 Leggett v. State, 21 Tex. App. 382, 17 back toward the spot where his assail- 
 
 S. W. 159; Hjeronymus v. State (Tex. ant had stood, but which had been va- 
 
 Crim. App.) 83 S. W. 708; Finder v. cated by him and was occupied by an- 
 
 State, 27 Fla. 370, 26 Am. St. Rep. 75, other, if at the time the shot was fired 
 
 8 So. 837; State v. Raymond, 11 Nev. the accused recognized that the person 
 
 98; State v. Thompson, Wright (Ohio) at whom he aimed was not his assail- 
 
 617 ; King v. Brown, 1 Leach, C. L. 148, ant. White v. State, supra. 
 
 1 East, P. C. 231, 245, 274; Rex v. sHoneycutt v. State, 42 Tex. Grim. 
 
 Conner, 7 Car. & P. 438; White v. State Rep. 129, 57 S. W. 808. 
 
 (Tex. Grim. App.) 63 L.R.A. 660, 68 4Rex v. Conner, supra. 
 
680 HOMICIDE. Ij 362 
 
 of manslaughter.'' And this is so where he shot in a careless or 
 reckless manner, though he was justified in ^, shooting.* So, one 
 who unlawfully draws or handles a firearm, which goes off acci- 
 dentally and kills a person other than the one against whom the 
 unlawful act was directed, is guilty of involuntary manslaughter 
 in the commission of an unlawful act.^ And this is the rule though 
 the slayer previously entertained an intent to kill the person against 
 whom such act was directed.* 
 
 One who tries in a sudden heat and passion to kill one person, 
 and accidentally kills another, however, cannot be guilty of a less 
 offense than manslaughter.® And one who kills another, mistaking 
 him for a third person, in an ati^mpt to illegally arrest such third 
 person, is guilty of homicide which cannot be of a less grade than 
 manslaughter, though done upon a reasonable apprehension of danger, 
 the slayer in such case standing in the attitude of a trespasser or one 
 who provoked a difficulty.^" So, though a person was justified in 
 shooting at another, if he did so in a careless and reckless manner 
 and vothout due caution, and killed another, he is guilty of involun- 
 tary manslaughter. ^ ^ But where a person engaged in a fight with 
 others and deliberately killed an innocent bystander, no question 
 arises of the reduction of the crime to manslaughter because he acted 
 in a heat of passion produced by the fight, in the absence of evidence 
 that he mistook the person killed for one of his antagonists.'^ 
 
 SButler v. State, 92 Ga. 601, 19 S. But that at the time one killed an- 
 
 E. 51. And see Turner v. Com. (Ky.) other he was laboring under such pas- 
 
 89 S. W. 482. sion as deprived him of the power of 
 
 eScott V. State (Ark.) 86 S. W. 1004. forming an intent to kill with delib- 
 
 TMcPherson v. State, 22 Ga. 478 ; erate mind does not reduce the crime to 
 
 Golliher v. Com. 2 Duv. 163, 87 Am. Dec. manslaughter, if the passion was caused 
 
 493. by another person, and the killing of 
 
 But where a person entered into a the deceased was intentional and not by 
 conflict with another and discharged a mistake, under a statute defining man- 
 shot from a revolver at him, which slaughter as homicide committed un- 
 missed him, and immediately afterwards der the immediate influence of sudden 
 the parties clutched each other, and in passion arising from adequate cause, 
 the struggle which took place, and just and providing that the act must be 
 as the one holding the revolver fell, or directly caused by passion arising out 
 while he was on the ground, it went of a provocation, and that a provocation 
 off, though apparently without inten- given by some other person than the 
 tion on his part, and killed a boy who one killed is not sufBoient. White v. 
 was near, the act is not merely invol- State (Tex. Crim. App.) 63 L.R.A. 660, 
 untary manslaughter, consisting of an 68 S. W. 689. 
 
 accidental killing in the performance . lo Peter v. State, 23 Tex. App. 684, 5 
 
 of an unlawful act, but is voluntary S. W. 228. And see Carter v. State, 'sO 
 
 manslaughter, since that would have Tex. App. 551, 28 Am. St. Rep. 944 17 
 
 been the offense had he shot the man S. W. 1102. 
 
 with whom he was struggling. Com. n Scott v. State (Ark.) 86 S. W. 1004. 
 
 V. Flanigan, 8 Phila. 430. izState v. Crawford, 115 Mo. 620, 
 
 sGolliher v. Com. supra. 22 S. W. 371. 
 
 sSims V. Com. 12 Ky. L. Rep. 215, 13 
 S. W. 1079; Wills v. State, 74 Ala. 21. 
 
§ 363] KILiLING ONE BY UNLAWFUL ACT AIMED AT ANOTHER. 581 
 
 363. When justifiable or excusable. — If the killing of a' person in- 
 tended to be killed would, under the circumstances, have been excus- 
 able or justifiable homicide for any reason, then the unintentional 
 killing of a bystander or other third person is also excusable and 
 justifiable.-' Ai>d where a party shoots at another in necessary self- 
 defense, and accidentally kills a third person, it is no offense.* And 
 where a person preparing to defend himself against the attack of an- 
 other accidentally kills a third person, it makes no difference on 
 the question of criminal responsibility whether the act of prepara- 
 tion was either apparently or actually dangerous to the life of others, 
 since he had the right to so prepare himself, whether he endangered 
 other persons or not. * Nor is there any criminality in shooting in or- 
 der to scare away an assailant, and where one does so with reasonable 
 care, and accidentally kills a third person, it is excusable homicide.* 
 So, if a man intending to kill a thief or housebreaker in his own 
 house happens by mistake to kill a member of his own family, or 
 another, it cannot be imputed to him as a criminal act. ® 
 
 Where a person with malice aforethought discharges a gun intend- 
 ing to kill one person, but kills another, however, it is not an accident 
 within the meaning of a statute providing that no act done by acci- 
 dent is an offense.® And self-defense is not available to one who 
 shoots and kills one person when intending to kill another, to re- 
 
 iPinder v. State, 27 Fla. 370, 26 Am. ELevett's Case, Cro. Car. 538, Fost. 
 
 St. Rep. 75, 8 So. 837; Ringer v. State, C. L. 258; McPherson v. State, 22 Ga. 
 
 74 Ark. 262, 85 S. W. 410; Morris v. 478; Com. v. Moore, 28 Ky. L. Rep. 62, 
 
 Piatt, 32 Conn. 75; Butler v. State, 92 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 719, 88 S. W. 1085. 
 
 Ga. 601, 19 S. E. 51 ; Aaron v. State, And the fact that a supposed burglar 
 
 31 Ga. 167 ; State v. Baptiste, 105 La. seizes the gun of the owner of the house, 
 
 661, 30 So. 147; Powell v. State (Tex. who catches him in a supposed attempt 
 
 Crim. App.) 70 S. W. 218; Levett's to burglarize it, to prevent being shot. 
 
 Case, Cro. Car. 538. And see Turner v. does not deprive the owner of his right 
 
 Com. (Ky.) 89 S. W. 482. to shoot him unless the alleged burglar 
 
 2 Clark V. State, 19 Tex. App. 495; surrenders himself, so as to render him 
 
 Lankster v. State, • 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. responsible for the killing of another by 
 
 603, 56 S. W. 05 ; Pinder v. State, su- an accidental discharge of the gun while 
 
 pra. And see Bennett v. State (Tex. thus held by the burglar, as having been 
 
 Crim. App.) 75 S. W. 314; Lankster v. done in the execution of an unlawful 
 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 72 S. W. 388. act. McPherson v. State, supra. 
 
 Where a person was assaulted with- So, a man who surprises another in 
 
 out having himself provoked the assault, the act of adultery with his wife is 
 
 and shot at his assailant in consequence justified iinder the Texas statute in 
 
 thereof, and killed another person by killing the paramour, and if he draws 
 
 bad shooting, it would be a homicide by his knife with a view to killing him, 
 
 misadventure if the assault was such as and in attempting to push his wife aside 
 
 would justify killing the assailant. But- so as to get at her paramour, he ac- 
 
 ler v. State, supra. cidentally cuts and wounds her, he is en- 
 
 sLankster v. State, supra; Trahue v. titled to an acquittal. Pena v. State, 
 
 Com. 23 Ky. L. Rep. 2135, 66 S. W. 38 Tex. Crim. Eep. 333, 42 S. W. 991. 
 
 718. sRichards v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Kep. 
 
 dRinger v. State, supra. 38, 30 S. W. 805. 
 
582 HOMICIDE t§ 363 
 
 lieve him from responsibility, whatever danger he believes himself 
 to be in, unless the circumstances are such as to justify the belief on 
 the part of an ordinarily reasonable and prudent man.'' And it 
 is the province of the jury in such a case to determine whether the 
 slayer had reasonable cause to believe that the person killed was the 
 one against whom the violence was justified or intended to be used.* 
 
 vState V. Brown, 4 Penn. (Del.) 120, sPeople v. Melendrez, 129 Cal. 649, 62 
 53 Atl. 354. And see Taylor v. State, Fac. 109. 
 73 Ark. 158, 83 S. W. 922. 
 
CHAPTER XVX 
 
 RIOTOUS HOMICIDE. 
 
 364. In war levied against government. 
 
 365. Joint responsibility of rioters for. 
 
 366. Application of rules with reference to provocation and hot blood. 
 
 367. Killing third person or bystander. 
 
 368. Killing by lynch law. 
 
 369. Killing to suppress riot. 
 
 364. In war levied against government — When an unlawful as- 
 semblage takes place for the redress of a supposed public wrong, 
 and particularly where its object is the extinction of government, 
 the destruction of judicial process, or the resistance of executive 
 authority as such, participation in it, to the extent of levying war 
 against the government for these public purposes, becomes treason. 
 Where, however, the intention is to redress a private or social griev- 
 ance, and to incidentally resist process merely so far as may be nec- 
 essary to effect the private or social end, the offense does not amount 
 to the dignity of treason, and if during its commission life is lost, 
 the offender must be tried for homicide. But, even supposing that 
 treason exists, the felony of murder or manslaughter does not merge 
 in it. Merger only exists where a misdemeanor and a felony form 
 a constituent part of the same act, as, where an attempt to commit 
 a larceny and the larceny itself unite. In such cases it is the felony 
 alone that can be prosecuted. But two felonies cannot thus coalesce, 
 for, being each of equal dignity, neither sinks into the other. And 
 the domains of treason have become restricted within limits which 
 exclude the great mass of those cases of general riot, which were 
 formerly included within the term; and "levying war" in the defi- 
 nition of treason is shorn of the constructive element, and restricted, 
 as the terms suggest, to the actual making of war against the state, 
 and should be confined to insurrections and rebellions for the pur- 
 pose of "overturning the government by force and arms." And 
 the expression does not include a combination on the part of certain 
 citizens in a particular neighborhood to aid fugitive slaves in re- 
 
 583 
 
5»4 HOMICIDE. [§ 3S4 
 
 sisting their capture, and, even though such resistance results in 
 murder and robbery, it is not treason. ^ 
 
 It has been asserted, however, that there is no such separate offense 
 known to the law as a riotous homicide, and the fact that the killing 
 was committed by a crowd of persons engaged in a riot does not dis- 
 tinguish it in kind or degree from other felonious homicides. ^ 
 
 365. Joint responsibility of rioters for — The joint responsibility of 
 rioters for each other's misconduct rests on the principle that when 
 an act is committed by a body of men engaged in a common enter- 
 prise, such act is treated as if specifically committed by each individ- 
 ual. The rule as usually stated is that "Where diver? persons 
 resolve generally to resist all opposers in the commission of any 
 breach of the peace, and to execilte it in such a manner as naturally 
 tends to raise tumults and affrays, . . . and in so doing happen 
 to kill a man, they are all guilty of murder, for they must, at their 
 peril, abide the event of their action who wilfully engage in such 
 bold disturbances of the public peace, in open opposition to, and de- 
 fiance of, the justice of the nation."* It is wholly a question of 
 participation and common design, a full consideration of which will 
 be found in other chapters of this work. ^ 
 
 366. Application of rules with reference to provocation and hot 
 blood. — "Hot blood" is no excuse, unless it is attended with sufficient 
 provocatory causes. Such causes, when taken in connection with 
 riotous homicide, are comparatively limited. When death occurs 
 through a collision of groups of heated partisans between whom there 
 has long been a grudge, and such death is produced incidentally by 
 an instrument not necessarily mortal ; and when this death, therefore, 
 is connected with a passionate impulse arising from a temper already 
 morbid with old griefs, — 'the offense is manslaughter. And so also' 
 if, on a collision arising, one or more of the parties hurries to his 
 home, and, still under the influence of passion, fetches firearms, and 
 there kills another, the offense is but manslaughter. For when there- 
 is hot blood caused by a collision with a hostile party to any extent 
 equal in strength, the law in its tenderness makes allowance for it 
 by lowering the degree. It should be observed, however, that where- 
 
 lUnited States v. Hanway, 2 Wall. Fost. & F. 351; Washington v. State, 
 
 Jr. 144, Fed. Cas. No. 15,299; Whar- 36 Ga. 222; Brennan v. People, 15 111. 
 
 ton, Crim. Law, 7th ed. § 2725. 511; State v. Simmons, 51 N. C. (6- 
 
 2State V. Jenkins, 14 Rich, L. 215, Jones, L.) 21; Ruloff v. People, 45 N. 
 
 94 Am. Dec. 132. Y. 213; Huling v. State, 17 Ohio St. 
 
 11 Hawk. P. C. chap. 31, § 51; 583; United States v. Ross, 1 Gall. 624, 
 
 Staundeforde, 17; 1 Hale, P. C. 439 et Fed. Cas. No. 16,196. 
 
 seq.; 4 Bl. Com. 200; 1 East, P. C. 2See supra, chapter VI., and infra^ 
 
 chap. 55, § 33, p. 257 ; Reg. v. Archer, 1 chapter XXI., § 420. 
 
S 3B8] RIOTOUS HOMICIDE. 585 
 
 one party is greatly superior to the other in strength, the former 
 cannot be allowed the benefit of such a defense.^ And this dis- 
 tinction is particularly applicable to cases of popular affrays. When 
 there are two factions who are in a state of partisan warfare, as. 
 long as either acts in hot blood the law takes compassion on this 
 infirmity, and lessens the degree of homicide to manslaughter, pro- 
 vided there is no cooling time, and no premeditated use of deadly 
 weapons. But where there is a marked preponderance in strength 
 on the one side or the other, no degree of supposed provocation can 
 relieve from the guilt of murder the individuals of an armed mob, 
 which undertakes thus to follow up a supposed enemy. ^ So, it is 
 obvious that no measurement of cooling time can be adopted in 
 this respect. In periods of great public excitement, when men's 
 minds have been so absorbed with a particular topic as to be incapable 
 of considering anything else, it takes a much greater period to 
 cool after a supposed provocation than under ordinary circumstances. 
 Care, however, should be taken in this, as well as in all similar 
 cases, lest the public excitement be used as a cloak for private 
 cupidity or revenge.* 
 
 367. Killing third person or bystander. — ^Where an unlawful as- 
 sembly resorts to the use of deadly weapons, and death ensues 
 to innocent third parties, it seems that such a homicide is murder 
 at common law, supposing the guilt of the offender is not ex- 
 tenuated by such a state of hot blood as would reduce the grade 
 to manslaughter. It has, indeed, been intimated that such a hom- 
 icide would be murder at common law, without any qualification 
 from the state of the blood. The true view, however, is that it 
 is not the character of the deceased, but the relation and posi- 
 tion of the offender, that determines the grade. And if a fight with 
 firearms between two bodies of enraged men should take place in a 
 public street, and from a simultaneous fire, innocent citizens, their 
 wives or children in their houses, should be killed by some of the 
 missiles discharged, the violators of the public peace, whose unlaw- 
 ful acts have produced the death of the unoffending, cannot escape, 
 because from the manner and time of the fire it is impossible to 
 tell from what quarter the implement of death was propelled. If 
 men are so reckless of the lives of the innocent as to engage in a 
 
 iSee supra, chapter X., § 200. riotous and exciting affray involving a 
 
 2See supra, chapter X., § 199. considerable number of persons, and the 
 
 3 See People v. Curtis, 52 Mich. 616, absence of these qualities cannot be 
 
 18 N. W. 385. treated as "aggravating the acts of per- 
 
 Coolness and deliberation are not to sons ia the original wrong. Ibid. 
 
 be expected of persons concerned in a 
 
586 HOMICIDE. [§ 367 
 
 conflict witli firearms in the public highway of a thickly populated 
 city, they cannot have the benefit of impracticable niceties, in order 
 to their indemnity from the consequences of their own conduct.* 
 It was said, however, that such homicide, in any view of the case, 
 would not be murder in the first degree, as there would be wanting 
 that specific malice which is necessary to constitute that offense. If, 
 however, there is a deliberate killing of an innocent third party, 
 knowing him to be such, the offense is murder in the first degree.* 
 
 368. Killing by lynch law — ^When the object of riotous conduct 
 resulting in death is to inflict capital punishment, by what is called 
 lynch law, all who consent to the design are responsible for the 
 overt act.* It is not necessary to say that under our laws this is 
 murder in the first degree when not executed in hot blood. Of all 
 species of homicide it is the one that most strikingly combines the 
 two distinctive features of that type, — viz.^ deliberation and a specific 
 intent to take life. 
 
 In Texas there is a statute making it a separate and specific offense 
 to take human life by mob violence, the purpose of which is to rem- 
 edy the taking from the custody of officers of the law, by bodies 
 of armed citizens, persons accused of crime, and to provide speedy 
 punishment in cases of rape, and to give venue in cases of mob vio- 
 lence in counties other than the county in which it was committed.* 
 This provision is confined strictly to lynch law, and the provision 
 thereof that a mob may consist of as small a number as two persons 
 is not intended to include homicide committed in pursuance of a 
 conspiracy instigated by personal malice, or to repeal statutes with 
 reference to murder committed in pursuance of a conspiracy or com- 
 bination, unless the object of such conspiracy or combination was 
 to take from olficers by force persons charged with, or who had com- 
 mitted, a crime, and to execute them. ^ 
 
 369. Killing to suppress riot. — This subject is considered in all its 
 phases in another chapter of this work.* 
 
 iSee supra, chapter VIII., § 90. sAlexander v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. 
 
 2Se. supra, chapter IX., § 135. »«,P-Jf ' ^^ «. W. 229, 50 S. W. 716. 
 
 iSee State v. Wilson, 38 Conn. 126. iSee infra, chapter XXIV., § 623. 
 
CHAPTER XVIL 
 
 SUICIDE. 
 370. A branch of the law of homicide. 
 
 370. A branch of the law of homicide — Suicide is homicide, and 
 the moral responsibility therefor is the same. Homicide may be 
 committed by killing one's self, as well as by killing another. ^ And 
 a person might be a principal in the first degree in suicide where 
 the act was committed by another under his direction and through 
 his compulsion, as in the case of the freedman who, in ancient times, 
 held the sword that his master might fall upon it.^ In earlier 
 times it was punished in various ways, — ^by the Athenian law by 
 cutting off the hand which committed the desperate act.* In Eng- 
 land it was formerly punished by burial in the highway with a 
 stake driven through the body,* and by a forfeiture of the goods 
 and chattels of the suicide to the King, with a view that his care 
 for his reputation and for the welfare of his family would be some 
 motive to restrain him.^ But punishment by burial in the highway 
 was abolished by 4 George IV., chap. 52, providing for private in- 
 tennent by night, without the rites of Christian burial.® And in 
 the United States, though suicide is regarded as an unlawful and 
 criminal act, there is no mode of punishment affecting either the 
 body or the property of the deceased.'' Attempts to commit suicide, 
 however, are punishable generally. But the Jaw with reference to 
 attempted suicide is not regarded as a part of this subject. And 
 one may aid and abet suicide, as well as other kinds of homicide. 
 The subject of aiding and abetting suicide is elsewhere considered 
 in this work.^ 
 
 14 Bl. Com. ■ Chase's ed. 937. «* Bl. Com. Chase's ed. 938, note. 
 
 2Lord McCauIay in Report on India 'Com. v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 25 Am. 
 
 Penal Code. Eep. 109; Burnett v. People, 204 111. 
 
 34 Bl. Com. Chase's ed. 937. 20S, 68 L.E.A. 304, 98 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 4lbid., 933. 206, 68 N. E. 505. 
 
 Bibid. sSee supra, chapter VI., §§ 43, 54, 64. 
 
 587 
 
CHAPTEE XVIIL 
 
 INFANTICIDE. 
 
 371. Scope of subject. 
 
 372. Injuries causing death before birtii. 
 
 373. Death after birth from injuries prior to birth. 
 
 374. Injury and death during process of birth. 
 
 375. Infanticide under the statutes. 
 
 371. Scope of subject. — The criminal responsibility for killing 
 a live infant fully born differs in no respect from that for killing 
 an adult, and all the rules and principles stated in this work apply 
 as well to the one as to the other; and when a fully born infant 
 is killed, it is immaterial that the design to kill was formed previous 
 to the birth of the child. ^ The purpose of this chapter is to state the 
 law with reference to injuries causing the death of a child before 
 birth; and to injuries before birth causing death after birth; and 
 to injuries after partial, but before complete, birth causing death. 
 
 372. Injuries causing death before birth — To kill a child in its 
 mother's womb is not murder ; if an injury is inflicted upon a child, 
 which causes its death en ventre sa mere, it is not murder.* And 
 therefore, if a woman being quick with child take any potion to 
 cause an abortion, or if another give her any such potion, or if a 
 person strike her, whereby the child within her is killed, it is not 
 murder or manslaughter.^ It was not homicide at common law 
 to take the life of an unborn child at any period of gestation previous 
 to delivery;* and this was so, though the killing was in the very 
 process of delivery.* Nor is an infant en ventre sa mere a human 
 being within the meaning of statutory provisions that whoever kills 
 
 iWallace v. State, 7 Tex. App. 570. In Evans v. People, 49 N. Y. 86, how- 
 
 A person who, before the birth of an ever, it was said that causing the death 
 
 infant, procured others to kill it, which of an infant in its mother's womb was, 
 
 they did immediately after its birth, at a very early day, deemed murder. 
 
 is guilty of a felony without clergy. 2 State v. Prude, supra: 
 
 Parker's Case, 2 Dyer, 186a. sMitchell v. Com. 78 Ky. 204,' 39 Am. 
 
 iQueen v. West, 2 Car. & K. 786, 787 ; Rep. 229 ; State v. Cooper, 22 N. J. L. 
 
 Clarke v. State, 117 Ala. 1, 67 Am. St. 52, 51 Am. Dec. 248; Evans v. People, 
 
 Rep. 157, 23 So. 671; State v. Prude, 76 supra. 
 
 Miss. 543, 24 So. 871. < State v. Cooper, supra. 
 
 688 
 
5 372] INFANTICIDE. 539 
 
 any human being with malice aforethought, either express or im- 
 plied, is guilty of murder.* 
 
 373. Death after birth from injuries prior to birth If a child be 
 
 born alive, and die after birth through a potion or bruises received 
 in the womb, it is murder in the person who administered or gave 
 them.* Where, also, a blow is maliciously given to a child while 
 in the act of being bom, as, for instance, upon the head as soon- 
 as the head appears, and before the child has breathed, it will 
 be murder if the child is afterwards born alive, and dies thereof.* 
 And if a person intending to procure abortion does an act which 
 causes a child to be born so much earlier than the natural time, 
 that it is born in a state rendering it much less capable of living, 
 and afterwards dies in consequence of its exposure to the external 
 world, the person who by this misconduct so brings the child into 
 the world, and puts it thereby in a situation in which it cannot 
 live, is guilty of murder; and the mere existence of a possibility 
 that something might have been done to prevent the death would 
 not render it less murder. * 
 
 Beating a mother quick with child, inflicting injuries upon the 
 child from which it dies after birth, however, is not murder in the 
 first degree in the absence of express malice or an intent to take 
 life. * But if the beating was of such a character as to be dangerous 
 to the life of the mother, the killing is murder in the second degree, 
 of which implied malice is a distingaiishing characteristic' But 
 when the act causing the death of the child was done in good faith, 
 and in the exercise of reasonable care, merely for the purpose of 
 assisting delivery, the homicide is justifiable and the accused should 
 be acquitted.® 
 
 374. Injury and death during process of birth Life cannot be 
 
 taken unless life exists, and we have seen that a new-born infant 
 cannot be a subject of homicide until it is possessed of independent 
 
 sAbrams v. Foshee, 3 Iowa, 274, 66 2Rex v. Senior, supra; 3 Inst. 50; 1 
 
 Am. Dec. 77; Evans v. People, supra. Hawk. P. C. chap. 31, § 16; 4 Bl. Com. 
 
 13 Inst. 50; Rex v. Poulton, 5 Car. 198; 1 East, P. C. chap. 5, § 14, p. 228. 
 
 6 P. 329; Reg. V. Wright, 9 Car. & P. Contra, 1 Hale, P. C. 432; and Staunde- 
 754; Rex v. Senior, 1 Moody, C. C. forde, 21. But the reasons on which the 
 346; Queen v. West, 2 Car. & K. 786, opinions of the last two writers seem 
 787; Clarke v. State, 117 Ala. 1, 67 to be founded, namely, the difficulty of 
 Am. St. Rep. 157, 23 So. 671; Evans v. ascertaining the fact, cannot be consid- 
 People, 49 N. Y. 86. ered as satisfactory, unless it be sup- 
 
 And a wife may testify for or against posed that such fact never can be clearly 
 
 her husband on a charge against him established. 
 
 for having beaten her, thereby causing 3Queen v. West, 2 Car. &, K. 783. 
 
 the death after its birth of her child, < Clarke v. State, supra. 
 
 of which she was then pregnant. Clarke sjbid. 
 
 V. State, supra. sWallace v. State, 7 Tex. App. 570. 
 
590 HOMICIDE. [I 374 
 
 life.* It must have been born alive, or have been alive at the in- 
 ception of its birth;'' and it cannot be said to have independent 
 life, within this rule, until an independent circulation has been 
 established.* If the child has been wholly produced from the body 
 of its mother alive, and she wilfully and of malice aforethought 
 strangles it while it is alive, and has an independent circulation of 
 its own, this is murder, although the child be still attached to its 
 mother by the umbilical cord.* Eut it must be proved that the 
 entire child has actually been born into the world in a living 
 state ;*' and the fact of its having breathed is not a conclusive 
 proof thereof." It might breathe before it was born; its having 
 breathed is not sufBcient life to make the killing of the child murder.'' 
 Being born means that the whole body must be brought into the 
 world, and it is not suiEcient that the child respires in the progress 
 of the birth. * It is clear, however, that if a child be actually wholly 
 produced alive, it is not necessary that it should have breathed to 
 make it the subject of murder, as many children are born alive, and 
 yet do not breathe for some time after their birth.® An indictment 
 alleging murder of an infant committed in some way or manner, and 
 by some means, instruments, and weapons to the jurors unknown, suffi- 
 
 ipee supra, chapter III., § 13. a child by its mother shortly after its 
 
 2Evans v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) birth, unaccompanied by positive tes- 
 
 89 S. W. 974. timony that the child was born alive, 
 
 sState V. Winthrop, 43 Iowa, 519, 22 is insufficient to warrant a conviction 
 
 Am. Rep. 257; United States v. Hewson, of the mother of the murder of her in- 
 
 7 Host. L. Rep. 361 ; Rex v. Enoch, 5 fant. Davis's Case, 3 N. Y. City Hall 
 
 Car. & P. 539; Rex v. Poulton, 5 Car. Rec. 45. 
 
 & P. 329; Reg. v. Wright, 9 Car. & P. But the appearance of the body of a 
 
 754. child as to whether it was fully or par- 
 
 4Eeg. V. Trilloe, 1 Car. & M. 650; tiauy developed is a matter of obser- 
 
 Reg. v. Reeves, 9 Car. & P. 25; Evans vation and fact, and a statement of a 
 
 V. People, 49 N. Y. 86; Com. v. O'Don- witness that he examined such a body 
 
 ohue, 8 Phila. 623. and found it fully developed is compe- 
 
 In State v. Winthrop, supra, however, tent in a prosecution for infanticide, 
 
 it was said by way of argument upon Hubbard v. State, 72 Ala. 164. 
 
 another point, that where a child is sReg. v. Sellis, supra; Rex v. Enoch, 
 
 born alive, but the umbilical cord is 5 Car. & P. 539; Reg. v. Wright, 9 Car. 
 
 not severed, and independent circulation & P. 754; Wallace v. State, supra. 
 
 has not been established, independent 'Rex v. Enoch, and Reg. v. Wright, 
 
 life is impossible. supra. 
 
 5Rex V. Sellis, 7 Car. & P. 850; Reg. sRex v. Poulton, 5 Car. & P. 329; 
 
 V. Crutchley, 7 Car. & P. 814; Harris Com. v. O'Donohue, 8 Phila. 623. 
 
 V. State, 28 Tex. App. 308, 19 Am. St. In Wallace v. State, 10 Tex. App. 
 
 Rep. 837, 12 S. W. 1102; Wallace v. 255, it was said that physiology and ob- 
 
 State, 10 Tex. App. 255; Josef v. State, stetries have established the position 
 
 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 446, 30 S. W. 1067. that the respiration of a child after par- 
 
 That the child was born alive must be turition is complete demonstrates that 
 
 established in a prosecution for infan- the circulation of its blood is independ- 
 
 ticide as a part of the corpus delicti, ent of its mother and shows its individ- 
 
 Josef V. State, supra. ual existence. 
 
 And mere evidence of concealment of sRex v. Brain, 6 Car. & P. 349. 
 
§ 374 J INFANTICIDE. 591 
 
 ciently charges the offense of infanticide upon a child newly born. ^ * 
 Eut an averment in an indictment for infanticide that the deceased 
 infant was a female is descriptive, and it is incumbent upon the 
 state to prove it. ^ ^ Whether the child was born alive is a ques- 
 tion of fact to be determined by the jury in view of all the circum- 
 stances of the case. ^ ^ 
 
 375. Infanticide under the statutes. — The statutes of some of the 
 states have made it manslaughter to kill an unborn quick child by 
 an injury to its mother/ or to cause the death of a child by an 
 attempt to procure a miscarriage by its mother.^ Under such stat- 
 utes manslaughter is sufficiently made out where the injury to the 
 mother was inflicted under such circumstances that the crime would 
 have been murder had they resulted in her death instead of that 
 of the child. ^ But the taking of any substance or the use of any 
 instrument by a pregnant woman herself, with intent to destroy her 
 child, is not covered by a provision making it manslaughter to 
 administer medicine to, or use instruments upon, a woman preg- 
 nant with a quick child.* And an indictment merely charging 
 the felonious killing of an unborn child is not sufficient under such 
 a provision. ° And it cannot be said that within the meaning of these 
 rules an act causing abortion, done in any stage of pregnancy, is man- 
 slaughter; there cannot be death until there is life, or, in other 
 words, until the child has become quick." And a child is not quick 
 until it stirs or quickens in the womb; until the mother has felt 
 the child alive within her.^ 
 
 loSheppard v. State, 17 Tex. App. 74. sWilliams v. State, supra. 
 
 iiWallaee v. State, supra. estate v. Prude, supra. 
 
 i2Hubbard v. State, 72 Ala. 164; Eog. elbid. 
 
 V. Middleship, 5 Cox, C. C. 275. «Evans v. People, 49 N. Y. 80; Heg. 
 
 iSee Evans v. People, 49 N. Y. 83; v. Wycherley, 8 Car. & P. 262. 
 
 Williams v. State, 34 Fla. 217, 15 So. 'Evans v. People, supra; State v. 
 
 760. Cooper, 22 N. J. L. 52, 51 Am. Dee. 
 
 2See Evans v. People, supra; State 248. 
 V. Prude, 76 Miss. 543, 24 So. 871. 
 
CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 HOMICIDE BY ABORTION OR ATTEMPTED ABORTION.t 
 
 I. Cbiminal liability generally. 
 
 376. Common-law and general rules as to. 
 
 377. Theory that it is a killing in the commission of an unlawful leL 
 
 378. Theory that it is a killing in doing an act dangerous to life. 
 II. Gbade or degree of the crime. 
 
 379. At common law. 
 
 380. Under general statutes as to degree of homicide. 
 
 III. Special statutory provisions as to criminality. 
 
 381. Substance of, generally. 
 
 382. When common-law rules are superseded. 
 
 IV. Justification or excuse. 
 
 383. Consent. 
 
 384. That act was necessary to life or health. 
 
 I. Ceiminal liability geneeally. 
 
 376. Common-law and general rules as to ^At common law, if life 
 
 was destroyed in the commission of, or attempt to commit, an 
 abortion, Avhether the woman was quick with child or not, it was 
 murder, or at least manslaughter.^ And under the various stat- 
 utes on the subject, causing the death of a pregnant woman by means 
 of an attempt to procure a miscarriage, or by the use of instruments 
 for that purpose, is made punishable, as a general rule, whether 
 or not she was quick with child. ^ And though the injury to, or 
 wound inflicted upon, a woman for the purpose of procuring an 
 abortion may not have been sufficient of itself to produce death, 
 yet if, owing to her condition, death was produced, when but for 
 the wound she would not have died, the wound is, in law, the cause 
 of her death, and the person inflicting it is criminally responsible 
 therefor. * In order to cause criminal liability, however, the abortion, 
 or attempt to commit abortion, must have been deliberate and in- 
 
 iThe subject of homicide in the com- rel. Chauneey v. Keeper of Prison, 2 
 
 mission of, or attempt to commit, an Ashm. (Pa.) 227; Com. v. Jackson, 15 
 
 abortion is extensively considered in a Gray, 187 ; Reg. v. Gaylor, Dears. & 
 
 note to State v. Power, 63 L.R.A. 902. B. C. C. 288, 7 Cox, C. C. 253. 
 
 zPeoples V. Com. 87 Ky. 487, 9 S. sPeople v. Abbott, 116 Mich. 263, 74 
 
 W. 509, 810; State v. Moore, 25 Iowa, N. W. 529; Smith v. State, supra. 
 
 128, 95 Am. Dec. 77G; Smith v. State, 4Clark v. Com. Ill Ky. 443, 63 S. W. 
 
 33 Me. 48, 54 Am. Dec. 607; Com. ex 740. 
 
 592 
 
S 376] BY ABORTION OR ATTEMPTED ABORTION. 593 
 
 tended, and death must have resulted therefrom, and not from ac- 
 •cident or natural causes.^ And the jury in a prosecution therefor 
 must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did not 
 cause the injury while, in good faith, endeavoring to assist nature 
 and perform the duties of a legitimate employment.® 
 
 377. Theory that it is a killing in the commission of an unlawful 
 act — The common-law rule is that causing an abortion is a felony 
 when done by an act or an agency dangerous to human life, and that 
 an abortion or attempted abortion, except when, in proper profes- 
 sional judgment, it is necessary to preserve the life of the woman, 
 is an unlawful act; and if the death of the woman ensues it is 
 murder, though there was no specific intent to take her life. ^ And 
 if the attempt at abortion was by an act or agency not usually dan- 
 gerous to human life, the resulting death was manslaughter, done 
 in the perpetration of an act not, of itself, felonious.^ ToUowing 
 this rule the courts of some of the states have held that where the stat- 
 ute makes abortion a felony if the death of the mother results, the 
 ■offense is murder, though done without intent to kill, malice being im- 
 puted from a killing in an attempt to commit a felony.^ But where 
 the statute leaves the abortion or attempt at abortion, a misdemeanor, 
 causing the mother's death in attempting an abortion is manslaughter 
 ■only, being a felonious homicide resulting from the perpetration of 
 an unlawful act not, in itself, felonious.* And the fact that a stat- 
 ute making it a misdemeanor to employ means to procure the mis- 
 carriage of a pregnant woman prescribes the penalty for the offense 
 does not take such act, when it results in death, out of the provi- 
 sions of a statute making it manslaughter to kill another in the 
 •commission of some unlawful act.^ 
 
 378. Theory that it is a killing in doing an act dangerous to life 
 
 In view of the fact that it is sometimes regarded as no offense to 
 procure an abortion, unless the woman be quick with child, and to 
 
 sPeople V. Seaman, 107 Mich. 348, the jury as to such theory is reversible 
 
 €1 Am. St. Rep. 326, 65 N. W. 203; error. People v. Seaman, supra. 
 
 State V. Glass, 5 Or. 73; Smith v. State, iState v. Smith, 32 Me. 369, 54 Am. 
 
 ^upra. Dec. 578; State v. Moore, 25 Iowa, 128, 
 
 6'Sta!te V. Glass, supra. 95 Am. Dec. 776; People v. Sessions, 
 
 And where, in a prosecution for man- 58 Mich. 594, 26 N. W. 291. 
 
 slaughter in causing death by acts cal- aState v. McNab, 20 N. H. 160; 
 
 culated to produce an abortion, there Worthington v. State, 92 Md. 222, 56 
 
 is evidence warranting the theory that L.R.A. 352, 84 Am. St. Rep. 506, 48 Atl. 
 
 the deceased aborted from natural 355. 
 
 causes, or by reason of ordinary sick- s Smith v. State, 33 Me. 48, 54 Am. 
 
 ness augmented or occasioned by a sea Dec. 007. 
 
 voyage,- together with nervous excite- ^Worthington v. State, supra.. 
 
 ment, fatigue, lack of nourishment, and estate v. Power, 34 Wash. 34, 63 L.R. 
 
 change of climate, a refusal to instruct A. 902, 63 Pac. 1112. 
 Horn.— 38 
 
594 HOMICIDE. [§ 37s 
 
 avoid a miscarriage of justice, some of the cases have repudiated the 
 theory that killing in abortion or attempted abortion is to be punished 
 as a homicide in the commission of an unlawful act, and adopted the 
 rule that criminality should be based upon the fact that it is a de- 
 liberate act dangerous to life and involving serious bodily harm, and' 
 that the resulting death is murder on that theory, though there was 
 no actual malice or intent to kill. ^ Within this theory one who kills 
 a woman by using an instrument upon her for the purpose of pro- 
 curing an abortion, the instrument being one which is ordinarily 
 dangerous to life when so used, is guilty of murder.* And an 
 instruction as to involuntary manslaughter in such case is properly 
 refused where the killing resulted from an attempt to procure ac 
 abortion.* By statute in Illinois, and perhaps in some of the other 
 states, it is expressly provided that if any person shall, in the attempt 
 to procure a miscarriage of a pregnant woman, thereby cause her 
 death, the person so offending shall be deemed guilty of murder, and 
 shall be punished as the law requires for such offense; such a 
 statute brings the crime under the general rule which governs 
 and controls murder committed by other means. * And in such case 
 a verdict for manslaughter may be found by the jury, as well as in 
 case of a prosecution for murder of any other kind. ® 
 
 II. Geade oe degeee of the ceime. 
 
 379. At common law — At common law the general rule was that 
 the commission, or attempted commission, of an abortion upon a 
 woman quick with child, by an agency dangerous to human life, 
 was to be regarded as murder.* But the crime of abortion was a 
 misdemeanor only at common law, when not perpetrated by an agency 
 dangerous to human life; and causing the death of the mother, 
 in attempting to cause an abortion on her in such case, would be man- 
 slaughter only.^ 
 
 380. Under general statutes as to degree of homicide. — Where homi- 
 cide or murder in the commission of any felony is made murder in 
 the first degree by statute, and the statute makes abortion a felony, 
 
 iPeoples V. Cora. 87 Ky. 487, 9 S. W. 4EarlI v. People, 73 111. 329. 
 
 509,810; Com. ex rel. Chauncey V. Keep- BEarll v. People, supra. 
 
 er of Prison, 2 Ashm. (Pa.) 227. igtate v. Dickinson, 41 Wis. 299; 
 
 2Clark V. Com. Ill Ky. 443, 63 S. W. State v. Smith, 32 Me. 369, 54 Am. Dec. 
 
 740; Peoples v. Cora, supra; Beasley 578; People v. Sessions, 58 Mich. 594, 
 
 V. People, 89 111. 571; Tinclder's Case, 26 N. W. 291. 
 
 1 East, P. C. 230, Fost. C. L. 261, 1 zWorthington v. State, 92 Md. 222, 
 
 Hale, P. C. 429. 56 L.K.A. 352, 84 Ara. St. Rep. 506, 48 
 
 3Wilson V. Com. 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1251, Atl. 355. 
 GO S. W. 400. 
 
5 380] BY ABORTION OR ATTEMPTED ABORTION. 595 
 
 a homicide in the commission, or attempted commission, of an abor- 
 tion is, of course, murder in the first degree.'^ And where the statute 
 provides that homicide thus committed is the same as murder com- 
 mitted in any other way, and no degrees of murder are established, 
 homicide thus committed is, of course, murder.^ But where the 
 statute' as to degrees in homicide provides that murder or killing in 
 the commission of, or attempt to commit, certain named or specified 
 felonies or crimes shall be murder in the first degree, and all other 
 murder shall be murder in the second degree, omitting to name abor- 
 tion as one of such felonies or crimes, homicide in the commission of 
 an abortion is murder in the second degree when committed through 
 the use of an agency dangerous to human life.* Malice, either ex- 
 press or implied, or intent to kill, however, is an essential ingredient 
 of murder in the second degree as well as in the first degree, and in 
 the absence of allegation and proof of such malice or intent to kill, 
 a conviction cannot be had in a case of homicide in the commission 
 of an abortion, even for murder in the second degree.* And homi- 
 cide in the commission, or attempted commission, of an abortion is 
 manslaughter only, and not murder, where the instrument or agency 
 used was not necessarily dangerous to human life ; ^ the homicide in 
 such case being a felonious one resulting from the perpetration of 
 an unlawful act not, of itself, felonious.® But where an abortion 
 resulting in death is manslaughter on the part of the person causing 
 it, it is voluntary, and not involuntary manslaughter. '' 
 
 III. Special statutoey provisions as to ceiminality. 
 381. Substance of, generally — The offense of killing a woman by 
 
 iSee Smith v. State, 33 Me. 48, 54 her into another state and there cut 
 
 Am. Deo. 607. off her liead for the purpose of destroy- 
 
 2EarIl V. People, 73 111. 329. ing identification, when she was, in fact, 
 
 sState V. Leeper, 70 Iowa, 748, 30 alive, is guilty of murder within the 
 
 N. W. 501 ; State v. Moore, 25 Iowa, jurisdiction of the courts of the lat- 
 
 128, 95 Am. Dec. 776; State v. Lodge, 9 ter state in the county where he did the 
 
 Houst. (Del.) 542, 33 Atl. 312; State v. cutting. Jackson v. Com. 100 Ky. 239, 
 
 Alcorn, 7 Idaho, 599, 97 Am. St. Rep. 66 Am. St. Rep. 336, 38 S. W. 422, Re- 
 
 252, 64 Pac. 1014; Com. ex rel. Chaun- hearing denied in 100 Ky. 268, 38 S. 
 
 cey V. Keeper of Prison, 2 Ashm. (Pa.) W. 1091. 
 
 229; Ex parte Fatheree, 34 Tex. Crim. 4 State v. Young, 55 Kan. 349, 40 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 594, 31 S. W. 403. 659. 
 
 One who feloniously administered, or sClark v. Com. Ill Ky. 443, 63 S. 
 
 procured another to administer, drugs W. 740; Peoples v. Com. 87 Ky. 487, 9 
 
 to a woman in one state for the purpose S. W. 509, 810 ; Wilson v. Com. 22 Ky. 
 
 of procuring an abortion, when she was L. Rep. 1251, 60 S. W. 400; Reg. v. Far- 
 
 so far advanced in pregnancy as to make row. Dears. & B. C. C. 164, 3 Jur. N. S. 
 
 it necessarily dangerous to life, or when 167, 5 Week. Rep. 269. 
 
 the drugs were in themselves, or in the estate v. McNab, 20 N. H. 160. 
 
 manner of their administration, danger- 7CIark v. Com. and Peoples v. Com. 
 
 ous to her life, and, believing her to supra, 
 have been killed in that way, carried 
 
596 HOMICIDE. 
 
 K 381 
 
 committing or attempting an abortion upon her is provided for by 
 statute, and made a special offense in many of the states.^ Thus, in 
 New York, it is manslaughter to administer drugs to a pregnant 
 female with intent to destroy the child, in case the death of such child 
 is thereby produced. ^ And in Wisconsin, procuring an abortion, and 
 thereby causing the death of the woman operated upon, is man- 
 slaughter in the second degree. * So, what would have been embraced 
 within the technical offense of murder at common law in causing 
 the death of a woman in attempting to procure an abortion is a statu- 
 tory offense in Massachusetts, distinguishable from murder, and pun- 
 ishable by a milder punishment.* A statutory provision that any 
 person who shall commit, or attempt to commit, an abortion upon any 
 woman, unless the same shall be necessary to preserve her life, shall 
 be guilty of manslaughter, however, is inoperative and invalid, since 
 it undertakes to establish a degree of felonious homicide where there 
 may have been no homicide at all. ® 
 
 382. When comiiion-law rules are superseded The rule has been 
 
 laid down that statutes making it a misdemeanor to employ means to 
 procure abortion of a pregnant woman, and prescribing penalties for 
 the offense, do not take such act, when it results in death, out of the 
 provisions of a statute making it manslaughter to kill another in the 
 commission of some unlawful act.^ And it has been held that a 
 statute providing that any person who shall strike or thrust another, 
 not designing to cause death, or who shall do any other unlawful act 
 so that the person struck or thrust shall die within a designated time 
 thereof, shall be punished in a designated manner, was not intended 
 to meet the case of destroying life in the commission of an abortion, 
 and does not repeal the common law relating to it ; ^ and that, though 
 the statute makes homicide in the commission of an abortion murder 
 the same as if committed in a different manner, it does not prevent 
 a verdict of manslaughter the same as may be given in any other 
 kind of murder.* And the fact that a statutory penalty has been at- 
 
 iSee Robbing v. State, 8 Ohio St. zLohman v. People, supra. 
 138; Earll v. People, 73 111. 329; Mont- sHatehard v. State, supra. 
 gomery v. State, 80 Ind. 338, 41 Am. iCom. v. Jackson, supra. 
 Rep. 815; Peoples v. Com. supra; Peo- estate v. Young, 55 Kan. 349, 40 Pac. 
 pie V. Abbott, 116 Mich. 263, 74 N. W. 659; State v. Hartley, 185 Mo. 669, 105 
 529; Com. v. Jackson, 15 Gray, 187; Am. St. Rep. 608, 84 S. W. 910. 
 State V. Emerich, 87 Mo. 110; Lohman i State v. Power, 24 Wash. 34, 63 L. 
 V. People, 1 N. Y. 379, 49 Am. Dec. 340; R.A. 902, 03 Pac. 1112; State v. Erne- 
 People V. Davis, 56 N. Y. 96; State v. rich, 87 Mo. 110. 
 
 Belyea, 9 N. D. 353, 83 N. W. 1 ; State aPeoples v. Com. 87 Ky. 487, 9 S. 
 
 V. Power, 24 Wash. 34, 63 L.R.A. 902, 63 W. 509, 810. 
 
 Pac. 1112; Hatchard v. State, 79 Wis. sEarll v. People, 73 111. 329; Yundt 
 
 357, 48 N. W. 380. v. People, 65 111. 372. 
 
§ »82] BY ABORTION OR ATTEMPTED ABORTION. 597 
 
 tached to abortion has been held to furnish ground for the conviction 
 for manslaughter of a person who causes the death of a woman in 
 an attempt to procure her abortion, as in the performance of an 
 illegal act, though the attempt to procure the abortion was not other- 
 wise unlawful. * Upon the other hand, however, it has been held that 
 statutes with relation to the degree of homicide make the killing in 
 the performahce of an unlawful act the gist of the crime, and the un- 
 lawful means or act is simply distinctive matter of description ; while 
 under statutes making abortion or attempted abortion a special crime, 
 the unlawful act is the gist of the offense, and the consequence of 
 death is simply a descriptive circumstance; so that in such case the 
 death would not be murder, but would be punishable under the special 
 statute only.^ Under this rule a statutory provision imposing a spe- 
 cial penalty upon any person procuring, or attempting to procure, 
 the miscarriage of a woman, and causing her death thereby, takes 
 such a case out of the class designated as murders, and makes it a 
 felony of a lesser degree, punishable only as directed in the statute. * 
 And the act of procuring an abortion is foreign, and not generally 
 connected with the fact of murder perpetrated without design to 
 effect death by a person engaged in the com -mission of a felony under 
 statutory provision therefor.'' So, a charge of causing the death of 
 a woman under a statute providing that any person procuring, or 
 attempting to procure, the commission of an abortion upon any 
 woman shall, in case of her death, or that of her child, be guilty of 
 felony, is not a charge of homicide in any degree, the death of the 
 deceased not being a necessary ingredient of the crime.* And in 
 such a case it is not error to refuse to charge upon manslaughter.® 
 
 IV. Jtjstieicatiom' oe excuse. 
 
 383. Consent. — The commission, or attempt to commit, an abor- 
 tion without the consent of the woman concerned, if not impossible, 
 seems never to have taken place, but the idea that the fact of her 
 consent is of no effect upon the question of criminality runs through 
 all the cases upon the subject. It has been directly held, however, that 
 
 ^People V. Abbott, 116 Mich. 263, 74 'State v. Belyea, 9 N. D. 353, 83 N. 
 
 N. W. S29; Smith v. State, 33 Me. 48, W. 1. 
 54 Am. Dec. 607. sPeople v. Davis, 56 N. Y. 96. 
 
 BRobbins v. State, 8 Ohio St. 138; s Johnson v. People, 33 Colo. 224, 80 
 
 State V. Barker, 28 Ohio St. 583. Pac. 133; People v. Balkwell, 143 Cal. 
 
 6Com. V. Railing, 113 Pa. 37, 4 Atl. 259, 76 Pac. 1017. 
 459; Montgomery v. State, 80 Ind. 338, 
 41 Am. Rep. 815. 
 
598 HOMICIDE. [•§ 3S3 
 
 the assent of the woman killed to an abortion committed upon her, 
 which causes her death, is no justification or excuse in a prosecution 
 for her murder, either at common law or under various statutes.* 
 And an indictment for manslaughter in causing death in an attempt 
 to commit an abortion, charging that the act was committed with 
 force and violence, is sufficient to support a conviction, though the 
 evidence shows that it was done with the woman's consent.^ Nor is 
 it material in such a prosecution that the deceased, prior to the com- 
 mission of the offense, made an attempt to relieve herself of her 
 pregnancy, unless such attempt contributed to her death.* 
 
 384. That act was necessary to life or health. — ^TJpon general and 
 common-law principles, where the circumstances of a case were such 
 as to induce in the mind of a competent person the belief that a mis- 
 carriage was necessary to preserve the life of the mother, or where 
 the evidence was such as to leave the question in doubt whether it was 
 so necessary, this would be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt in 
 the minds of the jury in a prosecution for homicide in the commission 
 of an abortion as to the necessity of the act which would justify an 
 acquittal.* And a physician in aiding a miscarriage, from which 
 death results, is not guilty of manslaughter if he acted from good 
 motives and with ordinary skill, though he may not have acted with 
 the best judgment. ^ And it devolves upon the state to show that the 
 act of a person committing, or attempting to commit, an abortion, 
 from which act death resulted, was not necessary to preserve the life 
 of the mother, the degree of certainty required being such that no 
 competent person could be presumed to have believed the act neces- 
 sary.* 
 
 The statutes of a number of the states, however, prohibit the com- 
 mission of an abortion without the advice of two physicians that it 
 is necessary to save the life of the mother, and under such statutes 
 a person who acts without such advice does so at his peril, and al- 
 though he may, himself, be a physician and believe that such neces- 
 sity exists, if, in fact, it does not exist, he is not exonerated. * And 
 
 iState V. Lodge, 9 Houst. (Del.) 542, the woman in question was in an ap- 
 
 33 Atl. 312; State v. Moore, 25 Iowa, parently healthy condition, and that 
 
 128, 95 Am. Dec. 776; Peoples v. Com. afterwards she had no other ailment 
 
 87 Ky. 487, 9 S. W. 509, 810. than that which resulted from the act, 
 
 2People V. Abbott, 116 Mich. 263, 74 is sufficient to sustain a verdict of man- 
 
 N. W. 529. slaughter in a prosecution for killing 
 
 3 State V. Glass, 5 Or. 73. her in the commission of an abortion. 
 
 ilbid. Howard v. People, 185 111. 552, 57 N. 
 
 ailonnard v. People, 77 111. 481. E. 441. 
 
 sState V. Glass, supra. ^Hatchard v. State, 79 Wis. 357, 48 
 
 But evidence that previous to the N. W. 380. 
 time of the commission of an abortion 
 
% 384] BY ABORTION OR ATTEMPTED ABORTION. 599 
 
 the burden of proving that the advice of two physicians that an abor- 
 tion was necessary to preserve the life of the mother was had rests 
 with the accused, the fact of its existence being peculiarly within his 
 knowledge.® But that the abortion was necessary in order to save 
 the life of the mother is a good excuse under such statutes, though the 
 advice of two physicians had not been had ; it is not necessary that 
 both the advice and the necessity should have existed.® And the ad- 
 vice of two physicians that it was necessary to destroy the child in 
 order to save the life of the mother may be proved by a preponder- 
 ance of the evidence, and need not be established beyond a reasonable 
 ■doubt. ^ So, an indictment for manslaughter, for killing a woman 
 in the performance of an abortion upon her, failing to allege that the 
 miscarriage was not necessary to save her life, is bad under such 
 provisions.* And such statutes were intended to apply only to cases 
 in which the death of the mother could reasonably be expected to re- 
 sult from natural causes unless the abortion was performed, and do 
 not apply to a case in which the mother threatened to commit suicide 
 unless she was relieved from her trouble. ® 
 
 sibid. peritonitis and died thereof the day suc- 
 
 sState V. Fitzporter, 93 Mo. 390, 6 S. ceeding the delivery, and that the dis- 
 
 W. 223. ease was caused by the operation, — 
 
 'Hatehard v. State, supra. raises an irresistible inference in a 
 
 Evidence that a woman upon whom prosecution for the killing that the act 
 
 an abortion was committed was nine- was not necessary to preserve the life 
 
 teen yeaxs of age, and in good health; of the mother, within the meaning of a 
 
 that several operations were performed statutory provision making that neces- 
 
 to accomplish the object, and that u. sity an excuse for the act. Ibid, 
 
 few days after the last operation the sWilley v. State, 46 Ind. 363. 
 
 woman was delivered of a child; that sHatchard v. State, 79 Wis. 357, 48 
 
 she was immediately attacked with N. W. 380. 
 
CHAPTEE.XX. 
 
 HOMICIDE OF OFFICERS OF JUSTICE OR IN RESISTING ARREST.t 
 
 I. Ckiminalitt genekaixy. 
 
 385. The general doctrine. 
 
 386. Express or premeditated malice. 
 
 387. Implied malice. 
 
 388. Mitigation and excuse. 
 
 389. Duration of officer's protection. 
 
 11. ClECUMSTANCES AND CONDITIONS NECESSAEY TO PBOTECTION OP OFFiaBB& 
 
 a. Generally. 
 
 390. Enumeration. 
 
 b. Authority to act. 
 
 391. Qualification of officer. 
 
 392. The warrant. 
 
 393. Arrest for felony without a warrant. 
 
 394. Arrest for misdemeanor without warrant. 
 393. Criminal acts in presence of officer. 
 
 396. Arrest by private person. 
 
 397. Persons aiding officers. 
 
 398. Effect of innocence of charge. 
 
 399. Authority in civil cases. 
 C. Manner of execution of authority. 
 
 400. Force as provocation. 
 
 401. Unnecessary force as warranting action in self-defense. 
 402*. Limit of right of self-defense. 
 
 d. Knowledge of authority and purpose. 
 
 403. General rules as to knowledge and notice. 
 
 404. Sufficiency of notice. 
 
 405. When notice may be dispensed with. 
 
 406. Refusal to state authority on demand. 
 
 m. Unlawful akkest as affecting criminal EESPONSiBiUTr. 
 
 407. As a provocation. 
 
 408. Right to resist generally. 
 
 409. Limits of right to resist. 
 
 410. Effect of excessive resistance on degree. 
 
 411. Application of rules to escape after submission. 
 
 412. Officers taking opposite sides in difficulty. 
 
 IV. PEOTECTION of ASSISTANTS. 
 
 413. Extent of right. 
 
 v. Resistance by tiiied peesons. 
 
 414. Criminal liability for. 
 VI. Escape from confinement. 
 
 415. Rules applicable to. 
 
 iThe subject of homicide in resisting tensively considered in a note to Keady 
 arrest, or of officers of justice, is ex- v. People, 66 L.R.A. 353 
 
 600 
 
§ 385] OF OFFICERS OF JUSTICE OR IN RESISTING ARREST. 601 
 
 VII. Statdtoby protection to certain federal officers. 
 416. Enrolment officers. 
 
 I. OEIMIliTALITT GENEEALLT. 
 
 385. The general doctrine — It is a general rule that where persons 
 having authority to arrest or imprison, using the proper means for 
 that purpose, are resisted in so doing, and killed, it will be murder in 
 all who take a part in such resistance ; for it is homicide committed 
 in despite of justice and law. This rule is laid down upon the sup- 
 position that resistance be made; and, upon that supposition, it is 
 conceived that it will hold in all cases, whether civil or criminal ; for 
 under circumstances of resistance, in either case, the persons having 
 authority to arrest or imprison may repel force by force, and will 
 be justified if death should ensue in the struggle ; while, on the other 
 hand, the persons resisting will be guilty of murder.^ But if an ar- 
 rest, under color of legal authority, be illegally attempted, the better 
 opinion now is that the killing of the person arresting, not in malice, 
 but in resisting the arrest, is but manslaughter. * Resistance of arrest 
 is unlawful, however, and if the offender in resisting shoots and kills 
 the oificer, he is at least guilty of manslaughter; and if the killing 
 is malicious, or if there is a purpose to kill, it will be murder in the 
 second degree ; and if, in addition to this, there is premeditation and 
 deliberation, it will be murder in the first degree. * 
 
 386. Express or premeditated malice — The killing of an officer in 
 resistance of an arrest is murder in the first degree where it was done 
 with express or premeditated malice, whether or not the officer had 
 a warrant, and whether the attempted arrest was legal or illegal, ex- 
 press and premeditated malice having the same effect upon a homi- 
 cide in all cases, whether the person killed is an officer or a private 
 individual, and without reference to the capacity in which he acted. * 
 
 2Fost. G. L. 270, 271; 1 Hale, P. C. State, 14 Mo. 146, 55 Am. Dec. 97; 
 
 494; 3 Inst. 56; 2 Hale, P. C. 117, 118; Galvin v. State, 6 Coldw. 291; Tackett 
 
 1 Hawk. P. C. chap. 31, § § 48-54; Fost. v. State, 3 Yerg. 392, 24 Am. Dec. 582; 
 
 0. L. 272; 1 Hale, P. C. 438 ;1 Hale, P. Queen v. Tooley, 2 Ld. Raym. 1296; Reg. 
 
 C. 446; 1 Russell, Crimes, 535. v. Phelps, 1 Car. & M. 180, 2 Moody, C. 
 
 A peremptory instruction to the jury C. 240; Ilex v. Patience, 7 Car. & P. 
 
 to find the accused not guilty should not 775; Rex v. Thompson, 1 Moody, C. C. 
 
 be given in the case of a public officer 80. 
 
 seeking to perform his duty in attempt- 4 State v. Pate, 5 Ohio S. & 0. P. Dec. 
 
 ing to arrest a person who had commit- 732. 
 
 ted a public offense in his presence, in i State v. Oliver, 2 Houst. (Del.) 585; 
 
 making which effort he was slain. Robertson v. State, 43 Fla. 156, 52 
 
 Hendrickson v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 224, L.R.A. 751, 29 So. 535; Eafferty v. Peo- 
 
 81 S. W. 266. pie, 72 111. 37 ; Com. v. Clegget, 3 Legal 
 
 3Com. V. Drew, 4 Mass. 391; Com. v. Gaz. 9; People v. Randall, 1 Wheeler, 
 
 Carey, 12 Cush. 246; Noles v. State, 26 C. C. 258, 5 N. Y. City Hall Rec. 141; 
 
 Ala. 31, 62 Am. Dee. 711; State v. Oli- Wilson v. State, 11 Lea, 310; Davis v. 
 
 ver, 2 Houst. (Del.) 605; Roberts v. Com. 89 Va. 132, 15 S. E. 388. 
 
602 HOMICIDE. l§ 386 
 
 And the rule is the same where the premeditated intent was merely 
 to slay the officer rather than to submit to arrest.^ Nor is the rule 
 confined to the malicious intent to kill ; it is the same with reference 
 to an intent to inflict serious bodily harm to an officer in resisting ar- 
 rest by him.^ And although an attempted arrest by an officer is 
 illegal, yet if he is killed by the person sought to be arrested, with 
 express or premeditated malice, the killing is murder either in the 
 first or the second degree. * And where one, expecting an attempt will 
 be made to arrest him, deliberately prepares arms for immediate use, 
 and determines to kill the person attempting the arrest, and deliber- 
 ately kills him upon his appearance for that purpose, it is a murder 
 upon express malice, though the arrest is illegal to his knowledge-^ 
 ISTor is there any such inconsistency between killing with a deliberate 
 design to effect death and killing during an attempt to commit a 
 felony as to prevent the submission of both theories to the jury, where 
 the facts of the case show the killing of a police officer during an ex- 
 pedition having burglary in view.^ 
 
 A person killing an officer who attempted to arrest him, however, 
 is entitled to the benefit of a reasonable doubt upon the question 
 whether he provoked the difficulty with the intention of killing the 
 officer or doing him serious bodily harm, and whether the officer had 
 authority to arrest him, or whether he knew of the want of such au- 
 thority.'^ And where an officer was killed in an attempt to make an 
 arrest, and the circumstances of the killing are unknown, there should 
 loG a charge with reference to murder in the second degree;* but to 
 sustain a conviction of a charge of murder in the first degree in such 
 
 zHendrickson v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. ePeople v. Sullivan, 173 N. Y. 122, 63 
 
 224, 81 S. W. 266. L.R.A. 353, 93 Am. St. Kep. 582, 65 N. 
 
 sQueen v. Porter, 12 Cox, C. C. 444. E. 989. 
 
 estate V. Holcomb, 86 Mo. 371; Noles 7Vann v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 V. State, 26 Ala. 31, 62 Am. Dec. 711; 4.34. 107 Am. St. Eep. 997, 77 S. W. 813. 
 
 State V. Scheele, 57 Conn. 307, 14 Am. sMoore v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Hep. 
 
 St. Eep. 106, 18 Atl. 250; State v. Ward, 439, 50 S. W. 942. 
 
 6 Harr. (Del.) 490; Eobertson v. State, And where a person kills an officer 
 
 supra; Palmer v. People, 138 111. 356, 32 in defending his house against an un- 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 146, 28 N. E. 130; State lawful entry for the purpose of execut- 
 
 V. Spaulding, 34 Minn. 361, 25 N. W. ing a lawful warrant, and in defending 
 
 795; Brooks v. Com. 61 Pa. 352, 100 Am. his person against an arrest unlawful by 
 
 Dec. 645 ; Briggs v. Com. 82 Va. 554 ; reason of such unlawful entry, and there 
 
 United States v. Travers, 2 Wheeler, C. is evidence tending to prove that prior 
 
 C. 490, Fed. Cas. No. 16.537; Reg. v. to the killing he had had a quarrel with 
 
 Allen, 17 L. T. N. S. 222. And see the officer killed, and had bitter feelings 
 
 Stockley's Case, 1 East, P. C. 310; toward him, and had made threats 
 
 Curtis's Case, Fost. C. L. 135. against him, and had planned to murder 
 
 5MilIer v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. him, the question whether it is murder 
 
 609, 37 Am. St. Rep. 836, 21 S. W. 925. or manslaughter is properly referred to 
 
 And .see McPhay v. State (Miss.) 40 So. the jury. State v. Scheele, 57 Conn. 307, 
 
 17. 14 Am. St. Rep. 106, 18 Atl. 256. 
 
§ 386] OF OFFICERS OF JUSTICE OR IN RESISTING ARREST. 603 
 
 cases, it is not necessary that all the jurors should agree upon a 
 verdict of deliberate and premeditated murder on the one hand, or 
 of murder in an attempt to commit a felony upon the other; it is 
 sufficient if each is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
 statutory crime was committed. ® 
 
 387. Implied malice. — ^Ministers of justice, such as bailiffs, con- 
 stables, watchmen, etc., while in the execution of their offices, are 
 under the peculiar protection of the law; and the killing of officers 
 «o employed has been deemed murder of malice prepense, as being 
 an outrage wilfully committed in defiance of justice and law. ^ The 
 general rule, therefore, is that if a person attempting or making an 
 arrest is a lawful officer, and known to be such by the person sought 
 to be arrested, and is authorized by law to make the arrest, and he is 
 slain in the discharge of his duty by the latter, or by some other 
 person interfering in his behalf, the killing is deemed to be malicious 
 and the offense is murder in some degree, according to the other ac- 
 companying circumstances.^ And, in the absence of statutory change, 
 this rule applies as well to arrests made under a warrant for a mis- 
 demeanor as for a felony.* And it is especially applicable where it 
 appears that the slayer had recently shot another person, and was 
 running away from the place of the shooting at the time of the at- 
 tempted arrest.* This rule is based upon the theory that every per- 
 son is bound to submit to the ordinary course of justice, and that the 
 law clothes an officer with power to make an arrest in a proper case, 
 and his warrant protects him in all acts reasonably necessary for its 
 
 'People V. Sullivan, supra. Manger v. St^te (Tex. Crim. App.) 69 
 
 11 Russell, Crimes, 4th ed. 799 et seq.; S. W. 145; State v. Green, 66 Mo. 631; 
 
 1 Hale, P. C. 456, 460. Brooks v. Com. 61 Pa. 352, 100 Am. Dec. 
 
 2Alford V. State, 8 Tex. App. 545; 645. 
 
 State V. Johnson, 76 Mo. 123; Re Riots An attempt to kill a policeman to pre- 
 
 of 1844, 2 Clark (Pa.) 275; Com. v. vent an arrest, vchich he is authorized 
 
 Clegget, 3 Legal Gaz. 9; Brown v. State, to make, is an assault with intent to 
 
 109 Ala. 70, 20 So. 103; Seams v. State, murder, though no malice toward the 
 
 S4 Ala. 410, 4 So. 521 ; State v. Oliver, 2 policeman is shown other than that indi- 
 
 Houst. (Del.) 585; Croom v. State, 85 cated by the use of a weapon likely to 
 
 Go.. 718, 21 Am. St. Rep. 179, 11 S. E. produce death. Harrell v. State, 75 Ga. 
 
 1035; Brooks v. State, 114 Ga. 6, 39 S. 842. 
 
 E. 877; Raiferty v. People, 69 111. Ill, 18 sstate v. Green, supra. 
 
 Am. Rep. 601 ; Roberts v. State, 14 Mo. The rule that killing an officer in 
 
 138, 55 Am. Dec. 97 ; Jones v. State, 14 resisting arrest is murder is modified 
 
 Mo. 412; State v. Green, 66 Mo. 631; by the Missouri statute so as to make it 
 
 State V. Albright, 144 Mo. 638, 46 S. W. murder in the first degree only when 
 
 620; Johnson v. State, 5 Tex. App. 43; the officer is killed by the person he is 
 
 James v. State, 44 Tex.. 314; Tiner v. attempting to arrest under a charge of 
 
 State, 44 Tex. 128; United States v. felony. Ibid. 
 
 Travers, 2 Wheeler, C. C. 490, Fed. Cas. « Brooks v. State, 114 Ga. 6, 39 S. B. 
 
 No. 16,537; Yong's Case, 4 Coke, 40a; 877. 
 Mackalley's Case, 9 Coke, 65b. And see 
 
604 HOMICIDE. [§ SSr 
 
 execution;® and that where one has the right to arrest another, the 
 other has no right to resist, since the two rights cannot coexist, and 
 resistance in such case is a crime, and killing the officer in making 
 such resistance is a homicide in the commission of an unlawful act;® 
 and that therefore the law would imply or presume malice from such 
 unlawful resistance. "^ Killing an officer in resistance of the perform- 
 ance of his duty is sufficient evidence of a deliberate intent to kill.* 
 And where a sheriff or other officer having an execution or other 
 process is slain in executing it, or in performance of his office, it is 
 murder in the person who kills him, though there was no former 
 malice,® and no intent to inflict grievous bodily harm.'" So, the 
 killing of any magistrate, sheriff, coroner, constable, or other officer 
 of justice, either civil or criminal, in the execution of his office or 
 duty, is declared by statute in some states to be murder. ' ' 
 
 388. Mitigation and excuse — Malice being implied from unlawful 
 resistance to an officer, hot blood cannot be regarded as having been 
 engendered, where one person has a right to arrest another, by the 
 making or attempting of such arrest, which will reduce the degree 
 of the crime of killing the officer while making the arrest to a lower 
 degree. ' A felon knows his violation of law and that duty demands 
 his capture, so that in his case there is no just provocation, and pas- 
 sion is madness, and resistance a crime. ^ Nor does the question of 
 
 estate v. Spaulding, 34 Minn. 361, 25 lOQueen v. Porter, supra. 
 N. W. 793; Floyd v. State, 82 Ala. 16, A prisoner who had been lawfully 
 
 2 So. 683; State v. Fuller, 96 Mo. 165, apprehended by an ofEcer on a criminal 
 
 9 S. W. 583. charge, who uses violence to the officer 
 
 estate v. Albright, 144 Mo. 638, 46 S. or to a person lawfully called in to as- 
 
 W. 620; State v. Cushenberry, 157 Mo. sist him, whereby such person is killed, 
 
 168, 56 S. W. 737; State v. Evans, 161 is guilty of murder, though his only 
 
 Mo. 95, 84 Am. St. Eep. 669, 61 S. W. intent was to escape. Ibid. 
 590; Queen v. Porter, 12 Cox, C. C. 444. uSee Bullock v. State, 65 N. J. L. 
 
 And a person on trial for homicide 557, 86 Am. St. Eep. 668, 47 Atl. 62. 
 committed upon a peace officer who had iState v. Albright, 144 Mo. 638, 46 
 
 made no arrest is not entitled to com- S. W. 620; State v. Cushenberry, 157 
 
 plain because the trial court treated the Mo. 168, 56 S. W. 737 ; State v. Spauld- 
 
 case as one of homicide by one citizen ing, 34 Minn. 361, 25 N. W. 793; Galvin 
 
 upon another, since that would be dis- v. State, 6 Coldw. 283; State v. Shock- 
 
 tinctly to his advantage. Bishop v. ley, 29 ijtah, 25, 80 Pac. 865; State v. 
 
 Com. 109 Ky. 558, 60 S. W. 190, Revers- Shaw, 73 Vt. 149, 50 Atl. 863. 
 ing 22 Ky. L. Rep. 760, 58 S. W. 817, on 2Brooks v. Com. 61 Pa. 352, 100 Am. 
 
 other grounds on rehearing. Dec. 645. 
 
 7 State V. Zeibart, 40 Iowa, 169; State And heat of passion need not be de- 
 
 v. Town, Wright (Ohio) 75; Mackaley's fined in a prosecution for a homicide 
 
 Case, 2 Cro. Jac. 280; Yong's Case, 4 consisting of killing an officer in resist- 
 
 Coke, 40a. ance of action in his official capacity. 
 
 sPeople V. Woods, 147 Cal. 265, 81 State v. Cushenberry, supra. 
 Pac. 652. On this subject, see also supra, diap- 
 
 sDilger v. Com. 88 Ky. 550, 11 S. W. ter X., § 184. 
 651 ; State v. Shaw, 73 Vt. 149, 60 Atl. 
 863. 
 
5 388] OF OFFICERS OF JUSTICE OR IN RESISTING ARREST. 605 
 
 self-defense arise in a case in which a person sought to be arrested 
 kills the officer seeking to make the arrest, where the officer acts within 
 the law,* unless the person resisting the arrest has reasonable grounds 
 to believe, and does believe, that the officer is not acting in good faith 
 in the attempt to arrest, but is using his official position to gratify 
 personal feeling, and that by submitting to the arrest and upon being 
 disarmed, he will be in danger of great bodily harm, or of loss of 
 life.* 
 
 A person lawfully apprehended on a criminal charge, however, 
 who causes the death of the officer or a person assisting him, is guilty 
 ■of manslaughter only, where the injury is inflicted accidentally in the 
 •course of effort to pull away from him, there being no intent even 
 to injure. ® And where the state relies upon the fact that the person 
 slain was an officer in the discharge of his duty, the existence of that 
 fact must be submitted to the jury, and the knowledge of the accused 
 of his official character must be shown.® And the court cannot limit 
 the inquiry of the jury in the application of the facts in such a ease 
 by declaring that manslaughter from the accidental but negligent 
 killing of a human being could not arise in the case, without improp- 
 erly expressing an opinion upon the weight of the evidence. ^ 
 
 389. Duration of officer's protection — The rule that officers of jus- 
 tice engaged in the execution of the duties of their offices are pecul- 
 iarly within the protection of the law is not confined to the instant 
 the officer is upon the spot, and at the scene of action, engaged in the 
 business that brought him thither ; for he is under the same protection 
 of the law eundo, morando, et redeundo; and therefore, if he come to 
 do his office, and, meeting with great opposition, retire, and be killed 
 in the retreat, this will amount to murder, as he went in obedience 
 to the law and in the execution of his office, and his retreat was neces- 
 sary in order to avoid the danger by which he was threatened. And, 
 upon the same principle, if he meet with opposition by the way, and 
 be killed before he come to the place, such opposition being intended 
 to prevent his doing his duty (which is a fact to be collected from cir- 
 
 sState V. Shaw, supra; Floyd v. State, rest the person who killed him. State 
 
 82 Ala. 16, 2 So. 683; Fleetwood v. Com. v. Fuller, 96 Mo. 165, 9 S. W. 583. 
 
 80 Ky. 1 ; State v. Horner, 139 N. C. 603, 4Fleetwood v. Com. supra. 
 
 52 S. E. 136; Hardin v. State, 40 Tex. BQueen v. Porter, 12 Cox, C. C. 444. 
 
 Grim. Rep. 208, 49 S. W. 607. estate v. Hayes, 89 Mo. 262, 1 S. W. 
 
 And instructions in a prosecution for 305. And see Vann v. State, 45 Tex. 
 
 homicide involving the right of self- Crim. Rep. 434, 107 Am. St. Rep. 997, 77 
 
 defense are properly refused where they S. W. 813. 
 
 ignore the fact that the person killed 'State v. Davis, 53 S. C. 150, 69 Am. 
 
 was an officer, and had the right to ar- St. Rep. 845, 31 S. E. 62. 
 
606 HOMICIDE. [§ 389 
 
 cumstances appearing in evidence), this likewise will amount to 
 murder. ^ 
 
 II. ClECUMSTANCES AND CONDITIONS NECESSARY TO PEOTEOTION OP 
 
 OFFICEIES. 
 
 a. Generally. 
 
 390. Emimeration. — In determining as to the criminality, or the 
 degree of criminality, of a killing in resistance of an arrest or official 
 action, or to escape from official detention, three things must be con- 
 sidered: First, the legality of the officer's authority; second, the 
 legality of the manner in which he executed it ; and third, the knowl- 
 edge of the person arrested of that authority. ^ In considering these 
 questions it is not deemed necessary to cover the whole question of 
 arrest and the right to arrest. This question is touched upon only so 
 far as it has been determined in homicide cases, and so far as it is 
 incidental or necessary to the solution of questions arising in cases 
 of homicide in resisting arrest or officers of justice. 
 
 b. Authority to act. 
 
 391. ftualification of officer. — In Michigan, where the action of an 
 officer is sought to be justified in a case of killing in resistance of his 
 authority, proof that he was an officer de jure is required by constitu- 
 tional provision.^ But the general rule is that, if an officer seeking 
 to make an arrest, who was killed in the attempt, was an officer de 
 facto though not de jure, or if he was known and recognized in the 
 community as such officer, it is sufficient to render the crime of kill- 
 ing him in resistance of the arrest no less than murder.^ And a 
 policeman is a watchman and has the same power of making arrests 
 
 iFost. C. L. 308, 309. See also Com. and there was nothing tending to show 
 
 V. Drew, 4 Mass. 391 ; United States v. that he was not acting in good faith, 
 
 Travers, 2 Wheeler, C. C. 509, Fed. Cas. and in the full belief that his acts as an 
 
 No. 16,537. officer were valid; since in such case he 
 
 1 Roberts v. State, 14 Mo. 138, 55 Am. is an officer de jure. Ibid. 
 Dec. 97; Jones v. State, 14 Mo. 412. aSfcate v. Holcomb, 86 Mo. 371; Mc- 
 
 iFeople V. Gosch, 82 Mich. 22, 46 N. Duffie v. State, 121 Ga. 580, 49 S. E. 
 
 W. 101. 708; Weatlierford v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. 
 
 But a deputy sheriff shot and killed Rep. 530, 37 Am. St. Rep. 828. 28 S. 
 
 while making an arrest was not dis- W. 251. And see Earl v. State, 124 Ga. 
 
 qualified to hold his office by reason of 28, 52 S. E. 78. 
 
 holding the office of supervisor of a One is not justified in shooting an of- 
 
 township, under a constitutional pro- fioer who announces his intention to 
 
 vision that a sheriff shall not hold any arrest him, without more, although the 
 
 other office, where it appears that the character of the officer does not appear, 
 
 sheriff was regularly appointed and took and the arrest appears to be unwar- 
 
 the constitutional oath, and was acting ranted. Keady v. People, 32 Colo. 57, 
 
 under such constitutional appointment, 66 L.R.A. 353, 74 Pac. 892. 
 
§ 391] OF OFFICBES OF JUSTICE OR IN RESIBTING AEREST. 607 
 
 for crimes or offenses against the state as has a sheriff or constable, 
 and is entitled to the same protection, where the term "policeman" 
 is used in the statutes as the equivalent of watchman at common law. * 
 And where the statute gives a marshal power to make or order all 
 arrests with proper process for any offenses against the laws of the 
 state or city, and makes policemen subject to the orders of the marshal, 
 it is not necessary, in a prosecution for the killing of a policeman, to 
 produce his official appointment.* An ordinance of a city conferring 
 power upon policemen with reference to arrests, however, greater than 
 those possessed by constables, is in contravention of the general law, 
 and therefore void; and the killing of an officer seeking to make an 
 arrest under such an ordinance would be manslaughter only, in the 
 absence of malice- ^ And a verbal order of the mayor of a city con- 
 fers no additional authority in such case. ® Nor is a legal officer pro- 
 tected in making an arrest outside of his own county or jurisdictional 
 district, unless the circumstances were such as to authorize him to 
 do so as a private citizen ;'^ though, where the pursuit is fresh, officers 
 may follow the fugitive outside of such district, and are protected 
 in doing so, so that killing them would be murder. * 
 
 The question whether a person killed while attempting to make an 
 arrest was a peace officer is one for the court, and not for the jury.* 
 But the court cannot, under a statutory or constitutional provision 
 requiring officers annually to renew their bonds, and providing that 
 in case of neglect their offices shall immediately expire, pronounce a 
 judgment of forfeiture of the office of an officer in a prosecution for 
 killing him in resistance of his authority.'-** l^or can a person be 
 assiimed to have been a deputy sheriff, and to have had the right to 
 arrest for disorderly conduct committed in his presence, in a prose- 
 cution for killing him in resisting the arrest, where the sheriff could 
 not appoint a deputy without the approval of the county court, since 
 in such case the approval must be shown to render the appointment 
 
 sState V. Evans, 161 Mo. 95, 84 Am. first killing are admissible in evidence 
 
 St. Rep. 609, 61 S. W. 590. in a prosecution for the second Icilling 
 
 ■•State V. Holcomb, supra. to explain the conduct and motive of the 
 
 sMuscoe V. Com. 86 Va. 443, 10 S. E. officer and his posse in making the pur- 
 
 534. suit. Cortez v. State (Tex. Crim 
 
 elbid. App.) 83 S. W. 812. 
 
 TPeople v. Coughlin, 13 Utah, 58, 44 sCreighton v. Com. 83 Ky. 142, 4 Am. 
 
 Pac. 94; State v. Morgan, 22 Utah, 162, St. Rep. 143; Hendrickson v. Com. 26 
 
 61 Pac. 527. Ky. L. Eep. 224, 81 S. W. 266. 
 
 SState v. Morgan, supra. lOBuUock v. State, 65 N. J. L. 557, 86 
 
 Where a man commits a murder, and Am. St. Eep. 668, 47 Atl. 62. 
 afterwards, in attempting to escape, 
 kills the sheriff seeking to arrest him in 
 another county, the circumstances of the 
 
608 HOMICIDE [i 391 
 
 valid. ^ ^ Nor does it follow that one assuming the duties of an office 
 or exercising the authority of an officer thereby makes himself an 
 officer de facto. ^ ^ 
 
 392. The warrant — An officer may safely obey all process fair on 
 its face, and if a warrant is for an offense within the jurisdiction of 
 the officer issuing it, and the crime charged is described with suffi- 
 cient precision to apprise the accused of the offense with which he 
 is charged, it will protect the officer, so that killing him in resistance 
 of its execution will be murder.-^ And in such case the production 
 of the warrant is all that is required; the prior proceedings cannot 
 be investigated.^ And that the officer acting under the warrant knew 
 of defects in it which rendered it worthless and illegal,® or knew that 
 the warrant had been procured by the complainant to accomplish 
 improper and illegal objects,* furnishes no defense in a prosecution 
 for killing him in resistance of his authority under it. Nor does the 
 mere fact that a warrant is informal, or not strictly legal, or that it 
 does not express the cause particularly enough, justify the person 
 against whom it is issued in killing the officer seeking to execute it, 
 where the matter is within the jurisdiction of the officer who issued 
 it;^ as, in case of a warrant for larceny omitting the word "feloni- 
 ous" ; ® or of one misspelling the name of the person against whom it 
 was issued. "^ Nor is an attachment or warrant illegal because signed 
 by the county clerk in his own cause, so as to prevent the killing of 
 
 iiBiickles V. Com. 113 Ky. 795, 68 S. may be amended or erased by the of- 
 
 W. 1084. ficer at his pleasure, so that a statement 
 
 i2Creighton v. Com. supra. written thereon, that by virtue thereof 
 
 iState V. Jones, 88 N. C. 671; Bullock he had arrested the defendant, would 
 
 V. State, supra; Eainey v. State, 20 Tex. not preclude him or any other officer to 
 
 App. 455. And see Curtis's Case, Fost. whom the warrant was directed from 
 
 C. L. 135. making further service or return there- 
 
 2BulIock V. State, supra. of, or render such further service illegal, 
 
 sRainey v. State, supra. so as to prevent resistance to such 
 
 4Bulloek v. State, 65 N. J. L. 557, 86 service from being an illegal act, or the 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 668, 47 Atl. 62. killing of the officer in such resistance 
 
 6Boyd V. State, 17 Ga. 194; Alsop v. from being murder. Com. v. Moran, 
 
 Com. 4 Ky. L. Rep. 547; Com. v. Moran, supra. 
 
 107 Mass. 239; People v. Bernard, 125 estate v. Jones, supra. 
 
 Mich. 550, 65 L.R.A. 559, 84 N. W. 1092; ^People v. Gosch, 82 Mich. 22, 46 N. 
 
 Reg. V. Allen, 17 L. T. N. S. 222; W. 101. 
 
 Mackalley's Case, 9 Coke, 65b. And see In Ferrers's Case, Cro. Oar. 371, 
 
 R. V. Harris, 3 Russell, Crimes, 621; Wm. Jones, 346, however, it was held 
 
 Rex V. Ford, 1 Russ. & R. C. C. 329; that the addition of "Knight" instead 
 
 Reg. V. Roberts, 4 Cox, C. C. 145; of "Baronet" to the name of the de- 
 
 Sissinghurst's Case, 1 Hale, P. C. 462; fendant is fatal to an indictment, and 
 
 Com. V. Martin, 98 Mass. 4. if the officer is killed in the attempt to 
 
 Until a warrant has been returned to arrest a, person who is a baronet under 
 
 the magistrate issuing it, any memoran- a warrant against him describing him 
 
 dum made thereon by an officer holding as a knight, it is manslaughter only, 
 it has not the character of a record, but 
 
S 352] OP OFFICERS OF JUSTICE OR IN RESISTING ARREST. 609 
 
 the officer acting under it from being murder. ^ And so of a warrant 
 issued -without a seal, where the officer issuing it is not required bj 
 law to affix his seal to warrants.^ And a malicious killing of an 
 officer acting under a warrant is murder, though the warrant was 
 without a seal, and the seal was required by law, and it was absolutely 
 void without it. ^ ** 
 
 The rule, however, that if a warrant is for an offense within the 
 jurisdiction of the justice, and the crime charged is described with 
 sufficient precision to apprise the accused of the offense with which 
 he is charged, it is good and will protect the officer, and that killing 
 Mm in its execution will be murder, applies only to those cases in 
 ■which the justice acts ministerially, as in cases of warrants to arrest 
 offenders where he has not final jurisdiction. Where he takes 
 ■cognizance of a criminal action within his jurisdiction, the warrant 
 is the indictment and must set out the facts constituting the offense 
 ■with such certainty that the accused will be able to judge whether 
 they constitute an offense, and as to the nature of the offense 
 charged.*^ And it would be manslaughter only to shoot an officer 
 acting under a warrant issued by a person to whom the authority of 
 justice had been improperly and illegally delegated. ^ ^ And a war- 
 rant or mittimus issued in violation of law, directing the arrest of a 
 person, does not justify an attempt to make such arrest, and the 
 killing of an officer in resistance of such attempt does not amount to 
 murder. ^ * 
 
 393. Arrest for felony without a warrant — Where a crime consist- 
 ing of a public offense or a felony has been committed, and reason- 
 able ground exists to believe that the person sought to be arrested 
 committed it, an officer is entitled to make the arrest without a war- 
 rant, and an attempt to make such arrest is not unlawful, or a justifi- 
 
 SKing V. Baker, 1 Leach, C. L. 112. iiState v. Jones, 88 N. C. 671. 
 
 Where an attachment or warrant i3 The killing of a bailiff in resisting 
 
 signed by an officer in his own cause the execution of mesne process in a civil 
 
 in issuing it he acts in his ministerial action does not amount to murder where 
 
 capacity, and not as a judge in his own he attempted to execute the writ with- 
 
 •cause. Ibid. out a non omittas clause within an ex- 
 
 9 Starr v. United States, 153 U. S. 614, elusive liberty. Rex v. Mead, 2 Starkie 
 
 -38 L. ed. 814, 14 Sup. Ot. Rep. 919. 205. 
 
 loPalmer v. People, 138 111. 356, 32 laStockley's Case, 1 East, P. C. 310. 
 Am. St. Rep. 146, 28 N. E. 130. isPoteete v. State, 9 Baxt. 261, 40 
 
 But if an officer attempt to arrest the Am. Rep. 90. 
 party named upon such authority, he So, the affidavit of a married woman 
 
 proceeds at his peril, and is a wrong- stating that she is afraid her husband 
 
 ■doer; and, in the absence of malice, if will beat, wound, or kill her, or do her 
 
 he be killed in the attempt by the party, some great bodily hurt, does not author- 
 
 the slayer is guilty of manslaughter, ize the arrest of her husband under a 
 
 and not murder. Tackett v. State, 3 statute warranting such arrest only 
 
 Yerg. 392, 24 Am. Dec. 582. where the person has threatened to com- 
 Hom.— 39 
 
610 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 [§ 39S 
 
 cation for killing the officer who attempted it. ^ And this is the rule^ 
 though the attempt to arrest was made under a charge of felony 
 pending in another county.^ So, breaking jail by a person lawfully 
 imprisoned therein for a lawful cause, whether civil or criminal, is 
 a felony at common law which will warrant an arrest, and render the 
 killing of the person attempting it murder, and not manslaughter.* 
 And the same rule applies to larceny, which was a felony at common 
 law, in jurisdictions where it still remains so.* And in such case 
 the right to arrest does not depend upon the value of the property 
 stolen, and the killing of an officer in resisting an arrest therefor 
 would be murder, though it was petit larceny.® The test as to the 
 right of an officer to make an arrest in such cases is. Did he have rea- 
 sonable ground to suspect that a felony had been committed by the 
 person sought to be arrested ?" And the jury are warranted in assum- 
 ing, in the absence of evidence, that the officer was acting in the per- 
 formance of his duty and that he was deliberately murdered to pre- 
 vent detection. '' And in such case identification by the person giving 
 the information is sufficient* So, if a policeman in uniform hears 
 
 mit an offense on the person or property 
 of another, or is about to commit such 
 an offense; and where a warrant of a 
 justice appears on its face to be predi- 
 cated on such an affidavit, it is void, 
 and furnishes no protection to the of- 
 ficer executing it, so that killing him in 
 resistance of such execution would not 
 be murder. Noles v. State, 24 Ala. 672. 
 
 iSimmerman v. State, 16 Neb. 615, 21 
 N. W. 387; State v. Phillips, 118 Iowa, 
 660, 92 N. W. 876; White v. State, 70 
 Miss. 253, 11 So. 632; State v. Cushen- 
 berry, 157 Mo. 168, 56 S. W. 737; Brown 
 V. State, 62 N. J. L. 666, 42 Atl. 811; 
 State V. Byrd, 72 S. C. 104, 51 S. E. 542; 
 Rex V. Ford, Russ. & R. C. C. 329. 
 
 2 State V. Symes, 20 Wash. 484, 55 
 Pae. 626. 
 
 But evidence of information given to 
 a sheriff of a killing, and that the 
 sheriff immediately started in search 
 of the slayer, and in continuing the 
 search passed through the county seat, 
 without pausing for a warrant, is ad- 
 missible in a prosecution against the 
 slayer for killing the sheriff in resisting 
 arrest by him, under a statute providing 
 that upon representation of a credible 
 person that a felony has been commit- 
 ted, and that the offender is about to 
 escape, a peace officer may, without a 
 warrant, pursue and arrest the person 
 accused. Cortez v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 App.) 83 S. W. 812. 
 
 3 State V. Shaw, 73 Vt. 149, 50 Atl. 
 863; Williford v. State, 121 Ga. 173, 48 
 S. E. 962. And see Wallace v. State, 
 20 Tex. App. 360. 
 
 4 People V. Wilson, 55 Mich. 506, 21 
 N. W. 905. 
 
 Though the act of taking property 
 from the owner was claimed to be in 
 sport, an officer knowing of the taking 
 cannot be said to have had no knowledge 
 or information or ground of suspicion 
 that larceny had been committed, which 
 would warrant an arrest without a war- 
 rant, BO as to excuse or mitigate the 
 crime of killing him in resisting arrest, 
 where the facts were such that an im- 
 partial jury might have been satisfied 
 of the fact of the guilt. Ibid. 
 
 BIbid. 
 
 estate v. Shaw, supra. 
 
 That persons furnishing information 
 upon which officers make an arrest 
 without a warrant were not credible- 
 persons is of no effect in a prosecution 
 for killing in resisting such arrest, since 
 the law presumes all persons 'to be 
 credible. Miller v. State, 32 Tex. Crim. 
 Rep. 319, 20 S. W. 1103. 
 
 'People V. Woods, 147 Cal. 265, 81 
 Pae. 652. 
 
 8 State V. Evans, 161 Mo. 95, 84 Am. 
 St. Rep. 669, 61 S. W. 590. 
 
 Where, in a prosecution for homicide 
 in killing an officer who had arrested 
 the accused, it appeared that the ac- 
 
§ 393] OF OFFICERS OF JUSTICE OR IN RESISTING ARREST. 611 
 
 a pistol shot a short distance away, and sees a man running from the 
 direction of the shot, he has a right to arrest him, and killing the 
 officer to prevent it is murder, especially where the slayer had, in fact, 
 fired the shot heard. ® Nor is the killing of an officer less than mur- 
 der when done in resisting arrest, though he took the accused on a 
 charge which did not, in terms, specify all the particulars necessary 
 to constitute the felony, it not heing necessary that the charge should 
 contain the same accurate description of the offense as the indict- 
 ment.*** 
 
 Mere belief upon the part of an officer, however, that a person had 
 been guilty of an offense, or was engaged in the commission of one, 
 not based on any foundation of fact, does not authorize an attempt to 
 arrest, and will not render resistance to such arrest unlawful within 
 the meaning of the rule holding persons liable for homicide when 
 perpetrated in the commission of an unlawful act.** Whether a 
 felony had been committed, and an officer had reasonable ground to 
 suspect that it had been committed, and that the person sought to be 
 arrested did it, are questions for the jury in a prosecution for killing 
 him in resisting arrest;*^ though the question of probable cause for 
 belief that a felony has been committed is one of law for the court, 
 where there is no dispute in the evidence as to the facts going to con- 
 stitute probable cause. * ^ 
 
 cused and another had taken their meals New Jersey Criminal Code, the grade of 
 
 at a neighboring restaurant, but had the offense being determined by the 
 
 discontinued doing so at the time a character and grade of the punishment 
 
 burglary had been committed, and that prescribed, rather than by the eommon- 
 
 the proprietor and his head waiter sus- law classification of felonies and ijiis- 
 
 pected them of being connected with the demeanors ; and a peace oiBcer can ar- 
 
 burglary, and communicated their sus- rest an offender without a warrant for 
 
 picions to the police, and were instruct- treason, felony, breach of the peace, and 
 
 ed by the police authorities to call them some misdemeanors when committed in 
 
 if such persons should reappear; that his view, or if there are existing facts 
 
 such persons subsequently reappeared which give rise to reasonable suspicion 
 
 and the authorities were notified, and that the person arrested was the guilty 
 
 an officer sent to malce the arrest, to party; and if, in resisting the arrest, or 
 
 whom they were identified, — it is in an endeavor to escape arrest, the per- 
 
 proper to submit to the jury the ques- son sought to be arrested kills the of- 
 
 tion whether the officer had reasonable ficer, not in self-defense, it is murder 
 
 cause to believe the persons to be ar- of one grade or the other, depending 
 
 rested liad committed the felony, and upon whether he deliberately intended 
 
 whether he was justified as a peace of- to take the life of the offieerj or only to 
 
 ficer in making the arrest without a do him grave bodily harm. Brown v. 
 
 warrant. People v. Wilson, 141 N. Y. State, 62 N. J. L. 666, 42 Atl. 811. 
 185, 36 N. E. 230. ii State v. Grant, 79 Mo. 113, 49 Am. 
 
 9Broolts V. State, 114 Ga. 6, 39 S. E. Rep. 218. 
 877. i2Brown v. State, supra; State v. 
 
 lORex V. Ford, Russ. & R. C. C. 329. Phillips, 118 Iowa, 660, 92 N. W. 876. 
 
 The distinction between felonies and 1 3 State v. Shaw, 73 Vt. 149, 50 Atl. 
 
 misdemeanors is ■ not observed in the 863. 
 
612 HOMICIDE. [§ 394 
 
 394. Arrest for misdemeanor without warrant. — Peace officers are 
 not warranted, as a general rule, in arresting without a warrant a 
 person suspected of having committed a crime not a felony, and not 
 a public offense or a breach of the peace, and malice and an intent to 
 kill cannot be predicated upon resistance to such an arrest* And 
 breaking open a ticket office, though with intent to steal, but without 
 in fact stealing, is a misdemeanor and not a felony within this rule, 
 and the culprit is not precluded from asserting self-defense in resist- 
 ing an attempt to arrest him without a warrant. ^ Nor has an officer 
 a right to arrest a disorderly person, though known to him, unless he 
 is committing a breach of the peace at the time, and resistance against 
 such an arrest is justified.* Nor is an arrest without a warrant for 
 a mere injury to property authorized, so as to render resistance to the 
 arrest unlawful.* And stealing growing vegetables is not a felony 
 which will give an officer a right to arrest without a warrant, or 
 make it murder to kill him in resistance of such an arrest.® 
 
 The mere fact that a crime which an officer had reason to suspect 
 a person had committed was not a felony, however, does not govern 
 all cases, and deprive an officer of the right to lawfully arrest such 
 person without a warrant, so as to affect the degree of homicide if 
 the officer is killed in resistance of such arrest. ^ And such an arrest 
 is authorized, and the officer is protected in making it, for making 
 loud noises or otherwise disturbing the peace of society;'' or where a 
 serious assault is threatened and there is a probability of its execu- 
 tion.® And it is not necessary, to authorize an arrest for carrying 
 
 iCom. V. McLaughlin. 12 Cush. 615; sReg. v. Loekley, 4 Fost. & F. 155. 
 Wright V. Com. 85 Ky. 123, 2 S. W. 904; 4Mundine v. State, 37 Tex. Crim. 
 
 Rex V. Curvan, 1 Moody, C. C. 132; Rex Rep. 5, 38 S. W. 619. 
 Y. Bright, 4 Carr. & P. 387;Galliard v. BReg. v. Phelps, 1 Car. & M. 180, 2 
 
 Laxton, 2 Best & S. 363 ; Reg. v. Walker, Moody, C. C. 140. 
 
 Dears. C. C. 358. See to same effect 6 Com. v. Hughes, 183 Mass. 221, 66 
 
 Queen v. Marsden, L. R. 1 C. C. 131; N. E. 716. 
 Reg. V. Chapman, 12 Cox, C. C. 4. 'Angell v. State, 36 Tex. 542, 14 Am. 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution Rep. 380. And see State v. Laudano, 74 
 
 for homicide against one who shot and Conn. 638, 51 Atl. 860. 
 killed an officer seeking to arrest him And the ordinances of a town defin- 
 
 without a warrant for a misdemeanor ing disorderly conduct and prescribing 
 
 not committed in his presence, that a the duties of the marshal are admissible 
 
 police officer has no right to arrest a in evidence for the purpose of showing 
 
 person without a warrant, except in cer- the authority of the marshal to make 
 
 tain specified cases, or in pursuance of arrests for misconduct, in a prosecu- 
 
 legal ordinances of the city of whose tion against a person for attempting to 
 
 police force he is a member, empowering kill him in resistance of an attempted 
 
 him to make an arrest in such specified arrest for such misconduct. Porter v. 
 
 cases, is erroneous where there are no State, 124 Ga. 297, 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 730, 
 
 legal ordinances of the city to empower 52 S. E. 283. 
 
 such arrest. Muscoe v. Com. 86 Va. sReg. v. Light, Dears. & B. C. C. 332; 
 
 443, 10 S. E. 534. Baynes v. Brewster, 11 L. J. Mag. Cas. 
 
 2Com. V. Carey, 12 Cush. 246. N. S. 5; 2 Hale, P. C. 88. 
 
§ 394] OF OFFICERS OF JUSTICE OE IN RESISTING ARREST. 
 
 613 
 
 concealed weapons, so as to make resistance an unlawful act, which 
 would affect the grade of the crime of killing the officer while making 
 it, that it was being committed at the time the officer was notified 
 thereof and attempted the arrest.® And the conductor of a railway 
 train may, under his powers as a police officer, arrest a person steal- 
 ing a ride ; and killing him or one of his assistants in resisting such 
 an arrest is murder, and not manslaughter. ^ ° 
 
 395. Criminal acts in presence of officer. — A peace officer has the 
 right, and it is his duty, to arrest a person committing a crime or a 
 breach of the peace in his presence, and to use such force as may be 
 necessary for the arrest; and if the person sought to be arrested re- 
 sists, and in so doing kills the officer, it is murder if he knew his offi- 
 cial character and purpose, and manslaughter if he did not.-' This 
 rule applies to the act of carrying away personal property of another 
 without the assent of the owner, with intent to convert it to the use of 
 the taker, done in the presence and within view of an officer;^ and 
 to the act of several of engaging in a brawl in the presence of an of- 
 ficer, whose duty it is to preserve the peace and prevent brawls.* 
 And the violation of a city ordinance punishable by fine or imprison- 
 
 sMiller v. State, 32 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 319, 20 S. W. 1103. See also Mooney v. 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 65 S. W. 926. 
 
 So, upon the trial of a person for 
 shooting an oiiieer who was attempting 
 to take a weapon from him, evidence is 
 admissible of a request for protection 
 which had been made to the police upon 
 receipt of a telegram from the accused 
 that he was coming to the city to visit 
 the one making the request, the latter 
 stating that his purpose was to kill her, 
 and that he was armed, and was a 
 dangerous person. Keady v. People, 32 
 Colo. 57, 66 L.R.A. 353, 74 Pac. 892. 
 
 loGriffin v. State, 113 Ga. 279, 38 S. 
 W. 844. 
 
 iFleetwood v. Com. 80 Ky. 1 ; Mocka- 
 bee V. Com. 78 Ky. 380 ; State v. Brown, 
 5 Harr. (Del.) 505; State v. Appleton, 
 70 Kan. 217, 78 Pac. 445; Com. v. 
 Deacon, 8 Serg. & R. 47; Johnson v. 
 State, 5 Tex. App. 43; Reg. v. Mabel, 9 
 Car. & P. 494. And see Brown v. State, 
 62 N. J. L. 666, 42 Atl. 811 ; Hendrick- 
 son V. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 224, 81 S. W. 
 266; Angell v. State, 36 Tex. 542, 14 Am. 
 Rep. 380; Lynch v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 
 Rep. 510, 57 S. W. 1130; Reg. v. Hagan, 
 8 Car. & P. 167; Rex v. Light, 7 Cox, 
 C. C. 389 ; Rex v. Sheriff, 20 Cox, C. C. 
 334. 
 
 In New York this right is said to be 
 
 limited to felonies and breaches of the 
 peace. Butolph v. Blust, 5 Lans. 84; 
 Boyleston v. Kerr, 2 Daly, 220. 
 
 2 State V. Evans, 161 Mo. 95, 84 Am. 
 St. Rep. 669, 61 S. W. 590; State v. 
 Grant, 76 Mo. 236. 
 
 And where parties are in possession 
 of horses known to be stolen, and a 
 seizure is attempted openly by the 
 sheriff without a warrant, he is acting 
 properly and may arrest the thief or 
 person in possession of such property; 
 and if, in such case, his assistant is shot 
 and killed by one of them, the jury in 
 a prosecution therefor should not be in- 
 structed upon the hypothesis of an 
 illegal arrest. English v. State, 34 Tex. 
 Crim. Rep. 180, 30 S. W. 233. 
 
 sUnited States v. Travers, 2 Wheeler, 
 C. C. 490, Fed. Cas. No. 16,537. 
 
 And where a person plays a musical 
 instrument in a public thoroughfare 
 and thereby collects together a crowd of 
 people, a policeman is justified in at- 
 tempting to make him pass on, without 
 using undue force, and where he is 
 killed with a dangerous weapon in re- 
 sistance of such an attempt, it is mur- 
 der ; though it might be otherwise if the 
 policeman had used undue force. Reg. 
 V. Hagan, supra. 
 
 But the mere refusal of a person to 
 leave a house before which he stood at 
 
614 HOMICIDE. [§ 395 
 
 ment is a public offense authorizing the arrest of the offender with- 
 out a warrant by a peace officer in whose presence the offense was 
 committed, and resistance to such an arrest would be unlawful.* So, 
 a peace officer may make an arrest when ordered verbally to do so by 
 a superior officer in whose presence the offense was committed, where 
 there is no time to procure a warrant, and the offender is about to 
 escape, and in such case killing him in resisting the arrest would be 
 murder. ^ And the same rule applies where the offense was not coni- 
 mitted in the sight of the officer, but within his hearing, and so near 
 that he could not be mistaken as to the offender, or the offense." So, 
 where an officer hears a shot and is at once informed that a designated 
 person fired it at another, or sees a person attempting to escape, he 
 is justified in attempting to arrest such person, and in case of a kill- 
 ing in resistance thereto, it is murder.'^ And an officer who sees a 
 person go into the vestibule of a building, and pull the door shut be- 
 hind him, after looking up and down the street, has reasonable ground 
 to believe his object to be to commit a criminal offense, and has the 
 right to arrest him without process, within the meaning of these 
 rules. ® 
 
 I A statute authorizing a specified officer to arrest without process 
 in all cases where specified offenses shall be committed or attempted 
 in his presence, however, does not give him power to arrest without 
 a warrant for a past offense, so as to render resistance to such arrest 
 an illegal act.® And generally the party supposed to be guilty must 
 be apprehended either while committing the offense, or upon imme- 
 diate and fresh pursuit. ^ " And in making an authorized arrest with- 
 out a warrant the officer, in order to render it inadequate as a provo- 
 cation, should inform the offender of the cause of arrest. ^ * 
 
 396. Arrest by private person — A private person may, in a tem- 
 perate manner, without a warrant, arrest one who has just committed 
 a felony, and it is murder if the person sought to be arrested kills 
 
 night, and his threat to break the win- TCahill v. People, 106 111. 611 ; Brooks 
 
 dows if a light appeared, do not justify v. State, 114 Ga. 6, 39 S. E. 877. 
 
 a constable in arresting him and taking sBrown v. State, 62 N. J. L. 666, 42 
 
 him into custody, and where he at- Atl. 811. 
 
 tempts to do so, and the other kills oState v. Holcomb, 86 Mo. 371. 
 
 him, it is not murder, but manslaughter. icReg. v. Curran, 3 Car. &, P. 397; 
 
 Rex V. Bright, 4 Car. & P. 387. Hanway v. Boultbee, 1 Moody & R. 14; 
 
 4State V. Cantieny, 34 Minn. 1, 24 N. Reg. v. Fraser, 1 Moody, C. C. 419; Reg. 
 
 W. 458. V. Phelps, 1 Car. & M. 180; 1 Russell, 
 
 sjohnson v. State, 5 Tex. App. 43. Crimes, 603. 
 
 And see State v. Renfrew, 111 Mo. 589, nEarles v. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 
 
 20 S. W. 299. 85 S. W. 1. i 
 
 6Dilger v. Com. 88 Ky. 550, 11 S. W. 
 651. 
 
S 396] OF OFFICERS OF JUSTICE OR IN RESISTING ARREST. 
 
 G15 
 
 ■one whom lie knows to be in fresh pursuit and endeavoring to arrest 
 him for such felony;^ and in such case it is not necessary that the 
 citizen should have exhibited or mentioned a warrant.^ And such 
 an arrest is justified by a prima facie showing that a felony had been 
 committed in a sister state, and the production of an indictment 
 against the person sought to be arrested from such state, and the 
 proclamation of the governor of that state offering a reward for his 
 apprehension, a record of conviction not being necessary.^ In such 
 <;ase the law is the warrant of the persons making the arrest, and they 
 may not improperly be considered as persons engaged in the public 
 service, and for the advancement of justice, though without any spe- 
 cial appointment ; and being so considered, they are under the same 
 protection as the ordinary ministers of justice.* And it is murder 
 for the defendant, he being pursued for felony, of which probable 
 cause is shown, to kill one of the pursuers, knowing them to be 
 such. ® Within these rules larceny, though sometimes a light offense, 
 justifies an arrest by a private person, to which resistance would be 
 nnlawful, and a killing in resistance would be murder.® And the 
 owner of property taken from his premises is justified in attempting 
 
 iState V. Mowry, 37 Kan. 369, 15 Pac. 
 282; People v. Raten, 63 Cal. 421 ; Snell- 
 ing V. State. 87 Ga. 51, 13 S. E. 154; 
 ■Kennedy v. State, 107 Ind. 144, 57 Am. 
 Rep. 99, 6 N. E. 305; Com. v. Grether, 
 204 Pa. 203, 53 Atl. 753; Brooks v. Com. 
 «1 Pa. 352, 100 Am. Dee. 645; State v. 
 Davis, 50 S. C. 405, 62 Am. St. Rep. 837, 
 27 S. E. n05; State v. Morgan, 22 Utah, 
 162, 61 Pac. 527; State v. Shoekley, 29 
 Utah, 25, 80 Pac. 865; Rex v. Hunt, 1 
 Moody C. C. 93; Reg. v. Price, 8 Car. 
 & P. 282. 
 
 At common law a private citizen had 
 a right to arrest -without a warrant any 
 person who committed, or attempted to 
 commit, a, felony in his view, but did 
 "not have such right where the offense 
 was a misdemeanor only. State v. 
 Davis, supra. 
 
 zSnelling v. State, 87 Ga. 50, 13 S. E. 
 154. 
 
 sState V. Anderson, 1 Hill, L. 327. 
 
 So, where a constable was informed 
 that two persons had stolen horses and 
 ■other things in his county and was re- 
 •quested to arrest them, and he went 
 with assistants to a, place in another 
 state where they were found, and such 
 persons, in resisting the arrest, shot and 
 ti'led one of the assistants, they cannot 
 palliate or claim immunity for the act 
 
 on the ground that the attempted arrest 
 was illegal, because the constable was 
 out of his county, where a statute exist- 
 ed authorizing a private person to make 
 an arrest when the person arrested had 
 committed a felony, although not in his 
 presence, when the felony had been in 
 fact committed and he had reasonable 
 cause for believing that the person 
 arrested committed it, since in such case 
 the constable acted as a private citizen. 
 People V. Coughlin, 13 Utah, 58, 44 Pac. 
 94. 
 
 4Fost. C. L. 309; Rex v. Jackson, 1 
 East, P. C. 298; Brooks v. Com. supra. 
 
 Bibid. See Galvin v. State, 6 Coldw. 
 283; Reuok v. McGregor, 3 N. J. L. 70; 
 Holley V. Mix, 3 Wend. 350, 20 Am. Dec. 
 702; Com. V. Deacon, 8 Serg. & R. 48; 
 State V. Roane, 13 N. C. (2 Dev. L.) 58. 
 
 eBrooks v. Com. 61 Pa. 352, 100 Am. 
 Dec. 645. 
 
 But one who sees another stealing, or 
 attempting to steal, his property has 
 no right to arrest him unless it appears 
 that the value of such property was 
 sufficient to make the offense a felony, 
 and the legality or illegality of the ar- 
 rest is a vital question in a prosecution 
 for homicide committed in resisting the 
 arrest. State v. Davis, 50 S. C. 405, 62 
 Am. St. Rep. 837, 27 S. E. 905. 
 
(il6 HOMICIDE. [§ 396 
 
 to retake it, and the thief has no right of resistance thereto which will 
 affect the crime of killing the owner. '' And the same rule applies to 
 the killing of a servant of the owner of property stolen, in resistance 
 of an attempt by him to apprehend the thief. * And where a person 
 has reasonable cause to suspect, and acts upon the suspicion, that an- 
 other person has stolen property in his possession, he has a lawful 
 right to arrest such person, which renders killing him in an attempt 
 to escape, murder and not manslaughter.® So, private citizens, or 
 nonresident officers acting as such, have a right to arrest persons who 
 committed a burglary upon the previous night, where the circum- 
 stances had been communicated to them, so that the killing of one of 
 their number in resistance of the arrest would be murder ; ^ ° and so 
 is the killing of a keeper by a poacher in resistance of an attempt to 
 arrest. ^ ^ And provocation or alarm cannot be complete as a defense 
 where private individuals pursued a person to arrest him on account 
 of his having shot and killed a third person, where he shot and killed 
 a pursuer.-'^ 
 
 To justify arrest by private persons, however, and to render resist- 
 ance thereto illegal, there must have been reasonable ground to believe 
 that a felony had been committed, and the seizure must be openly 
 made, and proceedings had without delay. -^^ And the killing of a 
 servant of the owner of property stolen in resistance of arrest for the 
 taking is not murder if the servant did not see the accused in the ac- 
 
 7State V. DaviSj 53 S. C. 150, 69 Am. if the robbers killed one of the pursuers- 
 St. Rep. 845, 31 S. E. 62. in resisting the arrest it is murder, and 
 
 But the right of a private person to not manslaughter. Broolcs v. Com. 
 repossess himself of property belonging supra. 
 
 to him, taken possession of in his pres- uRex v. Ball, 1 Moody, C. C. 330. 
 ence by another, under rules with ref- izPeople v. Raten, 63 Cal. 421. 
 erenoe to homicide in resisting arrest, i3Porez v. State, supra. And see 
 cannot be la^vfully exercised where in State v. Rutherford, 8 N. C. (1 Hawks) 
 doing so he necessarily commits a 457, 9 Am. Dec. 658. 
 breach of the peace. State v. Davis, 50 But an instruction in a prosecution 
 S. C. 405, 62 Am. St. Rep. 837, 27 S. E. for murder that if the person killed was 
 905. a private individual, who undertook 
 
 sRex V. Curran, 3 Car. & P. 397. without a warrant to arrest the accused,. 
 
 sCom. V. Carey, 12 Gush. 246; Wilson believing him to be another person, and 
 V. State, 11 Lea, 310; Porez v. State, 29 the accused in resisting the arrest killed 
 Tex. App. 618, 16 S. W. 750. him, such killing would not be murder, 
 
 loState v. Morgan, 22 Utah, 162, 61 but would be manslaughter, unless it 
 Par. 527. was done in such a way as to show 
 
 And where the owner of a hotel, upon brutality and a wicked, malignant pur- 
 returning to it, was informed that his pose, is erroneous, as warranting the 
 bar drawer had been robbed by two men jury in inferring that they could return 
 who had left a very short time before, a verdict of murder merely because of 
 and started with another in pursuit of the mode in which the killing was done, 
 the thieves and overtook them a mile even if the facts otherwise made a case 
 from the house, the pursuit was a fresh of manslaughter only. Brown v. United 
 one, which authorized him, though not States, 159 U. S. 100, 40 L. ed. 90, lo 
 a public officer, to arrest them, so that Sup. .Ct. Rep. 29. 
 
§ 396] OF OFFICERS OF JUSTICE OR IN RESISTING AUEEST. , 617 
 
 tual commission of the offense, ^ * or if the servant was taking the ac- 
 cused to any other place than before a magistrate. ^ ^ l^or does the 
 right to arrest exist in a private individual within the meaning of 
 these rules, where the offense for which it is sought to be made was a 
 misdemeanor only.-^* And the word "escape" in a statute providing 
 for an arrest by a private person, where a person committing a felony 
 is pursued immediately after escape, is to be taken, not in its technical 
 sense, but in its popular sense, meaning to flee from. ^ '' The inquiry 
 in such case is whether, at the moment the deed was done, such cir- 
 cumstances existed, taking them all into consideration, including in- 
 tent and mode of killing, as made the taking of life manslaughter or 
 murder. * ® An indictment found is a good cause of arrest by private 
 persons, if it may be made without the death of the felon; but it is 
 said that if he be killed, their justification must depend upon the fact 
 of the party's guilt, which it will be incumbent on them to make out ;. 
 otherwise, they will be guilty of manslaughter. "• ^ 
 
 397. Persons aiding officers. — Every person coming to the aid of 
 oiEcers of justice, and lending his assistance for the keeping of the 
 peace, or attending for that purpose, whether commanded or not, 
 is under the same protection as the oificer himself. ^ A person aiding 
 a policeman in conveying a person suspected of felony to the station- 
 house is entitled to the same protection eundo, morandOj et redeundo 
 as the policeman.^ And the rule includes one who was required by 
 a policeman to aid him in taking a man whom he had apprehended 
 to the station-house, and who did so for some time, and then was 
 going away, when he was attacked and beaten to death; and if hue 
 and cry be raised, all who join in aid of those who began the pursuit 
 will be under the same protection of the law ; and the same rule holds 
 if a felon, after arrest, break away as he is being carried to jail, and 
 his pursuers cannot retake him without killing him.' So, if a per- 
 son present at an affray interfere for the purpose of restraining the 
 offenders and keeping the peace, and be killed;* or if a person pres- 
 
 iiRex V. Curran, 3 Car. & P. 397. v. Moore, 2 Dougl. (Mich.) 1. And the 
 
 iBlbid. officer may have special private assist- 
 
 I estate v. Davis, 50 S. C. 405, 62 Am. ants. Coyles v. Hurtin, 10 Jchns. 85. 
 St. Rep. 837, 27 S. E. 905. 2Reg. v. Phelps, 1 Car. & M. 180; 
 
 i7Lewig v. State, 3 Head, 127. Queen v. Porter, 12 Cox, C. C. 444; State 
 
 isBrown v. United States, supra. v. Oliver, 2 Houst. (Del.) 585. 
 
 isDalt. chap. 170, § 5; 1 East P. C. 31 Hale, P. C. 489, 490; 1 Hawk. P. C. 
 
 chap. 5, § 68, p. 301. chap. 28, § 11; Fost. C. L. 309; 1 East, 
 
 II Hale, P. C. 462, 463; Fost. C. L. P. C. chap. 5, § 67, p. 298; Jackson's 
 309 ; Brooks v. Com. 61 Pa. 352, 100 Am. Case, 1 Hale, P. C. 464. 
 
 Dec. 645; Galvin v. Com. 6 Coldw. 283. 43 lust. 52; 1 Hawk. P. C. chap. 31, | 
 
 In such case the private persons so as- 21 ; Fost. C. L. 310, 311 ; State v. Fer- 
 
 sisting are under the officer's -commands, guson, 2 Hill, L. 619, 27 Am. Dec. 412. 
 Hex V. Patience, 7 Car. & P. 775 ; People 
 
618 HOMICIDE. [§ sa7 
 
 ent when another attempts to commit a treason or felony lay hold of 
 him in order to prevent him, and be killed,® — ^the killing in these 
 cases would be murder, whether the person arresting or interfering, 
 etc., be a constable or not; for either has power to arrest or interfere, 
 etc., in such a case.® 
 
 398. Effect of innocence of charge. — The fact that a person charged 
 with a felony is innocent does not prevent his resisting arrest there- 
 for from being a criminal act, so as to afford excuse or palliation for 
 killing the officer to prevent the arrest. ^ If the fact that the person 
 seeking to arrest was an officer was known to the person sought to be 
 arrested, killing him to prevent the arrest is murder, though no felony 
 had been committed.^ And the fact that two persons charged with 
 burglary were acquitted is immaterial, and does not affect the ques- 
 tion of the guilt of one of them on a charge of murder in shooting 
 an officer in resisting arrest and endeavoring to escape on an attempt 
 to arrest him for the burglary.^ The right to arrest exists where the 
 officer has reasonable cause to suspect that the person sought to be 
 arrested had committed a felony, without reference to his actual 
 guilt or innocence ; and in such case killing in resistance of arrest is 
 murder.* It is not within the province of the officer in such case to 
 determine whether, in point of law, the person sought to be arrested 
 was guilty of the crime charged against him.^ It is sufficient that 
 he knew of the pendency of the charge and of an outstanding war- 
 rant.® And the same rule applies to killing in an attempt to rescue 
 
 B2 Hawk. P. C. chap. 14, § 19. tion by telephone from a deputy bailiff 
 
 6Rex V. Hunt, 1 Moody, C. C. 93 ; Rex, that persons confined in jail had broken 
 V. Curran, 3 Car. & P. 397 ; Reg. v. out and fled, he has reasonable ground 
 Price, 8 Car. & P. 282; and King v. to suspect that a felony has been com- 
 Wier, 1 Barn. & C. 288. mitted by them, and may pursue and 
 
 1 Floyd V. State, 82 Ala. 16, 2 So. 683; arrest them at once, without reference 
 Dryer v. State, 139 Ala. 117, 36 So. 38; to the question whether they were 
 Lewis V. State, 3 Head, 127; Wilson v. legally confined in jail or not; and kill- 
 State, 11 Lea, 310; State v. Shaw, 73 ing one of his assistants in resistance 
 Vt. 149, 50 Ati. 863. of such arrest would be murder, and not 
 
 2Eex V. Woolmer, 1 Moody, C. C. 334; manslaughter. State v. Shaw, mpra. 
 Boyd V. State, 17 Ga. 194. 6Ibid. 
 
 And in such case evidence that the estate v. Symes, supra. 
 person sought to be arrested was not, in Where a watchman is informed by a 
 fact, guilty of the crime charged person that another has attempted to 
 against him is incompetent. State v. rob him, and is called upon to arrest 
 Symes, 20 Wash. 484, 55 Pac. 626. such person, and the alleged robber is 
 
 sMcMahon v. People, 189 111. 222, 59 pointed out to him, he may legally ar- 
 N. E. 584. rest him without specifying the charge 
 
 ■iBrown v. State, 62 N. J. L. 666, 42 against him, and killing the watchman 
 Atl. 811; State v. Symes, supra; State in resistance of such arrest is murder, 
 V. Evans, 161 Mo. 95, 84 Am. St. Rep. though the person sought to be arrest- 
 669, 61 S. W. 590. ed was innocent. Rex v. Woolmer, 1 
 
 And where a sheriff received informa- Moody, C. C. 334. 
 
f 398] OF OFFICERS OF JUSTICE OS. IN RESISTING ARREST. 619 
 
 by force a person arrested, and in such case the accused is not preju- 
 diced by an instruction that the question of legality of arrest is not 
 one for the determination of the jury.'' So, where a private citizen 
 has reasonable ground to believe that another has committed a felony, 
 it is the duty of the latter to submit to be arrested by him, and in 
 case of killing to avoid the arrest the same rule applies. * 
 
 When, however, the offense was in fact committed, and the person 
 arrested was in fact guilty, the character of the information upon 
 which the officer or citizen acted in making the arrest is immaterial 
 on the question of his right to make it; the truth, when known, is a 
 sufficient justification of the act, though if the officer or citizen acted 
 on insufficient information, and the accused proved to be innocent, he 
 acted at his peril. ® 
 
 399. Authority in civil cases. — The authority of an officer, in civil 
 cases, must be regulated and limited by the writ of process which he 
 is empowered to execute, and by the extent of the district in which 
 he is privileged to act. It is only in the character of officer that he 
 «an proceed to arrest or imprison, as no private person can, of his own 
 authority, arrest in civil suits. ^ Where he proceeds irregularly, and 
 exceeds the limits of his authority, the law gives him no protection 
 in that excess ; and if he be killed the offense will amount to no more 
 than manslaughter in the person whose liberty is so invaded.^ He 
 should be careful, therefore, to execute process only within the juris- 
 diction of the court from whence it issues; as, if it be executed out 
 of such jurisdiction, the killing the officer attempting to enforce the 
 execution of it will be only manslaughter.^ But if the process be 
 executed within the jurisdiction of the court or magistrate from 
 whence it issued, it will be sufficient, though it be executed out of the 
 vill of the constable, provided it be directed to a particular constable 
 by name, or even by his name of office. * In civil suits the principle 
 that a man's house is his castle, for safety and repose to himself and 
 his family, is admitted; and accordingly, in such cases, an officer 
 
 'Sierra v. State, 37 Tex. Crim. Rep. fords to parties executing it in the ar- 
 
 430, 35 S. W. 982. rest of deserters, does not depend upon 
 
 So, the protection which the act of the legal guilt of the persons charged as 
 
 Congress of February 24, 1864 (13 Stat, deserters. United States v. Gleason, 
 
 at L. 8, chap. 13), with reference to re- Woolw. 128, Fed. Cas. No. 15,218. 
 
 sisting any enrolment or enrolment of- sWilson v. State, 11 Lea, 310. 
 
 ficer employed in arresting spies or de- sState v. Phillips, 118 Iowa, 660, 92 
 
 serters from the United States military N. W. 876. 
 
 service, providing that in cases where il Hawk. P. C. chap. 28, § 19. 
 
 the assaulting, obstructing, hindering, 2Fost. C. L. 312. 
 
 or impeding shall produce the death of 31 Hale, P. C. 458; 1 East, P. C. 314. 
 
 such officer or other person, the offender 41 Hale, P. C. 459. 
 shall be deemed guilty of murder, af- 
 
620 HOMICIDE. [§ 39» 
 
 cannot justify the breaking open an outside door or window to execute 
 the process. ° If he does so, he will be a trespasser; and if the oc- 
 cupier of the house resists him, and in the struggle kills him, the 
 offense will be only manslaughter; for if the occupier of the house 
 does not know him to be an officer, and has reasonable ground of sus- 
 picion that the house is being broken into with a felonious intent, the 
 killing of such officer will be no felony. ^ 
 
 c. Manner of execution of authority. 
 
 400. Force as provocation — Force used by an officer in making an 
 arrest or keeping the peace, which is within the line of his duty and 
 necessary for the preservation of order, cannot be deemed an assault 
 which would reduce the crime of killing him in resistance of such 
 force from murder to manslaughter.-' Nor is an arrest under color 
 of legal authority, though unlawfully done, anything more than a 
 mere trespass, and it does not constitute an aggravated provocation 
 which will warrant the person arrested in killing the person making 
 the arrest. ^ And the provocation arising from the trespass committed 
 by an officer in breaking open a shop door for the purpose of unlaw- 
 fully entering and arresting a person within is insufficient to reduce 
 the killing of the officer in resisting such entry below the crime of 
 murder, where it was done with a deadly weapon.* 
 
 A legal arrest, whether with or without a warrant, however, may be 
 attempted in such a violent and menacing manner that if death result 
 to the officer in the heat of the struggle thus excited, the killing will 
 not be murder in the first degree. * And where an officer and a citi- 
 zen engage in mutual combat upon a personal grudge, and the 
 officer follows the citizen to his dwelling and forces his way in with 
 weapon in hand, and is there shot by the citizen, the shooting will 
 be deemed to have been prompted by the passion caused by the 
 officer's illegal act, and the killing is manslaughter only.^ So, a 
 person who shoots an officer attempting to arrest him is guilty of 
 manslaughter only, where he shot out of anger arising from a violent 
 and unnecessary attack by the officer upon him, which rendered his 
 mind incapable of cool reflection. ® 
 
 6 Cook's Case, Cro. Car. 537; Fost. C. 4 State v. Phillips, 118 Iowa, 660, 92 
 
 L. 319. N. W. 876. 
 
 61 Hale, P. C. 458; 1 East, P. C. ehap. estate v. List, Houst. Crim. Eep.. 
 
 5, § 87, pp. 321, 322. (Del.) 133. 
 
 iRex V. Hems, 7 Car. & P. 312. cVa.nn v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 zGalvin v. State, 6 Coldw. 283; Keady 434, 107 Am. St. Rep. 997, 77 S. W. 813. 
 
 V. People, 32 Colo. 57, 66 L.R.A. 353, 74 And see State v. Will. 18 N. C. (1 Dev. 
 
 Pac. 892. & B. L.) 121. 
 
 3Com. V. Drew, 4 Mass. 391. And where an officer seeking to make 
 
I 401] OF OFFICERS OF JUSTICE OR IN RESISTING ARREST. 621 
 
 401. Unnecessary force as warranting action in self-defense. — An 
 •officer seeking to make an arrest may only use such force as is rea- 
 sonably necessary to subject the person sought to be arrested to his 
 authority; and where he goes further, and uses unnecessary force, 
 the rule applicable to a private individual attacked by another, that 
 if a person believes, or has reason to believe, that he is in danger of 
 receiving great bodily harm, he may defend himself to a reasonable 
 extent, and if he is in a place where he has a right to be and is vio- 
 lently assaulted, he may, without retreating, repel force with force, 
 applies to the person sought to be arrested. ^ A person sought to be 
 arrested may oppose a felonious aggression in the execution of the 
 arrest, even to slaying the officer when necessary to save his own life, 
 or to save himself from serious bodily harm. ^ And where such a per- 
 son has reasonable ground to believe that the attempted arrest was 
 a mere pretext to disarm him, for the purpose of killing him or doing 
 him great bodily injury, he may, if necessary, kill the persons seeking 
 to make the arrest to prevent the accomplishment of their object.^ 
 And the^rule is the same where, in thus attempting to defend himself, 
 he accidentally kills a third person.* JSTor has an officer a right to 
 kill a person sought to be arrested, who does not resist, but merely at- 
 tempts to escape; and if in such case he attempts to kill him, the 
 right of self-defense of the other is complete, warranting him in kill- 
 
 an arrest refuses^ on demand, to show sideration of the jury the conduct of the 
 
 his warrant, but at once seizes the ac- accused. State v. Brownfield, 60 S. C. 
 
 cused and jerks him to the door of the 509, 39 S. E. 2. 
 
 house in which he is seeking to arrest 2Williams v. State, 44 Ala. 41 ; Bis- 
 
 him, when the accused kills him, a sot v. State, 53 Ind. 408; State v. Pate, 
 
 charge in a prosecution therefor that supra; Logue v. Com. 38 Pa. 265, 80 
 
 if he drew the pistol with intent to kill, Am. Dec. 481. 
 
 and death ensued, it is murder, is And evidence that a city marshal beat 
 
 erroneous. Drennan v. People, 10 Mich, a person over the head with his billy 
 
 169. before the latter fired the fatal shot is 
 
 iPlummer v. State, 135 Ind. 308, 34 competent and material in a prosecution 
 N. E. 968; Appleton v. State, 61 Ark. against the latter for killing the mar- 
 590, 33 S. W. 1066; Bullock v. State, 65 shal, whether he was justified in arrest- 
 N. J. L. 557, 86 Am. St. Rep. 668, 47 ing him or not, since it tends to reduce 
 Atl. 62; State v. Pate, 5 Ohio S. & C. P. the homicide from murder to man- 
 Dec. 732; Vann v. State, supra; Jones slaughter, and to prove that the shot 
 V. State, 26 Tex. App. 1, 8 Am. St. Rep. was fired in self-defense. North v. Peo- 
 454, 9 S. W. 53; Tiner v. State, 44 Tex. pie, 139 111. 81, 28 N. E. 966. 
 128. 3Minniard v. Com. 87 Ky. 213, 8 S. 
 
 But a requested instruction in a W. 269. 
 
 prosecution for homicide committed in The purpose of a person in making 
 
 resisting an arrest, that if the arrest, an arrest is a, question for the jury in 
 
 even though lawful, was made in such a a prosecution against the person sought 
 
 menacing manner as to threaten death to be arrested for killing him. State v. 
 
 or bodily harm, it justifies resistance Pate, supra. 
 
 even to the killing of the officer, is ^Minniard v. Com. supra. 
 erroneous in eliminating from the con- 
 
622 HOMICIDE. [§ 40I 
 
 ing the officer to protect his own life.® And killing an officer in 
 making a reasonable defense against an unlawful entry, for the pur- 
 pose of making an arrest, into the house of the accused, is man- 
 slaughter only." So, the rule that when an officer in executing his 
 office proceeds irregularly and exceeds the limits of his authority the 
 law gives him no protection in that excess, and if he be killed the 
 offense will be no more than manslaughter in the person whose lib- 
 erty is so invaded, also applies to matters concerning the validity and 
 character of his process.'' 
 
 If an officer is resisted or assaulted in the execution of the duties 
 of his office, however, he is not bound to fly to the wall as others are, 
 and his failure to do so does not affect the degree of the crime of kill- 
 ing him in resisting arrest.* And he has an undoubted right to use 
 force to overcome resistance, or to prevent the escape of a fleeing 
 criminal.® And mere technical defects in a warrant which it is the 
 duty of the officers named in it to execute, and the act of the officer 
 seeking to execute it in gaining admission to the house of the accused 
 by subterfuge, do not entitle the accused to kill him, or even warrant 
 the omission of the officer to execute it. ^ ^ Nor is an arrest to prevent 
 a breach of the peace, or in case of a breach of the peace, any the 
 less lawful because made in the night; and killing the officer seeking 
 to make it is none the less murder. ^ ^ 
 
 402. Limit of right of self-defense — The fact that an officer or citi- 
 zen making an arrest exceeded his authority does not necessarily 
 
 EHardin v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Eep. to kill the officer, and do so, not acting 
 208, 49 S. W. 607. in necessary self-defense, the crime may 
 
 estate v. Scheele, 57 Conn. 307, 14 be one of the lower degrees of homicide. 
 Am. St. Rep. 106, 18 Atl. 256. Moore v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Eep. 439, 
 
 So, where a person inflicted a danger- 50 S. W. 492. 
 ous wound on another with a deadly 'Bullock v. State, 65 N. J. L. 557, 86 
 weapon, and drove him from his house, Am. St. Eep. 668, 47 Atl. 62. 
 and secured the door, and shortly after- sMackalley's Case, 9 Coke, 65b. 
 wards a peace officer, with others, came sPeople v. Carlton, 115 N. Y. 618, 22 
 to the door, and without demanding ad- N. E. 257. And see Smith v. State, 46 
 mission broke it open to arrest the of- Tex. Crim. Eep. 267, 81 S. W. 712, 936. 
 fender, who refused to submit and Officers having a valid writ of dis- 
 killed the officer; if he was actuated possession have a right to go on the 
 merely by the purpose of defending his premises in question and use all reason- 
 own house from invasion, and actually able force to execute the writ, and where 
 believed he had a right to do so, he is this appears to be all they did, omission 
 guilty of manslaughter only, though to charge in a prosecution for the kill- 
 such belief was erroneous. People v. ing of one of them in resistance of the 
 Eandall, 1 Wheeler, C. C. 258, 5 New execution of the writ that the defendant 
 York City Hall Eec. 141. could resist excessive force is not error. 
 
 And where an officer rides up to men, Smith v. State, supra. 
 and without notifying them of his pur- lostevenson's Trial, 19 How. St. Tr. 
 ■poam draws his pistol, and the men be- 846. 
 
 come alarmed and agitated and draw uMackalley's Case, supra. 
 their pistols, and then form an intent 
 
§ 402] OP OFFICERS OF JUSTICE OR IN RESISTING ARREST. 623 
 
 justify killing him in resistance of the arrest, or necessarily reduce 
 the killing to manslaughter.^ The question in such case is whether 
 the act of killing the officer was done in the lawful exercise of the 
 right of self-defense.^ And if the person sought to be arrested had 
 no valid reason to believe himself in immediate danger of death or 
 great bodily harm, the killing will be deemed to have been com- 
 mitted, not in passion or fear, but with malice. * A person sought to 
 be arrested has no right to take life except to protect his own life, or 
 his person from great bodily harm, though the person attempting to 
 make the arrest may not have strictly complied in every respect with 
 the law.* And the fact that officers about to make an arrest pre- 
 pared themselves to meet anticipated resistance furnishes no ground 
 for action in self-defense by the persons sought to be arrested, espe- 
 cially where previous threats had been made against persons seeking 
 to arrest them.® 
 
 It is within the province of the jury in a prosecution against a 
 person for killing one who sought to arrest him to determine whether 
 the facts and circumstances justified the taking of life, on the theory 
 that the acts of the person killed were such as to jeopardize the life 
 of accused or cause him serious bodily injury. ® And it is also for the 
 jury to say whether the persons seeking to make the arrest were of- 
 ficers, and whether they were proceeding with discretion and pro- 
 priety. '' Where no unnecessary force was used in making an arrest 
 a person resisting the arrest or engaging in a conspiracy to resist the 
 officer cannot plead self-defense or defense of another, if the officer 
 is killed.^ 
 
 iGalvin v. State, 6 Coldw. 283 ; Bui- manslaughter, as are, also, all who were 
 
 lock V. State, 65 N. J. L. 557, 86 Am. St. aiding or abetting the act. Reg. v. 
 
 Rep. C68, 47 Atl. 62. Luck. 3 Fost. & F. 483. 
 
 2Bul]ock V. State, supra. BMiller v. State, 32 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 sGalvin v. State, supra. 319, 20 S. W. 1103; People v. Morales, 
 An intentional killing is not reduced 143 Cal. 550, 77 Pac. 470. 
 from murder to manslaughter by the And where a gamekeeper is author- 
 fact that the victim, a police officer, ized to apprehend poachers, and he is 
 caught the accused by one arm, and in killed in the attempt to apprehend one, 
 a rude and insolent manner ordered him the offender is guilty of murder, though 
 to get out of a hack, where he had a. the keeper had previously struck him 
 right to be. Keady v. People, 32 Colo, or some of his party, if he struck in 
 57, 66 L.R.A. 353, 74 Pac. 892. self-defense only, and to diminish 
 4Bowling V. Com. 7 Ky. L. Rep. 821. violence illegally used against him, and 
 While the use of a flail, which is a not in vindictiveness. Rex v. Ball, 1 
 dangerous weapon, by one of the party Moody, C. C. 330. 
 
 of gamekeepers in attempting to arrest estate v. Davis, 53 S. C. 150, 69 Am. 
 
 poachers might reduce the offense of the St. Rep. 845, 31 S. E. 62. 
 
 killing of the person using it by one of TStrickland v. State, 81 Miss. 134, 32 
 
 the poachers to manslaughter, it could So. 921. 
 
 not reduce it lower; and whoever fired sSmith v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 89 
 
 the shot that killed him is guilty of S. W. 817. 
 
€24 HOMICIDE. [S 403 
 
 d. Knowledge of authority and purpose. 
 
 403. General rules as to knowledge and notice Where an officer 
 
 or his assistant is killed in the resistance of an arrest, in determining 
 the criminality and degree of the homicide it is a material inquiry 
 whether the party resisting had knowledge or notice of the official 
 character of the officer, and of his purpose to exercise official author- 
 ity; if there is no such knowledge or notice the homicide cannot be 
 more than manslaughter, unless the resistance was in enormous dis- 
 proportion to the threatened injury.-^ And where one kills an officer 
 attempting to arrest him, if there is nothing from which the official 
 character of the officer can be inferred the measure of his offense 
 descends from murder to manslaughter. ^ And this is the rule though 
 the officer had power to make the arrest without a warrant, where he 
 was required by statute, in executing the warrant, to make known 
 the authority.^ And the rule that it is murder to kill a human being 
 without authority of law, when it is done in the commission of an 
 act dangerous to others and evincing a depraved heart regardless of 
 human life, though without a premeditated design to effect the death 
 of any particular person, is not applicable to a case in which the ac- 
 cused was suddenly accosted by a crowd of armed men demanding 
 his immediate surrender.* So, if a person is placed in a position in 
 which his life is imperiled by the act of another, having no notice of 
 his official character, and the killing is apparently necessary to save 
 his own life, it is homicide in self-defense, though the deceased was 
 legally seeking to arrest him, the accused not knowing, or having 
 reasonable groimds to know, that he was an officer. ® 
 
 1 State V. Alford, 80 N. C. 445; Brown assailants because of being unlawfully 
 
 V. State, 109 Ala. 70, 20 So. 103; Kobin- restrained of his liberty, and was, 
 
 son V. State, 93 Ga. 77, 44 Am. St. Kep. therefore, guilty of manslaughter only, 
 
 127, 18 S. E. 1018; Croom v. State, 85 placed before the jury, where it is not 
 
 Ga. 718, 21 Am. St. Rep. 179, 11 S. E. shown that he had committed any 
 
 1035; State v. Spaulding, 34 Minn. 361, criminal act, or that has assailants had 
 
 25 N. W. 793; Lynch v. State, 41 Tex. a warrant against him. Strickland v. 
 
 Grim. Eep. 510, 57 S. W. 1130; Mont- State, supra, 
 
 goraery v. State, 43 Tex. Grim. Rep. 3Montgomery v. State, supra. 
 
 304, 55 L.R.A. 808, 65 S. W. 537; ^Strickland v. State, 81 Miss. 134, 32 
 
 Mackalley's Case, 9 Coke, 65b. So. 921. 
 
 zYates v. People, 32 N. Y. 509; Croom sStarr v. United States, 153 U. S. 
 
 V. State, supra. And see Pennington v. 614, 28 L. ed. 841, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 919; 
 
 Com. 21 Ky. L. Rep. 542, 51 S. W. 818. Mann v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 723, 82 S. 
 
 And where four persons went to the W. 438; Yates v. People, supra; Logue 
 home of another late at night, two of v. Com. 38 Pa. 265, 80 Am. Dec. 481. 
 them armed, declaring they had come to And see Bruce v. State, 68 Ark. 310, 57 
 arrest him, and demanded that he throw S. W. 1103; Com. v. Kirby. 2 Cush. 577; 
 up his hands, when he fired upon them Com. v. Cooley, 6 Gray, 350; People v. 
 and one of them was killed, he is en- Muldoon, 2 Park. Crim. Rep. 13; John- 
 titled on a prosecution therefor to have son v. State, 26 Tex. 117. 
 his contention, that he fired upon his 
 
I 403] OP OFFICERS OF JUSTICE OK IN RESISTING ARREST. 625 
 
 But though it is the duty of an officer to give notice of his intention 
 to arrest before doing so, the person sought to be arrested may not 
 lawfully resist or kill his assailant until all other means of peaceably 
 avoiding the arrest have been exhausted.® And the omission of the 
 •officer to exhibit his warrant or declare his authority can do no more 
 than deprive him of the protection which the law affords him in the 
 rightful discharge of his duty, and does not justify the person sought 
 to be arrested in killing him, if the apparently illegal arrest can be 
 otherwise resisted.'^ And the question of the knowledge of the per- 
 son soiight to be arrested of the official character of the person seek- 
 ing to arrest him in such case is one of fact for the jury. ^ 
 
 404. Sufficiency of notice — It has been asserted that, to render the 
 killing of an officer in making an arrest murder, the officer ought to 
 show at whose suit, and out of what court, the process issued, and for 
 what cause he makes the arrest, where the party submits thereto;^ 
 and that one other than a known officer, who makes an arrest without 
 a warrant, ought to make known on demand that the warrant exists, 
 where it is, and that he claims to be acting under its authority. ^ But 
 the prevailing rule would seem to be that no particular form of words 
 is necessary in a notification by an officer to a person sought to be ar- 
 rested of his authority and the grounds for the arrest, and that the 
 information is sufficient if it is such as to give the accused person an 
 opportunity to submit in an orderly and peaceable manner to the 
 arrest, and such that he knows, as a reasonable man would know, 
 that nothing but his arrest is sought, and no bodily harm intended;* 
 and that he need only give such notice as could be expected under the 
 circumstances of one governed by reason, good faith, and honest pur- 
 pose. * Within this rule, using the words, "I arrest you in the King's 
 name" is sufficient notice that the person is an officer.^ And the 
 words "You are my prisoner" constitute sufficient notice that the 
 person using them is a peace officer, to prevent the act of killing him in 
 
 And an attempt by a constable to ar- ePeople v. Carlton, 115 N. Y. 618, 22 
 
 rest a person by wounding him, without N. E. 257. And see Bruce v. State, 
 
 informing him of the offense charged supra. 
 
 against him, or that there was a war- 7 State v. Phinney, 42 Me. 384. 
 
 rant for his arrest, may be lawfully re- s State v. Grant, 76 Mo. 236. 
 
 sisted under a statutory provision that iMackalley's Case, 9 Coke, 65b. 
 
 no unnecessary force or violence shall ZRobinson v. State, 93 Ga. 77, 44 Am. 
 
 be used in making an arrest, and that St. Rep. 127, 18 S. E. 1018. 
 
 the person making the arrest shall in- sState v. Phillips, 118 Iowa, 660, 92 
 
 form the person sought to be arrested N. W. 876 ; State v. Spaulding, 34 Minn, 
 
 of the intention of the arrest, and of the 361, 25 N. W. 793. 
 
 offense charged against him, and if act- ^Territory v. McGinnis, 10 N. M. 269, 
 
 ing under a warrant the officer shall 61 Pac. 208; Keady v. People, 32 Colo, 
 
 give information thereof. Hamlin v. 57, 66 L.R.A. 353, 74 Pac. 892. 
 
 Com. 11 Ky. L. Rep. 348, 12 S. W. 146. sMackalley's Case, supra. 
 Hom. — 40 
 
626 HOMICIDE. . [g 40^ 
 
 resistance of the arrest from being justifiable homicide.^ And offi- 
 cial character is sufficiently shown by the wearing of uniforms by the 
 police officers on fresh pursuit, especially when taken in connection 
 with threats made against them.'^ And the rule is the same with 
 reference to carrying a constable's staff and giving notice of bis pur- 
 pose.® So, reading a warrant is sufficient notification of authority 
 to arrest." Nor is it necessary that a warrant be shown to the party 
 to be arrested, provided its substance be mentioned.^" Indeed, if 
 reading the warrant to the defendant is a prerequisite to an arrest, 
 the defendant might never be arrested, for he might decline to wait 
 to hear the warrant read. ' ^ And the announcement by officers that 
 they are officers and have come to arrest the accused, and have a war- 
 rant for his arrest, is sufficient to require submission on his part,, 
 and to render his resistance unlawful, so that killing one of the officers 
 would be unlawful. ^ ^ Nor has a person sought to be arrested a right 
 to shoot officers seeking to make the arrest, because of failure to give 
 express notice of their purpose before getting near enough to make 
 the capture. ^^ 
 
 A mere statement of "Hands up, I want you," emphasized by a dis- 
 play of weapons, however, though addressed to a person charged with 
 burglary, does not deprive him of his right to resist, or warrant 
 a conviction against him for murder in the first degree for kill- 
 ing the officer making the statement, in mailing a reasonable resist- 
 ance in proportion to the danger to be avoided. ^ * Nor is it sufficient 
 to state that he was an officer, and wanted the accused.^® And the 
 expression "You are my meat" has been held to be suggestive of 
 slaughter, rather than an intent to arrest.^** The question whether 
 an officer about to make an arrest, who was killed by one resisting 
 the arrest, gave sufficient notice of his official character and intent, 
 is one of mixed law and fact to be determined relatively by the 
 
 ePeople v. Pool, 27 Cal. 573; State v. Stceves, 10 Wend. 514; Wolf v. State, 
 
 Spaulding, svpra. 19 Ohio St. 248. See, however, under 
 
 TState V. Evans, 161 Mo. 95, 84 Am. the English statute, Reg. v. Davis, 1 
 
 St. Rep. 669, 61 S. W. 590; Rex v. Wool- Leigh & C. C. 0. 64. 
 mer, 1 Moody, 0. C. 344. i2Brovvn v. State, 109 Ala. 78, 20 So. 
 
 sGordon's Case, 1 East, P. C. 315. 103. 
 
 sState v. Green, 66 Mo. 631. UThomas v. State, 91 Ga. 204, 18 S. 
 
 102 Hawk. P. C. chap. 13, § 28; E. 305. 
 though see State v. Garrett, GO N. C. 1 4 State v. Phillips, 118 Iowa, 660, 92 
 
 (1 Winat. L.) 144, 84 Am. Dec. 359; N. W. 876. 
 Mass. Gen. Stat. chap. 158, S 1. iBBrown v. State, supra. 
 
 iiSee Reg. v. Allen, 17 L. T. N. S. 222; leCroom v. State, 85 Ga. 718, 21 Am. 
 
 State V. To^'nsend, 5 Harr. (Del.) 487; St. Rep. 179. 11 S. E. 1035. 
 Com. V. Cooley, 6 Gray, 350; Drennan 
 V. People, 10 Mich. 169; Arnold v. 
 
S 404] OF OFFICERS OF JlJSTICE OR IN RESISTING ARREST. 627 
 
 jury tmder proper instructions.*^ And where it appears that the 
 expression used was, "You are mine," or "You are my meat," both 
 expressions should be recited in the charge to the jury. * * 
 
 405. When notice may be dispensed with While it is the duty of 
 
 an officer attempting to make an arrest to make known his purpose 
 and the capacity in which he acts, if that purpose and that capacity 
 are known to the party when the arrest is attempted, and the arrest 
 is otherwise legal, submission to it is a duty, and resistance is un- 
 justifiable, though no notice is given ; and if, in such case, resistance 
 is made and the officer is killed, the killing is unlawful.* And 
 the rule is the same though the officer had no warrant, and though the 
 person sought to be arrested had done nothing for which she was 
 liable to arrest.^ And if the defendant knew the person appre- 
 hending to be an officer, he cannot set up as a defense his erroneous 
 belief that the proceedings were irregular.^ So belief, or reasonable 
 grounds of belief, as to the purpose and official character of the officer, 
 is equivalent to knowledge, and dispenses with notice.* And it has 
 been held that if the officer is a public one he need not show his 
 warrant, although it is demanded, in order to make killing him 
 in resistance of arrest murder; and a special officer need not do so 
 unless it is demanded.^ And an officer within his own proper dis- 
 trict, where he is known or generally acknowledged to be such, is 
 presumed to have been known to a person killing him in resisting 
 arrest, especially if it was in the daytime.® Nor is an officer re- 
 quired to notify a person sought to be arrested of his authority, 
 or of the cause for arrest, in order to render killing him murder, 
 where the person charged is taken in the commission of the offense. "^ 
 And this is the rule though the person doing the killing did not 
 
 1 'Territory v. McGinnis, 10 N. M. 269, attempted to arrest him, went away and 
 
 61 Pae. 208; Brown v. State, supra. concealed himself, cannot be said to 
 
 isCroom v. State, supra. have had no knowledge of the official 
 
 iTiner V. State, 44 Tex. 128; Appleton character of the officer, or of the reasons 
 V. State, 61 Ark. 590, 33 S. W. 1066; for the attempted arrest, so as to fur- 
 People V. Pool, 27 Cal. 573 ; Robinson nish excuse or palliation lor the killing. 
 V. State, 93 Ga. 77, 44 Am. St. Rep. 127, People v. Wilson, 55 Mich. 506, 21 N. 
 18 S. E. 1018; State v. Gay, 18 Mont. W. 905. 
 
 51, 44 Pac. 411; State v. Anderson, 1 2Rex v. Woolmer, 1 Moody, C. C. 334. 
 
 Hill, L. 327 ; State v. Shaw, 73 Vt. 149, sReg. v. Bentlev, 4 Cox, C. C. 403. 
 
 50 Atl. 863; Rex v. Howarth, 1 Moody, 4Croom v. State, 85 Ga. 718, 21 Am. 
 
 C. C. 207; Pew's Case, Cro. Car. 183. St. Rep. 179, 11 S. E. 1035; Robinson v. 
 
 And see Brooks v. State, 114 Ga. 6, 39 State, 93 Ga. 77, 44 Am. St. Rep. 127, 
 
 S. E. 877. 18 S. E. 1018. 
 
 A person accused of stealing a barrel BMaelcalley's Case, 9 Coke, 65b. 
 
 of oil, who had locked it up upon his 61 Hale, P. C. 361; Fost. C. L. 311. 
 
 premises and knew that officers had 'Lewis v. State, 3 Head, 127; Rex v. 
 
 found it there and were looking for him, Payne, 1 Moody, C. C. 378. 
 and who, after shooting an officer who 
 
628 HOMICIDE. [j 405 
 
 know the person killed.® Nor is it necessary to notify a felon for 
 what he is arrested in order to make it murder on his part to kill 
 the officer in resisting the arrest, where the arrest is made on fresh 
 pursuit.^ And the pursuit is fresh within this rule where no more 
 than twenty to twenty-five minutes elapsed between the time the 
 pursuit began and the time of the apprehension/" though, where 
 the person making the fresh pursuit is a private citizen, he must 
 give notice of his purpose to arrest in order to bring himseK with- 
 in the protection of the law. ^ ^ 
 
 So, if a person sought to be arrested killed the oflacer who was 
 about to arrest him, he is guilty of murder though the oflacer did not 
 use words of arrest, or express his intention of making the arrest, 
 where the former had prepared himself to resist, and there was 
 no time or opportunity to give notice without risking death or seri- 
 ous bodily harm at his hands ;^^ and in such case he cannot plead 
 self-defense or defense of a relative.^* In such case the actions of 
 the person sought to be arrested are equivalent to intentional re- 
 sistance of lawful authority, which dispenses with the ceremony of 
 disclosing official character of the officer and the reason for the 
 arrest. ^ * And it is not necessary that the cause of the arrest should 
 have been stated, where the intention to arrest was announced, and 
 the accused made no demand for the cause. -^^ It has been held, 
 however, that threatening and violent conduct on the part of the 
 person sought to be arrested, preventing the officer seeking to arrest 
 him from making his character and mission known, does not neces- 
 
 8 Yang's Case, 4 Coke, 40a. 13 Smith v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 So, where the statute makes it a fel- 89 S. W. 817. 
 
 ony for any person lawfully confined instate v. Gay, 18 Mont. 51, 44 Pae. 
 
 in the penitentiary to escape therefrom, 411. 
 
 it is no excuse or justification on the Where an escaped felon arrayed him- 
 
 part of an escaped convict, who kills self against organized society, defying 
 
 a person attempting to arrest him, that civil authority, and with arms in his 
 
 he was not notified or aware of the pur- hands and an armed ally, both having 
 
 pose of the person killed in pursuing weapons ready for instant use, and with 
 
 him. State v. Craft, 164 Mo. 631, 65 reason to believe that persons whom 
 
 S. W. 280. they met were in pursuit for the pur- 
 
 sState V. Evans, 161 Mo. 95, 84 Am. pose of arresting him and sending him 
 
 St. Rep. 669, 61 S. W. 590; State v. to the penitentiary from which he had 
 
 Craft, supra; State v. Mowry, 37 Kan. escaped, he is responsible for killing one 
 
 369, 15 Pae. 282; Lewis v. State, supra, of the pursuers, without reference to 
 
 loState V. Evans, supra. which shot first, or whether or not they 
 
 iiBrooks V. Com. 61 Pa. 352, 100 had announced their intention to arrest 
 
 Am. Deo. 645. him. Tolbert v. State, supra. 
 
 i2Pew's Case, Cro. Car. 183; Mack- "State v. Anderson, 1 Hill, L. 327. 
 
 alley's Case, 9 Coke, 65b; Tolbert v. So, where a valid ordinance against 
 
 State, 75 Miss. 179, 42 Am. St. Rep. 454, the obstruction of streets by persons 
 
 14 So. 462; Lewis v. State, 3 Head, 127; standing on them exists, it is no excuse 
 
 People v. Coughlin, 13 Utah, 58, 44 Pae. or justification Avhich will affect the de- 
 
 94; Curtis's Case, Fost. C. L. 135. gree of the crime of a lounger, who 
 
§ 405] OF OFFICERS OF JUSTICE OR IN RESISTING ARREST. 629 
 
 sarily, and as matter of law, deprive him of the right to plead self- 
 defense to a charge of killing the officer, where the conduct of 
 the latter was such as to indicate a deadly purpose on his part and 
 the danger appeared imminent, and there were apparently no avail- 
 able means of avoiding or averting it, except by an immediate kill- 
 ing. ^^ 
 
 406. Refusal to state authority on demand. — If an officer seeking to 
 make an arrest refuses on demand to exhibit his warrant or de- 
 clare his authority, killing him is not justifiable, but is manslaughter 
 only, and not murder.-^ And killing an officer in resistance of ar- 
 rest, though done with intent to kill, is not necessarily murder where 
 the officer merely stated that he had a warrant, but refused on de- 
 mand to show it, and followed his refusal by a violent assault.^ 
 And where a person sought to be arrested acts in good faith in de- 
 manding the authority of the person attempting the arrest, and in 
 resisting the arrest upon refusal to state it, honestly believing that 
 the other is making a totally unauthorized assault upon him, and 
 the other makes a demonstration with a deadly weapon, thus put- 
 ting him in danger of life and limb, killing him is justifiable.^ 
 So, though a person who had been arrested on a warrant and had 
 escaped after questioning the officer's authority is not entitled upon 
 rearrest to demand the authority of the officer to the same extent 
 as on an original arrest, he may demand his authority, and upon 
 refusal to give it, treat it as an illegal arrest.* A demand for 
 authority which was a mere pretense, however, made when the per- 
 son sought to be arrested knew, or ought to have known, the other's 
 authority, and why he was attempting to arrest him, and the re- 
 fusal to give it, confer no right to resist, and such demand and re- 
 fusal have no effect upon the guilt of the person killing the officer 
 who seeks to apprehend him. ^ 
 
 III. Unlawful aeeest as affecting ceiminal ebsponsibilitt. 
 
 407. As a provocation. — "While a man is not justified in killing in 
 defense against an illegal arrest of an ordinary character, the law 
 sets such a high value upon the liberty of the citizen that an attempt 
 to arrest him unlawfully is esteemed a great provocation, such as 
 
 killed an officer attempting to enforce i State v. Phinney, 42 Me. 384. 
 
 the ordinance, that an order directing 2Drennan v. People, 10 Mich. 169. 
 
 the enforcement of such ordinance had sRobinson v. State, 93 Ga. 77, 44 Am. 
 
 not been brought to his knowledge. St. Rep. 127, 18 S. E. 1018. 
 
 Carter v. State, 22 Fla. 553. 4 State v. Phinney, swpra. 
 
 16 Starr v. United States, 153 U. S. BRobinson v. State, swpra. 
 614, 38 L. ed. 841, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 919. 
 
630 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 [§ 407 
 
 may reduce a killing in resistance of such arrest to manslaughter.' 
 And, as a general rule, it is not murder, but manslaughter, to kill 
 an officer to prevent an illegal arrest,^ unless the evidence shows 
 previous or express malice.* And in such case it is immaterial 
 whether the slayer knew of the unlawful character of the proposed 
 arrest or not.* And where the mere fact of an illegal arrest, at- 
 tempted or consummated, appears, if the one suffering it kill the 
 officer or person arresting him, whether with a deadly weapon or by 
 other means, he may rely on the presumption that his mind was be- 
 clouded with passion.® A homicide cannot be more than man- 
 slaughter where it was provoked by unlawful violence and the dis- 
 play of deadly weapons to compel submission to an unlawful ar- 
 rest.^ And the rule is the same though the arrest was not actually 
 made, and though the accused had armed himself with a deadly 
 weapon to resist such attempt, where he could not otherwise escape 
 from the arrest. '^ These rules have been applied to an attempt to 
 arrest a person under a warrant having no seal, in a jurisdiction in 
 which a seal is necessary.^ And to an attempt to make an arrest 
 
 iMiller v. State, 32 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 310, 20 S. W. 1103; Ex parte Sherwood, 
 29 Tex. App. 334, 15 S. W. 812; Good- 
 man V. State, 4 Tex. App. 349 ; Jones v. 
 State, 26 Tex. App. 1, 8 Am. St. Rep. 
 454, S. W. 53 ; Dyson v. State, 14 Tex. 
 App. 454; Noles v. State, 26 Ala. 31, 62 
 Am. Dec. 711; Brooks v. Com. 61 Pa. 
 352, 100 Am. Dec. 645 ; Mooney v. State 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 65 S. W. 926; King 
 V. Adey, 1 T^each, C. L. 206; Rex v. Cur- 
 van, 1 Moody, C. C. 132; Queen v. 
 Tooley, 2 Ld. Rayra. 1296. 
 
 2State V. Oliver, 2 Houst. (Del.) 585; 
 Roberson v. State, 43 Fla. 156, 52 L.R.A. 
 751, 29 So. 535: Thomas v. State, 91 Ga. 
 204, 18 S. E. 305; Rafferty v. People, 69 
 111. Ill, 18 Am. Rep. 601, 72 111. 37; 
 Cora. V. Carey, 12 Cush. 246; Com. v. 
 McLaughlin, 12 Cush. 615; Johnson v. 
 State, 5 Tex. App. 43; Alford v. State, 
 8 Tex. App. 545; Ledbetter v. State, 23 
 Tex. App. 247, 5 S. W.226; Meuly v. 
 State, 26 Tex. App. 274, 8 Am. St. Rep. 
 477, 9 S. W. 563 ; Lynch v. State, 41 Tex. 
 Crim. Rep. 510, 57 S. W. 1130; James v. 
 State, 44 Tex. 314; Briggs v. Com. 83 
 Va. 554; Muscoe v. Com. 86 Va. 443, 
 10 S. E. 534; State v. Symes, 20 Wash. 
 484, 55 Pac. 626; United States v. 
 Travers, 2 Wheeler, C. C. 490, Fed. Cas. 
 No. 16,537; Rex v. Keite, 1 Ld. Rajin. 
 138; Reg. v. Chapman, 12 Cox, C. C. 4. 
 
 sRafferty v. People; State v. Oliver; 
 
 Muscoe v. Com.; and Briggs v. Com., — 
 supra. 
 
 ■tAlford v. State, supra; Cortes! v. 
 State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 169, 69 S. W. 
 536. Overruling in effect Ex parte Sher- 
 wood, 29 Tex. App. 334, 15 S. W. 812; 
 Earles v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 85 
 S. W. 1. 
 
 Where an arrest or an attempted ar- 
 rest was without lawful authority, the 
 case should be tried as if the person 
 seeking to make the arrest was not at 
 the time acting, or attempting to act, 
 as an officer of law. Creighton v. Com. 
 83 Ky. 142, 4 Am. St. Rep. 143. 
 
 BBriggs V. Com. supra. 
 
 ePeople v. Burt, 51 Mich. 199, 16 N. 
 W. 378. 
 
 7Rex V. Thompson, 1 Moody, C. C. 80. 
 
 sTackett v. State, 3 Yerg. 392, 24 Am. 
 Dec. 582. 
 
 So, a warrant for horse stealing, is- 
 sued for the arrest of John Smith, and 
 altered, apparently by the officer having 
 it in charge, by writing in the name of 
 the person he sought to arrest in brack- 
 ets after the name John Smith, does not 
 authorize the arrest of the person whose 
 name is thus written in, such inter- 
 lineation being a fraud and a nullity, 
 and if the officer attempts to arrest 
 such person and is slain in the attempt, 
 or after the arrest is made, the homicide 
 is manslaughter, and not murder. Al- 
 ford V. State, 8 Tex. App. 545. 
 
I 407] OF OFFICERS OF JUSTICE OR IN RESISTING ARREST. 631 
 
 outside of the jurisdiction of the officer attempting it.* And mili- 
 tary and naval officers, when acting without authority, are to be 
 •considered as private citizens, and are responsible as such, and where 
 an officer of a warship attempted, without special warrant, to im- 
 press seamen of a merchant vessel, and was killed in the attempt, 
 the offense is nothing more than manslaughter. ^ " So, the fact that 
 a man is assisting in unlawfully detaining a person in prison is 
 sufficient to make killing him by a third person manslaughter only, 
 though the person detained is a stranger to the slayer. ^^ 
 
 But in order that an unlawful arrest shall reduce a killing to 
 prevent it from murder to manslaughter, sudden passion arising 
 therefrom must have existed in the mind of the slayer at the time. ^ ^ 
 A person sought to be arrested, who kills the person seeking to arrest 
 him, is excused to the extent only that it is presumed that he acted, 
 not with malice, but from the excitement of the moment. * * If the 
 killing of an officer making an illegal arrest was solely the result 
 of sudden passion provoked by the unlawfulness of the arrest, the 
 offense is manslaughter; but if it was from premeditated design, 
 it is murder. * * 
 
 408. Right to resist generally — ^If an officer, without lawful au- 
 thority or just cause, arrests a person, there is an illegal assault 
 which such person has a right at once to resist and prevent;^ and 
 if the death of the person seeking to make the arrest results from 
 
 9 Jones V. State, 26 Tex. App. 1, 8 Am. rested without a warrant under an order 
 
 St. Rep. 454, 9 S. Wl 53. from the chief of police, and he killed 
 
 lOThe Pitt Packet, 4 Boston L. J. 3?". an officer in resisting the arrest, the 
 
 iiQueen v. Tooley, 2 Ld. Raym. 1296. breach of his promise to leave the city 
 
 izMiller v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. furnishes no justification for his arrest 
 
 '609, 37 Am. St. Rep. 836, 21 S. W. 925; without a warrant, and the killing is 
 
 Brooks V. Com. 61 Pa. 352, 100 Am. Dec. no more than manslaughter ; but if the 
 
 ^45. arrest was made, not because of the 
 
 The mere illegality of an arrest is not breach of the promise, but because he 
 
 alone sufficient to reduce the crime of was at the time a vagrant within the 
 
 killing the officer from murder to man- meaning of the ordinance, the arrest 
 
 slaughter. State v. Walker, 1 Ohio Dec. was legal and the killing is murder. 
 
 Reprint, 35*. Roberts v. State, 14 Mo. 138, 55 Am. Dec. 
 
 isReg. V. Chapman, 12 Cox, C. C. 4. 97, 15 Mo. 28; Jones v. State, 14 Mo. 
 
 And see Earles "v. State (Tex. Crim. 412. 
 App.) 85 S. W. 1. iStockton v. State, 25 Tex. 772; Miers 
 
 KRoberson v. State, 43 Fla. 156, 52 v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 161, 53 Am. 
 
 L.R.A. 751, 29 So. 535; Brooks v. Com. St. Rep. 705, 29 S. W. 1074; Miller v. 
 
 supra; Brigga v. Com. 82 Va. 554. And State, supra; Lynch v. State, 41 Tex. 
 
 see King v. Adey, 1 Leach, C. L. 208. Crim. Rep. 510, 57 S. W. 1130; Noleg v. 
 
 Where the officers of a city arrested State, 26 Ala. 31, 62 Am. Dec. 711 ; Cole- 
 
 a person as a vagrant under a city ordi- man v. State, 121 Ga. 594, 49 S. E. 716. 
 
 nance, and afterwards discharged him And see Mooney v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 upon his promise to leave the city, which App.) 65 S. W. 926. 
 was broken, whereupon he was again ar- 
 
632 HOMICIDE. t§ 408 
 
 the resistance by lawful measures, it is excusable bomicide;^ and 
 it has been held that, if necessary, rather than submit, he may law- 
 fully kill the person seeking to arrest him.^ Nor is the right to- 
 resist affected by the knowledge of the accused that the arrest is 
 illegal, where he only uses such force as is necessary to prevent 
 the arrest, or to free himself from illegal restraint.* And the per- 
 son sought to be illegally arrested is not bound before resisting,, 
 even to the death, to give warning to the person attempting to ar- 
 rest him.° So, where an attempt illegally to arrest a man is made, 
 and the officer is shot by the brother of the person sought to be ar- 
 rested, the brother's rights are precisely the same as those of the 
 latter." 
 
 The illegality of the arrest, however, is not necessarily an excuse 
 for killing the officer attempting it, and an instruction, without ex- 
 planation, that the accused had the right to resist an unlawful ar- 
 rest is properly refused.'^ And a finding of malice is justified where 
 it appears that, upon an attempt to arrest, the accused killed the 
 person seeking to arrest him when there was no longer reason to do 
 so in order to free himself.® And when an officer is killed while at- 
 tempting to make an arrest, instructions should be given in the 
 prosecution therefor with reference to the right to arrest, as well 
 as with reference to the right to resist.® So, constitutional require- 
 
 2State V. Scheele, 57 Conn. 307, 14 fine force. Montgomery v. State, 45' 
 
 Am. St. Rep. lOG, 18 Atl. 256; Williams Tex. Crira. Rep. 373, 77 S. W. 788. 
 
 V. State, 44 Ala. 41 ; Cortez v. State, 44 ^Cortez v. State; Dyson v. State; and 
 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 169, 69 S. W. 536; Williams v. State, — supra. 
 
 Dyson v. State, 14 Tex. App. 454. And 6Rex v. Thompson, 1 Moody, C. C. 
 
 see Com. v. Hughes, 183 Mass. 221, 66 N. 80. 
 
 E. 716. sDyson v. State, 14 Tex. App. 454. 
 
 Homicide in resisting an arrest sub- TWilliams v. State, 44 Ala. 41. And 
 
 stantially illegal amounts, at most, to see Mooney v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 manslaughter. United States v. Trav- 65 S. W. 926. 
 
 ers, 2 Wheeler, C. C. 490, Fed. Cas. No. sBriggs v. Com. 82 Va. 554. 
 
 16.537. 8 Cortez v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 sSimmerman v. State, 14 Neb. 568, 17 375, 66 S. W. 453. 
 
 N. W. 115; State v. Scheele, and Rober- But, though the burden rests with the- 
 
 son V. State, supra; Creighton v. Com. prosecution to establish every fact necea- 
 
 83 Ky. 142, 4 Am. St. Rep. 143; Wright sary to conviction, the.court in a prose- 
 
 V. Com. 85 Ky. 123, 2 S. W. 904; Miers cution for homicide in resisting arrest 
 
 V. State, and Stockton v. State, supra; is not bound to specifically charge that 
 
 Ross V. State, 10 Tex. App. 455, 38 Am. the burden is on the government to- 
 
 Rep. 643. prove the legality of the arrest beyond 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution reasonable doubt, where it charged in 
 for killing an officer seeking to make an general terms and at considerable length,, 
 arrest, that if the arrest was illegal the detailing fully and correctly the doc- 
 defendant had the right to resist the trine of the " burden of proof beyond 
 same and use all force reasonably neoes- reasonable doubt. Com. v. Hughes, 183- 
 sary to resist the arrest, is not objec- Mass. 221, 06 N. E. 716. 
 tionable for failure of the court to de- 
 
5 408] OF OFFICERS OF JUSTICE OR IN RESISTING ARREST. 63». 
 
 ments that the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, etc., 
 from unreasonable searches or seizures, have no application to this- 
 question and should not be given in charge in a case of the shoot- 
 ing of a policeman v^ho had gained access to a dwelling for the 
 purpose of arresting a person therein, where the law with reference 
 to the right to resist an unlawful arrest is given. ^ " 
 
 409. Limits of right to resist — The degree of violence which is. 
 necessary to resist an illegal arrest, or to regain one's liberty when 
 illegally restrained, depends upon that used or attempted by the 
 person making such arrest; one may oppose a felonious aggression 
 even to the extent of slaying the officer, when it cannot otherwise- 
 be prevented.-' And if a person resists an officer attempting an 
 arrest without lawful authority, and the resistance is only propor- 
 tionate to the assault, and is provoked by it, and the killing is with- 
 out malice, it is neither murder nor manslaughter.^ If the person 
 seeking to make the arrest uses a deadly weapon, or attempts to 
 shoot, the person sought to be arrested may protect himself by doing- 
 the same.* And he is not required to permit his assailant to take- 
 the lead, but may, if he has reason to apprehend that the officer 
 will resort to a deadly weapon, anticipate him by drawing his 
 weapon and by shooting, if necessary to protect himself.* A citi- 
 zen may resist an attempt to arrest him which is merely illegal, 
 however, only to a limited extent, not involving any serious injury to- 
 the officer.® 
 
 But though the law of self-defense justifies the repelling of forc& 
 by force in resisting an unlawful arrest, even unto death, it does 
 not justify wanton or unnecessary aggression.* The right to kill 
 in resistance of an unlawful arrest does not arise unless, in the case 
 of a lawful, and not disproportionate, resistance of the arrest, the 
 person seeking to make it so conducts himself that it becomes nec- 
 essary, or apparently necessary, to kill him in order to prevent 
 
 1 estate V. LaudanOj 74 Conn. 638, 51 gether, and draws and fires his pistol 
 
 Atl. 860. at the one sought to be arrested, the im- 
 
 iWilliams v. State, 44 Ala. 41 ; Gal- mediate shooting of the officer by the 
 
 vin V. State, 6 Coldw. 283 ; Miers v. other, to prevent further shooting on his 
 
 State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 161, 53 Am. part, is justifiable. Ross v. State, 10 
 
 St. Rep. 705, 29 S. W. 1074. And see Tex. App. 455, 38 Am. Rep. 643. 
 Lynch v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 510, 4lbid. ; Cortez v. State, supra. 
 57 S. W. 1130,- Montgomery v. State, 6 Williams v. State; Galvin v. State; 
 
 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 373, 77 S. W. 788. and Miers v. State,— swpra. 
 
 2State V. Oliver, 2 Houst. (Del.) 585. sRoss v. State, 10 Tex. App. 455, 38. 
 
 SMiers v. State, supra; Cortez v. Am. Rep. 643; Miller v. State, 31 Tex. 
 
 State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 169, 69 S. W. Crim. Rep. 609, 37 Am. St. Rep. 836, 21 
 
 536. S. W. 925. And see State v. Row, 8L 
 
 And where an officer seeks illegally Iowa, 138, 46 N. W. 872. 
 to arrest one of two brothers who are to- 
 
634 HOMICIDE. [§ 409 
 
 the infliction of great bodily harm, or the commission of some other 
 felony, '^ And if the force used is disproportionate to the injury 
 about to be inflicted, self-defense is eliminated; and if the killing 
 is attributable to any other cause than resistance to the illegal ar- 
 rest, the arrest cannot be looked to as a mitigating circumstance;* 
 and in such case the slayer is guilty, at least, of manslaughter.* 
 And to protect him the slayer must have not only deemed the ne- 
 cessity sufficient to warrant killing his pursuer to save himself from 
 great bodily harm, but there must also have been reasonable ground 
 for such belief.*'* These rules apply, though the person attempt- 
 ing to make the arrest was not an officer either de jure or de facto. * * 
 And the person sought to be arrested is not justified in resorting 
 to a deadly weapon if he has no reason to apprehend a greater in- 
 jury than a mere unlawful arrest;*^ or where it does not appear 
 that the officer had a deadly weapon, or was attempting to procure 
 one. * * 
 
 410. Effect of excessive resistance on degree. — The question whether 
 killing an officer in making excessive resistance to an illegal ar- 
 rest is murder or manslaughter depends upon whether or not the 
 resistance was such as to indicate that the resistance was made sole- 
 
 7,State V. Cantieny, 34 Minn. 1, 24 N. had been made, is not justified by the 
 VV. 458; State v. Spaulding, 34 Minn, fact that they were illegal. Johnson 
 361, 25 N. W. 793; State v. Ward, 5 v. State, 30 Ga. 426. 
 Harr. (Del.) 496; Roberson v. Ktate, 43 sCortez v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 Ma. 156, 52 L.R.A. 751, 29 So. 535; 169, 69 S. W. 536; United States v. 
 Creighton v. Com. 84 Ky. 103, 4 Am. St. Travers, 2 Wheeler, C. C. 490, Fed. Cas. 
 Rep. 193. No. 16,537; Noles v. State, 26 Ala. 31, 
 
 The act of throwing a dynamite, bomb 62 Am. Dec. 711; State v. Cantieny, 
 into a body of policemen, resulting in supra. 
 
 the death of one of them, is not justi- lOFloyd v. State, 82 Ala. 16, 2 So. 
 fled nor the grade of its criminality 683 ; State v. Spaulding, supra. 
 mitigated by the facts that the police- nCreighton v. Com. 83 Ky. 142, 4 
 men, in excess of their authority, gave Am. St. Rep. 143. 
 
 an order that the persons there as- izRoberson v. State, 43 Fla. 156, 52 
 sembled disperse, and that the bomb L.R.A. 751, 29 So. 535; Noles v. State, 
 thrower, being a member of the as- supra; State v. Underwood, 75 Mo. 230; 
 serablage, adopted tliis mode of resisting Galvin v. State, 6 Coldw. 283. And see 
 the invasion of his rights. Spies v. People v. Morales, 143 Cal. 550, 77 Pac. 
 People, 122 111. 1, 3 Am. St. Rep. 320, 470. 
 12 N. E. 865, 17 N. E. 989. So, it has been held that where a per- 
 
 sMiller v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. son sought to be illegally arrested has 
 609, 37 Am. St. Rep. 836, 21 S. W. 925 ; no reason to apprehend any worse treat- 
 Furlough v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 65 ment than an illegal arrest would sub- 
 S. W. 1069; Dryer v. State, 139 Ala. 117, ject him to, he should submit and seek 
 36 So. 38; Coleman v. State, 121 Ga. redress from the law. Williams v. 
 594, 49 S. E. 716; Alsop v. Com. 4 Ky. State, 44 Ala. 41; State v. Cantieny, 34 
 L. Rep. 547. Minn. 1, 24 N. W. 458. 
 
 So, the act of a person arrested and is Stockton v. State, 25 Tex. 772; 
 searched, of shooting the officer who ar- Cortez v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 169, 
 rested and searched him, not to prevent 69 S. W. 536. 
 the arrest and. search, but after they 
 
J 410] OF OFFICERS OF JUSTICE OK IN RESISTING ARREST. 635 
 
 ly for the purpose of self-defense, or partly or wholly through mal- 
 ice and for revenge.^ Killing an officer after he had given up his 
 ■attempt to make an illegal arrest, with knowledge of such abandon- 
 ment, is murder;^ and so is killing an officer who was acting in good 
 faith and using no more force than was reasonably necessary to 
 execute the warrant;^ especially if a deadly weapon was used.* And 
 though an arrest is illegal or without authority, killing the officer 
 in resistance is murder, and not manslaughter, when it results from 
 unlawful means provoked by malice, and death in cool blood is 
 intended. ' The mere fact of the use of a deadly weapon, or of more 
 force than was necessary, however, does not necessarily raise the 
 crime of killing the officer in resisting an illegal arrest above the 
 degree of manslaughter.® And where one is unlawfully restrained 
 of his liberty and resists, and the conflict is fierce on both sides, 
 his act of killing the officer in the conflict for the purpose of ef- 
 fecting his escape constitutes manslaughter only.'' 
 
 Whether the action of the person arrested in causing the death 
 of the person arresting him was prompted solely by passion pro- 
 voked by the unlawfulness of the arrest, or whether it resulted from 
 malice or a premeditated design to effect death, is a question for 
 the jury in a prosecution for the killing, under proper instructions.* 
 As is also the question whether the slayer was actuated by malice 
 or the motive of self -protection.® And so is the question whether 
 the arrest was made under circumstances which rendered it legal 
 or illegal.^*' And whether a person committing a homicide in re- 
 sisting an officer understood him to be an officer, and knew his busi- 
 ness or knew of any irregularity or want of authority in making 
 
 iState V. Sclieele, 57 Conn. 307, 14 TState v. Ward, 5 Harr. (Del.) 496; 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 106, 18 Atl. 256; Reg. v. Strickland v. State, 81 Miss. 134, 32 So. 
 
 Loelcley, 4 Fost. & F. 155. 921. 
 
 2Reg. V. Lnckley, supra. So, where the servant of one land- 
 
 The interference by a gamekeeper owner finds a night poacher on the land 
 
 with persons found armed and in pur- of another landowner, and pursues him 
 
 suit of game on the lands of an adjoin- with intent to capture liim, it is such 
 
 ing proprietor, without any attempt to an attempted attack and illegal arrest 
 
 forcibly apprehend them, is not a suf- that if the poacher shoots the servant 
 
 ficient provocation to reduce a malicious and kills him, it is manslaughter only, 
 
 wounding and killing of such gamekeep- and not murder. Rex v. Davis, 7 Car. 
 
 er from murder to manslaughter. Rex & P. 785. 
 
 v. Warner, 1 Moodv. C. C. 380. sRoberson v. State, 43 Fla. 156, 52 
 
 SAlsop V. Com. 4 Ky. L. Rep. 547. L.R.A. 751, 29 So. 535. 
 
 4Galvin v. State, 6 Coldw. 283. estate v. Scheele, 57 Conn. 307, 14 
 
 estate v. Scheele. supra. Am. St. Rep. 106, 18 Atl. 256. 
 
 6Ross V. State, 10 Tex. App. 455, 38 lORoberts v. State, and Jones v. State, 
 
 Am. Rep. 643; Roberts v. State. 14 Mo. supra. 
 138, 55 Am. Dec. 97; Jones v. State, 14 
 Mo. 409. 
 
836 HOMICIDE. |5 410, 
 
 the arrest, are matters to be considered in determining the question 
 of provocation or the degree of the offense. ' ^ 
 
 411. Application of rules to escape after submission One who 
 
 makes an illegal arrest has no right to detain the prisoner, and no 
 authority to prevent his escape, and in doing so he is a trespasser, 
 and stands toward the prisoner on the question as to resistance to 
 such detention on the same ground as a private citizen.^ And the- 
 fact that no resistance or protest was made to the original arrest 
 does not make it legal and deprive the person of the right to attempt 
 to regain his liberty, so as to affect the degree of the crime of kill- 
 ing the officer in such attempt. ^ Such a killing may be manslaughter, 
 or it may be justifiable as in self-defense.* And where an officer 
 had made an illegal arrest on civil process, and was obliged to re- 
 tire by the party's snapping a pistol at him several times, but after- 
 wards returned again with assistants, who attempted to force the 
 door, when the party within shot one of the assistants, it was ruled 
 to be only manslaughter.* 
 
 But while a person unlawfully arrested has a right to resist, or 
 one unlawfully detained has a right to escape, he is not justified in 
 at once killing the person restraining him of his liberty.® The 
 rule that an attempted unlawful arrest may not be resisted by means 
 greatly disproportionate to the injury threatened, and that the kill- 
 ing of the assailant is not justified where there is danger neither of 
 great bodily harm nor of the commission of a felony, nor reasonable 
 apprehension of such danger, applies in a case of an attempt to 
 escape after unlawful arrest.® And the illegality of an arrest af- 
 fords no justification to the person arrested in turning upon and 
 killing the ofiieer suddenly, after having gone some distance with 
 him quietly and peaceably.''' So, killing a person who has illegally 
 arrested and restrained another is manslaughter and not murder;* 
 though it is murder and not manslaughter when accompanied by cir- 
 cumstances indicating malice or deliberation and premeditation.® 
 
 11 State V. Spaulding, 34 Minn. 361, liberty, short of taking life. Goodman 
 
 25 N. W. 793. V. State, 4 Tex. App. 349. 
 
 iMiers v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Eep. 2Miers v. State, supra. 
 161, 53 Am. St. Rep. 705, 29 S. W. 1074; sMiller v. State, supra. 
 Miller v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 609, iStevenson's Case, 1 9 How. St. Tr. 846. 
 37 Am. St. Rep. 836, 21 S. W. 925. And estate v. Ward, 5 Harr. (Del.) 496. 
 see Rex v. Curvan, 1 Moody, C. C. 132. estate v. Cantieny, 34 Minn. 1, 24 N. 
 
 So, where an otRcer unlawfully ar- VV. 458. 
 rests a person and turns him over to an- 'People v. Wilson, 141 N. Y. 185, 36. 
 
 other oflicer, who has no warrant or N. E. 230. 
 
 authority to restrain him of his liberty, sRex v. Keite, 1 Ld. Raym. 138; 
 
 the person arrested has the right to use Queen v. Tooley, 11 Mod. 242. 
 such force as is necessary to regain his 9Rex v. Whithorne, 3 Car. & P. 394; 
 
5 412] OP OFFICERS OP JUSTICE OR IN RESISTING AiRREST. 637 
 
 412. Officers taking opposite sides in difficulty In such case, killing 
 
 is but manslaughter. Where officers, accidentally and without mal- 
 ice, take opposite parts in an affray, and one of them is killed, this, 
 says Lord Hale, seems but manslaughter, and not murder, inas- 
 much as the officers and their assistants were engaged one against 
 the other, and each had as much authority as the other ;^ but upon 
 this it has been remarked that, perhaps, it had been better expressed 
 to have said that, inasmuch as they acted not so much with a view 
 to keep the peace as in the nature of partisans to the different par- 
 ties, they acted altogether out of the scope of their characters as 
 peace officers, and without any authority whatever.^ If the sheriff, 
 says the same authority, have a writ of possession against the house 
 and lands of A., and A., pretending it to be a riot upon him, gain 
 the constable of the vill to assist him, and to suppress the sheriff 
 or his bailiffs, and in the conflict the constable be killed, this is 
 not so much as manslaughter; but if any of the sheriff's officers be 
 killed, it would be murder, because the constable had no authority 
 to interfere with the sheriff's proceeding when acting by virtue of 
 the Eang's writ.^ 
 
 IV. Peotection op assistants. 
 
 413. Extent of right. — Where a peace officer calls upon another 
 to assist him, it is the duty of the person so called upon to do so, 
 and the protection to which the officer is entitled extends to the per- 
 son aiding him, so that the crime of killing the assistant would be 
 the same ^s that of killing the officer. ^ And the killing by a per- 
 son who had escaped from jail of an assistant of the sheriff, know- 
 ing that the assistant and the sheriff were endeavoring to effect his 
 recapture, constitutes murder, regardless of the question of malice, 
 where they properly conducted themselves.^ So, where two per- 
 sons held a warrant for the arrest of a third and went to him for 
 the purpose of serving it, acting in concert in the discharge of their 
 legal duty, and one of them was killed by the accused in resisting the 
 arrest, the fact that the other held the warrant at the time furnishes 
 
 Reg. V. Allen, 17 L. T. N. S. 222; Hug- si Hale, P. C. 460. 
 
 gett's Case, J. Kelyng, 59. i State v. McMahan, 103 N. C. 379, 9 
 
 And there is no question of man- S. E. 489 ; Robinson v. State, 93 Ga. 77, 
 
 slaughter in a prosecution for the kill- 44 Am. St. Rep. 127, 18 S. E. 1018. 
 
 ing of an officer in an attempt to rescue And see English v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. 
 
 one whom he had illegally arrested. Rep. 190, 30 S. W. 233; Zimmerman v. 
 
 Sierra v. State, 37 Tex. Crim. Rep. State (Ala.) 30 So. 18; State v. Shaw, 
 
 430, 35 S. W. 982. 73 Vt. 149, 50 Atl. 863; Rex v. Curvan, 
 
 11 Hale, P. C. 460. 1 Moody, C. C. 132. 
 
 21 East, P. C. chap. 5, § 71, p. 304. 2State v. Shaw, supra. 
 
638 HOMICIDE. [§ 41J 
 
 no excuse for the killing, and no objection to the admission of the 
 warrant in evidence in a prosecution for the homicide.^ Nor is 
 it necessary that the assistant should remain in the actual presence 
 of the sheriff ; if the two are in the same neighborhood and acting in 
 concert, the sheriff giving orders and Lhe other obeying them, literal- 
 ly or according to their general spirit and purpose, with a view to 
 effecting the common design, it is sufficient.* 
 
 A warrant, not in the hands of the assistant, but in the hands of 
 a superior at another place, however, furnishes no authority for 
 an arrest by the assistant, and does not deprive the party sought 
 to be arrested of his right of self-defense. ° And a warrant issued 
 to named officers and their assistants does not justify an apprehen- 
 sion by anyone not in the presence, actual or constructive, of the 
 named officers or their assistants; and the assistant of one of the 
 assistants is not justified in acting, and if he attempts to do so and 
 is killed, it will be a case of manslaughter only.** Nor is it un- 
 lawful to resist a person attempting to aid in making an arrest, 
 where he was not duly summoned therefor.^ 
 
 V. Resistance bt third peesons. 
 
 414. Criminal liability for ^Whoever joins with a defendant in 
 
 resisting process is in the same position, if he has notice, as the 
 defendant himself.^ And if a bailiff or other officer be resisted in 
 the regular discharge of his duty in executing process against a 
 party, and a third person, even the servant or a friend of the part} 
 resisting, comes in and takes part against the officer, and kills him, 
 it will be murder, though he knew him not ; ^ though the party whom 
 they came in to assist must have had due notice of the officer's au- 
 
 sPeopIe V. Durfee, 62 Mich. 487, 29 father, though in sight, is a quarter of 
 
 N. W. 109. a mile away, and the person against 
 
 ^Robinson v. State, 93 Ga, 77, 44 Am. whom he attempts to execute it resists 
 
 St. Eep. 127, 18 S. E. 1018. and kills him, it is manslaughter only. 
 
 So, it is the duty of policemen to as- unless it appears that th? accused had 
 
 sist each other in making arrests, and prepared beforehand to resist, the 
 
 where one calls upon another to stop a father being too far off to be regarded 
 
 man running to a bridge which would as assisting in the arrest. Rex v. 
 
 carry him out of the jurisdiction, it is Patience, 7 Car. & P. 775. 
 
 the duty of the latter to arrest the eRex v. Whalley, 7 Car. & P. 245. 
 
 fugitive, and if the fugitive attempts to 7Hamlin v. Com. 11 Ky. L. Rep. 348, 
 
 stab him to avoid being arrested, he is 12 S. W. 146. 
 
 liable for an assault with intent to kill. iBoyd v. State, 17 Ga. 194; State v. 
 
 Harrell v. State, 75 Ga. 842. Garrett, 60 N. C. (1 Wdnst. L. ) 144 : 
 
 BCroom V. State, 85 Ga. 718, 21 Am. Wolf v. State, 19 Ohio St. 248; Queen 
 
 St. Eep. 179, 11 S. E. 1035. v. Dadson, 2 Den. C. C. 35. 
 
 Where a constable having a, warrant 21 Hawk. P. C. chap. 31; Yong's Case, 
 
 of arrest gives it to his son, who at- 4 Coke, 40b. 
 tempts to execute it at a time when the 
 
§ 414] OF OFFICERS OF JUSTICE OR IN RESISTING ARREST. 639 
 
 thority ; and if the offense would not have been murder in the party 
 himself resisting, for want of such notice, neither would it in the 
 servant or friend under a like ignorance.* And if a stranger seeing 
 two persons engaged, one of them, a bailiff, attacking the other with 
 a sword, and the other resisting an arrest by such bailiff, interferes 
 between them without knowing the latter, for the express purpose of 
 defending the party attacked against him, he must abide the conse- 
 quences at his peril; but if he interferes, not for the purpose of 
 aiding one party against the other, but with intent only to preserve 
 the peace and prevent mischief, and in so doing happens to kill 
 the bailiff, the case would possibly fall under a different considera- 
 tion.* So, if the party who is arrested yields himself and makes 
 no resistance, but others endeavor to rescue him, and he does no 
 act to declare his joining with them, if those who come to rescue 
 him kill any of the bailiffs, this is murder in them, but not in the 
 party arrested; but not so if he does any act to countenance the 
 violence of the rescuers. ^ Where a person was illegally arrested and 
 restrained of his liberty, however, and a rescue which seemed prac- 
 ticable at the time the affray began was attempted, in which swords 
 were drawn, a mutual combat ensiied, and the blood was heated 
 before the mortal wound was given, and one of the rescuers killed 
 one of the arresting party, the killing is manslaughter only." And 
 it has been held that where a constable acting without authority 
 arrested a person, and strangers assaulted him for the purpose of 
 rescuing the prisoner from his custody, and one of them gave his 
 assistant a mortal wound, the offense was manslaughter only, on the 
 ground that if one be imprisoned upon an unlawful authority, it 
 is a sufficient provocation to all people, out of compassion, and much 
 more so when it is done under a color of justice.'^ But five of the 
 judges differed, thinking that the person sought to be arrested be- 
 ing a stranger to the prisoners, it could not be a provocation to 
 them; otherwise, if he had been a friend or servant; and that it 
 would be dangerous to allow such a power of interference to the 
 mob.** And this case has been criticized as not sustained by the au- 
 thorities,^ and it may now be considered as entirely overruled.^* 
 
 31 East, P. C. chap. 5, § 82, p. 316. eHuggett's Case, J. Kelyng, 59. 
 
 41 Russell, Crimes & Misdemeanors, v Queen v. Tooley, 2 Ld. Raym. 1296- 
 
 627. See State v. Hilton, 26 Mo. 199; sibid. 
 
 State V. Murray, 15 Me. 100; Reg. v. sFost. C. L. 312 et seq. 
 
 Luck, 3 Fost. & F. 483. loRex v. Warner, 1 Moody, C. C. 385, 
 
 ^Stanley's Case, J. Kelyng, 87; Rex Alderson, B. See remarks of Pollock, 
 
 V Whithorne, 3 Car. & P. 394; Jack- C. B., in Reg. v. Davis, Leigh & C. C. C. 
 
 son's Case, 1 Hale, P. C. 464, 465. 64. 
 
«40 HOMICIDE. 
 
 [S 414 
 
 Persons interfering to release prisoners cannot take advantage of 
 informality of the warrant. ^ ^ 
 
 VI. Escape feom confinement. 
 
 415. Rules applicable to — ^The fact that persons killing another 
 were convicts deprived of their liberty does not justify them in kill- 
 ing their guard to regain their liberty, or affect the grade of the 
 homicide when they do so.^ And the officer pursuing and attempt- 
 ing to recapture escaped convicts, is in the discharge of his duty as 
 such, and his pursuit and attempt to capture them are lawful, and 
 in no seuse an assault upon them, which will warrant their killing 
 him in self-defense.^ Even a misdemeanor convict, who had es- 
 caped lawful confinement, may be recaptured by any police officer 
 without a warrant, and if he slays the officer to prevent the recapture 
 the homicide is murder. ^ And the act of a convict of administerinp' 
 chloroform to a guard to facilitate escape, in consequence of which 
 the guard dies, is murder in the first degree.^ So, where prison 
 or jail breaking is made a felony by law, killing in an attempt to 
 •escape from prison or jail falls within statutes making murder in 
 the commission of a felony, mi^rder in the first degree.^ And in 
 such case it is sufficient to show that the accused was arrested upon 
 a valid warrant issued by competent authority, and duly examined 
 and held to answer, and properly committed ; it is not necessary to 
 put in evidence the proceedings taken upon his examination.® Nor 
 
 iiReg. V. Allen, 17 L. T. N. S. 222; 4State v. Wells, 61 Iowa, 629, 47 Am. 
 
 Wharton, Crim. Law, 7tli ed. § 1037. Kep. 822, 17 N. W. 90. 
 
 iWashington v. State, 1 Tex. App. estate v. Turlington, 102 Mo. 642, 15 
 
 «47; Wallace v. State, 20 Tex. App. 360; S. W. 141 ; People v. Johnson, 110 N. Y. 
 
 Stanley's Case, J. Kelyng, 86. And see 134, 17 N. E. 684, Affirming 46 Hun, 667. 
 
 Stone V. State, 137 Ala. 1, 34 So. 629; ePeople v. Johnson, supra. 
 
 State V. Craft, 164 Mo. 631, 65 S. W. A commitment against a person stat- 
 
 280; State v. Shaw, 73 Vt. 149, 50 Atl. ing that he was held to answer upon a 
 
 863; Curtis's Case, Fost. C. L. 135. charge of burglary in the third degree. 
 
 And where two persons determined to and a second one stating that he was 
 
 break out of prison together, and, know- held upon a charge of grand larceny in 
 
 ing the danger of being shot by watch- the first degree, sufficiently comply with 
 
 men, deliberately supplied themselves a statute requiring that the nature of 
 
 with arms for the purpose of killing the crime shall be briefly stated in a 
 
 anyone who might resist them, and in commitment, so as to render them ad- 
 
 the encounter which followed their dis- missible in evidence in a prosecution 
 
 covery by a watchman he was wilfully against a person committed for murder 
 
 killed by one of them, both are guilty of in the first degree in killing the guard 
 
 murder in the first degree. State v. in an attempt to escape from prison, 
 
 Allen, 47 Conn. 121. as against an objection that the commit- 
 
 zWallace v. State, supra. ments did not comply with the law, and 
 
 sWilliford v. State, 121 Ga. 173, 48 that he was not lawfully confined. 
 
 S. E. 962, Ibid. 
 
I 4X5] OF OFFICERS OF JUSTICE OR IN RESISTING ARREST. 641 
 
 does the fact that a person legally sentenced to a penitentiary for 
 a felony "was permitted by the warden of the penitentiary to leave 
 it without a guard deprive an officer, who recognized him, of the 
 authority to arrest him without a warrant, so as to reduce killing 
 the officer in resisting the arrest to manslaughter. '^ 
 
 The fact that a homicide was committed by a felon in an attempt 
 to escape from a penitentiary, however, does not obviate the neces- 
 sity of proving premeditation and deliberation to make it murder 
 in the first degree, under statutes making it murder in the first 
 degree to kill in the perpetration of certain named felonies, not 
 including jail or prison breaking.® 
 
 VII. Statutoey peotection to CEETAiiir Fedeeal officees. 
 
 416. Enrolment officers. — A Federal statute^ defining the crim- 
 inal character of resisting or opposing any enrolment officer, and 
 of assaulting, obstructing, hindering, or impeding any officer or 
 other person employed in arresting, or aiding to arrest, any spy or 
 deserter from the military service of the United States, provides 
 that where such assaulting, obstructing, hindering, or impeding shall 
 produce the death of such officer or other person, the offender shall 
 be deemed guilty of murder and punished with death. The pur- 
 pose of this act is to protect the lives of persons acting under it, 
 and such protection continues while they are employed in a service 
 necessary and proper to the full discharge of their duty; and it 
 is not necessary to their protection that they should have been, at 
 the time, engaged in the immediate act of making the arrest, or 
 that the accused should have previously made an assault.^ And 
 a purpose in the mind of a person to obstruct the execution of that 
 act is not necessary to constitute the offense of homicide where an 
 officer is killed, and such purpose need not be alleged.^ 
 
 Killing an officer in a quarrel in which he became involved through 
 some private matter having no connection with his official duties, 
 however, does not fall within the provision of this act.* And the 
 person making the assault must have been moved thereto by some 
 
 TSirapson v. State, 56 Ark. 8, 19 S. So, it is enough that a person charged 
 
 W. 99. with murder obstructed the enrolment 
 
 sState V. Atkinson, 6 Ohio N. P. 232. officer and brought about, or aided in 
 
 lAct of Congress February 24, 1864 bringing about, his death, though he 
 
 (13 Stat, at L. 8, chap. 13). himself made no assault. United States 
 
 2United States v. Gleason, Woolw. v. Gleason, Woolw. 128, Fed. Cas. No. 
 
 128, Fed. Cas. No. 15,216. 15,216. 
 
 sUnited States v. Gleason, Woolw. 75, ^United States v. Gleason, Woolw. 75, 
 
 Fed. Cas. No. 15,215. 128, Fed. Cas. Nos. 15,215, 15,216. 
 Hem.— 41 
 
G42 HOMICIDE. [§ 416 
 
 motive having relation to the service in which the officer was engaged ; 
 it is not enough that it occurred in a casual rencounter, which might 
 liave occurred if the person assaulted had not been engaged in that 
 service. ^ Nor does the word "enrolment," as used in that act, include 
 draft, and the statute does not apply to a homicide occurring in a serv- 
 ice relating to a draft.® 
 
 ^United States v. Gleason, Woolw. 18 L. ed. 218; United States v. Murphy, 
 128, Fed. Cas. No. 15,216. 3 Wall. 653, 18 L. ed. 218. 
 
 sUnited States v. Scott, 3 Wall. 642, 
 
CHAPTEK XXI. 
 
 HOMICriDE IN CARRYING OUT CONSPIRACY TO DO UNLAWFUL ACT.i 
 
 I. SOOPE OP SUBJECT. 
 
 417. Distinction between conspiracy and aiding and abetting, etc. 
 11. Okiminal responsibility. 
 
 418. General rules. 
 
 III. Application of kules to particulak acts. 
 
 419. The doing of personal violence. 
 
 420. Breaches of the peace, riots, etc. 
 
 421. Invasion of property rights. 
 
 422. Escape from conifineinent. 
 IV. The Conspiracy. 
 
 423. Necessity of, as an element of criminal responsibility. 
 
 424. When and how formed. 
 
 425. Accused must be party thereto, 
 
 426. Necessity of unlawfulness. 
 
 V. Homicide as a result of conspiract. 
 
 a. Must be within scope of. 
 
 427. Limitation of liability. 
 
 b. Measure of the scope. 
 
 428. General rules. 
 
 429. Individual action from independent motive. 
 
 430. Violent, dangerous, or homicidal conspiracies. 
 
 431. Conspiracies not conducive to the use of dangerous forea 
 
 432. Proximate, as distinguished from collsiteral or incidental, 
 
 cause. 
 
 433. Killing person not conspired against. 
 
 434. Escape as part of combination. 
 
 c. Abandonment of purpose. 
 
 435. Effect of. 
 
 VI. The degree of homicide. 
 
 436. The general rule and its reasons. 
 
 437. In case of conspiracy to kill. 
 
 438. In case of conspiracy to commit felony. 
 
 439. In case of conspiracy to commit act dangerous to life. 
 
 440. In case of conspiracy to commit misdemeanor or minor criminal 
 
 act. 
 VII. The conspiracy, how established. 
 
 441. General rules. 
 
 442. Joint acts of preparation. 
 
 443. Joint acts of execution. 
 VIII. Alibi as a defense. 
 
 444. When competent. 
 
 643 
 
644 HOMICIDE. (^ 417 
 
 I. Scope of subject. 
 
 417. Distinction between conspiracy and aiding and abetting, etc . 
 
 The subject of homicide resulting from conspiracy to do an un- 
 lawful act, though closely allied to that of aiding and abetting homi- 
 cide, and of advising or procuring homicide, is distinguished from 
 it in that an aider or abetter must be present, either actually or con- 
 structively aiding in the commission of the very act, and an acces- 
 sory must have advised or procured the very act itself; while in 
 the case of conspiracy, the concert or conspiracy is usually to do 
 some other unlawful act not including the commission of homicide, 
 but from which homicide results; and conspiracy involves previous 
 arrangement to do an unlawful act, while aiding and abetting in- 
 volves no previous arrangement. A coconspirator in a conspiracy 
 to do an unlawful act which results in homicide, however, is in fact 
 a principal in the first degree, since the theory of his liability is 
 that, as the homicide resulted from the act for the performance of 
 which he conspired, it is his act.^ 
 
 J II. Ceimiital eesponsibilitt. 
 
 418. General rules. — The general rule is that, when several per- 
 sons conspire or combine together to commit an unlawful act, and a 
 homicide results, each is criminally responsible for the act of the 
 associates or confederates, if committed in furtherance or in prose- 
 cution of the common design for which they combined.* And the 
 rule is the same in such case whether or not the person sought to 
 be held was present at the time of the homicide, and whether he 
 
 iTliis subject is extensively consid- pie, 15 111. 511; Bruner v. United 
 
 ered in a note on homicide in carrying States, 4 Ind. Terr. 580, 76 S. VV. 244; 
 
 out unlawful conspiracy, to People v. Stipp v. State, 11 Ind. 62; State v. 
 
 Lawrence, 68 L.R.A. 193. Mushrush, 97 Iowa, 444, 66 N. W. 74G; 
 
 2See State v. Miller, 156 Mo. 76, 55 State v. Munchrath, 78 Iowa, 263. 43 N. 
 
 S. W. 907. W. 211; State v. Shelledy, 8 Iowa, 477; 
 
 iMartin v. State, 136 Ala. 32, 34 So. Com. v. Campbell, 7 Allen, 541, 83 Am. 
 
 205; Liner v. State, 124 Ala. 1, 27 So. Dec. 705; Peden v. State, 61 Miss. 267; 
 
 438; Evans v. State, 109 Ala. 22, 19 Brabston v. State, 68 Miss. 208. 8 So. 
 
 So. 535; Turner v. State, 97 Ala. 57, 12 326; State v. Walker, 98 Mo. 95, 9 S. 
 
 So. 54; Tanner v. State, 92 Ala. 1, 9 So. W. 646, 11 S. W. 1133; Carrington v. 
 
 613; Amos V. State, 83 Ala. 1, 3 Am. St. People, 6 Park. Crim. Rep. 336; Ruloff 
 
 Rep. 682, 3 So. 749; Frank v. State, 27 v. People, 45 N. Y. 213; State v. Gtooch, 
 
 Ala. 37; Carr v. State, 43 Ark. 99; 94 N. C. 987; State v. Finley, 118 N. 
 
 People V. Olson, 80 Cal. 122, 22 Pac. C. 1161, 24 S. E. 495; State v. Johnson, 
 
 125: Smith v. People, 1 Colo. 121; Han- 7 Or. 210; Weston v. Com. Ill Pa. 251, 
 
 na V. People, 86 111. 243; Butler v. Peo- 2 Atl. 191 ; Com. v. Miller, 4 Phila. 195; 
 
 pie, 125 111. 641, 1 L.R.A. 211, 8 Am. St. Com. v. Martin, 7 Pa. Diat. R. 219; 
 
 Rep. 423, 18 N. E. 338; Spies v. People, Moody v. State, 6 Coldw. 299- Blain v. 
 
 122 111. 1, 3 Am. St. Rep. 320, 12 N. State, 30 Tex. App. 702, 18 S. W 862; 
 
 E. 865, 17 N. E. 898; Brennan v. Peo- Kirby v. State, 23 Tex. App 13 5 S W. 
 
§ 418] IN CARRYING OUT CONSPIRACY TO DO UNIAWFUL ACT. 645 
 
 or a coconspirator did the deed.^ Nor is Ills rfesponsibility affected 
 by the fact that homicide was not the result intended, or -within the 
 contemplation of the parties as a part of the original design.^ And 
 it is no defense that the coconspirator sought to be charged forbade 
 his associates to kill, or that he disapproved of the killing, or re- 
 gretted that any person was slain.* Where one person combines 
 with another to do an unlawful act, he impliedly consents to the 
 use of such means by his confederates as may be necessary or usual 
 in the successful accomplishment of such act, and if such means 
 involve a homicide he will be criminally responsible therefor.^ In 
 such case they are deemed in law to be parties to all acts done by 
 each in furtherance of the common design, before and afterwards, 
 as well as at the time it was formed.® And one who is a party to 
 a criminal conspiracy the direct result of which is murder per- 
 petrated by one of his coconspirators, and who is actually present 
 
 165; Cain v. State, 42 Tex. Grim. Rep. 
 210, 59 S. W. 275; Stevenson v. State, 
 17 Tex. App. 619; Phillips v. State, 26 
 Tex. App. 228, 8 Am. St. Rep. 471, 9 
 S. W. 557; Mitchell v. State, 36 Tex. 
 Grim. Rep. 278, 33 S. W. 367, 36 S. W. 
 456; State v. Morgan, 22 Utah, 162, 61 
 Pac. 527; Hayes v. State, 112 Wis. 304, 
 87 N. W. 1076; Miller v. State, 25 Wis. 
 384; United States v. Ross, 1 Gall. 624, 
 Fed. Gas. No. 16,196; Reg. v. Jackson, 
 7 Gox, G. G. 357; Reg. v. Lee, 4 Fost. & 
 F. 63; Macldin's Case, 2 Lewin, C. G. 
 225; Stanley's Case, J. Kelyng, 86. 
 
 And an instruction directing an ac- 
 quittal of the accused in a prosecution 
 for homicide if he and the person killed 
 had a fight, and after he had inflicted 
 a wound upon the deceased his brother 
 came up, and without his Icnowledge or 
 consent or connivance inflicted a cruel 
 wound upon the deceased, is erroneous 
 and properly refused where there was 
 evidence tending to show a conspiracy 
 between him and the brother. Sanders 
 V. State, 134 Ala. 74, 32 So. 654. 
 
 zPeople V. Brown, 59 Gal. 345 ; Fergu- 
 son V. State, 134 Ala. 63, 92 Am. St. Rep. 
 17, 32 So. 760; Evans v. State, supra; 
 Mow V. People, 31 Colo. 351, 72 Pac. 
 1069; Kennedy v. People, 40 111. 488; 
 Brennan v. People, and Spies v. Peo- 
 ple, supra; State v. Penney, 113 Iowa, 
 691, 84 N. W. 509; Roesel v. State, 62 
 N. J. L. 216, 41 Atl. 408; Ruloff v. Peo- 
 ple, supra; People v. Lagroppo, 90 App. 
 Div. 219, 86 N. Y. Supp. 116; State v. 
 Pinley; State v. Gooch; State v. John- 
 
 son ; Weston v. Com. ; Blain v. State ; 
 Gain v. State; and State v. Morgan, — 
 supra; State v. King, 24 Utah, 482, 91 
 Am. St. Rep. 808, 68 Pac. 418; Reg. v. 
 Howell, 9 Gar. & P. 437 ; Stanley's Case, 
 supra. And see Bardin v. State, 143 
 Ala. 74, 38 So. 833; People v. Wood, 145 
 Gal. 659, 79 Pac. 367; Dover v. State, 
 109 Ga. 485, 34 S. E. 1030. But see 
 Bowen v. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 82 S. 
 W. 520. 
 
 sEvans v. State, supra; Collins v. 
 State, 138 Ala. 57, 34 So. 993 ; Liner v. 
 State; Turner v. State; Tanner v. 
 State; and Carr v. State, — supra; Peo- 
 ple V. Vasquez, 49 Gal. 560; Spies v. 
 People, supra; McMahon v. People, 189 
 II!. 222, 59 N. E. 584; Brennan v. Peo- 
 ple, and State v. Mushrush, supra; 
 State V. Barrett, 40 Minn. 77, 41 N. W. 
 463; Peden v. State; State v. Walker; 
 and State v. Finlev, — supra; Stephens 
 V. State, 42 Ohio St." 150; Coins v. State, 
 46 Ohio St. 457, 21 N. E. 476; Com. v. 
 Major, 198 Pa. 290, 82 Am. St. Rep. 
 803, 47 Atl. 741; Moody v. State; 
 Mitchell V. State; Blain v. State; and 
 Reg. V. Lee, — supra; Reg. v. Wallis, 1 
 Salk. 334. And see People v. Lawrence, 
 143 Gal. 148, 68 L.R.A. 193, 76 Pac. 893. 
 
 4 People V. Vasquez, and People v. 
 LaAvrence, supra. 
 
 BWilliams v. State, 81 Ala. 1, 60 Am. 
 Rep. 133, 1 So. 179; Lamb v. People, 96 
 111. 73. And see Kennedy v. People, 
 supra. 
 
 sSpies V. People, 122 111. 1, 3 Am. St. 
 Rep. 320, 12 N. E. 865, 17 N. E. 898. 
 
04B HOMICIDE. 
 
 K 418 
 
 assisting to tlie extent of his ability in the accomplishment of the 
 common design, is himself guilty of murder though the circumstances 
 were such that his assistance was ineffective, the extent and effect- 
 iveness of his assistance being immaterial.'^ 'Nov is the criminality 
 of the killing affected by the fact that the person killed had threaten- 
 ed or attempted an unlawful act against the slayer.* 
 
 It has been held, however, that a coconspirator to commit a crime 
 cannot be held guilty as principal if he was not present at the time 
 and place of the commission,® though this decision seems to have 
 been based upon principles applicable to aiding and abetting mur- 
 der, rather than to conspiracy. And it is not within the power of 
 the United States to punish for conspiracy resulting in homicide 
 committed within a state, unless the homicide was in violation of a 
 United States statute; and the questions of the power of the United 
 States to inquire into, and punish for, a conspiracy to oppress and 
 intimidate a citizen of the United States, which resulted in the mur- 
 der of the citizen's agent, and whether each conspirator was pun- 
 ishable under the Federal statutes, depend upon whether the kill- 
 ing was done in pursuance of such conspiracy.^" So, where there 
 is evidence in a prosecution for homicide that the killing was done 
 by the person on trial, it is not necessary, merely because the evi- 
 dence suggests conspiracy, for the court to define conspiracy to the 
 jury, a charge as to the personal guilt of the accused being suffi- 
 cient. * * 
 
 III. Application of eules to pabticulae acts. 
 419. The doing of personal violence. — Where the common conspir- 
 acy or design of several persons is to effect death, each and every 
 one of them engaged in the common enterprise is a principal in the 
 transaction and is responsible for the acts of the others, and if death 
 results they are all equally guilty of homicide, no matter who caused 
 the death.* And where several persons enter into a conspiracy to 
 
 'Territory v. McGinnis, 10 N. M. 269, was no design to effect death. People 
 
 61 Pac. 208. V. Wilson, 145 N. Y. 628, 40 N. E. 392. 
 
 So, an instruction in a prosecution sBruner v. United States, 4 Ind. Terr, 
 
 for the homicide of an officer who had 580, 76 S. W. 244. 
 
 arrested the accused and another, that sBowen v. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 
 
 if there was no intent upon the part of 82 S. W. 520. 
 
 the accused to kill the officer, he not mUnited States v. Lancaster, 10 L. 
 
 knowing that the other intended to kill R.A. 333. 44 Fed. 896. 
 
 him, he cannot be convicted of murder n Augustine v. State, 41 Tex. Grim, 
 
 in the first degree, though present, is Rep. 59, 96 Am. St. Rep. 765, 52 S. W. 
 
 erroneous under a statute making it 77. 
 
 murder for a person engaged in the com- iThomas v. State, 124 Ala. 48, 27 So. 
 
 mission of a felony to kill, though there 315; Bardin v. State, 143 Ala. 74, 38 So. 
 
I 419] IN CARRYING OUT CONSPIRACY TO DO UNLAWFUL ACT. 047 
 
 assault and beat another, and in carrying out such conspiracy the 
 latter is killed, each is criminally responsible for the killing.^ ]^or 
 is a coconspirator charged with killing relieved from responsibility 
 by the fact that there is nothing in the evidence to show who struck 
 the fatal blow.* And the same rule has been applied where men 
 conspire together to fight with their fists with other men, and one 
 of the conspirators causes the death of an opponent, all being held 
 alike guilty.* So, where two persons go to a house for the purpose 
 of committing rape therein, and while inside one of them causes 
 the death of the owner, the criminality of the act attaches to each." 
 And if several persons enter into a joint undertaking, imposing upon 
 each a personal duty with respect to the performance of the under- 
 taking, and upon all alike, and by the neglect or omission of such 
 duty a casualty occurs resulting in the death of a third person, an 
 indictment will lie against all for the killing.® 
 
 420. Breaches of the peace, riots, etc. — ^Where persons combine to 
 stand by one another in a breach of the peace, with a general resolu- 
 tion of resistance to the death of opposers, and in the execution of 
 their design homicide is committed, all of the company are equally 
 guilty in the crime. ^ And coconspirators in such a case may be 
 
 «33; Vasser v. State (Ark.) 87 S. W. 
 
 <i35; People v. Lagroppo, 90 App. Div. 
 
 219, 86 N. Y. Supp. 116; Carpenter v. 
 
 State, 62 Ark. 286, 36 S. W. 900; Mow v. 
 
 People, 31 Colo. 351, 72 Pac. 1069; 
 
 Jennings v. Com. 13 Ky. L. Rep. 79, 16 
 
 S. W. 348; Com. v. Neills, 2 Brewst. 
 
 (Pa.) 553; Com. v. Toth, 145 Pa. 308, 
 
 22 Atl. 157; Miller v. State, 15 Tex. 
 
 App. 125; Leslie v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. 
 
 Rep. 65, 57 S. W. 659; Holtz v. State, 76 
 
 Wis. 99, 44 N. W. 1107; Reg. v. Price, 8 
 
 Cox, C. C. 96. And see Stevens v. 
 
 State, 133 Ala. 28, 32 So. 270. 
 
 2Gibson v. State, 89 Ala. 121, 18 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 96, 8 So. 98 ; Williams v. State, 
 
 81 Ala. 1, 60 Am. Rep. 133, 1 So. 179; 
 
 State V. Munehrath, 78 Iowa, 268, 43 
 
 N. W. 211; State v. Furney, 41 Kan. 
 
 115, 13 Am. St. Rep. 262, 21 Pac. 213; 
 
 Peden v. State, 61 Miss. 267 ; Mitchell v. 
 
 State, 36 Tex. Crim. Rep. 278, 33 S. W. 
 367, 36 S. W. 456; People v. Garretson, 
 2 Wheeler, C. C. 347; Reg. v. Price, 
 tupra. And see Com. v. Lewis, Addison 
 
 (Pa.) 279; Ferguson v. State, 134 Ala. 
 63, 92 Am. St. Rep. 17, 32 So. 760. 
 
 sGreen v. State, 51 Ark. 189, 10 S. W. 
 266. 
 
 And where two persons arm them- 
 selves and go in pursuit of another for 
 
 the purpose of chastising him for an in- 
 sult to their mother, their design being 
 that the stronger of the two should 
 chastise such person and the other 
 should stand guard while this was be- 
 ing done, neither intending to kill un- 
 less it becomes necessary in order to 
 save their own lives, and such person 
 resist, shooting and disabling the 
 brother on guard, when the other 
 brother shoots and kills him, these 
 rules apply in a prosecution against 
 the brother who stands guard, notwith- 
 standing the fact of his being disabled 
 at the time of the killing. Irvine v. 
 State, 104 Tenn. 132, 56 S. W. 845. 
 
 4Reg. V. Caton, 12 Cox, C. C. 624; 
 State V. Matthewa, 80 N. C. 418. 
 
 BMercersmith v. State, 8 Tex. App. 
 211. 
 
 sAinsworth v. United States, 1 App. 
 D. C. 518. 
 
 iMartin v. State, 89 Ala. 115, 18 Am. 
 St. Rep. 91, 8 So. 23; People v. Cowan 
 (Cal.) 82 Pac. 339; Spies v. People, 122 
 111. 1, 3 Am. St. Rep. 320, 12 N. E. 865, 
 17 N. E. 898; Com. v. Daley, 2 Clark 
 (Pa.) 361; Kirby v. State, 23 Tex. App. 
 13, 5 S. W. 165; Reg. v. Howell, 9 Car. 
 & P. 437 ; Reg. v. Tyler, 8 Car. & P. 616; 
 Reg. v. Harrington, 5 Cox, C. C. 231 ; 
 
648 HOMICIDE. [>§ 42O 
 
 held criminally responsible, though the person procuring the com- 
 bination was insane and irresponsible, and the killing was done by 
 him, and though they did not know of his condition, since, as they 
 contemplated resistance to lawfully constituted authority in case 
 there should be occasion, there was a common purpose which would 
 render them all answerable for the homicide.^ So, this rule applies 
 to several persons who entered into a conspiracy to disturb a meet- 
 ing and thus provoke a difficulty, and to resist all opposers even to 
 death, where one of them killed a person in the difficulty provoked.* 
 And one who enters into a conspiracy with others to raise a body 
 of armed men to alarm legislators is guilty of murder, where, as 
 a result of such conspiracy, a legislator is shot and killed, though 
 death was not the original purpose of the conspiracy.* Likewise, 
 where a number of felonious rioters were associated together, en- 
 gaged in common resistance against officers of justice attempting 
 to restrain them, and one of them killed an officer, all are involved 
 in the common guilt.® And where two belligerent parties of men 
 engaged in a conflict with each other, and a citizen not concerned 
 in the conflict was killed, all the members of both parties are alike 
 offenders and chargeable with the consequences, and a member of 
 one of the parties cannot escape by raising a doubt as to whether 
 the fatal shot came from his party or from the other. ® So, if several 
 persons conspire to bring about a social revolution, and as a part of 
 that conspiracy to excite sedition, tumult, and riot, and for that 
 purpose advise, by newspaper articles and speeches, the murder of 
 the authorities of 1h.e city, and the murder of a policeman follows, 
 
 Ashton's Case, 12 Mod. 256; King v. Queen v. McNaughten, 14 Cox, C. C.576; 
 
 Plummer, 12 Mod. 627. Basset's Case, 1 East, P. C. 259, 1 Hale, 
 
 Where a number of persons went to P. C. 440, 1 Hawk. P. C. 128. 
 the house of an old man where a wed- eCom. v. Hare, 2 Clark (Pa.) 467; 
 ding was in progress, and pushed one Rex v. Hubson, 1 East, P. C. 258. 
 another against him, throwing him And where the accused in a prosecu- 
 against a wall and pushing him down, tion for homicide, and others with whom 
 and all of them fell over him, and he he was associated, after an assault up- 
 received injuries which caused his on and dispersion of a meeting held by 
 death, all alike are criminally responsi- them, left the scene of action and gath- 
 ble without reference to whose act ered friends and arms and returned and 
 caused the injury. Com. v. Lewis, Ad- commenced burning the houses and 
 dison (Pa.) 279. property of their assailants, and firing 
 
 2Reg. V. Tyler, supra. upon and endeavoring to kill them, for 
 
 sBibby v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) the purpose of avenging their wrongs, 
 
 65 S. W. 193. and not for the purpose of assisting in 
 
 ^Powers V. Com. 110 Ky. 386, 53 L.R. bringing th6 original offenders to iiis- 
 
 A. 245, 61 S. W. 735. tice, their conduct is Illegal and un- 
 
 BRe Riots of 1844, 2 Clark (Pa.) justifiable, and they are all liable for 
 
 275 ; Burgess v. State, 93 Ga. 304, 20 the fatal consequences flowing from such 
 
 S. E. 331; Reg. v. Wallis, 1 Salk. 334; acts. Com. v. Hare, supra. 
 
§ 420] IN CARRYING OUT CONSPIRACY TO DO UNLAWFUL ACT. 64i» 
 
 they are responsible therefor.'^ And this is so though the act caus- 
 ing death, and the means by which it was carried into effect, was 
 the independent act of another, and not done under their special 
 direction. * 
 
 A statute, however, providing that whenever two or more persons 
 shall combine together for the purpose of mob violence, and in pur- 
 suance of said combination shall wilfully and unlawfully take the 
 life of any reasonable creature in being by such violence, they shall 
 be deemed guilty of murder by mob violence, aimed in its passage 
 at participation in mobs, does not apply to acts of homicide com- 
 mitted in pursuance of a conspiracy instigated by personal malice, 
 and does not operate as a repeal of the statutes with reference to 
 murder committed in pursuance of a conspiracy or combination, un- 
 less its object was the forcible taking from the custody of officers a 
 person charged with crime. ® 
 
 421. Invasion of property rights. — The same general rules with 
 reference to criminal responsibility for conspiracies to do personal 
 violence resulting in death apply to conspiracies for criminal in- 
 vasion of property rights, such as to commit larceny, burglary, rob- 
 bery, etc. ; and where several persons invade the premises of another 
 with a common purpose of breaking in and stealing, and a homi- 
 cide is committed by one of them, which was a natural consequence 
 of the act done in pursuance of the common design, thoss participat- 
 ing in the common design are as guilty as the slayer. ^ And the same 
 rule applies to persons engaged in stealing, who concerted together 
 to resist attempts to arrest them, where one of them killed an officer 
 seeking to make such an arrest. ^ So, where several persons combine 
 together for the purpose of committing burglary, and death results 
 to a third person from the act of one of them in carrying out the 
 common design, they are all criminally responsible.^ And this is 
 so though the person sought to be charged remained outside to watch, 
 and fled at the approach of a policeman, who was afterwards killed 
 by others inside.* So, if a homicide was committed by one of several 
 associates in an enterprise for the robbing of a person in furtherance 
 
 'Spies V. People, 122 111. 1, 3 Am. St. sEnglish v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 Rep. 320, 12 N. E. 865, 17 N. E. 898. 190, 30 S. W. 233. 
 
 8Spie3 V. People, supra. sRex v. Tin Ah Chin, 3 Haw. 90; 
 
 sAlexander v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. MeMahon v. People, 189 111. 222, 59 N. 
 
 Kep 395 49 S. W. 229, 50 S. W. 716. E. 584; State v. Young. 67 N. J. L. 223, 
 
 iState'v. Cannon, 49 S. C. 550, 27 S. 5 Atl. 939; Com. v. Major, 198 Pa. 290, 
 
 E. 526; Hamilton v. People, 113 111. 34, 82 Am. St. Rep. 803, 47 Atl. 741; Mer- 
 
 65 Am'. Rep. 396; Ritzman v. People, eersmith v. State, 8 Tex. App. 211. 
 
 110 111. 362; Daore'a Case, 1 Hale, P. C. <Moody v. State, 6 Coldw. 299. 
 439, F. Moore, 86. 
 
«50 HOMICIDE. [5 421 
 
 of their common purpose, the associates are as accountable as though 
 their own hands had intentionally and actually given the fatal blow. * 
 And where, as in the case of burglary, a person remains outside 
 to watch, he is equally guilty with the rest though the killing was 
 unintentionally done by one of the others. " If or is the general rule 
 affected by the fact that the act causing death was directed toward 
 some other person, and fell upon the person killed accidentally.'' And 
 the act of giving a signal to another indicating a favorable oppor- 
 tunity to commit a robbery, after which the person signaled com- 
 mits the robbery and kills the victim, renders the person giving the 
 signal not merely an accessory but a principal in the murder, and 
 his guilt in no wise depends upon the guilt or innocence, conviction 
 or acquittal, of the other participant in the crime.* These rules 
 have been applied in case of a conspiracy for train robbery, in which 
 one of the conspirators killed the engineer in furtherance of the 
 object, it being held to be murder in the first degree in the other 
 conspirators.® And where several conspire to seize with force and 
 violence a vessel, and run away with her, and, if necessary, kill 
 any person who shall oppose them, and death ensues in its prosecu- 
 tion, it is mnrder in all who were present aiding and abetting in the 
 execution of the design. ^ " 
 
 422. Escape from confinement. — An escape by one in confinement 
 or custody for felony is a felonious act, and where two persons in 
 lawful confinement or custody on a charge of felony conspire to- 
 gether and aid and assist each other in an attempt to escape, and one 
 of them kills the ofiicer in charge in such an attempt, the other is 
 guilty of murder, without regard to whether a design existed to 
 
 BPeople V. Lawrence, 143 Cal. 148, 68 person who shall oppose them, and 
 
 L.R.A. 193, 76 Pac. 893; People v. Vas- death ensues in the prosecution of the 
 
 quez, 49 Cal. 560 ; Andrews v. People, 33 design, it is murder in all who are pres- 
 
 Colo. 193, 79 Pac. 1031 ; State v. Barrett, ent aiding and abetting in the common 
 
 40 Minn. 77, 41 N. W. 463; State v. design, and that all engaged in such 
 
 Murray, 126 Mo. 526, 29 S. W. 590; an outrage must alike suffer the conse- 
 
 Roesel v. State, 62 N. J. L. 216, 41 Atl. quences, is not subject to objection that 
 
 408; Stephens v. State, 42 Ohio St. the use of the word "outrage" was cal- 
 
 150; Com. v. Major, 198 Pa. 290, 82 Am. culated to prejudice the case of the ac- 
 
 St. Rep. 803, 47 Atl. 741 ; Com. v. Miller, cused. People' v. Pool, 27 Cal. 573. 
 
 4 Phila. 195; State v. King, 24 Utah, eStephens v. State, supra; Mitchell 
 
 482, 91 Am. St. Rep. 808, 68 Pac. 418; v. Com. 33 Gratt. 845. 
 
 State V. Morgan, 22 Utah, 162, 61 Pac. 'Mansell's Case, 2 Dyer, 128b. 
 
 527; Rex v. Tin Ah Chin, supra; Reg. sDean v. State, 85 Miss. 40 37 So 
 
 V. Jackson, 7 Cox, C. C. 357. 501. ' 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution sDarlington v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. 
 
 for homicide that if several persons con- Rep. 333, 50 S. W. 375. 
 
 spire to rob and escape with the prop- loUnited States v. Ross 1 Gall 624 
 
 erty taken, and, if necessary, kill any Fed. Cas. No. 16,196. ' ' ' 
 
I 422] m CARRYING OUT CONSPIRACY TO DO UNLAWFUL ACT. 651 
 
 effect death. ^ So, where one who furnishes to prisoners arms and in- 
 struments and means for the purpose of breaking out of prison, who, 
 pursuant to the common purpose to secure their liberty, break out 
 and attempt to escape, and in doing so or in their immediate flight 
 kill a person attempting to prevent it, the person thus furnishing 
 them with arms and means is guilty of the crime of murder, though 
 the fatal shot was not fired with a premeditated design to effect 
 death. ^ And where an ally was with an escaped convict at a time 
 when the convict shot and killed one of a party seeking, under the 
 direction of the sheriff, to rearrest him, armed and attempting to 
 assist him, and afterwards fled v/ith and remained with him, still 
 retaining his arms, he too is equally guilty of homicide. * And where 
 two persons determined to escape from prison together, and one of 
 them shot and killed a watchman, the warrant under which the per- 
 son doing the shooting was committed to prison is admissible in 
 evidence on a prosecution therefor, to show that he was a lawful 
 prisoner, and that the conspiracy of the two to escape was an un- 
 lawful combination.* So, evidence in a prosecution for murder al- 
 leged to have been committed by soldiers pursuant to a conspiracy 
 on their part to release a fellow soldier who had been confined in 
 jail, that a body of armed men were seen returning from the place 
 where the murder was committed at or about the time of its com- 
 mission, is competent, though none of them were identified as the 
 defendants on trial.'' 
 
 IV. The conspieagt. 
 
 423. Necessity of, as an element of criminal responsibility. — To hold 
 one criminally responsible for a homicide committed by another, 
 there must have been a conspiracy or concert between them, and the 
 deed must have been done in furtherance thereof, and it must have 
 
 »People V. Wilson, 145 N. Y. 628, 40 able the guard, and it appears that, if 
 
 N. E. 392; People v. Flanigan, 174 N. Y. there was any conspiracy, it was mur- 
 
 357, 66 N. E. 988; State v. Allen, 47 derous in its character; and the sole 
 
 Conn. 121. And see People v. Eldridge, theory of the defense was that he was 
 
 147 Cal. 782, 82 Pac. 442. absolutely guiltless of any participation 
 
 And refusal to instruct the jury in a whatever in the attack; since such a 
 
 prosecution for homicide against one of charge is not pertinent to the issue. 
 
 two convicts who killed a guard in Perry v. State, 110 Ga. 234, 36 S. E. 
 
 prison, that, if the two conspired mere- 781. 
 
 ly to commit an assault and battery 2Reeves v. Territory, 10 Okla. 194, 61 
 
 upon the guard for the purpose of ef- Pac. 828. 
 
 feeting an escape, the one on trial can- sTolbert v. State, 71 Miss. 179, 42 Am. 
 
 not be chargeable with the homicide of St. Eep. 454, 14 So. 462. 
 
 the guard committed by the other, is not estate v. Allen, 47 Conn. 121. 
 
 error where there was no evidence to BKipper v. State, 45 Tex. Crira. Eep. 
 
 show conspiracy merely to beat or dis- 377, 77 S. W. 611. 
 
652 HOMICIDE. 
 
 B 42S 
 
 been within tlie common object or purpose. ^ One who merely knocks 
 another down, after which a third person kills him, is not guilty 
 of murder in the absence of any showing of a previous agreement 
 or concert between them.^ So, though there was a conspiracy or 
 concert of action, and a murder resulted, a person cannot be held 
 criminally responsible .therefor where another did the deed, and it 
 does not appear beyond reasonable doubt that the general purpose 
 was contemplated or asssented to by him, or that it was done with 
 his knowledge.^ And if it appears that neither the person subse- 
 quently killed nor the alleged coconspirator was present at the time 
 of' the conspiracy or when the diiSculty commenced, but both came 
 afterwards and took part therein, the alleged coconspirator is entitle-l 
 to a charge as to his responsibility for the killing by another in the 
 absence of a conspiracy.* 
 
 It is immaterial, however, whether the conspiracy or concert was 
 by prearrangement, or entered into on the emergency.® Nor is it 
 necessary, in a prosecution for homicide alleged to have been the 
 result of a conspiracy, to show that the accused entered into the con- 
 spiracy or agreement with persons doing the killing; he is respon- 
 sible for a conspiracy with others who employed persons to do the 
 killing, as he would also be if he had employed others to do it him- 
 self." And where persons conspire together to bring about a social 
 revolution, and as a part of that conspiracy they also conspire to ex- 
 cite classes of people to sedition, tumult, and riot, and the taking of 
 human life, and for that purpose encourage them by newspaper 
 articles and speeches to murder the authorities of the city, and subse- 
 
 iState V. Finley, 118 N. C. 1161, 24 Evidence that one person threatened 
 
 S. E. 495; State v. Jimmerson, 118 N. C. to kill another on different occasions is 
 
 1173, 24 S. E. 494; State v. Edwards, inadmissible in a prosecution against 
 
 126 N. C. 1051, 35 S. E. 540; Stevens v. the brother of the threatener for killing 
 
 State, 133 Ala. 28, 32 So. 270; Chapman the person threatened, in the absence of 
 
 V. State, 43 Tex. Grim. Rep. 328, 96 Am. evidence of an agreement or conspiracy 
 
 St. Rep. 874, 65 S. W. 1098; Hayes v. between the brothers to assault or kill 
 
 State, 112 Wis. 308, 87 N. W. 1076; Reg. such person. Wills v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 V. Skeet, 4 Fost. & F. 931. App.) 22 S. W. 969. 
 
 But an instruction in a prosecution sNite v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 for homicide authorizing the jury to 340, 54 S. W. 763; Frank v. State, 
 
 find a verdict of guilty if they believe supra; State v. Furney, 41 Kan. 115, 31 
 
 that the shooting was done pursuant to Am. St. Rep. 262, 21 Pac. 213. 
 
 a common understanding and intent to ^Chapman v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. 
 
 kill is not prejudicial to the accused, Rep. 479, 76 S. W. 477. 
 
 where the proof did not disclose any ^Tanner v. State, 92 Ala. 1, 9 So. 
 
 concert of action or any act done in pur- 613; State v. Penney, 113 Iowa, 691, 84 
 
 suance of a purpose entertained by him, N. W. 509. 
 
 and in which he was a participant. elsaacs v. State, 36 Tex. Crim. Ken. 
 
 Howard v. Com. 96 Ky. 19, 27 S. W. 854. 505, 38 S. W. 40 
 
 2 Frank v. State, 27 Ala. 37. 
 
I 423] IN CAJRRYING OUT CONSPIRACY TO DO UNLAWFUL ACT. 653 
 
 quently others meet and adopt a plan for such destruction, and in 
 pursuance of such plan a person is killed', the subsequent plan will 
 be regarded as merely a specific mode of carrying out the general 
 conspiracy, and all will be regarded as parties thereto, so that one 
 of the original conspirators would be responsible for such killing.^ 
 Where statutes defining conspiracy make no exception in favor 
 of a wife in respect to who may be engaged in it, a husband and 
 wife may conspire together, even without the intervention of a 
 third person, to commit a murder, or to do some other unlawful 
 act, so as to be responsible for the acts of each other in carrying 
 out the conspiracy. ® 
 
 424. When and how formed. — The time when the illegal combina- 
 tion or arrangement was made, which resulted in a homicide, is 
 not material in a prosecution therefor, in which it is sought to 
 hold a coconfederate of the slayer, as long as it was made before 
 the actual commission of the offense.^ And it is not necessary that 
 the purpose to resist to death any person who should interfere should 
 have been formed when coconfederates went out with a common 
 design to commit an unlawful act, in order to render them all 
 principals in a murder perpetrated by one of them in resisting 
 such interference.^ Nor is it necessary to show, in order to hold 
 a person criminally liable for homicide as a coconspirator, that 
 the alleged conspirators met and actually agreed jointly to under- 
 take the perpetration of a criminal act.^ And it need not be shown 
 by direct evidence, but may be inferred from circumstances, such 
 as the number, aim, and behavior of the parties at and before the 
 scene of action.* And it matters not whether the intent or agree- 
 ment to perform an unlawful act, or resist interference to the death, 
 was formed as a part of the general policy adopted by the crim- 
 inals in their violation of law, or whether it was an instantaneous 
 compact bom of the exigency of the case.® 
 
 425. Accused must be party thereto — ISTo person can be held guilty 
 of homicide, unless the act is either actually or constructively his, 
 and it cannot be his in either sense unless committed by his own 
 hand, or by someone acting in concert with him or in furtherance of 
 
 'Spies V. People, 122 III. I, 3 Am. SI. sPeople v. Lawrence, 143 Cal. 148, 08 
 
 Rep. 320, 12 N. E. 865, 17 N. E. 898. L.R.A. 193, 76 Pac. 893. 
 
 sSmith V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 89 iRulofif v. People; People v. Law- 
 
 S. W. 817. rence; and Territory v. McGinnis, — 
 
 iRuloflF V. People, 45 N. Y. 213. supra. 
 
 2Mercersmith v. State, 8 Tex. App. ^People v. Wilson, 145 N. Y. 628, 40 
 
 211; Riiloff V. People, supra; Territory N. E. 392. 
 V. McGinnis, 10 N. M. 269, 61 Pac. 208. 
 
654 HOMICIDE. ['§ 425 
 
 a common object or purpose, as distinguished from someone acting 
 independently or in opposition to him/ And a person engaged 
 in a riot cannot be held either for murder or manslaughter for the 
 killing of a person by a shot fired by an officer or person seeking 
 to suppress the riot.^ ISTor are men lying in wait to do a criminal 
 act criminally responsible for the murder of one of their number 
 iby another, out of malice toward him.* jSTor is one of two men 
 who had agreed to fight criminally responsible for the act of the 
 other in killing the stakeholder.* And a man engaged in a fight 
 with another is not guilty of murder because a third person came 
 up and inflicted a mortal wound tipon his antagonist, without his 
 consent or connivance, in the absence of anything to show conspir- 
 acy between him and the person doing the killing.® So, the fact 
 that persons had information which led them to believe that an- 
 other person would be killed does not make them parties to a plot 
 to do the killing. ® And where a person was so drunk at the time of 
 entering into an alleged conspiracy as to be incapable of understand- 
 ing its nature and consequences, he cannot be held criminally re- 
 sponsible for a resulting death.'' 
 
 But while mere presence while another commits a homicide will 
 not make one a principal, where there is evidence of a conspiracy to 
 kill beforehand, the extent of the participation in the act is not 
 material, and mere presence might be a sufiicient act of encourage- 
 ment to render the person so present criminally responsible.* And 
 where several acts of force have been actually committed in pursuance 
 of a common design, it is not necessary to find that the person en- 
 gaged in such common design aided and assisted in the resulting hom- 
 icide; it is only necessary that he was present, though no partic- 
 ular act of force was done by him. ® Nor is the rule that, where two 
 or more persons conspire to commit a felony, and in the prosecution 
 of that common design one of them commits murder, it is murder in 
 all, affected by the fact that two of the persons conspiring together 
 
 iCom. V. Campbell, 7 Allen, 541, 83 sPowers v. Com. 114 Ky. 237, 70 S. 
 
 Am. Dec. 705; Butler v. People, 125 W. 644,- 1050, 71 S. W. 494. 
 
 111. 641, 1 L.R.A. 211, 8 Am. St. Rep. And in such case statements made 
 
 423, 18 N. E. 338; Com. v. Moore, 28 Ky. by the other alleged coconspirators are 
 
 L. Eep. 62, 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 719, 88 S. ^o* admissible in evidence against him 
 
 W 1085 ' ^" "' prosecution for aiding and abetting 
 
 2Com.'v. Campbell, supra. *^^^ '\"1'"S- Ibid. 
 
 3Rex V. Plummer, J. Kelyng, 109, 12 n. W. 682'' ' ' ^^^' "~ 
 
 Mod^ 027. r T> o n n TA-, ^Leslie v. State, 42 Tex. Grim. Rep. 
 
 4Queen v. Taylor, L. R. 2 C. C. 147. 65, 57 S. W 659 
 
 BTurner v. State, 97 Ala. 57, 12 So. oKing v. 'sorthwick, 1 Doucrl K B 
 
 54; Reg. V. Caton, 12 Cox, C. 0. 624. 207. i^ou„i. iv. d. 
 
I 425] IN CARRYING OUT CONSPIRACY TO DO UNLAWFUL ACT. U5» 
 
 are husband and wife ; ^ " unless it can be said that the wife did not 
 act freely in what she did, but was under the coercive influence of 
 her husband. ^^ Where it is left in doubt by the testimony in a 
 case of this kind as to whether the accused was included within the 
 conspiracy, the doubt as to his connection with it should be sub- 
 mitted to the jury under proper instructions. ^ ^ 
 
 426. Necessity of unlawfulness. — It is the unlawfulness or crimi- 
 nality of a purpose for which two or more persons combine which 
 gives scope and character to acts committed in carrying it out, and 
 if the original intention is lawful and prosecuted by lawful means, 
 and opposition is made by others, and one of the opposing party is 
 killed, the person actually killing may be guilty of murder or man- 
 slaughter, but others not present or actually aiding or abetting are 
 not.-' And the rule of law that confederates in an unlawful under- 
 taking or transaction are each responsible for evil consequences that 
 ensue does not apply to persons who are engaged in the performance 
 of a lawful duty, under the direction of superior officers, who, in no 
 way, exceed the scope of their authority.^ So, it has been held that 
 the doctrine of constructive homicide as affecting offenders not ac- 
 tually present at, or parties to, the homicide, but sought to be made 
 liable by reason of their being engaged in a common purpose in the 
 course of carrying out which the act of homicide occurs, only applies 
 
 loSmith V. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. and overtook them, and shots were ex- 
 
 267, 81 S. W. 712, 936; Miller v. State, changed, and the daughter was killed, 
 
 25 Wis. 384. and evidence of the meetings of th& 
 
 iiMiller v. State, supra. brother and others was admitted in a 
 
 And a determination of the question prosecution for the killing for the pur- 
 
 whether a wife, who joined with her pose of showing a conspiracy, evidence 
 
 husband in the commission of a robbery, of a conspiracy to bind every one of the 
 
 could be held responsible for a. murder abdu"tors to keep the peace is compe- 
 
 eommitted by him, or whether she is tent to show that such meetings were 
 
 within the excuse of compulsion be- for a lawful purpose. Delaney v. Com. 
 
 cause the law intends that she shall supra. 
 
 have no will, will not be disturbed on 2North Carolina v. Kirkpatrick, 42 
 
 appeal from a judgment rendered in Fed. 689; People v. Leith, supra; 
 
 -d, prosecution against her for murder, Com. v. Martin, 7 Pa. Dist. R. 219. 
 
 where the question whether she acted But an instruction in a prosecution 
 
 through restraint was fairly submitted for homicide committed by an alleged 
 
 to the jury, and they found that she coconspirator with the accused, inform- 
 
 did not. Ibid. ing the jury of the ways in which a con- 
 
 i2Renner v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. spiracy may arise, is not subject to ob- 
 
 347, 65 S. W. 1102. jection because it does not direct them 
 
 iMercersmith v. State, 8 Tex. App. that the thing which they conspire to 
 
 211; People V. Leith, 52 Cal. 251; De- do must be unlawful, or be done by un- 
 
 laney v. Com. 15 Ry. L. Rep. 797, 25 lawful means, where another instruc- 
 
 S. W. 830. tion clearly states that rule and the in- 
 
 And where a young man was kid- structions read together present the cor- 
 
 napped by a man and woman for the rect rule. State v. McCahill, 72 Iowa, 
 
 purpose of compelling him to marry m. 30 N. W. 553, 33 N. W. 599. 
 their daughter, and his brother pursued 
 
656 HOMICIDE. [§ 426 
 
 where the common purpose is felonious, and not to cases of a com- 
 mon purpose to commit a mere misdemeanor, without intent to com- 
 mit it at all hazards. ® 
 
 A conspiracy for the accomplishment of an object, such as bring- 
 ing about a change of government by peaceful means if possible, but 
 by force if necessary, however, is unlawful, so as to charge the cocon- 
 spirators with responsibility for a homicide committed in carrying 
 it out. * And though a posse is summoned by a sheriff, if it was done, 
 not for the purpose of preserving the peace, but for inflicting upon 
 others wanton and unnecessary outrage and injury, without reference 
 to their acts and conduct, all who joined in the purpose may be con- 
 victed for the killing of one of the others pursuant to such purpose, 
 notwithstanding the apparently official character of the act.° Where 
 the evidence is conflicting in cases of this class, the jury may prop- 
 erly be instructed that they shall weigh and take into consideration 
 all the facts and circumstances tending to throw light on the motives 
 and conduct of the alleged coconspirator, in determining whether he 
 had an unlawful design, and whether his associates shared in it® 
 
 V. Homicide as a eesult of conspieacy. 
 
 a. Must be within scope of. 
 
 427. Limitation of liability — The rule of criminal responsibility 
 for the acts of others done in the prosecution of an unlawful project 
 is subject to the limitation that the particular act of one of a party 
 for which the associates and confederates are to be held liable must 
 have been done for the furtherance, or in the prosecution, of the com- 
 mon object and design for which they combined together.* There 
 can be no criminal responsibility on the part of a coconspirator for a 
 death resulting from something which is not fairly within the com- 
 mon enterprise, and which might not be expected to happen if occa- 
 sion should arise for anyone to cause it. ^ The true test as to the re^- 
 sponsibility of one person for a homicide committed by another is, 
 Did the parties act together, and was the act done in pursuance of a 
 common design and purpose in which their minds had met and 
 
 sReg. V. Skeet, 4 Fost. & F. 931. Am. Dec. 705; Butler v. People, 125 111. 
 
 4Spies V. People, 122 111. 1, 3 Am. 641, 1 L.R.A. 211, 8 Am. St. Rep. 423. 
 
 St. Rep. 320, 12 N. E. 865, 17 N. E. 18 N. E. 338; Powers v. Com 110 Ky. 
 
 898- 386, 53 L.R.A. 245, 61 S. W. 735; Kiiia 
 
 5Com. V. Martin, 7 Pa. Dist. R. 219. -i. Plummer, 12 Mod. 627. 
 
 sDover v. State, 109 Ga. 485, 34 S. E. zPeople v. Knapp, 26 Mich 112- 
 
 1030. And see Eeg. v. Luck, 3 Fost. & Evans v. State, 109 Ala. 22, 19 So. 535; 
 
 ^- 4S3. Tanner v. State, 92 Ala. 1, 9 So 613- 
 
 iCom. V. Campbell, 7 Allen, 541, 83 Frank v. State, 27 Ala. 37; Cunning- 
 
§ 427] IN OAERYING OUT CONSPIRACY TO DO UNLAWFUL ACT. 657 
 
 agreed?^ ■ Where a homicide is committed by one or more of a body 
 who have associated together for reasons having no connection with 
 the common object, the responsibility for such homicide attaches ex- 
 clusively to its actual perpetrators/ And where several persons go 
 to a house, though with the unlawful purpose of breaking in and steal- 
 ing, and in the execution of such common purpose a homicide is com- 
 mitted by one of them, if the killing has no connection with the com- 
 mon purpose, and does not ensue as a probable result of an attempt 
 to execute it, then the slayer alone is responsible.® 
 
 b. Measure of the scope. 
 
 428. General rules — When two or more persons enter into a com- 
 mon enterprise or adventure, which contemplates the commission, of 
 a criminal offense, each is a conspirator, and his criminal account- 
 ability extends not alone to the enterprise, adventure, or encounter 
 in which they are engaged, but takes in the proximate, natural, and 
 logical' consequences of such adventure ; and if such conspiracy or 
 community of purpose embraces the contingency that a deadly en- 
 counter may ensue, with the common intent, express or implied, to 
 Encourage and assist even to the taking of life should the exigencies 
 of the encounter lead to that result, the act of one of taking life is 
 likewise the act of all. ^ And if an unlawful act agreed to be done by 
 
 ham V. People, 195 111. 550, 63 .N. E. 517 ; subsequently died the death would be= 
 
 State V. Furney, 41 Kan. 115, 13 Am. due to the fight, and not to the conspir- 
 
 St. Rep. S62, 21 Pac. 213; Powers v. acy; and where there is evidence to that 
 
 Com. 110 Ky. 386, 53 L.R.A. 245, 61 effect in a prosecution for homicide the 
 
 S. W. 735; Kirby v. State, 23 Tex. App. law in regard to that state of the case 
 
 13, 5 S. W. 165; Stevenson v. State, 17 should be given to the jury. Moore v. 
 
 Tex. App. 618; Blain v. State, 30 Tex. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 45, 68 S. W. 
 
 App. 702, 18 S. W. 862 ; Renner v. State, 279. 
 
 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 347, 65 S. W. 1102; sState v. Cannon, 49 S. C. 550, 27 S. 
 
 Bibby v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 65 E. 526. 
 
 S. W. 193; Nite v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. But an instruction in a prosecution 
 Rep. 340, 54 S. W. 763; Reg. v. Price, 8 for homicide with reference to a, eon- 
 Cox, C. C, 96. spiracy to go to a, private house and 
 sKirby v. State, supra; Burrell v. take a person out of it, in execution of 
 State, 18 Tex. 713. which a person, residing there was killed, 
 ■ <Com- V. Daley, 2 Clark (Pa.) 361: stating that if the killing was not in- 
 Frank V. State, 27 Ala. 37. cidental to the conspirators' purpose in 
 Where two persons induced another to going there, or probably not in their 
 engage in a gambling transaction with contemplation, and the killing was. 
 them, and the latter became insulting, done by another of his own malice, and 
 and one of the former beat and choked not by the defendant, he would not be 
 him, and they afterwards left him asleep guilty, is improper unless predica;ted 
 on the floor, they should not be found upon the hypothesis of a lawful purpose 
 guilty of homicide upon his being sub- in going there. Evans v. State, 109 Ala. 
 sequeiitiy found dead, upon the theory 11. 19 So. 535. 
 
 that he was killed pursuant to a con- iTanner v. State, 92 Ala. 1, 9 So. 613; 
 
 spiracy to obtain his money, since if he Macklin's Case, 2 Lewin, C. C. 225. 
 Hom.— 42 
 
658 HOMICIDE. ['§ 42S 
 
 coconspirators is dangerous or homicidal in its character, or if its en- 
 forcement will require the use of force and violence which may re- 
 sult in the taking of human life, each coconspirator will be criminally 
 liable if such taking of life results, whether he was present or not.'* 
 When men confederate together to commit crimes, of such a nature or 
 under such circumstances as will, when tested by human experience, 
 probably result in taking human life if such necessity should arise 
 to prevent anything from thwarting them, it must be presumed that 
 they all understand the consequences which may reasonably be ex- 
 pected to flow from carrying their plans into effect, and that they as- 
 sent to the taking of human life if necessary to accomplish their ob- 
 ject.^ 
 
 Where an unlawful act agreed to be done by coconspirators, how- 
 ever, is not of a dangerous or homicidal character, and its accom- 
 plishment does not necessarily or probably require the use of force 
 or violence which may result in the unlawful taking of human life, 
 criminal liability for such taking of life by one of them will not at- 
 tach to another from the mere fact of his having been party to the 
 agieement.* To render a person responsible for an act committed 
 in furtherance of a conspiracy, his will must have contributed to 
 the thing actually done, and it must have been the ordinary and 
 probable effect of the wrongful act especially agTeed upon, so that the 
 connection between the acts is reasonably apparent. ° And the homi- 
 cide must not have been a fresh and independent product of the 
 mind of the confederate doing the deed, outside of, and foreign to, 
 the common design ; ® though where it appears that persons who killed 
 a man were acting in accordance with the purpose of a band who 
 had combined to do an unlawful act, a member of the band is liable 
 for such killing, though he only entered into such conspiracy after it 
 had proceeded to part completion, since he would be deemed, in law, 
 a party to all acts done by any one of the conspirators, either before 
 or afterwards, in furtherance of the common design. '^ It is within 
 the province of the jury to determine from all the evidence, under 
 proper instructions from the court, whether the homicide did or did 
 not follow incidentally in the execution of the common design as one 
 of its natural consequences. * 
 
 zLamb v. People, 96 111. 73; United A. 245, 61 S. W. 735; Williams v. State, 
 
 States V. Boyd, 45 Fed. 851. 81 Ala. 1, 60 Am. Rep. 133, 1 So. 179. 
 
 sReeves v. Territory, 10 Okla. 194, 61 eWilliams v. State, supra. 
 Pac. 828; Lamb v. People, supra. 7 State v. Walker, 98 Mo. 95, 9 S. W. 
 
 <TInited States v. Boyd, supra. 646, 11 S. W. 1133. 
 
 sPowers v. Com. 110 Ky. 386, 53 L.E. sMartin v. State, 136 Ala. 32, 34 So. 
 
5 429] IN CARRYING OUT CONSPIRACY TO DO UNLAWFUL ACT. 659 
 
 429. Individual action from independent motive Though a person 
 
 is engaged in a criminal conspiracy with others, where the others, 
 without his knowledge, concurrence, advice, aid, or encouragement, 
 and independently and of their own accord, and to accomplish a pur- 
 pose and intent of their own, kill a man, he is not responsible for their 
 acts. ^ And this is so, though he was himself seeking to kill the same 
 man.^ And though several persons were confederated together for 
 an unlawful purpose, and were armed with deadly weapons and 
 acted with such indications of violence as to lead to the reasonable 
 apprehension of fatal consequences, if one or more of them commit 
 a homicide, not in pursuance of the original design, but in a per- 
 sonal encounter, or upon a new provocation, the killing will be man- 
 slaughter or murder, according to the circumstances, on the part of 
 the slayers, but will be referred to the new provocation, and not to 
 the conspiracy, and the other confederates will not be deemed parties 
 to the act.^ 'Hot is it murder in any other than the slayer, where 
 thieves go together to rob, and quarrel among themselves, and one 
 of them is killed.* And where two persons engage in a fight, and a 
 third inflicts a mortal wound on one of them without the consent or 
 connivance of the other, the latter is not guilty of murder in the 
 absence of anything to show conspiracy between him and the person 
 doing the killing. ® So, a person engaged with others in a riotous at- 
 tack upon an armory cannot be held guilty either of murder or man- 
 slaughter for the killing of a person by a shot fired by persons acting 
 together in defending the building against them.® Nor is a stake- 
 holder in whose hands two men, who had agreed to fight with their 
 fists, put up a stake to bind the bargain, responsible for the killing 
 of one of them by the other, though he paid over the stake to the 
 winner.^ 
 
 20.5 ; Frank v. State, 27 Ala. 37 ; People BTurner v. State, 97 Ala. 57, 12 So. 
 
 V. Holmes, 118 Cal. 444, 50 Pae, 675; 54; Reg. v. Caton, 12 Cox, C. C. 624. 
 
 Powers V. Com. supra; Bibby v. State So, in Macklin's Case, 2 Lewin, C. C. 
 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 6.5 S. W. 193. 225, it was held that, if several persons 
 
 iMiller v. State, 15 Tex. App. 125; intending only to fight u, constable get 
 
 Com. V. Daley, 2 Clark (Pa.) 361; Com. together, and one of them uses a dead- 
 
 V. Neills, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 553; Moody ly weapon and shoots and kills the eon- 
 
 V. State, 6 Coldw. 299; Rex v. Murphy, stable, the act will only aflfeet the in- 
 
 6 Car. & P. 103 ; Duffey's Case, 1 Lewin, dividual by whom it was done, since to 
 C._ C. 194. And see Owens v. State, 82 hold the others responsible it must have 
 Miss. 18, 33 So. 718. been done in pursuance of the common 
 
 SMiller v. State, supra. intent. 
 
 aPeople v. Garretson, 2 Wheeler, C. C. sCom. v. Campbell, 7 Allen, 543, 83 
 
 347 : Reg. v. Luck, 3 Fost. & F. 483 ; Rex Am. Dec. 705. 
 
 v. Plummer, J. Kelyng, 109. 'Queen v. Taylor, L. R. 2 0. C. 147. 
 
 4King V. Plummer, 12 Mod. 627, J. 
 Kelyng, 109. 
 
660 HOMICIDE. [| 430 
 
 430. Violent, dangerous, or liomicidal conspiracies — Death must be 
 deemed to be within the scope of conspiracies for the doing of violent, 
 dangerous, or homicidal acts ; and where prisoners conspire to escape 
 from jail, and prepare deadly weapons as a means to be used if neces- 
 sary in the accomplishment of the common purpose, a homicide with 
 such a weapon by one of them is not a collateral, independent act of 
 the actual perpetrator, but is an act directly incident to, and grow- 
 ing out of, the common design, for which all are criminally respon- 
 sible.* And a conspiracy to resist an officer by force, pursuant to 
 which one of the conspirators kills the officer, renders both con- 
 spirators principals, and neither is an accomplice.^ Nor is a homi- 
 cide collateral to concert and participation in a riot, or a riotous 
 affray, especially if it takes place in the nighttime, and if a homi- 
 cide results it is the guilty act of all the rioters.* And concert to 
 disturb a meeting and oppose resistance to the disturbance, even to 
 the use of deadly weapons, falls within the same rule.* And where 
 there is evidence of such concert, and also that the intent was merely 
 to cause a fight with fists, both theories should be given to the jury 
 in a prosecution for a killing by one of the disturbers.^ So, homicide 
 is the direct, proximate, and natural result of a conspiracy to shoot 
 and maim another without killing him. ® And the same rule applies 
 to a common design to use a knife, where in using it one of the con- 
 spirators causes death.'' And an intent entertained and acted iipon 
 by several, jointly to hold possession of land by a show of arms for 
 intiraidation, renders all criminally responsible where a killing fol- 
 lows.® And when an officer is killed by one of several persons con- 
 certing together to resist arrest by him, the presumption of malice 
 arising from the killing attaches equally to all who aided or took part 
 knowingly in the resistance.® 
 
 iKirby v. State, 23 Tex. App. 13, 5 case was one in which an officer was 
 
 S. W. 165. And see People v. Wilson, killed and so were members of the un- 
 
 145 N. Y. 628, 40 N. E. 392. lawful assembly, and the prosecution 
 
 2Cortez V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) was against the officers, and it appears 
 
 83 S. W. 812. to uphold the principle that members 
 
 3Rex V. Hubson, 1 East, P. C. 258; of an unlawful assembly, guilty of man- 
 Burgess V. State, 93 Ga. 304, 20 S. E. slaughter, may be held for the killing 
 331. of some of their own number by officers, 
 
 In Queen v. McNaughten, 14 Cox, C. C. as well as for the killing of the officers. 
 
 576, it was held that if per.sons assem- <Bibby v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 ble to obstruct officers of law in the G5 S. W. 193. 
 
 service of process, all so assembling are elbid. 
 
 guilty of an unlawful assembly, whether sFerguson v. State, 134 Ala. 63, 92 
 
 a riot takes place or not ; and if a homi- Am. St. Rep. 17, 32 So. 700. 
 
 cide results in consequence of the un- ''Reg. v. Price, 8 Cox, C. C. 96. 
 
 lawful assembly, everyone who takes s Weston v. Com. Ill Pa. 251, 2 Atl. 
 
 part in the obstruction may be himself 191. 
 
 personally responsible for it; but the 9 State v. Zeibart, 40 Iowa 169 
 
§ 430] IN CARRYING OUT CONSPIRACY TO DO UNLAWFUL ACT. 661 
 
 Likewise, each member of a combination of striking workmen to 
 compel men employed in their place to leave their employment is 
 responsible for the killing by one of their number of one of the sub- 
 stitutes. ■^ " And it is a question for the jury in a prosecution for 
 homicide whether the killing of a legislator was the necessary and 
 probable result of a conspiracy to assemble a large number of men 
 for the purpose of alarming legislators. ^ ^ So, robbery consists of 
 an act of violence against the person, and is an enterprise which 
 might naturally and reasonably result in death, so that when a num- 
 ber of persons agree and enter upon the crime of robbery, and a 
 person is killed in the execution of the purpose to rob, all the parties 
 to the agreement, who entered upon the execution thereof, are equally 
 responsible for the killing. ^^ And this rule is especially applicable 
 to a conspiracy for train robbery. * * And where persons agree to take 
 another out for the purpose of making him disclose the whereabouts 
 of a third person, and after getting him out they agree to hang him, 
 and proceed to do so, refusal to charge in a prosecution for the kill^ 
 ing on any phase of murder in the second degree, or manslaughter, is 
 not error. ^ * 
 
 431. Conspiracies not conducive to the use of dangerous force. — = 
 Where the design of a conspiracy is to commit a wrongful act, not 
 requiring a depraved, wicked, or malignant spirit, or involving the 
 use of dangerous force, a conspirator, merely as such, is not guilty 
 of murder because in carrying out the common design a cocon- 
 spirator kills a person.-' And one who conspires with another to 
 commit a mere misdemeanor, such as an assault and battery with 
 his hands and fists, not dangerous to life, is not liable for homicide 
 where the other uses weapons dangerous to life and kills the party 
 
 lOState V. McCahill, 72 Iowa, 111, 30 after was an independent act having 
 
 N. W. So3, 33 N. W. 599. nothing to do with the common design. 
 
 And where several members of a labor People v. Holmes, 118 Cal. 444, 50 Pac. 
 
 union enter into an agreement to re- 675. 
 
 quest a nonunion man to quit work, and uPowers v. Com. 110 Ky. 386, 53 L. 
 
 go to him and make such request, and R.A. 245, 61 S. W. 735. 
 afterwards repeat it, and go to him a i2Boyd v. United States, 142 U. S.- 
 
 third time, accompanied by a, large 450, 35 L. ed. 1076, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 force of men, and repeat the request, 292; Rex v. Whithorne, 3 Car. & P. 
 
 and assault him as soon as he comes 394. And see Miller v. State, 25 Wis. 
 
 within reach, and he is killed, it is for 384. 
 
 the jury to say, on a prosecution there- islsaacs v. State, 36 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 for, whether the killing was a part of 505, 38 S. W. 40. 
 
 the original design; and the members of 1 4 Stevens v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 the union may not escape responsibility 154, 59 S. W. 545. And see Evans v. 
 
 for the killing on the theory that it is State, 109 Ala. 22, 19 So. 535. 
 not known who did the act, and that the iPowers v. Com. 110 Ky. 386, 53 L. 
 
 only agreement was to ask him to quit R.A. 245, 61 S. W. 735. 
 work, and that anything occurring there- 
 
662 HOMICIDE. [§ 431 
 
 assaulted;'' though the rule is different where the conspiracy was to 
 fight with fists, and the death was caused by a blow with the fist, the 
 killing in such case being the direct result of the conspiracy.* So, 
 a conspiracy to tie up a third person does not render one of the 
 conspirators guilty either of murder or manslaughter because the 
 other afterwards robbed and killed the person tied, since the tying 
 would not probably result in death or serious injury, and the killing 
 would be an independent, malicious act. * ISTor does the concert with 
 others in placing inflammable material upon the clothes of another 
 as a joke, to drive him away, include and render one responsible for 
 the act of another of setting fire to the inflammable matter, thereby 
 causing death.® And the rule is the same where the accused was 
 present when the fire was set, where he did not adopt the intent of 
 the others or agree to the setting, either by word or action. * 
 
 Likewise a common purpose of indulging in immoral conduct with 
 the occupants of a house does not render one of the persons enter- 
 taining it responsible for the act of the other, without his consent, in 
 shooting and killing the owner of the house.'' And this is so, though 
 the shooting may have been done to enable both to evade discovery 
 and effect their escape.* And an agreement between conspirators 
 to steal and dispose of the stolen goods, under circumstances favorable 
 to the execution of their enterprise, does not constitute an enterprise 
 of such dangerous character as to render the unlawful taking of life 
 probably necessary in carrying it into execution, so as to render one 
 of the conspirators criminally responsible for such taking of life 
 hj the other.® So, even though several persons went out with a 
 joint design to commit a felony, if there was no joint design to com- 
 mit personal violence, and one of them, without the knowledge or 
 
 3Mitclicll V. State, 36 Tex. Crim. Eep. on a difficulty by strikinjt a person with 
 
 278, .33 S. W. 367, 36 S. W. 456; Bibby his Bst does rot render him responsible 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 65 S. W. for the act of another of his party in 
 
 193; Brown v. State, 28 Ga. 199; State killing the person he struck, when it ap- 
 
 V. May, 142 Mo. 135, 43 S. W. 637; Reg. pears "that he did not know the other 
 
 V. Price, 8 Cox, C. C. 96. And see State was doing the act, and did not consent 
 
 V. Howard, 112 N. C. 859, 17 S. E. 166. thereto. Bibby v. State, supra. 
 
 Where two persons combine and con- ^People v. Keefer, 65 Cal. 232, 3 Pac. 
 
 spire together to beat another, and in 818. 
 
 the course of such beating, neither of 5Renner v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 them intending to kill, one of them 347, 65 S. W. 1102. 
 
 strikes at the person being beaten with sChapman v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. 
 
 his pistol, and it is accidentally fired Rep. 328, 96 Am. St. Rep. 874, 65 S. W. 
 
 and kills him, the other is not guilty of 1098. 
 
 murder, but of assault and battery only. 'Mercersmith v. State. 8 Tex. App. 
 
 Mitchell V. State, supra. 211. 
 
 3Reg. V. Caton, 12 Cox. C. C. 624. sibid. 
 
 But the mere fact that one of several SLamb v. People, 96 HI. 70. 
 persons disturbing a, meeting brought 
 
i 431] IN CAiRRYlNG OUT CONSPIRACY TO DO UNLAWFUL ACT. 6tJ3 
 
 consent of the others, used such violence, and death resulted, he is 
 guilty of murder. ^ ^ And the killing of an oiScer by one of a party 
 agreeing together to frighten him is the guilty act of the one who did 
 the killing only, though the rule would be different if the common 
 intent were to attack him or forcibly resist the performance of his 
 oiEcial duties.^* 
 
 432. Prcsdmate, as distinguished from collateral or incidental, cause. 
 — There is a distinction where killing follows a joint criminal design, 
 between a killing which is the mere collateral or incidental result 
 of the criminal design, and one in which the joint design was the 
 proximate cause, without other causes intervening, coconspirators 
 being held criminally responsible in the one case, and not in the 
 other ; and where the act causing death was done in the direct prose- 
 cution of the joint design, all the coconspirators are criminally re- 
 sponsible though the act was a mere trespass. ^ And though the con- 
 spiracy was merely to fight with fists, and death was caused by a 
 blow with the fist, all of the conspirators are responsible, since the 
 killing was the direct result of the conspiracy. ^ Likewise it is mur- 
 der in all of a company engaged in an affray, after being ordered to 
 ■disperse by an ofiicer, where a bystander was killed, though it is not 
 known who did the killing.^ And where several combined to rob a 
 railway train, and, in the execution of the robbery, forced a trainman 
 to a place of danger, where he was shot by an express messenger not 
 responsible for the robbery, supposing he was shooting at the robbers, 
 all of the persons engaged in the robbery are as guilty of murder as 
 if they had themselves shot and killed the trainman.* Rioters can- 
 not be convicted, however, for the death of one not connected with 
 the affray, resulting from the act of an officer in defending himself 
 from an assault by them.® And persons engaged in a common un- 
 lawful (though not felonious) enterprise are not jointly responsible 
 for a homicide accidentally committed by one of them while at the 
 common work.* Nor, in an affray, are the original parties respon- 
 sible for a death caused by strangers breaking independently into 
 
 lO-Reg. V. Lee, 4 Foat. & F. 63; Duf- 5S4, 55 S. W. 961; Keaton v. State. 41 
 
 fey'8 Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 194. Tex. Crim. Eep. 621, 57 S. W. 1125. 
 
 liMacklin's Case, 2 Lewin, C. C. 225. sButler v. People, supra; Com. v. 
 
 HTnitcd States v. Ross. 1 Gall. 624, Campbell, 7 Allen, 541, 83 Am. Dec. 
 
 Fed. Cas. No. 16,196; Butler v. People, 705. 
 
 125 111. 641, 1 L.R.A. 211, 8 Am. St. Rep. 6Reg. v. Skeet, 4 Post. & F. 93; Rex 
 
 423, 18 N. E. 338; State v. Shelledy, 8 v. Collison, 4 Car. & P. 565; Reg. v. 
 
 Iowa, 477. Howell, 9 Car. & P. 437 ; People v. 
 
 2Reg. V. Caton, 12 Cox, C. C. 624. Knapp, 26 Mich. 112; Rex v. Murphy, 6 
 
 sKing V. Hodgson, 1 Leach, C. L. 6. Car. & P. 103; Reg. v. Turner, 4 Fost. & 
 
 1 Taylor v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. P. 339. 
 
664 HOMICIDE. - ■ .[1 432 
 
 the ring. '' And a person entering into an affray with others cannot 
 be held responsible for the accidental killing of one of them by a 
 blow delivered by some person who was probably co-operating in the 
 affray with the person killed, and who probably intended tho blow 
 for the party sought to be held for the killing. ** So, while a person 
 engaged in an unlawful act with others is criminally responsible for 
 maliciously slaying one of the others, his accomplices would not be 
 regarded as aiders and abetters to the murder.® 
 
 433. Killing person not conspired against. — Where several persons 
 associate or conspire together for the purpose of a criminal enterprise, 
 and in furtherance of the common object one of them attempts to 
 kill a person, but by mistake kills a third person, the mistake has no 
 effect upon the criminal responsibility of the person concerned, and 
 all are equally responsible for the act. ^ And evidence that a person 
 was privy to a plot to murder another person by the use of explosive 
 machines is sufficient to go to the jury on an indictment charging 
 him with murder of another person accidentally killed by the ex- 
 plosion. ^ So, where a killing was pursuant to a conspiracy to do an 
 unlawful act, which included the killing of anyone who might inter- 
 fere to prevent its execution, all of the conspirators are responsible 
 criminally for the killing by one of them of a third person who so 
 interfered.* But the jurors in a prosecution for such a killing 
 should be made to understand that they must find that the agreement 
 or conspiracy embraced the person killed, or the killing of anyone 
 who might interfere to prevent the execution of their design, and the 
 court should specifically define conspiracy and charge that the guilt 
 depended upon whether or not the conspiracy included the killing of 
 a person other than the one againsb whom it was directed.* And 
 where persons enter into a conspiracy against another which embraces 
 the killing of anyone else who interposes or interferes, the jury may 
 consider the separate and individual act of each coconspirator as evi- 
 dence against the others.® 
 
 434. Escape as part of combination. — A combination in order fo 
 make an escape effectual cannot be lawfully inferred from a com- 
 bination to do an original wrong, so as to render one conspirator liable 
 criminally for a homicide committed by another while making his 
 
 7T!ex v.. Murphy, supra. ^Reg. v. Bernard, I Fost. & F. 240. 
 
 sManier v. State, Baxt. 595. a Chapman v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. 
 
 9Re.x; V. Plummer, J. Kelyng, 109, 12 Rep. 479, 76 S. W. 477. 
 Mod. 627. <Ibid. 
 
 iState V. Johnson, 7 Or. 210; Rex v. sibid. 
 
 Plummer, supra; Majisell's Case, .2 
 Dyer, 128b. 
 
§ 434] IN CARRYING OUT CONSPIRACY TO DO UNLAWFUL ACT. 665 
 
 escape.^ And where several persons combine together for the pur- 
 pose of committing a felony, and upon an alarm they run in different 
 directions, and one of them kills a pursuer, the others cannot be con- 
 sidered as principals in the act.^ The common design to effect an 
 escape, however, may be suggested and assented to after the arrival 
 of officers seeking to arrest.* And the mere fact of combined effort 
 or resistance is sufficient to establish a combination to escape, which 
 will render each conspirator accountable, not only for his own acts, 
 but for the acts of others done in an attempt to get away. * And this 
 is so whether the killing was done in furtherance of the common de- 
 sign or not.^ So, evidence that armed burglars in a store started to 
 run, but, upon one being captured, the other returned at his request 
 and shot one of his captors, warrants the jury in inferring that the 
 act was within the general purpose of the confederation.® And evi- 
 dence that coconspirators participated in other crimes is competent 
 as tending to show general concert of action for the purpose of estab- 
 lishing an agreement to oppose force in attempting to apprehend 
 them.''' 
 
 c. Abandonment of purpose. 
 
 435. Effect of — Where several persons unite, and each is actuated 
 by a desire to take the life of another, or commit some other crime, 
 but one of them repents and relinquishes his purpose before the act 
 is committed, he is not guilty though afterwards some of the others 
 kill the person intended, or commit a homicide in carrying out the 
 common purpose.^ And this is so, though the criminal enterprise 
 had been carried out in part, there having been no intent to kill up 
 to the time of the abandonment.^ Where one abandons a con- 
 spiracy, his liability for the culpatory acts proved against him prior 
 to the abandonment, if he can be held liable for them at all, or if, 
 without abandonment, he was liable for them, will be that of an ac- 
 
 iPeopIe V. Knapp, 26 Mich. 112. 'Territory v. McGinnis, supra. 
 
 2Rex V. White, Russ. & R. C. C. 99. lOom. v.-Neills, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 553. 
 
 STerritory v. McGinnis, 10 N. M. 269, 2Harris v. State, 15 Tex. App. 629. 
 
 61 Pac. 208, Where one of several striking miners 
 
 estate V. Zeibart, 40 Iowa, 169; Me- who united in an attack upon new men 
 
 Mahon v. People, 189 111. 222, 59 N. E. employed in their places helped drive 
 
 584; State v. Davis, 87 N. C. 514; Com. them away, and then withdrew his aid 
 
 V. T5rown, 90 Va. 671, 19 S. E. 447; Rex and encouragement in any further ac- 
 
 V. .Tackson, 1 East, P. C. 299; Rex v. tion, he is not responsible for the acts 
 
 Edmeads, 3 Car. & P. 390. of the others in going to another mine 
 
 sMcMahon v. People, supra. and there killing a man. State v. Mc- 
 
 cRuloff V. People, 45 N. Y. 213; Rex Cahill, 72 Iowa, 111, 30 N. W. 553,. 33 
 
 V. Whithorne, 3 Car. & P. 394. N. W.. 599. 
 
660 HOMICIDE. B 435. 
 
 complice and not of a principal, where he was not present or acting 
 with the coconspirators in the killing.* One who advises and per- 
 forms unlawful acts from which death results, however, cannot es- 
 cape responsibility by withdrawing from the scene, since in such case 
 his guilty act is the encouragement and advice he gives those who 
 commit the crime. * ISTor can a conspirator to commit a crime release 
 himself from criminal responsibility for a murder committed by a 
 coconspirator by withdrawing from participation in the enterprise 
 previous to the killing, where the abandonment was not evidenced 
 by some act or word calculated to apprise the other confederates of 
 his intention. ° And the mere temporary separation of the alleged 
 coconspirators, though the homicide was committed during its con- 
 tinuance, does not amount to an abandonment which will relieve one 
 of the conspirators from liability for the homicide, where they after- 
 wards rejoined each other. ^ 
 
 VI. The degree of homicide, 
 
 436. The general rule and its reasons ^Homicide in carrying out 
 
 a conspiracy to do an unlawful act is homicide in the commission 
 of an unlawful act, within the meaning of the statutes on that sub- 
 ject ; and since the act of each conspirator is the act of all, the ques- 
 tion of the degree of such a homicide, whether the killing was actually 
 done by the person charged or by a coconspirator, is governed by the 
 rules applicable to homicide in the commission of an unlawful act 
 generally, the nature, turpitude, and probable result of the con- 
 certed act being the controlling elements. The crime is murder, as 
 a general rule, if perpetrated in carrying out a conspiracy to commit 
 a felony, or do a criminal act tending to destroy life; and man- 
 slaughter if perpetrated in carrying out a conspiracy to commit a 
 misdemeanor, or a crime not amounting to a felony, and not naturally 
 tending to destroy life.^ And where the acts done by each con- 
 spirator, if all done by one would together indicate an intent to kill, 
 
 sPhillips V. State, 26 Tex. App. 228, fact that the other left him and went 
 
 8 Am. St. Rep. 471, 9 S. W. 557. to his cell just before the fatal shot 
 
 estate V. MoCahill, supra. was fired has some significance on the 
 
 sWilson V. United States, 5 Ind. Terr, question of his intention, and of notice 
 
 610, 82 S. W. 924; State v. Allen, 47 to the other that he had abandoned the 
 
 Conn. 121. attempt to escape, and is proper for 
 
 But where two prisoners determine to the consideration of the jury in a pros- 
 break out of prison together, and delib- ecution against him for the homicide, 
 erately supply themselves with weapons State v. Allen^ supra. 
 for the purpose of killing anyone who 6 Jones v. State, 14 Ohio C. C. 35. 
 shall resist them, and one of them kills iSee supra, chapter IX.. §§ 118 et seq., 
 a, watchman who discovers them, the chapter X., §§ 213 et seq. 
 
§ 436] IN CARRYING OUT CONSPIRACY TO DO UNLAWFUL ACT. C67 
 
 the killing is murder in all ; and if they do not indicate such intent 
 it is manslaughter only.^ A killing growing out of a concerted act 
 is murder, however, when the act causing death was done in the direct 
 prosecution of the common design, as distinguished from happening 
 •collaterally outside of the original design.* And since malice is 
 inferred from the conspiracy to do an unlawful act, provocation would 
 appear to have no effect in the way of reducing the degree of the 
 <;rime, and each of the conspirators would be guilty of murder where 
 one oi them committed a homicide in carrying out the conspiracy, 
 though the deceased had offered provocation, such as an attempt to 
 make an illegal arrest* But if the offense is but manslaughter in 
 the person striking the blow, it is not, without proof of express malice, 
 more than manslaughter in his associates.^ And if a homicide by a 
 conspirator to do an unlawful act, though growing out of the con- 
 spiracy, is justifiable, his coconspirators are not guilty of homicide 
 in any degTee." 
 
 437. In case of conspiracy to kill — A conspiracy to kill, followed 
 by a killing, furnishes all the elements of murder in the first degree, 
 and if several persons concert together, and each and all of them 
 are actuated by the desire to take the life of another person wilfully, 
 deliberately, maliciously, and premeditatedly, and in pursuance of 
 such common design they act in concert, still actuated by the pur- 
 pose of murder, unrepented of up to the instant of the killing, a co- 
 conspirator is guilty of murder in the first degree, though his hand 
 did not actually cause the death. '^ And a coconspirator is equally 
 guilty with others of the crime of murder though he did not intend 
 to participate in the killing, where he knew that some of his asso- 
 ciates intended to kill and were armed for that purpose, and tacitly 
 consented to it.^ Nor can one who was present at the scene of a 
 homicide aiding and abetting in its commission be guilty of a lower 
 grade of homicide than murder in the first degree, though the original 
 design of the conspirators was not to murder the deceased.* And 
 a conviction for manslaughter in a prosecution for homicide furnishes 
 no evidence that the submission of the issue of conspiracy to kill was 
 
 2Macklin's Case, 2 Lewin, C. C. 225. N. Y. 213; Miller v. State, supra; Reg. 
 
 sSee supra, § 427. v. Price, 8 Cox, C. C. 96. 
 
 4Bruner v. United States, 4 Ind. Terr. 2Holtz v. State, 76 Wis. 99, 44 N. W. 
 
 680, 76 S. W. 244. 1107. 
 
 6Rex V. Murphy, 6 Car. & P. 103. 3 Stevens v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 eMiller v. State, 15 Tex. App. 125. 154, 59 S. W. 545. 
 
 iCom. V. Neills, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 553; It is not error, however, to charge in 
 
 Mow V. People, 31 Colo. 351, 72 Pac. a prosecution for homicide that where 
 
 1089- Jennings v. Com. 13 Ky. L. Rep. several persons enter into a conspiracy 
 
 79 16 S W 348- Rulofif v. People, 45 to kill another, and the latter is killed 
 
668 HOMICIDE. ['5 437 
 
 not warranted.* It is to be observed on this subject, however, that 
 where the conspiracy was to commit the murder itself, the cocon- 
 spirator is responsible as a principal, or as an aider and abetter, if 
 he was present at, and consented to, the commission of the act, though 
 the others did the act which caused the death; and if he counseled 
 and assisted iu preparing for the act in advance, he is responsible as 
 an accessory before the fact, though he was not present when the act 
 was committed. The questions as to criminal liability as a principal, 
 and as aider and abetter, and as an accessory, are considered in an- 
 other part of this work. ^ 
 
 438. In case of conspiracy to commit felony ^Where a number of 
 
 persons conspire together to do an unlawful act, and in the prose- 
 cntion of the common design a person is killed, all will be guilty of 
 murder if the unlawful act is a felony ; and it will be murder in the 
 first degree where the statute makes it murder in that degree to kill 
 or murder in the commission of a felony, or of any particular felony. ^ 
 And in such case it is immaterial, upon the question of the degree 
 of guilt, whether there was malice or personal animosity toward the 
 person killed.^ And this is the rule in cases of felony, though death 
 happened collaterally, or outside of the original design.* These 
 rules apply to two or more persons conspiring together to commit a 
 burglary, where in the execution of the common design an officer or 
 other person who interfered with them was killed by one of the con- 
 spirators, so that all of them participating in the common object are 
 guilty of murder. * And where several persons combine and conspire 
 together for the common object of committing a robbery, and in pur- 
 suit of that object one of them does an act which causes the death of 
 a third person, each and all are principals, and each and all may be 
 convicted of murder, usually in the first degree, under the statute.® 
 
 pursuant thereto, each is guilty of mur- sButler v. People; State v. Shelledy; 
 
 der in the second degree if the killing and United States v. Ross, — supra. 
 was done unlawfully and with malice. So, in Com. v. Brown, 90 Va. 671, 19 
 
 Stevens v. State, 133 Ala. 28, 32 So. S. E. 447, it was held that, though a 
 
 270. shot by which a person was killed was 
 
 4 Chambers v. State (Tex. Crim. fired by another, if such other was en- 
 
 App.) 86 S. W. 752. gaged jointly with the accused in the 
 
 BSee supra, chapter VI. commission of a felonious act, and it 
 
 iButler V. People, 125 111. 641, 1 L.R. was fired in an attempt to accomplish 
 
 A. 211, 8 Am. St. Rep. 423, 18 N. E. their common escape, the accused be- 
 
 338 ; State v. Shelledy, 8 Iowa, 477 ; ing present aiding and abetting the per- 
 
 United States v. Ross, 1 Gall. 624, Fed. son who fired it, he will be guilty of 
 
 Cas. No. 16,196; Reg. v. Lee, 4 Fost. & murder in the second degree, at least. 
 P. 63. 4McMahon v. People, 189 111. 222, 59 
 
 2Smith V. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. N. E. 584. 
 267, 81 S. W. 712, 936; Stephens v. State, eCom. v. Miller, 4 Phila. 195; State 
 
 42 Ohio St. 150. v. Young, 67 N. J. L. 223, 51 Atl. 939; 
 
S 4383 IN CARRYING OUT CONSPIRA'CY TO DO UNLAWFUL ACT. 669 
 
 And in defining a conspiracy in a prosecution for murder perpe- 
 trated in the commission of a robbery, it is not error to limit it to 
 murder and robbery where the evidence does not raise any other 
 issue.® So, a conspiracy by prisoners in confinement to break out 
 and escape, in which they deliberately supplied themselves with 
 deadly weapons for the purpose of killing anyone who might resist 
 them, is governed by the same rules, and if one of them wilfully kills 
 a person attempting to prevent the escape, all are equally guilty of 
 murder in the first degree.^ And the rule is the same whether they 
 intended to take life or not.* And where the statute makes it mur- 
 der for a person engaged in the commission of a felony to kill, a jjer- 
 son conspiring with another to escape from an officer who had arrested 
 him is guilty of murder where the other kills the officer, though 
 there was no design npon his part to efEect death.® 
 
 In states in which express malice is required to constitute murder 
 in the first degree, however, a conspirator can be held for a homicidis 
 committed by a coconspirator, in carrying out a conspiracy to com- 
 mit a felony, for murder in the second degree only, though if there 
 was express malice on the part of the coconspirator doing the killing, 
 he should be convicted of murder in the first degree. ^ " 
 
 439, In case of conspiracy to commit act dangerous to life. — ^Where 
 several persons enter into a conspiracy for the commission of a 
 criminal act, and in its execution a person is killed by one of them, 
 all who continue in its execution np to the time of the killing are 
 guilty of murder, provided the act agreed to be done is one which, 
 from its nature, or the way it is to be executed, might jeopardize 
 or be dangerous to life, or which is homicidal in its character. ^ With- 
 in this rule a conspiracy to commit an unlawful assault with deadly 
 
 State V. Murray, 126 Mo. 526, 29 S. W. only separated from it by a semicolon, 
 590; Reg. v. Jackson, 7 Cox, C. C. 357; applies the rule to the facts of the case, 
 Roesel v. State, 62 N. J. L. 216, 41 Atl. and fixes the unlawful act to be eonsid- 
 408 ; Stephens v. State, 42 Ohio iSt, 150 ; ered as robbery, and only permits a con- 
 Mitchell V. Com. 33 Gratt. 845; Dar- viction on the finding of the factj aa 
 lington V. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. charged in the indictment, in an at- 
 333, 50 S. W. 375. tempt to perpetrate a robbery. State v. 
 
 sNite V. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. Weems, 96 Iowa, 426, 65 N. W. 387. 
 
 340, 54 S. W. 763. And see State v. 7State v. Allen, 47 Conn. 121. 
 
 Young, supra. sPeople v. Flanigpn, 174 N. Y. 357, 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution 66 N. E. 988; Reeves v. Territory, 10 
 
 for homicide that if two or more per- Okla. 194, 61 Pac. 828. 
 
 sons conspire together to commit an un- aPeonle v. Wilson, 145 N. Y. 628, 40 
 
 lawful act, and in pursuit of such con- N. E. 392. 
 
 spiracy such persons, or either of them, lOKirby v. State, 23 Tex. App. 13, 5 
 
 aided and q,betted by the other, take a S. W. 165. 
 
 human life, it is murder, though legally lUnited States v. Boyd, 45 Fed. 851; 
 
 inaccurate, in the use of the words "un- Com. v. Neills, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 553; 
 
 lawful act," involves no error where the Miller v. State, 15 Tex. App. 125; Holtz 
 
 remainder of the instruction, which is v. State, 76 Wis. 99, 44 N. W. 1107. 
 
670 HOMICIDE. CI 43» 
 
 weapons, or of a sort calculated to endanger life, in the execution of 
 ■which death results from the act of one of the conspirators, constitutes 
 murder upon the part of all.^ And where several persons combine 
 together to whip or beat anoth(;r, and, if necessary, to take his life 
 in case of resistance, and one of them kills him while seeking to escape 
 from them, both are guilty of murder, though the coconspirator not 
 doing the killing did not contemplate that result.^ So, the rule is 
 the same where the conspiracy was to assault, beat, and stab. * And 
 it has also been applied where the design of the conspirators was to 
 commit personal violence upon another, though not to take his life, 
 where their acts were such as to cause a reasonable and well-grounded 
 apprehension of violence or loss of life on his part, which caused 
 him to perform an act, in an effort to escape, which caused his death." 
 Likewise, where divers persons resolve generally to resist officers in 
 the commission of a breach of the peace, and to carry out their inten- 
 tion in a mamier which would naturally tend to raise tumults and 
 affrays, and in so doing happen to kill a man, they are all guilty of 
 murder, malice in such case being implied by law in all who are en- 
 gaged in the unlawful enterprise.® Cases of this kind, however, 
 where there is an absence of intent to kill, or of deliberation or pre- 
 meditation, are murder because malice is implied from the dangerous 
 nature of the act, and are generally murder in the second degree 
 only;'^ though if the killing was deliberate and premeditated and 
 without excuse, it would be murder in the first degree.* 
 
 440. In case of conspiracy to commit misdemeanor or minor criminal 
 act. — Where several men are combined together for the doing of an 
 unlawful act, and one of them in the prosecution of the joint design 
 receives a provocation which would reduce homicide to manslaughter, 
 and he, or an unknown member of the conspirators, kills the per- 
 son giving the provocation, neither of them can be held guilty of 
 murder, since there is no common design to inflict murderous or 
 felonious violence, but all are guilty of manslaughter. ^ But while, 
 
 ^People V. Garretson, 2 Wheeler, C. 0. assisting in the perpetration of a mur- 
 
 347; Hayes v. State, 112 Wis. 304, 87 der. Smith v. People, 1 Colo. 121. 
 N. W. 1076. sMitchell v. State, 36 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 And where a person, without provoca- 278, 33 S. W. 367, 36 S. W. 456. 
 tion, knocked another down once with a iState v. Furney, 41 Kan. 115, 13 Am. 
 
 stool and again with a chunk of wood, St. Rep. 262, 21 Pac. 213. 
 hitting him on the head once at least, 5State v. Shelledy, 8 Iowa, 477. 
 and after his confederate had killed and sCom. v. Daley, 2 Clark (Pa.) 361; 
 
 tied a rope around the neck of the per- Reg. v. Tyler, 8 Car. & P. 616. 
 son knocked down, he assisted in drag- 'Com. v. Hare, 2 Clark (Pa.) 467. 
 ging the body some 40 or 50 yards to a sjbid. 
 
 place of concealment, it is either murder iReg. v. Turner, 4 Fost. It F. 339. 
 on his part, or aiding and abetting and 
 
§ 440] IN CARRYING OUT OONSPIRICY TO DO UNLAWFUL ACT. 671 
 
 in a case in which persons conspiring to perform an illegal act are 
 assaulted, and one of them is struck a blow with, a weapon likely to 
 inflict serious injury, and the assailant is killed by one of the con- 
 spirators, the use of the weapon might reduce the offense from mur- 
 der to manslaughter, it cannot reduce it lower, and the question of 
 the liability of the others for the killing, or of the liability of each 
 if the slayer was not identified, would depend upon whether they 
 were trespassing at the time.^ So, one who was connected with the 
 act of killing, but not with the intention to kill, and did not know 
 that the person doing the killing intended to do an act dangerous to 
 human life, is guilty of manslaughter only, where a killing results. "'' 
 ISTor is it murder upon the part of a conspirator to do a wrongful act 
 not requiring a depraved, wicked, or malignant spirit, where in car- 
 rying out the conspiracy a coconspirator killed a person.* And 
 where two men conspire together to fight with other men with their 
 fists, and one of them strikes an unlucky blow which causes the death 
 of one of the others, both are guilty of manslaughter.^ And where 
 persons concert together to eject another from his house, and they 
 succeed in putting him out, and kill, though without intent, one of 
 the owner's party upon an attempt to regain possession, the act is 
 manslaughter in all of the ejecting party, because their entry and 
 force was unlawful." So, the unlawful character of a project of 
 getting a man drunk, and putting him in a cab, and having him 
 driven to a fictitious address, whereby his death results, makes it man- 
 slaughter in all engaged in the project.^ And the killing of a girl, 
 without intending it, in order to avoid arrest or exposure, is man- 
 slaughter where the slayer was one of several who combined together 
 for the unlawful object of inducing the girl to go out with them for 
 an immoral purpose.® 
 
 The rule has been laid down, however, that where the act causing 
 death was done in the direct prosecution of the joint design, the kill- 
 ing is murder in all of the conspirators, thoiigh such act was a mere 
 
 2Eeaf. V. Luck, 3 Fost. & F. 483. And tlie intent, though the jury convicted 
 
 see State v. Shelledy, 8 Iowa, 477. him of manslaughter only. Brown v. 
 
 sBrown v. State, 28 Ga. 199. And see State, supra. 
 Reg. V. Salmon, l4 Cox, C. C. 494, L. 4 Powers v. Com. 110 Ky. 388, 53 
 
 R. 6 Q. B. Div. 79. L.E.A. 245, 61 S. W. 735. 
 
 And a charge in a prosecution for 'Reg. v. Caton, 12 Cox, C. C. 6?4. 
 homicide that, if the accused was con- eBasset's Case, 1 East, P. C. 259, 1 
 
 nented with the act of killing, he was Hale, P. C. 440, 1 Hawk. P. C, 128. 
 guilty of murder is a ground for a new 7Reg, v, Packard, Car. & M. 236. 
 trial where he was not connected with sPeople v. Knapp, 26 Mich. 112. 
 
072 HOMICIDE. [§ 440 
 
 trespass.® And, apparently in accordance with this rule, it has been 
 held that if the circumstances were such that the killing was murder 
 upon the part of the person who actually did it, it would be murder 
 upon the part of his coconspirators, though he did not intend to 
 kill;^° and that where several persons were engaged in worrying, 
 oppressing, and annoying another, and one of them caused his death, 
 without provocation or excuse, it is murder in the second degree in 
 all.^1 
 
 VII. The conspieaoYj how established. 
 
 441. General rules — It is not, necessary, in a prosecution for 
 homicide alleged to have resulted from the carrying out of a con- 
 spiracy, to prove that the conspirators met together and agreed 
 in terms upon the common design, and to pursue it by common 
 means. ^ A conspiracy may be, and generally must be, proved 
 by the circumstances.^ And it may be established as well by 
 circumstances sufficient to satisfy the jury of its existence, as by 
 direct evidence.^ And the state may show the motive which 
 actuated each conspirator.* And it is sufficient to prove the acts 
 of the alleged coconspirators, and that they pursued the same, 
 object, often by the same means, one performing one part and 
 another another, so as to complete it with a view to the attainment 
 of the object in view.'' Nor is the order in which the evidence is 
 given mandatory ; it is not necessary that the conspiracy should be 
 first established before any evidence at all can be given against an 
 alleged coconspirator of the person who did the killing.® And thei 
 weight and sufficiency of the evidence to prove a criminal conspiracy 
 
 'United States v. Ross, 1 Gall. 624, And where the circumstances in n 
 
 Fed. Caa. No. 16,190; State v. Shelledy, prosecution for homicide are such as 
 
 8 Iowa, 477. tend fairly to prove a, conspiracy 01* 
 
 loPeden v. State, 61 Miss. 267; State common design to do an unlawful act, 
 
 V. Simmons, 51 N. C. (6 Jones, L.) they constitute a sufficient foundation 
 
 21. for the admission of acts and deelara- 
 
 iiState V. Finley, 118 N. C. 1161, tions of each of the parties against the 
 
 24 S. E. 495; State v. Jimmerson, 113 others. State v. Prater supra 
 
 N. C. 1173, 24 S. E. 494. sMartin v. State, 136 Ala. 32," 34 So! 
 
 iSpies V. People. 122 111. 1, 3 Am. St. 205; ColHtis v. State, 138 Ala 57, 34 
 
 Rep. 320, 12 N. E. 865, 17 N. E. 898; So. 99,3; State v. Prater, supra. And 
 
 Williams v. State, 81 Ala. 1, 60 Am. see People v. Patrick, 182 N. Y. 131 74 
 
 Rep. 133, 1 So. 179; People v. Lawrence, N. E. 843. ' ' ' 
 
 143 Cal. 148, 08 L.R.A. 193, 76 Pac. 4Rufer v. State, 25 Ohio St 464 
 
 893: State v. Prater, 52 W. Va. 132, 43 eSpies v. People, supra. 
 
 S. E. 230. GPeople v. Donnelly, 143 Oal. 394, 
 
 ^People V. Lawrence, supra. 77 Pac. 177. 
 
§ 441] IN CARRYING OUT CONSPIRACY TO DO UNLAWFUL ACT. 673 
 
 resulting in homicide are matters of fact for the jury.'' And so is 
 the question of the existence of a conspiracy. * And it is for the jury, 
 and not for the court, to determine whether the circumstances ap- 
 pearing in evidence and offered to prove conspiracy are consistent 
 ■with a reasonable hypothesis of innocence.® 
 
 It requires more than passive cognizance of a crime on the part 
 of a person, hovrever, to sustain a charge of conspiracy, pursuant to 
 which a homicide was committed ; the jury must find that such per- 
 son did some act, or made some agreement, showing an intention to 
 participate in some way in such conspiracy. ^ " And matters merely 
 going to show opportunity to form a conspiracy, and sympathy and 
 interest in the purpose of the alleged conspirators, are not competent 
 for the purpose of establishing such a conspiracy. ^ ^ 
 
 442. Joint acts of preparation — ^Joint acts of preparation to com- 
 mit a crime may furnish sufficient evidence of conspiracy ; and that 
 a person was privy to a plot to murder another by the use of explo- 
 sives is sufficient to go to the jury on a charge of murder of a person 
 accidentally killed by an explosion.^ And where there is evidence 
 of the clandestine procxirement of a pistol by one person, with which 
 another was killed by a third, the court should instruct the jury on the 
 issue of conspiracy. ^ So, a conspiracy to kill a third person is suffi- 
 ciently shovm by evidence of joint ill-feeling toward him, and that 
 one urged on a quarrel between the other and the person afterwards 
 killed, and reproached his associate for not having killed in a desig- 
 nated encounter.^ And that the alleged conspirators were together 
 
 7'People V. Wilson, 145 N. Y. 628, 40 lOUnited States v. Lancaster, 10 L. 
 
 N. E. 392; Amos v. State, 83 Ala. 1, E.A. 333, 44 Fed. 896. 
 
 3 Am. St. Rep. 682, 3 So. 749; People uPowers v. Com. 114 Ky. 237, 70 S. 
 
 V. Lawrence, 143 Cal. 148, 68 L.R.A. 193, W. 644, 1050, 71 S. W. 494. 
 
 76 Pae. 893. iReg. v. Bernard, 1 Fost. & F. 240. 
 
 sState V. Matthews, 80 N. C. 418; So, an instruction as to conspiracy 
 
 Ferguson v. State, 134 Ala. 63, 92 Am. is justified in a prosecution for homi- 
 
 St. Rep. 17, 32 So. 760; Wallace v. eide by evidence of enmity between the 
 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 87 S. W. 1041. accused and the deceased, and that on 
 
 And see Moore v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. the day of the homicide accused, learn- 
 
 Rep. 526, 72 S. W. 595. ing oi" deceased's whereabouts, bor- 
 
 sPeople V. Moran, 144 Cal. 48, 77 Pac. rowed and loaded a gun and concealed 
 
 777. And see Nelson v. State, 43 Tex. it with one of his own in a wagon, and 
 
 Crim. Rep. 553, 67 S. W. 320. went with another after deceased by a 
 
 The finding bj' the jury of a con- road on which be was expected to re- 
 
 Bpiracy to rob, and the participation by turn, and that on such meeting he was 
 
 one of the conspirators in killing the killed. Gregory v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 owner of property while attempting to App.) 48 S. W. 577. 
 
 carry out the conspiracy, upon conflict- 2Moore v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 ing evidence, some of which, if believed, 526, 72 S. W. 595. 
 
 is sufficient to establish the fact, is con- sState v. Gatlin, 170 Mo. 354, 70 S. 
 
 elusive upon the appellate court. Peo- W. 885. 
 
 pie v. Lawrence, supra. So, evidence that two persons went 
 Hom. — 43 
 
674 HOMICIDE. R 442 
 
 by appointment on the niglit of the killing, having deadly weapons in 
 their possession, and announced their intention to visit the house 
 "where the murder v^as shortly afterwards committed, is sufficient to 
 go to the jury on that question. * And so is evidence that the accused 
 was in company with two proved conspirators previous to the killing, 
 and went with them to the scene of the killing, in connection with 
 proof that he afterwards denied, and then admitted, having gone with 
 them. ^ Likewise, that several persons were acting together in prepar- 
 ation for a murder is sufficiently shown by evidence of animosity 
 against the deceased, and that one of them had threatened to kill him, 
 and that on a controversy between deceased and a third party the 
 third party called the one who had made the threats, and they armed 
 themselves and the latter shot him, the other preventing resistance.* 
 The mere facts, however, that one of several alleged conspirators 
 was present when another threatened the deceased, and that they had 
 been seen talking together, and had purchased pistols, and that they 
 were together when the killing occurred, do not establish a combina- 
 tion between them to kill. ^ Nor do they show a combination to com- 
 mit a crime, of which the crime committed was a reasonable result. * 
 Nor is an expression used by one of them, "Let's go for him," suffi- 
 cient to show a common design to kill, where there is nothing to show 
 that the expression was used with reference to a person afterwards 
 killed by one of them.' And the rule is the same with reference to 
 a conversation between several persons, one of whom afterwards com- 
 mitted a homicide, in which one of them said, "We will have to kill 
 some of them."^° Nor is such expression sufficient to render admis- 
 
 armed to a place where they were lia- proprietor in a natural tone of voice, 
 
 ble to meet another, for the purpose of when they were about 5 to 7 feet away, 
 
 investiffating a, difficulty the latter had "There goes the burglars," it is for the 
 
 had with a person related to the two, jury in a prosecution against one of 
 
 and that one of them took care of their them for the killing by the other of an 
 
 team while the other shot and killed officer who had arrested him, to deter- 
 
 such person, is sufficient to sustain a mine whether they heard the remark; 
 
 joint conviction against both for man- and if they believe that they did, it is 
 
 slaughter. McDonnall v. People, 168 111. an important fact bearing both upon 
 
 93, 48 N. E. 86. the subject of the arrest, and the op- 
 
 4Carrington v. People, 6 Park. Crim. portunity afforded the suspected men to 
 
 Rep. 336; People v. Cowan (Cal.) 82 make an agreement to resist the arrest, 
 
 Pac. 339. And see Martin v. State, 138 if the others should attempt it, and evi- 
 
 Ala. 32, 34 So. 205. dence to that effect is, therefore, com- 
 
 5People V. Donnolly, 143 Cal. 394, 77 petent. People v. Wilson, 145 N. Y. 
 
 Pac. 177. 028, 40 N. E. 392. 
 
 6EIain v. State, 33 Tex. Crim. Rep. ffilain v. State, 30 Tex. App. 702 18 
 
 236, 26 S. W. 63. And see State v. Mat- S. W. 862. 
 thews, 80 N. C. 418. sibid. 
 
 Where two persons suspected of hav- 9Queen v. Curtley, 27 U. 0. Q. B. 613. 
 ing committed a burglary entered a res- lORhodes v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 taurant, and the head waiter said to the 332, 45 S. W. 1009. 
 
5 4423 IN CARRYING OUT CONSPIRACY TO DO UNLAWFUL ACT. 675 
 
 sible in a prosecution against one of them for a homicide the acts and 
 declarations of the other alleged coconspirators, done and made when 
 he was not present. ^ ^ 
 
 443. Joint acts of execution. — Where several persons acting in con- 
 cert participate in an assault upon another, each performing acts 
 calculated to injure or embarrass the person assaulted, and to assist 
 his associates in accomplishing their object, conspiracy and concert 
 of action and intent sufficiently appear to render each criminally re- 
 sponsible for the killing of the person assaulted, without reference to 
 the question as to whose act caused the death. ^ And this is par- 
 ticularly the case when such act is requested or demanded by the 
 associates.* And where persons act jointly in the alleged common 
 design, and run away together, it is sufficient to hold them all joint- 
 ly liable for a homicide committed by one of them in the prosecu- 
 tion of the joint project.^ So, keeping watch outside while others 
 burglarize a building, and rob and kill the proprietor, raises a ques- 
 tion for the jury as to the concert of the watcher.* And where per- 
 sons burglarize a store, and while doing so one left to watch out- 
 side kills a man, the ones inside are not entitled to an instruc- 
 tion that they should be acquitted unless a conspiracy to kill the 
 deceased is shown. ^ And the robbery of a person by several, after 
 which one of them kills him, and the subsequent division of the pro- 
 ceeds of the robbery, are sufficient to show a common object or pur- 
 pose from which the murder resulted, which will render one of them 
 criminally liable though the killing was done by another." So, 
 evidence that accused and a coemployee were discharged and another 
 man put in their place ; that they made threats, and Inrked about the 
 
 iiIbitL continued together for some distance, in 
 
 iSmith V. People, 1 Colo. 121 ; Starks connection with the fact that the two, 
 
 V. State, 137 Ala. 9, 34 So. 687; Davis with others, were in a saloon most of 
 
 V. State, 114 Ga. 104, 39 S. E. 906; the afternoon drinking together, and 
 
 People V. Wilson, 145 N. Y. 628, 40 N. that something was heard said about 
 
 E. 392. And see Burgess v. State, 93 doing up a scab, is sufficient to go to 
 
 Ga. 304, 20 S. E. 331 ; Martin v. State, the jury in a, prosecution for the kill- 
 
 136 Ala. 32, 34 So. 205; Green v. State, ing on the question of the existence of 
 
 51 Ark. 189, 10 S. W. 266; Nite v. State, a conspiracy to kill the deceased, they 
 
 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 340, 54 S. W. 763 ; being union men, and the deceased being 
 
 Hayes v. State, 112 Wis. 304, 87 N. W. a nonunion man, and known to them 
 
 1076. as a "scab." People v. Moran, supra. 
 
 2Reg. V. Luck, 3 Fost. & F. 483; Reg. iTrim v. Cora. 18 Gratt. 983, 99 Am. 
 
 V. Lee, 4 Fost. & F. 63. Dec. 765. And see Ruloff v. People, 45 
 
 aState v. Norton, 69 S. C. 454, 48 S. N. Y. 213; Nite v. State, supra. 
 
 E. 464; People v. Moran, 144 Cal. 48, 5 Starks v. State, 137 Ala. 9, 34 So. 
 
 77 Pac. 777. 687. 
 
 ' And evidence that one person stood estate v. Barrett, 40 Minn. 77, 41 N. 
 
 by Avhile another shot a third person, W. 463. 
 and that they fled from the scene and 
 
676 HOMICIDE. t§ 443 
 
 place where he was supposed to work and sleep ; that a person was 
 killed in such a place, and that blood was found upon the clothes of the 
 accused, — is sufficient to support a verdict against him, though there 
 is nothing to show whether he or his confederate did the killing.'' 
 And a common design appears where a number of persons attack the 
 police and unite to rescue persons whom they have taken into custody, 
 attacking a building which the police are guarding, and rallying each 
 other by common cries, and acting under the direction of leaders.* 
 Evidence that two persons were engaged in a fight, however, and 
 that one stabbed the other, causing his subsequent death, and that 
 a third person interfered by taking hold of the person stabbed, 
 does not warrant holding such third person responsible for the kill- 
 ing in the absence of anything to show the object of his interference.* 
 And proof of the disturbance of a meeting by a person with intent to 
 provoke an affray, and that during the affray provoked a knife was 
 used and a person killed, does not suffice to render the disturber 
 criniinally responsible for the killing in the absence of proof of a 
 previous understanding that a knife was to be used.^** Nor does 
 evidence that a number of men became intoxicated and used their 
 pistols indiscriminately, causing . the death of a person, establish 
 a conspiracy between them; though, taken in connection with evi- 
 dence that one of them had a pistol, and that he was pursuing the 
 deceased when last seen alive, it is sufficient to establish his guilt.* * 
 
 VIII. Alibi as a defense. 
 
 444, When competent.— Where a conspiracy on the part of several 
 persons to kill another, or to do some other unlawful act from which 
 a killing results, is established in a prosecution for the killing, an 
 
 TState V. Dennis, 119 Iowa, 688, 94 N. purpose of showing a conspiracy be- 
 
 W. 235. tween the deceased and those with him 
 
 sPeople V. Judson, 11 Daly, 1. to take the life of the accused, or to 
 
 sGuilford v. State, 24 Ga. 315. And commit a felony upon him, there having 
 
 see State v. Meyers, 174 Mo. 352, 74 S. been no evidence previously introduced 
 
 W. 862. to show the existence of such a con- 
 
 And where one person Icilled another spiracy, since these acts may have been 
 
 with a pistol, firing three shots at him, lawfully done for the purpose of pre- 
 
 and it does not appear which of the venting a murder, and do not, of them- 
 
 shots caused the death, evidence that selves, tend to establish a conspiracy. 
 
 subsequent to the firing of the first shot Simmons v. State, 79 Ga. 696, 4 S. E. 
 
 a, person who was present in company 894. 
 
 with the deceased struck the accused lOBibby v. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 
 
 during the progress of the difficulty 65 S. W. 193. 
 
 with a stick, and that another person liCombs v. Com. 14 Ky. L. Rep. 703, 
 
 who was also present fired a pistol at 21 S. W. 353. 
 the accused, is not admissible for the 
 
§ 444] IN OAREYING OUT CONSPIRACY TO DO UNLAWFUL ACT. 677 
 
 alibi cannot be shown in defense; it makes no difference wbether 
 the accused was present or absent when the murder was committed, 
 and an instruction as to alibi would be improper and misleading.^ 
 This, of course, refers to presence or absence at the time of the kill- 
 ing, and not at the time of the formation of the conspiracy, and it 
 would appear that absence at that time would be a good defense.^ 
 And where an alibi with reference to conspiracy is sought to be shown 
 by the testimony of a witness, thus disproving the conspiracy, such 
 statements may be contradicted either by proof of contrary state- 
 ments or otherwise, since the. alibi testimony in such a case is upon 
 a material issue. * 
 
 iState V. Gatldn, 170 Mo. 354, 70 S. 2See Jenkins v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. 
 W. 885 ; Gain v. State, 42 Tex. Crlm. Eep. 173, 75 S. W. 312. 
 Eep. 210, 59 S. W. 275. sibid. 
 
CHAPTEE XXII. 
 
 NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE.i 
 
 I. Natube anb criminality. 
 
 445. Definition and nature. 
 
 44fi. General rules as to criminal responsibility. 
 
 447. Restrictions as to character of duty omitted or misper- 
 
 formed. 
 
 448. Effect of wilfulness or illegality of act. 
 
 449. Causal connection between the negligence and injury. 
 II. Classification of subject-matteb. 
 
 450. Enumeration of classes. 
 
 III. Omission to perform duty. 
 
 451. General view. 
 
 452. Of parent to care for child. 
 
 453. Existence of the proper relationship. 
 
 454. Of husband to care for wife. 
 
 455. Of master to care for servant or apprentice. 
 
 456. Of keepers or jailers to care for persons in charge. 
 
 457. Omissions by those charged with dangerous agencies. 
 
 IV. Improper performance of duty. 
 
 a. In handling dangerous agencies. 
 
 458. Negligent use involves responsibility. 
 
 459. Negligent use of firearms and explosives. 
 
 460. Careless handling of deadly weapons. 
 
 461. Negligent exposure or giving of poison. 
 
 462. Loosing dangerous animals. 
 
 b. In doing acts calculated to injure. 
 
 1. General rules; miscellaneous matters. 
 
 463. Application generally, and to particular acts. 
 
 2. In the use of means of travel or transportation, 
 
 464. Highways and streets. 
 
 465. Care is to be proportioned to danger. 
 
 466. Railways, locomotives, etc. 
 
 467. Vessels and navigation generally. 
 
 468. Vessels, etc., under Federal statutes. 
 
 3. In practising medicine, surgery, etc. 
 
 469. DiiTering rules as to. 
 
 470. The English doctrine. 
 
 471. The rule in the United States. 
 
 iTlie subject of negligent homicide is 
 fully considered in a note to Johnson 
 v. State, 61 L.R.A. 277. 
 
 678 
 
§ 445] NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. 67!) 
 
 V. COBBECnON BY PEBSONS IN AUTHORITY. 
 
 472. The general rule as to criminal liability. 
 
 473. Parent and child. 
 
 474. Persons in loco parentis. 
 
 475. Schoolmaster and pupil. 
 
 476. Husband and wife. 
 
 477. Master and servant. 
 
 478. The question of degree. 
 
 VL Neguqent homicide xtndeb the Texas Code. 
 
 479. Definition of, and liability under. 
 VII. Necessity of pebsonai, negligence. 
 
 480. Responsibility for the negligent acts of another 
 Vin. Appucation of doctrine to contbibutoey negligence. 
 
 481. Negligence of third persons contributing. 
 
 482. Negligence of the deceased contributing. 
 
 I. ITatuee and ceiminalitt. 
 
 445. Definition and nature — Criminal negligence is the omission 
 to do something which a reasonable and prudent man would do, or 
 the doing of something which such a man would not do, under the 
 circumstances surrounding the particular case; or it is the want 
 of such care as a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar 
 circumstances." It is an unlawful act carelessly or negligently done, 
 or a lawful act done without due caution or circumspection.* And 
 negligent homicide is defined as causing the death of another neg- 
 ligently and carelessly in the performance of a lawful act.* And it 
 occurs when a death is caused by a person who is doing anything, 
 or has charge of anything, dangerous in itself, and conducts himself 
 with regard to it, either by something which he does or omits to do, 
 in such a careless manner that he is guilty of culpable negligence 
 which ought to be punished.^ It is to be observed that negligent 
 homicide is included in, and perhaps covers, that portion of invol- 
 untary manslaughter defined at common law, and under most of 
 the statutes, as a killing in the commission of an act, either lawful 
 
 sPeopIe V. Buddensieck, 24 N. Y. of doing them, and from which death 
 
 Weekly Dig. 82. accidentally ensues. Com. v. Pierce, 133 
 
 81 Wharton, Crim. Law, 8th ed. § Mass. 165, 52 Am. Rep. 264. 
 
 125; 1 Bishop, Crim. Law, 6th ed. § sReg. v. Doherty, 16 Cox, C. C. 308. 
 
 313; State v. Brown, Houst. Crim. Rep. Under the Texas statute there must 
 
 (Del.) 539; Studstill v. State, 7 Ga. be an apparent danger of causing the 
 
 13. death of the person killed or another, 
 
 ^Anderson v. State, 27 Tex. App. 177, in order to constitute the offense of 
 
 3 L.R.A. 644, 11 Am. St. Rep. 189, 11 S. negligent homicide, defined to be the 
 
 W. 33. killing of a person in the performance 
 
 A man may commit murder or man- of a lawful act by negligence or care- 
 slaughter by doing otherwise lawful lessness. Gorden v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 acts ruthlessly, as well as by doing acts App.) 90 S. W. 636. 
 unlawful independently of the manner 
 
680 HOMICIDE. [<§ 445 
 
 or unlawful, but not amounting to a felony, done in a careless, neg- 
 ligent, or improper manner, or without due caution and circum- 
 spection, though, as will be seen, negligent homicide is not neces- 
 sarily confined to manslaughter, but may be murder, the malice 
 necessary to raise it to that degree being inferable in a proper case 
 from wilful negligence or the illegality of the act engaged in.® 
 Where, however, the statute defines manslaughter to be the killing 
 of another unintentionally while the slayer is in the commission 
 of some unlawful act, omitting the usual provision with reference 
 to a lawful act done without due caution or circumspection, a negli- 
 gent act causing death is not manslaughter, unless such act is pro- 
 hibited by positive law; and it is not sufficient that it constituted a 
 crime at common law, or that it was grossly and culpably negligent. '' 
 And no question of negligent homicide arises when it is evident 
 that the case was either one of deliberate and premeditated mur- 
 der, or of accident constituting justifiable homicide.* 
 
 446 General rules as to criminal responsibility The general rule 
 
 is that where one, by his negligence, contributes to the death of 
 another, he is criminally responsible therefor; and that every act 
 of gross negligence, and every omission of a legal duty, whereby 
 death ensues, is indictable either as murder or manslaughter;^ a 
 negligent killing from which malice is not inferable being man- 
 slaughter.* If a person does an act which in itself is dangerous^ 
 without taking proper precautions to prevent danger arising there- 
 from, and the death of a person results, it is a criminal act against 
 the person killed.^ There may be criminal responsibility within 
 this rule for the grossly negligent performance of a lawful act re- 
 
 6See infra, §§ 446, 448. iTessymond's Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 
 
 7 Johnson v. State, 66 Ohio St. 59, 61 169; Reg. v. Swindall, 2 Car. & K. 230, 
 
 L.R.A. 277, 90 Am. St. Rep. 564, 63 N. E. 2 Cox, C. C. 141 ; Reg. v. Whitehead, 3 
 
 607. Car. & K. 202; White v. State, 84 Ala. 
 
 sState V. Hanson, 106 Mo. 66, 16 S. 421, 4 So. 598; Fitzgerald v. State, 112 
 
 W. 285; Scott v. State (Tex. Grim. Ala. 34, 20 So. 966: Stnt= v. Rrown, 
 
 App.) 85 S. W. 1060. Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 539; State v. 
 
 But the judge in a prosecution for Vance, 17 Iowa, 138; Com. v. Matthews, 
 
 homicide should not limit the inquiry 89 Ky. 287, 12 S. W. 333; Chrystal v. 
 
 of the jury, in the application of the Com. 9 Bush, 669; State v. O'Brien, 32 
 
 facts to the crime of manslaughter, by N. J. L. 169; State v. Justus, 11 Or. 
 
 decaring that manslaughter from an ac- 178, 50 Am. Rep. 470, 8 Pac. 337. And 
 
 cidental but negligent killing of a hu- see Schmidt v. State, 124 Wis. 516, 102 
 
 man creature cannot arise in a case N. W. 1071. 
 
 in which the thief was caught by the sUnited States v. King, 34 Fed. 302. 
 owner in the act of stealing, and the ^Reg. v. Salmon, 14 Cox, C. C. 494, 
 
 owner was killed in an effort to recap- L. R. 6 Q. B. Div. 79, 43 L. T. N. S. 573, 
 
 ture the money and arrest the thief. 29 Week. Rep. 246, 23 Alb. L. J 273 
 
 State V. Davis, 53 S. C. 150, 69 Am. St. 50 L. J. Mag. Cas. N. S. 25, 45 J P. 
 
 Rep. 845, 31 S. E. 62. 270, 29 Moak, Eng. Rep. 503. 
 
§ 446] NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. 6Sl 
 
 suiting in the death of another.* And an act of omission is includ- 
 ed as well as an act of (jommission. " Everyone placed in a situation 
 where his acts may affect the safety of others must guard against 
 the risk arising therefrom, and a failure to do so, resulting in death, 
 amounts to homicide.® And though there is no malice or evil de- 
 sign, either in law or in fact, if death results from a negligent act 
 or omission, it is at least manslaughter.'^ And where death is the 
 immediate result of the omission to perform a plain duty imposed 
 hj law or contract, it is felonious homicide.® Nor is it material 
 whether the action be that of the mind or of the body, or whethei- 
 it operated alone or concurrently with other things, or whether it 
 was consented to by the person upon whom it operated.® And ii' 
 several persons enter into a joint undertaking, imposing upon each 
 and all alike a personal duty, and death occurs through a neglect 
 or omission in the performance of such duty, an indictment will 
 lie against all for the killing.^" 
 
 There is no criminal responsibility, however, where the act caus- 
 ing death was lawful, unless there was negligence in its perform- 
 ance. ^ ^ And to make a lawful act carelessly performed, resulting' 
 in death, a criminal one, the carelessness must have been gross, im- 
 plying an indifference to consequences.^^ And the degree of care 
 required, the absence of which would affect one with criminal re- 
 
 iThomas v. People, 2 Colo. App. 513, (Del.) 539; Ringer v. State, 74 Ark. 
 
 31 Pac. 349; Com. v. Eodes, 6 B. Mon. 262, 85 S. W. 410; United States v. 
 
 174; Ann v. State, 11 Humph. 159; Kin^, supra. 
 
 United States v. Freeman, 4 Mason, 505, sUnited States v. Knowles, supra ; 
 
 Fed. Gas. No. 15,162. Territory v. Manton, 8 Mont. 95, 19 
 
 sUnited States v. Farnham, 2 BKtchf. Pac. 387. 
 
 528, Fed. Oas. No. 15,071; United States 9Territory v. Manton, supra. 
 
 V. Taylor, 5 McLean, 242, Fed. Cas. lOAinsworth v. United States, 1 App. 
 
 No. 16,441; United States v. Knowles, D. C. 518; Reg. v. Haines, 2 Car. & K. 
 
 4 Sawy. 517, Fed. Cas. No. 15,540; State 368. 
 
 V. Berkshire, 2 Ind. 207; State v. Bailey, nBlalock v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 21 N. H. 185. 154, 49 S. W. 100; Queen v. Cavendish, 
 
 But an engineer having ehsirge of an Ir. Rep. 8 C. L. 178. 
 
 engine which was worked for the pur- i2Fitzgerald v. State, 112 Ala. 34, 20 
 
 pose of keeping up a supply of pure So. 966; Reg. v. Elliott, 16 Cox, C. C. 
 
 air in a mine, who neglected his duty so 710; Reg. v. Finney, 1'. Cox, C. C. 
 
 that the engdne stopped, and the mine 625; Gore's Case, 9 Coke, 81a; Reg. v. 
 
 became charged with foul air, which Lowe, 3 Car. & K. 1J3, 4 Cox, C. C. 
 
 exploded and caused the death of a, 449. 
 
 miner, cannot be convicted of man- . It is not necessary, however, in an 
 
 slaughter on an indictment which does instruction defining manslaughter re- 
 
 not allege a duty resting upon him suiting from culpable negligence, to use 
 
 which he neglected to perform. Reg. v. the words "culpable negligence," but it 
 
 Barrett, 3 Car. & K. 243. would be plainer and better to tell the 
 
 6Re Paton, 2 Broun, Justic. 525; Re jury what facts amount to such necH- 
 
 Rowbotham, 2 Irvine, Justic. 89, cited gence. State v. Haines, 160 Mo. 555, 61 
 
 in 3 L.R.A. 645 note. S. W. 621. 
 
 'State V. Brown, Houst. Crim. Rep. 
 
*'S2 HOMICIDE. [§ 448 
 
 sponsibility for homicide, must of necessity have some relation to 
 the subject and the consequences.^* And where the act, though care- 
 less in itself, is committed under circumstances from which it might 
 be reasonably inferred that no injury could happen, the person per- 
 forming it is not criminally responsible. ^ * But the mere fact that 
 an accident happened through an honest misapprehension of the 
 surrounding circumstances, or by reason of a mistake in judgment, 
 will not excuse the person whose act caused it, where such misappre- 
 hension or omission resulted from negligence in failing to observe 
 and obey any rule or precaution which it was his duty to obey and 
 (jbserve.*^ Nor is it an excuse that, after it was too late, the ac- 
 cused sought to avoid the infliction of the injury, when it was caused 
 by his wanton and negligent act calculated to endanger life. ^ * 
 
 447. Restrictions as to character of duty omitted or misperformed 
 
 ■j'o render one responsible for the fatal consequences of the mal- 
 I erformance or nonperformance of duty, the duty must have been 
 one which he was bound to perform by law or contract, and not one 
 the performance of which depended simply upon his humanity, or 
 his sense of justice and propriety.* There must have been no dis- 
 cretion in the discharge of the duty; persons having power "to do 
 an act in their discretion are not criminally responsible for the 
 death of a person resulting from an omission to do it." To fasten 
 criminal responsibility upon a person for criminal negligence caus- 
 ing death, it is indispensable that he omitted to do something which 
 he ought to have done, or did that which he ought not to have done, 
 in such a grossly negligent way that the law imputes to him the 
 criminal intent which is the essential ingredient of crime.* And 
 the duty, failure in the performance of which will render one re- 
 sponsible for a resulting homicide, must have been a plain one; if 
 doubt exist as to what conduct should have been pursued in a 
 particular case, the omission to adopt one course instead of another 
 
 isReg. V. Elliott, 16 Cox, C. C. 710. public road was directed to watch it, 
 
 KChrystal v. Com. 9 Bush, 669; Cora, and while he was absent from duty au 
 
 V. Matthews, 89 Ky. 387, 12 S. W. 333 ; accident occurred, whereby a person was 
 
 State V. Justus, 11 Or. 178, 50 Am. killed, the absence is not such a breach 
 
 Rep. 470, 8 Pac. 337. of duty as will make him guilty of man- 
 
 isCom. V. Cook, 8 Pa. Co. Ct. 486. slaughter, the duty being due to a pri- 
 
 1 estate v. Stentz, 33 Wash. 444, 74 vate master, and not to the public. 
 
 Pac. 588. 2Queen v. Pocock, 17 Q. B. 34, 5 Cox, 
 
 lUnited States v. Knowles, 4 Sawy. C. C. 172; Reg. v. Edwards, 8 Car. & P. 
 
 517, Fed. Cas. No. 15.540; Thomas v. 611. And see Reg. v. Marriott 8 Car" 
 
 People, 2 Colo. App. 513, 31 Pac. 349. & P. 425. 
 
 In Reg. V. Smith, 11 Cox, C. C. 210, it sThomas v. People, and Reg. v. 
 
 was held that where a private servant Smith, supra. 
 
 of the owner of a tramway crossing a 
 
§ 4471 NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. 683 
 
 does not raise an inference of guilt.* So, the duty must have been 
 one connected with life, so that the ordinary consequences of neglect- 
 ing it would be death. ^ 
 
 To make negligence indictable, however, it is not necessary that 
 it should be in violation of a contract.® Wherever the defendant 
 fails to discharge a duty imposed on him, whether this duty be 
 by natural law, or statute, or contract, then he is indictable for in- 
 juries thus produced, provided, as has just been seen, the duty i? 
 one with which he is exclusively charged. Civil and criminal re- 
 sponsibility are, in this view, far from being convertible. On the 
 one hand, contracts, as a general rule, cannot be made the basis 
 of a criminal prosecution.^ On the other hand, there are many 
 cases in which indictments lie (e. g., nuisance and neglect of officiaJ 
 duty in which there is no special damage to an individual), where 
 no civil action can be maintained. But so far as concerns homicide, 
 we may safely say that there is no criminal responsibility where 
 the defendant would not have been civilly liable at the suit of the 
 party injured, had he survived the injury.* Nor is it any defense 
 that the defendant's business was lawful. If he acts negligently, 
 and from his negligence, as a natural, usual, and likely result, death 
 follows, it is undoubtedly manslaughter.* Such also is the law with 
 regard to manufacturers and workmen,^" to persons having charge 
 of children or dependents, * * and to officers of steam and other ves- 
 sels. * * 
 
 448. Effect of wilfulness or illegality of act. — ^When a person does 
 an act without due caution and circumspection, causing death, it 
 may be misadventure, manslaughter, or murder, according to the 
 «ircumstances under which the original act was done.^ The mere 
 naked neglect or omission in the performance of a known duty, 
 which causes or hastens death, constitutes manslaughter only.'' And 
 one who causes the death of another through recklessness and care- 
 lessness is guilty of manslaughter.^ But the general rule is that 
 
 ^United States v. Knowles, and 8 Cox, C. C. 74. And see also infra, §§ 
 
 Thomas v. People, supra. 458 et seq. 
 
 6 Queen v. Pocock, supra. iiSee infra, §§ 472 et seq. 
 
 sWharton, Crim. Law, § 1003. i2See infra, §§ 467, 468. 
 
 'Queen v. Daniell, 6 Mod. 99; King iBias v. United States, 3 Ind. Terr. 
 
 V. Wheailey, 1 W. Bl. 273; Com. v. 27, 53 S. W. 471. 
 
 Hearsey, 1 Mass. 137. zstate v. Smith, 65 Me. 257; Lewis 
 
 8See remarks of Willes, J., in Reg. v. State, 72 Ga. 164, 53 Am. Rep. 835; 
 
 V. Birchall, 4 Fost. & F. 1087. Tessymond's C^se, 1 Lewin, C. C. 169; 
 
 SWharton, Crim. Law, § 1013. Reg. v. Doherty, 16 Cox, C. C. 306. 
 
 loSee R^. v. Bennett, Bell, C. O. 1, estate v. Hardie, 47 Iowa, 647, 29 Am. 
 
684 HOMICIDE. [•§: 448 
 
 one wlio causes death bj his negligence is responsible, whether he 
 was at the time engaged in a legal or illegal act ; and if his act was 
 in its character felonious, he is guilty of murder, it being homicide 
 committed in the performance of a felonious act.* And where death 
 ensues in consequence of a wilful omission of duty, it constitutes 
 murder.^ And one who, though in pursuit of his common and law- 
 ful occupation, sees danger probably arising to others from his 
 act, and still persists in such act, without giving warning . of th6 
 danger, and death ensues, is guilty of murder.' 
 
 A criminal intent is not necessary on the part of a person whose 
 carelessness has caused the death of another, however, to make it 
 manslaughter, when the death was the result of neglect of a known 
 duty;^ and ignorance of the law forms no basis for an acquittal.* 
 And deliberate and intentional killing is not negligent homicide, 
 and an instruction in a prosecution for homicide is not objectionable 
 for failure to submit the law as to negligent homicide, where the 
 evidence shows the killing to have been deliberate and intentional.* 
 On the contrary it is error in such case to submit the issue of neg- 
 ligent homicide. ^ " 
 
 449. Causal connection between the negligence and injury. — To 
 render a person criminally responsible for the death of another re- 
 sulting from his negligent act or omission, the death must have been 
 the immediate and direct result and consequence of such an act or 
 omission.^ If the act was merely the condition of the death and 
 not its cause, no criminal responsibility attaches.^ And a condition 
 
 Rep. 496; State v. Shelledy, 8 Iowa, sPeople v. Kilvington (Cal.) 36 Pac. 
 
 477 : State v. O'Brien, 32 N. J. L. 169. 13, 
 
 <Com. V. Matthews, 89 Ky. 287, 12 sAiken v. State, 10 Tex. App. 610. 
 
 S. W. 333; Ohrystal v. Com. 9 Bush, And an instruction in a prosecution 
 
 669; State v. Justus, 11 Or. 178, 50 Am. for homicide in shooting another, with 
 
 Rep. 470, 8 Pac. 337. reference to the rule of law if the shoot- 
 
 A statute providing that where one ing was not intentionally done, but was 
 
 in the execution of, or attempt to ex- the result of negligence, sufficiently 
 
 ecute, an act made a felony by law submits to the jury the point as to 
 
 should kill another, though without ap- whether the killing was accidental, 
 
 parent intention to kill, the offense can- State v. Emery, .78 Mo. 77, 47 Am. Rep. 
 
 not come within the definition of neg- 92. 
 
 ligent homicide, is not invalid because loFlynn v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 it does not name the offense of which 407, 66 S. W. 551 ; Giebel v. State, 28 
 
 the party would have been guilty if he Tex. App. 151, 12 S. W. 591. 
 
 violated that article. Richards v. State, lUnited States v. Knowles, 4 Sawy. 
 
 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 38, 30 S. W. 805. 517, Fed. Cas. No. 15,540 ; Thomas v. 
 
 sLewis V. State, supra; Queen v. People, 2 Colo. App. 513, 31 Pac. 349. 
 
 Hughes, 26 L. J. Mag. Cas. N. S. 202, 2 State v. Preslar, 48 N. C. (3 Jones, 
 
 7 Cox, C. C. 301, Dears. & B. C. C. 248, L.) 421. 
 
 3 Jur. N. S. 696. A nurse employed for a person, who 
 
 6Lee v. State, 1 Coldw. 62. afterwards died from Bright's disease 
 
 1 State V. Smith, 65 Me. 257. superinduced by the excessive use of al- 
 
§ 449] NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. 685 
 
 ■within this rule is a prior act without which a subsequent act can- 
 not exist. A. sells to B. an explosive oil, which afterwards, from omis- 
 sion on B.'s part to take due care, explodes. The sale from A. to B. 
 is a condition of the subsequent explosion, but A. is not the cause 
 of the explosion, if it be shown that the oil when sold was in the 
 condition in which oils of the same class are regularly brought to 
 market. On the other hand, if the oil was not in such condition, 
 but was of such a character that it would explode unless precau- 
 tions unusual and unnecessary in regular business were undertaken 
 by the purchaser, then A., by his misconduct in selling the oil in 
 such a state, is the cause of the explosion, and is penally responsible 
 for its results. So, the city of B. distributes unwholesome water 
 which it obtains from C. under a contract made with the latter. C, 
 is the condition of the distribution, but he is not the cause, unless 
 the water which he supplied the city was unwholesome at the tune 
 of the supply.^ 
 
 II. CLASSIFICATIOlSr OF SUBJECT-MATTEE. 
 
 450. Enumeration of classes — Negligent homicides may be divided 
 generally, with reference to the subject-matter, into the follovdng 
 classes: First, those growing out of omission to perform duty; sec- 
 ond, those growing out of improper performance of duty ; and third, 
 those growing out of the improper exercise of authority. These class- 
 es are considered in their order in the following subdivisions of 
 this chapter. 
 
 III. Omission to peefoem duty. 
 
 451. General view — Omissions are not the basis of penal action, 
 unless they constitute a defect in the discharge of a responsibility 
 with which the defendant is especially invested.^ There is no such 
 thing, in fact, as an omission that can be treated as an absolute blank. 
 A man who is apparently inactive is actually doing something, even 
 
 coholie drink, cannot be held guilty of ever gave any whisky to the patient ex- 
 
 manalaughter or other homicide on the cept in accordance with the directions 
 
 theory that he knew that the patient of the attending physician, or that he 
 
 had such a passion for whisky that his was in any way instrumental in allow- 
 
 death would be the result of an unre- ing him to obtain it. Peocle v. Ander- 
 
 strained use of it, and gave it to him son, 131 Cal. 352, 63 Pac. 668. 
 
 to drink or placed it within his reach, sStein v. State, 37 Ala. 123; Queen v. 
 
 either for the purpose of producing Pelham, 8 Q. B. 959. And see supra, 
 
 death, or with such carelessness as to chapter V., § 28. 
 
 constitute criminal negligence, in the lEeg. v. Gray, 4 Fosti & F. 1098. 
 
 absence of anything to show that he 
 
686 HOMICIDE. [§ 451 
 
 though that something is the cancelling of something else that he 
 ought to have done. Even sleeping is an affirmative act, and may 
 become the object of penal prosecution when it operates to inter- 
 rupt an act on the part of the defendant which the law requires 
 of him, with the penalty of prosecution for his disobedience. As,, 
 therefore, an omission takes its character from prior responsibil- 
 ity that it suspends, that responsibility must be scrutinized 
 when we undertake to estimate the penal character of an omission 
 to perform it. And, as a general rule, in this respect we may say 
 that when a responsibility exclusively imposed on the defendant is 
 such that an omission in its performance is, in the usual course of 
 events, causally followed by an injury to another person or to the 
 state, then the defendant is indictable for such an omission.^ 
 
 452. Of parent to care for child — .A parent who negligently with- 
 holds food, or other necessaries, from his child, having the means 
 to supply them, in consequence of which the child dies, is guilty of 
 manslaughter;* and if such Avithholding is wilful, the act is murder.* 
 To render criminal the neglect of parents and others having charge 
 of children, or other dependents, by reason of which death results, 
 however, there must be capacity, means, and ability to provide sup- 
 port and care for them, or to prevent the threatened harm, as well 
 as legal duty to provide and act, there being no criminal liability 
 in the absence of such capacity, means, and ability.* And a mother 
 cannot be held for murder of her child by omitting to supply it with 
 food, unless it appears that food had been supplied her or was 
 within her reach for that purpose.* And it is not sufficient that 
 
 2See Reg. v. Hughes, Dears. & B. C. a prosecution against the father for 
 C. 248, 7 Cox, C. C. 301 ; Reg. v. Haines, having killed the child by inflicting 
 2 Car. & K. 368; Ues. v. Lowe, 3 Car. blows upon it, for the purpose ofshow- 
 & K. 123. 4 Cox, C. C. 449. ing malice. Burnett v. State, 14 Lea, 
 
 iReg. V. Conde, 10 Cox, U. C. 547; Rex 439. 
 V. Friend, Russ. & R. C. C. 20; Rex aState v. Noakes, 70 Vt. 247, 40 Atl., 
 V. Squire, 3 Russell, Crimes, 6th ed. p. 249; Reg. v. Hogan, 5 Eng. Law & Kq. 
 13; Pallis V. State, 123 Ala. 12, 82 Am. 553, 2 Den. C. C. 277, 5 Cox, C. C 255- 
 St. Rep. 106, 26 So. 339. Saunders's Case, 7 Car. & P. 277; Reg. 
 
 And though a parent supplied sufli- v. Phillpot, 20 Eng. Law & Eq. 591, i> 
 cient food and clothing to another for Cox, C. C. 140; Reg. v. Vann, 8 En", 
 the use of his child, where the other Law & Eq. 596, 2 Den. C. C. 325. 
 wilfully withheld it from the child, and 4Rex v. Saunders, 7 Car. & P. 277. 
 the parent knew it, and failed to inter- And an indictment charging a woman 
 fere, and the child died from want with manslaughter in neglecting to sup- 
 thereof, he is guilty of manslaughter, ply her infant child with suffiefent food 
 Reg. V. Bubb, 4 Cox, C. C. 455. is bad where it does not state that she 
 
 2Reg. V. Conde, and Reg. v. Bubb, su- was the mother of the child, or that 
 pra. she owed it any duty to supply it with 
 
 And evidence that a father exposed food. Reg. v. Edwards, 8 Oar. & P. 611. 
 and neglected his child is admissible in 
 
§ 452] NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. 6«7 
 
 the food needed could have been ohtained by application to the proper 
 authorities.^ But wilful neglect to apply for the assistance pro- 
 vided by the poor laws, by reason of which a child dies, is sufficient 
 to render the offense manslaughter, even though the accused had a 
 husband with sufficient means to support his family, but which 
 he neglected to do.** And in an indictment against a parent for 
 neglecting to provide sufficient food and clothing for a child of 
 tender years, for whom he is bound by law to provide, it is not 
 necessary to aver that the parent was, at the time of the alleged 
 offense, of sufficient ability to perform the duty so imposed upon 
 him.'' 
 
 So, the failure on the part of a parent to provide a child of ten- 
 der years with shelter, or its abandonment and exposure, whereby its 
 death results, constitutes an assault, and renders the parent guilty of 
 manslaughter, or of murder if the exposure or neglect was of a 
 dangerous kind;* it being manslaughter only if the child is left 
 in a place where it was likely to be found and cared for,® and mur- 
 der if it was left in a remote place where it was not liable to be 
 found. * " Nor is the crime reduced to the grade of voluntary man- 
 slaughter by the fact that the mother deserted the child in the 
 hope that it would be rescued and taken care of. ^^ And neglect by 
 a parent to call a physician for his child, whereby death results, is 
 likewise manslaughter.*'' And this is so though the omission to 
 
 6Re^. V. Ru^, 12 Cox, C. C. 16, 24 An indictment charging that a moth- 
 
 h. T. N. S. 192; Reg. v. Chandler, 6 Cox, er, with intent to kill and murder her 
 
 C. C. 519. child, put it in an outhouse and there 
 
 Where a grandmother of an infant, deserted it and left it exposed to the 
 
 whose mother was dead, took charge of weather, without clothing or shelter, 
 
 it, though not bound by law to care from which the child died, is not sub- 
 
 for it, fell into bad circumstances and jeet to objection that it did not show 
 
 was obliged to go out to service during that she was in duty bound to protect 
 
 the day, and placed the child in the the child, or that the child was unable 
 
 charge of a young boy, with instruc- to help itself. State v. Behm, 72 Iowa, 
 
 tions to look after it, leaving food with 533, 34 N. W. 319. 
 
 which to feed it, and the child was al- sGibson v. Com. supra. And see 
 
 lowed to die from starvation, she is not Queen v. Pinhorn, 1 Cox, C. C. 70. 
 
 guilty of manslaughter, since her fault loGibson v. Com. supra; Reg. v. 
 
 consisted solely in omitting to send Handley, 13 Cox, C. C. 79. 
 
 the child to the parish authorities. Reg. A mother who permitted a new-born 
 
 V. Nieholls, 13 Cox, C. C. 75. child to fall into a closet, where it was 
 
 SReg. V. Mabbett, 5 Cox, C. C. 339; smothered in the soil, is guilty of mur- 
 
 Reg. V. Chandler, Dears. C. C. 453. der if she had the power of procuring 
 
 TQueen v. Ryland, L. R. 1 C. C. 99, 10 such assistance as might have saved the 
 
 Cox. C. C. 569. child's life, and neglected to do so. Reg. 
 
 sPallis V. State, 123 Ala. 12, 82 Am. v. Middleship, 5 Cox, C. C. 275. 
 
 St. Rep. 106, 26 So. 339; Gibson v. Com. nGibson v. Com. supra. See also 
 
 106 Kv. 360, 90 Am. St. Rep. 230, 50 S. Reg. v. Walters, Car. & M. 164. 
 
 W. 532; Reg. v. Walters, Car. & M. izReg. v. Cook, 62 J. P. 712, 58 Alb. 
 
 1G4 L. J. 232; Reg. v. Downes, 13 Cox, C. 
 
688 HOMICIDE. P§ 452 
 
 call a physician was occasioned by superstitious, conscientious, or re- 
 ligious beliefs.^* 
 
 It is not sufficient, however, on a charge of manslaughter merely 
 to show that a parent had neglected to use reasonable means of saving 
 the life of his child; it is also necessary to show that his neglect had 
 the effect of shortening the child's life.'^* Nor will the parent be 
 held liable upon a mere vague statement of a skilled witness that prob- 
 ably the life of the child might have been prolonged if medical 
 assistance had been called. ^^ Nor is a parent indictable for the 
 death, by starvation, of a child competent to assist itself, unless the 
 parent in some way shut the child off from obtaining assistance.^® 
 And if his omission was the result of a conscientious error of judg- 
 ment in the nursing of a child or dependent, he cannot be convicted 
 of manslaughter if there was no culpable neglect of duty on his 
 part. ^ '^ And it has been held that he cannot be convicted unless he 
 had means to relieve, and wilfully withheld the relief. ^ ^ 
 
 453. Existence of the proper relationship. — It will be seen that crim- 
 inal liability in this class of cases depends upon duty to support. 
 A father, therefore, is not guilty of manslaughter for failure to 
 call medical attendance for his adult daughter, whereby her death 
 results.^ And the primary duty to support and care for children 
 resting with the father, the mother is not held responsible, as a 
 general rule, for negligence upon her part in supplying her children 
 with necessaries, whereby their death results, unless she has assumed 
 exclusive charge.^ And the same reasoning has been applied to a 
 
 C. Ill, L. E. 1 Q. B. Div. 25, 45 L. J. isReg. v. Morby, supra. 
 
 Mag. Cas. N. S. 8, 33 L. T. N. S. 675, isReg. v. Waters, Temple & M. C. 
 
 24 Week. Rep. 278. C. 57, 1 Den. C. C. 356, 2 Car. & K. 
 
 isibid. ; State v. Clienoweih, 163 Ind. 864; Reg. v. Shepherd, 9 Cox, C. C. 
 94, 71 N. E. 197; State v. Sandford, 99 123, Leigh & C. C. C. 147- Rex v Friend, 
 Me. 441, 59 Atl. 597. Contra, Reg. v. Russ. & R. C. C. 20. 
 WagstaflFe, 10 Cox, C. C. 530. i7Reg. v. Wagstaffe, 10 Cox, C. C. 
 
 And conscientious and superstitious 530. 
 opinions upon the part of parents that isRex v. SaunderS, 7 Car. & P. 277. 
 it is wrong and irreligious to provide iReg. v. Shepherd, 9 Cox, C. C. 123, 
 medical attendance for their infant Leigh & C. C. C. 147, 31 L. J. Mag. Cas. 
 children in their custody is no excuse for N. S. 102, 8 Jur. N. S. 418 5 L. T. N. 
 disobeying a statute making such omis- S. 687, 10 Week. Rep. 297. 
 sion punishable summarily, so as to re- 2Rex v. Saunders, 7 Car. & P. 277- 
 lieve the parent from criminal liabil- Reg. v. Edwards. 8 Car. & P. 611- Reg'. 
 ity for manslaughter in case of the v. Shepherd, 9 Cox, C. C. 123. 
 death of a child because of such omis- So, there is no legal obligation upon 
 sion. Reg. v. Downes, supra. the part of ii person to maintain a 
 
 l4Reg. V. Morby, 15 Cox, C. C. 35, brother, so as to make the omission to 
 L. R. 8 Q. B. Div. 571, 46 L. T. N. S. do so indictable, though the brother is 
 288, 51 L. J. Mag. Cas. N. S. 85, 30 an idiot and helpless and an inmate 
 Week. Rep. 613, 46 J. P. 422. And see of the house of the accused; and the lat- 
 Reg. V. Martin, 11 Cox, C. C. 136. ter is not indictable for the omission 
 
§ 453] NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. 689 
 
 mother who neglects to supply the wants of a lunatic illegitimate 
 child. ^ So far as concerns the neglect of a mother to properly at- 
 tend to a bastard child after birth, statutes exist by which the com- 
 mon-law offense is absorbed. Independent of these statutes, it may 
 be generally stated that for a parent, having exclusive charge of an 
 infant child, to so culpably neglect it that death ensues as a con- 
 sequence of such neglect, is manslaughter if death or grievous bodily 
 harm were not intended, and murder if there was an intent to in- 
 flict death or grievous bodily harm.* And much doubt ex- 
 ists as to the legal obligation of a father to support an illegitimate 
 child, though as to the fact of the moral duty there can be no ques- 
 tion.® Puffendorf tells us^ that "maintenance is due not only to 
 legitimate children, but even to incestuous issue." 
 
 But be this as it may, it is clear that when a party assumes 
 the guardianship of a child, whether as putative or step parent, 
 he becomes responsible for mismanagement or neglect.^ And one 
 who undertakes the charge of supplying an infant or incompetent 
 person with proper food, clothing, or care, and Avho is furnished with 
 means of discharging that duty, and wilfully or negligently omits 
 to perform it, whereby death results, is guilty either of murder or 
 manslaughter.* And this is so though there was no intent to kill;" 
 l)iit the negligence must have been so great as to indicate a wicked 
 heart, in the sense of recklessness as to whether the creature died 
 or not. ^ " And one may be made responsible for earing for another 
 within the meaning of these rules, without his direct agi'ecment 
 and assent, by the surrounding conditions and circumstances, as in 
 case of helplessness upon the part of one when the other is the only 
 one able or in a position to give assistance. ' ^ But merely permit- 
 to supply his brother with proper food, BNichols v. Allen, 3 Car. & P. 36. 
 warmth, etc., whereby his death result- eBook 4, chap. 11, § 6. 
 ed. Rex v. Smith, 2 Car. & P. 449. 'Stone v. Carr, 3 Esp. 1; Cooper v. 
 
 sQueen v. Pelham, 8 Q. B. 9S9. Martin, 4 East, 77; Murdock v. Mur- 
 
 So, a woman knowing that she is dock, 7 Cal. 511 ; Brush v. Blanehard, 
 about to be confined, who wilfully ab- 18 111. 46; Gillett v. Camp, 27 Mo. 541; 
 stains from taking necessary precau- Hussey v. Eoundtree, 44 N. C. (Bus- 
 tions to preserve the life of the child bee, L.) 110; Williams v. Hutchinson, 
 after its birth, in consequence of which 3 N. Y. 312, 53 Am. Dec. 301 ; Sharp v. 
 the child dies, is not guilty of man- Cropsey, 11 Barb. 224; Lantz v. Frey, 
 slaughter, but may be found guilty of 14 Pa. 201 ; Davis v. Goodenow, 27 Vt. 
 concealing the birtih of the child. Peg. 715; Schouler, Dora. Eel. 378. 
 V. Knights, 2 Fost. & F. 46. sReg. v. Bubb, supra; Reg. v. Smith, 
 
 4Reg. v. Chandler, Dears. C. C. 453; 10 Cox, C. C. 82; Reg. v. Nicholls, 13 
 Reg. v. Mabbett, 5 Cox, C. C. 339; Reg. Cox, C. C. 75; Lewis v. State, 72 Ga. 
 V. Bubb, 4 Cox, C. C. 455; Reg. v. 164, 53 Am. Rep. 835. 
 Conde, 10 Cox, C. C. 547; Queen v. Ev- sLewis v. State, supra. 
 land, L. R. 1 C. C. 99, 10 Cox, C. C. loReg. v. Nicholls, supra. 
 569. But see Reg. v. Knights, supra. HQueen v. Waters, 1 Den. C. C. 356, 
 
 Horn. — 44 
 
690 HOMICIDE. [§ 45» 
 
 ting a child to be bom in one's house does not charge hini with 
 a legal duty to care for the child, so as to render him guilty of crim- 
 inal negligence in not having procured someone to assist its motliei 
 at its birth, without regard to the attendant circumstances, or to his 
 ability to procure such assistance. ^ ^ 
 
 454. Of husband to care for wife. — .Neglect or refusal of a husband 
 to provide necessary food, clothing, shelter, and protection from in- 
 clement weather to his wife, resulting in her sickness and death, 
 renders him guilty of manslaughter. ^ And if a man wilfully aban- 
 dons his wife to the destruction of the elements when he could save 
 her, or criminally neglects to shelter her when he is able to do so^ 
 and knowingly leaves her to perish, he is as much a murderer as if 
 he had assaulted and slain her with a deadly weapon.* And though 
 they had separated, and he would be justified, ordinarily, in refus- 
 ing her aid because of an allowance made her, and regularly paid, 
 if he refused her shelter when he knew she was ill and without shelter, 
 and her death resulted or was accelerated, he would be guilty of 
 manslaughter.^ And an indictment charging a husband with killing 
 his wife, alleging their relationship, his duty to provide her with 
 necessities, her own incapacity, and that he feloniously and wilfully 
 neglected and '•'^ifused to provide necessities, and her subsequent 
 sickness and death, is sufficient, and not subject to objection that 
 it contains no allegation that the condition of the wife, and her 
 
 2 Car. & K. 864, Temple & M. C. C. 57, voluntary manslaughter as relating to 
 
 18 L. J. Mag. Cas. N. S. 53, 13 Jur. a killing in the performance of an un- 
 
 130. lawful act, not felonious, or the per- 
 
 Where an elderly woman was inca- formance of a lawful act without due 
 
 pable, through illness, of attending to care and caution, is inapplicable and 
 
 her own wants, or obtaining assistance, must be rejected as surplusage. Terri- 
 
 and a niece of full age living with her tory v. Manton, 8 Mont. 95, 19 Pac. 
 
 and supported by her, receiving and hav- 387. 
 
 ing access to articles of food during the 3Reg. v. Plummer, 1 Car. & K. 600, 8 
 
 time, failed to supply either food or Jur. 921. 
 
 medical attendance or nursing to her So, evidence that a man whose wife 
 aunt, or to make her condition known, was assaulted by him and left exposed 
 whereby her death was accelerated, the to the elements during a cold night, and 
 niece is guilty of manslaughter, it hav- frozen to death, had a hired man liv- 
 ing been her duty under the circumstan- ing with hiin, who was willing to help 
 ces to supply the wants of the deceased, him, and that they could have brought 
 Queen v. Instan, 62 L. J. Mag. Cas. N. her to the house but did not do so until 
 S. 86 [1893] 1 Q. B. 4S0, 41 Week. Rep. the next morning, and that she died the 
 308, 17 Cox, C. C. 602. next day, is suiEcient to sustain a ver- 
 
 i2State V. Noakes, 70 Vt. 247, 40 Atl. diet of murf'^r in the second degree 
 
 249. against the husband, though the wife 
 
 iState V. Smith, 65 Me. 257. had been drinking, and probably, for 
 
 2Territory v. Manton, 7 Mont. 162, thnt reason, was unable to reach the 
 
 14 Pac. 637. house herself. Territory v. Manton, su- 
 
 And in such a, case an instruction in pro. 
 a prosecution for the killing, defining in- 
 
§ 454] NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. 69,1 
 
 necessities, and the facts alleged constituting the crime, were known 
 to the accused.* Nor is it material that the wife was diseased and 
 would have died shortly, if her death was accelerated by the hus- 
 band's act or neglect. ' 
 
 The mere facts that a husband was guilty of neglect and that 
 his wife died, hov/ever, are not sufficient to charge him with crim- 
 inal responsibility; it must appear that his neglect caused the sick- 
 ness and death, and the character of the sickness should be stated. " 
 And to support an indictment for such a homicide it should appear 
 that the wife was in such a helpless state as to be unable to appeal 
 elsewhere for aid, and that the death was the natural and regular 
 and likely consequence of the husband's withdrawal of aid.'' Nor is 
 an indictment charging a felonious assault upon a wife by forcing 
 her to leave her dwelling, whereby she came to her death, supported 
 by proof of a beating, and that she afterwards voluntarily left, and 
 imnecessarily remained away.* 
 
 455. Of master to care for servant or apprentice. — 'Ro duty rests 
 upon a master, under ordinary circumstances, to provide necessaries 
 to his servant, where the latter is left free to choose whether to 
 stay in the service or to leave it, and he cannot be held guilty of 
 manslaughter for neglecting to supply such necessaries though death 
 results.* Unless the master in some way shuts off the servant from 
 obtaining assistance, he is not responsible for the death of the serv- 
 ant for want of such assistance.^ To impose such a duty upon the 
 master as will render him criminally responsible for death due to 
 failure to supply sufficient food or sustenance to the servant, it 
 must appear that the servant was of tender years, or under the 
 dominion and control of the master.* But where a servant is re- 
 duced to such an enfeebled state of mind and of body as to be en- 
 tirely unable to take care of himself, and to be totally under the 
 control of the master and unable to withdraw himself from such 
 control, and his death is caused or accelerated by his master's neg- 
 ligence in supplying necessaries, the latter is guilty of manslaughter. * 
 And it has been asserted that a master is bound by general law to 
 
 estate V. Smith, supra. L. J. Mag, Cas. N. S. 153, 11 Jur. N. S. 
 
 6Eeg. V. Plummer, supra. 605. 
 
 «State V. Lowe, 66 Minn. 296, 68 N. 2Eeg. v. S , 5 Cox, C. C. 279; Reg. 
 
 W. 1094. V. Smith, 8 Car. & P. 153; Reg. v. Smith, 
 
 7Reg. V. Plummer, 1 Car. & K. 600; Leigh & C. C. C. 607, 10 Cox, C. C. 82; 
 
 State V. Preslar, 48 N. C. (3 Jones, L.) But see Rex v. Ridley, 2 Campb. 650. 
 
 421 ; Wharton, Crim. Law, 7th ed. § 3 Rex v. Ridley, supra. 
 
 2508. *Reg. v. Smith, supra. And see Reg. 
 
 8 State V. Preslar, supra. v. S— — — , supra. 
 
 iReg. V. Smith, 10 Cox, C. C. 82, 34 
 
692 HOMICIDE. [§ 455 
 
 furnisli medical aid to his servant." And where the accused has 
 regularly treated the deceased as his servant he cannot defend him- 
 self upon the ground that he was not so.* 
 
 So, a master is guilty if he causes the death of an apprentice 
 by negligence or harsh usage ;^ or by refusal to supply him with 
 sufficient food, lodging, and apparel. ® But the master is not bound 
 to supply the apprentice with medicine, and if the death of the ap- 
 prentice results from failure to supply him with medicine, when 
 ill, the master is not criminally responsible.® And if the apprentice 
 was capable of applying elsewhere for aid, or for release from his 
 indenture, the master, on the principles already stated, would not 
 be liable for the homicide, unless it should appear that the deceased 
 was prevented by fear of violence, or other circumstances, from ap- 
 plying for such relief. ^ ** Though if the apprentice is sick, and un- 
 able to apply for aid himself, or is prevented in any way from mak- 
 ing such application by the master, a criminal prosecution may be 
 maintained for such neglect. ^^ 
 
 So, seamen, at sea, for the time being are absolutely under the 
 control of the master of the vessel, and it would appear that neglect 
 upon the part of the master to supply a seaman with necessaries, 
 whereby his death is caused, would render him guilty of manslaughter 
 or murder, according to whether or not it was done with malice.^* 
 And in such case a conviction may be had for causing death by star- 
 vation or exposure under a statute providing for punishment for 
 ieausing death by means of a mortal wound given, or other violence or 
 injury inflicted. ^ * 
 
 456. Of keepers or jailers to care for persons in charge. — One who 
 imprisons a person must feed and care for him, and in case of his 
 neglect to do so, causing death, he is guilty of manslaughter.^ 
 
 BReg. V. Smith, supra. told the witness that the deceased was 
 
 sReg. V. Davies, 1 Russell, Crimes, his apprentice is sufBcient, without the 
 
 491. production of any indenture, to estab- 
 
 'King V. Self, 1 Leach, C. L. 137, 1 lish the apprenticeship as alleged in the 
 
 East, P. C. 226; Rex v. Squire, 1 Rus- second count, but not as alleged in the 
 
 Bell, Crimes, 6th ed. 151. first. Reg. v. Crumpton, Car. & M. 
 
 SReg. V. Smith, supra. 597. 
 
 And where an indictment for man- 'Reg. v. Smith, 8 Car. & P. 153. 
 
 slaughter charges in the first count that loReg. v. S— — , 5 Cox, C. C. 279. 
 
 the person killed was the apprentice of uReg. v. Smith, supra. 
 
 the accused, and that it was the duty i2See United States v. Freeman, 4 
 
 of the latter to provide him with proper Mason, 505, Fed. Cas. No. 15,162; Re". 
 
 nourishment, medicine, etc., but that he v. Leggett, 8 Car. & P. 191. 
 
 died from neglect; and charges in the isCom. v. Macloon, 101 Mass. 1 100 
 
 second count that the deceased, being Am. Dec. 89. 
 
 such apprentice, was killed by overwork iReg. v. Edwards, 8 Car. & P. 611. 
 and beating,^-evidence that the accused 
 
S *m NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. 693 
 
 Thus, the keeper of an asylum or prison who undertakes, to the ex- 
 clusion of others, to feed a sick pauper, or lunatic, or prisoner, is 
 penally responsible for the death of such pauper, lunatic, or prisoner, 
 naturally resulting from his neglect.^ And where the neglect to sup- 
 ply necessaries is so wilful and gross as to warrant the inference that 
 the person confining another contemplates the latter's death, he is 
 guilty of murder, instead of manslaughter.* Likewise an overseer 
 of the poor having the care of a poor person belonging to his town- 
 ship, for whom he neglected to provide necessary food, whereby death 
 was caused, may be held criminally responsible for such death.* 
 And an ofiicer whose duty it is to give prompt medical assistance on 
 application of destitute persons in case of urgent necessity cannot 
 excuse himself from criminal liability for refusing such assistance, 
 from which refusal death results, on the ground that the applicant 
 was employed at wages, or other remuneration, when he was in fact 
 destitute.® 
 
 But the act of a deputy warden in an institution of taking a per- 
 son, against his consent, and keeping him in a room without neces- 
 saries, by reason of which his death is caused, does not constitute mur- 
 der.® And to constitute manslaughter it is necessary that the guar- 
 dianship should be exclusive. ^ And a person omitting to supply his 
 idiot brother with food is not, in default of proof of such exclusive- 
 ness, indictable for the omission. * But it is otherwise if the control 
 be exclusive and absolute.® 
 
 457. Omissions by those charged with dangerous agencies. — Here 
 again are to be put the questions: Was the defendant exclusively 
 charged with a particular office ? Did injury to another ensue as a 
 regular and usual consequence from his omission ? If so, the de- 
 fendant is to be held penally responsible.* Hence, such responsi- 
 bility has been held to attach where an engineer leaves a -steam-engine 
 in charge of an incompetent person;^ where the officers of a vessel 
 
 I 
 
 2See Eex v. Hugpfins, 2 Strange. 882, 7Queeii v. Pelham, 8 Q. B. 959. ' 
 
 2 Ld. Raym. 1574; Treeve's Case, 2 East, sRex v. Smith, 2 Car. & P. 449. 
 
 P. C. 821 ; Reg. v. Barrett, 2 Car. & K. sEeg. v. Porter, Leigh & C. C. C. 
 
 343; Reg. v. Porter, Leigh & C. C. C. 394, 9 Cox, C. C. 449; Reg. v. Edwards, 
 
 394, 9 Cox, C. C. 449; Queen v. Pelham, 8 Car. & P. 611. 
 
 8 Q. B. 959; Reg. v. Marriott, 8 Car. iReg. v. Hughes, Dears. & B. C. C. 
 
 & P. 425; Rex v. Warren, Russ. & R. 248; Reg. v. Haines, 2 Car. & K. 368; 
 
 C. C. 48 note; Rex v. Booth, RusS. & Reg. v. Lowe, 3 Oar. & K. 123, 4 Cox 
 
 E. C. C. 47 note. C. C. 449. 
 
 8Reg. V. Marriott, supra. ^Reg. v. Lowe, 4 Cox, C. C. 449. But 
 
 <Rex V. Booth, supra. merely to leave a machine at rest does 
 
 BReg. V. Curtis, 15 Cox, C. 0. 746. not per se confer responsibility. Hil- 
 
 «Rex V. Huggins, supra. ton's Case, 2 Lewdn, C. C. 214. 
 
694 HOMICIDE. [5 457 
 
 omit to keep a proper lookout;* where a pilot omits to make himSelf 
 properly understood by a foreign helmsman ; * where the officer in 
 charge omits to ventilate a mine;® rzhere a railway tender omits to 
 give the proper signal;® where an iron founder, instead of recasting 
 a piece that had burst, fills up the crevice with lead;'' where a me- 
 chanic, employed for the purpose in a colliery, omits to plank up a 
 shaft ;^ where a switch tender omits properly to turn a switch;* and 
 where a conductor of a street car, whose duty it is to look out and to 
 stop the car if it is likely to do damage, neglects to keep a proper 
 lookout.*" And failure upon the part of a brakeman on a train 
 stopped in a dangerous position to perform his duty to signal an ap- 
 proaching train, whereby a collision occurred from which death re- 
 sulted, is criminal negligence rendering him guilty of manslaughter, 
 and his omission is not excused by the fact that it arose from obedience 
 to instructions of an official superior. * * But, as has been seen, the 
 responsibility of the defendant, which he thus fails to discharge, 
 must be exclusive and peremptory.** And the indictment must al- 
 lege a duty resting upon the accused, which he failed to perform, * * 
 and a stranger who sees that, unless a railway switch is turned or the 
 car stopped, an accident may ensue, is not indictable for not turning 
 the switch or stopping the car. The reason for this is obvious. To 
 coerce, by criminal prosecutions, every person to supervise all other 
 persons and things, would destroy that division of labor and respon- 
 sibility by which alone busines can be safely conducted, and would 
 establish an industrial communism by which private enterprise and 
 private caution would be extinguished. ITothing can be effectually 
 guarded when everything is to be guarded by everybody. No machin- 
 ery could be properly worked if every passer-by were compelled by 
 the terror of a criminal prosecution to rush in and adjust anything 
 that might appear to him to be wrong, or which was wrong, no mat- 
 ter how it might happen to appear. By this wild and irresponsible 
 interference even the simplest forms of machinery would be speedily 
 destroyed. 
 
 So, for a person charged exclusively with dangerous machinery to 
 
 sReg. V. Lowe, 4 Cox, C. C. 449, 3 sReg. v. Hughes, 7 Cox, C. C. 301. 
 Car. & K. 123; Queen v. Spence, 1 Cox, sState v. O'Brien, 32 N. J. L. 169. 
 C. C. 352, correcting Bex v. Allen, 7 loCom. v. Metropolitan R. Co. 107 
 
 Car. & P. 153, and Rex v. Green, 7 Car. Mass. 236. 
 & P. 156. 11 People v. Melius, 1 N. Y. Grim. Rep. 
 
 *Queen v. Spence, supra. 39. 
 
 BReg. V. Haines, 2 Car. & K. 368. i2Reg. v. Gray, 4 Fost. & F. 1098; 
 
 6Reg. V. Pargeter, 3 Cox, C. C. 191. Reg. v. Barrett, 2 Car. & K. 343. 
 
 7Epx v. Carr, 8 Car. & P. 163. isReg. v. Barrett, supra. 
 
§ 457] NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. 695 
 
 desert without notice and leave an incompetent substitute in his 
 place makes him liable for death caused by the incompetency of such 
 substitute/* But a person so leaving machinery is not liable for 
 injuries caused by the interposition of an independent responsible 
 agent. ^ ' Nor is an engineer in charge of engines, using oil for fuel, 
 chargeable with manslaughter in leaving the boilers unattended, re- 
 sulting in an explosion causing death, where from past experience he 
 was justified in believing, and did believe, that it was consistent with 
 safety to be absent for the length of time he was so. ^ ® 
 
 IV. Impkopee peefoemance of duty. 
 
 a. In handling dangerous agencies. 
 
 458. Negligent use involves responsibility — Manslaughter may 
 exist where there is no evidence of sudden heat or passion, as where 
 the killing results from the negligent use of dangerous agencies.^ 
 Whoever possesses a dangerous agent must take such care of it as 
 good business men, under such circumstances, are accustomed to ap- 
 ply; and if, from his neglecting to exercise such care, death ensues 
 to another, he is liable for manslaughter. A person cannot be con- 
 victed for homicide resulting from the improper use of a dangerous 
 agency, however, when he adopted a common and reasonably suffi- 
 cient mode of action, though there were other and safer modes. ^ 
 Illustration of these principles will appear in the following sections. 
 
 469. Negligent use of firearms and explosives. — Where a person fired 
 his pistol in the street, which by accident killed a person, the offense 
 is manslaughter, the act being likely to produce danger, and mani- 
 
 i <Reg. V. Lowe, 3 Car. & K. 123, 4 moral act with a woman, and thereby in- 
 
 Cox, C. C. 449. fliots a wound from which her death re- 
 
 iBHilton's Case, 2 Lewin, C. C. 214. suits, is guilty of manslaughter if he 
 
 isPeople V. Thompson, 122 Mich. 411, was careless or negligent either in tho 
 
 81 N. W. 344. manner of doing the act, or in the use 
 
 It would be competent in such case, of the instrument employed. State v. 
 
 however, to show the effect of the use of Center, 35 Vt. 378. 
 
 oil as fuel, as bearing upon the ques- 2Rigmaidon's Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 
 
 tion of negligence in leaving the boiler 180. 
 
 room ; and evidence of experiments made Where there are three modes of 
 to ascertain within what time a given swinging casks into place, one of which 
 pressure of steam could be raised in a modes was safer than the others, a mer- 
 boiler by the use of oil as fuel is com- chant swinging a cask by one of the leas 
 petent in support of opinion evidence as safe modes, which falls, causing the 
 bearing upon the question of negligence, death of passers-by, cannot be convict- 
 People V. Thompson, supra. ed of manslaughter if the mode adopted 
 
 lUnited States v. Meagher, 37 Fed. was reasonably suflSeient, though not 
 
 875. the safest one. Rigmaidon's Case, si*- 
 
 A man who uses artificial means for pro. 
 the purpose of consummating an im- 
 
696 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 [§ 459 
 
 festly improper;^ and so is it manslaughter in the common law if 
 one negligently discharge a gun in a public place or street, and kill 
 one whom he does not see;^ and it is culpable criminal negligence to 
 point a gun at a human being, and if the gun goes off and such per- 
 son is killed, it is manslaughter;* and where the shooting is malicious 
 the offense is murder.* 
 
 A hunter shooting in a wilderness, however, is not bound to the 
 caution required of a person shooting in a populous neighborhood,^ 
 or of a military officer who, when training his men, negligently shoots 
 one of their number;* though in the latter case it must be remem- 
 bered that, as the use of firearms is lawful, and the men take upon 
 them all the risks incident to their employment, the burden is on the 
 plaintiff to prove negligence.'^ But when the firing is unlawful, or 
 when, being lawful, it is negligent, then it brings liability for the 
 consequences,* including injuries caused by fright.® And as loaded 
 firearms are dangerous weapons, it is negligence to place them in the 
 hands of persons incompetent to use them. ^ " JSTor can one escape 
 
 iRex V. BurtoHj 1 Strange, 481. See 
 also State v. Vanoej 17 Iowa, 138. 
 
 aPeople v. Fuller, 2 Park. Crira. Rep. 
 16; Sparks v. Com. 3 Bush, 111, 96 
 Am. Dec. 196; State v. Vance, supra. 
 
 And where, in a prosecution for hom- 
 icide, it appears that the acwised had 
 a pistol, but no one saw him discharge 
 it or saw the deceased shot or knew it 
 had been done until his dead body was 
 found, and there was proof that a 
 Shot was heard in the vicinity at about 
 ihe time the accused passed out from 
 the place where he was in company with 
 others, going near the place where the 
 body was found and returning again, 
 the question of negligent homicide fair- 
 ly and naturally arises, so as to require 
 a suitable charge on that subject. El- 
 liston V. State, 10 Tex. App. 361. 
 
 3 See Golliher v. Com. 2 Duv. 163, 87 
 Am. Dec. 493. 
 
 4State V. Morrison, 104 Mo. 638, 16 S. 
 W. 493. And see Minton v. Com. 79 
 Ky. 461. 
 
 sBizzell V. Booker, 16 Ark. 308. 
 
 eCastle v. Duryea, 32 Barb. 480, 2 
 Keyes, 169. 
 
 So, evidence that a husband and wife 
 were engaged in a r;uarrel, that she at- 
 tempted to get a gun for some mis- 
 chievous purpose, and that he seized it, 
 and that a struggle ensued, she having 
 hold of the muzzle and he of the breech, 
 and that it went off about the time he 
 
 succeeded in taking it away from her 
 and killed her, shows a right on his 
 part to take the gun from her, and does 
 not show negligence requiring the court 
 to charge as to negligent homicide in a 
 prosecutici! against him for the kill- 
 ing. Blalock v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. 
 Rep. 154, 49 S. W. 100. 
 
 'See Reg. v. Hutchinson, 9 Cox, C. 
 C. 555; and comments in 3 Russell, 
 Crimes & Misdemeanors, 660. 
 
 Where general orders are given by 
 a major general pursuant to which an 
 artilleryman, acting under the orders of 
 a superior officer, discharges a gun in 
 the ordinary course of ball practice, 
 which misses the mark and kills a man, 
 the major general is not guilty of man- 
 slaughter. Reg. v. Hutchinson, supra. 
 
 sReg. V. Archer, 1 Fost. & F. 351, (a 
 case of unlawful snatching of a loaded 
 gun, when it accidentally went off). 
 
 oWharton, Neg. § 836. See Haack 
 V. Fearins, 5 Robt. 528. 
 
 loWharton, Neg. §§ 92, 853. 
 
 Where deer had entered a corn-field, 
 and were beating down the corn, and the 
 owner went with his servant to watch 
 at night with a gun, charging him to 
 fire when he heard anything rush into 
 the standing corn, and upon the owner 
 rushing into the corn in another part of 
 the field, the servant fired and killed 
 him, the killing is misadventure; for 
 the servant was misguided by his mas- 
 
i 459] NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. 697 
 
 criminal responsibilty for tilling another with a deadly weapon, even 
 in lawful sport, where there was an absence of common caution in 
 its use.^^ 
 
 It has been held, however, that a person who unlawfully keeps 
 powder in his house is not responsible for michief caused by negli- 
 gent meddling with it by his servants. ^ ^ 
 
 460- Careless handling of deadly weapons. — ^Both at common law 
 and under the statutes the killing of a person, resulting from the 
 heedless and incautious use or handling of firearms or other deadly 
 weapons, is involuntary manslaughter, consisting of a killing in the 
 commission of an unlawful act. ^ And one who strikes another inten- 
 tionally with a pistol, when it accidentally goes off and kills the other, 
 may be found guilty of manslaughter.^ And a person who waves 
 his pistol for the purpose of intimidating his neighbors, and acci- 
 dentally kills another with it, is guilty of negligent homicide in the 
 second degree, consisting, under the Texas statute, of an uninten- 
 tional killing in the performance of an unlawful act.* So, one who 
 fires off a pistol in the streets of a town, thereby causing death, is 
 guilty of involuntary manslaughter, whether the act be malum in se, 
 or merely malum prohibitum,, especially when he knows he is violating 
 the law. * And though a peace officer has authority to carry a pistol, 
 it is an offense for him to display and fire it where it would be likely 
 to disturb the occupants of a residence, and if he does so and death 
 results, he is criminally responsible. ® So, one who shoots another in 
 
 ter's own direction, and was ignorant v. Emery, 78 Mo. 77, 47 Am. Eep. 92; 
 that it was anyttiing else but the deer. State v. Kelly, 1 Nev. 224; State v. 
 But if the master had not given such Gilliam, 66 S. C. 419, 45 S. E. 6; Brit- 
 direction, which was the occasion of tain v. State, 36 Tex. Grim. Rep. 406, 
 the mistake, it would have been man- 37 S. W. 758. 
 
 slaughter, because of the want of due zStewart v. State, 137 Ala. 33, 34 So. 
 
 caution in the servant in shooting be- 818. 
 
 fore he discovered his mark. 1 Hale, sHoward v. State, 25 Tex. App. 686, 
 
 P. C. 475; Rex. v. Burton, 1 Strange, 8 S. W. 929 ; Friday v. State (Tex. Grim. 
 
 481. App.) 79 S. W. 815. 
 
 Ill Hale, P. C. 472. ^Sparks v. Com. supra; People v. Ful- 
 
 l2Reg. v. Bennett, Bell, C. C. 1, 8 ler, 2 Park. Grim. Rep. 16. And see 
 
 Cox, C. C. 74. Morton v. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 
 
 iState v. Hardie, 47 Iowa, 647, 29 71 S. W. 281. 
 Am. Rep. 496; Com. v. Matthews, 89 The grade of the crime of killing by 
 
 Ky. 287, 12 S. W. 333; York v. Com. the unintentional discharge of a firearm 
 
 82 Ky. 360; Chrystal v. Com. 9 Bush, in a careless manner is dependent upon 
 
 669; Sparks v. Com. 3 Bush, 111, 96 whether, at the time and place of the 
 
 Am. Dec. 196; Murphy v. Com. 15 Ky. killing, it was lawful for the slayer to 
 
 Ij. Rep. 215, 22 S. W. 649; Messer v. be in possession of such weapon. Aus- 
 
 Com. 25 Ky. L. Rep. 700, 76 S. W. 331 ; tin v. State, 110 Ga. 74S, 78 Am. St. 
 
 Selby v. Com. 25 Ky. L. Rep. 2209, 80 Rep. 134, 36 S. E. 52. 
 S. W. 221 ; Montgomery v. Com. 26 Ky. 6Russell v. State, 38 Tex. Grim. Rep. 
 
 L. Rep. 356. 81 S. W. 264; State v. 590, 44 S. W. 159. 
 Grote, 109 Mo. 345, 19 S. W. 93; State 
 
698 HOMICIDE. [§ 460 
 
 the act of illustrating to him the use of a pistol in a particular way, 
 pointing it toward him, is guilty of manslaughter.® And the same 
 rule applies to shooting for the purpose of intimidating a person, and 
 unintentionally hitting him.'' Nor is a man relieved from criminal 
 liability for shooting and killing another by the fact that the gun, 
 when it went off, was in the hands of a third person, where it was 
 discharged accidentally while he was attempting to wrest it from 
 him.® And the accidental killing of another with a pistol supposed 
 to be unloaded is manslaughter, where ordinary precaution to learn 
 whether it was loaded had not been used.® 
 
 Where death resulted, however, from the discharge of a gun in 
 the hands of another, who had no intention to kill, or discharge the 
 gun, the slayer is guilty of manslaughter only. ^ " In order to make 
 snch person guilty of murder, it must appear that there was an in- 
 tention on his part to discharge the gun, when the circumstances were 
 such that an act of that character would naturally tend to destroy 
 human life. ^ ' Nor is one guilty, if at all, of anything more than 
 involuntary manslaughter, where he seizes an intoxicated and violent 
 person for the purpose of taking a pistol from him, which goes off 
 after he has secured it, killing the person from whom it is taken. ^* 
 Nor is a person guilty of negligent homicide in the performance of 
 an unlawful act, who accidentally kills a person in an attempt to 
 dispossess him of a deadly weapon, where he has reason to apprehend 
 danger from such person's use of it.^* And if a killing is wholly 
 accidental, the person doing it should be acquitted.'* Nor is it 
 necessary that the highest degree of care and prudence in handling 
 
 eWeller v. State, 19 Ohio 0. C. 166. isBIalock v. State, 40 Tex. Grim. Rep. 
 
 And the familiarity with firearms of 154, 40 S. W. 100; Williams v. State, 45 
 that class of a person who shoots an- Tex. Grim. Rep. 218, 75 S. W. 859. And 
 other in the act of illustrating to him see Teel v. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 73 
 a certain use of a pistol may be shown S. W. 11. 
 
 on cross-examination in a prosecution nCom. v. Matthews, 89 Ky. 287, 12 
 for the killing, and evidence of owner- S. W. 333. 
 
 ship of other revolvers, and of inci- And where it appears that a person, 
 dents connected with them and with upon being asked to pay a bill, took a 
 such ownership, is competent as touch- revolver from his pocket, which was 
 ing upon such familiarity. Ibid. immediately discharged and a fatal 
 
 'State V. Hamilton, 170 Mo. 377, 70 wound inflicted upon the other, evidence 
 S. W. 876. in a, prosecution for the killing that 
 
 sState V. Hall, 132 N. C. 1094, 44 S. he carried his revolver and money in 
 E. 553. the same pocket, and when about to 
 
 PRampton's Case, 1 East, P. G. 267. use money that day, at other places, he 
 
 loAustin V. State, 110 Ga. 748, 78 had taken the revolver out of his pocket, 
 Am. St. Rep. 134, 36 S. E. 52; Aaron v. and testimony as to whether he point- 
 State, 31 Ga. 167. And see Tanks v. ed the revolver at the time the shot was 
 State, 71 Ark. 459, 75 S. W. 851. fired, are admissible as bearing, upon 
 
 iiAustin V. StatCj supra. the theory of accident. State v. Wright, 
 
 izAdams v. State, 65 Ind. 565. 112 Iowa, 436, 84 N. W. 541. 
 
§ 460] NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. 699 
 
 a dangerous weapon should be used to relieve the person handling 
 it from responsibility for manslaughter in accidentally killing an- 
 other with it ; only such care as a reasonably prudent man should use 
 is necessary. ^ ^ And it does not necessarily follow that the act of two 
 persons engaged in shooting for pleasure, remote from other people, 
 of exchanging weapons, in the process of which one of them was shot, 
 was of such a reckless nature as to be felonious and criminal ; whether 
 it was or not must depend upon the time, place, and actual circum- 
 stances. ^ " Nor is a homicide springing out of the mere act of car- 
 rying a pistol a negligent homicide predicated upon the doing of a 
 lawful act in a negligent manner.^'' 
 
 461. Negligent exposure or giving of poison. — ^Whoever negligently 
 exposes poison in such a way that, as an ordinary consequence, it 
 produces death is guilty of manslaughter;* though, as will be seen, 
 his penal responsibility ceases if the poison was taken through the 
 negligence of the deceased, or that of an independent responsible 
 third person.^ So, he who administers poison negligently to an- 
 other, causing death, is guilty of manslaughter; and it is sufficient 
 to establish negligence in this respect that he ought to have knovm 
 the pernicious character of the drug he administered. Cui facile est 
 scire, ei detrimento esse debet ignorantia siui.^ This principle has 
 been frequently recognized in our criminal jurisprudence.* Thus, 
 it is manslaughter in a nurse to produce the death of a child by 
 
 Instate V. Hardie, 47 Iowa, 647, 29 When a man lays poison to kill rats, 
 
 Am. Rep. 496. See also State v. Haines, and another man takes it, and it kills 
 
 160 Mo. 655, 61 S. W. 621. him, if the poison was laid in such a 
 
 Where a man loads a pistol without manner and place as to be mistaken for 
 
 putting in a ball, and tells a woman food, it is, perhaps, manslaughter; if 
 
 that if she does not kiss him he will otherwise, misadventure only. 1 Hale, 
 
 shoot her, and a friendly struggle en- P. C. 431; Gore's Case, 9 Coke, 81a. 
 
 sues in which the pistol goes off and But a mistake upon the part of a 
 
 she is killed, the killing does not con- chemist in putting a poisonous lina- 
 
 stitute voluntary manslaughter. Nel- ment in a medicine bottle instead of in 
 
 son V. State, 6 Baxt. 418. a linament bottle, in consequence of 
 
 16 Smith V. Com. 93 Ky. 318, 20 S. which the linament was taken internal- 
 
 W. 229. ly by his customer, who was killed, doei 
 
 Where one person kills another by the not amount to such criminal negligence 
 
 accidental discharge of a firearm, while as to warrant his conviction for man- 
 
 the two were exchanging firearms, and slaughter, where he was put out of his 
 
 while engaged in shooting for amuse- ordinary course of conduct by the cus- 
 
 ment, the fact that the slayer was a, tomer sending bottles of his own. Reg. 
 
 guard and the deceased his prisoner v. Noakes, 4 Fost. & F 920. 
 
 does not affect the guard's criminality. 2See infra, §§ 481, 482. 
 
 Ibid. 3See Wharton, Neg. §§ 91, 440, 441, 
 
 iTBrittain v. State, 36 Tex. Crim. 853. 
 
 Rep. 406, 37 S. W. 758. iTessymond's Case, 1 Lewin, C. 0. 
 
 11 Hale, P. C. 431; Reg. v. Cham- 109. 
 berlain, 10 Cox, C. C. 486; State v. Lind- 
 sey, 19 Nev. 47, 3 Am. St. Rep. 776, 5 
 Pac. 822. 
 
700 HOMICIDE. [§ 461 
 
 negligently administering to it laudanum with the intention of quiet- 
 ing it;^ and for an apothecary negligently to label "laudanum" as 
 "paregoric," thereby causing death." But if the mistake be made 
 under such circumstances as would perplex an ordinarily prudent 
 man, there should be, it seems, an acquittal. '^ The same principle 
 applies to the negligent administration of an overdose of intoxicating 
 liquor.® And causing the death of a child by giving it spirituous 
 liquors in a quantity quite unfit for its tender age amounts, in point 
 of law, to manslaughter. ® 
 
 462. loosing dangerous animals. — He who lets loose a dangerous 
 animal is responsible for death caused by such animal, provided he 
 either knew of the animal's dangerous tendencies, or was in such a 
 position that he should have known thereof. ^ If the mischief was un- 
 designed by the defendant, the offense is manslaughter ; if designed, 
 murder. ^ 
 
 b. In doing acts calculated to injure. 
 
 1. General rules ; miscellaneous matters. 
 
 463. Application generally, and to particular acts — ^We have seen 
 that it is the duty of one who does an act which may be dangerous to 
 human life to take proper precautions to prevent danger from arising 
 therefrom, and that if one does an act from which danger to others 
 may arise, without taking such precautions, and death results, it is 
 negligent homicide in some degree.^ Illustrations of the application 
 of these rules to particular classes of cases are to be found in the 
 following sections of this work. And they also apply to make it 
 manslaughter negligently to drop articles on a thoroughfare, by which 
 a person passing is struck and killed.^ If this is done in the ordi- 
 
 5Ann V. State, 11 Humph. 159. person was killed, where it is not al- 
 
 And the nurse of an infant knowing leged that anyone asked him to com- 
 that laudanum is poison and likely to pound the prescription, and it does not 
 kill, who gives the infant enough of it appear what were the ingredients there- 
 to kill it, and it dies therefrom, is of, or by whom the prescription was 
 guilty of murder in the absence of any- made. State v. Smith, 66 Mo. 92. 
 thing to qualify the presumption of law 'Reg. v. Noakes, 4 Fost. & F. 920. 
 that everyone intends the natural and *Reg. v. Packard, Car. & M. 236; Reg. 
 ordinary consequences of his acts. v. Martin, 3 Car. & P. 211. 
 State V. Leak, 61 N. C. (Phill. L.) 450. oReg. v. Martin, supra. 
 
 eTessymond's Case, supra. iReg. v. Dant, Leigh & C. C. C. 567, 
 
 But a druggist cannot be held liable 10 Cox, C. C. 102. 
 
 for manslaughter in the fourth degree 2Wharton, Neg. § 904. 
 
 under the Missouri statute for care- iSee supra, § 446. 
 
 lessly and negligently filling a prescrip- 2Rigmaidon's Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 
 
 tion with a deadly poison, whereby a 180; Hull's Case, J. Kelyng, 40. 
 
§ 463) NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. 701 
 
 nary course of business, without looking or giving warning, when 
 there is even a small probability of persons passing by, and a person 
 imderneath happens to be killed, it is manslaughter.* And it has, 
 indeed, been said that if this be done in the streets of a populous 
 town, it will be manslaughter, notwithstanding such caution used.* 
 But this must be understood with some limitation. If it be done 
 early in the morning, when few or no people are stirring, and the 
 ordinary caution be used, the party may be excusable ; but when the 
 streets are full, such ordinary caution will not suffice, for, in the 
 hurry and noise of a crowded street, few people hear the warning, or 
 sufficiently attend to it.° 
 
 So, if a person breaking an unruly horse ride him among a crowd 
 of people, and death ensue from the viciousness of the animal, and 
 this appears to have been done heedlessly and incautiously only, and 
 not with an intent to do mischief, the crime will be manslaughter ; ® 
 though it would be murder, if the rider intended to divert himself 
 with the fright of the crowd, ^ or to have seriously injured anyone 
 whom he might strike.® And one who, by culpably negligent acts 
 and omissions in the selection and use of materials for the construc- 
 tion of a building, occasions the death of another by the falling of a 
 wall upon him, is guilty of manslaughter." So, one throwing stones 
 into a mine and breaking the scaffolding therein, in consequence of 
 which the car in which a person was descending into the mine struck 
 a beam and threw him out and killed him, is guilty of manslaughter, 
 where he should have anticipated the knocking away of the scaffold- 
 ing, and that the car would probably strike against it and overturn, 
 though the act was one of mere wantonness and sport. * ** And a lad 
 who removes the trapstick from a cart, in consequence of which it is 
 upset and the cartman is killed, is guilty of manslaughter though he 
 acted in frolic, without intention to do harm. ^ ^ 
 
 2. In the use of means of travel or transportation. 
 
 464. Highways and streets — ^It is the duty of every man who drives 
 horses attached to vehicles to do so with such care and caution as to 
 prevent, so far as within his power, any accident or injury there- 
 si East, P. C. 262; Fost. C. L. 262. 81 Hale, P. C. 475; Fost. C. L. 263; 
 ^Hull's Case, supra. Lee v. State, 1 Coldw. 62. 
 5Fost. C. L. 263. And see Wharton, sPeople v. Buddensieck, 103 N. Y. 487. 
 Neg. § 839. 57 Am. Rep. 766, 9 N. E. 44. 
 
 61 East, P. C. 231. lOFenton's Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 179. 
 
 71 Hawk. P. C. chap. 31, § 68. uRex v. Sullivan, 7 Car. & P. 641. 
 
702 HOMICIDE. [§ 464 
 
 from, neglect to perform which -will render him criminally respon- 
 sible for a resulting injury/ And the necessity for the exercise of 
 reasonable care upon the part of a driver exists both with reference 
 to the safety of passengers and to persons whom he may meet in the 
 road. ^ And the rule of criminal responsibility applies alike to death 
 caused by collision in a highway,* and to death caused by running 
 over the victim. * And where the defense in a prosecution for killing 
 a person by driving over her in a public highway is that the driver 
 used due and proper care, the burden of proof of negligence does not 
 lie with the Crown, but, the fact of the killing being proved, the onus 
 rests with the prisoner to show that he used proper care-® 
 
 Nor is racing in a public road lawful, and if, in doing so, a pas- 
 senger or traveler in the highway is killed, the offense is man- 
 slaughter.® And where two persons drive together at a dangerous 
 pace and one of them runs over and kills a person, both are guilty 
 of manslaughter. '' Likewise a driver who runs over and kills a per- 
 son by reason of being in a place where he could not see obstructions 
 is guilty of negligence, and responsible as for negligent homicide.* 
 And this rule is particularly applicable where he was nearsighted;* 
 and also where he might have seen the danger, but did not look before 
 him.*" And where the streets are unusually crowded the driver 
 
 iRex V. Walker, I Car. & P. 320. driving or from any other cause the 
 
 And where a person driving horses other could not get out of the way in 
 
 drawing a carriage in which another is time, the driver is guilty of manslaugh- 
 
 rjding drives them at a rapid and dan- ter, though he called to the other to get 
 
 gerous rate of speed, and the person out of the way, and the other might 
 
 riding in the carriage falls or is thrown have done so if he had not been dnmk. 
 
 out and killed, it is immaterial in a Rex v. Walker, 1 Car. & P. 320. 
 
 prosecution for homicide whether his sQueen v. Cavendish, Ir. Rep. 8 C. L. 
 
 being thrown out was without volition 178. 
 
 on his part and simply on account of sRex v. Timmins, 7 Car. & P. 499; 
 
 the speed of driving, or whether, in an Thompson v. State, 131 Ala. 18, 31 So. 
 
 attempt to get out of the vehicle, he was 725. 
 
 violently thrown therefrom. Morris v. 'Reg. v. Swindall, 2 Car. & K. 230, 2 
 
 State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 313, 33 S. W. Cox, C. C. 141. And see Reg. v. Mastin, 
 
 539. 6 Car. & P. 396. 
 
 zReg. V. Jones, 11 Cox, C. C. 544, 22 But where two coaches, totally inde- 
 
 L. T. N. S. 217. pendent of each other, are proceeding 
 
 sBelk V. People, 125 111. 584, 17 N. in the ordinary way along a road, one 
 
 E. 744. after the other, and the driver of the 
 
 <Rex V. Walker, supra. first is guilty of negligence causing the 
 
 And the criminal responsibility of a death of a person, the driver of the sec- 
 person who drives over another in a ond is not responsible, though his action 
 public highway is not altered or af- contributed to some extent to the death, 
 fected by the fact that he was drunk, where he had not the same means of 
 People V. Pearne, 118 Cal. 154, 50 Pac. pulling up. Reg. v. Swindall, supra. 
 370. sKnight's Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 168. 
 
 So, if a person while driving a cart 9Rex v. Grout, 6 Car. & P. fi29. 
 
 at an unusually rapid pace drives over lOFost. C. L. 263. 
 another, and from the rapidity of the 
 
§ 464] ' NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. 703 
 
 of a conveyance is required to be particularly cautious, and is crimi- 
 nally answerable for any accident resulting in death caused by driving 
 at a rate of speed not warranted by the surroundings, or without the 
 precautions rendered necessary thereby. ^^ Where an accident 
 happens through some chance which a driver using reasonable care 
 and diligence cannot see and avoid, however, he cannot be held 
 criminally liable for a death resulting therefrom. ^ ^ The degree of 
 care and caution required to avoid danger by a person using a public 
 highway, so as to avoid liability for negligent homicide in killing a 
 person therein, is that which a man of ordinary prudence would have 
 used under like circumstances.^^ 
 
 465. Care is to be proportioned to danger — To drive rapidly on an 
 open country highway, where the danger of collision is slight, is not 
 negligence. On the other hand, rapid driving in a thronged street 
 invokes a peculiar degree of caution, ^ and a fortiori proof of driving 
 in a public street in a city, at a rate beyond that allowed by law, is 
 suiEcient to charge the driver with the consequences that follow from 
 Buch driving.* So also it is the duty of persons who are driving 
 over a crossing for foot-passengers to drive slowly, cautiously, and 
 carefully.^ Driving at the rate of 15 miles an hour, or a mile in 
 four minutes, on a thronged highway, is wilful rashness, per se; and 
 if death ensued from a collision thus produced, without fault of the 
 injured party, the offense, it seems, would be murder in the second 
 degree, unless accompanied with such circumstances of passion as to 
 reduce the offense to manslaughter.* 
 
 liReg. V. Murray, 5 Cox, C. C. 509. because of the killing of a child which 
 
 Where an intoxicated person drives ran across the road before the cart and 
 
 his horses in a reckless manner and at was run over, unless he could have 
 
 an unusual speed over a woman at- saved the life of the child if he had 
 
 tempting to cross the street, fatally in- been driving with reins. Queen v. 
 
 juring her, it is manslaughter by killing Dalloway, 2 Cox, C. C. 273. 
 
 a human being in the commission of an isMorris v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 unlawful act, or in the commission of 313, 33 S. W. 539; Reg. v. Murray, 
 
 a lawful act in an unlawful manner, or supra; Reg v. Grout, 6 Car. & P. 629. 
 
 without due caution and circumspec- iReg. v. Swindall, 2 Car. & K. 230, 2 
 
 tion; but in such case the charge should Cox, C. C. 141; Williams v. Richards, 3 
 
 rest on the commission of an act done Car. & K. 81 ; Garmon v. Bangor, 38 Me. 
 
 without due caution and circumspection, 443 ; .letter v. New York & H. R. Co. 2 
 
 and not upon the commission of an un- Keyes, 154. 
 
 lawful act, in driving at a greater rate 2Moody v. Osgood, 60 Barb. 644. 
 
 of speed than that allowed by an ordi- sReg. v. Grout, supra; Williams v. 
 
 nance of the county. People v. Peame, Richards, 3 Car. & K. 82; Cotton v. 
 
 118 Cal. 154, 50 Pac. 376. Wood, 8 0. B. ;?. S. 571; Garmon v. 
 
 i2Eeg. V. Murray, supra. Bangor, supra. 
 
 A person who drove in a cart in a ^Kennedy v. Way, Brightly (Pa.) 
 
 public highway, without reins, but not 186. 
 rapidly, is not guilty of manslaughter 
 
704 HOMICIDE. [I 466 
 
 466. Railways, locomotives, etc. — Those conducting or driving a 
 locomotive engine are bound to show in their calling the diligence 
 that good and prudent officers in such departments are accustomed 
 to exercise. If, from lack of such diligence, death ensues either to 
 a passenger in the train or a traveler on the road, the officer guilty 
 of the neglect is liable for manslaughter. ^ And the act of a switch- 
 tender in neglecting his duty to adjust, and keep adjusted, certain 
 switches of a railroad, whereby a train was derailed and persons 
 killed, amounts to gross, culpable, and criminal negligence rendering 
 him guilty of manslaughter.^ Nor is it necessary in this class of 
 cases to make out that the negligent act was wilful.* And the act 
 of criminal negligence is not excused because it arose from obedience 
 to the instructions of an official superior.* A person in charge of a 
 railroad train or cars, however, cannot be held guilty of manslaughter 
 where he exercised due care and caution, since his act in running or 
 managing the cars is not an unlawful one. ® And to hold a person thus 
 causing the death of another for manslaughter, he must have been 
 guilty of gross negligence, or recklessly negligent conduct.^ And a 
 mere mistake in judgment, or a mere miscalculation, without wilful 
 disobedience as to traffic regulations, though death results, is no 
 crime ;''^ though the act would be criminal if the accused, by wilful 
 confidence in his own opinion, which was contrary to all reason and 
 experience, acted so as to cause the accident. * So, a person in charge 
 of a locomotive, who does an act which causes death, would seem to 
 be innocent of manslaughter where the act was done accidentally and 
 
 iSee topic discussed at large in the negligence charged; and in the 
 
 Wharton, Negligence, §§ 645, 798. And absence of evidence supporting such 
 
 see Com. v. Kuhn, 1 Pittsb. 13. allegation a conviction cannot be main- 
 
 zPtflte V. O'Brien, 32 N. J. L. 169. tained. Com. v. Hartwell, 128 Mass. 
 
 sibid. 415, 35 Am. Eep. 391. 
 
 But where, in a prosecution for man- 4 People v. Melius, 1 N. Y. Grim. Eep. 
 
 slaughter, a railroad conductor is 39. 
 
 charged with negligence and omission 5Com. v. Kuhn, supia. 
 
 of duty, whereby another train was 6Reg. v. Elliott, 16 Cox, C. C. 710. 
 
 thrown from the track and a passenger 'Ibid, 
 
 thereon was killed, and that, knowing sibid. 
 
 the rules of the railroad and his duty in A clear and positive rule forbidding 
 
 that regard and what signals should be the dividing of a train upon an incline 
 
 given, and knowing that a particular would be a strong element on the ques- 
 
 train was then due and about to arrive, tion of negligence in a prosecution 
 
 he neglected to give the required signal, against a conductor of a special ex- 
 
 a special averment of knowledge that cursion train for so dividing it, where- 
 
 the other train was due, and of the by a part of it ran down the incline 
 
 rules, and of his duty, is made an es- and collided with the other part, caus- 
 
 sential and material portion of the de- ing death, and would justify a verdict 
 
 scription of his acts going to constitute of guilty. Ibid. 
 
S 466] NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. 705 
 
 he did not know the probable result of it, though the rule would be 
 different if it was intentional and he knew its effect.® 
 
 Carelessly and negligently running locomotives or cars, so as to 
 effect death, is also involuntary manslaughter under statutes defin- 
 ing involuntary manslaughter to be the killing of a human being in- 
 voluntarily, but in the commission of some unlawful act.*" And a 
 statutory provision making it a misdemeanor for any person in the 
 service of any transportation company to refuse or neglect to obey 
 any rule or regulation of such company, or to wilfully or negligently 
 fail to observe any precaution which it is his duty to observe, and 
 injury or death results, defines two classes of offenses : First, a neg- 
 lect or refusal to observe a rule or regulation of the company; and 
 second, a failure, by reason of negligence or misconduct, to observe 
 any precaution or rule which it is his duty to observe ; and in either 
 case the negligence, whether wilful or not, constitutes the offense, and 
 the omission to observe the rule or regulation is negligence whether 
 intentional or not.** And the employees of such a company are 
 punishable by indictment for such an act. * * When a collision occurs 
 on a railroad, and death is caused, the person responsible, by the 
 English rule, is the man actually in charge of the engine, and whose 
 negligence caused the accident at the time of the collision ; * * and he 
 is responsible if he leave the engine in charge of an incompetent 
 person. ' * 
 
 467. Vessels and navigation generally — Persons navigating public 
 waters improperly, either by excessive speed or by other negligent 
 conduct, are as liable criminally, if death ensues therefrom, as those 
 who cause it on a public highway on land by furious driving or other 
 negligent conduct* Under this rule a captain or person in charge 
 
 sWhite v. State, 84 Ala. 421, 4 So. did their best to stop, without avail. 
 
 693. Ee^. V. Trainer, 4 Fost. & F. 105. 
 
 An engine driver and fireman of a lostate v. Dorsey, 118 Ind. 167, 10 
 
 railway train are not liable for man- Am. St. Rep. Ill, 20 N. E. 777. 
 
 slaughter in killing several persons nCom. v. Cook, 8 Pa. Co. Ct. 486. 
 
 traveling in a preceding train, throuerh is Com. v. Hamilton, 26 Phila. Leg. 
 
 the running of their train into the pre- Int. 68. 
 
 ceding one, vifhere it appears that special isReg. v. Birchall, 4 Fost. & F. 1087. 
 
 instructions had been issued to thens, When there is malice, it is murder. See 
 
 which in some respects differed from the Golliher v. Com. 2 Duv. 163, 87 Am. 
 
 general rules and regulations, and ma- Dec. 493. 
 
 terially altered the signal for danger KR^g. v. Lowe, 4 Cox, C. C. 449. 
 
 calculated to stop trains, and the trains iReg. v. Taylor, 9 Car. & P. 672. And 
 
 were started by superior officers at ir- see United States v. Taylor, 5 McLean, 
 
 regular intervals, if they honestly 242. Fed. Cas. No. 16,441 ; Queen v. 
 
 believed they were observing the rules Williamson, 1 Cox, C. C. 97. 
 
 and the rules were not obviously irregu- And a warrant charging persons hav- 
 
 lar; and when they saw the danger they ing charge of a boat with creating an 
 Horn. — 45. 
 
706 HOMICIDE. [§ 467 
 
 of a vessel v;ho permits tlie declc to be left in an unguarded condition, 
 ■whereby a passenger falls into the water and is drowned, is guilty 
 of manslaughter.^ And where a person falls overboard, whether a 
 passenger or a seaman, the omission of the captain or other person in 
 charge to stop the vessel, lower boats, throw out buoys and other 
 articles which can be readily obtained, is criminal, and if followed by 
 the death of the person overboard constitutes manslaughter. ^ Though 
 the mere failure to stop or to lower boats, or to make any attempt to 
 rescue a sailor who had fallen overboard, would not warrant a con- 
 viction for any greater offense than manslaughter.* So, a pilot hav- 
 ing direction of a vessel, who runs down a boat and causes loss of 
 life, is guilty of manslaughter, where the accident was the result of 
 his negligent failure to make foreign sailors understand his orders.^ 
 And the omission of a captain to give orders for the raising of the 
 safety valve of the engine when his boat stops, in compliance with a 
 statutory requirement, though not declared to be of itself a crime, is 
 competent evidence of misconduct or negligence on his part, made 
 criminal by statute where death results from the failure to raise 
 the valve.® 
 
 To render the commander of a ship criminally liable for a death, 
 however, it must appear that the death resulted from his negligent 
 act, and where a person falls overboard, the commander is not 
 criminally liable because of his failure to do anything to assist him, 
 where it appears that death resulted from the fall, and not from 
 drowning. '^ ISTor will a person in charge of a vessel, who causes a 
 death indirectly, be held criminally liable if it occurred from events 
 or circumstances over which he had no control ; or if he exercised all 
 
 undue and unsafe quantity of steam for bodily harm. People ox rel. Me]\Iahon 
 
 the purnose of outrunning another boat, v. Sheriff, 1 Park. Crim. Rep. 659. 
 and failing to use ordinary prudence in zUnited States v. Beaeham, 29 Fed. 
 
 its management, in consequence where- 2S4. 
 
 of the boat took fire and death ensued, ^\nd an allegation in an indictment 
 
 sufficiently charges manslaughter, dp- against the captain of a vessel charging 
 
 fined to be the killing without design to I'omicide due to the dangerous and un- 
 
 effect death by the act, procurement, gufirded condition of the deck of his ves- 
 
 or culpable negligence of another, while ?"'■ °"'i"^ .^ the absence of a rail, leav- 
 
 such other is engaged in the perpetra- ^"S a portion of the deck unguarded, ia 
 
 tion of any crime or misdemeanor not ""? subject to objection aa not suf- 
 
 amounting to a felony; but it is insuf- ^7'?;;"-\'';°^'''"" "^'^l/^Tv." t'":,'^"*-^ 
 
 ficient as a charge of murder by the ?/^ f'laee ^ibid ''" '""* 
 
 killing of a human being without an- 5T;'„;+a,i «+.,+„ t- i . n 
 
 J.1 ■." t , J- r 1 1 L 'H nited btate^ v. Knowlcs, 4 Sawv. 
 
 thority of law, perpetrated by an act gjy y^^^^ q,^^ ^,,^ Ifi 540 
 
 imminently dangerous to others, evinc- 4lbid. 
 
 ing a depraved mind regardless of hu- cQueen v. Spojice 1 Cox C C 35" 
 
 man life, although without a premed- oUnite:! Stfites' v. Parnh'ain " 3 
 
 itated desifrn to effort doith. there bei^g Blatchf. 528. Fed. Cas.No. 15,071. ' '" 
 
 no allegation of an intention to do 7UniteJ States v. Knowles,' supra. 
 
§ 407] NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. 707. 
 
 the care in the nianage^mciit of his craft that skill, reason, and pru- 
 dence would seem to dictate, ^^'llile proceeding in a lawful, prudent, 
 and careful manner,^ though in such case his conduct and the circum- 
 stances should be rigidly scrutinized." Within this rule a captain 
 who stations a man to keep a lookout is not criminally responsible for 
 an accident resulting in death, due to the fact that the lookout de- 
 serted his post; though the rule would be different if the captain 
 had called him away. ' " And the mere fact that a vessel ran down 
 a boat and drowned an occupant is not sufficient to charge the cap- 
 tain of the vessel with manslaughter, though it would be if there was 
 sufficient light, and the captain was either at the helm, or at a station 
 of command, and did that which caused the injury.^* Nor is the 
 fact that valves, etc., of a steamer were out of order sufficient to es- 
 tablish guilt in a prosecution against the master and engineer thereof, 
 for manslaughter for the death of persons caused by an explosion of 
 the boiler. ^ ^ And where the steward of a ship is charged with the 
 manslaughter of several persons who perished in a fire which took 
 place on board, it must appear that the act done was dangerous, hav- 
 ing regard to the place or the contents of the place in which it was 
 done, for, if not, it would not be an act tending to the immediate 
 loss, destruction, or serious damage of the ship within the meaning 
 of a statute making such an act a misdemeanor. ^ ^ 
 
 468. Vessels, etc., under Federal statutes A Federal statute pro- 
 vides that persons employed on any steamboat or vessel, by whose 
 negligence the life of any person is destroyed, shall be deemed guilty 
 of manslaughter. ^ JSTegligence within the meaning of this statute is 
 
 sCom.-v. Bilderback, 2 Pars. Sel. Eq. A vessel not propelled in whole or in 
 
 Gas. 447; Rex v. Waters, Car. & P. part by steam does not come within the 
 
 328. terms of the act of Congress of July 
 
 Officers of a steamboat charged with 7, 1838 (5 Stat, at L. 303, chap. 191, § 
 
 neglect of duty whereby their boat came 121, but that act was amended by the 
 
 , into collision with a schooner should not act of February 28, 1871 (U. S. Rev. 
 
 be convicted of manslaughter because Stat. § 5344, U. S. Corap. Stat. 1901, p. 
 
 their boat was sunk and lives were de- 3629), by extending the terms of the 
 
 stroyed, where it appears that the acci- provision to include not only vessels 
 
 dent was the result of misconduct or propelled in whole or in part by steam, 
 
 unskilfulnesg on the part of the nersons but any steamboat on the navigable 
 
 in charge of the schooner. United States waters of the United States; and under 
 
 V. Warner, 4 McLean, 483, Fed. Cas. No. U. S. Rev. Stat. § 3 (U. S. Comn. Stat. 
 
 16,643. 1001, p. 4), defining the word "vessel" 
 
 9Com. v. Bilderback, supra. to include every description of water 
 
 lORex v. Allen, 7 Car. & P. 153. craft or other artificial conveyance used, 
 
 iiRex V. Green, 7 Car. & P. 156. or capable of being used, as "a means of 
 
 i2Reg. V. Gregory, 2 Fost. & F. 153. transportation on water, sailing yachts 
 
 isRecf. V. Gardner, 1 Fost. & F. 6B9. would be included. United States v 
 
 lU. S. Rev. Stat. § 5344 (U. S. Comp. Holmes, 104 Fed. 884. 
 
 Stat. 1901, p. 3629). 
 
708 HOMICIDE. [5 («88 
 
 the violation of some rule which is made to govern and control in 
 the discharge of some duty.^ It is the omission or commission of any 
 act, the omission or commission of which might naturally lead to 
 such consequences.^ And it is immaterial under that provision 
 whether the misconduct was slight or gross, where the destruction of 
 life was the necessary or probable result of it.* Nor is it necessary 
 that the accused entertained a criminal intent, or was guilty of wil- 
 ful or intentional misconduct, negligence, or inattention to duty ; it 
 is sufficient if he was guilty of a violation of the statute.® And every- 
 one who assumes to perform the duties of pilot, captain, or other 
 officer on board a vessel is made responsible thereby for any act done 
 through ignorance or negligence, without reference to his fitness for 
 such duty." Within these rules the captain of a steamboat which 
 collides with another craft, who omits to run her ashore upon dis- 
 covering that she will shortly sink, is criminally responsible if death 
 results.^ And the officers of a steamboat may be held liable for man- 
 slaughter where death resulted from improperly regulating the fires 
 and raising too much steam.* So, the omission to raise the safety 
 valve while at dock, or perform some other act under express statutory 
 requirement, is an act of misconduct or negligence on the part of the 
 person required to raise it, within the meaning of the act.® And a 
 charge of failure to keep a suitable number of watchmen on each 
 deck to give alarm in case of accident, as required by statute, by 
 reason of which a passenger who fell overboard was drowned, no par- 
 ticular measures for rescue being taken, sufficiently charges the cap- 
 tain with manslaughter.^** 
 
 ^United States v. Keller, 19 Fed. 633. the act, that one should be employed 
 
 'United States v. Famham, 2 under pay to perform any particular 
 
 Blatchf. 528, Fed. Cas. No. 15,071; duty. United States v. CoUyer, Fed. 
 
 United States v. Collyer, Fed. Cas. No. Cas. No. 14,838. 
 
 14,838. And officers of a vessel occupying dif- 
 
 4Ibid. ferent stations of employment, as the 
 
 sUnited States v. Keller, and United captain, engineer, pilot, etc., may be 
 
 States V. Holmes, supra; The Henry joined in a prosecution under this act 
 
 Clay, Fed. Ca3. No. 6,375 ; United States without showing that their acts were 
 
 V. Farnham, and United States v. Coll- jointly destructive of the lives of the 
 
 yer, supra; Re Charge, Newberry, Adm. persons on board, or that they joined 
 
 323, Fed. Cas. No. 18,253 ; United States in their commission. Ibid. 
 
 V. Warner, 4 McLean^ 463, Fed. Cas. No. A part owner, assuming the duty of 
 
 16,643. BTi officer, is responsible under the act. 
 
 cUnited States v. Taylor, 5 McLean, Ibid. 
 
 242, Fed. Cas. No. 16,441. 'United States v. Warner, supra. 
 
 The statute -.ippliea to anyone actually sThe Henry Clay, Fed. Cas. No. 6,375. 
 
 engaged in performing the duties of an sUnited States v. Farnham, 2 Blatchf. 
 
 officer or employee on board a vessel, and 528, Fed. Cas. No. 15;071. 
 
 it is not necessary, in order to be "em- lOUnited States v. Beaoham, 29 Fed. 
 
 ployed on board" within the meaning of 284. 
 
I 468j NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. 709 
 
 The destruction of life, however, is the essence of the offense de- 
 fined by that act, and it is not sufficient that the officer has been guilty 
 of misconduct or negligence; human life must have been destroyed, 
 and the offender is guilty, not -when the misconduct or negligence 
 occurs, but when it bears fruit by causing the death of a human 
 being; so that, where the negligence occurs in one jurisdiction and the 
 death in another, the court of the former jurisdiction cannot try the 
 offender. * ^ And there must be a causal connection between the neg- 
 ligence and the injury, and the former must appear to be the proxi- 
 mate cause of the latter. ^ ^ The loss of life must be connected with 
 the negligent or wrongful act as a necessary or probable result of 
 it.^^ Nor is an officer of a vessel responsible for anyone's conduct 
 but his own, and if the death in question was the result of the mis- 
 conduct, negligence, or inattention to duty of others, and he in no 
 wise contributed to it, no blame can attach to him.** And while a 
 captain is charged with responsibility for the right performance of 
 all duties which pertain to the command and management of the pro- 
 pelling power of the vessel, including those of the engineer and other 
 officers in their special departments, and is criminally responsible for 
 any negligence in those departments, if he procures competent per- 
 sons for the performance of such duties, and gives them injunctions 
 to perform them, the law will not impute a killing through their neg- 
 ligent acts to him, if they, without his knowledge, neglected the duties 
 assigned to them. * ® So, casus ^ or inevitable accident, is, of course, a 
 good defense. ' ® 
 
 Manslaughter committed within the territorial limits of a state, 
 however, by the misconduct or negligence of a pilot or officer of a 
 steamship in charge of a vessel, by the negligent management thereof, 
 is punishable under both Federal and state laws, and the fact that it 
 is made an offense against the United States by the Federal statute 
 
 »iEe Doig, 4 Fed. 193. tion of law the life of any person is de- 
 
 isUnited Sta^tes v. Collyer, Fed. Cas. stroyed, guilty of manslaughter, for the 
 
 No. 14,838. And see also United States killing of a person alleged to be due to 
 
 T. Warner, 4 McLean, 463, Fed. Cas. No. takingf more passengers on board than 
 
 10,643; United States v. Taylor, 5 Mc- permitted by the certificate of inspec- 
 
 Lean, 242, Fed. Cas. No. 16,441; Eex v. tion, the "other public officer" referred 
 
 Green, 7 Car. & P. 156. to being one who has something to do 
 
 laUnited States v. Warner, and with regulating or limiting the number 
 
 United States v. Collyer, supra. of passengers to be taken on board, over 
 
 i4United States v. Kellerj 19 Fed. which the pilot has no authority. 
 
 663; United States v. Collyer, supra. United States v. Holtzhauer, 40 Fed. 76. 
 
 A pilot cannot be convicted under a isUnited States v. Farnham, 2 
 
 statute making every owner, inspector, Blatchf. 528, Fed. Cas. No. 15,071. 
 
 or other public officer, through whoso isUnited States v. Warner, 4 Mc- 
 
 fraud, connivance, misconduct, or viola- Lean, 463, Fed. Cas. No. 16,643. 
 
.710 HOMICIDE. [§ 4GS 
 
 does not prevent its punishment; under the laws of the state. *^ And 
 an indictment under this act need not allege particular acts of mis- 
 conduct and negligence, and it need not be charged that they were 
 committed feloniously; it is sufficient if it charges substantially in 
 the language of the statute the misconduct, negligence, and inatten- 
 tion to duty;^^ though the pleader should describe the fact's upon 
 which the government relies to prove misconduct, negligence, or 
 inattention to duty upon the part of the accused. ^ ® 
 
 3. In practising medicine, surgery, etc. 
 
 469. Differing rules as to. — The rule is universal that criminal 
 negligence upon which criminal responsibility for homicide may be 
 based may consist in the negligent use of medicines, in the use of 
 which care is required, and of the properties of which the person 
 using them is ignorant.' The rule with reference to the amount of 
 skill which a medical practitioner must bring to his work in order to 
 relieve himself from criminal responsibility for unfavorable results, 
 however, is radically different in the United States from that existing 
 in England, and the two rules, therefore, will be separately considered. 
 
 470. The English doctrine — The rule in England is that any per- 
 son, licensed or unlicensed as a medical practitioner, who deals with 
 the life or healtli of others, is bound to use competent skill and suffi- 
 cient attention, and if the patient dies from want of either, the prac- 
 titioner is guilty of manslaughter.' And the rule applies to gross 
 negligence in attending a patient after the application of a remedy, 
 as well as to its application. ^ So, it applies whether or not the prac- 
 titioner had received a medical education, and a person not having a 
 
 i7People V. Welch, 141 N. Y. 268, 21 and certain to inform tlie defendant of 
 
 L.K.A. 117, 38 Am. St. Eep. 79.3, 36 N. the nature of the accusation against 
 
 fi. 328, Affirming 74 Hun, 474, 26 N. Y. him. Ibid. 
 Supp. 694. iReg. v. JTarkuss, 4 Fost. & F. 356. 
 
 isUnited States v. Collyer, Fed. Cas. iRex v. Spiller, 5 Car. & P. 333; Rex 
 
 No. 14,838. V. Senior, 1 Jtoody, C. C. 346; Rex v. 
 
 isUnited States v. Holtzhauer, 40 Williamson, 3 Car. & P. 635; Rex v. 
 
 Fed. 76. Wpbb, 1 INfoody & R. 405; Rex v. Long, 
 
 An indictment for manslaughter 4 €ar. & P. 398; Reg. v. Whitehead. 3 
 
 under this provision charging the mas- Car. & K. 202. See Reg. v. Chamber- 
 
 ter of a v<!ssel with a Aiolation of a pub- lain, 10 Cox, C. C. 486; Reg. v. Markuss, 
 
 lie law forbidding the taking on board sii/ua; Reg. v. Macleod, 12 Cox, C. .0. 
 
 any steamer a greiitcr nvimber of pna- ,534. 
 
 sengers than is died in the pcitificate It is not n crime to administer medi- 
 
 of inspection, and alleging that deceased cine, but it is one to administer it so 
 
 came to her death by defendint's disre- carelessly and rashly as to produce 
 
 gard of that law, though perhaps not death. Reg. a-. Crick, 1 Fost. & F. 519. 
 technically accurate, is sufficiently clear zRex v. Long, 4 Car. & P. 423, 
 
J 4701 NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. 711 
 
 medical education has no right to administer medicine of. a dangerous 
 tendency when medical assistance can be had ; and if he does so, and 
 such medicine destroys the life of the patient, he is guilty of man- 
 slaughter, though he meant to produce beneficial results, and did not 
 intend to cause death. ^ And where a physician administers a poison 
 without knowing or taking pains to find out what its effect will be, 
 or without adequate and proper directions as to its use, he is guilty 
 of culpable negligence and liable for manslaughter if death results.* 
 So, one who iises dangerous applications is bound to exercise skill 
 in their use, and the application by an ignorant person of an injurious 
 substance, which causes death, is- evidence on the question as to 
 whether, under all the circumstances, he acted with criminal inat- 
 tention and carelessness." And in such case evidence of the effect 
 of the substance when applied to other patients is competent." lior 
 is a medical practitioner justified in making use of instruments in 
 themselves dangerous, vmless he does so with a proper degree of skill 
 and caution ; and where he does so, and causes death by want of such 
 skill and caution, be is guilty of manslaughter;'' the questions for 
 the jury in such case being whether the deceased died from the ef- 
 fect of the use of the instruments, and whether the treatment pur*- 
 sued was marked by negligence, unskilfulness, or ignorance.® And 
 it is immaterial whether the physician deals with the patient for a 
 recompense or gratuitously from friendship." A person exercising 
 a competent degree of skill and knowledge, as a physician, however, 
 is not criminally responsible for an accidental mistake in his treat- 
 ment of a patient, from which death ensues.^** And the mere fact 
 
 3Thid. : Simpson's Case. 1 Lewin, C. And an allegation in an indictment 
 
 C. 175; Reg. v. Markuss, supra; Rpx v. for homicide against a medical prae- 
 
 Webb, 1 Moody & R. 405, 2 Lewin, 0. C. titioner, charging that the death was 
 
 196; Reg. v. Maeleod, supra; Reg. v. caused by a plaster made and applied 
 
 Bull, 2 Fost. & F. 201. by the accused, is sufficiently cstab- 
 
 There is a marked distinction be- lished by showing that three plasters 
 
 tween the case of a person acting as a were applied, two of them by the ac- 
 
 medical practitioner, though feloniously cused, and that the third was made from 
 
 and in ,a negligent and careless manner, materials furnished by him. Rex v. 
 
 or without full knowledge of the sub- Spiller. 5 Car. & P. 333. 
 
 ject in hand, and one in which a person ^Qneen v. Spilling, 2 Moody & R. 107. 
 
 assuming to act as a medical prac- sReg. v. Whitehead, 3 Car. k K. 202; 
 
 titioner was a blacksmith., and was Queen v. Spilling, supra. 
 
 drunk, and so ignorant of the proper siReg. v. Maeleod, 12 Cox. C. C. 534. 
 
 ;3teps that he totally neglected what loRex v. tt'ebb, 1 Moody & R. 405, 2 
 
 was absolutely necessary. Re.x v. Long, Lewin, C. C. 196. 
 
 4 Car. & P. 398. And giving an overdose of a danger- 
 
 <Reg. V. Chamberlain, and Reg. v. ous poison will not be held to be such 
 
 Maeleod, supra. And see Reg. v. culpable negligence as will make the 
 
 Markuss, 4 Fost. & F. 356. person giving it criminally responsible, 
 
 ERog. V. Crook, 1 Fost. & F. 521. where the circumstances were such that 
 
 citex V. Long, supra. it would be impossible to tell how much 
 
712. HOMICIDE. [§ 470 
 
 that a physician's treatment resulted in death does not impose 
 criminal responsibility, unless his conduct was characterized by gross 
 ignorance or inattention to his patient's safety. ^^ And this is the 
 rule whether he is a regular surgeon or not, or has a medical educa- 
 tion or not, though he might be liable for penalties for practising 
 without a license. ^ ^ And a favorable view of the conduct of a physi- 
 cian shflwld be taken where the patient grew better while his prescrip- 
 tion wag. being followed, but grew worse and died after its discon- 
 tinuance. ^ * The question in such case is whether, with reference to 
 the remedy the physician used and the conduct he displayed, he acted 
 with a due degree of caution, or whether he acted with gross and im- 
 proper rashness and want of caution. ^ * And evidence of ignorance 
 and negligence in the treatment of former cases cannot be gone into 
 by either side, though witnesses may give their opinions as to the 
 scienti^c skill of the accused. ^ ° Nor is the consent of the deceased 
 a defense in a prosecution against a medical practitioner for negligent 
 homicide in causing the death of a patient by improper treatment. * ® 
 These rules apply also to persons practising midwifery. ^ ^ But here, 
 as in the case of a physician, the mere fact that the act of the mid- 
 wife resulted in death does not render her guilty of manslaughter, 
 unless there was criminal misconduct arising either from gross negli- 
 gence or criminal inattention.** And the burden is on the prose- 
 cution to prove negligence*® And where poison was given by mis- 
 take, in order to sustain the burden of showing that giving it was 
 the result of criminal negligence on the part of a physician, it is not 
 enough to show that in dispensing his own drugs he supplied a mix- 
 ture containing a large quantity of poison ; it must appear that there 
 was such gross and culpable negligence as would tend to show an 
 evil mind.^" 
 
 471, The rule in the United States — In the United States, as in 
 England, a mere mistake of judgment by a physician in the selection 
 and application of remedies or appliances causing death does not 
 render him criminally responsible for the results.* And the inad- 
 
 had been given, and whether the liquid isReff. v. Whitehead, 3 Car. & K. 202. 
 
 might have dropped faster than the ac- isReg. v. Ellis, 2 Car. & K. 470. 
 
 cused supposed it v?ould. Reg. v. Bull, i 'Ferguson's Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 
 
 2 Fost. & F. 201. 181 ; Rex v. Senior, 1 Moody C. C. 34G, 
 
 iiRex V. Long, 4 Car. & P. 398. 1 Lewin, C. C. 183 note. 
 
 i2T!ex V. Van Butchell, 3 Car. & P. isRex v. Williamson, 3 Car. & P. 635. 
 
 620: Rex v. Long, supra. isReg. v. Bull, 2 Fost. & F. 201; Reg. 
 
 l3Reg. V. Crick, 1 Fost & F. 519. v. Spencer, 10 Cox, C. C. 525. 
 
 KRex V. Long, 4 Car. & P. 423; Rex soReg. v. Spencer, supra. 
 
 V. Willinmson, 3 Car. & P. 635; Fer- iState v. Hardister, 38 Ark. 605, 42 
 
 guson's Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 181. Am. Rep. 5. 
 
{ i711 NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. 713 
 
 vertent infliction of a wound by a physician on a patient, resulting 
 in death, does not render him guilty either of murder or man- 
 slaughter, where he used the instrument commonly employed for like 
 purposes, without evil intent or culpable negligence.^ But a much 
 more liberal rule than that of the English cases on the question of 
 the necessary skill of the physician to relieve him from criminal re- 
 sponsibility for results was adopted by a number of che earlier Amer- 
 ican cases, it being held that if a person assumes to act as a physician 
 and prescribes with an honest intention of curing the patient, and 
 the patient dies in consequence of the treatment, the physician is 
 not guilty either of murder or manslaughter, however ignorant of 
 medical science, or of the nature of the disease, or of the conse- 
 quences of the treatment, he may be;^ and that, to render a person 
 causing the death of another by administering poison guilty of man- 
 slaughter, where he was ignorant of the poisonous character of the 
 drug, it must appear that he was giving the drug with a wicked or 
 evil purpose.* But even under this rule if the person prescribing 
 had so much knowledge of the fatal prescription that it may be rea- 
 sonably presumed that he administered the medicine from an obsti- 
 nate, wilful rashness, and not with an honest intention and expecta- 
 tion of effecting a cure, he is guilty of manslaughter at least, although 
 he did not intend bodily harm to the patient. '^ 
 
 The more modern rule, however, which seems to be growing in 
 favor, holds that an actual good intent and the expectation of good 
 results by a physician in his treatment of a patient are not an abso- 
 lute justification of his acts, however foolhardy they may have been 
 if judged by an external standard ; and if his act was the result of 
 foolhardy presumption or gross negligence, he is as responsible for 
 the result as though he had done unlawful acts for independent rea- 
 sons. And the condition of the individual's mind with regard to the 
 consequences must be taken into consideration, as distinguished from 
 mere knowledge of present or past circumstances from which others 
 might be led to anticipate or apprehend a particular result from 
 acts done.* And a physician is held criminally liable for the results 
 of gross ignorance of the art he assumes to practise, or of gross 
 ignorance in the selection or application of remedies, and of gross 
 
 iState V. Reynolds, 42 Kan. 322, 16 ^Cavwood v. Com. 7 Ky. L. Rep. 224. 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 483, 22 Pac. 410. BRjee v. State, supra. 
 
 BRice V. State, 8 Mo. 561; State v. eCom. v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 52 Am. 
 
 Schulz, 55 Iowa, 628, 39 Am. Eep. 187, Rep. 264, Criticizing and explaining 
 
 8 N. W. 469; Cora. v. Thompson, 6 Mass. Com. v. Thompson, 6 Mass. 134. 
 134; Robbins v. State, 8 Ohio St. 138. 
 
714 HOMICIDE. [§ 471 
 
 negligence with referencje thereto.'^ Under this rule, where poison is 
 tnowingly administered with intent to accomplish some unlawful 
 purpose, and death ensuijs, it is murder though the death was not 
 intended; but manslaughter only, if it was heedlessly administered 
 with no unlawful purpose.* And it is the duty of a physician, 
 neglect of which may render him criminally responsible for fatal 
 results, to direct as to sanitary conditions surrounding the patient, 
 and the means and manner of taking the medicines, and whatever 
 other applications and operations are necessary to restoration of 
 health. ^ Nor is the consent of a patient any defense in a prosecution 
 against a surgeon for causing his death, unless the operation per- 
 formed by the surgeon was done with due care and skill; consent is 
 no excuse for recklessness or want of skill. ^ " 
 
 The criminal liability of a physician for the death of his patient, 
 brought about by his gross negligence, carelessness, or ignorance, 
 may be established under an indictment or information predicated 
 upon general statutes defining manslaughter. ' ^ And a statutory 
 provision that if a ph^'sician under certain conditions shall, without 
 design to effect death, administer any poison, drug, or medicine, or 
 do any other act to another person which shall produce the latter's 
 
 'State V. Hardister, 38 Ark. 605, 42 the physician, or intentionally by the ac- 
 
 Am. Rep. 5; Hampton v. State (Fla.) cused, the accused is entitled, upon 
 
 39 So. 421. cro5s-examination, to show that the 
 
 And where a man who publicly prac- dealing of the physician referred to did 
 
 tised as a physician was called to attend not justify the professional character 
 
 a sick woman, and caused her, though for care and skill which the witness had 
 
 with her consent, to be kept in flannels given him. Dresback v. State, 38 Ohio 
 
 saturated in kerosene for about three St. 365. 
 
 daj's, by reason of which she died, and '3 State v. Power, 24 Wash. 34, 63 
 it appeared that the treatment was ap- L.K.A. 902, 63 Pac. 1112. 
 plied as the result of foolhardy pre- And an instruction to that effect is 
 sumption or gross negligence, his act is not subject to the objection that it 
 regarded as an assault upon her, and virtually tells the jury that any negli- 
 lier death amounts to homicide in the gent or improper treatment of "the "de- 
 commission of an unlawful act; and an ceased would be sufficient to convict the 
 allegation in a prosecution therefor, accused, the rule being that he is not 
 that kerosene is of a dangerous criminally liable unless he is guilty of 
 tendency, is superfluous. Com. v. gross want of skill or attention, ibid. 
 Pierce, supra. icStnte v. Gile, 8 Wash. 12, 35 Pac. 
 
 sState V. Wagner, 78 Mo. 644, 47 Am. 417; Reg. v. Ellis, 2 Car. & K. 470. 
 
 Rep. 131. And see Hampton v. State, HHampton v. State (Fla.) 39 So. 421. 
 
 supra. AVhere an information charges a phy- 
 
 And where in a prosecution for homi- sieian with causing the death of a 
 
 cide a witness on the part of the state patient by negligently injuring and 
 
 had, in effect, testified that a designated pulling out the intc-itines.. the" word 
 
 physician had been a customer at his "intestines" must be given its popular, 
 
 store, that he had very often filled pre- broadest, and most comprehensive sense, 
 
 seriptions for him, and that he was a and must be construed to include every- 
 
 ^00(1 and careful phj'sician, and the issue thing contained in the abdominal cavity, 
 
 is whether poison was administered to Ibid, 
 the deceased through the negligence of 
 
"§ ^47-i;i NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. 715 
 
 death, he shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter, furnishes the rule 
 of action in the enumerated cases only, and does not prevent holding 
 a physician criminally liable for the unintended death of his patient, 
 brought about by his gross negligence or igorance, in cases other than 
 the enumerated ones. ^ ^ 
 
 V. COKEECTION BY PEESONS IN AUTIIOEITY. ^ 
 
 472. The general rule as to criminal liability. — Parents, masters, 
 and other persons having authority in foro domestico may give rea- 
 sonable correction to those under their care, and if death ensue with- 
 out their fault, it will be no more than an accidental death, not im- 
 posing criminal liability.^ But if the correction exceed the bounds 
 of due moderation, either in the measure of it or in the instrument 
 made use of for the purpose of administering it, it would be either 
 murder or manslaughter, according to the circumstances of the case.^ 
 If a father, master, or schoolmaster correct his child, servant, or 
 scholar, he must do it with a fit instrument for correction, and not 
 with such an instrument as is likely to kill him, and if he uses such an 
 instrument he is criminally liable therefor.* And as a general rule 
 a beating from which death results will be regarded as excessive, so 
 as to render the person inflicting it guilty, at least, of manslaughter. ® 
 
 473. Parent and child — A parent cannot be permitted to deliber- 
 ately inflict such punishment upon his child as will be likely to pro- 
 duce death, and escape criminal responsibility under cover of parental 
 authority to correct in moderation.^ The right of a parent to cor- 
 rect a child within the meaning of this rule has reference only to such 
 children as are capable of correction, and of appreciating it, and not 
 to a very young infant ; so that, while a slight slap might be lawfully 
 given to an infant by its mother, violent treatment, from which death 
 might result, by the father, would not be justifiable.^ And refusal to 
 instruct in a prosecution for homicide that the absence of motive to 
 till is a circumstance favorable to the accused is proper on the trial 
 of a father who, in administering punishment, cruelly beat his child 
 of tender years to death.* And the act of a parent of throwing a 
 
 l2Tbid. 4Grey's Case, J. Kelyng, 64, 1 East, 
 
 iThe question of homicide by exces- V. C. 2f)l. 
 
 ;sive,or improper chastisement was ex- oRes;. v. Honley, 2 Eost. & F. 20^. 
 
 tensively considered in a note to State :! Powell v. State, 67 Miss. 119, 6 So. 
 
 V S^i-f."'.. 60 T,.T(.A. 801. 646. 
 
 aState v. Harris, 6.3 N. C. 1 ; 1 East, ^les. v. Griflin, 11 Cox, C. C. 402. 
 
 p. C. 281. sPowell V. State, supra. 
 
 3 State V. Harris, supra. That the accused had previously killed 
 
716 HOMICIDE. (I 47» 
 
 missile at one of her children and accidentally hitting another child, 
 causing its death, is manslaughter, although she had no intention of 
 hitting either child, but only intended to frighten into obedience tho 
 one at which it was thrown.* If the instrument used in correction, 
 however, is not a deadly weapon, and not evidently dangerous and 
 likely to kill or produce great bodily harm, the killing will not be 
 more than manslaughter. ^ And where the intent was not to kill, but 
 simply to chastise the child reasonably and properly, and the child 
 by some mischance or accident died in consequence thereof, the parent 
 can be guilty of nothing more than involuntary manslaughter." And 
 where it might be inferred from evidence that the parent killing his 
 child in correcting him was not actuated by intention to kill, or by 
 an evil or cruel disposition, the law with reference to absence of in- 
 tent to kill should be given to the jury, as well as where the intention 
 clearly and evidently appears.'' 
 
 474. Persons in loco parentis — -Where one person stands to another 
 in loco parentis, with the lawful right to administer chastisement 
 with a proper instrument for that purpose, and the chastisement is 
 moderate, but death ensues, it is, as a matter of law, excusable homi- 
 cide ; ^ but if the chastisement is immoderate and excessive and death 
 ensues, it is manslaughter;* and if the punishment is inflicted in a 
 cruel and unusual manner and death results, it is, at least, manslaugh- 
 ter, if not a higher crime. ^ This rule has been applied to OTie 
 who struck a young child for disobedience in an unimportant matter, 
 several times with an iron poker, knocking her down and then stamp- 
 ing upon her, thus causing her death, holding him guilty of man- 
 slaughter;* and also to a case of killing by throwing a child's stool, 
 
 another child, and had inflicted cruel sState v. Shaw, supra. 
 
 and unusual punishments upon his sreople v. DeGarmo, 73 App. Dir. 46, 
 
 children, is admissible in evidence in 76 N. Y. Supp. 477. 
 
 a prosecution against him for killing A verdict of murder in the second 
 
 his child by administering a whipping, degree is warranted in a prosecution 
 
 Ackers v. State, 73 Ark. 262, 83 S. W. against a stepfather for killing his 
 
 909. ' stepdaughter by beating her to death, 
 
 tRex V. Conner, 7 Car. & P. 438. by evidence that the beating was cruel 
 
 cPowell V. State, and Ackers v. State, and unmerciful, tnat the punishment 
 
 supra. was inflicted with a heavy rope, and that 
 
 sWilliams v. State, 57 Ga. 478; Ack- the rope was found wet from a recent 
 
 ers V. State, supra. washing, with blood remaining on it, 
 
 'Hill V. State, 11 Tex. App. 456. And and that the child's hands were broken, 
 
 see Montgomery v. Com. 23 Ky. L. Rep. and that there were lacerations and 
 
 732, 63 S. W. 747. bruises on different parts of her body. 
 
 iStnte V. Shaw, 64 S. C. 566, 60 L.R.A. Taylor v. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 67 
 
 801, 92 Am. St. Rep. 817, 43 S. E. 14j S. W. 812. 
 
 State v. Harris, 03 N. C. 1. ^People v. SeQarmo, supra. 
 
r§ 474] NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. 717 
 
 and afterwards concealing evidence of the crime, it having been held 
 to be either murder or manslaughter.® 
 
 Express malice on the part of the slayer, however, need not be 
 made to appear in such case in order to convict him of murder ; malice 
 will be inferred where the whipping was with such cruelty and in- 
 humanity as to exclude the idea of passion." And evidence of a 
 brutal course of treatment through a long period of time, and that the 
 child was found dead, and that death was occasioned by burning, 
 and that the accused was guilty of causing it, warrants a verdict 
 of wilful, deliberate, and premeditated murder.^ But the act of a 
 person standing in the relation of parent to a boy who was dis- 
 obedient, of tying him in a grain sack having holes in it, and then 
 becoming otherwise engaged and forgetting the boy, and allowing 
 him to remain there for several hours, from which death results, is 
 not wilful murder, but manslaughter.* And a person standing in 
 such a relation who punishes a child by compelling it to work beyond 
 its strength, after which the child dies, should be held guilty of man- 
 slaughter only, though the punishment was cruel and excessive, where 
 he believed that the child was shamming illness and was really able 
 to do the work required.® 
 
 475. Schoolmaster and pupil. — A schoolmaster represents the parent 
 of a pupil and has parental authority delegated to him for the time 
 being, and may, for the purpose of correcting a scholar, inflict mod- 
 erate and reasonable corporal punishment ; but if it be administered 
 to gratify passion, or if it be excessive or immoderate in nature or 
 (degree, or if protracted beyond the child's powers of endurance, or 
 if with an instrument unfitted for the purpose and calculated to pro- 
 duce danger to life or limb, the violence is unlawful, and if death 
 ensues the person inflicting it is, at least, guilty of manslaughter.* 
 While a father may authorize the chastisement of his child, he can- 
 not authorize an excessive chastisement which will justify a school- 
 master in inflicting such punishment as will cause death, whatever 
 his motive may have been.^ The rule in such case is that, in inflict- 
 ing corporal punishment, a teacher must exercise reasonable judg- 
 ment and discretion, and be governed as to the mode and severity by 
 the nature of the offense, and the age, size, and apparent powers of 
 
 BKingT. Hazel, 1 Leacli, C. L. 368. sgtnte v. Fields, 70 Iowa, 196, 30 N. 
 
 estate v. Harris. 63 N. C. 1 ; State v. W. 480. 
 
 Shaw. 04 S. C. 566, 60 L.R.A. 801, 92 9Eex v. CheeseinaTi. 7 Car. & P. 455. 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 817. 43 S. E. 14. And see iRecr. v. Hopley, 2 Fost. & F. 202, 
 
 Statp T. Shock, 68 ]\To. 552. SIbid. 
 
 estate V. Mahly, 08 Mo. 315. 
 
718 HOIIICIDK. [§ 475 
 
 endurance of the pupil ; * the question as to whether the punishment 
 was excessive being one of fact for the jury.* . 
 
 476. Husband and wife. — Under the common-law rule that a hus- 
 band has a right to correct his wife on words between them, he must 
 do it with a proper instrument, and if he does it with an improper 
 instrument, such as a pestle, and death results, he is guilty of mur- 
 der or manslaughter.-^ But under the law as it appears to exist in 
 the American states, beating or striking a wife violently with the 
 open hand is not one of the rights conferred on a husband by mar- 
 riage, even though she is drunk and insolent, and such blows being 
 illegal; if they cause the death of the wife, render the husband guilty, 
 at least, of manslaughter. ^ And the killing of a wife by her husband 
 by stamping and jumping upon her prostrate person, and by blows 
 and kicks inflicted with great violence, and at repeated intervals, is 
 murder committed with extreme atrocity and cruelty within the 
 meaning of a statute making such killing murder in the first de- 
 gree.* But to hold a husband criminally responsible for the death 
 of his wife by excessive or improper chastisement, her death must 
 have been the natural and probable consequence of his act.* And 
 where a husband unlawfully beats his wife, causing death, after birth, 
 of a child subsequently born, the offense is murder, and not man- 
 slaughter, malice being implied from the fact that death ensued from 
 an unlawful act dangerous to human life. ® Though where there is no 
 evidence that the alleged beating was with an intent to take life, 
 which is the equivalent of express malice, it would be murder in the 
 second degree only.** 
 
 477. Master and servant.— At common law every master had a 
 right moderately to chastise his servant, on just grounds and with an 
 
 'Com. V. Randall, 4 Gray, 36. Anrl an instruction against a husband 
 
 Where a schoolmaster wrote to a foj- killing his wife, that if he used such 
 parent of a pupil pronosing to be^it the force and violence toward her as caused 
 pupil severely to subdue his obstinacy, her to leave his house from fear of 
 and, upon receiving the parent's reply death or great bodily harm at his hands, 
 assenting to his proposition, beat the and her death was produced from ex- 
 boy with a thick stick for two-and one- posure to cold, he is guilty of man- 
 half hours in the night, until he died, slaughter, is improper in the absence 
 he is guilty of manslaughter. Reg. v. of any instruction as to whether the 
 H(>pley, supra. fear was well grounded, where it ap- 
 
 4Com. V. Randall, supra. pears that the husband was a cripple 
 
 iG'rcy's Case, J. Kelyng, 64, 1 East, and had but one useful arm, and that 
 P. (',. 201 ; citing Dalton, Justice of she M'as a strong and high-tempered 
 PeT'G, 218. woman. Ibid. 
 
 2Com. V. McAfee, 108 Mass. 458, 11 EClarke v. State, 117 Ala. 1, 67 Am. 
 Am. Rep. 383. St. Rep. 157, 23 So. 671. 
 
 8Com. V. Devlin, 12fl Mass. 253. eibid. 
 
 ■tHendrickson v. Com. 85 Ky. 281, 7 
 Am. St. Rep. 590, 3 S. W. 166. 
 
§ 477] NEG-LI6E]SfT HOMICIDE. 710 
 
 instrument properly adapted to the purpose of correction.* But the 
 instrument must have been a proper one, and the master who used an 
 improper one, such as a stake, throwing it and striking the servant 
 on the head, causing his death, was guilty of manslaughter.^ And 
 the use of an instrument from which death is liable to ensue imports 
 a mischievous disposition and gives rise to an inference of malice, so 
 that, if death does ensue, the killing is murder;^ and so of immoder- 
 ate and excessive chastisement causing death, though with an ordi- 
 nary instrument.* And the same rule applies where a master, by 
 premeditated negligence or harsh usage, causes the death of an ap- 
 prentice, such act rendering him gTiilty of murder.® So, where a 
 slave was killed by his master or overseer in inilicting punishment 
 upon him, the rules of common law with respect to criminal re- 
 sponsibility of a master for so killing a servant apply." And where 
 a master punished a slave barbarously, unreasonably, and immoder- 
 ately, or accompanied the punishment by hard usage and the with- 
 holding of food, clothing, and rest, the punishment loses its char- 
 acter of correction and denotes a contemplation of a fatal result, 
 so that in case of the death of the slave the master is guilty of mur- 
 der.'' And it has been held that the act of a master of a slave 
 of wilfully and excessively whipping him, so as to cause his death, 
 is murder in the first degree, though it was not done with the pur^ 
 pose and intention of killing him.* And the question whether the 
 punishment from which death resulted was inflicted with modera- 
 tion, or was cruel and unusual, is one of fact for the jury.* 
 
 iKing V. Wiggs, 1 Leach, C. L. 378 While the insolence of a slave would 
 note; Kelly v. State, 3 Smedes & M. justify a white man in giving him 
 518. And see State v. Shaw, 64 S. C. moderate chastisement with an ordinary 
 568, 60 L.R.A. 801, 92 Am. St. Kep. 817, instrument of correction at the moment 
 43 S. E. 14. , when the insolent language was used, it 
 2King V. Wiggs, supra. would not authorize an excessive battery 
 In Grey's Case, J. Kelyng, 64, 1 East, with a, dangerous weapon, or justify 
 P. C. 261, it was said that "if a master even moderate correction at a subse- 
 eorrect his servant, or lord his villain, quent period of time. State v. Jarrott, 
 and by force of that correction he 23 N. C. (1 Ired. L.) 76. 
 dieth, although he did not intend to kill sSouther v. Com. 7 Gratt. 673. 
 him, yet this is felony, because they But a master cannot be convicted of 
 ought to govern themselves in their cor- a higher offense than murder in the 
 reetion in such ways that such a mis- second degree for killing his slave, under 
 adventure might not happen." a statute providing that a master hav- 
 sRex V. Keite, 1 Ld. Raym. 140; King ing the right to correct his slave, who 
 V. Wiggs, supra. causes his death by cruellv Avhipping, 
 <State V. Shaw, supra. or by beating, or by any other cruel or 
 sKing V. Self, 1 Leach, C. L. 137, 1 inhuman treatment, though without in- 
 East, P. C. 226; Grey's Case, supra. tention, is guilty of murder in the scc- 
 cKelly v. State, 3 Smedes & M. 51S. ond degree and may be guilty of murder 
 'State V. Hoover, 20 N. C. 500 (4 in the first degree. Ex parte Howard, 
 Dev. & B. L. 365), 34 Am. Dec. 383; 30 Ala. 43. 
 Wilson V. State, 29 Tex. 240. sKelly v. State, supra. 
 
720 HOMICIDE. '[8 477 
 
 It is thought, however, that since the abolition of slavery in 
 America the right of a master to inflict personal chastisement upon 
 a servant is confined entirely to masters standing in loco parentis 
 to the servant ; * ** and that, therefore, the relationship of master and 
 servant betvi^een the slayer and the person killed in inflicting chas- 
 tisement would have no effect in ordinary cases upon the criminality 
 ■of the act. Where punishment is inflicted upon a slave by his 
 master, so severe as to cause death, the lesser offense of abuse or 
 cruel treatment of a slave, provided for by statute, is merged in the 
 greater offense of manslaughter or murder. ^^ 
 
 478. The question of degree — If correction is inflicted with an 
 instrument improper for the purpose, but not likely to kill, such as 
 a cudgel or large stick, and death unintentionally results, the act 
 is a negligent homicide constituting manslaughter.^ And the act is 
 the same where a proper instrument is used but the punishment 
 is carried to an excessive or improper degree.^ But where the 
 instrument used is a deadly weapon, or equivalent thereto, and 
 death results, it is murder.^ And the rule is the same where the 
 act of chastisement was such, under the surrounding circumstances, 
 as to naturally tend to destroy life* or produce great bodily harm.® 
 And punishment may be so prolonged and so barbarous as to in- 
 dicate malice constituting the essential ingredient of murder.® Be- 
 
 10 See State v. Shaw, 64 S. C. 566, 60 ris, 63 N. C. 1; Rex v. Conner. 7 Car. & 
 L.R.A. 801, 92 Am. St. Rep. 817, 43 S. P. 438; Rex v. Cheeseman, 7 Car. & P. 
 E. 14. 455. 
 
 11 Wilson V. State, 29 Tex. 240. < Williams v. State, supra; Powell v. 
 iMontgomery v. Com. 23 Ky. L. Rep. State, 67 Miss. 119, 6 So. 646. 
 
 732, 63 S. W. 747; Anonymous, I East, Where a father stripped his eight- 
 P. C. 261. year-old son naked, threw him on the 
 
 Where death was caused by a cruel floor and savagely beat him from head 
 whipping with a rope, which might or to toot for about one-half hour with a 
 might not have been a deadly weapon, piece of rubber pipe, for some trifling 
 an issue of manslaughter is raised in a offense, and death resulted therefrom 
 prosecution for the killing, and limiting within a few minutes, an instruction in 
 the jury to murder in the first or sec- a, prosecution for the killing; with ref- 
 ond degree is error. Taylor v. State, 41 erence to murder in the doing of a 
 Tex. Grim. Rep. 148, 51 S. W. 1108. dangerous act likely to kill or produce 
 
 And charging statutory provisions great bodily harm is proper. Powell v. 
 with regard to murder, predicated upon State, supra. 
 
 a neglect or failure to call in aid to pre- 6Ibid. 
 
 serve the life of the injured party, is estate v. Shaw, 64 S. C. 566, 60 L.R.A. 
 
 erroneous in a prosecution for murder 801, 92 Am. St. Rep. 817, 43 S. E. 14. 
 
 where the evidence discloses that the And see Powell v. State, supra. 
 
 killing was occasioned by a beating in- Where a child was stripped naked by 
 
 flicted with a rope. Ibid. a person with whom he lived, and placed 
 
 2Montgomery v. Com. 23 Ky. L. Rep. on his back with his feet tied up, and 
 
 732, 63 S. W. 747. And see Lee v. State, kept there from morning to night every 
 
 44 Tex. Grim. Rep. 460, 72 S. W. 195. day for a week, and repeatedly" whipped 
 
 sMontgomery v. Com. supra; Wil- each day while in that position with a 
 
 liams v. State, 57 Ga. 478; State v. Har- heavy leather strap, a knitted cord, and 
 
S 478] NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. 721 
 
 fore convicting a person of murder for killing another in exercising 
 the right to chastise and correct him, however, the jury must be- 
 lieve from the evidence, beyond reasonable doubt, that the correc- 
 tion was excessive, cruel, unusual, and evidently dangerous, and 
 likely to produce great bodily harm. ^ 
 
 VL Negligent homicide undeb the Texas Code. 
 
 479. Definition of, and liability under. — The Texas statute pro- 
 vides for a special class of homicide known as negligent homicide, 
 dividing it into first and second degrees; negligent homicide in 
 the first degree consisting of the doing of a lawful act in a negli- 
 gent manner, from which death results;^ and negligent homicide 
 in the second degree consisting of homicide in the prosecution of 
 an unlawful act not rising to the degree of a misdemeanor.'' In a 
 negligent homicide in either degree under this act there must have 
 been no apparent intention to kill;* though there must have been ap- 
 parent danger of causing the death of the person killed, or some 
 other person.* But a homicide in the commission of an act made 
 a felony by law is not negligent homicide.^ Nor can it be a negli- 
 gent homicide if there was malice aforethought." And there is 
 no question of a negligent homicide under the claim that the shoot- 
 ing was unintentional, in an attempt to strike the deceased with a 
 pistol to avoid being shot by him;'' or where the homicide springs 
 out of the mere act of unlawfully carrying a pistol.* 
 
 Where a person assaults another, however, not intending to kill 
 but only to beat, and in doing so accidentally kills a third person, 
 
 an iron ramrod, until he died, the death ensued, the stick not being a 
 
 provocation being small, malice and de- deadly weapon, but one calculated to 
 
 liberation are shown, warranting a con- inflict, and which did inflict, serious 
 
 viction for nurder. State v. Harris, 63 bodily injury, it is a question for the 
 
 N. C. 1. jury whether the intention was to kill 
 
 'Powell V. State, 67 Miss. 119, 6 So. or merely to beat; and since the offense 
 
 646. would be negligent homicide if it was 
 
 iBlalock V. State, 40 Tex. Grim. Eep. only intended to beat, the law of negli- 
 
 154, 49 S. W. 100. gent homicide in the second degree 
 
 2Hobins v. State, 9 Tex. App. 666; should be given to the jury. Robins v. 
 
 Howard v. State, 25 Tex. App. 686, 8 S. State, supra. 
 
 W. 929; Flynn v. State, 43 Tex. Grim. ^Howard v. State, supra. 
 
 Eep. 407, 66 S. W. 551. BRichards v. State, 35 Tex. Grim. Rep 
 
 3 Clark v. State, 19 Tex. App. 495; 38, 30 S. W. 805. 
 
 Aiken v. State, 10 Tex. App. 610; How- elbid.: McConnell v. State, 13 Tex. 
 
 ard V. State; Blalock v. State; and App. 390. 
 
 Flynn v. State, — supra. 'Teel v. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 73 
 
 Where one of two girls in a conflict S. W. 11. 
 
 with a man held him while the other sBrittain v. State, 36 Tex. Grim. Rep. 
 
 beat him with a stick, from which his 406, 37 S. W. 758. 
 Horn. — IG 
 
722 HOMICIDE. [§ 479 
 
 the offense comes within the definition of negligent homicide.® And 
 shooting for the mere purpose of frightening the person shot at 
 or others, not intending to hit anyone, hut killing a person by ac- 
 cident, is negligent homicide in the second degree.^" So, the rule 
 is the same where a pistol was drawn and displayed near a gather- 
 ing of people for mere amusement, where it was carelessly and neg- 
 ligently discharged, killing a person. ^ ' And shooting a person un- 
 der the supposition that he was an animal is negligent homicide, 
 where by the exercise of such care and caution as a man of ordinary 
 prudence would use under like circumstances the slayer could have 
 ascertained the truth before shooting. ^^ One found guilty of negli- 
 gent homicide, as in other cases of homicide in general, is, in fact, 
 acquitted of all other grades of homicide above that of negligent 
 homicide, and where the evidence shows that he was not guilty of 
 that offense the prosecution must be dismissed on appeal.** 
 
 VII. Necessity of peesonal negligence. 
 
 480. Responsibility for the negligent acts of another. — To render 
 a person guilty of homicide because of the performance of a negli- 
 gent act causing death, the negligent act must have been his per- 
 sonal, individual act.* And where a person having charge of a 
 steam engine stopped it and went away, and another came and set 
 it in motion, by reason of which a person was killed, the one who 
 went away is not criminally responsible for the death.* Nor can 
 
 sMeConnell V. State, s«pra. iHilton's Case, 2 Lewin, C. C. 214; 
 
 lOKeddick v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) Reg. v. Gray, 4 Fost. & F. 1098; Reg. 
 
 47 S. W. 993; Curtis v. State, 22 Tex. v. Birchall, 4 Fost. & F. 1087; Reg. v. 
 
 App. 227, 58 Am. Rep. 635, 3 S. W. 88. Gregory, 2 Fost. & F. 153; Rex v. Allen, 
 
 And see Morton v. State (Tex. Crim. 7 Car. & P. 153; Reg. v. Taylor, 9 Car. 
 
 App.) 71 S. W. 281. & P. 672. And see Reg. v. Pocock, 5 
 
 Where a husband and wife were rid- Cox, C. C. 172. 
 
 ing in a carriage with their infant child, And an indictment charging four per- 
 
 and the husband got out and went back sons witli having assumed the work of 
 
 to pick up his wife's hat, when she changing and altering the supporting 
 
 started the horses and was rapidly driv- walls or piers of a building, and that 
 
 ing off leaving him, and he fired his it was their duty to so conduct the work 
 
 pistol, not at the wife or child, but at as not to endanger the stability of the 
 
 the horses for the purpose of cutting floors of the building, but that they 
 
 one of them down, so as to compel them neglected and omitted to so conduct a 
 
 to atop, and. hit and killed the child, part of the work, whereby the floors fell, 
 
 his crime is negligent homicide in the killing a person, is insufficient in the 
 
 second degree. McConnell v. State, 22 absence of anything to show what 
 
 Tex. App. 354, 58 Am. Rep. 648, 3 S. W. relation each one of the four bore to the 
 
 699. work, or showing that there was in legal 
 
 I'Brittain v. State, supra,. contemplation a common or personal 
 
 i2Bertrong v. State, 2 Tex. App. 160. duty on the part of each. Ainsworth v. 
 
 isFlynn v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. United States, 1 App. D. C. 518. 
 
 407, 66 S. W. 551. zHilton's Case, supra. 
 
J 480] NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. 723 
 
 a railway brakeman, having no control of the engine, be held re- 
 sponsible for the killing of a person resulting from a neglect of 
 duty on the part of the engineer and fireman.* So, a person charged 
 with the performance of an ordinary duty cannot be held criminal- 
 ly responsible for negligent homicide, because of a death resulting 
 from a failure to perform, or an improper performance of, such 
 duty, where he has procured a competent agent to perform such 
 duty in good faith, and the negligence is that of the agent, and 
 not of himself. * Nor can an agent intrusted merely with the naked 
 execution of his principal's orders, without discretion as to the plan 
 of the work, be held criminally responsible for injuries resulting 
 from negligent and improper planning and arrangement of the 
 work.^ And the engine driver's first duty being to attend to his 
 engine, where he is so engaged and has given instructions to his 
 fireman to look out for signals, the latter, and not the former, is 
 responsible for negligence in failing to see signals, from which death 
 results.® So, where a fatal railway accident was caused by a train 
 running off the line, at a spot where rails had been taken up, with- 
 out allowing sufficient time to replace them, and also without giv- 
 ing sufficient, or, at all events, effective warning to the engine driver ; 
 and it was the duty of the foreman of the plate-layers to direc*' when 
 the work should be done, and also to direct effective signals to be 
 given, — it was held that though he was under the general control 
 of an inspector of the district, the inspector was not liable, but that 
 the foreman was, assuming his negligence to have been a material 
 and substantial cause of the accident, even although there had also 
 been negligence on the part of the engine driver in not keeping a 
 sufficient lookout. '^ Nor is a person who manufactures and keeps 
 fireworks in his house criminally responsible for the death of a 
 person caused by the shooting of a rocket across the street, setting 
 fire to a house on the opposite side, caused by the negligent act of 
 his servant, there being no connection between the act of keeping 
 
 sAnderson v. State, 27 Tex. App. 177, would be his own neglect, and not that 
 
 3 L.R.A. 644, 11 Am. St. Rep. 189, 11 S. of the engine driver, which caused his 
 
 W. 33. death, the engine driver cannot be held 
 
 And where an accident occurred and guilty of manslaughter. Reg. v. Gray, 
 
 the fireman on an engine was l^illed, and supra. 
 
 from all that appeared it was the duty <Rex v. Allen, and Rex v. Taylor, 
 
 of both the engine driver and the fire- supra. 
 
 man, or of one of them, to keep the re: eThomas v. People, 2 Colo. App. 513, 
 
 quired lookout, and the fireman might 31 Pac. 349. 
 
 have been keeping the lookout at the eReg. v. Birchall, 4 Fost. & F. 1087. 
 
 time he was killed. In which case it 7Reg. v. Benge, 4 Feet. & F. 504. 
 
724 HOMICIDE. (§ 480 
 
 the fireworks and the supposed negligence of the servant, which was 
 the proximate cause of death. * 
 
 Where, however, a man is expressly charged by statute or other- 
 wise with the performance of, or with seeing to and securing the 
 performance of, a duty, and the duty is neglected or improperly 
 performed by an agent, and death results, such omission or negli- 
 gent performance is an act of misconduct or negligence on the part 
 of the principal within the meaning of these rules, for which he 
 is criminally responsible.® And an agent cannot be charged with 
 negligent homicide for failure to perform a duty due his principal, 
 or to signal another agent to do it, through which failure death 
 resulted, though he was in a position to perform and saw the danger 
 of failure to do so, where the duty was expressly imposed upon the 
 other agent by statutory provision. ^ " 
 
 VIII. Application of docteine of conteibutoet negligence. 
 
 481. Negligence of third persons contributing — It is no defense 
 to one charged with manslaughter for contributing to the death of 
 another by his negligence, that the death was caused by the negli- 
 gence of others, as well as himself, since if the death was caused 
 partly by his negligence and partly by the negligence of others, they 
 are all guilty of manslaughter.* It is immaterial that others, by 
 their negligence, contributed to cause the death in question, where 
 the act of the accused was one of the primary causes." And the 
 act of an employee of a railroad company in taking up the rails 
 of the road at a time when a train was about to arrive, and it would 
 be impossible to replace them in time to avoid accident, is the 
 primary cause of the ensuing accident within the meaning of this 
 rule, though the flagman and engine driver had also been guilty of 
 negligence which contributed to the catastrophe, and though other 
 precautions provided to prevent such an occurrence had not been 
 observed.* But while a prosecution for manslaughter may be main- 
 tained where the death in question was the result of the joint neg- 
 ligence of the accused and others, it must have been the direct re- 
 suit, wholly or in part, of his negligence, and his negligence must 
 
 sReg. V. Bennett, 8 Cox, C. C. 74, 28 iState v. Shelledy, 8 Iowa, 477; Reg. 
 
 L. J. Mag. Cas. N. S. 27, Bell, C. C. 1. v. Haines, 2 Car. & K. SaS; Reg. v. 
 
 'United States v. Farnham, 2 Blatchf. Benge, 4 Fost. & F. 504. 
 
 528, Fed. Cas. No. 15,071. =Reg. v. Benge, supra; Com. v. Cook, 
 
 lOAnderson v. State, 27 Tex. App. 177, 8 Pa. Co. Ct. 486. 
 
 3 L.R.A. 644, 11 Am. St. Rep. 189, 11 3Reg. v. Benge, supra. 
 S. W. 33. 
 
« 431] NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. 725 
 
 have been, wholly or in part, the proximate and efficient cause, where 
 the negligence of some other party has intervened between his act 
 or omission and the fatal result.* And the instructions in a prose- 
 cution for negligent homicide may properly confine responsibility 
 to the accused alone, and omit to combine his act with the alleged 
 negligent act of the person killed, where, if there was any negligence 
 in the case, it was the negligence of the accused.® 
 
 482. Negligence of the deceased contributing ^When a death is 
 
 directly imputable to the negligence or imprudence of the deceased, 
 another, though guilty of gross negligence, cannot be held criminal- 
 ly liable therefor unless the imprudence of the deceased was the 
 natural result of his negligence.^ And the rule has been laid down 
 that a man cannot be held criminally responsible for the death of 
 another, resulting in part from his negligence, where the contribu- 
 tory negligence of the person killed was such that accused would 
 not have been civilly liable in an action for damages by the party 
 injured if the injury sustained had not caused death. ^ And it 
 has been held that a driver cannot be held guilty of manslaughter 
 for the killing of a passenger because of unskilful and negligent 
 driving, where the passenger interposed in the management of the 
 horses, and so assisted in bringing about the accident.* 
 
 The prevailing rule, however, is that there is no analogy between 
 a civil case of pecuniary compensation to the injured person and a 
 criminal case for the punishment of guilt, and that there can be 
 no balance of blame in charges of felony; and that, therefore, a 
 charge of negligent homicide will lie where death ensues from in- 
 juries negligently inflicted, though the person killed may have con- 
 tributed to his own death by his own negligence.'' And this rule, 
 it is held, is especially applicable where the negligent act of the 
 
 iQueen v. Ledger, 2 Fost. & F. 857 ; and he turned on the hot water and told 
 
 Ainsworth v. United States, 1 App. D. the occupant to get out, but he failed to 
 
 C. 518. And see Reg. v. Swindall, 2 do so, and received burns which caused 
 
 Car. & K. 230, 2 Cox, C. C. 141. his death, it cannot be regarded as grosi 
 
 BWarthan v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. negligence for which the attendant 
 
 385, 55 S. W. 5". would be criminally rpsponsible. Reg. 
 
 lUnited States v. Warner, 4 McLean, v. Finney, 12 Cox, C. C. 625. 
 463, Fed. Cas. No. 16,643. , 2Eeg. v. Birchall, 4 Fost. & F. 108.7. 
 
 And where it was the duty of an at- 3Reg. v. Jones, 22 L. T. N. S. 217, 11 
 
 tendant in an insane asylum to let hot Cox, C. C. 544. 
 
 water into a bath while a patient was <Reg. v. Longbottom, 3 Cox, C. C. 
 
 in it, and the patient was capable of 439; Reg. v. Swindall, 2 Car. & K. 230, 
 
 nnderstinding what was said to him, and 2 Cox, C. C. 141 ; Reg. v. Kew 12 Cox, 
 
 of getting out of the bath when told to C. C. 355; State v. Moore (Iowa) 106 
 
 do so, and the attention of the attend- N. W. 16. And see Rex v. Walker, 1 
 
 ant was distracted by a question from Car. & P. 320. 
 another attendant at an adjoining bath. 
 
726 HOMICIDE. [§ 482 
 
 accused produced, or was the cause of, the negligent act of the de- 
 ceafed.° And where the driver of a vehicle negligently collides 
 with another vehicle and the death of a person in the latter vehicle 
 results, his negligent act will he regarded as the proximate cause of 
 the death, so as to render him penally responsible therefor, without 
 reference to the question whether the other driver was guilty of 
 negligence in failing to control his team after the collision.^ But 
 even if the doctrine of contributory negligence does apply to crim- 
 inal cases, there is no contributory negligence on the part of a per- 
 son who merely gets into a vehicle and allows himself to be driven, 
 though the driver is perceptibly drunk, which will relieve the latter 
 from criminal responsibility for negligence causing the other's 
 death.'' And error in a charge to acquit a physician of murder of 
 a patient if the death occurred by any gross negligence of the de- 
 ceased or his attendants is harmless, where there is no evidence in- 
 dicating a want of care or medical attention, and it was unques- 
 tioned that the wound inflicted caused the death. * 
 
 B Queen v. Williamson, 1 'Cox, C. 0. floats, rafts, etc., and were drowned, the 
 
 97 ; United States v. Warner, 4 McLean, loss of their lives is not so connected 
 
 463, Fed. Cas. No. 16,643. with, and such a necessary result of, the 
 
 But where a collision took place be- collision that the officers could be held 
 
 tween vessels through the alleged negli- criminally responsible therefor. United 
 
 geuce and misconduct of officers of one States v. Warner, supra. 
 of them, and the passengers thereon eBelk v. People, 125 111. 684, 17 N. 
 
 were told they would be safe if they re- E. 744. 
 
 mained on the upper deck, and those TKeg. v. Jonis, 11 Cox, C. C. 544, 22 
 
 who so remained were saved, but under L. T. N. S. 217. 
 
 the influence of alarm some unneces- sBrown ». State (Tex. Grim. App.) 
 
 fiarily and indiscreetly left the boat on 50 S. W. 554. 
 
CHAPTER XXIII. 
 
 HOMICIDE BY OFFICERS OF JUSTICE.i 
 
 I. In obedience to WAEEANT OE official DIEECTION OB EEQUIBEMENT. 
 
 483. In execution of death sentence. 
 
 484. In the discharge of ordinary official duty. 
 
 485. In the discharge of military duty in war. 
 IL In peeseevation of the peace. 
 
 486. How far justifiable. 
 III. In effecting an aeeest. 
 
 a. General rules. 
 
 487. As to criminal liability. 
 
 488. As to effect of official character and action. 
 
 b. Use of force in making arrest generally. 
 
 489. For felony. 
 
 490. For misdemeanor. 
 
 491. Resistance as distinguished from mere avoidance. 
 e. Use of force in checking flight. 
 
 492. In case of felony. 
 
 493. In case of misdemeanor. 
 
 d. Use of force in preventing escape or rescue. 
 
 494. In case of felony. 
 
 495. In case of misdemeanor. 
 
 e. Use of force in recapture. 
 
 496. Generally. 
 
 497. Of escaped convicts. 
 
 f. Limitations as to amount of force. 
 
 498. General rules. 
 
 499. Self-defense as a, test. 
 
 500. When use of deadly weapon is justifiable. 
 
 501. Appearance as a test of the right of self-defense. 
 
 502. Necessity a question for the jury. 
 
 g. Effect of illegal or improper action. 
 
 503. General rule as to illegal action. 
 
 504. Action by officer without warrant. 
 
 505. Arrest by private citizen. 
 
 506. Action outside of territorial jurisdiction. 
 
 507. Negligent action. 
 
 508. Action with improper or malicious motive. 
 
 509. Failure to give notice of character and purpose. 
 
 510. Further consideration. 
 
 iThe question of homicide by official tensively considered in a note to State v. 
 action or by officers of justice is ex- Phillips, 67 L.R.A. 292. 
 
 727 
 
728 HOMICIDE. (8 483 
 
 h. Rules in case of action by deputy or assistant. 
 
 511. Responsibility for. 
 
 512. Protection of deputy or assistant. 
 
 i. Application of rules to arrest in civil cases. 
 
 613. Officer killing a person flying from civil arrest chargeable with 
 murder, if intending to kill. 
 
 I. In obedience to waeeant oe official dieection ok eequiee- 
 
 MENT. 
 
 483. In execution of death sentence. — The putting a malefactor to 
 death, who has forfeited his life by the laws and verdict of his 
 country, by one whose office obliges it, is a civil duty, and not only 
 justifiable, but commendable where the law requires it* And homi- 
 cide committed by the sheriff in execution of a warrant to that effect is, 
 of course, justifiable, entitling him to an acquittal.* It is important 
 to observe, however, that the judgment and sentence must be strictly 
 followed, since if death is inflicted otherwise than as directed the 
 officer will be guilty of felony, at least, if not of murder.* If the 
 judgment be to be hanged, and the officer behead the party, it is said 
 to be murder;® and in England even the King was held not to be 
 able to change the punishment of the law by altering the hanging 
 or burning into beheading, though, when beheading is part of the 
 sentence, he may remit the rest.® The better opinion seems to be 
 that this prerogative of the Crown, founded in mercy and imme- 
 morially exercised, is part of the English common law;^ and that 
 though the King cannot, by his prerogative, vary the execution so as 
 to aggravate the punishment beyond the intention of the Jaw, yet 
 he may mitigate the pain or infamy of it; and accordingly that 
 an officer, acting upon a warrant from the Crown for beheading a 
 person under sentence of death for felony, would not be guilty of 
 any offense;® and it was, in earlier days, the practice, founded in 
 humanity, when women were condemned to be burned for treason, 
 to strangle them at the stake before the fire reached them, though 
 the letter of the judgment was that they should be burned in the 
 fire "till they were dead."® The rule may still apply to an officer 
 varying from the judgment of his o^vn head, and without warrant 
 
 24 Bl. Com. 178. «3 Inst. 52; 2 Hale, P. C. 412 
 
 3 State V. Dugan, Houst. Crim. Rep. 7Fost. C. L. 270; Fitzherbert'a New 
 
 (Del.) 563. Nat. Brev. 244, h; 19 Rymer'a Fcedera, 
 
 41 Hale, P. C. 501; 2 Hale, P. C. 411; 284. J- " J^ieuera, 
 
 3 Inat; 52, 211; 4 Bl. Com. 179. See SFost. C. L. 268; 4 Bl. Com 405- 1 
 
 Wharton, Crim. Law, 7th ed. § 3400. East, P. C. chap. 5, 8 96 D 335 
 
 61 Hale, P. C. 433, 464, 466, 501; 2 sFost. C. L. 268 ' " "^' 
 Hale, P. C. 411; 3 Inst. 52; 4 Bl. Com. 
 179. 
 
S 483] BY OFFICERS OP JUSTICE. 721> 
 
 or color of authority. If an officer, whose duty it is to execute a 
 sentence of whipping upon a criminal, should be so barbarous as to 
 exceed all bounds of moderation, and thereby cause the party's 
 death, he will, at least, be guilty of manslaughter.^" At present, 
 however, these matters are controlled largely by statutory enact- 
 ments, which, like all penal provisions, must be strictly construed 
 and accurately followed. 
 
 484. In the discharge of ordinary ofSlcial duty The general rule is 
 
 that, where an officer in the performance of what he conceives to 
 be his duty as such transcends his authority and invades the rights 
 of individuals, he is answerable to the government or poWer under 
 whose authority he is acting, but he is not liable to answer to crim- 
 inal process of a different government.^ And where an officer in 
 the due exiecution of his office kills a person who assaults or resists 
 him, or who attempts to prevent the performance of such duty, it 
 is justifiable homicide where it was necessary to his own defense 
 or to the performance of his duty.'' So, where an officer of one juris- 
 diction is held in custody under process of another jurisdiction for 
 a homicide committed within the authority conferred upon him by 
 the laws of the government for which he acts, that government will 
 protect itself by procuring his release through its judicial depart- 
 ment, by habeas corpus or otherwise,* upon its being shown that 
 the homicide was necessary, or that it was reasonably apparent to 
 the mind of the officer at the time and under the circumstances sur- 
 rounding him that it was necessary, to protect him in the perform- 
 ance of his duty.* And the right of a Federal officer in such a 
 case to a writ of habeas corpus to remove his case to a Federal 
 court is not affected by the fact that there is no provision of law 
 for trial by jury in the enactments of Congress providing for the 
 writ of habeas corpus.® These rules apply to a deputy marshal of 
 the United States charged with protecting and guarding a judge of 
 
 101 Hawk. p. C. chap. 29, § 5. Federal court will not examine the eyi- 
 
 iRe Fair, 100 Fed. 140; Ee Lewis, 83 deuce for the purpose of determining 
 
 Fed. 159; Ee Waite, 81 Fed. 359. wiiether the accused should have been 
 
 estate V. Dugan, supra; United States foand s"'lty or innocent, though it may 
 
 ex rel. Roberts v. Fayette County Jail- and should examine it for the purpose of 
 
 er, 2 Abb. (U. S.) 265, Fed. Cas. No. 15,- determining whether the act alleged to 
 
 463. And see Dodson v. State, 45 Tex. be criminah was done while in the per- 
 
 Cnm. Eep. 571, 78 S. W. 940. formance of his duty as an officer. Re 
 
 . 3Ee Fair, and United States ex rel. Fair, supra. 
 
 Roberts v. Fayette County Jailer, . .<Ee Neagle, 5 L.R.A. 78, 14 Sawy. 
 
 supra; Kelly v. Georgia, 68 Fed. 652. 232, 39 Fed. 833, Affirmed in 135 U. S. 
 
 But in habeas corpus proceedings by 1, 34 L. ed. 55, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 658. 
 
 an officer of the United States charged BKelly v. Georgia, supra. 
 with a homicide in a state court, the 
 
730 HOMICIDE. [§ 484 
 
 a United States court, while in the discharge of his official duty, 
 against assault, and where he is present at the critical moment when 
 prompt action is necessary, he is justified in killing a person making 
 such assault, if necessary to protect the life of the judge or save 
 him from great bodily injury.® Such a killing, if an offense at all, 
 is an offense under the laws of the state; but when done in the 
 performance of his duty in protecting a judge from assault and 
 violence because of his judicial decisions, it is an act done in pur- 
 suance of the laws of the United States, and is not, and cannot 
 be, an offense against the laws of a state, no matter what the statutes 
 of the state may be, the laws of the United States being the supreme 
 law of the land. "^ 
 
 A Federal officer acting under process, who kills a person and is 
 prosecuted in a state court for homicide, however, is not entitled to 
 discharge on habeas corpus issued from a Federal court, where the 
 evidence does not justify the conclusion that the shooting was done 
 in order to enable the officer to perform his duty, or execute the 
 process in his hands, and in such case he must be remanded to the 
 state court, there to stand trial.® And an officer or soldier in time 
 of peace is as much bound as a citizen to respect the laws of the 
 state, and is justified in disobeying improper or illegal orders, and 
 where he constitutes a part of the posse of a revenue officer, he has 
 only the same rights of self-defense that a citizen would have under 
 the same circumstances, and though ordered by a military command- 
 er to fire a fatal shot, he is responsible for the result, if the order 
 was unlawful.® And where a person is killed pursuant to an order 
 given by a superior officer, it devolves upon the person giving the 
 order to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he was legal- 
 
 6 Re Neagle (Cunningham v. Neagle), 'Ibid. 
 
 135 U. S. 1, 34 L. ed. 55, 10 Sup. Ct. sUnited States ex rel. Weeden, 2 
 
 Rep. 658. Flipp. 76, Fed. Cas. No. 14,412. 
 
 Where a deputy marshal was present 9 Georgia v. O'Grady, 3 Woods, 496, 
 
 when an attempt was made to kill a Fed. Cas. No. 5,352. And see Rex v. 
 
 judge of the United States Supreme Huggins, 2 Ld. Raym. 1574, 2 Strange, 
 
 Court, and several lives were endan- 882. 
 
 gered, the marshal, being in a position Where a collector of the King's duty 
 
 to judge as to the dangers and require- went to a house to demand money, and 
 
 ments of the occasion, was the one to de not being paid distrained a silver cup 
 
 termine when the proper moment arrived found there, and a maid, to prevent his 
 
 to slay the assailant in order to be jus- going out, stood in the door, when he 
 
 tified by law, and if he acted in good took her by the arm and beat her head 
 
 faith, and with reasonable judgment and against the door, causing her death, he 
 
 discretion, the law will justify him is criminally responsible therefor, 
 
 though he erred. Re Neagle, 5 L.R.A. GoSe's Case, 1 Vent. 216. 
 78, 14 Ssiwy. 232, 39 Fed. 833, Affirmed 
 in 135 U. S. 1. 31 L. ed. 55, 10 Sup. Ct 
 Rep. 658. 
 
§ 484] BY OFFICERS OF JUSTICE. 731 
 
 ly justified and excused in giving it. * ° So, a subject of one country 
 who, under directions from the legal authorities thereof, commits 
 homicide in another country in time of peace, may be prosecuted in 
 the courts of the latter country as a murderer, even though his sover- 
 eign approves his conduct by adopting the directions under which 
 he did it as a lawful act of governments^ And in such case the 
 jurisdiction of the courts of the latter country is not superseded 
 by the fact that the whole matter has become a matter of diplomatic 
 negotiation between the two countries. ^^ 
 
 485. In the discharge of military duty in war. — It is legal for a 
 soldier to kill an alien enemy in the heat and excitement of war. ^ 
 And the acts of a subordinate officer or soldier, in compliance with 
 his supposed duty, or of superior orders, are justifiable, and he will 
 be protected against the consequences, unless they are manifestly 
 beyond the scope of his authority, and such that a man of ordinary 
 sense and understanding would know to be illegal, where he acts 
 in good faith and without malice.^ So, rules, laws, and regulations 
 for the efiiciency and discipline of the Army of the United States 
 are matters vested by the Constitution solely in the general govern- 
 ment, and an ofiicer of such government who commits a homicide 
 within the scope of his authority as such oificer cannot be held an- 
 swerable therefor under the criminal laws of another, and different, 
 government.* And the authority of civil officers of the government 
 is subordinated to that of the military officers, when the government, 
 in response to a call for military aid to restore order which the civil 
 officers are unable to maintain, details a military officer, with troops 
 at his command, to perform that duty, so that a soldier killing a per- 
 
 lostate V. Coit, 8 Ohio S. & C. P. Deo. 91 Am. Dec. 272; United States v. Carr, 
 
 62. 1 Woods, 480, Fed. Cas. No. 14,732. 
 
 Where the only danger to be feared A sergeant of the guard in charge of 
 by officers within a building from a mob a person under conviction of a, court- 
 outside is the breaking in of the door martial for conduct prejudicial to mili- 
 the officer in charge is not justified or tary discipline has the right to shoot 
 excused in ordering his men to fire on '>'™ *" prevent an escape, where it can- 
 the crowd in case the door is broken ?°* ^« ^^''^'""Pl'!,!?^^, ^7 °^^^^ means, 
 open, on the ground that he is endeavor- Umted States v. Clark, supra. 
 ing to protect the property belonging to ^f ^ ^^".' ««P»"<»- . ^ ^,, , 
 the public Ibid ^ ^ ^ ^ Murder is an offense against the laws 
 
 ,Jx> i' „ -M-^T-^j 1 TT-11 oTT or of 3, state whether the perpetrator be a 
 
 WpnT^^^ ^7 ^^ ; L ' ' "^^^"^ "^ ^°1<1'" '» time of poace, but it 
 
 V^kf »^ °°'y ^° ""^^"^^ ^Sainst the laws of the 
 
 ,ol i. n i lo -Kr- o^, r,; «,T United States when committed in time 
 
 iState V. Gut, 13 Minn. 341, Gil. 315. of civil war, insurrection, or rebellion, 
 
 2Re Fair, 100 Fed. 149; United States ^here the perpetrator is in the military 
 
 v. Cla/k, 31 Fed. 710; McCall v. Mc- service of the United States and sub- 
 
 Dowell, 1 Abb. (U. S.) 212, Fed. Cas. ject to the Articles of War. State v. 
 
 No. 8,673; Riggs v. State, 3 Coldw. 85, Rankin, 4 Coldw. 145. 
 
732 HOMICIDE. [§ 485 
 
 son under his orders cannot be punished by the civil authorities.'* 
 Nor can officers of the United States in charge of a war vessel, 
 charged with taking the life of a seaman, claimed by them to have 
 been in the rightful exercise of their authority, be held for trial by 
 a court of civil jurisdiction, where cognizance thereof has been taken 
 by a court-martial.® And the killing of a person by a soldier under 
 orders from a superior office is not unlawful, where such killing, 
 or a serious wounding, was apparently necessary to the suppression 
 of a mutiny, then and there existing, or a disorder which threatened 
 speedily to ripen into a mutiny.* And the principle of law that 
 when men are assembled for an illegal purpose the commission of 
 any offense by one of the party is the act of the whole is not ap- 
 plicable to a soldier entering the military service, and he cannot 
 be held liable for the killing of a person, unless it was his act, or 
 he aided and abetted it.^ 
 
 But while an alien enemy may be killed in the heat and excite- 
 ment of war, it is murder to kill him after he has laid down his 
 arms, and especially when he is in prison.* And if a court-martial 
 order a man to be flogged where they have no jurisdiction, and the 
 flogging kills the man, the members who concurred in that order 
 are guilty of murder.^ And so is an officer or marine of a warship 
 who kills a man for resisting an unlawful impressment.*" Nor is 
 it anything less than murder when a ship's sentinel shoots a man 
 because he persists in approaching the ship when he has been ordered 
 not to do so, unless such an act was necessary for the ship's safety, 
 though the sentinel acted under the mistaken apprehension that it 
 was his duty. * ' And the order of a nation at war directing the 
 destruction of property or life of its enemy within the territory of 
 a neutral power is void and affords no protection to persons acting 
 
 <Com. ex rel. Wadaworth v. Shortall, eUnited States v. Carr, 1 Woods, 480, 
 
 206 Pa. 165, 65 L.R.A. 193, 98 Am. St. Fed. Cas. No. 14.732. 
 
 Eep. 759, 55 Atl. 95i!. 'Rigga v. State, 3 Coldw. 85, 91 Am. 
 
 And a private soldier who has been Dee. 272. 
 
 stationed to guard a residence which, sState v. Gut, 13 Minn. 341, Gil. 315. 
 
 during a time of rioting and disorder, 'Warden v. Bailey, 4 Taunt. 77. 
 
 has been dynamited, and against which And if a sentinel stationed at the gate 
 
 threats had been made to repeat the oi"- of a fort should wantonly shoot a oivil- 
 
 fense, with orders to shoot and kill any ian endeavoring to enter in the daytime, 
 
 person found prowling about the house, or if an officer should recklessly slay a 
 
 is guilty of no crime if he shoots a per- soldier for some misconduct or breach of 
 
 son approaching the building and re- discipline, no supposed obligation on hia 
 
 fusing to obey his command to halt, part to do so would excuse it. United 
 
 Ibid. S-iates v. Clark, 31 Fed. 710. 
 
 sUnited States v. Mackenzie, 1 N. Y. loi East, P. C. 313. 
 
 Legal Obs. 371. llR— v. Thomas, 1 Russell, Crimea, 614 
 
: 485] BY OFFICERS OF JUSTICE. 733 
 
 under it** And a plea of an Indian war by members of Indian 
 tribes living -within the bounds and under the . protection of an or-> 
 ganized territorial government will not secure immunity for acts 
 of treachery and murder committed by individual Indians belonging 
 to such tribes, living among white people in a part of the country 
 not involved in hostility.*^ Nor does the mere fact that a person 
 killing another was sergeant of the guard at a fort, and the person 
 killed was at the time a private soldier therein, of itself make the 
 killing a lawful homicide. ^ * And if an order given by a superior 
 military officer is illegal in itself, and not justified by the rules and 
 usages of war, so that a person of ordinary sense and understanding 
 would know when he heard it that it was illegal, it will afford no 
 protection in a prosecution for homicide.^" 
 
 Under constitutional provisions declaring that the military shall 
 be in strict subordination to the civil power, however, a military 
 officer when called in aid of the civil authorities has no power to 
 act independently thereof; they can act as an armed police subject 
 to the exclusive control and direction of the civil authorities, but 
 the latter cannot delegate any discretionary power to take any in- 
 dependent step, though they have discretion as to the best methods 
 of carrying out their orders from civil authorities. * " The question 
 whether homicide is justifiable or excusable on the facts as an act of 
 war is one of fact for the jury in a prosecution therefor. ^^ And 
 the trial and acquittal of a soldier of the United States by court- 
 
 JSPeople V. McLeod, 1 Hill, 377, 25 er for the purpose of protecting the 
 
 Wend. 483, 37 Am. Dec. 328. prisoner and the public property, and 
 
 isYelm Jim v. Territory, 1 Wash, he cannot legally take life in accomplish- 
 
 Terr. 63. ing these ends, unless, by a prudent and 
 
 In Yelm Jim v. Territory, supra, it reasonable exercise of his faculties, he 
 was said to be doubtful whether a tribe believes it to be necessary and proper 
 of Indians living within the bounds and to accomplish tha purpose in hand; and 
 under the protection of an organized that a colonel of a regiment of a state 
 territorial government have such a na- national guard is not a public officer in 
 tional character that they can, at their such case, and is entitled to none of the 
 will, make war and claim immunity for usual presumptions in favor of the legal- 
 acts of indiscriminate homicide on the ity of the acts of public olEcers; and 
 plea of legal hostility. that if he act solely in his capacity as 
 
 i^United States v. Carr, 1 Woods, a military officer performing orders 
 
 480, Fed. Cas. No. 14,732. given by the civil authorities, and not as 
 
 iBRiggs v. State, 3 Coldw. 85, 91 Am. an individual in self-defense or in pre- 
 
 Dec. 272; United States v. Carr, supra, venting a felony or in dispersing a riot, 
 
 1 estate v. Coit, 8 Ohio S. & C P. Dec. the rightfulness or wron^ulness of his 
 
 62. conduct is to be measured by the rules 
 
 In State v. Coit, supra, it was held which govern the conduct of military 
 
 that a military officer called upon by officers while acting in aid of the civil 
 
 the civil authorities to quell a riot and authorities, 
 prevent a lynching is under duty to use iTPeople v. McLeod, supra. 
 only such force as is necessary and prop- 
 
734 HOMICIDE. [5 485 
 
 martial for homicide is not a bar to an inquiry and prosecution as 
 to the crime by the proper civil authorities.^* 
 
 II. In peeseevation of the peace. 
 
 486. How far justifiable. — As has been already observed, if officers 
 of the law, when engaged in the preservation of the peace, find it 
 necessary to take life, such homicide is justifiable. And felonious 
 rioters resisting lawful authority may be slain with impunity by 
 officers of justice in the lawful execution of their duty to suppress 
 riots. ^ Nor is the rule confined to the instant the officer is on the 
 spot, and at the scene of action, engaged in the business which 
 brought him thither, for he is under the same protection going to, 
 remaining at, or returning from the same ; and, therefore, if he went 
 to do his office, and, meeting great opposition, retired and in the 
 retreat was killed, this will amount to murder. He went in obedi- 
 ence to the law, and in the execution of his office, and his retreat was 
 necessary to avoid the danger which threatened him. And upon 
 the same principle, if he met with opposition by the way, and was 
 killed before he came to the place, such opposition being intended 
 to prevent his doing his duty, which is a fact to be collected from 
 the circumstances appearing in evidence, this will amount to mur- 
 der. He was strictly in the execution of his office, going to dis- 
 charge the duty the law required of him. It follows from these 
 premises that if such an officer successfully resists those who seek 
 to obstruct and hinder him from proceeding to the lawful execution 
 of his duty, he is justified, even should the lives of the assailants, 
 their aiders and abetters, be taken, from the necessary extent of 
 the resistance so made.^ And evidence of conduct upon the part 
 of a person calculated to provoke a fight or riot is admissible in an 
 action against a peace officer for shooting such person, as part of 
 
 isRe Fair, 100 Fed. 149; United ing on the street after a specified time. 
 
 States V. Clark, 31 Fed. 710. without reasonable excuse, is not admis- 
 
 Great weight, however, should bo sible in evidence in a prosecution 
 
 given to the finding of a court-martial against a marshal for killing a person 
 
 in a homicide case as an expression of in an attempt to arrest him, where the 
 
 the opinion of a military guard on the arrest was made for disorderly conduct, 
 
 question of the magnitude of the otTense. and no claim is made that the officer 
 
 United States v. Clark, supra. was undertaking to enforce the or- 
 
 iRe Riots of 1844, 2 Clark (Pa.) 275. dinanee. Davis v. Com. 25 Ky L Rep. 
 
 And see State v. McNally, 87 Mo. 644. 1426, 77 S. W. 1101. 
 
 And an ordinance against persons be- sKing, P. J., Re Riota of 1844, supra. 
 
S 4861 BY OFFICERS OF JUSTICE. 735 
 
 the res gestw, when a scuffle ensued from such conduct and the 
 shooting occurred immediately afterwards;* 
 
 III. In effecting an aeeest. 
 
 a. General rules. 
 
 487. As tp criminal liability. — As a general principle, officers of 
 the law, when their authority to arrest or imprison is resisted, will 
 be justified in opposing force to force, even if death shouli be the 
 consequence;* and while the law will generally presume murder in 
 the second degree from the simple act of killing, an instruction to 
 that effect should not be given in a prosecution against an officer 
 for killing a person while seeking to arrest him.^ But they ought 
 not to come to extremities upon every slight resistance, without 
 a reasonable necessity.* If they should kill where no resistance is 
 made, it will be murder ; and the same rule will exist if they should 
 kill a party after the resistance is over and the necessity has ceased, 
 provided that sufficient time has elapsed for the blood to have cooled. * 
 The mere fact that a person seeking to arrest another, and using 
 force in order to do so, was an officer and was engaged in the execu- 
 tion of his official duty does not render such use of force justifiable.^ 
 
 488. As to effect of official character and action ^An officer charged 
 
 with preserving peace and good order, and maintaining the suprem- 
 acy of the law, and executing its mandates, must, of necessity, act 
 on the aggressive in many instances, and is not confined in the use 
 of physical force to that which may be lawfully used by a private 
 person in his relations with others; he is clothed with authority to 
 exert such force as may be necessary to the proper performance 
 of the functions of his office, though death may result. •" And where 
 the statute makes it justifiable homicide for an officer, acting as 
 such, to kill a person in specified cases, it is error in a prosecution 
 for such a killing for the court in its instructions to ignore the 
 officer's official character. ^ So while, under a constitutional pro- 
 
 aPetrie v. Cartwright, 114 Ky. 103, 31 East, P. C. 297. 
 
 59 L.R.A. 720, 102 Am. St. Rep. 274, 70 41 Hale, P. C. 481; Fost. C. L. 291. 
 
 S. W. 297. BGolden v. State, 1 S. C. N. S. 292; 
 
 11 Bl. Com. 180; State v. Garrett, 60 State v. Lane, 158 Mo. 572, 59 S. W. 
 
 N. C. (1 Winst. L.) 144. 84 Am. Dec. 967. 
 
 359; Wolf V. State, 19 Ohio St. 252; iState v. Dierberger, supra; State v. 
 
 State V. Anderson, 1 Hill, L. 327 ; MeNally, 87 Mo. 044 ; Bowman v. Com. 
 
 Queen v. Dadson, 2 Den. C. C. 35. 9G Ky. 8, 27 S. W. 870. 
 
 2State V. Dierberger, 96 Mo. 666, 9 2State v. MeNally, supra. 
 Am. St. Rep. 380, 10 S. W. 168. 
 
736 HOMICIDE. CJ 488 
 
 vision requiring all officers before entering upon the discharge of 
 their duties to take and subscribe to an oath or affirmation to sup- 
 port the Constitution and faithfully demean themselves, an officer 
 who has not taken such oath is not an officer de jure, he is an officer 
 de facto; and where he kills a man in an attempt to arrest him, the 
 jury in a prosecution for the killing should be instructed upon the 
 theory that he was an officer.^ 
 
 An erroneous failure to call attention to the accused's official char- 
 acter in instructing the jury in a prosecution against him for homi- 
 cide, however, is not reversible error where it was admitted that 
 he was an officer, and the fact was testified to by several witnesses 
 without contradiction. * And that the deceased was not guilty of the 
 charge contained in a warrant issued for his arrest, and placed in 
 the hands of a proper officer for execution, is of no effect in a prose- 
 cution against the officer for killing the person sought to be arrested, 
 alleged to have been done necessarily in overcoming his resistance, 
 that being a matter cognizable only in a direct proceeding by the 
 court having jurisdiction of the offense charged in the warrant.'' 
 'EoY is an instruction in such a prosecution that a certain finding 
 should be made if certain things are proved beyond a reasonable 
 doubt, among which is that defendant, at the time of the homi- 
 cide, was an officer in the exercise of his official duty, subject to 
 objection that his official character was a matter of defense, and that 
 he was required to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt." A surety 
 on a bail bond occupies the same position toward the person for 
 whom he is surety, and has the same rights and privileges, that an 
 officer has when acting under a warrant on a charge of a misde- 
 meanor; and where such a surety endeavors to surrender the per^ 
 son giving the bail and is resisted, he has a right to use all reason- 
 able means to take him to the jailer for the purpose of relieving 
 himself from liability on the bond, and need not flee to avoid or 
 avert danger, but may meet force with force. ^ And the refusal of 
 the jailer to take the custody of the person sought to be surrendered 
 does not affect the right of the surety thereafter to hold him.® 
 
 estate v. Dierberger, 90 Mo. 369, 2 S. sRoten v. State, 31 Fla. 514, 12 So. 
 
 W. 286, 96 Mo. 666, 9 Am. St. Rep. 380, 910. 
 
 10 S. W. 168. And see State v. Cole- sPeople v. Adams, 85 Cal. 231, 24 Paa 
 
 man, 186 Mo. 151, 69 L.R.A. 381, 84 S. 629. 
 W. 978. 7Finney v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 785, 
 
 <Davi3 V. Com. 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1426, 82 S. W. 636. 
 77 S. W. 1101. «lbid. 
 
S 489] BY OFFICERS OF JUSTICE. 737 
 
 b. Use of force in making arrest generally. 
 
 489. For felony. — Any peace officer, or even a private person, pres- 
 ent when a felony is committed, is bound by law to arrest the felon, 
 and may justify killing him when he cannot otherwise be taken.'' 
 And it is his duty to make such arrest, either with or without a 
 warrant.^ And the person seeking to arrest a felon need not en- 
 gage with him on equal terms, but may overcome resistance by supe- 
 rior force. ^ Nor does the fact that the discharge of an ofBcer's pistol 
 while he was attempting to arrest a person was accidental instead 
 of intentional affect his right to justify the shooting, where the per- 
 son sought to be arrested was killed, on the ground that it was nec- 
 essary in order to effect the arrest.* And an honest and non-negli- 
 gent belief that a felony is about to be perpetrated will extenuate 
 a homicide committed in prevention of it, though the slayer was 
 but a private citizen.^ And where a person was shot while resist- 
 ing the service upon him of legal process by a legally authorized 
 officer, the latter cannot be convicted of manslaughter in a degree 
 defined by statute to include every other killing of a human being 
 by the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of another, not justi- 
 fiable or excusable, and not declared to be murder or manslaughter 
 in some other degree; since, if the killing was necessary, he Avas 
 guilty of no crime, and if he acted unnecessarily, he would be guilty 
 of another degree of manslaughter under the statute.® It has been 
 held, however, that where no process has been issued, a homicide 
 by an officer seeking to make an arrest can only be justified by show- 
 ing the actual commission of a felony, and that there was positive 
 necessity to take life in order to arrest or detain the felon.'' 
 
 499. For misdemeanor — The security of persons and property is 
 endangered by a bad offender being at large, as in case of a felon; 
 but the taking of human life in the name of the law is a punishment 
 
 iBrooks V. Com. 61 Pa. 352, 100 Am. v. State, 17 Ala. 587 ; Dill v. State, 25 
 
 Dec. 645; People v. Adams, supra; State Ala. 15; 1 East. P. C. 25!). 
 V. Dugan, Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) sDolierty v. State, 84 Wis. 152, 53 N. 
 
 563; Lamma v. State, 46 Neb. 236, 64 W. 1120. 
 
 N. W. 956; Conraddy v. People, 5 Park. 'Conraddy v. People, 5 Park. Crim. 
 
 Grim. Rep. 234. ^^I"- V^'^-^. 
 
 zPeople V. Adams, supra; State v. Under this rule, where an ofBcer kills 
 
 Bryunt, 65 N. C. 327; North Carolina v. ^ person he is seeking to arrest it is 
 
 r.„™„ii nA v^A niA "°t ^ defense to show that he had rea- 
 
 Gosnell 74 Fed. 734. sonaWe ground to believe that the per- 
 
 sState V. Bryant, and North Carolina ^^^ ^jUgj j,^^ ^een guilty of a felony, 
 
 V. Gosnell, supra. and that he had reasonable ground to be- 
 
 4 State V. McNally, 87 Mo. 644. lieve that the deceased would otherwise 
 
 ePond V. People, 8 Mich. 150; Oliver effect an escape. Ibid. 
 Horn.— 47 
 
738 HOMICIDE. [§ 490 
 
 inflicted after conviction for the highest grade of felony only, and 
 it would ill become the law to justify such a sacrifice to avoid a 
 failure of justice in not arresting one charged with a misdemeanor, 
 when, if taken and convicted, a sentence of fine or imprisonment on- 
 ly could be imposed.^ And an oflicer making an arrest for a mis- 
 demeanor cannot take the life of the accused or inflict upon him 
 great bodily harm, except to save his own life or prevent like harm 
 to himself.^ And he must not use any greater force than is ap- 
 parently and reasonably necessary for his protection.^ But the 
 act of an ofiicer in killing a person in arresting him for a misde- 
 meanor will amount only to manslaughter where the killing was 
 not intended.'* And in making an arrest for a misdemeanor the 
 ofiicer may exert such physical force as is necessary to effect the 
 arrest by overcoming the resistance he encounters, or to subdue the 
 efforts of the prisoner to escape.® He may oppose force to force, 
 sufficient to overcome it even to taking life, where the offender puts 
 his life in jeopardy;® and he is not bound to retreat or give way.'' 
 And if he uses no more force than is reasonably necessary to ac- 
 complish the arrest, he should be acquitted on a prosecution for kill- 
 ing the person sought to be arrested.* And the burden of proof 
 rests with the state in such case to show the absence of necessity to 
 kill.» 
 
 491. Resistance as distinguished from mere avoidance. — "While it is 
 the duty of every citizen to submit to lawful arrest, there is a broad 
 distinction on the question of the force which may have been used 
 in resisting the arrest, between active resistance and forcible oppo- 
 sition to arrest, and mere avoidance of a lawful warrant by fleeing 
 from it.^ If a person sought to be arrested turns upon the ofiicer 
 and resists, the ofiicer is protected in the use of a degree of force 
 
 iCom. V. Rhoada, 23 Pa. Super. Ct. Mo. 66'i, Am. St. Rep. 380, 10 S. W. 
 
 512. 168; State v. MeNallj', 87 Mo. 644. 
 
 2Smith V. State, 59 Ark. 132, 43 Am. sHead v. Martin, and Dilger v. Com. 
 
 St. Rep. 20, 26 S'. W. 712; Thomas v. supra. 
 
 Kinkead, 55 Ark. 502, 15 L.R.A. 558, 29 And that a person sought to be ar- 
 
 Am. St. Rep. GS, 18 S. W. 854; Conraddy rested for intoxication and afterwards 
 
 \-. People, supra. killed by an o!ficer, offered to go if he 
 
 sHe-^d V. Martin, 85 Kv. 480. 3 S. W. was permitted to do so. is irrelevant in 
 
 622; Dilger v. Com. 88 Kv. 550, 11 S. a prosecution for the killing. State v. 
 
 W. 651 ; State v. Phillips, l'l9 Iowa, 652, Phillips, .iiiprn. 
 
 07 L.R.A. 292, 94 N. W. 299. 7Smith v. State, 59 Ark. 132, 43 Am. 
 
 41 East, P. C. 302. And see State v. St. Rep. 20, 20 S. W. 712; Com. v. 
 
 Oliver. 2 Houst. (Dn!.! 585- State v. Rhonds, 23 Pa. Super. Ct. 512. 
 
 Phillips (Iowa) 89 N. W. 1092. sState v. Dierberger, supra; Golden 
 
 5Thomas v. Kinkead, and Smith v. v. State, 1 S. C. N. s. 292. 
 
 State, .lupra: Bowman v. Com. 96 Ky. 8, sState v. Dierberger, supra, 
 
 27 S. W. 870; State v. Dierberger, 96 iCom. v. Rhoads, supra. 
 
§ 491] BY OFFICERS OF JUSTICE. "'J 
 
 that a jury would ordinarily consider excessive, if he acts in good 
 faith and without malice.^ And if the officer is obliged to take the 
 life of the person sought to be arrested in self-defense, the homicide 
 is justifiable.* And though the arrest is for a misdemeanor, the 
 officer and his assistants are not only authorized, but bound, to use 
 such force as is necessary to execute the warrant; and if they kill 
 the accused they are entitled to acquittal on the ground that the 
 homicide is justifiable, if no unnecessary force was used.* And 
 he may repel force by force and need not give back.® And though 
 he shoots unnecessarily, he is guilty only of manslaughter under a 
 statute defining it to be the unnecessary killing of another while 
 resisting an attempt by such other to commit a felony or do an 
 unlawful act.® Resistance to an arrest may begin in the use of 
 words which import defiance atid indicate a purpose to use violence 
 if necessary, and after the use of such words the officer may in- 
 stantly employ such a degree of force as is necessary to reduce ihc 
 person using them to submission, and accomplish the arrest. '^ And 
 where threats are made the officer is not bound to wait until the 
 other actually assails him before himself resorting to force; if it 
 is apparent that such person intends and is able to resist with vio- 
 lence, the officer may at once use such force as may appear to be 
 necessary to compel surrender.* And that the person sought to be 
 
 2State V. Sigman, 106 N. C. 728, US. means at hand to effect the arrest may 
 
 E. 520; State v. Mahon, 3 Harr. (Del.) lawfully take the slave's life under cir- 
 
 56S ; Com. v. Max, 8 Phila. 422 ; Plasters cumstances which would render any oth- 
 
 V. State, 1 Tex. App. 673. And see Ter- er homicide justifiablfe on the ground of 
 
 rltory v. Gutierez (N. M.) 79 Pac. 716. self-defense. Morton v. Bradley, 30 
 
 stjnited States ex rel. Roberts v. Fay- Ala. 683. 
 ette County Jailer, 2 Abb. (U. S.) 265, ecieraents v. State, 50 Ala. 117; Lin- 
 Fed. Cas. No. 15.463. die v. Com. supra; Com. v. Rhoads, 23 
 
 4State V. Garrett. 60 N. C. (1 Winst. Pa. Super. Ct. 512; Com. v. Weathers, 
 
 L.) 144, 84 Am. i)ee. 359; People v. 7 Kulp, 1; North Carolina v. Gosnell, 
 
 Brooks, 131 Cal. 311, 63 Pac. 464; Lin- supra. 
 
 die V. Com. Ill Ky. 866, 64 S. W. 986; sMesmer v. Com. 26 Gratt. 976. 
 
 State V. Coleman, 86 Mo. 151, 69 L.R.A. TRamsey v. State, 92 Ga. 53, 17 S. E. 
 
 381, 84 R. W. 978; Mesmer v. Com. 26 613. 
 
 Gratt. 976; Re Riots of 1844, 2 Clark Revenue officers seeking to arrest a 
 (Pa.) 275; State v. McNally, 87 Mo. man for violation of the revenue laws, 
 644; Com. v. Rhoads, 23 Pa. Super. Ct. who shoot and kill him, cannot be held 
 513; Plasters v. State, supra; North guilty of murder where the deceased re- 
 Carolina V. Gosnell, 74 Fed. 734; Mac- ceived the bullet shot while in ambush, 
 kalley's Case.. 9 Coke, 65b. from which he had fired upon the reve- 
 
 Where a runaway slave resists appre- nue officers, and at or immediately after 
 
 hension and presents a hostile attitude, the time of the discharge by himself 
 
 his captor is not bound to desist from or and his comrades of their weapons at the 
 
 abandon the arrest, but may press for- officers. State v. Port, 3 Fed. 124. 
 
 ward in the prosecution of his purpose, sRamsey v. State, supra. 
 and after using all reasonably available 
 
740 HOMICIDE. [I 491 
 
 arrested pulled away from the officer and proposed to argue the 
 matter is evidence on the question of justification.® 
 
 But a mere attitude of defiance or preparation to resist, not 
 amounting to an assault, on the part of a person sought to be arrest- 
 ed, does not justify the officer seeking to make the arrest in killing 
 laim. ^ " And an officer is not justified in shooting a person whom he 
 sought to arrest, and who had put himself in resistance, where at 
 the time of the shooting he had abandoned his purpose of resisting 
 and was attempting to make good his escape by moving off. ^ ^ Wheth- 
 er a person shot by an officer in an attempt to arrest him was then 
 acting in resistance to the death, of the execution of the law, or 
 whether he had abandoned his deadly purpose of resisting and was 
 attempting to make his escape by moving off, is a question for the 
 jury in a prosecution for the killing. ^^ 
 
 c. Use of force in checking flight. 
 
 492. In case of felony. — By the common law it is lawful to kill 
 a fleeing felon where he cannot otherwise be taken, flight being 
 tantamount to resistance. ^ And statutes making homicide justifiable 
 when necessarily Committed in arresting a felon fleeing from justice 
 are merely declaratory of the common law, and warrant killing a 
 fleeing felon where he cannot otherwise be taken. ^ And generally 
 an officer, in making an arrest in a case of felony, may use such force 
 as is necessary to capture the felon, even to killing him when in 
 flight.^ Even a private person is justified in killing a fleeing felon 
 who cannot otherwise be taken, if he can prove that the person is 
 actually guilty of the felony;* though such a homicide is not justi- 
 fied unless special authority be given, or the pursuit be conducted 
 according to law.^ 
 
 'Stephens v. Com. 20 Kj. L. Rep. 544, zJackson v. State, supra. 
 
 47 S. W. 229. sState v. Eoane, 13 N. C. (2 Der. L.) 
 
 The admission in evidenoe in a pro=!e- 58; Rex v. Hagan, 8 Car. & P. 167; 
 
 cution against an officer for homicide, United States v. Travers, 2 Wheeler, C. 
 
 of a statement of the person shot by him C. 510, Fed. Cas. No. 16,537 ; Head v. 
 
 in an attempt to arrest him, that he did Martin, 85 Ky. 480, 3 S. W. 622 ; Dilafer 
 
 not think the officer was going to shoot, v. Com. 8S Ky. 550, 11 S. W. 651; 
 
 if erroneous is not material or reverai- Thomas v. Kinkead, 55 Ark. 502, 15 L. 
 
 ble error. Ibid. R.A. 558, 29 Am. St. Rep. 08. 18 S. W. 
 
 lOClements v. State, supra. 854; Carr v. State, 43 Ark. 99; Com. v. 
 
 liState V. Garrett, 60 N. C. (1 Winst. Long, 17 Pa. Super. Ct. 641. 
 
 L.) 144, 84 Am. Dec. 359, 1 East, P. C. 4Com. v. Long, and Carr v. State, 
 
 525; State v. Port, supra. supra. 
 
 isState V. Garrett, supra. sState v. Rutherford, 8 N. C. (1 
 
 ijackson v. State, 66 Miss. 89, 14 Am. Hawks) 457, 9 Am. Dec. 658; Com. v. 
 St. Rep. 542, 5 So. 690; Rex v. Finnu- 
 cane. Craw. & D. (Ir.) 1. 
 
§■492] BY OFFICERS OF JUSTICE. 741 
 
 If the felon may be taken in any case without such severity, how- 
 ever, killing him is, at least, manslaughter.® Nor can the killing 
 of a fleeing man sought to be arrested without a warrant, upon a 
 suspicion of having committed a felony, be justified unless there 
 was proof that the felony was in fact committed. '^ And officers are 
 criminally responsible for killing a fleeing man to prevent his escape 
 from arrest, though he had previously attacked them, where he had 
 desisted from his attack at the time.® And it has been held that 
 the right of a private citizen to kill a felon extends only to felonies 
 which are capital, or constitute a personal offense, such as murder 
 or rape;® and does not give a right to kill a person guilty of a felony 
 of an inferior grade, in which the person is not endangered, such as 
 theft. ^^ 
 
 493. In case of misdemeanor. — An officer has no right to shoot a 
 person who is merely running away from him without committing 
 any violence, when imder arrest or to avoid arrest for a misde- 
 meanor.^ He must, at least, stop short of force which will result 
 in the sacrifice of human life;^ and a killing in such case is man- 
 slaughter at least.* And where the killing is voluntary, it is mur- 
 der, usually in the second degree.* ISTor is a peace officer acting 
 without a warrant, who kills a fleeing person who refused to stop 
 when commanded to do so, on suspicion that he is guilty of a felony, 
 
 Selfridge, Horrigan & T. Cas. 1 ; Rex v. 274, 70 S. W. 297 ; State v. Coleman, 186 
 
 Howarth, 1 Moody, C. C. 207; Rex v. Mo. 151, 69 L.R.A. 381, 84 S. W. 978; 
 
 Williams, 1 Moody, C. C. 387; Rex v. Com. v. Greer, 20 Pa. Co. Ct. 535; State 
 
 LoDgden, Russ. & R. C. C. 228. v. Anderson, 1 Hill, L. 327 ; North Caro- 
 
 6Thomas v. Kinkead, 55 Ark. 502, 15 lina v. Gosnell, 74 Fed. 734. 
 L.R.A. 558, 29 Am. St. Rep. 68, 18 S. Killing a man who was out at night 
 W. 854. dressed in white to represent a ghost. 
 An officer who kills one for whom he for the purpose of frightening persons 
 had a warrant for felony must satisfy in the neighborhood, cannot be excused 
 the jury trying him that he tried, in on the ground that he could not other- 
 good faith, with reasonable prudence and wise be taken. Rex v. Smith, 3 Russell, 
 caution, to make the arrest, and was un- Crimes, 6th ed. 132. 
 
 able because of flight to secure the ac- 2 Stephens v. Com. 20 Ky. L. Rep. 544, 
 
 cused, and that he resorted to the means 47 S. W. 229. 
 
 employed only after all other proper 3 State v. Sigman, 106 N. C. 728, 11 
 
 means had failed. Jackson v. State, 66 S. E. 520. 
 
 Miss. 89, 14 Am. St. Rep. 542, 5 So. 690. A verdict of guilty of homicide Is 
 
 'Com. V. Greer, 20 Pa. Co. Ct. 535. justified by evidence that a deputy sher- 
 
 8 State V. Port, 3 Fed. 124; State v. iff with a, warrant for a person for a 
 
 Garrett, 60 N. C. (1 Winst. L.) 144, 84 misdemeanor shot and killed him while 
 
 Am. Dec. 359. he was fleeing to avoid arrest, when he 
 
 sState v. Bryant, 65 N. C. 327. had never been in actual custody, and 
 
 lolbid. when he was without firearms, and aid 
 
 iBrown v. Weaver, 76 Miss. 7, 42 L. not physicallv resist the officer. Com. v. 
 
 E.A. 423, 71 Am. St. Rep. 512, 23 So. Rhoades, 23 Pa. Super. Ct. 512. 
 
 388; Head v. Martin, 85 Ky. 480, 3 S. 4Williams v. State, 44 Ala. 41; Cald- 
 
 W. 624; Petrie v. Cartwright, 114 Ky. well v. State, 41 Tex. 86; Scott v. State 
 
 103, 69 L.R.A. 720, 102 Am. St. Rep. (Tex. Grim. App.) 85 S. W. 1060. 
 
742 HOMICIDK [§ 493 
 
 relieved from crimina] liability, where the criminal act was, in fact, 
 only a misdemeanor.^ And a person attempting to arrest a rim- 
 away slave has no right to kill him to prevent his escape, unless 
 he is in danger from resistance, as by assaulting or striking." And 
 this is the rule though the person seeking to make the arrest was 
 a constable having a warrant.'^ 
 
 Whenever a party legally liable to arrest, by his conduct puts in 
 jeopardy the life of anyone attempting to arrest him, however, he 
 may be killed, and the killing will be excusable.* And while it is 
 murder, as a general rule, to kill a party accused of a misdemeanor 
 for fleeing from aiTest, though he cannot be othermse taken, fla- 
 grant misdemeanors, as where a dangerous wound has been inflicted, 
 or a riot exists, are an exception to the rule, since in such cases 
 the presumption is great that the offense may turn out to be a 
 felony.* And where the person sought to be arrested has put him- 
 self in resistance to the ofiicer's authority, and afterwards moves 
 away, retaining his arms, the officer is not bound to risk his life 
 by running after him, where it still appears to be his purpose to 
 resist and make a running fight. ^" 
 
 d. Use of force in preventing escape or rescue. 
 
 494. In case of felony — ^The general rule is that an officer having 
 custody of a person charged with felony may take his life if it be- 
 comes absolutely necessary to do so to prevent his escape.^ And 
 where an officer has a person in custody under lawful arrest, and 
 other persons attempt to rescue him from such custody, the officer, 
 in resisting such attempt, will be protected in the use of force that 
 a jury would ordinarily consider excessive, if he is acting in good 
 
 sPetrie ^. Cartwriglit, supra. mit himself to examination, any free- 
 
 sMorton v. Bradley, 30 Ala. 683; Ar- holder may arrest him, and if he at- 
 
 thur V. Wells, 2 Mill, Const. 314. tempts to make his escape, the freehold- 
 
 'Middleton v. Holmes, 3 Port. (Ala.) er is authorized to make use of arms. 
 
 424. Duperrier v. Dautrive, 12 La. Ann. 664. 
 
 But where a slave is hailed by mem- sgtate v. Anderson, 1 Hill, L. 327. 
 
 bers of a patrol company on duty, and sCom. v. Max, 8 Phila. 422. 
 
 repeatedly called upon to stop, and is mState v. Garrett, GO N. C. (1 Winst. 
 
 fired upon by them after they have L.) 144, 84 Am. Dee. 359. 
 
 every reason to suspect that he will lUnited States v. Clark, 31 Fed. 710; 
 
 otherwise effect his escape and cannot be United IStntes ex rel. Roberts v. Fayette 
 
 overtaken by pursuit, they are justified County Jailer, 2 Abb. (U. S.) 265, Fed. 
 
 in the act, where it is without a deliber- Cas. 1\6. 15.463; Thomas v. Kinkead, 55 
 
 ate intention to kill, by a statute pro- Ark. 502, 15 L.R.A. 558, 29 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 viding that, if any slave shall be found 08, 18 S. W. 854; Conraddy v. People, 5 
 
 absent from his usual place of work or Park. Crim. Rep. 234; Com. v. Max, 
 
 residence, without some white person ac- nupra; 1 East, P. C. 302. 
 companying hitp. ajid shall refuse to sub- 
 
S 494] BY OFFICERS OF JUSTICE. 743 
 
 faith and without malice.^ And he has authority to arrest the at- 
 tempted rescuers, and to use force to make such arrests, even to the 
 extent of killing.* 
 
 OiEcers whose duty it is to make arrests, however, are not ordi- 
 narily authorized to use firearms or dangerous weapons, and they 
 are not ordinarily excusable for killing the person sought to be ar- 
 rested in an attempt to escape, though he is charged with a felony, 
 where with diligence and caution he could have been otherwise held. * 
 And a guard in charge of a number of penitentiary convicts, who 
 were engaged in emptying and filling cans of water from a river, 
 who saw one of them fall into the stream, and, knowing that he 
 was not attempting to escape, but was making efforts to return, 
 nevertheless fired upon and killed him, is guilty of murder.^ The 
 criminality of the act of an ofilcer in killing a prisoner held for 
 felony, who sought to escape, is the same whether he held the prison- 
 er before or after judgment." 
 
 495. In case of misdemeanor. — The force or violence which an officer 
 may lawfully use to prevent the escape of a person arrested for a 
 misdemeanor is no greater than that which might have been right- 
 fully employed to effect his arrest.^ And an officer having in his 
 custody a prisoner accused of a misdemeanor may not take his life 
 if he attempts to break away, though no other means are available 
 to prevent his escape.^ And where a person is arrested or held in 
 custody for a misdemeanor, and attempts to escape, it is murder 
 in the officer, as a general rule, to kill him ; * 'though it will be only 
 manslaughter if it appears that death was not intended.* So, where 
 
 2State V. Rollins, 113 N. C. 722, 18 5Jackson v. State, 76 Ga. 473. 
 
 S. E. 394. sReneau v. State, supra. 
 
 sjbid.; Com. v. Megary, 8 Phila. 607. iThomas v. Kinkead, 55 Ark. 502, 15 
 
 4Reiieau v. State, 2 Lea, 720, 31 Am. L.R.A. 558, 29 Am. St. Rep. 68, 18 S. 
 
 Rep. 626. W. 854. 
 
 And if an officer was apprised that his 2lbid. ; Smith v. State, 59 Ark. 132, 
 prisoner contemplated an escape, the 43 Am. St. Rep. 20, 26 S. W. 712: Hand- 
 jury in a prosecution against the officer ley v. State, 96 Ala. 48, 38 Am. St. Rep. 
 for killing the prisoner are warranted in 81, 11 So. 322; State v. Smith, 127 
 finding that the killing was not iusti- Iowa, 534, 70 L.R.A. 246, 101 N. W. 110; 
 fiable, where it appears that the prison- Head v. Martin, 85 Ky. 480, 3 S. W. 624 ; 
 er was within the walls of the jail, and Conraddy v. People, 5 Park. Crim. Rep. 
 he is not shown to have been armed, and 234 ; Skidmore v. State, 2 Tex. App. 20 ; 
 his escape could have been prevented by United States v. Clark, 31 Fed. 710; 
 closing the outside door, or by putting Forster's Case. 1 Lewin, C. C. 187. And 
 him in a cell, or by otherwise securing see State v. Phillips (Iowa) 89 N. W. 
 him; and it does "not appear that he 1092; State v. Moore, 39 Conn. 244. 
 failed to comply with a request to halt, sReneau v. State, 2 Lea, 720, 31 Am. 
 or that the fatal shot was not flred after Rep. 626. 
 he had complied. Lamma v. State, 46 4Ibirl. 
 Neb. 236, 64 N. \y. 956. In Handley v. State, supra, however. 
 
744 HOMICIDE. [§ 495 
 
 an officer without a warrant arrests a man who is guilty of no offense, 
 and in preventing an escape kills him, a conviction of involuntary 
 manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act is justified. ° 
 And an officer with a prisoner in charge, who is struck by a third 
 person, and who kills the latter, not to prevent an escape, but be- 
 cause of the blow, is guilty of manslaughter." It has been held, 
 however, that after an accused person has been arrested, an officer 
 is justified in using the amount of force necessary to detain him in 
 custody, and may kill the prisoner to prevent an escape, if necessary, 
 whether he was charged with felony or misdemeanor.'' 
 
 e. Use of force in recapture. 
 
 496. Generally. — ^A sheriff or any other person having prisoners in 
 charge, or any person acting by his authority, has the right to re- 
 capture a prisoner escaping from lawful arrest and custody, and has 
 the right to use such force as may be necessary to overcome resist- 
 ance to his lawful authority in making such recapture. ^ But where 
 a prisoner charged with a misdemeanor has already escaped, an of- 
 ficer cannot lawfully use any means to recapture him that he would 
 not have been justified in employing in making the first arrest; 
 and if, in pursuit, he intentionally kills him, it is murder.^ And 
 a statute providing that, on escaping, a prisoner under sentence of 
 death or imprisonment in the penitentiary may be killed by the 
 officer having legal control over him, if his escape can be prevented 
 in no other way, applies only to original arrests and to prevention 
 of escape, and not to rearrest after an entire escape, and does not 
 give an officer attempting such rearrest the same authority to kill 
 in order to prevent escape that it gives to an officer having the legal 
 custody of a convict who is attempting to escape.^ 
 
 497. Of escaped convicts. — The duty of a guard or person in charge 
 of penitentiary convicts is to safely keep them and prevent their es- 
 cape, and if he is justified in believing that one of them is attempting 
 
 it was held that where a person called BO'Connor v. State, 64 Ga. 127, 37 Am. 
 
 upon by an officer to assist in arresting Rep. 58. 
 
 a misdemeanant shoots him to prevent ^Williams v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 an epcane, the jury in a prosecution for 365, 54 S. W. 759. 
 
 the killing will not be justified in find- 'Stnte v. Sigman, 106 N. C. 728, 11 
 
 Insr him guilty of manslaug^iter only, or S. E. 5?0. 
 
 authorised to conclude that he did not iJames v. State, 44 Tex. 314. 
 
 entertain the formed design to kill zStnte v. Sigman, supra. 
 
 which is necessary in murder, since the sWright v. State, 44 Tex. 645. 
 
 law presumes the design from the fact 
 
 that he intentionally used a deadly 
 
 weapon with » fatal result. 
 
§ 497J BY OFFICERS OF JUSTICE. 745 
 
 to escape or has escaped auJ tliat it is necessary to kill him to pre- 
 vent the escape or effect u recapture, such killing is justifiable hom- 
 icide.'' And under a statutory provision making it a felc-ny for any- 
 one confined in jail upon conviction for any criminal offense to 
 Weak jail and escape therefrom, a guard has the right, when a 
 prisoner attempts to escape, to oppose force to force to the extremity 
 of killing the prisoner.^ A statute conferring power to arrest upon 
 a sheriff, coroner, constable, or other officer of police intrusted with 
 the care and preservation of the peace, however, does not authorize 
 a superintendent of a convict camp to arrest an escaped convict, 
 so as to justify or mitigate a charge of killing the convict in making 
 an arrest.^ And a statute providing that prisoners under sentence 
 of death or imprisonment in the penitentiary, on attempting to es- 
 cape, may be killed by the officer having legal control over them, if 
 an escape can be prevented in no other way, though applying to 
 convicts at labor on a plantation, does not apply to con- 
 victs who had entirely escaped from custody; and after such an 
 escape a guard has only such authority to effect a recapture as be- 
 3)ngs to ordinary peace officers in making arrests, and can only take 
 life when it becomes necessary to protect his own life or save him- 
 self from serious bodily harm.* ISTor is the homicide of a convict 
 by a guard justified, unless the circumstances were such that a rea- 
 sonably prudent man would have been impressed at the moment of 
 the killing that the necessity was upon him to kill in order to pre- 
 vent the escape.'' And a superintendent of a convict camp is not 
 justified in shooting an escaping convict where the convict did not 
 know him, and did not resist, but ran for his life. ® And whether a 
 guard who shot a convict commanded him to stop or return is a cir- 
 cumstance to be weighed with other circumstances in a prosecution, 
 for the killing, on the question of justification. "^ 
 
 f. Limitations as to amount of force. 
 
 498. General rules. — The amount of force which a person may use 
 in making an arrest is limited to as much as is necessary to effect 
 his object.* And persons acting in aid of an officer are only war- 
 
 i.Tackson v. State. 76 Ga. 473. 'Jackson v. State, 76 Ga. 473. 
 
 2State V. Turlington, 102 Mo. 642, 15 iGolden v. State, 1 S. C N. S. 292; 
 
 S. W. 141. People v. Brooks, 131 Cal. 311, 63 Pac. 
 
 aState t. Stancill, 128 N. C. 608, 38 464; State v. Phillips, U9 Iowa, 652, 61 
 
 S. E. 926. L.R.A. 292, 94 N. W. 229; Dilger v. Com 
 
 4Wright V. State, 44 Tex. 645. 88 Ky. 550, 11 S. W. 651 ; Head v. Mar- 
 
 6 Jackson v. State, supra. tin, 85 Ky. 480, 3 S. W. 622; State v 
 
 State V. Stancill, supra. Coit, 8 Ohio S. & C. P. Deo. 62 ; North 
 
746 HOMICIDE. [i 498 
 
 ranted in using the same force. ^ To excuse the taking of life in 
 making an arrest it must appear that the killing was necessary to 
 effect the object, and that the arrest could not have been made with- 
 out it;* or that the officer reasonably believed, and had grounds to 
 believe, that it was necessary to effect his purpose.* Even a felon 
 cannot be killed in an effort to arrest him, without criminal respon- 
 sibility, unless he cannot otherwise be captured. '^ And if he can be 
 taken or his escape prevented without killing him, and he is slain, the 
 officer is guilty of manslaughter at least." Nor will proof that an 
 officer in making an arrest did not intend to use unnecessary force 
 excuse the use of such force. ^ 
 
 The law does not require an officer in making an arrest for a mis- 
 demeanor or criminal offense committed in his presence, when re- 
 sistance to the arrest is offered, however, to determine with absolute 
 precision what force is necessary to accomplish his purpose.* And 
 proof of absolute necessity is not necessary to justify an officer in kill- 
 ing a person whom he is attempting to arrest for misdemeanor, where 
 the statute requires him to employ no more force in effecting the ar- 
 rest than to him, acting as an ordinarily prudent person, would, under 
 the circumstances, seem reasonably and apparently necessary to ef- 
 fect the result." And an officer cannot be convicted of murder for 
 killing a person whom he is attempting to arrest by striking him on 
 the head, if he uses no more force than is necessary in case of an 
 ordinary person, although it proves fatal in the particular ease be- 
 
 Carolina v. Gosnell, 74 Fed. 734; Rex v. him into a cell, whereupon the officer 
 
 Mann, G Cox, C. C. 461. struck .and killed him, presents a ques- 
 
 2State V. C-oit, supra. tion of fact whether the death of the 
 
 3State V. Weston, &8 Iowa, 125, 67 prisoner was caused by an unnecessary 
 
 N. W. 84; Dover v. State, 109 Ga. 485, blow bv the officer in compelling obedi- 
 
 34 S. E. 1030; State v. Rose, 142 Mo. ence. State v. Lane, 158 Mo. 572, 59 S. 
 
 418, 44 S. W. 329. And see Wright v. W. 967. 
 
 State, 44 Tex. 645; Angel v. Com. 14 Ky. 'Golden v. State, 1 S. C. N. S. 29^. 
 
 L. Rep. 10, 18 S. W. 849. And the fact that a person killed by 
 
 estate V. Lane, 158 Mo. 573, 59 S. W. an officer in making an arrest, or pre- 
 
 971. And see Jackson v. State, supra, venting his escape, by a blow upon the 
 
 sWilliams v. State, 44 Ala. 41; State head, had an exceedingly thin skull, is 
 
 V. Bryant, 65 N. C. 327; Lander v. Miles, important for the jury in a proseevitiou 
 
 3 Or. 35. against the officer for the homicide, in 
 
 sLamnia v. State, 46 Neb. 236, 64 N. considering and estimating the character 
 
 W. 956. and probable effect of the blows de- 
 
 And a record in a prosecution of an livered, but will not warrant an inter- 
 officer for killing a person he had ar- ference with a finding of manslaughter, 
 rested, showing that the prisoner was State v. Phillips (Iowa) 89 N. W. 1092. 
 drunk and had been disarmed, and that sstate v. Rose, 142 Mo. 418, 44 S. W. 
 the officer was sober, and a much more 329. 
 
 powerful man than the prisoner, and sState v. Phillips, 119 Iowa, 652, 67 
 
 had an assistant with him, and that L.R.A. 292, 94 N. W. 229; State v. 
 
 the prisoner resisted by attempting to Phillips (Iowa) 89 N. W. 1092. 
 elude the officer when he sought to push 
 
§ 498] BY OFFICERS OF JUSTICE. 747 
 
 cause of a physical peculiarity unknown to the officer, such as un- 
 usual thinness of the skull. ^" So, the act of an officer of killing a 
 person under arrest by striking him with a dangerous weapon in a 
 heat of passion, unless justifiable on the ground that it was nec- 
 essary to accomplish his incarceration, is manslaughter and not mur- 
 der, since striking with the pistol, instead of shooting, indicates an 
 absence of design to kill. ^ ^ 
 
 499. Self-defense as a test. — The justification of an officer in 
 killing a person sought to be arrested by him for a misdemeanor 
 rests solely upon the grouni of self-defense.^ And the rule is the 
 same in case of an attempt to arrest in a civil action.^ An officer 
 seeking to make an arrest for misdemeanor is not justified in taking 
 life, even if the arrest cannot otherwise be effected, except where the 
 resistance is so violent as to put the officer in danger of death or 
 great bodily harm.^ And the threatened harm must be serious, as 
 distinguished from slight.* A degree of resistance to arrest for a 
 misdemeanor, not amounting in itself to a crime, and unlawful only 
 on account of the obligation of the person sought to be arrested to 
 surrender, will not justify the officer seeking to arrest him in kill- 
 ing him to accomplish his purpose.^ But an officer assaulted by 
 one whom he is lawfully seeking to arrest is not, like a private person, 
 required to retreat to the wall before resorting to such defensive 
 measures as may reasonably seem necessary to him to protect himself 
 against loss of life, or from great bodily injury, even to the extent 
 of taking life. " A person seeking to make an arrest may meet force 
 with force and need not give back, and if the person making the re- 
 
 lostate V. Phillips, 119 Iowa, 652, 67 estate v. Hickey, 70 N. J. L. 623, 57 
 
 L.R.A. 292, 94 N. W. 229. Atl. 264. 
 
 "State V. Lane, supra. sciements v. State, 50 Ala. 117. 
 
 iCom. V. Rhoads, 23 Pa. Super. Ct. eBoykin v. People, 22 Colo. 496, 45 
 
 512; Com. V.Greer, 20 Pa. Co. Ct. 535. Pac. 419; Head v. Martin, 85 Ky. 480, 
 
 And instructions laying down the law 3 S. W. 622; Dilger v. Com. 88 Ky. 550, 
 of self-defense are not objectionable in a US. W. 651; Stephens v. Com. 20 Ky. 
 prosecution against an officer for a. L. Rep. 544, 47 S. W. 229; Com. v. Crow- 
 homicide committed in making an ar- ley, 26 Pa. Super. Ct. 124; Com. v. 
 rest, where the whole theory of the de- Rhoads, 23 Pa. Super. Ct. 512. 
 fense is that the killing was necessary. And an instruction as to the right of 
 not for the purpose of making the ar- self-defense where it appears to the of- 
 rest, but to prevent the person arrested ficer making the arrest, in the exercise 
 from killing the officer. People v. of reasonable judgment, that there were 
 Adams, 85 Cal. 231, 24 Pac. 629. no other safe means of averting real or 
 
 2Com. V. Greer, supra. apparent daii^^er at the hands of the per- 
 
 sCom. V. Rhoads, supra; Plasters v. son sought to be arrested but to shoot 
 
 State, 1 Tex. App. 673. And see Smith him, is not subject to the objection that 
 
 V. State, 59 Ark. 132, 43 Am. St. Rep. it required the officer to avoid the dan- 
 
 20, 26 S. W. 712; Thomas v. Kinkead, ger, if any, by flight. Stephens v. Com. 
 
 55 Ark. 502, 15 L.R.A. 588, 29 Am. St. supra. 
 Rep. 68, 18 S. W. 854. 
 
748 HOMICIDE. .(I 4S9 
 
 sistance is unavoidably killed in the struggle, the homicide is jus- 
 tifiable.'' And if the officer is driven away with a deadly weapon 
 he is not required to flee or refuse to return, or, having returned, to 
 escape the impending danger by flight, in order to relieve himself 
 from liability for killing his antagonist.® And this rule is the same 
 whether the arrest is for a felony or for a misdemeanor.^ But an 
 officer must not use greater force than is reasonably or apparently 
 necessary for his protection.^" These rules apply also to deputy 
 officers and persons called upon to assist an officer, and such persons 
 have the same right to omit to retreat, and to pursue and arrest an 
 assailant, and to use all necessary means of effecting his arrest, 
 that the officer himself would have. ^ ^ 
 
 It will be seen, however, that self-defense, as a test of the amount 
 of force which an officer may use in making arrests, applies to arrests 
 for misdemeanors and in civil actions only. The amount of force 
 permitted in making an arrest for a felony, depends, not upon what 
 was necessary for the officer to defend himself, but upon what was 
 necessary to enable him to accomplish his object. ^^ 
 
 500. When use of deadly weapon is justifiable. — ^An officer may not 
 exert force in effecting an arrest for a misdemeanor, or in preventing 
 escape or rescue after such arrest, to the extent of employing a deadly 
 weapon, or of taking life, though without such force the wrongdoer 
 may escape.* And this is so whether his purpose was to kill or 
 merely to stop the other's flight.^ And officers are not ordinarily 
 authorized to use dangerous weapons in making an arrest or pre- 
 venting an escape, though the party sought to be arrested was charged 
 with a felony, where with diligence and caution he could be otherwise 
 held.* But where an arrest is sought to be made, though for a mis- 
 demeanor only, and the person sought to be arrested resists by the 
 use of deadly weapons, the officer has the right, if he believes, or has 
 
 'Clements v. State, 50 Ala. 117; Lin- be arrested, denying hia right to act in 
 
 die V. Com. Ill Ky. 866, 64 S. W. 986; self-defense if, after being driven from 
 
 North Carolina v. Gosnell, 74 Fed. 734. the ground by a friend of the resisting 
 
 sCockrill v. Com. 95 Ky. 22, 23 S. W. prisoner, he voluntarily returned and 
 
 659. renewed the difficulty, unless after such 
 
 sSmith V. State, 59 Ark. 132, 43 Am. return he abandoned the difficultv in 
 
 St. Rep. 20, 26 S. W. 712; Com. v. good faith, is erroneous. Cockrill v. 
 
 Rhoads, supra. Com. supra. 
 
 loHead v. Martin, and Dilger v. Com. 12 See supra, §§ 489, 490. 
 
 supra. iState v. Smith (Iowa) 70L.R.A. 246, 
 
 iiPeople V. Brooks, 131 Cal. 311, 63 101 N. W. 110; State v. Sigman, 106 N. 
 
 Pac. 494; Cockrill v. Com. supra. C. 728, U S. E. 520. 
 
 And an instruction in a prosscution sPtTte v. Sitrman, supra. 
 
 for homicide against a person summoned sReneau v. State, 2 Lea, 720, 31 Am. 
 
 to aid a deputy sheriff in arresting an Rep. 626. 
 offender, who killed the person sought to 
 
S 500} BY OFFICERS OF JUSTICE. 749 
 
 reasonable ground to believe, that the other will kill him or inflict 
 great bodily harm upon him, to use his own weapons even to the 
 taking of life.* And an officer may use a deadly weapon to defend 
 himself where previous violence has incapacitated him from using 
 any other. ^ Nor is an officer seeking to make an arrest, who is re- 
 sisted by the use of a deadly weapon, required to afford the resisting 
 offender the opportunity for a fair and equal struggle, but may 
 avail himself of any advantages that arise in the conflict " So, where 
 a person sought to be arrested has made public threats against the 
 life of the officer seeking to arrest him, he is justified, upon making 
 an attempt, and finding the offender apparently prepared to carry 
 out his threats, in using a deadly weapon and taking his life.'' 
 
 The rule of reasonable necessity, however, applies here as else- 
 where, and to warrant the use of a deadly weapon in making an 
 arrest, it should appear that the resistance offered either put the 
 officer in great personal danger, or that an escape from actual arrest 
 for a felony was intended and could not otherwise be prevented.® 
 And the use of a deadly weapon is not justified where an intoxicated 
 man merely seeks to release himself from the grasp of the officer, 
 assisted by another equally intoxicated. * And the killing of a per- 
 son sought to be arrested is murder, or, at least, manslaughter, 
 where at the time of the killing he was some distance from his arms, 
 and the officers were between him and them, and he was entirely in 
 
 4 Bowman v. Com. 96 Ky. 8, 27 S. W. sForster's Case, supra. 
 870; North Carolina v. Kirkpatrick, 42 eNorth Carolina v. Gosnell, supra. 
 Fed. 689; North Carolina v. Gosnell, 74 And though the testimony in a prose- 
 Fed. 734; Forster's Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. cution against an offiesr for homicide 
 187. warrants the jury in finding a verdict of 
 
 A rock used in a close conflict is a guilty, it is error to refuse instructions 
 deadly weapon within these rules, and as to self-defense where there is any 
 where a, person wounded an officer seek- evidence supporting the theory advanced 
 ing to arrest him, with a rock, and had by the accused, that deceased was killed 
 another in his hand manifesting a pur- while trying to draw a pistol to resist 
 pose to throw it, he was in a condition an effort upon the part of the accused to 
 of deadly resistance which justified the arrest him. Harris v. State, 72 Miss, 
 officer in shooting him. North Carolina 99, 16 So. 360. 
 T. Gosnell, supra. 'United States v. Rice, 1 Hughes, 560, 
 
 And where a person attempts to use a Fed. Cas. No. 16,153; Kelly v. Georgia, 
 pistol and it is taken from him, and 68 Fed. 652. 
 afterwards an officer, in seeking to ar- sCom. v. Max, 8 Phila. 422. 
 rest him, kills him, the failure of the of- sibid. 
 
 ficer to search him when he had a right But where two persons make a dan- 
 to may be considered by the jury in a, gerous attack upon an officer seeking to 
 prosecution for the killing as bearing arrest them, it is the officer's duty to 
 upon the probability of his statement proceed to the last extremity, even to 
 that he hf d not been informed that the the use of deadly weapons, to overcome 
 other's pistol had been taken from him. them, and this is so though they were 
 People V. Adams, 85 Cal. 231, 24 Pac. somewhat under the influence of liquor, 
 629. Ibid. 
 
750 HOJVnCIDE. [§ 500 
 
 their power. ^^ While the burden of proving a charge of murder 
 rests with the prosecution where the case is one of an officer using 
 a deadly weapon against a person he seeks to arrest, the burden of 
 justifying such use rests with him. ^ ^ And the question is whether, 
 under all the circumstances, the deceased being in the prosecution 
 of an illegal act, and having made the first assault, the prisoner 
 had such reasonable occasion to resort to a deadly weapon to de- 
 fend himself, as might fairly and naturally be expected to make 
 any reasonable man resort to it. ^ ^ 
 
 501. Appearance as a test of the right of self-defense — .An officer 
 under prosecution for killing a person whom he attempted to arrest 
 for an offense committed in his presence is entitled to have the jury 
 apply the law to the facts, not as they appear to the jury, but as they 
 reasonably appeared to him at the time of the killing. ^ And the dan- 
 ger to the officer or a person acting as such, which will authorize 
 him to act in self-defense, need not be real, but may be apparent 
 only.^ And where such appearance of necessity exists, the officer is 
 not obliged to retreat, but may stand his ground, even to the extent of 
 taking human life. ^ And this rule applies to a person called upon by 
 an officer to assist him in making an arrest, as well as to the officer.* 
 And where such a person has grounds to believe, as a reasonably 
 prudent man, and does believe, that the person sought to be arrested 
 has unlawfully shot or mortally wounded a superior officer in re- 
 
 loRex V. Reason, 1 Strangje, 499. the other intended to shoot him to pre- 
 
 iiPeople V. McCarthy, 110 N. Y. 309, vent tlie arrest, so that, while each 
 
 18 N. E. 128. might be mistaken as to the purpose of 
 
 i2Forster's Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 187; the other, each might be excusable on 
 
 1 Russell, Crimes, 643. the ground of self-defense for shooting 
 
 iStfite V. Rose, 142 Mo. 418, 44 S. W. at the other, under a supposition that 
 
 329; State v. Phillips, 119 Iowa, 652, 07 he was about to be shot at. Doolin a. 
 
 L.R.A. 292, 94 N. W. 229. Com. supra. 
 
 2Finney v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 785, But an instruction in a prosecution 
 
 82 S. W. 636; Coekrill v. Com. 95 Ivy. 22, for homicide confining the right of the 
 
 23 S. W. 65*9; Doolin v. Com. 95 Ky. 29, accused to kill the deceased to the exist- 
 
 23 S. W. 663 ; Bowman v. Com. 96 Ky. enee of actual, instead of apparent, dan- 
 
 9, 27 vS. W. 870; North Carolina v. Cos- ger to his life or person, ignoring his 
 
 nell. 74 Fed. 734. And see Re Neagle, right to act in defense of a brother, if 
 
 14 Sawy. 232, 5 L.R.A. 78, 39 Fed. 833, the latter was in good faith aiding him 
 
 Affirmed in 135 U. S. 1, 34 L. ed. 55, 10 in making the arrest, though erroneous, 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 668. is not reversible error, where in another 
 
 Where an officer was armed and pur- instruction the jury were correctly ad- 
 suing a person with intent to arrest him, vised upon wliat set of facts the accused 
 but without intending to kill him, and might avail himself of the law of self- 
 others shouted, "Shoot him," and the defense. Havens w Com. 20 Ky. L. Rep. 
 person pursued was also armed, the cir- 706, 82 S. W. 369. 
 
 cumstances are such that it might be SBoykin v. People, 22 Colo. 496, 45 
 
 that the latter thought the officer in- Pac. 419. 
 
 tended to shoot him unlawfully to stop 4People v. Brool^s, 131 Cal. 311, 6S 
 
 his flight, and that the pursuer thought Pac. 464. 
 
§ 501] BY OFFICERS OF JUSTICE, Vol 
 
 sisting arrest, he not only has the right, hut it is his duty, to pur- 
 sue and arrest such person, and use all necessary means of effecting 
 his arrest, even to taking his life. ^ Nor is it necessary in such ease 
 to show that the killing was actually necessary to prevent the felony ; 
 it is enough that the circumstances were sufficient to excite the fears 
 of a reasonable man that it was the purpose of the deceased to per- 
 petrate the felony, and that accused acted under the influence of 
 such fear, and not for revenge. " 
 
 To warrant a killing in this class of cases, however, the circum- 
 stances must have been such as reasonably to warrant a belief of 
 danger of death or great bodily harm.'' And the belief should 
 be that of a reasonably courageous mind as distinguished from that 
 of a coward.* And bad character of the person killed is not com- 
 petent on the question of justification in shooting to scare and stop 
 him in order that an arrest might be made.' Under the New York 
 statute, however, to justify a homicide in arresting a felon there 
 must be an actual necessity for it, and not merely reasonable ground 
 to suspect that it is necessary. ^ ** 
 
 502. Necessity a question for the jury — It has been held that the 
 amount of force and the employment of the usual means of making 
 an arrest and detention within the compass of the means ordinarily 
 resorted to for securing one found committing a criminal act must 
 be left to the discretion and judgment of the ofilcer, where he is 
 engaged in discharging a public and official duty, and is actuated by 
 no ill-will.^ But the prevailing rule seems to be that the law does 
 not clothe an officer with authority to judge arbitrarily of the neces- 
 sity of killing a prisoner to secure him, or of killing a person to pre- 
 vent the rescue of a prisoner, and that he cannot kill unless there 
 is necessity for it ; ^ and that whether there is such a necessity is a 
 question of fact for the jury in a prosecution for the killing, to be 
 determined from all the evidence of the ease,^ a doubt as to the non- 
 
 Blbid.; Adams v. State, 72 Ga. 85. Iowa, 652, 67 L.R.A. 292, 94 N. W. 229; 
 
 sAdams v. State, supra. Jackson v. State. 66 Miss. 89, 14 Am. St. 
 
 TPeople V. Adams, 85 Cal. 231, 24 Pao. Rep. 542, 5 So. 690: Stnte v. Lane, 158 
 
 629. Mo. 572, 59 S. W. 9G5; Conraddy v. Peo- 
 
 sbover V. State, 109 Ga. 485, 34 S. E. pie. supra: Lander v. Miles. 3 Or. 35; 
 
 1030. Golden v. Stste, 1 S. C, N. S. 292. And 
 
 9 Com. V. Greer, 20 Pa. Co. Ct. 535. -see State v. Garrett, 60 N. C. (1 Winst. 
 
 loConraddy v. People, 4 Park. Crim. L.) 144, 84 Am. Deo. 359. 
 
 Rep. 234. So, the question whether the death of 
 
 iState V. McNinch, 90 N. C. 696. the prisoner was due to unnecessnry and 
 
 2State V. Bland,. 97 N. C. 438, 2 S. E. unreasonable force used by the oflieer in 
 
 4g0 ' • attempting his incarceration is one of 
 
 sState y. Bland, supra; Williams v. fact for the jury, a, determination of 
 
 State, 44 Ala. 41; State v. Phillips, 119 which, based upon evidence to sustain 
 
752 HOMICIDE. Tl 502 
 
 existence of sxich necessity entitling tlie ofEcer to an acquittal.* 
 Where such force is used in making an arrest that death is caused, 
 there is no presumption of law that the oiScer acted in good faith, 
 or without malice or excessive force; the jury must judge of the 
 reasonableness of the force used, the burden resting with the prisoner 
 to show matters of excuse or mitigation. ^ It is proper, however, for 
 the judge in a prosecution in such a case to tell the jury that what 
 would be excessive force in an individual in an ordinary encounter 
 might not be so in an officer resisting an escape or rescue of a pris- 
 oner, though the omission to do so is not error when the instruction 
 is not asked for.® 
 
 g. Effect of illegal or improper action. 
 
 503. General rule as to illegal action. — An officer who attempts il- 
 legally to make an arrest, and in doing so invades the right of 
 liberty of the person sought to be arrested, and is placed in a sit- 
 uation rendering it necessary for him to defend himself against an 
 attack made upon him superinduced by his wrong, cannot plead 
 self-defense in justification of the killing of such person where the 
 necessity grows out of resistance to the arrest. ^ In such case the law 
 justly limits his right of self-defense and regulates it according to 
 the magnitude of his wrong. ^ And one who kills another, or a per- 
 son mistaken for him, in an attempt to illegally arrest him is guilty 
 of a homicide, which cannot be of a less degree than manslaughter, 
 though he acts upon a reasonable apprehension of danger, the slayer 
 in such case standing in the attitude of a trespasser, or one who 
 provokes a difficulty, or furnishes occasion therefor.^ Nor can an 
 officer take shelter behind his character as such, and claim that he 
 was acting in his official character in seeking to preserve the peace, 
 where his wrongful acts and conduct brought on a difficulty in which 
 he killed another.* 
 
 it, will not be disturbed on appeal. State elbid. 
 
 V. Lane, supra. iRoberson v. State, 53 Ark. 516, 14 S. 
 
 * Jackson v. State, supra. W. 002; State v. Eollins. supra; Carter 
 
 But a request to charge in a prosecu- v. State, 30 Tex. Apn. 551, 28 Am. St. 
 
 tion against an officer for homicide in Rep. 944, 17 S. W. 1102. And see Com. 
 
 making an arrest for an alleged felony, v. Crowley, 26 Pa. Super. Ct. 134. 
 
 that if the jury had any doubt about zCarter v. State, supra. 
 'the lawfulness of the means adopted by sibid. ; Peter v. State, 23 Tex. App. 
 
 the accused to arrest the deceased, they 6S4, 5 S. W. 228; O'Connor v. State, 64 
 
 should acquit, is properly refused as too Ga. 125, 37 Am. Rep. 58. 
 
 indefinite. People v. Matthews (Cal.) 4Johnson v. State, 58 Ark. 67, 23 S. 
 
 68 Pac. 371. W. 7. 
 estate v. Rollins, 113 N. C. 722, 18 S. 
 
 E. 394. 
 
§ 503] BY OFFICERS OF JUSTICE. 753 
 
 Though the act of an officer seeking to make an arrest was illegal, 
 however, and though death resulted, it is not necessarily murder, and 
 if the intention was not to take life or maliciously inflict great bodily 
 harm, but simply to maim the prisoner and thus capture him, it 
 would be manslaughter only. ® And where an officer has good reason 
 to believe that he is authorized to arrest a person for the violation 
 of a law or ordinance in his presence, and acts in good faith in 
 making the arrest, and the person sought to be arrested resists, ren- 
 dering it necessary to kill him in self-defense, such killing is justi- 
 fiable though the person killed was not guilty, for the reason that 
 no law or ordinance prohibiting his act existed.® And in such case 
 an instruction tending to neutralize the effect of the officer's good 
 faith as a justification should not be given. ^ 
 
 504. Action by officer without warrant — An arrest or an attempt 
 to arrest a person without a warrant, made by an officer for a mis- 
 demeanor not committed in his presence, is illegal, and the person's 
 resistance to such arrest, or his escape therefrom, constitutes no justi- 
 fication for the taking of his life; and where the officer kills such 
 person in an effort to overcome his resistance, or recapture him, he 
 is guilty either of murder or manslaughter, according to the facts and 
 circumstances of the case. ^ And a statute making it imperative upon 
 a person summoned by a proper officer to aid in restoration or pres- 
 ervation of the public peace, and prevent its breach, applies only to 
 present breaches, and does not warrant an arrest after the offense has 
 been committed and the offenders have dispersed, and killing in 
 making such an arrest is, at least, manslaughter. ^ But a peace officer 
 has the right, without a warrant, to arrest a person in the night, where 
 he has reasonable grounds to believe that such person has committed 
 a felony, and is protected in the necessary use of force in so doing.* 
 And the rule protecting a person killing a felon or one who had given 
 a dangerous wound, in the use of force in an attempt to arrest him 
 when fleeing from justice, is not confined to those who are present, 
 so as to have ocular proof of the fact of the commission of the act, 
 or those who first have knowledge of it, but extends to all who join 
 or aid in the pursuit,* and reasonable cause to believe that a person 
 
 BCom. V. Max, 8 Phila. 422. App. 551, 28 Am. St. Rep. 944, 17 S. W. 
 
 estate v. Coleman, 186 Mo. 151, 69 1102. 
 L.R.A. 381, 84 S. W. 978. agtate v. Campbell, 107 N. C. 948, 12 
 
 7lbid. S. E. 441. 
 
 iState V. Dietz, 59 Kan. 576, 53 Pao. aPeople v. Kilvington, 104 Cal. 88, 43 
 
 870; O'Connor v. State, 64 Ga. 125, 37 Am. St. Rep. 73, 37 Pac. 799. 
 Am. Rep. 58; Carter v. State, 30 Tex. ^Carr v. State, 43 Ark. 99. 
 Horn.— 4« 
 
734 HOMICIDE. [§ 504 
 
 had committed a felony justifies an oiScer in shooting for the purpose 
 of causing him to stop, so as to secure his arrest, so that if he is 
 accidentally killed by the shot the officer is relieved from liability 
 therefor. ° So, seeing a person running at night pursued by an 
 officer crying "Stop thief," and the refusal of such person to stop on 
 being ordered, furnish such reasonable excuse.® And that the per- 
 son shot went to the place of the shooting on lawful business is im- 
 material, where the officer knew nothing of the matter.^ 
 
 The mere fact that a person sought to be arrested without a warrant 
 may have been justly suspected of a felony, however, will not justify 
 an officer seeking to arrest him in killing him, unless he brings him- 
 self within some of the rules authorizing such an arrest without 
 a warrant.® And to warrant such an arrest there must have been 
 such a state of facts as would lead a man of ordinary care and pru- 
 dence to believe, or entertain a strong suspicion, that the person sought 
 to be arrested had been guilty of a felony.® Nor does the mere fact 
 that a person ran upon a public street in the night, pursued by a 
 stranger, not known to be an officer, furnish ground for such sus- 
 picion.^" And the mere possession of stolen property, or taking it 
 through a county, is not a felony within the meaning of a statute 
 authorizing a peace officer without a warrant to arrest any offender 
 in designated classes of cases of the commission of felonies or breach- 
 es of the peace. ^ ^ 
 
 All that is required of an officer or persons stiminoned to assist 
 him in case of alleged riots or illegal assemblage, however, is that 
 
 And evidence that two men who had sufficient merely to show a belief or ap- 
 
 a quarrel and fight made up their differ- prehension upon the part of the person 
 
 enees and became reconciled before an of- seeking to make the arrest that a felony 
 
 ficer made an attempt to arrest one of had been committed, 
 
 them for an alleged felony is immaterial ePeople v. Kilvington, supra. 
 
 and inadmissible in a prosecution vibid. 
 
 against the officer for killing the person sCarter v. State, 30 Tex. App. 551, 28 
 
 sought to be arrested in evading arrest, Am. St. Rep. 944, 17 S. W. 1102. 
 
 since the only use that could be made of sPeople v. Kilvington, 104 Cal. 88, 43 
 
 it would be to show that no arrest was Am. St. Eep. 73, 37 Pac. 799. 
 
 necessary. People v. Adams, 85 Cal. 231, And a quarrel and fight between two 
 
 24 Pac. 629. persons are admissible in evidence in a 
 
 ePeople v. Kilvington, supra. prosecution against an officer who killed 
 
 In Conraddy v. People, 5 Park. Crira. one of them while seeking to arrest him, 
 
 Rep. 234, however, it was held that as bearing upon the question whether he 
 
 where no process had been issued for the had committed a felony, and whether 
 
 arrest of an alleged felon, a homicide in the officer had a right to arrest him 
 
 making an arrest therefor, even by an without a warrant, and kill him if nee- 
 
 officer, can only be justified by showing essary to effect his arrest. People v. 
 
 the actual commission of a felony, and Adams, 85 Cal. 231, 24 Pac. 629. 
 
 that there was a positive necessity to lopeople v. McCarthy, 47 Hun, 491, 
 
 take the life of the felon in order to ar- Affirmed in 110 N. Y. 309, 18 N. E. 128. 
 
 rest or detain him; and that it is not uLacy v. State, 7 Tex. App. 403. 
 
§ 504] BY OFFICERS OF JUSTICE. 755 
 
 they shall in good faith believe, and have reasonable grounds to 
 believe, that the persons assembled had banded together for the 
 purpose of acting riotously, or injuring or intimidating others, and 
 in such case they are entitled, without a warrant, to use such force 
 as is reasonably necessary to restrain them, and if necessary may 
 shoot persons resisting them.^^ And an officer may arrest without 
 a warrant for wife beating, if he arrives during its progTess or 
 immediately afterwards, being attracted by the disturbance, and may 
 in such case use such force as is necessary to overcome resistance. ^ * 
 
 In determining the question of the existence of probable cause to 
 warrant an officer iu making an arrest, only the facts and circum- 
 stances presented to him at the time he was required to act are 
 to be taken into account-^* And while the question as to the exist- 
 ence of facts warranting his action is one for the jury, it is not 
 their province to decide whether the facts and circumstances were 
 BufSeient to constitute probable cause to believe that a felony had been 
 committed, the question of probable cause or reasonable ground for 
 suspicion being one of law, unless the evidence out of which it 
 arises is conflicting. ^ ^ 
 
 505. Arrest by private citizen — As has already been observed in 
 the case of private persons using their endeavors to bring felons 
 to justice, caution must be used to ascertain that a felony has actually 
 been committed, and that it has been committed by the party arrested 
 or pursued upon suspicion; as, if the suspicion be not supported by 
 the fact, the person endeavoring to arrest or imprison, and killing 
 the party in the prosecution of such purpose, will be guilty of 
 manslaughter.^ And a conspiracy for the escape from a chain gang 
 
 i2Lindle v. Com. Ill Ky. 866, 64 S. fense in a prosecution against deputy 
 
 W. 986. And see Com. v. Weathers, 7 sheriflFs who killed members of the mine 
 
 Kulp, 1. workers' association in an attempt to 
 
 And declarations made by members of break up an alleged illegal assemblage 
 
 a mine workers' association as to plans of striking miners assembled forthepur- 
 
 and purposes of the organization with pose of closing such mines. Lindle v. 
 
 reference to closing up certain mines, Com. supra. 
 
 and declarations made by them to eer- ' sRamsey v. State, 92 Ga. 53, 17 S. E. 
 
 tain nonunion miners that if they did 613. 
 
 not cease work peaceably they would be i^People v. Kilvington, 104 Cal. 86, 
 
 forced to do so, and that certain leaders 4.3 Am. St. Rep. 73^ 37 Pac. 799. 
 
 of the mine workers' association were islbid. 
 
 armed when coming from the scene of a Where the evidence out of which 
 conflict between them and the officers, arises a question as to the probable cause 
 and a contract between the union miners or reasonable ground for suspicion that 
 and mine operators in neighboring eoun- a felony has been committed is conflict- 
 ties, which furnished a motive upon the ing, it is the duty of the court to in- 
 part of the miners for closing certain struct the jury what facts, if established, 
 mines involved in a strike, are admis- would constitute probable cause. Ibid, 
 sible in evidence in behalf of the de- iFost. C. L. 318. 
 
75S HOMICIDE. [i 505 
 
 of a person under sentence for a misdemeanor is not a felony under a 
 statute defining it to be an offense for which the offender on con- 
 viction shall be liable to be punished by death or imprisonment in 
 the penitentiary, and self-defense cannot be interposed as a justi- 
 fication for the killing by a private person in an effort to arrest the 
 conspirator.^ Nor is the taking of property from another, for some 
 other purpose than to appropriate it to the taker's use, robbery, or 
 a felony within the meaning of these rules.® Private individuals 
 may forcibly interfere to suppress a riot, or resist rioters, if they 
 icannot otherwise suppress it or defend themselves against the rioters, 
 however, though a riot is not necessarily a felony in itself; and they 
 may justify a homicide in killing them, since it is their right and 
 duty to aid in preserving the peace.* But private persons inter- 
 fering for the furtherance of public justice should expressly avow 
 their intention, or their killing will be manslaughter. ^ And if intent 
 to kill appears, the killing is murder. ® 
 
 506. Action outside of territorial jurisdiction. — As a general rule 
 the power of an officer is confined to the territorial limits of the 
 state, county, or municipality of which he is an officer, and 
 ihis protection as an officer is subject to a like limit; and a warrant 
 issued in one state authorizing the arrest of a person gives no au- 
 ithority to arrest him in another state, and the attempt to arrest him 
 in the latter state is unauthorized and illegal, and the officer's official 
 icharacter affords him no protection.^ And where officers find a 
 person sought to be arrested in another state, and present arms at 
 him for the purpose of arresting him, and he is shot and killed, 
 the slayer is guilty of murder in the second degree, though his gun 
 iwas accidentally discharged.^ Nor does the fact that a person has 
 ibeen deputized by a sheriff to arrest another authorize him to do so 
 outside of the sheriff's county, so that such an arrest could be re- 
 garded as an official act in a prosecution against him for killing the 
 person sought to be arrested.^ Statutory provisions authorizing 
 
 zState V. Whittle, 59 S. 0. 297, 37 S. And a copy of an indictment and 
 
 E. 923. bench warrant against a person, with in- 
 
 slbid. dorsements thereon, is not admissible 
 
 <Pond V. People, 8 Mich. 150. in evidence against a person deputized 
 
 5Post. C. L. 310, 311; United States by the sheriff to make an arrest under 
 
 V. Travers, 2 Wheeler, C. C. 510, Fed. such warrant, who killed the person 
 
 Cas. No. 16,537; 1 East, P. C. chap. 5, § sought to be arrested, where the arrest 
 
 58, p. 510. was not in the sheriff's county. York v. 
 
 estate v. Ferguson, 2 Hill, L. 619; Ck)m. 82 Ky. 360. 
 
 Rex V. Bourne, 5 Car. & P. 120. 2Tarvers v. State, supra. 
 
 iTarvera v. State, 90 Tenn. 485, 16 S. sYork v. Com. supra. 
 W. 1041. 
 
§ 506] BY OFFICERS OF JUSTICE. 757 
 
 the issue of warrants for the arrest of any fugitive in the state for 
 specified crimes committed in any other state, and providing that an 
 officer or a private individual may lawfully arrest without a warrant 
 one whom he has reasonable grounds to suspect of a felony, or other 
 specified crime, however, authorize the arrest in one state of fugitives 
 therein who have committed specified crimes in another state, either 
 by an officer or private person. * And while the authority of a peace 
 officer of a municipality does not, as a general rule, extend beyond 
 its corporate limits, he, or any other private individual, has the 
 right to arrest without a warrant, and take into custody, any person 
 who is at the time engaged in a breach of the peace, and is pro- 
 tected in so doing, though he acted outside of such corporate limits.® 
 507. Negligent action. — An officer seeking to make an arrest may 
 be guilty of a negligent homicide, as well as any other person. ^ To 
 constitute, in law, homicide, there must exist a union or joint oper- 
 ation of the act of killing with either a criminal intent or criminal 
 negligence.^ And where an officer shoots a man and claims to 
 have shot merely for the purpose of stopping his flight to effect 
 an arrest, the question in a prosecution therefor is whether, under the 
 circumstances as they appeared to him, he acted recklessly and with 
 criminal negligence.* And in such case the question whether the 
 act of the officer was one of criminal negligence is one of fact, the 
 determination of which must be left to the sound judgment and dis- 
 cretion of the jury, and in its decision the accused is entitled to the 
 benefit of any reasonable doubt arising upon the evidence.* One who 
 discharges his gun at a fleeing felon in a careful and heedful manner, 
 not for the purpose of killing him, but to slightly injure him and 
 prevent his flight, where he cannot otherwise stop him, is justified 
 in his act though death results, where it is due to the fact that 
 
 iState V. Whittle, 59 S. C. 297, 37 S. zibid. 
 
 E. 023. 3 Ibid. 
 
 5State V. Weston, 98 Iowa, 125, 67 And evidence that the accused was 
 
 N. W. 84. cool and clear-headed, or otherwise, and 
 
 But refusal to instruct in a proseeu- that he had or had not been drinking 
 
 tion against an ofEeer for killing a per- intoxicating liquors, is admissible in 
 
 son sought to be arrested, that the of- evidence, either in chief or in rebuttal, 
 
 ficer had the right to exercise the du- in a prosecution for homicide defended 
 
 ties of his office outside the corporate on the ground that the killing was done 
 
 limits of his city, if erroneous, is cured b}' a peace officer- in order to make the 
 
 by an instruction that he had a right to arrest. Stephens v. Cora. 20 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 arrest anyone who was creating a dis- 544, 47 S. W. 229. 
 
 turbance, that being the act for which 4People v. Kilvington, 104 Cal. 86, 43 
 
 the arrest was sought to be made. Am. St. Rep. 73, 37 Pac. 799. 
 Ibid. 
 
 iPeople V. Kilvington (Cal.) 36 Pac 
 13. 
 
758 HOMICIDE. [§ 507 
 
 the felon suddenly and unexpectedly changes his position, so that the 
 wound is delivered in a place not intended.® But where a convict 
 fell or jumped into a river, and it does not appear whether he was 
 attempting to escape, or whether he fell in accidentally and was 
 about to return, and a guard shot and killed him, a charge should be 
 given in a prosecution for the killing on the subject of involuntary 
 manslaughter in the commission of a lawful act without due caution 
 and circumspection.® 
 
 508. Action with improper or malicious motive. — Officers seeking 
 to make an arrest and committing homicide in so doing cannot rely 
 upon the protection with which the law clothes them, and be excused 
 on the ground of self-defense, where they act. with improper or 
 malicious motives, and where they do not act in good faith in what 
 appears to them to be the proper discharge of their official duty.^ 
 Thus the fact that a person had committed a felony does not justify 
 an officer in shooting at him with intent to do him grievous bodily 
 harm, where he did not know of the felony at the time.^ And the 
 rule is the same where the killing was with malice and premedita- 
 tion, though the officer supposed, whether mistakenly or otherwise, 
 that he had authority to arrest.^ ISTor is the killing of a person 
 unnecessarily, wantonly, or wilfully by a peace officer justified by 
 the fact that the person killed was engaged in habitual violation of 
 the law.* And malicious or improper motives in this class of cases 
 may be shown by evidence of an unprovoked assault with a deadly 
 weapon, without justification;® or of ill-feeling and threats;" and 
 the personal relations of the parties should be shown.'' 
 
 ' 6Com. V. Long, 17 Pa. Super. Ct. 641; 485, 16 S. W. 1041. And see People v. 
 
 People V. Matthews (Cal.) 58 Pac. 371. Brooks, 131 Cal. 311, 63 Pac. 464. 
 
 ejaekson v. State, 76 Ga. 473. So, that when a warrant of arrest was 
 
 Where a person is alleged to have been given to an officer it was read and ex- 
 negligently killed by an officer seeking plained to him, and that he was in- 
 to arrest him, testimony in a proseeu- formed what to do under it, are admis- 
 tion therefor against the officer as to sible in evidence in a prosecution against 
 the reason why the person slain was at him for killing the person sought to be 
 the place where the killing was done is arrested under it. Jackson v. State, 65 
 improper. People v. Kilvington (Cal.) Miss. 89, 14 Am. St. Rep. 542, 5 So. 
 30 Pac. 13. 690. 
 
 iLindle v. Cora. Ill Ky. 866, 64 S. W. 6North Carolina v. Gosnell, 74 Fed. 
 
 986; Dover v. State, 109 Ga. 485, 34 S. 734; Tarvers v. State, supra. 
 
 E. 1030. And see Bartay v. State (Tex. The use of harsh terms by a person 
 
 dim. App.) 67 S. W. 416. about one whom he killed in an effort 
 
 2Reg. V. Dadson, 4 Cox, C. C. 358, to arrest him, and a statement that he 
 
 2 Den. C. C. 35, 14 Jur. 1051. would not mind killing him, are proper 
 
 sState v. Coleman, 186 Mo. 151, 69 to go to the jury in a prosecution for 
 
 L.R.A. 381, 84 S. W. 978. such killing on the question whether he 
 
 4 Georgia v. O'Grady, 3 Woods, 498, entertained a deliberate purpose to 
 
 Fed. Cas. No. 5,352. kill. North Carolina v. Gosnel), supra. 
 
 BHavens v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 708, 7See Lindle v. Com. Ill Ky. 866, 64 S. 
 82 S. W. 369 ; Tarvers v. State, 90 Tenn. 
 
5 508] BY OFFICERS OF JUSTICE. 759 
 
 The mere fact that an ofBcer having a warrant for the arrest of 
 a person went out with a predetermination to kill him, however, is 
 not alone sufficient to render him guilty of murder in the first 
 degree in this class of cases; the evil intention and the deed must co- 
 exist, and the intention must have prompted the deed.* Nor is the 
 mere fact that an officer proceeding in the line of his duty, who is 
 resisted and kills his assailant, entertained ill-will or malice toward 
 his assailant, sufficient to establish premeditated malice making a 
 homicide murder in the first degree.** And where there is an affray 
 between an officer and a person sought to be arrested by him, and 
 mutual blows are exchanged, and the officer kills the other while in 
 a heat of passion, it is manslaughter, although the other was originally 
 engaged in an unlawful act, but it is not murder ; ^ ° though it would 
 be murder if the officer had time to cool his passions. ^ ^ 
 
 509. Failure to give notice of character and purpose. — It is the duty 
 of an officer attempting to make an arrest to make known his purpose 
 and the capacity in which he acts, if they are not already known 
 to the person sought to be arrested, failure to perform which may 
 render him the aggressor, or the apparent aggressor, so as to warrant 
 resistance by the accused, and deprive the officer of the right to 
 make a claim to have acted in self-defense in overcoming resistance, 
 though so forcible as to put him in danger of life or of serious bodily 
 harm.^ And in such case the person making the arrest and slaying 
 the person arrested is guilty of murder, unless excessive force 
 was used in resisting, in which case he is guilty of manslaughter.^ 
 And to justify the killing in such case by a private person, the 
 slayer must show not only that a felony was actually committed, but 
 also that he avowed his object and the felon refused to submit.^ 
 
 But if the purpose and capacity of the officer are known to the 
 person sought to be arrested when the arrest is attempted, and the 
 arrest is otherwise legal, submission is a duty, and resistance 
 in unjustifiable and warrants the use of such force as may 
 
 W. 986; Handley v. State, 96 Ala. 48, 39, 42 L.R.A. 774, 71 Am. St. Rep. 553, 
 
 38 Am. St. Rep. 81, 11 So. 322. 47 S. W. 1058. 
 
 sClements v. State, 50 Ala. 117. iiCom. v. Max, supra. 
 
 sNorth Carolina v. Gosnell, supra. iPlasters v. State, 1 Tex. App. 673; 
 
 loForster's Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 187; State v. Rollins, 113 N. C. 722, 18 S. E. 
 
 Com. V. Max, 8 Phila. 422. 394; United States v. Rice, 1 Hughes, 
 
 So. the right of one who goes upon an- 560, Fed. Cas. No. 16,153. 
 
 other's premises to arrest him for a fel- 2 State v. Rollins, supra. 
 
 ony to be there is not destroyed by the sState v. Roane, 13 N. 0. (2 Dev. L.) 
 
 fact that he shot the latter in hot blood 58. And see People v. Lee (Cal. App.) 
 
 because of insulting words spoken by the 81 Pac. 969. 
 other to him. State v. Grugin, 147 Mo. 
 
760 HOMICIDE. [i 5U9 
 
 be necessary to overcome it; and failure to give notice does 
 not make the arrest unlawful so as to be no justification for 
 a killing in effecting it. * Nor is an oflBcer known to be such, having 
 legal authority to arrest, bound to show or read his warrant before 
 arrest is secured, where resistance is made. ^ And an officer arresting 
 for an offense committed in his presence is not bound to inform 
 the prisoner of the charge and of his purpose to arrest him before 
 doing so.® So, the question whether a fleeing felon, who was about 
 to reach a place of safety, should have been notified of the cause of 
 arrest before shooting is one of fact for the jury under the evidence.'' 
 And while a person who is not a known officer ought to show his 
 warrant, and read it if required, a failure to do so will not make 
 him a trespasser ah initio^ so as to deprive him of the right to over- 
 come resistance by such force as may be necessary, where the other 
 had notice of the warrant and was fully aware of its contents, and 
 had made up his mind to resist its execution at all hazards.® 
 
 510. Further consideration — The questions of an officer's authority 
 to act, and of the propriety of his methods, and as to whether 
 they conferred the right of resistance upon a person sought to be 
 arrested, and as to their effect upon a resulting homicide, seem to 
 be precisely the same whether the officer killed the person sought to 
 be arrested or vice versa. Further authority applicable to these ques- 
 tions, therefore, may be found by reference to the chapter in this 
 work on the subject of homicide in resisting arrest.-' 
 
 h. Kules in case of action by deputy or assistant 
 
 511. Responsibility for — An officer cannot be held to answer crim- 
 inally for the act of his deputy, unless it was done with his con- 
 sent or by his command; and where a deputy jailer causes the death 
 of a prisoner by confining him against his will, and keeping him 
 confined in an unwholesome and dangerous room, the deputy, and 
 
 And a person who, suspecting that lar- ^Plasters v. State, supra; Wolf v. 
 
 ceny had been committed, does not go State, 19 Ohio St. 248. And see Ram- 
 
 for a warrant or an officer, but takes his sey v. State, 92 Ga. 53, 17 S. E. 613. 
 
 gun and goes to the suspected felon's BNorth Carolina v. Gosnell, 74 Fed. 
 
 house and calling him out informs him 734; United States v. Rice, supra. And 
 
 that he has come to look for the stolen see State v. Rudolph, 187 Mo. 67, Sb S. 
 
 property, and shoots him as he runs off, W. .584. 
 
 without informing him that he has come eCom. v. Weathers, 7 Kulp, 1. 
 
 to arrest him, or commanding him to 'Com. v. Long, 17 Pa. Super. Gt 
 
 surrender, uses unnecessary force which 641. 
 
 will render him guilty of manslaughter sStnte v. Garrett, 60 N. C. (X Winst. 
 
 at least. State v. Bryant, 65 N. C. L.) 144, 84 Am. Dec. 359. 
 
 327. iSee supra, chapter XX. 
 
5 611] BY OFFICERS OF JUSTICE 761 
 
 not the jailer, is criminally responsible for the death. ^ Neither can. 
 a principal delegate to his agent authority to do an illegal act; and 
 authority given by the owner of a slave to kill the slave if he cannot 
 otherwise be taken is illegal and imposes no obligation of perform- 
 ance.^ And where such authority is given and the agent delegates it 
 to a third person and the third person kills the slave, he is not re- 
 lieved from liability therefor on the theory that the owner cannot 
 take advantage of his own wrong, since the delegation to the agent 
 of the power to kill the slave carries with it no authority to employ 
 assistants in the work, or to transfer his immunity from liability to 
 another. ^ Such owner, however, cannot relieve himself from liability 
 for the killing of the slave by the agent on the theory that the killing 
 was the act of the agent, and not his act.* 
 
 512. Protection of deputy or assistant. — ^A duly summoned assist- 
 ant of an officer is entitled to the same protection which is afforded 
 to the officer, who has process in his hands, and where he obeys the 
 orders of his superior officer and resistance is made to his performance 
 of duty, he may, even in the temporary absence of the principal 
 officer, resort to such extreme measures as may be necessary for self- 
 defense, and the arrest of the offender;^ though the right of the 
 person called to aid in making an arrest is no greater than that of 
 the principal officer.^ And a person deputized to serve a warrant 
 should be treated in a prosecution for killing the person sought 
 to be arrested as clothed with the protection thrown around officers 
 de facto, whether or not there was any power to deputize a private 
 person to serve a warrant.* So, a statute giving constables power 
 to appoint deputies, and providing that the appointment shall be 
 filed in a designated office, is directory only as to the provision for 
 iiling; and a deputy appointed by a constable, who killed a man in 
 an attempt to arrest him for a breach of the peace, is not deprived by 
 this provision of his right to say in justification of his act that he 
 was a deputized constable, because of failure to file his appointment * 
 
 iRex V. Huggins, 2 Ld. Eaym. 1574, W. 286, 96 Mo. 666, 9 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 2 Strange, 882. 380, 10 S. W. 168. 
 
 zMorton v. Bradley, 30 Ala. 683. And the uncoramunicated intentions 
 
 sibid. of a constable who had appointed a dep- 
 
 4lbid. uty, that the deputy should not act as 
 
 iNorth Carolina v. Gosnell, 74 Fed. such, are immaterial and inadmissible 
 
 734. in evidence in a prosecution against the 
 
 2Hand]ey v. State, 96 Ala. 48, 38 Am. deputy for killing a man in an attempt 
 
 St. Rep. 81, 11 So. 322. to arrest him for a breach of the peace. 
 
 sHarris v. State, 72 Miss. 99, 16 So. State v. Dierberger, 90 Mo. 369, 2 S. W. 
 
 360. 286. 
 4 State V. Dierberger, 90 Mo. 369, 2 S. 
 
762 HOMICIDE. [§ 513 
 
 i. Application of rules to arrest in civil cases. 
 513. Officer killing a person flying from civil arrest chargeable with 
 murder, if intending to kill — In civil suits, if the party against whom 
 the process has issued fly from the officer endeavoring to arrest him, 
 or if he fly after an arrest actually made, or out of custody in 
 execution for debt, and the officer, not being able to overtake him, 
 make use of any deadly weapon, and by so doing, or by other means, 
 intentionally kill him in the pursuit, it has been said that it will 
 amount to murder.* But this is an extreme case; for the same 
 authorities inform us that if the officer, in the heat of the pursuit, 
 and merely in order to overtake the party, should trip up his heels, 
 or give him a stroke with an ordinary cudgel, or other weapon 
 not likely to kill, and death should unhappily ensue, this will not 
 amount to more than manslaughter, if, in some cases, even to that of- 
 fense;^ and if there be resistance, and an affray ensue, during which 
 the party sought to be arrested is slain, the offense will be but man- 
 slaughter.* So, if a party liable to civil arrest put in jeopardy the 
 lives of those seeking to arrest him, his homicide will be excusable.* 
 A bastardy proceeding, though a civil one, is in the nature of a 
 prosecution for a misdemeanor within the rules of law with reference 
 to the amount of force which may be used in making an arrest, where 
 it proceeds in the name of the commonwealth and the offender is 
 subject to arrest.^ 
 
 ilHale, P. €. 481 ; Fost. C. L. 291. 4State v. Anderson, 1 Hill, L. 327. 
 
 2Rex V. Reason, 1 Strange, 499. BHead v. Martin, So Ky. 480, 3 S. W. 
 
 3 Fost. C. U 293. 294. 622. 
 
CHAPTEE XXlV. 
 
 HOMICIDE TO PREVENT CRIMINAL OR UNLAWFUL ACTS.» 
 
 L CeiMINAI. UABILITY GENERALLY. 
 
 514. General rule and to what applicable. 
 
 515. Justification limited to necessity. 
 
 510. Apparent, as distinguished from real, danger as necessity. 
 
 517. Justification limited to prevention, aa distinguished from pun- 
 
 ishment. 
 IL Application of rules to particular acts. 
 
 a. Personal aggression or force. 
 
 518. Attempts to kill or injure the slayer. 
 
 519. Attempt to kill or injure others. 
 620. Assault upon family and relations. 
 
 521. Status of relative as affecting right to interfere. 
 
 522. What relationship warrants interference. 
 
 b. Aggression upon public order. 
 
 523. Breaches of the peace. 
 
 c. Aggression upon property rights. 
 
 524. Eobbery and burglary. 
 
 525. Larceny. 
 
 526. Trespass on property generally. 
 
 527. Trespass on, or appropriation of, personalty. 
 
 528. Trespass on realty. 
 
 529. Use of spring guns. 
 
 530. Attack on dwelling. 
 
 531. Attack in dwelling. 
 632. Resisting expulsion. 
 
 533. Who may defend and against whom. 
 
 534. What constitutes dwelling or castle. 
 III. The question of degree. 
 
 635. Malice and improper performance as a test. 
 
 I. Ceiminal liability generally. 
 
 514- General rule and to what applicable At common law as well 
 
 as under the various statutes of the states, it is the duty of anyone 
 seeing a felony attempted by force to prevent it, and if need be to 
 extinguish the felon's existence for that purpose. ^ The rule is that 
 
 iThe subject of homicide to prevent S. W. 900; Dill v. State, 25 Ala. 15; 
 criminal or unlawful acts is fully con- Pond v. People, 8 Mich. 150; State v. 
 sidered in a note to Morrison v. Com. Harris, 46 N. C. (1 Jones, L.) 190 And 
 67 L.R.A. 529. see Irby v. State, 32 Ga. 496. 
 
 ^Carpenter v. State, 62 Ark. 286, 36 Anyone not himself in the wrong, di- 
 
 763 
 
764 HOMICIDE. [§ 514 
 
 a person may repel force by :force in defense of his person, habitation, 
 or property against one who manifestly endeavors, by violence or 
 surprise, to commit a known felony, such as rape, robbery, arson, 
 burglary, or the like, and is not obliged to retreat, but may pursue 
 his adversary until he has freed himself from all danger.^ And in 
 such case a homicide committed by a person in defense of his person, 
 habitation, or property is justifiable.* And it is likewise justifiable 
 when committed for the prevention of any crime involving atrocity 
 or the use of physical force, ^ the rule being the same whether the 
 crime is leveled at the slayer or at others.** And the rule extends to 
 statutory felonies as well as to felonies at common law.'' So, al- 
 though generally the right is limited to the prevention of felonies, 
 yet as riots are productive of felonies, and as it is the duty of a 
 private citizen to interfere for the suppression of riots, so if a riot can 
 apparently be suppressed only by the taking of life, taking of life, 
 even by a private citizen, will, under such circumstances, be excus- 
 able. » 
 
 One can only kill, however, to save life or limb, or prevent a 
 great crime, or accomplish a necessary public duty.® And a homi- 
 cide committed in endeavoring to restrain or prevent the commission 
 
 rectly or by complicity, may forcibly in- BMitohell v. State, 22 Ga. 211, 68 Am. 
 terfere to prevent a dangerous felony. Dec. 493. 
 
 People V. Curtis, 52 Mich. 616, 18 N. W. egee Ruloff v. People, 45 N. Y. 213; 
 385. Oliver v. State, 17 Ala. 587; Dill v. 
 
 3 Carroll v. State, 23 Ala. 28, 58 Am. State, 25 Ala. 15; People v. Payne, 3 
 Dec. 282; Storey v. State, 71 Ala. 329; Cal. 341; People v. Campbell, 30 Cal. 
 Carpenter v. State, supra; Mitchell v. 312; McPherson v. State, 22 Ga. 478; 
 State, 43 Fla. 188, 30 So. 803; Richard Murphy v. People, 37 111. 447; Kingen 
 V. State, 42 Fla. 528, 29 So. 413; Lane v. v. State, 45 Ind. 518; Payne v. Com. 1 
 State, 44 Fla. 105, 32 So. 896; Powell Met. (Ky.) 370; People v. Doe, 1 Mich, 
 v. State, 101 Ga. 9, 65 Am. St. Rep. 277, 451 -, Pond v. People, 8 Mich. 150; Unit- 
 29 S. E. 309 ; State v. Thompson, 9 Iowa, ed States v. Wiltberger, supra. 
 188, 74 Am. Dec. 342; State v. Kennedy, 7Storey v. State, and Pond v. People, 
 20 Iowa, 569 ; Burton v. Com. 23 Ky. L. supra ; State v. Taylor, 143 Mo. 150, 44 
 Eep. 1915, 66 S. W. 516; Brabston v. S. W. 785. 
 
 State, 68 Miss. 208, 8 So. 326; Seribner SRespublica v. Montgomery, 1 Yeates, 
 v. Beach, 4 Denio, 448, 47 Am. Dec. 421; Wharton, Crim. Law, § 2934; Phil- 
 265; State v. Conally, 3 Or. 69; Com. lips v. Trull, 11 Johns. 486; Pond v. 
 V. Daley, 2 Clark (Pa.) 361; Stoneham People, supra. And see supra, chapter 
 V. Com. 86 Va. 523, 10 S. E. 238; United XVI. 
 
 States v. Outerbridge, 5 Sawy. 620, Fed. sRtate v. Morgan, 25 N. C. (3 Ired. 
 Cas. No. 15,978; United States v. Wilt- L.) 186, 38 Am. Dec. 714. 
 berger, 3 Wash. C. C. 515, Fed. Cas. No. In United States v. Travers, 2 Wheel- 
 16,738. er, C. C. 490, Fed. Cas. No. 16,537, how- 
 
 ^Parriah v. Com. 81 Va. 1; State v. ever, it was held that the law will not 
 Dugan, Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 563; suffer any crime to be prevented by 
 State V. Thompson, and State v. Ken- death unless the same, if committed, 
 nedy, supra; State v. Rutherford, 8 N. would be punishable with death. 
 C. (1 Hawks) 457, 9 Am. Dec. 658; 
 Smith V. State, 105 Tenn. 305, 60 S. W. 
 145. 
 
I 514] TO PREVENT CRIRHNAL OR UNLAWFUL ACTS. 765 
 
 of a mere misdemeanor is not justifiable.^" Nor does the general 
 rule justifying homicide to prevent felony authorize the killing of 
 persons attempting secret felonies, not accompanied by force, such as 
 mere larceny, or picking pockets. ■^^ And where a felonious act is 
 not of a violent or forcible character, as in case of crime partaking 
 of fraud rather than of force, there is no necessity to prevent, and, 
 therefore, no justification for homicide. ^^ 
 
 Kulea of Isiw v^ith reference to the right to kill in good faith to 
 prevent the perpetration of certain offenses do not qualify or limit 
 the law of justifiable homicide in case of danger to life, arising 
 in case of an assault or fight, when both parties had been in fault, 
 and instructions as to these separate branches of the law of homicide 
 should not confuse the one with the other. ^* And where a killing 
 is done in resisting a felony or unlawful act, the slayer is entitled 
 in a prosecution therefor to a specific charge with reference to such 
 a killing, uncomplicated with instructions, even though they be cor- 
 rect, with reference to homicide justifiable because committed in 
 defense of one's person. ^ * Though instructions as to the effect of an 
 apprehended felony by a person killed, as a defense in homicide, are 
 not required or warranted in the absence of evidence of the com- 
 mission or attempted commission thereof, they furnish the accused 
 with no grounds of objection. ' ® 
 
 515. Justification limited to necessity. — The common-law doctrine 
 was that, to justify homicide for the prevention of a forcible or 
 atrocious crime, there must have been absolute necessity for the 
 act.* Killing a man was justifiable homicide only where there was 
 an intention upon the part of the person killed to rob or murder, or 
 do some serious bodily injury to the slayer or another, rendering such 
 killing necessary to prevent it. ^ And under the general statutes ex- 
 isting in most, if not all, of the states, to excuse one person for taking 
 the life of another there must exist a necessity to prevent the commis- 
 
 loPeople V. Grimes, 132 Cal. 30, 64 S. E. 938. And see Mell v. State, 112 
 
 Pac. 101 ; Crawford v. State, 90 Ga. 701, Ga. 78. 37 S. E. 121 ; Moultrie v. State, 
 
 35 Am. St. Rep. 242, 17 S. E. 628; State 112 Ga. 121, 37 S. E. 122. 
 V. Smith, 127 Iowa, 534, 70 L.R.A. 248, KAllen v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 66 
 
 103 N. W. 944; Carmouclie v. Bouis, 6 S. W. 671. 
 La. Ann. 95, 54 Am. Dec. 558. isBloom v. State, 155 Ind. 292, 58 
 
 iiStorey v. State, 71 Ala. 329; Car- N. E. 81. 
 mouche v. Bouis, supra; Weaver v. iMiehell v. State, 22 Ga. 211, 68 Am. 
 
 State, 19 Tex. App. 547, 53 Am. Rep. Dee. 493; Reg. v. Bull, 9 Car. & P. 22. 
 
 389. And see State v. Vance, 17 Iowa, And see Richard v. State, 42 Fla. 528, 
 
 144. 29 So. 413; Young v. State (Neb.) 2 
 
 laPond V. People, 8 Mich. 150. L.R.A. (N.S.I 66, 104 N. W. 867. 
 
 isPugh V. State, 114 Ga. 16, 39 S. E. 2Keg. v. Bull, supra; State v. Jones, 
 
 875; Teasley v. SUte, 104 Ga. 738, 30 71 N. J. L. 543, 60 Atl. 396. 
 
766 HOMICIDE. [§ 515 
 
 sion of a felony or the infliction of great bodily hanii, or a reasonable 
 belief in the mind of the slayer that such necessity exists.* And it 
 is, at least, manslaughter where one unnecessarily kills another while 
 resisting an attempt by such other to commit any felony, or do any 
 unlawful act, or where the killing is done after such attempt haa 
 failed.* Within these rules, killing a person to prevent the com- 
 mission of a felony by him is not justified when, by arresting him, 
 or disabling him, or otherwise, the felony could have been prevented.^ 
 Nor would the slayer be justified if he used more force than reason- 
 ably appeared to be necessary to restrain the person killed;® or if 
 the danger or felony intended were problematical or remote, and 
 not evident and immediate.^ To justify homicide in such case the 
 provocation must be great and the situation imminently perilous.* 
 And the purpose to commit a felony must be apparently dear; it 
 not being enough if the evidence shows a mere assault.^ 
 
 A person resisting an attempt to commit a felony or serious crime, 
 however, is not required to determine with absolute certainty what 
 force is necessary for that purpose,^** though he must not use more 
 force than seems to him to be reasonably necessaiy. -^ * Whether 
 killing a person was necessary to prevent the commission of a felony 
 
 sNoles V. State, 26 Ala. 31, 62 Am. supra. And see People v. Cook, 39 
 
 Dec. 711; Lovett v. State, 30 Fla. 142, Mich. 230, 33 Am. Rep. 380. 
 
 17 L.R.A. 705, 11 So. 550. And see 8 State v. Thompson, 9 Iowa, 188, 74 
 
 Mitchell V. State, 43 Fla. 188, 30 So. Am. Dec. 342; State v. Kennedy, 20 
 
 803; Richard v. State, supra. Iowa, 569. 
 
 4Perugi V. State, 104 Wis. 230, 76 Am. One who surprised another in the aqt 
 
 St. Rep. 865, 80 N. W. 593. And see of placing an obstruction upon the track 
 
 Morris v. State (Ala.) 39 So. 608. of a railroad with intent to wreck » 
 
 sCarpenter v. State, 62 Ark. 288, 36 train expected to pass a short time later, 
 
 S. W. 900; Rex v. Scully, 1 Car. & P. and thereby endanger the lives of persons 
 
 319; State v. Roane, 13 N. C. (2 Dev. upon the train, and who shot him to 
 
 L.) 58; State v. Rutherford, 8 N. C. (1 prevent it, cannot justify the act as one 
 
 Hawks) 457; Rex v. Howarth, 1 Moody, done to prevent a felony, where he had 
 
 C. C. 207; Rex v. Williams, 1 Moody, no ground to fear that his own life 
 
 C. C. 387; Rex v. Longden, Russ. & R. would be taken, or that he would suffer 
 
 C. C. 228; Reg. v. Bull, 9 Car. & P. great bodily harm, since other means 
 
 22. might have been taken to prevent the 
 
 But all reference as to whether or not derailing of the train, and the endanger- 
 
 thtro was a peace officer on the ground ing of life was too problematical and re- 
 
 at the time should be omitted from the mote so long as the train was not im- 
 
 instructions in a prosecution against a mediately approaching. Weaver v. 
 
 person who killed another whom he had State, supra. 
 
 reasonable ground to believe was about oSce Parker v. State, 31 Tex. 132; 
 
 to commit a felony, in an effort to dis- State v. Morgan, 25 N. C. (3 Ired. L.) 
 
 arm him and prevent its commission. 193; Rex v. Bourne, 5 Car. & P. 120; 
 
 Burton v. Com. 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1915, 08 Morris v. State (Ala.) 39 So. 608. 
 
 S. W. 516. loState v. Harper, 149 Mo. 614, 61 S- 
 
 61bid.; Bissot v. State, 53 Ijid. 408. W. 89. 
 
 'Weaver v. State, 19 Tex. App. 547, iilbid. 
 63 Am. Rep. 389; Carpenter v. State, 
 
§ 515] ■ TO PREVENT CRIMINAL OR UNLAWFUL ACTS. 7G7 
 
 or great bodily harm to the slayer or another is a question for the 
 jury in such cases, to be determined upon a preponderance of the 
 evidence, the accused being entitled to the benefit of a reasonable 
 doubt. ^ ^ And the known character of a person for violence, and his 
 acts and threats personally made, are a proper subject for considera- 
 tion on the question as to whether killing him was necessary to pre- 
 vent the commission of a felony, or a serious crime. ^^ Nor is the 
 rule that a person killing another must, in order to justify himself, 
 show the necessity for so doing in order to prevent the commission 
 of a felony, rendered inapplicable by the fact that the act complained 
 of did not result in death, and that the prosecution was for an assault 
 with intent to kill, instead of for homicide. ' * 
 
 516. Apparent, as distinguished from real, danger as necessity. — At 
 common law the necessity to prevent the commission of a felony 
 or the danger of great bodily harm which would justify a homicide 
 must have been real; that it was apparent only was not sufficient.^ 
 And where the statute makes homicide justifiable when committed 
 in preventing a felony, or in suppressing a riot, etc., the justification 
 depends upon the actual necessity, and not upon reasonable belief 
 arising from appearances.^ Under the general form of the statutes 
 on this subject prevailing in most of the states, however, the peril 
 which would warrant a person in killing another to prevent the 
 commission of a felony, or the infliction of great bodily harm, need 
 not be real, but it must appear to be so, and this appearance must 
 be the real aspect of the affair presented to the slayer at the time.* 
 
 lastate v. Conally, 3 Or. 69. Dec. 282; Oliver v. State, 17 Ala. 587; 
 
 islbid. Pratt v. State, 75 Ark. 350, 87 S. W. 
 
 Threats of personal violence made by 651 ; People v. De Los Angeles, 61 Cal. 
 
 one person against another are not ad- 188; Lovett v. State, 30 Fla. 142, 17 
 
 missiWe in evidence in a prosecution L.R.A. 705, 11 So. 550; Palraour v. State, 
 
 against the latter for killing the former, 116 Ga. 269, 42 S. K. 512; Stanley v. 
 
 alleged to be in prevention of a felony. Com. 86 Ky. 440, 9 Am. St. Rep. 305, 6 
 
 where such threats were not communi- S. W. 155; Staten v. State, 30 Miss, 
 
 cated to the accused. Carroll v. State, 619; People v. Walworth, 4 N. Y. Crim. 
 
 23 Ala. 28, 58 Am. Dec. 282. Rep. 3S5; State v. Harris, 46 N. C. (1 
 
 i4Newman v. State. 60 Ga. 609. Jones, L.) 190; State v. Conally, 3 Or. 
 
 1 People V. Cole, 4 Park. Crim. Rep. 69; Weaver v. State, 19 Tex. App. 547, 
 
 35; Dyson v. State, 26 Miss. 362. And S3 Am. Rep. 389. And see Hurd v. 
 
 see Burns V. Erben, 40 N. Y. 463 ; Brooks People, 25 Mich. 405; Richardson v. 
 
 V. Com. 61 Pa. 352, 100 Am. Dee. 645; State, 7 Tex. App. 486; Stoneman v. 
 
 Hawlev V. Butler, 54 Barb. 490; Staten Com. 25 Grat. 887; Parrish v. Com 81 
 
 V. State, 30 Miss. 619; State v. Roane, Va. 1. 
 
 13 N. C. (2 Dev. L.) 58; Adams v. Where an officer interfering in a diffi- 
 
 Moore, 2 Selvv. N. P. 126. culty between two other persons drew his 
 
 2Riehard v. State, 42 Fla. 528, 29 So. pistol, and a third person, believing 
 
 413; People v. Cole, supra. that the officer was not noting oflfioial- 
 
 3Harris v. State, 96 Ala. 24, 1 1 So. ly to preserve the peace, but was taking 
 
 255 ; Carroll v. State, 23 Ala. 29, 58 Am. part in the fight, shot and killed him to 
 
768 HOMICIDE. £S 516 
 
 And the appearance must be such as would excite reasonable appre- 
 hension of such danger. * And there must have been an actual belief 
 on the part of the accused that the necessity was real, and not merely 
 apparent.'' A bare fear upon the part of one person that another is 
 about to commit a felony will not justify killing him.® Nor is a per- 
 son confined to actual danger of injury under a statute providing 
 that any person may, in aid or defense of one about to be injured, 
 make resistance suiEcient to prevent the offense, such a prevention 
 warranting action upon well-grounded apprehension of injury, as in 
 the case of self-defense. '' Whether the circumstances were such as to 
 create a reasonable belief in the mind of one slaying to prevent a 
 felony that the necessity existed for taking life is a question for the 
 jury in a prosecution for homicidej and not one for the slayer, and in 
 its solution they may consider the condition of both parties.^ And 
 any fact tending to prove that at the time of the killing the slayer 
 cither knew, or did not know, that the deceased intended to commit 
 any felony, or to do any great bodily harm, is admissible in evidence, 
 where the defense is that the killing was done to prevent the com- 
 mission of a felony.® 
 
 517. Justification limited to prevention, as distinguished from pun- 
 ishment. — Homicide is justified when committed for the purpose of 
 
 save the life of the person against whom commit a felony or do some great bodily 
 
 he appeared to be about to use his pis- injury as distinguished from actual dan- 
 
 to], the killing would be excusable, ger at the time, and do not dispense with 
 
 though the officer was, in fact, attempt- the necessity of showing some overt act 
 
 ing to prevent a fight and preserve the indicating present intent to kill or do 
 
 peace. Glover v. State, 33 Tex. Grim, some great bodily injury, and that the 
 
 Hep. 224, 26 S. W. 204. danger was imminent at the time. Dy- 
 
 iCarroll v. State, 23 Ala. 28, 58 Am. son v. State, 26 Miss. 362. 
 Dee. 282; Noles v. State, 26 Ala. 31, 62 sQliver v. State, 17 Ala. 587; People 
 
 Am. Dec. 711; State v. Conally, su- v. Walworth, 4 N. Y. Grim. Rep. 355; 
 
 pra. ' State v. Harris, 46 N. C. (1 Jones, L.) 
 
 BLovett V. State, .30 Fla. 142, 17 L. 190. 
 R.A. 705, 11 So. 550; Oliver v. State, But where the juiy in a prosecution 
 
 and State v. Conally, supra. for homicide are instructed as to the 
 
 estate V. Conally, supra; Thompson right of the accused to resist a felony 
 
 V. State, 55 6a. 47 ; Stoneman v. Com. actually attempted, failure of the court 
 
 supra; State v. Cain, 20 W. Va. 679. to charge as to the right of the accused 
 
 'Fisher v. State, 10 Lea, 151. to resist when the facts and circumstan- 
 
 So, statutes making homicide justifi- ces were such as would have induced a 
 
 able when committed in lawful defense reasonable person of ordinary prudence 
 
 of one's self, or of certain other named and judgment to believe that a felony 
 
 persons, when there shall be reasonable was about to be committed is not error, 
 
 ground to apprehend a design to commit where no request for such charge was 
 
 a felony or do some great bodily injury, made. People v. De Los Angeles, 61 Cal. 
 
 and there shall be imminerit danjrer of 188. 
 
 such design being accomplished, modify sNoles v. State, 26 Ala. 31, 62 Am. 
 
 the common law only by making a homi- Dec. 711. And see De Forest v. State, 
 
 cide justifiable when there shall be rea- 21 Ind. 23. 
 sonable ground to apprehend a design to 
 
§ 517] TO PREVENT CRIMINAL OR UNLAWFUL ACTS. 769 
 
 preventing felony, but not when committed as a punishment for one 
 already committed.^ The act of deliberately seeking another and 
 slaying him for past wrongs, however heinous they may be, is broadly 
 separated on the question of justification from slaying another to 
 prevent his doing a present or future wrong immediately pending.^ 
 A well-grounded belief that a felony is about to be committed will 
 extenuate a homicide to prevent its commission.^ And one who 
 •discovers another entering the bedchamber of his wife with the 
 apparent intention of ravishing her is justified in killing him if it 
 cannot be prevented in any other way.* But to justify the killing 
 by a husband of his wife's paramour, it must be done to prevent him 
 from attempting or consummating an impending adultery, and not 
 to avenge a past one.^ ISTor can a killing be justified on the theory 
 that it was done by the slayer to protect the virtue of his aifianced 
 wife, where she was in a place of safety at the time of the killing. *' 
 So, to justify a defense against homicide that the killing was done 
 in protection of the slayer's property, or property in his possession, 
 it must appear that he killed while the deceased was in the very 
 act of making a violent attack upon such property, and that that was 
 his only means of preventing the injury. '^ And the right of self- 
 defense, or the defense of one's family or habitation, does not justify 
 pursuing and killing an intruder or aggressor after he has retreated. * 
 
 iState V. Koane, 13 N. C. (2 Dev. L.) son v. State, 91 Ga. 271, 44 Am. St. Rep. 
 58; Hill V. State, 64 Ga. 453; State v. 22, 18 S. E. 298. 
 
 Rutherford, 8 N. C. (1 Hawks) 457, 9 In Biggs v. State, 29 Ga. 723, 76 Am. 
 Am. Dec. 658. Dec. 630, however, it was held that the 
 
 2Hi]l V. State, supra. And see State act of a person of shooting another in 
 V. Hicks, 178 Mo. 433, 77 S. W. 539. the mornins, because he had attempted 
 
 And though an attack upon an un- illicit relations with Ms wife the night 
 lawful assembly by a body of men, by before, was excusable upon the theory 
 which it was dispersed, was unjustifi- that his conduct in the morning amount- 
 able and unlawful, the killing of one of ed to a renewal of the attempt, 
 the attacking party by one of the as- «Futch v. State, 90 Ga. 472, 16 S. E. 
 sembly is not justifiable where it oc- ■'^"^■ 
 
 curred after the friends of the assembly „t.''^f°i^'^ nn?***®' ^^ "^^^^ °''™- -^^P' 
 had been rallied and were returning the "'If a r^ ,, o ^ ^« r,^ ^ 
 
 assault, though the asailants were guilty „ f^^^^ ^ ^°lr I' ^,.% ^V .^*.\*? ^A 
 of the first illegal assault. Com. v A"*^?[^°'fi'„^ ^; ?■ '^p^^'^'^' ,*x7'p^ 
 Daley, 2 Clark (Pa.) 361. ^b^v L ) 58 ^' "' 
 
 3State r. Rutherford, s«pra ^jjere a woman, having reasonable 
 
 4Staten v. State. 30 Miss. 619; State grounds to apprehend personal violence 
 V. Neville, 51 N. C. (6 Jones, L.) 432. at the hands of her husband, seeks a 
 And see State v. Craton, 28 N. 0. (6 temporary refuge in the house of an- 
 Ired. L.) 164; State v. Harman, 78 N. other, and the husband seeks to enter 
 C 515. against the command of the owner, 
 
 5Hill V. State, 64 Ga. 453; Farmer v. either the owner or the wife has the 
 
 State, 91 Ga. 720, 18 S. E. 987; Cloud v. right to use all necessary fore 3 to pre- 
 
 State, 81 Ga. 444, 7 S. E. 641 ; Bone v. vent him from entering, but they have 
 
 State, 86 Ga. 108, 12 S. E. 205; Jack- no right to pursue him and shoot him 
 
 Horn.— 49 
 
770 HOMICIDE. [§ 517 
 
 Evidence of previous criminal intimacy betweem deceased and the 
 slayer's vi^ife, however, and of his persistently following her up, .and 
 that he was shot while accompanying her into a dark alley, is suffi- 
 cient to go to the jury in a prosecution for homicide under a stat- 
 ute providing that homicide is justifiable to prevent a felony, and 
 in defense of one's family under certain circumstances, and in all 
 other instances standing on a like footing of justice and reason.® 
 
 II. Application of eules to pakticular acts. 
 
 a. Personal aggression or force. 
 
 518. Attempts to kill or injure the slayer. — The application of rules 
 with reference to justification of homicide to prevent criminal or 
 unlawful acts to acts of violence toward the slayer involves and in- 
 cludes the whole subject of homicide committed in self-defense, which, 
 owing to its extent and distinct character, has been made the subject 
 of an independent chapter.^ 
 
 519. Attempt to kill or injure others — Where a person is unlaw- 
 fully, wilfully, and feloniously engaged in an attempt to kill another 
 or do him great bodily harm, not in his own self-defense, another 
 person may lawfully interfere to prevent the injury, and may even 
 take the life of the person seeking to do the injury in order to 
 prevent it, provided such action is apparently necessary for that pur- 
 pose. ^ Where it appears to a person in the exercise of reasonable 
 judgment that another is about to commit a felonious or deadly as- 
 sault upon a third person, he has a right to interpose and do for the 
 third person what the latter might do for himself, even to the 
 killing of the assailant, if necessary.^ And the killing of a person 
 
 after he has given up his attempt to en- State v. Greer, 22 W. Vn. 800. And see 
 
 ter, the attempt in such case furnishing People v. Lee (Col. App. ) 81 Pae. 009. 
 
 no justification for the shooting. State And an instruction defining rape and 
 
 V. Conally, supra. assault with intent to rape should be 
 
 sCloud V. State, supra. given in a prosecution for horaicida in 
 
 iSee supra, chapter XII. wliich the accused claimed that he killed 
 
 iStanley v. Com. 8G Ky. 440, 9 Am. the deceased because the latter was in 
 
 St. Hep. 305, 6 S. W. 155; Morrison v. the act of perpstratin"? rape. Scott v. 
 
 Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 2493, 67 L.R.A. State, 48 Tex. Crim. Rep. 85, 79 S. W. 
 
 529, 74 S. W. 277; Carroll v. Com. 20 543. 
 
 Ky. L. Rep. 1083, 83 S. W. SriZ; Mitchell 2Fletcher v. Com. 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1157, 
 
 V. State, 22 Ga. 211, 68 Am. Dec. 493; 83 >S, W. 688; Carroll v. Com. supia; 
 
 People V. Cole, 4 Park. Crim. Rep. Sri; Stanton v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 29 
 
 Weaver v. State, 19 Tex. App. 547, 53 S. W. 47G; Garza \. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 Am. Rep. 389; Glover v. State, 33 Tex. App.) 88 S. W. 231; Gray v. State (Tox. 
 
 Crim. Rep. 224, 20 S. W. 204; Gnrcia v. Crim. App.) 83 S. W. 705. 
 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 57 S. W. 650; But an instruction that homicide com- 
 
§ 519] TO PREVENT CRIMINAL OR UNLA^VFUL ACTS. 771 
 
 by an assistant of an officer seeking to arrest liiin is justified where 
 the circumstances were such as to excite the fears of a reasonable 
 man that it was the purpose of the person sought to be arrested 
 to perpetrate a felony upon the officer and his assistant, and he acted 
 under the influence of such fears, and not in a spirit of revenge.'* 
 Nor does the fact that a person interfering to prevent a felonious 
 act assaulted the person attempting it interfere with his right to de- 
 fend his own person against the other, even to the extent of killing 
 him if necessary.* And if a felonious assault is made by one per- 
 son upon another, and a third person interferes to prevent it, and 
 a fourth interferes tx) prevent such interference, the person first inter- 
 fering is justified in doing whatever appears to him to be necessary 
 to rescue the person first assaulted, even to the taking of the life 
 of the person assaulting him to prevent his interference.® And a 
 person is using a deadly weapon within the meaning of a statute 
 making homicide justifiable when it takes place to prevent murder, 
 maiming, etc., and providing that it shall be presumed that a person 
 using a deadly weapon designed to kill, where he used threatening 
 language, and seized and partially drew his pistol, and was only 
 prevented from drawing and using it by the interference of by- 
 standers.*' So, to justify a killing under a statutory provision that 
 it is justifiable homicide for one person to kill another who, in 
 connection with others, manifestly intends and endeavors, in a riot- 
 ous and tumultuous manner, to enter the habitation of another for the 
 purpose of assaulting or offering personal violence to any person 
 dwelling or being therein, it is not necessary that the personal vio- 
 lence should amount to a felony. '^ The right to slay in defense of 
 another, however, where the person slaying is not himself assaulted, 
 
 mitted in defense of another is not jus- tion is necessary, is justified in killing^ 
 tifiable unless the killing was done, not the person making an assault if neces- 
 with malice but because it was neces- sary to protect the life of the judge,, 
 sarv to save the life of the person fe- and in so doing he is acting under the 
 loniously assaulted by the deceased, and laws of the United States, and is not an- 
 such person had given no provocation swerable for the act in the coui'ts of the 
 for such assault, but was engaged in state. Ee Neagle (Cunningham v. 
 lawful business, is improper in not de- Neagle) 135 U. S. 1, 34 L. ed. 65, 10 Sup. 
 fining what constitutes a felonious as- Ct. Rep. 6.58, Affirming 14 Sawy. 232, 5 
 sault, and in assuming that the person L.R.A. 78, 39 Fed. 833. 
 defended was not in fault. Brabston v. <iCampbell v. Com. 88 Ky. 402, 21 Am. 
 State, 68 Miss. 208, 8 So. 326. St. Rep. 348, 11 S. W. 290. 
 
 sAdaras v. State, 72 Ga. 85. 6Eatep v. Com. 86 Ky. 39, 9 Am. St. 
 
 A deputy marshal of the United States Rep. 260, 4 S. W. 820. 
 charged with the duty of protecting and eWarrI v. State, 30 Tex. App. 687, 18 
 guarding a judge of the United States, S. W. 793. 
 
 while in the dischiirofe of his ofipial TSnnth v. State, 106 Ga. 673, 71 Am. 
 duties, against assault, being present St. Rep. 286., 32 S. E. 851. 
 at the critical moment when prompt ac- 
 
772 HOMICIDE. [§ 519 
 
 depends, both at common law and under the statutes, upon necessity, 
 and the homicide is justifiable only when necessarily committed.® 
 The slayer must have acted in good faith and used all reasonable 
 means in his power to prevent the perpetration of the crime.® And 
 the homicide must have been in necessary resistance to aggression ap- 
 parently violent, immediate, and imminent toward the person about 
 to be injured. ^ ** And statutes with reference to homicide, justifiable 
 because committed in defense of another, relate to transactions oc- 
 curring in respect to parties present at the time and place of its oc- 
 currence, and have no application to a case in which the danger is 
 to an absent person. ^ ^ JSTor can a person justify an interference in 
 behalf of another, or the killing of a third person for his protection, 
 upon the ground that he came into the difficulty for the purpose of 
 taking the place of the person assaulted, where he does not stand to 
 such person in the relation of husband or wife, parent or child, or 
 master or servant ; in such case he can justify, if at all, merely as a 
 disinterested person seeking to preserve the peace, ^^ and the protec- 
 tion of the other must be incidental to that purpose.'^* And how- 
 ever heinous an offense against another may be, a person is not justi- 
 fied in taking vengeance into his own hands and deliberately slaying 
 the wrongdoer. ^ * 
 
 sRiehard v. State, 42 Fla. 528, 29 So. Tex. Crim. Rep. 224, 26 S. W. 204; Ru- 
 
 413; People v. 'Ck)le, 4 Park. Crim. Rep. loff v. People, 45 N. Y. 213. 
 
 35. And see People v. Lee (Cal. App.) And where two persons ejigage in an 
 
 81 Pac. 969. affray, fighting with their fists, it can- 
 
 The rule that one may act in self-de- not be deemed necessary for a third per- 
 fense upon apparent danger of death or son to resort to firearms, or to take life, 
 great bodily harm, as distinguished from for the purpose of protecting one corn- 
 real danger, applies where one person batant from being injured by the other, 
 intervenes to defend another against an People v. Cole, supra. 
 assault by a, third person; there must uPeople v. Walworth, 4 N. Y. Crim. 
 be an apparently fatal assault, or one Rep. 355. 
 calculated to work grievous harm, to i2Morrison v. Com. supra. 
 justify the intervener In taking the as- isPeople v. Cole, 4 Park. Crim. Rep. 
 sailant's life. United States v. King, 35. 
 34 Fed. 302. 1 4 Perry v. State, 102 Ga. 365, 30 S. 
 
 sMitchell v. State, 22 Ga. 211, 68 Am. E. 903. 
 
 Dec. 493. And evidence that the accused had a 
 
 A person who Intervenes in defense pistol concealed in his pocket is admis- 
 
 of another who is assaulted by a third sible in a prosecution for homicide, 
 
 person, under a belief that a felonious where it is shown that, on seeing a 
 
 assault is in process of commission, difficulty between his father and the de- 
 
 v.'hich can only be resisted by the death ceased, he left the place where he was 
 
 of the assailant, and kills the assailant, standing and went to the place of the 
 
 is guilty of manslaughter if his belief killing, 15 or 20 steps away, and on the 
 
 was negligently formed. United States way drew a pistol, the statute provid- 
 
 V. King, supra. ing that when a killing in a sudden af- 
 
 lOWeaver v. State, 19 Tex. App. 547, fray is caused by the assailant by the 
 
 53 Am. Rep. 389. And see Morrison v. use of a deadly weapon concealed before 
 
 Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 2493, 67 L.R.A. the commencement of the fight, the ad- 
 
 529, 74 S. W. 277; Glover v. State, 33 versary having no weapon drawn, the 
 
§ 519] TO PREVENT CRIMINAL OR UNLAWFUL ACTS. 773 
 
 So, i£ the person defended is in fault, the general rule is that the 
 person killing another in his defense acts at his own peril. ^ ® And 
 when it is claimed that a homicide was committed in defense of an- 
 other the particulars of the difficulty between the original parties 
 are admissible in evidence in a prosecution for the killing.^" ISTor 
 can one who participates with another in bringing on a difficulty, and 
 who is equally in the wrong with the latter, act in his defense. ^ '' 
 It has been held, however, that the amenability to the law of a per- 
 son who, finding another engaged in an affray, goes to his aid and 
 takes part in the conflict, depends upon his own acts and intent, and 
 not upon the intent which actuates the person to whose aid he goes, 
 he having no knowledge thereof. ^ ® 
 
 Where one person interposed in a fight between two others, and 
 shot one of them, it is for the jury in a prosecution therefor to say 
 whether, in shooting, he intended to interfere to prevent the mur- 
 der of the other combatant, and nothing else. ^ ® And the burden rests 
 with the prosecution to show guilt; the accused is not charged with 
 the onus of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was 
 done to prevent the perpetration of a crime. ^ " And where a homi- 
 cide was committed in defense of another it is not sufficient to in- 
 struct the jury as to the right of the slayer to kill in his own defense, 
 but the court should also instruct as to his right to kill in defense of 
 the person for whom he interceded. ^ ^ 
 
 520. Assault upon family and relations — A person is always justi- 
 fied in acting for the defense of his family, according to the circum- 
 stances as they appear to him, even to the extent of taking life, if 
 necessary, or apparently necessary, to save them from death or great 
 bodily harm. ^ And a man who finds another violating or attempting 
 
 killing is murder. Morris v. State siAshcraft v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 (Ala.) 39 So. 608. 488, 68 S. W. 847. 
 
 leStanley v. Com. 86 Ky. 440, 9 Am. But refusal or failure of the court to 
 
 St. Rep. 305, 6 S. W. 155; Mitchell v. charge in a prosecution for homicide 
 
 State, 22 Ga. 211, 68 Am. Dec. 493; upon the right of the accused to kill if 
 
 Martinez v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 88 the deceased was attempting to talce the 
 
 S. W. 234. But see State v. Harper, life of his friend is not error, where the 
 
 149 Mo. 514, 51 S. W. 89. accused himself testified that he fired 
 
 leSanford v. State, 143 Ala. 78, 39 So. upon the deceased solely in self-defense, 
 
 370. especially where, if such an attack was 
 
 i^Woodrich v. State (Tex. Crim. made upon the friend, accused did not 
 
 App.) 90 S. W. 882. see it. Mitchell v. State, 38 Tex. Crim. 
 
 isGuffee v. State, 8 Tex. App. 187; Rep. 170, 41 S. W. 816. 
 
 Snell V. State, 29 Tex. App. 236, 25 Am. iRichardsoji v. State, 7 Tex. App. 
 
 St. Rep. 723, 15 S. W. 722. 486; Waybright v. State, 56 Ind. 122; 
 
 isPeople V. Cole, 4 Park. Crim. Rep. Dukes v. State, 11 Ind. 557, 71 Am. Dec. 
 
 35. 370; Morrison v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 2 Scott V. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 2493, 67 L.R.A. 529, 74 S. W. 277. And 
 85, 79 S. W. 543; Thacker v. Com. 24 
 Ky. L. Rep. 1584, 71 S. W. 931. 
 
774 HOMICIDE. [5 520 
 
 to violate his wife, and kills him, is justified in the act, as the woTnan 
 herself would be.^ So, a husband has the right to use force, if neces- 
 sary, to enable him to regain possession of his wife from one in whose 
 society he finds her, where he has reason to believe that they have 
 committed, or are about to commit, a criminal act.* And he may 
 kill her father, if necessary, to protect himself, or to prevent the 
 father from taking his wife or child, or both, from him.* And where 
 a statute enumerates certain classes of justifiable homicide, and makes 
 other cases standing upon the same footing of justice and reason 
 also justifiable, it is a question for the jury whether the act of a 
 husband in taking the life of another, who attempted the seduction 
 of his wife under circumstances of gross and direct aggravation, was 
 justifiable under the statute.® So, one who sees a brother or sister 
 assaulted by another has the same right to resist the assault, and is 
 entitled to the same defense, or partial defense, reducing the grade 
 of the crime in case of killing the assailant, as the person assaulted. " 
 And the rule is the same though there was failure to save the brother 
 or sister.'' Likewise, where a father kills a person to prevent an 
 attempt to take away his children, the question is whether the cir- 
 cumstances were such as to produce a reasonable relief in his mind 
 of a pressing necessity to take the life of the assailant.® And a 
 
 see Pratt v. State. 75 Ark. .350, 87 S. W. Biggs v. State, 29 Ga. 723, 7C Am. Dee. 
 
 651; Cheek v. State, 35 Ind. 492; Pond 630. 
 
 V. People, 8 Mich. 150; Sharp v. State, ^Cole v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 19 Ohio, 387; Connaughty v. Stale, 1 225, 75 S. W. 527. 
 
 Wis. 1G5, GO Am. Dee. 370; liandock \. sBiggs v. State, supra. 
 
 Baker, 2 Bos. & P. 200; Reg. v. Har- ePalmer v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 rington, 10 Cox, C. C. 370. 83 S. W. 202; Snell v. State, 29 Tex. 
 
 And an instruction limiting self-de- App. 236, 25 Am. St. Rep. 723, 15 S. 
 
 fense to a killing in defense of the slay- W. 722; Dyson v. State, 14 Tex. App. 
 
 er is improper and erroneous wliera 454; Chambers v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. 
 
 there was evidence that it was done in Rep. 61, 79 S. W. 572; Guffee v. State, 
 
 defense of himself and his son. Thacker 8 Tex. App. 187; Smurr v. State, 105 
 
 V. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1584, 71 S. W. Ind. 125, 4 N. E. 445; SIcQueen v. State, 
 
 931. 23 Ky. L. Rep. 20, 88 S. W. 1047; Ross 
 
 2State V. Neville, 51 N. C. (6 Jones, v. Com. 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1344, 55 S. W. 
 
 L.) 432; Staten v. State, 30 Miss. 619. 4; State v. Greer, 22 W. Va. 800. And 
 
 And see Sherrill v. State, 138 Ala. 3, 35 see Whatley v. State, 91 Ala. 108, 9 So. 
 
 So. 129. , 236; Mitchell v. State. 43 Fla. 183, 30 
 
 sState V. Craton, 28 N. C. (6 Ired. So. 803; Delaney v. Com. 18 Ky L. 
 
 L-) 164. Rep. 212, 35 S. W. 1037; Richard v. 
 
 So, one who shoots at another in de- State, 42 Fla. 528, 29 So. 413; Shu- 
 fense of his Avife, wliom the latter had mate v. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. '26G, 42 
 attempted to seduce, and who would bo S. W. 600. 
 justified in his acts had he killed the TGuffee v. State, supra. 
 other, cannot be held criminally liabl? sOlivcr v. State, 17 Ala. 587. 
 for shooting where death does not re- And in such case it is wholly immate- 
 sult, under a statute imposing a pen- rial to inquire whether the father was 
 alty upon any person who shall be guilty in a state of fear or alarm, or whether 
 of the offense of shooting at another, he was a man of firmness and character. 
 
§ 520] TO PIXEVENT CrJMtNAL OR UNLAWFUL ACTS. 775 
 
 father has 1]ic right to slay, if necessary, to prevent the seduction of 
 his minor female child." And the act of a person in shooting an- 
 other who was about to burn the dwelling of his mother, or commit 
 some other known felony with reference to her, where there was im- 
 minent danger of the design being carried into effect, is justifiable.^" 
 And this is so though the danger was unreal. ^ ^ And where a son 
 killed his father, having reasonable grounds for believing, and hon- 
 estly believing, that his act was necessary for the protection of his 
 mother from death or serious bodily injury, the homicide is excus- 
 able.^ ^ So, the right of a son to defend his father is coextensive with 
 the right of the father to defend himself, and whatever the father 
 may do rightfully in repelling an assault, actual or threatened, the 
 son, coming to his assistance, may rightfully do. ^ * Nor is a son in- 
 terfering to prevent the commission of a felony upon his father re- 
 quired to determine with absolute certainty the amount of force 
 necessary for that purpose. ^ * And where a nephew killed a person, 
 believing and having reasonable grounds to believe that he was about 
 to kill or inflict great bodily injury upon his uncle, and that it was 
 necessary, or apparently necessary, to do what he did to prevent such 
 injury, and he was actuated by no other motive, and used no greater 
 force than was necessary to avert such impending danger, the uncle 
 not being the original aggressor, it is excusable homicide. ^ ^ 
 
 A person has no right to kill another, however, because the latter 
 has made threats against his relatives which he thinks may, at some 
 future time, be executed, the threatened relatives not being present 
 at the time.^® And to justify interference in defense of a relative 
 an actual attack upon him must have been made ; it is not sufficient 
 merely that such an attack had been previously made, or that the 
 relative was present at the time, there being no attack. ^ '' 
 
 or of a weak and cowardly disposition. i oParrish v. Com. 81 Va. 1 ; State 
 
 Ibid. V. Pollard, 139 Mo. 220.. 40 S. W. 949. 
 
 Whether the taking or decoyinor of uParrish v. Com. supra. 
 a child away from its parents would be I23^eg. v. Rose, 15 Cox, C. C. 540. 
 a felony, to prevent which the taking isKrrr v. State, 108 Ala. 1, 17 So. 
 
 of life would be justifiable under a 328; Pratt v. State, 75 Ark. 350, 87 
 
 statutory provision punishing by inipris- S. W. 651 ; Benge v. Com. 24 Ky. L. 
 
 onment in the penitentiary every per- Rep. 1466, 71 S. W. 048. 
 son who shall maliciously, forcibly, or I'lState v. Harper, 149 Mo. 514, 51 S. 
 
 fraudulently decoy or entice away any W. 89. 
 
 child under a designated age, with in- isTubbs v. Com. 22 Ky. L. Rep. 431, 
 
 tent to conceal it, depends upon the in- 57 S. W. 623. 
 
 tent with which the child is taken, and isPeople v. Walwoith, 4 N. Y. Crim. 
 
 to render the offense a felony the erira- Rep. 355. 
 
 inal intent and the act must both con- iTjohnson v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 cur. Ibid. 84 S. W. 824; Priro v. State, 30 Tex. 
 
 sGossett V. State, 123 Ga. 431, 51 S. Crim. Rep. 403, 37 S. W. 743; Morris v. 
 
 E. 394. State (Ala.) 39 So. 608; People v. Re- 
 
776 HOMICIDE. [§ 520 
 
 One wlio kills another while assuming to act in defense of rela- 
 tives may give in evidence in a prosecution therefor any facts tend- 
 ing to show the character of the attack which he resisted, the inten- 
 tion with which he made the resistance, and that he had reasonable 
 grounds to believe that it was necessary, as a measure of prevention, 
 to go to the extent he did in resisting it. ^ * And where the character 
 of a wife for chastity is impeached in a prosecution against her hus- 
 band for interfering to prevent her attempted seduction, it is com- 
 petent for the husband to give evidence in support of such character ; 
 since if her character was bad, it would be less justifiable to resort to 
 violent means to rescue and protect her. ^ ® And a decree in a divorce 
 case rendered in favor of a wife against her husband is admissible 
 in evidence in a prosecution against the wife's brother for killing the 
 husband, alleged to have been done in defense of his family, for the 
 purpose of showing that the person killed was no longer the husband 
 of the accused's sister, but was a mere intruder upon the premises 
 of the family, having no pretense of right to go there, and properly 
 subject to be regarded as a trespasser. ^ " 
 
 521. Status of relative as affecting right to interfere The general 
 
 rule, as ordinarily stated, is that a brother or other relative assisting 
 another in resisting a wrongful act directed against the latter can use 
 no more force than the person he assists would be entitled to use ; ^ 
 and that interference to protect a relative is not justified where the 
 relative was the aggressor in the original difficulty.^ A person has 
 a right to use violence in defense of another only when the imperiled 
 person would have been justified in using it in his own defense.'^ 
 Both must have been free from fault in bringing on the difficulty.* 
 
 gan, 107 App. Div. 608, 94 N. Y. Supp. S. W. 900. And see Cook v. State, 85 
 
 841. And see Gossett v. State, 123 Ga. Miss. 738, 38 So. 110. 
 
 431, 51 S. E. 394. 2Spau]ding v. State, 162 Ind. 297, 70 
 
 And while one whose brother had N. E. 243; Surginer v. State, 134 Ala. 
 been abducted and carried away in u 120, 32 So. 277. And see supra, chap- 
 carriage has a right to rescue him, he ter XII., § 332. 
 
 has no right to commence firing into While a son may fight in the neces- 
 
 the carriage, or to make hostile demon- sary defense of his father, yet the act 
 
 strations upon overtaking it, before de- of the son resulting in the death of his 
 
 manding his brother's release, and in father's opponent must receive the same 
 
 ease he does so and causes the death of construction as it would have received 
 
 one of the abducting party, he is guilty had it been the act of the father. State 
 
 of manslaughter. Delaney v. Com. 18 v. Brittain, 89 N. C. 481. 
 Ky. L. Rep. 212, 35 S. W. 1037. sSurginer v. State, supra; Sherrill 
 
 isDukes V. State, 11 Ind. 557, 71 Am. v. State, 138 Ala. 3, 75 So. 129; Stevens 
 Dec. 370. And see State v. Felker, 27 v. State, 133 Ala. 28, 32 So. 270; Mitch- 
 Mont. 451, 71 Pac. 668. ell v. State, 129 Ala. 23, 30 So. 348; 
 
 isBiggs v. State, 29 Ga. 723, 76 Am. Morris v. State (Ala.) 39 So. 608. And 
 
 Dec. 630. see Sanders v. State, 134 Ala. 74, 32 So. 
 
 soStoneraan v. Com. 25 Grnlt. 8S7. 654. 
 
 iCarpenter v. State, 02 Ark. 286, 36 4Morris v. State, supra. 
 
§ 521] TO PREVENT CRBIINAL OR UNLAWFUL ACTS. 777 
 
 One cannot lawfully interpose to defend a brother or other relative 
 who is engaged in the commission of a felonious and unlawful as- 
 sault.^ If a person is in fault in provoking an assault, he must re- 
 treat as far as he safely can before another will be justified in taking 
 the life of his assailant in his defense. ® 
 
 It has been held, however, that the culpability of a person who 
 kills in defense of another is measured by the intent with which he 
 acted, and not by that with which the other was actuated, unless he 
 knew, or might reasonably have known, such intent. '^ 
 
 522. Wliat relationship warrants interference The right to inter- 
 fere for the protection of others to the extent of taking life, when 
 necessary, includes generally persons connected by the relation of 
 the family, guardian and ward, master and servant,^ and host and 
 guest. ^ And it has been held that an uncle, who is justified by the 
 facts in striking in defense of his nephew, may use such force as is 
 apparently necessary to avert impending peril to tlie nephew, in the 
 exercise of reasonable judgment, and is not required to measure the 
 exact force necessary to avert such danger.^ And that an uncle, 
 who has reasonable grounds to believe that a rape is about to be com- 
 mitted upon his niece, is justified in killing the person about to com- 
 mit it, if he acts in good faith for the purpose of preventing the in- 
 jury.* 
 
 A man is not entitled to champion the cause of a woman with 
 whom he is maintaining improper relations, however, and defend 
 her against simple assaults of her brother, so as to give him the benefit 
 of the rule of self-defense in case he kills the brother. ^ And a brother 
 
 eSmith v. State, 105 Tenn. 305, 60 iWaybriglit v. State, 56 Ind. 122; 
 
 S. W. 145. And see Wood v. State, Dukes v. State, 11 Ipd. 557, 71 Am. Dec. 
 
 128 Ala. 27, 86 Am. St. Rep. 71, 29 So. 370. 
 
 557. 2 Cooper's Case, Cro. Car. 544; Se- 
 
 sState V. Greer, 22 W. Va. 800. mayne's Case, 5 Coke, 92; Curtis v. 
 
 But where a person engaged in a dif- Hubbard, 1 Hill, 336, 4 Hill, 437, 40 
 
 ficulty with another is so drunk as not Am. Dec. 292; De Forest v. State, 21 
 
 to be mentally able to know his duty to Ind. 23. 
 
 retreat to save himself from injury, or sCarroll v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 1083, 
 
 is physically unable to retreat, his 83 S. W. 552. 
 
 brother is not bound to stand by and 4Roe v. Com. 6 Ky. L. Rep. 364. 
 
 see him killed or suffer great bodily 6Morrison v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 harm because he does not retreat, but 2493, 67 L.R.A. 529, 74 S. W. 277. 
 
 may interpose and defend him, even to But in such case evidence is admis- 
 
 the extent, if necessary, of taking the sible to show such relations for the 
 
 life of his assailant. Ibid. purpose of explaining the circumstances 
 
 7Monson v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) of the parties, illustrating their motives, 
 
 63 S. W. 647; State v. Harper, 149 Mo. and showing interest upon the part of 
 
 514, 51 S. W. 89. And see Alexander the woman, who testified on behalf of 
 
 v State, 118 Ga. 26, 44 S. E. 857; Cham- the defendant. Ibid, 
 bers V. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 61, 79 
 S. W. 572. 
 
77S HOMICIDE. (§ 522 
 
 is not included among domestic relatives within the meaning of a 
 statute authorizing the defense of domestic relatives in a proper 
 case." And the principle of relationship has no application on the 
 question of the right of a man to take life in defense of a woman, 
 where they were not married, but were previously coslaves, and lived 
 together while siich, and subsequently occupied the same bed in a 
 room with other freed people.'' So, a statute providing that homi- 
 cide is justiiiable when committed in defense of the slayer's hus- 
 band, wife, parent, child, master, mistress, or servant, when there 
 shall be reasonable ground to apprehend a design to commit a felony, 
 or do some great personal injury, and there shall be imminent dan- 
 ger of such felony being accomplished, includes neither a brother 
 nor sister of the person doing the killing.^ ISTor is the agent of a 
 husband for the purpose of hunting out evidence of the adultery of 
 his wife justified or excused in shooting her paramour, though he 
 catches the parties in the very act.® 
 
 b. Aggression upon public order. 
 
 523. Breaches of the peace — It is as much every man's duty to 
 interfere to prevent a breach of the peace as it is to prevent a felony, 
 since a breach of the peace, whether felonious in itself or not, is 
 liable to lead to felony, and felonious rioters resisting lawful au- 
 thority may be slain with impunity when necessary for the purpose 
 of maintaining or restoring the public peace. ^ And these rules apply 
 to interference by private persons, as well as by public officers, since 
 it is their right and duty to aid in preserving the peace. ^ Thus where 
 one sees another about to shoot into a house where a large number of 
 persons are assembled, he has a right to disarm and restrain him in 
 order to prevent the commission of the act, and may use such force 
 as is necessary. '' And an attack upon a place of business for the pur- 
 
 6Richard v. State, 42 Fla. 528, 29 So. ises, since in any event the killing is 
 
 413. not justifiable. Ibid. " 
 
 TParker v. State, 31 Tex. 132. iRe Riots of 1844, 2 Clark (Pa.) 275; 
 
 sMitehell v. State, 43 Fla. 188, 30 Com. v. Daley, 2 Clark (Pa.) 361. 
 
 So. 803; Richard v. State, 42 Fla. 528, 2Pond v. People, 8 Mich. 150. 
 
 29 So. 413. One who peaceably goes to the house 
 
 sPeople V. Horton, 4 Mich. 67. of another solely to stop a disturbance, 
 
 And whether a husband or his wife and to require an apology for previous 
 
 were in possession of the premises con- insults to his wife, and who is attacked 
 
 stituting their residence, and whether by the other with a deadly weapon, 
 
 a trespasser entered the house with or upon which he kills his assailant, is 
 
 without the permission of the wife, is not guilty of murder. Watson v. Com. 
 
 immaterial in a prosecution against an 87 Va. 608, 13 S. E. 22. 
 
 agent of the husband employed to hunt sBurton v. Com. 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1915, 
 
 out' evidence of the adultery of his wife 66 S. VV. 516. 
 for killing the trespasser on such prem- 
 
§ 523] TO PREVENT CRIMINAL OR UNLAWFUL ACTS. 770 
 
 pose of destroying it is a violent, forcible felony justifying the owner 
 in killing the assailant, when necessary to prevent its destruction, with- 
 out reference to whether or not it is a part of his dwelling. * So, while 
 this is the common-law rule, homicide is made justifiable by statute 
 in many of the states when committed in lawfully suppressing any 
 Tiot, or lawfully keeping and preserving the peace. ^ And under such 
 statutes the killing by a person of two or more persons assaulting or 
 attempting to kill his brother or sister is one to prevent a violent 
 breach of the peace.® And one who interposes in a fight between 
 two others, whose design is to prevent the commission of a crime by 
 one upon the other, and unnecessarily kills the one he seeks to re- 
 strain, is guilty of manslaughter only.^ So, where it is a felony to 
 aid a prisoner in custody to escape, the ofiicer in charge may, to 
 prevent the felony, use a deadly weapon if that is the only reason- 
 ably apparent method of accomplishing the result.* 
 
 The rule that a person has the right to kill to prevent the commis- 
 sion of an atrocious crime, where he acts in good faith and the kill- 
 ing is necessary for the purpose, however, does not apply where the 
 slayer acted in concert with another in bringing about an affray or 
 diiliculty with the person slain, and made himself a party to it.® 
 And a person is not excusable for killing another to prevent a breach 
 of the peace, where he used more force than reasonably appeared to 
 be necessary to restrain him. ^ " Neither can an unlawful, or even a 
 riotous, assembly of persons be shot down and killed without any 
 previous effort being made to suppress it by other means. ^ ^ And it 
 
 4Pond V. People, supra. sMitchell v. State, and Richard v. 
 
 BPeople V. Cole, 4 Park. Crim. Rep. State, supra. 
 
 35; Mitchell v. State, 43 Fla. 188, 30 'People v. Cole, supra. 
 
 So. 803; Richard v. State, 42 Fla. 528, sstate v. Smith. 127 Iowa, 534, 70 
 
 29 So. 413. And see Smith v. State, 108 L.R.A. 248, 103 N. W. 944. 
 
 Ga. 673, 71 Am. St. Rep. 286, 32 S. E. sMitchell v. State, 22 Ga. 211, 68 Am. 
 
 851. Dec. 493. And see Johnston's Case, 5 
 
 Where two or more persons manifest- Gratt. COO. 
 
 ly intended and endeavored, in a riot- And one who finds two men fighting, 
 
 ous and tumultuous manner, to enter the one of whom is a friend, and inflicts a 
 
 habitation of another for the purpose of dangerous stab upon the other without 
 
 assaulting or inflicting personal vio- provocation, is no more excusable than 
 
 lence upon anyone therein, and one of he would have been for the same act 
 
 them, to prevent such injury, was killed committed on one who was fighting with 
 
 by the occupant of the house, if the cii- a stranger, or who was not fighting at 
 
 cumstaneea were sufiicient to excite the all. Conner v. State, 4 Yerg. 137, 26 
 
 fears of a reasonable man that such Am. Dec. 217. 
 
 entry was intended, and the killing was loBurton v. Com. 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1915, 
 
 done under the influence of such fears, 08 S. W. 516. 
 
 such homicide is justifiable under Ga. nCom. v. Daley, 2 Clark (Pa.) 361. 
 Pen. Code, § 90, though the assault or 
 personal violence intended was less than 
 a felony. Smith v. State, supra. 
 
780 HOMICIDE. [§ 52S 
 
 cannot be said that to keep the peace in a mere fist fight it can be neces- 
 sary to resort to firearms, or to take life in any case. ^ ^ 
 
 c. Aggression upon property rights. 
 
 524. Robbery and burglary — ^Eobbery is a forcible felony, and a 
 person has a legal right to prevent the attempted commission of rob- 
 bery by the infliction of death upon the person attempting it, if neces- 
 sary. ^ Where one person wrongfully takes the money or property- of 
 another from his possession, whether forcibly or through fraud, the 
 right to protect it is regarded as an extension of the right to protect 
 one's person, and goes to the same extent.^ And where one person 
 raises a crop upon the land of another under a contract by which he 
 is entitled to a share of it for his services, they are not joint tenants 
 or tenants in common in the crop produced ; it is exclusively the prop- 
 erty of the landowner, so that a forcible taking of the crop by the 
 tenant would be robbery, which might justify killing him to prevent 
 it. ^ So, if a person intending to kill a robber or housebreaker in his 
 own house happens, by mistake, to kill a member of his own family, 
 or a third person, it cannot be imputed to him as a criminal action.* 
 And where a robbery is being committed the right to prevent it by 
 any necessary means, even to that of inflicting death, includes a 
 right to prevent an escape with the proceeds. ^ And one whose money 
 is fraudulently taken from him by another may thereupon retake it 
 from him.® These rules apply whether the goods are taken by vio- 
 lence, or by putting the owner in fear.'' And to constitute robbery 
 
 i2People V. Cole, 4 Park. Crim. Eep. erly resist all attempts to inflict bodily 
 35; Johnston's Case, supra. injury upon himself, and may lawful- 
 
 iPeople V. Grimes, 132 Cal. 30, 64 Pac. ly detain the robbers and hand them 
 101; Smith V. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Eep. over to the ofiicers of the law, and it 
 14, 19 S. W. 252. will only be by the use of unnecessary 
 
 2 Com. V. Donahue, 148 Mass. 529, 2 and wanton violence, or the infliction of 
 L.R.A. 623, 12 Am. St. Rep. 591, 20 N. unnecessary or wanton injury to the 
 E. 171. criminals, that the person discovering 
 
 sParrish v. Com. 81 Va. 1. them could become a wrongdoer. Ru- 
 
 4Levett's Case, Cro. Car. 538; Mc- loff v. People, 45 N. Y. 213. 
 Pherson v. State, 22 Ga. 478. eCom. v. Donahue, supra. 
 
 BPeople V. Grimes, supra. 'MoDaniel v. State, 8 Smedes & M. 
 
 Where a statute provides that every 401, 47 Am. Dec. 93. 
 person who shall unnecessarily kill an- And where a strong man threatened 
 other while resisting an attempt by such to take by force from the person of a 
 other to commit a felony, or do any weaker one a watch, falsely claiming it 
 unlawful act, shall be deemed guilty of to be his, pressing upon him while the 
 manslaughter in the second degree, a latter retreated until the i'ormer neared 
 person discovering others in the com- him and raised his hand to seize or 
 mission of a robbery may use all the strike him, when he shot and killed the 
 force necessary to oppose and prevent a former, an instruction with reference 
 consummation of the robbery, and prop- to the right to repel force by force in 
 
•S 524] TO PREVENT CRIMINAL OR UNLAWFUL ACTS. 781 
 
 to prevent wliicli a killing may be justified, it is not necessary that 
 the taking of property shall be directly from one's person ; it is suffi- 
 cient if taken while in his possession and immediate presence. ^ Nor 
 is it any the less robbery which may justify a homicide to prevent it, 
 where violence is used to obtain possession of property with felonious 
 intent, because the thief had recourse to some colorable or specious 
 claim of right to effect his pu.rpose. " And where the statute provides 
 that one who shall kill a person attempting to commit a burglary, 
 robbery, or other specified crime, shall be totally acquitted and dis- 
 charged, the right to take life to prevent the offense is absolute and 
 may be exercised, though less radical means would render the attempt 
 to commit the offense abortive. ^° And where the evidence tends to 
 show an attempt to rob and a homicide to prevent it, the accused is 
 ■entitled to an instruction as to his right of self-defense in the pro- 
 tection of his property against an attempt to rob, uncomplicated by 
 further instructions with reference to provocation and hot blood aris- 
 ing from such attempt. '^ ^ 
 
 To constitute a robbery to prevent which a killing may be justified, 
 however, there must have been force or intimidation, asportation 
 without the consent of the owner, and the intent to steal ; the act of 
 a person taking property from another under a bona fide claim of 
 right, for the purpose of applying it to a claim of debt from another 
 to himself, is not such robbery. ■^ ^ And a killing to prevent a taking 
 of slight moment or importance cannot be justified, though it tech- 
 nically amounts to a robbery. -^^ ISTor is a killing in retaking prop- 
 erty fraudulently or forcibly taken justified where more force was 
 used than was necessary for the retaking ; the amount of force which 
 may be used being a question of fact for the jury. ^ * 
 
 •defense of one's person or property is accused from him and put it ip his 
 proper and necessary in a prosecution pocket, and got into his wagon and rode 
 for the killing. Stoneham v. Com. 86 off, when the accused followed him, 
 Va. 523, 10 S. E. 238. grabbed the whip from the wagon, and 
 
 8 Crawford v. State, 90 Ga. 701, 35 struck at him, when the deceased 
 Am. St. Rep. 242, 17 S. E. 628. jumped from the wagon with his hand 
 
 sParrish v. Com. 81 Va. 1. in his pocket, and the accused then shot 
 
 10 State V. Bonofiglio, 67 N. J. L. 239, him. McKinney v. State, 40 Tex. Grim. 
 ■91 Am. St. Rep. 423, 52 Atl. 712. Rep. 372, 50 S. W. 708. 
 
 1 1 Andrews V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) isBowman v. State (Tex. Grim. 
 76 S. W. 918. App.) 21 S. W. 48. 
 
 i2Crawford v. State, 90 6a. 701, 35 The fact that one took from another 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 242, 17 S. E. 628. by violence a, iiickel, with intent to ap- 
 
 Refusal to give a special instruction propriate it, does not justify the lat- 
 in a prosecution for a homicide alleged ter in killing him while retreating with 
 to have been committed to prevent a the money. Ibid. 
 
 robbery is not error where it appears "Com. v. Donahue, 148 Mass. 529, 
 
 that, in a previous scuffle between the 2 L.R.A. 623, 12 Am. St. Rep. 591, 20 
 
 parties, deceased took the knife of the N. E. 171. 
 
782 HOMICIDE. [§ 525 
 
 525. Larceny. — Larceny is a secret crime not attended with force,, 
 and the killing of one person by another to prevent a larceny of 
 small amount, such as petit larceny, is not justified, since its justifi- 
 cation Avould sanction punishing with death an offense for which the 
 law has provided a much milder punishment.^ Thus, a person has 
 no right to shoot and kill another to prevent him from taking a dog;, 
 which both claim, away from his premises." Xor may the owner of 
 poultry protect it by shooting and killing tlie thief, in the absence of 
 any effort to arrest him, or of any showing that he could not have 
 been arrested, or that the poultry could not have been protected by 
 other means. ^ So, one who kills a slave while in the act of committing 
 a larceny within his inclosure or on his property is liable therefor, 
 where the act was not necessary for the defense of his person, family, 
 or domicil.* Isot does a mere larceny justify an intentional killing, 
 under a statute justifying a homicide when committed by a person 
 in resisting an attempt to commit a felony upon him. ® 
 
 Where the owner of stolen property tries to prevent a theft or re- 
 cover the property, however, and is resisted, he may repel force with 
 force and need not retreat, and if the thief is unavoidably killed, 
 the homicide is justifiable." And where the statute makes homicide 
 justifiable when inflicted to prevent theft at night, where the offender 
 is within reach of a gunshot from the place of the theft, killing the 
 thief is justifiable where he was still within reach of a gunshot, 
 whether he had abandoned the property stolen and was fleeing from 
 the place of the theft, or not. '' And a theft by night within the mean- 
 
 iBloom V. state, 155 Ind. 292, 58 N. mouohe v. Bouis, 6 La. Ann. 95, 54 Am. 
 
 E. 81; State v. Vance, 17 Iowa, 138; Deo. 558; Priester v. Augley, 5 Kich. 
 
 Reg. V. Murphy, 2 Craw. & D. (Ir.) L. 44. 
 
 20. sMcDaniel v. State, 8 Smedes & M. 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution 401, 47 Am. Deo. 93. 
 
 for manslaughter that, while boys have estorey v. State, 71 Ala. 329; Lilly 
 
 no right to enter the melon patch of v. State, 20 Tex. App. 1. 
 
 another and help themselves to his mel- And if a slave, though the property 
 
 ons without his consent, it would be a of another, be found in the nighttime 
 
 reproach to the laws to hold that for engaged in stealing the property of a 
 
 such act the owner has a right, without citizen upon his premises, under such 
 
 notice or warning, to shoot them, tends circumstances that he cannot be iden- 
 
 to show a proper comprehension of the tified or apprehended with safety, the 
 
 siuTcdness of human life, and is not ob- citizen may lawfully shoot at him with 
 
 jectionable as tending unjustly to preju- intent to wound him and prevent his 
 
 dice the jury. State v. Vance, supra. escape, but without intent to produce 
 
 2Trusty v. Com. 19 Ky. L. Rep. 708, his death, without incurring criminal 
 
 41 S. W. 7Bf>. responsibility, even though death en- 
 
 3Marks v. Borum, 1 Baxt. 87, 25 Am. sues. McClelland v. Kay, 14 B. Jlon. 
 
 Rep. 7()4; Gardiner v. Thibodeau, 14 103. 
 
 La. Ann. 742; Rex v. Scully, 1 Gar. & nVhitten v. State, 29 Tex. App. 504,. 
 
 P. 319. 16 S. W. 296. 
 
 4Bibb V. Hebert, 3 La. Ann. 132; Car- 
 
§ 525] TO PREVENT CRIJiIINAL OR UNLAWFUL ACTS. 783 
 
 ing of such statutes means, in analogy with the statute with refer- 
 ence to burglary, a theft committed any time between thirty minutes 
 after sunset and thirty minutes before sunrise, where the statute thus 
 provides with reference to burglary.® But the taking of partnership 
 property by a partner is neither larceny nor a trespass within the 
 meaning of rules of law with reference to the use of force to prevent 
 a trespass or a felony. * 
 
 526. Trespass on property generally. — While the law justifies the 
 taking of life when necessary to prevent the commission of a felony, 
 one cannot defend his property, other than his habitation, to the ex- 
 tent of killing the aggressor for the mere purpose of preventing a 
 trespass. "^ Rather than slay the aggressor to prevent a mere trespass, 
 he should yield and appeal to the courts for redress.^ A person 
 should not, in defense of his property, as distinguished from the de- 
 fense of his person, resort to means reasonably calculated to endanger 
 life.^ And if one deliberately kills another to prevent a mere tres- 
 pass on property, whether such trespass can or cannot otherwise be 
 prevented, it is murder.* One is not justified in killing to prevent a 
 trespass even in his own dwelling.^ And where one person attacks 
 the property of another, one who interferes in his behalf is not justi- 
 fied in killing the assailant, imless the life or person of the injured 
 party is in peril by reason of the attack upon his property.® 
 
 sLaws V. State, 26 Tex. App. 643, 10 Shippey, 10 Minn. 223, Gil. 178, 88 Am. 
 
 S. W. 220. Dec. 70; Lambeth v. State. 23 Miss. 32?; 
 
 9 Jones V. State, 76 Ala. 8. People v. Cole, 4 Park. Crim. Rep. 35; 
 
 lOIiver v. State, 17 Ala. 587; Storey State v. Morgan, 25 N. C. (3 Ired. L.) 
 V. State, supra; Carpenter v. State, 62 186, 38 Am. Dec. 714; State v. Bran- 
 Ark. 286, 36 S. W. 900; State v. Becker, don, 53 N. C. (8 Jones, L.) 463; State 
 9 Houst! (Del.) 411, 33 Atl. 178; Da- v. McDonald, 49 N. C. (4 Jones. L.) 
 vison V. People, 90 111. 221; People v. 19; Reg. v. Archer, 1 Post. & F. 351. 
 Divine, 1 Eclm. Sel. Cas. 594. And a statutory provision that who- 
 
 And neither the secrecy of a trespass, ever unnecessarily kills another, except 
 
 nor the fr":quency of its repetition, af- by accident or misfortune, either while 
 
 fects the right to use force, or the quan- resisting an attempt by such other to 
 
 tity of force which may be used in the commit any felony or do any other un- 
 
 protection of property. Simpson v. lawful act, or after such attempt has 
 
 State, 59 Ala. 1, 31 Am. Rep. 1. failed, shall be guilty of manslaughter 
 
 sCarpenter v. State, and Davison v. in the second degree, has no application 
 
 People, -tupra. to a ease of a killing with an ax by in- 
 
 sState V. Dooley, 121 Mo. 591, 26 S. flioting blows therewith upon the head 
 
 W. 558; State v. Forsythe, 89 Mo. 667, and neck of the deceased, claimed to be 
 
 1 S. W. 834; Meade's Case, 1 Lewin, C. in resistance of civil trespass upon lands 
 
 C. 184. or cattle, or both, belonging to the per- 
 
 4Harrison v. State, 24 Ala. 67, 60 son using the ax, there being no pretext 
 
 Am. Dec. 450; Noles v. State, 26 Ala. of an absence of design to effect death. 
 
 31 62 Am. Dec. 711; Monroe v. State, State v. Hoyt, 13 Minn. 132, Gil. 125. 
 5 Ga. 95: Keener v. State, 18 Ga. 194, BState v. Taylor, 143 Mo. 150, 44 S. 
 
 63 Am. Dec. 269; State v. Kennedy, 20 W. 785. 
 
 Iowa, 569 ; Com. v. Drew, 4 Mass. 391 ; eRendall v. State, 8 Tex. App. 569. 
 People v. Horton, 4 Mich. 67; State v. 
 
784 HOMICIDE. [§ 526 
 
 A man may use force to defend proj^erty in his actual possession 
 against one who endeavors to dispossess him, without right, however, 
 taking care that the force used does not exceed what reasonably ap- 
 pears to be necessary for the purpose of defense and prevention.'' 
 And if a trespass on the property of another amounts to a felony, the 
 killing of the trespasser is justified, if necessary to prevent it.* Nor 
 is he obliged to retreat, but may pursue his adversary, if necessary, 
 till he find himself out of danger.® And a man may lawfully de- 
 fend property in his possession by any degree of force, short of taking 
 life, necessary to make the defense effectual. ^ ° And in case of rea- 
 sonable apprehension or fear of death or serious bodily harm, he may 
 act at once and defend himself by taking the life of the other, with- 
 out resorting to other means to prevent the attack, or protect the prop- 
 erty. ^ ^ Statutes are to be found in some of the states specially giv- 
 ing the right to take life in the protection of property, provided all 
 other means have been resorted to for the prevention of the injury. ^^ 
 And under such statutes the right of the ovsnaer to defend property 
 is not dependent upon the fact that the injury to it is, or is not, ac- 
 companied by violence to himseK; it is only where a third person 
 interferes in behalf of one whose person or property is assaulted 
 that the killing by such third person will not be justifiable, unless the 
 life or person of the injured party is in peril by reason of the attack 
 upon his property.-^'' But such a statute has no application where 
 the property attacked or invaded is inconsiderable, and the injury 
 intended is slight and trifling, and not in fact a felony. ^ * And where 
 property is attacked, but not in such a manner as to endanger the life 
 of the owner or person in charge, or to render him liable to serious 
 bodily harm, every effort must be made to repel the aggression before 
 resorting to homicide in order to prevent it. ^ ^ 
 
 7 Carpenter v. State, 62 Ark. 286, 36 that he had not proceeded to take it 
 
 S. W. 900; Davison v. People, 90 111. when he was shot by the other, does 
 
 221. njt raise an issue as to the right of the 
 
 sCrawford v. State, 90 Ga. 701, 35 other to kill in defense of the property, 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 242, 17 S. E. 628. and does not require a charge as to 
 
 sPond V. People, 8 Mich. 150; Ledbet- that issue. Dean v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 ter V. State, 26 Tex. App. 22, 9 S. W. App.) 83 S. W. 810. 
 
 60. i2Lilly V. State, 20 Tex. App. 1; 
 
 10 State V. Forsythe, 89 Mo. 067, 1 Crawford v. State, supra. 
 
 S. W. 834; Richardson v. State, 7 Tex. isLilly v. State, supra. 
 
 App. 486. i^Crawford v. State, 90 Ga. 701, 34 
 
 iiLedbetter v. State, and Pond v. Peo- Am. St. Rep. 242, 17 S. E. 628. 
 
 pie, supra. And see Howell v. State iBLedbetter v. State, 28 Tex. App. 
 
 (Tex. Grim. App.) 60 S. W. 44. 22, 9 S. W. 60. 
 
 But evidence that a person informed A statutory provision authorizing the 
 
 another that he was going to take prop- defense of property need not be given 
 
 erty upon which the latter had a claim, in charge to the iury in a prosecution 
 
 and which was in his possession, but for homicide where the evidence shows 
 
S uilJ} TO PREVENT CRIMINAL OR UNLAWFUL ACTS. 785 
 
 527. Trespass on, or appropriation of, personalty. — To kill a mere 
 trespasser not attempting to remove the personal property of another, 
 or commit any felony upon it, is, at least, manslaughter, and may be 
 murder.^ And an open taking of property in the presence of the 
 •owner, or other persons, without the use of deadly \^eapons, is only 
 a trespass and not a felony, to prevent which the taking of life may 
 be justified.^ Nor, where property was so taken without criminal 
 intent, would it be lawful to recapture it by an exercise of force 
 which would amount even to a breach of the peace, much less felonious 
 homicide ; ^ the killing of a trespasser in such cases being murder if 
 ■committed with a deadly weapon, the kind of weapon used deter- 
 mining the intent.* These rules apply to the seizure of property 
 under an irregular claim of ownership, or of a lien thereon, and where 
 it is attempted to take property in such ease, the killing of the taker 
 to prevent it is not justifiable if the claim is made in good faith, 
 and tliere is no intent to steal. ° And the killing of a constable who 
 goes to make a lawful distress is manslaughter, though his act is 
 illegal.* And the act of a gambler of appropriating the stakes on a 
 claim of cheating is not robbery, and, therefore, a felony, to prevent 
 which a killing would be justifiable.'' 
 
 The owner of personal property, however, has a right to use as 
 much force as is necessary to prevent its forcible and illegal re- 
 moval.* And where a person wrongfully attempts to remove and 
 
 that the deceased had merely informed charge of his oiScial duty within the 
 the accused that he was going to take rule of law which makes killing an offi- 
 certain property in possession of the cer murder, when it would not have been 
 latter. Dean v. State (Tex. Crim. murder if he had not been an officer, 
 App.) 83 S. W. 816. since he can only justify his acts when 
 
 lUnited States v. Williams, 2 Cranch, those of the owner or landlord could 
 ■Q. G. 439, Fed. Cas. No. 16,710; State v. have been justified had he personally 
 Vance, 17 Iowa, 144; Com. v. Drew, 4 distrained. Ibid. 
 
 Mass. 391; Priester v. Augley, 5 Rich. 'People v. Grimes, 132 Cal. 30, 64 
 L. 44; State v. McDonald, 49 N. C. (4 Pac. 101; Greer v. State {Tex. Crim. 
 Jones, L.) 19; State v. Morgan, 25 N. App.) 45 S. W. 12; Askew v. State 
 'C. (3 Ired. L.) 186, 38 Am. Dee. 714. (Tex. Crim. App.) 83 S. W. 706. 
 
 2McDaniel v. State, 8 Smedes & M. sSee People v. Payne, 8 Cal. 341; 
 401, 47 Am. Dee. 93; People v. Payne, Com. v. Kennard, 8 Pick. 133; Com. v. 
 ■8 Cal. 341. Power, 7 Met. 596, 41 Am. Dec. 465; 
 
 2 Storey v. State, 71 Ala. 329. Johnson v. Patterson, 14 Conn. 1, 35 
 
 ■iMcDaniel v. State, supra; Hayes v. Am. Dec. 96; People v. Hubbard, 24 
 State, 58 Ga. 35. Wend. 309, 35 Am. Dec. 628; Curtis v. 
 
 sCrawford v. State, 90 Ga. 701, 35 Hubbard, 1 Hill, 336, 4 Hill, 437, 40 
 Am. St. Rep. 242, 17 S. E. 628; Mc- Am. Dec. 292; Weaver v. State (Tex. 
 Daniel v. State, supra; Reg. r. Archer, Crim. App.) 70 S. W. 764. 
 1 Post. & F. 351. And see Eeg. v. Sul- And an instruction on the defense of 
 livan, Car. & M. 209. property in a prosecution for homicide 
 
 ^United States v. Williams, supra. that, if the accused did not know that 
 
 A constable levying a distress war- the deceased had legal process for seiz- 
 Tant for rent is not acting in the dis- ing the property in question, he would 
 Hom.— 50 
 
786 HOMICIDE. [§ 527 
 
 appropriate the personal pro])erty of another, and the latter kills 
 him, the killing is justifiable if the person removing it intended to 
 kill the owner if necessary to effect the removal." And a mere false 
 claim of title t^ or a lien upon, any article taken is not sufficient to 
 do away with the criminal intent of the taking to prevent which a 
 killing would be justified. ^ " Likewise, in the recapture of property 
 taken from the owner he is authorized to use such force as is reason- 
 ably necessary to effect his purpose, provided it does not extend to 
 the use of deadly weapons, or an assault likely to produce death or 
 great bodily harm. ^ ^ And the right of the owner to use force is 
 not confined to the immediate time and place of the taking, but con- 
 tinues though the property is taken temporarily out of his sight, 
 where pursuit is immediate. ^ ^ 
 
 523. Trespass on realty — A bare trespass against or upon the real 
 property of another, not his dwelling, does not warrant the owner 
 in using a deadly weapon in its defense, and if he does, and kills 
 the trespasser, it is murder, though the killing is actually necessary 
 to prevent the trespass. ■' Thus a homicide committed with a deadly 
 weapon in order to prevent the removal of a line fence in dispute 
 is murder in the absence of proof that would tend to rebut the pre- 
 sumption of malice arising from the use of such weapon.^ And the 
 guilt or innocence of the accused in such case is in no degree de- 
 pendent upon the title to the lajid or fence in dispute,^ and the courts 
 
 be authorized to use force against force I2lbid. 
 
 in preventing the seizure, is not erro- iState v. Vance, 17 Iowa, 138; Car- 
 
 neous as easting upon the accused the penter v. State, 62 Ark. 286, 38 S. W. 
 
 burden of proof that he did not have 900: State v. Warren, 1 Marv. (Del.) 
 
 .such knowledge. Howell v. State (Tex. 487, 41 Atl. 190; Price v. State, 72 Ga. 
 
 Crim. App.) 60 S. W. 44. 441; State v. Countrymaji, 57 Kan. 815, 
 
 sPeople V. Payne, supra; Beard v. 48 Pac. 137; Chapman v. Com. 12 Ky. 
 
 United States, 158 U. S. 550, 39 L. ed. L. Rep. 704, 15 S. W. 50; Com. v. Bul- 
 
 lOSH, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 962. lock, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 78, 67 S. W. 992; 
 
 lOMcDaniel v. State, 8 Smedes & M. Com. v. Drew, 4 ilass. 391; State v. 
 
 401, 47 Am. Dec. 93. And see Jones v. Shippey, 10 Minn. 223, 88 Am. Dec. 70, 
 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 77 S. W. 802. Gil. 178; Ayers v. State, 60 Miss. 709; 
 
 "State V. Dooley, 121 Mo. 591, 26 S. State v. Taylor, 143 Mo. 150, 44 S. W. 
 
 W. 558. 785; State v. Zellers, 7 N. J. L. 220; 
 
 Persons whose horses have been taken. Tiffany v. Com. 121 Pa. 165, 6 Am. St. 
 
 who go after the persons taking them Rep. 775, 15 Atl. 462; Hull v. State, 6 
 
 with a settled and determined purpose Lea, 250; State v. Clark, 51 W. Va. 
 
 to shoot them unless they comply with 457, 41 S. E. 204. 
 
 their demand for the return of the sLambeth v. State, 23 Miss. 322. 
 
 horses, and who, upon overtaking them, sibid. And see Brown v. State, 31 
 
 assume a position for shooting before Fla. 207, 12 So. 640. 
 
 demand is made, and omit to shoot only Where a person in possession of land 
 
 because the demand is complied with, as a lessee obstructs a road crossing it, 
 
 use force in procuring the return of and another person claiming a right to 
 
 their property in excess of that author- travel over such road kills the former 
 
 izod by law, and the fact that the orig- for the purpose of removing the ob- 
 inal taking of the horses was unlawful 
 is no justification. Ibid. 
 
§ 528] TO PREVENT CRIMINAL OR UNLAWFUL ACTS. 787 
 
 will not inquire into the title in snch case. * Nov can a killing with 
 a deadly weapon be deemed manslaughter, consisting of the un- 
 necessary killing of another in resisting an attempt by such other 
 to commit an unlawful act, merely because it was done in resistance 
 of a civil trespass upon land.^ And where two persons are entitled 
 to the joint use and occupation of realty, and one of them kills the 
 other in a dispute over such use, the question at issue with reference 
 to the justification of the act is whether it was necessary to save 
 his own life from such a serious assault as would create a reasonable 
 apprehension that his life was in imminent peril, and whether the 
 slayer did the killing to avert the threatened danger, and not whether 
 it was done to protect his property.® So, a person occupying land 
 as a lessee, over which another has no right, is not justified in killing 
 him to prevent him from traveling over it. ^ 
 
 A person in possession of realty, however, is justified in using 
 all necessary force to defend his possession and eject trespassers;* 
 though his purpose in using force must be to put the trespasser off, 
 and not to do him gi-eat bodily harm.^ And a person assaulted on 
 his own premises, though outside of his dwelling house, is not obliged 
 to retreat or consider whether he can retreat, but may stand his 
 ground and meet any unprovoked attack upon him in such a way 
 and with such force as may appear to him, in the exercise of an 
 
 struction, there is no question of de- upon his lands for the purpose of using 
 fense of property or habitation which suoh arms to prevent him from so en- 
 will justify the killing. People v. Conk- tering, he is a wrongdoer, and if he 
 ling, 111 Cal. 616, 44 Pac. 314. kills the traveler in the encounter, the 
 estate V. Zellers, supra. killing is murder. State v. Talley, 9 
 A person, though the rightful owner Houst. (Del.) 417, 3.3 Atl. 481. 
 of property, has no right to forcibly in- sCorey v. People, 45 Barb. 262; State 
 vade the actual and peaceable occupancy v. Warren, 1 Marv. (Del.) 487, 41 Atl. 
 of another, though the latter holds it 100; Boykin v. State, 86 Miss. 481, 38 
 Avitho'it right, and where he does so, So. 725 ; Tiffany v. Com. 121 Pa. 165, 6 
 he is a trespasser, and the possessor has Am. St. Rep. 775, 15 Atl. 462; Mont- 
 a right to defend himself and his pos- gomery v. Com. 99 Va. 833, 37 S. E. 
 session, if unlawfully assaulted by him. 841 : Hinchcliife's Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 
 White V. Territory, 3 Wash. Terr. 397, 161. And see Nix v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 19 Pac. 37. App.) 74 S. W. 764. 
 
 estate v. Hoyt, 13 Minn. 132, Gil. And in such case he will not be held 
 
 125. answerable for any unfortunate acci- 
 
 sHaynes v. State, 17 Ga. 465. dent that may happen in so doing, from 
 
 'People V. Conkling, 111 Cal. 616, 44 which the death of the invader occurs. 
 
 Pac. 314. Hinchcliffe's Case, supra. 
 
 So, where a public highway is ob- And a person in charge of a farm up- 
 structed by a, heavy fall of snow and on which a homicide was committed is 
 becomes impassable, travelers have the competent to testify in a prosecution 
 right to enter upon and travel across against him for the homicide as to in- 
 adjoining lands; and where, in suoh structions given him by the owner as 
 a ease, the owner of adjoining lands to policing the farm. State v. Halli- 
 prepares himself with arras, and goes day. 111 La. 47, 35 So. 380. 
 to a place where a traveler would enter siStite v. Warren, supra. 
 
788 HOMICIDE. [§ 528 
 
 honest judgment, to be necessary to protect himself from death or 
 great bodily harm, ^ " though he has no right to commit a breach of 
 the peace in the outset ; and if he assaults the trespasser without giv- 
 ing him notice and opportunity to retire, the latter may defend him- 
 self so far as is necessary to prevent bodily harm to himself. ^ ^ So, 
 under statutory provisions giving the owner in possession of prop- 
 erty a right to use such force as is necessary to prevent a forcible 
 trespass on it, and providing that if, in so doing, he is compelled 
 to kill, it is justifiable, where persons differ as to the ownership of 
 the land, and one seeks to dispossess the other, the latter need not 
 retreat, and is bound to resort to no other means of defense than such 
 as are at his conmiand at the time, before resorting to killing. ^ ^ 
 And it is not necessary that he should permit himself to be driven 
 away, and resort to injunction against the trespasser. ^ ^ And it is 
 lawful, not rightful, possession which may be defended under such 
 a provision. ^ * 
 
 But even under such statutory provisions it is never justifiable 
 to kill in defense of one's property or the property of another, until 
 every other means at hand has been resorted to, to prevent the in- 
 jury or felony attempted.^® And a mere right to pasture stock 
 on lands in the possession of another does not bring the person en- 
 titled thereto within their protection with reference to a difiicult}' 
 between him and such possessor. -^ ^ JSTor does the mere act of the 
 person killed of driving the slayer's stock off the land in controversy 
 between them involve the protection of the slayer's property, or re- 
 quire an instruction to the jury in a prosecution for the killing in 
 regard to the slayer's right to defend his property, in connection with 
 
 lOBeard v. United States, 158 U. S. 154, 36 S. W. 256, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 550, 39 L. ed. 1086, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 647, 44 S. W. 522. 
 
 962; State v. Gushing, 14 Wash. 527, 53 isSims v. State, 36 Tex. Grim. Rep. 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 883, 45 Pae. 145. 154, 36 S. E. 256. 
 
 Where premises are held under a "Ibid, 
 verbal lease, by which each party is to And surveys, maps, and testimony 
 
 have half of a crop raised thereon, and with reference to the claim and title 
 
 the right to use therefrom for daily oi" a, claimant of a disputed strip of 
 
 use during the season, the owner and land, and admissions made by the former 
 
 landlord has the right to go upon the owner of the land in dispute, are not 
 
 promises and request a division, to the admissible in evidence in a prosecution 
 
 end that each may not encroach upop against a claimant in lawful possession 
 
 the other's rights, and in case he does for killing the other claimant in an 
 
 so, and the tenant attempts to drive alleged affray to prevent him from rc- 
 
 him away by an assault, he may use moving the line fence. Sims v. State, 
 
 such force as is necessary to protect 38 Tex. Grim. Rep. 637, 44 S. W. 522^ 
 himself. State v. Forsythe, 89 Mo. 667, iBWeaver v. State, 19 Tex. App. 547, 
 
 1 S. W. 834. 53 Am. Rep. 389. 
 
 iiMontgomnry v. Com. 99 Va. 833, 37 leHill v. State, 43 Tex. Grim. Rep. 
 
 S. E. 841. 583, 67 S. W. 506. 
 
 12 Sims V. State, 36 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
§ 528] TO PREVENT CRIMINAL OR UNLAWFUL ACTS. 789 
 
 a charge on manslaughter.^'^ And where a person is engaged in a 
 public business the character of which is an invitation to enter to 
 all persons who so desire, the rule that an owner may stand his ground 
 and defend his possession does not apply to a difficulty between him 
 and a person who entered his premises, in which he killed such per- 
 son, where the assault upon the deceased was not made in an effort 
 to eject him after due notice. ^ ® 
 
 529. Use of spring guns.^ — ^The mere act of setting spring guns 
 on one's premises for their protection is not unlawful in itself.^ 
 Such a gun may be used in a house to protect valuables there 
 stored.^ But persons setting spring guns may be responsible for in- 
 juries caused thereby to individuals, and may be indictable for the 
 erection of a nuisance if they are thereby subjected to danger.* 
 And it is negligence to plant such guns in a place where they would 
 be liable to injure trespassers, ordinarily accustomed to frequent 
 such place. ^ And it is criminal homicide for an occupant of land 
 to set spring guns upon his premises, which cause the death of a 
 trespasser.® Nor has a person a right to take life to prevent the 
 breaking into or entering a shop at night, though with intent to 
 steal, unless such act is made a felony by statute; and the killing 
 of a person so breaking into a shop, by the use of a spring gun set 
 therein, would be a criminal homicide;'' though if the trespasser was 
 injured and not killed, the person setting the gun could not be convict- 
 ed of assault with intent to murder, since to establish that crime the 
 
 I'Scott V. State, 43 Tex. Grim. Rep. esimpson v. State, 59 Ala. 1, 31 Am. 
 591, 68 S. W. 177. Rep. 1; State v. Moore, supra. 
 
 isstate V. Hargraves, 188 Mo. 337, 87 The common-law rule once prevailing 
 S. W. 491. in England, which allowed the owner of 
 
 iThe subject of liability for killing property to set spring guns to protect 
 or injuring trespassers by means of it against trespassers, is inconsistent 
 spring guns, traps, and other dangerous with American manners and customs, 
 instruments is extensively considered in and has never obtained here. Simpson 
 a note to State v. Barr, 29 L.R.A. \5i. v. State, supra. 
 
 2State V. Moore, 31 Conn. 479, 83 Am. 'State v. Moore, 31 Conn. 479, 83 Am. 
 Dee. 159. Dee. 159. 
 
 sGray v. Combs, 7 J. J. Marsh. 478, And an information charging that the 
 23 Am. Dec. 431; State v. Moore, supra, defendant personally killed a person 
 
 estate V. Moore, supra. named is not insufficient because there 
 
 sjohnson v. Patterson, 14 Conn. 1, 35 was no intent to kill any particular 
 Am. Deo. 96; State v. Moore, supra; person, but merely to kill anyone who 
 Bird V. Holbrook, 4 Bing. 628. See might attempt to enter a certain build- 
 Wharton, Neg. § 347; Townsend v. Wa- ing in which spring guns were set, 
 then. 9 East, 277. where the statute requires the facts to 
 
 Though setting spring guns is justifi- be stated, but makes an information suf- 
 able in itself, they constitute a nuisance iicient against attack unless the defend- 
 if they cause actual danger to passers- ant could be misled to his injury. State 
 by in the street, though the annoyance v. Barr, 11 Wash. 481, 29 L.R.A. 154, 
 to the public must be real and substan- 48 Am. St. Rep. 890, 39 Pac. 1080. 
 tial. State V. Moore, supra. 
 
790 HOMICIDE. [i 529 
 
 intent to kill the particulai' person injured must be shown. ^ The 
 right to fix a loaded gun in a building so that it will be discharged 
 on forcing open the front door, and kill the person attempting to 
 enter, is a question of fact, or mixed law and fact, for the decision 
 of the j'Try UjDon all the facts and circumstances of the case.® 
 
 530. Attack on dwelling'. — A man's house is his castle and he has 
 the right to resort to any means to prevent another from entering 
 :t, or to defend himself in it, even to the extent of taking life, if 
 the entrance cannot otherwise be prevented.^ And an inmate of 
 a dwelling which is attacked need not flee therefrom to escape be- 
 ing injured, but may meet the assailant at the threshold and prevent 
 him from breaking in by any means rendered necessary by the ex- 
 igency.^ The law regards an attack on a person's dwelling in the 
 night as equivalent to an assault upon a man's person, on the ques- 
 tion of the amount of force which may be used to repel the attack.^ 
 And where the purpose of an assailant of a dwelling is to take life 
 or inflict great bodily harm, and the object of the attack is to gain 
 access to the inmates, the same means may lawfully be used to pre- 
 vent him as might have been used to prevent him from making a 
 harmful assault upon the person in case the parties had met at an- 
 other place.* Nor does the law require that there shall be actual 
 danger to one's habitation to justify killing in defense of it; it is 
 sufficient if the circumstances were such as would create a just and 
 reasonable apprehension of danger in the mind of a reasonable man. ® 
 These rules apply to the case of a strong man attacking a weaker 
 one, and following him up with the apparent intention of attack- 
 
 sSimpson v. State, supra. State, 7 Tex. App. 486; Weaver v. State, 
 
 ' SiState V. Barr, supra. 19 Tex. App. 547, 53 Am. Rep. 389. And 
 
 iState V. Dugan, Houst. Crim. Rep. see Benge v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1466, 
 (Del.) 563; Wilson v. State, 30 Fla. 234, 71 S. W. 648. 
 
 17 L.R.A. 654, 11 So. 556; Hayner v. iState v. Patterson, supra. And see 
 People, 213 111. 142, 72 N. E. 792; Allen v. State, supia. 
 Davison v. People, 90 111. 221; Sparks eStoneman v. Com. 25 Gratt. 887; 
 V. Com. 89 Ky. 644, 20 S. W. 167; Pond People v. Walsh, 43 Cal. 447; Richard- 
 V. People, 8 Mich. 150; Young v. State son v. State, 7 Tex. App. 486. 
 (Neb.) 2 L.R.A. (N. S.) 66, 104 N. W. And vi'here a person had gained ad- 
 867; Allen v. State (Tex. Crim. Ann.) mittance into a house of ill fame by 
 60 S. W. 671; McGlothlin v. Stat* (Tex. violence and against the will of the 
 Crim. App.) 53 S. W. 869; State v. I'at- keeper, vi'ho killed the aggressor, threats 
 terson, 45 Vt. 308, 12 Am. Rep. 200; made by parties a week previous to the 
 Semayne's Case, 5 Coke, 91a. assault, that they would return some 
 
 sState v. Patterson, supra; Carroll other night and break in again, are ad- 
 V. State, 23 Ala. 28, 58 Am. Dee. 282 ; misslble in a prosecution for the Idlling, 
 Smith V. Com. 16 Ky. L. Rep. 112, 26 though the rejection thereof would not 
 S. W. 583; State v. Conall^, 3 Or. 69. be ground for reversal, where it was 
 But see Dakin's Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 166. not shown that the person killed was 
 
 sMeade's Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 184; one of those v/ho made the threats. 
 Wilson V. State, supra; Richardson v. People v. Rector, 19 Wend. 969. 
 
§ 530] TO PREVENT CRIMINAL OR UNLAWFUL ACTS. 791 
 
 ing him again inside his dwelling;® and to that of several persons go- 
 ing to the house of another in the nighttime for the purpose of arrest- 
 ing him and depriving him of his liberty without authority;^ and 
 to that of a wife seeking temporary refuge in the house of another 
 from the violence of her husband, who is followed by him and an 
 entrance attempted by force or intimidation.* 
 
 The idea embodied in the expression that a man's house is his 
 castle, however, is not that it is his property, and, as such, he has a 
 right to defend it and protecc it, but that it is sacred for the pro- 
 tection of his person and his family ; and an assault upon one's house 
 can be regarded as an assault upon the person within the meaning 
 of this rule only when the purpose of the assault is injury to the 
 person of the occupant or members of his family, to accomplish 
 which the assailant attacks the castle to reach the inmates." And 
 to justify a homicide in protection of a dwelling, it must have been 
 necessary to the effectual protection of the occupant and his family. ' ** 
 And a person who was defending his house against an unlawful 
 entry, though having the right to resist, would be guilty of man- 
 slaughter if he made an unreasonable defense and killed the tres- 
 passer, though unintentionally. ^ ^ 
 
 Where the statute makes homicide justifiable when committed 
 in self-defense against any persons who manifestly intend and en- 
 deavor, in a riotous and tumultuous manner, to enter the habita- 
 tion of another for the purpose of assaulting or offering personal 
 violence to any person dwelling or being therein, a homicide thus 
 committed is justifiable, though the circumstances may not have 
 been such as to justify a belief that there was actual peril of life, 
 or great bodily harm, or that the act was necessary to prevent the 
 commission of a felony ;^^ though a mere belief that the purpose of 
 
 BHurd V. People, 25 Mich. 405; Reins dwelliEg, or had so attempted, and 
 
 V. People, 30 111. 266. would renew such attempt, is properly 
 
 'Wright V. Com. 85 Ky. 123, 2 S. W. refused in a prosecution for homicide, 
 
 904. since even under these circumstances 
 
 8 State V. Connally, 3 Or. 69. the homicide might have been the result 
 
 sState V. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308, 12 of sudden rage, resentment, or terror. 
 
 Am. Rep. 200. Allen v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 66 S. 
 
 lOIbid.; Carroll v. State, 23 Ala. 28, W. 671. 
 58 Am. Dee. 282; Pond v. People, 8 uState v. Scheele, 57 Conn. 307, 14 
 
 Mich. 150; Young v. State (Neb.) 2 Am. St. Rep. 108, 18 Atl. 256. 
 L.R.A.(N.S.) 66, 104 N. W. 867; State And see People v. Walsh, 43 Cal. 447; 
 
 V. Conally, supra; Meade's Case, 1 State v. Horskin, Houst. Crim. Rep. 
 
 Lewin, C. C. 184. (Del.) 116. 
 
 And an instruction that one person isHayner v. People, 213 111. 142, 72 
 
 was justified in killing another if he N. E. 792. 
 
 had reasonable ground to believe that And see Brown v. State. 55 Ark. 593, 
 
 the latter was attempting to enter his 18 S. W. 1051. 
 
792 HOMICIDE. (§ 530 
 
 the entry was to commit an unlawful act is not enough/* And 
 it has been held that such a statute contemplates the joint action 
 of two or more persons, and does not apply to a single individual. ^ * 
 So, a statutory provision making killing justifiable where it is ab- 
 solutely necessary to prevent a forcible attack on the property and 
 habitation of a person, where a serious bodily injury is intended 
 or might accrue to the person, property, or family of the owner, con- 
 templates an attack upon property or habitation of another, or upon 
 his person or his family by an invasion of his property, and applies 
 only to the right of defense given to a citizen in protecting his 
 habitation or property or family or hims&lf while in such place, 
 from forcible attack. "-^ 
 
 iN'or, independent of statutory provision, will a mere demonstra- 
 tion toward, or even an effort to break into, a dwelling excuse a 
 homicide by the owner or an inmate to prevent a breaking in ; ^ * nor 
 will a mere civil trespass upon a man's house, unaccompanied by 
 such force as to make it a breach of the peace. ^ ^ And a mere dis- 
 turbance outside of a dwelling house, created for the purpose of an- 
 noying the inmates, not accompanied by any actual attack upon the 
 house, or forcible attempt to enter it, will not justify or excuse 
 an occupant in attacking the disturbers in such a way as to result 
 in death. ^® A person charged with homicide is not entitled to in- 
 structions as to his right to kill in defense of his dwelling, where 
 
 isPeople V. Walsh, 43 Cal. 448. Dec. 2S2. And see People v. Walsh, 43 
 
 i4Hudgms V. State, 2 Ga. 173. Cal. 447; Reg. v. Bull, 9 Car. & P. 22. 
 
 isPound V. State, 43 Ga. 88. isPatten v. People, 18 Mich. 314, 100 
 
 But it is not necessary to the justifi- Am. Dec. 173. 
 
 cation of one killing in defense of his And see Harmon v. State, 158 Ind. 37, 
 
 dwelling that the danger was so urgent 62 N. E. 630. 
 
 and pressing that in order to save his And the fact that the mother of the 
 
 own life the killing of the other was owner of a house, around which a nura- 
 
 absolutely necessary, and that the per- ber of people raised a disturbance, with- 
 
 son killed should have been the assail- out making an actual attack upon it, 
 
 ant, or that the slayer had in good faith was in feeble health, and that fear and 
 
 declined any further struggle before excitement caused by the disturbance 
 
 the mortal blow was given. Ibid. produced alarming effects upon her 
 
 16 Wright V. Com. 85 Ky. 123, 2 S. W. from which her speedy death might be 
 
 904. And see Hudson v. State, 44 Tex. apprehended, is not available as an e\- 
 
 Crim. Rep. 251, 70 S. W. 764. cuse for an attack by the owner upon 
 
 But where it reasonably appears that the disturbers with a deadly weapon, 
 the purpose of an attempt to break into and the killing of one of them, unless 
 a. dwelling house in the nighttime is to the rioters v.ere informed of her eon- 
 commit a felony, the owner may at once dition and the efl'ect produced by their 
 resort to any extremity to repel the in- conduct upon her, or unless every 
 vasion, even to the killing of the in- reasonable and practical effort hud 
 truder. State v. Horskin, Houst. Crim. been made to inform them. Patten v'. 
 Rep. (Del.) 116. People, supra. 
 
 17 Carroll v. State, 23 Ala. 28, 58 Am. 
 
I 530] TO PREVENT CRIMINAL OR UNLAWFUL ACTS. 793 
 
 his own testimony was to the effect that the killing was in defense 
 of his person. ^ ^ 
 
 531. Attack in dwelling — An attack in a dwelling and killing in 
 resistance of such attack is purely a self-defense subject, the fact 
 that the attack was in the slayer's dwelling having a bearing on his 
 duty to retreat or take other steps to avoid the necessity of killing, 
 and therefore it has been considered in the chapter on that subject.^ 
 
 532. Resisting expulsion — The rule that a man's house is regarded 
 as his castle, affording him and his family a city of refuge, applies 
 with reference to the expulsion of intruders, as well as to the pre- 
 vention of intrusion ; and if a person unlawfully intrudes, the house- 
 holder, after warning him to depart, and after his refusal to obey 
 within a reasonable time, may employ sufficient force to expel him. ^ 
 And it is the duty, as well as the right, of every householder to 
 prevent breaches of the peace in his dwelling, and for that purpose 
 he has a clear and legal right to expel from his house any person 
 attempting to commit such a breach therein, and may use all force 
 necessary to such expulsion.^ And the owner has the right to stand 
 his ground and defend himself, as well as the inmates of his house, 
 and his right of justification should not be made to depend upon 
 there being any other safe, or apparently safe, means of escape from 
 impending danger.^ Nor is the owner under any legal obligation, 
 where he has a right to expel, to avoid the altercation by yielding 
 the right as a mode of avoiding apprehended violence.* 
 
 But while a man has a right to order another to leave his house, 
 
 isPennington v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. ting at him, and that he walked back- 
 
 321, 68 S. W. 451. wards cutting with his razor some 12 
 
 iSee supra, chapter XIII., §§ 308 et or 15 feet while the owner continued 
 
 seq. to advance, warrants and requires an 
 
 iState V. Bartmess, 33 Or. 110, 54 instruction in a prosecution for the 
 
 Pac. 167; McCoy v. State, 8 Ark. 451; killing as to the amount of force which 
 
 State V. Dugan, Houst. Crim. Rep. might lawfully be used by the owner to 
 
 (Del.) 563; Lyon v. State, 22 Ga. 399; expel an intruder. State v. Taylor, 82 
 
 Reins v. People, 30 111. 256; Com. v. N. C. 554. 
 
 Robertson, Addison (Pa.) 246; State v. ^Brinkley v. State, 89 Ala. 34, 18 Am. 
 
 Cannon, 52 S. C. 452, 30 S. B. 589; State St. Rep. 87, 8 So. 22. 
 V. Foutch, 96 Tenn. 242, 34 S. W. 1 ; So, if a man finds himself barred out 
 
 Hinton v. State, 24 Tex. 454. and excluded from his own house by 
 
 2State V. Conally, 3 Or. 69; State v. another, and is denied admission after 
 
 Foutch, supra. repeated demands, he has a legal right 
 
 sEstep V. Com. 86 Ky. 39, 9 Am. St. to break in the door, and if he en- 
 Rep. 260, 4 S. W. 820; State v. Foutch, counters resistance on thus entering, 
 supra. and is first struck by the occupant with 
 
 And evidence that a man was seen at a deadly weapon, and in meeting force 
 
 the door of the house of another cutting with force takes the life of svich occu- 
 
 or reaching in with a razor, when the pant, the killing is excusable homicide 
 
 owner came out striking at him with a committed in self-defense. De Forest 
 
 whip staiT while the trespasser was cut- v. State, 21 Ind. 23. 
 
794 HOMICIDE. [§ 532 
 
 and to lay his hands upon him gently, and, if he then resists, use 
 force, he has no right to put him out by force until all other means 
 have failed, or to use violence at the outset.^ And it is not his 
 right or duty to kill an intruder to prevent a slight breach of the 
 peace, or a simple assault on himself or another." JSTor does the right 
 upon the part of the owner of premises to use force to eject another 
 therefrom, even to the taking of life, exist as against an invited 
 guest, who has not been requested to leave. '^ And it vyill be, at least, 
 manslaughter if the owner of a house kills a visitor who comes in 
 peaceably, though forbidden, and who refuses to leave when ordered 
 out.* And though the occupant of a house who killed another there- 
 in had reason to believe that the latter was there for the purpose 
 of debauching his wife, he is not entitled to an instruction in a prose- 
 cution for the killing as to his right to eject the latter, where he was 
 not asked to leave until after the fatal blow was struck.^ And an 
 assault upon a trespasser is not justified when it was not made in 
 repelling resistance to efforts to eject him or in the preservation of 
 peace and order in the place in which it was made. ■^ ** The general 
 and comprehensive rule would seem to be that when a trespasser 
 or unwelcome visitor invades the premises of another, the latter has 
 the right to remove him, but the law requires that he shall first 
 request him to leave, and, if he does not do so, that he shall lay 
 hands gently upon him, and if he then resists he may use sufficient 
 force to remove him, taking care to use no more force than is nec- 
 essary to accomplish tliat object; but if the intruder defiantly stands 
 his ground, armed with a deadly weapon, the owner may at once 
 
 BMcCoy V. state, 8 Ark. 451 ; State stances as would justify him had the 
 V. Dugan, Houst. Grim. Eep. (Del.) affray occurred elsewhere, except that 
 503; State v. Becker, 9 Houst. (Del.) he need not retreat, but may defend 
 411, 3,3 Atl. 178. himself even to the extent of taking life, 
 
 estate v. Conally, 3 Or. 69. And see if necessary to protect himself from 
 Greschia v. People, 53 111. 295. great personal injury. State v. Martin, 
 
 'ICversole v. Com. 17 Kv. L. Eep. 30 Wis. 216, 11 Am. Rep. 567. 
 1259, 34 S. W. 231; State v. Partlow, 90 sState v. Smith, 20 N. C. (3 Dev. & 
 Mo. 608, 59 Am. Eep. 31, 4 S. W. 14; B. L.) 117; McCoy v. State, 8 Ark. 451; 
 State V. Mcintosh, 40 S. C. 349, 18 S. Reg. v. Sullivan, Car. & M. 209. 
 E. 1033. And see State v. Hargraves, If a man enters another's dwelling 
 188 jMo. 337, 87 S. W. 491. house peaceably on an implied license, 
 
 And where a, person enters the house though he misbehaves therein he cannot 
 
 of anotlier peaceably for the transaction be ejected, except on request to leave, 
 
 of business, and is not ordered to leave followed by no more than the necessary 
 
 before the beginning of an affray with and proper force to put him out. State 
 
 the owner, and the affray is entirely v. Partlow, supra. 
 
 personal between them, and does not in- 9Penee v. Com. 21 Ky. L. Rep. 500, 
 
 volve violence to the dwelling, or prop- 51 S. W. 801. 
 
 erty, or family, the owner is justified loState v. Tooker, 188 Mo. 438, 87 S. 
 
 in killing liim only under such eircum- W. 487. 
 
i 532] TO PREVENT CRIMINAL OR UNLAWFUL ACTS. 795 
 
 resort to force, and it is for the jury to decide whether he uses 
 more than is necessary. ^ ^ 
 
 533. Who may defend and against whom — The rule justifying homi- 
 cide in a proper case when committed in defense of one's dwelling 
 extends to lodgers or sojourners in a house, as well as to its master.^ 
 And not only the owner of a house, but his friends, neighbors, serv- 
 ants, and guests may arm themselves foa* this purpose.^ And one 
 who rents a house of an owner and is entitled to possession and 
 enters under him has the same right to use force in keeping pos- 
 session that the owner had.* So, a person in his own house has the 
 same right of defense, and the same right to stand his ground and 
 kill in self-defense, when assaulted by a partner or cotenant as when 
 assaulted by a stranger.* And the moral character of a person or 
 of his doings or transactions in his domicil does not affect his right 
 to take life, if necessary, in its defense against an intruder, and evi- 
 dence as to such business in a prosecution for a homicide committed 
 upon such defense is inadmissible. ° Where, however, the house in 
 which a difficulty resulting in death took place was the property 
 of a third person, and neither of the combatants were members of 
 her family, and both alike had a right to be in the house, and neither 
 had any right to eject the other, the ordinary rules as to self-defense 
 are alone applicable; and those governing the rights of a house- 
 holder against a violent intruder have no application." 
 
 534. What constitutes dwelling or castle. — Where a building is used 
 by a person as a dwelling place for himself and his family, no ques- 
 tion can arise as to its constituting his dwelling or castle. But a 
 house cannot be said to be the owner's castle, within the meaning of 
 rules of law with reference to the right to use force in defense of 
 one's castle, where it is not used as a dwelling, but merely as a store- 
 house.^ And the rule that a person assaulted in his own castle is 
 not compelled to flee or resort to such means of escape as may be ap- 
 
 11 State V. Taylor, 82 N. C. 554. Crawford v. State, supra; People v. 
 
 iCooper's Case, Cro. Car. 544; State Walsh, 43 Cal. 447; De Forest v. S*ate, 
 
 V. Horskin, Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 21 Ind. 23;Pond v. People, 8 Mich. 150; 
 
 IIG. Curtis V. Hubbard, 4 Hill, 437, 40 Am. 
 
 One who is rightfully in a house and Dec. 292; Temple v. People, 4 Lans. 119; 
 
 lawfully entitled to its protection may Cooper's Case, supra; Semayne's Case, 
 
 reijuire a stranger who intrudes with- 5 Coke, 92. 
 
 out permission to depart, and, if he re- sCorey v. People, 45 Barb. 262. 
 
 fuses to do so, may use the necessary 4Jones v. State, 76 Ala. 8. 
 
 force to eject him, the kind and degree estate v. Kennade, 121 Mo. 405, 26 
 
 of the force depending upon the con- S. W. 347. 
 
 duct of the intruder. Crawford v. eCom. v. Johnson, 213 Pa. 432, 62 
 
 State, 112 Ala. 1, 21 So. 214. Atl. 1064. 
 
 aMcPherson v. State, 22 Ga. •178; iCorey v. People, 45 Barb. 262. 
 
796 HOMICIDE. [§ dO-i 
 
 parent to him has no application where the assault was in the owner's 
 store, to which persons were invited, and where the assailant had a 
 right to be,^ though it does apply after refusal to leave on request 
 to do so.* So, one cannot eject another from a place of public 
 resort, as from his domicil; to justify such an ejection it must ap- 
 pear that the person sought to be ejected had committed an act 
 objectionable to others present, and there must have been some ap- 
 pearance of a breach of the peace.* And a small boat used for the 
 common carriage of passengers for hire, having neither sleeping 
 apartments nor places for meals, is not within the rule justifying 
 the forcible resistance of an attempt to enter a dwelling house, al- 
 though a seat in the boat is used for a sleeping place by the person 
 in possession of it.^ Nor does the right to employ force in defense 
 of one's habitation extend beyond the limits of the dwelling and 
 the customary outbuildings.^ 
 
 A house within the owner's curtilage, however, and which is near 
 his dwelling, and used for purposes of ordinary occupation and as 
 a dormitory for his servants, is a part of his dwelling within the 
 meaning of the rule authorizing a person to kill, if necessary, in de- 
 fense of his dwelling. '^ And a man's place of business may be re- 
 garded as his dwelling, under rules of law authorizing him, in case 
 of necessity, to take life in its defense. ® And so may a man's office 
 for the transaction of his business.^ And a man in the home of his 
 
 2Hall V. Com. 94 Ky. 322, 22 S. W. A person who shot and killed one of 
 
 333. a number of persons who had followed 
 
 And the fact that a man sleeps and and threatened him, and who had at- 
 
 keeps his clothes in the back part of tempted forcibly to enter his dwelling, 
 
 a, room used as a store, under an agree- and who were in the act of seizing and 
 
 ment with the tenant, does not justify choking his servant, and had commenced 
 
 him in defending the building against to tear away boards from the building 
 
 intruders, as his dwelling or private in which they were found, is entitled to 
 
 habitation. State v. Smith, 100 Iowa, defend on the ground that the act was 
 
 1, 69 N. W. 269. done in defense of his dwelling. Pond 
 
 sState V. Reed, 154 Mo. 122, 55 S. v. People, supra. 
 
 W. 278. s Jones v. State, 76 Ala. 8; Willis v. 
 
 estate V. Williams, 111 La. 205, 35 State, 43 Neb. 102, 61 N. W. 254. And 
 
 So. 521. see Lee v. State, supra. 
 
 sPeople V. Bernard, 125 Mich. 550, 65 oMorgan v. Durfee. 69 Mo. 469, 33 
 
 L.E.A. 559, 84 N. W. 1092. Am. Rep. 508. 
 
 estate v. Bartmess, 33 Or. 110, 54 A lawyer in his office who is abused 
 
 Pac. 167; Lee v. State, 92 Ala. 15, 25 by a person therein, who is his physical 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 17, 9 So. 407. And see superior, and who refuses to go when 
 
 State V. Tooker, 188 Mo. 438, 87 S. W. told to do so, and threatens the life oi" 
 
 487. the former, and attacks him, has the 
 
 It does not include all one's land or right to defend his office from ruthless 
 
 all of the land to the exclusive posses- intrusion, and his person against a bat- 
 
 sion of which he is entitled. Lee v. tery, as well as to defend himself 
 
 State, supra. against threatened death, and may em- 
 
 7Pond V. People, 8 Mich. 150; Par- ploy all the means within his reach, and. 
 
 rish V. Com. 81 Va. 1. all the ""energies under his control ap- 
 
1 534] , TO PREVENT CRIMINAL OR UNLAWFUL ACTS. 797 
 
 mother has a right to protect it and himself and everyone in it against 
 intruders, and if he kill an intruder whose acts were such as to arouse 
 fear of death or great bodily harm, his act would be justifiable.^" 
 So, killing in defense of one's room in a tavern is justifiable where 
 intruders attempt forcibly to put the lawful occupant out."-^ And 
 a room rented by a person and occupied as a sleeping room is his 
 castle, from which no duty to retreat rests on him, and in case of 
 an attack therein, he has the right to stand his ground and defend 
 himself, even to the death of his assailant, who is, or appears to be, 
 about to kill or infiict grievous bodily harm on him. ^ ^ So, a box 
 stall at a fair groimd, provided with inside fastenings to its doors, 
 which was prepared and used by a man as his of&ce and sleeping 
 apartment, he having no other place of abode, and which contained 
 his clothing, his money, and all his belongings, is, in legal effect, 
 his home or domicil within the meaning of rules of law with refer- 
 ence to his right to defend his home.-^^ Whether, and to what 
 extent, a place occupied by a person was his dwelling are questions 
 properly left to the jury in a prosecution against him for killing 
 an intruder.^* A consideration of this subject with reference to 
 the duty to retreat will be found in another part of this work. ^ " 
 
 III. The QUESTioiT of degree. 
 
 535. Malice and improper performance as a test. — Malice is the dis- 
 tinctive feature of murder, though the question of prevention of 
 felony or unlawful act is involved, and one who kills another with 
 malice, express or implied, is guilty of murder, and cannot take 
 shelter behind the rule justifying or palliating homicide committed 
 to prevent a felonious or unlawful act. -^ And a homicide with a 
 deadly weapon in order to prevent a mere trespass is murder in 
 the absence of proof which would tend to rebut the presumption of 
 malice arising from the tise of such weapon.^ And such a trespass 
 upon a man's house, unaccompanied by such force as to make it 
 
 parently necessary for such defense; is Young v. State (Neb.) 2 L.R.A. 
 
 and his act in defending himself from (N.S.) 66, 104 N. W. 867. 
 
 sucli attack, while the other has him by i*State v. Williams, 111 La. 205, 35 
 
 the throat, of striking him upon the So. 521. 
 
 head with a notarial seal and killing is See supra, chapter XII., § 309. 
 
 him, is justifiable. Ibid. iCarroll v. State, 23 Ala. 28, 58 A.m. 
 
 I estate V. Pollard, 139 Mo. 220, 40 S. Dee. 282; Long v. State, 52 Miss. 23. 
 W. 949. 2Lambeth v. State, 23 Miss. 322. 
 
 II Ford's Case, J. Kelyng, 51. 
 
 12 Harris v. State, 96 Ala. 24, 11 So. 
 255. 
 
798 HOMICIDE. [i 535 
 
 a breach of the peace, will not reduce the killing of the trespasser 
 (0 manslaughter where the circumstances were such as to warrant 
 an implication of malice.^ The mere fact that the element of de- 
 fense of person or property is involved in an act of homicide does 
 not make it, as matter of law, nothing more than manslaughter; it 
 is for the jury to say in all such cases whether there was malice 
 which would make it murder.* Nor can one who is about to be 
 arrested for a misdemeanor, having a desire to kill the officer, fortify 
 himself in his dwelling and shoot him without warning, without 
 being criminally responsible for the murder.® And one who kills 
 another with actual malice cannot shelter himself behind the stat- 
 utory provision making it manslaughter unnecessarily to kill an- 
 other while resisting an attempt to do an unlawful act." And one 
 who kills a trespasser, knowing that a trespass only was intended, 
 ii guilty of murder. '^ And though the trespass was against property, 
 and the killing was unintentional, it is at least manslaughter where 
 a deadly weapon was used.^ 
 
 If a killing was done to prevent a felony, however, or in defense 
 of home, property, or of another, but was unnecessary, or done with 
 improper force, it is manslaughter only, if the act was without 
 malice.® And a killing committed with a weapon, and in a manner 
 not likely to cause death, can be no more than manslaughter, though 
 it was done to prevent a mere trespass. ^ " And to reduce a homicide 
 from murder to manslaughter the slayer is not obliged, before the 
 mortal wound is given, to retreat from his domicil or family.** 
 So, where a person breaks into a house for the purpose of executing 
 civil process, and the owner kills him, it is manslaiighter only, and 
 not murder.*^ And one who sees another engaged in the commis- 
 sion of an offense against the criminal laws, and resists the ac- 
 complishment of such purpose, and in such resistance slays the per- 
 son so engaged, is guilty of manslaughter, and not murder, though 
 
 sCarroll v. State, supra. 'State v. Medlin, 60 N. C. (2 Winst. 
 
 iState V. Scheele, 57 Conn. 307, 14 L.) 99; Hull v. State, 6 I.ea, 250. 
 Am. St. Rep. 103, 18 Atl. 256. sState v. Vanee, 17 Iowa, 138. 
 
 And where an oflficer is about to enter sCarroll v. State, 23 Ala. 28, 58 Am. 
 a house unlawfully in the daytime, for Dee. 282. 
 
 the purpose of arresting the occupant So, if life be unnecessarily taken by 
 for a misdemeanor, and the occupant a third person interfering between two 
 kills him with express malice, the crime combatants for the purpose of preserv- 
 is not manslaughter, as matter of law, ing the peace in protecting one against 
 merely because of the unlawful act of the other, the offense is manslaughter, 
 the officer. Ibid. People v. Cole, 4 Park. Grim. Rep. 35. 
 
 Bibid. lOState v. Vance, supra. 
 
 6Lon<; V. State, 52 Miss. 23; State v. nHaynes v. State, 17 Ga. 465. 
 Hoyt, 13 Minn. 132, Gil. 125; People v. i2Cook's Case, Cro. Car. 537. 
 Divine, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 594. 
 
§ 535] TO PREVENT CRIMINAL OR UNLAWFUL ACTS. 789 
 
 the act of killing is not necessary to the defeat of the criminal act, 
 and though the killing ensues directly after the abandonment of the 
 attempt.^* Likewise a taking of property under a bona fide claim 
 of right or title, or for the purpose of settling a debt, is a trespass, 
 and a killing to prevent it, though not justifiable, is manslaughter 
 only. ^ * And the killing of a constable who comes to make an lui- 
 lawful distress is manslaughter, though the act is illegal. ^ ^ 
 
 Of course, if the case is in every way a proper one for the exer- 
 cise of the right to kill for the purpose of preventing a felonious 
 or unlawful act, the homicide is justifiable and no question of de- 
 gree arises. There can be a question of degree in this class of 
 cases only when a felonious or criminal act was attempted, and the 
 right to resist or prevent was improperly or illegally exercised and 
 death resulted. 
 
 i-.Lcmg V. State, 52 Miss. 23. App.) 45 S. W. 12; Reg. v. Archer, 1 
 
 i4Cra,wford v. State, 90 Ga. 701, 35 Fost. & F. 351. 
 Am. St. Rep. 242, 17 S. E. 628; Me- 15 United States v. Williams, 2 
 Daniel v. State, 8 Smedes & M. 401, 47 Cranch, C. C. 439, Fed. Cas. No. 16,710. 
 Am. Dec. 93j Greer v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
CHAPTER XXV. 
 
 INSANITY AND DRUNKENNESS. 
 
 I. Scope and contents of chapter. 
 
 536. The subject of criminal responsibility generally. 
 11. Insanity. 
 
 537. General rviles. 
 
 538. Common-law rule as to effect of partial insanity on degree. 
 
 539. The modern rule. 
 
 540. Passion as a mitigating element in connection with irresistible im- 
 
 pulse. 
 
 541. The law of self-defense as applied to insane persons. 
 III. Drunkenness. 
 
 542. General rules as to effect on responsibility. 
 
 543. Use of, to show noneommission. 
 
 544. Intoxication as aflfecting intent. 
 
 545. Degree necessary to aflfect intent. 
 
 546. Intoxication as affecting deliberation and premeditation. 
 
 547. Degree necessary to affect deliberation and premeditation. 
 
 548. Intoxication as affecting provocation and hot blood. 
 
 549. Intoxication as affecting self-defense. 
 
 550. Texas statute as to intoxication. 
 
 551. Intoxication by way of preparation. 
 
 I. Scope and contents of chapter. 
 
 536. The subject of criminal responsibility generally. — ^The subject 
 of responsibility for crime as affected by insanity and drunkenness, 
 in its general bearing, has been discussed in another treatise, and 
 though the defenses of insanity and drunkenness are far more fre- 
 quently set up in homicide cases than in cases of any other class, 
 the rules with reference to what insanity or what drunkenness will 
 excuse crime generally apply where insanity or drunkenness is as- 
 serted, and the reader is, therefore, referred to such treatise for a 
 full consideration of the subject of insanity and drunkenness as an 
 excuse for criiae, including homicide.^ Some of the general rules 
 with relation to the subject, however, are here given in an intro- 
 ductory way, and those phases of the law with relation to insanity 
 
 11 Wharton & S. Med. Jur. 5th ed. 
 chapters 8, 9. 
 
 800 
 
i 536] INSANITY AND DRUNKENNESS. 801 
 
 and drunkenness which are particularly affected by the fact that the 
 criminal act sought to be excused is homicide are here considered. 
 
 II. Insanity. 
 
 537. General rules. — There is hardly a principle of law with refer- 
 ence to insanity as affecting homicide which does not apply to in- 
 sanity as affecting other crimes in general, and, therefore, hardly 
 a principle which does not belong to the general field of criminal 
 responsibility as affected by insanity, rather than that of homicide. 
 For a consideration of these principles the reader is referred to an- 
 other treatise.^ A few of the principles of the law of insanity are 
 specially applicable to homicide, and other crimes divided into de- 
 grees, and those principles will be here considered; and as pre- 
 liminary to such consideration the general rules of criminal respon- 
 sibility in cases of insanity may be stated to be that generally a per- 
 son who commits a crime, acting under the impulse of mental dis- 
 ease, is not criminally responsible therefor.^ As to the degree of 
 insanity which will effect this result the test is the question whether 
 the accused was capable of distinguishing right from wrong with 
 reference to the act which he committed. * This rule applies alike to 
 idiocy and general mania,* and to partial insanity or monomania,® 
 and to insane delusions.® But with reference to insane delusions 
 the person laboring under a particular delusion must be considered 
 in the same situation with relation to criminal responsibility as if 
 the facts with respect to which the delusion existed were real, and 
 criminal responsibility is relieved only when such facts would, if 
 actually existing, have justified the act and rendered it excusable.'^ 
 
 11 Wharton & S. Med. Jur. 5th ed.can be no such thin^ as malice without 
 
 chap. 8. mental accountability, and this cannot 
 
 2See 1 Wharton & S. Med. Jur. 5th coexist with incapacity to distinguish 
 
 «d. § 162. right from wrong. Grissom v. State, 62 
 
 31bid., § 175. Miss. 167. 
 
 A presumption of a want of sanity sSee 1 Wharton & S. Med. Jur. 5th ed. 
 
 will not be indulged in in a prosecution § 183. 
 
 for homicide, because of the enormity The commission of a homicide for the 
 
 of the crime. Singleton v. State, 71 purpose of being hanged shows a morbid 
 
 Miss. 782, 42 Am. St. Rep. 488, 16 So. state of mind only, and not un insane 
 
 295. delusion which will relieve one from 
 
 41 Wharton & S. Med. Jur. 5th ed. criminal responsibility for the act. Reg. 
 
 I 175. V. Burton, 3 Post. & F. 772. 
 
 Slbid., § 180. 'See 1 Wharton & S. Med. Jur. 5th 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution ed. § 187. 
 
 for homicide that if the accused acted A delusion upon the part of one per- 
 
 with malice he is guilty of murder, son that another was a robber, who 
 
 though he may have labored under par- had entered his house, in which he killed 
 
 tral insanity, is erroneous, since there the supposed robber, is an objective one 
 Horn.— 51 
 
802 HOlVnCIDE. ^CS 537 
 
 And with reference to irresistible impulse in jurisdictions where 
 it is admitted as a defense to crime, the test as to criminality is 
 whether the accused had sufficient reason to know right from wrong 
 with reference to the act in question, and whether he had sufficient 
 power to control and govern his actions, and to resist his morbid 
 inclination to perpetrate the offense. ^ 
 
 538. Common-law rule as to effect of partial insanity on degree ■ 
 
 The old common-law doctrine in this respect is founded on the 
 hypothesis that sanity and insanity are states as clearly and ab- 
 solutely distinguishable as are coverture and non-coverture; ar.d 
 that men are either wholly sane, so as to be wholly responsible, or 
 wholly insane, so as to be wholly irresponsible. This principle, how- 
 ever, is now abandoned as based on a psychological untruth. There 
 are many degrees both of sanity and insanity; and the two states 
 approach each other in imperceptible gradations, melting into each 
 other, to adopt an illustration borrowed by Lord Penzance from 
 Burke, as day melts into night. There may, therefore, be phases 
 of mind which cannot be positively spoken of as either sane or in- 
 sane. The only course under such circumstances is to find the de- 
 fendant guilty of the offense in a diminished grade, when the law 
 establishes such grade ; or, when it does not, to inflict on him modi- 
 fied punishment.^ Nor is this view unknown to the law. Such 
 considerations (i. e., those of the defendant's mental constitution) 
 
 as distinguished from a delusion as to comprehension of right or wrong are 
 a matter of opinion, and a good de- unimpaired, but on the other hand he 
 fense in a prosecution for the killing, inherited a deficiency of moral strength. 
 Levett's Case, Gro. Car. 538. His maternal grandfather committed sui- 
 
 But an insane delusion entertained cide, his mother died deranged, and his 
 by a convict, that another convict was father was an habitual drunkard. These 
 acting as a spy with intent to destioy facts Dr. Reinecke thinks are calculat- 
 his pi ins of escape from the prison, does ed to produce in Kullman a want of 
 not affect his criminal responsibility for independence in forming opinions, sus- 
 killing the other. People v. Taylor, 138 ceptibility to external impressions, cold- 
 N. Y. 398, 34 N. E. 275. ness of heart, vanity, and a tendency to 
 
 sSee 1 Wharton & S. Med. Jur. 5th violence. He is, therefore, of opinion 
 ed. § 191. that although Kullman may be consid- 
 
 lAn illustration of this principle, as ered an accountable being, his nature, 
 it obtains in the German law, is found nevertheless, inherits a morbid dispo- 
 in the trinl of Kullman, at ISerlin, in sition calculated to affect his free will. 
 October, 1874. I quote the following The president of the court summed up 
 from a cable despatch of October 29, the medical testimony to the effect that 
 1874, appearing in the Boston papers at the time of the assassination, as well 
 of October 31, 1874: — as at present, Kullman was accountable 
 
 Berlin, Oct. 29. — The trial of Kull- for his acts to but a limited degree, 
 man wan resumed this morning. Dr. Kullman was found guilty as charged 
 Eeinc-V* testified that he did not con- in the indictment, and sentenced to four- 
 sider Kullman a religious or political teen years' imprisonment in the house 
 fanatic, or that he possessed a natural of correction, and ten years' suspension 
 predisposition to crime; neither was he of his civil rights and police surveil- 
 a common inuraerer. His powers of lanes. 
 
S 538] INSANITY AND DRUNKENNESS. 803 
 
 are invoked ■whenever we have to determine whether a party as- 
 sailed acted bona fide when resorting to violent measures of self- 
 defense. So do we gauge responsibility in cases of sleep-drunken- 
 ness ; so do we estimate the conduct of persons when roused- by any 
 great political or religious excitement;^ and so we hold in cases of 
 intoxication, when called upon to measure deliberation and intent.* 
 If, in cases where homicide has been committed during an excitement 
 which the defendant's peculiar psychical state has abnormally pro- 
 tracted and intensified, a vbrdict of murder in the second degree, or 
 of manslaughter, is given in accordance with these views, a result 
 is reached which not only harmonizes with sound principle, but is 
 far more consistent with the public idea of justice than would be 
 a verdict either of not guilty, or of murder in the first degree.* 
 "Partial insanity may be evidence to disprove the presence of the 
 kind of malice required by the law to constitute the particular crime 
 of which the prisoner is accused."^ 
 
 539. The modem rule — Under the modern rule on this subject 
 there is not deemed to be any condition intermediate between sanity 
 and insanity which will mitigate crime without excusing it.^ And 
 where a person committing a homicide was conscious of what he 
 was doing, and capable of distinguishing between right and wrong, 
 and premeditated the commission of the act, he is guilty of murder 
 in the first degree, though he was deranged.^ Nor can a conviction 
 of a lower degree of crime be had on the theory that the defendant's 
 mind was unsound to a degree rendering him incapable of delibera- 
 tion, where he knew the nature of the act.* And insanity cannot 
 reduce homicide from murder to manslaughter, unless the provoca- 
 tion was such, at least, as would stir the resentment of a reason- 
 able man.* Evidence of insanity, however, is admissible in such 
 
 2See supra, chapter IX., § 139. zNevling v. Com. 98 Pa. 323. 
 
 sSee Eoberts v. People, 19 Mich. 401. sState v. Kotovsky, supra; State v. 
 
 4See, as illustrating this, McGregor's Holloway, 156 Mo. 222, 56 S. W. 734; 
 
 Case, 23 Am. Jour. Ins. 549. Jarvis v. State, 70 Ark. 613, Appx., 67 
 
 sStephen, Crim. Law, 1863, p. 92. S. W. 76; Osburn v. State, 164 Ind 262, 
 
 iSage V. State, 91 Ind. 141; United 73 N. E. 601; Com. v. Wireback, 190 Pa. 
 
 States T. Lee, 4 Mackey, 489, 54 Am. 138, 70 Am. St. Rep. 6?g, 42 Atl. 542; 
 
 Rep. 293; State v. Kotovsky, 11 Mo. Com. v. HoUinger, 190 Pa. 155, 42 Atl. 
 
 App. 584; Sindram v. People. 1 N. Y. 548; Com. v. Earner, 199 Pa. 335, 49 
 
 Crim. Rep. 448. And see Porter v. At!. 60; Cornell v. State, 104 Wis 527 80 
 
 State, 140 Ala. 87, 37 So. 81. N. W. 745. 
 
 But an instruction in a prosecution iHorton v. United States, 15 App. D. 
 
 for homicide thit if the accused was in- C. 310: People v. Hurtado, 63 Cal. 288. 
 
 sane at the time of the act the jury And an instruction in a prosecution 
 
 must declare him not guilty, without for homicide that if the defendant Avas 
 
 reference to the degree of insanity, is not insane at the time of the shooting 
 
 too broad and cannot be sustained. Peo- he ought to be found guilty as charged 
 
 pie V. Best, 39 Cal. 690. in the indictment is not subject to the 
 
804 HOMICIDE. [§ 539 
 
 eases to show the absence of any deliberate or premeditated design. ^ 
 And one who killed another when his mind was so far impaired 
 as to render him incapable of deliberate, premeditated murder, but 
 was not totally irresponsible by reason of his insanity, should be 
 convicted of murder in the second degree only." And evidence of 
 excitement and abnormal sensitiveness resulting from sunstroke and 
 a fall and other accidents, though not sufficient to establish irrespon- 
 sibility, is sufficient to reduce a homicide from murder in the first, 
 to murder in the second, degree.'^ 
 
 540. Passion as a mitigating element in connection with irresistible 
 impulse. — In jurisdictions in which irresistible impulse, the mind 
 being sane, is regarded as no defense to a homicide or other crime, 
 violent passion is still to be taken into account as a mitigating 
 element, and the peculiar temperament of the offender is to be gauged 
 for the purpose of estimating whether the provocation was such 
 as would create hot blood, and whether there was adequate cooling 
 time. A sane person may, from epilepsy, or from prior insanity, 
 or from nervous or physical derangement, or from, hereditary taint, 
 be peculiarly susceptible to excitement, and as the law treats assaults 
 committed in hot blood as of a lower grade than those committed 
 deliberately, this excitability may properly be considered in de- 
 termining whether the blood at the time was hot. Hence, epileptic, 
 nervous, and cerebral diseases, and hereditary tendencies, may be 
 put in evidence to lower the grade of the offense, though they do 
 not amount to insanity. This is but following the authorities which 
 declare that drunkenness, though no defense to crime, may be used 
 to show that an assault was not deliberate. ^ 
 
 541. The law of self-defense as applied to insane persons. — The law 
 of self-defense is applicable alike to the sane and the insane;^ and 
 insanity and self-defense are not inconsistent defenses, and a per- 
 
 objection that it precludes the jury Atl. 648; Com. v. Earner, 199 Pa. 335, 
 
 from finding a lesser degree of the of- 49 Atl. GO ; Jarvis v. State, 70 Ark. 613 
 
 fense, the shooting being admitted. Peo- Appx. 67 S. W. 76. 
 
 pie V. Hobson, 17 Cal. 424. But an instruction in a prosecution 
 
 BSindram v. People, 1 N. Y. Crim. for homicide that if the accused was not 
 
 Pep. 448; Sage v. State, 91 Ind. 141; in a frame of mind to deliberate and pre- 
 
 Hempton v. State, HI Wis. 127, 86 N. meditate the killing would not be mur- 
 
 W. 596 ; Youtsey v. United States, 38 der is objectionable as vague and ambig- 
 
 C. C. A. 562, 97 Fed. 937. uous, and not showing the measure of 
 
 sAnderson v. State, 43 Conn. 514, 21 criminal responsibility. Dejarnette v. 
 
 Am. Pvep. 669; Cottell v. State, 12 Ohio Com. 75 Va. 867. 
 
 C. C. 467; Green v. Com. 83 Pa. 75; vPeople v. Conroy, 33 Hun, 119. 
 
 Jones V. Com. 75 Pa. 403; Pistorius v. H Wharton & S. Med. Jur. 5th ed. § 
 
 Com. 84 Pa. 158; Willis v. Com. 32 194. 
 
 Gratt. 929. And see Boren v. State, 32 iState v. Wade, 161 Mo. 441, 61 S. 
 
 Tex. Crim. Pep. 637, 25 S. W. 775. Con- W. 800. 
 tra. Com. v. HoUinger, 190 Pa. 155, 42 
 
§ 541] INSANITY AND DRUNKENNESS. 805 
 
 son pleading botli may be acquitted on either, if sustained by the 
 evidence.^ 
 
 III. Deuitkenwess. ^ 
 
 542. General rules as to effect on responsibility. — The rule is prac- 
 tically universal, and is supported by a vast number of cases, only 
 a few of which are here cited, that voluntary intoxication is no 
 justification or excuse for homicide, or any other criminal act;^ 
 nor is mere drunken excitement and rage any excuse.^ And the 
 disease of cenomania or dipsomania, consisting of an inordinate thirst 
 for liquor, caused by the habit of drinking, does not affect criminal 
 responsibility for acts committed by the one that is impelled to 
 drink, while in a state of intoxication.* Intoxication is not in- 
 sanity or unsoundness of mind, unless a fixed and continuous de- 
 
 zlbid. 95, 19 Pac. 387; O'Grady v. State, 36 
 
 iThe general question as to what in- Neb. 320, 54 N. W. 556; State v. Thomp- 
 toxioation will excuse crime is consid- son, 12 Nev. 140; State v. Martin, 4 
 ered in a note to Harris v. United N. J. L. J. 252, 3 Orim. L. Mag. -44; 
 States, 36 L.R.A. 465. Territory v. Franklin, 2 N. M. 307; 
 
 zBeasley v. State, 50 Ala. 149, 20 Am. Planigan v. People, 86 N. Y. 654, 40 Am. 
 Bep. 292; McLeroy v. State, 120 Ala. Rep. 556; State v. John, 30 N. C. (8 
 274, 25 So. 247; Chrisman v. State, 54 Ired. L.) 330, 49 Am. Dec. 396; State 
 Ark. 283, 26 Am. St. Rep. 44, 15 S. W. v. Kale, 124 N. C. S16, 32 S. E. 892; 
 889; People v. Nichol, 34 Cal. 212; Peo- State v. Koerner, 8 N. D. 292, 73 Am. 
 pie V. Methever, 132 Cal. 326, 64 Pac. St. Rep. 752, 78 N. W. 981 ; Pigman v. 
 481; State v. Johnson, 41 Conn. 584; State, 14 Ohio, 555, 45 Am. Dec. 558; 
 State V. Johnson, 40 Conn. 136; Peo- Cline v. State, 43 Ohio St. 332, 1 N. E. 
 pie V. Odell, 1 Dak. 197, 46 N. W. 601; 22; Keenan v. Com. 44 Pa. 55, 84 Am. 
 State V. Thomas, Houst. Crim. Rep. Dec. 414; Com. v. Cleary, 148 Pa. 26, 23 
 (Del.) 511; State v. Snow, 3 Penn. Atl. 1110; State v. Bundy, 24 S. C. 439, 
 (Del.) 259, 51 Atl. 607; Harris v. Unit- 58 Am. Rep. 263; Wilcox v. State, 94 
 ed States, 8 App. D. C. 20, 36 L.R.A. Tenn. 106, 28 S. W. 312; Carter v. State, 
 465; Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 29 12 Tex. 500, 62 Am. Dee. 539; Evers v. 
 Am. St. Rep. 232, 9 So. 835; Choice v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 318, 18 L.R.A. 
 State, 31 Ga. 424; Cribb v. State, 118 421, 37 Am. St. Rep. 811, 20 S. W. 744; 
 Ga. 316, 45 S. E. 396; Upstone v. Peo- wStat© v. Tatro, 50 Vt. 483; Longley v. 
 pie, 109 111. 169; Dawson v. State, 16 Com. 99 Va. 807, 37 S. E. 339; State 
 Ind. 428, 79 Am. Dec. 439; Aszman v. v. Robinson, 20 W. Va. 713, 43' Am. 
 State, 123 Ind. 347, 8 L.R.A. 33, 24 N. Rep. 799; United States v. McGlue, 1 
 E. 123; State v. Hart, 29 Iowa, 268; Curt. C. C. 1, Fed. Cas. No. 15,679; 
 State V. Roan, 122 Iowa, 136, 97 N. W. Beverley's Case, 4 Coke, 125a; Reg. v. 
 997; State v. O'Neil, 51 Kan. 651, 24 Dixon, 11 Cox, C. C. 341. 
 L.R.A. 555, 33 Pac. 287; Shannahan v. s State v. Wilson, 104 N. C. 868, 10 
 Com. 8 Bush, 464, 8 Am. Rep. 465; Si E. 315. And see State v Lowe, 93 
 Conley v. Com. 98 Ky. 125, 32 S. W. Mo. 547, 5 S. W. 889. 
 285 ; State v. Coleman, 27 La. Ann. 691 ; A deliberate intent unlawfully to 
 Com. V. Gilbert, 165 Mass. 45, 42 N. E. take buman life constitutes the malice 
 336; People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9, 97 necessary to murder in the first degree, 
 Am. Dec. 162; State v. Garvey, 11 Minn, whether it springs from hatred, ill-will, 
 154, Gil. 95; Kelly v. State, 3 Smedes revenge, or mere fren2y of drunkenness. 
 & M. 518; State v. Hundley, 46 Mo. Beck v. State, 76 Ga. 452. 
 414; State v. West, 157 Mo. 309, 57 S. iChoice v. State, 31 Ga. 424; State 
 W. 1071 ; Territory v. Manton, 8 Mont. v. Potts, 100 N. C. 457, 6 S. E. 657. 
 
806 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 [§ S42 
 
 rangement has resulted therefrom.^ And this, without reference to 
 the character of the licjuor causing it.® If mental incapacity pro- 
 duced by voluntary intoxication existed only temporarily at the time 
 of the commission of the crime, it is no excuse therefor.'" 
 
 The rule, as expressed by some of the cases, is, however, that 
 drunkenness will not excuse crime unless it destroys capacity to 
 distinguish between right and wrong,* or unless it renders the party 
 unconscious of what he is doing,® or unless it is such as to prevent 
 him from restraining himself from coramitting the act.^" And 
 it has been asserted that intoxication is an aggravation rather than 
 an excuse for crime. ^ ^ But the general rule seems to be that drunk- 
 enness neither aggravates, excuses, extenuates, nor mitigates a crim- 
 inal act.*^ 
 
 estate v. Martin, 4 N. J. L. J. 252, 3 
 Crim. L. Mag. 44; Re Johnson, 57 Cal. 
 529; Aszman v. State, 123 Ind. 347, 8 
 L.R.A. 33, 24 N. E. 123; Choice v. State, 
 supra; People v. Odell, 1 Dak. 197, 46 
 N. W. 601 : State v. Wells, 54 Kan. 161, 
 
 37 Pac. 1005; Wilkerson v. Com. 88 Ky. 
 29, 9 S. W. 836; Buckhannon v. Com. 
 88 Ky. 110. 5 S. W. 358; Com. v. Gil- 
 bert, 165 Mass. 45, 42 N. E. 336. 
 
 The test of insanity as affecting crim- 
 inal responsibility, that the accused 
 must have labored under such a defect 
 of reason as not to know the nature or 
 quality of the act, or, if he did know it, 
 that he did not know he was doing 
 wrong, does not apply to drunkenness. 
 PeOTile V. Ferris, 55 Cal. 588. 
 
 eCribb v. State, 118 Ga. 316, 45 S. 
 E. .S96. 
 
 7 Fisher v. State, 64 Ind. 435; State 
 V. Bullock, 13 Ala. 413: People v. Lewis, 
 
 38 Cal. 531; People v. Williams, 43 Cal. 
 344; Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 29 
 Am. St. Rep. 239, 9 So. 835; Beck v. 
 State, 76 Ga. 452; Upstoiie v. People, 
 109 111. 169; Wright v. Cora. 24 Ky. L. 
 Rep. 1838. 72 S. W. 340; State v. Haab, 
 105 La. 230, 29 So. 7?5; State v. Hund- 
 ley, 46 Mo. 414; Schleiipker v. State, 
 
 9 Neb. 241, 1 N. W. 857; Stnte v. 
 Thompson, 12 Nev. 140; State v. Martin, 
 svpra; Ppiole v. Krist, 168 N. Y. 19, 
 60 N. E. 1057 : Longlpy v. Com. 99 Va. 
 807, 37 S. E. 339; GustaA-pnson v. State, 
 
 10 Wyo. 309, 68 P:ic. 1003. 
 Intoxication existing only tempora- 
 rily at the time of the commi=ision of 
 the criminal act is no exou=i3 therefor, 
 though it was such as to render the per- 
 son incapable of distinguishing between 
 right and wrong for the time being. 
 
 State V. Haab, supra; Montag t. Peo- 
 ple, 141 111. 75, 30 N. E. 337. 
 
 sRoss V. State, 62 Ala. 224: State v. 
 Wells, 54 Kan. 161, 37 Pae. 1005; State 
 V. Ford, 16 S. D. 228. 92 N. W. 18. And 
 see Territory v. Franklin, 2 N. M. 307; 
 Com. V. Hart. 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 546. 
 
 9 State V. Till, Houst. Crim. Rep. 
 (Del.) 233; Pigman v. State, 14 Ohio, 
 555, 45 Am. Dec. 558; Oshorn v. State 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 26 S. W. 625. And 
 see State v. Wells, supra. 
 
 lOReg. v. Monkhouse, 4 Cox, C. C. 55; 
 People V. Odell. 1 Dak. 197, 46 N. W. 
 601; Com. v. Gilbert, 165 Mass. 45, 42 
 N. E. 336. 
 
 iiUnited States v. Forbes, Crabbe, 
 558, Fed. Cas. No. 15,129; United States 
 V. Cornell, 2 Mason. 99, Fed. Cas. No. 
 14.868; State v. Thompson, Wright 
 (Ohio) 617; United States v. Claypool, 
 14 Fed. 127. 
 
 In Willis V. Com. 32 Gratt. 929, it 
 was held that intoxication at the time 
 may raise homicidje to murder in the 
 iirst degree. 
 
 i=:\TcIntvre v. Peonle, 38 111. 514; 
 Terrell v. State, 43 Tex. 503: State v. 
 Murphy, 118 Mo. 7, 25 S. W. 95: State 
 V. Sneed, 88 Mo. 138; State t. Ramsey, 
 82 Mo. 133; State v. Edwards, 71 Mo. 
 321; State v. Cross. 27 Mo. 332; State 
 V. Harlow, 21 Mo. 440. 
 
 Drunkenness cannot convert a mere 
 accident into a felony. State v. Cross, 
 42 W. Va. 253, 24 S.E. 996. 
 
 And a remark by the court in the 
 hearing of the .jury in a criminal prose- 
 cution, that drunkenness is more of an 
 aggravation than an excuse, without ex- 
 planation, is improper. State v. Don- 
 ovan, 61 Iowa, 369, 16 N. W. 205. 
 
§ 542] INSANITY AND DRUNKENNESS. 807 
 
 Of course, settled insanity which becomes fixed and established as 
 a diseased condition of the mind, produced by habitual intoxication, 
 affects criminal responsibility. in the same way as insanity produced 
 by any other cause. ^^ 
 
 543. Use of, to show noncommission Intoxication may be shown 
 
 in a prosecution for homicide like any other fact, not as an excuse, 
 but to throw light on the other facts and circumstances in the case,^ 
 and as tending to show physical inability to commit the offense,^ and 
 as throwing light upon the question whether the accused was in such 
 a mental condition as to know he was committing an offense.* And 
 the fact that a person talked with his usual intelligence at the time 
 is competent and material, where he claims to have been so under 
 the influence of liquor as not to know what he was doing.* Excuse 
 for criminal acts because of drunkenness, however, is to be received 
 at all times with great caution on account of the ease with which it 
 may be perverted.^ And expressions of opinion as to the quantity 
 and weight of evidence on that question should be avoided in in- 
 structing the jury. ** 
 
 544. Intoxication as affecting intent — .Where a criminal act is one 
 which, like most kinds of homicide, can be committed only by doing 
 a particular thing with a specific intent, it may be shown that at 
 the time of doing it the accused was so drunk that he could not have 
 entertained the intent necessary to constitute the offense.* And in- 
 
 But an instruction in a criminal man v. State, 14 Ohio, 555, 45 Am. Dec. 
 prosecution characterizing drunlcenness 558. And see Fisher v. State, 30 Tex. 
 as gross vice and misconduct is not re- App. 502, 18 S. W. 90. 
 versible error, where the language was 4White v. State, 103 Ala. 72, 16 So. 
 not applied to the defandant. People v. 63. 
 Calton, 5 Utah, 451, 16 Pac. 902. BKriel v. Com. 5 Buslh, 362. 
 
 isState V. Alartin, 4 N. J. L. J. 252, estate v. Donovan, 61 Iowa, 369, 10 
 3 Crira. L. Mag. 44; Fonville v. State, N. W. 206. 
 
 91 Ala. 39, 8 So. 688; People v. Trav- iMcLeroy v. State, 120 Ala. 274, 25 
 ers, 88 Cal. 233. 26 Pac. 88; State v. So. 247; Chrisman v. St=ite, 54 Ark. 
 Rilev, 100 Mo. 493, 13 S. W. 1063; Hill 283, 26 Am. St. Rep. 44, 15 S. W. S89; 
 V. State, 42 Neb. 509, 60 N. W. 916; People v. Methever, 132 Cal. 326, 64 
 People V. Rogers, 18 N. Y. 9, 72 Am. Pac. 481 ; State v. Piske, 63 Conn. 388, 
 Dec. 484; Nevling v. Com. 98 Pa. 323; 28 Atl. 572; State v. Fairo, 1 Marv. 
 Cora. V. Piatt, 11 Phila. 4?;; United (Del.) 492, 41 At.1. 134; State v. Di 
 States V. Forbes, Crabbe, 558, Fed. Cas. Guglielmo, 4 Penn. ;r>o].) 336 55 All. 
 No. 15,129. And see the State v. Dilla- 350; Garner v. Stats, 28 Fla.' 113, 29 
 hunt, 3 Harr. (Del.) 551. Am. St. Rep. 232, 9 So. 835; Malone v. 
 
 J Jenkins v. State, 93 Ga. 1, 18 S. E. State, 49 Ga. 210; Bartholomew v. Peo- 
 992; Hanvey v. State, 68 Ga. 612; Lan- pie, 104 111. 605, 44 Am. Rep. 97; Booher 
 ergan v. People, 6 Park. Crim. Rep. v. State. 156 Ind. 435. 54 L.R.A. 391, 60 
 209; Ferrell v. State, 43 Tex. 503. N. E. 156; State v. Pasnau, 118 Iowa, 
 
 2 Jenkins v. State, supra; State v. 501, 92 N. W. 682; State v. Mowrv, 37 
 Koerner, 8 N. D. 292, 73 Am. St. Rep. Kan. 369, 15 Pac. 282; Keeton v. Com. 
 752, 78 N. W. 981; Ferrell v. State, su- 92 Ky. 522, 18 S. W. 359; State v. Tri- 
 pra. vas, 32 La. Ann. 1086 36 A-n. Ren. 293; 
 
 3People V. Harris, 29 Cal. 678; Pig- People v. Walker, 38 Mich. 156; State v. 
 
808 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 [§ 544 
 
 toxication may be considered in determining the motive or intent in 
 cases of crimes divided into degrees.^ Thiis, drunl?:enness may pro- 
 duce a state of mind in v^hich one is incapable of entertaining or 
 forming a design to take life. ^ And it may be taken into considera- 
 tion in determining the purpose, motive, and intent in the commis- 
 sion of the act,* and as bearing upon the existence or nonexistence 
 of malice.^ And an instruction as to manslaughter is not erroneous 
 in a prosecution for homicide, where there was evidence that the 
 accused had been drinking heavily and was drunk at the time of 
 the killing, and no motive for the killing is shown.® Wor is an in- 
 
 Garvey, 11 Minn. 154, Gil. 95; Kelly v. 
 State, 3 Smedes & M. 518; O'Grady v. 
 State, 36 Neb. 320, 54 N. W. 556; Peo- 
 ple V. Leonardi, 143 N. Y. 360, 38 N. E. 
 372; Swan v. State, 4 Humph. 136; Seott 
 V. State, 12 Tex. App. 31; Hempton v. 
 State, 111 Wis. 127, 86 N. W. 596; Gus- 
 tavenson v. State, 10 Wyo. 300, 68 Pae. 
 1006; Reg. v. Monkhouse, 4 Cox, C. C. 
 55. And see also State v. Cather, 121 
 Iowa, 106, 96 N. W. 722. 
 
 sPeople V. Odell, 1 Dak. 197, 46 N. 
 W. 601; People v. Young, 102 Cal. 411, 
 36 Pac. 770; State v. Williams, 122 
 Iowa, 115, 97 N. W. 992; O'Grady v. 
 State, supra; Wilson v. State, 60 N. J. 
 L. 171, 37 Atl. 954, 38 Atl. 428; Unit- 
 ed States V. Meagher, 37 Fed. 875; Reg. 
 V. Gamlen, 1 Post. & P. 90. And see 
 People V. Belencia, 21 Cal. 544; Conley 
 V. Com. 98 Ky. 125, 32 S. W. 285; Kriel 
 V. Com. 5 Bush, 363; Smith v. Com. 1 
 Duv. 224. 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution 
 for murder in the language of Cal. Pen. 
 Code, § 22, that no act committed by a 
 person while in a state of intoxication 
 is less criminal by reason of his having 
 been in such a condition, would be er- 
 roneous if given alone, because of the 
 omission of that portion of the section 
 which qualified it in cases in which the 
 actual existence of an intention is a 
 necessary element in the offense, but is 
 proper where the whole section is given, 
 if the information includes the ofi^ense 
 of manslaughter, to which that part is 
 applicable. People v. Lane, 100 Cal. 379, 
 34 Pac. 856. 
 
 3Fonville v. State, 91 Ala. 39, 8 So. 
 688; Morrison v. State, 84 Ala. 405, 4 
 So. 402 ; State v. Smith, 49 Conn. 376 ; 
 Kelly V. State, 3 Smedes & M. 518. 
 
 4 People V. Cassiano, 30 Hun, 388; 
 Rogers v. People, 3 Park. Crim Rep. 
 633 ; People v. Eastwood, 14 N. Y. 562 ; 
 
 Lanergan v. People, 50 Barb. 266; Peo- 
 ple V. Hammill, 2 Park. Crim. Rep. 
 223; People v. Methever, 132 Cal. 326, 
 64 Pac. 481; People v. King, 27 Cal. 
 507, 87 Am. Dec. 95; People v. Nichol, 
 34 Cal. 211; People v. Kloss, 115 Cal. 
 567, 47 Pac. 459; Jenkins v. State, 93 
 Ga. 1, 18 S. E. 992; Aszman v. State, 123 
 Ind. 347, 8 L.R.A. 33, 24 N. E. 123; 
 State V. Williams, 122 Iowa, 115, 97 
 N. W. 992; State v. Pasnau, 118 Iowa, 
 501, 92 N. W. 682; State v. Roan, 122 
 Iowa, 136, 97 N. W. 997; Keeton v. Com. 
 92 Ky. 522, 18 S. W. 359; Kelly v. State, 
 supra; United States v. Meagher, su- 
 pra. And see Jones v. State, 29 6a. 594 ; 
 Golliher v. Com. 2 Duv. 163, 87 Am. 
 Dec. 493. 
 
 BFord v. State, 71 Ala. 385; State 
 V. Johnson, 40 Conn. 136; Wilkerson v. 
 Com. 88 Ky. 29, 9 S. W. 836; Shanna- 
 han V. Com. 8 Bush, 464, 8 Am. Rep. 
 466 ; Blimm v. Com. 7 Bush, 320 ; Bishop 
 V. Com. 109 Ky. 558, 60 S. W. 190; Gol- 
 liher V. Com. supra ; Seaborn v. Com. 25 
 Ky. L. Rep. 2203, 80 S. W. 223; Moon 
 V. State, 68 Ga. 687; Kelly v. State, 
 supra. 
 
 In Nichols v. State, 8 Ohio St. 435, 
 however, it was held that the intoxica- 
 tion of a person at the time of commit- 
 ting a homicide has nothing to do with 
 the question of malice. 
 
 sHenderson v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 
 1985, 72 S. W. 781. 
 
 But refusal to instruct that, if the 
 accused was intoxicated when the homi- 
 cide with which he was charged wa^ 
 committed, they might take the fact of 
 intoxication into consideration in de- 
 termining the degree of punishment 
 which should be inflicted, if erroneous, 
 is not prejudicial where a conviction 
 was had for manslaughter only. Lanck- 
 ton V. United States, 18 App. D. C. 348. 
 
§ 544] INSANITY AND DEUNKENNESS. 809 
 
 struction in a prosecution for homicide, not dealing with the testi- 
 mony, but simply pointing out the distinctions which the law makes 
 with reference to responsibility between the different degrees of 
 intoxication, directing the jury to use great caution not to give im- 
 munity to persons who commit crimes while inflamed by intoxicat- 
 ing drink, objectionable as indicating the court's opinion that the 
 crime in question was committed when the accused was capable of 
 forming an intent to take life.^ But though drunkenness is a cir- 
 cumstance tending to show absence of malice in homicide, it should 
 not be singled out from the other proof and laid before the jury 
 with the statement that it mitigates the offense.® 
 
 Homicide committed when the accused was so intoxicated that 
 no intent to commit the crime of murder could have existed, however, 
 not being miirder in the first degTee, is either manslaughter or mur- 
 der in the second degree.^ Intoxication cannot operate as an en- 
 tire exemption from criminal responsibility,'" and it is not con- 
 chisive against the existence of a criminal intent. ^^ At the utmost 
 it only extenuates the crime from murder to manslaughter, ■'^ ^ and 
 it does not do this, as matter of law.'^ Whether the accused was 
 so intoxicated as to render him incapable of entertaining the spe- 
 cific intent necessary to constitute the crime is a question of fact 
 for the jury. ' * And it will be presumed, in the absence of proof 
 
 7State V. Hawkins, 23 Wash. 289, 63 S. E. 315. And see People v. Methever, 
 Pac. 258. 132 Cal. 326, 64 Pac. 481. 
 
 sShannahan v. Com. 8 Buah, 464, 8 In Thomas v. State, 47 Fla. 99, 36 So. 
 Am. Rep. 465. 161, it was held that voluntary intoxi- 
 
 And refusal to instruct the jury in cation not resulting in a fixed or set- 
 a prosecution jPor homicide that in fix- tied frenzy of insanity, either permanent 
 ing the grade of the crime evidence of or intermittent, does not excuse or jus- 
 intoxication i8 proper, and must be care- tify any degree of unlawful homicide 
 fully weighed, is not error where the below murder in the first degree, 
 jury were required to weigh carefully n State v. White, 14 Kan. 538; State 
 all the evidence in the case, but were v. Avery, 44 N. H. 392. 
 told that they themselves must deter- isBlimm v. Com. supra. And see 
 mine its importance. People v. Kemm- Thomas v. State, supra. 
 ler, 119 N. Y. 580, 24 N. E. 9. is State v. Johnson, 40 Conn. 136; 
 
 sRogers v. People, 3 Park. Orim. Rep. White v. State, 103 Ala. 72, 16 So. 63; 
 633; People v. Lane, 100 Cal. 379, 34 State v. Ashley, 45 La. Ann. 1036, 13 So. 
 Pac. 856; Tidwell v. State, 70 Ala. 33; 738. And see State v. White, 14 Kan. 
 Cook v. State (Fla.) 35 So. 665; Smith 538. 
 
 V. State, 4 Neb. 277; State v. Martin, Evidence of drunkenness can only be 
 4 N. J. L. J. 252, 3 Crim. L. Mag. 44 ; considered in a prosecution for homicide 
 Com. V. Baker, 11 Phila. 631; Tucker for the purpose of determining the de- 
 V. United States, 151 U. S. 164, 38 L. gree of the crime, and for this purpose 
 ed. 112, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 299. And see it must be received with great caution. 
 State V. Corrivau, 93 Minn. 38, 100 N. People v. Lewis, 36 Cal. 531. 
 W. 638. i4United States v. Meagher, 37 Fed, 
 
 loKriel v. Com. 5 Eusih, 363; Blimm 879; Chatham v. State, 92 Ala. 47, 9 So. 
 V. Com. 7 Bush, 320; Cleveland v. State, 607; Armor v. State, 63 Ala. 176; King 
 86 Ala. 1, 5 So. 426; State v. Martin, v. State, 90 Ala. 612. 8 So. 856; State 
 supra; State v. Wilson, 104 N. C. 868, 10 v. Smith, 49 Conn. 376; People v. Mills, 
 
810 HOIVUCIDE. [§ 54-i 
 
 to the contrary, that the accused, though intoxicated, intended the 
 actual consequences of his acts.^^ And the burden rests with the 
 accused to show that he was so intoxicated as to be incapable of 
 forming any intent/" 
 
 The rule has been asserted, however, that voluntary intoxication 
 cannot reduce a homicide which would have been murder if com- 
 mitted by a sober man, to manslaughter. ^ '^ Murder in the second 
 degree rests upon implied malice, and the jury may find the exist- 
 ence of implied malice which will subject the accused to a charge 
 of murder in that degree, though his intoxication was such as dis- 
 proved express malice. ' * But as between murder in the second de- 
 gree and manslaughter under this rule, drunkenness of the offender 
 forms no legitimate matter of inquiry; the killing being voluntary, 
 tlie offense is necessarily murder in the second degree, unless the 
 provocation was of such a character as would, at common law, reduce 
 the crime to manslaughter, for which latter offense a drunken man 
 is equally responsible with a sober man. ^ ^ 
 
 545. Degree necessary to affect intent — It is the intent, and not the 
 motive, with which the homicide is committed which is the test 
 of the criminal responsibility of the perpetrator in determining the 
 degree of his guilt. ■' And the drunkenness which will reduce homi- 
 cide from murder to manslaughter must be of such a character and 
 extent as to render the perpetrator incapable of entertaining or form- 
 ing a design to take life.^ It must have been such as to result in 
 a fixed mental disease of some duration,'^ or such as to effect a 
 temporary destruction of the reason; mere nervous excitement not 
 being sufiicient,* even though the excitement amounted to a frenzy.^ 
 The mere fact that one was intoxicated, and that he was induced 
 to conceive a design to kill more readily because of his intoxication, 
 
 98N. Y. 176; Cook V. Territory, 3 Wyo. GiUooley v. State, 58 Ind. 182; Rob- 
 110, 4 Pac. 887. erts v. People, 19 Mich. 401; Hempton 
 
 isSmurr v. State, 88 Ind. S04; People v. State, 111 Wis. 127, 86 N W 5!)G 
 V. Fish, 125 N. Y. 130, 26 N. E. 319; But unless the jury in a prosecution 
 Friery v. People, 54 Barb. 319. for murder are satisiRed beyond a rea- 
 
 1 estate v. Corrivau, 93 Minn. 38, 100 sonable doubt that the accused was so 
 N. W. 038. free from intoxication that he could 
 
 i7Bro\vn v. State, 4 Tex. App. 275; form an intention maliciously to kill, 
 Hanvey v. State, 68 Ga. 612; Com. v. and did form such an intention, they 
 Piatt, 11 Phila. 415. cannot convict him of a higher crime 
 
 isState V. .Johnson, 41 Conn. 584. than manslaughter. Smith v. State 4 
 
 isState V. Robinson, 20 W. Va. 713. 43 Neb. 277. 
 Am. Rep. 799; Wilson v. State, 60 N. sLancrgan v. People, 6 Park Crim 
 J. L. 171, 37 Atl. 954. 38 Atl. 42s. Rep. 203; Gillooley v. State, supra. 
 
 iState V. Hansen, 25 Or. 391, 35 Pac. ■iCusat v. State, 40 Ark 511- Walker 
 970, 30 Pac. 290; Reg. v. Di.xon, 11 Cox, v. State, 91 Ala. 76, 9 So. 87. 
 C. C. 341. sFNnigan v. People, 86 N. Y. 554, 40 
 
 2King V. State, 90 Ala. 612, 8 So. 850; Am. Rep. 556. 
 
§ 545] INSANITY AND DRUNKENNESS. 811 
 
 is of no effect. ® And one who, though intoxicated, knows what he is 
 doing, and selects the means naturally adapted to his purpose, and 
 kills his victim by such means, will be deemed capable of entertain- 
 ing an intent, and is responsible for his acts in the same manner, 
 and to the same extent, as if he were sober ; '^ as, for example, kill- 
 ing -with a deadly weapon,^ or killing by mixing poison with one's 
 drink or food. ® And it has been held that one who was sober enough 
 to intend to shoot at another, end who actually did shoot at and 
 hit him, without provocation or justification, must be deemed to 
 have been sober enough to form a specific intent to murder.^" 
 
 546. Intoxication as affecting deliberation and premeditation. — In- 
 toxication, though involuntary, is to be considered by the jury in 
 a prosecution for murder in the first degree, in which a premeditated 
 design to effect death is essential, with reference to its effect upon 
 the ability of the accused at the time to form and entertain such 
 a design;* not because, per se, it either excuses or mitigates the 
 
 •"Warner v. State. 56 N. J. L. 686, 44 such a character that the assailant's 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 415, 29 Atl. 505. mental faculties were so far overcome or 
 
 And refusal to instruct in a murder stuDefled as to render him Incapable of 
 case that if the defendant was so intox- distinguishing between right and wrong. 
 icated that his drunken condition was iPeople v. Nichol, 34 Cal. 212; Peo- 
 observable, it is important on the ques- pie v. Belencia, 21 Cal. 544; People v. 
 tion of his capacity to form an intent to Williams, 43 Cal. 344; State v. John- 
 commit the deed, is not error, where the son, 40 Conn. 136; Garner v. State, 28 
 court had previously instructed that m- T^l". n.''. 29 Am. St. Eep. 232, 9 So. 
 toxieation might destroy capacity to 835 ; Golden v. State, 25 Ga. 527 ; Jones 
 form an intent to kill. State v. Smith, v. State, 29 Ga. 594; Aszman v. State, 
 49 Conn. 376. 123 Ind. 347, 8 L.R.A. 33, 24 N. E. 123 ; 
 
 'Roberta v. People, 19 Mich. 401; State v. Williams, 122 Iowa. 115. 97 N. 
 
 State V. Gut, 13 Minn. 343, Gil. 315; W. 992; State v. O'Neil, 51 Kan. 651 24 
 
 Warner v. State, 56 N. J. L. 686, 44 Am. L.R.A. 555, 33 Pae. 287; State v. Mowry, 
 
 St. Rep. 415, 29 Atl. 505; People v. Ham- 37 Kan. 369. 15 Pac. 282; Buckhanndn 
 
 mill, 2 Park. Grim. Rep. 223; People v. Com. 86 Ky. 110, 5 S. W. 358; Cum' 
 
 V. Jones, 2 Edm. Sel. Cas. 88; State v. v. Com. 2 Bush, 67: Golliher v. Coni. 
 
 Tatro. 50 Vt. 483; Reg. v. Dixon, 11 2 Duv. 164, 87 Am. Dec. 493; State v. 
 
 Cox. C. C. 341. Corrivau, 93 Minn. 38, 100 N. W. 638; 
 
 8Lanergan v. People, 50 Barb. 266; Hill v. State, 42 Neb. 503, 60 N. W 
 
 Rex T. Meakin. 7 Car. & P. 297. 916; Sehlencker v. State, 9 Neb. 241, 1 
 
 sPeonle v. Robinson, 2 Park. Crim. N. W. 857; Smith v. State, 4 Neb. 277; 
 
 Rep. 235. People v. Batting, 49 How. Pr. 392; 
 
 loEstes V. State, 55 Ga. 30. People v. Conroy, 2 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 
 
 So, in Marshall v. State, 59 Ga. 154, 247; Pigman v. State, 14 Ohio^ 555, 45 
 
 it was held that one who can voluntarily Am. Dec. 558; State v. Zorn, 22 Or. 
 
 shoot is capable of entertaining, and 591, 30 Pac. 317; State v. Weaver, 35 
 
 acting from, malice, unless he can Or. 415, 58 Pac. 109; Cartwright v. 
 
 plead some infirmity besides drunken- State, 8 Lea, 381 ; Pirtle v. State, 9 
 
 ness; and that in order to be too drunk Humph. 6S3; Haile v. State, 11 Humph, 
 
 to form an intent to kill, he must be too 154; Swan a-. State, 4 Humnh. 136; Nor- 
 
 drunk to shoot. fleet v. State. 4 Sneed, 345: Avres v. 
 
 And in Brown v. State, 142 Ala. 287, Stnte (Tex. Crim. App.) 26 S. W. 396; 
 
 38 So. 288, it was held that voluntary Clore v. State. 26 Tex. App. 624, 10 S. 
 
 drunkenness, to be available to dis- W. 24"^; Williams v. State. 25 Tex. 
 
 prove an intent to murder in the mak- App. 76, 7 S. W. 661 ; Charles v. State, 
 
 ing of an assault, must have been of 13 Tex. App. 658; McCarty v. State, 4 
 
812 HOMICIDE. [§ 546 
 
 crime, but because, in connection with other facts, an absence of 
 malice or premeditation may appear.^ Drunkenness as evidence 
 of want of premeditation or deliberation is not within the rule which 
 excludes it as an excuse for crime.* And a person who commits 
 a crime while so drunk as to be incapable of forming a deliberate 
 and premeditated design to kill is not guilty of murder in the first 
 degree. ^ 
 
 The influence of intoxication upon the question of the existence 
 of premeditation, however, depends upon its degree, and its effect 
 on the mind and passions.^ No inference of the absence of de- 
 liberation and premeditation arises from intoxication, as a matter of 
 law. ® And intoxication cannot serve as an excuse for the offender ; '' 
 and it should be received with great caution, even for the purpose 
 of reducing the crime to a lower degree.* Nor does intoxication 
 form a legitimate matter of inquiry as between murder in the second 
 degree and manslaughter, unless the provocation was such as would, 
 
 Tex. App. 468; Colbath v. State, 4 Tex. And a conviction of murder in the 
 
 App. 76; Brown v. State, 4 Tex. App. first degree ia not warranted where 
 
 275 ; Colbath v. State, 2 Tex. App. 391 ; death was inflicted in a conflict, while 
 
 Willis V. Com. 32 Gratt. 929; State v. the defendant was excited by liquor, in 
 
 Robinson, 20 W. Va. 713, 43 Am. Kep. the absence of evidence tending to show 
 
 799; State v. Hertzog, 55 W. Va. 74, that after the conflict began, and before 
 
 46 S. E. 792; Cross v. State, 55 Wis. the stabbing, there might have been an 
 
 261, 12 N. W. 425; Gustavenson v. State, instant of time for deliberation and pre- 
 
 10 Wyo. 300, 68 Pac. 1006; Hopt v. meditation. State v. Sopher, 70 Iowa, 
 
 Utah, 104 U. S. 631, 26 L. ed. 873; Eex 494, 30 N. W. 917. 
 
 v. Grindley, 1 Russell, Crimes, 2d Am. BGolliher v. Com. 2 Duv. 164, 87 Am. 
 
 ed. *8. But see Rex v. Carroll, 7 Car. Dec. 493. 
 
 & P. 145. And an instruction that, if the mind 
 
 zBuckhamion v. Com. supra; Peo- of the accused was so weakened and dis- 
 
 ple V. King, 27 Cal. 507, 87 Am. Dec. eased from the continued use of in- 
 
 95; State v. Johnson, and Hill v. State, toxicants as to prevent him from de- 
 
 supra. liberating on the act he committed, ho 
 
 sPeople V. Belencia, 21 Cal. 544; State should be found guilty of murder in the 
 
 V. Williams, 122 Iowa, 115, 97 N. W. second degree, is properly refused in a 
 
 992; Cartwright v. State, 8 Lea, 377; prosecution for homicide where there 
 
 State V. Robinson, sMpro; State v. Davis, was no evidence indicating a weakened 
 
 52 W. Va. 224, 43 S. E. 99; Gustavenson or diseased mind, or to show the extent 
 
 V. State, supra. of his use of intoxicating liquors. State 
 
 4Com. V. Perrier, 3 Phila. 229; Com. v. Brown, 181 Mo. 192, 79 S W. 1111. 
 
 V. Cleary, 148 Pa. 26, 23 Atl. 1110; Mc- ePeople v. Mills, 98 N. Y. 176; O'Brien 
 
 Ginnis v. Com. 102 Pa. 66; Com. v. Du- v. People, 48 Barb. 274; State v. Avery, 
 
 dash, 204 Pa. 124, 53 Atl. 756; Com. v. 44 N. H. 392; Com. v. M'Fall, Addison 
 
 Piatt, 11 Phila. 421; Com. v. Hart, 2 (Pa.) 257; Cook v. Territory, 3 Wyo. 
 
 Brewst. (Pa.) 546; Com. v. Baker, 11 110, 4 Pac. 887. And see People v. Wil- 
 
 Phila. 631. Hams, 43 Cal. 344; People v. Belencia, 
 
 Homicide committed without provo- 21 Cal. 544. 
 
 cation, but while so intoxicated as to 'People v. Fuller, 2 Park. Crim. Rep. 
 
 render the person incapable of doing a 16; State v. Johnson, 40 Conn. 136. 
 
 deliberate or premeditated act, is mur- sPeople v. Vincent, 95 Cal. 425, 30 
 
 der in the second degree. Boswell v. Pac. 581; People v. Belencia, supra. 
 Cora. 20 Gratt. 860; State v. Robinson, 
 supra. 
 
5 546] INSANITY AND DRUNKENNESS. 813 
 
 at common law, reduce the degree of the crime to manslaughter;® 
 or unless it existed to such an extent as to render the person incapable 
 of forming a purpose or of intending the act.^** 
 
 The question whether intoxication has incapacitated a person to 
 form a premeditated design to kill is one for the jury.^^ And so 
 is the question as to the weight to which the evidence is entitled. ^ ^ 
 And drunkenness on the part of the accused in a prosecution for 
 murder in the first degree should be submitted to the jury, what- 
 ever its degree. ^^ But when so submitted the court may properly 
 instruct the jury as to what might amount to deliberation and pre- 
 meditation on the part of the accused.^* And the court should 
 instruct the jury as to the effect of intoxication to a degree sufficient 
 to render the accused incapable of forming a premeditated design 
 to kill. 15 
 
 547. Degree necessary to affect deliberation and premeditation. — 
 Murder in the first degree, involving malice and premeditation, can- 
 not be committed by one who is incapacitated to think deliberately 
 and determine rationally as to the quality, character, and conse- 
 quences of the act; and intoxication sufficient to deprive a person of 
 the power to see and weigh the nature of the act charged is siiffi- 
 cient to reduce the homicide from murder in the first, to murder in 
 the second, degree. ^ The test of responsibility in such case is 
 
 sPeople T. Langton, 67 Cal. 427, 7 Pac. iBGarner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 29 Am. 
 
 843 ; People v. Nichol, 34 Cal. 211 ; State St. Rep. 232, 9 So. 835. 
 
 V. Robinson, 20 W. Va. 713, 43 Am. Rep. But an instruction that if the de- 
 
 799 ; Davis v. State, 25 Ohio St. 369 ; f endant committed the homicide in ques- 
 
 State V. Weaver, 35 Or. 415, 58 Pac. 109; tion under the influence of intoxication, 
 
 Pirtle V. State, 9 Humph. 663; Norfleet or the effect of previous habits of in- 
 
 V. State, 4 Sneed, 345 ; Gustavenson v. toxication, and if the intoxication or the 
 
 State, 10 Wyo. 300, 68 Pac. 1006; Rex effect was not such as would negative 
 
 V. Carroll, 7 Car. & P. 145. the legal inference of malice implied by 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution law from the character and eircum- 
 
 for murder, that if the accused, when he stances of the act, and the want of 
 
 fired the fatal shot, was intoxicated the provocation, he should be found guilty 
 
 jury may consider that fact in de- of murder in the second degree, is 
 
 termining whether he acted in passion erroneous as a charge on the sufficiency 
 
 and heat of blood, or from excitement and weight of evidence. Gwatkin v. 
 
 from a blow he had received, or without Com. 9 Leigh, 678, 33 Am. Deo. 264. 
 
 malice, is properly refused. Morrison lAszman v. State, 123 Ind. 347, 8 
 
 V. State, 84 Ala. 405, 4 So. 402. L.R.A. 33, 24 N. E. 123; Jones v. Com. 
 
 loDavis v. State, supra. And see 75 Pa. 403; Com. v. Cleary, 148 Pa. 26, 
 
 Keenan v. Com. 44 Pa. 55, 84 Am. Dec. 23 Atl. 1110; Com. v. Hart, 2 Brewst. 
 
 414. (Pa.) 546 ; Com. v. Perrier, 3 Phila. 229 ; 
 
 iiCom. V. M'Fall, Addison (Pa.) 255; State v. Davis, 9 Houst. (Del.) 407, 33 
 
 King v. State, 90 Ala. 612, 8 So. 856; Atl. 55; Ayres v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 State V. Smith, 49 Conn. 376; King v. App.) 26 S. W. 396; MeCarty v. State, 
 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 64 S. W. 245. 4 Tex. App. 461; Willis v. Com. 32 
 
 12 People V. Belencia, 21 Cal. 544. Gratt. 929; Boswell v. Com. 20 Gratt. 
 
 isLancaster v. State, 2 Lea, 575. 860; State v. Robinson, 20 W. Va. 713, 
 
 i4People V. Williams, 43 Cal. 344. 
 
8U HOMICIDE. [§ 647 
 
 the question whetlier the accused was, at the time, rendered in- 
 capable of forming an intent and exercising the deliberation and 
 premeditation which were necessary to the commission of the crime. ^ 
 To warrant a finding of the absence of the necessary degree of de- 
 liberation or premeditation to constitute murder in the first degree, 
 however, the intoxication need not go to the extent of depriving 
 the person of volition, or the ability to form an intent.* And the 
 fact that a person was sober enough to form an intent raises no 
 presumption that he was sober enough to form a premeditated de- 
 sign to kill.* But no intoxication which does not render the per- 
 son charged utterly incapable of free motive will shield him.® And 
 to reduce homicide from murder in the first, to murder in the second, 
 degree, it must be such as to deprive the slayer of the power of 
 judging of his acts and their legitimate consequences." And one 
 who is drunk may act with deliberation and premeditation, as well 
 as one who is sober, and in such case is equally responsible.' Vol- 
 untary intoxication, in the absence of such incapacity resulting there- 
 from as renders the intoxicated person incapable of thinking de- 
 liberately, or determining rationally upon the purpose of taking 
 human life, and which leaves him full power to know the quality 
 of his act, and to abstain from doing it, cannot reduce murder in 
 the first degree to a lower degree of homicide.* 
 
 548. Intoxication as affecting provocation and hot blood. — ^Whether 
 a person committing a homicide was sober or intoxicated cannot affect 
 the question of the existence or the nonexistence of such an adequate 
 cause or provocation as might reduce the offense from murder to 
 
 43 Am. Eep. 799. And see State v. an intelligent and true account of it at 
 
 Bowen, Houst. Crim. Eep. (Del.) 91. the trial, must be held responsible for 
 
 2Territory v. Davis, 2 Ariz. 59, 10 his conduct. Territory v. Franklin, 2 
 
 Pac. 359; Gilraore v. State, 126 Ala. 20, N. M. 307. 
 
 28 So. 595; State v. McDaniel, 115 N. C. 'People v. Belencia, 21 Cal. 544; Peo- 
 
 807, 20 S. E. 622; Nevling v. Com. 98 pie v. Williams, 43 Cal. 344; State v. 
 
 Pa. 323; Bernliardt v. State, 82 Wis. 2.3, Bullock, 13 Ala. 417; State v. Hansen, 
 
 51 N. W. 1009. 25 Or. 391, 35 Pac. 976, 36 Pac. 296; 
 
 sPeople V. Leonardi, 143 N. Y. 360, Com. v. McGowan, 189 Pa. 641, 69 Am. 
 
 38 N. E. 372; Mclntyre v. People, 38 St. Eep. 836, 42 Atl. 365 ; State v. Tatro, 
 
 111. 514. 50 Vt. 483; Honesty v. Com. 81 Va. 283; 
 
 ■iGarner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 29 Am. State v. Douglass, 28 W. Va. 297; State 
 
 St. Eep. 232, 9 So. 835. v. Eobinson, 20 W. Va. 713, 43 Am. Rep. 
 
 BCluck V. State, 40 Ind. 263; State v. 799; Eex v. Thomas, 7 Car. & P. 817. 
 Bullock, 13 Ala. 413; State v. Davis, 9 sAszinan v. State, 123 Ind. 347. 8 
 
 Houst. (Del.) 407, ^3 Atl. 55; Kenney L.E.A. 3.3, 24 N. E. 123: People v. Fish, 
 
 V. People, 27 How. Pr. 206. 125 N. Y. 136, 26 N. E. 319; State v. 
 
 «Coni. V. Crozier, 1 Brewst. (Pa.) 349. McDaniel, 115 N. C. 807, 20 S. E. 622; 
 
 An intoxicated person who at the time Keenan v. Com. 44 Pa. 55, 84 Am. Dec. 
 
 oi" committing a homicide was conscious 414. 
 
 of, and understood, what was done and One who was sober enough to force 
 
 said by himself and others, so as to give his way into a building where hi? in- 
 
§ 648] INSANITY AND DRUNKENNESS. 815 
 
 manslaughter.^ And a murder committed by a drunken man from 
 sudden passion, imagining a provocation when there was none, or 
 when it was not adequate, at a time when the offender was not in a 
 frame of mind to deliberate and premeditate, is murder in the aecond 
 degree.^ 
 
 V/here a person committing a homicide has received a provocation, 
 hoVever, which, if acted upon instantly, would mitigate the offense 
 of a sober man, evidence of intoxication may be considered in de- 
 termining whether the killing was due to the provocation or malice, 
 and whether it was done in the heat of passion, or with a deliberate 
 purpose or otherwise, and generally to explain his conduct.'^ And 
 the jury may consider the drunkenness of a person accused of homi- 
 cide in grading the act, not to excuse, mitigate, or extenuate it, but 
 to assist in deciding whether the intention to kill preceded the provo- 
 cation, or was produced by it.* The principle is that, where an 
 encounter was sudden and the accused, prior to such encounter, had 
 no malice or grudge, intoxication at the time of the encounter may 
 be taken into consideration to ascertain whether he acted from 
 malice or from sudden passion, and whether the act done was spe- 
 cifically intended; but if malice or specific intent to do the act is 
 proved aliunde, then intoxication at the time does not lower the 
 grade of the offense.' Drunkenness will not change the grade of 
 an offense, unless the evidence suggests some motive for the act to be 
 compared by the jury with the state's theory of a malicious intent, 
 and in the absence of such suggestion no charge with reference to 
 
 tended victim was, and follow him from Rog-ers, 18 N. Y. 9^ 72 Am. Dec. 484; 
 
 room to room, and provide himself with Eastwood v. People, 3 Park. Crim. Rep. 
 
 a murderous weapon, and to announce 25; State v. McCants, 1 Speers L. 3Sfl; 
 
 his intentions, and finally to execute CaW.wright v. State, 8 Lea, 377; Rex 
 
 his pui-pose by a repetition of fatal v. Thomas, 7 Car. & P. 817; Reg. v. 
 
 blows, and to plan and execute an ira- Monkhouse, 4 Cox, C. C. 55. 
 mediate escape, was not sufBciently in- A lesser provocation might suddenly 
 
 toxicated to reduce the grade of his of- heat and blird a man with an^ry pas- 
 
 fense. Kenry v. People, 31 N. Y. 330. sior while intoxicated than whife sober, 
 
 iGaitan v. State, 11 Tex. App. 544; and for that reason intoxication may be 
 
 Mclntyre v. People, 3S 111. 514; Com. ernsidered in determining the nue?tion 
 
 V. Hawkins, 3 Gray, 463; Vann v. State, of mnliee, with a view to reducing a 
 
 83 Gn. 44, 9 S. E. 945; Xeenan v. Com. homicide by him from murder to man- 
 
 44 Pa. 55j 84 Am. Dec. 414. slaughter. State v. Hurley, Houst. 
 
 Where a killing was unprovoked, the Crim. Rep. (Del.) 28. 
 fact that the perpetrator was intoxieat- 4Jones v. State, 29 Ga. 594. And see 
 
 ed cannot be allowed to affect the legal Kelly v. Com. 1 Grant, Cas. 484. 
 character of the act. Friery v. People, 5 See S"haller v. State, 14 Mo. 502; 
 
 64 Barb. 319. Rex v. Thomas, supra. And see also 
 
 2Willis v. Com. 32 Gratt. 929. Wharton, Crim.' Law, 8th ed. §§ S4 et 
 
 3 Jones V. State, 29 Ga. 594: State v. seq. 
 Mullen, 14 La. Ann. 577; People v. 
 
816 HOMICIDE. [§ 548 
 
 drunkenness as a separate element in grading the offense need be 
 given. ® 
 
 549. Intoxication as affecting self-defense. — ^Voluntary drunkenness 
 or intoxication does not enlarge the right of self-defense, and it is 
 not available as a defense to a charge of murder, when, in conse- 
 quence thereof, the accused acted upon an exaggerated or unjusti- 
 fiable belief as to the necessity for taking the life of another in de- 
 fense of his own. ^ And one who kills another believing he is acting 
 in self-defense, but who errs in determining whether his peril is 
 imminent, his error being due to the fact that he is intoxicated, is 
 negligent in forming his belief and will be guilty of manslaughter, 
 since negligent homicide is manslaughter.^ The intoxication of a 
 person committing homicide alleged to be in self-defense, however, 
 may be considered on the question whether the apprehended danger 
 was sufficient to justify the act.^ And intoxication may be consid- 
 ered in determining whether the accused acted under a bona fide 
 apprehension that his person or property was about to be attacked.* 
 Nor is a person bound to stand by and see a brother or near relative 
 killed or suffer great bodily harm, because the brother was so drunk 
 as not to know his duty to retreat and get out of the way of 
 bodily harm, or as to be physically unable to retreat. ^ 
 
 550. Texas statute as to intoxication. — There is a statutory pro- 
 vision in Texas that neither intoxication nor temporary insanity 
 produced by the voluntary recent use of ardent spirits shall constitute 
 an excuse for the commission of crime; nor shall intoxication miti- 
 gate either the degree or the penalty of a crime; but evidence of 
 temporary insanity produced by such use of ardent spirits may be 
 introduced in mitigation of the penalty, and, in cases of murder, 
 to determine the degree. The effect of this provision is to eliminate 
 mere intoxication as a defense in a criminal prosecution, regard- 
 less of the constituent elements of the crime, and to prevent tem- 
 porary insanity produced by intoxication from being a defense, ex- 
 cept in the way of establishing the degree in murder cases, and 
 of mitigating or lessening the penalty in other cases. ^ And under 
 it, mere intoxication from the recent use of ardent spirits will not 
 excuse or mitigate the degree of the crime, unless the intoxication 
 
 6Estes v. State, 55 6a. 30. ^Marshall's Case, supra. 
 
 iSpringfield v. State, 98 Ala. 81, 38 estate v. Greer, 22 W. Va. 800. 
 
 Am. St. Eep. 85, 11 So. 250. lEvers v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 zUnited States v. King, 34 Fed. 302. 318, 18 L.R.A. 421, 37 Am. St. Rep. 811, 
 
 sReg. V. Gamlen, 1 Fost. & F. 90 ; Rex 20 S. W. 744 ; Lyle v. State, 31 Tex. 
 
 V. Thomas, 7 Car. & P. 817; Marshall's Crim. Rep. 103, 19 S. W. 903; Williams 
 
 Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 76; State v. Roan, v. State, 25 Tex. App. 76, 7 S. W. 661. 
 122 Iowa, 136, 97 N. W. 997. 
 
§ 536] INSANITY AND DRUNKENNESS. 801 
 
 and dninkeimess wtich are particularly affected by the fact that the 
 criminal act sought to be excused is homicide are here considered. 
 
 II. Insanity. 
 
 537. General rtiles — There is hardly a principle of law -with refer- 
 ence to insanity as affecting homicide which does not apply to in- 
 sanity as affecting other crimes in general, and, therefore, hardly 
 a principle which does not belong to the general field of criminal 
 responsibility as affected by insanity, rather than that of homicide. 
 For a consideration of these principles the reader is referred to an- 
 other treatise. ^ A few of the principles of the law of insanity are 
 specially applicable to homicide, and other crimes divided into de- 
 grees, and those principles will be here considered; and as pre- 
 liminary to such consideration the general rules of criminal respon- 
 sibility in cases of insanity may be stated to be that generally a per- 
 son who commits a crime, acting under the impulse of mental dis- 
 ease, is not criminally responsible therefor.^ As to the degree of 
 insanity which will effect this result the test is the question whether 
 the accused was capable of distinguishing right from, wrong with 
 reference to the act which he committed. ^ This rule applies alike to 
 idiocy and general mania,* and to partial insanity or monomania,^ 
 and to insane delusions.® But with reference to insane delusions 
 the person laboring under a particular delusion must be considered 
 in the same situation with relation to criminal responsibility as if 
 the facts with respect to which the delusion existed were real, and 
 criminal responsibility is relieved only when such facts would, if 
 actually existing, have justified the act and rendered it excusable.'^ 
 
 11 Wiarton & S. Med. Jur. 5th ed. can te no such thing as malice without 
 
 chap. 8. mental accountability, and this cannot 
 
 2 See 1 Wharton & S. Med. Jur. 5th coexist with incapacity to distinguish 
 
 ed. § 162. right from wrong. Grissom v. State, 62 
 
 sibid., § 175. Miss. 167. 
 
 A presumption of a want of sanity eSee 1 Wharton & S. Med. Jur. 5th ed. 
 
 will not be indulged in in a prosecution § 183. 
 
 for homicide, because of the enormity The commission of a homicide for the 
 
 of the crime. Singleton v. State, 71 purpose of being hanged shows a morbid 
 
 Miss. 782, 42 Am. St. Rep. 488, 16 So. state of mind only, and not an insane 
 
 295. delusion which will relieve one from 
 
 41 Wharton & S. Med. Jur. 5th ed. criminal responsibility for the act. Reg. 
 
 § 175. V. Burton, 3 Fost. & F. 772. 
 
 Slbid., § 180. ''See 1 Wharton & S. Med. Jur. 5th 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution ed. § 187. 
 
 for homicide that if the accused acted A delusion upon the part of one per- 
 
 with malice he is guilty of murder, son that another was a robber, who 
 
 though he may have labored under par- had entered his house, in which he killed 
 
 tial insanity, is erroneous, since there the supposed robber, is an objective one 
 Horn.— 51 
 
802 HOMICIDE. *(§ 537 
 
 And with reference to irresistible impulse in jurisdictions where 
 it is admitted as a defense to crime, the test as to criminality is 
 whether the accused had sufficient reason to know right from wrong 
 with reference to the act in question, and whether he had sufficient 
 power to control and govern his actions, 'and to resist his morbid 
 inclination to perpetrate the offense. ® 
 
 538. Common-law rule as to effect of partial insanity on degree . 
 
 The old common-law doctrine in this respect is founded on the 
 hypothesis that sanity and insanity are states as clearly and ab- 
 solutely distinguishable as are coverture and non-eoverture ; and 
 that men are either wholly sane, so as to be wholly responsible, or 
 wholly insane, so as to be wholly irresponsible. This principle, how- 
 ever, is now abandoned as based on a psychological untruth. There 
 are many degrees both of sanity and insanity; and the two states 
 approach each other in imperceptible gradations, melting into each 
 other, to adopt an illustration borrowed by Lord Penzance from 
 Burke, as day melts into night. There may, therefore, be phases 
 of mind which cannot be positively spoken of as either sane or in- 
 sane. The only course under such circumstances is to find the de- 
 fendant guilty of the offense in a diminished grade, when the law 
 establishes such grade ; or, when it does not, to inflict on him modi- 
 fied punishment.-' Nor is this view unknown to the law. Such 
 considerations (i. e., those of the defendant's mental constitution) 
 
 as distinguished from a delusion as to compreheiision of right or wrong are 
 
 a matter of opinion, and a good de- unimpaired, but on the other hand he 
 
 fense in a prosecution for the Icilling. inherited a deficiency of moral strength. 
 
 Levett's Case, Cro. Car. 538. His maternal grandfather committed sui- 
 
 But an insane delusion entertained eide, his mother died deranged, and his 
 
 by a convict, that another convict vi'as father was an habitual drunkard. These 
 
 acting as a spy vcith intent to destroy facts Dr. Reinecke thinks are calculat- 
 
 his pl-ins of escape from the prison, does ed to produce in Kullman a want of 
 
 not affect his criminal responsibility for independence in forming opinions, sus- 
 
 killing the other. People v. Taylor, 138 ceptibility to external impressions, cold- 
 
 N. Y. 398, 34 N. E. 275. ness of heart, vanity, and a tendency to 
 
 sSee 1 Wharton & S. Med. Jur. 5th violence. He is, therefore, of opinion 
 
 ed. § 191. that although Kullman may be consid- 
 
 lAn illustration of this principle, as ered an accountable being, his nature, 
 
 it obtains in the German law, is found nevertheless, inherits a morbid dispo- 
 
 in the triil of Kullman, at Berlin, in sition calculated to affect his free will. 
 
 October, 1874. I quote the following The president of the court summed up 
 
 from a cable despatch of October 29, the medical testimony to the effect that 
 
 1874, appearing in the Boston papers at the time of the assassination, as well 
 
 of October 31, 1874: — iis at present, Kullman was accountable 
 
 Berlin, Oct. 29. — The trial of Kull- for his acts to but a limited degree, 
 man waR resumed this morning. Dr. Kullman was found guilty as charged 
 
 Eeinc>.\« testified that he did not con- in the indictment, and sentenced to four- 
 
 sider Kullman a religious or political teen years' imprisonment in the house 
 
 fanatic, or that he possessed a natural of correction, and ten years' suspension 
 
 predisposition to crime; neither was he of his civil rights and police surveil- 
 
 a common muraerer. His powers of lanca. 
 
§ 538] INSANITY AND DRUNKENNESS. 803 
 
 are invoked whenever we have to determine whether a party as- 
 sailed acted bona fide when resorting to violent measares of self- 
 defense. So do we gauge responsibility in cases of sleep-drunken- 
 ness; so do we estimate the conduct of persons when roused by any 
 great political or religious excitement;^ and so we hold in cases of 
 intoxication, when called upon to measure deliberation and intent.^ 
 If, in cases where homicide has been committed during an excitement 
 which the defendant's peculiar psychical state has abnormally pro- 
 tracted and intensified, a verdict of murder in the second degree, or 
 of manslaughter, is given in accordance with these views, a result 
 is reached which not only harmonizes with sound principle, but is 
 far more consistent with the public idea of justice than would be 
 a verdict either of not guilty, or of murder in the first degree.* 
 "Partial insanity may be evidence to disprove the presence of the 
 kind of malice required by the law to constitute the particular crime 
 of which the prisoner is accused."^ 
 
 539. The modem rule. — Under the modern rule on this subject 
 there is not deemed to be any condition intermediate between sanity 
 and insanity which will mitigate crime without excusing it.* And 
 where a person committing a homicide was conscious of what he 
 was doing, and capable of distinguishing between right and wrong, 
 and premeditated the commission of the act, he is guilty of murder 
 in the first degree, though he was deranged.^ Nor can a conviction 
 of a lower degree of crime be had on the theory that the defendant's 
 mind was unsound to a degree rendering him incapable of delibera- 
 tion, where he knew the nature of the act.^ And insanity cannot 
 reduce homicide from murder to manslaughter, unless the provoca- 
 tion was such, at least, as would stir the resentment of a reason- 
 able man.* Evidence of insanity, however, is admissible in such 
 
 2See svpra, chapter IX., § 139. sNevling v. Com. 98 Pa. 323. 
 
 3See Eoberts v. People, 19 Mich. 401. astate v. Kotovsky, supra; State v. 
 
 <See, as illustrating this, McGregor's Holloway, ISO Mo. 222, 56 S. W. 734; 
 
 Case, 23 Am. Jour. Ins. 549. Jarvis v. State, 70 Ark. 613, Appx., 67 
 
 cStephen, Grim. Law, 1863, p. 92. S. W. 76; Osburn v. State, 164 In d 262, 
 
 iSage V. State, 91 Ind. 141; United 73 N. E. 601; Ctom. v. Wireback, 190 Pa. 
 
 States V. Lee, 4 Mackey, 489, 54 Am. 138, 70 Am. St. Rep. 625, 42 Atl. 542; 
 
 Rep. 293; State v. Kotovsky, 11 Mo. Com. v. Hollinger, 190 Pa. 155. 42 Atl. 
 
 App. 584; Sindram v. People. 1 N. Y. 548; Com. v. Earner, 199 Pa.' 335, 49 
 
 Crim. Rep. 448. And see Porter v. Atl. 60; Cornell v. State, 104 Wis 527 80 
 
 State, 140 Ala. 87, 37 So. 81. N. W. 745. 
 
 But an instruction in a. prosecution 4Horton v. United States, 15 App. D. 
 
 for homicide thnt if the accused was in- C. 310: People v. Hurtado, 63 Cal. 288. 
 
 sane at the time of the act the jury And an instruction in a prosecution 
 
 must declare him not guilty, without for homicide that if the defandnnt was 
 
 reference to the degree of insanity, is not insane at the time of the shooting 
 
 too broad and cannot be sustained. Peo- he ought to be found guilty as chargad 
 
 pie V. Best, 39 Cal. 690. in the indictment is not subject to the 
 
804 HOMICIDE. [§ 539 
 
 cases to show the absence of any deliberate or premeditated design.'* 
 And one who killed another when his mind was so far impaired 
 as to render him incapable of deliberate, premeditated murder, but 
 was not totally irresponsible by reason of his insanity, should be 
 convicted of murder in the second degree only.® And evidence of 
 excitement and abnormal sensitiveness resulting from sunstroke and 
 a fall and other accidents, though not suificient to establish irrespon- 
 sibility, is sufficient to reduce a homicide from murder in the first, 
 to murder in the second, degree. '^ 
 
 540. Passion as a mitigating element in connection with irresistible 
 impulse. — In jurisdictions in which irresistible impulse, the mind 
 being sane, is regarded as no defense to a homicide or other crime, 
 violent passion is still to be taken into account as a mitigating 
 element, and the peculiar temperament of the offender is to be gauged 
 for the purpose of estimating whether the provocation was such 
 as would create hot blood, and whether there was adequate cooling 
 time. A sane person may, from epilepsy, or from prior insanity, 
 or from nervous or physical derangement, or from hereditary taint, 
 be peculiarly susceptible to excitement, and as the law treats assaults 
 committed in hot blood as of a lower grade than those committed 
 deliberately, this excitability may properly be considered in de- 
 termining whether the blood at the time was hot. Hence, epileptic, 
 nervous, and cerebral diseases, and hereditary tendencies, may be 
 put in evidence to lower the grade of the offense, though they do 
 not amount to insanity. This is but following the authorities which 
 declare that drunkenness, though no defense to crime, may be used 
 to show that an assault was not deliberate. ■'^ 
 
 541. The law of self-defense as applied to insane persons. — The law 
 of self-defense is applicable alike to the sane and the insane;* and 
 insanity and self-defense are not inconsistent defenses, and a per- 
 
 objection that it precludes the jury Atl. 648; Com. v. Earner, 199 Pa. 335, 
 
 from finding a lesaer degree of the of- 49 Atl. 60 ; Jarvia v. State, 70 Ark. 613 
 
 fense, the shooting being admitted. Peo- Appx. 67 S. W. 76. 
 
 pie V. Hobson, 17 Gal. 424. But an instruction in a prosecution 
 
 BSindram v. People, 1 N. Y. Crim. for homicide that if the accused was not 
 
 Eep. 448; Sage v. State, 91 Ind. 141; in a frame of mind to deliberate and pre- 
 
 Hempton v. State, 111 Wis. 127, 86 N. meditate the killing would not be mur- 
 
 W. 596 ; Youtsey v. United States, 38 der is objectionable as vague and ambig- 
 
 C. C. A. 562, 97 Fed. 937. uous, and not showing the measure of 
 
 sAnderson v. State, 43 Conn. 514, 21 criminal responsibility. Deiarnette v. 
 
 Am. Kep. 669 ; Cottell v. State, 12 Ohio Com. 75 Va. 867. 
 
 C. C. 467; Green v. Com. 83 Pa. 75; 'People v. Conroy, 33 Hun, 119. 
 
 Jones V. Com. 75 Pa. 403; Pistorius v. il Wharton & S. Med. Jur. 5th ed § 
 
 Com. 84 Pa. 158; Willis v. Com. 32 194. 
 
 Gratt. 929. And see Boren v. State, 32 iState v. Wade, 161 Mo 441 61 S. 
 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 637, 25 S. W. 775. Con- W. 800. 
 tra. Com. v. Hollinger, 190 Pa. 155. 42 
 
§ 541] INSANITY AND DRUNKENNESS. 805 
 
 son pleading botli may be acquitted on either, if sustained by the 
 evidence.^ 
 
 III. Deunkenness. ^ 
 
 542. General rules as to effect on responsibility. — The rule is prac- 
 tically universal, and is supported by a vast number of cases, only 
 a few of which are here cited, that voluntary intoxication is no 
 justification or excuse for homicide, or any other criminal act;^ 
 nor is mere drunken excitement and rage any excuse.^ And the 
 disease of oenomania or dipsomania, consisting of an inordinate thirst 
 for liquor, caused by the habit of drinking, does not affect criminal 
 responsibility for acts committed by the one that is impelled to 
 drink, while in a state of intoxication.* Intoxication is not in- 
 sanity or unsoundness of mind, unless a fixed and continuous de- 
 
 2Ibid. 95, 19 Pac. 387; O'Grady v. State, 36 
 
 iThe general question as to what in- Neb. 320, 54 N. W. 556; State v. Thomp- 
 toxieation will excuse crime is consid- son, 12 Nev. 140; State v. Martin, 4 
 ered in a note to Harris v. United N. J. L. J. 252, 3 Orim. L. Mag. 44; 
 States, 36 L.R.A. 465. Territory v. Franklin, 2 N. M. 307; 
 
 2Beasley v. State, 50 Ala. 149, 20 Am. Flanigan v. People, 86 N. Y. 554, 40 Am. 
 Bep. 292; McLeroy v. State, 120 Ala. Rep. 556; State v. John, 30 N. C. (8 
 274, 25 So. 247; Chrisman v. State, 54 Ired. L.) 330, 49 Am. Dee. 396; State 
 Ark. 283, 26 Am. St. Rep. 44, 15 S. W. v. Kale, 124 N. C. 816, 32 S. E. 892; 
 889; People v. Niehol, 34 Cal. 212; Peo- State v. Koerner, 8 N. D. 292^ 73 Am. 
 pie V. Methever, 132 Cal. 326, 64 Pac. St. Rep. 752, 78 N. W. 981 ; Pigman v. 
 481; State v. Johnson, 41 Conn. 584; State, 14 Ohio, 555, 45 Am. Dee. 558; 
 State V. Johnson, 40 Conn. 136; Peo- Cline v. State, 43 Ohio St. 332, 1 N. E. 
 pie V. Odell, 1 Dak. 197, 46 N. W. 601; 22; Keenan v. Com. 44 Pa. 55, 84 Am. 
 State V. Thomas, Houst. Grim. Rep. Dec. 414; Com. v. Cleary, 148 Pa. 26, 23 
 (Del.) 511; State v. Snow, 3 Penn. Atl. 1110; State v. Bundy, 24 S. C. 439, 
 (Del.) 259, 51 Atl. 607; Harris v. Unit- 58 Am. Rep. 263; Wilcox v. State, 94 
 ed States, 8 App. D. C. 20, 36 L.R.A. Tenn. 106, 28 S. W. 312 ; Carter v. State, 
 465; Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 29 12 Tex. 500, 62 Am. Dec. 539; Evers v. 
 Am. St. Rep. 232, 9 So. 835; Choice v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 318, 18 L.R.A. 
 State, 31 Ga. 424; Cribb v. State, 118 421, 37 Am. St. Rep. 811, 20 S. W. 744; 
 Ga. 316, 45 S. E. 396; Upstone v. Peo- State v. Tatro, 50 Vt. 483; Longley v. 
 pie, 109 111. 169; Dawson v. State, 16 Com. 99 Va. 807, 37 S. E. 339; State 
 Ind. 428, 79 Am. Deo. 439; Aszman v. v. Robinson, 20 W. Va. 713, 43 Am. 
 State, 123 Ind. 347, 8 L.R.A. 33, 24 N. Eiep. 799; United States v. McGlue, 1 
 E. 123; State v. Hart, 29 Iowa, 268; Curt. C. C. 1, Fed. Cas. No. 15,679; 
 State V. Roan, 122 Iowa, 136, 97 N. W. Beverley's Case, 4 Coke, 125a; Reg. v. 
 997; State v. O'Neil, 51 Kan. 651, 24 Dixon, 11 Cox, C. C. 341. 
 L.R.A. 555, 33 Pac. 287; Shannahan v. sState v. Wilson, 104 N. C. 868, 10 
 Com. 8 Bush, 464, 8 Am. Rep. 465; S. E. 315. And see State v. Lowe, 93 
 Conley v. Com. 98 Ky. 125, 32 S. W. Mo. 547, 5 S. W. 889. 
 285; State V. Coleman, 27 La. Ann. 691 ; A deliberate intent unlawfully to 
 Com. V. Gilbert, 165 Mass. 45, 42 N. E. take human life constitutes the malice 
 336; People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9, 97 necessary to murder in the first degree. 
 Am. Dee. 162; State v. G'arvey, 11 Minn, whether it springs from hatred, ill-will, 
 154, Gil. 95; Kelly v. State, 3 Smedes revenge, or mere frenzy of drunkenness. 
 & M. 518; State v. Hundley, 46 Mo. Beck v. State, 76 Ga. 452. 
 414; State v. West, 157 Mo. 309, 57 S. ^Choice v. State, 31 Ga. 424; State 
 W. 1071 ; Territory v. Manton, 8 Mont. v. Potts, 100 N. C. 457, 6 S. E. 657. 
 
800 HOMICIDE. [I 542 
 
 rangement Las resulted therefrom.® And this, without reference to 
 the character of the liquor causing it.® If mental incapacity pro- 
 duced by voluntary intoxication existed only temporarily at the time 
 of the commission of the crime, it is no excuse therefor.'' 
 
 The rule, as expressed by some of the cases, is, however, that 
 drunkenness will not excuse crime unless it destroys capacity to 
 distinguish between right and wrong,* or unless it renders the party 
 unconscious of what he is doing,® or unless it is such as to prevent 
 him from restraining himself from committing the act.^" And 
 it has been asserted that intoxication is an aggravation rather than 
 an excuse for crime. ^ ^ But the general rule seems to be that drunk- 
 enness neither aggravates, excuses, extenuates, nor mitigates a crim- 
 inal act.^'' 
 
 estate v. Martin, 4 N. J L. J. 25?, 3 State v. Haab, supra; Montag t. Peo- 
 
 Crim. L. Mag. 44; Re Johnson, 57 Cal. pie, 141 111. 75. 30 N. E. 337. 
 529; Aszinan v. State, 123 Ind. 347, 8 sRoss v. State, 62 Ala. 224: State v. 
 
 L.R.A. 33, 24 N. E. 123; Choice v. State, Wells, 54 Kan. 161, 37 Pac. 1005; State 
 
 supra; People v. Odell, 1 Dak. 197, 46 v. Ford, 16 S. D. 228. 92 N. W. 18. And 
 
 N. W. 601: State v. Wells, 54 Kan. 161, see Territory v. Franklin, 2 N. M. 307; 
 
 37 Pac. 1005; Wilkerson v. Com. 88 Ky. Com. v. Hart. 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 546. 
 29, 9 S. W. 836; Buckhannon v. Com. sState v. Till, Houst. Crim. Rep. 
 
 86 Ky. 110. 5 S. W. 358; Com. v. Gil- (Del.) 233; Pigman v. State, 14 Ohio, 
 
 bert, 165 Mass. 45, 42 N. E. 336. 555, 45 Am. Dec. 558 ; Oshorn v. State 
 
 The test of insanity as affecting crim- (Tex. Crim. App.) 26 S. W. 626. And 
 
 inal responsibility, that the accused see State v. Wells, supra. 
 must have labored under such a defect lOReg. v. JTonkhouse, 4 Cox, C. C. 55; 
 
 of reason as not to know the nature or People v. Odell, 1 Dak. 197, 46 N. W. 
 
 quality of the act, or, if he did know it, 601; Com. v. Gilbert, 165 Mass. 45, 42 
 
 that he did not know he was doing N. E. 336. 
 
 wrong, does not apply to drunkenness. nUnited States v. Forbes, Crabbe. 
 
 Peonle v. Ferris, 55 Cal. 588. 558, Fed. Cas. No. 15,129; United States 
 
 GCribb V. State, 118 Ga. 316, 45 S. v. Cornell, 2 Mason. 99, Fed. Cas. No. 
 
 E. 396. 14.868 ; State v. Thompson, Wright 
 
 TFisher v. State, 64 Ind. 435; State (Ohio) 617; United States v, Claypool, 
 
 V. Bullock, 13 Ala. 413 : People v. Lewis, 14 Fed. 127. 
 
 36 Cal. 531; People v. Williams, 43 Cal. In Willis v. Com. 32 Gratt. 929, it 
 
 344; Gamer v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 29 was held that intoxication at the time 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 232, 9 So. 835; Beck v. may raise homieidje to murder in the 
 
 State, 76 Ga. 452; Upstone v. People, first degree. 
 
 109 111. 169; Wright v. Com. 24 Ky. L. izMcIntvre v. Peonle, 38 HI. 514; 
 
 Reo. 1838. 72 S. W. 340; State v. Haab, Ferrell v. State, 43 Tex. 503; State v. 
 
 105 La. ?30, 29 So. 7^5; State v. Hund- Murphy, 118 Mo. 7, 25 S. W. 95: State 
 
 ley, 46 Mo. 414; ScWencker v. State, v. Sneed, 88 Mo. 138; State v. Ramsey, 
 
 9 Neb. 241, 1 N. W. 857; Stite v. 82 Mo. 133; Stite v. Edwards, 71 Mo. 
 Thompson, 12 Nev. 140; State v. Martin, 321; State v. Cross, 27 Mo. 332; State 
 supra; People v. Krist, 168 N. Y. 19, v. Harlow, 21 Mo. 446. 
 
 60 N. E. 1057 ; Longley v. Com. 99 Va. Drunkenness cnnnot convert a mere 
 
 807, 37 S. E. 339; Gustavenson v. State, accident into a felony. State v. Cross, 
 
 10 Wyo. 309, 68 Pac. 1008. 42 W. Va. 253, 24 S. "E. 996. 
 Intoxication existing only tempora- And a remark by the court in the 
 
 rily at the time of the commission of hearing of the .jury in a criminal prose- 
 the criminal act is no excuse therefor, cution, that drunkenness is more of an 
 though it was such as to render the per- ags;ravation than an excuse, without ex- 
 son incapable of distinguishing between planation, is improper. State v. Don- 
 right and wrong for the time being, ovan, 61 Iowa, 369, 16 N. W. 208. 
 
§ 542] INSANITY AND DRUNKENNESS. 807 
 
 Of course, settled insanity which becomes fixed and established as 
 a diseased condition of the mind, produced by habitual intoxication, 
 affects criminal responsibility in the same way as insan'ty produced 
 by any other cause. ^* 
 
 543. Use of, to show noncommission. — Intoxication may be shown 
 in a prosecution for homicide like any other fact, not as an excuse, 
 but to throw light on the other facts and circumstances in the case,^ 
 and as tending to show physical inability to commit the offense,^ and 
 as throwing light upon the question whether the accused was in such 
 a mental condition as to know he was committing an offense.^ And 
 the fact that a person talked with his usual intelligence at the time 
 is competent and material, where he claims to have been so under 
 the influence of liquor as not to know what he was doing.* Excuse 
 for criminal acts because of drunkenness, however, is to be received 
 at all times with great caution on account of the ease with which it 
 may be perverted.® And expressions of opinion as to the quantity 
 and weight of evidence on that question should be avoided in in- 
 structing the jury.® 
 
 544. Intoxication as affecting intent. — .Where a criminal act is one 
 which, like most kinds of homicide, can be committed only by doing 
 a particular thing with a specific intent, it may be shown that at 
 the time of doing it the accused was so drunk that he could not have 
 entertained the intent necessary to constitute the offense.* And in- 
 
 But an instruction in a criminal man v. State, 14 Ohio, 555, 45 Am. Dec. 
 prosecution characterizing^ drunkenness 558. And see Fisher v. State, 30 Tex. 
 as gross vice and misconduct is not re- App. 502, 18 S. W. 90. 
 versible error, where the languige was 4White v. State, 103 Ala. 72, 16 So. 
 not applied to the defendant. People v. 63. 
 Calton, 5 Utah, 451, 18 Pae. 902. BKriel v. Com. 5 Buslh, 362. 
 
 i3State V. Martin, 4 N. J. L. J. 252, estate v. Donovan, 61 Iowa, 369, 10 
 3 Crim. L. Mag. 44; Fonville v. State, N. W. 206. 
 
 91 Ala. 39, 8 So. 688; People v. Trav- iMcLeroy v. State, 120 Ala. 274, 25 
 ers, 88 Cal. 233. 26 Pac. 88; State v. So. 247; Chrisman v. St'ite, 54 Ark. 
 Rilev, 100 Mo. 493, 13 S. W. 1063; Hill 283, 26 Am. St. Rep. 44, 15 S. W. S.S9; 
 V. State, 42 Neb. 509, 60 N. W. 916; People v. Methever, 132 Cal. 326, 64 
 People V. Rogers, 18 N. Y. 9, 72 Am. Pac. 481; State v. Piske, 63 Conn. 388, 
 Dec. 484; Nevling v. Com. 98 Pa. 313; 28 Atl. 572; State v. Faino, 1 Marv. 
 Cora. V. Piatt, 11 Phila. 423; United (Del.) 492, 41 At.l. 134; Stnte v. Di 
 States V. Forbes, Crabbe, 558, Fed. Cas. Guglielmo, 4 Penn. (Del.) 336, 55 A 1,1. 
 No. 15,129. And see the State v. Dilla- 350; Garner v. Stats, 28 Fla.' 113, 29 
 hunt, 3 Harr. (Del.) 551. Am. St. Rep. 232, 9 So. 835; Malone v. 
 
 I Jenkins v. State, 93 Ga. 1, 18 S. E. State, 49 Ga. 210; Bartholomew v. Peo- 
 992; Hanvev v. State. 68 Ga. 612; Lan- pie, 104 111. 605, 44 Am. Rep. 97; Booher 
 ergan v. People, 6 Park. Crim. Rep. v. State. 156 Ind. 435. 54 L.R.A. 391, 60 
 209; Ferrell v. State, 43 Tex. 503. N. E. 156; State v. Pasnau, 118 Iowa, 
 
 2 Jenkins v. State, supra; State v. 501, 92 N. W. 682; State v. Mowry, 37 
 Koemer, 8 N. D. 292, 73 Am. St. Rep. Kan. 369, 15 Pac. 282; Keeton v. Com. 
 752, 78 N. W. 981; Ferrell v. State, su- 92 Ky. 522, 18 S. W. 359; State v. Tri- 
 pra. vas, 32 La. Ann. 1086 36 A-n. Reu. 293; 
 
 sPeople V. Harris, 29 Cal. 678; Pig- People v. Walker, 38 Mich. 156; State v. 
 
808 HOMICIDE. [§ 544 
 
 toxication may be considered in detonnining the motive or intent in 
 cases of crimes divided into degrees.^ Thus, drunkenness may pro- 
 duce a state of mind in which one is incapable of entertaining or 
 forming a design to take life. * And it may be taken into considera- 
 tion in determining the purpose, motive, and intent in the commis- 
 sion of the act,* and as bearing upon the existence or nonexistence 
 of malice.^ And an instruction as to manslaughter is not erroneous 
 in a prosecution for homicide, -where there was evidence that the 
 accused had been drinking heavily and was drunk at the time of 
 the killing, and no motive for the killing is shown.® ISTor is an in- 
 
 Garvey, 11 Minn. 154, Gil. 95; Kelly v. Lanergan v. People, 50 Barb. 266; Peo- 
 State, 3 Smedes & M. 518; O'Grady v. pie v. Hammill, 2 Park. Grim. Eep. 
 State, 36 Neb. 320, 54 N W 556; Peo- 223; People v. Methever, 132 Cal. 326, 
 pie V. Leonardi, 143 N. Y. 360, 38 N. E. 64 Pae. 481 ; People v. King, 27 Cal. 
 372; Swan V. State, 4 Humph. 136; Scott 507, 87 Am. Dec. 95; People v. Nichol, 
 
 V. State, 12 Tex. App. 31; Hempton v. 34 Cal. 211; People v. Kloss, 115 Cal. 
 
 State, 111 Wis. 127, 86 N. W. 596; Gus- 567, 47 Pac. 459; Jenkina v. State, 93 
 
 tavenson v. State, 10 Wyo. 300, 68 Pac. Ga. 1, 18 S. E. 992; Aszman v. State, 123 
 
 1006; Peg. V. Monkhouse, 4 Cox, C. C. Ind. 347, 8 L.K.A. 33, 24 N. E. 123; 
 
 55. And see also State v. Gather, 121 State v. Williams, 122 Iowa, 115, 97 
 
 Iowa, 106, 96 N. W. 722. N. W. 992; State v. Pasnau, 118 Iowa, 
 
 2People V. Odell, 1 Dak. 197, 46 N. 501, 92 N. W. 682; State v. Roan, 122 
 
 W. 601; People v. Young, 102 Cal. 411, Iowa, 136, 97 N. W. 997; Keeton t. Com. 
 
 36 Pac. 770; State v. Williams, 122 92 Ky. 522, 18 S. W. 359; Kelly v. State, 
 
 Iowa, 115, 97 N. W. 992; O'Grady v. supra; United States v. Meagher, su- 
 
 State, supra; Wilson v. State, 60 N. J. pra. And see Jones v. State, 29 6a. 594; 
 
 L. 171, 37 Atl. 954, 38 Atl. 428; Unit- Golliher v. Com. 2 Duv. 163, 87 Am. 
 
 ed States v. Meagher, 37 Fed. 875 ; Reg. Dec. 493. 
 
 V. Gamlen, 1 Post. & F. 90. And see BFord v. State, 71 Ala. 385; State 
 
 People V. Belencia, 21 Cal. 544; Conlev v. Johnson, 40 Conn. 136; Wilkerson v. 
 
 V. Com. 98 Ky. 125, 32 S. W. 285; Kriel Com. 88 Ky. 29, 9 S. W. 836; Shanna- 
 
 V. Com. 5 Bush, 363; Smith v. Com. 1 han v. Com. 8 Bush, 464, 8 Am. Rep. 
 
 Duv. 224. 466 ; Blimm v. Com. 7 Bush, 320 ; Bishop 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution v. Com. 109 Ky. 558, 60 S. W. 190; Gol- 
 
 for murder in the language of Cal. Pen. liher v. Com. supra; Seaborn v. Com. 25 
 
 Code, § 22, that no act committed by a Ky. L. Eep. 2203, 80 S. W. 223; Moon 
 
 person while in a state of intoxication v. State, 68 Ga. 687; Kelly v. State, 
 
 is less criminal by reason of his having supra. 
 
 been in such a condition, would be er- In Nichols v. State, 8 Ohio St. 435, 
 
 roneous if given alone, because of the however, it was held that the intoxica- 
 
 omission of that portion of the section tion of a person at the time of commit- 
 
 which qualified it in cases in which the ting a homicide has nothing to do with 
 
 actual existence of an intention is a the question of malice, 
 necessary element in the offense, but is eHenderson v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 proper where the whole section is given, 1985, 72 S. W. 781. 
 
 if the ini^ormation includes the offense But refusal to instruct that, if the 
 
 of manslaughter, to which that part is accused was intoxicated when the homi- 
 
 applieable. People v. Lane, 100 Cal. 379, cide with which he was charged was 
 
 34 Pac. 856. committed, they might take the fact of 
 
 sFonville v. State, 91 Ala. 39, 8 So. intoxication into consideration in de- 
 
 688; IMorrison v. State, 84 Ala. 405, 4 termining the degree of punishment 
 
 So. 402; State v. Smith, 49 Conn. 376; which should be inflicted, if erroneous, 
 
 Kelly V. State, 3 Smedes & M. 518. is not prejudicial where a conviction 
 
 4People V. Cassiano, 30 Hun, 388; was had for manslaughter only. Lanck- 
 
 Rogers v. People, 3 Park. Crim. Rep. ton v. United States, 18 App. t). C. 348. 
 633; People v. Eastwood, 14 N. Y. 562; 
 
§ 544] INSANITY AND DRUNKENNESS. 80» 
 
 struction in a prosecution for homicide, not dealing with the testi- 
 mony, but simply pointing out the distinctions which the law makes 
 with reference to responsibility between the different degrees of 
 intoxication, directing the jury to use great caution not to give im- 
 munity to persons who commit crimes while inflamed by intoxicat- 
 ing drink, objectionable as indicating the court's opinion that the 
 crime in question was committed when the accused was capable of 
 forming an intent to take life.^ But though drunkenness is a cir- 
 cumstance tending to show absence of malice in homicide, it should 
 not be singled out from the other proof and laid before the jury 
 with the statement that it mitigates the offeoise. ^ 
 
 Homicide committed when the accused was so intoxicated that 
 no intent to commit the crime of murder could have existed, however, 
 not being murder in the first degree, is either manslaughter or mur- 
 der in the second degree.® Intoxication cannot operate as an en- 
 tire exemption from criminal responsibility,^" and it is not con- 
 clusive against the existence of a criminal intent. ^^ At the utmost 
 it only extenuates the crime from murder to manslaughter,''^ and 
 it does not do this, as matter of law.'^^ Whether the accused was 
 so intoxicated as to render him incapable of entertaining the spe- 
 cific intent necessary to constitute the crime is a question of fact 
 for the jury.-'* And it will be presumed, in the absence of proof 
 
 7State V. Hawkins, 23 Wash. 289, 63 S. E. 315. And see People v. Methever, 
 Pac. 258. 132 Cal. 326, 64 Pac. 481. 
 
 sShannahan v. Com. 8 Bush, 464, 8 In Thomas v. State, 47 Fla. 99, 36 So. 
 Am. Rep. 465. 161, it was held that voluntary intoxi- 
 
 And refusal to instruct the jury in cation not resulting in a fixed or set- 
 a prosecution for homicide that in fix- tied frenzy of insanity, either permanent 
 ing the grade of the crime evidence of or intermittent, does not excuse or jus- 
 intoxication is proper, and must be care- tify any degree of unlawful homicide 
 fully weighed, is not error where the below murder in the first degree, 
 jury were required to weigh carefully uState v. White, 14 Kan. 538; State 
 all the evidence in the case, but were v. Avery, 44 N. H. 392. 
 told that they themselves must deter- isBlimm v. Com. supra. And see 
 mine its importance. People v. Kemm- Thomas v. State, supra. 
 ler, 119 N. Y. 580, 24 N. E. 9. 1 3 State v. Johnson, 40 Conn. 136; 
 
 sRogers v. People, 3 Park. Grim. Rep. White v. State, 103 Ala. 72, 16 So. 63; 
 633; People v. Lane, 100 Cal. 379, 34 State v. Ashley, 45 La. Ann. 1036, 13 So. 
 Pac. 856; Tidwell v. State, 70 Ala. 33; 738. And see State v. White, 14 Kan. 
 Cook V. State (Fla.) 35 So. 665; Smith 538. 
 
 v. State, 4 Neb. 277; State v. Martin, Evidence of drunkenness can only be 
 4 N. J. L. J. 252, 3 Grim. L. Mag. 44 ; considered in a prosecution for homicide 
 Com. V. Baker, 11 Phila. 631; Tucker for the purpose of determining the de- 
 V. United States, 151 U. S. 164, 38 L. gree of the crime, and for this purpose 
 ed. 112, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 299. And see it must be received with great caution. 
 State V. Corrivau, 93 Minn. 38, 100 N. People v. Lewis, 36 Gal. 531. 
 W. 638. i4United States v. Meagher, 37 Fed. 
 
 ioKriel v. Com. 5 Busih, 363; Blimm 879; Chatham v. State, 92 Ala. 47, 9 So. 
 V. Com. 7 Bush, 320; Gleveland v. State, 607; Armor v. State, 03 Ala. 176; King 
 86 Ala. 1, 5 So. 426; State v. Martin, v. State, 90 Ala. 612, 8 So. 856; State 
 supra; State v. Wilson, 104 N. C. 868, 10 v. Smith, 49 Conn. 376: People v. Mills, 
 
810 HOMICIDE. [§ DJi 
 
 to the contrary, that the accused, though intoxicated, intended the 
 actual consequences of his acts. ■'^ And the burden rests with the 
 accused to show that he was so intoxicated as to be incapable of 
 forming any intent.^" 
 
 The rule has been asserted, however, that voluntary intoxication 
 cannot reduce a homicide which would have been murder if com- 
 mitted by a sober man, to manslaughter.^^ Murder in the second 
 degree rests upon implied malice, and the jury may find the exist- 
 ence of implied malice which will subject the accused to a charge 
 of murder in that degree, though his intoxication was such as dis- 
 proved express malice. ' ^ But as between murder in the second de- 
 gree and manslaughter under this rule, drunkenness of the offender 
 forms no legitimate matter of inquiry; the killing being voluntary, 
 tlie offense is necessarily murder in the second degree, unless the 
 provocation was of such a character as would, at common law, reduce 
 the crime to manslaughter, for which latter offense a drunken man 
 is equally responsible Avith a sober man. '** 
 
 545. Degree necessary to affect intent. — It is the intent, and not the 
 motive, with which the homicide is committed which is the test 
 of the criminal responsibility of the perpetrator in determining the 
 degree of his guilt. ^ And the drunkenness which will reduce homi- 
 cide from murder to manslaughter must be of such a character and 
 extent as to render the perpetrator incapable of entertaining or form- 
 ing a design to take life.^ It must have been such as to result in 
 a fixed mental disease of some duration,^ or such as to effect a 
 temporary destruction of the reason; mere nervous excitement not 
 being sufficient,* even though the excitement amounted to a frenzv.^ 
 The mere fact that one was intoxicated, and that he was induced 
 to conceive a design to kill more readily because of his intoxication, 
 
 98N. Y. 176; Cook V. Territory, 3 Wyo. Gilloolev v. State, 58 Ind. 182; Rob- 
 110, 4 Pac. 887. erts v. People, 19 Mich. 401; Hempton 
 
 isSmurr v. State, 88 Ind. 504; People v. State, 111 Wis. 127, 86 N W 596. 
 V. Fish, 125 N. Y. 136, 26 N. E. 319; But unless the jury in a prosecution 
 Friery v. People, 54 Barb. 319. for murder are satisiHed beyond a rea- 
 
 icState V. Corrivau, 93 Minn. 38, 100 sonable doubt that the accused was so 
 N. W. 638. free from intoxicauon that he could 
 
 I'Brown v. State, 4 Tex. App. 275; form an intention maliciously to kill, 
 Hanvey v. State, 68 Ga. 612; Com. v. and did form such an intention, thoy 
 Piatt, 11 Phila. 415. cannot convict him of a higher crime 
 
 isState V. Johnson, 4] Conn. 584. than nianslaugliter. Smith v State 4 
 
 "State V. Kobinaon, 20 W. Va. 713. 43 Neb. 277. 
 Am. Rep. 799; Wilson v. State, 60 N. ^Lanergan y. People, C Park Crira 
 J. L. 171, 37 Atl. 954, 38 Atl. 428. Rep. 20!); Gillooley v. State, svpra. 
 
 iState V. Hansen, 25 Or. 391, 35 Pac. 4Casat v. State," 40 Ark. 511- Walker 
 970, 30 Pac. 296; Reg. v. Dixon, 11 Cox, v. State, 91 Ala. 76, 9 So. 87. 
 C. C. 341. BFl'inigan v. People, 86 N. Y. 554, 40 
 
 2King V. State, 90 Ala. 612, 8 So. 856; Am. Rep. 556. 
 
§ 545] 
 
 INSANITY AND DRUNKENNESS. 
 
 8U 
 
 is of no effect. ® And one who, though intoxicated, knows what he is 
 doing, and selects the means naturally adapted to his purpos", and 
 kills his victim by such means, will be deemed capable of enteitain- 
 ing an intent, and is responsible for his acts in the same .manner, 
 and to the same extent, as if he were sober ; "^ as, for example, kill- 
 ing -with a deadly weapon,* or killing by mixing poison with one's 
 drink or food.^ And it has been held that one who was sober enough 
 to intend to shoot at another, ?nd who actually did shoot at and 
 hit him, without provocation or justification, must be deemed to 
 have been sober enough to form a specific intent to murder.^" 
 
 546. Intoxication as affecting deliberation and premeditation In- 
 toxication, though involuntary, is to be considered by the jury in 
 a prosecution for murder in the first degree, in which a premeditated 
 design to effect death is essential, with reference to its effect upon 
 the ability of the accused at the time to form and entertain such 
 a design;^ not because, per se, it either excuses or mitigates the 
 
 « Warner v. State. 56 N. J. L. 686, 44 
 Am. St. Rep. 415, 29 Atl. 505. 
 
 And refusal to instruct in a murder 
 case that if the defendant was so intox- 
 icated that his drunken condition was 
 observahle, it is important on the ques- 
 tion of his capacity to form an intent to 
 commit the deed, is not error, where the 
 court had previously instructed that in- 
 toxication might destroy capacity to 
 form Rn intent to kill. State v. Smith, 
 49 Conn. 376. 
 
 7Robert3 v. People, 19 Mich. 401; 
 State V. Gut, 13 Minn. 343, Gil. 315; 
 Warner v. State, 56 N. J. L. 686, 44 Am. 
 St. Rep. 415, 29 Atl. 505 ; People v. Ham- 
 mill, 2 Park. Grim. Rep. 223; People 
 V. Jones, 2 Edm. Sel. Gas. 88; State v. 
 Tatro. 50 Vt. 483; Reg. v. Dixon, 11 
 Cox. C. C. 341. 
 
 sLanergan v. People, 50 Barb. 266; 
 Rex V. Meakin. 7 Car. & P. 297. 
 
 sPeonle v. Robinson, 2 Park. Crim. 
 Rep. 235. 
 
 lOEstes V. State, 55 Ga. 30. 
 
 So, in Marshall v. State, 59 Ga. 154, 
 it was held that one who can voluntarily 
 shoot is capable of entertaining, and 
 acting from, malice, unless he can 
 plead some infirmity besides drunken- 
 ness; and that in order to be too drunk 
 to form an intent to kill, he must be too 
 drunk to shoot. 
 
 And in Brown v. State, 142 Ala. 287, 
 38 So. 268, it was held that voluntary 
 drunkenness, to be available to dis- 
 prove an intent to murder in the mak- 
 ing of an assault, must have been of 
 
 such a character that the assailant's 
 mental faculties were so far overcome or 
 stupefied as to render him incapable of 
 distinguishing between right and wrong. 
 iPeople V. Nichol, 34 Gal. 212; Peo- 
 ple V. Belencia, 21 Cal. 544; People v. 
 Williams, 43 Cal. 344; State v. John- 
 son, 40 Conn. 136; Garner v. State, 28 
 Fl> 113. 29 Am. St. Rep. 232, 9 So. 
 835 ; Golden v. State, 25 Ga. 527 ; Jones 
 V. State, 29 Ga. 594; Aszman v. State, 
 123 Ind. 347, 8 L.R.A. 33, 24 N. E. 123; 
 State V. Williams, 122 Iowa. 115. 97 N. 
 W. 992; State v. O'Neil, 51 Kan. 651 24 
 L.R.A. 555, 33 Pac. 287 ; State v. Mowry, 
 37 Kan. 369. 15 Pac. 282; Buckhannon 
 V. Com. 86 Ky. 110, 5 S. W. 358; Currv 
 V. Com. 2 Bush, 67: Golliher v. Coni. 
 2 Duv. 164, 87 Am. Dec. 493; State v. 
 Corrivau, 93 Minn. 3S, 100 N. W. 638: 
 Hill V. State, 42 Neb. 503, 60 N. W. 
 916: Schlencker v. State, 9 Neb. 241, 1 
 N. W. 857 ; Smith v. State, 4 Neb. 277 ; 
 People V. Batting, 49 How. Pr. 392; 
 People V. Conroy, 2 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 
 247; Pigma.n v. State, 14 Ohio, 555, 45 
 Am. Dec. 558; State v. Zorn^ 22 Or. 
 591, 30 Pnc. 317; State v. Weaver, 35 
 Or. 415, 58 Pac. 109: Cartwright v. 
 State, 8 Lea, 381; Pirtle v. State, 9 
 Humph. 663; Haile v. State, 11 Humph. 
 154: Swan v. State. 4 Humnh. 136: Nor- 
 fleet V. State. 4 Sneed, 345: Ayres v. 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 26 S. W. 396; 
 Clore V. State. 26 Tex. App. 624, 10 S. 
 W. 242; Williams v. State, 25 Tex. 
 App. 76, 7 S. W. 661 ; Charles v. State, 
 13 Tex. App. 658; McCarty v. State 4 
 
8]2 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 [§ 546 
 
 crime, but because, in connection with other facts, an absence of 
 malice or premeditation may appear.^ Drunkenness as evidence 
 of want of premeditation or deliberation is not within the rule which 
 excludes it as an excuse for crime.* And a person who commits 
 a crime while so drunk as to be incapable of forming a deliberate 
 and premeditated design to kill is not guilty of murder in the first 
 degree. * 
 
 The influence of intoxication upon the question of the existence 
 of premeditation, however, depends upon its degree, and its effect 
 on the mind and passions.^ ISTo inference of the absence of de- 
 liberation and premeditation arises from intoxication, as a matter of 
 law.® And intoxication cannot serve as an excuse for the offender;'' 
 and it should be received with great caution, even for the purpose 
 of reducing the crime to a lower degree.® Nor does intoxication 
 form a legitimate matter of inquiry as between murder in the second 
 degree and manslaughter, unless the provocation was such as would. 
 
 Tex. App. 468; Colbath v. State, 4 Tex. 
 App. 76; Brown v. State, 4 Tex. App. 
 275; Colbath v. S'tate, 2 Tex. App. 391; 
 Willis V. Com. 32 Gratt. 929; State v. 
 Robinson, 20 W. Va. 713, 43 Am. Rep. 
 799; State v. Hertzog, 55 W. Va. 74, 
 46 S. E. 792; Cross v. State, 55 Wis. 
 261, 12 N. W. 425 ; Gustavenson v. State, 
 10 Wyo. 300, 68 Pac. 1006; Hopt v. 
 Utah, 104 U. S. 631, 26 L. ed. 873; Rex 
 V. Grlndley, 1 Russell, Crimes, 2d Am. 
 ed. *8. But see Rex v. Carroll, 7 Car. 
 & P. 145. 
 
 2Buckhanmon v. Com. supra; Peo- 
 ple V. King, 27 Cal. 507, 87 Am. Dec. 
 95 ; State v. Johnson, and Hill v. State, 
 supra. 
 
 sPeople V. Belencia, 21 Cal. 544; State 
 V. Williams, 122 Iowa, 115, 97 N. W. 
 992; Cartwright v. State, 8 Lea, 377; 
 State V. Robinson, supra; State v. Davis, 
 52 W. Va. 224, 43 S. E. 99; Gustavenson 
 V. State, supra. 
 
 4 Com. V. Perrier, 3 Phila. 229; Com. 
 V. Cleary, 148 Pa. 26, 23 Atl. 1110; Me- 
 Ginnis v. Com. 102 Pa. 66 ; Com. v. Du- 
 dash, 204 Pa. 124, 53 Atl. 756; Com. v. 
 Piatt, 11 Phila. 421; Com. v. Hart, 2 
 Brewst. (Pa.) 546; Com. v. Baker, 11 
 Phila. 631. 
 
 Homicide committed without provo- 
 cation, but while so intoxicated as to 
 render the person incapable of doing a. 
 deliberate or premeditated act, is mur- 
 der in the second degree. Boswell v. 
 Com. 20 Gratt. 860; State v. Robinson, 
 supra. 
 
 And a conviction of murder in the 
 first degree is not warranted where 
 death was inflicted in a conflict, while 
 the defendant was excited by liquor, in 
 the absence of evidence tending to show 
 that after the conflict began, and before 
 the stabbing, there might have been an 
 instant of time for deliberation and pre- 
 meditation. State v. Sopher, 70 Iowa, 
 494, 30 N. W. 917. 
 
 BGolliher v. Com. 2 Duv. 164, 87 Am. 
 Dec. 493. 
 
 And an instruction that, if the mind 
 of the accused was so weakened and dis- 
 eased from the continued use of in- 
 toxicants .as to prevent him from de- 
 liberating on the act he committed, he 
 should be found guilty of murder in the 
 second degree, is properly refused in a 
 prosecution for homicide where there 
 was no evidence indicating a weakened 
 or diseased mind, or to show the extent 
 of his use of intoxicating liquors. State 
 V. Brown, 181 Mo. 192, 79 S. W. 1111. 
 
 ePeople v. Mills, 98 N. Y. 176; O'Brien 
 V. People, 48 Barb. 274 ; State v. Avery, 
 44 N. H. 392; Com. v. M'Fall, Addison 
 (Pa.) 257; Cook v. Territory, 3 Wyo. 
 110, 4 Pac. 887. And see People v. Wil- 
 liams, 43 Cal. 344; People v. Belencia, 
 21 Cal. 544. 
 
 'People V. Fuller, 2 Park. Grim. Rep. 
 16; State v. Johnson, 40 Conn. 136. 
 
 sPeople V. Vincent, 95 Cal. 425, 30 
 Pac. 581; People v. Belencia, supra. 
 
§ 5-16] INSANITY AND DRUNKENNESS. 813 
 
 ut common law, reduce the degree of the crime to manslaughter;® 
 or unless it existed to such an extent as to render the person incapable 
 of forming a purpose or of intending the act.^" 
 
 The question whether intoxication has incapacitated a person to 
 form a premeditated design to kill is one for the jury/^ And so 
 is the question as to the weight to which the evidence is entitled. ^^ 
 And drunkenness on the part of the accused in a prosecution for 
 murder in the first degree should be submitted to the jury, what- 
 ever its degree. ^ * But when so submitted the court may properly 
 instruct the jury as to what might amount to deliberation and pre- 
 meditation on the part of the accused.^* And the court should 
 instruct the jury as to the effect of intoxication to a degree sufficient 
 to render the accused incapable of forming a premeditated design 
 to kiU.^^ 
 
 547. Degree necessary to affect deliberation and premeditation 
 
 Murder in the first degree, involving malice and premeditation, can- 
 not be committed by one who is incapacitated to think deliberately 
 and determine rationally as to the quality, character, and conse- 
 quences of the act ; and intoxication sufficient to deprive a person of 
 the power to see and weigh the nature of the act charged is suffi- 
 cient to reduce the homicide from murder in the first, to murder in 
 the second, degree.^ The test of responsibility in such case is 
 
 sPeople V. Lang+on, 67 Cal. 427, 7 Pac. isGarner v. State, 28 Pla. 113, 29 Am. 
 
 843 ; People v. Nichol, 34 Cal. 211 ; State St. Rep. 232, 9 So. 835. 
 V. Robinson, 20 W. Va. 713, 43 Am. Rep. But an instruction that it the de- 
 
 799 ; Davis v. State, 25 Ohio St. 369 ; f endant committed the homicide in ques- 
 
 State V. Weaver, 35 Or. 415, 58 Pac. 109 ; tion under the influence of intoxication, 
 
 Pirtle V. State, 9 Humph. 663; Norfleet or the effect of previous habits of in- 
 
 V. State, 4 Sneed, 345 ; Gustavenson v. toxication, and if the intoxication or the 
 
 State, 10 Wyo. 300, 68 Pac. 1006; Res eflfect was not such as would negative 
 
 V. Carroll, 7 Car. & P. 145. the legal inference of malice implied by 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution law from the character and circum- 
 
 for murder, that if the accused, when he stances of the act, and the want of 
 
 fired the fatal shot, was intoxicated the provocation, he should be found guilty 
 
 jury may consider that fact in de- of murder in the second degree, is 
 
 termining wheither he acted in passion erroneous as a charge on the sufficiency 
 
 and heat of blood, or from excitement and weight of evidence. Gwatkin v. 
 
 from a blow he had received, or without Com. 9 Leigh, 678, 33 Am. Dee. 264. 
 malice, is properly refused. Morrison lAszman v. State, 123 Ind. 347, 8 
 
 V. State, 84 Ala. 405, 4 So. 402. L.R.A. 33, 24 N. E. 123; Jones v. Com. 
 
 lODavis v. State, supra. And see 75 Pa. 403; Com. v. Cleary, 148 Pa. 26, 
 
 Keenan v. Com. 44 Pa. 55, 84 Am. Dec. 23 Atl. 1110; Com. v. Hart, 2 Brewst. 
 
 414. (Pa.) 546 ; Com. v. Perrier, 3 Phila. 229 ; 
 
 liCom. V. M'Fall, Addison (Pa.) 255; State v. Davis, 9 Houst. (Del.) 407, 33 
 
 King V. State, 90 Ala. 612, 8 So. 856; Atl. 55; Ayres v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 State V. Smith, 49 Conn. 376; King v. App.) 26 S. W. 396; McCarty v. State, 
 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 64 S. W. 245. 4 Tex. App. 461; Willis v. Com. 32 
 
 izPeople V. Belencia, 21 Cal. 544. Gratt. 929; Boswell v. Com. 20 Gratt. 
 
 i3Lancaster v. State, 2 Lea, 575. 860; State v. Robinson, 20 W. Va. 713, 
 
 i4People V. Williams, 43 Cal. 344. 
 
814 HOMICIDE. {S 547 
 
 the question whether the accused was, at the time, rendered in- 
 capable of forming an intent and exercising the deliberation and 
 premeditation which were necessary to the commission of the crime. ^ 
 To warrant a finding of the absence of the necessary degree of cle- 
 liberation or premeditation to constitute murder in the first degree, 
 however, the intoxication need not go to the extent o£ depriving 
 the person of volition, or the ability to form an intent.* And the 
 fact that a person was sober enough to form an intent raises no 
 presumption that he was sober enough to form a premeditated de- 
 sign to kill.* But no intoxication which does not render the per- 
 son charged utterly incapable of free motive will shield him.^ And 
 to reduce homicide from murder in the first, to murder in the second, 
 degree, it must be such as to deprive the slayer of the power of 
 judging of his acts and their legitimate consequences." And one 
 who is drunk may act with deliberation and premeditation, as well 
 as one who is sober, and in such case is equally responsible.' Vol- 
 untary intoxication, in the absence of such incapacity resulting there- 
 from as renders the intoxicated person incapable of thinking de- 
 liberately, or determining rationally upon the purpose of taking 
 human life, and which leaves him full power to know the quality 
 of his act, and to abstain from doing it, cannot reduce murder in 
 the first degree to a lower degree of homicide.® 
 
 548. Intoxication as affecting provocation and hot blood. — Whether 
 a person committing a homicide was sober or intoxicated cannot affect 
 the question of the existence or the nonexistence of such an adequate 
 cause or provocation as might reduce the offense from murder to 
 
 43 Am. Eep. 799. And see State v. an intelligent and true account of it at 
 
 Bowen, Houst. Grim. Rep. (Del.) 91. the trial, must be held responsible for 
 
 zTerritory v. Davis, 2 Ariz. 59, 10 his conrluct. Territory v. Franklin, 2 
 
 Pac. 359; Gilmore v. State, 126 Ala. 20, N. M. 307. 
 
 28 So. 595; State v. McDaniel, 115 N. C. 'People v. Belencia, 21 Cal. 544; Peo- 
 
 807, 20 S. E. 622; Nevling v. Com. 98 pie v. Williams, 43 Cal. 344; State v. 
 
 Pa. 323; Bernhardt v. State, 82 Wis. 2.3, Bullock, 13 Ala. 417; State v. Hansen, 
 
 51 N. W. 1009. 25 Or. 391, 35 Pac. 976, 36 Pac. 296; 
 
 sPoople V. Leonardi, 143 N. Y. 360, Com. v. McGowan, 189 Pa. 641, 69 Am. 
 
 38 N. E. 372; Melntyre v. People, 38 St. Rep. 836, 42 Atl. 365 : State v. Tatro, 
 
 111. 514. 50 Vt. 483; Honesty v. Com. 81 Va. 283; 
 
 4Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 29 Am. State v. Douglass, 28 W. Va. 297; State 
 
 St. Rep. 232, 9 So. 835. v. Robinson, 20 W. Va. 713, 43 Am. Rep. 
 
 liCluck V. State, 40 Ind. 263; State v. 799; Rex v. Thomss. 7 Car. & P. 817. 
 
 Bullock, 13 Ala. 413; State v. Davis, 9 sAsziran v. State, 123 Ind. 347. 8 
 
 Houst. (Del.) 407, 33 Atl. 55; Kenney L.R.A. 3.3, 24 N. E. 123: People v. Fish, 
 
 V. People, 27 How. Pr. 206. 125 N. Y. 136, 26 N. E. 319; State v. 
 
 cConi. V. Crozier, 1 Brewst. (Pa.) 349. McDaniel, 115 N. C. 807, 20 S. E. 622; 
 
 An intoxicated person who at the time Keenan v. Com. 44 Pa. 55, 84 Am. Dec. 
 
 of committing a homicide was conscious 414. 
 
 of, and understood, what was done and One who was sober enough to force 
 
 said by himself and others, so as to give his way into a building where hie in- 
 
i 548] .INSANITY AND DRUNKENNESS. 815 
 
 manslaughter.^ And a murder committed by a drunken man from 
 sudden passion, imagining a provocation when there was none, or 
 when it was not adequate, at a time when the offender was not in a 
 frame of mind to deliberate and premeditate, is murder in the second 
 degree. ^ 
 
 V/here a person committing a homicide has received a provocation, 
 however, which, if acted upon instantly, would mitigate the offense 
 of a sober man, evidence of intoxication may be considered in de- 
 termining whether the killing was due to the provocation or malice, 
 and whether it was done in the heat of passion, or with a deliberate 
 purpose or otherwise, and generally to explain his conduct.'^ And 
 the jury may consider the drunkenness of a person accused of homi- 
 cide in grading the act, not to excuse, mitigate, or extenuate it, but 
 to assist in deciding whether the intention to kill preceded the provo- 
 cation, or was produced by it.* The principle is that, where an 
 encounter was sudden and the accused, prior to such encounter, had 
 no malice or grudge, intoxication at the time of the encounter may 
 be taken into consideration to ascertain whether he acted from 
 malice or from sudden passion, and whether the act done was spe- 
 cifically intended; but if malice or specific intent to do the act is 
 proved aliunde, then intoxication at the time does not lower the 
 grade of the offense.'' Drunkenness will not change the grade of 
 an offense, unless the evidence suggests some motive for the act to be 
 compared by the jury with the state's theory of a malicious intent, 
 and in the absence of such suggestion no charge with reference to 
 
 tended victim was, and follow him from Roarers, 18 N. Y. 9;, 72 Am. Dec. 484; 
 
 room to room, and provide himself with Eastwood v. People, 3 Park. Crim. Rep. 
 
 a murderous weapon, and to announce 25; State v. MeCants, 1 Speers L. SSfl; 
 
 his intentions, and finally to execute Car*.wright v. State, 8 Lea, 377; Rex 
 
 his purpose by a repetition of fatal v. Thomas, 7 Car. & P. 817; Reg. v. 
 
 blows, and to plan and execute an im- Monkhouse, 4 Cox, C. C. 55. 
 
 mediate escape, was not sufficiently in- A lesser provocation might suddenly 
 
 toxicated to reduce the grade of his of- heat and blird a man with an<iry pas- 
 
 fense. Kenry v. People. 31 N. Y. 330. sior while intoxicated than while sober, 
 
 iGnitan v. State, 11 Tex. App. 544; and for that reason intoxication may be 
 
 Mclntyre v. People, 33 111. 514; Com. ccnsidered in determining the ouestion 
 
 V. Hawkins, 3 Gray, 463; Vann v. State, of mnliee, with a view to reducing a 
 
 83 Gn. 44, 9 S. E. 945; Keenan v. Com. homicide by him from murder to man- 
 
 44 Pa. 65_, 84 Am. Dec. 414. slfiughter. State v. Hurley, Houst. 
 
 Where a killing was unprovoked, the Crim. Rep. (Del.) 28. 
 
 fact that the perpetrator was intoxicat- ^.Tones v. State, 29 Ga. 594. And see 
 
 ed cannot be allowed to aflfect the legal Kellv v. Com. 1 Grant, Gas. 484. 
 
 character of the act. Friery v. People, sSee S'-haller v. State, 14 Mo. 502; 
 
 64 Barb. 319. Rex v. Thomas, supra. And see also 
 
 sWillis V. Com. 32 Graft. 929. Wharton, Crim.' Law, 8th ed. §§ 54 et 
 
 3 Jones v. State, 29 Ga. 594: State v. seq. 
 Mullen, 14 La. Ann. 577; People v. 
 
816 HOMICIDE. [§ 548 
 
 drunkenness as a separate element in grading tlie offense need be 
 given. ® 
 
 549. Intoxication as affecting self-defense. — .Voluntary drunkenness 
 or intoxication does not enlarge the right of self-defense, and it is 
 not available as a defense to a charge of murder, -when, in conse- 
 quence thereof, the accused acted upon an exaggerated or unjusti- 
 fiable belief as to the necessity for taking the life of another in de- 
 fense of his own. ^ And one who kills another believing he is acting 
 in self-defense, but who errs in determining whether his peril is 
 imminent, his error being due to the fact that he is intoxicated, is 
 negligent in forming his belief and will be guilty of manslaughter, 
 since negligent homicide is manslaughter.^ The intoxication of a 
 person committing homicide alleged to be in self-defense, however, 
 may be considered on the question whether the apprehended danger 
 was sufficient to justify the act.^ And intoxication may be consid- 
 ered in determining whether the accused acted under a bona fide 
 apprehension that his person or property was about to be attacked.* 
 JSTor is a person bound to stand by and see a brother or near relative 
 killed or suffer great bodily harm, because the brother was so drunk 
 as not to know his duty to retreat and get out of the way of 
 bodily harm, or as to be physically unable to retreat. ® 
 
 550. Texas statute as to intoxication There is a statutory pro- 
 vision in Texas that neither intoxication nor temporary insanity 
 produced by the voluntary recent use of ardent spirits shall constitute 
 an excuse for the commission of crime; nor shall intoxication miti- 
 gate either the degree or the penalty of a crime; but evidence of 
 temporary insanity produced by such use of ardent spirits may be 
 introduced in mitigation of the penalty, and, in cases of murder, 
 to determine the degree. The effect of this provision is to eliminate 
 mere intoxication as a defense in a criminal prosecution, regard- 
 less of the constituent elements of the crime, and to prevent tem- 
 porary insanity produced by intoxication from being a defense, ex- 
 cept in the way of establishing the degree in murder cases, and 
 of mitigating or lessening the penalty in other cases. ^ And under 
 it, mere intoxication from the recent use of ardent spirits will not 
 excuse or mitigate the degree of the crime, unless the intoxication 
 
 sEstes V. State, 55 Ga. 30., ^Marshall's Case, supra. 
 
 iSprins;field v. State, 96 Ala. 81, 38 estate v. Greer, 22 W. Va. 800. 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 85, 11 So. 250. lEvers v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 zUnited States v. King, 34 Fed. 302. 318, 18 L.R.A. 421, 37 Am. St. Rep. 811, 
 
 3Reg. v. Gamlen, 1 Fost. & F. 90; Rex 20 S. W. 744; Lyle v. State, 31 Tex. 
 
 V. Thomas, 7 Car. &, P. 817; Marshall's Crim. Rep. 103, 19 S. W. 903; Williams 
 
 Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 76; State v. Roan, v. State, 25 Tex. App. 76, 7 S. W. 661. 
 122 Iowa, 136, 97 N. W. 997. 
 
§ 550] INSANITY AND DRUNKENNESS. 817 
 
 v^as such as to produce temporary insanity depriving the person 
 of capacity to distinguish between right and wrong as to the par- 
 ticular act charged. ^ And the intoxication must have been operative 
 on the mind of the accused at the time, to the extent of rendering 
 him temporarily insane.® And under it a person committing homi- 
 cide is not entitled to bail merely because of his intoxication at the 
 time of its commission. * Nor should a continuance be granted to 
 procure evideilce that the accused was drunt previous to the homi- 
 cide.'' 
 
 A person committing crime, whose intoxication was so excessive 
 as to render him unconscious that he was doing a wrong act, which 
 would subject him to punishment, however, is not prevented from 
 pleading his condition in defense.® And temporary insanity pro- 
 duced by the voluntary recent use of ardent spirits may be con- 
 sidered in determining the degree of a murder. '' And evidence tend- 
 ing to prove that a person was temporarily insane from the use of 
 ardent spirits at the time of committing a homicide is sufficient to re- 
 quire the submission to the jury of the issue of murder in the second 
 degree;* but it is no defense in a prosecution for murder in the 
 second degree. ® E'er does the statute apply to actual insanity, though 
 it arises from intoxication, but not from the recent use of intoxicat- 
 ing liquors;^" or to delirium tremens, or mania a potu, generally 
 caused by abstinence from liquor after long indulgence, which is 
 an absolute defense. -^^ 
 
 551. Intoxication by way of preparation. — Intoxication or drunken- 
 ness is entitled to no consideration in determining the degree of a 
 
 2Evers v. State, supra; Ex parte 5Sherar v. State, 30 Tex. App. 349, 17 
 
 Evers, 29 Tex. App. 539, 16 S. W. 343; S. W. 621. 
 
 Kelley v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 216, sEvers v. State, 31 Tex. Grim. Rep. 
 
 20 S. W. 357; De Alberts v. State, 34 318, 18 L.R.A. 421, 37 Am. St. Rep. 811, 
 
 Tex. Grim. Rep. 508, 31 S. W. 391 ; Hous- 28 S. W. 744. 
 
 ton V. State, 26 Tex. App. 657, 14 S. W. THouston v. State, 26 Tex. App. 657, 
 
 352; Glore v. State, 26 Tex. App. 624, 10 US. VV. 352; Ex parte Evers, 29 Tex. 
 
 S. W. 242. And see Holloway v. State, App. 539, 16 S. W. 343; Ward v. State, 
 
 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 303, 77 S. W. 14. 19 Tex. App. 664; Rather v. State, 25 
 
 But -nhUe intoxication short of insan- Tex. App. fl'24, 9 S. W. 69. 
 
 ity is not to be regarded by the jury sBurkhard v. State, 18 Tex. App. 599. 
 
 under the Texas statute for any pur- And see Holloway v. State, 45 Tex. Grim, 
 
 pose in a prosecution for crime, if it Rep. 30.3, 77 S. W. 14. 
 
 renders the party incapable of dis- sTippett v. State, 37 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 tincfuiahing between right and wrong as 186, 39 S. W. 120. 
 
 to the particular act done, the jury may lOWard v. State, supra; Rather v. 
 
 regard it in giving a lesser punisliment. State, 25 Tex. App. 623, 9 S. W. 69 : 
 
 but not in an acquittal. Kelley v. Williams v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 53 
 
 State, supra. S. W. 859. 
 
 sGonzalesv. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. nKellev v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 508, 21 S. W. 253. 216, 20 S." W. 357. 
 
 ■lEx parte Evers, supra. 
 Hom. — 52 
 
818 HOMICIDE. (§ 551 
 
 homicide where the slayer drank liquor for the purpose of nerving 
 himself for the deed, or to excite iiis animal courage. ^ Nor is it an 
 excuse where it is done for the purpose of preparing an excuse for 
 the killing.^ In such case culpability is heightened, rather than 
 lessened.^ An instruction assuming that drunkenness at the time 
 of the killing is so inconsistent with malice that it becomes the duty 
 of the state to trace its existence to a period anterior to the drunk- 
 enness, and show affirmatively that the drinking was for the purpose 
 of committing the deed, however, is erroneous ; * though an instruction 
 to the effect that intoxication may be considered on the question of 
 responsibility for homicide may properly be qualified by a statement 
 that if the liquor was taken to enable the accused to carry out a 
 purpose previously formed, it would not reduce the degree of the 
 crime. ° And though the killing was deliberate, and the slayer de- 
 clared that he desired to do it and nerved himself with liquor to do 
 the act and expected to suffer for it, the question as to his legal 
 responsibility for his acts is one for the jury.'' 
 
 iWillis V. Com. 32 Graft. 929 ; Garner sUnited States v. Claypool, 14 Fed. 
 
 V. State, 28 Pla. 113, 29 Am. St. Kep. 127. 
 
 232, 9 So. 835; Blimm v. Com. 7 Bush, estate v. Ashley, 45 La. Ann. 1036, 13 
 
 320; O'Grady v. State, 36 Neb. 320, 54 So. 738. 
 
 N. W. 550; Com. v. MeMurray, 198 Pa. cCom. v. McMurray, 198 Pa. 51, 82 
 
 5], 82 Am. St. Kep. 787, 47 Atl. 952. Am- St. Rep. 787, 47 Atl. 952. 
 
 And see State v. Eobinson, 20 W. Va. ePeople v. Krist, 108 N. Y. 19, 00 N. 
 
 713, 43 Am. Rep. 799. E. 1057. 
 
 2Smith V. Com. 1 Duv. 224; Blimm v. 
 Com. supra. 
 
CHAPTEE XXVI, 
 
 LIMITATION OF THE PROSECUTION. 
 652. Construction and application of statutes. 
 
 552. Construction and application of statutes. — The statutes of the 
 various states, as a general rule, prescribe no limitation of time -with- 
 in which a prosecution for murder, or for wilful murder, may be 
 brought, but prohibit the prosecution of other crimes, including 
 manslaughter, and, in some cases, murder in the lower degrees, after 
 the expiration of a named period of time. ^ These provisions apply 
 and are eilectual in homicide as well as in other criminal matters, 
 and are to be construed liberally in favor of the accused;^ and since 
 the crime of an accessory before the fact in murder is murder, if 
 there is no limitation upon the time of prosecuting murder, the time 
 for the prosecution of the offense of the accessory is not limited.^ 
 So, when the statute places no limitation upon prosecutions for mur- 
 der, murder in the second degree is within the provision of the 
 exemption, as well as murder in the first degree.* 
 
 The question frequently arises, however, as to the effect of a ver- 
 dict for manslaughter or murder in a lower degree in a prosecution 
 for murder in a higher degree, in the absence of a limitation upon 
 murder of that degree, brought after the period of limitation as 
 to manslaughter has expired, the result apparently depending upon 
 the language of the statute in question. Thus, a conviction for mur- 
 der in the third degree under an indictment for murder in the first 
 degree cannot be sustained where the offense was not prosecuted 
 within the period fixed by a statute providing that all offenses not 
 punishable with death shall be prosecuted within a designated period 
 
 iSee People V. Haun, 44 Cal. 96; Nel- The crime of manslaughter is pre- 
 
 Bon V. State, 17 Fla. 195; State v. Cobbs, scriptible in one year from its eommis- 
 
 7La. Ann. 107; People v. Burt, 51 Mich, sion, under the Louisiana statute. 
 
 199, 16 N. W. 378; Rigga v. State, 30 State v. Baker, 30 La. Ann. 1134. 
 Miss. 635; People v. Mather, 4 Wend. sjjelson v. State, supra j White v. 
 
 299, 21 Am. Dec. 122; Carlisle v. State, State, 4 Tex. App. 488. 
 31 Tex. Crim. Kep. 537, 21 S. W. 358. sPeople v. Mather and Carlisle v. 
 
 In State v. Williams, 30 La. Ann. 842, State, supra. 
 it was held that the crime of murder 4People v. Haun, 44 Cal. 96. 
 cannot be prescribed. 
 
 819 
 
820 HOMICIDE. [§ 552 
 
 next after the same shall have been committed;^ in such case, to 
 warrant a conviction the offense must be proved to have been com- 
 mitted within the statutory limitation.® So, where the statute pro- 
 vides that a party indicted for murder may be convicted of any de- 
 gree of manslaughter that the evidence warrants, but that he cannot 
 be convicted of manslaughter unless the indictment was found with- 
 in a designated time after the offense was committed, if the killing 
 occurred more than the designated period before the indictment, the 
 accused cannot be convicted of manslaughter, though charged with 
 murder.''^ And in such case one who was guilty of manslaughter, 
 but convicted of murder, should be discharged on the vacation of 
 the judgment against him, if the right to prosecute him for man- 
 slaughter was outlawed when the proceedings for murder were taken. * 
 So, where a person is indicted for murder and convicted of man- 
 slaughter, under a statute providing that, no person shall be prose- 
 cuted for any offense, except wilful murder, unless indictment shall 
 be found within one year next after the offense shall have been made 
 known to a public oiBcer having power to investigate, unless the 
 accused abscond or flee from justice, the judgment should be arrested 
 if the crime had not been denounced to such an officer within the 
 designated period.^ And in such case no proof can be offered of 
 causes of suspension of prescription, unless the same are averred 
 in the indictment;^" though the arrest of judgment in such a case 
 does not bar another prosecution for manslaughter under a proper 
 indictment averring causes of suspension of prescription.^^ So, 
 under a statute providing that an indictment for any other felony 
 than murder must be found within a designated period after its 
 commission, where an indictment for murder is used as a substi- 
 tute for, and in place of, an indictment for manslaughter, it must 
 contain the averment as to the time which would be essential in an 
 indictment for manslaughter. ^ ^ And prima facie the lapse of time 
 named in the statute is a good defense, and where a statutory ex- 
 ception is relied on, it must be set up and proved by the prosecution. ^ ^ 
 
 sNelson v. State, 17 Pla. 195. waa a fugitive from justice from the 
 
 8 Ibid. time the act charged was committed is 
 
 'Riggs V. State, 30 Miss. 635. admissible in evidence in a prosecution 
 
 sPeopIe V. Burt, 51 Mich. 199, 16 N. for the killing, as affecting the question 
 
 W. 378. of prescription and as to prescriptible 
 
 sState V. Victor, 30 La. Ann. 978; offenses. State v. Williams, 30 La. 
 
 State V. Freeman, 17 La. Ann. 69; State Ann. 842. 
 
 V. Oobbs, 7 La. Ann. 107. uState v. Victor, supra. 
 
 instate V. Victor, supra; State v. laPeople v. Miller, 12 c'al. 291. 
 
 Foster, 7 La. Ann. 256. islbid. 
 That a person charged with homicide 
 
§ 552] LIMITATION OF THE PROSECUTION. 821 
 
 Likewise a statute providing that an indictment for all other felonies 
 except murder may be presented within a designated time after the 
 commission of the offense, and not afterwards, and that murder in- 
 cludes all lesser crimes of culpable homicide, precludes a convic- 
 tion for manslaughter, though on an indictment for murder, 
 where the indictment was not presented within the period of lim- 
 itation. ^ * 
 
 It has been held, however, that a statute providing that an in- 
 dictment for murder may be found any time after, but that other 
 indictments must be found within, a designated period, simply limits 
 the finding of an indictment; and where it is also provided that, 
 upon an indictment for any offense consisting of different degrees, 
 the jury may find the accused guilty of any lesser degree than that 
 charged, a person charged with murder may be found guilty of man- 
 slaughter, though the indictment was found after the expiration of the 
 period of limitation prescribed for manslaughter. ^ ^ And where the 
 statute requires indictment or presentment for manslaughter to be 
 found within a designated period, if the state moves against the offen- 
 der within the prescribed time by presenting an indictment on which a 
 jury are authorized to return a verdict for manslaughter, it is suffi- 
 cient to stop the running of the statute though the indictment was 
 for murder, and not manslaughter.^^ 
 
 idWhite V. state, 4 Tex. App. 488. committed within the statutory limita- 
 
 And it is not necessary for the ac- tion. Ibid. 
 
 CTised in a prosecution for homicide to lePeople v. Dowling, 1 N. Y. Crim. 
 
 plead the defense of limitation; the Eep. 529. 
 
 onus is on the state to prove an offense is State v. Diskin, 35 La. Ann. 46. 
 
CHAPTEE XXVIL 
 
 JURISDICTION. 
 
 I. Application of general kules of ckiminal law. 
 
 553. Generally applicable. 
 
 II. Cause of death and result in different jurisdictions. 
 
 554. General rules. 
 
 555. Statutory provision as to. 
 
 I. ApPLICATIOIsr OF GENEEAL EULES OF CRIMINAL IiA\7. 
 
 553. Generally applicable. — General rules of criminal law with 
 reference to jurisdiction apply in homicide cases. The only differ- 
 ence between rules with reference to homicide cases and the general 
 rules arises from questions with relation to the effect of acts per- 
 formed in one jurisdiction which result in death in a different ju- 
 risdiction. The mere fact of removal of the body of the person 
 killed after death does not affect jurisdiction or venue, and where 
 the proof in a prosecution for homicide tends to show that the ac- 
 cused killed the deceased in the county in which the indictment was 
 returned, and afterwards removed the body to another county in 
 which it was found, a verdict finding him guilty under such indict- 
 ment will not be reversed because of failure of proof of venue. ^ And 
 where the evidence is circumstantial, tending to show that the deceased 
 was killed in the county where the indictment was found and his 
 body thrown into a river in which it was afterwards discovered in 
 another county, with marks and bruises upon it corresponding with 
 the evidence as to the method of the death, the venue of the crime and 
 the corpus delicti are questions of fact for the determination of the 
 jury, and the refusal of an affirmative charge as to such points is not 
 erroneous.^ 
 
 II. Cause of death and result in different jurisdictions. 
 
 554. General rules — In early times and at common law, where an 
 act causing death occurred in one jurisdiction and the death itself 
 resulted in another, it was doubtful whether the crime should be prose- 
 
 iKeith V. state, 157 Ind. 376, 61 N. aVaugtn v. State, 130 Ala. 18, 30 So. 
 E. 716. 609. 
 
 822 
 
S 5545 JUEISDICTION. 823 
 
 cuted in either jurisdiction. But the more common opinion was 
 that it might be indicted where the stroke was given. * In view of 
 this uncertainty and to remedy it, it was provided by statute at an 
 early day that where the stroke and the death occurred in different 
 counties, venue in an indictment for murder should be in the county 
 where the death took place. ^ And some of the American cases 
 adopting this statute as a part of the common law have held the rule 
 to be that when a person is injured in one jurisdiction and dies of 
 his injuries in another jurisdiction the person who inflicted them is 
 triable for the homicide, not in the place where they were inflicted, 
 but in the place of death. ^ Though where a wound was inflicted in 
 one state and death took place in another state, an indictment where 
 the stroke was given is valid.* And where an act is performed out- 
 side of a country or state, which results in death inside of it, it has 
 been asserted that the courts of the country or state have jurisdic- 
 tion of the offense, on the principle that a man who does a criminal 
 act in one jurisdiction may be held liable for its continuous opera- 
 tion in another.'' Under this view the principle that a crime com- 
 mitted in a foreign country in violation of the laws thereof cannot, 
 by mere legislative fiction or construction, be construed as an offense 
 In another country, cannot be applied to a case where a crime is 
 perpetrated partly in one state or country and partly in another, 
 where the act done in the country taking jurisdiction amounted to 
 a substantive wrong, and not merely to an incident thereof, which 
 of itself might be innocent." By the greater number of American 
 eases, however, the common law as adopted in this country has been 
 deemed to include the original rule only, and the rule as applied here 
 was held to be that where a mortal wound is inflicted in one juris- 
 
 iSee State v. McCoy, 8 Rob. (La.) 2See United States v. Guiteau, and 
 
 547, 44 Am. Dee. 301 ; State v. Cum- State v. McCoy, supra. 
 
 raings, 5 La. Ann. 330; United States v. 3Com. v. Linton, 2 Va. Gas. 205; Tyler 
 
 Guiteau, 1 Mackey, 498, 47 Am. Eep. v. People, 8 Mich. 320. 
 
 247; Com. v. Macloon, 101 Mass. 1, l'>0 4State v. McCoy, 8 Rob. (La.) 545, 
 
 Am. Dec. 89; Stoughton v. State, 13 41 Am. Dec. 301. 
 
 Sraedes & M. 255; Ex parte McNeeley, sCom. v. Macloon, 101 Mass. 1, 100 
 
 36 W. Va. 84, 15 L.R.A. 226, 32 Am. St. Am. Dec. 89; Com. v. Parker, 2 Pick. 
 
 Eep. 831, 14 S. E. 436; United States v. 550. 
 
 M'Gill, 4 Dall. 426, 1 L. ed. 894, Fed. In United States v. Armstrong, 2 
 
 Cas. No. 15,676. Curt. C. C. 446, Fed. Cas. No. 14,467, it 
 
 At common law, murder consisted of was held that no act of Congress makes 
 
 the stroke and the consequent death, punishable an unlawful stroke on the 
 
 and the concurrence of both was neces- sea, without malice, followed by death 
 
 sary for the consummation of the crime, on shore, but that the guilty person 
 
 and where they occurred in different might be convicted of an assault with a 
 
 jurisdictions the offense was incomplete dangerous weapon, 
 
 in either. State v. McCoy, 8 Rob. (La.) eQreen v. State, 66 Ala. 40, 41 Am. 
 
 545, 41 Am. Dee. 301. Eep. 744; Com. v. Macloon, suyra. 
 
824 HOMICIDE. [§ 554 
 
 diction, and death afterwards ensues in another jurisdiction, it is 
 not the place of death, but the place where the criminal act was per- 
 petrated or oonsummated, the courts of which have jurisidiction to try 
 the case.'' Within this rule the crime of murder consists in inflict- 
 ing a fatal wound, coupled with the requisite intent or design which 
 legally renders it felonious, the subsequent death of the injured 
 party being a result or consequence, rather than a constituent ele- 
 mental part of the crime.* But an information charging a person 
 with making a felonious assault at a specified time and place upon 
 another person, and then and there murdering him, will not sup- 
 port a conviction for murder on evidence that the person assaulted 
 died at a later time and at another place.® 
 
 So, among the exceptions to the general rule that penal laws are 
 strictly local, which are now well settled, is the principle that where 
 one, being in one jurisdiction, does a criminal act which takes ef- 
 fect in another, the act is deemed to have been committed in the 
 latter jurisdiction, and the courts of that jurisdiction are authorized 
 to try the case. ^ " Thus a man standing without the lines of a state, 
 and discharging a shot over the line, and killing a person vsdthin the 
 state, is punishable for the crime by the courts of that state, ^ ^ and, 
 
 TState V. Carter, 27 N. J. L. 499; death. The other is that the shot that 
 
 Hunter v. State, 40 N. J. L. 495; Green planted the bullet is the wrong. With 
 
 V. State, supra; United States v. it the prisoner's action began and ended. 
 
 Guiteau, 1 Maekey, 498, 47 Am. Rep. The suffering and dying are acts, not 
 
 247; Roach v. State, 34 Ga. 78; State v. his, but acts of the deceased; mere 
 
 Bowen, 16 Kan. 475; State v. Foster, 8 consequences or results of his act. He 
 
 La. Ann. 290, 58 Am. 'Dec. 678 ; State v. is answerable only because he started 
 
 Fields, 51 La. Ann. 1239, 26 So. 99; the force causing death; that he struck 
 
 State V. Kelly, 76 Me. 331, 49 Am. Rep. no blow in this state and committed no 
 
 620; People v. Tyler, 7 Mich. 161, .74 breach of her peace or sovereignty." 
 
 Am. Dec. 703; Stout v. State, 76 Md. Ex parte McNeeley, 36 W Va. 84, 15 
 
 317, 25 Atl. 299; State v. Gessert, 21 L.R.A. 226, 32 Am. St. Rep. 831, 14 S. 
 
 Minn. 369; State v. Blunt, 110 Mo. 322, E. 436. 
 
 19 S. W. 650 ; State v. Garrison, 147 Mo. sGreen v. State, 66 Ala. 40, 41 Am. 
 
 548, 49 S. W. 508; Robbins v. State, 8 Rep. 744, following Re.x v. Hargrave, 5 
 
 Ohio St. 133; Riley v. State, 9 Humph. Car. & P. 170. 
 646. sChapman v. People, 39 Mich. 357. 
 
 Two lines of reasoning have been ap- loState v. Cutshall, 110 N. G. 538, 16 
 plied to cases of this class: "One is L.R.A. 130, 15 S. E. 261; State v. Cha- 
 that while the blow is the beginning in pin, 17 Ark. 561, 65 Am. Dec. 452. 
 the criminal transaction, it is only the A person from whose acts death re- 
 beginning. The wound is because of suits may be considered as present at the 
 the wrong in planting the bullet in the place where his acts become operative, 
 body, that wrong yet operating towards Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 321. 
 the consummation, which is the death; uState v. Grady, 34 Conn. 118; Peo- 
 that the prisoner's agency is yet active pie v. Adams, 3 Denio, 190, 45 Am. Dec. 
 in all this in the languishing, in the de- 468 ; State v. Wyckoff, 31 N. J. L. 65 ; 
 cay of the physical strength, in the State v. Hall, 114 N. C. 909, 28 L.R.A. 
 dying by reason of his wrong that start- 59, 41 Am. St. Rep. 822, 19 S. E. 602, 113 
 ed the process ending in death; and N. C. 811, 28 L.R.A. 289, 44 Am. St. 
 that its energy ceased not for a moment Rep. 501, 20 S. E. 729. 
 until death; and that this caused the 
 
§ 55i] JURISDICTION. 825 
 
 in the absence of statutory enactment, not by those «5f the state in 
 which the shot was fired. ■'^ And where a gun is fired from land 
 and kills a man at sea, the offense must be tried by the admiralty, and 
 not by the common-law, courts, the crime being committed where 
 the death occurs, and not at the place from whence the cause of 
 death proceeds.''* And no difference exists between the case of 
 a murder committed by means of a gun discharged at sea from a ves- 
 sel, shooting a person on shore, and by means of a boat's crew de- 
 spatched for that purpose. ^ * So, where a man on board an American 
 ship shoots and kills a person on board a foreign ship, the crime 
 is within the jurisdiction of the foreign government, and not of 
 the courts of the United States. ^ '^ And the same rule applies to the 
 act of a person in one jurisdiction of killing a person in another 
 jurisdiction by the employment of an innocent agent therein. ^ ® And 
 a person who was in one jurisdiction at the time a murder was com- 
 mitted across the line in another jurisdiction may be tried as an aider 
 and abetter in the latter jurisdiction, where he rendered substantial 
 aid and shared in the criminal intent. ' ^ So, an attempt to commit 
 a murder in. another state, supposed by the guilty party to have been 
 there successful, but in reality completed in the state, though by an 
 act not intended or believed to be in consummation of the original 
 purpose, is punishable in the state, though the rule would be other- 
 wise if the crime had been completed out of the state, and its result • 
 had been death in the state. ^* Persons guilty of such acts are 
 
 12 State V. Hallj supra. a person in another jurisdiction, and of 
 
 isPeople v. Adams, supra; Coombe's planning its execution in the former 
 
 Case, 1 East, P. C. 367, 1 Leach, C. L. jurisdiction, and enticing the deceased 
 
 388. from it into the latter jurisdiction, pur- 
 
 In United States v. M'Gill, 4 Dall. suant to such conspiracy, and there 
 
 426, 1 L. ed. 894, Fed. Cas. No. 15,676, actually murdering him, is valid under 
 
 however, it was held that to constitute a statute providing that when a crime 
 
 the crime of murder on the high seas the is committed pajtly in one county and 
 
 stroke must be given and death happen partly in another, and the acts or facts 
 
 thereon, and that where a wound is giv- thereof constituting, or requisite to, the 
 
 en on the sea and death does not result consummation of the offense occurred in 
 
 until the removal of the injured person two or more counties, the jurisdiction is 
 
 to the shore, the offense is not cogniz- in either county. People v. Thorn, 21 
 
 able in a Federal court. Misc. 130, 47 N. Y. Supp. 46. 
 
 KUnited States v. Furlong, 5 Wheat. is Jackson v. Com. 100 Ky. 239, 6 Am. 
 
 184, 5 L. ed. 64. St. Rep. 336, 38 S. W. 422, 1091. 
 
 isUnited States v. Davis, 2 Sumn. In such case the motive which inspired 
 
 482, Fed. Cas. No. 14,932. the attempted crime in the former juris- 
 
 isLindsey v. State, 38 Ohio St. 512; diction, and the circumstances of the at- 
 
 State V. Wyckoff, 31 N. J. L. 65. tempt, ma}' be considered in a prosecu- 
 
 1 'Hatfield v. Com. 11 Ky. L. Rep. tion for the killing in the latter juris- 
 
 468, 12 S. W. 309. ' diction with a view to determining the 
 
 And an indictment charging persons criminality of the ultimate act which 
 
 with conspiring in the jurisdiction in took place in the latter jurisdiction and 
 
 which the bill was found, to murder caused death. iDid. 
 
826 HOMICIDE. [§ 554 
 
 liable to indictment and punishment when tliey venture voluntarily 
 within the territorial limits of the offended sovereignty, or whenever 
 they may be brought there under the provisions of the extradition 
 laws or otherwise. ^ " 
 
 While the question of the territorial limits of a parish is probably 
 one of law, questions as to the place where a mortal blow was given, 
 and whether it was within or without the parish, are questions of 
 fact. 2" 
 
 555. Statutory provision as to — The statutes of a large number of 
 the states have provided, in words or in substance, that when the 
 commission of an offense commences elsewhere and is consummated 
 within the boundaries of the state, the offender is liable to punishment 
 in it, although he was out of it at the time of the commission of the 
 offense charged, if he consummated it in the state by some means 
 proceeding directly from himself; and the jurisdiction in such case, 
 unless otherwise provided for by law, is in the county in which the 
 offense is consummated.^ And statutory provisions that, if a person 
 be stricken or poisoned out of the state or county, and die by reason 
 thereof within the state or county, the offender may be prosecuted 
 and punished as if the mortal stroke had been given, or the poison 
 administered, in the county where the person so stricken or poi- 
 soned may so die, exist in a number of the states and give jurisdic- 
 tion to the courts of the latter state or comity to try the offender.^ 
 The constitutionality of such statutes has been uniformly sustained, 
 both upon the ground that the principle of law that a state or politi- 
 cal division cannot punish an act done outside of its territory does 
 not apply to cases in which a crime is perpetrated partly in one ju- 
 risdiction and partly in another,^ and that they constitute the act 
 
 isstate V. Cutshall, 110 N. C. 538, 16 county where the venue is laid. Terri- 
 L.R.A. 130, 15 S. E. 261. tory v. Hicks, 6 N. M. 596, 30 Pac. 872. 
 
 20State V. Foster, 8 La. Ann. 290, 58 ^Ex parte McNeeley, 36 W. Va. 84, 15 
 Am. Dec. 678. L.R.A. 226, 32 Am. St. Rep. 831, 14 S. 
 
 iSee Green v. State, 66 Ala. 40, 41 Am. E. 436; Stout v. State, supra; Com. v. 
 Rep. 744; State v. Kelly, 76 Me. 331, 49 Macloon, 101 Mass. 1, 100 Am. Dec. 89; 
 Am. Rpp. 620; Stout v. State, 76 Md. ^y'"'' J; People, 8 Mich. 320. 
 317, 25 Atl. 299; Stoughton v. State, 13 . ^J^ otout v. State, supra, such a pro- 
 Smedes & M. 255; Turner v. State, 28 ^'^'°? relating to counties was held to 
 Miss. 684; State v. Caldwell, 115 N. C. ?,*'„/"°Py declaratory of the common 
 7nd 90 S P 'i9-i ' " *"'''■'' "^^ principle applies 
 
 ^tJ rVr'wv,' • 1 • -1 equally where the mortal blow or poison 
 
 To establish the venue in a homicide ' „ „,■,,„„ ;„ , „ + • .if "' F"'="" 
 
 , . , , , J ■ /!• i 1 ■ ^^"•^ given in a county in the state, an'l 
 
 case in which the wound was indicted in +i,„ „arQnn ^t^i„\-^„ ^~ „■ j j-\3 ■ 
 
 . ,. ,. J 1 ji_ , • ^"'^ person stricken or poisoned died in 
 
 one jurisdiction and death occurred m consequence thereof out of the state 
 another, it is sufficient under such a =Ex parte McNeeley, and Com' v 
 
 provision to prove that the person Macloon, sapra; Com. v. Parker 2 Pick 
 
 charged to have been killed died in the 550; Tyler v. People, supra. ' 
 
§ 555] JURISDICTION. 827 
 
 murder within the jurisdiction,* the principle being that each state 
 may protect her own citizens in the enjoyment of life, libsrty, and 
 property by determining what acts within her own limits shall be 
 deemed criminal, and by punishing the causes of those acts, the 
 right of punishment extending not only to persons who commit in- 
 fractions of the criminal law within the state, but also to all persons 
 who cause such infractions as are, in contemplation of law, within 
 the state." And such provisions are not in conflict with provisions 
 of the Federal Constitution that trial shall be held in the state where 
 the crime was committed, they applying only to proceedings in the 
 United States courts for offenses against the United States;" and 
 they apply to foreigners, as well as to citizens.^ But such provisions 
 do not apply to offenses committed and consummated without the 
 state, though the means by which they were committed and consum- 
 mated were within the state.® Nor do they apply where the injury 
 which caused the death was inflicted by one foreigner upon another 
 on board a foreign vessel upon the high seas, so that if death had 
 then and there followed, no offense cognizable by the laws of the 
 country would have taken place.® And under the theory that mur- 
 der consists of the act of causing death, and that the languishing and 
 death constitute no part of it, it has been held that they do not em- 
 brace cases where the injury was inflicted within a foreign jurisdic- 
 tion, without any act done by the accused within the jurisdiction of 
 the courts of the state, since to thus apply them would give the 
 courts of the state jurisdiction over all subjects of all governments, 
 with power to try and punish them if possession of their persons 
 could be obtained, where personal injuries were followed by death. ^^ 
 So, where the statute provides that in case of injury in one juris- 
 diction and resulting death in another an indictment shall be found 
 at the place where the death occurs, an indictment in the juris- 
 diction in which the blow was struck cannot be sustained. ^ ^ And a 
 
 4Tyler v. People, supra; State v. Cald- indictment, and providing that every 
 
 well, 115 N. C. 794, 20 S. E. 523. indictment shall be found by a desig- 
 
 sjohns V. State, 19 Ind. 421, 81 Am. nated number of freemen of the county 
 
 Dec. 408. where the crime was committed. Ex 
 
 estate v. Caldwell, supra. And see parte Slater, 72 Mo. 102. 
 
 Ex parte McNeeley, SSS W. Va. 84, 15 'State v. Caldwell, 115 N. C. 794, 20 
 
 L.R.A. 226, 32 Am. St. Rep. 831, 14 S. S. E. 523. 
 
 E. 436. 8 Stewart v. Jessup, 51 Ind. 413, 19 
 
 But a statutory provision authorizing Am. Rep. 739. 
 
 the finding of an indictment under cer- sReg. v. Lewis, 7 Cox, C. C. 277. 
 
 tain circumstances in a county other lo State v. Carter, 27 N. J. L. 499. 
 
 than that in which the homicide charged uSee Stoughton v. State, 13 Smedes 
 
 was committed is unconstitutional and & M. 255; Riggs v. State, 26 Miss. 51; 
 
 void under a constitutional provision Turner v. State, 28 Miss. 687. 
 requiring the prosecution of homicide by 
 
828 HOMICIDE. [§ 555 
 
 statutory provision that designated persons performing specified acts, 
 by which the life of any person is destroyed, shall be guilty of man- 
 slaughter, malies the destruction of life the essence of the offense, 
 and where such act is performed within one jurisdiction and it 
 results in death of the person in another jurisdiction, the offense is 
 triable in the latter, and not in the former, jurisdiction. ^ ^ 
 
 So, statutes existing in some of the states providing that when 
 a public offense has been committed partly in one county and partly 
 in another, or the acts or effects constituting or requisite to the con- 
 summation of the offense occur in two or more counties, the jurisdic- 
 tion is in either, are not unconstitutional. ^ ^ And when a person is 
 seized and bound in one county in pursuance of a conspiracy to 
 kill him, there formed, and taken into another county in which the 
 killing is consummated, the case is triable in either county imder such 
 a provision. ^ * ISTor is it essential in such case to the validity of an. 
 indictment for homicide caused by a mortal blow given in one 
 parish, death ensuing in another, that such fact shall be averred; 
 the crime may be charged to have been committed in the parish where 
 the bill is found. ^ ^ And a charge that a murder was committed in 
 the county where the indictment was found is sustained by proof of 
 death in another county. ^ ® But the statute will not be construed to 
 include a trial for a homicide resulting from blows inflicted before 
 its enactment.-^'' And where a blow is struck in one jurisdiction and 
 death results in another jurisdiction, and a court of one of them first 
 takes cognizance of the case, its jurisdiction is exclusive. ^ ® And the 
 same rule applies to a statute with reference to a killing which might 
 have been in either of several jurisdictions. ^ ® A crime is partly com- 
 mitted in each of two different jurisdictions within the meaning of 
 such an act, where an intent to kill was formed and there was de- 
 liberation and premeditation in one jurisdiction, and the killing was 
 done in another. ^'* 
 
 So, a statute authorizing a prosecution for murder in the juris- 
 diction in which the fatal blow was struck, though the victim died 
 in another jurisdiction, is valid and constitutional.^^ And a homi- 
 
 i2Re Doig, 4 Fed. 193. "State v. Sweat, 16 S. C. 624. 
 
 13 Archer v. State, 106 Ind. 426, 7 N. isgtate v. Pauley, 12 Wis. 537; Cole- 
 
 E. 225; State v. Pauley, 12 Wig. 537. man v. State, supra. 
 And see State v. Jones, 38 La. Ann. 792. lOWatt v. People, 126 111. 9, 1 L.R.A. 
 
 "Archer v. State, supra. 403, 18 N. E. 340. 
 
 leState V. Jones, supra. zoPeopIe w Thorn, 21 Misc. 130 47 
 
 isColeman v. State, 83 Miss. 290, 64 N. Y. Supp. 46. 
 L.E,.A. 807, 35 So. 937. aiGreen v. State, 06 Ala. 40, 41 Am.- 
 
§ 555] JURISDICTION. 820 
 
 cide is committed in the county where the fatal blow was given, 
 regardless of the time or place of the death of the deceased, within 
 the meaning of a statute providing for the trial of all criminal ac- 
 tions in the county where the offense was committed. ^^ And under 
 a statute providing that all persons who commit, in whole or in 
 part, a crime within the state are liable to punishment under its 
 laws, one who sends a disguised poison by mail in the state with 
 the intent to take the life of a person residing in another state, who 
 died there from the effect of the poison, is triable therefore within 
 the state in the same way, and in the same courts, and by the same 
 procedure, as if death had occurred vsdthin the state. ^* 
 
 Rep. 744; Hunter v. State, 40 N. J. L. tain county, to allege the place of the 
 495. death of the deceased in order to fix the 
 
 22State V. Baldwin, 15 Wash. 15, 45 place of jurisdiction. State v. Bald- 
 Pac. 650. And see Albright v. Terri- win, supra. 
 toiy, 11 Okla. 497, 69 Pac. 789. 23People v. Botkin, 132 Cal. 231. 84 
 
 And in such case it is not necessary. Am. St. Rep. 39, 64 Pac. 286. 
 in an inionnation for homicide in a cer- ' • - 
 
CHAPTER XXVIII. 
 
 PLEADING, INFORMATION, AND INDICTIMENT. 
 
 I. Application op genekal kiiles of ckiminal law. 
 550. Treatment limited to special matters. 
 II. General rules as to effect of statutes on indictments. 
 557. Retention of common-law rules. 
 
 III. Averment of fact of killing. 
 
 55S. General rules. 
 
 559. Time of act causing death. 
 
 560. Time of death. 
 
 561. Place of act causing death. 
 
 562. Place of death. 
 
 IV. Averment of manner of killing. 
 
 563. General ond common-law rules as to necessity of. 
 56-1. Statutory rules. 
 
 505. Description of instrument or means of death. 
 566. Use of instruments or means of death. 
 537. The question of variance. 
 568. Description of wound or injury. 
 
 V. Description of deceased. 
 
 569-. Name and personal characteristics. 
 VI. Condition of mind; motive. 
 
 570. Malice. 
 
 571. Intent to kill. 
 
 572. Deliberation and premeditation. 
 
 573. Wilfully, feloniously, and unlawfully. 
 VII. Homicide in commission of another crime. 
 
 a. General rules. 
 
 574. Necessity of charging collateral felony. 
 
 575. Effect of charge of collateral felony. 
 
 576. Unlawful acts not amounting to felony generally. 
 
 b. Particular felonies or unlawful acts. 
 
 577. Resisting arrest or official action. 
 
 578. Negligent homicide. 
 
 C79. Abortion or attempted abortion generally. 
 
 580. Abortion under special statutory provisions. 
 VIII. Participation in the act of another. 
 
 581. Aiders and abetters. 
 
 582. Accessories. 
 
 583. Coconspirators. 
 
 8S0 
 
§ 556] PLEADING, INFORMATION, AND INDICTMENT. 831 
 
 I. Application of gei^eral eules of ceiminal law. 
 556. Treatment limited to special matters — The general rules of 
 criminal law as to indictments and pleas apply in hojTji/"'de cases, 
 and here as elsewhere an indictment must coniam a statement of 
 the acts constituting the offense in the ordinary concise language, 
 and in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding 
 to know what is intended; and it must be direct and certain as re- 
 gards the party and offense charged when they are necessary to con- 
 stitute a complete offense; but the trial, judgment, or other proceed- 
 ings thereon cannot be affected by any defect which does not tend to 
 prejudice the substantial rights of the accused on the merits. ^ And it 
 is sufficient if a man of ordinary intelligence can understand from 
 it that a mortal injury was inflicted with felonious intent, of which 
 the wounded person died within a year and a day from its infliction.^ 
 And here as elsewhere it is not necessary in an indictment to nega- 
 tive matters of defense, such as insanity, or self-defense, or other 
 justification, or to allege provocation and hot blood, the ofl3ce of which 
 is to mitigate the offense.^ A consideration of the whole subject of 
 criminal pleading, therefore, will not be here attempted ; all that 
 will be sought to be shown in this chapter are such rules of law 
 with reference to indictments and pleas as differ, because of the fact 
 that they are applied in homicide cases, from the rules of law ap- 
 plicable in other criminal cases in general. 
 
 II. Geneeal eules as to effect of statutes on indictments. 
 
 557. Retention of common-law rules — The general rule has been 
 laid down that statutes defining homicide and dividing it into de- 
 grees do not affect the common-law rules as to pleading.* Under this 
 rule, every averment that is substantially necessary for the informa- 
 tion of the accused, so that he may know the particular circum- 
 stances of the charge alleged against him, and how to defend himself, 
 is still necessary, as at common law,^ though they need not be stated 
 with the particularity required at common law;^ and the language 
 
 iWhito V. Com. 9 Bush, 178; People Jerry v. State, 1 Blackf. 395; Dillon v. 
 
 V. Wallaoe, 9 Cal. 30 ; People v. Lloyd, 9 State, 9 Ind. 408 ; Snell v. State, 50 Ind. 
 
 Cal. 55; People v. Cox, 9 Cal. 32; Peo- 516. 
 pie V. Dolan, 9 Cal. 576. iPeople v. Lloyd, 9 Cal. 54; People v. 
 
 speople V. Dolan, supra; People v. Dolan, 9 Cal. 578; Metealfs v. Com. 27 
 
 Cronin, 34 Cal. 200; People v. Murphy, Ky. L. Rep. 704, 86 S. W. 534; People v. 
 
 39 Cal. 55; People v. Davis, 73 Cal. 355, Willett, 102 N. Y. 251, 6 N. E. 301; Jen- 
 
 15 Pac. 8: McConnell v. State, 22 TeK. nings v. State, 7 Tex. App. 350. 
 App. 354, 58 Am. Rep. 648, 3 S. W. 699. aPeople v. Lloyd, supra. 
 
 aFahnestock v. State, 23 Ind. 231; sPeople v. Dolan, supra. 
 
832 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 [§ 557 
 
 of the statute, except, in particular cases, need not be followed. * And 
 there is an extensive holding that where the statute divides murder 
 into dilBferent degrees, specifying what constitutes each degree, a con- 
 viction for murder in the first or any other degree is regular, al- 
 though the indictment is simply in the common-law form, without 
 any further charge or description corresponding with the statute.^ 
 But an indictment for manslaughter must conform either to the 
 common law or to the statute, one which conforms with neither being 
 insufficient. ® 
 
 The sufficiency of an indictment, however, is not to be tested by 
 the rules of the common law, but by the requirements of the statute. "^ 
 And the rule which would appear to be the prevailing one, and 
 which is, at least, gaining in favor, is that when the statute creating 
 degrees of homicide makes anything an element of any particular 
 degree of murder or homicide which was not so at common law, 
 that element must be alleged and proved as an independent fact; 
 and if this is not done it can only be regarded as a charge of homicide 
 of a degree not including such element.® And to sustain a convic- 
 
 4Gratz V. Com. 96 Ky. 162, 28 S. W. 
 159; Territory v. Vialpando, 8 N. M. 211, 
 42 Pac. 64. 
 
 BGehrke v. State, 13 Tex. 568; Wall 
 V. State, 18 Tex. 682, 70 Am. Dee. 302; 
 White V. State, 16 Tex. 206; MeAdams 
 V. State, '25 Ark. 405 ; People v. Bonilla, 
 38 Cal. 699 ; People v. Lloyd, 9 Cal. 54 ; 
 Hill V. People, 1 Colo. 436; Fannestock 
 V. State, 23 Ind. 231: State v. Verrill, 
 64 Me. 408 ; Davis v. State, 39 Md. 355 ; 
 Green v. Com. 12 Allen, 155; Com. v. 
 Desmarteau, 16 Gray, 1 ; Com. v. Herty, 
 109 Mass. 348; Cargen v. People, 39 
 Mich. 549; State v. Lessing, 16 Minn. 75, 
 Gil. 64; Territory v. Stears, 2 Mont. 
 324; State v. Millain, 3 Nev. 409; State 
 V. Pike, 49 N. H. 399, 6 Am. Eep. 533; 
 Tenario v. Territory, 1 N. M.' 279 ; Peo- 
 ple V. Sullivan, 173 N. Y. 122, 63 L.E.A. 
 353, 93 Am. St. Rep. 582, 65 N. E. 989; 
 Cox V. People, 80 N. Y. 500; Fitzgerald 
 V. People, 49 Barb. 122, 37 N. Y. 413; 
 People V. McDonnell, 92 N. Y. 657 ; Peo- 
 ple V. Butler, 3 Park. Crim. Rep. 377; 
 Keefe v. People, 40 N. Y. 348 ; People v. 
 Osmond, 138 N. Y. 80. 33 N. E. 739: 
 Kennedy v. People, 39 N. Y. 245; Com. 
 V. Flanagan, 7 Watts & S. 415; White 
 v. Com. 6 Binn. 183, 6 Am. Dec. 443; 
 Taylor v. State, 11 Lea, 708: Hines v. 
 State, 8 Humph. 597 ; Mitchell v. State, 
 5 Yerg. 340; Com. v. Miller, 1 Va. Cas. 
 310; Wicka v. Com. 2 Va. Cas. 387; 
 
 Cluverius v. Com. 81 Va. 787 ; Kibler v. 
 Com. 94 Va. 804, 26 S. E. 858; Living- 
 ston V. Com. 14 Gratt. 592; Bull v. Com. 
 14 Gratt. 613; Thompson v. Com. 20 
 Gratt. 730; Com. v. Gibson, 2 Va. Cas. 
 70; Leschi v. Territory, 1 Wash. Terr. 
 14. 
 
 An indictment charging murder in the 
 common-law form in a state in which 
 the statute divides murder into degrees 
 is not insufficient and invalid under a 
 constitutional provision that in all 
 prosecutions the accxised shall be in- 
 formed of the nature and cause of the 
 accvisation. Graves v. State, 45 N. J. 
 L. 203. 
 
 eNichols v. State, 46 Miss. 284. 
 
 7People V. Davis, 73 Cal. 353, 15 Pac. 
 8; People v. Murphy, 39 Cal. 52; People 
 V. Cronin, 34 Cal. 200. 
 
 RSee Jewell v. Territory, 4 Okla. 53, 
 45 Pac. 1075 ; Dias v. State, 7 Blackf. 20, 
 39 Am. Dec. 448; Davis v. State, 39 Md. 
 355; Fonts v. State, 8 Ohio St. 98; Kain 
 V. State, 8 Ohio St. 306 ; Cravey v. State, 
 36 Tex. Crim. Rep. 90, 61 Am. St. Rep. 
 833, 35 S. W. 658. 
 
 Where a statute creates an offense, 
 or increa.ses the punishment of an of- 
 fense, an indictment founded upon such 
 offense must aver the circumstances 
 which constitute the increased offense, 
 or which effect the increase in punish- 
 ment. Davis V. State, supra. 
 
I 557} PLEADING, INFORMATION AND INDICTJMENT. 833 
 
 tion for any particular degree of homicide the indictment and proof 
 must show the existence of the statutory ingredients of that degree. " 
 And a common-law indictment for manslaughter is not sufficient un- 
 der a statute defining manslaughter to be voluntary homicide com- 
 mitted under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from 
 an adequate cause, but neither justified nor excused by law, since 
 that definition of manslaughter differs materially from the common- 
 law definition. ^ ** So, to constitute a good indictment for murder in 
 a particular degree the necessary facts must be charged; it is not 
 sufficient merely to call it murder in that degree;^ ^ though, where 
 the statute provides, like that of Connecticut, that in all indictments 
 for murder the degree of the crime shall be charged, murder in 
 the first degree may be charged in two ways, either by alleging that 
 the murder was committed wilfully, deliberately, and premeditatedly, 
 or by adding to the common-law indictment that it was murder in 
 the first degree. ^ ^ And such statutes are within legislative power, ^ * 
 and do not conflict with constitutional or statutory provisions that 
 the degree of a murder is to be found by the jury. ^ * An indictment 
 for any grade of homicide in the langauge of the statute defining 
 it, however, is sufficient ; ^ ^ the language used sufficiently indicating 
 the grade to be that which the statute defines. ■'■ ® And it is not nec- 
 essary to use the very words of the statute defining the offense; it 
 is sufficient if those used convey the same meaning, ^ '' though it has 
 been held that if the language of the statutes is not followed, words 
 
 ?Fouts V. State, 4 G. Greene, 501. L. J. 279; O'Kelly v. Territory, 1 Or. 
 
 lojennings v. State, 7 Tex. App. 350. 51; Cathcart v. Com. 37 Pa. 108; Peter- 
 But a common-law indictment for son v. State, 12 Tex. App. 650 ; Dwyer v. 
 manslaughter is good in a prosecution State, 12 Tex. App. 535; State v. Doug- 
 for manslaughter under the Ohio stat- lass, 41 W. Va. 537, 23 S. E. 724; State 
 ute. Sutcliffe v. State, 18 Ohio, 469, 51 v. Flanagan, 26 W. Va. 116. And see 
 Am. Dec. 459. State v. Sheppard, 49 W. Va. 582, 39 S. 
 
 iiState V. McCormick, 27 Iowa, 402; K. 676; Nabors v. State, 120 Ala. 323 
 Pouts V. State, 8 Ohio St. 98. 25 So. 529. 
 
 12 State V. Hamlin, 47 Conn. 95, 36 And the reasons for the technical eon- 
 Am. Rep. 54; State v. Smith, 38 Conn, elusion of indictments for murder all 
 393; Smith v. State, 50 Conn. 193. disappear under the statute defining the 
 
 isCom. V. Ibrahim, 184 Mass. 255, 68 degrees of murder, and providing that 
 N. E. 231. ' the jury shall designate the degree in 
 
 I4lbid. their verdict. Territory v. Young, 5 
 
 i5PeopIe V. Dolan, 9 Cal. 576; People Mont. 242, 5 Pac. 248. 
 V. Murray, 10 Cal. 309; People v. De isGraves v. State, supra. 
 La Cour Soto, 63 Cal. 165; People v. "Davis v. Utah, 151 U. S. 262, 38 L. 
 Hyndman, 99 Cal. 1, 33 Pac. 782; ed. 153, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 328; Leschi r. 
 Bilansky V. State, 3 Minn. 427, Gil. 313 ; Territory, 1 Was?h. Terr. 14. And see 
 Nichols v. State, 46 Miss. 284; Staw v. La Rue v. State, 64 Ark. 144, 41 S. W. 
 Ryan, 13 Minn. 370, Gil. 343; Graves v. 53; State v. Spivey, 191 Mo. 87, 90 S. 
 State, 45 N. J. L. 203; State v. Millain, W. 81. 
 3 Net. 409; State v. Williamson, 4 Ohio 
 Horn.— 53 
 
834 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 [i 557 
 
 of absolutely identical meaning must be used. * ^ And an indictment 
 under a statute creating and defining a crime, or using descriptive 
 words with reference to it, must use the language of the statute, 
 and a material variance is fatal. * ® IsTor need the degree of the of- 
 fense be stated under this rule when the statutory facts constituting 
 the crime in the degree in question appear.^" And an indictment 
 sufficient to charge murder in the first degree includes all lower 
 degrees of homicide, and will support a conviction for any such lower 
 degree,^ ^ the rule applying to convictions for voluntary manslaughter 
 under indictments for murder, as well as to convictions for lower de- 
 
 is8tate V. Green, 4« La. Ann. 644, 7 
 So. V93. 
 
 isTenorio v. Territory, 1 N. M. 279; 
 Fonts V. State, 4 G. Greene, 500; Con- 
 ner V. Com. 13 Bush, 714; Nichols v. 
 State, 46 Miss. 284; Leschi v. Territory, 
 suprn. 
 
 And an indictment not averring that 
 11 homicide was committed with pre- 
 meditated malice, or in perpetration of 
 or attempt to perpetrate any crime, and 
 not averring that the killing was upon 
 a sudden heat, or in the commission of 
 an unlawful act, charges no indictable 
 offense. Dukes v. State, 11 Ind. 557, 71 
 Am. Dee. .370. 
 
 zoPeople V. Lloyd, 9 Cal. 54; People 
 V. Dolan. 9 Cal. 576: Peoole v. Vance, 
 21 Cal. 400: State v. Phillips, 118 Iowa, 
 660, 9"? N. W. 876; Divis v. State. 39 
 Md. 355; Cargen v. People, 39 Mich. 
 549; State v. Dumphey, 4 Minn. 438. 
 Gil. 340; State v. Lautensehlager. 22 
 Minn. 514; Territory v. Johnson. 9 Mont. 
 .30, 22 Pao. 346; Territory v. Stears, 2 
 Mont. 3=^7; Territory v.' O'Donnell, 4 
 N. M. 196, 12 Pac. 743: State v. Murple, 
 15 Or. 205, 14 Pac. 5=^1 : State v. 
 Wintzingerode. 9 Or. 153; White v. Com. 
 6 Binn. 179 6 Am. Dec. 443; Alexnnder 
 V. State. 3 Feisk. 475: Williams v. State, 
 3 Heisk. 37: lesehi v. Tervitorv, 1 
 Wash. Terr. 23; State v. Schnelle, 24 W. 
 Va. 767; Hnaran v. State. 30 Wis. 428, 11 
 An,. Pen, 575: Davis v. Utah, 151 U. S. 
 282, 38 L. ed. 153, 14 Sup. Ct. Pen. 328. 
 
 siPeonle v. Dolan. supra; Nol»s v. 
 Stole. 24 Ala. 672: Linnehan v. State, 
 120 Al'i. 293, 25 So. 6; McAdnms v. 
 State, ?5 Ark. 405; Allen v. State. 37 
 'Vrk. 433; State v. Dowd, 19 C-onn. 388; 
 ■State V. Smith. 38 Conn. 398; Pots- 
 flnmer v. St-'te. 17 Fla. 895: Morrison v. 
 Stntn. 42 Fla. 149, 28 So. 97; Lewis v. 
 St^te, 4T FH. 253. 28 So. 397: McCoy v. 
 State, 40 Fla. 494, 24 So. 485; State v. 
 
 Baldwin, 79 Iowa, 714, 45 N. W. 297; 
 State V. Huber, 8 Kan. 447; Patterson 
 v. Com. 99 Ky. 610, 5 S. W. 765; People 
 V. Doe, 1 Mich, 451; State v. Stokely, 
 16 Minn. 282, Gil. 249; State v. Lessing, 
 16 Minn. 75, Gil. 64; McGee v. State, 8 
 Mo. 495; State v. Sloan, 47 Mo. 604; 
 State V. Talmage, 107 Mo. 543. 17 S. W. 
 990; State v. Dieekman, 11 Mo. App. 
 538; Territory v. Stears, 2 Mont. 324; 
 State V, NorthrUT), 13 Mont. 538, 35 Pac. 
 228: Tenorio v. Territory, 1 N. M. 279; 
 McNevins v. People, 61 Barb. 307 ; Keefe 
 V. People, 40 N. Y. 348 ; State v. Grant, 
 7 Or. 414: State v. Wintzingerode, 9 Or. 
 159; Riptoe v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 42 S. W. 381; Livina:ston v. Com. 14 
 Gratt. 592: Giskie v. State, 71 Wis. 612, 
 38 N. W. 334. " 
 
 And an indictment alleging a killing 
 committed wilfully, deliberately, and 
 premeditatedly, and with malice afore- 
 thousht. charges every element of mur- 
 der in the first degree. State v. Perigo, 
 70 Iowa, 657, 28 N. W. 452. 
 
 2 2McPherson v. State, 29 Ark. 225; 
 Packer v, People. 8 Colo. 361 ; State v. 
 Dowd. 19 Conn. 392; Revnolds v. State, 
 1 Ga. 222; Carrick v. State, 18 Ind. 409; 
 Goff v. Prime, 26 Ind. 196; St^te v. Gor- 
 don, 3 Iowa. 410; State v. TSveedy. 11 
 Iowa, 350: Roy v. State, 2 Kan. '405: 
 State V. Salter. 48 La. Ann. 197, 19 So. 
 265; King V. State, 5 How. (Miss.) 730; 
 Watson V. State, 5 Mo. 497; Plummer 
 V. Stnte. 6 Mo. 231 ; Peonle v. McDon- 
 nell, 92 N. Y. 657; Sutcliffe v. State, 18 
 Ohio, 469. 51 Am. Dec. 459; State v. 
 Grant, supra: State v. Putman, 18 S. C. 
 175, 44 Am. Ren. 569; Burnett v. State, 
 14 Len. 439: White v. Territory, 3 Wash. 
 Terr. 397, 19 Pnc. 27; United States v. 
 Meagher. 37 Fed. 875. And see '^t.a.e v. 
 Nichols. 8 Conn. 496: State v. White 45 
 Iowa, 325 ; State v. Sloan, 47 Mo. 604. 
 
§ 557] PLEADING, INFORMATION AND INDICTMENT. 836 
 
 grees of murder ;^^ and also to negligent homicide.^* But though 
 degree need not be averred an indictment for homicide is not invali- 
 dated by a charge that the homicide was of a specified degree, since 
 it may be treated as surplusage ; ~ * and a conviction may be had for 
 the degree shown by the evidence, notwithstanding such an aver- 
 ment. ^° And a statement that a crime is manslaughter in an in- 
 dictment charging facts constituting murder is not a ground for ar- 
 resting judgment.^® Of course, however, in such case the convic- 
 tion cannot be had for a higher degree of homicide than manslaugh- 
 ter.*' And in order to sustain a conviction for involuntary man- 
 slaughter, it is necessary that it be distinctly charged in the indict- 
 ment as sueh.^® Nor are special statutory offenses consisting of an 
 act by which death is caused, differing from homicide at common 
 law, included in the crime of murder. ^ ® So, a statute providing that 
 an indictment shall charge but one crime and in one form only, except 
 that where the crime may be committed by the use of different means, 
 the indictment may allege the means in the alternative, does not pre- 
 vent charging in the conjunctive the different acts by which a killing 
 was accomplished.^" 
 
 III. AVEEMENT OF FACT OF KILLIITO. 
 
 558. General rules — It is essential in all homicide cases to show 
 that the deceased was living at the time the alleged mortal blow was 
 struck, and that he died,^ and that death resulted from the injuries 
 alleged;* and that the accused did the act which caused death must 
 
 zsBradshaw v. State (Tex. Crim. zState v. Sundheimer, 93 Mo. 311, 6 
 
 App.) 50 S. W. 3.'i9. S. W. 52; State v. Bronstine, 147 Mo. 
 
 24People V. King, 27 Cal. 507, 87 Am. 520, 49 S. W. 512; State v. Snell, 78 Mo. 
 
 Dec. 95; People v. Nichol. 34 Cal. 211; 240; State v. Morea, 2 Ala.. 275; Terry 
 
 People V. Vance, 21 Cal. 400. v. State, 120 Ala. 286, 25 So. 176; Peo- 
 
 25People V. Nichol, supra. pie v. Lloyd, supra; People v. Ybarra, 
 
 = 8Camp V. State, 25 Ga. 689. 17 Cal. 168; People v. Aro, 6 Cal. 207, 
 
 27Tbid. 65 Am. Dec. 503; United States v. Bar- 
 
 zsWalters v. Com. 44 Pa. 135; Com. ber, 9 Mackey, 79; Hieks v. State, 105 
 
 V. Gable, 7 Serg. & R. 423; Com. v. Ga. 627, 31 S. E. 579; West v. State, 
 
 Bilderback, 2 Pars. Sel. Eq. Cas. 447; 48 Ind. 483; Wood v. State, 92 Ind. 270; 
 
 Bruner v. State, 58 Ind. 159; Brown v. State v. Conley. 39 Me. 78; Com. v Fox 
 
 State, 110 Ind. 486, 11 N. E. 447. But 7 Gray, 585; Territory v. Godas, 8 Mont! 
 
 see Conner v. Com. 13 Bush, 714; Buck- 347. 21 Pac. 20; McVey v. State, 57 Neb. 
 
 ner v. Com. 14 Bush, 601. 471, 77 N. W. 1111 ; People v. Wilson, 3 
 
 29Conner v. Com. and Buckner v. Park. Crim. Rep. 199; State v. Rine- 
 
 Com. supra. hart. 75 N. C. 58; State v. Morgan. 85 
 
 aoState v. Eiester, 32 Or. 254, 50 Pac. N. C. 581: Lutz v. Com. 29 Pa. 441; 
 
 561. State v. Wimberly, 3 M'Cord, L. 190; 
 
 iStrickland v. State, 19 Tex. App. Edmondson v. State, 41 Tex. 496 • Tickle 
 
 .518: Pfonle V. Sanford, 4^ Cal. 29; Peo- v. State. 6 Tex. App. 623; Mathis v 
 
 pie V. Llovd, 9 Cal. 55; State v. Hagan, State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep 549 47 S 
 
 104 Mo. 654, 05 S. W. 249. 
 
836 HOMICIDE. [§ 558 
 
 be directly averred in a prosecution for homicide;^ and it must be 
 charged that death resulted from such act.* Within these rules 
 the result of the homicidal act is a separate fact and element in the 
 crime of murder from the act itself, and must be specifically averred.^ 
 And no degree of emphasis in stating the mortal or fatal nature of 
 the prisoner's act can make it amount to an averment that the in- 
 jured person actually died, or that he died by this means ; the sole 
 office of that averment being to charge that the act was homicidal,® 
 And an indictment charging a person with throwing another into 
 the water, and that the latter was there mortally choked, suffocated, 
 and drowned, is fatally defective for want of averment of death from 
 the injuries alleged. '' 
 
 In charging homicide, however, an allegation that the accused 
 killed the deceased sufficiently avers the death;® and so does the 
 charge that the accused did kill and murder the deceased.® And 
 such a charge sufficiently shows that the unlawful act charged re- 
 sulted in death. ^ " And the words "deprive of life" are equivalent 
 to the word "kill," ^ ^ and a charge that the accused killed a person, 
 naming him, is a sufficient allegation of the murder of a human 
 being;^^ it is not necessary to use the statutory word "murder." ^^ 
 And where "did die" was plainly intended, an indictment will not 
 be held bad for the unintentional omission of the word "did."^* 
 Likewise the word "murder," used in charging homicide ex vi ter- 
 mini, imports death,^^ though a charge that the accused murdered 
 
 W. 464; Eeg. v. Ellis, 2 Car. & K. 470; 518; Flynn v. State, 97 Wis. 44, 72 N. 
 
 Keg. V. Sandys, Car. & M. 345. W. 374. And see Butler v. State, 102 
 
 sFlinn v. State, 24 Ind. 286. And see Wis. 364, 78 N. W. 590; Justice v. Com. 
 
 State V. Graham, 49 La. Ann. 1524, 22 20 Ky. L. Rep. 386, 46 S. W. 499, 
 
 So. 807. instate v. Kirby, supra. 
 
 iMilton V. State, 40 Fla. 251, 24 So. n Walker v. State, 14 Tex. App. 609. 
 
 60. laPeople v. MeNulty, 93 Gal. 427, 26 
 
 eUnited States v. Barber, 9 Maokey, Pac. 597, 29 Pac. 61 ; Caldwell v. State, 
 
 79; State v. Keerl, 29 Mont. 508, 101 28 Tex. App. 566, 14 S. W. 122; State v. 
 
 Am. St. Eep. 579, 75 Pac. 362 ; State v. Day, supra. 
 
 Furgerson, 152 Mo. 92, 53 S. W. 427. isCaldwell v. State, supra. 
 
 eUnited States v. Barber, supra. nKitts v. State, 70 Ark. 521, 69 S. 
 
 ■7lbid. W. 545. 
 
 sState V. Day, 4 Wash. 104, 29 Pac. iBCordell v. State, 22 Ind. 1; Bfichtel- 
 
 984; State v. Thomas, 32 La. Ann. 349; heimer v. State, 54 Ind. 128. 
 
 State V. Reynolds, 171 Mo. 552, 72 S. In Dias y. State, 7 Blackf. 20, 39 Am. 
 
 W. 39 ; State v. Anderson, 4 Nev. 2B5. Dec. 448, it was held that although ai) 
 
 sPeople V. Sanford, 43 Gal. 29; People indictment charges the accused with 
 
 V. Alviso, 55 Cal. 230; State v. Sly feloniously and wilfully and of his 
 
 (Idaho) 80 Pac. 1125; Lane v. State, malice aforethought striking the de- 
 
 151 Ind. 511, 51 N. E. 1056; Bechtel- ceased, giving him a mortal wound, yet 
 
 heimer v. State, 54 Ind. 128 ; State v. if it does not contain a technical allega- 
 
 Kirby, 62 Kan. 436, 63 Pac. 752; State tion that he feloniously murdered him, 
 
 V. Robertson, 50 La. Ann. 455, 23 So. it is an indictment for manslaughter 
 
 610; Strickland v. State, 19 Tex. App. only, and not for murder, the word 
 
§ 5580 PLEADING, INFOKMATIOTST AND INDICTMENT. 837 
 
 the deceased is insufficient as a charge of mnrder, being a mere con- 
 clusion of law; the prinlary facts, consisting of the killing, etc., 
 which constitute the crime of murder must be set forth. ■^^ So, a 
 charge of killing and murdering by cutting, stabbing, and mortally 
 wounding with a knife sufficiently avers that death resulted from 
 the alleged injuries ;^'^ and so does a charge of an injury, "of which 
 said injury" the deceased died ; ^ ^ and alleging a killing by shooting 
 sufficiently charges the infliction of a mortal wound ; ^ ® and so does 
 th& charge "did strike, penetrate, and wound him one mortal 
 wound." ^^ Nor is an allegation in an indictment for homicide 
 chai'ging the infliction of a mortal wound, ftom which the deceased 
 languished and died, insufficient as a charge that the death proceeded 
 from the wound. ^^ And the wound charged need not be described 
 as a niortal one; a charge of the fact of wounding, and that death 
 resulted therefrom, is sufficient. ^^ l^for is it necessary to aver that 
 the deceased died of the stroke ; it is enough to allege that he died 
 of the wound. ^ * So, an indictment which charges that the prisoner 
 did administer poison to the deceased, who took and swallowed it, by 
 means of which taking and swallowing the deceased became mortally 
 sick, and "of the said mortal sickness died," is good, without also 
 stating that the deceased died of the poisoning.^* 
 
 "murder" being a term of art which 19 Caldwell v. State, 28 Tex. App. 566, 
 
 cannot be supplied by any other word iii 14 S. W. 122. 
 
 an indictment. 2 0McDonnall v. People, 168 111. 93, 48 
 
 isStriekland v. State, 19 Tex. App. N. E. 86. 
 
 518; Pierce v. State, 21 Tex. App. 669, aiTickle v. State, 6 Tex. App. 623. 
 
 3 S. W. Ill ; People V. Arc, 6 Cal. 207, 65 So, an indictment for murder, com- 
 
 Am. Dee. 503. plete in form, alleging the oflFense and 
 
 iTMeiers v. State, 56 Ind. 336; Wood the mortal wound, and that of such mor- 
 
 V. State, 92 Ind. 269. And aee State v. tal wound the deceased then and there 
 
 Bailey, 190 Mo. 257, 88 S. W. 733; did languish, and languishing did live 
 
 Ewert V. State, 48 Fla. 36, 37 So. 334. until a date mentioned, upon which last 
 
 And an indictment charging the ac- date the deceased did die, sufficiently al- 
 
 cused with the murder of his wife by leged that the death of the deceased was 
 
 an assault and battery committed on caused by the wound inflicted. Milton 
 
 her with his hands and feet, by means Y. State, 40 Fla. 251, 24 So. 60. 
 
 whereof, and in consequence of her sick- 2 2Brown v. State, 18 Fla. 472; People 
 
 ness, her death was hastened, sufficient- v. Judd, 10 Cal. 313; Com. v. Maeloon, 
 
 ly sets forth the means or mode in which 101 Mass. 1, 100 Am. Dec. 89. And see 
 
 the homicide was committed, without People v. Cronin, 34 Cal. 191 ; State v. 
 
 averring the state or condition of her Robertson, 178 Mo. 496, 77 S. W. 528. 
 
 body or her health at the time, which Contra, State v. McCoy, 8 Rob. (La.) 
 
 tended to make the acts of the accused 545, 41 Am. Dec. 301. 
 
 more dangerous and fatal. Com. v. Fox, zsState v. Conley, 39 Me. 78; Reg. v. 
 
 7 Gray, 585. Sandys, Car. & M. '345. 
 
 iSWest V. State, 48 Ind. 483; Terri- 24Reg. v. Sandys, Car. & M. 345, 2 
 
 'tory v. Godas, 8 Mont. 347, 21 Pac. 26 ; Moody, C. C. 227. 
 
 Lutz V. Com. 29 Pa. 441. And see Peo- And an indictment in a prosecution 
 
 pie V. Murphy, 179 N. Y. 595, 72 N. E. against a husband for the murder of 
 
 1146, Affirming 93 App. Div. 383, 87 N. his wife by kicking her, after which a 
 
 Y. Siipp. 786. surgeon administered brandy as a 
 
838 HOMICIDE. [I 558 
 
 So, the fact that two or more persons were killed by one and the 
 same act does not render an indictment charging the killing of both 
 in a single count bad for duplicity ; ^ ^ though it has been held that 
 the killing of two persons by the same act constitutes two offenses, 
 for each of which a separate prosecution will lie.^® And when the 
 killing of two is charged, proof of the killing of but one of them does 
 not produce a fatal variance. ^^ 
 
 559. Time of act causing death — The prevailing rule is that, in 
 order that a person accused of homicide may be apprised of the 
 charges against him, it is necessary to allege in the indictment there- 
 for the time the wound or injury which caused death was inflicted. ^ 
 And it has been held that it must be precisely and distinctly stated,^ 
 and that its averment in the conclusion of the indictment will not 
 cure its omission in the body. * This has been dispensed with by stat- 
 ute, however, in some states.* And it is not necessary to sustain 
 the precise allegation by proof, if the time stated be previous to 
 the finding of the indictment. ° And a mistake of date, apparent on 
 the face of the indictment, does not exclude proof of death on any 
 other than the named date, or furnish grounds for arresting judg- 
 ment;" and a mere mistake in spelling the day of the month is of no 
 effect.' But it is material to show that the prosecution was com- 
 
 restorative, some of which entered her v. G. S. 1 Tyler (Vt.) 295, 4 Am. Dec. 
 
 lungs and may have oaused her death, 724. 
 
 alleging the blow or blows which ren- sState v. Kennedy, 8 Rob. (La.) 591. 
 
 dered necessary the application of the sibid. 
 
 brandy sufficiently states the cause of ^See Com. v. Rnell, 189 Mass. 12, S 
 
 death. Queen v. Mclntyre, 2 Cox, C. C. L.R.A. (N.S.) 1019. 75 N. E. 75; People 
 
 379. ' ' ' V. Kelly, 6 Cal. 211. 
 
 25Clem V. State, 42 Ind. 420, 13 Am. ^ ^Starkie, Crim. PI. 58; Wharton, 
 Rep. 369; Womack v. State, 7 Coldw. g"^' -.01' ^ -f.*^-,??*' Shelton v. 
 508; Fowler v. State, 3 Heisk. 154; ^^"^hl ^""--^^ ^^ 'f'^"' l?l' L'^J^ 
 Chivarrio V. State, 15 Tex. App. 330; l' S l^'",',' t^" Y ^ZV^^l' ^^^^^ 
 ■n 1 oi t >7 rr. A An ^ ^- "olite, 33 La. Ann. 1016; People v. 
 
 Rucker v. State, 7 Tex App. 549 Co^ Jackson, 111 N. Y. 362. 19 N. I 54; 
 tm Cora V. Starr, 36 P.ttsb. L. J 334^ St.te v. Orrell, 12 N. C. (1 Dev. L. 
 
 2 6People V Ma.iors, 65 Cal. 138, 52 139, 17 Am. Dee. 563; O'Connell v. State, 
 Am. Rep. 295, 3 Pac. 597. is Tex. 343; Foster v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 27Nite V. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. App.) 45 S. W. 803; Livingston v. Com. 
 .340, 64 S. W. 783. And see Helmerking 14 Gratt. 592; State v. Anderson, 30 
 V. Com. 100 Ky. 74, 37 S. W. 264. Wash. 14, 70 Pac. 104. 
 
 iPeople V. Wallace, 9 Cal. 30 ; People Time is not of the essence of homicide, 
 V. Cox, 9 Cal. 32; State v. Conley, 39 and an indictment therefor is sufficient 
 Me. 78 : State v. Sundlieimer, 93 Mo. if it is shown that the killing occurred 
 311. 6 S. W. 52; Lester v. State, 9 Mo. previous to the finding of the indict- 
 666 : State v. Haney, 67 N. C. 467 ; State ment, though not on the day stated 
 V. Baker, 46 N. C. (1 Jones, L.) 267: therein. State v. Martin, 9 Ohio S. & 
 State v. Orrell, i2 N, C. (1 Dev. L.) 139, C. P. Dec. 778. 
 
 17 Am. Dec. 563; State v. Huggins, 12 eCom. v. Ail stock. 3 Gratt. 650: State 
 Rich. L. 402: State v. Beckwith, 1 Stew. v. McDaniel, 94 Mo. 301, 7 S. W. 634. 
 (Ala.) 318. 18 Am. Dec. 46; King ex rel. 7State v. Shepherd, 30 N. 0. (8 Ired. 
 Smith v. Taylor, 3 Barn. & C. 502; State L.) 195. 
 
§ 559] I PLEADING, INFORMATION AND INDICTMENT. 839 
 
 menced in due time, where it is enacted that it shall be commenced 
 within a particular time;^ and where the offense is statutory, of 
 course the time laid must be subsequent to the passage of the statute 
 by which the offense was created. So, if the offense is laid on an 
 uncertain or impossible day, or on a future day, or on different days, 
 or on such a day as renders the indictment repugnant to itself, the 
 objection is fatal on motion to arrest judgment, even after verdict;® 
 and so if the date be left blank. ^^ Where an assault is charged to 
 have been made at a specified time, hov/ever, the averment of time 
 need not be repeated as to the blow which caused the death. * ^ And 
 a charge that an injury which caused death was inflicted "on or about 
 a specified time" has been held to be sufiicient, "or about" being re- 
 garded as surplusage.^* 
 
 When time and place have been once named with precision, the 
 words "then and there," referring to the last antecedent, will after- 
 wards sufficiently express both.'* And where the time and place 
 are immaterial, they may be introduced by the words, "to wit;" 
 though without a scilicet in such case, a variance would not preju- 
 dice; and as, in cases where they are of the essence of the charge, 
 a scilicet will not aid a variance in proof, ' * it is rarely ever useful. ' ^ 
 Even if the words "then and there" be omitted, it would seem 
 that the court will still give judgment on the indictment if the gram- 
 matical construction be such as to apply the time given at the outset 
 to the subsequent allegations. ' ^ But where two distinct periods have 
 been averred, the statement "then and there" is not enough ; one par- 
 
 sSee King v. Chandler, 1 Salk. 378, La. Ann. 32,3, 10 So. 673; State v. Wil- 
 
 Carth. 501, 5 Mod. 446, 1 Ld. Raym. 582; Hams, 13 Wash. 335, 43 Pac. 15. And 
 
 Queen v. Simpson, 10 Mod. 248. see State v. Walters, 16 La. Ann. 401 ; 
 
 9Wharton, Crim. Law, 7th ed. §§ 204, State v. Williams, 30 La. Ann. 843. 
 
 273; State v. Sexton, 10 N. C. (3 Contra, People v. Aro, 6 Cal. 207, 65 
 
 Hawks) 184, 14 Am. Dec. 584; State v. Am. Db^. 503. 
 
 Hendricks, 1 N. C. pt. 2, p. 445 (Con- 13 Wharton, Crim. Law, 7th ed. 272 
 
 ferenee, 369) ; State v. Dandy, 1 Brev. et seq.; Stout v. Com. 11 Serg. & R. 177; 
 
 395 ; Serpentine V. State, 1 How. (Miss.) Turns v. Com. 6 Met. 225; State v. 
 
 260. Sundheiner. 93 Mo. 311, 6 S. W. 52; 
 loState V. Beckmth, 1 Stew. (Ala.) State v. Riddle. 179 Mo. 287. 78 S. W. 
 
 318, 18 Am. Dec. 46; State v. Roach, 3 606; State v. Privitt, 175 Mo. 207, 75 
 
 N. C. (2 Hayw.) 352, 2 Am. Dec. 626. S. W. 457; State v. Kelly, 41 Or. 20, 68 
 
 See fully Whart. Crim. Law 7th ed. §§ Pac. 1 ; State v. Stewart', 26 S. C. 125, 1 
 
 261, 273. S. E. 468; Caldwell v. State, 28 Tex. 
 iiCom. V. Barker, 12 Cush. 186; St:ite App. 566, 14 S. W. 122. And see Pal- 
 
 V. Cherry, 7 N. C. (3 Murph.) 7; State rner v. Pennlp. 138 111. 356, 32 Am. St. 
 
 V. Owen, 5 N. C. (1 Murph.) 452, 4 Am. Rep. 146, 28 N. E. 130. 
 
 Dec. 571. i4Bn=bT v. Watson, 2 W. Bl. 1050. 
 
 i2State V. Barnett, 3 Kan. 250. 87 iBDickinson's Q. S. 6th ed. 212. 
 Am. Dee. 471; State v. Harp, 31 Kan. 16 State v. Cherry, 7 N. C. (3 Murph.) 
 
 493, 3 Pac. 432; State v. McCarthy, 44 7; Com. v. Bugbee, 4 Gray, 203. 
 
840 HOMICIDE. [§ 55* 
 
 ticular time should be averred.^'' And a charge that A., on such 
 a day, at, etc., made an assault upon B., and him with a knife 
 feloniously struck, killed, and murdered, was held not to import 
 sufficiently that the stroke was at the same time and place as the 
 assault, for want of the words "then and there ;" and for this and 
 other exceptions an outlawry on this charge was reversed. ^ * Nor will 
 the word "immediately" or "instantly" supply the place in an in- 
 dictment for homicide of the words "then and there." ^® And an in- 
 dictment against two defendants, which states the death to be the 
 result of two different injuries inflicted by each of the defendants 
 separately, on different days, is bad. ^ " 
 
 560. Time of death — ^An indictment for homicide should state the 
 time of the death of the person killed, so that the death may be seen 
 to be the consequence of the acts charged. "^ An indictment, upon 
 which it does not appear that the death happened within a year and 
 a day after the wound was given, is fatally defective; because, when 
 the death does not ensue within a year and a day after the wound is 
 inflicted, the law presumes that it proceeded from some other cause. ^ 
 The date of the death, therefore, as well as that of the stroke, must 
 distinctly, appear.^ Variance as to either, however, with the qual- 
 ification just announced, is not fatal.* The averment that the de- 
 fendant "killed" the deceased on a certain day implies that the latter 
 died on such day,^ and it is enough, when the date of the injury is 
 
 I'Storrs V. State, 3 Mo. 9; Wharton, 2Sta,te v. Orrell, 12 N. C. (1 Dev. L.) 
 Crim. Law, 7th ed. § 272. 139, 17 Am. Dec. 563; People v. Aro, 6 
 
 181 East, P. C. chap. 5, § 112, p. 343; Cal. 207, 65 Am. Dec. 503; People v. 
 2 Hawk. P. C. chap. 23, § 90; 2 Inst. Kelly, 6 Cal. 210; People v. Wallace, 9 
 318. Cal. 30; State v. Reakey, 1 Mo. App. 3; 
 
 19 State V. Eeakey, 1 Mo. App. 3; State v. Sundheimer, supra; State v. 
 Com. V. Ailstoek, 3 Gratt. 650; Queen Huff, 11 Nev. 17; Edmondson v. State, 
 V. Brownlow, 11 Ad. & El. 119. 41 Tex. 497; Hardin v. State, 4 Tex. 
 
 zoReg. V. Devett, 8 Car. & P. 639. App. 355; Caldwell v. State, 28 Tex. 
 
 iPeople V. Aro, 6 Cal. 208, 65 Am. App. 566, 14 S. W. 122. 
 Dec. 503; People v. Cox, 9 Cal. 32; sState v. Conley, 39 Me. 78. 
 Thomas v. State, 71 Ga. 44; Jane v. ^Wharton, Crim. Law, 7th ed. §§ 261, 
 Com. 3 Met. (Ky.) 18; State v. Ken- 599; State v. Haney, 67 N. C. 467; State 
 nedy, 8 Rob. (La.) 591; State v. Luke, v. Baker, 46 N. C. (1 Jones, L.) 267; 
 104 Mo. ivo3, 16 S. W. 242 ; State v. Snell, State v. Hobbs, 33 La. Ann. 226 ; State 
 78 Mo. 240 ; State v. Lakey, 65 Mo. 217 ; v. Ward, 74 Mo. 253 ; State v. Pate, 121 
 State V. Sundheimer, 93 Mo. 311, 6 S. N. C. 659, 28 S. E. 354; Cudd v. State, 
 W. 52; State v. Mayfield, 66 Mo. 125; supra; O'Connell v. State, 18 Tex. 343; 
 Lester v. State, 9 Mo. 666; State v. Livingston v. Com. 14 Gratt. 592. 
 Haney, 67 N. C. 467; State v. Baker, 46 estate v. Ryan, 13 Minn. 371, Gil. 
 N. C. a Jones, L.) 267; Cudd v. State, 343; People v. Sanford, 43 Cal. 29- 
 28 Tex. App. 124, 12 S. W. 1010; Ed- Thomas v. State, 71 Ga. 44: Jane v. 
 mondson v. State, 41 Tex. 496; Hamby Com. 3 Met. (Ky.) 18: State v. Hobbs. 
 V. State, 36 Tex. 523; Ball v. United supra; State v. Anderson, 4 Nev 265' 
 States, 140 U. S. 118, 35 L. ed. 377, 11 State v. Huff, 11 Nev. 17; People v'. 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 761. Murphy, 93 App. Div. 383, 87 N. Y. 
 
§ 560j 
 
 PLEADING, INFORMATION AND INDICTMENT. 
 
 841 
 
 alleged, to say that the deceased "then and there died."® And this 
 is so though the death did not occur until the next day after the 
 injury.'' But the words "immediately died" or "instantly died" do 
 not supply the place of the words "then and there."® And a charge 
 of an injury, and that the person injured did then and there suffer^ 
 and languishing did live, and after a few hours did die, is insuffi- 
 cient, the words "then and there" not referring to the death;® though 
 the rule is different when the charge was that deceased "then and 
 there languished and languishing died." ^ ** 
 
 An allegation in an indictment for homicide, however, charging 
 that a wound was given on one day, and that the person woimded 
 languished until the next day and died, sufficiently states the re- 
 spective dates of the stroke and the death, and is sufficient to show 
 that the death resulted from the wound given. ^ ^ And a mere cler- 
 ical mistake in stating the time of death, apparent on the fact of 
 the indictment, will not affect its validity. ^^ So, an indictment 
 charging a killing on a named day warrants proof that the deceased 
 was shot on that day, and that he died of his wounds several days 
 
 Supp. 786; Cudd v. State, 28 Tex. App. 
 124, 12 S. W. 1010; Caldwell v. State, 
 supra. 
 
 estate v. Haney, and State v. Baker, 
 supra; Palmer v. People, 138 111. 356, 
 32 Am. St. Rep. 146, 28 N. E. 130; State 
 V. Stanley, 33 Iowa, 526; Com. v. Snell, 
 189 Mass. 12, 3 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1019, 75 
 N. E. 75; Woodsides v. State, 2 How. 
 (Miss.) 665; State v. Taylor, 21 Mo. 
 477; State v. Ward, 74 Mo. 253; State 
 v. Luke, 104 Mo. 563, 16 S. W. 242; State 
 V. Huggins, 12 Rich. L. 402; United 
 States V. Ball, 163 XJ. S. 662, 41 L. ed. 
 300, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1192. And see 
 People V. Murphy, supra. 
 
 And an averment in an indictment for 
 homicide that the defendant on a named 
 date, with force and arms, killed, etc., 
 is sufficiently clear and specific as to 
 time without the use of the words "then 
 and there." Thomas v. State, 71 Ga. 44. 
 
 7State V. Reeder, 72 S. C. 223, 51 S. 
 E. 702. 
 
 sState V. Reakey, 1 Mo. App. 3; Les- 
 ter V. State, 9 Mo. 666 ; State v. Lakey, 
 65 Mo. 217; State v. Sides, 64 M«. 383; 
 State V. Testerman, 68 Mo. 408; State 
 V. Morgan, 85 N. C. 581 ; State v. Baker, 
 46 N. C. (1 Jones, L.) 267; Hamby v. 
 State, 36 Tex. 523; Queen v. Pelham, 8 
 Q B. 959. Contra, King v. Hindmarsh, 
 2 Leach, C. L. 569. 
 
 But an averment of the giving, then 
 and there, of two mortal wounds, of 
 which mortal wounds sO given as afore- 
 said the person wounded did instantly 
 die, sufficiently charges that death re- 
 sulted from the injury within a year 
 and a day. Hardin v. State, 4 Tex. App. 
 355; Borrego v. Territory, 8 N. M. 446, 
 46 Pac. 349. 
 
 9 State V. Kennedy, 8 Rob. (La.) 591. 
 And see State v. Sundheimer, 93 Mo. 
 311, 6 S. W. 52. 
 
 loState V. Champoux, 33 Wash. 339, 
 74 Pac. 557; State v. Luke, 104 Mo. 
 563, 16 S. W. 242. 
 
 iiPalmer v. People, 138 111. 356, 32 
 Am. St. Rep. 146, 28 N. E. 130. 
 
 An averment that a fatal blow was 
 struck on a specified day, and that the 
 deceased languished one hour and then 
 died, sufficiently indicates the date of 
 the death. State v. Luke, supra. 
 
 izState V. Eaton, 75 Mo. 586: State 
 V. McDaniel, 94 Mo. 301, 7 S. W. 634; 
 State V. Shepherd, 30 N. C. (8 Ired. L.) 
 195; Com. v. Ailstock, 3 Gratt. 650. 
 
 An indictment charging the giving of 
 a wound on the 9th of December, of 
 which wound the deceased died on the 
 said 14th of December, is not fatally 
 defective, since the word "said" may be 
 regarded as surplusage. Lazier v. CJom 
 10 Gratt. 708. 
 
S42 HOMICIDE. [§ 560 
 
 thereafter. ^ ^ And a charge of the infliction of a mortal wound or 
 injury on a given date, of which the wounded person died, suffi- 
 ciently shows a killing prior to the indictment.'-* And thft rule 
 has been laid down that an allegation as to the time of the death may 
 be entirely dispensed with in a prosecution for homicide charging 
 the infliction of mortal wounds upon a designated day, where that 
 date is such, when considered in connection with the finding of the 
 indictment, as to render it certain that the death must have occurred 
 within a year and a day. ^ ® Objection to an indictment for murder 
 for failure to show that death occurred within a year and a day after 
 the perpetration of the act which produced it is waived by failure 
 of the accused to demur to the indictment.^* 
 
 561. Place of act causing death — That a person charged with homi- 
 cide may be fully apprised of the charges against him, so that he 
 may be prepared for his defense, and that the place of venue may 
 be fixed, it is necessary to state in an indictment therefor the place 
 in which the killing took place. ^ And it has been held that it 
 must be precisely and distinctly stated,^ and that its averment in 
 the conclusion of the indictment will not cure its omission from 
 the body thereof;^ and that it must be proved as stated.* Nor 
 is it sufficient that the district or jurisdiction is named in the cap- 
 tion of the bill; it must be charged in the body of the indictment 
 that the offense was committed at a place over which the court has 
 jurisdiction. ° And a statement of the place where the mortal stroke 
 was given is not dispensed with by the fact that it was alleged and 
 proved that death occurred in the jurisdiction in which the indict- 
 ment was found." 
 
 isCom. V. Major, 198 Pa. 290, 82 Am. of the indictment. Brassfield v. State, 
 
 St. Rep. 803, 47 Atl. 741. supra. 
 
 i4Sutherland v. State, 121 Ga. 591, i estate v. Huff, 11 Nev. 17. 
 
 49 S. E. 781; Baker v. State, 121 Ga. iPeople v. Wallace, 9 Gal. 30; People 
 
 592, 49 S. E. 782; People v. Murphy, 179 v. Cox. 9 Cal. 32; People v. Robinson, 17 
 
 N. Y. 595, 72 N. E. 1146, Affirming 93 Cal. 363: Smith v. State. 42 Fla. 236, 
 
 App. Div. 383, 87 N. Y. Supp. 786. 27 So. 868; Studstill v. State, 7 Ga. 2; 
 
 iBBowen v. State, 1 Or. 270; Brass- Jackson v. People, 18 111. 269: Cluck v. 
 
 field V. State, 55 Ark. 556, 18 S. W. State, 40 Ind. 263; State v. Kennedy, 8 
 
 1040 ; State v. Champoux. 33 Wash. 3.39, Rob. ( La. ) 591 ; Stnte v. Wasmer.' 61 
 
 74 Pae. 557. And see State v. Shepherd, Me. 178; State v. Waller, 88 Mo. 402; 
 
 30 N. C. (8 Ired. L.) 195; Burton v. State v. Lamon, 10 N. C. (3 Hawlcs) 
 
 State, 141 Ala. 32, 37 So. 435. 175. 
 
 An indictment for murder alleging 2gtate v. Kennedy, supra. 
 
 that the fatal blow was given on a 3Thid. 
 
 designated day, and that death resulted, 4 Smith v. State, supra. 
 
 is rot defective in failing to allege that estate v. Adams, 1 N. C. pt. 1, p. 21 
 
 death ensued within a year and a day (Martin, pt. 1, p. 30). 
 
 from the time the blow was given, if sSmith v. State, 42 Fla. 236, 27 So. 
 
 that fact is deducible from the caption 808. 
 
3 561] PLEABING, INFORMATION AND INDICTMENT. 843 
 
 The legislature of a state, however, has power to dispense with the 
 averment in an indictment for homicide that the oifense was com- 
 mitted within the county in which the indictment was foimd.^ 
 But even though such action has been taken, if the venue has been 
 formally alleged in the indictment, it must be proved is alleged. * 
 So, while the venue of a homicide must be laid in an indictment 
 therefor, the precise point within the jurisdiction at which it was 
 committed need not be named,® and the allegation, when made, is 
 presumed to be true, if not denied.^" And though it has been 
 entirely omitted it will be presumed after judgment, or on motion 
 to arrest judgment, that it was proved at the trial that the offense 
 was committed in the county or district in which the indictment was 
 found. ^^ So, where the place at which an injury resulting in 
 death was inflicted is distinctly stated in an indictment for the kill- 
 ing, it need not thereafter be repeated ; the words "then and there," 
 afterwards used, referring to the last antecedent, sufficiently charges 
 it.^^ And in such case, where the county has been previously 
 named, it is sufficient to locate the killing as "in the county afore- 
 said;"** and there is no difference in alleging that the act took place 
 "at" or "in" a designated place.** And an indictment for murder 
 which stated that A. B., late of Bladen county, etc., with force 
 and arms, in the county aforesaid, etc., was held to contain a suffi- 
 
 7Noles V. state, 24 Ala. 672. of the United States. United States v. 
 
 And where a murder committed on a Benoham, 29 Fed. 284. 
 
 vessel is of such a character that a court loState v. Outerbridge, 82 N. C. 617. 
 
 of the United States can entertain juris- nThetstone v. State, supra. 
 
 diction of it, although the vessel has no isTurns v. Com. 6 Met. 225; State v. 
 
 national character, no na,tional charac- Sundheimer, 93 Mo. 311, 6 S. W. 52; 
 
 ter need be alleged in the indictment. State v. Riddle, 179 Mo. 287, 78 S. W. 
 
 and it need not negative the foreign 606; State v. Stewart, 26 S. C. 125, 1 
 
 nationality of the vessel. United States S. E. 468; Caldwell v. State, 28 Tex. 
 
 V. Demarchi, 5 Blatchf. 84, Fed. Cas. No. App. 566, 14 S. W. 122. 
 
 14,944. And an indi"tment for manslaughter 
 
 sNoles V. State, supra; Thetstone v. charging that one person gave another 
 
 State, 32 Ark. 179. divers mortal blows at a designated 
 
 sProple V.' Robinson, 17 Cal. 363; P'ace, and that the person receiving such 
 
 Nolesv. State, SMpra/Lancktonv. Unit- ^'°P languished and died at another 
 
 ed States, 18 App. D. C. 348; State v. -e^ignated place and that the prisoner 
 
 Shav, 30 La. Ann. 114; Andersen v. rLn/"t^» *^f^fu"^'",? '"/ t«'°"7' 
 TT„,-+li o+„<-„„ 170 TT a Aa^ ao t ^a '^ 8°°°' ^he word "there" referring to 
 
 ^Tr-^Q Q W ?, f«Q ' ^^^ Pl^«« '"^^^^ the mortal blows were 
 
 1116. 18 Sup Ct. Rep. 689. ^i,,,^^ ^n^ „ot to t,,^ I^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^ 
 
 Ad allegation in an indictment for ^eath occurred. Rex v. Harsrave 5 
 
 homicide charging its commission upon c^r. & P. 170. 
 
 a steamboat navigating Chesapeake bay isgitate v. Lamon, 10 N. C. (3 
 
 between Baltimore and Annapolis sub- Hawks) 175; Thomas' v. State, 71 Ga. 
 
 stantially charges that the steamboat 44. 
 
 was being used on the navigable waters i4State v. Smith, 38 La. Ann. 301. 
 
844 HOMICIDE. [§ 561 
 
 cient description of the place where the murder was alleged to have 
 been committed. ^ ^ 
 
 562. Place of death. — ^An indictment for homicide must allege the 
 county or jurisdiction within which the death of the person killed 
 took place. ^ And it should be precisely and definitely stated.^ 
 An averment of the correct time and place of death in the conclu- 
 sion of an indictment does not cure its omission from the body of 
 the bill.* And its omission cannot be supplied by amendment* 
 Even where the mortal blow was given in one jurisdiction and the 
 death occurred in another, the place of death must be stated.^ And 
 this is the rule both at common law and under statutes providing 
 for cases of this class.® At common law the indictment should 
 aver that the deceased died in the county in which the indictment 
 is found. "^ In this country the usual practice in averring place 
 is by charging the offense to have taken place in the county where 
 it was committed.^ And it has been held that if, from the terms 
 of the location of a town or district by the act of incorporation, the 
 court cannot conclude that the whole town, district, or unincorporat- 
 ed place lies in the same county, both town and county must be 
 averred; and that the proper course, in all capital cases, is to lay 
 both county and town.* In the city of New York the practice is 
 to name the ward ; in the city of New Orleans, the parish. * " 
 
 16 State V. Lamon, supra. 2 State v. Kennedy, supra. 
 
 So, proof that a crime was committed sibid. 
 
 in the city of Indianapolis sufficiently 4 State v. Blakeney, supra. 
 
 establishes the venue under an indict- 5 State v. Cummings, 5 La. Ann. 330. 
 
 ment charging a homicide in Merion estate v. Coleman, 17 S. C. 473. 
 
 county in the city of Indianapolis, since 12 Hawk. P. C. b. 2, chap. 25, § 36 ; 1 
 
 the court will take judicial notice that Chitty, Crim. Law, 178; 3 Ibid. 732; 
 
 Indianapolis is in Merion county, Indi- State v. Orrell, 12 N. C. (1 Dev. L.) 
 
 ana. Cluck v. State, 40 Ind. 263. 139; Com. v. Linton, 2 Va. Cas. 205. 
 
 iState V. Sundheimer, 93 Mo. 311. 6 And see ^Vharton, Crim. Law, 7th ed. §§ 
 
 S. W. 52; State v. Mayfield, 66 Mo. 125; 699, 710, 1052; People v. Cox, 9 Cal. 32; 
 
 People V. Aro, 6 Cal. 207, 65 Am. Dec. Riggs v. State, 26 Miss. 51. 
 
 503; People v. Wallace, 9 Cal. 30; Peo- In Albright v. Territory, 11 Okla. 497, 
 
 pie V. Cox, 9 Cal. 32; Turpin v. State, 69 Pac. 789, however, it was held that 
 
 80 Ind. 148; Nash v. State, 2 G. Greene, at common law the place of death was 
 
 286 ; State v. Kennedy, 8 Rob. ( La. ) an essential allegation in an indictment 
 
 591 ; State v. Cummings, 5 La. Ann. for homicide. 
 
 330; Stoughton v. State, 13 Smedes & sWharton, Crim. Law, 7th ed. § 277; 
 
 M. 255; Riggs V. State, 26 Miss. 51; Duncan v. Com. 4 Serg. & R. 449; State 
 
 State V. Haney, 67 N. C. 467; State v. v. Lamon, 10 N. C. (3 Hawks) 175. 
 
 Orrell, 12 N. C. (1 Dev. L.) 139, 17 Am. And see Coleman v. State, 83 Miss. 290, 
 
 Dec. 563; State v. Coleman, 17 S. C. 64 L.R.A. 807, 35 So. 937. 
 
 473; State v. Blakeney, 33 S. C. Ill, 11 9Com. v. Springfield, 7 Masfe. 9. 
 
 S. E. 637; State ex rel. Matthews v. mSee fully Wharton, Crim. Law, 7th 
 
 Toomer, Cheves, L. 106; Riley v. State, ed. § 277. 
 9 Humph. 646; Com. v. Linton, 2 Va. 
 Cas. 205. 
 
S 562] PLEADING, INFORMATION AND INDICTMENT. 843 
 
 The rule has been asserted, however, that where the injury is 
 inflicted in one jurisdiction, and death ensues in another, under 
 the doctrine that the fatal blow constitutes the only criminal act 
 of the accused, and that the place of such blow is the place where 
 he committed the crime, an information for murder is sufficient 
 which charges the giving of the fatal blow in the county in which 
 the prosecution is had, and the fact of the ensuing death, although 
 it fails to allege specifically in what county or state the death took 
 place. * * And under statutes providing for the trial of criminal 
 actions in the county where the offense was committed, an informa- 
 tion or indictment alleging the place where the offense was committed 
 need not also allege the place of the death. ^^ Nor need the place 
 of the death be alleged under a statute prescribing that if the in- 
 dictment contains no statement of the place in which the offense was 
 committed, it shall be considered as charged therein that it was 
 committed within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the court 
 in which the grand jury were impaneled.*^ And where the statute 
 provides that where the fatal blow is struck in one county and death 
 occurs in another, the defendant may be indicted and tried in either 
 county, under an indictment charging the murder in the county in 
 which it is found, evidence that death occurred in another county 
 is admissible. ^ ^ 
 
 So, an indictment for homicide properly charging the time and 
 place of the infliction of a wound or injury need not repeat the 
 time and place with reference to the death, but is sufficient where 
 it charges that the deceased then and there died.^^ But the omis- 
 sion of the words "then and there" before the word "died" is fatal. ' ® 
 And an information charging a felonious assault at a specified time 
 and place, and that the assailant did then and there murder the 
 
 iiState V. Bowen, 16 Kan. 475; State, 80 Ind. 148; Davidson v. State, 
 
 Roberson v. State, 42 Fla, 212, 28 So. 135 Ind. 254, 34 N. E. 972; Com. v. Snell 
 
 427. And see State v. Gessert, 21 Minn. 189 Mass. 12, 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1019, 75 n' 
 
 369; State v. Foster, 7 La. Ann. 255. E. 75; Com. v. Robertson, 162 Mass 90 
 
 i2Statfi V. Baldwin, 15 Wash. 15, 45 38 N. E. 25; State v. Steeley, 65 Mo 218 
 
 Pac. 650; Roberson v. State, supra; 27 Am Ren 271- Rie^s v LSifat^ 9fi 
 
 Mathis V State 45 Fla. 46, 34 So. 287.. Miss. 51 ; s'tate V. ffiney, 33 ^' C 
 
 And see Albright v. Territory, 11 Okla. iii it o -^ 007 
 
 497, 69 Pac. 789; State v. Bowen, 16 a' j +?'„ „' ;„;' „, j., , „,, „ 
 
 Kan 476 omission of the word there" 
 
 isBrassfield v. State, 55 Ark. 556, 18 %"^" ^"^f J°f^ "^''f """t" l-^.f ^^ P?''* 
 
 S W 1040 ^ ot an indictment for homicide which 
 
 ■i4Coleman v. State, 83 Miss. 290, 64 charges a felonious assault is imma- 
 
 L.R.A. 807 35 So. 937. terial where the averment of the place 
 
 "i5United' States v. Ball, 163 U. S. 662, °^ ^^^^'°- i^ found in the same eonnec- 
 
 41 L. ed. 300, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1192; ^lon, and is necessarily referred to. 
 
 Tnln-pr v. People, 138 111. 356, 32 Am. Jackson v. People, 18 111. 269. 
 
 St. Rep. 146, 28 N. E. 130; Turpin v. i^Riggs v. State, supra. 
 
846 HOMICIDE. [§ 56» 
 
 person assaulted, will not support a conviction on evidence that the 
 person assaulted died at a later time and at another place. ^'' And 
 charging a wounding or injury at a named place, and that the per- 
 son injured "instantly did die," or "did immediately die," is not 
 a sufficient allegation of the place of death. ^* 
 
 IV. Averment of manner of killing. 
 
 563. General and common-law rules as to necessity of. — At com- 
 mon law it was necessary to particularly and specifically allege the 
 manner of killing in a prosecution for homicide.^ And while thia 
 has been changed in England by statutory enactment,^ the common- 
 law rule seems to have been adopted in America and under Amer- 
 ican statutes, the general rule being that the particular facts nec- 
 essary to show the manner in which a homicide was committed, or 
 the means of its perpetration, must be alleged in an indictment or 
 information therefor, with as much certainty as the circumstances 
 of the case will permit.^ Thus, where certain assaults were put 
 in evidence, and relied on by the Crown as being the cause of death, 
 but where the clear surgical testimony was that the death was 
 
 i7Chapraan v. People, 39 Mich. 357. 7 So. 593; Adams v. State, 28 Fla. .511, 
 
 isLester V. State, 9 Mo. 666; State v. 10 So. 108; Michael v. State, 40 Fla. 
 Tosterraan, 68 Mo. 408; State v. Lakey. 265, 2.'? So. 944; Walker v. Statn, 124 
 
 65 Mo. 217. Ga. 440, 53 S. E. 738 ; Mayes v. People, 
 
 iSharwin's Case, 1 East, P. C. 341. 106 111. 306, 46 Am. Rep. 698; Dukes v. 
 
 \nd see People v. Wallace, 9 Cal. 30, State, 11 Ind. 557, 71 Am. Dee. 370; 
 
 People V. Aro, 6 Cal. 207, 65 Am. Dec. Veatch v. State, 56 Ind. 584, 26 Am. 
 
 503. Hep. 44; State v. Dillon, 74 Iowa, 653, 
 
 But where homicide is committed by 38 N. W. 525; State v. Smith, 32 Me. 
 
 suifocation, and death results from the 369, 54 Am. Dec. 578; Com. v. Fox, 7 
 
 swelling up of the passage of the throat. Gray, 585; Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 
 
 ind such swelling proceeds from wounds 52 Am. Dec. 711; State v. Jones, 20 
 
 occasioned by forcing something into the Mo. 58 ; State v. Rector, 126 Mo. 328, 23 
 
 throat, it is sufficient in an indictment S. W. 1074; State v. Reakey, 1 Mo. App. 
 
 for the killing to state that the things 3; Territory v. Young, 5 Mont. 242, 5 
 
 were forced into the throat, and the de- Pac. 248; State v. Burke, 54 N. H. 92; 
 
 ceased was thereby suffocated; the pro- State v. Fox, 25 N. J. L. 566; Colt v. 
 
 cess immediately causing the suffoca- Pfnnle, I Park. Crim. Rep. 611; Shay 
 
 tion, — namely, the swelling, — need not v. People, 22 N. Y. 317 ; State v. Owen, 
 
 be stated. Rex v. Tye, Russ. & R, C. C. 5 N. C. ( 1 Murph. ) 452 ; 4 Am. Dec. 
 
 345. 571; State v. Gould, 90 N. C. 658; Res- 
 
 224 & 35 Vict. chap. 100, § 6. publica v. Honeyman, 2 Dall. 228, 1 L. 
 
 3 White V. Com. 9 Bush, 178; Jefrrie.s cd. 359; State v. Freeman, 1 Speers, L. 
 
 V. Com. 84 Ky. 237, 1 S. W. 442; Sims 57; State v. Jenkins, 14 Rich. L. 215, 94 
 
 V. Com. 12 Ky. L,. Rep. 215, 13 S. W. Am. Dec. 132; State v. Williams, 36 
 
 1079; Rodders v. State, 50 Ala. 102, Tex. 352; Drye v. State, 14 Tex. App. 
 
 Haney v. State, 34 Ark. 263; People y. 185; Walker v. State, 14 Tex. App. 609; 
 
 Choiser^ 10 Cal. .310; State V Town- pheppard v. State, 17 Tex. App. 74; 
 
 send, Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 340; t„ t,„^ „ ci^i o^ rr. n ■ r, to 
 
 c!4.„*l ., rr„,.i TT „t. n>;™ T>„v, Jackson V. State, 34 Tex. Cnm. Rep. 38, 
 
 State V. Taylor, Houst. Cnm. Kep. ' c rf r, 
 
 (Del.) 436; Hodge v. State, 26 Fla. 11, f^^- ^- 815; Gibson v. Com. 2 Va. Gas. 
 
S 563] PLEADING, INFORMATION AND INDICTMENT. 847 
 
 caused by a blow on the head, of which there was no evidence what- 
 ever, the defendants were entitled to an acquittal. * And a charge in 
 an indictment that the offense was committed with a "shotgun" does 
 not set forth the manner and circumstances attending the use of the 
 gun with such certainty as would enable a defendant to make a 
 complete defense.® So, if the charge be that the prisoner "did com- 
 pel and force" another person to do an act which caused the death 
 of a third party, this all^ation will require evidence of per- 
 sonal affirmative force applied to the person in question." An in- 
 dictment charging that the accused did commit manslaughter on 
 the high sea by casting a designated person from a described ves- 
 sel, however, is sufficiently certain as to the manner of the killing.''^ 
 And an indictment charging the accused with suffocating the de- 
 ceased by placing his hands about his neck is sustained by proof 
 that he was suffocated in any manner, either by the accused or by 
 any other person in his presence and at his instigation.® 
 
 So, it is well settled that it is sufficient to allege that a murder 
 was committed in some way and by some means, instruments and 
 weapons to the grand jury unknown, when the circumstances of the- 
 case will not permit of greater certainty of statement.® And such 
 an allegation does not render inadmissible evidence as to the man- 
 ner and means of killing. ^ " Nor is the fact that a killing occurred 
 in the- prosecution of a riot of the essence of the crime, so as to make 
 it necessary that it should be alleged in the indictment. ^ ^ And 
 an indictment for murder may be sufficient without charging the 
 accused in formal terms with the commission of an assault or an 
 assault and battery on the person of the deceased.^* But where 
 
 <Queen v. Bird, Temple & M. C. C. 78 Am. Dec. 248; State v. Pa-rker, 65- 
 
 437, 2 Den. C. C. 94, 5 Cox, C. n. 11, 15 N. C. 453: Stite v. Jenkins, 14 Rich. L. 
 
 Jur. 193. 215, 94 Am. Dec. 132; Sheppard v. State, 
 
 sEdwards v. State, 27 Ark. 493. And 17 Tex. App. 74; Drye v. State. 14 Tex. 
 
 see State v. Johnson, 191 Mo. 177, 90 S. Anp. 185: Walker v. Sit.ate, 14 Tex. App. 
 
 W. 89. 609 ; Harris v. State, 37 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 6Rex V. Lloyd, 1 Car. & P. 301. 4-11, 36 S. W. 88; Crenshaw v. State- 
 
 'United States v. Holmes, 1 Wall. Jr., (Tex. Crim. App.) 29 S. W. 787. And 
 
 1, Fed. Cas. No. 15.383. see Hu£;hes v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 sRex V. Culkin, 5 Car. & P. 121. 60 S. W. 562. 
 
 sPeople V. Cronin, 34 Cal. 191; New- loFletcher v. State, 122 Ga. 574, 50- 
 ell V. State. 115 Ala. 54, 2-2 So. 572; Ed- S. E. 360. 
 montla v. State, 34 Ark. 720; Donahue v. n State v. Jenkins, supra. 
 State (Tnd.) 74 N. E. 998; Wagg;oner v. That a killing occurred in the prose- 
 State. 1.'55 Ind. 341, 80 Am. St. Rep. cution of a riot does not distinguish the- 
 237, 58 N. E. 190; Com. v. Webster, 5 homicide, either in kind or degree, and 
 Cush. 295, 52 Am. Dee. 711; Com. v. therefore that fact need not be stated 
 Martin, 125 Mass. 394; State v. Brown, in the indictment. Ibid. 
 168 Mo. 449, 68 S. W. 56S; Olive v. laDennis v. State, 103 Ind. 142, 2 N. 
 State, 11 Neb. 1, 7 N. W. 444; State v. E 349; Waggoner v. State, 1=5 Ind. 
 Williams, 52 N. C. (7 Jones, L.) 446, 341, 80 Am. St. Rep. 237, 58 N. £. 190. 
 
848 HOMICIDE. [§ 563 
 
 the killing is alleged to have been caused by a battery, it is neces- 
 sary to allege an assault.^'' In indictments for neglect, however, 
 where no violence is alleged, the "assault" may be omitted.^* But 
 the term "assault" does not vitiate, though it should appear that the 
 deceiased consented to the injurious act being done. ^® And an in- 
 dictment v?hich alleges that the death was caused by a wounding, 
 an exposure, and a starving is not bad for duplicity, nor for failure 
 to allege that the wounding, exposure, and starving were mortal, 
 or of a mortal nature ; and may be sustained by proof of death by 
 any of the specified means. ^* 
 
 So, acts which hasten the death of a person already suffering with 
 a disease of which he would probably have soon died may be laid 
 in an indictment for the murder, as the sole cause of the death, 
 without mentioning the disease. ^'^ But an indictment charging 
 the death to have been occasioned by two co-operating causes, if 
 the evidence fail to support one of the causes, is insufficient. Where 
 a count stated the death to have been caused by omitting to give 
 the deceased proper food, and also by beating, it was held that the 
 prisoner, being a married woman, was not legally responsible for 
 omitting to provide food, and consequently that this count, which 
 charged the death jointly by starving and beating, was not sup- 
 ported. ^ * 
 
 Where the means by which the murder was committed are un- 
 certain, its commission by different means may be charged in a count 
 of the information, and proof of any one will sustain the allegation, 
 but the means so charged in the same count must not be repugnant. ^ * 
 And an allegation of killing by shooting, and by cutting, bruising, 
 
 isLester v. State, 9 Mo. 666; State iTCom. v. Fox, 7 Gray, 585; State v. 
 
 V. Blan, 69 Mo. 317; Reed v. State, 8 Morea, 2 Ala. 275. See, however, Stock- 
 
 Ind. 200. dale's Case, 2 Lewin, C. C. 220. 
 
 But where the statutory form is used isRex v. Saundera, 7 Cair. & P. 277. 
 
 in ain indictment for murder, and there l9State v. O'Neil, 51 Kan. 651, 24 
 
 is added thereto an allegation that the L.R.A. 555, 33 Pac. 287 ; State v. Hewes, 
 
 accused committed an assault upon the 60 Kan. 765, 57 Pac. 959; State v. Fies- 
 
 deeeased, the particular means by which ter, 32 Or. 254, 50 Pac. 561. And see 
 
 the assault was committed need not be King v. State, 137 Ala. 47, 34 So. 683; 
 
 set forth, though it would be necessary Andersen v. United States, 170 U. S. 
 
 to prove that the murder was committed 481, 42 L. ed. 1116, 18 Sup. Ot. Rep. 
 
 by force of some kind. State v. Mor- 689. 
 
 rissey, 70 Me. 401. But where an indictment charges the 
 
 -iReg. V. Plummor, 1 Car. & K. GOO; moans by which a homicide was com- 
 
 Reg. V. Crumpton, Oar. & M. 597; Reg. mitted in the alternative, each alterna: 
 
 V. Hughes, 7 Cox, C. C. 301 ; R«x. v. tive avenuent must be construed as a 
 
 Friend, Russ. & R. C. C. 20. separate count. Smith v. Staite, 142 
 
 iBReg. V. Ellis, 2 Car. & K. 470. Ala. 14, 39 So. 329. 
 
 leCom. V. Maeloon, 101 Mass. 1. 100 
 Am. Dec. 89. 
 
§ X3] PLEADING, INFORMATION, AND INDICTMENT. 849 
 
 and striking, charges that the accused inflicted two mortal wounds 
 upon the deceased, one by shooting, and one by striking, and is not 
 bad for repugnancy.^" Nor is a charge of murder bad as charging 
 more than one offense, because it contains an averment that the ac- 
 cused did make and commit an assault upon the deceased. ^^ And 
 an indictment charging a homicide to have been committed by shoot- 
 ing and drowning is not demurrable for duplicity, or uncertainty, 
 or repugnance, on the ground that such means are inconsistent.^^ 
 564, Statutory rules. — It is provided by statute in some of the 
 states, in words or substance, that in any indictment for murder 
 or manslaughter, it shall not be necessary to set forth the manner in 
 which, or the means by which, the death of the deceased was caused ; 
 but it shall be suiEcient, in every indictment for murder, to charge 
 that the defendant did feloniously, wilfully, and of his malice afore- 
 thought kill and murder the deceased; and it shall be sufficient, in 
 every indictment for manslaughter, to charge that the defendant did 
 feloniously kill and slay the deceased.^ And such statutes are not 
 nnconstitutional as depriving the accused of the right to be informed 
 as to the nature and cause of the accusation against him,^ or as 
 depriving the accused of equal protection of the laws, or of due 
 process of law. * The nature and cause of a criminal prosecution are 
 sufficiently averred under these provisions by charging the crime al- 
 leged to have been committed.* The mode or manner of its com- 
 
 zoSutherlin v. State, 148 Ind. 695, 48 defendant did unlawfully kill the de- 
 
 N. E. 246. ceased. Williams v. State, 35 Ohio St. 
 
 2iBa.ysinger v. Territory (Okla.) 82 175; Wolf v. State, 19 Ohio St. 248. 
 Pae. 728. ' 2 Jordan v. People, 19 Colo. 417, 30 
 
 22Andersenv. United States, swpro. Pac. 218; Redus v. People, 10 Colo. 208, 
 
 And where a person was shot on a ves- 14 Pac. 323 ; State v. Bartley, 34 La. 
 
 sel and his body immediately thrown Ann. 147; State v. Granville, 34 La. 
 
 overboard, a, charge of shooting and Ann. 1088 ; State v. Verrill, 54 Me. 408 ; 
 
 drowning need not be made in the al- Newcomb v. Stnte, 37 Hiss. 383: State 
 
 ternative in separate counts. Ibid. v. Moore, 104 N. C. 743, 10 S. E. 183: 
 
 iPa. Rev. Act 1860. pamph. p. 435, Williams v. State, supra; Cathcart a". 
 
 §§ 11, 20; Oliio Act May 6, 1869, § 7; Com. 37 Pa. 109; Goersen v. Com. su- 
 
 Warren's Ohio Crim. Law, p. 180; Colo, pra ; State v. Noakes, 70 Vt. 247, 40 Atl. 
 
 Gen. Stat. § 926; La. Rev. Stat. § 1048; 249; State v. Schnelle, 24 W. Va. 767; 
 
 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 4660; N. J. Rev. Stat. Rowan v. State, 30 Wis. 129, 11 Am. 
 
 1877, 275, § 45; N. C. Laws 1887, chap. Rep. 559; Hogan v. State, 30 Wis. 428, 
 
 58; Va. Acts 1882, chap. 118, § 1. And 11 Am. Rep. 575; State ex rel. Welch 
 
 see State v. Munston, 35 La. Ann. 888; v. Sloan, 65 Wis. 647, 27 N. W. 616. 
 
 Coratola v. United States, 24 App. D. And see Com. v. Snell, 189 Mass. 12, 3 
 
 C. 229; Sneed v. People, 38 Mich. 248; L.R.A.(N.S.) 1019, 75 N. E. 75. 
 People V. Bemis, 51 Mich. 422, 16 N. sBerg^emann v. Backer. 157 U. S. 65.^. 
 
 W. 794; Goersen v. Com. 99 Pa. 388; 39 L. ed. 845, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 727; State 
 
 Com. V. Buccieri, 153 Pa. 535, 26 Atl. v. Noakes, supra. And see State v. 
 
 228. Moore, and State v. Schnelle. supra. 
 
 Murder is sufficiently charged under ^Goersen v. Com. 99 Pa. 388; State 
 
 the Ohio statute by an allegation that v. Verrill, supra; State v. Morrissey, 70 
 Horn.— 54 
 
850' HOMICIDE. [§ 50* 
 
 mission, which need not be charged thereunder, refers to the instru- 
 ment with which the crime was committed, or the specific agency 
 used to accomplish the result," the constitutional right of a person 
 charged with crime to have his offense fully described to him re- 
 quiring only such particularity of allegation as may be of service 
 to him in enabling him to understand the charge and to prepare 
 his defense.® Provisions of this class, however, apply only to omis- 
 sions or defects of such a character that the accused may waive them, 
 expressly or by silence ; and since the constitutional right to demand 
 the nature and cause of an accusation against a person cannot be 
 waived or surrendered by him, if an indictment does not contain 
 such a description of the offense as to notify him of the nature and 
 cause of the accusation against him, it is a nullity and may be 
 objected to at any time.^ 
 
 So, the same result has been arrived at under general provisions 
 as to pleading in codes of criminal procedure, with reference to 
 statements of facts; and under them it has been held that in an 
 indictment for murder it is not necessary to aver the means by which 
 the homicide was committed;* and that an indictment is good if 
 the essential constituents of the crime are alleged, so that the nature 
 of the offense can be understood.® And an indictment charging the 
 time and place, and that the accused feloniously, wilfully, and of his 
 malice aforethought did kill and murder the deceased, sufficiently 
 charges murder under a statute requiring the crime of murder to 
 
 .Me. 401; State v. MooTe, supra. And 799; State v. Whitnah (Iowa) 105 N. 
 
 see Gustavenson v. State, 10 Wyo. 300, W. 432; Alexander v. State, 3 Heisk.. 
 
 (iS Pac. lOOB; State v. Pate, 121 N. C. 475. 
 
 059, 28 S. E. 354. While it is necessary in an indictment 
 sGoeraen v. Com.; State v. Morrissey; for murder to set forth particularly the- 
 :;nd State v. Schnelle, — supra. manner of the death, and the means by 
 6 Com. V. Robertson, 162 Mass. 90, 38 which it was efi'ected, no technical terms 
 X. E. 25. are required in stating the facts which 
 ^Newcomb v. State, 37 Miss. 383; constitute the offense, and an averment 
 i'eople V. Olmstead. 30 Mich. 439. of the manner and means of death in con- 
 In Chapman v. People, 39 Mich. 357, eise and ordinary language, and in such 
 it was held that an information for u. way as to enable a person of common 
 iinirder cannot omit or misdescribe any understanding to know what was intend- 
 faf^t which at common law was regard- ed, is sufficient. Adams v. State, 28 Fla. 
 cd US an essentiil element. 511, 10 So. 106. 
 
 sPeople V. King, 27 Cal. 607, 87 Am. sSee Thomas v. State, 71 Ga. 44; 
 Dee. 95; People v. Cronin, 34 Cal. 191; Scott v. State, 141 Ala. 1, 37 So. 357; 
 I'eople V. Weaver, 47 Cal. 106; People Michael v. State, 40 Fla. 265, 23 So. 
 V. Hong Ah Duck, 61 Cal. 387; People 944; State v. Robinson, 126 Iowa, 69, 
 V. Hyndman, 99 Cal. 1, 33 Pac. 782; Peo- 101 N. W. 634; State v. Moore, 104 N. C. 
 pie V. Murphy, 39 Cal. 52; Davis v. 743, 10 S. E. 183; State v. Brown, 106 
 United States, 16 App. D. C. 442; State N. C. 645, 10 S. E. 870; State v. Ed- 
 V. Sly (Idaho) 80 Pac. 1125; Dukes v. rounds (S". D.) 104 N. W. 1115; Peter- 
 State, 11 Ind. 557, 71 Am. Dec. 370; son v. State, 12 Tex. App. 650. 
 Drake v. State, 145 Ind. 210, 41 N. E. 
 
§ 5«4] PLEADING, INFORMATION, AND INDICTMENT. 8&1 
 
 be stated in an indictment with directness and certainty.*" And 
 an indictment charging murder wilfully, feloniously, and with mal- 
 ice aforethought is not vitiated by omission to so characterize the 
 assault in the statement of facts as to show that it was a murderous 
 one ; * * and it need not specify the weapon used ; * ^ nor is an in- 
 dictment charging murder bad because of failure to state that life 
 was taken by poisoning. * * And an indictment alleging a felonious 
 and malicious killing suiSciently charges murder in the first degree, 
 as well as in other degrees, though it did not charge that it was 
 committed with a premeditated design to effect death.** But un- 
 der such provisions a statement of the facts constituting the offense 
 is necessary; they only dispense with a statement of the manner 
 and means by which death was caused. * ^ And while an averment of 
 killing by shooting and mortally wounding is good,*^ one of killing 
 by firing a revolver, with nothing as to wounding, or the direction 
 or intention of the firing, is not. * ^ And when it is alleged that the 
 death was caused in a particular manner, it is incumbent upon the 
 state to prove it substantially as alleged.*® 
 
 565. Description of instrument or means of death. — The general and 
 common-law rule is that the character of the instrument or weapon 
 with which a homicide was committed should be stated in an in- 
 dictment therefor.* If the instrument by which the homicide was 
 committed be not known, however, it is enough for the indictment 
 to aver such fact; and under those circumstances the want of speci- 
 fication will be excused on the same principles as allow the non- 
 
 loPeople V. Cronin, supra; State v. cused unlawfully and feloniously did 
 
 Harringrton, 9 Nev. 91. And see State kill a person named, by then and there 
 
 V. Smith, 9 Wash. 341, 37 Pae. 491. unlawfully and feloniously cutting, 
 
 iiOhase v. State, 50 Wis. 510, 7 N. W. stabbing, and mortally wounding him 
 
 376; State v. Shay, 30 La. Ann. 114; with a knife, sufficiently charges vol- 
 
 State V. Voorhies, 115 La. 200, 38 So. untarv manslaughter. Willey v. State, 
 
 964. 46 Ind. 363. 
 
 Nor is an indictment oharging the isLittell v. State, 133 Ind. 577, 33 N. 
 
 accused with feloniously assaulting a, E. 417. 
 
 person, and of killing and murdering An indictment for manslaughter 
 
 him. objectionable as charging two of- charging that the accused did unlaw- 
 
 fenses. People v. Weaver, 47 Cal. 106. fully kill the deceased is bad on motion 
 
 i2Alexander v. State, 3 Heisk. 475; to quasih, even under the statute. State 
 
 State V. Florenza, 28 La. Ann. 945; v. Lay, 93 Ind. 341. 
 
 State V. Matakovich, 59 Minn. 514, 61 leVeatch v. State, 56 Ind. 584, 26 
 
 N. W. 677. Am. Rep. 44 ; State v. Yandell, 34 Wash. 
 
 l3State V. Hartley, 34 La. Ann. 147; 409. 75 Pac. 988. 
 
 People V. Bemis, 51 Mich. 422, 16 N. W. I'Shepherd v. State. 54 Ind. 25. 
 
 794. i^Knapp v. State, 25 Ohio C. C. 571. 
 
 i4Hogaji V. State, .30 Wis. 428, 11 Am. iDrye v. State, 14 Tex. App. 185; 
 
 Rep. 575; State ex rel. Welch v. Sloan, Hornsby v. State. 94 Ala. 55, 10 So. 
 
 65 Wis. 647, 27 N. W. 616. 522. ATjd see State v. Prendible, 165 
 
 Ad indictment alleging that the ac- Mo. 329, 65 S. W. 559. 
 
852 HOMICIDE. [§ 565 
 
 setting out of a stolen or forged paper, when such paper is lost 
 or in the prisoner's possession.^ And an indictment may properly 
 charge a killing with a described instrument, or with an instrument 
 to the grand jury unknown. ^ l!^ or is an indictment containing such 
 a charge invalidated by the fact that by proper diligence the jury 
 might have learned the nature of the instrument, and it was brought 
 out on the trial,* though there is a variance if the proof shows that 
 the jury actually did know.® So, in describing means of killing, 
 merely naming an instrument naturally and usually used for strik- 
 ing, such as a club, stick, or stone, is usually regarded as sufficient.® 
 And when an indictment describes the instrument which caused the 
 death by two names, it is sufficient if it be proved to be either. '' And 
 a charge of murder by shooting with a leaden ball is sufficient, with- 
 out a designation of the kind of firearm used.^ And describing it 
 as a "loaded pistol" is sufficient, though the manner in which it was 
 charged is not shown.® Nor is it necessary to allege that the wea- 
 pon was loaded;^" and the kind of gun or the kind of shot with 
 
 sWharton, Crim. Law, 311, 1064; Eat- fact that the instrument was known to 
 
 man v. State, 139 Ala. 67, 36 So. 16; the grand jury entitles the accused to an 
 
 Terry v. State, 120 Ala. 286, 23 So. acquittal on that particular count only. 
 
 944; Smith v. State, 142 Ala. 14, 39 Smith v. State, supra. 
 
 So. 329; People v. Cronin, 34 Cal. 191; estate v. Smith, 61 N. C. (PMll. L.) 
 
 People V. Martin, 47 Cal. 101; Hides v. 340; State v. Owen, 5 N. C. (1 Murph.) 
 
 State, 105 Ga. 627, 31 S. E. 579; Com. 452, 4 Am. Dec. 571. 
 
 V. Snell, 189 Mass. 12, 3 L.R.A. (JST.S.) An indictment charging a homicide 
 
 1019, 75 N. E. 75; Com. v. Webster, 5 to have been committed by beating the 
 
 Ciish. 295, 52 Am. Dec. 711; State v. deceased with a piece of iron need not 
 
 Williams, 52 N. C. (7 Jones, L.) 446, specifically set forth the size or weight 
 
 78 Am. Dec. 248; State v. Wood, 53 N. thereof. Bowens v. State, 106 Ga. 760, 
 
 H. 484; Hughes v. State (Tex. Crim. 32 S. E. 666. 
 
 App.) 60 S. W. 562; Drye v. State, su- 'Rigmaidon'a Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 180. 
 
 pra; Hex v. Grounsell, 7 Car. & P. sBlanlcenship v. Com. 23 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 788. 1995, 66 S. W. 994. 
 
 sKing V. State, 137 Ala. 47, 34 So. sPeople v. Choiser, 10 Cal. 310. 
 
 683; Terry v. State, 118 Ala. 79, 23 So. A charge that the accused killed his 
 
 776; Houston v. State (Fla.) 39 So. wife by wounding her with a revolver 
 
 468. loaded with gunpowder amd leaden bul- 
 
 4Terry v. State, supra. lets, which revolver he discharged at 
 
 Where an indictment charges a mur- and into her person, sufficiently shows 
 
 der committed by means unlcno^vn to that the revolver was fired, and not 
 
 the grand .jury, and the evidence indi- thrown as a missile. Green v. State, 
 
 cates only in a vague and general way 154 Ind. 655, 57 N. E. 637. 
 
 what means did cause tlie deatli of the lo Peterson v. State, 47 Ga. 524; Cook 
 
 deceased, no evidence need be oiTered v. State, 119 Ga. 108, 46 S. E. 64; Par- 
 
 that the means of the death were un- ker v. State, 95 Ga. 482, 22 S. E. 276; 
 
 known as alleged. Harris v. State, 37 Tlwmais v. State, 71 Ga. 44; McDonald 
 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 441, 36 S. W. 8!5. v. State, 46 Fla. 149, 35 So. 72 ; Dukes 
 
 sSmith v. State, 142 Ala. 14, 39 So. v. State, 11 Ind. 557, 71 Am. Dec. 370; 
 
 329; Houston v. State, supra. Jeffries v. Com. 84 Ky. 237, 1 S. W. 
 
 But where an indictment charges a 442 ; Stutsman v. Territory, l' Okla. 490, 
 
 killing to have been done with an Instru- 59 Pac. 707. 
 ment unknown to the grand jury, the 
 
§ 5651 PLEADING, rNTFORMATION, AND INDICTMENT. 853 
 
 which it was charged need not be stated. ^ ^ And an instrument with 
 which death was cansed need not he alleged to be a deadly or dan- 
 gerous weapon. ^ ^ And the early requirement that its value be stated 
 is now obsolete. ^ ® 
 
 So, the weapon used need not be described under a statute pro- 
 viding that it is not necessary in an indictment for homicide to 
 aver the means by which it was committed. ^ * And the means of the 
 commission of a homicide need not be charged under statutes re- 
 quiring the indictment to contain a statement of the facts con- 
 stituting the offense, in plain and concise language. -^^ And though 
 the killing was by poison a charge that the deceased was killed or 
 murdered is sufficient;^® though where a person puts poison into 
 a teapot with intent to murder three persons, the intent to murder 
 each is a separate offense, and an indictment therefor must charge 
 each separately.^'' And a mere charge of murder by administering 
 a designated poison is sufficient to meet any phase of the evidence. ^ * 
 It may be generally stated that when one kind of poison is averred 
 and another proved, the variance is not fatal. ^* Nor need the 
 indictment state the quantity used,^" or the way it affected the per- 
 son killed,^ ^ or allege knowledge of its dangerous properties on the 
 part of the accused,^ ^ or that it was knowingly and voluntarily re- 
 ceived and swallowed. ^ * And where in one count of an indictment 
 for murder the death was stated to be by a blow of a stick, and in 
 another by the throwing of a stone, ^* these are not inconsistent 
 
 llDukea v. State, supra. Rex v. Gromisell, 7 Car. & P. 788; Rex 
 
 iSTenorio v. Territory, 1 N. M. 279; v. Martin, 5 Car. & P. 128. And see 
 
 Jeffries v. Com. supra; Bljuikenship v. Reg. v. O'Brian, 2 Car. & K. 115; Reg. 
 
 Com. 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1995, 66 S. W. 994; v. Warman, 2 Car. & K. 195; Carter v. 
 
 State V. McDaniel, 94 Mo. 301, 7 S. W. State, 2 Ind. 617; State v. Vawter, 7 
 
 634; State v. Bowles, 146 Mo. 6, 69 Am. Blackf. 592. As to ambiguous descrip- 
 
 St. Rep. 598, 47 S. W. 892; Lee v. tion of poison, see King v. Clark 2 
 
 State, 44 Tex. Grim. Rep. 460, 72 S. W. Brod. & B. 473. 
 
 195; State V. Regan, 8 Wash. 506, 36 aoEpps v. State, 102 Ind. 539, 1 N. 
 
 Pac. 472. . E. 491 ; Rosenbarger v. State, 154 Ind. 
 
 i3Dukes V. State, supra. 425, 56 N. E. 514; Morrison v. State, 
 
 i^People V. Hooik Ah Duck, 61 Cal. 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 473, 51 S. W. 358; 
 
 387. And see Green v. State, 71 Ark. Puryear v. Com. 83 Va. 51, 1 S. E. 512. 
 
 150, 71 S. W. 665. 21 Westmoreland v. United States, 155 
 
 iBLittell V. State, 133 Ind. 577, 33 N. U. S. 545, 39 L. ed. 255, 15 Sup. Ct. 
 
 E. 417; Freese v. State, 159 Ind. 597, 65 Rep. 43. 
 
 N. E. 915. And see Mathis v. State, 39 22Jane v. Com. 3 Met. (Ky.) 19; 
 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 549, 47 S. W. 464. State v. Slagle, 83 N. C. 630; State v. 
 
 leState V. Bartley, 34 La. Ann. 147. Utley, 126 N. C. 997, 35 S. E. 428; 
 
 I'Qxieen v. Murphy, 1 Cox, C. C. 108. Thornton v. Com. 24 Gratt. 657. 
 
 isNordan v. State (Ala.) 39 So. 406. zsSiple v. State, 154 Ind. 647, 57 N 
 
 i92Hale, P. C. 485; Rex v. Tye, Russ. E. 544. 
 
 & R. C. G. 345; Rex v. Culkin, 5 Car. & 2 4E.eg. v. O'Brian, 2 Car. & K. 115, 
 
 P. 121; Rex v. Waters, 7 Car. & P. 250; 1 Den. C. C. 9. 
 
854 HOMICIDE. [§ 565 
 
 statements of the modes of death. In this country the practice is 
 to take a verdict of guilty if either count is sustained by the evidence, 
 no matter how inconsistently the instrument may be stated in other 
 counts.^® The proper course, no doijbt, is to take the verdict on the 
 count sustained by the evidence. Yet, even after a general verdict 
 of guilty, the counts containing the misdescription may be removed 
 by nolle prosequi, and judgment entered on the good count. 
 
 566. Use of instruments or means of death. — It is not necessary to 
 a full description of a homicide, or in order to inform the accused 
 of the particulars of the charge vyhich he is to meet, that the manner 
 in which the instrument or means of death were held or used shall 
 be definitely stated. ^ And where such an averment is made, it need 
 not be proved.^ The rule that an indictment for murder must 
 state the manner of death means merely that the particular mode 
 by which death was caused, whether by shooting, stabbing, beating, 
 or striking, strangulation, or poisoning, etc., must be set forth, and 
 not that the manner of the connection of the accused with the use 
 of that mode shall be made to appear.' Thus, an indictment 
 charging two or more persons with murder committed with a weapon 
 held in their hands is not demurrable as improperly describing the 
 offense, or as charging a physical impossibility.* And the same 
 principle applies to sustain an indictment charging killing with a 
 pistol loaded with a leaden ball, where the proof shows that it was 
 loaded with at least two balls, and that a leaden ball had been dis- 
 charged from the pistol before the shot which caused death.® Nor 
 need it be charged, or proved as charged, in which hand the slayer 
 held the weapon with which he did the killing.® 
 
 sBLanergan v. People, 39 N". Y. 39; sState v. Jenkins, 14 Rich. L. 215, 94 
 
 State V. Baker, 63 N. C. 276. And see Am. Dec. 132. 
 
 People V. Davis, 56 N. Y. 95; People v. And an indictment for homicide char- 
 Valencia, 43 Cal. 552; Reg. v. O'Brian, ging an assault as a part of the crime 
 supra. charges but a single offense, and is not 
 
 iCora. V. Costley, 118 Mass. 1; Cora, bad for duplicity. Warner v. State, 114 
 
 V. Robertson, 162 Mass. 90, 38 N. E. 25; Ind. 137, 16 N. E. 189. 
 
 State V. Bell (Del.) 62 Atl. 147; Pyke 4Evans v. State, 58 Ark. 47, 22 S. W. 
 
 V. State, 47 Fla. 93. 36 So. 577; Welch v. 1026; Coates v. People, 72 111. 303; State 
 
 State, 104 Ind. 347, 3 N. E. 850; Den- v. Brown, 21 Kan. 38; State v. Payton, 
 
 iiis V. State, 103 Ind. 142, 2 N. E. 349; 90 Mo. 220. 2 S. W. 394; Hash v. 'Com. 
 
 Ward V. State, 8 Blaokf. 101; Noble v. 88 Va. 172, 13 S. E. 398. 
 
 Com. 11 Ky. h. Rep. 867, 13 S. W. estate v. Robertson, 178 Mo. 498, 77 
 
 429; State v. Steinemann, 162 Mo. 188, S. W. 528. 
 
 62 S. W. 694; Territory v. Young, 5 estate v. Martin, 9 Ohio S. & 0. P. 
 
 Mont. 242, 5 Pac. 248; Catheart v. Com. Dec. 778. 
 37 Pa. 108. 
 
 2 Com. V. Costley, and Territory v. 
 Young, supra. 
 
f 566] PLEADING, INFORMATION, AND INDICTJVIENT. 855 
 
 When a homicide is charged to have been committed with a par- 
 ticular weapon or instrument, or by a particular means, however, 
 the method of use of such weapon, instrument, or means by which 
 death was effected must be described,'' and proved as alleged;** 
 and it must be charged that the assault was made with the described 
 instrument,® though a mere accidental omission of the wed "with" 
 would not vitiate the indictment/" And where death is charged 
 to have been occasioned by a wound, bruise, or assault the stroke 
 must be expressly laid. ' * But if siich method of use plainly ap- 
 pears, it is sufficient; no particular word or phrase is required to 
 be used in alleging it.^^ A charge of killing with a gun is not 
 objectionable for not charging a battery, that being implied from 
 the charge of killing ;^^ and a charge of killing with a firearm 
 warrants proof that it was loaded, and that the assault was made by 
 firing it at the person assaulted. * * And an indictment charging that 
 the defendant, with a certain stone which he held in his right hand, 
 in and upon the right side of the head of the deceased, feloniously, 
 etc., did cast and throw, and that the defendant with the stone afore- 
 said, so as aforesaid cast and thrown, the deceased in and upon the 
 right side of the head feloniously did strike, etc., was held to con- 
 tain a sufficient allegation that the defendant threw the stone and 
 struck the deceased with it. ^ ® 
 
 So, when the stroke is alleged it is sufficient, though it is not 
 charged to have been given in a cruel, brutal, or inhuman manner. ^ * 
 And where the instrument was a dagger, "stab, stick, and thrust" 
 
 TPeople V. Aro, 6 Cal. 207, 65 Am. Vea-tch v. State, 56 Ind. 584, 26 Am. 
 
 Dee. 503; Thompson v. State, 26 Ark. Rep. 44; State v. Heinzman, 171 Mo. 
 
 324; Edwards v. State, 27 Ark. 493; 629, 71 S. W. 1010. 
 
 Haney v. State, 34 Ark. 263; State v. isRay v. State, 108 Tenn. 282, 67 S. 
 
 Townsend, Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) W. 553! 
 
 337; Shepherd v. State, 54 Ind. 25; And an indictment for homicide char- 
 Powers V. State, 80 Ind. 77; State v. ging that the accused, with a revolver 
 Blan, 69 Mo. 317; State v. Sundheimer, loaded with gunpowder and leaden balls, 
 93 Mo. 311, 6 S.W. 52; State v. John- shot, struck, and penetrated the de- 
 son, 191 Mo. 177, 90 S. W. 89; Light- ceased, is not fatally defective because 
 foot V. State, 20 Tex. App. 77; Gibson it fails to aver that the leaden balls 
 V. Cora. 2 Va. Cas. Ill; Ball v. United struck and penetrated the body of the 
 States, 140 U. S. 118, 35 L. ed. 377, 11 deceased. State v. Silk, 145 Mo. 240, 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 761. . 44 S. W. 764, 46 S. W. 959. 
 
 sDanfbrth v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. uPeterson v. State. 41 Fla. 285, 26 
 
 105, 69 S. W. 159. So. 709; Thomas v. State, 71 Ga. 44; 
 
 sState V. Furgerson, 162 Mo. 668, 61 State v. Shunka, 116 Iowa, 206, 89 N. 
 
 S. W. 101. W. 977. And see Pyke v. State, 47 Fla. 
 
 1 estate V. Evans, 158 Mo. 589, 59 S. 93, 36 So. 577. 
 
 W. 904. 15 White v. Com. 6 Binn. 183, 6 Am. 
 
 liState V. Owen, 5 N. C. (1 Murph.) Dec. 443. See also Turns v. Com. 6 Met. 
 
 452, 4 Am. Dee. 571. 225; Rex v. Dale, 1 Moody, C. C. 5. 
 
 i2Palmer v. People, 138 IlL 356, 32 isLee v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 460, 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 146, 28 N. E. 130. And see 72 S. W. 195. 
 
856 HOMICIDE. [§ 566 
 
 would be held equivalent to "strike" ^^ Nor is a charge of killing 
 by striking with a hatchet or with some blunt instrument objection- 
 able for indefiniteness in not showing whether death was caused 
 by a shock, or by some other use of the blunt instrument.^* And 
 use of the words "shoot off and discharge" is sufficient in charging 
 gunshot wounds. ' ® And a charge of murder by striking the deceased 
 with clubs, and shooting him and mortally wounding him by strik- 
 ing and shooting him with clubs and guns, is not objectionable as 
 charging a shooting with clubs. ^" So, a charge that the accused 
 administered, or caused to be administered, poison is good,^^ and it 
 is not necessary to allege more than the act with which the poisoner 
 was charged; it is not the practice to allege the health or physical 
 condition in which the deceased might be, however much that con- 
 dition might assist in rendering the act of the poisoner fatal, where 
 the death was accelerated by the poison. ^^ And an indictment 
 charging a killing by strangulation in choking the deceased to death 
 sufficiently describes the means of killing. ^^ So, in a case where 
 the death proceeded from suffocation, when the primary cause of 
 the suffocation was the forcing of a substance into the throat of a 
 child, it was not necessary to state in the indictment the inter- 
 mediate process, viz., the swelling up of the passage of the throat, 
 which occasioned the suffocation.^* 
 
 567. The question of variance. — The common-law rule, in plead- 
 ing the instrument of death, is that, where the instrument laid atid 
 the instrument proved are of the same nature and character, there 
 is no variance ; where they are of opposite nature and character, the 
 
 I'Gibson v. Com. 2 Va. Cas. 111. rendered defective by the fact that it 
 
 isSmith V. State, 142 Ala. 14, 39 charges that two mortal wounds were 
 
 So. 329. inflicted with a revolver loaded with one 
 
 19 State V. Freeman, 1 Speers, L. 57; bullet. State v. Taylor, 126 Mo. 531, 
 
 Green v. State, 154 Ind. 655, 57 N. E. 29 S. W. 598. 
 
 637; Stutsman v. Territory, 7 Okla. 2 State v. Blan, 69 Mo. 317, AfSrm- 
 
 490, 54 Pac. 707. And see State v. Sly ing 7 Mo. App. 582. 
 
 (Idaho) 80 Pae. 1125; Cooper v. State, So, an indictment for homicide de- 
 
 47 Fla. 21, 36 So. 53; Knight v. State, signed to charge a killing by shooting 
 
 44 Fla. 94, 32 So. 110; State v. Colomb, is not bad because the word "shooting" 
 
 108 La. 253, 32 So. 351 ; State v. Nelson, was spelled "shorting." Francis v. 
 
 181 Mo. 340, 103 Am. St. Eep. 602, 80 State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 246, 70 S. W. 
 
 S. W. 947 ; State v. Privitt, 175 Mo. 207, 751. 
 
 75 S. W. 457; State v. Gleason, 172 Mo. 2iRosenbarger v. State, 154 Ind. 425, 
 
 259, 72 S. W. 676; State v. Wilson, 172 56 N. E. 914. 
 
 Mo. 420, 72 S. W. 696; State ex rel. 22Webb's Case, 2 Lewin, C. C. 196, 1 
 
 Kotilinic v. Swenson, 18 S. D. 196, 99 Moodv & R. 405. 
 
 N. W. 1114; Morrison v. State, 40 Tex. 23Redd v. State, 69 Ala. 255. 
 
 Crim. Rep. 473, 51 S. W. 358. uRex v. Tye, Russ. & K. C. C. 345. 
 And an indictment for murder is not 
 
§ 567] 
 
 PLEADING, INFORMATION, AND INDICTMENT. 
 
 857 
 
 contrary.* Thus, evidence as to a dagger will support the aver- 
 ment of a knife, but evidence as to a knife will not support the aver- 
 ment of a pistol. ^ But where the species of death would be different, 
 — as, if the indictment allege a stabbing or shooting, and the evi- 
 dence prove a poisoning or starving, — the variance is fatal ;^ and 
 the same if the indictment state a poisoning, and the evidence prove 
 a starving. 
 
 The questions are as to whether the nature of the injury would 
 be the same,* and the mode of applying violence the same.® Thus, 
 where an indictment stated that the defendant assaulted the de- 
 ceased, and struck and beat him upon the head, and thereby gave 
 him divers mortal blows and bruises of which he died, and it ap- 
 peared in evidence that the death was by the deceased falling on the 
 ground in consequence of a blow on the head received from the de- 
 fendant, it was held that the cause of the death was not properly 
 stated.® But if it be proved that the deceased was killed by any 
 
 1 State V. Smith, 32 Me. 369, 54 Am. 
 Dec. 578; Rodgers v. State, 50 Ala. 102; 
 Phillips V. State, 68 Ala. 469; State v. 
 Taylor, Houst. Grim. Rep. (Del.) 436; 
 Drummer v. State, 45 Fla. 17, 33 So. 
 1008; Dukes v. State, 11 Ind. 557, 71 
 Am. Deo. 370; State v. Hoyt, 13 Minn. 
 132, Gil. 125; State v. Lautensehlager, 
 22 Minn. 514; Long v. State, 23 Neb. 
 33, 36 N. W. 310; State v. Fox, 25 N. 
 J. L. 566; State v. Gould, 90 N. C. 
 658; State v. Smith, 61 N. C. (Phill. 
 L.) 340; State v. Jenkins, 14 Rich. L. 
 215, 94 Am. Dec. 132; Witt v. State, 6 
 Coldw. 5; Miller v. State, 25 Wis. 384; 
 Reg. V. O'Brian, 2 Oar. & K. 115; Rex 
 V. Martin, 5 Car. & P. 128. 
 
 2Phillips V. State, 68 Ala. 469. 
 
 3Rex V. Brigga, 1 Moody, C. C. 318; 
 Rex V. Martin, supra; Rex v. Waters, 
 7 Oar. & P. 250; State v. Townsend, 
 Houst. Grim. Rep. (Del.) 337; Witt v. 
 State, supra. 
 
 So, in Rex v. Hughes, 5 Gar. & P. 126, 
 it was held that a charge of shooting 
 with a leaden bullet was not sustained 
 by proof tending to show that the wound 
 from which death resulted might have 
 been occasioned by the wadding of the 
 pistol. 
 
 4State V. Dame, 11 N. H. 271, 35 Am. 
 Dec. 495; Goodwyn v. State, 4 Sniedes 
 & M. 520; Rex v. Culkin, 5 Car. & P. 
 121. 
 
 BState V. Jenkins, 14 Rich. L. 215, 94 
 Am. Dee. 132. And see Rex v. Groun- 
 sell, 7 Car. & P. 788. 
 
 Evidence of several wounds, one of 
 which was mortal, is not a variance 
 from an indictment charging the in- 
 fliction of one mortal wound. State 
 V. Sanders, 76 Mo. 35. 
 
 6Rex V. Thompson, 1 Moody, C. C. 
 139; Sta;te v. Reed, 154 Mo. 122, 55 S. 
 W. 278. And see People v. Tannan, 4 
 Park. Grim. Rep. 514; Collins v. State 
 (Tex. Grim. App.) 83 S. W. 866; Rocha 
 V. State, 43 Tex. Grim. Rep. 169, 63 S. 
 W. 1018; G-ibson v. Com. 2 Va. Gas. 
 Ill; Rex V. Kelly, 1 Moody, G. C. 113; 
 Wrigley's Case, 1 Lewin, G. G. 127; Rex 
 V. Martin, 5 Car. & P. 128. 
 
 And an indictment for homicide char- 
 ging that the killing was accomplished 
 by physical violence does not warrant an 
 instruction authorizing a, conviction for 
 murder in the first degree, if the jury 
 found that by reason of the acts of the 
 accused the deceased was put in fear 
 and agitation to such an extent that 
 she lost her reason and jumped into a 
 well, which act caused her death; and 
 error in so instructing is not cured by 
 the fact that the verdict rendered was 
 not foT murder, but for involuntary 
 manslaughter. Gipe v. State (Ind.) 
 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 419, 75 N. E. 881. 
 
 In Com. V. McAfee, 108 Mass. 458, 11 
 Am. Rep. 383, however, it was held 
 that an allegation in an indictment 
 against a, husband for the homicide of 
 his wife, that he struck, kicked, beat, 
 bruised, and wounded, her upon the head 
 and body, and threw her upon the floor. 
 
858 
 
 HOMICtDE. 
 
 [§ 567 
 
 other instrument, as with a dagger, sword, staff, bill, or the like, 
 capable of producing the same kind of death as the instrument stated 
 in the indictment, the variance will not be material.'' Nor is proof 
 of striking with a stick a variance from an allegation charging 
 striking with a rock.* Nor is proof of throwing an ax and hitting 
 the victim, from an allegation of striking him with it.^ So, where 
 one kind of shot is averred and another proved.^" And the same 
 rule applies to a charge of shooting with a gun and proof of shoot- 
 ing with a pistol. ^ ^ And so, of an allegation of strangling or chok- 
 ing with the hands and proof of doing it with a scarf or cord.^^ 
 In New York, under the statute, a far more liberal rule has been 
 announced, it having been substantially held that the use of a pistol 
 might be proved under an indictment charging the weapon to have 
 been a knife. ^^ But at common law, proof of striking with a gun 
 will not sustain an averment of shooting. ^ * 
 
 568. Description of wound or injury. — It was formerly held to be 
 necessary to insert a full description of the wound which caused 
 death in an indictment for homicide.^ And in charging homicide 
 
 causing her death, sets forth the kill- 
 ing with sufficient particularity, though 
 the proof is that he struck her with his 
 open hand, and that she fell to the floor, 
 and medical evidence attributed her 
 death to falling on a chair, causing con- 
 cussion of the brain. 
 
 'Mackalley's Case, 9 Coke, 67a; Gil- 
 bert, Ev. 231 ; Rex v. Briggs, 1 Moody, 
 C. C. 318. See Rex v. Culkin, 5 Car. & 
 P. 121; Rex V. Grounsell, supra; Rex 
 V. Tve, Russ. & R. C. C. 345; Rex v. 
 Edwards, 6 Car. & P. 401 ; Rex v. Wa- 
 ters, 7 Car. & P. 250; Jones v. State, 
 137 Ala. 12, 34 So. 681. 
 
 So, a, charge in an indictment that 
 death was produced by bruises and blows 
 is sufficiently supported by evidence that 
 death resulted from pleuro-pneumonia, 
 produced by wounds and blows. Bur- 
 nett V. State, 14 Lea, 439. 
 
 sstate V. Gould, 90 N. C. 658. 
 
 And proof that a killing was done 
 with a piece of iron is not a majterial 
 and fatal variance where the indictment 
 charges that it was done with a piece of 
 plank. State v. Weddington, 103 N. C. 
 364, 9 S. E. 577. 
 
 sWebster v. State, 47 Fla. 108, 36 So. 
 584. 
 
 i^Goodwyn v. State, 4 Smedes & M. 
 520. 
 
 11 Turner v. State, 97 Ala. 57, 12 So. 
 54; Drommer v. State, 45 Fla. 17, 33 
 
 So. 1008; Douglass v. State, 26 Tex. 
 App. 109, 8 Am. St. Rep. 459, 9 S. W. 
 489; Taylor v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. 
 Rep. 547, 72 S. W. 396. And see Brown 
 V. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 293, 65 S. 
 W. 529; State v. Bell (Del.) 62 Atl. 
 147. 
 
 So, in Lighfcfoot v. Com. 80 Ky. 516, 
 it was held that a conviction for mur- 
 der under an indictment charging a 
 killing with a pistol will be sustained 
 in the absence of a demurrer, where a 
 malicious killing is shown, though it 
 does not appear whether the accused 
 shot the deceased with a pistol, or beat 
 him upon the head with it, producing 
 death. 
 
 "Thomas v. Com. 14 Ky. L. Rep. 288, 
 20 S. W. 226. 
 
 isPeople V. Colt, 3 Hill, 432. 
 
 KGuedel v. People, 43 111. 226. 
 
 12 Hale, P. C. 185, 186; 2 Hawk. P. 
 0. chap. 23, §§ 80, 81; King & Queen 
 V. Biggleston, 1 Tremaine, P. C. 10; 
 Staundeforde, 78b, 79a: Yong's Case, 
 4 Coke, 40a, 41a; Long's Case, 5 Coke, 
 120a, 121b, 122a; Hall's Case, Cro. Jao. 
 95; Starkie, Crim. Law, 375, 380. And 
 see Bryan v. State, 19 Fla. 870; West 
 V. State, 48 Ind. 483; State v. McCoy, 
 8 Rob. (La.) 546, 41 Am. Dec. 301; 
 State V. Jones, 20 Mo. 58; State v. 
 Moses, 13 N. C. (2 Dev. L.) 45'2; State 
 V. Owen, 5 N. C. (1 Murph.) 452, 4 Am. 
 
I C6S] PLEADING, INFORMATION, AND INDICTMENT. 859 
 
 the rule has always been, and still is, universal that it must be 
 alleged that the wound was mortal, and that the wounded person died 
 thereof.^ But it is not now deemed necessary to describe the 
 wound,^ or to state its length, breadth, or depth;* nor is it neces- 
 sary to state that it was of a character likely to produce death.® 
 And a constitiitional provision entitling a person charged with crime 
 to have his offense fully described to him does not require such de- 
 scription, such a provision requiring such particularity of descrip- 
 tion only as may be of service in enabling him to understand the 
 'danger and prepare his defense.** Nor is it necessary to specify 
 the portion of the body upon which a wound was inflicted;^ the 
 words "upon the body" are a sufficient averment of location.® If 
 
 Dec. 571 ; State v. Crank, 2 Bail. L. 66, description of the wound. Com. v. 
 
 ^3 Am. Dec. 117. Woodward, supra. 
 
 sPeople V. Lloyd, 9 Oal. 55; People estate v. McCoy, 8 Eob. (La.) 545, 
 
 V. Judd, 10 Cal. 313; Brown v. State, 41 Am. Dec. 301; Dias v. State, supra; 
 
 18 Fla. 472; State v. Green, 111 Mo. Com. v. Chapman, 11 Cosh. 422; Smith 
 
 585, 20 S. W. 304; State v. Moses, su- v. State, and Lazier v. Com. supra, 
 
 pro; State v. McCoy, 8 Eob. (La.) 545, estate v. Snell, 78 Mo. 240. 
 
 41 Am. Dec. 301; State v. Conley, 39 6Com. v. Eobertson, 162 Mass. 90, 38 
 
 Me. 78; Sta,te v. Snell, 78 Mo. 240; King N. E. 25. 
 
 V. Lad, 1 Leach, C. L. 96. 'Tjongley v. State, 3 Tex. App. 611; 
 
 2State V. Arnewine, 126 Mo. 567, 29 Williams v. State, 1 Tex. App. 465, 3 
 S. W. 602; State v. Bronstine, 147, Mo. Tex. App. 123; Nelson v. State, 1 Tex. 
 520, 49 S. W. 512 ; State v. Green, su- App. 41 ; Wilkerson v. State, 2 Tex. 
 pra; People v. Steventon, 9 Cal. 273; App. 255; Giebel v. State, 28 Tex. App. 
 People V. King, 27 Cal. 507, 87 Am. 159, 12 S. W. 591; People v. Judd, 10 
 Dec. 95; People v. Hong Ah Duck, 61 Cal. 313; Walker v. State, 34 Fla. 167, 
 Oal. 387; Hodge v. State, 26 Fla. 11, 7 43 Am. St. Eep. 186, 16 So. 80; Eob- 
 So. 593; Walker v. State, 34 Fla. 1C7, erson v. State, 42 Fla. 223, 28 So. 424; 
 43 Am. St. Rep. 186, 10 So. 80; Stone Bowens v. State, 106 Ga. 760, 32 S. E. 
 V. People, 3 111. 326; Jones v. State, 35 666; Eoekmore v. State, 93 Ga. 123, 19 
 Ind. 122; Dias v. State, 7 Blackf. 20, 39 S. E. 32; Cordell v. State, 22 Ind. 5; 
 Am. Dec. 448; Dillon v. State, 9 Ind. Whelchell v. State, 23 Ind. 80; Jones v. 
 408; Dukes v. State, 11 Ind. 557, 71 State, 35 Ind. 122; Meiers v. State, 56 
 Am. Dee. 370; West v. State, 48 Ind. Ind. 336; Com. v. Coy, 157 Mass. 200, 
 483; Nash v. State, 2 G. Greene, 286; 32 N. E. 4; State v. Arnewine, 126 Mo. 
 State V. Homsby, 8 Rob. (La.) 554, 41 567, 29 S. W. 602; State v. Bronstine, 
 Am. Dec. 305; State v. Robertson, 30 147 Mo. 520, 49 S. W. 512; State v. Ed- 
 La. Ann. 340; State v. Conley, supra; mundson, 64 Mo. 398; State v. Blan, 69 
 Com. V. Woodward, 102 Mass. 155; Com. Mo. 317; State v. Sanders, 76 Mo. 35; 
 V. Costley, 118 Mass. 1; State v. Moses, State v. Henson, 81 Mo. 384; State v. 
 13 N. C. (2 Dev. L.) 452; Hamby v. Ramsey, 82 Mo. 133; State v. Waller, 88 
 State, 36 Tex. 523; Smith v. Stats, 43 Mo. 402; State v. Anderson, 98 Mo. 461, 
 Tex. 643; Nelson v. State, 1 Tex. App. 11 S. W. 981; Alexander v. State, 3 
 41; Lazier v. Com. 10 Gratt. 708; Unit- Heisk. 475. Contra, State v. .Jones, 20 
 ed States v. Maunier, 1 Hughes, 412, Mo. 58; Smith v. Sta.te, 43 Tex. 643. 
 Fed. CaB. No. 15,746; Rex v. Mosley, 1 In Dias v. State, 7 Blackf. 20, 39 Am. 
 Moody, C. C. 97; Eex v. Tomlinson, 6 Dee. 448, it was held that a charge of 
 Car. & P. 370. murder must state the part of the body 
 
 An indictment for manslaughter to which the violence was applied, but 
 
 charging that the death ensued from that proof need not correspond with the 
 
 nne mortal wound given on the left side S'tatement. 
 
 of the head of the deceased by a stroke sSanchez v. People, 22 N. Y. 147; 
 
 with a Tvhipstock contains a, suflBcient Whelchell v. State, supra. And see Peo- 
 
860 HOMICIDE. [§ 56» 
 
 the wound be stated to be on one part of the body and be proved to 
 be on another, the variance is not fatal,® though it has been held 
 that the allegation that the wound was inflicted on the body of the 
 deceased is necessary. -^ " ISTor need the wound which caused death 
 be proved exactly as alleged; it is sufficient if there is a substantial 
 conformity between the allegation and the proof. ^ ^ And where the 
 indictment charged the death by cutting the throat, and a surgeon 
 proved that the jugular vein was divided, but not the carotid artery, 
 and that what he called the throat was not cut, the wound not hav- 
 ing extended so far round the neck, it was held that this was suffi- 
 cient, for the term "throat" meant, not that part of the throat which 
 was scientifically called the throat, but that which was commonly 
 called the throat.^* Nor is an indictment merely charging the in- 
 fliction of a mortal wound unsustained when the proof shows two 
 wounds in different places, one, and only one, of which was mortal. ^ * 
 And an insufficient description of a wound in one part of an indict- 
 ment may be striken out as surplusage, where a sufficient description 
 is contained in another part. ^ * So, where the death was occasioned 
 by a bruise, a description of its dimensions, etc., is clearly not neces- 
 sary.-'^ Even as to an incised wound, the dimensions need no 
 longer be set forth. ^® In all these cases it should be remembered 
 that, even when it is considered necessary to state the manner and 
 place of the hurt, and its nature, in order that the indictment might 
 be good as to its formality, yet, if it appeared upon the evidence 
 that the party died of another kind of wound, in another place, 
 the indictment is nevertheless maintainable. ■''' 
 
 An indictment which states the death to have been caused by 
 means of ravishing an infant, however, but omits to aver that a 
 
 pie V. Davis, 56 N. Y. 95; Com. v. 14 Wise v. State, 2 Kan. 419, 85 Am. 
 
 Snell, 189Mass. 12, 3 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1019, Dec. 595; Robertson v. Com. (Va.) 20 
 
 75 N. E. 75. S. E. 362. 
 
 92Hale, P. 0. 186; ATchbold, P. C. leState v. Owen, 5 N. C. (1 Murph.) 
 
 384; Bryan v. State, 19 Fla. 864; Free- 452. 4 Am. Dec. 571; State v. Crank, 2 
 
 man v. State (Fla.) 39 So. 785; Rock- Bail. L. 66, 23 Am. Dec. 117; Rex v. 
 
 more v. State, 93 Ga. 123, 19 S. E. 32; Mosley, 1 Moody, C. C. 97; Rex v. Tom- 
 
 Dias V. State; State v. Waller; and linson, 6 Car. & P. 370; Turner's Case, 
 
 State V. Edmundson, — supra; State v. 1 Lewin, C. C. 177. See State v Moses, 
 
 Moses, 13 N. C. (2 Dev. L.) 462; Nel- 13 N. C. (2 Dev. L.) 452, contra. 
 son V. State, 1 Tex. App. 41. leLazier v. Com. 10 Gratt. 708; Stone 
 
 loState V. Yordi, 30 Kan. 221, 2 Pac. v. People, 3 111. 326; Dillon v. State, 9 
 
 161 ; Nelson v. State, supra. Ind. 408 ; State v. Conley, 39 Me. 78 ; 
 
 JiState V. Martin, 9 Ohio S. & C. P. Com. v. Chapman, 11 Gush. 422; Com. 
 
 Dec. 778: Bradham v. State, 41 Fla. v. Woodward, 102 ilass. 159; Turner's 
 
 541, 26 So. 730. Case, supra. 
 
 l2Rex V. Edwards, 6 Car. & P. 401. 172 Hale, P. C. 185, 186; 2 Hawk. P. 
 
 isHamby v. Statfl, 36 Tex. 523; Real C. chap. 23, § 81; Din^ v. State, 7 
 
 \. People, 42 N. Y. 270. Blackf. 20, 39 Am. Dec. 448. 
 
§ 568] 
 
 PLEADING, INFORMATION, AND INDICTMENT. 
 
 861 
 
 mortal wound or bruise was given, is defective.^* And "did shoot 
 and strike one mortal wound" is not a sufficiently direct allegation 
 of the giving of the wound. ^® 
 
 V. DESCEIPTIOlir OF DECEASED. 
 
 569. Name and personal characteristics — The indictment must be 
 so certain as to the party against whom the offense is committed, 
 as to enable the prisoner to know and understand who that party 
 is, and what charge he is called on to answer.^ If his name is 
 known it must be averred.^ Both the Christain name and surname 
 of the deceased should be set forth,* though charging the initials 
 of the first name has been held to be sufficient.* And a variance 
 in the name or identity of the party laid as injured will, under 
 the statutes, as well as at common law, entitle the prisoner to ac- 
 quittal,^ though such acquittal does not bar a second indictment. 
 Even a change in the initial letter of the surname of the person 
 killed vitiates an indictment for the homicide, where it makes an 
 entirely different name of it;" and a failure to prove the Christain 
 
 isKing V. Lad, 1 Leach, C. L. 96; Reg. 
 V. Sandys, Car. & M. 345. 
 
 19 State V. Brown, 168 Mo. 449, 68 S. 
 W. 568. 
 
 i2Curwood'3 Hawk. P. C. 319; Whar- 
 ton, Crim. Law, 7th ed. § 250; Page v. 
 State, 61 Ala. 16; State v. Witt, 34 
 Kan. 488, 8 Pac. 769. And see Dias v. 
 State, 7 Blackf. 20, 39 Am. Dec. 448; 
 State V. Brabson, 38 La. Ann. 144. 
 
 2 Page V. State, supra; Moynahan v. 
 People, 3 Colo. 367; Wall v. State, 51 
 Ind. 453; State v. Pike, 65 Me. Ill; 
 State V. Meadows, 156 Mo. 110, 56 S. 
 W. 878: State v. Gardiner, Wright 
 (Ohio) 392; BoTd v. State, 7 Coldw. 69; 
 Henry v. State,'7 Tex. App. 388; Roths- 
 child V. State, 7 Tex. App. 519; Jo- 
 raseo v. State, 6 Tex. App. 238 ; Milon- 
 tree v. State, 30 Tex. App. 151, 16 S. 
 W. 764; State v. Lincoln, 17 Wis. 579. 
 Contra by statute. State v. Windahl, 95 
 Iowa, 470, 64 N. W. 420. 
 
 The purpose of setting forth the name 
 of the person on whom a homicide has 
 been committed is to identify a particu- 
 lar fact on which the indictment is 
 found, so that the defendant may have 
 the benefit of an acquittal or conviction 
 if accused a second time, and it is gen- 
 erally required as the best mode of de- 
 
 scribing the person. StaAe v. Angel, 29 
 N. C. (7 Irfid. L.) 27. 
 
 sMoynahan v. People, supra. 
 
 The only object of a name in an in- 
 dictment for homicide under the Cali- 
 fornia statute is to identify the party, 
 and in this respect there is no difference 
 between a Christian name and a sur- 
 name. People V. Kelly, 6 Cal. 211. 
 
 4Brown v. Com. 86 Va. 466, 10 S. E. 
 745; Mitehum v. State, 11 Ga. 615. 
 
 BWharton, Crim. Law, 7th ed. § 597; 
 Milontree v. State, 30 Tex. App. 151, 16 
 S. W. 764; Davis v. People, 19 111. 74. 
 
 As to variance in spelling, see O'Neil 
 V. State, 48 Ga. 66; Dickison's Q. S. 
 6th ed. 213. 
 
 A mistake in drawing an indictment 
 in substituting the name of the person 
 killed for that of the accused, so as to 
 make it an allegation that the deceased 
 killed himself, is an incurable error. 
 State V. Edwards, 70 Mo. 480. 
 
 estate v. Finn, 43 La. Ann. 895, 9 So. 
 498. 
 
 An indictment charging the murder 
 of Patrick Fitz Patrick is fatally de- 
 fective where the true name of the per- 
 son killed was Patrick Fitzpatrick. 
 Moynahan v. People, 3 Colo. 367. 
 
8S2 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 £§ S6» 
 
 name as alleged is a material variance/ thougli after verdict it is 
 too late to raise the objection.^ 
 
 The mispelling of a name, however, when its usual pronunciation 
 is satisfied by the manner in which it is written in the record is 
 no variance,® though the rule is different where the pronunciation 
 is changed. ^ " Nor is the omission of, or a mistake in, the "middle 
 letter of the name material. ^^ And it is proper to allege the name 
 by which the deceased was commonly known, though it was not 
 his right name.'^^ And where a party is as usually known by one 
 name as another, he may be described by either, and by the name 
 which he has assumed, even though shown not to be his right name. ^ ' 
 Nor is the misnaming of the deceased material where he is other- 
 wise so described that his identity cannot be mistaken;** and when 
 both Christian name and surname are charged in an indictment, the 
 
 'Penrod v. People, 89 111. 150; Davis 
 V. People, supra; Lewis v. State, 90 Ga. 
 95, 15 S. E. 697. 
 
 8 Joyce V. State, 2 Swan, 666; Seott 
 V. State. 7 Lea, 232. 
 
 And the failure of a witness in a 
 prosecution for murder to give the full 
 name of the person killed as alleged in 
 the indictment is not material after ver- 
 dict, where the name as given by him 
 corresponds, so far as it goes, with the 
 name charged, and there is no contest 
 on the question of identity. Eutherford 
 V. State, 11 Lea, 31. 
 
 sWharton, Crim. Law. 7th ed. § 258; 
 State v. Witt, 34 Kan. 488. 8 Pae. 769; 
 Com. V. Desmarteau, 16 Gray, 1 ; Scott 
 v. State, supra; Milontree v. State, 30 
 Tex. App. 151, 16 S. W. 764; State v. 
 Linnoln, 17 Wis. 579. And see State v. 
 Neihekier, 184 Mo. 211, 83 S. W. 523; 
 Gutirrez v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 59 S. W. 274. 
 
 A variance in the name of the de- 
 ceased as charged in nn indictment for 
 murder, from his real name as proved, 
 is not material where the name as writ- 
 ten and the real name are so nearly tha 
 same that the difference in pronuncia- 
 tion would he scarcely perceptible, and 
 he would be readily known by his name 
 nronounced in either way. Aaron v. 
 State, 37 Ala. 106. 
 
 lOMilontree v. State, supra. 
 
 iiPeople V. Loekwood, 6 Cal. 205. 
 
 isPeople V. Freeland, 6 Cal. 96; 
 Aaron v. State, 37 Ala. 106; Mitohum v. 
 State, 11 Ga. 615; O'Brien v. People, 48 
 Barb. 27-1; State v. Ann-el, 29 N. C. (7 
 Ired. L.) 27; State v. Bell, 05 N. C. 313; 
 
 State V. Gardiner, Wright (Ohio) 392; 
 Hunter v. State, 8 Tex. App. 75; Carter 
 V. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Eep. 345, 46 S. 
 W. 236, 48 S. W. 508 ; State v. Lincoln, 
 17 Wis. 579; Rex v. Norton, Russ. & R. 
 C. 0. 510: Rex v. Berriman, 5 Car. & 
 P. 601, Cox, C. C. 388. 
 
 And the exclusion of testimony in a 
 prosecution for homicide as to the rea- 
 son given by the deceased for changing 
 his name is not error where such rea- 
 son did not show the name to diifer from 
 that set out in the indictment. Edens 
 V. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 522, 55 S. 
 W. 815. 
 
 isRex V. Norton, supra; Rex v. Berri- 
 man, 5 Car. & P. 601; Kriel v. Com. 
 5 Bush, 362; O'Brien v. People; State v. 
 Bell: and Stite v. Gardiner, — suvra; 
 Timms v. State, 4 Coldw. 133; Williams 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 63 S. W. 
 859: State v. Lincoln, supra. 
 
 Whether or not the name of the de- 
 ceased as mentioned in the indictment 
 in a prosecution for murder was his 
 true name is a question of fact for the 
 iurv. State v. Angel, 29 N. 0. (7 Ired. 
 L.) 27. 
 
 5 4 State V. Witt, 34 Kan. 488, 8 Pac. 
 769; Shepherd v. People, 72 111. 480; 
 Krjel V. Com. 5 Bush, 363; Boyd v. 
 State, 14 Lea, 161. 
 
 The object of charging the name of 
 the person killed in an indictment for 
 killing him is to establish his identity, 
 and this may be done by his occupa.taon, 
 as well as by his Christian name; and 
 where the indictment charges his name 
 in full, evidence as to his surname, and 
 that he was a barber, and Hie only one 
 
569] 
 
 PLEADING, INFORMATION, AND INDICTMENT. 
 
 863 
 
 deceased may be thereafter referred to by his Christiaai name only. ^ ^ 
 And if the name is stated in the part of the indictment charging the 
 assault or injury, its omission from the averment of death is not 
 material/" though it has been held that its omission from the 
 conclusion is fatal. ■^^ 
 
 Likewise, where the name of the deceased cannot be ascertained, 
 as where the body of a murdered person is found which cannot be 
 identified, the indictment may allege the party to be "to the jurors 
 unknown."** And this rule applies to the Christian name as well 
 as to the surname of the deceased. * ® But the allegation is material 
 and must be proved.*" And to support the description of "un- 
 known" it must appear that the name could not have been supposed 
 to have been known to the grand jury.^* But this averment holds 
 good, even though the name of the deceased is disclosed between the 
 finding of the bill and the trial.** Nor need the name of the person 
 
 in the place where he resided, 13 suflR- 
 cient to establish identity. Shepherd v. 
 People, and State v. Angel, supra. 
 
 isState V. Pike, 65 Me. 111. And see 
 Staite V. Williams, 184 Mo. 261, 83 S. 
 W. 756. 
 
 And an indictment charging the ac- 
 cused with the murder of his wife, giv- 
 ing both her Christian name and sur- 
 name, is sufficiently sustained by the 
 testimony of the witnesses as to her sur- 
 name, and that she v/as the wife of the 
 accused, though they did not give her 
 Christian name. Stuart v. State, 1 
 Baxt. 178. 
 
 i6Alford V. Com. 84 Ky. 623, 2 S. W. 
 234. And see State v. Brabson, 38 La. 
 Ann. 144. 
 
 iTDias V. State, 7 Blackf. 20, 39 Am. 
 Dec. 443; State v. Pemberton, 30 Mo. 
 376; Reg. V. Phelps, 1 Russell, Crimes, 
 564, Oar. & M. 180. 
 
 1S2 Hale, P. C. 181; 2 Hawk. P. C. 
 cihap. 25, S 71 ; Wharton, Crim. Law, 
 7th ed. § 251; Reese v. State, 90 Ala. 
 624, 8 So. 818; Terape v. State, 40 Ala. 
 350; Bryant v. State, 36 Ala. 270; Ed- 
 monds v. State, 34 Ark. 720; Reed v. 
 State, 16 Ark. 499; State v. Irvin, 5 
 Blackf. 343; State v. McConkey, 20 
 Iowa, 574; Stat-e v. Richmond, 42 La. 
 Ann. 299. 7 So. 459; Com. v. Stoddard, 
 9 Allen, 280; Com. v. Sherman, 13 Allen, 
 248: State v. Morrissey, 70 Me. 401; 
 State V. Haddock, 3 N. C. (2 Hayw.) 
 162; State v. Angel, 29 N. C. (7 Ired. 
 L.) 27; -Rothschild v. State, 7 Tex. App. 
 
 519; Henry v. State, 7 Tex. App. 388; 
 Williams v. State, 3 Tex. App. 123; 
 Brooks v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 56 S. 
 W. 924; Trumble v. Territory, 3 Wyo. 
 280, 6 L.R.A. 384, 21 Pac. 1801; Reg. v. 
 Campbell, 1 Car. & K. 82. 
 
 An indictment describing the deceased 
 as "a certain Wyandotte Indian, whose 
 name is unknown to the grand jury," is 
 sufficient. Reed v. State, supra. 
 
 19 Bryant v. State, supra. 
 
 The sufficiency of an indictment char- 
 ging the name of the person killed to be 
 to the grand jury unknown is not af- 
 fected by a subsequent averment therein 
 of a name which was supposed to be his. 
 Reese v. State, 90 Ala. 624, 8 So. 818. 
 
 20Reed v. State, 16 Ark. 499; Ed- 
 monds V. Sta.te, 34 Ark. 720. 
 
 2iReg. V. Stroud, 1 Car. & K. 187; 
 Reese v. State, supra. 
 
 2 3 See Com. v. Hendrie, 2 Gray, 503; 
 Com. V. Hill, 11 Gush. 137; Com. v. 
 Tompson, 2 Cush. 551; Cheek v. State, 
 38 Ala. 227 : State v. Bryant, 14 Mo. 340. 
 
 So, objection cannot be made to an 
 indictment charging the murder of a, 
 person to the grand jury unknown, after 
 conviction and on appeal, on the ground 
 that the grand jury might have ascer- 
 tained the name of the person killed, 
 where evidence by the proseciraion 
 that it was impossible to obtain such 
 name was excluded on the objection of 
 the accused. Trumble v. Territory, 3 
 Wyo. 280, 6 L.R.A. 384, 21 Pac. lusi. 
 
864 HOMICIDE. [§ 569 
 
 killed be alleged where lie had no name; and if he was a child so 
 young as to have acquired no name, either by baptism or by usage, 
 it is sufScient to describe him as "an infant child unknown;'"'^ or 
 as a "child not named ;"^* though "not baptized" would be insuffi- 
 cient.^® ISTor need the sex be stated, even though the name is un- 
 known. ^ ® And the rule is the same where the death of a child after 
 birth is caused by injuries inflicted upon its mother before its birth, 
 though it is not otherwise described than by reference to its mater- 
 nity.^^ 
 
 And so, "unknown" was held sufficient where there was evidence 
 that the party injured, a bastard child who died when twelve days 
 old, unbaptized, had been called by its mother "Mary Ann."^* 
 A bastard which had never acquired a name is sufficiently identified 
 by showing the name of its parent;^® though he must not be de- 
 scribed by his mother's name till he has acquired it by reputation. * " 
 A bastard child, six weeks old, who was baptized on a Sunday, and 
 down to the following Tuesday had been called by its name of bap- 
 tism and mother's surname, was properly described by both those 
 names in an indictment for its murder ; ^ ^ but where a bastard was 
 baptized "Eliza," without mentioning any surname at the ceremony, 
 and was afterwards, at three years old, suffocated by the prisoner, 
 an indictment styling it "Eliza Waters," that being the mother's 
 surname, was bad. ^ ^ And an indictment for murder of a legitimate 
 child, of tender years, is insufficient where it neither stated the 
 child's name, nor that it was "to the jurors unknown,"^* though it 
 would have sufficed to describe him as "a certain male child, etc., 
 of tender age, that is to say, about the age of six weeks, and not 
 baptized, born of the body of C. B."^* So, where the party injured 
 has a mother or father of the same name, it is better to style 
 him "the younger," as it may be presumed that the parent 
 
 2 3Tempe v. State, 40 Ala. 350. And was held bad, for not stating the name 
 
 see State v. Cunningham, 111 Iowa, 233, of the child, or accounting for its omis- 
 
 82 N. W. 775. sion. 
 
 2 4 Reg. V. Waters, 2 Car. & K. 864, 1 so Rex v. Clark, Russ. & R. C. C. 358; 
 
 Den. C. C. 363; Puryear v. State, 28 contra. 
 
 Tex. App. 73, 11 S. W. 929. siReg. v. Evans, 8 Car. & P. 765. 
 
 2 5Reg. V. Waters, supra. 3 2Rex v. Waters, 1 Moody, C. C. 457. 
 
 26State V. Morrissey, 70 Me'. 401. See Reg. v. Stroud, 1 Car. & K. 187, 
 
 27.Clarke v. State, 117 Ala. 1, 67 Am. and cases collected; Williams v. Bry- 
 
 St. Rep. 157, 23 So. 671. ant, 5 Mees. & W. 447; Rex v. Clark, 
 
 2SRex V. Smith, 1 Moody, C. C. 402, supra; Rex v. Sheen, 2 Car. & P. 634. 
 
 6 Car. & P. 151. ssReg. v. Biss, 8 Car. & P. 773. 
 
 2 9Reg. V. Hogg, 2 Moody & R. 380. 3 4 gee Rex v. Sheen, supra; Reg. v. 
 
 See Reg. v. Hicks, 2 Moody & R. 302. Willis, 1 Car. & K. 722. 
 where an indictment for child murder 
 
§ 5G9] 
 
 PLEADING, INFORMATION, AND INDICTMENT. 
 
 863 
 
 is the party meant ;®^ but this is immaterial, where it is sufficiently 
 proved who was the party deserihod as assaulted.^® And if a con- 
 stable, watchman, or other minister of justice be killed in the ex- 
 ecution of his office, the special matter need not be stated, but the 
 offender may be indicted generally of murder by malice prepense.^'' 
 But where the case rests upon a neglect to provide sufficient food 
 for the deceased, it must show that it was the duty of the prisoner 
 to provide it.*® An indictment for the homicide of a named per- 
 son, however, need not aver that he was a human being, that fact 
 appearing from the name.*® Nor need it allege that he was a rea- 
 sonable creature in being,*" or that he was in the peace of the state 
 or of the King'.*^ And a proper allegation of homicide in the 
 commission of an abortion sufficiently charges that the person killed 
 was a woman. *^ Nor is it necessary to charge the age and sex of 
 an infant child.** Where an indictment for homicide describes 
 the person killed with unnecessary particularity, all the circum- 
 stances of the description must be proved, since, though unnecessary, 
 by being alleged they are made essential on the question of iden- 
 tity.** 
 
 ssSingleton v. Johnson, 9 Mees. & W. 
 67. 
 
 36King V. Peace, 3 Barn. & Aid. 519. 
 
 a'Mackalley's Case, 9 Coke, 68a; 1 
 Hale, P. C. 460; Boyd v. State, 17 Ga. 
 194; Wright v. State, 18 Ga. 383; State 
 V. Green, 66 Mo. 631. 
 
 ssSee Reg. v. Waters, 2 Car. & K. 
 862; R. V. Goodwin, 1 Russ. C. & M. 
 563. 
 
 3 9Palmer v. People, 138 111. 356, 32 
 Am. St. Rep. 146, 28 N. E. 130; Kirk- 
 bam V. People, 170 111. 9, 48 N. E. 465; 
 Reed v. State, 16 Ark. 499; People v. 
 McNulty, 93 Cal. 427, 26 Pac. 597, 29 
 Pae. 61; Sutherland v. State, 121 Ga. 
 591, 49 S. E. 781; Baker v. State, 121 
 Ga. 592, 49 S. E. 782 ; Merrick v. State, 
 63 Ind. 327; State v. Stanley, 33 Iowa, 
 .526; State v. Smith, 38 La. Ann. 301; 
 State V. Ooleman, 111 La. 303, 35 So. 
 560; Ogden v. State, 15 Tex. App. 454; 
 BohaJinon v. Sta;te, 14 Tex. App. 271; 
 State V. Day, 4 Wash. 104, 29 Pac. 984; 
 Bowers v. State, 122 Wis. 163, 99 N. W. 
 447. 
 
 4 Wade v. State, 23 Tex. App. 308, 4 
 S. W. 896; Bohannon v. State, and Og- 
 den V. State, supra; Bean v. Sta.te, 17 
 Tex. App. 60; Perryman v. State, 36 Tex. 
 321. 
 
 Horn. — 55 
 
 The fact that the name of the per- 
 son killed was a, peculiar one, which 
 perhaps had never before been applied to 
 a person, the name in question being 
 "Smutty My Darling" does not render 
 it necessary, in a prosecution for kill- 
 ing him, to charge that he was a reason- 
 able creature in being. Wade v. State, 
 supra. 
 
 In People v. Lee Look, 137 Cal. 590, 
 70 Pac. 660, however, it was held that 
 an indictment charging the accused with 
 killing "Lee Wing" is defective for fail- 
 ure to state that a human being was 
 killed. 
 
 4iDumas v. State, 63 Ga. 600; State 
 V. Coleman, supra; Com. v. Murphy, 
 11 Cush. 472; Heydon's Case, 4 Coke, 
 41b. Contra, State v. Pemberton, 30 
 Mo. 376. 
 
 4 2Weightnovel v. State, 46 Fla. 1, 35 
 So. 856. 
 
 43Triggs v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 53 S. W. 104; Clarke v. State, 117 Ala. 
 1, 67 Am. St. Rep. 157, 23 So. 671. And 
 see State v. Morriasev, 70 Me. 401. 
 
 4 4 Felix V. State, 18 Ala. 720; Reed 
 V. State, 16 Ark. 499. 
 
866 HOMICIDE. [§ 570 
 
 VI. OONDITIOM- OF mind; MOTIVE. 
 
 570. Malice — Malice being an essential ingredient of murder in 
 any degree, it is always necessary in charging murder to allege, 
 either in words or in substance, that the killing was done with malice 
 aforethought.* If the averment respecting malice aforethought be 
 omitted, and the indictment only allege that the stroke was given 
 feloniously, or that the prisoner murdered, etc., or killed, or slew 
 the deceased, the conviction can only be for manslaughter.^ And 
 the malice must be alleged to have been against the person killed, 
 though the fatal act was directed against one and accidentally took 
 effect upon another.^ Nor is the omission supplied by an allega- 
 
 iGibson v. State. 89 Ala. 121, 18 Am. 58 Am. Eep. 648, 3 S. W. 699; Scott v. 
 
 St. Rep. 96, 8 So. 98; Ward v. State, 96 State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 363, 20 S. W. 
 
 Ala. 100, 11 So. 217; Anderson v. SUte, 755; Com. v. Gibson, 2 Va. Caa. 70; 
 
 5 Ark. 444; Edwards v. Sta.te, 25 Ark. Nicholson's Case, 1 East, P. C. 348; 
 
 444: People V. Dolan, 9 Cal. 576; People Bradley v. Banks, Yelv. 205. 
 V. Urias, 12 Cal. 325; People v. Vance, In Massaolmsetts the terms may be- 
 
 21 Cal. 400 ; People v. Bonilla, 38 Cal. omitted as to the assault, if given after- 
 699 ; People v. Schmidt, 63 Cal. 28 ; wairds as to the killing. Com. v. Chap- 
 People V. Davis, 73 Cal. 355, 15 Pac. main, 11 Gush. 422. See a.lso Rex v> 
 8; Redus V. People, 10 Colo. 208, 14 Pac. Nicliolson. supra; Maile v. Com. 9 
 323; Territory v. Evans, 2 Idaho, 425, Leigh, 661. 
 
 17 Pac. 139; Finn v. State, 5 Ind. 400; In Iowa, the indictment, under the 
 
 State V. Johnson, 8 Iowa, 525, 74 Am. statute, must aver both assault and 
 
 Dec. 321 ; Touts v. State, 4 G. Greene, killing to be wilful, deliberate, and pre- 
 
 500; State v. Newberry, 26 Iowa, 467; meditated. State v. Knouse, 29 Iowa, 
 
 State V. Stanley, 33 Iowa, 526; State 118. 
 
 V. Shelton, 64 Iowa, 333, 20 N. W. 459; In Wisconsin, under statute, "malice 
 
 State V. Thurmaji, 66 Iowa, 693, 24 N. aforethought" need not be here used. 
 
 W. 511; State v. Fooks, 29 Kan. 425; State v. Duvall, 26 Wis. 415. 
 
 State V. McGaffin, 36 Kan. 315, 13 Pac. In Missouri the words "with malice- 
 
 560; Jane v. Com. 3 Met. (Ky. ) 18; aforethought" are the legal equivalent 
 
 State V. Forney, 24 La. Ann. 191 ; State of "with malice and premeditation," and 
 
 V. Phelps, 24 La. Ann. 493; State v. an indictment which charges the hom- 
 
 Harris, 27 La. Ann. 572; State v. Flor- icidal act to have been done feloniously, 
 
 enza, 28 La. Ann. 945; State v. Cren- wilfully, and with malice aforethought, 
 
 ehaw, 32 La. Ann. 406; State v. John- sufficiently charges the crime of murder 
 
 son. 37 Minn. 493, 35 N. W. 373 ; Sarah in the second degree. State v. Lowe, 93 
 
 V. State, 28 Miss. 267, 61 Am. Dec. 544; Mo. 547, 5 S. W. 889. 
 
 State V. Eaton, 75 Mo. 586; State v. aWharton, Precedents of Indictments 
 
 Brown, 168 Mo. 449, 63 S. W. 568 ; Ter- & Pleas, 7, 8 ; Etheridge v. State, 141 
 
 ritory v. Manton, 7 Mont. 162, 14 Pac. Ala. 29, 37 So. 337. But see Anderson 
 
 637; Schaffer v. State, 22 Neb. 557, 3 v. State, 5 Ark. 445. 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 274, 35 N. W. 384; State In Griffith v. State, 90 Ala. 583, 8 
 
 V. Hing, 16 Nev. 307; People v. White, So. 812, it was held that the omissdott 
 
 22 Wend. 167 ; Loeffner v. State, 10 Ohio of the last three letters of the words 
 St. 598; Riddle v. State, 3 Heisk. 401; "malice aforethought" in charging mal- 
 Williams v. State, 3 Hcisk. 376; Witt ice in an indictment for murder is mat- 
 v. State, 6 Coldw. 5; Fisher v. State, ter of substance which destroys the le- 
 10 Lea. 151; Gehrke v. State, 13 Tex. gal sufficiency of the count. 
 
 568; Henrie v. State, 41 Tex. 573; Mc- sState v. Clark, 147 Mo. 20. 47 S. W. 
 
 EIroy V. State, 14 Tex. App. 235 ; Banks 880. And see Padgett v. State, 40 Fla.. 
 
 V. State, 24 Tex. App. 559, 7 S. W. 327 ; 451, 24 So. 145. 
 McConnell v. State, 22 Tex. App. 354, 
 
i 570] PLEADING, mFOMIATION, AND INDICTMENT. 867 
 
 tion of an intent to kill, since malice aforethought and intent to 
 kill are not the same.* And it has been held that "malice afore- 
 thought" is a technical term, having no equivalent or substitute, 
 and of which there is no legal synonym in criminal pleading;* and 
 that an indictment charging a killing to have been done v^ith malice, 
 but omitting the word "aforethought," is fatally defective;® and 
 that it is not sufficient merely to charge that the wound was given 
 with malice aforethought ; it must be directly charged that the offense 
 was so committed. '' 
 
 The prevailing rule would appear to be, however, that it is not 
 necessary in all cases to use the words "malice aforethought;" it 
 is sufficient if the words used have the same import, and clearly 
 charge malice aforethought according to the common understanding 
 of that term.* Within this rule the words "deliberation and pre- 
 meditation" are regarded as synonymous with "malice afore- 
 thought,"® and so are the words "did feloniously kill and mur- 
 der."^" And the words "malice and premeditation" are legally 
 equivalent to the words "malice aforethought."^^ And charging 
 that a killing was done maliciously ineans the same as charging that 
 it was done with malice aforethought. ^ ^ And it has been held that 
 a charge that the accused did wickedly commit a murder is suffi- 
 cient, without the words "of his malice aforethought."^* Nor is 
 an allegation of express malice necessary to a charge of murder, 
 
 ^People V. Urias, 12 Cal. 326. charged to have been done by adminis- 
 
 BMcElroy v. State, 14 Tex. App. 235. tering poison, it is not necessary to al- 
 «Cravey v. State, 36 Tex. Crim. Rep. lege that it was done with malice in or- 
 90, 61 Am. St. Rep. 833, 35 S. W. 658 ; der to constitute murder in the first de- 
 State V. Green, 42 La. Ann. 644, 7 So. gree. Bechtelheimer v. State, 54 Ind. 
 793. 128. 
 
 'Com. V. Gibson, 2 Va. Cas. 70; Ha- sMcAdams v. State, 25 Ark. 405; Ed- 
 gan V. State, 10 Ohio St. 459. Contra, wards v. State, 25 Ark. 444; State v. 
 State V. Dooley, 89 Iowa, 584, 57 N. W. MeGaffin, 36 Kan. 315, 13 Pac. 560; 
 414. And see MaAle v. Com. 9 Leigh, State v. Holong, 38 Minn. 368, 37 N. 
 661. W. 587; State v. Duvall, 26 Wis. 416. 
 
 sState V. Thurman, 66 Iowa, 693, 24 lOState v. Phelps, 24 La. Ann. 493; 
 N. W. 511; State v. Neeley, 20 Iowa, Williams v. State, 45 Fla. 128, 34 So. 
 108; Sta.te v. Dooley, supra; State v. 279; Chelsey v. State, 121 Ga. 340, 49 
 Bradford, 33 La. Ann. 921; State v. S. E. 258. 
 
 Arnewine, 126 Mo. 567, 29 S. W. 602; uState v. Lowe, 93 Mo. 547, 5 S. W. 
 Lindsey v. State, 69 Ohio St. 215, 69 889; People v. Vance, 21 Cal. 400. And 
 N. E. 126. see State v. Johnson, 104 La. 417, 81 
 
 An indictment for murder charging Am. St. Rep. 139, 29 So. 24. 
 the use by the accused of drugs admin- izFisher v. State, 10 Lea, 151; State 
 istered to, and an instrument used up- v. Neeley, 20 Iowa, 108. Contra, State 
 on, the deceased with specific intent to v. Green, 42 La. Ann. 644, 7 So. 793. 
 produce an abortion, sufficiently charges 1 3 Anderson v. State, 5 Ark. 444 ; State 
 malice aforethought. State v. Thurman, v. Forney, 24 La. Ann. 191; State T. 
 supra. Phelps, supra. 
 
 And where a purposed killing is 
 
868 HOMICIDE. [§ 570 
 
 even though it be murder in the first degree.^* And the kind of 
 malice, whether express or implied, need not be distinctly alleged 
 in the indictment. ^ ^ The phrase "malice aforethought" includes 
 both express and implied malice and is sufficient to charge murder 
 in either degree.^® And express malice is sufficiently charged by 
 the words "malice aforethought."^^ Nor is it necessary to charge 
 malice in the killing as well as in the intent to kill. ^ * And a charge 
 is not bad for omission to allege malice aforethought in the killing, 
 when it does allege its existence with reference to the act which 
 caused death. ^® And an indictment for murder in the first degree, 
 which describes the offense in the language of the statute, is suffi- 
 cient though the technical words "malice aforethought" are not 
 used.="» 
 
 Nor need there be any allegation of malice aforethought in an in- 
 dictment for manslaughter. ^ ^ Malice not being an element of man- 
 slaughter, such an allegation is mere surplusage. ^ ^ And an indict- 
 ment for murder insufficient in improperly alleging malice may 
 be held as good as an indictment for manslaughter. ^ * An indictment 
 for manslaughter differs from an indictment for the higher crime 
 of murder, in the omission of any statement as to malice, and of 
 the conclusion that the party accused did kill and "murder;" and 
 we have seen that a bill of indictment for murder may be converted 
 into one for manslaughter, by striking out such statement and con- 
 clusion.^* And this appears to be the practice at the present time 
 in some of the circuits ; but the usual course in this country is, un- 
 less the emergency of the case prevents it, to present a new bill to 
 
 iiPeople V. Bonilla, 38 Cal. 699. W. 623;, Respublica v. Honeyman, 2 
 
 leLongley v. State, 3 Tex. App. 611; Dall. 228, 1 L. ed. 359. And see State 
 
 Henrie v. State, 41 Tex. 573; Smith v. v. Dooley, 89 Iowa, 584, 57 N. W. 414. 
 
 State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 14, 19 S. W. zoCox v. People, 80 N. Y. 500. And 
 
 252; Perry v. State, 44 Tex. 473. see Bullock v. State, supra. 
 
 isBohannon v. State, 14 Tex. App. So, the use of the words "of his malice 
 
 271 ; Giebel v. State, 28 Tex. App. 151, aforethought," instead of "with malice 
 
 12 S. W. 591 ; Sharpe v. State, 17 Tex. aforethought," in an indictment for 
 
 App. 486; Rather v. State, 25 Tex. App. murder, is sufficient. Rocha v. State, 43 
 
 628, 9 S. W. 69. And see Bullock v. Tex. Crim. Rep. 169, 63 S. W. 1018. 
 
 State, 65 N. J. L. 557, 86 Am. St. Rep. 2iCoe v. Com. 94 Ky. 606, 23 S. W. 
 
 668, 47 Atl. 62. 371; State v. Sundheimer, 93 Mo. 311, 
 
 i7Perry v. State; Henrie v. State; 6 S. W. 52; Baldwin v. State, 12 Neb. 
 
 and Smith v. State, supra. 61, 10 N. W. 463; State v. Pike, 49 N. 
 
 IS State V. Bradford, 33 La. Ann. 921. H. 399, 6 Am. Rep. 533. 
 
 And see State v. Burns, 148 Mo. 167, 71 22Coe v. Com. supra. 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 588, 49 S. W. 1005; State 23Blanton v. State, 1 Wash. 265, 24 
 
 V. Bollard, 50 La. Ann. 594, 69 Am. St. Pac. 439. And see People v. Maine, 5l 
 
 Rep. 461, 23 So. 504. App. Div. 142, 64 N. Y. Supp. 579. 
 
 i9Com. V. Chapman, 11 Cush. 422; 242Hale, P. C. 162; 1 Ruaa. Cromp. 
 
 Tubbs V. Com. 22 Ky. L. Rep. 481, 57 S. & M. 584. 
 
§ 570] PLEADING, rNTOEMATION, AND INBICTMENT. 869 
 
 tlie grand jury for manslaughter. And in England a learred judge 
 went so far as to say that this should be done where the grand 
 jury have returned manslaughter upon a bill for murder, saying 
 he thought it the better course to prefer a new bill, although the 
 usual course on the circuit had been to alter the bill for murder, on 
 the finding of the grand jury. ^ ^ 
 
 Where a killing is charged to have been done with malice, how- 
 ever, a negative averment that it was not done in performing a 
 necessary surgical operation is not necessary;^® nor is an allegation 
 of mitigating or excusing circumstances.^'' And it is not necessary 
 to charge that the accused was a person of sound mind.^* 
 
 571. Intent to kill — The general rule is that where an intent to 
 kill is an essential ingredient of the crime of murder in any degree 
 an indictment failing to allege it is insufficient. ^ And an allegation 
 that the shooting, or the act which caused death, was purposely done 
 does not supply the place of one of an intent to kill. * Both the as- 
 sault and the killing must be alleged to have been purposely done.* 
 And it must appear that the assault was made in pursuance of the 
 intent* And the omission of an averment of an intent to kill 
 cannot be supplied by any rule of evidence applicable to the proof 
 on the trial, ^ or be cured by the legal conclusion of the grand jury, 
 usually inserted in the closing part of the indictment, drawn from 
 the antecedent averments and descriptive of the crime;* though the 
 rule would be different in regard to indictments under statutes with 
 reference to pleading facts constituting an offense in plain, concise 
 language, abolishing the common-law form of pleading.'' 
 
 26- Turner's Case, 1 Lewin, C. O. 177. supra; People v. Davis, 8 Utah, 412, 32 
 
 2 6Merriek v. State, 63 lud. 327. Pac. 670. 
 
 27State V. Mafcakovicli, 59 Minn. 514, And an indictment under a statute 
 
 61 N. W. 677. denouncing shooting at another with in- 
 
 2 8Fahnestock v. State, 23 Ind. 231. tent to kill, charging an assault upon a, 
 
 1 State V. Brown, 21 Kan. 38; Ruis person with intent to kill him, is not 
 
 V. State, 43 Fla. 186, 30 So. 802; Snyder sustained by proof that the accused 
 
 V. State, 59 Ind. 105; State v. McCor- made the assault with intent to kill 
 
 mick, 27 Iowa, 402; State v. Baldwin, upon one person, and accidentally 
 
 79 Iowa, 714, 45 N. W. 297; Schaffer v. wounded or killed another. Morgan v. 
 
 State, 22 Neb. 557, 3 Am. St. Rep. 274, State, 13 Smedes & M. 242. 
 35 N. W. 384; Touts v. State, 8 Ohio St. 4Hogan v. Stajte, 42 Fla. 562, 28 So. 
 
 98; Kain v. State, 8 Ohio St. 307; State 763. And see State v. Shanley (S. D.) 
 
 V. So Ho Ge, 1 Wash. 275, 24 Pac. 442; 104 N. W. 522. 
 State V. So He Me, 1 Wash. 276, 24 Pac. SFouts v. State. 8 Ohio St. 98. 
 443. And see Robinson v. State, 43 Fla. eFouts v. State, supra; Kain v. State, 
 
 175, 29 So. 625. 8 Ohio St. 307; Sehaflfer v. State, 22 
 
 2Schaffer v. State, supra; State v. Neb. 557, 3 Am. St. Rep. 274, 35 N. W. 
 
 Linhoff, 121 Iowa, 632, 97 N. W. 77; 384. 
 
 Leonard v. Territory, 2 Wash. Terr. 381, 'Smith v. State, 1 Kan. 365; State v. 
 
 7 Pac. 872. Ohampoux, 33 Wash. 339, 74 Pao. 557. 
 
 3Fo«t3 v. State, and Kain v. State, 
 
870 HOmCIDE. [§ 571 
 
 An intent to kill, however, need not be alleged in the exact lan- 
 guage of the statute; it is sufficient if the language used clearly 
 shows the intent.* And an averment of an intent to kill is not 
 necessary in an indictment charging the killing to have been done 
 in the commission of a felony;® or where the killing is charged to 
 have been committed by means of poison, or lying in wait, * " though 
 an indictment for killing by poison may properly charge that it 
 was done wilfully and with malice aforethought. ^ ^ Nor is it neces- 
 sary to set forth the particular intent with which a homicide was 
 committed ; it is sufficient to allege that it was done feloniously and 
 with malice aforethought, and contrary to the form of the statute. ^ * 
 And where the means of killing are charged, together with the 
 fact that the killing was wilfully and purposely done, it is not 
 necessary to add that the means were employed for the purpose of 
 killing.^* And in jurisdictions in which the common-law form of 
 indictment is regarded as sufficient to charge murder in the first 
 degree, an indictment for murder in that degree need not charge 
 an intent to kill. ^ * Nor is a charge of an assault and stabbing, with 
 felonious intent then and there to kill, objectionable as referring 
 the intent merely to the battery and not to the assault. * ^ 
 
 A special scienter in cases of poisoning is prudent,^' though in 
 Pennsylvania, at a time when granting an allocatur for review was 
 at the discretion of the court, the omission of the scienter (the in- 
 dictment containing the averment "knowingly") was held, after 
 conviction, not ground for an allocatur.^'' In Massachusetts, it 
 is not necessary to aver in poisoning a specific intent to kill.^* 
 
 sLoefTner v. State, 10 Ohio St. 598; see State v. Johnson, 51 La. Ann. 1647, 
 
 State V. Bridges, 29 Kan. 138. And see 26 So. 437 ; State v. McDonald, 14 Utah, 
 
 Pvke V. State, 47 Fla. 93, 36 So. 577 ; 173, 46 Pac. S72. 
 
 Anderson v. State, 44 Fla. 413, 33 So. isBeehtelheimer v. State, 54 Ind. 128. 
 
 294; Grav v. State, 44 Fla. 436, 33 So. And see State v. Smith, 78 Minn. 362, 
 
 295; Brinkley v. State, 44 Fla. 418, 33 81 N. W. 17; State v. Bradford, 156 Mo. 
 
 So. 296; State v. Brousaard, 107 La. 189, 91, 56 S. W. 898. 
 
 31 So. 637; State v. Lavery, 35 Or. 402, i4Territory v. Godas, 8 Mont. 347, 21 
 
 58 Pac. 107 ; State v. Williams, 191 Mo. Pac. 26 ; Territory v. Young, 5 Mont. 
 
 205, 90 S. W. 448. 242, 5 Pac. 248; Territory v. McAn- 
 
 9 Cox V. People, 80 N. Y. 500; People drews, 3 Mont. 158; Territory v. Steara, 
 
 V. Giblin, 115 N. Y. 198, 4 L.R.A. 757, 2 Mont. 325; State v. Keerl, 29 Mont. 
 
 21 N. E. 1062; State v. Watkins, 27 508, 101 Am. St. Rep. 579, 75 Pac. 362. 
 
 Iowa, 415. IB State v. Clark, 100 Iowa, 47, 69 N. 
 
 10 Com. V. Hersey, 2 Allen, 173; State W. 257. 
 
 V. Van Tassel, 103 Iowa, 6, 72 N. W. 497. leSee forms in Wharton, Precedents 
 
 iiHamlin v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. of Indictments & Pleas, 125 et seq. 
 
 579 47 S. W. 656. ivCom. v. Earle, 1 Whart. 525. 
 
 izPeople V. Conroy, 97 N. Y. 62; Stata 18 Com. v. Hersey, 2 Allen, 173. 
 V. Shutf, 9 Idaho, 115, 72 Pao. 664. And 
 
5 572] PLEADING, INFORMATION, AND INDICTMENT. 871 
 
 572. Deliberation and premeditation — An indictment for murder 
 in the first degree, or -which will sustain a conviction of murder 
 in the first degree, which does not charge that the killing was done 
 by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by torture, or in the 
 perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, a felony, must charge that 
 the killing was done deliberately and premeditatedly, or with a pre- 
 meditated intent to kill.^ And it must be the killing itself which 
 is charged to have been done with deliberation and premeditation; 
 it is not sufficient to charge that the act which caused the death was 
 so committed.^ To be sufiicient it must be charged that the unlawful 
 acts by which the homicide was perpetrated, and the killing itself, 
 were all done with the premeditated design or intention to effect 
 the death of the deceased. * This rule has been carried to the extent 
 of holding that the statutory words "wilful," "deliberate," "ma- 
 licious," and "premeditated," each has its peculiar meaning, and 
 that neither can be omitted, nor can other words of like import be 
 substituted in the place of either.* 
 
 The prevailing rule would seem to be, however, that in charging 
 murder in the first degree it is not necessary to use the statutory 
 words "deliberate and premeditated," and that it is sufficient if 
 the same meaning is expressed in other language.® And within this 
 rule the absence of the word "deliberate" in an indictment for 
 murder does not affect its validity where the crime is alleged to have 
 
 iState V. Brown, 21 Kan. 38 ; Cannon 2State v. Brown, 21 Kan. 38 ; State 
 
 V. State, 60 Ark. 564, 31 S. W. 150, 32 v. Andrews, 84 Iowa, 88, 50 N. W. 549; 
 
 S. W. 128; Wiggins v. State, 23 Fla. State v. MeCormick, 27 Iowa, 402 ; State 
 
 180, 1 So. 693; Denham v. State, 22 Fla. v. Watkins, supra; State v. Reakey, 1 
 
 664; SimmoJis v. State, 32 Fla. 387, 13 Mo. App. 3; State v. Woodward, 191 Mo. 
 
 So. 896; Finn v. State, 5 Ind. 400; Fonts 617, 90 S. W. 90; Kain v. State, supra; 
 
 V. State, 4 G. Greene, 500; State v. Mc- Fonts v. State, 8 Ohio St. 98; Hagan v. 
 
 Corraiek, 27 Iowa, 402; State v. Wat- State, 10 Ohio ot. 459; Jewell v. Terri- 
 
 kins, 27 Iowa, 415; State v. Boyle, 28 tory. 4 Okla. 54, 43 Pae. 1075; Blanton 
 
 Iowa, 522; State v. Knouse, 29 Iowa, v. State, 1 Wash. 265, 24 Pae. 439. 
 
 118; State v. Thompson, 31 Iowa, 393; sHolt v. Territory, 4 Okla. 76, 43 Pae. 
 
 Smith V. State, 1 Kan. 365; State v. 1083. 
 
 Jones, 20 Mo. 58; State v. Meyers, 99 4Poole v. State, 2 Baxt. 288; State v. 
 
 Mo. 107, 12 S. W. 516; State v. Rector, Bovle, 28 Iowa, 522; State v. Jones, 20 
 
 126 Mo. 328. 23 S. W. 1074; State v. Mo. 58. 
 
 Metealf, 17 Mont. 417, 43 Pae. 182; Kain sSee People v. Murray, 10 Oal. 309; 
 
 V. State, 8 Ohio St. 306; Fonts v. State, Vasser v. State, 75 Ark. 373, 87 S. W. 
 
 8 Ohio St. 98; Jewell v. Territory, 4 635; Hill v. People, 1 Colo. 436; Web- 
 
 Okla. 53, 43 Pae. 1075 ; Barker v. Terri- ster v. State. 49 Fla. 131, 38 So 514 
 
 tory (Okla.) 78 Pae. 81; Poole v. State, State v. Wood, 112 Iowa, 411, 84 N. W. 
 
 2 Baxt. 288; Leonard v. Territory, 2 520; State v. Petty, 21 Kan. 55; Greerv 
 
 Wash. Terr. 381, 7 Pae. 872. v. Com. 12 Allen, 155; Barker v. State 
 
 A common-law indictment for murder (Neb.) 103 N. W. 71; State v. Crozier, 
 
 does not include murder in the first de- 12 Nev. 300; Kennedy v. People, 39 N. 
 
 gree under the statute. Fonts v. State, Y. 249; Mitchell v. State, 8 Yerg. 514; 
 
 4 6. Greene, 500. Lrannigan v. People, 3 Utah, 488, 24 
 
872 HOMICIDE. [I 572 
 
 been committed purposely and with malice aforethought, the two 
 expressions being synonymous,^ and the same rule applies to a charge 
 of killing "with express malice aforethought;"^ and a charge of 
 killing "after deliberation and premeditation" is sufficient® And 
 an indictment is not rendered insufficient by the fact that it alleges 
 a killing "with premeditation," instead of "after premeditation."® 
 So, deliberation includes premeditation.^" And where the rule ob- 
 tains that the common-law form of indictment is sufficient to sus- 
 tain a conviction for murder in the first degree, it is, of course, not 
 necessary to charge deliberation and premeditation.-^^ Nor is it 
 necessary to aver deliberation and premeditation where the murdor 
 was committed by means of poison, or by lying in wait;^^ or by 
 torture;^® or where the killing was done while the slayer was en- 
 gaged in the commission of a felony.^* And charging that the act 
 which caused death was done with intent to kill and with delibera- 
 tion and premeditation is sufficient, though it is not charged that 
 the intent to kill was formed with deliberation and premeditation. * ® 
 And an indictment charging in the body thereof a premeditated 
 killing with malice aforethought is not rendered defective as a 
 charge of murder in the first degree by an omission to so eharacter- 
 
 Pac. 767; State v. Haworth, 24 Uta.h, An indictment for murder under the 
 398, 68 Pac. 155; Ohaae v. State, 50 Wis. Texas statute is not bad because of the 
 510, 7 N. W. 376. omission of the word "express" before 
 
 ePeonle v. Dolan, 9 Cal. 576; Dillard the words "malice aforethoug-ht." White 
 V. State, 65 Ark. 404, 46 S. W. 533; Hill v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 42 S. W. 303. 
 V. People, supra; Redus v. People, 10 sVasser v. State, 75 Ark. 373, 87 S. 
 Colo. 208, 14 Pac. 323; State v. Hliboka, W. 635. 
 
 31 Mont. 45.5, 78 Pac. 965; People v. sGreen v. State, 71 Ark. 150, 71 S. W. 
 Enoch, 13 Wend. 159, 27 Am. Dec. 197; 665. 
 
 Fitzgerrold v. People, 37 N. Y. 413, 49 loState v. Dale, 108 Mo. 205, 18 S. W. 
 Barb. 122; People v. Clark, 7 N. Y. 393; 976. And see Bullock v. State, 65 N. 
 People V. Ah Choy, 1 Idaho, 317; State J. L. 557, 86 Am. St. Rep. 668, 47 Atl. 62. 
 V. Thompson, 12 Nev. 140; Riptoe v. nMcAdams v. State, 25 Ark. 405; 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 42 S. W. 381; Territory v. Bannigan, 1 Dak. 451, 46 
 Brannigan v. People, supra; Weather- N. W. 597; State v. Cole, 132 N. C. 
 man v. Com. (Va.) 19 S. E. 778. And 1069, 44 S. E. 391; Mitchell v. State, 8 
 see State v. Gray, 116 Iowa, 231, 89 N. Yerg. 518. 
 
 W. 987; State V. Campbell, 24 Utah, 103, instate v. Jones, 20 Mo. 58. 
 66 Pac. 771. Contra, Fouts v. State, 4 'STerritory v. Vialpando, 8 N. M. 211, 
 G. Greene, .500; Finn v. State, 5 Ind. 400. 43 Pac. 64. 
 
 In Fouts V. State, supra, however, it nCox v. People, 80 N. Y. 500. 
 v,ras held that an indictment charging . . ' estate v. Shelton, 64 Iowa, 333, 20 
 that a killing was done wilfully, felo- N. W. 459; State v. Stanley, 33 Iowa, 
 niously, and unlawfully, and also with 526; State v. Noel (Kan.) 58 Pae. 990. 
 malice aforethought, is not sufficiently And see Smith v. Territory, 11 Okla. 656, 
 descriptive of murder in the first de- 69 Pac. 803; State v. McPherson, 114 
 grec, but is srflicient as a charg ■< of mur- Iowa, 492, 87 N. W. 421 ; State v. Burns, 
 der in the second degree. 148 Mo. 167, 71 Am. St. Rep. 588, 49 S. 
 
 7Borrego v. Territory, 8 N. M. 446, 46 W. 1005. 
 Pac. 349. 
 
? 572] PLEADING, INFORMATION, AND INDICTMENT. 873 
 
 ize the acts of killing in the conclusion. ^ ® 'Nov does failure to charge 
 that a murder was committed with premeditated design to eifect 
 death affect its validity where it is charged that it was committed 
 feloniously and with malice aforethought, and the statute provides 
 that it shall not be necessary to set forth the manner and means 
 by which death was caused, but that it shall be sufficient to charge 
 that the accused did feloniously and wilfully and with malice afore- 
 thought kill the deceased. ^ '' And the rule is the same under a stat- 
 ute declaring murder to be the unlawful killing of a human being 
 with malice aforethought.** And where it is provided by statute, 
 as in Connecticut, that the degree of the crime shall be alleged in 
 the indictment, an allegation that the offense charged is murder in 
 the first degree necessarily charges that the offense was committed 
 deliberately, and with premeditation.*® 
 
 573. Wilfully, feloniously, and unlawfully. — In Louisiana the use 
 of the word "wilfully" in charging murder is imperatively required 
 by statute. * And where wilful killing is a part of the definition of 
 murder, that the killing was wilful must be alleged.^ In the absence 
 of such statutory requirements, however, the use of the word "wil- 
 ful" in charging murder is not essential to the validity of an in- 
 dictment therefor.* And an allegation of a wilful assault, then 
 and there causing death, sufficiently charges not only that the assault 
 was wilful, but also that the killing was wilful. * And it is sufficient 
 to charge that the killing was wilful; it need not be also alleged 
 that the assault was wilful.^ Nor is it necessary in such case to 
 
 isstate V. Northrup, 13 Mont. 522, 35 sgtate v. Arnold, 107 N. 0. 861, 11 S. 
 
 Pac. 228 ; Territory v. Young, 5 Mont. E. 990 ; Aubrey v. State, 62 Ark. 368, 35 
 
 244, 5 Pac. 248. S. W. 792; Com. v. Chapman, 11 Cush. 
 
 And an indictment charging a de- 422; Metcalfe v. Com. 27 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 liberate and premeditated intent to kill 704, 86 S. W. 534. And see Perkins v. 
 
 and murder, and a deliberate and pre- Territory, 10 Okla. 506, 63 Pac. 860. 
 
 meditated assault, and that by such as- A charge in an indictment for assault 
 
 sault a mortal wound was given of with intent to kill and murder, that it 
 
 which the person wounded died, includes was feloniously and unlawfully done, 
 
 all elements of murder in the first de- with malice aforethought, sufficiently 
 
 gree. State v. Stackhouse, 24 Kan. 445. charges wilfulness, without the use of 
 
 i7Hogan V. State, 30 Wis. 428, 11 Am. the word "wilfully." McCoy v. State, 
 
 Rep. 575; State ex rel. Welch v. Sloan, 8 Ark. 451. 
 
 65 Wis. 647, 27 N. W. 616. And see ^People v. Davis, 73 Cal. 355, 15 Pac. 
 
 Fitzpatriek v. United States, 178 U. S. 8; State v. Townsend, 66 Iowa, 741, 24 
 
 304, 44 L. ed. 1078, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 944. N. W. 535 ; State v. Arnewine, 126 Mo. 
 
 isPeople V. TJng Ting Bow, 142 Cal. 567, 29 S. W. 602; State v. Snell, 78 Mo. 
 
 841, 75 Pac. 899. 240 ; State v. Privitt, 175 Mo. 207, 75 
 
 isSmith v. State, 50 Conn. 193. S. W. 4,57. 
 
 iState. V. Williams, 37 La. Ann. 776; 5State v. Dunn, 116 Iowa, 219, 89 N. 
 
 State v. Thomas, 29 La. Ann. 601 ; State W. 984. 
 V. Scott, 38 La. Ann. 387. 
 
 2State v. McCorraiok, 27 Iowa, 402; 
 State V. Watkins, 27 Iowa, 415. 
 
874 HOMICIDE. [§ 573 
 
 use the exact language of the statute, equivalent words being suffi- 
 cient." And "wilfully" is included in the words "deliberately and 
 premeditatedly."'^ Nor is it necessary either to charge or prove wil- 
 fulness in a prosecution for manslaughter.* And a mere allegation 
 of wilfully killing does not charge a design to effect death, and con- 
 stitutes a charge of manslaughter, not murder. 
 
 So, an indictment for homicide, especially where the statute makes 
 felonious action a necessary constitutent of murder, must allege that 
 the homicidal act was done feloniously;^" and a failure to make 
 this charge in the body of the indictment is not supplied by an 
 allegation that the assault was made feloniously,*^ or by the con- 
 cluding words of the indictment, or anything else contained therein. * ^ 
 And it must be stated that the killing was done feloniously, wilfully, 
 etc., in the conclusion of the indictment, as well as in the averment 
 of the commission of the homicidal act itself. * * An indictment for 
 murder is not bad, however, because it does not state that the assault 
 was made feloniously and wilfully. * * And a mere mistaken use of 
 the word "willingly" for the word "wilfully" does not vitiate an 
 indictment. * ° And where the statute defining the crime of murder 
 does not make a felonious or unlawful action a part of the definition, 
 an indictment in the language of the statute is sufficient, though the 
 words "feloniously" and "unlawfully" are not used.*® 
 
 So, that a killing was unlawful must be alleged in substance, at 
 least. * '' And a statute dispensing with the averment of presumptions 
 of law does not dispense with the necessity of averring in a prosecu- 
 tion for homicide that the killing was unlawful.** But the words 
 "unlawful" or "unlawfully" need not be used in an indictment for 
 murder, where they are not used in the statutory definition of mur- 
 
 6 state V. Townsend, supra. And see Arnett v. Com. 114 Ky. 593, 71 
 
 TState V. Whitaker, 35 Kan. 731, 12 S. W. 635. 
 
 Pac. 106. iiState v. Herrell, supra; Respublica 
 
 80om. V. Woodward, 102 Mass. 155. v. Honeyman, 2 Dall. 228, 1 L. ed. 359. 
 
 sState V. Smith, 78 Minn. 362, 81 N. Contra. Drake v. State, 145 Ind. 210, 41 
 
 W. 17. N. E. 799. 
 
 instate v. Herrell, 97 Mo. 105, 10 Am. laState v. Herrell, supra. 
 
 St. Kep. 289, 10 S. W. 387; State v. Eec- isState v. Rector, supra. But see 
 
 tor, 126 Mo. 328, 23 S. W. 1074; Ander- Chase v. State, 50 Wis. 510, 7 N. W. 376. 
 
 son V. State, 5 Ark. 444; Edwards v. n Chase v. State, supra; State v. 
 
 State, 25 Ark. 444; Holt v. People, 23 Furgerson, 162 Mo. 668, 63 S. W. 101. 
 
 Colo. 1, 45 Pac. 374; Drake v. State, 145 isDaniels v. State (Ark.) 88 S. W. 
 
 Ind. 210, 41 N. E. 799; Henning v. State, 844. 
 
 106 Ind. 386, 55 Am. Rep. 756, 6 N. E. isRiddle v. State, 3 Heisk. 401; Wil- 
 
 803, 7 N. E. 4 ; State v. Williams, 37 La. liams v. State, 3 Heisk. 376. 
 
 Ann. 776; Witt v. State, 6 Coldw. 5; i^PIenry v. State, 33 Ala. 389. 
 
 Allen V. State. 86 Wis. 22, 54 N. W. 999. isibid. 
 
§ 573] PLEADING, INFORMATION, AND INDICTMENT. 875 
 
 der.^* It is sufficient, in sucli case, if the facts charged show that 
 the acta were unlawful.^" And the word "feloniously" includes 
 "unlawfully" in alleging homicide. ^ '^ And a charge that a killing 
 was done with malice aforethought sufficiently shows that it was un- 
 lawful. ^^ So, where the intent with which the act was done is 
 charged to have been felonious it is not necessary to aver that the 
 act itself was imlawful or felonious. ^ ® 
 
 VII. Homicide in commissioit of anothee ckimb. 
 
 a. General rules. 
 
 574. Necessity of charging collateral felony — ^At common law it was 
 not necessary to charge in an indictment for murder that the murder 
 was committed in the perpetration of another crime, in order to 
 introduce proof showing that a felony was attempted in committing 
 it ; it was sufficient to charge murder in the common form, and then, 
 upon proof that it was committed in the perpetration of a felony, 
 malice, deliberation, and premeditation were implied.-^ And stat- 
 utes defining different degrees of murder, and subjecting them to 
 different punishments, do not render it necessary to alter the form of 
 an indictment for the crime or to supply such facts as would show the 
 offense to be murder in any particular degree. ^ And an indictment in 
 the common-law form is sufficient under statutes dividing the crime of 
 murder into degrees, and providing that all murder perpetrated in 
 the commission of, or attempt to commit, a felony, or certain named 
 felonies, is murder in the first degree, as a charge of murder there- 
 under.^ Nor is it necessary to state in an indictment for murder 
 
 i9Beavers v. State, 58 Ind. 530; Jerry iState v. King, 24 Utah, 482, 91 Am. 
 
 T. State, 1 Blackf. 395; State v. Abrams, St. Rep. 808, 68 Pae. 418; State v. Mey- 
 
 11 Or. 169, 8 Pae. 327; Morrison v. ers, 99 Mo. 107, 12 S. W. 516; People v. 
 
 State, 40 Tex. Grim. Rep. 473, 51 S. W. Meyer, 162 N. Y. 357, 56 N. E. 758; 
 
 358. Thompson v. Com. 20 Gratt. 724. 
 
 2 0Beasley v. People, 89 111. 571; State sThompson v. Com. supra; Andrews 
 
 V. Leeper, 70 Iowa, 748, 30 N. W. 501; v. People, 33 Colo. 193, 79 Pae. 1031; 
 
 Ruiz V. Territory, 10 N. M. 120, 61 Pae. Cox v. People, 80 N. Y. 500, Affirming 
 
 126. 19 Hun, 430; Com. v. Flanagan, 7 Watta 
 
 21 Beavers v. State, and Jerry v. State, & S. 415. 
 
 supra. sWhite v. State, 16 Tex. 206; Gehrke 
 
 22Ha]l V. State, 28 Tex. App. 146, 12 v. State, 13 Tex. 568; Roach v. State, 8 
 
 S. W. 739; Bean v. State, 17 Tex. App. Tex. App. 479; Williams v. State (Tex, 
 
 60; Thompson v. State, 36 Tex. 326; Grim. App.) 64 S. W. 1042; Nite v. 
 
 Carroll v. State, 71 Ark. 403, 75 S. W. State, 41 Tex. Grim. Rep. 340, 54 S. W. 
 
 471 ; State v. Abrams, supra. And see 763 ; Sharpe v. State, 17 Tex, App, 487 ; 
 
 People V. Suesser, 142 Cal. 354, 75 Pae. Powell v. State, 74 Ark, 355, 85 S. W. 
 
 1093. 781 ; State v. Foster, 136 Mo. 653, 38 S. 
 
 23Fairlee v. People, 11 111. 1. And see W. 721 ; State v. Meyers, 99 Mo. 107, 12 
 
 State V. Rice, 149 Mo. 461, 51 S. W. 78. S. W. 516; State v. Worrell, 25 Mo. 205; 
 
876 HOMICIDB. [§ 574 
 
 the grade of the offense, where it was committed m the perpetration 
 of, or attempt to perpetrate, an offense enumerated in the statute;* 
 nor to allege an intent to kill.® The perpetration of, or attempt to 
 perpetrate, any of the named felonies, during which attempt a homi- 
 cide is committed, in such case stands for, and is the legal equivalent 
 of, the premeditation, deliberation, etc., which otherwise are neces- 
 sary attributes of murder in the first degree.® The felony in such 
 case is but a link in the chain of evidence to show malice, deliberation, 
 and premeditation, and where the indictment charges a killing upon 
 express malice only, proof is admissible to show that the killing was 
 committed in the perpetration of a felony, or of one of the enumer- 
 ated felonies, or that the motive of the accused in perpetrating the 
 murder was to commit such crime. ^ And that a murder was com- 
 mitted in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, either arson, 
 rape, robbery, or burglary, is admissible as part of the res gestce 
 under an indictment charging murder by violence upon express mal- 
 ice aforethought.* And an instruction as to murder in an attempt 
 to commit a felony in the language of the statute is warranted.® 
 And a person indicted for murder in the first degree under a charge 
 of deliberation and premeditation may be convicted of homicide com- 
 mitted in the perpetration of a felony, though its commission while 
 in such perpetration was not especially pleaded. ^ " So, the same re- 
 State V. McGinnis, 158 Mo. 105, 59 S. W. in the first degree, where the statute 
 83; People v. Flanigan, 174 N. Y. 356, makes such killing murder in the first 
 66 N. E. 988; State v. Covington, 117 degree, and provides that the jury shall 
 N. C. 834, 25 S. E. 337; State v. King, ascertain in their verdict whether the 
 supra; Kobertson v. Com. (Va.) 20 S. murder be in the first or in the second 
 E. 362. degree. Johnson v. Com. 24 Pa. 386. 
 
 Statutes dividing murder into degrees, 7Mendez v. State, 29 Tex. App. 608, 
 amd making it murder in the first de- 16 S. W. 766; Gay v. State, 40 Tex. 
 gree to kill in the perpetration of, or Grim. Rep. 242, 49 S. W. 612; Sharpe v. 
 the attempt to perpetrate, a named State, 17 Tex. App. 487 ; State v. 
 felony, creates no new offense, but Weems, 96 Iowa, 426, 65 N. W. 387; 
 merely divides the common-law offense; State v. Johnson, 72 Iowa, 393, 34 N. 
 and the degree of the offense may be es- W. 177 ; Titus v. State, 49 N. J. L. 36, 7 
 tablished under a general indictment by Atl. 621 ; State v. King, 24 Utah, 482, 
 proving that the crime was committed 91 Am. St. Rep. 808, 68 Pac. 418. 
 in the perpetration of a felony. Com. sKeyes v. State, 10 Tex. App. 1 ; Roach 
 V. Flanagan, supra. v. State, 8 Tex. App. 479; Powell v. 
 
 4Ibid. ; State v. Covington, supra. State, 74 Ark. 355, 85 S. W. 781 ; State 
 
 estate v. Robinson, 126 Iowa, 69, 101 v. Weems, supra; State v. Foster, 136 
 N. W. 634. Mo. 653, 38 S. W. 721 ; State v. Pike, 49 
 
 estate v. Meyers, supra; Singleton v. N. II. 399, 6 Am. Rep. 533. 
 State, 1 Tex. App. 502. oSharpe v. State, 17 Tex. App. 486. 
 
 Where an indictment charges murder loPeopIe v. Flanigan, 174 N. Y. 357, 
 to have be,en committed wilfully, de- 66 N. E. 988: Cox v. People, 19 Hun, 
 liberately, and premeditatedly, or in 430, Affirmed in 80 N. Y. 500; People v. 
 perpetrating, or attempting to perpe- Giblin, 115 N. Y. 196, 4 L.R.A. 757, 21 
 trate, a named felony, a verdict of guilty N. E. 1062; Mitchell v. Stnte, 1 Tex. 
 sufficiently ascertains the murder to be App. 195; Wall v. State, 18 Tex. C82, 70 
 
S 574] PLEADING, LNFOEIVIATION, AND INDICTMENT. 877 
 
 suit i3 arrived at tmder statutes providing that it shall not be nec- 
 essary in an indictment for murder to set forth the manner in which, 
 or the means by which, the death of the deceased was caused, and 
 it is sufficient under them to charge a felonious and malicious 
 killing, without charging that it was done in the commission of a 
 felony. * ^ A conviction for involuntary manslaughter, however, 
 consisting of a killing caused by some unlawful act, or lawfiil act 
 done in an unlawful manner, cannot be found under an indictment 
 charging a felony alone. * ^ And the rule has been asserted that where 
 a pleader unnecessarily alleges that a murder was committed with 
 express malice, or with malice aforethought and deliberation and 
 premeditation, he thereby alleges one of the distinct species of mur- 
 der in the first degree, and to that particular kind of murder the 
 charge of the court should be confined ; and that a charge as to killing 
 in the perpetration of a felony is improper. ^ * 
 
 575. Effect of charge of collateral felony — ^While a charge that 
 murder was committed in the perpetration of a felony is not deemed 
 necessary in a prosecution for homicide, and the indictment may be 
 drawn for murder in the first degree in such case in the common form, 
 such a charge will not vitiate the indictment.^ And an indictment 
 charging that a murder was committed by poison in the perpetration 
 of, or the attempt to perpetrate, a robbery, is good.^ But a bare charge 
 that the Homicide was committed in the perpetration of, or the at- 
 tempt to perpetrate, a named offense, without setting out the acts of 
 the accused, is a mere conclusion of law.^ If the indictment charges 
 the commission of a felony, facts must be alleged constituting the 
 crime named, and it must be shown that the accused was engaged in 
 the commission thereof.* And where the statute provides that if 
 
 Am. Dec. 302; State v. Johnson, 72 pleted commission of a burglary, and 
 
 Iowa, 393, 34 N. W. 177 ; State v. Tyler, that the accused, while engaged in the 
 
 122 Iowa, 125, 97 N. W. 983; People v. commission thereof, committed the raur- 
 
 Sullivan, 173 N. Y. 122, 63 L.R.A. 353, der charged, is not objectionable as 
 
 93 Am. St. Rep. 582, 65 N. B. 989. But showing that the murder was commit- 
 
 see Raybum v. State, 69 Ark. 177, 63 ted, not while the accused was engaged 
 
 S. W. 356. in the commission of the burglary, but 
 
 iiSee State v. Schnelle, 24 W. Va. after it had been committed. Dolan v. 
 
 767. People, 64 N. Y. 485, Affirming 6 Hun, 
 
 l2C!om. V. Bilderback, 2 Para. Sel. Eq. 493. 
 
 Oas. 447; Morrisett v. People, 21 How. zRoach v. State, 8 Tex. App. 479, dic- 
 
 Pr. 203. turn. 
 
 13 Sharps V. State, 17 Tex. App. 487; 3 Titus v. State, 49 N. J. L. 36, 7 Atl. 
 
 Gay V. State, 40 Tex. Grim. Rep. 242, 49 621. But see Gates v. State (Tex. Grim. 
 
 S. W. 612; Raybum v. State, supra. App.) 86 S. W. 769. 
 
 iState V. Foster, 136 Mo. 653, 38 S. iPeople v. Cole, 2 N. Y. Grim. Rep. 
 
 W. 721; Thompson v. Com. 20 Gratt. 108; Dolan v. People, 64 N. Y. 485; 
 
 724. People v. Willett, 102 N. Y. 251, 6 N. 
 
 So, an indictment charging the com- E. 301 ; Titus v. State, supra. 
 
878 HOMICIDE. [§ 575 
 
 any person in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, certain 
 named felonies, shall shoot, stab, or thrust any person with a danger- 
 ous weapon, or with intent to commit the crime of murder, he shall, 
 on conviction therefor, be punished with death, the indictment should 
 charge the two specific acts the concurrence of which in point o± 
 time create the offense, and state all the material facts and circum- 
 stances of each of the two offenses.^ 
 
 In charging murder in the perpetration of a felony, however, 
 it is not necessary to set out all the elements of the felony in the in- 
 dictment. ® And an averment that the accused did feloniously steal, 
 take, and carry away is a sufficient charge of larceny within the mean- 
 ing of these rules.'' And a charge of murder committed in the per- 
 petration of a train robbery by derailing the train, after which money 
 was taken from the express messenger, is a sufficient charge of rob- 
 bery.® And an alle-;;ation that by means of setting fire to and burn- 
 ing a dwelling house, a person then and there known by accused to 
 be occupying said dwelling house was burned to death, sufficiently 
 charges arson.® So, an indictment charging the commission of a 
 felony, and that while engaged in the commission thereof the accused 
 committed a murder, is a charge of but one offense within these 
 Tules, and is not objectionable because the felony is described more 
 minutely than necessary. ^ " And a verdict of guilty of murder in the 
 first degree as charged in the indictment is not inconsistent because 
 one count of the indictment charged the accused with taking the life 
 
 Where am indictment for murder com- band in some of the counts, and of his 
 
 mitted by stabbing another in an at- 'vvife in others, where it is a matter of 
 
 tempt to perpetrate a robbery suifioient- lirgal doubt as to which of them some 
 
 ly describes the stabbing with a danger- portions of such property belonged, the 
 
 ous weapon, but does not describe the laiceny being in fact a single taking, 
 
 robbery by showing who was robbed, and some portion of the property belong- 
 
 and of what, and a verdict of guilty is ing to each. Cox v. People, 19 Hiui, 
 
 found, its effect must be limited to the 430, Affirmed in 80 N. Y. 500. 
 
 offense of stabbing, and the sentance im- sWilliams v. State, 30 Tex. App. 354, 
 
 posed must be confined to that offense. 17 S. W. 408. 
 
 State V. Brown, 21 La. Ann. 347. oMcClaine v. Territory, 1 Wash. 345, 
 
 5lbid. 25 Pac. 453. 
 
 6Nite V. Ste.te, 41 Tex. Grim. Rep. No allegation of occupancy as a place 
 
 340, 54 S. W. 763; Dates v. State (Tex. of abode is required in a prosecution 
 
 Grim. App.) 86 S. W. 769; State v. Gov- under a statute defining the crime of 
 
 ington, 117 N. G. 834, 23 S. E. 337. arson, and providing, among other 
 
 7People V. Willett, 102 N. Y. 251, 6 things, that should the death of any 
 
 N. B. 301. person ensue therei'rom, known to be 
 
 And it is proper in a prosecution for cceupying or present in the premises at 
 murder in the first degree for killing a the time they are wilfully set fire to, tne 
 person while perpetrating, or attempt- offender shall be deemed guilty of mur- 
 ing to perpetrate, a larceny, to charge der in the first degree. Ibid, 
 the larceny in which the arcuaed was lODolan v. People, 64 N. Y. 485, Af- 
 engaged as of the property of a hus- firming 6 Hun, 493. 
 
i 575] PLEADING, INFOEMATION, AND INDICTMENT. 879 
 
 of his victim while eommitting burglary, and gjiother -while com- 
 mitting a robbery, and a third with deliberation and premeditation. * ^ 
 Nor is such an indictment bad for duplicity. ^ ^ Nor does a charge of 
 murder of a woman in an attempt to perpetrate rape upon her in- 
 volve the necessity of proving the corpus delicti of each of the two 
 different crimes, since the crime charged is murder, and the body 
 of the crime does not include the manner or details of its commissioi:, 
 of any other crime, if any other has been committed. ^^ So, an in- 
 dictment for homicide in the commission of a burglary is not defo;- 
 tive because it does not allege that the killing was without any design 
 to effect death, where it was alleged that the killing was felonious and 
 wilful, since it would be absurd to so construe the statute as to enable 
 a person charged with murder under it to establish a defense by prov- 
 ing that he designed the murder.^* 
 
 576. Unlawful acts not amounting to felony generally — ^We have 
 seen that causing death by unlawful acts not amounting to felony, 
 or by lawful acts unlawfully done, constitutes involuntary mau- 
 slaughter.^ To make an indictment for involuntary manslaughter 
 good, it must be alleged that the accused was in the commission of 
 some unlawful act, or of a lawful act unlawfully done, and that death 
 resulted therefrom. * A conviction for involuntary manslaughter can- 
 not be had under an indictment for voluntary manslaughter or for 
 murder. * And an indictment for a killing, not alleging that the doer 
 
 iiDolan V. People, 6 Hun, 493. suflSciently charges a purpose to kill. 
 
 But where an information for murder the allegation in respect of attempted 
 contains two counts, by the first of rape being regarded as surplusage, 
 which the accused was charged with the Bechtelheiraer v. State, 54 Ind. 128. 
 killing of the deceased, purposely and "Dolan v. People, 64 N. Y. 485, Af- 
 of his deliberate and premeditated firming 6 Hun, 493. 
 
 malice, and by the second the killing is iSee supra, chapter X., §§ 210 et seq. 
 alleged to have been done in the perpe- zwilley v. State, 46 Ind. 363. 
 tration of a rape upon the person of the sRruner v. State, 58 Ind. 159; Adama 
 deceased, it is proper to instruct the v. State, 65 Ind. 565; Com. v. Bilder- 
 jury that murder in the second degree back, 2 iPars. Sel. Eq. Cas. 447. 
 and manslaughter are not included in In People v. Pearne, 118 Cal. 154, 50 
 the second count, and that in case the Pac. 376, however, it was held that in- 
 accused is found guilty as therein voluntary manslaughter, consisting of 
 charged, the verdict should be murder a killing in the commission of a lawful 
 in the first degree. Morgan v. State, act which might produce death if done 
 51 Neb. 672, 71 N. W. 788. in an unlawful manner, or without due 
 
 izPolan V. People, 6 Hun, 493. caution and circumspection, is always 
 
 Instate v. Leuth, 5 Ohio C. C. 94. included in an indictment for murder. 
 
 An inrlictment charging the accused and may be found on a prosecution 
 with killing a woman in an unlawful therefor. 
 
 attempt to forcibly and feloniously rav- And in Siberry v. State, 149 Ind. 684, 
 ish her by giving her poison mingled 39 N. E. 933, 47 N. E. 458, it was held 
 with wine, intending thereby to excite that the question of the propriety of 
 her passions, charges a murder by tne uniting a count for murder with a count 
 administration of poison, and not mur- for involuntary manslaughter in the 
 der in an attempt to commit a rape, and same indictment is not presented on ap- 
 
880 HOMICIDE. [§ »76 
 
 was engaged in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, a crime or 
 misdemeanor not amounting to a felony, is insufficient under a stat- 
 ute making it manslaughter in a specified degree to kill a human 
 being without design to effect death by a person engaged in the 
 perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any crime or misdemeanor 
 not amounting to a felony, in cases in which such killing would be 
 murder at common law.* And in charging the collateral crime or 
 misdemeanor, either the statutory language must be used, or the stat- 
 utory ingredients must be substantially charged.^ An indictment 
 describing the crime of manslaughter in the common-law form, 
 however, is good.* And an indictment for manslaughter need not 
 allege that the killing was done without malice.'' And it need not 
 expressly charge the commission of the crime of manslaughter where 
 the crime is definitely described in the words of the statute, and it 
 is alleged that death resulted therefrom. * JSTor is it necessary to state 
 in terms that the killing was involuntary and unintentional, where 
 the inference arises from the facts charged, that death resulted in- 
 voluntarily while the accused was engaged in the commission of an 
 unlawful act.® And an indictment charging the accused with an 
 assault upon the person killed by unlawfully shooting a loaded fire- 
 arm at him sufficiently describes the required unlawful act and is a 
 sufficient charge of manslaughter.^" And an information charging 
 a man with culpable negligence in carrying a boy, against his will, 
 into a river where the water was deep and dangerous, whereby he was 
 drowned, sufficiently charges manslaughter and is not subject to 
 the objection that it does not set forth the means by which the death 
 of the boy was caused, or directly connect the accused with it. ^ ' So, 
 while under an indictment charging felonious homicide there cannot 
 be a conviction of involuntary manslaughter, a count of involuntary 
 manslaughter may be joined in an indictment with one for felonious 
 homicide. ^ ^ 
 
 peal, in the absence of a motion to sUnited States v. Holtzha.iier, 40 Fed. 
 
 quash in the record and a ruling there- 76. 
 
 on. sBrown v. State, 110 Ind. 486, 11 N. 
 
 4State V. Emerich, 87 Mo. 110, Affirm- E. 447. 
 
 ing 13 Mo. App. 492. And see Eaton loSutcliffe v. State, supra; Surber v. 
 
 V. State, 162 Ind. 554, 70 N. E. 814; State, 99 Ind. 71; Siberry v. Stat«, 149 
 
 Morrisett v. People, 21 How. Pr. 203. Ind. 684, 39 N. E. 936, 47 N. E. 458. 
 
 6Eaton V. State, supra. iiState v. Radford, 56 Kan. 591, 44 
 
 eSutcliffe v. State, 18 Ohio, 469, 51 Pac. 19. 
 
 Am. Dec. 459. 12 Cora. v. Bilderback, 2 Para. SeL Eq. 
 
 'Ibid. Cas. 447. 
 
i 577] PLEADING, INFORMATION, AND INDICTMENT. 881 
 
 b. Particular felonies or unlawful acts. 
 
 577, Eesisting arrest or official action — Eesisting arrest or official 
 action is an unlawful act from which malice will be implied, and, 
 therefore, since it is a mere evidential fact going to show malice, an 
 indictment for a homicide committed in making such resistance, 
 charging a killing with malice aforethought, is sufficient; it is not 
 necessary to charge that the person killed was an officer, or engaged 
 in the performance of the duties of an officer, at the time, to warrant 
 proof of such facts upon the trial.-' And evidence of the official char- 
 acter of the person killed, and the capacity in which he was acting, 
 may be admitted, though not alleged in the indictment.^ So, where 
 attempt to escape from custody is made a felony, an indictment 
 charging that a homicide was committed while the accused was 
 engaged in an attempt to escape from jail, where he was confined on 
 a charge of felony, charges murder in the first degree, without ref- 
 erence to deliberation or premeditation.* 
 
 The animus of an assault upon an enrolment officer, however, 
 must have been aroused by his discharge of his duties to bring his 
 killing within the statutory provision with reference to resisting or op- 
 posing any enrolment or enrolment officer, and to assaulting, obstruct- 
 ing, hindering, or impeding any officer or other person employed 
 in arresting or aiding to arrest any spy or deserter from the military 
 service of the United States, and providing that in cases where such 
 assaulting, obstructing, hindering, or impeding shall produce 
 death, the offender shall be deemed guilty of murder; and in such 
 a case the indictment must contain an averment to that effect.* 
 But the purpose to obstruct the execution of such act need not be 
 alleged.^ 
 
 578. Negligent homicide. — ^Where an offense was involuntary hom- 
 icide and involved no assault, but arose out of some negligence or 
 fault from which death resulted, the ordinary forms of averment are 
 not sufficient; an indictment therefor must be framed upon the pe^ 
 culiar facts of the case, * and the duty which was neglected or improp- 
 erly performed must be charged, as well as the acts of the accused 
 
 iKeady v. People, 32 Colo. 57, 66 Com. 4 Ky. L. Rep. 547 ; State v. Craft, 
 
 L.R.A. 353, 74 Pac. 892; Wright v. 164 Mo. 631, 65 S. W. 280; Mackalley's 
 
 State, 18 Ga. 383; Bovd v. State, 17 Ga. Case, 9 Coke, 65 b. 
 
 194; Dilser v. Com. 88 Ky. 550, 11 S. W. sPeople v. Johnson, 110 N. Y. 134, 17 
 
 651 ; Bullock v. State, 65 N. J. L. 557, 86 N. E. 684, AfBrming 46 Hun, 667. 
 Am. St. Rep. 668, 47 Atl. 62; Lyons v. lUnited States v. Gleason, Woolw. 75, 
 
 State, 9 Tex. App. 636. Fed. Cas. No. 15,215. 
 
 2North V. People, 139 111. 81, 28 N. Bibid. 
 E. 906: Boyd v. State, supra; Alsop v. iPeople v. Olmstead, 30 Mich. 431. 
 Horn.— 56 
 
882 HOMICIDE. [§ 578 
 
 constituting failure to perform or improper performance. ^ Thus, an 
 indictment against a woman for manslaughter for neglecting to supply 
 an infant of tender years with sufficient food is bad where it does 
 not state that she was the mother of the child, or that she owed it any 
 duty to supply it with food,* or that it was unable to take care of it- 
 self.* And a charge that a woman deserted her new-born child, and 
 that it died, is insufficient in the absence of an allegation that the de- 
 sertion was for such a length of time that death was the probable 
 result.® Nor is an indictment charging neglect and refusal to pro- 
 cure care or medical treatment sufficient in the absence of a direct 
 charge that the neglect caused death, or, at least, shortened life.* 
 And a charge against a husband for assaulting his wife, and forcing 
 her to leave their house, whereby she came to her death, is not sup- 
 ported by proof that he had beaten her and that she voluntarily left 
 the house.'' So, an indictment against a master for not providing 
 sufficient food and sustenance for a servant is insufficient, unless it 
 alleges that the servant was of tender years and under the dominion 
 and control of the master.* And where an indictment against a rail- 
 way conductor for negligence in causing death by collision of railway 
 trains alleges knowledge that another train was due, and a known 
 violation of duty with reference to giving signals, such allegation 
 is made an essential portion of the description of the acts of the 
 accused constituting the negligence charged, which must be supported 
 by evidence to warrant a conviction.* 
 
 It is not necessary, however, to allege or prove a criminal intent 
 upon a charge of homicide arising from a negligent omission of 
 a known duty ; ' ** and an averment in an indictment for manslaughter 
 by neglecting to give the proper signal to denote the obstruction of a 
 line of railway, whereby a collision took place and a passenger was 
 killed, that it was the duty of the accused to signal such obstruction, 
 
 sSee United States v. Beaeham, 29 the latter to provide him with proper 
 
 Fed. 284; Ainsworth v. United Sta.tes, nourishment, medicine, etc., but that he 
 
 1 App. D. 0. 518; Reg. v. Edwards, 8 died fram neglect; and charges in the 
 
 Car. & P. 611. second count that deoeas,ed, being such 
 
 3Reg. V. Edwards, supra. apprentice, was killed by the prisoner 
 
 4Queen v. Waters, 1 Den. C. C. 363. by overwork and beating, — evidence that 
 
 sQueen v. Pinhorn, 1 Cox, C. C. 70. tlie prisoner told the witness that the 
 
 estate V. Lowe, 66 Minn. 296, 68 N. deceased was his apprentice, without the 
 
 W. 1094. production of any indenture, is suf- 
 
 'State V. Preslar, 48 N. C. (3 Jones, fioient proof of the allegation of ap- 
 
 L.) 421. prenticeship to support th« second 
 
 sRex V. Ridley, 2 Campb. 650. count, but not the first. Reg. v. Crump- 
 
 And where an indictment for man- ton, Car. & M. 597. 
 
 slaughter charges in the first count that sCom. v. Hartwell, 128 Mass. 415, 35 
 
 deceased was the apprentice of the Am. Rep. 391. 
 
 prisoner, and that it was tlie duty of lo State v. Smith, 65 Me. 257. 
 
S 578] PLEADING, INFORMATION, AND INDICTMENT. 883 
 
 which he neglected to perforin, is a sufficient description of the offense, 
 though it does not allege that there was an obstruction which, but for 
 neglect, he might have seen. ^ ^ And a charge against a physician that 
 he feloniously, and without due caution and circumspection, and by 
 malpractice in the use of remedies and appliances, and by abandon- 
 ment, caused the death of a patient, is sufficient. ^ ^ ISTor need an in- 
 dictment against a physician charge an undertaking to cure the 
 patient and a felonious breach of duty. ^ ^ And a charge that a pa- 
 tient was injured by the use of a specified agent is not insufficient be- 
 cause of a failure to allege that the agent was a dangerous one.^* 
 So, an indictment against a husband charging that he wilfully neg- 
 lected and refused to provide necessary clothing and shelter for his 
 wife, whereby her death resulted, is sufficient, and not subject to ob- 
 jection that it contained no allegation that the condition of the wife 
 rendering protection necessary was known to him. * ° And an indict- 
 ment charging the accused with causing death by culpable negligence 
 in the selection and use of materials for the construction of a building 
 which he was erecting, specifying such acts, resulting in the falling 
 of a wall upon deceased, sufficiently charges manslaughter. * " So, a 
 charge in an indictment for homicide that the death of the deceased 
 was caused by beating and starving her, and by hanging her with a 
 rope, is not bad for duplicity. ^ ^ 
 
 579. Abortion or attempted abortion generally. — We have seen that 
 homicide in the commission of, or attempt to commit, an abortion 
 may be murder in the first or second degree where abortion is regard- 
 ed as a felony, under statutes as to homicide in the commission of a 
 felony, and that it is sometimes regarded as murder in the second 
 degree upon the theory that malice is implied from an act dangerous 
 to human life ; and that where abortion is regarded as a mere misde- 
 meanor, or where it was committed or attempted with an instrument 
 or by means not ordinarily dangerous to human life, it is involuntary 
 
 llReg. V. Pargeter, 3 Cox, C. C. 191. sion to define manslaughter to the jury 
 
 And see People ex rel. MeMahon v. in a prosecution thereunder is error; 
 
 Westchester County, 1 Park. Crim. but a charge defining voluntary and in- 
 
 Eep. 059. voluntary manslaughter, relating to 
 
 l2State V. Hardister, 38 Ark. 605, 42 sudden heat of passion, and the per- 
 
 Am. Rep. 5. formajice of unlawful acts not felonious 
 
 isReg. V. Ellis, 2 Car. & K. 470. and the performance of lawful acts 
 
 KCora. V. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 52 without due care and caution, is in- 
 
 Am. Rep. 264. applicable and can be rejected as sur- 
 
 1 estate v. Smith, 65 Me. 257. plusage. Territory v. Manton, 8 Mont. 
 
 So, an indictment charging wilful 95, 19 Pae. 387. 
 failure of the accused to prevent his lePeopIe v. Buddensieek, 103 N. Y. 
 
 ■wife from perishing from exposure to 487, 57 Am. Rep. 766, 9 N. E. 44. 
 the cold charges murder, which neces- I'Medina v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 earily includes manslaughter, and omis- 49 S. W. 380. 
 
884 HOMICIDE. [§ 579 
 
 manslaughter oiily.^ Charging homicide in the commission of, or 
 attempt to commit, an abortion, therefore, would appear to fall within, 
 and be governed by, rules with reference to homicide in the commis- 
 sion of a felony, or homicide in the commission of an act dangerous 
 to human life, or homicide in the commission of a misdemeanor, 
 amounting to manslaughter only, as the case may be. And an in- 
 dictment, for causing the death of a mother by an abortion is not de- 
 murrable at common law for charging the accused with manslaughter 
 instead of murder.^ In charging the offense, however, since a mis- 
 carriage may be produced without criminality, it is necessary that 
 an indictment for homicide in the commission of an abortion should 
 charge that the act was done with the intention to commit that crime.* 
 But an indictment charging the killing of a woman wilfully, felo- 
 niously, and with malice aforethought is sufficient, though it does not 
 specifically set out the unlawful purpose in terms. * And it is not sub- 
 ject to objection that it fails to charge the accused with any intent 
 or purpose to injure the woman, or that the means used were dan- 
 gerous.^ And a charge that drugs were administered and instru- 
 ments used upon the body of the deceased, with specific intent to pro- 
 duce abortion, implies previous deliberation, and charges malice afore- 
 thought.® JSTor does a charge of homicide caused by procuring a mis- 
 carriage show an intent to take life, so as to make it murder in the 
 first degree, instead of homicide in the commission of an abortion.'' 
 And an intent to destroy the life of the child is not charged in an in- 
 dictment alleging an attempt to commit an abortion by the use 
 
 iSee supra, chapter XIX. by the statute. Lohman v. People, 1 
 
 aWorthington v. State, 92 Md. 222, N. Y. 379, 49 Am. Dec. 340, Affirming 
 
 56 L.R.A. 353, 84 Am. St. Rep. 506, 48 2 Barb. 216. 
 
 Atl. 355. «Wilson v. Com. 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1251, 
 
 3 State V. Leeper, 70 Iowa, 748, 30 N. 60 S. W. 400. 
 
 W. 501 ; People v. Lohman, 2 Barb. 216. eibid. 
 
 And an indictment charging the in- estate v. Thurman, 66 Iowa, 693, 24 
 
 tent to be to produce a miscarriage in- N. W. 511. 
 
 stead of to destroy the child charges a 'State v. Baldwin, 79 Iowa, 714, 45 
 
 misdemeanor under a statute making an N. W. 297. 
 
 attempt to produce a miscarriage with And an information under the Wia- 
 
 such intent a misdemeanor; and where consin statute charging a man and his 
 
 it goes further and alleges that the wife with the felonious killing of a 
 
 patient was quick with child, and that woman by the commission of an abor- 
 
 the death of such child was effected, tion upon her is not subject to the objec- 
 
 characterizing the act of the accused as tion that it charges three distinct of- 
 
 felonious, without charging an intent fenses, assault, causing abortion, and 
 
 upon his part to destroy the child, these manslaughter in the first degree, since 
 
 allegations do not contradict the charge the statute makes such killing man- 
 
 of a misdemeanor, and do not merge the slnughter in the second degree, and the 
 
 misdemeanor, since they do not contain information properly charges that de- 
 
 a valid charge of felony, intent to de- gree of felonious homicide. Hatchard 
 
 stroy the child being an essential part v. State, 79 Wis. 357, 48 N. W. 380. 
 of the definition of the ofl"ens« described 
 
§ 579] PLEADING, INFORMATION, AND INDICTMENT. 885 
 
 of instruments.* So, charging the use of certain instruments, or of 
 certain medicines, to the jurors unknown, sufficiently describes the 
 means and cause of death in such case.* And an indictment charging 
 the commission of abortion less than a year before the date thereof, 
 and that the deceased theretofore died therefrom, is not objectionable 
 for not averring the death -within a year and a day. ^ " 
 
 So, an indictment alleging the killing of a woman in the commis- 
 sion of an abortion by the use of instruments or drugs is sufficient, 
 though it does not aver that death was occasioned by the use of such 
 instruments or drugs. ^ ^ And it is not necessary to prove that death 
 resulted from the use of the particular instruments alleged; it is 
 sufficient if death is proved to have resulted from the use of instru- 
 ments.^^ And where it is equally criminal to produce an abortion 
 before or after the quickening of the child, it is not necessary in an 
 indictment for the killing to prove that the deceased was quick with 
 child. ^* Nor is an indictment charging the use of instnmients in 
 one count, and the use of drugs and medicines in another count, bad 
 for duplicity ; ^ * and a charge as to abortion by the use of instruments 
 does not preclude instructions with reference to abortion by admin- 
 istering drugs or poisons taken internally ; * ^ and the same rule ap- 
 plies to the addition of a charge of using unlawful means to prociire 
 a miscarriage, constituting involuntary manslaughter.^® Nor do 
 allegations concerning an abortion and miscarriage, and concerning 
 the instruments and drugs used to produce the miscarriage, constitute 
 separate and distinct charges, so as to be objectionable on the ground 
 of duplicity. * ^ 
 
 580. Abortion under special statutory provisions Causing death by 
 
 acts calculated to produce an abortion is a statutory offense in some 
 states, originating in the statute defining it, which does not come 
 
 sSmith V. State, 33 Me. 48, 54 Am. count relied upon for conviction in a 
 
 Dec. 607. prosecution for manslaugfhter for caus- 
 
 90om. V. Jackson, 15 Gray, 187; State ing death by acts intended to produce 
 
 V. Baldwin, supra. an abortion, under an information 
 
 10 Wilson V. Com. 22 Ky. L. Eep. 1251, charging respectively the use of drugs, 
 
 60 S. W. 400. the use of instruments, and the employ- 
 
 1 iState v. Barker, 28 Ohio St. 583. ment of means unlcnown, may, upon sub- 
 
 And see Weightnovel v. State, 46 Fla. mission of the case to the jury, suf- 
 
 1, 35 So. 856. ficiently protect the rights of the ac- 
 
 l2State V. Smith, 32 Me. 369, 54 Am. eused. People v. Seaman, 107 Mich. 
 
 Dec. 579. 348, 61 Am. St. Rep. 326. 65 N. W. 203. 
 
 I3lbid.; Peoples v. Com. 87 Ky. 487, isCIark v. Com. Ill Ky. 443, 63 S. 
 
 9 S. W. 509, 810. W. 740. 
 
 Instate V. Baldwin, 79 Iowa, 714, 45 isTraylor v. State, 101 Ind. 65. 
 
 N. W. 297; Com. v. Brown, 14 Gray, iTState v. Carrington, 15 Utah, 480, 
 
 419. 50 Pac. 526. And see Com. v. Brown, 
 
 An election by the people of the supra. 
 
886 HOMICmB. [5 580 
 
 within any of the descriptions of manslaughter or murder at common 
 law.^ Under statutes of this class, nothing short of an allegation 
 conforming to the statute is adequate to inform the accused of the 
 offense with which he is charged.^ And all the averments relating 
 to the subordinate criminal act are properly and necessarily inserted 
 in the indictment or information as descriptive of the major offense.* 
 And an indictment in such case, which sinlply charges a felonious 
 and wilful killing contrary to the statute, is insufficient where it does 
 not set out the means or manner of causing the death, or refer 
 specifically to the statute.* So, where the statute makes it man- 
 slaughter to administer drugs to a pregnant female with intent 
 to destroy the child, thus caiising death, charging the intent to be to 
 produce a miscarriage instead of to destroy the child is fatally defec- 
 tive.® And an indictment thereunder is not sufficient where it does 
 not charge that the child had quickened at the time of the offense.* 
 Nor is an indictment sufficient where it omits the descriptive words 
 "pregnant with a quick child," under a statute denouncing the pro- 
 duction of a miscarriage of a woman pregnant with a quick child.'' 
 An information averring every substantial fact constituting the crime 
 charged, against which the statute is aimed, substantially in the 
 language of the statute, however, is sufficient.* And an indictment 
 charging that the act was done with force and violence will support 
 a conviction, though the evidence shows that it was done with the 
 woman's consent.® Nor need the offense be charged to have been 
 
 So, an indictment cannot be regarded the death of the mother results from an 
 
 as one for abortion rather than for abortion, the person producing it shall 
 
 homicide, so as to exclude evidence of be guilty of murder; and the word 
 
 dying declarations, where it charges the "mother" therein means a woman preg- 
 
 proeurement of a woman's death by nant with child; and a conviction for 
 
 means of an abortion, although it uses manslaughter may be had thereunder 
 
 the words "without legal justification," imder an indictment charging the mur- 
 
 whieh are a part of the statutory der of such a woman. Howard v. Peo- 
 
 definition of the crime of abortion, pie, 185 111. 552, 57 N. E. 441. 
 
 Worthington v. State, 92 Md. a2a, 5f) 5Lohman v. People, 1 N. Y. 379, 49 
 
 L.R.A. 353, 84 Am. St. Eep. 506, 48 Atl. Am. Dec. 340, Affirming 2 Barb. 216. 
 
 355. 6 Evans v. .People, 49 N. Y. 86. 
 
 iSee People v. Olmstead, 30 Mich. 'State v. Emerich, 87 Mo. 110, Af- 
 
 431; Com. v. Jackson, 15 Grray, 187; firming 13 Mo. App. 492. 
 
 State V. Belyea, 9 N. D. 353, 83 N. W. sHatchard v. State, 79 Wis. 357 48 
 
 1 ; Hatchard v. State, 79 Wis. 357, 48 N. W. 380; Johnson v. People, 33 Colo. 
 
 N. W. 380. 224, 80 Pac. 133. 
 
 zPeople V. Olmstead, supra. speople v. Abbott, 116 Mich. 263. 74 
 
 s State V. Belyea, supra. N. W. 529. 
 
 ^People V. Olmstead, supra. And And an indictment charging a man 
 
 see State v. Prude, 76 Miss. 543, 24 So. with procuring a miscarriage by one or 
 
 871. more of the means prescribed In the 
 
 But the lesser crime of manslaughter statute, whereby the woman died, and 
 
 is included in the greater crime of mur- whereby the accused killed her, suffi- 
 
 der under a statute providing that if ciently avers that she died in conso- 
 
5 580] PLEADING, INFORMATION, AND INDICTMENT. 887 
 
 lione feloniously, where it is charged as a statutory offense and appro- 
 priate terms are used to describe it as such.'^"' And charging the 
 killing, and setting out the facts constituting the minor offense, do 
 not constitute charging two distinct and independent offenses, so as 
 to render the indictment demurrable for duplicity. ^ ^ And a count 
 for murder at common law in causing the death of a woman by an 
 attempt to commit an abortion, and a count for the statutory offense 
 of manslaughter, may be joined in the same information, where the 
 charge in both counts grew out of the same transaction. ^ ^ 
 
 So, where the statute excuses abortion when necessary to save the 
 woman's life, it must be averred in an indictment for homicide in the 
 commission of, or attempt to commit, an abortion that miscarriage 
 was not necessary to save the woman's life.^* And it is insufficient 
 to allege that the employment of the instruments in question was 
 not necessary to preserve her life. ^ * But a charge of the administra- 
 tion of drugs, with the continuation "it not being necessary to ad- 
 minister the same for the preservation of her life," sufficiently nega- 
 tives the statutory exception. ^ ^ And it has been held to be unneces- 
 sary to negative such exception. * ® 
 
 VIII. PaETICIPATION ITT THE ACT OF ANOTHEK. 
 
 581. Aiders and abetters. — A homicide is deemed to be the act of all 
 persons participating in the offense, and a person present, aiding and 
 abetting another in a homicide, may be charged in an indictment 
 therefor as being the actual perpetrator. ^ And a charge that named 
 persons concerned in a riot committed a homicide is sustained by 
 proof that it was committed by others of the rioters, whether they 
 
 quenoe thereof, and does not charge the 12 N. E. 865, 17 N. E. 898; Thompson 
 
 crime of manslaughter. Com. v. Brown, v. Com. 1 Met. (Ky.) 13; Com. v. Chap- 
 
 14 Gray, 419. man, 11 Cush. 422; State v. Payton, 90 
 
 loCom. V. Jackson, 15 Gray, 187; Mo. 220, 2 S. W. 394; State v. Cockman, 
 
 Johnson v. People, supra. 60 N. C. (2 Winst. L.) 95; State v. 
 
 iiState V. Belyea, 9 N. D. 353, 83 N. Jenkins, 14 Rich. L. 215, 94 Am. Dec. 
 
 W. ]. 132; United States v. Douglass, 2 
 
 laPeople v. Sessions, 58 Mich. 594, 26 Blatchf. 207, Fed. Cas. No. 14,989; Eex 
 
 N. W. 291. V. Culkin, 5 Car. & P. 121. 
 
 isSta.te V. Leeper, 70 Iowa, 748, 30 The mere fact that the statutory pro- 
 
 N. W. 501. vision with reference to homicide names 
 
 KWilley V. State, 46 Ind. 363. aiders and abetters does not make the 
 
 isBeasley v. People, 89 111. 571. aiding and abetting of an act of murder 
 
 i6,Johnson v. People, 33 Colo. 224, 80 by personal presence and assistance a 
 
 Pae. 133. separate and distinct offense, rendering 
 
 iBrister v. State, 26 Ala. 107; People it necessary to charge an aider and 
 
 v. Ah Fat. 48 Cal. 61 ; State v. O'Neal, abetter as such, and not as a principal. 
 
 Houst. Grim. Rep. (Del.) 58; Spies v. United States v. Douglass, supra. 
 People, 122 111. 1, 3 Am. St. Eep. 320, 
 
888 HOMICIDE. [§ 581 
 
 were known or unknown.^ And an indictment charging three named 
 persons with the crime of murder fully complies with a statute re- 
 quiring indictments to he certain with regard to the parties and the 
 offense charged. * So, one may be charged in an indictment for homi- 
 cide as an aider and abetter of an unknown principal.* And an 
 indictment for aiding and abetting a murder, laying the venue to the 
 murder itself and stating that the accused was then and there pres- 
 ent, aiding and abetting, is sufficient. ' And if several be charged as 
 principals, one as principal perpetrator, and the others as present, 
 aiding and abetting, it is not material which of them be charged as 
 principal in the first degree, as having given the mortal blow, for the 
 mortal injury done by any one of those present is, in legal considera- 
 tion, the injury of each and every one of them." So, since the em- 
 ployment of an irresponsible agent does not break causal connection, 
 poison administered by such an agent, under the defendant's direc- 
 tion, may be laid as administered by the defendant himself.'' Where 
 the prisoner vpas charged with murder by poisoning, and the indict- 
 ment stated that she delivered the poisoned food to the deceased, such 
 allegation is proved by showing that the prisoner put the poison in 
 some meal which was in a bowl in the milk house, from whence it 
 was taken by the deceased, as usual, to make the pudding for the 
 family, and afterwards eaten by her. * 
 
 582. Accessories — In the absence of statutory provision an acces- 
 sory, either before or after the fact, should not be indicted as prin- 
 cipal in homicide, and under such an indictment proof that the ac- 
 cused was an accessory only will not sustain a conviction.* And a 
 
 estate V. Jenkins, supra. And see O'Brian, 1 Den. C. C. 9, 2 Car. & K. 
 Mackalley's Case, 9 Coke, 67 b; Jones 115; Com. v. Chapman, 11 Cush. 422; 
 V. State, 14 Ohio C. C. 35. State v. Fley, supra; State v. Jenkins, 
 
 sPuckett V. Com. 13 Ky. L. Rep. 466, 14 Rich. L. 215, 94 Am. Dee. 132. 
 17 S. W. 335. And two counts in an indictment for 
 
 4Spi6s V. People, 122 111. 1, 3 Am. St. murder, one charging one person with 
 Rep. 320, 12 N. E. 865, 17 N. E. 898. givins the mortal wound and another 
 
 estate v. Taylor, 21 Mo. 477; Wood- with being present, aiding and abetting, 
 sides V. State, 2 How. (Miss.) 655. and the other count charging the latter 
 And see State v. Fley, 2 Brev. 338, 4 with giving the mortal wound, and the 
 Am. Dec. 583. former with being present, aiding and 
 
 And an indictment of an accessory to abetting, are not incongruous, since 
 a murder, charging that the killing was both are thereby charged as being prin- 
 done by the principal by choking the cipals. State v. Cameron, 2 Chand. 
 deceased to death, is not invalidated (Wis.) 172. 
 
 by an indictment against the principal 'Reg. v. Michael, 2 Moody, C. C. 120, 
 found upon the following day, charging 9 Car. & P. 356. And see Rex v. Spil- 
 him with doing the killing by ways, ler, 5 Car. & P. 333. 
 means, and manner to the grand jurors sNicholson's Case, 1 East, P. C. chap, 
 unknown. Sanohez v. State, 46 Tex. 5, § 116, p. 346. 
 Crim. Rep. 179, 78 S. W. 504. iWalrath v. State, 8 Neb. 80; Hughes 
 
 6Fost. C. Ij. 551; 1 East, P. C. 350; v. State, 12 Ala. 458; People v. Valencia, 
 State V. Mairs, 1 N. J. L. 453; Reg. v. 43 Cal. 552; Josephine v. State, 39 Miss. 
 
I 582] PLEADING, INFORMATION, AND INDICTMENT. 889 
 
 mistake in an indictment for homicide in cliarging the accused with 
 having incited himself to. commit the act is fatal. ^ So, an indictment 
 charging the accused with having aided and abetted the killing, and 
 also charging him with being an accessory before the fact, is fatally 
 inconsistent, since it, in effect, charges him with being both present 
 and absent at the time of the act. ^ And an indictment charging the 
 accused as principal in one count, and as an accomplice in another 
 count, sets forth two distinct and separate offenses between which 
 the prosecutor may be required to elect.* Eut in order to justify 
 conviction of an accessory before the fact to the crime of murder the 
 principal need not be named in the indictment. ^ And a charge that 
 the accused procured or induced another to do the killing is sufficient, 
 though it is not alleged that the killing did, in fact, occur as a con- 
 sequence of the alleged procurement. ® 
 
 Under statutes providing that accessories may be charged as 
 principals, and that in any indictment for murder or manslaughter 
 it shall not be necessary to set forth the manner and means by which 
 the death of the deceased was caused, but that it shall be sufficient 
 to charge that the defendant did feloniously, wilfully, and of his 
 malice aforethought kill the deceased, however, an indictment is 
 sufficient if the charge is stated with such certainty that the accused 
 may know what he is called upon to answer ; that the killing was done 
 by the hand of another need not be stated.'' And there is no variance 
 between an indictment charging the accused as principal, and evi- 
 dence tending to show him to be an accessory before the fact, under 
 such a statute.® And where it is doubtful whether the accused was 
 a principal or an accessory, he may be charged in one count of the 
 indictment as a principal and in another as an accessory.^ So, where 
 the prosecution is against both principals and accessories, one count 
 
 613; Simms v. State, 10 Tex. App. 131; sState v. Baldwin, 79 Iowa, 714, 45 
 
 KinR V. Gordon, 1 Leach, C. L. 515; Rex N. W. 297. 
 
 V. Plant, 7 Car. & P. 575. And where the statute provides that 
 
 2State V. Hoiuston, 19 Mo. 211. an accessory before the fact may be in- 
 
 sState V. Sales, 30 La. Ann. 916. dieted, tried, and punished as a prlnci- 
 
 *Simms v. State, supra. pal if he instigated, advised, or com- 
 
 BPowers V. Com. 110 Ky. 386, 53 manded the commission of the act, but 
 
 L.E..A. 245. 61 S. W. 735. was not present when it was committed, 
 
 sGivens v. State, 103 Tenn. 648, 55 S. the prosecution need not show that it 
 
 W. 1107. was committed in the particular way 
 
 'Campbell V. Com. 84 Pa. 187; Brandt instigated, or that any special time, 
 
 V. Com. 94 Pa. 290; People v. Outeveras, manner, or place was stated. Griffith 
 
 48 Cal. 19; State v. Hamlin, 47 Conn. v. State, 90 Ala. 583, 8 So. 812. 
 
 95, 36 Am. Rep. 54; State v. O'Neal, 9 State v. Hamlin, supra; People v. 
 
 Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 58; Jackson Valencia, 43 Cal. 552; Hawley v. Com. 
 
 V. Com. 100 Ky. 239, 66 Am. St. Rep. 75 Va. 847. And see Cochran v. State, 
 
 336, 38 S. W. 422, 1091 ; Drury v. Terri- 113 Ga. 736, 39 S. E. 337. 
 
 tory, 9 (M4la. 398. 60 Pae. 101. 
 
890 HOMICIDE. [S 582 
 
 may charge all as principals, and another may charge part as prin- 
 cipals, and the others as accessories before -the fact.^° And where 
 each of two or more persons are jointly charged with murder in an 
 indictment charging them in one count with inflicting the mortal 
 wound, and in another with aiding or abetting, but one offense is 
 charged, of which all may be convicted and punished alike as princi- 
 pals, and the prosecution need not be called upon to elect on which 
 count it will seek conviction. ^ ^ 
 
 But such statutes do not apply to accessories after the fact,^^ 
 though it has been held that a count in an indictment charging the 
 accused with murder is not repugnant to another count charging him 
 as accessory after the fact to such murder.-'* If a person be in- 
 dicted as accessory after the fact to a murder, he may be convicted 
 as accessory after the fact to manslaughter, if the offense of the prin- 
 cipal turns out to be manslaughter. ' * Either assisting the party to 
 conceal the death, or in any way enabling him to evade the pursuit 
 of justice, will render a party who knows the offense to have been 
 committed, an accessory after the fact. ^ " And notwithstanding the 
 statute abolishing the distinction between an accessory and a prin- 
 cipal in homicide, the accessory may still be treated as such, and an 
 indictment may charge him either as principal or accessory. ^ ® But 
 when the statute declares that aiders, abetters, and accessories are 
 all principals, and shall be indicted and punished as such, they must 
 be indicted as principals, or not at all. ^^ And though the same 
 
 So, an indictment for homicide may 17 S. W. 335. And see Myers v. State, 
 
 charge that the killing was done by one 43 Fla. 500, 31 So. 275; Green v. State, 
 
 of three naimed persons, but which one 40 Fla. 191, 23 So. 851 ; Howard v. Com. 
 
 was to the grand jury unknown, and 110 Ky. 356, 61 S. W. 756. 
 
 where, in such case, no evidence was of- 12 See supra, chapter VI., § 67. 
 
 fered by either side, the verity of the 13 State v. Burbage, 51 S. C. 284, 28 
 
 averment of want of knowledge is pre- S. E. 937. 
 
 sumed and need not be proved in order i^Rex v. Greenacre, 8 Car. & P. 35; 
 
 to sustain a conviction. Reeves v. State v. Burbage, supra. 
 
 Territory, 10 Okla. 194, 61 Pac. 828. i5Rex v. Greenacre, supra. 
 
 10 State V. Hamlin, 47 Conn. 95, 36 leState v. Payton, 90 Mo. 220, 2 S. W. 
 
 Am. Rep. 54; Josephine v. State, 39 394. 
 
 Miss. 615. And see People v. Ah Hop, And a statute making an accessory, 
 
 1 Idaho, 698. aider, or abetter punishable as a prin- 
 
 And refusal to require the prosecutor cipal does not remove the necessity of 
 
 to elect between counts of an indictment charging the accused as an accessory 
 
 is not error, where one of them charjres in a prosecution against him as acces- 
 
 a third person with shooting and kill- sory before the fact to a homicide, where 
 
 ing the deceased, and the accused with the offense was committed prior to the 
 
 being present, aiding and abetting the enactment of the law. Josephine v. 
 
 killing; and the other charges the ac- State. 39 Miss. 614. 
 
 cused with the killing and a third per- I'People v. Outeveras, 48 Cal. 19. 
 
 son with being present, aiding and abet- But where an indictment charges 
 
 ting. State v. Testerman, 68 Mo. 408. several persons as principals in a homi- 
 
 UPuckett v. Com. 13 Ky. L. Rep. 466, cide in conformity to a stainite requir- 
 
§ 582] PLEADING, INFORMATION, AND INDICTMENT. 891 
 
 indictment may charge one with murder and another with manslaugh- 
 ter, yet if it charged both with murder the grand jury cannot find 
 it a true bill against one, and manslaughter as to the other; but a 
 finding against one for murder will be good, and there ought to be 
 a new bill against the other for manslaughter. ^ ® 
 
 583. Coconspirators An indictment charging homicide, which 
 
 notifies the accused that he is charged with conspiring to procure 
 the murder of a person, or for the commission of some other crim- 
 inal act, and that the murder was done by someone acting in pursu- 
 ance of such conspiracy, sufficiently and properly charges the offense. ^ 
 And a statute providing that a demurrer is proper if more than one 
 offense is charged in the indictment does not prevent a charge of con- 
 spiracy to commit an offense between persons accused of homicide, 
 where a charge of conspiracy against two or more persons jointly 
 indicted for the same offense is permitted. ^ Nor is failure to charge 
 in an indictment for conspiracy to murder, or from which murder 
 results, that the killing was done pursuant to, and in furtherance of, 
 the conspiracy, fatal, if the accused is directly charged with coim- 
 seling, aiding, and procuring the killing, and that, having so coun- 
 seled, aided, and procured it, the coconspirators committed the of- 
 fense.^ 
 
 A charge of a conspiracy between persons accused of homicide to 
 commit an offense, however, does not constitute a separate offense 
 which must be separately alleged, but constitutes an aggravated ele- 
 ment of the homicide.* And an indictment against a conspirator 
 for a homicide by a coconspirator in carrying out a conspiracy, char- 
 ging the murder as the act of a particular individual of the party, is 
 sufiicient, and well sustained by evidence that some other of the party 
 gave the fatal blow, or that it was given by some of them, though it 
 does not appear by which. ^ And testimony may be given upon the 
 part of the state in such a prosecution for the purpose of showing a 
 conspiracy between the accused and others, though such others are not 
 included in the indictment, and though such conspiracy is not averred 
 therein.* Nor is it necessary to charge conspiracy between them in 
 
 ing all persons concerned in the commis- iPowera v. Com. 110 Ky. 386, 53 
 
 sion of an offense, -whether as principals L.E.A. 245, 61 S. W. 735. 
 or accessories before the fact, to be in- sSalisbury v. Cora. 79 Ky. 428. 
 dieted as principals, a second count sPowers v. Com. supra. 
 therein charging a part of the defend- ^ Salisbury v. Com. 79 Ky. 425. 
 ,ints with being accessories before the sgtate v. Jenkins, 14 Rich. L. 215, 94 
 
 fact is surplnsage and does not vitiate Am. Dec. 132. 
 
 the indictment. People v. Ah Hop, 1 estate v. Kennedy, 177 Mo. 98, 75 S. 
 
 Idaho, 698. W. 979. 
 181 East, P. C. p. 347. 
 
892 HOMICIDE. [§ 583 
 
 order to convict persons charged with the joint commission of a mur- 
 der.^ And though the fact that the killing of a person occurred in 
 the prosecution of a riot to which the person charged with the homi- 
 cide was a party is necessary to be proved in order to show his guilty 
 concurrence in the act, where the injury was not proved to have been 
 inflicted directly by himself, it is not of the essence of the crime and 
 need not, therefore, be stated in the indictment, since all who are 
 present, concurring in a murder, are principals therein, and the act 
 which causes death is, in law, the act of each and of all.® Nor is 
 an indictment charging several persons with murder and with con- 
 spiracy resulting in murder bad for duplicity.* 
 
 7State V. Anderson, 89 Mo. 313, 1 S. s State v. Jenkins, supra. 
 W. 135; Goins v. State, 46 Ohio St. 457, sPeople v. Thorn, 21 Miac. 130, 47 N. 
 21 N. E. 47e. y. Supp. 46. 
 
CHAPTER XXIS. 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 I. Scope. 
 
 584. Confined to matters not included in general rules of 
 
 criminal evidence. 
 
 II. CoarUS DELICTI. 
 
 585. Application of rules to homicide. 
 
 586. Necessity of proof of. 
 
 587. Constituent elements. 
 
 588. Proof of death generally. 
 
 589. Particular items of proof of death. 
 
 590. Criminal agency generally. 
 
 591. Particular items of proof of criminal agency. 
 
 592. Poisoning. 
 
 593. Identity. 
 
 III. MOTIVB. 
 
 594. Limitation of subject. 
 
 595. General rules as to admissibility and purpose. 
 696. How determined and proved. 
 
 597. Desire to acquire or to accomplish something. 
 
 598. Removal of burden or obstacle. 
 
 599. Revenge. 
 
 600. Jealousy. 
 
 rV. ClBCUMSTAlSrCES. 
 
 a. Threats by the accused. 
 
 601. Scope; general rules as to admissibility. 
 
 602. Nature of threat as affecting admissibility. 
 
 603. The question of application to the person killed. 
 
 604. Connection of accused with threats by third persons. 
 
 605. Determination as to admissibility and sufficiency. 
 
 b. Condition and surroundings of body. 
 
 606. General rule. 
 
 607. Wounds. 
 
 608. Marks. 
 
 609. Position. 
 
 610. Clothing, weapons, etc. 
 
 611. Blood stains. 
 
 612. Presence of poison. 
 
 V. Unlawful acts resulting in homicide. 
 
 a. Felonies made controlling as to degree by statute. 
 
 613. Rules as to admissibility. 
 
 614. Rules as to sufficiency. 
 
 b. Other felonies and unlawful acts. 
 
 615. Criminal conspiracies gene ally. 
 
 616. Acts and declarations of coconspirators. 
 
 893 
 
894 HOMICIDE. 
 
 617. Resistance of official action generally; circum.5tancc3. 
 
 618. Authority of officer. 
 
 619. Negligence and minor unlawful acts. 
 
 620. Abortion. 
 VI. Dying declarations. 
 
 a. Scope. 
 
 621. Wholly a homicide subject. 
 
 b. Grounds for admissibility. 
 
 622. Reasons for rejecting general rule. 
 u. Application of doctrine. 
 
 623. To what classes of cases. 
 
 624. In favor of, as well as against, acecused. 
 
 625. With reference to person making them. 
 
 d. Subject-matter as affecting admissibility. 
 
 626. The general rule. 
 
 627. Confined to statements otherwise admissible. 
 
 628. Antecedent and subsequent matters. 
 
 629. Opinion and conclusion. 
 
 630. Effect of presence of collateral or inadmissible matter. 
 
 e. Physical and mental condition as affecting admissibility. 
 
 1. Actually impending death. 
 
 631. Necessity of. 
 
 2. Sense of impending death. 
 
 632. General rules. 
 
 633. Possession of mental faculties. 
 
 3. How evidenced. 
 
 634. General rule. 
 
 635. Statements of the deceased. 
 
 636. Statements and surrounding circumstances. 
 
 637. Circumstances in the absence of statement, 
 
 638. Physicians' opinions. 
 
 639. Conclusions of nonexpert witnesses. 
 
 640. Sending for or obtaining priest. 
 
 641. Arranging business affairs. 
 
 4. Belief in after accountability. 
 
 642. Effect and proof of. 
 
 f. Time when made as affecting admissibility. 
 
 643. General rules. 
 
 g. Matters of form and practice. 
 
 644. Preparation or construction of declaration. 
 
 645. Proof of substance and circumstances. 
 
 646. Effect of incompleteness. 
 
 647. Application of rules as to best and secondary evidence, 
 h. Determination as to competency and weight. 
 
 648. Competency usually a. question of law. 
 
 649. Practice in determining competency. 
 
 650. Weight a. question of fact for the jury. 
 i. Impeachment or eontradietion of declaration. 
 
 651. Contradictory rules. 
 
§ 584] EVIDENCE. 895 
 
 I. Scope. 
 
 584. Confined to matters not included in general rales of criminal evi- 
 dence — It is apparent to everyone that all the rules of criminal evi- 
 dence are called into play in homicide cases, and that preparation on 
 the subject of criminal evidence in general is as necessary to the 
 proper handling of a homicide case as is preparation on the subject 
 of the substantive law of homicide. The wide field covered by the 
 law of criminal evidence, however, as well as the extended growth 
 of the subject of homicide, has rendered it necessary to leave crim- 
 inal law in general, and criminal evidence, for consideration in other 
 treatises, and to confine this discussion of the subject of evidence to 
 a consideration of questions which can only arise in homicide cases, 
 or which are specially affected or influenced by the fact that they 
 arise in homicide cases. And on this subject it may be stated gen- 
 erally that anything which will throw light on a homicide, and 
 everything that might have influenced the mind of the person charged 
 with committing it, may be shown in a prosecution therefor, and 
 every fact from which the jury may legitimately deduce the guilt 
 or innocence of the accused should be submitted to them, when, taken 
 in connection with other facts, or all the other facts, its relevancy is 
 made to appear.^ 
 
 II. COEPUS DELICTI.^ 
 
 585. Application of rules to homicide — Eules with reference to 
 proof of the corpus delicti are not confined to homicide cases, bv.t 
 apply alike to all criminal prosecutions, and general rules with rpf- 
 erence to it are not regarded as within the scope of this work. The 
 constitutent elements of the corpus delicti in homicide, however, and 
 other elements of, and questions concerning, corpus delicti, which dif- 
 fer from the general rules when applied in homicide cases, and which 
 have special application thereto, are here considered. 
 
 586. Necessity of proof of — In homicide as in other criminal 
 cases the corpus delicti must be proved as an essential condition of 
 conviction.* Satisfactory proof of the corpus delicti, either by di- 
 
 iState V. Keed, 53 Kan. 767, 42 Am. in criminal cases is fully considered in 
 
 St. Eep. 322, 37 Pac. 174; Jenldns v. a, note to Bines v. State, 68 L.R.A. 33. 
 State, 35 Fla. 737, 48 Am. St. Rep. 267, iLovelady v. State, 14 Tex. App. 545; 
 
 IS So. 182. Nobles v. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 68 
 
 iThe subject of proof of corpus delicti S. W. 989 ; McBride v. People, 5 Colo. 
 
896 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 [§ S86 
 
 rect evidence or by cogent, irresistible grounds of presumption, is 
 necessary.^ Before presumptive evidence, tending to connect the 
 defendant with the crime, can be invoked, the corpus delicti must 
 be established beyond reasonable doubt. ^ And it devolves upon the 
 prosecution to make such proof, so far as it lies within its power.* 
 The Roman law is the same : "Diligenter cavenduw, est jvdici, ne sup- 
 plicium proecipitet, antequam de crimine constiterit."^ "De cor- 
 pore interfecti necesse est ut constet."^ The death in such a case 
 should be distinctly proved, either by direct evidence of the fact, as 
 inspection of the body,'' or by circumstantial evidence strong enough 
 to leave no ground for reasonable doubt. * And proof of malice, hav- 
 ing no tendency to prove that death was caused by the act of the 
 accused, is not admissible in a prosecution for a homicide, until the 
 fact of death by criminal means has been shown, though where that 
 fact appears it is relevant to show motive." 
 
 App. 91, 37 Pae. 953; State v. Nesen- 
 hener, 164 Mo. 461, 65 S. W. 230; Drees- 
 sen V. State, 38 Neb. 375, 56 N. W. 1025; 
 Zoldoske v. State, 82 Wis. 581, 52 N. 
 W. 778. And see People v. Callego, 133 
 Cal. 295, 65 Pae. 572. 
 
 2 State V. Flanagan, 26 W. "Va. 116. 
 3See Green v. State, 96 Ala. 29, H 
 So. 478; Territory v. Munroe, 2 Ariz. 1, 
 6 Pae. 478 ; People v. Ah Fung, 16 Cal. 
 137; People v. Callego, supra; State v. 
 Taylor, Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 436; 
 State V. Miller, 9 Houst. (Del.) 564, 
 32 Atl. 137; State v. Vincent, 24 Iowa, 
 570, 95 Am. Dec. 753; State v. Keeter, 28 
 Iowa, 553; Morris v. Com. 20 Ky. L. 
 Rep. 402, 46 S. W. 491 ; Com. v. York, 9 
 Met. 93, 43 Am. Dec. 373; People v. 
 Millard, 53 Mich. 63, 18 N. W. 562; Peo- 
 ple V. Hall, 48 Mich. 482, 42 Am. Rep. 
 477, 12 N. W. 665; State v. Laliyer, 4 
 Minn. 368, Gil. 277 ; People v. Aikin, 66 
 Mich. 460, 11 Am. St. Rep. 512, 33 N. 
 W. 821; People v. Swetland, 77 Mich. 
 53, 43 N. W. 779; Haynes v. State 
 (Miss.) 27 So. 601; State v. Moxley, 102 
 Mo. 374, 14 S. W. 969, 15 S. W. 556; 
 State V. Brown, 1 Mo. App. 86; 
 Dreessen v. State, 38 Neb. 375, 36 N. 
 W. 1024; McNamee v. State, 34 Neb. 
 288, 51 N. W. 821 ; RuloflF v. People, 18 
 N. y. 179; People v. Bennett, 49 N. Y. 
 137; Com. v. O'Donohue, 8 Phila. 623; 
 Tyner v. State, 5 Humph. 383; Shep- 
 pard V. State, 17 Tex. App. 74; Inicas 
 V. State, 19 Tex. App. 79; Gay v. State, 
 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 242, 49 S. W. 612; 
 Lightfoot V. State, 20 Tex. App. 77; 
 Hunter v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 599, 
 
 31 S. W. 674; Josef v. State, 34 Tex. 
 Crim. Rep. 446, 30 S. W. 1067; Kugadt 
 V. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 681, 44 S. 
 W. 989 ; High v. State, 26 Tex. App. 545, 
 8 Am. St. Rep. 488, 10 S. W. 238; State 
 V. Davidson, 30 Vt. 377, 73 Am. Dec. 
 312; Timmermau v. Territory, 3 Wash. 
 Terr. 445, 17 Pae. 624; Smith v. Com. 21 
 Gratt. 809; State v. Flanagan, 26 W. 
 Va. 116; United States v. Hewson, 
 Brunner, Col. Cas. 532, Fed. Cas. No. 
 15,360; Rex v. Clewes, 4 Car. & P. 221; 
 Evans v. Evans, 1 Hagg. Consist. Rep. 
 105; Reg. v. Hopkins, 8 Car. & P. 591; 
 and numerous other eases. 
 
 See, however. State v. Lamb, 28 Mo. 
 218, where a laxer view was taken. 
 
 But where the corpus delicti in a 
 prosecution for murder cannot well be 
 proved except by the introduction of 
 evidence tending to show the defend- 
 ant's guilty connection vrith the offense, 
 the evidence tending to prove both the 
 corpus delicti and the defendant's guilt 
 may be introduced at the same time. 
 State V. Davis, 48 Kan. 1, 28 Pae. 1092. 
 
 4Wellar v. People, 30 Mich. 16. 
 
 sMatth. de Crim. in Dig. lib. 48, tit 
 16, chap. 1. 
 
 6Matth. Probat. chap. 1, n. 4, p. 9. 
 
 71 Starkie, Ev. 575, 3d ed. chap. 5. 
 And see People v. Ah Fung, 16 Cal. 137; 
 People v. Hall, 48 Mich. 482, 42 Am. 
 Rep. 477, 12 N. W. 665. 
 
 sPeople V. Rulloflf, 3 Park. Crim. Rep. 
 401; State v. Williams (Or.) 80 Pae. 
 655. And see Tyner v. State, 5 Humph. 
 383; Mitchum v. State, 11 Ga. 615. 
 
 ^People v. Hall, supra. 
 
J 586] EVIDENCE. 897 
 
 It has been held, however, that the order in which the evidence 
 proving the different material facts is introduced is not material.^*' 
 And there may be cases in which, after a prima facie case from the 
 prosecution, the defense, when it has peculiar means of knowing 
 the history of the deceased, may have thrown on it the burden of 
 disproving death. ^^ 
 
 587. Constituent elements. — The corpus delicti in homicide con- 
 sists of the criminal act and the resulting death, and the agency of the 
 accused in its commission. ^ As to it, it is requisite, first, that the 
 deceased should be shown to have died from the effects of a wound ; 
 second, that it should appear that the wound was unlawfully in- 
 flicted by the person charged. ^ It consists not merely of the objective 
 crime, but also of the agency of the accused in the crime.* It is 
 made up of two things, first, certain facts forming its basis, usually 
 the death of the deceased, and second, the existence of criminal 
 agency as the cause of them.* The corpus delicti cannot be said to 
 be established in homicide until it is proved that the death was not 
 caused by natural causes, or by accident;^ and in order to establish 
 it in infanticide it must be shown that the child was born alive.® 
 It consists of the substance of the crime, however, and does not in- 
 clude the manner in which it was consummated.'^ 
 
 lOState V. Alcorn, 7 Idaho, 599, 97 State, 45 Ga. 43; Campbell v. People, 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 252, 64 Pac. 1014. 159 111. 9, 50 Am. St. Rep. 134, 42 N. E. 
 
 iiState V. Vincent, 24 Iowa, 750, 95 123; Pitts v. State, 43 Miss. 472; State 
 
 Am. Dec. 753. v. Dickson, 78 Mo. 438 ; State v. Shackel- 
 
 iState V. Dickson, 78 Mo. 438; People ford, 148 Mo. 493, 50 S. W. 105; State 
 
 V. Moran, 144 Cal. 48, 77 Pac. 777; Mc- v. Henderson, 186 Mo. 473, 85 S. W. 576; 
 
 Bride v. People, 5 Colo. App. 91, 37 Pac. State v. Pepo, 23 Mo-t. 473, 59 Pac. 721 ; 
 
 953 ; Thomas v. State, 67 Ga. 460 ; Peo- Sullivan v. State, 58 Neb. 796, 79 N. W. 
 
 pie V. Bennett, 49 N. Y. 137; Ruloff v. 721; State v. Leuth, 5 Ohio C. C. 94; 
 
 People, 18 N. Y. 179; Lovelady v. State, Com. v. Cutaiar, 5 Pa. Dist. R. 403; 
 
 14 Tex. App. 545; Smith v. Com. 21 Harris v. State, supra; Lovelady v. 
 
 Gratt. 820; Zoldoske v. State, 82 Wis. State, 14 Tex. App. 545, 17 Tex. App. 
 
 580, 52 N. W. 778. 287; Shulze v. State, 28 Tex. App. 316, 
 
 zMcBride v. People, supra. 12 S. W. 1084; Jackson v. State, 29 Tex. 
 
 sHarris v. State, 28 Tex. App. 308, 19 App. 458. 16 S. W. 247 ; Conde v. Stats, 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 837, 12 S. W. 1102; Josef 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 98, 60 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 V. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 446, 30 S. 22, 34 S. W. 286 ; Josef v. State, supra; 
 
 W. 1067. Little v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 654, 
 
 4People V. Bennett, supra; People v. 47 S. W. 984; Gay v. State, 40 Tex. 
 
 Schryver, 42 N. Y. 6, 1 Am. Rep. 480; Crim. Rep. 242, 49 S. W. 612, 42 Tex. 
 
 People V. Place, 157 N. Y. 584, 52 N. Crim. Rep. 450, 60 S. W. 771 ; Smith v. 
 
 E. 576; People v. Benham, 160 N. Y. Com. 21 Gratt. 809; Williams v. State; 
 
 402, 55 N. E. 11; People v. Palmer, 109 61 Wis. 281. 21 N. W. 56. 
 
 N. Y. 110, 4 Am. St. Rep. 423, 16 N. E. estate v. Flanagan, 26 W. Va. 116. 
 
 529; Ruloff v. People, supra; Cavaness « Josef v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 V. State. 43 Ark. 331; Redd v. State, 63 446, 30 S. W. 1067; Sheppard v. State, 
 
 Ark. 457, 40 S. W. 374; McBride v. 17 Tex. App. 74. 
 
 People, supra; State v. Miller, 9 Houst. TRtate v. Knapp, 70 Ohio St. 380, 71 
 
 (Del.) 564, 32 Atl. 137; Holsenbake v. N. E. 705. 
 Horn.— 57 
 
M8 HOMICIDE. [§ 3£» 
 
 588. Proof of death generally — The common-law rule, and what 
 has been held to be the general rule, with reference to proof of 
 corpus delicti in homicide, is that the first of the two component parts 
 of the crime, consisting of the death of a person, must be established 
 by direct evidence, though the criminal agency may be shown by cir- 
 cumstances. '^ And though the body of the person alleged to have 
 been killed is found to have been partly or wholly consumed, mu- 
 tilated, or destroyed, it is necessary to establish by full proof that it 
 was the remains of the deceased, this proof being a necessary part of 
 the corpus delicti.^ And where it is provided by statute that no per- 
 son shall be convicted of any grade of homicide unless the body of the 
 deceased, or portions of it, are found and sufficiently identified to 
 establish the fact of the death of the person alleged to have been 
 killed, it is indispensable that a dead body, or portions of a dead 
 body, should be found, and that it should be clearly proved to be 
 that of the person alleged to have been killed.* But the rule that 
 there should be no conviction for murder unless the body was ac- 
 tually found, obtaining in some of the states, does not apply to 
 murder upon the high seas, where the body is rarely, if ever, found;* 
 though this exception does not exist where the tragedy was near the 
 shore, and there is strong reason to suppose that if a murder Lad 
 been committed the body would have been discovered.^ 
 
 A large number of the more modern cases, probably constituting 
 the weight of authority, however, have adopted the rule that all 
 of the elements of the corpus delicti, including the fact of the death 
 of the person alleged to have been murdered, as well as the criminal 
 agency of the accused, and the identity of the deceased, may be proved 
 by presumptive or circumstantial evidence, at least when direct evi- 
 dence is not available.® And in case of the entire destruction or 
 
 iPeople V. Benham, 160 N. Y. 402, 55 or the other, and where one is proved by 
 
 N. E. 1 1 ; People v. Place, 157 N. Y. 584, direct evidence, the other can be proved 
 
 52 N. E. 576; People v. Beekwith, 108 by circumstances. 
 
 N. Y. 67, 15 N. E. 53; Ruloff v. People, 2State v. Flanagan, 26 W. Va. 116. 
 
 18 N. Y. 179; People v. Bennett, 49 N. aWalker v. State, 14 Tex. App. 609; 
 
 Y. 137; Edmonds v. State, 34 Ark. 720; Williams v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 65 
 
 State v. Henderson, 186 Mo. 473, 85 S. S. W. 1059; Puryear v. State, 28 Tex. 
 
 W. 576; State v. Williams, 52 N. C. (7 App. 73, 11 S. W. 929; Jackson v. State, 
 
 Jones, L.) 446, 78 Am. Dec. 248; King 29 Tex. App. 458, 16 S. W. 247. And see 
 
 V. Hindmarsb, 2 Leach, C. L. 569; Reg. Shulze v. Sta.te, 28 Tex. App. 316, 12 S. 
 
 v. Hopkins, 8 Car. & P. 591. W. 1084; Gay v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. 
 
 In People v. Bennett, and Ruloff v. Rep. 450, 60 S. W. 771. 
 
 People, supra, the rule was said to be 4St. Clair v. United States, 154 U. S. 
 
 that the corpus delicti in murder or 134, 3S L. ed. 936, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1002. 
 
 manslnughtev has two component parts, GPeople v. \Vilson, 3 Park. Crim. Rep. 
 
 — death as the result, and crimin.il 199. 
 
 ag>jncy of another as the cause; and GSt. Clnir v. United States, 154 U. S. 
 
 thJ^t there must be direct proof of one 135, 38 L. ed. 936, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
§ 588] EVIDENCE. 899 
 
 disappearance of the body of the person alleged to have been killed, 
 as in the case of drowning at sea, the cor'pus delicti may be proved 
 circumstantially or inf erentially. '^ And where direct and positive 
 proof of death cannot be obtained, facts going to show the impossi- 
 bility or improbability of rescue may be shown as bearing on the ques- 
 tion of death;* and the existence of wounds and their extent may be 
 considered;® and so may the previous health of the deceased.^" 
 But to establish the fact of death, constituting a part of the corpus 
 delicti, by presumptive or circumstantial evidence, it must be strong 
 and cogent. ^ * A mere showing of absence, unaccounted for, is not 
 sufficient ^ ^ And the fact of death should be shown, either by wit- 
 
 1002; Isaacs v. United States, 159 U. U. S. 134, 38 L. ed. 936, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 S. 487, 40 L. ed. 229, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1002; United States v. Brown, Fed. Cas. 
 51; United States v. Gibert, 2 Sumn. 19, No. 14,656a; United States v. Williams, 
 Fed. Cas. No. 15,204; Edmonds v. State, 1 Cliff. 5; United States v. Matthews, 
 34 Ark. 720; Anderson v. State, 24 Fla. Fed. Cas. No. 15,741a; King v. Hind- 
 139, 3 So. 884; Holland v. State, 39 Fla. marsh. 2 Leach, C. L. 569. But see 
 178, 22 So. 298; Mitchum v. State, 11 United States v. Hewson, Brunner, Col. 
 Ga. 615; State v. Alcorn, 7 Idaho, 599, Cas. 532, Fed. Cas. No. 15,360. 
 97 Am. St. Rep. 252, 64 Pac. 1014; sst. Clair v. United States, supra. 
 Campbell v. People, 159 111. 9, 50 Am. Evidence of the captain of a vessel 
 St. Rep. 134, 42 N. E. 123; Stocking v. on which it was alleged that a murder 
 State, 7 Ind. 326; McCulloeh v. State, was committed and the body thrown 
 48 Ind. 109; State v. Keeler, 28 Iowa, overboard, that he saw no other vessels 
 551 ; State v. Novak, 109 Iowa, 717, 79 for several days before or after deceased 
 N. W. 465; State v. Wescott (Iowa) 104 was missing, is competent to show that 
 N. W. 341 ; State v. Winner, 17 Kan. he was actually drowned, and was not 
 298; Johnson v. Com. 81 Ky. 325; Com. rescued after being thrown into the sea. 
 V. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 52 Am. Dec. Ibid. 
 
 711; Com. v. Williams, 171 Mass. 461, 50 sSee Fuller v. State, 117 Ala. 36, 23 
 N. E. 1035; Pitts V. State, 43 Miss. 472; So. 688; Basye v. State, 45 Neb. 261, 63 
 State V. Henderson. 186 Mo. 473, 85 S. N. W. 811; Wilson v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 W. 576; State v. Dickson, 78 Mo. 438; App.) 24 S. W. 409. 
 State V. Ah Chuey, 14 Nev. 79, 33 Am. loSee Phillips v. State, 68 Ala. 469; 
 Rep. 530; State v. Williams, 52 N. C. Davidson v. State, 135 Ind. 254, 34 N. 
 (7 Jones, L.) 446, 78 Am. Dee. 248; Zell E. 972: Williams v. State, 64 Md. 384, 1 
 V. Com. 94 Pa. 258; Gray v. Com. 101 ''+1. 887; Reg. v. Johnson, 2 Car. & K. 
 Pa. 381, 47 Am. Rep. 733; Com. v. John- 354. 
 
 son, 162 Pa. 63, 29 Atl. 280; State v. n State v. Williams, 52 N. C. (7 
 Motley, 7 Rich. L. 327; Lancaster v. Jones, L.) 446, 78 Am. Dee. 248. 
 State, 91 Tenii. 267, 18 S. W. 777; Tim- But an instruction in a prosecution 
 merman v. Territory, 3 Wash. Terr. 445, for homicide that the corpus delicti may 
 17 Pae. 624; State v. Gates, 28 Wash, be established by circumstantial testi- 
 689, 69 Pac. 385; Zoldoske v. State. 82 mony is proper, and not subject to ob- 
 Wis. 580, 52 N. W. 778; Buel v. State, jection for failure to add that the clr- 
 104 Wis. 132, 80 N. W. 78. And see cumstantial testimony must be such as 
 State V. Heusack, 189 Mo. 295, 88 S. W. to create irresistible grounds for the 
 21 ; State v. White, 189 Mo. 339, 87 S. presumption, where no request was 
 W. 1188. made for the addition of such a 
 
 'See Bemis's Report of Webster Case, tfualification, and the jury were charged 
 75, 70: Edmonds v. State, 34 Ark. 720; that every element of the crime must be 
 People V. Alviso, 55 Cal. 231 ; State v. made out to their satisi'action beyond a 
 Winner, 17 Kan. 298; People v. Wilson, reasonable doubt. Isaacs v. United 
 3 Park. Crim. Rep. 199; State v. Wil- States. 159 U. 8. 487, 40 L. ed. 229, 16 
 liams, 52 N. C. f7 Jones. L) 446. 78 Am. Sup. Ct. Rep. 51. 
 Dec. 248j St. Clair v. United States, 154 i2Haynes v. State (Miss.) 27 So. 601. 
 
900 HOMICIDE., [§ 588 
 
 nesses who were present when the murderous act was done, or by proof 
 of the body having been seen dead, or of criminal violence adequate 
 to produce death and which would account for the disappearance of 
 the body.^^ And when only mutilated remains have been found, it 
 ought to be clearly and satisfactorily shown that they are the remains 
 of a human being answering to the age, sex, and description of the 
 person charged to have been killed. ^ * 
 
 Proof of death and of the means of it may be made before any offer 
 of evidence tending to show the accused to be the guilty agent. ^ ^ The 
 conclusiveness of circumstantial evidence to establish the fact of death 
 in a prosecution for the murder is for the jury, and not for the court 
 to determine; the province of the court ends in such case in seeing 
 that improper evidence does not go to the jury, and that they are 
 properly instructed.*® 
 
 589. Particular items of proof of death — Should the decease be 
 proved by eyewitnesses, the inspection of the body after death may, 
 of course, be dispensed with. * And if the dead body of the person 
 charged to have been killed is found and identified the proof of death 
 is conclusive.^ And the rule has been adopted in Louisiana that in 
 ordinary cases the death and the cau^e thereof may be proved by the 
 determination of a coroner's inquest;^ but that adopted in other 
 states would appear to be that a coroner's inquest is not competent 
 evidence for the purpose of proving death, or for any purpose other 
 than that of contradicting a witness. * So, proof of a wound sufficient 
 
 isSmith V. Com. 21 Gratt. 809; Ruloff Dec. 711. And see Thomas v. Com. 14 
 
 V. People, 18 N. Y. 179. And see High Ky. L. Rep. 288, 20 S. W. 226. 
 V. State, 26 Tex. App. 545, 8 Am. St. The result of a post mortem exami- 
 
 Rep. 488, 10 S. W. 238. nation made seven months after death is 
 
 But the fact that the state did not competent in a prosecution for homi- 
 
 call as a witness in a prosecution for cide, its weight being for the jury, and 
 
 homicide a physician who had examined is not rendered incompetent by the fact 
 
 the body of the person killed is not that the accused had no notice of the 
 
 prejudicial to the accused, where notice disinterment of the body of the deceased, 
 
 was given early in the trial that he Hayes v. State, 112 Wis. 304, 87 N. W. 
 
 would not be called, and that the ac- 1076. 
 
 cused might call him if he chose. Com. estate v. Baptiste, 108 La. 234, 32 So. 
 
 V. Danz, 211 Pa. 507, 60 Atl. 1070. 371; State v. Tate, 50 La. Ann. 1183, 24 
 
 14 Wilson V. State, 41 Tex. 320; Mc- ^°- ^^2; State v. Parker, 7 La. Ann. 83; 
 
 Culloch V. State, 48 Ind. 109. ^^^^^ v- Johnson, 10 La. Ann. 457 ; State 
 
 isScott V. State, 141 Ala. 1, 37 So. I; ^°'^°'i' ^8 La. Ann. 19; State v. 
 357 , . o . j)^fi^^ gg L^ ^jjjj 4jg^ 2 So. 184. 
 
 i6Johnson V. Com. 81 Ky. 325. „ *^ ^°™/ T" ?„Y"' ^^i„^!t?^ Pj 
 
 iKing V. Hindmarsh, 2 -Leaoh. C. L. fs^S s! I.t^' ; Zt^^. Kl^'l^t 
 
 Cliff. 5, Fed Ca^. No. 16,707 p,e v.' White, 22 Wend. '167; 24 Wend. 
 
 2 Com. V. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 52 Am. 52O; Colquit v. State, 107 Tenn. 381, 64 
 
§ 589] EVIDENCE. 901 
 
 to cause death, and that the person charged to have been killed was 
 reported to be dead, is sufficient to establish the fact of death,'' and 
 to authorize the introduction in evidence of the dying declarations of 
 the deceasel. ® And the killing of the deceased by the accused is suffi- 
 ciently shown by the testimony of a witness that he saw a flash and 
 heard the report of a pistol, and that deceased fell to the ground 
 and declared that he was shot, and that the accused did the shooting. '^ 
 And evidence of the finding of the skeleton of a human being of the 
 sex of a person charged to have been murdered, and corresponding 
 to his size, is sufficient proof of the corpus delicti in a prosecution 
 for the killing to justify the admission of circumstantial evidence to 
 identify the skeleton as that of the murdered person, as well as to 
 show the cause and manner of his death ; ® though the mere finding of 
 the skeleton of the deceased, together with evidence of possession by 
 the accused of some of the property of the deceased, is not sufficient 
 to show death by violence. ® So, proof of the corpus delicti in homi- 
 cide is sufficient corroboration of a confession of the homicidal act 
 to warrant a conviction, especially where the confession is such as 
 could not have been made without the presence of the accused at the 
 scene of the crime ; ^ " though the mere confession of the accused is 
 insufficient alone to prove that the deceased was killed in the man- 
 ner charged. ^ ^ And the finding of the body of a person, with un- 
 mistakable marks of murder upon it, constitutes the necessary addi- 
 tional proof required under statutory provisions that the confession 
 of the accused shall not be sufficient to warrant a conviction, without 
 additional proof that the crime charged has been committed. ^ ^ And 
 
 S. W. 713; Whitehurst v. Com. 79 Va. sMcCulloch v. State, 48 Ind. 109. 
 556; Queen v. Gregory, 8 Q. B. 508, 15 » Williams v. State, {Tex. Grim. App.) 
 
 L. J. Mag. Cas. N. S. 38, 10 Jur. 385. 65 S. W. 1059. 
 
 But the admission in evidence of a lOWilliamg v. State, 69 Ga. 11; 
 
 coroner's verdict that accused murdered Holsenbake v. State, 45 Ga. 43. 
 the deceased is not reversible error And the deposition of a person as- 
 
 where the court afterwards strikes out saulted, taken at an examining trial of 
 
 such testimony and directs the jury to the person accused of the assault before 
 
 disregard it. Colquit v. State, supra. the death of the former, is admissible 
 
 The general subject of admissibility of in evidence after his death in a prosecu- 
 
 finding of coroner to show cause of death tion for the killing, thoiugh there was 
 
 is fully considered in a note to Mtna, no proof that the wounds inflicted by 
 
 Ij. Ins. Co. v. Milward, 68 L.R.A. 285. the accused in the assault were the ef- 
 
 And the subject of admissibility on trial ficient cause of the subsequent death of 
 
 for murder of testimony of the accused the deceased. Hart v. State, 15 Tex. 
 
 at coroner's inquest is considered in a, App. 202, 49 Am. Rep. 188. 
 note to Tuttle v. People, 70 L.R.A. 33. iiFollis v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 sCavaness v. State, 43 Ark. 331. 202, 78 S. W. 1069; People v. Franlc 
 
 6 Wilson V. State, 140 Ala. 43, 37 So. (Cal. App.) 83 Pac. 578. 
 93. izPeople v. Deacons, 109 N. Y. 374, 16 
 
 'Casteel v. State (Ark.) 88 S. W. N. E. 676. 
 1004. 
 
902 HOmCIDE. [§ 580 
 
 it is sufficient, in the absence of other evidence on the subject, to 
 warrant a conclusion that the homicide was committed in the county 
 where the body was found. ^ * So, proof of finding bones, hair, cloth- 
 ing, etc., resembling those of the deceased sufficiently establishes the 
 corpus delicti to warrant the admission in evidence of a confession 
 of the killing of the deceased and the placing of the body where such 
 bones, etc., were found. ^ * And proof of finding a charred body in 
 the ruins of the house of the person charged to have been killed, the 
 house having been destroyed by fire, with a pocket-knife belonging 
 to him near it, and that he had not been seen since the fire, and that 
 he had no cause for leaving the place, sufficiently establishes the 
 corpus delicti. ^ ^ And the same rule applies to finding fragments of 
 a body, together with articles worn by, or in the possession of, the 
 person alleged to have been killed.*® And though direct proof of 
 death is required by statute, proof of the finding of dismembered parts 
 of a human body, and of their positive identification with the person 
 alleged to have been killed, together with the confession of the ac- 
 cused to the commission of the crime, are sufficient direct proof of 
 the death of the person alleged to have been killed, within the mean- 
 ing of such a statute. ' '' And when both the prosecution and the 
 defense assume, during' the progress of the trial, that the person al- 
 leged to have been killed is dead, such direct proof of death is not 
 necessary to conviction.*® So, a statement of the accused in a prose- 
 cution for homicide that he would assume the blame and prove self- 
 defense is competent as an admission that he did the killing.** 
 Death is not sufficiently established, however, by evidence of the 
 ill-usage of, or injuries inflicted upon, the person alleged to have 
 been killed, in the absence of evidence that he was actually killed, or 
 that he was never afterwards seen.^*' And proof of unaccountable 
 disappearance is not sufficient, though accompanied by suspicious 
 circumstances. * * And the same rule applies to the disappearance of 
 
 isHawkina v. State, 60 Neb. 380, 83 And an instruction in a prosecution 
 
 N. W. 198. for homicide assuming the fact that fcha 
 
 iiJackson v. State, 29 Tex. App. 458, killing was shown by the evidence ia 
 
 16 S. W. 247. harmless error where" the fact of the 
 
 iBState V. Henderson, 186 Mo. 473, killing is not a disputed fact in tha 
 
 85 S. W. 576. And see State v. Paul- ca.^. Davis v. People, 114 111. 86, 29 
 
 son, 118 Wis. 89, 94 N. W. 771. N. E. 192. 
 
 "State V. Williams (Or.) 80 Pac. 655. 2oPeople v. Callego, 133 Cal. 295, 65 
 
 "People V. Beekwith, 108 N. Y. 67, Pac. 572; People v. Ah Fung, 16 Cal- 
 ls N. K. 53; State v. Calder, 23 Mont. 137. And see Puryear v. State, 28 Tex. 
 504, 59 Pac. 903. App. 73, 11 S. W. 929. 
 
 isPeople V. Lagroppo, 90 App. Div. ziSee Puryear v. State, supra; State 
 
 219, 8(5 N. Y. Supp. 116. v. Miller, 9 Houat. (Del.) 564, 32 Atl. 
 
 isState V. White, 189 Mo. 339, 87 S. 137; Com. v. Webster. 5 Gush. 2^5, 52 
 
 W. 1188. Am. Dec. 711; Bemis's Webster Case, 
 
§ 589] EVIDENCE. 903 
 
 a young child, last seen in charge of its mother, who was charged 
 with its murder. ^^ And, a naked and uncorroborated confession is 
 not sufficient of itself to establish the corpus delicti, or support a 
 conviction for homicide.^ ^ Nor can proof of death be dispensed 
 with because of the admission of it by the accused, and a denial 
 that he had anything to do with it. ^ * But evidence that portions of 
 the body of the person alleged to have been killed had been seen 
 and identified, and proof of culpable agency causing death, warrant 
 proof of the corpus delicti by the confession of the accused, cor- 
 roborated by the testimony of an accomplice.^® 
 
 590. Criminal agency generally — Proof of criminal agency in caus- 
 ing the death of the person alleged to have been killed is necessary 
 to support a conviction therefor, as well as proof of death. * Unless 
 death by criminal agency is established a conviction for homicide 
 cannot be sustained, even upon the confession of the accused. ^ The 
 mere fact of death is not sufficient, unless it appears that it was 
 not due to accident or to natural causes or to the act of the deceased 
 himself.* And a plea of self-defense does not foreclose the jury from 
 considering the question of the cause of death when the killing was 
 denied.* Nor is it sufficient that death may have resulted either 
 from criminal means upon the one hand, or from accident, disease, 
 or suicide upon the other ; that it resulted from criminal means must 
 appear beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
 s 
 
 479; Haynea v. State (Miss.) 27 So. But the court in a prosecution for 
 601. murder in which death has been proved 
 
 2 2Reg V. Hopkins, 8 'Car. & P. 591 — has discretionary power in the further- 
 Abinger. anee of justice to permit a. departure 
 
 2 3 Jackson v. State, 29 Tex. App. 458, from the regular order of proof, by ad- 
 16 S. W. 247. mitting evidence of motive before tlifl 
 
 24State V. Marx, 78 Conn. 18, 60 Atl. completion of proof that the death was 
 690. produced by criminal means. People v. 
 
 ZBAnderson v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Benham, 160 jST. Y. 402, 55 N. E. 11. 
 Rep. 546, 53 Am. St. Eep. 722, 31 S. W. sWrigley's Case, 1 I^win, C. C. 171 ; 
 673. Cole V. State, supra; Herren v. People, 
 
 iCole V. State, 59 Ark. 50, 26 S. W. 28 Colo. 23, 62 Pac. 833; McBride v. 
 377; Pitts v. State, 43 Miss. 472; State People, 5 Colo. App. 91, 37 Pac. 953; 
 V. Nesenhener, 164 Mo. 461, 65 S. W. State v. Billings, 81 Iowa, 99, 46 N. W. 
 230; I»velady v. Stats, 14 Tex. App. 862; Bourn v. State (Miss.) 5 So. 626; 
 545. Lee v. State, 76 Ga. 498; Dreessen v. 
 
 2Pitt3 V. State, supra; Holsenbake v. State, 38 Neb. 375, 56 N. W. 1024; Lucas 
 State, 45 Ga. 43; State v. German, 54 v. State, 19 Tex. App. 79; Robinson v. 
 Mo. 526. 14 Am. Rep. 481; Conde v. State, 16 Tex. App. 347; Williams v. 
 State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 98, 60 Am. St. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 65 S. W. 1059; 
 Rep. 22, 34 S. W. 286; Harris v. State, State v. Flajiagfin, 26 W. Va. 116. And 
 28 Tex. App. 308, 19 Am. St. Rep. 837, see Fletcher v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 12 S. W. 1102; Jackson v. State, 29 Tex. 68 S. W. 173. 
 
 App. 458, 16 S. W. 247. See also State ^Cannon v. People, 141 111. 270, 30 N. 
 V. Scates, 50 N. C. (5 Jones, L.) 420; E. 1027. 
 
 People V. De Garmo, 73 App. Div. 46, 76 6 See Dreessen v. State; Lee v. State; 
 N. Y. Supp. 477. Herren v. People; McBride v. People; 
 
904 HOMICIDB. [§ 590 
 
 The specific means by which a violent death was caused, however, 
 need not be shown.® !Nor need the fact of criminal agency in the 
 death of the deceased be established by direct evidence; circum- 
 stantial evidence is sufficient.''^ And it is not necessary that the 
 corpvs delicti be established by proof entirely independent of con- 
 fession.* And where the statute, like that of New York, provides 
 that no person shall be convicted of murder or manslaughter unless 
 the death of the person alleged to have been killed, and the fact of 
 the killing by the defendant as alleged, are each established as in- 
 ilependent facts, the former by direct proof, and the latter beyond 
 reasonable doubt, only direct proof of death is required, and the iden- 
 tity of both the victim and the slayer may be proved by circumstan- 
 tial evidence.^ And under a statute like that of Texas, providing that 
 no person shall be convicted of any degree of homicide unless the body 
 of the deceased, or portions of it, shall be found, and sufficiently iden- 
 tified to establish the fact of death of the person charged to have been 
 killed, when the body is found, it may be identified by circumstantial 
 evidence.^" And the criminal agency of the accused in the killing 
 may be so established. ^ ^ Nor is it necessary to the proof of the 
 
 State V. Billings ; and. Bourn v. State, — proved, either by direct evidence of wit- 
 
 svpra; State v. iVToxley, 102 Mo. 374, 14 nesses, who have seen and identified the 
 
 S. W. 969, 15 S. W. 556; People v. Ker- body, or where the proof of death is so 
 
 rigan, 9 N. Y. Grim. Rep. 469 ; Harris strong and intense as to produce the full 
 
 V. State, 30 Tex. App. 549, 17 S. W. assurance of moral certainty, that the 
 
 1110; Lovelady v. State, 14 Tex. App. criminal agency can be establisihed by 
 
 545, 17 Tex. App. 286; Robinson v. circumstantial evidence. 
 
 State, and Lucas v. State, supra; Monk sHubbard v. State (Ark.) 91 S. W. 
 
 V. State, 27 Tex. App. 450, 11 S. W. 460; 11. 
 
 State V. Flanagan, 26 W. Va. 116. sPeople v. Palmer, 109 N. Y. 110, 4 
 
 6 Com. V. Cutaiar, 5 Pa. Dist. R. 403; Am. St. Rep. 423, 16 N. E. 529; People 
 
 Com. V. Webster, 5 Oush. 295, 52 Am. v. Benham, supra; State v. Pepo, 23 
 
 Dec. 711. Mont. 473, 59 Pac. 721 ; State v. Calder, 
 
 'People V. Harris, 136 N. Y. 423, 33 23 Mont. 504, 59 Pac. 903. 
 N. E. 65; People v. Place, 157 N. Y. 584, This statutory prohibition applies to 
 
 52 N. E. 576; People v. Benham, 160 N. the time of trial, without regard to the 
 
 Y. 402, 55 N. E. 11 ; People v. Patrick, time when the offense was committed, 
 
 182 N. Y. 131, 74 N. E. 843; People v. whether before or after the enactment 
 
 Holmes, 118 Cal. 444, 50 Pac. 675; Baker of the law. People v. Beckwith, 108 N. 
 
 V. State, 30 Fla. 41, 11 So. 492; Y. 67. 15 N. E. 53. 
 
 Flinchem v. Com. 28 Ivy. L. Rep. 653, 89 loOlark v. State, 29 Tex. App. 357, 16 
 
 S. W. 1129; State v. Shackelford, 148 S. W. 187; Kugadt v. State, 38 Tex. 
 
 Mo. 493, 50 S. W. 109; People v. Parme- Crim. Rep. 681, 44 S. W. 989; Gay v. 
 
 lee, 112 Mich. 291, 70 N. W. 577; Sul- State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 242, 49 S. \V. 
 
 livaji V. State, 58 Neb. 796, 79 N. W. 612. 
 721. iiShulze v. Sta.te, 28 Tex. App. 316, 12 
 
 But in Smith v. Com. 21 Gratt. 809, S. W. 1084; Carter v. State, 40 Tex. 
 
 it was held that in proving the corpus Crim. Rep. 225, 47 S. W. 979, 49 S. W. 
 
 delicti in homicide, it is only where 74, 619; Darlington v. State, 40 Tex. 
 
 death by criminal violence has been Ciim. Rep. 333, 50 S. W. 375. 
 
§ 590] EVIDENCE. 905 
 
 corpus delicti in homicide that the body of the person killed should 
 itself furnish evidence that death was caused by criminal means. ^^ 
 591. Particular items of proof of criminal agency. — Generally, 
 where a dead body is found with an injury to it apparently suffi- 
 cient to cause death, imder circumstances which exclude any infer- 
 ence of accident or suicide, death by criminal agency is established. ^ 
 And this is especially the case where the pui'pose of the evidence is 
 to furnish a basis for the admission in evidence of the confession 
 of the accused.^ And where such injury exists, the finding of the 
 body in a place to which it would not be liable to get without human 
 agency sufiiciently shows criminal agency in causing death.* So, 
 evidence that parts of a mutilated human body corresponded with 
 the description of the person killed, and that such person had dis- 
 appeared, and had been seen alive a short time before, is sufficient 
 to establish an inference of sudden and unusual death, as distin- 
 guished from death by suicide or accident.'' And the same infer- 
 ence may properly be drawn from the fact that the wounds upon a 
 body, which caused death, were numerous and different in character. ^ 
 And death by criminal means is sufficiently indicated by the fact 
 that it was not the result of natural causes, and that there had been 
 an apparent effort to destroy the body or its identity;® or by proof 
 of the infliction of wounds, and death shortly afterwards resulting 
 
 i2Dunn V. State (Ind.) 67 N. E. 940. ^Paulson v. State, 118 Wis. 89, 94 N. 
 
 iSee People v. Palmer, 109 N. Y. 113, W. 771; Malcek v. State, supra. And 
 
 4 Am. St. Rep. 423, 16 N. E. 529; Peo- see State v. Martin, 47 S. C. 67, 25 S. 
 
 pie V. Lagroppo, 90 App. Div. 219, 86 N. E. 113. 
 
 Y. Supp. 116; Hunt v. State, 135 Ala. sstate v. Gates, 28 Wash. 689, 69 Pac. 
 
 1, 33 So. 329; People v. Wood, 145 Cal. .385. And see Carter v. State, 40 Tex. 
 
 659, 79 Pac. 367; Malcek v. State, 33 Crim. Rep. 225, 47 S. W. 979, 49 S. W. 
 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 14, 24 S. W. 417; Buel 74, 619. 
 V. State, 104 Wis. 132, 80 N. W. 78. estate v. Tettaton, 159 Mo. 354, 60 
 
 2Hunt V. State, supra; Williams v. S. W. 743; Udderzook v. Com. 76 Pa. 
 
 state, 57 Ga. 478; Daniel v. State, 63 340; State v. Smith, 9 Wash. 341, 37 
 
 Ga. 339; South v. People, 98 III. 261; Pac. 491. 
 
 Sta;te V. Feltes, 51 Iowa, 501, 1 N. W. And evidence that a skull had, when 
 
 755; Holland v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. found, a, place dented in it, not broken 
 
 790, 82 N. W. 596; State v. Leuth, 5 entirely through, about the size of the 
 
 Ohio C. 0. 94; Com. v. Hainlon, 8 Phila. head of a hammer, which, physicians 
 
 401. testified, would, if given in life, have 
 
 And the finding of a dead body with caused immediate death, is sufficient to 
 
 unmLstakable marks of a murder upon justify the jury in a prosecution for 
 
 it constitutes additional proof, within homicide in concluding that death was 
 
 the meaning of a statutory provision caused from that wound, though one 
 
 that a confession should not be suf- medical witness gave his opinion that 
 
 ficient to warrant a conviction without the blow was given after death, because 
 
 additional proof that the crime charged no hair was found driven into the skull, 
 
 has been committed. People v. Deacons, Wilson v. State, 43 Tex. 472. 
 109 N. Y. 374, 16 N. E. 676. 
 
 sOom. V. Costley, 118 Mass. 1; Com. 
 v. Cutaiar, 5 Pa. Dist. R. 403. 
 
906 HOMICIDE. fS 501 
 
 from wounds;'' or by the fact that the death of a female resulted 
 from strangulation subsequent to a violation of her person.^ 
 
 So, death immediately after the infliction of a wound sufficiently 
 establishes death from the wound, though it was not probed or ex- 
 amined.' And so of death shortly after the wounding of a person 
 previously in good health. ^ " And proof tending to show that the ac- 
 cused fired a pistol two or three times at the deceased, inflicting 
 two wounds, one upon the head and one in the body, either of which 
 would have been necessarily mortal, is sufficient under an indict- 
 ment charging that the killing was effected by shooting the deceased 
 in the head, though it failed to show which one was first inflicted, 
 or which actually caused death. ^^ And evidence of robbery of the 
 deceased and of his death, resulting from injuries which might 
 have been caused either by accident or by a criminal assault, is suffi- 
 cient to go to the jury upon the question of death by criminal 
 agency. ^^ So, proof of death, apparently by poison, and of the 
 presence of poison in sufficient quantities to cause death, is suffi- 
 cient;^^ and so is proof of death by a gunshot wound inflicted by 
 
 'Gibson v. Territory (Ariz.) 68 Pac. isWilliams v. State, 61 Wis. 281, 21 
 640. N. W. 56. And see Com. v. Williams, 
 
 sMorgan v. State, 51 Neb. 672, 71 N. 171 Mass. 461, 50 N. E. 1035; Com. v. 
 W. 788. Danz, 211 Pa. 507, 60 Atl. 1070. And 
 
 And evidence in a, prosecution for see Buel v. State, 104 Wis. 132, 80 N. 
 the killing of a young girl, that screams W. 78. 
 
 were heard directly after she was last So, evidence that the accused car- 
 seen alive, from the direction of the barn ried a large amount of life insurance, 
 of the accused, and of the finding of her and that the deceased was with him on 
 body several days afterwards in a cis- the afternoon and evening previous to 
 tern in the kitchen of his house, with the burning of his store, and had not 
 marks of violence upon it indicating been seen alive since ; that a body which 
 an attempt to ravish her, sufficiently bore some resemblance to the deceased 
 establishes the corpus delicti. Dunn v. was found in the diiris of the burned 
 State (Ind.) 67 N. E. 940. store; that the accused mysteriously 
 
 9Thompson v. State, 38 Tex. Crim. disappeared on the night of the fire, 
 Rep. 335, 42 S. W. 974. and when arrested, before being told 
 
 And while the prosecutor on a charge why, denied his name and that he had 
 of homicide must prove that the accused resided or done business at the place of 
 caused the death of the deceased, proof the fire; that the body of deceased 
 of blows inflicted with a dangerous showed indications of having been be- 
 weapon, followed by insensibility or fore the fire at the place where it was 
 other alarming symptoms, and soon aft- found, and a fracture of his skull suffi- 
 erwards by death, is sufficient to im- cient to cause his death was found, — suf- 
 pose upon the accused the burden of ficiently establishes the fact that the de- 
 showing that death was occasioned by ceased was murdered; the theory of the 
 some other cause. United States v. prosecution being that the intent of the 
 Wiltberger, 3 Wash. C. C. 515, Fed. accused was that the body of the de- 
 Cas. No. 16,738. ceased should be mistaken for his own, 
 
 loScott v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) so that his estate might collect his life 
 47 S. W. 531. insurance. State v. Novak, 109 Iowa, 
 
 iiReal v. People, 42 N. Y. 270. And 717, 79 N. W. 465. 
 see State v. Dunn, 179 Mo. 95, 77 S. W. isShows v. State, 1 Misa. Dec. 43, 23 
 848. So. 1021. And see State v. Bhackel- 
 
§ 591] EVIDENCE. 90T 
 
 the accused. * * And the criminal agency of an alleged accessory to 
 a murder is sufficiently established to take the case to the jury by 
 the confession of the principal that he killed the deceased, who was 
 a wealthy man, at the instigation of the accessory; and by proof 
 that the accessory was the legatee of the deceased, and that upon 
 learning of the death he promptly appeared and appropriated moneys 
 and securities in the latter's apartments, and made efforts to raise 
 money on forged checks of the deceased in the handwriting of the 
 principal and indorsed by himself; and that he made an extraordi- 
 nary effort to have the body immediately cremated, andj failing in 
 this, to have it embalmed. ^ ** 
 
 So, the opinions of medical experts that death was caused by 
 strangulation caused by external force, leaving an outward impres- 
 sion, is sufficient.^® And medical testimony that a wound caused 
 death, and that a disease or various diseases combined to produce 
 that result, and that they were produced by the wound, is sufficient 
 in a prosecution for homicide to establish the corpus delicti. ^ '' And 
 the rule has been asserted that the corpus delicti will not be deemed 
 to have been sufficiently proved to warrant a conviction in a prose- 
 cution for homicide, in the absence of evidence by a physician as 
 to the nature, extent, or location of the wound alleged to have caused 
 death, or as to what caused death, where the deceased was attended 
 by physicians and such testimony was available/* though it has 
 
 ford, 148 Mo. 493, 50 S. W. 105; State of physicians, surgeons, chemists, and 
 
 V. Baldwin, 36 Kan. 1, 12 Pae. 318. other scientific persons, who have ex- 
 
 But where a person of generally good amined the body, are often of the great- 
 health dies suddenly, and symptoms and est value on the question of the means 
 appearances indicate poison, but they or cause of death. Pitts v. State, su- 
 are similar to symptoms common to cer- pra. 
 
 tain diseases, and the testimony of ex- i^Powell v. State, 13 Tex. App. 244. 
 
 perts who have examined the stomach And where there is medical testimony 
 
 and its contents is conflicting, leaving in a prosecution for homicide to the ef- 
 
 the probabilities equally balanced wheth- feet that the wound resulting in death 
 
 er the death was by poison or disease, must have been caused by a powerful 
 
 the evidence, though accompanied by a blow, evidence that the accused was a 
 
 confession of the accused that he ad- strong and powerful man is competent, 
 
 ministered the poison, is not suflScient Thiede v. Utah, 159 U. S. 510, 40 L. 
 
 to warrant a conviction. Pitts v. State, ed. 237, 16 Sup. Ct. Eep. 32. 
 
 43 Miss. 472. isHigh v. State, 26 Tex. App. 545, 
 
 14 Wilson V. State, 140 Ala. 43, 37 8 Am. St. Rep. 488, 10 S. W. 238. 
 
 So. 93. But neither expert nor nonexpert 
 
 isPeople V. Patrick, 182 N. Y. 131, testimony is admissible in a prosecu- 
 
 74 N. E. 843. tion for homicide on the issue of wheth- 
 
 l«Com. V. Bell, 164 Pa. 517, 30 Atl. er death was caused by criminal agency, 
 
 511. as to whether or not a suicide would 
 
 And when the body of a person al- be liable to hold a knife with which he 
 
 leged to have been killed is discovered killed himself tightly grasped in his 
 
 and identified, and the immediate cause hand, and error in admitting nonex- 
 
 of death remains unknown, the opinions pert testimony on that question is not 
 
908 HOMICIDB. li 591 
 
 also been held that it is not necessary to prove death by criminal 
 agency by expert medical testimony, where the wound was such that 
 any person of ordinary intelligence would have known that it was 
 mortal. ^ ' 
 
 The testimony of a witness in a prosecution for homicide, who 
 saw the body of the deceased, however, that there was a bloody cloth 
 over the neck, but that he saw no wounds or marks of violence, is 
 not sufficient to establish death by criminal agency. ^ ° And the part 
 of a coroner's inquest which tends to trace the death of the person 
 killed to the person accused of the death is inadmissible in evidence 
 under a constitutional provision giving a person accused of crime 
 the right of meeting the witnesses face to face.^^ And the corpus 
 delicti in a prosecution for manslaughter caused by procuring an 
 abortion is to be established, not only by post mortem examination, 
 but also by proof of the fact of the pregnancy of the deceased, in- 
 cluding the history of her illness from the beginning to the end in 
 detail, and what accused said and did in connection with it while 
 he attended her.^^ 
 
 592. Poisoning. — "In the case of death by poisoning,^ it is not 
 necessary to prove the particular substance or kind of poison used; 
 nor to give direct and positive proof what is the quantity which would 
 destroy life; nor is it necessary to prove that such a quantity was 
 found in the body of the deceased. It is sufficient, if the jury are 
 satisfied from all the circumstances, and beyond reasonable doubt, 
 that the death was caused by poison administered by the prisoner.'' 
 Upon the latter point the material questions are whether the pris- 
 oner had any motive to poison the deceased, whether he had the op- 
 portunity of administering poison, and whether he had poison in 
 his possession, or power to administer. To these inquiries, every 
 part of the prisoner's conduct and language in relation to the sub- 
 ject are material parts of the res gestae, and are admissible in evi- 
 
 cured by introducing expert testimony therefor; and if, from such evidence, 
 
 to the same effect. Eedd v. State, 63 the jury are convinced beyond a, rea- 
 
 Ark. 457, 40 S. W. 374. sonable doubt that the wounds thus 
 
 isWaller v. People, 209 111. 284, 70 testified to did produce the death, it is 
 
 N. E. 681. sufficient to sustain a conviction. 
 
 So, in Edwards v. State, 39 Pla. 753, zoConde v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 23 So. 537, it was said that in cases 98, 60 Am. St. Rep. 22, 34 S. W. 286. 
 
 of homicide it is always best to have 21 State v. Parker, 7 La. Ann. 83. 
 
 the evidence of medical experts, if they And see Colquit v. State, 107 Tenn. 
 
 can be obtained, as to the fatal charac- 381, 64 S. W. 713. 
 
 ter of the wounds, but where such evi- 2 2Peop]e v. Aikin, 66 Mich. 460, 11 
 
 dence is not accessible, nonexperts may, Am. St. Rep. 512, 33 N. W. 821. 
 
 after describing the wounds, give their 13 G-reenl. Ev. § 135. 
 
 opinions as to whether such wounds 2R — v. Sawwell, Wills, Circumstan- 
 
 caused the death with their reasons tial Ev. 180. 
 
% 592] EVIDENCE. 909 
 
 dence."^ Yet in such case, unless the evidence of the corpus delicti 
 be overwhelming, the court should not permit a conviction.* If the 
 expert testimony renders it doubtful whether the deceased was or 
 was not poisoned, a conviction cannot be sustained even on the de- 
 fendant's confession;^ yet the detection of poison in the body by 
 means of a chemical analysis is not essential, but the ofEense will 
 be sufficiently proved if established by the concurrent evidence of 
 the symptoms of the disease, the marks upon the body after death, 
 and other inferential testimony.® The possession of poison by the 
 accused is an item of evidence against him, especially when false 
 reasons are given for its possession.'^ And it is important to in- 
 quire, in seeking for the probable criminal, whether any party with- 
 in the range of suspicion procured poison, particularly of the kind 
 which probably proved fatal, shortly before the death of the de- 
 ceased ; whether such person was acquainted with the preparation of 
 poisons, or had opportunity to administer it;* and it is to be ob- 
 served that the more nearly the poison found in the body corresponds 
 with that purchased or prepared by the prisoner, the more vivid 
 does the suspicion become.^ 
 
 So, in cases of poisons which act instantaneously, some light may 
 be thrown on the question by the position of the body. Thus. Mr. 
 Amos^" tells us of a trial in which the hypothesis of suicide was de- 
 feated by the fact that, while the united result of medical experience 
 is that prussic acid produces instantaneous death, the deceased was 
 found with a corked bottle in her hand, from which five drachms had 
 been taken, and with the bedclothes composed about her person with 
 elaborate precision. And while, as a general rule, evidence of the 
 commission of one crime is not competent in a prosecution for an- 
 other, on a trial for poisoning, it is admissible to prove prior poison- 
 ing by the same person with the same poison, to rebut a defense that 
 the poisoning was accidental, ^ ^ and where ignorance of the poisonous 
 
 3 See the observations of BuUer, J., Guy's Forensic Medicine, 404^407; Puc- 
 
 in Donellan's Case; Wills, Circum- cinotti, 222, 253; Lancet, Aug. 4, 1860, 
 
 stantial Ev. 187-191. See also Queen p. 119; Reg. v. Palmer, Taylor, Med. 
 
 V. Geering, 18 L. J. Mag. Cas. N. S. Jur. by Reese, 101. 
 
 215; People v. Patrick, 182 N. Y. 131, 7R. v. Higgins, 14 Lond. Med. Gaz. 
 
 74 N. E. 843; Blackburn v. State, 23 896. 
 
 Ohio St. 146; Com. v. Danz, 2H Pa. sSee, on this point, supra, chapter 
 
 507, 60 Atl. 1070. VIII., § 97. 
 
 •iSee State v. Wharton, Taylor's Med. 92 Mitter. Deut. St. § 124. 
 
 Jur. by Reese, 25; Com. v. Sehoeppe, loGreat Oyer, 347. 
 
 Taylor's Med. Jur. by Reese, 25. HReg. v. Garner, 4 Fost. & F. 346; 
 
 BPitts V. State, 43 Miss. 472; Stan- Goersen v. Com. 106 Pa. 477, 51 Am. 
 
 ley V. State, 82 Miss. 498, 34 So. 360. Rep. 534. And see Queen v. Geering, 
 
 sTaylor, Med. Jur. 159. See also 18 L. J. Mag. Cas. N. S. 215. 
 
910 HOMICIDE. [§ 502 
 
 character of the drug administered is set up as a defense. ^ ^ The mere 
 presence of poison in a dead body, however, does not prove the corpus 
 delicti, unless it be shown that the remains were those of the de- 
 ceased, that the remains had not been tampered with by strangers, 
 and that the examination had been conducted in such a way as to 
 exclude the hypothesis of the poison having been introduced after 
 exhumation. ^ ^ And here, as elsewhere, the rule applies that no con- 
 viction shall take place unless the death occurs within a year and 
 a day from the injury received.-'* And it has been laid down by 
 medical writers that certain poisons have a stated time to run, and 
 that unless the deceased's illness corresponded with such period, the 
 inference of poisoning is negatived. But the conflict of expert testi- 
 mony on this point is too great to sustain any definite conclusion; 
 and if it should appear that the defendant was poisoned, and died 
 of poison, the length of his illness, within the limitation above given, 
 is immaterial.^® 
 
 593. Identity. — The law does not require any more direct or posi- 
 tive proof to identify the body of a murdered man than it does to 
 prove the murder or identify the murderer. ^ Identity may be shown 
 as effectually by inferences from facts as from positive testimony 
 of witnesses who saw the alleged body of the deceased.^ And it may 
 be established by facts and circumstances sufficiently convincing to 
 exclude reasonable doubt. ^ Identification may be made in such cases 
 by a relative or an acquaintance, and, if it is positive, it is suffi- 
 cient;* and the impressions and beliefs of witnesses, based on ob- 
 servation, are competent on the question of identity ; ® and it may be 
 established by evidence of general similarity and correspondence 
 between the remains found and the person alleged to have been killed. * 
 And a statutory requirement that the death of the person alleged 
 to have been killed shall be established by direct proof does not 
 preclude evidence of points and features of resemblance, and circum- 
 
 i2Heg. V. Dossett, 2 Car. & K. 306. App. 238; SUte v. German, 54 Mo. 530, 
 
 isTaylor's Med. Jur. by Reese, 27; 14 Am. Eep. 481; People v. Beckwith, 45 
 
 Com. V. Lloyd, tried at Leesburg, Oct. Hun, 422; State v. Martin, 47 S. C. 67, 
 
 30, 1872. 25 S. E. 113; Hamby v. State, 36 Tex. 
 
 i4See on this subject Amos's Great 523; Wilson v. State, 43 Tex. 472; Keg. 
 
 Oyer, 347. v. Cheverton, 2 Fost. & P. 833. 
 
 16R — V. Russell, Taylor's Med. Jur. sPeople v. Beckwith, and State v. 
 
 by Reese, 99. Dickson, supra. And see Harris v. 
 
 iTaylor v. State, 35 Tex. 97. And Cora. 25 Ky. L. Rep. 297, 74 S. W. 
 
 see Johnson v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 1044. 
 453, 77 S. W. 15. -iPeople v. Wise, 163 N. Y. 440, 57 
 
 2See Wharton, Crim. Law, 7th ed. N. E. 740; Keith v. State, 157 Ind. 376^ 
 
 §§ 732 et seq.; State v. Heusack, 189 61 N. P. 716. 
 Mo. 295, 88 S. W. 21 ; State v. Dickson, BState v. Dickson, supra. 
 78 Mo. 438; State v. Knolle, 90 Mo. 6 Wilson v. State, supra. 
 
§ 593] EVIDENCE. 911 
 
 stances tending to establish identity."^ Even though the body had 
 not been examined or seen by persons acquainted with the deceased 
 in his lifetime, identification may be sufficient where a minute de- 
 scription of the body after death was recognized by a near relative 
 of the deceased, and the clothing and articles found with the body 
 were identified by him.^ So, correspondence of size, form, and 
 clothing is sufficient to go to the jury on th-? question of identity.® 
 And identification may be made entirely from clothing and other 
 articles upon or with the person of the deceased.^" And identifi- 
 cation of the clothing found upon the body as that belonging to the 
 person alleged to have been killed, or of articles found with the body 
 as having belonged to the deceased, is competent on the question 
 of identity.^ ^ So, proof of the killing of a person of the same name 
 as that of the person charged in the indictment to have been killed 
 is sufficient on the question of the identity of the deceased. ^ ^ 
 
 'People V. Beckwith, 45 Hun, 422. knew the clothes that the deceased was 
 
 And evidence of finding fragments wearing, and that they were the same 
 
 of a body in searching the house of a clothes produced by the coroner. State 
 
 man accused of murder; that, when v. Cadotte, 17 Mont. 315, 42 Pac. 857. 
 put together, they outlined, so far as Or by evidence that he was buried 
 
 they went, a man of the size and ap- in the clothing he wore when killed, and 
 
 pearance of the deceased ; that the head that it was subsequently removed when 
 
 was missing; that one of the lungs had the body was exhumed for the purpose 
 
 been punctured by a sharp instrument, of examination, and thereafter disposed 
 
 making a wound sufficient to cause of under the directions of the coroner 
 
 death; that the smell of something Durn- and other officers. State v. Porter, 32 
 
 ing had been emitted from the accused's Or. 135, 49 Pac. 964. 
 house; and that clothing was found with uState v. Novak, 109 Iowa, 717, 79 
 
 blood upon it, proved to have belonged N. W. 465; State v. Dickson, 78 Mo. 
 
 to the deceased — constitute direct proof 438. 
 
 of the death of the person alleged to 12 State v. Kilgore, 70 Mo. 546. 
 have been killed, within the meaning of Evidence that a person killed had 
 
 a statutory provision making such been heard spoken of by another name 
 
 proof necessary to sustain a conviction, than that charged in the indictment does 
 
 People V. Beckwith, 108 N. Y. 67, 15 not show a variance between the alle- 
 
 N. E. 53. gation and proof, or that the accused 
 
 sTaylor v. State, 35 Tex. 97; Carter was charged with killing one person and 
 
 V. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Eep. 225, 47 proved to have killed another, where 
 
 S. W. 979, 49 S. W. 74, 619. it appears that he was known to the 
 
 9 State V. Downing, 24 Wash. 340, 64 accused by the name charged, and not 
 
 Pac. 550. by any other. Rye v. State, 8 Tex. 
 
 loCom. V. Cutaiar, 5 Pa. Dist. R. 403; App. 163. 
 Com. V. Williams, 171 Mass. 461, 50 N. And where a bank was robbed by four 
 
 E. 1035; State v. Henderson, 186 Mo. confederates, evidence that just before 
 
 473. 85 S. W. 576; State v. Smith, 9 the robbery, while sitting near the bank. 
 
 Wash. 341, 37 Pac. 491. a witness said to another person as two 
 
 Clothing worn by the deceased at the men passed and went into the bank, 
 
 time of the killing and offered in evi- "There goes Jim Jones," that the party 
 
 dence by the state is sufficiently identi- referred to looked back when his name 
 
 fied in a prosecution for the homicide was called, and that the witness was 
 
 by the testimony of the coroner that looking for a man by the name of Jones, 
 
 he had taken the clothes from the body is admissible upon cross-examination on 
 
 of the deceased, together with the tas- the question of the identity of the ac- 
 
 timony of another witness that she cused in a prosecution for murder com- 
 
912 HOMICIDE. [§ 593 
 
 Identity of the person killed in sucli cases, however, is a question 
 for the jury, ^ * and not one for an expert witness. ^ * And it should 
 be so completely proved in a prosecution for the killing as to leave 
 no reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury. ^ ^ So, under the Texas 
 statute the dead body of the person killed, or a portion thereof, must 
 be found, and must be identified as that of the person alleged to have 
 been killed.^® And where a body was partially destroyed, mere 
 proof that it was the body of a human being and of a man is not 
 sufficient to establish the corpus delicti. ^ ^ 
 
 It has been held, hoAvever, that identity is not included in the 
 corpus delicti, and that a showing that a human being had been 
 killed by criminal agency is sufficient. ^ * 
 
 III. Motive. 
 
 594. limitation of subject — Motive, and the methods of proving 
 it, and the effect of its presence or absence, though subjects arising, 
 perhaps, more frequently in homicide than in other cases, are sub- 
 mitted in the perpetration of a robbery And where the body of a person al- 
 of the bank, to show witness's reason leged to have been killed is discovered, 
 for having noticed the robbers closely, the jury in a prosecution for the kill- 
 and in believing that said Jones was ing must be satisfied that the body found 
 one of them. Nite v. State, 41 Tex. is the body of the person alleged to 
 Crim. Rep. 340, 54 S. W. 763. have been murdered, before they can 
 
 isPeople V. Wilson, 3 Park. Crim. convict. People v. Wilson, supra. 
 
 Rep. 199; State v. Vincent, 24 Iowa, lePui^ear v. State, 28 Tex. App. 73, 
 
 570, 95 Am. Dee. 753; Holland v. Com. 11 S. W. 929; Gay v. State, 42 Tex. 
 
 26 Ky. L. Rep. 789, 82 S. W. 598; Rye Crim. Rep. 450, 60 S. W. 771; Walker 
 
 v. State, s«pra; State v. Williams, 36 v. State, 14 Tex. App. 609. 
 
 Wash. 143, 78 Pae. 780. I'Gay v. State, supra. And see 
 
 So, the identity of articles found with Walker v. State, supra. 
 
 the body of the deceased as being the And the corpus delicti is not suffi- 
 
 property of the accused is a question of ciently proved in a prosecution for 
 
 fact for the determination of tne jury homicide, where the proof shows that 
 
 in a prosecution for homicide. Vaughn the person alleged to have been killed 
 
 V. State, 130 Ala. 18, 30 So. 669. had an upper front tooth missing, and 
 
 i^People V. Wilson, and State v. Vin- the witnesses differ as to whether a 
 
 cent, supra. skeleton alleged to be that of such per- 
 
 But when the head of the murdered son, which had been found, had the 
 
 man having been found severed from the upper or lower front tooth missing, and 
 
 body, and taken by a physician, was there was no evidence tending to show 
 
 preserved in alcohol and exhibited at that the skeleton was examined by any- 
 
 the trial, it was held competent, to re- one skilled in the anatomy of the human 
 
 but this evidence, for an expert to frame, and capable of giving an opinion 
 
 state the character of the changes pro- as to age, sex, etc. Wilson v. State, 
 
 dueed by death, and to explain how far 41 Tex. 320. 
 
 such changes had acted on the head in isPeople v. Palmer, 109 N. Y. 110, 
 
 question, but not to answer whether it 4 Am. St. Rep. 423, 16 N. E. 529; State 
 
 was possible to identify the head. State v. Calder, 23 Mont. 504, 59 Pac. 903; 
 
 v. Vincent, supra. State v. Wehr, 6 Ohio N. P. 345. Con- 
 
 iBTavlor v. State, 35 Tex. 97; State tra, Edmonds v. State, 34 Ark. 720. 
 V. Miller, 9 Houst. (Del.) 564, 32 Atl. 
 137. 
 
S 594] EVIDENCE. 913 
 
 jects of general criminal law; and the rules which apply in homi- 
 cide cases differ in no respect from those governing in other criminal 
 cases. The effort is here made, therefore, to consider it only so far 
 as the rules with reference thereto are changed or varied by being 
 applied in homicide cases, referring the reader to another work for 
 an exposition of the general subject of proof of motive. ^ 
 
 595. General rules as to adiinissibility and purpose ^When the 
 
 corpus delicti has been proved in a prosecution for homicide, and 
 the circumstances indicate that the accused was the perpetrator of 
 the homicide, facts tending, even though remotely, to show a motive 
 are admissible in evidence against him, though the jury should 
 exercise great caution in attaching importance to such proof. ^ And 
 all evidence of whatsoever nature tending to throw light upon the 
 relations existing between the accused and the deceased, and the feel- 
 ing existing between them, is competent,^ the remoteness of the evi- 
 
 iSee Wharton, Crim. Ev. Rep. 557, 54 N. E. 51; People v. Ben- 
 
 iDill V. State, 1 Tex. App. 278; Jones ham, 160 N. Y. 402, 55 N. E. 11; People 
 
 V. State, 4 Tex. App. 436; McCoy v. v. Jones, 99 N. Y. 667, 2 N. E. 49; 
 
 State, 25 Tex. 33, 78 Am. Dee. 520; M'Kee v. People, 36 N. Y. 113; Hen- 
 
 Gonzales v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. driekson v. People, 10 N. Y. 13, 61 Am. 
 
 508, 21 S. W. 253; Little v. State, 39 Dec. 721; Hester v. Com. 85 Pa. 139; 
 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 654, 47 S. W. 984 ; Pry- McManus v. Com. 91 Pa. 57 ; Sayres 
 
 or V. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 643, 51 v. Com. 88 Pa. 291 ; Erb v. Com. 98 Pa. 
 
 S. W. 375; Barkman v. State, 41 Tex. 347; McBride v. Com. 95 Va. 818, 30 
 
 Crim. Rep. 105, 52 S. W. 73; Patterson S. E. 454. And see Gray v. State (Tex. 
 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 60 S. W. Crim. App.) 83 S. W. 705; Josephine 
 
 557; Hart v. State, 15 Tex. App. 202, v. State, 39 Miss. 614. 
 
 49 Am. Rep. 188 ; Flanagan v. State, 46 aSee Ex parte Nettles, 58 Ala. 268 ; 
 
 Ala. 703; Kelsoe v. State, 47 Ala. 573; Polk v. State, 62 Ala. 237; Phillips v. 
 
 People V. Durrant, 116 Cal. 179, 48 Pac. State, 68 Ala. 469; Allen v. State, 111 
 
 75; State v. West, Houst. Crim. Rep. Ala. 80, 20 So. 490; Gray v. State, 63 
 
 (Del.) 382; Eraser v. State, 55 Ga. 325; Ala. 66; Boiling v. State, 54 Ark. 588, 
 
 Weyrich v. People, 89 111. 90; David- 16 S. W. 658; People v. Kern, 61 Cal. 
 
 son V. State, 135 Ind. 254, 34 N. E. 244; People v. French, 69 Cal. 169, 10 
 
 972; Jones v. State, 64 Ind. 473; Binns Pac. 378; People v. Young, 102 Cal. 
 
 V. State, 57 Ind. 46, 26 Am. Rep. 48; 411, 36 Pac. 770; People v. Sehorn, 116 
 
 State V. Seymour, 94 Iowa, 699, 63 N. Cal. 503, 48 Pac. 495; Pearson v. Unit- 
 
 E. 661; O'Brien v. Com. 89 ICy. 354, 12 ed States, 10 App. D. C. 536; Shaw v. 
 
 S. W. 471; State v. Edwards, 34 La. State, 60 Ga. 246; Fisher v. People, 23 
 
 Ann. 1012; Kernan v. State, 65 Md. 111. 283; Binns v. State, 66 Ind. 428; 
 
 253, 4 Atl. 124; Gillum V. State, 62Misa. Siberry v. State, 133 Ind. 677, 33 N. 
 
 547; Bateman v. State, 64 Miss. 233, 1 E. 681, 149 Ind. 688, 39 N. E. 936, 47 
 
 So. 172; Webb v. State, 73 Miss. 456, N. E. 458; State v. Crafton, 89 Iowa, 
 
 19 So. 238; Story v. State, 68 Miss. 109, 56 N. W. 257 ; State v. Cole, 63 Iowa, 
 <509, 10 So. 47; State v. Downs, 91 Mo. 695, 17 N. W. 183; State v. Helm, 97 
 19, 3 S. W. 219; State v. Walker, 98 Iowa, 378, 66 N. W. 751; State v. Rains- 
 Mo. 95, 9 S. W. 646, 11 S. W. 1133; barger, 74 Iowa, 196, 37 N. W. 153; 
 State V. David 131 Mo. 380, 33 S. W. O'Brien v. Com. 89 Kv. 354, 12 S. W. 
 28; Gravely v. State, 45 Neb. 878, 64 N. 471; Ross v. Com. 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1344, 
 W. 452; State v. Palmer, 65 N. H. 216, 55 S. W. 4; Utterbaek v. Com. 22 Ky. 
 
 20 Atl. 6; People v. Osmond, 138 N. Y. L. Rep. 1011, 59 S. W. 515, 60 S. W. 15; 
 80, 33 N. E. 739; People v. Sutherland, Helton v. Com. 27 Ky. L. Rep. 137, 84 
 154 N. Y. 345, 48 N. E. 518; People v. S. W. 574; State v. Fontenot, 48 La. 
 Kennedy, 159 N. Y. 346, 70 Am. St. Ann. 305, 19 So. Ill; State v. Savage, 
 
 Horn.— 58. 
 
914 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 [§ 595 
 
 dence of motive going to its weight, and not its admissibility.' Though 
 not necessary to the existence of malice in homicide, motive is fre- 
 quently a constituent element of it, and the presence or absence of 
 motive is always a subject of proof as a means of establishing the 
 presence or absence of malice.* And proof of motive is competent 
 as tending to explain the character of the killing and to strengthen 
 the probability that the accused was impelled thereby, rather than 
 actuated by other causes. ° And motive upon the part of a third 
 person may be shown, where there was evidence that the person 
 doing the killing acted in his behalf.* And where the question is 
 as to which was the aggressor, the accused should be permitted to 
 explain his motive in seeking an interview with the deceased, and 
 to prove his and the other's conduct on that occasion. '^ So, evidence 
 lending to show a motive for a killing consistent vdth reason and 
 soundness of mind is competent in a prosecution for homicide to 
 rebut the defense of unsoundness of mind,® or that of accidental 
 killing.® And a defense in a prosecution for homicide that death 
 came by suicide may be rebutted by the state by showing that the 
 health of the deceased was not such as to induce suicidal inclina- 
 
 69 Me. 112; Com. v. Costley, 118 Mass. 
 1 ; Dillin v. People, 8 Mich. 357 ; Wash- 
 burn V. People, 10 Mich. 372; Wellar 
 V. People, 30 Mich. 16; People v. Be- 
 mis, 51 Mich. 423, 16 N. W. 794; People 
 V. Parmelee, 112 Mich. 291, 70 N. W. 
 677; State v. Lentz, 45 Minn. 177, 47 
 N. W. 720; Josephine v. State, supra; 
 State V. Mahly, 68 Mo. 315; State v. 
 Evans, 158 Mo. 589, 59 S. W. 994; Clough 
 V. State, 7 Neb. 320; Lillie v. State 
 (Neb.) 100 N. W. 316; People v. Will- 
 son, 109 N. Y. 345, 16 N. E. 540; Peo- 
 ple V. Place, 157 N. Y. 584, 52 N. E. 576; 
 People V. Barberi, 149 N. Y. 256. 52 Am. 
 St. Rep. 717, 43 N. E. 635; State v. 
 Gooch, 94 N. (J. 987; Smith v. Terri- 
 tory, 11 Okla. 669. 69 Pac. 805: McMeen 
 V. Com. 114 Pa. 300, 9 Atl. 878; State 
 V. Bodie, 33 S. C. 117, 11 S. E. 624; 
 State V. Senn, 32 S. C. 392, 11 S. E. 
 292; Fisher v. State, 10 Lea, 151; Cart- 
 wright V. State, 12 Lea, 620; Aycock 
 V. State, 2 Tex. App. 381; Hamblin v. 
 State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 135, 50 S. 
 W. 1019, 51 S. W. nil; Villereal v. 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 61 S. W. 715; 
 Mack V. State, 48 Wis. 281, 4 N. W. 
 449: Thiede v. Utah, 159 U. S. 510, 
 40 L. ed. 237, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 62. 
 
 And letters found in the possession 
 of a man charged with killing a woman, 
 addressed to her and shown to be in his 
 
 handwriting, tend to prove the rela- 
 tions existing between them, and thus 
 tend to show motive for the killing, 
 and are admissible in evidence in a pros- 
 ecution therefor without direct evidence 
 that they had been delivered to the de- 
 ceased. Simons v. People, 150 111. 66, 
 36 N. E. 1019. 
 
 3 Weaver v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 607, 81 S. W. 39. 
 
 4 See supra,, chapter VIII., § 82. 
 
 6 Story V. State, 68 Miss. 609, 10 So. 
 47. 
 
 sibid. 
 
 'Cannon v. State, 60 Ark. 564. 31 S. 
 W. 150, 32 S. W. 128. 
 
 And in such case he would be enti- 
 tled to a continuance to procure the 
 attendance of witnesses who would tes- 
 tify that the other had made threats 
 to kill him. Ibid. 
 
 SBenaon v. State, 119 Ind. 488, 21 
 N. E. 1109; People v. Donlan, 135 Cal. 
 489, 67 Pac. 761. And see Blume v. 
 State, 154 Ind. 343, 56 N. E. 771. 
 
 sReg. V. Heesom, 14 Cox, C. C. 40. 
 
 And evidence in a prosecution for 
 murder by poison, of a previous and a 
 subsequent death of two other persons 
 under like circumstances and with sim- 
 ilar symptoms, is admissible as tend- 
 ing to show that the poisoning was not 
 accidental. . Ibid. 
 
I S95) EVIDENCE. 915 
 
 tions.*" Nor is evidence of motive rendered inadmissible by the 
 fact that the crime committed is out of proportion to the motive 
 shown. ^^ Nor is evidence tending to show motive rendered inad- 
 missible by the fact that it tended to show participation in this or 
 other crimes by third persons. ^ ^ 
 
 So, an apparent absence of motive upon the part of the accused in 
 a prosecution for homicide should be weighed by the jury, together 
 with the other evidence/^ though the mere absence of evidence of 
 motive does not in itself require an acquittal ; ^ * and when there is 
 evidence of motive an instruction as to effect of the absence of mo- 
 tive is improper and should be refused. ^ ^ And relationship between 
 the parties is important to be considered by the jury in a prose- 
 cution for homicide, as tending to show absence of motive, though 
 the evidence required in such case is not different in degree from 
 that required in ordinary cases. * ^ It will be seen, however, that in 
 the absence of controversy as to the killing an inference of malice 
 may arise from absence of motive for the killing, so that it cannot 
 be regarded as a strong circumstance in favor of the accused, as 
 matter of law.''' And that a third party had malice toward the 
 deceased, and a motive to take his life, and opportunity to do so, and 
 had threatened it, is not admissible in evidence in favor of another 
 
 loState V. Marsh, 70 Vt. 288, 40 Atl. i4State v. Brown, 168 Mo. 449, 68 S. 
 
 836. W. 568. 
 
 iiLillie V. State (Neb.) 100 N. W. And refusal to charge that absence of 
 
 316. motive ought to operate strongly in fa- 
 
 And where the evidence in a prose- vor of the accused is not error. Clough 
 
 cution for homicide tends to show an v. State, supra. 
 
 unprovoked assault by the accused up- And an instruction that the failure 
 
 on the one hand and a killing in self- of the state to prove a motive for the 
 
 defense upon the other, an instruction killing is a circumstance in favor of 
 
 that motives are difficult to prove, and the accused is properly refused as giv- 
 
 that there might have been a concealed ing imdue prominence to one phase of 
 
 motive, though it was impossible to the case. Carwile v. State (Ala.) 39 
 
 prove any, is erroneous as authorizing So. 220. 
 the jury to imagine a motive without is State v. Brown, supra. 
 proof. People v. Enwright, 134 Cal. leGray v. State, 4 Baxt. 331. 
 527, 66 Pae. 726. " In Davis v. «tate, 126 Ala. 44, 28 
 
 i2State V. Moore, 67 Kan. 620, 73 Pae. So. 617, however, it was held that wliere 
 
 905. a man killed a woman with whom he 
 
 isPeople V. Ah Fung, 17 Cal. 377; was living, whether they were husband 
 
 Lanckton v. United States, 18 App. D. and wife, or were living together in 
 
 C. 348; Smith v. State, 61 Neb. 296, 85 adultery, is immaterial and in no way 
 
 N. W. 49; Clough v. State, 7 Neb. 320; affects the degree of the crime, and 
 
 Pointer ▼. United States, 151 U. S. 396, instructions with reference to t'"ir re- 
 
 38 L. ed. 208. 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 410 lations are improper in a prosecution 
 
 And see Russell v. State^ 11 Tex. App. for the killing. 
 288. 17 Cross v. State, 68 Ala. 476, 
 
918 HOMICIDE. [§ S'Jb 
 
 person accused of killing him, as tending to show absence of motive 
 on his part or otherwise. ' * 
 
 596. How determined and proved. — The motive for a homicide is 
 a question of fact for the consideration of the jury in a prosecution 
 therefor,' and it may be inferred by them from the commission of 
 the crime itself,^ or from the actions of the alleged slayer.^ And 
 the conduct and feelings of the parties toward each other are com- 
 petent for the purpose of determining motive, in connection with 
 other facts concerning, and circumstances surrounding, the act.* 
 And proof of the commission of another crime may be given, where 
 it tends to show motive for the homicide in question. ® So, while the 
 testimony of a person who killed another as to the intent with which 
 he did the deed is not admissible,® the statements of a person who 
 did an act causing death, as to the motives which prompted him, 
 are competent, though not conclusive in his favor on the question 
 of malice. '^ And in looking for motive in a prosecution for homi- 
 cide in order to ascertain whether there was an intent to kill, the 
 birthplace, education, manners, and customs of the country of which 
 the prisoner was a native, and in which he had been brought up, 
 may be inquired into.* And if a person who killed another did it 
 under a belief that a wrong had been done him, the state of mind 
 induced by the belief might be considered in a prosecution for the 
 killing in determining the motive and intent for his actions.* 
 
 In order to establish a motive for the commission of a crime, how- 
 ever, it is essential that the facts upon which the alleged motive is 
 based shall be within the knowledge of the accused, and evidence 
 as to conduct and acts tending to show motive for a killing is not 
 
 i 
 
 isState V. Lambert, 93 N. C. 619; estate v. Deschamps, 42 La. Ann. 567, 
 
 Tatum V. State, 131 Ala. 32, 31 So. 21 Am. St. Rep. 392, 7 So. 703. 
 
 369; State v. Jones, 80 N. C. 415; State 6 Lewis v. State, 96 Ala. 6, 38 Am. St. 
 
 V. Duncan, 28 N. C. (6 Ired. L.) 236. Eep. 75, 11 So. 259; Com. v. Woodward, 
 
 iFendrick v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 102 Mass. 155. 
 
 56 S. W. 626. TDavis v. State, 51 Neb. 301, 70 N. 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution W. 984. And see State v. Banks, 73 Mo. 
 
 for homicide that evidence of motive for 592; State v. Jones, 14 Mo. App. 589. 
 
 the killing is of an inconclusive char- sPeople v. Grunzig, 2 Edm. Sel. Cas. 
 
 acter is properly refused, as calculated 236. 
 
 to caiise the .iury to infer that the Differences in religious views have 
 
 court believed ithat the evidence was in- been productive of many serious per- 
 
 auffieient. Carwile v. State (Ala.) 39 sonal and national troubles, and evi- 
 
 So. 220. denee that a person accused of homi- 
 
 sWheeler v. State, 158 Ind. 687, 63 cide did not indorse the religious views 
 
 N. E. 975. of the person killed is proper to go to 
 
 sPerryman v. State, 36 Tex. 321. the iurv upon the question of motive. 
 
 ^People v. Jones. 99 N. Y. 667, 2 N. Long v." State (Tex. Crim. App.) 88 S. 
 
 E. 49; Ex parte Nettles, 58 Ala. 268; W. 203. 
 
 Commander v. State, 60 Ala. 1 ; McKin- 9Peoplo v. Webster, 139 N. Y. 73 34 
 
 ney v. State, 8 Tex. App. 626. N. E. 730. 
 
§ 590] ' EVIDENCE. 917 
 
 admissible where it does not appear that such acts and conduct were 
 brought to the kno^^'ledge of the accused, "• " though actual knowledge 
 need not be shown, apparent opportunity to become informed being 
 sufficient ; * * and so is neighborhood reputation or rumor, where the 
 parties were neighbors. ^ ^ And it has been held that the commission 
 of another homicide cannot be proved, either to establish motive or 
 as an attack on the character of the accused.^* Nor is it material 
 that a similar occasion and opportunity previously existed at a cer- 
 tain time, of which the accused did not take advantage. ^ * 
 
 The proper practice is for the defense to show the absence of mo- 
 tive in the first instance, which proof is to be rebutted by proof of 
 motive upon the part of the prosecution.^' But the fact that the 
 prosecution had established a prima facie case of murder does not 
 preclude it from going on to prove motive in its case in chief. ^® 
 The question of motive as applied to homicide may arise from four 
 different causes: First, desire to procure something or accomplish 
 some object; second, desire to prevent injurious action by the per- 
 son killed ; third, desire to settle an old grudge or quarrel ; and fourth, 
 jealousy. * '' 
 
 597. Desire to acquire or to accomplish something. — Evidence tend- 
 ing to show robbery or theft as a motive for a killing is always ad- 
 missible.* And if a murder is committed in an attempt to conceal 
 stolen goods, evidence may be introduced in a prosecution therefor 
 tending to connect the murder with the robbery, in order to prove 
 the motive and object of the crime, and as part of the history of the 
 
 lOSon V. Territory, 5 Okla. 526, 49 iiMarable v. State, 89 Ga. 425, 15 S. 
 
 Pac. 923; People v. Morgan, 124 Mich. E. 453. 
 
 527, 83 N. W. 275; Gillum v. State, 62 i2Lancaster v. State (Tex. Grim. 
 
 Miss. 547 ; People v. Osmond, 138 N. Y. App. ) 31 S. W. 515. 
 
 80, 33 N. E. 739; Cockerel! v. State, 32 isKearney v. State, 68 Miss. 233, 8 
 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 585, 25 S. W. 421; So. 292. 
 
 Lancaster v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) ^People v. Pope, 108 Mich. 361, 66 
 
 31 S. W. 515. N. W. 213. 
 
 In People v. Chin Hane, 108 Cal. isState v. Schieler, 4 Idaho, 120, 37 
 
 599, 41 Pac. 697, however, it was held Pac. 272. 
 
 that where the prosecution in a trial isPeople v. Cook (Cal.) 83 Pac. 43. 
 
 for murder offered evidence to the ef- ivSee Weyrich v. People, 89 111. 90. 
 
 feet that the deceased was upon the iMarable v. State, 89 Ga. 425, 15 S. 
 
 bond of one of his assailants, for the E. 453; Bowen v. State, 140 Ala. 65, 37 
 
 purpose of showing motive, the fact that So. 233; People v. Antony, 146 Cal. 
 
 there was no evidence that the accused 124, 79 Pac. 858; State v. Osnes, 14 
 
 knew that deceased had gone upon such Mont. 553, 37 Pac. 13 ; Jerome v. State, 
 
 bond goes only to the weight of evi- 61 Neb. 459, 85 N. W. 394; Smith v. 
 
 dence, and not to its competency, and if Territory, 11 Okla. 669, 69 Pac. 805; 
 
 he had no knowledge of the fact the Lancaster v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 evidence was harmless, and no injury 31 S. W. 515. And see State v. TSoa- 
 
 pould result from its admission. nelly, 130 Mo. 642, 32 S. W. 1124. 
 
818 HOMICEDB. [§ 597 
 
 occurrence.^ In these cases the questions arise as to whether the 
 fact that the deceased was in possession of money, particularly if 
 the amount was considerable, was known to anyone; and if so, to 
 whom; whether money was found on the corpse or was missing; 
 whether there is evidence that any suspected party, suddenly and 
 from an unexplained cause, became possessed of a large siun, paid 
 long-standing and pressing debts of considerable amount, or remark- 
 ably increased his expenditures.* And the previous possession by 
 the deceased of a considerable sum of money, or of things of con- 
 siderable value, to the knowledge of the accused, may be shown on 
 the issue of desire for pecuniary gain.* And it is always admissible 
 to introduce evidence showing that the deceased had a pecuniary 
 claim on the defendant.^ So, evidence of previous urgent need of 
 money and efforts to obtain it on the part of the accused is com- 
 petent in a prosecution for homicide alleged to have been perpetrated 
 in an attempted robbery.® !N^or is it improper to prove destitution 
 upon the part of a husband, and means possessed by his wife, where 
 he killed her for refusal to live with him, such evidence tending to 
 show motive for the desire to return to live with her;'' and where 
 a man killed his wife, whom he had compelled to live a life of prosti- 
 tution, previous assaults to force her to give up money made by 
 prostitution may be given in evidence as bearing upon the motive 
 of the fatal assault.® 
 
 So, a plan of the accused to defraud the deceased out of money or 
 
 sMeConkey v. Com. 101 Pa. 416. rest, and that when the body was dis- 
 
 sSee Kennedy v. People, .S9 N. Y. 245 ; covered the key was not there, but was 
 
 People V. Jackson, 182 N. Y. 66, 74 N. found in the bureau drawer, is admis- 
 
 E. 565; State v. Rice, 7 Idaho, 762, 66 sible in a prosecution against the hus- 
 
 Pac. 87 ; Howser v. Com. 51 Pa. 332 ; band for killing her, as tending to show 
 
 Gay V. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 450, his connection with the commission of 
 
 60 S. W. 771 ; State v. Henry, 51 W. the crime and motive for its perpetra- 
 
 Va. 283, 41 S. E. 439. tion, and as tending to corroborate a 
 
 ^Davidson v. State, 135 Ind. 254, 34 confession made by him that he took 
 
 N. E. 972; Musser v. State, 157 Ind. the key from her pocket and opened the 
 
 423, 61 N. E. 1; State v. Crowley, 33 bureau drawer. State v. Hansen, 25 
 
 La. Ann. 782; Dean v. State, 85 Miss. Or. 391, 35 Pac. 976, 36 Pac. 296. 
 
 40, 37 So. 501; State v. Jackson, 95 Mo. eHamby v. State, 36 Tex. 523; Lan- 
 
 623, 8 S. W. 749 ; State v. Lucey, 24 caster v. State, supra. 
 
 Mont. 295, 61 Pac. 994; Ettinger v. Com. sTurtier v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 98 Pa. 338; Cordova v. State, 6 Tex. 89 S. W. 975. 
 
 App. 207; Early v. State, 9 Tex. App. In Com. v. Twitchell, 1 Brewst. (Pa.) 
 
 476; Lancaster v. State, 36 Tex. Crim. 560, it was held competent for the 
 
 Rep. 16, 35 S. W. 105. And see Carwile prosecution to prove that defendant was 
 
 v. State (Ala.) 39 So. 220. pressed for money, but not that he lived 
 
 Evidence that a, woman kept her expensively and had no occupation or 
 
 money in a bureau drawer, and car- means. 
 
 ried the key in her pocket, and that 'Sayres v. Com. 88 Pa. 291. 
 
 before she was killed her husband had sPainter v. People, 147 III. 444, 35 N. 
 
 no money, but had money after his ar- E. 64. 
 
5 597] EVIDENCE. Sl'J 
 
 things of value is admissible in a prosecution against the former for 
 the killing.® And the known existence of insurance payable to, or 
 which might be realized upon by, the accused, may be shown as in- 
 dicating motive. ^ ** And such evidence is not to be rejected because 
 it tends to show the commission of another crime, ^ ^ though in such 
 case knowledge of its small value by the accused is also admissible 
 in rebuttal ;^^ and the mere existence of insurance of the deceased 
 beneficial to the accused is not sufficient to establish a motive for 
 killing, where it appears that but for urging he would have per- 
 mitted it to lapse. ^^ And the same rule applies to proof that the 
 accused was the heir at law, legatee, or devisee of the deceased, or 
 that he was in a position to receive a financial or other benefit from 
 the latter's death. ^* A previous attempt by the accused to insure 
 another person for his benefit, however, is not admissible in evi- 
 dence.*® Nor is the fact that the life of the person killed was in- 
 sured admissible, in the absence of evidence of knowledge thereof by 
 the accused,*® or that the insurance was a valid and subsisting con- 
 tract * ^ 
 
 So, that the slayer had just previously engaged in a criminal en- 
 terprise is admissible in evidence on the question of his motive, and 
 
 sByers v. State, 105 Ala. 31, 16 So. cumstances, and with similar symptoms, 
 
 716. And see People v. Ascher, 126 by showing that they also were in- 
 
 Mich. 637, 86 N. W. 140; People v. Hill sured by the accused in the same or 
 
 (Cal. App.) 82 Pac. 39S. similar societies. Reg. v. Heesom, 14 
 
 loCom. V. Robinson, 146 Mass. 571, 16 Cox, C. C. 40. 
 
 N. E. 452; State v. West, Houst. Crim. n State v. Coleman, 17 S. D. 594, OS 
 
 Rep. (Del.) 371; State v. Shackelford, N. W. 175. 
 
 148 Mo. 493, 50 S. W. 105; Com. v. izjahnke v. State, 68 Neb. 154, 94 N. 
 
 -Clemraer, 190 Pa. 202, 42 Atl. 675. And W. 158, 104 N. W. 154. 
 
 see Bess v. Com. 116 Ky. 927, 77 S. W. isNordgren v. People, 211 111. 425, 71 
 
 549. N. E. 1042. 
 
 And a statement by the prosecuting ^People v. Buchanan, 145 N. Y. 1, 
 
 attorney in his opening to the jury up- 39 N. E. 846; State v. Kuhn, 117 Iowa, 
 
 on tlie prosecution of a woman for the 216, 90 N. W. 733. And see Davidson v. 
 
 murder of her husband, that she had State, 135 Ind. 254, 34 N. E. 972; State 
 
 procured an assignment to herself of v. Sheppard, 49 W. Va. 582, 39 S. E. 
 
 certain policies of insurance on her hus- 676. 
 
 band's life, is not prejudicial though it iBReg. v. Hendershott, 26 Ont. Rep. 
 
 afterwards appears that, instead of the 678. 
 
 policies having been assigned to her, she But that a son had sought, but 
 
 was the beneficiary named therein. Peo- failed to obtain, insurance upon the 
 
 pie V. Pope, 108 Mich. 361, 66 N. W. life of his motlier, without her knowl- 
 
 213. edge, a short time before her death, is 
 
 But where it is proved in a prosecu- admissible in evidence in a prosecution 
 
 tion for homicide that a motive for against him for killing her. Com. v. 
 
 the death of the deceased might exist, Crossmire, 156 Pa. 304, 27 Atl. 40. 
 
 owing to the fact that the accused had isPeople v. Morgan, 124 Mich. 527, 83 
 
 insured the life of the deceased, evi- N. W. 275; State v. Felker, 27 Mont, 
 
 dence may be given that there might 451, 71 Pac. 668. 
 
 have been an equal motive for the death i 'State v. Felker, supra. 
 of two other persons under like cir- 
 
920 HOMICIDE. [§ 597 
 
 probable action, where he killed a pursuer.^* And evidence tending 
 to show that deceased had been raped before the killing is competent 
 as tending to show motive. ^ ® And the existence of a secret criminal 
 organization the purpose of one divison of which is to furnish men 
 to commit murder in consideration of, or return for, the commission 
 of a like crime by members of another divison is admissible in evi- 
 dence in a prosecution for a homicide by an alleged member of the 
 organization, to show motive for the crime. ^'^ And evidence that 
 a woman had told a man that he ought to lick a named person or he 
 was no friend of hers is admissible in a prosecution against the man 
 for killing the named person, as tending to show motive. ^ ^ 
 
 598. Removal of burden or obstacle As a general rule, anything 
 
 tending to show that one person is a burden upon, or obstacle in the 
 way of the plans of, another, is admissible in evidence in a prosecu- 
 tion against the latter for killing the former, as tending to show 
 motive. ^ And that accused was bound to maintain deceased during 
 life, and was entitled to his property on death, may be shown in such 
 ease.^ So, it is important to inquire in a prosecution for homicide 
 whether there were any debtors of the deceased in sums which they 
 were unable to pay, and whether their dealing with their creditor 
 had been marked with such urgency on his part and embarrassment 
 on theirs as to make his death a relief to them.* And it is proper 
 to show an effort of the deceased to have a homestead allotted out of 
 1 ands in the beneficial possession of the accused. * And that the em- 
 ployer of the accused had threatened to discharge him and employ 
 the deceased in his place is competent on this subject;® and so is 
 the fact that the slayer was a member of a union engaged in a strike, 
 
 isPeopIe V. Woods, 147 Cal. 265, 81 iPeople v. Buchanan, 145 N. Y. 1, 39 
 
 Pac. 652. And see Patterson v. State N. E. 846 ; People v. Sutherland, 154 N. 
 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 60 S. W. 557. Y. 345, 48 N. E. 518; Davidson v. State, 
 
 i9Robinson v. State, 114 Ga. 56, 39 135 Ind. 254, 34 N. E. 972; Benson v. 
 
 S. E. 862. State, 119 Ind. 488, 21 N. E. 1109; Com. 
 
 20Carroll v. Com. 84 Pa. 107. v. Snell, 189 Mass. 12, 3 L.R.A.(N.S.) 
 
 And evidence of the purposes, prac- 1019, 75 N. E. 75; Miller v. State, 68 
 
 tices, and objects of a society organized Miss. 221, 8 So. 273. 
 
 for the commission of crime, and that 2Davidson v. State, supra. 
 
 those who committed the murder in sBemis's Webster Case, 421. And see 
 
 question were members of such an or- State v. Mortensen, 26 Utah, 312, 73 
 
 ganization, and that through its instru- Pac. 562, 633. 
 
 mentality the murder was committed, is ^State v. Tettaton, 159 Mo. 354, 60 S. 
 
 competent in a prosecution therefor to W. 743. 
 
 show motive and to explain the connec- ePowers v. State, 23 Tex. App. 42, 5 
 
 tion of the accused therewith. Camp- S. W. 153. 
 bell V. Com. 84 Pa. 187. 
 
 21 People V. Gallagher, 75 App. Div. 
 39, 78 N. Y. Supp. 5. 
 
§ 698] EVIDENCE. 921 
 
 and that the person killed was a strike breaker, working during such 
 strike.® 
 
 So, evidence that the deceased opposed or prevented a desired 
 marriage by the accused is admissible in a prosecution for homi- 
 cide on the question of motive ; "^ and so is evidence that the accused 
 applied to the deceased for permission to visit her daughter, and 
 was denied it because he was a married man. ® So, that the deceased 
 had been criminally intimate with the daughter of the accused, and 
 that he had desired her to run away with him, and that the accused 
 knew of their purpose and opposed it, and opposed their association 
 together, is competent on the question of motive.® And that a 
 woman charged to have been killed by a man was pregnant with a 
 probably live foetus is competent in a prosecution against the man 
 for killing her, as tending to show motive, though nothing is charged 
 with reference to the killing of an unborn child ; ^ " and so is the fact 
 that the accused and the deceased lived together as husband and 
 wife, ^ * and that the accused was the father of the illegitimate child 
 of the deceased. ^^ And so is evidence that a mother threatened to 
 almost kill her daughter if she was pregnant, in a prosecution against 
 the mother for killing the daughter's child at birth. ^ * And that the 
 deceased was the illegitimate child of the accused, and that she had 
 represented it to be the child of her husband, is competent.^* 
 
 So, evidence of interference by the deceased to prevent criminal 
 relations between accused and another is admissible as evidence of 
 
 ePeople v. Donnolly, 143 Cal. 394, 77 90. And see Gallegos v. State (Tex. 
 
 Pac. 177. Crim. App.) 85 S. W. 1150. 
 
 7MarIer v. State, 67 Ala. 55, 42 Am. lo Jackson v. Com. 100 Ky. 239, 66 Am. 
 
 Rep. 95; Felix v. State, 18 Ala. 720; St. Rep. 336, 38 S. W. 422, 1091. 
 
 Fraser v. State, 55 Ga. 325 ; O'Brien v. And letters written by a woman to a 
 
 Com. 89 Ky. 354, 12 S. W. 471 ; State v. man, indicating that she considered him 
 
 Lentz, 45 Minn. 177, 47 N. W. 720; the father of her child, and informing 
 
 Stephens v. People, 4 Park. Crim. Rep. him that she was dependent upon him, 
 
 396. And see State v. Burton, 63 Kan. and considered their relations perma- 
 
 602, 66 Pac. 633. nent, though affectionate in tone, are 
 
 sJohnson v. State, 17 Ala. 618. admissible in evidence in a prosecution 
 
 And that the accused, who was a against him for killing her, not to prove 
 
 single man, had endeavored to induce a the facts stated in them, but as bearing 
 
 woman to whom the deceased was en- upon the question of motive on his part 
 
 gaged to be married to break the en- for the killing. People v. Sutherland, 
 
 gagement is admissible in evidence in a, 154 N. Y. 345, 48 N. E. 518. 
 
 prosecution against the accused for nQ'Boyle v. Com. 100 Va. 785, 40 S. 
 
 killing deceased, as tending in some de- E. 121 ; People v. Young, 102 Gal. 411, 
 
 gree to show that the latter was an 33 Pac. 770. 
 
 obstacle in the way of the desire of the isQ'Boyle v. Com. supra. 
 
 former to marry the woman, the evi- isGregg v. State, 106 Ala. 44, 17 So. 
 
 denoe going to the question of motive. 321. 
 
 State v. Burton, supra. 1 4 Fletcher v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 sKennedy v. State, 140 Ala. 1, 37 So. 68 S. W. 173. 
 
■922 HOMICIDE. [§ 598 
 
 motive in a prosecution against accused for killing deceased;^® and 
 so are illicit relations between a person charged with homicide and 
 the wife of the person killed. ^ ^ And illicit relations between a man 
 and a woman may be shown on a joint indictment against both for 
 killing the woman's husband, ^^ And this is the rule though such 
 relations were entered into immediately after the killing.^® And 
 such relations with a third person may be shown on a prosecution 
 against the man for killing his wife, ^ ® or against a woman for kill- 
 
 isPate V. state, 94 Ala. 14, 10 So. of his passion for her, not only to prove 
 665; Johnson v. State, 94 Ala. 35, 10 So. a motive for the killing, but to show the 
 667 ; Caddell v. State, 129 Ala. 57, 30 So. degree of the crime. State v. Reed, 53 
 76; People v. Brown, 130 Cal. 591, 62 Kan. 767, 42 Am. St. Rep. 322, 37 Pac. 
 Pac. 1072; State v. Watkins, 9 Conn. 47, 174; Martin v. State, 17 Ohio C. C. 406. 
 21 Am. Dec. 712; Johnson v. State, 24 But where such testimony is received, 
 Fla. 162, 4 So. 535; Fraser v. State, 55 it is error to refuse to allow the ac- 
 Ga. 325; State v. Reed, 53 Kan. 767, 42 cused to offer testimony tending to 
 Am. St. Rep. 322, 37 Pac. 174; Stricklin prove that for years the character of the 
 V. Com. 83 Ky. 566; Guidas v. State, 78 woman was above reproach, though he 
 Miss. 622, 29 So. 525; State v. Duestrow, had been allowed to deny the alleged 
 137 Mo. 44, 38 S. W. 554, 39 S. W. 266; criminal intimacy. Martin v. State, 
 St. Louis V. State, 8 Neb. 405, 1 N. W. supra. 
 
 371; State v. Abbatto, 64 N. J. L. 658, "Brunson v. State, 124 Ala,. 37, 27 
 47 Atl. 10; People v. Harris, 136 N. Y. So. 410. 
 
 423, 33 N. E. 65; People v. Scott, 153 isMiller v. State, 68 Miss. 221, 8 So. 
 N. Y. 40, 46 N. E. 1028 ; Stout v. Peo- 273 ; State v. Hinkle, 6 Iowa, 380 ; State 
 pie, 4 Park. Crim. Rep. 71; State v. v. Abbatto, 64 N. J. L. 658, 47 Atl. 10. 
 John, 30 N. C. (8 Ired. L.) 330, 49 Am. But evidence of an act of adultery 
 Dec. 396; Com. v. Fry, 198 Pa. 379, 48 by the accused in a prosecution for 
 Atl. 257 ; State v. Aughtry, 49 S. C. murder, with the widow of the deceased 
 285, 26 S. E. 619, 27 S. E. 199; Wilker- four or five days after the killing, is 
 son V. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 86, 19 not competent as tending either to show 
 S. W. 903 ; State v. Chase, 68 Vt. 405, 35 that the motive tor the killing was not 
 Atl. 336; Mack v. State, 48 Wis. 281, 4 self-defense, or to rebut any presump- 
 N. W. 449; Sullivan v. State, 100 Wis. tion of innocence arising from the cir- 
 283, 75 N. W. 956. And see Morrison eumstances under which the killing was 
 V. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 2493, 67 L.R.A. done, and the single act does not, of 
 529, 74 S. W. 277. itself, tend to prove prior acts. Trav- 
 
 is Johnson V. State; Pate v. State; erse v. State, supra. 
 and People v. Brown, — supra; Gardner And the testimony of the wife of de- 
 v. United States, 5 Ind. Terr. 150, 82 ceased that the accused committed a 
 S. W. 704; State v. Reed, supra; Com. rape upon her soon aftf-r killing her 
 V. Kennedy. 170 Mass. 18, 48 N. E. 770; husband, on the same day and while 
 Ouidas V. State, supra; State \. God- still on his premises, is not admissible 
 dard, 162 Mo. 198, 62 S. W. 697 ; State in a prosecution for the killing to prove 
 V. Abbatto, and Com. v. Fry, supra; the motive of the prisoner, where the 
 Traverse v. State, 61 Wis. 144, 20 N. fact of the killing is not denied. Far- 
 W. 724. And see Com. v. Smith, 7 ris v. People, 129 111. 521, 4 L.R.A. 582, 
 Smith's Laws Appx. 2 Wheeler, C. C. 16 Am. St. Rep. 283, 21 N. E. 821. 
 80; Stokes v. State, 71 Ark. 112, 71 S. ispeople v. Montgomery, 178 N. Y. 
 W. 248; Ouidas v. State, supra; Weaver 219, 68 N. E. 258; Caddell v. State, 136 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 607, 81 S. Ala. 9, 34 So. 191. 
 
 W. 39, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 340, 65 S. W. But where a husband is indicted for 
 534 ; State v. Chase, supra. the murder of his wife, and there is 
 
 Criminal intimacy between the ac- evidence tending to show criminal re- 
 cused and the wife of the person killed lations between him and another woman 
 is admissible in evidence in a proaecu- who stayeJ at his house, and a witness 
 tion for homicide, based upon the theory testifies that the husband and wife lived 
 that the crime was committed because agreeably together until the woman 
 
§ 598] EVIDENCE. 923 
 
 ing her husband.*" And the same rule applies to the subsequent 
 marriage of the accused and the wife of the deceased:*^ and such 
 evidence is not rendered inadmissible, though it also tends to show 
 bigamy on the part of the accused. * * So, among the circumstances 
 from which malice may be inferred are adultery by either husband 
 or wife, illustrating a desire to get rid of the marital relation;** 
 bigamy by the accused;** long illtreatment of a wife by her hus- 
 band;** and misconduct leading to a suit against a husband by his 
 wife to compel good behavior.*® And criminal intimacy between 
 the mother of the deceased, a child, and the accused, may be proved 
 as tending to show desire to remove an impediment or encumbrance. * '' 
 The mere fact that a few moments before the killing, however, the 
 slayer made an improper proposal to the wife of the deceased is 
 not competent on the question of motive for the killing, and evidence 
 to this effect is objectionable, as likely to incense the jury against 
 the accused and deprive him of a fair trial.*® 
 
 Likewise, evidence of knowledge by the deceased of matters the 
 revealing of which would be detrimental to the accused is competent 
 in homicide cases on the question of motive.** And evidence tend- 
 ing to show that one person having knowledge of facts damaging to 
 another was in a position to inform against him, or to become a wit- 
 ness against him or against his interests in some proceeding, civil 
 or criminal, in which he was interested, is admissible on the ques- 
 
 went to their house, it is not competent 27; McCann v. People, 3 Park. Crim. 
 
 for the witness to further testify that Eep. 272; State v. Watkins, 9 Conn. 49, 
 
 after she went there, the witness had 21 Am. Dee. 712; State v. Ureen, supra. 
 
 often seen the wife crying, and the ad- And see Wharton v. State, 73 Ala. 366. 
 
 mission of such testimony is reversible zePeople v. Williams, 3 Park. Crim. 
 
 error. Caddell v. State, 129 Ala. 57, 30 Eep. 84. 
 
 So. 76. 27State v. Noakes, 70 Vt. 247, 40 Atl. 
 
 2 estate V. Kuhn, 117 Iowa, 216, 90 N. 249. 
 
 W. 733; People v. Bowers (Cal. ) 82 So where, in a, prosecution against a 
 
 Pac. 553. husband as accessory to the murder of 
 
 ziPierson v. People, 79 N. Y. 424, 35 his wife's child, it appears that for 
 
 Am. Rep. 524. years the wife had declined to implicate 
 
 2 2 Ibid. And see Walker v. State, 63 him in the murder and had sheltered 
 
 Ala. 105. him from prosecution, and that he made 
 
 23State V. Rash, 34 N. C. (12 Ired. the murderof tne child the condition of 
 
 L.) 382, 55 Am. Dec. 420; Hall v. State, his marrying her, and that it was to in- 
 
 40 Ala. 698; Weyrich v. People, 89 111. fluence him to take her as his wife that 
 
 90; Green v. Com. 17 Ky. L. Rep. 943, she murdered her child, and that after- 
 
 33 S. W. 100; Templeton v. People, 27 wards he applied for a divorce, it is 
 
 Mich. 501; Miller v. State, 68 Miss. 221, competent for the state to prove when 
 
 8 So. 273; People v. Benham, 160 N. it was that the wife made known her 
 
 Y. 402, 55 N. E. 11; Com. v. Ferrigan, 44 husband's complicity in the crime, after 
 
 Pa. 386; Phillips v. State, 22 Tex. App. having previously shielded him. Sage 
 
 139, 2 S. W. 601. V. State, 127 Ind. 15, 26 N. E. 667. 
 
 24State V. Green, 35 Conn. 203. 28Gardner v. State, 11 Tex. App. 265. 
 
 25State V. Langford, 44 N. C. (Bus- 29Burton v. State, 107 Ala. 108, 18 
 
 hce, L.) 436; Stone v. State, 4 Humph. So. 284. 
 
924 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 [I 59S 
 
 tion of motive in a prosecution against tlie latter for killing the 
 former.^" So, evidence of a different and distinct murder is ad- 
 missible in a prosecution for homicide -where there is evidence tend- 
 ing to prove that the one for which the trial is being had is connected 
 with, or grew out of, the other, as where it is probable that the one 
 may have been committed to prevent prosecution for the other. ^* 
 And that the person killed was an officer, who interfered to prevent 
 the slayer from going forth to kill persons against whom he had a 
 grievance, is admissible. ^ ^ And the prior commission of a felony 
 by the accused is competent where the person killed was an officer, 
 as tending to show motive for resisting arrest.*^ And evidence in 
 a prosecution for the killing of an officer that the accused was in jail 
 awaiting sentence for another criminal act is admissible as tending 
 to show a purpose to make an escape. * * 
 
 59&. Revenge — For the purpose of raising an inference of a desire 
 for revenge or to injure, previous quarrels and difficulties between the 
 parties, and illtreatment of the accused by the deceased, are com- 
 petent in a prosecution for homicide;^ and this is so, though there 
 
 soMarler v. State, 67 Ala. 55, 42 Am. 
 Rep. 95; Childs v. State, 55 Ala. 25; 
 Garden v. State, 84 Ala. 417, 4 So. 823; 
 Hodge V. State, 97 Ala. 37, 38 Am. St. 
 Rep. 145, 12 So. 164; Nordan v. State 
 (Ala.) 39 So. 406; Turner v. State, 70 
 Ga. 705; Williams v. State, 69 Ga. 11; 
 State V. Seymour, 94 Iowa, 699, 63 N. 
 W. 661 ; Martin v. Com. 93 Ky. 189, 19 
 S. W. 580 ; Cloud v. Com. 7 Ky. L. Rep. 
 818; Roberts v. Com. 10 Ky. L. Rep. 433, 
 8 S. W. 270; State v. Patza, 3 La. Ann. 
 612; State v. Kuehner, 93 Mo. 193, 6 S. 
 W. 118; Murphy v. People, 63 N. Y. 
 590; McCann v. People, 3 Park. Grim. 
 Rep. 272; State v. Ingram, 23 Or. 434, 
 31 Pac. 1049; Marnoch v. State, 7 Tex. 
 App. 269; Kunde v. State, 22 Tex. App. 
 65, 3 S. W. 325; Hudson v. State, 28 
 Tex. App. 323, 13 S. W. 388 ; Johnson v. 
 State, 29 Tex. App. 150, 15 S. W. 647; 
 Easterwood v. State, 34 Tex. Grim. Rep. 
 400, 31 S. W. 294;Hamblin v. State, 41 
 Tex. Grim. Rep. 135, 50 S. W. 1019, 5 S. 
 W. 1111; Smith v. State, 44 Tex. Grim. 
 Rep. 53, 68 S. W. 267. But see Walker 
 V. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 569, 72 S. 
 W. 997. 
 
 And that there was an indictment 
 against the accused, and that deceased 
 was a witness for the state in the case, 
 offered in connection witli threats made 
 by the accused to take tne life of de- 
 ceased because she was a witness against 
 him, is admissible in a prosecution 
 
 against him for killing her, as tending 
 to show motive for the killing. Hodge 
 V. State, supra. 
 
 siDunn v. State, 2 Ark. 229, 35 Am. 
 Dec. 54. 
 
 3 2People V. Suesser, 142 Gal. 354, 75 
 Pao. 1093. 
 
 But a statement by a person charged 
 with homicide, against whom there had 
 been prosecutions for violating the 
 liquor law, that he would rather have 
 a murder case against him than a prose- 
 cution for illegally selling liquors, is not 
 competent evidence against him in the 
 murder trial. Walker v. State, supra. 
 
 sastate v. Morgan, 22 Utah, 162, 61 
 Pac. 527. 
 
 3 4People V. Valliere, 123 Cal. 576, 56 
 Pac. 433. 
 
 iMcAnally v. State, 74 Ala. 9; Gar- 
 rett V. State, 76 Ala. 18; Holmes v. 
 State, 100 Ala. 80, 14 So. 864; Ellis v. 
 State, 120 Ala. 333, 25 So. 1 ; Gray v. 
 State, 63 Ala. 66; Walker v. State, 63 
 Ala. 105; Stitt V. State, 91 Ala. 10, 24 
 Am. St. Rep. 853, 8 So. 669; Dunn v. 
 State, 2 Ark. 229, 35 Am. Dee. 54; Peo- 
 ple V. Taylor, 36 Cal. 255; People v. 
 Brown, 76 Cal. 573, 18 Pac. 678; People 
 V. Gibson, 106 Cal. 458, 39 Pac. 864; 
 People V. Thomson, 92 Cal. 506, 28 Pac. 
 589; People v. Colvin, 118 Gal. 349, 50 
 Pac. 539; People v. Conkling, 111 Cal. 
 616, 44 Pac. 314; State v. Green, 35 
 Conn. 203; Monroe v. State, 5 Ga. 85; 
 
§ 599] EVIDENCE. 925 
 
 was evidence tending to show that the parties were on friendly terms 
 in the meantime ; ^ and so are hostility and ill-feeling by the accused 
 toward the deceased ; ^ and previous relations between them, tending 
 to create ill-feeling.* And prior attempts by the accused to kill the 
 deceased may be given in evidence,^ and so may evidence of prior 
 aggravated assaults.® And lapse of time between the previous quar- 
 rel or difficulty and the homicide goes only to the weight of the evi- 
 dence; it does not affect its admissibility.'' Nor is a difficulty be- 
 
 Choice V. State, 31 Ga. 424; Brown v. Com. 91 Va. 741, 21 S. E. 364; State v. 
 State, 51 Ga. 502 ; Starke v. State, 81 Ackles, 8 Wash. 462, 36 Pac. 597 ; Watts 
 Ga. 593. 7 S. E. 807; Roberts v. Stats, v. State, 5 W. Va. 535; Boyle v. State, 
 123 Ga. 146, 51 S. E. 374; Koerner v. 61 Wis. 440, 21 N. W. 289; Theal v. 
 State, 98 Ind. 7 ; State v. Moelchen, 53 Queen, 7 Can. S. C. 397. And see Miera 
 Iowa, 310, 5 N. W. 186; State v. Helm, v. Territory (N. M.) 81 Pac. 586. 
 97 Iowa, 378, 66 N. W. 751; State v. And a dispute amounting to a de- 
 Perigo, 70 Iowa, 657, 28 N. W. 452; mand for the possession of stepchildren 
 State V. Seymour, 94 Iowa, 699, 63 N. by the accused, and refusal to deliver 
 W^. 661 ; State v. McKinney, 31 Kan. them up by the deceased, culminating in 
 570, 3 Pac. 356; State v. O'Neil, 51 Kan. a habeas corpus case, constitute a dif- 
 651, 24 L.R.A. 555, 33 Pac. 287; Thomas ficulty within the meaning of an in- 
 V. Com. 14 Ky. L. Rep. 288, 20 S. W. struction in a prosecution against the 
 226; Com. V. Gray, 17 Ky. L. Rep. 354, accused for killing deceased, with ref- 
 30 S. W. 1015; Wade v. Com. 106 Ky. erence to previous difficulties. Eraser 
 321, 50 S. W. 271; Bess v. Com. 26 Ky. v. State, 55 Ga. 325. 
 L. Rep. 839, 82 S. W. 576; State v. Cole- 2 Starke v. State, 81 Ga. 593, 7 S. E. 
 man. 111 La. 303, 35 So. 560; Williams 807. 
 
 V. State, 64 Md. 384, 1 Atl. 887 ; Com. sPeople v. Barthleman, 120 Cal. 7, 52 
 V. Storti, 177 Mass. 339, 58 N. E. 1021; Pac. 112; Johnson v. State, 17 Ala. 618; 
 Com. V. Holmes, 157 Mass. 233, 34 Am. Campbell v. State, 123 Ga. 533, 51 S. E. 
 St. Rep. 270, 32 N. E. 6; People v. 644; Franklin v. Com. 92 Ky. 612, 18 S. 
 Simpson, 48 Mich. 474, 12 N. W. 612; W. 532; State v. Moore, 104 N. C. 743, 
 State V. Nugent, 8 Mo. App. 563, Af- 10 S. E. 183; Wells v. Territory, 14 Okla. 
 firmed in 71 Mo. 136; State v. Lewis, 80 436, 78 Pac. 124; Baines v. State, 43 
 Mo. 110: State v. Dettmer, 124 Mo. 426, Tex. Crim. Rep. 490, 66 S. W. 847; State 
 27 S. W. 1117; Territory v. Manton, 8 v. Crawford, 31 Wash. 260, 71 Pac. 1030. 
 Mont. 95, 19 Pae. 387; State v. Shafer, And see Long v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 26 Mont. 11, 66 Pac. 463; Hendrickson App.) 88 S. W. 203; Friday v. State 
 V. People, 1 Park. Crim. Rep. 406; (Tex. Crim. App.) 79 S. W. 815. 
 People V. Kemmler, 119 N. Y. 580, 24 4Stone v. State, 137 Ala. 1, 34 So. 
 N. E. 9; People v. Benham, 160 N. Y. 629; Rone v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1174, 
 402, 55 N. E. 11; People v. Lyons, 110 N. 70 S. W. 1042; State v. Gilliam, 66 S. C. 
 Y. 618, 17 N. E. 391; Com. v. Cross- 419, 45 S. E. 6; Stanton v. State, 42 
 mire, 156 Pa. 304, 27 Atl. 40; Sayres v. Tex. Crim. Rep. 269, 59 S. W. 271. And 
 Com. 88 Pa. 291; Stone v. State, 4 see Mann v. State, 134 Ala. 1, 32 So. 
 Humph, 27; Oarr v. State, 41 Tex. 544; 704; Ray v. State, 108 Tenn. 282, 67 
 Medina v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 49 S. W. 553. And see Rawlins v. State, 
 S. W. 380; Flores v. State (Tex. Crim. 124 Ga. 31, 52 S. E. 1. 
 App.) 38 S. W. 790; Young v. State, 41 5Jahnke v. State, 68 Neb. 154, 94 N. 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 442, 55 S. W. 331; W. 158, 104 N. W. 154. 
 Powers V. State, 23 Tex. App. 42, 5 S. ePowell v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 W. 153; Stanton v. State, 42 Tex. Crim. 70 S. W. 218. 
 
 Rep. 269, 59 S. W. 271; White v. State, 'Koerner v. State, 98 Ind. 7; Dillin v. 
 30 Tex. App. 652, 18 S. W. 462; Everett People, 8 Mich. 357; People v. Bemis, 51 
 V. State, 30 Tex. App. 682, 18 S. W. 674; Mich. 423, 16 N. W. 794; Sayres v. Com. 
 Gallegos v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 85 88 Pa. 291. And see People v. Benham, 
 S. W. 1150;Hardisonv. State(Tex. Crim. 160 N. Y. 402, 55 N. E. 11; State v. 
 App.) 85 S. W. 1071; State v. Bradley, Felker, 27 Mont. 4S1, 71 Pac. 668. 
 67 Vt. 465, 32 Atl. 238; Nicholas v. While evidence of ill-feeling between 
 
026 HOMICIDE. [§ 509 
 
 tween the accused and other persons coiiQected with the deceased, 
 prior to the killing, at which the deceased was not present, inadmis- 
 sible in evidence where the purpose is to show a conspiracy upon the 
 part of the accused and others against the deceased and others, and 
 to connect the two difficulties.® And that the accused shot other 
 persons immediately after killing the deceased is admissible in a 
 prosecution for the killing on the question of malice.® Nor are ef- 
 forts to effect a reconciliation, made by the deceased, and their re- 
 pulse by the accused, incompetent in this connection. ^ " 
 
 So, any act of the deceased which had greatly excited the anger 
 of the accused is competent for this purpose. ^ ^ And in case of al- 
 leged wife murder it may be shown that the wife had commenced 
 a proceeding for divorce.-'^ And the fact that a husband took his 
 child away from his divorced wife to a remote place, and the decree 
 of divorce awarding the custody of the child to her, are admissible 
 in evidence in a prosecution against the husband for killing the 
 wife.^* So, illicit relations between the deceased and the wife or 
 a near relative of the accused, known to the latter, may be shown ; * * 
 and evidence of a refusal of marriage, and that the man deliberately 
 
 the accused and the deceased extending and made a second attack and killed 
 
 back two years before the killing is re- his opponent, is sufficient to justify a 
 
 mote in a prosecution for homicide, its finding that the motive of the offense 
 
 admission is not error. People v. Bern- was revenge. People v. Kennedy, 
 
 is, 51 Mich. 422, 16 N. W. 794. supra. 
 
 sPeople V. Stonecifer, 6 Cal. 405. laMalcek v. State, 33 Tex. Grim. Eep. 
 
 And see Reddick v. Com. 17 Ky. L. Rep. 14, 24 S. W. 417. 
 
 1020, 33 S. W. 416; Johnson v. State, 17 In State v. Kennedy, 177 Mo. 98, 75 
 
 Ala. 618; Dunn v. State, 2 Ark. 229, 35 S. W. 979, however, it was held that a 
 
 Am. Deo. 54; Walters v. People, 6 Park, petition by a man afterwards killed. 
 
 Grim. Rep. 15; State v. Rash, 34 N. C. for the annulment of his marriage ta 
 
 (12 Ired. L.) 382, 55 Am. Dec. 420; the alleged slayer, is not competent evi- 
 
 Heath v. Com. 1 Rob. (Va.) 735; Rex dence in a prosecution for the killing, 
 
 v. Voke, Russ. & R. C. G. 531; Rex v. isPeople v. Barthleman, 120 Cal. 7, 
 
 Roberts, 1 Campb. 400. 52 Pac. 112. 
 
 sGoodall v. State (Tex. Grim. App.) i4People v. Osmond, 138 N. Y. 80, 33 
 
 47 S. W. 359. N. E. 739 ; Gafford v. State, 122 Ala. 54, 
 
 lORoss v. Com. 21 Ky. L. Eep. 1344, 25 So. 10; Singleton v. State, 71 Miss. 
 
 55 S. W. 4. 782, 42 Am. St. Rep. 488, 16 So. 295. 
 
 iiRea V. State, 8 Lea, 356; Lawrence And see People v. Webster, 139 N. Y. 73, 
 
 v. State, 45 Fla. 42, 34 So. 87; Harris 34 N. E. 730; Littleiohn v. State (Ark.) 
 
 V. Com. 25 Ky. L. Rep. 297, 74 S. W. 89 S. W. 463. 
 
 1044. And see People v. Williams, 3 And evidence tending to show that the 
 
 Park. Grim. Rep. 84; People v. Ken- deceased had entered into a eombina- 
 
 nedy, 159 N. Y. 346, 70 Am. St. Rep. tion with a third person to induce the 
 
 557, 54 N. E. 51 ; People v. Glarke, 130 wife of the accused to elope with such 
 
 Cal. 642, 63 Pac. 138; State v. Campbell, third person and leave her husband and 
 
 25 Utah, 342^ 71 Pac. 529. children, and that such combination 
 
 And evidence in a homicide case of a had recently come to the knowledge of 
 
 personal encounter between two persons, the accused, is admissible in a prosecu- 
 
 in which one of them was defeated, and tion against him for homicide of the de^ 
 
 that he then armed himself and re- ceased. Cheek v. State, 35 Ind, 492. 
 turned to the place of the first affray, 
 
§ 599] EVIDENCE. 927 
 
 armed himself and shot llie girl in spite of the efforts of her friends 
 to protect her, shows murder in the first degree. ^ ^ And the utter- 
 ance by the deceased of a slander against the wife of the accused is 
 competent. ^ ® 
 
 So, the state may show that the person killed had testified ad- 
 versely to the accused in a case in which he was interested, and that 
 the latter had knowledge thereof at the time of the killing. ^ ^ And 
 a petition filed by the deceased for an injunction against the accused 
 is competent.^* And anticipated litigation between the parties to 
 a homicide, who were relatives by marriage, is admissible in evi- 
 dence in a prosecution therefor in connection with threats by the 
 accused.^® So, the fact that the deceased procured an indictment 
 against the accused is competent evidence on the question of motive 
 in a prosecution for homicide.^" And an information filed by the 
 deceased against the accused is also competent;^ ^ as is evidence 
 showing belief by the accused that deceased had given information 
 leading to proceedings against him;^^ and a record of conviction of 
 the accused on a former prosecution by deceased. ^^ And that ac- 
 cused had served a term in the penitentiary for burglarizing the 
 house of the deceased is competent.^* And where it is shown that 
 prior to the killing the accused knew of an indictment against him, 
 which he believed to have been prociired by the deceased, and had 
 threatened to kill him for it, these facts, together with the indictment, 
 are competent to establish motive for the killing. ^^ So, an indict- 
 ment procured by the deceased against a brother "' or an accessory^ '^ 
 of the accused may likewise be shown; and so may a previous as- 
 
 iBCom V. Krause, 193 Pa. 306, 44 Atl. 21 State v. Geddes, 22 Mont. 68, 55 
 
 454; Powell v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) Pae. 919; Zipperian v. People, 33 Colo. 
 
 59 S. W. 1114. 134, 79 Pae. 1018; Butler v. State, 91 
 
 leMassie v. Com. 15 Ky. L. Eep. 562, Ga. 161, 16 S. E. 984; Renfro v. State, 
 
 24 S. W. 611. 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. 393, 56 S. W. 1013. 
 
 I'Barkman v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. And see Jimmerson v. State, 133 Ala. 18, 
 
 Rep. 105, 52 S. W. 73; Terrv v. State, 32 So. 141. 
 
 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 264, 76 S. W. 928. 2 2State v. Rose, 129 N. C. 575, 40 S. E. 
 
 And see Rea v. State, 8 Lea, 357. 83. 
 
 isTurner v. State, 33 Tex. Crim. Rep. zsState v. Bodie, 33 S. C. 117, 11 S. 
 
 103, 25 S. W. 635. E. 624. 
 
 isCommander v. State, 60 Ala. 1. 24Powell v. State, 13 Tex. App. 244. 
 
 20Singleton v. State, 71 Miss. 782, 42 2 5Gillum v. State, 62 Miss. 547. 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 488, 16 So. 295; Carden v. zsCoward v. State, 6 Tex. App. 59. 
 
 State, 84 Ala. 417, 4 So. 823; Smith v. ZTgtate v. Welch, 22 Mont. 92. 55 Pae. 
 
 State, 48 Fla. 307, 37 So. 573 ; Kunde v. 927. And see Finch v. State, 81 Ala. 
 
 State, 22 Tex. App. 65, 3 S. W. 325; 41, 1 So. 565; Mask v. State, 32 Miss. 
 
 Rucker v. State, 7 Tex. App. 549 ; Taylor 405. 
 
 V. State, 14 Tex. App. 340; Hart v. But although a complaint filed by the 
 
 State, 15 Tex. App. 202, 49 Am. Rep. deceased against an accessory of the 
 
 188; Robinson v. State, 16 Tex. App. accused is admissible in a prosecution 
 
 347. for murder, to show a motive for the 
 
<)28 HOMICIDK.. [§ 599 
 
 sault by the deceased upon the paramour of the accused in his pres- 
 
 2 S 
 
 ence. 
 
 Occurrences or circumstances injurious to the accused, however, 
 are not admissible in evidence to show motive for his homicidal act, 
 where it is not shown that the deceased had any connection with 
 such occurrences or circumstances, or that the accused knew of their 
 existence.^'' So, kind acts and feelings may be shown, as well as 
 unkind ones.^" And where motive is sought to be shown by proof 
 that accused was defeated in an attempt to seduce deceased it is com- 
 petent to show in rebuttal that the feeling previously existing between 
 them was bad.*^ ISTor are previous quarrels and difficulties admis- 
 sible in evidence until the corpus delicti is established,*^ and unless 
 they are so connected with the killing as to give color of cause and 
 effect to the whole transaction.** And quarrels taking place years 
 before are too remote to be admissible, since they have no tendency 
 to show the state of mind of the accused.** And a mere drunken 
 quarrel, after which the parties became and remained friendly, does 
 not tend to show animosity, and is inadmissible.*® Nor are previous 
 difficulties or quarrels between either the deceased or the accused 
 and third persons admissible in evidence in homicide; to be com- 
 petent the difficulties or quarrels must be between the parties to the 
 homicide;*® though the rule is different where either the accused or 
 
 killing, it is error for the state's at- 134 Ala. 1, 32 So. 704; Horton v. State, 
 
 torney to comment on the facts charged supra; Raines v. State, 81 Miss. 489, 33 
 
 in such complaint as though they were So. 19. But see Hamilton v. State, 41 
 
 true, although there was incompetent Tex. Grim. Rep. 644, 56 S. W. 926. 
 evidence tending to show such facts. So, that the accused in shooting an- 
 
 State V. Welch, supra. other acted without adequate provoca- 
 
 2 8State V. Lawlor, 28 Minn. 216, 9 tion, or with a reckless disregard of hu- 
 
 N. W. 698. man life, cannot be proved in a prosecu- 
 
 2 9Gillum V. State, supra; Goodall v. tion for the shooting by showing his 
 State (Tex. Grim. App.) 47 S. W. 359; reckless conduct on other occasions. 
 Earles v. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 85 People v. Larubia, 140 N. Y. 87, 35 N. 
 S. W. 1. E. 412. 
 
 3 State V. Anderson, 96 Mo. 241, 9 3 5McAnear v. State, 43 Tex. Grim. 
 S. W. 636; State v. Punshon, 124 Mo. Rep. 518, 67 S. W. 117. 
 
 448, 27 S. W. 1111; State v. Gartrell, 36Dabney v. State, 113 Ala. 38, 59 
 
 171 Mo. 489. 71 S. W. 1045; Johnson v. Am. St. Rep. 92, 21 So. 211; Levy v. 
 
 State, 8 Wyo. 494, 58 Pac. 761. State, 70 Ark. 610, 68 S. W. 485; People 
 
 siBaines v. State, 43 Tex. Grim. Rep. v. Henderson, 28 Gal. 465; People v. 
 
 490, 68 S. W. 847. Clark, 84 Gal. 573, 24 Pac. 313; People 
 
 szMcBride v. People, 5 Colo. App. 91, v. Mitchell, 100 Gal. 328, 34 Pac. 698; 
 
 37 Pac. 953. Leach v. People, 53 111. 311; Hirschman 
 
 ssPound V. State, 43 Ga. 89; Daniel v. People, 101 111. 568; Binns v. State, 
 
 V. State, 103 Ga. 202, 29 S. E. 767; 66 Ind. 428; Gaskev v. Com. 15 Ky. L. 
 
 Horton v. State, 110 Ga. 739, 35 S. E. Rep. 257, 23 S. W. 368; State v. Bowser, 
 
 659; Hudson v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 42 La. Ann. 936, 8 So. 474; People v. 
 
 785, 67 S. W. 1079. And see State v. Simpson, 48 Mich. 474, 12 N. W. 662; 
 
 Hossack, 116 Iowa, 194, 89 N. W. 1077. State v. Anderson, 4 Nev. 265; State 
 
 34Woodward v. State, 42 Tex. Grim. v. Sumner, 130 N. C. 718, 41 S. E. 803; 
 
 Rep. 188, 58 S. W. 135 ; Mann v. State, Dorsey v. State, 34 Tex. 651 ; Sherar v. 
 
§ 599] EVIDENCE. C29 
 
 the deceased espoused the quarrel of a third person.^'' Nor is the 
 fact that the deceased and a third person had a difficulty prior to the 
 homicide admissible in evidence as tending to show that the third 
 person did the killing, and that, therefore, the accused was inno- 
 cent.** And the relations of a father toward his child are not a 
 proper subject of investigation in a prosecution against him for kill- 
 ing his wife,^* though when the evidence is circumstantial a previ- 
 ous difficulty between the deceased and the brother of the accused 
 may be shown.*" And it is the fact of a previous difficulty or quar- 
 rel only which is admissible in evidence ; neither the particulars nor 
 events thereof can be shown. *^ And the details of a difficulty in 
 which the deceased killed a brother of the accused are not competent 
 evidence in a prosecution against the accused for killing the de- 
 ceased, though the former difficulty was the origin of the feud re- 
 sulting in the killing of the deceased, where they contain nothing 
 which sheds light on the subsequent difficulty and killing.*^ 
 
 state, 30 Tex. App. 349, 17 S. W. 621; Ala. 436; Garrett v. State, 76 Ala. 18; 
 
 Woodard v. State (Tex. Grim. App.) Rutledge v. State, 88 Ala. 85, 7 So. 335; 
 
 51 S. W. 122; McAnear v. State, supra. Stitt v. State, 91 Ala. 10, 24 Am. St. 
 
 3 7 State V. Teaterman, 68 Mo. 408; Rep. 853, 8 So. 669 ; Jimmerson v. State, 
 
 People V. M'Kay, 122 Gal. 628, 55 Pac. 133 Ala. 18, 32 So. 141 ; Bohlman v. 
 
 594; People v. Gibson, 106 Gal. 458, 39 State, 135 Ala. 45, 33 So. 44; Dunn v. 
 
 Pae. 864; Thacker v. Gom. 24 Ky. L. State (Ala.) 39 So. 147; Sanford v. 
 
 Rep. 1584, 71 S. W. 931; Story v. State, State (Ala.) 39 So. 370; People v. Col- 
 
 68 Mis3. 609, 10 So. 47. vin, 118 Gal. 349, 50 Pae. 539; People 
 
 The subsequent deliberate murder by v. Conkling, 111 Gal. 616, 44 Pac. 314; 
 
 a, man of hia wife's parents without People v. Yokum, 118 Gal. 437, 50 Pac. 
 
 warning, shortly after killing hia wife, 686; People v. Thomson, 92 Gal. 506, 28 
 
 is admissible in evidence in a proaecu- Pae. 589; Williama v. State, 69 Ga. 11; 
 
 tion for killing the wife as tending to State v. Sorter, 52 Kan. 531, 34 Pac. 
 
 show that both killings were part of a 1036; Sanders v. Gom. 13 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 common plan, for the purpoae of eatab- 820, 18 S. W. 528; Mabry v. State, 71 
 
 lishing the motive of the crime, and is Miss. 716, 14 So. 267; Thompson v. 
 
 not irrelevant as an attempt to estab- State, 84 Miss. 758, 36 So. 389; State 
 
 lish another and different crime. Peo- v. Goddard, 162 Mo. 198. 62 S. W. 697; 
 
 pie V. Craig, 111 Cal. 460, 44 Pac. 186. State v. Adams, 68 S. C. 421, 47 S. B. 
 
 asBaker v. State, 122 Ala. 1, 26 So. 676; Newman v. State (Tex. Grim. 
 
 194. App.) 69 S. W. 519. And see State v. 
 
 Nor does the fact that a third per- Rodman, 173 Mo. 681, 73 S. W. 605; 
 
 son entertained malevolent feelings to- Thacker v. Gom. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1584, 71 
 
 ward the deceased, and expressed them S. W. 931. But see Ryan v. State, 100 
 
 to the accused, and that he remained Ala. 105, 14 So. 766. 
 silent, justify the inference in a proae- In Marnoch v. State, 7 Tex. App. 269, 
 
 cution against him for killing the de- however, it was held that the circum- 
 
 ceased that he entertained the same stances of a previous difficulty between 
 
 feelings. People v. Larubia, 140 N. Y. the accused and the deceased in a mur- 
 
 87, 35 N. E. 412. der trial are competent in behalf of the 
 
 ssPettit V. State, 135 Ind. 393, 34 N. state as showing the animus of the ac- 
 
 E. 1118. oused and in his behalf as explanatory 
 
 loSanders v. State, 134 Ala. 74, 32 of his act. 
 So. 654. 4 2Poole v. State, 45 Tex. Grim. Rep. 
 
 4iGray v. State, 63 Ala. 66; McAnallv 348, 76 S. W. 565; Wood v. State, 128 
 
 V. State, 74 Ala. 9; Stewart v. State, 78 Ala. 27, 86 Am. St. Rep. 71, 29 So. 557. 
 Horn.— 59 
 
030 HOMICIDE. [§ 60O 
 
 600. Jealousy — Jealousy, and the facts on whicli it rests, may al- 
 ways be put in evidence as throwing light on motive in homicide 
 cases. ^ Thus the facts that the accused was disinherited and the 
 deceased provided for are competent.^ And evidence that the ac- 
 cused was a rejected suitor and the deceased an accepted suitor of 
 the same woman, and that rumors of her approaching marriage to 
 the deceased had reached the accused, is competent;* and, coupled 
 with threats, is sufficient to show malice.* So, criminal relations 
 between the accused and a woman may be shown in connection with 
 evidence of jealousy of attentions to her by others, and that the de- 
 ceased had been attentive to her. ® And such evidence is not rendered 
 inadmissible by the fact that it directly tends to establish the un- 
 chastity of the accused, which was not in issue.* So, the relations 
 existing between the accused and a woman with whom he lived be- 
 fore the homicide are competent evidence where it was alleged that 
 the killing resulted from jealousy of the deceased, as bearing upon 
 the question of motive which guided the conduct of the accused, and 
 as to whether or not he acted as a reasonable man under all the cir- 
 cumstances of the case.'' And evidence that two men visited the 
 same woman, and that just after one of them was killed the other 
 said he had warned him not to visit the woman, as she would prove 
 a curse to him, and now it had come to pass, is competent in a prose- 
 cution against him for the killing as tending to show motive.® And 
 meretricious relations between the slayer and the person killed, and 
 the facts leading up to such relations, are competent where they 
 tend to show a motive for the act.® 
 
 But the infidelity of a wife, or other ground for jealousy, offered 
 in evidence in homicide as showing motive for killing the offender, 
 
 iSee Com. v. Madan^ 102 Mags. 1; sHunter v. State, 43 Ga. 483; Brown 
 
 Nesbit V. State, 43 Ga. 238; Jones v. v. Com. 13 Ky. L. Rep. 372, 17 S. W. 
 
 State, 117 Ga. 324, 43 S. E. 715; Fear- 220. 
 
 son V. UniteJ States, 10 App. D. C. 53G; iRowsey v. Com. 116 Ky. 617, 76 S. 
 
 Fisher v. People, 23 111. 283 ; Mathley v. W. 409. And see McUiu v. United 
 
 Com. 27 Ky. L. Rep. 785, 86 S. W. 988; States, 17 App. D. C. 323. 
 
 Templeton v. People, 27 Mich. 501; State ePeople v. Cook (Cal.) 83 Pac. 43. 
 
 Y. Larkin, 11 Nev. 316; People v. Place, sPeople v. Easton (Cal.) 82 Pac. 840. 
 
 157 N. Y. 584, 52 N. E. 576; People v. 'State v. O'Brien, 18 Mont. 1, 43 Pac. 
 
 Sutherland. 154 N. Y. 345, 48 N. E. 518; 1091, 44 Pac. 399. 
 
 People V. Martell, 138 N. Y. 595, 33 N. sMcCue v. Com. 78 Pa. 185, 21 Am. 
 
 E. 838; Com. v. McManus, 143 Pa. 64, Eep. 7. 
 
 14 L.R.A. 89. 21 Atl. 1018, 22 Atl. 761; sPeople v. Sutherland, 154 N. Y. 345, 
 
 Reeve'^ v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 83 S. 48 N, E. 518; Mobley v. State, 41 Fla.. 
 
 W. 803; State v. Bean, 77 Vt. 384, 60 621, 26 So. 732. 
 Atl. 807. 
 
 2 State V. Ingram, 23 Or. 434, 31 Pac. 
 1049. 
 
§ 600] EVIDENCE. 931 
 
 must, to be competent, be shown to have been known to the slayer. 
 And that a husband was jealous of his wife and accused her of 
 intimacy with other men, and accused other men of intimacy with 
 her, can furnish no explanation of a homicide in which his life is 
 taken; and evidence in a prosecution for such a killing tending to 
 prove that it grew out of a quarrel between him and the accused, oc- 
 casioned by his having charged the accused with intimacy with his 
 wife, is inadmissible. ^ ^ 
 
 IV. ClECUMSTANCES. 
 
 a. Threats by the accused. 
 
 601. Scope; general rules as to admissibility. — .While rules of law 
 with reference to declarations of intention and threats apply in all 
 other criminal matters, as well as in homicide, they arise so fre- 
 quently in homicide cases as to lead to their incorporation in this 
 work, so far, at least, as they apply particularly to homicide. In 
 such cases such declarations and threats are admissible in evidence, 
 not because they give rise to a presumption of law as to guilt, but 
 because from them, in connection with other circumstances, and on 
 proof of the corpus delicti, guilt may be inferred. ^ And as we have 
 seen, threats previously made are evidence in homicide of delibera- 
 
 loPhillips V. State, 22 Tex. App. 139, Com. 25 Ky. L. Rep. 297, 74 S. W. 1044; 
 
 2 S. W. 601 ; People V. Hill, 116 Cal. 562, State v. Edwards, 34 La. Ann. 1012; 
 
 48 Pac. 711; People v. Osmond, 138 N. State v. Hamilton, 170 Mo. 377, 70 S. 
 
 Y. 80, 33 N. E. 739. W. 876; State v. Wentworth, 37 N. H. 
 
 iiCostley V. State, 48 Md. 175. And 196; Stephens v. People, 4 Park. Crim. 
 
 see Barnard v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. Rep. 396 ; LaBeau v. People, 34 N. Y. 
 
 67, 73 S. W. 957. 233; State v. Rash, 34 N. C. (12 Ired. 
 
 But on a trial for wife murder in L.) 382, 55 Am. Dec. 420; Mimms v. 
 which the accused claims that he did State, 16 Ohio St. 221 ; Hopkins v. Com. 
 the killing while shocked and overcome 50 Pa. 9, 88 Am. Dec. 518; Com. v. 
 by an admission by the wife of in- Smith, 7 Smith's Laws, 697; Jim v. 
 fidelity, evidence of improper relations State, 5 Humph. 146; White v. State, 32 
 of the accused with other women is ad- Tex. Crim. Rep. 625, 25 S. W. 784; 
 missible for the purpose of showing his Heath v. Com. 1 Rob. (Va.) 735; Bur- 
 estimate and appreciation of the marital gess v. Com. 2 Va. Cas. 484; Arehbold, 
 relation and fidelity, and the improb- Crim. Pr. & PI. 283. And see Cluck v. 
 ability that he was shocked and over- State, 40 Ind. 263; Utterback v. Com. 
 come by his wife's admission so as to be 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1011, 59 S. W. 515, 60 S. 
 deprived of all reason and control of W. 15; State v. Brown, 188 Mo. 451, 87 
 himself. Garlitz v. State, 71 Md. 293, S. W. 519; Moore v. State, 2 Ohio St. 
 4 L.R.A. 601, 18 Atl. 39, 500; Maxwell v. State, 3 Heisk. 420. 
 
 1 Johnson v. State, 17 Ala. 618; Sprag- And where repeated threats by the ac- 
 
 gins V. State, 139 Ala. 93, 35 So. 1000; eused against the deceased are shown in 
 
 Jarvis v. State, 138 Ala. 17j 34 So. 1025; a prosecution for homicide^ it is not 
 
 Davis V. State, 126 Ala. 44, 28 So. 617; error to exclude evidence that he had 
 
 Pitman v. State, 22 Ark. 354; Dunn v. no enmity against the deceased, and 
 
 State, 2 Ark. 229, 35 Am. Dee. 54 ; State sought to be friendly with him, and sent 
 
 V. Alford, 31 Conn. 40; Painter v. Peo- him word to that effect. Rea v. State, 
 
 pie, 147 111. 444, 35 N. E. 64; Harris v. 8 Lea. 356. 
 
USi HOMICIDE. [§ 601 
 
 tion and premeditation;^ as are also declarations showing animos- 
 ity.* So, threats thus made, whether communicated or uncommuni- 
 cated, are always admissible for the purpose of showing malice and 
 criminal intent,* and as tending to show that the person making 
 them is the person who did the killing, where that fact is in issue. ^ 
 Nor are threats rendered inadmissible in a prosecution for homicide 
 because the injury was inflicted by other means than those threat^ 
 
 2See supra, chapter IX., §§ 151 et State v. Henn, 39 Minn. 476, 40 N. W. 
 
 seq. 572 ; Riggs v. State, 30 Miss. 635 ; State 
 
 3Stat€ V. Exmn, 138 N. C. 599, 50 S. v. Harrod, 102 Mo. 590, 15 S. W. 373; 
 
 E. 283; Tipton v. State, 140 Ala. 39, 37 State v. Wright, 141 Mo. 333, 42 S. W. 
 
 So. 231; MoUin v. United States, 17 934; State v. Sloan, 22 Mont. 293, 56 
 
 App. D. C. 323; Utterback v. State, Pac. 364; State v. Bonds, 2 Nev. 265; 
 
 supra; State v. Nix, 111 La. 812, 35 State v. Palmer, 65 N. H. 216, 20 Atl. 
 
 So. 917; Washington v. State, 45 Tex. 6; People v. Decker, 157 N. Y. 186, 51 
 
 Grim. Eep. 184, 79 S. W. 811; Bateson N. E. 1018; People v. Jones, 99 N. Y. 
 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Grim. Eep. 34, 80 S. 667, 2 N. E. 49; State v. Hildreth, 31 
 
 W. 88; Rush v. State (Tex. Grim. App.) N. C. (9 Ired. L.) 429, 51 Am. Dec. 364; 
 
 76 S. W. 927. State v. Matthews, 80 N. C. 417 ; fStatc 
 
 A paper, in the nature of a testa- v. Foster, 130 N. C. 666, 89 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 mentary disposition of a person's world- 876, 41 S. E. 284; Stewart v. State, 1 
 
 ly goods, purporting to have been writ- Ohio St. 66; State v. Powers, 10 Or. 145. 
 
 ten on the day he was charged with 45 Am. Rep. 138; Com. v. Major, 19R 
 
 killing his wife, containing a reference Pa. 290, 82 Am. St. Eep. 803, 47 Atl. 
 
 to the intended killing, is competent in 741 ; State v. Lee, 58 S. C. 335, 36 S. E. 
 
 a prosecution for the killing, as throw- 708; Goaler v. State, 5 Baxt. 678; 
 
 ing light upon his intent to kill. Phil- March v. State, 3 Tex. App. 107; Self 
 
 lips V. State, 62 Ark. 119, 34 S. W. 539. v. State, 39 Tex. Grim. Rep. 455, 47 S. 
 
 ^Among the numerous cases holding W. 26; Renfro v. State, 42 Tex. Grim. 
 
 this proposition are the following: Rep. 393, 56 S. W. 1013; Stat« v. Brad- 
 
 Stitt V. State, 91 Ala. 10, 24 Am. St. ley, 67 Vt. 465, 32 Atl. 238; White v. 
 
 Rep. 853, 8 So. 669 ; Davis v. State, 126 Territory, 3 Wash. Terr. 397, 19 Pac. 37.. 
 
 Ala. 44, 28 So. 617; Phillips v. State, And a charge that threats and previ- 
 
 supra; Dunn v. State, 2 Ark. 229, 35 ous difficulties are evidence tending to 
 
 Am. Dee. 54; People v. Gronin, 34 Cal. prove malice is not objectionable in a 
 
 191; People v. Dice, 120 Cal. 189, 52 prosecution for homicide as assuming 
 
 Pac. 477; Babcoek v. People, 13 Colo, that threats have been proved, but is 
 
 516, 22 Pac. 817; State v. Hoyt, 46 Conn, merely an equivalent to saying that if 
 
 330, 47 Conn. 518, 36 Am. Rep. 89; such threats and previous difficulties 
 
 United States v. Neverson, 1 Mackey, existed, they should be looked to in de- 
 
 152; Hodge v. State, 26 Fla. 11, 7 So. termining the question of malice. 
 
 593; McDaniel v. State, 100 Ga. 67, 27 Territory v. Scott, 7 Mont. 407, 17 Pac. 
 
 S. E. 158; State v. Davis, 6 Idaho, 159, 627. 
 
 53 Pac. 678; Palmer v. People, 138 111. sState v. Davis, 6 Idaho, 159. 53 Pac. 
 
 356, 32 Am. St. Rep. 146, 28 N. E. 130; 678; Nichols v. Com. 11 Bush, 578; State 
 
 McCoy V. People, 175 111. 224, 51 N. E. v. Cummings (Mo.) 88 S. W. 706; State 
 
 777; Cluck v. State, 40 Ind. 263; State v. Bonds, supra; Long v. State (Tex. 
 
 v. Sullivan, 51 Iowa, 142, 50 N. W. 572: Crim. App.) 88 S. W. 203; Baker v. 
 
 State v. McCahill, 72 Iowa, 111, 30 N. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 392, 77 S. W. 
 
 W. 553, 33 N. W. 599; State v. Me- 618. And see Hall v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 Kinney, 31 Kan. 570, 3 Pac. 356; Nichols App.) 88 S. W. 244. 
 
 V. Com. 11 Bush, 575; Trusty v. Com. In Keith v. State, 157 Ind. 376, 61 
 
 19 Ky. L. Rep. 706, 41 S. W. 766; N. E. 716, however, it was held that 
 
 State V. Birdwell, 36 La. Ann. 859 ; evidence that the accused in a prosecu- 
 
 State V. Pain, 48 La. Ann. 311, 19 So. tion for homicide was to marry the de- 
 
 138; Com. V. Holmes, 157 Mass. 233, 34 ceased shortly after the date of the 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 270, 32 N. E. 6; People v. murder, and that on that day he was 
 
 Curtis, 52 Mich. 616, 18 N. W. 385; looking for her with threats to murder 
 
§ 601] EVIDENCE. 933 
 
 ened." Nor are they inadmissible as constituting proof of the com- 
 mission of another crime ;'^ nor because they tend to prove malice, 
 where the prosecution is for manslaughter.* And where a threat 
 is admissible in evidence to show malice, the whole statement con- 
 taining it should be given;® though a threat is not rendered inad- 
 missible by the fact that part of the conversation not connected, or 
 only collaterally connected, with it cannot be remembered or is not 
 given.*" Nor is a threat inadmissible because it is not immediately 
 connected with the killing.** And threats made by the accused 
 against the deceased previous to the homicidal act do not come with- 
 in the operation of the rule requiring proof of communication to the 
 person threatened as a foundation for their admissibility; this rule 
 applies alone to proof offered by the accused of threats made by the 
 deceased. * ^ 
 
 Nor does lapse of time furnish any objection to the competency 
 of the evidence of threats made by the accused in a prosecution for 
 homicide. * ^ Eemoteness goes to weight, and not to competency. * * 
 And evidence of threats by the accused against the person killed is 
 not rendered inadmissible in a prosecution for the homicide by evi- 
 dence that, after the threats had been made, friendly feeling was 
 restored between the parties, such evidence being merely an addi- 
 tional fact for the consideration of the jury in determining the weight 
 to be given to the evidence of the threats. * ^ So, threats by the ac- 
 
 her if she did not marry him, may isJefferds v. People, 5 Park. Crim. 
 
 properly be excluded in the absence of Rep. 522; PuUiam v. State, 88 Ala. 1, 
 
 proof of, or offer to prove, any overt 6 So. 839; People v. Hong Ah Duck, 61 
 
 act on his part. Oal. 387 ; Johns v. State, 46 Fla. 153, 35 
 
 sLaBeau v. People, 34 N. Y. 223, 6 So. 71 ; Hodge v. State, 26 Fla. 11, 7 So. 
 
 Park. Crim. Rep. 371. 593; Goodwin v. State, 96 Ind. 550; 
 
 'Johnson v. State, 85 Miss. 572, 37 Nichols v. Com. 11 Bush, 575; State v. 
 
 So. 926. Coleman, 186 Mo. 151, 69 L.R.A. 381, 84 
 
 sTumer v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) S. W. 978; State v. Wright, 141 Mo. 333, 
 
 46 S. W. 830, 51 S. W. 366. 42 S. W. 934; State v. Adams, 76 Mo. 
 
 sPeople V. Curtis, 52 Mich. 616, 18 357; Territory v. Roberts, 9 Mont. 12, 
 
 N. W. 385. 22 Pac. 132; 'State v. Rosa, 72 N. J. L. 
 
 loPeople V. Dice, 120 Cal. 1«9, 52 462, 62 Atl. 695; Com. v. Salyards, 158 
 
 Pap. 477; State v. Oliver, 43 La. Ann. Pa. 501, 27 Atl. 993; State v. Lee, 58 
 
 1003, 10 So. 20. S. C. 335, 36 S. E. 706; State v. Camp- 
 
 A witness testifying in a prosecution bell, 35 S. C. 28, 14 S. E. 292; Brown 
 
 for homicide to threats made by the ac- v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 50 S. W. 
 
 cused against the deceased should not 354. But see Mackmasters v. State, 
 
 be permitted to further testify that he 81 Miss. 374, 33 So. 2. 
 
 remonstrated with him therefor, where i* Abbott v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 148, 
 
 the remonstrance evoked no reply. Burt 68 S. W. 124; State v. Hoyt, 46 Conn 
 
 V. State, 72 Miss. 408, 48 Am. St. Rep. 330; State v. Gates, 28 Wash. 689, 69 
 
 563, 16 So. 342. Pac. 385. 
 
 iiFranklin V. State (Ala.) 39 So. 979. iBJefferda v. People, 5 Park. Crim. 
 
 3 2State v. Jones, 47 La. Ann. 1524, 18 Rep. 522. 
 So. 516. 
 
934 HOMICIDE. [I 601 
 
 cused against the deceased are admissible in rebuttal of evidence of 
 friendly feeling between them. ^ ® 
 
 Statements, declarations, or threats, however, in no manner con- 
 nected with or having reference to the killing, are inadmissible.^'^ 
 And the statement of a third person that "he will kill you" is not 
 competent as evidence of a threat. ^ * And where threats are proved 
 to have been made by the accused against the deceased in a prosecu- 
 tion for homicide, the defense should be permitted to inquire of the 
 witness as to any irritating or provoking remarks made at the time 
 by the deceased, tending to induce such threats.^* 
 
 602. Nature of threat as affecting admissibility — ^Every declaration 
 which indicates, however vaguely and indefinitely, an intention upon 
 the part of the person making it to inflict violence upon another is a 
 threat within the meaning of these rules ; ^ and a threat to prosecute 
 for a violation of law has been held to be an admissible threat.^ 
 And a statement by a person that he would stop the laying of a road 
 across his land with a gun is admissible in evidence in a prosecution 
 against him for shooting a man while the road was being laid out, 
 although it was the result of an altercation not connected with the 
 road, since such evidence shows the animus of the accused in being 
 at the place of the killing with a gun.* So, language used by the 
 accused against the deceased expressing hostility and dislike is ad- 
 missible in a prosecution against him for killing the deceased, though 
 it did not amount to threats.* And threats, though susceptible of 
 an innocent interpretation, may be given in evidence in a prosecu- 
 tion for homicide if, when taken in connection with other threats 
 directly made against the deceased, they may have a guilty mean- 
 ing,^ the uncertainty of meaning going to the weight, and not the 
 admissibility of the evidence.® Nor are threats rendered inadmis- 
 sible by the fact that they were apparently made in jest,^ or in a 
 I 
 
 isRambo v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) to get even with her as soon as he got 
 69 S. W. 163. out, though the (locket contains no rec- 
 
 17 Gaines v. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. ord of the threat. Com v. Brown, 193 
 202 42 S. W. 385; Ilarr v. State, 100 Pa. 507, 44 Atl. 497. 
 Ala. 4, 46 Am. St. Rep. 17, 14 So. 851. zWestbrook v. People, 126 111. 81, 18 
 
 isCole V. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. N. E. 304. 
 225, 75 S. W. 527. sFurlow v. State. 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 isAtkins v. State, 16 Ark. 568. 12, 51 S. W. 938. 
 
 iState V. Sloan, 22 Mont. 203, 56 Pac. 4People v. Barthleman, 120 Cal. 7, 
 364. 52 Pac. 112. 
 
 A magistrate's docket is admissible sState v. Dieckman, 11 Mo. App. 
 in evidence to show the date and nature 538 ; Hudson v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. 
 of criminal proceedings by a wife Rep. 251, 70 S. W. 764. 
 against her husband on the trial of an eHudson v. State, supra. 
 indictment against him for her murder, 'People v. Holmes, 111 Mich. 364, 69 
 where it appears that he had threatened N. W. 501. 
 
I 602] EVIDENCE. 935 
 
 thoughtless and bragging manner;® nor because they were condi- 
 tional ; ^ nor because the utterer was drunlc ; "■ " nor because they were 
 immediately withdrawn by the utterer on being cautioned ;^^ nor 
 because they were covert, indirect, or vague;^^ nor because they 
 were threats to rob, and not to kill. ^ ^ 
 
 But to be admissible the threats must have had apparent and 
 obvious relation to the homicide charged, ^ * and a threat by a hus- 
 band to divorce his wife for some trivial matter is not competent in 
 a prosecution against him for killing her. ^ ^ And in addition to these 
 things it is important to observe: First, that the words supposed 
 to be declaratory of criminal intention may have been misunder- 
 stood or misremembered ; second, that it does not necessarily follow, 
 because a man avows an intention, or threatens to commit a crime, 
 that such intention really exists in his mind; the words may have 
 been uttered through bravado, or with a view of intimidating, an- 
 noying, extorting money, or other collateral objects; third, another 
 person, really desirous of committing the offense, may have profited 
 by the occasion of the threat, to avert suspicion from himself. ' " An 
 instance of this is given in the Causes Celebres. ^"^ A woman of ex- 
 tremely bad character and violent temper, in the open street, threat- 
 ened a man who had done something to displease her that she would 
 
 sState V. Horn, 116 N. C. 1037, 21 S. sible in a prosecution against him for 
 
 E. 694; Palmer v. People, 138 111. 356, killing her in the absence of evidence to 
 
 32 Am. St. Eep. 146, 28 N. E. 130; establish knowledge on his part of her 
 
 Jones V. State, 64 Ind. 473. infidelity. 
 
 And evidence that a person indicted lo Smith v. Com. 9 Ky. L. Eep. 215, 4 
 
 as an accessory in murder was a man of S. W. 798. And see Gater v. State, 141 
 
 violent passions, and in the habit of Ala. 10, 37 So. 692. 
 
 using threatening language, is irrele- nCribbs v. State, supra. 
 
 vant and inadmissible in a prosecution isState v. Crawford, 99 Mo. 74, 12 
 
 against him for homicide to rebut the S. W. 354. And see Moore v. State, 44 
 
 presumption arising from threats made Tex. Crira. Rep. 526, 72 S. W. 595 ; Ditt- 
 
 by him against the deceased. State v. mer v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 103, 74 
 
 Duncan, 28 N. C. (6 Ired. L.) 236. S. W. 34. 
 
 sStato V. Adams, 76 Mo. 355; Cribbs Testimony as to a threat made by an 
 
 v. State, 86 Ala. 613, 6 So. 109; Barnes unknown person, though incompetent by 
 
 V. State, 134 Ala. 36, 32 So. 670; People itself, is rendered admissible in a 
 
 V. Dice, 120 Cal. 189, 52 Pac. 477 ; Abbott prosecution for homicide by a showing 
 
 V. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 148, 68 S. W. that none but the defendant and his 
 
 124; State v. Rose, 129 N. C. 575, 40 S. victim were at the place from wnlcli 
 
 E. 83; Brown v. State (Tex. Crim. the voice uttering it proceeded. State 
 
 App.) 50 S. W. 354; Washington v. v. Fiester, 32 Or. 254, 50 Pac. 561. 
 
 State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 184, 79 S. W. isCom. v. Farrell, 187 Pa. 408, 41 Atl. 
 
 811; Hudson v. State, supra; State v. 382. 
 
 Crawford, 31 Wash. 260, 71 Pac. 1030. i^Eaines v. State, 81 Miss. 489, 33 So. 
 
 In Phillips v. State, 22 Tex. App. 139, 19. 
 
 2 S. W. 601, however, it was held that a I51bid. 
 
 casual remark by a man prior to the "See, as giving cautions on thia 
 
 killing of his wife, that if he knew his point, Reg. v. Hagan, 12 Cox, C. C. 357. 
 
 wife was unfaithful to him he would i^Causes C6l6bres, 437. 
 kill her, and himself, too, is inadmis- 
 
938 HOMICIDE. [5 60a 
 
 "get his hams cut across for him." He was found dead a short time 
 afterwards with his hams cut across. This was, of course, sufficient 
 to excite suspicion against the female, who, according to the practice 
 of continental tribunals at that time, was put to the torture, con- 
 fessed the crime, and was executed. A person was, however, soon 
 after taken into custody for some other offense, who confessed that 
 he was the murderer ; that, happening to be passing when the threat 
 was uttered, he conceived the idea of committing the crime, as he 
 knew the woman's bad character would be sure to tell against her. 
 So, it must be recollected that the tendency of a threat or declara- 
 tion of this nature is to frustrate its own accomplishment. By 
 threatening a man you put him on his guard, and force him to have 
 recourse to such means of protection as the force of the law, or any 
 extra judicial powers which he may have at command, may be capa- 
 ble of affording him. 
 
 603. The question of application to the person killed — General 
 threats made by a person charged with killing another to kill some 
 person other than the one killed are not admissible in evidence in a 
 prosecution for homicide to show malice, or otherwise.^ And the 
 reception of such evidence cannot be justified upon the assumption 
 that it tends to impeach the character or standing of the accused as 
 a witness.^ Evidence of a threat by the accused to stab or kill a 
 third person is admissible, however, when it constitutes a part of the 
 admission by the accused of the crime with which he is charged, al- 
 though it tends to prove another distinct offense.* And threats to 
 kill a third person, made by the accused, are admissible where the 
 killing was done in a general assault upon the person threatened, 
 
 iCarr v. State^ 23 Neb. 749, 37 N. W. author of » libelous article, but who he 
 630; Jordan v. State, 79 Ala. 9; Peo- afterwards found out was not, cannot 
 pie V. Powell, 87 Cal. 348, 11 L.Il.A. 75, be proved against him on a trial for 
 25 Pao. 481 ; People v. Bezy, 67 Cal. 223, killing another person, his ill-feeling 
 7 Pac. 643; Green v. Com. 17 Ky. L. Kep. toward whom grew out of the same 
 943, 33 S. W. 100; Shaw v. State, 79 publication. People v. Powell, 87 Cal. 
 Miss. 21, 30 So. 42; State v. Smith, 125 358, U L.R.A. 75. 25 Pac. 481. 
 ]\Io. 2, 28 S. W. 181 ; State v. Walsh, 5 zPeople v. Drake, supra. 
 Nev. 315; People v. Drake, 65 Hun, 331, aState v. Smith, supra. And see 
 20 N. Y. Supp. 228; State v. Barfield, 29 State v. Partlow, 90 Mo. 60S, 59 Am. 
 N. C. (7 Ired. L.) 299; Abernethy v. Rep. 31, 4 S. W. 14. 
 Com. 101 Pa. 328 ; McMahon v. State, 48 A threat by a person charged with 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 540, 81 S. W. 296; homicide to kill a companion, who pro- 
 Drake V. State, 5 Tex. App. 649 ; Bird v. tested against his proposition to kill a 
 United States, 180 U. S. 356, 45 L. ed. physician S'^ing to the relief of his vic- 
 570, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 403. And see Fri- tim, is admissible in evidence in a 
 day V. State (Tex.' Crim. App.) 79 S. prosecution against the threatener for 
 W. 815. killing the victim, as evidencing malice 
 
 A threat by a person to get even with o gainst the latter. Perr,y v. SSite, 110 
 
 another whom he supposed to be the C!a. 234, 36 S. E. 781. 
 
§ GC3] EVIDENCE. 937 
 
 together with the person killed and others.* And threats by the ac- 
 cused to kill several persons, or a class of persons, including the de- 
 ceased, are admissible in evidence;^ and are not subject to the ob- 
 jection that it is incompetent to prove threats, ill-will, or malice 
 against a third person.® And evidence of threats by the accused to 
 kill both the deceased and a third person are admissible where both 
 threats form a part of one and the same conversation or statement.'' 
 And general threats are not rendered inadmissible by the fact that 
 the deceased was not named, where it appears that they were intended 
 to apply to him.® 
 
 So, it has been held that general threats to kill someone, not hav- 
 ing apparent reference to any particular person, are admissible to 
 establish malice and a purpose to injure or kill, of which the de- 
 ceased became the victim.^ And it is for the jury to determine 
 whether they had reference to the person killed. ' " But the prevail- 
 
 4Rawlins v. State, 124 Ga. 31, 52 S. App.) 56 S. W. 53; Starr v. State, 160 
 
 E. 1; State V. Crawford, 115 Mo. 620, Ind. 661, 67 N. E. 527; Wheeler v. 
 
 22 S. W. 371. State, 158 Ind. 687, 63 N. E. 975; State 
 
 BSlade V. State, 29 Tex. App. 381, 16 v. Windahl 95 Iowa, 470, 64 N. W. 420; 
 
 S. W. 253; Sebastian v. State, 41 Tex. Barnes v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1143, 70 
 
 Crim. Rep. 248, 53 S. W. 875; Long v. S. W. 827; Hopkins v. Com. 50 Pa. 9, 
 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 88 S. W. 203; 88 Am. Dec. 518. 
 
 People V. Craig, 111 Cal. 460, 44 Pac. Previous threats made by the accused 
 
 186; People v. Gross, 123 Cal. 389, 55 against a railroad company are admis- 
 
 Pac. 1054; State v. Bailey, 190 Mo. 257, sible in evidence in a prosecution 
 
 88 S. W. 733; State v. Exum, 138 N. C. against the threaten^r for an assault 
 
 599, 50 S. E. 283; State v. Belton, 24 S. upon one of its employees, upon the 
 
 C. 185, 58 Am. Rep. 245 ; State v. Kohne, question of motive. Newton v. State, 
 
 48 W. Va. 335, 37 S. E. 553 ; Holmes v. 92 Ala. 33. 9 So. 404. 
 State, 124 Wis. 133, 102 N. W. 321. sBrooks v. Com. 100 Ky. 194, 37 S. 
 
 sSlade v. State, and People v. Craig, W. 1043; Whittaker v. Com. 13 Ky. L. 
 
 supra. Eep. 504, 17 S. W. 358; Williams v. 
 
 Declarations upon the part of a per- Com. 21 Ky. L. Rep. 612, 52 S. W. 843; 
 
 son charged with homicide, showing » Moore v. People, 26 Colo. 213, 57 Pac. 
 
 hostile and deadly animus against the 857; Harris v. State, 109 Ga. 280, 34 
 
 son of the person killed, and a purpose S. E. 583 ; State v. Cochran, 147 Mo. 
 
 to go to the house where the person 504, 49 S. W. 558; State v. Crabtree, 111 
 
 killed and his son resided and "clean Mo. 136, 20 S. W. 7; State v. Harlan, 
 
 them up," are admissible in a prosecu- 130 Mo. 381, 32 S. W. 997; State v. 
 
 tion against the threatener for killing Rosa, 72 N. J. L. 462, 62 Atl. 695 ; Hop- 
 
 the other as disclosing motive for the kins v. Com. supra; State v. Vance, 29 
 
 offense. Bonner v. State, 107 Ala. 97, Wash. 435, 70 Pac. 34; Benedict v. 
 
 18 So 2'6 State, 14 Wis. 423. And see People v. 
 
 vState^v. Wong Gee, 35 Or. 276, 57 Sutherland, 154 N. Y. 345, 48 N. E. 518. 
 Pac. 914; State v. Exum, supra. But evidence of general threats made 
 
 sHolloway v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. by the accused against the deceased 
 
 Rep 303 77 S. W. 14; Marchan v. State, some time before killing him is inad- 
 
 45 Tex Crim Rep. 212, 75 S. W. 532; miasible in a prosecution for the killing, 
 
 Tavlor V. Stnte, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 547, where in the meantime they had been 
 
 72 "S W 396; Brown v. State, 43 Tex. on friendly terms up to the day of the 
 
 Crim Eep 293 65 S. W. 529; De la homicide. State v. Crabtree, supra. 
 Garza v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 61 S. loMoore v. People, and State v. 
 
 W. 484; Davis v. State (Tex. Crim. Rosa, supra. 
 
933 HOMICIDE. t§ 603 
 
 ing rule would seem to be that threats of a general character are ad- 
 missible in homicide when the person killed came within the scope 
 and meaning of the threat uttered, though it did not refer to him by 
 name, but not otherwise;^ ^ and the question whether he did come 
 within the scope of the threat is one of fact for the jury;^^ and the 
 application of the threat to the deceased is provable by the circum- 
 stances. ^ * Thus, threats against all policemen are admissible in evi- 
 dence in a prosecution against the threatener for killing a x>olice- 
 man ; ^ * and so is a threat to split down any fellow that was saucy ; ^ ^ 
 and a threat to kill anybody who interfered ; ^ ^ or to kill some of the 
 militia, if they sought to recapture the threatener. ^ '^ But a threat 
 to kill the next deputy marshal that arrested the threatener is too 
 remote to be admissible in a prosecution against him, though he sub- 
 sequently killed a deputy marshal. ^ * And evidence of hostile feel- 
 
 iiParker v. State, 136 Ind. 285, 35 specifying the name of the person 
 N. E. 1105; State v. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 518, threatened, the opinion of a witness that 
 36 Am. Eep. 89; State v. Pierce, 90 the accused was talking about the de- 
 Iowa, 506, 58 N. W. 891 ; Redd v. State, ceased is inadmissible in a prosecution 
 68 Ala. 492; Ford V. State, 71 Ala. 385; for the killing. Johnson v. Com. 9 
 Jones V. State, 76 Ala. 8; Anderson v. Bush, 224. 
 
 State, 79 Ala. 5; Harrison v. State, 79 1 3 State v. Hymer, supra. And see 
 Ala. 29; Jordan v. State, 79 Ala. 9; Madison v. Com. and Williams v. State, 
 Billings V. State, 52 Ark. 303, 12 S. W. supra. 
 
 574; Madison v. Com. 13 Ky. L. Rep. Where evidence is given in a prosecu- 
 313, 17 S. W. 164; State v. Guy, 69 Mo. tion for homicide that the accused ha'd 
 430; State v. Fitzgerald, 130 Mo. 407, stated that he would get square with 
 32 S. W. 1113; State v. Hymer, 15 Nev. someone before night, and the accused 
 49; Strange v. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. unequivocally denied making the state- 
 280, 42 S. W. 551 ; Mathis v. State, 34 ment, it is error to permit him to testify 
 Tex. Crim. Eep. 39, 28 S. W. 817 ; Hardy that if he did use such language it had 
 V. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 289, 20 S. no reference to the deceased. State v. 
 W. 561; Melton v. State (Tex. Crim. Harlan, SM/)ro. 
 
 App.) 83 S. W. 822; Hall v. State, 43 i4Dixou v. State, 13 Fla. 636; Palmer 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 257, 64 S. W. 248; v. People, 138 111. 356, 32 Am. St. Eep. 
 Holley v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 302, 146, 28 N. E. 130; Quinn v. Com. 23 
 46 S. W. 39; Heffington v. State, 41 Tex. Ky. L. Eep. 1302, 63 S. W. 792; State v. 
 Crim. Rep. 315, 54 S. W. 755; Godwin Grant, 79 Mo. 113, 49 Am. Rep. 218; 
 v. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 466, 43 S. Miller v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. 609, 
 W. 336 ; Williams v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. 37 Am. St. Rep. 836, 21 S. W. 925. 
 Eep. 497, 51 S. W. 220; De la Garza v. isRespublica v. Bob, 4 Dall. 146, 1 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 6i S. W. 484; L. ed. 777. 
 
 Gaines v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 53 iGCaddell v. State, 129 Ala. 57, 30 So. 
 S. W. 623; Snodgrass v. Com. 89 Va. 76; State v. Teaehey, 138 N. C. 587, 50 
 679, 17 S. E. 238. And see Friday v. S. E. 232 ; Mathis v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 79 S. W. 815; Rep. 39, 28 S. W. 817; State v. Gates, 
 People v. Moran, 144 Cal. 48, 77 Pac. 28 Wash. 689, 69 Pac. 385. 
 777. i7People v. Wood, 145 Cal. 659, 79 
 
 laPeople v. Gross, 123 Cal. 389, 55 Pac. 367. 
 Pac. 1054; People v. Craig, 111 Cal. 460, isStevenson V. United States, 29 C. 
 44 Pac. 186; Harrison v. State, and C. A. 600, 52 U. S. App. 647, 86 Fed. 106 ; 
 Jones V. State, supra; State v. Harlan, Owens v. State, 80 Miss. 499, 32 So. 152. 
 130 Mo. 381, 32 S. W. 997. And see Earles v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 And where a person who afterwards App.) 85 S. W. 1. 
 killed another uttered threats, without 
 
§ 603] EVIDENCE. 939 
 
 ings and threats against spotters is too remote, where nothing con- 
 nects the person killed with that class, except that he was a prohibi- 
 tionist.^® And the same rule applies to threats to kill any officer 
 who attempted to arrest the threatener for a designated cause, when 
 the attempt to arrest, made by the officer killed, had no connection 
 with such cause. * ** 
 
 604. Connection of accused with threats by third persons. — ^As a gen- 
 eral rule, nothing else appearing, threats made by third persons 
 against the person alleged to have been killed are inadmissible in a 
 prosecution for the killing. * Threats made by a third person Avho is 
 shown to be an accomplice or an accessory, however, may be given 
 in evidence ; ^ and so may those of a person acting in concert with the 
 accused.* And where threats of third persons are part of the res 
 gestae, or form links in the chain of evidence connecting the person 
 making them with the crime itself, they are admissible in evidence 
 in behalf of the accused as tending to show that another, and not he, 
 committed the crime.* And where it is shown that another person 
 besides the accused had armed himself and was hunting for the de- 
 ceased, under the belief that the latter had done him an injury, 
 threats of such other against the deceased, and his declarations as ti> 
 his purpose, are admissible as part of the res gestae.^ But evidenco 
 of this character, to be competent, must have been such as to shov/ 
 such a deeply seated and enduring hostility on the part of the threat 
 ener as to lead to the presumption that, without further manifesta- 
 tion, it continued down to, and existed at the time of, the murder, 
 
 isHarrison v. State (Tex. Criin. aMarler v. State, 67 Ala. 55, 42 Am. 
 
 App.) 83 S. W. 699; Whitten v. State Eep. 95; State v. Gaylord, 70 S. C. 415, 
 
 (Tex. Grim. App.) 86 S. W. 1134. 50 S. E. 20. 
 
 aoEarles v. State, supra. sGardner v. People, 4 111. 83; State v. 
 
 iCom. V. Abbott, 130 Mass. 472; Al- McCahill, 72 Iowa, 111, 30 N. W. 553, 
 
 ston V. State, 63 Ala. 178; State v. 33 N. W. 599; Bell v. State (Tex. Grim. 
 
 Beaudet, 53 Conn. 536, 54 Am. Hep. App.) 24 S. W. 644; McCoy v. State, 27 
 
 155, 4 Atl. 237; Woolfolk v. State, Si Tex. App. 415, 11 S. W. 454. 
 
 'Ga 551, 8 S. E. 724; Jones v. State, 64 So, a threat against a person after- 
 
 Ind 474- Stroud V. Com. 14 Ky. L. Rep. wards killed is not rendered inadmis- 
 
 179, 19 S. W. 976; Cloud v. Com. 7 Ky. fble in a prosecution against accused 
 
 L. Rep. 818; State v. Laque, 41 La. Ann. for killing himby the fact that it was 
 
 1070, 6 So. 787; State v. Crawford, 99 ™.^d? ^y ^ "'i^/ P^"-^"?' ^^^'^T^ /"?'> 
 
 i, %,, in CI TIT o=y cci i -n „„„„ third person held a grudge against tlie 
 
 ^°-xJVl!-r^-.^^/\^o,''«^ r ' deceased which was sharld by th« ac- 
 
 28 N. C. (6 Ired. L.) 236; Preston v. ^^^^^ g^^jg ^ Hatfield, 48 W. Va. oUl, 
 
 State, 4 Tex. App. 186; Boothe v. btate, gy g g ggg 
 
 4 Tex. App. 202; Walker v. State, 6 Tex. 4 State v. Hawley, 63 Conn. 47, 27 Atl. 
 
 App. 576; Holt v. State, 9 Tex. App. 417. Morgan v. Com. 14 Bush, 106. 
 
 671; Wills V. State (Tex. Grim. App.) But see Buel v. State, supra. 
 
 22 S. W. 969; Henry v. State (Tex. BAlexander v. United States, 138 U. 
 
 Crim. App.) 30 S. W. 802; Buel v. State, S. 353, 34 L. ed. 954, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 104 Wis. 132, 80 N. W. 78. 350. 
 
940 HOMICIDE. [§ 604 
 
 and furnished a motive for its commission.® And threats previously 
 made by the deceased to kill himself are incompetent.'' 
 
 605. Determination as to admissibility and sufficiency. — The ques- 
 tion as to the admissibility of evidence of threats in homicide as in 
 other eases is, of course, for the decision of the court. ^ And the ques^ 
 tion of the remoteness of acts and declarations offered in evidence 
 also rests in its sound discretion.^ The question of the weight and 
 sufficiency of the evidence of threats in connection with other evi- 
 dence, however, is one of fact for the jury, to be determined upon a 
 consideration of all the circumstances of the case.^ And it has been 
 held that a previous threat or grudge against a person whom the 
 threatener afterwards kills is evidence of express malice, and fixes 
 the character of the killing, unless circumstances be shown to alter 
 or mitigate it and relieve it from the imputation of malice ;* and 
 that declarations of the accused made subsequent to the killing, in- 
 dicating maliciousness and ill-will toward the deceased, though 
 standing alone, do not leave a verdict of murder in the first degree 
 entirely without support in evidence;^ though the prevailing rule 
 would seem to be that mere threats to take the life of another are 
 not sufficient to warrant a conviction in the absence of other evidence 
 connecting the accused with the perpetration of the crime threat- 
 ened.® Less weight should be given to threats made under material 
 provocation than to threats made in cool blood, or after passion has 
 had time to cool, manifesting a deliberate design to injure.'' And 
 where threats are made and afterwards a reconciliation takes place, 
 and subsequently, after a new provocation, the threatener kills the 
 other, the killing will be deemed to have resulted from the later prov- 
 ocation, and not the previous malice indicated by the threats.* 
 Xor is it error to charge that the probative force of threats is in- 
 
 6Com. V. Abbott, 130 Mass. 472. 11 S. W. 260; JeflFerds v. People, 5 Park. 
 
 'State V. Punahon, 124 Mo. 448, 27 S. Crim. Pep. 522; State v. Horn, 116 N. C. 
 
 W. 1111. 1037, 21 S. E. 694; Murray v. Com. 79 
 
 iCom. V. Holmes, 157 Mass. 233, 34 Pa. 311. 
 Am. St. Eep. 270, 32 N. E. 6. 4Riggs v. State, 30 Miss. 635. 
 
 2lbid.; Com. v. Quinn, 150 Mass. 401, estate v. Sale, 119 Iowa, 1, 92 N. W. 
 
 23 N. E. 54; Com. v. Ryan, 134 Mass. 680, 95 N. W. 193. 
 223; Com. v. Abbott, supra. eBailey v. State, 104 Ga. 530, 30 S. E. 
 
 sState V. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 518, 36 Am. 817; Jones v. State, 57 Miss. 684; State 
 
 Rep. 89; Redd v. State, 68 Ala. 492; v. Glahn, supra; Com. v. Farrell, 187 
 
 Oibbs V. State, 86 Ala. 013, 6 So. 109; Pa. 408, 41 Atl. 382. 
 Griffin v. State, 90 Ala. 596, 8 So. 670; 'North Carolina v. Gosnell, 74 Fed. 
 
 People V. Hong Ab Duck, 61 Cal. 387; 734. 
 
 United States v. Neverson, 1 Mackey, SState v. Horn, supra; People v. 
 
 152; Everett v. State, 02 Ga. 65: Bolzer tiyndman, 90 Cal. 1, 33 Pac. 782; Mur- 
 
 V. People, 129 111. 112, 4 L.R.A. 579, 21 ray v. Com. supra. 
 N. E. 818; State v. Glahn, 97 Mo. 679, 
 
§ 605] EVIDENCE. 941 
 
 creased if they wore repeated during the time intervening between 
 their first utterance and the killing.^ A.nd remoteness of threats 
 from the time of the homicide is to be considered in determining 
 their weight. ^ " 
 
 b. Condition and surroundings of body. 
 
 606. General rule. — ^The condition of the body of a deceased per- 
 son and of things in the vicinity in which it was found is admissible 
 in evidence in a prosecution for the killing. This is a general state- 
 ment of a rule universally recognized, which is fortified and par- 
 ticularized in the following sections. ^ 
 
 607. Wounds — The condition of the body of the person killed, 
 when found, with reference to the number and character of the 
 wounds inflicted, is competent and sometimes cogent evidence in a 
 prosecution for the killing.^ And parts of the body, properly identi- 
 fied, may be introduced in evidence.^ And they may be described 
 by a person who examined the deceased after the killing.^ In ordi- 
 nary cases the shape of the wound will agree with the instrument 
 with which it has been produced. This is particularly the case with 
 those inflicted by a knife, a dirk, a sword, or a razor, or, in general, 
 by any sharp weapon by which a cut or thrust may be made. If, 
 however, death has been produced by a bruise or contusion,* the case 
 presents more difficulty, as it not infrequently happens that such 
 wounds are unaccompanied with any mark of external violence. 
 But in almost every case a careful investigation will lead to the dis- 
 covery whether the instrument was blunt or sharp, of wood or of 
 metal, whether the blows were repeated, and whether they were suffi- 
 cient to cause death. Thus, where the question was whether de- 
 ceased was killed by a stray shot, or by a shot which there was some 
 
 sBeavers v. State, 103 Ala. 36, 15 So. App.) 56 S. W. 626. And see MeCabe 
 
 616. V. Com. 3 Sadler (Pa.) 426, 8 Atl. 45. ; 
 
 loGrOodwin v. State, 96 Ind. 550; And refusal to instruct the jury in a 
 
 Griffin v. State, 90 Ala. 596, 8 So. 670. prosecution for homicide to find a ver- 
 
 And see State v. Wright, 141 Mo. 333, diet of not guilty is not error where the 
 
 42 S. W. 934; State v. Adams, 76 Mo. state has proved the killing of the de- 
 
 357. ceased by the accused, the weapons 
 
 I'See People v. Mahateh (Cal.) 82 used, the motive therefor, and the con- 
 
 Pac. 779; Com. v. Holmes, 157 Mass. dition in which the body was found. 
 
 233, 34 Am. St. Rep. 270, 32 N. E. 6. State v. Coella, 8 Wash. 512, 36 Pac. 474. 
 
 iTerry v. State, 118 Ala. 79, 23 So. zTurner v. State, 89 Tenn. 547, 15 S. 
 
 776; Dukes v. State, 11 Ind. 557, 71 Am. W. 838; State v. Moxley, 102 Mo. 374, 
 
 Dee 370; Davidson v. State, 135 Ind. 14 S. W. 969, 15 S. W. 556. And see 
 
 254, 34 N. E. 972; Com. v. Holmes, State v. Allen, 23 Mont. 118, 57 Pac. 725. 
 
 supra- People v. Wright, 89 Mioh. 70, sHarrison v. State (Ala.) 40 So. 57. 
 
 .50 N.'W. 792; McConnell v. State, 22 4Gardiner v. People, 6 Park. Crim. 
 
 Tex. App. 354. 5S Am. Rep. 648, 3 S. W. Rep. 155. 
 6Q9; Fendrick v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
942 HOMICIDE. [§ 607 
 
 evidence to show was aimed from a lliii'd-story window, the doubt 
 was solved by the slanting direction of the wound. ^ But evidence 
 of this kind must be received with much caution. ® No positive rule 
 can be laid down as to the precise course taken by a ball when enter- 
 ing a human body. It does not necessarily pursue a straight course, 
 and is deflected by obstacles which at the first glance seem inappre- 
 ciable. '' 
 
 So, a description of the character of a gunshot wound is competent 
 on the question of the proximity of the parties to the combat ® And, 
 in incised wounds, inference may be drawn from the skill of inflic- 
 tion; when a wound is skilfully directed to such a vital part as an 
 ordinary observer would not be acquainted with, special knowledge 
 of the subject is inferred. And a wound has been traced to a butcher 
 from the fact that it was inflicted in the way used by butchers in 
 killing sheep.® And if a wound is shown to have been effected by 
 a person who was right-handed, it is a ground of defense that the 
 defendant was left-handed, and there may be a slight inculpatory 
 inference, in case of a left-handed wound, drawn from the fact that 
 the defendant was left-handed. ^ " And the number and positions of 
 wounds may bear legitimately on the question whether death was 
 the result of suicide or homicide. In ordinary cases of suicide^ but 
 one wound is inflicted, which proves fatal; and if the self -destroyer 
 effects his purpose by a cutting instrument, or incisions, he selects 
 the throat; if he stabs himself he selects the chest, particularly the 
 heart or belly ; and if he shoots himself he generally does it through 
 the head. ^ * It therefore becomes a subject of legitimate investiga- 
 tion whether or not the wounds are in a position likely to have been 
 selected by one seeking instantaneous self-destruction. So, too, the 
 variety of the wounds will often sufficiently indicate the fact of 
 murder. ^^ And the description and location of a wound inflicted 
 by one person upon another may be given in evidence in a prosecu- 
 tion against the former for killing the latter, as tending to deter- 
 
 BWatson, Homicide, 276. 97, — where Sellis, a servant of the Ti-ake 
 
 6Saunders v. State, 37 Tex. 710. of Cumberland, being found in his bed 
 
 'See, as bearing on this point. State Itilled by a razor, the question of suicide 
 
 V. Morphy, 33 Iowa, 270, 11 Am. Rep. or homicide (in which there was an at- 
 
 122; State v. Porter, 34 Iowa, 131; tempt to implicate the duke) arising, 
 
 Saunders v. State, supra. the hypothesis of suicide was said at 
 
 sState V. Hamilton, 170 Mo. 377, 70 first to be sustained by the fact that the 
 
 S. W. 876. razor was found on the left side of 
 
 sTaylor's Med. Jur. by Eeese, 277. Sellis's bed. This was met by proof 
 
 loSee Taylor's Med. Jur. by Reese, that Sellis was ambidextrous. 
 
 279; and see R. v. Phillips, Woodhull's uWataon, Homicide, 276. 
 
 Trials, 80; Wills, Circumstantial Ev. .^aWills, Circumstantial Ev. 169. 
 
§ 607] < EVIDENCE. 943 
 
 mine whether death resulted therefrom.^' And evidence of wounds 
 inflicted upon a third person is competent in a prosecution for homi- 
 cide, where their infliction was a part of the transaction resulting 
 in the killing for which the prosecution is had. ^ * 
 
 Whether a particular wound could have been produced by a par- 
 ticular instrument is a question as to which the opinion of experts 
 can be asked. ^ ^ And the opinion of an expert as to which of two 
 wounds, either of which was necessarily fatal, actually caused the 
 death of the deceased, is competent evidence. ^ ^ 
 
 608. Marks. — It is important to inquire, in prosecutions for homi- 
 cide where the defense of suicide is asserted, whether there are marks 
 upon the person other than those made by the fatal wounds; e. g., 
 whether the hands or arms have the appearance of having been held 
 forcibly during the commission of the deed; whether the head ap- 
 pears to have been bruised, as if the victim were first rendered in- 
 sensible by a blow upon that portion of the frame ; whether the wound 
 is in a position that could not have been reached by the deceased, and 
 which may often be ascertained by placing the weapon in the hand 
 of the corpse, and observing whether or not the direction of its prob- 
 able course corresponds with that of the wound. It must be con- 
 sidered, also, whether there are signs of the presence of another, as 
 in the case of a woman found dead in a room with her throat cut, 
 and a large quantity of blood on her person, the presence of another 
 person in that room was clearly demonstrated by the print of a bloody 
 left hand on the left arm of the deceased.^ So, all stains or marks 
 of dirt on the person or dress of the deceased should be carefully 
 scrutinized.^ And the hands of the deceased should be examined 
 for the purpose of seeing whether they exhibit any traces of attack 
 or defense. And marks and bruises upon the person of the deceased 
 may tend to show which of the parties was the aggressor in the fatal 
 difficulty, and are admissible in evidence for that purpose.^ So 
 
 isBasye v. State^ 45 Neb. 265, 63 N. tially identified, and that of her mur- 
 
 W. 811. derer connected with it by the fact that 
 
 iiPeople V. Wright, 89 Mich. 70, 50 on both of them were found traces of 
 
 N. W. 792. evacuations which took place during 
 
 isDavis V. State, 38 Md. 15; State the violence committed on her, which 
 
 V. Morphy, 33 Iowa, 270, 11 Am. Rep. evacuations contained the seeds of figs 
 
 122; State v. Porter, 34 Iowa, 131; of which she had previously copiously 
 
 Com. V. Lenox, 3 Brewst. (Pa.) 249. eaten. 
 
 But see Wilson v. People, 4 Park. Crim. sBillings v. State, 52 Ark. 303, 12 S. 
 
 Rep. 619. W. 574. 
 
 leEggler v. People, 56 N. Y. 642. And that there was sand in the 
 iNorkott's Case, 14 How. St. Tr. 1324. mouth, nostrils, and windpipe of the de- 
 2Iii the famous case of Leontade, ceased when her body was first found 
 where a young girl, after having been after her death is admissible in a prose- 
 ravished, was killed, her dress was par- cution for the killing. Com. v. Holmes, 
 
944 HOMICIDE. '[§ 608 
 
 where, from lapse of time or otherwise, there is a question as to 
 identity of the deceased, peculiar marks upon his person and other 
 points of resemblance may be given in evidence by persons ac- 
 quainted therewith.* 
 
 609. Position. — The position of the body of the person killed is 
 relevant and material in a prosecution for homicide, on an issue as 
 to whether death was due to criminal agency, or to accident, or sui- 
 cide. ^ 
 
 610. Clothing, weapons, etc. — .The clothing worn by the person 
 killed may be introduced in evidence in a prosecution for the killing 
 whenever it may, in any way, aid in explaining or determining any 
 disputed question in connection therewith;^ and so may identified 
 portions or particles of it.^ And the clothes worn by other persons 
 killed at the same time and place are also competent evidence.* And 
 the clothes worn by the accused at the time of the alleged perpetra- 
 tion of the homicide may be given in evidence for a similar pur- 
 pose;* it being a question for the jury whether or not he wore the 
 clothes upon the occasion of the crime. ® And the condition of the 
 clothing of the person killed is competent,^ as are also articles found 
 
 J 57 Mass. 233, 34 Am. St. Eep. 270, 32 W. 1105; State v. Cushing, 14 Wash. 
 
 N. E. 6. 527, 53 Am. St. Rep. 883, 45 Pac. 145. 
 
 iKeith V. State, 157 Ind. 376, 61 N. And permitting the clothing of a 
 
 E. 716. girl alleged to have been murdered to be 
 
 iDavidson v; State, 135 Ind. 254, 34 displayed to the jury in a prosecutioii 
 
 N. E. 972. for the killing, upon a dressmaKer"s 
 
 iDorsey v. State, 107 Ala. 157, 18 So. frame, as a, convenient mode of display- 
 
 199; Wilson v. State, 128 Ala. 17, 29 So. ing it, is not error, it not being claimed 
 
 569; People v. Knapp, 71 Cal. 1, 11 Pac. that the frame represented the height, 
 
 793; People v. O'Brien, 78 Cal. 41, 20 size, or figure of the girl. People v. 
 
 Pac. 359; People v. Hawes, 98 Cal. 648, Durrant, 116 Cal. 182, 48 Pac. 75. 
 
 33 Pac. 791; Henry v. People, 198 111. zwilson v. State, supra. 
 
 162, 65 N. E. 120; McDonel v. State, 90 sState v. Porter, 32 Or. 135, 49 Pac. 
 
 Ind. 320; Story v. State, 99 Ind. 413; 964. 
 
 Davidson v. State, 135 Ind. 254, 34 N. E. ipeople v. McCurdy, 68 Cal. 576, 10 
 
 972; State v. Winter, 72 Iowa, 627, 34 Pac. 207; State v. Stair, 87 Mo. 268, 56 
 
 N. W. 475; Seaborn v. Com. 25 Ky. L. Am. Rep. 449; People v. Neufeld, 165 M. 
 
 Rep. 2203, 80 S. W. 223; People v. Y. 43, 58 N. E. 786; State v. Baker, 33 
 
 Wright, 89 Mich. 70, 50 N. W. 792; W. Va. 319, 10 S. E. 639. 
 
 State V. Symmes, 40 S. C. 383, 19 S. E. sPeople v. Neufeld, supra. 
 
 16; King V. State, 13 Tex. App. 277; But the question whether an article of 
 
 Hart V. State, 15 Tex. App. 202, 49 Am. clothing of the deceased offered in evi- 
 
 Rep. 188; Frizzell v. State, 30 Tex. App. denoe in a prosecution for homicide is 
 
 42, 16 S. W. 751; Levy v. State, 28 Tex. in the same condition as at the time of 
 
 App. 203, 19 Am. St. Rep. 826, 12 S. W. the homicide is, in the first instance, 
 
 596; Mitchell v. State, 38 Tex. Grim, one for the determination of the trial 
 
 Rep. 170, 41 S. W. 816; Head v. State, court. Com. v. Tucker, 189 Mass 457, 
 
 40 Tex. Crira. Rep. 265, 50 S. W. 352; 70 N. E. 127. 
 
 Barkman v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. eWatkins v. State, 89 Ala. 82, 8 So. 
 
 105, 52 S. W. 73; Gregory v. Stata 134; People v. Majors, 65 Cal. 138, 52 
 
 (Tex. Grim. App.) 48 S. W. 577; Thorn- Am. Rep. 295, 3 Pac. 597; Com. v. Pope, 
 
 ton V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 65 S. 103 Mass. 440. 
 
§ 610] EVIDENCE. 945 
 
 upon the body/ or near it, at the place where the killing took place.® 
 And the disposition made of the clothing of the person killed shortly 
 after the homicide is also competent.' So, the condition of things 
 at the house of the deceased immediately after the body was found 
 may be shown. ^ " And tracks in the snow near the body, and other 
 surroundings, are competent. ^ ' And where a man was killed by a 
 shotgun while sitting in his buggy, the buggy may be produced in 
 court in a prosecution for the killing, and shown to the jury to enable 
 the witnesses to explain the position of the deceased and of the ac- 
 cused, and the range or charge of the shot which passed through the 
 body and lodged in the cushion. ^ ^ 
 
 So, the condition of a weapon or instrument with which a homi- 
 cide was committed is a proper subject of proof in a prosecution for 
 the killing;^* as is also the condition of a weapon carried by the de- 
 ceased at the time of the killing. ^ * And if the weapon with which 
 the deed was committed is identified as the one in the possession of 
 the deceased at the time of the killing the jury cannot be permitted 
 to disregard it. ^ ® And an instrument with which the killing is sup- 
 posed to have been done may be put in evidence, ^ ® though to be ad- 
 
 'People V. Irwin, 77 Cal. 494, 20 Pac. sBess v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Eep. 839, 82 
 
 56; King V. Com. 35 Pittsb. L. J. 127. S. W. 576. And see State v. Usher, 126 
 
 The trial court in a prosecution for Iowa, 287, 102 N. W. 101. 
 
 homicide should compel the prosecuting loDavidson v. State, 135 Ind. 254 34 
 
 attorney to produce any papers found jq^ j; g^2 ' 
 
 on the body of the deceased, where they ' ' ' . . . . , ■ .j 
 
 tend to prove a motive for the killing, or Uoots of a room m which a homicide 
 
 where the accused has claimed that occurred are proper evidence in a 
 
 such papers are forgeries. State v. prosecution therefor to show the location 
 
 Goddard, 146 Mo. 177, 48 S. W. 82. <>* t^e pistol balls therein where they 
 
 sThomton v. State, 113 Ala. 43, 59 are shown to have remained m the same 
 
 Am. St. Eep. 97, 21 So. 356; Lillie v. condition as at the time of the homicide. 
 
 State (Iowa) 100 N. W. 316; Ruloflf v. State v. Goddard, supra. 
 
 People, 45 N. Y. 213; Williams v. Com. nHoward v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 950, 
 
 85 Va. 607, 8 S. E. 470. And see Bur- 70 S. W. 295. 
 
 ton V. State, 107 Ala. 110, 18 So. 284. i2Henry v. People, 198 111. 162, 65 
 
 Where a woman suddenly disappeared n. e. 120. 
 
 from the neighborhood where she had isstate v. Pritchett, 106 N. C. 667, 11 
 
 li%'ed, and metallic articles of female g g gg^ 
 
 dress were found among the ashes of a " ^^g^^^^" ^ chevallier, 36 La. Ann. 81. 
 
 fire where a large quantity of wood had Crawford, 31 Wash, 
 
 been burned. It is competent for the ^^^^ 
 
 purpose of showing her identity in a ' 
 
 prosecution for homicide carried on "^^V^^ ^- ^^ds, 90 App. Div. 58, 
 
 upon the theory that she had been §5 N. Y. Supp. 627. 
 
 murdered and her body consumed by leRoberts v. State, 123 Ga. 146, 51 S. 
 
 fire to show that she had worn such E. 374; Osburn v. State, 164 Ind. 262, 
 
 things previous to her disappearance; 73 N. E. 601; State v. Seery (Iowa) 105 
 
 and lapse of time between the period of N. W. 511 ; State v. Aspara, 113 La. 940, 
 
 her wearing such articles and her dis- 37 So. 883; People v. Higgins, 127 Mich, 
 
 appearance, though it would weaken 291, 86 N. W. 812; People v. Lagroppo, 
 
 such evidence, would not destroy its 90 App. Div. 219, 86 N. Y. Supp. 116; 
 
 competency. State v. Williams, 52 N. Yancey v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 366, 
 
 C. (7 Jones, L.) 446, 78 Am. Dec. 248. 76 S. W. 571 ; Long v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 Horn.— 60 
 
946 HOMICIDE. [§ 6ia 
 
 missible the weapon must be clearly identified.^'' And bullets ex- 
 tracted from the body of a deceased person, when properly identiiied^ 
 are admissible in evidence in a prosecution for killing him;^^ and 
 so is a pistol or other weapon, such as may have been used in com- 
 mitting the crime, afterwards found at the place of commission,^* 
 though the rule is different with reference to unidentified bullets or 
 other articles found at the scene of the homicide a long time after- 
 wards.^" And articles of this class may be given in evidence, though 
 found some distance away from the scene of the homicide, where 
 there were reasons for supposing that they were used in the killing 
 and that the accused had fled in that direction. ^^ And the fact that 
 others had access to the place where such articles were found goes to 
 their probative force, but not to their admissibility.^^ So, an 
 X-ray photograph showing the position and location of the bullet in 
 the body of the person alleged to have been shot is admissible in evi- 
 dence in a prosecution for the shooting as a photograph, and not sub- 
 ject to objection that it is not sufficiently identified as a representa- 
 tion of anything in evidence. ^ ^ So, hair or other parts of the body 
 may adhere to the weapon. And this, in respect to hair, is strong 
 evidence connecting the weapon with the homicide, when the hair 
 resembles that of the deceased. But hair should be carefully ex- 
 amined by microscope so as to determine whether it is human. ^* 
 
 App.) 88 S. W. 203; De la G-arza v. But where it appeared that the last 
 
 State (Tex. Grim. App.) 61 S. W. 484; seen of the person alleged to have been 
 
 State V. Bean, 77 Vt. 384, 60 Atl. 807; killed was when he went away with 
 
 State V. Tucker, 52 W. Va. 420, 44 S. E. the accused, and afterwards, near a pile 
 
 427. And see Nickles v. State, 48 Fla. of ashes containing some bones, there 
 
 46, 37 So. 312; People v. Morales, 143 were found buttons and articles of cloth- 
 
 Cal. 550, 77 Pac. 470; Jones v. State, 137 ing, it is competent for a witness who 
 
 Ala. 12, 34 So. 681; Luton v. State (Tex. saw the parties going away together to 
 
 Crim. App.) 64 S. W. 1051; Gustaven- testify that the buttons and pieces of 
 
 son V. State, 10 Wyo. 300, 68 Pac. 1006. clothing so found were the buttons on 
 
 Instate V. Cadotte, 17 Mont. 315, 42 the coat deceased wore at that time, 
 
 Pac. 857. And see McDuffie v. State, and that the articles of clothing were 
 
 121 Ga. 580, 49 S. E. 708; State v. part of the clothing he then wore. Bur- 
 
 Seery, supra. ton v. State, 107 Ala. 110, 18 So. 284. 
 
 isMoon V. State, 68 6a. 687; People ziHorn v. State, 12 Wyo. 80, 73 Pac. 
 
 V. Morales, supra. And see Miller v. 705. And see Litton v. Com. 101 Va. 
 
 State, 130 Ala. 1, 30 So. 379. 833, 44 S. E. 923; State v. Hill, 65 N. J. 
 
 isState V. Aspara, 113 La. 940, 37 So. L. 626, 47 Atl. 814; People v. Smith, 
 
 883; Boynton v. State, 115 Ga. 587, 41 172 N. Y. 210, 64 N. E. 814; Baines v. 
 
 S. E. 995; State v. Gartrell, 171 Mo. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 490, 66 S. W. 
 
 489, 71 S. W. 1045; State v. Henry, 51 847; Norris v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 W. Va. 283, 41 S. E. 439. And see 64 S. W. 1044. 
 
 State V. Laudano, 74 Conn. 638, 51 Atl. 22Grimsinger v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. 
 
 860; State v. Romano (Wash.) 83 Pac. Rep. 1, 69 S. W. 583. 
 
 1; State v. Dunn, 116 Iowa, 219, 89 N. zsState v. Matheson (Iowa) 103 N. 
 
 W. 984; State v. Gray, 116 Iowa, 231, W. 137. 
 
 89 N. W. 987. 2 4See case detailed by Lyon in Apol- 
 
 zoHickey v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. oey for the Microscope, p. 24. 
 297, 76 S. W. 920. 
 
§ 610] EVIDENCE. 947 
 
 And the same general rules apply to fibres of the clothing worn by 
 the deceased, ^^ and to particles of bone, such as the blow given 
 might have taken from the deceased.^® 
 
 The clothing of the deceased and other surroundings are not ad- 
 missible in evidence, however, unless they illustrate and make perti- 
 nent some phase of the evidence of the prosecution;^'' and the ad- 
 mission in evidence of the bloody clothing of the deceased is errone- 
 ous as calculated to prejudice the jury against the slayer, where 
 everything connected with the wound is admitted or clearly proved.^* 
 And refusal to permit a witness who saw the accused at a point three 
 or more miles distant from the scene of the difficulty, at least an 
 hour later, and after he had been at his home, to testify as to the con- 
 dition of his clothing, and whether or not it was torn, is not error in 
 the absence of anything to show that he had on the same clothing. * ® 
 
 The introduction in evidence or the exhibition to the jury in a 
 prosecution for homicide of clothing, weapons, or other articles taken 
 from the accused, tending to show his guilt, does not contravene a 
 constitutional provision that no person shall be compelled to give 
 testimony tending in any manner to incriminate himself.*" 
 
 611. Blood stains — The examination of spots supposed to be blood 
 upon the person and clothes of the suspected party is always of the 
 greatest importance.* Traces of blood near the corpse or in the way 
 leading to or from it, or marks or spots of blood upon the person or 
 clothes of the accused, should be carefully examined with a view to 
 the solution of any of the following inquiries : 1. Were the wounds 
 self-inflicted, or the act of another ? This may, in some cases, be de- 
 termined by observing that blood is visible in spots or pools in places 
 where it could not have been if the death had been the result of sui- 
 cide; or that there is no communication between the blood on the 
 floor and the corpse ; as if the body had been removed by another from 
 the spot on which the deed was committed. 2. Was the deceased 
 erect or lying down when the wounds were received ? It will throw 
 much light on this question if the spots of blood on the adjoining wall, 
 or any other erect body near the locality, be examined, as the direction 
 from which they came may frequently be determined from the man* 
 
 25Reff V Harrington, Taylor's Med. asCole v. State, 45 Tes. Crim. Rep. 
 Jur. by Reese, 7th Am. ed. 289; State 225, 75 S. W. 527. 
 
 V Weddinston, 103 N. C. 364 9 S. E. 29State v. Moore, 168 Mo. 434, 68 S. 
 577 W. 358. 
 
 z'eCom. V. Sturtivant, 117 Mass. 122, soDrake v. State, 75 Ga. 413. 
 19 Am Rep 401. ^See State v. Brown, 168 Mo. 449, 
 
 27Christian v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. 68 S. W. 568; Cole v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 Rep 47 79 S. W. 562. And see Ireland App.) 88 S. W. 341 ; State v. Henry, 51 
 
 V &m.'22 Ky. L. Rep. 478, 57 S. W. 616. W. Va. 283, 41 S. E. 439. 
 
948 HOMICrDE. t§ 611 
 
 ner in which they have spattered. Prints of bloody hands may fre- 
 quently be observed, and impressions of bloody feet which give in- 
 formation as to the direction taken by the murderer after the com- 
 mission of the act. Care should be taken, however, not to create 
 indicia while searching for thein.^ And though blood stains were 
 found upon articles in close proximity to the place of the finding of 
 the body of a deceased person, and at or about the time the body was 
 found, no presumption arises that it was human blood. ^ So, the 
 amount of blood flowing may be considered, to determine whether the 
 wounds were homicidal or accidental.* And the bloody clothing 
 worn by the deceased at the time of a homicide is admissible in evi- 
 dence, and may be important as a part of the res gestce in a prosecu- 
 tion for the killing. ® 
 
 Likewise, bloodstains upon articles belonging to, or in the pos- 
 session of, the accused are competent evidence against him.® And 
 such articles may be inspected by the jury; and nonexpert testimony 
 as to the character of the marks may be given, though it has not been 
 established by miscroscopic examination or otherwise that the marks 
 are bloodstains.^ But the facts that the deceased bled profusely 
 and that the clothes of the accused, put in evidence, had no blood 
 stains on them, raise no presumption that he did not commit the 
 crime, — especially if there was opportunity for removal.® And 
 where the overcoat of the accused in a prosecution for homicide was 
 exhibited to the jury under the theory that he acted in self-defense, 
 and that certain cuts in it were made by the deceased in the affray, 
 the jury may properly be , invited to examine the coat for blood 
 stains, for the purpose of refuting that theory.* 
 
 To render blood-stained clothing admissible in evidence in such 
 cases, however, its identity must be established, and it must appear 
 
 I 
 
 21 Taylor, Med. Jur. 372. And see But evidence that blood was found 
 
 Com. V. Sturtivant, 117 Mass. 122, 19 upon the clothes of alleged conspirators 
 
 Am. Rep. 401 ; Drake v. State, supra; in a conspiracy to murder is inadmissi- 
 
 Painter v. People, 147 111. 444, 35 N. E. hie in a. prosecution for the murder in 
 
 64; McCabe v. Com. 3 Sadler (Pa.) the absence of sufficient proof of a con- 
 
 426, 8 Atl. 45 ; State v. Martin, 47 B. C. spiracy. People v. Pavlik, 7 N. Y. 
 
 67, 25 S. E. 113. Crim. Rep. 30. 
 
 sMcCabe v. Com. supra. 'State v. Henry, 51 W. Va. 283, 41 S. 
 
 ■lO'Mara v. Com. 75 Pa. 424. E. 439. 
 
 sPeople V. Hong Ah Duck, 61 Ca), sPeople v. Jackson, 182 N. Y. 66, 74 
 
 387 ; People v. Antony, 146 Cal. 124, 79 N. E. 565. 
 
 Pac. 858. cRichards v. State, 82 Wis. 172, 51 
 
 sWalker v. State, 139 Ala. 56, 35 So. N. W. 652. 
 1011; Davis v. State, 126 Ala. 44, 28 So. 
 617; People v. Neufeld, 165 N. Y. 43, 
 58 N. E. 786. 
 
§ 611] EVIDENCE. 949 
 
 that it had not been interfered with, eitlier purposely or otherwise. ^ '* 
 And it is error to admit evidence with reference to blood-stained 
 clothing and its appearance, where the clothing itself is not produced, 
 or its nonproduction accounted for.^^ But proof that a bloody 
 garment was taken from the body of the deceased several hours after 
 his death sufficiently identifies it to warrant its admission in evi- 
 dence. ^ ^ So, an exhibition before the jury in a prosecution for homi- 
 cide, of blood-stained clothing worn by the deceased at the time of 
 the homicide, is not proper in the absence of any questions as to the 
 location of the wounds, their effect, or their character. ^^ Nor is 
 evidence with reference to alleged blood stains competent when death 
 appears to havie been caused by choking.^* And where the killing 
 is unquestioned, and the character, condition, and location of the 
 wounds are fully described to the jury, so that the exhibition of the 
 bloody garments of the person killed would throw no further light 
 upon the case, their exhibition is error. ^ ® 
 
 As to the general character of blood stains the following points 
 must be kept in mind : — ^Heavy blunt instruments may produce death 
 without immediate effusion of blood ; ^ ® a weapon may be wiped after 
 the fatal blow; and in all cases, the handle, casement, and joints 
 of the weapon should be scrutinized. Often a weapon, after in- 
 flicting a rapid incised or punctured wound, is wiped by the edges of 
 the wound closing before blood has reached the surface. In stabs 
 the dagger or knife may inflict death vidthout receiving any blood 
 stains, or, at the most, a film which leaves, when dried, a faint 
 yellow-brovm tinge. The absence of blood stains on the dress of the 
 accused affords but a slight presumption of innocence, even in cases 
 of violent homicide by cutting, since such stains may have been ef- 
 faced, and since, also, there are many cases of such homicides (e. g., 
 cutting a throat from behind), in which the blood would not reach the 
 person of the assailant. ^ ^ On clothing, supposing it to be identified 
 with the deceased, which is a prerequisite,^^ the direction of the 
 flow of the blood must be examined. If downwards it proves an up- 
 per blow, and indicates that the wounded person was more or less 
 
 xoState V. McAnarney, 70 Kan. 679, 14 Vaughn v. State, 130 Ala. 18, 30 So. 
 
 79 Pac. 137; State v. Moore, 168 Mo. 432, 669. 
 
 68 S W 358. IB Crenshaw v. State (Tex. Crim. 
 
 1 1 Johnson V. State, 80 Miss. 798, 32 App.) 85 S. W. 1147. 
 
 go 49_ leSee O'Mara v. Com. 75 Pa. 424. 
 
 12 Venters v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) i' Taylor's Med. Jur. by Eeese, 290. 
 
 83 S. W. 832. **If lost, secondary evidence of the 
 
 iskelton V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) condition of the clothing may be given. 
 
 83 S. W. 822. Com. v. Pope, 103 Mass. 440. 
 
950 HOMICIDE. [I 611 
 
 erect at the time of the wound. Spattering may indicate an arterial 
 wound, or a continued struggle. On shirts and other undergarments 
 blood stains may arise from flea or mosquito bites and other causes. 
 
 612. Presence of poison Where, in a prosecution for homicide 
 
 by poisoning, there is evidence that poison was administerei */ the 
 lifetime of the deceased, medical testimony of the finding of poison 
 in the stomach of the deceased is admissible. ^ And it is competent 
 to permit a physician who attended during her last illness a person 
 alleged to have been killed by poison to describe, in a prosecution 
 for the killing, her condition and the nature of her suffering;^ and 
 the results of chemical analysis of the contents of the stomach of the 
 deceased, properly identified, are, of course, competent.* So, the 
 soiled condition of the bedding and clothing of an alleged victim of 
 arsenical poisoning is competent in a prosecution for the killing in 
 corroboration of evidence of purging and vomiting, which are symp- 
 toms of such poisoning.* And where it is established, in a case of 
 arsenical poisoning, that arsenic is rapidly eliminated from the human 
 body after administration, it is not incumbent on the state to prove 
 that a quantity of poison sufficient to cause death was found in the 
 body before the jury can be allowed to find that it was the cause of 
 death. ^ The quantity of arsenic remaining a number of years after 
 death and after burial is not evidence of the quantity in the body 
 at the time of death, or of the quantity administered.® And when 
 poison is found in the stomach of the deceased, and the same kind of 
 poison was purchased shortly previous to the killing on a forged 
 prescription of the accused, this sufficiently connects the accused with 
 the obtaining of the poison to warrant proof of the sale thereof by 
 a druggist to a sister of the accused.'' 
 
 V. TJlTLAWFUL ACTS RESULTING IN HOMICIDE. 
 
 a. Felonies made controlling as to degree by statute. 
 
 613. Rules as to admissibility — -Where the law fixes the grade or 
 degree of a homicide with reference to the question whether or not 
 it was committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, 
 an unlawful act, it necessarily contemplates the admission of evidence 
 
 iPeople v. Quimby, 134 Mich. 625, 96 BCom. v. Danz, 211 Pa. 507. 60 Atl. 
 
 N. VV. 1061. 1070. 
 
 2Nordan v. State, (Ala.) 39 So. 40B. 6 Ibid. 
 
 'Il>i<l. 'People V. Bowers, supra. 
 ^People V. Bowers (Cal.) 82 Pac. 553. 
 
S 613] EVIDENCE. 951 
 
 in a prosecution for the homicide as to such unlawful act.^ And 
 rules with reference to the admissibility of evidence of crime gen- 
 erally, including homicide, apply to such proof. Thus, a threat to 
 rob a person is admissible in evidence in a prosecution for a murder 
 alleged to have been committed in an attempt to rob, for the pur- 
 pose of showing motive on the part of the accused;^ though it is not 
 admissible as tending to prove the actual presence of the accused at 
 the time and place of the murder;^ and there is no legal presumption 
 that such a threat would be executed, which relieves the prosecittion 
 from proving participation of the accused in the robbery.* So, the 
 expression of an intention to do an unlawful act is evidence in such 
 a case on the question of its execution ; and in a prosecution for the 
 murder of a woman in the commission of arson, evidence may be 
 given of ill-will on the part of the accused against the owner of the 
 building in which she was burned to death, and of a declaration 
 that he would get even with him.® And a declaration of a person 
 that he knew of a smokehouse full of meat is admissible against him 
 in a prosecution for shooting a man while entering a smokehouse, as 
 tending to show intention to burglarize the building.® So, evidence 
 that the deceased had money before being killed, and that immediate- 
 ly after the arrest the accused was found to have money on his per- 
 son, is admissible as a circumstance tending to prove that he robbed 
 the deceased, although the money is not identified. '' And the amount 
 of money the deceased had on deposit may be shown in a prosecu- 
 tion for his murder, alleged to have been done in an attempt to rob 
 
 iCom. V. Major, 198 Pa. 290, 82 Am. 6Reddick v. Com. 17 Ky. L. Eep. 1020, 
 
 St. Eep. 803, 47 Atl. 741; Robertson v. 33 S. W. 416. 
 
 Com. (Va.) 20 S. E. 362. sHedriek v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 2Com. V. Farrell, 187 Pa. 408, 41 Atl. 532, 51 S. W. 252. 
 
 382. 'Chapman v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Eep. 
 
 So, evidence in a prosecution for homi- 328, 96 Am. St. Rep. 874, 65 S. W. 1098. 
 
 cide as to a conversation between two And see State v. Gallivan, 75 Conn. 326, 
 
 persons while engaged in packing a 96 Am. St. Rep. 203, 53 Atl. 731. 
 
 valise in preparation for a proposed But where it appears in a prosecution 
 
 iourney, upon the first stage of whicli for homicide that the accused had a 
 
 one killed the other, as to how the ac- nif^l with a hole in it. testimony of 
 
 cused would get his trunk to the place witnesses as to -<. statement by the de- 
 
 , ., " . . , . . ., „ ceased, made several hours after an 
 where they were going, in which the ac- ^jj^^ ^^^^ ^^^ ^^^ receiving of in- 
 cused suggested having it brought by .p^^ ^^^^-^ afterwards caused death, 
 his wife, IS admissible as part of the ^^^^ ^^ j,^^ ^ „i(.^gl ^^j^jj ^ j^^jg -^^ j^^ 
 res gestw upon the theory that accused ^^ answer to questions calculated to 
 deliberately enticed the other to his gijgjt gup], ^n answer, is not admissible 
 death, and the case is not altered by the ^s part of the res gestw for the purpose 
 fact that the accused had no wife. State of fastening upon the accused the crime 
 V. Lueey, 24 Mont. 295, 61 Pac. 994. of the robbery. Faulkner v. State, 43 
 
 3Com. V. Farrell, supra. Tex. Crim. Eep. 311, 65 S. W. 1093; 
 
 4 Ibid. Chapman v. State, supra. 
 
952 HOMIOiDE. [§ 613 
 
 him, where the accused knew that he intended to draw the money.* 
 And evidence tending to show the presence of an anaesthetic has been 
 held to be admissible as a circumstance tending to show that the 
 deceased had been stupefied for some such purpose as robbery.® l^or 
 is evidence which is relevant or pertinent to the point in issue, 
 or which tends to prove the crime charged, or any averment of it, 
 incompetent because it may show the commission of another crime 
 independent of, or disconnected with, the crime charged. ■^'* And 
 proof in a prosecution for homicide alleged to have been committed 
 in an attempt to rob, of the robbery of another house, or robbery 
 and homicide therein immediately previous to the homicide in ques- 
 tion, is competent as tending to show the motive or mission of the 
 robbers in entering the house where the murder was committed ; ^ ^ 
 and it is also admissible for the purpose of identification.'^ And 
 such evidence may be given for the purpose of corroborating the con- 
 fession of one of the persons accused of the crime. '^ 
 
 Evidence of other crimes having no necessary connection with the 
 murder, however, and not elucidating the issue in the murder trial, 
 is inadmissible. ' * And evidence in a prosecution for murder in per- 
 petrating or attempting to perpetrate a rape, that the accused had 
 previously committed a rape upon another person, amounts to noth- 
 ing but an attack upon the character of the accused, and is not 
 admissible, unless he puts his character in issue. ' ® Nor are stains 
 in the pockets of the deceased, not proved to have been blood stains,, 
 admissible in evidence in a prosecution for the killing, for the pur- 
 pose of showing that the slayer had rifled the pockets of the deceased 
 with bloody hands.'® 
 
 614. Rules as to sufficiency — The rule that there must be evidence 
 of all the facts constituting the crime, and that the jury must be 
 satisfied of the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, con- 
 trols with reference to the question of the sufficiency of evidence to 
 establish the unlawful act, where the charge is homicide in the 
 commission of an unlawful act, as well as with reference to the kill- 
 
 sState v. Lucey, 24 Mont. 295, 61 Pae. isO'Brien v. Com. supra. 
 
 904- i4Boyd V. United States, 142 U. S. 
 
 9 Chapman v. State, supra. 450, 35 L. ed. 1077, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 loUnited States v. Boyd, 45 Fed. 851. 292. 
 
 iiQ'Brien v. Com. 115 Ky. 608, 74 lEState v. Lapage, 57 N. H. 245, 24 
 
 S. W. 606; Whitney v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Am. Rep. 69. 
 
 Rep. 2524, 74 S. W. 257. And see Com. i estate v. Garrington 11 S. D. 178» 
 
 V. Major, 198 Pa. 290, 82 Am. St. Rep. 76 N. W. 326. ' 
 803, 47 Atl. 741. 
 
 120'Brien v. Com. and Whitney v. 
 Com. supra. 
 
§ 614] EVIDENCE. 953 
 
 ing itself.^ But confession of the crime in all its details, together 
 ■with corroborative marks upon the clothes of the accused, is sufficient 
 to sustain an indictment for homicide in the commission of rape.^ 
 And marks upon the body of the deceased furnishing unmistakable 
 evidence of a criminal violation of her person and of death by stran- 
 gulation warrants a conclusion that she was killed in the perpetration 
 of a rape;^ and circumstantial evidence tending to show presence of 
 the accused, and a statement upon his part that he proposed to stay 
 with her or choke her to death, are sufficient to warrant his con- 
 viction;* though vague evidence of former improper relations be- 
 tween the accused and the deceased does not establish rape or adul- 
 tery, so as to make the murder one in the commission of a felony, 
 in the absence of any evidence of a struggle or resistance.^ So, evi- 
 dence that the deceased was found bound and gagged, death having 
 resulted from the gag, and that a burglary had been committed, to- 
 gether with evidence of the identity of the accused, warrants his 
 conviction for murder in the perpetration of a burglary.® And evi- 
 dence of the robbing of a house, the killing of a person vsdthin, and 
 setting fire to the house, is sufficient to support a conviction of mur- 
 der in the perpetration of a robbery against a person who remained 
 outside to watch. ^ And proof of murder and robbery of the de- 
 ceased, and of possession of property stolen or taken, or some portion 
 of it, is sufficient, in the absence of explanatory evidence, to sustain 
 a conviction J ^ and this is especially the case where an attempt to 
 
 iPeople V. Hand, 4 Alb. L. J. 91. question whether the killing was for re- 
 
 sWashington v. State, 25 Tex. App. v^nge, or in an attempt to perpetrate a. 
 
 387, 8 S. W. 642. robbery or burglary, is one for the jury. 
 
 sMorgan v. State, 51 Neb. 672, 71 N. Com. v. Manfredi, 162 Pa. 144, 29 Atl. 
 
 W. 788; People v. Wheelock (Cal.) 68 404. 
 
 Pac. 579. sPeople v. Neufeld, 165 N. Y. 43, 58 
 
 4People V. Wheelock, supra. N. E. 786 ; Blythe v. State, 4 Ohio C. C. 
 
 BPliemling v. State, 46 Wis. 516, 1 N. 435, Affirmed in 47 Ohio St. 234, 24 N. 
 
 W. 278. E. 268; Com. v. Epps, 193 Pa. 512 44 
 
 SQueen v. Franz, 2 Fost. & F. 580. Atl. 570; Gonzales v. State, 19 Tex. App. 
 
 And see State v. Lyons, 70 N. J. L. 394. And see State v. Wilson, 172 Mo. 
 
 635, 58 Atl. 398 ; Wilkins v. State, 35 420, 72 S. W. 696. 
 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 525, 34 S. W. 627. So, evidence that three men met upon 
 
 And an instruction with reference to the street in the night; that a blow was 
 
 a nighttime burglary is not erroneous in heard and one fell to the ground, and 
 
 a prosecution for a murder in the per- that another one stooped over his pros- 
 
 petration of a burglary, where it ap- trate body and then ran awaj'; that, 
 
 pears that the burglary was committed when caught he said there was a fight, 
 
 in the night. Hedrick v. State, 40 Tex. and admitted that he struck someone, 
 
 Crim. Eep. 532, 51 S. W. 252. though no sound of a scuffle was heard 
 
 'Fields V. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Eep. by nearby witnesses; that the person 
 
 42, 19 S. W. 604. knocked down was killed, and that he 
 
 So, where a person who was compelled was found with his coat unbuttoned, and 
 
 to leave a house returns thereto, and with some of his pockets turned inside 
 
 kills the owner in the nighttime, the out, — sufficiently supports the theory 
 
954 HOMICIDE. [I 614 
 
 escape also appears.® And the accused in such case is sufficiently 
 connected with the act of killing by evidence of the disappearance 
 of the deceased, and that the accused took possession of his property, 
 and sold it, and persisted in making false statements as to his where- 
 abouts.^" So, finding the body of a person with his pockets turned 
 inside out, with no money or other property upon his person, when 
 he had had a small sum of money the day before, justifies an in- 
 struction as to homicide in the perpetration, or attempted perpetra- 
 tion, of a robbery. ^ ^ And a verdict of guilty of murder in the com- 
 mission of a robbery is supported by evidence identifying the slayer, 
 and showing that the deceased, previous to her disappearance, had 
 a purse with money in it to the knowledge of the accused. ^^ And 
 the subsequent possession of money by persons who previously had 
 none is suificient to show that the killing by them of a person who 
 previously had money was murder for the purpose of robbery. ^ * 
 But while the possession of property stolen from a person killed, 
 or some portion of it, by the accused at a time subsequent to the 
 alleged murder, affords some evidence of guilt on the part of the 
 possessor, the presumption is not conclusive, but disputable, and to 
 be dealt with by the jury as a mere inference of fact, its value 
 being small and depending upon whether it stands alone or is con- 
 nected with other circumstances, such as a previous denial of pos- 
 session by the party charged, or his refusal to give any explanation of 
 the fact, or giving false and incredible accounts of the manner of 
 acquisition, etc. ^ * A conviction for murder will not be overturned 
 on appeal because the evidence was circumstantial, conflicting, or 
 unsatisfactory, and because it was not sufficient to remove doubt from 
 the judicial mind, where it was sufficient to warrant its admission 
 
 thai the accused and his companions i2Tilley v. Com. 89 Va. 136, 15 S. E. 
 intended a robbery, and that one of them 526. 
 
 struck deceased with a stone, or some So, evidence that several men had 
 other weapon, which blow subsequently ridden a long distance, armed and pre- 
 caused his death, and the other extract- pared for traveling, and that they sur- 
 ed from his pockets whatever bhey con- rounded a depot for the purpose of rob- 
 tained of value, warranting a conviction bing an agent of money shipped there 
 for murder in the commission of a fel- that day, and that, when the agsnt 
 ony. People v. Wise, 163 N. Y. 443, 57 asked one of them to stop, he was fired 
 N. E. 740. upon from different directions by them 
 
 sGonzales v. State, and Com. v. Epps, and killed, sufficiently shows murder in 
 supra; Mendez v. State, 29 Tex. App. the commission of a robbery, and evi- 
 608, 16 S. W. 766. (fence thereof is not subject to objection 
 
 loPearl v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. that there was simply a preparation to 
 189, 66 S. W. 1013. And see Little v. rob, and no more. Isaacs v. State, 36 
 State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 654, 47 S. W. Tex. Crim. Rep. 505, 38 S. W. 40. 
 884. isWilson v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 "State V. Donnelly, 130 Mo. 642, 32 55 S. W. 489. 
 S. W. 1124. Instate v. Millain, 3 Nev. 409. 
 
% 614] EVIDENCE. 955 
 
 to the jury upon the material questions wliether there was malice, 
 deliberation, and premeditation, or whether the crime was committed 
 in an attempt to commit another crime. ^^ 
 
 b. Other felonies and unlawful acts. 
 
 615. Criminal conspiracies generally — Proof of criminal conspiracy 
 in a prosecution for homicide alleged to have resulted from such a 
 conspiracy is not confined to direct evidence; it may be established 
 by facts and circumstances suilicient to satisfy the jury of its exist- 
 ence.* And every act or declaration of the accused which may tend 
 to establish such fact is admissible against him.^ Nor are acts and 
 conversations of the alleged coconspirator rendered inadmissible by 
 the fact that they occurred before the formation of the alleged con- 
 spiracy, and were not had in the presence of the accused. ^ And the 
 motive with which each conspirator acted may be shown as cogent 
 evidence of the existence of the conspiracy.* Thus, the act of a person 
 in preparing arms or other means for the use of the actual per- 
 petrator is competent.® And where a homicide is alleged to have 
 resulted from a conspiracy to kill, it may be shown that there was 
 a general strike, in which the alleged coconspirators were involved, 
 and that the deceased occupied the position of a strikebreaker.® 
 
 Instate V. Greenleaf, 71 N. H. 606, 54 sistance with firearms, a question ad- 
 Atl. 38. dressed by him to the mother of the per- 
 
 iPeople V. Lawrence, 143 Cal. 148, son shot, who was returning from the 
 68 L.R.A. 193, 76 Pac. 893; Martin v. place of the shooting but a minute or 
 State, 136 Ala. 32, 34 So. 205; Collins so after her son was killed, is admissl- 
 V. State, 138 Ala. 57, 34 So. 993; Cad- ble in evidence in a prosecution for the 
 dell V. State, 129 Ala. 57, 30 So. 76; Tcr- killing as part of the res gestw, where 
 ritory v. McGinnis, 10 N. M. 269, 61 it wa,s claimed that a conspiracy exist- 
 Pac. 208; Ruloff v. People, 45 N. Y. 213; ed between the father and son to do the 
 State V. Matthews, 80 N. C. 418; State killing. Ferguson v. State, 141 Ala. 20, 
 V. Prater, 52 W. Va. 132, 43 S. E. 230. 37 So. 448. 
 
 And a finding by the jury of a con- sState v. Munchrath, 78 Iowa, 268, 43 
 spiracy to rob, and the participation of N. W. 211; Smith v. State (Tex. Grim, 
 one of the conspirators in killing the App.) 89 S. W. 817. 
 owner of property while attempting to iRufer v. State, 25 Ohio St. 464. And 
 carry out the conspiracy, upon conflict- see Miller v. State, 130 Ala. 1, 30 So. 
 ing evidence, some of which, if believed, 379. 
 
 ia sufficient to establish the fact, is con- BColIins v. State, 138 Ala. 57, 34 So. 
 elusive upon the appellate court. Peo- 993; Ferguson v. State, supra. 
 pie V. Lawrence, supra. speople v. Donnolly, 143 Cal. 397, 77 
 
 zCollins v. State, supra; Horton v. Pac. 177. 
 'Com. 99 Va. 848, 38 S. E. 184; Jenkins And evidence of a statement by the 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 173, 75 S. accused in a prosecution for homicide 
 W. 312. And see Smith v. State (Tex. committed by another, that someone in 
 Crim. App. ) 89 S. W. 817 ; Smith v. a saloon where he was with others spoke 
 State, 137 Ala. 22, 34 So. 396. about going out to get a scab, or doing 
 
 Where one person shot another at a up a scab, is admissible against him as 
 time when the father of the person who tending to show a conspiracy to kill the 
 -did the shooting was going to his as- scab, where he went with others to wait 
 
956 HOMICIDE. [§ 61& 
 
 So, relationship of the parties in connection with other circumstances 
 may tend to show a conspiracy between them.; and where two men 
 were arrested and one of them killed the officer, the fact that they 
 were brothers is admissible in connection with other circumstances, 
 as bearing upon the question of an agreement between them to effect 
 their escape by concert of action. '' And a statement by a father that 
 a killing by his son was harmless, and that he had means to defend 
 him, is also admissible upon the question of conspiracy.^ And the 
 fact that a person was part owner of a saloon in which a robbery and 
 murder occurred has been held to be a circumstance for the con- 
 sideration of the jury in passing upon the question of his co-opera- 
 tion in the robbery and killing.^ 
 
 So, acts done in carrying out an alleged conspiracy, either as 
 originally made, or as modified during the time it is being carried 
 out, are admissible in evidence in a prosecution for a subsequent 
 killing of a person by one of the persons thus engaged, as tending 
 to show the intent with which the act was done.^" And the acts 
 of a coconspirator may be followed up to the time of his arrest. ^^ 
 And orders and directions of an acting governor to the state militia 
 are admissible in a prosecution for aiding and abetting the murder 
 of a candidate for governor, carried on upon the theory that the 
 murder was done in the furtherance of a plot to intimidate the 
 legislature;^^ and statements made at a meeting held at a public 
 place indicating violent and improper intentions are admissible in 
 evidence in such case.^^ So, evidence of other offenses committed 
 by the accused and others is admissible in a prosecution for homi- 
 cide alleged to have been committed by one of a number of cocon- 
 spirators, as tending to show a conspiracy between them, where it 
 tends to show unlawful acts done in the execution of the plans and 
 
 for the car conveying the person in The use of the militia immediately 
 
 question, and at a concerted signal after the assassination having been 
 
 boarded the car. People v. Moran, 144 proved in such ease, it is permissible to 
 
 Gal. 48, 77 Pac. 777. prove that they were called out for a 
 
 'People v. Wilson, 145 N. Y. 628, 40 lawful purpose, and to establish this 
 
 N. E. 392. And see Nite v. State, 41 fact it may be shown that there was an 
 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 340, 54 S. W. 763. angry and excited crowd gathering 
 
 sFerguson v. State, 141 Ala. 20, 37 around the executive grounds and 
 
 So. 448. threatening the occupants of the execu- 
 
 sChapman v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. tive buildings, and that a riot appeared 
 
 Rep. 328, 96 Am. St. Rep. 874, 65 S. W. imminent. Ibid. 
 
 isPowera v. Com. 110 Ky. 386, 53 L. 
 
 1098. 
 
 loState V. Lee, 91 Iowa, 499, 60 N. W. E.A. 245, 61 S. W. 735. 
 119- But in such case the accused is en- 
 
 iiJenkins v. htate, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. titled to show all that was done at the 
 173, 75 S. W. 312. meeting. Ibid. 
 
 12 Powers V. Com. 114 Ky. 237, 70 S. 
 W. 644, 1050, 71 S. W. 494. 
 
S 615] 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 957 
 
 purposes of the accused and those with -whom he acted in concert.^ 
 And where a prosecution for the homicide of an officer killed while 
 seeking to make an arrest proceeds upon the theory that the accused, 
 with others, confederated and conspired together to oppose any at- 
 tempt to apprehend them, evidence of his relations with the others 
 is admissible though it includes proof of previous offenses for which 
 the arrest was sought to be made.^^ 
 
 Matters going only to show opportunity to form a conspiracy, how- 
 ever, and sympathy and interest in the purpose of the alleged 
 conspirators, are not admissible in evidence for the purpose of es- 
 tablishing a conspiracy. ^ ® ISTor is mere rumor of acts done in furth- 
 erance of the alleged conspiracy. ^ '^ And evidence of an interested 
 conversation between the accused and coconspirators just previoiis to 
 the killing upon an unknown subject is not competent, as tending 
 to show conspiracy. ' * And a conspiracy cannot be proved by evi- 
 dence of ill-feeling of a third person toward the person killed, and 
 a statement by the third person to the deceased that he ought not 
 
 i4State V. MeOahill, 72 Iowa, 111, 30 
 N. W. 553, 33 N. W. 599; State v. Lee, 
 91 Iowa, 499, 60 N. W. 119. And see 
 Miller v. State, 130 Ala. 1, 30 So. 
 ^79. 
 
 Where the theory on which the case 
 in behalf of the government proceeds in 
 a prosecution for homicide is that the 
 prisoner was a participator in an un- 
 lawful assemblage and riot, during the 
 progress of which a homicide was cotq- 
 mitted, and that he is responsible there- 
 for through having been engaged in the 
 riot, the material facts to be proved are 
 that there was such a riot, and that the 
 prisoner took an active part in it; and 
 if acts taking place at an earlier part 
 of the day, though several hours before 
 the homicide, were participated in by 
 the prisoner and done with the same 
 general purpose and design of resist- 
 ing the law and disturbing the peace as 
 those which were committed at the time 
 of the homicide, and were so connected 
 as to form a part of one transaction, and 
 constitute one and the same riot, they 
 are admissible in evidence as tending 
 to prove the guilty purpose and intent 
 of the prisoner at the subsequent point 
 of time, though it is necessary that 
 the foundation be first laid by proof of 
 such connection. Com. v. Campbell, 7 
 Allen, 541, 83 Am. Dec. 705. 
 
 iBTerritory v. MoGinnis, 10 N. M. 
 269, 61 Pac 208; People v. Pool, 27 Gal. 
 ^73. 
 
 But experiments showing the effec- 
 tiveness of a barricade are not admis- 
 sible in evidence in a prosecution for 
 homicide in the execution of a conspir- 
 acy to resist officers, on the theory that 
 the barricade was prepared for the pur- 
 pose of such resistance, where there is 
 no evidence to show that the accused 
 knew anything about the resisting pow- 
 er of such barricade. Smith v. State, 
 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 267, 81 S. W. 712, 
 936. 
 
 lePowers v. Com. 114 Ky. 237, 70 S. 
 W. 644, 1050, 71 S. W. 494. 
 
 17 Ibid. 
 
 18 State V. Kennedy, 177 Mo. 98, 75 
 S. W. 979. But see Wilson v. State 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 90 S. W. 312. 
 
 So, evidence that a person about to 
 procure a marriage license in the re- 
 corder's olHce for his marriage to the 
 daughter of a person accompanying him 
 started to cross the room to speak to a 
 newspaper reporter, when the father in- 
 terfered and stopped him, saying, "This 
 is not over yet," is not admissible in a 
 prosecution against the daughter for 
 subsequently killing the applicant for 
 the license to whom she was afterwards 
 married under such license, as tentling 
 to show a conspiracy between the wo- 
 man and her father and brothers to kill 
 deceased if he did not marry her, or if 
 he did not live with her after miarrying 
 her. State v. Kennedy, supra. 
 
958 HOMICIDE. [§ 615 
 
 to live, made in the presence of the slayer. ^ ® !N'or is evidence of the 
 joint doings of the slayer and an alleged coconspirator admissible 
 to show a conspiracy between them which led to the killing, in the 
 absence of anything to show how they happened to be together on 
 the occasion in question.^" 
 
 616. Acts and declarations of coconspirators. — Where there is evi- 
 dence tending to show a community of design between two or more 
 persons for the performance of an unlawful act, the rule that the 
 actions, conduct, and statements of one of them are admissible in 
 evidence in a prosecution against another of the coconspirators ap- 
 plies in a prosecution for homicide alleged to have resulted from the 
 conspiracy, as well as in other cases of conspiracy.-' And this is the 
 rule though such acts were not done, or though such statements or 
 declarations were not made, in the presence of the person against 
 whom they are used.^ And it is immaterial that the parties were 
 jointly indicted, where they were separately tried.* Nor is it 
 material whether the conspiracy was formed at the time of the acts, 
 declarations, threats, etc., if it was subsequently formed, the effect 
 in such case being a question for the jury.* And the fact that two 
 persons were husband and wife does not preclude them from forming 
 a conspiracy which will render the acts, declarations, and threats 
 
 isRufer v. State, 25 Ohio St. 464. 45 Tex. Grim. Eep. 377, 77 S. W. 611; 
 
 2 0Pulpu3 V. State, 84 Miss. 49, 36 Nelson v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 87 
 
 So. 190. S. W. 143; Fielding v. State (Tex. 
 
 iCollins V. State, 138 Ala. 57, 34 So. Crim. App.) 87 S. W. 1044. And see 
 
 993; Amos V. State, 83 Ala. 1, 3 Am. St. Smith v. State (Tex. Crim App.) 89 
 
 Rep. 682, 3 So. 749; Williams v. State, S. W. 817. 
 
 81 Ala. 1, 60 Am. Rep. 133, 1 So. 179; sState v. Row, supra; People v. Cot- 
 People V. Cotta, 49 Cal. 166; People v. ta, 49 Cal. 166; State v. Gatlin; Smith 
 Pool, 27 Cal. 572 ; People v. Murphy, 146 v. State ; and Chapman v. State, — supra. 
 Cal. 502, 80 Pac. 709 ; Lyons v. People, But failure of the court in a prosecu- 
 137 111. 602, 27 N. E. 677; State v. Nash, tion for homicide alleged to have result- 
 7 Iowa, 347; State v. Row, 81 Iowa, 138, ed from a conspiracy to kill, to instruct 
 46 N. W. 872; State v. Dennis, 119 the jury as to the extent to which, and 
 Iowa, 688, 94 N. W. 235; State v. Win- circumstances under which, evidence of 
 ner, 17 Kan. 298; Powers v. Com. 114 acts and declarations of coconspirators 
 Ky. 237, 70 S. W. 644, 1050, 71 S. W. not made in the presence of the others 
 494, 110 Ky. 386, 53 L.R.A. 245, 61 S. are to be received, is not error where 
 W. 735 ; Allen v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. the conspiracy was fully proved, and the 
 808, 82 S. W. 589; State v. Gatlin, 170 connection of each of the conspirators 
 
 Mo. 354, 70 S. W. 885; State v. Ken- was shown, and it appears that no ac- 
 
 nedy, 177 Mo. 98, 75 S. W. 979; Coins tions or declarations were proved for 
 
 V. State, 46 Ohio St. 457, 21 N. E. 476 ; which each was not liable. Allen v. 
 
 State V. Fitzhugh, 2 Or. 227; Chapman Com. supra. 
 
 v. Statp, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 479, 76 S. speople v. Cotta, supra. 
 
 W. 477; Smith v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. ^Smith v. State, 46 Tex. Crim Rep. 
 
 Rep. 267. 81 S. W. 712, 936; Renner v. 267, 81 S. W. 712, 936; Chapman v. 
 
 State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. ,347, 65 S. W. State. 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 479, 76 S. W. 
 
 1102; Wallace v. Statfi, 46 Tex. Crim. 477; Jenkins v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 Rep. 341, 81 S. W. 960; Kipper v. State, 173, 75 S. W. 312. 
 
§ 616] EVIDENCE. 959 
 
 of one admissible against the other. ^ But after the commission of a 
 homicide resulting from a conspiracy, acts or declarations of one con- 
 spirator will not bind the others, and such acts and declarations are 
 not competent in a prosecution for the homicide;" though the move- 
 ments of the conspirators immediately after the homicide may be 
 shown.'' The acts and declarations of coconspirators which may be 
 given in evidence in a prosecution for homicide resulting from con- 
 spiracy include any act or declaration in furtherance of, or reason- 
 ably calculated to carry out, the purpose and object of the conspiracy, 
 but do not include matters merely narrative of something said or 
 done by others.* 
 
 The declarations of several persons engaged in an unlawful act 
 from which death ensues, however, are to be received as evidence of 
 their motives and intentions only so far as their acts are consistent 
 with such declarations,* and only where their acts and declarations 
 are in furtherance of their common desig-n. ^ " And statements and 
 acts of alleged coconspirators are not admissible against a person 
 charged with homicide, where no evidence of conspiracy appears. ^^ 
 And they are not admissible for the purpose of establishing con- 
 spiracy in the first instance ; they are to be considered in determining 
 the question of guilt or innocence after proof of the conspiracy. ^ ^ 
 
 eSmith v. State, supra. 42 Tex. Crlm. Eep. 118, 57 S. W. 821; 
 
 sjenkins v. State, supra; Nelson v. Renner v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Eep. 347, 
 
 State, 43 Tex. Crim. Eep. 553, 67 S. W. 65 S. W. 1102; Wallace v. State, and 
 
 320; State v. Kennedy, 177 Mo. 98, 75 State v. Cain, supra. 
 S. W. 979. And an error in the admission of 
 
 'Jenkins v. State, supra. statements and acts of alleged eonspira- 
 
 sBowen v. State (Tex. Crim. App. ) tors, where no evidence of the conspiracy 
 
 82 S. W. 520. appears, is not cured by their subse- 
 
 9 State V. Shelledy, 8 Iowa, 477. quent withdrawal. Bowen v. State, 
 
 But the admission in evidence in a supra. Though the rule is different in 
 prosecution for homicide of a statement the case of a wrongful admission of evi- 
 by one of several alleged conspirators, dence of a mere threat by an alleged co- 
 whether admissible or not, is not re- conspirator. Hatcher v. State, 43 Tex. 
 versible error, where the jury had be- Crim. Rep. 237, 60 S. W. 97. And er- 
 fore them the real tragedy detailed by ror in admitting declarations of a co- 
 eye witnesses, and could not be misled or conspirator in a prosecution for homl- 
 influenced by it. Clem v. Com. 11 Ky. cide before a proper foundation has 
 L. Eep. 780, 13 S. W. 102. been laid by proof of the conspiracy is 
 
 10 Wallace v. Sta,te (Tex. Crim. App.) not ground for reversal where the fact 
 
 87 S. W. 1041 ; State v. Cain, 20 W. Va. of the conspiracy is afterwards prima 
 
 679. facie established. State v. Cain, 
 
 iiState v. Kennedy, 177 Mo. 98, 75 supra. Or where the question as to the 
 
 S. W. 979; Pulpus v. State, 84 Miss, conspiracy ha;d reference only to the 
 
 49, 30 So. 190; Moore v. State, 44 Tex. crime of murder, and the verdict of the 
 
 Crim. Eep. 526, 72 S. W. 595; Bowen v. jury was for manslaughter. State v. 
 
 State, supra; He La Garza v. State Row, 81 Iowa, 138. 46 N. W. 872. 
 (Tex. Crim. App. J 61 S. W. 484; Rhodes laCoIlins v. State, 138 Ala. 57, 34 So. 
 
 V. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 332, 45 S. 993; State v. Miller, 35 Ivan. 328, 10 
 
 W. ] 009 ; Wright v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Pae. 865; State v. Kennedy, supra; 
 
 Eep. 447, 50 S. W. 940; Casner v. State, Chapman v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
960 HOMICIDE. [§ 616 
 
 And the mere fact that witnesses had information of such facts as 
 to induce them to believe that a person would be killed does not 
 make them parties to a plot to do the killing, so as to make state- 
 ments by them with reference thereto admissible against other per- 
 sons prosecuted as aiding or abetting or assisting the conspirators. ^ ^ 
 But full previous proof of a conspiracy cannot be required where 
 it depends upon a vast amount of circumstantial evidence and a vast 
 number of isolated and independent facts ; ^ * since in such case the 
 time when the conspiracy was entered into is a disputed fact, which 
 must be submitted with other issues to the jury;^° though to justify 
 admission of acts and statements of conspirators in any event, the 
 proof must tend to show that the conspiracy existed. ^ ® And where 
 the jury have a reasonable doubt as to the establishment of a con- 
 spiracy, they should reject and refuse to consider all the individual 
 acts and declarations of the alleged conspirators. ^ '' Nor can acts or 
 declarations of alleged coconspirators of a person charged with homi- 
 cide be given in evidence for the purpose of showing malice on their 
 part toward the deceased, where they are not put upon trial, unless 
 such declarations were made during the pendency of the conspiracy 
 in furtherance of the common design.^* 
 
 617. Resistance of official action generally; circumstances. — It is 
 competent in a prosecution for homicide to establish any fact which 
 tends to show motive upon the part of the accused, and to make plain 
 to the jury the relations which existed between him and the per- 
 son killed at the time of the killing ; and since the killing of an officer 
 in resistance of arrest gives rise to an inference of malice, if an 
 
 479, 76 S. W. 477; Harris v. State, 31 1, 60 Am. Rep. 133, 1 So. 179; State v. 
 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 411, 20 S. W. 916. Nash, 7 Iowa, 347; Graham v. State 
 
 So, in State v. May, 142 Mo. 135, 43 (Tex. Crim. App.) 61 S. W. 714. 
 
 S. W. 637, it was held that threats made 17 Chapman v. State, 45 Tex. Crim. 
 
 by one alleged conspirator are not ad- Rep. 479, 76 S. W. 477; Wallace v. 
 
 miasible in evidence against the other in State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 341, 81 S. W. 
 
 a prosecution against him for murder 966. 
 
 committed by the person making the So, where the statute requires the 
 
 threats, for the purpose of establishing court to instruct on all questions of law, 
 
 a conspiracy, where it appears that at and declares that failure to so instruct 
 
 the time the threats were made the de- in cases of felony shall be a ground for 
 
 fendant did not reside in the state. a, new trial in case of conviction, wheth- 
 
 i3Powers V. Com. 114 Ky. 237, 70 S. er or not there was a conspiracy be- 
 
 W. 644, 1050, 71 S. W. 494, 110 Ky. 386, tween the accused and others to kill the 
 
 53 L.R.A. 245, 61 S. W. 735. deceased is a question for the jury in a 
 
 Instate V. Miller, 35 Kan. 328, 10 Pac. prosecution for the killing, to be deter- 
 
 865; Bowen v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) mined before statements and acts of 
 
 82 S. W. 520; Harris v. State, supra. conspirators can be considered in evi- 
 
 iBHarris v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. Rep. dpnce, and a failure to so instruct the 
 
 411, 20 S. W. 916; Bowen v. State, supra, jury is prejudicial error. State v. Kcn- 
 
 leState v. Kennedy, 177 Mo. 98, 75 nedy, supra. 
 
 S. W. 979; Williams v. State, 81 Ala. isRufer v. State, 25 Ohio St. 464. 
 
§ 617] EVIDENCE. 961 
 
 offi-cer is killed by a person ■whom he is trying to arrest, the facts 
 with relation thereto are a proper subject of proof. ^ And the cir- 
 cumstances of resistance to an officer killed in resisting arrest by the 
 person sought to be arrested, and the means he had for knowing 
 the officer's authority, and the propriety of his mode of action, are 
 all to be considered on the question of malice.^ And threats made 
 against an officer, and of resistance to arrest should one be attempted, 
 are competent as showing the circumstances under which the kill- 
 ing took place, and who were the responsible parties.^ So, evidence 
 of such threats is admissible where an officer other than the one 
 threatened was killed, as tending to show malice, not toward the 
 officer killed, but toward any officer who sought to make the arrest.* 
 And a general threat is admissible as indicating intention to resist 
 any officer, and as indicating malice against all persons who might 
 attempt the arrest.® 
 
 So, evidence of forcible and continued resistance to every officer 
 seeking to arrest the accused is admissible in evidence in a prose- 
 cution for a subsequent killing of an officer seeking to arrest him, 
 as indicating a purpose to kill any person who might attempt to 
 arrest him, and as manifesting a deliberate intent to kill all such per- 
 sons.® And the intentional use of a deadly weapon by a person 
 
 iBishop V. Com. 109 Ky. 558^ 60 S. And evidence in a prosecution for 
 
 W. 190; Sta>te v. Zeibart, 40 Iowa, 169; homicide that the accused had aided an- 
 
 Com. V. Major, 198 Pa. 290, 82 Am. St. other to escape from arrest, and threat- 
 
 Eep. 803, 47 Atl. 741. ened to kill anyone who attemplcd to 
 
 The fact thait an under sheriff was arrest him; that prior to the homicide 
 shot and instantly killed while attempt- in question both had resisted officers on 
 ing to arrest the person who did the several occasions ; thait while bein;| pur- 
 shooting, within the jurisdiction of the sued the other killed the officer pursuing 
 officer, by virtue of a warrant then in his him, whose official character was known 
 possession, strongly tends to show the to both, and whom the accused had him- 
 accused guilty of murder in some de- self threatened to kill ; and that he him- 
 gree, and it is the duty of the court in self shot another officer upon being dis- 
 a prosecution therefor to submit the case covered in hiding, and shot at still an- 
 upon such facts to the jury. People v. other, when he had aA no time been 
 Durfee, 62 Mich. 487, 29 N. W. 109. fired upon until he first drew his own 
 
 And evidence that the accused armed gun, — is sufficient to sustain a c mvlc- 
 
 himiself and started out to commit a. tion for murder in the first degree, 
 
 burglary, and encountered and killed a State v. Gay, 18 Mont. 51, 44 Pac. 411. 
 
 p<.]iceman near the scene of the intended 4Palmer v. People, 138 111. 356, 32 Am. 
 
 crime, establishes deliberation and pre- St. Rep. 146, 28 N. E. 130. 
 
 meditation necessary to constitute the BPeople v. Coughlin, 13 Utah, 58, 44 
 
 crime of murder in the first degree, Pac. 94. And see Campbell v. State, 15 
 
 thcugh there is also evidence that the Tex. App. 500. 
 
 officer was the first to shoot. People v. ePeople v. Coughlin, supra. 
 
 Sullivan, 173 N. Y. 122, 63 L.R.A. 353, And where two persons are sought to 
 
 93 Am. St. Rep. 582, 65 N. E. 989. be arrested for the commission of a fel- 
 
 2State V. Oliver. 2 Houst. (Del.) 585. ony, and one of them kills one of the 
 
 And see Yates v. 'People, 32 N. Y. 509. pursuers, and another kills another, evi- 
 
 sPeople V. Gosch, 82 Mich. 22, 46 N. dence as to the killing of one pursuer 
 
 \]f}_ 101. is admissible in a prosecution for the 
 Horn.— 61 
 
962 HOMICIDE. t§ GIT 
 
 upon one who lawfully seeks to arrest him will be deemed to have 
 been intended to do great bodily harm, or to kill, that he might es- 
 cape, so as to raise a presumption of malice making the act of kill- 
 ing murder, which cannot be reduced to manslaughter on the theory 
 that it was done without malice in the heat of the struggle;'' though 
 in rebutting evidence of malice and preparation to resist arrest the 
 accused may show that he had armed himself in expectation of a 
 felonious assault by a person with whom he had had a quarrel. 
 And evidence that the accused provided himself with arms, without 
 apparent reason other than to resist arrest, and of threats uttered 
 against certain oificers, and of the killing of an officer who attempted 
 his arrest, is sufficient to justify the jury in finding malice;® or 
 to establish deliberation and premeditation necessary to constitute 
 the crime of murder in the first degree.^" So, the conduct of a 
 person accused of crime after the offense has been committed is a 
 legitimate subject of investigation, and evidence in a prosecution for 
 homicide that a person who killed an officer seeking to arrest him 
 on account of his suspicious actions evaded arrest for some time, 
 and after arrest broke jail a few days before the court met, remain- 
 ing at large for several months before being retaken, is admissible. ^ * 
 The character of an officer killed by a person whom he sought to 
 arrest, however, is not admissible in a prosecution for the killing. * ^ 
 Nor is that of the person sought to be arrested, and who did the 
 killing. ^^ And that a person had had advice by counsel that he 
 had a legal right to maintain possession of land is inadmissible in 
 evidence in his favor in a prosecution against him or a coconspirator 
 for killing an officer in resisting dispossession from such land.^* 
 
 Killing of the other as part of the res sible in evidence, the killing having been 
 
 gestw and a description of the wound is done in resisting capture, where they 
 
 also proper . Ibid. were being tried jointly, since in such 
 
 'Com. V. Grether, 204 Pa. 203, 53 Atl. ease neither can exclude testimony 
 
 753. And see People v. Wilson, 141 N. which is pertinent against himself sim- 
 
 Y. 185, 36 N. E. 230. ply because it might not be entitled to 
 
 sState V. Spaulding, 34 Minn. 361, 25 any consideration against his codefend- 
 
 N. W. 793. ant. State v. Phillips, 118 Iowa, 660, 02 
 
 sRafferty v. People, 72 111. 37; Pal- N. W. 876. 
 
 mer v. People, 138 111. 356, 32 Am. St. izMiers v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 Rep. 146, 28 N. E. 130. 161, 53 Am. St. Rep. 705, 29 S. W. 1074. 
 
 loPeople V. Sullivan, 173 N. Y. 122, Whether or not a policeman was the 
 
 63 L.R.A. 353, 93 Am. St. Rep. 582, 65 prosecutor is incompetent and imma- 
 
 N. E. 989. terial in a, prosecution against a person 
 
 iiWilliams v. Com. 85 Va. 607, 8 S. E. who assaulted him with intent to kill 
 
 470. to prevent an illegal arrest. Harrcl! v. 
 
 And statements by persons accused of Stiite, 75 Ga. 842. 
 
 murder in resisting arrest, made in jail isMiers v. State, supra. 
 
 after their arrest, bearing upon an al- 14 Smith v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 leged robbery of a bank, and upon a con- 267, 81 S. W. 712. 936. 
 flict preceding their capture, are admis- 
 
5 618] EVIDENCE. 963 
 
 618. Authority of officer. — The fact that a person was acting as a 
 peace officer when attempting to make an arrest in resistance of which 
 he was killed may he shown hy evidence that he was so acting at 
 the time, record evidence of his official character not being neces- 
 sary.^ And the fact that a person acting as a public officer was 
 known to be so acting is prima facie evidence of his official character, 
 without the production of his commission or appointment.^ So, a 
 valid warrant under which an arrest is being made, in resistance of 
 which the person arrested kills the officer making it, is admissible 
 in evidence in a prosecution for the killing.^ And its production is 
 necessary to a conviction for killing in resistance of arrest iinder 
 such a warrant.* And before secondary evidence can properly be 
 received of its contents, a foundation must be laid by evidence es- 
 tablishing a reasonable presumption of its loss.^ So, a warrant of 
 arrest is admissible in a prosecution for homicide in resisting arrest, 
 which was defended upon the theory that the accused fired in self- 
 defense, and in resistance of a supposed hostile movement by the 
 deceased, for the purpose of explaining the movements of the de- 
 ceased.® And this is the rule, though technically the warrant was 
 defective.'^ Nor is a warrant under which an officer was acting when 
 killed in resistance of arrest rendered inadmissible to show the au- 
 thority of the officer by the fact that it was defective in not being 
 addressed to any constable, and that the deceased was not properly 
 deputized to execute it.® And the rule has been laid down that 
 the warrant of arrest under which the officer acted is admissible in 
 a prosecution for killing him in resisting arrest, though it was il- 
 legal and void, since its nullity may be shown, and its existence 
 and illegality may have a bearing on the degree of the offense.® 
 
 iState V. Zeibart, 40 Iowa, 169; Peo- And the testimony of the justice who 
 
 pie V. Goschj 82 Mich. 22, 46 N. W. 101. delivered a warrant to an oiBcer, that he 
 
 And see Zimmerman v. State (Ala.) 30 had not seen it and did not know where 
 
 So. 18. it waSj and that he had searched for it 
 
 2 State V. McMahan, 103 N. 0. 379, 9 thoroughly and had not been able to find 
 
 S. E. 489; Earl v. State, 124 Ga. 28, 52 it, is not alone sufficient to raise a. pre- 
 
 g. E. 78. sumption of its loss in a prosecution 
 
 sRafferty v. People, 69 111. Ill, 18 for homicide in resisting arrest under 
 
 Am. Rep. 601; Zimmerman v. State, it. Ibid. 
 
 supra. epalmer v. People, 138 111. 356, 32 Am. 
 
 4Rafrerty v. People, supra. St. Rep. 146, 28 N. E. 130. 
 
 But in order to make the killing of a 7 Ibid, 
 
 bailiff in resisting the execution of sAlsop v. Com. 4 Ky. L. Rep. 547. 
 
 mesne process in a civil action amount sRafTerty v. People, 69 111. 11, 18 
 
 to murder, it is necessary to prove the Am. Rep. 601 ; State v. Symes, 20 Wash, 
 
 writ as well as the sheriff's warrant to 484, 55 Pac. 626; People v. Brown, 59 
 
 the bailiff. Rex v. Mead, 2 Starkie, 205. Cal. 345. 
 
 BStete V. Spaulding, 34 Minn. 361, 25 ' 
 N. W. 793. 
 
004 HOMICIDE. [§ 618 
 
 But where, in case of tlie killing of an officer in resisting arrest, 
 the question of actual malice or premeditation is in dispute, and 
 the question of the grade of the offense is open for the jury, the 
 existence of process and its validity is material, and an error in 
 the reception of evidence of the existence or contents of a warrant, 
 where one is required, is presumptively prejudicial.-'*' 
 
 So, where the arrest was made without a warrant, any fact, cir- 
 cumstance, or information on which the officer acted in making 
 the arrest is admissible in a prosecution for homicide in resistance 
 of the arrest, where the defense is that the arrest was illegal and un- 
 authorized, not as proof of the fact, but as evidence on the question 
 whether or not the officer in making the arrest did so on reasonable 
 grounds of suspicion.^ ^ And evidence that a felony had recently 
 been committed and that the pursuit was fresh is admissible, ^^ and 
 not subject to objection as an attempt to prove a crime not alleged 
 in the indictment, calculated to prejudice the minds of the jury.^^ 
 So, the fact that a crime had been committed and tliat the person 
 sought to be arrested was accused of committing it is competent in 
 a prosecution against him for killing in resisting arrest, to justify 
 the officer's action in arresting him;^* but it is not competent to 
 
 lOState V. Spaulding, 34 Minn. 361, sisting arrest they killed one of the 
 25 N. W. 793. ofBcers, it is immaterial whether the of- 
 
 A capias from another county for the fleers were aware, at the time, of the 
 commission of a burglary in that county robbery then being committed at the 
 is not admissible in evidence in a prose- house, they having followed in close 
 cution against a person against vvhom it pursuit from the scene of the burglary, 
 was issued for killing an officer attempt- and overtaken the burglars while yet 
 ing to arrest and detain him under it, within the house, and evidence in a pros- 
 such capias from another county fur- eeution therefor of the perpetration of 
 uishing no authority to make the ar- the robbery at the house at the time of 
 rest. Miers v. State, 34 Tex. Grim. Rep. the shooting is not subject to objection 
 161, 53 Am. St. Rep. 705, 29 S. W. 1074. that the officers were not at the time 
 
 iljohnson v. State, 30 Ga. 426; Mil- aware of it. Com. v. Major, 198 Pa. 
 ler V. State, 130 Ala. 1, 30 So. 379; 200, 82 Am. St. Rep. 803, 47 Atl. 741. 
 Keady v. People, 32 Colo. 57 66 L.R.A. i^Bishop v. Com. 109 Ky. 558, 60 S. 
 353, 74 Pac. 892; People v. Wilson, 141 W. 190; White v. State, 70 Miss. 253, 
 N. Y. 185, 36 N. E. 230; Cortez v. State 11 So. 632; Cortez v. State, supra. 
 (Tex. Crim. App.) 83 S. W. 812; Wil- And that an officer found persons upon 
 liams v. Com. 85 Va. 607, 8 S. E. 470. his beat so dressed and having such an 
 And see State v. Grant, 79 Mo. 113, 49 appearance as to arouse his suspicion of 
 Am. Rep. 218. an unlawful design, and tnat after ar- 
 
 i2Kennedy v. State, 107 Ind. 144, 57 resting them one of them shot another 
 Am. Rep. 99, 6 N. E. 305. officer who was conducting them to the 
 
 13 People V. Wilson, supra. station, and that thereupon both of them 
 
 And where a railway station was ran away, is sufficient in a prosecution 
 burglarized, and the persons who did for the shooting to justify a finding of 
 it went from there to a house and a legal arrest under the Massachusetts 
 robbed the inmates, and officers followed statute relating to watch and ward, 
 them from the scene of the burglary and Com. v. Hughes, 183 Mass. 221 66 N. E. 
 overtook them at the house, and in re- 716. ' 
 
§ 618] .EVIDENCE. S65 
 
 stow guilt under the indictment. ^^ So, such proof is admissible as 
 tending to justify the officer in calling for assistance in making the 
 pursuit, to show that the person sought to be arrested was engaged 
 in the commission of a criminal act. ^ ® And evidence of the criminal 
 act for which the arrest is sought is admissible, not only to show that 
 the accused was engaged in the commission of such act, thus justify- 
 ing the action of the officer, ^ '' but also to show that the accused had 
 a motive, beyond his own protection as an innocent man, in killing 
 the officer to effect his escape. ^ ^ So, that the accused was a fugitive 
 from justice on account of criminal charges against him is admis- 
 sible in evidence, where it appears that the person killed by him was 
 an officer, not to prove other crimes than the one for which he was 
 being tried, but to show a motive on his part to resist arrest.^® 
 And an agreement between the accused and others to come into 
 the state for the purpose of robbing a certain class of persons is 
 admissible in a prosecution for the murder of an officer in an at- 
 tempt to arrest him and others for robbing one of such persons, 
 for the purpose of identifying him as one of the robbers sought to 
 be arrested.^** Likewise, evidence that the accused was a convict 
 and that the person killed was a guard at the time and place of the 
 killing is competent in a prosecution for the homicide;^ ^ and so 
 is evidence tending to show that the accused had stolen goods con- 
 cealed upon his person at the time. ^ ^ And a direction by a superior 
 officer to an inferior one to proceed to make an arrest without a war- 
 rant is admissible in a prosecution against the one who killed him 
 in resisting arrest to show reasonable cause for belief that the ac- 
 cused had in fact committed a felony. ^^ 
 
 Evidence that a sheriff had been informed by a credible person 
 that another person was guilty of a theft and was about to escape, 
 
 1 5 Bishop V. Com. supra. And see And evidence that the accused in a 
 
 State V. Spaulding, 34 Minn. 361, 25 prosecution for homicide and another 
 
 N. W. 793. were in possession of stolen horses, and 
 
 1 estate v. Morgan, 22 Utah, 162, 61 that the sheriff and a person requested 
 
 •Pae. 527. to assist him examined the horses to 
 
 1 'People V. Pool, 27 Cal. 573; Bishop ascertain whether they were stolen prop- 
 
 V. Cora, supra. ei'ty and waited for the men to come 
 
 isjbid. back for them, and that when they came 
 
 i9WiIliam9 v. Com. 85 Va. 607, 8 S. b.ack one of them shot and killed the 
 
 E. 470; Patterson v. State (Tex. Crim. sheriff's assistant, sufficiently supports a 
 
 App. ) 60 S. W. 557. verdict for murder in the second degree, 
 
 soMoore v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Eep. in the killing of an officer in the perform- 
 
 439 50 S W 942 anee of his duty. English v. State, 34 
 
 2'i Stone V." State, 137 Ala. 1, 34 So. Tex. Crim. Rep. 190, 30 S. W. 233. 
 (•■29. And sec State v. Shaw, 73 Vt. 2sPeople v. Coughlin, 13 Utah, 58, 
 
 149 .50 Atl 863 44 Pac. 94. And see Com. v. Hughes, 
 
 22Dryer v. State, 139 Ala. 117, 36 So. 183 Mass. 221. 66 N. E. 716. 
 CS. 
 
968 HOMICroE. [§ 618 
 
 however, and that he did not have time to procure a warrant for 
 his arrest, is not admissible in a prosecution against such person for 
 killing the oiScer, in the absence of anything to show authority to 
 arrest without a warrant, and that the method pursued in attempt- 
 ing the arrest was in accordance with the law.^* And evidence as 
 to the kind and color of the clothes worn by the deceased, and as to 
 the insignia of the office of marshal that he had about his person, 
 is inadmissible against a person who killed him, on the claim that it 
 was done unlawfully in resisting arrest, where the deceased was 
 not at the time marshal, and was not, even if he had been, authorized 
 to arrest the accused without a warrant.^' 
 
 So, evidence as to the right to make the arrest and as to the 
 grounds therefor is admissible where it is claimed that the arrest was 
 illegal, to enable the jury to determine whether the assault was made 
 with malice aforethought or was committed under the influence of 
 sudden passion arising from adequate cause. ^ * 
 
 619. Negligence and minor unlawful acts. — The questions for the 
 jury in homicide caused by negligence, and in involuntary man- 
 slaughter by killing another in doing an unlawful act, or in doing 
 a lawful act in an unlawful manner, are whether the accused exer- 
 cised proper and ordinary caution, and what constitutes carelessness 
 on the one hand and due care on the other ; ^ and anything bearing 
 upon these questions and having a tendency to elucidate them is 
 competent in a prosecution for a homicide of this class. Thus, where 
 it appears that the accused had been previously guilty of similar acts 
 <if negligence, it may be shown that he had been warned of the dan- 
 ger, as bearing upon the question of his recklessness.^ And ex- 
 pressions used by the person killed, at the time and shortly after the 
 infliction of the injury resulting in death, are admissible as a part 
 i)f the res gestae in a prosecution for the killing.* So, that persons 
 I'ther than the one named in the indictment had been killed or in- 
 jured by the negligence in question is admissible as going to show 
 the whole effect of the negligence.* And where the death of a 
 patient is occasioned by the act of a medical practitioner, evidence 
 may be given in a prosecution therefor of the effect of similar acts 
 jierformed by him on other patients.® So, where negligence in the 
 
 2iCortez V. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Eep. zPeople v. Thompson, 122 Mich. 411, 
 
 1 09, 69 S. W. 536. 81 N. W. 344. 
 
 25Bates V. Com. 14 Ky. L. Kep. 177, sMorris v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 19 S. W. 928. 313, 33 S. W. 539. 
 
 2 6Goodman v. State, 4 Tex. App. 349. 4People v. Thompson, supra. 
 
 iCom. V. Bilderback, 2 Par 3. Sel. Eq. BRex v. Long, 4 Car. & P. 398. 
 Cas. 447; Com. v. Kuhn, 1 Pittsb. 13; 
 Queen v. Williamson, 1 Cox. C. C. 97. 
 
^ ei9] EVIDENCE. 967 
 
 erection of a structure is alleged as the cause of a death, a portion 
 of the structure may be shown to enable the jury to understand the 
 difference between the structure in question and a proper one. " And 
 the fact that a person riding in the street, who rode over and killod 
 a person, was riding at a greater speed than allowed by ordinance, 
 though not conclusive, may be considered with the other evidence 
 in the case upon the question of the negligence of the accused. ^ And 
 where the question of the proper handling or running of machinery 
 is involved, evidence as to the duty of the accused with reference 
 thereto, and of an omission, or apparent omission, to take some step 
 included within such duty, is sufficient to go to the jury on the 
 question of negligence.^ So, in case of an accidental shooting, evi- 
 dence of ownership of other revolvers, and incidents connected with 
 them, and with such ownership, is competent upon the question of 
 the knowledge of the accused of dangers attending their use.® And 
 proof of using a pistol for the purpose of frightening a person, and 
 killing him in doing so, warrants a conviction for manslaughter.^" 
 So, evidence of beatings extending over a period of several months 
 prior to the death of the deceased is admissible in a prosecution 
 for homicide, under an indictment for causing death by beating, 
 where it is clear that such beatings were the cause of death, though 
 it cannot be said that any one of them caused it. ^ ^ 
 
 Testimony covering a good many occasions, and extending over a 
 long period of time, tending to show other similar acts of negligence, 
 however, is inadmissible in a prosecution for manslaughter by crim- 
 inal negligence, for the purpose of showing the character of the ac- 
 
 sPeople V. Buddensieek, 103 N. Y. 487, ieide resulting therefrom to show the ef- 
 
 57 Am. Rep. 766, 9 N. E. 44. feet of the use of oil as fuel, as bearing 
 
 'State V. Moore (Iowa) 106 N. W. 16. upon the question of whether his ab- 
 
 8 See United States v. Farnham, 2 sence from the boiler room was negli- 
 
 Blatchf. 528, Fed. Cas. No. 15,071; Unit- gent; and evidence of experiments made 
 
 ed States v. Taylor, 5 McLean, 242, Fed. to ascertain within what time a given 
 
 Cas. No. 16.441. pressure of steam could be raised in a 
 
 An engineer in charge of engines us- boiler by the use of oil as fuel is com- 
 ing oil for fuel, charged with manslaugh- petent in such case in support of opin- 
 ter in negligently leaving the boilers un- ion evidence, as bearing upon the ques- 
 attended, whereby an explosion is al- tion of whether the absence of tlie en- 
 leged to have occurred and death result- gineer was negligence. People v. Thomp- 
 ed, who from past experience and from son, 122 Mich. 411, 81 N. W. 344. 
 knowledge of boilers and of the flow of sWeller v. State, 19 Ohio C. C. 166. 
 oil and of the burner had reason to be- loState v. Hardie, 47 Iowa, 647, 29 
 lieve, and did believe, that it was consist- Am. Rep. 496; Murphy v. Com. 15 Ky. 
 ent with safety to be absent from the L. Rep. 215, 22 S. W. 649. And see Cur- 
 boiler room for the length of time he was tis v. State, 22 Tex. App. 227, 58 Am. 
 so absent at the time of the explosion, is Rep. 635, 3 S. W. 86. 
 not, in law, guilty of criminal negligence nMedina v. State (Tex. Cnm. App.) 
 by reason of such absence, but it would 49 S. W. 380. 
 be competent in a prosecution for a horn- 
 
968 HOMICIDE. [§ 619 
 
 cused for negligence, where he had described his act and the reasons 
 therefor, and claimed that the act was not negligent. ^^ And evi- 
 dence as to the taking of several persons injured by the negligence 
 of another to the hospital, and as to how long they were there, is 
 not admissible in a prosecution for neglis^cutly killing one of such 
 persons, since it would not help to determine whether or not be was 
 criminally negligent. ^^ So, evidence of an assault in which ac- 
 cused attempted to draw a pistol, and was only prevented by acci- 
 dent, and that after a continued sculfle the two became separated and 
 the pistol went off and killed the other combatant, shows murder, 
 and not negligent homicide. ^ * 
 
 620. Abortion. — In homicide in the commission of abortion, the 
 unlawful procurement of a miscarriage constitutes the corpus delicti, 
 which must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, and a verdict is not 
 supported in the absence of evidence fairly tending to establish it.^ 
 It must appear that the accused performed the act upon, or admin- 
 istered or caused to be administered to, the deceased the drugs in ques- 
 tion, for the purpose of procuring abortion, and that death was 
 the result.^ And the condition of the deceased as to pregnancy is 
 a proper subject of inquiry, which must be established beyond rea- 
 sonable doubt, though it need not be demonstrated to an absolute cer- 
 tainty;^ and a conviction in such case is sufficiently supported by 
 evidence, where it clearly appears that the death of the woman was 
 caused by a miscarriage, which was caused by the accused, not for 
 the purpose of saving the life of the deceased, but for some other 
 unlawful purpose.* 
 
 On this behalf it is competent to show search upon the part of 
 the deceased for a physician to procure an abortion, for the purpose 
 
 laPeople v. Thompson, 122 Mich. 411, i4Giebel v. State, 28 Tex. App. 151, 12 
 
 81 N. W. 344. S. W. 591. 
 
 And where, through a long trial for JTraylor v. State, 101 Ind. 65. 
 
 negligent homicide, the judge and jury But the corpus delicti in a prosecu- 
 
 were under the impression that the neg- tion for homicide resulting from an at- 
 
 ligenee of the accused at the time of the tempt to produce a, miscarriage may be 
 
 killing might be presumed if he was proved by declarations and circum- 
 
 shown to have been negligent on prior stances, and the order in which the dif- 
 
 occasions, and it was not until just be- ferent facts is introduced is immaterial, 
 
 fore the jury were sent out that they State v. Alcorn, 7 Idaho, 599, 97 Am. 
 
 were told that the testimony as to pre- St. Rep. 252, 64 Pac. 1014. 
 
 vious negligence was competent only as aState v. Edmonson, 131 Mo. 348, 33 
 
 bearing upon the question whether his S. W. 17. 
 
 negligence at the time of the killing was 3 State v. Alcorn, supra; State v. 
 
 wilful, and the statement was not clear- Glass, 5 Or. 73. 
 
 jly made, — the wrong done in the ad- ^State ?. Leeper, 70 Iowa, 748, 30 N. 
 
 mission of such testimony, accompanied W. 501. And see State v. Minard, 96 
 
 by the erroneous reason assigned, will Iowa, 267, 65 N. W. 147 ; State v. Ed- 
 
 not be deemed to have been cured. Ibid, monson, supra. 
 
 islbid. 
 
5 620] EVIDENCE. 969 
 
 of showing her pregnancy.'' And a physician may testify as an ex- 
 pert upon the question of pregnancy, giving his reasons for his belief 
 after making a post mortem examination.** And injured parts of 
 the body of deceased, preserved in spirits, may be exhibited to the 
 jury in connection with the testimony of the physician who made 
 the post mortem examination.^ So, previous declarations of the de- 
 ceased that she was pregnant, and desired a miscarriage, are admis- 
 sible in such a prosecution as part of the res gestae, and as explanatory 
 of her acts ; * and so are declarations of the deceased contemporaneous 
 with the main fact under consideration, and so connected with it as 
 to restrict its character;® though what deceased said shortly after 
 the performance of the operation is merely narrative of past events, 
 and no part of the res gestae, and is not admissible. -^ •* So, all that 
 the accused said and did in furtherance of his purpose, and all the 
 means employed in doing what he did, are a part of the res gestae 
 in a prosecution for homicide in the commission of abortion, and 
 proper to be given in evidence therein. ^ ^ And a statement by him 
 to the deceased and her friends, that he had helped hundreds of 
 girls and women out of similar trouble, is competent to show the 
 purpose of the deceased, and the nature of the action of the ac- 
 cused. ^ ^ And the character of the place kept by the accused, and the 
 fact that it was a place of resort for such practices, and that the 
 
 5 State V. Glass, supra. And see are admissible in evidence against him 
 Brown v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 1269, 83 does not apply to declarations made by 
 S. W. 645. ii woman, tending to show that a per- 
 
 6 State V. Smith, 32 Me. 369, 54 Am. son accused of causing her death by at- 
 Dee. 579. tempting to procure an abortion was in- 
 
 So, testimony of a nurse who had care nccent, and she alone was responsible, 
 
 of a woman charged to have been killed Maine v. People, 9 Hun, 113. 
 
 by an attempt to procure an abortion, sState v. Dickinson, 41 Wis. 299; 
 
 as to certain appearances upon the bed State v. Alcorn, 7 Idaho, 599, 97 Am. 
 
 and clothing, and as to a peculiar odor St. Eep. 252, 64 Pac. 1014. 
 
 which she had noticed, is admissible in lOMaine v. People, supra; People v. 
 
 a prosecution for the killing. People v. Davis, 56 N. Y. 96; State v. Dickinson, 
 
 Olmstead, 30 Mich. 431. supra. 
 
 . But the opinion of a nurse employed n People v. McDowell, 63 Mich. 229, 
 
 to taJte care of a woman as to what was 30 N. W. 68; People v. Hodge (Mich.) 
 
 the matter with her is not admissible in 104 N. W. 599. 
 
 a prosecution for manslaughter in caus- izHatchard v. State, 79 Wis.. 357, 48 
 
 ing the death of the woman by acts cal- N. W. 380. And see People v. Hodge, 
 
 culated to produce an abortion, where supra; People v. Abbott, 116 Mich. 263, 
 
 there was nothing to show whether the 74 N. W. 529._ 
 
 ^urse possessed such knowledge as And a, verdict against the accused for 
 
 would justify an opinion upon a medical coiising the death of a child by procur- 
 
 question. Ibid. ing an abortion upon its mother is sup- 
 
 7Com. V. Brown, 14 Gray, 419. ported by evidence that the accused told 
 
 , . sState V. Power, 24 Wash. 34, 63 L.R. the mother he would relieve her, and ar- 
 
 A. 902, 63 Pac. 1112; Brown v. Oom. 26 ranged to leave medicine at a place 
 
 Ky. L. Rep. 1269, 83 S. W. 045. some distance from her father's resi- 
 
 But the rule that declarations against dence; that she obtained and took it, and 
 
 the interest of the party making them that he gave her a second bottle, when 
 
970 HOMICIDE. [§ 620 
 
 accused was frequently there for the purpose of performing his part 
 in such operations, may be shown to establish guilty knowledge and 
 intent on his part;^* though where the intent or guilty knowledge 
 is a necessary conclusion from the act done, proof of other offenses 
 of a similar character violates the rule that the evidence must be con- 
 fined to the issue. ^* So, proof of opportunity to perform the act, 
 and that the deceased was previously healthy, and that the accused 
 subsequently gave a false certificate of the cause of death, justifies 
 a verdict of guilty in such a case ; ^ ® though it is a question of fact 
 for the jury in such a case whether the facts are consistent with 
 guilt or innocence.^® 
 
 Proof of the mere fact of giving medicine which might cause 
 abortion, however, does not sufficiently establish the corpus delicti, 
 where it does not appear whether the symptons were such as would 
 respond to the use of the drugs procured, or how much was taken. ^ '' 
 And the mere facts that the uterus was dilated and found to be 
 punctured, and that blood was found in the bed, are not sufficient. ^ * 
 Nor is a verdict of conviction justified by proof of a puncture with 
 a sharp instrument, there being nothing to show the connection of 
 the accused with the instrument.-'® So, the fact that the accused 
 was criminally intimate with the deceased does not authorize a con- 
 viction for homicide in the commission of an abortion;^" nor does 
 the mere fact that accused was the medical attendant of a woman at 
 the time she had a miscarriage, from which death resulted, and 
 that he burned the foetus instead of burying it. ^^ And where two 
 persons were jointly indicted for the crime of manslaughter alleged 
 to have been committed by means of a criminal operation, and there 
 
 she became sick ; that the medicine was He in a prosecution for the killing to 
 
 tested and found to contain extracts of show that statements made by the ac- 
 
 ergot and cotton root, and that the ef- cused in a death certificate subsequently 
 
 feet of such compound was shown to be issued by him, giving her a different 
 
 to produce an abortion; and by testi- name, were knowingly false. People v. 
 
 mony of a physician that the defendant Seaman, supra. 
 
 endeavored to employ him to procure the ^People v. Lonsdale, 122 Mich. 388, 
 
 abortion, but he declined to do so. State 81 N. W. 277. 
 
 V. McLeod, 136 Mo. 109, 37 S. W. 828. iBEarll v. People, 73 111. 329. 
 
 isPeople V. Seaman, 107 Mich. 348, lejbid. 
 
 61 Am. St. Rep. 326, 65 N. W. 203; "Wilson v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 Maine v. People, 9 Hun, 113. 179, 53 S. W. 122. 
 
 And evidence that after the death of islbid. 
 
 u, woman charged to have been killed in isWilson v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 producing an abortion upon her, a regis- 58 S. W. 1009. 
 
 tered letter was delivered at the place zoState v. Bowker, 26 Or. 309, 38 Pac. 
 
 where she was staying, containing a 124. 
 
 money order payable to her, and that ziClarke v. People, 16 Colo. 511, 27 
 
 the accused indorsed it in her name, and Pac. 724. 
 that the money was obtained, is admissi- 
 
1 620] EVIDENCE. 971 
 
 was a severance, conviction of cne is not competent evidence tending 
 to show the guilt of the other. ^^ 
 
 So, where the circumstances were such as to induce in the mind 
 of a competent person the belief that a miscarriage was necessary 
 to preserve the life of a mother, this would be sufficient to create 
 a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury as to guilt, which would 
 justify an acquittal. ^^ But the burden of proving the advice of 
 physicians as to such necessity, when required by statute, rests with 
 the accused, that being a matter peculiarly within his knowledge.^* 
 And proof of previous good health and subsequent freedom from 
 trouble other than that resulting from the act is sufficient to sustain a 
 finding of an absence of necessity to destroy the child to preserve 
 the life of the mother. ^^ And evidence of the previous performance 
 of abortions on other women is competent on that issue. ^® 
 
 YI. Dying deci^eations. ^ 
 
 a. Scope. 
 
 621. Wholly a homicide subject — Dying declarations have been ad- 
 mitted in civil cases as an exception to the general rule, founded up- 
 on necessity.^ And they have been admitted generally as con- 
 stituting confession of great iniquity.^ And also as showing the 
 opinion of the witness as to the state of her health, a fact best known 
 to her.* But these holdings have been repeatedly overruled in later 
 
 22State V. Bowker^ supra. ^Wright ex dem. Clymer v. Littler, 
 
 And declarations by a person jointly 3 Burr. 1244, 1 W. Bl. 345. And see 
 
 indicted with another on trial for man- Rex v. Reason, 16 How. St. Tr. 1. 
 slaughter in causing the death of a wo- In Eex v. Baker, 2 Moody & R. 53, 
 
 man in an attempt to commit an abor- evidence that the person for whose kill- 
 
 tion upon her, as to his real purpose in ing the prosecution was had ate a cake 
 
 going with the woman in question to the for breakfast, immediately after which 
 
 place where the act wa^ committed, are he was taken sick, and his maid serv- 
 
 not admissible on a separate trial of the ant, who was present and had made 
 
 other, where they were made previous the cake, declared that she was not 
 
 to any meeting between them. State v. afraid of it, and ate of it, and was in 
 
 Glass, 5 Or. 73. consequence poisoned and speedily died; 
 
 2 3Ibid. and her declarations made after her mas- 
 
 24Hatchard v. State, 79 Wis. 357, 48 ter's death, and while she was conscious!. 
 
 N. W. 380. of her own approaching death, as to ' 
 
 26Howard v. People, 185 111. 553, 57 the manner in which she made the cake, 
 
 N. E. 441 ; Hatchard v. State, supra. and that she put nothing poisonous into 
 
 2 6People v. Hodge (Mich.) 104 N. W. it, and that accused was present eating 
 
 599. his breakfast at the same table while 
 
 iThe subject of dying declarations as she was making the cake, — were admit- 
 
 evidence is extensively considered in a ted. 
 
 note to Worthington v. State, 56 L.R.A. lAveson v. Kinnaird, 6 East, 188, 2 
 
 353. Smith, 286. 
 
 2 See Goodwin v. Harrison, 1 Root, 80; 
 State V. Williams. 67 N. C. 12. 
 
972 HOMICIDE. [§ 621 
 
 cases, and the general, if not universal, rule now seems to be that 
 dying declarations are only admissible in evidence where the death 
 of the deceased is the subject of the charge, and the circumstances 
 of the death are the subject of the declaration ; ° and that, although 
 the declarations might relate to the cause of the death, still such 
 declarations are admissible in those cases alone where the death 
 of the party is the subject of inquiry;" and that such declarations 
 are limited to criminal prosecutions when the subject-matter of the 
 investigation is the declarant's death J This is the common-law rule, 
 which remains unchanged as to all classes of cases where no change 
 
 BWharton, Grim. Law, 7th ed. §§ 670, ing to procure a miscarriage of a wom- 
 671 ; 2 Russell, Crimes, 761 ; North v. an by means of instruments, in con- 
 People, 139 111. 81, 28 N. E. 966; Hack- sequence of which she died, there was 
 ett V. People, 54 Barb. 370; State v. a count for manslaughter, upon which 
 Shelton, 47 N. C. (2 Jones, L.) 360, 64 the accused was acquitted, dying dec- 
 Am. Dec. 587 ; Hudson v. State, 3 Coldw. larations of the woman are properly re- 
 355 ; Stobart v. Dryden, 1 Mees. & W. jected on the second trial of the remain- 
 615, 626; Queen v. Jenkins, L. R. 1 ing issues of the ca/se. State v. How- 
 0. C. 192 ; Reg. v. Peltier, 4 Lower Can. ard, 32 Vt. 380. 
 Rep. 3. 701iver v. State, 17 Ala. 587; Mose 
 
 AH outcries of a person deceased, v. State, 35 Ala. 421 ; Johnson v. State, 
 
 made during the perpetration of an as- 47 Ala. 9; Reynolds v. State, 68 Ala. 
 
 sault, which results in his death, or up- 502; Pulliara v. State, 88 Ala. 1, 6 So. 
 
 on the approach of the assailant, are 839; Blackburn v. State, 98 Ala. 63, 
 
 competent evidence upon the trial of a 13 So. 274; People v. Hall, 94 Cal. 595, 
 
 person charged with his murder, and 30 Pac. 7; MeBride v. People, 5 Colo. 
 
 may be considered with other evidence App. 91, 37 Pac. 953; Daily v. New 
 
 upon the question of the identity of the York & N. H. R. Co. 32 Conn. 356, 87 
 
 accused; and the outcries of another Am. Dec. 176; East Tennessee, V. & G. 
 
 person, which were heard by the same R. Co. v. Maloy, 77 Ga. 237, 2 S. E. 
 
 party a few minutes previously, during 941 ; Parks v. State, 105 Ga. 242, 31 S. 
 
 the perpetration of one and the same E, 580; North v. People, 139 111. 81, 28 
 
 burglary, but on another part of the N. E. 986; Marshall v. Chicago & G. 
 
 premises, are also admissible for that E. R. Co. 48 111. 475, 95 Am. Dec. 561; 
 
 purpose; but such outcries partake Binns v. State, 46 Ind. 311 ; Montgomery 
 
 much of the nature of the res gestce, v. State, 80 Ind. 338, 41 Am. Rep. 815; 
 
 and the admission of the outcries of the Middleton v. Middleton, 31 Iowa, 151 ; 
 
 other person shooild be placed on this State v. O'Shea, 60 Kan. 772, 57 Pac. 
 
 ground, and not that they are dying 970; Walston v. Com. 16 B. Mon. 15; 
 
 declarations. State v. Wagner, 61 Me. Luker v. Com. 9 Ky. L. Rep. 385 5 S. 
 
 178. W. 354; Mitchell v. Com. 12 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 6Rex V. Hutchinson, 2 Barn. & C. 458, 14 S. W. 489; Bronn v. L. C. & 
 
 608 note; Reg. v. Newton, 1 Post. & F. L. R. Co. 7 Ky. L. Rep. 96; State v. 
 
 641; Rex V. Baker, supra; Aveson v. Black, 42 La. Ann. 861, 8 So. 594; Wil- 
 
 Kinnaird, 6 East, 195; Doe ex dem. lis v. Kern, 21 La. Ann. 749; McDaniel 
 
 Sutton v. Ridgway, 4 Barn. & AM. 54; v. State, 8 Smedes & M. 401, 47 Am. 
 
 Wooten V. Wilkins, 39 Ga. 223, 99 Am. Dec. 93; Lipscomb v. State, 75 Miss. 
 
 Dec. 456; Stobart v. Dryden, supra; 559, 23 So. 210, 230; State v. Jefferson, 
 
 Duling V. Johnson, 32 Ind. 155; Spatz 77 Mo. 136; State v. Pagels, 92 Mo. 
 
 V. Lyons, 55 Barb. 476; Gray v. Good- 300, 4 S. W. 931; State v. Welsor, 117 
 
 rich, 7 Johns. 95; Wilson v. Boerem, 15 Mo. 570, 21 S. W. 443; Brownell v. Pa- 
 
 .Tohns. 286; Jackson ex dom. Coe v. cific R. Co. 47 Mo. 239; Binfield v. State, 
 
 Kniffen, 2 Johns. 35, 3 Am. Dec. 390; 15 Neb. 484, 19 N. W. 607; People v. 
 
 Pettiford V. Mayo, 117 N. C. 27, 23 S. E. Davis, 56 N. Y. 95; Hackett v. People, 
 
 252; State v. Harris, 112 La. 937, 36 So. 54 Barb. 370; Waldele v. Ne^" York 
 
 810. C. & H. R. R. Co. 61 How. Pr. 350; 
 
 Where, in an indictment for attempt- 
 
§ 621] 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 973 
 
 haa been expressly made by statute.^ And even in case of an action 
 under a statute providing therefor, for wrongfully causing death, 
 such declarations are excluded though they would be competent in 
 a criminal prosecution based upon the same facts." Dying declara- 
 tions, therefore, though a subject of criminal evidence generally, are 
 here fully considered because of their peculiarly exclusive relation 
 to the subject of homicide. 
 
 b. Grounds for admissibility. 
 
 622. Reasons for rejecting general rule. — ^Dying declarations con- 
 stitute one of the exceptions to the rule which rejects hearsay evi- 
 dence;^ and the ground for their admission is generally placed up- 
 on necessity, in order to prevent the escape of the slayer from jus- 
 tice.^ And it is founded upon the theory that when an individual 
 is in constant expectation of immediate death, all temptation to 
 
 Jackson ex dem. Youngs v. Vredenbergh, 
 1 Johns. 159; Barfield v. Britt, 47 N. C. 
 (2 Jones, L.) 41, 62 Am. Deo. 190; State 
 V. Harper, 35 Ohio St. 78, 35 Am. Rep. 
 596; Cosgrove v. Schafer, 9 Ohio Dec. 
 Reprint, 550; State v. Fitzhugh, 2 Or. 
 227; Com. v. Murray, 2 Ashm. (Pa.) 
 41; Com. v. Reed, 5 Phila. 528: Fried- 
 man V. Railroad Co. 7 Phila. 203; Cora. 
 V. Gumpert, 6 Luzerne Lesfal Reg. 187; 
 Railing v. Com. 110 Pa. 100, 1 Atl. 314; 
 Com. V. Keene, 7 Pa. Super. Ct. 293; 
 State V. Johnson, 26 S. C. 152, 1 S. E. 
 510; State v. Bradley, 34 S. C. 136, 13 
 S. E. 315; State v. Banister, 35 S. C. 
 290, 14 S. E. 678; State v. Faile, 43 S. C. 
 52, 20 S. E. 798; Hudson v. State, 3 
 Coldw. 355; Wright v. State, 41 Tex. 
 246; Kreba v. State, 3 Tex. App. 348; 
 State V. Carrington, 15 Utah, 480, 50 
 Pae. 526; State v. Center, 35 Vt. 378; 
 Crookham v. State, 5 W. Va. 510; State 
 V. Cameron, 2 Chand. (Wis.) 172, 2 
 Pinney (Wis.) 490; Miller v. State, 25 
 Wis. 384; State v. Dickinson, 41 Wis. 
 299; Rex v. Hutchinson, 2 Barn. & C. 
 608 note; Rex v. Lloyd, 4 Car. & P. 233; 
 Reg. V. Hind, 8 Cox, 0. C. 300, Bell, 0. 
 C. 253, 29 L. J. Mag. Gas. N. S. 147, 6 
 Jur. N. S. 514, 2 L. T. N. S. 253, 8 Week. 
 Rep. 421; King v. Mead, 4 Dowl. & R. 
 120, 2 Barn. & C. 605, 26 Revised Rep. 
 484; United States v. McGurk, 1 Cranch, 
 C. C. 71, Fed. Cas. No. 15,680; Jack v. 
 Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso. 51 C. C. 
 A. 36, 113 Fed. 49. And see Richard v. 
 State, 42 Fla. 528, 29 So. 413. 
 
 sThayer v. Lombard, 165 Mass. 174, 52 
 Am. St. Rep. 507, 42 N. E. 563. 
 
 9 Cosgrove v. Schafer, 9 Ohio Dec. Re- 
 print, 550. 
 
 iMitehell v. State, 71 Ga. 128; State 
 V. Knoll, 69 Kan. 767, 77 Pac. 580; 
 Haney v. Com. 5 Ky. L. Rep. 203. 
 
 2 Ward V. State, 78 Ala. 441; Mose v. 
 State, 35 Ala. 421 ; Ben v. State, 37 Ala. 
 103; Sylvester v. State, 71 Ala. 18; Sul- 
 livan V. State, 102 Ala. 135, 48 Am. St. 
 Rep. 22, 15 So. 264; Newberry v. State, 
 68 Ark. 355, 58 S. W. 351; People v. 
 Glenn, 10 Cal. 32; Graves v. People, 18 
 Colo. 170, 32 Pac. 63; Mitchell v. State, 
 supra; United States v. Schneider, 21 D. 
 C. 381 ; Leiber v. Com. 9 Bush, 11 ; Peo- 
 ples V. Com. 87 Ky. 487, 9 S. W. 509, 
 810; Luker v. Com. 9 Ky. L. Rep. 385, 5 
 S. W. 354; Mitchell v. Com. 12 Ky. L. 
 Rep. 458, 14 S. W. 489; Walston v. Com. 
 16 B. Mon. 15; State v. Carter, 107 La. 
 792, 32 So. 183; State v. Wagner, 61 Me. 
 178; People v. Lonsdale, 122 Mich. 388, 
 81 N. W. 277; Brown v. State, 32 Miss. 
 433; State v. Wensell, 98 Mo. 137, 11 S. 
 W. 614; Fitzgerald v. State, 11 Neb. 
 577, 10 S. W. 495; People v. Wood, 2 
 Edm. Sel. Cas. 71; Hackett v. People, 
 54 Barb. 370; Barfield v. Britt, 47 N. C. 
 (2 Jones, L.) 41, 62 Am. Deo. 190; State 
 V. Garrand, 5 Or. 216; Com. v. Murray, 
 2 Ashm. (Pa.) 41; Railing v. Com. 110 
 Pa. 100, 1 Atl. 314; Com. v. Sullivan, 13 
 Phila. 410; Nelson v. State, 7 Humph. 
 542; Warren v. State, 9 Tex. App. 619, 
 35 Am. Rep. 745. And see Stobart v. 
 Dryden, 1 Mees. & W. 615, 2 Gale, 146. 
 
974 
 
 HOMicroE. 
 
 [§ 622 
 
 falsehood, either of iuterest, hope, or fear, -will be removed, and the 
 awful nature of his situation will be presumed to impress him as 
 strongly with the necessity of a strict adherence to truth as the 
 most solemn obligation of an oath administered in a court of justice.* 
 Dying declarations are admitted in evidence because it is presumed 
 that no person who is immediately going into the presence of hia 
 Maker will do so with a lie on his lips.* And their admission in 
 evidence is not in contravention of constitutional and statutory pro- 
 visions that the defendant in a criminal action should have the right 
 to be confronted with the witnesses against him, since such declara- 
 tions were admissible at common law, and it is the witness who tes- 
 tifies in court by whom the accused is entitled to be confronted, and 
 not the declarant.^ And this rule applies, though a written declara- 
 tion prepared or signed by the declarant himself is offered in evi- 
 dence.* Nor does a statutory provision that dying declarations of 
 a deceased person may be offered in evidence, either for or against 
 a person charged with killing him, where at the time of making such 
 declarations he was conscious of approaching death, and believed 
 
 sKing V. Woodcock, 1 Leach, C. L. 
 602; 1 Gilbert, Ev. 280; 1 Chitty, Crim. 
 Law, 568, 569; Oliver v. State, 17 Ala. 
 587; Moore v. State, 12 Ala. 764, 46 Am. 
 Dec. 276; Ward v. State, 78 Ala. 441; 
 Sullivan v. State, 102 Ala. 135, 48 Am. 
 St. Rep. 22, 15 So. 264; Dunn v. State, 
 2 Ark. 229, 35 Am. Dec. 54; People v. 
 Lee, 17 Cal. 76; People v. Ybarra, 17 
 Cal. 166; State v. Oliver, 2 Houst. 
 (Del.) 585; Mitchell v. State, 71 Ga. 
 128; Hill V. State, 41 Ga. 484; State v. 
 Nash, 7 Iowa, 347; State v. Knoll, 69 
 Kan. 767, 77 Pac. 580; Walston v. Com. 
 16 B. Mon. 15; Bates v. Com. 14 Ky. L. 
 Eep. 177, 19 S. W. 928; State v. Scott, 
 12 La. Ann. 274 ; Kurd v. State, 25 Mich. 
 405; Lambeth v. State, 23 Miss. 322; 
 State V. Wensell, 98 Mo. 137, 11 S. W. 
 614; Donnelly v. State, 26 N. J. L. 463, 
 601 ; People v. Davis, 56 N. Y. 95 ; Peo- 
 ple V. Wood, 2 Edm. Sel. Cas. 71 ; State 
 V. Moody, 3 N. C. (2 Hayw.) 31, 2 Am. 
 Dec. 616; Com. v. Murray, 2 Ashm. 
 (Pa.) 42; Com. v. Williams, 2 Ashm. 
 (Pa.) 69; Brown v. Com. 73 Pa. 321, 13 
 Am. Eep. 740; State v. Jeswell, 22 R. I. 
 136, 46 Atl. 405; Benavides v. State, 31 
 Tex. 579. 
 
 4Reg. V. Osman, 15 Cox, C. C. 1, 31 
 Moak, Erg. Rep. 739. 
 
 BMcLean v. State, 16 Ala. 672; Green 
 V. State, 66 Ala. 40, 41 Am. Rep. 744; 
 State V. Thawley, 4 Harr. (Del.) 562; 
 
 State V. Oliver, 2 Houst. (Del.) 535; 
 Campbell v. State, 11 Ga. 353; State v. 
 Nash, 7 Iowa, 347; Walston v. Com. 16 
 B. Mon. 15; State v. Price, 6 La. Ann. 
 691 ; Com. v. Richards, 18 Pick. 434, 29 
 Am. Dec. 608 ; Com. v. M'Pike, 3 Cush. 
 181, 50 Am. Dec. 727; Com. v. Carey, 12 
 Cush. 246; McDaniel v. State, 8 Smedes 
 & M. 401, 47 Am. Dec. 93 ; Woodsides v. 
 State, 2 How. (Miss.) 655; Green v. 
 State, 13 Mo. 382; State v. Houser, 20 
 Mo. 431 ; State v. Vansant, 80 Mo. 67 ; 
 People v. Corey, 157 N. Y. 332, 51 N. E. 
 1024; State v. Arnold, 35 N. C. (13 
 Ired. L.) 184; Summons v. Stale, 5 
 Ohio St. 342; Robbins v. State, 8 Ohio 
 St. 131; Montgomery v. State, 11 Ohio, 
 424; State v. Saunders, 14 Or. 302, 12 
 Pac. 441; Com. v. Stoops, Addison (Pa.) 
 381; State v. Waldron, 16 R. I. 191, 14 
 Atl. 847; State v. Jeswell, 22 R. I. 136, 
 46 Atl. 405; Anthony v. State, Meigs, 
 265, 33 Am. Dec. 143; Burrell v. State, 
 18 Tex. 713; Black v. State, 1 Tex. App. 
 388 ; Taylor v. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 552, 43 S. W. 1019; Payne v. State, 45 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 564, 78 S. W. 934; Hill 
 V. Com. 2 Gratt. 594; State v. Baldwin, 
 15 Wash. 15, 45 Pae. 650; State v. 
 Cameron, 2 Chand. (Wis.) 172; Miller 
 V. State, 25 Wis. 384; State v. Dickin- 
 son, 41 Wis. 299. 
 
 estate v. Kindle, 47 Ohio St 358, 24 
 N. E. 485. 
 
§ 622] EVIDENCE. 975 
 
 there was no hope of recovery, and the declarations were voluntarily 
 made, and were not in answer to interrogatories calculated to lead 
 the deceased to make any particular statement, and that he was of 
 sane mind at the time of making the declaration, lay down any new 
 rule of law; it is merely an affirmance of the common-law rule of evi- 
 dence. ^ 
 
 Since it has been manifested by experience and observation, how- 
 ever, that sometimes hate and prejudice only expire with life, and 
 men seek to gratify a spirit of revenge in the face of immediate 
 death, and since the whole truth may not be elicited because of at- 
 tention not being directed to some circumstances, or unconscious 
 delusions produced by surprise or alarm may not have been dis- 
 pelled, such declarations should be received with the greatest cau- 
 tion, and the primary facts on which their admissibility depends 
 should be closely scrutinized.® And dying declarations should be 
 received and weighed with great caution for the reasons, also, that 
 they are necessarily wanting in the test of credibility of cross-ex- 
 amination, and in that the jury are without opportunity of observing 
 the temper and manner of the declarant, and that such testimony is 
 generally given by relatives and friends of the deceased, from whom 
 bias is to be expected.® 
 
 But the necessity which furnishes the basis for admission in evi- 
 dence of dying declarations is not the exigency of any particular 
 case, but a public necessity of which civilized society feels the pres- 
 sure for the protection of human life by the punishment of man- 
 slayers. *° And dying declarations are not rendered inadmissible 
 by the fact that there was other evidence of the homicide and the 
 circumstances attending it, so that their use was not necessary ;^^ 
 nor by the fact that there was sufficient evidence to convict the ac- 
 cused without them. ^ ^ And it is not a valid objection to the ad- 
 mission of dying declarations that the facts sought to be established 
 
 vBenavides v. State, 31 Tex. 579. 14 Or. 300, 12 Pac. 441 ; Com. v. Koddy, 
 
 sWard v. State, 78 Ala. 441. And swpra; Lyles v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 see Railing v. Com. 110 Pa. 100, 1 Atl. 86 S. W. 763; Rex v. Reason, 1 Strange, 
 
 314. 500, 16 How. St. Tr. 1. 
 
 sShell V. State, 88 Ala. 14, 7 So. 40. izState v. Yee Wee, 7 Idaho, 188, 61 
 
 loCom. V. Roddy, 184 Pa. 274, 39 Pac. 588; Battle v. State, 74 Ga. 101; 
 
 Atl. 211 ; State v. Wilson, 24 Kan. 189, Darby v. State, 79 Ga. 63, 3 S. E. 663. 
 
 36 Am. Rep. 257. There is no rule of law which makes 
 
 liReynolds v. State, 68 Ala. 502; Peo- the admissibility of a, dying declaration, 
 
 pie V. Glenn. 10 C'al. 32 ; Parks v. State, as such, depend upon the exigencies of 
 
 105 Ga. 242, 31 S. E. 580; State v. the case. People v. Beverly, 108 Mich. 
 
 Wilson, supra; Luker v. Com. 9 Ky. L. 509, 63 N. W. 379. 
 
 Eep. 386, 5 S. W. 354; State v. Saunders, 
 
970 HOMICEDE. [§ 622 
 
 may be proved by other witnesses than the decedent/^ Nor is the 
 wrongful admission of incompetent dying declarations rendered 
 harmless by the fact that there is other evidence tending to establish 
 the guilt of the accused, since it cannot be determined how much 
 influence the dying declarations had, either on the verdict, or the 
 punishment imposed. ■'^* 
 
 c. Application of doctrine. 
 
 623. To what classes of cases. — ^We have seen that dying declara- 
 tions are admissible in evidence only in cases of homicide in which 
 the death of the deceased is the subject of inquiry.^ They are not 
 admissible for the purpose of proving a mere assault.^ So closely 
 is this rule adhered to, that dying declarations are held to be in- 
 admissible in a prosecution for abortion, as distinguished from homi- 
 cide in the commission of, or attempt to commit, abortion.* And a 
 charge of causing the death of a woman, brought under a statute pro- 
 viding that any person procuring, or attempting to procure, or ad- 
 vising the procurement of, an abortion, either by the use of medi- 
 cines or instruments upon any woman, shall, in case of her death 
 or that of her child, be guilty of a felony, is not a charge of homi- 
 cide in any degree, and the death of the deceased is not a necessary 
 ingredient of the crime, and therefore her dying declarations are 
 not admissible on the trial. * Nor is the death of a woman on whom 
 
 isPayne v. State, 61 Miss. 161; In State v. Pearce, 56 Minn. 226, 57 N. 
 Fuqua v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 2204, 73 W. 652, 1065, however, it was held that 
 S. W. 782; People v. Knickerbocker, 1 upon the trial of an indictment for man- 
 Park. Crim. Rep. 302. Contra, Stewart slaughter, in which it appeared that the 
 V. State, 2 Lea, 598. And see Binfield v. crime was committed by the accused in 
 State, 15 Neb. 484, 19 N. W. 607. an attempt to procure an abortion at 
 
 Instate V. Johnson, 118 Mo. 491, 40 the request of the deceased and her hus- 
 Am. St. Rep. 405, 24 S. W. 229. band, that the husband was an accom- 
 
 iSee supra, § 620. plice with the accused, and that there- 
 
 The dying declarations of a, woman fore the latter could not be convicted 
 upon whom a rape had been committed, upon his uncorroborated testimony, and 
 and who after the commission of the of- that the dying declarations of the wife 
 fense cut her own throat, are not ad- were properly admitted in evidence to 
 missible on the trial of a person in- corroboi-ate the evidence of lier hus- 
 dicted for the rape. Reg. v. Newton, band; and that, while it might seem to 
 1 Fost. & F. 641. be an unsound rule that one who solicits 
 
 2People V. Schiavi, 96 App. Div. 479, the commission of an offense, and will- 
 89 N. Y. Supp. 584. infcly submits to its being committed 
 
 aState v. Harper, 35 Ohio St. 78, 35 upon her person, should not be deemed 
 Am. Rep. 590; Com. v. Gumpert, 6 Lu- an accomplico, while those whom she 
 zerne Legal Reg. 187; Railing v. Com. has thus solicited shall be deemed 
 110 Pa. 100, 1 Atl. 314, Overruling Com. principal criminals in the transaction. 
 V. Bruce, 16 Phila. 510; King ex rel. yet in cases of this kind the public wel- 
 Law V. Mead, 2 Barn. & C. 608; Reg. fare demands the application of the rule 
 V. Hind, 8 Cox, C. C. 300, 6 Jur. N. S. 4PeopIe v. Davis, 56 N. Y. 96; Rail- 
 514. ing V. Com. supra. 
 
% 623] EVIDENCE. 077 
 
 an abortion was comnutted an essential element of the crime, so as 
 to render her dying declarations admissible in evidence under a 
 statute providing that any person who administers, prescribes for, 
 or directs any pregnant woman to take, any drug or noxious thing, 
 or who shall use any instrument or means whatever with intent to 
 procure a miscarriage, shall be guilty of a high misdemeanor and 
 punished accordingly. ° And the same rule applies to a statutory 
 provision for the imprisonment of any person who, with intent to 
 procure a miscarriage, shall do certain acts; or use certain means, 
 where the woman dies in consequence thereof." 
 
 In some of the states, however, dying declarations have been made 
 admissible in evidence in prosecutions for abortion with like effect, 
 and under like limitations, as those applying to declarations in 
 prosecutions for felonious homicide.'' And dying declarations are 
 not rendered inadmissible in a prosecution for homicide in an at- 
 tempt to commit abortion, upon the theory that the death of the 
 woman is no part of the facts which go to constitute the crime;® or 
 by a constitutional provision securing to the accused the right to meet 
 the witnesses face to face;® or by the fact that the offense of procur- 
 ing an abortion, by which the death of the woman was caused, has 
 been mitigated and changed from murder to manslaughter by stat- 
 ute.''*' So, dying declarations are admissible against an aider and 
 abetter in a homicide, as well as against the principal actor.-' ^ 
 And the fact that the prosecution was for manslaughter, and not 
 for murder, does not render them inadmissible. ^ ^ Nor does a slight 
 contradiction or inconsistency on the part of the witnesses who testi- 
 fied to such dying declaration and the facts warranting its admis- 
 sion render it incompetent, where the witness adhered to the state- 
 ment that the declarant insisted she was dying. ^ ^ And a dying dec- 
 laration to the effect that a named physician operated upon declarant 
 is not objectionable as an expression of an opinion, but is the state- 
 ment of a fact peculiarly within her knowledge.^* Mere exclama- 
 tions such as might naturally come from a person in pain, whose 
 
 estate v. Meyer 64 N. J. L. 382, 45 Dec. 607. And see Com. v. Thompson, 
 
 Atl. 779. 159 Mass. 56, 33 N. E. 1111; State v. 
 
 eCom. V. Homer, 153 Mass. 343, 26 N. Pearce, 56 Minn. 226, 57 N. W. 652, 1065. 
 
 E. 872. sstate v. Dickinson, 41 Wis. 299. 
 
 7See Com. v. Keene, 7 Pa. Super. Ct. lolbid. 
 
 293; Com. v. Homer, supra. uPeopIe v. Moran, 144 Cal. 48, 77 
 
 But such provisions are prospective in Pac. 777. 
 
 their operation, and do not apply where izState v. Hannah, 10 La. Ann. 131. 
 
 the death of the woman occurred pre- isHawkins v. State, 98 Md. 355, 57 
 
 vious to their enactment. Com. v. Atl. 27. 
 
 Homer, supra. uMaine v. People, 9 Hun, 113. 
 
 sSmith V. State, 33 Me. 48, 58 Am. 
 Horn.— 62 
 
978 HOMICIDE. [i 025 
 
 attention was distracted from persons and things about her, however, 
 are not admissible in such a prosecution as dying declarations, where 
 there is nothing to indicate that they referred to the cause of death. 
 And a statute providing that whoever prescribes for, or administer* 
 to, any pregnant woman any drug, medicine, or substance whatever, 
 with intent thereby to procure her miscarriage, or with like intent 
 uses any instrument or means whatever, unless such miscarriage is 
 necessary to preserve her lift, shall, if she miscarries, or dies in con- 
 sequence thereof, be fined or imprisoned, makes the death a subject 
 of inquiry, so as to render her dying declarations admissible.^® 
 And it is to be noted that in California, by statute, dying declarations 
 as to the cause of death may be given in all criminal actions. 
 
 624. In favor of, as well as against, accused. — The general rule is 
 that dying declarations of the deceased may be given in evidence in 
 a prosecution for homicide where the death is the subject of the 
 charge, where they are in favor of the accused, as well as where they 
 are against him. ^ And rules of evidence relative to the admissibility 
 of dying declarations are not to be as rigorously applied when the 
 fact that they were made has been satisfactorily established, and they 
 are in favor of the accused, as where they are sought to be urged 
 against him. ^ And the rejection of a portion of a dying declaration 
 is error where it tends to show the purpose of the deceased a short 
 time before the killing, furnishing, to some extent, a ground for ar- 
 guing that he had acted for the purpose of procuring a difficulty 
 with the accused.* So, while the general rule is that declarations of 
 the deceased are admissible only where they relate to facts, and not 
 to matters of opinion, declarations of the mere opinion of the deceased 
 are admissible where they are favorable to the accused, and explain 
 the conduct or motives of the deceased.* And a declaration of the 
 deceased that he did not think the accused would have struck him if 
 he had not provoked him is competent. ^ So, dying declarations are 
 
 iBPeople V. Olmstead, 30 Mich. 431; Scaife, 1 Moody & R. 551, 2 Lewin, C. 
 
 State V. Baldwin, 79 Iowa, 714, 45 N. C. 150. But see People v. McLauffhlin, 
 
 W. 297. 44 Cal. 435. 
 
 leMontgomery v. State, 80 Ind. 339, 2State v. Ash worth, supra. 
 
 41 Am. Rep. 815. sChittenden v. Com. supra. 
 
 iMoore v. State, 12 Ala. 764, 46 Am. 4Haney v. Com. 5 Ky. L. Rep. 203; 
 
 Dec. 276; Brock v. Com. 92 Ky. 183, State v. Ashworth, 50 La. Ann. 94, 23 
 
 17 S. W. 337; Chittenden v. Com. 10 Ky. So. 270. 
 
 L. Rep. 330, 9 S. W. 386; State v. Ash- 6Rex v. Scaife, 1 Moody & R. 551. 2 
 
 worth, 50 La. Ann. 94, 23 So. 270; Peo- Lewin, C. C. 150. And see Uni+fid 
 
 pie V. Knapp, 26 Mich. 112; Mattox v. States v. Taylor, 4 Cranch, C. C. 338, 
 
 United States, 146 U. S. 140, 36 L. ed. Fed. Cas. No. 16,436; Moore v. State, 
 
 917, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 50; Rex v. 12 Ala. 764, 46 Am. Dec 276. 
 
§ 024] EVIDENCE. 979 
 
 admissible on behalf of the accused to show that the killing was done 
 by another person." 
 
 It has been held, however, that dying declarations of the deceased 
 made shortly before his death, which state in substance that the ac- 
 cused was not to blame, afford no evidence of anything more than a 
 truly Christian spirit of forgiveness, and are inadmissible as evidence 
 in behalf of the accused. '' And a dying declaration of the deceased in 
 a prosecution for homicide, that some person other than the accused 
 shot him, is inadmissible and properly rejected upon the ground that 
 it was a physical impossibility for the deceased to know who shot him, 
 and was merely an expression of an opinion on his part. * And here, 
 as in other cases, the declarations must be made under a sense of im- 
 pending dissolution.® 
 
 625. With reference to person making them. — Dying declarations, 
 in order to be admissible in evidence, must, as a general rule, be the 
 statements and declarations of the person for the killing of whom the 
 accused is being tried. ^ And where a person is on trial for homicide 
 of one person it is not competent to admit dying declarations of an- 
 other person in evidence against him, though such other person was 
 killed in the same affray.^ And this is the rule though the person 
 whose homicide is charged and the declarant were husband and wife. ^ 
 And the rule is not altered by a statute providing that dying declara- 
 tions of the deceased may be offered in evidence, either for or against 
 a person charged with homicide of such deceased person.* Nor are 
 the dying declarations of a witness to a homicide admissible in a 
 prosecution therefor.® And a deathbed confession of a person that 
 he killed deceased is not admissible as a dying declaration in a prose- 
 cution of another person for doing the killing. * And upon the trial 
 
 ePeople v. Southern, 120 Cal. 645, 53 zState v. Fitzhugh, 2 Or. 227; Taylor 
 
 Pao. 214. V. State, 120 Ga. 857, 48 S. E. 3G1 ; State 
 
 7Moeck V. People, 100 111. 242, 39 Am. v. Bohan, supra; State v. Westfall, 49 
 
 Rep. 38; Adams v. People, 47 111. 376. Iowa, 328; Hudson v. State, supra; 
 
 sjones V. State. 52 Ark. 345, 12 S. W. Radford v. State, 33 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 704. And when the widow of the de- 520, 27 S. W. 143; Krehs v. State, 3 Tex. 
 
 opased identified the accused as among App. 348. 
 
 the persons present at the afTray in sKrebs v. State, and Radford v. State, 
 
 which the killing was done, it is not supra; Moore v. State, 12 Ala. 764, 46 
 
 competent to contradict her by evidence Am. Dec. 276 ; People v. Green, 1 Denio, 
 
 that her husband, in her presence, two 614; Brown v. Com. 73 Pa. 321, 13 Am. 
 
 or three days after the affray declared Rep. 708; Com. v. Stoops, Addison 
 
 his ignorance as to who the parties (Pa.) 381. And see Hackett v. Peo- 
 
 were, and that she made no reply. Com. pie, 54 Barb. 370. 
 V. Densmore, 12 Allen. 535. iRadford v. State, supra. 
 
 (,j]i,;^[ ePoteete v. State. 9 Baxt. 261, 40 Am. 
 
 1 State V. Bohan, 15 Kan. 407; State Rep. 90. 
 V Wilson 23 La. Ann. 558 ; Poteete v. sDavis v. Com. 95 Ky. 19, 44 Am. St. 
 
 State, 9 Baxt. 261, 40 Am. Rep. 90; Hud- Rep. 201. 23 S. W. 585. 
 60P V. State. 3 Coldw. 355. 
 
080 HOMICIDE. [i 625 
 
 of a person charged witli aiding and abetting another in the commis- 
 sion of a homicide, the declaration of the principal exculpating the 
 accused, just before being hung by a mob, is incompetent as a dying 
 declaration. "^ 
 
 Where mortal injuries are inflicted upon several by the same trans- 
 action, however, dying declarations of one are admissible in evidence 
 in a prosecution for the homicide of another.® And where poison 
 is administered to a person, and is taken at the same time by two 
 others, who also die from its effects, their declarations are admissible 
 in a prosecution for the killing of the person to whom it was directly 
 administered.® And where two persons are mortally wounded by 
 the same shot, and a trial is had for the murder of one of them, the 
 general rule is so far relaxed as to admit in evidence on the trial the 
 dying declarations of the other.*" Nor are dying declarations of a 
 wife rendered inadmissible on a charge against her husband for her 
 murder by the fact that they are the declarations of a wife against 
 her husband, the principle being the same as that which allows her 
 to testify against him where the complaint is of violence against 
 her person.** And a dying declaration of a husband is competent 
 evidence against his wife on a trial for his murder.*^ And dying 
 declarations are not rendered inadmissible by the fact that they are 
 those of a slave. * * Those of a child, however, are not admissible on 
 a prosecution for its murder, where it was of such tender years that 
 it could not be supposed to have grasped the idea of the future state, 
 the grasping of which is considered as the equivalent of a solemn 
 oath. * * But if the child be of intelligent mind, and fully compre- 
 hends the nature of an oath, and the consequences in a future state 
 of telling a falsehood, his declarations, made under a sense of im- 
 pending dissolution, are admissible. * ^ Thus, the dying declarations 
 of an intelligent child ten years old have been admitted. * ® But the 
 dying declarations of persons disqualified by conviction of an in- 
 famous offense are, at common law, inadmissible.*'^ 
 
 'Mitchell V. Com. 12 Ky. L. Rep. 458, isState v. Hannah, 10 La. Ann. 131; 
 
 14 S. W. 489. Lewis v. State, 9 Smedes & M. 115. 
 
 sRex V. Baker, 2 Moody & R. 53. i4Rex v. Pike, 3 Car. & P. 598; Lam- 
 
 sState V. Terrell, 12 Rich. L. 321; beth v. State, 23 Miss. 322. 
 
 Rex V. Baker, supra. 152 Russell, Crimes, 765. 
 
 loState V. Wilson, 23 La. Ann. 558. isReR. v. Perkins, 2 Moody, C. 0. 
 
 11 People V. Green, 1 Denio, 615; Com. 135. 9 Car. & P. 395. 
 
 V. Stoops, Addis. m (Pa.) 3S1 ; State v. iTKiiia: v. Drummond, 1 Leach, C. L. 
 
 Belcher, 13 S. C. -]5n. 337; i Russ. C. & M. 763; Walker v. 
 
 i2Moore v. State, 12 Ala. 764, 46 Am. SLate, 39 Ark. 221. 
 Dec. 276. 
 
§ 620] EVIDENCE. 981 
 
 d. Subject-matter as affecting admissibility. 
 
 626. The general rule. — Tbe general rule is that dying declara- 
 tions are only admissible as to actual facts which point distinctly to 
 the cause of death for which the prosecution was brought, and to 
 circumstances producing and attending it.^ Thus, declarations by a 
 wife after being fatally shot by her husband, that she wanted him 
 to keep and raise the children, are not competent as dying declara- 
 tions.^ Nor is the expression "I pray God to forgive him" admis- 
 
 iMcLean v. State, 16 Ala. 672; Oliver Eep. 598, 47 S. W. 892; State v. Sexton, 
 
 V. State, 17 Ala. 587 ; Johnson v. State, 147 Mo. 89, 48 S. W. 452 ; Binfield v. 
 
 17 Ala. 618; Mose v. State, 35 Ala. 421; State, 15 Neb. 484, 19 N. W. 607; Peo- 
 
 Johnson v. State, 47 Ala. 9; Johnson pie v. Davis, 56 N. Y. 95; State v. 
 
 V. State, 50 Ala. 456; Faire v. State, 58 Shelton, 47 N. C. (2 Jones, L.) 360, 64 
 
 Ala. 74; Eeynolds v. State, 68 Ala. 502; Am. Dec. 587; State v. Harper, 35 Ohio 
 
 Sylvester v. State, 71 Ala. 17; PuUiam St. 78, 35 Am. Rep. 596; State v. Gar- 
 
 v." State, 88 Ala. 1, 6 So. 839; Kirby v. rand, 5 Or. 216; Com. v. Gumpert, 6 
 
 State, 89 Ala. 63, 8 So. 110; Blackburn Luzerne Legal Reg. 187; Com. v. Mur- 
 
 V. State, 98 Ala. 63, 13 So. 274; Sullivan ray, 2 Ashm. (Pa.) 41; Com. v. Keene, 
 
 V. State, 102 Ala. 135, 48 Am. St. Rep. 7 Pa. Super. Ct. 293; State v. Johnson, 
 
 22, 15 So. 264; Allen v. State, 70 Ark. 26 S. C. 152. 1 S. B. 510; State v. 
 
 337, 68 S. W. 28; People v. Taylor, 59 Bradley, 34 S. C. 136, 13 S. E. 315; 
 
 Oal. 640; People v. Fong Ah Sing, 70 State v. Banister, 35 S. C. 290, 14 S. E. 
 
 Cal. 8. 11 Pae. 323; People v. Hall, 94 678; State v. Faile, 43 S. C. 52, 20 S. E. 
 
 Cal. 595, 30 Pac. 7; People v. Wong 798; Nelson v. State, 7 Humph. 542; 
 
 Chuey, 117 Cal. 624, 49 Pac. 833; Mc- Warren v. State, 9 Tex. App. 619, 35 
 
 Bride v. People, 5 Colo. App. 91, 37 Am. Rep. 745 ; Ex parte Barber, 16 Tex. 
 
 Pac. 953; United States v. Heath, 9 App. 369; Medina v. State, 43 Tex. 
 
 Mackey, 272; Savage v. State, 18 Fla. Crira. Rep. 52, 63 S. W. 331; Craven 
 
 909; Parks v. State, 105 Ga. 242, 31 S. v. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 90 S. W. 
 
 E. 580; North v. People, 139 111. 81, 28 311; State v. Kessler, 15 Utah, 142, 62 
 
 N. E. 966; Binns v. State, 46 Ind. 311; Am. St. Rep. 911, 49 Pac. 293; State 
 
 Montgomery v. State, 80 Ind. 338, 41 v. Carrington, 15 Utah, 480, 50 Pac. 
 
 Am. Rep. 815; Boyle v. State, 105 Ind. 526; State v. Center, 35 Vt. 378; Crook- 
 
 469, 55 Am. Rep. 218, 5 N. E. 203; ham v. State. 5 W. Va. 510; State v. 
 
 Archibald v. State, 122' Ind. 122, 23 N. Cameron, 2 Chand. (Wis.) 172, 2 Pin- 
 
 E. 758; State v. Baldwin, 79 Iowa, 714, ney (Wis.) 490; State v. Dickinson, 41 
 
 45 N. W. 297 ; State v. Perigo, 80 Iowa, Wis. 299 ; Rex v. Hutchinson, 2 Barn. & 
 
 37, 45 N. W. 399 ; State v. O'Shea, 60 C. 608 note ; Reg. v. Hind, 8 Cox, 0. C. 
 
 Kan 772, 57 Pac. 920; Walston v. Com. 300, Bell, C. C. 253, 29 L. J. Mag. Cas. 
 
 16 B. Mon. 15; Leiber v. Com. 9 Bush, N. S. 147, 6 Jur. N. S. 514, 2 L. T. N. S. 
 
 11; Pace v. Com. 89 Ky. 204, 12 S. W. 253, 8 Week. Rep. 421; King v. Mead, 4 
 
 271 ; Starr v. Com. 97 Ky. 193, 30 S. W. Dowl. & R. 120, 2 Barn. & C. 605, 26 
 
 397; Henderson v. Com. 5 Ky. L. Rep. Revised Rep. 484; Ashton's Case, 2 
 
 244 • Luker v. Com. 9 Ky. L. Rep. 385, 5 Lewin, C. C. 147. And see Richard v. 
 
 S. W. 354; Owens v. Com. 22 Ky. L. State, 42 Fla. 528, 29 So. 413. 
 
 Rep 514, 58 S. W. 422; State v. Black, A statement of the deceased that it 
 
 42 La. Ann. 861 8 So. 594; People v. was hard to be killed for telling the 
 
 Olrastead, 30 Mich. 431; Merrill v. truth, yet God knew that he told the 
 
 State, 58 Miss. 65 ; Payne v. State, 61 truth, and a person mentioned by name 
 
 Miss ' 161 ; Lipscomb v. State, 75 Miss, knew that it was the truth, is admissible 
 
 559 23 So' 210, 230; State v. Draper, 65 over the objection that it disclosed no 
 
 Mo' 335, 27 Am. Rep. 287 ; State v. Jef- fact as to the relation of the parties to 
 
 ferson 77 Mo 136- State v. Vansant, 80 the encounter, or connected with it. 
 
 Mo 67- State v. Chambers, 87 Mo. 406; Whitley v. State, 38 Ga. 50. 
 
 State V Parker, 96 Mo. 382, 9 S. W. 728; 2 Johnson v. State, 94 Ala. 35, 10 So. 
 
 State V. Bowles, 146 Mo. 6, 69 Am. St. 667. 
 
982 HOlVncrDK [§ 626 
 
 sible as a dying declaration.^ And the same rule applies to statements 
 by the deceased that if the friends of the accused had not interfered 
 he would have fixed him.* And a declaration of the deceased, 
 calling the attention of the witness to the fact that he was unarmed, 
 is inadmissible. ® And statements by the deceased after he was fatai- 
 ly injured, to the effect that he was at fault or to blame, and that 
 the accused had been good to him, are properly excluded as having 
 no relation to the circumstances of the killing.® And the same rule 
 applies to a bare statement that a designated person shot him.'' 
 Dying declarations identifying the accused, however, are admis- 
 sible;* and are not rendered inadmissible by the fact that the deceased 
 gave no reason for thinking the persons identified were the ones who 
 had injured him.® And dying declarations of the deceased are ad' 
 missible in evidence where they tend to show the place at which he 
 was injured;^" and so are declarations tending to show the object 
 of the deceased in going to the place where the injury was inflicted. ^ ^ 
 And a declaration that he had no pistol when he was shot is com- 
 petent in rebuttal of evidence that the killing was done in self-de- 
 fense. ^ * So, dying declarations are competent as such, where they 
 tend to show what deceased was doing when he received the injury 
 which resulted in his death. ^ * And declarations of the deceased re- 
 
 i sSuIlivan v. State, 102 Ala. 135, 48 not competent to go to the jury on the 
 
 Am. St. Eep. 22, 15 So. 264. question of the fact of killing. Baker v. 
 
 So, a statement offered as a dying Com. 106 Ky. 212. 50 S. W. 54. 
 
 declaration, that the good Lord had ewilliams v. State, 130 Ala. 107, 30 
 
 sent the declarant back to tell that Dr. So. 487. And see Reynolds v. State, 68 
 
 Lipscomb had killed him — had poisoned Ala. 502. 
 
 him with a capsule he gave him — is in- In Haney v. Com. 5 Ky. L. Rep. 203, 
 
 admissible in evidence so far as the however, it was held that a declaration 
 
 statement that he had been dead is con- by a deceased person that he brought on 
 
 cerned, because irrelevant; but the the difficulty in which his death vras 
 
 words, "Dr. Lipscomb has killed me — caused, himself, and that he did not 
 
 has poisoned me with a capsule he gave blame the accused for shooting him, and 
 
 me," — can be separated from the other that he alone was to blame, is not mere 
 
 part of the statement, and are admissi- matter of opinion, since his opportunity 
 
 ble as a statement of fact. Lipscomb v. for knowing whether he was to blame 
 
 State, 75 Miss. 559, 23 So. 210, 230. was greater than that of anyone else. 
 
 4Franklin v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. TMcHargess v. Com. 15 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 21, 51 S. W. 951. 323, 23 S. W. 349. 
 
 estate v. Eddon, 8 Wash. 292, 36 Pac. sCom. v. Roddy, 184 Pa. 274, 39 Atl. 
 
 139. 211 ; Marcum v. Com. 8 Ky. L. Rep. 418, 
 
 So, it is inadmissible to permit wit- 1 S. W. 727; State v. Roberts (Nev.) 
 
 nesses to state that the deceased said: 82 Pac. 100. 
 
 "I want all you people to swear the 9 Com. v. Roddy, supra. 
 
 truth about this;" such statement is ad- lOMedina v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 missible for consideration by the court, 52, 63 S. W. 331. 
 
 as tending in some manner to show the HRedmond v. Com. 21 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 consciousness of impending death, in de- 331, 51 S. W. 565. 
 
 termining the admissibility of state- izibid. 
 
 ments as to the fact of the killing and isState v. Jones, 89 lowa^ 182, 56 N. 
 
 the attendant circumstances, but it is VV. 427. 
 
5 626] EVIDENCE. 983 
 
 lating to what was said by him or by the accused, and as to what hap- 
 pened between them at the time of the fatal encounter, are always 
 properly admissible. ^ * ^ 
 
 627. Confined to statements otherwise admissible. — Dying declara- 
 tions are admitted on the ground that the danger of impending death 
 is equivalent to the sanction of an oath, and that the persons making 
 them are considered in the light of witnesses, and stand in the same 
 situation as if they were sworn; what, therefore, would exclude a 
 living witness will exclude his dying declarations.^ Declarations 
 which may be admitted in evidence as dying declarations must be 
 such as the deceased would have been permitted to testify to had he 
 been a witness.^ Nothing can be evidence in a declaration in artir 
 culo mortis which would not have been so if the party had been ex- 
 amined.* The object of the law in permitting such declarations to be 
 received would be defeated, however, if they were confined to the im- 
 mediate physical cause of death ; and the name of the slayer, the con- 
 versation or conduct of the parties at or immediately preceding the 
 homicide, and constituting the res gestce of the occurrence, such as a 
 witness would be permitted to relate, and which would throw light up- 
 on the conduct of the parties on that occasion, may be proved by dying 
 declarations of the person killed.* And where it appears that a de- 
 clarant had been convicted of a felony, his dying declarations, which 
 might not have been admissible under the common-law rule, are ad- 
 missible under a statutory provision making such person a com- 
 petent witness, though the conviction may be shown for the purpose 
 
 KClemmons v. State, 43 Fla. 200, 30 the jury that dying declarations are to 
 
 So. 699; State V. Parker, 172 Mo. 191, 72 be considered by them just as though 
 
 S. W. 650; State v. Whitt, 113 N. C. the deceased had been sworn and put on 
 
 716, 18 S. E. 715. the stand, and had testified to the words 
 
 iDonnelly v. State, 26 N. J. L. 463; used in his dying declaration, since any 
 
 Walker v. State, 39 Ark. 221 ; Lam- misleading tendency in such an instruc- 
 
 beth V. State, 23 Misa. 322 ; Respublica tion may be corrected by an explanatory 
 
 V. Langcake, 1 Yeates, 415. And see charge, if requested by the accused. 
 
 Haney v. Com. 5 Ky. L. Rep. 203. Kennedy v. State, 85 Ala. 326, 5 So. 
 
 2Hall V. State, 132 Ind. 317, 31 N. E. 300. 
 
 636; Montgomery v. State, 80 Ind. 338, 3Rex v. Sellers, Car. Crim. Law, 233. 
 
 41 Am. Rep. 815; Whitley v. State, 38 And see Boyd v. State, 84 Miss. 414, 36 
 
 <3a. 50; State v. Wright, 112 Iowa, 436, So. 525. 
 
 84 N. W. 541 ; State v. Elkins, 101 Mo. And dying declarations may be Im- 
 
 344, 14 S. W. 116; State v. Saunders, 14 peached in any of the modes by which 
 
 Or. 300, 12 Pac. 441 ; State v. Foot You, the evidence of the declarant could have 
 
 24 Or. 75, 32 Pac. 1031, 33 Pac. 537 ; been impeached had he or she been alive 
 
 Roberts v. State, 5 Tex. App. 141 ; Con- and testifying in open court. Nordgren 
 
 nell V. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. 259, v. People, 211 111. 425, 71 N. E. 1042. 
 
 81 S W 746; State v. Carrington, 15 iWilkeraon v. State, 91 Ga. 729, 17 
 
 Utah, 480, 50 Pac. 526: State v. Bur- S. E. 990; White v. State. 100 Ga. 659, 
 
 nett, 47 W. Va. 731, 35 S. E. 983. 28 S. E. 423; People v. Glover, 141 Cal. 
 
 And the court may properly instruct 233, 74 Pac. 745. 
 
984 HOMICIDE. [§ 627 
 
 of affecting the credibility of his statement. ^ And a statute declaring 
 that dying declarations made by any person who is conscious of his 
 condition, as to the cause of his death and the person who killed him, 
 are admissible in a prosecution for homicide, is broad enough to 
 include all relevant facts embraced in the res gestce of the homicide. " 
 
 Error in admitting improper statements in dying declarations is 
 not ground for reversal, however, where the subject-matter of such 
 statements is brought out by the evidence. '' 
 
 628. Antecedent and subsequent matters. — Dying declarations are 
 admissible only to prove what was done at the time of the commis- 
 sion of the unlawful act which caused death, and cannot be admitted 
 where they relate to matters antecedent or subsequent to the trans- 
 action which was the cause of the death. ' Dying declarations when 
 they relate to former, or subsequent, or distinct transactions do not 
 come within the principle of necessity, under which they are admis- 
 sible in evidence, since in such case other testimony may usually be 
 obtained. ^ Anything previously or subsequently done or said, unless 
 called up and made part of the altercation, cannot be proved as a 
 dying declaration; and when so called up it can be proved only to 
 the extent it was repeated or uttered in the altercation. * And though 
 tending to identify the accused as the perpetrator of the alleged hom- 
 
 BState V. Baldwin, 15 Wash. 15, 45 Ben v. State, 37 Ala. 103; Sullivan v. 
 
 Pac. 650. State, 102 Ala. 135, 48 Am. St. Rep. 22, 
 
 eWilkerson v. State, and White v. 15 So. 264; Perry v. State, 102 Ga. 365, 
 
 State, supra. 30 S. E. 903; Leiber v. Com. 9 Bush, 11 ; 
 
 7PeopIe V. Sowell, 145 Cal. 292, 78 State v. Shelton, 47 N. C. (2 Jones, 
 
 Pac. 717. L.) 360, 64 Am. Dec. 587; Warren v. 
 
 iMontgomery v. State, 80 Ind. 338, State, 9 Tex. App. 619, 35 Am. Rep. 
 
 41 Am. Rep. 815; Sullivan v. State, 102 745; King ex rel. Law v. Mead, 2 
 
 Ala. 135, 48 Am. St. Rep. 22, 15 So. Barn. & C. 605; Reg. v. Hind, Bell, C. 
 
 264; ?erry v. State, 102 Ga. 365, 30 S. E. C. 253, 8 Cox. C. C. 300. 
 903; Binns v. State, 46 Ind. 311; State 3 Sullivan v. State, supra; Nordgren 
 
 V. Baldwin, 79 Iowa. 714, 45 N. W. 297; v. People, 211 111. 425, 71 N. E. 1042; 
 
 State V. Perigo, 80 'Iowa, 37, 45 N. W. State v. Spivey, 191 Mo. 87, 90 S. W. 81. 
 399; State v. O'Shea, 60 Kan. 772, 57 A dying declaration that defendant 
 
 Pac. 970; Chittenden v. Com. 10 Ky. L. had no reason whatever for the homi- 
 
 Rep. 330, 9 S. W. 386; Peoples v. Oom. cide may be fairly referred solely to the 
 
 87 Ky. 487, 9 S. W. 509, 810; Henderson time of tlie homicide, and may be con- 
 
 V. Com. 5 Ky. L. Rep. 244; Lipscomb v. strued to mean that the deceased at- 
 
 State, 75 Miss. 599, 23 So. 210, 230; tempted no violence toward the defend- 
 
 vState V. Parker, 172 Mo. 191, 72 S. W. ant; but if construed as relating to pnst 
 
 050; State v. Draper, 65 Mo. 335, 27 transactions, or as a mere expression of 
 
 Am. Rep. 287 ; Nelson v. State, 7 opinion, the specifie objection to such 
 
 Humph. 542; Winfrey v. State. 41 Tex. portion of the declaration may be 
 
 Crim. Rep. 538, 56 S. W. 919 ; Medina v. called to the attention of the trial court 
 
 State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 52, 63 S. W. by a motion to strike out. or by some 
 
 331 ; State v. Moody, 18 Wash. 165, 51 other appropriate method', or the ob- 
 
 Pac. 358. jection will not be considered on ap- 
 
 2lTackett v. People, 54 Barb. 370; peal. People v. Farmer, 77 Cal. 1, 18 
 
 People V. Smith, 172 N. Y. 210, 64 N. Pso. 800. 
 E. 814; Johnson v. State, 17 Ala. 618; 
 
EVIDENCE. 985 
 
 icicle, and to establisli and explain the circumstances of the res gestcB, 
 they cannot be admitted as dying declarations when they also purport 
 to disclose former and distinct transactions not relating to the par- 
 ticular facts constituting the subject-matter of the charge, for the 
 identification of the accused.* Thus, dying declarations of the 
 deceased are not admissible to show old malice on the part of the 
 accused against him,® though the rule is different with reference to 
 malice at the time of the transaction which resulted in death ;^ and 
 previous threats by the accused against the deceased are not subject 
 to proof by the deceased's dying declarations;'' nor can previous at- 
 tempts to kill be so proved ;® nor can a previous difficulty between the 
 accused and the deceased be proved by dying declarations of the 
 deceased ;^ or the absence of such previous difficulties. ' " And a mere 
 narrative by the deceased to her physician in answer to inquiries as 
 to her condition and symptoms, stating what had taken place with 
 reference to taking medicine, and other occurrences, is not admissible 
 as a dying declaration in a prosecution for homicide in the commis- 
 sion of an abortion. ^ ^ ISTor are expressions of the deceased referring 
 to former relations with her seducer, such as might naturally be made 
 in her extremity, and which do not necessarily refer to an attempt to 
 procure an abortion. ^ ^ So, statements included in dying declarations 
 as to the condition of the deceased several days after the unlawful act 
 was committed, and of facts entirely distinct from the act itself, 
 are not competent as dying declarations. ^ ^ 
 
 On a trial under an indictment for murder, however, where there 
 is evidence showing a conspiracy between the accused and his wife 
 to kill the deceased, and that for the purpose of carrying out such 
 conspiracy a letter was written by the wife to the deceased, it is 
 competent for the state to prove by dying declarations of the deceased 
 
 ^Leiber v. Com. 9 Bush, 11. sWarren v. State, 9 Tex. App. 619, 
 
 BState V. Garrand, 5 Or. 216. 35 Am. Rep. 745; Nelson v. State, 7 
 
 ejbid. Humph. 542; Mose v. State, and Ben v. 
 
 7 Jones V. State, 71 Ind. 66; Mose v. State, supra. 
 
 State, 35 Ala. 421; Ben v. State, 37 oPeople v. Taylor, 59 Cal. 640; Foley 
 
 Ala. 103; Merrill v. State, 58 Miss. 65; y. State, 11 Wyo. 464, 72 Pac. 627. But 
 
 State V. Parker, 172 Mo. 191, 72 S. W. see Donnelly v. State, 26 N. J. L. 463, 
 
 650; State v. Wood, 53 Vt. 560. 601; State v. Belton, 24 S. C. 185, 58 
 
 And a refusal of the court to in- Am. Rep. 245. 
 
 struct the jury that a portion of a dy- lollenderson v. Com. 5 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 ing declaration showing prior threats 244. 
 
 bv the accused should be disregarded is n Hays v. State, 40 Md. 633. 
 
 prejudicial error, and cannot be pre- i2State v. Baldwin, 79 Iowa, 714, 45 
 
 sumed to be harmless from the fact that N. W. 297. 
 
 it was cumulative and merely corrobora- i sMontgomery v. State, 80 Ind. 338, 
 
 tive of another witness. State v. 41 Am. Kep. 815. 
 
 Moody, 18 Wash. 165, 51 Pac. 356. 
 
886 HOMICIDE. [§ 628 
 
 that the wife wrote him to come and see her. ^ * And it is competent 
 to detail collateral remarks, on the part of the declarant, made at the 
 time of the uttering of the declarations as to the homicide, when such 
 collateral declarations tend to sustain the declarant's mental capac- 
 ity. ^ ® So, a dying declaration that the person killed did not do any- 
 thing to cause anybody to kill him is not objectionable as relating 
 to past events and not a part of the res gestce.^'^ 
 
 629. Opinion and conclusion. — It is a general rule that matters of 
 opinion and conclusion and conjecture, stated by persons whose dec- 
 larations are sought to be admitted as dying declarations, are inad- 
 missible.^ And it is immaterial whether the fact that the declaration 
 is mere matter of opinion appears from the statement itself, or from 
 other undisputed evidence showing that it was impossible for the de- 
 clarant to have known the fact stated ; ^ though if, upon any view of the 
 evidence, it is possible that the declarant knew the truth of what he 
 stated, his declaration, being otherwise competent, should be received 
 and considered loj the jury in the light of all the evidence.^ Thus, a 
 declaration by the deceased as to who shot or killed him, which was 
 merely meant to express his opinion or suspicions as an inference 
 from the facts, is inadmissible as a dying declaration and should be 
 disregarded by the jury as evidence in itself.* And an admission 
 
 i4WiIliani3 v. State, 130 Ala. 107, 30 61 Miss. 161; Lipscomb v. State, 75 
 
 So. 484. Miss. 559, 23 So. 210, 230; State v. El- 
 
 i5Donnelly v. State, 26 N. J. L. M6. kins, 101 Mo. 344, 14 S. W. 116; State 
 
 isBurroughs v. United States (Ind. v. Chambers, 87 Mo. 400; State v. Jef- 
 
 Terr.) 90 S. W. 8. ferson, 125 N. C. 712, 34 S. E. 648; 
 
 lAllen V. State, 70 Ark. 337, 68 S. VV. State v. Patrick, 48 N. C. (3 Jones, L.) 
 
 28; Johnson v. State, 17 Ala. 61S; Ben 443; Roberts v. State, 5 Tex. App. 141; 
 
 V. State, 37 Ala. 103; People v. Tay- Jledina v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 52, 
 
 lor, 59 Cal. 640; People v. Lanajran, SI 63 S. W. 331; State v. Carrington, 15 
 
 Cal. 142, 22 Pac. 482; McBride V. Pco- Utah, 480, 50 Pac. 526: United States 
 
 pie, 5 Colo. App. 91, 37 Pac. 953; Whit- v. Veitch. 1 Cranch, C. C. 115, Fed. 
 
 ley V. State, 38 Ga. 50; MePherson v. Cas. No. 16,614; Rex v. Sellers, O. B. 
 
 State, 22 Ga. 478 ; Darby V. State, 79 Ga. 1796, Car. Crim. Law, 233. And see 
 
 63, 3 S. E. 663; White v. State, 100 Ga. Young v. State, 70 Ark. 156, 66 S. W. 
 
 659, 28 S. E. 423; Barnett v. People, 658. 
 
 54 111. 325; Binns v. State, 46 Ind. 2 Jones v. State, 52 Ark. 345, 12 S. 
 
 311; Morgan v. State, 31 Ind. 193; W. 704; State v. Burnett, 47 W. Va. 
 
 State V. Donnelly, 69 Iowa, 705, 58 Am. 731 , 35 S. E. 983. 
 
 Rep. 234, 27 N. W. 369; State v. Bald- 3 Jones v. State, supra. And see Pen- 
 win, 79 Iowa, 714, 45 N. W. 297; State nington v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 321, 68 
 V. Perigo, 80 Iowa, 37, 45 N. W. 399; S. W. 451. 
 
 State V. O'Shea, 60 Kan. 772, 57 Pac. iState v. Arnold, 35 N. C. (13 Ired. 
 
 790; Luby v. Com. 12 Bush, 1; Pace v. L.) 184. And see Green v. Cora. 13 Ky. 
 
 Com. 89 Ky. 204, 12 S. W. 271; Com. v. L. Rep. 897, 18 S. W. 515. 
 Matthews, 89 Ky. 287, 12 S. V^. 333; Ha- And error in admitting dying deo- 
 
 ney v. Com. 5 Ky. L. Rep. 203 ; Math- larations of the deceased as to wiiom 
 
 edy V. Com. 14 Ky. L. Rep. 182, 19 S. she thought shot her is not cured by 
 
 W. 977 ; Owens v. Com. 22 Ky. L. Rep. an instruction that the jury should dis- 
 
 514, 58 S. W. 422; State v. Black, 42 regard it if they believed the dying 
 
 La. Ann. 861, 8 So. 594; Payne v. State, declaration was the statement of an 
 
S 629] EVIDENCE. 987 
 
 upon the part of the deceased that he did not see who shot him ren- 
 ders his declaration a mere expression of opinion or conjecture.® 
 So, a declaration by the deceased that he thought that a named 
 man was the one who shot him is not a declaration of fact admissible 
 as a dying declaration;® and this is so, though he based his opinion 
 upon the fact that the named person had previously threatened to 
 do it.^ And a declaration that "he murdered me without cause" is 
 not competent. ® So, a dying declaration with reference to who did the 
 killing is inadmissible where it appears that it was a physical im- 
 possibility for the deceased to have seen who shot him, or inflicted 
 the injury from which he died.® And this rule applies to a person 
 shot through a window, where the statement was based on the fact 
 that accused had threatened to shoot her through that window,^** 
 or upon the fact that the parties had previously quarreled.^ ^ And a 
 statement by a dying person that he was poisoned by the accused^ 
 who gave him a drink of whiskey that tasted bad, and he shortly 
 afterwards [became sick, is inadmissible. as an expression of opinion. ^ ^ 
 A statement by a person shot or injured as to the identity of the 
 person shooting or injuring him, however, is admissible in evidence 
 as a dying declaration.^* And it has been held that where the de- 
 ceased declares that another shot or killed him, it is presumed prima 
 
 opinion. Jones v. State, 79 Miss. 309, sBateson v. State, 46 Tex. Grim. Rep. 
 
 30 So. 759. 34, 80 S. W. 88. 
 
 5State V. Williams, 67 N. C. 12. But a statement made by a person. 
 
 So, a dying declaration by the de- after being shot, to the person whc) shot 
 ceased that he did not know the motive him, that he had murdered him without 
 for the killing, unless the accused did cause or occasion, is admissible in evi- 
 it for a debt he owed him, or unless dence in a prosecution for the killing 
 he was hired to do it, is incompetent as ns a charge not denied. Kendrick v. 
 a mere expression of opinion, and as' State, 55 Miss. 436. 
 tending to create a suspicion in the And exceptions relating to dying dee- 
 minds of the jury that the accused had larations, in which the declarant stat- 
 been hired to do the act, which would ed that he was murdered by the accused 
 necessarily create a prejudice in their without cause or notice^ and that he 
 minds against him. Feltner v. Com. 23 had no weapon, will be overruled on ap- 
 Ky. L. Rep. 1110, 64 S. W. 959. peal in a prosecution for the murder in 
 
 sPeople V. Wasson, 65 Cal. 538, 4 Pac. which the jury returned a verdict for 
 
 555 manslaughter, since by such verdict the 
 
 7State V. Burnett, 47 W. Va. 731, 33 jury showed they did not believe such 
 
 5 E 983; Jones v. State 79 Miss. 309, dying declaration. State v. Stuckey, 56 
 30 So. 759; Warren v. State, 9 Tex. App. S. C. 576. 35 S. E. 263. 
 
 619, 35 Am. Rep. 745. sjones v. State, 52 Ark. 345, 12 S. 
 
 So, statements by a person in extre- W. 704. 
 
 mis to the effect that her husband and loBinns v. State, 46 Ind. 311. 
 
 another were the cause of her suffer- uState v. Jefferson, 125 N. O. 712, 
 
 ing, and that she had expected they 34 S. E. 648. 
 
 would cause her death, are not state- izBerry v. State, 63 Ark. 382, 38 S. 
 
 ments of fact admissible as dying dec- W. 1038. .,„ . , „„., „„ „ 
 
 larations. Shaw v. People, 3 Hun, 275, 1 3 Allen v. State, 70 Ark. 337, 68 S. 
 
 6 Thomp. & C. 439. W. 28; Darby v. State, 79 Ga. 63, 3 
 
988 HOMICIDE. [§ 629 
 
 facie that he intended to state a fact of which he had knowledge, 
 and not a mere conclusion. ^ * And a statement by the deceased that 
 the accused poisoned him is not objectionable as being a conclusion, 
 and not a fact. ^ ° JSTor does the mere fact that the deceased added the 
 expression, "aint I right," to his statement as to who shot him ren- 
 der it inadmissible as a dying declaration, where the first part of the 
 declaration is a distinct assertion that the accused did the shooting. ^ " 
 And a declaration of the deceased as to who shot him is admissible, 
 though he stated that he was shot in the back and could not see the 
 man who shot him, but caught a glimpse of him as he fell, where he 
 afterwards identified the accused as the man. ^^ So, a statement that 
 the shooting was wilful and malicious is not objectionable as a 
 mere statement of opinion, where the testimony tends to show that 
 there were facts within the knowledge of the deceased upon which 
 he might have based an opinion to that effect. ^ * And the prevailing 
 rule is that a declaration that a killing was done without provocation, 
 or without reason, or for nothing, constitutes a statement of fact and 
 is admissible as a dying declaration;^* though the contrary rule has 
 been asserted. ^ " And a declaration that "he shoot me down like a 
 dog" is not objectionable as a conclusion, being intended to illustrate 
 a lack of provocation, and to describe the manner of the commission 
 
 S. E. 663; Henderson v. Com. 24 Ky. Ind. 630, 57 N. E. 519. But see Berry 
 L. Rep. 1985, 72 S. W. 781 ; State v. v. State, 63 Ark. 382, 38 S. W. 1038. 
 Teachey, 138 N. C. 587, 50 S. E. 232; i estate v. demons, 51 Iowa, 274, 1 
 State V. Freeman, 1 Speers, L. 57. N. W. 546. 
 
 And statements of the deceased that 17 State v. Foot You, 24 Or. 75, 32 
 the accused ought not to have shot Pac. 1031, 33 Pac. 537. And see Smith 
 him, and that he did not think he was v. State, 133 Ala. 73, 31 So. 942. 
 going to, are admissible as dying dec- isState v. Lee, 58 S. C. 335, 36 S. 
 larations in a. prosecution for homicide, . E. 706. 
 
 where there was an issue as to whether isBoyle v. State, 97 Ind. 322; Pen- 
 the deceased was doing any act or mak- nington v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 321, 68 
 ing any demonstration toward the ac- S. W. 451; Payne v. State, 61 Miss, 
 cused, or whether he could have antici- 161; Wroe v. State, 20 Ohio St. 460; 
 pated that the accused would shoot him. State v. Lee, supra; Roberts v. State, 
 Sims V. State, 36 Tex. Crim. Rep. 154, 5 Tex. App. 141. 
 36 S W 256 ' ^ statement in a dying declara- 
 
 iiState V. Arnold, 35 N. C. (13 Ired. H""^ that the accused was reaching in 
 T > ■jg^ his pocket for his revolver is not a 
 
 T T •„„„ T, „ c!^„+„ IK tvt;„„ rcn mere statement of a conclusion and in- 
 
 In Lipscomb v. btate, 75 Miss. 559, j • 'ui i i. i • j • i- c 
 no CI til A non i j-v t admissible as such, but is descriptive of 
 23 So. 210, 230, however, the court re- ^^^ ^^^ ^^ ^,^g ^^^^^^^ .^ getting^his re- 
 fused to follow State v. Arnold, supra, ^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ ,^gt gf^^e v Brown, 
 so far as it lays down the rule that a jgg lyj^ ^gj g^ g -^^r 5J9 
 dying declaration, which purports of zo'col'lins'v. Com'. 12 Bush, 271; 
 itself to declare the facts, must be sub- Jones v. Com. 20 Ky. L. Rep. 355, 46 
 mitted to the jury. S. W. 217: Feltner v. Com. 23 Ky. L. 
 iBState v. Kuhn, 117 Iowa, 216, 90 Rep. 1110, 64 S. W. 959; Sanford v. 
 N. W. 733; Shenkenberger v. State, 154 State (Ala.) 39 So. 370. 
 
§ 629] EVIDEXCE. 980 
 
 of the act.^* Likewise a statement by the deceased that the accused 
 operated on her is the statement of a fact peculiarly within her 
 knowledge and admissible as such in a prosecution for the commis- 
 sion of an abortion. ^^ 
 
 That the purpose of an operation was to produce an abortion is 
 matter of opinion, however, and inadmissible as such.^^ ITor are 
 declarations of a person who died from a mortal wound, to the effect 
 that its infliction was an accident, admissible in favor of the slayer 
 upon his trial for murder;^* and the same rule applies to an expres- 
 sion of belief that the accused did not intend to hurt him f^ and to 
 one that it was his own fault and the accused was not to blame. ^® 
 And a declaration that the accused was of unsound mind, or crazy, 
 amounts to nothing but an expression of opinion, and is incompetent 
 as a dying declaration. ^ "^ Nor is a statement |by a declarant that he 
 believed he would have to die, anything more than the expression of 
 an opinion that the injury he had received would ultimately cause 
 his death. ^* 
 
 630. Effect of presence of collateral or inadmissible matter A dying 
 
 declaration otherwise admissible in evidence is not rendered inad- 
 missible because it happens to contain some extraneous matter; in 
 such case the whole should be admitted, with proper instructions 
 from the court ;^ and this is particularly the case where the objec- 
 tionable portion is so interwoven with the thread of the narrative that 
 it cannot be separated without marring the sense. ^ And the admission 
 
 ziState V. Saunders, 14 Or. 300, 12 2 6MePherson v. State, 22 Ga. 478. 
 
 tac. 441; White v. State, 100 Ga. 2 6E,atteree v. State, 53 Ga. 570; Sweat 
 
 659, 28 S. E. 423. v. State, 107 Ga. 712, 33 S. E. 422; State 
 
 So, a declaration by the deceased that v. Sale, 119 Iowa, 1, 92 N. W. 680, 95 
 
 he had been butchered by named per- N. W. 193; Haney v. Com. 5 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 sons is a statement of fact and admis- 203. And see State v. Harris, 112 La. 
 
 sible as such, since the word "butch- 937, 36 So. 810. 
 
 ered" simply means killed in an un- 27Sniith v. Com. 13 Ky. L. Rep. 612, 
 
 usual, cruel, or wanton manner, the dec- 17 S. W. 868; State v. Wright, swpra. 
 
 laration expressing an opinion no more 2SVaughan v. Com. 86 Ky. 431, 6 S. 
 
 than it would have done had the word W. 153. 
 
 "killed" been used. State v. Gile, 8 And a dymg declaration that accused 
 
 Wash. 12; 35 Pac. 417. ^"'^ '^"°*''f l^^^^ '"""", ^^^^ '"^"1* 
 
 orni/r • Tj 1 n ■a„„ n ■! IS incompetent, as a conclusion. Wil- 
 
 Maine v. People 9 Hun 113 j.^^^ v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 497, 
 
 2 3Montgomery v. State, 80 Ind. 338, gj g -^ 220 
 
 41 Am. Rep. 815; State v. Carrington, 15 igiate'v. Eddon, 8 Wash. 292, 36 Pac. 
 
 Utah, 480, 50 Pac. 526. I39. Newberry v. State, 68 Ark. 355, 58 
 
 24Kearney v. State, 101 Ga. 803, 65 g y^r 35X. jones v. State, 71 Ind. 66; 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 344. 29 S. E. 127; State gtate v. Carter, 107 La. 792, 32 So. 183; 
 
 V. Wright, 112 Iowa, 436, 84 N. E. 541; Bennett v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 75 
 
 Com. V. Matthews, 89 Ky. 287, 12 S. s. w. 314. 
 
 W. 333; Com. v. Dunan, 128 Mass. 422. 2VVest v. State, 7 Tex. App. 150. And 
 
 And see Young v. State, 70 Ark. 156, 66 rpe «tfite v. Petsch, 43 S. C. 132, 20 S. 
 
 S. W. 658. E. 993. 
 
990 HOMICIDE. [§ 630 
 
 of a dying declaration ■wliicli contains statements not relating to the 
 immediate circumstances attending the death of the declarant is 
 not cause for a reversal, unless it is objected to on that ground.' 
 And a general objection to evidence of a dying declaration should be 
 overruled if any part of it is admissible. * The rule is that, when the 
 written statement contains both legal and illegal evidence, the court 
 cannot be required to expunge that which is illegal ; if the court points 
 out to the jury the illegal testimony and characterizes it as such, 
 so that the jury can identify it, it is all that can be required.^ And 
 no question is presented on an assignment that the court erred in ad- 
 mitting a certain portion of a dying declaration, where the ac- 
 tion of the court in admitting the part of the dying declaration com- 
 plained of on appeal was not called in question.® Nor is it error to 
 deny a motion to exclude or strike out a statement offered as a dying 
 declaration, when a portion sought to be excluded is admissible, though 
 another portion may be objectionable; the proper practice in such 
 case is to confine the objection to the inadmissible portion.'' And 
 the court will not interfere to set aside a conviction for murder because 
 a portion of the declaration of deceased admitted in evidence refers to 
 prior difficulties between the parties, where it was admitted in evi- 
 dence without objection. * Nor is an objection to a dying declaration 
 that it is hearsay sufficiently specific to cover the point that the 
 declaration did not touch the cause of, or circumstances surrounding, 
 the approaching death of the declarant.* 
 
 So, if dying declarations are indefinite the defense should move 
 to exclude them from the consideration of the jury; and where the 
 proper foundation is laid, there is no error in permitting them to 
 be detailed to the jury, subject to exclusion, if not definite or appli- 
 cable to the issue. * " And the action of the trial court in admitting 
 a statement as a dying declaration, which does not relate to the 
 circumstances of the killing, but to prior occurrences, will not be 
 disturbed where there was no objection to the admission of the evi- 
 
 sstate V. Talbert, 41 S. C. 526, 19 6Ex parte Barber, 16 Tex. App. 369. 
 
 S. E. 852; State v. Bonar (Kan.) 81 And see Freeman v. State, 112 Ga. 48, 
 
 Pae. 484; Com. v. Spahr, 211 Pa. 542, 60 37 S. E. 172. 
 
 ■A^tl. 1084. 6Lane v. State, 151 Ind. 511. 51 N. E. 
 
 < Kelly V. State, 52 Ala. 361; Rey- 1056. 
 
 nolds V. State, 68 Ala. 502; Archibald 'Eichard v. State, 42 Pla. 528, 29 So. 
 
 V. State, 122 Ind. 122, 23 N. E. 758; 413. 
 
 Lipscomb v. State, 75 Miss. 559, 23 So. sThomas v. State, 11 Tex. App. 314; 
 
 210, 230; State v. Welsor, IIV Mo. 570, Caldwell v. State, 12 Tex. App. 306. 
 
 21 S. W. 443. And see State v. Mar- 9 state v. Murphy, 9 Nev. 394. 
 
 tin, 30 Wis. 216, 11 Am. Rep. 667. lOScott v. People, 63 111. 508. 
 
5 630] EVIDENCE. «9I 
 
 dence, but the accused waited until the evidence was in, and then 
 moved to strike it out.^^ Nov is a conviction reversible because 
 of the erroneous admission of a dying declaration which was irrelevant 
 in whole or in part, where the other evidence in the case fully war- 
 ranted the conviction ; ^ ^ or where it could not have had any bearing 
 whatever upon the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused. * ^ 
 
 e. Physical and mental condition as affecting admissibility. 
 
 1. Actually impending death. 
 
 631. Necessity of. — The rule is laid down generally by many cases 
 that dying declarations, to be admissible as such, must be made in 
 extremis^ when the declarant is at the very point of death.* But to 
 render the statement of the deceased receivable in evidence as a dying 
 declaration he need not have been at the time in articulo mortis; 
 it is only necessary that it should have been made under a sense of 
 impending dissolution, which soon thereafter occurred.^ It is not 
 
 liPeople v. Samario, 84 Cal. 484, 24 Ohio St. 131; State v. Johnson, 26 S. 
 Pac. 283. And see State v. O'Brien, 81 C. 152, 1 S. E. 510; State v. Bradley, 
 Iowa, 88, 46 N. W. 752. 34 S. C. 136, 13 S. E. 315; State v. 
 
 izState V. Murphy, supra; Peoples Banister, 35 S. C. 290, 14 S. E. 678; 
 V. Com. 87 Ky. 487, 9 S. W. 509, 810. State v. Faile, 43 S. C. 52, 20 S. E. 
 
 l3Perry v. State, 102 Ga. 305, 30 798; State v. Jaggers, 58 S. C. 41, 36 
 S. E. 903. S. E. 434; Curtis v. State, 14 Lea, 502; 
 
 But a fact of no importance, and Gibson v. Com. 2 Va. Cas. Ill; Bowles 
 wholly immaterial standing alone, can- v. Cora. 103 Va. 816, 48 S. E. 527 ; State 
 not be used as a vehicle to introduce v. Cameron, 2 Chand. (Wis.) 172, 2 
 a declaration sought to be used as a Pinney (Wis.) 490; Reg. v. Perkins, 9 
 dying declariition which is incompetent Car. & P. 395; Queen v. Dalmas, 1 Cox, 
 when standing alone. State v. Wood, C. C. 95; Eeg. v. Smith, 10 Cox, C. C. 
 53 N. H. 484. 82, Leigh & C. C. C. 607, 34 L. J. Mag. 
 
 iPulliam V. State, 88 Ala. 1, 6 So. Cas. N. S. 153, 11 Jur. N. S. 695. 12 L. 
 839; Graves v. People, 18 Colo. 170, 32 T. N. S. 609, 13 Week. Rep. 816. And 
 Pac. 63; Campbell v. State, 11 Ga. 355; see Richard v. State, 42 Fla. 528, 29 
 Thompson v. State, 24 Ga. 297; Nesbit So. 413; Young v. State, 114 Ga. 849, 
 V. State, 43 Ga. 238; Mitchell v. State, 40 S. E. 1000. 
 
 71 Ga. 128; State v. Yee Wee, 7 Idaho, zgtate v. Sndler, 51 La. Ann. 1397, 
 188, 61 Pac. 588; Morgan v. Stito, 31 26 So. 390; State v. Keenan, 38 La. 
 Ind. 193; Archibald v. State, 122 Ind. Ann. 660; Johnson v. State, 102 Ala. 
 122, 23 N. E. 758; Walston v. Com. 16 1, 16 So. 99; Young v. State, 95 Ala. 
 B Mon 15- Peoples v. Com. 87 Ky. 4, 10 So. 913; Sims v. State, 139 Ala. 
 487, 9 S. W. 509, 810; Pace v. Com. 89 74, 101 Am. St. Rep. 17, 36 So. 138; 
 Ky' 204 12 S W. 271; Com. v. Mat- Anderson v. State, 117 Ga. 255, 43 S. 
 thews 89 Ky. 287, 12 S. W. 333 ; Hays E. 835 ; State v. Nash, 7 Iowa, 347 ; 
 V Com 12 ky. L. Rep. 611, 14 S. W. Com. v. Haney, 127 Mass. 455; State v. 
 833; Jones v. Com. 20 Ky. L. Rep. 35-5, Tilghman, 33 N. C. (11 Ired. L.) 513. 
 46 S W 217; McLean v. State (Miss.) The law admits dying declarations in 
 12 So. 905; State v. Crabtree, 111 Mo. evidence, not because recovery is im- 
 136 20 S. W. 7; Kastner v. State, 58 possible, but because there is a con- 
 Neb 767 79 N. W. 713; People v. Wood, viction of approachins; death. Queen 
 2 Edm. ' Sel. Cas. 71 ; Montgomery v. v. Pym, 1 Cox. C. C. 339. 
 State, 11 Ohio, 424; Robbins v. State, 8 
 
992 HOMICIDE. [§ 631 
 
 enough to show that the declarant died soon after making his declara- 
 tion,^ or that he was mortally wounded.* There must, however, have 
 been real danger of death at the time the declaration was made.* 
 And one who can travel around a neighborhood and walk from place 
 to place, and who is not in such extremity as to take to his bed, cannot 
 be said to be in extremis so as to render his dying declaration admis- 
 sible. ® But a statement made by deceased on a named day after being 
 stabbed, and repeated on the following day, is admissible as a dying 
 declaration where he died on the day following its repetition.'' 
 
 2. Sense of impending death. 
 
 633. General rules — While the deceased need not have been at the 
 time in articulo mortis to render his dying declarations admissible in 
 a prosecution for homicide, it is necessary that they should have 
 been made under a sense of impending dissolution, and with a con- 
 viction that he could not possibly live, and his death must have oc- 
 curred soon thereafter. ^ To entitle such statements to ,be received in 
 
 sJustice V. state, 99 Ala. 180, 13 So. pie v. Lem Deo, 132 Gal. 199, 64 Pae. 
 
 658. 265; State v. Smith, 49 Conn. 376; 
 
 4Green v. Com. 13 Ky. L. Kep. 897, Dixon v. State, 13 Fla. 636; Roten v. 
 
 18 S. W. 515. And see yueen v. Cleary, State, 31 Fla. 514, 12 So. 910; Nesbit 
 
 2 Fost. & F. 850. V. State, 43 Ga. 238; Mitchell v. State, 
 
 BSussex Peerage Case, 11 Clark & F. 71 Ga. 128; Sutherland v. State, 121 Ga. 
 
 95, 8 Jur. 793. And see Reg. v. Per- 190. 48 S. E. 915; State v. Yee Wee, 7 
 
 kins, 9 Car. & P. 395. Idaho, 188, 61 Pac. 588; Starkey v. Peo- 
 
 sMeLean v. State (Miss.) 12 So. 905. pie, 17 111. 17; Scott v. People, 63 111. 
 
 Nor are statements made by a per- 508; Westbrook v. People, 126 111. 81, 
 
 son two hours after being shot, and 18 N. E. 304; Digby v. People, 113 111. 
 
 after having fled from the house where 123, 55 Am. Rep. 402; Burehfield v. 
 
 the shooting occurred to a neighbor's State, 82 Ind. 580; State v. Gillick, 7 
 
 house 400 yards distant, admissible as Iowa, 287; State v. Nash, 7 Iowa, 347; 
 
 dying declarations in the absence of evi- State v. Perigo, 80 Iowa, 37, 45 N. W. 
 
 dence that declarant had lost all hope 399; State v. Baldwin, 79 Iowa, 714, 
 
 of recovery. State v. Taylor, 56 S. C. 45 N. W. 297; State v. Kuhn, 117 Iowa, 
 
 360, 34 S. E. 939. 216, 90 N. w. 733; Vaughan v. Com. 86 
 
 ■^Richards v. State, 82 Wis. 172, 51 Ky. 431, 6 S. W. 153; Pace v. Com. 89 
 
 N. W. 652. Ky. 204, 12 S. W. 271 ; Starr v. Com. 
 
 iMay V. State, 55 Ala. 39; Faire v. !)7 Ky. 193, 30 S. W. 397; Luker v. 
 
 State, 58 Ala. 74; Moore v. State, 12 Com. 9 Ky. L. Rep. 385, 5 S. W. 354; 
 
 Ala. 764, 46 Am. Dec. 270; Hussey v. Hays v. Com. 12 Ky. L. Rep. 611, 14 
 
 State, 87 Ala. 121, 6 So. 420; Pulliam S. VV. 833: Norlleet v. Com. 17 Ky. L. 
 
 v. State, 88 Ala. 1, 6 So. 839; Young v. Rep. 1137, 33 S. W. 938; Fuqua v. Com. 
 
 State, 95 Ala. 4, 10 So. 913; Blackburn 24 Ky. L. Rop. 2204, 73 S. W. 782; 
 
 v. State, 98 Ala. 63, 13 So. 274; Gib- State v. Spencer, 30 La. Ann. 362 i 
 
 son V. State, 126 Ala. 59, 28 So. 673; State v. Trivas, 32 La. Ann. 1086, 38 
 
 Wagoner v. Territory, 5 Ariz. 175, 51 Am. Rep. 293; State v. Keenan, 38 La. 
 
 I'ac. 145; Allen v. State, 70 Ark. 337, Ann. 060; State v. Jones 38 La. Ann. 
 
 68 S. W. 28; Newberry v. State, 68 792; State v. Newhouse,' 39 La. Ann. 
 
 Ark. 355, 58 S. W. 351; Dunn v. State, 862, 2 So. 799; State v. Jones, 47 La. 
 
 2 Ark. 229, 35 Am. Dec. 54; People v. Ann. 1524, IS So. 515; State v. Sadler, 
 
 Taylor, 59 Cal. 640; People v. Loe Sare 51 La. Ann. 1397, 26 So. 390; Com. v. 
 
 Bo, 72 Cal. 623, 14 Pac. 310; People v. Brewer, 164 Mass. 577, 42 N. E. 92; Com. 
 
 Ramirez, 73 Cal. 403, 15 Pac. 33; Peo- \. Densmore, 12 Allen, 535; People v. 
 
632], EVIDENCE. 993 
 
 evidence the person making them must have lost all hope of recovery 
 and have been under the impression of speedily approaching death.' 
 
 Simpson, 48 Mich. 474, 12 N. W. 662; Cox, C. C. ], 31 Moak, Eng. Rep. 739; 
 Lambeth v. State, 23 Miss. 322; Brown Reg. v. Mitchell, 17 Cox, C. C. 503; Reg. 
 V. State, 32 Miss. 433 ; McLean v. State v. Qiialter, 6 Cox, C. C. 357 ; Queen 
 (Miss.) 12 So. 905; Bell v. State, 72 v. Cleary, 2 Fost. & F. 850; Mattox v. 
 Miss. 507, 17 So. 232; Joalin v. State. United States, 146 IT. S. 140, 36 L. ed. 
 75 Miss. 838, 23 So. 515; Lipscomb v. 917, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 50; King v. Wood- 
 State, 75 Miss. 559, 23 So. 210, 230; cock, 1 Leach, C. L. 500; Welbourn's 
 McDaniel v. State, 8 Smedes & M. 401, Case, 1 East, P. C. 358; Rex v. Van 
 47 Am. Dec 93; State v. Simon, 50 Mo. Butchell, 3 Car. & P. 629; Rex v. Pike, 
 370: State v. McCanon, 51 Mo. 160; 3 Car. & P. 598; Rex v. Croelcett, 4 Car. 
 State V. Nelson, 101 Mo. 464, 14 S. W. & P. 544; Rex v. Hayward, 6 Car. & P. 
 712; State v. Crabtree, 111 Mo. 136, 20 157; Rex v. Spilsbury, 7 Car. & P. 187. 
 S. W. 7; State v. Re«d, 137 Mo. 125, And see State v. Kessler, 15 Utah, 142, 
 38 S. W. 574; Raliea v. People, 2 Neb. 62 Am. St. Rep. 911, 49 Pac. 293; Da- 
 157; Fitzgerald v. State, 11 Neb. 577, vis v. State, 120 Ga. 843, 48 S. E. 305; 
 10 N. W. 495; Binfield v. State, 15 Neb. State v. Molisse, 36 La. Ann. 920. 
 484, 19 N. W. 607; Basye v. State, 45 2Johnson v. State, 17 Ala. 618; Ex 
 Neb. 261, 63 N. W. 811; Kastner v. parte Nettles, 58 Ala. 268; Hussey v. 
 State, 58 Neb. 767, 79 N. W. 713; Peak State, 87 Ala. 121, 6 So. 420; Young v. 
 V. State, 50 N. J. L. 179, 12 Atl. 701; State, 95 Ala. 4, 10 So. 913; Blackburn 
 People V. Sweeney, 41 Hun, 332 ; People v. State, 98 Ala. 63, 13 So. 274 ; John- 
 V. Anderson, 2 Wheeler, C. C. 390; State son v. State, 102 Ala. 1, 16 So. 99; 
 V. Poll, 8 N. C. (1 Hawks) 442, 9 Am. Evans v. State, 58 Ark. 47, 22 S. W. 
 Dec. 655; State v. Tilghman, 33 N. C. 1026: Allen v. State, 70 Ark. 337, 68 
 (11 Ired. L.) 513; State v. Moody, 3 N. S. W. 28; People v. Ah Dat, 49 Cal. 
 C. (2 Hayw.) 31, 2 Am. Dec. 616; Mont- 652; People v. Gray, 61 Cal. 164, 44 Am. 
 gomery v. State, 11 Ohio, 424; Robbins Rep. 549; People v. Abbott (Cal.) 4 
 V. State, 8 Ohio St. 131; State v. Shaf- Pac. 769: People v. Sanchez, 24 Cal. 
 for, 23 Or. 555, 32 Pac. 545; Com. v. 17; People v. Fuhrig, 127 Cal. 412, 
 Murray, 2 Ashm. (Pa.) 41; Com. v. 59 Pac. 693; Graves v. People, 18 Colo. 
 Williams, 2 Ashm. (Pa.) 69; Kilpat- 170, 32 Vac. 63 : United States v. Schnei- 
 rick V. Com. 31 Pa. 198; Com. v. Brit- der, 21 D. C. 381; Green v. State, 43 Fla. 
 ton, 1 Legal Giiz. Rep. 513; Kane v. 552, 30 So. 798; Thompson v. State, 24 
 Com. 109 Pa. 541; Com. v. Birriolo, 197 Ga. 297; Mitchell v. State, 71 Ga. 128; 
 Pa. 371, 47 Atl. 355; Com. v. Winkel- Scott v. People, 63 111. 508; Westbrook 
 man, 12 Pa. Super. Ct. 497; State v. v. People. 126 111. 81, 18 N. E. 304; Si- 
 Sullivan, 20 R. I. 114, 37 Atl. 673 : mons v. People, 150 111. 66, 36 N. E. 
 State V. Nance, 25 S. C. 168; Nelson v. 1019; Kirkhara v. People, 170 111. 11, 
 State, 7 Humph. 542 ; King v. State, 91 48 N. E. 465 ; Jones v. State, 71 Ind. 
 Tenn. 617. 20 S. W. 169; Brakefield v. 66; Archibald v. State, 122 Ind. 122, 
 State, 1 Sneed, 215; Benavides v. State, 23 N. E. 758; State v. Gillick, 7 Iowa, 
 31 Tex. 579; Taylor v. State, 38 Tex. 287; State v. Furney, 41 Kan. 115, 13 
 Crim. Rep. 552, 43 S. W. 1019; Lyles Am. St. Rep. 262, 21 Pac. 213; State v. 
 V. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 86 S. W. Wellington, 43 Kan. 121, 23 Pac. 157; 
 763; Wilson v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) State v. Aldrich, 50 Kan. 666, 32 Pao. 
 90 S. W. 312; O'Boyle v. Com. 100 Va. 408; State v. Morrison, 64 Kan. 669, 68 
 785, 40 S. E. 121 ; Bowles v. Com. 103 Pac. 48 : State v. Knoll, 69 Kan. 767, 77 
 Va. 816, 48 S. E. 527 ; Thompson v. Pac. 580 ; Peoples v. Com. 87 Ky. 487, 9 
 Territory, 1 Wash. Terr. 548; State v. S. W. 509, 810; Pace v. Com. 89 Ky. 
 Cameron, 2 Chand. (Wis.) 172, 2 Pin- 204, 12 S. W. 271; Com. v. Matthews, 
 ney (Wis.) 490; King v. Callaghan, 1 89 Ky. 287, 12 S. W. 333; Henderson v. 
 MacNally, Ev. 385; Reg. v. Smith, 10 Com. 5 Ky. L. Rep. 244; Green v. Com. 
 Cox, C. C. 82, Leigh & C. C. C. 607, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 897, 18 S. W. 515; Jones 
 34 L. J. Mag. Gas. N. S. 153, 11 Jur. v. Com. 20 Ky. L. Rep. 355, 46 S. W. 
 N. S. 695, 12 L. T. N. S. 609, 13 Week. 217 ; Wilson v. Com. 22 Ky. L. Rep. 
 Rep. 816; Reg. v. Forester, 4 Fost. &, 1251, 60 S. W. 400; State v. Daniels, 
 F. 857, 10 Cox, C. C. 368; Reg. v. Mac- 115 La. 59, 38 So. 894; Com. v. Rob- 
 kay, 11 Cox, C. C. 148 ; Reg. V. Hubbard, erts, 108 Mass. 296; Com. v. Bishop, 
 14 Cox, C. C. 565; Reg. v. Osman, 15 165 Mass. 148, 42 N. E. 560; Com. v. 
 Horn.— 63 
 
994 HOMICIDE. E§ 032 
 
 The belief of a speedy dissolution is the test by which the competency 
 of a dying declaration is to be measured.^ That the declarant was 
 actually in a dying condition is not enough ; * and the offer of dying 
 declarations in evidence should be preceded by evidence that they 
 were actually made in the expectation of impending death. ° Two 
 things must be made to appear before the declarations can be ad- 
 mitted; first, that the death of the declarant was imminent, and 
 second, that he was so fully aware of this as to be without hope 
 
 Densmore, 12 Allen, 535; Brown v. v. Smith, 10 Cox, C. C. 82, Leigh & C. 
 
 State, 32 Miss. 433; Bell v. State, 72 C. C. 607, 34 L. J. Mag. Cas. N. S. 153, 
 
 Miss. 507,. 17 So. 232; Lipscomb v. 11 Jur. N. S. 695, 12 L. T. N. S. 609, 
 
 State, 75 Miss. 559, 23 So. 210, 230; 13 Week. Rep. 816; Reg. v. Mackay, 11 
 
 State V. McCanon, 51 Mo. 160; State Cox, C. C. 148; Reg. v. Osman, 15 Cox, 
 
 V. Mathes, 90 Mo. 571, 2 S. W. 800; C. C. 1, 31 Moak, Eng. Rep. 739; Reg. 
 
 State V. Wensell, 98 Mo. 137, 11 S. W. v. Mitchell, 17 Cox, 0. C. 503; Wel- 
 
 614; State v. Nelson, 101 Mo. 464, 14 bourn's Case, 1 East, P. C. 358, 1 Leach, 
 
 S. W. 712; State v. Wilson, 121 Mo. C. L. 503 note; Reg. v. Peel, 2 Fost. 
 
 434, 26 S. W. 357; State v. Bowles, 146 & F. 21 ; Queen v. Cleary, 2 Fost. & F. 
 
 Mo. 6, 69 Am. St. Rep. 598, 47 S. W. 850; Dingler's Case, 1 Leach, 0. L. 504 
 
 892; State v. Garrison, 147 Mo. 548, 49 note, 1 East, P. C. 356; Carver v. Unit- 
 
 S. W. 508; Kastner v. State, 58 Neb. ed States, 160 U. S. 553, 40 L. ed. 532, 
 
 767, 79 N. W. 713; Peak v. State, 50 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 388. And see Richard 
 
 N. J. L. 179,, 12 Atl. 701; People v. v. State, 42 Fla. 528, 29 So. 413. 
 Wood, 2 Edm. Sel. Cas. 71 ; People v. In People v. Anderson, 2 Wheeler, 
 
 Grunzig, 2 Edm. Sel. Cas. 236; People C. C. 390, however, it was said that, 
 
 V. Perry, 8 Abb. Pr. N. S. 27; Maine v. perhaps, dying declarations of a mur- 
 
 People, 9 Hun, 113; People v. Sweeney, dered person might be received though 
 
 41 Hun, 332; People v. Chase, 79 Hun, there was a faint, lingering hope of re- 
 
 296, 29 N. Y. Supp. 376; People v. Rob- covery by the sufferer. See also State 
 
 inson, 2 Park. Crim. Rep. 235: State v. v. Center, 35 Vt. 378; Queen v. Pym, 1 
 
 Moody, 3 N. C. (2 Hayw.) 31, 2 Am. Cox, C. C. 339. 
 
 Dec. 616; Robbins v. State, 8 Ohio St. aSullivan v. Com. 93 Pa. 284, Affirm- 
 
 131; Wade v. State, 25 Ohio C. C. 279; ing 13 Phila. 410; Hussey v. State, 87 
 
 State v. Quick, 15 Rich. L. 342; State Ala. 121, 6 So. 42*); North v. People, 
 
 V. Gill, 14 S. C. 410; State v. Belton, 24 139 111. 81, 28 N. E. 966; State v. Do- 
 
 S. C. 185, 58 Am. Rep. 245; State v. minique, 30 Mo. 585. 
 Johnson, 26 S. C. 152, 1 S. E. 510; State ^People v. Perry, 8 Abb. Pr. N. S. 
 
 V. Bradle.y, 34 S. C. 136, 13 S. E. 315; 27; People v. Anderson, supra. 
 State V. Banister, 35 S. C. 290, 14 S. E. It is the impression of almost imme- 
 
 678; State v. Faile, 43 S. C. 52, 20 S. diate dissolution, and not the rapid 
 
 E. 798 ; State v. Taylor, 56 S. C. 3R0, succession of death in point of fact, that 
 
 34 S. E. 939; State v. Jaggers, 58 S. C. renders dying declarations admissible in 
 
 41, 36 S. E. 434 ; State v. Wyse, 32 S. evidence. Vaughan v. Com. 86 Ky. 431, 
 
 C. 45, 10 S. E. 612; State v. Center, 35 6 S. W. 153. 
 
 Vt. 378; Jackson v. Com. 19 Gratt. 656; 5McHugh v. State, 31 Ala. 317; Les- 
 
 Benavides v. State, 31 Tex. 579; Taylor ter v. State, 37 Fla. 382, 20 So. 232; 
 
 V. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 552, 43 S. Green v. State, 43 Fla. 552, 30 So. 798; 
 
 W. 1019; Brande v. State (Tex. Crim. State v. Furney, 41 Kan. 115, 13 Am. 
 
 App.) 45 S. W. 17; Rex v. Crockett, St. Rep. 202, 21 Pac. 213; Wyatt v. Com. 
 
 4 Car. & P. 544; Reg. v. Perkins, 9 Car. 8 Ky. L. Rep. .55, 1 S. W. 196; People 
 
 & P. 395, 2 Moody, C. C. 135; Rex v. v. Simpson. 48 Mich. 474, 12 N. W. 662; 
 
 Christie. Car. Crim. Law, 232, 1 Lewin, Lewis v. State, 9 Stnedes & M. 115; 
 
 C. C. 78 note ; Errington's Case, 2 Lewm, McLean v. State (Miss.) 12 So. 905; 
 
 C. C. 148: Queen v. Howell, 1 Cox, C. Ashley v. Stite (Miss.) 37 So. 960; 
 
 C. 151, 1 Den. C. C. 1, 1 Car. & K. 689; State v. Partlow, 90 Mo. 608, 59 Am. 
 
 Reg. V. Qualter, 6 Cox, C. C. 357; Reg. Rep. 31, 4 S. W. 14. 
 
S 632] 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 995 
 
 of life.' There must have been not only an actual nearness of death, 
 but an absolute conviction to that effect in the mind of the declarant.'' 
 And the actions and declarations of the deceased must have manifest- 
 ed his consciousness of, and belief in, speedy dissolution. * A strong 
 sense of danger founded on a sense of pain, and not arising from 
 any knowledge of the cause of complaint, does not constitute such a 
 conviction of impending dissolution as to render the declaration of 
 the sufferer admissible as a dying declaration. ® And mere despair of 
 ultimate recovery after a lengthened illness is not sufficient. * ° 
 
 Dying declarations of a deceased person are properly admitted in 
 evidence, however, where it is proved that when he made them he ex- 
 pected soon to die ; ^ ^ and this may be shown by the nature of the in- 
 jury, and by what the injured person said, or what physicians or at- 
 tendants said in his hearing, and by the evident state of his mind. * ^ 
 And it is not necessary that apprehensions of immediate death should 
 be embodied in the language of the deceased ; it is sufficient if the dan- 
 ger was so imminent as to satisfy the court that the deceased must, of 
 necessity, have been laboring under the impression of immediate dis- 
 solution. ^ ^ And a statement made or written down by a person who 
 
 estate v. Gill, 14 S. C. 410; State 
 V. Wilson, 121 Mo. 434, 26 S. W. 357. 
 
 VNorth V. People, 139 111. 81, 28 N. 
 E. 908; McLean v. State, supra; State 
 V. Johnson, 118 Mo. 491, 40 Am. St. 
 Rep. 405, 24 S. W. 229; Edmondson v. 
 State, 41 Tex. 496; Rex v. Van Buteh- 
 ell, 3 Car. & P. 629 ; Rex v. Crockett, 4 
 Car. & P. 544; Queen v. Dalmas, 1 Cox, 
 C. C. 95. 
 
 An instrument prepared by an in- 
 jured person in full possession of his 
 mental faculties, and in the confident 
 hope of recovery, to be signed as a dy- 
 ing declaration in the event of subse- 
 quent conviction of the fatal termination 
 of the injury is not, although execut- 
 ed under such conviction, admissible in 
 evidence as a dying declaration. Har- 
 per V. State, 79 Miss. 575, 56 L.R.A. 
 372. 31 So. 195. 
 
 sstate V. Spencer, 30 La. Ann. 302. 
 And see Pitts v. State, 140 Ala. 70, 37 
 So. 101. 
 
 sQueen t. Thomas, 1 Cox, C. C. 52. 
 
 loSmith V. state, 9 Humph. 9; Lo- 
 g<in V. State, 9 Humph. 24; State v. 
 Belcher, 13 S. C. 459. 
 
 nState v. Oliver, 2 Houst. (Del.) 
 685; Moore v. State, 12 Ala. 764, 46 Am. 
 Dec. 276; Kilgore v. State, 74 Ala. 1; 
 Wills T. State, 74 Ala. 24; West v. State, 
 
 76 Ala. 98; Walker v. State, 139 Ala. 
 56, 35 So. 1011; People v. Glover 141 
 Cal. 233, 74 Pac. 745; Richard v. State, 
 42 Fla. 528, 29 So. 413; Lester v. State, 
 37 Fla. 382, 20 So. 232; Handy v. 
 State, 108 Ga. 749, 32 S. E. 665; Scott 
 V. People, 63 111. 508; Archibald v. 
 State, 122 Ind. 122, 23 N. E. 758; Lane 
 V. State, 151 Ind. 511, 51 N. E. 1056; 
 Hurd V. People, 25 Mich. 405; State v. 
 Welsor, 117 Mo. 550, 21 S. W. 443; 
 State v. Garrison, 147 Mo. 548, 49 S. 
 W. 508; State v. Kring, 11 Mo. App. 
 92, Affirmed in 74 Mo. 612; Donnelly 
 v. State, 26 N. J. L. 463, 601; Peo- 
 ple v. Smith, 172 N. Y. 210, 64 N. E. 
 814; State v. Moody, 3 N. C. (2 Haywr.) 
 31, 2 Am. Dec. 616; State v. Pool, 20 
 Or. 150, 25 Pac. 375; Kehoe v. Com. 85 
 Pa. 127; State v. Jeswell, 22 R. I. 136, 
 46 Atl. 405; State v. Thompson, 21 W. 
 Va. 741 ; Carver v. United States, 160 
 U. S. 553, 40 L. ed. 532, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 388; Reg. v. Whitworth, 1 Fost. & F. 
 382. 
 
 i2People v. Simpson, 48 Mich. 474, 12 
 N. W. 662. 
 
 isSmith v. State, 9 Humph. 9; Stew- 
 art v. State, 2 Lea, 598 ; Curtis v. State, 
 14 Lea, 502; Rex v. Bonner, 6 Car. & 
 P. 386. And see King v. Woodcock, 1 
 Leach, C. L. 500, 1 East, P. C. 354. 
 
996 HOMICIDE. [§ 632 
 
 had not abandoned and given up all hope of living is admissible as 
 a dying declaration vyhere he had stated it to be correct when he 
 was past hope ; ^ * though the rule would appear to be different in the 
 absence of such a restatement of correctness.^^ Nor is it material 
 that the declarant had previously stated that he did not expect to 
 die. ^ ® And the admissibility of such a statement is not affected by 
 the fact that the declarant afterward revived, or renewed hope to 
 some extent ;^'^ though repetition of a dying declaration cannot it- 
 self be admitted as a reiteration of the alleged facts, if made when 
 hope has been regained.^* Nor are statements of a person, made 
 when he believed he would not recover, inadmissible in evidence as 
 his dying declarations, though the surgeon did not think his case 
 hopeless and continued to tell him so until his death. ^ ® 
 
 So, the rule has been asserted that it is not necessary, in order to 
 render the statements of deceased persons admissible as dying dec- 
 larations, that they should believe that death will ensue within any 
 specified time;^" and that the deceased need not have apprehended 
 immediate death to render his declaration admissible; it is suffi- 
 cient if he had no expectation of surviving the injury inflicted by 
 the accused. ^ ^ That he expected to live a short time — ^long enough 
 to see his family — does not affect the admissibility of the declaration 
 
 14 Wilson V. Com. 22 Ky. L. Rep. Am. Rep. 330; State v. Nash, 7 Iowa, 
 1251, 60 S. W. 400; Mockabee v. Com. 347; State v. Reed, 53 Kan. 767, 42 Am. 
 78 Ky. 380; Million v. Com. 16 Ky. L. St. Rep. 322, 37 Pac. 174; State v. Kil- 
 Rep. 17, 25 S. W. 1059; Young v. Com. gore, 70 Mo. 546; State v. Mills, 91 N. 
 6 Bush, 312; Smith v. Com. 113 Kv. C. 581; State v. Tilghman, 33 N. C. (11 
 19, 67 S. W. 32; Johnson v. State, 102 Ired. L.) 513; State v. Shaffer, 23 Or. 
 Ala. 1, 16 So. 99; Sims v. State, 139 555, 32 Pac. 545; Simpson's Case, 1 
 Ala. 74, 101 Am. St. Rep. 17, 36 So. Lewin, C. C. 78; Reg. v. Hubbard, 14 
 138; People v. Crews, 102 Cal. 174, 36 Cox, C. C. 565. 
 
 Pac. 367 ; Brown v. State, 32 Miss. 433 ; In Reg. v. Taylor, 3 Cox, C. C. 84, 
 State V. Evans, 124 Mo. 408, 28 S. W. however, it was held that a statement 
 8; State V. Garth, 164 Mo. 553, 65 S. will not be admitted in evidence as a 
 W. 275; State v. Ferguson, 2 Hill, L. dying declaration where it was made 
 619, 27 Am. Dec. 412; Snell v. State, after the declarant had said that he 
 29 Tex. App. 236, 25 Am. St. Rep. 723, thought he should die, where, two or 
 15 S. W. 722; Bryant v. State, 35 Tex. three days afterwards, he expressed his 
 Crim. Rep. 394, 33 S. W. 978, 36 S. W. belief that he would recover, and lived 
 79; Cahn v. State, 27 Tex. App. 709, some days after that. 
 11 S. W. 723; Bull V. Com. 14 Gratt. isCarver v. United States, 160 U. S. 
 613; Reg. v. Steele, 12 Cox, C. C. 168. 553, 40 L. ed. 532, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 And this is so notwithstanding the 388. 
 fact that it was not read over to him at isRex v. Mosley, 1 Moody, C. C. 97, 
 the time of reaffirmance of its correct- 1 Lewin, C. C. 79. And see Sylvester 
 ness. Johnson v. State, and Sims v. v. State, 72 Ala. 201. 
 State, supra. 2 0Krebs v. State, 3 Tex. App. 348. 
 
 iBHarper v. State, 79 Miss. 575, 56 ziEvans v. State, 58 Ark. 47, 22 S. W. 
 L.R.A. 372, 31 So. 195. 1026; State v. Nash, 7 Iowa, 347; State 
 
 leSmall v. Com. 91 Pa. 304. v. Sullivan, 20 R. I. 114, 37 Atl. 673. 
 
 I'llall v. Com. 89 Va. 171, 15 S. E. A statement offered as a person's dy- 
 517; Swisher v. Com. 26 Gratt. 963, 21 ing declaration should not be excluded 
 
S 632] EVIDENCE. 997 
 
 under this rule.^^ And the principle is not affected by the fact that 
 death did not ensue until a considerable time after the declarations 
 were made.^® And where the declarations of the injured party are 
 part of the res gestw, they are admissible without proof of a conscious- 
 ness of approaching death ;^'' but such is not the case when they 
 relate to anything beyond the corpus delicti. Thus, in death by 
 wounding, they have been confined to statements necessary to give 
 information on the subject of the wound, ^^ and in death by poison- 
 ing, to details of the deceased's health. ^ ® 
 
 633. Possession of mental faculties — To render dying declarations 
 admissible as evidence it must satisfactorily appear that the per- 
 son making them was sane and mentally capable of testifying.^ 
 And a statutory provision that to render dying declarations competent 
 it must be satisfactorily proved that the declarant was of sane mind 
 at the time of making the declarations is a mere affirmance of the 
 common-law rule. ^ That the declarant was in possession of his men- 
 tal faculties at the time he made a dying declaration, however, need 
 not be shovsm as a condition precedent to its admission in evidence.* 
 The court will not presume that a deceased person, whose statements 
 are offered in evidence as dying declarations, had become insane 
 in the absence of anything to indicate that fact.* And the testi- 
 mony of witnesses called to prove the declarations, that the deceased 
 was in his right mind, is sufficient, in the absence of any suggestion 
 to the contrary;' and so is evidence that the declarant apparently 
 understood what she was talking about and conversed intelligibly with 
 other persons concerning other matters, though she was at times in 
 
 because the death was delayed for any State, 31 Tex. 579; State v. Wilmbusse, 
 
 length of time^ if the death resulted 8 Idaho, 608, 70 Pae. 849 ; Owens v. Com. 
 
 from the injury in question. Com. v. 22 Ky. L. Rep. 514, 58 S. W. 422; Don- 
 
 Birriolo, 197 Pa. 371, 47 Atl. 355. nelly v. State, 26 N. J. L. 463; State v. 
 
 2 2 State V. Aldrich, 50 Kan. 666, 32 Reed, 137 Mo. 125, 38 S. W. 574. 
 Pac. 408; Starr v. Com. 97 Ky. 193, 30 zBenavides v. State, supra. 
 S. W. 397. 3 State v. Reed, supra. 
 
 2 3Rex V. Mosley, 1 Moody, C. C. 97; But dying declarations of a child ten 
 
 State V. Brown, 111 La. 696, 35 So. 818; years old cannot be admitted in evidence 
 
 2 Russell, Crimes, 757. ™*'l PJ"?*^, foundation has been laid 
 
 24Com. V. M'Pike, 3 Cush. 181, 50 ^ P™°f f.^? ^'1^7'?^^''%, ^^ 
 
 1 T. Ta>, /-I XT 1 ii o Aii^ Frazier, 109 La. 458, 33 So. 561. 
 
 Am. Dec. 727; Com. v. Hackett, 2 A len, ^^^^^ ^ Garrand, 5 Or. 216. 
 
 136; State v. Porter 34 Iowa, 131; .^^^ ^. gjj jgj p^ ^g^ 39 Atl. 
 
 State V. Wagner, 61 Me. 178. And see j^g 
 
 Reg. V. Edwards, 12 Cox, C. C. 230. g^^. evidence as to the competency of 
 
 2 6Denton v. State, 1 Swan, 279. And j^ person making a dying declaration 
 
 see Donnelly v. State, 26 N. J. L. 463, m^y |,e confined to the time of making 
 
 601. it, and that he was incompetent two 
 
 2 6Reg. V. Johnson, 2 Car. & K. 354. days after it was made is inadmissible. 
 
 lEx parte Fatheree, 34 Tex. Crim. State v. Wilmbusse, 8 Idaho, 608, 70 
 
 Eep. 594, 31 S. W. 403; Benavides v. Pac. 849. 
 
998 HOMICIDE. [§ 633 
 
 a stupor.® But statements should be rejected, though the deceased 
 recognized his physician and asked about his condition, and that his 
 family be sent for, where the physician informed the court that not 
 more than half he said could be understood, leaving in the dark the 
 fact as to whether this was caused by exhaustion or mental in- 
 capacity.' 
 
 So, dying declarations, otherwise admissible, are not rendered in- 
 admissible by the fact that the declarant was, at the time of making 
 them, partially under the influence of opiates and had to be aroused 
 from time to time to continue his statements, the statements being 
 intelligent, continuous, and logical;* the effect of the narcotics in 
 such case going to the weight and not to the admissibility, of the 
 evidence.® And where a person, being at the point of death, and 
 conscious of her condition, but unable to speak articulately in con- 
 sequence of wounds inflicted upon her head, was asked whether it 
 was C. who inflicted the wounds; and, if so, she was requested to 
 squeeze the hand of the person making the inquiry, it was held that 
 under all the circumstances of the case there was proper evidence 
 against C. for the consideration of the jury; they being the judges 
 of its credibility, and of the effect to be given to it. ^ " 
 
 Declarations made by a person when it was not evident that she 
 was awake or in her senses, and which were such as might naturally 
 come from a person in agony, whose attention was completely dis- 
 tracted from the persons and things about her, however, are inadmis- 
 sible. ^ ^ And statements offered as dying declarations should be ex- 
 cluded where it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the part 
 taken in the conversation by the deceased or the witness to whom the 
 declarations were made, and where the answers given were frag- 
 mentary, and the capacity of the deceased to make tibe statemtot was 
 
 sHughes V. state, 109 Wis. 397, 85 that he had been unconscious, but had 
 
 N. W. 333. been spared to tell who injured him. 
 
 A dying declaration is not rendered Lipscomb v. State, 75 Miss. 559, 23 So. 
 
 inadmissible by evidence going no fur- 210, 230. 
 
 ther than to show that the declarant at 'Ledbetter v. State, 23 Tex. App. 247, 
 
 the time of making the declaration had 6 S. W. 226. 
 
 considerable fever and had taken an sTaylor v. State, 38 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 opiate, where it did not appear that 552, 43 S. W. 1019; Walker v. State, 
 
 either had affected his mind. State v. 139 Ala. 56, 35 So. 1011; Hays v. Com. 
 
 Garrand, supra. 12 Ky. L. Rep. 611, 14 S. W. 833; Com. 
 
 And a statement by a person whose v. Straesser, 153 Pa. 451, 26 Atl. 17. 
 
 dying declaration was offered in evi- 9 Hays v. Com. supra. And see State 
 
 dence, that he had been dead and the v. McGowan, 66 Conn. 392, 34 Atl. 99; 
 
 Lord had sent him back to tell who Com. v. Straesser, supra. 
 
 killed him, does not necessarily indi- loCom. v. Casey, 11 Cush. 417 59 
 
 cate that his utterances were those of Am. Dec. 150. ' 
 
 a diseased mind or disordered imagina- liPeople v. Olmstead, 30 Mich. 431; 
 
 tion, since he may have meant merely Reg. v. Smith, 16 Cox, C. C. 170. 
 
} 633] EVIDENCE. 999 
 
 questionable. ^ ^ So, a statement written by au attorney during the 
 night on which the deceased died was held not admissible as the 
 dying declaration of the deceased, when it appeared that the attorney 
 propounded questions to him, which he tried to answer, but was 
 unable to do so; that his attendant friends then "explained the 
 questions to him, and made the answers, to which he assented only 
 by nodding his head ;" that the statement, consisting of the answers 
 thus made, was, when finished, "read over to him by the attorney, 
 slowly and distinctly, and he signified his assent thereto by nodding 
 his head;" that he spoke but a few words afterwards, and had 
 frequently to be aroused ; and that he seemed, while the statement was 
 being read to him, to be in a stupor. ^ * To throw light on the de- 
 ceased's mental state his declarations on collateral matters are ad- 
 missible. ^ * 
 
 3. How evidenced. 
 
 634. General rule, — The fact that a statement of a person was 
 made under a sense of impending death, so as to render it admissible 
 as his dying declaration, may be shown by what the injured person 
 said, or from the nature and extent of the wound, which was obviously 
 such that be must have known that he could not survive, or by his 
 conduct at the time, and the communications, if any, made to him by 
 his medical advisers, if assented to understandingly and acquiesced in 
 by him; or by any other mode, either by direct proof of express 
 language of the declarant, or by inference from evident danger, or 
 other circumstances revealing the state of the declarant's mind.^ 
 The court should look not only to the declaration and statements 
 of the person killed, but also to all facts concerning him and exist- 
 ing at the time of and before and after the declarations were made, 
 forming part of the res gestae, and tending to show the true state of 
 his mind.^ It is sufiicient to admit in evidence statements as dying 
 declarations, if it satisfactorily appears that they were made under 
 
 i2Mitehell v. State, 71 Ga. 128. Consciousness of approaching death 
 
 isMcHugh V. State, 31 Ala. 317. See on the part of the declarant may ap- 
 
 also Barnett v. People, 54 111. 325. pear, so as to render a dying declara- 
 
 KDonnelly v. State, 26 N. J. L. 496. tion admissible in evidence, from any 
 
 1 State V. Sullivan, 20 R. I. 114, 37 existing means of inferring such knowl- 
 
 Atl. 673; State v. Kuhn, 117 Iowa, 216, edge: it is not necessary that the declar- 
 
 90 N. W. 733; Krebs v. State, 3 Tex. ant should have shown in some way, 
 
 App. 348; Mattox v. United States, 146 by conduct or language, that he knew 
 
 U S 140, 36 L. ed. 917, 13 Sup. Ct. he was going to die. Gipe v. State 
 
 Rep. 60. And see Long v. State (Tex. (Tnd.) 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 419, 75 N. E. 
 
 Crim. App.) 88 S. W. 203; Clemmona 881. 
 
 V. State^ 43 Pla. 200, 30 So. 699. aStarkey v. People, 17 111. 17. 
 
1000 • HOMICIDE. [§ 634 
 
 a sense of impending death, whether it is proved by express words 
 of the declarant, or by his evident danger, or the opinion of medical 
 or other attendants expressed to him, or by his conduct or other cir- 
 cumstances of the case, all of which may be resorted to in order to 
 ascertain the state of his mind.^ But the preliminary fact that a 
 dying declaration was made under a sense of impending death must 
 be proved by the party offering the declaration in evidence;* and 
 the degree of proof required to establish that the declarant was in 
 extremis at the time is such as to exclude reasonable doubt. ^ And 
 a writing not signed by an injured person, but certified to by a jus- 
 tice of the peace as containing statements made by him, is not ad- 
 missible in evidence as a dying declaration in the absence of testi- 
 mony that the deceased did make the statements contained in the 
 writing. ® 
 
 635. Statements of the deceased. — ^A statement of the deceased is 
 admissible in evidence as a dying declaration if it satisfactorily 
 appears therefrom that, at the time, he believed that he must soon die 
 from the effects of the injury with reference to which he makes the 
 statement.^ And, as a general rule, a sufficient predicate is laid for 
 the admission of dying declarations by a repeatedly expressed asser- 
 tion upon the part of the declarant that he would die.^ And this is 
 
 sState V. Schmidt, 73 Iowa, 469, 35 Rep. 189, 27 S. W. 1; Smith v. Com. 113 
 
 N. W. 590; State v. Noeton, 121 Mo. 537, Kv. 19, 67 S. W. 32; Com. v. Thompson, 
 
 26 S. W. 551; Donnelly v. State, 26 N. 159 Mass. 56, 33 N. E. 1111; People v. 
 
 J. L. 463; Kilpatrick v. Com. 31 Pa. Burt, 51 App. Div. 106, 64 N. Y. Supp. 
 
 19S. 417, Affirmed in 170 N. Y. 561, 62 N. 
 
 4Kelly V. United States, 27 Fed. 616; E. 1099; Winfrey v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 
 
 Eoten V. Stats, 31 Fla. 514, 12 So. 910; Rep. 538, 56 S. W. 919. 
 Green v. State, 43 Fla. 552, 30 So. 798; Zjordan v. State, 81 Ala. 20, 1 So. 
 
 Peak V. State, 50 N. J. L. 179, 12 Atl. 577; Gregory v. State, 140 Ala. 16, 37 
 
 701 ; Com. V. Winkelman, 12 Pa. Super. So. 259 ; McQueen v. State, 94 Ala. 50, 
 
 Ct. 497. 10 So. 433; Scales v. State, 96 Ala. 69, 
 
 A statement will not he admitted in 11 So. 121; Smith v. State, 136 Ala. 1, 
 
 evidence as a dying declaration where, 34 So. 168; Cole v. State, 105 Ala. 76, 
 
 \\hen it was made, there was nothing to 16 So. 762; Milton v. State, 134 Ala. 42, 
 
 show whether the declarant thought 32 So. 653; People v. Yokum, 118 Cal. 
 
 there was any hope of recovery, and no 437, 50 Pac. 686; People v. Glover, 141 
 
 physician was present, and it is not Cal. 233, 74 Pac. 745; State v. Trusty, 
 
 shown whether one had visited him at 1 Penn. (Del.) 319, 40 Atl. 766; State 
 
 the time, and the character of the wound v. Frazier, Houst. Crim. Rep. (Del.) 
 
 is not described. Dixon v. State, 13 176; Grant v. State, 118 Ga. 804, 45 S 
 
 FJa. 636. E. 603; State v. Bonar (Kan.) 81 Pac! 
 
 BLipseomb v. State, 75 Miss. 559, 23 484 : Crump v. Com. 14 Ky L Rep 450 
 
 So. 210, 230; Bell v. State, 72 Miss. 507, 20 S. W. 390; State v. Ashworth, 50 La 
 
 17 So. 232. Ann. 94, 23 So. 270; Hawkins v. State, 
 
 6Green v. State, supra. 98 Md. 355, 57 Atl. 27; Dillard v. State, 
 
 iState V. Walton, 92 Iowa. 455, 61 58 Miss. 368; State v. Brown 188 Mo 
 
 N. W. 179; Starks v. State, 137 Ala. 9, 451, 87 S. W. 519; Hunnieutt v. State, 
 
 34 So. 687; Hammil v. State, 90 Ala. 18 Tex. App. 498, 51 Am. Rep 330; 
 
 577, 8 So. 380; Doolin v. Com. 16 Ky. L. Testard v. State, 26 Tex. App. 260 9 S. 
 
§ 635] EVIDENCB. 1001 
 
 the rule, thougli he was told by his physician or others that he might 
 get well;^ and though it did not appear that his attending physician 
 had told him that he was going to die;* or though his doctor had 
 tried to encourage him as to his condition. ^ Nor is this rule affected 
 by the fact that all of the assertions of expected death were not made 
 prior to the declaration in question, where this was afterwards re- 
 iterated.® And any expressions of one mortally wounded at the time 
 of making the alleged dying declaration, tending to show that he be- 
 lieved his death was imminent, are admissible for the purpose of 
 determining whether, when it was made, it was in fact a dying dec- 
 laration.'' ISTor is it necessary that any set form of words should 
 be required in a dying declaration, to show that the declarant was 
 under the belief of speedily approaching death ; the court must draw 
 a rational conclusion from all that was said and done, in connec- 
 tion with such surroundings as must have been known to the declar- 
 ant, as to whether the declarant was in such a condition of mind as 
 would render his declarations competent.* A statement by a de- 
 clarant that he was willing to die and was going to rest is equivalent 
 to a declaration that he was about to die.® And such expressions 
 in a written declaration as "Believing myself to be now on my 
 deathbed," or "Believing that I shall not recover," are sufficient. ^ •* 
 
 W. 888; Roberts v. State (Tex. Crim. So. 699; State v. Wilmbusse, 8 Idaho, 
 
 App.) 88 S. W. 221; Queen v. Brooks, 1 608, 70 Pac. 849; State v. McMullin, 170 
 
 Cox, C. C. 6. Mo. 608, 71 S. W. 221 ; State v. Gar- 
 
 Where a person was shot and serious- rand, 5 Or. 216; Benson v. State, 38 
 ly or mortally wounded, and stated to a Tex. Crim. Rep. 487, 43 S. W. 527 ; Win- 
 relative that he was bound to die, it fiey v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 538, 
 cjinnot be assumed that he simply meant 56 S. W. 919; Connell v. State, 46 Tex. 
 that at some time in the future he was Crim. Rep. 259, 81 S. W. 746. 
 bound to die, so as to exclude a dying sstate v. Johnson, 26 S. C. 152, 1 S. 
 declaration made by him, on the theory E. 510; Justice v. State, 99 Ala. 180^ 13 
 that he did not contemplate immediate- So. 658; Winfrey v. State, supra. 
 ly impending death. Miller v. State, 27 sLowry v. State, 12 Lea, 142. 
 Tex. App. 63, 10 S. W. 445. lODooiin v. Com. 16 Ky. L. Rep. 189, 
 
 sjordan v. State, supra; Hussey v. 27 S. W. 1 : Arnett v. Cora. 114 Ky. 
 
 State, 87 Ala. 126, 6 So. 420; Pitts v. 593, 71 S. W. 635; State v. Dixon, 131 
 
 State. 140 Ala. 70, 37 So. 101; Wheeler N. C. 808. 42 S. E. 944; State v. Jeswell, 
 
 V. State, 112 Ga. 43, 37 S. E. 126; Ter- 22 R. I. 136, 46 Atl. 405; Reg. v. Reaney, 
 
 rell V. Com. 13 Bush, 246; Worthington 7 Cox, C. C. 209, 3 Jur. N. S. 191. But 
 
 V. State, 92 Md. 222, 56 L.R.A. 353, 84 see Rex v. Van Butchell, 3 Car. & P. 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 506, 48 Atl. 355 ; MeDaniel 631 ; People v. Robinson, 2 Parle. Crim. 
 
 V. State, 8 Smedes & M. 401, 47 Am. Rep. 235. 
 
 Dec. 93. See also Jordan v. State, 82 But a recital in a statement offered 
 
 Ala. 1, 2 So. 460; State v. Roberts in evidence as a dying declaration, 
 
 (Nev.) 82 Pac. 100. "Believing that I am very near death 
 
 ^People V. Grunzig, 1 Park. Crim. and realizing that I may not recover, I 
 
 Rep. 299. wish to make this my dying statement 
 
 5Stephens v. Com. 20 Ky. L. Rep. 544, as to the cause of my death," shows on 
 
 47 S. W. 229. its face that the deflarant had not 
 
 estate v. Vaug.han, 22 Nev. 285, 3!) abandoned all hope of recovery and is 
 
 Pac. 733; Dillard v. State, 58 Miss. 368. inadmissible. People v. Hodgdon, 55 
 
 'Clemmons v. State, 43 Fla. 200, 30 Cal. 72, 36 Am. Rep. 30. 
 
1002 HOMICIDE. [§ 635 
 
 And the statement "I am done," or "I am killed," is sufficient ;^' 
 and so is the statement "I can never get well." ^ ^ 
 
 Nor does an inquiry by a declarant of his medical attendant as to 
 whether he could help him show anything beyond the hope of pres- 
 ent ease or relief, and it is not, therefore, sufficient to exclude his 
 dying declarations.^* And such a declaration, made after declar- 
 ing expectation of death, is not excluded by the fact that the declar- 
 ant failed to make any disposition of property, and said nothing 
 about his affairs ; ^ * or by the fact that the declaration of expected 
 death was made some time after the infliction of the injury, where 
 it was positive and contemporaneous with the statement offered as 
 a dying declaration.^® Nor is it excluded by the fact that the 
 declarant was under the influence of drugs, and delirious at times, 
 though it should be guarded by appropriate instructions. ^ ® And it 
 is immaterial whether the opinion of the declarant that he would 
 die was expressed before or after the narration of the facts of the 
 case, there being no evidence that during the time of this conver- 
 sation his condition materially changed. ^ ^ 
 
 But, in considering whether dying declarations are made under 
 circumstances which entitle them to be received in evidence, the court 
 is not bound to follow blindly the statements of the declarant as 
 to his belief in impending death; if the other facts proved convince 
 the court as to such belief, the court should act accordingly, without 
 reference to such statements.^* And a statement is inadmissible 
 a dying declaration when made after the declarant had been ad- 
 
 iiState V. Garrand, 5 Or. 216; May iBPuUiam v. State, 88 Ala. 1, 6 So. 
 T. State, 55 Ala. 39 ; State v. Belton, 24 839. 
 
 S. C. 185, 58 Am. Eep. 245;State v. Free- isRoberta v. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 
 man, 1 Speers, L. 57. 88 S. W. 221. 
 
 Evid^,nce that an injured person said I'State v. Peace^ 46 N. C. (1 Jones, 
 he was a murdered man, and it would L.) 251. 
 
 have been better if they had killed him isPeople v. Chase, 79 Hun, 296, 29 N. 
 on the spot than to leave him lingering, Y. Supp. 376 ; Bell v. State, 72 Miss. 507, 
 and that he thought he should never get 17 So. 232. And see Craven v. State 
 over it, though he lived several weolcs (Tex. Crim. App.) 90 S. W. 311. 
 after, renders his dying declaration While it is not required that the de- 
 prima facie admissible; but if he did ceased S'hould have declared in terms 
 not use the words "murdered man" in that he expected to die at onoe, in order 
 their literal sense, and had no immedi- to admit his dying declarations in evi- 
 ate fear of death in his mind, the rule dence, where jfiis condition was sudi 
 would be different. Reg. v. Qualter, 6 that of necessity such an impression 
 Cox, C. C. 357. must have existed in his mind, still, no 
 
 12 State V. McKnight, 119 Iowa, 79, matter how strong the expression of 
 t)3 N. W. 63. this certainty of death may have been, 
 
 isJohnson v. State, 17 Ala. 618; if there is any evidence of hope in the 
 Hawkins v. State, 98 Md. 355, 57 Atl. language or actions of the declarant, his 
 27; Highsmith v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. statement will be rejected. Morffajn v. 
 Rep. 32, 50 S. W. 72.3, 51 S. W. 919. State, 31 Ind. 193. 
 
 HBarnett v. People, 54 111. 325. 
 
§ 635] EVIDENCE. 1003 
 
 vised by his physician that he would get well, and his wound was 
 rapidly healing, and his physician had discharged him, where a sec- 
 ond hemorrhage of the wound was the immediate cause of death, 
 though he had repeatedly stated that he would not recover. * ® Nor is a 
 statement by a declarant that he did not think he would get well,^" or 
 that he thought himself in great danger,^ ^ sufficient to warrant the 
 admission in evidence of his dying declarations ; and the expression 
 ^'If I die," or its equivalent, indicates a surviving hope of life.*^ 
 N^or are declarations indicative of great pain sufficient;** nor is a 
 statement by the declarant that he did not think the accused would 
 shoot him. * * And the statement, "he has shot me," does not show a 
 sense of impending death. * ® Nor does a mere expression of regi-et 
 by the declarant at Ibeing taken away from the support of his fam- 
 ily;^® nor a statement by him that he did not know whether he 
 would live till night;*'' or that he did not think he could stand the 
 pain.** And the same rule applies to a statement that he was too 
 far gone to say any more ;* ® and to an exclamation of "Oh ! my peo- 
 ple," uttered by a slave upon the discovery of a mortal wound.** 
 So, a statement made by an injured person that he had to die of his 
 injuries, and that any hour or day he might die, does not show such 
 a sense of immediately impending death as to render his dying dec- 
 larations admissible in evidence.*^ 
 
 isirby V. State, 25 Tex. App. 203, 7 implies a hope of recovery and ■will not 
 
 S. W. 705. And see State v. Weaver, support her dying declarations as to 
 
 57 Iowa, 730, II N. W. 675; Brom v. who committed the deed, such declara- 
 
 People, 216 111. 148, 74 N. E. 790. tions will not be stricken out in a 
 
 20Whitaker v. State, 79 Ga. 87, 3 S. prosecution for the homicide, where, 
 
 E. 403; Titus v. State, 117 Ala. 16, 23 after the request was made, and before 
 
 So. 77; Smith v. Com. 113 Ky. 19, 67 making the declarations, s.he constantly 
 
 S. W. 32. said she knew she would die. Hawkins 
 
 2iErrington's Case, 2 Lewin, C. C. v. State, 98 Md. 355, 57 Atl. 27. 
 
 148. And see Eex v. Smith, 65 J. P. 2 3 Justice v. State, 99 Ala. 180, 13 So. 
 
 426. 658. And see Rex v. Abbott, 67 J. P. 
 
 Where a person made a declaration 151. 
 
 containing the statement that she had 2 4Barnes v. Com. 110 Ky. 348, 61 S. 
 
 no hope of recovery, and she afterwards W. 733. 
 
 amended it so as to read that she had 2 6 State v. Eider, 90 Mo. 54, 1 S. W. 
 
 no hope, at present, of recovery, it is 825; State v. Jaggers, 58 S. C. 41, 36 S. 
 
 incompetent as a dying declaration. E. 434. 
 
 Eeg. v. Jenkins, 11 Cox, C. C. 250, 38 L. 2 6Starks v. State (Miss.) 6 So. 843. 
 
 J Mag. Caa. N. S. 82. 27State v. Weaver, 57 Iowa, 730, 11 
 
 22State V. Medlicott, 9 Kan. 257; N. W. 675. 
 
 State V. Simon, 50 Mo. 370. And see zsstate v. Phillips, 118 Iowa, 660, 92 
 
 State y. Center. 35 Vt. 378; Collins v. N. W. 876. 
 
 People, 194 111. 506, 62 N. E. 902; People 2 9K«g. v. Nicolas, 6 Cox, C. C. 120. 
 
 v Evans, 40 Hun, 492; Reg. v. Megson, soLewis v. State, 9 Smedes & M. 115. 
 
 9 Car. & P. 418. 31 State v. Knoll, 69 Kan. 767, 77 Pac. 
 
 But while a request by a girl upon 580. 
 
 whom an abortion had been committed, So, evidence of the wife of a deceased 
 
 as follows, "You get me help; if you person, consisting of statements of the 
 
 don't send for the doctor, I will die," deceased as to the manner in which and 
 
1004 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 (§ 63e 
 
 636. Statements and surrounding circumstances. — When dying dec- 
 larations are offered in evidence, there are, in the great majority of 
 cases, both statements by the deceased, and surrounding circumstances 
 bearing upon the question of his belief in his immediately impend- 
 ing death; in such cases it is sufficient to warrant their admission 
 in evidence that his statements and conduct, considered in connection 
 with the surrounding circumstances, were of such a character as 
 should convince the court that at the time of making the declaration in 
 question the declarant believed that he was about to die, and that all 
 hope of recovery had departed. '■ Thus a statement of expected death, 
 together with the fact that the declarant suffered great pain from 
 a necessarily fatal wound, is sufficient ; ^ and so is such a statement in 
 connection with the fact that the wound was plainly mortal,^ as in 
 the case of a crushed skull ; * or in connection with total collapse, and 
 the apparent near approach of death upon the part of the declarant. ^ 
 So, a declared conviction of approaching death is sufficient to warrant 
 the admission of a statement of the declarant, then made as a dying 
 declaration, when taken in connection with the fact that he sent for 
 
 the persons by whom the injury was in- 
 flicted, and that he was a ruined and a 
 dead man unless he could get speedy 
 relief, about twenty minutes after which 
 he became insensible, and remained in 
 that condition until his death, is insuf- 
 ficient to establisih the certainty on his 
 part of approaching death. Adwell v. 
 Com. 17 B. Mon. 310. 
 
 iPeople V. Chase, 79 Hun, 296, 29 N. 
 Y. Supp. 376 ; Hammil v. State, 90 Ala. 
 577, 8 So. 380: Pennington v. Com. 24 
 Ky. L. Rep. 321, 68 S. W. 451; State v. 
 Kring, 11 Mo. App. 92. And see Reg. v. 
 Goddard, 15 Cox. C. C. 7. 
 
 aPeople v. Ybarra, 17 Cal. 168; John- 
 son V. State, 17 Ala. 618; Watson v. 
 State, 63 Ind. 548; State v. Young, 104 
 Iowa, 730, 74 N. W. 693; Pryor v. State 
 (Miss.) 39 So. 1012; State v. Vaughan, 
 22 Nev. 285, 39 Pac. 733; Kea,ton v. 
 State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 621, 57 S. W. 
 1125; Puryear v. Com. 83 Va. 51, 1 S. E. 
 512; State v. Power, 24 Wash. 34, 63 
 L.R.A. 902, 63 Pac. 1112. 
 
 3 State V. Cornish, 5 Harr. (Del.) 502; 
 State V. Oliver, 2 Houst. (Del.) 585; 
 Fuller V. State, 117 Ala. 36, 23 So. 688; 
 Anderson v. State, 79 Ala. 5; Oliver v. 
 State, 17 Ala. 587; Faire v. Stats, 58 
 Ala. 74; Fuqua v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 
 i9.0, 81 S. W. 923; Rowsey v. Com. 116 
 Ky. 617, 76 S. W. 409; State v. Whitt, 
 113 N. C. 716, 18 S. E. 715; Com. v. 
 
 Van Horn, 4 Lack. Legal News, 63; 
 Com. V. Mika, 171 Pa. 273, 33 Atl. 65; 
 People V. Lem Deo, 132 Cal. 199, 64 Pac. 
 265; People v. Samario, 84 Cal. 484, 24 
 Pac. 283; State v. Brown, 188 Mo. 451, 
 87 S. W. 519; Moore v. State, 96 Teiin. 
 209, 33 S. W. 1046; King v. State, 34 
 Tex. Crim. Rep. 228, 29 S. W. 1086. 
 And see King v. Com. 2 Va. Cas. 78; 
 Puryear v. Com. supra; Rex v. Bonner, 
 6 Car. & P. 386. 
 
 4State V. Finley, 118 N. C. 1161, 24 
 S. E. 495. And see State v. Blackburn, 
 80 N. C. 474. 
 
 estate v. Quick, 15 Rich. L. 342; State 
 V. Head, 60 S. C. 516, 39 S. E. 6; State 
 V. Johnson, 26 S. C. 152, 1 S. E. 510; 
 Gipe V. State (Ind.) 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 
 419, 75 N. E. 881; State v. Dennis, 119 
 Iowa, 688, 94 N. W. 235; State v. Smith, 
 48 La. Ann. 533, 19 So. 452; State v. 
 KrIng, 11 Mo. App. 92, Affirmed in 74 
 Mo. 612; State v. Fletcher, 24 Or. 295, 
 33 Pac. 575. And see Green v. State, 
 154 Ind. 655, 57 N. E. 637. 
 
 A statement made by a person lying 
 on the ground mortally wounded and 
 gasping for breath, in response to a re- 
 quest by another to bystanders to 
 "listen to him while he tells how it 
 happened before he dies," is admissible 
 in a prosecution for the killing as a 
 dying declaration. Newberry v. State, 
 68 Ark. 355, 58 S. W. 351. 
 
I 636] EVIDENCE. 1005 
 
 a notary or other officer or person for tlie express purpose of taking his 
 statement,'' or that he deliberately signed his statement after it was 
 written out, as his dying declaration, having repeatedly reiterated 
 the same.^ And repeated statements by an injured person that he 
 would die, and his act in calling a lawyer to make his will and of 
 giving directions as to the management of his business, are a suffi- 
 cient predicate for the admission of his statements in evidence as 
 dying declarations, though his attending physicians testified that 
 shortly after the injury his condition improved, and that he was in 
 no great danger until blood poisoning set in. * So, proof of feeble old 
 age and an inability to articulate after the injury, in connection with 
 the expression of a conviction of impending death, is sufficient. ® And 
 the expression by the injured person of a wish to see his wife and 
 children does not militate against the competency of his declara- 
 tion ; ^ " nor does asking that a doctor be sent for. ^ ^ And a dying 
 declaration is admissible in evidence, although there is testimony 
 that for some days after the deceased was shot he had little or no fear 
 of impending death, this being prior to the time of his declaration, 
 but that at the time it was made he had experienced a change, and 
 had grown more serious, and had been informed by his physician 
 that he was going to die, and said he realized it.^^ 
 
 Though an injured person has declared his belief that he is about 
 to die, however, his statement of the circumstances of his injury will 
 not be received as a dying declaration where his injuries were not 
 such as to impress him that they were necessarily fatal, and their 
 seriousness had not been explained to him.^^ And the use of lan- 
 
 eFulcher v. State, 28 Tex. App. 465, sCrockett v. State, 45 Tex. Grim. Rep. 
 
 13 S. W. 750. 276, 77 S. W. 4. 
 
 'People V. Vernon, 35 Cal. 49, 95 Am. So, a statement by an injured person 
 
 Dee. 49; Hamrail v. State, 90 Ala. 576, that, if he must die, he would say that 
 
 8 So. 380; State v. Wilson, 121 Mo. 434, a, named person killed him, soon after 
 
 26 S. W. 367; Rex v. Hayward, 6 Car. which he called for an insurance policy 
 
 & P. 157. on his life and read it to his wife and 
 
 But an introductory statement de- asked her if it was satisfactory, and 
 daring a knowledge of impending spoke to her of death, and then stated 
 death, written by a person who took a the circumstances of the killing, is ad- 
 dying statement, without a previous missible as a, dying declaration, includ- 
 statement of such knowledge by the ing the circumstances of the killing, 
 declarant, on a request that it be writ- Curtis v. State, 14 Lea, 502. 
 ten, is not shown to be distinctly rati- f'Baxter v. State, 15 Lea, 657. And 
 fled by a mere general assent to the see Tijickler's Case, 1 East, P. C. 354. 
 document, which was lengthy, made loState v. Bordelon, 113 La. 690, 37 
 after a single reading of it as a whole. So. 603. 
 
 and the signing of it by the declarant, — nPitts v. State, 140 Ala. 70, 37 So. 
 
 especially where the circumstances were 101. 
 
 such as to indicate that a belief of im- laState v. Baldwin, 15 Wash. 15, 45 
 
 pending death was not then manifestly Pac. 650. 
 
 in the mind of the declarant. People isBell v. State, 72 Miss. 507, 17 So. 
 
 T. Fuhrig, 127 Cal. 412, 59 Pac. 693. 232. 
 
1006 HOMICIDE. [§ G3ft 
 
 guage by a person just after being shot, indicating that he then feared 
 that the shot ■would prove fatal, does not authorize the admission 
 of statements made by him five to seven hours later as dying declara- 
 tions, where he seemed to be resting easily and manifested no con- 
 cern about himself, though it appears that a few hours after that he 
 had no hope of recovery.^* Nor will a statement be admitted as a 
 dying declaration upon the assertion of the declarant that he must 
 die, when he unnecessarily and imprudently exposed and exerted 
 himself, and made no preparations for death, or arrangements con- 
 cerning his family and property, though he had ample opportunity ; * ^ 
 or when, on the advice of his physician, he went to a distant place 
 to have himself operated upon, as a chance of recovery. ^ ® And con- 
 tradictory statements as to expectation of impending death will pre- 
 vent the admission of a statement as a dying declaration when, after 
 being injured, the declarant pursued his assailant until he lost sight 
 of him.^^ And subsequent inquiries by an injured person as to 
 whether the person addressed thought he would live show a suffi- 
 cient hope of recovery to defeat his dying declarations as evidence, 
 though he had declared his expectation of impending death. * ^ Nor 
 is it sufficient merely to prove a statement of the declarant that he 
 did not think he would be long in the world, and that he made his 
 declaration with the fear of death before his eyes. ^ ® 
 
 637. Circumstances in the absence of statement. — It is not neces- 
 sary to the admissibility of dying declarations, as such, that the 
 declarant should have said that he believed that he would imme- 
 diately die ; it is sufficient if the surrounding facts were such as to 
 indicate that he was conscious of his impending dissolution at the 
 time of making his declaration;^ and that he was conscious of the 
 
 Instate V. Jaggers, 58 S. C. 41, 36 S. isRex v. Fagent, 7 Car. & P. 238; 
 
 E. 434. State v. Buohanan, Houst. Crim. Rep. 
 
 And though an injured person was (Del.) 79; State v. Center, 35 Vt. 378. 
 
 previously fully possessed of the belief Contra, State v. Elldns, 101 Mo. 344, 14 
 
 that he was bound to die, a statement S. W. 116; State v. Turlington, 102 Mo. 
 
 made by him some five or ten minutes 642, 15 S. W. 141. 
 
 after the statement offered as a dying isReg. v. Gloster, 16 Cox, C. C. 471. 
 
 declaration, that he had hopes that he i Clark v. State, 105 Ala. 91, 17 So. 
 
 might recover, raises a doubt as to the 37; Gerald v. State, 128 Ala. 6, 29 So. 
 
 absence of all hope at the time the 614; Dunn v. State, 2 Ark. 229, 35 Am. 
 
 statement was made, and defeats its ad- Dec. 54; People v. Taylor, 69 Cal. 640; 
 
 missibility as a dying declaration. Ex People v. Lee Sare Bo, 72 Cal. 623, 14 
 
 parte Myers, 33 Tex. Crim. Rep. 204, Pac. 310; People v. Farmer, 77 Cal. 1, 
 
 26 S. W. 196. 18 Pac. 800; People v. Bemmerly, 87 
 
 isStarkey v. People, 17 111. 17; Brown Cal. 117, 25 Pac. 266; People v. Yokum, 
 
 V. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 1269, 83 S. W. 118 Cal. 437, 50 Pac. C86; People v. 
 
 645. Sanchez, 24 Cal. 17; People v. Gray, 61 
 
 Instate V. Gianfala, 113 La. 463, 37 Cal. 164, 44 Am. Rep. 549; Zipperian v. 
 
 So. 30. People, 33 Colo. 13-1, 79 Pac. 1018; Les- 
 
 i7Morgan v. State, 31 Ind. 193. ter v. State, 37 Fla. 382, 20 So. 232 ^ 
 
§ 637]. EVIDENCE. 1007 
 
 fact, not as a thing of surmise, conjecture, and apprehension, but as 
 a fixed and inevitable fact.^ Nor need such a statement be incor- 
 porated in the declaration, if made under such circumstances as to 
 justify the court in believing that it was dene under a belief in im- 
 pending death. ^ The bodily condition and appearance of the declar- 
 ant, the state of his wound, his conduct and language, and statements 
 made by him through his attendants, and to him by his physician, 
 may all be taken into consideration, and a conclusion deduced there- 
 from as to the state of his consciousness at the time.* And that a 
 wound was necessarily fatal, and that its nature was such that the 
 wounded person must have realized his situation, are sufficient to 
 render his dying declarations admissible in evidence without a decla- 
 ration of the expectation of death on his part. ^ And declarations of 
 
 Campbell v. State, 11 Ga. 355; Young Stewart v. State, 2 Lea, 598; Curtis v. 
 V. State, 114 Ga. 849, 40 S. E. 1000; State, 14 Lea, 502; Anthony v. State, 
 Murphy v. People, 37 111. 447; State v. Meigs, 265. 33 Am. Dec. 143; Brake- 
 Baldwin, 79 Iowa, 714, 45 N. W. 297; field v. State, 1 Sneed, 215; Burrell v. 
 Morgan v. State, 31 Ind. 193; Peoples v. State, 18 Tex. 713; Hill v. Com. 2 Gratt. 
 Com. 87 Ky. 487, 9 S. W. 509, 810; Com. 594; Rex v. Bonner, 6 Car. & P. 386; 
 V. Matthews, 89 Ky. 287, 12 S. W. 333; 1 East, P. C. 355; King v. Dingier, 2 
 Green v. Com. 13 Ky. L. Rep. 897, 18 S. I^ach, C. L. 561 ; 2 Russell, Crimes, 
 W. 515; McHargess v. Com. 15 Ky. L. 761; Re Orpen, 86 Fed. 760. 
 Rep. 323, 23 S. W. 349; Austin v. Com. That hope had fled and an injured 
 19 Ky. L. Rep. 474, 40 S. W. 905; Jones person had not the slightest expectation 
 V. Com. 20 Ky. L. Rep. 355, 46 S. W. of recovery may be shown by any cir- 
 217; Pennington v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. eumstances, or from all the circum- 
 321, 68 S. W. 451 ; State v. Wilson, 23 stances of the case taken together, such 
 La. Ann. 558; State v. Keenan, 38 La. as the character of his wounds, his 
 Ann. 660; State v. Black, 42 La. Ann. sufferings and pain, the opinion of the 
 861, 8 So. 594; State v. Sadler, 51 La. surgeon and other attendants as to his 
 Ann. 1397, 26 So. 390; State v. Scott, condition; his alarm and anxiety, if 
 12 La. Ann. 274; State v. Newhouse, 39 manifested, and his final preparation 
 La. Ann. 862, 2 So. 799; Worthington for death, if any was made; his taking 
 V. State, 92 Md. 222, 56 L.R.A. 353, 84 leave of friends, his seeking the con- 
 Am. St. Rep. 506, 48 Atl. 355; People solations of religion, and the last of- 
 V. Simpson, 48 Mich. 474, 12 N. W. 662 ; fices of the church, if such was the case. 
 McDaniel v. State, 8 Smedes & M. 401, People v. Sanchez, 24 Cal. 17. 
 47 Am. Dee. 93; Bell v. State, 72 Miss. 2Sraith v. State, supra; Logan v. 
 507, 17 So. 232; State v. Nocton, 121 Mo. State, 9 Humph. 24. 
 537, 36 S. W. 551; Rakes v. People, 2 sMcLean v. State, 16 Ala. 672; State 
 Neb. 157; Fitzgerald v. State, 11 Neb. v. Power, 24 Wash. 34, 63 L.R.A. 902, 
 577, 10 N. W. 495; State v. Roberts 63 Pac. 1112; Queen v. Hunt, 2 Cox, C. 
 (Nev.) 82 Pac. 100; Donnelly v. State, C. 230. 
 
 26 N. J. L. 463; People v. Chase, 79 <Westbrook v. People, 126 111. 81, 18 
 
 Hun, 296, 29 N. Y. Supp. 376; People v. N. E. 304; State v. Gillick, 7 Iowa, 287; 
 
 Grunzig. 1 Park. Crim. Rep. 299; People Pennington v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 321, 
 
 V. Knickerbocker, 1 Park. Crim. Rep. 68 S. W. 451 ; State v. Keenan, 38 La. 
 
 302; People v. Perry, 8 Abb. Pr. N. S. Ann. 660; State v. Scott, 12 La. Ann. 
 
 27; Com. v. Britton, 1 Legal Gaz. Rep. 274; State v. Russell, 13 Mont. 164, 32 
 
 513; Com. v. Murray, 2 Ashm. (Pa.) Pac. 854; Hill v. Com. 2 Gratt. 594; Re 
 
 41; Com. v. Birriolo, 197 Pa. 371, 47 Orpen, 86 Fed. 760; John's Case, I East, 
 
 Atl. 355; Kilpatrick v. Com. 31 Pa. 198; P. C. 357. 
 
 Com V. Winkelman, 12 Pa. Super. Ct. sGipe v. State (Ind.) 1 L.R.A. (N.S.) 
 
 497; State v. Bradley, 34 S. C. 136, 13 419, 75 N. E. 881; Anthony v. State,. 
 
 S. E. 315; Nelson v. State, 7 Humph. Meigs, 265, 33 Am. Dec. 143. 
 542; Smith v. State, 9 Humph. 9; 
 
1008 HOMICIDE. [§ 637 
 
 the deceased as to -vvlio shot him, made immediately after the shoot- 
 ing and on the first opportunity to do so, are admissible as dying 
 declarations.'^ So, sending for a person to take a statement suffi- 
 ciently shows belief in impending death to make the statement ad- 
 missible in evidence as a dying declaration. ^ And -while it has been 
 held that the act of an injured person in sending or asking for a 
 physician indicates an absence of the necessary solemn expectation 
 of impending dissolution,* the prevailing rule is that sending for a 
 physician, or expressing a desire for one, indicates, not a hope of re- 
 covery, but a desire for temporary relief from pain and suffering, 
 and does not, therefore, render dying declarations inadmissible.* 
 And this is particularly the case where the declarant had expressed 
 his belief that he was dying, or would die. ^ " And an effort upon the 
 part of an injured person to persuade another to kill him is com- 
 petent as showing that he was conscious, and that he had no hope of 
 recovery. * ^ 
 
 But the court in a prosecu'don for homicide in which dying decla- 
 rations are sought to be introduced in evidence will not presume, in 
 the absence of evidence, that a man who has been injured, though 
 seriously, must necessarily feel that he is about to die, and on such 
 presumption admit his declarations.-'^ And in the absence of any 
 expression of the expectation of death on the part of the declarant, 
 declarations will not be rendered admissible as dying declarations 
 merely by the facts that he was told that he was dangerously ill, 
 and that a clergyman was sent for, who told him to prepare for 
 death. ^ * And a person will not be deemed to have been in extremis 
 when he made a declaration, so as to render it admissible as a dying 
 
 BDmnas v. State, 62 Ga. 58, 65 Ga. lOReg. v. Howell; McQueen v. State; 
 
 471. State v. Evans; and State v. Kilgore, — 
 
 'Toliver v. Com. 104 Ky. 760, 47 S. supra. And see Baker v. Com. 106 Ky. 
 
 W. 1082. 212, .W S. W. 54. 
 
 And testimony of a witness that de- nWillis v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 
 ceased asked him to take down his 90 S. VV. 1100. 
 
 testimony as to the difficulty is admis- izQueen v. Cleary, 2 Fost. & F. 850; 
 
 sible in a prosecution for homicide to Reg. v. Morgan, 14 Cox, C. C. 337. And 
 
 show the connection of the witness with see Reg. v. Bedingfield, 14 Cox, C. C. 
 
 the statements. Pitts v. State, 140 341, 28 Moak, Eng. Rep. 587. 
 Ala. 70, 37 So. 101. isReg. v. Mooney, 5 Cox, C. C. 318. 
 
 sMathedy v. Com. 14 Ky. L. Rep. 182, In Stevens v. State, 138 Ala. 71, 35 
 
 19 S. W. 977. So. 122, however, it was held that a 
 
 9Reg. V. Howell, 1 Den. C. C. 1, 1 Car. statement made by a person as to the 
 
 & K. 689; Queen v. Thomas, 1 Cox, C. circumstances of a difficulty which re- 
 
 C. 52; McQueen v. Sta-te, 103 Ala. 12, suited in his death, immediately after 
 
 15 So. 824; Justice v. State, 99 Ala. 180, being told by his attending physician 
 
 13 So. 658; State v. Evans, 124 Mo. 397, and by his father that he was going to 
 
 28 S. W. 8; State v. Kilgore, 70 Mo. die, are admissible in evidence as dying 
 
 546; Hunnicutt v. State, 20 Tex. App, declarations, 
 632. 
 
§ C37]' EVIDENCE. 1009 
 
 declaration, where he lived nearly a month after making it, during 
 which he appeared to be convalescent for several days, and was told 
 by his physician that he thought he would get well, to which he re- 
 plied he hoped he would. ^* Nor will a person be deemed to have 
 acted in expectation of impending death, where, after he was injured 
 and after the assault was apparently abandoned, he made strenuous 
 and prolonged exertion to place himself beyond the reach of further 
 harm from the same source.^® So, where the circumstances were 
 such as to raise a doubt as to whether a declaration was made under 
 a belief in impending death, threats upon the part of the declarant 
 to get even with the person charged with his injury are sufficient to 
 warrant its rejection. -"^ And when the mind of the declarant was 
 busy at the time with the idea of prosecuting his assailant, proof of 
 abandonment of hope is not convincing unless it is in the form of 
 a specific admission by the declarant;^'' though the rule would be 
 different if, a short time thereafter, he stated that the injury was 
 mortal, and continued to so state up to the time of his death ;^® or 
 if the statements offered as dying declarations were made without 
 any knowledge or expectation upon the part of the declarant that they 
 would or could be used in a criminal prosecution against the ac- 
 cused. * ® 
 
 638. Physicians' opinions — The advice of a physician and his state- 
 ment as to the cause which brings about a person's death, by which 
 such person is brought to believe that he is about to die, are admis- 
 sible in evidence in a prosecution for homicide as a foundation for 
 the admission of dying declarations, as well as anything else which 
 induces such a belief in the declarant.-' And that the declarant's 
 physician had told him that he could not recover, and would soon 
 die, and had declared his belief in his approaching death, is admis- 
 sible;^ the ground of admission being that the opinion of the physi- 
 cian, thus expressed, contributed to confirm the belief of the de- 
 ceased in his approaching end, or his impending dissolution. * And, 
 as a general rule, evidence that physicians had told the deceased 
 about the time he made the statement offered as a dying declaration, 
 
 iiUnited States v. Woods, 4 Cranch, 18 State v. Pearce, 56 Minn. 226, 57 N. 
 
 C. C. 484, Fed. Cas. No. 16,760. W. 652, 1065. 
 
 iBDunn V. State, 2 Ark. 229, 35 Am. iState v. Yee Wee, 7 Idaho, 188, 61 
 
 Dec. 54. Pac. 588. 
 
 isYoung V. Sta;te, 95 Ala. 4, 10 So. 2State v. Leeper, 70 Iowa, 748, 30 N. 
 
 913- Irby v. State, 25 Tex. App. 203, 7 W. 501 ; Hagenow v. People, 188 111. 545, 
 
 g yf 705 59 N. E. 242; People v. Lonsdale, 122 
 
 ' "State V. Daniels, 115 La. 59, 38 So. Mich. 388, 81 N. W. 277. 
 g94_ 3 State v. Somnier, 33 La. Ann. 237. 
 
 isPolk V. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 495, 34 S. W. 633. 
 Horn.— 64 
 
lOlO HOMICrOB. [§ 63» 
 
 that they thought his injuries were mortal, or that he would never 
 recover, is sufficient to warrant the admission of his dying declara- 
 tions upon the ground that he knew that death was impending. * And 
 the rule is applied with special force where it appears not only that 
 the physician informed the patient of his approaching death, but 
 also that the patient acquiesced therein and expressed an expecta- 
 tion of death f or where it appears that the declarant was in a state 
 of collapse, or so near death that his condition could not have been 
 unknown to him.*" Nor will an inquiry as to the efficacy of his will 
 in the event of his recovery render his dying declarations inadmis- 
 sible, where the above circumstances concur.^ Nor, in such case, 
 does the fact that he hoped and expected to live a short time, long 
 enough to see his family, affect the admissibility of the declaration. * 
 
 4State V. Finley, 118 N. C. 1161, 24 Brotherton v. People, 75 N. Y. 159, Af- 
 
 S. E. 495; Oliver v. State, 17, Ala. 587; firming 14 Hun, 486; State v. Black- 
 
 Jarvis v. State, 138 Ala. 17, 34 So. 1025; burn, 80 N. C. 474; State v. Boggan. 
 
 People V. Hawea, 98 Cal. 648, 33 Pac. 133 N. C. 761, 46 S. E. Ill; Allison v. 
 
 791; Boyd v. State, 84 Miss. 414, 36 So. Com. 99 Pa. 17; Com. v. Rhoads, 23 Pa. 
 
 625; State v. Gay, 18 Mont. 51, 44 Pac. Super. Ct. 512; State v. McEvoy, 9 S. 
 
 41 1 ; State V. Gray, 43 Or. 446, 74 Pac. C. N. S. 208 ; Lemons v. State, 97 Tenn. 
 
 927; Burrell v. State, 18 Tex. 713; 560, 37 S. W. 552; Jones v. States (Tex. 
 
 Smith's Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 81 ; Reg. V. Grim. App.) 38 S. W. 992; Sims v. 
 
 Perldns, 9 Oar. & P. 395. State, 36 Tex. Crim. Rep. 154, 36 S. W. 
 
 But that a person who had been shot 256; Pierson v. State, 21 Tex. App. 14, 
 
 ■H'as greatly prostrated by the shook and 17 S. W. 468; Bull v. Com. 14 Gratt. 
 
 suiTered much, and that his attending 613; O'Boyle v. Com. 100 Va. 785, 40 
 
 physician was satisfied upon his exami- S. E. 121 ; State v. Baldwin, 15 Wash, 
 
 nation that he would die, will not justify 15, 45 Pac. 650; Reg. v. Smith, 23 U. C. 
 
 the admission in evidence of eonversa- C. P. 312; Reg. v. Clarke, 2 Post. & F. 
 
 tions had with him shortly after the 2; Ashton's Case, 2 Lewin. C. C 147. 
 
 shooting, as dying declarations, when he And see Oliver v. State, 17 Ala. 587; 
 
 had become fairly free from pain and DuBose v. State, 120 Ala. 300, 25 So. 
 
 was not suffering so much, and gave no 185; People v. Crews, 102 Cal. 174, 36 
 
 opinion as to the result of his wound, Pac. 367; State v. Weaver, 57 Iowa, 730, 
 
 whether he thought he would die or get 11 N. W. 675; State v. Morrison, 
 
 well. Blackburn v. State, 98 Ala. 63, supra; Doolin v. Com. 16 Ky. L. Repi 
 
 13 So. 274. 189, 27 S. W. 1; Stephens v. Com. 20 
 
 s.Tohnson v. State, 47 Ala. 9 ; Stevens Ky. L. Rep. 544, 47 S. W. 229 ; State 
 
 V. State, 138 Ala. 71, 35 So. 122; People v. Smith, 48 La. Ann. 533, 19 So. 452; 
 
 v. Vernon, 35 Cal. 49, 95 Am. Dec. 49; State v. Mills, 91 N. C. 581; Small v. 
 
 People V. Dobbins, 138 Cal. 694, 72 Pac. Com. 91 Pa. 304; Sims v. State, and 
 
 339; People v. Lem Deo, 132 Cal. 199, State v. Baldwin, supra: Queen v. 
 
 67 Pac. 265; Scott v. People, 63 111. 508; Brooks, 1 Cox, C. C. 6; R^. v. Peel, 2 
 
 State V. Murdy, 81 Iowa, 603, 47 N. W. Post. & P. 21 ; Rex v. Mosley, 1 Moody, 
 
 867; State v. Young, 104 Iowa, 730. 74 C. C. 97, 1 Lewin, C. C. 79; Craven's 
 
 N. W. 693 ; State v. Morrison, 64 Kan. Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 77 ; Simpson's Case, 
 
 (i69, 68 Pac. 48 ; Polly v. Com. 15 Ky. L. 1 Lewin, C. C. 78. 
 
 l!ep. 502, 24 S. W. 7; Pennington v. estate v. Johnson, 26 S. C. 152, 1 S. 
 
 Tom. 24 Kv. L. Rep. 321, 68 S. W. 451; E. 510; Johnson v. State, 47 Ala. 9. 
 Vuqua v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 2204, 73 'Allison v. Com. 99 Pa. 17. 
 S. W. 782; State v. Draper, 65 Mo. 335, sState v. Aldrich, 50 Kan. 6GG, 32 
 
 27 Am. Rep. 287; State v. Umble, 115 Pac. 408: Starr v. Com. 97 Ky. 193, 3a 
 
 Mo. 452, 22 S. W. 378; People v. Burt, S. W. 397. 
 51 App. Div. 106, 64 N. Y. Supp. 417; 
 
§ 638] EVIDENCE. 1011 
 
 ISTor does a statement by him that he could not afford to die;® and in 
 such case his declaration -will he admitted in evidence, though he de- 
 nied that he thought he was going to die at the time he made it, ^ " 
 and though he lived for some time after making it. ^ ^ 
 
 The law does not require, however, that the belief of the de- 
 ceased in impending death, in order to render his statements admis- 
 sible as a dying declaration, should be founded upon the expert testi- 
 mony of a physician. -^ ^ And though a physician has advised the 
 declarant of his approaching death, if he refuses to accept such ad- 
 vice and retains the opinion that he will recover, his declaration is 
 inadmissible.^* And such retention of hope of recovery may be 
 inferred from jesting and cheerful conduct.^* JSTor is a declaration 
 admissible where the physicians of the declarant endeavored to en- 
 courage him and buoy him up, though they believed he would die, 
 where their efforts seemed to have some effect upon him;^° though 
 the rule is different where the declarant absolutely rejected the ad- 
 vice of his physician that he might live, and held to the opinion that 
 his death would inevitably occur. ^ ® And a statement by a doctor to 
 a patient that he had little or no hope of recovery, understood by the 
 patient, does not show such hopeless expectation of immediate death 
 as to render subsequent dying declarations admissible. ^ ^ And the 
 rule is the same where the patient was told that the only chance of 
 his living lay in keeping himself quiet. ^ * And where the deceased 
 asked his surgeon if the wound was necessarily mortal, and on being 
 told that recovery was just possible, and that there had been an in- 
 stance where a person had recovered after such a wound, he said, 
 
 sState V. Craig, 190 Mo. 332, 88 S. to be performed. Peak v. State, 50 N. 
 
 W. 641. J. L- 179, 12 Atl. 701. 
 
 lostate V. Parker, 172 Mo. 191, 72 S. leKirkham v. People, 170 111. 9, 48 N. 
 
 W. 650. E. 465. 
 
 iiBurton v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1162, Where an injured person, before mak- 
 
 70 S. W. 831. ing bis declarations, stated to his phy- 
 
 i2Com. V. Birriolo, 197 Pa. 371, 47 sician that he knew he was going to die, 
 
 Atl. 355. t'l'® f*<'t that the physician told him that 
 
 1 SState V. Moore, 8 Ohio, Dec. 674; he thought he was going to die, but hoped 
 
 Stewart v. State, 2 Lea, 598. he would get well, and that another per- 
 
 KStewart v. State, supra. son told him that the physician had 
 
 l6Wa.lIier v. State, 52 Ala. 192; State hopes for him, does not render his dying 
 
 V Taylor, 56 S. C. 360, 30 S. E. 939. declarations inadmissible in evidence. 
 
 ' A statement by an injured person State v. Caldwell, 115 N. C. 794, 20 S. 
 
 that she did not expect to get well, but E. 523. 
 
 would like to, will not support the ad- i7Eeg. v. Mitchell, 17 Cox, C. C. 503: 
 
 mission in evidence of her dying declara- R — v. Christie, Car. Crim. Law, 232, I 
 
 lions where her physician had told her Lewin, C. C. 78 note. And see State v. 
 
 she might die any moment, but tuere Daniels, 115 La. 59, 38 So. 894. 
 
 was one hope, resting upon an operation is Reg. v. Hay\vard, 6 Car. & P. 157, 
 
1012 HOMICIDE. [§ 638 
 
 "I am satisfied," and after this he made a statement, the statement 
 is inadmissible as a declaration in articulo mortis. ^ " 
 
 So, upon the other hand, if deceased believed he was dying, the 
 admissibility of his declarations is not affected by the fact that his 
 medical attendant had hope.^" The credibility of the testimony of 
 a medical witness as to the condition of a declarant at the time of 
 making a dying declaration is a question for the jury. ^ * 
 
 639. Conclusions of nonexpert witnesses, — ^The question as to the 
 belief of a person whose statements or declarations are sought to be 
 introduced in evidence as dying declarations, that his death was then 
 impending, must be determined from the facts proved, and not from 
 mere opinions of witnesses ; and no weight can be given to the testi- 
 mony of a witness that, in his opinion, an injured person at the time 
 of making a statement of the facts of the case believed he was about 
 to die, without giving any facts upon which such opinion is based.* 
 And an ordinary witness cannot be asked whether, from his knowl- 
 edge of the character of the deceased, and from his conduct on the 
 occasion of the declaration, he thought he was under a religious sense 
 of his responsibility to his Maker, that being a conclusion within the 
 province of the court and jury, and not of the witness.^ Nor can 
 one testify that when a dying man made the declaration, he made 
 statements from which witness inferred that he had some hope of 
 living.* 
 
 The rule, however, that a witness, even though not an expert, who 
 details a conversation between himself and another, may also, in con- 
 nection therewith, state his opinion, belief, or impression as to the 
 state of mind of such person as it seemed or appeared to him at the 
 time of the conversation, applies where such a witness is asked the 
 condition of the mind of a person at the time he made statements 
 to the witness which are sought to be introduced in evidence as his 
 dying declarations.* And the testimony of a witness that a declar- 
 ant was sane and conscious of his approaching death, and expressed 
 no hope of recovery, is admissible and sufficient to support a dying 
 declaration.^ And it has been held that the testimony of a witness 
 that a declarant knew, when he made his declaration, that he was 
 
 19R V. Christie, Oar. Crim. Law, N. E. 304; State v. Brunetto, 13 La. 
 
 232, O. B. 1821. Ann. 45; State v. Tilghman, 33 N. C. 
 
 20Rex V. Mosley, 1 Moody, C. C. 97; (11 Ired. L. ) 513. 
 Reg. V. Peel, 2 Fost. & F. 21. And see 2 State v. Brunetto, supra. 
 Reg. V. Eeaney, 40 Eng. L. & Eq. 552, sHamlin v. State, 48 Conn. 92. 
 Dears. & B. C. C. 151, 7 Cox, C. C. 209. ■iPeople v. Sanford, 43 Cal. 29. 
 
 2iState V. Davis, 134 N. C. 633, 46 S. sQarza v. State, 3 Tex. App. 286; 
 E. 722. Lewis v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 89 S. 
 
 iWestbrook v. People, 126 111. 81, 18 W. 1073. 
 
§ 639] EVIDENCE. 1013 
 
 going to die, it appearing that the witness had opportunity to know 
 the condition of his mind, is admissible and a sufficient foundation 
 for the admission of dying declarations ; and that, if a further show- 
 ing of knowledge that the declarant was going to die is required, it 
 is for the defendant to inquire into that point on cross-examination. ^ 
 Declarations made in extremis, the declarant being conscious of his 
 situation, however, are admissible in evidence though the witness 
 who deposed to them was of the opinion that the declarant thought 
 he would recover, where other witnesses had deposed that he was 
 conscious that he could not. '' 
 
 640. Sending for or obtaining priest. — Where dying declarations are 
 offered in evidence, the fact that the declarant had sent for a priest, 
 or had procured one who had administered to him the last rites of 
 the church, consisting of confession, absolution, and extreme unction, 
 may be given in evidence for the purpose of showing that he was 
 conscious of impending death. -^ And the admissibility of such evi- 
 dence is not affected by the fact that it was offered after other suffi- 
 cient evidence had been given, or after the reception of the dying 
 declaration itself.^ The fact that the deceased immediately sent for 
 a priest is an important fact to be considered in connection with 
 others on the question as to whether there existed in his mind a sense 
 of impending death, such as is essential to render his statement as 
 to the cause of his death admissible as a dying declaration.* And 
 evidence that an injured person had asked and obtained religious 
 consolation, absolution, and extreme unction is sufficient to warrant 
 the admission of his statement as a dying declaration.* And this is 
 particularly the case where the wound was of such a nature as to 
 call to the mind of any person a grave apprehension that it might 
 be fatal. ^ So, the rule is also laid down that a statement of the de- 
 ceased is properly admitted as a dying declaration where it is estab- 
 lished that his wound was mortal, and that he had stated that he 
 could not live, and requested that a priest be sent for,® or expressed 
 
 estate v. Johnson, 72 Iowa, 393, 34 293; State v. Cantieny, 34 Minn. 1, 24 
 
 N. W. 177. N. W. 458; Murphy v. People, 37 111. 
 
 'Gibson v. Com. 2 Va. Cas. 111. 447; Com. v. Williams, 2 Ashm. (Pa.) 
 
 iCarver v. United States, 164 U. S. 69; Logan v. State, 9 Humph. 24; King 
 
 694, 41 L. ed. 602, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 228; v. Jlinton, 1 MacNally, Ev. 386. 
 
 State V. Swift, 57 Conn. 496, 18 Atl. 6 State v. Cantieny, supra. 
 
 664. And see Re Orpen, 86 Fed. 760. ePeople v. Lee, 17 Cal. 76 ; State v. 
 
 2State V. Swift, supra. Wilson, 24 Kan. 189, 36 Am. Rep. 257; 
 
 sHammil v. State, 90 Ala. 577, 8 So. State v. O'Brien, 81 Iowa, 88, 46 N. W. 
 
 380. 752; Lister v. State, 1 Tex. App. 739; 
 
 4State V. Nash, 7 Iowa, 347; State v. Cook v. State, 22 Tex. App. 511, 3 S. W. 
 
 Triva.s, 32 La. Ann. 1086, 36 Am. Rep. 749. 
 
!014 HOMICIDE. [§ 610 
 
 a desire to see one.'' And religious expressions are strong evidence, 
 and in many cases conclusive, as to abandonment of hope. ® 
 
 641. Arranging business affairs — Great anxiety to settle one's busi- 
 ness and worldly affairs is cogent evidence of his conviction that he 
 has not long to live, as bearing upon the question of the admissibility 
 in evidence in homicide of dying declarations made by him.^ It is 
 natural that an injured person who feels that his end is drawing 
 near, and who has no hope of recovery, should consider his business 
 and worldly affairs with a view to leaving them in a condition of 
 advantage to those for whom he wishes to provide.^ And the making 
 of a will, accompanied by expressions indicating a desire that it be 
 completed quickly, is evidence in such case of the abandonment of 
 all hope.^ And giving directions as to the division of his property 
 among his relatives is also evidence of a belief of impending dis- 
 solution.* So, the act of a person who had been injured of designat- 
 ing the minister whom he wanted to preach his funeral sermon is 
 also evidence of the belief of impending dissolution ; ® and so is the 
 act of making provision for burial, designating the place and man- 
 ner.* And the act of a person who had been injured, giving in- 
 structions as to his worldly affairs, to be carried out after his death, 
 together with the asking for, and obtaining of, religious consolation, 
 is suiEcient to render his dying declaration admissible;'' and so are 
 provisions or expressions of solicitude for the welfare of near relatives, 
 together with declarations of the expectation of immediate death.^ 
 And the act of a man calling his children to his bedside and bidding 
 them goodby, and telling his wife to care for them as best she could, 
 is sufficient to render his dying declarations admissible.® 
 I Where it is doubtful whether the declarant believed that the hand 
 of death was laid upon him, however, his conduct in failing to make 
 any preparation for death indicates the absence of such belief to some 
 extent. ^ " And though the declarant had made his will in prepara- 
 tion for death, and had expressed his belief that he must soon die, 
 
 vUnited States v. Taylor, 4 Cranoh, C. estate v. Nelson, 101 Mo. 4G4, 14 S. 
 
 C. 338, Fed. Caa. No. 16.436. W. 712. 
 
 8Queen v. Thomas, 1 Cox, C. C. 52. Bibid. 
 
 iRex V. Bonner, 6 Car. & P. 386; Peo- estate v. RusseU, 13 Mont. 164, 32 
 
 pie V. Abbott (Cal.) 4 Pac. 769. And Pac. 854. 
 
 see Re Orpen, 86 Fed. 760. 'State v. Trivas, and State v. Nash, 
 
 2Eex V. Spilsbury, 7 Car. & P. 187. supra. 
 
 sQueen v. Thomas, supra; People v. sTemple v. State, supra; State v. 
 
 Oray, 61 Cal. 164, 44 Am. Rep. 549; Johnson, 70 Mo. 121; Brakefield v. 
 
 State V. Nash, 7 Iowa, 347; State v. State, 1 Sneed, 218. 
 
 Trivas, 32 La. Ann. 1086, 36 Am. Rep. estate v. Spencer, 30 La. Ann. 362. 
 
 293; Curtis v. State, 14 Lea, 502; loPeople v. Fuhrig, 127 Gal 412, 59 
 
 Temple v. State, 15 Tex. App. 304, 49 Pac. G93. 
 Am. Rep. 200. 
 
I 641] EVIDENCE. 1015 
 
 an expression of hope subsequently made by him is sufficient to de- 
 feat his dying declaration as evidence. ^ ^ And a mere expression of 
 concern by the declarant about his children in the event of his death, 
 and a request that, if it take place, a named disposition be made 
 of them, is not enough to render a dying declaration admissible, where 
 the declarant had not been advised that he was going to die, or ex- 
 pressed a belief to that effect. ^^ 
 
 4r. Belief in after-accountability. 
 
 642. Effect and proof of — If a declarant, by reason of a disbelief in 
 a future state of accountability, would have been excluded as a wit- 
 ness while living, his dying declaration should, for the same cause, 
 be rejected by the court when offered in evidence after his death. ^ 
 And upon this theory many of the cases have adopted the general 
 rule that dying declarations are not admissible if the person mak- 
 ing them had no belief in a God, and in a future state of reward and 
 punishment.^ Under this rule a reasonable doubt of a belief in a 
 future state of reward and punishment was sufficient to exclude a dy- 
 ing declaration.* And profane language used by the declarant dur- 
 ing conversation had with him at the time of or after making a dec- 
 laration is competent on the question as to the existence of such be- 
 lief.* And where a declarant, in making his statements in the pres- 
 ence of the accused, was guilty of gross irreverence and blasphemy, 
 and made statements denied by the accused, it is sufficient to war- 
 rant the rejection of his declaration.^ So, that he used profane 
 language and made no preparation for death, and spoke of resumini>; 
 his business and of being married, is also sufficient;® though tho 
 mere fact that he expressed revengeful feelings, and threatened what 
 he would do in case of recovery, does not render a dying declaration 
 inadmissible upon the theory that his contemplation of a future state 
 of reward and punishment must have removed every feeling of re- 
 venge from his mind.'' 
 
 11 Jackson v. Com. 19 Gratt. 656. Affirmed in 26 N. J. L. 601; Brown v. 
 
 izCollins V. People, 194 111. 506, 62 State, 78 Miss. 6.S7, 84 Am. St. Rep. 041, 
 
 N E 902. 29 So. 519; Hartigan v. Territory, 1 
 
 'iStarkey v. People, 17 111. 17; Tracy Wash. Terr. 448. 
 
 V. People, 97 III. 101; State v. Elliott, sTracy v. People, supra. 
 
 45 Iowa, 486. 4 Ibid. 
 
 At common law, persons insensible to sBrown v. State, supra. 
 
 the obligation of an oath from defect ^Digby v. People, 113 111. 123, 55 Am. 
 
 of religious sentiment and belief were Rep. 402. 
 
 incompetent to testify as witnesses. 7Baker v. Com. 106 Ky. 212, 50 S. W. 
 
 State V. Elliott, supia. 54. 
 
 sDonnelly v. State, 26 N. J. L. 463, 
 
1016 HOMICIDE. [§ 642 
 
 The law will presume in the absence of proof to the contrary, 
 liowever, that a dying declaration was made under a serious sense 
 that the declarant would soon be called to account before his Maker 
 for the truth or falsity of his statements.^ And it is a disbelief 
 in the existence of a God, and in a state of future reward and pun- 
 ishment, which will render a dying declaration inadmissible; the 
 mere fact that the declarant was irreligious and believed all the re- 
 ligions of the day to be humbugs is not enough.® And it is proper 
 for a witness to give his opinion, based upon his knowledge of the 
 character of the declarant, and upon her conduct on the occasion of 
 the making of the declaration, whether or not she was under a re- 
 ligious sense of responsibility to her Maker. ^'' 
 
 The rule has been laid down, however, that the fact that the de- 
 ceased was a disbeliever in a future state of reward and punishment 
 may be used to discredit his testimony,^' but that it does not exclude 
 it in jurisdictions where the deceased, if a witness, would have been 
 competent.-'^ And under statutes providing that no person shall 
 he rendered incompetent as a witness in consequence of his opinions 
 on matters of religion, or be questioned in any court of justice touch- 
 ing his religious belief, to affect the weight of his testimony, dying 
 declarations are admissible without reference to the belief or dis- 
 l>elief of the declarant.-'* And under them, inquiry as to religious 
 belief of the declarant is not admissible upon the point of competency 
 of declarations. ^ * But where a dying declaration has been admitted 
 in evidence, it is competent to prove that the declarant was a disbe- 
 1 iever in future reward and punishment, for the purpose of discredit- 
 ing his dying declarations.^^ Though the inquiry is properly con- 
 fined to the opinion or belief, or want of belief, upon the part of the 
 individual; it is not proper to prove the tenets of the prevailing re- 
 ligion in the country from which declarant came. ^'^ Nor is it 
 
 sStarkey v. People, 17 III. 17; Don- loState v. Brunette, 13 La. Ann. 45. 
 nelly v. State, 26 N. J. L. 463, 26 N. J. nGoodall v. State, 1 Or. 333, 80 Am. 
 
 L. 601. And see Lewis v. State, 9 Dec. 396; Nesbit v. State, 43 Ga. 238; 
 
 Sraedea & M. 115. State v. Elliott, 45 Iowa, 486. 
 
 Where a Chinaman who had been at- 12 People v. Sanford, 43 Cal. 29; State 
 
 tending a missionary school was killed v. Elliott, supra. 
 
 l:ecause he had treated the Joss house isState v. Ah Lee; People v. San- 
 
 with disrespect and contempt, it may ford; and State v. Elliott, — supra. 
 he presumed, on an issue as to his dying i^People v. Chin Mook Sow, 51 Cal. 
 
 declarations, that he had been taught 597; State v. Elliott, supra. 
 the doctrine of the Christian religion, isGoodall v. State, 1 Or. 333, 80 Am. 
 
 and that he was a believer in the Chris- Dec. 300; Hill v. State, 64 Miss 431 1 
 
 tian faith. State v. Ah Lee, 8 Or. 214. So. 494. ' ' 
 
 sHartigan v. Territory, 1 Wash. Terr. isPeople v. Chin Mook Sow. suvra. 
 448. '^ 
 
§ 642] EVrOENCE. lOlT 
 
 proper to prove the tenets of the particular church to which the 
 declarant belonged, that there may be repentance at any moment 
 before death. ^'^ 
 
 f. Time when made as affecting admissibility. 
 
 643. General rules. — It is the impression of almost immediate dis- 
 solution, and not the rapid succession of death in point of time, 
 which renders dying declarations admissible in evidence.^ And 
 the length of time which elapses between a dying declaration and the 
 death of the declarant furnishes no rule of admission or rejection 
 of the statement. ^ All that is material is that, when the declaration 
 was made, the declarant believed that he was about to die.* The 
 general rule is that the declarant, to render his declarations ad- 
 missible as dying declarations, must have uttered them under a sense 
 of impending dissolution, with a consciousness of the awful occasion ; 
 and this principle is not affected by the fact that death did not ensue 
 immediately thereafter. * And this has been held to be the case where 
 there was a lapse of several hours between the time of the statement 
 and the declarant's death ;^ and so, in cases of a lapse of several 
 days;** and of several weeks.'' And even the expiration of an in- 
 terval of several months between the making of a declaration and the 
 death of the declarant will not defeat the declaration as evidence.^ 
 
 l7Xorth V. People, 139 111. 81, 28 N. & Eq. 552; Dears. & B. C. C. 151, 7 Cox, 
 
 E. 966. C. C. 209. 
 
 iVaughan v. Com. 86 Ky. 431, 6 S. ^State v. Sadler, 51 La. Ann. 1397, 
 
 W. 153; State v. Reed, 53 Kan. 767, 42 26 So. 390; Reynolds v. State, 68 Ala. 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 322, 37 Pac. 174; State v. 502. 
 
 Daniel, 31 La. Ann. 91 ; State v. Nocton, sState v. Reed, 53 Kao. 767, 42 Am. 
 
 121 Mo. 537. 26 S. W. 551 ; People v. St. Rep. 322, 37 Pae. 174. 
 Chase, 79 Hun, 296, 29 N. Y. Supp. 376; 6 Jones v. State, 71 Ind. 66; State v.^ 
 
 State V. Center. 35 Vt. 378. Jones, 38 La. Ann. 792 ; State v. Daniel, 
 
 2Rakes v. People, 2 Neb. 157; Fitz- 31 La. Ann. 91; Com. v. Haney, 127 
 
 gerald v. State, 11 Neb. 577, 10 N. W. ITass. 455; People v. Weaver, 108 Mich. 
 
 495; North v. People, 139 111. 81, 28 N. 649, 66 N. W. 567; State v. Banister, 35 
 
 E. 966; State v. Nash, 7 Iowa, 347; Bur- S. C. 290, 14 S. E. 678; Rex v. Bonner, 
 
 ton V. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1162, 70 S. 6 Car. & P. 386; Rex v. Mosley, 1 Moody, 
 
 W. 831 ; State v. Nocton, and People v. C. C. 97, 1 Lewin, C. C. 79. 
 Chase, supm; People v. Conklin, 175 N. 'State v. Yee Wee, 7 Idaho, 188, 61 
 
 Y. 333, 67 N. E. 624; State v. Center, Pac. 588; Com. v. Cooper, 5 Allen, 495, 
 
 supra. 81 Am. Dec. 762; Lowry v. State, 12 
 
 sFitzgerald v. State, 11 Neb. 577, 10 Lea. 142; Baxter v. State, 15 Lea, 657; 
 
 N W. 495; State v. Oliver, 2 Houst. Reg. v. Bernadotti, 11 Cox, C. C. 316. 
 (Del.) 585; McDaniel v. State, 8 sState v. Craine, 120 N. C. 601, 27 S. 
 
 Sraedes & M. 401, 47 Am. Dec. 93; Com. E. 72. And see PuUiam v. State, 83 
 
 V Cooper. 5 Allen, 495, 81 Am. Dec. 762; Ala. 1, 6 So. 839; McDaniel v. State, 
 
 State V Poll, 8 N. C. (1 Hawks.) 442, 8 Smedes & M. 401, 47 Am. Dec. 93; 
 
 9 Am. Dee. 655; Rex v. Mosley, 1 State v. Wilson, 121 Mo. 434, 26 S. W. 
 
 RToody. C. C. 97 ; Reg. v. Meg5on, 9 Car. 357 ; Reg. v. Taylor, 3 Cox, C. C. 84. 
 & P. '418; Reg. v. Reaney, 40 Eng. L. 
 
1018 HOMICIDE. [i 643 
 
 To render dying declarations admissible on a trial for murder, 
 however, as to the fact of homicide and the person by whom it 
 was committed, the length of time elapsing between the making of 
 the declarations and the death is one of the elements to be con- 
 sidered.® And in the absence of better testimony it may serve as 
 one of the exponents of the declarant's belief that his dissolution was 
 or was not impending. ^ " And where declarations were made a long 
 time before the death of the deceased, it is competent and proper 
 to ask the witness what the deceased said, as to whether or not he 
 thought he would get well, just before making the declaration.^^ 
 And a statement by the declarant at that time that he would not get 
 well, and that he could not stand it much longer, is not sufficient to 
 warrant the admission of his declaration, where he lived nearly seven 
 months after making it. ^ ^ 
 
 Statements by the declarant at the time of making the decla- 
 ration, however, that he was obliged to die, are sufficient to render 
 his dying declaration admissible as such, where he lived only three 
 or four days thereafter;^* and so is a statement that he could not 
 live.^* And an admonition to the magistrate taking the statement, 
 to be quick or he would die, is sufficient though the declarant lived 
 nearly three weeks afterwards. ^ ® So, it has been held that a state- 
 ment made by a declarant, after declaring to his physician that he 
 was afraid he would never get better, is admissible though made 
 after he had been confined to his bed for weeks, where he died short- 
 ly after making the statement.-'® Nor is there any rule of law 
 which makes the admissibility of a dying declaration depend upon 
 its having been taken immediately after the injury.-'^ 
 
 g. Matters of form and practice. 
 
 644. Preparation or construction of declaration. — The law does not 
 require dying declarations to be reduced to writing before they can 
 
 sMattox V. United States, 146 U. S. though she said she thought at the time 
 140, 36 L. ed. 917, 13 Sup. Ct. Eep. 50. the violence was inflicted that she 
 
 lostate V. Nocton, 121 Mo. 537, 26 S. would then die. State v. Belcher. 13 S. 
 W. 551 ; People v. Chase, 79 Hun, 296, 29 C. 459. 
 N. Y. Supp. 376. iiBoulden v. State, 102 Ala. 78, 15 
 
 Testimony of a physician as to the So. 341. 
 statements of the deceased to him does 12 Starr y. Com. 97 Ky. 193, 30 S. W. 
 not come within the definition of dying 397. 
 
 declarations, where he did not witness isstate v. Banister, 35 S. C. 290, 14 
 the acts complained of, but only related S. E. 678. 
 
 what he was told had taken place, l4Com. v. Haney, 127 Mass. 455. 
 where the deceased was afflicted with a iBReg. v. Bernadotti, 11 Oox, C. C. 
 lingering disease, and her statement was 316. 
 
 made nearly three months before she 1 6 Craven's Case, 1 Lewin, G. C. 77. 
 died, and it did not appear that the i7P(»ple v. Beverly, lOs' Midi. 509, 
 statement was made in extremity, 66 N. W. 379. 
 
§ 644] EVIDENCE. 1019 
 
 be received in evidence, even thougli there was opportunity to do 
 so. ^ And when a declaration is reduced to writing it is not renderfid 
 inadmissible by the fact that, as a whole, it was first made orally 
 to a person, who then reduced it to writing and the declarant signed 
 it.^ Nor is a declaration committed to writing rendered inadmis- 
 sible by the mere fact that it was not signed by the deceased, though 
 he was mentally and physically able to do so ; * though the rule would 
 be different if the writing had not been read over by, or to, or in 
 any way recognized by, him.* And that it was written by the at- 
 tending physician, and the signature of the declarant was subse- 
 quently appended and authenticated by a justice of the peace, does 
 not militate against it.^ Nor are dying declarations rendered inad- 
 missible by the mere fact that they have been sworn to;® or by the 
 fact that they were not made under oath;'' or because some of the 
 statements by themselves, and if standing alone, would not fall with- 
 in the rule admitting dying declarations, since the declaration must 
 go in as a whole. ^ So, the fact that a part of a statement admitted 
 as a dying declaration was in writing and signed by the deceased, 
 while other declarations were established by parol, is not an objec- 
 tion to its admission in evidence;^ though proof of a verbal state- 
 ment made by a declarant at the time he made his dying declarations 
 
 iState V. Gill, 14 S. C. 410; State v. 81 S. W. 923; Foley v. State, 11 Wyo. 
 
 Somnier, 33 La. Ann. 237. 464, 72 Pae. 627. 
 
 2Drake v. State, 25 Tex. App. 293, 7 estate v. Parham, 48 La. Ann. 1309, 
 
 S. W. 868; state v. Carrington, 15 Utah, 20 So. 727. And see State v. Wilm- 
 
 480, 50 Pac. 526. And see Bennett v. busse, 8 Idaho. 608, 70 Pac. 849. 
 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 81 S. W. 30; estate v. Carter, 106 La. 407, 30 So. 
 
 Hendrickson v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 895; State v. Talbert, 41 S. C. 526, 19 
 
 2173, 73 S. W. 764. S. E. 852; Turner v. State, .89 Tenn. 
 
 Nor does putting a written dying 547, 15 S. W. 838. 
 declaration in evidence, as distinguished So, in Zipperian v. People, 33 Colo, 
 from oral testimony of the statements 134, 79 Pac. 1018, it was held that the 
 made by the declarant, make him a wit- act of a justice taking down deelara- 
 ness in the case so as to constitute a tions intended by the person making 
 violation of the constitutional provision them as dying declarations, in treat- 
 that every person on trial, charged with ing the instrument as a criminal com- 
 crirae, shall have the right to be con- plaint, furnishes no reason for disre- 
 fronted with the witnesses against him. garding it as a dying declaration. 
 State v. Kindle, 47 Ohio St. 358, 24 N. 'Reg. v. Bernadotti, 11 Cox, C. C. 316. 
 E. 485. A dying declaration having in effect 
 
 In Rex V. Smith, 65 J. P. 426, how- the sanction of an oath, an added oath 
 
 ever, it was held that answers of a dying by the declarant at the time of making 
 
 woman, taken down by a doctor, to ques- the declaration gives it no additional 
 
 tions put to her by a magistrate are not verity. Turner v. State, supra. 
 
 admissible in evidence. sstate v. Carter, supra. 
 
 sState V. Carrington, 15 Utah, 480, 50 sState v. Schmidt, 73 Iowa, 469, 35 
 
 Pae. 527; Freeman v. State, 112 Ga. 48, N. W. 590. And see Zipperian v. Peo- 
 
 37 S. E. 172. pie, supra. 
 
 «Fuqua V. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. 420, 
 
1020 HOMICIDE. [§ 644 
 
 in writing is inadmissible. ^ ** And there is no rule of law or practice 
 requiring that a dying declaration should be made at one time, with- 
 out interruption or turning aside to other matters. ^ ^ 
 
 Nor is it material whether the declaration of the deceased as to 
 how he was injured was made before or after his statement that he 
 expected to die;'^ and it is immaterial whether the accused was 
 present or absent when the declaration was made. ^ ^ And the fact 
 that a deposition does not show on its face that it is a dying decla- 
 ration does not render it inadmissible in a prosecution for homicide* 
 if it be shown by evidence aliunde that it is one. ^ * Nor is a dying 
 declaration objectionable because it is in narrative form, and does 
 not include the questions asked. ^ ^ And the fact that the deceased, 
 at the time of making the statements received in evidence as dying 
 declarations, was unable to speak intelligibly, and that the sub- 
 stance of the declarations was communicated by signs or in writing, 
 furnishes no objection to its admissibility ; ^ ^ nor does the fact that 
 statements were communicated by signs by one and reduced to writ- 
 ing by another, when afterwards read over and signed by the de- 
 ceased. '^'^ So, the fact that a declaration was elicited by questions 
 asked the deceased by witnesses, instead of being a volunteer state- 
 ment, does not render it inadmissible in evidence as a dying declar- 
 
 lOAdams v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) v. Green, 1 Denio, 614, 1 Park. Crim. 
 
 19 S. W. 907. But see Hendrickson v. Rep. 11. 
 Com. 24 Ky. L. Eep. 2173, 73 S. W. 764. In People v. Beverly, 108 Mich. 509, 
 
 iiState V. Ashworth, 50 La. Ann. 94, 66 N. W. 379, the court said that it 
 
 23 So. 270. could recall no case holding that the 
 
 izPeopIe V. Lee Sare Bo, 72 Cal. 623, admissibility of a dying declaration, as 
 
 14 Pac. 310. such, depends upon notice of the in- 
 
 A writing signed by a person, since tended taking of such statement to the 
 
 deceased, made in articulo mortis and defendant or his counsel, 
 conscious of his condition, when ac- uState v. Wilson, 23 La. Ann. 558. 
 companied by evidence showing that it i estate v. Williams (Nev.) 82 Pao. 
 
 was read over to him, and that he under- 353. 
 
 stood its contents, and that he intended 16 Jones v. State, 71 Ind. 66; Com. v. 
 
 it as his dying declaration, is admissible Casey, 11 Cush. 417, 59 Am. Dec. 150; 
 
 in evidence so far as it relates to the Warren v. State, 9 Tex. App. 619, 35 
 
 cause of his d&a.th and the person who Am. Eep. 745 ; McHugh v. State, 31 Ala. 
 
 killed him. no matter when or by whom 317; State v. Morrison, 64 Kan. 669, 68 
 
 it was prepared, and without reference Pac. 48. 
 
 to the circumstances attending its Where the declarant at the time of 
 
 preparation ; and any question as to making a dying declaration was feeblo 
 
 whether the deceased understood its and unable to articulate the name of the 
 
 contents is for the consideration of the person charged with having injured him, 
 
 jury in determining what weight should it is a proper question for the jury to 
 
 bo attached to it. Perry v. State, 102 determine from all the circumstances 
 
 Ga. 365, 30 S. E. 903. whether ho meant to name the accused. 
 
 isShenkenberger v. State, 154 Ind. State v. Johnson, 72 Iowa, 393, 34 N. 
 
 630, 57 N. E. 519; State v. Brunetto, W. 177. 
 
 13 La. Ann. 45. And see Powers v. iTJones v. State, and State v. Mor- 
 
 State, 74 Miss. 777, 21 So. 657; People rison, supra. 
 
644] 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 1021 
 
 ation.^* And this is true, aside from statutory provision, though 
 the questions asked were leading;-^® and though statements were ob- 
 tained upon pressing and earnest solicitation. ^ " 
 
 It is provided by statute, however, in Texas, at least, that such 
 declarations, to be evidence, must not have been made in answer to 
 interrogatories calculated to lead the deceased to make any par- 
 ticular statement; but the mere fact that statements were made in 
 answer to questions does not take from them their voluntary and 
 spontaneous character within such a provision. ^^ And the ques- 
 tion, "Who shot you ?" is not one calculated to lead the deceased to 
 make a particular statement within this rule;^^ nor is a question as 
 to what the trouble came up about. ^^ And the same rule applies 
 to a question whether the accused was advancing when he shot.^* 
 And a statement made as a dying declaration does not offend against 
 this rule because a part of it was in reply to interrogatories, where 
 such interrogatories were not calculated to lead the deceased to make 
 the particular statement.^® 
 
 The proper course in taking such declarations is to permit the per- 
 son making them to state fully and freely all he desires, leaving 
 it to the trial court to reject such portions of it as will not be com- 
 
 isMcHugh V. state, supra; Anderson 
 V. State, 79 Ala. 5; Ingram v. State, 67 
 Ala. 67; Richard v. State, 42 Fla. 528, 
 29 So. 413; North v. People, 139 111. 81, 
 28 N. E. 966; State v. Morrison, supra; 
 State V. Ashworth, 50 La. Ann. 94, 23 
 So. 270; State v. Trivas, 32 La. Ann. 
 1086, 36 Am. Hep. 293; Com. v. Haney, 
 127 Mass. 455; People v. Callaghan, 4 
 Utah, 49, 6 Pac. 49; Vass v. Com. 3 
 Leigh, 786, 24 Am. Dec. 695; Hex v. 
 Pagent, 7 Car. & P. 238 ; Reg. v. Smith, 
 10 Cox. C. C. 82, 11 Jur. N. S. 695. 
 
 isMaine v. People, 9 Hun, 113; Peo- 
 ple V. Sanchez, 24 Cal. 17; Com. v. 
 Casey, 11 Cush. 417, 59 Am. Dec. 150; 
 Vassv. Com.; Reg. v. Smith; and Rex v. 
 Fagent, — supra. 
 
 So, the fact that the state's attor- 
 ney was present at the time a dying 
 declaration was made, while no one was 
 present to represent the accused, af- 
 fects the weight of the declaration only, 
 and not its competency. North v. Peo- 
 ple, 139 111. 81, 28 N. E. 966. 
 
 aoMaine v. People, 9 Hun, 113. 
 
 In Reg. V. Mitchell, 17 Cox, C. C. 503, 
 however, it was held that a statement 
 giving the substance of questions put 
 to, and answers given by, the deceased 
 is inadmissible in evidence as a dying 
 declaration; and that, if questions are 
 
 put, the questions and answers must 
 both be given in order that it may ap- 
 pear how much was suggested by the 
 examiner, and how much produced by 
 the person making the declaration. 
 
 21 White V. State, 30 Tex. App. 652, 18 
 S. W. 462; Taylor v. State, 38 Tex. 
 Crim. Rep. 552, 43 S. W. 1019. And see 
 Mathews v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 77 
 S. W. 218. 
 
 2 2 White V. State, supra. 
 
 2 3Brande v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 
 45 S. W. 17. 
 
 24Grubb V. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 72, 63 S. W. 314. 
 
 2 5Hunnicutt v. State, 18 Tex. App. 
 498, 51 Am. Rep. 330. 
 
 So, where a witness, who was the at- 
 tending physician of the deceased, testi- 
 fied as to dying declarations made by 
 him, and in his testimony stated that 
 at the time the declaration wus made 
 someone asked the deceased if he could 
 be mistaken about the person who shot 
 him, and he replied that he did not 
 think it possible, the question does not 
 render the declaration inadmissible on 
 the ground that it was one calculated 
 to lead the deceased to make any par- 
 ticular statement. Pierson v. State, 18 
 Tex. App. 524. 
 
1022 HOMICIDE. [§ 644 
 
 petent testimony; the draftsman should not be allowed to decide 
 ■what is, and what is not, competent.^® And when a deposition i* 
 put in evidence, the whole of it is to be read.^^ 
 
 645. Proof of substance and circumstances. — It has been held that 
 dying declarations must, in order to be admissible in evidence, be 
 proved in the actual words of the deceased.* But the prevailing, 
 if not the universal, rule now seems to be that a witness to a dying 
 declaration may state its substance, if he is not able to repeat the 
 language of the declarant,^ the rule governing the admission of the 
 former testimony of a deceased witness, requiring the identical 
 words to be given, not applying;* the credit of the narration and 
 the weight of evidence in such case being a question for the jury.* 
 So, where the exact words are given by the witness, it is for the 
 jury to judge of their import, and he cannot be asked his opinion 
 as to what the declarant meant.' Nor is proof of the condition of 
 mind of the declarant, and of his declarations as to the cause of 
 his death, confined to the same witnesses.® And it is not necessary 
 that each witness testifying to the declaration should also, by his 
 testimony, definitely fix the belief of the person making the decla- 
 ration ; the sense of impending death may be shown by one witness^ 
 and the declaration may be proved by another.'' And the testimony 
 of a witness that the declarant had given up all hope of recovery 
 is admissible to lay a foundation for the admission of declarations 
 made substantially at that time to other witnesses with reference to 
 the commission of the act in question;* though a fact of no im- 
 portance, and which is wholly immaterial when standing alone, can- 
 not be used as a vehicle to introduce a declaration sought to be used 
 
 26Chittenden v. Com. 10 Ky. L. Rep. erts v. State, 5 Tex. App. 141; Ward v. 
 
 330, 9 S. W. 386. State, 8 Blackf. 101 ; Worthlngton v. 
 
 A declaration by deceased, of- State, 92 Md. 222, 56 L.R.A. 353, 84 
 
 fered as his dying declaration, made Am. St. Rep. 506, 48 Atl. 355; Mont- 
 
 when persons on trial were brought gomery v. State, 11 Ohio, 424; Starkey 
 
 into his presence for identification, is v. People, 17 111. 17; Nelms v. State, 13 
 
 not rendered inadmissible because Smedes & M. 500, 53 Am. Dec 94. See 
 
 masks were put on the faces of such § 766. 
 
 persons, so as to leave the same por- sWard v. State, supra. 
 
 tions of their heads and faces open for ^Montgomery v. State, supra. 
 
 examination as were exposed by the rob- BNelms v. State, supra. And see 
 
 bers when the crime was committed, the Castillo v. State (Tex. Grim. App.) 69 
 
 mask being used at the deceased's re- S. W. 517. 
 
 quest and without objection from any- sKing v. Com. 2 Va. Cas. 78; Smith's 
 
 one. Com. v. Roddy, 184 Pa. 274, 39 Case, 1 Lewin, C. C. 81. 
 
 Atl. 211. 'People v. Garcia, 63 Cal. 19; King 
 
 27State V. Martin, 30 Wis. 216, 11 v. State, 34 Tex. Grim. Rep. 228. 29 & 
 
 Am. Rep. 567. W. 1086. 
 
 iReg V. Mitchell, 17 Cox, C. C. 503. sstate v. Cronin, 64 Conn. 293. 29 
 
 2Krebs v. State, 8 Tex. App. 1 ; Rob- Atl. 536. 
 
§ 645] EVIDENCE. 1023 
 
 as a dying declaration, but which was incompetent standing alone. ^ 
 And where a dying man makes a statement to one person, and shortly 
 afterwards tells him to repeat it to another, his repetition of it is 
 equivalent to a repetition by the dying man himself, and it may be 
 proved by testimony of the man to whom it was repeated. ^ " Nor is 
 a dying declaration rendered inadmissible by the fact that state- 
 ments of the declarant were interpreted to a justice of the peace, 
 who took it from the interpreter and identified it as the declaration 
 thus made, and testified to the sanity and consciousness of ap- 
 proaching death of the declarant.-'* And that a statement made 
 by a dying person took the form of a message to his wife, instead 
 of that of a statement for the information of the witness, and made 
 directly to him, renders it none the less admissible as a dying dec- 
 laration. * * 
 
 So, in criminal prosecutions the people are not restricted to proof 
 of a single dying declaration; but such declarations, if otherwise 
 admissible, may be proved as made from time to time. * * And where 
 declarations in extremis are made at different times, and covering 
 different grounds, and referring to different matters, all may be 
 admitted in evidence.** And where several declarations are made, 
 the state may offer any one or all of the complete statements and is 
 not confined to any one of them; nor is it necessary to offer all of 
 the separate and distinct statements made at different times, in order 
 to render other distinct statements made at other times admissible. * ^ 
 
 646. Effect of incompleteness. — When dying declarations offered in 
 evidence are incomplete by reason of death intervening, or tem- 
 porary inability suspending their utterance, which is never renewed, 
 or by reason of interruption, where there is a failure to afterwards 
 complete them, they should not be received as evidence, and, if re- 
 ceived, cannot constitute a sufficient basis for a verdict. * And a dy- 
 ing declaration cannot be given in evidence where it appears that 
 more was said upon the principal subject, which could not be under- 
 
 s State V. Wood, 53 N. H. 484. i State v. Nettlebush, 20 Iowa, 257; 
 
 lOReg V.' Steele, 12 Cox, C. C. 168. State v. Johnson, 118 Mo. 491, 40 Am. 
 
 11 Garza v. State, 3 Tex. App. 286. St. Hep. 405, 24 S. W. 229; Vass v. Com. 
 
 l2Daughdrill v. State, 113 Ala. 7, 21 3 Leigh, 786, 24 Am. Det 695. 
 
 So 378. ^^^ ^'^^ ^^'^^ that a witness who testi- 
 
 isDunn v. People, 172 111. 582, 50 N. fied aa to dying declarations of the de- 
 
 j> j3y_ ceased had lost the paper containing 
 
 Instate V. Tweedy, 11 Iowa, 350; them does not bear upon the question 
 
 State V. Walton, 92 Iowa, 455, 61 N. as to their completeness, though it may 
 W. 179; lane v. State, 151 Ind. 511, 51 have some bearing as to the weight 
 
 N ' E 1056. which ought to be accorded to the evi- 
 
 'i5Morrison v. State, 42 Fla. 149, 28 dence, as depending upon the accuracy 
 
 g_ 07 of the recollection of the witness, and 
 
1024 HOMICIDE. [§ 646 
 
 stood. ^ Nor can dying declarations be given in evidence as such, 
 where they were designed by the dying man to be connected with, 
 and qualified by, other statements, forming with them an entire 
 and complete narrative, where such qualifying statements were never 
 made or completed.^ And the same rule applies where the decla- 
 rations of the deceased appeared to be a partial and incomplete nar- 
 ration of the facts, not embracing all that was said, prepared after 
 consultation between persons having it in charge, who designedly 
 omitted statements material to the issue.* And where a dying dec- 
 laration was afterwards stated by the declarant to be substantially 
 correct, but that there was some immaterial alteration he would 
 like to make in it, which alteration never was made, it should be 
 rejected, since his statement that the alteration was immaterial is 
 nothing but a conclusion.^ ISTor is a dying declaration sufficient 
 which does not state who did the injury ; and this is so, though the 
 declarant had stated it at the time of the injury, but failed to re- 
 peat it as a part of the dying declaration.® 
 
 It is not necessary, however, in order to make dying declarations 
 admissible, that the declarant should state bl^erything constituting 
 the res gestce of the subject of the statement; it is only necessary 
 that his statement of any given fact should give full expression to 
 all that he intended to say, conveying his meaning as to such facts.'' 
 It is not a subject of objection that the declarant did not give a 
 complete narrative of all that occurred, or might be legitimately 
 supposed to have occurred.* And where the declarant was asked 
 who shot or stabbed him, his reply is a complete declaration, and 
 cannot be rejected because, from weakness and exhaustion, he was 
 
 his correctness in repeating from mem- tions, but on the contrary used and re- 
 
 ory what deceased said to him. State f erred to them as evidence. State v. 
 
 V. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308, 12 Am. Rep. Giroux, 26 La. Ann. 582. 
 
 200. iBrown v. State, 32 Miss. 433. 
 
 2State V. Center, 35 Vt. 378. And see sDrake v. State, supra. 
 
 State V. Mace, 118 N. C. 1244, 24 S. E. estate v. Johnson, 118 Mo. 491, 40 
 
 798. Am. St. Rep. 405, 24 S. W. 229. 
 
 3Vass V. Com. supra; Drake v. State, 'State v. Patterson 45 Vt. 308, 12 
 
 25 Tex. App. 293, 7 S. W. 868. Am. Rep. 200. 
 
 But a refusal to charge in regard to » State v. Nettlebush, 20 Iowa, 257. 
 the dying declarations of the deceased, And where a witness, being asked by 
 that the statement must be complete the prisoner's counsel why she put a 
 in itself, and that if the declarations aj)- particular question to the deceased just 
 pear to have been intended by the dying before his death, answered that she did 
 man to be connected with, and qualified so in consequence of something the 
 by, other statements, which he was pre- prisoner had told her some two hours 
 vented through any cause from making, before, this will not authorize the 
 they should not be received, is correct prisoner to give in evidence his oonver- 
 where such refusal is based on the pation with the witness at the time re- 
 ground that defendant's counsel did not ferred to. McLean v. State, 16 Ala. 672- 
 object to the admission of such declara- 
 
5 646] EVIDENCE. 1025 
 
 unable to answer another question afterwards propounded. * Nor 
 is a proper dying declaration as to how the diiEculty which resulted 
 in the death of the declarant commenced incompetent for incom- 
 pleteness, where the narrative was continued, from the place the 
 deceased left off, by other witnesses on the trial, showing the cul- 
 mination of the affair.'" And the testimony of a witness who re^ 
 lates all that passed between the deceased and himself with reference 
 to the subject in question is not rendered inadmissible by his fail- 
 ure to hear or remember conversations which may have taken place 
 at the time between the deceased and other persons. ^ ^ So, a dying 
 declaration is not rendered inadmissible by the fact that the accused 
 was not named, where he was present and it took the form of an 
 accusation against him ; * ^ or by the fact that the name of the ac- 
 cused was suggested by a third person and assented to by the declar- 
 ant.'^ And the dying declarations of a woman, whose death was 
 caused by an abortion, that it was committed by "Doctor (specifying 
 his surname)," are not inadmissible as not identifying him, since the 
 question of identification in such case is for the jury.'* 
 
 647. Application of rules as to best and secondary evidence.^ — The 
 general rule is that, where dying declarations of a person have been 
 reduced to writing, parol proof thereof will not be admitted in evi- 
 dence without accounting for the nonproduction of the writing;' 
 nor will a copy of the paper be received in evidence.^ The ru]^ 
 that the best evidence the case admits of must be produced, if witur 
 in the power of the party, applies in such case.^ And when dying 
 declarations are reduced to writing at the time they are made, every 
 reasonable effort which might have resulted in the production of 
 the writing must be shown to have been made without avail, before 
 
 sibid.; Vass v. Com. 3 Leigh, 786, 24 E. 798. And see Powers v. State, 74 
 
 Am. Deo. 695. Miss. 777, 21 So. 657. 
 
 lOBrande v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) isWorthington v. State, 92 Md. 222, 
 
 45 S. W. 17. 56 L.II.A. 353, 84 Am. St. Rep. 506, 48 
 
 So, where two witnesses testify to Atl. 355. 
 
 dying declarations made in their pres- i^Ibid. 
 
 enoe, being together at the time, and i Collier v. State, 20 Ark. 36; State v. 
 
 their testimony agrees in the essenuals Fraunburg, 40 Iowa, 555, 20 Am. Kep. 
 
 of the commission of an unprovoked 583; State v. Tweedy, 11 Iowa, 350; 
 
 homicide, the fact that they vary some- Krebs v. State, 8 Tex. App. 1 ; Drake 
 
 what as to the attendant circumstances, v. State, 25 Tex. App. 297, 7 S. W. 868. 
 
 one being more explicit than the other, 2Rex v. Gay, 7 Car. & P. 230; Collier 
 
 does not entitle the accused to an in- v. State, supra; Bmns v. State, 46 Ind. 
 
 struetion for the rejection of the testi- 311; Beets v. State, Meigs, 106. 
 
 mony of both, on the ground that it is SHines v. Com. 90 Ky. 64, 13 S. W. 
 
 contradictory or untrue. Leigh v. Peo- 445; Freeman v. State, 112 Ga. 48, 37 S. 
 
 X 113 111 372 E. 172; Dunn v. People, 172 111. 582, 50 
 
 iiState V As'hworth, 50 La. Ann. 94, N. E. 137: King v. State, 91 Tenn. 617, 
 
 23 So. 270. 20S. W. 169. 
 
 izstate V. Maoe, 118 N. C. 1244, 24 S. 
 Hom.— 65 
 
1026 HOMICIDE. [§ 647 
 
 secondary evidence of such declarations can be received.* Within 
 these rules, where a declaration was reduced to writing by a witness 
 immediately after it was made, and then signed by the declarant, 
 the writing cannot be ignored, and the testimony of a witness applied 
 to the narrative of the declarant as related immediately before it 
 was reduced to writing. ® And there is no error in admitting a writ- 
 ing purporting to be a statement of a deceased person as a dying 
 declaration, because it was not signed by the deceased.^ 
 
 But while, as a general rule, where a dying declaration consists 
 of a single declaration reduced to writing, it must be produced or its 
 absence accounted for, this rule has been somewhat relaxed where the 
 declaration has been repeated at different times, at one of which it 
 was made under oath and informally reduced to writing by a wit- 
 ness, in which case oral evidence will be received of it, if it was an 
 independent declaration. '^ And where a deposition is incompetent 
 for want of a required notice, or otherwise, the facts in it may be 
 proved by a witness as the dying declarations of the deceased.* 
 And where the accused for any reason procures the rejection of a 
 writing offered as a dying declaration, it does not lie in his mouth 
 to object to oral testimony detailing what the deceased then said, 
 where it is shown that the statement was made under the conditions 
 necessary to render it admissible as such.® So, oral testimony may 
 be given to corroborate or elaborate what is contained in the writ- 
 ing.^" And it is also proper to allow evidence as to circumstances 
 
 <Boulden v. State, 102 Ala. 78, 15 So. And in such case a witness testifying 
 341. to statements made by the deceased at 
 
 The testimony of a -witness who had the time of taking the deposition, and 
 the custody of a, writing containing offered and received as his dying decla- 
 dying declarations, that he turned it ration, may read over the deposition 
 over to the grand jury and had not seen taken in his presence for the purpose of 
 it since, and that he failed to find it refreshing his memory with reference 
 among his own papers after diligent to the matter. State v. Finley, supra. 
 search, and after diligent search through sHines v. Com. 90 Ky. 64, 13 S. W. 
 the papers of the grand jury, furnishes 445; O'Boyle v. Com. 100 Va. 785, 40 
 an insufficient predicate to authorize the S. E. 121 ; State v. Viaux, 8 La. Ann. 
 admission of oral evidence of dying dec- 514. 
 larations. Ibid. So, oral evidence of a, dying declara- 
 
 sDrake v. State, 25 Tex. App. 293, 7 tion is not subject to objection on ap- 
 S. W. 868; Turner v. State, 89 Tenn. peal on the ground that the declaration 
 547, 15 S. W. 838. had been taken in writing, wbere the 
 
 sRex V. Reason, 1 Strange, 499, 16 bill of exceptions does not show whether 
 Hnw. St. Tr. 1; Freeman v. State, 112 the written declaration was admitted 
 Ga. 48, 37 S. E. 172. And see Beets in evidence, or what it contained. Long 
 V. State, Meigs, 106. v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 88 S. W. 
 
 ^Epperson v. State, 5 Lea, 291. 203. 
 
 sState v. Finley, 118 N. C. 1161, 24 lOBailey v. Com. 2 Ky. L. Rep. 436; 
 S. B. 495. And see Foley v. State, 11 State v. Parker, 96 Mo. 382, 9 S. W. 728; 
 Wyo. 464, 72 Pac. 627; King v. Calla- Queen v. Sparham, 25 U. C. C. P. 143. 
 ghan, 1 MacNally, Ev. 385; King v. 
 Woodcock, 1 Leach, C. L. 500. 
 
§ 647] EVIDENCE. 1027 
 
 under which dying declarations were made, in addition to admitting 
 the document itself. ^ ^ And other declarations made at different 
 times, which were not reduced to writing, may be proved by parol. * ^ 
 And the rule has been asserted that the fact that dying declarations 
 have been committed to writing does not exclude paxol evidence as 
 to such declarations, where they had never been read over to, or signed 
 by, the deceased. ^ ^ So, the fact that dying declarations have been re- 
 duced to writing does not preclude evidence of oral dying decla- 
 rations made at other times. ^ * And when a deposition is lost, parol 
 evidence of its contents can, of course, be given. ^ ® 
 
 The rule has been asserted, however, that since the declarations 
 of a deceased person were verbal the fact that a witness wrote them 
 down at the time gives the writing no higher dignity than a state- 
 ment thereof would have, and that their sole use, therefore, would be 
 to refresh the witness's memory; and that it does not add to their 
 value that the deceased was sworn when he made the statement. ^ " 
 And under this rule the fact that a written memorandum of a state- 
 ment verified by the deceased was read in evidence as his dying 
 declaration furnishes no objection to the introduction of independent 
 oral evidence of the same or similar dying declarations.*^ And it 
 is not error, after written dying declarations have been admitted in 
 evidence, to permit the proof of verbal declarations of the deceased, 
 similar to and confirmatory of, his written declarations. * * 
 
 "People V. Knapp, 26 Mich. 112. 142, 50 N. W. 572. And see Long v. 
 
 And where a dying declaration is ad- State (Tex. Crim. App.) 88 S. W. 203. 
 
 mitted in evidence a statement by the i^Dunn v. People, 172 111. 582, 50 N. 
 
 declarant that she was mortally wound- E. 137. 
 
 ed and about to die is admissible to isState v. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308, 12 
 
 show the surrounding circumstances. Am. Rep. 200. 
 
 to enable the jury to determine what The fact that a witness by whom dy- 
 
 credit should be given to her declara- ing declarations are sought to be proved 
 
 tions. Green v. State, 154 Ind. 655, 57 reduced the declarations to writing at 
 
 N. E. 637. the time they were made, but had lost 
 
 laOoUier v. State, 20 Ark. 36; Peo- the memorandum, does not bear upon 
 
 pie V. Glenn, 10 Gal. 32; Lane v. State, the question of their admissibility, but 
 
 151 Ind. 511. 51 N. E. 1056; State v. goes only to the reliability of the recol- 
 
 Walton, 92 towa, 455, 61 N. W. 179; lection of the witness. Ibid. 
 
 State V. Tweedy, 11 Iowa, 350; Epper- leState v. Whitson, 111 N. C. 695, 16 
 
 son V. State, 5 Lea, 291 ; Herd v. State, S. E. 332. And see State v. Wilson, 24 
 
 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 575, 67 S. W. 495; Kan. 189, 36 Am. Rep. 257. 
 
 Krebs v. State, 8 Tex. App. 1; Rex v. i 'People v. Vernon, 35 Cal. 49, 95 Am. 
 
 Reason, 1 Strange, 500. Dee. 49. And see Kelly v. State, 52 
 
 isAllison V. Cora. 99 Pa. 17; Sims v. Ala. 361; Fuqua v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 State, 139 Ala. 74, 101 Am. St. Rep. 2204, 73 S. W. 782. 
 
 17, 36 So. 138; Jarvis v. State, 138 Ala. isPeople v. Glenn, 10 Cal. 32; State 
 
 17, 34 So. 10?5; State v. Fraunburg, 40 v. Hendricks, 172 Mo. 654, 73 S. W. 194. 
 Iowa, 655; State v. Sullivan. 51 Iowa, 
 
1028 HOMICIDE. [§ 648 
 
 h. Determination as to competency and weight. 
 
 648. Competehcy usually a question of law. — ^Wliat constitutes a 
 dying declaration is a question of law. ^ And whether the circum- 
 stances under which statements of a deceased person, offered as his 
 dying declarations, were made are such as to form a sufficient founda- 
 tion for their reception in evidence is usually a question for the trial 
 judge to determine.^ And where the admissibility of dying dec- 
 larations is brought in question, it is the duty of the court to deter- 
 mine, as a preliminary issue, whether the alleged declaration was 
 made by the deceased in view of speedy death;* and whether his 
 mental condition was such that he knew what he was saying.* In 
 such case the preliminary proof to show the admissibility of dying 
 declarations, and of the circumstances under which they were made, 
 are to be made to the judge, whose exclusive province is to deter- 
 mine as to their admissibility, in the same manner as the preliminary 
 proof of documents, and the competency of the witnesses is 
 always addressed to the court.^ And the extent of such preliminary 
 examination is a matter within the judicial discretion of the court, 
 and reviewable only where such discretion has been abused. ** Nor 
 is it improper to stop to enable the court to hear testimony in be- 
 half of the accused against the admissibility of the declaration, as 
 well as that on behalf of the people in favor of it.''^ And it is dis-' 
 
 iDonnellv v. State, 26 N. J. L. 463. State, 43 Fla. 552, 30 So. 798; Smith 
 
 2Tbid.; People V. Glenn, sMpra; Dixon v. State, 118 Ga. 61, 44 S. E. 817; 
 
 V. State, 13 Fla. 636; Westbrook v. Peo- Owens v. State, 59 Miss. 547; Bateson 
 
 pie, 126 111. 81, 18 N. E. 304; Starkey v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. Eep. 34, 80 S. 
 
 V. People, 17 111. 17; State v. Kuhn, 117 W. 88. 
 
 Iowa, 216, 90 N. W. 733; Wyatt v. Com. ^Sima v. State, supra. 
 
 8 Ky. L. Rep. 5.5, 1 S. W. 196 ; Lambeth BLambeth v. State, 23 Miss. 322; 
 
 V. State, 23' Miss. 322; McDaniel v. Owens v. State, supra; Lester v. State, 
 
 State. 8 Smedes & M. 401, 47 Am. Dee. 37 Fla. 382, 20 So. 232 ; People v. Smith, 
 
 03; Maine v. People, 9 Hun, 113, 43 N. 104 N. Y. 491, 58 Am. Rep. 537, 10 N. E. 
 
 E. 80; State v. Williams, 68 N. C. 62; 873; Rex v. Van Butchell, supra. 
 
 State V. Poll, 8 N. C. (1 Hawks) 442, 9 eKlehn v. Territory, supra; Martin 
 
 Am. Dec. 655; Com. v. Murray, 2 Ashm. v. Com. 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1928, 78 S. W. 
 
 (Pa.) 41; Hill V. Com. 2 Gratt. 594; 1104. But see Martin v. State, 17 Ohio, 
 
 State V. Cameron, 2 Chand. (Wis.) 172, C. C. 406. 
 
 2 Pinney (Wis.) 490; Rex v. Hucks, 1 The question of the propriety of ad- 
 Starkie, 523 ; 1 Leach, C. L. 503 ; 1 mitting dying declarations in a proseeu- 
 Leach, C. L. 504; Rex v. Van Butchell, tion for homicide cannot be reviewed in 
 
 3 Car. & P. 629: Reg. v. Reaney, 40 the absence of a, bill of exceptions. 
 Eng. L. & Eq. 552; Dears. & B. C. C. Mathews v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) 77 
 151, 7 Cox. C. C. 209; Queen v. Jen- S. W. 218. 
 
 kins, L. R. 1 C. C. 187; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 7 State v. Cornish, 5 Harr. (Del.) 
 
 leO. Contra, Campbell v. State, 11 Ga. 502. 
 
 354. But where, in a prosecution for 
 
 sKlehn v. Territory, 1 Wash. 584, 21 homicide, the court admitted as dying 
 
 Pac. 31 ; Sims v. State, 139 Ala. 74, 101 declarations statements of the deceased 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 17, 36 So. 138; Tarver v. after he was shot, but subsequently 
 
 State, 137 Ala. 29, 34 So. 627; Green v. withdrew them, and refused to allo-w 
 
648] 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 1029 
 
 cretionary with the court whether or not the preliminary inquiry 
 shall be conducted in the presence of the jnry.* 
 
 So, the question as to whether the deceased was in articulo mortis 
 and was fully conscious of that fact at the time the statements were 
 made which are sought to be introduced as dying declarations is 
 one for the judge, and not the jury, to determine.® And the same 
 rule applies to the question whether a declaration was one of fact, 
 and therefore admissible, or one of opinion, and therefore inadmis- 
 sible. ^"^ And the question whether a statement is a dying decla- 
 ration being one of law it is a proper subject for review upon writ of 
 error or appeal. ^ ^ And if a judge permits declarations of a deceased 
 person to go before the jury as dying declarations, and the proof 
 does. not show satisfactorily that they were such, it is a ground for 
 reversal, whether objected to or not.^^ It is not enough that the 
 evidence tends that way, and the court may not admit them in such 
 case and leave it to the jury to say whether or not they will regard 
 them; it must be satisfied by proof, in the first instance, that they 
 are such as to justify their introduction as evidence. ^^ But the 
 
 the defense to prove that he made other 
 statements contradictory to those which 
 had been admitted and withdrawn, but 
 which other statements were neither res 
 gestw nor dying declarations, it is not 
 clear that the declarations were not 
 legal evidence against the accused, and 
 if they were, their withdrawal was in 
 his favor, and if they were not, their 
 adnriission and subsequent withdrawal 
 did not entitle him to introduce the con- 
 tradictory statements, otherwise inad- 
 missible. Sutton V. State, 2 Tex. App. 
 342. 
 
 8 State V. Shaffer, 23 Or. 555, 32 Pac. 
 645 ; Doles v. State, 97 Ind. 555 ; People 
 V. Smith, supra. And see Austin v. 
 Com. 19 Ky. L. Rep. 474, 40 S. W. 905; 
 North v. People, 139 111. 81, 28 N. E. 
 966. 
 
 sjustice V. State, 99 Ala. 180, 13 So. 
 658; Moore v. State, 12 Ala. 764, 46 Am. 
 Dec. 276; Faire v. State, 58 Ala. 74; 
 Roten V. State, 31 Fla. 514, 12 So. 910; 
 Richard v. State, 42 Fla. 528, 29 So. 
 413; Starkey v. People, 17 111. 17; West- 
 brook V. People, 126 111. 81, 18 N. E. 
 304: State v. Baldwin, 79 Iowa, 714, 
 45 N. W. 297; State v. Kuhn, 117 Iowa, 
 216, 90 N. W. 733; State v. Trivas, 32 
 La. Ann. 1086, 36 Am. Rep. 293; State 
 V. Molisse, 36 La. Ann. 920; State v. 
 Cantienv, 34 Minn. 1, 24 N. W. 458; 
 Lipscomb v. State, 75 Miss. 559, 33 So. 
 210, 230; State v. Simon, 50 Mo. 370; 
 
 State V. Johnson, 76 Mo. 121; State v. 
 Johnson, 118 Mo. 491, 40 Am. St. Rep. 
 405, 24 S. W. 229; State v. Reed, 137 Mo. 
 125, 38 S. W. 574; State v. Sexton, 147 
 Mo. 89, 48 S. W. 452; Basye v. State, 45 
 Neb. 261, 63 N. W. 811; Maine v. Peo- 
 ple, 9 Hun, 113; People v. Anderson, 2 
 Wheeler, C. C. 390; State v. Shaffer, 
 supra; Com. v. Winkelman, 12 Pa. 
 Super. Ct. 497; Kehoe v. Com. 85 Pa. 
 127; Com. v. Sullivan, 13 Phila. 410; 
 State V. Quick, 15 Rich. L. 342; Smith 
 v. State, 9 Humph. 9; State v. Center, 
 35 Vt. 378; Reg. v. Reaney, 7 Cox. C. 
 C. 209, 3 Jur. N. S. 191; Reg. v. Smith, 
 10 Cox, C. C. 82, 11 Jur. N. S. 695; 
 John's Case, 1 East, P. C. 357 ; King v. 
 Woodcock, 1 Leach, C. L. 500. And see 
 Anderson v. State, 122 Ga. 161, 50 S. E. 
 46; Donnelly v. State, 26 N. J. L. 463. 
 
 lOLipseomb v. State, supra. 
 
 iiDonnelly v. State, supra. 
 
 i2Smith V. State, supra. 
 
 13 State V. Center, supra; Starkey v. 
 People, 17 111. 17; Westbrook v. People, 
 126 111. 81, 18 N. E. 304; Com. v. Bir- 
 riolo, 197 Pa. 371, 47 Atl. 355. 
 
 And an instruction in a prosecution 
 for homicide that if the jury believed 
 that the dying declarations of the de- 
 ceased were not made in extremis, and 
 at a time and under circumstances 
 when the deceased was impressed with 
 the conviction of death resulting from 
 the illness with which he was then con- 
 
1030 HOMICIDE. [§ 648 
 
 question whether declarations were made under a sense of impend- 
 ing death being a preliminary question of fact for the trial judge, 
 his finding will not be overturned where there is evidence to sup- 
 port it. ^ * And if deceased was in fact in articulo mortis, and the 
 circumstances were such as to indicate that he must have known 
 that he was so, it is proper to allow his declaration to be proved, and 
 instruct the jury to determine for themselves whether or not the 
 statements made by the deceased were conscious utterances made 
 in the apprehension and immediate prospect of death. * ^ But where 
 the state offers evidence of the dying declarations of the deceased, 
 and the defendant objects to their admissibility and moves to ex- 
 clude them, if the court refuses to decide on the motion until all 
 the evidence in the case is closed, and compels the defendant to pro- 
 ceed with his defense, and then, after the evidence in the case is 
 closed, decides the defendant's motion and excludes a part only of 
 the dying declarations objected to, and the defendant is convicted, 
 the judgment will be reversed.^® 
 
 The rule has been laid down in a number of cases, however, and 
 would seem to be the settJed rule, at least in Georgia and Massachu- 
 setts, that where dying declarations are offered in evidence, their 
 admissibility is primarily a question for the court ; but if the court 
 is not satisfied prima facie that the declarant was in extremis and 
 conscious of his condition, it will allow the declaration to go to 
 the jury, who will look to all the evidence and see for themselves 
 if the person making the declarations was in extremis and conscious 
 of his condition. ^ "^ And under a statute providing that dying dec- 
 larations made by any person in the article of death, who is con- 
 scious of his condition and of the cause of his death, and of the per- 
 
 fined, they should disregard such dec- the court on appeal. State v. Brown, 
 
 larations, although they believe the evi- 111 La,. 696, 35 So. 818. 
 
 dence in respect thereto to be true, is iBYoung v. State, 114 Ga. 849, 40 S. 
 
 properly refused as leaving it to the E. 1000. 
 
 jury to pass upon the admissibility of is Johnson v. State, 47 Ala. 9. 
 
 the declaration. State v. Burns, 33 Mo. iTOampbell v. State, 11 Ga. 355; 
 
 483. Jackson v. State, 56 Ga. 235; Dumas 
 
 iiNewberry v. State, 68 Ark. 355, 58 v. State, 62 Ga. 58; Mitchell v. State, 
 S. W. 351; Gipe v. State (Ind.) 1 L.R. 71 Ga. 128; Varnedoe v. State, 75 Ga. 
 A. (N.S.) 419, 75 N. E. 881 ; State v. Ah 181, 58 Am. Rep. 465 ; Bush v. State, 109 
 Lee, 7 Or. 239. And see State v. Ben- Ga. 120, 34 S. E. 298; Smith v. State, 
 nett, 14 La. Ann. 661; State v. Ross, 18 118 Ga. 61, 44 S. E. 817; Cora. v. Brew- 
 La. Ann. 340. er, 164 Mass. 577, 42 N. E. 92. And see 
 
 And the reception in evidence by the State v. Thawley, 4 Harr. (Del.) 562; 
 
 court in a prosecution for homicide of Com. v. Britton,"l Legal Gaz. Rep. 513; 
 
 declarations of the deceased as dying State v. Banister, 35 S. C. 290, 14 S. E. 
 
 declarations vill be assumed to be cor- 678; Com. v. Murray, 2 Ashm. (Pa.) 
 
 rect, where the judge states that his 41; State v. Cameron, 2 Chand. (Wis.) 
 
 ruling was based upon the entire evi- 172, 2 Pinney (Wis.) 490; People v. 
 
 dence, such evidence not being before Wood, 2 Edm. Sel. Cas. 71. 
 
^ 648] EVIDENCE. 1031 
 
 son who killed him, are admissible in evidence in a prosecution for 
 homicide, it is for the jury to determine whether the evidence suffi- 
 ciently shows that the declarant was conscious of his approaching 
 death, and whether death was really approaching, in determining 
 whether or not to disregard the dying declarations. ^ ® Here, as else- 
 where, the court is to determine whether the foundation for dying 
 declarations has been laid; but after admitting the evidence it is 
 for the jury to consider it in connection with the other evidence, and 
 determine whether or not to give it consideration. ^ ^ A prima facie 
 case is all that is necessary to carry declarations made by a deceased 
 person to the jury as dying declarations, it being an issue of fact 
 whether or not they were made in immediate prospect of death.*" 
 And when such declarations are admitted it is not to the prejudice of 
 the accused to instruct the jury that the evidence upon which their 
 admission is based is not for their consideration if they believe the 
 declarations were not made at a time when the declarant was in 
 extremis, or at a time when he had no hope or expectation of living. ^ ^ 
 And such an instruction is not violative of a statute forbidding the 
 judge from expressing or intimating an opinion concerning the 
 evidence.** 
 
 So, it has been held that dying declarations, held to be such by 
 the court on preliminary examination, should not be allowed to go 
 to the jury, as such, unless the prosecution first offers evidence tend- 
 ing to show that they were in fact dying declarations of the deceased 
 person, made by him in articulo mortis and under a sense of speedy 
 and impending death.** And the question on conflicting evidence 
 as to whether or not a declaration was made is always one of fact 
 for the jury. * * 
 
 649. Practice in determining competency. — In passing upon the 
 competency of a dying declaration, the court should make full in- 
 quiry as to the circumstances, and, if necessary, require all evi- 
 dence capable of throwing light upon the subject to be produced.^ 
 
 18 Johnson v. State, 72 Ga. 679. 2 2 Smith v. State, supra. 
 
 i9Whitaker v. State, 79 Ga. 87, 3 S. 2 3Martin v. State, 17 Ohio, C. C. 406. 
 
 E. 403; Walton v. State, 79 Ga. 446, 5 24Ccm. v. Lawson, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
 S E 203; Bryant v. State, 80 Ga. 272, 2187, 80 S. W. 206; State v. Hendricks, 
 
 4 S. E. 853; Bush v. State, 109 Ga. 120, 172 Mo. 654, 73 S. W. 194. 
 
 34 S. E. 298; Smith v. State, 110 Ga. So, in People v. Thomson, 145 Cal. 
 
 255, 34 S. E. 204. 717, 79 Pac. 435, it was held that wheth- 
 
 20Varnedoe v. State, 75 Ga. 181, 58 er declarations admitted in evidence as 
 
 Am. Rep. 465. And see Campbell v. dying declarations are such in fact is a 
 
 State, 11 Ga. 353; Mitchell v. State, 71 question for the jury, and an instruc- 
 
 Ga. 128. tion assuming that they were dying 
 
 a'lWailaee v. State, 90 Ga. 117, 15 S. declarations is erroneous. 
 
 E. 700; Smith v. State, 110 Ga. 255, 34 iBell v. State, 72 Miss. 507, 17 So. 
 
 S. E. 204. 232. 
 
1032 HOMICIDE. [§ 64ft 
 
 And the hearing of proof preliminary to the introduction of death 
 statements by the court in the presence of the jury is largely with- 
 in its discretion.^ Though good practice would require that it 
 be heard in the absence of the jury, yet if no motion to exclude the 
 matter, or request that the jury be sent out, is made, error can- 
 not be predicated on a failure to withhold it from the hearing of 
 the jury.^ JSTor is it reversible error to permit the state to read in 
 evidence a dying declaration after the defense has closed its case, 
 that being a matter resting in the sound discretion of the court.* 
 And it is not essential to the admissibility of a dying declaration 
 that the witness who signed his name as such to the statement of 
 the declaration should be produced, or his absence accounted for.^ 
 And where dying declarations of the deceased were admitted in evi- 
 dence in rebuttal, without objection, error cannot be claimed by 
 the accused upon appeal for failure of the prosecution to offer such 
 evidence in chief. ® So, the rule that in a second or subsequent trial 
 of a criminal charge it is competent for the prosecution to put in 
 evidence the testimony given at a previous trial by a witness who has 
 since died, and that such testimony may be proved by a person who- 
 heard it given, applies as well to dying declarations made by the 
 person killed as to other facts testified to by a deceased witness. '^ 
 And a statement of a deceased person, offered as his dying decla- 
 ration, is not within a statutory provision requiring the names of 
 the witnesses to be indorsed \ipon the information.® 
 
 Objections to the admission of dying declarations, however, must 
 be interposed at the trial in the court below ; they come too late when 
 raised for the first time on appeal.* And it is error to require the 
 
 2Statc V. Furney, 41 Kan. 115, 13 Am. wilJ not be proper evidence that the jury 
 >St. Bep. 262, 21 Pae. 213. And see should be withdrawn, and when such 
 Leigh V. People, 113 111. 372; Donnelly declarations are admitted the jury will 
 V. State. 26 N. J. L. 463. be entitled to hear the preliminary evi- 
 
 The fact that a preliminary examina- dence showing their admissibility. North 
 tion of a physician as to the physical v. People, 139 111. 81, 28 N. E. 966. 
 condition of the deceased, to show 4State v. Reed, 137 Mo. 125, 38 S. W. 
 whether or not the latter was in articulo 574. 
 
 mortis, made with a view to ascertain- oMcHugh v. State, 31 Ala. 317. 
 ing whether dying declarations were ad- sPeopIe v. Wong Cliuey, 117 Cal. 624, 
 missible, was conducted in the pres- 49 Pac. 833. 
 
 enee of the jury, is not a ground for a 7Black v. State, 1 Tex. App. 368. 
 new trial where none of the declarations sPeople v. Beverly, 108 Mich. 509, 66 
 themselves were elicited or stated. Price N. W. 379. 
 V. State, 72 Ga. 441. sBlack v. State, supra; State v. Par- 
 
 sState V. Furney, supra. ham, 48 La. Ann. 1309, 20 So. 727. 
 
 Where dying declarations are proper- It will be assumed on appeal in a- 
 ly admissible, it is not error to permit prosecution for homicide that a proper 
 the prelimiuiary examination to be made predicate for a dying declaration admit- 
 in the presence of the jury; it is to ted in evidence was laid, where no ob- 
 avoid the possibility that declarations joction was made thereto, and a larg?- 
 
§ 649] EVIDENCE. 1033 
 
 defendant to proceed with his defense before deciding a test ques- 
 tion as to the admissibility of dying declarations;^" or to permit 
 the dying declarations of the deceased to go to the jury room for 
 investigation by the jury ; the principle being the same as that upon 
 which witnesses' depositions are excltided from the jury room. ^ ^ 
 But the fact that a memorandum or exhibit of statements of the de- 
 ceased, made by a witness for his own use, was accidentally taken 
 to the jury room, does not constitute reversible error, where the 
 paper purported to carry with it none of the characteristics of a dep- 
 osition, but constituted a mere paper memorandum, marked as an 
 exhibit. ^ ^ 
 
 A divorced wife is competent to testify against her husband as 
 to dying declarations made by their daughter in a prosecution against 
 him for killing the daughter.^* And a statutory provision mak- 
 ing the accused a competent witness for himself in a criminal trial, 
 when the testimony of the person on or against whom, or against 
 whose property, the offense is alleged to have been committed, is 
 used against him, applies to make the testimony of a person ac- 
 cused of murder competent in his own behalf, where the dying dec- 
 larations of the deceased were used against him.^* 
 
 650. Weight a question of fact for the jury — The weight and credi- 
 bility of dying declarations when admitted in evidence are always 
 questions for the jury to determine, taking into consideration the 
 whole case. ■^ This rule is universal, but there is some conflict of 
 
 number of witnesses were heard whose Pac. 356; Dxinn v. Peoplej 172 111. 582, 
 
 testimony was not brought up. State 50 N. E. 137. 
 
 V. Frazier, 109 La. 458, 33 So. 561. i2State v. Webster, 21 Wash. 63, 57 
 
 And the court cannot be put in er- Pac. 361. 
 ror for admitting testimony in the shape isEx parte Fatheree, 34 Tex. Grim, 
 
 of a dying declaration which is clearly Rep. 594, 31 S. W. 403. 
 competent at the time, because after- 14 Owens v. State, 59 Miss. 547. 
 wards it may turn out incompetent for ijustiee v. State, 99 Ala. 180, 13 So. 
 
 the reason that the accused had evi- 658 ; Moore v. State, 12 Ala. 764, 46 Am. 
 
 dence which would have pevented its Dec. 276; Faire v. State, 58 Ala. 74; 
 
 admission, but which he kept back until Kilgore v. State, 74 Ala. 1; Wills v. 
 
 a later stage of the trial. BoUn v. State, 74 Ala. 21; West v. State, 76 
 
 State, 9 Lea, 516. Ala. 98; Ward v. State, 78 Ala. 441; 
 
 lOJohnson v. State, 47 Ala. 9. DuBose v. State, 120 Ala. 300, 25 So. 
 
 Where dying declarations are er- 185; Sims v. State, 139 Ala. 74, 101 Am. 
 
 roneously admitted in evidence, how- St. Rep. 17, 36 So. 138; Campbell v. 
 
 ever, their subsequent exclusion is not State, 38 Ark. 498 ; Walker v. State, 39 
 
 erroneous, but in such case the court Ark. 221; People v. Abbott (Cal.) 4 
 
 should endeavor, as far as practicable, Pac. 769 ; Perry v. State, 102 Ga. 365, 30 
 
 to remove any unfavorable impression S. E. 903; Starkey v. People, 17 111. 17 
 
 which such evidence has made, and Hagenow v. People, 188 111. 545, 59 X 
 
 should clearly and explicitly instruct the E. 242; Doles v. State, 97 Ind. 555 
 
 iury to disregard it altogether. Jordan State v. Phillips, 118 Iowa, 600, 92 N. 
 
 V State 79 Ala. 9. W. 876; Walston v. Com. 16 B. jVlon. 
 
 ' 1 1 State V. Moody, 18 Wash. 165, 51 15; Henderson v. Com. 7 Ky. L. Rep. 
 
1034 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 [§ 650 
 
 opinion as to the amount of credit which should be given to such 
 declarations, and as to the instruction which should be given to the 
 jury with reference thereto. On the one hand the rule is laid down 
 that the dying declarations of a person killed, made with regard to 
 the circumstances which produced his death, are to be received with 
 the same degree of credit as the testimony of the deceased would 
 have been if examined under oath as a witness,^ and to no more.* 
 And it is proper to instruct the jury under this rule that dying 
 declarations of the deceased, when in evidence in the case, are en- 
 titled to the same consideration as if given under oath, and to no 
 greater. * 
 
 The great weight of authority, however, holds that, while the law 
 recognizes the necessity of admitting proof of dying declarations on 
 a par with an oath in a court of justice, it does not regard them 
 as of the same value and weight as the evidence of a witness given 
 in a court of justice under all the tests and safeguards which are 
 there offered for the discovery of the truth ; ^ and that the testimony 
 of a living witness, seen and heard by the jury and cross-examined 
 
 745; Wyatt v. Com. 8 Ky. L. Rep. 55, 
 1 S. W. 196; Brock v. Com. 92 Ky. 183, 
 17 S. W. 337; People v. Beverly, 108 
 Mich. 509, 66 N. W. 379; Lambeth v. 
 State, 23 Miss. 322; State v. Stephens, 
 96 Mo. 637, 10 S. W. 172; State v. Sex- 
 ton, 147 Mo. 89, 48 S. W. 452; State v. 
 Simon, 50 Mo. 370; State v. McCannon, 
 51 Mo. 160; State v. Parker, 172 Mo. 
 191, 72 S. W. 650; Kastner v. State, 58 
 Neb. 767, 79 N. W. 713; Donnelly v. 
 State, 26 N. J. L. 463; People v. Green, 
 1 Park. Crim. Rep. 1 1 ; People v. 
 Knickerbocker, 1 Park. Crim. Rep. 302; 
 State V. Davis, 134 N. C. 633, 46 S. E. 
 722; Com. V. Lenox, 3 Brewst. (Pa.) 
 249; Com. v. Winkelman, 12 Pa. Super. 
 Ct. 497; State v. Sullivan, 20 R. I. 114, 
 37 Atl. 673; State v. Quick, 15 Rich. 
 L. 342; Walker v. State, 37 Tex. 366; 
 State v. Eddon, 8 Wash. 292, 36 Pac. 
 139; United States v. Gleason, Woolw. 
 128, Fed. Cas. No. 15,216. 
 
 An instruction in a prosecution for 
 homicide that, if dying declarations that 
 the defendant did the killing were true, 
 they should find him guilty, is improper 
 where the evidence connecting the de- 
 fendant vpith the commission of the of- 
 fense vi-as principally circumstantial, 
 the only direct evidence being the 
 declaration, as constituting a charge 
 with respect to a matter of fact within 
 the meaning of a constitutional provi- 
 
 sion prohibiting such charge. People v. 
 Ybarra, 17 Cal. 166. 
 
 But a mere reference by the court to a 
 statement as to a dying declaration of 
 the deceased, after the court had admit- 
 ted the declaration as such, is not error 
 as invading the province of the jury. 
 State V. ShafTer, 23 Or. 555, 32 Pac. 545. 
 
 And omission of the court in char- 
 ging the jury in a prosecution for homi- 
 cide to tell them that it was for them to 
 determine the weight to be given to a 
 dying declaration is not prejudicial er- 
 ror where, taking the whole charge to- 
 gether, the case was fairly presented to 
 the jury. Newberry v. State, 68 Ark. 
 355, 58 S. W. 351. 
 
 2AlIen V. State, 70 Ark. 337, 68 S. W. 
 28; Hill V. State, 41 Ga. 484; Green v. 
 State, 13 Mo. 382; People v. Knapp, 1 
 Edm. Sel. Cas. 177; State v. Whitson, 
 111 N. C. 695, 16 S. E. 332. And see 
 State V. Daniel, 31 La. Ann. 91. 
 
 ^People V. Knapp, supra; Peoole v. 
 Thomson, 145 Cal. 717, 79 Pac. 435. 
 
 4 State V. Schmidt, 73 Iowa, 469, 33 
 N. W. 590; Baxter v. State, 15 Lea, 665; 
 State V. McCanon, 51 Mo. 160; State v. 
 Simon, 50 Mo. 370. 
 
 ePeople v. Kraft, 148 N. Y. 631, 43 N. 
 E. 80, Affirming 91 Hun, 474. 36 N. Y. 
 Supp. 1034; Nordgren v. People, 211 III. 
 425, 71 N. E. 1042. 
 
S 650] EVIDENCE. 1036 
 
 by them, is entitled to more weight and furnishes a more reliable 
 basis for a verdict than the reported statements of a dying man, 
 whose memory and physical condition at the time they were made 
 could not be observed by the jury, and the accuracy of whose state- 
 ments had not been subjected to the crucial test of a cross-examina- 
 tion in the court." The weight to be attached to dying declarations 
 under this rule depends upon several considerations: First, the 
 trustworthiness of the reporters ; second, the capacity of the declarant 
 at the time to remember accurately the past; and third, his dis- 
 position to truly tell what he remembers. '^ And it is proper that 
 such evidence should be carefully subjected to the application of 
 «ach of these conditions. * And an instruction that the dying decla- 
 rations of a person, made with regard to the circumstances which pro- 
 duced his death, are to be received with the same degree of credit 
 as the testimony of the deceased would have been if examined under 
 oath as a witness, is erroneous under this rule;® and so is a charge 
 that the premonitions of immediate death, from which there is no 
 hope of recovery, are always sufficient to influence persons so situated 
 to speak the truth. ^^ The accused in such case is entitled to every 
 allowance and benefit that he may have lost by the absence of op- 
 portunity for the fuller investigation which can be had in the case 
 of a living witness. ^ ^ And it has been held that no greater weight 
 shall be given a dying declaration than would be given to sworn 
 
 estate V. Vansant, 80 Mo. 67; State V. quittal, and charging in effect that 
 
 Mathes, 90 Mo. 571. 2 S. W. 800. though the jury believed from the evi- 
 
 A verdict of guilty in a prosecution denee that the shot was accidental they 
 
 for homicide cannot be said to be un- might convict, is erroneous. Com. v. 
 
 supported, as matter of law, however, Silcox, 161 Pa. 484, 29 Atl. 105. 
 
 though the only evidence supporting it loPeople v. Corey, 157 N. Y. 332, 51 
 
 consists of the dying declarations of the N. E. 1024. 
 
 deceased, and the silence of the alleged nAshton's Case, 2 Lewin, C. C. 147. 
 
 slayer when accused. People v. Amaya, But a conviction will not be reversed 
 
 134 Cal. 531, 66 Pae. 794. because of a refusal of an instruction 
 
 'State v.* Vansant, and State v. asked by the accused, that the jury, in 
 
 Mathes, supra. And see Leigh v. Peo- determining the weight to be given to 
 
 pie 113 111. 372; State v. Washington, dying statements of the deceased, might 
 
 13 S C. 453. take into consideration the fact that the 
 
 sSee Walker v. State, 37 Tex. 366. defendant had no opportunity to cross- 
 
 sState v McCanon, 51 Mo. 160; Nord- examine, although such instruction 
 
 gren v People, and Walker v. State, might well have been given if the court 
 
 supra ■ State v. Eddon, 8 Wash. 292, 36 had told the jury that it was for them 
 
 Pac 139. *-" determine the weight to be given such 
 
 And refusal to charge in a prosecu- statements, and that they could consider 
 
 tion for homicide that if deceased de- whether such statements were volun- 
 
 clared to certain witnesses at the time tarily made, and whether they covered 
 
 of, and after, the shooting that the shot all the circumstances of the shooting. 
 
 v^ia accidental, so contradicting his dy- Newberry v. State, 68 Ark. 355, 58 S. W. 
 
 ing declaration, and the former deelara- 351. 
 tions were true, there should be an ac- 
 
1036 HOMICIDE. [§ 65t^ 
 
 testimony, when no opportunity was given for a cross-examination. ^ * 
 The proper rule is that where the statements of the deceased have 
 been admitted as dying declarations, the court should instruct the 
 jury that they are to look to all the circumstances under which the 
 dying declarations were made, and give them such credit as they 
 think they might be fairly entitled to in the light of all the evidence 
 in the case ; ^ ^ taking into consideration the absence of the opportuni- 
 ty of cross-examination, ^ * the conduct of the person making them, ^ ^ 
 and any inconsistency that may exist in them ; ^ " and also the men- 
 tal condition of the declarant at the time, as affected by his wounds, 
 or otherwise ; and all the circumstances under which the declarations 
 were made,^'' as well as the fact, if it is one, that the declarations 
 were the result of questions propounded by an attorney at a time 
 when accused was not represented by counsel. ^ * But an instruc- 
 tion which points out, by way of precaution, the inherent qualities 
 which by law apply to dying declarations, and which refers to the 
 source rather than to the weight of the evidence, is not objectionable 
 as being upon the weight of the evidence, since there is a, distinction 
 between the source of evidence and its weight.-'® 
 
 i. Impeachment or contradiction of declaration. 
 
 651. Contradictory rules — The rule has been asserted that decla- 
 rations or statements of a declarant contradictory or inconsistent with 
 his dying declaration cannot be admitted in evidence under any cir- 
 
 i2State V. Eddon, supra; Zipperian 1031, 33 Pac. 537; North v. People, 139 
 
 V. People, 33 Colo. 134, 79 Pae. 1018. III. 81, 28 N. E. 966. And see State v. 
 
 13 Jones V. State, 70 Miss. 401, 12 So. Schmidt, 73 Iowa, 469, 35 N. W. 590. 
 
 444; Murphy v. People, 37 111. 447; In State v. Hendricks, 172 Mo. 654, 
 
 Wyatt V. Com. 8 Ky. L. Rep. 55, 1 S. W. 73 S. W. 194, it was held that in con- 
 
 196; Com. v. Casey, 11 Cush. 417, 59 sidering the dying declarations of a per- 
 
 Am. Dee. 150; Donnelly v. State, 26 N. son the jury are not to be governed by 
 
 J. L. 463, 26 N. J. L. 601 ; United States the same rule of caution that applies to 
 
 V. Gleason, Woolw. 128, Fed. Gas. No. tlie consideration of repetitions by wit- 
 
 15,216. And see State v. Pearce, 56 nesses of statements made by a person 
 
 Minn. 226, 57 N. W. 652, 1065. charged with murder. 
 
 i4Brown v. State, 32 Miss. 433; New- isLipscomb v. State, 75 Miss. 559, 23 
 
 berry v. State, supra; People v. Kraft, So. 210, 230. 
 
 148 N. Y. 631, 43 N. E. 80, Affirming An instruction for the people in a 
 
 91 Hun, 474, 36 N. Y. Supp. 1034; State prosecution for homicide, naming cer- 
 
 V. Davis, 134 N. C. 633, 46 S. E. 722. tain matters which the jury might con- 
 
 iBDonnelly v. State, 26 N. J. L. 463. sider in determining the weight to be 
 
 isMoore v. State, 12 Ala. 764, 46 Am. given to dying declarations, is not er- 
 
 Dec. 276 ; Richards v. State, 82 Wis. 172, ronecus merely because it fails to in- 
 
 51 N. W. 652. form the jury that the declarations 
 
 17 Brown v. State, 32 Miss. 433; State must have been made under a sense of 
 V. Crawford. 31 Wash. 260, 71 Pac. 1030; impending death, where it does not ex- 
 State V. CaSieron, 2 Ghand. (Wis.) 172, elude the idea of this being the cr ■», and 
 2 Pinney (Wis.) 490. the deficiency is supplied in another in- 
 
 isState V. Foot You, 24 Or. 01, 32 Pac. struction. Leigh v. People, 113 111. 372. 
 
i 651] EVIDENCE. 1037 
 
 cumstances for the purpose of impeaching his dying declarations, 
 since to do so would be to violate the rule that evidence of a state- 
 ment made by a witness, offered for the purpose of contradicting 
 him, cannot be received until the attention of the witness has been 
 first called to the matter, and he has been asked on cross-examination 
 if he has, or has not, made the statement. ^ And, on the theory that 
 a dying declaration can only be impeached or contradicted by state- 
 ments made under similar circumstances, it has been held that where 
 dying declarations are proved, a statement of the declarant conflict- 
 ing therewith, which is neither a dying declaration nor a part of 
 the res gestw or under oath, cannot be given in evidence to impeach 
 it;^ but that contradictory statements or dying declarations are 
 governed by the rules of evidence in relation to contradictory state- 
 ments made by a witness in a court of justice;^ and that, if the con- 
 tradictions were produced by ignorance on the part of the declarant, 
 they ought to be permitted to have no weight, but that, if they were 
 otherwise produced, they should be taken into consideration and 
 given such weight as, under all the circumstances, they are justly 
 entitled to.* 
 
 The rule supported by the great majority of cases, however, pro- 
 ceeds upon the theory that dying declarations are themselves hear- 
 say, and admissible only through necessity, and that after admitting 
 them it would be a perversion of right reasoning to deny to the 
 accused a like relaxation of the rule which requires that the at- 
 tention of a witness shall be called to his statement before contrary 
 statements can be proved against him; and that, therefore, dying 
 declarations may be impeached by evidence of other statements 
 by the same person inconsistent therewith ; ^ and that it is reversible 
 
 iMaine v. People, 9 Hun, 113. And People v. Glenn, 10 Cal. 32; State v. 
 
 see Stacy v. Graham, 14 N. Y. 492. Lodge, 9 Houst. (Del.) 542, 33 Atl. 
 
 2Wroe V. State, 20 Ohio St. 460; State 312; State v. Frazier, Houst. Grim. Kep. 
 
 V. Taylor, 56 S. C. 360, 34 S. E. 939; (Del.) 176: Morrison v. State, 42 Fla. 
 
 State V. Stuokey, 56 S. C. 576, 35 S. E. 140, 28 So. 97; Battle v. State, 74 Ga. 101; 
 
 263; Runyan v. Price, 15 Ohio St. 1, Nesbit v. State, 43 Ga. 238; Dunn v. 
 
 86 Am. Dec. 459. People, 172 111. 582, 50 N. E. 137; State 
 
 sM'Pherson v. State, 9 Yerg. 279. v. Burt, 41 La. Ann. 787, 6 L.R.A. 79, 6 
 
 4lbid. So. 631; Hurd v. People, 25 Mich. 405; 
 
 The fact that dying declarations are People v. Knapp, 26 Mioh. 112; Nelms v. 
 
 inconsistent or untrue in part, in that State, 13 Smedes & M. 500, 53 Am. Dec. 
 
 they include parties to the shooting who 94; Donnelly v. State, 26 N. J. L. 496; 
 
 are positively shown not to have been People v. Knapp, 1 Edm. Sel. Gas. 177; 
 
 present, will not render them incompe- Com. v. Lenox, 3 Brewst. (Pa.) 249; 
 
 tent and inadmissible, but goes rather Morelock v. State, 90 Tenn. 528, 18 8. 
 
 to their credibility. White v. State, 30 W. 258 ; M'Pherson v. State, 9 Yerg. 
 
 Tex. App. 652, 18 S. W. 462. 279; Felder v. State, 23 T«x. App. 477, 
 
 sShell V. State, 88 Ala. 14, 7 So. 40; 59 Am. Rep. 777, 5 S. W. 145; Herd v. 
 
 Gregory v. State, 140 Ala. 16, 37 So. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 575, 67 S. W. 
 
 259; People v. Lawrence, 21 Cal. 368; 495; Carver v. United States, 164 U. S. 
 
1038 HOMICIDE. § 651 
 
 error for the court to refuse to permit such impeaching testimony to 
 be introduced;" and that such inconsistent statements need not be 
 themselves dying declarations;^ and that evidence of the circum- 
 stances under which a declaration was made is also admissible as 
 affecting its weight.® Within this rule it is competent, when dying 
 declarations of a man have been admitted, to show by way of im- 
 peaching their credibility what he said on the same subject at other 
 times.® And this is so, notwithstanding the fact that the accused 
 had been allowed to introduce another and contradictory declaration 
 by way of impeachment. ^ ° And where dying declarations have 
 been admitted to prove the identity of the accused it may be shown 
 that the deceased had, at other times, mistaken other persons for the 
 accused, and that he was in the habit of thus mistaking persons. ^ ^ 
 And it may be shown that the declarant was insane, ^ ^ though it has. 
 been held that it is not competent for the prisoner to prove that, 
 before the affray, the deceased had expressed a violent hatred toward 
 him, and a disposition to do him injury, or that he was very hostile 
 to him. ^ ^ 
 
 694, 41 L. ed. 602, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 228; 'State v. Charles, 111 La. 933, 36 So> 
 
 Rex V. Sellers, O. B. 1796, Car. Crim. 29. 
 
 Law, 233. And see State v. McGowan, sstate v. Crawford, 31 Wash. 260, 71 
 
 66 Conn. 392, 34 Atl. 99. Pac. 1030. 
 
 But while refusal to allow the ac- In State v. Hendricks, 172 Mo. 654, 
 
 eused in a prosecution for homicide to 73 S. W. 194, however, it was held that 
 
 show that after the shooting, and while statements of an injured person other 
 
 the deceased believed that he was going than his dying declarations are not ad- 
 
 to die, he and the deceased talked over missible in corroboration of such dec- 
 
 the matter of the shooting, and de- larations. 
 
 ceased acknowledged that ie was to 9Nelms v. State, 13 Smedes & M. 500, 
 
 blame, is error, it is harmless where the 53 Am. Dec. 94. 
 
 witness stated what was actually said But where, on the preliminary exami- 
 
 on the occasion alluded to. Hurd v. nation as to the admissibility of a dy- 
 
 People, 25 Mich. 405. ing declaration, a witness swore that 
 
 sHerd v. State, supra. deceased said he was dying, evidence 
 
 And the absence of a witness who contradicting this statement, to the ef- 
 
 would have stated facts showing that feet that the deceased did not say that 
 
 certain statements admitted as dying he was dying, is not admissible upon 
 
 declarations were not made under such the preliminary investigation, but should 
 
 circumstances as to render them admis- be admitted before the jury on the trial 
 
 sible, and that they are not worthy of in chief, as evidence tending to Impeach 
 
 credit, is good ground for a continuance, the credibility of the state's witness. 
 
 Wyatt V. Com. 8 Ky. L. Rep. 55, 1 S. W. Hunnicutt v. State, 20 Tex. App. 632. 
 
 196. Oontra, State v. Elliott, 45 Iowa, 486. 
 
 But refusal of the court to admit in loGreen v. State, 154 Ind. 655, 57 N. 
 
 evidence an affidavit made by the person E. 637. 
 
 assa-ulted and injured against his as- liCom. v. Cooper, 5 Allen, 495, 81 Am. 
 
 sailant, for the purpose of impeaching Dec. 762. 
 
 the dying declaration of the former, is izDonnelly v. State, 26 N. J. L. 469. 
 
 not prejudicial error where there is isState v. Varney, 8 Boston L. R. 
 
 nothing in such affidavit which contra- 542. 
 diets any statement in such declaration. 
 Leigh V. People, 113 111. 372. 
 
5 651] EVIDENCE. 1039 
 
 So, upon the same theory, and on the theory that the declarant 
 stands on the same footing as a witness called into court and ex- 
 amined, it is held that dying declarations may be impeached by 
 showing the bad character and repiitation of the declarant, either 
 generally or for truth and veracity.^* And where contradictory or 
 inconsistent statements of a declarant have been admitted in evi- 
 dence to impeach his dying declarations, it is competent to intro- 
 duce other declarations of the declarant, whether made in extremis 
 or not, as rebutting testimony, and to sustain the declaration.^^ 
 Likewise, the weight of a dying declaration may be attacked by evi- 
 dence of malice entertained by the declarant toward the accused.^® 
 But the rule that a witness cannot be impeached by evidence that he 
 had been guilty of misdemeanors applies to an attempt to impeach a 
 dying declaration in a prosecution for homicide •,^'' though where such 
 an attempt has been made by showing that the declarant had been 
 convicted of a felony and sent to the penitentiary, it is error to 
 permit the prosecution to introduce in evidence a pardon for the 
 felony.^* Here, as elsewhere, it is for the court to determine upon 
 the competency of such impeaching evidence, and for the jury to ad- 
 judge its credibility.-'* 
 
 So, after examination and eross-ex- But where the defense in a prosecu- 
 amination of the witnesses for the state tion for homicide proceeded to meet the 
 on a preliminary inquiry by the court, to dying declarations by testimony to the 
 ascertain whether a deceased person was effect that deceased made statements 
 under a due sense and apprehension of which the witness said were contra- 
 impending dissolution to render his dy- dictory to the dying declarations, the 
 ing declaration admissible, and after testimony of the witness is incompetent 
 such declarations are admitted in evi- as comprehending only his own conclu- 
 dence, it is improper to allow wit- sion, where he omitted to state the sub- 
 nesses to be called and examined on the stance of such variant statements, 
 other side to rebut or controvert such Snell v. State, 29 Tex. App. 236, 25 Am. 
 testimony. State v. Frazier, Houst. St. Rep. 723, 15 S. W. 722. 
 Grim. Rep. (Del.) 176. leNordgren v. People, 211 111. 425, 71 
 
 i4State V. Burt, 41 La. Ann. 787, 6 N. E. 1042. 
 
 L R.A. 79, 6 So. 631 ; Lester v. State, 37 i^Martin v. Com. 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1928, 
 
 Fla. 382, 20 So. 232; Redd v. State, 99 78 S. W. 1104. 
 
 Ga. 210, 25 S. E. 268; People v. Knapp, islbid. 
 
 per Edmonds, J., 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 177. isNelms v. State, 13 Smedes & M. 500, 
 
 See Carter v. People, 2 Hill, 317. 53 Am. Dec. 94; Moore v. State, 12 Ala. 
 
 isState V. Blackburn, 80 N. C. 474; 764, 46 Am. Dec. 276; Starliey v. Peo- 
 
 State V. Thomason, 46 N. C. (1 Jones, pie, 17 111. 17. 
 L.) 274; Bostick v. State, 3 Humpn. 
 344. 
 
CHAPTER XXX. 
 
 VERDICT. 
 
 652. Form and contents. 
 
 653. Power to find lower or different degrees. 
 
 654. Necessity of nega-tiving higher degrees. 
 
 655. Assessment of punishment and recommendation to mercy. 
 
 656. Right of judge to direct verdict. 
 
 657. Concurrence of jurors necessary. 
 
 652. Form and contents — The general rule of criminal law, that 
 a verdict in a prosecution for a crime divided into degrees must 
 specify the degree found, applies to homicide cases, as a general 
 rule, where the indictment in the case is such that it would sup- 
 port a verdict for different degrees of the crime, ^ though a verdict 
 of guilty as charged may be amended with the consent of the jury 
 by adding the intended degree.^ An exception to this rule exists, 
 however, in homicide cases in which the indictment charges a par- 
 ticular degree, in language not applicable to any other degree, in 
 which case a verdict of guilty as charged is sufficient.* And in 
 some of the states it is regarded as necessary to specify the degree 
 of the homicide only when the finding is of a degree other than 
 that charged.* And under this rule, where one is charged in the 
 indictment as an accessory before the fact, a verdict of "guilty as 
 
 iDick V. State, 3 Ohio St. 89; State gan v. State, 30 Wis. 428, 11 Am. Rep. 
 V. Town, Wright (Ohio) 75; Parka v. 575. 
 
 State, 3 Ohio St. 101 ; Johnson v. State, zState v. Potter, 16 Kan. 80. 
 17 Ala. 618; Hall v. State, 40 Ala. 698; sState v. Weese, 53 Iowa, 92, 4 N. 
 Robertson V. State, 42 Ala. 509; Thomp- W. 827; State v. Gilchrist, 113 N. C. 
 son V. State, 26 Ark. 323; People v. 673, 18 S. E. 319; Com. v. Earle, 1 
 Campbell, 40 Cal. 129; State v. Dowd, Whart. 525; Patterson v. State (Tex. 
 19 Conn. 388 ; State v. Oliver, 2 Houst. Crim. App. ) 56 S. W. 59 ; Leschi v. Ter- 
 (IJel.) 585; Kennedy v. State, 6 Ind. ritory, 1 Wash. Terr. 13; Timmeran v. 
 485 ; State V. Moran, 7 Iowa, 236 ; State Territory, 3 Wash. Terr. 445, 17 Pac. 
 V. Redman, 17 Iowa, 329; State v. Red- 624; State v. Henry, 51 W. Va. 283, 41 
 dick, 7 Kan. 143; State v. Huber, 8 S. E. 439; Lowe v. State, 118 Wis. 641, 
 Kan. 447; State v. Cleveland, 58 Me. 96 N. W. 417; Cook v. Territory, 3 
 564; State v. Verrill, 54 Me. 408; Ford Wyo. 110, 4 Pac. 887. 
 V. State, 12 Md. 514; Tully v. People, 6 4People v. Rugg, 98 N. Y. 537; Bi- 
 Mich. 273; McGee v. State, 8 Mo. 495; lansky v. State, 3 Minn. 427, Gil. 313; 
 State V. Upton, 20 Mo. 397; Kirby v. State v. Eno, 8 Minn. 220, Gil. 190; 
 State, 7 Yerg. 259; Buster v. State, 42 State v. Brannon, 45 Mo. 329; Terri- 
 Tex. 315; Isbell v. State, 31 Tex. 138; tory v. Romine, 2 N. M. 114; Territory 
 Colbath V. State, 2 Tex. App. 391; Ho- v. Yarberry, 2 N. M. 391. 
 
 1040 
 
S 652] VERDICT. 1041 
 
 charged" is sufficient.^ And when the indictment charges murder 
 generally, without specifying the degree, a verdict of guilty of mur- 
 der in the second degree, as charged, is good.® Though when a 
 verdict is found against a defendant of "guilty of murder as principal 
 in the second degree," when he is indicted as the absolute actor and 
 perpetrator of the crime, the verdict is erroneous under the Georgia 
 statute.'' And when the statute directs the jury to assess the pun- 
 ishment, a verdict of guilty assessing the statutory penalty for a 
 particular degree is sufficient as a verdict for that degree.^ But a 
 verdict of guilty as charged in a prosecution for homicide, fixing 
 the penalty of serving a term in the state penitentiary, and asking 
 the mercy of the court, without fixing the time for the term of im- 
 prisonment, is improper.^ So, it has been held that on an indict- 
 ment for murder at common law, a verdict of guilty, without specify- 
 ing the degree, is a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree. ^ " 
 Though the contrary rule, that it is a verdict for the lower grade of 
 homicide, has been asserted. ^^ And in Georgia, at least, a verdict 
 of guilty of manslaughter is regarded as a verdict of guilty of volun- 
 tary manslaughter, the highest grade of that offense.-'^ And a ver- 
 dict that the accused is guilty of involuntary manslaughter will be 
 referred to the highest degree of that offense, and be treated as equiv- 
 alent to a finding that he was guilty of involuntary manslaughter in 
 the commission of an unlawful act. ^ * A verdict of guilty as charged, 
 however, is a verdict for that degree of homicide indicated by the 
 facts stated in the indictment only, though a higher or different de- 
 gree is named therein.^* And where the legislative vrill has been 
 declared to be that the jury shall specify in their verdict the degree 
 of murder of which they convict the accused, a verdict in a murder 
 
 SHorton v. Com. 99 Va. 848, 38 S. a. two years' sentence as to each. Stevens 
 
 E. 184. V. State, 133 Ala. 28, 32 So. 270. 
 
 sPadron v. State^ 41 Tex. Crim. Bep. sOwens v. State, 82 Miss. 18, 33 So. 
 
 548, 55 S. W. 827. And see State v. 718. 
 
 Brock, 61 Kan. 857, 58 Pac. 972. loKennedy v. People, 39 N. Y. 245 
 
 TAVashington v. State, 36 Ga. 222. Fitzgerrold v. People, 37 N. Y. 413 
 
 sNoles V. State, 24 Ala. 672; Wat- People v. Enoch, 13 Wend. 159, 27 Am. 
 
 kins V. State, 133 Ala. 88, 32 So. 627; Dec. 197; Com. v. Earle, 1 Whart. 525 
 
 Hooker v. Com. 24 Ky. L. Hep. 936, 70 And see Green v. Com. 12 Allen, 155. 
 
 S. W. 291. ' iGarvey v. People, 6 Colo. 559, 45 
 
 And a verdict in a prosecution for Am. Rep. 531. 
 
 homicide against two persons, finding i2Welch v. State, 50 Ga. 128, 15 Am. 
 
 them guilty of manslaughter and fixing Rep. 690. 
 
 the punishment at two years' imprison- isThomas v. State, 121 Ga. 331, 49 
 
 ment, if erroneous in failing to show S. E. 273; Dickerson v. State, 121 Ga. 
 
 whether it means a two years' sentence 333, 49 S. E. 275. 
 
 for each, is cured by an examination of i* Johnson v. Com. 24 Pa. 386. And 
 
 the jury in the presence of the accused see State v. McCormick, 27 Iowa, 402. 
 in which they state that the verdict ficxes 
 Horn.— <56 
 
1042 HOMICIDE. [§ 652 
 
 case not stating the degree, but merely finding the accused guilty as 
 charged in the indictment, is a nullity and will not support a judg- 
 ment. ^ ^ And this is so though but one degree is charged in the in- 
 dictment;*® and a qualification "with mitigating circumstances" is 
 not sufficient to validate it. ^ ^ And finding a particular class of homi- 
 cide, naming it, is not sufficient, though the statute specifies the de- 
 gree of that class.-'* Nor is the rule affected by the fact that the 
 verdict is one of guilty of being an accomplice to the crime of mur- 
 der, where the accomplice is made punishable in the same manner 
 as the principal offender.*® And where the statute provides that 
 whenever a jury shall find a person guilty of manslaughter they shall 
 designate by their verdict whether it is voluntary or involuntary, 
 a verdict of guilty of manslaughter not so designating is void.^" 
 A verdict in the following words : "We, the jury, find, from the 
 evidence produced, that the prisoner is guilty of the murder of B.," 
 is a general verdict. ^ * And that a general verdict of guilty should 
 be taken when there is a variety of counts, stating the mode of death 
 in different ways, is no error. * ^ And a finding upon an indictment 
 for murder in which there are two counts substantially in the form 
 of a general verdict of murder in the first degree is sufficient as a 
 finding on both counts.''* Where the jury find the homicide is ex- 
 cusable, the practice in this country is not to find so specially, but 
 to acquit.** 
 
 iBHarbolt v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) impanel a jury and exaimine testimony, 
 
 40 S. W. 983; Lyles v. State (Tex. and the degree of the crime should be 
 
 Crim. App.) 86 S. W. 763; Robertson v. found by the jury, a verdict after such 
 
 State, 42 Ala. 509 ; Re Brown, 32 Cal. a plea without a finding as to the degree 
 
 48; State v. Cleveland, 58 Me. 564; of guilt is irregular and insufficient to 
 
 Dick V. State, 3 Ohio St. 89; Waddle v. sustain a judgment. Lancaster v. State, 
 
 State, 112 Tenn. 556, 82 S. W. 827 ; State 71 Ark. 100, 71 S. W. 251. 
 
 v. Hager, 50 W. Va. 370, 40 S. E. 393. zoMahany v. People, 31 Colo. 365, 
 
 And see Reyes v. State (Fla.) 38 So. 73 Pac. 26. 
 
 257; State v. Hubbard (S. D.) 104 N. 2iMeGuffie v. State, 17 Ga. 498. And 
 
 W. 1120; Russell v. State, 66 Neb. 497, see Com. v. Herty, 109 Mass. 348. 
 
 92 N. W. 751. 22State v. Baker, 63 N. C. 276. 
 
 isHerabree v. State (Ark.) 58 S. W. zsLevells v. State, 32 Ark. 585. 
 
 350. So, where an information for murder 
 
 I'Waddle v. State, supra; Nelson v. in the first degree contains different 
 
 State, 32 Fla. 244, 13 So. 361; Hall counts charging the homicide to have 
 
 V. State, 31 Fla. 176, 12 So. 449; Lov- been committed with deliberation and 
 
 ett V. State, 31 Fla. 164, 12 So. 452; premeditation, and also in the perpe- 
 
 Murphy v. State, 31 Fla. 160, 12 So. tration of, or attempt to perpetrate, a 
 
 453. robbery, it is not error to submit to the 
 
 isBrooks V. State, 42 Tex. Crim. Rep. jury for their finding blank forms of 
 
 347, 60 S. W. 53. general verdicts of guilty or not guilty 
 
 isThoraas v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. of the crime charged, though a form of 
 
 Rep. 20, 9G Am. St. Rep. 834, 62 S. W. the finding of not guilty as to one only 
 
 ^^^ of the different counts of the informa- 
 
 So, where the statute provides that tion is omitted. Rhea v. State, 63 Neb. 
 
 if the accused in a prosecution for 401, 88 N. W. 789. 
 
 murder pleads guilty, Uie court should 2«See supra, chapter XII. 
 
5 653] HOMICIDE. 1043 
 
 653. Power to find lower or different degrees On an indictment 
 
 for murder the jury may find a verdict of manslaugliter or of mur- 
 der in the Eeeond degree ; ^ so also, on an indictment for murder in 
 the second degree, there can be a conviction of manslaughter. Dif- 
 ferent defendants may be convicted of different degrees.'' And a 
 verdict in a prosecution for murder of guilty as charged of man- 
 slaughter is sufficiently certain to warrant a judgment and does not 
 find the accused guilty of two offenses.^ This rule applies to a 
 verdict in a prosecution for murder of involuntary manslaughter, 
 consisting of a killing in the commission of an unlawful act not 
 amounting to a felony, or of a lawful act done in an unlawful man- 
 ner or without due caution or circumspection.* And a person 
 charged with murder may be convicted of negligent homicide. ^ And 
 a conviction of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of an 
 unlawful act may be had under an indictment charging a slave with 
 voluntary manslaughter, consisting of the killing of a white per- 
 son,® though it does not apply where the involuntary manslaughter 
 has special statutory ingredients which must be alleged, and which 
 are not included in a general charge contained in the indictment;'' 
 
 iWharton, Crim. Law, 7th ed. 400, So, a person indicted for murder in 
 
 627 ; Brown v. State, 31 Fla. 207, 12 So. the form prescribed by Miss. Code 1892, 
 
 640; Re Alcorn, 7 Idaho, 101, 60 Pac. § 1359, may be convicted of the crime 
 
 561 ; Coolman v. State, 163 Ind. 503, of pointing a pistol intentionally at the 
 
 72 N. E. 568; State v. Huber, 8 Kan. deceased, the same being then and there 
 
 447; State v. Parks, 115 La. 765, 40 So. discharged, and killing deceased, as pro- 
 
 39; Davis v. State, 39 Md. 355; Com. ^-ided for by § 9695 thereof. Thomas v. 
 
 V. Hertv, 109 Mass. 348; State v. Fra- State, 73 Miss. 46, 19 So. 195. 
 
 zier, 137 Mo. 317, 38 S. W. 913; Mc- 3 Jones v. Territory, 4 Okla. 45, 43 
 
 Nevins v. People, 61 Barb. 307; Keefe Pac. 1072. 
 
 V. People, 40 N. Y. 348; Jones v. Terri- And a conviction may be had for vol- 
 
 tory, 4 Okla. 45, 43 Pac. 1072; United untary manslaughter under an indict- 
 
 States V. Carr, 1 Woods, 480, Fed. Cas. ment for the statutory crime of murder 
 
 No. 14,732; Salisbury's Case, 1 Plowd. of a white person by a slave. Henry 
 
 101. V. State, 33 Ala. 389. 
 
 Anil an instruction that under an in- 4People v. Pearne, 118 Cal. 154, 50 
 
 dictment for murder in the first degree Pac. 376; State v. Moore (Iowa) 106 
 
 the jury can find the defendant guilty N. W. 16; Conner v. Com. 13 Bush, 
 
 of a lesser degree, or not guilty, as the 714; Keefe v. People, 40 N. Y. 348; 
 
 evidence warrants, is not erroneous in People v. Thompson, 41 N. Y. 1 ; Lane 
 
 the use of the word "can." Territory v. Com. 59 Pa. 371; Reg. v. Greenwood, 
 
 v. Gonzales, 11 N. M. 301, 68 Pac. 925. 7 Cox, C. C. 404. Contra, Bruner v. 
 
 In People v. Sanchez, 24 Cal. 17, how- State, 58 Ind. 159; Adams v. State, 65 
 
 ever, it was held that in a prosecution Ind. 565. 
 
 for m.urder committed in the perpetra- 5Bradshaw v. State ( Tex. Crim. App. ) 
 
 tion of, or attempt to perpetrate, a 50 S. W. 359. 
 
 felony the jury has no option but to find elsham v. State, 38 Ala. 213. 
 
 the accused guilty of murder in the 7See Conner v. Com. 13 Bush, 714; 
 
 first degree. Buckner v. Com. 14 Bush, 601; Overby 
 
 2Wharton, Crim. Law, 7th ed. § 3199; v. State, 115 Ga. 240, 41 S. E. 609; 
 
 Smith V. State, 142 Ala. 14. 39 So. 329; State v. Emerich, 87 Mo. 110, Affirming 
 
 Mickey v. Com. 9 Bush, 593; King v. 13 Mo. App. 492. 
 Gary, 3 Bulst, 206. 
 
1044 HOMICIDE. [§ 653 
 
 or where such manslaughter is regarded as a misdemeanor only. 
 And a verdict for manslaughter may be returned in a prosecution 
 for murder under a statute declaring an attempt to produce an abor- 
 tion, which canses death, to be murder, as well as in the case of an 
 indictment for any other kind of murder.® But one who is tried 
 upon the sole theory that he had caused death while procuring an 
 abortion and was, therefore, guilty of murder cannot be convicted 
 upon the totally different theory that he had acted without due cau- 
 tion or circumspection while treating the deceased medically,^" and 
 a verdict of murder in the second degree, finding the accused guilty 
 of unlawfully procuring an abortion as charged, is unauthorized and 
 illegal where the information charged homicide in the commission of 
 an independent felony. -^^ 
 
 So, where there is a reasonable doubt as to the degree of a homi- 
 cide in a prosecution therefor, the accused is entitled to an acquittal 
 of the higher degree, whether or not the evidence establishes the ex- 
 istence of the inferior degree. -^^ And where the court had not, in 
 terms, instructed the jury concerning their duty if they were satis- 
 fied of the guilt of the accused of some degree of murder, but were 
 in doubt as to which degree, refusal to charge the statutory rule 
 that when there is a reasonable doubt of which of two or more de- 
 grees of an offense the accused is guilty, he must be convicted of the 
 lowest degree, is error. ^ * And a verdict for a lower degree of homi- 
 cide will not be set aside on the ground that the evidence does not 
 make out that degree of the crime in terms as defined by the statute, 
 when it would have supported a finding of a higher degree.^* Nor 
 
 8Com. V. Gable, 7 Serg. & R. 423; i^Morrison v. State, 42 Fla. 149, 28 
 
 Walters v. Com. 44 Pa. 135; Com. v. So. 97; Fuller v. State, 30 Tex. App. 
 
 Bilderback, 2 Pars. Sel. Eq. Cas. 447. 559, 17 S. W. 1108; Castlin v. State 
 
 sEarll V. People, 73 111. 329; Howard (Tex. Grim. App.) 57 S. W. 827; State 
 
 V. People, 185 111. 552, 57 N. E. 442; v. Underwood, 35 Wash. 568, 77 Pac. 
 
 State V. Alcorn, 7 Idaho, 599, 97 Am. 863. And see State v. Mowry, 21 R. 
 
 St. Rep. 252, 64 Pac. 1014. I. 376, 43 Atl. 871. 
 
 loPeople V. Huntington, 138 Cal. 261, A person convicted of voluntary man- 
 
 70 Pac. 284. slaughter cannot be heard to say that 
 
 iiState V. Belyea, 9 N. D. 353, 83 N. his conviction is erroneous, because un- 
 
 W. 1. der the circumstances of the killing he 
 
 isCasey v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) miglit have been convicted of murder. 
 
 90 S. W. 1018. Moore v. People, 26 Colo. 213, 57 Pac. 
 
 isCooIman v. State, 163 Ind. 503, 857. 
 
 72 >7. E. 568. And a verdict of murder in a lower 
 
 But an instruction in a prosecution degree vidll be sustained as against a 
 
 for homicide that when a party is in- motion for a new trial on the ground 
 
 dieted for murder he may be convicted that the evidence is not sufficient to 
 
 of manslaughter, if the jury believes support it, though it does not make out 
 
 from the evidence that he was guilty of a case of murder in that degree, but is 
 
 manslaughter, is erroneous where it sufficient to sustain a verdict of a Mffher 
 
 does not define manslaughter. State v. degree. Clcmmons v. State 43 Fla. 
 
 Sloan, 47 Mo. 604. 200, 30 So. 699. ' 
 
§ 633] VERDICT. 1045 
 
 are errors with reference to a charge of homicide in a higher clegTee 
 ground for reversal of a conviction of a lower degree when the evi- 
 dence clearly shows guilt in that degree.^'' So, a verdict for man- 
 slaughter will be upheld against error in the instructions in improp- 
 erly restricting the scope of manslaughter.-^^ And where a ver- 
 dict of murder in a higher degree is set aside for error affecting the 
 degree of the murder, the court may in its discretion, instead of 
 remanding the case for a new trial on the whole case, set aside the 
 verdict of the higher degree, and allow it to stand as a verdict in a 
 lower degree, and remand the case for sentence for the lesser de- 
 gree,^'' such procedure not being objectionable as a denial of a trial 
 by jury.** And where a person was indicted for murder and con- 
 victed of manslaughter, and the verdict was set aside on his ap- 
 peal, and he was again tried and found guilty as charged, the verdict 
 is responsive to the charge of manslaughter. ^ * 
 
 654. Necessity of negativing higher degrees Where the jury con- 
 victs of manslaughter (or of murder in the second degree), the ver- 
 dict, in order to be technically correct, should be, "not guilty of mur- 
 der, but guilty of manslaughter (or of murder in the second degree)." 
 In Maryland this exactness is held to be essential.^ But in most ju- 
 risdictions such nicety is not required.^ 
 
 655. Assessment of punishment and recommendation to mercy 
 
 When the punishment for homicide is fixed by law the verdict need 
 not assess the punishment. ^ When, however, the statute requires the 
 
 isTaylor v. State, 72 Ark. 613, 82 S. the ease then standing aa though the 
 
 W. 495; demons v. State (Fla.) 37 So. jury bad failed to assess punishment, 
 
 647; McDuffie v. State, 121 Ga. 580, 49 so that it will be remanded with an or- 
 
 S. E. 70S ; Goodman v. State, 122 Ga. der to sentence for murder in the second 
 
 111, 49 S. W. 922; Taber v. Com. 26 degree. Vance v. State, supra; Levy 
 
 Ky. L. Rep. 754, 82 S. \V. 443. v. State, 70 Ark. 610, 68 S. W. 485. 
 
 leShepherd v. Com. 26 Ky. L. Rep. isState v. Halliday, 112 La. 846, 36 
 
 698, 82 S. W. 378. So. 753. 
 
 iTDarden v. State, 73 Ark. 315, 84 iState v. Flannigan, 6 Md. 167; 
 
 S. W. 507 ; Simpson v. State, 56 Ark. Weighorst v. State, 7 Md. 445. 
 
 19, 19 S. W. 99; Routt v. State, 61 Ark. 2See Wharton, Crim. Law, 7th ed. §§ 
 
 594, 34 S. W. 262; Eastling v. State, 69 561, 562, 3183, 3696. 
 
 Ark. 189, 62 S. W. 584; Vance v. State, It is competent and proper for the 
 
 70 Ark. 272, 68 S. W. 37 ; Noble v. Jury in a prosecution for murder to 
 
 State, 75 Ark. 246, 87 S. W. 120. And negative the proposition that the ac- 
 
 see Ballew v. United States, 160 U. S. cused intended to kill the deceased, and 
 
 187, 40 L. ed. 388, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. a verdict that he did not design or in- 
 
 263. tend to Icill, but that he unlawfully 
 
 isDarden v. State, supra. killed him while engaged in the commis- 
 
 So, where there is evidence to support sion of some felony, is proper and con- 
 
 a conviction of murder in the first de- stitutes a verdict of murder in the third 
 
 gree, but material evidence on the ques- degree under the Wisconsin statute. 
 
 tion' of murder in the second degree is State v. Hammond, 35 Wis. 315. 
 
 wrongfully excluded, the court on appeal i Territory v. Webb, 2 N. M. 149; Ter- 
 
 may, in its discretion, set aside the ritoiy v. Romine, 2 N. M. 114. 
 judgment of murder in the first degree. 
 
1046 HOMICIDE, [§ 65S 
 
 jury to assess the punishment, the punishment assessed must be spe- 
 cifically set out in the verdict,^ and such an assessment is invalid 
 when it is arrived at by averaging the individual assessments of the 
 difFerent jurors, all agreeing to be bound thereby.® But a verdict 
 assessing the punishment at imprisonment for a designated period is 
 sufficiently formal and regular, though it does not name the place of 
 imprisonment;* and it is not objectionable because it does not specify 
 ■'at hard labor."^ Nor is a verdict for murder in the first degree in- 
 sufficient to sustain a judgment, because the dates of the sentence and 
 of execution thereof are expressed in figures, instead of words.® 
 And a verdict in a prosecution for murder of guilty, assessing a pun- 
 ishment applicable to manslaughter under the statute, but not to mur- 
 der, is a verdict for manslaughter and will be upheld as such.'' So, 
 where the statute permits the jury to find a verdict of guilty, without 
 capital punishment, such a verdict may be rendered in a murder case, 
 though there are no mitigating or palliating circumstances.^ The 
 act of the court of taking from the jury the duty of fixing the punish- 
 ment for a homicide is not prejudicial error under such a statute, 
 however, when the lowest possible degree was fixed upon, and the 
 smallest possible punishment was imposed.® And it has been held 
 that if the jury cannot agree as to the punishment to be assessed, it 
 may be determined by the court.*" 
 I When a recommendation to mercy is provided for by statute the 
 
 zWalton V. State, 57 Miss. 533; Spain swinston v. United States, 172 U. S. 
 
 V. State. 59 Miss. 19 ; People v. French, 303, 43 L. ed. 456, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 69 Cal. 169, 10 Pae. 378; Dias v. State, 212. 
 
 7 Blackf. 20, 39 Am. Dec. 448; Veateh But an instruction in a prosecution 
 
 V. State, 60 Ind. 291 ; State v. Foster, for murder that if the jury find the 
 
 36 La. Ana. 857; Doran v. State, 7 Tex. defendant guilty of murder in the first 
 
 App. 385. degree, and also find some extenuating 
 
 Such a requirement is not unconsti- fact or circumstance, it is within their 
 
 tutional as trenching upon judicial paw- discretion to fix the punishment at im- 
 
 ers. State v. Hockett, 70 Iowa, 442, 30 prisonraent for life, but that, if there 
 
 N. W. 742. were no extenuating circumstances, then 
 
 sHunter v. State, 8 Tex. App. 75. they should impose the death penalty, is 
 
 4Sudduth V. State, 124 Ala. 32, 27 So. not erroneous as interfering with the 
 
 487. discretion of the jury, though instruc- 
 
 sState V. Trout, 74 Iowa, 545, 7 Am. tions on that subject are not to be en- 
 
 St. Eep. 499, 38 N. W. 405. couraged. People v. Bawden, 90 Cal. 
 
 GNoles V. State. 24 Ala. 672. 195, 27 Pac. 204. 
 
 So, a verdict, "We, the jury, find the The maximum punishment imposed 
 
 defendant guilty of murder in the sec- for manslaughter will not be reduced 
 
 ond degree and recommend sentence to by the fact that the evidence of identi- 
 
 the penitentiary for twenty years," is fication of the accused as the one who 
 
 sutBciently formal and definite to sus- fired the fatal shot is not strong. State 
 
 tain H, judgment and sentence of im- v. Gray, 116 Iowa. 231, 89 N. W. 987. 
 
 prisonment in the penitentiary for twen- 9Taylor v. State, 73 Ark. 158, ?3 S. 
 
 ty years. Lewis v. State, 51 Ala. 1. W. 922. 
 
 TWhiteneck v. Com. 21 Ky. L. Rep. loPeople v. Welch, 49 Oal. 177. 
 1625, .55 S. W. 916, 56 S. W. 3. 
 
I 655] VERDICT, 1047 
 
 jury may or may not, at their discretion, incorporate it in their ver- 
 dict, ^ ^ and a verdict of murder "with recommendation to the mercy 
 of the court" sufficiently complies with a statutory provision permit- 
 ting the jury to recommend imprisonment for life, and supports a 
 judgment imposing such imprisonment.-'^ So, a recommendation 
 to mercy included in a verdict for murder, though not provided for 
 by statute, does not invfilidate the verdict. ^^ Such a recommenda- 
 tion to mercy, however, is not an essential part of the verdict and is 
 not binding on the court, ^ * and the verdict may be entered and re- 
 corded without it. ^ ^ And a verdict of conviction of murder will not 
 be disturbed on an affidavit of one of the jurors that he had doubts 
 as to the prisoner's guilt, and agreed to the verdict only because he 
 believed the recommendation to mercy would procure pardon or 
 commutation of sentence.^® 
 
 656. Right of judge to direct verdict. — The general duties of the 
 court in this relation are elsewhere discussed, and it is shown that 
 while, where there is absolutely no evidence of guilt of a particular 
 grade, the court should direct an acquittal, yet that, unless there is 
 neither evidence nor inference pointing to a particular grade, the 
 court has no right to exclude such grade from the consideration of 
 the jury.^ Indeed, in view of the law heretofore stated, that the 
 distinction between murder in the first degree and murder in the 
 second degree depends upon the mental capacity of the defendant at 
 the time of the offense to form a distinct intent, and that this capacity 
 can be only inferentially determined, it would be hard to conceive 
 of a case in which a judge would be justified in telling the jury they 
 cannot convict of murder in the second degree. He is entitled, how- 
 ever, freely to express his opinion as to the grade, provided he does 
 not do so as a peremptory direction.^ 
 
 657. Concurrence of jurors necessary — The common-law rule appli- 
 cable to all classes of cases, both civil and criminal, and which 
 still remains intact with reference to nearly all of them, that the con- 
 currence of all of the twelve jurors is necessary to a verdict, is, of 
 
 iiThomas v. State, 89 Ga. 479, 15 S. i estate v. Bennett, 40 S. C. 308, 18 
 
 E. 537; West v. State, 79 Ga. 773, 4 S. S. E. 886. 
 
 E. 325; Ee Harris, 93 Ga. 203, 18 S. E. iWharton, Grim. Law, 7th ed. § 
 
 823; Hackett v. People, 8 Colo. 390, 8 3163a; Harris v. State, 47 Miss. 318; 
 
 Pac. 574 ; State v. Bennett, 40 S. C. McNevins v. People, 61 Barb. 307 ; Bur- 
 
 308, 18 S. E. 886; Eason v. State, 6 dick v. People, 58 Barb. 51; Lane v. 
 
 Baxt. 431. Com. 59 Pa. 371 ; Jones v. Com. 75 Pa. 
 
 isile Harris, supra. 403; Com. v. Twitehell, 1 Brewst. (Pa.) 
 
 i3State V. Bennett, supra. 552. 
 
 KHackett v. People, supra; Walston 2See Jones v. Com. supra; Wharton, 
 
 V. State. 54 Ga. 242. Grim. Law, 7th ed. § 3163a, 
 
 iBPeople V. Lee, 17 Gal. 76. 
 
1048 HOMICIDE. [§ 657 
 
 course, applicable to homicide cases. And where it is provided by 
 constitutional enactment that in cases in which the punishment is 
 capital there must be a jury of twelve, all of whom must concur in 
 rendering a verdict, and that in cases in which the punishment is at 
 hard labor there must be a jury of twelve, nine of whom may ren- 
 der a verdict, on a trial for murder all of the twelve jxtrors must con- 
 cur to find a verdict for manslaughter.^ 
 
 iState T. Biagas, 105 La. 603, 29 So. 
 971. 
 
CHAPTER XXXI. 
 
 JUDGMENT AND EXECUTION. 
 
 I. EPFTxrr OF conviction oe ACQUirrAi, on fuetheb PBOSBxnjnoH. 
 
 658. Application of general rule. 
 II. Punishment. 
 
 659. The Penalty. 
 
 660. Determination of penalty. 
 
 661. How inflicted. 
 
 662. Time of execution of death sentence. 
 
 663. How and by whom executed. 
 
 I. Effect of conviction oe acquittal on fubthee peosecution. 
 658. Application of general rule — The effect of conviction for a 
 criminal act on further prosecution therefor is one of general crim- 
 inal law, in no respect specially applicable to homicide. All that 
 need be said in this connection is that the rules of criminal law that 
 where one crime is included in, and forms a necessary part of, an- 
 other, and is but a different degree of the same offense, and where 
 on a prosecution for the higher crime a conviction may be had for 
 the lower, then a conviction or acquittal for the higher will bar a 
 prosecution for the lower j"^ and that a conviction or acquittal for 
 the minor offense included in a greater will bar a prosecution for 
 the greater, if on an indictment for the greater the defendant could 
 be convicted of the lesser,^ — s-PPty to homicide, as well as to other 
 
 iSee State v. Standifer, 5 Port. (Ala.) 52 Ala. 348; Bell v. State, 48 Ala. 685, 
 
 523; Com. v. Eoby, 12 Pick. 503; State 17 Am. Rep. 40; People v. Gilmore, 4 
 
 V. Cooper, 13 N. J. L. 361, 25 Am. Dec. Cal. 376, 60 Am. Dec. 620; Jordan v. 
 
 490; Thomas v. State, 40 Tex. 39; State, 22 Ga. 545; Brennan v. People, 
 
 United States v. Houston, 4 Cranch, G. 15 111. 511; Clem v. State, 42 Ind. 420, 
 
 C. 267, Fed. Gas. No. 15,398. 13 Am. Rep. 369; Conner v. Com. supra; 
 
 Where degrees of murder are spoken People v. Knapp, 26 Mich. 116; State 
 
 of in statutory provisions with refer- v. Liessing, 16 Minn. 75, Gil, 64; Hurt 
 
 ence thereto, it should be understood to v. State, 25 Miss. 378, 59 Am. Dec. 225 ; 
 
 refer to the degrees recognized by the State v. Smith, 53 Mo. 139; State v. 
 
 common law, and when all offenses of Ross, 29 Mo. 32; State v. Cooper, su- 
 
 homicide are declared to be degrees of pra; People v. Cox, 67 App. Div. 344, 
 
 the same offense, it should be held to 73 N. Y. Supp. 774; State v. Barry (N. 
 
 mean offenses of homicide as recognized D.) 103 N. W. 637; Com. v. Neeley, 2 
 
 by the common law, and not including Chester Co. Rep. 191 : Slaughter v. 
 
 statutory offenses. Conner v. Com. 13 State, 6 Humph. 410; Thomas v. State, 
 
 Bush, 7i4. 40 Tex. 39; Cheek v. State, 4 Tex. App. 
 
 2See Com. v. Roby, supra; Com. v. 444; Plynn v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 
 
 Hertv. 109 Mass. 348; Fields v. State, 407, 60 S. W. 551; State v. Martin, 30 
 ■' 1049 
 
1050 HOMICIDE. [§ 658 
 
 crimes divided into degrees. And, of course, if a person has been 
 put on trial for a homicide or other offense embracing different de- 
 grees, and has been convicted of the higher degree, he cannot again 
 be put upon trial for that degree,* And though a reversal is se- 
 cured and a new trial ordered upon application of the accused, the 
 prevailing rule is that, on the second trial, he cannot be tried for or 
 convicted of a higher degree of the crime than that of vyhich he was 
 previously convicted.* And the legal effect of receiving a plea of 
 guilty of manslaughter in a prosecution for murder, and rendering 
 judgment thereon, is to dispose of the whole case, and the accused 
 cannot afterwards be convicted of murder in any degree because of 
 the commission of that homicide.^ So, a conviction on one count of 
 an indictment for homicide is an acquittal upon other counts and a 
 bar to a further prosecution therefor.® And where a person is in- 
 dicted for homicide as principal, and acquitted, he cannot be again 
 indicted as an accessory before the fact. '' And where a person is put 
 in jeopardy as accessory before the fact to murder, a conviction for 
 a lower degree of homicide is a bar, while unreversed, to another 
 prosecution for any other degree of homicide embraced in the indict- 
 ment. ^ 
 
 A person charged in an indictment for murder as principal in 
 the second degree, however, may be convicted of murder, although 
 the person charged in the same indictment as principal in the first 
 degree had been convicted by a former jury of manslaughter only, 
 where the statute defines a principal in the second degree as one 
 aiding and abetting the act to be done, and provides that, unless 
 otherwise provided, he shall receive the same punishment as that 
 prescribed for the principal in the first degree.® And where invol- 
 untary manslaughter is a misdemeanor only, and one indicted for 
 
 Wis. 216, 11 Am. Rep. 567; Rex v. Jen- accused on trial under a second indict- 
 nings, Russ. & R. C. C. 388. ment for murder in the first degree. 
 
 A conviction of an ofifenae in a minor State v. Goddard, 162 Mo. 198, 62 S. 
 grade is, in effect, an acquittal of a W. 697. 
 
 higher grade charged in the indictment. And the same result is arrived at un- 
 Potsdamer v. State, 17 Fla. 895. der the Kentucky statute. Spriggs v. 
 
 sConde v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. Com. 113 Ky. 724, 68 S. W. 1087- Com 
 98, 60 Am. St. Rep. 22, 34 S. W. 288. v. Arnold, 83 Ky. 1. 4 Am. St. Ren. 
 
 4See Lewis v. State, 51 Ala. 1 ; John- 117. 
 son V. State, 29 Ark. 31, 21 Am. Rep. 6Stat« v. Morrison (Ind.) 75 N E 
 154; People v. McFarlane, 138 Cal. 481, 968. 
 61 L.R.A. 245, 71 Pac. 568, 72 Pac. 48. eHawley v. Com. 75 Va. 847. 
 
 But a judgment convicting a person 'People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 229, 21 
 of murder in the second degree under Am. Dec. 122. 
 
 an indictment charging murder in the 8 State v. Steeves, 29 Or. 85, 43 Pac. 
 first degree, reversed, for errors of law, 947. 
 
 by the suoreme court, is not a bar un- BBruce v. State, 99 Ga. 50, 25 S. E. 
 der the Missouri statute to putting the 760. 
 
§ 658] JUDGMENT AND EXECUTION. 1051 
 
 a felony cannot be convicted of involuntary manslaughter, on an 
 indictment for murder, an acquittal or conviction of murder is not 
 a bar to a subsequent prosecution for involuntary manslaughter/" 
 Nor is an acquittal in a prosecution for murdering one person a bar 
 to a subsequent prosecution for murdering another person, unless it 
 is made to appear that both homicides were produced by the same 
 act.-** And the fact that a person had been previously convicted of 
 murder in the second degree, and thereby acquitted of murder in the 
 first degree, does not render it improper to instruct the jury on a 
 subsequent trial on the difference between express and implied mal- 
 ice, where the jury are also told that they can only consider murder 
 in the second degree and manslaughter.*^ Nor does the fact that 
 a person charged with homicide had been previously acquitted of 
 murder in the first degree prevent the admission of evidence in a 
 subsequent trfal, showing express malice, or preclude the counsel in 
 the closing argument from arguing that the facts of the case tend 
 to show a deliberate killing upon express malice. * * And he may be 
 convicted of murder in the second degree in such subsequent trial, 
 on evidence showing guilt of murder in the first degree.** The 
 contrary rule that whenever an appeal from a conviction of a lower 
 degree of homicide is granted, or a new trial ordered, the judgment 
 is opened as to higher degrees as well as to lower ones, has been as- 
 serted, however. * ^ And where the statute provides that the granting 
 of a new trial places the parties in the same position as if no trial had 
 been had, a person who has been convicted of a lower degree of hom- 
 icide under an indictment charging a higher one may, on being grant- 
 ed a new trial, be again tried for the higher degree.*** 
 
 So, the general rule that a person cannot be convicted and punished 
 for two distinct felonies growing out of the same identical act, where 
 one is a necessary ingredient of the other, and the state has selected 
 
 lOCom. V. Werbine, 12 Lane. Bar, McCord, 8 Kan. 232, 12 Am. Rep. 469; 
 
 79; Hilands v. Com. 114 Pa. 372, 6 Atl. Turner v. Territory (Okla.) 82 Pac. 
 
 267. And see Com. v. Highland, 1 Pa. 650. 
 
 •Co. Ct. 532; Com. v. Skeels, 13 Pa. Co. leTurner v. Territory, supra. 
 
 -Ct. 174. -^^ erroneous ruling by the court in 
 
 iiSta'te V. Rosa, 72 N. J. 1>. 462, 62 a, prosecution for homicide that the ac- 
 
 Atl. 695. cused, who had been convicted of man- 
 
 laEverett v. State (Tex. Crim. App.) slaughter under an indictment for mur- 
 
 24 S W. 506. '!*'■> could not be retried for murder 
 
 isibid." Arid see Martin v. State, 42 does not entitle the prosecution to a 
 
 Tex Crim. Rep. 144, 58 S. W. 112. new trial on the ground that the accused 
 
 liConneil v. State,' 46 Tex. Crim. Rep. might have been convicted of a higher 
 
 259 81 S. W. 746; Sylvester v. State, degree of homicide, though the stat- 
 
 72 Ala 201. ' "^^ declares that the granting of a new 
 
 "isUnited States v. Harding, 1 Wall, trial places the parties in the same po- 
 
 Jr 127 Fed. Cas. No. 15,3U1; State v. sition as if no trial had been had. Ibid. 
 
1052 HOMICIDE. [§ 658 
 
 and prosecuted one to conviction, also applies in the case of hom- 
 icide in the commission of a felony or unlawful act. ^ '' And when a 
 person has been convicted of the crime of arson he may plead that 
 conviction in bar of an indictment for murder committed in the 
 same bxirning by the burning to death of a person in the building 
 burned. ^^ The proper practice in such a case is to indict and try 
 for the higher crime, and if the part of the offense which is peculiar 
 to that is not proved, and all that is necessary to constitute the infe- 
 rior one is, the verdict should convict of the inferior felony and acquit 
 as to the residue of the charge. ^ * A prosecution for the murder of 
 one person in an attempt to perpetrate a robbery, however, is not a 
 bar to the conviction of the same person for an assault with intent 
 to rob upon another person, though the transaction is the same.^" 
 And an acquittal on a count of an indictment charging the defendant 
 with killing another purposely and with premeditated malice does not 
 work an acquittal upon another count in the same indictment charging 
 the killing to have been done in the perpetration of a burglary, so 
 as to overturn a conviction upon a verdict of guilty on the second 
 count. ^ ^ 
 
 Likewise, under statutes providing that the jurisdiction shall be 
 in the courts of the county where the prosecution shall be first begun, 
 when a death following a fatal blow struck in one county occurs 
 in another, the commencement of a prosecution in either will bar 
 a subsequent one in the other, though a nolle prosequi was entered 
 before the termination of the trial. ^^ The state cannot, by reason 
 of the fact that the crime is partly consummated in each of several 
 counties, so that the courts of each have jurisdiction of the offense, 
 institute a prosecution in one of them, and then at its pleasure dis- 
 miss that and commence another in another county, and so harass the 
 accused in every county in which jurisdiction can be obtained. ^^ 
 
 II. Punishment. 
 
 659. The penalty. — -At common law the penalty for murder was 
 death. ^ And where no mode of execution is prescribed by statute 
 the common law obtains, and the penalty for murder remains the 
 same.^ It is provided by statute, however, in England, that persons 
 
 "State V. Cooper, 13 N. J. L. 361, L.R.A. 807, 35 So. 937; Ex parte Bald- 
 
 25 Am. Dec. 490. win, 69 Iowa, 602, 29 N. W. 428. 
 
 islbid. 23Coleman v. State, supra. 
 
 islbid. 14 Bl Com. 201. 
 
 20Keaton v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. sDone v. People, 5 Park. Grim. Rep. 
 
 021, .57 S. W. 1125. ,364. 
 
 2iBissot V. State, 53 Ind. 408. Deatli being tlie penalty for murder 
 
 2 2Coleman v. State, 83 Miss. 290, G4 at common law the death penalty fbr 
 
« 659] JUDGMENT AND EXECUTION. 1053 
 
 convicted of murder shall suffer death.-^ And death is the statutory 
 penalty for murder in the first degree in a large number of the United 
 States. In states in which the crime of murder has not been divid- 
 ed into degrees, the punishment is generally death, or imprisonment 
 either for life or for a term of years, in the discretion of the court or 
 jury.^ And under the Federal statutes, murder is punishable by 
 death unless the jury qualify their verdict by adding "without cap- 
 ital punishment.'"' And in some of the states, murder in the first 
 degree is punishable either by death or by imprisonment for life.'' 
 And in a few of the states, capital punishment has been abolished and 
 imprisonment for life has been substituted in its stead, as the punish- 
 ment for murder in the first degree.* And this has been made the 
 rule in certain classes of cases under the Federal statutes.® Pun- 
 ishment for murder by death is not cruel within the meaning of a 
 constitutional provision against the infliction of cruel and unusual 
 punishment. ^ " Punishments are cruel in this sense only when they 
 involve torture, or a lingering death. ^ ^ And the fact that a person 
 convicted of murder is already serving a sentence of imprisonment 
 for another crime does not affect the right to inflict capital punish- 
 ment upon him. ^ ^ 
 
 The execution of sentence by imprisonment for life or a term of 
 years for murder in lower degrees and for manslaughter differs in no 
 way from the execution of similar sentences for other crimes. And 
 if no punishment for homicide is prescribed by statute the common- 
 law punishment may be inflicted.^® And where involuntary man- 
 slaughter is made a misdemeanor by statute, but no punishment is 
 
 murder in the first degree is not abol- 7 See Kilgor v. State^ 124 Ala. 24, 27 
 
 ished by a statute repealing a statute So. 4; Brown v. State, ZOS Ala. 70, 20 
 
 providing for that penalty. Lowenberg So. 103; Valentine v. State, 77 6a. 470; 
 
 V. People, 27 N. Y. 33G. Fy v. State, 81 Ga. 645, 8 S. E. 64; 
 
 And a statute providing for the pun- Cyrus v. State, 102 Ga. 616, 29 S. E. 
 
 ishment of persons under eighteen years 917; Perry v. State, 102 Ga. 365, 30 
 
 of age, designed for the government of S. E. 903. 
 
 a state reform school, does not repeal sSee People v. Wright, 89 Mich. 70, 
 
 the general statute providing that per- 50 N. W. 792. 
 
 sons convicted of murder in the first sMotes v. United States, supra. 
 
 degree shall suffer death, so as to abol- loPeople v. Kemmler, 119 N. Y. 580, 
 
 ish the death penalty as to criminals 24 N. E. 9; Re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 
 
 under eighteen. State v. Schmidt, 136 34 L. ed. 519, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 930. 
 
 Mo. 644, 38 S. W. 719. iiRe Kemmler, supra. 
 
 324 & 25 Viet. chap. 100, § 1. The general subject of cruel and un- 
 
 4See Calton v. Utah, 130 U. S. 83, usual punishments is fully considered 
 
 32 L ed. 870, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 435. in a note to State ex rel. Garvey v. 
 
 eSee Hickam v. People, 137 111. 75, 27 Whitaker, 35 L.R.A. 561. 
 
 U_ E gg. isThomas v. P-eopIe, 67 N. Y. 218. 
 
 GSee Motes v. United States, 178 U. isEx parte Garrison, 36 W. Va. 686, 
 
 S. 458, 44 L. ed. 1150, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 15 S. E. 417. 
 993. 
 
1064 HOAIICtDB. [§ 659 
 
 attached, either to involuntary manslaughter or to misdemeanors, 
 the common-law punishment for a misdemeanor by fine and imprison- 
 ment, or either, may be imposed. ^ * And where the statute expressly 
 provides for a punishment for murder in the second or other degree 
 of a term of imprisonment of not less than a specified number of 
 years, placing no limit upon the duration of the imprisonment, the 
 accused may be sentenced to imprisonment during life. ^ ® And a sen- 
 tence of fifty years' imprisonment for manslaughter in the first de- 
 gree, under a statute fixing the punishment for that crime at a period 
 not less than four years, cannot be held on appeal, as matter of law, 
 to be a cruel and unusual punishment, in the absence of anything in 
 the record showing the age or previous character of the prisoner, or 
 circumstances under which the crime was committed. ^ * 
 
 660. Determination of penalty. — In cases in which the statute pre- 
 scribes a penalty of imprisonment for a term of years, it is within 
 the province of the court to determine within the statutory limits 
 the number of years of imprisonment, as in other similar cases. ^ 
 And nothing should be said to the jury with reference thereto; 
 the only instances in which it is allowable to say anything to 
 the jury as to the quantum of punishment are those in which they 
 are allowed or directed by statute to determine or recommend with 
 reference to it.^ And where the statute is absolute, requiring pun- 
 ishment by death or imprisonment for life in case of conviction, the 
 sentence is pronounced by the court, which has no alternative bat 
 to pronounce the prescribed sentence;^ and in such case a recom- 
 
 Klbid. the penitentiary is not improper under 
 
 lePeople v. Brooks, 131 Oa,l. 311, 63 a statute providing that whoever is 
 Pae. 464 ; Drake v. State, 5 Tex. App. guilty of murder shall suffer the punish- 
 649. And see Miller v. State, 54 Ala. ment of death or imprisonment in the 
 155. penitentiary for his natural life, or for 
 
 Confinement in the penitentiary for a term not less than fourteen years, 
 life is not too severe a punishment for either as a sentence for life, or as one 
 a person who unlawfully, knowingly, of more than fourteen years. Hickam 
 and wilfully invades another's premises v. People, 137 111. 75, 27 N. E. 88. 
 armed, and then shoots the owner, who 2Johnson v. State. 78 Miss. 627, 29 
 attempts in a lawful manner to remove So. 515; Ellerbe v. State, 79 Miss. 10, 
 him therefrom. State v. Kohne, 48 30 So. 57; State v. Tettaton, 159 Mo. 
 W. Va. 335, 37 S. E. 553. 354, 60 S. W. 743. 
 
 lejones v. Territory, 4 Okla. 45, 43 sSee Calton v. Utah. 130 U. S. 83, 32 
 Pac. 1072. And see also State v. Smith, L. ed. 870, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 435; Merritt 
 73 Iowa, 33, 34 N. W. 597; Bradshaw v. v. State, 52 Ga. 82; Territory v. Griego, 
 State (Tex. Crim. App.) 50 S. W. 359. 8 N. M. 133, 42 Pac. 81. 
 
 iSee Coil v. State, 62 Neb. 15, 86 N. And ordering a prisoner eharsfed with 
 W. 025; Baysingar v. Territory (Okla.) homicide to remain in the jail of the 
 82 Pac. 728; Com. v. Beucher, 10 Pa. Co. county where he is convicted, and where 
 Ct. 3; State v. Bennett, 40 S. C. 308, 18 the sentence of death is to be imposed, 
 S. E. 888; Ex parte Rogers, 138 Fed. after a change of venue, is not subject 
 961. to objection upon the ground that the 
 
 A sentence of ninety-nine years in imprisonment should be in the county 
 
§ 660] JUDGMENT AND EXECUTION. 1055 
 
 mendation to the mercy of the court is ineffectual;* though an error 
 in not conforming to the statute in such a case does not entitle the 
 accused to a discharge, when the indictment and conviction were 
 valid;® it simply warrants a reversal of judgment." So, when the 
 penalty for murder in the first degree is fixed absolutely at death, 
 it is not necessary, though not improper, to charge the jury as to the 
 punishment. '^ And an instruction defining manslaughter, but fail- 
 ing to fully state the punishment which might be inflicted therefor, 
 is not prejudicial error where it was not the province of the jury to 
 fix the punishment.* 
 
 So, where the statute prescribes that persons guilty of murder 
 in the first degree shall suffer death, or, upon the recommendation 
 of the jury, be imprisoned for life, the court has no alternative in 
 the absence of such a recommendation but to sentence the accused to 
 death. ^ And failure of the court in such a case to instruct the jury 
 as to their right to recommend imprisonment for life in place of the 
 punishment of death is reversible error. ^^ The jury are the exclu- 
 sive judges under such a statute, as to which punishment shall be 
 imposed, and their decision must stand unless it is manifest that 
 they have exceeded their powers. ^ ^ And when the statute provides 
 that no person shall be sentenced to death by any court, unless the 
 jury shall have so found by the verdict upon the trial, the restriction 
 
 where the crime was committed, since the court had fully instructed the jury 
 
 the punishment in such case is dsath, as to the form of verdict necessary if 
 
 and not imprisonment. Jackson v. Peo- the punishment was to be imprisonment 
 
 pie, 18 111. 269. for life, and that a verdict of guilty as 
 
 ^Territory v. Griego, supra; State v. charged in the indictment would be fol- 
 
 May, 172 Mo. 630, 72 S. W. 918. And lowed by capital punishment. Harris 
 
 see State v. Bennett, supra; State v. v. State (Miss.) 10 So. 478. 
 
 Murrell, 33 S. C. 83, 11 S. E. 682. lOCalton v. Utah, supra. And see 
 
 STerritory v. Griego, supra; Wash- Cohen v. State, 116 Ga. 573, 42 S. E. 
 
 ington V. State, 125 Ala. 40, 28 So. 78. 781; Evans v. State (Miss.) 40 So. 8. 
 
 sWashington v. State, supra. But an instruction in a prosecution 
 
 'Boothe V. State, 4 Tex. App. 202; for murder that, if the jury find the ae- 
 Hunt V. State, 7 Tex. App. 212; State v. cused guilty of murder in the first de- 
 Smith, 127 Iowa, 528, 103 N. W. 769. gres, they may recommend his eonfine- 
 And see State v. Yourex, 30 Wash. 611, ment in the penitentiary, and thus 
 71 Pac. 203; Bliss v. State, 117 Wis. avert the infliction of death, need not 
 596, 94 N. W. 325. be given in the absence of a request 
 
 s'state V. Peffers, 80 Iowa, 580, 46 N. therefor. And where the record is 
 
 W. 662. silent as to asking, giving, or refusal of 
 
 sCalton V. Utah, 130 U. S. 83, 32 L. such an instruction it is conclusively 
 
 ed. 870, 9 Sup. Ct. Hep. 435; Valentine presumed that, if requested, the instruc- 
 
 V. "state, 77 Ga. 470. tion was given, and if not requested 
 
 And the act of a juror in a prosecu- it was waived. State v. Beatty, 51 W. 
 
 tion for homicide of adding to his name Va. 232, 41 S. E. 434. 
 
 the words "opposed to capital punish- il Jackson v. State, 161 Ind. 36, 67 N. 
 
 ment," upon signing a verdict of guilty E. 690; Cohen v. State, supra. And 
 
 as charged in the indictment, does not see Bowles v. State (Miss.) 40 So. 165. 
 affect the sentence to be imposed, where 
 
1056 HOMICIDE. [§ 660 
 
 is confined to the sentence of death, and a sentence of imprisonment 
 for life on a plea of guilty is justified. ^ ^ 
 
 Where the statute permits the jury to qualify their verdict in 
 a prosecution for murder by adding thereto "without capital punish- 
 ment;" or prescribes that jDcrsons guilty of murder in the first de- 
 gree shall suffer death, or, upon recommendation of the jury, be im- 
 prisoned for life; or that no person shall be sentenced to death by 
 any court unless the jury shall have so found in their verdict upon 
 the trial, — the right to determine whether a sentence of death or of 
 imprisonment shall be imposed is left to the sound discretion of 
 the jury,^* with no power in the court to review their action.^* 
 And the court cannot require the jury to find palliating circum- 
 stances to authorize such a qualification;^^ and it cannot direct or 
 advise them upon the subject further than to inform them of their 
 province. ^ ® ISTor has it any authority to permit the solicitor of the 
 state by consent of the defendant, to waive capital punishment ; ^ ^ 
 though it may call upon the jury to consider all the attendant facts 
 and circumstances and determine the question of punishment from 
 a sense of duty. ^ * 
 
 So, where the jury are authorized to determine the degree of the 
 homicide, it is proper for the court to advise them of the distinction 
 between the different degrees, but it cannot give a binding instruction 
 
 izHamilton v. People, 71 111. 498. i^People v. Leary, supra. And see 
 
 13 Winston v. United States, 172 U. S. Hayner v. People, 213 111. 142, 72 N. E. 
 
 303, 43 L. ed. 456, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 212; 792. 
 
 United States v. Williams, 103 Fed. 1 5 United States v. Williams, supro. 
 838; People v. Kamaunu, 110 Cal. 609, isPeople v. Kamaunu, supra; People 
 
 42 Pac. 1090; People v. Leary, 105 Oal. v. Ross, 134 Cal. 256, 66 Pae. 229; 
 
 486, 39 Pac. 24; Fry v. State, 81 Ga. Washington v. State, 125 Ala. 40, 28 
 
 645, 8 S. E. 308; Thomas v. State, 89 So. 78; Perrv v. State, supra. And see 
 
 Ga. 479, 15 S. E. 537; Perry v. State, State v. Schiller, 70 Ohio St. 1, 70 N. 
 
 102 Ga. 365, 30 S. E. 903 ; Cyrus v. State, E. 505 ; Johnson v. State, 78 Miss. 627, 
 
 102 Ga. 616, 29 S. B. 917; Inman v. 29 So. 515; Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 
 
 State, 72 Ga. 269; Valentine v. State, 29 Am. St. Rep. 232, 9 So. 839. 
 77 Ga. 470. I'Kilgore v. State, 124 Ala. 24, 27 So. 
 
 But a sentence of imprisonment for 4. 
 life for conspiracy accompanied with isBrown v. State, 109 Ala. 70, 20 So. 
 
 murder, under a Federal statute provid- 103; Valentine v. State, 77 Ga. 470; 
 
 ing i'or such punishment as the laws of Fry v. State, 81 Ga. 645, 8 S. E. 308; 
 
 the state in which the offense is commit- (Jyrus v. State, 102 Ga. 616, 29 S. E. 
 
 ted may impose, is not in excess of the 917. 
 
 authority of a circuit court of the And an instruction in a, prosecution 
 United States, though the verdict of for homicide that if the jury convict 
 the Jury did not indicate the punish- the accused it is for them to say wheth- 
 ment as required by state statutes in er tlie facts and circumstances of the 
 case of murder, where Congress had case warrant them in recommending 
 abolished th,e death penalty in such him to the mercy of the court does not 
 cases, and provided for a sentence of circumscribe or restrict the jury in re- 
 imprisonment for life. Motes v. United spect to the exercise ot their right of 
 States, 178 U. S. 458, 44 L. ed. 1150, 20 recommendation. Valentine v. State, 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 993. supra. 
 
§ 660] JUDGMENT AND EXECUTION. 1057 
 
 to find any particular degree.^" But such statutes do not authorize 
 the jury to determine whether the punishment shall be death or im- 
 prisonment^" And they cannot be permitted to act arbitrarily, or 
 merely in accordance with their opinion, as to the kind or quantity 
 of punishment which should be inflicted ;^^ and a statute providing 
 that the jury shall fix the penalty in their verdict applies only to 
 crimes committed after its enactment. ^ ^ Under statutes of this class 
 the duty of the court is performed by stating to the jury the statutory 
 limits of the time of punishment within which they must keep.^* 
 And instructions to the jury naming a smaller maximum limit of 
 punishment than that prescribed are not subject to objection by the 
 accused,^* though it is ground for reversal to name a larger maxi- 
 mum limit than the prescribed one.^^ 
 
 So, statutes permitting the jury to recommend a particular pun- 
 ishment confer on them nothing but a power of suggestion, subject 
 to approval or disapproval by the court, and refusal to follow a 
 recommendation is not ground for a new trial. ^ ® And the rule by 
 which the opinion of the jury finding mitigating circumstances was 
 made obligatory on the court in some states has been changed by stat- 
 ute, so that it is now left to the sound discretion of the court, upon 
 the recommendation of the jury upon an unbiased and discriminat- 
 ing survey of the whole case, to give effect to that recommendation 
 or to refuse to do so, as the ends of public justice may seem to 
 dictate.^'' These provisions only give the jury the right to express 
 the opinion in their verdict that there are mitigating circumstances, 
 which amounts merely to a recommendation to mercy, which the 
 
 isCora. V. Fellows, 212 Pa. 297, 61 S4Leal v. State, 46 Tex. Grim. Rep. 
 
 Atl. 922; Rhodes v. Com. 48 Pa. 398; 334, 81 S. W. 961. 
 
 Lane v. Com. 59 Pa. 371; Shaffner v. ssMullins v. Com. 23 Kj. L. Rep. 
 
 Cora. 72 Pa. 60, 13 Am. Rep. 649; Gam. 2433, 67 S. W. 824. 
 
 V. Sutton, 205 Pa. 605, 55 Atl. 781. asDaniel v. State, 118 Ga. 16, 43 S. 
 
 2 0MeCIoud V. State, 37 Tex. Grim. E- 861 ■. 
 
 Rep. 237, 39 S. W. 104. , A verdict of a jury m a prosecution 
 
 siState V. Cole, 132 N. G. 1069, 44 S. ff homicide flnding the accused guilty 
 
 y on, of murder m the first degree, and 
 
 '22'walker V State 46 Neb 25 64 N sentencing him to death by hanging, is 
 
 w IsC sufficient to sustain a sentence that he 
 
 .7" , . ,. . J. . . be hanged. Stewart v. State, 137 Ala. 
 
 And a designation in a verdict m a gg g^ g^ gjg 
 
 prosecution for homicide of the place, '27Lewi3 v. State, 3 Head, 127; Greer 
 
 as well as the period, of punisnment, is ^ state, 3 Baxt. 321 ; Honeycutt v. 
 
 surplusage, and the error is immaterial, gtf^tg^ g j^^xt. 372; Linoaster v. State, 
 
 since it cannot interfere with the dis- 91 Tenn. 267, 18 S. W. 777; Leach v. 
 
 cretion of the court in designating such state, 99 Tenn. 584, 42 .S. W. 195. And 
 
 place. Henson v. State, 120 Ala. 316, 25 see Mann v. State, 3 Head, 374; Ray v. 
 
 So. 23. State, 108 Tenn. 282, 07 S. W. 553 ; C^l- 
 
 23State V. Miti-hell, 170 Mo. 633, 94 ton v. Utah, 130 U. S. 83, 32 L. ed. 870, 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 763, 71 S. W. 175. 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 435. 
 
 Horn.— 67 
 
1058 HOMICIDE. [§ 660 
 
 court may, or may not, disregard, aud do not subdivide murder in 
 the first degree into two separate grades of crime, so that a finding of 
 mitigating circumstances by one jury would be an acquittal of the 
 higher grade and a bar to a finding of murder without mitigating 
 circumstances in another trial.^^ The functions of the court are best 
 performed under such provisions by simply giving the terms of 
 the statute to the jury, and informing them that the making or with- 
 holding of the recommendation is a matter entirely within the dis- 
 cretion of a majority of their number.^® And an instruction that 
 the jury have the right to recommend the prisoner to the mercy of 
 the court in case of conviction, if a majority of their number so de- 
 cide, is not objectionable as a suggestion to the jury to abuse their 
 discretion to the disadvantage of the accused.^" Under the Georgia 
 statutes the jury in a murder case have no right to recommend, in 
 lieu of the death penalty, imprisonment for life, except in cases in 
 which the conviction is founded solely on circumstantial evidence;^'' 
 In such cases only, have either the presiding judge or the jury au- 
 thority to commute the punishment from death to that of life im- 
 prisonment.^^ And the statute should not be given to the jury in 
 instructions, though the impropriety of so doing is not a ground for a 
 new trial. ^^ 
 
 Under statutes of this class upon the question of punishment, 
 as upon all other questions, the accused is entitled to be tried in 
 accordance with the law, and if the trial judge shall illegally admit 
 evidence which will injuriously affect his interests, or illegally with- 
 hold from the jury relevant evidence which would be beneficial to 
 him in determining the question of punishment, such action is mate- 
 rially prejudicial.^* When there is a discretion to be exercised by 
 the jury on the question of punishment they should be put in pos- 
 session of all the facts of the case bearing thereon. ^ ' And this may 
 
 28Greer v. State, supra. their consistency, the hypothesis 
 
 2 9Lovett V. State, 30 Fla. 142, 17 claimed. Merritt v. State, 52 Ga. 82. 
 L.Pv.A. 705, 11 So. 550; Mann v. State, szlbid. 
 
 22 Fla. 601; Garner v. State, 28 Fla. ssBlackman v. State 80 Ga. 785, 7 
 
 113, 20 Am. St. Rep. 232, 9 So. 839. S. E. 626; Long v. State, supra. 
 
 Reading to the jury the section of 3 4Perry v. State, 102 Ga. 365, 30 S. 
 
 the statute applicable to recoramenda- E. 903; Vance v. State, 70 Ark. 272, 68 
 
 tions for mercy in case of a conviction S. W. 37. And see JlcCarty v Cora, 
 
 for homicide is not error, though the 114 Ky. 620, 71 S. W. 656- People v 
 
 court had fully charged the jury on that M'Kav, 122 Cal. 628, 55 Pac 594 
 question. Denham v. State, 22 Fla. 664. 3BP'eop]e v. Hong Ah Duck, 61 Cal 
 
 soLovett V. State, supra. 387; Fields v. State, 47 Ala. 603 11 Am 
 
 V\°''lJ^ ^^^^^- ^^ ^^- ^^^- ^^P- '^'^^5 Kistler v. State, 54 Ind. 400. 
 
 And the circumstantial testimony And where it appears in a prosecution 
 
 which authorizes the commutation of for homicide that the day before it oe- 
 
 the punishment for murder is tha,t eurred the father of the deceased was 
 
 which only tends to establish the issue in persistent pursuit of tlie accu.^ied 
 
 by proof of various facts sustaining, by armed with a deadly weapon and seek- 
 
§ 660] JUDGMENT AND EXECUTION. 1059 
 
 be done by collateral inqtiiry.^" And the people may properly be 
 permitted to prove in a prosecution for homicide that the accused 
 was serving sentence for life at the time of the homicide, not as 
 in any manner affecting the question of his guilt, but simply to 
 bring to the understanding of the jury that if he were found guilty 
 of murder in the first degree, and his punishment fixed at imprison- 
 ment for life, there would be no addition to the punishment inflicted 
 in the former case. ^ '' Nor are statutes of this class unconstitutional 
 as conferring judicial power upon bodies other than courts;^* and 
 the repeal of a constitutional provision authorizing juries to sub- 
 stitu.te imprisonment for life for the death penalty does not affect 
 that right as to crimes committed before the repeal, though the trial 
 and sentence were of a subsequent date.^* 
 
 661. How inflicted — At common law the death penalty for murder 
 was inflicted by hanging. ^ And where no mode of execution is pre- 
 scribed by the statute, sentences of death must be carried out by hang- 
 ing, as at common law.^ And the statutes of a large number of the 
 states have re-enacted the common law by requiring the execution 
 of a sentence of death to be by hanging.^ In several of the states, 
 however, the execution of the death penalty by hanging has been 
 abolished, and it is required to be executed by causing a current of 
 electricity to pass through the body of the convict, sufficient in inten« 
 sity to cause his death.* The legislature of a state has power to 
 change the manner of inflicting the penalty of death. ^ And while the 
 infliction of the death penalty by a new agency is unusual, the adop- 
 
 ing his life, and after failing to find him perpetrate, a, felony, providing for an 
 
 still threatened to kill him on sight, and increased penalty if it be so found, is 
 
 that the latter was informed of the to the disadvantage of the accused, and 
 
 threats, evidence that in seeking to kill is unconstitutional as an ex post facto 
 
 the father he killed the daughter is ad- law, where the Constitution provides 
 
 missibliB on the question of the punish- that any law passed after the commis- 
 
 ment to be inflicted for the killing, sion of an offense, which, with relation 
 
 Nowacryk v. People, 139 111. 336, 28 N. to that offense, alters the situation of a 
 
 E. 901. ps^rty to his disadvantage, is an ex posC 
 
 3 5 Fields v. State, and People v. Hong facto law. Garvey v. People, 6 Colo. 
 
 Ah Duck, supra. 559, 45 Am. Rep. 531. 
 
 37People V. Hong Ah Duck, supra. iDone v. People, 5 Park. Grim. Rep.. 
 
 ssstate V. Hockett, 70 Iowa, 442, 30 364; Lowenberg v. People, 27 N. Y. 330. 
 
 N. W. 742. 2lbid. 
 
 3 9 Murray v. State. 1 Tex. App. 417; 3 See statutory provisions of the dif- 
 
 Hunt V. State, 7 Tex. App. 212. ferent states. 
 
 But a statute providing that where a ^See People v. Kemmler, 119 N. Y. 
 
 person indicted for murder shall plead 580, 24 N. E. 9; Storti v. Com. 17S 
 
 guilty the court shall impanel a jury, Mass. 549, 52 L.R.A. 520, 60 N. E. 210. 
 
 to whom shall be submitted the ques- ePeople ex rel. Kemmler v. Durston^ 
 
 tion as to whether the killing was de- 119 N. Y. 569, 7 L.R.A. 715, 16 Am. St. 
 
 liberate or premeditated, or was done Rep. 859, 24 N. E. 6, Affirming 55 Hun, 
 
 in the perpetration of, or attempt to 64, 7 N. Y. Supp. 813. 
 
1060 HOMICroE. [§ 661 
 
 tion of such an agency which is not certainly a prolonged and tor- 
 turous proceeding is not violative of a constitutional provision against 
 the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.® And whether the 
 use of electricity is a jnore humane method of executing the sentence 
 of the court in capital cases is a fact for the determination of the 
 legislature, and its determination of that question in the affirmative, 
 after careful deliberation, is conclusive upon the courts, and cannot 
 be declared in violation of constitutional provisions.'' So, such a 
 provision is within the legitimate sphere of the legislative power of 
 a state,* and does not amount in law to a denial by the state of 
 due process of law to one accused of crime, or of any right secured 
 to him by the Constitution of the United States.® But such a 
 statutory provision is not retroactive, and a murder committed before 
 such an act took effect, a conviction for which was had afterwards, is 
 properly punished by hanging.^'* So, a statute prescribing the 
 punishment of death or imprisonment for life for the offense of 
 murder, as the jury may, in their discretion, determine, is a valid 
 and constitutional act of legislation. ^ ^ And a statute providing 
 that a person sentenced to death shall be kept in solitary confinement 
 in prison until the death punishment is inflicted is not repugnant 
 to a constitutional provision prohibiting cruel or unusual punish- 
 ment, or otherwise repugnant to the Federal Constitution. ' ^ 
 
 662. Time of execution of death sentence Fixing the time of the 
 
 execution of a sentence of death within the limits prescribed by stat- 
 ute, unless otherwise prescribed by law, is within the province of 
 the court ;^ and the court has authority to fix the date of execution 
 in cases of afiirmance, where the execution has been stayed upon writ 
 
 «People V. Kemmler, and Storti v. Brush, 142 U. S. 155, 35 L. ed. 971, 12 
 
 Com. supra. Sup. Ct. Eep. 156. 
 
 The general question of cruel and un- sRe Kemmler, supra. 
 
 usual punishments is fully considered lop.eople v. Nolan, 115 N. Y. 660, 21 
 
 in a note to State ex rel. Garvey v. N. E. 1060. 
 
 Whitaker, 35 L.R.A. 561. And where, after a person is found 
 
 'People ex rel. Kemmler v. Durston, guilty of murder, but before sentence 
 
 s«pm; Re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 34 L. is pronounced, a statute takes effect, 
 
 ed. 519, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 930. providing a different method of exe- 
 
 The decision of a, state court sustain- cution of the sentence of death, a motion 
 
 ing the validity, under a state constitu- for a, new trial, assigning as a ground 
 
 tion, of an act providing that the errors occurring at the trial, does not 
 
 punishment of death shall he by elec- raise the question whether the act 
 
 tricity, is not re-examinable in the Su- making the change is an ex post facto 
 
 preme Court of the United States, such law. Keitli v. State, 157 Ind. 376, 61 
 
 decision not being against any title, N. E. 716. 
 
 right, privilege, or immunity specially n State v. Lautenschlager, 22 Minn. 
 
 set up or claimed by the petitioner 514. 
 
 under the Constitution of the United isMcElvaine v. Brush, supra. 
 
 States. Re Kemmler, supra. iSee Wallace v. People, 159 111. 446, 
 
 8Re Kemmler, supra; McElvaine v. 42 N. E. 771. 
 
§ 662] JUDGMENT AND EXECUTION. 1001 
 
 of error or otherwise.^ And an error in designating the week of ex- 
 ecution in a sentence of death for homicide is immaterial where the 
 execution of the sentence is stayed by the appellate court pending a 
 review. But a judgment sentencing a prisoner to death need not 
 name the hour at which the execution is to take place, under a pro- 
 vision that the death penalty shall be inflicted by the sheriff between 
 sunrise and sunset on the day designated in the judgment, that being 
 left to the discretion of the sheriff.* And where the court improperly 
 sentences a prisoner to be executed on a fixed day, and the judgment 
 is affirmed on appeal without fixing a new day of execution, the 
 erroneous part of the execution being void, and having become, by 
 lapse of time, incapable of any operation, is cured. ^ And permitting 
 the warden to select the day of the week designated by the court for 
 the execution does not render the statute providing for execution 
 void, as tending to aggTavate the prisoner's distress by enhancing 
 his suspense.® So, where the execution of a sentence of death has 
 been respited by the governor for the purpose of having the conviction 
 reviewed by an appellate court, it is the duty of the sheriff to execute 
 the sentence on the day to which execution is respited, unless the 
 judgment be reversed or annulled, or a further respite be granted.'^ 
 And where the statute authorizes the court to fix the date of execution 
 at not less than fifteen nor more than twenty-five days from the time 
 sentence is pronounced, provided that, for good cause, the court or 
 governor may prolong the time, the proviso relates to the power of 
 the court or governor after judgment of sentence has been pronounced, 
 and does not authorize the court to extend the time fixed by statute 
 within which the execution shall take place.® 
 
 2Mora V. People, 19 Colo. 255, 35 Pae. The week of time required by statute 
 
 179. to be appointed and designated in capi- 
 
 3 Ibid. tal cases, within which the sentence 
 
 iPuckett V. Com. 13 Ky. L. Rep. 466, must be executed, is a period of time 
 
 17 S. W. 335. extending from 12 o'clock midnight on 
 
 sLowenberg v. People, 27 N. Y. 336. a Saturday until 12 o'clock midnight 
 
 And an order fixing, for the execu- on the following Saturday. Mora v. 
 
 tion of a judgment of conviction for People, 19 Colo. 255^ 35 Pae.' 179. 
 
 murder, a day less than ten days i^om 'People v. Enoch, 13 Wend. 159, 27 
 
 the date of the order, is not erroneous Am. Dec. 197. 
 
 as an abuse of discretion in not giving Where a. sheriff is about to execute 
 
 sufficient time to have a bill of excep- a sentence of death which has been res- 
 
 tions prepared, where, as a, matter of pited by the governor, on the day to 
 
 fact, a petition for a certificate of prob- which the execution was respited, it is 
 
 able cause, together with a bill of ex- not necessary that the convict be 
 
 ceptions, was presented to the justices previously brought into court by habeas 
 
 before the day fixed for the execution, corpus. Ibid. 
 
 and was denied. People v. Ebanks, 120 sWallace v. People, 159 HI. 446, 42 
 
 Cal. 626, .52 Pae. 1078. N. E. 771. 
 
 eStorti v. Com. 178 Mass. 549, 52 
 L.R.A. 520, 60 N. E. 210. 
 
1062 HOMICIDE. [§ 663 
 
 663. How and by whom executed — A sentence of death in a prose- 
 cution for homicide is usually required to be carried into execution 
 by the sheriff of the county where the trial took place/ though the 
 duty is sometimes imposed upon the warden of the state's prison, or 
 other ministerial officer. ' And where the statute provides that every 
 person guilty of murder shall suffer death, but does not provide the 
 mode of executing the sentence, the duty devolves upon the court 
 thus passing sentence for the crimes made punishable thereby to 
 determine the means of imposing the punishment prescribed.^ And 
 in such case a sentence for murder that the prisoner be shot is within 
 the authority of the court.* So, a warrant which commands the 
 sentence of death to be executed in the mode and manner and at the 
 place by law prescribed is authority for the confinement of the pris- 
 oner, as well as for the infliction of the penalty of death. ^' 
 
 iState V. Cunningham, 72 N. C. 469; warden, and fails to prescribe when, 
 
 State V. Twiggs, 60 N. C. (Winst. L. ) where, how, and by whom death sen- 
 
 142. And see People v. Enoch, supra. tences shall be executed, if the second 
 
 2See People v. Ebanks, 120 Cal. 626, statute impliedly repeals the first the 
 
 52 Pae. 1078. death penalty for murder previously 
 
 sWilkerson v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130, 25 provided for is not thereby abrogated, 
 
 L. ed. 345. but the court is left free to follow the 
 
 Where it is provided by statute that common law in determining the execu- 
 
 sentences of death pronounced in certain tion of the sentence. Keith v. State, 
 
 counties shall be executed by the war- 157 Ind. 376, 61 N. E. 716. 
 
 den of a designated prison, and a subse- iWilkerson v. Utah, supra. 
 
 quent statute changes the name of the BMcElvaine v. Brush, 142 U. S. 155, 
 
 prison and designa-tes the officer in 35 L. ed. 971, 12 Sup. Ct. Eep. 156. 
 charge as superintendent instead of 
 
CHAPTEE XXXII. 
 
 EFFECT ON RIGHT TO BURIAL. 
 664. Right coextensive with duty to bury. 
 
 664. Right coextensive with duty to bury — Legal questions as to 
 the burial of the dead have, with few exceptions, been approached 
 from the standpoint of duty springing from necessity to dispose of 
 dead bodies, as distingiaished from that of a right to burial. So 
 far as the question has been considered, however, the right has been 
 held to be coextensive with the duty, and a decent burial is the right 
 of everyone, springing from the necessities of the case and recognized 
 in all well-ordered communities.^ And in the absence of statutory 
 provisions this right is not impaired or affected by the fact that 
 the person for whom it is claimed is a murderer or suicide.^ ISTor 
 does the fact that a person was a murderer or suicide furnish any 
 ground for denial of the right to inter his remains in a public ceme- 
 tery.^ But the right is confined to orderly interment in a suitable 
 place ; it does not include a right to Christian burial with the services 
 of a religious organization.* 
 
 iKitchen v. Wilkinson, 26 Pa. Super. 
 
 sibid. 
 
 Ct. 75. 
 
 4Ibid. 
 
 2Ibi<L 
 
 
 1063 
 
CHAPTER XXXIIL 
 
 EFFECT ON DEVOLUTION OF PROPERTY. 
 
 I. Public policy docteine genebally. 
 
 665. As applied to transfers by devise or operation of the eonisnon-law 
 
 rules. 
 
 666. As applied to life insurance. 
 
 II. Exception in cases of tbansfeb undeb positive statutoey peovisions. 
 
 667. A question of statutory construction. 
 
 I. Public policy docteikte generally. 
 
 665. As applied to transfers by devise or operation of the common- 
 law rules — To permit a person who commits a murder, or any person 
 claiming under him, to benefit by his criminal act, would be contrary 
 to public policy. ^ And no devisee can take under the will of a testa- 
 tor whose death has been caused by the criminal and felonious act 
 of the devisee himself.^ And in applying this rule, no distinction 
 can be made between a death caused by murder and one caused by 
 manslaughter.^ Wor does the common-law right of succession by 
 descent operate in favor of one who wilfully takes the life of his an- 
 cestor for the purpose of succeeding to his property rights.* And 
 the common-law right of a man to succeed to the property of his wife 
 upon her death does not operate in favor of one who murders his 
 wife.® And the rule that the common-law doctrine of succession to 
 property does not operate in favor of one who wilfully takes the life 
 of his ancestor should apply against any person claiming through 
 or under the slayer." Nor does a rule of law that a common-law 
 right of succession to property does not operate in favor of one who 
 wilfully takes the life of his ancestor contravene a constitutional 
 provision that a conviction of crime shall not work a forfeiture 
 of the estate. '^ 
 
 The doctrine that it is contrary to public policy to permit a per- 
 son who commits a murder, or any person claiming under him, to 
 
 1 Cleaver V. Mutual Reserve Fund Life 4Box v. Lanier. 112 Tenn. 393, 64 
 
 Asso. riS92] 1 Q. B. 147. L.R.A. 458. 70 S. W. 1042. 
 
 2LiiTirly V. Lundy, 24 Can. S. C. 650, ejbid. 
 
 Reversing 21 Ont. App. Rep. 660, and sJbid. 
 
 Affirming 24 Ont. Rep. 133. 7Ibid. 
 
 sibid. 
 
 1064 
 
§ 665] EFFECT ON DEVOLUTION OF PEOPERTY. 1065 
 
 benefit by bis criminal act, however, ought not to be stretched beyond 
 what is necessary for the protection of the public, and it does not 
 apply where the matter can be so dealt with that such person shall not 
 be benefited.® And the executors of a person who has effected an 
 insurance on his life for the benefit of his wife can maintain an 
 action on the insurance policy, notwithstanding the fact that the 
 death of the insured was caused by the felonious act of the wife, 
 since the trust created by the policy in favor of the wife being in- 
 capable of performance by reason of her crime, the insurance money 
 forms a part of the estate of the insured, and between his legal 
 representatives and the assured no question of public policy arises 
 to afford a defense.® Nor does the fact that the beneficiary under 
 a will caused the death of the testator by felonious means, to enable 
 her to come into possession of the estate devised to her, render the 
 will invalid, and the only relief which can be obtained against the 
 beneficiary is equitable and injunctive by way of forbidding the 
 enforcement of a legal right and preventing the enjoyment of the 
 fruits of iniquity. ^ " 
 
 G6a As applied to life insurance. — A beneficiary under a life or en- 
 dowment insurance policy cannot recover thereon where he felonious- 
 ly took the life of the person insured, since permitting it would 
 be equivalent to permitting recovery of insurance money on a build- 
 ing which the beneficiary in the policy had wilfully burned.* The 
 exception against liability in such a case is implied by law, and need 
 not be found in the terms of the policy.^ And it is not necessary, 
 in order to defeat the right of the beneficiary to recover, to show that 
 his purpose was to obtain the proceeds of the policy ; it is sufficient 
 that the killing was his intentional and wrongful act. ^ And evidence 
 
 s Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Life Fund Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso. [1892] 
 
 Asso. [1892] 1 Q. B. 147. I Q. B. 147. And see Prince of Wales 
 
 9Ibid. Asso. Co. v. Palmer, 25 Beav. 605. 
 
 lOEllerson v. Westcott, 148 N. Y. 149, And evidence tending to show tliat 
 
 42 N. E. 540. the assignee of an endowment policy of 
 
 An amendment to a complaint in an insurance effected insurance upon the 
 action or petition brought by an heir life of the insured in other companies 
 at law of a testator against a devisee at about the same time is admissible 
 in possession, charging that the devisee in support of the theory of the dsfense 
 caused the death of the testator by in an action upon the policy that in ob- 
 poison or other means, is properly de- taining the insurance in question it was 
 nied, since it does not show, or tend to the object of the assignee to cheat and 
 show, that the devise was void. Eller- defra-ud the insurance company, the de- 
 son V. Westcott, 148 N. Y. 149, 42 N. fense being that he caused the death of 
 E. 540, Reversing 88 Hun, 389, 34 N. Y. the insured for the purnose of obtaining 
 siipp 813 ^^^ insurance. Mutual L. Ins. Oo. v. 
 
 iMutuai L. Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, Armstrong, supra. 
 117 II. S. 591, 29 L. ed. 997, 6 Sup. Ct. zSehreiner v. Higli Court, C. O. of F. 
 
 Rep. 877 : Schreiner v. High Court, C. 0. supra. 
 of F. 35 111. App. 576; Cleaver v. slbid. 
 
1066 HOMICIDE. [§ 666 
 
 it'nding to prove that tlje assignee of an endowment policy of in- 
 surance caused the death of the insured by felonious means is 
 admissible in an action by him against the insurance company to 
 recover on the policy.* IsTor can children of a beneficiary in an 
 insurance policy who murdered the insured, thus forfeiting their 
 rights to the insurance, claim it as her heirs under a certificate 
 payable to her, her heirs, or legal representatives. ^ And the rule of 
 public policy which prevents a beneficiary in an insurance policy, who 
 killed the insured, from taking anything under the policy, applies 
 also to any person claiming through or under him.'' 
 
 Liability on a benefit certificate is not defeated, however, because 
 the beneficiary's rights were forfeited by causing the death of the 
 insured. The certificate may be enforced by the latter's administra- 
 tor for the benefit of the estate, on the ground of a resulting trust 
 ■created in favor of the estate by the forfeiture of the rights of the 
 beneficiary named. ^ And the executors of a person who had effected 
 an insurance on his life for the benefit of his wife can maintain an 
 action on the policy, notwithstanding the fact that his death was 
 caused by the felonious act of his wife, since in such case the in- 
 surance money forms a part of the general estate of the insured.* 
 ISTor does the incapacity of a man's administrators to receive the 
 proceeds of a policy on his life, which had been assigned to his wife, 
 because he wilfully took her life, cause their escheat to the state; 
 they will pass to her distributees as though her husband had never 
 been in existence.® And the killing of an insured person by an in- 
 sane beneficiary does not forfeit the policy or bar a suit for re- 
 covery thereon, though the killing was done under such circum- 
 stances that it Avould have been murder had the beneficiary been 
 sane.^" And while a beneficiary in an insurance policy cannot re- 
 cover where the death of the assured was intentionally caused by his 
 act, if the homicide is the result of carelessness, and not an inten- 
 tional killing, it does not bar his right of recovery. ^ ^ 
 
 ^Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, policy, whose claim to it is valid only 
 
 .supra. for a reimbvirsement of the claim paid, 
 
 BSchmidt v. Northern Life Asso. 112 forfeits the assignee's part of the in- 
 
 lowa, 41, 51 L.R.A. 141, 84 Am. St. Rep. surance, but not the residue thereof, to 
 
 323, 83 N. W. 800. which the estate of the insured is en- 
 
 6 Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life titled. Nevvf York L. Ins. Co v Davis, 
 
 Asso. [1892] 1 Q. B. 147; Schmidt v. 96 Va. 737, 44 L.R.A. 305, 32 S. E. 475. 
 
 Northern Life Asso. supra. sBox v. Lanier, 112 Terni. 393, 64 
 
 'Schmidt v. Northern Life Asso. L.R.A. 458, 79 S. W. 1042. 
 
 ^■upra. lOHoldom v. Ancient Order U. W. 
 
 sCleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life 159 111. 619, 31 L.R.A. 67, 50 Am St. 
 
 Asso. supra. Rep. 183, 43 N. E. 772. 
 
 The murder of a person whose life is nSchreiner v. High Court, 0. O. of 
 
 insured, by an assignee of the insurance F. 35 111. App. 576. 
 
5 667] EFFECT ON DEVOLUTION OF PEOPERT.Y. 1067 
 
 II. Exception in cases of teansfek undee positive statutoey 
 
 PEG VISIONS. 
 
 667. A question of statutory construction The broad theory has 
 
 ■been asserted that all laws must be controlled, in general operation 
 and effect, by the general fundamental maxim of the common law, 
 that no one shall be permitted to profit by his own wrong, or found 
 any claim upon his own iniquity, or acquire property by his own 
 crime ; and the rule has been asserted that the statutes of descent and 
 distribution are to be considered with reference to these i^rinciples, 
 and that a murderer cannot be permitted to take thereunder, either 
 as heir or legatee, the estate of one whom he has murdered for 
 the purpose of obtaining his property. ^ This rule, however, has been 
 «ither rejected, or limited and confined in its application.^ And the 
 prevailing, if not the universal, rule would appear to be that where 
 a statute of descent and distribution, or provision for succession, is 
 plain and unambiguous in its terms, there is no room for construction 
 or interpretation, and it operates solely within its own terms, and 
 vests in the heir such estate as he is entitled to immediately upon the 
 death of the intestate from whom the inheritance comes, without 
 reference to any question of criminal responsibility of the heir for 
 the death of the intestate or devisor.* This rule finds its inception 
 in the theory that the public policy of a state is the law of that 
 state, as found in its Constitution, its statutory enactments, and its 
 judicial records.* And where the intestate law casts the estate of 
 a deceased person upon designated persons, this is absolute and 
 
 And an allegation In an answer to a above cited, was flatly repudiated in the 
 complaint in an action upon an insur- same case on a subsequent appeal re- 
 anoe policy that death was caused solely ported in 41 Neb. 6.31, 25 L.R.A. 564, 59 
 by the wilful and felonious act of the N. W. 935 ; and Riggs v. Palmer, above 
 beneficiary is supported by proof of cited, was distinguished, limited, and ex- 
 facts constituting the crime of inyolun- plained in Ellerson v. Westcott, 148 N. 
 tary manslaughter, and is not, there- Y. 149, 42 N. E. 540, in which attention 
 fore, a defense to an action upon a was called to the fact that that was an 
 policy of life insurance. Ibid. action by an heir at law of a testator 
 
 iRigt's V. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506, 5 against a devisee and legatee who had 
 
 L.R.A. "340,' 12 Am. St. Rep. 819, 22 N. murdered the testator to obtain the pos- 
 
 e'. 188; Shellenberger v. Ransom, 31 session of the property given him by 
 
 Neb. 61, 10 L.R.A. 810, 28 Am. St. Rep. the will, and that the holding was not 
 
 S00*47'n. W. 700. that the will was void, but that the 
 
 s'o, in kcKinno'n v. Lundy, 24 Ont. k-gatee was not entitled to take there- 
 Rep.' 132, holding that by feloniously under, either as distributee or other- 
 killing his wife a husband absolutely wise. 
 
 nrecludes hims,elf from obtaining any 3 Shellenberger v. Ransom, 41 Neb. 
 
 benefit under her will, and that his as- 631, 25 L.R.A. 564, 59 N. W. 935; Owens 
 
 sisnee or grantee can stand in no better v. Owens, 100 N. C. 240, 6 S. E. 794 ; 
 
 DO^^ition than himself, it was stated by McAlister v. Fair (Kan.) 3 L.R.A. (X. 
 
 iW. court in argument that he could S.) 726, 84 Pac. 112. 
 
 nf i'ther inherit nor take under the will. ^Kuhn v. Kuhn, 125 Iowa, 449, 101 
 
 JThe rule of Shellenberger v. Ransom, N. W. 151. 
 
i068 HOMICIDE. [{ 867 
 
 peremptory, and no rule of public policy can take it from the per- 
 sons designated by statute and give it to others, even for the reason 
 that the designated person killed the intestate, without a violation of 
 the statute.® So, one killing his ancestor for an estate which would 
 come to him under the statutes of descent and distribution is en- 
 titled to talfe under constitutional provisions prohibiting attainders 
 working corruption of blood and forfeiture of estates, and under 
 statutes providing no penalty for murder except death by hanging." 
 And a widow's right of dower is not barred by her act of killing her 
 husband, or being accessory to the act of killing, where the statute 
 provides for the bar of dower only in case of committing adultery 
 and living separate from the husband.^ 
 
 It is provided by statute, however, in Iowa, and perhaps in other 
 states, that no person who feloniously takes, or causes or procures 
 another to take, the life of a person, shall inherit from him, or take 
 by devise or legacy from him any portion of his estate, but, in every 
 instance mentioned, all benefits which would accrue to such person 
 upon the death of the other shall become distributive among the 
 other heirs of such deceased person, according to the rules of 
 descent and distribution. ^ But under such a statute a wife takes her 
 distributive share of her deceased husband's estate as a matter of con- 
 tract and right, and not by inheritance, and it does not prevent a 
 widow who killed her husband from taking her distributive share of 
 his estate;® though the additional amount, if any, which she might 
 take by law, where there is no issue surviving, would be taken as an 
 heir, and not as a matter of contract and right. ' " 
 
 B Carpenter's Appeal, 170 Pa. 203j 29 that the imirderer of a person shall not 
 
 L.R.A. 145, 50 Am. St. Rep. 765, 32 Atl. inherit or take by devise or legacy from 
 
 637. the deceased person, does not bring the 
 
 ^Carpenter's Appeal, supra; Deem v. claim of a widow who had killed her 
 
 Milliken, G Ohio, C. C. 357, Affirmed in husband, for her distributive share of 
 
 53 Ohio St. 668, 44 N. E. 1134. his estate, within its provisions, since 
 
 'Owens V. Owens, supra. the language relates back to the par- 
 
 8 See Kuhn v. Kuhn, supra. ticular persons who are prohibited from 
 
 slbid. taking. Ibid. 
 
 And a provision that all benefits lolbid. 
 
 which would accrue to any person upon The Iowa statute has been amended 
 
 the death of the person whose life is so as to bring the surviving spouse of 
 
 taken shall be distributed among the the person killed within its express 
 
 other heirs, under a statute providing terms. Thid. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 (References are to pages.) 
 
 ABANDONMENT, 
 
 of homicidal purpose as relieving from responsibility, 71. 
 
 ABORTION, 
 
 abortionist as accessory before the fact^ 80. 
 
 homicide by administering poison to cause, not murder in first degree, 156. 
 
 killing in attempt to perpetrate, murder in second degree, 180. 
 
 killing unborn child by causing, not murder or manslaughter, 588. 
 
 degree of homicide by killing by abortion or attempted abortion, 594. 
 
 statutory provisions as to criminality of killing by abortion or attempted 
 
 abortion, 595-597. 
 killing unborn quick child as manslaughter by statute, 591. 
 death of child after birth from prior injuries, 589. 
 causing death of pregnant woman by, 592-597. 
 
 causing death by producing, as killing in doing act dangerous to life, 593. 
 causing death by producing, as killing in commission of unlawful act, 593. 
 unlawful procurement of miscarriage constitutes corpus delicti, 968. 
 
 ACCESSORY. See Peincipals and Accessobies. 
 
 ACCIDENT. See also Defenses to Homicide; Homicide. 
 killing by mere accident not crime, 9. 
 accidental homicide is murder if malice exists, 3. 
 
 of person other than one intended as murder, 108. 
 
 as involuntary manslaughter, 8. 
 
 not excusable unless resulting from lawful act, 571. 
 
 ADULTERY. See also Husband and Wife. 
 
 does not justify killing of guilty party or paramour, 393. 
 
 deliberate killing of adulterer for revenge is murder, 304. 
 
 killing in sudden resentment by husband, of wife taken in, murder in 
 second degree, 212. 
 
 killing wife's paramour in compromising situation as provocation reduc- 
 ing homicide to manslaughter, 305. 
 
 bv or with spouse or relative as adequate provocation, reducing killing 
 to manslaughter, 303-306. 
 
 •a provocation reducing homicide to manslaughter, under special statutes, 
 306. 
 
 1089 
 
1070 INDEX. 
 
 homicide through irresponsible or innocent agent, 22. 
 
 ALIBI, 
 
 does not render instruction on manslaughter unnecessary, 262, 
 no defense where conspiracy to kill shown, 676. 
 
 ALIEN ENEMY, 
 
 soldier may kill, in war, 731. 
 
 killing of, after surrender, is murder, 732. 
 
 ANIMALS, 
 
 death from loosing dangerous animals, 700. 
 
 ARREST. See also Evidence ; Homicide; Officees. 
 
 officer must not use unnecessary force, 745. 
 
 or deadly weapon in arresting for misdemeanor or to prevent escape, 748^ 
 
 to warrant use of deadly weapon by officer, it must have been reasonably 
 necessary, 749. 
 
 officer may use deadly weapon where arrest for misdemeanor resisted with 
 one, 749. 
 
 right of officer to arrest outside of his territorial jurisdiction, 756. 
 
 crime of killing officer in resisting arrest as determined by officer's author- 
 ity, 606. 
 
 officers attempting, are under protection of law, 605. 
 
 person assisting officer to arrest under same legal protection as latter, 617. 
 
 killing of one not known to be officer. 624. 
 
 if purpose of officer known, notice unnecessary, and killing is unlawful, 627. 
 
 sufficiency of officer's notice of intention to arrest to render killing in 
 resistance, murder, 625. 
 
 malice implied from killing officer while resisting arrest, 603. 
 
 malice not shown by resisting arrest for misdemeanor without warrant, 602^ 
 
 killing with express malice in resisting arrest, murder in first degree, 601. 
 
 killing to evade lawful arrest is murder, 601. 
 
 warrant as protecting officer so that killing him in resistance will be mur- 
 der, 608. 
 
 when killing in resisting, for criminal act committed in officer's presence, 
 murder, 613. 
 
 killing of private person attempting to arrest for felony, murder, 614. 
 
 killing enrolment officer attempting arrest is murder, 641. 
 
 killing person fleeing from civil arrest as murder, 762. 
 
 liability of conspirators for murder committed while attempting to escape, 
 664. 
 
 that officer attempting arrest was killed in hot blood does not reduce 
 degree of crime, 604. 
 
 illegal or improper arrest as adequate provocation rendering homicide man- 
 slaughter, 299. 
 
 resisting legal arrest attempted under color of legal authority, man- 
 slaughter, 601. 
 
 when killing in resisting arrest for criminal act committed in officer'a 
 presence, manslaughter, 613. 
 
INDEX. 1071 
 
 ARREST — continued. 
 
 force in making, not provocation reducing killing of oiRcer to manslaughter, 
 
 620. 
 killing officer attempting arrest in violent manner may be manslaughter, 
 
 620. 
 killing officer refusing to show authority to arrest, manslaughter, 629. 
 unlawful arrest as provocation reducing killing in resisting to manslaughter, 
 
 629. 
 killing in resisting unlawful arrest manslaughter when done in sudden 
 
 passion, 631. 
 killing by private person of one unjustly suspected of felony, manslaughter, 
 
 755. 
 officer seeking to arrest may be guilty of negligent homicide, 757. 
 illegal arrest as precluding right of self-defense, 527. 
 abuse of prisoner after lawful arrest, act of aggression, 527. 
 when use of unnecessary force in resisting, gives right of self-defense, 621. 
 officer arresting for misdemeanor cannot take life except in self-defense, 
 
 737, 747. 
 self-defense not generally available to officer attempting illegal arrest, 752. 
 attempted arrest for felony without warrant does not justify killing officer, 
 
 609. 
 innocence of charge of felony does not excuse killing officer attempting 
 
 arrest, 618. 
 killing in resistance of unlawful arrest as excusable homicide, 631. 
 illegality of, not necessarily excuse for killing officer, 632. 
 limit of right of self-defense in resisting, 622. 
 to what extent unlawful arrest may be resdsted, 633. 
 excessive resistance to unlawful arrest, 634. 
 
 third person aiding in resisting arrest stands in position of defendant, 638. 
 officers may kill one resisting, 735. 
 
 killing of one committing felony justifiable if necessary to overcome resist- 
 ance, 737. 
 resistance to lawful arrest as justifying homicide, 738. 
 killing in escaping after submission to illegal arrest, 636. 
 lawful to kill fleeing felon who cannot otherwise be taken, 740. 
 mere suspicion of felony does not justify officer in killing, 754. 
 officer without right to kill one fleeing from arrest for misdemeanor, 741. 
 
 AUSON, 
 
 homicide by setting fire to building, murder in first degree, 176. 
 
 ASSAULT, 
 
 injury not inflicting death may be assault with intent to kill, 31. 
 
 intent in cases of assault with intent to kill, 206. 
 
 no such oflfense as assault with intent to commit manslaughter, 201. 
 
 with intent to commit manslaughter may exist by statute, 261. 
 
 when death resulting from, is murder, 193. 
 
 when death results from improper treatment, 42. 
 
 as dangerous act within meaning of statute, 193. 
 
 as provocation reducing homicide to manslaughter, 276. 283-287, 302. 
 
1073 INDEX. 
 
 ASSAULT — continued. 
 
 upon relatives or friends as provocation rendering homicide manslaughter, 
 
 296. 
 upon v^'ife as provocation rendering killing by husband manslaughter, 297. 
 upon child as provocation reducing killing to manslaughter, 297. 
 killing in commission of minor assault, involuntary manslaughter, 339. 
 as justifying killing in self-defense, 374. 
 as precluding assailant from pleading self-defense, 526. 
 protecting another against unlawful assault, not provocation of difficulty, 
 
 528. 
 to evict trespasser does not deprive of right of self-defense, 530. 
 
 ATROCITY, 
 
 extreme, meaning and scope of statutory term, 171. 
 
 need not be premeditated, 172. 
 
 when atrocious killing not reduced to manslaughter by provocation, 172. 
 AX, 
 
 not deadly weapon, per se, 140. 
 
 B 
 
 BOILER, 
 
 liability for homicide due to leaving unattended, 695. 
 
 BOMB, 
 
 malice and deliberation inferred from manufacture of, 232. 
 
 BREACH OF CONTRACT, 
 
 not adequate provocation reducing homicide to manslaughter, 303. 
 
 BREACH OF PEACE. 
 
 when homicide to prevent Justifiable, 778. 
 
 BROTHER. 
 
 homicide in defense of. 774. 
 
 BURGLARY. 
 
 as felony rendering homicide perpetrated in committing, murder in first 
 
 degree, 180, 186. 
 homicide to prevent attempted commission of, 781. 
 
 BURIAL, 
 
 right of, not affected by fact deceased was murderer or suicide, 1063. 
 
 CAPACITY, 
 
 of infant to commit homicide. 12. 
 
 CASTLE. See Dwelling. 
 
 CHANCE MEDLEY, 
 homicide by, 9. 
 
IInDEX. 1073 
 
 CHARIVARI, 
 
 as adequate provocation reducing homicide to manslaughter, 302. 
 
 CONFEDERATE. See also Conspiracy; Principal and Accessoby. 
 degree of murder in case of killing by, 216. 
 conspirator criminally responsible for act of, 644. 
 
 CONSENT, 
 
 of deceased no bar to prosecution for homicide^ 20. 
 
 of patient no excuse for physician's recklessnes or want of skill, 714. 
 
 CONSPIRACY, 
 
 distinction between conspiracy and aiding and abetting, 641. 
 
 may be made any time before commission of offense, 653. 
 
 necessary to render one guilty of homicide committed by another, 651, 653. 
 
 conspirator criminally responsible for act of confederates, 644. 
 
 one abandoning conspiracy before commission of homicide not responsible, 
 685. 
 
 rendering conspirators responsible for homicide must be unlawful, 655. 
 
 homicide must be within scope of, to render' confederate liable, 656. 
 
 to do act not of homicidal character does not impose criminal responsibility, 
 658. 
 
 each conspirator liable for natural consequences of adventure, 657. 
 
 confederate not responsible for individual action of others from independent 
 motive, 659. 
 
 mere presence of conspirator may make him responsible for homicide, 654. 
 
 to do personal violence renders all principals and equally responsible, 646. 
 
 death deemed within scope of conspiracy to do dangerous, violent, or hom- 
 icidal act, 660. 
 
 conspirator not responsible for killing by confederate, where conspiracy did 
 not require use of dangerous force, 661. 
 
 drunkenness as excusing conspirator from responsibility for homicide, 654. 
 
 conspirators liable for killing of which conspiracy was proximate cause, 663. 
 
 conspirator not liable where killing incidentally, results, 663. 
 
 combination to resist opposers of breach of peace renders all guilty of re- 
 sulting homieidej 647. 
 to invade property rights renders conspirators equally guilty of re- 
 sulting homicide, 649. 
 
 to commit robbery renders confederates liable for resulting killing, 661, 
 668. 
 
 to change government unlawful, rendering all responsible for homicide, 656. 
 
 homicide resulting from conspiracy to disturb meetings, 648, 660. 
 
 liability of combination of striking workmen for homicide, 661. 
 
 of husband and wife to commit murder, 653, 654. 
 
 liability of conspirators for murder committed while attempting to escape, 
 664. 
 
 to escape from confinement renders all guilty of murder of officer by con- 
 federates, 650. 
 
 conspirators to kill liable for homicide of third person by mistake, 664. 
 
 homicide committed in carrying out conspiracy to do unlawful act is gen- 
 erally murder, 666. 
 
 homicide in pursuance of conspiracy to kill as murder in first degree, 607. 
 
 Honi.— 68. 
 
1074 INDEX. 
 
 CONSPIRACY— continued. 
 
 homicide in pursuance of conspiracy to commit felony as murder in first 
 
 degree, 668. 
 homicide in pursuance of conspiracy to commit act dangerous to life, 
 
 murder, 669. 
 killing by conspirator on provocation reduces ofifense to manslaughter, 670. 
 conspirators cannot set up self-defense, 514. 
 admissibility of threats of conspirators on issue of self-defense, 417. 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. See also Homicide; Negligence. 
 of deceased, defense to prosecution for negligent homicide, 725. 
 
 CONVICT, 
 
 triable for homicide. 11. 
 
 killing by prisoners in attempt to escape from confinement, 640, 669. 
 
 death of, from keeper's wilful failure to supply necessaries is murder, 693, 
 
 death of, from neglect of keeper as manslaughter, 692. 
 
 when killing of, by guard justifiable, 744. 
 
 CORPORATIONS, 
 
 criminal responsibility for homicide, 12. 
 
 CORPUS DELICTI. See also Evidence. 
 is question for jury, 822. 
 
 death and criminal agency constitute elements of, 897. 
 identity not included in. 912. 
 
 COURTS MARTIAL, 
 
 acquittal of soldier on, not bar to prosecution by civil authorities, 734. 
 
 CRUELTY, 
 
 extreme, meaning and scope of statutory term, 171. 
 
 need not be premeditated, 17'2. 
 
 malice inferred from homicide committed with great cruelty and barbarity, 
 
 118. 
 killing by stamping upon as, 172. 
 killing with lighted kerosene lamp as, 172. 
 when cruel killing not reduced to manslaughter by provocation, 172. 
 
 D 
 
 DANGEROUS ACTS, 
 
 "act eminently dangerous to others," what constitutes, 191. 
 evincing depraved mind, what constitutes, 189—191. 
 reckless use of firearms, 191. 
 death resulting from assault and battery, 193. 
 homicide caused by derailing railway train, 195. 
 
 DEADLY WEAPON. See also Arrest; Manslaughter; Trial, Questions for 
 Jury. 
 definition of, 135. 
 what constitutes, 136', 137. 
 guns, swords, knives, and pistols are, 138. 
 
INDEX. 1075 
 
 DEADLY WEAPON— continued. 
 
 those designed for stabbing are per se, 139. 
 
 pocket knife as^ 140. 
 
 ax not, per se, 140. 
 
 rock may be, 141. 
 
 malice implied from use of, 124, 131. 
 
 malice not inferred from possession of, if lawfully carried, 127. 
 
 what constitutes deliberate use of, 230. 
 
 inference of deliberate intent to kill from use of, 227. 
 
 use of, with little provocation, mui-der in first degree, 229. 
 
 killing with, without deliberation or malice, may be manslaughter, 253. 
 
 DEATH, 
 
 must result within a year and a day from injury, 19. 
 
 is penalty for murder, 1053. 
 
 penalty may be inflicted on one already serving sentence of imprisonment, 
 
 1053. 
 infliction of death penalty not cruel or unusual punishment, 1053. 
 legislature has power to change manner of inflicting death penalty, 1059. 
 penalty usually inflicted by hanging, 1059. 
 penalty usually inflicted by sherifl: or ministerial officer, 1062. 
 
 DEFENSES TO HOMICIDE. See also Homicide; Manslaughtee; Mubder. 
 
 mere trespass does not justify killing trespasser, 390. 
 
 killing in order to enjoy lawful rights of property not justifiable, 390. 
 
 adultery does not justify killing either guilty party or paramour, 393. 
 
 jealousy or desire for revenge no excuse, 202. 
 
 alibi no defense where conspiracy to kill shown, 676. 
 
 Indian war as immunity for murder committed, 733. 
 
 voluntary intoxication no justification or excuse for, 805. 
 
 settled insanity produced by drunkenness may excuse, 807. 
 
 Texas statute as to intoxication as defense, 816. 
 
 no defense to deliberate homicide that defendant had other object in view, 108. 
 
 that wrongful act from which death resulted was mere misdemeanor, 176. 
 
 that homicide committed in collision of groups of heated partisans may 
 reduce offense to manslaughter, 584. 
 
 malice aforethought no defense in prosecution for manslaughter, 5. 
 
 consent of deceased no bar to prosecution for homicide, 20. 
 
 consent as justification of killing woman by abortion, 597. 
 
 consent of patient no excuse for physician's recklessness or want of skill, 714. 
 
 contributory negligence no defense on prosecution of corporation, 13. 
 
 intervening negligence of injured person, 42. 
 
 contributory negligence of third person no defense to prosecution for negli- 
 gent manslaughter, 724. 
 
 that death was not due solely to act of accused, 35. 
 
 that deceased might have recovered under more skilful treatment, 40. 
 
 surgeon may perform critical operation where death would otherwise be 
 certain, 561. 
 
 life of child may be sacrificed to save that of mother, 561. 
 
 overruling necessity as excusing sacrifice of life, 561, 562. 
 
1076 INDEX. 
 
 DEFENSES TO KOMlsClDE— continued. 
 
 defense that commission of abortion was necessary to life or health, 598. 
 
 whether necessity defense when resulting from defendant's culpable act, 563. 
 
 overruling necessity as justifying killing in self-preservation, 563, 565. 
 
 self-defense. 
 
 definition of self-defense, 354. 
 
 self-defense must not exceed bounds of defense and prevention, 496. 
 
 does not include accidental killing, 354. 
 acquittal for accidental killing not dependent on self-defense, 567. 
 self-defense as justifying accidental killing of third person, 591. 
 perfect and imperfect self-defense, 360. 
 
 •when wife's paramour attacked by husband has imperfect right of self-de- 
 fense, 533. 
 justifiable and excusable self-defense, 361. 
 
 killing in exercise of perfect right of self-defense, justifiable, 547. 
 homicide not justified by previous ill treatment or cruel abuse, 384. 
 former hostile acts do not authorize slayer to take initiative, 384. 
 homicide to prevent interference with marital rights, 393. 
 no insult or wrong to wife of accused, justification, 393. 
 use of deadly weapon to repel attack does not prevent homicide from being 
 
 justifiable, 499. 
 pursuing and killing retreating adversary not generally justifiable as, 501. 
 right of self-defense as affected by failure to seek protection of law, 446. 
 
 as affected by failure to call upon others for aid, 447. 
 
 not affected by relationship of parties, 453. 
 
 as against participant or confederate, 388, 39G. 
 confederate of aggressor cannot set up self-defense, 514. 
 one interfering in behalf of another cannot plead self-defense, unless latter 
 
 could, 534. 
 right to plead self-defense in killing person mistaken for another, 454. 
 intoxication of assailant does not modify right of self-defense, 453. 
 voluntary intoxication does not enlarge right of self-defense, 816. 
 law of self-defense applicable alike to sane and insane, 804. 
 insanity and self-defense not inconsistent defenses, 804. 
 defendant pleading not guilty may rely on self-defense, 356. 
 motive or intent as affecting right of self-defense, 511-514. 
 intent to kill not incompatible with self-defense, 359. 
 
 no question of self-defense when killing is with malice aforethought, 548. 
 one arming and entering into difficulty with intent to kill cannot plead 
 
 self-defense, 51'9. 
 self-defense not available to officer committing homicide from improper 
 
 motives, 758. 
 previous malice does not deprive of right of self-defense, 359. 
 intent to beat slayer as justifying killing, 387. 
 
 malicious intent of deceased not necessary to right of self-defense, 452. 
 right of self-defense founded upon necessity, 362. 
 
 one attacked in his own dwelling may only kill from necessity, 494. 
 apparent not real necessity to kill in self-defense controls on question 
 
 of justification, 365-369. 
 ^ect of negligence in forming belief of necessity to kill, 373. 
 
INDEX. 1077 
 
 DEFENSES TO HOMICIDE— co»i<iMMed. 
 
 basis of apprehension of danger or belief as to necessity of killing, 3S3. 
 rule that necessity of killing in self-defense must be judged by jury, 456. 
 rule that necessity of killing in self-defense must be judged by slayer, 
 
 455. 
 rule that standard as to necessity of killing is that of reasonable man, 
 
 459, 463. 
 slayer must have employed all means to avert necessity to kill, 464, 467. 
 necessity under Texas statute of resorting to other means before killing 
 
 assailant, 465. 
 one entitled to stand ground must not kill except in case of necessity, 477. 
 duty to retreat to avoid necessity of killing. 467. 
 common-lavi' doctrine that person assaulted must retreat if danger not 
 
 thereby increased, 469. 
 American rule that person without fault who is assaulted need not retreat, 
 
 469, 473. 
 person feloniously assaulted need not retreat, 471. 
 ■where right of self-defense imperfect party must retreat, 480. 
 one provoking difficulty must retreat, 480. 
 when retreat of aggressor revives right of self-defense, 481, 483. 
 assaulted person need not retreat if act perilous, 483. 
 when person assaulted may infer retreat would increase peril, 485. 
 person assaulted may pursue adversary to secure himself from danger, 487, 
 
 490, 501. 
 duty to retreat not affected by question whether assault was dangerous to 
 
 life, 488. 
 duty of one assaulted without felonious intent to retreat, 488. 
 person assaulted in his dwelling need not retreat, 490. 
 after retreating from his domicil, person assaulted may only strike from 
 
 necessity, 492. 
 what constitutes dwelling excusing person attacked from retreating, 495. 
 place of business as dwelling excusing one from retreating, 495. 
 officer in proper performance of official duty need not retreat, 496. 
 self-defense not applicable where person retreats, arms himself, and returns, 
 
 451. 
 slayer in self-defense must have had no reasonable mode of escaping, 358, 
 
 362, 364. 
 person assaulted may act on appearances as to means of escape, 484. 
 one not justified in using deadly weapon in self-defense, unless without 
 
 means of escape, 498. 
 slayer in self-defense' must believe himself in danger of death or serious 
 
 bodily harm, 358, 362. 
 circumstances must have warranted such a belief, 358, 362. 
 slayer in self-defense may act on reasonable appearance and belief of 
 
 danger, 366. 
 reasonable belief in danger excuses, although appearance false, 367. 
 dano-er authorizing officer to act in self-defense may be apparent only, 750. 
 belief in danger must have been actually entertained to justify homi- 
 cide, 371. 
 belief of danger assumed from reasonable ground for believing, 372. 
 
1078 INDEX. 
 
 DEFENSES TO nOMlCIim— continued. 
 
 what dangei' warrants killing in self-defense, 374. 
 assault as justifying killing in self-defense, 374. 
 
 person assaulted need not nicely calculate force necessary to repel as- 
 sault, 497. 
 imminence of danger as justifying homicide in self-defense, 378-380. 
 where one's person or property is assailed, 392. 
 where slayer was assailed with deadly weapon, 389. 
 shooting one armed with knife, 379. 
 
 when danger justifying homicide in self-defense deemed past, 380. 
 right to kill in self-defense ceases when danger ceases, 381. 
 previous ill-will does not authorize inference of danger, 383. 
 neither words nor gestures constitute hostile demonstrations, 385. 
 mere assault, not felonious, does not justify homicide, 386. 
 necessity of hostile demonstration by deceased, 394. 
 
 what is overt act or demonstration justifying homicide in s«lf-defense, 397. 
 person threatened need not wait until attack actually made, 395. 
 threats no excuse for killing, 399. 
 previous threats unaccompanied by hostile demonstration do not justify 
 
 homicide, 400. , , 
 
 uncommunicated threats cannot justify homicide, 407. 
 violent or dangerous character of deceased does not justify killing, 421. 
 one seeking and provoking quarrel cannot plead self-defense, 341. 
 slayer in self-defense must have been without fault in bringing <»n difficulty, 
 
 358. 
 aggressor cannot justify killing on ground of self-defense, 502. 
 extent of danger of aggressor immaterial on question of self-defense, 504. 
 reason for rule that self-defense not available when slayer was aggressor, 
 
 507. 
 self-defense available when slayer reasonably free from fault, 508. 
 what constitutes freedom from fault rendering self-defense available, 509. 
 expectation of attack does not require person to refrain from going abroad, 
 
 477. 
 slayer's act of aggression as limiting right of self-defense, 510. 
 aggressor, whether with or without felonious intent, forfeits right of self- 
 defense, 511. 
 slayer may plead self-defense unless his words and acts led to affray, 513. 
 aggressor in one combat may act in self-defense in subsequent one, '•15. 
 what constitutes one aggressor, precluding right of, 516. 
 slayer's illegal act provoking difficulty bars right to plead self-defense, 510. 
 mere preparation for difficulty does not deprive of right of, 518. 
 one remaining where he has right to be not provoker of difficulty, 520. 
 merely seeking another does not forfeit right of self-defense, 520. 
 one becoming aggressor after seeking another with friendly purpose cannot 
 
 set up self-defense, 521. 
 aggressor seeking another with intent to provoke difficulty cannot set up 
 
 self-defense, 521. 
 slayer intending to injure cannot plead self-defense, though deceased struck 
 
 first blow, 522. 
 insulting remarks do not deprive of right of, 523. 
 
INDEX. 1079 
 
 DEIENSES TO HOMICIDE— coH/inwed. 
 
 annoying acts or words do not constitute provoking difficulty, 523. 
 foul and abusive words continuing to termination of affray bar plea of, 524. 
 threats against life of another not alone sufficient to deprive of right of, 525. 
 direct personal assault as precluding assailant from pleading self-defense, 
 
 526. 
 illegal arrest act of aggression precluding right of self-defense, 527. 
 abuse of prisoner after lawful arrest, act of aggression, 527. 
 rough treatment in sport not provocation of difficulty precluding plea of, 
 
 527. 
 that slayer was committing trespass when attacked does not deprive him of 
 
 right of, 527. 
 protecting another against unlawful assault, not provocation of difficulty, 
 
 528. 
 unlawfully depriving another of personal property, act of aggression, 530. 
 assault to evict trespasser does not deprive of right of, 530. 
 preparation for or renewal of difficulty as depriving of right of, 531. 
 return to place of difficulty to demand property or explanation does not 
 
 deprive of right of, 532. 
 debauching wife or daughter of another as provoking difficulty, 532. 
 interference in behalf of near relative not act of aggression, 535. 
 self-defense not available in case of mutual combat, 536. 
 declining further combat and retreating, necessary to right of self-defense 
 
 in case of mutual combat, 538. 
 what constitutes mutual combat precluding right of, 538. 
 aggressor cannot kill in defense of return assault, unless he has first aban- 
 doned the contest;, 542. ' 
 aggressor's right of self-defense revives on withdrawal from difficulty, 540. 
 reasons for doctrine, 543. 
 what constitutes withdrawal from conflict sufficient to revive aggressor's 
 
 right of, 544. 
 no abandonment of difficulty where fight was continuous, 545. 
 aggressor need not withdraw further when retreat means probable death, 
 
 545. 
 aggressor should make known intention to withdraw, 546. 
 when use of unnecessary force in resisting arrest gives right of, 621. 
 limit of right of self-defense in resisting arrest, 622. 
 self-defense not applicable to killing in resisting arrest, 60'5. 
 to prevent arrest by assistant to peace officer without warrant, 638. 
 self-defense not generally available to officer attempting illegal arrest, 752. 
 oflScer's failure to give notice of character or purpose as depriving him of 
 
 right of, 759. 
 right of deputy or assistant attempting arrest to act in self-defense, 761. 
 
 DELIBERATION. See also Murdeb. 
 
 meaning and construction of term, 159. 
 
 necessary element of crime of murder, 2. 
 
 intent to kill need not have been entertained for any particular period of 
 
 time, 164. 
 may be inferred from character of weapon used, 167. 
 
1080 INDEX. 
 
 DESCENT, 
 
 heir killing ancestor not entitled to inherit, 1064. 
 
 right of heir killing ancestor to inherit under statutory proTisions, 1067> 
 
 DISEASE, 
 
 resulting from wound imputable to it, 38. 
 infliction of injury on one mortally diseased, 39. 
 
 DOLUS, 
 
 definition of, 89, 90. 
 
 dolus determinatus, 93. 
 
 dolus alternativus or eventualis, 94. 
 
 DUCKING, 
 
 death caused by ducking another as manslaughter, 302, 347. 
 
 DUEL, 
 
 killing in, is murder, 196. 
 
 principals and seconds guilty of homicide, 6S. 
 
 seconds and those encouraging, guilty of murder, 196. 
 
 mere presence at, not sufficient to render one guilty of murder, 198. 
 
 DWELLING, 
 
 what constitutes dwelling or castle, 795. 
 who may defend dwelling and against whom, 795. 
 forcible expulsion of unlawful intruder from, 793. 
 homicide to prevent entrance to, 790. 
 
 DYING DECLARATIONS. See also Evidence. 
 
 when admission of irrelevant dying declarations not reversible error, 991. 
 whether a statement is a dying declaration proper subject for review, 1029. 
 objection to admission of dying declaration cannot be first made on appeal, 
 1032. 
 
 ELECTROCUTION, 
 
 infliction of death penalty by, 1059. 
 
 EVIDENCE, 
 
 anything throwing light on homicide may be shown, 895. 
 
 order of proving material facts not material. 897. 
 
 taken at coroner's inquest, inadmissible to show guilt, 908. 
 
 presumptions. 
 
 presumption that person proved to have been alive is still so, 14. 
 
 death following wound presumed to have been caused thereby, 45. 
 
 presumption of malice from poisoning not conclusive, 123. 
 
 rebutting presumption of malice from use of deadly weapon, 134. 
 
 expressions of regret and efforts to save, to rebut presumption of intent to 
 
 kill, 142. 
 burden of proof. 
 
 prosecution must show deceased was alive at time of alleged killing, 14. 
 burden on defense to show death from malpractice and not from wound, 42. 
 
INDEX. 1081 
 
 EVlBliNCE— continued. 
 
 burden of proof of malice rests on prosecution, 12&. 
 
 burden of proving justification or mitigation rests on accused, 221. 
 
 prosecution must sliow facts in addition to Icilling making offense murder in 
 first degree, 223. 
 
 burden of showing extenuating circumstances rests on one using deadly 
 weapon with little provocation, 226. 
 
 officer has burden of justifying use of deadly weapon in making arrest, 750. 
 
 burden of proving provocation rests on defendant, 331, 
 
 statutory rule devolving upon slayer burden of showing justification or ex- 
 cuse, 554. 
 
 prosecution has burden of showing killing not justifiable or excusable by 
 reason of self-defensCj 550. 
 
 rule that burden of establishing self-defense rests upon defense, 551. 
 
 where necessity of killing appears, burden is on prosecution to show slayer 
 provoked difficulty, 555. 
 
 accused has burden of showing homicide from overruling necessity, 563. 
 
 state must overcome plea of homicide by misadventure, 568. 
 
 state must show absence of necessity of killing when resisting arrest for 
 misdemeanor, 738. 
 
 burden rests on prosecution to show guilt of one committing homicide in 
 defense of another, 773. 
 
 accused must show intoxication depriving him of criminal intent, 810. 
 
 defense should show absence of motive in first instance, 917. 
 
 accused has burden of showing miscarriage necessary to save life of mother, 
 971. 
 
 party ofifering dying declaration must show it was made under sense of im- 
 pending death, 1000. 
 
 demonstrative evijence. 
 
 parts of body may be introduced in, 941. 
 
 clothing worn by deceased admissible, 944. 
 
 but must illustrate some phase of the evidence, 947. 
 
 blood stains as, 947. 
 
 admissibility of blood stains upon clothing, 949. 
 
 blood stains upon articles of accused, competent, 948. 
 
 instrument used in killing admissible, 945. 
 
 exhibition of articles or weapons talcen from accused, 947. 
 
 opinions. 
 
 proof by nonexpert opinion that death resulted from wound, 46. 
 
 opinion of physician whether wound was fatal, 46. 
 
 expert may testify whether wound could have been infiicted by particular 
 instrument, 943. 
 as to which of two wounds caused death, 943. 
 
 medical testimony as to presence of poison, 950. 
 
 confession. 
 
 corroboration of confession of principal to poisoning, 75. 
 
 finding of body with marks of mortal injury, basis for admission of con- 
 fession 905. 
 
 confession or admission of accused not sufficient proof of death, 903. 
 
1083 INDEX. 
 
 EVIDENCE— co»/i« u ed. 
 
 acts and declarations. 
 
 subsequent acts of one aiding and abetting competent evidence of partici- 
 pation, 62. 
 
 witnesses may testify as to manner and language of deceased just before 
 killing, 373. 
 
 acts and declaration of one admissible against coconspirators, 958. 
 
 declarations of coconspirators only admissible when in furtherance of com- 
 mon design, 959. 
 
 and when consistent with other acts, 956. 
 
 acts or declarations after commission of homicide inadmissible against co- 
 conspirators, 959. 
 
 res gestae. 
 
 details of previous difficulty between parties part of res gestw, 373. 
 
 threats made by deceased, unaccompanied by demonstration, inadmissible 
 unless part of, 402. 
 
 admissibility of threats when part of, 409, 415. 
 
 all that occurred part of res gestos where person, after retreating, arms him- 
 self, returns, and kills antagonist, 451. 
 
 conduct of person shot by peace officer admissible as part of, 734. 
 
 admissibility as part of res gestce of proof that homicide committed in 
 perpetration of felony, 876. 
 
 prisoner's conduct and language part of res gestce in prosecution for poison- 
 ing, 908. 
 
 dying declarations. 
 
 dying declarations generally admissible only where death of declarant sub- 
 ject of inquiry, 972, 976. 
 
 admissible on ground of necessity, 973. 
 
 admission of dying declarations does not infringe right of accused to con- 
 front witnesses against him, 974. 
 
 admissible, although other evidence available, 975. 
 
 admissibility of dying declarations in prosecution for abortion, 976. 
 
 in favor of accused admissible, 978. 
 
 must be those of person for whose murder accused is tried, 979. 
 
 of one mortally injured in same transaction admissible on prosecution for 
 homicide of another, 980. 
 
 only admissible as to facts pointing to cause of death, 981. 
 
 identifying accused admissible, 982. 
 
 statement as to identity of person killing admissible as, 987. 
 
 what would exclude living witness would exclude dying declarations, 983. 
 
 only admissible as to what was done at time of act causing death, 984. 
 
 relating to former, subsequent, or distinct transactions inadmissible, 984. 
 
 matters of opinion, conclusion, and conjecture stated in dying declarations 
 inadmissible, 986. 
 
 not inadmissible because containing some extraneous matter, 989. 
 
 must be made in extremis, 991. 
 
 must be made under sense of impending dissolution, 992, 997. 
 
 declarant must be same when making, 997. 
 
 admissible, although declarant partially under the influence of opiates, 998. 
 
 how fact that declaration made under sense of impending death established, 
 999. 
 
INDEX. 1083 
 
 EVIDENCE— comtijiMed. 
 
 when statement of declarant shows sense of impending death, 1002-1006. 
 
 statement of declarant that he would soon die sufficient to admit, 1000. 
 
 inquiry of declarant as to his condition insufficient to exclude, 1002. 
 
 declarant need not state belief of impending death, 1006. 
 
 court will not presume that declarant believed death impending, 1008. 
 
 admissible on proof £liat physician advised deceased he was about to die, 
 1009. 
 
 declarant's belief in impending death need not be founded on medical ad- 
 vice, 1011. 
 
 belief of declarant in impending death cannot be shown by opinions of wit- 
 nesses, 1012. 
 
 that declarant sent for priest shows belief in impending death, 1013. 
 
 anxiety of declarant to arrange business affairs as showing belief in im- 
 pending death, 1014. 
 
 ■disbelief in future accountability as excluding, 1015. 
 
 law will presume dying declaration made under sense of future account- 
 ability, 1016. 
 
 that death did not immediately ensue does not render inadmissible, 1017. 
 
 need not be in writing, 1019. 
 
 admissibility of written dying declarations, 1019. 
 
 immaterial whether made before or after declarant's statement of expecta- 
 tion of death, 1020. 
 
 immaterial whether accused present or absent when made, 1020. 
 
 that substance of dying declaration was communicated by means of writing 
 does not render it inadmissible, 1020. 
 
 that dying declaration elicited was by questions does not render inadmis- 
 sible, 1020. 
 
 statutory rule in Texas as to interrogatories, 1021. 
 
 witness may state substance of, 1022. 
 
 proof of declaration and declarant's mental condition need not be by same 
 witness, 1022. 
 
 dying declarations made at different times may be proved, 1023. 
 
 incomplete dying declaration inadmissible, 1023. 
 
 whether dying declarations reduced to writing may be proved by parol, 
 1025-1027. 
 
 witness may prove dying declarations where deposition incompetent, 1026. 
 
 parol evidence of contents of lost deposition as to dying declarations, ad- 
 missible, 1027. 
 
 written dying declaration may be corroborated or elaborated by parol, 1026. 
 
 different dying declarations not reduced to writing provable by parol, 1027. 
 
 proof preliminary to admission of, 1031-1033. 
 
 weight to be given dying declarations, 1034. 
 
 impeachment of by proof of incomsistent statements, 1037. 
 
 impeachment of by proof of bad character of declarant, 1039. 
 
 threats. 
 
 inadmissible to justify homicide unless tending to show self-defense, 401, 415. 
 
 proof of self-defense warranting admission of, 405. 
 
 incompetent where slayer was aggressor, 401. 
 
 inadmissible unless communicated to accused, 403. 
 
 proof of communication of threats, 409. 
 
1084 INDEX. 
 
 EVIDENCE — continued. 
 
 uncommunicated threats admissible to show who began difficulty, 407. 
 to show person uttering them was aggressor, 407. 
 to show animus of demonstration or attack, 408. 
 to show disposition of deceased toward accused, 408. 
 to corroborate evidence of communicated threats, 408. 
 to show who was aggressor, 409. 
 thi^eats admissible to show whether accused was making an attack, 403, 40.5. 
 accompanied with overt acts competent to show belief of necessity of 
 
 killing, 403. 
 prior threats of deceased admissible to show slayer's belief of imminent dan- 
 ger, 404. 
 , necessity of hostile demonstration to render prior threats by deceased ad- 
 missible in justification, 410. 
 sufficiency of overt act to render threats by deceased admissible in justifi- 
 cation, 412. 
 proof of overt act to render threats by deceased admissible, 411. 
 admissibility of threats to show self-defense, 415. 
 indefinite threats inadmissible to show self-defense, 416. 
 previous threats of deceased plainly relating to slayer, admissible, 416. 
 admissibility of threats of conspirators on issue of self-defense, 417. 
 threat competent on issue of self-defense, although remote in time, 417. 
 circumstances showing character and effect of threats, admissible on issue 
 
 of self-defense, 418. 
 threats inadmissible unless indicating intention to take life or do great bodily 
 
 harm, 417. 
 threats by slayer admissible to show animus, 526. 
 communicated to slayer admissible to show animus of parties, 404. 
 threats of accused admissible on question of guilt, 931. 
 
 not rendered incompetent by lapse of time, 933. 
 unconnected with killing inadmissible, 934, 935. 
 declaration of intent to inflict violence admissible as threat, 934. 
 general threats to kill someone or a third person, inadmissible, 416, 936, 937. 
 threats made by third persons against deceased inadmissible, 939. 
 threats of deceased to kill himself, incompetent, 940. 
 character and reputation. 
 
 violent or dangerous character of deceased not generally admissible, 422. 
 proof that deceased was aggressor warrants evidence of his dangerous 
 
 character, 425, 429. 
 violent character of deceased competent where it is doubtful who was ag- 
 gressor, 432. 
 violent character of deceased admissible as part of proof of self-defense, 
 
 422-^24, 431. 
 what may be shown as to character of deceased on issue of self-defense, 434. 
 reputation of deceased as to habit of carrying arms admissible on issue 
 
 of self-defense, 436. 
 proof of dangerous character of deceased not admissible, in absence of hostile 
 
 act, 426, 429. 
 what overt acts of deceased warrant admission of evidence of dangerous 
 character, 427. 
 
INDEX. 1085 
 
 EVIDENCE— oonMnMed. 
 
 accused must have known of dangerous cliaracter of deceased to render proof 
 
 thereof admissible^ 429. 
 violent character of deceased competent where it is doubtful whether killing 
 
 was maliciouSj 432. 
 admissibility of proof of violent character, where evidence of homicide wholly 
 
 circumstantial, 433. 
 proof of violent character of deceased must be by general reputation, 440. 
 admissibility of evidence of general character for purpose of grading of- 
 fense, 433. 
 proof of character of deceased not confined to general character, 436. 
 admissibility of quarrelsome character of deceased when under influence of 
 
 liquor, 437. 
 character of officer inadmissible in prosecution for killing, 962. 
 good character of deceased not provable unless attacked, 438. 
 specific acts of general bad conduct admissible to show character of de- 
 ceased, 440-442. 
 specific acts of violence of deceased known to slayer admissible, 442. 
 particular conduct of deceased known to accused not admissible when re- 
 mote in time, 443. 
 proof of general good character of deceased, in rebuttal, 439, 440. 
 specific difficulties engaged in by deceased inadmissible in rebuttal of evi- 
 dence of good character, 443. 
 general good character of deceased, in rebuttal not confined to general repu- 
 tation, 444. 
 intenit or motive. 
 
 intoxication may be shown as affecting intent, 807. 
 acts in carrying out conspiracy admissible to show intent, 956. 
 unprovoked assault or threats admissible to show malicious motive of officer 
 
 killing while attempting to arrest, 758. 
 of interference to prevent illicit relations as proof of motive, 922. 
 of prevention of criminal intimacy between deceased and slayer's wife, 770. 
 one killing in defense of relative may show character of attack and extent 
 
 of his resistance, 776. 
 facts tending to show motive admissible against accused, 913. 
 state may show motive of each conspirator, 672. 
 
 evidence of motive competent to rebut defense of insanity or accident, 914. 
 facts showing motive must be within knowledge of accused, 916. 
 motive may be inferred from killing or acts of slayer, 916. 
 of another crime admissible to show motive, 916. 
 of robbery or theft as motive for killing, admissible, 917. 
 of plan to defraud admissible to show motive, 918. 
 of criminal enterprise admissible to show motive, 919. 
 that killing designed to remove burdeu or obstacle admissible to show motive, 
 
 920. 
 knowledge by deceased of matters detrimental to accused as proof of motive, 
 
 923. 
 of desire for revenge or injury as motive, 924. 
 act of deceased enraging accused competent to show motive, 926. 
 that deceased had testified adversely to accused admissible to show motive, 
 927. 
 
1086 INDEX. 
 
 EVIDENCE— co»Hn«ecJ. 
 
 that deceased had procured indictment against accused admissible to show 
 motive, 927. 
 
 kind acta and feelings admissible on question of motive, 928. 
 
 jealousy admissible to show motive, 930. 
 
 malice. 
 
 proof of express malice, 103. 
 
 malice may be established by circumstantial evidence, 116. 
 
 abandonment of malice may be shown by evidence or inferred from circum- 
 stances, 116. 
 
 inference of malice from use ot deadly weapon may be rebutted by circum- 
 stances, 126. 
 
 exposure and neglect of child killed by blows, admissible to show, 119. 
 
 previous hatred and ill-will admissible to show, 120. 
 
 circumstances attending homicide as proof of, 120-122. 
 
 preparing and concealing weapon, evidence of, 121. 
 
 act of slayer preventing aid to dying victim proof of, 121. 
 
 previous threats admissible to show, 121, 122. 
 
 threats by accused admissible to show malice and criminal intent, 932. 
 
 former difficulty between accused and deceased admissible to show, 141. 
 
 of intoxication admissible to show whether accused acted from malice or 
 sudden passion, 815. 
 
 that killing committed in perpetration of felony admissible to show malice 
 or motive, 876. 
 
 proof of malice inadmissible until fact of death shown, 896. 
 
 deliberation or premeditation. 
 
 proof of deliberation and premeditation by procuring knife, 231. 
 by preparing grave, 231. 
 
 opprobrious epithets addressed to slayer, evidence of absence of premedita- 
 tion, 235. 
 
 similar acts. 
 
 of similar acts of negligence in prosecution for negligent homicide, 966. 
 inadmissible to show character of accused therefor^ 967. 
 
 of other crimes unconnected with the homicide, inadmissible, 952. 
 
 of prior poisoning, 909. 
 
 conspiracy. 
 
 proof of conspiracy, 672, 957. 
 
 conspiracy may be proved by circumstances, 672. 
 
 proof of criminal conspiracy may be by direct or circumstantial evidence, 955. 
 
 joint acts of preparation evidence of conspiracy^ 673. 
 
 joint acts in execution of common design show conspiracy, 675. 
 
 declarations and acts not admissible to establish conspiracy, 959. 
 
 corpus delicti. 
 
 corpus deHcti must be proved, 895. 
 
 corpus delicti must be shown before presumptive evidence of guilt admis- 
 sible, 896. 
 
 death may be shown by direct or circumstantial evidence, 896, 898. 
 
 mere absence not sufficient proof of death, 899, 902. 
 
 proof of criminal agency causing death necessary, 903. 
 
 criminal agency causing death may be shovi^n by circumstances, 898, 904. 
 
 position in which body found, relevant on question of criminal agency, 944. 
 
INDEX. 1087 
 
 I OVIDENCE— coTCfiiiMed. 
 
 finding of body conclusive proof of death, 900. 
 
 finding body with marks of mortal injury as proof of criminal agency, 905. 
 
 inspection of body unnecessary where death proved by eye witnesses, 900. 
 
 ill usage or injury not suificient proof of death, 902. 
 
 specific means causing death need not be shown, 904. 
 
 death immediately after woimding establishes death from wound, 906. 
 
 opinion of medical expert that injury caused death, sufficient proof of corpus 
 
 delicti, 907. 
 of particular substance or kind of poison used, unnecessary, 908. 
 mere presence of poison in dead body does not prove corpus delicti, 910. 
 identity of body may be shown by inference as well as positive testimony, 
 
 910. 
 sufficiency of, to establish identity of dead body, 911. 
 of corpus delicti where death caused by procuring abortion, 908. 
 self-defense. 
 
 accused may testify to his belief of danger of death or bodily harm, 373. 
 prior occurrence on same day admissible on question of self-defense, 383. 
 when relative strength and personal qualities of parties may be shown on 
 
 issue of, 448-451. 
 relative strength admissible to show use of greater force than necessary in 
 
 self-defense, 502. 
 that deceased was frail man admissible to disprove, 449. 
 peaceful mission of deceased immaterial on issue of, 452. 
 relevancy and weight, 
 that one charged as principal in first degree was present aiding and abetting 
 
 is competent, 73. 
 proof of abandonment of unlawful design previous to homicide, 188. 
 elements of murder in first degree may be shown directly or inferred from 
 
 circumstances, 224. 
 proof of intoxication of deceased, 47. 
 proof of intoxication to show mental condition, 807. 
 
 relation and feeling existing between accused and deceased, competent, 913. 
 circumstances of resistance to officer killed, admissible, 960. 
 that person killed was acting as peace officer, admissible, 963. 
 warrant in resistance of which accused killed officer admissible, 963. 
 of information on which officer killed acted in attempting to arrest, 964. 
 that deceased was quarrelsome man of greath strength inadmissible to show 
 
 provocation, 267. 
 fact of provocation must be shown by preponderance of evidence, 332. 
 that death would not have ensued but for disease, inadmissible, 39. 
 as to propriety of medical treatment of wound, 41. 
 that death resulted from wound may be shown by circumstances, 46. 
 description of gunshot wound competent on question of proximity of parties, 
 
 942. 
 condition of weapon with which homicide committed may be shown, 945. 
 condition and surroundings of body admissible, 941. 
 of number and character of wounds, admissible, 941. 
 of marks and bruises upon body, 943. 
 admissibility of proof that homicide committed in perpetration of unlawful 
 
 act, 950. 
 
1089 INDEX. 
 
 EVIDENCE — continued. 
 
 sufficiency of, to establish unlawful act in connection with which homicidr 
 
 charged, 952. 
 proof of eommiasion of abortion, 968. 
 proof of pregnancy in prosecution of abortion, 909. 
 
 EXCUSABLE HOMICIDE. See Homicide. 
 
 EXPLOSION, 
 
 negligent killing by, 697. 
 
 EXPOSURE, 
 
 effect of voluntary exposure to death by injured person, 43. 
 
 P 
 
 FELONY. See a'so Homicide; Muedee. 
 
 homicide, in prevention of, justifiable, 763. 
 
 whether necessity justifying homicide to prevent felony must be real or 
 apparent, 767. 
 
 person resisting attempt to commit, may use degree of force reasonably neces- 
 sary, 766. 
 
 homicide committed as punishment for felony already committed not justi- 
 fiable, 767. 
 
 FIEE ARMS, 
 
 reckless use of, as dangerous act evincing depraved mind, 191, 210. 
 unintentionil killing by use of, may be manslaughter, 193. 
 killing by accidental discharge of, as involuntary manslaughter, 342-344. 
 death caused by shooting with gun fired to alarm, as manslaughter, 347. 
 homicide by accidental shooting, 570. 
 
 homicide by discharge of, unlawfully pointed, not misadventure, 571. 
 accidental discharge of fire arms without negligence, homicide by misadven- 
 ture, 572. 
 killing by negligent use of, 695, 699. 
 homicide by use of spring guns, 789. 
 
 FLIGHT, 
 
 does not show deliberation or premeditation, 230. 
 
 FOILS, 
 
 accidental killing while playing at, manslaughter, 345. 
 
 FORCE, 
 
 forcibly compelling another to injure himself, as homicide, 20. 
 
 FORMER JEOPARDY. See Judgment. 
 
 FRIGHT, 
 
 homicide by frightening another, 24, 27. 
 
 G 
 
 GAMES, 
 
 accidental killing in dangerous sports, manslaughter, 345. 
 
llS'DEX. 1081 
 
 GRIEF, 
 
 death caused by, not homicide, 27. 
 GUARDIAif AND WARD, 
 
 ■ guardian of child responsible for its death from neglect, 689. 
 relationship of, justifies killing in defense, 777. 
 
 GUEST, 
 
 relationship of host and guest justifies killing in defense, 777. 
 GUNS, 
 
 arc deadly weapons, 138. 
 
 HOMICIDE. See also Accident; Justifiable Homicidb; Malice; Man- 
 slaughter; MUBDEE. 
 kinds of, 1. 
 definition of, 1, 4. 
 excusable homicide defined, 9. 
 justification and excuse generally, 348. 
 committed in self-defense excusable, 9. 
 no penalty inflicted for excusable homicide, 568. 
 not justifiable where motive was revenge, 359. 
 neither words nor gestures will justify, 385. 
 accusation of crime does not justify, 386. 
 who may commit, 11. 
 convict may commit, 11. 
 slave punishable for, 12. 
 Indians triable for, 12. 
 
 criminal responsibility of corporations for, 12. 
 infant may commit, 12. 
 by innocent or irresponsible agent, 20. 
 law of, applies only to human beings, 15. 
 slave subject of, 15, 16. 
 unborn child not a subject of, 15. 
 killing live infant, homicide, 588, 590. 
 
 degree of homicide by killing by abortion or attempted abortion, 594. 
 statutory provisions as to crime of killing by person on attempted abortion, 
 
 595-597. 
 of alien enemies not murder, 16, 17. 
 soldier may kill alien enemy in war, 731. 
 in war levied against government, 583. 
 oflScer or soldier responsible for killing in obedience of unlawful order, 730, 
 
 731. 
 suicide constitutes, 15, 587. 
 by furnishing poison to suicide, 24. 
 by act causing another to injure himself, 24. 
 causing nervous irritation or shock not, 26. 
 death caused by grief not, 27. 
 
 Horn.— 69. 
 
1090 INDEX. 
 
 HOMICIDE — continued. 
 
 by exposure of helpless person, 28. 
 
 failure to rescue or prevent killing as^ 29. 
 
 time and place of consummation, 17, 18. 
 
 death must result within a year and a day from injury, 19. 
 
 consent of deceased no bar to prosecution for, 20. 
 
 killing another with his consent is, 69. 
 
 fatal termination of dangerous surgical operation not, 20, 21. 
 
 principals and seconds at duel guilty of, 68. 
 
 killing in attempted redress of private or social greivances as, 583. 
 
 method of killing not material except as enhancing guilt, 22. 
 
 causal connection of act of accused, 30. 
 
 act of accused must have been proximate cause of death, 31. 
 
 withdrawal after putting destructive agency in motion, 33. 
 
 infliction of injuries by diiTerent persons at different times, 34. 
 
 act accelerating death of one mortally wounded, 35. 
 
 acquittal where it cannot be ascertained which of several persons did killing, 
 35, 45. 
 
 responsibility of one inflicting first injury, 36, 37. 
 
 infliction of injury on one mortally diseased, 39. 
 
 effect of voluntary exposure to death by injured person, 43. 
 
 failure to procure medical aid for injured person, 44. 
 
 by misadventure defined, 566. 
 requisites of, 568. 
 
 accidental killing, murder if there is malice, 568. 
 
 due to lack of diligence or care, not misadventure, 569. 
 
 by fall of object thrown, 570. 
 
 by riding or driving over person, 569, 570. 
 
 by accidental shooting, 570. 
 
 where one takes poison placed to kill rats, 570. 
 
 accidental killing not excusable unless resulting from lawful act, 571. 
 
 by discha.rge of firearms unlawfully pointed not misadventure, 571. 
 
 accidental discharge of firearms without negligence, homicide by misad- 
 venture, 572. 
 
 unintentional killing in repelling unlawful attack, excusable, 573. 
 
 one killing person mistaken for another, responsible as if person intended 
 killed, 574. 
 
 killing one person in attempt to kill another, 574. 
 
 unintentional killing of third person, offense of same degree as if person 
 intended killed, 577. 
 rule under Texas statute, 578. 
 rule in Tennessee, 578. 
 
 if killing person intended justified or excusable, killing of third person by 
 mistake would be, 581. 
 
 definition of negligent homicide, 67fl. 
 
 classes of negligent homicide, 685. 
 
 when criminal responsibility attaches to negligence contributing to death 
 of another, 680. 
 
 lawful act causing death not criminal in absence of negligence, G81. 
 
 negligent homicide not criminal where no duty omitted, 082. 
 
INDEX. 1091 
 
 HOMICIDE— co/i*in«ed. 
 
 death must result directly from negligent act or omission, 684. 
 
 guardian of child responsible for its death from neglect, 6&9. 
 
 by omission of duty of one in charge of dangerous agency, 693. 
 
 officer of vessel penally responsible for failure to keep proper lookout, 693. 
 
 liability for homicide due to leaving machine or boiler unattended, 693, 695. 
 
 negligent killing by firearms or explosives, 695-699. 
 
 physician not criminally responsible for death due to mere mistake of judg- 
 ment, 712. 
 
 physician liable for death due to gross ignorance or negligence, 713. 
 
 death caused by reasonable correction of child, servant, or scholar, 715. 
 
 degree of homicide committed while inflicting correction, 720. 
 
 negligent homicide under Texas Code, 721. 
 
 negligent act causing death must have been individual act of accused, 722. 
 
 principal responsible for death due to neglect by agent of statutory duty, 
 724. 
 
 ofiicer seeking to arrest may be guilty of negligent homicide, 757. 
 
 attempted arrest for felony without warrant does not justify killing officer, 
 609. 
 
 innocence of charge of felony does not excuse killing officer attempting ar- 
 rest, 618. 
 
 killing in resistance of unlawful arrest as excusable homicide, 631. 
 
 illegality of arrest not necessary excuse for killing officer, 632. 
 
 killing by persons in attempting to escape from confinement, 640, 669. 
 
 official execution of death sentence justifiable, 728. 
 
 by officer, of one assaulting or resisting him, justifiable, 729. 
 
 committed by officer in preservation of peace, justifiable, 734. 
 
 officer arresting for misdemeanor cannot take life except in self-defense, 737. 
 
 killing of one committing felony justifiable if necessary to overcome re- 
 sistance, 737. 
 
 resistance to lawful arrest as justifying, 738. 
 
 lawful to kill fleeing felon who cannot otherwise be taken, 740. 
 
 officer without right to kill one fleeing from arrest for misdemeanor, 741. 
 
 officer may kill person charged with felony to prevent escape, 742. 
 
 officer not justified in killing prisoner charged with misdemeanor, 743. 
 
 when killing of convict by guard justifiable, 744. 
 
 officer in recapturing may use any means justifiable in arresting, 744. 
 
 in prevention of felony justifiable, 763. 
 
 but not to prevent misdemeanor, 764. 
 
 killing person sought to be arrested for misdemeanor, justifiable in self- 
 defense, 747. 
 
 mere suspicion of felony does not justify officer in killing, 754. 
 
 absolute necessity only justifies homicide for prevention of crime, 765. 
 
 person resisting attempt to commit felony may use degree of force reason- 
 ably necessary, 766. 
 
 committed as punishment for felony already committed not justifiable, 767. 
 
 whether necessity justifying homicide to prevent felony must be real or ap- 
 parent, 767. 
 
 by husband to protect virtue of wife, 769. 
 
 of assailant by third person to prevent attempt to kill another, justifiable, 
 770. 
 
1092 INDEX. 
 
 HOMICIDE— coretwMed. 
 
 by third person to prevent killing of another justified only by necessity, 772. 
 
 third person acts at his own peril in killing assailant of one in fault, 773. 
 
 by husband in defense of wife, 773. 
 
 one may take life in defense of his family, 773. 
 
 in defense of parent, child, or relative, 774. 
 
 in defense of brother or sister, 774. 
 
 to justify interference in behalf of relative, actual attack must have been 
 
 made, 775. 
 one defending relative can use no more force than latter entitled to use, 776. 
 culpability of person acting in defense of another measured by intent, 777. 
 relationship of guardian and ward justifies killing in defense, 777. 
 relationship of master and servant justifies killing in defense, 777. 
 relationship of host and guest justifies killing in defense, 777. 
 when defense of another on ground of relationship not justified, 777. 
 when homicide justifiable to prevent breach of peace, 778. 
 committed in the protection of propertj', 391, 392. 
 
 committed in defense of person, habitation, or property, justifiable, 764. 
 to prevent entrance to dwelling, 790. 
 
 to prevent attempted commission of robbery, justifiable, 780. 
 to prevent attempted commission of burglary, 781. 
 in recovering stolen property, 782. 
 
 unnecessary force must not be used in retaking property, 781. 
 killing to prevent petit larceny not justifiable, 782. 
 to prevent trespass, not generally justifiable, 783. 
 killing trespasser with a, deadly weapon, murder, 786. 
 by use of spring guns, 789. 
 
 malicious killing not justifiable as prevention of unlawful act, 797. 
 degree of malicious or unnecessary homicide in prevention of unlawful act, 
 
 797. 
 perpetrated in attempt to commit rape, murder in first degree, 176, 182. 
 in Commission of felonious or unlawful act, effect of statutes, 173. 
 acquittal of lesser degree no bar to conviction in higher degree, 72. 
 insane person not criminally responsible for, 801. 
 effect of partial insanity on degree of crime at common law, 802. 
 modern rule recognizes no condition between sanity and insanity, 803. 
 degree of, committed by intoxicated person, 809-811, 813. 
 intoxication cannot be considered when liquor dranlc to prepare for crime, 
 
 817. 
 
 HORSE RACE, 
 
 accidental killing in dangerous sport, manslaughter, 345. 
 
 HOST, 
 
 relationship of host and guest justifies killing in defense, 777. 
 
 HUSBAND AND WIFE, 
 
 conspiracy of, to commit murder, 653, 654. 
 
 wife may be accessory before the fact, 55. 
 
 responsibility of wife committing homicide jointly with husband, 55. 
 
 wife concealing husband not liable as accessory after the fact, 87. 
 
INDEX. 1093 
 
 HUSBAND AND miFE— continued. 
 
 homicide by husband in defense of wife, 773. 
 
 assault upon wife as provocation rendering killing by husband manslaughter, 
 297. 
 
 insult or wrong to wife of accused no justification for homicide, 393. 
 
 homicide to prevent interference with marital rights, 393. 
 by husband to protect virtue of wife, 769. 
 
 killing in sudden resentment by husband, of wife taken in adultery, murder 
 in second degree, 212. 
 
 when wife's paramour attacked by husband has imperfect right of self- 
 defense, 533. 
 
 death of wife from neglect of husband to provide is manslaughter, 690. 
 
 husband not responsible unless neglect caused death, 691. 
 
 death of wife due to beating by husband, as manslaughter, 718. 
 
 INDIANS, 
 
 triable for homicide, 12. 
 
 war as immunity for murder committed by, 733. 
 
 INDICTMENT, 
 
 averments must be direct and certain, 831. 
 
 must state acts constituting offense in ordinary concise language, 831. 
 
 facts necessary for information of accused must be averred, 831. 
 
 need not negative matters of defense, 831, 869. 
 
 sufficient if in language of statute, 833. 
 
 language of statute need not generally be followed, 832. 
 
 intent to kill need not be averred in statutory language, 870. 
 
 not necessary to use statutory words in charging deliberation or premedita 
 
 tion, 871. 
 sufficiency of, tested by requirements of statute, 832. 
 
 under statutory provisions making death due to abortion an offense, 885. 
 statutory element of particular degree must be alleged, 832. 
 averment that homicide is of specified degree, surplusage, 835. 
 conviction cannot be had for higher degree than that charged, 835. 
 causal connection of act of accused must be alleged, 30. 
 where disease or physicial condition co-operates with injury, 38, 39. 
 must show deceased was alive when blow was struck, 835. 
 
 allege that death resulted from injuries inflicted, 835. 
 
 aver that accused did the act causing death, 836. 
 
 charge that death resulted from act of accused, 836. 
 allegation of time of act causing death, 838. 
 should state time of death of person killed, 840. 
 must state place in which killing took place, 842. 
 must allege county or jurisdiction in which death of person killed took 
 
 place, 844. 
 necessity of such averment when death ensues in another jurisdiction, 845. 
 should aver manner of killing, 846. 
 may allege murder was committed by means unJcnown, 847. 
 
1094 INDEX. 
 
 INDICTMENT— cowimued. 
 
 alleging murder of infant by means unknown, charges offense of infanticide, 
 590. 
 
 means of killing charged in same count must not be repugnant, 848. 
 
 statutory rules as to alleging manner of killing, 849. 
 
 averment of character of weapon with which homicide committed, 851. 
 
 weapon need not be described where, by statute, means of killing need not 
 be alleged, 853. 
 
 manner in which instrument or means of death used need not be stated, 854. 
 
 unless homicide charged to have been committed with particular instru- 
 ment or means, 855. 
 
 no variance where instrument laid and proved are of same nature and char- 
 aotei-, 856. 
 
 description of wound or injury unnecessary, 859. 
 
 must allege that wound a\:-5 mortal, 859. 
 
 must be certain as to party against whom offense committed, 861. 
 
 should aver name of deceased, 861. 
 
 description of deceased, 801-865. 
 
 averment when name of deceased unknown, 863. 
 
 need not allege that person named was human being, 865. 
 
 for resisting ari'est or official act, 881. 
 
 for homicide due to malpractice, 883. 
 
 whfin death due to abortion or attempted abortion, 883. 
 
 charging conspiracy to procure homicide, 891. 
 
 charging murder and conspiracy resulting in murder not bad for duplicity, 
 892. 
 
 for killing one by unlawful act aimed at another, must allege assault on per- 
 son killed, 576. 
 
 averment that homicidal act was done feloniously and unlawfully, 8T4. 
 
 that killing occurred in prosecution of riot need not be charged, 892. 
 
 averment of intent or scienter in case of poisoning, 870. 
 
 charging murder by poison need not allege intent to kill, 154. 
 
 allegation that murder committed with malicu aforethought charges murder 
 in first degree, 197. 
 
 charging murder must allege malice aforethought, 866. 
 
 in alleging malice aforethought words of similar import may be used, 867. 
 
 charging murder must allege intent to kill when essential ingredient of 
 crime, 869. 
 
 averment of deliberation or premeditation in charging murder in first de- 
 gree, 871. 
 
 necessity of averment of wilfulness in charging murder, 873. 
 
 necessity of charging that murder was committed by perpetration of another 
 crime, 875. 
 
 charge that murder committed in perpetration of felony unneces';arv but, 
 good, 877. 
 
 elements of felony need not be averred in charging murder in perpetration 
 thereof, 878. 
 
 for manslaughter by causing a fire, 33. 
 
 voluntary manslaughter must be distinctly charged, 8,'!,j, 
 
 for manslaughter need not allege malice aforethought, 868. 
 
INDEX. 1095 
 
 imilCTMEl^iT— continued. 
 
 describing- crime of manslaughter in common-law form, good, 880. 
 
 for manslaughter, need not allege killing done without malice, 880. 
 
 alleging unlawful shooting sufficient charge of manslaughter, 880. 
 
 for involuntary manslaughter must allege killing in commission of unlaw- 
 ful act, or lawful act unlawfully done, 879. 
 
 count for involuntary manslaughter may be joined with one for felonious 
 homicide, 8S0. 
 
 for homicide by neglect, 848. 
 
 for negligent homicide need not aver criminal intent, 882. 
 must charge duty which was neglected, 881. 
 
 for homicide due to neglect to provide necessaries, 882. 
 
 for neglect of child need not allege ability of parent, 687. 
 
 charging several persons as principals, 56. 
 
 where principal in first degree dies or escapes, 72. 
 
 for aiding and abetting properly charges accused as principal, 73. 
 
 juay charge aider or abettor as actual perpetrator, 887. 
 
 form of, of accessory before the fact, 82, 83. 
 
 accessory should not be indicted as principal, 888. 
 
 charging accessories as principals under statute, 889. 
 
 INFANTS, 
 
 criminal responsibility for homicide, 12. 
 
 death from exposure as homicide, 28. 
 
 interposition by, as intermediate agent of death, 44. 
 
 unborn child not a subject of homicide, 15. 
 
 killing unborn quick child as manslaughter by statute, 591. 
 
 killing live infant, homicide, 588, 590. 
 
 death of, after birth from prior injuries, 589. 
 
 INSAJSriTY, 
 
 insane person not criminally responsible, 801. 
 
 effect of partial insanity on degree of crime at common law, 802. 
 modern rule recognizes no condition between sanity and insanity, 803. 
 partial as mitigating element in connection with irresistible impulse, 804. 
 law of self-defense applicable alike to sane and insane, 804. 
 
 INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY, 
 
 court should define statutory terms, 246. 
 
 as to malice, 2, 3. 
 
 right to draw inferences, as to malice, 144. 
 
 as to inference of malice from use of deadly weapon inapplicable where mis- 
 adventure is asserted, 127. 
 
 court should, on request, instruct what is deadly weapon in case of killing 
 therewith, 138. 
 
 as to premeditation and deliberation, 163. 
 
 as to murder in first degree must not ignore elements of deliberation and 
 premeditation, 199. 
 
 as to intoxication rendering accused incapable of premeditation, 813. 
 
 instruction to find specified degree generally improper, 244. 
 
 court cannot give binding instructions where jury authorized to determine 
 degree, 1056. 
 
1096 INDEX. 
 
 INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY— continued. 
 
 charge should show distinction between degrees of murder, 214. 
 
 court should instruct as to distinctions between different grades of homicide, 
 
 246. 
 robbery shown as motive, warrants instruction on murder in first degree, 
 
 225, note 6. 
 as to murder in second degree, proper in prosecution for murder in first 
 
 degree, 242. 
 where evidence circumstantial, court should instruct as to murder in both 
 
 first and second degrees, 242. 
 defining adequate cause, when charging jury as to murder in second degree, 
 
 243. 
 if evidence shows lower grade of homicide, court must instruct jury as to, 
 
 241. 
 where evidence warrants verdict of particular degree, duty of court to so 
 
 instruct, 243. 
 court should instruct as to each degree which might be found under the 
 
 evidence, 246. 
 court need not charge as to degree concerning which there is no evidence, 247. 
 error to instruct as to grade of homicide of which evidence shows accused 
 
 not guilty, 243. 
 erroneous instruction as to higher degree harmless where conviction is for 
 
 lower degree, 249. 
 not reversible error to instruct as to one degree when evidence shows and 
 
 conviction is for another, 249. 
 accused not prejudiced by instruction submitting theory of lower degree than 
 
 evidence shows, 250. 
 as to degrees of hom:cide should include self-defense, 356. 
 as to self-defense, 356-358, 557, 558. 
 
 as to burden of proof where self-defense is set up, 550, 555. 
 as to distinction between perfect and imperfect self-defense, 511. 
 where evidence tends to show self-defense, defendant entitled to in.struction 
 
 therefor, 355, 356, 365. 
 that due caution must be used in applying rules as to self-defense^ not ob- 
 jectionable, 357 note, 12. 
 as to self-defense should state constituent elements, 357. 
 
 plea of self-defense does not preclude instruction as to manslaughter, 356. 
 as to self-defense should be given where evidence shows ofl^ense is either 
 
 murder or manslaughter, 357. 
 that jury may infer from facts accused not in imminent danger, improper, 
 
 364. 
 as to apparent necessity justifying killing in self-defense, 368. 
 apparent danger and necessity to kill entitles accused to instruction on 
 
 self-defense, 369. 
 curing instruction limiting right of self-defense to actual danger, 370. 
 where deceased assailed slayer with deadly weapon, 388. 
 as to right to anticipate attack in self-defense, 306. 
 on self-defense not required where threats not communicated, 406. 
 as to self-defense when slayer was aggressor, 505. 
 as to act of aggression depriving slayer of right of self-defense, 517. 
 
INDEX. 1097 
 
 INSTRUCTIONS TO JVnY— continued. 
 
 as to self-defense, should not assume that slayer was at fault or without 
 fault, 507. 
 
 as to duty to retreat, 471, 475, 479, 481, 490. 
 
 as to self-defense inapplicable when deceased was retreating when killed, 501. 
 
 as to right to pursue improper, in absence of showing of actual pursuit, 488. 
 
 as to self-defense and defense of domicil, 493. 
 
 as to abandonment of difficulty and renewal, 560. 
 
 alibi does not render instruction on manslaughter unnecessary, 262. 
 
 plea of self-defense does not render unnecessary instruction on manslaughter, 
 262. 
 
 court should instruct on manslaughter if evidence would warrant verdict for 
 that offense, 262. 
 
 evidence showing want of malice entitles accused to instruction on man- 
 slaughter, 263. 
 
 court need not charge on manslaughter where guilt depends on question of 
 insanity, 263. 
 
 on manslaughter not necessary where no evidence tends to show manslaughter 
 and defense is justification, 263. 
 warranted where there were no eye witnesses to killing, 263. 
 not error, where homicide is either murder or justifiable in self-defensp, 
 264. 
 
 charge on provocation confining jury to facts occurring at time, 273. 
 
 adequacy of provocation, 274. 
 
 in prosecution for voluntary manslaughter, court should define adequate 
 and legal provocation, 310. 
 
 where homicide results from sudden quarrel, 289. 
 
 denying "heat of passion," in prosecution for manslaughter, 314. 
 
 court need not charge as to heat of passion, where deliberation shown, 315. 
 
 as to manslaughter improper where evidence shows murder or justifiable 
 homicide, 356. 
 
 evidence of accidental killing does not warrant instructions as to man- 
 slaughter, 567. 
 
 as to justifiable or excusable homicide, 348. 
 
 as to burden of proving justification or excuse, 222. 
 
 where evidence shows threats against accused, 406. 
 
 that repetition of threats increase their probative force, not erroneous, 940. 
 
 as to homicide by misadventure, 568. 
 
 on prosecution of officer for killing one resisting arrest, 736. 
 
 as to excessive force in resisting rescue or escape of prisoner, 752. 
 right of person to kill in defense of another, 773. 
 absence of motive improper when evidence shows motive, 915. 
 weight dying declaration entitled to, 1034. 
 punishment prescribed for murder or manslaughter, 1055. 
 their right to make recommendation, 1055. 
 
 INSURANCE, 
 
 beneficiary killing insured not entitled to insurance money, 1065. 
 when killing of insured person forfeits policy^ 1066. 
 
1098 INDEX. 
 
 INTENT, 
 
 to kill, see also Murder. 
 
 to kill, as element of voluntary manslaughter, 6, 7. 
 
 presumed from use of deadly weapon, 7. 
 
 distinguished from malice, 99. 
 
 does not necessarily constitute malice, 106. 
 
 not necessary to the offense of liomloide, 106. 
 
 inferred from use or absence of deadly weapon, 115. 
 
 inferred from character of act, 115. 
 
 Inferred from deliberate shooting into occupied house, 128L, 
 
 conclusively presumed from intent to commit felony, 174. 
 
 may be inferred from character of weapon used, 167. 
 in cases of assault with intent to kill, 206. 
 to do bodily harm necessary element of murder, 3. 
 to do severe bodily harm, followed by homicide, constitutes murder, 106. 
 absence of, characteristic of involuntary manslaughter, 7, 8. 
 accused must participate both in criminal act and intent, 64. 
 criminal responsibility not affected by change of, 202. 
 as affecting right of self-defense, 511-514. 
 culpability of person acting in defense of another, measured by intent, 777. 
 
 INTOXICATING LIQUOR, 
 
 manslaughter by administering excessive quantities of, 347. 
 
 INTOXICATION, 
 
 voluntary intoxication no justification or excuse for homicide, 805. 
 
 settled insanity produced by drunkenness may excuse, 807. 
 
 Texas statute as to intoxication as defense, 816. 
 
 of assailant does not modify right of self-defense, 453. 
 
 does not enlarge right of self-defense, 816. 
 
 INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER. See Manslaughter. 
 
 JEALOUSY, 
 
 homicide prompted by, is murder, 260. 
 
 JOKE, 
 
 Adhere death occurs as result of, 346. 
 
 JUDGMENT, 
 
 recommendation of mercy in, 1046. 
 
 conviction or acquittal of higher crime as bar to prosecution for lower, 1048. 
 
 conviction or acquittal of minor offense included in greater as bar, 1048. 
 
 conviction upon one count as acquittal upon others, 1050. 
 
 defendant cannot be convicted of higher degree on second trial than on 
 
 first, 1050. 
 acquittal as principal bars indictment as accessory before fact, 1050. 
 prosecution for two distinct felonies growing out of same act, 1051. 
 commencement of prosecution in one jurisdiction as bar to prosecution in 
 
 another, 1052. 
 
INDEX. 1099 
 
 JURISDICTION. 
 
 removal of body after death does not affect, 822. 
 
 where wound inflicted in one place and death occurs in another, 822-826. 
 where person within one jurisdiction shoots person within another, 824, 825. 
 statutory provisions as to jurisdiction of offense committed elsewhere, 826. 
 statutes conferring jurisdiction upon place where fatal blow struck, 828. 
 
 or where ofl'ense commenced or consummated, 828. 
 averments as to, see Indictment. 
 
 JURY. See also Instructions to Jtjey; Tkial. 
 assessment of punishment by, 1045. 
 recommendation by, as to punishment, 1055-1069. 
 
 JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE. See also Homicide. 
 definition of, 9. 
 
 distinction between excusable and justifiable homicide now disregarded, 10. 
 no responsibility as principal in second degree in, 57. 
 one compelled to aid in homicide may take lives of those compelling him, 68. 
 
 K 
 
 KNIVES, 
 
 are deadly weapons, 138. 
 pocket-knife as deadly weapon, 140. 
 
 LABOR UNIONS. 
 
 liability of combination of striking workmen for homicide, 661. 
 
 I>ARCENY. 
 
 killing to prevent petit larceny not justifiable, 782. 
 homicide in recovering stolen property, 782. 
 
 LIBEL, 
 
 not adequate provocation reducing homicide to manslaughter, 276. 
 
 LIMITATION OF ACTIONS, 
 
 when prosecution barred under statutes, 819-821. 
 statutes generally prescribe no limitation for murder, 819. 
 as to murder in lower degree and manslaughter, 819. 
 statute construed liberally in favor of accused, 819. 
 
 LOCUS IN QUO, 
 
 of offense of accessory before the fact, 82. 
 
 LYING IN WAIT, 
 
 murder by, what constitutes, 156. 
 
 killing by means of, murder in first degree, 198. 
 
 LYNCHING, 
 
 all participants in, responsible for overt act, 586. 
 
 Texas statute as to taking human life by mob violence, 586. 
 
1100 INDEX. 
 
 M 
 MACHINERY, 
 
 liability for homicide due to leaving unattended, 693, 695. 
 
 MALICE. See also Dolus; Intent; Manslaughter; Muedeb. ' 
 definition of, 2, 4, 89, 94, 9(i. 
 
 should be defined to jury in prosecution for murder, 3. 
 malice aforethought defined, 101. 
 
 scope and meaning of statutory malice aforethought, 197. 
 wilful preparation and giving of poison with intent to, kill constitutea ex- 
 press malice aforethought, 171. 
 deliberation essential to malice aforethought, 100. 
 malice aforethought no defense to indictment for manslaughter, 5. 
 express malice defined, 102. 
 
 definition and scope of "express malice" as used in statutes, 167-171. 
 to constitute express malice, slayer need not be wholly self-possessed, 169. 
 implied malice defined, 103. 
 express malice comprises implied malice, 104. 
 distinction between express and implied, 104. 
 constituent elements of, 99. 
 necessary ingredient of crime of murder, 2, 3. 
 express or implied must be shown to constitute murder, 116. 
 must be directed toward person killed to be murder in first degree, 170. 
 not an ingredient of crime of manslaughter, 5. 
 anger not necessarily malice, 99. 
 
 physical presence not necessary to existence of malice, 101. 
 distinguished from intent to kill, 99. 
 intent to kill as, 105. 
 
 deliberate intent unlawfully to take human life constitutes, 106. 
 intent to kill does not necessarily constitute, 106. 
 intent to do bodily harm, 106. 
 
 where person other than one intended is killed by mistake, 108. 
 towards class includes malice towards individual, 110. 
 motive not indispensable element of, 101. 
 when presumed, 128. 
 
 implied from any deliberate or cruel act, 100-104. 
 
 inferred from homicide committed with great cruelty and barbarity, 118. 
 may be implied from any deliberately cruel ac+ against another, 115. 
 inference of, from the fact of killing, 116. 
 presumed from apparently intentional killing, 128. 
 intentional killing not incompatible with absence of malice, 118. 
 implied from wrongful killing when express malice not shown, 207. 
 
 only in absence of explanatory evidence, 117. 
 
 from circumstances of homicide, 119. 
 inferred in homicide resulting from resolution to resist all ojiposers while 
 committing breach of peace, 88. 
 
 from unlawful administration of poison, 122. 
 
 commission of dangerous act evincing depraved mind, 189. 
 implied from use of deadly weapon, 124, 131. 
 what is deadly weapon from which malice will be inferred, 135. 
 not inferred from possession of deadly weapon lawfully carried. 127. 
 
INDEX. 1101 
 
 MALICE — continued. 
 
 inference from use of weapon not applicable where defense ia insanity, 127. 
 
 not inferred from use of weapon superior to that used by person killed, 127. 
 
 inference of, may be rebutted by circumstances, 126. 
 
 presumption of continuance of, 141, 316. 
 
 abandonment of, may be shown by evidence or inferred from circumstances, 
 
 116. 
 provocation does not disprove malice, 99. 
 reckless disregard of human life shows express malice, 110. 
 may be established by circumstantial evidence, 115. 
 determined by attendant circumstances when shown, 131. 
 may be shown by cool deportment of accused, 168. 
 robbery and subsequent killing, evidence of express malice, 169. , 
 mere use of a deadly weapon does not show express malice, 169. 
 threats as evidence of, 317. 
 
 MANSLAUGHTER, 
 
 definition of, 5, 6, 252. 
 
 no accessories before the fact in, 75. 
 
 where intent is not to kill, accessory may be found guilty of, 218. 
 
 what constitutes, 253. 
 
 one aiding a homicide in sudden passion guilty of, 51. 
 
 participants in killing at prize fight guilty of manslaughter, 69. 
 
 homicide in commission of bare trespass is, 112. 
 
 verdict for, may be rendered in prosecution for killing done in perpetration 
 
 of felony, 114. 
 in the absence of felonious intent, homicide by use of weapon not deadly is, 
 
 126. 
 killing in sudden quarrel may be, 253. 
 intentional killing on serious provocation may be, 253. 
 killing with deadly weapon without deliberation or malice may be, 253. 
 where weapon used not likely to kill, 253. 
 
 killinpr in sudden transport of passion without malice is, 254. 
 intent to kill necessary element of, 25.5. 
 statutory degrees of, 255-258. 
 malice not an ingredient of crime of, 5. 
 malice distinguishes murder from manslaughter, 258. 
 malice not inferred if provocation great, 260. 
 killing resulting from reckless indifference to life is, 260. 
 murder and manslaughter are different crimes, 261. 
 
 characterized by absence of intent to kill, and action in heat of passion, 25D. 
 absence of intent to kill as distinction between murder and manslaughter, 
 
 261. 
 no such offense as assault with intent to commit, 261. 
 assault with intent to commit, may exist by statute, 261. 
 by carrying right of self-defense too far, 380. 
 
 killin" in self-defense by aggressor intending only slight punishment is, 512. 
 homicide by one assaulted when committing misdemeanor is, 548. 
 killing to prevent injury less than serious bodily harm is, 548. 
 homicide in collision of groups of heated partisans is, 584. 
 bv statute, to kill unborn quick child, 591. 
 
1103 INDEX. 
 
 UANS'LAUGllTmi— continued. 
 
 causing death of pregnant woman by abortion, o92--5i97. 
 not manslaughter to aid miscarriage with good motives, 598. 
 resistance of arrest illegally attempted under color of legal authority, man- 
 slaughter, 601. 
 when killing in resisting arrest for criminal act committed in officer's 
 
 presence is, 613. 
 killing of officer exceeding authority in civil cases, 619. 
 
 force in making arrest not provocation reducing killing of officer to, 020. 
 killing in resisting legal arrest attempted in violent manner may be, 620. 
 killing of one not known to be officer in resisting arrest, 624. 
 unlawful arrest as provocation reducing killing of officer to, 629. 
 killing of officer refusing to show authority to arrest, as, 629. 
 by killing in sudden passion while resisting unlawful arrest, 631. 
 excessive resistance to unlawful arrest, 634. 
 killing in escaping after submission to illegal arrest, 636. 
 killing in attempt to arrest for misdemeanor without warrant may be, 753. 
 private person killing one unjustly suspected of felony, guilty of, 7.35. 
 killing where officers take opposite sides in difficulty, as, 637. 
 killing mere trespasser as, 785. 
 
 unnecessary killing without malice to prevent felony, is, 798. 
 voluntary manslaughter defined, 6^ 264. 
 voluntary manslaughter, what constitutes, 265. 
 killing in heat of passion, voluntary manslaughter, 6. 
 
 sudden passion arising from provocation necessary element of voluntary man- 
 slaughter, 312. 
 of what passion reducing murder to manslaughter may consist, 313. 
 intent to kill as element of voluntary manslaughter, 6, 7. 
 slayer not guilty of voluntary manslaughter unless killing unlawful, 7. 
 may be voluntary though there is no intent to kill, 265. 
 killing of different person from one intended in heat of passion, voluntary 
 
 manslaughter, 579. 
 but cannot be less offense than manslaughter, 580. 
 by one interfering in difficulty, 269. 
 by ducking another, 302, 347. 
 
 killing on great provocation, voluntary manslaughter, 6. 
 homicide suddenly committed on adequate provocation is, 265. 
 provocation cannot excuse homicide but may mitigate murder to, 266. 
 ■when atrocious or cruel killing not reduced to, by provocation, 172. 
 killing by conspirator on provocation reduces offense to manslaughter, 670. 
 provocation defined, 266. 
 
 exercise of legal right not provocation lowering grade of homicide, 267 
 public wrong not sufficient provocation, 268. 
 provocation must be offered by person killed, 269. 
 provocation as affected by duty to protect, 270. 
 adequacy of provocation, 271. 
 
 provocation not naturally causing instant resentment insufficient, 273. 
 •words and gestures not generally sufficient provocation if accused intenJcd t.i 
 
 kill, 274, 276. 
 threats or menaces not adequate provocation, 275. 298. 
 
INDEX. 1103 
 
 MANSLAUGHTEE,— coreiireued. 
 
 libel or slander not adequate provocation, 276. 
 
 assault or personal violence generally necessary to constitute adequate prov- 
 ocation, 276. 
 
 ■words or acts as reducing homicide to manslaughter under statute, 278. 
 
 insulting words or conduct towards female relative as sufficient provocation, 
 279. 
 
 assault as sufScient provocation, 283-287. 
 
 degree of force of assault not criterion of legal provocation, 286. 
 
 excessive resistance as assault constituting provocation, 287. 
 
 interchange of blows induced by insulting words as provocation, 288. 
 
 killing in sudden quarrel, voluntary manslaughter, 288. 
 
 sudden combat as sufficient provocation, 289. 
 
 what constitutes mutual combat affording adequate provocation, 291. 
 
 use of deadly weapon after exchange of blows, 290. 
 
 killing with fist or weapon not deadly, 290. 
 
 discontinuance of affray or retreating as anecting muxual combat as provo- 
 cation, 290, 291, 
 
 provocation does not render killing manslaughter, where slayer takes undue 
 advantage, 292. 
 
 when killing with deadly weapon in mutual combat, manslaughter, 293. 
 
 mutual combat not adequate provocation when slayer sought difficulty, 294. 
 
 adequacy of provocation as affected by disparity of strength or weapons, 
 295. 
 
 assault upon relatives or friends as provocation, 296. 
 
 assault upon wife as provocation reducing killing by husband to manslaugh- 
 ter, 297. 
 
 assault upon child as provocation reducing killing to manslaughter, 297. 
 
 killing of friend as sufficient provocation, 297. 
 
 illegal restraint or coercion as adequate provocation, 298. 
 
 illegal or improper arrest as adequate provocation, 299. 
 
 bare trespass not sufficient provocation, 300. 
 
 sudden killing provoked by trespass may be manslaughter, 302. 
 
 assault as adequate provocation, 302. 
 
 forcible entry or attack upon residence as adequate provocation, 302. 
 
 charivari as adequate provocation, 302. 
 
 breach of contract not adequate provocation, 303. 
 
 adultery by or with spouse or relative as adequate provocation, 303-306. 
 
 killing wife's paramour in compromising situation, manslaughter, 305. 
 
 adultery as provocation under special statutes, 306. 
 
 attack on chastity of relative, dependent or friend, as adequate provocation, 
 308. 
 
 attempted commission of sodomy on child as adequate provocation to killing 
 by father, 308. 
 
 seduction of daughter as adequate provocation, 308. 
 
 intent to chastise as affecting adequacy of provocation, 309. 
 
 where intent is merely to chastise for trespass, 310. 
 
 design to kill renders homicide under provocation murder, 312. 
 
 killing in passion, without legal provocation, murder, 313. 
 
 provocation immaterial if killing deliberate, 315, 317. 
 
1104 INDEX. 
 
 MANSLAUGHTER— co»<ire«ed. 
 
 difficulty sought or incited by slayer not provocation, 318. 
 intoxication cannot affect existence of adequate provocation reducing of- 
 fense to, 814. 
 involuntary manslaughter defined, 7, 332. 
 elements of involuntary manslaughter, 332. 
 classes of involuntary manslaughter, 335. 
 distinction between involuntary manslaughter and other classes of homicide, 
 
 333. 
 absence of intent characteristic of involuntary manslaughter, 7, 334. 
 nnintentional killing by use of firearms may be manslaughter, 193. 
 homicide not reduced to involuntary manslaughter by intent to wound, 
 
 and not to kill, 106. 
 killing in commission of unlawful act, involuntary manslaughter, 8. 
 preliminary unlawful act in commission of involuntary, 336, 338. 
 unlawful preliminary act in involuntary manslaughter must be wilful, 337. 
 not necessary that person doing unlawful act should have intended to violate 
 
 the law, 337. 
 involuntary manslaughter in commission of unlawful act must be natural 
 
 result of act, 338. 
 killing by one attempting suicide involuntary manslaughter, 338. 
 killing in commission of minor assault, involuntary manslaughter, 339. 
 death inflicted in struggle in anger, at least manslaughter, 341. 
 slaying in fair combat without deadly weapon, manslaughter, 341. 
 homicide in riots without intent to kill, manslaughter, 341. 
 killing by accidental discharge of firearms as involuntary manslaughter, 342- 
 
 344. 
 accidental killing in dangerous sport, manslaughter, 341, 572. 
 while playing at foils, manslaughtea-, 345. 
 in prize fight as manslaughter, 345. 
 when death caused by sparring with gloves, manslaughter, 340. 
 where death occurs as result of practical joke, 346. 
 ty shooting with gun fired to alarm, 347. 
 
 by administering excessive quantities of intoxicating liquor, 347. 
 accidental killing b^- negligence, 8. 
 killing by mere accident not crime, 9. 
 fatal injury negligently inflicted constitutes. 111. 
 negligent administration of poison is, 155. 
 one causing death by negligent act responsible whether act legal or illegal, 
 
 683. 
 causing death by neglect of known duty as, 683. 
 death of child from parent's neglect to provide necessaries, •*!», 086, 089. 
 
 of wife from neglect of husband to provide is, 690. 
 husband not responsible unless neglect caused death, 691. 
 death of seaman from master's refusal to supply necessaries, 692. 
 of servant from master's neglect to supply necessaries as, 691. 
 of prisoner from neglect of keeper, 692. 
 death in collision due to failure of brakeman to perform duty, manslaughter, 
 
 694. 
 may exist without sudden passion, where killing results from negligent lise 
 
INDEX. 1105 
 
 MANSLAUGHTER— contiraMed. 
 
 of dangerous agencies, 695. 
 killing by negligent use of firearms as, 695, 699. 
 death from negligent exposure or giving of poison as, 699. 
 by negligently dropping or throwing articles, 700. 
 death from loosing dangerous animals as, 700. 
 by riding unruly horse among crowd, 701. 
 by removing ti-apstiek from cart, 701. 
 by fast driving, 701-703. 
 
 by negligent management of locomotive or train, 704, 723. 
 by negligent navigation of vessels, 705. 
 
 under Federal statutes by negligent navigation of vessel, 707, 710. 
 English rule that physician failing to use competent skill and sufficient 
 
 attention guilty of, 710, 712. 
 death of child from punishment as manslaughter, 715. 
 death of child from punishment inflicted by one in loco parentis, 716. 
 death of pupil from immoderate punishment as, 717. 
 death of wife due to beating by husband as, 718. 
 death of servant from punishment inflicted by master, 718. 
 
 MASTER AND SERVANT. 
 
 death of servant from master's neglect to supply necessaries as manslaugh- 
 ter, 691. 
 death caused by reasonable correction of servant, 715. 
 death of servant from punishment inflicted by master, 718. 
 relationship of, justifies killing in defense, 777. 
 
 MAXIMS, 
 
 actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea, 457. 
 
 jus publicum privatorum voluntate mutari nequit, 20. 
 
 qui facile est scire, ei detrimento esse debit ignorantia sua, 699. 
 
 MEETINGS, 
 
 liability for homicide resulting from conspiracy to disturb, 648, 660. 
 
 MISADVENTURE, 
 
 homicide by, see Homicide. 
 
 distinguished from involuntary manslaughter by happening in consequence 
 of lawful act, 567. 
 
 MISTAKE, 
 
 one killing person mistaken for another, responsible as if person intended 
 killed, 574. 
 
 MOTIVE, 
 
 as affecting right of self-defense, 511-514. 
 state may show motive of each conspirator, 672. 
 proof of, see Evidence 
 
 MURDER, 
 
 definition ofj 2. 
 
 statutory meaning of term, 175. 
 penalty for, is death, 1052. 
 penalty for, inflicted by hanging, 1059. 
 Horn.— 70. 
 
1106 INDEX. 
 
 MURDER — continued. 
 
 mui-der and manslaughter are different crimes, 261. 
 
 effect of statutes establishing degrees of murder on distinction between 
 
 murder and manslaughter, 151. 
 distinguished from manslaughter by malice, 258. 
 malice necessary ingredient of crime of, 2, 3. 
 malice express or implied must be shown, 116. 
 scope and meaning of statutory malice aforethought, 197. 
 malice not implied when circumstances of killing shown, 220. 
 malice not infen-ed if provocation great, 260. 
 malice implied from killing officer while resisting arrest, 603. 
 malicious killing not justifiable as prevention of unlawful act, 797. 
 malice should be defined to jury in prosecution for, 3. 
 deliberation and intent necessary, 3. 
 
 absence of intent to kill as distinction between manslaughter and, 261. 
 accidental killing of person other than one intended as, 108. 
 mitigation and excuse not presumed, when killing intentional, 221. 
 intent to do severe bodily harm followed by homicide constitutes, 106. 
 intent to kill may be inferred from weapon used or acts of malice, 225. 
 inference of deliberate intent to kill from manner of killing, 227. 
 
 from nature of wound, 227. 
 
 from use of deadly weapon, 227. 
 ffhut constitutes deliberate use of deadly weapon, 230. 
 deliberation or premeditation not shown by flight, 230. 
 
 inference of deliberate intent to kill from preparation for flight or con- 
 cealing body, 230. 
 
 from provoking affray, 230. 
 proof of deliberation and premeditation by procuring knife, 231. 
 
 by preparing grave, 231. 
 malice and deliberation inferred from manufacture of implement to kill 
 another, 232. 
 
 from manufacture of bomb, 232. 
 inference of deliberation, premeditation, and intent to kill from threats. 
 
 232-234. 
 inference of deliberation, premeditation, and express malice from subse- 
 quent declarations of acused as to intent, 233. 
 inference of deliberate and premeditated intent to kill from prior acts and 
 
 relations, 234. 
 opprobrious epithets addressed to slayer, evidence of absence of premedita- 
 tion, 235. 
 malice or premeditation not shown by slayer's fear for his personal safety 
 
 235. 
 previous grievances not conclusive of premeditation in case of mutual re- 
 crimination, 235. 
 intoxication as affecting deliberation and premeditation, 811. 
 one directing another to take poison guilty of, 69. 
 homicide committed in perpetration of felony is, 112. 
 homicide prompted by revenge or jealousy is, 260. 
 deliberate killing of adulterer for revenge is, 30-1. 
 design to kill renders homicide under provocation murder, 312. 
 
INDEX. 1107 
 
 MURDER— continued. 
 
 to kill in gratification of grudge is, 315. 
 
 slayer provoking combat in order to kill or harm adversary, guilty of, 511. 
 
 homicide by one assaulted vsfhen committing misdemeanor is, 548. 
 
 killing of innocent person by participant in riotous conflict, 585. 
 
 participants in lynching responsible for overt act, 586. 
 
 where poison prepared for one person taken by another, 577. 
 
 Texas statute as to taking human life by mob violence, 588. 
 
 where child dies after birth from prior injuries, 589. 
 
 killing unborn child not murder, 588. 
 
 causing death of pregnant woman by abortion, 592-597. 
 
 killing to evade lawful arrest is murder, 601. 
 
 warrant as protecting officer so that killing him in resistance will be mur- 
 der, 608. 
 
 when killing in resisting arrest for criminal act committed in officer's pres- 
 ence, murder, 613. 
 
 killing of private person attempting to arrest for felony, murder, 614. 
 
 sufficiency of officer's notice of intention to arrest to render killing in re- 
 sistance, murder, 625. 
 
 excessive resistance to unlawful arrest, 634. 
 
 to kill enrolment officer attempting arrest, 641. 
 
 homicide committed in carrying out conspiracy to do unlawful act i< 
 generally, 666. 
 in pursuance of conspiracy to commit act dangerous to life, murder, 6fii). 
 
 death of child from parent's wilful neglect to provide is, 686. 
 
 prisoner's death from keeper's wilful failure to supply necessaries is, 6n?>. 
 
 killing by negligent use of firearms as, 695, 699. 
 
 death from loosing dangerous animals as, 700. 
 
 killing of alien enemy after surrender is, 732. 
 
 killing in attempt to arrest for misdemeanor without warrant may be, T.j.'i. 
 
 killing person fleeing from civil arrest as, 762. 
 
 killing mere trespasser as, 785. 
 
 no degrees of, at common law, 147. 
 
 degrees of, established by statute, 147-151. 
 
 degree of, in case of killing by confederate, 216. 
 
 duty of jury to convict of lower degree in case of reasonable doubt, 239. 
 
 statutery requisites of murder in first degree, 198. 
 
 mere intentional killing not, in first degree, 199. 
 
 in first degree, must have been wilful, deliberate, premeditated, and with 
 malice aforethought, 199. 
 
 express malice must affirmatively appear in murder in first degree, 200. 
 
 killing in heat of passion not murder in first degree, 200. 
 
 deliberate intent to take life is murder in first degree, 214. 
 
 characteristics of murder in first degree not presumed, 223. 
 
 elements of murder in first degree may be shown directly or inferred from 
 circumstances, 224. 
 inferred from character of act of killing, 226. 
 
 in first degree, where deadly weapon used with little provocation, 229. 
 
 killing one person by act aimed at another, murder in first degree, 576. 
 
 killing with express malice in resisting arrest, murder in first degree, 601. 
 
1108 INDEX. 
 
 MUEDER — continued. 
 
 homicide in pursuance of conspiracy to kill, as murder in the first degree, 
 667. 
 
 homicide in pursuance of conspiracy to commit felony as muorder in first 
 degree, 668. 
 
 administering poison, murder in first degree, 153, 198. 
 
 giving of poison by convicts to guard, murder in first degree, 176. 
 
 homicide by administering poison to cause abortion, not murder in first 
 degree, 156. 
 
 killing by lying in wait, murder in first degree, 156, 198. 
 
 by lying in vi^ait, what constitutes, 156. 
 
 deliberate, what constitutes, 160, 166. 
 
 premeditation, what constitutes, 162. 
 
 previous intent to kill need not have been entertained for any particular 
 period of time, 164. 
 
 malice must be directed toward person killed to be murder in first degree, 
 170. 
 
 what constitutes extreme atrocity and cruelty, 171. 
 
 killing in perpetration of felony as murder in first degree, 174, 176. 
 
 homicide by setting fire to building, murder in first degree, 176. 
 
 what unlawful acts felonious rendering homicide committed in perpetrat- 
 ing them murder in first degree, 178-180. 
 
 where statute specifies felonies, those not named excluded, 180. 
 
 statutes making homicide committed in perpetrating murder in first de- 
 gree refer to independent crime, 181. 
 
 burglary as felony rendering homicide perpetrated in committing, murder 
 in first degree, 180, 186. 
 
 robbery as felony rendering homicide committed in its perpetration murder 
 in first degree, 181, 186. ■ 
 
 act of killing committed in perpetrating felony must have been murder as 
 distinguished from homicide, 183. 
 
 killing resulting from felonious act murder without reference to manner or 
 method, 183. 
 
 killing in perpetration of felony not murder in first degree unless done in 
 pursuance of unlawful act, 184. 
 
 homicide committed within res gestce of felony committed in perpetration 
 of it, 166. 
 
 distinction between perpetration and attempt under statutes making hom- 
 icide committed in such attempt murder in first degree, 187. 
 
 accidental killing after abandonment of unlawful act not murder, 188. 
 
 dangerous act evincing depraved mind murder in first degree under statute, 
 although without deliberation, premeditation, or intent to kill, 
 189. 
 
 must be intent to do bodily harm to render dangerous act evincing de- 
 praved mind, murder, 190. 
 
 by reckless use of firearms, 191. 
 
 homicide by recklessly firing pistol into private residence, murder in first 
 degree, 191. 
 
 when death resulting from assault and battery is, 193. 
 
 homicide caused by derailing railway train, murder in first degree, 195. 
 
INDEX. 1109 
 
 ^lUKD^S.— continued. 
 
 killing in duel is, 196. 
 
 seconds and those encouraging duel guilty of murder, 196. 
 
 mere presence at duel not sufficient to render one guilty of murder, 196. 
 
 committed in attempt to perpetrate felony, murder in first degree, 198. 
 
 killing occurring in attempt to commit rape, 187. 
 
 killing occurring in attempt to commit robbery, 188. 
 
 criminal responsibility not affected by change of intent to kill, 202. 
 
 intent to take life final criterion of murder in first degree, 203. 
 
 intent to kill need exist for no particular time, 204. 
 
 in second degree defined, 207. 
 
 distinction between murder in first and second degrees, 213. 
 
 intent to kill whether deliberate or not, distinction between murder in first 
 
 and second degree, 213. 
 in second degree, act instantaneously follows intent, 208. 
 implied malice necessary element of murder in second degree, 209. 
 in second degree, statutory constituents of, 207, 209, 211. 
 killing in attempt to perpetrate abortion, murder in second degree, 180. 
 killing in sudden resentment by husband, of wife taken in adultery, murder 
 
 in second degree, 212. 
 in second degree provoked by sudden resentment, 212. 
 sufficiency of insulting words to reduce killing to mujder in second degree, 
 
 213. 
 in second degree, killing in combat engendering hot blood as, 213. 
 killing under mistaken idea as to slayer's right to act, 213. 
 shooting with intent to disable, causing death, 213. 
 intent to do serious bodily harm resulting in death, murder in second 
 
 degree, 215. 
 courts unwilling to disturb compromise verdict of murder in second degree, 
 
 215. 
 mere intentional killing presumed murder in second degree, 219. 
 intoxication as reducing murder to second degree, 813. 
 in third degree, what constitutes, 215. 
 
 N 
 
 NEGLIGENCE. See also Homicide. 
 
 effect of voluntary exposure to death by injured person, 43. 
 intervening negligence of person injured no defense, 43. 
 homicide due to lack of diligence or care, not misadventure, 569. 
 homicide due to fall of object thrown, 570. 
 homicide by accidental shooting, 570. 
 
 where one takes poison placed to kill rats, 570. 
 when criminal responsibility attaches to negligence, contributing to death 
 
 of another, 680. 
 lawful act causing death not criminal in absence of negligence, 681. 
 driver of horse must use care proportionate to danger, 703. 
 to render commander of ship liable, death must have resulted from his neg- 
 ligent act, 706. 
 
1110 INDEX. 
 
 O 
 
 OFFICERS, 
 
 in proper performance of official duty need not retreat, 496. 
 
 right of deputy or assistant attempting arrest to act in self-defense, 761. 
 
 attempting arrest under protection of law, 605. 
 
 person assisting officer to arrest under same legal protection as latt-er, 617. 
 
 killing enrolment officer attempting arrest is murder, 641. 
 
 crime of killing officer in resisting arrest as determined by officer's authority, 
 606. 
 
 killing of assistant to peace officer same crime as killing officer, 637. 
 
 warrant as protecting officer so that killing him in resistance will be mur- 
 der, 608. 
 
 attempted arrest for felony without warrant does not justify killing officer, 
 609. 
 
 innocence of charge of felony does not excuse killing officer attempting arrest, 
 618. 
 
 killing of, when exceeding authority in civil cases, manslaughter, 619. 
 
 killing where officers take opposite sides in difficulty, manslaughter, 037. 
 
 homicide by, of one assaulting or resisting, justifiable, 729. 
 
 may kill one resisting arrest, 735. 
 
 officer may kill person charged with felony to prevent escape, 742. 
 
 officer not justified in killing prisoner charged with misdemeanor, 743. 
 
 officer in recapturing may use any means justifiable in arresting, 744. 
 
 may use force reasonably necessary to restrain rioters, 755. 
 
 responsibility of, for homicide by deputy, 760. 
 
 responsible for killing in obedience of unlawful order, 730, 731. 
 
 official execution of death sentence justifiable, 728. 
 
 OVERSEER OF POOR, 
 
 criminal responsibility for death of poor person from neglect, 693. 
 
 PARENT AND CHILD, 
 
 assault upon child as provocation reducing killing to manslaughter, 297. 
 seduction of daughter as adequate provocation, 308. 
 
 attempted commission of sodomy on child as adequate provocation, 308. 
 death of child from parent's wilful neglect to provide is murder, 686. 
 death of child from parent's neglect as manslaughter, 686, 689. 
 liablility of parent neglecting to provide for child depends on duty to sup- 
 port, 688. 
 death caused by reasonable correction of child, 715. 
 death of child from punishment as manslaughter, 715. 
 
 inflicted by one in loco parentis, 716. 
 homicide in defense of parent or child, 774. 
 
 PHYSICIANS, 
 
 malpractice of, as proximate cause of death of injured person, 31, 32. 
 intervening surgical negligence as afl'ecting result of wound, 40. 
 failure to procure medical aid for injured person as homicide, 44. 
 fatal termination of dangerous surgical operation not homicide, 20, 21. 
 
INDEX. 1111 
 
 PHYSICIANS— coMitnued. 
 
 may perform critical operation, where death otherwise certain, 561. 
 
 may sacrifice life of child to save that of mother, 561. 
 
 not manslaughter to aid miscarriage with good motives, 598. 
 
 English rule that physician failing to use competent skill and sufficient at' 
 tention, guilty of manslaughter, 710, 712. 
 
 physician not criminally responsible for death due to mere mistake of judg- 
 ment, 712. 
 
 physician liable for death due to gross ignorance or negligence, 713. 
 
 PISTOLS, 
 
 are deadly weapons, 138. 
 
 PLACE, 
 
 of consummation of homicide, 17, 18, 
 
 POISON, 
 
 homicide by causing another to take, 22. 
 
 administered by innocent or irresponsible person, 23. 
 
 one procuring administration of, by innocent agent, not accessory, but 
 
 principal, 81. 
 furnishing to suicide as homicide, 24. 
 one directing another to take, guilty of murder, 69. 
 malice inferred from unlawful administration of poison, 122. 
 poisoning of child by nurse, 123. 
 
 deliberate administration of, murder in first degree, 153, 155, 198. 
 homicide by administering, to cause abortion, not murder in first degree, 
 
 156. 
 wilful preparation and giving of, with intent to kill, constitutes malice 
 
 aforethought, 171. 
 giving of, by convicts to guard, murder in first degree, 176. 
 murder where poison prepared for one person is taken by another, 577. 
 negligent administration of, manslaughter, 155. 
 death from negligent exposure or giving of, 699. 
 averment of intent or scienter in case of, 870. 
 corroboration of confession of principal as to administering, 75. 
 prosecution must show symptoms inconsistent with any other disease or 
 
 ailment, 156. 
 
 PREMEDITATION. See also Mukdee. 
 
 meaning and construction of term, 161. 
 
 what constitutes, 162. 
 
 not synonymous with deliberation, 163. 
 
 intent to kill need not have been entertained for any particular period of 
 
 time, 164. 
 atrocity and cruelty need not be premeditated, 172. 
 not inferred from mere fact of killing, 225. 
 
 PRESENCE, 
 
 constitutes one principal in second degree, 58. 
 
 without participation in act does not constitute one principal in second 
 degree, 60. 
 
1112 INDEX. 
 
 PRESENCE— continued. 
 
 one who keeps guard constructively present at homicide, 59. 
 not necessary to existence of malice, 101. 
 
 PRINCIPAL AND AGENT, 
 
 principal responsible for death due to neglect by agent of statutory duty, 
 724. 
 
 PRINCIPALS AND ACCESSORIES. See also Indictment. 
 
 principal defined, 49. 
 
 accessory defined, 49. 
 
 distinction between, 49. 
 
 statutory abolition of distinction between principal and accessory, 82. 
 
 statute abolishing distinction between principal and accessory, not ex post 
 facto, 85. 
 
 criminality of participant in homicide, 50. 
 
 responsibility of joint participants in homicide, 54. 
 
 persons acting independently in killing another as joint principals, 54. 
 
 conspirators in criminal act resulting in homicide are all principals, 87. 
 
 principal may be actually or constructively present, 52. 
 
 principal in first degree defined, 52. 
 
 one acting through irresponsible agent is principal in first degree, 52. 
 
 one procuring administration of poison by innocent agent, not accessory, but 
 principal, 81. 
 
 responsible person instrumental in committing homicide principal in first 
 degree, 53. 
 
 one compelling another to commit suicide is principal in first degree, 53. 
 
 definition of principals in second degree, 55. 
 
 distinction between principals in first and second degree, 56. 
 
 to constitute principal in second degree there must ibe responsible prin- 
 cipal in first degree, 56. 
 
 principals in second degree must participate and be actually present, 56. 
 
 no responsibility as principal in second degree in justifiable homicide, 57. 
 
 there may be principals in second degree in voluntary manslaughter, 57. 
 
 presence as constituting one principal in second degree, 58. 
 
 one who keeps guard is constructively present, 59. 
 
 what participation constitutes one principal in second degree, 60-62. 
 
 presence without participation in act does not constitute one principal in 
 second degree, 60. 
 
 accused must participate both in criminal act and intent, 64. 
 
 one inciting others to commit homicide is principal, 63. 
 
 one persuading another to commit suicide principal in second degree, 69. 
 
 one acting under compulsion not a principal, 70. 
 
 survivor of suicidal attempt by two guilty as principal in second degree, 70. 
 
 responsibility of principal in second degree ceases on abandonment of hom- 
 icidal purpose, 71. 
 necessity of conviction of principal in first degree, 71. 
 
 principal in second degree may be tried before principal in first degree, 72. 
 definition of accessory before the fact, 74. 
 what constitutes accessory before the fact, 74. 
 accessory before the fact chargeable with murder, 218. 
 
INDEX. lltS 
 
 PKINCIPALS AND ACCESSORIES— cojittwMed. ' 
 
 where intent is not to kill, accessory may be found guilty of manslaughter, 
 218. 
 
 wife committing homicide jointly with husband may be accessory before 
 the fact, 55. 
 
 no accessory before the fact in manslaughter, 75. 
 
 may be accessory before the fact in murder with deliberation, 75. 
 
 solicitation, or procurement of homicide, by accessories before the fact, 76.. 
 
 one concealing knowledge of contemplated homicide not accessory before the 
 fact, 76. 
 
 must be concurrence of procurement and result to constitute accessory before 
 the fact, 77. 
 
 killing need not be direct result of act of accessory before the fact, 78. 
 
 principal's guilt must be shown on trial of accessory, 79. 
 
 acquittal of principal does not bar prosecution of accessory before the fact, 
 79. 
 
 accessory before the fact may be tried independently of principal's con- 
 viction, 79. 
 
 acquittal as principal bars indictment as accessory before fact, 1050. 
 
 abortionist as accessory before the fact, 80. 
 
 one inciting another to commit suicide as accessory, 81. 
 
 person persuading another to commit suicide accessory before the fact, if 
 absent when deed is done, 80. 
 
 locus in quo, of offense of accessory before the fact, 82. 
 
 definition of accessory after the fact, 85. 
 
 what constitutes accessory after the fact, 85, 86. 
 
 homicide must be completed before one accessory after the fact, 86. 
 
 accessory after the fact must know that felon is guilty, 86. 
 
 wife concealing husband not liable as accessory after the fact, 87. 
 
 accessory after the fact not accomplice whose testimony must be corrobo- 
 rated, 86. 
 
 one aiding in a, homicide in sudden passion guilty of manslaughter, 51. 
 
 killing of person mistaken for another does not affect guilt of aider or abet- 
 ter, 66. 
 
 consanguinity does not affect relationship as principal and abetter, 67. 
 
 presumption that married woman aiding homicide by husband coerced by him, 
 67. 
 
 persons present at duel guilty of abetting principal offender, 68. 
 
 responsibility of one aiding or abetting through compulsion, 68. 
 
 statutes abolishing distinction between principals and abetters, 72. 
 
 guilt of abetter measured by that of principal, where both have same intent, 
 216. 
 
 abetter not responsible when principal acts in self-defense, 360. 
 
 one may aid and abet suicide, 587. 
 
 distinction between conspiracy and aiding and abetting, 644. 
 
 PRIZE FIGHT, 
 
 persons present principals in breach of peace, 69. 
 participants in killing at, guilty of manslaughter, 69. 
 accidental killing in, as manslaughter, 345. 
 when death caused by sparring with gloves, manslaughter, 346. 
 
1114 INDEX. 
 
 PROPERTY, 
 
 homicide committed in protection of, 391, 392. 
 
 owner of personal property may use necessary force to prevent illegal re- 
 moval, 785. 
 
 unlawfully depriving another of personal property, act of aggression preclud 
 ing self-defense, 530. 
 
 return to demand, does not deprive of right of self-defense, 532. 
 
 right to retake, 786. 
 
 unnecessary force must not be used in retaking, 781. 
 
 homicide in recovering stolen property, 782. 
 
 PROVOCATION. See also Manslaughteb. 
 definition of, 266. 
 
 may mitigate murder to manslaughter, 266. 
 when atrocious or cruel killing not reduced to manslaughter by, 172. 
 
 PROXIMATE CAUSE, 
 
 of death must have been act of accused, 31. 
 
 malpractice of attending physician as, 31, 32. 
 
 intervening surgical negligence, 40. 
 
 disease resulting from wound imputable to defendant, 38. 
 
 withdrawal after putting destructive agency in motion, 33. 
 
 infliction of injuries by different persons at different times, 34. 
 
 act of one jointly negligent must be, 36. 
 
 interposition of irresponsible intermediate agent, 44. 
 
 PUNISHMENT, 
 
 death penalty, 1052. 
 
 imprisonment for life or term of years, 1053. 
 
 court determines period of imprisonment within statutory limits, 1054. 
 
 when jury fail to make recommendation, 1055. 
 
 death penalty usually inflicted by hanging, 1059. 
 
 legislature has power to change manner of inflicting death penalty, 1059. 
 
 infliction of death penalty by electrocution, 1059. 
 
 usually inflicted by sheriff or ministerial officer, 1062. 
 
 fixing time of execution of death sentence province of court, 1060. 
 
 time of execution of death penalty, 1061. 
 
 Q 
 
 QUESTION FOR JURY. See Teial. 
 
 R 
 
 RAILROADS, 
 
 homicide by derailing railway train, 195. 
 
 death in collision due to failure of brakeman to perform duty manslaughter 
 
 694. 
 manslaughter by negligent management of locomotive or train, 704, 723. 
 
INDEX. 1115 
 
 HAPE, 
 
 homicide perpetrated i:i attempt to commit, murder in the first degree, 170, 
 
 182. 
 felony from which malice implied in case of killing, 179. 
 killing occurring in attempt to commit, 187. 
 
 RELATIVE, 
 
 homicide in defense of, 774, 777. 
 
 one defending relative can use no more force than latter entitled to use, 770. 
 
 RESCUE, 
 
 failure to prevent killing not homicide, 29. 
 
 HEVENGE, 
 
 homicide prompted by, is murder, 260. 
 not justifiable motive for homicide^ 359. 
 
 MOTS, 
 
 liability of rioters for homicide committed, 648, 652, 660, 663. 
 
 rioters jointly responsible for homicide, 584. 
 
 homicide in, vrithout intent to kill, manslaughter, 341. 
 
 homicide in collision of groups of heated partisans is manslaughter, 584. 
 
 homicide in suppressing riot or resisting rioters justifiable, 756, 764. 
 
 HOBBERY, 
 
 robbery and subsequent killing, evidence of express malice, 169. 
 
 killing occurring in perpetration of, murder in first degree, 176. 
 
 as felony rendering homicide committed in its perpetration murder in first 
 
 degree, 181, 186. 
 killing occurring in attempt to commit, 188. 
 conspiracy to commit, renders confederates liable for resulting killing, 661, 
 
 668. 
 homicide to prevent attempted commission of, justifiable, 780. 
 
 ROCK, 
 
 may be deadly weapon, 141. 
 
 s 
 
 SCHOOLS, 
 
 death caused by reasonable correction of scholar, 715. 
 
 death of pupil from immoderate punishment as manslaughter, 717. 
 
 SEDUCTION, 
 
 of daughter as adequate provocation reducing homicide to manslaughter, 
 308. 
 
 SELF-DEFENSE. See also Defenses to Homicide. 
 definition of, 354. 
 as excuse for homicide, 9. 
 grades of degrees of killing in, 547. 
 
 ISHIPWRECK, 
 
 right to kill in self-preservation in case of, 563. 
 
1116 INDEX. 
 
 SISTER, 
 
 homicide in defense of, 774. 
 
 SLANDER, 
 
 not adequate provocation reducing homicide to manslaughter, 276. 
 
 SLAVE, 
 
 punishaible for homicide^ 12. 
 subject of homicide, 15, 16. 
 
 SODOMY, 
 
 attempted commission of, on child as adequate provocation, 308. 
 
 SOLDIER, 
 
 responsible for killing in obedience of unlawful order, 730-733. 
 may kill alien enemy in war, 731. 
 
 ^^ PORTS, 
 
 accidental killing in dangerous sports, 341, 572. 
 
 rough treatment in, not provocation precluding plea of self-defense, 527. 
 
 SPRING GUNS, 
 
 homicide by use of, 789. 
 
 SUICIDE, 
 
 constitutes homicide, 15, 587. 
 
 homicide by furnishing poison to, 24. 
 
 killing another with his consent is homicide, 09. 
 
 one persuading another to commit, principal in second degree, 69. 
 
 survivor of suicidal attempt by two guilty as principal in second degree, 70. 
 
 one inciting another to commit suicide as accessory, 81. 
 
 one persuading another to commit suicide accessory before the fact if absent 
 
 when deed is done, 80. 
 one may aid and abet. 587. 
 
 killing by one vphile attempting, involuntary manslaughter, 338. 
 of one mortally injured, 36. 
 effect of attempted suicide of person injured, 45. 
 
 SWORDS, 
 
 are deadly weapons, 138. 
 
 THREATS. See also Defenses to Homicide; Evidence; Manslaughter. 
 inference of deliberation, premeditation, and intent to kill from, 232-234. 
 previous, unaccompanied by hostile demonatratjon, do not justify homicide 
 400. 
 
 TIME. 
 
 of consummation of homicide, 17, 18. 
 
 TRESPASS, 
 
 mere trespass does not justify homicide, 390, 7S3. 
 
INDEX. 1117 
 
 TRESPASS— coji<in«ed. 
 
 killing mere trespasser, manslaughter, and may be murder, 785. 
 
 bare trespass not sufficient provocation to reduce homicide to manslaughter, 
 
 300. 
 sudden killing provoked by, may be manslaughter, 302. 
 manslaughter where intent is merely to chastise for, 310. 
 commission of, when attacked, does not deprive slayer • of right of self- 
 defense, 528. 
 assault to evict, does not deprive of right of self-defense, 530. 
 necessary force may be used to eject from realty, 787. 
 
 TRIAL, 
 
 questions for court. 
 
 what is deadly weapon, 137. 
 
 what is reasonable or suflBeient provocation, 310. 
 
 what facts excuse or justify homicide, 557. 
 
 whether one killed while attempting arrest was peace officer, 607. 
 
 what constitutes dying declaration, 1028. 
 
 questions of admissibility of evidence are for court, 445. 
 
 admissibility of evidence of threats, 420, 940. 
 
 whether there is evidence of hostile act warranting proof of threats, 420. 
 
 whether proper foundation laid for introduction of evidence, 445. 
 
 competency of dying declaration, 1028-1031. 
 
 whether evidence competent to establish any particular grade of homicide, 
 
 241. 
 whether presumption of malice has been rebutted, 144. 
 what grade of homicide evidence tends to establish, 241. 
 in case of confession or plea of guilty, degree of homicide ascertained by 
 
 court, 240. 
 cruelty of. killing, question for court where the facts appear, 172. 
 court determines period of imprisonment within statutory limits, 1054. 
 province of court limited to defining the issues, 244. 
 questions for jury, 
 whether criminal intent of principal participated in by aider or abetter, 
 
 question for jury, 67. 
 whether aider or abetter knew principal acted with criminal intent, 67. 
 intent of abetter in homicide, 218. 
 existence of fully formed intent to kill, 100, 143. 
 intent of one interposing in fight between others, 773. 
 whether accused was so intoxicated as to be without criminal intent, 809. 
 express malice, question of fact, 103. 
 malice on part of accused, 142. 
 whether homicide malicious or due to ungovernable passion arising from 
 
 provocation, 317. 
 whether killing of officer attempting unlawful arrest due to passion or malice. 
 
 635. 
 whether intoxication rendered accused incapable of premeditation, 813. 
 motive of homicide question for jury, 916. 
 
 whether wound caused death question for jviry on conflicting evidence, 47. 
 whether assault liable to produce fatal results, question for jury, 144. 
 
1118 INDEX. 
 
 TRIAL — continued. 
 
 whether one compelled to aid in homicide might have escaped doing so, 
 68. 
 
 what constitutes cniel, barbarous, or unusual method of killing, 119. 
 
 whether substance is poisonous, 123. 
 
 deadly character of weapon not exclusively designed to take life, 137. 
 
 whether particular weapon is deadly, 137. 
 
 inference from fact slayer was armed, 137. 
 
 whether oaken stick is deadly weapon, 139. 
 
 whether wooden chair is deadly weapon, 139. 
 
 whether brick bat is a deadly weapon, 139. 
 
 whether ax handle deadly weapon, 140. 
 
 whether wrench deadly weapon, 140. 
 
 whether shovel handle deadly weapon, 140. 
 
 whether pistol deadly weapon, 140. 
 
 degree of criminality by administering poison, question of fact, 155. 
 
 whether malicious killing murder in first degree, question for jury in view 
 of circumstances, 225. 
 
 province of jury to determine degree of homicide, 236. 
 
 to pass upon credibility of evidence with reference to degree of homicide, 
 237. 
 
 in Texas jury must find degree of murder, although accused pleads guilty. 
 240. 
 
 whether words or acts sufficient provocation to reduce murder to man- 
 slaughter, question for jury, 277. 
 
 whether homicide was committed in efl^ecting illegal arrest, 300. 
 
 whether adultery adequate provocation reducing murder to manslaughter, 
 304, 305. 
 
 adequacy of provocation in particular case, 311. 
 
 who provoked or encouraged the difficulty, 319. 
 
 whether acts of accused provoked difficulty, 559. 
 
 whether affray resulting in death Avas separate encounter, 331. 
 
 effect of cooling time on defenda-nt^ 331. 
 
 whether involuntary manslaughter enters into case, 335. 
 
 what constitutes necessity to kill another, 3G4. 
 
 existence of necessity to slay another, 364. 
 
 whether appearance of danger justified action in self-defense, 369. 
 
 reasonable grounds for believing there was necessity to kill, 373. 
 
 jury as judges of the necessity of one killing another in self-defense, 455. 
 
 whether circumstances justify slayer in fearing great bodily injury, 377. 
 
 whether slayer had reasonable ground of belief of imminent danger, 421. 
 
 what constitutes great bodily injury, 377. 
 
 whether one party was injured so that self-defense not applicable, 379. 
 
 whether slayer acted in revenge or from fear, 386. 
 
 sufficiency of overt act to justify acting in self-defense, 399. 
 
 whether use of deadly weapon to repel assault justifiable, 500. 
 
 aggressor's intent as affecting right of self-defense, 511. 
 
 whether homicide justifiable or ('.reusable on ground of self-defense, 556. 
 
 whether person assaulted conld have safely retreated, 558. 
 
 whether person assaulted did retreat, 558, 500. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 1119' 
 
 TRIAL — continued. 
 
 whether homicide murder, mutual combat, or self-defense, 560. 
 
 whether shooting at one person and killing another voluntary or involuntary 
 homicide or justifiable self-defense, 576. 
 
 whether attempted arrest legal or illegal, 635. 
 
 question of existence of conspiracy for jury, 673. 
 
 whether homicide excusable or justifiable as act of war, question for jury,. 
 733. 
 
 necessity of officers killing prisoner, 751. 
 
 vrhether killing a person was necessary to prevention of felony, 767. 
 
 whether necessity existed justifying homicide to prevent commission of fel- 
 ony, 768. 
 
 right to fix loaded gun in building, 790. 
 
 venue of crime and corpus delicti, 822. 
 
 identity of person killed, 912. 
 
 question of due care for jury in prosecution for involuntary manslaughter, 
 966. 
 in prosecution for negligent homicide, 966. 
 
 weight of evidence of threats, question for jury, 421. 
 
 weight and sufficiency of evidence of violent character of deceased, 446. 
 
 conclusiveness of circumstantial evidence to establish fact of death, 900 
 
 sufficiency of evidence of threats, 940. 
 
 weight and credibility of dying declarations, 1033. 
 
 whether deceased when killed wore clothes offered in evidence, 944. 
 
 U 
 
 UNBORN CHILD, 
 
 not a subject of homicide, 15. 
 
 VENUE. See also Jdeisdictiost. 
 of crime, question for jury, 822. 
 removal of body after death does not affect, 822. 
 
 VERDICT, 
 
 necessity of specifying degree of crime found, 1040. 
 
 amending verdict of guilty by adding intended degree, 1040. 
 
 may be for lower or different degree of homicide than charged, 1043. 
 
 necessity of negativing higher degree than that found, 1045. 
 
 court should direct verdict in absence of evidence of guilt, 1047. 
 
 concurrence of all jurors necessary to verdict, 1047. 
 
 VESSEL, 
 
 officer, of, penally responsible for failure to keep proper lookout, 693. 
 manslaughter by negligent navigation of, 705. 
 
 manslaughter under Federal statutes by negligent navigation of, 707, 710. 
 to render commander of ship liable, death must have resulted from his negli- 
 gent act, 706. 
 
1120 INDEX. 
 
 VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER. Wee Manslauguteb. 
 
 W 
 WILFULLY, 
 
 meaning of term, 158. 
 
 not equivalent of maliciously, 158. 
 
 included in words "maliciously," "deliberately," and "premeditatedly," 1S8. 
 
 WILLS, 
 
 devisee killing testator not entitled to take under will, 1064. 
 
 WITNESSES, 
 
 competency of witness to testify as to character or reputation of deceased, 
 444.