William J.Nagel 
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THE LAW OF 
 
 INNKEEPERS AND HOTELS 
 
 INCLUDING OTHER PUBLIC HOUSES 
 
 THEATRES, SLEEPING CARS 
 
 BY 
 
 JOSEPH HENRY BEALE, JR., 
 
 BUSSET PBOFBSSOB OF LAW IN HARVARD TTNIVEBSITY. 
 
 OCT 6 2000 
 
 CORNELL UiNivhiOii i 
 
 LIBRARIES 
 
 ITHACA, N. Y. 14853 
 
 WILLIAM J. NAGEL Hotel Administration Library 
 BOSTON StatlerHaU 
 
 1906 
 
Copyright, 1906, 
 By JOSEPH HEISTRT BEALE, Jb. 
 
PREFACE 
 
 The law of innkeepers was the eariiest developed and is the 
 simplest and clearest of those topics of law which are con- 
 cerned with the various pubHc-service callings. While its ex- 
 tent is slight, it is of considerable practical importance; and 
 its theoretical interest is great to those who are concerned 
 with the development and appUcation of pubUc-service law. 
 
 It is the last aspect of the subject which drew the attention 
 of the author to it. The practical importance and the legal 
 interest of the public-service law justify a thorough study 
 and investigation of it in all its appUcations. The rapid and 
 enormous growth of the modern public-service corporations 
 has outrun the law. The general principles by which they are 
 governed have been apprehended by the courts, and the suc- 
 cess of the courts in applying these principles is a new triumph 
 in our time for the plasticity of the common law; but these 
 principles have not in all cases been formulated, after a care- 
 ful study of their origin and limitations, in a way which is 
 entirely satisfactory ; and a careful study of them in all their 
 applications seemed desirable. 
 
 In a topic of the law which took form within the Middle 
 Ages, it is essential to glance at the history of the hfe out of 
 which it grew. Some knowledge of life in the inns of medieval 
 England is helpful if not necessary for an understanding of the 
 law of innkeepers. This book therefore begins with a short 
 and necessarily imperfect sketch of the conditions of life which 
 caused the pecuharities of the law. In developing the general 
 principles of the law conciseness of treatment has usually 
 been sought wherever it seemed possible; but in the more dif- 
 ficult portions of the subject, those where there is conflict of 
 
 [iii] 
 
Pbeface 
 
 authority, and those newer developments of the law where 
 authority is slight or altogether lacking, the subject has been 
 discussed at greater length. Such statutes have been added 
 as may be of interest to guests at inns and other houses of 
 pubhc entertainment. 
 
 There is included in this book, along with the law of inn- 
 keepers proper, such principles of law as have been developed 
 with regard to other houses of public entertainment, such as 
 boarding and lodging houses, restaurants and theatres. The 
 principles regulating the action of sleeping-car companies are 
 also considered at some length. These companies, while 
 neither innkeepers nor carriers, are, like them, in a public 
 employment, and they partake to some extent of the charac- 
 terestics of innkeepers. 
 
 It has seemed best to bring down the citation of authorities 
 to what are contained in some volume of digest. This book 
 contains, or should contain, the cases cited in the American 
 Digest through the second volume for 1905; in the EngUsh 
 Annual Digest for 1905; and in the Canadian and other Colo- 
 nial digests for 1904. It is impossible to say with confidence, 
 even in so narrow a subject, that every case which should be 
 included has been found and cited. 
 
 Joseph H. Beale, Jr. 
 Cambridge, April 30, 1906. 
 
 [iv] 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 TITLE I. 
 THE PUBLIC CALLING OF INNKEEPERS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 
 
 1. Inns in the ancient and me- 
 
 dieval world. 
 
 2. Study of the history of English 
 
 inns necessary to understand 
 the law. 
 
 3. The conditions of travel in 
 
 medieval England. 
 
 § 4. Houses of accommodation for 
 travellers. 
 
 5. Development of inns from pri- 
 
 vate houses. 
 
 6. Development of the law. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE NATURE OF AN INN. 
 
 § 11. The inn a public house. 
 
 12. The innkeeper professes a pub- 
 
 lic business. 
 
 13. Distinction between innkeeper 
 
 and private host for hire. 
 
 14. The innkeeper serves transient 
 
 guests. 
 
 15. The innkeeper supplies all 
 
 needs of a traveller. 
 
 16. House conducted on the "Eu- 
 
 ropean plan." 
 
 17. The innkeeper need not supply 
 
 aU the desires of a guest. 
 
 18. The innkeeper is the proprietor 
 
 of an inn. 
 
 19. How the innkeeper's profes- 
 
 sion is made. 
 
 20. Failure to procure a license. 
 
 21. Carrying on of other business. 
 
 22. Name given to inn is immate- 
 
 rial. 
 
 [V] 
 
Contents. 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 OTHER HOUSES OF ENTERTAINMENT. 
 
 31. Other public houses not in pub- 
 
 lic calling. 
 
 32. Boarding houses. 
 
 33. Livery stables. 
 
 § 34. Lodging and apartment 
 houses. 
 
 35. Restaurants. 
 
 36. Theatres. 
 
 37. Sleeping cars and steamboats. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 REGULATION AND LICENSE OF PUBLIC HOUSES. 
 
 41. Regulation of public houses 
 
 permitted. 
 
 42. Licenses. 
 
 43. Licenses usually granted by 
 
 local administrative body. 
 
 44. Corruption in granting or re- 
 
 fusing license criminal. 
 
 § 45. License board compelled to act 
 by mandamus. 
 
 46. Discretion of board cannot be 
 
 controlled. 
 
 47. Remedy for wrong exercise of 
 
 discretion. 
 
 48. Punishment for violation of the 
 
 license law. 
 
 TITLE II. 
 
 THE PUBLIC DUTY OF INNKEEPERS. 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 GENERAL PRINCIPLES REGULATING THE DUTY OF PERSONS IN 
 THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT. 
 
 51. The law of public employment. 
 
 52. The innkeeper is in a public 
 
 employment. 
 
 53. The duty to receive guests. 
 
 54. The duty to provide adequate 
 
 facilities. 
 
 [vi] 
 
 § 55. The duty to refrain from dis- 
 crimination. 
 
 56. What amounts to unreason- 
 
 able discrimination. 
 
 57. The duty to make reasonable 
 
 charges. 
 
 58. The duty to receive strangers. 
 
Contents. 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 DUTY TO RECEIVE GUESTS. 
 
 61 
 
 The innkeeper must receive all 
 who apply. 
 
 62. Duty owed to travellers only. 
 
 63. Who is a traveller. 
 
 64. Duty to receive persons inca- 
 
 pable of contracting. 
 Restriction of accommodation 
 
 to certain classes. 
 Reception may be demanded 
 
 at night. 
 
 65. 
 
 66 
 
 § 67. Innkeeper must be notified of 
 traveller's desire to be re- 
 ceived. 
 
 68. Innkeeper's duty to receive 
 
 goods with the guest. 
 
 69. Tender of price of accommoda- 
 
 tion. 
 
 70. Remedy for refusal to receive. 
 
 71. End of obligation to receive. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE DUTY OF AN INNKEEPER TO PERSONS WHO ARE NOT GUESTS. 
 
 81. Innkeeper's responsibility to 
 
 third persons for acts of 
 guests. 
 
 82. Duty to admit strangers not 
 
 seeking entertainment. 
 
 83. Stranger coming to inn for con- 
 
 venience of guest. 
 
 84. Stranger coming for a social 
 
 call on guest. 
 
 85. Stranger coming by appoint- 
 
 ment to do business with 
 guest. 
 
 § 86. Stranger coming to solicit pat- 
 ronage. 
 
 87. Discrimination between car- 
 
 riers coming to solicit patron- 
 age. 
 
 88. Right of stranger forfeited by 
 
 misconduct. 
 
 89. Stra,nger entering to make in- 
 
 quiry. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 EXCUSES FOR REFUSAL TO RECEIVE A GUEST. 
 
 91. Refusal to receive guest be- 
 
 cause of lack of accommoda- 
 tion. 
 
 92. Refusal to receive objection- 
 
 able person. 
 
 § 93. 
 
 Refusal to receive one suffering 
 from contagious disease. 
 94. Refusal to receive one whose 
 companions have acted im- 
 properly. 
 
 [vii] 
 
Contents. 
 
 95. Refusal to receive one who 
 
 comes at improper time. 
 
 96. Refusal to receive one who 
 
 brings an animal. 
 
 97. Refusal to receive a rival. 
 
 98. Refusal to receive because the 
 
 inn is unlicensed. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 THE INNKEEPER S RIGHT TO EJECT ONE WHO HAS BEEN 
 ADMITTED TO THE INN. 
 
 101. Right to eject in general. 
 
 102. Ejection for misconduct. 
 
 103. Ejection for illness. 
 
 § 104. Ejection for refusal to pay. 
 105. Ejection of one who h 
 ceased to be a traveller. 
 
 TITLE III. 
 
 THE UNDERTAKING OF THE INNKEEPER WITH 
 HIS GUEST. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 THE NATURE OF THE INNKEEPER'S OBLIGATION. 
 
 111. The obligation is imposed by 
 
 law. 
 
 112. Capacity to contract not re- 
 
 quired. 
 
 § 113. Guest need not be the party 
 bound to pay. 
 114. What law governs the obliga- 
 tion. 
 
 [viii] 
 
Contents. 
 
 SUBTITLE I. 
 
 THE BEGINNING OF RESPONSIBILITY. 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 THE HECEPTION OF THE GUEST. 
 
 121. Relation of host and guest es- 
 
 tablished by reception. 
 
 122. Reception requires communi- 
 
 cation of intention to the 
 innkeeper. 
 
 § 123. Traveller entering inn with- 
 out presenting himself as 
 guest. 
 
 124. Refusal of innkeeper to ac- 
 
 cept guest. 
 
 125. Reception in another capac- 
 
 ity than as guest. 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 WHO IS A GUEST. 
 
 131. A guest need not resort to an 
 
 inn for both food and lodg- 
 ing. 
 
 132. Whether a guest must be per- 
 
 sonally entertained. 
 
 133. Entertainment of servant or 
 
 child as making master or 
 father a guest. 
 
 134. Resorting to inn to attend 
 
 banquet or ball. 
 
 135. One not entitled to admit- 
 
 tance received as guest. 
 
 § 136. Guest at inn for illegal pur- 
 pose. 
 
 137. Guest at inn as result of ille- 
 
 gal act. 
 
 138. Difference between guest and 
 
 boarder. 
 
 139. Length of stay at inn as a 
 
 test of the difference. 
 
 140. Residence in the town as a 
 
 test of the difference. 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 UNDERTAKING OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE GUEST'S GOODS. 
 
 § 141. Ways of creating responsibil- 
 ity. 
 Topic I. Goods within the pre- 
 cincts of the inn. 
 
 Subtopic A. Goods bailed to 
 the innkeeper. 
 § 142. Responsibility begins at mo- 
 ment of bailment, 
 [ix] 
 
Contents. 
 
 143. Responsibility conditioned on 
 
 owner becoming guest. 
 
 144. Delivery to a servant of the 
 
 innkeeper. 
 
 145. Delivery by custom. 
 
 146. Delivery by a third person for 
 
 a guest. ' 
 
 147. Delivery to the innkeeper or 
 
 servant in another capacity. 
 Subtopic B. Goods brought 
 with the guest. 
 
 148. Responsibility of innkeeper 
 
 extends to goods in posses- 
 sion of guest. 
 
 149. Goods must be within general 
 
 control of innkeeper. 
 
 § 150. Innkeeper's responsibiUty for 
 merchandise. 
 
 151. Special arrangement made by 
 
 the guest. 
 
 152. Goods brought by guest to 
 
 inn after his own arrival. 
 Topic II. Goods outside the inn. 
 
 153. Innkeeper not generally re- 
 
 sponsible for goods taken by 
 the guest outside the inn. 
 
 154. Goods placed outside the inn 
 
 by the innkeeper. 
 
 155. Goods placed in customary 
 
 place outside the inn by 
 guest. 
 
 SUBTITLE II. 
 
 EXTENT OF RESPONSIBILITY. 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 PROTECTION AND CARE OP THE GUEST S PERSON. 
 
 § 161. Classification of duties of inn- 
 keeper to guest. 
 
 162. Duty to furnish safe prem- 
 
 ises. 
 
 163. Defective premises. 
 
 164. Open elevator well. 
 
 165. Contributory negligence of 
 
 guest falling down elevator 
 well. 
 
 166. Duty to furnish accommoda- 
 
 tions to the guest. 
 
 167. Right to assign room. 
 
 168. Right to control use of room. 
 
 [x] 
 
 § 169. Duty to supply food. 
 
 170. Duty to protect guest. 
 
 171. Protection against injury by 
 
 third parties. 
 
 172. Protection against injury by 
 
 servants. 
 
 173. Cases limiting the duty. 
 
 174. The true extent of the duty. 
 
 175. Protection against one who 
 
 has a right to remain in the 
 inn. 
 
 176. Duty to protect against fire. 
 
Contents. 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 RESPONSIBILITY OP THE INNKEEPER FOR GOODS OF THE 
 
 GUEST. 
 
 § 181. The innkeeper as a protector 
 against marauders. 
 
 182. Innkeeper's responsibility not 
 
 a case of bailment. 
 
 183. History of innkeeper's respon- 
 
 sibility in England. 
 
 184. In the United States. 
 
 185. Jurisdictions imposing the in- 
 
 surance liability. 
 
 § 186, 
 
 Jurisdictions imposing liability 
 of innkeeper for negligence 
 only. 
 
 187. Jurisdictions imposing liabil- 
 
 ity for negligence or breach 
 of undertaking. 
 
 188. Loss by theft. 
 
 189. Loss by accidental fire. 
 
 190. Presumption of negligence. 
 
 191. For what goods the innkeeper 
 
 is responsible. 
 
 CHAPTER XVL 
 
 innkeeper's RESPONSIBILITY AS A MERE BAILEE. 
 
 Topic I. Responsibility for 
 goods of boarder. 
 
 201. Boarder not entitled to extra- 
 
 ordinary responsibility of 
 innkeeper. 
 
 202. Innkeeper is ordinary bailee 
 
 for hire of boarder's goods. 
 Topic II. Responsibility for 
 goods of one neither guest 
 nor boarder. 
 
 203. Goods placed in the inn by one 
 
 not a guest or boarder. 
 
 § 204. Responsibility of innkeeper 
 when he takes the goods as 
 a matter of business. 
 
 205. Responsibility of innkeeper as 
 
 gratuitous bailee. 
 
 206. Responsibility for misdeliv- 
 
 ery. 
 Topic III. Responsibility for 
 goods of guest outside the 
 inn. 
 
 207. Goods in bath house attached 
 
 to inn. 
 
 CHAPTER XVIL 
 
 LIMITATION AND MODIFICATION OP RESPONSIBILITY. 
 
 211. Limitation of liability by con- 
 
 tract. 
 
 212. Reasonable rules for the con- 
 
 duct of the guest. 
 
 § 213. Rule requiring deposit of the 
 goods. 
 
 214. How far deposit can be re- 
 
 quired. 
 
 215. Sufficiency of the notice. 
 
 [xi] 
 
Contents. 
 
 CHAPTER XVIII. 
 
 LOSS CHARGEABLE TO THE GUEST; CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 221. Goods taken by servant or 
 
 companion of guest. 
 
 222. Goods injured because of 
 
 owner's act. 
 
 223. Goods lost by reason of con- 
 
 tributory negligence of 
 guest. 
 
 224. What, is contributory negli- 
 
 gence: failure to lock door 
 or window. 
 
 § 225. Failure to deliver valuables 
 to innkeeper. 
 
 226. Failure to inform innkeeper 
 
 of value of goods deposited. 
 
 227. Publicly exhibiting money or 
 
 valuables. 
 
 228. Other acts of negligence. 
 
 SUBTITLE lY. 
 
 THE END OF RESPONSIBILITY. 
 
 CHAPTEH XIX. 
 
 TERMINATION OF RELATION OF HOST AND GUEST. 
 
 231. Guest leaves the inn finally. 
 
 232. Responsibility during tem- 
 
 porary absence of guest. 
 
 233. What is a merely temporary 
 
 absence. 
 
 § 234. Responsibility during reason- 
 able time for removal. 
 235. Goods received after termina- 
 tion of relation. 
 
 TITLE IT. 
 
 COMPENSATION AND LIEN OF THE INNKEEPER. 
 CHAPTER XX. 
 
 THE CHARGES OF THE INNKEEPER. 
 
 241. The innkeeper's charges must 
 
 be reasonable. 
 
 242. The amount of the charges 
 
 may be fixed by statute. 
 [xii] 
 
 § 243. The innlceeper may fix rates. 
 244. Payment may be required in 
 advance. 
 
Contents. 
 
 245. Compensation due as soon as 
 
 relation is established. 
 
 246. Compensation ceases when 
 
 relation ends. 
 
 247. For what services innkeeper 
 
 is entitled to compensation. 
 
 § 248. Entire obligation must be per- 
 formed. 
 249. Which of several guests is 
 liable to pay charges. 
 
 CHAPTER XXI. 
 
 THE INNKEEPER S LIEN. 
 
 Topic- I. Nature of the right 
 to lien; 
 \ 251. Nature of innkeeper's lien. 
 
 252. General rule. 
 
 253. Lien does not require a bind- 
 
 ing contract. 
 
 254. Lien does not cover prior 
 
 charges. 
 Topic II .-To what property 
 the lien extends. 
 
 255. Every kind of property sub- 
 
 ject to lien for entire charge. 
 
 256. Goods received in the inn sub- 
 
 ject to lien, though the host 
 might have excluded them. 
 
 257. No lien on the person of the 
 
 guest. 
 
 258. No lien on goods which can- 
 
 not be taken without viola- 
 tion of law. 
 
 259. Wearing apparel worn by 
 
 guest. 
 
 260. Property exempt from exe- 
 
 cution. 
 Topic III. Against whose 
 property the lien exists. 
 
 261. Goods of a third person 
 
 brought by the guest to the 
 inn. 
 
 262. Knowledge of the innkeeper 
 
 that the goods do not be- 
 long to the guest. 
 
 I 263. The rule in Georgia. 
 
 264. Goods of a guest not respon- 
 
 sible for charges. 
 
 265. Statutory liens hold only 
 
 property of the guest. 
 Topic IT. The beginning and 
 continuance of the lien. 
 
 266. Lien attaches when charges 
 
 accrue. 
 
 267. Sale of goods by owner does 
 
 not affect lien. 
 
 268. Removal of goods to another 
 
 State does not affect lien. 
 
 269. Care of goods held on lien. 
 Topic V. End of the lien. 
 
 270. Delivery of goods to the 
 
 guest. 
 
 271. Delivery induced by fraud. 
 
 272. Delivery for temporary use. 
 
 273. Giving payment. 
 
 274. Attachment of goods by the 
 
 innkeeper. 
 
 275. Conversion of the goods. 
 Topic VI. Enforcement of 
 
 lien. 
 
 276. Iimkeeper's lien cannot be 
 
 foreclosed by sale. 
 
 277. Foreclosure in equity. 
 
 278. Lien as a defence. 
 
 279. Statutory methods of enforc- 
 
 ing the lien. 
 
 [xiii] 
 
Contents. 
 
 TITLE V". 
 
 REMEDIES AGAINST INNKEEPER. 
 
 CHAPTER XXII. 
 
 ACTION AGAINST INNKEEPER. 
 
 281. Nature of action 
 
 282. Form of action. 
 
 283. The declaration. 
 
 § 284'. Survival of action. 
 285. Who may sue. 
 
 TITLE YI. 
 
 OTHER PUBLIC HOUSES. 
 
 CHAPTER XXIII. 
 
 THE BOARDING HOUSE. 
 
 291. Difference between boarding 
 
 house and inn. 
 
 292. Responsibility of keeper for 
 
 goods of boarder. 
 
 293. Responsibility for negligence 
 
 of servant. 
 
 294. Nature of care required. 
 
 § 295. Care in the admission of per- 
 sons as boarders. 
 
 296. Contributory negligence of 
 
 the boarder. 
 
 297. Special undertaking of the 
 
 boarding-house keeper. 
 
 298. Boarding-house keeper's lien. 
 
 CHAPTER XXIV. 
 
 THE RESTAURANT. 
 
 301. Difference between restaurant 
 
 and inn. 
 
 302. Duty of keeper of restaurant 
 
 to customer personally. 
 
 303. Responsibility for the goods 
 
 of customer. 
 
 [xiv] 
 
 304. Responsibility on a bailment. 
 
 305. Responsibility on an implied 
 
 bailment. 
 
 306. Responsibility for defect of 
 
 watchfulness. 
 
Contexts. 
 CHAPTER XXV. 
 
 THE THEATRE. 
 
 Topic I. The nature of a 
 theatre. 
 
 311. Definition of a theatre. 
 
 312. An opera house is a theatre. 
 Topic II. Admission to the 
 
 theatre. 
 
 313. The manager may fix prices 
 
 as he pleases. 
 
 314. The manager may admit 
 
 whom he pleases. 
 
 315. Ticket for entrance to a the- 
 
 atre is a mere license. 
 
 316. Ticket is also a contract not 
 
 to revoke license. 
 
 317. How far a ticket is transfer- 
 
 able. 
 
 318. Accommodations secured by 
 
 the ticket. 
 Topic III. Rights of specta- 
 tors. 
 
 § 319. The right of spectators to crit- 
 icise the entertainment. 
 
 320. The right of spectators to ap- 
 
 plaud or hiss. 
 Topic IV. Responsibility of 
 the manager. 
 
 321. Responsibility of the manager 
 
 for the personal safety of 
 the spectator. 
 
 322. Responsibility of the manager 
 
 for the safety of the prem- 
 ises. 
 
 323. Contributory negligence of 
 
 the injured party. 
 
 324. Responsibility of the manager 
 
 for the goods of the specta- 
 tor. 
 Topic V. Licenses. 
 
 325. The requirement of a license. 
 
 CHAPTER XXVI. 
 
 OTHER PUBLIC HOUSES. 
 
 331. Lodging houses. 
 
 332. Extent of Hability. 
 
 I § 333. Bath houses. 
 
 [xvl 
 
Contents. 
 TITLE YII. 
 SLEEPING CARS. 
 CHAPTER XXVII. 
 
 DUTY TO SERVE PASSENGERS. 
 
 341. Sleeping car not an inn. 
 
 342. Sleeping car company not a 
 
 carrier. 
 
 343. Sleeping car company must 
 
 serve the public. 
 
 344. Right of an applicant to a 
 
 berth. 
 
 346. Right to occupy an entire sec- 
 tion. 
 
 346. What berths are vacant; res- 
 ervation of berths. 
 
 § 347. No duty of company to grant 
 reservation. 
 
 348. Reservation by ticket. 
 
 349. Reservation of berths for way 
 
 stations. 
 
 350. Failure of reserving passen- 
 
 ger to occupy. 
 
 351. Duty to put on extra car. 
 
 352. Right to compensation. 
 
 CHAPTER XXVIII. 
 
 RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SAFETY AND COMPORT OF THE 
 
 PASSENGER. 
 
 361. Duty to provide appliances. 
 
 362. Appliances for convenient use 
 
 of upper berth. 
 
 363. Warming and ventilating the 
 
 car. 
 
 364. Providing berth for which 
 
 ticket has been issued. 
 
 365. Providing berth throughout 
 
 the journey. 
 
 366. Excuse for ejecting passenger. 
 
 367. Right of company to change 
 
 berth. 
 
 368. Who may occupy berth. 
 
 [xvi] 
 
 § 369. Making up berth. 
 
 370. Duty to awaken passengers. 
 
 371. Regulations. 
 
 372. Safety of the car. 
 
 373. Protection of passengers. 
 
 374. Injury by servant of the com- 
 
 pany. 
 
 375. Cumulative liability of the 
 
 carrier. 
 
 376. Duty of the passenger to take 
 
 care of the berth. 
 
 377. Right of the passenger to as- 
 
 sign or exchange berth. 
 
Contents. 
 CHAPTER XXIX. 
 
 RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROPERTY OF THE PASSENGER. 
 
 381. Liability for negligence. 
 
 382. Loss by theft of servant of the 
 
 company. 
 
 383. For what goods the company 
 
 is responsible. 
 
 384. Amount of care required. 
 
 385. Negligence in the daytime. 
 
 386. Care necessary at night. 
 
 387. Continuous and effective 
 
 watch. 
 
 388. Theft by another passenger. 
 
 389. Preventing a passenger from 
 
 carrying off another's lug- 
 gage. 
 
 390. Limitation of liability. 
 
 391. Contributory negligence. 
 
 392. Evidence of negligence. 
 
 393. Burden of proof. 
 
 394. Care of property left behind 
 
 by a passenger. 
 
 395. Company when liable for 
 
 goods as baUee. 
 
 CHAPTER XXX. 
 
 ACTIONS, DAMAGES AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS. 
 
 401 . Form of action. 
 
 402. Measure of damages. 
 
 I § 403. Conflict of laws. 
 
 TITLE YIII. 
 STATUTES AFFECTING INNKEEPERS. 
 
 CHAPTER XXXI. 
 
 LIMITATIONS OF INNKEEPERS' LIABILITY. 
 
 Topic I. General Principles. 
 
 411. General statutory limitations 
 
 of liability. 
 
 412. Non-compliance by guest not 
 
 causing loss. 
 
 413. Non-compliance by innkeeper. 
 
 414. Negligence of innkeeper. 
 
 415. Effect of statute on responsi- 
 
 bility for merchandise. 
 
 416. Burden of proof. 
 
 Topic II. The Posting of No- 
 tice. 
 
 417. Requirements of statute must 
 
 be exactly complied with. 
 
 418. Printing notice on register not 
 
 sufficient. 
 
 419. Notice erroneously printed. 
 
 [ xvii ] 
 
Contents. 
 
 420. Actual notice of regulation on 
 
 part of guest: New York 
 rule. 
 
 421. Actual notice: general rule. 
 
 422. Actual notice: what is suffi- 
 
 cient to constitute. 
 
 Topic III. Deposit of Goods 
 with the Innkeeper. 
 
 423. What constitutes a sufficient 
 
 deposit. 
 
 424. Deposit must be for safe keep- 
 
 ing. 
 
 425. Effect of deposit. 
 
 426. Waiver of deposit. 
 
 § 427. During what time the limita- 
 tion is in effect. 
 Topic IV. What goods must 
 be deposited with the inn- 
 keeper. 
 
 428. Whether all goods must be 
 
 deposited. 
 
 429. Statutes expressly excepting 
 
 goods needed in guest's 
 room. 
 
 430. Statutes expressly enumerat- 
 
 ing classes of goods to be 
 deposited. 
 
 431. Deposit of watch. 
 
 432. Deposit of article needed for 
 
 immediate use. 
 
 CHAPTER XXXII. 
 
 CRIMES AGAINST INNKEEPERS. 
 
 Topic I. Fraud on innkeeper 
 in general. 
 § 441. Statutes punishing fraud in 
 guests and boarders. 
 
 442. Statute strictly construed. 
 
 443. Form of indictment. 
 
 Topic II. Fraudulent obtain- 
 ing of board. 
 
 444. Fraud essential. 
 
 445. False representation required. 
 
 446. Pretence must be made with 
 
 fraudulent motive. 
 
 447. Board or other accommoda- 
 
 tion must be actually ob- 
 tained. 
 
 448. Board must be obtained by 
 
 the pretence. 
 Topic III. Surreptitious re- 
 moval of property. 
 
 449. Surreptitious removal as 
 
 prima facie evidence of 
 fraud. 
 
 450. Surreptitious removal as sub- 
 
 stantive offence. 
 
 451. What sort of removal is sur- 
 
 reptitious. 
 
 452. Posting of notice not neces- 
 
 sary. 
 
 Appendix of Statutes. . . 307 I 
 Table of Cases Cited. . . .535 
 
 Index 571 
 
 [ xviii ] 
 
INNKEEPEES 
 
 TITLE I. 
 
 THE PUBLIC CALLING OF INNKEEPERS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 
 
 5 1. Inns in the ancient and me- 
 dieval world. 
 
 2. Study of the history of English 
 
 inns necessary to understand 
 the law. 
 
 3. The conditions of travel in 
 
 medieval England. 
 
 § 4. Houses of accommodation for 
 travellers. 
 
 5. Development of inns from pri- 
 
 vate houses. 
 
 6. Development of the law. 
 
 § 1. Inns in the ancient and medieval world. 
 
 Houses of public entertainment have been maintained in all 
 countries from early times. In the ancient world we hear of 
 inns in all civilized countries, in Asia, in Palestine, in Greece 
 and in Italy.^ Throughout the middle ages the use of such 
 houses continued all over the world, from the cabarets and au- 
 berges of France to the khans and caravanseries of the 
 Orient. 
 
 Travel abroad was much commoner during the middle ages 
 than we often realize; and the traveller returning to England 
 
 l"AuSol . . . TrpQiTOL &v$p(iTr<Pv, twv iifiets Idftev, . . , Ki,TnjKoi iyivavro." 
 Herodotos i, 94. 
 
 " OiiK ^v airroii riros iv t$ KaTaXiimri." Luke ii, 7. 
 
 "Forum Appi, 
 Differtum nautis cauponibus atque malignis." 
 
 Horace Sat. i, 5, 3. 
 
 [1] 
 
§ 2.] Innkeepers. [Chap. I. 
 
 might have brought home with him information about the 
 trade of the innkeeper and suggested its estabUshment in his 
 own land. But there is no reason to suppose that the English 
 inns were not of indigenous growth; certain it is that they 
 were noted as the cleanest, the best supplied and the most at- 
 tractive inns in the world. We must turn to the habits and 
 needs of travel in medieval England to explain the origin, the 
 nature and the legal position of Enghsh inns. 
 
 § 2. Study of the history of English inns necessary to understand 
 the law. 
 
 Such study of origins it behooves us to make. The law reg- 
 ulating the rights and duties of an innkeeper are not in all 
 respects what one might have looked for as applying to the 
 innkeeper of to-day. The innkeeper occupies in our law a pe- 
 culiar and apparently anomalous position: while not techni- 
 cally a bailee of the goods of his guests he is held up to the 
 strictest responsibility which any bailee is under; and while 
 apparently a mere individual householder with no corporate 
 or other franchise specially granted he is compelled, Uke the 
 great raihoad corporations, to receive and entertain strangers 
 whether he wUl or no. These and other duties and responsibil- 
 ities of the innkeeper will be considered at length in later chap- 
 ters, but in order that we may understand the reason for the 
 apparently peculiar doctrine of the law regulating the rights 
 and habiUties of innkeepers, in order that we may learn the ex- 
 tent of their responsibilities and understand their limitations, 
 we must examine briefly, as has just been said, the early his- 
 tory of innkeeping in England; the character and nature of 
 inns, and the functions which they performed in the social Ufe 
 of the Enghsh people at the time when the law of innkeepers 
 was forming, that is, during the fourteenth and fifteenth cen- 
 tviries. The nature of the English inn in the middle ages de- 
 termined the Enghsh law of innkeepers; and the principles thus 
 established form the basis of the law of innkeepers in every 
 place where the common law prevails. 
 [2] 
 
Chap. I.] Historical Introduction. [§4. 
 
 § 3. The condition of travel in medieval England. 
 
 There was a surprising amount of travelling in England in 
 the middle ages. The roads to be sure were very bad and in 
 general were impassable for loaded wagons; and the transpor- 
 tation of goods from place to place was therefore almost impos- 
 sible. While one portion of the country was well supplied with 
 food another portion not so far away might be in the throes of 
 famine without a chance of relief so far as land transportation 
 was concerned. Yet in spite of this the roads were sufficient 
 for- foot passengers, or for lightly loaded horses, and they were 
 used by multitudes of people on foot and on horseback. Car- 
 riers of goods existed, but they transported their goods in packs 
 by means of horses. M. Jusserand gives an interesting and 
 graphic picture of the condition of travel on the English roads 
 during this period.^ 
 
 The roads were not only bad, but they were infested with 
 outlaws and robbers of all sorts. Between the villages there 
 were long stretches of forest, and these forests were the refuge 
 of the outlaws who formed a considerable proportion of the 
 population of the country. They might at any time attack 
 travellers by day, but that was unusual. As it usually hap- 
 pened that travellers proceeded in companies, there was not 
 much danger of attack so long as dayUght lasted; but at night 
 the danger was considerable. 
 
 § 4. Houses of accommodation for travellers. 
 
 Such being the conditions of travelUng two results followed: 
 a traveller must carry as Ught weight of baggage as possible, 
 and he must secure protection at night from thieves and out- 
 laws. He could not conveniently carry with him food for his 
 journey, and he must therefore find entertainment along the 
 road. He could not safely sleep in the open and he must, there- 
 fore, find some house which would offer him protection as well 
 as entertainment for the night. These needs led naturally to the 
 estabfishment of a course of business which should supply the 
 2 " English Wayfaring Life," passim. 
 
 [3] 
 
§ 4.] Innkeepers. [Chap. I. 
 
 demand. At the proper place on every main road of travel 
 houses were devoted to the business of furnishing food, drink 
 and safe lodging to hungry and weary travellers. Thus out of 
 the needs of the wayfarer and as an incident of travel from 
 place to place grew the English inn. It was established to sup- 
 ply the needs of the traveller along his journey, to wit, to fur- 
 nish food and drink for man and beast and rest and safety for 
 the night. 
 
 "Inns . . . were intended for the middle class: mer- 
 chants, small landowners, packmen, etc. A certain number of 
 beds were placed in one room, and each man bought separately 
 what he wished to eat, chiefly bread, a Uttle meat, and some 
 beer. Complaints as to the excessive prices were not much less 
 frequent then than now; the people petitioned Parliament and 
 the king interfered accordingly with his accustomed useless 
 good will. Edward III promulgated, in the 23d year of his 
 reign, a statute to constrain 'hostelers et herbergers' to sell 
 food at reasonable prices; and again, four years later, tried to 
 put an end to the 'great and outrageous cost of victuals kept 
 up in all the realm by innkeepers and other retailers of vict- 
 uals, to the great detriment of the people travelling across 
 the realm. ' " ^ 
 
 The inn was not the only accommodation which weary trav- 
 ellers might find in the course of their journey. The rehgious 
 houses practiced hospitality, and freely received certain classes 
 of people. The nobles and magnates habitually resorted to 
 them for refreshment and were received both in consideration 
 of their own bounty and as representatives of the class to which 
 the community owed its foundation and its wealth. The very 
 poor also were received out of mere charity, for hospitality to 
 the poor was one of the first requirements of rehgion as it was 
 understood in the middle ages. To the houses of the friars, 
 therefore, rich and poor resorted for entertainment; but the 
 great middle class, the men who were able to pay their way, 
 
 3 Jusserand, " English Wayfaring I;ife," p. 126. 
 [4] 
 
Chap. I.] Historical Introduction. [§ 5. 
 
 were not welcome there. If they had the means to pay for 
 accommodation and were without special claim to favor, they 
 must go to those whose business it was to care for them. The 
 great houses of nobles and gentry were also open to travellers 
 who were in need of entertainment, but there, too, it was as a 
 rule only the rich and the poor who were expected to avail 
 themselves of the private hospitality. Anyone lost or be- 
 nighted would of course be received; but the lord of the manor 
 had no desire to compete with the innkeeper who must make 
 his Uvelihood from the wayfarer. 
 
 Besides these private houses and the inn for necessary enter- 
 tainment, the alehouse or tavern supplied incidental refresh- 
 ment to the traveller, though primarily intended to serve an- 
 other purpose. This house primarily supplied the wants of the 
 inhabitants of the place, for there the native foimd rest, heat, 
 companionship and beer. He could stay until the stroke of 
 curfew, and then was turned out to find his way home as best 
 he might, quarrelling and fighting by the way, using his knife 
 freely, or falling from his horse into a convenient stream, the 
 easy prey for enemies and for robbers. "The law would not 
 have a tavern haunted out of season, " and the nighttime was 
 out of season. The difference between the inn and the. tavern 
 is therefore obvious. The one was instituted for the weary 
 traveller, the other for the native; the one furnished food that 
 the traveller might continue his journey, the other furnished 
 drink for the mere pleasure of neighbors; the one was open to 
 the traveller for protection at night, the other turned its guest 
 out at the very moment when he most needed protection, and 
 left him to find it, if his remaining senses permitted him to do 
 so, in his own home. It is unnecessary, therefore, to point out 
 the fact that a tavern is not an inn, and that the innkeeper's 
 duties do not extend to the tavernkeeper. 
 
 § 5. Development of inns from private houses. 
 
 Such being the course of life among wayfarers in medieval 
 England, the inn was a natural outgrowth of the conditions. 
 
 [5] 
 
§ 5.] Innkeepers. [Chap. I. 
 
 The inn, the pubUc house of entertainment, was natiirally 
 evolved from the private house. Any householder might re- 
 ceive a stranger for the night, as indeed in rural communities 
 many householders are apt to do. If in the course of time one 
 such householder came, either through the superiority of his 
 own accommodation or by reason of the lack of competition, 
 to receive all persons who in that village needed accommoda- 
 tion he would thereby have become an innkeeper. He would 
 have done it perhaps gradually, without any distinct change 
 marking the transition from the private householder to the pub- 
 lic innkeeper; nor would the accommodation he offered be differ- 
 ent in kind from the accommodation that would be offered by 
 the private householder furnishing occasional accommodation 
 to a transient guest. The inn was an outgrowth of the private 
 house, and the kind of house employed and the general conduct 
 of hfe in the house would be the same in the early inn and the 
 private house of the same period. In order to discover the na- 
 ture of the accommodation afforded by the inn it will, there- 
 fore, be worth while to examine the plan of life in the ordinary 
 dwelHng of the time. 
 
 The English houses of the thirteenth and fourteenth centu- 
 ries differed greatly, of course, in size and in elegance, but the 
 plan of life in all houses had certain common features. Life 
 indoors centred about the great hall, the principal part of the 
 house, to which other parts were added as they might be re- 
 quired. In the hall the days were spent, so far as they were 
 spent indoors, meals were eaten, and night having come the 
 tables were removed and the beds were spread. The mistress, 
 to be sure, had a small room of her own, the bower, into which 
 she could retire at any time, and the master of the house had 
 a separate chamber in which he slept. But the retainers, the 
 servants and the ordinary guests slept together in the common 
 hall. The house of a man who was well to do might have an 
 additional chamber for guests, and a stable was usually at- 
 tached to the hall at one end. The hall was warmed and 
 lighted by a great fire. In each chamber there was a small fire- 
 [6] 
 
Chap. I.] Historical Introduction. [§ 6. 
 
 place for heat, and light was given by a candle. The inn was 
 undoubtedly built on this same plan, even when a building was 
 built especially for an inn; in most cases doubtless the inn had 
 been built for an ordinary dwelling house. The weary trav- 
 eller coming to the inn at nightfall would have his supper at 
 the great table, and his bed would then be spread in the hall 
 itself. Heat and such light as was necessary he would have 
 from the hall fire. If he brought a horse and paid for his keep 
 we are told he paid no extra charge for his bed, but the foot 
 traveller paid a small sum for his lodging. A traveller of better 
 estate would pay for and receive accommodation in a small 
 chamber. There he would be served with food, and his bed 
 would be spread; and he would be charged not merely for the 
 food and lodging, but also for his fire and his candle. Even 
 there he would not be likely to occupy the chamber alone, or 
 even a bed alone; the king himself on his travels was expected 
 to have a bedfellow, and a private person would be fortunate 
 if he had only one. Still he was travelling in luxury if he 
 shared with two or three others a private chamber, a private 
 bed and a private fire. As time went on and the business of 
 the innkeepers increased, especially in the great towns, build- 
 ings were built as inns, the number of chambers being greatly 
 increased. In the sixteenth century we hear of inns in London 
 which could accommodate one himdred guests. It must be 
 clear that with so many guests the common hall would be 
 needed for their reception and for the general table; and the 
 guests must have all been put into special chambers for sleep- 
 ing; but most of these were undoubtedly still common cham- 
 bers, in which travellers were put as they happened to come, 
 sharing not merely the chamber but the bed with strange bed- 
 fellows. 
 
 § 6. Development of the law. 
 
 Such being the business and such the customs of innkeepers, 
 their responsibihty, which seen through modern eyes seems 
 anomalous, is easily explained. They undertake as a business 
 
 [7] 
 
§ 6.] Innkeepers. [Chap. I. 
 
 to furnish food, protection and shelter to the wayfaring guest; 
 having undertaken such a public business, and the public need 
 being concerned, the innkeeper must supply his service to all; 
 and in order to perform his undertaking he must furnish not 
 merely sufficient food and a tight roof, but sufficient protection 
 against the dangers of country travelling. Either to refuse 
 shelter, to fail to provide food, or to permit robbers from out- 
 side to en|;er the inn would be a breach of his obligation and 
 would render him liable to action. ) ' But this is not the limit 
 of his obligation. If he puts a stranger into a common room 
 with other strangers and bids him sleep, the innkeeper must 
 undertake his care and protection during the night, not merely 
 against persons outside but against strange bedfellows within 
 the inn. It is interesting to notice how history repeats itself 
 in this case. A much later invention, the sleeping car, brought 
 back to modern life some of the obsolete features of the life of 
 the middle ages. A number of persons, strangers to one an- 
 other, were received to sleep jn a common room open to per- 
 sons from outside. The existence of the same conditions im- 
 posed a similar responsibility, and the proprietor of the sleep- 
 ing car, like the innkeeper in the middle ages, was obliged to 
 protect his guests as well as he could against danger from 
 within and from without. The innkeeper's liability did not ex- 
 ist in the case of a private chamber, into which only the guest 
 who engaged it or friends brought into it by himself were al- 
 lowed to enter. If a man engaged a room and was put in ex- 
 clusive control of it, and was given the key, the protection 
 which the innkeeper was obliged to furnish him was, therefore, 
 merely against outsiders who might be permitted to break into 
 the room without right. Against the inmates the guest had no 
 right to call upon the innkeeper for protection. This is the 
 reason of the stress laid in the old cases upon the fact that the 
 innkeeper has given the guest the key of his room; this gift of 
 key marked and symbolized the fact that the room was no 
 longer in the innkeeper's disposal, that he could quarter no 
 stranger in it, and that the guest and his friends alone could 
 [8] 
 
Chap I.] Historical Introduction. [§ 6. 
 
 enter, and, therefore, against those who rightly entered the 
 innkeeper undertook no responsibihty. 
 
 The business of innkeeper having been carried on in this way 
 the distinctive features of the law are easily accounted for. 
 The principles of the innkeeper's liability once being estab- 
 lished have continued unchanged until the present day; and 
 the hotel keeper in the great cities of the United States derives 
 his rights and traces his responsibiUties to the host of the 
 humble village inn of medieval England. 
 
 [9] 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE NATURE OF AN INN. 
 
 11. The inn a public house. 
 
 12. The innkeeper professes a pub- 
 
 lic business. 
 
 13. Distinction between innkeeper 
 
 and private host for hire. 
 
 14. The innkeeper serves transient 
 
 guests. 
 
 15. The innkeeper supplies aU 
 
 needs of a traveller. 
 
 16. House conducted on the "Eu- 
 
 ropean plan." 
 
 § 17. The innkeeper need not supply 
 all the desires of a guest. 
 
 18. The innkeeper is the proprietor 
 
 of an inn. 
 
 19. How the innkeeper's profes- 
 
 sion is made. 
 
 20. Failure to procure a license. 
 
 21. Carrying on of other business. 
 
 22. Name given to inn is immate- 
 
 rial. 
 
 § 11. The inn a public house. 
 
 From the earliest times the fundamental characteristic of an 
 inn has been its pubUc nature. It is a pubhc house, a house of 
 public entertainment, or, as it is legally phrased, a common inn.* 
 " An inn is a house, the owner of which holds out that he will 
 receive all travellers and sojourners who are willing to pay a 
 price adequate to the sort of accommodation provided, and who 
 come in a situation in which they" are fit to be received. " ^ "A 
 house [kept] publicly, openly and notoriously for the entertain- 
 ment and accommodation of travellers and others, for a re- 
 ward. " ^ 
 
 The whole system of travel and communication in rural Eng- 
 land, at the time the law of inns was in the making, required, 
 as has been seen,* that the weary traveller should find at con- 
 venient places beside the highway houses of entertainment and 
 shelter to which he might resort during his journey for food, 
 
 1 Horslow's Case, Year Book 22 Hen. 6, 21, pi. 38 (1444). 
 
 2 Best, J., in Thompson v. Lacy, 3 B. & Aid. (Eng.) 283 (1820). 
 
 3 State V. Stone, 6 Vt. 295 (1834). 
 *Ante, §4. 
 
 [10] 
 
Chap. II.] The Nature of An Inn. [§ 13. 
 
 rest and protection. The ordinary laws of supply and demand 
 would lead to the establishment of such houses by the roadside 
 at places which would sufficiently serve the public convenience; 
 but those laws could not be trusted to secure to each individual 
 the benefit of the food and shelter therein provided. The de- 
 sire for gain is not the only passion which moves men, innkeep- 
 ers or others. Hatred, prejudice, envy, sloth or undue fastid- 
 iousness might influence an innkeeper to refuse entertainment 
 to a traveller, even though he could pay his score. The supply 
 of food and shelter to a traveller was a matter of public concern, 
 and the house which offered such food and shelter was engaged 
 in a public service. The law must make injustice to the in- 
 dividual traveller impossible ; the caprice of the host could not 
 be permitted to leave a subject of the king hungry and shelter- 
 less. In a matter of such importance the public had an inter- 
 est, and must see that, so far as was consistent with justice to 
 the innkeeper, his inn was carried on for the benefit of the whole 
 public; and so it became in an exact sense a public house. 
 
 § 12. The innkeeper professes a public business. 
 
 It follow^ from the nature of the inn that an innkeeper is 
 one who professes to serve the public by keeping an inn. The 
 most striking characteristic of his eriiplo3n]aent, that which dis- 
 tinguishes his employment from that of an ordinary person's," 
 is the fact that his calling is a public one. He is a " common 
 innkeeper," ^ who, in the quaint language of Lord Holt, ^ "has 
 made profession of a trade which is for the public good, and 
 has thereby exposed and vested an interest of himself in all the 
 king's subjects that will employ him in the way of his trade. " 
 Whether a man is an innkeeper depends, therefore, in the first 
 place upon whether he makes a profession of serving the pubHc 
 needs; whether his regular business is entertaining travellers. 
 
 § 13. Distinction between innkeeper and private host for hire. 
 In many places where there are no inns, private householders 
 
 6 Year Book, 11 Hen. 4, 45, pi. 18 (1410). 
 8 Lane v. Cotton, 12 Mod. 472, 484 (1701). 
 
 [11] 
 
§ 13.] Innkeepees. [Chap. II. 
 
 occasionally, and even frequently, take in and accommodate 
 travellers and receive compensation for it; but merely as a 
 matter of accommodation, and without making a business of 
 the practice. They receive the stranger and traveller out of 
 mere hospitality, or from motives among which gain is merely 
 incidental, and their livelihood in not derived from their hos- 
 pitahty. Such persons, though they receive compensation for 
 the accommodation they furnish, are not innkeepers.'' 
 
 Thus in a Texas case * it was shown that a man had a house 
 on the high road, much visited by travellers, who were uni- 
 formly entertained and charged; these facts were notorious 
 and relied on by travellers. On the other hand, he often de- 
 clared that he did not keep an inn, he refused to take boarders, 
 and often entertained his friends and countrjmien free of charge. 
 The court held that the question whether he was or was not 
 an innkeeper was for the jury and that the jury might on this 
 evidence find him an innkeeper. In the course of his opinion 
 Judge Roberts said: 
 
 "There are numerous farmers situated on the public roads 
 of the country, who occasionally, and even frequently, take in 
 and accommodate travellers, and receive compensation for it, 
 who are not innkeepers, and are not liable as such. It is not 
 their business or occupation, nor do they prepare and fit up 
 their establishments for it. They yield to the laws of hospi- 
 tahty, in receiving and entertaining the stranger and the trav- 
 eller, yet they cannot afford to do so without some compensa- 
 tion. This view of the subject the court also presented to the 
 minds of the jury, by telUng them in substance that if the de- 
 fendant only occasionally entertained travellers for compensa- 
 tion, when it suited his own pleasure, he did not thereby be- 
 come an innkeeper. " 
 
 In a similar case in Iowa it was proved that the person al- 
 
 'Lyon V. Smith, 1 Morris (la.), 184 (1843); Kisten v. Hildebrand, 9 B. 
 Mon. (Ky.) 74, 48 Am. Dec. 416 (1848); State v. Matthews, 2 Dev. & B. 
 (N. C.) 424 (1837); Howth v. Franklin, 20 Tex. 798, 73 Am. Dec. 218 (1858). 
 
 8 Howth V. Franklin, 20 Tex. 798, 73 Am. Dec. 218 (1858). 
 [12] 
 
Chap. II.] The Nature of an Inn. [§ 13. 
 
 leged to be an innkeeper had entertained several individuals 
 at his house overnight and been paid a compensation for his 
 care and attentions; but there was no proof that he held him- 
 self out in any manner as a common innkeeper, or that he was 
 so regarded by the pubUc. The court upheld a finding that 
 the person was not an innkeeper." In the course of his opinion 
 Chief Justice Mason said: "To render a person liable as a com- 
 mon innkeeper, it is not sufficient to show that he occasionally 
 entertains travellers. Most of the farmers in a new country 
 do this, without supposing themselves answerable for the horses 
 or other property of their guests which may be stolen, or other- 
 wise lost, without any fault of their own. Nor is such the rule 
 in older countries, where it would operate with far less injustice, 
 and be less opposed to good poUcy than with us. To be sub- 
 jected to the same responsibilities attaching to innkeepers, a 
 person must make tavernkeeping, to some extent, a regular 
 business, a means of Uvefihood. He should hold himself out 
 to the world as an innkeeper. It is not necessary that he 
 should have a sign or a license, provided that he has in any 
 other manner authorized the general understanding that his 
 was a public house, where strangers had a right to require ac- 
 commodation. The person who occasionally entertains others 
 for a reasonable compensation is no more subject to the 
 extraordinary responsibility of an innkeeper than he is 
 liable as a common carrier, who in certain special cases car- 
 ries the property of others from one place to another for 
 hire." 
 ' If, however, the housekeeper does as a matter of fact receive 
 every member of the pubhc who appHes for entertainment, as 
 a regular course of business, he is an innkeeper, though he may 
 claim that his house is still a private one.'" 
 
 The question whether a house where a guest is entertained 
 is a pubhc inn or a private house is a question of fact, to be 
 
 9 Lyon V. Smith, Morris (la.), 184 (1843). 
 
 10 Jaquet v. Edwards, 1 Jamaica, 4 (1867). 
 
 [13] 
 
§ 14.] Innkeepers. [Chap. II. 
 
 determined, like any fact, upon all the evidence; " and an ap- 
 pellate court will not disturb the finding of the lower court on 
 the question, though it might as an original question have 
 come to a different conclusion on the, evidence.'^ 
 
 In determining the question, the facts may lead to a presump- 
 tion against a party. Thus if a housekeeper does an act which 
 he could not legally do unless he is an innkeeper he will be 
 presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to be 
 an innkeeper.i^ 
 
 § 14. The innkeeper serves transient guests. 
 
 The person whose needs the innkeeper undertakes to serve 
 is the weary traveller; a person who stays with him merely 
 for a short time in the course of his journey. The inn is there- 
 fore primarily provided for transient guests; and one who does 
 not profess to serve transient guests is not an innkeeper." 
 
 This characteristic of an innkeeper is the distinguishing fea- 
 ture between an inn and a boarding house. A boarding house 
 is for the entertainment not of transient guests, who must find 
 food and shelter at once, but of more or less permanent occu- 
 pants, who may at their leisure make bargains with their host. 
 The boarder being in this position, the housekeeper may exer- 
 cise the same Uberty. If the boarder may select and bargain 
 for his boarding place, so the housekeeper may select and bar- 
 gain with his guests.i^ The distinction and the reason for it 
 
 11 Howth V. Franklin, 20 Tex. 798, 73 Am. Dec. 218 (1858); Clary v. WU- 
 ley, 49 Vt. 55 (1875). 
 
 12 Rees V. McKeown, 7 Ont. App. 521 (1882). 
 JSKorn v. Schedler, 11 Daly (N. Y.), 234 (1882). 
 
 w For this reason it was held necessary in the old cases to allege, in an 
 action by a guest against an innkeeper, that the plaintiff was '"transient." 
 Grimstone v. An Innkeeper, Hetley (Eng.), 49 (1627); Drope v. Thaire, 
 Latch (Eng.), 126 (1626). 
 
 16 Parker v. Flint, 12 Mod. 254, Carthew, 417 (Eng. 1701); Pinkerton v. 
 Woodward, 33 Cal. 557, 91 Am. Dec. 657 (1867); BeaU v. Beck, Fed. Cas. 
 No. 1161, 3 Cr. C. C. 666 (D. C. 1829); Willard v. Reinhardt, 2 E. D. Smith 
 (N. Y.), 148 (1853); Commonwealth v. Cuncannon, 3 Brewst. (Pa.), 344 
 (1869). 
 
 [14] 
 
Chap. II.] The Nature of an Inn. [§ 14. 
 
 were brought out very neatly in an early Georgia case.'" The 
 defendant, who was proceeded against on a statute affecting 
 innkeepers, was the keeper of a hotel at a country watering 
 place, who undertook, either in his hotel or in cottages near 
 it which he rented, to entertain for a season visitors at the 
 watering place. In holding that he was not an innkeeper 
 Judge Nesbet said: "It is because inns and innkeepers have 
 to do with the travelling pubUc — strangers — and that for brief 
 periods, and under circumstances which render it impossible 
 for each customer to contract for the terms of his entertain- 
 ment, that the law has taken them so strictly in charge. And 
 it is because of the compulsion innkeepers are under, to afford 
 entertainment to anybody, that the law has clothed them 
 with extraordinary privileges. Now, under this (it is sub- 
 mitted), correct legal view of innkeepers, was the plaintiff 
 in this case, an innkeeper? Was that his business? His 
 business was to rent his houses to families or persons who 
 might contract with him for their occupancy. They are not 
 his guests, they are beyond dispute, his tenants, and he their 
 landlord. His business was, to furnish board, lodging and at- 
 tention. But to whom? To the wayfaring world? No. But 
 to persons who might resort to his healthful fountains and 
 salubrious locahty, for a season, that is, for the fall and sum- 
 mer months. They were not his guests for a day, or night, or 
 week, but his lodgers or boarders for a season. They were not 
 chargeable according to any tariff of rates, fixed by law, but 
 according to contract, varied, beyond doubt, according to time, 
 amount of accommodation, and other circumstances. These 
 are not the characteristics of the business of innkeeping, but 
 indicate a boarding house. As well might every private board- 
 ing house in the State, be adjudged an inn or a tavern, as this 
 party's establishment. The object for which people are stated 
 in the declaration, to have visited the springs, necessarily for- 
 bids the idea of their being travellers, and of plaintiff's house 
 being a tavern. It was health, in the use of the medicinal 
 
 i« Bonner v. Welborn, 7 Ga. 296 (1849). 
 
 [15] 
 
§ 14.] Innkeepers. [Chap. II. 
 
 waters. That object indicates abiding — permanency of loca- 
 tion, for a season, at least. These waters cannot cure by seven 
 draughts; or Uke the waters of Jordan, by seven washings. "^^ 
 
 But the fact that a person receives those who are not 
 transient guests does not prevent his being an innkeeper. 
 Though in its origin the business of an innkeeper was to sup- 
 ply the needs of travellers, yet once in the business an innkeeper 
 will naturally be quite willing to do a profitable business with 
 other persons. An innkeeper will ordinarily receive and care 
 for any proper person who applies, even though, not being a 
 traveller, he could not demand such reception as a legal right; 
 and such reception of guests does not work a change of employ- 
 ment. One who keeps a house of entertainment for travellers 
 is none the less an innkeeper because he also receives other 
 persons." 
 
 Even if the innkeeper caters for permanent guests, and makes 
 his inn attractive for them, he is none the less an innkeeper 
 if he professes also to supply the needs of travellers, as most 
 hotel keepers do. Thus the facts that a house stands upon 
 enclosed grounds which are reserved for the exclusive use of 
 guests, that the gates are closed at night, and that the house 
 is thus rendered attractive as a pleasure resort and guests are 
 thereby induced to remain a considerable time, do not prevent 
 the house from being an inn if it is held out as a place of en- 
 tertainment for travellers.^^ And even in a case where the chief 
 attraction of a hotel was a mineral spring connected with it, and 
 it did not appear that persons resorted to the hotel except such 
 as desired to use it as a watering place, it was assumed without 
 argument that the hotel was an inn.^" 
 
 " See to the same effect dicta in Kisten v. Hildebrand, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 
 72, 48 Am. Dec. 416 (1848); Southwood v. Myers, 3 Bush (Ky.), 681 (1868). 
 
 18 Wintermute v. Clark, 5 Sandf. (N. Y.) 242 (1851). Conversely a keeper 
 of a boarding house may entertain transient guests. Kisten v. Hildebrand, 
 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 72, 48 Am. Dec. 416 (1848). 
 
 19 Fay V. Pacific Improvement Co., 93 Cal. 253, 26 Pac. 1099, 28 Pac. 943, 
 27 Am. St. Rep. 198, 16 L. R. A. 188 (1891). 
 
 2» Willis V. McMahon, 89 Cal. 156, 26 Pac. 649 (1891). 
 [16] 
 
Chap. II.] The Nature of an Inn. [§ 16. 
 
 § 15. The innkeeper supplies all needs of a traveller. 
 
 The innkeeper supplies all the entertainment which the weary- 
 traveller actually needs on his road; which in lowest terms is 
 food, shelter and protection.^! If the keeper of a house of en- 
 tertainment does not undertake to furnish either of these ne- 
 cessities he is not a common innkeeper; and this requirement 
 distinguishes inns from many similar houses of pubhc enter- 
 tainment. Thus a house which does not supply lodging is not 
 an inn; and this rule excludes from among inns a restaurant 
 or eating house.^^ On the same principle a coffee house ^^ or a 
 drinking saloon ^* is not an inn. And for the same reason a 
 house that furnishes only lodging without food, like a lodging 
 house,^^ or an apartment hotel ^* or a sleeping car ^' is not an 
 inn. 
 
 § 16. House conducted on the "European plan." 
 
 If all elements of entertainment required by a traveller are 
 furnished him by the host the house may be an inn, notwith- 
 standing they are independently furnished and separately 
 charged. Thus a hotel is no less an inn though it is conducted 
 
 21 Pinkerton v. Woodward, 33 Cal. 557, 91 Am. Dec. 657 (1867); Walling 
 V. Potter, 35 Conn. 183 (1868); Wintermute v. Clark, 5 Sandf. (N. Y.) 242 
 (1851); CromweU v. Stephens, 2 Daly (N. Y.), 15 (1867); Dickerson v. 
 Rogers, 4 Humph. (Tenn.) 179, 40 Am. Dec. 642 (1843); Thompson v. Lacy, 
 3 B. & Aid. (Eng.) 283 (1820). 
 
 22 Sheffer v. Willoughby, 163 lU. 518, 45 N. E. 253, 34 L. R. A. 464, 
 affirming 61 lU. App. 263 (1896); Block v. Sherry, 43 N. Y. Misc. 342, 87 
 N. Y. Supp. 160 (1904); Carpenter v. Taylor, 1 Hilt. (N. Y.) 193 (1856); 
 Regina v. Rymer, 2 Q. B. D. 136, 46 L. J. M. C. 108 (Eng. 1877); Dunn 
 V. Bean, Quebec Rep. 11 Super. Ct. 538 (1897). 
 
 23 Doe V. Laming, 4 Camp. (Eng.) 73, 77 (1814). 
 
 24 People V. Jones, 54 Barb. (N. Y.) 311 (1863); Kelly v. New York Ex- 
 cise Comrs., 54 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 327 (1877); Pabe v. Myers, 5 Ohio S. & 
 C. P. Deo. 578 (1895); Regina v. Rymer, 2 Q. B. D. 136, 46 L. J. M. C. 108 
 (Eiig. 1877). 
 
 25 Kelly V. New York Excise Comrs., 54 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 327 (1877); 
 CromweU v. Stephens, 2 Daly (N. Y.), 15 (1867); Parker v. Flint, 12 Mod. 
 (Eng.) 254 (1701). 
 
 2« Davis V. Gay, 141 Mass. 531, 6 N. E. 549 (1886). 
 27 PuUman Palace Car Co. v. Smith, 73 111. 360, 24 Am. Rep. 258 (1874); 
 post § 342. 
 
 [17] 
 
§ 17.] Innkeepers. [Chap. II. 
 
 on the European plan, so called; the fact that food is sepa- 
 rately obtained and paid for, and the guest may procure his 
 food elsewhere if he chooses, does not alter the legal character 
 of the house.^* 
 
 In the case of such a hotel it usually happens that food is 
 supphed in a restaurant, connected with the hotel, but open to 
 everyone, not merely to guests of the hotel. It is this connec- 
 tion of the restaurant with the hotel as part of the same estab- 
 lishment that makes the hotel an inn. The hotel keeper can- 
 not avoid the responsibility of an innkeeper by proving that 
 the restaurant is in fact conducted by an independent person. 
 If the hotel is held out to the public as having a restaurant 
 connected with it and forming part of it, it is an inn, and not 
 a mere lodging house.^* But, on the other hand, if there is no 
 holding them out as parts of the same establishment, the fact 
 that an independent restaurant is conducted under the same 
 roof and is resorted to by lodgers, does not make a lodging 
 house an inn; '" nor does the fact that the keeper of the lodging 
 house is in the habit of sending out to procure cooked food for 
 his guests at their request.^^ 
 
 § 17. The innkeeper need not supply all the desires of a guest. 
 
 Though the inn is a house which professes to supply all that a 
 traveller actually needs on his journey, it need not be perfectly 
 equipped to supply everything that he might desire. Thus, one 
 may keep an inn though he does not profess to supply accom- 
 modation for horses, ^^ or to sell wine or liquor.'^ 
 
 28 Bullock V. Adair, 63 111. App. 30 (1895); Johnson v. Chadbourn Fur- 
 nace Co., 89 Minn. 310, 94 N. W. 874 (1903); Krohn v. Sweeney, 2 Daly 
 (N. Y.), 200 (1867); McClure v. Krumbholz, 9 Pa. Dist. R. 544, 31 Pittsb. 
 Leg. J. (N. S) 3, 14 York Leg. Rec. 31 (1900). 
 
 29 Johnson v. Chadbourn Furnace Co., 89 Minn. 310, 94 N. W. 874 (1903). 
 
 30 Cromwell v. Stephens, 2 Daly (N. Y.), 15 (1867). 
 
 31 KeUy V. New York Excise Comrs., 54 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 327 (1877). 
 32Kisten v. Hildebrand, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 72, 48 Am. Dec. 416 (1848); 
 
 Commonwealth v. Wetherbee, 101 Mass. 214 (1869). 
 
 33Pinkerton v. Woodward, 33 Cal. 557, 91 Am. Dec. 657 (1867); People 
 
 [18] 
 
Chap. II.] The Nature of an Inn. [§ 19. 
 
 § 18. The innkeeper is the proprietor of an inn. 
 
 The innkeeper is the person who on his own account is carry- 
 ing on the business of an inn. In other words, he is the pro- 
 prietor of the establishment. The person actually employed 
 as manager, though he has the whole direction of the enterprise, 
 is not an innkeeper if he is acting on behalf of someone else. 
 Thus the salaried manager of a hotel belonging to a corporation 
 is not to be held responsible as an innkeeper; the corporation 
 is the innkeeper.''* 
 
 On the other hand, the real owner of the enterprise, the per- 
 son in actual charge of it, cannot escape responsibiUty by 
 taking out a Hcense to conduct an inn in the name of another, 
 or by placing another's name on the sign or the advertisements 
 as the ostensible innkeeper. In spite of such devices, the per- 
 son who actually conducts the inn will be held as the inn- 
 keeper.^* 
 
 § 19. How the innkeeper's profession is made. 
 
 The profession of readiness to serve the pubUc need not be 
 made in any particular way; it is enough that by word or act 
 the innkeeper makes pubhc his intention to become such. It 
 has been usual, particularly in former times, to advertise his 
 house by hanging out a sign; but it is not essential to a man's 
 being an innkeeper that he. should do so. If he in fact car- 
 ries on the business pubHcly as innkeeper he will be held as 
 
 V. Murphy, 5 Parker Cr. R. (N. Y.) 130 (1861); Curtis v. State, 5 Ohio, 324 
 (1832). 
 
 34 Dixon V. Birch, L. R. 8 Ex. 135, 42 L. J. Ex. 135, 28 L. T. 360, 28 W. 
 R. 443 (Eng. 1873). 
 
 85 McKay v. Brown, 5 Can. L. J. 91 (1859). It is to be noticed that an 
 employee who is not the real innkeeper but who conducts the inn for an- 
 other, being paid a salary, may be indicted for keeping an inn without a 
 license. Winter v. State, 30 Ala. 22 (1857). The question is a different one 
 from that presented in the text; for any person may be indicted who in fact 
 carries on the business, though he does it on behalf of another, who alone 
 is subject to the liabilities of an innkeeper and liable to a civil action. He 
 is taking part in the commission of a misdemeanor, and is therefore crimi- 
 nally responsible as principal. 
 
 [19] 
 
§ 19.] Innkeepers. [Chap. II, 
 
 such, although he never displayed a sign.^^ The profession 
 may be made by any method of soliciting the patronage of the 
 public; ^^ as by advertising, by keeping a public register, and 
 by running a coach to a railroad station.^* 
 
 What acts are sufficient to justify a finding that a man is 
 an innkeeper is a question which has often been a subject of 
 judicial decision. In a case in California the keeper of the 
 "What Cheer House" insisted that his house was a lodging 
 house and not an inn; because, as he said, the eating depart- 
 ment was distinct from the lodging department. It appeared 
 that in the basement of the "What Cheer House," and con- 
 nected with it by a stairway, there was a restaurant, which was 
 conducted by the defendant and two other persons jointly, and 
 that the three shared the profits. The court held that the 
 " What Cheer House " was an inn.^^ In the course of his opinion 
 Judge Rhodes said: "Where a person, by the means usually 
 employed in that business, holds himself out to the world as 
 an innkeeper, and, in that capacity, is accustomed to receive 
 travellers as his guests, and solicits a continuance of their pat- 
 ronage, and a traveller relying on such representations goes to 
 the house to receive such entertainment as he has occasion for, 
 the relation of innkeeper and guest is created, and the innkeeper 
 cannot be heard to say that his professions were false, and that 
 he was not in fact an innkeeper. The rules regulating the re- 
 spective rights, duties and responsibiUties of innkeeper and 
 guest have their origin in consideration of public pohcy, and 
 were designed mainly for the protection and seciirity of trav- 
 ellers and their property. ' They would afford the traveller but 
 poor security if, before venturing to intrust his property to one 
 who by his agents, cards, bills, advertisements, sign, and all the 
 
 36 Anonymous, Godbolt, 345, pi. 440 (Eng. 1623); Lyon v. Smith, Morris 
 (la.), 184 (1843); Diclierson v. Rogers, 4 Humph. (Tenn.) 179, 40 Am. Dec. 
 642 (1843). 
 
 3' Pinkerton v. Woodward, 33 Cal. 557, 91 Am. Dec. 657 (1867). 
 
 38 Fay V. Pacific Improvement Co., 93 Cal. 253, 26 Pac. 1099, 28 Pac. 
 943, 27 Am. St. Rep. 198, 16 L. R. A. 188 (1891). 
 
 39 Pinkerton v. Woodward, 33 Cal. 557, 91 Am. Dec. 657 (1867). 
 
 [20] 
 
Chap. II.] The Nature of an Inn. [§ 20. 
 
 means by which publicity and notoriety can be given to his 
 business, represents himself as an innkeeper, he is required to 
 inquire of the employees as to their interest in the establishment, 
 or take notice of the agencies or means by which the several 
 departments are conducted. The same considerations of pub- 
 lic policy that dictated those rules demand that the innkeeper 
 should be held to the responsibilities which, by his representa- 
 tions, he induced his guest to believe he would assume. We 
 think the jury were fully warranted by the evidence in finding 
 that the ' What Cheer House ' was an inn. " 
 
 In a later case in the same State the court dealt with a sim- 
 ilar question as follows: ^^ "We think that the evidence in this 
 case is full and complete to the point that the 'Hatel Del 
 Monte' was a pubhc inn. It not only had a name indicating its 
 character as such, but it was also shown that it was open to 
 all persons who have a right to demand entertainment at a 
 public house; that it solicited pubhc patronage by advertising 
 and in the distribution of its business cards, and kept a public 
 register in which its guests entered their names upon arrival, 
 and before they were assigned rooms; that the hotel, at its own 
 expense, ran a coach to the railroad station for the purpose of 
 conveying its patrons to and from the hotel; that it had its 
 manager, clerks, waiters, and in its interior management all 
 the ordinary arrangements and appearances of an hotel, and 
 the prices charged were for board and lodging. These facts 
 were certainly sufficient to justify the court in finding, as it 
 did, that the appellant was an innkeeper. " 
 
 § 20. Failure to procure a license. 
 
 The failure of an innkeeper to procure a license, as required 
 by law, does not prevent him from being an innkeeper; *' 
 
 *" De Haven, J., in Fay v. Pacific Improvement Co., 93 Cal. 253, 26 Pac. 
 1099, 28 Pac. 943, 27 Am. St. Rep. 198, 16 L. R. A. 188 (1891). 
 
 " Lanier v. Youngblood, 73 Ala. 587 (1883); Lyon v. Smith, Morris (la), 
 184 (1843); Norcross v. Norcross, 53 Me. 163 (1865); Atwater v. Sawyer, 
 76 Me. 539, 49 Am. Rep. 634 (1884); State v. Wynne, 1 Hawks (N.C.),451 
 (1821) ; Dickerson v. Rogers, 4 Humph. (Tenn.) 179, 40 Am. Dec. 642 (1843). 
 
 [21] 
 
§ 22.] Innkeepers. [Chap. II. 
 
 nor does his act of taking out a license in the name of an- 
 other.^2 
 
 § 21. Carrying on of other business. 
 
 An innkeeper may at the same time and on the same or 
 neighboring premises carry on a different business, which though 
 similar to that of the innkeeper is not identical with it. For 
 instance, an innkeeper who is bound, as such, to have a stable 
 for the accommodation of the horses of his guests, may in the 
 same stable carry on the business of livery stable keeper. If, 
 under those circumstances, a horse is given to the innkeeper it 
 would be a question for the jury whether it was received by 
 him as innkeeper or keeper of a hvery stable.*^ In the same 
 way, an innkeeper may estabUsh under the same roof as his inn 
 a restaurant for the accommodation of persons who are not 
 his guests. If the restaurant is entirely distinct from the 
 rooms proper to the inn, a person who resorts merely to the 
 restaurant is not a guest. So where an innkeeper had the 
 refreshment bar at the side of his building with a separate 
 entrance it was held that one served there was not a guest.** 
 On this principle one who, not being a lodger in a hotel on the 
 European plan, resorts to the restaurant connected with the 
 hotel for food is not a guest.*^ 
 
 § 22. Name given to inn is immaterial. 
 
 The innkeeper cannot escape responsibility by giving some 
 other name than inn or hotel to his house. So where the owner 
 holds himself out as ready to supply all travellers with the food 
 and drink they require, he is an innkeeper, though he call his 
 house a " boarding house, " *® or a " coffee palace. " " On the 
 
 12 Schermerhorn v. Tripp, 2 Caines (N. Y.), 108 (1804); McKay v. Brown, 
 5 Can. L. J. 91 (1859). 
 
 "Mason v. Thompson, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 280 (1830). 
 "Regina v. Rymer, 2 Q. B. D. 136, 46 L. J. M. C. 108 (Eng. 1877). 
 "Krohn v. Sweeney, 2 Daly (N. Y.), 200 (1867). 
 "State V. Stone, 6 Vt. 295 (1834). 
 
 « Miller v. Federal Coffee Palace, 15 Victorian Law R. 30 (1889). 
 [22] 
 
Ghap. II.] The Nature op an Inn. [§ 22. 
 
 other hand, calling a house a "hotel" does not make it an inn. 
 The " International Hotel, " so called, being really a boarding 
 house and restaurant, will not be held an inn merely because 
 of its name.'** 
 
 In this country the words hotel and tavern are usually used 
 as synonymous with inn; and a hotel or tavern which is main- 
 tained for the accommodation of travellers is an inn.^^ 
 
 « Carpenter v. Taylor, 1 Hilt. (N. Y.) 193 (1856). 
 
 « Commonwealth v. Shortridge, 3 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 638 (1830); City of 
 St. Louis V. Siegrist, 46 Mo. 593 (1870); Town of Crown Point Poor Over- 
 seers V. Warner, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 150 (1842); Cromwell v. Stephens, 2 Daly 
 (N. Y.), 15 (1867); Taylor v. Monnot, 4 Duer (N. Y.), 116 (1854); People 
 V. Jones, 54 Barb. (N. Y.) 311 (1863); Jones v. Osbom, 2 Chit. (Eng.) 484 
 (1785). Where "tavern" is used as a synonym for liquor saloon or drink- 
 ing shop, it is of course not the same as ah inn. Regina v. Rymer, 2 Q. B. D. 
 136, 46 L. J. M. C. 108 (Eng. 1877). 
 
 [23] 
 
CHAPTER III, 
 
 OTHER HOUSES OF ENTERTAINMENT. 
 
 31. Other public houses notln pub- 
 
 lic calling. 
 
 32. Boarding houses. 
 
 33. Livery stables. 
 
 § 34. Lodging and apartment 
 houses. 
 
 35. Restaurants. 
 
 36. Theatres. 
 
 37. Sleeping cars and steamboats. 
 
 §31. Other public houses not in public calling. 
 
 Similar in many respects to inns are other houses maintained 
 for use of the public; but none of them ministers to any abso- 
 lute public necessity, and none of them, therefore, is regarded 
 as engaged in a pubhc calhng. No part of the law of public 
 calUngs, therefore, applies to these establishments; and the 
 questions examined in Title II of this work are inapplicable to 
 them. Furthermore, the law regulating the extent of hability 
 of innkeepers is, as we shall see, in many respects peculiar, and 
 does not apply to keepers "of other public houses. Nor does 
 any keeper of such a house have a lien at common law though, 
 as will be seen, a hen has been given to some of them by statute. 
 But in other respects the same principles of law apply to 
 these houses of entertainment as to inns. 
 
 In the following pages cases involving other public houses, 
 not inns, will be treated in their place, noting in every case of 
 importance the nature of the house involved, and the peculiar 
 rules of liability of each house of the sort will be treated in a 
 separate chapter.^ In this chapter the principal houses of the 
 sort wiU be enumerated and their nature stated. 
 
 § 32. Soarding houses. 
 The distinction between an innkeeper and a boarding-house 
 
 1 Post, chapters 23-26. 
 [24] 
 
Chap. III.] Other Houses of Entertainment. [§ 34. 
 
 keeper is that the latter, not having made a profession of his 
 services to the public, is at liberty to choose his guests, and to 
 make special arrangements with them.^ Since the boarding 
 house is particularly designed for a residence of some perma- 
 nence there is time for the parties to come to a mutually sat- 
 isfactory agreement by consultation, and there is therefore no 
 need for the law to protect the boarder.' But though designed 
 for permanent boarders, a boarding house is none the less such 
 because transient guests are entertained there.^ 
 
 The trade of boarding-house keeper may be regulated by 
 statute, in exercise of the police power of the State.^ The 
 keeper is frequently given a lien by statute.® The extent of 
 the boarding-house keeper's Uability will be examined in a 
 later chapter.'' 
 
 § 33. Livery stables. 
 
 A livery stable is a place where horses are groomed, fed, and 
 hired and vehicles are let.* It is not altogether a place for 
 pubUc entertainment, since an important part of its business 
 is the letting to the pubHc of its own horses and vehicles. It 
 may however be regulated by statute, and it is often given a 
 statutory lien. 
 
 § 34. Lodging and apartment houses. 
 
 Lodging and apartment houses differ from inns in that they 
 furnish lodging only, and not food. They differ from each 
 other in that the control of the lodging house is kept by the 
 proprietor or keeper of it, who (like the innkeeper) licenses the 
 
 2 Pinkerton v. Woodward, 33 Cal. 557, 91 Am. Dec. 657 (1867); BeaU v. 
 Beck, Fed. Cas. No. 1161, 3 Cr. C. C. 666 (Dist. Col. 1829); Willard v. Rein- 
 hardt, 2 E. D. Smith (N. Y.), 148 (1853); Commonwealth v. Cuncannon, 
 3 Brewst. (Pa.) 344 (1869). 
 
 3 Mamiing v. Wells, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 746, 51 Am. Dec. 688 (1849). 
 * Kisten v. Hildebrand, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 72, 48 Am. Dec. 416 (1848). 
 6 Post, §41. 
 
 « Post, § 297. 
 
 ''Post, chapter 21. 
 
 8 Williams v. Garignes, 30 La. Ann. 1094 (1878). 
 
 [25] 
 
§ 37.] Innkeepers. [Chap. III. 
 
 lodger to occupy his room; while the apartment is leased to 
 the occupant of it, who gets the exclusive possession and be- 
 comes a tenant.® The lodging house is a public house, may be 
 regulated by statute, and is often given a lien by statute. 
 
 § 35. Restaurants. 
 
 A restaurant differs from an inn in that it furnishes only food, 
 and not lodging or shelter. The keeper of a restaurant is not 
 an innkeeper, nor is he engaged in a public employment.^" The 
 extent of Uability of the keeper of a restaurant will be exam- 
 ined later." 
 
 §36. Theatres. 
 
 A public theatre differs from an inn both in the nature of 
 the entertainment furnished, and also in that what is furnished 
 is not a necessity of life. For this reason the manager of a 
 theatre is not engaged in a public employment. As Sir James 
 Mansfield said,*^ " theatres are not absolute necessaries of life, 
 and any person may stay away who does not approve of the 
 manner in which they are managed. " "Theatres are not nec- 
 essaries of Hfe, and the proprietors of them may manage their 
 business in their own way."" 
 
 Theatres are usually regulated by statute." The extent of 
 Uability of the manager wiU be considered later.^^ 
 
 § 37. Sleeping cars and steamboats. 
 
 Certain cars on railroad trains have characteristics similar 
 to inns; for instance, sleeping cars and dining cars. But 
 
 9 Toms V. Luckett, 5 C. B. (Eng.) 23, 38 (1847); Davis v. Gay, 141 Mass. 
 531, 6 N. E. 549 (1886); Shearman v. Iroquois H. & A. Co., 42 N. Y. Misc. 
 217, 85 N. Y. Supp. 365 (1903). 
 
 "La Salle R. & O. House v. McMasters, 85 lU. App. 677 (1899); Harris 
 V. Childs' U. D. Co., 84 N. Y. Supp. 260 (1903). 
 
 " Post, chapter 24. 
 
 12 Clifford V. Brandon, 2 Camp. (Eng.) 358, 368 (1809). 
 
 13 Pearce v. Spalding, 12 Mo. App. 141 (1882). 
 " Post, § 325. 
 
 16 Post, chapter 25. 
 
 [26] 
 
Chap. III.] Other Houses of Entertainment. [§ 37. 
 
 though analogous to inns, they lack the essential feature of 
 being provided for the entertainment of the traveller at stop- 
 ping places on his journey. The rights, duties, and obhga- 
 tions of sleeping car companies are considered later. ^^ A 
 steamboat is not an inn, though it supplies board and lodg- 
 ing as well as transportation." It is a common carrier, and 
 the law appl3dng to it is to be sought in the law of common 
 carriers of passengers. 
 
 i« Post, chap. 27. 
 
 "Clark V. Burns, 118 Mass. 275 (1875). 
 
 [27] 
 
§ 41.] Innkeepers. [Chap. IV. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 REGULATION AND LICENSE OF PUBLIC HOUSES. 
 
 41. Regulation of public houses 
 
 permitted. 
 
 42. Licenses. 
 
 43. Licenses usually granted by 
 
 local administrative body. 
 
 44. Corruption in granting or re- 
 
 fusing license criminal. 
 
 45. License board compelled to act 
 
 by mandamus. 
 
 46. Discretion of board cannot be 
 
 controlled. 
 
 47. Remedy for wrong exercise of 
 
 discretion. 
 
 48. Punishment for violation of the 
 
 license law. 
 
 §41. Regulation of public houses permitted. 
 
 The carrying on of any business may be regulated by the 
 State, so far as such regulation is an exercise of the pohce power. 
 The keeping of any house of entertainment as a matter of busi- 
 ness may therefore be regulated in such a way as to secure the 
 health and morals of the commimity.* So a sailors' boarding 
 house may be regulated by law. "The State, in its sovereign 
 capacity, as 'parens patriae, is charged with the duty of guarding 
 the interests of the community by protecting the lives, preserv- 
 ing the health and morals, and promoting the happiness of its 
 subjects; and, as a corollary thereto, any employment that 
 tends to subvert the obhgation thus imposed may be regulated 
 or prohibited by the Legislative Assembly. " ^ On the same 
 principle are justified the laws regulating places of pubUc amuse- 
 ment.^ 
 
 1 Commonwealth v. Muir, 38 Wkly. Notes Cas. (Pa.) 328 (1896). 
 
 2 Moore, C. J., in White v. Holman, 44 Or. 180, 74 Pac. 933 (1904). 
 sGreeneberg v. Western Turf Assoc, 140 Cal. 357, 73 Pac. 1050 (1903); 
 
 People v. King, 110 N. Y. 418, 18 N. E. 245, 6 Am. St. Rep. 389, 1 L. R. A. 
 293 (1888); Grannan v. Westchester Racing Assoc, 16 N. Y. App. Div. 8, 
 44 N. Y. Supp. 790 (1897). 
 [28] 
 
Chap. IV.] License of Public Houses. [§ 43. 
 
 In the case of an inn, an additional power of regulation exists 
 in the public nature of the innkeeper's employment. "It is a 
 matter of great public concernment that those who keep houses 
 of public entertainment should be fit and proper persons, that 
 the persons and property of travellers may be safe; that they 
 should be required to make suitable provision for their accom- 
 modation, and their rates be known and fixed. " * 
 
 Regulations of houses of public entertainment are therefore 
 common, and will be found collected and commented upon in 
 a later chapter. 
 
 The right to keep an inn was unrestricted at common law. 
 The right to maintain an inn has never been regarded as a fran- 
 chise, and neither king's patent nor act of Parliament could give 
 the subject more right to become an innkeeper than the law 
 already gave him.^ 
 
 §42. Licenses. 
 
 The power to regulate inns is frequently exercised by requir- 
 ing them to be licensed. This is a proper exercise of the power 
 of regtilation, and a license may be required by any body upon 
 which the power to make regulations has been conferred." 
 § 43. License usually granted by local administrative body. 
 
 The granting of licenses to imikeepers or other keepers of 
 
 i Ormond, J., in State v. Cloud, 6 Ala. 628, 630 (1844). 
 
 5 Rex V. Collins, Palmer, 367, 373, 2 RoUe, 345 (1623); Stephens v. Wat- 
 son, Salk. 45 (1701). An alehouse must be licensed by 5 & 6 Ed. 6, c. 25; 
 but "this statute extends not to inns, for they are for lodging of travellers; 
 but if an inn degenerate to an alehouse by suffering disorderly tippling, etc., 
 it shall be deemed as such. " Stephens v. Watson, supra. Two of the judges 
 in Rex v. Collins, supra, thought that "in ancient times a common innkeeper 
 should have common license in eyre, " and a license of the time of King John 
 was cited; but this was shown to have been a license hospitari terram, that 
 is, to farm out the land of a tenant in capita. 
 
 8 As a municipal corporation. RusseUviUe v. White, 41 Ark. 485 (1883). 
 In some States all inns must be licensed. Lord v. Jones, 24 Me. 439, 41 
 Am. Dec. 391 (1844); State v. Fletcher, 5 N. H. 257 (1830); State v. Stone, 
 6 Vt. 295 (1834). In others a license is necessary only if liquor is sold. 
 People v. Murphy, 5 Parker Cr. R. 130 (N. Y. 1861); McClure v. Krumb- 
 holz, 9 Pa. Dist. R. 544, 31 Pittsb. Leg. J. (N. S.) 3, 14 York Leg. Rec. 31 
 (Pa. 1900). 
 
 [29] 
 
§ 44.] Innkeepers. ^ [Chap. IV. 
 
 houses of public entertainment is usually confided to some local 
 administrative body, such as a county court or Hcensing board, 
 or the mayor or aldermen of a city. The act of such a board 
 is an administrative rather than a legislative act, and the power 
 to Ucense conferred upon it is therefore not an unconstitutional 
 delegation of power. Where an appeal lies from such a body 
 to a court, it is not a judicial but an administrative appeal, and 
 the court does no more than reexamine the evidence already 
 offered to see that the board used its discretion fairly.'' 
 
 § 44. Corruption in granting or refusing license criminal. 
 
 Such a body in granting or refusing a license is exercising a 
 public duty, and may be indicted if it acts corruptly; but it 
 cannot be called to account for an error committed hona fide. 
 Thus where a license had been erroneously granted to a person 
 to sell liquors at an inn, and the commissioners were indicted 
 for granting it, they were held not guilty of a crime, where the 
 evidence did not show actual corruption.* Allen, J., said: 
 
 "The duties devolved upon commissioners of excise by the 
 act . . . call for the exercise of discretion and judgment, 
 and are, to some extent, discretionary and judicial. The com- 
 missioners cannot be coerced in the exercise of their discretion, 
 by mandamus or otherwise, and for a mere mistake are not 
 hable either civilly or criminally. But for an unlawful and 
 corrupt exercise of the powers vested in them they are answer- 
 able criminally. They cannot willfully and knowingly violate 
 the law with impimity ; and while they are only responsible for 
 good faith and integrity, they cannot from corrupt motives 
 either grant or withhold a license improperly, and shield them- 
 selves imder the judicial character of their office. 
 
 "An indictment for willfully and corruptly granting a hcense 
 to a person to sell spirituous Uquors as an innkeeper, the com- 
 missioners knowing that the applicant was not a man of good 
 moral, character, nor a person of sufficient ability to keep a 
 
 'In re Stedman, 14 Phila. 376, 37 Leg. Int. 444 (Pa. 1880). 
 8 People V. Jones, 54 Barb. (N. Y.) 312 (1863). 
 [30] 
 
Chap. IV.] License of Public Houses. [§ 45. 
 
 tavern, was sustained, on demurrer, in The People v. Norton,' 
 and the reasoning of Judge Willard is entirely conclusive. . . . 
 The offence consists in the motive and intent with which the 
 act was done. The mere granting of a license which a court or 
 jury might say ought not to have been granted, is not an of- 
 fence; but the jury must be able to say, from the evidence, 
 that the commissioners, or such as are pronoimced guilty, knew, 
 at the time, that it was not a proper case for a license under 
 the statute, and nevertheless granted it in willful disregard of 
 the statute ; that is, that they knowingly and purposely disre- 
 garded the statute. If they acted in good faith, although er- 
 roneously, they cannot be punished. " 
 
 § 45. License board compelled to act by mandamus. 
 
 In consequence of its public duty to pass on licenses, a board 
 which refuses to act on licenses altogether may be compelled 
 to do so by mandamus.^" And it must act bona fide on the 
 question whether a certain applicant is entitled to a license or 
 not. It cannot prohibit a business under the guise of Ucensing 
 it. As Simpson, J., well said in City of Louisville v. Kean : " 
 
 "Taverns are necessary' for the convenience of the travelling 
 pubUc. They are authorized, and their privileges and duties 
 prescribed by the law. The county court is the tribimal under 
 the general law to decide on the propriety of their existence at 
 the places proposed, and also of the quaUfications of the apph- 
 cants. But this power is not unlimited and uncontrollable. 
 It must be exercised according to law; otherwise, it might be 
 so exercised as wholly to defeat the legislative intention in re- 
 gard to such houses, and to prevent their existence altogether. 
 
 "They have not the right of prohibition, but only the right 
 to decide how many taverns, having the privilege of selling 
 spirituous liquors, are required within the city for the public 
 
 8 7 Barb. (N. Y.) 477 (1849). The learned judge also cited to the same 
 effect, State v. McDonald, 4 Harr. (Del.) 555 (1847), and Russell on Crimes, 
 116. 
 
 10 City of Louisville v. Kean, 18 B. Men. (Ky.) 9 (1856). 
 
 11 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 9 (1856). 
 
 [31] 
 
§ 46.] Innkeepers. [Chap. IV. 
 
 accommodation and convenience, and whether the apphcants 
 have the proper legal qualifications to entitle them to a hcense. 
 The existence of such taverns is not only sanctioned but deemed 
 necessary by the general law, and the city authorities have no 
 power to prohibit their existence within the city. ... It 
 would be a willful abuse of discretion to refuse such a hcense 
 upon the ground that they intended to prohibit altogether the 
 sale of spirituous liquors by retail within the city, knowing at 
 the same time that they had not the legal power to do it, so far 
 as taverns were concerned. " 
 
 § 46. Discretion of board cannot be controlled. 
 
 A hcensing board has a discretion, however, in granting 
 Ucenses which ordinarily cannot be controlled, by writ of man- 
 damus or otherwise. ^^ In one case, however, it was suggested 
 that "a denial of an application for a hcense may be such as to 
 constitute an abuse of power, and be subject to review and cor- 
 rection by mandamus. " " But this suggestion must be con- 
 fined to cases where the board either refuses to act altogether 
 or so grossly abuses its discretion as to be clearly corrupt; or 
 perhaps where it acts imder a clear mistake of law. This is 
 doubtless the ground on which to rest a late case in Oregon, in 
 which the court allowed the writ though, under the circum- 
 stances, this amounted to a control over the court's discretion. 
 The petitioners had been refused by the board of commission- 
 ers a license to maintain a sailors' boarding house. Only one 
 such hcense was granted by the board; and the petitioners' 
 apphcation was refused, not because he was found an unsuit- 
 able person, but because the board deemed one such house 
 enough. The court having decided that the board could not 
 
 i'lnns: City of Louisville v. Kean, 18 B. Men. (Ky.) 9 (1856); State v. 
 Stone, 6 Vt. 295 (1834). Theatres: People ex relatione Cumisky v. Wurster, 
 14 N. Y. App. Div. 556, 43 N. Y. Supp. 1088 (1897); People ex relatione 
 Armstrong v. Murphy, 65 N. Y. App. Div. 123, 72 N. Y. Supp. 473 (1901); 
 People ex relatione Park Circle Amusement Co. v. Board of Police, 36 N. Y. 
 Misc. 89, 72 N. Y. Supp. 583 (1901). 
 
 13 People V. Wurster, 14 N. Y. App. Div. 556, 43 N. Y. Supp. 1088 (1897). 
 [32] 
 
Chap. IV.] License of Public Houses. [§ 48. 
 
 legally limit the number of such houses to one, granted a per- 
 emptory writ to compel the board to grant petitioners' license.*** 
 The court said that it was " possible that the petitioners are un- 
 worthy and incompetent, and therefore not entitled to a li- 
 cense ; " but since the record showed that the refusal was based 
 on the illegal desire of the board to monopoUze business, the 
 court affirmed the judgment for a peremptory writ to issue. 
 
 The fact that the discretion of different boards in various 
 parts of the State may be differently exercised^ and the statute 
 thus operate unequally in different parts of the State, is no 
 legal objection to the exercise of such discretion.** 
 
 § 47. Remedy for wrong exercise of discretion. 
 
 A remedy may be provided by statute in case a license is 
 wrongly refused ; *® but even if no remedy is provided, a person 
 who is refused a license, though the refusal was legally wrong, 
 cannot act without the license if a statute requires the license." 
 
 § 48. Punishment for violation of the license law. 
 
 For iUegaUy keeping an inn or other house of entertainment 
 without a license, or otherwise in violation of statutory regu- 
 lation, the ordinary method of ptmishment is by indictment." 
 The punishment may be inflicted as often as the offence is re- 
 peated.*^ It is no defence that the defendant on such an in- 
 dictment was ignorant of the fact that he had no license, ^^ or 
 that he carried on the business on account of an employer and 
 not for himself.^* 
 
 Where a license is required before carrying on the business of 
 innkeeper, one carrjong on such business without a license can- 
 
 " White V. Hohnan, 44 Or. 180, 74 Pac. 933 (1904). 
 
 16 Bancroft v. Dumas, 21 Vt. 456 (1849). 
 
 18 Sights V. YarnaUs, 12 Grat. (Va.) 292 (1855). 
 
 " State V. Stone, 6 Vt. 295 (1834). 
 
 18 State V. Cloud, 6 Ala. 628 (1844) ; State v. Fletcher, 5 N. H. 257 (1830). 
 
 le State v. Johnson, 65 Me. 362 (1876). 
 
 20 Commonwealth v. Keatley, 82 S. W. 232 (Ky. 1904). 
 
 21 Winter v. State, 30 Ala. 22 (1857). 
 
 3 [33] 
 
§ 48.] Innkeepers. [Chap. IV. 
 
 not sue for damage to such business,^^ or recover compensation 
 for board furnished,^^ or establish a lien on property of the 
 guest.^* 
 
 "When a license is required for the protection of the public, 
 and to prevent improper persons from engaging in a particular 
 business, and the license is not for revenue merely, a contract 
 made by an unUcensed person in violation of the act is void. " ^* 
 But failure to obtain a license will not protect the innkeeper 
 from the responsibihties of his occupation,^^ as, for instance, 
 from indictment for exacting more than the estabUshed rates.^'^ 
 
 22 Bonner v. Wellborn, 7 Ga. 296 (1849); Trimmer v. Hiscock, 27 Hun 
 (N. Y.), 31 (1882). The failure of the plaintiff to procure a license must, 
 however, be set up by the defendant, or he cannot take advantage of it. Ibid. 
 
 23 Randall v. TueU, 89 Me. 443, 36 Atl. 910 (1897). 
 
 24 Stanwood v. Woodward, 38 Me. 192 (1854). 
 
 25 Foster, J., in Randall v. TueU, supra. 
 
 28 Dickerson v. Rogers, 4 Humph. (Tenn.) 179, 40 Am. Dec. 642 (1843). 
 2' State V. Wynne, 1 Hawks (N. C), 451 (1821). 
 
 [34] 
 
Chap, v.] Pebsons in Public Employment. 
 
 [§51. 
 
 TITLE II. 
 
 THE PUBLIC DUTY OF INNKEEPERS. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 GENERAL PRINCIPLES REGULATING THE DUTY OF PERSONS IN 
 THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT. 
 
 51. The law of public employment. 
 62. The innkeeper is in a public 
 
 employment. 
 53. The duty to receive guests. 
 64. The duty to provide adequate 
 
 facilities. 
 
 § 55. The duty to refrain from dis- 
 crimination. 
 
 56. What amounts to unreason- 
 
 able discrimination. 
 
 57. The duty to make reasonable 
 
 charges. 
 
 58. The duty to receive strangers. 
 
 § 51. The law of public employments. 
 
 From the very beginning of our law it has been recognized 
 that some kinds of business were of special importance to the 
 public, and that all persons engaged in such business owed the 
 public certain duties. No one could be compelled to enter upon 
 the employment; but if he chose to do so, he thereby under- 
 took the performance of the pubUc duties connected with it. 
 The property which he devotes to the public emplojnnent is 
 "affected with a public interest" and ceases to be juris privati 
 only.^ "Property does become clothed with a public in- 
 terest when used in a manner to make it of pubhc consequence, 
 and affect the community at large. When, therefore, one de- 
 votes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, 
 he, in effect, grants to the pubhc an interest in that use, and 
 must submit to be controlled by the pubhc for the common 
 good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created. He 
 
 1 Lord Hale, De Portibus Maris, I Harg. Law Tracts, 78. 
 
 [35] 
 
§ 52.] Innkeepers. [Chap V. 
 
 may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use; but so long 
 as he maiatains the use he must submit to the control. " ^ 
 
 The duty placed upon one exercising a public calling is pri- 
 marily a duty to serve every man as a member of the pubUc. 
 This primary duty involves for its complete performance that 
 the service should be adequate, that only a reasonable price 
 should be charged for it, and that all members of the public 
 shoiild be served equally and without discrimination. 
 
 § 52. The innkeeper is in a public employment. 
 
 The innkeeper has from the earliest time been recognized as 
 engaged in a public employment, and therefore as subject to 
 the duty of one engaged in such an employment. "The person 
 who erects the sign, " the Court of King's Bench quaintly said 
 in the time of James the First, "charges himself to the common- 
 wealth." ^ If the innkeeper violates his public obligation he 
 must suffer for it; * " because he has made profession of a trade 
 which is for the pubUc good, and has thereby exposed and 
 vested an interest of himself in all the king's subjects that will 
 employ him in the way of his trade." ^ 
 
 The reason for holding that an innkeeper's calling is a public 
 one has already been explained ; " and it has been forcibly ex- 
 pressed elsewhere as follows: "When the weary traveller 
 reaches the wayside inn in the gathering dusk, if the host turn 
 him away what shall he do? Go on to the next inn? It is 
 miles away, and the roads are infested with robbers. The 
 traveller would be at the mercy of the innkeeper, who might 
 practise upon him any extortion, for the guest would submit 
 to anything almost, rather than be put out into the night. 
 
 2Waite, C. J., in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876). 
 
 3 Rex V. Collins, Palmer (Eng.), 373 (1623). Other reports of the same 
 case, Palmer, 367, 2 Rolle, 345, contain substantially the same language. 
 
 i Year Book,39 Hen. 6, 18, pi. 24 (1460), per Moile, J.; Year Book, 22 Ed. 
 4, 49, pi. 15 (1483); Year Book, 14 Hen. 7, 22, pi. 4 (1499); Anonymous, 
 Keilway, 50, pi. 4 (1503). 
 
 6 Holt, C. J., in Lane v. Cotton, 12 Mod. 472, 484 (1701). 
 
 «Ante, § 11. 
 
 [36] 
 
Chap, v.] Persons in Public Employment. [§ 55. 
 
 Truly a special law is required to meet this situation, for the 
 traveller is so in the hands of the innkeeper that only an affirm- 
 ative law can protect him. " ^ 
 
 § 53. The duty to receive guests. 
 
 The first public duty of the innkeeper, in which his calling 
 differs from the analogous calhngs of boarding and lodging- 
 house keepers, and the other callings examined in this volume, 
 is his duty to receive travellers as his guests. The duty will be 
 examined at length in a later chapter.* 
 
 § 54. The duty to provide adeijuate facilities, 
 
 Not only must the umkeeper be willing to receive travellers 
 as his guests, he must be prepared to shelter and entertain 
 them. An innkeeper without a roof to cover the heads of his 
 guests or without sufficient food to appease their hxmger would 
 be as little regardful of the pubhc obUgation under which he 
 acts as the innkeeper who refused admittance to his inn to the 
 weary traveller. It is apparent, therefore, that from the duty 
 to receive necessarily follows the duty to provide adequate 
 faciUties. Such facilities include an inn in proper repair, and 
 of sufficient size to supply the demand; sufficient stores of 
 wholesome food and comfortable furniture; and a sufficient 
 number of servants to perform the requirements of service 
 and protection to the guest. The innkeeper's duty in these 
 particulars will be considered at greater length in a later 
 chapterv?) 
 
 § 55. The duty to refrain from discrimination. 
 
 It is clear that the innkeeper can perform his duty to the 
 pubUc only by refraining from discrimination in his treatment 
 of guests. If he gives to one man better service in the line of 
 his business than to another, or serves him at a lower price, 
 he is to that extent fostering the interest of an individual 
 
 ' Professor Bruce Wyman in 17 Harvard Law Rev. 159. 
 8 Post, chapter 6. 
 " Post, chapter 14. 
 
 [37] 
 
§ 55.] Innkeepers. [Chap. V. 
 
 against that of the whole pubhc. Each traveller who applies 
 for admittance to an inn does so as a representative of the pub- 
 lic, into whose service the innkeeper has entered; and each per- 
 son equally represents that public, and is equally entitled to all 
 the service which the innkeeper owes. It is only when he steps 
 outside his pubhc calling and performs services not included in 
 the business of innkeeping that he is entitled to act from mo- 
 tives of private interest or friendship. "The public right is 
 a common right, and a common signifies a reasonably equal 
 right. . . . Equality, in the sense of freedom from imrea- 
 sonable discrimination, being of the very substance of the com- 
 mon right, an individual is deprived of his lawful enjoyment 
 of the common right when he is subjected to unreasonable and 
 injurious discrimination in respect to terms, faciUties, or ac- 
 commodations. . . . Whether unreasonableness of terms, 
 faciUties, or accommodations operates as a total or a partial 
 denial of the right, and whether the unreasonableness is in the 
 intrinsic, individual nature of the terms, facilities or accommo- 
 datiops, or in their discriminating, collective and comparative 
 character, the right denied is one and the same common right, 
 which would not be a right if it could be rightfully denied, and 
 would not be common, in the legal sense, if it could be legally 
 subjected to unreasonable discrimination, and parcelled out 
 among men in unreasonably superior and inferior grades at the 
 behest of the servant from whom the service is due. The com- 
 monness of the right necessarily imphes an equality of right, 
 in the sense of freedom from unreasonable discrimination. . . . 
 What kind of a common right of carriage would that be which 
 the carrier could so administer as to tmreasonably, capriciously, 
 and despotically enrich one man and ruin another?" *" "A 
 service for the public necessarily impUes equal treatment in its 
 performance, when the right to the service is common. Be- 
 cause the institution, so to speak, is public, every member of 
 the community stands on an equality as to the right to its ben- 
 efit, and therefore the carrier cannot discriminate between 
 10 Doe, J., in McDuffee v. Portland & R. R. R., 52 N. H. 430 (1873). 
 [38] 
 
Chap, v.] Persons in Public Employment. [§ 56. 
 
 individuals for whom he will render the service. In the very 
 nature, then, of his duty and of the pubUc right his conduct 
 should be equal and just to all. " ^^ 
 
 These vigorous opinions were delivered in cases where dis- 
 crimination by common carriers was in question; but the 
 same public duty which was the foundation of the obUgation 
 in these cases binds the innkeeper, and the language used is as 
 appUcable to the one employment as to the other. Innkeepers 
 too are forbidden to discriminate between guests; "as they 
 cannot refuse to receive guests, so neither can they impose un- 
 reasonable terms upon them. " ^^ ' 
 
 § 56. What amounts to unreasonable discrimination. 
 
 EquaUty of service does not mean identity of service; and 
 if one guest gets service that is reasonably and substantially 
 equivalent to that furnished to another guest, he cannot com- 
 plain. Some difference is of course necessary. If all the guest 
 chambers in an inn are properly equipped, no one can legally 
 complain because the room assigned to another has more taste- 
 ful furniture, or a more attractive outlook from the window; nor 
 can a guest object because he is not assigned to the same table 
 in the dining room as another, or because a particular servant 
 is assigned to another guest rather than to himself. (An inn 
 might doubtless consist of two separate buildings for guests; 
 and if each was properly equipped, no guest could complain 
 that he was assigned to one rather than to the other. WhUe, 
 therefore, an innkeeper could not legally discriminate between 
 guests of different classes or different races he might separate 
 them, putting each class or race into a separate but equally 
 well-equipped building.^^ 
 
 Even if there is discrimination, it may in some circumstances 
 be justified. A guest might for his own fault, in order to secure 
 
 n Bedle, J., in Messenger v. Pennsylvania R. R., 8 Vroom (N. J.), 531 
 (1874). 
 
 12 Lord Kenyon, C. J., in Kirkman v. Shawoross, 6 T. R. 14, 17 (1794). 
 
 "See Younger v. Judah, 111 Mo. 303, 19 S. W. 1109, 33 Am. St. Rep. 
 527 (1892); West Chester & P. R. R. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209 (1867). 
 
 [39] 
 
§ 56.] Innkeepers. [Chap. V. 
 
 the comfort or the safety of other guests, be obliged to be con- 
 tent with inferior accommodations. IV This principle is, ex- 
 pressed by Judge Doe with his usual clearness and vigor :^-? 
 
 "A certain inequahty of terms, facilities, or accommodations 
 may be reasonable, and required by the doctrine of reasonable- 
 ness, and therefore not an infringement of the common right. 
 It may be the duty of a common carrier of passengers to carry 
 under discriminating restrictions, or to refuse to carry those 
 who, by reason of their physical or mental condition, would in- 
 jure, endanger, disturb, or annoy other passengers; and an 
 analogous rule may be apphcable to the common carriage of 
 goods. Healthy passengers in a palatial car would not be pro- 
 vided with reasonable accommodations if they were there un- 
 reasonably and negligently exposed by the carrier to the society 
 of smallpox patients. Sober, quiet, moral, and sensitive trav- 
 ellers may have cause to complain of their accommodations if 
 they are imreasonably exposed to the companionship of imre- 
 strained, intoxicated, noisy, profane, and abusive passengers, 
 who may enjoy the discomfort they cast upon others. In one 
 sense, both classes, carried together, might be provided with 
 equal accommodations ; in another sense, they would not. The 
 feelings not corporal, and the decencies of progressive civiliza- 
 tion, as well as physical hfe, health, and comfort, are entitled 
 to reasonable accommodations. Mental and moral sensibUi- 
 ties, unreasonably wounded, may be an actual cause of suffer- 
 ing, as plain as a broken limb; and if the injury is caused by 
 unreasonableness of facilities or accommodations (which is syn- 
 onymous with unreasonableness of service), it may be as plain 
 a legal cause of action as any bodily hurt, commercial incon- 
 venience, or pecuniary loss. To allow one passenger to be 
 made uncomfortable by another committing an outrage, with- 
 out physical violence, against the ordinary proprieties of life 
 and the common sentiments of mankind, may be as clear a vio- 
 lation of the common right, and as clear an actionable neglect 
 
 " Pendergast v. Compton, 8 C. & P. (Eng.) 454 (1837). 
 16 In McDuffee v. Portland & R. R. R., 52 N. H. 430 (1873). 
 [40] 
 
Chap, v.] Persons in Public Employment. [§ 58. 
 
 of a common carrier's duty, as to permit one to occupy two 
 seats while another stands in the aisle. " 
 
 § 57. The duty to make reasonable charges. 
 
 Another rule clearly following from the general principle that 
 the innkeeper must receive all travellers as his guests is that he 
 is limited to a reasonable compensation for his services; for if 
 he could charge what he pleased, he could make anyone's right 
 to be received valueless by requiring the payment by way of 
 accommodation of a prohibitive amount. The question what 
 compensation the innkeeper is entitled to recover will be dis- 
 cussed in a subsequent chapter.^O 
 
 § 58. The duty to receive strangers. 
 
 Under some circumstances the innkeeper in the course of his 
 pubUc service may be obUged to admit to the inn persons who 
 are not and do not intend to become guests. The nature and 
 extent of this duty will be examined later!"' 
 
 16 Post, chapter 20. 
 
 17 Post, chapter 7. 
 
 [41] 
 
§ 62.] 
 
 Innkeepers. 
 
 [Chap. VI. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 DUTY TO RECEIVE GUESTS. 
 
 61. The innkeeper must receive all 
 
 who apply. 
 
 62. Duty owed to travellers only. 
 
 63. Who is a traveller. 
 
 64. Duty to receive persons inca- 
 
 pable of contracting. 
 
 65. Restriction of accommodation 
 
 to certain classes. 
 
 66. Reception may be demanded 
 
 at night. 
 
 § 67. Innkeeper must be notified of 
 traveller's desire to be re- 
 ceived. 
 
 68. Innkeeper's duty to receive 
 
 goods with the guest. 
 
 69. Tender of price of accommoda- 
 
 tion. 
 
 70. Remedy for refusal to receive. 
 
 71. End of obligation to receive. 
 
 § 61. The innkeeper must receive all who apply. 
 
 The fundamental duty of the innkeeper to the pubUc, as a 
 person engaged in a public employment/ is to receive for enter- 
 tainment in his inn all travellers who properly apply to be ad- 
 mitted as guests.^ This duty is not absolute, as will be seen; * 
 but, subject to the excuses later examined, it binds every keeper 
 of a common inn from the time he opens his doors to the public. 
 
 § 62. Duty owed to travellers only- 
 
 The inn is established for travellers, and it is such persons 
 only who are the necessary objects of the public sohcitude. 
 One who is not a traveller does not need the inn to protect him, 
 
 1 Ante, §§ 11, 51. 
 
 2 "Willis V. MoMahon, 89 Cal. 156, 26 Pac. 649 (1891); Kisten v. Hilde- 
 brand, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 72, 48 Am. Dec. 416 (1848); Markham v. Brown, 
 8 N. H. 523, 31 Am. Dec. 209 (1837); Adams v. Freeman, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 
 408, 7 Am. Dec. 827 (1815); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 2 Parsons (Pa.), 
 431, 1 Phila. 63 (1850); Rex v. Ivens, 7 Car. & P. (Eng.) 213 (1835); Haw- 
 thorne V. Hammond, 1 Car. & K. (Eng.) 404 (1844); Rex v. Collins, Palmer, 
 363, 373, 2 RoUe, 345 (Eng. 1623); Rex v. Smith, 65 J. P. 521 (Eng. 1901). 
 
 3 Post, chapter 8. 
 
 [42] 
 
Chap. VI.] Duty to Receive Guests. [§ 63. 
 
 for he can provide a home for that purpose. The pubhc duty 
 of the innkeeper is therefore owed to travellers only, and no 
 one who is not a traveller can demand to be received at an 
 inn.^ 
 
 Thus in the leading case on the law of innkeepers ® the court 
 said: "Common inns are instituted for passengers and way- 
 faring men; for the Latin word for an inn is diversoriwn, be- 
 cause he who lodges there is quasi divertens se a via; and so 
 diversoriolum. And therefore if a neighbor, who is no traveller, 
 as a friend, at the request of the innholder lodges there, and 
 his goods be stolen, etc., he shall not have an action; for the 
 writ is ad hospitandos homines, etc., transeuntes in eisdem hospi- 
 tantes. " And though the philology of the court may be ques- 
 tionable, its law is accurate. 
 
 §63- Who is a traveller. 
 
 A friend of the innkeeper who calls upon him socially is not 
 a traveller ; ® and it seems that in general one who hves in the 
 same town will not be a traveller. In an old case it was said 
 that if an innkeeper invites one to supper, and the night being 
 far spent he invites him to stay all night, such a guest is no 
 traveller.'' 
 
 But it is entirely possible for an inhabitant of the town to 
 be a traveller when he comes to the um; and the tendency of 
 the modern cases is to be very liberal in regarding one who de- 
 sires the services of the innkeeper as a traveller, in spite of his 
 residence in the same town. Certainly a man to be a traveller 
 does not need to be at the time engaged in a long or merely 
 occasional jom-ney.* Where, for instance, a man on his way 
 from his city office to his suburban home, stopped at an inn 
 
 4 Rex V. Luellin, 12 Mod. 445 (1700); Curtis v. Murphy, 63 Wis. 4, 22 
 N. W. 825 (1885). 
 
 sCalye's Case, 8 Coke, 63 (1584). 
 
 oSouthcote V. Stanley, 1 H. & N. (Eng.) 247 (1856). 
 
 'Carr's Case, 1 Roll. Abr. 3, pi. 4 (1583). 
 
 8 Atkinson v. Sellers, 5 C. B. N. S. (Eng.) 442 (1858). 
 
 [43] 
 
§ 64.] Innkeepers. [Chap. VI. 
 
 to get dinner he was held to be a traveller.^ In that case Mr. 
 Justice Kennedy said: 
 
 "Any person who was neither an inhabitant of the house nor 
 a private guest of the innkeeper or his family, but who came 
 into the house as a guest to get such accommodation as is af- 
 forded and he was willing to pay for, was a traveller. It does 
 not seem to me to make any difference whether his journey be 
 a long or a short one. " 
 
 And in a leading case in Connecticut the court said : 
 
 "A townsman or neighbor may be a traveller and therefore 
 a guest at an inn as well as he who comes from a distance, or 
 from a foreign country. If he resides at the inn, his relation to 
 the innkeeper is that of a boarder; but if he resides away from 
 it, whether far or near, and comes to it for entertainment as a 
 traveller and receives it as such, paying the customary rates, 
 we know of no reason why he should not be subjected to aU the 
 duties of a guest, and entitled to all the rights and privileges 
 of one. In short, anyone away from home, receiving accom- 
 modations at an inn as a traveller, is a guest." ^° 
 
 A man who takes a walk and just before reaching home goes 
 into an inn to get a drink is not a traveller, and cannot demand 
 the accommodation he seeks; " but if in the course of a long 
 walk for pleasure he stops on his way for refreshment at an inn, 
 he is entitled to be entertained; if he' is bona fide in the course 
 of travelling from one place to another he is none the less a 
 traveller because the purpose of his journey is merely pleasure.^^ 
 
 § 64. Duty to receive persons incapable of contracting. 
 
 The innkeeper's obligation to receive is not confined to the 
 reception of guests with whom he can make a binding contract. 
 A. married woman or] an infant requires the services of an inn- 
 keeper during a journey as much as another, and the interest 
 
 » Orchard v. Bush [1898], 2 Q. B. (Eng.) 284, 289. 
 loWaUing v. Potter, 35 Conn. 183 (1868). 
 
 11 Murphy v. Innes, 11 So. Australia, 56 (1877). 
 
 12 Taylor v. Humphreys, 30 L. J. M. C. 242 (Eng. 1861). 
 
 [44] 
 
Chap. VI.] Duty to Receive Guests. [§ 65. 
 
 of the public is just as fully involved in Itheic comfort and pro- 
 tection. A married woman oHan infauMiay therefore demand 
 admittance to an inn.^^ This has been laid down, to be sure, 
 with the proviso that the innkeeper does not know that the in- 
 fant's guardian objects to the infant becomiag a guest;® but 
 this proviso must be confined to a case where the guardian is 
 himself present or at least has made other sufficient provision 
 for the infant; for it is clear that the umkeeper must not leave 
 the infant to starve id the street, even if the guardian objects 
 to his being received. 
 
 A charge of Lord Abinger to a jury in the case of Proctor 
 V. Nicholson ^^ looks at first sight as if the innkeeper need not 
 receive a person incapable of contracting; he said, "the land- 
 lord of an inn may supply whatever things the guest orders, 
 and the guest is bound to pay for them, provided that the guest 
 be possessed of his reason, and is not an infant. In either of 
 these latter cases the landlord must look to himself. " But the 
 meaning appears to be that the landlord in such a case must 
 take care that the articles supplied are necessaries, as otherwise 
 he cannot recover. The passage does not really signify that 
 the landlord may refuse to receive an infant as guest. 
 
 §65- Restriction of accommodation to certain classes. 
 
 It is imcertain on the authorities how far an innkeeper may 
 consent to receive only a certain class of guests. It is no doubt 
 competent for an innkeeper to fix the character of his entertain- 
 ment so high that his reasonable charges will shut out all but 
 wealthy or well-to-do patrons. "He does not absolutely en- 
 gage to receive every person who comes to his house, but only 
 such as are capable of pajong a compensation suitable to the 
 accommodation provided." ^® 
 
 If, however, a person appUes for such accommodation and is 
 
 13 Watson V. Cross, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 147 (1865). 
 " Ibid. 
 
 16 7 Car. & P. (Eng.) 67, 69 (1835). 
 
 10 Abbott, C. J., in Thompson v. Lacy, 3 B. & Aid. 283, 285 (1820). 
 
 [45] 
 
§ 67.] Innkeepers. [Chap. VI. 
 
 prepared to pay the price demanded, the innkeeper could 
 hardly refuse to receive the guest on the ground that he was a 
 poor man, and ought not to afford such an entertainment. Nor 
 it would seem could he justify a refusal to receive a guest on 
 the ground that he belongs to an unpopular race or profession. 
 It is said, to be sure, in State v. Steele," that a person who 
 would be obnoxious to all the other guests might be excluded, 
 and this opinion would justify the exclusion of a person because 
 he belonged to an tmpopular race or was of a despised color. 
 It is not likely, however, that the law would permit an inn- 
 keeper to tender his house for the use only of members of a cer- 
 tain race, or to persons of a certain color; yet in Johnson v. 
 Midland Railway^* Baron Parke said: "A man may keep 
 an inn for those persons only who come in their own car- 
 riages. " This doctrine is a very doubtful one; but it is doubt- 
 less competent for an innkeeper to entertain guests of different 
 classes in different rooms or reqioire them to eat at separate 
 tables, provided each gets reasonable accommodations.^* 
 
 § 66. Eeception may be demanded at night. 
 
 While it is clear that an inn may be closed at reasonable hours 
 during the night, ^^ it seems also clear that a traveller actually 
 reaching the inn while it is closed may wake the innkeeper and 
 demand admittance. This was rightly assumed to be the law 
 by Baron Parke in an EngUsh case.^^ 
 
 § 67. Innkeeper must be notified of traveller's desire to be received. 
 The burden appears to be on the applicant to give notice to 
 the innkeeper that he desires to be received as a guest. Thus 
 where a person was travelling at night, and came to an inn after 
 it was shut up for the night, and knocked, it was held that the 
 
 " 106 N. C. 766, 11 S. E. 478, 19 Am. St. Rep. 573, 8 L. R. A. 516 (1890). 
 18 4 Exch. (Eng.) 367, 371 (1849). 
 w Post, § 167. 
 
 20 Commonwealth v. Wetherbee, 101 Mass. 214 (1869). 
 
 21 Hawthorne v. Hammond, 1 C. & K. (Eng.) 404 (1844); Ace. Rex v. 
 Ivens, 7 Car. & P. (Eng.) 213 (1835). 
 
 [46] 
 
Chap. VI.] Duty to Receive Guests. [§ 68. 
 
 innkeeper must, in order to be liable for not admitting the 
 guest, have heard the knocking, and in addition must reason- 
 ably have concluded that the person was a bona fide guest. 
 Parke, B., said, in charging the jury: 
 
 "There is no doubt that the law is, that a person who keeps 
 a public inn is boimd to admit all persons who apply peaceably 
 to be admitted as guests. You will therefore have to say 
 . whether you are satisfied that the noise made by the plaintiff's 
 brother was really heard by the defendant; and if so, whether 
 you think that she ought to have concluded from it that the 
 persons so knocking at the door were persons requiring to be 
 admitted as guests, or whether she might have concluded that 
 they were drunken persons, who had come there to make a 
 disturbance. You wiU take the case into your consideration, 
 and find, by your verdict, whether you think that the noise 
 made at the door implied that the persons who made it wanted 
 to be admitted as guests or not. " ^^ 
 
 § 68. Innkeeper's duty to receive goods with the gnest. 
 
 An innkeeper must certainly receive with the guest all goods 
 which could. properly be called baggage; but it would seem that 
 his obligation goes further, and that he must receive all that 
 the guest brings with him to the iim, provided it is not dan- 
 gerous or a nuisance. In Br oadwood v. G ranara.^^ Baron Parke 
 said: "An innkeeper has a lien on such goods only as he is 
 compelled to receive with his guest. Could he be indicted for 
 not receiving a pianoforte? It might be a nuisance to persons 
 in his house. " This expression is probably too large. An inn- 
 keeper could not base his refusal on the fact that the goods 
 might become a nuisance, if he had power by regulation to pre- 
 vent such use as would be harmful ; and it is submitted that in 
 the unusual case whqre a person travels with a piano he should 
 ybe permitted to bring it with him to the inn (unless it is so heavy 
 
 22 Hawthorne v. Hammoni 1 C. & K. (Eng.) 404 (1844). 
 ,23 10 Exclf. <Eng.) 417,(420, 24 L. J. Ex. 1, 1 Jur. N. S. 19, 3 W. R. 25, 
 sb. L. R. 177 j[l854)_^ ^ 
 
 [47] 
 
§ 68.] Innkeepers. [Chap. VI. 
 
 or unwieldy that the innkeeper with his reasonable supply of 
 servants cannot handle it) ; while of course the innkeeper may, 
 by regulation, provide that it shall not be used at unreasonable 
 hours. In the later case of Robins v. Gray,^* a guest was 
 thought to be entitled to bring with him a sewing machine ; and 
 Lord Esher, M. R., said: "If a traveller comes to an inn with 
 goods which are his luggage — I do not say his personal luggage, 
 but his luggage — the innkeeper, by the law of the land, is bound 
 to take him and his luggage in. The innkeeper cannot dis- 
 criminate and say that he will take in the traveller but not his 
 luggage. If the traveller brought something exceptional which 
 is not luggage — such as a tiger or a package of d3Tiamite — the 
 innkeeper might refuse to take it in; but the custom of the 
 reahn is that, unless there is some reason to the contrary in the 
 exceptional character of the things brought, he must take in 
 the traveller and his goods." 
 
 Whether an animal which is not dangerous, Uke a dog, could 
 be refused on the ground that there are no faciUties at the inn 
 to prevent the dog from becoming a nuisance to the guests is 
 more doubtful. It could not be restrained from annoyance by 
 a regulation, hke a piano ; and on the whole it would seem that 
 unless the inn has, or, considering the nature of its business, 
 ought to have, pecuUar facilities for caring for animal pets they 
 may be excluded from the inn and placed in the stable.^^ 
 
 In order to demand admittance for the goods he brings the 
 guest is not boimd to prove them his own. A guest may come 
 to an inn with the goods of another, and the ownership of the 
 goods is no business of the innkeeper. "He has not to inquire 
 whether the goods are the property of the person who brings 
 them or of some other person. If he does so inquire, the trav- 
 eller may refuse to tell him, and may say, 'What business is 
 that of yours? I bring the goods here as my luggage, and I in- 
 sist upon your taking them in ; ' or he may say, ' They are not 
 my property, but I bring them here as my luggage, and I insist 
 
 2* [1895] 2Q. B. 501. 
 25 See post § 96. 
 [48] 
 
Chap. VI.] Duty to Receive Guests. [§ 71. 
 
 upon your taking them m;' and then the innkeeper is bound 
 by law to take them in. " ^* The innkeeper may undoubtedly 
 refuse to receive goods known to him to be stolen when they 
 are broiight to the inn by the thief; but in the ordinary case 
 he need not and cannot investigate the question of title. 
 
 § 69. Tender of price of accommodation. 
 
 The innkeeper is not bound to receive the guest until the 
 price of the accommodation is tendered.^^ But the necessity 
 of tender may be, and usually is, waived in practice. Thus, if 
 the inn is open and the traveller enters it and makes his desire 
 to become a guest known to the innkeeper, the latter must 
 request a tender if he means to insist upon it as a condition of 
 receiving a guest; while if the inn is closed, or access to it is 
 refused to the traveller, he is injured by refusal to receive him 
 before the time has come for him to make a tender.^* 
 
 § 70. Bemedy for refusal to receive. 
 
 An innkeeper is indictable for illegal refusal to receive a 
 guest; ^^ or the party wrongly refused accommodation may 
 bring an action on the case to recover damages for the refusal.'" 
 
 § 71. End of obligation to receive. 
 
 The innkeeper may put an end to his duty to receive guests 
 by going out of the business of innkeeping.'^ He is not obUged 
 to continue in the business merely because he has once under- 
 taken it.'^ But his giving up the business must be bona fide; 
 
 28 Lord Esher, M. R., in Robins v. Gray [1895], 2 Q. B. 501. 
 
 27 FeU V. Knight, 8 M. & W. 269, 10 L. J. Ex. 277, 5 Jur. 554 (Eng. 1841); 
 Pinohon's Case, 9 Colce, 87 (1611). 
 
 28 Fell V. Knight, supra. 
 
 29Kisten v. Hildebrand, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 72, 48 Am. Dec. 416 (1848); 
 Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 2 Parsons (Pa.), 431, 1 Phila. 63 (1850); Rex v. 
 Ivens, 7 Car. & P. (Eng.) 213 (1835). 
 
 30 Anonymous, Godbolt (Eng.), 345, pi. 440 (1623); Rex v. Collins, Pal- 
 mer (Eng.), 373 (1623); CorneU v. Huber, 102 N. Y. App. Div. 293, 92 
 N. Y. Supp. 434 (1905); Whiting v. Mills, 7 Up. Can. Q. B. 450 (1849). 
 
 3t Anonymous, Godbolt, 345, pi. 440 (1623); Rex v. Collins, Palmer, 373 
 (1623). 
 
 32 Conklin v. Prospect Park Hotel Co., 1 N. Y. Supp. 406 (1888). 
 4 * [ 49 ] 
 
§ 71.] Innkeepers. [Chap. VI. 
 
 if he merely pretends to give up the business, whUe really con- 
 tinuing to receive guests, he will remaia hable.^^ "If an inn- 
 keeper taketh down his sign, and yet keepeth an hosterie, an 
 action upon the case will he against him, if he do deny lodging 
 unto a traveller for his money. " ^* 
 
 33 Rex V. CoUins, Palmer, 373 (1623). 
 
 3* Anonymous, Godbolt, 345, pi. 440 (1623). 
 
 [50 
 
Chap. VII.] Duty to Persons not Guests. 
 
 [§82. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE DUTY OF AN INNKEEPER TO PERSONS WHO ARE NOT GUESTS. 
 
 i 81. Innkeeper's responsibility to 
 third persons for acts of 
 guests. 
 
 82. Duty to admit strangers not 
 
 seeking entertainment. 
 
 83. Stranger coming to inn for con- 
 
 venience of guest. 
 
 84. Stranger coifiing for a social 
 
 call on guest. 
 
 85. Stranger coming by appoint- 
 
 ment to do business with 
 guest. 
 
 § 86. Stranger coming to solicit pat- 
 ronage. 
 
 87. Discrimination between car- 
 
 riers coming to solicit patron- 
 age. 
 
 88. Right of stranger forfeited by 
 
 misconduct. 
 
 89. Stranger entering to make in- 
 
 quiry. 
 
 § 81. Innkeeper's responsibility to third persons for acts of guests. 
 The innkeeper is not a guarantor of his guests' solvency or 
 honesty in their dealings with third persons. He cannot be 
 held responsible, for instance, for a bill incurred by the guest 
 for washing his linen. ' Such responsibiUty may, however, be 
 imposed upon the innkeeper by statute. Thus under a statute 
 by which the occupier of any house where a dog is permitted 
 to live is regarded as the owner, the innkeeper is Uable for in- 
 juries caused by a guest's dog which the guest had kept at the 
 inn.^ 
 
 § 82. Duty to admit strangers not seeking entertainment. 
 
 One who is not a guest or intending immediately to become 
 a guest, has, generally speaking, no right to enter or remain ia 
 the inn against the objection of the innkeeper.^ There are, to 
 be sure, in every inn, "public rooms, " so called, and persons not 
 
 1 Callard v. White, 1 Stark. 171 (Eng. 1816). 
 
 2 Gardner v. Hart, 44 W. R. 527 (Eng. 1896). 
 
 3 State V. Whitby, 5 Harr. (Del.) 494 (1854). 
 
 [51] 
 
§ 83.] Innkeepeks. [Chap. VII. 
 
 guests are often in the habit of resorting to such rooms; but 
 they are admitted to them only by the consent of the innkeeper. 
 If that consent is withdrawn, one who is not a guest has no 
 more right to enter a public room in an inn than he has ,to enter 
 the private room of a guest. " Barring the Umitation imposed 
 by holding out inducements to the public to seek acconmioda- 
 tion at his inn, the proprietor occupies it as his dwelling house, 
 from which he may expel all who have not acquired rights, 
 growing out of the relation of guest. " ^ 
 
 The same idea was vigorously expressed by Judge Parsons, 
 in Commonwealth v. Mitchell: ^ "If it should be held, as was 
 contended on the argument, that because a man keeps a public 
 house all who choose have a right to enter and occupy the hall 
 or bar-room, or even the pubHc parlor in the hotel, and that 
 the proprietor has not a right to request them to leave, and if 
 they do not, and he gently lays his hands on one to lead him 
 out, he is guilty of an assault and battery, but few persons 
 would be found as lodgers in pubUc houses. For where is the 
 distinction to be drawn? If one may enter the inn and tarry 
 there, all may. The pickpocket, the burglar, gambler and 
 horse thief, can come and take his seat by the side of the most 
 virtuous man in the commimity in the gentleman's common 
 parlor at the hotel, and the proprietor cannot eject him (no 
 matter how annoying it may be to the guest) without being 
 indicted for an assault and battery. Nor would the line of 
 distinction be drawn here — the filthy and unclean would claim 
 the same right. It is only necessary to state such a proposi- 
 tion to show its absurdity. " 
 
 § 83. Stranger coining to inn for convenience of guest. 
 
 While the general principle just stated is imquestioned, there 
 are certain cases in which a stranger may desire to enter the 
 inn, not merely for his own pleasure or business, but because 
 
 4 Avery, J., in State v. Steele, 106 N. C. 766, 11 S. E. 478, 19 Am. St. Rep. 
 573, 8 L. R. A. 516 (1890). 
 s 2 Parsons (Pa.), 431, 1 Phila. 63 (1850). 
 [52] 
 
Chap. VII.] Duty to Persons not Guests. [§ 85. 
 
 the convenience of a guest of the inn calls him there. While 
 no right to enter the inn can be based on his own claim, he can 
 imder certain circumstances claim to be exercising a right of 
 the guest. Where such is the case it would seem that his right 
 to admittance is as clear as the right of a guest. It must be 
 borne in mind, however, that in order to show a right of ad- 
 mittance he must base his claim on a right of the guest whom 
 he comes to see. 
 
 Even in such a case there is some authority for saying that 
 he cannot legally enter the inn against the objection of the inn- 
 keeper. Judge Parsons, in Commonwealth v. Mitchell,^was 
 of opinion that a person desiring to call upon a guest, even if 
 he had been sent for by the guest, could not legally resist ex- 
 clusion by the innkeeper, and that the innkeeper might use 
 any force that was necessary to exclude him without being 
 Uable to an action for assault and battery, though he might be 
 liable to an action on the case for refusal. This opinion, how- 
 ever, is probably incorrect. If, either in his own right or the 
 right of a guest, the party is permitted by the law to enter the 
 inn, the innkeeper can probably not justify the use of force to 
 exclude him. 
 
 § 84. Stranger coming for a social call on guest. 
 
 Though there is no direct authority in favor of such a right, 
 it seems that a stranger coming to make a social call upon the 
 guest at the guest's request would have a right to be admitted 
 for that purpose. Any other rule would deprive the guest of 
 one privilege necessary for his comfort while at the inn. If, 
 however, the guest has not previously requested the stranger 
 to call, it seems clear that the stranger cannot object if he is 
 denied admittance to the inn and the guest is not informed of 
 his presence.'' 
 
 § 85. Stranger coming by appointment to do business with guest. 
 In the ordinary case it is tolerably clear that a stranger who 
 
 « 2 Parsons (Pa.), 431, 1 Phila. 63 (1850). 
 
 'Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 2 Parsons (Pa.) 43, 10 Phila. 63 (1850). 
 
 [53] 
 
§ 85.] Innkeepers. [Chap. VII. 
 
 comes by appointment to do business with a guest has a right 
 to be admitted. " It is conceded, " said Parker, J., in Markham 
 V. Brown,* "that he may be bound to permit the entry of per- 
 sons who have been sent for by the guest. " And" even those 
 courts which are most reluctant to permit the entrance of a 
 stranger, do in fact, concede the right to such persons. To be 
 sure, if the visitor after his entrance misconducts himself he 
 may be excluded. As Judge Avery said in State v. Steele: ^ 
 
 "If it be conceded that the prosecutor went into the hotel at 
 the request of a guest, and for the purpose of conferring with 
 the latter on business, still, in any view of the case, if, after 
 entering, he engaged in ' drumming ' for his employer when he 
 had been previously notified to desist in obedience to a regula- 
 tion of the house, the defendant had a right to expel him if he 
 did not use more force than was necessary. . . . The guest, 
 by sending for a hackman, could not delegate to him the right 
 to do an act for which even the guest himself might lawfully 
 be put out of the hotel." 
 
 And Judge Parsons said forcibly in Commonwealth v. Mitch- 
 ell : ^^ " Can it be said that . . . the proprietor is bound to 
 let every felon in the city enter his house, find access to his 
 chambers, to visit a guest who happens to lodge there, and who 
 has thus sought the lodging to enable his associates in crime to 
 enter the house for the purpose of robbing the other guests, or 
 stealing the valuables from the hotel ? Such a thing could not 
 be tolerated." 
 
 As to the general right of the guest to have a proper person 
 visit him at the inn on business, the same learned justice in the 
 same case appears to recognize it, while qualifying it by his 
 doctrine, already stated, that the innkeeper might lawfully use 
 force to keep the visitor from making use of this right. ' ' When 
 a guest has been admitted to a hotel and has taken a room, if 
 any one calls to see him upon business, fair dealing would seem 
 
 8 8 N. H. 623, 31 Am. Dec. 209 (1837). 
 
 9 106 N. C. 766, 11 S. E. 478, 19 Am. St. Rep. 573, 8 L. R. A. 516 (1890). 
 10 2 Parsons (Pa.), 431, 1 Phila. 63 (1850). 
 
 [54] 
 
Chap. VII.] Duty to Persons not Guests. [§ 86. 
 
 to require that the proprietor should communicate the intelli- 
 gence to the guest, and if he consented to see the visitor, let 
 him enter. But this, I apprehend, would be more by courtesy 
 than a sheer claim of right. And if the proprietor of the house 
 should refuse to suffer the visitor to come in, or if he had en- 
 tered should request him to depart, and on his refusal, gently 
 lead him out, I am not prepared to say he would be guilty of 
 an assault and battery for so doing. That the proprietor would 
 be liable to an action, both to the guest and the visitor for any 
 injury either might sustain in consequence thereof, I have no 
 doubt. And probably might be Uable to an indictment upon 
 the same principle he would be for refusing to entertain a trav- 
 eller when he had room. But because one should allege he had 
 business with a guest, and the guest desire to see a visitor that 
 was obnoxious to the keeper of the house, and therefore any 
 one can enter the hotel on such a pretext and stay as long as he 
 pleases without the proprietor possessing the power to remove 
 him, is a principle which cannot be sanctioned on any clear 
 legal ground. The guest is but an occupier of his lodgings at 
 the will or sufferance of the proprietor, and necessity requires 
 that he who has charge of that house should determine whether 
 visitors who may desire to call upon a lodger are proper persons 
 to be admitted within his chambers; otherwise, under such a 
 pretext, thieves and robbers might gain admittance and rob 
 his other guests of much that is valuable. Any different rule 
 would expose every hotel keeper to an imminent risk. " 
 
 § 86- Stranger coming to solicit patronage. 
 
 ~7^ Where a stranger seeks admittance to an inn for the purpose 
 of soliciting the patronage of guests, he may clearly be excluded 
 from the inn. Indeed, as is pointed out in the case of State v. 
 Steele,** it may under some circumstances be the innkeeper's 
 duty to exclude such persons, for he is bound to protect the 
 guest against troublesome tradesmen. The innkeeper is cer- 
 tainly under no obhgation to furnish his inn as a free place of 
 
 " 106 N. C. 766, 11 S. E. 478, 19 Am. St. Rep. 573, 8 L. R. A. 516 (1890). 
 
 [55] 
 
§ 86.] Innkeepers. [Chap. VII. 
 
 business for all tradesmen who wish to use it for that purpose. 
 If the privilege of carrying on business in the inn is a valuable 
 one, there is no reason why the innkeeper should not secure for 
 himself that benefit. Accordingly the innkeeper may either 
 conduct himself, or make an exclusive contract with another to 
 conduct a barber shop, news stand, or other business in the inn. 
 V"An innkeeper has unquestionably the right to establish a 
 news stand or a barber shop in his hotel, and to exclude persons 
 who come for the purpose of vending newspapers or books, or 
 of sohciting employment as barbers; and, in order to render 
 his business more lucrative, he may establish a laundry or a 
 Hvery stable in connection with his hotel, or contract with the 
 proprietor of a livery stable in the vicinity to secure for the 
 latter, as far as he legitimately can, the patronage of his guests 
 in that line for a per centum of the proceeds or profits derived 
 by such owner of vehicles and horses from dealing with the pa- 
 trons of the public house. After concluding such a contract, 
 the innkeeper may make, and after personal notice to violators, 
 enforce, a rule excluding from his hotel the agents and repre- 
 sentatives of other livery stables who enter to soHcit the pat- 
 ronage of his guests; and where one has persisted in visiting 
 the hotel for that purpose, after notice to desist, the proprietor 
 may use sufficient force to expel him if he refuse to leave when 
 requested, and may eject him, even though on a particular oc- 
 casion he may have entered for a lawful purpose, if he does not 
 disclose his true intent when requested to leave, or whatever 
 may have been his purpose in entering, if he in fact has engaged 
 in sohciting the patronage of the guests. . . . The propri- 
 etors of the pubhc house might legitimately share in the profits 
 of any such incidental business, as furnishing carriages, buggies, 
 or horses to the patrons, and for that purpose had as full right 
 to close their house against one who attempted to injure the 
 business in which they had such interest as the owner of a pri- 
 vate house would have had, and this view of the case is consis- 
 tent with the doctrine enunciated in Markham v. Brown. " ^^j 
 12 Avery, J., in State v. Steele, supra. 
 
 [56] 
 
Chap. Vn.] Duty to Pebsons not Guests. [§ 87. 
 
 § 87. Discrimination between carriers coming to solicit patronage. 
 
 There is, however, one case in which the right of the innkeeper 
 to exploit the privilege of using the inn for his own benefit may, 
 it seems, be limited. In any business not connected with travel 
 he may do as he pleases and the guest has no right to complain; 
 but as the inn is estabHshed for the comfort and safety of trav- 
 ellers, and the innkeeper is under a public duty to secure that 
 comfort and safety, he owes a fiduciary protection towards his 
 guest in all that concerns travelling, and he is, therefore, not 
 permitted to do anything which might bring his own private 
 interests into competition with the interest of his guest in any 
 matter that is connected with the guest's journey. The de- 
 parture from the inn, in continuation of the guest's journey, is, 
 therefore, a matter in which the innkeeper must act solely for 
 the benefit of the guest, and cannot permit his own Interest in 
 any way to come into competition with the guest's interest. 
 Any arrangement, therefore, by which he permits one carrier 
 to enter the inn and soUcit the patronage of the guest, in con- 
 nection with his departure, and refuses to permit other com- 
 peting carriers to do the same, is not permitted to him; for 
 the guest, finding his patronage solicited by a carrier, will nat- 
 urally conclude that he must deal with that carrier if he is to 
 get away from the inn, and even if he knows that there is an- 
 other competing carrier he will be xmder an inducement to deal 
 with the first carrier owing to the greater convenience of so 
 doing. This advantage extended by the innkeeper to one car- 
 rier over another will enable the favored carrier to obtain a 
 larger compensation for his services from the guest than he 
 could get if the competition were equal, and this is detrimental 
 to the interest of the guest. It is true that the favored carrier 
 is obliged to carry the guest at a reasonable rate, but that rea- 
 sonable rate is not a rate that is rigidly fixed ; and a rate con- 
 siderably higher than a competitive rate may nevertheless be 
 reasonable. If, as may usually be the case, the carrier is obUged 
 to pay the innkeeper a certain sum for his privilege, he will be 
 entitled to have the amount so paid included in the rate he 
 
 [57] 
 
§ 87.] Innkeepers. [Chap. VII. 
 
 may charge, since it seems a part of his legitimate expenses. 
 Since, therefore, the innkeeper in giving the exclusive privilege 
 of soliciting patronage to one carrier is acting to the detriment 
 of his guest in a matter which concerns the continuation of his 
 journey, the innkeeper's action is illegal, and the competing 
 carrier has a right to demand admittance for the purpose of 
 soliciting the patronage of the guests. This right it will be 
 noticed is based upon the right of the guest not to be subjected 
 to a monopoly, and the carrier, therefore, will have no right to 
 demand admittance if aU carriers are equally excluded from 
 the inn. 
 
 The leading case on this point is Markham v. Brown," in 
 which it was held that an innkeeper who admitted to his inn 
 the representative of one line of stage coaches which passed 
 through the town could not lawfully exclude the representa- 
 tive of another competing Hne. \ In his opinion Parker, J., 
 said : i'^ 
 
 "As he is bound to admit travellers, under certain limitations, 
 he may Ukewise be held, under proper limitations, to admit 
 those who have business with them as such. This may be con- 
 sidered as derived from the right of the traveller. It is con- 
 ceded that he may be bound to permit the entry of persons who 
 have been sent for by the guest. But we think the rule is not 
 to be limited, in all cases, to this. There may be such connec- 
 tion between travellers and those engaged in their conveyance^ 
 that the latter, although not specially sent for, may have a 
 right to enter a common inn; or such that the landlord, if he 
 give a general hcense to some of those whose business is con- 
 nected with his guests, in their characters as travellers, cannot 
 lawfully exclude others, pursuing the same business, and who 
 enter for a similar object. 
 
 "There seems to be no good reason why the landlord should 
 
 have the power to discriminate in such cases, and to say that 
 
 one shall be admitted and another excluded, so long as each has 
 
 the same connection with his guests — the same lawful purpose 
 
 13 8 N. H. 523, 31 Am. Dec. 209 (1837). 
 
 [58] 
 
Chap. VII.] Duty to Persons not Guests. [§ 87. 
 
 — comes in a like suitable condition, and with as proper a de- 
 meanor; any more than he has the right to admit one traveller 
 and exclude another, merely because it is his pleasure. 
 
 "If one comes to injure his house, or if his business operates 
 directly as an injury, that may alter the case — but that has not 
 been alleged here. And perhaps' there may be cases in which 
 he may have a right to exclude all but travellers and those who 
 have been sent for by them. It is not necessary to settle that 
 at this time. 
 
 "In the present case it appeared that stage coaches brought 
 their passengers to the plaintiff's inn from various quarters, and 
 carried them away in different directions. It is understood 
 that Hanover was not a place where the lines of stages or con- 
 veyances terminated, and where passengers were left to seek 
 their own conveyance onward, as is often the case in the larger 
 cities; but that the line of stages extended through the place 
 in such manner that travellers might reasonably expect con- 
 veyances onward would be tendered for their use. 
 
 "The drivers of some of the coaches were accustomed to re- 
 sort to the plaintiff's inn, and boarded there. 
 
 "Under these circimistances, we see no objection to the first 
 part of the charge to the jury. The defendant had clearly a 
 right to estabhsh a line of stage coaches, and to go to the plain- 
 tiff's inn with travellers, and he might of course lawfully enter 
 it for the purpose of leaving their baggage and receiving his 
 fare. 
 
 "And we are of opinion that, so long as others were permitted 
 to do the same, the defendant had an equal and lawful right, 
 notwithstanding any prohibition by the plaintiff, to enter the 
 plaintiff's inn for the piu-pose of tendering his coach for the use 
 of travellers, and soliciting them to take passage with him; and 
 for that purpose to go into the common pubHc rooms of the 
 inn, where guests were usually placed to await the departure 
 of the stages, although he was not requested by such guests; 
 provided there was a reasonable expectation that passengers 
 might be there, and he came at a suitable time, in a proper 
 
 [59] 
 
§ 88.] Innkeepers. [Chap. VII. 
 
 maimer, demeaned himself peaceably, and remained no longer 
 than was necessary, and was doing no injury to the plaintiff. " 
 
 § 88. Bight of stranger forfeited by misconduct. 
 
 It is clear that this right, Uke the right of the guest himself,^* 
 may be forfeited by the misconduct of the visitor, and may even 
 be denied because of the bad character or bad intentions of the 
 visitor. The language of Judge Parsons to this effect has al- 
 ready been quoted ; " and to the same effect is the opinion of 
 the New Hampshire Supreme Court in the case of Markham v. 
 Brown : ^* 
 
 "The defendant might forfeit his right by his misconduct, 
 so that the plaintiff might reqiiire him to depart, and expel him ; 
 and if, by reason of several instances of misconduct, it appeared 
 to be necessary for the protection of his guests or of himseK, 
 the plaintiff might prohibit the defendant from entering again, 
 imtil the ground of apprehension was removed. Thus if af- 
 frays or quarrels were caused through his fault, or he was noisy, 
 disturbing the guests in the house, interfered with its due reg- 
 ulation, intruded into the private rooms, remained longer 
 than was necessary after being requested to depart, or other- 
 wise abused his right, as by improper importunity to guests to 
 induce them to take passage with him ; the plaintiff would have 
 a right to reform that, and, if necessary, to forbid the defendant 
 to enter, and treat him as a trespasser if he disregarded the 
 prohibition. 
 
 "So, if, after a lawful entry of the defendant, he committed 
 an assault upon the plaintiff, or any trespass upon his property, 
 the plaintiff might treat him as having entered for the unlawful 
 purpose, and as a trespasser ab initio." 
 
 When a person otherwise having a right to enter is refused 
 admittance because it is suspected that he intends to do wrong 
 after he enters, or because he is a person of bad character or 
 
 1* Post, chapters 8, 9. 
 
 15 Supra, § 85. 
 
 w 8 N. H. 523, 31 Am. Dec. 209 (1837). 
 
 [60] 
 
Chap. VII.] Duty to Persons not Guests. [§ 89. 
 
 reputation, the responsibiUty of the innkeeper is . evidently 
 large. So far as the authorities go, the innkeeper may un- 
 doubtedly justify exclusion on such a ground. Yet it is a 
 difficult matter to establish a mere evil intention; and in the 
 ordinary case it is the wiser course to admit the applicant, 
 subject to the rules of the inn, and eject him when he violates 
 a rule or does any act justifying exclusion. ' 
 
 § 89. Stranger entering to make inquiry. 
 
 In one class of cases, however, one who is neither a guest 
 nor a person having business with a guest may enter an inn. 
 One may have occasion to make inquiry at the office of an 
 inn either into some matter connected with the business of 
 the inn or even for a letter or message addressed to himself. 
 If aU inns had the same accommodations and charged the same 
 prices, persons who desired accommodation would not need 
 to make inquiry before deciding which inn to patronize; or 
 if in each place there was but a single inn there would be no 
 object in such an investigation. But wherever more than one 
 inn is found in a town, the traveller needs information before 
 he can choose which inn to patronize. It must be his right, 
 therefore, before deciding to become a guest, to enter and in- 
 quire what room he can get and what price will be charged, 
 and to make such other investigation as is possible. While 
 no decided case has been found in which this subject is dis- 
 cussed, the right is believed to be beyond question; and in 
 the analogous case of a common carrier it has been so held. 
 A person going to a railroad station in order to get a time- 
 table, but not at that time to take a train, has been held to 
 have a right on the premises. ^^ 
 
 It is the custom of inns to receive letters and telegrams 
 addressed to strangers and to keep them a reasonable time 
 to be called for. While of course an innkeeper cannot be 
 compelled to accept such commimications, still if he makes 
 
 " Bradford v. Boston & M. R. R., 160 Mass. 392, 35 N. E. Rep. 1131 
 (1894). 
 
 [61] 
 
§ 89.] Innkeepers. [Chap. VII. 
 
 a practice of doing so (as in fact is true of most innkeepers) 
 it seems to be clear that he must admit to the office persons 
 coming bona fide to make inquiries for such communications. 
 This is of course not a duty placed upon the innkeeper by 
 reason of any provision of the law of innkeepers; but it re- 
 sults necessarily from the practice of innkeepers, as it has 
 just been described. An illustration of the importance of 
 this right may be found in the EngUsh case of Strauss v. 
 County Hotel and Wine Company.^* In that case a person 
 came to an inn intending to stay overnight, and found wait- 
 ing for him a telegram summoning him to another city. If 
 the innkeeper as a matter of good business pohcy consents 
 to receive such messages, he leads travellers to depend upon 
 being admitted to inquire for them; and he cannot therefore 
 refuse to admit them. 
 
 18 la^Q. B. D. 27,f53 L. J. Q. B. 25, 49 L. T. 6011 32 W. Rep. 170, 48 
 J. P. 69\(Eng. 1883).'^" - - 
 
 -A 
 
 [62] 
 
Chap. VIII.] Refusal to Receive a Guest. 
 
 [§91. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 EXCUSES FOR REFUSAL TO RECEIVE A GUEST. 
 
 § 95 
 
 Refusal to receive one who 
 comes at improper time. 
 
 Refusal to receive one who 
 brings an animal. 
 
 Refusal to receive a rival. 
 98. Refusal to receive because the 
 inn is unlicensed. 
 
 96 
 
 97. 
 
 § 91. Refusal to receive guest be- 
 cause of lack of accommoda- 
 tion. 
 
 92. Refusal to receive objection- 
 
 able person. 
 
 93. Refusal to receive one suffering 
 
 from contagious disease. 
 
 94. Refusal to receive one whose 
 
 companions have acted im- 
 properly. 
 
 § 91. Refusal to receive guest because of lack of accommodation. 
 
 When the innkeeper's accommodation is exhausted, he may 
 refuse to receive an applicant as a guest. If all his sleeping 
 rooms are occupied, he need not admit a guest to sleep in a 
 sitting room, or (in modern times) to share the bedroom of 
 ariother guest. In an EngUsh case an applicant who had been 
 refused admission to an inn because the inn was full sued the 
 innkeeper and proved that the coffee room was unoccupied, 
 and that there was room without overcrowding for the appli- 
 cant to sleep in a room with another guest. The court held, 
 nevertheless, that he had been rightly refused admission.^ 
 Lord Alverston, C. J., was of opinion that even if the applicant 
 had asked to occupy the coffee room, he might legally have 
 been refused. Darling, J., said: 
 
 "No doubt an innkeeper is bound to provide accommodation 
 for travellers, but he is not to do so at all risks and all costs. 
 He is only bound to provide accommodation so long as his 
 
 1 Browne v. Brandt [1902], 1 K. B. 696, 71 L. J. K. B. 367, 86 L. T. 625, 
 50 W. R. 654. 
 
 [63] 
 
§ 92.] Innkeepers. [Chap. VIII. 
 
 house is not full ; when it is full he has no duty in that respect. 
 The question then arises, when an innkeeper's house may prop- 
 erly be said to be full. I do not think that the old cases can 
 help one very much, because in olden times people were in the 
 habit of sleeping many in one room, and several in one bed. 
 People who were absolutely xmknown to each other would sleep 
 in the same room, as is done in common lodging houses at the 
 present time. Therefore, if we got a definition of ' full ' in one 
 of the old cases, I should not be surprised to find that what was 
 called 'full' then, we should now call 'indecent overcrowding.' 
 It is the habit now of people to occupy separate bedrooms, and, 
 having regard to the ordinary way of hving at the present time, 
 I think an inn may be said to be full for the purpose of affording 
 accommodation for the night if all the bedrooms are occupied. 
 There might have been a difhcxilty here if the plaintiff had said, 
 'I wiU take your sitting room. I do not want to go to bed. I 
 will sit up aU night. ' But that difficulty does not arise on the 
 facts of this case. The coimty court judge has found that the 
 house was full, having regard to modern ways of hving. He 
 referred to Chaucer and the Canterbury pilgrims. One need 
 only look at the 'Sentimental Journey' to see how people's 
 habits have altered since the time of Laurence Sterne. I 
 am of opinion that the coimty court judge's decision was 
 right." 
 
 §92. Befusal to receive objectionable person. 
 
 It has sometimes been laid down broadly that persons who 
 would be so objectionable to the patrons of the house that it 
 would injure the business of the innkeeper to admit them may 
 be excluded ; though the reason for exclusion is simply the race 
 of the apphcant.^ While this is doubtless too broadly stated 
 as a common-law proposition, a person who is in himself rea- 
 sonably objectionable may be excluded. Thus an innkeeper 
 may excuse the refusal to accept a person as his guest because 
 
 2 State V. Steele, 106 N. C. 766, 11 S. E. 478, 19 Am. St. Rep. 573, 8 
 L. R. A. 516 (1890). 
 [64] 
 
Chap. VIII.] Refusal to Receive a Guest. [§ 94. 
 
 he is drunk,* filthy,^ profane,^ indecently or improperly be- 
 haved,® a common brawler or thief,'' or a person of bad reputa- 
 tion ; * or if he desires to enter for an unlawful purpose, as to 
 assault an inmate;* or if he attempts to enter by violence." 
 But mere unconventionahty of costume is no ground for re- 
 fusal to receive a guest, so long as the costume is decent. Thus 
 a woman who wore a "rational dress," so called, was held en- 
 titled to service from an innkeeper." 
 
 § 93. Refusal to receive one suffering from contagious disease. 
 
 It seems obvious that, for the protection of his other guests, 
 an innkeeper may refuse to receive a traveller suffering from 
 a contagious disease. This seems sufficiently clear, even with- 
 out the support of decided cases; so clear, indeed, that one 
 would not expect to find the proposition disputed in litigation. 
 Yet in an early English case, where one was indicted for refus- 
 ing to receive at his inn one suffering from smallpox, the 
 only objection apparently taken, at any rate the objection on 
 account of which the indictment was quashed, was that the 
 appUcant was not alleged to have been a traveller. ^^ 
 
 §94. Refusal to receive one whose companions have acted im- 
 properly. 
 
 The innkeeper cannot refuse to receive a guest or other per- 
 
 sMarkham v. Brown, 8 N. H. 523, 31 Am. Dec. 209 (1837); State v. 
 Steele, 106 N. C. 766, 11 S. E. 478, 19 Am. St. Rep. 573, 8 L. R. A. 516 
 (1890); Rex v. Ivens, 7 Car. & P. 213 (Eng. 1835). 
 
 ■iMarkham v. Brown, 8 N. H. 523, 31 Am. Dec. 209 (1837); State v. 
 Steele, 106 N. C. 766, 11 S. E. 478, 19 Am. St. Rep. 573, 8 L. R. A. 516 
 (1890). 
 
 6 State V. Steele, 106 N. C. 766, 11 S. E. 478, 19 Am. St. Rep. 573, 8 
 L. R. A. 516 (1890). 
 
 oRex V. Ivens, 7 Car. & P. 2l3 (Eng. 1835). 
 
 ' Markham v. Brown, 8 N. H. 523, 31 Am. Deo. 209 (1837). 
 
 8 Goodenow v. Travis, 3 Johns. 427 (N. Y. 1808). 
 
 » Markham v. Brown, 8 N. H. 523, 31 Am. Dec. 209 (1837). 
 
 i» As by breaking the door. Goodenow v. Travis, 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 427 
 (1808). 
 
 11 Regina v. Sprague, 63 J. P. 233 (Eng. 1899). 
 
 12 Rex v. Luellin, 12 Mod. 445 (1700). 
 
 5 [65] 
 
§ 94.] Innkeepers. [Chap. VIII. 
 
 son otherwise admissible because companions of the apphcant 
 have previously misconducted themselves." 
 
 Thus in a leadkig case the innkeeper refused to serve an ap- 
 phcant because he belonged to the mihtia and wore the uniform, 
 and other members of the mihtia wearing the same uniform 
 had previously misconducted themselves. The iankeeper al- 
 leged that he was unable to discriminate between them, and 
 took them all as parties who came there to create a disturbance 
 in the house. This excuse was held insufficient." Emery, J., 
 said: 
 
 "The offered testimony would not be admissible unless it 
 logically tended to prove a reasonable cause for such behef. 
 The bill of exceptions states, that some eighty or a hundred 
 men, members of two militia companies, and clad ia the uni- 
 form of the Maine mihtia arrived in town on the day named; 
 that ' more or less ' of them (how many is not stated) went to 
 the defendant's inn, and there behaved in a disorderly and in- 
 sulting manner. These plaintiffs, though members of the mi- 
 htia companies, were not of this disorderly party, nor with 
 them. It is not claimed that the plaintiffs were otherwise than 
 sober, orderly and respectable. The only coimection shown 
 between them and the disorderly ones was their membership 
 of the same mihtia companies. It is not even shown they were 
 of the same company. The only similarity in appearance was 
 in the uniform. Such membership was honorable, and there 
 was not in that any reasonable cause to beheve the plaintiffs 
 intended insult. The uniform was honorable and the rightful 
 wearing it by the plaintiffs was no reasonable cause for appre- 
 hension of insult. We do not know how many of the organi- 
 zation had misbehaved. We have no right to assume the num- 
 ber was large. We ought rather to assume the number was 
 small. It would be illogical and unjust to say, there was reason- 
 able cause to beheve that every member of those companies 
 
 13 Atwater v. Sawyer, 76 Me. 539, 49 Am. Rep. 634 (1884); Markham v. 
 Brown, 8 N. H. 523, 31 Am. Dec. 209 (1837). 
 
 " Atwater v. Sawyer, 76 Me. 539, 49 Am. Rep. 634 (1884). 
 [66] 
 
Chap. VIII.] Refusal to Receive a Guest. [§ 96. 
 
 meditated misconduct because a small number of them had 
 already misconducted. Yet if there was reasonable cause to 
 fear insult from the plaintiffs, there was equal cause to fear 
 it from every member. 
 
 "The defendant's claim that he could not distinguish be- 
 tween the plaintiffs and the others, cannot be admitted against 
 the plaintiffs' right to entertaiament. The plaintiffs were not 
 with the others. Their rights cannot be abridged by the simi- 
 larity in appearance to other persons not present. It was the 
 defendant's duty to discriminate." 
 
 § 95. Refusal to receive one who comes at improper time. 
 
 The innkeeper cannot refuse to receive a traveller because 
 he comes late at night. Indeed, the traveller who cannot reach 
 an inn until late is all the more in need of the protection and 
 entertainment it affords. In a case where an innkeeper set up 
 the late arrival of the plaintiff as an excuse for refusal to re- 
 ceive him, Mr. Justice Coleridge said to the jury, "it is next 
 said that he came to the inn at a late hour of the night, when 
 probably the .family were gone to bed. Have we not all 
 knocked at inn doors at late hours of the night, and after the 
 family have retired to rest, not for the pm-pose of annoyance, 
 but to get the people up?" ^^ -This is not a very conclusive 
 answer to the defendant's contention, but it seems to need no 
 greater consideration. 
 
 In the same case the defendant set up, as another excuse, 
 that the plaintiff had been travelling on Sunday ; but this was 
 dismissed with the curt answer that travelling on Sunday was 
 not illegal.^* But even if it had been illegal, the case would 
 have been the same; the fact that a person has been illegally 
 travelling on Simday does not affect his rights as guest." 
 
 § 96. Refusal to receive one who brings an animal. 
 
 An irmkeeper is of course prepared to receive guests who 
 
 IB Rex V. Ivens, 7 Car. & P. (Eng.) 213, 219 (1835). 
 
 I' Rex V. Ivens, supra. 
 
 " Cox V. Cook, 14 AUen (Mass.), 165 (1867). 
 
 [67] 
 
§ 97.] Innkeepees. [Chap. VIII. 
 
 drive to an inn, and to entertain his horses as well as himself; 
 but if he insists upon bringing with him other animals as pets 
 it is doubtful how far the innkeeper may be compelled to re- 
 ceive him. Certaialy he cannot be obliged to take in an animal 
 which will annoy other guests. 
 
 ^ In an Enghsh case it appeared that a person who had been 
 in the habit of bringing one or more large dogs with him to an 
 inn, to the annoyance of guests, had been forbidden by the inn- 
 keeper to come to the inn with a dog. Notwithstanding this, 
 he demanded admittance, having with him a large dog in leash. 
 The innkeeper refused to admit him, and was indicted for the 
 refusal. The court held that the refusal was justifiable." In 
 the course of his opinion Chief Baron Kelly said : " I do not lay 
 down positively that imder no circumstances could a guest have 
 a right to bring a dog into an inn. There may possibly be cir- 
 cumstances in which, if a person came to an inn with a dog 
 and the innkeeper refused to put up the dog in any stable or 
 outhouse, and there were nothing that could make the dog a 
 cause of alarm or annoyance to others, the guest might be jus- 
 tified in bringing the dog into the inn. But it is not necessary 
 to decide any such question. In this case, looking at the pre- 
 vious facts, the number of dogs previously brought, and their 
 kind and behavior, the nature of the right claimed by the 
 prosecutor in his letter,*^ and the size and class of the dog, I 
 think the defendant would have had ample ground for his re- 
 fusal. " Mr. Justice Manisty added that, in his opinion, "a 
 guest cannot under any circumstances, insist on bringing a dog 
 into any room or place in an inn where other guests are. ", 
 
 § 97. Refusal to receive a rival. 
 
 It is sometimes said that an innkeeper is not obliged to en- 
 tertain a rival who is acting in the interest of his rival inn. 
 
 18 Regina v. Rymer, 2 Q. B. D. 136, 46 L. J. M. C. 108, 35 L. T. 774, 25 
 W. R. 415, 13 Cox C. C. 378 (1877). 
 
 19 To "follow his inclinations" in bringing dogs, when they were not wet 
 and dirty. 
 
 [68] 
 
Chap. VIII.] Refusal to Receive a Guest. [§ 98. 
 
 Thus in Jencks v. Coleman/" Story, J., said: "Suppose pas- 
 sengers are accustomed to breakfast, or dine, or sup at his 
 house, and an agent is employed by a rival house, at the dis- 
 tance of a few miles, to decoy the passengers away the moment 
 they arrive at the inn ; is the innkeeper bound to entertain and 
 lodge such agent, and thereby enable him to accompUsh the 
 very objects of his mission, to the iajury or ruin of his own 
 interests? I think not." 
 
 It may, however, be doubtful whether an innkeeper can jus- 
 tify the refusal to receive a bona fide traveller merely because 
 he intends to act in, the interest of a rival inn. If that is his 
 sole purpose in coming to the inn he is not a bona fide traveller^ 
 and may be refused admittance on that ground ; if he is a gen- 
 uine guest, the innkeeper must receive him, but may prevent 
 him from soliciting custom while a guest. The innkeeper un- 
 questionably has such power,^^ and by the exercise of it he 
 may sufficiently protect himself. 
 
 § 98. Befusal to receive because the inn is unlicensed- 
 
 Though' keeping an inn without a hcense may be illegal, the 
 innkeeper cannot take advantage of this illegaUty to excuse 
 himself for refusing to receive a guest. The obligation to serve 
 the public attaches to one who is actually keeping a common 
 inn, even if he is in default for not obtaining a hcense ; and the 
 lack of a license is no excuse to an innkeeper for refusal to re- 
 ceive a guest. ^^ And therefore in an action against one who 
 has acted as an innkeeper it is not necessary to show that he 
 had a license to keep an inn.^^ 
 
 20 2 Sumner, 221, Fed. Cas. No. 7,258 (1835). 
 
 21 Post. § 212. 
 
 22 Atwater v. Sawyer, 76 Me. 539, 49 Am. Rep. 634 (1884); State v. Wynn, 
 1 Hawks (N. C), 451 (1821); Anonymous, Godbolt (Eng.), 345, pi. 440 
 (1623). 
 
 23 Anonymous, Godbolt (Eng.) 345, pi. 440 (1823). 
 
 [69] 
 
102.] Innkeepers. [Chap. IX. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 THE innkeeper's RIGHT TO EJECT ONE WHO HAS BEEN 
 ADMITTED TO THE INN. 
 
 101. Right to eject in general. 
 
 102. Ejection for misconduct. 
 
 103. Ejection for illness. 
 
 § 104. Ejection for refusal to pay. 
 105. Ejection of one who h 
 ceased to be a traveller. 
 
 § 101. Right to eject in general. 
 
 Even after one has been admitted to an km as a guest he 
 may be ejected for proper cause. By his admission as a guest 
 he is perhaps in a better position to demand the services of the 
 innkeeper than when he first appUed for admission ; but prob- 
 ably this advantage is merely tactical. While the burden is 
 on one who apphes for admission to prove himself entitled to 
 demand it, as soon as he has been received as a guest the burden 
 is placed on the innkeeper to justify the act of ejecting him. 
 But so far as substantive right goes, it is doubtful if the 
 guest gains any by securing admission to the inn. If after his 
 admission circumstances occur which would have justified the 
 innkeeper in refusing to admit him if they had existed when 
 he apphed for admission, they will equally justify the innkeeper 
 in ejecting him. 
 
 § 102. Ejection for misconduct. 
 
 If the guest after being received misconducts himself so as 
 to annoy the other guests, he may for that cause be ejected 
 from the inn. Thus a guest may be ejected who persists in 
 annoying other guests by soliciting their custom in his busi- 
 ness.^ So one may be ejected who becomes obnoxious to other 
 
 1 State V. Steele, 106 N. C. 766, 11 S. E. 478, 19 Am. St. Rep. 573, 8 
 L. R. A. 516 (1890). 
 
 [70] 
 
Chap. IX.] Right to Eject One Admitted. [§ 103. 
 
 guests by reason of intoxication.^ So a guest may be ejected 
 who makes a disturbance in the um. "If a man comes into a 
 pubhc house and conducts himself in a disorderly manner, and 
 the landlord requests him to go out, and he will not, the land- 
 lord may turn him out. There is no doubt that a landlord may 
 turn out a person who is making a disturbance in a pubUc 
 house, though such disturbance does not amount to a breach 
 of the peace. " ^ Indeed, such disturbance would make the 
 guest guilty of trespass ab initio* 
 
 § 103. Ejection for illness. 
 
 If the guest while in the inn contracts a contagious disease, 
 so as to endanger the other guests, the innkeeper might send 
 him away from the inn if it could be properly and safely done. 
 If this can be done at all, it must be done reasonably, so as to 
 avoid any injury to the guest. If the innkeeper cannot re- 
 move the guest safely, he must refrain from doing so.* 
 
 In Levy v. Corey * the plaintiff alleged that while his wife 
 was confined to her room in the defendant's hotel, dangerously 
 ill with typhoid fever, the defendant at three o'clock in the morn- 
 ing made noisy preparations, declaring it his intention to re- 
 move her from the hotel to an outhouse where the servants 
 slept, unless the plaintiff paid two thousand five hundred dol- 
 lars. The plaintiff, having paid thie money, was suing to re- 
 cover it on the ground that it was paid under duress. Chief 
 Judge McAdam thus charged the jury: 
 
 "Where a guest is taken ill at a hotel, with a contagious dis- 
 ease, hkely to be communicated to others, the proprietor, after 
 notifsong the sick guest to leave, has the right to remove such 
 guest in a careful and becoming maimer, and at an appropriate 
 
 2 McHugh V. Schlosser, 159 Pa. 480, 28 Atl. 291, 39 Am. St. Rep. 699, 34 
 Wkly. Notes Cas. 33 (1894). 
 
 3 Parke, B., in HoweU v. Jackson, 6 Car. & P. (Eng.) 723, 725 (1834). 
 * The Six Carpenters' Case, 8 Coke (Eng.), 290 (1610). 
 
 5 McHugh V. Schlosser, 159 Pa. 480, 28 Atl. 291, 39 Am. St. Rep. 699, 
 34 Wkly. Notes Cas. 33 (1894). 
 
 6 1 City Ct. Rep. Supp. 57 (1884). 
 
 [71] 
 
§ 104.] Innkeepers. [Chap. IX. 
 
 hour, to some hospital or other place of safety provided the 
 life of the guest be not imperilled thereby. This is not only a 
 right inherent in the hotel keeper, but a duty owing to the 
 other guests, and to the preservation of pubhc health. If the 
 hotel keeper exercises these rights at an improper time, or in 
 an illegal and unbecoming manner, he is Uable therefor on the 
 ground of negligence, or for the abuse of authority. 
 
 "The hotel keeper has the right, imder the circumstances be- 
 fore detailed, to make any reasonable arrangement for extra 
 compensation, the amoimt of which is left largely to the mutual 
 agreement of the parties in interest, and when they mutually 
 agree in respect thereto, the law will infer that the price agreed 
 upon is fair and just, and the burden of proving the contrary 
 is on him who alleges imposition or undue advantage. The 
 agreement, to be legal, however, should be voluntary, and the 
 result of mutual assent in respect to which the minds of both 
 parties should meet. If, however, the hotel keeper, not con- 
 tent to join in an agreement foimded on mutual assent, deter- 
 mines to take advantage of the misfortime which has occurred 
 in his house, makes threats to remove the guest when not in a 
 condition to be removed, or threatens to remove such guest at 
 a time or in a manner not warranted by the circumstances, and 
 by force of such threats exacts from such guest, or her husband, 
 a sum of money arbitrarily named by him, and not fixed by 
 voluntary assent, nor warranted by the exigencies of the oc- 
 casion, he commits a wrong which the law will not tolerate; 
 he has exacted the money so obtained by duress, and acquires 
 no title to it, and it can be recovered back by the person from 
 whom it was wrongfully exacted." 
 
 § 104. Ejection for refusal to pay. 
 
 As the innkeeper may refuse to admit a traveller at the be- 
 ginning unless he will pay in advance, so he may eject him if 
 after admission he falls into arrears and fails on demand to 
 pay the amoimt due the innkeeper.'' 
 
 ' Doyle V. Walker, 26 Up. Can. Q. B. 502 (1867). 
 [72] 
 
Chap. IX.] Right to Eject One Admitted. [§ 105. 
 
 § 105. Ejection of one who has ceased to be a traveller. 
 
 If in the lapse of time the guest has ceased to be a traveller 
 and has become a resident, he has no longer a right to demand 
 entertainment, and the innkeeper may exclude him. In an 
 English case it appeared that the plaintiff went to an inn in 
 Brighton, was given rooms, and stayed there for a period of 
 ten months. It was then intimated to her that the manager 
 wished her to leave, but this she refused to do. Then notice 
 was given to her requiring her to leave, and as she still refused, 
 advantage was taken of her being out of the hotel, and her 
 things were brought down and put outside, and on her retinrn 
 she was refused admittance. She then sued the innkeeper for 
 wrongfully excluding her from the inn. The court held that 
 she was lawfully excluded.* Lord Esher, M. R., delivering the 
 opinion of the court, said: 
 
 "The question is whether it is the law that if a person goes 
 to an ion in the character of a traveller that person retains the 
 same character for any time however long. If so, the law 
 would be contrary to the truth; and I will never submit, un- 
 less compelled by an act of Parhament, to say that a thing shall 
 be deemed to be that which it is not. Therefore, the question 
 whether a person has ceased to be a traveller seems to me again 
 to be a question of fact, and mere length of residence is not 
 decisive of the matter, because there may be circumstances 
 which show that the length of stay does not prevent the guest 
 being a traveller, as, for instance, where it arises from illness; 
 but it is wrong to say that length of time is not one of the cir- 
 cumstances to be taken into account in determining whether 
 the guest has retained his character of traveller. " 
 
 But though the innkeeper may lawfully exclude an inmate 
 after he has ceased to be technically a guest, his justification 
 for such exclusion depends upon his being able to show affirm- 
 atively that the former guest has ceased to have that character. 
 This was the ground of decision in a Canadian case. A trav- 
 
 8 Lamond v. Richard [1897], 1 Q. B. 541, 66 L. J. Q. B. 315, 76 L. T. 141, 
 45 W. R. 289, 61 J. P. 260. 
 
 [73] 
 
'§ 105.] Innkeepers. [Chap. IX. 
 
 eller came to an inn, was received as a guest, and remained six 
 weeks, paying for her board by the week; and at the end of 
 that time she was ejected by the innkeeper. She was held to 
 be entitled to damages.* In the course of his opinion Robin- 
 son, C. J., said : 
 
 "It was proved that the plaintiff came to this inn as a trav- 
 eller or guest, and was received as such. If she did pay by the 
 week as was alleged, and if she was charged for board by that 
 name, that would not certainly show that she was there under 
 any special contract inconsistent with the common law relation 
 between an innkeeper and his guest. She had been there about 
 six weeks. If she had rented a certain apartment as tenant for 
 any certain term, she would have been no longer a guest; but 
 what is shown is that she came to the inn as a guest ; that she 
 was so received, staid there six weeks, and had paid for her 
 board by the week two days in advance. Under these facts, 
 we think the defendant, for all that appears, had his privilege 
 of hen on the plaintiff's' goods, if she had attempted to depart 
 without paying; and that she, on the other hand, had her 
 rights as a guest, and could not be rudely or abruptly turned 
 out without some cause to justify it; and no such cause was 
 shown, nor was any pleaded. If the relation of guest had, be- 
 fore the occasion complained of been put an end to, we can only 
 say that it was not proved to be so upon the trial. " 
 
 8 Whiting V. Mills, 7 Up. Can. Q. B. 450 (1849). 
 
 [74] 
 
Chap. X.] Undertaking of the Innkeeper. [§ 111. 
 
 TITLE III. 
 
 THE UNDERTAKING OF THE INNKEEPER WITH 
 HIS GUEST. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 the nature of the innkeeper's obligation. 
 
 111. The obligation is imposed by 
 
 law. 
 
 112. Capacity to contract not re- 
 
 quired. 
 
 § 113. Guest need not be the party 
 bound to pay. 
 114. What law governs the obliga.- 
 tion. 
 
 § 111. The obligation is imposed by law. 
 
 The obhgation of an mnkeeper to care for his guest is imposed 
 by law, and necessarily results from the admittance of the guest 
 to the inn. There is no need of a contract between the parties. 
 As soon as the relation o. host and guest is estabhshed, the 
 rights and duties of both parties to the relation are at once fixed. 
 This is to be sure a consensual obhgation, in the sense that the 
 consent of the itmkeeper as well as that of the guest is needed 
 to create it. If the innkeeper refuses to receive the guest, 
 though his refusal is wrongful,^ or if the guest enters the inn 
 without the knowledge of the inrikeeper, and without his con- 
 sent,^ the obhgation does not arise. But though consent to 
 receive the guest is required, and the obhgation is a consensual 
 one, it is not in any sense contractual ; and it is unnecessary to 
 seek the elements of a contract in the relation between the 
 parties. 
 
 1 Bird V. Bird, 1 And. 29, Benl. 60 (Eng. 1658); Bennett v. MeUor, 5 T. 
 R. (Eng.) 273 (1793). 
 
 2 Gastenhofer v. Glair, 10 Daly (N. Y.), 265 (1881). 
 
 [75] 
 
§ 113.] iNNKBfiPERS. [Chap. X. 
 
 § 112. Capacity to contract not required. 
 
 For this reason it is not necessary to find in a guest the ca- 
 pacity to make a contract. The relationship may be as well 
 estabhshed with a person imder incapacity, an iaf ant, a married 
 woman, or an insane person, as with a person entirely sui juris. 
 The innkeeper is obliged to receive and entertain the guest, and 
 he is obviously bound by the obligations and entitled to the 
 rights flowing from the relation. As he is compelled to receive, 
 "it would be a legal absurdity to compel a man to make a con- 
 tract, and at the same time permit the other party, who is the 
 instrument of compulsion, to avoid such contract. " ^ 
 
 On the other hand, when a man has become and remains an 
 innkeeper, a supervening incapacity on his own part will not 
 protect him from responsibility. So in an old EngUsh case 
 where an innkeeper was sued for failure to keep safely the goods 
 of his guest, he pleaded that at the time the guest lodged with 
 him he was sick and of non sane memory. On demurrer, this 
 was Jield not to be a good plea. "For the defendant, if he will 
 keep an inn, ought at his peril to keep safely his guest's goods; 
 and although he be sick, his servants then ought carefuUy to 
 look to them. And to say he is of non sane memory it heth 
 not in him to disable himself. "* 
 
 § 113. Guest need not be the party bound to pay. 
 
 It is not necessary even that the guest should be personally 
 obliged to pay. If, for instance, a man goes with his family to 
 an inn, each member of the family is a guest, though the head 
 of the family alone is responsible for payment of the innkeeper's 
 charges. And in general everyone who is received and enter- 
 tained as a guest at an inn is a guest, though his bill is paid by 
 another.^ . 
 
 3 Watson V. Cross, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 147 (1865). The court is of course using 
 the word contract in a broad and non-technical sense. See further on this 
 question post, § 253. 
 
 i Cross V. Andrews, Cro. Eliz. 622 (1598). 
 
 5 Kopper V. Willis, 9 Daly (N. Y.), 460 (1881); Read v. Amidon, 41 Vt. 
 15, 98 Am. Deo. 560 (1868). 
 [76] 
 
Chap. X.] Undertaking of the Innkeeper. [§ 114. 
 
 § 114. What law governs the obligation, 
 
 Since the obhgation of the innkeeper to his guest is created 
 by the law, and not by the will of the parties, the nature of the 
 obhgation depends upon the law that creates it; and since the 
 law may differ in different jurisdictions, it may become impor- 
 tant to determine what law it is that creates and governs the re- 
 lation. The law of the place in which the guest is received by 
 the innkeeper as his guest will determine the nature of the ob- 
 ligation created by such reception.* 
 
 8 Holland v. Pack, Peck (Tenn.), 151 (1823). 
 
 [77] 
 
§ 122.] 
 
 Innkeepers. 
 
 [Chap. XI. 
 
 SUBTITLE I. 
 
 THE BEGINNING OF RESPONSIBILITY. 
 
 CHAPTER XL 
 
 THE RECEPTION OF THE GUEST. 
 
 § 121. Relation of host and guest es- 
 tablished by reception. 
 122. Reception requires communi- 
 cation of intention to the 
 innkeeper. 
 
 § 123. Traveller entering inn with- 
 out presenting himself as 
 guest. 
 
 124. Refusal of innkeeper to ac- 
 
 cept guest. 
 
 125. Reception in another capac- 
 
 ity than as guest. 
 
 § 121. Relation of host and guest established by reception. 
 
 When a traveller comes to an inn and is received by the inn- 
 keeper for the purpose of entertaining him during his journey, 
 the relation of host and guest is thereby estabhshed.^ No lapse 
 of time is required for the establishment of this relation ; if the 
 guest presents himself for entertainment and is accepted, the 
 relation "is instantly estabhshed between them." ^ 
 
 §122. Reception requires communication of intention to the inn- 
 keeper. 
 
 To be received at an inn the guest must usually communicate 
 
 with the innkeeper or with some servant authorized to receive 
 
 guests; and though sometimes (as at a pubUc restaurant, part 
 
 of the inn) one may perhaps become a guest by merely going 
 
 1 Pinkerton v. Woodward, 33 Cal. 557, 91 Am. Dec. 657 (1867); Norcross 
 V. Norcross, 53 Me. 163 (1865); Healey v. Gray, 68 Me. 489, 28 Am. Rep. 
 80 (1878); Ross v.'Mellin, 36 Minn. 421, 32 N. W. 172 (1887). 
 
 2 Norcross v. Norcross, 53 Me. 163 (1865). See to the same effect Ross 
 V. MeUin, 36 Minn. 421, 32 N. W. 172 (1887). 
 
 [78] 
 
Chap. XI.] Reception of the Guest. [§ 122. 
 
 into a part of the inn provided for that purpose, that is not the 
 case with the dining room of an inn of the ordinary sort. One 
 entering the dining room and calling for food without notice to 
 the innkeeper or his clerk does not become a guest.^ In such a 
 case Judge Van Hoesen said: "There must be at least two par- 
 ties to every contract, and when it is attempted to charge an 
 innkeeper with Uability for the loss of goods belonging to a per- 
 son who asserts that he was a guest, the inquiry is, how was 
 the relation of guest and innkeeper created? No person can 
 make himself a guest without the iimkeeper's assent. Of 
 course, that assent may be given by an agent or a servant, 
 entrusted with the duty of receiving and rejecting travellers. 
 There need be no formal bargain, for the acceptance of a person 
 as a guest will be implied where he calls for refreshment which 
 is furnished to him by a servant who has the discretion either 
 to give or to withhold it. But a man cannot make himself a 
 guest by slipping into the dining room of a hotel and ordering 
 a diimer of a waiter who has no discretion whatever, and who 
 brings what is ordered, under the belief that the person who 
 gives the order is in the dining room by permission of the inn- 
 keeper. Permission to enter the dining room cannot be im- 
 plied. A man can no more enter the dining room without per- 
 mission, than he can enter a sleeping room, and go to bed 
 without permission. He must first give the innkeeper an op- 
 portunity to receive or to reject him. He could not become 
 a guest without making an application to be received as such 
 to Clair, or to some person authorized to act for him in such a 
 matter." And Judge J. F. Daly added: "It is not the fact 
 that a person does or does not take lodgings or partake of re- 
 freshments in the inn that makes him a guest. It is the motive 
 with which he visits the place: whether to use it even for the 
 briefest period or the most trifling purpose as a pubUc house 
 or not; and I think it will be long before the courts will be dis- 
 posed to hold landlords liable for the property of persons who 
 caU to visit their guests, and incidentally enjoy the hospitality 
 
 3 Gastenhofer v. Clair, 10 Daly, 265 (N. Y. 1881). 
 
 [79] 
 
§ 124.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XI. 
 
 of the house. The taking of the dinner without notice to the 
 proprietor or the clerk no more constituted plaintiff a guest 
 than his sitting in the parlor, using the reading room or writing 
 room, etc., for any period, whUe waiting for his host to appear. " 
 
 §123. Traveller entering inn without presenting himself as guest. 
 
 A traveller may, however, enter a public room at an inn with- 
 out at once presenting himself as a guest ; and in such case the 
 relation of host and guest is not estabUshed between the inn- 
 keeper and himself. So a traveller who enters a pubUc room 
 of an inn for a temporary purpose, without intending to lodge 
 or be otherwise entertained at the inn is not a guest.'* 
 
 As soon as the relation is estabhshed, the guest must com- 
 pensate the innkeeper for his ser-vices ; and it must be clear that 
 one who enters an inn does not by that mere fact become Uable 
 to pay the irmkeeper's charges. Bearing this in mind, we can 
 agree in the correctness of the decision in an English case where 
 it appeared that a traveller went to an inn and gave his luggage 
 to a porter, intending to stay at the inn, but upon being handed 
 a telegram which had been sent there for him, he decided not 
 to stop, but to continue his journey at once. It was held he 
 had not become a guest.^ 
 
 § 124. Refusal of innkeeper to accept guest. 
 
 Not only must the guest communicate his Intention to the 
 innkeeper; the latter must consent to receive him as a guest. 
 If the innkeeper refuses to receive a person as a guest, whether 
 the refusal is legal or illegal, the relation is not estabUshed. 
 Therefore when an innkeeper refuses to receive a guest (whether 
 justifiably because his house is fuU, or imjustifiably), such per- 
 son cannot, by placing his property in the inn, make the inn- 
 keeper hable for it.* 
 
 ■• Bernard v. Lalond, 8 Leg. News (Can.), 215 (1885). 
 
 5 Strauss v. County H. & W. Co., 12 Q. B. D. 27 (1883). 
 
 6 Bird V. Bird, 1 And. 29, Benl. 60 (Eng. 1558); Bennett v. Mellor, 5 T. R 
 (Eng.) 273 (1793). 
 
 [80] 
 
Chap. XI.] Reception of the Guest. [§ 125. 
 
 If the refusal is wrongful, the remedy is by action for the 
 refusal; if it is lawful, the apphcant has no right to force the 
 obUgation on the innkeeper. Thus, where the iankeeper hav- 
 ing said his inn was full, the apphcant nevertheless placed his 
 goods in the inn, and induced a guest to share his bed with him, 
 without the consent of the innkeeper, it was held that the lat- 
 ter was not responsible for the goods as innkeeper.'' 
 
 So where an innkeeper refused to accept a guest because he 
 was going to serve on a jury next morning, and the traveller at 
 his request received the keys to look out for himself, the rela- 
 tion of host and guest was not established.* 
 
 § 125. Beception in another capacity than as guest. 
 
 A person may be received in an inn by the innkeeper, but 
 in another capacity than as guest. He may, for instance, come 
 to the inn on the invitation of the innkeeper as his friend, and 
 not on the footing of a paying guest. The relation of host and 
 guest is not estabhshed in such a case, and the responsibility 
 of an innkeeper does not come into existence.^ Many cases 
 considered in the following chapter are instances of this prin- 
 ciple. 
 
 7 Bird V. Bird, 1 And. 29, Benl. 60 (Eng. 1558); White's Case, 2 Dyer, 
 158 6 (Eng. 1558). 
 
 SY. B. 11 Hen. 4, 45, pi. 18 (1410). 
 
 » Anonymous, 1 RoU. Abr. 3, pi. 4; Taylor v. Humphreys, 30 L. J. M. C. 
 242 (Eng. 1861). 
 
 [81] 
 
§ 131.] 
 
 Innkeepers. 
 
 [Chap. XII. 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 WHO IS A GUEST. 
 
 § 131. A guest need not resort to an 
 inn for both food and lodg- 
 ing. 
 
 132. Whether a guest must be per- 
 
 sonally entertained. 
 
 133. Entertainment of servant or 
 
 child as making master or 
 father a guest. 
 
 134. Resorting to inn to attend 
 
 banquet or ball. 
 
 135. One not entitled to admit- 
 
 tance received as guest. 
 
 § 136. Guest at inn for illegal pur- 
 pose. 
 137. Guest at inn as result of ille- 
 gal act. 
 Difference between guest and 
 
 boarder. 
 Length of stay at inn as a 
 test of the difference. 
 140. Residence in the town as a 
 test of the difference. 
 
 138. 
 
 139. 
 
 § 131. A guest need not resort to an inn for both food and lodging. 
 
 It is not necessary, in order that one received at an inn 
 should become a guest there, that he should resort to the inn 
 for both food and lodgirig. The inn must be prepared to sup- 
 ply both, at the traveller's need; but the traveller may stop 
 on his way at an inn merely for food and drink, or for either 
 one of them, and proceed on his journey the same day; or he 
 may arrive at the inn late at night, needing lodging only, and 
 leave the inn early in the morning without stopping for break- 
 fast. In either case he is a guest. 
 
 So it has been held that a traveller resorting to an inn for 
 food and drink only is a guest.^ , Upon this principle where a 
 person came to an inn in the afternoon, intending to leave by 
 a late train that night, and therefore took no room, but re- 
 mained in the public room of the inn, waiting for his train, and 
 
 1 McDonald v. Edgerton, 5 Barb. (N. Y.) 560 (1849); Kopper v. Willis, 9 
 Daly (N. Y.), 460 (1881); Read v. Amidgn, 41 Vt. 15, 98 Am. Dec. 560 
 (1868). 
 
 [82] 
 
Chap. XII.] Who is a Guest. [§ 132. 
 
 intending to get supper there, it was held that he was a guest.^ 
 And so where one called at an inn for the purpose of dining 
 only, and was suppUed with dinner in the dining room, he was 
 held to be a guest.' Even if he resorts to the inn for drink 
 only, he may thereby become a guest.^ "Of course, a man 
 could not be said to be a traveller who goes to a place merely 
 for the purpose of taking refreshment; but if he goes to an inn 
 for refreshment in the course of a journey, whether of business 
 or of pleasure, he is entitled to demand refreshment. " ^ So 
 in an English case where the servant of the plaintiff, having the 
 plaintiff's goods, asked if he could leave the goods until next 
 week, and upon the innkeeper's saying he could not yet tell 
 whether he would have the room to keep them, the servant set 
 down the goods and had some Uquor, and whUe he was drinking 
 the goods were stolen, it was held that the relationship of host 
 and guest had been established, and the innkeeper had become 
 liable for the goods.* 
 
 § 132. Whether a guest must be personally entertained. 
 
 Whether, in order to be a guest, a traveller must be person- 
 ally entertained at the iim is somewhat doubtful on the author- 
 ities. In several jurisdictions it has been held that a traveller 
 who comes to town and himself lodges in a private house is not 
 a guest, though he sends his servant or his horse to the inn. 
 If, under such circimistances, the horse dies in the night through 
 no negligence of the innkeeper, it is held that the latter is not 
 liable.' 
 
 2 Overstreet v. Moser, 88 Mo. App. 72 (1901). 
 
 3 Orchard v. Bush, [1898] 2 Q. B. 284, 67 L. J. Q. B. 650, 78 L. T. Rep. 
 557, 46 W. R. 527 (Eng. 1898); Read v. Amidon, 41 Vt. 15, 98 Am. Dec. 560 
 (1868). 
 
 * McDonald v. Edgerton, 5 Barb. (N. Y.) 560 (1849). 
 
 6 Cockburn, C. J., in Atkinson v. SeUers, 5 C. B. N. S. (Ei^.) 442, 448 
 (1858). 
 
 8 Bennett v. MeUor, 5 T. R. 273 (1793). 
 
 ' Healey v. Gray, 68 Me. 489, 28 Am. Rep. 80 (1878); Ingallsbee v. Wood, 
 33 N. Y. 577, 88 Am. Dec. 409 (1865); Neale v. Crocker, 8 Up. Can. C. P. 224 
 (1858). 
 
 [83] 
 
§ 132.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XII. 
 
 But by another view it is held in such a case that the inn- 
 keeper is hable as such if he receives a horse, though the owner 
 do not lodge at the inn ; for he receives the horse and is paid 
 for it in the course of his business as innkeeper. The majority 
 of the court of Queen's Bench so held, against the opinion of 
 Lord Holt ; * and this opinion has been f oUowed in Massachu- 
 setts ^ and Delaware." In the opinion of the Delaware court 
 Chief Justice Comegys said: "The law makes the owner a guest 
 because of the compensation charged by the innkeeper. The 
 liability of the traveller for that (which attaches upon the re- 
 ception of the beasts) constitutes this relation of host and 
 guest. It is his property that is nourished while upoii his jour- 
 ney, and that in law is the same as if he had been in his own 
 person the actual recipient of entertainment. It would be 
 otherwise entirely of dead or inanimate things left at the inn 
 by such traveller, as to which nothing would be paid to the 
 innkeeper. The existence of an inn involves, in legal contem- 
 plation, a stable attached to it also, and travellers with horses 
 and carriages are not to be presumed to put them up at the 
 iim to be kept there otherwise than as in inn stables strictly; 
 whereas those not travellers in the sense I have been employing, 
 but merely putting up their teams at the inn stables as a hvery 
 (as is the case with persons residing near town who use such 
 stables as mere conveniences), are not to be considered in the 
 light of guests, and entitled to the same degree of protection 
 as travellers are. " 
 
 The Vermont authorities appear to take the same view, 
 though the point is not finally determined. In the leading case 
 of McDaniels v. Robinson it appeared that the plaintiff left his 
 horse at the defendant's inn, and took a room in the inn and 
 left goods in the room; he took only part of his meals there, 
 
 8 Yorke v. Grenaugh, 2 Ld. Ray. 866 (1703). "For the innkeeper gains 
 by the horse, and therefore makes the owner a guest, though he was absent; 
 contra of goods left there by a man, because the innkeeper has no advantage 
 by them." 
 
 9 Mason v. Thompson, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 280, 20 Am. Dec. 471 (1830). 
 10 Russell V. Fagan, 7 Houst. 389, 8 Atl. 258 (Del. 1886). 
 [84] 
 
Chap. XII.] "Who is a Guest. [§ 133. 
 
 and did not use his room every night. Some of the goods were 
 lost. The innkeeper was held Uable as such, on all the facts, 
 and the court intimated that putting the horse up was alone 
 enough to make the plaintiff a guest." On a new trial, how- 
 ever, the plaintiff was not proved to have been a guest person- 
 ally; and the leaving of the goods which were lost had nothing 
 to do with the stabling of the horse. For this reason (without 
 denying that the innkeeper would have been liable as such for 
 injury to the horse) the court gave judgment for the defend- 
 ant." 
 
 § 133. Entertainment of servant or child as making master or 
 father a guest. 
 
 Where a man's servant (or minor child) with his property is 
 received at an inn, it has been said that the master (or father) 
 is a guest, and has the rights of such.^^ It is clear, however, 
 that the servant or child who is personally present at the inn 
 is himself a guest, even if the master or father accompanies him 
 and pays the bill,^^ a fortiori if he is not present. It would 
 seem that since there is but one person present, obtaining en- 
 tertainment, and as but one guest is paid for, there is but one 
 guest; and the absent master or father is therefore not prop- 
 erly a guest. The point actually decided in the cases is that the 
 innkeeper is directly liable to the master or father, as owner, 
 for a loss of the goods; and the true reason for the decision is 
 doubtless that in the mind of the court in Robinson v. Waller, ^^ 
 when it distinguished the case from that where the goods were 
 taken to the inn by a bailee on the ground that in the case 
 under discussion "the absolute property" is in the owner. In 
 other words, the father or master being in legal possession of 
 
 11 McDaniels v. Robinson, 26 Vt. 316, 62 Am. Dec. 574 (1854). 
 izMcDaniels v. Robinson, 28 Vt. 387 (1856). 
 
 13 Robinson v. Waller, 1 Roll. Abr. 3, pi. 7 (Eng. 1617); Coykendall v. 
 Eaton, 55 Barb. 188, 37 How. Pr. 438 (N. Y. 1869); Epps v. Hinds, 27 Miss. 
 657, 61 Am. Dec. 528 ^1854). 
 
 14 Ante, § 113. 
 
 15 Supra. 
 
 [85] 
 
§ 134.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XII. 
 
 the goods while they are in the hands of the servant or mem- 
 ber of his family, he may sue the umkeeper directly, as the 
 person whose possession has been infringed. 
 
 § 134. Resorting to inn to attend banc[uet or ball. 
 
 Where a banquet or a ball is held at an inn, a guest at such 
 banquet or ball is not a guest of the innkeeper, and the latter 
 is not hable, in the absence of neghgence, for any goods lost 
 by the guest.^® In such a case Judge Blodgett said: "As to 
 the banquet where the loss occurred, and which they attended 
 on the invitation and at the expense of the club, the plaintiffs 
 are justly to be regarded as its guests, and not of the defendant, 
 as umkeeper or otherwise, who simply provided the banquet as 
 caterer under a contract with the club, without any hen or 
 claim for compensation against its guests, and with no right or 
 power to exclude anybody from participating in its festivities 
 whom the club might properly invite. Neither by contract nor 
 by operation of law was the defendant acting in the character 
 of innkeeper as to the club, and still less as to its guests, who 
 would have had no right whatever to attend except upon its 
 invitation. Both the club and its guests came, not as ordinary 
 travellers to an inn, but as to a banquet, for the purpose of par- 
 ticipating in and enjoying its festivities. " " 
 
 The fact that the innkeeper himself supplies the banquet, so 
 that the persons present are being furnished entertainment by 
 him for hire, does not alter the case. On this point Judge Blod- 
 gett well said, in Amey v. Winchester, ^^ "the fact that the de- 
 fendant chanced to be keeping an inn, and served the banquet 
 there, makes his liability no greater than that of any other per- 
 son not an innkeeper, who might have taken and executed the 
 
 16 Carter v. Hobbs, 12 Mich. 52, 83 Am. Dec. 762 (1863); Amey v. Win- 
 chester, 68 N. H. 447, 39 Atl. 487, 39 L. R. A. 760 (1896). But in Bourgoin 
 V. Hogan, 15 L. Can. R. 424 (1864), the innkeeper was held liable in such a 
 case for the loss of a coat of which he took charge, and for which he issued a 
 check. 
 
 17 Amy V. Winchester, supra. 
 
 18 Supra. 
 
 [86] 
 
Chap. XII.] Who is a Guest. [§ 135. 
 
 contract, either at the inn or elsewhere. One may be an inn- 
 keeper without being a club caterer, or he may be a club caterer 
 without being an innkeeper, or he may be both; but, if he is, 
 the two employments are so far separate and distinct in respect 
 of duties and liabilities as not to make him responsible in the 
 one capacity for habilities incurred in the other. " The case is 
 the same even if the guest at the ball or banquet deal in other 
 ways directly with the innkeeper, as by buying hquor, or put- 
 ting up his horse in the stable of the inn.^^ 
 
 Nor is th6 case altered even if the innkeeper is himself the 
 person who gives the entertainment and invites the pubUc to 
 be present. 
 
 So, where an innkeeper gave a ball and fm-nished food and 
 drink to a person attending the ball, he was held not to be an 
 innkeeper in so doing, though one who resorted to him as an 
 innkeeper and was provided with the same refreshment would 
 become a guest. In this case the innkeeper, the court said, 
 was in the position of any owner of a ballroom who should do 
 the same. It is not the amoimt of refreshment but the char- 
 acter under which the person buys it that makes him a 
 guest.^" 
 
 In the case of Amey v. Winchester,^' a person who was ap- 
 parently a guest at the inn, attended such a banquet, leaving 
 his hat at the door of the supper room, and it was lost during 
 the banquet. The court held that the owner was not a guest 
 at the time, and the innkeeper was not liable. It may be 
 doubted whether in this case the court did not go too far; for 
 it is difficult to see how the guest ceased to be such by attending 
 the banquet at his inn. 
 
 § 135. One not entitled to admittance received as guest. 
 
 Even a person not entitled to demand admittance, not being 
 
 19 Carter v. Hobbs, 12 Mich. 52, 83 Am. Dec. 762 (1863); Fitch v. Casler, 
 17 Hun (N. Y.), 126 (1879). 
 
 20 Fitch V. Casler, 17 Hun (N. Y.), 126 (1879). 
 
 21 68 N. H. 447, 39 Atl. 487, 39 L. R. A. 760 (1896). 
 
 [87] 
 
§ 136.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XII. 
 
 a bona fide traveller, will become a guest and entitled to all the 
 rights of a guest if he is received voluntarily in the inn upon 
 the footing of a guest. The innkeeper has a right to refuse to 
 receive him, but that right he may waive ; and he does waive 
 it by consenting to receive the guest. Thus it is usually stated 
 that one who Uves in the same town with the innkeeper cannot 
 be a guest, since he is not a traveller seeking entertainment 
 during his journey. While it is true that such a person is often 
 received to be entertained out of friendship merely, and there- 
 fore is not a guest,^^ yet if he is really received on the footing of 
 a guest the relation of host and guest is thereby estabUshed.^^ 
 
 § 136. Guest at inn for illegal purpose. 
 
 Where a person went to an inn with a prostitute and took a 
 room which he occupied with her, it was held that on account 
 of his misconduct he did not become a guest, any more than a 
 thief would who took a room to steal from the guests.^* It is 
 clear in this case, as the court says, that if the innkeeper had 
 been aware of the party's purpose in applying for the room, he 
 might have refused to receive him; and even after the appli- 
 cant had been received, he could have been ejected upon his 
 purpose becoming known. It does not follow, however, as the 
 court appeared to hold, that therefore he was not a guest. The 
 court says that if he had been a guest " he could not have been 
 turned into the street, though his profligate conduct was out- 
 raging all decency and ruining the reputation of the hotel." 
 This dictum can hardly be supported; for, as has been seen,^^ 
 the innkeeper would certainly have a right to turn out a guest 
 under such circtimstances. And though the innkeeper would 
 have been justified in refusing to receive the apphcant as a 
 guest, it by no means follows that if he was received the apph- 
 cant did not occupy the exact position of a guest. The inn- 
 
 22 Ante, § 125. 
 
 23 WaUing v. Potter, 35 Conn. 183 (1868); Orchard v. Bush, [1898] 2 Q. B. 
 284, 67 L. J. Q. B. 650, 78 L. T. Rep. 557, 46 W. R. 527 (Eng. 1898). 
 
 24 Curtis V. Murphy, 63 Wis. 4, 22 N. W. 825, 53 Am. Rep. 242 (1885). 
 
 25 Ante, § 102. 
 
 [88] 
 
Chap. XII.] Who is a Guest. [§ 137. 
 
 keeper can doubtless waive his right to refuse admittance and 
 accept an appUcant as his guest; though it is equally clear that 
 he may if he choose, accept him on such terms that he will not 
 be a guest.^* In this case the applicant was received as a 
 guest. He, however, was guilty of fraud in asking for accom- 
 modation for himself and wife ; and the decision may probably 
 best be supported on the groimd that the guest was precluded 
 from recovery in the case because of his fraud. 
 
 As Mr. Justice Kennedy said in Orchard v. Bush -P " If a man 
 is in an inn for the purpose of receiving such accommodation 
 as the innkeeper can give him, he is entitled to the protection 
 the law gives to a guest at an inn. " 
 
 § 137. Guest at inn as result of illegal act. 
 
 However it may be with the guest who is acting illegally 
 while in the inn, it is clear that he is none the less a guest be- 
 cause he may have been guilty of an illegal act in coming to 
 the inn, if his illegal conduct has ceased. Thus in a similar case 
 to the one just discussed where the man remained after the 
 woman had left the inn, and lost his goods, it was held that he 
 might recover from the innkeeper. Even assuming that such 
 misconduct would have barred him while the misconduct con- 
 tinued, the loss here happened after his misconduct ceased, and 
 his previous immorahty could not affect his subsequent status 
 as a guest.^* 
 
 On the same principle, in a case where it appeared that the 
 defendant was received at the inn on Sunday, and that to reach 
 the inn on that day he had broken the statute which forbade 
 travelling on Sunday, he was held to be a guest nevertheless, 
 
 MAnte, §125, 135. 
 
 27 Supra. 
 
 28 Lucia V. Omel, 46 App. Div. (N. Y.) 200, 61 N. Y. S. 659 (1899), affirmed 
 53 App. Div. 641, 66 N. Y. S. 1136 (1900). The facts differed from the Wis- 
 consin case (which was distinguished in the opinion) in two important par- 
 ticulars: In the Wisconsin case the plaintiff was a resident of the same town, 
 which does not seem to have been true in this case; and the innkeeper had 
 wrongfully refused to take charge of the property before its loss. 
 
 [89] 
 
§ 139.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XII. 
 
 since the relationship was estabUshed by acts not necessarily 
 connected with travelling on Sunday.^* 
 
 § 138. Difference between guest and boarder. 
 
 An innkeeper may, and commonly does, entertain not merely 
 transient guests, but other persons who stay at the inn for a 
 considerable period, making in fact lieir residence there ; such 
 persons are boarders, not guests.^" 
 
 If a person is at an inn for entertainment, the question 
 whether he is a guest or a boarder is a question of fact.^^ 
 
 The relation of innkeeper and guest once being established 
 will be presumed to continue imtil the contrary appears, and 
 not to be changed to the relation of host and boarder. The 
 relation is not necessarily and conclusively changed by an agree- 
 ment as to price, or any definite length of sojourn.^^ 
 
 § 139. Length of stay at inn as a test of the difference. 
 
 When one is staying at the inn under a contract by which he 
 is to remain there a certain considerable time, and in return 
 gets a special rate for board, he is presumably a boarder.^^ 
 
 In a California case the facts were that the plaintiff went to 
 the inn to ascertain if it was a place where the health of his wife 
 would be benefited, with the determination to rema,in there 
 indefinitely, perhaps for a very long time, if such should be the 
 
 28 Cox V. Cook, 14 AUen (Mass.), 165 (1867). 
 
 soWaJling v. Potter, 35 Conn. 183 (1868); Hall v. Pike, 100 Mass. 495 
 (1868); Horner v. Harvey, 3 N. Mex. 197, 5 Pac. 329 (1885); Jeffords v. 
 Crump, 12 Phila. (Pa.) 500 (1878); Lawrence v. Howard, 1 Utah, 142 (1874). 
 
 81 Haff V. Adams (Ari. 1899), 59 Pac. Ill; Magee v. Pacific Improvement 
 Co., 98 Cal. 678, 33 Pac. 772 (1893); PoUock v. Landis, 36 la. 651 (1873); 
 Hall V. Pike, 100 Mass. 495 (1868); Hancock v. Rand, 94 N. Y. 1, 46 Am. 
 Rep. 112 (1883); Light v. Abel, 6 AEen (New Br.), 400 (1867). 
 
 32 Ross V. MeUin, 36 Minn. 421, 32 N. W. 172 (1887). 
 
 S3 Haff V. Adams, 6 Ari. 395, 59 Pao. Ill (1899); Moore v. Long Beach 
 Development Co., 87 Cal. 483, 26 Pac. 92, 22 Am. St. Rep. 265 (1891); Shoe- 
 craft V. Bailey, 25 la. 553 (1868); Johnson v. Reynolds, 3 Kan. 257 (1865); 
 Smith V. Keyes, 2 Th. & C. (N. Y.) 650 (1874); Meacham v. GaUoway, 102 
 Tenn. 415, 52 S. W. 859 (1899); ex parte M'Manus, 6 Austral. L. T. (Vict.) 
 12 (1884). 
 
 [90] 
 
Chap. XII.] Who is a Guest. [§ 139. 
 
 case; but with a view, if her health did not improve, to leave 
 at any time. Before going there with his family he had made 
 an arrangement for terms of entertainment at a great deal less 
 than those for a transient traveller, and by the month, and he 
 went prepared to stay, if he desired, for a considerable time, 
 and to enjoy all the gayeties that might take place. He had 
 no other place of residence, and for the time being this inn was 
 to be such. It was evidently the hope and the expectation of 
 the plaintiff and wife that her health would be benefited at this 
 inn, which was a pleasure resort, its principal business season 
 being that of the summer. These facts, the court said, were 
 "very persuasive that it was the intention of all the parties 
 that he should be a boarder, and not a mere transient traveller 
 or guest^ and for the time being a resident in the place where 
 he was intending to board;" and the court refused to disturb 
 the finding of the court below, that the plaintiff was a boarder.^^ 
 In the late case of Crapo v. Rockwell,^^ the plaintiff went to 
 Albany in September, 1902, having just prior thereto married 
 John M. Crapo, a business man of that city. With her husband 
 she Uved in various boarding houses mitil September, 1903, 
 when they took rooms at the Ten Eyck Annex, the defendant's 
 inn, where, with the exception of an absence of about five 
 weeks at Bar Harbor, plaintiff continued to reside until Feb- 
 ruary, 1905. The loss occurred in January of the latter year. 
 Plaintiff's husband died at the Annex in November, 1904. He 
 had resided and been in business in Albany since his marriage 
 to plaintiff, and prior thereto. After their marriage he trans- 
 ferred his business to the plaintiff, and at the time of the trial 
 she was still conducting the same in Albany. Neither she nor 
 her husband had any other residence than the inn during the 
 time they were there. The court held that she was a boarder, 
 not a guest; and the controlling reasons appear to have been 
 the length of her stay at the inn and the fact that she had no 
 
 a Moore v. Long Beach Development Co., 87 Cal. 483, 26 Pac. 92, 22 Am. 
 St. Rep. 265 (1891). 
 
 35 94 N. Y. Supp. 1122 (1905). 
 
 [91J 
 
§ 140.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XII. 
 
 other residence in the town, though she unquestionably Hved 
 there. It was not possible, the court said, to regard her in the 
 light of a transient guest. 
 
 But the mere fact that he has stayed for a week or longer, 
 and that he is paying the weekly rather than the daily rate, 
 does not prove that he is a boarder.^* 
 
 A lumberman, doing business on the river, went to a hotel, 
 and, after remaining two or three days, informed the hotel keeper 
 that he should be there frequently during the summer, and de- 
 sired some deduction in the regular charge of the hotel ; and it 
 was agreed to keep him for one dollar per day, the regular price 
 being two dollars. Nothing was said as to the length of time 
 he expected to remain. He was held to be a guest.'^ In a 
 case in the Supreme Court of Jamaica, one who was staying 
 at an inn while he was in attendance at a sitting of the court 
 was held to be a guest.^* 
 § 140. Besidence in the town as a test of the difference. 
 
 The determination of the question whether one who is stay- 
 ing at an inn is a guest or a boarder may depend upon whether 
 the person is a resident of the town or a stranger. So a for- 
 eigner visiting the country and staying for a considerable time 
 at a hotel was held a guest,^^ and a resident of another town, 
 visiting the town where the inn was situated for business pur- 
 poses merely, was held to be a guest.^" 
 
 38Beale v. Posey, 72 Ala. 323 (1882); Pinkerton v. Woodward, 33 Cal. 
 557, 91 Am. Dec. 657 (1867); Fay v. Pacific Improvement Co., 93 Cal. 253, 
 26 Pac. 1099, 28 Pac. 943, 27 Am. St. Rep. 943, 16 L. R. A. 188 (1891); 
 Magee v. Pacific Improvement Co., 98 Cal. 678, 33 Pac. 772 (1893); Shoe- 
 craft V. Bailey, 25 la. 553 (1868); Pollock v. Landis, 36 la. 651 (1873); 
 Berkshire Woolen Co. v. Proctor, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 417 (1851); Hall v. Pilce, 
 100 Mass. 495 (1868); R. L. PoUi & Co. v. Melenbaoker, 136 Mich. 611, B9 
 N. W. 867 (1904); Ross v. MeUin, 36 Minn. 421, 32 N. W. 172 (1887); Metz- 
 ger v. Schnabel, 23 N. Y. Misc. 698, 52 N. Y. Supp. 105 (1898); Lima v. 
 DwineUe, 7 Alb. L. J. 44 (N. Y. 1873); Jalie v. Cardinal, 35 Wis. 118 (1874); 
 Whiting V. MiUs, 7 Up. Can. Q. B. 450 (1849). 
 
 37 Shoecraft v. Bailey, 25 la. 553 (1868). 
 
 38 Jaquet v. Edwards, 1 Jamaica, 4 (1867). 
 
 30 Metzger v. Schnabel, 23 N. Y. Misc. 698, 52 N. Y. Supp. 105 (1898). 
 •lo Beale v. Posey, 72 Ala. 323 (1882). 
 [92] 
 
Chap. XII.] Who is a Guest. [§ 140. 
 
 On the other hand, an employee of a railroad, making his 
 regular trips, and stopping over at each end of his route at the 
 hotel, where he rents a room by the month, is not a guest. He 
 is, as the court said, "a citizen of the commimity at both ends 
 of the route. " *^ So where a man breaks up his home and goes 
 to a hotel in the same town, he is a boarder.^^ 
 
 Where a man sent his family to an inn in a distant city and 
 they remained there for several months, while he made them 
 an occasional short visit, his family were boarders and he was 
 a guest.^^ 
 
 One of the most important cases involving the distinction 
 between a guest and a boarder is the New York case of Han- 
 cock V. Rand.*^ The husband of the plaintiff. General Hancock, 
 was an officer in the United States army, and in November, 
 1873, he applied for rooms and board at the defendants' hotel 
 for himself and family. After some conversation between the 
 innkeeper and Hancock, in regard to himself and family re- 
 maining at the hotel, m which certain rooms in a private house 
 adjoining said hotel, which the defendants were then using in 
 connection with the same, were mentioned, it was said by Gen^ 
 eral Hancock that he expected to remain until the following 
 summer, provided everything was satisfactory, and provided, 
 also, he was not sooner ordered elsewhere on military duty. 
 The defendants offered the terms which they would take for 
 said rooms, which terms General Hancock accepted on the un- 
 derstanding that he should continue to occupy them imtil the 
 next following spring or stunmer, provided everything was sat- 
 isfactory, and provided, also, he was not sooner ordered away 
 on miUtary duty. General Hancock and family, immediately 
 prior to their going to the hotel of the defendants, had been 
 boarding at another hotel in New York city, and had no per- 
 il Horner v. Harvey, 3 N. Mex. 197, 5 Pac. 329 (1885). 
 
 « Haff V. Adams, 6 Ari. 395, 59 Pac. Ill (1899); Meacham v. Galloway, 
 102 Tenn. 415, 52 S. W. 859 (1899). 
 
 « Lusk V Belote, 22 Minn. 468 (1876). 
 
 « 94 N. Y. 1, 46 Am. Rep. 112 (1883), affirming S. C, 17 Hun, 279. 
 
 [93] 
 
§ 140.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XII. 
 
 manent home anjrwhere; and prior to the year 1873 and ever 
 since that time the home of General Hancock had been where- 
 ever his mihtary headquarters were, and such headquarters 
 duririg that time had been at different places. The court held 
 that Mrs. Hancock was a guest, not a boarder. An examina- 
 tion of the opinion at length will be instructive, and will show 
 the spirit ia which a court approaches the question imder dis- 
 cussion. 
 
 "As a soldier, General Hancock was unable to acquire a per- 
 manent home, and by reason of his profession was obliged to 
 live temporarily and for imcertain periods of time at different 
 places and with innkeepers and others who make provision for 
 the entertainment of guests and travellers. He was necessarily 
 a transient person liable to respond to the call of his superiors 
 at any moment and to change the locahty of himself and fam- 
 ily. The defendants kept a hotel or inn, taking care of tran- 
 sient guests, some staying for a longer, some for a shorter, period. 
 General Hancock, for himself and family, paid for their meals 
 the same as other transient guests, and by express agreement 
 they were at hberty to leave at any time they saw fit. Under 
 these circumstances no reason exists why they should not be 
 protected as well as the other" travellers or guests at the hotel. 
 It is very evident, from the testimony, that no absolute and 
 express contract was made for the hiring of the rooms and the 
 board of General Hancock and his family for any stipulated 
 period of time, and the most that can be claimed, on the part 
 of the appellants, is that it was a question of fact for the con- 
 sideration of the referee and for him to determine whether 
 General Hancock and family were travellers and guests or board- 
 ers. On the one hand, as already stated, General Hancock was 
 a transient person and could not depend upon remaining for 
 any particular period of time at any place ; he was without any 
 permanent residence or home, and it positively appears that 
 he made no arrangement for any permanent occupation of the 
 rooms at defendants' hotel. On the other hand, separate apart- 
 ments were kept for boarders and for transient persons by the 
 [94] 
 
Chap. XII.] Who is a Guest. [§ 140. 
 
 defendants, and the general and his family were registered 
 among the former, but it does not appear that he knew this 
 fact, and hence it cannot well be claimed that he had grounds 
 for supposing and understood that he and his family were 
 boarders and not guests. The authorities hold beyond ques- 
 tion that the fixing of the price does not make the party a 
 boarder. 
 
 "The fair intendment from the evidence is that General Han- 
 cock did not go to defendants' hotel under a contract hiring the 
 rooms for a season, but that he was a transient person who had 
 the right to leave at any moment, the same as any other guest. 
 Regarding the evidence as it stands, and conceding the facts 
 in reference to the question whether General Hancock and fam- 
 ily were travellers and guests or boarders, there would seem to 
 be but little question that the weight of the testimony is in favor 
 of the proposition that they were travellers or wayfarers and 
 that there was no hiring of the rooms of the defendants for a 
 season or a specified time. Even if there might have been a 
 doubt as to whether there was a hiring for a term, as the ref- 
 eree has found in favor of the plaintiff upon this question, we 
 cannot disturb the finding and it should be upheld. 
 
 " In considering the question discussed it should not be over- 
 looked that the St. Cloud Hotel was kept as a public inn in 
 every sense and was clearly distinguishable from a boarding 
 house; its proprietors did not claim that it was a boarding 
 house, and there is no evidence to show that it was considered 
 in that light, and neither the fixing of the price nor the conver- 
 sation had in reference to the probability of General Hancock 
 and family remaining for a period of time could alter or change 
 its true character. Hotels in modem days are differently con- 
 ducted from what they were in times gone by. Furnishing 
 rooms at a fixed price and meals at prices depending upon the 
 orders given at the usual hotel rates constitutes a material dif- 
 ference in the system of keeping hotels from that which for- 
 merly existed. The defendants conducted a restaurant in 
 connection with their hotel, at which meals were furnished in 
 
 [95] 
 
§ 140.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XII. 
 
 accordance with fixed prices. General Hancock and family, 
 after the first month of their stay at the defendants' hotel, and 
 at the time the property in question was stolen, took their meals 
 at the restaurant, for which they paid prices for each meal the 
 same as other guests or travellers. So far then as this is con- 
 cerned they must be considered the same as other guests. 
 Certainly they were not boarders in the sense in which that 
 term is imderstood. As they were guests at the restaurant at 
 the time when the loss occurred and paid as such, it is diffi- 
 cult to see upon what principle it can be urged that they 
 were boarders because their lodgings were in the hotel or in 
 rooms connected therewith. To sustain such a rule would 
 make them boarders in part and guests in part. This would 
 be unreasonable, the more so in this case, because the proof 
 does not estabhsh a contract for any fixed time. " 
 
 The gist of the case was summed up in these words: "As a 
 soldier, General Hancock was imable to acquire a permanent 
 home, and by reason of his profession was obliged to live tempo- 
 rarily and for uncertain periods of time at different places, and ' 
 with innkeepers and others who make provision for the entertain- 
 ment of guests and travellers. He was necessarily a transient per- 
 son, Uable to respond to the call of his superiors at any moment, 
 and to change the locahty of himself and family. " 
 
 [96] 
 
Chap. XIII.] Responsibility for the Guest's Goods. [§ 141. 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 undertaking op responsibility for the guest's goods. 
 
 § 141. Ways of creating responsibil- 
 ity. 
 Topic I. Goods within the pre- 
 cincts of the inn. 
 Subtopic A. Goods bailed to 
 the innkeeper. 
 
 142. Responsibility begins at mo- 
 
 ment of bailment. 
 
 143. Responsibility conditioned on 
 
 owner becoming guest. 
 
 144. Delivery to a servant of the 
 
 innkeeper. 
 
 145. Delivery by custom. 
 
 146. Delivery by a third person for 
 
 a guest. 
 
 147. Delivery to the innkeeper or 
 
 servant in another capacity. 
 Subtopic B. Goods brought 
 with the guest. 
 
 § 148. Responsibility of innkeeper 
 extends to goods in posses- 
 sion of guest. 
 
 149. Goods must be within general 
 
 control of innkeeper. 
 
 150. Iimkeeper's responsibility for 
 
 merchandise. 
 
 151. Special arrangement made by 
 
 the guest. 
 
 152. Goods brought by guest to 
 
 inn after his own arrival. 
 Topic II. Goods outside the inn. 
 
 153. Innkeeper not generally re- 
 
 sponsible for goods taken by 
 the guest outside the inn. 
 
 154. Goods placed outside the inn 
 
 by the innkeeper. 
 
 155. Goods placed in customary 
 
 place outside the inn by 
 guest. 
 
 § 141. Ways of creating responsibility- 
 
 The innkeeper may or may not be an actual bailee of the 
 goods brought to the inn by the guest ; whether he is or is not 
 a bailee, his responsibiUty for goods for which he is answerable 
 at all as irmkeeper is the same. When a guest comes to an inn 
 he always keeps in his own possession and control certain goods, 
 such, for instance, as wearing apparel ; while other goods he is 
 Ukely to hand to the innkeeper for safe custody. The innkeep- 
 er's responsibiUty extends to both classes of goods ; but the cre- 
 ation of responsibiUty is due to diiferent circumstances in the 
 two cases. They are, therefore, to be dealt with separately. 
 7 [97] 
 
§ 142.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XIII. 
 
 Furthermore, while the innkeeper is usually responsible for 
 goods of a guest within the precincts of the inn, he is not usually 
 responsible for goods outside the precincts of the inn. It is 
 therefore necessary to examine separately the case of goods 
 outside the inn. 
 
 TOPIC I. 
 
 GOODS WITHIN THE PRECINCTS OF THE INN. 
 
 SUBTOPIC A. 
 
 GOODS BAILED TO THE INNKEEPER. 
 
 § 142. Responsibility begins at moment of bailment. 
 
 Where the goods are actually given into the possession of the 
 innkeeper, the Habihty as innkeeper begins at latest at the mo- 
 ment of delivery to the innkeeper ; and therefore the innkeeper 
 may become responsible for the goods of a guest, even before 
 the relationship of host and guest is established. This often 
 happens where the innkeeper sends a conveyance to a railroad 
 station to bring guests to his inn. When, in such a case, a 
 traveller gives his baggage to the porter or other person author- 
 ized by the innkeeper to take it, the innkeeper becomes Uable 
 for it at once, provided the traveller later becomes a guest.^ 
 
 Even if the baggage itself is not given to the servant of the 
 innkeeper, but only the check for it, the case would seem to be 
 the same. "If it should appear that the trunk was not deliv- 
 ered by the railroad company, the innkeeper would not be ha- 
 ble. Being boimd to extraordinary diligence in the preserva- 
 
 iCoskery v. Nagle, 83 Ga. 696, 10 S. E. 491, 20 Am. St. Rep. 333, 6 
 L. R. A. 483 (1889); Williams v. Moore, 69 111. App. 618 (1897) (arrangement 
 made by innkeeper with a baggage transfer company to receive and bring 
 to the inn the guest's baggage.) Dickinson v. Winchester, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 
 114 (1849). In this case the court said the innkeeper, who provided the 
 conveyance, was liable from the receipt of the baggage either as innkeeper 
 or as common carrier. The latter alternative does not seem admissible, and 
 the case is always taken as establishing innkeeper's liability. 
 
 [98] 
 
Chap. XIII.] Responsibility for the Guest's Goods. [§ 143. 
 
 tion of the baggage delivered him by guests, it is incumbent on 
 the innkeeper to show that the trunk was not received by him 
 or his servants. The guest makes out a case, prima facie, 
 when he shows the dehvery of the check to the servant within 
 the scope of whose, employment was the getting of baggage 
 and delivering it to the guests, and that the innkeeper has re- 
 fused to deUver to him the baggage or the check. " ^ 
 
 Strictly speaking, no doubt, the liability of the innkeeper is 
 only for the check, and if the innkeeper produced the check and 
 showed sufficient reason for not having obtained the baggage 
 he would no doubt perform his whole duty ; but responsibility 
 for the safety of the check and for the proper use of it is placed 
 on the innkeeper as soon as the check is handed to his servant. 
 
 A similar state of affairs exists when the goods of an intend- 
 ing guest are sent to the inn and delivered there before the 
 guest arrives. The innkeeper is obviously not obliged to accept 
 the goods imder these circumstances, but if he does so and the 
 guest afterwards arrives and remains, the responsibihty of the 
 innkeeper for the goods begins at the moment they are re- 
 ceived.* 
 
 § 143. Besponsibility conditioned on owner becoming guest. 
 
 It must clearly be seen, however, that in all these cases the 
 responsibihty of the innkeeper is conditioned on the owner of 
 the goods becoming a guest within a reasonable time. Al- 
 though at the time the goods are given to the innkeeper the 
 owner bona fide intends to become a guest, still if he changes his 
 mind and does not do so the iimkeeper will be regarded as not 
 responsible as such for the goods. So where the traveller gave 
 his luggage to the; porter of the inn at the railroad station, and 
 the porter carried it to the inn, but the owner never became a 
 guest, it was held that the innkeeper never became responsible 
 for it as innkeeper.* And in a similar case where the traveller 
 
 2Carhart v. Wainman, 114 Ga. 632, 40 S. E. 781 (1902) Ace. Williams v. 
 Moore, supra. 
 
 3 Eden v. Drey, 17 111. App. 102 (1898). 
 
 ^Tulane Hotel Co. v. Holohan, 112 Tenn. 214, 79 S. W. 113 (1904). 
 
 [99] 
 
§ 143.] Innkeepbes. [Chap. XIII. 
 
 went to the office of the inn, but there found a telegram ad- 
 dressed to him, in consequence of which he did not register, but 
 went to another place, the innkeeper did not become respon- 
 sible.* 
 
 In both these cases it will be noticed that if the traveller had 
 become a guest the innkeeper's responsibiUty for the goods 
 would have dated from the moment when the porter took 
 charge of them at the railroad station ; but as the owner never 
 became a guest, the innkeeper was not Uable as such even dur- 
 ing the time while the traveller was on his way to the hotel. 
 In other words, during that period the responsibiUty is doubt- 
 ful; and it is settled only by the event. 
 
 Where the check for the baggage is delivered to the porter 
 of the hotel by one who does not intend to become a guest, it 
 is obvious that the porter has no authority to accept the goods 
 on behalf of the hotel ; and the innkeeper would not be respon- 
 sible for the goods even as bailee. Even if he deposited the 
 goods in the hotel office, without calling the attention of the 
 proper clerk to it, the innkeeper is not responsible as innkeeper 
 or even as ordinary bailee; "it is the same as if the porter had 
 gratuitously brought up the valise of a friend or a stranger and 
 put it down in the hotel office without calling any attention to 
 it or giving the hotel employees any notice of it, and no occa- 
 sion existing for them to take charge of it. " The porter indi- 
 vidually is the bailee.* 
 
 The case would seem, however, to be different if the owner, 
 at the time he gives the goods to the porter, bona fide intends to 
 become a guest within a reasonable time. The porter's author- 
 ity as distinguished from the innkeeper's responsibility, must 
 be determined by the facts existing at the time he takes the 
 goods; and at that time the facts are the same as in any case 
 of the sort where the owner carries out his intention and be- 
 comes a guest. If the owner acts bona fide the porter has au- 
 thority to receive the goods for the innkeeper and the latter is 
 
 6 Strauss v. County H. & W. Co., 12 Q. B. D. (Eng.) 27 (1883). 
 oTulane Hotel v. Holohan, 112 Tenn. 214, 79 S. W. 113 (1904). 
 [100] 
 
Chap. XIII.] Responsibility for the Guest's Goods. [§ 146. 
 
 a gratuitous bailee. In the case just cited, however, the owner 
 intended, at the time he gave his valise to the porter, to be- 
 come a guest; but the distinction indicated was not made by 
 the court, and the innkeeper was held not to be even a bailee. 
 
 § 144. Delivery to a servant of the innkeeper. 
 
 Where goods are placed directly in the custody of the inn- 
 keeper they are usually given, not to the innkeeper himself, but 
 to a servant. If it is desired to hold the innkeeper liable for 
 a receipt of the goods by his servant, it is, of course, essential 
 to prove the service. But it is, clearly, enough to prove appar- 
 ent authority on the part of the servant, as for instance, when 
 he is in the inn and clothed with the appearance of service 
 there.'' Thus, ordinarily, a proper person with whom to deposit 
 valuables is the person who stands in the office and assigns 
 rooms to guests.* 
 
 § 145. Delivery by custom. 
 
 DeUvery may be made to the innkeeper by custom without 
 an actual manual transfer. This is usually accomplished by 
 putting the goods in a certain place in an open manner. Thus, 
 where such is the custom the innkeeper may be held as bailee 
 without showing actual knowledge on his part of the dehvery 
 where a baggage transfer company put the guest's baggage on 
 the platform of the hotel and shouted "baggage," ' or on the 
 sidewalk in front of the hotel and rang the porter's bell.^° 
 
 § 146. Delivery by a third person for a guest. 
 
 In order to be responsible for a guest's goods as innkeeper, 
 it is not necessary that the innkeeper receive the goods from 
 the guest himself. The goods may be delivered to the inn- 
 
 7 Rockwell V. Proctor, 39 Ga. 105 (1869); Labold v. Southern Hotel Co., 
 54 Mo. App. 567 (1893); Buckle v. Probasco, 58 Mo. App. 49 (1894); Houser 
 V. Tully, 62 Pa. 92, 1 Am. Rep. 390 (1869); Curtis v. Murphy, 63 Wis. 4, 
 22 N. W. 825, 53 Am. Rep. 242 (1885). 
 
 8 Buckle V. Probasco, supra; Curtis v. Murphy, supra. 
 •Maloney v. Bacon, 33 Mo. App. 501 (1888). 
 
 »» Becker v. Haynes, 29 Fed. 441 (1887). 
 
 [101] 
 
§ 148.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XIII. 
 
 keeper by a third person to hold for the guest; and in that case 
 the responsibility for the goods is that of an innkeeper." 
 
 And accordingly where an innkeeper was accustomed to re- 
 ceive and take charge of packages brought to the inn by trades- 
 men for guests, he was held to be responsible as innkeeper for 
 such packages as soon as he received them; although he might 
 perhaps not have been bound to receive the packages. He had 
 made it part of his business to receive the packages.^^ 
 
 § 147. Delivery to the innkeeper or servant in another capacity. 
 
 If goods are delivered to the innkeeper it may be shown that 
 he had them, not as innkeeper but in some other capacity.^' 
 And if goods are handed to a servant of the innkeeper, it 
 is open to the innkeeper to show that they were given to such 
 servant not as acting for the innkeeper, but merely to hold as 
 a friend of the owner. ^^ Whether they are given to the inn- 
 keeper, or the servant, in respect of the innkeeper's pubhc call- 
 ing, or as a private matter, is a question of fact in each case.*^ 
 
 SUBTOPIC B. 
 
 GOODS BROUGHT WITH THE GUEST. 
 
 § 148. Responsibility of innkeeper extends to goods in possession 
 of the guest. 
 
 In order for the innkeeper to become responsible for the 
 goods of his guest it is not necessary that the possession of 
 them should be given up to the innkeeper; so where the inn- 
 keeper gives the guest a key to his room and the guest takes 
 the goods to his room and keeps them there, the innkeeper is 
 hable for the safety of the goods.^" 
 
 "Western U. T. Co. v. Trissal, 98 Ind. 566 (1884). 
 
 12 Needles v. Howard, 1 E. D. Smith (N. Y.), 54 (1850). 
 
 13 Bemon v. Watson, 1 Roll. Abr. 3, pi. 1. 
 "Sneider v. Geiss, 1 Yeates (Pa.), 34 (1791). 
 isHouser v. TuUy, 62, Pa. 92, 1 Am. Rep. 390 (1869). 
 
 18 Y. B. 42 Ed. 3, 11, pi. 13 (1367); 11 H. 4, 45, pi. 18 (1410); Fay v. Pa- 
 cific Imp. Co., 93 Cal. 253, 26 Pac. 1099, 28 Pac. 943, 27 Am. St. Rep. 198, 
 [102] 
 
Chap. XIII.] Responsibility for the Guest's Goods. [§ 150. 
 
 So where a guest places his overcoat or gloves in the place 
 provided for them in the inn, although the innkeeper is not 
 notified of the fact, the hability of the innkeeper attaches.^' 
 
 And so where the guest's personal baggage is placed in a pub- 
 Uc room in the inn, without the knowledge of the innkeeper, 
 or even by the special request of the guest, the innkeeper is 
 liable." 
 
 § 149. Goods must be within general control of innkeeper. 
 
 But while it is not necessary, in order to make the innkeeper 
 responsible for the goods, that they should be delivered into his 
 possession, still they must be within his general care and con- 
 trol. If the guest himself undertakes the care of them, or if 
 he makes a special arrangement by which the control of them 
 is removed from the innkeeper, the latter is not liable.^* Thus 
 in an old case the innkeeper gave notice to a guest that he could 
 not receive him, because he was obUged to leave at once to 
 serve on a jury. The guest then requested that he might him- 
 self take the keys and take care of the goods. The innkeeper 
 gave him the keys, and went away; and the goods were lost. 
 It was held that the innkeeper was not Uable.^" 
 
 § 150. Innkeeper's responsibility for merchandise. 
 
 The question often arises where a guest brings merchandise 
 to an inn and there takes a room for the purpose of exhibition 
 and sale of the merchandise. Where the goods are placed, un- 
 der these circumstances, in a separate, private room, to which 
 
 16 L. R. A. 188 (1891); Weisenger v. Taylor, 1 Bush (Ky.), 275, 89 Am. Dec. 
 626 (1866); Epps v. Hinds, 27 Miss. 657, 61 Am. Dec. 528 (1854); Jalie v. 
 Cardinal, 35 Wis. 118 (1874); Shaw v. Ray, 1 Cr. & Dix C. C. (Ire.) 84 (1839). 
 
 17 Norcross v. Norcross, 53 Me. 163 (1865); McDonald v. Edgerton, 5 Barb. 
 (N. Y.) 560 (1849); Bradner v. Mullen, 27 N. Y. Misc. 479, 59 N. Y. Supp. 
 178 (1899); Read v. Amidon, 41 Vt. 15, 98 Am. Dec. 560 (1868); Shaw v. 
 Ray, 1 Cr. & Dix C. C. (Ire.) 84 (1839). 
 
 18 Packard v. Northcraft, 2 Met. (Ky.) 439 (1859); Burrows v. Trieber, 
 21 Md. 320, 83 Am. Dec. 590 (1864); Candy v. Spencer, 3 F. & F. (Eng.) 
 306 (1862); Richmond v. Smith, 8 B. & C. 9, 2 M. & Ry. (Eng.) 235 (1828). 
 
 10 Vance v. Throckmorton, 5 Bush (Ky.), 41, 96 Am. Dec. 327 (1869). 
 20 Year Book, 11 Hen. 4, 45, pi. 18 (1410). 
 
 [103] 
 
§ 152.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XIII. 
 
 the guest is authorized to invite the customers, and in which 
 he is to show his goods, the landlord is not Uable for the mer- 
 chandise so contained in the room.^* 
 
 § 151. Special arrangement made by the guest. 
 
 One element of these decisions is the fact that a special con- 
 tract was made between the innkeeper and the plaintiff, who 
 was therefore not received on the terms created by the common 
 law. This was the significant fact in an important New York 
 case. The plaintiff, by a special arrangement with an innkeeper 
 and at special rates, brought his stalhon to the inn on certain 
 days in each week. The plaintiff cared for the horse, the inn- 
 keeper furnishing the feed. The horse was burned in the barn 
 without negligence of the innkeeper, who was held not to be 
 liable.22 
 
 § 152. Goods brought by guest to inn after his own arrival 
 
 The fact that property is brought to the inn by the guest, 
 after he becomes such, should, it would seem, have no bearing 
 on the question whether the innkeeper has become respon- 
 
 21 Fisher v. Kelsey, 121 U. S. 383, 30 L. ed. 930 (1887, semble); Myers v. 
 CottriU, 5 Biss. 465, Fed. Cas. No. 9985 (1873); Burgess v. Clements, 4 M. 
 & S. (Eng.) 306 (1815); Farnworth v. Packwood, 1 Holt N. P. 209, 1 Stark. 
 249 (Eng. 1816). Where personal goods of the guest were placed in the 
 same room (which was used as his private bedroom, /he innkeeper was held 
 liable as such for them. Myers v. CottriU, supra. 
 
 22 Mowers v. Fethers, 61 N. Y. 34, 19 Am. Rep. 244 (1874). Reynolds, C.,' 
 said: "He is doubtless bound to receive and entertain a strolling pedler, and 
 securely guard his pack of trinkets if brought infra hospitium, so long as he 
 remains a mere guest. So, also, would he be bound to receive and entertain 
 a wayfarer, incumbered with a stallion, but under no obligation as an inn- 
 keeper to allow his curtilage to be turned into an asylum for the breeding of 
 horses. It is very manifest in this case that the sojourn of the plaintiff Egg- 
 ner, with the horse, at the defendant's inn, was not that of an ordinary trav- 
 eller. The purpose and object was entirely different, and the defendant, as 
 an innkeeper, was under no common-law obligation to receive and entertain 
 the plaintiff Eggner and his horse for such a purpose. . . . Under this 
 condition of 'facts it appears to me obvious that Eggner did not come for 
 entertainment at the defendant's inn as an ordinary wayfarer, but under a 
 Bpecial arrangement previously made." 
 
 [104] 
 
Chap. XIII.] Responsibility fob the Guest's Goods. [§ 153. 
 
 sible for it; whether the property was brought by the guest 
 when he came to the inn or later is immaterial.^* 
 
 TOPIC II. 
 
 GOODS outside THE INN. 
 
 8 153. Innkeeper not generally responsible for goods taken by the 
 guest outside the inn. 
 
 Where the guest's goods are placed outside the inn by the 
 guest or in accordance with his directions, the innkeeper is not 
 responsible for the goods. So in an old case where a horse was 
 brought to an inn, and the owner requested that it be put out 
 to pasture, and this was done, it was held that the horse was 
 not brought within the inn, and the innkeeper was not liable.^* 
 So an innkeeper is not Uable in his character as such if sheep be 
 put to pasture under the direction of the guest and they are 
 injured by eating poisonous plants.^^ In a modern case an 
 innkeeper provided, on the seashore, bath houses for the use of 
 his guests, and goods of a guest were lost from a bath house. It 
 was held that whatever might be the liabihty of the innkeeper, 
 he was at any rate not liable for the goods so stolen on a dec- 
 laration charging him as innkeeper.^^ And so where a guest 
 put his horse in the pasture belonging to the innkeeper, and 
 himself fed and took care of the horse, it was clear that the 
 innkeeper was not Hable for the horse.^^ 
 
 The case is still clearer, where the guest leaves his goods out- 
 side the inn, against the direction of the innkeeper. Thus, 
 where a clothier brought a cart of wool to the inn, and the inn- 
 keeper said if the clothier wished him to take charge of his cart 
 he must put it into the yard near the inn, and the clothier did 
 
 23Mateer v. Brown, 1 Cal. 221, 52 Am. Dec. 303 (1850). 
 
 24 Windham v. Mead, 4 Leon. 96 (abt. 1600); Dale v. Gibson, 1 Roll. Abr. 
 3, pi. 3 (but see Mosley v. Fosset, *.). 
 
 25 Hawley v. Smith, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 642 (1841). 
 
 28 Minor v. Staples, 71 Me. 316, 36 Am. Rep. 318 (1880). 
 2' Neal V. Wilcox, 4 Jones (N. C), Law 146, 67 Am. Dec. 266 (1856). 
 
 [105] 
 
§ 154.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XIII. 
 
 not do so, the innkeeper was held not liable.^* So where the 
 innkeeper expressly declined to be responsible for certain goods, 
 not being needed by the guest for his own use, unless the goods 
 were given to the innkeeper himself, the court held that if he 
 chose to keep them, the innkeeper was not responsible.^* But 
 the important fact in these cases is that the goods were left 
 outside the Ltin or outside the innkeeper's control. This is 
 shown by a rather common case where it appears that the inn- 
 keeper offers to take goods to the guest's room, but the guest 
 requests that they may remain in a common hallway, saying 
 that they will be safer there. In these cases the innkeeper has 
 been held responsible, if he allowed the goods to remain. It 
 must be clear, therefore, that if the goods are actually within 
 the inn the innkeeper must give explicit directions where they 
 are to be placed, if he is to escape responsibihty when the goods 
 are not disposed of according to his wish.^" 
 
 § 154. Goods placed outside the inn by the innkeeper. 
 
 If the innkeeper himself, without the direction of the guest, 
 puts property of the guest which has been given to him, in a 
 place outside the inn, or even entirely separate from it, the 
 iimkeeper is hable for it. So in the old case cited, the court 
 held that if the innkeeper, without direction from the guest, 
 had put the horse to pasture, the innkeeper would be liable.^' 
 And the same thing is true where the goods of the guest are 
 placed by the innkeeper or under his direction in any place not 
 directly connected with the inn. So where the plaintiff, on a 
 fair-day, coming to the defendant's inn with a horse and gig 
 ordered the horse to be put into the stable, but gave no special 
 direction as to the gig, and the horse was put into the stable, 
 and the gig placed with other carriages in the public highway, 
 near the house, where it was the practice of the defendant to 
 
 28 Anon., cited in Brand v. Glasse, F. Moore, 158 (1563). 
 
 29 Brand v. Glasse, F. Moore, 158 (1584). 
 
 30 Richmond v. Smith, 8 B. & C. 9, 2 M. & Ry. 235 (Eng. 1828). 
 
 31 Windham v. Mead, 4 Leon. 96 (abt. 1600); Dale v. Gibson, 1 Roll. Abr. 
 3 F. pi. 3; Calye's Case, 8 Co. 63 (1584). 
 
 [106] 
 
Chap. XIII.] Responsibility for the Guest's Goods. [§ 155. 
 
 put carriages on fair-days, it was held that the innkeeper was 
 responsible for the gig, and was liable for its loss.^^ Lord Den- 
 man said that the gig was taken while under the protection of 
 the innkeeper; while Littledale, J., said that since the place was 
 commonly used for the purpose on fair-days it must be taken, 
 as against the defendant^ to be part of the inn, or, as Taunton, J., 
 put it, it was part of the inn since the defendant by his conduct 
 treated it as such. 
 
 So where a sleigh loaded with wheat, belonging to a guest, 
 was put into an outhouse appurtenant to an inn, where loads 
 of that description were usually received, and the grain was 
 stolen during the night, the innkeeper was held liable for the 
 loss.^^ And so where the guest's carriage is deposited in an 
 open space near the highway which is the place designated by 
 the innkeeper, the latter is responsible for goods contained in 
 the carriage.^* 
 
 The same principle was involved in the case of Cohen v. 
 Manuel.'^ An innkeeper directed his guest to take his horse 
 and cart to a livery stable which belonged to the innkeeper, 
 but was not connected with the inn. The guest did so, and 
 put the horse and cart into the care of the innkeeper's hostler. 
 This was held to constitute a dehvery to the innkeeper, and the 
 property was infra hospitium. The stable, as Savage, J., said, 
 was his own stable, and the place he selected in which to 
 keep the goods safely. Putting up at the iim and dehvering 
 the goods to the innkeeper was a single transaction, and he 
 imdoubtedly received the goods as innkeeper. 
 
 § 155. Goods placed in customary place outside inn by guest. 
 
 Where, however, the guest himself places his horse or car- 
 riage in a shed outside the iim, without notice to the innkeeper, 
 even though it was the customary place where the innkeeper 
 
 32 Jones V. Tyler, 1 A. & E. 522, 3 N. & M. 576, 3 L. J. K. B. 166 (Eng. 
 1834). 
 
 33 Clute V. Wiggins, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 175, 7 Am. Dec. 448 (1817). 
 
 34 Piper V. Manny, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 282 (1839). 
 
 35 91 Me. 274, 39 Atl. 1030, 40 L. R. A. 491 (1898). 
 
 [107] 
 
§ 155.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XIII. 
 
 placed horses and carriages of his guests, it was held that the 
 innkeeper did not thereby become liable.'* The real reason for 
 the distinction would seem to be that in this case the innkeeper 
 never consented to assume any liabihty (not knowing that the 
 carriage had been placed in the shed), nor had he dispensed 
 with the requirement of notice by any custom to become re- 
 sponsible without notice. A custom of the innkeeper to place 
 goods in such a place is not a custom to accept goods placed 
 there by others without notice to himself. "Such a shed is 
 obviously not a place of safety, and a person leaving his horses 
 therein, without request of any kind of the innkeeper or his 
 hostler for their care, cannot hold the innkeeper for loss of the 
 property, on an implied contract of bailment, arising out of 
 such a state of facts. The law raises no such impKcation. '"'' 
 The reason given in Albin v. Presby '* is different ; it appears 
 to be, that the owner, knowing the custom to place teams in an 
 open yard or shed, assimies the risk of loss arising out of so 
 placing them. This reasoning seems opposed to the Maine 
 and New York cases cited, and is not to be commended. On 
 the facts, however, the case seems to have been rightly decided. 
 
 38 Albin V. Presby, 8 N. H. 408, 29 Am. Dec. 679 (1836); Bradley Livery 
 Co. V. Snook, 66 N. J. L. 654, 50 Atl. 358, 55 L. R. A. 208 (1901). 
 3' Fort, J., in Bradley Livery Co. v. Snook, supra. 
 38 8 N. H. 408, 29 Am. Dec. 679 (1836). 
 
 [108] 
 
Chap. XIV.] Protection of Guest's Person. 
 
 [ §162. 
 
 SUBTITLE II. 
 
 EXTENT OF RESPONSIBILITY. 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 protection and care of the guest's person. 
 
 161. Classification of duties of inn- 
 
 keeper to guest. 
 
 162. Duty to furnish safe prem- 
 
 ises. 
 
 163. Defective premises. 
 
 164. Open elevator well. 
 
 165. Contributory negligence of 
 
 guest falling down elevator, 
 well. 
 
 166. Duty to furnish accommoda- 
 
 tions to the guest. 
 
 167. Right to assign room. 
 
 168. Right to control use of room. 
 
 § 169. Duty to supply food. 
 
 170. Duty to protect guest. 
 
 171. Protection against injury by 
 
 third parties. 
 
 172. Protection against injury by 
 
 servants. 
 
 173. Cases limiting the duty. 
 
 174. The true extent of the duty. 
 
 175. Protection against one who 
 
 has a right to remain in the 
 inn. 
 
 176. Duty to protect against fire. 
 
 § 161. Classification of duties of innkeeper to gnest. 
 
 The duties of the innkeeper to his guests personally may be 
 divided into three classes: he must furnish shelter, protection 
 and food. He is therefore called upon to provide safe premises, 
 to protect the guests against personal harm, and to furnish a 
 sufficient quantity of wholesome food. 
 
 8 162. Duty to furnish safe premises. 
 
 The innkeeper is bound to provide reasonably safe premises.* 
 This duty the innkeeper cannot escape by delegating it to an- 
 other, even though the latter is a proper and generally careful 
 person. The innkeeper is responsible if his delegate is negh- 
 
 1 Woodward v. Birch, 4 Bush (Ky.), 510 (1869); Hilton v. Adams, 71 Me. 
 19 (1879); Washburn v. Jones, 14 Barb. (N. Y.) 193 (1851); Dickerson v. 
 Rogers, 4 Humph. (Tenn.) 179, 40 Am. Dec. 642 (1843). 
 
 [109] 
 
§ 163.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XIV. 
 
 gent. Thus, where an innkeeper had his elevator inspected in 
 the usual way by a proper inspector and the latter negligently 
 failed to find a defect, the iankeeper was held liable to a guest 
 who was injured by reason of the defect.^ 
 
 § 163. Defective premises. 
 
 Both in original safety of construction and in maintenance 
 the premises must be such as reasonably to secure the safety 
 of the guest. So the innkeeper has been held liable for injury 
 to the guest by the ceiling falling upon him, owing to its de- 
 fective condition ; ^ by the elevator falling with him, after hav- 
 ing been neghgently inspected, although the innkeeper himself 
 had employed a proper inspector and was not personally neg- 
 ligent ; * by the breaking of a defective railing, by reason of 
 which the guest fell into an area; ^ and by the guest falling off 
 an unguarded stairway.^ 
 
 If, however, the defect is an obvious one, the guest must use 
 reasonable care on his own part ; and if he is himself negligent 
 he cannot recover compensation for an injury from the inn- 
 keeper. So where a guest fell from an unrailed gallery he was 
 not allowed to recover compensation where it appeared that 
 he was aware of the defect.'' 
 
 Of course, before a guest can recover compensation from the 
 innkeeper in such a case it must be shown that the defect com- 
 plained of was the cause of the injury. So where a guest was 
 burned to death in an inn, and it was shown that there were 
 no proper fire escapes on the inn, his representative could not 
 recover damages for the death where the death was not shown 
 to be in any way due to the lack of fire escapes.* 
 
 2 Stott V. ChurchiU, 15 N. Y. Misc. 80, 36 N. Y. Supp. 476 (1895), affirmed 
 without opinion, 157 N. Y. 692, 51 N. E. 1094 (1898). 
 
 3 Sandys v. Florence, 47 L. J. C. P. (Eng.) 598 (1878). 
 
 i Stott V. ChurchUl, 157 N. Y. 692, 51 N. E. 1094 (1898), affirming 15 N. Y. 
 Misc. 80, 36 N. Y. Supp. 476 (1895). 
 
 6 Hotel Assoc, v. Walters, 23 Neb. 280, 36 N. W. 561 (1888). 
 8 West V. Thomas, 97 Ala. 622, 11 So. 768 (1892). 
 
 7 Ten Broeck v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 47 Fed. 690 (1891); Sneed v. More- 
 head, 70 Miss. 690, 13 So. 235 (1893). 
 
 8 Weeks v. McNulty, 101 Tenn. 495, 48 S. W. 809 (1898). 
 
 [110] 
 
Chap. XIV.] Protection of Guest's Person. [§ 165. 
 
 § 164. Open elevator well. 
 
 Where an innkeeper leaves the door to an elevator open or 
 unlocked so that a guest falls into the well and is injured, the 
 innkepeer is in the ordinary case held liable.* 
 
 This duty of the innkeeper does not arise out of his control 
 of the elevator, but merely out of his duty to guard the guest 
 against harm arising from the construction or operation of the 
 premises. The duty would be the same, though the innkeeper 
 has no control over the elevator and no right to close the door 
 of the elevator well. " Granting that defendant had no control 
 of the elevator shaft, or the small hall leading to it, it was his 
 duty to have maintained a door or barrier at the entrance from 
 the main hall to the small hall which led to the dangerous aper- 
 ture. To leave the approach from his hall to another which 
 conducted his guest to a pitfall, open and imguarded, was such 
 negligence as would make him Uable, in our opinion, and that 
 he had no control of the small hall, and the shaft itself, would 
 not relieve him. When the conditions are permitted to be 
 such, in a hotel, that from slight want of attention, or from the 
 confusion or misapprehension that naturally attends a stranger 
 in feeUng his way through a dark hall, one may be led up, with- 
 out meeting door or barrier, to a well-hole into which a plunge 
 is taken, it may be to death, the hotel keeper cannot escape 
 the charge of negligence on the plea that he had no right to 
 close up the well-hole itself. He might bar or close up the en- 
 trance to a small hall, and thus prevent guests of his house, 
 who were unacquainted with the location and the hmits of his 
 possession and control in the halls, from entering the passage 
 to tread which in darkness was dangerous." ^^ 
 
 § 165. Contributory negligence of guest falling down elevator well. 
 But, as in the ordinary case, the guest cannot recover, in 
 spite of the innkeeper's neglect of duty, if he was himself neg- 
 ligent. Thus, where the guest was familiar with the elevator, 
 
 »Hayward v. MerriU, 94 lU. 349, 34 Am. Rep. 229 (1880); Bremer v. 
 PleisB, 121 Wis. 61, 98 N. W. 945 (1904). 
 
 i»Moran, J., in Mauzy v. Kinzel, 19 111. App. 571 (1886). 
 
 [Ill] 
 
§ 165.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XIV. 
 
 found the door partly open, pushed it further open, and fell 
 in, his recovery was barred by contributory neghgence." 
 
 "Where the door is fully open and the shaft is dark, the ques- 
 tion whether a passenger is guilty of contributory negUgence 
 in stepping in without examLnation is one for the jury. We 
 have found no case, however, holding that where the door to 
 the shaft is only halfway open, so that the passenger entering is 
 obhged to, and does, open it the rest of the way in order to 
 enter, the question of contributory negligence is a matter of 
 doubt; nor do we see how it could be so held. It seems to us 
 entirely clear that the fact that the door is only part way 
 open is a definite and imequivocal advertisement that some- 
 thing is wrong — certainly not an assurance that the car is there. 
 The use of passenger elevators is now so universal that all 
 know that when , an elevator car is brought to a standstill, 
 ready for passengers to enter or leave, the door is always thrown 
 wide open. A door only halfway open is a plain suggestion of 
 some unusual condition — a hint to investigate, not an invita- 
 tion to enter, or an assurance of safety. " *^ 
 
 The questioii not infrequently arises whether the guest is 
 neghgent when he goes at night into a part of the inn which is 
 not open to guests and there falls into an open elevator well. 
 This was decided in the affirmative by a majority of the Eng- 
 Ush House of Lords in the case of Walker v. Midland Railway.*' 
 The plaintiff's husband, a guest in a hotel, started at night to 
 go to the water-closet; went by mistake into a service room 
 which was not open to guests, and there fell down an open ele- 
 vator shaft and was killed. There was no light in the service 
 room. It was held that the innkeeper was not Uable, and a 
 verdict in favor of the plaintiff was set aside. The opinion of 
 Lord Selbome is worth quoting at length, as it illustrates the 
 way in which such a question may be dealt with by a good 
 judge. 
 
 11 Bremer v. Pleiss, 121 Wis. 61, 98 N. "W. 945 (1904). 
 
 12 Winslow, J., in Bremer v. Pleiss, supra. 
 
 13 55 L. T. 489, 51 J. P. 116 (1886). 
 
 [112] 
 
Chap. XIV.] Protection of Guest's Person. [§ 165. 
 
 " Unless there was evidence fit for the consideration of a jury 
 that any guest in the position of the deceased would, in the 
 darkness of night, have reasonable ground for believing this 
 service room to be a water-closet, and for acting as he did, 
 there is nothing else in the case which (as it seems to me) could 
 make the respondents' omission to provide against dangers 
 within that service room wrongful towards the plaintiff's hus- 
 band or generally towards the guests; for there was no other 
 ground on which the presence of any guest there could reason- 
 ably be explained or excused. Were, then, those circumstances 
 connected with this room, which alone can be supposed to have 
 suggested to the mind of the deceased that it might be a water- 
 closet, enough to furnish reasonable ground for a belief, on 
 which a guest in the situation of the deceased might reasonably 
 act in the way he did, that this service room was a water- 
 closet? This seems to me to be the question, putting it most 
 favorably for the appellant. Those circiraistances were the 
 glass in the door and the audible drip of water within. I do 
 not add the absence of Hght; for to me it would not seem rea- 
 sonable to expect that water-closets intended for use at night 
 in such an hotel would be left imlighted. But the glass in the 
 door no more denoted a water-closet (there being no hght 
 within) than it did any other kind of room, passage, or place, 
 which might receive borrowed light from the corridor, such, 
 for instance, as a service room, a housemaid's closet, or the en- 
 trance to a passage or back staircase. And the drip of water 
 would be left behind by anyone advancing, as the plaintiff's 
 husband did, into the room, and could not be supposed by any 
 such person to denote the situation of the object of his search. 
 At the most, these circumstances might explain his first act, in 
 opening the door to see what (if anything) might be discernible 
 within; but when he had done this, and found the room quite 
 dark, I cannot regard either of them alone, or both together, 
 as furnishing reasonable ground for his going forward in the 
 dark to the place where he fell, instead of proceeding a little 
 further along the corridor, where proper water-closets, with 
 8 [ 113 ] 
 
§ 165.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XIV. 
 
 proper lights, might have been fotind. Would the respondents 
 have been wrongdoers towards him (all other circumstances 
 being the same) if he had come to a steep staircase instead of 
 the unguarded well of a lift, and had fallen down it? I think 
 not; and, if not, I do not think they can be liable because it 
 was the well of a hf t with iron doors, which had been, purposely 
 or inadvertently, left tinclosed. The magnitude of a particular 
 danger, to anyone who may happen to come in the way of it 
 unawares, may doubtless enhance the responsibility of the per- 
 son to whom it is imputable, for the neglect of any duty which 
 he owes to persons whom he leaves exposed to it; but I do not 
 see how it can create such a duty, when the person who suffers 
 would not, in the proper and ordinary course of things, or with- 
 out his own unauthorized and unreasonable act, have been 
 within the reach of the danger at all. . . . In considering 
 whether there was any evidence of neglect of duty by the re- 
 spondents, it would not, in my opinion, be right to leave out of 
 sight the fact that they did not so conduct their hotel as to 
 drive their guests to grope about in dark places, or to explore 
 unknown rooms in order to find water-closets. These conven- 
 iences were provided on that corridor, in positions easily access- 
 ible, and easily discoverable by any guests in the circumstances 
 of the appellant's husband, who might endeavor, with reason- 
 able care and patience, to observe or to find them; and they 
 were kept properly Ughted at night. " 
 
 It may well be doubted whether the court were not usurping 
 the function of a jury in determining on the evidence that the 
 plaintiff was negligent. There were circumstances in the case 
 which, according to the doctrine of the American courts, would 
 surely have justified a submission of the issue to the jury ; and 
 in a similar case in Illinois a guest who wandered into a hallway 
 apparently not open to guests while searching for a water-closet 
 in the night, and was injured by falling down an elevator shaft 
 was allowed to recover." 
 
 " Mauzy v. Kinzel, 19 111. App. 571 (1886). 
 [114] 
 
Chap. XIV.] Protection of Guest's Person. [§ 167. 
 
 § 166. Duty to furnish accommodations to the guest. 
 
 The duty of the innkeeper to furnish accommodation to the 
 guest is simply to supply him with such entertainment as he 
 needs. The iim, though a public house, does not become in 
 any sense the house of the guests; the innkeeper continues to 
 be the housekeeper, and the management of the premises re- 
 mains absolutely and at all times in his hands, subject only to 
 the right of the guests to receive reasonable entertainment. 
 
 § 167. Right to assign room. 
 
 It follows that the innkeeper, in the course of his manage- 
 ment, has the absolute right to assign the guest to any proper 
 chamber; *^ and having assigned a guest to one room, he may 
 at will change the room, putting him into a different room, pro- 
 vided the latter furnishes reasonable accommodation.^^ The 
 assignment of a guest to a room is no sense a lease ; it is a mere 
 revocable license." 
 
 The innkeeper must, of course, provide a reasonable num- 
 ber of common rooms; but he may refuse to furnish hght and 
 heat for the guest to occupy his chamber as a reading or writing 
 room, or a common room as a sleeping apartment. So where 
 a guest refused to sleep in the chamber assigned to him, and 
 requested that candles should be furnished him that he might 
 sit up all night in a chamber, the innkeeper was justified in re- 
 fusing, at least where he offered to allow the guest to sit up and 
 have Ught in the regular reading room. Lord Abinger, C. B., 
 said: "A landlord is not boimd to provide a traveller with a 
 particular room, nor to permit him to occupy a bedchamber as 
 a sitting room if he offers him another room fit and proper for 
 the purpose. He is to provide him with a room affording rea- 
 ls FeU V. Knight, 8 M. & W. 269, 10 L. J. Ex. 277, 5 Jur. 554 (Eng. 1841); 
 Scrivenor v. Reed, 6 W. R. (Eng.) 603 (1857); Doyle v. Walker, 26 Up. Can. 
 Q. B. 502 (1867). 
 
 18 Doyle V. WaUcer, 26 Up. Can. Q. B. 502 (1867). 
 
 "Rodgers v. People, 86 N. Y. 360 (1881); Lane v. Dixon, 3 C. B. 776, 
 784 (Eng. 1847). "We think the contention on the plaintiff's part involves 
 a confusion between the character and position of an innkeeper and a lodging- 
 house keeper." Draper, C. J., in Doyle v. Walker, supra. 
 
 [115] 
 
§ 167.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XIV. 
 
 sonable accommodation, but not any room which the caprice 
 of his guest may lead him to select, for with that he is not bound 
 to comply. " ** 
 
 As the innkeeper may assign the guest to any chamber he 
 pleases, so he may serve him with food in any room he pleases, 
 provided it is a decent and proper room ; and the guest cannot 
 complain if the innkeeper refuses to serve him in the common 
 dining room. This question was involved in the interesting 
 case of Regina v. Sprague.^^ The suit was an indictment for 
 refusing to supply Lady Harberton with food. Lady Harber- 
 ton was cycling, clad in the "rational costume," so called, 
 and she stopped for luncheon at the defendant's inn. The 
 defendant refused to serve her in the coffee room unless she 
 put a skirt over the rational costume, but offered to serve her 
 in a private room behind the bar. On looking into the room 
 Lady Harberton foimd it was occupied by men, some of whom 
 were smoking, and refused to enter; and thereupon the prose- 
 cution was instituted, at the Surrey Quarter Sessions. The 
 defendant urged that no person had a right to choose a par- 
 ticular room; to which Mr. Cave, the Chairman, replied, 
 "Suppose a landlord said he would only supply victuals in 
 the coal cellar?" The defendant said that was an extreme 
 case; but would an indictment lie against a landlord because 
 a fastidious lady disliked the smell of smoke? The case ought 
 not to be left to the jury. 
 
 The Chairman, however, left the question to the jury. The 
 question was, he said, "whether there was a refusal to supply 
 food in a decent and proper place. The innkeeper could select 
 the room provided it was a decent and proper place. Nor, 
 in his opinion, was a guest entitled to have a room exactly 
 to his or her taste. The jury must judge by the requirement 
 of ordinary and reasonable persons." The Chairman then 
 asked the jury to consider whether the bar parlor was a decent 
 and proper room for a guest to have limch in. The jury 
 
 18 FeU V. Knight, 8 M. & W. 269, 10 L. J. Ex. 277, 5 Jur. 554 (Eng. 1841). 
 "Regina v. Sprague, 63 J. P. 233 (Eng. 1899). 
 [116] 
 
Chap. XIV.] Protection of Guest's Person. [§ 169. 
 
 brought in a verdict of not guilty. It may be doubted whether 
 an American jury would have been so ungaUant; but the 
 action of the Chairman was unquestionably correct. 
 
 § 168. Bight to control use of room. 
 
 At the same time the innkeeper cannot go further than de- 
 termine the kind of accommodation to be furnished to the 
 guest; he cannot demand that the guest make any particular 
 use of the accommodation. He may place such reasonable 
 food as he chooses before the guest, but he cannot complain 
 if the guest refuses to eat it; nor can he object if the guest re- 
 fuses to occupy his bed, but chooses to sit up all night. So in 
 the course of the argument in Fell v. Knight,^" Alderson, B., 
 said: "A traveller is not bound to go to bed. He may have 
 business to attend to which would render it necessary for him 
 to sit up all night. An innkeeper cannot be justified in turning 
 his guest out because he refuses to sleep. " 
 
 § 169. Duty to supply food. 
 
 The innkeeper must provide as much food as he can reason- 
 ably foresee to be necessary. He must provide and keep on 
 hand food enough for such guests as may be reasonably ex- 
 pected.^^ He is not an insurer of the quaUty of his food, but 
 he would be hable for knowingly or negligently furnishing bad 
 and deleterious food.^^ 
 
 As an innkeeper does not lease his rooms, so he does not sell 
 the food he supplies to the guest. It is his duty to supply such 
 food as the guest needs, and the corresponding right of the guest 
 is to consume the food he needs and to take no more. Having 
 finished his meal, he has no right to take food from the table, 
 even the uneaten portion of the food supplied to him ; nor can 
 
 ao 8 M. & W. 269, 10 L. J. Ex. 277, 5 Jur. 554 (Eng. 1841). 
 
 21 Atwater v. Sawyer, 76 Me. 539, 49 Am. Rep. 634 (1884), in -which case 
 it appeared that this common-law obligation had been enacted in statutes. 
 
 22 Sheffer v. WiUoughby, 163 111. 518, 45 N. E. 253 (1896) (the case of a 
 restaurant). In Stringfellow v. Grunewald, 109 La. 187, 33 So. 190 (1902), 
 where this was the complaint, the charge was not made out on the facts. 
 
 [117] 
 
§ 171.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XIV. 
 
 he claim a certain portion of food as his own, to be handed over 
 to another in case he chooses not to consume it himself. The 
 title to food never passes as a result of an ordinary transaction 
 of supplying food to a guest; or, as it was quaintly put in an 
 old case, "he does not sell but utters his provision." ^^ For 
 this reason an innkeeper is not a trader, and cannot become a 
 bankrupt or insolvent under an act which applies to traders 
 only.24 
 
 § 170. Duty to protect guest. 
 
 It is the duty of an innkeeper to take reasonable care of the 
 persons of his guests, so that they may not be injured while in 
 the inn by want of such care on his part. So in the case of 
 Sandys v. Florence, just cited, where a part of the ceiling 
 fell on a guest in an inn and injured him, the innkeeper was 
 held liable only if he was negligent.^.^ He is not, however, 
 an insurer of the guest's safety; his responsibility is limited 
 to exercising reasonable care.^* 
 
 § 171- Protection against injury by third parties. 
 
 The innkeeper, while not an insurer of a guest against per- 
 sonal injury, must protect him against injury from third per- 
 sons so far as it is within his power to do so. Thus, where, in 
 the presence of the innkeeper, and without being prevented by 
 him, one guest pinned a piece of paper on the coat of another 
 guest and set it on fire, the innkeeper was held responsible to 
 the injured guest for the injury thus caused.^^ And so an inn- 
 keeper who, without warning, allows a guest to come to an inn 
 
 23 Wright, Serg., in Parker v. Flint, 12 Mod. 254 (1701). 
 
 21 Parker v. Flint, 12 Mod. 254 (1701); Harman v. Clarkson, 22 Up. Can. 
 C. P. 291 (1871). 
 
 25 Stott V. Churchill, 15 N. Y. Misc. 80, 36 N. Y. Supp. 476 (1895); Sandys 
 V. Florence, 47 L. J. C. P. (Eng.) 598 (1878). 
 
 28 Weeks v. MeNulty, 101 Tenn. 495, 48 S. W. 809 (1898); Clancy v. 
 Barker, 131 Fed. 161 (U. S. C. C. A. Neb. 1904). 
 
 27 Rommel v. Schambacher, 120 Pa. 579, 11 Atl. 779, 6 Am. St. Rep. 732 
 (1887). And see to the same effect Curran v. Olson, 88 Minn. 307, 92 N. W. 
 1124 (1903). 
 
 [118] 
 
Chap. XIV.] Protection of Gukst's Person. [§ 172. 
 
 in which he knows there is a contagious disease is responsible 
 to the guest if he contracts the disease.^* 
 
 § 172. Protection against injury by servants. 
 
 As the innkeeper must protect a guest against third persons, 
 a fortiori he must protect him against injuries from his servants. 
 And since the servants are provided, among other things, for 
 the purpose of protecting guests, every injury inflicted upon the 
 guest by the servant, either intentionally or negUgently, is a 
 breach of his duty of protection, and renders the irmkeeper li- 
 able to the guest.^* The innkeeper's duty, the breach of which 
 by his servant causes the injury, is not the negative duty not 
 to assault the guest, but the affirmative duty to protect him 
 from assault. The servant, in assaulting the guest, is com- 
 mitting the tort for himself; but he is breaking the obligation 
 of protection which rests on the innkeeper, and which the serv- 
 ant has himself been employed to carry out. This is recognized 
 in the well-considered cases as the true ground of UabiHty.'" 
 
 "If, then, the defendants were under a contractual obliga- 
 tion that the plaintiff and his family should be treated with due 
 consideration for their comfort and safety, the act of the serv- 
 ant, resulting in the injuries complained of, obviously amounts 
 to a breach of contract. That the wrongful act was committed 
 by a servant is wholly immaterial. The rule which requires 
 that a guest at a hotel be treated with due consideration for 
 his comfort and safety would be of Httle value if Hmited to the 
 proprietor himself. As a rule, he does not come in contact with 
 
 28 Gilbert v. Hoffman, 66 la. 205, 55 Am. Rep. 263 n (1885); Levy v. 
 Corey, 1 City Ct. Rep. Supp. 57 (1884). 
 
 28 Wade V. Thayer, 40 Cal. 578 (1871); Overstreet v. Moser, 88 Mo. App. 
 72 (1901); Clancy v. Barker, (Neb.), 98 N. W. 440 (1904); Curran v. 
 Olson, 88 Minn. 307, 92 N. W. 1124 (1903). In Block v. .Sherry, 43 N. Y. 
 Misc. 342, 87 N. Y. Supp. 160 (1904), even a restaurant keeper, whose lia- 
 bility is less than that of an innkeeper, was held liable for the negligent spill- 
 ing of water on a customer by a waiter. 
 
 3» Curran v. Olson, 88 Minn. 307, 92 N. W. 1124 (1903); Clancy v. Barker 
 (Neb.), 98 N. W. 440 (1904); Rommel v. Schambacher, 120 Pa. 579, 11 Atl. 
 779, 6 Am. St. Rep. 732 (1887). 
 
 [119] 
 
§ 173.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XIV. 
 
 the guests. His undertaking is not that he personally shall 
 treat them with due consideration, but that they shall be so 
 treated while inmates of the hotel as guests ; and, if they be not 
 thus treated, there is a breach of the implied contract, whether 
 the lack of such treatment is the result of some act or omission 
 of the proprietor himself, or of his servant or servants. 
 
 "Neither do we deem it material whether the servant at the 
 time of the injury was actively engaged in the discharge of his 
 duty as servant or not. He was a servant of the proprietor, 
 and an inmate of the hotel. His duty as to the treatment to 
 be accorded the guests of the hotel was a continuing one, and 
 rested upon him wherever, within the hotel, he was brought in 
 contact with them. To hold otherwise would be to say that 
 a guest would have no redress for any manner of indignity re- 
 ceived at a hotel, so long as it was inflicted by a servant not 
 actively engaged in the discharge of some duty. " ^* 
 
 § 173' Cases limiting the duty. 
 
 This principle, however, has not been accepted by all courts. 
 In the case of Clancy v. Barker in the Circuit Court of Appeals^^ 
 it appeared that the plaintiff, a boy about six years old, who 
 was a guest at the defendant's inn, entered a room in which 
 he heard someone playing a harmonica, actuated, apparently, 
 by no other motive than childish curiosity, and found a boy, 
 who was employed about the hotel either as a bell boy or 
 porter, engaged in playing the instrument. Another boy who 
 ran the hotel elevator was also in the room. Both of these 
 employees of the hotel seem to have been off duty at the time, 
 and engaged in amusing themselves in a room that was not 
 occupied by guests. As the boy Clancy entered the room, 
 the boy who was playing the harmonica said to him, evidently 
 in jest, "See here, young fellow; if you touch anything, here 
 is what you will get," at the same time pointing a pistol at 
 him. The pistol was accidentally discharged, the ball strik- 
 
 31 Albert, C, in Clancy v. Barker, supra. 
 32 131 Fed. Rep. 161, 66 C. C. A. 469 (1904). 
 [120] 
 
Chap. XIV.] Protection of Guest's Person. [§ 173. 
 
 ing the boy in the head, fracturing "the frontal ethnoid and 
 sphenoid bones of the head," and destrojang one of his eyes. 
 The ball also passed through the boy's thumb ; but the injury 
 did not prove fatal. It was urged that the defendant was 
 liable in the case, irrespective of the question whether the 
 servant was acting in the course of his service; but a majority 
 of the court held otherwise. Circuit Judge Sanborn thus at- 
 tempted to distinguish the case of the innkeeper from that 
 of the carrier: 
 
 "There is a marked difference in the character of the con- 
 tracts of carriage on a railroad or steamboat and of enter- 
 tainment at an inn, and a wide difference in the relations of 
 the parties to these contracts. In the former, the carrier takes 
 and the passenger surrenders to him the control and dominion 
 of his person, and the chief, nay, practically the only, occu- 
 pation of both parties is the performance of the contract of 
 carriage. For the time being all other occupations are sub- 
 ordinate to the transportation. The carrier regulates the 
 movements of the passenger, assigns him his seat or berth, 
 and determines when, how, and where he shall ride, eat, and 
 sleep, while the passenger submits to the rules, regulations and 
 directions of the carrier, and is transported in the manner the 
 latter directs. The contract is that the passenger will surren- 
 der the direction and dominion of his person to the servants 
 of the carrier, to be transported in the car, seat or berth and 
 in the manner in which they direct, and that the latter will 
 take charge of and transport the person of the passenger safely. 
 The logical and necessary result of this relation of the parties 
 is that every servant of the carrier who is employed in assist- 
 ing to transport the passenger safely, every conductor, brake- 
 man and porter who is employed to assist in the transporta- 
 tion, is constantly acting within the scope and course of his 
 emplojonent while he is upon the train or boat, because he is 
 one of those selected by his master and placed in charge of the 
 person of the passenger to safely transport him to his destina- 
 tion. Any negligent or willful act of such a servant which 
 
 [121] 
 
§ 173.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XIV. 
 
 inflicts injury upon the passenger is necessarily a breach of 
 the master's contract of safe carriage, and for it the latter must 
 respond. But the contract of an innkeeper with his guest, 
 and their relations to each other, are not of this character. 
 The innkeeper does not take, nor does the guest surrender, 
 the control or dominion of the latter's person. The perform- 
 ance of the contract of entertainment is not the chief occupa- 
 tion of the parties, but it is subordinate to the ordinary busi- 
 ness or pleasure of the guest. The innkeeper assigns a room 
 to his guest, but neither he nor his servants direct him when 
 or how he shall occupy it; but they leave him free to use or 
 to fail to use it, and all the other means of entertainment 
 proffered, when and as he chooses, and to retain the uncon- 
 trolled dominion of his person and of his movements. The 
 agreement is not that the guest shall surrender the control 
 of his person and action to the servants of the innkeeper, in 
 order that he may be protected from injury and entertained. 
 It is that the guest may retain the direction of his own action, 
 that he may enjoy the entertainment offered, and that the 
 innkeeper will exercise ordinary care to provide for his comfort 
 and safety. The servants of the innkeeper are not placed in 
 charge of the person of the guest, to direct, guide, and control 
 his location and action, nor are they employed to perform any 
 contract to insure his safety; but they are engaged in the 
 execution of the agreement of the master to exercise ordinary 
 care for the comfort and safety of the visitor. The natural 
 and logical result of this relation of the parties is that when 
 the servants are not engaged in the course or scope of their 
 employment, although they may be present in the hotel, they 
 are not performing their master's contract, and he is not Uable 
 for their neghgent or willful acts." 
 
 In a Cahfornia case, also, it was held that while the inn- 
 keeper must employ careful servants, and would be Uable for 
 negUgence in employing his servants, and would furthermore 
 be liable if he personally stood by and saw his servant injure a 
 guest, yet he could not be held liable for an assault by his serv- 
 [122] 
 
Chap. XIV.] Protection op Guest's Person. [§ 174. 
 
 ant on a guest in the absence of personal negligence. The inn- 
 keeper's responsibility, the court said, is distinguishable from 
 that of the carrier.^^ 
 
 § 174. The true extent of the duty. 
 
 These must be regarded as ill-considered decisions. The 
 obligation of the carrier and of the innkeeper in this respect 
 must be placed on the same ground. This is not, as seems to 
 have been thought in the cases, a supposed duty to insure the 
 safety of the guest; such a duty, it is admitted, does not exist. 
 It is rather a duty of the carrier to protect his passenger from 
 injury and of an innkeeper to protect his guest from injury to 
 the best of his abihty, by the use of reasonable means. The 
 innkeeper must take reasonable steps to protect his guests. 
 His method of so doing is, among other things, to provide 
 servants; and every such servant is at all times under a duty 
 to protect the guest from threatened harm while he is within 
 the inn (though probably not while outside the inn) in. so far 
 as he is able. In all cases where the injury is by the servant 
 himself and he could by reasonable care have avoided the 
 injury the innkeeper should be held responsible for the failure 
 of the servant to perform the delegated duty of protecting 
 the guest. 
 
 The arguments advanced in favor of the limited responsi- 
 bihty are, it seems, fully met by Circuit Judge Thayer in his 
 dissenting opinion in Clancy v. Barker.^^ 
 
 "If a servant of a hotel, when off duty, should meet a guest 
 outside of the hotel, and not on the premises, and there assault 
 him, it is doubtless true — although the case at bar requires no 
 decision on that point — that the innkeeper could not be charged 
 with responsibility for the servant's conduct; and it is probably 
 true that the innkeeper would not be responsible for an assault 
 
 33 Rahmel v. Lehndorff, 142 Cal. 681, 76 Pac. 659, 65 L. R. A. 88 (1904). 
 The court was unable to find decisions on the exact point; overlooking, of 
 course, the decisions examined in this and the preceding sections. 
 
 34 131 Fed. Rep. 161, 66 C. C. A. 469 (1904). 
 
 [ 123 ] 
 
§ 175.] Innkeepers, [Chap. XIV. 
 
 committed on one of his guests within the hotel by a stranger, 
 provided he has taken all reasonable precautions to prevent 
 such occurrences by excluding disorderly persons from his 
 premises. But in my opinion the law casts on the innkeeper 
 an obligation to see to it that his guest is not injured, while 
 within the hotel, by the wrongful, inconsiderate, or negligent 
 acts of those who are his servants. . . . 
 
 " Now, it is true that a hotel is an immovable structure and 
 does not run on wheels like a train of cars; but in all other 
 respects the relation existing between an innkeeper and his 
 guest is like that existing between a carrier and passenger, 
 and this fact has always been recognized, as shown by the 
 cases above cited. An innkeeper, like a carrier, is engaged 
 in a quasi-pubUc service. When he embarks in the business 
 of keeping a hotel, he is bound to provide entertainment for 
 all travellers who seek a place of rest and refreshment, provided 
 they come to him in a fit condition to be entertained as guests, 
 and are able to pay the customary charges. . . . The inn- 
 keeper, like the carrier, has the exclusive right to select all of 
 the persons who are to aid him in the discharge of his quasi- 
 public functions. I have been imable, therefore, to discover 
 any sufficient reason why he should not be held responsible 
 to his guests for the consequences of any willful and wrongful 
 acts of his servants, committed within the hotel, to the same 
 extent that the carrier is responsible to his passengers for like 
 wrongful acts of its servants; and within the authorities above 
 cited a carrier would be clearly responsible to one of its passen- 
 gers for an injury inflicted by one of its employees under such 
 circumstances as those disclosed in the present case." 
 
 § 175- Protection ag^ainst one who has a right to remain in the inn. 
 
 Where, however, the innkeeper is so situated that he is un- 
 able to exclude a certain person from the inn or to control that 
 person's acts, he is not liable for injury done by such person, 
 in the absence of negligence. Thus, where a married woman 
 kept an inn, and her husband, who lived in the inn, injured a 
 [124] 
 
Chap. XIV.] Protection of Guest's Person. [§ 176. 
 
 guest, the innkeeper was held not to be liable in the absence 
 of negligence.^^ The court pointed out that the wife could 
 not control, direct or discharge her husband, who had a right 
 of homestead in the premises; and even though he acted as 
 her servant about the inn, she could not be made hable for 
 his act. 
 
 § 176. Duty to protect against fire. 
 
 The innkeeper is bound to protect his guest against injury 
 by fire through his negligence, but is not an insurer against 
 injury by fire ; ^^ and it has been held that he is bound to warn 
 his guests when a fire breaks out on the premises," but this 
 must surely depend upon the circumstances. It seems clear 
 that he should provide proper fire escapes, and indeed the law 
 usually requires it; but he is not responsible for injury to the 
 guest by fire, even if proper fire escapes were not provided, 
 unless the injury was caused by the lack of fire escapes.'* 
 
 36 Curtis V. Dinneen, 4 Dak. 245, 30 N. W. 148 (1886). 
 
 38 Weeks v. McNulty, 101 Tenn. 495, 48 S. W. 809 (1898). 
 
 37 Hare v. Henderson, 43 Up. Can. Q. B. 571 (1878). 
 
 38 Weeks v. McNulty, 101 Tenn. 495, 48 S. W. 809 (1898). 
 
 [125] 
 
§ 181.] 
 
 Innkebpees. 
 
 [Chap. XV. 
 
 CHAPTEE XV. 
 
 RESPONSIBILITY OF THE INNKEEPER FOR GOODS OF THE 
 
 GUEST. 
 
 181. The innkeeper as a protector 
 
 against marauders. 
 
 182. Innkeeper's responsibility not 
 
 a case of bailment. 
 
 183. History of innkeeper's respon- 
 
 sibility in England 
 
 184. In the United States. 
 
 185. Jurisdictions imposing the in- 
 
 surance liability. 
 
 § 186. Jurisdiction imposing liability 
 ef innkeeper for negligence 
 only. 
 
 187. Jurisdictions imposing liabil- 
 
 ity for negligence or breach 
 of undertaking. 
 
 188. Loss by theft. 
 
 189. Loss by accidental fire. 
 
 190. Presumption of negligence. 
 
 191. For what goods the innkeeper 
 
 is responsible. 
 
 § 181. The innkeeper as a protector against marauders. 
 
 The liabUity of the innkeeper for the goods of the guest has 
 been enforced from very early times; and its nature can best 
 be learned from a consideration of the original function of the 
 innkeeper. As has already been seen, the inn was estabUshed 
 for the entertainment of travellers on their journey; and par- 
 ticularly to protect them against the bands of marauders and 
 outlaws that infested the roads at night. The most important 
 fimctionof the innkeeper, therefore, after the furnishing of food 
 and drink, was the protection which he offered to the weary 
 traveller against nocturnal robbers. If a traveller were robbed 
 at an inn, it was necessarily from defect of care of the inn- 
 keeper, since he undertook to protect against such a misfortune. 
 
 It was therefore decided as early as the year 1368 that the 
 innkeeper is responsible for the goods of his guest stolen from 
 the inn. In the earhest case ' the loss was alleged to be "for 
 
 1 Y. B. 42 Ed. 3, 11, pi. 13 (1367). 
 
 [126] 
 
Chap. XV.] Responsibility for Goods of Guest. [§ 182. 
 
 defect of guard of the innkeeper and his servants. " This case 
 was followed in the same year by another decision of Justice 
 Knivet after consultation with all the Justices and Serjeants 
 at Law: "and the reason of the judgment was that he became 
 answerable, for himself and his servants, for the chambers and 
 stables. " ^ 
 
 As was well and forcibly said by' Judge Cochrane in Crapo v. 
 Rockwell : ^ " This rigorous rule had its origin in the feudal con- 
 ditions which were the outgrowth of the Middle Ages. In those 
 days there was Uttle safety outside of castles and fortified towns 
 for the wayfaring traveller, who, exposed on his journey to the 
 depredations of bandits and brigands, had Uttle protection 
 when he sought at night temporary refuge at the wayside inns, 
 estabUshed and conducted for his entertainment and conven- 
 ience. Exposed as he was to robbery and violence, he was 
 compelled to repose confidence, when stopping on his pilgrim- 
 ages over night, in landlords who were not exempt from temp- 
 tation; and hence there grew up the salutary principle that a 
 host owed to his guest the duty, not only of hospitality, but 
 also of protection. With the march of civilization and the 
 progress of commercial development, the conditions in which 
 the common-law liability of the innkeeper to his guest origi- 
 nated have passed away; but other conditions exist, which 
 render it wise and expedient that the modem hotel keeper 
 should respond for the loss of his guest's property while he is 
 extending to the latter for compensation his hospitaUty, and 
 there has consequently been no relaxation in the rule of his 
 common-law Uability, except as such UabUity has been modified 
 by statute." 
 
 § 182. Innkeeper's responsibility not a case of bailment. 
 
 This principle has often been thought to depend upon the 
 law of bailment ; and indeed the responsibility of the innkeeper 
 is treated as one kind of bailment-obUgation in the treatises on 
 
 2 Y. B. 42 Lib. Assis. 260, pi. 17 (1367). 
 394 N. Y. Supp. 1122 (1905). 
 
 [127] 
 
§ 182.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XV. 
 
 the law of baihnents ; being treated, along with that of the com- 
 mon carrier, as an example of bailments where the responsibil- 
 ity is exceptionally severe.^ 
 
 In the earlier cases the innkeeper seems not to have been 
 thought of as a bailee. In the leading case of Coggs v. Bernard,^ 
 in which the law of bailments was elaborately considered, the 
 innkeeper was not mentioned, either in connection with the 
 common carrier or otherwise, as an example of a bailee; and 
 in the great case of Lane v. Cotton,* while Lord Holt mentioned 
 the innkeeper as in a public employment, it was not suggested 
 that he is a bailee. Sir William Jones was probably the first 
 to speak of an innkeeper as a bailee,^ though he would exempt 
 the iankeeper from liabiUty if he used ordinary care. Judge 
 Story * follows Jones in placing innkeepers among the bailees. 
 
 If Sir William Jones was really the first authority who dis- 
 tinctly included innkeepers among bailees, the fact is signifi- 
 cant; for he, as is well known, was a distinguished student of 
 Roman law, and introduced the principles of the civil law, so 
 far at least as analysis and nomenclature are concerned, into 
 the EngHsh law of bailment. In placing innkeepers among 
 bailees he was doubtless influenced by a supposed rule of the 
 Roman law, expressed in one of the classical texts of the Digest : 
 to wit, the section "Nautce caupones stabularii," ^ which was 
 believed to be the foundation of the EngUsh law of bailment. 
 The literal text itself shows that it cannot be the basis of the 
 English law either of carriers or of innkeepers; but the asso- 
 
 * "Exceptional rules and exceptional responsibility confront us, when we 
 come to regard innkeepers and common carriers; not that they are more or 
 less than bailees, as to the method of performance, but because public policy 
 sees fit to clothe those who regularly pursue these vocations with a bailment 
 responsibility confided to them, unusually great, and in fact approximating 
 insurance." Schouler, Bailments, 14. 
 
 5 2Ld. Raym. 909 (1703). 
 
 « 12 Mod. 472 (1701). 
 
 ' Jones, Bailments (1781), 95. 
 
 8 Bailments (1832), §4. 
 
 •Dig. 4, 9, 1. "Nautffl caupones stabularii, quod cuiusque ealvum fore 
 reoeperint, nisi restituant, in eos judicium dabo." 
 [128] 
 
Chap. XV.] Responsibility for Goods of Guest. [§ 183. 
 
 elation of persons supposed to correspond to innkeepers with 
 persons supposed to represent the whole class of carriers {Nautne) 
 led to a belief that the responsibiUty of the innkeeper and that 
 of the carrier were similar. 
 
 It is obvious, however, that the responsibility of the inn- 
 keeper is not that of a bailee of any sort; for the crucial test 
 of bailment, deUvery of possession to the bailee, is lacking. 
 The innkeeper's responsibiUty does not depend in any degree 
 upon delivery to him of the goods for which he is held Uable.^" 
 In the earliest case in which he was held answerable for the 
 goods stolen he attempted to avoid liabihty by pleading that 
 the guest had not dehvered the goods to him, but had put them 
 in the chamber; but judgment was given for the guest upon 
 this plea.^^ The responsibiUty must therefore be rested upon 
 the pubUc undertaking of the innkeeper, rather than upon his 
 position as bailee. 
 
 § 183. History of innkeeper's responsibility in England. 
 
 The English law until within a century seems not to have 
 lost sight of the origin and true ground of UabUity of the hm- 
 keeper. In the leading case on the subject, Calye's case,^^ it 
 was resolved that "the umholder shaU not be charged, unless 
 there be a default in him or his servants, in the weU and safe 
 keeping and custody of their guest's goods and chattels within 
 his common inn; for the innkeeper is bound in law to keep 
 them safe without any stealing or purloining. " No trace can 
 be foimd in the reports or abridgements of any different doc- 
 trine until the case of Richmond v. Smith.*^ This was a case 
 which turned on the innkeeper's responsibiUty for a package 
 carried at the request of the guest into the " commercial room, " 
 a common room of the inn; and therefore the question now 
 under discussion was not involved in that case. In that case, 
 
 10 Ante, § 148. 
 
 n Y. B. 42 Ed. 3, 11, pi. 13 (1367). 
 
 12 8 Coke 63 (1574). 
 
 13 8 B. & C. 9 (1828). 
 
 9 [ 129 ] 
 
§ 183.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XV. 
 
 however, for the first time, in a judicial decision, the court lik- 
 ened the innkeeper to the common carrier; and Mr. Justice 
 Bayley used language which seemed to carry his responsibiUty 
 for loss as far as that of the common carrier. "It appears to 
 me that an innkeeper's Uabihty very closely resembles that of 
 a carrier. He is prima facie hable for any loss not occasioned 
 by the act of God or the king's enemies; although he may be 
 exonerated where the guest chooses to have his goods under 
 his own care. " 
 
 In Dawson v. Chamney,^* Lord Chief Justice Denman again 
 laid down the old rule as it was stated in Calye's case, to the 
 effect that the carrier is not liable except for negligence ; and he 
 rightly explained the language of Bayley, J., just quoted, as 
 applying to "another branch of the doctrine, namely, the ex- 
 ception from the rule which arises where the guest chooses to 
 take the chattels entirely imder his own care." 
 
 Later in Morgan v. Ravey,^^ the court again laid down the 
 more extreme rule. Chief Baron Pollock said : 
 
 "It remains to consider whether the direction to the jury was 
 correct. We think it was. The objection was that it assumed 
 the defendants were hable if there was no negligence in the 
 plaintiff, and that therefore the defendants would be Hable, 
 though not only not neghgent, but even dihgent. But we 
 think that is the law. It is true the expression in the forms 
 in "tort" is, that the loss was "propter defectum" of the inn- 
 keeper; but we think the cases show that there is a defect in 
 the innkeeper, wherever there is a loss not arising from the 
 plaintiff's neghgence, the act of God, or the Queen's enemies. " 
 
 The court criticized Dawson v. Chamney as the only case 
 opposed to this view. And in the later case of Day v. Bather,^" 
 the rule of extreme liabihty is asssumed by the court. It is 
 probable, therefore, that in England to-day the rule that the 
 
 " 5 Q. B. 164, D. & M. 348 (Eng. 1843). 
 15 6 H. &N. 265 (1861). 
 
 18 2 H. &. C. 14 (1863). Ace. Butler v. Quilter (Eng. 1900), 17 T. L. R. 
 159. 
 
 [130] 
 
Chap. XV.] Responsibility for Goods of Guest. [§ 185. 
 
 innkeeper is liable for all loss, except what is caused by act of 
 God or the king's enemies or by negligence of the guest him- 
 self, is established. And this is also held in the British 
 colonies.^^ 
 
 § 184. In the United States. 
 
 In this country, as might naturally have been expected con- 
 sidering the history of the EngUsh doctrine, there has been 
 much confusion as to the true rule for innkeeper's UabiUty for 
 loss of goods. Judge Story's authority is in favor of the rule 
 laid down in the earher cases. " Innkeepers, " he says,^* "are 
 not responsible to the same extent as common carriers;" and 
 he adds that the innkeeper may repel the presumption of neg- 
 ligence "by showing that there has been no negUgence what- 
 soever, or that the loss is attributable to the personal negligence 
 of the guest himself, or that it has been occasioned by inevitable 
 casualty or by superior force. " The decisions, however, have 
 not uniformly followed Judge Story's opinion. AVhile they are 
 almost always based on the language of the court in Calye's 
 case, they are in hopeless disagreement as to whether or not 
 the rule in Calye's case calls for personal default on the part of 
 the innkeeper or his servant before the innkeeper can be held 
 liable for a loss of the goods of the guest. Some minor differ- 
 ences may be found in the language of the decisions, but in 
 general the rules laid down may be reduced to three. 
 
 § 185. Jurisdictions imposing tlie insurance liability. 
 
 In perhaps a majority of the jurisdictions the court has 
 clearly imposed upon the innkeeper the habiUty analagous to 
 that of the common carrier, adopting the language of Chan- 
 cellor Kent.^* The rule as commonly stated in these jurisdic- 
 tions is that the innkeeper is hable for the goods of the guest 
 lost in the inn, unless the loss has been by act of God or of a 
 
 17 Nott V. Maclurgan, 20 W. N. (N. S. W.) 135 (1903); MiUer v. Federal 
 Coffee Palace, 15 Victorian Law R. 30 (1889). 
 
 18 Bailments, § 472. 
 18 2 Kent Conn. 594. 
 
 [131] 
 
§ 185.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XV. 
 
 public enemy or by fault of the owner.^" The extent and rea- 
 son of this doctrine are well expressed by Mr. Justice Wilde in 
 Mason v. Thompson : ^^ "Nothing is better settled than the gen- 
 eral principle, that innkeepers are chargeable for the goods of 
 their guests lost or stolen from their inns. This liability is im- 
 posed upon them for considerations of public policy, for the 
 security of travellers, and to protect them not only against the 
 negligence, but also against the dishonest practices of the inn- 
 keeper or his servants. And from long experience it has been 
 found to be a salutary principle of pubUc policy. It may un- 
 doubtedly, in some cases, subject the innkeeper to losses, with- 
 out any negligence or fault on his part. This may seem hard 
 and unjust, but hard cases are not always to be avoided, and 
 a wholesome rigor is sometimes necessary, to insure public se- 
 curity. It is, however, no more hard for an innkeeper than for 
 his guest, to sustain a loss, neither party being in fault ; espe- 
 cially when the former undertakes a trade with a full knowledge 
 of his liabihties, for he may so regulate his charges as to indem- 
 nify himself. Innkeepers, as well as common carriers, are re- 
 garded as insurers of the property committed to their care, and 
 are bound to make restitution for any injury or loss not caused 
 by the act of God, or the common enemy, or the neglect or 
 fault of the owner of the property." 
 
 Under this rule the innkeeper is excused if the loss happens 
 by act of God or the kiag's enemies ; but even if the goods are 
 
 20 Mateer v. Brown, 1 Cal. 221, 52 Am. Dec. 303 (1850); Russell v. Fagan, 
 7 Houst. 389, 8 Atl. 258 (Del. 1886); Shaw v. Berry, 31 Me. 478, 52 Am. Dec. 
 628 (1850); Norcross v. Norcross, 53 Me. 163 (1865); Mason v. Thompson, 
 9 Pick. (Mass.) 280, 20 Am. Deo. 471 (1830); Dunbier v. Day, 12 Neb. 596, 
 12 N. W. 109, 41 Am. Rep. 772 (1882); Sibley v. Aldrich, 33 N. H. 553, 66 
 Am. Dec. 745 (1856); Hulett v. Swift, 33 N. Y. 571, 88 Am. Dec. 405 (1865), 
 affirming S. C, 42 Barb. 230 (1864); Gile v. Libby, 36 Barb. 70 (N. Y. 1861); 
 Classon v. Leopold, 2 Sweeny (N. Y.), 705 (1870); Lucia v. Omel, 53 N. Y. 
 App. Div. 641, 66 N. Y. Supp. 1136 (1900); WiUard v. Reinhardt, 2 E. D. 
 Smith (N. Y.), 148 (1853); Gast v. Gooding, 1 Ohio Dec. 315 (1849); Cun- 
 ningham V. Bucky, 42 W. Va. 671, 26 S. E. 442, 35 L. R. A. 850 (1896); 
 Jalie V. Cardinal, 35 Wis. 118 (1874). 
 
 219 Pick. 283 (1830). 
 [132] 
 
Chap. XV.] Responsibility foi? Goods of Guest. [§ 186. 
 
 injured by act of God (a sudden and unusual storm) the 
 innkeeper is liable if he negligently fail to protect them 
 against the storm.^^ 
 
 § 186. Jurisdiction imposing liability of innkeepers for negli- 
 gence only. 
 
 In several jurisdictions a much less stringent rule is laid 
 down, the innkeeper being held liable for loss of goods in the 
 inn only if he is negligent personally, or by his servants.^^ " It 
 is a harsh rule," said Judge Trumbull in Metcalf v. Hess,^ 
 "which makes a person in any case responsible for a loss which 
 has occurred without any fault of his, and it can only be jus- 
 tified upon groimds of pubhc poUcy, and in consideration of 
 the numerous opportimities afforded by the nature of his busi- 
 ness, for fraudulent combination and clandestine dealing, to 
 the injtu"y of the owner of the property. The rule ought not 
 to be extended beyond the reason in which it originated." 
 
 The rule which appears to prevail in Kentucky is that as to 
 goods of the guest actually deposited with the innkeeper, he 
 is imder a bailee's liability substantially Hke that of the com- 
 mon carrier, "approximating insurance;" ^^ but as to goods 
 kept imder the control of the guest, while he is to take "wa.- 
 common care"' to protect them ^^ he is not responsible for their 
 loss if it happened by mere accident for which he is in no degree 
 responsible.^ 
 
 22 Scheffer v. Corson, 5 S. D. 233, 58 N. W. 555 (1894). 
 
 23 Johnson v. Richardson, 17 111. 302, 63 Am. Dec. 369 (1855); Metcalf v. 
 Hess, 14 lU. 129 (1852); Baker v. Dessauer, 49 Ind. 28 (1874); Laird v. 
 Eichold, 10 Ind. 212, 71 Am. Dec. 323 (1858) (overruling a dictum to the 
 contrary in Thickstun v. Howard, 8 Blackf. [Ind.] 535 [1847] ); Hill v. Owen, 
 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 323, 35 Am. Dec. 124 (1840); Woodworth v. Morse, 18 La. 
 Ann. 156 (1866) (Civil Law); Towson v. Havre de Grace Bank, 6 Har. & J. 
 (Md.) 47, 14 Am. Dec. 254 (1823); Cutler v. Bonney, 30 Mich. 259, 18 Am. 
 Rep. 127 (1874); Howth v. Franklin, 20 Tex. 798 (1858); Howe Machine Co. 
 v. Pease, 49 Vt. 477 (1877); Merritt v. Claghorn, 23 Vt. 177 (1851). 
 
 2< 14 m. 129 (1852). 
 
 25 Weisenger v. Taylor, 1 Bush (Ky.), 275 (1866). 
 
 28 Packard v. Northcraft, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 439 (1859). 
 
 27 Vance v. Throckmorton, 5 Bush (Ky.), 41, 96 Am. Dec. 327 (1869). 
 
 [133] 
 
§ 188.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XV. 
 
 § 187. Jurisdictions imposing liability for negligence or breach of 
 undertaking. 
 
 A third form of rule, however, or it may be merely a more 
 accurate way of stating the rule just examined, is that the inn- 
 keeper is liable either for actual negligence or for breach of his 
 imdertaking ; that is, for failure to furnish entertainment, safe 
 premises, and protection against theft. For failure in these 
 matters which he specially undertakes he' is responsible, with 
 or without negligence; but for loss from any other cause he is 
 liable only if the loss happened through his own negligence.^* 
 In Johnson v. Chadbourn Furnace Co,^^ Judge Collins said: 
 "The fact is that in nearly all of the cases supporting the doc- 
 trine of absolute UabiUty unexplained thefts or losses of prop- 
 erty were involved. No distinction was made between goods 
 stolen and goods destroyed by fire for which the landlord was 
 in no manner responsible. That there might be a well-defined 
 distinction does not seem to have been thought of. . . . 
 All losses of property incurred by guests at a public hotel or 
 inn by fire are prima facie due to the negligence of the propri- 
 etor, but he may discharge or relieve himself from habihty by 
 showing that the loss happened by an irresistible force or un- 
 avoidable accident, such as a fire originating upon premises 
 over which he has no control, without fault or neghgence on 
 his part. This doctrine does not infringe upon the common- 
 law rule, which makes him responsible for all thefts from within 
 his house, or unexplained, whether committed by guests, serv- 
 ants or strangers, upon the general principle that an innkeeper- 
 guarantees the good behavior of all who may be xmder his roof — 
 particularly his servants. " 
 
 §188. Loss by theft. 
 
 Loss of goods by theft on the part of the innkeeper's serv- 
 ants would clearly charge the innkeeper under any rule.'° And 
 
 28 Johnson v. Chadbourn Furnace Co., 89 Minn. 310, 94 N. W. 874 (1903); 
 ■McDaniels v. Robinson, 26 Vt. 316, 62 Am, Deo. 574 (1854). 
 
 29 89 Minn. 310, 94 N. W. 874 (1903). 
 
 30 Walsh V. Porterfield, 87 Pa. 376 (1878); Shultz v. Wall, 134 Pa. 262, 
 
 [134] 
 
Chap. XV.] Responsibility for Goods of Guest. [§ 190. 
 
 even if the goods are stolen by a stranger without actual neg- 
 ligence on the part of the innkeeper (unless they are stolen by 
 someone for whom the guest is responsible) there is a breach 
 of the innkeeper's obUgation, and he should be held Uable un- 
 der any theory of liabiUty.^* 
 
 But in one or two cases, in which the least stringent hability 
 is imposed, the innkeeper is exonerated from loss even by 
 theft, if neither he nor his servants were negligent.^^ 
 § 189. Loss by accidental fire. 
 
 Loss by accidental fire, where the innkeeper was not negli- 
 gent, charges the innkeeper or not according to the rule adopted 
 in the jurisdiction concerned. In a State where the stringent 
 habiUty is imposed, the innkeeper is liable for a loss by acci- 
 dental fire.^^ But in jurisdictions which hold the innkeeper 
 hable only for negligence or breach of imdertaking, he is not 
 responsible where the goods were lost by accidental fire.'* 
 
 §190. Presumption of negligence. 
 
 Whatever view is adopted, it is agreed that upon loss or in- 
 jury to the goods being shown the innkeeper is prima facie 
 liable, and the burden is upon him to prove such facts as will 
 exonerate him.*^ 
 
 19 Atl. 742, 26 "Wkly. Notes Cas. 51, 19 Am. St. Rep. 686, 8 L. R. A. 97 
 (1890). 
 
 31 Lanier v. Ypungblood, 73 Ala. 587 (1883); Sasseen v. Clark, 37 Ga. 242 
 (1867); Johnson v. Richardson, 17 III. 302, 63 Am. Dec. 369 (1855); Lusk 
 V. Belote, 22 Minn. 468 (1876); Olson v. Grossman, 31 Minn. 222 (1883); 
 Dunbier v. Day, 12 Neb. 596, 12 N. W. 109, 41 Am. Rep. 772 (1882); Wies 
 V. Hoffman House, 28 N. Y. Misc. 225, 59 N. Y. Supp. 38 (1899); Gast v. 
 Gooding, 1 Ohio Dec. 315 (1849); Newson v. Axon, 1 McCord (S. Car.), 509, 
 10 Am. Dec. 685 (1821); McDaniels v. Robinson, 26 Vt. 316, 62 Am. Deo. 
 574 (1854). 
 
 32 Baker v. Dessauer, 49 Ind. 28 (1874). 
 
 33 Fay V. Pacific Improvement Co., 93 Cal. 253, 26 Pac. 1099, 28 Pac. 943, 
 27 Am. St. Rep. 198, 16 L. R. A. 188 (1891); Hulett v. Swift, 33 N. Y. 571, 
 88 Am. Dec. 406 (1865); Nott v. Maclurgan, 20 W. N. (N. S. W.) 135 (1903). 
 
 34 Vance v. Throckmorton, 5 Bush (Ky.), 41, 96 Am. Dec. 327 (1869); 
 Cutler V. Bonney, 30 Mich. 259, 18 Am. Rep. 127 (1874) ; Merritt v. Claghom, 
 23 Vt. 177 (1851). 
 
 35 Sasseen v. Clark, 37 Ga. 242 (1867); Johnson v. Richardson, 17 111. 302, 
 
 [135] 
 
§ 191.] Innkeepers. [Chap XV. 
 
 § 191. For what goods the innkeeper is responsible. 
 
 Tlie innkeeper's responsibility is not confined to goods of 
 any particular kind, but extends to money '® and to all other 
 personal property brought by the guest to the inn.^^ 
 
 In Louisiana, however, being a State governed by the civil 
 law, the innkeeper is absolutely responsible only for baggage 
 and for money for immediate expenses, unless it is deposited 
 with the innkeeper.^* The same doctrine seems to be held also 
 in Maryland where the innkeeper is held liable in case of loss 
 for baggage only.^* By baggage is meant articles for use on 
 the journey or while a guest; it does not include silver knives, 
 forks and spoons,*" surgical instruments or pistols.'** 
 
 63 Am. Dec. 369 (1855); Eden v. Drey, 75 III. App. 102 (1898); Hulbert v. 
 Hartman, 79 111. App. 289 (1898); Bowell v. De Wald, 2 Ind. App. 303, 28 
 N. E. 430 (1891); Burrows v. Trieber, 21 Md. 320, 83 Am. Deo. 590 (1864); 
 Baehr v. Downey, 133 Mich. 163, 94 N. W. 750, 10 Detroit Leg. N. 153 (1903); 
 Cheesebrough v. Taylor, 12 Abb. Prac. (N. Y.) 227 (1860) ; Murray v. Clarke, 
 2 Daly, 102 (N. Y. 1866); Quinton v. Courtney, 1 Hayw. (N. C.) 40 (1794); 
 Jordan v. Boone, 5 Rich. Law (S. C.),528 (1875); Howe Machine Co. v. 
 Pease, 49 Vt. 477 (1877). 
 
 36 Kent V. Shuckard, 2 B. & Ad. 803, 1 L. J. K. B. 1 (Eng. 1831). 
 
 37 Eden v. Drey, 75 111. App. 102 (1898) ; Berkshire Woolen Co. v. Proctor, 
 7 Cush. (Mass.) 417 (1851); Smith v. WUson, 36 Minn. 334, 31 N. W. 176 
 (1887); Wilkins v. Earle, 44 N. Y. 172 (1870); Taylor v. Monnot, 1 Abb. 
 Prac. (N. Y.) 325 (1854); Van Wyck v. Howard, 12 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 147 
 (1856); KeUogg v. Sweeney, 1 Lans. (N. Y.) 397 (1869). This is probably 
 also the law in Georgia, Sasseen v. Clark, 37 Ga. 242 (1867), and in Kentucky, 
 though there aU goods not personally needed by the guest must be deposited 
 with the innkeeper to make him liable at common law. Weisenger v. Tay- 
 lor, 1 Bush (Ky.), 275, 89 Am. Dec. 626 (1867). 
 
 38 Simon v. Miller, 7 La. Ann. 360 (1852); Pope v. Hall, 14 La. Ann. 324 
 (1869); Profilet v. Hall, 14 La. Ann. 524 (1859). 
 
 39Pettigrew v. Barnum, 11 Md. 434, 69 Am. Dec. 212 (1857); Treiber v. 
 Burrows, 27 Md. 130 (1867). 
 «Pettigrew v. Barnum, 11 Md. 434, 69 Am. Dec. 212 (1857). 
 « GUes V. Pauntleroy, 13 Md. 126 (1859). 
 
 [136] 
 
Chap. XVI.] Responsibility as a Mere Bailee. [§ 201. 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 innkeeper's responsibility as a mere bailee. 
 
 Topic I. Responsibflity for 
 goods of boarder, 
 i 201. Boarder not entitled to extra- 
 ordinary responsibility of 
 innkeeper. 
 
 202. Innkeeper is ordinary bailee 
 
 for hire of boarder's goods. 
 Topic II. Responsibility for 
 goods of one neither guest 
 nor boarder. 
 
 203. Goods placed in the inn by one 
 
 not a guest or boarder. 
 
 § 204. Responsibility of innkeeper 
 when he takes the goods as 
 a matter of business. 
 
 205. Responsibility of innkeeper as 
 
 gratuitous bailee. 
 
 206. Responsibility for misdeliv- 
 
 ery. 
 Topic III. Responsibility for 
 goods of guest outside the 
 inn. 
 
 207. Goods in bath house attached 
 
 to inn. 
 
 TOPIC I. 
 
 responsibility for goods, of boarder. 
 
 § 201. Boarder not entitled to extraordinary responsibility of inn- 
 keeper. 
 
 A boarder at an inn is not entitled to the exceptional respon- 
 sibility of the innkeeper for the goods of his guest. ^ So where 
 money is deposited in the office safe and is stolen by a clerk 
 who was not negligently employed,^ and where goods are stolen 
 
 1 Jeffords v. Crump, 2 Phila. (Pa.) 500 (1878); Vance v. Throckmorton, 
 5 Bush (Ky.),4I, 96 Am. Dec. 327 (1869); Manning v. Wells, 9 Humph. 
 (Tenn.) 746, 51 Am. Dec. 688 (1849); Lusk v. Belote, 22 Mion. 468 (1876), 
 Kisten v. Hildebrand, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 72, 48 Am. Dec. 416 (1848); Barber 
 V. Harrison, 6 City HaU Rec. (N. Y.) 89 (1821); Wiser v. Chesley, 53 Mo. 
 547 (1873); Neal v. WUcox, 4 Jones (N. C), 146 (1856). 
 
 2 Taylor v. Downey, 104 Mich. 532, 62 N. W. 716, 53 Am. St. Rep. 472. 
 29 L. R. A. 92 (1895); Hutchinson v. Donovan, 76 Mo. App. 391 (1898); 
 Johnson v. Reynolds, 3 Kan. 257 (1865). 
 
 [137] 
 
§ 201.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XVI. 
 
 from the chamber of the guest/ the imikeeper is not responsi- 
 ble. Thus, in one of the cases just cited, Johnson v. Reynolds, 
 the plaintiff, a regular boarder in the defendant's inn, de- 
 posited three hundred and thirty-eight dollars in gold, done 
 up in a rag marked $338, with the defendant. The defendant 
 put it in his safe, from which it was stolen by burglars. The 
 defendant was held not to be liable as innkeeper, but only as 
 bailee. So in the old case of Barber v. Harrison, cited in the 
 last note, it appeared that the defendant kept an irm, in the 
 city of New York, and that the plaintiff, an inhabitant of the 
 city, was boarding at the inn, paying the regular price for 
 boarders, which was less than that for transient guests. The 
 plaintiff occupied a double room, into which the defendant was 
 accustomed to put lodgers without objection by the defendant. 
 "A man of genteel appearance, representing himself as on his 
 way from Philadelphia to Albany" was put into the room, 
 and during the night carried off the plaintiff's clothes, watch, 
 and certain valuable papers. Ordinary care and diligence was 
 used by the innkeeper to the plaintiff, and there was no lack 
 of care on the part of the servants of the inn. The court held 
 that since the plaintiff was merely a boarder the defendant 
 was not liable. 
 
 "A passenger or wayfaring man may be an entire stranger. 
 He must put up and lodge at the inn to which his day's jomney 
 may bring him. It is therefore important that he should be 
 protected by the most stringent rules of law, enforcing the lia- 
 bility of the innkeeper. In such case, therefore, the law makes 
 the innkeeper an insurer of the goods of his guest except as to 
 losses occasioned by the act of God or public enemies. But as 
 a boarder he does not need such protection, the law does not 
 afford it. It is sufficient to give him a remedy when he shall 
 prove the innkeeper has been guilty of culpable neghgence. " * 
 
 3 Haff V. Adams (Ari.), 59 Pac. Ill (1899); Chamberlain v. Masterton, 26 
 Ala. 371 (1855); Barber v. Harrison, 6 City Hall Rec. (N. Y.) 89 (1821); 
 Manning v. Wells, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 746, 51 Am. Dec. 688 (1849); Meacham 
 V. Galloway, 102 Tenn. 415, 52 S. W. 859 (1899). 
 
 4 Manning v. Wells, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 746, 51 Am. Dec. 688 (1849). 
 
 [138] 
 
Chap. XVI.] Responsibility as a Mere Bailee. [§ 202. 
 
 Where a portion of a man's family were boarders at a hotel, 
 and while he was visiting them as a transient guest some of the 
 goods of the guest and of his family were stolen, the innkeeper 
 was held liable as such for the guest's goods, but only as 
 ordinary bailee for the goods of the other members of the 
 family.^ 
 
 § 202. Innkeeper is ordinary bailee for hire of boarder's goods. 
 
 But the innkeeper in such a case is obviously a bailee for hire ; 
 the care of the boarder's goods being as much a part of his im- 
 dertaking, for which he is paid, as the care of the goods of a 
 guest. He does not receive the boarder as part of his public 
 duty and therefore does not tmdertake the extreme responsi- 
 bihty undertaken toward the guest's goods; but he receives 
 the boarder and his goods to be entertained and cared for in 
 the same way that a guest is entertained and cared for, with 
 the single exception that he does not offer his house to a boarder 
 as a refuge from the perils of the road. For any injury to the 
 goods, which an innkeeper carrying on his business in the ordi- 
 nary way should have guarded against, the innkeeper ought 
 to be hable. This is usually expressed, in the language ordi- 
 narily used in connection with bailments, as that duty of "or- 
 dinary care " which is due in bailments for the mutual benefit.* 
 This is true whether the boarder keeps the goods in his own 
 hands or dehvers them to the innkeeper, though those are cir- 
 cumstances which without affecting the legal duty of care are 
 to be considered in determining whether in fact due care has 
 been lacking. 
 
 "The nature of the liabihty is not changed by a deposit in 
 the safe, though the degree of care may be increased over that 
 required where the boarder retains the custody of valuables; 
 but the keeper of the house is still a bailee for mutual benefit, 
 and stiU owes the duty of ordinary care, which varies in degree 
 
 sLusk V. Belote, 22 Minn. 468 (1876). 
 
 6 Taylor v. Downey, 104 Mich. 532, 62 N. W. 716, 53 Am. St. Rep. 472, 
 29 L. R. A. 92 (1895). 
 
 [139] 
 
§ 203.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XVI. 
 
 as the responsibility is thrown upon him, or is asstimed by the 
 owner. " ^ 
 
 TOPIC II. 
 
 RESPONSIBILITY FOR GOODS OF ONE NEITHER GUEST NOR 
 
 BOARDER. 
 
 § 203. Goods placed in the inn by one not a guest or boarder. 
 
 Where goods are placed within the inn and in the care of the 
 innkeeper by one who is not a guest, the innkeeper is not re- 
 sponsible as such, but only as an ordinary bailee.* This is true, 
 even though at the time he gave the goods to the innkeeper 
 the owner bona fide intended to become a guest. The ques- 
 tion was discussed in an EngUsh case.^ The plaintiff arrived 
 at the railway station at Carlisle, and was there met by one 
 of the porters of the defendant's hotel, which adjoined the 
 railway station. He delivered his luggage to the porter, and 
 went to the hotel, intending to pass the night there; but after 
 reading a telegram which he foimd waiting for him at the office, 
 he decided to go on to Manchester the same day. He went to 
 the coffee room to dine, but was told that there was no joint 
 ready, and proceeded, by the waiter's advice, to the station 
 refreshment room, which was under the same management 
 as the hotel, and connected with it by a covered passage. On 
 his way to the refreshment room he met the porter with his 
 luggage, and told him to lock it up tiU he was ready to start 
 for Manchester. The luggage was locked up in a room ad- 
 joining the refreshment room, but on the plaintiff's arrival 
 at the platform, part of it was found to be missing. 
 
 7 Per Curiam, in Taylor v. Downey, 104 Mich. 532, 62 N. W. 716, 53 Am. 
 St. Rep. 472, 29 L. R. A. 92 (1895). 
 
 8 Centlivre v. Ryder, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. (N. Y.) 273 (1846) ; Toub v. Schmidt 
 60 Hun (N. Y.), 409, 15 N. Y. Supp. 616 (1891); Tulane Hotel Co. v. Holo- 
 han, 112 Tenn. 214, 79 S. W. 113 (1903); Bernard v. Lalond, 8 Leg. News 
 (Can.), 215 (1885); Holmes v. Moore, 17 L. C. R. 143 (1867). 
 
 9 Strauss V. County H. &. W. Co., 12 Q. B. D. 27, 53 L. J. Q. B. 25, 49 
 L. T. 601, 32 W. R. 170, 48 J. P. 69 (Eng. 1883). 
 
 [140] 
 
Chap. XVI,] Responsibility as a Mere Bailee. [§ 204. 
 
 The court held that the plaintiff had not become a guest, 
 since his only entertainment by the defendant was in the 
 refreshment room, a place outside the precincts of the inn; 
 and that there was no proof of negligence on the part of the 
 defendant. Mr. Justice Mathews said that at the time the 
 plaintiff gave his luggage to the porter he had not made up 
 his mind to become a guest. This seems not to be consistent 
 with the facts as stated; but the case did not turn on the 
 point. His bona fide intention to become a guest at the inn 
 is clear at the time he gave the luggage to the porter. 
 
 The principle was carried to an extreme in the case where 
 a person engaged a room for the storage of his goods, not in- 
 tending himself to occupy the room; it was held under these 
 circumstances that the owner of the goods was not a guest and 
 that the innkeeper's hability was that of an ordinary bailee.^" 
 
 § 204. Responsibility of innkeeper when he takes the goods as a 
 matter of business. 
 
 When the innkeeper takes the goods as a matter of business 
 in cormection with his trade of innkeeper, whether he receives 
 compensation especially for keeping the goods or keeps them 
 without additional compensation, he is Uable not as an insurer 
 but as an ordinary bailee. 
 
 So where a commercial traveller brings goods to an inn un- 
 der such circumstances that the innkeeper is not responsible 
 as such for the goods, he is nevertheless bound to exercise care 
 for their protection, and is liable for a loss occasioned by his 
 negligence." And so an innkeeper who takes horses to board 
 for one not a guest is responsible for them only as a bailee for 
 hire.^^ 
 
 On this principle while an innkeeper is liable for the negli- 
 gent loss of goods left at the inn by a guest upon his departure," 
 
 loBunn v. Johnson, 77 Mo. App. 596 (1898). 
 
 " Myers v. Cottrill, 5 Biss. 465, Fed. Cas. 9,985 (1873); Scheffer v. Corson, 
 5 S. D. 233, 58 N. W. 555 (1894). 
 
 "Ingallsbee v. Wood, 33 N. Y. 577, 88 Am. Dec. 405 (1865), affirming 
 S. C, 36 Barb. 452. 
 
 w Murray v. Clarke, 2 Daly (N. Y.), 102 (1866); Coykendall v. Eaton, 55 
 
 [141] 
 
§ 205.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XVI. 
 
 his responsibility is that of an ordinary bailee for hire, and he 
 is therefore hable if the goods are lost or injured through his 
 neglect of care. 
 
 In a few cases the liability of the innkeeper in such a case 
 is spoken of as that of a gratuitous bailee, who is held only for 
 damage caused by his gross negligence.^'* 
 
 § 205. Responsibility of innkeeper as gratuitous bailee. 
 
 Where goods are left within the inn with consent of the inn- 
 keeper by one not a guest, the innkeeper must take due care 
 of the goods, and is liable for a loss caused by his negUgence.^^ 
 
 Even as a gratuitous bailee he is liable for loss or injury to 
 the goods caused by his gross negligence.^® 
 
 It is usually enough that he takes as much care of the goods 
 so deposited as he does of his own ; but, when the keeper of a 
 coffee house left money, entrusted to him for the purpose of 
 taking up a bill, in his cash box in his taproom, where it was 
 lost, together with a much larger sum of his own, there was 
 held to be evidence of gross negligence sufficient to go to the 
 jury." 
 
 Barb. (N. Y.) 188, 37 How. Pr. 438 (1869); George v. Depierris, 17 N. Y. 
 Misc. 400, 39 N. Y. Supp. 1082 (1896). 
 
 "Johnson v. Reynolds, 3 Kan. 257 (1865); Jeffords v. Crump, 12 Phila. 
 (Pa.) 500 (1878). In Lawrence v. Howard, 1 Utah, 142 (1874), sometimes 
 cited to the same point, the ground of decision was that the goods had been 
 left behind by the boarder, without any agreement with the innkeeper, who 
 was therefore in fact only a gratuitous bailee. 
 
 15 Wear v. Gleason, 52 Ark. 364, 12 S. W. 756, 20 Am. St. Rep. 186 (1889); 
 Stewart v. Head, 70 Ga. 449 (1883); Wiser v. Chesley, 53 Mo. 547 (1873); 
 IngaUsbee v. Wood, 33 N. Y. 577, 88 Am. Dec. 405 (1865); Centlivre v. 
 Ryder, 1 Edm. Sel. Gas. (N. Y.) 273 (1846); Toub v. Schmidt, 60 Hun 
 (N. Y.),409, 15 N. Y. Supp. 616 (1891); Arcade Hotel Co. v. Wiatt, 44 Ohio. 
 St. 32, 4 N. E. 398 (1886); Tulane Hotel Co. v. Holohan, 112 Tenn. 214, 79 
 S. W. 113 (1903); Bernard v. Lalond, 8 Leg. News, 215 (Can. 1885); Holmes 
 V. Moore, 17 L. C. R. 143 (1867). 
 
 18 Doorman v. Jenkins, 2 A. & E. 256, 4 Nev. & M. 170, 4 L. J. K. B. 29 
 (Eng. 1834); Coykendall v. Eaton, 55 Barb. (N. Y.) 188, 37 How. Pr. 438 
 (1869); George v. Depierris, 17 N. Y. Misc. 400, 39 N. Y. Supp. 1080 (1896). 
 
 17 Doorman v. Jenkins, 2 A. &. E. 256, 4 N. & M. 170, 4 L. J. K. B. 29 
 (Eng. 1834). 
 
 [142] 
 
Chap. XVI.] Responsibility as a Mere Bailee. [§ 206. 
 
 § 206. Responsibility for misdelivery. 
 
 A misdelivery of goods bailed is ordinarily held to make even 
 a gratuitous bailee liable. This is obviously true if the mis- 
 delivery was neghgent. So of a delivery to an apparent 
 stranger who claims it without an effort to verify his claim.** 
 And so where the goods were wrongly delivered to an express- 
 man who brought a sUp of paper with the owner's name on it, 
 the innkeeper was held liable.*^ The facts of the case were 
 as follows. The plaintiff had been a boarder at the defend- 
 ant's inn, as a servant to other boarders, but she had de- 
 parted from the inn, leaving her trunk behind. On Novem- 
 ber 18, 1895, the plaintiff left the order with Jackson's express 
 to call for her trunk. Manning, one of the drivers employed 
 by that concern, called at the hotel for the trunk the next 
 morning and demanded the trunk, but was told that it had 
 been delivered to another expressman on the previous day. 
 The defendant proved that a man with a wagon called on 
 November 18, 1895; that he had a slip of paper with the plain- 
 tiff's name thereon, and that upon demanding the trunk he 
 was allowed to take it. The defendant took no receipt for 
 the trunk. Randolph, the hall man, who delivered it, testified 
 that he had worked in hotels for six or seven years, and that 
 in general they took receipts, but that "he did not think to 
 take a receipt for help's trunks." He did not obtain the name 
 of the man to whom he delivered it, or ascertain the license 
 number of his wagon, or require him to leave the slip of paper 
 containing the plaintiff's name; so that the defendant was 
 unable to give any information concerning where the trunk 
 had gone or where it could be found, further than it was given 
 to an unknown expressman. The plaintiff testified that the 
 delivery made was without her authority; and that, although 
 she had consulted detectives and made efforts to recover her 
 property, she had not been able to obtain it. 
 
 Under these circumstances the court held the defendant 
 
 18 Wear v. Gleason, 52 Ark. 364, 12 S. W. 756, 20 Am. St. Rep. 186 (1889). 
 10 George v. Depierris, 17 N. Y. Misc. 400, 39 N. Y. Supp. 1082 (1896). 
 
 [143] 
 
§ 207.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XVI. 
 
 liable. The delivery of the trunk was not the exercise of that 
 care which the law imposed upon the plaintiff; and the facts 
 showed an indifference respecting the safety of the plaintiff's 
 property and disregard of the usage as to taking receipts which 
 excludes the idea that any diligence was used by the defendant 
 to insure its delivery to her. - 
 
 The innkeeper is equally liable for a misdelivery the circum- 
 stances of which are unexplained. The burden is upon him 
 to explain the loss.^° And there is good authority and reason 
 for the view that even a gratuitous bailee is Uable in case of 
 a misdelivery, however careful he may have been to secure a 
 good deUvery; for it is departing from the terms of his bail- 
 ment.^^ 
 
 TOPIC III. 
 
 RESPONSIBILITY FOR GOODS OF GUEST OUTSIDE THE INN. 
 
 § 207. Goods in bath house attached to inn. 
 
 Where the goods of a guest are left in charge of the innkeeper 
 outside the precincts of the inn, though the innkeeper is not 
 as such Uable for the goods, he is nevertheless responsible for 
 the exercise of due care. So where an innkeeper provided bath 
 rooms, outside the inn, for his guests, and the guest's goods 
 were lost from the bath room, while the iimkeeper is not Uable 
 on a declarartion charging him as innkeeper ^^ he is Uable for 
 loss by his negUgence or misdeUvery.^^ 
 
 20 Murray v. Clarke, 2 Daly (N. Y.), 102 (1866). 
 
 21 Jenkins v. Bacon, 111 Mass. 373 (1873). 
 
 22 Minor v. Staples, 71 Me. 316, 36 Am. Rep. 318 (1880). 
 
 23 Tombler v. Koelling, 60 Ark. 62, 28 S. W. 795 (1894). The defendant 
 was the keeper of the bath house, not an innkeeper, but the same principle 
 is involved. 
 
 [144] 
 
Chap. XVII.] Limitation of Responsibility. 
 
 [§ 212. 
 
 CHAPTER XVII. 
 
 LIMITATION AND MODIFICATION OF HESPONSIBILITY. 
 
 211. Limitation of liability by con- 
 
 tract. 
 
 212. Reasonable rules for the con- 
 
 duct of the guest. 
 
 § 213. Rule requiring deposit of the 
 goods. 
 
 214. How far deposit can be re- 
 
 quired. 
 
 215. Sufficiency of the notice. 
 
 § 211. Limitation of liability by contract. 
 
 Like other persons engaged in a public employment, for in- 
 stance, the common carrier, the innkeeper may not limit his 
 liability for loss of the guest's goods, as it is imposed by the 
 common law, by a contract with the guest. ^ The same neces- 
 sity of the guest who applies to be received which leads to the 
 obligation to receive him, puts him at the mercy of the inn- 
 keeper who requires a consent to the limitation of liabihty as 
 a condition of his being received. The parties are not on an 
 equal footing, and public policy requires that the guest be pro- 
 tected. The contract therefore for limitation of the innkeep- 
 er's liabiUty is void as against pubUc poUcy. 
 
 For the same reason, the innkeeper cannot require the guest 
 to take charge of his own goods, for that would in effect be a 
 refusal to take them into the inn.^ 
 
 § 212. Reasonable rules for the conduct of the guest. 
 
 Like the common carriers and others engaged in a public 
 occupation, the innkeeper may make reasonable rules for the 
 
 1 Stanton v. Leland, 4 E. D. Smith (N. Y.), 88 (1855); Fuller v. Coats, 18 
 Ohio St, 343 (1868). 
 
 2 Calye's Case, 8 Coke, 63 (1584). 
 
 10 [ 145 ] 
 
§ 213.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XVII. 
 
 conduct of his business. These rules cannot affect the nature 
 or extent of his obligation, as for instance, his habihty for loss 
 of goods, or they would be open to the same objection as con- 
 tracts hmiting Uability. They may, however, so far as is rea- 
 sonable, affect the conduct of himself and his guests.' "The 
 protection of the innkeeper by reasonable rules respecting the 
 custody of the goods of the guest while he remains at the inn, 
 is not disfavored in the law, and it is eminently just that he 
 upon whom the responsibility for the safety of the goods doth 
 rest, shall have power to use such guards for that safe keeping 
 as are consistent with the due comfort and convenience of the 
 guest. The clothing of the guest, and articles necessary for 
 his daily use and comfort while remaining, could not, of course) 
 under this view of the subject, be removed from him, so as to 
 interfere with or interrupt that use and convenience. But 
 goods, merchandise and money, in trunks or packages, are, 
 in my opinion, subject to the landlord's reasonable requirement 
 in this respect. " * 
 
 §213. Rule requiring deposit of the goods. 
 
 The commonest form of regulation is a rule that valuable 
 packages must be left at the office to be placed ia the safe. 
 So far as this may be reasonably required of a guest, failure to 
 do so will exonerate the innkeeper from loss.® This is no more 
 than just to the innkeeper; for since the innkeeper can have 
 no effective control over articles taken by the guest into his 
 room, he ought where the risk is great to be allowed to exercise 
 a more direct and efficient control. As Mr. Chief Justice Day 
 said in the case of Fuller v. Coats, cited in the last note, "To 
 enable the innkeeper to discharge his duty, and to secure the 
 property of the traveller from loss, while in a house ever open 
 to the public, it may, in many instances, become absolutely 
 necessary for him to provide special means, and to make 
 
 3 Stanton v. Leland, 4 E. D. Smith (N. Y.), 88 (1855). 
 ■1 Woodruff, J., in Stanton v. Leland, 4 E. D. Smith (N. Y.), 88 (1855). 
 6 Stanton v. Leland, 4 E. D. Smith (N. Y.), 88 (1855); FuUer v. Coats, 
 18 Ohio St. 343 (1868). 
 [146] 
 
Chap. XVII.] Limitation of Responsibility. [§ 214. 
 
 necessary regulations and requirements to be observed by 
 the guest, to secure the safety of his property. When such 
 means and requirements are reasonable and proper for that 
 purpose, and they are brought to the knowledge of the guest, 
 with the information that, if not observed by him, the inn- 
 keeper will not be responsible, ordinary prudence, the interest 
 of both parties, and public policy, would require of the guest 
 a compliance therewith; and if he should fail to do so, and his 
 goods are lost, solely for that reason, he would justly and 
 properly be chargeable with negUgence. To hold otherwise, 
 would subject the party without fault to the payment of dam- 
 ages to a party for loss occasioned by his own negligence, and 
 would be carrying the liability of innkeepers to an unreason- 
 able extent." 
 
 As will be seen in the next chapter, the defence of the inn- 
 keeper does not so properly rest upon the neglect of due care 
 by the guest as upon neglect of a more specific duty, that is, 
 the duty of acting in accordance with the innkeeper's direc- 
 tions. The notice of the innkeeper's reasonable rule for the 
 conduct of the guest in this respect puts upon the guest the 
 duty of abiding by the rule; and if the guest neglects the duty 
 of abiding by the innkeeper's reasonable regulation the inn- 
 keeper is for that reason exempted from responsibility for the 
 resulting loss. 
 
 A similar requirement is often made by statute. Such 
 statutes will be collected and discussed in a subsequent chapter. 
 
 An innkeeper is liable for the loss of everything deposited 
 under this notice.* 
 
 § 214. How far deposit can be required. 
 
 The notice is effective only as to property which can con- 
 veniently be left in the safe, not as to property which the guest 
 needs to keep by him; clothing and articles of daily use are 
 not covered by it.^ For it is obvious that the guest must have 
 
 ePinkerton v. Woodward, 33 Cal. 557, 91 Am. Dec. 657 (1867). 
 'Johnson v. Richardson, 17 111. 302, 63 Am. Dec. 369 (1855); Milford v. 
 
 [147] 
 
§ 215.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XVII. 
 
 these things by him in his room. He cannot go to the inn- 
 keeper's office every time he needs an article of clothing to 
 wear or a little money to spend, nor can he withdraw his watch 
 from the safe whenever he desires to know the time. It is, 
 therefore, not reasonable to require him to surrender these 
 things to the innkeeper. 
 
 It may of course be argued that he might be forced to exer- 
 cise the option of surrendering them to the innkeeper or of 
 taking himself the risk of losing them, as he would do if he 
 carried them with him into the street outside the inn. But 
 it is to be observed that if the innkeeper by means of his notice 
 can force this alternative upon the guest, since the first course 
 is impracticable, he is really forcing the guest to take the risk 
 of loss, or in other words is limiting his own liability by notice, 
 a thing which he is forbidden by law to do. A different prob- 
 lem is presented when a statute requires the guest to sur- 
 render goods to the landlord on notice, or else to take the risk 
 of loss. The risk of loss may of course be placed upon the 
 guest by statute, though it cannot be placed upon him by 
 notice or contract of the innkeeper; and it is therefore a mere 
 matter of interpreting the statute in order to discover whether 
 the language of it covers the case. The question so far as it 
 involves the construction of a statute will be discussed in a 
 later chapter. 
 
 § 215. Sufficiency of the notice. 
 
 The notice must be given reasonably. Notice given a year 
 previously to the person becoming a guest is not reasonable.* 
 
 Notice posted on the door of the guest's chamber was held 
 not to be brought home to the guest unless it was found as 
 a matter of fact that he either saw it or was negligent for not 
 doing so.* 
 
 Wesley, 1 Wilson (Ind.), 119 (1872); Stanton v. Leland, 4 E. D. Smith 
 (N. Y.), 88 (1855). 
 
 8 Lanier v. Youngblood, 73 Ala. 587 (1883). 
 
 » Bodwell V. Bragg, 29 la. 232 (1870). 
 [148] 
 
Chap. XVII.] Limitation of Responsibility. [§ 215. 
 
 The notice must be construed strictly. Thus a notice that 
 "valuables" must be put in the safe has been held not to ex- 
 tend to mineral specimens ^° or to money; ^^ and a notice that 
 the guest had better dispose of goods in a certain way is not 
 notice that he must do so in order to hold the landlord re- 
 sponsible.^^ 
 
 10 Brown Hotel Co. v. Burckhardt, 13 Col. App. 59, 56 Pao. 188 (1899). 
 
 11 Stanton v. Leland, 4 E. D. Smith (N. Y.), 88 (1855). 
 " Packard v. Northcraft, 2-Metc. (Ky.) 439 (1859). 
 
 [149] 
 
§ 221.] 
 
 Innkeepers. 
 
 [Chap. XVIII. 
 
 CHAPTER XVIII. 
 
 LOSS CHAEGEABLE TO THE GUEST; CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 221. Goods taken by servant or 
 
 companion of guest. 
 
 222. Goods injured because of 
 
 owner's act. 
 
 223. Goods lost by reason of con- 
 
 tributory negligence of 
 guest. 
 
 224. What is contributory negli- 
 
 gence: failure to lock door 
 or window. 
 
 § 225. Faliure to deliver valuables 
 to innkeeper. 
 
 226. Failure to inform innkeeper 
 
 of value of goods deposited. 
 
 227. Publicly exhibiting money or 
 
 valuables. 
 
 228. Other acts of negligence. 
 
 § 221. Goods taken by servant or companion of guest. 
 
 If the loss of the goods is chargeable in any way to the guest 
 himself, the innkeeper is absolved. Thus the innkeeper is not 
 responsible if the goods are taken by the guest's servant,^ or 
 by one who accompanied the guest to the inn and shared his 
 room by his will.^ Of course, if the innkeeper himself put the 
 thief into the guest's room, the innkeeper is hable, even though 
 the guest consent. 
 
 In Horslow's Case,' counsel for the defendant said in argu- 
 ment: " Suppose I with my good will suffer a stranger to lodge 
 with me in the inn, and in my chamber, which stranger robs 
 me, and I do not know him, shall not the innkeeper be charged 
 with it?" To which Newton, C. J., answered: "No, sir; when 
 he was lodged in your chamber not by the innkeeper, but by 
 
 1 Calye's Case, 8 Coke, 32 (1584). 
 
 2Calye's Case, 8 Coke, 32 (1584); Horslow's Case, Y. B. 22 Hen. 6, 21, 
 pi. 38 (1444). 
 
 3 Y. B. 22 Hen. 6, 21, pi. 38 (1444). 
 [150] 
 
Chap. XVIIL] Loss Chargeable to Guest. [§ 222, 
 
 your own sufferance; but if he was lodged with you by the 
 innkeeper, then the innkeeper shall be charged. And suppose 
 that your own servant who is with you in the inn robs you 
 shall the innkeeper be charged? Certainly not." 
 
 On this principle, if a guest allows another to appear to be 
 the owner of the goods and to exercise acts of ownership over 
 them, and the latter carries the goods away, the innkeeper is 
 excused.* 
 
 § 222. Goods injured because of owner's act. 
 
 ^ So,'where the guest gives exphcit directions as to the care of 
 the goods, and the loss happens through following such direc- 
 tions, the innkeeper is not liable. So in Owens v. Geiger ^ 
 the facts, as stated by the court, were that the defendant was 
 an innkeeper, and the plaintiff "delivered his horse to him 
 to be kept till his return, as he was going to foreign parts; that 
 Owens agreed with Geiger as to the feeding and keeping of the 
 horse till his return, for which Owens was to pay a reasonable 
 reward;" and "that Owens told Geiger that he wished his 
 horse to run in his yard in the daytime, his legs being swelled." 
 Owens's horse was put into the yard, jumped out and escaped, 
 and was lost. The court held an instruction to the jury that 
 "if they beUeved that Owens's horse was put into the defend- 
 ant's yard by Owens's direction, and that the horse escaped 
 therefrom without negligence on the part of Geiger, then they 
 must find for the defendant," was correct. And so where the 
 guest gives the goods, not to the innkeeper or to his servant 
 as such, but to another guest or other inmate in whom he re- 
 poses confidence, and the goods are embezzled, the innkeeper 
 is not Uable.® 
 
 4 Kelsey v. Berry, 42 111. 469 (1867). But the fact that the owner had 
 several times taken the thief into his room, and had authorized him to sell 
 goods from the samples there (but not to remove them) did not justify the 
 innkeeper in admitting the thief to the room, or excuse him for loss of the 
 goods. Jacobi v. Haynes, 14 N. Y. Misc. 15, 35 N. Y. Supp. 120 (1895). 
 
 5 2 Mo. 39, 22 Am. Dec. 435 (1828). 
 
 « Houser v. Tully, 62 Pa. 92, 1 Am. Rep. 390 (1869). 
 
 [151] 
 
1 223.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XVIII. 
 
 § 223. Goods lost by reason of contributory negligence of guest. 
 
 The loss of goods is most conimonly chargeable to the guest 
 himself by reason of contributory negligence on the part of the 
 guest. A guest cannot recover for the loss of his goods from 
 an inn if his own negligence contributed to the loss.'' 
 
 In order to protect the innkeeper from liabihty the negli- 
 gence of the guest need not be gross.* It is enough if it is the 
 want of such ordinary care as a reasonable prudent man would 
 exercise imder the existing circumstances.^ And the care re- 
 quired of the guest must not be such care as will cause him 
 serious personal inconvenience ; the innkeeper cannot call upon 
 the guest seriously to inconvenience himself in such a mat- 
 ter.^" A fortiori the guest cannot be called upon to run into 
 danger.^^ 
 
 Whether the negligence of the guest did contribute to the 
 loss is a question of fact ; ^^ and the burden of proof of this fact 
 is on the iimkeeper." If the innkeeper might subsequently 
 
 ' Burgess v. Clements, 4 M. & S. 306, Holt, 211 n., 1 Stark. 251 n. (Eng. 
 1815); Armistead v. Wilde, 17 Q. B. 261, 20 L. J. Q. B. 524, 15 Jur. 1010 
 (Eng. 1851); Cashill v. Wright, 6 E. & B. 891, 2 Jur. N. S. 1072, 4 W. R. 
 709 (Eng. 1856); Elcox v. HiU, 98 U. S. 218, 25 L. ed. 103 (1878); Cham- 
 berlain V. Masterton, 26 Ala. 371 (1855); Sasseen v. Clark, 37 Ga. 242 (1867); 
 Watson V. Loughran, 112 Ga. 837, 38 S. E. 82 (1901); Hulbert v. Hartman, 
 79 lU. App. 289 (1898); Spring v. Hager, 145 Mass. 186, 13 N. E. 479 (1887); 
 Rubenstein v. Cruikshanks, 54 JJich. 199, 19 N. W. 954, 52 Am. Rep. 806 
 (1884); Hadley v. Upshaw, 27 Tex. 547, 86 Am. Dec. 654 (1864). 
 
 8 CashiU V. Wright, 6 E. & B. 891, 2 Jur. N. S. 1072, 4 W. R. 709 (Eng. 
 1856); Lanier v. Youngblood, 73 Ala. 587 (1883); Fowler v. Dorlon, 24 
 Barb. (N. Y.) 384 (1856). 
 
 9 Lanier v. Youngblood, 73 Ala. 587 (1883); Hadley v. Upshaw, 27 Tex. 
 547, 86 Am. Dec. 654 (1864). 
 
 10 Maltby v. Chapman, 25 Md. 310 (1866). 
 
 11 Jefferson Hotel Co. v. Warren, 128 Fed. 565 (1904). 
 
 12 Armistead v. Wilde, 17 Q. B. 261, 20 L. J. Q. B. 524, 15 Jur. 1010 (Eng. 
 1851); Jefferson Hotel Co. v. Warren, 128 Fed. 565 (1904); Lanier v. Young- 
 blood, 73 Ala. 587 (1883); Hadley v. Upshaw, 27 Tex. 547, 86 Am. Dec. 654 
 (1864); Read v. Amidon, 41 Vt. 15, 98 Am. Dec. 560 (1868). Of course the 
 facts may be so clear'that the court will decide the question without leaving 
 it to the jury. Lanier v. Youngblood, 73 Ala. 587 (1883). 
 
 13 Jefferson Hotel Co. v. Warren, 128 Fed. 565 (1904). 
 
 [152] 
 
Chap. XVIIL] Loss Chargeable to Guest. [§ 223. 
 
 have avoided the effect of the guest's negligence but failed to 
 do so, he cannot escape liability." 
 
 In the case of Medawar v. Grand Hotel Company, cited in 
 the last note, the plaintiff sued the defendant innkeeper for 
 the loss of certain jewelry. The plaintiff came to the inn and 
 found it full, with the exception of one room which had been 
 engaged in advance by another person. The plaintiff, however, 
 was allowed to dress in the room, and keep it untU the arrival 
 of the person who had engaged it. He went to the room, 
 opened his bag, and took out a stand which contained various 
 implements for the toilet, and also in a drawer the trinkets 
 for the loss of which he sued. After he finished dressing he 
 went out, leaving the stand on the dressing table and the door 
 of the room unlocked, and left the irm to attend the races. 
 While he was absent the person who had engaged the room 
 arrived, and in order to clear the room for his occupancy the 
 stand with the plaintiff's other luggage was placed in the 
 corridor, where it remained until the plaintiff's return, that 
 night. While the luggage was in the corridor the jewelry was 
 stolen. The High Court held that the innkeeper was not liable, 
 but the Court of Appeal reversed the decision. On the point 
 here under discussion Lord Esher, Master of the RoUs, re- 
 marked: "There was contributory negligence on the part of 
 the plaintiff while the goods were in the room; but when the 
 defendant's servants went into the room and became aware 
 of the plaintiff's negligence they were bound to take reason- 
 able care of the property. When they saw the negligence of 
 the plaintiff they ought to have taken care not to be negligent 
 themselves. If the jewelry was stolen while it was in the 
 corridor, it was stolen not in consequence of the plaintiff's 
 negligence, but by reason of the defendant's negligence." 
 
 The negligence must of course have to do with the loss of 
 
 "Watson V. Loughran, 112 Ga. 837, 38 S. E. 82 (discovered that guest 
 left door unlocked and yet did not lock it). Medawar v. Grand Hotel Co. 
 (1891), 2 Q. B. 11, 60 L. J. Q. B. 209, 64 L. T. 851, 55 J. P. 614 (discovered 
 door unlocked, and removed goods to public corridor). 
 
 [153] 
 
§ 224.] Innkeepees. [Chap. XVIII. 
 
 the goods themselves ; and evidence of careless conduct by the 
 guest either before or after the time he was at the inn will not 
 be received. ^^ 
 
 It is obvious that the question is the same, whether the 
 owner of the goods is guest, boarder or lodger; siace contrib- 
 utory negUgence will bar them all. The cases of all will there- 
 fore be considered together. 
 
 § 224. "What 'is contributory negligence : failure to lock door or 
 window. 
 
 In accordance with the general doctrine, it is a question of 
 fact in each case whether a failure upon the part of the guest 
 to lock his door at night constitutes such negUgence as to pre- 
 vent him from recovering from the innkeeper the value of the 
 goods stolen from his room; and it is a question for the jury 
 unless the facts are so plain that the court will not leave it to 
 the jury. 
 
 In one case a lodger in a city lodging house left his own door 
 unlocked, while he knew that the outer door was left imlocked, 
 and anyone might enter the house and the rooms unnoticed. 
 He was held to be barred by his own negUgence from recover- 
 ing for goods lost from his room.^^ This case is stronger than 
 the ordinary case for two reasons. First, it being a case of a 
 lodging house, the lodger could recover only on the ground of 
 the housekeeper's negUgence, which in this case was alleged 
 to be the very act of leaving the outer door imlocked which 
 he knew and might have guarded against. Second, in the case 
 of an ordinary inn where the outer door is imlocked the inn- 
 keeper or his servant is on the watch to keep out thieves. 
 
 In a few cases the coiu-t has held, upon the whole evidence 
 (usually after a verdict for the plaintiff) that failure to lock a 
 door was not negUgence." And in one case where the inn- 
 
 15 Burrows v. Trieber, 21 Md. 320, 83 Am. Dec. 590 (1864). 
 
 "Swann v. Smith, 14 Daly (N. Y.), 114 (1887). 
 
 "Mitchell V. Woods, 16 L. T. 676 (Eng. 1867); Buddenburg v. Benner, 
 1 Hilt. (N.Y.) 84 (1856) (boarding house); Cunningham v. Bucky, 42 W. Va. 
 671, 26 S. E. 442, 35 L. R. A. 850 (1896). 
 [154] 
 
Chap. XVIII.] Loss Chargeable to Guest. [§ 224. 
 
 keeper directed the guest not to lock the door, as other persons 
 were to go into the same room, the court without leaving the 
 question to the jury decided that the guest who left the door 
 unlocked was not thereby barred from recovery.^* 
 
 In a case in Illinois (where the innkeeper is not responsible 
 without negUgence) it was held that a guest carmot recover 
 where the evidence shows that he probably left the door un- 
 locked, and that he failed to deposit his valuables in the office 
 in accordance with the requirements of a notice which he saw.^^ 
 
 In most cases, however, it has been held that the failure to 
 lock the door is sufficient evidence of contributory negligence 
 to go to the jury; and that the jury is to determine the fact 
 upon that and all the other evidence^JSSJand a dismissal of the 
 suit by the judge on the groimd of contributory negligence, 
 without leaving the question to the jury, is erroneous.^^ 
 
 All the circumstances are to be considered by the jury in 
 determining this fact ; as, for instance, that the inn was a Lon- 
 don inn, where bad characters might be expected to seek en- 
 try,^^ or that the valuable goods or money had been pubUcly 
 displayed.^^ 
 
 "The fact of the guest having the means of secimng himself, 
 and choosing not to use them, is one which with the other cir- 
 
 isMnford V. Wesley, 1 Wilson (Ind.), 119 (1872). 
 
 19 Hulbert v. Hartman, 79 111. App. 289 (1898). 
 
 20 Oppenheim v. White Lion Hotel Co., L. R. 6 C. P. 515, 40 L. J. C. P. 
 231, 25 L. T. 93 (Eng. 1871); Filipowsld v. Meriyweather, 2 F. & F. 285 
 (Eng. 1860); Herbert v. Markwell, W. N. (Eng. 1882) 112, affirming S. C, 
 45 L. T. 649, 46 J. P. 358; Spice v. Bacon, 36 L. T. 896 (Eng. 1877); Bohler 
 V. Owens, 60 Ga. 185 (1878); Murchison v. Sergent, 69 Ga. 206, 47 Am. Rep. 
 754 (1882); Batterson v. Vogel, 10 Mo. App. 235 (1881); Dimbier v. Day, 
 12 Neb. 596, 12 N. W. 109, 41 Am. Rep. 772 (1882); Ramaley v. Leland, 6 
 Robt. (N. Y.) 358 (1868); Becker v. Warner, 90 Hun (N. Y.), 187, 35 N. Y. 
 Supp. 739 (1895); Shultz v. Wall, 134 Pa. 262, 19 Atl. 742 (1890). 
 
 21 Classen v. Leopold, 2 Sweeney (N. Y.), 705 (1870). 
 
 22 Filipowski v. Merryweather, 2 F. & F. 285 (1860), per Erie, C. J. 
 
 23 Oppenheim v. White Lion Hotel Co., L. R. 6 C. P. 515, 40 L. J. C. P. 
 231, 25 L. T. 93 (Eng. 1871); Herbert v. Markwell, W. N. (Eng. 1882) 112, 
 affirming S. C, 45 L. T. 649, 46 J. P. 358; Dunbier v. Day, 12 Neb. 596, 12 
 N. W. 109, 41 Am. Rep. 772 (1882). 
 
 [155] 
 
§ 224.] Innkeepers, [Chap. XVIII. 
 
 cumstances of the case should be left to the jury. The weight 
 of it must, of course, depend upon the state of society at the 
 time and place. What would be prudent in a small hotel, in 
 a small town, might be the extreme of imprudence at a large 
 hotel in a city Uke Bristol, where probably three hundred bed- 
 rooms are occupied by people of all sorts. " ^^ 
 
 The fact of the guest having the means of securing himself 
 and not choosing to use them, is one which, with the other 
 circumstances of the case, should be left to the jury. It should 
 not be singled out and put to the jury as a test of negUgence. 
 The question is, whether the loss would or would not have 
 happened if the plaintiff had used the ordinary care that a 
 prudent man might reasonably be expected to have taken un- 
 der the circumstances. The jury are not to be told that, if by 
 reasonable care the plaintiff might have locked his door and 
 did not do so, this is such negUgence as to exonerate the inn- 
 keeper, if the loss occurred through leaving the door unlocked.^^ 
 
 Failure of the guest, after locking the door, to bolt it also, 
 when he did not see the bolt nor have it called to his attention, 
 is so clearly not contributory negUgence that the court will not 
 allow the jury to pass on the question, but wiU direct the jury 
 that such failure will not defeat the action.^® The court in 
 this case said: 
 
 "It must often depend much upon the circumstances of the 
 case, the customs of the age and coimtry, and the usages of 
 the place, whether the plaintiff has been guilty of such negU- 
 gence that the loss can be said to be attributable to it; and we 
 cannot say, as matter of law, that on the facts appearing in 
 this case, if the plaintiff saw the bolt, and did not use it, this 
 was not some evidence of negUgence to be submitted to the 
 jury. The deUvery of a key to a guest may be held to be an 
 intimation to him that he is to use it in locking his door. The 
 
 ^ M. Smith, J., in Oppenheim v. White Lion Hotel Co., L. R. 6 C. P. 515 
 40 L. J. C. P. 231, 25 L. T. 93 (Eng. 1871). 
 25 Batterson v. Vogel, 10 Mo. App. 235. 
 28 Spring V. Hager, 145 Mass. 186, 13 N. E. 479 (1887). 
 [156] 
 
Chap. XVIII.] Loss Chargeable to Guest. [§ 225. 
 
 lock, however, is the only fastening which the guest can use 
 when not in the room. A bolt, if seen, may itself suggest that 
 it ought to be used. If, however, there are no regulations 
 brought to the notice of a guest requesting him to bolt the 
 door, and if it is not known to the guest that there is a bolt, 
 and his attention is not in any way called to it, we think the 
 fact that, after locking his door with the key, he does not 
 search for a bolt and find it, is not evidence of negligence on 
 his part." A new trial was granted, after a verdict for the 
 defendant, by reason of the failure of the judge to direct the 
 jury as the plaintiff requested. 
 
 On the other hand, where the guest saw the bolts, failure to 
 use them was reUed on as one element of negligence to bar his 
 recovery.^'' Failure to notify the innkeeper that the lock is 
 out of repair is not neghgence on the part of the guest.^* 
 
 § 225. Failure to deliver valuables to innkeeper. 
 
 In the absence of special circumstances, it is not negligence 
 for the guest to retain valuables in his own possessioii instead 
 of depositing them with the innkeeper.^^ So the innkeeper is 
 responsible for the loss of money locked in a trunk in the 
 guest's room,^" or worn upon his person in a money belt while 
 he is asleep.^^ 
 
 So it is not neghgence to leave the goods in a pubUc room 
 in the inn, if it is with the assent of the innkeeper or his serv- 
 ants, even though the innkeeper informed the guest that the 
 goods would be safer elsewhere. Thus where the goods were 
 left in the lobby of the inn and were lost, the iimkeeper was 
 Uable, though the innkeeper's servant had informed the guest 
 that the "commercial room" was the usual and proper place 
 
 2'Hulbert v. Hartman, 79 111. App. 289 (1898). 
 
 28 Lanier v. Youngblood, 73 Ala. 587 (1883). 
 
 zoMurchison v. Sergent, 69 Ga. 206, 47 Am. Rep. 754 (1882); MoClay v. 
 Nash, 6 Ky. Law Rep. 298 (1884); Smith v. Wilson, 36 Minn. 334, 31 N. W. 
 176 (1887); Jalie v. Cardinal, 35 Wis. 118 (1874). 
 
 30 Berkshire Woolen Co. v. Proctor, 7 Gush. (Mass.) 417 (1851); Van Wyck 
 V. Howard, 15 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 147 (1856). 
 
 31 Smith V. Wilson, 36 Minn. 334, 31 N. W. 176 (1887). 
 
 [157] 
 
§ 225.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XVIII. 
 
 for such goods, and had offered to put them there, but had left 
 them in the lobby at the guest's request.^^ 
 
 So, where an innkeeper, as his guest was about to go to bed, 
 remarked to him that he had better take his valise to his room, 
 to which he repUed it was not necessary, that his valise would 
 be safe in the barroom, where it was allowed to remain; and 
 on the next morning it was gone and could not be found, it 
 was held that the keeper was hable for its loss.^^ 
 
 Where, however, the guest's act is not expressly permitted 
 by the innkeeper, though known to him, the question of ha- 
 bility is for the jury. Thus where the guest laid down a val- 
 uable pair of gloves on a bench in a public room in the presence 
 of the innkeeper, and they were lost, the question of contrib- 
 utory negUgence must be determined by the jury.*^ 
 
 The fact that a custom exists to deposit valuables with the 
 iimkeeper does not render it neghgence in the guest not to do 
 so, if the custom was unknown to him; though if he knew of 
 it, it might be negligent in him to fail to comply with it.^^ 
 
 Where, however, the guest has express notice that he takes 
 the risk of loss if he does not deposit his valuables with the 
 innkeeper, he is neghgent if he fails to comply with the notice.^" 
 Thus were a guest saw a notice to the effect that "the propri- 
 etor wiU be happy to take charge of any valuables," it was 
 held negUgent for the guest to leave money in a bag in his 
 room, and he was not allowed to recover for the loss of it." 
 Pigott, B., said: "The invitation embodied in the notice was 
 equivalent to a warning of risk. After that warning it was 
 negligent in the plaintiff to leave his property as he did;" and 
 Bramwell, B., characterized the plaintiff's conduct as "most 
 careless." So where the guest asked if the goods would be 
 safe in his room, and he was told he must leave them at the 
 
 32 Candy v. Spencer, 3 F. & P. 306 (1862). 
 
 33 Packard v. Northcraft, 2 Met. (Ky.) 439 (1859). 
 
 34 Read v. Amidon, 41 Vt. 15, 98 Am. Deo. 560 (1868). 
 
 35 Berkshire "Woolen Co. v. Proctor, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 417 (1851). 
 30 Jalie V. Cardinal, 35 Wis. 118 (1874) (semhk). 
 
 3? Jones V. Jackson, 29 L. T. 399 (Eng. 1873). 
 [158] 
 
Chap. XVIII.] Loss Chargeable to Guest. [§ 226. 
 
 bar, but notwithstanding this warning he kept them in his 
 room and they were lost, he was barred from recovery by his 
 negUgence.^* 
 
 The notice, in order to affect the guest with the risk of loss, 
 must be clear; and other courts might perhaps have decided 
 differently on the facts of the English case just stated. A no- 
 tice that packages of value may be deposited in the office safe, 
 and cautioning guests against leaving money or valuables in 
 a guest's room, was held in a New York case insufficient to 
 put the risk of loss of goods left in the room upon a guest. 
 "This may very well have been understood, as Forbes appears 
 to have understood it, as merely cautioning him against leav- 
 ing money or valuables loose or exposed about his room. If 
 the landlord, to enable him the more effectu!ally to secure the 
 property, requires soniething to be done by the guest, it must 
 appear that what was reqtured was in itself reasonable, and 
 that the guest was distinctly informed of what was necessary 
 to be done on his part. Whether the request was made orally 
 or in the form of a printed notice, it should be in terms so 
 clear and immistakable as to leave room for no reasonable 
 doubt as to what was intended. The traveller should know 
 precisely what he is to do before he can be chargeable with 
 negligence for not doing it; and as the notice did not apprise 
 him that he was not to leave money locked up in his trunk, 
 he carmot be regarded as guilty of negligence in so leaving it. " ^^ 
 
 § 226. Failure to inform innkeeper of value of goods deposited. 
 
 It is not negUgence to fail to inform the innkeeper that a 
 package put into his possession or that of his servants con- 
 tains valuables.*" 
 
 38 Wilson V. Halpin, 30 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 124, 1 Daly, 496 (1865). 
 
 39 Van Wyck v. Howard, 12 How. Pr. (N. Y-) 147 (1856). 
 
 « Coskeiy v. Nagle, 83 Ga. 696, 10 S. E. 491, 20 Am. St. Rep. 333, 6 
 L. R. A. 483 (1889) ; Johnson v. Richardson, 17 111. 302, 63 Am. Dec. 369 (1855) ; 
 Bowell V. DeWald, 2 Ind. App. 303, 28 N. E. 430 (1891); Shoecraft v. Bailey, 
 25 la. 653 (1868); Rubenstein v. Cruikshanks, 54 Mich. 199, 19 N. W. 954, 
 52 Am. Rep. 806 (1884); Fowler v. Dorlon, 24 Barb. (N. Y.) 384 (1856). 
 
 [159] 
 
§ 227.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XVIII. 
 
 § 227- Publicly exhibiting money or valuables. 
 
 Opening or coxinting one's money or exhibiting valuable 
 goods in a pubUc place is not of itself such negligence as will 
 bar recovery by the guest,*^ but it is one of the circumstances 
 to be considered by the jury which may find the act negligent.*^ 
 In Armistead v. WUde the plaintiff was a guest at an inn, 
 and had lost from a box which he brought to the inn a parcel 
 containing several hundred pounds in bank notes. Upon the 
 facts being examined, the evidence showed that the plaintiff 
 had boasted of the sum which he possessed, and had ostenta- 
 tiously rolled up the notes and put them in the box in the 
 travellers' room in the presence of several persons, and had then 
 left the box in the travellers' room, imperfectly secured. One 
 of the persons to whom the plaintiff had shown the notes was 
 probably the thief. The judge directed the jury to find a ver- 
 dict for the defendant if they thought the plaintiff "had been 
 guilty of gross negligence in leaving the money in the travellers' 
 room;" and the jury accordingly found a verdict of not guilty. 
 The plaintiff had the temerity to move for a new trial on the 
 groimd of misdirection, but the rule was discharged. Lord 
 Chief Justice Campbell said: "Suppose a guest were to count 
 out his money and leave it lying loose on the table of the 
 public room; surely that might be such gross negligence as 
 to be the cause of the loss. The facts here do not go so far 
 as that; but there was evidence that the plaintiff's servant 
 in a public room took out a large sum of money, counted it 
 and showed it, and then left it there in a box capable of being 
 opened without using a key. These facts might or might not 
 amount to negligence; but they were evidence of it; and it 
 was a fair question for the jury." 
 
 The court also noticed that the judge in his charge had 
 
 " Dunbier v. Day, 12 Neb. 696, 12 N. W. 109, 41 Am. Rep. 772 (1882); 
 Cuimmgham v. Bucky, 42 W. Va. 671, 26 S. E. 442, 35 L. R. A. 850 
 (1896). 
 
 « Armistead v. Wilde, 17 Q. B. 261, 20 L. J. Q. B. 524, 15 Jur. 1010 
 (1851); CashiU v. Wright, 6 E. & B. 891, 2 Jur. N. S. 1072, 4 W. R. 709 
 (1856). 
 
 [160] 
 
Chap. XVIII.] Loss Chargeable to Guest. [§ 228. 
 
 spoken of "gross" negligence, and intimated that this was 
 more favorable to the plaintiff than he had a right to ask. 
 
 § 228. Other acts of negligence. 
 
 Intoxication of the guest is not in itself contributory negli- 
 gence,'*' but if it contributes in any way to the loss it bars the 
 recovery.*^ 
 
 Failure to inquire after the safety of the goods for several 
 days after the innkeeper received them is not negUgence;"" 
 nor failure to occupy the room at night; ** nor failure to re- 
 quest a search of a place in which the goods might be.*'' 
 
 43 Cunningham v. Bucky, 42 W. Va. 671, 26 S. E. 442, 35 L. R. A. 442 
 (1896). 
 " Walsh V. Porterfield, 87 Pa. 376 (1878). 
 « Eden v. Drey, 75 111. App. 102 (1898). 
 
 « Turner v. Whitaker, 9 Pa. Super. Ct. 83, 43 Wkly. Notes Cas. 375 (1898). 
 «7 Dunbier v. Day, 12 Neb. 596, 12 N. W. 109, 41 Am. Rep. 772 (1882). 
 
 11 [ 161 ] 
 
§ 231.] 
 
 Innkeepers. 
 
 [Chap. XIX. 
 
 SUBTITLE lY. 
 
 THE END OF RESPONSIBILITY. 
 
 CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 TEEMINATION OF RELATION OF HOST AND GUEST. 
 
 231. Guest leaves the inn finally. 
 
 232. Responsibility during tem- 
 
 porary absence of guest. 
 
 233. What is a merely temporary 
 
 absence. 
 
 § 234. Responsibility during reason- 
 able time for removal. 
 235. Goods received after termina- 
 tion of relation. 
 
 § 231. Gruest leaves the inn finally. 
 
 If the guest pays his bill and leaves the inn without any in- 
 tention of returning, but leaves goods, with consent of the inn- 
 keeper, to be kept until called for, the relation of host and 
 guest is at an end, and the innkeeper is hable as gratuitous 
 bailee only.^ In Hays v. Turner, just cited in support of this 
 proposition, the facts proved were that the defendant was an 
 innkeeper, and the plaintiff stopped at the inn as a guest, 
 having a trunk full of baggage with him. After remaining 
 at the inn for several days the plaintiff paid his bill, except 
 twenty-five cents, and left for a neighboring town, leaving 
 his trunk, and stating to the innkeeper that he would return 
 to his inn in three or four days. The plaintiff was engaged 
 at the time in looking for a location in which to set up his 
 
 1 Glenn v. Jackson, 93 Ala. 342, 9 So. 259, 12 L. R. A. 382 (1890); O'Brien 
 V. VaiU, 22 Fla. 627, 1 So. 137, 1 Am. St. Rep. 219 (1886); Hays v. Turner, 
 23 la. 214 (1867); Hoffman v. Roessle, 39 N. Y. Misc. 787, 81 N. Y. Supp. 
 291 (1902); Wintermute v. Clarke, 5 Sandf. (N. Y.) 242 (1851); Whitemore 
 V. Haroldson, 2 Lea (Tenn.), 312 (1879); McDaniels v. Robinson, 28 Vt. 
 387, 67 Am. Dec. 720 (1856). 
 [162] 
 
Chap. XIX.] Termination op Relation. [§ 232. 
 
 trade. During his absence the trunk was given up to a stranger. 
 After a few days the plaintiff returned to the inn and found 
 his trunk gone; and he brought this action, charging the de- 
 fendant as innkeeper. The court held that the defendant 
 could not be charged as an innkeeper, because the relation of 
 innkeeper and guest was terminated when the plaintiff left 
 the inn. The court said that the law would not be the same 
 if the property left behind had been a horse; citing to that 
 effect Bacon's Abridgement, where indeed it was said that the 
 innkeeper would continue hable, since he benefited by the 
 continuance of the horse with him. Nor, the court continued, 
 " would the rule be the same if the guest leaves, intending to, 
 and actually should, return the same day; or if it appeared, 
 that though absent, he was hable aU the while for his board." 
 When the goods are left without the consent of the innkeeper 
 he is not under the innkeeper's liability as to the goods; ^ and 
 all the more clearly if a guest leaves the inn so as to put an 
 end to the relation of host and guest without paying his bill, 
 the innkeeper is not liable as such for goods left on the prem- 
 ises, but is hable as gratuitous bailee.* 
 
 § 232. Responsibility during temporary absence of guest. 
 
 One who is a guest at an inn may leave the inn for a time, 
 and still leave his property under the safeguard of the land- 
 lord's habihty.* So where the guest having registered goes out 
 
 2Wintermute v. Clarke, 5 Sandf. (N. Y.) 242 (1851); Palin v. Reid, 10 
 Ont. 63 (1885). 
 
 3 Murray v. Marshall, 9 Col. 482, 13 Pac. 589, 59 Am. Rep. 152 (1886); 
 Murray v. Clarke, 2 Daly (N. Y.), 102 (1866); Lawrence v. Howard, 1 Utah, 
 142 (1874). 
 
 < Brown Hotel Co. v. Burckhardt, 13 Col. App. 59, 56 Pac. 188 (1899); 
 Hayes v. Turner, 23 la. 214 (1867); GrinneU v. Cook, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 490 
 (1842); McDonald v. Edgerton, 5 Barb. (N. Y.) 560 (1849); Whitemore v. 
 Haroldson, 2 Lea (Tenn.), 312 (1879); McDaniels v. Robinson, 26 Vt. 316, 
 62 Am. Dec. 574 (1854); AUen v. Smith, 12 C. B. N. S. 638, 31 L. J. C. P. 
 306, 9 Jur. N. S. 230, 6 L. T. 459, 10 W. R. 646, affirmed, 9 Jur. N. S. 1284, 
 11 W. R. 440 (Eng. 1862); Day v. Bather, 2 H. & C. (Eng.) 14 (1863); 
 McElwaine v. Bahnoral Hotel Co., Montreal L. R. 7 S. C. 139 (1891). 
 
 [163] 
 
§ 232.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XIX. 
 
 to view the town intending to return before night, the relation 
 continues.^ 
 
 While lapse of time is not conclusive on this point, yet if 
 the guest's absence is to continue for a considerable time there 
 is the less reason for regarding him as a guest in the interim. 
 Indeed, in an old case, the court said that "one left goods in 
 an inn and went about his business and returned on the same 
 day, the innkeeper is answerable for the robbery of goods in 
 the meantime; otherwise if he had not returned within three 
 or four days. " " But this is not properly a proposition of law; 
 the length of the guest's absence is important only as it is 
 evidence bearing on the main question, namely, whether the 
 relation of host and guest continues in the interim. 
 
 The absence is the more likely to be regarded as temporary 
 if the guest leaves behind him a horse or other property for 
 the care of which he pays compensation. Thus, in the case 
 of Day V. Bather, cited above, the plaintiff, who had become 
 a guest at the defendant's inn, left the inn, saying that he 
 should not be back until the following Monday, and requested 
 that his mare might be properly attended to. He did not in 
 fact return for about a fortnight. Meanwhile the hostler 
 drove the mare out for exercise, and the mare became fright- 
 ened, ran away, and received an injury. The plaintiff sued 
 for damages for the injury. It was objected that the plain- 
 tiff had ceased to be a guest. In answer to the objection 
 Chief Baron Pollock asked, "When did the horse cease to be 
 in the defendant's custody as an innkeeper?" and Baron Martin 
 said, "We must infer that the relation of innkeeper and guest 
 existed between the defendant and the plaintiff until some- 
 thing was done to indicate the contrary." Baron Bramwell 
 was a Uttle more careful in his form of statement. "It is 
 said that, as a matter of law, the relation of innkeeper and 
 guest ceased to exist at the time of the accident. I do not 
 
 6 Hayes v. Turner, 23 la. 214 (1867); McDonald v. Edgerton, 5 Barb. 
 (N. y.) 560 (1849); Gelley v. Clerk, Cro. Jac. (Eng.) 188 (1607). 
 Sands' Case cited in Natbroke v. Griffith, F. Moore, 876 (Eng. 1603). 
 [164] 
 
Chap. XIX.] Termination of Relation. [§ 233. 
 
 assent to that. The judge might not have been wrong if he 
 had found, as a matter of fact, that the appellant was not an 
 innkeeper with reference to the respondent at that time, 
 especially if this was the first time the respondent had been 
 at the inn. But suppose that what occurred on this occasion 
 had happened before, and that the respondent, after staying 
 away for a longer time, had returned and paid for the horse, 
 any objection that the relation of innkeeper and guest did not 
 exist would be at an end." 
 
 The effect of these opinions is evidently that an absence of 
 several weeks does not necessarily interrupt the relation of 
 host and guest where the guest has left a horse at the inn on 
 which charges are constantly accruing in favor of the land- 
 lord; but it is equally clear that if the guest had definitely 
 left the inn the court would have considered the relation at 
 an end, even if the horse had remained behind. 
 
 § 233- What is a merely temporary absence. 
 
 In order to have- the relation continue during the absence 
 of the guest, certain conditions must be fulfilled : 
 
 1. There must be an animus revertendi.'' This intent must 
 be known to the innkeeper. Thus, where a traveller took a 
 room merely to dress in, dressed and left the inn, the inn- 
 keeper would not be liable as such for goods left in the room, 
 in spite of the secret intention of the guest to return and 
 remain all night.* 
 
 2. The intent must be to return within a definite and rea- 
 sonable time.^ If, however, at the time he leaves the inn the 
 guest intends to return within a certain reasonable time the 
 relation of host and guest will continue although the return 
 is accidentally delayed.^" 
 
 7 AUen V. Smith, 12 C. B. N. S. 638, 31 L. J. C. P. 306, 9 Jur. N. S. 230, 
 6 L. T. 459, 10 W. R. 646, affirmed, 9 Jur. N. S. 1284, 11 W. R. 440 (Eng. 
 1862); McDaniels v. Robinson, 28 Vt. 387, 67 Am. Dec. 720 (1856). 
 
 8 Lynar v. Mossup, 36 Up. Can. Q. B. 230 (1875). 
 
 oWhitemore v. Haroldson, 2 Lea (Tenn.), 312 (1879); Day v. Bather, 2 
 H. & C. (Eng.) 14 (1863). 
 
 10 Day V. Bather, 2 H. & C. (Eng.) 14 (1863). 
 
 [165] 
 
§ 234.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XIX. 
 
 3. " The liability to compensate the innkeeper must continue 
 during the absence." And so where a guest pays his bill and 
 has his name checked off the register he ceases to be a guest, 
 though he intends soon to return. ^^ Where, however, he pays 
 his bill in order to cash a draft, and does not have his name 
 checked off the register, but, on the contrary, it is understood 
 that he intends to continue a guest during his absence, the re- 
 lation continues.^^ 
 
 "The right to charge is the criterion of the innkeeper's Ua- 
 bility. When the liability of the guest to be charged as such 
 ceases, his claim on the innkeeper as such expires, subject only 
 to the right to hold him responsible for the baggage of the 
 guest for such time as may be reasonable to effect a removal. " " 
 
 If, therefore, it can be determined that the guest continues 
 Uable for the innkeeper's charges during the interim, he is 
 thereby shown to continue as a guest, since the relation and 
 the hability to pay are concurrent. ^^ 
 
 § 234. Responsibility during reasonable time for removal. 
 
 After a guest pays his bill and departs, leaving baggage with 
 the innkeeper's consent, the innkeeper continues Uable as such 
 during a reasonable time for the removal of the baggage.^* 
 So, after the bill had been paid and while the guest's horse 
 was being harnessed in order that he might drive away, the 
 innkeeper continued Uable as such for the safety of the horse.*^ 
 So where a traveller was told he could have a room only until 
 an expected guest who had engaged it should arrive, and on 
 
 11 Miller v. Peeples, 60 Miss. 819, 45 Am. Rep. 423 (1883). 
 
 12 Hayes v. Turner, 23 la. 214 (1867). 
 
 13 Brown Hotel Co. v. Burekhardt, 13 Col. App. 59, 56 Pac. 188 (1899). 
 w Miller v. Peeples, 60 Miss. 819, 45 Am. Rep. 423 (1883). 
 
 15 Hayes v. Turner, 23 la. 214 (1867); Miller v. Peeples, 60 Miss. 819, 45 
 Am. Rep. 423 (1883). 
 
 "Murray v. Marshall, 9 Col. 482, 13 Pac. 589, 59 Am. Rep. 152 (1886); 
 Clark V. Ball, 62 Pac. 529 (Col. 1905); Adams v. Clem, 41 Ga. 65, 5 Am. 
 Rep. 524 (1870); Maxwell v. Gerard, 84 Hun, 537, 32 N. Y. Supp. 849 
 (1895); Baehr v. Downey, 133 Mich. 163, 94 N. W. 750 (1903). 
 
 " Seymour v. Cook, 53 Barb. 451, 35 How. Pr. 180 (N. Y. 1868). 
 [166] 
 
Chap. XIX.] Termination of Relation. [§ 235. 
 
 these terms he took the room and put his goods in it, and when 
 the expected guest arrived the innkeeper's servants put the 
 goods in the corridor, where they were lost, it was held that 
 the innkeeper's liability continued after the goods had been 
 placed in the corridor.^* 
 
 And where the innkeeper imdertakes to deliver the baggage 
 at a steamboat or at a railroad station, the innkeeper's liability 
 continues imtil it is so delivered.^' 
 
 § 235. Goods received after termination of relation. 
 
 Where the goods are received by the innkeeper for the guest 
 after the relation has terminated and the guest has left the inn, 
 the innkeeper is not liable as such, but only as ordinary bailee ; ^° 
 even though the innkeeper may previously have agreed with 
 the guest to receive and forward the goods.^^ 
 
 18 Medawar v. Grand Hotel Co. (1891), 2 Q. B. 11, 60 L. J. Q. B. 209, 64 
 L.T. 851, 55 J. P. 614. 
 
 "Sasseen v. Clark, 37 Ga. 242 (1867); GUes v. Fauntleroy, 13 Md. 126 
 (1859); MaxweU v. Gerard, 84 Hun (N. Y.), 537, 32 N. Y. Supp. 849 (1895). 
 
 20 Wear v. Gleason, 52 Ark. 364, 12 S. W. 756, 20 Am. St. Rep. 186 (1889); 
 Baehr v. Downey, 133 Mich. 163, 94 N. W. 750, 10 Detroit Leg. N. 153 (1903). 
 
 21 Baehr v. Downey, 133 Mich. 163, 94 N. W. 750, 10 Detroit Leg. N. 153 
 (1903). 
 
 [167] 
 
§ 241.] 
 
 Innkeepers. 
 
 [Chap. XX. 
 
 TITLE lY. 
 
 COMPENSATION AND LIEN OF THE INNKEEPER. 
 
 CHAPTER XX. 
 
 THE CHARGES OF THE INNKEEPER. 
 
 § 241. The innkeeper's charges must 
 be reasonable. 
 
 242. The amount of the charges 
 
 may be fixed by statute. 
 
 243. The innkeeper may fix rates. 
 
 244. Payment may be required in 
 
 advance. 
 
 245. Compensation due as soon as 
 
 relation is established. 
 
 § 246. Compensation teases when 
 relation ends. 
 
 247. For what services innkeeper 
 
 is entitled to compensation. 
 
 248. Entire obligation must be per- 
 
 formed. , 
 
 249. Which of several guests is 
 
 liable to pay charges. 
 
 § 241. The innkeeper's charges must be reasonable. 
 
 The innkeeper is not only obliged by law to receive all proper 
 travellers for whom he has room, but he is obUged to entertain 
 them for a reasonable compensation.^ The requirement that 
 the compensation should be reasonable is a necessary corallary 
 of the requirement that the guest should be received, for if it 
 were open to the innkeeper to charge what he pleased he might 
 exclude such appUcants as he did not care to entertain by the 
 mere device of demanding from them an unreasonable payment. 
 "They do not deal upon contracts as others do, they only 
 make bills, in which they can't set unreasonable rates; if they 
 do, they are indictable for extortion. " ^ 
 
 The amount of the charge cannot easily be fixed by rule; 
 
 1 Baldwin v. Webb, 121 Ga. 416, 49 S. E. 265 (1904); Roche v. Road 
 Driver's Assoc, 96 N. Y. Supp. 205 (N. Y. 1905). 
 ' Eyre, J., in Newton v. Trigg, 1 Shower, 268 (1691). 
 
 [168] 
 
Chap. XX.] Charges of the Innkeeper. [§ 242. 
 
 nor is it usual to find the amount charged by an innkeeper 
 disputed in court. The charge made by the innkeeper would, 
 it seems, be upheld if it were not extravagant; "a person re- 
 siding in a hotel cannot Uve as cheaply as at his own house. " ' 
 To prove the reasonableness or otherwise of a charge for 
 board, the price of board at a similar inn in the neighborhood 
 at about the same time may be shown.* 
 
 § 242. The amount of the charges may be fixed by statute. 
 
 In earlier times it was more common than it is to-day to 
 fix by statute the compensation to which an iankeeper should 
 be entitled; for instaijce, as early as the year 1349, in one of 
 the sections of the Statute of Laborers,^ it was provided that 
 the hostelers, that is innkeepers, or other sellers of victuals 
 "shall be bound to sell the same victual for a reasonable price, 
 having respect to the price that such victual be sold at in the 
 places adjoining, so that the same sellers have moderate gains, 
 and not excessive, reasonably to be required according to the 
 distance of the place from whence the said victuals be carried. " 
 
 And in the year 1623,* it was provided that "the hostelers 
 or innholders shall sell their horse-bread, and their hay, oats, 
 beans, peas, provender, and also all kind of victual both for 
 man and beast, for reasonable gain, having respect to the 
 prices for which they shall be sold in the markets adjoining, 
 without taking anything for litter." 
 
 In most of the American colonies the regulation of the price 
 of entertainment in general appears not to have been fotmd 
 necessary in earlier times. In the Massachusetts and Plymouth 
 colonies, for instance,'' the price of ale and liquor was regulated, 
 but not the price of food or other entertainment. Indeed, the 
 Puritan colonists were rather more anxious to prevent than 
 
 3 Lord Abinger, C. B., to the jury in Proctor v. Nicholson, 7 C. & P. 67 
 (1835). 
 
 4 Cross V. Wilkins, 43 N. H. 332 (1861). 
 6 23 Ed. 3 c. 6. 
 
 8 21 Jac. 1, c. 21. 
 
 ' Mass. Colonial Laws, 81; Plym. Col. Rec, Laws, 195. 
 
 [169] 
 
§ 244.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XX. 
 
 encourage miscellaneous travel, and they were interested to 
 secure reasonable entertainment rather for themselves than 
 for travellers who might be passing through. In some of the 
 colonies, however, the price of entertainment in general was 
 more carefully regulated. , 
 
 The amount of an innkeeper's compensation is not now com- 
 monly fixed by statute, though in some places power is given 
 to a local governmental body, as, for instance, the local jus- 
 tices, to fix rates,* and where this has been done, the iankeeper 
 can recover no more than the rates so fixed.^ 
 
 It is sometimes required by statute that the rates of board 
 should be conspicuously posted in the inn; but where this is 
 required, failure to post the rates will not prevent the innkeeper 
 from recovering compensation, if in fact the guests remain at 
 the inn to be entertained.^" 
 
 § 243. The innkeeper may fix rates. 
 
 If no regulation of the innkeeper's charges is made by statute 
 the innkeeper is entitled, himself, to frame a schedule of rates, 
 provided such rates are reasonable ; or without having_framed 
 a formal schedule he may in any individual case make a rea- 
 sonable charge. This may be a customary rate, or in the ab- 
 sence of a schedule of rates or any custom, it might be such 
 amount as the innkeeper pleases to charge, subject to the pro- 
 vision that it be not more than the entertainment is reason- 
 ably worth. When once the rate of compensation has been 
 fixed it continues until a new arrangement is made." 
 
 § 244. Payment may be required in advance. 
 
 The innkeeper has a right if he chooses to demand payment 
 
 8 Commonwealth v. Shortridge, 3 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.), 638 (1830). 
 
 9 Banks v. Oden, 1 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.), 546 (1819). 
 
 10 WliaUey v. Toddington, 36 Leg. Int. 136, 13 Phila. 2 (Pa.), (1879). 
 
 11 This applies, of course, as well to the rates of a boarding-house keeper 
 as to the rates of an innkeeper, and so where a boarder was given notice to 
 quit, but afterwards was allowed to remain without further agreement, no 
 change was effected in the rate of compensation, but it continued as it was 
 before the notice of quittance was given. Shoemaker v. Beaver, 42 Leg. 
 Int. (Pa.) 511 (1885). 
 
 [170] 
 
Chap. XX.] Charges of the Innkeeper. [§ 245. 
 
 in advance of his charges before he receives the guest.^^ This 
 is of course a more awkward rule to utilize than the payment 
 in advance in the case of the carrier, and yet it is quite clear 
 that this is within the rights of the innkeeper. Whether the 
 traveller apphes for a room or for board he could undoubtedly 
 be required, as a condition of his reception, to pay in advance 
 for entertainment which he intends to receive for a reasonable 
 time; that he must pay for one night's lodging at the time of 
 being received is quite clear./ Doubtless he could be compelled 
 to pay his board for a day in advance if the inn were conducted 
 on the "American plan, " but whether the umkeeper could de- 
 mand payment for a longer period in advance than a single 
 day is doubtful. A bill for entertainment at an inn accrues 
 de die in diem,^^ and the day's charge would seem to be the unit 
 of charge and the limit of the innkeeper's demand. 
 
 § 245. Compensation due as soon as relation is established. 
 
 The right to receive compensation for his services accrues 
 to the innkeeper at the moment of the reception of a guest, 
 and indeed the creation of the relation of host and guest and 
 the right to make a charge for services performed are neces- 
 sarily coincident.^"*' From this it would follow that as soon as 
 the guest signs the register and is received into the inn 'he is 
 bound to pay some compensation, even though he receives no 
 further entertainment than the mere right of remaining in a 
 common room, the liability to pay compensation continues 
 until the guest ceases to bear that character. If he tempo- 
 rarily leaves the inn, intending to return and remaining mean- 
 while a guest, the umkeeper is entitled to make reasonable 
 charge, even though neither food nor lodging is meantime fur- 
 nished him." 
 
 12 MuUiner v. Florence, 3 Q. B. D. 484, 47 L. J. Q. B. 700, 38 L. T. 167, 
 26 W. R. 385 (Eng. 1876); FeU v. Knight, 8 M. & W. 276 (1841). 
 
 13 Doyle V. Walker, 26 Up. Can. Q. B. 502 (1867). 
 
 I -*Hyiedawar v. Grand Hotel Co., (1891) 2 Q. B. 11, 60 L. J. Q. B. 209, 64 
 L. T. 851, 55 J. P. 614. 
 ■w^Smith V. Keyes, 2 Thomp. & C. (N. Y.) 650 (1874). 
 
 [ 171 ] 
 
§ 247.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XX. 
 
 In an English case a traveller on applying for a room at an 
 inn was told that the inn was full, but that he might occupy 
 a room which would not be needed until night. He went to 
 the room and dressed there. The court intimated that the 
 innkeeper was entitled to compensation, Bowen, L. J., saying: 
 "I think that, as soon as he had taken the plaintiff's luggage 
 up to the room, and had placed it in the room, the innkeeper 
 became entitled to charge the plaintiff for the use of the room, 
 a charge which would be expanded or contracted, according 
 as the plaintiff's occupation of the room was prolonged or 
 not."i«- 
 
 § 246. Gompensation ceases when relatipii en^^ 
 
 If the guest finally leaves the inn and ceases to be a guest 
 the innkeeper's right to charge for his services as such comes 
 to an end, although circumstances may exist which would give 
 the innkeeper a right to compensation for services rendered. 
 Thus, if upon leaving a guest desires that his room be reserved 
 for him or for someone else whom he may send to the inn, he 
 would be responsible for the rental value of the room.'*'" These 
 services, however, are not innkeeper's services, and the amount 
 of charge and methods of enforcing the charge would be gov- 
 erned by the ordinary law of debtor and creditor, not by the 
 law of innkeepers. 
 
 § 247- For what services innkeeper is entitled to compensation. 
 
 The obligation of an innkeeper to his guest includes the ob- 
 ligation to render without extra charge the usual and reason- , 
 able personal attention to the health and comfort of the guest.^^' 
 For extraordinary services, however, the innkeeper is entitled 
 to make a special, additional charge ; for instance, if the guest 
 
 16 Medawar v. Grand Hotel Co., (1891) 2 Q. B. 11, 60 L. J. Q. B. 209, 64 
 L. T. 851, 55 J. P. 614. 
 
 1' This was so held in the case of a lodging-house keeper, Sonneborn v. 
 Steinan, 85 N. Y. Supp. 334 (1903), but it would doubtless be equally true 
 in the case of an innkeeper. 
 
 18 Kennard v. Hobson, 1 Houst. (Del.) 36 (1855). 
 [172] 
 
Chap. XX.] Charges of the Innkeeper. [§ 249. 
 
 is nursed by the innkeeper through a severe and protracted 
 illness, compensation for the service as nurse is due the inn- 
 keeper.^" 
 
 § 248- Entire obligation must be performed- 
 
 The innkeeper must perform his entire obUgation before he 
 is entitled to any compensation. For instance, if he under- 
 takes to furnish room and board he can make no charge for 
 the room, although he furnishes it, if in point of fact he does 
 not supply the guest with the reasonable board.^" Where, 
 however, there is a separate charge for separate articles of en- 
 tertainment the innkeeper may be entitled to charge for some 
 of the articles furnished, though he is not entitled to charge 
 for others; for instance, if an innkeeper being unUcensed to 
 sell hquor is unable to recover compensation for Uquor fur- 
 nished, he may, nevertheless, recover such amoimt as he is 
 legally entitled to charge for board.^^ 
 
 § 249. Which of several guests is liable to pay charges. 
 
 Where a party of several persons dines together, and there 
 is no agreement to give credit to any particular one, they are, 
 it would seem, jointly hable for all the charges, not merely lia- 
 ble each for his own share.^^ If, however, the host knew that 
 one member of the party had invited the others to dine with 
 him he could hold only the one who is entertaining his friends.^^ 
 And where the party forms a family, the head of the family is 
 the person liable for the whole charge and not the separate 
 members of the family; thus, where a father went to an inn 
 with his daughter, it was held that the daughter was not liable 
 for her father's entertainment, nor it would seem for her own.^* 
 
 19 Ibid. 
 
 20 Wilson V. Martin, 1 Denio (N. Y.), 602 (1845). 
 
 21 Chase v. Burkholder, 18 Pa. 48 (1851); Scattergood v. Waterman, 2 
 Miles (Pa.), 32.3 (1839). 
 
 22 Forster v. Taylor, 3 Camp. 49 (1811). 
 
 23 So in 1 Rol. Abr., Action sur Case, 24, "As to the host both are liable 
 to pay the reckoning, unless the host knew that Bhad been invited." 
 
 21 Clayton v. Butterfield, 10 Rich. Law (S. C), 300 (1857). 
 
 [173] 
 
§ 249.] Innkeepers. [ Chap. XX. 
 
 And so where a husband and wife go to an inn together, the 
 wife is not chargeable with any part of the bill, unless indeed 
 it can be shown that the credit was extended to her and not 
 to the husband.^* 
 
 28 Bimey v. Wheaton, 2 How. Pr. N. S. (N. Y.) 519 (1885). 
 
 [174] 
 
Chap. XXI.] The Innkeeper's Lien. 
 
 [§251. 
 
 CHAPTER XXI. 
 
 THE innkeeper's LIEN. 
 
 254. 
 
 255. 
 
 Topic I. Nature of the right 
 to lien. 
 
 251. Nature of innkeeper's lien. 
 
 252. General rule. 
 
 253. Lien does not require a bind- 
 
 ing contract. 
 
 Lien does not cover prior 
 charges. 
 
 Topic II. To what property 
 the lien extends. 
 
 Every kind of property sub- 
 ject to lien for entire charge. 
 
 256. Goods received in the inn sub- 
 
 ject to lien, though the host 
 might have excluded them. 
 
 257. No lien on the person of the 
 
 guest. 
 
 258. No lien on goods which can- 
 
 not be taken without viola- 
 tion of law. 
 
 259. Wearing apparel worn by 
 
 guest. 
 
 260. Property exempt from exe- 
 
 cution. 
 
 Topic III. Against whose 
 property the lien exists. 
 
 Goods of a third person 
 brought by the guest to the 
 inn. 
 
 Knowledge of the innkeeper 
 that the goods do not be- 
 long to the guest. 
 
 261. 
 
 262. 
 
 263. The rule in Georgia. 
 
 264. Goods of a guest not respon- 
 
 sible for charges. 
 
 265. Statutory liens , hold only 
 
 property of the guest. 
 Topic IV, The beginning and 
 continuance of the lien. 
 
 266. Lien attaches when charges 
 
 accrue. 
 
 267. Sale of goods by owner does 
 
 not affect lien. 
 
 268. Removal of goods to another 
 
 State does not affect lien. 
 
 269. Care of goods held on hen. 
 Topic V. End of the lien. 
 
 270. Delivery of goods to the 
 
 guest. 
 
 271. Delivery induced by fraud. 
 
 272. Delivery for temporary use. 
 
 273. Giving payment. 
 
 274. Attachment of goods by the 
 
 innkeeper. 
 
 275. Conversion of the goods. 
 Topic VI. Enforcement of 
 
 lien. 
 
 276. Innkeeper's lien cannot be 
 
 foreclosed by sale. 
 
 277. Foreclosure in equity. 
 
 278. Lien as a defence. 
 
 279. Statutory methods of enforc- 
 
 ing the lien. 
 
 Topic I. Nature of the right to lien. 
 §251. Nature of innkeeper's lien. 
 
 The innkeeper, being obliged by law to receive travellers and 
 entertain them, is given by law, not merely the right to com- 
 
 [175] 
 
§ 252.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXI. 
 
 pensation from the guest, but also a hen on the goods of the 
 guest in the inn, to the extent of his charges. This lien differs 
 in one respect from other hens created by the common law in 
 that technical possession on the part of the innkeeper is not 
 necessary for the enforcement of the lien. Although the goods 
 remain in the possession of the guest, the innkeeper may pre- 
 vent their being carried from the inn, take them into his own 
 actual possession, and hold them as security for his charges. 
 In other respects this lien is in its nature and incidents like 
 other liens given by the common law to persons carrying on 
 a public employment, such as carriers and public warehouse- 
 men. 
 
 § 252. General rule. 
 
 By the common law an innkeeper is entitled to a lien for 
 the amount of his charges on all the goods of his guest which 
 are found in the inij.^ 
 
 The charges which are secured by the lien include not merely 
 compensation for entertainment, but also other charges con- 
 nected with the guest's stay at the inn, as for money lent to 
 the guest by the innkeeper.^ 
 
 The lien is restricted to charges as between the iimkeeper 
 and the one who is his guest in the strict sense. Thus, an inn- 
 keeper at common law has no lien on the goods of a boarder,^ 
 
 t Y. B. 5 Ed. 4, 2, pi. 20 (1465); Y. B. 21 Hen. 7, 14, pi. 19 (1505); Thomp- 
 son V. Lacy, 3 B. & Aid. 283 (Eng. 1820); Proctor v. Nicholson, 7 C. & P. 
 67 (Eng. 1835); Pollock v. Landis, 36 la. 651 (1873); Singer Mfg. Co. v. 
 Miller, 52 Minn. 516, 55 N. W. 56 ri893); Hursh v. Byers, 29 Mo. 469 (1860); 
 Ewart V. Stark, 8 Rich. L. (S. C.) 423 (1832); Dunlap v. Thorne, 1 Rich. L. 
 (S. C.) 213 (1845). Carlisle v. Quattlebaum, 2 Bailey (S. C.) 4.52 (1831), 
 contra, must be regarded as overruled. 
 
 2 Proctor V. Nicholson, 7 Car. & P. 67 (Eng. 1835); Watson v. Cross, 2 
 Duv. (Ky.) 147 (1865). 
 
 3 Lamond v. Richards, (1897) 1 Q. B. 541, 66 L. J. Q. B. 315, 76 L. T. 141, 
 45 W. R. 289, 61 J. P. 260; Pollock v. Landis, 36 la. 651 (1873); Reed v. 
 Teneyck, 103 Ky. 65, 44 S. W. 356 (1898); Singer Mfg. Co. v. MUler, 52 
 Minn. 516, 55 N. W. 56, 38 Am. St. Rep. 568, 21 L. R. A. 229 (1893); Hursh 
 V. Byers, 29 Mo. 469 (1860); Ewart v. Stark, 8 Rich. L. (S. C.) 423 (1832); 
 Neale v. Crocker, 8 Up. Can. C. P. 224 (1858). 
 
 [176] 
 
Chap. XXI.] The Innkeepee's Lien. [ § 253. 
 
 except of course by special agreement.* So an innkeeper tak- 
 ing horses to board for one who is not a guest, has no lien at 
 common law.^ Nor can one who merely keeps a lodging house 
 and lets rooms have a hen.* But it has been held that an inn- 
 keeper to whom a horse is committed to be doctored and cured 
 has a hen for his charges, as a farrier/ and that he has a 
 lien for his services on a horse sent to be trained.* 
 
 § 253. Lien does not require a binding contract- 
 
 This hen is, properly speaking, not created by a contract, 
 but by law; the innkeeper being obliged by law to receive, is 
 given by law the lien. Consequently, by the better view, an 
 innkeeper may maintain his hen even against a guest who is 
 incapable of making a binding contract.^ "It was his legal 
 duty to receive the appellee as a guest, and that being the case, 
 the contract was, on his part, compulsory, and the law will not 
 render such a contract on the other side either void or void- 
 able, upon the simple ground of disability arising from in- 
 fancy. ... It would be a legal absurdity to compel a 
 man to make a contract, and at the same time permit the other 
 party, who is the instrument of such compulsion, to avoid such 
 contract."" 
 
 * Regina v. Askin, 20 Up. Can Q. B. 626 (1861). 
 
 B Smith V. Dearlove, 6 C. B. 132, 17 L. J. C. P. 219, 12 Jur. 377 (1848); 
 Binns v. Pigot, 9 Car. & P. 208 (1840); Hickman v. Thomas, 16 Ala. 666 
 (1849); Taylor v. Downey, 104 Mich. 532, 62 N. W. 716 (1895); Elliott v. 
 Martin, 105 Mich. 506, 63 N. W. 525, 55 Am. St. Rep. 461 (1895); Grinnell 
 V. Cook, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 485, 38 Am. Dec. 663 (1842); Dixon v. Dalby, 11 
 Up. Can. Q. B. 79 (1852). 
 
 6 Cochrane v. Sohryver, 12 Daly (N. Y.), 174 (1883). 
 
 7 Danforth v. Pratt, 42 Me. 50 (1856). 
 
 8 Bevan v. Waters, 3 Car. & P. 520 (Eng. 1828). 
 
 9 Watson V. Cross, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 147 (1865) (infant). Contra, a dictum 
 in Proctor v. Nicholson, 7 Car. & P. 440 (Eng 183S). 
 
 10 Sampson, C. J., in Watson v. Cross, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 147 (1865). On the 
 other hand. Lord Abinger, C. B., charging the jury in Proctor v. Nicholson, 
 7 Car. & P. 67, 69 (Eng. 1835), said: "The landlord of an inn may supply 
 whatever things the guest orders, and the guest is bound to pay for them, 
 provided that the guest be possessed of his reason, and is not an infant. In 
 either of these latter cases the landlord must look to himself." This was 
 
 [177] 
 
§ 255.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXI. 
 
 § 254. Lien does not cover prior charges- 
 
 The innkeeper's lien is not a general lien, that is, it covers 
 only charges accrued during the last period of entertainment. 
 If the innkeeper once waives his lien by allowing the guest to 
 depart and take away his goods without paying his bill, the 
 charges then due can never afterwards be secured by a de- 
 tainer of goods brought to the inn by the same guest on a sub- 
 sequent occasion. This was estabUshed in the early case 
 of Jones V. Thurloe." This was an action of trover against 
 an innkeeper for detaining and converting the plaintiff's horse. 
 The defendant pleaded that the plaintiff owed him money for 
 horse-meat at several times, and that he detained the horse 
 according to the custom for what was due. On demurrer the 
 plea was held bad. The court said that if the innkeeper "give 
 him credit for that time, and let him depart without payment, 
 then he has waived the benefit of that custom by his own con- 
 sent to the departure, and shall never afterwards . detain the 
 horse for that expense. For this custom is founded on the 
 hardship of the innkeeper's case to sue for every little debt, 
 or on a greater hardship, that he may not know where to find 
 him who was his guest after he is gone : therefore, when he has 
 waived that privilege which the law gives him, he must rely 
 on his other agreement." 
 
 Topic II. To what property the lien extends. 
 § 255. Every kind of property subject to lien for entire charge. 
 
 Generally speaking the hen extends to all property of every 
 kind brought to the inn by the guest, or left at the inn for the 
 guest, each article of property being security for the whole 
 bill. There is one debt and one lien in respect of the whole 
 of the innkeeper's charges. This proposition has almost never 
 been questioned; it was, however, doubted and htigated in 
 
 said obiter and without consideration, and must be regarded as unsound, 
 unless the meaning is merely to restrict the innkeeper's claim in such a case 
 to actual necessaries. See ante, §§ 64, 112. 
 11 Jones V. Thurloe, 8 Mod. 172 (Eng. 1723). 
 [178] 
 
Chap. XXI.] The Innkeeper's Lien. [ § 256. 
 
 the case of Mulhner v. Florence.^^ In that case it appeared 
 that a guest brought with him to the defendant's inn a pair 
 of horses, wagonette and harness. The guest left the inn 
 owing over one hundred pounds for his own entertainment 
 and over twenty pounds for the keep of the horses. The 
 horses belonged in fact to the plaintiff, who tendered the 
 amount due for their keep and demanded that they be given 
 up to him. The court held that he must pay the whole charge. 
 The Lord Justice Bramwell said: "Was it a hen on the horses 
 for the charges in respect of the horses, and on the carriage in 
 respect of the charges of the carriage, and no lien on them for 
 the guest's reasonable expenses, or was it a general lien on the 
 horses and carriage and guest's goods conjointly for the whole 
 amount of the defendant's claim as innkeeper ? I am of opin- 
 ion that the latter was the true view as to his lien, and for this 
 reason, that the debt in respect of which the lien was claimed 
 was one debt, although that was made up of several items. 
 An innkeeper may demand the expenses before he receives the 
 guest, but if he does not, and takes him in and finds him in all 
 things that the guest requires it is one contract, and the lien 
 that he has is a hen in respect of the whole contract to pay 
 for the things that, are supplied to him while he is a guest. 
 If this was not the case a man might go to an hotel with his 
 wife, and then it might be said that the innkeeper's Hen was 
 on the guest's luggage for what he had consumed, and on the 
 wife's luggage for what she had had. The contract was, 
 that the guest and his horses and carriage shall be received 
 and provided for; there was one contract, one debt, and one 
 lien in respect of the whole of the charges." 
 
 §256. Goods received in the inn subject to lien, though the host 
 might have excluded them. 
 
 There was a tendency in the Enghsh cases at one time to 
 
 restrict the hen to such goods only as the innkeeper is com- 
 
 12 3 Q. B. D. 484, 47 L. J. Q. B. 700, 38 L. T. 167, 26 W. R. 385 CEng. 
 1877). 
 
 [179] 
 
§ 257.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXI. 
 
 pelled to receive with his guests. Thus in Broadwood v. Gran- 
 ara/^ Baron Parke said in the course of the argument: ^^ "The 
 innkeeper has a hen on such goods only as he is compelled to 
 receive with his guests. Could he be indicted for not receiv- 
 ing a pianoforte? It might be a nuisance to persons in his 
 house." And again, later, the same judge said: ^^ "The prin- 
 ciple on which the innkeeper's lien depends is that he is bound 
 to receive travellers and the goods which they bring with them 
 to the inn. " This notion, however, was imsoimd, and has been 
 abandoned. The lien secures not merely compensation for care 
 extended to the very goods over which it is exercised, but com- 
 pensation for charges incurred by the guest for his own enter- 
 tainment. The innkeeper is bound to receive and entertain 
 the guest; and if he chooses to receive with him goods he is 
 not obliged to receive, his right in those goods, after he chooses 
 to receive them, is the same as his right in any other goods 
 of the guest. "They are. in the same position as goods prop- 
 erly offered to the innkeeper according to the custom of the 
 realm. " " 
 
 § 257. No lien on the person of the guest. 
 
 The Uefi is restricted to the goods of the guest; his person 
 cannot be detained as security for the charges. In the case 
 of Sunbolf V. Alford " the plaintiff sued the defendant, an 
 innkeeper, for assault and battery. The defendant pleaded 
 that the plaintiff was a guest, and as such became indebted 
 to the defendant, and would have left the inn without paying 
 the debt, and for this cause the defendant detained him. 
 The court held the plea insufficient. Lord Chief Baron Abinger 
 said: "If an innkeeper has a right to detain the person of his 
 guest for the non-payment of his bill, he has a right to detain 
 him until the bill is paid, — which may be for life; so that this 
 
 13 10 Exch. 417 (1854). 
 
 " At page 420. 
 
 16 At page 423. 
 
 16 Lord Esher, M. R., in Robins v. Gray, (1895) 2 Q. B. 501. 
 
 " 3 M. & W. 248, 1 H. & H. 13, 7 L. J. Ex. 60, 2 Jur. 110 (Eng. 1838). 
 
 [180] 
 
Chap. XXI.] The Innkeeper's Lien. [ § 258. 
 
 defence supposes that by the common law a man who owes a 
 small debt, for which he could not be imprisoned by legal 
 process, may yet be detained by an innkeeper for life. The 
 proposition is monstrous. Again, if he have any right to 
 detain the person, surely he is a judge in his own cause: for 
 he is then the party to determine whether the amount of his 
 bill is reasonable, and he must detain him till the man brings 
 an action against him for false imprisonment, and then if it 
 were determined that the charge was not reasonable, and it 
 appeared that the party had made an offer of a reasonable 
 sum, the detainer would be unlawful." He distinguished the 
 case of lien on goods as an exception to the general law. The 
 lien on goods is doubtless a survival of an ancient power of 
 legally permitted self-help; but in modern times it is an ex- 
 ceptional process, confined to certain classes of cases. This 
 lien has never been extended at conmion law to any other class 
 of property than tangible personal property; and there is not 
 the slightest authority for extending it to the person of the 
 debtor. 
 
 § 258. Xo lien on goods wMcli cannot be taken without violation of 
 law. 
 No lien exists if it would be impossible to exercise it without 
 violating the law. Thus where horses, whether owned by an 
 individual or the government, were employed in transporting 
 the mails, the innkeeper could not hold the horses on lien in 
 such a way as to interfere with the mail.^* District Judge Win- 
 chester said on this point: "The law does not allow any 
 justification of a wilful and voluntary act of obstruction to the 
 passage of the mail. . . . Many exceptions might be in- 
 troduced, and perhaps with propriety. For instance, a stolen 
 horse found in the mail-stage. The owner cannot seize him. 
 The driver being in debt, or even committing an offence, can 
 only be arrested in such way as does not obstruct the passage 
 
 18 United States v. Barney, Fed. Cas. No. 14,525, 3 Hughes, 645, 2 Wheeler 
 C. C. 513 (1810) . But see United States v. McCracken, 3 Hughes, 544 (1878). 
 
 [ 181 ] 
 
§ 261.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXI. 
 
 of the mail. These examples are as strong as any which are 
 likely to occur, but even these are not excepted by the statute." 
 
 § 259. Wearing apparel worn by guest. 
 
 For this reason no hen can be exercised over clothes actually 
 on the person of the guest, since they could not be detained 
 without a breach of the peace and the risk, at any rate, of in- 
 decency."**-^ 
 
 As Baron Parke said in the case cited: "There is, at all 
 events, no power to do what this plea justifies — ^namely, to 
 strip the guest of his clothes; for if there be, then, if the inn- 
 keeper take the coat off his back, and that prove to be an 
 insufficient pledge, he may go on and strip him naked, and 
 would apply either to a male or to a female. That is a conse- 
 quence so utterly absm-d that it cannot be entertained for a 
 moment. "'^'^ 
 
 § 260. Property exempt from execution. 
 
 This principle, however^ does not extend so far as to cover 
 property exempt by law from execution ; and the hen may be 
 exercised over such property. The privilege of exemption 
 granted to a debtor does not prevent him from voluntarily 
 giving another an interest in such property or subjecting it 
 voluntarily to a hen, as the guest does by taking it with him 
 to an inn.^^ 
 
 § 261. Goods of a tMrd person brought by tbe guest to the inn. 
 
 Where a guest brings to an inn goods ostensibly his, the lien 
 of the innkeeper attaches to the goods though they were in 
 fact the goods of a third person.^^ 
 
 ., IS Tunbolf V. Alford, 3 M. & W. 248, 1 H. & H. 13, 7 L. J. Ex. 60, 2 Jur. 
 110 (Eng. 18381 . 
 
 ^ 20 "The consequence of holding otherwise might be to subject parties to 
 disgrace and duress, in order to compel them to pay a trifling debt, which 
 after all was not due, and which the innkeeper had no pretence for demand- 
 ing." BoUand, B., in the same case. 
 
 21 Swan V. Bournes, 47 la. 501, 29 Am. Rep. 492 (1877). 
 
 22 Johnson v. Hill, 3 Stark. 172, 23 Rev. Rep. 764 (1822); Snead v. Wat- 
 
 [182] 
 
Chap. XXI.] The Innkeeper's Lien. [§ 261. 
 
 This was finally determined after considerable difference of 
 opinion by the court of King's Bench in 1616 in the case of 
 Robinson v. Walter.^' In that case Dodderidge, J., said: "He 
 is to receive all guests and horses that come to his inn. 
 He is not bound to examine who is the true owner of the horse 
 brought to his inn, he is bound as he is the innkeeper to receive 
 them and therefore there is very great reason for him to retain 
 him until he be satisfied for his meat that he has eaten, and 
 the true owner cannot have him away until he has satisfied the 
 innkeeper for his meat." And at the reargument the same 
 judge said: "This is a fine trick for the plaintiff to have his 
 horse kept and to give the innkeeper nothing for the same." 
 Croke, J., said: "Here the innkeeper hath done no wrong at 
 all; the owner is to satisfy him for his meat, because he was 
 here compellable to receive him. " Some doubt was for a time 
 thought to have been cast on this doctrine by the case of 
 Broadwood v. Granara,^* but the Court of Appeal finally dis- 
 pelled any doubt in the leading case of Robins v. Gray.^^ In 
 that case a commercial traveller employed by a firm who dealt 
 in sewing machines went to stay at an inn, and whilst there 
 machines were sent to him by his employers in the ordinary 
 course of business for the purpose of selling them to customers 
 in the neighborhood. Before the goods were sent the innkeeper 
 
 kins, 1 C. B. N. S. 267, 26 L. J. C. P. 57 (1857); TurriU v. Crawley, 13 Q. B. 
 197, 18 L. J. Q. B. 155, 13 Jur.878, 13 J. P. 747 (1849); ThrefaU v. Borwick, 
 L. R. 10 Q. B. 210, 44 L. J. Q. B. 87, 32 L. T. 32, 23 W. R. 312 a875); 
 Robins v. Gray, (1895) 2 Q. B. 501; Black v. Brennan, 5 Dana (Ky.), 310 
 (1837); R. L. Polk & Co. v. Melenbacker (Mich.), 99 N. W. 867, 11 Detroit 
 Leg. N. 130 (1904); Singer Mfg. Co. v. Miller, 52 Minn. 516, 55 N. W. 56, 
 38 Am. St. Rep. 568, 21 L. R. A. 229 (1893); Jones v. Morrill, 42 Barb. 623 
 (N. Y. 1864); Waters v. Gerard, 94 N. Y. Supp. 702 (1905); Cook v. Kane, 
 13 Ore. 482, 57 Am. Rep. 28, 11 Pac. 226 (1886); Singer Mfg. Co. v. Flanni- 
 gan, 7 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 45 (1888); Alvord v. Davenport, 43 Vt. 30 (1870); 
 Manning v. Hollenbeck, 27 Wis. 202 (1870); Goodyear v. Klemm, 5 Austral. 
 Jur. 136 (1874); Hook v. Singer Mfg. Co., 11 Natal L. R. 301 (1890). CmUra 
 Taylor v. O'Brien, Que. R. 24 Super. Ct. 407 (1903). 
 
 23 3 Bulst. 269, 1 Roll. 449 n; Poph. 127 (Eng. 1616). 
 
 24 10 Exch. 417 (Eng. 1854). 
 26 [1895] 2 Q. B. 501. 
 
 [183] 
 
§ 262.] Innkeepebs. [Chap. XXI. 
 
 had express notice that they were the property of the employ- 
 ers, but he received them as the baggage of the traveller, who 
 subsequently left the inn without paying his board bill. It was 
 held that the innkeeper had a lien on the machines for the 
 amount of the bill. Lord Esher, Master of the Rolls, said: 
 "I have no doubt about this case. I protest against being 
 asked, upon some new discovery as to the law of innkeeper's 
 lien, to disturb a well known and very large business carried 
 on in this country for centuries. " Speaking of Broadwood v. 
 Granara he said: "There the proposition that if a guest brings 
 goods into an inn as his luggage they must be treated as if 
 they were his goods was fully recognized. The judges held in 
 that case that a piano, not brought to the inn by the guest as 
 his luggage, but sent in by a tradesman for the guest to play 
 upon during his stay at the iim, was not offered to, nor taken 
 possession of by, the innkeeper under the custom of the realm 
 as the luggage of the guest, and therefore that the piano was 
 not subject to the innkeeper's lien. Whether we should have 
 agreed with that decision is immaterial. The case was ex- 
 pressly decided on the ground that the law of innkeepers did 
 not apply. It is, therefore, no authority in the case now before 
 us, where, as the learned judge in the court below has found, 
 the goods were brought to the inn as the goods of the traveller 
 and accepted as his goods by the innkeeper. " 
 
 § 262. Knowledge of the innkeeper that the goods do not belong to 
 the guest. 
 There is some authority for the proposition that if the inn- 
 keeper knows that the guest has no title to the goods he brings 
 to the inn, he can claim no lien on the goods.^^ This doctrine 
 goes back to a charge of Lord Chief Justice Abbott to the jury 
 at Nisi Prius in Johnson v. Hill.^^ This was an action of 
 
 ! 26 Johnson v. Hill, 3 Stark. 172 (Eng. 1822); Broadwood v. Granara, 10 
 Exch. 417, 2-1 L. J. Ex. 1, 1 Jur. N. S. 19, 3 W. R. 25, 3 C. L. R. 177 (I riT. 
 1854); Covington v. Newberger, 99 N. C. 523, 6 S. E. 205 (1888, er ■ 
 Cook V. Kane, 13 Or. 482, 57 Am. Rep. 28, 11 Pac. 226 (1886, stmblc); x... jk 
 V. Singer Mfg. Co., 11 Natal L. R. 301 (1890). 
 27 3 Stark. 172, 174 (Eng. 1822). 
 [184] 
 
Chap. XXI.] The Innkeeper's Lien. [§ 262. 
 
 trover brought by the true owner of goods against an inn- 
 keeper who had refused to deliver the goods on demand, as- 
 serting a lien. The goods had been illegally seized, under color 
 of legal process, and taken by the wrongdoer to the inn. The 
 Lord Chief Justice charged the jury that "the question was, 
 whether the defendant knew, at the time when the horse was 
 deKvered into his custody, that Pritchard was not the owner 
 of the property, but a mere wrongdoer; if he knew that fact, 
 he made himself a party to the wrongful act of Pritchard, and 
 could not insist on any recompense for keeping the horse. " 
 
 This reason extends, therefore, only to a case where the pos- 
 session of the guest is wrongftd, and is known to the innkeeper 
 to be so; and to this extent the doctrine is undoubtedly cor- 
 rect. The case of Broadwood v. Granara ^* was very different 
 in its facts. The guest, a professional pianist, borrowed from 
 the plaintiff a piano to practice upon wMle he stayed in the inn. 
 The defendant, the innkeeper, knew all the facts at the time 
 the piano was brought to the inn. The court denied the ex- 
 istence of the hen, but principally on the ground that the piano 
 was brought to the inn after the guest arrived, under a definite 
 contract of bailment. Baron Alderson said: "The pianoforte 
 was not brought to the inn by the guest, but was sent there 
 by the plaintiffs, the defendant knowing that it was theirs; 
 then how can it be said that the defendant received it as the 
 goods of the guest?" Chief Baron Pollock said: "This is the 
 case of goods, not brought to the inn by a traveller as his goods, 
 either upon his coming to or whilst staying at the inn, but they 
 are goods furnished for his temporary use by a third person, 
 and known by the innkeeper to belong to that person." 
 
 The real reason for denjdng a lien in this case seems to be 
 the definite bailment relation between the owner and the guest, 
 known to the innkeeper. If the goods had been rented to the 
 guest for six months, the innkeeper could probably have main- 
 tained his lien during the six months; here they were dehv- 
 ered for a period determinable at the will of the bailor, and 
 
 28 10 Exch. 417, supra. 
 
 [1851 
 
§ 262.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXI. 
 
 the guest would be guilty of trover if he detained them after 
 demand, and in the language of Johnson v. Hill ^^ the defend- 
 ant made himself a party to the conversion by detaining them 
 after such demand. This point is brought out by the Lord 
 Justice Kay in Robins v. Gray.'" Speaking of Broadwood v. 
 Granara, he said: "An analogous case to that was put by the 
 Master of the Rolls during the argument of the present case. 
 Suppose a jeweller in the town sent, with the knowledge of the 
 innkeeper, certain jewels to a guest at the inn on approval, 
 and allowed them to remain in the inn for some days — could 
 the innkeeper claim and enforce a lien upon those jewels? I 
 should think he could not, because they were sent for a special 
 temporary purpose, and the innkeeper knew it; they were, 
 therefore, not sent as the goods — I do not mean as the prop- 
 erty — of the guest; they were not goods which he was likely 
 to take about with him as his luggage." 
 
 Suppose, however, the goods are brought to the inn right- 
 fully by the guest, under an arrangement by which he is en- 
 titled to hold them indefinitely; or suppose the guest brings 
 them in pursuance of an agreement by which he is using them 
 according to the owner's desire; in such a case the innkeeper 
 should have a right to the hen even though he is aware that 
 the guest is not the legal owner of the goods. So if the guest 
 is to the knowledge of the innkeeper a servant or agent, em- 
 ployed by the owner to deal with the goods he brings to the 
 inn, the lien may be enforced on the goods against the master.'^ 
 Lord Esher, Master of the Rolls, said in Robins v. Gray: '^ 
 "I am of opinion that an innkeeper is bound to take in goods 
 with which a person who comes to an inn is travelling as his 
 goods, unless they are of an exceptional character; that the 
 
 2» 3 Stark. 172(1822). 
 
 30 [1895] 2 Q. B. 501. 
 
 31 Robins v. Gray (1895), 2 Q. B. 601, 65 L. ,T. Q. B. 44, 14 Rep. 671, 73 
 L. T. 252, 44 W. R. 1, 59 J. P. 741. And see Snead v. Watkins, 1 C. B. N. 
 S. 267, 26 L. J. C. P. 57, 21 J. P. 263 (Eng. 1857); Fogarty v. Dion, 6 Quebec 
 L. R. 163 (1880). 
 
 32 Supra. 
 
 [186] 
 
Chap. XXI.] The Innkeeper's Lien. [ § 265. 
 
 innkeeper's lien attaches, and that the question of whose prop- 
 erty the goods are, or of the innkeeper's knowledge as to whose 
 property they are, is immaterial. " The best rule, that involved 
 in this decision, appears to be that knowledge of the innkeeper 
 that the goods are owned by a third party is immaterial in a 
 case where the owner bails them to the guest to take in the 
 ordinary way to the inn Uke his own goods. 
 
 § 263. The rule in Georgia. 
 
 In Georgia it is held that no lien can be exercised over goods 
 of one not a guest except for charges on the specific article on 
 which the lien is claimed.'^ But this doctrine appears to be 
 confined to that State. 
 
 § 264- Goods of guest not responsible for charges- 
 
 Where several people go together to an inn, but one of them 
 only is responsible for pa3dng the bill, only property which is 
 really or ostensibly the property of the responsible party can 
 be held on hen for the charges. Thus where a father and his 
 daughter went to an inn, under such circumstances that the 
 father alone was responsible for the bill, the host could not 
 hold the daughter's goods as security for the payment of the 
 bill.** And so where a husband and wife go together to an 
 inn, the credit being extended to the husband, there is no hen 
 on property evidently belonging to the wife,*^ though if the 
 credit were extended to the wife her goods could be held, and 
 not the husband's.*^ Where the wife goes alone to the inn, 
 but the husband is hable, the wife's goods cannot be held." 
 
 § 265- Statutory liens hold only property of the guest. 
 
 Where the hen is given by statute it is usually hmited to the 
 
 33 Domestic Sewing Machine Co. v. Waiters, 50 Ga. 573 (1874). 
 
 3* Clayton v. Butterfield, 10 Rich. Law (S. C), 300 (1857). In this case 
 the daughter tendered the amount of the charges incurred on her account; 
 if she had not tendered this, the lien would not have been valid, as it seems, 
 even to that extent, since she owed no debt. 
 
 35 Birney v. Wheaton, 2 How. Pr. N. S. (N. Y.) 519 (1885); Mcllvane v. 
 Hilton, 7 Hun (N. Y.), 594 (1876: a case of a boarding-house keeper's lien). 
 
 36 Bimey v. Wheaton, 2 How. Pr. N. S. (N. Y.) 519 (1885). 
 
 37 Baker v. Stratton, 52 N. J. Law, 277, 19 Atl. 661 (1890). 
 
 [187] 
 
§266.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXI. 
 
 property of the guest; the hen cannot be exercised upon prop- 
 erty of a third person, even if it was brought to the house by 
 the guest as his own property. 
 
 This is generally held even in case of a statutory innkeeper's 
 lien, though the statute was apparently not intended to change 
 the provisions of the common law.^* A fortiori a statute which 
 extends to boarding-house keepers or lodging-house keepers a 
 hen on the goods of the boarder or lodger does not create a 
 hen on the goods of a third person in the hands of the boarder 
 or lodger, even if they are ostensibly the property of the boarder 
 or lodger.^" And so the statutory lien of the Uvery-stable 
 keeper can be exercised only against the person to whom he 
 extended credit.^" 
 
 Topic IV. The Beginning and Continuance of Lien. 
 
 § 266. Lien attaches when charges accrue. 
 
 The lien attaches as soon as the charge is incurred, that is, 
 as soon as the guest is received, even if the time for payment 
 has not arrived. So in a Massachusetts case it appeared that 
 the defendant was a boarder at the plaintiff's house, paying 
 his board by the week at the end of the week. A week's board 
 would be due on Satvirday night; on Saturday morning the 
 defendant undertook, against the will of the plaintiff, and with- 
 
 38Wyckoff V. Southern Hotel Co., 24 Mo. App. 382 (1887); McClain v. 
 Williams, 11 S. D. 227, 76 N. W. 930, 74 Am. St. Rep. 791, 49 L. R. A. 
 610 (1898); Torrey v. McClellan, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 371, 43 S. W. 64 (1897). 
 In Iowa the statute expressly provides for a lien on property "belonging to 
 or under control of" the guest; and this obviously covers property of a third 
 person brought to the inn by a guest. Brown Shoe Co. v. Hunt, 103 la. 
 586, 72N. W..765 (1897). 
 
 39 MiUs V. Shirley, 110 Mass. 158 (1872); Misch v. O'Hara, 9 Daly (N. Y.), 
 361 (1880); Barnett v. Walker, 39 N. Y. Misc. 323, 79 N. Y. Supp. 859 
 (1902). But see a different holding under the earlier form of the statute. 
 Jones v. Morrill, 52 Barb. 623 (1864); Newcombe v. Anderson, 11 Ont. 665 
 (1886). 
 
 « Gump V. Showalter, 43 Pa. 507 (1862); McManigle v. Grouse, 1 Walker 
 (Pa.), 43 (1887). 
 [188] 
 
Chap. XXI.] The Innkeeper's Lien. [§ 267. 
 
 out paying anything for board during the week, to remove his 
 baggage; and upon the plaintiff interfering, he forcibly re- 
 moved her from the room. The plaintiff brought an action 
 for assault and battery, and the defendant set up in defence 
 his right to remove his property. The Supreme Court, how- 
 ever, held that the lien existed, and the plaintiff could recover. 
 Mr. Justice Morton said: "Otherwise, a guest who had ob- 
 tained credit upon the strength of the lien might destroy the 
 security ... by a sale or by removing the goods at any 
 time before the bill for board became payable by the contract; 
 a result which is inconsistent with the nature of the lien." ^^ 
 
 § 267- Sale of goods by owner does not affect lien. 
 
 A sale of the property by the guest to a third person does 
 not terminate the lien; the innkeeper may retain the goods 
 against the purchaser for all charges accrued (even after the 
 sale) until notice of the sale is received by the mnkeeper. 
 So in a Massachusetts case it appeared that a/boarder brought 
 property to the plaintiff's boarding house m which he was 
 boarding; after a time he sold the property to a third person. 
 He paid his board up to the time of the sale, but afterwards 
 remained, retaining possession of the goods, and contracted 
 a debt for board. The housekeeper had no notice of the sale. 
 The defendant, a sheriff, took the goods on a writ against the 
 purchaser, and the plaintiff brought suit for conversion. It 
 was held that the plaintiff had a lien.'*^ Mr. Justice Hoar said: 
 "The plaintiff had no notice of the sale; and we think that, 
 within the meaning of the statute, she had a right to continue 
 to furnish board, on the security of the lien, until such notice 
 was given, if the property remained in the house. Otherwise, 
 a boarder, who had obtained credit on the strength of the lien 
 which the law gave upon his property, might deprive the 
 
 « Smith V. Colcord, 115 Mass. 70 (1874). This was the case of a statu- 
 tory boarding-house keeper's lien; but the reasoning would equally apply to 
 the common-law lien of an innkeeper. 
 
 « Bayley v. Merrill, 10 All. (Mass.) 360 (1865). 
 
 [189] 
 
§ 269.] Innkeepebs. [Chap. XXI. 
 
 boarding-house keeper of the security by an immediate sale. 
 The statute creates the pledge of the property, when the owner 
 brings it, for whatever may be due while he stays." Though 
 this "^as the case of a statutory hen, the principle involved is 
 obviously apphcable to the common-law lien of the innkeeper. 
 Indeed, it would naturally follow, in the case of the innkeeper, 
 from the well-estabhshed doctrine that the hen holds goods 
 even of a third party brought to the inn as goods of the guest. 
 
 § 268. Removal of goods to another State does not affect lien. 
 
 The hen is not lost by taking the goods into another State, 
 even if no such hen would be created by the law of the latter 
 State; for the hen once having attached to the goods remains, 
 wherever they may be taken by the innkeeper. In a New 
 Hampshire case the facts were thayone S. in Massachusetts 
 held a trunk belonging to plaintiff's son under a hen for board; 
 and at plaintiff's request she sent the trunk to him, in New 
 Hampshire, by the defendant express company, C. 0. D. 
 The plaintiff tendered the charges for carriage only, and de- 
 manded the trunk; and upon the defendant refusing to give 
 it up he brought this action of replevin. The Supreme Court 
 gave judgment for the defendant.*' Mr. Justice Stanley said: 
 "In this case, there is an attempt to divest S. of her hen, and 
 there is no reason why she may not defend her title as well 
 as if she were the absolute owner residing in Massachusetts 
 and a suit were brought to take the property from her. The 
 hen of S. was as perfect as the hen under a mortgage made and 
 executed in Massachusetts in accordance with their laws 
 would be. In such cases the title imder the mortgage could 
 be shown, and would be a defence." (Tn 
 
 § 269. Care of goods held on lien. 
 
 An innkeeper holding goods on hen is bound to take due care 
 of the goods, which is said to be the care which he takes of his 
 own goods of a similar description. So where an innkeeper 
 
 <3 Jaquith v. American Express Co., 60 N. H. 61 (1880). 
 [190] 
 
Chap. XXL] The Innkeeper's Lien. [§ 269. 
 
 who was holding clothing and furs on a lien, put them into a 
 closet with similar goods of his own, and they were injured 
 by moths and mice, it was held that that amount of negli- 
 gence which would make an innkeeper hable had not been 
 shown.^^ He may make reasonable use of the goods if such 
 use is beneficial to the owner, as, for instance, in the case of Uve 
 animals; but in that case he is bound to account for the value 
 of the use. This question. was discussed in a Vermont case.** 
 An innkeeper while holding a horse on hen learned that the 
 horse really belonged not to the guest but to someone from 
 whom it had been stolen; and imder these circumstances he 
 made use of the horse. The court held this action proper un- 
 der the circumstances. The right of the bailee to use the 
 property, the court said, depended, in the absence of express 
 agreement, upon the circumstances. Thus, if the use would 
 be for the benefit of the property the consent of the owner 
 might fairly be presumed, but not if it would be injurious or 
 perilous; while if the use would be indifferent, other circum- 
 stances might determine it. "It is generally not only the 
 right, but the duty, of the bailee to use the property so far as 
 necessary to its preservation. To this extent the assent of 
 thfe owner may be presumed — as in case of the milking of a 
 milch cow; and in case of a horse, exercise and moderate use 
 to the extent necessary to the health and vigor of the animal. 
 Again, it is laid down by the elementary writers that the right 
 to use the property may depend on whether it is property of 
 a nature that requires expense to keep it; and if so, the bailee 
 may use it reasonably to compensate him for the charge of 
 keeping." Under the circumstances of this case it was rea- 
 sonable to use the horse. The innkeeper did not know the 
 owner, nor had he any reason to suppose that the owner would 
 appear. Even though his hen was good against the owner, 
 still he might hold the horse until it died without being paid, 
 
 « Angus V. McLachlan, 23 Ch. D. 330, 52 L. J. Ch. 587, 48 L. T. 863, 31 
 W. R. 641 (Eng. 1889). 
 
 « Alvord V. Davenport, 43 Vt. 30 (1870). 
 
 [191] 
 
§ 272.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXI. 
 
 and then his only security for payment would be gone. "Un- 
 der such circumstances, the defendant had a right to use the 
 property moderately and prudently, to the extent of com- 
 pensating him for his charges, in the manner that the case 
 shows he did use it. AVhether the actual assent of the plaintiff 
 in the meantime is presumed or not, it is fairly to be presumed 
 that if the plaintiff had known the facts he would have as- 
 sented. The use of the property has manifestly benefited 
 the plaintiff, for, but for that, the expense of keeping for the 
 four years would probably have exhausted the whole prop- 
 erty." 
 
 The value of the use must, however, be credited on the lien. 
 "The defendant, having lawfully used the property, must ac- 
 count for the use upon his charges for trouble and expense of 
 keeping the property; and the court having found that it is 
 a full equivalent, the defendant had no hen upon the property." 
 
 Topic V. End of Lien. 
 
 § 270. Delivery of goods to the guest. 
 
 The hen is at an end when the innkeeper voluntarily delivers 
 the goods to the guest.^^ But a mere executory agreement to 
 give up the goods, made without consideration, does not put 
 an end to the Uen.^'' 
 
 § 271. Delivery induced by fraud. 
 
 If the innkeeper is induced to give up the goods by fraud, 
 the hen continues in spite of the dehvery, or rather the inn- 
 keeper has the right to renew it; he may recover the goods by 
 legal process, or otherwise, and the lien will again attach to 
 them.^8 
 
 § 272. Delivery for temporary use. 
 The innkeeper may allow the guest to take the goods tem- 
 
 " Jones V. Thurloe, 8 Mod. 172 (Eng. 1723); Danforth v. Pratt, 42 Me. 
 50 (1856); Grinnell v. Cook, 3 HiU (N. Y.), 486 (1842). 
 « Danforth v. Pratt, 42 Me. 50 (1856). 
 48 Manning v. Hollenbeck, 27 Wis. 202 (1870). 
 [192] 
 
Chap. XXI.] The Innkeeper's Lien. [§ 274. 
 
 porarily without parting with his lien; as, for instance, where 
 a horse is put up at an inn and the guest drives it out from 
 time to time, the innkeeper does not lose his lien.^* 
 
 In such a case the better view appears to be that the lien 
 continues even during the temporary possession of the guest. 
 A creditor attached the horse of a guest at an inn while the 
 guest was driving the horse in the neighborhood of the inn; 
 the innkeeper's hen was held to have priority over the attach- 
 ment.^" But the opposite opinion has also been held.*^ 
 
 § 273. Giving payment- 
 
 The lien is of course destroyed by payment of the debt. 
 And so where the innkeeper owes the guest for labor more than 
 the guest owes for food, and the guest has a right to set off 
 the amount due him against his debt, there is no lien.^^ But 
 a mere agreement to accept security for the bill if it is not 
 inconsistent with the lien, does not put an end to it.^' 
 
 § 274- Attachment of goods by the innkeeper. 
 
 The hen is not destroyed by the innkeeper attaching the 
 goods held by him on hen in an action to recover his charges. 
 So far from being a waiver of his security, this is an attempt 
 to obtain additional secmity. The innkeeper, Uke any other 
 creditor, may attach subject to the hen. This question was 
 fuUy discussed in a suit in West Virginia '^ upon a statutory 
 
 « AUen V. Smith, 12 C. B. N. S. 638, 31 L. J. C. P. 306, 9 Jur. N. S. 230, 
 6 L. T. 459, 10 W. R. 646; affirmed, 9 Jur. N. S. 1284, 11 W. R. 440 (Eng. 
 1862); Huffman v. Walterhouse, 19 Ont. 186 (1890). 
 
 60 CaldweU v. Tutt, 10 Lea (Temi.), 258, 43 Am. Rep. 307 (1882). 
 
 61 Crabtree v. Griffith, 22 Up. Can. Q. B. 573 (1863). And see Grinnell v. 
 Cook, 3 HiU (N. Y.), 486 (1842). 
 
 62 Hamlin v. Walters, 3 Col. App. 519, 34 Pac. 686 (1893). 
 
 63 Angus V. McLachlan, 23 Ch. D. 330, 52 L. J. Ch. 587, 48 L. T. 863, 31 
 W. R. 641 (Eng. 1889). 
 
 54 Lambert v. Niklass, 45 W. Va. 527, 31 S. E. 951, 44 L. R. A. 561 (1898). 
 See contra, however, Jacobs v. Latour, 5 Bing. 130 (Eng. 1828), where the 
 lien of a horse trainer was held lost when he caused the horse to be taken in 
 execution at his own suit; the court saying in explanation that "in order to 
 sell, the sheriff must have had possession." 
 
 13 [ 193 ] 
 
§ 275.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXI. 
 
 stable-keeper's lien. The argument against the continuance 
 of the lien was based on two grounds : First, that the lien was 
 destroyed by the judgment; second, that the possession taken 
 by the sheriff necessarily put an end to the lien, since that de- 
 pended on maintaining possession. To the first point the 
 court replied that the debt is one thing and the lien another; 
 and though the debt is merged in the judgment the lien con- 
 tinues and secures the judgment. On the second point the 
 court said that the only method of enforcing the lien provided 
 by the common law is by judicial process; and this seems to be 
 a reasonable process. "He is not thus waiving, but enforcing 
 his hen. Why it should be said that, when the officer levies 
 on the property to enforce this hen the innkeeper loses his 
 lien because he gives up possession, I cannot see. The officer 
 is his agent for this purpose. To say so is technical in the 
 highest degree, and defeats justice. The innkeeper is not sur- 
 rendering possession to the owner, nor to an officer acting in 
 furtherance of his demand. He could bring a suit, as shown 
 above, without forfeiting his Hen; and by resorting to an 
 attachment he simply availed himself of a fact giving him 
 the right to attachment to enforce a debt for which there was 
 a lien, using a cumulative remedy." 
 
 § 275. Conversion of the goods. 
 
 Conversion of the goods or wrongful dealing with them by 
 the innkeeper while he holds them on Hen puts an end to the 
 Hen. Thus, if the innkeeper refuses to give up the goods 
 upon a good tender of the amount due, he is guilty of a con- 
 version; but not where the tender is not a good one.^^ In 
 England, the effect is not only to destroy the Hen, but also to' 
 make the innkeeper Hable for the entire value of the goods, 
 without deducting his charges.^" In the United States, how- 
 ever, though the Hen is lost the innkeeper may deduct the 
 
 55 Gordon v. Cox, 7 Car. & P. 172 (Eng. 1835). 
 
 56 MuUiner v. Florence, 3 Q. B. D. 484, 47 L. J. Q. B. 700, 38 L. T. 167, 
 26 W. R. 385 (1876). 
 
 [194] 
 
Chap. XXL] The Innkeeper's Lien. [§ 277. 
 
 amount of his charges from the value of the goods." The 
 fact that the innkeeper claims a hen for a greater amoimt than 
 he has a right to do does not destroy his lien for the rightful 
 amount, provided he does not convert the goods by refusing 
 a tender of the correct amount.^* 
 
 Topic VI. Enforcement of Lien. 
 § 276. Innkeeper's lien cannot be foreclosed by sale. 
 
 An innkeeper holding goods on hen cannot sell the goods 
 without legal process to reimburse himself, even though the 
 care and keeping of the goods necessitates expense. ^^ Nor can 
 he pledge the goods.®" 
 
 By the custom of London an innkeeper was entitled to sell 
 a horse held on hen as soon as the horse had eaten his value; 
 but this was a local custom, and never formed part of the law 
 of England." 
 
 § 277- Foreclosure in equity. 
 The proper method of enforcing the hen, in the absence of 
 
 57 This appears not to have been the subject of judicial decision in the case 
 of an innkeeper's Uen, but it is well settled in the case of similar liens. 
 1 Sedg. Dams. § 80. 
 
 58 Allen V. Smith, 12 C. B. N. S. 638, 31 L. J. C. P. 306, 9 Jur. N. S. 230, 
 6 L. T. 459, 10 W. R. 646; affirmed, 9 Jur. N. S. 1284, 11 W. R. 440 (Eng. 
 1862). 
 
 M Westbrook v. Griffith, F. Moore, 876 (Eng. 1608); MuUiner v. Florence, 
 3 Q. B. D. 484, 47 L. J. Q. B. 700, 38 L.T. 167, 26 W. R. 385 (Eng. 1876), 
 Case V. Fogg, 46 Mo. 44 (1870); Fox v. McGregor, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 41 (1851); 
 GUdea v. Earle, 2 City Ct. R. (N. Y.) 122 (1885). 
 
 60 People V. Husband, 36 Mich. 306 (1877). 
 
 81 Rosse V. Bramstead, 2 Roll. Rep. 438 (Eng. 1623); Warbrooke v. Grif- 
 fin, 2 Brownl. & Gold. 254 (Eng. 1609). "If one brings a horse to an inn, 
 leaves him there and goes his way, and the horse eats up more than his price, 
 by the custom of London the innkeeper may sell this horse to pay himself, 
 but not if the debt was for other horses, as if one do bring many horses into 
 an inn, and afterwards takes all of them away but one, the innkeeper cannot 
 sell this one horse for payment of that which was due to him for the other 
 horses, by the custom of London, notwithstanding the debt doth amount to 
 more than the price of this horse; but every horse is to be sold, by the cus- 
 tom, to satisfy the debt due for his own meat only." Mosse v. Townsend, 
 1 Bulst. 207 (Eng. 1612). 
 
 [195] 
 
§ 279.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXI. 
 
 statute, is by a bill in equity to foreclose the lien; and on such 
 a bill the court may order the sale of the goods.®^ If, however, 
 there is an adequate remedy provided by statute the bill in 
 equity will not lie.°* 
 
 § 278. Lien as a defence. 
 
 The hen may be set up at conmion law in defence; as, for 
 instance, where an action is brought by the owner for convert- 
 ing the goods by refusing to allow the owner to take them from 
 the inn.^* The lien may also be set up in an answer to a suit 
 in replevin brought by the owner to obtain possession of 
 his goods.^* 
 
 § 279. Statutory methods of enforcing the lien. 
 
 Statutory methods of enforcing the lien are provided in 
 some States.®* 
 
 62 Black V. Brennan, 5 Dana (Ky.), 310 (1837); Fox v. McGregor, 11 Barb. 
 (N. Y.) 41 (1851); Gildea v. Earle, 2 City Ct. Rep. (N. Y.) 122 (1885). 
 
 63 Goates v. Acheson, 23 Mo. App. 255 (1886). 
 
 64 Proctor V. Nicholson, 7 Car. & P. 67 (Eng. 1835). 
 
 65 Pollock V. Landis, 36 la. 651 (1873). 
 
 66 Connecticut. The statute permits sale to foreclose the lien in certain 
 cases; there being no requirement in the statute for notice to the owner of 
 the sale, such notice need not be given. Brooks v. Harrison, 41 Conn. 184 
 (1874). Missouri. A judgment for the debt is a prerequisite to enforcing 
 the lien. Goates v. Acheson, 23 Mo. App. 255 (1886). And though a ease 
 is not made out for enforcing the lien, judgment may be given for the amount 
 of debt proved. Hods v. Benecke, 11 Mo. App. 393 (1882). Though the 
 statutory method of enforcement, by sale, does not aptly apply to a lien on 
 wages, yet the enforcement must be according to the statute; the lien can- 
 not be enforced by garnishment. Hods v. Benecke, 11 Mo. App. 393 (1882). 
 
 [196] 
 
Chap. XXII.] Action AGAINST Innkbepeh. ' [§281. 
 
 TITLE y. 
 
 REMEDIES AGAINST INNKEEPER. 
 
 CHAPTER XXII. 
 
 ACTION AGAINST INNKEEPER. 
 
 281. Nature of action. 
 
 282. Form of action. 
 
 283. The declaration. 
 
 § 284. Survival of action. 
 285. Who may sue. 
 
 §281. Nature of action. 
 
 An action against an innkeeper for injury to a guest or his 
 goods is in its essence an action for breach of his undertaking 
 at the time he accepted the guest; an undertaking growing out 
 of his consent to receive the guest, but not properly a contract, 
 since the terms of the imdertaking are fixed by law, and not 
 by agreement of the parties. An action against an innkeeper 
 for refusal to perform his public duty is still more clearly for 
 breach of an undertaking imposed by law, and not growing 
 out of an agreement by the parties. 
 
 This kind of action was one well known in earlier times; it 
 was an action on the case upon the super se assumpsit. As 
 Lord Holt said in Coggs v. Bernard,^ explaining the difference 
 between such an action and one for the breach of an executory , 
 contract, " assumpsit does not only signify a future agreement, 
 but in such a case as this it signifies an actual entry upon the 
 thing, and taking the trust upon himself." Actions on the 
 case induced by an assumpsit included, therefore, both actions 
 for breach of a contract made on good consideration, and ac- 
 
 » 2 Ld. Raym. 909 (1703). 
 
 [197] 
 
§ 282.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXII. 
 
 tions for breach of a non- contractual undertaking upon per- 
 formance of which the defendant had entered.^ 
 
 When those actions in which the assuihpsit was of a present 
 trust were differentiated from those in which it was executory, 
 the former would properly have united with the old action of 
 detinue, founded on bailment, to make up the grand division 
 of undertakings, just as the latter did in fact unite with actions 
 of debt and covenant to form the grand division of actions 
 sounding in contract. But no separate division of acts based 
 on undertaking was ever formed. Bailments were, after a 
 struggle, included with contracts; and other undertakings, not 
 being of sufficient importance to form a separate division of 
 actions, either followed bailments, or with other actions on the 
 case sank back into the division of torts. In most cases this 
 fact is marked by the singular doctrine that a breach of an 
 undertaking like that of a carrier or innkeeper to a particular 
 person may be redressed by an action sounding in tort or by 
 one sounding in contract, at the plaintiff's option. This op- 
 tion, however, does not extend to the case where the person 
 who has undertaken a pubHc employment refuses to exercise 
 his employment for the benefit of a person having a right to 
 demand it. For such a breach of obhgation the remedy is in 
 tort only. 
 
 § 282. Form of action. 
 
 For refusal to receive a traveller as a guest, therefore, re- 
 dress against the innkeeper must be had by the injured party 
 in an action on the case sounding in tort.^ For injury to the 
 person or property, the action may be either assumpsit for 
 breach of the "implied contract,"* or, as is more usual, an ac- 
 
 2 Such an action is distinguished from a tort in Y. B. 43 Edw. 3, 33, pi. 38 
 (1368); from a contractual action in Y. B. 11 Hen. 4, 33, pi. 60 (1410); Y. B. 
 2 Hen. 4, 3, pi. 9 (1400). 
 
 3 Anonymous, Godbolt, 345, pi. 440 (1623); Rex v. Collins, Pahner, 373 
 (1623). 
 
 ■1 Clancy v. Barker, (Neb.), 98 N. W. 440 (1904); Morgan v. Ravey, 6 
 H. & N. (Eng.) 265 (1861). 
 
 [198] 
 
Chap. XXII.] Action against Innkeeper. [§ 284. 
 
 tion on the case.' Even for entu-e destruction or loss of the 
 goods, the innkeeper is not liable in trover, unless an actual 
 conversion is shown.® 
 
 § 283. The declaration. 
 
 The declaration against the innkeeper need not set out the 
 customary hability of innkeepers, since that is part of the law 
 of the land,'' but it must allege the defendant to be an inn- 
 keeper,* and must state the existence of the relation of host 
 and guest between the parties at the time of the injury.* 
 
 § 284. Survival of action. 
 
 An action against the innkeeper for personal injury will not 
 survive against the executors of the innkeeper, since the injury 
 is a merely personal one; '" while an action for injury to the 
 guest's property wiU survive both against the innkeeper and 
 in favor of the representative of the guest." In the case of 
 Saunders v. Plummer, just cited, Lord Chief Justice Bridgman 
 said: "This action here, in the principal case, is not merely in 
 nature of an action of trespass, founded upon a tort, though it 
 be called trespass upon the case. So neither is it grounded 
 merely upon a contract; for it is mixed with negligence and 
 special prejudice, by his not keeping the horse of his guest, 
 with which he was intrusted; and, therefore, it is more doubt- 
 ful whether the executor had any remedy at the common law; 
 because, though the action had something of crime or fault, 
 
 « Norcross v. Norcross, 53 Me. 163 (1865); Stanley v. Bircher, 78 Mo. 245 
 (1883); People v. Willett, 26 Barb. (N. Y.) 78 (1857). 
 « Hallenbake v. Fish, 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 547, 24 Am. Dec. 88 (1832). 
 
 7 Kisten v. HUdebrand, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 72 (1848). 
 
 8 Horslow's Case, Y. B. 22 Hen. 6, 21, pi. 38 (1444). "Being entertained 
 as a guest at defendant's inn" sufficiently alleges that defendant is an inn- 
 keeper. Norcross v. Norcross, 53 Me. 163 (1865). 
 
 9 Towson V. Havre de Grace Bank, 6 Har. &. J. (Md.) 47, 14 Am. Dec. 254 
 (1823). "Being a public innkeeper, received the horses as such" sufficiently 
 alleges the relation. Peet v. McGraw, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 653 (1841). 
 
 i» Stanley v. Bircher, 78 Mo. 245 (1883). 
 
 " Morgan v. Ravey, 6 H. & N. (Eng.) 265 (1861); Saunders v. Plummer, 
 0. Bridg. 223 (1662). 
 
 [ 199 ] 
 
§ 285.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXII. 
 
 the action is per defectum bonoe custodioe. ... In this case, 
 there is contractus, or quMsi contractus, between the guest and 
 the innkeeper. . . . The law forceth the guest to make 
 a recompense. If he pay not, he, may detain his horse, and 
 is not bound to his action; or if he will bring his action, he 
 may without any special contract have an action for his horse, 
 and all the meat, drink, lodging, and other accommodations 
 which he had at the inn. So that now the law makes the con- 
 tract; and his not safely delivering the horse, though it be 
 occasioned by his own negligence, yet is a breach of his con- 
 tract in law, which was to keep, preserve, and restore the 
 horse. If there had been an assumpsit in fact to deliver goods, 
 though they were after stolen, an action would lie by the 
 executor for breach of it by the common law; the same reason 
 here upon an assumpsit, or contract in law. And this is the 
 main reason that moves me in this case." 
 
 § 285. Who may sue. 
 
 An innkeeper may be sued as such for loss of goods only by 
 the guest. If one lends his property to another, and the bailee 
 comes with it to an inn and it is there lost, the guest alone 
 may enforce the innkeeper's pecuhar UabiUty.^^ If, however, 
 the guest is a member of the owner's family the owner may 
 sue; so a father may sue the innkeeper for the loss of his goods 
 taken to an inn by his minor son,^^ or a master for his goods 
 taken to an inn by his servant," or a partner for goods of the 
 firm taken to an inn by another partner. ^^ 
 
 12 Robinson v. Waller, 1 Rol. Abr. 3, pi. 6 (1617) ; Coykendall v. Eaton, 
 55 Barb. (N. Y.) 188, 37 How. Pr. 438 (1869); Chandler v. Haas, 12 York 
 Leg. Rec. (Pa.) 127 (1899). 
 
 "Dickinson v. Winchester, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 114 (1849); Epps v. Hinds; 
 27 Miss. 657, 61 Am. Dec. 528 (1854); CoykendaU v. Eaton, 55 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 188, 37 How. Pr. 438 (1869); Read v. Amidon, 41 Vt. 15 (1868). 
 
 " Robinson v. Waller, 1 Rol. Abr. 3, pi. 7 (1617); Beedle v. Morris, Cro. 
 Jac. 224, Yelv. 162 (1609); Candy v. Spencer, 3 F. & F. 306 (1862); Becker 
 V. Haynes, 29 Fed. 441 (1887); Berkshire Woolen Co. v. Proctor, 7 Cush. 
 (Mass.) 417 (1851). 
 
 15 Needles v. Howard, 1 E. D. Smith (N. Y.), 54 (1850). 
 
 [200] 
 
Chap. XXII.] Action against Innkeeper. [§ 285. 
 
 The reason for these decisions is that the legal possession of 
 the goods at the time of the injury is in the father or master, 
 and he is permitted to sue directly for an injury to his posses- 
 sion. The bailee has an independent possession, and the bailor 
 should therefore have no action based on the duty of innkeeper. 
 If the innkeeper committed an active tort, as, for instance, by 
 converting the goods to his own use, the bailor should of course 
 have an action, as any owner would have; but this is quite 
 independent of the action based on the habihty of the inn- 
 keeper. 
 
 This distinction appears to have been lost sight of by the 
 courts in a few cases. In Maryland, a bailee of money be- 
 came a guest at an inn, and the money was stolen. The owner 
 of the money was allowed to sue the innkeeper for the loss.'* 
 The innkeeper was chargeable, the court said, not on the ground 
 that the owner was a guest, but because the innkeeper received, 
 no matter from what hand, a compensation for the risk. 
 
 In an early case in Massachusetts the owner of a horse which 
 had been hired and taken to the inn by the guest was allowed 
 to sue for the loss of it. The guest was described in the dec- 
 laration and the opinion of the court as the plaintiff's servant, 
 but she was obviously a bailee." In a later case in Massachu- 
 setts (where, in fact, the guest was a servant) a dictum of the 
 court in Bedle v. Morris, as reported by Yelverton,'* is cited: 
 " Moreover it is not material whether he was his servant or not; 
 for if it was his friend by whom the party sent the money, and 
 he is robbed in the inn, the true owner shall have the action. " 
 This dictum is probably the source of the error; but though 
 it seems incorrect it does not justify the inference that an or- 
 dinary bailor can sue. 
 
 1" Towson V. Havre de Grace Bank, 6 Har. & J. (Md.) 47, 14 Am. Dec. 254 
 (1823). And see to the same effect Walker v. Sharpe, 31 Up. Can. Q. B. 
 340 (1871). 
 
 " Mason v. Thompson, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 280, 20 Am. Dec. 471 (1830). 
 
 w Yelv. 162; the dictum does not occur in the report of the same case. 
 Cro. Jac. 224 (Eng. 1609). 
 
 [201] 
 
§ 291.] 
 
 Innkeepers. 
 
 [Chap. XXIII. 
 
 TITLE YI. 
 
 OTHER PUBLIC HOUSES. 
 
 CHAPTER XXIII. 
 
 THE BOARDING HOUSE. 
 
 § 291. Difference between boarding 
 house and inn. 
 
 292. Responsibility of keeper for 
 
 goods of boarder. 
 
 293. Responsibility for negligence 
 
 of servant. 
 
 294. Kature of care required. 
 
 § 295. Care in the admission of per- 
 sons as boarders. 
 
 296. Contributory negligence of 
 
 the boarder. 
 
 297. Special undertaking of the 
 
 Boarding-house keeper. 
 
 298. boarding-house keeper's lien. 
 
 § 291. Difference between boarding house and inn. 
 
 The boarding house, as has aheady been seen/ is a house 
 for the entertainment of persons who make a more or less per- 
 manent residence in it. Its patrons are not, like those of an 
 inn, engaged on a journey; they have time to find out a sat- 
 isfactory house and make a fair bargain with the keeper of it 
 before engaging accommodations. The difference between 
 them, therefore, is that an inn is a house which midertakes to 
 serve the immediate necessities of a traveller while engaged 
 on a journey; a boarding house is a house provided for a per- 
 manent habitation for more or less settled residents of the 
 place.^ And therefore a hotel at a watering place which takes 
 only such guests as come to stay for a time for pleasure is a 
 
 1 Ante, f§ 14,32. 
 
 2 Parker v. Flint, 12 Mod. 254 (Eng. 1701); Pinkerton v. Woodward, 33 
 Cal. 557, 91 Am. Dec. 657 (1867); Beall v. Beck, Fed. Cas. No. 1161, 3 Cr. 
 C. C. 666 (D. C. 1829); Willard v. Reinhardt, 2 E. D. Smith (N. Y.), 148 
 (1853); Commonwealth v. Cuncannon, 3 Brewst. (Pa.) 344 (1869). 
 
 [202] 
 
Chap. XXIII.] The Boarding House. [§ 292. 
 
 boarding house, not an inn.^ There is no need for a special 
 and severe requirement of law to protect boarders, since there 
 is time for a boarder to protect himself in any arrangement he 
 may make for his board? 
 A boarding house, as well as an inn, may be called a " hotel. " ^ 
 Though not engaged in a pubUc emplo3mient, the keeper of 
 a boarding house is carrsdng on a business which may be so 
 conducted as to become a nuisance ; and it is therefore an oc- 
 cupation which concerns the police power. The business may 
 therefore constitutionally be regulated." 
 
 § 292. Responsibility of keeper for goods of boarder. 
 
 The responsibility of a boarding-house keeper for the goods 
 of his boarder is the same as that of the innkeeper for the 
 goods of the boarder; that is, being a case of so-called bailment 
 for mutual benefit, the relation imposes upon the boarding- 
 house keeper a duty to exercise ordinary care to protect the 
 goods intrusted to him against loss by theft or otherwise, and 
 subjects him to responsibihty for "ordinary negUgence," that 
 is, omission to exercise ordinary care.'' 
 
 But while the standard of care is the same, the question of 
 fact, namely, what constitutes due care, is to be determined 
 with reference to the acts undertaken by a boarding-house 
 keeper, which are in some respects different from the acts un- 
 dertaken by an innkeeper as to his boarders. Thus, for in- 
 stance, it is the innkeeper's duty to keep servants to guard 
 the rooms of the guests from theft, the outer door being open 
 to the pubUc; and for lack of a reasonable guard the innkeeper 
 
 s Bonner v. Welborn, 7 Ga. 296 (1849); Kisten v. Hildebrand, 9 B. Mon. 
 (Ky.) 72, 48 Am. Dec. 416 (1848); Southwood v. Myers, 3 Bush (Ky.), 681 
 (1868). 
 
 4 Manning v. Wells, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 746, 51 Am. Dec. 688 (1859). 
 
 6 Bonner v. Welborn, 7 Ga. 296 (1849); Carpenter v. Taylor, 1 Hilton 
 (N. Y.), 193 (1856). 
 
 6 White V. Holman, 44 Or. 180, 74 Pac. 933 (1904); ante, § 41. 
 
 ' Siegman v. Keeler,'4 N. Y. Misc. 528, 24 N. Y. Supp. 821 (1893); Smith 
 V. Read, 54 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 14, 6 Daly, 33 (1875). 
 
 [203] 
 
§ 293.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXIII. 
 
 would doubtless be held negligent, even toward a boarder.* 
 But the boarding house is not open to the world; strangers 
 are not freely permitted to enter its outside door, and the 
 boarding-house keeper is therefore not to be held negUgent if 
 the boarder's goods are stolen from his room, even though it 
 is done by thieves from outside. If, however, the boarding- 
 house keeper or his servant knowingly permits a stranger to 
 enter a boarder's room, the act is neghgent and the house- 
 keeper is liable if the stranger steals goods from the room.^ 
 
 § 293. Responsibility for negligence of servant- 
 
 In an English case the responsibility of the boarding-house 
 keeper was much discussed. The goods of a boarder^ who was 
 about to leave the house, were in the hall when they were 
 stolen by a thief who entered through the outside door, negli- 
 gently left open by a servant of the housekeeper. The judge 
 charged that if the housekeeper was not personally neghgent 
 the boarder could not recover. On a rule for a new trial the 
 court of Queen's Bench was equally divided.'" There can be 
 no doubt that the charge was erroneous. Erie, J., supported 
 it on the ground that " there is no delivery of the goods of the 
 plaintiff to the defendant; there is no contract by the defend- 
 ant to keep them with care and dehver them again; there is 
 no reward in respect of goods, the terms being the same for a 
 boarder whether with or without goods; there is no duty of 
 keeping owing from defendant to plaintiff, and consequently 
 no measure by which to try whether any given act, such as 
 leaving a door open, is actionable neghgence contrary to that 
 duty. The goods of the plaintiff in this case remained in her 
 possession and under her control, and were disposed of by her 
 as she chose, without notif3dng what she had done to the de- 
 fendant. The bailee for reward has possession, and can apply 
 
 8 This seems to have been assumed in Dansey v. Richardson, 3 E. & B. 
 143 (Eng. 1854), and in Siegman v. Keeler, 4 N. Y. Misc. 628, 24 N. Y. Supp. 
 821 (1893). 
 
 8 Smith V. Read, 54 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 14, 6 Daly, 33 (1875). 
 
 10 Dansey v. Richardson, 3 E..& B. 143 (Eng. 1854). 
 [204] 
 
Chap. XXIII.] The Boarding House. [§ 293. 
 
 care to guard, and undertakes to do so; the defendant had no 
 possession and could apply no care to goods which she knew ■ 
 not of." "The defendant's duty was performed, if she took 
 such care of the house and things in it as a prudent owner 
 would take. . . . The door might be left open in the man- 
 ner alleged by a servant without any want of any degree of 
 care on the mistress's part, seeing that the owner of a house 
 cannot always be at the front door; and when he is absent the 
 fact may occur notwithstanding every precaution on his part 
 to prevent it. " 
 
 These arguments were fully answered by Coleridge, J.: 
 "Whether I am staying at an inn or a boarding house, there 
 is ordinarily neither more nor less of an express bailment of 
 my goods to the master of the house; in both cases the custody 
 of the goods, such as it is, is incident to myself being there as 
 guest; and this is in consideration of a valuable reward. . . . 
 There may be no express or independent bailment . . . 
 and yet there may be a liability where they sustain damage 
 or are lost by the misconduct or negligence of the boarding- 
 house keeper;" and by Lord Campbell, C. J.: "There is a duty 
 on his part, analogous to that incumbent on every prudent 
 householder to keep the outer door of the house shut at times 
 when there is danger that thieves may enter and steal the 
 goods of the guests. If he employs servants to perform this 
 duty, while they are performing it they are acting within the 
 scope of their employment, and he is answerable for their neg- 
 ligence. . . . Wherever a loss of the thing bailed arises 
 from a want of the degree of care which from the nature of the 
 bailment ought to be exercised, I think it immaterial whether 
 the negligence be imputable personally to the bailee, or to 
 servants employed by him. . . . The only duty in this 
 case arose out of the relation of boarding-house keepe^ and 
 guest; but I think there might have been a breach of that duty 
 under the circumstances alleged and proved, without proof of 
 personal misconduct on the part of the defendant." 
 
 The correctness of the last opinion is clear, and the boarding- 
 
 [205] 
 
§ 295.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXIII. 
 
 house keeper, like every other master, is responsible for the 
 negUgence of his servant in the coiirse of his emplojmient.^^ 
 
 § 294, Nature of care required. 
 
 The analysis by Coleridge, J., of the obhgation of the keeper 
 of a boarding house is valuable. 
 
 " If the defendant here had neglected to give the plaintiff a 
 dry bed, or wholesome food, and the plaintiff had become sick 
 in consequence, if the defendant had by negligence lost the 
 boots or shoes, or any articles of the plaintiff's dress which in 
 the course of attendance on her she had taken to clean it can- 
 not be doubted that she would have been liable to make rec- 
 ompense in damages. . . . 
 
 "When indeed we speak of taking the same care of the 
 guest's goods as a prudent owner would take care of his own, 
 we do not speak of a habit or character generally, but we apply 
 it to the particular instance upon which the question arises in 
 judgment. Occasional carelessness of conduct is consistent 
 with general carefulness of character, though it is not com- 
 monly found with it. A man, therefore, may be a prudent 
 owner, and yet not in every instance take good care of his own 
 property. " 
 
 § 295. Care in the admission of persons as boarders. 
 
 In Siegman v. Keeler " a boarder sued the keeper of the 
 boarding house to recover the value of goods stolen from his 
 room. He alleged negUgence in three particulars: that the 
 street door was in an insecure condition; that the housekeeper 
 did not keep the boarder's room locked during his absence; and 
 that she did not at once eject a boarder who on one or two 
 occasions had come home late at night and left the street door 
 ajar. As to the first ground, it was found untrue in fact; it 
 seemed to be conceded that ' it would have been negligence 
 knowingly to leave the street door insecurely fastened. As to 
 
 11 Smith V. Read, 54 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 14, 6 Daly, 33 (1875). 
 
 12 4 N. Y. Misc. 528, 24 N. Y. Supp. 821 (1893). 
 
 [206] 
 
Chap. XXIII.] The Boakding House. [§ 295. 
 
 the second ground, the court said that "in the absence of proof 
 to the contrary, we must assume that defendant exercised at 
 least ordinary care in the admission of persons as patrons of 
 her house or otherwise, refusing admission to such as were 
 known to be of ill repute, vicious inclinations or habits, by 
 which the persons or goods of others were endangered. Hav- 
 ing done so, she was not to be considered as an insurer against 
 acts of imprudence or dishonesty on the part of persons ad- 
 mitted, and it most certainly would have been an exhibition 
 of extraordinary viligance if, under such circimistances, de- 
 fendant had kept every room, nook, and cranny of her house 
 securely locked and bolted against possible marauders from 
 within. " The correctness of this view must be conceded. The 
 boarding-house keeper is under a duty to admit no dangerous 
 person knowingly as a guest, and to exercise some reasonable 
 scrutiny as to the character of the inmates. That done, he is 
 not responsible, without actual negUgence, for a theft by one 
 boarder from another. 
 
 As to the third point, the court said : 
 
 "Lastly, we are unable to persuade ourselves that with like 
 care in the choice of her patrons it was even sUght negligence 
 on the part of defendant that she did not rid her house of 
 a patron who had once, or even twice, relaxed the exercise of 
 ordinary caution to securely close the front door after his in- 
 gress late at night. It would involve the severest strain to 
 construe this circumstance into omission by defendant to use 
 ordinary care to protect her patrons' effects. Occasional omis- 
 sions of precaution of merely prudential suggestion, however 
 induced, are not of infrequent occurrence. We do not believe 
 ourselves at faidt if we assume that they have happened to 
 most, if not to all, persons, and that they will happen again and 
 again, and because of that fact the frailty of human foresight 
 in that respect may be said to fairly enter into the considera- 
 tion of our daily affairs, and so that plaintiff and his brother 
 may be deemed to have entered defendant's house subject to 
 the risk of such occurrences. If it was negligence for defend- 
 
 [207] 
 
§ 295.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXIII. 
 
 ant to continue to harbor an offender upon discovery of his 
 transgressions, it would have been equally so for another to 
 have afforded him shelter with knowledge of his fault; and the 
 logical sequence of respondent's contention would be that the 
 occasional lapses of defendant's convivial boarder should have 
 been visited with punishment so severe that he would be from 
 henceforth and forever compelled to be ' a wanderer on the face 
 of the earth. ' Of course, a vastly different aspect of the matter 
 would have been presented had it appeared in evidence that 
 defendant continued to harbor a patron who was habitually 
 remiss in his attention to matters of common prudence, and 
 whose conduct thus tended to expose the persons and goods 
 of other patrons to needless risk." 
 
 The boarding-house keeper, the court also said, must exer- 
 cise a reasonable degree of care for the safety of his guests and 
 their goods. " If it be shown that the goods have been lost, 
 destroyed or stolen, he is not answerable for their value, unless 
 it further appears that with due care on the part of the bailee 
 the loss, destruction, or theft would have been averted. ^^ The 
 burden of proof in such a case is, as in other instances of im- 
 puted negUgence, upon him who asserts the want of due care, 
 the presumption always being that a person has performed a 
 duty required of him. . . . Ordinary care is that degree 
 of care which constitutes the average of common prudence, 
 and would have been employed by most persons under the 
 same circumstances," and in the case of a boarding-house 
 keeper may properly include the exercise of a reasonable degree 
 of discrimination in the admission and maintenance of persons 
 as patrons of his estabUshment. A boarding-house keeper, 
 furthermore, is, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, 
 in contemplation of law, a custodian of his patron's goods.^^ 
 The former thus becomes a bailee of the latter's goods. The 
 
 13 Citing Claflin v. Meyer, 75 N. Y. 260; Leoncini v. Post, 13 N. Y. Supp. 
 825. 
 
 " Citing Ernst v. R. R., 35 N. Y. 9, 26. 
 
 15 Citing Ingallsbee v. Wood, 36 Barb. 452. 
 
 [208] 
 
Chap. XXIII.] The Boarding House. [§ 297. 
 
 relation of the parties creates a baihnent for mutual benefit, 
 which imposes upon the bailee a duty to exercise ordinary care 
 to protect the goods intrusted to him against loss by theft or 
 otherwise, and subjects him to responsibiUty for ordinary neg- 
 Ugence; that is to say, for the omission to exercise ordinary 
 care. " ' 
 
 § 296. Contributory negligence of the boarder. 
 
 As in the case of an inn, so in the case of a boarding house, 
 the contributory negUgence of the boarder may bar his ac- 
 tion against the housekeeper for loss of goods. Thus, in a case 
 where goods were stolen from the boarder's room he was held 
 barred from recovery on account of his contributory negli- 
 gence in leaving his door unlocked; ** and though this might 
 be questionable in the case of an inn," it seems imdoubtedly 
 correct in the case of an ordinary boarding house. In an inn 
 there are usually servants employed to guard the corridors 
 and keep out suspicious intruders; but in an ordinary boarding 
 house no such watchfulness can be expected of the keeper, and 
 it is therefore incumbent upon the boarder to exercise care over 
 his goods by locking his door. 
 
 § 297- Special nudertaking of the boarding-house keeper. 
 
 Of course the common-law UabiUty of the boarding-house 
 keeper may be modified or the extent of care required of him 
 be enlarged by an express agreement or by the special cir- 
 cumstances of the case. This was well brought out by the 
 case of Scarbrough v. Cosgrove." The plaintiff was a boarder 
 in the defendant's house. He informed the defendant that 
 he had property which he wished to keep under lock and key, 
 and asked for a key of the bedroom door. He was told that 
 a second key could not be suppHed, that he must remove the 
 key and leave it with the defendant as it was required for the 
 
 10 Buddenburg v. Benner, 1 Hilton (N. Y.), 84 (1856). 
 
 "Ante, §224. 
 
 18 [1905] 2 K. B. 805. 
 
 14 [ 209 ] 
 
§ 298.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXIII. 
 
 purpose of giving the servants access to the room, and that 
 the room would be quite safe as the people in the house were 
 aU known. Valuable goods were stolen from the plaintiff's 
 room by another boarder, who had been admitted to the house 
 without references or inquiry about him, and who turned out 
 to be a professional thief. It was held by the Court of Ap- 
 peal that imder the special circumstances there was evidence 
 from which a Jury might find such lack of reasonable care as 
 would make the defendant liable for the loss. The Lord 
 Justice Romer said: "Seeing that the landlord carries on his 
 business of a boarding-house keeper for a reward, I think he 
 is bound to carry on that business with reasonable care, having 
 regard to the nature and normal conduct of the business as 
 known to the guest, or as represented to the guest by him; 
 and if by reason of a breach of that duty on his part the lug- 
 gage is lost I can see no reason why he should not be held 
 liable for the loss to the guest." Stress was laid on the fact 
 that an improper person had been admitted to the house, 
 contrary to the defendant's representations. "One of the 
 considerations which has pressed on me is that, on the evidence 
 as it stands, tinanswered at present by the defendant, the 
 business appears to have been represented by the defendant 
 to the plaintiffs as one where the guests staying in the house 
 were known to the defendant, and where, consequently, there 
 was comparatively Httle risk in the system adopted by the 
 defendant in the management of the business as to only one 
 key being kept both for the purposes of the guest and the 
 purposes of the defendant's servants: whereas it now appears 
 from the evidence, as it at present stands, that the defendant 
 admitted the guest who stole the plaintiff's chattels without 
 any knowledge of him, and without any references or intro- 
 duction, or inquiry as to his respectabiUty." 
 
 § 298. Boarding-liouse keeper's lien. 
 
 A boarding-house keeper is often given by statute a lien on 
 his guest's goods for board. This statute does not apply to a 
 [210] 
 
Chap. XXIII.] The Boarding House. [§ 298. 
 
 mere private housekeeper who incidentally receives a person 
 to board, but only to one who makes a business of keeping a 
 boarding house; " but to such person it gives the same hen 
 upon the effects of his boarder for his charges which an inn- 
 keeper has at common law upon the goods of his guest for the 
 price of his board and lodging.^" The lien covers only charges 
 for board and lodging actually furnished to the boarder; it does 
 not cover a charge for keeping a horse,^^ nor does it secure 
 damages due for breach of a contract to remain as a boarder.^^ 
 It exists upon the goods of a transient as well as of a perma- 
 nent boarder.^^ 
 
 The statutory lien extends only to goods of the boarder, and 
 not to goods of a third person brought to the house by the 
 boarder.^^ This is true even if the owner of the goods is re- 
 sponsible for the board bill. Thus, where a man drove his wife 
 and child from home by his cruelty and neglect, and they went 
 to a boarding house imder such circimistances that he was Uable 
 for their board, taking with them certain furniture and wearing 
 apparel belonging to the man, it was held that the boarding- 
 house keeper had no lien on the goods.^' 
 
 On the other hand, there is no lien on the goods of the boarder 
 where the credit for the board bill is actually extended to an- 
 other. Thus, where a husband engaged board for his wife and 
 became responsible for the board bill, no Hen could be enforced 
 against the wife's goods.^* 
 
 The lien attaches to the goods when the charge is incurred, 
 
 loCady V. McElweU, 1 Lans. (N. Y.) 484 (1869). 
 
 20 Nichols V. HaUiday, 27 Wis. 406 (1871). 
 
 21 Cross V. Wilkins, 43 N. H. 332 (1861). 
 
 22 Shafer v. Guest, 6 Rob. (N. Y.) 264, 35 How. Pr. 184 (1868). 
 
 23 Stewart v. McCready, 24 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 62 (1861). 
 
 21 Mills V. Shirley, 110 Mass. 158 (1872); Misch v. O'Hara, 9 Daly (N. Y.), 
 361 (1880); Barnett v. Walker, 39 N. Y. Misc. 323, 79 N. Y. Supp. 859 
 (1902) . (See under earlier statute, however, Jones v. Morrill, 52 Barb. (N. Y. 
 1864), 623; Newcombe v. Anderson, 11 Ont. 665 (1886); ante, § 265. 
 
 25 Mills V. Shirley, 110 Mass. 158 (1872). 
 
 28 McUvane v. HUton, 7 Hun (N. Y.), 594 (1876); ante, § 264. 
 
 [211] 
 
§ 298.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXIII. 
 
 though the time for pasnuent has not yet arrived," and con- 
 tinues to bind the goods wherever they are carried, even though 
 they be taken into another State.^* 
 
 2' Smith V. Colcord, 115 Mass. 70 (1874). 
 
 28 Jaquith y. American Express Co., 60 N. H. 61 (1880). 
 
 [212] 
 
Chap. XXIV.] 
 
 The Restaurant, 
 
 [§ 302. 
 
 CHAPTEE XXIV. 
 
 THE RESTAURANT. 
 
 301. Difference between restaurant 
 
 and inn. 
 
 302. Duty of keeper of restaurant 
 
 to customer personally. 
 
 303. Responsibility for the goods 
 
 of customer. 
 
 § 304. Responsibility on a bailment. 
 
 305. Responsibility on an implied 
 
 bailment. 
 
 306. Responsibility for defect of 
 
 watchfulness. 
 
 § 301. Difference between restaurant and inn. 
 
 The restaurant is a house for the entertainment of anyone, 
 whether resident or traveller; and the entertainment furnished 
 is food and drink, without lodging. It differs in this respect 
 from inn and boarding house, which furnish lodging as well as 
 food.^ An innkeeper may carry on, under the same roof, a 
 restaurant, to which he invites all persons to come for food and 
 drink only.^ 
 
 § 302- Duty of keeper of restaurant to customer personally. 
 
 The restaurant keeper is not an insurer of the quality of the 
 food he furnishes, but he is liable for knowingly or negligently 
 furnishing bad and deleterious food.' He is also responsible 
 for the conduct of his servants towards his customers. He is 
 liable if a waiter negligently spills a glass of water on a cus- 
 tomer's dress.* 
 
 1 Sheffer v. Willoughby, 163 HI. 518, 45 N. E. 253, 34 L. R. A. 464 (1896); 
 Block V. Sherry, 43 N. Y. Misc. 342, 87 N. Y. Supp. 160 (1904); Carpenter 
 V. Taylor, 1 Hilton (N. Y.), 193 (1856) ; Dunn v. Bean, Quebec Rep. 11 Super. 
 Ct. 538 (1897). 
 
 2 Regina v. Rymer, 2 Q. B. D. 136, 46 L. J. M. C. 108 (1877). 
 
 3 Sheffer v. Willoughby, 163 111. 518, 45 N. E. 253, 34 L. R. A. 464 (1896). 
 * Block V. Sherry, 43 N. Y. Misc. 342, 87 N. Y. Supp. 160 (1904). 
 
 [213] 
 
§ 304.] Innkeepeks. [Chap. XXIV. 
 
 The keeper must also take care to secure the safety of his 
 customer against defects of the building itself. Thus, where a 
 person taking a meal in the defendant's restaurant, situated 
 on the "Iron Pier" at Rockaway Beach, was injured by the 
 collapse of the pier, she was held entitled to compensation. 
 "The plaintiff was upon this platform for the purpose of eating 
 a meal. She was there because the defendant impliedly stated 
 to her that the place was safe for that purpose and it was the 
 duty of the defendant to have the premises in a reasonably 
 safe condition. The platform fell, the plaintiff was injured, 
 and, the defendant having failed to show a condition of facts 
 estabhshing a reasonable degree of care to make the premises 
 what he had held them out to be, he was properly chargeable 
 with liability for the injuries sustained."^ 
 
 § 303' Responsibility for the goods of customer- 
 
 The responsibility of the restaurant keeper for the goods of 
 the customer brought by him into the restaurant has been 
 much discussed. It is certain that at common law he does 
 not have under any circumstances the extraordinary UabiUty 
 of an innkeeper; ® though in the Province of Quebec, where 
 the innkeeper is responsible only for due care, and is hable only 
 for a loss caused by his negligence, the restaurant keeper is 
 said to be under the same responsibihty as an innkeeper.^ 
 
 The habiUty of the restaurant keeper may be rested upon 
 either one of the three following grounds: 
 
 § 304. Responsibility on a bailment- 
 
 By the custom of the restaurant, the guest's coat and hat 
 may be taken by a servant at the entrance to the restaurant. 
 In that case there is an. express bailment to the restaurant 
 keeper, and the bailment is for hire, or, as it is sometimes put, 
 for the mutual benefit of bailor and bailee. For though there 
 
 6 Schnitzer v. Phillips, 95 N. Y. Supp. 478 (1905), per "Woodward, J. 
 6 Simpson v. Rourke, 13 N. Y. Misc. 230, 34 N. Y. Supp. 11 (1895). 
 ^ Dunn v. Bean, Quebec R. US. C. 538 (1897). 
 [214] 
 
Chap. XXIV.] The Restaurant. [§ 305. 
 
 is nothing specially paid to the restaurant keeper for taking 
 charge of the goods, still it is done as a business matter: "for 
 such a system might obAdously add to the popularity of the 
 establishment, and would probably be adopted with that very 
 object in view."* The restaurant keeper in such a case is 
 therefore Uable for any loss caused by his neglect of reasonable 
 care.* 
 
 The same principle is involved where the waiter takes the 
 guest's coat and hat and hangs them on a hook when the guest 
 sits at the table; then, too, there is held to be a bailment for 
 mutual benefit, so that the restam-ant keeper is Uable for a loss 
 which happens by reason of his negligence.^" 
 
 § 305. Responsibility on an implied bailment. 
 
 In the second place, an "imphed bailment" may be estab- 
 lished by less direct proof of delivery to the servant of the res- 
 taurant keeper; as, for instance, by evidence that an overcoat 
 was necessarily laid aside tinder circumstances showing at least 
 notice of the fact and of such necessity to the restaurant keeper 
 or his servants." 
 
 If there is a bailment the restaurant keeper is responsible 
 for a loss caused by his negligence, even though the words " not 
 responsible for hats and coats" were printed on the bill of fare, 
 and the waiters were forbidden to take hats and coats. The 
 customer could be affected by a rule of this sort only if it was 
 properly published so as to be called to his attention.!^ 
 
 8 Charles, J., in Ultzen v. Nicol, (1894) 1 Q. B. 92, 63 L. J. Q. B. 289, 10 
 Rep. 13, 70 L. T. 140, 40 W. R. 58, 58 J. P. 103 (Eng.). 
 
 9 La Salle Restaurant & Oyster House v. McMasters, 85 111. App. 677 
 (1899); Buttman v. Dennett, 9 N. Y. Misc. 462, 30 N. Y. Supp. 247 
 (1894). 
 
 10 Ultzen V. Nicol, (1894) 1 Q. B. 92, 63 L. J. Q. B. 289, 10 Rep. 13, 70 L. 
 T. 140, 42 W. R. 58, 58 J. P. 103 (Eng.); Appleton v. Welch, 20 N. Y. Misc. 
 343, 45 N. Y. Supp. 751 (1897). 
 
 11 Montgomery v. Ladjing, 30 N. Y. Misc. 92, 61 N. Y. Supp. 840 
 (1899). 
 
 12 La Salle Restaurant & Oyster House v. McMasters, 85 HI. App. 677 
 (1899). 
 
 [215] 
 
§ 306.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXIV. 
 
 §306. Responsibility for defect of watchfulness. 
 
 Finally, the restaurant keeper, though not a bailee in any 
 sense, may be held responsible for loss of the goods of his guest 
 if the loss happened by reason of the insufficiency of the gen- 
 eral supervision exercised by the keeper of the restaurant for 
 the protection of his customer's goods; and the burden of prov- 
 ing neglect of duty is on the plaintiff." The kind and amount 
 of supervision reqtiired of the restaurant keeper, and the ques- 
 tion of his neglect of due care, depend of course upon the 
 special circimistances of each case. "It is well known that 
 there are all kinds of restaurants. In some of them good taste 
 and etiquette require that a customer should take his hat and 
 overcoat off while taking a meal, while in others, especially the 
 so-called 'quick lunch' establishments, customers frequently 
 remove neither hat nor overcoat. " " And where sufficient 
 general supervision is exercised by the restaurant keeper, he 
 is not liable when the guest himself hangs his overcoat on a 
 hook, without calling the waiter's attention to it, and it is 
 stolen from the hook.^^ 
 
 13 Montgomery v. Ladjing, 30 N. Y. Misc. 92, 61 N. Y. Supp. 840 (1899); 
 Harris v. Childs' Unique Dairy Co., 84 N. Y. Supp. 260 (1903); Simpson v. 
 Rourke, 13 N. Y. Misc. 230, 34 N. Y. Supp. 11 (1895). 
 
 14 Freedman, P. J., in Montgomery v. Ladjing, supra. 
 
 15 Simpson v. Rourke, 13 N. Y. Misc. 230, 34 N. Y. Supp. 11 (1895); 
 Montgomery v. Ladjing, 30 N. Y. Misc. 92, 61 N. Y. Supp. 840 (1899); 
 Harris v. Childs' Unique Dairy Co., 84 N. Y. Supp. 260 (1903). In both the 
 last two cases the guest had notice that articles might be deposited with 
 the cashier; but the cases seem to have turned on the absence of a bailment. 
 
 [216] 
 
Chap. XXV. 
 
 The Theatre. 
 
 [[§ 312.- 
 
 CHAPTER XXV. 
 
 THE THEATRE. 
 
 Topic I. The nature of a 
 theatre. 
 
 Definition of a theatre. 
 
 An opera house is a theatre. 
 
 Topic II. Admission to the 
 theatre. 
 313. The manager may fix prices 
 as he pleases. 
 
 The manager may admit 
 whom he pleases. 
 
 Ticket for entrance to a the- 
 atre is a mere license. 
 
 Ticket is also a contract not 
 to revoke license. 
 
 How far a ticket is transfer- 
 able. 
 318. Accommodations secured by 
 the ticket. 
 
 Topic III. Rights of specta- 
 tors. 
 
 § 311 
 312 
 
 314. 
 
 315. 
 
 316. 
 
 317. 
 
 § 319. The right of spectators to crit- 
 icise the entertainment. 
 
 320. The right of spectators to ap- 
 
 plaud or hiss. 
 Topic IT. Responsibility of 
 the manager. 
 
 321. Responsibility of the manager 
 
 for the personal safety of 
 the spectator. 
 
 322. Responsibility of the manager 
 
 for the safety of the prem- 
 ises. 
 
 323. Contributory negligence of 
 
 the injured party. 
 
 324. Responsibility of the manager 
 
 for the goods of the specta- 
 tor. 
 Topic T. Licenses. 
 
 325. The requirement of a license. 
 
 Topic I. The Nature of a Theatre. 
 
 § 311. Definition of a theatre. 
 
 A theatre is a house in which a story is represented by human 
 action upon a stage.^ Though the stage is usually supplied 
 with appropriate scenery and with machinery for producing 
 certain spectacular effects, this is not essential; for both in 
 early times and to-day dramas are performed without scenery. 
 It is not necessary that the words spoken on the stage be com- 
 
 1 Jacko V. State, 22 Ala. 73 (1853); Bell v. Mahn, 121 Pa. 225, 15 Atl. 523, 
 6 Am. St. Rep. 786, 1 L. R. A. 364 (1888). 
 
 [217] 
 
§ 312.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXV. 
 
 mitted to memory, the dialogue may be impromptu.^ Nor is 
 it even necessary that there shall be dialogue; a pantomime, or 
 a ballet which represents a consecutive story,^ or a comic song 
 sung in character, with costumes and action,* constitutes a 
 theatrical entertainment, but not mere dancing in costume on 
 the stage ^ or a mere exhibition on the stage of natural or arti- 
 ficial curiosities.^ 
 
 In an English case it appeared that a room contained a stEtge, 
 footUghts, scenery, etc.; that only two living characters ap- 
 peared on the stage, one of whom took no important part in the 
 performance, and that a drama was carried on, but the action, 
 speaking and dancing of all the characters except those men- 
 tioned took place in a room below the stage, and were so re- 
 flected upon the stage by mirrors, etc., as to seem to the spec- 
 tators to be taking place there. On the ground that two actors 
 were actually performing their parts on the stage, this was held 
 to be a "stage play, " in the language of the act; but the court 
 was uncertain whether the performance of the actors in the 
 room below could be described by that term.'' This doubt was 
 probably caused by the peculiar term used in the act; a house 
 for such a performance would be a theatre. 
 
 §312. An opera house is a theatre. 
 
 An early case, not much considered, held that an opera house 
 was not a theatre ; the distinction being drawn between a drama, 
 which is spoken or recited, and an opera, which is sung.* But 
 this case was afterwards overruled, and an opera held to be a 
 theatrical exhibition.® In the course of his opinion Judge Clark 
 
 2 Society for the RefonnatioB, etc., v. Diers, 10 Abb. Pr. N. S. (N. Y.) 216 
 (1871). 
 
 sWigan v. Strange, L. R. 1 C. P. 175 (1865). 
 
 i Gartenstein's License, 15 Pa. Co. Ct. 612, 4 Pa. Dist. Rep. 37 (1894). 
 
 6 Wigan V. Strange, L. R. 1 C. P. 175 (1865). 
 
 6 New Orleans v. North, 12 La. Ann. 205 (1857). 
 
 1 Day V. Simpson, 18 C. B. N. S. 680 (1865). 
 
 8 Rowland v. Kleber, 1 Pittsb. (Pa.) 68 (1853). 
 
 » Bell V. Mahn, 121 Pa. 225, 15 Atl. 523, 6 Am. St. Rep. 786, 1 L. R. A. 
 364 (1888). 
 
 [218] 
 
Chap. XXV.] The Theatre. [§ 312. 
 
 said: "A drama is a story represented by action. The repre- 
 sentation is as if the real persons were introduced and em- 
 ployed in the action itself. It is ordinarily designed to be 
 spoken, but it may be represented in pantomime, when the 
 actors use gesticulation, sometimes in the form of the ballet, 
 but do not speak; or in opera, where music takes the place of 
 poetry and of ordinary speech, and the dramatic treatment is 
 essentially different from either. An 'opera' is defined: 'A 
 musical drama, consisting of airs, choruses, recitations, etc., 
 enriched with magnificent scenery, machinery, and other dec- 
 orations, and representing some passionate action. ' (Webster.) 
 The spoken drama, therefore, and the opera, agree in the 
 method or manner which is essential to the dramatic art, viz: 
 imitation in the way of action. In the former, it is true, the 
 actor observes the rules of rhetoric and of oratory, and foUows 
 the special laws of dramatic delivery; while in the latter he 
 employs the power of music, both vocal and instrumental, as 
 a medium of artistic and passionate expression, — music, how- 
 ever, which is not arranged with reference mainly to its melodic 
 interest, but in such form as to express, not only the words, but 
 the thoughts, emotions and passions of the mind, such as 
 joy, grief, hope, despair, etc., which the idea or conception of 
 the play may involve. The word setting, the orchestrazation, 
 the musical intervals, and the composition generally, are all 
 arranged to serve the exigency of the passing sentiment, and 
 to turn the subject of the story into the action of the play. In 
 short, the opera is composed with special reference to the de- 
 clamatory power of music. . . . 
 
 "The opera is essentially and in every point of view a dra- 
 matic composition, and its representation a dramatic exhibi- 
 tion. It is a matter of common knowledge that some of the 
 most famous dramatic characters of modern times have devel- 
 oped their exquisite powers upon the operatic stage. It may, 
 of course, be conceded that music is in some sense an essential 
 element in the opera. In this respect it is distinguished from 
 the spoken drama, but the fimdamental and really essential 
 
 [219] 
 
§ 314.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXV. 
 
 element of both is action. The opera house and the theatre 
 alike comprehend the stage, proscenium boxes, orchestra, pit 
 or parquet, and the galleries. The scenic representation is of 
 the same general character, and the stage machinery and dec- 
 orations of the same order. The ordinary theatre is adapted 
 to the performance of the opera, and it is well known that this 
 form of exhibition, especially of the light opera and the opera 
 comique, rendered 'partly in song and partly in dialogue,' 
 forms in these days a prominent feature of theatre work." 
 
 Topic II. Admission to the Theatre. 
 
 § 313- The manager may fix prices as he pleases. 
 
 The manager of a theatre is not engaged in a public employ- 
 ment, and he may therefore conduct his business as he pleases; 
 and he may therefore fix prices without regard to the question 
 whether they are reasonable. In a case where it was attempted 
 to justify a tumult in a theatre on the ground that the spec- 
 tators were justly incensed by a raising of the prices. Sir James 
 Mansfield said: "Theatres are not absolute necessaries of life, 
 and any person may stay away who does not approve of the 
 manner in which they are managed. If the prices of admission 
 are unreasonable, the evil will cure itself. People will not go, 
 and the proprietors will be ruined imless they lower their de- 
 mands. But the proprietors of a theatre have a right to man- 
 age their property in their own way, and to fix what prices of 
 admission they think most for their own advantage. " ^° The 
 theatre, as was well said in a New York case, "is in no sense a 
 public enterprise, and is consequently not governed by the 
 same rules which relate to common carriers or other public in- 
 stitutions of a like character." ^^ 
 
 §314. The manager may admit whom he pleases. 
 
 The manager of a theatre may admit or exclude from his 
 theatre anyone he pleases; no one has a right to demand ad- 
 
 10 Clifford V. Brandon, 2 Camp. (Eng.) 358, 368 (1809). 
 
 11 MoneU, J., in Purcell v. Daly, 19 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 301. 303 (1886). 
 
 [220] 
 
Chap. XXV.] The Theatee. [§ 316. 
 
 mittance. " Should anyone apply at the box office of a theatre 
 and desire to purchase tickets of admission and be refused, 
 there can be no question that he would have no cause of action 
 against the proprietor of the theatre for such refusal. " ^^ Even 
 the public advertisement of a sale of tickets for a performance 
 is not an offer, which is accepted by the purchaser tendering 
 his money at the box office. The offer for a contract is made 
 by the person desiring to buy a ticket when he tenders his 
 money, and the ticket seller may legally refuse to sell him a 
 ticket." 
 
 § 315- Ticket for entrance to a theatre a mere license. 
 
 A ticket for entrance to a theatre is a mere license, not an 
 interest in land;'* and not being coupled with an interest it 
 may be revoked at any time, either before or after entrance to 
 the theatre.*^ If after such revocation the purchaser persists 
 in staying in the theatre, or in attempting to enter it, he may 
 be excluded by the use of such force as is necessary for the 
 purpose.'" And being a mere license, a ticket does not bind 
 an assignee or lessee of the person issuing it." 
 
 §316. Ticket is also a contract not to revoke license. 
 
 But though a ticket is a mere hcense, so far as any right to 
 enter the building is concerned, it is also a contract with the 
 holder of it to permit him to enter and see the play. A revo- 
 
 "MoneU, J., in PurceU v. Daly, 19 Abb. N. C. 301, 303 (1886). 
 
 13 Pearce v. Spalding, 12 Mo. App. 141 (1882). 
 
 "Taylor v. Waters, 7 Taunt. (Eng.) 374 (1817); Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 
 M. & W. (Eng.) 838 (1845); McCrea v. Marsh, 12 Gray (Mass.), 211, 71 Am. 
 Dec. 745 (1858); Burton v. Scherpf, 1 Allen (Mass.), 133, 79 Am. Dec. 717 
 (1861); Purcell v. Daly, 19 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 301 (1886); Collister v. Hay- 
 man, 71 App. Div. 316, 75 N. Y. Supp. 1102 (1902). 
 
 15 Wood V. Leadbitter, 13 M. & W. (Eng.) 838 (1845), overruling on this 
 point Taylor v. Waters, 7 Taunt. (Eng.) 374 (1817). 
 
 18 McCrea v. Marsh; 12 Gray (Mass.), 211, 71 Am. Dec 745 (1858); Burton 
 V. Scherpf, 1 Allen (Mass.), 133, 79 Am. Dec. 717 (1861); Purcell v. Daly, 
 19 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 301 (1886); (but see Smith v. Leo, 92 Hun [N. Y.], 
 242, 36 N. Y. Supp. 949 [1895] ); Collister v. Hayman, 71 N. Y. App. Div. 
 316, 75 N. Y. Supp. 1102 (1902, semble). 
 
 17 Coleman v. Foster, 1 H. & N. (Eng.) 37 (1856). 
 
 [221] 
 
§ 316.] Innkeepees. [Chap. XXV. 
 
 cation of the license, therefore, while not a tort, is a breach of 
 the contract contained in the ticket; and though the person 
 who presents the ticket has no right to remain on the premises, 
 he may sue for breach of the contract, and recover not only 
 the price of admission but also any incidental expenses to which 
 he may have been put.^* 
 
 The damages for illegal expulsion from a place of amusement 
 of one who is rightfully in includes not merely the amount paid 
 for admission, but also compensation for the indignity and 
 disgrace, and any other damage actually suffered as a result of 
 the expulsion," but not exemplary damages, in the ordinary 
 case.^" 
 
 There is a tendency in some courts to deny that a ticket is 
 a mere revocable license, but in such a case the court usually 
 decides only that an action lies; and the real nature of the 
 action is for breach of contract by revoking the license con- 
 trary to the terms of the agreement. Thus, in Drew v. Peer ^^ 
 where a ticket holder was ejected from the lobby of the theatre 
 he was held entitled to damages; and Judge Sterrett said: 
 "Whether the tickets conferred merely a Hcense or something 
 more is immaterial. If they gave only a license to enter the 
 theatre and remain there during the performance it is very 
 clear that the agent of the defendant had no right to revoke 
 it as they did, and summarily eject Peer and his wife from the 
 building in such manner as to injure her. We incUne to the 
 opinion, however, that as purchasers and holders of tickets for 
 particular seats they had more than a mere hcense. Their 
 right was more in the nature of a lease, entitUng them to peace- 
 able ingress and egress, and exclusive possession of the des- 
 ignated seats during the performance on that particular 
 evening. " 
 
 w Burton v. Scherpf, 1 Allen (Mass.), 133, 79 Am. Deo. 717 (1861); Pup- 
 ceU V. Daly, 19 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 301 (1886). 
 
 19 Smith V. Leo, 92 Hun (N. Y.), 242, 36 N. Y. Supp. 949 (1895). 
 
 20 McGowan v. Duff, 14 Daly (N. Y.), 315 (1887). 
 
 21 93 Pa. 234 (1880). 
 
 [222] 
 
Chap. XXV.] The Theatre. [§ 319. 
 
 § 317- How far a ticket is transferable. 
 
 A ticket is in its nature transferable, and capable of being 
 used by the holder; but the power of transferring it may be 
 denied by special terms in the ticket itself, ^^ and the manager 
 may by notice, publicly posted and printed on the ticket, refuse 
 to accept it if bought from an unauthorized person, for instance, 
 a scalper.^' 
 
 § 318. AccommodationB secured by the ticket. 
 
 The purchaser of a ticket has no right to any other accom- 
 modation than that given him by the ticket. Thus, though 
 there is no room left in the pit, a purchaser of a ticket for the 
 pit cannot enter an empty box.^* 
 
 A regulation adopted in several States, however, gives the 
 purchaser of an admission ticket the right to any seat not sold 
 when the doors open.^^ Such a regulation was however held 
 unreasonable and void in one case.^* 
 
 Topic. III. Rights of Spectators. 
 
 § 319. The right of spectators to criticise the entertainment. 
 
 An entertainment publicly given invites and justifies public 
 criticism of its merits; but the criticism must be fair. In a 
 suit for libel against a newspaper for an unfair comment upon 
 a play. Lord Kenyon charged the jury that the editor of a pub- 
 lic newspaper may fairly and candidly comment on any public 
 entertainment, but it must be done fairly and without mahce 
 or view to injm-e or prejudice the proprietor in the eyes of the 
 public.^^ 
 
 22 PureeU v. Daly, 19 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 301 (1886). 
 
 23 Collister v. Hayman, 71 N. Y. App. Div. 316, 75 N. Y. Supp. 1102 (1902) ; 
 PurceU V. Daly, 19 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 301 (1886). 
 
 21 Lewis V. Arnold, 4 C. & P. (Eng.) 354 (1830). 
 
 25 Cincinnati v. Brill, 7 Ohio N. P. 534, 5 Oh. S. & C. P. Deo. 566 (1900); 
 Commonwealth v. Powell, 10 Phila. (Pa.) 180, 30 Leg. Int. 100 (1873). 
 
 2» District of Columbia v. Saville, 1 McArthur (Dist. Col.), 581, 29 Am. 
 Rep. 616(1874). 
 
 27 Dibdin v. Swan, 1 Esp. (Eng.) 28 (1793). 
 
 [ 223 ] 
 
§ 320.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXV. 
 
 § 320. Tlie right of spectators to applaud or hiss. 
 
 The right of the spectators to give loud and vigorous expres- 
 sion to their approbation or disapprobation was much discussed 
 at the beginning of the last century, when such conduct was 
 common. In CUfford v. Brandon ^* the plaintiff, who sued for 
 false imprisonment, had been arrested for taking part in a riot 
 in the Covent Garden Theatre. The spectators, being incensed 
 at the act of the manager in raising prices, made such a noise 
 in the theatre that the play could not go on. Sir James Mans- 
 field first directed the jury that the raising of prices was no 
 excuse for the disturbance. He then added: "These premed- 
 itated and systematic tumults have been compared to that 
 noise which has been at all times witnessed at theatres in the 
 immediate expression of the feeUngs of the audience upon a 
 new piece, or the merits or defects of a particular performer. 
 The cases, however, are widely different. The audience have 
 certainly a right to express by applause or hisses the sensations 
 which naturally present themselves at the moment ; and nobody 
 has ever hindered, or would ever question, the exercise of that 
 right. But if any body of men were to go to the theatre with 
 the settled intention of hissing an actor, or even of damning a 
 piece, there can be no doubt that such a deliberate and precon- 
 certed scheme would amount to a conspiracy, and that the 
 persons concerned in it might be brought to punishment." 
 
 As time went on, and the ordinary manners of an audience 
 became less boisterous, it came to be recognized that signs of 
 disapprobation must at any rate be confined to peaceful acts. 
 Thus, in a case where the defendants were informed against for 
 a conspiracy to create a riot, and it was alleged that they had 
 gone to a theatre in order to cry down an actor whom they did 
 not hke, Chief Justice Bushe charged the jury as follows: "The 
 rights of an audience at a theatre are perfectly well defined. 
 They may cry down a play or other performance which they 
 disHke, or they may hiss or hoot the actors who depend upon 
 their approbation or their caprice. Even that privilege, how- 
 
 28 2 Camp. (Eng.) 358 (1809). 
 [224] 
 
Chap. XXV.] The Theatre. [§ 321. 
 
 ever, is confined within its Hmits. They must not break the 
 peace, or act in such a manner as has a tendency to excite 
 terror or disturbance. Their censure or approbation, although 
 it may be noisy, must not be riotous. That censure or appro- 
 bation must be the expression of the feelings of the moment, 
 for if it be premeditated by a number of persons confederated 
 beforehand to cry down a performance or even an actor, it 
 becomes criminal. Such are the Umits of the privileges of an 
 audience, even as to actors and authors. " ^^ 
 
 The same principle was expressed more clearly and concisely 
 later by Chief Justice Tindal in Gregory v. Duke of Brunswick : ^° 
 " The public who go to a theatre have the right to express their 
 free and imbiased opinions of the merits of the performers who 
 appear upon the stage; but have no right to go to the theatre 
 by a preconcerted plan to make such a noise that an actor, 
 without any judgment being formed on his performance, should 
 be driven from the stage by such a scheme." 
 
 At the present day the rights of those who go to the theatre 
 to see the play, rather than to express their opinion of it, would 
 no doubt be recognized; and expressions of opinion must be 
 limited to such acts as would not interfere with the comfortable 
 hearing of the play by others. 
 
 Topic IV. Responsibility of the Manager. 
 
 §321. Responsibility of the manager for tlie personal safety of the 
 spectator. 
 The manager of the theatre must protect his patrons from 
 any personal danger from the performance, so far as such dan- 
 ger can be foreseen and guarded against. So where the plain- 
 tiff, while watching a shooting entertainment given by the 
 defendant, was injured by being hit in the eye by a metallic 
 piece which flew from the target when the bullet hit it, the 
 jury was allowed to find a verdict for the plaintiff if the de- 
 
 29 Rex V. Forbes, 1 Craw. & Dix (Ire.) 157 (1823). 
 
 30 1 Car. & K. (Eng.) 24, 31 (1843). 
 
 15 [225] 
 
§ 321.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXV. 
 
 fendant could have foreseen and by due care guarded against 
 the danger.^^ 
 
 The manager is responsible for an assault on a patron by his 
 servant, acting in the course of his employment; as by a door- 
 keeper in the effort illegally to eject a patron.^^ And the duty 
 of the manager to protect the spectator probably goes further. 
 He must provide servants to protect him against violence which 
 can be prevented; and he is therefore responsible for any vio- 
 lence inflicted from whatever cause by such servant.^^ As 
 Judge Howard said in Dickson v. Waldron: '^ 
 
 " The treatment due from a carrier to his passenger, from an 
 innkeeper to his guest, and from a theatrical manager to his 
 patron, while perhaps differing in degree, is similar in kind. 
 . . . Common carriers, innkeepers, merchants, managers of 
 theatres, and others who invite the pubUc to become their 
 patrons and guests, and thus submit personal safety and com- 
 fort to their keeping, owe a more special duty to those who 
 may accept such invitation. Such patrons and guests have a 
 right to ask that they shall be protected from injury while 
 present on such invitation, and particularly that they shall not 
 suffer wrong from the agents and servants of those who have 
 invited them. " 
 
 In accordance with this doctrine, the manager of an enter- 
 tainment was held responsible to one of the persons present 
 who was injured by a drunken man, when the manager had 
 sold liquor to the latter with knowledge of his quarrelsome pro- 
 pensity when drunk. ^^ 
 
 31 Thompson v. LoweU, L. & H. St. Ry., 170 Mass. 577, 49 N. E. 913, 64 
 Am. St. Rep. 323, 40 L. R. A. 345 (1898). So in a case where a spectator 
 was hit by an exploding firecracker. Herrick v. Wixom, 121 Mich. 384, 
 80 N. W. 117, 81 N. W. 333 (1899). 
 
 32 Dickson v. Waldron, 135 Ind. 507, 34 N. E. 506, 35 N. E. 1 (1893); 
 Fowler v. Hohnes, 3 N. Y. Supp. 816 (1889). 
 
 33 Ante, § 172. 
 
 3i 135 Ind. 507, 34 N. E. 506 (1893). 
 
 36 Mastad v. Swedish Brethren, 83 Minn. 40, 85 N. W. 913, 85 Am. St. Rep. 
 446, 53 L. R. A. 803 (1901). 
 [226] 
 
Chap. XXV.] The Theatre. [§ 322. 
 
 § 322. Responsibility of the manager for the safety of the premises. 
 
 The owner or manager of a theatre or other building in which 
 pubUc performances are held is not an insurer of the safety of 
 the building.^^ He is, however, obliged to make the place as 
 little dangerous as such a place can be, having regard to the 
 contrivances necessarily used in carrying on the business; and 
 he is liable for any injury to a patron due to a defect which 
 could have been avoided.'^ The fact that the manager em- 
 ploys a competent workman or contractor to construct the 
 building and make it safe will not relieve him from liability if 
 it is constructed improperly, even if he is not in any re- 
 spect personally negligent; he cannot escape the respon- 
 sibility for providing a safe building by delegating the duty 
 to another.^* 
 
 Not only must the premises be properly constructed in the 
 beginning; all reasonable care must be taken to remedy defects 
 which arise during the use of the building. So where the cov- 
 ering of a step on a staircase became loose, and tripped up a 
 spectator who thereby suffered injury, it was held that the man- 
 ager should have used reasonable diligence in finding and re- 
 pairing the defect; and that a space of twenty-four hours since 
 
 38 Dunning v. Jacobs, 15 N. Y. Misc. 85, 36 N. Y. Supp. 453 (1895). 
 
 37 Hart V. Washington Park, 157 111. 9, 41 N. E. 620, 48 Am. St. Rep. 298, 
 29 L. R. A. 492 (1895); WUliams v. Nat. C. P. Assoc. (la.), 102 N. W. 
 783 (1905); Currier v. Boston Music Hall, 135 Mass. 414 (1883); Oxford v. 
 Leathe, 165 Mass. 254, 43 N. E. 92 (1896); Schofield v. Wood, 170 Mass. 
 415, 49 N. E. 636 (1898); Sebeck v. P. V. Verein, 64 N. J. Law, 624, 46 Atl. 
 631, 81 Am. St. Rep. 512, 50 L. R. A. 199 (1900); Camp v. Wood, 76 N. Y- 
 92, 32 Am. Rep. 282 (1879); Dunning v. Jacobs, 15 N. Y. Misc. 85, 36 N. Y. 
 Supp. 453 (1895); Fox v. Buffalo Park, 21 N. Y. App. Div. 321, 47 N. Y. 
 Supp. 788 (1897); Dunn v. Agricultural Society, 46 Ohio St. 93, 18 N. E. 
 496, 15 Am. St. Rep. 556, 1 L. R. A. 754 (1888); Richmond & M. Ry. v. 
 Moore, 94 Va. 493, 27 S. E. 70, 37 L. R. A. 258 (1897); Francis v. Cockrell, 
 L. R. 5 Q. B. 501 (1870). 
 
 3« Currier v. Boston Music Hall, 135 Mass. 414 (1883); Sebeck v. P. V. 
 Verein, 64 N. J. Law, 624, 46 Atl. 631, 81 Am. St. Rep. 512, 50 L. R. A. 199 
 (1900); Fox V. Buffalo Park, 21 N. Y. App Div. 321, 47 N. Y. Supp. 788 
 (1897); Richmond & M. Ry. v. Moore, 94 Va. 493, 27 S. E. 70, 37 L. R. A. 
 258 (1897); Francis v. Cockrell, L. R. 5 Q. B. 501 (1870). 
 
 [227] 
 
§ 324.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXV. 
 
 the covering became loose was a long enough time for the man- 
 ager to have acted.'* 
 
 § 323- Contributory negligence of the injured party- 
 
 The injured party may, of course, be barred from recovery 
 by his own contributory negligence; *" and what constitutes 
 contributory negligence is a question of fact, to be decided in 
 a doubtful case by the jury.^* But where the entrance to the 
 building was by a Ughted hall and stairway known to the plain- 
 tiff, and he left the hall and stepped through an unlocked door, 
 in the dark, upon an imrailed platform from which he fell, the 
 court ordered a verdict for the defendant, and this was sus- 
 tained; the Supreme Court saying that the injury was so 
 clearly the result of his own negUgence that the direction was 
 not error.*^ 
 
 § 324- Responsibility of the manager for the goods of the spectator. 
 
 The proprietor of a theatre is responsible only for the exer- 
 cise of reasonable care for the protection of his patrons and 
 their goods. He is not an insurer of the goods of a patron. 
 Thus, where a patron hung on a hook in a box occupied by him 
 certain articles of apparel which are usually laid aside when 
 attending a play, and they were stolen during the perform- 
 ance, the keeper of the theatre cannot be held Uable in the 
 absence of evidence of negUgence.*' In the course of his 
 opinion Judge Bischoff said: 
 
 "The manager of a theatre, in the absence of a special agree- 
 ment, is not, unlike an innkeeper and common carrier of goods, 
 upon which classes of persons the common law, from motives 
 of public policy then prevailing, imposed an extraordinary lia- 
 
 39 Butcher v. Hyde, 10 N. Y. Misc. 275, 30 N. Y. Supp. 1073 (1894). 
 i» Johnson v. Willcox, 135 Pa. 217, 19 Atl. 939 (1890). 
 
 41 Sohofield V. Wood, 170 Mass. 415, 49 N. E. 636 (1898); Camp v. Wood, 
 76 N. Y. 92, 32 Am. Rep. 282 (1879). 
 
 42 Johnson v. WiUcox, 135 Pa. 217, 19 Atl. 939 (1890). 
 
 "Pattison v. Hammerstein, 17 N. Y. Misc. 375, 39 N. Y. Supp. 1039 
 (1896). 
 
 [228] 
 
Chap. XXV.] The Theatre. [§ 324. 
 
 bility, an insurer of his patrons' property, though the property 
 may consist of apparel such as is necessarily or usually worn 
 by the patrons and laid aside by them while attending the play. 
 His habiUty is, at most, that of every person except innkeepers 
 and common carriers of goods, and granting that the manager, 
 with regard to the persons of his patrons and the particular 
 property alluded to, rests under a duty to observe, by himself 
 and his servants, reasonable care to insure safety for the time 
 being, it remains that the record before us is woefully deficient 
 in showing that the eloignment of the plaintiff's overcoat was 
 attributable to neglect on the part of the defendant or any of 
 his servants. Nothing appears to have been conamitted by the 
 defendant, or any of his servants, that ought to have been left 
 undone. Nothing was omitted that ought to have been per- 
 formed. 
 
 "The defendant, whether he be regarded as a lessor or as a 
 mere Ucensor, could not reasonably be expected, without a re- 
 quest to that effect, to prevent access by others than the plain- 
 tiff's party to their box while the latter were present therein. 
 How was he to know that such others were not friends or ac- 
 quaintances, or their presence otherwise agreeable to all or 
 some one of the plaintiff's party? Nor could he be reasonably 
 expected to eject persons other than members of the plaintiff's 
 party while none of the latter protested against the presence 
 of such other persons." 
 
 In answer to the contention that the placing of hooks for 
 outer garments in the box was in invitation to the occupant 
 to give such garments into the manager's care, the learned 
 judge said: 
 
 "There was no invitation to the plaintiff, express or implied, 
 held out by the defendant, that the former should yield his 
 personal vigilance even for a moment. The hooks provided 
 by the defendant were a means of enabling the occupants of 
 the box to care for their apparel with greater ease and comfort 
 to themselves, but an effort to imply from the mere presence 
 of such hooks an assumption by the defendant of the custody 
 
 [229] 
 
§ 325.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXV. 
 
 of whatever the occupants of the box might place thereon tor- 
 tures reason." 
 
 Topic V. Licenses. 
 
 § 325. The reqiiirement of a license. 
 
 The question whether the licensing power may be controlled, 
 or has unlimited discretion, has already been considered. The 
 power to grant a hcense involves the power to exact a hcense 
 fee.^* It seems that a license need not be contained in a written 
 document, in the ordinary form, but may be by parol; ^^ but 
 a mere statement by the licensing board that they would not 
 grant a hcense, but should not object to the entertainment so 
 long as it was proper, is not a hcense.^® 
 
 It does not come within the scope of this chapter to examine 
 at length the hcensing acts of the several States, and the in- 
 terpretations put upon them by the courts. Some of the de- 
 cisions will be found in the notes.^^ 
 
 ■1* Boston V. Schaffer, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 415 (1830). 
 
 « Boston V. Schaffer, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 415 (1830); but see Simpson v. Wood 
 105 Mass. 263 (1870). 
 
 " Simpson v. Wood, 105 Mass. 263 (1870). 
 
 *' Alabama. Offering a hall for rent to dramatic companies is not carry- 
 ing on the business of keeping a theatre, at least where it does not appear to 
 have been rented. Gillman v. State, 55 Ala. 248 (1876). An exhibition 
 of feats of ledgerdemain is not covered by a license to run a theatre. Jacko 
 V. State, 22 Ala. 73 (1853). A public exhibition must be licensed, though it 
 is conducted gratuitously. Pike v. State, 35 Ala. 419 (1860; but see Lou- 
 isiana) . 
 
 Louisiana. A gratuitous exhibition need not be licensed. State v. Lun- 
 die, 47 La. Ann. 1596, 18 So. 636 (1895; but see Alabama). The owner of 
 the building, which is leased and managed by another, need not pay a li- 
 cense. State V. French Opera Assoc, 107 La. 284, 31 So. 630 (1902). 
 
 Iowa. A skatingrink is not a "place of public amusement" requiring a 
 license. Bowlin v. Lyon, 67 la. 536, 56 Am. Rep. 355, 25 N. W. 766 (1885). 
 
 Massachusetts. What is a "place of public amusement." See Common- 
 wealth V. Gee, 6 Gush. 174 (1830; dancing school is not); Commonwealth 
 V. Bow, 177 Mass. 347, 58 N. E. 1017 (1901; merry-go-round is). Where 
 a place of public amusement is conducted gratuitously, it must nevertheless 
 be licensed. Commonwealth v. Colton, 8 Gray, 488 (1857). 
 
 Minnesota. A license fee of $125, for six months for theatrical perform- 
 
 [230] 
 
Chap. XXVI.] Other Public Houses. [§ 331. 
 
 CHAPTEK XXVI. 
 
 OTHER PUBLIC HOUSES. 
 
 § 331. Lodging houses. | } 383. Bath houses. 
 
 332. Extent of liability. 
 
 §331. Lodging houses. 
 
 The keeper of a lodging house has even less control and re- 
 sponsibility than the keeper of a boarding house; and it seems 
 clear that he is imder no duty to care in any way for the safety 
 of his lodger's goo'ds. His liability was carefully considered 
 and so determined in the case of Holder v. Soulby.^ In the 
 
 ances is not unreasonable. City of Duluth v. Marsh, 71 Minn. 248, 73 N. W. 
 962 (1898). 
 
 New York. As to what exhibitions must be licensed, see New York v. 
 Eden Musee, 102 N. Y. 593, 8 N. E. 40 (1886; concert on stage must be); 
 People V. Royal, 23 N. Y. App. Div. 258, 48 N. Y. Supp. 742 (1897; free 
 exhibition of tricks to attract purchasers for goods to be sold need not); 
 People V. Campbell, 51 N. Y. App. Div. 565, 65 N. Y. Supp. 114 (1900; 
 piano played in liquor saloon need not). 
 
 Pennsylvania. Outside Philadelphia and Pittsburg it is the business, not 
 the house, that is to be licensed. Commonwealth v. Keeler, 3 Pa. Dist. R. 
 158 (1893). If the manager pays the license, this protects all actors playing 
 in his troupe, though the personnel be changed. Commonwealth v. Reif- 
 snyder, 14 Pa. Co. Ct. 353, 3 Pa. Dist. R. 193 (1894). The owner of the 
 building, who is not the manager of the performance, need not take out a 
 license, Hayes v. Opera House Co., 139 Pa. 636, 22 Atl. 647 (1891), but be- 
 tween themselves the parties may agree that the owner of the building shall 
 take out the license, Gandy v. Oellers, 39 Wkly. Notes Cas. 438 (1897), and 
 in that case the license protects the manager. Green v. Kousins, 3 Pa. Dist. 
 R. 302 (1894). The Ucense must be renewed annually, and one Ucense will 
 cover performances at only one place at once. Nurdlinger v. Irvine, 18 
 
 1 8 C. B. N. S. 254 (Eng. 1860). 
 
 [231] 
 
§331.] Innkeepers, [Chap. XXVI. 
 
 course of his opinion in that case €hief Justice Erie said: 
 "The reason why the law makes an innkeeper Uable for the loss 
 of his guest's goods in olden times was [is?] that the wayfaring 
 guest has no means of knowing the neighborhood or the char- 
 acters of those he may meet with at the inn. It was therefore 
 thought right to cast that duty on the host. Knowing that 
 this is one of the Uabilities he iilcurs, the innkeeper can make 
 such charge for the entertainment of his guests as will compen- 
 sate him for the risk; and it may be observed that unless the 
 law cast upon him this burthen, a dishonest innkeeper might 
 be tempted to take advantage of a wealthy traveller. None of 
 these reasons can apply to the case of a lodging-house keeper; 
 and the law has never been so laid down. Although it has not 
 been contended that there is any absolute duty on the part of 
 the keeper of a lodging house to take care of a lodger's goods, 
 it is said that it is his duty to take such due and proper care of 
 them as a prudent owner might reasonably be expected to take 
 of his own goods, and that the defendant has failed in the per- 
 
 Wkly. Notes Cas. 65 (1886). A license is not required for an amateur per- 
 formance, though an admission fee is charged, because the Ucense is the reg- 
 ulation of a trade or business. OeUers v. Horn, 3 Pa. Super. Ct. 537, 39 
 Wkly. Notes Cas. 559 (1896; but see England). 
 
 Tennessee. A license issued for a theatre protects travelling companies 
 performing in it. Taxing District v. Emerson, 4 Lea (Tenn.), 312 (1880). 
 
 Texas. What constitutes a variety show. See Ex parte Bell, 32 Tex. Cr. 
 R. 308, 22 S. W. 1040, 40 Am. St. Rep. 778 (1893). 
 
 Washington. A public dance is a public amusement. Pearson v. Seattle, 
 14 Wash. 438, 44 Pac. 884 (1896). 
 
 England. A building used for charitable performances only must be li- 
 censed. Shelley v. Bethell, 12 Q. B. D. 11 (1883; but see Pennsylvania). 
 
 What is a place of dancing and music. See Clarke v. Searle, 1 Esp. 25 
 (1793); Bellis v. Burghall, 2 Esp. 722 (1799); Bellis v. Beal, 2 Esp. 592 
 (1798); Archer v. Willingrice, 4 Esp. 186 (1802); Shutt v. Lewis, 5 Esp. 128 
 (1804). See Rex v. Handy, 6 T. R. 286 (1795; tumbling is not "an enter- 
 tainment of the stage"); Regina v. Tucker, 2 Q. B. D. 417 (1877; a skating 
 rink where persons skate to music is an "entertainment of like kind to music 
 and dancing"). A portable booth used as a theatre is not a "tenement" 
 used for entertainment, Fredericks v. Howie, 1 H. & C. 381 (1862), or a 
 "house" for that purpose, Davys v. Douglas, 4 H. & N. 180 (1859), but it 
 is a "place" so used. Fredericks v. Payne, 1 H. & C. 584 (1862). 
 [232] 
 
Chap. XXVI.] Other Public Houses. [§331. 
 
 formance of this duty on the present occasion. I am most 
 particularly averse from affirming for the first time the propo- 
 sition that a lodging-house keeper has a duty cast upon him 
 by law to take care of his lodger's goods. I foresee great diffi- 
 culties in so holding; and I think it would be casting upon him 
 an undefined responsibility which would be most inconvenient. 
 Considering that lodgers consist of persons of all classes, — the 
 highest as well as the lowest, — one can hardly exaggerate the 
 mischief which would ensue from holding that the lodging- 
 house keeper was responsible for the safety of his lodger's 
 goods. It would be impossible to lay down any definite test 
 of this Hability: each case must be left to the discretion or the 
 caprice of the jury. The habits of a lodging-house keeper must 
 vary according to the situation of the premises, and a variety 
 of other circumstances. At watering places, for instance, it 
 would be exceedingly inconvenient if the doors were kept locked 
 all day. So, in seaport towns, where lodgers come suddenly 
 and depart at short notice, the duty contended for here would 
 be most preposterously onerous. If, on the other hand, the 
 law is that the lodger must take care of his own goods, it only 
 imposes upon him the same care that he is bound to take as 
 he walks the streets. He may always secure his valuables by 
 carrying them about with him or by placing them specially in 
 the custody of the keeper of the house." 
 
 In his opinion in the same case Judge Byles said: "If the 
 lodger be robbed by a servant of the lodging-house keeper, the 
 latter is not responsible for it. That is consistent with prin- 
 ciple as with authority. There is no contract on the part of 
 the lodging-house keeper to take care of his lodger's goods; nor 
 is there any bailment; and there is no precedent for the impo- 
 sition of such a liability upon him. ... I have chambers 
 in an inn of court, or rooms in a college; if I am robbed, can 
 I charge the benchers or the trustees because they or other 
 servants have neglected to keep the outer gate locked, or have 
 permitted dishonest persons to enter? Surely not. There is 
 no sound distinction between the two cases." 
 
 [233] 
 
§ 333.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXVI. 
 
 § 332. Extent of liability. 
 
 But though not liable as a bailee for the lodger's goods, the 
 lodging-house keeper is, it seems, under a duty to keep reason- 
 able watch over the house and its contents; and the case of 
 Holder v. Soulby must in this respect be limited. It was 
 criticised in the recent case of Scarbrough v. Cosgrove.^ In 
 the later case Sir Richard Collins, Master of the Rolls, saw no 
 difference in principle between the boarding-house keeper and 
 the lodging-house keeper; and as to the latter said: "The 
 general control of the house must be in the keeper. By the 
 nature of the arrangement itself the custody of the lodger's 
 effects must be in him when the lodger is not in his room, and 
 the consideration paid ought as a matter of business to secure 
 some protection for the lodger where the ordinary conditions 
 to which he is expected to conform put it out of his own power 
 to look after his effects himself. I can see no reason why there 
 should be a presumption of immunity in his case from the 
 common duty of a person accepting a charge to exercise at 
 least ordinary care; a fortiori where he undertakes it for re- 
 ward. The guest and baggage are both in a house of which 
 he has the control, and his obligations to both of them arise 
 in the same way out of the relation itself." 
 
 §333. Bathhouses. 
 
 The keeper of a bath house may take the goods of a bather 
 on deposit, in which case he is of course liable as an ordinary 
 bailee. If he does not take the goods himself, he must use 
 such vigilance as the nature of the case demands for the pro- 
 tection of the goods of the bather.^ So it was held that the pro- 
 prietor of a five-cent bathing house, having a bathing tank 
 used in common by all customers, and under the general super- 
 vision of a manager, who patrolled the place, was not liable to 
 a regular weekly bather, who placed his clothes, as usual, upon 
 a bench in the bathing room, for the loss of jewelry and money 
 
 2 [1905] 2 K. B. 805. See also Swann v. Smith, 14 Daly (N. Y.) 114 (1887). 
 
 3 Tombler v. Koelling, 60 Ark. 62, 28 S. W. 795 (1894). 
 
 [234 J 
 
Chap. XXVI.] Other Public Houses. [§ 333. 
 
 which he left in his clothes while he was taking a bath; that, 
 under the circumstances, the proprietor had fully performed 
 such duties towards his customers as he had imdertaken to 
 perform; and that, moreover, the failure of the bather to de- 
 posit his valuables with the proprietor, as he might have done 
 and had done before, constituted contributory negligence on 
 his part.* On the other hand, in the case of the proprietor of 
 a Russian and Turkish bathing estabhshment it appeared that 
 while the plaintiff was absent from the room assigned to him 
 for the purpose of disrobing, and in the bath in another part 
 of the estabhshment, his apparel left in the room assigned to 
 him was in defendant's keeping; that the assignment of the 
 room for the purpose of disrobing was, in effect, a representa- 
 tion by the defendant that he would assume the custody of 
 plaintiff's apparel at that place; that having received the sum 
 demanded of plaintiff for the privilege of the bath, and assumed 
 the custody of plaintiff's apparel while the latter was enjo3dng 
 the privilege, defendant became a voluntary custodian of plain- 
 tiff's apparel for profit, and was bound to exercise due care to 
 guard it against loss or theft by others having access to de- 
 fendant's estabhshment with his permission; and that the loss 
 or theft of plaintiff's overcoat could have been prevented if 
 defendant had, in view of the indiscriminate admission of per- 
 sons to his estabhshment, employed one or more competent 
 persons to guard against such occurrences. On these circum- 
 stances the proprietor was held hable.^ 
 
 4 Schneps v. Strum, 25 N. Y. Misc. 168, 54 N. Y. Supp. 140 (1898). 
 6 Bird V. Everard, 4 N. Y. Misc. 104, 23 N. Y. Supp. 1008 (1893). 
 
 [235] 
 
§ 341.] 
 
 Innkeepers. 
 
 [Chap. XXVII. 
 
 TITLE YII. 
 SLEEPING CARS. 
 CHAPTER XXVII. 
 
 DUTY TO SERVE PASSENGERS. 
 
 341. Sleeping car not an inn. 
 
 342. Sleeping car company not a 
 
 carrier. 
 
 343. Sleeping car company must 
 
 serve the public. 
 
 344. Right of an applicant to a 
 
 berth. 
 
 345. Right to occupy an entire sec- 
 
 tion. 
 
 346. What berths are vacant; res- 
 
 ervation of berths. 
 
 § 347. No duty of company to grant 
 reservation. 
 
 348. Reservation by ticket. 
 
 349. Reservation of berths for way 
 
 stations. 
 
 350. Failure of reserving passen- 
 
 ger to occupy. 
 
 351. Duty to put on extra car. 
 
 352. Right to compensation. 
 
 § 341. Sleeping^ car not an inn, 
 
 A sleeping car is a place for the reception and entertain- 
 ment of travellers, but it is not an inn.^ It differs from an 
 inn in many important particulars.^ In brief, the inn affords 
 necessary protection and accommodation to travellers while 
 they rest from their journey; the sleeping car offers a single 
 accommodation — a bed — to passengers while they continue 
 their journey. The sleeping car does not afford needed per- 
 sonal protection — the carrier is obliged to protect the passenger 
 even if he rides in the ordinary coach. Nor does the sleeping 
 car afford entertainment; the passenger may get his meals 
 on the train in a dining car, or even in the sleeping car 
 
 1 Ante, § 37. 
 
 2 Blum V. Southern P. P. C. Co., 1 Flip. 500, Fed. Cas. No. 1,574 (1876). 
 
 [236] 
 
Chap. XXVIL] Duty to Serve Passengers. ['§ 342. 
 
 itself, from a buffet, but this is not a necessary part of the 
 imdertaking of the car company. It is the duty of the carrier, 
 not of the car company, to provide facilities for meals. Fur- 
 thermore, the sleeping-car company does not undertake to 
 serve all travellers, but only those whom the carrier will allow 
 to ride in the car. For these reasons the sleeping car is almost 
 universally held not to be an inn.^ 
 
 § 342. Sleeping car company not a carrier. 
 
 The sleeping car company is not a carrier of passengers. 
 It provides, to be sure, a vehicle for them to ride in, and ac- 
 commodations for their comfort while riding; but the railroad 
 company and not the car company undertakes and is responsi- 
 ble for the transportation, and has entire charge of the joxirney. 
 If the journey is unduly delayed or interrupted or the train 
 meets with an accident whereby the passenger is injured, the 
 fault is with the railroad company alone. It is accordingly 
 almost universally held that a sleeping-car company is not a 
 common carrier.^ Therefore, the sleeping-car company is not 
 
 3 Blum V. Southern P. P. C. Co., 1 Flip. 500, Fed. Cas. No. 1,574 (1876); 
 Pullman P. C. Co. v. Adams, 120 Ala. 581, 24 So. 921, 74 Am. St. Rep. 53, 
 45 L. R. A. 767 (1898); Pullman P. C. Co. v. Freudenstein, 3 Col. App. .540, 
 34 Pac. 578 (1893); Pullman's P. C. Co. v. Hall, 106 Ga. 765, 32 S. E. 923, 
 71 Am. St. Rep. 293 (1899); Pullman P. C. Co. v. Smith, 73 111. 360, 24 Am. 
 Rep. 2.58 (1874); Woodruff S. & P. C. Co. v. Diehl, 84 Ind. 474, 43 Am. 
 Rep. 102 (1882); Whicher v. Boston & A. R. R., 176 Mass. 275, 57 N. E. 
 601 (1900); Illinois C. R. R. v. Handy, 63 Miss. 609, 56 Am. Rep. 846 (1886); 
 Welch V. Pullman P. C. Co., 16 Abb. Pr. N. S. (N. Y.) 352 (1874); Tracy 
 V. Pullman P. C. Co., 67 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 154 (1884); Welding v. Wagner, 
 1 City Ct. Rep. (N. Y.) 66 (1878); Fall River & M. Co. v. Pullman P. C. 
 Co., 6 Ohio Dec. 85 (1896); Pullman P. C. Co. v. Gardner, 3 Penny. (Pa.) 
 84, 14 W. N. C. 17 (1883); Pullman P. C. Co. v. Gavin, 93 Tenn. 53, 23 S. W. 
 70, 42 Am. St. Rep. 902, 21 L. R. A. 289 (1893); Dargan v. PuUman P. C. 
 Co., 2 WUls. (Tex.) § 691 (1885). In one or two cases, however, a sleeping 
 car has been held to be an inn. Pullman P. C. Co. v. Lowe, 28 Neb. 239, 
 44 N. W. 226 (1889); Sise v. PuDman P. C. Co., 1 Quebec Super. Ct. 9 (1892). 
 
 4 Blum V. Southern P. P. C. Co., 1 Flip. 500, Fed. Cas. No. 1,574 (1876); 
 Lemon v. Pullman P. C. Co., 52 Fed. 262 (1892); Pulhnan P. C. Co. v. 
 Adams, 120 Ala. 581, 24 So. 921, 74 Am. St. Rep. 53, 45 L. R. A. 767 (1898); 
 Pullman P. C. Co. v. Freudenstein, 3 Col. App. 540, 34 Pac. 678 (18931: 
 
 [ 237 ] 
 
§ 343.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXVII. 
 
 responsible for the act of a raihoad company over which its 
 cars are scheduled to run in failing to run trains ® or in un- 
 reasonable delay in running its trains; * nor is it liable for the 
 wrongful expulsion of the passenger from the train by the 
 servants of the raihoad.'' 
 
 § 343. Sleeping car company must serve the public. 
 
 Though neither an innkeeper nor a carrier, the sleeping-car 
 company is engaged in an analogous public employment, and 
 must serve such members of the pubUc as are within the class 
 which it undertakes to serve.* As Mr. Justice Mulkey said 
 in Nevin v. Pullman Palace Car Company:* "The running of 
 these sleepers has become a business and social necessity. 
 Such being the case, can it be maintained the law imposes no 
 obligations or restrictions on this company in the discharge 
 of its duties to the pubHc? Or, more accurately put, is it 
 true that this company owes no duties to the public except 
 such as are due from one mere private person to another? 
 
 Pullman's P. C. Co. v. Hall, 106 Ga. 765, 32 S. E. 923, 71 Am. St. Rep. 293 
 (1899); Pullman P. C. Co. v. Smith, 73 111. 360, 24 Am. Rep. 258 (1874); 
 Woodruff S. & P. C. Co. v. Diehl, 84 Ind. 474, 43 Am. Rep. 102 (1882); 
 Pullman P. C. Co. v. Gaylord, 9 Ky. L. Rep. 58 (1887); Whitney v. Pull- 
 man's P. C. Co., 143 Mass. 243, 9 N. E. 619 (1887); Dawley v. Wagner P. C. 
 Co., 169 Mass. 315, 47 N. E. 1024 (1897); Scaling v. Pulhnan P. C. Co., 
 24 Mo. App. 29 (1886); Tracy v. Pullman P. C. Co., 67 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 
 154 (1884); Welding v. Wagner, 1 City Ct. Rep. (N. Y.) 66 (1878); Pfaelzer 
 V. PuUman P. C. Co., 4 W. N. C. (Pa.) 240 (1877); PuUman P. C. Co. v. 
 Gardner, 3 Penny. (Pa.) 84, 14 W. N. C. 17 (1883); Pullman P. C. Co. v. 
 Gavin, 93 Tenn. 53, 23 S. W. 70, 42 Am. St. Rep. 902, 21 L. R. A. 289 (1893). 
 The contrary is stated in Pullman P. C. Co. v. Pollock, 69 Tex. 120, 5 Am. 
 St. Rep. 31 (1887). In Mississippi a sleeping-car company is declared a 
 common carrier by the constitution. PuUman P. C. Co. v. Lawrence, 74 
 Miss. 782, 22 So. 53 (1897). 
 
 sSimms v. PuUman S. C. Co., Fed. Cas. No. 12,869o (1878). 
 
 8 Pfaelzer v. Pullman P. C. Co., 4 W. N. C. (Pa.) 240 (1877). 
 
 'PuUman P. C. Co. v. Lee, 49 lU. App. 75 (1892). 
 
 8 Searles v. Mann B. C. Co., 45 Fed. 330 (1891); Nevin v. Pullman P. C. 
 Co., 106 lU. 222, 46 Am. Rep. 688 (1883); PuUman P. C. Co. v. Lawrence, 
 74 Miss. 782, 22 So. 53 (1897); Pullman P. C. Co. v. Booth (Tex. Civ. 
 App.), 28 S. W. 719 (1894). 
 
 8 Supra, 
 
 [238] 
 
Chap. XXVIL] Duty to Serve Passengers. [§ 344. 
 
 Can it be possible that the common carrier, the ferryman, the 
 innkeeper, and even the blacksmith on the roadside, are all, 
 by mere force of law, placed under special obligations and 
 duties to the pubHc which they are bound to observe in the 
 exercise of their respective calHngs, while, at the same time, 
 this company is entirely relieved from the observance of all 
 such duties and obligations which are not expressly contracted 
 for? We think not. To so hold would be to imjustly dis- 
 criminate between parties similarly situated, and make the 
 law inconsistent with itself, to the great detriment of the 
 public. If, then, this company owes any duties to the com- 
 munity by reason of its relation to the public, as we hold it 
 does, manifestly one of them is, that it shall treat aU persons 
 whose patronage it has sohcited with fairness, and without 
 unjust discrimination. When, therefore, a passenger who, 
 under the rules of the company, is entitled to a berth upon 
 payment of the usual fare, and to whom no personal objection 
 attaches, enters the company's sleeping car at a proper time 
 for the purpose of procuring accommodations, and in an orderly 
 and respectful manner applies for a berth, offering or tender- 
 ing the customary price therefor, the company is bound to 
 furnish it, provided it has a vacant one at its disposal." 
 
 § 344. Right of an applicant to a berth. 
 
 Accordingly, it is a legal wrong for the company to refuse 
 to furnish a berth to a proper person upon his application, if 
 it has an empty berth." The question whether the apphcant 
 is a -proper person must be settled by the carrier. "It was the 
 privilege of the railroad company, by its agents, to determine 
 who should occupy seats on its trains, and that included the 
 Pullman car, and to determine whether a party had paid the 
 proper amount, and was entitled to travel on the train to which 
 it was attached. Thus, the agent was then in a dual capacity, 
 as acting for the railroad and for the car company at the same 
 
 w Lemon v. Pullman P. C. Co., 52 Fed. 262 (1892) ; Nevin v. Pullman 
 P. C. Co., 106 lU. 222, 46 Am. Rep. 688 (1883). 
 
 [239] 
 
§ 345.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXVII. 
 
 time. It was not the privilege of the agent of the car com- 
 pany to sell a berth to any party unless he had a first-class 
 ticket on the railroad, or a ticket which entitled him to travel 
 in the Pullman car or in a first-class car." " Thus, as in the 
 case last quoted, the carrier may and cormnonly does require 
 that no one but a passenger entitled to first-class accommo- 
 dations shall ride in a parlor or sleeping car.'^ So the carrier 
 may require that no one shall ride in such a car except a pas- 
 senger having a through ticket; and a car company may 
 justify itself by such a requirement of the carrier for a refusal 
 to receive a passenger riding on a split ticket.^* "The defend- 
 ant company could only contract with a passenger when he 
 was of such a class that the railroad company permitted the 
 contract to be made." ^* 
 
 § 345. Right to occupy an entire section. 
 
 The question remains whether a car company may sell a 
 whole section to a single applicant, and justify the refusal to 
 supply the upper berth, unused by the purchaser, to a pas- 
 senger applying for it later. There is not much direct au- 
 thority upon this question; but there are obviously cases 
 where the right to a whole section might properly be given to 
 a passenger; as, for instance, to a woman or a sick person. 
 The case is of course stronger when the upper berth demanded 
 by the applicant is in a separate room, like a drawing-room or 
 stateroom; and in that case it has been held that the com- 
 pany may sell the whole room to a single applicant." No 
 authority has been found where the upper berth demanded 
 was in an ordinary open section in the car; but the same 
 decision would probably be given in such a case. 
 
 11 Hill, Dist. J., in Lemon v. Pullman P. C. Co., supra. 
 
 12 Lemon v. Pullman P. C. Co., 52 Fed. 262 (1892); Pullman P. C. Co. v. 
 Lee, 49 lU. App. 75 (1893). 
 
 13 Lawrence v. Pullman's P. C. Co., 144 Mass. 1, 10 N. E. 723, 59 Am. 
 Rep. 58 (1887). 
 
 " Devens, J., in Lawrence v. Pullman's P. C. Co., supra. 
 " Searles v. Mann B. C. Co., 45 Fed. 330 (1891). 
 
 [240 ] 
 
Chap. XXVIL] Duty to Serve Passengers. [§ 348. 
 
 § 346. What berths are vacant ; reservation of berths. 
 
 It may sometimes be difficult, owing to the practice of re- 
 serving berths, to determine whether the company has a va- 
 cant berth which it must give to an appUcant. If a berth is 
 neither occupied nor under reservation, it must obviously be 
 given to the proper applicant. But it is the custom to reserve 
 berths in advance for applicants in the order of appUcation. 
 Where a berth is so reserved, whether by contract or by the 
 issuing of a berth ticket, the person for whom it is reserved 
 has a right to occupy it, and another applicant, even if he 
 actually enters the car and demands it before the person for 
 whom it is reserved appears, has no right to it.^* 
 
 § 347. No duty of company to grant reservation. 
 
 While the company may reserve a berth and justify a re- 
 fusal to give the berth later to another, it is under no obliga- 
 tion to grant a reservation to one demanding it. This was 
 held in a case where an applicant found aU the berths occupied, 
 but one was to be vacated at the next station; he then de- 
 manded of the conductor a ticket for this berth from that 
 station to his destination. The conductor refused to sell him 
 such a ticket, and the refusal was held justified, the court 
 saying: "While the conductor might have sold to plaintiff a 
 ticket entitling him to the use of this berth from Birmingham 
 to Cincinnati before reaching the former place, he was not 
 under any obligation to do so." " It would follow that upon 
 the berth being vacated the conductor, not having consented 
 to reserve it, must sell it to the first applicant, whether the 
 former applicant or another. 
 
 § 348. Reservation by ticket. 
 
 The ordinary method of reserving a berth is by purchasing 
 a ticket for the berth. Such a ticket seems to be transferable, 
 
 16 Mann B. C. Co. v. Dnpre, 54 Fed. 646, 21 L. R. A. 289 (1893); Pull- 
 man P. C. Co. V. Booth (Tex. Civ. App.), 28 S. W. 719 (1894). 
 " Searles v. Mann B. C. Co., 45 Fed. 330 (1891). 
 
 16 [ 241 ] 
 
§ 350.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXVII. 
 
 and good in the hands of a transferee who has the proper rail- 
 road ticket.^* 
 
 § 349. Beservation of berths for way stations. 
 
 It is a common practice of sleeping car companies to re- 
 serve a certain number of sections for way stations, and even 
 if all berths not so reserved are full an applicant at the place 
 of departure of the train will not be given one of the reserved 
 berths tintil the train arrives at the way station and the pas- 
 sengers at that point are suppUed. This seems to be a rea- 
 sonable regulation, provided no more than the fair proportion 
 of berths are so reserved. If this were not allowed, passengers 
 at way stations would be at serious disadvantage by reason 
 of the earlier opportunity of passengers at prior stations to 
 occupy the berths. 
 
 § 350. Failure of reserving passenger to occupy. 
 
 While a car company may lawfully reserve berths for in- 
 tending passengers, it must be clear that they cannot thereby 
 give a greater accommodation to the intending passenger than 
 they could give one who appeared in person at the station 
 and there paid for his berth. As no passenger could engage 
 more than a single section, and could engage that only if he 
 actually occupied it, so an intending passenger can reserve no 
 more; and if he does not appear to occupy the berth reserved 
 for him, another apphcant may have it. 
 
 A somewhat similar problem is presented when a berth has 
 been reserved for a passenger who intends to take the train 
 at a way station, and a person on the train demands the right 
 to occupy the berth until that station is reached. Unless 
 there is some special inconvenience in doing so, the car 
 company would seem to be obliged to allow the applicant 
 to use the berth until it is needed for the person who has 
 engaged it. 
 
 18 Pullman P. C. Co. v. Reed, 75 111. 125, 131, 20 Am. Bep. 232 (1874); 
 Curlander v. Pullman P. C. Co. (Md.), 28 Chicago Leg. News 68 (1895). 
 [242] 
 
Chap. XXVII.] Duty to Serve Passengers. [§ 352. 
 
 § 351. Duty to put on extra car. 
 
 Whether a car company may be obliged, in case of an unex- 
 pectedly large demand for berths, to put on an extra car, 
 provided one is available and the carrier will permit it, is a 
 matter of some doubt. The car company cannot attach an- 
 other car to the train except by consent of the railway com- 
 pany; but assuming. such consent, it may be argued that the 
 car company is able to supply the demand for berths, and 
 therefore should do so. On the other hand, it may be argued 
 that the car company, hke the innkeeper, provides certain 
 cars' on certain trains in which to carry on its business, and 
 that its imdertaking is to receive passengers in such cars only. 
 In the absence of authority on this point the question must 
 be left in doubt. 
 
 § 352. Bight to compensation. 
 
 It must be clear that hke any other person performing a 
 public service the car company is entitled to demand reason- 
 able compensation as a condition of extending its accommo- 
 dation to the apphcant; and that this compensation is in 
 addition to the fare paid to the carrier.^* In a New York 
 case ^" it was held that a passenger who could find no seat 
 in the ordinary passenger coaches might demand a seat in a 
 parlor car without extra charge. However that may be when 
 the car is owned by the carrier ^^ it is clear to-day that even 
 under such circumstances a passenger cannot without paying 
 extra compensation demand a seat in a parlor or sleeping car 
 belonging to an independent car company. The New York 
 decision must be regarded as obsolete upon this point; and 
 it is to be noticed that even in that case action was not brought 
 against the car company for refusal to furnish a seat, but 
 against the carrier for the ejection of its passenger from the 
 only part of the train in which he could get a seat. 
 
 w St. Louis, A. & T. Ry. v. Hardy, 55 Ark. 134, 17 S. W. 711 (1891). 
 
 20 Thorpe v. New York C. & H. R. E. R., 76 N. Y. 402, 32 Am. Rep. 
 325 (1879). 
 
 21 See on this point some of the language used in St. Louis A. & T. Ry. 
 V. Hardy, supra. [ 243 ] 
 
§ 362.] 
 
 Innkeepers. 
 
 [Chap. XXVIII. 
 
 CHAPTER XXVIII. 
 
 RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SAFETY AND COMFORT OF THE 
 
 PASSENGER. 
 
 361. Duty to provide appliances. 
 
 362. Appliances for convenient use 
 
 ot upper berth. 
 
 363. Warming and ventilating the 
 
 car. 
 
 364. Providing berth for which 
 
 ticket has been issued. 
 
 365. Providing berth throughout 
 
 the journey. 
 
 366. Excuse for ejecting passenger. 
 
 367. Right of company to change 
 
 berth. 
 
 368. Who may occupy berth. 
 
 369. Making up berth. 
 
 370. Duty to awaken passengers. 
 
 371. Regulations. 
 
 372. Safety of the car. 
 
 373. Protection of passengers. 
 
 374. Injury by servant of the com- 
 
 pany. 
 
 375. Cumulative liability of the 
 
 carrier. 
 
 376. Duty of the passenger to take 
 
 care of the berth. 
 
 377. Right of the passenger to as- 
 
 sign or exchange berth. 
 
 §361. Duty to provide appliances. 
 
 The duty of the car company is obviously to have a safe 
 and comfortable car, fitted up with all reasonable appliances 
 for the safety and comfort of the passenger, "such supphes 
 and conveniences as are usually found in hke sleepers, and 
 are necessary to the health and comfort of passengers." ' 
 
 § 362. Appliances for convenient use of upper berth. 
 
 The upper berth is a difficult, and under some circumstances 
 dangerous, place to get in and out; and the car company must 
 take care accordingly. For any injury caused by improper 
 speed or jerking in running the train the carrier and not the 
 car company is of course hable; ^ but anything which the car 
 
 iNevin v. Pullman P. C. Co., 106 111. 222, 46 Am. Rep. 688 (1883). 
 2 Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Fielding, 62 111. App. 577 (1896); Smith 
 V. Canada Pac. R. R., 34 N. Sco. 22 (1901). 
 [244] 
 
Chap. XXVIII.] Safety and Comfort of Passenger. [§ 363. 
 
 company can reasonably do to assist passengers in the upper 
 berths, such as providing call-bells and steps, it must do. 
 " If it furnishes upper berths, which common observation and 
 experience teaches are difficult, if not dangerous, to alight from 
 when the car is in rapid motion, it is not carrjong its obliga- 
 tion any too far to require it to have steps, as it usually does, 
 or other mechanical contrivances, to assist in that act. And 
 having steps it is necessary, if they are movable, as is the 
 custom, that servants be employed to bring them to the aid 
 of the passenger, and in the night time such servants should 
 be alert and awake, ready to respond to the ring of the bell 
 provided to caU them. It is not alone the undertaking of 
 such a company to provide the bed to sleep in, but also rea- 
 sonably safe means of getting into and out of the bed. . . . 
 The company by providing bells for that purpose, held out a 
 notice that the bells would be responded to when nmg, whether 
 the passenger be sick- or well." ^ In the case in which this 
 opinion was dehvered a passenger who was thrown from an 
 upper berth and injured, in trying to descend after having 
 vainly rung the bell to summon the porter, was allowed to 
 recover damages from the car company. 
 
 § 363. Warmings and ventilating the car. 
 
 The car company must furnish a comfortably warm car. 
 This, however, does not mean that the car must bev warmed 
 to just the temperature and ventilated to just the degree de- 
 sired by any particular passenger. The car company owes 
 to any passenger a duty in this respect no less important than 
 that owed to each of the others; and "considering the vary- 
 ing predisposition towards heat and cold, and the exacting 
 demands of passengers generally," it is not usually necessary 
 to comply with the particular demands of any one passenger.** 
 So long as the warmth and ventilation are reasonably suited 
 
 3 Shepard, J., in Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Fielding, 62 HI. App. C77, 
 579 (1896). 
 * Hughes V. Pullman's P. C. Co., 74 Fed. 499 (1896). 
 
 [245] 
 
§ 364.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXVIII. 
 
 to the average man, the company is probably complying with 
 its duty. 
 
 It is not negligence. to leave a ventilating window open at 
 night, even if rain got in and wet the occupant of the upper 
 berth, where he might have closed it himself, and where the 
 porter would always open or close such window at the request 
 of the occupant of an upper berth and he made no such 
 request.^ 
 
 § 364. Providing berth for which ticket has been issued. 
 
 If for any reason a berth or seat which has been sold to a 
 passenger is not furnished to him, he is entitled to recover 
 all the damages thereby caused, including the discomfort 
 suffered from it.** If the passenger loses his berth ticket, but 
 brings written evidence from the agent that he is entitled to 
 the seat, it would seem to be the company's duty to let the 
 purchaser occupy the seat without further payment.'' If, to 
 be sure, the ticket is presented by another person, and the 
 company has no reason to refuse to honor it, the original 
 purchaser must lose his right; but the mere loss of the ticket, 
 which is not presented by anyone else, ought to cause for- 
 feitm-e of the right only so far as the reasonable methods of 
 business of the company require it. The unsupported state- 
 ment of the purchaser may not be received, because it cannot 
 be used as a voucher by the conductor; but the written state- 
 ment of the agent who has sold the ticket and is accoimtable 
 for the money paid ought to be received. The case is entirely 
 different from that of the loss of a railroad ticket. The rail- 
 road ticket ordinarily entitles the holder to no particular ac- 
 
 5 Edmimdson v. Pullman Palace Car Co., 92 Fed. 824 (1899). 
 
 8 Nevin v. Pullman P. C. Co., 106 111. 222, 46 Am. Rep. 688 (1883); Buck 
 V. Webb, .58 Hun (N. Y.), 185, 11 N. Y. Supp. 617 (1890); Braun v. Webb, 
 32 N. Y. Misc. 243, 65 N. Y. Supp. 668 (1900); Pullman Palace Car Co. v. 
 Nelson, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 223, 54 S. W. 624 (1899); Pullman P. C. Co. v. 
 Booth (Tex. Civ. App.), 28 S. W. 719 (1894); Nash v. Copeland, 4 New 
 So. Wales W. N. 41. 
 
 'Pullman P. C. Co. v. Reed, 75 111. 125, 20 Am. Rep. 232 (1874); Buck 
 V. Webb, .58 Hun (N. Y.), 185, 11 N. Y. Supp. 617 (1890). 
 [246] 
 
Chap. XXVIII.] Safety and Comfort of Passenger. [§ 365. 
 
 coiamodation, but on the other hand it may be presented 
 whenever the holder chooses. The berth ticket, on the other 
 hand, entitles the holder to a particular berth on a particular 
 train, and if it is not then presented it is of no value. 
 
 § 365. Providing berth throughout the journey. 
 
 The passenger who is provided with a berth during a certain 
 journey is entitled not only to have the berth prepared for 
 him, but also to keep that or another equally good berth 
 throughout the journey. This becomes a contractual obliga- 
 tion of the car company, to which it may be held although the 
 railroad company has entire control over the train and is to 
 blame for ejecting the passenger. Thus, where the passenger 
 was wrongfully removed from the sleeping car to an ordinary 
 coach before the completion of the journey, the car company 
 was held responsible; the court sasdng that, "the Pullman- 
 Company will not be reUeved of its contract by an arrange- 
 ment with the railroad company which prevented it from 
 carrjdng it out." * So where a plaintiff, having a raih-oad 
 ticket from New Orleans to New York over a certain route, 
 apphed to a sleeping-car agent for a berth through, presenting 
 his ticket, and was sold a berth in a certain car, this was 
 tantamount to an agreement that this car should carry him 
 over the route called for by his ticket. The car as a matter 
 of fact went over another route, and the passenger upon pre- 
 senting his ticket was refused passage by the railroad com- 
 pany. The court held that the car company was guilty of a 
 breach of obligation.' And where the car in which a berth 
 had been assigned to the plaintifif was dropped from the train 
 by the railroad company before reaching the destination, the 
 car company was held responsible for a breach of its obhga- 
 tion.i" And so where the passenger was forced to leave the 
 
 8 Pullman P. C. Co. v. Cain, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 503, 40 S. W. 220 (1897). 
 
 » Pullman's P. C. Co. v. King, 99 Fed. 380 (1900); Pullman P. C. Co. v. 
 McDonald, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 322, 21 S. W. 945 (1893). 
 
 lo Pullman P. C. Co. v. Taylor, 65 Ind. 153, 32 Am. Rep. 57 (1879). 
 See, however, contra, Duval v. Pullman P. C. Co., 62 Fed. 265 (1894). 
 
 [247] 
 
§ 367.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXVIII. 
 
 car because it had caught fire, owing to the negligence of the 
 servants of the company, the company was Uable." 
 
 §366. Excuse for ejecting passenger. 
 
 The car company may, however, have a legal excuse for 
 ejecting a passenger before he reaches his destination. Thus, 
 where a passenger develops a contagious disease, hke small- 
 pox, while on the journey, consideration for the other pas- 
 sengers requires that he should be removed in a reasonable 
 way; and so if a man was quarrelsome or intoxicated and 
 boisterous he might be removed, having due regard to his 
 safety and comfort.^^ 
 
 § 367. Right of company to change berth. 
 
 Some doubt exists on the authorities whether the company 
 having sold a berth to a passenger may then change the berth, 
 and compel the passenger to occupy another. In the case of 
 Mann Boudoir Car Company v. Dupre " a berth had been 
 assigned to a woman, made up, and she had gone to bed in it; 
 the conductor' afterwards discovered that he had made a 
 mistake, since the berth had been engaged by another person, 
 and compelled her to leave it and take another, equally good 
 in itself. The passenger brought action, and the court with- 
 out much consideration held that action would not he. It 
 might be doubtful in such a case whether any other berth 
 would be equal to the one in which a woman had aheady gone 
 to bed; and whether it was reasonable in such a case to insist 
 upon a change of berth in the middle of the night. The fact 
 that the company was under obhgation to furnish this berth 
 to a third party would of course have no bearing on its obhga- 
 tion to the plaintiff. 
 
 In the case of Pullman Palace Car Company v. Taylor," 
 however, the right of the car company to change the berth 
 
 " Pullman P. C. Co. v. Barker, 4 Col. 344, 34 .4m. Rep. 89 (1878). 
 
 12 Paddock v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R., 37 Fed. 841, 4 L. R. A. 231 
 (1889). 
 
 13 54 Fed. 646, 21 L. R. A. 289 (1893). 
 " 65 Ind. 153, 32 Am. Rep. 57 (1879). 
 
 [248] 
 
Chap. XXVIII.] Safety and Comfort of Passenger. [§ 368. 
 
 assigned was much limited, and it would seem altogether 
 denied. The court said that the contract was to furnish the 
 berth assigned "or at least to furnish an equally desirable 
 berth in the same locality, in another car of equal safety, 
 convenience and comfort." In that case the car to which 
 the plaintiff had been assigned was dropped by the railroad 
 short of his destination; and the car company offered him in 
 another car lower berth number 1, or a lower berth in the 
 drawing-room, in place of lower berth number 6, to which he 
 had been assigned. He was held entitled to recover damages. 
 Judge Worden said: "It was for the particular berth in the 
 car that the plaintiff paid his money. That berth was the one 
 which, by the contract, he was to have. There is, doubtless, 
 some choice in berths; and, whether from mere caprice or 
 from good reason the plaintiff chose and paid for that berth, 
 he was entitled to have it. The defendant could not, without 
 breach of contract, deprive him of that berth, although it 
 offered to furnish him another, any more than the plaintiff 
 could have claimed another, if he had happened to change his 
 mind and desire another." 
 
 § 368. Who may occupy berth. 
 
 The ordinary berth ticket in a sleeping car permits the 
 occupancy of the berth by two persons. If, however, a ticket 
 or pass is issued giving only one person a right to occupy the 
 berth he cannot invite another person to share it with him. 
 This difference was illustrated in a case where a person took 
 with him his wife and child on an excursion, under an arrange- 
 ment by which he was to buy regular tickets going and re- 
 ceive a pass retiu"ning. He bought a section in the sleeping 
 car going, and the child was allowed as a matter of course to 
 share the mother's berth; on the return he received a pass 
 for a section for himself and wife, and the child was not allowed 
 to share the wife's berth on the pass.^^ And in one case it 
 
 15 PuUman Palace Car Co. v. Marsh, 24 Ind. App. 129, 53 N. E. 782 
 (1899). 
 
 [249] 
 
§ 368.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXVIII. 
 
 was implied, though probably without sufficient consideration, 
 that a person has no right to occupy with another a berth 
 engaged by the latter.^^ 
 
 If the husband procures a berth, he and his wife are of 
 course allowed to occupy it; " but on the other hand it is the 
 duty of the company to prevent a man and woman, not being 
 married to one another, to occupy the same berth. As it is 
 of course impossible for the company to investigate the actual 
 fact in case a marriage is claimed, the company may act on 
 reasonable appearances; and if the alleged husband and wife 
 deal separately with the company, procuring different berths, 
 and especially if the alleged wife went to the husband's berth 
 clandestinely, the company would be justified in refusing to 
 permit them to occupy one berth together. In a case of this sort 
 the court said : " No question can exist with regard to the right 
 of a husband and wife to occupy the same berth in a sleeping 
 car. At the same time the proprietors of such conveyances 
 imperatively owe to the travelling public the duty of seeing 
 that men and women who do not occupy to each other that 
 relation shall not occupy the same one. Usually there need 
 exist no difficulty about preserving and enforcing both the 
 right and the duty. When a berth is contracted for by the 
 husband, either with an express understanding that it is en- 
 gaged for the joint occupancy of himself and wife or under 
 circumstances that are not misleading within themselves, the 
 refusal to permit such occupancy, without other reason than 
 the difference of sex, and when such refusaV would be a breach 
 of contract, would give to the injured party a right of action 
 for damages, in which might be considered circumstances of 
 insult and aggravation attending the breach. ... It may 
 be admitted that there was nothing improper in the conduct of 
 the plaintiff and his wife when their relationship to each other 
 is considered. And yet it cannot be affirmed that their actions 
 
 mPuUman P. C. Co. y. Bales, 80 Tex, 211, 14 S. W. 8.55 (1890). 
 17 Pullman P. C. Co. v. Bales, 80 Tex. 211, 14 S. W. 855, 15 S. W. 785 
 (1890). 
 
 [250] 
 
Chap. XXVIII.] Safety and Comfort of Passenger. [§ 370. 
 
 were not under the circumstances calculated to excite the 
 suspicion and arouse the Adgilance of defendant's servants, and 
 make it their duty to investigate the matter and apply a 
 remedy for the wrong, if one was foimd to exist." 
 
 §369. Making up berth. 
 
 While the passenger is doubtless entitled to have his berth 
 made up at any reasonable time,^* there is no absolute duty 
 to make it up at once upon demand. The utmost duty of the 
 company is to make it up within a reasonable time after de- 
 mand. Consequently, when a passenger, early in the evening, 
 demanded that his berth should be made up at once, and the 
 porter declined to do so until he had finished serving an order 
 for luncheon, but actually made the berth ready within half 
 an hour, the passenger was held to have no cause of action 
 against the car company.** 
 
 § 370. Duty to awaken passengers. 
 
 It is the duty of the car company to awaken a sleeping pas- 
 senger long enough before reaching his destination to enable 
 him to dress aind leave the train decently, safely, and without 
 undue haste or delay.^" In the case of McKeon v. Chicago, 
 Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway ^* it appeared that the plaintiff, 
 a married woman, had to change from one sleeping car to 
 another early in the morning at a junction. The porter failed 
 to awake her before reaching the junction, and she was obhged 
 to hurry from one car to another without a chance to dress 
 herself properly. The company was held liable for the dam- 
 ages she suffered. Mr. Chief Justice Cassoday said: "It be- 
 came the duty of the defendant, whether stipulated in the 
 
 18 Nevin v. Pullman P. C. Co., 106 III. 222, 46 Am. Rep. 688 (1883). 
 w Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Ehrman, 65 Miss. 383 (1888). 
 
 20 Airey v. Pullman P. C. Co., 50 La. Ann. 648, 23 So. 512 (1898); Pull- 
 man P. C. Co. V. Smith, 79 Tex. 468, 14 S. W. 993, 23 Am. St. Rep. 356, 
 13 L. R. A. 215 (1891); McKeon v. Chicago M. & S. P. Ry., 94 Wis. 477, 
 69 N. W. 175, 59 Am. St. Rep. 909, 35 L. R. A. 252 (1896). 
 
 21 Supra. 
 
 [251] 
 
§ 372.] Innkeepees. [Chap. XXVIII. 
 
 contract of carriage or not, to either awaken her in time to 
 make the necessary preparation for such change in a suitable 
 and decent manner, upon reaching the station, or, faiUng to so 
 awaken her before reaching the station, to hold the train at 
 that point for a sufficient length of time to enable her to make 
 such preparation as was necessary to change cars without 
 trepidation or the exposure of her person to the gaze of specta- 
 tors." 
 
 §371. Regulations. 
 
 Regulations may doubtless be made by the car company 
 to govern the conduct of passengers in its cars; but such 
 regulations must be reasonable in themselves, and must be 
 properly published, so that passengers may know of them. 
 Regulations of the company communicated orally from time 
 to time to its employees, not printed on any paper or brought 
 to knowledge of travellers except when communicated by the 
 employees, are not binding. "It would seem to be an un- 
 heard-of requirement to demand obedience to the defendant's 
 rules, when those rules are not pubhshed and are not known 
 to travellers who are to be guided by them." ^^ 
 
 §372. Safety of the car. 
 
 A car coinpany is bound to have a car which is safe both 
 in its construction and in its use; and it is therefore responsible 
 to a passenger for any injury caused by a negligent manage- 
 ment by its servant of the appliances in the car. So where a 
 passenger was injured by a headboard, placed between two 
 sections by the porter, falhng upon him, from a cause which 
 was not apparent, he was entitled to compensation; ^^ and in 
 the same way the company would be liable for an upper berth 
 improperly secured falhng on a passenger's head.^^ 
 
 22 Woods, C. J., in Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Lawrence, 74 Miss. 782, 
 796, 22 So. 53 (1897). 
 
 23 Jenkins v. Louisville & N. R. R., 104 Ky. 673, 47 S. W. 761 (1898). 
 2< In the actual decisions the carrier has been held liable; post, § 375. 
 
 If the carrier is liable, o fortiori the car company is liable. 
 [252] 
 
Chap. XXVIII.] Safety and Comfort of Passenger. [§ 373. 
 
 It is the duty of the company to keep the car in such a con- 
 dition that the passenger who has occasion to pass through it 
 at night may do so safely. "It is a matter of common knowl- 
 edge that on such cars passengers are expected to use the con- 
 veniences of the car during the night, and also are awakened 
 in time that they may both dress and make their toilets before 
 arriving at their destination;" and the company must therefore 
 sufficiently Ught the toilet rooms, and secure doors through 
 which a passenger might accidentally go and be injured.^^ 
 So it must keep the aisles clear of large articles of luggage or 
 other obstacles over which a passenger might stumble and be 
 hurt.26 
 
 § 373. Protection of passengers. 
 
 It is the duty of the sl'eeping-car company to guard its pas- 
 sengers from harm, so far as it may reasonably do so. Thus, 
 it must guard passengers from the attacks of wrongdoers, if 
 such attacks can be foreseen; but where the attack cannot be 
 foreseen, as in a case where a passenger is killed by an assassin, 
 the company is not liable. "It cannot be deemed to have 
 anticipated nor expected to guard and protect him against a 
 crime so horrid, and happily so rare, as that of murder. . . . 
 While not directly responsible to a passenger for a wrong in- 
 flicted by an intruder, or a stranger, or a fellow passenger, they 
 are responsible for such injury if it appears that the com- 
 panies knew, or ought to have known, that danger existed or 
 was reasonably to be apprehended, and that they could, by 
 the use of the agencies at their disposal, have prevented the 
 mischief." ^'' 
 
 So it is the duty of the car company to protect its passenger, 
 so far as it may, against annoyance and insult. Where the 
 company allowed drunken persons to enter a sleeping car and 
 
 25 Piper V. New York C. & H. R. R. R., 76 Hun (N. Y.), 44, 27 N. Y. 
 Supp. 693 (1894). 
 
 2«Levien v. Webb, 30 K. Y. Misc. 196, 61 N. Y. Supp. 1113 (1899). 
 
 27 Connell v. Chesapeake & O. Ry., 93 Va. 44, 24 S. E. 467, 57 Am. St. 
 Rep. 786 (1896). 
 
 [253] 
 
§ 375.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXVIII. 
 
 use vulgar, profane and indecent language it was liable in 
 damages to a female passenger for the injury thereby sus- 
 tained.^* 
 
 §374. Injury by servant of the company. 
 
 Since it is the duty of the company to protect the passenger 
 from injury so far as it is reasonably possible to do so, and the 
 company's conductor and porter are employed for the pur- 
 pose, among others, of performing this duty, it follows that 
 for every negligent or intentional injury to the passenger by 
 the conductor or the porter the company is liable; since the 
 servant who inflicted the injury could and should have pre- 
 vented it. Consequently, where the porter shot a passenger 
 by reason of negligently handling a pistol the company was 
 liable; ^^ and for the same reason the company is liable for 
 an assault upon a passenger by the porter.^" 
 
 Where a passenger from an ordinary car enters a Pullman 
 and is there assaulted by a servant of the company, the com- 
 pany owes such passenger no duty of protection; and imless 
 the assault is in the course of the porter's employment, which 
 is seldom the case, the company is not responsible as master, 
 and the assaulted passenger cannot maintain an action against 
 the company .^^ 
 
 §375. Cumulative liability of the carrier. 
 
 The railroad company is also liable for accidents caused by 
 improper construction or use of the cars, since as a carrier 
 it is responsible for the safety of the vehicles in which its 
 passengers are carried.^^ And for the same reason it is liable 
 
 28 Houston E. & W. T. Ry. v. Perkins, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 508, 52 S. W. 
 124 (1899). 
 
 20 Heenrich v. Pullman P. C. Co., 20 Fed. 100 (1884). 
 
 3» Campbell v. Pullman P. C. Co., 42 Fed. 484 (1890); Pullman P. C. Co. 
 V. Lawrence, 74 Miss. 782, 22 So. 53 (1897). 
 
 31 Williams v. Pullman P. C. Co., 40 I.a. Ann. 87, 3 So. 631 (1888); Cassedy 
 V. Pullman P. C. Co. (Miss.), 17 So. 373 (1895). 
 
 32 Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy, 102 U. S. 451, 26 L. Ed. 141 (1880); Rail- 
 road Co. V. Walrath, 38 Oh. S. 461, 43 Am. Rep. 433 (1882). 
 
 [254] 
 
Chap. XXVIII.] Safety and Comfort of Passenger. [§ 377. 
 
 for an assault by the porter upon the passenger, since the 
 carrier must protect the passenger, and has delegated the duty 
 to the car company and its servants.*' 
 
 §376. Duty of the passenger to take care of the berth. 
 
 The passenger is tmder an obligation to deal properly with 
 the berth and its furniture while he occupies it. As the Su- 
 preme Court of Illinois said : *■* " He impliedly agreed to con- 
 duct himself in a quiet and orderly manner, to take due and 
 proper care of the berths while in his possession, and surrender 
 the same at the end of his journey in as good condition as 
 when assigned to him, necessary wear excepted." 
 
 § 377. Right of the passenger to assign or exchange berth. 
 
 The question whether a passenger who has obtained a right 
 to a berth may assign the right to another passenger, or may 
 exchange berths with another passenger, seems never to have 
 been passed upon by a court of last resort. It was, however, 
 elaborately considered and decided in the affirmative by the 
 Superior Court of Baltimore. In that case the facts as they 
 appeared in evidence were that the plaintiff had been able to 
 secure an upper berth only; a friend who had taken a section 
 from Washington to Chicago, but left the train about seven 
 hours before reaching Chicago, handed the plaintiff his berth 
 check, and gave him permission to occupy the berth during 
 the rest of the journey. The conductor, however, resold the 
 section, and ejected the plaintiff. It was held that the plain- 
 tiff had a right to ride in the section, and he was allowed to 
 recover.'^ Mr. Justice Ritchie said: "The contract for the 
 use of a section is described in the text-books and in the regula- 
 tions of the company as a contract of sale — a sale of a given 
 ' space ' in a designated car. It is a hiring or a quasi lease of 
 the section, and gives to the passenger the right to the use of 
 
 33 DwineUe v. New York C. & H. R. R. R., 120 N. Y. 117, 24 N. E. 319, 
 17 Am. St. Rep. 611 (1890). 
 
 34 Nevin v. Pullman P. C. Co., 106 111. 222, 234, 46 Am. Rep. 688 (1883). 
 as Curlander v. Pullman P. C. Co. (Md.), 28 Chicago Leg. News 68 (1895). 
 
 [255] 
 
§ 377.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXVIII. 
 
 the same with its comforts and conveniences between the 
 points designated on the ticket. ... It makes no differ- 
 ence whether the porter makes up the berth and dusts off the 
 seat for one passenger or another. The company sells the use 
 of its section, with the right to some trifling services from its 
 porter, from one point to another, and is paid in full for the 
 same; it can make no possible difference to it whether the 
 section is occupied by one first-class passenger or another, and 
 whoever may hold it, the company can be called upon to do 
 or fm-nish nothing that it has not agreed to and been paid for. 
 If the holder leaves the train without transferring his section, 
 it might be inferred that he had abandoned it to the company, 
 and it might be resold, but when the company undertakes to 
 sell again what it has already once sold and been paid for, it 
 does so at the risk of trespassing upon the rights of others. 
 " It is held in Searles' case •^'^ that the purchaser of a section 
 may share its use with .any proper persons whom he invites 
 into it; this is because he has purchased the use of the whole 
 section, and as he can bestow on others the right to use part 
 of it while he is there, I can see no reason why he cannot 
 confer upon them the right to continue the use of it when he 
 leaves the train before the end of the trip for which it has been 
 sold. It is also conceded, as I have said, that the purchaser 
 may transfer his section before he enters upon his journey. 
 I can see no reason why be cannot transfer it immediately after 
 starting if he chooses to ride in a passenger coach; or why two 
 passengers might not exchange sections; or why, after having 
 gone half of his journey, the holder might not then transfer 
 his section for the balance of the trip, and himself withdi'aw 
 into a passenger coach. It is conceded that he can make such 
 transfers as long as he remains on the train, provided he gives 
 notice to the conductor and gets his assent. But the assent 
 of the defendant to such transfers is not necessary, because 
 there is no condition in the contract which requires it. If the 
 holder of the section, after ha\'ing gone part of his journey, 
 38 Searles v. Mann B. C. Co., 45 Fed. 330 (1891). 
 [256] 
 
Chap. XXVIII.] Safety and Comfort of Passengeb. [§ 377. 
 
 can transfer it to another for the rest of the trip, he himself 
 continuing on the train but riding in a passenger coach, as I 
 think he can do, he can make a vaUd transfer on leaving the 
 train, because it makes no difference to the Pullman Company, 
 which has nothing to do with his contract of transportation, 
 whether he withdraws into a passenger coach or leaves the 
 train." The case was not carried to a higher court. 
 
 In spite of the strong position and the able argument of the 
 court in this case, the correctness of the decision may well be 
 doubted. The assumption that the sale of a berth to a pas- 
 senger is in any way like a lease seems fundamentally errone- 
 ous. The sale of the berth is the mere grant of a Ucense to 
 occupy the berth; a license entirely personal to the passenger 
 to whom it is sold. If he chooses not to exercise his license, 
 no one has a right to complain that another is not allowed to 
 do so. It is possible that the company would have no right 
 to object to an exchange of berths between two first-class pas- 
 sengers, but an assignment of a berth is probably not legally 
 effective. 
 
 17 [ 257 ] 
 
§ 381.] 
 
 Innkeepers. 
 
 [Chap. XXIX. 
 
 CHAPTER XXIX. 
 
 RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROPERTY OF THE PASSENGER. 
 
 § 381. Liability for negligence. 
 
 382. Loss by theft of servant of the 
 
 company. 
 
 383. For what goods the company 
 
 is responsible. 
 
 384. Amount of care required. 
 
 385. Negligence in the daytime. 
 
 386. Care necessary at night. 
 
 387. Continuous and effective 
 
 watch. ' 
 
 388. Theft by another passenger. 
 
 389. Preventing a passenger from 
 carrying off another's lug- 
 
 390. Limitation of liability. 
 
 391. Contributory negligence. 
 
 392. Evidence of negligence. 
 
 393. Burden of proof. 
 
 394. Care of property left behind 
 
 by a passenger. 
 
 395. Company when liable for 
 
 goods as bailee. 
 
 § 381. Liability for negligence. 
 
 As has been seen/ a sleeping-car company is not an insurer 
 either as a common carrier or as an innkeeper. If it is to be 
 held liable for loss of the passenger's goods it must be on the 
 ground that it has been negligent in guarding the goods from 
 loss. The company is not liable in the absence of negligence.^ 
 When, however, goods of the passenger are lost through the 
 
 lAnte, §§341, 342. 
 
 2 PuUman P. C. Co. v. Freudenstein, 3 Col. App. 540, 34 Pac. 578 (1893); 
 Pullman P. C. Co. v. Smith, 73 lU. 360, 24 Am. Rep. 258 (1874); McMurray 
 V. Pullman's P. C. Co., 86 111. App. 619 (1899); Voss v. Wagner P. C. Co., 
 16 Ind. App. 271, 43 N. E. 20, 44 N. E. 1010 (1896); Whicher v. Boston & 
 A. R. R., 176 Mass. 275, 57 N. E. 601, 79 Am. St. Rep. 314 (1900); Root 
 V. New York C. S. C. Co., 28 Mo. App. 199 (1887); Tracy v. PuUman P. C. 
 Co., 67 How. Pr. 154 (1884); Welch v. Pulhnan P. C. Co., 16 Abb. Pr. 
 N. S. 352 (1874); Welding v. Wagner, 1 City Ct. Rep.' 66 (1878); Sessions 
 v. New York, L. E. & W. R. R., 78 Hun (N. Y.), 541, 29 N. Y. Supp. 628 
 (1894); Pullman P. C. Co. v. Hatch, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 303, 70 S. W. 771 
 (1902); Steam v. Pullman Car Co., 8 Ont. 171 (1885). Contra, Pullman 
 P. C. Co. V. Lowe, 28 Neb. 239, 44 N. W. 226, 26 Am. St. Rep. 325, 6 L. R. A. 
 809 (1889); Sise v. Pullman P. C. Co., 1 Quebec Super. 9 (semble). 
 [258] 
 
Chap. XXIX.] Property of the Passenger. [§ 383. 
 
 lack by the car company of due and reasonable care, the com- 
 pany is liable because of the negligence.^ 
 
 The question whether the company was negligent is for 
 the jury.^ 
 
 § 382. Loss by theft of servant of the company. 
 
 The company is absolutely liable for goods of the passenger 
 stolen by the porter or the conductor; for he is a servant who 
 is employed by the company to protect the passenger against 
 such a loss, and his theft is a failure to do his duty and makes 
 the company liable.^ 
 
 § 383. For what goods the company is responsible. 
 
 The responsibUity of the car company does not extend to 
 all goods that might be brought into the car by the passenger. 
 It is responsible for the clothing of the passenger, and for such 
 jewels and ornaments as he may reasonably wear; * for such 
 small hand luggage as a passenger usually takes with him 
 into the train,^ even though the contents were not to be used 
 
 3 Pullman P. C. Co. v. Martin, 92 Ga. 161, 18 S. E. 364 (1893); Woodruff 
 S. & P. C. Co. V. Diehl, 84 Ind. 474, 43 Am. Rep. 102 (1882); Dawley v. 
 Wagner P. C. Co., 169 Mass. 315, 47 N. E. 1024 (1897); Williams v. Webb, 
 27 N. Y. Misc. 508, 68 N. Y. Supp. 300 (1899); Falls River & M. Co. v. 
 Pullman P. C. Co., 6 Ohio Dec. 85 (1896); Pullman Car Co. v. Gardner. 
 3 Penny. (Pa.) 78, 14 W. N. C. 17 (1883); Pullman P. C. Co. v. Pollock, 
 69 Tex. 120, 5 S. W. 814, 5 Am. St. Rep. 31 (1887); Stevenson v. Pullman 
 P. C. Co., 26 S. W. 112 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894). 
 
 * Pullman Car Co. v. Gardner, 3 Penny. (Pa.) 78, 14 W. N. C. 17 (1883); 
 Hatch V. Pullman S. C. Co., 84 S. W. 246 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904). 
 
 f Pullman's P. C. Co. v. Martin, 95 Ga. 314, 22 S. E. 700 (1894); Root 
 V. New York S. C. Co., 28 Mo. App. 199 (1887); Morrow v. Pulhnan P. C. 
 Co., 98 Mo. App. 351, 73 S. W. 281 (1903); PuUman P. C. Co. v. Gavin, 
 93 Tenn. 53, 23 S. W. 70, 42 Am. St. Rep. 902, 21 L. R. A. 289 (1893) 
 PuUman P. C. Co. v. Matthews, 74 Tex. 654, 12 S. W. 744, 15 Am. St. Rep. 
 873 (1889). 
 
 8 Blum V. Southern P. P. C. Co., 1 Flip. 500, Fed. Cas. No. 1,574 (1876); 
 PuUman P. C. Co. v. Adams, 120 Ala. 581, 24 So. 921, 74 Am. St. Rep. 
 53, 45 L. R. A. 767 (1898); Pullman's P. C. Co. v. Martin, 95 Ga. 314, 22 
 S. E. 700 (1894); PuUman's P. C. Co. v. Harvey, 101 Ga. 733, 28 S. E. 
 989 (1897); PuUman P. C. Co. v. Gaylord, 9 Ky. L. Rep. 58 (1887). 
 
 ' Blum V. Southern P. P. C. Co., 1 Flip. 500, Fed. Cas. No. 1,574 (1876); 
 
 [ 259 ] 
 
§ 383.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXIX. 
 
 on the journey, and the passenger also had with him a trunk 
 in the baggage car; * and for a reasonable amount of money 
 for travelling expenses.* For any money he may be carry- 
 ing beyond such amount as may be reasonably necessary for 
 travelling expenses the passenger takes the risk; if it is lost 
 by negligence of the company, the owner must bear the loss.^" 
 "The small fee paid for a berth constitutes compensation 
 simply for the accommodation and the attendant watchful- 
 ness the company impliedly agrees to furnish; and though its 
 responsibility rests solely in negligence, it should not be ex- 
 posed to the hazard of false or exaggerated claims which 
 designing men may attempt to enforce. This hmitation of 
 liability need work no hardship on the traveller as he can 
 protect himself against loss by sending per express the money 
 in excess of the requirements of his trip, or by availing himself 
 of banking facilities, such as purchasing a draft on some bank- 
 ing house at the place of his destination." " What is a rea- 
 sonable amount for travelling expenses is a question for the 
 jury.i^ It has been held in one case that in the absence of 
 evidence of what would constitute a reasonable amount, 
 nominal damages only could be found; '^ but it would seem 
 that a minimum amount might be allowed on the general in- 
 formation of the jury. 
 
 Cooney v. PuUman P. C. Co., 121 AJa. 368, 25 So. 712, 50 L. R. A. 690 
 (1898); Kates v. Pullman's P. C. Co., 95 Ga. 810, 23 S. E. 186 (1895); Pull- 
 man's P. C. Co. V. Harvey, 101 Ga. 733, 28 S. E. 989 (1897). 
 
 8 Hampton v. Pullman P. C. Co., 42 Mo. App. 134 (1890). 
 
 8 Blum V. Southern P. P. C. Co., 1 Flip. 500, Fed. Cas. No. 1,574 (1876); 
 Kates V. Pullman's P. C. Co., 95 Ga. 810, 23 S. E. 186 (1895); Pullman 
 P. C. Co. V. Gaylord, 9 Ky. L. Rep. 58 (1887); Root v. New York C. S. C. 
 Co., 28 Mo. App. 199 (1887). 
 
 lOBarrott v. PuUman s P. C. Co., 51 Fed. 796 (1892); Hillis v. Chicago, 
 R. I. & P. Ry., 72 la. 228, 33 N. W. 643 (1887); Illinois C. R. R. v. Handy, 
 63 Miss. 609, 56 Am. Rep. 846 (1886); Wilson v. Baltimore & O. R. R., 32 
 Mo. App. 682 (1888); Williams v. Webb, 27 N. Y. Misc. 508, 58 N. Y. Supp. 
 300 (1899). 
 
 11 Levintritt, J., in Williams v. Webb, supra. 
 
 "Williams v. Webb, 27 N. Y. Misc. 508, 58 N. Y. Supp. 300 (1899). 
 
 13 Wilson V. Baltimore & O. R. R., 32 Mo. App. 682 (1888). 
 [260] 
 
Chap. XXlX.] Property of the Passenger. [§ 3S5. 
 
 In applying this general principle, recovery has been allowed 
 for a valuable diamond pin worn in a scarf," and for three 
 diamond rings worn on a passenger's finger; ^^ but not for a 
 diamond ring, not worn because it was broken, but carried 
 in the pocketbook for safe-keeping while being taken to a 
 jeweller for repair.^* Recovery may he had for loss of a 
 mileage book, but not of a pistol." 
 
 § 384. Amount of care required. 
 
 The amount of care required of the car company is what 
 is reasonable under the circumstances; such care as may be 
 reasonably necessary to secure the safety of the passenger 
 and his goods." It is obvious that a higher degree of care is 
 required at night, when the passenger is asleep, than in the 
 daytime, when he is awake and able to care take of him- 
 self; " it will therefore be advisable to consider separately 
 the question of neghgence by day and that of neghgence at 
 night. 
 §385. Negligence in the daytime. 
 
 During the daytime the company need take only the ordi- 
 nary and customary steps for guarding the passenger's goods; 
 the passenger himself must give them such care as is neces- 
 sary in addition to what he has a right to expect from the 
 company.^" 
 
 " Pullman's P. C. Co. v. Harvey, 101 Ga. 733, 28 S. E. 989 (1897); Bevls 
 V. Baltimore & O. R. R., 26 Mo. App. 19 (1887). 
 
 15 Pullman P. C. Co. v. Hunter, 107 Ky. .519, 54 S. W. 845, 47 L. R. A. 
 286 (1900). 
 
 "Pullman P. C. Co. v. Adams, 120 Ala. 581, 24 So. 921, 74 Am. St. 
 Rep. 53, 45 L. R. A. 767 (1898). 
 
 " Cooney v. Pullman P. C. Co., 121 Ala. 368, 25 So. 712, 50 L. R. A. 
 690 (1898). 
 
 18 Pullman's P. C. Co. v. Harvey, 101 Ga. 733, 28 S. E. 989 (1897); Pull- 
 man's P. C. Co. V. Hall, 106 Ga. 765, 32 S. E. 923, 71 Am. St. Rep. 293, 
 44 L. R. A. 790 (1899); Belden v. Pullman P. C. Co., 43 S. W. 22 (Tex. 
 Civ. App. 1897). 
 
 19 Pullman's P. C. Co. v. HaU, 106 Ga. 765, 32 S. E. 923, 71 Am. St. 
 Rep. 293, 44 L. R. A. 790 (1899); Whicher v. Boston & A. R. R., 176 Mass. 
 275, 57 N. E. 601, 79 Am. St. Rep. 314 (1900). 
 
 so Efron v. Wagner P. C. Co., 59 Mo. App. 641 (1894). 
 
 [261] 
 
§ 386.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXIX. 
 
 The commonest allegation of negligence while the passenger 
 is awake is connected with the porter leaving the car and 
 standing outside at a station. Generally in such a case, 
 where one door is locked or a porter stands at each end of the 
 car outside, so as to prevent the entry of unauthorized per- 
 sons, the precaution is sufhcient; ^' and indeed it is the porter's 
 duty to stand outside, to assist passengers who wish to enter 
 the car. But the circumstances may make this negligent; 
 as, for instance, when the train is standing in a station in the 
 evening, and the porter has left the passenger's goods near 
 an open window,^^ or in an unlocked drawing-room near an 
 unlocked door,^^ or there were other circumstances of neg- 
 ligence.^* But where the baggage is placed near an open 
 window and is taken from the outside while the train is in 
 motion, there is no negligence; such an event could hardly 
 be foreseen and guarded against.^^ 
 
 Where the porter helped the only passenger into the station 
 with her luggage, and left one article of luggage behind in 
 the unguarded car, the act was held negligent, and the com- 
 pany was held Hable for the loss of the article.^® 
 
 § 386. Care necessary at night. 
 
 During the night while the passenger is asleep the car com- 
 pany must exercise peculiar vigilance to protect the passenger 
 and his goods from injury. This care is inherent in the nature 
 of the business. "The invitation to make use of the bed 
 carries with it an invitation to sleep, and an implied agree- 
 ment to take reasonable care of the guest's effects while he 
 
 21 Efron V. Wagner P. C. Co., supra. 
 
 22Dawley v. Wagner P. C. Co., 169 Mass. 315, 47 N. E. 1024 (1897). 
 
 23 Arthur v. Pullman Co., 44 N. Y. Misc. 229, 88 N. Y. Supp. 552 (1904); 
 Sise V. Pullman P. C. Co., 1 Quebec Super. 9 (1892). 
 
 24 Pullman P. C. Co. v. Arents, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 71, 66 S. W. 329 (1902). 
 
 25 Pullman's P. C. Co. v. Hall, 106 Ga. 765, 32 S. E. 923, 71 Am. St. 
 Rep. 293, 44 L. R. A. 790 (1899). 
 
 28 Voss V. Wagner P. C. Co., 16 Ind. App. 271, 43 N. E. 20, 44 N. E. 
 1010 (1896). 
 
 [262] 
 
Chap. XXIX.] Propehty of the Passenger. [§ 387. 
 
 is in such a state that care, upon his own part, is impossible." ^ 
 As Mr. Chief Justice Morton said in Lewis v. New York Sleep- 
 ing Car Company: ^* "A sleeping-car company holds itself out 
 to the world as furnishing safe and comfortable cars, and, 
 when it sells a ticket, it impliedly stipulates to do so. It 
 invites passengers to pay for and make use of its cars for sleep- 
 ing, all parties knowing that, during the greater part of the 
 night, the passenger will be asleep, powerless to protect him- 
 self, or to guard his property. He cannot, Uke the guest of 
 an inn, by locking the door, guard against danger. He has 
 no right to take any such steps to protect himself in a sleeping 
 car, but, by the necessity of the case, is dependent upon the 
 owners and officers of the car to guard him and the property 
 he has with him from danger from thieves or otherwise. The 
 law raises the duty on the part of the car company to afford 
 him this protection." 
 
 § 387. Continuous and effective watch. 
 
 The vigilance required of the company during the night is 
 to keep a continuous and effective watch over the interior of 
 the car, both to prevent the entrance of criminal intruders and 
 to see that the occupants of the car do not steal from their 
 fellow occupants.^* It is enough to have one careful watch- 
 
 27 Brown, J., in Blum v. Southern P. P. C. Co., 1 Flip. 500, 505, Fed. 
 Cas. No. 1,574 (1876). 
 
 28 143 Mass. 267, 273, 9 N. E. 617, 58 Am. Rep. 135 (1887). 
 
 2» Blum V. Southern P. P. C. Co., 1 Flip. 500, Fed. Cas. No. 1,574 (1876); 
 Pullman P. C. Co. v. Adams, 120 Ala. 581, 24 So. 921, 74 Am. St. Rep. 
 53, 45 L. R. A. 767 (1898); Kates v. Pullman's P. C. Co., 95 Ga. 810, 23 
 S. E. 186 (1895); Woodruff S. & P. C. Co. v. Diehl, 84 Ind. 474, 43 Am. 
 Rep. 102 (1882); Pullman P. C. Co. v. Hunter, 107 Ky. 519, 54 S. W. 845 
 47 L. R. A. 286 (1900); Root v. New York C. S. C. Co., 28 Mo. App. 199 
 (1887); Hampton v. Pullman P. C. Co., 42 Mo. App. 134 (1890); Morrow 
 V. Pullman P. C. Co., 98 Mo. App. 351, 73 S. W. 281 (1903); Carpenter v. 
 New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 124 N. Y. 53, 26 N. E. 277, 21 Am. St. Rep. 
 644 (1891); Sessions v. New York, L. E. & "W. R. R., 78 Hun (N. Y.), 541, 
 29 N. Y. Supp. 628 (1894); Williams v. Webb, 27 N. Y. Misc. 508, 58 N. Y. 
 Supp. 300 (1899); Pullman Car Co. v. Gardiner, 3 Penny. (Pa.) 78, 18 
 W. N. C. 17 (1883); Pullman P. C. Co. v. Gavin, 93 Tenn. 53, 23 S. W. 70, 
 
 [263] 
 
§ 388.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXIX, 
 
 man at once; ^° but he must keep the whole aisle of the car 
 constantly in sight, and it is neglect of due care for him to 
 spend any part of his watch, at a closet or in a room from 
 which he cannot see the whole aisle,^^ or to leave the car and 
 stand outside it at a station/^ a thing which, as we have seen, 
 is perfectly permissible for him to do in the daytime. 
 
 § 388. Theft by another passenger. 
 
 The carrier should take due care at night to prevent theft 
 by a passenger, so far as it can be prevented; ^^ as, for instance, 
 where the evidence shows that the thief must have stood for 
 some time in the aisle while taking the goods.^^ 
 
 In one case it was urged with great force that the company 
 could not be held liable if there was nothing to call the porter's 
 attention to the danger of theft. "One who avails himself 
 of the comfort afforded on such cars does so with full knowl- 
 edge of the fact that others, whose character the company 
 cannot possibly know, may become fellow travellers with 
 himself, and that the arrangement of the car into berths or 
 sleeping chairs is such that he will necessarily, while asleep, 
 be subjected to easy approach by any dishonest traveller in 
 the same car. The risk of loss from such persons he assumes 
 
 42 Am. St. Rep. 902, 21 L. R. A. 298 (1893); Pullman P. C. Co. v. Hatch, 
 30 Tex. Civ. App. 303, 70 S. W. 771 (1902); Dargan v. Pullman P. C. Co., 
 2 Wills. (Tex.) App. § 691 (1885). 
 
 30 Pullman P. C. Co. v. Gaylord, 9 Ky. L. Rep. 58 (1887). 
 
 31 Woodruff S. & P. C. Co. v. Diehl, 84 Ind. 474, 43 Am. Rep. 102 (1882); 
 Carpenter v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 124 N. Y. 53, 26 N. E. 277, 
 21 Am. St. Rep. 644 (1891). 
 
 32 Pullman P. C. Co. v. Adams, 120 Ala. 581, 24 So. 921, 74 Am. St. Rep. 
 53, 45 L. R. A. 767 (1898); PuUman P. C. Co. v. Hunter, 107 Ky. 519, 54 
 S. W. 845, 47 L. R. A. 286 (1900); Carpenter v. New York, N. H. & H. 
 R. R., 124 N. Y. 53, 26 N. E. 277, 21 Am. St. Rep. 644 (1891). 
 
 33 Blum V. Southern P. P. C. Co., 1 Flip. 500, Fed. Cas. No. 1,574 (1876); 
 Woodruff S. & P. C. Co. v. Diehl, 84 Ind. 474, 43 Am. Rep. 102 (1882); 
 Pullman P. C. Co. v. Gavin, 93 Tenn. 53, 23 S. W. 70, 42 Am. St. Rep. 
 902, 21 L. R. A. 298 (1893). 
 
 34 Bevis V. Baltimore & O. R. R., 26 Mo. App. 19 (1887); Falls River & 
 M. Co. V. Pullman P. C. Co., 6 Ohio Dec. 85 (1896). 
 
 [264] 
 
Chap. XXIX.] Property op the Passenger. [§ 390. 
 
 as an incident of his circumstances, and the company can only 
 be made responsible by evidence of its neglect to keep that 
 reasonable guard which its contract implies that it will." ** 
 This reasoning, however, must be applied with caution. It 
 is no doubt apphcable fully to the case of a day journey; 
 but at night reasonable watchfulness on the part of the com- 
 pany might be expected to prevent most such thefts. 
 
 § 389. Preventing a passenger from carrying off another's luggage. 
 Where a passenger's luggage was carried away at a station 
 during the night by another passenger, the company was held 
 liable on the ground that it was neghgent in the porter not to 
 prevent it.^® But it seems impossible in the ordinary case 
 for the porter to identify every piece of luggage carried away 
 by a passenger; and on this ground in another similar case 
 the company was held not to be responsible.^^ 
 
 § 390. Limitation of liability. 
 
 The sleeping-car company often attempts by a notice posted 
 in the car or printed on the berth check to limit its liability 
 for loss of the passenger's goods through negUgence. Of course 
 such a notice will be of no avail unless brought home to the 
 passenger.^* But the car company being a public-service 
 company, the limitation of liability is against public policy 
 and void even if it is contained in a contract between the 
 company and a passenger.'^ 
 
 35 Cooper, C. J., in Illinois C. R. R. v. Handy, 63 Miss. 609, 56 Am. R«p. 
 846 (1886). 
 
 soCooney v. Pullman P. C. Co., 121 Ala. 368, 25 So. 712, 50 L. R. A. 
 690 (1898). 
 
 37 Belden v. PuUman P. C. Co., 43 S. W. 22 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897). 
 
 38 Lewis V. New York S. C. Co., 143 Mass. 267, 9 N. E. 617, .58 Am. Rep. 
 135 (1887). 
 
 39 Stevenson v. Pullman P. C. Co., 26 S. W. 112 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894). 
 In Louisville N. & G. S. R. R. v. Katzenberger, 16 Lea (Tenn.), 380, 1 
 S. W. 44, 57 Am. Rep. 232 (1886), it was held that such an exemption 
 could not affect the liability of the railroad company, and no reason ap- 
 pears for any distinction between the railroad company and the sleeping- 
 car company. 
 
 [265] 
 
§391.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXIX. 
 
 §391. Contributory negligence. 
 
 The passenger's recovery may be barred by the fact that 
 his own negligence contributed to the loss.^" So if the pas- 
 senger on going to sleep left his goods in an unsafe place he 
 cannot recover for their loss,*' though he cannot be expected 
 to find at his peril the safest place. *^ Contributory negligence 
 is no defence against an intentional act of the company or its 
 servant, as, for instance, theft by a porter; *^ nor is a passenger 
 barred of recovery by the negligence of his travelling com- 
 panion.** 
 
 It is contributory negligence for the passenger to leave a 
 pocketbook or money in his berth while he goes to the toilet 
 room or steps outside the car; *^ but of course it is proper to 
 leave a valise, overcoat, or other article which cannot properly 
 be taken with him.** Leaving a bag or other article on a 
 berth in the daytime while one goes to the smoking room or 
 to dinner has been held evidence of contributory negligence,*^ 
 and under some circumstances the negligence might be ob- 
 vious;** but since it is a regular and well-known custom of 
 
 « Blum V. Southern P. P. C. Co., 1 Flip. 500, Fed. Cas. No. 1,574 (1876); 
 Pullman P. C. Co. v. Adams, 120 Ala. 581, 24 So. 921, 74 Am. St. Rep. 
 53, 45 L. R. A. 767 (1898); Kates v. Pullman's P. C. Co., 95 Ga. 810, 23 
 S. E. 186 (1895). 
 
 " Pullman's P. C. Co. v. Harvey, 101 Ga. 733, 28 S. E. 989 (1897). 
 
 « Pullman P. C. Co. v. Adams, 120 Ala. 581, 24 So. 921, 74 Am. St. Rep. 
 .53, 45 L. R. A. 767 (1898). 
 
 «MoiTow V. PuUman P. C. Co., 98 Mo. App. 351, 73 S. W. 281 (1903); 
 Pullman P. C. Co. v. Matthews, 74 Tex. 654, 12 S. W. 744, 15 Am. St. Rep. 
 873 (1889). 
 
 a Pullman P. C. Co. v. Adams, 120 Ala. 581, 24 So. 921, 74 Am. St. 
 Rep. 53, 45 L. R. A. 767 (1898). 
 
 "Root V. New York C. S. C. Co., 28 Mo. App. 199 (1887); Chamberlain 
 V. PuUman P. C. Co., 55 Mo. App. 474 (1893); Pullman P. C. Co. v. Mat- 
 thew.s 74 Tex. 654, 12 S. W. 744, 15 Am. St. Rep. 873 (1889). 
 
 « Root V, New York C. S. C. Co., 28 Mo. App. 199 (1887). 
 
 «Dawley v. Wagner P. C. Co., 169 Mass. 315, 47 N. E. 1024 (1897); 
 Whioher v. Boston & A. R. R., 176 Mass. 275, 57 N. E. 601, 79 Am. St. 
 Rep. 314 (1900); Pullman P. C. Co. v. Arents, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 71, 66 
 S. W. .329 (1902). 
 
 48 Whitney v. Pullman's P. C. Co., 143 Mass. 243, 9 N. E. 619 (1887). 
 
 [266] 
 
Chap. XXIX.] Property of the Passenger. [§ 393. 
 
 passengers to leave articles in a berth while in the smoking 
 room or the dining car, it seems not quite accurate to speak 
 of the act under ordinary circumstances as negligent. It 
 would better be treated as an assumption by the passenger 
 of the risk of any loss occurring without the negligence of the 
 company.^* 
 
 § 392. Evidence of negligence. 
 
 The mere fact of loss of the property without any explana- 
 tion of the cause is not evidence that it was lost by the negli- 
 gence of the company .'"' The fact that two passengers in 
 the same car lost property on the same night is, however, 
 evidence of negligence;'*^ so is the fact that the porter was 
 seen asleep.^^ 
 
 § 393. Burden of proof. 
 
 The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to prove the negli- 
 gence which is the basis of his action.^* It is said, to be sure, 
 in Georgia, that after loss has been proved (at least when the 
 loss occurred at night) the burden of disproving negligence is 
 on the company, since it is peciiliarly within its power to 
 produce such evidence; ^* but the court probably had in mind 
 merely the burden of introducing evidence. Such a burden 
 
 48 Efron V. Wagner P. C. Co., 59 Mo. App. 641 (1894). 
 
 soWhicher v. Boston & A. R. R., 176 Mass. 27.5, 57 N. E. 601, 79 Am. 
 St. Rep. 314 (1900); Carpenter v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 124 N. Y. 
 53, 26 N. E. 277, 21 Am. St. Rep. 644, 11 L. R. A. 759 (1891); Tracy v. 
 Pullman P. C. Co., 67 How. Pr. 154 (1884); PuUman P. C. Co. v. Hatch, 
 30 Tex. Civ. App. 303, 70 S. W. 771 (1902); Steam v. Pullman Car Co., 
 
 8 Ont. 171 (1885). 
 
 51 Lewis V. New York S. C. Co., 143 Mass. 267, 9 N. E. 617, 58 Am. Rep 
 135 (1887); Pullman Car Co. v. Gardner, 3 Penny. (Pa.) 78, 14 W. N. C. 17 
 
 (1883). 
 
 62 Pullman P. C. Co. v. Adams, 120 Ala. 581, 24 So. 921, 74 Am. St. Rep. 
 53, 45 L. R. A. 767 (1898); Lewis v. New York S. C. Co., 143 Mass. 267, 
 
 9 N. E. 617, 58 Am. Rep. 135 (1887). 
 
 53 Sessions v. New York, L. E. & W. R. R., 78 Hun (N. Y.), 541, 29 
 N. Y. Supp. 628 (1894). 
 
 "Kates V. Pullman's P. C. Co., 95 Ga. 810, 23 S. E. 186 (1895); Pull- 
 man's P. C. Co. V. Harvey, 101 Ga. 733, 28 S. B. 989 (1897). 
 
 [267] 
 
§ 395.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXlX. 
 
 might well, under these circumstances, rest upon the com- 
 pany, which could meet it by testimony establishing the care- 
 fulness of the watch; ^^ but the evidence being in, the plaintiff 
 should satisfy the jury of the existence of negligence. And 
 in most jurisdictions the doctrine that unexplained loss is not 
 evidence of negligence is opposed to the view taken in the 
 Georgia cases, even as just explained. 
 
 The burden of introducing evidence of contributory negli- 
 gence of the passenger is on the company.^® In Missouri con- 
 tributory negligence is regarded as an affirmative defence, and 
 the burden is therefore on the company not only to introduce 
 evidence, but also to prove it.^^ 
 
 § 394. Care of property left behind by a passenger. 
 
 When a passenger leaves the train, leaving behind him 
 some article of property, the company cannot be held to any 
 duty of care in guarding the property until it is fotmd by 
 some servant of the company; ^* but when it is so found, the 
 company must take reasonable care of it, and do what it rea- 
 sonably can towards restoring it to the owner.^* Where, how- 
 ever, the passenger is without proper warning hurried out of 
 his car into another, without being given time to collect all 
 his effects, the company is responsible for any property which 
 he leaves behind; *" and this is still more clearly the case 
 where his goods are changed by the porter into another car 
 in his absence and without his knowledge.®^ 
 
 § 395. Company liable for goods as bailee. 
 
 While in the ordinary case the passenger remains in control 
 and possession of his baggage, the company may through its 
 
 55 PuUman P. C. Co. v. Preudenstein, 3 Col. App. 540, 34 Pac. 578 (1893). 
 58 Pullman P. C. Co. v. Adams, 120 Ala. 581, 24 So. 921, 74 Am. St. 
 Rep. 53, 45 L. R. A. 767 (1898). 
 
 67 Florida v. PuUman P. C. Co., 37 Mo. App. 598 (1889). 
 6s Illinois C. R. R. v. Handy, 63 Miss. 609, 56 Am. Rep. 846 (1886). 
 58 Kates V. Pullman's P. C. Co., 95 Ga. 810, 23 S. E. 186 (1895). 
 M Kates V. Pullman's P. C. Co., supra. 
 
 «i Kinsley v. Lake Shore R. R., 125 Mass. 54, 28 Am. Rep. 200 (1878). 
 [268] 
 
Chap. XXIX.] Property of the Passenger, [§ 395. 
 
 porter assume the possession; and the company will then be 
 liable, like a common carrier, for the safety of the goods. This 
 is the case where the porter imdertakes to remove the goods 
 from the car, either with the consent of the owner *^ or with- 
 out his knowledge.*^ This principle was in one decision im- 
 properly extended to a case where the porter placed the valise 
 of a passenger under his berth while he was asleep.*'' 
 
 82 Voss V. Wagner P. C. Co., 16 Ind. App. 271, 43 N. E. 20, 44 N. E. 
 1010 (1896). 
 
 83 Kinsley v. Lake Shore R. R., 125 Mass. 54, 28 Am. Rep. 200 (1878). 
 
 84 NashviUe C. & S. L. R. R. v. Lillie, 112 Tenn. 331, 78 S. W. 1055 (1904). 
 
 [269] 
 
§ 402.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXX. 
 
 CHAPTER XXX. 
 
 ACTIONS, DAMAGES AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS. 
 
 § 401. Form of action. j§ 403. Conflict of laws. 
 
 402. Measure of damages. ' 
 
 § 401. Form of action. 
 
 While the car company comes into contractual relations 
 with its passengers, and may be sued for breach of contract,^ 
 it owes to every passenger enjoying or demanding its services 
 a duty imposed by the law, not by any contract, and for 
 breach of this duty may be sued in an action sounding in tort.^ 
 In this respect the case of the car company is like that of the 
 innkeeper.^ 
 
 Action may be maintained by a passenger for the loss of 
 money in his possession, though he was merely a bailee of it.* 
 
 § 402. Measure of damages. 
 
 For a personal injury to a passenger he is entitled to com- 
 pensation for all his bodily injury, both present and future, 
 immediate and consequential,^ and for damages for mental 
 suffering if it was inflicted,*' but not to exemplary damages, 
 or damages exceeding the actual loss, unless there were cir- 
 
 1 Pullman P. C. Co. v. Taylor, 65 Ind. 153, 32 Am. Rep. 57 (3879). 
 
 2Nevin v. Pullman P. C. Co., 106 111. 222, 46 Am. Rep. 688 (1883); Pull- 
 man P. C. Co. V. Lawrence, 74 Miss. 782, 22 So. 53 (1897); PuUman P. C. 
 Co. V. Booth (Tex. Civ. App.), 28 S. W. 719 (1894). 
 
 sAnte, §281. 
 
 i Pullman P. C. Co. v. Gavin, 93 Tenn. 53, 23 S. W. 70, 42 Am. St. Rep. 
 902, 21 I.. A. R. 298 (1893). 
 
 6 Hughes V. Pullman P. C. Co., 74 Fed. 499 (1896). 
 
 'Campbell v. Pullman P. C. Co., 42 Fed. 484 (1890); PuUman P. C. 
 Co. v. Booth, 28 S. W. 719 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894). 
 [270] 
 
Chap. XXX.] Actions, damages, conflict of Laws. [§ 403. 
 
 ciimstances of malice or insult.'' When a passenger is wrong- 
 fully expelled from a sleeping car, the measure of damages is 
 the amount of discomfort suffered from completing his journey 
 in an ordinary car.* If the passenger is in a delicate state of 
 health, and the expulsion aggravated the trouble and caused 
 illness, the company is liable in damages for the illness.* 
 
 §403. Conflict of Laws. 
 
 The action against a sleeping-car company being an action 
 ex delicto, the law of the place where the injury was inflicted 
 determines the nature and extent of the injury,^" as, for in- 
 stance, whether exemplary damages may be recovered." The 
 law of the foreign State will be presumed to be the same as 
 that of the forum, in the absence of evidence; and this being 
 a question of modern commercial law which would probably 
 be determined in the same way in all States, it was presumed 
 that the law of Mexico was the same as that of Texas, though 
 one of the States was governed by the Civil Law and the other 
 by the Common Law.^^ 
 
 7 Lemon v. PuDman P. C. Co., 52 Fed. 262 (1887); Pullman P. C. Co. v. 
 Reed, 75 111. 125, 20 Am. Rep. 232 (1874) ; Missouri P. Ry. v. Groesbeck, 
 24 S. W. 702 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894); Norfolk & W. R. R. v. Lipscomb, 
 90 Va. 137, 17 S. E. 809, 20 L. R. A. 817 (1893). 
 
 8 Pullman P. C. Co. v. Reed, 75 111. 125, 20 Am. Rep. 232 (1874); Missouri 
 Pac. Ry. V. Groesbeck, 24 S. W. 702 (Tex. Civ. App. ]894). 
 
 » Mann B. C. Co. v. Dupr6, 54 Fed. 646 (1893). Pullman P. C. Co. v. 
 Barker, 4 Col. 344, 34 Am. Rep. 89 (1878), contra, is not to be commended. 
 
 w Pullman P. C. Co. v. Lawrence, 74 Miss. 782, 22 So. 53 (1897); Steven- 
 son V. Pullman P. C. Co., 26 S. W. 112 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894). 
 
 11 Pullman P. C. Co. v. Lawrence, 74 Miss. 782, 22 So. 53 (1897). 
 
 12 Stevenson v. Pullman P. C. Co., 26 S. W. 112 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894), 
 32 S. W. 335 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895). 
 
 [271 
 
§ 411.] 
 
 Innkeepers. 
 
 [Chap. XXXI. 
 
 TITLE YIII. 
 
 STATUTES AFFECTING INNKEEPERS. 
 
 CHAPTER XXXI. 
 
 LIMITATIONS OF INNKEEPERS' LIABILITY. 
 
 Topic I. General Principles. 
 
 411. General statutory limitations 
 
 of liability. 
 
 412. Non-compliance by guest not 
 
 causing loss. 
 
 413. Non-compliance by innkeeper. 
 
 414. Negligence of innkeeper. 
 
 415. Effect of statute on responsi- 
 
 bility for merchandise. 
 
 416. Burden of proof. 
 
 Topic II. The Posting of No- 
 tice. 
 
 Requirements of statute must 
 be exactly complied with. 
 
 Printing notice on register not 
 sufficient. 
 
 419. Notice erroneously printed. 
 
 420. Actual notice of regulation on 
 
 part of guest: New York 
 rule. 
 
 421. Actual notice: general rule. 
 
 422. Actual notice: what is suffi- 
 
 cient to constitute. 
 
 417. 
 
 418. 
 
 Topic III. Deposit of Goods 
 with the Innkeeper. 
 § 423. What constitutes a sufficient 
 deposit. 
 
 424. Deposit must be for safe keep- 
 
 ing. 
 
 425. Effect of deposit. 
 
 426. Waiver of deposit. 
 
 427. During what time the limita- 
 
 tion is in effect. 
 Topic IV. What goods must 
 be deposited with the inn- 
 keeper. 
 
 428. Whether aU goods must be 
 
 deposited. 
 
 429. Statutes expressly excepting 
 
 goods needed in guest's 
 room. 
 
 430. Statutes expressly enumerat- 
 
 ing classes of goods to be 
 deposited. 
 
 431. Deposit of watch. 
 
 432. Deposit of article needed for 
 
 immediate use. 
 
 Topic I. General Principles. 
 
 §411. General statutory limitations of liability. 
 
 In the year 1855 both New York and Pennsylvania passed 
 acts permitting an innkeeper who had provided a safe for the 
 protection of his guest's valuables to protect himself from lia- 
 [272] 
 
Chap. XXXI.] Limitations of Liability. [§ 413. 
 
 bility for valuables not deposited with him by the guest by 
 giving proper notice. Other States soon passed similar stat- 
 utes, and at the present time such statutes are practically 
 universal. 
 
 § 412. Non-compliance by guest not causing loss. 
 
 Where the guest is required, by a notice posted under au- 
 thority of the statute, to lock his door, or to do some similar 
 act, the guest who after noncomphance with the terms of the 
 notice loses goods from his room is not barred from recovery 
 by his failure to follow the regulation unless such failure was 
 the cause of the loss. Thus, where a guest was required to 
 lock his door at night, and he failed to do so, and his goods 
 were stolen at night by another guest placed in the room, 
 against the plaintiff's remonstrance, by the innkeeper, it was 
 held that the guest might recover compensation for his loss.* 
 So where the notice as posted required the guest before going 
 out to lock the door and leave the key at the office, and the 
 plaintiff, a guest, locked the door and kept the key in his 
 pocket, and goods were stolen from the room, he was held 
 entitled to recover in spite of his failure to comply with the 
 terms of the notice, since the loss was not caused by his failure 
 to leave the key at the office.^ This case, however, turned 
 on the precise language of the statute, which exonerates the 
 innkeeper only if the loss is attributable to the guest's non- 
 compliance with the terms of the notice. 
 
 §413. Non-compliance by innkeeper, 
 
 An innkeeper who fails to provide a safe in his office, as 
 required by the statute, is responsible as at common law for 
 goods of the guest not deposited with him; he can take no 
 advantage of the statute.^ The same thing is true of an 
 innkeeper who fails to post the notice required by the statute.^ 
 
 iGile V. Libby, 36 Barb. (N. Y.) 70 (1861). 
 zBurbank v. Chapin, 140 Mass. 123, 2 N. E. 934 (1885). 
 3 Dunbier v. Day, 12 Neb. 596, 12 N. W. 109, 41 Am. Rep. 772 (1882). 
 < Spicer v. Bacon, 2 Ex. D. 463, 46 L. J. Ex. 713, 36 L. T. 896, 25 W. R. 
 18 [273] 
 
§ 415.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXXI. 
 
 § 414, Negligence of innkeeper. 
 
 A common exception to the limitation of the innkeeper's 
 habihty is of cases where the loss happens through the act 
 or negligence of the innkeeper or his servant. This has been 
 held in England to mean cases where the loss occurs wholly 
 because of such act or negligence.^ In New York it has been 
 held that the negligence intended by the statute is that which 
 precedes, induces, or facUitates the loss, and not negligence 
 afterwards.^ 
 
 Where a guest at an inn failed to deposit jewels with the 
 innkeeper, and they were stolen from his room, it was held 
 that the fact that the defendants' servants did not cause the 
 premises to be searched upon the discovery of a poker and a 
 knife on the bed in the plaintiff's room from which the jewelry 
 was stolen was no evidence of neghgence on the part of the 
 defendants' servants.'' 
 
 § 415. Effect of statute on responsibility for merchandise. 
 
 As has been seen * the innkeeper is not required at common 
 law to permit the use of his inn as a shop for the display or 
 sale of merchandise, and he is therefore not required to receive 
 goods brought to the inn for such a purpose. The statute limit- 
 ing the innkeeper's Uability was not intended to increase his 
 obligation in this respect. For instance, the requirement that 
 he shall keep a safe does not compel him to have a safe large 
 enough to receive any merchandise, no matter how bulky or 
 valuable it may be, which a guest may choose to bring into the 
 inn.' 
 
 840 (1877); Beale v. Posey, 72 Ala. 323 (1882); Lanier v. Youngblood, 73 
 Ala. 587 (1888); Murchison v. Sergent, 69 Ga. 206 (1882); Olson v. Cross- 
 man, 31 Minn. 222, 17 N. W. 375 (1883); Batterson v. Vogel, 8 Mo. App. 
 24 (1879); Lima v. Dwinelle, 7 Alb. L. J. 44 (N. Y. 1873). 
 
 sMedewar v. Grand Hotel Co., [1891] 2 Q. B. 11, 60 L. J. Q. B. 209, 
 64L. T. 851,55 J. P. 614. 
 
 « Faucett v. Nichols, 4 Thomp. & C. (N. Y.) 597 (1874). 
 
 7 Marchioness of Huntly v. Bedford Hotel Co., 56 J. P. 53 (1891). 
 
 8 Ania, § 150. 
 
 8 Meyers v. Cottrill, 6 Biss. 465, Fed. Cas. No. 9,985 (1873). 
 [274] 
 
Chap. XXXI.] Limitations of Liability. [§ 416. 
 
 The common law on this point is, however, modified by 
 statute in Missouri,^" where it is provided that an innkeeper 
 is not hable for loss of merchandise for sale or sample belonging 
 to the guest, from the guest's room, unless written notice is 
 given to the innkeeper that the guest has such merchandise. 
 Under this statute the innkeeper was held not to be liable, 
 if the guest has failed to give such notice, even though the 
 innkeeper in fact knew the nature of the guest's business, and 
 that he had such goods for sale in his room. In this case the 
 liability is created, not limited, by the statute, and the pro- 
 visions of the act must be expressly followed in order to hold 
 the innkeeper to a statutory liability." Mr. Justice Harlan 
 said: "Since the innkeeper is not ordinarily bound to the 
 same care for the safety of goods, in the possession of a guest 
 for the purpose merely of being exhibited or sold, as for articles 
 carried by the latter for his comfort or convenience as a traveller, 
 the statute changed the rule so as to make his responsibihty 
 the same in both cases : provided, in the former case, the per- 
 son received as a guest gives written notice that he has mer- 
 chandise for sale or sample in his possession in the hotel, 
 leaving the innkeeper, upon such notice, to elect whether he 
 will permit the guest to remain in the hotel with such mer- 
 chandise for sale or sample. Notice in this form, when the 
 guest is permitted to remain in the hotel with merchandise 
 in his possession 'for sale or sample,' is made by the statute 
 evidence that the innkeeper has assumed responsibility for 
 the safety of such merchandise, to the full extent that he is 
 bound by the settled principles of law for the safety of 
 the baggage or other articles brought by guests into the 
 hotels." 
 
 §416. Burden of proof. 
 
 Whether the burden of bringing the case within the statute 
 lies on the innkeeper or the guest depends entirely upon the 
 
 10 Post, Appendix XXIII, § 4. 
 
 11 Fisher v. Kelsey, 121 U. S. 383, 30 L. Ed. 930, 7 Sup. Ct. 929 (1887). 
 
 [275] 
 
§ 417.] Innkebpkes. [Chap. XXXI. 
 
 form of the statute and the nature of the case. The burden 
 of proving compliance with all the forms required by the stat- 
 ute, such as posting notices, is certainly on the innkeeper, 
 and he must affirmatively show such compliance.^^ Com- 
 pliance with the requirements of the act having been shown 
 by the innkeeper, the burden may or may not be upon him to 
 show further the circumstances emmaerated in the act. In 
 some statutes the innkeeper is liable only for a loss which hap- 
 pens through the act or neglect of himself or his servants. In 
 such a case the burden is upon the guest to prove that the loss 
 happened through such act or neglect." But under a statute 
 exempting an innkeeper from liability for the loss by fire of 
 property of a guest in a barn or outbuilding, where it shall 
 appear that the loss was the work of an incendiary, and oc- 
 curred without negligence on his part, the burden is upon the 
 innkeeper to show that the fire was an incendiary one, and to 
 show absence of negligence on his part.^* And imder a statute 
 by which an innkeeper is relieved when the loss is attributable 
 to the guest's negligence or non-compliance with reasonable 
 regulations of the inn which are brought to his notice, it is for 
 the innkeeper to show that the non-compliance with a regula- 
 tion was the cause of the loss.^^ 
 
 Topic II. The Posting of Notice. 
 
 §417. Eequirements of statute must be exactly complied with. 
 
 The statute limiting the innkeeper's liability always pro- 
 vides for the posting of notice of the limitation. Such pro- 
 visions of the statute must be expressly complied with. Thus, 
 where the notice is to be printed "in ordinary-sized plain 
 English type" printing it in very small type is not enough, 
 
 12 Myers v. Cottrill, Fed. Cas. No. 9,985, 5 Biss. 465 (1873); Chamberlain 
 V. West, 37 Minn. 54, 33 N. W. 114 (1887). 
 
 isElcox V. Hill, 98 U. S. 218, 25 L. Ed. 103 (1878); Becker v. Haynes, 
 29 Fed. 441 (1887); Bumham v. Young, 72 Me. 273 (1881). 
 
 "Faucett v. Nichols, 64 N. Y. 377 (1876). 
 
 16 Burbank v. Chapin, 140 Mass. 123, 2 N. E. 934 (1885). 
 [276] 
 
Chap. XXXI.] Limitations of Liability. [§ 418. 
 
 even if the guest could just as easily have read it; ^* and where 
 notice is to be posted on the doors of the chambers, the notice 
 must be posted on the door of every room occupied by guests." 
 
 §418. Frinting notice on register not sufficient. 
 
 Where the statute requires that notice should be posted, 
 it is not enough to print the notice at the head of the register 
 in which a guest signs his name. Such information as to the 
 statute is not a sufficient compliance with the terms of the 
 statute, and does not exempt the innkeeper from liability 
 under the statute.^* And even if the statute makes no particu- 
 lar provision as to the method of posting the notice, as in 
 Georgia,^* it is not enough to print the notice at the head of 
 each page of the register. In a case arising under the Georgia 
 statute, it appeared that the innkeeper provided a safe in his 
 office, and printed at the top of the page in the register which 
 the guest signeid a notice that "money and other valuables 
 must be left at the office and checks received for them." The 
 guest lost money from his room, and sued the innkeeper; and 
 the trial court allowed the register to be produced in order to 
 prove a posting of notice under the statute. The Supreme 
 Court held this to be erroneous. Mr. Chief Justice Jackson 
 said on this point: "Does one man in a hundred, when he 
 registers his name, read the printed heading of the register? 
 What sort of publication is it to guests? In no view we can 
 take of our statutes, their reason and spirit, is it such a publica- 
 tion to the guest as the law requires, and if it were to transient 
 people stopping for meals and pulling off overcoats and laying 
 down valises, it is not to guests who take rooms at the hotel. 
 We think it, however, not sufficient under our statutes to bind 
 
 "Porter v. Gilkey, 57 Mo. 235 (1874); see Batterson v. Vogel, 8 Mo. 
 App. 24 (1879). 
 
 wBeale v. Posey, 72 Ala. 323 (1882); Lanier v. Youngblood, 73 Ala. 
 587 (1883); Lima v. Dwinelle, 7 Alb. L. J. 44 (N. Y. 1873). 
 
 "Olson V. Grossman, 31 Minn. 222, 17 N. W. 375 (1883); Batterson v. 
 Vogel, 8 Mo. App. 24 (1879). 
 
 i» Post, Appendix IX, § 7. 
 
 [277] 
 
§ 419.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXXI. 
 
 anybody. For these reasons we think the court erred in re- 
 gard to the admissibihty of this register with its heading." ^° 
 Nor will the notice thus printed at the head of the page 
 absolve the innkeeper, on the ground that it forms the basis 
 of a special contract between the innkeeper and the guest, in 
 the absence of affirmative evidence that the guest saw and 
 assented to it; nor, it may be added, unless a consideration 
 can be shown. On this point Mr. Chief Justice Gilfillan said 
 in the case of Olson v. Crossman:^* "A notice at the head of 
 the register of guests, or a verbal notice to the guest, not being 
 such notice as the statute prescribes, is of no avail unless the 
 guest consents to it, so as to constitute a contract limiting the 
 innkeeper's liability. Of course, it would not amount to such 
 a contract unless the guest's attention was called to it, so that 
 he might be presumed to have understood and assented to 
 it." 22 
 
 §419. Notice erroneously printed. 
 
 A material error in the printed notice wiU prevent the inn- 
 keeper from taking advantage of it. Thus, in the English 
 case of Spicer v. Bacon ^s the innkeeper had posted a notice 
 in intended compliance with the statute. The statute pro- 
 vided 24 that no innkeeper should be liable for loss of or injury 
 to the goods of his guest to a greater extent than thirty pounds, 
 with certain exceptions, " unless such goods or property shall 
 have been stolen, lost, or injured, through the willful act, 
 default, or neglect of such innkeeper or any servant in his 
 employ;" 2^ and it was further pro\'ided that a copy of this 
 
 2»Murchison v. Sergent, 69 Ga. 206 (1882). 
 
 21 31 Minn. 222, 17 N. W. 375 (1883). 
 
 22 And see to the same effect Marchioness of Huntley v. Bedford Hotel 
 Co., 56 J. P. 53 (Eng. 1891); Burbank v. Chapin, 140 Mass. 123, 2 N. E. 
 934 (1885); Kellogg v. Sweeney, 1 Lans. (N. Y.) 397 (1869); Bernstein v. 
 Sweeny, 33 N. Y. Super. Ct. 271 (1871). 
 
 23 2 Ex. D. 463, 46 L. J. Ex. 713, 36 L. T. 896, 25 W. R. 840 (1877). 
 
 24 26 & 27 Vict., ch. 41, §1. 
 
 25 The word "willful" in the statute qualifies the word "act" only, not 
 "default or neglect." Squire v. Wheeler, 16 L. T. 93 (1867). 
 
 [278] 
 
Chap. XXXI.] Limitations of Liability. [§ 419. 
 
 provision printed in plain type should be exhibited in a 
 conspicuous part of the hall or entrance to the inn. The 
 innkeeper inadvertently omitted the word "act" from the sen- 
 tence quoted, so that the clause read in the notice "unless such 
 goods . . . shall have been stolen . . . through the 
 willful default or neglect of such innkeeper," etc. This notice 
 was held not to protect the innkeeper under the act. Lord 
 Chancellor Cairns said : " I have not the least doubt that there 
 was a bona fide intention on the part of the defendant to give 
 a notice which was an exact compliance with the statute, and 
 that the omission which was relied upon has occurred entirely 
 per incwriam; but it has occurred, and we must deal with the 
 notice as it stands. Now at first it rather appeared that it 
 might be looked upon as if there had been an omission of a 
 word not material to the sense, and I certainly should not be 
 prepared to hold that, if a paper had been put up in an inn 
 which was intended in good faith to be a copy of the section 
 of the statute, and that all that could be said of it in opposition 
 to its being a copy was that a word or two words which were 
 not material to the sense and to the operation of the statute 
 had been omitted, the paper had ceased to be, or failed to be, 
 a copy within the meaning of the statute. But . . . the 
 omission here entirely alters the operation of the section of the 
 statute. The notice is, therefore, not a notice stating the law 
 in the way the first section of the statute states it. I feel 
 obliged, I repeat reluctantly, to hold that the claim for pro- 
 tection imder the statute fails, and that the case must be dealt 
 with as if the statute never had passed." And Chief Jus- 
 tice Cockburn said : " I quite concur in thinking that if this were 
 a mere clerical error we might hold the notice sufficient to 
 meet the requirement of the Act, as still being a copy; but 
 when we find an omission of that which is material, with a 
 view to a clear and distinct statement of the rights and lia- 
 bilities of the parties respectively we have an omission which 
 is far beyond a mere clerical error. It is an omission of a 
 substantial part of the notice. When we have an omission of 
 
 [279] 
 
§ 420.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXXI. 
 
 a material and really substantial part of the notice required 
 by statute, I cannot think it a copy sufficient to satisfy the 
 requirements of the Act." 
 
 § 420. Actual notice of regulation on part of guest : New York rule. 
 
 In a leading case in New York it appeared that the plain- 
 tiff, a guest at the defendant's inn, lost a large sum of money 
 from his room. The innkeeper had not posted notices in the 
 rooms of the guests, as required by the statute; but a waiter 
 informed the guest that there was a safe in the office provided 
 for the guests' valuables, and that they should be deposited 
 there. In an action by the guest for loss of his money, the 
 Superior Court of the City of New York held that the action 
 was barred by the statute.^^ Mr. Chief Justice Duer said: 
 "The only question that remains upon the special finding of 
 the jury, is whether the defendants are to be held liable for 
 the loss that is claimed, upon the sole ground that the notice 
 required by the statute was not at the time of the loss posted 
 up in the bedroom of the plaintiff, although he had actual 
 notice of all the facts that a notice so posted up would have 
 contained. Unless the affirmative of this proposition is true 
 the plaintiff cannot be entitled to recover; that it is true we 
 find it impossible to believe. We shall admit that the notice 
 given by the waiter to the plaintiff would not have been suffi- 
 cient to discharge the defendants at common law, notwith- 
 standing the charge of the judge and the finding of the jury, 
 upon the question of negligence, but that the notice was 
 rendered sufficient by the act of the legislature, not indeed 
 by its terms, but by its reasonable, and as it seems to us even 
 necessary, construction, we do not at all doubt. The notice 
 which the statute requires is merely constructive, since it is 
 evident that a notice posted up in the room of a guest may 
 wholly escape his attention, yet he is not permitted to aver his 
 ignorance, but is bound by that presumption of his knowledge 
 
 28 Purvis V. Coleman, 1 Bosw. (N. Y.) 321 (1857). 
 
 [280] 
 
Chap. XXXI.] Limitations of Liability. [§ 420. 
 
 which the statute raises. When the facts raising the pre- 
 sumption are proved, his recovery is barred. It is true, the 
 statute is silent as to the effect of actual notice, but we cannot 
 believe that the legislature intended that a greater effect should 
 be attributed to the presumed knowledge of a guest than to 
 its actual proof — that while the presumption bars his re- 
 covery, the proof must be rejected or disregarded. Such a 
 construction of the intention of the legislature would be most 
 unreasonable, and although that which we believe to have been 
 its true intention is not expressed, we cannot but think that 
 it is necessarily involved in that which is expressed, and the 
 meaning of the statute we hold to be, — that the knowledge of 
 a guest who has failed to deposit his money, or jewelry, in a 
 safe, that he knew to have been provided, shall defeat his 
 claim for a subsequent loss, and that such is its consequence, 
 whether the knowledge be established by direct and positive, 
 or merely presumptive, evidence. Nor do we suppose that 
 such a construction is confined to the statute under considera- 
 tion. The rule, we think, may be stated as universal, that 
 when a statute declares that certain acts shall create a pre- 
 sumption of knowledge, which the party to be affected by the 
 knowledge is not permitted to repel, it declares by facts to 
 which the presumption relates, is just as admissible in proof, 
 and when proved is equally conclusive. Of the application of 
 the rule, the actual knowledge of a subsequent purchaser of an 
 unrecorded deed or mortgage is an example. If it be said that 
 such a purchaser is not a purchaser in good faith, the reply 
 is that there is a similar want of good faith in a guest who, with 
 a fuU knowledge that a safe had been provided for the purpose 
 for which it was provided, seeks to deprive an innkeeper of 
 the protection that the legislature meant to afford him upon 
 the sole groimd, that the terms of the statute had not been 
 literally complied with. The notice given to the plaintiff in 
 this case, the jury have in effect found, contained all the in- 
 formation that a notice posted up in his room, if read, would 
 have conveyed to him,. and we are clearly of opinion, that in 
 
 [281] 
 
§ 421.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXXI. 
 
 disregarding such a notice, the plaintiff acted at his peril, and 
 took upon himself the risk of any subsequent loss." 
 
 The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Superior 
 Court,^^ saying that the actual notice was "far more satis- 
 factory and ample than the constructive one required by the 
 statute," and that the object and purpose of the statute had 
 been "more than comphed with." The Chief Justice and two 
 other judges dissented. 
 
 §421. Actual notice : general rule. 
 
 This decision has been much criticised in later cases, and 
 several courts have declined to follow it. Thus, in Batterson 
 V. Vogel ^* the innkeeper who had not posted a notice ia the 
 guest's room, as required by the act, was not absolved though 
 it appeared that the guest had read a copy of the act on the 
 register; the court saying that the act did not provide that 
 actual knowledge of the provisions of the act should take the 
 place of posting. And this seems to be the better view. The 
 statute prescribes the exact manner in which the innkeeper, 
 without any agreement on the part of the guest, may escape 
 his common-law liability. It is in derogation of the common 
 law, and should be strictly construed against the innkeeper, 
 who is attempting in reliance upon it, to protect himself against 
 an obligation towards his guest which the common law would 
 create. The statute makes no provision for an actual notice, 
 and a strict construction of the statute does not permit the 
 innkeeper who has failed to comply with the terms of it to 
 assert the actual notice of the guest as a sufficient substitute 
 for the statutory requirement.^^ Indeed, it is not accurate 
 to say that the statute assumes constructive notice on the part 
 of the guest as the result of posting the notice. It is more 
 exact to say that, without regard to knowledge on the part of 
 
 27 Purvis V. Coleman, 21 N. Y. Ill (1860). 
 
 28 8 Mo. App. 24 (1879). 
 
 29 Lanier v. Youngblood, 73 Ala. 587, 594 (1883); Porter v. Gilkey, 57 
 Mo. 235 (1874). 
 
 [ 282 ] 
 
Chap. XXXI.] Limitations of Liability. [§ 423. 
 
 the guest, the statute extends a privilege to the innkeeper 
 upon an express condition; which condition he must perform 
 if he would avail himself of the privilege. 
 
 § 422. Actual notice : what is sufficient to constitute. 
 
 If actual notice can take the place of the posting of printed 
 notices called for by the statute, either by securing to the 
 innkeeper the protection of the statute, or by forming the 
 basis of a contract limiting his liability, or by making it an act 
 of negligence in the guest to fail to deposit his valuables with 
 the innkeeper, the notice must have been given to the guest 
 at the time of his present visit to the inn, or at least within a 
 reasonable time previously, to be so found by the jury; *" and 
 notice actually given to the guest one year before his present 
 visit is not enough to relieve the innkeeper from liability upon 
 any ground.^^ 
 
 Topic III. Deposit of Goods with the Innkeeper. 
 
 § 423. What constitutes a sufficient deposit. 
 
 It may be assumed that when a guest places a package in 
 the hands of the servant who is authorized to accept deposits, 
 this will constitute a sufficient deposit under the terms of the 
 statute. It is not necessary to give detailed notice to the 
 innkeeper of the nature of the package, nor to state explicitly 
 that the delivery is upon deposit for safe-keeping. In the case 
 or Bradner v. MuUen *^ it appeared that defendant was pro- 
 prietor of an inn, and the plaintiff was then a guest at the inn; 
 that on the evening of that day the plaintiff walked in behind 
 the desk in the office and in the presence of an employee bf 
 the inn and the person apparently in charge of the office, hung 
 up his overcoat on one of the hooks therein used for that pur- 
 pose by guests; that the management usually gave checks for 
 
 3» Shultz V. WaU, 134 Pa. 262, 19 Atl. 742, 26 Wkly. Notes Cas. 51, 19 
 Am. St. Rep. 686, 8 L. R. A. 97 (1890). 
 
 31 Lanier v. Youngblood, 73 Ala. 587 (1883). 
 
 32 27 N. Y. Misc. 479, 59 N. Y. Supp. 178 (1899). 
 
 [283] 
 
§ 424.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXXI. 
 
 umbrellas, but none for overcoats unless asked, and the plain- 
 tiff in placing his coat behind the desk in the office placed it 
 upon hooks placed there for the purpose of hanging coats and 
 according to the custom of the guests. The coat was lost. 
 The court held that the innkeeper was liable, on the ground 
 that there had been a sufficient deposit of the overcoat under 
 the statute^ The guest put it where he had been invited to 
 place it by the defendant. It is true the innkeeper generally 
 gave checks; but this is not required by the statute, and is 
 rather for the convenience of the innkeeper than for the se- 
 curity of the guest's property. 
 
 This decision is to be contrasted with the Irish case of 
 O'Connor v. Grand International Hotel Company.^* In that 
 case it appeared that a guest gave a parcel to the innkeeper 
 saying, "Keep that for me." It was lost, and the guest sued 
 the innkeeper for the value. The package contained jewels 
 worth two hundred pounds. The court held that under the 
 statute the innkeeper's liabiUty was limited to thirty pounds, 
 since when making the deposit the guest did not inform the 
 innkeeper, in a reasonable and intelligible manner, that the 
 deposit was for the safe custody of the article. This decision 
 is not to be commended. 
 
 §424. Deposit must be for safe keeping. 
 
 But while it seems not necessary expressly to state to the 
 innkeeper that the goods are valuable, or are deposited under 
 the provisions of the statute, in order to make the innkeeper 
 responsible, it is nevertheless necessary that they should be 
 placed with him under such circumstances as to indicate that 
 they were deposited for safe-keeping. Where the deposit is 
 merely for the temporary convenience of the guest, who means 
 to keep the goods under his own care, the provisions of the act 
 are not comphed with. Thus, in Horton v. Terminal Hotel and 
 Arcade Company ^* a guest, before going to the adjacent res- 
 
 33 [1898] 2Ir. 92. 
 
 31 114 Mo. App. 357, 89 S. W. 363 (1905). 
 [284] 
 
Chap. XXXI.] Limitations of Liabilitt. [§ 424. 
 
 taurant to get his supper, handed a box containing a locket to 
 the clerk and requested him to keep it for him, but gave the clerk 
 no information concerning the contents of the box. The plain- 
 tiff intended to get the locket after supper aud keep it in his 
 room during the night, but forgot to call for it and never 
 thought of it again until midnight, after he had retired. When 
 he remembered leaving it with the clerk, he rang for a bell boy 
 and sent him to get the locket, at the same time showing the 
 boy another locket like it. This was the first time any em- 
 ployee about the hotel knew what was in the box the plaintiff 
 had left with the clerk. When the bell boy asked for the 
 locket, the clerk with whom it had been left had gone off 
 watch, and the night clerk who had come on could not find it. 
 About 3 o'clock at night this clerk did find it, and, after open- 
 ing the box and seeing the locket inside, intrusted it to the 
 bell boy to take to plaintiff's room. The boy laid the box on 
 a balustrade in the hotel until he filled an order for liquor 
 which some guests had given, and when he returned it was 
 gone. 
 
 The court held that under these circumstances the innkeeper 
 was not liable. Judge Goode said: "It is plain that when 
 plaintiff handed the box containing the locket to the hotel 
 clerk to keep imtil supper was over, not apprising him of its 
 contents, the hotel company became, at most, a gratuitous 
 bailee or depositary, and was liable only for gross negligence 
 in the care of the property. It assumed no liability as an 
 innkeeper, for the reason that the article was one which, imder 
 the statute we have cited, it was plaintiff's duty to intrust to 
 the defendant to be deposited in the hotel safe. The defend- 
 ant was responsible only as bailee." 
 
 The stress apparently laid by the court on the failure to 
 state the contents of the package was hardly meant to indi- 
 cate the fact as a reason for holding that there was no deposit 
 under the act, but rather as a reason for holding that the inn- 
 keeper was not liable as a bailee; the nature and value of the 
 package having a bearing on the amount of care necessary. 
 
 [ 285 ] 
 
§ 425.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXXI. 
 
 The only reason for holding that the statute was not complied 
 with appears to have been that the deposit was neither ex- 
 pressly nor by implication a deposit for safe-keeping mider 
 the act. 
 
 §425. Effect of deposit. 
 
 If the guest in compliance with the terms of the statute 
 deposits valuables with the innkeeper, the latter is hable for 
 them as at common law. So in the leading case of WUkins 
 V. Earle ^^ it appeared that the plaintiff, a guest in the defend- 
 ant's inn, deposited in the hands of the proper servant of the 
 defendant a package containing twenty thousand dollars, and 
 this package was stolen from the safe. The innkeeper was held 
 liable. Mr. Commissioner Hunt said: "The liability of an 
 innkeeper for the goods of his guest has been settled for cen- 
 turies. The act of 1855 does not purport to create it nor even 
 to declare it. It assumes the liability. It enacts that when- 
 ever the proprietors of an hotel shall provide a safe in their 
 office for the keeping of money, jewels, or ornaments belonging 
 to their guests, and shall notify their guests thereof, and a 
 guest shall neglect to deposit his money, jewels or ornaments 
 therein, the proprietor shall not be liable for any loss of the 
 same by his guest. This act assumes that, before its passage, 
 the innkeeper was liable for the loss of the money, jewels or 
 ornaments of his guest. It assumes that he still remains Hable, 
 if a deposit is made by the guest of his money nor jewels, ac- 
 cording to the terms of the act. It neither enlarges or restricts 
 the liability. It leaves it as the common law fixes it, with the 
 condition as to money and jewels, that, if a particular notice is 
 given by the innkeeper, the liability shall not attach unless 
 such money and jewels are deposited in the office safe. In the 
 present case this notice was given and the condition was com- 
 plied with. The liability stands therefore as the common law 
 fixed it." 
 
 The same thing is true if compliance with the statute is 
 
 35 44 N. Y. 172, 4 Am. Rep. 655 (1870). 
 [286] 
 
Chap. XXXI.] Limitations op Liability. [§ 426. 
 
 waived by the innkeeper. Thus, in the case of Friedman v. 
 Breshn '* it appeared that a guest at the defendant's inn had 
 some jewelry with her, which at various time she deposited 
 in the office safe, until upon a certain occasion, when she was 
 about to leave the hotel for a few hours, at the suggestion of 
 the clerk, the jewelry was left in her trunk in her room, the' 
 keys of the room and of the trunk being left in the custody of 
 the clerk, who agreed to look after them, and who assured her 
 that the jewels would be safe. During her absence the jewels 
 were stolen. The innkeeper was held liable, in spite of the 
 provisions of the statute. In the Appellate Division of the 
 Supreme Court Judge Woodward said: "That statute was 
 enacted for the protection of proprietors of hotels; but if the 
 rooming clerk was the manager of the hotel, and authorized 
 the plaintiff's assignor to leave her jewelry in her room, he 
 must be deemed to have waived any rights which the de- 
 fendant might have had under the law. It is well established 
 in this State that a party may waive a statutory, and even 
 a constitutional, provision made for his benefit, and that, 
 having once done so, he cannot afterwards ask for its 
 protection." 
 
 § 426. Waiver of deposit. 
 
 In order, however, to constitute a waiver of the provisions 
 of the statute the act of the innkeeper or his servant authoriz- 
 ing the guest to keep property in his room must be done with 
 full knowledge that the property is of the sort covered by the 
 statute. This unquestionable principle was made the basis 
 of decision in a case in which, to say the least, its application 
 was doubtful. The plaintiff, while a guest at the defendant's 
 hotel, offered a package of jewelry to the bookkeeper, request- 
 ing him to put it in the safe, but not disclosing the nature of 
 the contents; and the bookkeeper, without making inquiry in 
 regard to the same, told the plaintiff there was no necessity 
 
 38 169 N. Y. 574, 61 N. E. 1129 (1901), affirming S. C, 51 App. Div. 
 268, 65 N. Y. Supp. 5 (1900). 
 
 [287] 
 
§ 426.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXXI. 
 
 for that; to take the package to his room; that it would be 
 just as safe there, — whereupon the plaintiff took the package 
 to his room, and placed it in his trunk, from whence it was 
 stolen. Nothing in the appearance of the package indicated 
 the nature of its contents. It was held that the defendant 
 was not liable.^'' In the Supreme Court Judge George G. 
 Barnard said: "This interview can be available to the plain- 
 tiff, only on the ground that by it he was deprived of the 
 security of the safe, and that, therefore, the case is to be con- 
 sidered as if no safe had been provided. 
 
 "To have this effect, knowledge of the contents of the 
 package should be brought home to the clerk. The plaintiff 
 urges that he had reasonable notice of the contents, by its 
 being offered for deposit. Whether that was reasonable notice 
 or not, depends on all the surrounding circumstances. Under 
 the facts of this case, I think it was not. Here the plaintiff 
 offers a large package, done up in a rough style, not indicating 
 in any manner that it contained jewelry, but, on the contrary, 
 leading to the supposition that it was an ordinary package, 
 which the plaintiff, to prevent the necessity of going upstairs, 
 desired to have temporarily placed in the safe. It was calcu- 
 lated to mislead, and that it did mislead, and that the plaintiff 
 knew it misled the clerk, I think is apparent from the whole 
 evidence. As the clerk had previously deposited an opera 
 glass in the safe, at the plaintiff's request, his statement, that 
 this package would be just as secure in the room as in the safe, 
 was enough to show the plaintiff that the clerk was unaware 
 of the valuable contents of said package, and supposed it not 
 to be of a character which should require the protection of a 
 safe. The plaintiff knew the value of the package, and also 
 knew that the clerk did not, and the evidence warrants the 
 conclusion that the plaintiff knew that if he had disclosed 
 the value to the clerk, such clerk would have deposited it in the 
 safe, and that for some purpose of his own, he concealed the 
 
 37 Bendetson v. French, 46 N. Y. 266 (1871), affirming S. C, 44 Barb. 
 31 (1865). 
 
 [288] 
 
Chap. XXXI.] Limitations of Liability. [§ 428. 
 
 value purposely and knowingly, leaving the clerk under a 
 false impression." 
 
 § 427. During what time the limitation is in effect. 
 
 The deposit cannot always be made with the innkeeper, 
 as required by the act, at the very moment of the guest's 
 becoming such; and the limitation of liabiUty does not take 
 effect, it has been held, until the guest has failed to avail him- 
 self of the privilege of deposit. A reasonable time must there- 
 fore elapse, after the guest's arrival at the inn, for the guest 
 to deposit his valuables; and during that time the innkeeper 
 remains liable as at common law, in spite of the statute.'* 
 In the same way the guest must get his property together, 
 previous to his departure from the inn; and after the goods 
 have come to the hands of the guest for that purpose the stat- 
 ute cannot apply. This would seem to be equally true even 
 if the goods were never in fact deposited. It may be said 
 generally that notwithstanding the provisions of the statute 
 the innkeeper is responsible for the guest's goods, as at com- 
 mon law, for such reasonable period before his departure 
 as is necessary for him to collect, pack and remove his 
 goods.'* 
 
 Topic IV. What Goods must be deposited with the Innkeeper. 
 
 § 428. Whether all goods must be deposited. 
 
 A question much discussed in the cases is whether under the 
 statutes limiting habihty it is necessary to deposit all goods 
 with the innkeeper in order to enforce his responsibiUty for 
 the goods, or only certain classes of goods which can be spared. 
 On the one hand it is urged that the guest must for convenience 
 and even from necessity have with him in his room at all times 
 certain articles of personal use, clothing and sufficient money 
 
 38 Becker v. Haynes, 29 Fed. 441 (1887) ; Rosenplaenter v. Roessle, 54 
 N. Y. 262 (1873). 
 
 38 Bendetson v. French, 46 N. Y. 266 (1871). 
 
 19 [ 289 ] 
 
§ 429.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXXI. 
 
 for current expenses. On the other hand, it is pointed out that 
 this is a question of following the statute, and the statute is 
 expUcit in the matter. If the question were one of determin- 
 ing whether a rule of the innkeeper is reasonable, the conclusion 
 would be different. Where an innkeeper by regulation brought 
 to the notice of his guest requires the deposit of valuables with 
 the innkeeper, the regulation, as has been seen,*" is reasonable 
 only if articles which the guest needs to have with him are 
 excepted from its operation. But in dealing with a statute, 
 such considerations are not controlling though to be sure they 
 may have a certain weight in determining the proper inter- 
 pretation of the statute. It is necessary, therefore, to examine 
 with some care the separate statutes on this subject. 
 
 § 429. Statutes expressly excepting goods needed in guest's room. 
 It is to be noticed first of all that the matter is settled in 
 several States by the express language of the statute. Thus, 
 in the early Pennsylvania act ** it was provided that the exemp- 
 tion should not apply to " such an amount of money and such 
 articles of goods, jewelry, and valuables as is usual, common 
 and prudent for the guest or boarder to retain in his room or 
 about his person," and the same provision has been made in 
 Delaware,*^ Iowa,*' Maine,** Massachusetts,*^ Montana,** Ne- 
 braska,*^ New Hampshire,** North Dakota,*' Oklahoma,^" 
 South Dakota ^^ and Wyoming.^^ As to the articles so ex- 
 
 i«Ante, §213. 
 
 « P. L. 1855, p. 479; post, Appendix XXXVI, § 5. 
 
 « Appendix VII, §1. 
 
 " Appendix XIII, §1. 
 
 « Appendix XVII, § 3. 
 
 ■IS Appendix XIX, § 5. 
 
 « Appendix XXIV, § 3. 
 
 " Appendix XXV, § 2. 
 
 <8 Appendix XXVII, § 1. 
 
 « Appendix XXXII, § 2. 
 
 6» Appendix XXXIV, § 1. 
 
 61 Appendix XL, § 2. 
 
 62 Appendix XLIX, § 1. 
 
 [ 290 ] 
 
Chap. XXXI.] Limitations of Liability. [§ 430. 
 
 cepted, the common-law liability remains, in spite of the no- 
 tice.^' 
 
 Under the exception to the act are embraced a gold watch, 
 a pair of gold bracelets, a gold thimble, three gold rings and 
 a gold neck-pin for the owner's personal use and forty dollars 
 for travelling expenses; and the innkeeper is liable for their 
 loss though they were retained by the guest, and kept in his 
 trunk in the chamber.'^ These articles were taken with the 
 guest for personal use, not merely for transportation, and were 
 such as she might properly use daily while travelling or resting. 
 
 § 430. Statutes expressly enumerating classes of goods to be de- 
 posited. 
 
 In several States the articles which the innkeeper can re- 
 quire to be deposited in his safe are confined in a certain class 
 of things. Thus, in California the liability of the innkeeper 
 can be limited only in the case of money, jewelry, documents, 
 or other articles of unusual value and small compass; ^^ and 
 a similar provision may be found in Florida,^" lUinois,^^ Ken- 
 tucky,^* Louisiana,®^ Maryland,®" Michigan,** Minnesota,*^ 
 Missouri,®' New Jersey,®* New York,®^ North Carolina,®® 
 Ohio,®^ Rhode Island,®* Tennessee,®^ Vermont,'''' Washing- 
 
 53 Turner v. Whitaker, 9 Pa. Super. Ct. 83, 43 W. N. C. 375 (1898). 
 
 54 Noble V. Milliken, 74 Me. 225, 23 Am. Rep. 581 (1882). 
 
 55 Post, Appendix IV, § 9. 
 
 56 Appendix VIII, § 4. 
 67 Appendix XI, § 2. 
 
 58 Appendix XV, § 1 . 
 69 Appendix XVI, § 5. 
 
 80 Appendix XVIII, § 4. 
 
 81 Appendix XX, § 2. 
 
 82 Appendix XXI, § 2. 
 
 63 Appendix XXIII, § 3. 
 
 64 Appendix XXVIII, § 3. 
 
 65 Appendix XXX, § 3. 
 
 66 Appendix XXXI, § 6. 
 
 67 Appendix XXXIII, § 3. 
 
 68 Appendix XXXVIII, § 1. 
 
 69 Appendix XLI, § 5. 
 
 70 Appendix XLIV, § 2. 
 
 [291] 
 
§ 431.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXXI. 
 
 ton/* West Virigina ^^ and Wisconsin.''^ The statute is evi- 
 dently so framed as to exclude clothing and other mere per- 
 sonal baggage of small value; and for this the innkeeper is 
 liable in spite of the act.''^ And under an act which applies 
 to "jewels and ornaments" silver table forks and a silver 
 ladle are not included.''^ Mineral specimens are not included 
 under "valuables." '^^ 
 
 §431. Deposit of watch. 
 
 The cases differ on the question whether a watch and chain 
 come within the description "jewels and ornaments" or simi- 
 lar language of the statute. In Maryland and New York it 
 is held that they do not, but that the innkeeper is responsible 
 for them in spite of statute and notice." In Briggs v. Todd ^* 
 the plaintiff, a guest, lost from his room in the inn a watch on 
 the cover of which a state coat of arms had been engraved. 
 The picture of the owner's mother was inside the case. The 
 watch had been laid for a short time inside the owner's trunk. 
 In spite of these facts the court held that the watch was not 
 an ornament. 
 
 The reason for this interpretation of the words is forcibly 
 put by Mr. Justice Allen in Rameley v. Leland : ^^ " Certain 
 property particularly valuable in itself, taking but small space 
 compared with its value for its safe-keeping, easy of conceal- 
 ment and removal, holding out great temptation to the dis- 
 honest, and not necessary to the comfort or convenience of 
 
 " Appendix XLVI, § 3. 
 
 72 Appendix XL VII, § 3. 
 
 73 Appendix XL VIII, §1. 
 
 '1 Treiber v. Burrows, 27 Md. 130 (1867). 
 
 75 BriggG V. Todd, 28 N. Y. Misc. 208, 59 N. Y. Supp. 23 (1899). 
 
 76 Brown Hotel Co. v. Burckhardt, 13 Col. App. 59, 56 Pac. 188 (1899). 
 77Maltby v. Chapman, 25 Md. 310 (1866); Bernstein v. Sweeny, 33 
 
 N. Y. Super. Ct. 271 (1871); Ramaley v. Leland, 43 N. Y. 539, 3 Am. Rep. 
 728 (1871); Becker v. Warner, 90 Hun (N. Y.), 187, 35 N. Y. Supp. 739 
 (1895). 
 
 78 28 N. Y. Misc. 208, 59 N. Y. Supp. 23 (1899). 
 
 70 43 N. Y. 539, 3 Am. Rep. 728 (1871). 
 [292] 
 
Chap. XXXI.] Limitations of Liability. [§ 431. 
 
 the guest while in his room, is made the subject of the statutory 
 exemption. Property of a different description, including all 
 that which is useful or necessary to the comfort and conven- 
 ience of the guest, that which is usually carried and worn as a 
 part of the ordinary apparel and outfit, or is ordinarily used, 
 and is convenient for use, by travellers as well in as out of their 
 rooms, is left, as before the statute, at the risk of the innkeeper. 
 The words of the statute must be taken in their ordinary sense, 
 in the absence of any indication that they were used, either in 
 a technical sense or a sense other than that in which they are 
 popularly used. A watch is neither a jewel or ornament, as 
 these words are used and understood, either in common par- 
 lance or by lexicographers. It is not used or carried as a jewel 
 or ornament, but as a timepiece or chronometer, an article of 
 ordinary wear by most travellers of every class, and of daily 
 and hourly use by all. It is as useful and necessary to the 
 guest in his room as out of it, in the night as the daytime. It 
 is carried for use and convenience and not for ornament. But 
 it is enough that it is neither a jewel or ornament in any sense 
 in which these words have ever been used. The question of 
 negligence, and whether the plaintiff could and did bolt his 
 door, were properly submitted to and passed upon by the 
 jury." 
 
 In other States, however, a watch is held to come within the 
 words of the statute, and the innkeeper is not responsible for 
 it if it is not deposited with him, provided he has com- 
 plied with the requirements of the Act.*" In Stewart v. Par- 
 sons*^ the court said: "There is no satisfactory reason for 
 saying that the property lost does not come fully within the 
 language and intent of this enactment. The statute, in sub- 
 so Long V. Arcade Hotel Co., 9 Ohio Deo. 372, 12 Wkly. Law Bull. 250 
 (1883); Prescott v. Bruce, 2 Cinn. Rep. 58 (Oh. 1871); Meacham v. Gallo- 
 way, 102 Term. 419, 52 S. W. 859, 73 Am. St. Rep. 886, 46 L. R. A. 319 
 (1899); Rains v. Maxwell House Co., 112 Tenn. 219, 79 S. W. 114 (1904); 
 Stewart v. Parsons, 24 Wis. 241 (1869). 
 81 24 Wis. 242 (1869). 
 
 [293] 
 
§ 432.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXXI. 
 
 stance, provides that no innkeeper in this State who shall con- 
 stantly have in his inn an iron safe in good order, and suitable 
 for the safe custody of money, jewelry, and articles of gold and 
 silver manufacture and the hke, shall be liable. The object 
 of this law is very manifest. It is intended to limit and re- 
 strict the liability of an innkeeper at common law or by cus- 
 tom for the loss of the goods of his guests committed to his care." 
 
 § 432. Deposit of article needed for immediate use. 
 
 The question whether an article expressly mentioned in the 
 act but necessary to be kept by the guest in his room shall 
 be excepted from its provisions is also one of some doubt on 
 the authorities. In a case in New York decided soon after 
 the passage of the act it was held that the act would not apply 
 to a sum of money reasonably necessary for current expenses; 
 on the ground that the act could not be intended to require 
 so inconvenient a thing.*^ But this was afterwards overruled 
 in New York, and the doctrine established that the innkeeper 
 who has complied with the act is not responsible for any sum 
 of money, however small, not deposited with him.*' In Mary- 
 land it is still held that the guest is not required under the act 
 to deposit money necessary for his travelhng expenses; ^* but 
 in other jurisdictions the rule finally established in New York 
 prevails.*^ 
 
 This seems at first thought a hardship ; but as has been said, 
 the statute was adopted for the benefit of the hotel keepers, 
 not for the guests. It is to be considered that the innkeeper 
 is relieved only from an extraordinary liability, for which in 
 modern times the reason has largely ceased; and that the 
 result of the act is to put no greater burden of risk upon the 
 
 82 Gile V. Libby, 36 Barb. (N. Y.) 70 (1861); followed in Krohn v. Sweeny, 
 2 Daly (N. Y.), 200 (1867). 
 
 83 Hyatt V. Taylor, 42 N. Y. 258 (1869); Ramaley v. Leland, 43 N. Y. 
 539, 3 Am. Rep. 728 (1871); Rosenplaenter v. Roessle, 54 N. Y. 262 (1873). 
 
 s^Maltby v. Chapman, 25 Md. 310 (1866). 
 
 85 Lang V. Arcade Hotel Co., 9 Ohio Dec. 372, 12 Wkly. Law Bull. 250 
 (1883); Rains v. MaxweU House Co., 112 Tenn. 219, 79 S. W. 114 (1904). 
 [ 294 ] 
 
Chap. XXXI.] Limitations of Liability. [§ 432. 
 
 guest than he has at all times except when he happens to resort 
 to an inn. On this point the Supreme Court of Tennessee 
 said: ** "If a guest sees proper to keep his watch and his fob 
 and money upon his person or in his room, he does so at his 
 own risk, just as he keeps it about his own person and in his 
 possession when not in the hotel or inn. If he desires for his 
 own safety or convenience to place the responsibility for its 
 safe-keeping upon the hotel company during his stay in the 
 hotel as a guest, then he must place it in the safe which the 
 statute requires to be provided by the innkeeper for that pur- 
 pose. We can put no other construction upon the statute, 
 without nullifying wholly or to some extent its provisions. 
 
 "It may be inconvenient to deposit small sums of money and 
 pieces of jewelry of httle value in the safe of a hotel, and it 
 may be inconvenient to do without their use during the stay 
 of the guest; but this is a condition, imder the statute, upon 
 which the hotel keeper can alone be made liable for their safety 
 as an insurer. 
 
 "If the guest desires to avoid these inconveniences, he may 
 retain possession of his money and his jewelry, just as if he 
 were not a guest of the hotel." 
 
 Even in States where no limit is set in the statute to the 
 goods which the innkeeper may require to be deposited in 
 his safe, the court may place a limit based on the reasonable- 
 ness of the case. Thus, in Georgia, where an innkeeper re- 
 quired the deposit of all valuables in his safe, under the pro- 
 visions of the act,*' the court held that the guest need not 
 deposit his watch or a reasonable amount of money for his 
 expenses in order to hold the innkeeper responsible. Mr. 
 Chief Justice Jackson said: "It cannot be that such a notice 
 is applicable to guests in a room in the hotel. Is the guest to 
 deposit his valise there, and go or send after it to get out a 
 clean shirt to put on? Is he to leave his coat there, go to his 
 room in his shirt sleeves, or send it down and get a check for 
 
 88 Rains v. MaxweU House Co., 112 Tenn. 219, 79 S. W. 114 (1904). 
 87 Post, Appendix IX, § 7. 
 
 [295] 
 
§ 432.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXXI. 
 
 it after he goes to bed? Is he to deposit there his watch and 
 pocket change and get a check for them? The whole regula- 
 tion, if meant for guests in their rooms, is on its face not only 
 unreasonable but absurd. 
 
 "Was it admissible to show negligence in this guest in not 
 reading it when he registered his name imder it? He was 
 bound to know the law at his peril, and surely he may use it 
 for his protection. When he knew it, he knew that such notice 
 was not applicable, and could not be applicable, to him in his 
 room; because it was unreasonable to apply it to the wearing 
 apparel and valises and trunks and other luggage of the so- 
 journer at the hotel with his wife in his room." ** The court 
 cited in support of this view cases in which the innkeeper's 
 regulation had been adopted without the authorization of a 
 statute. 
 
 ssMurchison v. Sergent, 69 Ga. 206 (1882). 
 
 [296] 
 
Chap. XXXII.] Crimes against Innkeepers. 
 
 [§441. 
 
 CHAPTER XXXII. 
 
 CRIMES AGAINST INNKEEPERS. 
 
 Topic I. Fraud on innkeeper 
 in general. 
 § 441. Statutes punishing fraud in 
 guests and boarders. 
 
 442. Statute strictly construed. 
 
 443. Form of indictment. 
 
 Topic II. Fraudulent obtain- 
 ing of board. 
 
 444. Fraud essential. 
 
 445. False representation required. 
 
 446. Pretence must be made with 
 
 fraudulent motive. 
 
 447. Board or other accommoda- 
 
 tion must be actually ob- 
 tained. 
 
 § 448. Board must be obtained by 
 the pretence. 
 Topic III. Surreptitious re- 
 moval of property. 
 
 449. Surreptitious removal as 
 
 ■prima fade evidence of 
 fraud. 
 
 450. Surreptitious removal as sub- 
 
 stantive offence. 
 
 451. What sort of removal is sur- 
 
 reptitious. 
 
 452. Posting of notice not neces- 
 
 sary. 
 
 Topic I. Fraud on Innkeeper in General. 
 
 § 441. Statutes punishing fraud in guests and boarders. 
 
 By statute in several States the fraudulent obtaining of 
 board or other accommodation, and the fraudulent removal of 
 property in order to evade a board biU, are made criminal. 
 The statutes cover the cases of both inns and boarding houses^^:" 
 
 The statute is not unconstitutional, either as involving im- 
 prisonment for debt ^ or for any other reason.' 
 
 Even if the statute punishes the mere removal of baggage 
 
 1 Commonwealth v. Gough, 3 Kulp (Pa.) 148 (1884). 
 
 ^Ex parte King, 102 Ala. 182, 15 So. 524 (1894); Hutchinson v. Davis, 
 68 lU. App. 358 (1895); State v. Benson, 28 Minn. 424, 10 N. W. 471 (1881); 
 State V. Yardley, 95 Tenn. 546, 32 S W. 481 (1895). 
 
 3 State V. Kingsley, 108 Mo. 135, 18 S. W. 994 (1891); State v. Yardley, 
 95 Tenn. 546, 32 S. W. 481 (1895). 
 
 [297] 
 
§ 443.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXXII. 
 
 by one who has not paid his bill, without requiring a fraudu- 
 lent intent, it is constitutional. "The guest may then be im- 
 prisoned, not for failiire to pay the debt, but for impairing the 
 efficacy of the lien."* 
 
 § 442. Statute strictly construed. 
 
 T~ It has been held that the statute, being a penal one, must 
 oe strictly construed.' This consideration did not, however, 
 appeal with great force to Judge Handley, who in the Quarter 
 Sessions of Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, in the case of 
 Commonwealth v. Morton ^ used this poetic and almost scrip- 
 tural language: "This law was passed to protect the rights of 
 a meritorious class of citizens, and ought to be so construed as 
 to fully carry into effect the protection intended for such 
 persons from the wily ways of the hungry and dishonest, who, 
 roaming at large without any respect for the rights of others, 
 violate all laws with impunity. There is no crime but what 
 man will commit when hunger stares him in the face; and 
 when that hunger is appeased, there is no more ungrateful 
 creature at large. Parties who will eat of the bread obtained 
 by the sweat of another man's brow must pay for it, or obtain 
 it in an honest way, or for charity sake; otherwise, if he is 
 discovered removing surreptitiously his property out of any 
 such place named in the statute, after obtaining credit for 
 food or accommodations, although such property be but a 
 breast pin, he may be convicted and imprisoned under the 
 act." 
 
 § 443. Form of indictment. 
 
 The indictment need not allege that the board obtained 
 was of any value; nor need an indictment for surreptitious 
 removal of baggage, allege that the baggage was of any value.'' 
 
 ■1 State V. Engle, 156 Ind. 339, 58 N. E. 698 (1900). 
 5 Hutchinson v. Davis, 58 111. App. 358 (1895). 
 6 Luzerne Leg. Reg. 207, 9 Lane. Bar. 79 (Pa. 1877). 
 ' State V. Benson, 28 Minn. 424, 10 N. W. 471 (1881). 
 [298] 
 
Chap. XXXIL] Crimes against Innkeepers. [§ 445. 
 
 But an indictment for obtaining board by false pretences must 
 allege the nature and character of the pretences, that the de- 
 fendant may know the specific nature of the charge he is com- 
 pelled to meet.* 
 
 Topic II. Fraudulent obtaining of Board. 
 
 § 444. Fraud essential. 
 
 There must be some element of fraud about obtaining the 
 board in order to bring it within the statute. So where the 
 only evidence was that the defendant, after being entertained 
 for a week, was unable to pay; that the innkeeper forbade him 
 to go until he paid; that he asserted that money was due him 
 in a neighboring city, and the innkeeper allowed him to go to 
 get it; and that he did not return with the money, it was 
 held that a conviction could not be supported.* Judge Ross 
 said: "If an impecunious guest who has been guilty of no 
 fraud except inability to pay, is unable to pay the amount of 
 a board bill already incurred, it would seem from the conten- 
 tion of the complainant that he must either remain and in- 
 crease his liability and the landlord's loss, or if he goes away 
 openly, and for the ostensible purpose of obtaining the money 
 to pay the amount of the bill, that he is liable to arrest and 
 conviction. This would amount practically to liability to 
 conviction in every case of inability to pay a board bill. I do 
 not think that the statute contemplates such a result. A 
 hotel keeper can require payment in advance from his guests, 
 he has a common-law and statutory lien upon the baggage 
 of his guests, and he is protected from actual fraud, and this 
 is all. The mere fact of inabihty to pay a hotel bill is not 
 made a crime." 
 
 § 445. False representation required. 
 
 The statute is akin to the statutes punishing one who ob- 
 tains property by false pretences, and is to be interpreted in 
 
 8 Commonwealth v. Demiis, 1 Pa. Co. Ct. 278 (1884). 
 » People V. Nicholson, 25 N. Y. Misc. 266, 55 N. Y. Supp. 447 (1898). 
 
 [299] 
 
§ 446.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXXII. 
 
 the same way. The false pretence by means of which the 
 board is obtained must therefore be made with reference to 
 a past or existing fact; a promise to do something in the 
 future is not such a false pretence as to justify a conviction 
 under the statute, even if the promise was not kept. Thus, 
 where a boarder promised to pay his board as soon as he drew 
 his pay as clerk of the general assembly, but when he drew 
 his pay he left the inn and the city without paying his board, 
 the statute was not violated.^" Judge EUison said: "The 
 statute upon which this indictment is founded cannot be dis- 
 tinguished in this respect from the sections relating to false 
 pretences, cheats, devices, etc. It simply places obtaining 
 board in the same category with other things obtained by 
 false pretences. The matter charged here was a false rep- 
 resentation, or statement, or pretence made by defendant, that 
 in the future, viz., when he drew his pay as clerk in the general 
 assembly, he would pay his board. The indictment does not 
 aver, nor is it pretended, that defendant made any representa- 
 tion as to any existing matter which was false. He was, at 
 the time, a clerk in the general assembly, and his promise, 
 representation, -statement or pretence, that he would pay his 
 board when he should, in the future, draw his money as clerk, 
 was no more than if he had promised 'to pay as soon as he 
 should get the money.' Everyone who boards at a hotel or 
 boarding house directly or indirectly promises to pay his 
 board, and yet it would scarcely be thought such promise, 
 though false, would subject the promisor to a criminal prosecu- 
 tion." 
 
 § 446. Pretence must be made with fraudulent motive. 
 
 The pretence must be made for the purpose of obtaining 
 the board. In a Missouri case " the defendant registered at 
 the Southern Hotel on July 29, and was assigned to a room. 
 
 i« State V. Tull, 42 Mo. App. 324 (1890). See to the same effect State v. 
 Kingsley, 108 Mo. 135, 18 S. W. 994 (1891). 
 
 " State V. Kingsley, 108 Mo. 135, 18 S. W. 994 (1891). 
 
 [300] 
 
Chap. XXXII.] Ceimes against Innkeepers. [§ 447. 
 
 On July 31 she sent for the manager, rented a room as a studio, 
 stating that she was an artist, and inquired when the bills 
 were payable. Being told that they were payable weekly, 
 she said that it would be inconvenient to pay at the end of 
 the week, because she expected a remittance in two weeks; 
 and asked that her bill might be payable then. The manager, 
 without asking from whom she expected the remittance, 
 assented. No remittance coming at the end of two weeks she 
 was, after a few days, excluded from the hotel and indicted 
 under the statute. The Supreme Court held that upon this 
 evidence she should be discharged. Mr. Justice Thomas said: 
 "We do not think it can be fairly inferred from the evidence 
 that defendant in this case stated to the manager of the South- 
 ern Hotel that she expected a remittance, for the purpose of 
 obtaining board. She registered at the hotel on June [July] 29, 
 and without being questioned or making any statement she 
 was assigned a room. In this manner she obtained board 
 in the first instance. On June [July] 31 she sent for the man- 
 ager, and upon inquiry she was informed that bills for board 
 were payable weekly. She replied that she could not pay till 
 the end of two weeks, at which time she expected a remittance. 
 It appears, therefore, that she got board for two days, and 
 she could have continued there for one week, at least, without 
 saying a word about payment of the bills. Persons intending 
 to perpetrate tricks or obtain money, property or other valu- 
 able things by means of a false pretence, do not ordinarily 
 proceed in this way. They usually defer their false state- 
 ments till they are forced to the wall. Here defendant made 
 the statements voluntarily." 
 
 § 447. Board or other accommodation must be actually obtained. 
 
 The board must be actually obtained in order to have an 
 offence under the act; it is not enough that a contract for 
 board has been made. Thus, where one has contracted to 
 stay at an inn for a certain time and leaves before the time, 
 paying for all the board he has had, the act cannot apply. In 
 
 [301] 
 
§ 447.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXXII. 
 
 Lundmacher v. Block ^^ it appeared that the guest registered 
 at night, and on being asked how long he was to stay said 
 he should stay at least until after breakfast. He had notice 
 of a rule that a guest staying until after the beginning of a 
 meal must pay for that meal. The next morning, a few minutes 
 after breakfast was served, he tendered to the clerk the amount 
 due for his supper and room; but the clerk, though he knew 
 the guest had not eaten breakfast, demanded payment for 
 breakfast under the rule, and upon the guest refusing to pay 
 caused his arrest and prosecution under the statute. The 
 guest having been acquitted brought this action for malicious 
 prosecution, and the court held that he might recover; there 
 being no reasonable cause to suppose him guilty. Judge Pleas- 
 ants said: "He did not obtain the breakfast. Nor can it be 
 held that there was a contract, as to either, that he would 
 positively remain for any definite time. They were transients, 
 whose present purposes in that regard, though stated as 
 represented, would not be contracts for the time mentioned, 
 but lawfully changeable at their option for any reason there- 
 after arising. Nor, if they were contracts would it affect the 
 question under consideration. This statute is not to be ex- 
 tended by any liberality of construction in favor of innkeepers; 
 and we hold that in no proceeding under it is the civil liabihty 
 of the guest for any accommodation not actually ' obtained ' 
 at all pertinent. If he definitely contracted to remain for a 
 week, and left without fault of the innkeeper, at the close of 
 the first day, paying or tendering payment for all that he had 
 actually obtained, evidence of his refusal to pay for the further 
 time contracted for would not be admissible as tending to 
 prove an offence, or probable cause for a prosecution, under 
 this act. Nor should the jury be permitted, upon either of 
 those issues, to consider whether or not the accommodation 
 actually obtained was better, in view of what was fm-ther con- 
 tracted for, than it otherwise would have been, if payment for 
 
 12 39 lU. App. 553 (1891). 
 [302] 
 
Chap. XXXIL] Crimes against Innkeepers. [§ 448. 
 
 it was made or tendered according to its actual value or regu- 
 lar price. The innkeeper will not be allowed to claim that 
 if he had understood the guest was to remain only a day 
 instead of a week, he would or might have been furnished a 
 meaner room, any more than that there would or might have 
 been less of benignity in the smiles of the clerk or of alacrity 
 in the responses of bell boys or the movements of table waiters. 
 Having peculiar rights they are subject to peculiar obliga- 
 tions." 
 
 § 448. Board must be obtained by the pretence. 
 
 The board must be obtained by means of the false pretence. 
 If after the board has been obtained the guest employs a false 
 pretence to delay the time of payment or to put off the im- 
 portunity of his creditors, it does not come within the statute. 
 So where a guest had been staying at an inn without settling 
 his board bill since January, and in May, just before leaving 
 the inn, he made a false pret^ce, he could not be convicted 
 under the statute.^* Judge EUison said: "In order to a 
 proper conviction under the statute, the defendant must have 
 obtained the board by means of the false pretence, and the 
 party defrauded must have permitted him to obtain it on the 
 faith of, and in reliance upon the truth of, the false representa- 
 tion, statement or pretence. The true interpretation of the 
 testimony is that at about the time defendant was to leave 
 the hotel he made the false promise, substantially all the board 
 having been obtained." 
 
 So if the pretence was not believed by the innkeeper the 
 offence is not committed. " The proprietor must be shown 
 to have been deceived to his injury. If he knew the repre- 
 sentations were false, or if he believed they were false, or if 
 he did not beheve the statement or representation to be true, 
 or if he believed the representation, but, if they had no in- 
 fluence upon his conduct, no deception "was practiced. These 
 essentials are requisite to the maintenance of a civil action or 
 
 w state V. TuU, 42 Mo. App. 324 (1890). 
 
 [303] 
 
§ 451.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXXII. 
 
 defence predicated upon false representations, and surely 
 nothing less should suffice to support a criminal prosecu- 
 tion." " 
 
 Topic III. Surreptitious removal of Property. 
 § 449- Surreptitious removal as prima facie evidence of fraud. 
 
 Failure to pay the bill or absconding without paying the 
 bill and surreptitiously removing or attempting to remove 
 baggage, is often made prima facie evidence of fraudulently 
 obtaining the board. This clause must be so interpreted as 
 not to constitute practically an imprisonment for debt, since 
 such imprisonment would be unconstitutional. It cannot 
 therefore be so interpreted as to make the mere refusal to pay 
 a bill sufficient reasonable cause for prosecution and imprison- 
 ment. The removal of the baggage surreptitiously must ac- 
 company the refusal to pay, in order to have such effect. ^^ 
 
 § 450. Surreptitious removal as substantive oflfence. 
 ' Where the surreptitious removal of baggage after obtaining 
 credit is itself the offence, the crime is committed when the 
 baggage is removed, not at the time the accommodation is 
 obtained. In Commonwealth v. Morton " it appeared that 
 accommodations were obtained • and credit extended before 
 the passage of the act, but the defendant absconded and 
 surreptitiously removed his baggage after the act had come 
 into force. It was held that he might be convicted. "The 
 offence" the court said "is not complete when credit is ob- 
 tained, but, in the language of the law, is complete after the 
 defendant obtains credit and then absconds and surreptitiously 
 removes his baggage or property." \ 
 
 §451. What sort of removal is surreptitious. 
 
 A surreptitious removal of baggage involves some conceal- 
 ment; if it was done openly, though at a time when no one 
 
 "Chauncey v. State, 130 Ala. 71, 30 So. 403 (1901). See also State v. 
 Kingsley, 108 Mo. 135, 18 S. W. 994 (1891). 
 
 "Hutchinson v. Davis, 58 111. App. 358 (1895). 
 i" 6 Luz. Leg. Reg. (Pa.) 207, 9 Lane. Bar, 79 (1877). 
 [304] 
 
Ghap. XXXII.] Crimes against Innkeepers. [§ 451. 
 
 was watching, the removal would not be surreptitious. "The 
 fact that neither appellant nor any of his agents knew that 
 he was going away, or taking his baggage away, does not, of 
 itself, establish that the removal was surreptitious. He may 
 have gone and taken his baggage in the most open and pubUc 
 manner, and yet neither appellant nor any of his agents seen 
 the removal." " The approved definition of the word is 
 "done by stealth, or without legitimate authority, made or 
 produced fraudulently; characterized by concealment or un- 
 derhand dealing; clandestine;" " and though one of the 
 definitions mentions fraud, the fraud meant is obviously a 
 fraud used to escape the notice of the person interested; as 
 in the example given, the surreptitious edition of a book. 
 The word by derivation means, taken away secretly. It is 
 therefore obvious that a surreptitious removal is one which 
 is done clandestinely so as to escape the notice of the um- 
 keeper by reason of the method of doing it. / In Common- 
 wealth V. Morton,^^. however, the word "surreptitious" seems 
 to have received a different and hardly permissible interpreta- 
 tion. The defendant's gun being held by the innkeeper, he 
 induced the innkeeper to give it up to him by falsely pretend- 
 ing that he wished to lend it to a friend for a short time to 
 shoot with, and he would then return it. He failed to return 
 it. The court held that the jury upon this evidence might 
 find the removal surreptitious. Judge Handley said: "The 
 evidence shows that the defendant obtained possession of the 
 gun under representations which misled the prosecutor. 
 Upon the trial of the case, notwithstanding the defendant was 
 called on to testify, he failed to show why the gun was not 
 returned, and he also failed to establish the truth of his rep- 
 resentations when he secured possession of this property. It 
 was left with the jury to say, from all the evidence in the case, 
 whether his obtaining the possession was surreptitious within 
 
 "Waterman, P. J., in Hutchinson v. Davis, 58 111. App. 358, 363 (1895). 
 \i8 Century Dictionary, s. v. 
 il»6 Luz. Leg. Reg. (Pa.) 207, 9 Lane. Bar, 79 (1877). 
 
 20 [305] 
 
§ 452.] Innkeepers. [Chap. XXXII. 
 
 the meaning of the law. As this was a question of fact, under 
 the instructions given by the court, and the jury found the 
 defendant guilty, we have no reason to disturb their finding." \ 
 
 §452. Posting of notice not necessary, 
 
 Upon an indictment for absconding and surreptitiously 
 removing his baggage from a hotel after obtaining credit for 
 food and accommodations, it is improper to admit evidence 
 that the proprietor did or did not put up the notices required 
 by another section of the act, as it is only when such pro- 
 prietor is upon trial for any of the offences enumerated in the 
 other section that such evidence is pertinent^?" 
 
 20 Commonwealth v. Morton, 6 Luz. Leg. Reg. (Pa.) 207, 9 Lane. Bar, 
 79 (1877). 
 
 [306] 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 STATUTES OF THE VARIOUS STATES REGULATING INNS AND 
 OTHER PUBLIC HOUSES AND THE RIGHTS OP INNKEEPERS 
 AND GUEST. 
 
 ers. 
 
 ALABAMA. 
 
 Civil Code of 1896. 
 § 1. 
 
 In the absence of a special contract, as is 
 authorized in the succeeding section, the rights Liability of inn 
 of guests, and the liability of the keeper remain "J^}"^^^ ^°^^' 
 as at common law (Civ. Code, § 2539). 
 
 §2. 
 
 The keeper of a public inn or hotel may re- 
 quire any guest, or person proposing to become 
 a guest, to enter into a special contract as to 
 the kind and place of board, entertainment, or 
 lodging to be furnished such guest, and the price 
 therefor to be paid; and if such guest refuses to 
 enter into such contract and to accept such 
 board, entertainment, or lodging at the price 
 proposed, as the keeper may offer, the keeper 
 may refuse to receive or to entertain such guest, 
 and because of such refusal shall not incur any 
 liability whatever. Such special contract must 
 be in writing, signed by both parties; and 
 thereby the inn or hotel keeper may limit his 
 
 [307] 
 
 Special con- 
 tract between 
 inn or hotel 
 keeper and 
 guest author- 
 ized. 
 
Appendix. 
 
 for de- 
 posit of val- 
 uables. 
 
 Not liable for 
 articles not de- 
 posited. 
 
 liability for the safety of the goods of such guest, 
 as it is defined or declared by the common law 
 (Ibid., §2540). 
 
 §3. 
 
 Every keeper of a public inn or hotel in a city 
 must provide himself with an iron chest, or other 
 safe depository for valuable articles belonging to 
 his guests and customers, and must keep posted 
 upon his doors and other public places in his 
 house of entertainment, written or printed 
 notices to his guests and customers, that they 
 must leave their valuables with the landlord, 
 his agent, or clerk, for safe-keeping, that he may 
 make safe deposit of the same in the place pro- 
 vided for that purpose (Ibid., § 2541). ^ 
 
 §4. 
 
 Such hotel or innkeeper as shall comply with 
 the requirements of the preceding section, shall 
 not be Hable for any money, jewelry, watches, 
 plate, or other things made of gold or silver, or 
 of rare and precious stones, or for other valuable 
 articles of such description as may be contained 
 in small compass, which may be abstracted or 
 lost from any such pubHc inn or hotel, if the 
 same shall not be left with the hotel or inn- 
 keeper, his clerk, or agent for deposit, imless 
 such loss shall occur through the fraud of the 
 hotel or innkeeper, or some clerk or servant 
 
 1 Posting this notice on a single door is not sufficient. 
 Beale v. Posey, 72 Ala. 323 (1882). It must be posted 
 on the doors of all rooms occupied by guests. Lanier v. 
 Youngblood, 73 Ala. 587 (1883). The fact that notices 
 were posted a year before, at a previous visit of the guest, 
 is immaterial. Ibid. 
 
 [308] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 employed by him in such imi or hotel (Ibid., 
 § 2542). 2 
 
 §5. 
 
 The owner or manager of any theatre holding 
 any such license must issue tickets of admis- 
 sion to all persons whom they admit to their 
 exhibition, and must thereon assign a particular 
 seat to each such person, in such part of the 
 theatre as the convenience of such owner or 
 manager may require (Ibid., § 4122, 1[ 15, re- 
 pealed by Acts of 1900-1901, p. 2633). 
 
 Theatre tick- 
 ets: provision 
 repealed. 
 
 " §6. 
 
 Any person who by fraud or misrepresenta- 
 tion obtains board or lodging from the landlord, 
 proprietor or keeper of any hotel or boarding 
 house, and fails or refuses to pay for the same, 
 must, on conviction, be fined not more than 
 five hundred dollars, and may also be sentenced 
 to hard labor for the county for not longer than 
 six months (Penal Code, § 4755).^ 
 
 2 This provision must be construed strictly against the 
 innkeeper. Lanier v. Youngblood, 73 Ala. 587 (1883). 
 And if the innkeeper fails to post the notice as provided 
 in the preceding section, he continues liable as at common 
 law. Tbid. 
 
 3 This statute is not unconstitutional. Ex parte King, 
 102 Ala. 182, 15 So. 524 (1894). One of the necessary- 
 elements of this crime is that the misrepresentations or 
 fraud charged should have been relied on by the hotel 
 keeper, and induced him to furnish the board and lodging, 
 in consequence of which he was deceived to his injury ; 
 and hence where such hotel keeper, at the trial of a prose- 
 cution under the section, testified that he did not believe 
 the statements made by the defendant which were al- 
 leged to have constituted the fraud, no conviction could be 
 had.— Chauncey v. State, 130 Ala. 71 , 30 So. 403 (1901). 
 
 Obtaining 
 board by 
 fraud. 
 
 [309] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 II. 
 
 ARIZONA. 
 
 Revised Statutes of 1901. 
 
 Liens 
 baggage. 
 
 on 
 
 §1. 
 
 All hotel, inn, boarding-house or lodging- 
 house keepers shall have a lien upon the baggage 
 and other property of value of their guests or 
 boarders or lodgers, brought into such hotel, 
 inn, or boarding house or lodging house by such 
 guests or boarders or lodgers for the proper 
 charges due from such guests or boarders or 
 lodgers for their accommodation, board or lodg- 
 ing and room rent, and such extras as are fur- 
 nished at their request, with the right to the 
 possession of such baggage or other property of 
 value, until all such charges are paid (Rev. 
 Stat., §2916). 
 
 Hotel keepers 
 may sell bag- 
 gage after six 
 months. 
 
 [310] 
 
 §2. 
 
 Whenever any trunk, carpetbag, valise, box, 
 bundle, furniture, merchandise or baggage has 
 heretofore, or shall hereafter come into the pos- 
 session of the keeper of any hotel, inn, boarding 
 or lodging house as such, and has remained or 
 shall remain unclaimed for the period of six 
 months, such keeper may proceed to sell the same 
 at pubUc auction, and out of the proceeds of 
 
Appendix. 
 
 such sale may retain the charges for storage if 
 any, and the expenses of advertising and sale 
 thereof; but no such sale shall be made until the 
 expiration of four weeks from the first publica- 
 tion of notice of such sale in a newspaper pub- 
 Ushed in or nearest the city, town, village or 
 place in which said hotel, inn, boarding or 
 lodging house or warehouse is situated. Said 
 notice shall be published once a week for four 
 successive weeks, in some newspaper, daily or 
 weekly, of general circulation, and shall contain 
 a description of each trunk, carpetbag, valise, 
 bundle, box, furniture, merchandise or baggage, 
 as near as may be, the name of the owner, if 
 known, the- name of such keeper, and the time 
 and place of such place (sale) ; and the expenses 
 incurred for advertising shall be a lien upon 
 such trunk, carpetbag, vaUse, box, bundle, 
 furniture, merchandise or baggage at a ratable 
 proportion, according to the value of such prop- 
 erty or thing or article sold; and in case any 
 balance arising from such sale shall not be 
 claimed by the rightful owner within one week 
 from the day of said sale, the same shall be paid 
 into the treasury of the county in which such 
 sale took place; and if the same be not claimed 
 by the owner thereof or his legal representative 
 within one year thereafter, the same shall be 
 paid into the general fimd of said county (Ibid., 
 § 2917). 
 
 §3. 
 
 Every keeper of a hotel, inn, boarding or 
 lodging house shall post in a conspicuous place 
 in the office or public room, and in every bed- 
 room of said hotel or boarding house, a printed 
 
 Hotel keepers 
 must post this 
 section. 
 
 [311] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 copy of this section, with a printed statement of 
 charge or rate of charges by the day, week or 
 month, as the case may be, for simple meals, 
 lodging, or for items furnished. No charge shall 
 be made or sum collected or received by any 
 such person for any service so enumerated, not 
 actually rendered, or for any item not actually 
 dehvered, or for any greater or other sum than 
 he is entitled to by the general rules and regula- 
 tions of said hotel, iim, boarding or lodging 
 house. For any violation of this section, or any 
 provision here contained, the offender shall for- 
 feit to the injured party three times the amount 
 of the sum charged in excess of what he is en- 
 titled to {Ibid., § 2918). 
 
 Innkeeper lia- 
 ble to guests 
 for damages 
 to property. 
 
 §4. 
 
 An innkeeper is liable for all losses of, or in- 
 juries to personal property placed or left by his 
 guests under his care; imless occasioned by an 
 irresistible, superhuman cause, by a public 
 enemy, by the neghgence of the owner, or by the 
 act of someone whom be brought into the inn 
 {Ibid., §2919). 
 
 Fire-proof 
 safe. Notice 
 of, must be 
 given. 
 
 [312] 
 
 §6. 
 
 If an innkeeper keeps a fire-proof safe, and 
 gives notice to a guest, either personally or by 
 putting up a printed notice in a prominent place 
 in the room occupied by the guest, that he keeps 
 such a safe and will not be hable for money, 
 jewelry, documents or other articles of unusual 
 value and of small compass, unless placed 
 therein, he is not liable, except so far as his 
 own acts contribute thereto, for any loss of or 
 
Appendix. 
 
 any injury to such articles if not deposited with 
 him and not required by the guest for present 
 use (Ibid., § 2920). 
 
 §6. 
 
 It shall be the duty of all hotel, inn, boarding 
 and lodging-house keepers to issue receipts or 
 checks to guests for all baggage, clothing or 
 things of value left with them for safe-keeping, 
 but such receipts or checks shall not specify any 
 amoimt or value attached to such articles, unless 
 by mutual agreement between the party de- 
 positing the same and the party receiving it 
 {Ibid., §2921). 
 
 Checks for 
 baggage, etc. 
 
 §7. 
 
 Any person who shall put up at any hotel, 
 inn, or lodging house, and shaH procure any 
 food, entertainment or accommodation without 
 paying therefor, except where credit is expressly 
 given, with intent to cheat or defraud the owner 
 or keeper thereof out of the pay for the same; 
 or who with intent to cheat or defraud such 
 owner, or keeper, out of the pay therefor, shall 
 obtain credit by means of any false show of 
 baggage or effects brought thereto, or who shall 
 with such intent remove or cause to be removed 
 any baggage or effects from any hotel, inn or 
 lodging house while there is a lien thereon for the 
 proper charges due from him, for such accom- 
 modation, shall be punished by imprisonment in 
 the county jail, not exceeding three months or 
 by a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars 
 ($100) (Laws 1905, ch. 10, §1). 
 
 Punishment 
 for fraud on 
 innkeepers. 
 
 [313] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 III. 
 
 ARKANSAS. 
 
 Acts of Arkansas, 1899, Act CLXV. 
 
 An Act to prevent fraud upon hotels, inn or 
 boarding-house keepers, and for other purposes. 
 
 Gives keepers 
 of hotels lien 
 for board and 
 lodging. 
 
 Persons de- 
 frauding hotel 
 keepers by 
 fraud, misrep- 
 resentation or 
 in any other 
 way shall be 
 subject to fine. 
 
 [314] 
 
 §1. 
 
 Every person operating any hotel, inn or 
 boarding house in this State, shall have a lien 
 upon the baggage and personal effects of all 
 persons receiving food, entertainment or ac- 
 commodation thereat or therefrom (Acts of 
 1899, p. 300). 
 
 §2. 
 
 Any person who shall put up at any hotel, 
 inn or boarding house and shall procure any 
 food, entertainment or accommodation without 
 paying therefor, except where credit is given by 
 express agreement, with intent to cheat or de- 
 fraud the owner or keeper thereof, out of the pay 
 for the same; or, who with intent to cheat or 
 defraud such owner or keeper out of the pay 
 therefor, shall obtain credit at any hotel, inn or 
 boarding house for such food, entertainment or 
 accommodation by means of any false show of 
 baggage or effects brought thereto, or who shall 
 
Appendix. 
 
 with such intent remove or cause to be removed, 
 any baggage or effects from any hotel, inn or 
 boarding house, without paying the proper 
 charges due from him or her for such food, en- 
 tertainment or accommodation, shall be guilty 
 of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, 
 shall be fined in any sum not less than ten 
 dollars ($10) nor more than fifty dollars ($50) 
 (Ibid.). 
 
 [315] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 IV. 
 
 CALIFORNIA. 
 
 Penal Code of 1903. 
 
 §1. 
 
 Every person, and every agent or officer of any 
 
 Innkeepers corporation, carrying on business as an inn- 
 and carriers i • >■ 
 
 keeper, or as a common carrier oi passengers, 
 
 who refuses, without just cause or excuse, to 
 
 receive and entertain any guest or to receive and 
 
 carry any passenger, is guilty of a misdemeanor 
 
 (Pen. Code, § 365). 
 
 refusing to re- 
 ceive guests. 
 
 §2. 
 
 Any person who obtains any food or accom- 
 modation at an hotel, inn, restaurant, board- 
 Defrauding ing house or lodging house without paying 
 house " t^^r^foi") '^th intent to defraud the proprietor 
 or manager thereof, or who obtains credit at an 
 hotel, inn, restaurant, boarding house, or lodging 
 house by the use of any false pretence, or who, 
 after obtaining credit or accommodation at an 
 hotel, inn, restaurant, boarding house, or lodging 
 house absconds or surreptitiously removes his 
 baggage therefrom without paying for his food 
 or accommodations is guilty of a misdemeanor 
 {Ibid., §537). 
 [316] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 §3. 
 
 Every hotel keeper, lodging-house keeper, and 
 innkeeper, or keeper of any place where rooms 
 are let to lodgers in which, or any of which such 
 places illuminating gas is used, who shall turn 
 off, or cause to be turned off at the meter the 
 flow of such illuminating gas, during the time 
 of the use of any such room or rooms, shall be 
 guilty of a misdemeanor; provided, however, 
 that this act shall not apply to any of the per- 
 sons herein enumerated, when such person or 
 persons shall have connected every exit orifice 
 upon the gas fixtures used in such place or places 
 with a practical and safe automatic gas igniter 
 (Stat. 1903, p. 610, § 1). 
 
 Regulating 
 use of illumi- 
 nating gas. 
 
 §4. 
 
 Every person who owns, leases, lets, or hires, 
 to any person or persons, any room or apart- 
 ment in any building, house or other structure, 
 within the limits of any incorporated city, or 
 city and coimty, within the state of California, 
 for the purpose of a lodging or sleeping apart- 
 ment, which room or apartment contains less 
 than five hundred cubic feet of space, in the 
 clear, for each person so occup}ang such room 
 or apartment, shall be deemed guilty of a mis- 
 demeanor, and shall, upon conviction thereof, be 
 pimished by a fine of not less than fifty (50) 
 dollars or more than five himdred (500) dollars, 
 or by imprisonment in the county jail, or by 
 both such fine and imprisonment (Stat. 1875, 
 1876, p. 632, § 1). 
 
 Cubic air in 
 slee p ing 
 apartments. 
 
 [317] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 Punishment 
 of person 
 sleeping in 
 small rooms. 
 
 §6. 
 
 Any person or persons found sleeping or 
 lodging, or who hires or uses for the purpose of - 
 sleeping in, or lodging in, any room or apart- 
 ment, which contains less than five hundred 
 (500) cubic feet of space in the clear, for each 
 person so occupying such room or apartment, 
 shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and 
 shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of 
 not less than ten (10) or more than fifty (50) 
 doUars, or by both such fine and imprison- 
 ment (Ibid., § 2). 
 
 Police to in- 
 vestigate. 
 
 8 6. 
 
 It shall be the duty of the chief of poHce (or 
 such other person to whom the pohce powers 
 of a city are delegated) to detail a competent 
 and qualified officer or officers of the regular 
 force to examine into any violations of any of the 
 provisions of this act, and to arrest any person 
 guilty of any such violation {Ibid., § 3). 
 
 Political Code of 1903. 
 
 Innkeepers, 
 etc., may re- 
 tain goods un- 
 til charges 
 paid. 
 
 [318] 
 
 §7. 
 
 When any goods, merchandise, or other prop- 
 erty has been received by any railroad or 
 express company, or other common carrier, com- 
 mission merchants, innkeepers, or warehouse- 
 men, for transportation, or safe-keeping, and are 
 not delivered to the owner, consignee, or other 
 authorized person, the carrier, commission 
 merchant, innkeeper, or warehouseman, may 
 hold or store the same with some responsible 
 
Appendix. 
 
 perison until the freight and all just and reason- 
 able charges are paid (Polit. Code, § 3152). 
 
 Civil Code of 1903. 
 
 §8. 
 
 The liability of an innkeeper, hotel keeper, 
 boarding - and lodging-house keeper, for losses of 
 or injuries to personal property, other than 
 money placed by his guests, boarders, or lodgers 
 under his care, is that of a depositary for hire; 
 provided, however, that in no case shall such 
 liability exceed the sum of one himdred dollars 
 for each trunk and its contents, fifty dollars for 
 each valise or traveUng bag and contents, and 
 ten dollars for each box, bundle, or package and 
 contents, so placed under his care, unless he 
 shall have consented in writing with the owner 
 thereof to assume a greater liability (Civ. Code, 
 § 1859).» 
 
 Innkeeper's 
 liability. 
 
 §9- 
 
 If an innkeeper, hotel keeper, boarding-house 
 or lodging-house keeper, keeps a fireproof safe, 
 and gives notice to a guest, boarder, or lodger, 
 either personally or by putting up a printed 
 notice in a prominent place in the office or the 
 room occupied by the guest, boarder, or lodger, 
 
 1 The effect of this clause is to make an innkeeper 
 liable for the loss of personal property placed by his 
 guests under his care, unless occasioned by an irresistible 
 superhuman cause. For this purpose a loss occurring by 
 a fire which originated in the battery room of a hotel 
 cannot be considered occasioned by an "irresistible super- 
 human cause." Fay v. Pacific Imp. Co., 93 Cal. 253, 
 26 Pac. 1099, 28 Pac. 943, 27 Am. St. Rep. 198, 16 L. R. A. 
 188 (1892). 
 
 How exempt- 
 ed from liabil- 
 ity. 
 
 [319] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 that he keeps such a safe and will not be liable 
 for money, jewelry, documents, or other articles 
 of unusual value and small compass, unless 
 placed therein, he is not liable, except so far as 
 his own acts shall contribute thereto, for any 
 loss of or injury to such articles, if not deposited 
 with him to be placed therein, nor in any case 
 more than the sum of two hundred and fifty 
 dollars for any or all such property of any in- 
 dividual guest, boarder, or lodger, unless he shall 
 have given a receipt in writing therefor to such 
 guest, boarder, or lodger (Ibid., § 1860). 
 
 Lien of board- 
 ing - and lodg- 
 ing-house 
 keepers. 
 
 §10. 
 
 Hotel men, boarding-house and lodging-house 
 keepers, shaU have a hen upon the baggage and 
 other property of value of their guests, or 
 boarders, or lodgers, brought into such hotel, 
 inn, or boarding or lodging house by such guests, 
 or boarders, or lodgers, for their accommoda- 
 tion, board and lodging, and room rent, (and) 
 such extras as are furnished at their request, 
 with the right to the possession of such baggage, 
 or other property of value, until all such charges 
 are paid {Ibid., § 1861). 
 
 Unclaimed 
 baggage may 
 b e sold a t 
 auction. 
 
 [320] 
 
 §11. 
 
 Whenever any trunk, carpetbag, valise, box, 
 bundle, or other baggage has heretofore come, 
 or shall hereafter come, into the possession of 
 the keeper of any hotel, inn, boarding or lodging 
 house, as such, and has remained, or shall re- 
 main, unclaimed for the period of six months, 
 such keeper may proceed to sell the same at 
 public auction, and out of the proceeds of such 
 
Appendix. 
 
 sale may retain the charges for storage, if any, 
 and the expenses of advertising and sale thereof; 
 but no such sale shall be made until the expira- 
 tion of four weeks from the first publication of 
 notice of such sale in a newspaper published in 
 or nearest the city, town, village, or place in 
 which said hotel, inn, boarding or lodging house 
 is situated. Said notice shall be published once 
 a week, for four successive weeks, in some news- 
 paper, daily or weekly, of general circulation, and 
 shall contain a description of each trunk, carpet- 
 bag, vahse, box, bundle, or other baggage, as 
 near as may be; the name of the owner, if 
 known ; the name of such keeper, and the time 
 and place of sale ; and the expenses incurred for 
 advertising shall be a lien upon such trunk, 
 carpetbag, valise, box, bundle, or other bag- 
 gage, in a ratable proportion, according to the 
 value of such piece of property, or thing, or 
 article sold; and in case any balance arising 
 from such sale shall not be claimed by the 
 rightful owner within one week from the ,day 
 of said sale, the same shall be paid into the 
 treasury of the county in which such sale took 
 place; and if the same be not claimed by the 
 owner thereof, or his legal representatives, 
 within one year thereafter, the same shall be 
 paid into the general fund of said county (Ibid., 
 § 1862). 
 
 §12. 
 
 Every keeper of a hotel, inn, boarding or Keeper to 
 , , ,, . / \ • post rates of 
 
 lodging house, shall post, m (a) conspicuous gi,j^jggg 
 
 place, in the office, or pubUc room, and in every 
 
 bedroom of said hotel, boarding house, inn, or 
 
 lodging house, a printed copy of this section, 
 
 21 [321] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 Hiring of 
 lodgings for 
 indefinite 
 term. 
 
 and a statement of charge, or rate of charges, 
 by the day, and for meals or items fm-nished, 
 and for lodging. No charge or sum shall be 
 collected or received by any such person for any 
 service not actually rendered, or for any item 
 not actually delivered, or for any greater or other 
 sum than he is entitled to by the general rules 
 and regulations of said hotel, inn, boarding or 
 lodging house. For any violation of this sec- 
 tion or any provision herein contained, the 
 offender shall forfeit to the injured party three 
 times the amount of the sum charged in excess 
 of what he is entitled to (Ibid., § 1863). 
 
 §13. 
 
 A hiring of lodgings or a dwelling house for an 
 unspecified term is presumed to have been made 
 for such length of time as the parties adopt for 
 the estimation of the rent. Thus, a hiring at a 
 monthly rate of rent is presumed to be for one 
 nionth. In the absence of any agreement re- 
 specting the length of time or the rent, the hiring 
 is presumed to be monthly {Ibid., § 1944). 
 
 Refusal of ad- 
 mission to inns 
 etc. , places 
 of amuse- 
 ment, etc., on 
 account of 
 race or color, 
 imposes civil 
 liability. 
 
 [322] 
 
 General Laws of 1903. 
 
 §14. 
 
 That all citizens within the jurisdiction of this 
 State shall be entitled to the full and equal ac- 
 commodations, advantages, facilities, and privi- 
 leges of inns, restaurants, hotels, eating houses, 
 barber shops, bath houses, theatres, skating- 
 rinks, and all other places of public accommoda- 
 tion or amusement, subject only to the conditions 
 and Umitations established by law and appUcable 
 alike to all citizens (Title 86, Act 604). 
 
Appendix. 
 
 §16. 
 
 Whoever shall violate any of the provisions 
 of the foregoing section, by den5dng to any citi- 
 zen, except for reasons applicable alike to every Penalty, 
 race or color, and regardless of race or color, the 
 full accommodations, advantages, facilities, and 
 privileges in said section enumerated, or by aid- 
 ing or inciting such denial, or whoever shall make 
 any discrimination, distinction, or restriction on 
 account of color or race, or except for good cause, 
 applicable alike to all citizens of every color or 
 race whatever, in respect to the admission of any 
 citizen to, or his treatment in, any inn, restau- 
 rant, hotel, eating house, barber shop, bath- 
 house, theatre, skating-rink, or other public 
 place of amusement or accommodation, whether 
 such place be licensed or not, or whoever aids or 
 incites such discrimination, distinction, or re- 
 striction, shall, for each and every such offence, 
 be liable in damages in an amount not less 
 than fifty dollars, which may be recovered in an 
 action at law brought for that purpose {Ibid., 
 Act 605). 
 
 §16. 
 
 It shall be unlawful for any corporation, per- 
 son, or association, or the proprietor, lessee, or 
 the agents of either, of any opera house, theatre, 
 melodeon, musuem, circus, caravan, race-course, 
 fair, or other place of public amusement or en- 
 tertainment, to refuse admittance to any person 
 over the age of twenty-one years who presents 
 a ticket of admission acquired by purchase, and 
 who demands admission to such place; provided, 
 that any person under the influence of liquor, 
 
 Unlawful to 
 refuse admis- 
 sion to places 
 of amuse- 
 ment. 
 Theatres. 
 
 [323] 
 
Sale of thea- 
 tre tickets at 
 premium, un- 
 lawful. 
 
 Appendix. 
 
 or who is guilty of boisterous conduct, or any 
 person of lewd or immoral character, may be 
 excluded from any such place of amusement 
 (Title 497, Act 4099, § 1). 
 
 §17. 
 
 Any person who is refused admission to any 
 place of amusement contrary to the provisions 
 of this act is entitled to recover from the pro- 
 prietor, lessee, or their agents, or from any per- 
 son, association, corporation, or the directors 
 thereof, his actual damages and one hundred 
 dollars in addition thereto (Ibid., § 2). 
 
 Statutes and Amendments to the Codes, 1905. 
 
 §18. 
 
 Every person who sells or offers for sale any 
 ticket or tickets to any theatre or other public 
 place of amusement at a price in excess of that 
 charged originally by the management of such 
 theatre or public place of amusement is guilty of 
 a misdemeanor (Acts of 1905, chapter CXL; 
 inserted in Penal Code as § 526). 
 
 ;324] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 COLORADO. 
 
 Mills' Annotated Statutes (Supplement), 
 1891-1896. 
 
 §1. 
 
 That all persons within the jurisdiction of said 
 State shall be entitled to the full and equal en- 
 joyment of the accommodations, advantages, 
 facilities and privileges of inns, restaurants, eat- 
 ing houses, barber shops, pubUc conveyances on 
 land or water, theatres, and all other places of 
 public accommodation and amusement, subject 
 only to the conditions and limitations estab- 
 lished by law and applicable alike to all citizens 
 (Annot. Stat. Supp., § 423). 
 
 All persons 
 entitled to 
 equal enjoy- 
 ments. 
 
 §2. 
 
 That any person who shall violate any of the 
 provisions of the foregoing section by denying 
 to any citizen, except for reasons applicable Penalty. 
 aUke to all citizens of every race and color, and 
 regardless of color or race, the full enjoyment 
 of any of the accommodations, advantages, 
 facilities or privileges in said section enumerated, 
 or by aiding or inciting such denial, shall for 
 every such offence forfeit and pay a sum of not 
 less than fifty dollars ($50) nor more than five 
 
 [325] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 hundred dollars ($500) to the person aggrieved 
 thereby, to be recovered in any court of compe- 
 tent jurisdiction in the county where said 
 offence was committed; and shall also for every 
 such offence be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor; 
 and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined in 
 any sum not less than ten dollars ($10), or more 
 than three hundred dollars ($300), or shall be 
 imprisoned not more than one year, or both; 
 And, provided further, That a judgment in favor 
 of the party aggrieved, or punishment upon an 
 indictment ' or information shall be a bar to 
 either prosecution, respectively (Ibid., §424). 
 
 Obtaining 
 food or lodg- 
 ing — : misde- 
 meanor — pen- 
 alty. 
 
 §3. 
 
 Any person who shall obtain food, lodging, or 
 other accommodation at any hotel, lodging 
 house, furnished room, boarding house, or other 
 eating house, with intent to defraud the owner 
 or keeper thereof, shall be deemed guilty of a 
 misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall 
 be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars 
 ($100), or imprisoned in the county jail not less 
 than five days, nor more than thirty days, or 
 both in the discretion of the court {Ibid., § 1404). 
 
 Proof. 
 
 [326] 
 
 §4. 
 
 Proof that lodging, food or other accommoda- 
 tion was obtained by any false pretence, or by 
 any false or fictitious show or pretence of any 
 baggage, or other property, or that any person 
 absconded without paying or offering to pay for 
 such food, lodging or other accommodation, or 
 that any such person surreptitiously removed 
 or attempted to remove his or her baggage shall 
 
Appendix. 
 
 be prima facie proof of the fraudulent intent 
 mentioned in section one of this act {Ihid., 
 § 1405). 
 
 §5. 
 
 No conviction shall be had under this act, 
 unless notice of it shall have been posted on the Post copy of 
 inside door of the sleeping room of the person P'^*'®***"^ ^^•'" 
 sought to be convicted; or in case there are no 
 such rooms in connection with the eating house, 
 imless such notice shall have been posted in some 
 place at or near where guests usually paid their 
 bills {Ibid., §1406). 
 
 tions. 
 
 Mills' Annotated Statutes of 1891. 
 
 The keeper of any hotel, tavern, or boarding 
 house, or any person who rents furnished or 
 unfurnished rooms, shall have a lien upon the 
 baggage and furniture of his or her patrons, 
 boarders, guests or tenants, for such boarding, 
 lodging or rent, and for all costs incurred in 
 enforcing such lien (Annot. Stats., § 2854). 
 
 Lien of hotel 
 or boarding- 
 house keeper. 
 
 §7. 
 
 When any hotel, inn, boarding-house keeper, 
 or the keeper of furnished rooms, may hereafter 
 retain any baggage of any guest by virtue of any 
 lien thereon under the now existing laws of this 
 State, such lien may be enforced as follows, viz. : 
 The party or parties claiming such lien shall 
 address a letter to the best known post office, 
 or the post office entered upon the register of 
 names in such hotel, inn or boarding house of the 
 
 Baggfage may 
 be retained 
 and sold. 
 
 [327] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 party owning the baggage, notifying such party 
 of the amount of the lien claimed, and that the 
 person claiming the same would on a day and 
 hour stated, which shall not be less than thirty 
 days from the time of mailing of such notice, 
 proceed to sell the baggage of said owner at 
 public or private sale, for the payment of the 
 charges thereon now allowed by law. All sales 
 shown to have been conducted under the notice 
 herein required shall be deemed valid and suffi- 
 cient {Ihid., § 1407). 
 
 [328] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 taurant. 
 
 VI. 
 
 CONNECTICUT. 
 General Statutes of 1902. 
 
 §1. 
 
 Every person who shall, at any hotel, restau- Defrauding 
 rant, or boarding house, receive or cause to be J^eeper of 
 furnished any food or accommodation, with in- '*^" 
 
 tent to defraud the keeper of such hotel, res- 
 taurant, or boarding house, out of the value or 
 price of such food or accommodation, and every 
 person who shall obtain credit at any hotel, 
 restaurant, or boarding house, by the use of any 
 false pretence or device, shall be fined not more 
 than fifty dollars, or imprisoned not more than 
 thirty days, or both. The departure without 
 intent to return, of any guest from any hotel, 
 restaurant, or boarding house, without the pay- 
 ment of the amoimt due to the keeper thereof, 
 and without actual notice to said keeper of the 
 intention to depart, shall be •prima facie evidence 
 of intent to defraud. Every keeper of a hotel, 
 restaurant, or boarding house, shall post in a 
 conspicuous place and manner, in the office or 
 public room of such hotel, restaurant, or board- 
 ing house, a printed copy of this section (Gen. 
 Stat., §1427). 
 
 [329] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 Liens of 
 boarding- 
 house 
 keepers. 
 
 §2. 
 
 When a special agreement shall have been 
 made between the keeper of any boarding or 
 lodging house and any person boarding or 
 lodging at such house, regarding the price of 
 such board or lodging, all the baggage and 
 effects kept by such person at such house shall 
 be subject to a lien in favor of the keeper of 
 such house for all such sums as shall be at any 
 time due him from such person for board or 
 lodging; and such boarding-house or lodging- 
 house keeper may detain such baggage and 
 effects imtil such debt shall be paid; and, if it 
 be not paid within sixty days after it is due, he 
 may sell said property, or such part thereof as 
 shall be necessary, and apply the proceeds to the 
 payment of such debt {Ibid., § 4165). 
 
 Iiiens of hotel 
 keepers. 
 
 [330] 
 
 §3. 
 
 Whenever the keeper of any hotel or inn shall 
 receive into his hotel or inn any person as a 
 boarder, he shall have a Hen and right to detain 
 the baggage and effects of such boarder; and 
 such lien may be enforced in the manner herein- 
 after provided. At any time after thirty days 
 after the person incurring any debt or obliga- 
 tion has left the hotel or inn wherein such debt 
 or obligation was incurred, the debt or obliga- 
 tion being still due and unpaid, the proprietor of 
 said hotel or inn may sell at public auction for 
 cash at the office of said hotel or inn any or all 
 baggage or property left at said hotel or inn, and 
 apply the avails of said sale toward the pay- 
 ment of said debt or obhgation; provided, that 
 such sale shall be advertised in a newspaper 
 
Appendix. 
 
 published, or having a circulation in the town 
 where said hotel or inn is situated, three times, 
 commencing at least five days before said sale; 
 and that, in case the last usual place of abode 
 of said debtor is known to or can reasonably be 
 ascertained by said hotel keeper, notice of the 
 time and place of sale shall be given him by 
 mailing such notice to him in a registered letter, 
 postage paid, at such last usual place of abode 
 at least five days before the time of sale. The 
 proceeds of such sale, after deducting the amount 
 due to the proprietor of such hotel or inn, and 
 all expenses connected with such sale, shaU be 
 paid to the owner of the property, or his legal 
 representatives, if called for or claimed by him 
 or them at any time within one year from the 
 date of said sale, and if such balance is not 
 claimed or called for as aforesaid within said 
 period, then it shall escheat to the State {Ibid., 
 § 4166).! 
 
 1 Except so far as is required by the statute, notice 
 need not be given to the owner. Brooks v. Harrison, 
 41 Conn. 184 (1874). 
 
 [331] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 VII. 
 
 DELAWARE. 
 
 Revised Code of 1852, as Amended, 1893. 
 
 Proprietor of 
 hotel not lia- 
 ble for loss of 
 valuables un- 
 less deposited 
 in safe. 
 
 Proviso. 
 
 §1. 
 
 Whenever the proprietor or proprietors of any 
 hotel, inn or boarding house, shall provide a 
 good, sufficient and secure safe, in the office of 
 such hotel, or other convenient place, for the 
 safe keeping of any money, goods, jewelry and 
 valuables belonging to the guests and boarders 
 of such hotel, inn or boarding house, and shall 
 notify the guests and boarders thereof by plac- 
 ing in every lodging room, parlor and public 
 hall, and other conspicuous places, printed cards 
 or notices stating the fact that such safe is pro- 
 vided in which such goods, jewelry and valuables 
 may be deposited, and that the proprietor or 
 proprietors thereof will not be responsible for 
 said money, goods, jewelry and valuables unless 
 deposited in said safe, and if any such guest or 
 boarder shall neglect to deposit such money, 
 goods, jewelry or valuables in such safe the 
 proprietor or proprietors aforesaid shall not be 
 liable to any loss of such money, goods, jewehy 
 or valuables sustained by such guest by theft 
 or otherwise: Provided, that nothing herein- 
 contained shall apply to such an amount of 
 
 [332] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 money, and such articles of goods, jewelry and 
 valuables as is usual, common and prudent for 
 any guest or boarder to retain in his room or 
 about his person (Laws of Del., vol. 14, ch. 417, 
 p. 409, § 1). 
 
 Whenever the proprietor or proprietors of any 
 hotel, inn, or boarding house shall post in a 
 conspicuous manner as aforesaid notices requir- 
 ing said guest or boarder to bolt the door of the 
 room or rooms occupied by said guest or boarder, 
 or in leaving said room or rooms to lock the 
 door and to deposit the key or keys with the 
 proprietor or the clerk at the office, and if such 
 guest or boarder shall neglect so to do, the 
 proprietor or proprietors as aforesaid shall not 
 be liable for any baggage of such guest or boarder 
 which may be stolen from said room or rooms; 
 Provided, that said proprietor or proprietors 
 shall clearly establish the fact of said room or 
 rooms having been left unbolted or unlocked 
 by said guest or boarder, at the time of the loss 
 of said baggage as aforesaid (Ibid., § 2). 
 
 Proprietor of 
 hotel not lia- 
 ble for loss of 
 baggage ; 
 when. 
 
 Proviso. 
 
 §3. 
 
 If any person, with intent to cheat or defraud 
 shall, by any false or fraudulent representations, 
 or by any false show of baggage, goods or 
 chattels, which are calculated to deceive any 
 hotel, inn or boarding-house keeper, obtain lodg- 
 ing and credit in any hotel, inn or boarding 
 house, and shall subsequently refuse to pay for 
 his board and lodging, the person so offending 
 shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on con- 
 
 Misdemeanor 
 to defraud 
 hotel keeper. 
 
 [333] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 viction be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding 
 one hundred dollars, or undergo an imprison- 
 ment not exceeding three months, or both or 
 either at the discretion of the court {Ibid., § 3). 
 
 Keepers of 
 inns, etc., not 
 obliged to en- 
 tertain cer- 
 tain persons. 
 
 Meaning of 
 term " cus- 
 tomers." 
 
 Proprietors of 
 theatres, etc., 
 not obliged to 
 admit cer- 
 tain persons. 
 
 §4. 
 
 That no keeper of an inn, tavern, hotel, or 
 restaurant, or other place of public entertain- 
 ment or refreshment of travellers, guests, or 
 customers, shall be obhged, by law, to furnish 
 entertainment or refreshment to persons whose 
 reception or entertainment by him, would be 
 offensive to the major part of his customers, and 
 would injure his business. The term customers, 
 shall be taken to include aU who have occasion 
 for entertainment or refreshment (Laws of Del., 
 vol. 15, ch. 194, §1). 
 
 §5. 
 
 That the proprietor of a theatre, or other 
 pubhc place of amusement, shall not be obliged 
 to receive into his show, or admit into the place 
 where is he pursuing his occupation, any person 
 whose presence there would be offensive to the 
 major part of his spectators or patrons, and 
 thereby injure his business {Ibid., § 2). 
 
 [334] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 fined. 
 
 VIII. 
 FLORIDA. 
 
 Revised Statutes of 1892. 
 
 §1. 
 Every house kept in this State for the ac- Hotels de- 
 commodation of twenty-five or more lodgers 
 or boarders is hereby declared to be a hotel 
 (Rev. Stat., § 870). 
 
 §2. 
 
 Every proprietor or manager of a hotel is Rules and 
 authorized and empowered to prescribe and '®^'"* '"'^* 
 establish reasonable rules and regulations for 
 the government and management of the hotel 
 and its occupants and employees, and every 
 lodger, boarder, guest or person staying, so- 
 journing or employed in said hotel shall con- 
 form to and abide by said rules and regulations 
 so long as he shall remain in or at said hotel, 
 and said rules and regulations shall be held and 
 deemed to be a special contract and agreement 
 between the proprietor and manager of said hotel 
 and each and every lodger, boarder, guest, em- 
 ployee and person stajdng or sojourning at or in 
 said hotel, and shall regulate, fix and control the 
 habUities, responsibilities and obligations of 
 each, both and all parties; which said rules and 
 
 [335] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 regulations shall be printed in the English 
 language and posted, together with a copy of 
 this act, in each bedroom and in some public 
 place, such as the office or hall in the hotel 
 (Ibid., §871). 
 
 §3. 
 
 Safetobe An iron safe shall be kept in every hotel in 
 ®P this State for the safe-keeping of the valuables 
 
 of its occupants (Ibid., § 872). 
 
 No liability 
 for valuables 
 unless de- 
 posited. 
 
 §4. 
 
 The proprietor or manager of a hotel in this 
 State shall, in no event, be Uable or responsible 
 for any loss of any money, jewelry or precious 
 stones of any kind whatever belonging to any 
 lodger, boarder, guest or occupant of or in said 
 hotel, unless the owner thereof shall make a 
 special deposit of said property and take a re- 
 ceipt in writing therefor from the proprietor or 
 manager or a clerk in the office of said hotel, 
 which receipt shall set forth the value of said 
 property (Ibid., § 873). 
 
 Fastenings of 
 bedrooms. 
 
 §5. 
 
 Each bedroom shall be furnished or secured 
 with a good, substantial lock and key and a bolt 
 on the inside to fasten the same (Ibid., § 874). 
 
 §6. 
 
 Lien for In favor of keepers of hotels and boarding 
 oar g an houses for the board and lodging of, and for 
 moneys advanced to guests; upon the goods 
 [ 336] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 and chattels belonging to such guests in such 
 hotel or boarding house. 
 
 Upon the non-payment of such sums in ac- May eject for 
 cordance with the rules of such hotel or boarding non-payment, 
 house, the keeper thereof may instantly eject 
 such guest therefrom (Ibid., § 1740). 
 
 22 [3371 
 
Appendix. 
 
 IX. 
 
 GEORGIA. 
 
 Code of 1895; Supplement or 1901. 
 
 §1- 
 
 Definition 
 inn. 
 
 of 
 
 Liability of 
 innkeeper. 
 
 Guests. 
 
 Liability of 
 innkeeper for 
 stolen goods. 
 
 [338] 
 
 Under the term "inn" the law includes all 
 taverns, hotels and houses of public general 
 entertainment for guests (Code, § 2932). 
 
 §2. 
 
 An innkeeper is a depositary for hire, but from 
 the peculiar nature of his business, his liabihty 
 is governed by more stringent rules {Ibid., 
 § 2933). 
 
 §3. 
 
 All persons entertained for hire at an inn, or 
 tavern, or hotel, are guests (Ibid., § 2934). 
 
 §4. 
 
 An innkeeper is bound to extraordinary dili- 
 gence in preserving the property of his guests, 
 intrusted to his care, and is liable for the same, 
 if stolen, where the guest has compUed with all 
 reasonable rules of the inn {Ibid., § 2935). 
 
 §5. 
 
 It is not necessary to show actual delivery to 
 the innkeeper. Depositing goods in a public 
 
Appendix. 
 
 room set apart for such articles, or leaving them Proof, 
 in the room of the guest, or placing a horse in the 
 stable, is a delivery to the innkeeper; if, how- 
 ever, the guest delivers his goods to a servant 
 under special charge to him to keep the same, 
 the innkeeper is not liable therefor {Ihid., § 2936). 
 
 §6. 
 
 The innkeeper may provide an iron safe, or Deposit of 
 other place of deposit for valuable articles, and valuables, 
 by posting a notice thereof, may require his 
 guests to place such valuable articles therein, 
 or he will be relieved from responsibility for 
 them {Ihid., §2937).i 
 
 §7. 
 
 In case of loss, the presumption is want of Presumption, 
 proper dihgence in the landlord. Negligence 
 or default by the guest himself, of which the loss 
 is a consequence, is a sufficient defence. The 
 innkeeper cannot hmit his liability by a public 
 notice; he may adopt reasonable regulations 
 for his own protection, and the publication of 
 such to his guests, binds them to comply there- 
 with {Ihid., § 2938). 
 
 §8. 
 
 The innkeeper who advertises himself as such Duty to re- 
 is bound to receive, as far as he can accommo- •'®'^® guests, 
 date, all persons offering themselves as guests, 
 of good character, and who are willing to com- 
 ply with his rules. Persons entertaining only 
 
 1 If the notice is not duly posted, the innkeeper con- 
 tinues liable as at common law. Murchison v. Sergent, 
 69 Ga. 206 (1882). 
 
 [339] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 a few individuals, or simply for the accommoda- 
 tion of travellers, are not innkeepers, but simply 
 depositaries for hire, bound to ordinary dih- 
 gence (Ibid., §2939). 
 
 §9. 
 
 Lien. The innkeeper has a lien on the goods of all 
 
 his guests for aU his reasonable charges, and 
 may retain possession until they are paid; his 
 lien attaches though the guest has no title, or 
 even stole the property, and the true owner must 
 pay the charges upon that specific article before 
 receiving the same (Ibid., § 2940). 
 
 §10. 
 
 Checks for It shaU be the duty of the keepers of inns, 
 hotels and other houses of pubUc entertainment 
 for travellers in this State, to give receipts or 
 checks for aU baggage of their guests, delivered 
 in such inn, hotel or house of entertainment, 
 when requested so to do by such guest; and such 
 keeper shall not make any additional charge for 
 receipting for, checking or keeping such baggage, 
 so long as the owner remains a guest of the house ; 
 and if the keeper of any inn, hotel or any other 
 public house of entertainment as aforesaid, shall 
 violate any provision of this section, he shall be 
 guilty of a misdemeanor (Ibid., § 2941). 
 
 Hotel keepers 
 on beaches to 
 keep life- 
 boats. 
 
 [340] 
 
 §11. 
 
 The proprietor or keeper of every hotel, board- 
 ing house or other public house or bath house on 
 the seacoast of Georgia, where the public may 
 resort for purposes of surf bathing, shall at all 
 times during the surf-bathing season, keep and 
 
Appendix. 
 
 maintain at their respective establishments, in 
 full view and accessible to bathers and guests of 
 such house, a suitable, seaworthy life-boat or 
 life raft, fully equipped with oars, oar-locks, 
 life-preservers and life-ropes, and mounted upon 
 a proper wheeled carriage; which boat or raft 
 and apphances shall be kept at all times ready 
 for instant use, in case of emergencies to bathers 
 requiring the use of such apphances; and in 
 default of complying with the provisions of this 
 section, no proprietor or keeper of such hotel, 
 boarding house, public house or bath house shall 
 have the right to collect any debt from any 
 guest of such house, the consideration of which 
 is board, lodging or other service rendered such 
 guest during the surf-bathing season by the 
 proprietor or keeper of such house {Ibid., § 2942). 
 
 §12. 
 
 In default of complying with the provisions Penalty, 
 of this section, such proprietor or keeper shall be 
 guilty of a misdemeanor, and in addition to the 
 penalty for such offence, he shall not have the 
 right to collect any charge or debt from any 
 guest of such house, the consideration of which 
 is board, lodging or other service rendered such 
 guest during the surf-bathing season by the 
 proprietor or keeper (Grim. Code, § 509). 
 
 §13. 
 
 Keepers of inns, hotels, and other houses of 
 pubUc entertainment for travellers, shall give 
 receipts or checks for all baggage of their guests, 
 delivered in such inn, hotel, or house of enter- 
 tainment, when requested so to do by such 
 
 Innkeepers to 
 give checks 
 or receipts for 
 
 [341] 
 
Appendix, 
 
 Misdemeanor. 
 
 guest; and such keeper shall not make any 
 additional charge for receipting for, checking or 
 keeping such baggage, so long as the owner 
 remains a guest of the house. A violation of 
 the provisions of this section shall be a mis- 
 demeanor (Ibid., § 603). 
 
 §14. 
 
 Liens. Innkeepers, boarding-house keepers, carriers, 
 
 and livery stable keepers, shall have a hen for 
 their dues on the baggage of their guests, on the 
 goods and articles transported, and on the stock 
 placed in their care for keeping, which shall be 
 superior to other liens, except liens for taxes, 
 special liens of landlords for rent, liens of 
 laborers, and all general liens of which they had 
 actual notice before the property claimed to be 
 subject to lien came into their control, to which 
 excepted liens they shall be inferior (Civil Code, 
 §2810). 
 
 Enforce m e n t 
 of liens on 
 personalty. 
 
 [342] 
 
 §15. 
 
 Liens on personal property, . not mortgages, 
 when not otherwise provided, shall be fore- 
 closed in accordance with the following pro- 
 visions : 
 
 1. There must be a demand on the owner, 
 agent or lessee of the property for payment, and 
 a refusal to pay, and such demand and refusal 
 must be averred. If, however, no such demand 
 can be made, by reason of the absence, from the 
 county of his residence, of the party creating 
 the lien on personal property, by reason of re- 
 moval from the same, absconding from the same, 
 or other reasons showing an intention to be 
 
Appendix. 
 
 absent to defeat such demand, then the party 
 holding such hen shall not be obliged to make 
 a demand, or affidavit thereof, but may fore- 
 close without such demand, by stating, on oath, 
 why no such demand was made. 
 
 2. It must be prosecuted within one year after 
 the debt becomes due. 
 
 3. The person prosecuting such lien, either 
 for himself or as guardian, administrator, execu- 
 tor or trustee, must, by himself, agent or at- 
 torney, make affidavit, showing all the facts 
 necessary to constitute a lien under this Code, 
 and the amount claimed to be due. If the 
 amount claimed is under one hundred dollars, 
 the application may be made to a justice of the 
 peace, who may take all the other steps herein- 
 after prescribed, as in other cases in this court. 
 
 4. Upon such affidavit being filed with the 
 clerk, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the 
 Superior Court or the justice of the peace, if 
 in his court, to issue an execution instanter 
 against the person owing the debt, and also 
 against the property on which the lien is claimed, 
 or which is subject to said lien, for the amount 
 sworn to, and the cost, which execution, when 
 issued, shall be levied by any sheriff of this 
 State, or bailiff, if the amount be less than one 
 himdred dollars, on such property subject to 
 said hen, under the same rules and regulations 
 as other levies and sales under execution. 
 
 5. Affidavits may be made before any officer 
 authorized to administer an oath. 
 
 6. If the person defendant in such execution, 
 or any creditor of such defendant, contests the 
 amount or justice of the claim, or the existence 
 
 [343] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 of such lien, he may file his affidavit of the fact, 
 setting forth the ground of such denial, which 
 affidavit shall form an issue to be returned to 
 the court and tried as other causes. 
 
 7. If only a part of the amount claimed is 
 denied, the amount admitted to be due must be 
 paid before the affidavit shall be received by 
 the officer. 
 
 8. The defendant may replevy the property 
 by giving bond and security in double the 
 amount claimed, for the payment of the even- 
 tual condemnation money (Ibid., §2816). 
 
 Liens of 
 pawnees, inn- 
 keepers, etc., 
 how satisfied. 
 
 §16. 
 
 Liens of pawnees, innkeepers, boarding-house 
 keepers, livery-stablemen and attorneys at law, 
 in possession of personal property under a lien 
 for fees, shall be satisfied according to the pro- 
 visions of section 2958 of this Code, in cases 
 where there is no notice of conflicting liens; 
 but if there is a conflicting lien, the mode of 
 foreclosure pointed out in section 2816 shall 
 be pursued {Ibid., §2818). 
 
 §17. 
 
 Sale the by The pawnee may sell the property received 
 pawnee. jjj pledge after the debt becomes due and re- 
 
 mains unpaid; but he must always give notice 
 for thirty days to the pawner of his inten- 
 tion to sell, and the sale must be in public, 
 fairly conducted, and to the highest bidder, 
 imless otherwise provided by contract (Ibid., 
 § 2958). 
 
 [344] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 X. 
 
 IDAHO. 
 
 Political Code of 1901. 
 
 When any goods, merchandise or other prop- 
 erty has been received by any railroad or ex- 
 press company, or other common carrier, com- 
 mission merchant, innkeeper or warehouseman 
 for transportation or safe-keeping, and are not 
 deUvered to the owner, consignee or other au- 
 thorized person, the carrier, commission mer- 
 chant, innkeeper or warehouseman may hold or 
 store the same with some responsible person, 
 until the freight and all just and reasonable 
 charges are paid (Poht. Code, § 597). 
 
 Common car- 
 r i e r , i n n- 
 keeper, etc., 
 may retain 
 goods for 
 charges. 
 
 §2. 
 
 If no person calls for the property within four 
 months from the receipt thereof and pays freight 
 and charges thereon, the carrier, commission 
 merchant, innkeeper or warehouseman may sell 
 such property, or so much thereof, at public 
 auction to the highest bidder, as will pay freight 
 and charges, first having given twenty days' 
 notice of the time and place of sale to the owner, 
 consignee, or consignor, when known, and by 
 advertisement in a daily paper, ten days (or 
 
 Sale of un- 
 claimed prop- 
 erty. 
 
 [345] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 if in a weekly paper, four weeks), published 
 where such sale is to take place; and if any 
 surplus is left after paying freight, storage, cost 
 of advertising and other reasonable charges, the 
 same must be paid over to the owner of such 
 property at any time thereafter, upon demand 
 being made therefor within sixty days after the 
 sale (Ibid., §598). 
 
 Unclaime d 
 proce eds, 
 where to go. 
 
 Fraudulently 
 obtaining 
 board. 
 
 [346] 
 
 If the owner or his agent fails to demand such 
 surplus within sixty days of the time of such 
 sale, then it must be paid into the county 
 treasury, subject to the order of the owner 
 (Ibid., §599). 
 
 Session Laws of 1903. 
 §4. 
 
 Any person who shall obtain food, lodging or 
 other accommodations at any hotel, lodging 
 house, furnished room, boarding house, or other 
 eating house with intent to defraud the owner 
 or keeper thereof by not paying for the same 
 shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and 
 upon conviction thereof shall be fined in any 
 sum not less than twenty-five (25) dollars and 
 not exceeding one hundred (100) dollars or 
 imprisonment in the county jail not less than 
 five (5) days nor more than thirty (30) days or 
 both in the discretion of the court (Laws of 
 1903, p. 410, § 1). 
 
 §5. 
 
 Proof that lodging, food, or other accommoda- 
 tion was obtained by any false pretence, or by 
 
Appendix. 
 
 any false or fictitious show of pretence of any 
 baggage or other property or that any person 
 absconded without paying or offering to pay for 
 such food, lodging or other accommodation or 
 that any such person surreptitiously removed or 
 attempted to remove his or her baggage shall 
 be prima facie proof of the fraudulent intent 
 mentioned in section one (1) of this act {Ibid., 
 §2). 
 
 Evidence of 
 intent. 
 
 It shall be the. duty of every hotel, lodging 
 house, furnished room, boarding house or other 
 eating-house keeper within this State, to keep 
 a copy of the two preceding sections of this act 
 printed in plain English type posted upon the 
 inside entrance door of each public sleeping 
 room in such house and no conviction shall be 
 had under the provisions of this act unless it 
 shall be made to appear to the court that such 
 notice was posted upon the inside entrance of 
 the door of the sleeping room occupied by the 
 person or persons by whom it is alleged the 
 crime had been conunitted: Provided, however, 
 That when such act is committed against any 
 persons who do not keep public sleeping rooms 
 in connection with their eating house it shall be 
 sufficient to show in such case that said notice 
 was so posted in some public place at or near 
 where guests usually paid their bills {Ibid., § 3). 
 
 Copy of act 
 to be posted. 
 
 [347] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 XI. 
 
 ILLINOIS. 
 
 Annotated Statutes — Second Edition, 1896. 
 
 Safe — Notice 
 to deposit 
 valuables. 
 
 §1. 
 
 That hereafter every landlord or keeper of a 
 public inn or hotel in this State, who shall con- 
 stantly have in his inn or hotel an iron safe, in 
 good order, and suitable for the safe custody of 
 money, jewelry, and other valuable articles, 
 belonging to his guests or customers, shall keep 
 posted up conspicuously, on the ofRce, also at 
 the inside of every entrance door of every pub- 
 lic, sleeping, bar, reading, sitting and parlor 
 room of his inn or hotel, notices to his guests and 
 customers that they must leave their money, 
 jewelry or other valuables with the landlord, 
 his agent or clerk, for safe-keeping, that he may 
 make safe deposit of the same in the place pro- 
 vided for that purpose (Annot. Stat., vol. II, 
 p. 2163, chap. 71, par. 1). 
 
 Innkeeper's 
 liability lim- 
 ited. 
 
 [348] 
 
 §2. 
 
 That such landlord, hotel or innkeeper as 
 shall comply with the requirements of the first 
 section of this act, shall not be Hable for any 
 money, jewelry or other valuables, of gold, 
 silver or rare and precious stones, that may be 
 
Appendix. 
 
 lost, if the same is not delivered to said land- 
 lord, hotel or innkeeper, his agent or clerk, for 
 deposit, unless such loss shall occur by the hand 
 or through the negligence of the landlord, or by 
 a clerk or servant employed by him in such 
 hotel or inn : Provided, that nothing herein con- 
 tained shall apply to such amount of money and 
 valuables as is usual, common and prudent for 
 any such guest to retain in his room or about 
 his person {Ihid., par. 2).^ 
 
 §3. 
 
 Hotel, inn, and boarding-house keepers shall Lien, 
 have a lien upon the baggage and other valuables 
 of their guests or boarders brought into such 
 hotel, inn or boarding house by such guests or 
 boarders, for the proper charges due from such 
 guests or boarders for their accommodations, 
 board and lodgings, and such extras as are fur- 
 nished at their request {Ihid., p. 2581, chap. 82, 
 par. 42). 
 
 §4. 
 
 That whenever any trunk, carpetbag, valise, Sale of un- 
 bimdle, package, or article of property, trans- claimed prop- 
 ported, or coming into the possession of any 
 railroad or express company, or any other com- 
 mon carrier, or innkeeper or warehouseman, or 
 private warehouse keeper, shall remain un- 
 claimed, and the legal charges thereon unpaid 
 during the space of six months after its arrival 
 at the point to which it shall have been directed, 
 
 erty. 
 
 1 The burden is on a guest losing jewelry under such 
 circumstances to prove such theft or negligence. Elcox 
 V. Hill, 98 U. S. 218, 25 L. Ed. 103 (1878). 
 
 [349] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 and the owner or person to whom the same is 
 consigned cannot be found upon diligent in- 
 quiry, or, being found and notified of the arrival 
 of such article, shall refuse or neglect to receive 
 the same and pay the legal charges thereon for 
 the space of three months, it shall be lawful for 
 such common carrier, innkeeper, warehouseman 
 or private warehouse keeper to sell such article 
 ~ at public auction, after giving the owner or con- 
 signee fifteen days' notice of the time and place 
 of sale, through the post office, and by adver- 
 tising in a newspaper pubHshed in the coimty 
 where such sale is made, and out of the proceeds 
 of such sale to pay all legal charges on such 
 articles, and the overplus, if any, shall be paid 
 to the owner or the consignee upon demand 
 {Ibid., p. 3959, chap. 141, par. 1). 
 
 §5. 
 
 Defrauding Any person who shall obtain food, lodging or 
 innkeeper. other accommodation at any hotel, inn, board- 
 
 ing or eating house with intent to defraud the 
 owner or keeper thereof, shall be deemed guilty 
 of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be 
 punished by a fine not exceeding one himdred 
 dollars or imprisonment in the county jail not 
 exceeding thirty days (Annot. Stat., p. 1292, 
 chap. 38, §243). 2 
 
 2 This statute being a penal one must be strictly con- 
 strued. Hutchinson v. Davis, 58 111. App. 358 (1895). 
 Refusal to pay damages for a breach of a contract to 
 board does not come within the statute; only refusal to 
 pay for board actually furnished. Therefore no prosecu- 
 tion can be maintained for a refusal to pay for a meal 
 not obtained, though a guest, under his contract, it being 
 after mealtime, was liable to pay for it. Sundmacher 
 V. Block, 39 111. App. 553 (1891). 
 [350] 
 
fraud. 
 
 Appendix. 
 
 §6. 
 
 Proof that lodging, food or other accommo- Prima facie 
 dation was obtained by false pretence, or by proof of 
 false or fictitious show or pretence of baggage, 
 or that the party refused or neglected to pay for 
 such food, lodging, or other accommodation on 
 demand, or that he or she absconded or left the 
 premises without paying or offering to pay for 
 such food, lodging or other accommodation, or 
 that he or she surreptitiously removed or at- 
 tempted to remove his or her baggage, shall be 
 prima facie proof of the fraudulent intent men- 
 tioned in section one of this act, but this act 
 shall not apply to regular boarders, nor when 
 there has been an agreement for delay in pay- 
 ment (Ibid., §244) .3 
 
 3 In order to avoid declaring the statute unconstitutional 
 as creating imprisonment for debt, the court has inter- 
 preted the statute as requiring both refusal to pay (or 
 absconding) and surreptitious removal of baggage in 
 order to constitute the prima facie proof spoken of in the 
 act. Hutchinson v. Davis, 58 111. App. 358 (1895). 
 Surreptitious removal involves fraud and concealment; 
 and it is not committed when the baggage is removed 
 openly, even though the removal was not in fact seen 
 by the innkeeper. Ibid. 
 
 [351] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 XII. 
 INDIANA. 
 
 Burns' Annotated Statutes of 1901. 
 
 Defrauding 
 hotels and 
 boarding 
 houses. 
 
 Baggage re- 
 tained for 
 payment. 
 
 [352] 
 
 §1. 
 
 Any person or persons who shall obtain food, 
 lodging, entertainment or other accommodations 
 at any hotel, inn, restam'ant, rooming, boarding 
 or eating house with intent to defraud the owner 
 or keeper thereof, shall be fined not exceeding 
 twenty-five dollars ($25), or imprisoned in the 
 county jail or city workhouse not exceeding 
 sixty days, or both (Annot. Stat., § 7254a). 
 
 §2. 
 
 Any person or persons boarding or lodging, 
 who have boarded or lodged, at any hotel, inn, 
 boarding, eating, lodging house or restaurant, 
 as provided in this act, shall not be permitted to 
 remove any trunk, valise or other baggage there- 
 from, which he or they may have therein, until 
 all claims for bills, lodging, entertainment or 
 accommodation have been fully paid and satis- 
 fied in accordance with the regular advertised or 
 special contract rates of said hotel, inn, board- 
 ing, eating, lodging house or restaurant, and any 
 person or persons who shall remove or attempt 
 to remove any such trunk, valise or baggage, or 
 
Appendix. 
 
 other article of value, without satisfying said 
 claims or bills, shall be guilty of the same of- 
 fences named in section one (1) of this act, and 
 shall be pimished accordingly (Ibid., § 72546).* 
 
 §3. 
 
 The owner or keeper of any hotel, inn, res- Lien on bag- 
 taurant, boarding or eating house, as provided sage, sale, 
 in this act, shall, after demand for payment be 
 made of the person or persons owing any such 
 claims or bills, as set out in the preceding section 
 of this act, have a lien against the personal 
 property and the wages due of any person or Lien even 
 persons who may owe said owner or keeper for *f ^f * wages 
 food, lodging, entertainment or other accommo- 
 dation, to the extent only of his said claim, and 
 the property may be sold to satisfy such claim, 
 by said owner or keeper after obtaining judg- 
 ment for the same in any court of competent 
 jiu-isdiction and posting a written notice on the 
 outer door of his hotel, inn, restaurant, board- 
 ing or eating house, at least ten days before the 
 day of sale at public outcry to the highest bidder, 
 and any sum of money remaining from said sale, 
 after satisfying the claim, costs and expenses of 
 sale, shall be turned over to the person or per- 
 sons whose property was sold. When proper 
 divisions of such property can be made, such 
 part only as shall be necessary to satisfy the 
 claim, cost and expenses shall be sold (Ibid., 
 § 7254c). 
 
 1 In State v. Engle, 156 Ind. 339, 58 N. E. 698 (1900) 
 it was held that the words, " as provided in this act," 
 did not refer to the " intent to defraud," but referred to 
 the class of proprietors to be protected, and intent to de- 
 fraud is not essential, and need not be alleged in an af- 
 fidavit of information. 
 
 23 [353] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 XIII. 
 
 IOWA. 
 
 Annotated Code of 1897. 
 
 §1. 
 
 Hotel and inn- Keepers of hotels, inns and eating houses, who 
 keepers — lia- ghg,!! provide and keep therein a good and suffi- 
 cient vault or safe for the deposit of money, 
 jewels and other valuables, and shall provide a 
 safe and commodious place for the baggage, 
 clothing and other property belonging to their 
 guests and patrons, and keep posted up in a 
 conspicuous place in the office or other public 
 room, and in the guests' private apartments 
 therein, printed notices, stating that such places 
 for safe deposit are provided for the use and 
 accommodation of the inmates thereof, shall not 
 be liable for the loss of any money, jewels, valu- 
 ables, baggage or other property not deposited 
 with them, \mless such loss shall occur through 
 the fault or negligence of such landlord or 
 keeper, or his agent, servant or employee, but 
 nothing herein contained shall apply to such 
 reasonable amount of money, nor to such jewels, 
 baggage, valuables or other property as is usual, 
 fit and proper for any such guests to have and 
 retain in their apartments or about their per- 
 sons. Hotel, inn or eating-house keepers shall 
 [354] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 have a lien upon, and may take and retain pos- 
 session of, all baggage and other property be'- 
 longing to or under the control of their guests, 
 which may be in such hotel, inn or eating house, 
 for the value of their accommodations and keep, 
 and for all money paid for or advanced to, and 
 for such extras and other things as shall be 
 furnished, such guest, and such property so re- 
 tained shall not be exempt from attachment or 
 execution to the amount of the reasonable 
 charges of such hotel, inn or eating-house keeper, 
 against such guest, and the costs of enforcing 
 the lien thereon (Annot. Code, §3138).* 
 
 §2. 
 
 Any person who shall obtain food, lodging or 
 other accommodation at any hotel, inn or board- 
 ing or eating house, with intent to defraud the 
 owner or keeper thereof, shall be fined not ex- 
 ceeding one hundred dollars, or imprisoned not 
 exceeding thirty days {Ibid., §5076). 
 
 Frauds upon 
 hotel keepers. 
 
 §3. 
 
 Proof that lodging, food or other accommo- 
 dation was obtained by false pretence, or by 
 false or fictitious show or pretence of baggage, 
 or that the party refused or neglected to pay for 
 such food, lodging or other accommodation on 
 demand, or that he absconded or left the prem- 
 ises, without paying or offering to pay for such 
 food, lodging or other accommodation, or that 
 he surreptitiously removed or attempted to re- 
 
 iThe lien covers property of a third person brought 
 to the inn by the guest. Brown Shoe Co. v. Hunt, 103 
 la. 586, 72 N. W. 765 (1897). 
 
 Kvidence. 
 
 [355] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 move his baggage, shall be presumptive evidence 
 of the fraudulent intent mentioned in the pre- 
 ceding section, but this section shall not apply 
 to regular boarders, nor when there has been 
 an agreement for delay in payment (Ibid., 
 § 5077). 
 
 §4. 
 
 Infringement All persons within this State shall be entitled 
 of civil rights, jq the full and equal enjoyment of the accom- 
 modations, advantages, facilities and privileges 
 of inns, restaurants, chop houses, eating houses, 
 lunch counters and all other places where re- 
 freshments are served, public conveyances, bar- 
 ber shops, bath houses, theatres and all other 
 places of amusement. Any person who shall 
 violate the provisions of this section by deny- 
 ing to any person, except for reasons by law 
 apphcable to all persons, the full enjo3Tiient of 
 any of the accommodations, advantages, facili- 
 ties or privileges enumerated herein, or by aid- 
 ing or inciting such denial, shall be guilty of a 
 misdemeanor (Ibid., §5008). 
 
 [356] 
 
Appendix, 
 
 XIV. 
 
 KANSAS. 
 
 General Statutes of 1897. 
 
 §1. 
 
 Any . . . hotel keeper . . . having a lien 
 upon goods which may have remained in store 
 or in the possession of such bailee for six 
 months or more, may proceed to sell such goods, 
 or so much thereof as may be necessary to pay 
 the amount of the lien and expenses, according 
 to the provisions of this act (General Stats., 
 chap. 120, § 19). 
 
 §2. 
 
 Before any such property shall be sold, if the 
 name and residence of the owner thereof be 
 known, at least twenty days' notitfe of such sale 
 shall be given him in writing, either personally 
 or by mail, or by leaving a notice in writing at 
 his residence or place of doing business; but if 
 the name and residence be not known, the per- 
 son having the possession of such property shall 
 cause a notice of the time and place of sale, and 
 containing a description of the property, to be 
 published at least once a week for the space of 
 three weeks successively, in a newspaper if there 
 be one published in the county where such sale 
 is advertised to take place. If there be no news- 
 
 Lien. 
 
 Owner must 
 be notified 
 before sale. 
 
 [357] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 paper published in such county, then said notice 
 shall be published in some newspaper of general 
 circulation in such county. If the value of the 
 property does not exceed twenty dollars, such 
 notice may be given by written or printed hand- 
 bills posted up in at least five public places in the 
 township or city where the bailee resides or the 
 sale is to take place, one of which shall be in a 
 conspicuous part of the bailee's place of busi- 
 ness (Ibid., §22). 
 
 §3. 
 
 Sales for cash. AU sales under this act shall be at public 
 auction, for cash {Ibid., § 23). 
 
 §4. 
 
 Proceeds of The proceeds of such sale, after payment of 
 sale. (the lien) charges, and the expenses of publica- 
 
 tion and sale, shall, if the owner be absent, be 
 deposited with the treasurer of the county where 
 the sale takes place by the person making such 
 sale, he taking the treasurer's receipt therefor, 
 and shall be subject to the order of the person 
 legally entitled thereto {Ibid., § 24). 
 
 [358] 
 
Appendix, 
 
 XV. 
 
 KENTUCKY. 
 Compiled Statutes op 1894. 
 
 §1. 
 
 That no innkeeper in this Commonwealth who Liability. 
 shall constantly have in his inn an iron safe, or 
 suitable vault, in good order, and fit for the safe 
 custody of money, bank notes, jewelry, articles 
 of gold and silver manufacture, precious stones 
 and bullion, and who shall keep a copy of this 
 law, printed by itself, in large, plain, English type 
 and framed, constantly and conspicuously sus- 
 pended in the office, barroom, saloon, reading, 
 sitting and parlor room of his inn; and also a 
 copy, printed by itself, in ordinary-size plain 
 English type, posted upon the inside of the en- 
 trance door of every public sleeping room of his 
 inn, shall be liable for the loss of any such article 
 aforesaid suffered by any guest, unless such guest 
 shall have first offered to deliver such property 
 lost by him to such innkeeper for custody in such 
 iron safe, and such innkeeper shall have refused 
 or omitted to take it, and deposit it in such safe 
 for its custody, and to give such guest a receipt 
 therefor; but every innkeeper shall be liable 
 for any loss of the above-enumerated articles by 
 a guest in his inn, caused by the theft or negli- 
 
 [359] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 Houses of 
 private en- 
 tertainment. 
 
 gence of the innkeeper, or of any of his servants, 
 anything to the contrary in this law notwith- 
 standing (Comp. Stats., § 2176). 
 
 §2. 
 
 Any person other than the keeper of a tavern 
 or house of private entertainment, who shall 
 entertain in his house another, or furnish him 
 with diet or storage for his goods, not making an 
 agreement for compensation therefor, shall not 
 recover anything against the person so enter- 
 tained or furnished with diet or storage, or against 
 his estate, but the person so fm-nishing another 
 shall be considered as doing the same of com-tesy 
 (Ibid., §2178). 
 
 §3. 
 
 Keeper of. Any person not a tavern keeper, who shall 
 
 furnish for compensation lodging or diet to 
 travellers, or to one boarding in his house, or 
 provender in his stable or on his land for horses 
 or mules, shall be deemed the keeper of a house 
 of private entertainment. No license shall be 
 required to keep a house of private entertain- 
 ment {Ibid., § 2179). 
 
 Tavern li- 
 cense. 
 
 [360] 
 
 §4. 
 
 License to keep a tavern outside of an in- 
 corporated city or town shall be granted only to 
 persons who are prepared with houses, bedding, 
 stabling and provender sufficient to accommo- 
 date the public, and shall not be granted to any- 
 one unless the keeping of a tavern at the place 
 proposed is necessary for the accommodation 
 of the public, nor until the appUcant shall take 
 
Appendix. 
 
 an oath, in open court, that he, in good faith, 
 intends to keep a tavern for the accommodation 
 of the public (Ibid., §4206).i 
 
 §5. 
 
 That all hotel keepers, innkeepers, boarding- 
 house keepers and keepers of houses of private 
 entertainment shall have a lien on all baggage I-iea on bag- 
 and all personal property owned by, and brought ^*^*" 
 to, such house of entertainment by the person 
 receiving the board, nursing, care or attention 
 from such landlord, for the contract price of 
 such board, care and attention as is received, 
 and in case of no contract price for such board, 
 nursing, care or attention, then for a reason- 
 able price for same (Acts of 1896, chap. 12, § 1). 
 
 The first section of this act is not intended to 
 repeal section two thousand one hundred and 
 seventy-eight of the Kentucky statutes {Ibid., 
 §2). 
 
 §6. 
 
 When any such lien exists under section one 
 of this act in favor of any person, he may, be- 
 fore a justice of the peace or a judge of the Affidavit to 
 quarterly court of the coimty where the debt is * ™* ®" 
 created, by himself or agent or attorney, make 
 affidavit to the amount due him and in arrear 
 for board, nursing, keeping, care and attention 
 to the person so receiving same, and describing, 
 as near as may be, the baggage or other personal 
 property owned by, and brought to such house 
 
 1 See Commonwealth v. Shortridge, 3 J. J. Marsh. 638 
 (1830); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 7 Bush, 99 (1870); 
 Commonwealth v. Camp, 4 B. Mon. 385 (1854). 
 
 [361] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 of entertainment; and, thereupon such officer 
 shall issue a warrant, directed to the sheriff or 
 any constable or town marshal of said county, 
 authorizing him to levy upon and seize the said 
 goods for the amoxmt due, with interest and 
 costs; but if the said goods have been removed 
 from said place with the consent of such land- 
 lord, the lien herein provided for shall not con- 
 tinue longer than ten days from and after such 
 removal {Ibid., §3). 
 
 §7. 
 
 Proceedings. The proceedings under a warrant shall in all 
 respects be the same as in cases of distress 
 warrant, and none of the said goods shall be 
 exempt from seiziu-e or sale {Ibid., § 4). 
 
 Fine imposed 
 for defraud- 
 ing. 
 
 §8. 
 
 Any person who shall obtain food, lodging or 
 other accommodation at any hotel, inn, board- 
 ing house, or house of private entertainment 
 with intent to defraud the keeper thereof, shall 
 be fined in any sum not exceeding one hundred 
 dollars, or imprisoned in the county jail not 
 exceeding thirty days, either or both, in the 
 discretion of the court or jury trying the case 
 {Ibid., §5). 
 
 [362] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 XVI. 
 
 LOUISIANA. 
 VooRHiEs' Revised Civil Code of 1889. 
 
 Responsibility 
 of innkeeper. 
 
 §1. 
 
 An innkeeper is responsible as depositary for 
 the effects brought by travellers who lodge at 
 his house; the deposit of such effects is con- 
 sidered as a necessary (Rev. Civ. Code, Art. 
 2965). 
 
 §2. 
 
 An innkeeper is responsible for the effects 
 brought by travellers, even though they were not 
 delivered into his personal care, provided, how- 
 ever, they were delivered to a servant or person 
 in his (employment (Ibid., Art. 2966). 
 
 §3. 
 
 He is responsible if any of the effects be stolen Loss or injury, 
 or damaged, either by his servants or agents, or 
 by strangers going and coming in the inn {Ibid., 
 Art. 2967). 
 
 Delivery of 
 goods. 
 
 §4. 
 
 Every landlord or keeper of a public inn or 
 hotel, shall be required to provide with an iron 
 chest or other safe deposit for valuable articles 
 
 Safe. 
 
 [363] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 belonging to his guests or customers, and each 
 landlord or hotel keeper shall keep posted upon 
 his doors and other pubhc places in his house of 
 entertainment, written or printed notices to his 
 guests and customers that they must leave their 
 valuables with the landlord, his agent or clerk, 
 for safe-keeping, that he may make safe de- 
 posit of the same in the place provided for that 
 purpose (Ibid., Art. 2968). 
 
 Limitation 
 liability. 
 
 §5. 
 
 Every landlord, hotel or innkeeper who shall 
 comply with the requirements of the preceding 
 o* articles, shall not be hable for any money, 
 jewelry, watches, plate, or other things made of 
 gold or silver, or of rare and precious stones or 
 for other valuable articles of such description as 
 may be contained in small compass, which may 
 be abstracted or lost from any such pubhc inn or 
 hotel, if the same shall not be left with the land- 
 lord, his clerk or agent, for deposit, imless such 
 loss shall occur through the fraud or neghgence 
 of the landlord, or some clerk or servant em- 
 ployed by him in such inn or hotel; provided, 
 however, that the provisions of this article shall 
 not apply to a wearing watch, or such other 
 articles of jewelry as are ordinarily worn about 
 the person (Ibid., Art. 2969). 
 
 Forcible theft. 
 
 [364] 
 
 §6. 
 
 He is not responsible for what is stolen by 
 force and arms, or with exterior breaking open 
 of doors, or by any other extraordinary vio- 
 lence {Ibid., Art. 2970). 
 
Appendix. 
 
 §7. 
 
 The deposition on oath or afiirmation of a Evidence, 
 single competent and credible witness as to the 
 deposit at inns, may be admitted as a good 
 proof, even when the value of the thing so de- 
 posited exceeds five hundred dollars; but the 
 judge must admit this kind of proof, in that 
 case, with circumspection, according to the cir- 
 cumstances of the fact and the condition of the 
 parties (Ibid., Art. 2971). 
 
 §8. 
 
 Privilege is a right, which the nature of a debt p r i v i 1 e g e or 
 gives to a creditor, and which entitles him to be •ie"- 
 preferred before other creditors, even those who 
 have mortgages (Ibid., Art. 3186). 
 
 §9- 
 
 Innkeepers 
 entitled to. 
 
 The debts which are privileged on all the 
 movables in general, are those hereafter enu- 
 merated, and are paid in the following order: 
 
 1. Funeral charges. 
 
 2. Law charges. 
 
 3. Charges . . . occasioned by the last 
 sickness, . . . 
 
 4. Wages of servants. . . . 
 
 5. Supphes of provisions made to the debtor 
 or his family . . . during the last year, by 
 keepers of boarding houses and taverns. 
 
 6. Salaries in general. 
 
 7. Total rights due to wives by their hus- 
 bands (Ibid., § 3191). 
 
 §10. 
 
 The privilege of keepers of boarding houses. Extent of. 
 taverns, and other persons comprised in this 
 
 [365] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 class, extends to the last year due, and so much 
 as has expired of the current year {Ibid., § 3213). 
 
 Privilege 
 given inn- 
 keepers on 
 property of 
 persons who 
 take their 
 board or lodg- 
 ing with them. 
 
 ill- 
 Innkeepers and all others who let lodgings or 
 receive or take boarders have a privilege, or 
 more properly, a right of pledge on the property 
 of all persons who take their board or lodging 
 with them, by virtue of which they may retain 
 property, and have it sold, to obtain pa3Tiient 
 of what such persons may owe them on either 
 accounts above mentioned, and this privilege 
 shall extend to extras not to exceed ten ($10) 
 dollars supplied by the proprietors of hotels, inns 
 and boarding-house keepers {Ibid., § 3233, as 
 amended, Acts of 1896, p. 35, and Acts of 1898, 
 p. 157). 
 
 of third per 
 son. 
 
 §12. 
 
 Innkeepers, hotel, boarding-house and lodging- 
 O" JP^'>P«Jty house keepers enjoy this privilege on all the 
 property which the sojourner has brought to 
 their place, whether it belongs to him or not, 
 because the property so brought into their place 
 has become pledged to them by the mere fact 
 of its introduction into their place {Ibid., § 3234, 
 as amended 1896). 
 
 Who are trav- 
 ellers. 
 
 [366] 
 
 §13. 
 
 The term travellers applies to strangers and 
 such as being transiently in a place where they 
 have no domicile, take their board and lodging 
 at an inn {Ibid., § 3235). 
 
Appendix. 
 
 §14. 
 
 Whenever any trunk, carpetbag, valise, box, 
 bundle or other baggage which shall hereafter 
 come into the possession of the keeper of any 
 hotel, inn, boarding or lodging house, as such, 
 and shall remain unclaimed or imredeemed for 
 the period of six months, such keeper may pro- 
 ceed to sell the same at public auction, and Sale of unre- 
 without judicial proceedings, and out of the !L*™* v^op- 
 proceeds of such sale may retain the amount due 
 him for board, lodging and extras, and the 
 charges for storage, if any, and the expense of 
 advertising and sale thereof, but no such sale 
 shall be made until the expiration of four weeks 
 from the first pubhcation of notice of such sale 
 in a newspaper published in or nearest the city, 
 town, village or place in which said hotel, inn, 
 boarding or lodging house is situated. Said 
 notice shall be pubUshed once a week for four 
 successive weeks, in some newspaper, daily or 
 weekly, of general circulation, and shall contain 
 a description of each trunk, carpetbag, vaUse, 
 box, bundle or other baggage as near as may 
 be; the name of the owner, if known; the name 
 of said keeper, and the time and place of sale; 
 and the expense incurred for advertising shall 
 be a lien upon such trunk, carpetbag, valise, 
 box, bundle Or other baggage in a ratable pro- 
 portion according to the value of such property, 
 or thing or article sold; and in case any balance 
 arising upon such sale shall not be claimed by 
 the rightful owner within one week from the day 
 of said sale the same shall be paid to the Charity 
 Hospital of New Orleans {Ibid., § 3236, amended 
 Acts of 1896, p. 35). 
 
 [367] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 §15. 
 
 Prescription. Prescription is a manner of acquiring the 
 ownership of property, or discharging debts, by 
 the effect of time, and under the conditions 
 regulated by law. The prescription by which 
 debts are released, is a peremptory and perpetual 
 bar to every species of action, real or personal, 
 when the creditor has been silent for a certain 
 time without urging his claim. The following 
 actions are prescribed by one year: 
 
 That of innkeepers and such others, on ac- 
 count of lodging and board which they furnish 
 (Ibid., Arts. 3457, 3459, 3534).. 
 
 [368] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 XVII. 
 
 MAINE. 
 
 Revised Statutes op 1903. 
 
 §1. 
 
 Every innholder shall, at all times, be fur- 
 nished with suitable provisions and lodging for 
 strangers and travellers, and with stable room, 
 hay and provender for their horses and cattle; 
 and with pasturing, if it is required by the terms 
 of his license; and he shall grant such reason- 
 able accommodations as occasion requires, to 
 strangers, travellers and others (Rev. Stat., 
 chap. 29, §5). 
 
 §2- 
 
 In case of loss by fire, innholders are answer- 
 able to their guests only for ordinary and rea- 
 sonable care in the custody of their baggage or 
 other property (Ibid., §6).^ 
 
 Duty of inn- 
 holder to pro- 
 vide enter- 
 tainment. 
 
 Liability in 
 case of fire. 
 
 Liability of 
 innholder for 
 guests' losses. 
 
 §3. 
 
 Innholders are not liable for losses sustained 
 by their guests, except for wearing apparel, 
 articles worn or carried upon the person to a 
 reasonable amount, personal baggage and money 
 necessary for travelling expenses and personal 
 
 See Bumham v. Young, 72 Me. 273 (1881). 
 24 [ 369 ] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 use, unless upon delivery or offer of delivery, by 
 such guests, of their money, jewelry or other 
 property, to the innholder, his agent or servants, 
 for safe custody {Ibid., § 7).^ 
 
 §4. 
 
 An innholder against whom a claim is made 
 Losses by for loss sustained by a guest, may in all cases 
 neg gence of gjj^^ ^j^g^^ gy^j^ j^gg jg attributable to the negli- 
 guests. . 
 
 gence of the guest, or to his non-compliance with 
 
 the regulations of the inn; provided, that such 
 regulations are reasonable and proper, and are 
 shown to have been brought to the notice of the 
 guest {Ibid., § 8). 
 
 §5. 
 Duties of Every victualler has all the rights and privi- 
 victuallers. leges and is subject to all the duties and obliga- 
 tions of an innholder, except furnishing lodging 
 for travellers, and stable room, hay or provender 
 for cattle {Ibid., §9). 
 
 §6. 
 
 Licensing The licensing board shall prosecute for any 
 board to pros- YJolations of the foregoing sections that come to 
 citizen mav ^^^^^ knowledge, by complaint, indictment or 
 prosecute. action of debt; and all penalties recovered shall 
 
 inure to the town where the offence is com- 
 mitted. Any citizen of the State may prosecute 
 for any violation of the preceding sections in the 
 
 2 Forty dollars for travelling expenses, and a gold 
 watch, pair of gold bracelets, a gold thimble, three gold 
 rings, and a gold neck-pin taken for the owner's personal 
 use are within the exception. Noble v. Milliken, 74 Me. 
 225, 43 Am. Rep. 581 (1885). 
 [370] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 same manner as the licensing board may prose- 
 cute {Ibid., § 13). 
 
 §7. 
 
 Innholders or keepers of boarding houses have 
 a lien on the goods and personal baggage of their 
 guests and boarders, to secure the payment of 
 any money due from them for board or lodging, 
 and may enforce the same by a sale of such 
 goods or baggage, in the manner following. 
 After such goods or personal baggage have re- 
 mained in the possession of such innholder or 
 boarding-house keeper for six months, unre- 
 deemed, they may be sold at auction to pay 
 the sum due for board or lodging, and the ex- 
 pense of advertising and selling the same. Such 
 innholder or boarding-house keeper shall give 
 thirty days' notice of the time and place of such 
 sale, in a newspaper published in the town where 
 such articles are held, if any, otherwise notice 
 thereof shall be posted in three conspicuous 
 places therein; said notice shall give a descrip- 
 tion of such articles, and the name of the owner; 
 and the proceeds of sale, after deducting all 
 charges and expense of advertising and notice, 
 shall be applied in satisfaction of the claim upon 
 which such articles are sold, and the balance, if 
 any, shall be held for the benefit of the person 
 entitled thereto. All such sales shall be re- 
 corded in the office of the town clerk where the 
 sale takes place, in a suitable book open to 
 public inspection, in which the articles sold shall 
 be correctly described, with the charges and 
 expenses of advertising and selHng, and the prices 
 at which they were sold {Ibid., chap. 93, §65). 
 
 Lien on goods 
 and personal 
 baggage. 
 
 Goods and 
 baggage, un- 
 redeemed, 
 may be sold. 
 
 Notice of sale. 
 
 Proceeds of 
 sale, how ap- 
 propriated. 
 
 Record of 
 sales shall be 
 kept. 
 
 [371] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 Penalty for 
 defrauding 
 innkeepers 
 and boarding- 
 house keepers. 
 
 §8. 
 
 Whoever puts up at an inn, hotel or boarding 
 house, and without having an express agreement 
 for credit, procures food, entertainment or ac- 
 commodation without paying therefor, and with 
 intent to defraud the owner or keeper of the inn, 
 hotel or boarding house out of the pay for the 
 same; or, with intent to cheat or defraud such 
 owner or keeper out of the pay therefor, obtains 
 credit at an inn, hotel or boarding house for such 
 food, entertainment or acconmiodation by means 
 of any false show of baggage or effects brought 
 thereto; or with such intent, removes or causes 
 to be removed any baggage or effects from an 
 inn, hotel or boarding house, while there is a 
 hen existing thereon for the proper charges due 
 from him for fare and board furnished therein, 
 shall be punished by imprisonment not exceed- 
 ing six months, or by fine not exceeding one 
 hundred dollars (Ibid., chap. 127, § 5). 
 
 Copies of law 
 to be posted. 
 
 §9- 
 
 Innholders and keepers of hotels and board- 
 ing houses shall post up a printed copy of sec- 
 tions five and six, in a conspicuous place in each 
 room in their inns, hotels and boarding houses. 
 Judges of municipal and police courts and trial 
 justices shall have jurisdiction of all offences 
 arising under section five, where the amount of 
 which any such innkeeper or boarding-house 
 keeper or the owners thereof have been thus de- 
 frauded, does not exceed the sum of twenty 
 dollars (Ibid., §6). 
 
 [372] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 §10. 
 
 If an innholder, confectioner, or keeper of a 
 shop, boarding house, or Uvery stable, gives 
 credit for food, drink or horse or carriage hire, 
 to any pupil of a college or literary institution 
 in violation of its rules, he forfeits a sum equal 
 to the amount so credited, whether it has been 
 paid or not, to be recovered in an action of debt 
 by the treasurer of such institution; half to its 
 use, and half to the town where it is located; 
 and no person shall be licensed by the municipal 
 officers for any of said employments, if it ap- 
 pears that within the preceding year he had 
 given credit contrary to the provisions hereof 
 {Ibid., chap. 15, § 21). 
 
 Innholders, 
 stable keep- 
 ers, and cer- 
 tain others, 
 not to give 
 credit to stu- 
 dents. 
 
 Penalty. 
 
 §11. 
 
 If an innholder or victualler, on the Lord's 
 Day, suffers any persons, except travellers, 
 strangers or lodgers, to abide in his house, yard 
 or field, drinking or spending their time idly, at 
 play or doing any secular business, except works 
 of charity or necessity, he shall be punished by 
 fine not exceeding four dollars for each person 
 thus suffered to abide; and if after conviction 
 he is again guilty, by fine not exceeding ten 
 dollars for each offence; and upon a third con- 
 viction, he shall also be incapable of holding any 
 hcense; and every person so abiding shall be 
 fined not exceeding four dollars for each of- 
 fence {Ibid., § 26). 
 
 Innholders 
 and victual- 
 lers shaU not 
 allow gam- 
 bling, diver- 
 sion, or busi- 
 ness, on the 
 Lord's Day. 
 
 §12. 
 
 No person wearing boots or shoes with spikes 
 or calks in the sole or heel thereof shall enter 
 
 [373] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 Wearing of any public building, hotel, railroad station, rail- 
 spiked boots j.Qa^(j gar or steamboat, without special permis- 
 and shoes in . . ,. , . . 
 
 pubUc places ^^^^ ^^^^ *"^ owner, lessee, person in charge 
 forbidden. thereof, or some officer, agent or servant of 
 
 either of them, or having entered, shall remain 
 therein after having been requested to leave 
 such pubhc building, hotel, railroad station, 
 railroad car or steamboat, by the owner, lessee, 
 person in charge thereof or some officer, agent 
 or servant of either of them (Ibid., chap. 128, 
 §28). 
 
 Penalty for 
 violation. 
 
 §13. 
 
 Whoever violates either of the provisions of 
 section twenty-eight shall, on complaint and 
 conviction, be fined not less than one, nor more 
 than ten dollars, but a person having entered 
 as aforesaid without permission and remaining 
 after having been requested to leave as above 
 provided, shall only be convicted of violating 
 one of the provisions of section twenty-eight 
 {Ibid., §29). 
 
 Printed copies 
 of sees. 28 to 
 31 must b e 
 posted in 
 public places. 
 
 [374] 
 
 §14. 
 
 No person shall be convicted of any offence 
 under section twenty-eight imless a printed copy 
 of sections twenty-eight to thirty-one inclusive 
 shall have been posted in a conspicuous place 
 in the public building, hotel, railroad station, 
 railroad car or steamboat where said offence is 
 committed, for at least thirty days prior to the 
 commission of said offence, and is also posted 
 at the time of said offence (Ibid., § 30). 
 
Appendix. 
 
 §15. 
 
 Whoever wilfully destroys, defaces or tears Penalty for 
 down any such printed copy posted under the destroying 
 preceding section, shall forfeit not less than one, 
 nor more than ten dollars to be recovered on 
 complaint {Ibid., §31). 
 
 [375] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 XVIII. 
 
 MARYLAND. 
 
 Public General Laws of 1904. 
 
 Fraudulently 
 ob taining 
 board, etc. 
 
 Every person who shall by any false or fraudu- 
 lent representations, or by any false show of 
 baggage, goods or chattels, which are calculated 
 to deceive any hotel proprietor, keeper or man- 
 ager, obtain lodging or credit, or the use of any 
 horse or vehicle, or food or stabling for a horse 
 or horses in any hotel in this State, or from the 
 keeper of any livery stable, and shall subse- 
 quently refuse, decline or fail to pay for his 
 credit, board or lodging, or use of horse or food 
 or stabling for horse furnished him, shall be 
 guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction 
 thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more 
 than one hundred dollars or' by imprisonment 
 in jail for a term of not less than one month nor 
 more than six months, or by both such fine and 
 imprisonment in the discretion of the court 
 (Pub. Gen. Laws, Art. 27, § 120). 
 
 [376] 
 
 §2. 
 
 Every person who shall at any hotel, inn, 
 boarding house or livery stable receive or cause 
 to be furnished any food or accommodation for 
 
Appendix. 
 
 man or beast, and shall fraudulently fail to pay 
 for the same, and every person who shall obtain 
 credit at any hotel, inn or boarding house by the 
 use of any false pretence or device, or by fraudu- 
 lently depositing at such hotel, inn or boarding 
 house any baggage or property of value less than 
 the amount of such credit or of the bill by such 
 person incurred; and every person who, after 
 obtaining credit or accommodation at any hotel, 
 inn or boarding house, shall abscond or fraudu- 
 lently depart or remove his baggage therefrom 
 without discharging the debt as aforesaid in- 
 curred shall be guilty of a misedmeanor, and 
 upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a 
 fine of not less than one hundred dollars or by 
 imprisonment in jail for a term of not less than 
 one month nor more than six months, or by 
 both such fine and imprisonment in the discre- 
 tion of the court {Ibid., § 121), 
 
 The same sub- 
 ject. 
 
 §3. 
 
 Any ordinary or innkeeper in any city or 
 town, having a population of more than five 
 hundred inhabitants, who shall provide an iron 
 safe or other secure depository for the keeping 
 of the money, jewelry and plate belonging to his 
 guests, and who shall take charge for safe keep- 
 ing of such money, jewelry and plate shall be 
 Uable for the full value of the same if lost or 
 stolen while thus in his charge; to be recovered 
 before a justice of the peace if such value does 
 not exceed the sum of one hundred dollars, and 
 if over that sum by action of assumpsit in any 
 court having jurisdiction, unless the loss oc- 
 curred through fire proved to have happened 
 
 Depository 
 for valuables. 
 
 [377] 
 
Exemption 
 from liability 
 for valuables 
 not so d e- 
 posited. 
 
 Hotel and 
 innkeeper s 
 shall have a 
 lien upon bag- 
 gage, etc., for 
 non - payment 
 of board and 
 lodging. 
 
 [378] 
 
 Appendix. 
 
 without any negligence upon the part of him- 
 self or his agent {Ibid., Art. 71, §5).^ 
 
 §4. 
 
 If any ordinary or innkeeper referred to in the 
 preceding section shall cause written or printed 
 notices to be put in his chambers and other 
 conspicuous places about his house notifying his 
 guests of the purport of the preceding section 
 and requesting them to deposit their money and 
 plate with him or his agent to be designated by 
 such notice, then he shall not be responsible for 
 the loss by robbery or otherwise; provided, such 
 ordinary or innkeeper can prove that he has 
 complied with the provisions of this and the 
 preceding section, unless such loss occurred from 
 collusion or positive negligence on the part of 
 such ordinary or innkeeper or his agent (Ibid., 
 ,§6).2 
 
 §5. 
 
 For the price or value of any food or accom- 
 modation furnished to any person at any hotel, 
 boarding house, inn or ordinary in this State, 
 the proprietor or keeper of such hotel, inn or 
 ordinary shall have a hen upon all baggage and 
 other property belonging to or under the control 
 of such person and in such hotel, boarding house, 
 inn or ordinary and may keep possession of the 
 same until the price or value of such goods or 
 
 1 This section does not cover clothing and other articles 
 of small value. Treiber v. Burrows, 27 Md. 130 (1867). 
 
 2 Under these sections a guest is not required to de- 
 posit in the sate of an office in a hotel a sum of money 
 reasonably necessary for travelling expenses; what sum is 
 necessary is a question for the jury. A watch is not to 
 be deposited under these provisions. Maltby v. Chap- 
 man, 25 Md. 310 (1866). 
 
Appendix. 
 
 accommodation shall have been fully paid, 
 whether then due or to become due; and for the 
 purpose of collecting the said debt after the same 
 shaU have been due for a period of fifteen days 
 may sell such baggage or other property for cash 
 at public sale, upon giving notice of the time, 
 place and terms of sale by advertisement pub- 
 lished at least twice in one or more newspapers 
 pubhshed in the city or county wherein the said 
 hotel, inn or ordinary is situated, the first pub- 
 lication to be not less than ten days before such 
 sale, and the proceeds of sale to be apphed, after 
 pa5m[ient of expenses, to the discharge of such 
 indebtedness, and the balance, if any, to be paid 
 over to the person or persons entitled thereto 
 {Ibid., §7). 
 
 §6. 
 
 Any person taking boarders or lodgers into 
 his house and renting to them a room or furnish- 
 ing them with board or both shall have a lien 
 upon any personal effects, goods or furniture 
 brought upon the premises in pursuance of such 
 contracting for room or board, and it shall be 
 lawful to take and retain possession of the same 
 until such board or lodging shall have been 
 fully paid for whether due or not; and such 
 personal effects, goods and furniture may be 
 sold, upon reasonable notice of not less than ten 
 days after the debt for such board or lodging 
 shall have become due and payable, at either 
 public or private sale to satisfy such debt, the 
 proceeds after paying expenses of such sale to 
 be applied in Uquidation of such indebtedness, 
 and the balance, if any, paid over to such 
 debtor {Ibid., §8). 
 
 Boarding- 
 house keepers 
 to have lien 
 upon personal 
 efEe c t s of 
 boarders or 
 lodgers for 
 bo ard and 
 lodging; sale 
 of such e£Eects 
 for satisfac- 
 tion of lien. 
 
 [379] 
 
/ J 
 
 Appendix. 
 
 M arried 
 woman to 
 have same 
 rights and 
 powers un- 
 der section 
 8 as feme 
 sole. 
 
 §7. 
 
 A married woman may as landlady and 
 proprietress contract with anyone entering her 
 house for board or lodging or both, and have 
 and pursue the legal remedies given in section 8 
 the same as if she were a /erne sole, and shall 
 further have and enjoy all the powers, rights 
 and remedies with respect to the renting, keep- 
 ing and conducting of such boarding or lodging 
 house as if she were a /erne sole, and it shall not 
 be necessary for her husband to join in any 
 contract with reference thereto {Ibid., § 9). 
 
 [380] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 XIX. 
 
 MASSACHUSETTS. 
 Revised Laws of 1902. 
 
 §1- 
 
 Whoever makes any distinction, discrimina- Color or race 
 tion or restriction on account of color or race discrimina- 
 or, except for good cause, applicable alike to all *°°" 
 persons of every color and race, relative to the 
 admission of any person to, or his treatment in, 
 a theatre, skating rink or other public place of 
 amusementj licensed or unlicensed, or in a pub- 
 lic conveyance or public meeting, or in an inn, 
 barber shop or other public place kept for hire, 
 gain or reward, Ucensed or unlicensed, or who- 
 ever aids or incites such distinction, discrimina- 
 tion or restriction, shall, for each offence, be 
 punished by a fine of not more than three hun- 
 dred dollars or by imprisonment for not more 
 than one year, or by both such fine and im- 
 prisonment, and shall forfeit to any person ag- 
 grieved thereby not less than twenty-five nor 
 more than three himdred dollars; but such per- 
 son so aggrieved shall not recover against more 
 than one person by reason of any one act of 
 distinction, discrimination or restriction (Rev. 
 Laws, chap. 212, §89). 
 
 [381] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 Innholders, 
 etc., to have 
 suitable food, 
 rooms, etc., 
 for travellers. 
 
 §2. 
 
 Every innholder and every common victualler 
 shall at all times be provided with suitable food 
 for strangers and travellers. Every innholder 
 shall also have upon his premises suitable rooms, 
 with beds and bedding, for the lodging of his 
 guests, and, if the Ucensing board so requires 
 be provided with stable room, hay and provender 
 for their horses and cattle {Ibid., chap. 102, § 5). 
 
 Innholder's 
 license to be 
 refused, when. 
 
 Penalty on 
 innholder for 
 refusal to re- 
 ceive trav e 1- 
 lers. 
 
 §3. 
 
 An innholder's or common victualler's license 
 shall not be granted or issued unless at the time 
 of making application therefor the applicant has 
 upon his premises the necessary implements and 
 facilities for cooking, preparing and serving food 
 for strangers and travellers; and, if an apphcant 
 for an innkeeper's license, unless he also has the 
 rooms, beds and bedding and stable room and 
 provender for horses and cattle required by law 
 {Ibid., §6). 
 
 §4. 
 
 An innholder, who, upon request, refuses to 
 receive and make suitable provision for a 
 stranger or traveller, and also for his horses and 
 cattle, when he may under the provisions of this 
 chapter be legally required so to do, shall be 
 punished by a fine of not more than fifty dollars; 
 and shall also forfeit his license {Ibid., § 7). 
 
 On common 
 victualler for 
 refusal to sup- 
 ply food. 
 
 [382] 
 
 §5. 
 
 A common victualler who, upon request, upon 
 any other than the ^jord's Day, refuses to supply 
 food to a stranger or traveller, shall be punished 
 
Appendix. 
 
 by a fine of not more than fifty dollars; and 
 shall also forfeit his license {Ibid., § 8). 
 
 §6. 
 
 An innholder shall not be liable for losses sus- Liability of 
 tained by a guest, except of wearing apparel, "™^older for 
 articles worn or carried on the person, personal erty. 
 baggage and money necessary for travelhng ex- 
 penses and personal use; nor shall such guest 
 recover of an innholder more than one thousand 
 dollars as damages for any such loss; but an 
 innholder shall be liable in damages to an amount 
 not exceeding three thousand dollars for the loss 
 of money, jewels and ornaments of a guest 
 specially deposited for safe keeping, or offered 
 to be so deposited, with such innholder, person 
 in charge at the office of the inn or other agent 
 of such innholder authorized to receive such 
 deposit. The provisions of this section shall 
 not affect the innholder's liabiUty under the 
 provisions of any special contract for other 
 property deposited with him for safe keeping 
 after being fully informed of its nature and 
 value, nor increase his liability in case of loss by 
 fire or overwhelming force beyond that specified 
 in the following section {Ibid., § 10). 
 
 §7. 
 
 In case of loss by fire or overwhehning force. For loss by 
 innholders shall be answerable to their guests ^^- 
 only for ordinary and reasonable care in the 
 custody of their baggage or other property 
 {Ibid., §11). 
 
 [383] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 §8. 
 
 Penalty for Whoever puts up at an inn or boarding house 
 fraudulently q^^^^ without having an express agreement for 
 tertainment ''^^dit, procures food, entertainment or accom- 
 at an inn. modation without paying therefor, and with 
 
 intent to cheat or defraud the owner or keeper 
 thereof; or, with such intent, obtains credit at 
 an inn or boarding house for such food, enter- 
 tainment or accormnodation, by means of any 
 false show of baggage or effects brought thereto; 
 or, with such intent, removes or causes to be 
 removed any baggage or effects from an inn or 
 boarding house, while a Hen exists thereon for 
 the proper charges due from him for fare and 
 board furnished therein, shall be punished by a 
 fine of not more than fifty doUars or by im- 
 prisonment for not more than three months. 
 Boarding-house keepers shall post a copy of this 
 section in a conspicuous place in each room of 
 their boarding houses (Ibid., § 12). 
 
 §9- 
 
 Notice to be Innholders shall post a printed copy of this 
 posted. and the three preceding sections in a conspicu- 
 
 ous place in each room of their inns {Ibid., § 13). 
 
 Disposition of 
 baggage in 
 possession of 
 innholders, 
 etc. 
 
 [384] 
 
 §10. 
 
 An innholder, after retaining for six months 
 from the time of departure of a guest from his 
 inn any trunks, bags, valises, parcels, clothing, 
 goods or other personal property of a guest 
 which has been abandoned by such guest, or 
 which such innholder retains by virtue of his 
 hen thereon for the unpaid board, lodging and 
 other charges of such guest, may sell the same 
 
Appendix. 
 
 by public auction upon the premises of the inn, 
 notice of the time and place of sale first being 
 posted in a conspicuous place in the office of the 
 inn for four weeks prior to the date of such sale, 
 and published once in each of three successive 
 weeks in a newspaper, if any, published in the 
 city or town in which the inn is situated; other- 
 wise in a newspaper published in the county 
 in which the inn is situated, the first publica- 
 tion of such notice to be not less than twenty- 
 one days before the day of sale. A copy of such 
 notice shall be sent by mail prepaid and duly 
 registered and addressed to said guest at the 
 residence registered by him in the register of 
 such inn. Such notice shall contain a descrip- 
 tive list of all such property and of all such 
 specific marks as may serve to identify such 
 property, and the name of the guest so far as 
 known to such innholder {Ibid., § 14). 
 
 §11. 
 
 The proceeds of such sale, after deducting all 
 reasonable charges and expenses incurred in the 
 storage and sale of such property, shall be ap- Disposition of 
 plied to the discharge of the Hen of such inn- P^'"'®® * <* 
 holder thereon for the board, lodging and other 
 charges of such guest, and any proceeds re- 
 maining thereafter shall be paid to the treasurer 
 and receiver general for the use of the common- 
 wealth (Ibid., § 15). 
 
 §12. 
 
 If, within three years after such sale, the owner Balance of 
 
 of any such property claims it and proves his proceeds to 
 
 •' r- J- ./ 1 /■ 1 "^ paid to 
 
 ownership thereof, the said proceeds, after de- <„yner. 
 ducting all reasonable charges and expenses, 
 
 25 [385] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 shall be paid over to him by the treasurer and 
 receiver general {Ibid., § 16). 
 
 Negligence of 
 guests a de- 
 fence. 
 
 §13. 
 
 An innholder against whom a claim is made 
 for loss sustained by a guest may show that such 
 loss is attributable to the negUgence of the guest 
 or to his failure to comply with the regulations 
 of the inn, if they are reasonable- and proper and 
 are shown to have been duly brought to the 
 notice of the guest by the innholder (Ibid.,' § 17).^ 
 
 §14. 
 
 Every innholder and common victualler shall 
 Innholders' at all times have a board or sign afhxed to his 
 signs. house, shop, cellar or store, or in a conspicuous 
 
 place near the same, with his name legibly 
 inscribed thereon in large letters and the em- 
 ployment for which he is Ucensed inscribed 
 thereon, and upon neglect thereof shall forfeit 
 twenty dollars {Ibid., § 18). 
 
 Seamen ex- 
 empt from 
 lien. 
 
 §15. 
 
 A seaman or mariner who has shipped or 
 entered into a contract for a voyage from a 
 port in this commonwealth shall not be Uable 
 to arrest on mesne process on account of a debt 
 to a landlord or boarding-house keeper; nor 
 shaU a landlord or boarding-house keeper de- 
 tain or have a lien upon his wearing apparel 
 
 1 The innkeeper cannot escape liability by the pro- 
 visions of this section unless the loss was actually caused 
 by the guest's negligence. Burbank v. Chapin, 140 Mass. 
 123, 2 N. E. 934 (1885). 
 
 [386] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 or other property, or hinder, obstruct or delay 
 him in the performance of such contract, under 
 a penalty of not more than two hundred dol- 
 lars {Ibid., chap. 66, § 4). 
 
 §16. 
 
 Whoever, keeping a house, shop, cellar or 
 place of pubUc entertainment or refreshment, 
 entertains therein on the Lord's Day any per- 
 sons other than travellers, strangers, or lodgers, 
 or suffers such persons on said day to abide or 
 remain therein, or in the yards, orchards, or 
 fields appertaining to the same, drinking or 
 spending their time idly or at play, or in doing 
 any secular business, shall be pimished by a fine 
 of not more than fifty dollars for each person so 
 entertained or suffered so to abide or remain; 
 and upon subsequent conviction, by a fine of 
 not more than one hundred dollars; and if con- 
 victed three times, he shall thereafter be dis- 
 qualified to hold a license {Ibid., chap. 98, § 6). 
 
 Persons keep- 
 ing places of 
 entertain- 
 ment, etc., to 
 entertain only 
 travellers, 
 etc. 
 
 §17. 
 
 An innholder or other person who, being 
 licensed to keep a place of pubUc entertainment, 
 entertains or suffers to remain or be in his house, 
 yard or other places appurtenant, any persons 
 other than travellers, strangers or lodgers in 
 such house, drinking and spending their time 
 there, on the Lord's Day, or on the evening pre- 
 ceding the same, shall be punished by a fine of 
 not more than five dollars for each offence 
 {Ibid., §7). 
 
 Innholder s 
 not to enter- 
 tain persons 
 on Sunday, 
 or Saturday 
 evening, ex- 
 cept. 
 
 [387] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 Lien of board- 
 ing- and lodg- 
 ing-house 
 
 §18. 
 
 Boarding- or lodging-house keepers shall have 
 a hen on the baggage and effects brought to 
 their houses and belonging to their guests, 
 boarders or lodgers, except mariners, for all 
 proper charges due for fare and board or lodg- 
 ing, which may be enforced as provided in the 
 five preceding sections (Ibid., chap. 198, § 28).^ 
 
 Admission of 
 children to 
 theatres, reg- 
 ulated. 
 
 §19. 
 
 Whoever, himself or by his servant or agent, 
 admits a child under the age of thirteen years 
 to any licensed public show or place of amuse- 
 ment, unless said child is accompanied by a 
 person over the age of twenty-one years, shall, 
 on complaint of a parent or guardian of said 
 child or of the chief of pohce or a truant officer 
 of the city or town in which said child is so ad- 
 mitted, be punished by a fine of not more than 
 one himdred dollars; but the provisions of this 
 section shall not apply to shows and amuse- 
 ments which take place before sunset (Ibid., 
 chap. 102, §184). 
 
 [388] 
 
 §20. 
 
 Any ofl&cer or person having any duty in any 
 way connected with the inspections of theatres, 
 etc., provided for by this act, who requests for 
 himself or another, or accepts or uses any ticket 
 or pass or privilege of admission, or admission, 
 
 2 This lien does not cover goods of a third person brought 
 to the inn by the guest. Mills v. Shirley, 110 Mass. 158 
 (1872). The lien attaches when the board is furnished, 
 though the account is not yet payable. Smith v. Colcord, 
 115 Mass. 70 (1874). 
 
Appendix. 
 
 to any theatre or public hall, for which he is to 
 pay or has paid either nothing or a price less 
 than that demanded of the pubhc generally, 
 and any owner, proprietor, manager, lessee, 
 agent or employee of any theatre or pubUc hall, 
 or any other person who issues, dehvers, offers 
 or allows any such ticket, pass, privilege or ad- 
 mission to any such officer or person or to any 
 other person at the request, solicitation, procm-e- 
 ment, or with the connivance of any such officer 
 or person, shall be punished by a fine or not less 
 than one hundred nor more than one thousand 
 dollars (Acts of 1904, chap. 450, § 14). 
 
 Penalty on 
 officers, etc., 
 tor accepting, 
 and on pro- 
 prietoTS, etc., 
 for issuing 
 free passes, 
 etc. 
 
 [389] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 XX. 
 
 MICHIGAN. 
 Compiled Laws of 1897. 
 
 Liability of 
 hotel and inn- 
 keepers. 
 
 Proviso as to 
 amount. 
 
 Further pro 
 
 viso. 
 
 Proviso, 
 
 agreement 
 
 to be in 
 
 writing. 
 
 [390] 
 
 The liability of the keeper of any inn, whether 
 individual, partnership or corporation, for loss of 
 or injiiry to personal property of his guest, shall 
 be that of a depository for hire: Provided, how- 
 ever, That in no case shall such liability exceed 
 the sum of two hundred fifty dollars; and in 
 case of the loss of a trunk or chest, and its con- 
 tents, it shall not exceed the sum of one hundred 
 fifty dollars; in case of the loss of a valise, 
 portmanteau, grip, telescope or dress-suit case, 
 and contents, it shall not exceed the sum of 
 fifty dollars; and in case of the loss of a box, 
 bundle or package, and contents, it shall not 
 exceed the sum of ten dollars: And provided 
 further. That nothing in this act shall prohibit 
 an innkeeper from assuming a greater liability 
 than the sum of two hundred fifty dollars for 
 the personal effects of his guest: Provided, said 
 undertaking and agreement shall be in writing, 
 stating the kind of personal property received 
 and the value thereof, the kind and extent of 
 the liability of said innkeeper, which said agree- 
 ment shall be signed by said guests and said 
 
Appendix. 
 
 innkeeper or his clerk: And provided further, 
 That nothing contained in this section shall pre- 
 clude any remedy now existing for the enforce- 
 ment of the hotel keeper's or innkeeper's lien 
 (Public Acts of 1905, No. 42, § 1). 
 
 §2. 
 
 No innkeeper, whether individual, partner- 
 ship or corporation, who constantly has in his 
 inn a metal safe or suitable vault in good order, 
 and fit for the custody of money, bank notes, 
 jewelry, articles of gold and silver manufacture, 
 precious stones, personal ornaments, railroad 
 mileage books or tickets, negotiable or valuable 
 papers and bulhon, and who keeps on the doors 
 of the sleeping rooms used by his guests suit- 
 able locks and bolts, and on the transoms and 
 windows of said rooms suitable fastenings, and 
 who keeps a copy of this section printed in dis- 
 tinct tj^e constantly and conspicuously sus- 
 pended in the office and in the ladies' parlor 
 or sitting room, barroom, wash room and in 
 five other conspicuous places in said inn, or in 
 not less than ten conspicuous places in all in 
 said inn, shall be hable for the loss of or injury 
 to any such property belonging to any guest, 
 imless such guest has offered to deliver the 
 same to such innkeeper for custody in such 
 metal safe or vault, and such innkeeper has re- 
 fused or omitted to take it and deposit it in 
 such safe or vault for custody, and to give such 
 guest a receipt therefor: Provided, however. That 
 the keeper of any inn shall not be obliged to 
 receive from any one guest for deposit in such 
 safe or vault any property hereinbefore de- 
 scribed exceeding a total value of two hundred 
 
 Further pro- 
 viso. 
 
 When inn- 
 keeper not 
 liable for loss 
 of property. 
 
 Proviso, as to 
 acceptance of 
 property b e- 
 yond certain 
 value. 
 
 [391] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 fifty dollars, except under special agreement as 
 hereinbefore provided, and shall not be liable 
 for any excess of such property whether received 
 or not, but every innkeeper shall be liable for 
 any loss of the above enumerated articles of a 
 guest in his inn, caused by the theft or negli- 
 gence of the innkeeper or any of his servants 
 
 iibid.,^2y 
 
 Hotel k e e p- 
 ers, etc., may 
 detain bag- 
 gage for pay- 
 ment of board. 
 
 §3 
 
 The People of the State of Michigan enact, 
 That whenever the keeper of any hotel or inn 
 or boarding or lodging house shall receive into 
 his hotel or inn or boarding or lodging house 
 any person as a guest or boarder or lodger, he 
 shall have a lien upon and right to detain the 
 baggage and effects of such guest or boarder or 
 lodger to secure and compel payment of his 
 customary charges for the food and lodging fur- 
 nished such guest or boarder or lodger, and such 
 lien may be enforced in the manner hereinafter 
 prescribed (Comp. Laws, §5317). 
 
 When prop- 
 erty may be 
 sold. 
 
 [392] 
 
 §4. 
 
 Any hotel keeper or innkeeper or boarding- or 
 lodging-house keeper who shall have a lien for 
 fare, accommodations or board upon any goods, 
 baggage or other property, and in his possession 
 for three months at least after the departure 
 of the boarder or lodger or guest leaving the 
 
 1 The innkeeper cannot be expected to have a safe 
 large enough to keep merchandise. In order to avail 
 himself of this statute as a defense to an action tor the 
 loss of a guest's goods, he must show that he has literally 
 complied with it. Myers v. CottrUl, Fed. Cas. No. 9,985, 
 5 Biss. 465 (1873). 
 
Appendix. 
 
 same, or who for a period of six months shall 
 have in his custody any unclaimed trunk, box, 
 vahse, package, parcel or other chattel prop- 
 erty whatever, may proceed to sell the same at 
 public auction after first having given notice Notice of in 
 to the county treasurer of such intended sale, 
 and out of the proceeds of such sale may, in case 
 of Hen, retain the amount thereof and the ex- 
 pense of advertisement and sale, and in case of 
 unclaimed property the expense of storage, ad- 
 vertisement, and sale thereof: Provided, In all 
 instances, the notice specified in the next sec- 
 tion be first given as therein directed {Ibid., 
 § 5318). 
 
 tended sale to 
 be given 
 county treas- 
 urer. 
 
 Proviso as to 
 notice. 
 
 §5. 
 
 Fifteen days, at least, prior to the time of the 
 sale, a notice of the time and place of holding 
 the sale and containing a brief description of 
 the baggage and articles to be sold shall be pub- 
 lished in a newspaper of general circulation, 
 published in the city or town in which such 
 hotel, inn or boarding or lodging house is sit- 
 uated; but if there be none, then in such news- 
 paper published nearest said city or town; and 
 shall also be served upon said guest, boarder, 
 lodger or owner of such chattel articles or prop- 
 erty, if he resides or can be found within the 
 county where said hotel, inn, boarding house or 
 lodging house is situated, by delivering the same 
 to him personally or leaving it at his place of 
 residence with a person of suitable age in charge 
 thereof. But if such guest, boarder, lodger or 
 owner does not reside or cannot be found in 
 said coimty, the said notice shall be deposited 
 
 To be pub- 
 lished in 
 newspaper. 
 
 To be served 
 on owner. 
 
 [393] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 Or mailed. 
 
 Sale, how con- 
 ducted. 
 
 in the post office of said city or town with the 
 postage prepaid thereon, fifteen days prior to 
 said sale, and addressed to said guest, boarder, 
 lodger, or owner at his place of residence, if his 
 address be known to said hotel, inn, boarding- 
 or lodging-house keeper. The sale shall tak^ 
 place between the hours of ten o'clock in the 
 forenoon and four o'clock in the afternoon, and 
 all articles sold shall be to the highest bidder 
 for cash {Ibid., §5319). 
 
 Balance 
 proceeds. 
 
 §6. 
 
 Such hotel keeper, innkeeper, boarding- or 
 lodging-house keeper shall make an entry of 
 0* the articles sold and the balance of the proceeds 
 of the sale, if any, and within ten days from 
 such sale, shall, upon demand, refund such bal- 
 ance and surplus to such guest, boarder or per- 
 son leaving the articles sold {Ibid., § 5320). 
 
 When to be 
 paid to county 
 treasurer. 
 
 Affidavit to be 
 filed. 
 
 [394] 
 
 §7. 
 
 In case such balance shall not be demanded 
 and paid as specified in the last section within 
 said ten days, then within five days thereafter 
 said hotel keeper, boarding or lodging-house 
 keeper, shall pay said balance to the treasurer 
 of the county in which such hotel, inn, board- 
 ing or lodging house shall be situated, and shall 
 at the same time file with said treasurer an af- 
 fidavit made by him, in which shall be stated 
 the name and place of residence, so far as they 
 are known to him, of the guest, boarder or per- 
 son, whose goods, baggage or chattel articles 
 were sold, the name and residence of the auc- 
 tioneer making the sale, and a copy of the no- 
 
Appendix. 
 
 tice published and how served, whether by per- 
 sonal service or by mailing, and if not so served 
 and the reason thereof {Ibid., § 5321.) 
 
 §8. 
 
 Said treasurer shall keep surplus and moneys 
 for, and credit the same to the person named 
 in said affidavit as said guest, boarder, or per- 
 son leaving the articles sold, and shall pay the 
 same to said person, his or her agent or attor- 
 ney, executors or administrators, upon demand 
 and evidence satisfactory to said treasurer fur- 
 nished of their identity: Provided, That if 
 said amount be not claimed within two years 
 from the date of sale, it shall be placed in and 
 become a part of the contingent fund of the 
 county (Ibid., § 5322). 
 
 Treasurer to 
 pay to person 
 named, any 
 surplus. 
 
 Proviso as to 
 uncalled for 
 claim. 
 
 §9 
 
 Nothing herein contained shall preclude any 
 other remedy now existing for the enforcement 
 of hotel keeper's, innkeeper's or boarding or 
 lodging-house keeper's lien, nor bar their right 
 to recover for so much of the debt as shall not 
 be paid through said sale {Ibid., § 5323). 
 
 §10. 
 
 The People of the State of Michigan enact, 
 That any person who shall put up at any hotel 
 or inn as a guest and shall procure any food, 
 entertainment or accommodation without pay- 
 ing therefor, except when credit is given there- 
 for by express agreement, with intent to defraud 
 such keeper thereof out of the pay for the same, 
 or who, with intent to defraud such keeper out 
 
 Not bar other 
 rights. 
 
 Persons at- 
 tempting to 
 defraud hotel 
 keepers, etc., 
 guilty of mis- 
 demeanor. 
 
 [395] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 Penalty, of the pay therefor, shall obtain credit at any 
 hotel or inn for such food, entertainment or 
 accommodation, by means of any false show of 
 baggage or effects brought thereto, shall, upon 
 conviction thereof, upon the complaint of such 
 hotel keeper before a justice of the peace, be 
 adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be 
 punished by imprisonment in the county jail 
 not exceeding thirty days, or by fine not ex- 
 ceeding one hundred dollars, or by both fine 
 and imprisonment in the discretion of the jus- 
 
 Proviso. tice: Provided, That the (provision) provisions 
 of this act shall not apply to boarders at any 
 hotel or inn by the week or month {Ibid., 
 § 11615). 
 
 §11. 
 
 Prima facie Proof that lodging, food or other acconmio- 
 proof of fraud, dation was obtained by false pretence, or by 
 false or fictitious show or pretence of baggage, 
 or that the person refused or neglected to pay 
 for such food, lodging or other accommodation 
 on demand, or that he absconded or left the 
 premises without paying or offering to pay for 
 such food, lodging or other accommodation, or 
 that he surreptitiously removed or attempted 
 to remove his baggage shall be prima facie 
 proof of the fraudulent intent mentioned in 
 section one of this act (Ibid., § 11616). 
 
 Theatres, con- 
 cert ha'lls, 
 etc., marking 
 of seats in, 
 regulated. 
 
 [396] 
 
 §12. 
 
 The People of the State of Michigan enact. 
 That it shall not be lawful for the proprietor, 
 lessee or manager of any theatre, concert or 
 lecture hall, or other place of public entertain- 
 ment, to mark, or cause to be marked, any seat, 
 
Appendix. 
 
 or seats in any theatre, concert, or lecture hall, 
 or other place of public entertainment, as sold, 
 reserved or taken, unless the seat or seats so 
 marked or designated shall have been actually- 
 sold as reserved, at least one hour prior to the 
 time of beginning each performance, or enter- 
 tainment, in said theatre, concert, or lecture 
 haU, or place of public entertainment, and the 
 pm'chase of reserved seats for the puipose of 
 selling them is hereby prohibited (Ibid., § 5466). 
 
 §13. 
 
 Any proprietor, lessee, or manager, or other 
 person, who shall violate the provisions of the 
 preceding section, shall on conviction thereof. Penalty, 
 be fined not less than one doUar, and not more 
 than five dollars, for every seat so marked, des- 
 ignated or purchased (Ibid., §5467). 
 
 §14. 
 
 That all persons within the jurisdiction of 
 said State shall be entitled to the full and equal 
 accommodations, advantages, facilities, and 
 privileges of inns, restaurants, eating houses, 
 barber shops, public conveyances on land and 
 water, theatres, and all other places of public 
 accommodation and amusement, subject only 
 to the conditions and limitations established by 
 law and applicable alike to all citizens (Ibid., 
 § 11759). 
 
 Equal accom- 
 modations for 
 all persona. 
 
 §15. 
 
 That any person who shall violate any of the 
 provisions of the foregoing section, by denying 
 to any citizen, except for reasons applicable 
 alike to all citizens of every race and color, and 
 
 Penalty for 
 violation of 
 this act. 
 
 [397] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 regardless of color or race, the fuU accommoda- 
 tions, advantages, facilities, or privileges in said 
 section enumerated or by aiding or inciting such 
 denial, shall for every such offence be deemed 
 guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction 
 thereof, shall be fined not to exceed one hun- 
 dred dollars, or shall be imprisoned not more 
 than thirty days, or both (Ibid., § 11760). 
 
 [398] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 XXI. 
 
 MINNESOTA. 
 Statutes of 1894. 
 
 §1- 
 
 Hereafter every landlord or keeper of a public Safes; n o - 
 inn or hotel, or boarding-house keeper, in this tices; locks. 
 State, who shall constantly have in his inn or 
 .hotel an iron safe in good and suitable order 
 for the safe custody of money, jewelry or other 
 valuable articles belonging to his guests or cus- 
 tomers, shall keep posted conspicuously at the 
 office, also on the inside of every entrance door 
 of every public sleeping, reading, bar, sitting 
 and parlor room of such hotel, etc., notice to 
 the guests and customers that they must leave 
 their money, jewelry, and other valuables with 
 the landlord, his agent or clerk, for safe keeping, 
 and he or they may make safe deposits of the 
 same in the place provided for that purpose. 
 Every landlord or keeper of a public inn or hotel 
 shall provide locks and bolts for all room doors 
 (Stat., § 7997; See Rev. Laws of 1905, § 2810). 
 
 §2. 
 
 Such landlord, hotel, or innkeeper as shall 
 comply with the requirements of the first sec- 
 tion of this act, shall not be liable for any 
 
 [399] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 Exemption money, jewelry, or other valuables of gold, 
 from liabil- gjiver, or rare and precious stones, that may be 
 * ^' lost, if the same is not deUvered to said land- 
 
 lord, hotel, or innkeeper, his agent or clerk, for 
 deposit, unless such loss shall occur by the 
 hand, or through the negligence, of the land- 
 lord, or by a clerk or a servant employed by him 
 in such hotel, inn, etc. {Ibid. § 7998; Rev. 
 Laws, § 2810).! 
 
 §3. 
 
 A person who obtains any food or accommo- 
 dation at any inn, hotel, lodging house or board- 
 Defraudinff ^^^ house, without paying therefor, with intent 
 innkeepers. to defraud the proprietor or manager thereof, 
 or who obtains credit at any irm, hotel, lodging 
 house or boarding house, by or through any 
 false pretence, or who after obtaining credit and 
 accommodation at an inn, hotel, lodging house 
 or boarding house, absconds and surreptitiously 
 removes his baggage therefrom without paying 
 for his food and accommodation is guilty of a 
 misdemeanor, and the proprietor or manager of 
 any such inn, hotel, boarding or lodging house, 
 shall have a hen on any baggage or effects of 
 
 1 To enable an innkeeper to limit his liability as to 
 property of a guest by keeping an iron safe and posting 
 notices, a notice at the head of the register in which the 
 guest signed his name is not available if the guest's at- 
 tention was not called to it, so that he might be presumed 
 to have understood and assented to it. Olson v. Cross- 
 man, 31 Minn. 222, 17 N. W. 375 (1883). 
 
 Where there is no clear proof that defendant innkeeper 
 posted the notice required by statute, that valuables must 
 be left with him for safe-keeping, and there is no proof 
 of actual notice, the entire question is properly left to the 
 jury. Chamberlain v. West, 37 Minn. 54, 33 N. W. 114 
 (1887). 
 [400] 
 
Appendix, 
 
 any such person in his possession for the amount 
 due and unpaid for food or lodging so fraud- 
 ulently obtained {Ibid., §7999, amended by 
 Laws of 1905, chap. 325; Rev. Laws, § 5164) .^ 
 
 §4. 
 
 All goods or property taken by any hotel, 
 inn or boarding-house keeper, and by him held 
 for non-payment of any bill for board, lodging 
 or accommodation, may be sold after the ex- 
 piration of ninety days and default being made 
 in the payment of such bill, upon a notice of 
 ten days, at public auction, upon notice as in 
 cases of constable's sales {Ibid., § 8001 ; Rev. 
 Laws, § 2811). 
 
 Goods taken 
 for board may 
 be sold. 
 
 Exclusio n 
 from public 
 places on ac- 
 count of race, 
 color, etc. 
 
 §5. 
 
 That a person who excludes any other person 
 within the jurisdiction of the State of Minnesota, 
 on account of race, color or previous condition 
 of servitude, from the full and equal enjoyment 
 of any accommodation, advantage, facility or 
 privilege, furnished by innkeepers, hotel keepers, 
 managers or lessees, common carriers, or by 
 owners, managers or lessees of theatres or other 
 places of amusement, or public conveyance on 
 land or water, restaurants, barber shops, eating 
 houses, or other places of public resort, refresh- 
 ment, accommodation or entertainment, or de- 
 nies, or aids or incites another to deny to any 
 other person because of race, creed or color, or 
 
 2 Under this section the complaint need not allege either 
 the board obtained or the baggage removed to be of any 
 value. State v. Benson, 28 Minn. 424, 10 N. W. 471 
 (1881). 
 
 26 [ 401 ] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 previous condition of servitude, the full' and 
 equal enjoyment of any of the accommodations, 
 advantages, faciUties and privileges of any ho- 
 tel, inn, tavern, restaurant, eating house, soda 
 foxmtain, ice cream parlor, pubhc conveyance 
 on land or water, theatre, barber shop or other 
 place of pubhc refreshment, amusement, instruc- 
 tion, accommodation or entertainment, is guilty 
 of a misdemeanor, ptinishable by a fine of not 
 less than twenty-five (25) dollars, nor more than 
 one hundred (100) dollars, or imprisonment in 
 the coimty jail for not less than thirty (30) nor 
 more than ninety (90) days. And in addition 
 to the punishment prescribed herein he is liable 
 in damages, in a sum not less than twenty-five 
 (25) nor more than five hundred (500) dollars 
 to the party aggrieved, to be recovered in a 
 civil action {Ibid., §§ 8002, 8003, as amended by 
 Laws of 1897, chap. 349; Rev. Laws, § 2812). 
 
 Consignee to 
 keep record of 
 personal prop- 
 erty. 
 
 [402] 
 
 Whenever any personal property is consigned 
 to, or deposited with, any forwarding merchant, 
 wharf-keeper, warehouse-keeper, tavern-keeper, 
 express company, or the keeper of any depot 
 for the reception and storage of tnmks, baggage, 
 merchandise, or other personal property, such 
 consignee or bailee shall immediately cause to 
 be entered, in a book kept by him, a descrip- 
 tion of such property, with the date of the 
 reception thereof {Ibid., § 2090; Rev. Laws, 
 §2797). 
 
 §7. 
 
 If such, property is not left with such con- 
 signee or bailee for the purpose of being for- 
 
Appendix. 
 
 warded or disposed of according to directions 
 received by such consignee or bailee, at or be- 
 fore the time of the reception thereof, and if 
 the name and residence of the owner of such 
 property are known to the consignee or bailee, 
 he shall immediately notify the owner, by letter 
 directed to him and deposited in the post office, 
 of the reception of such property {Ibid., § 2091; 
 Rev. Laws, §2797). 
 
 To notify own- 
 er, when. 
 
 §8. 
 
 If any such property is not claimed and taken 
 away within one year after the time it is so 
 received, the consignee or bailee may at any 
 time thereafter proceed to seU the same in the 
 manner provided in this chapter {Ibid., § 2092; 
 Rev. Laws, § 2798). 
 
 Property may 
 be sold, when. 
 
 §9- 
 
 Before any such property is sold, if the name 
 and residence of the owner thereof are known, 
 at least sixty days' notice of such sale shall be 
 given him, either personally or by mail, or by 
 leaving a notice at his residence or place of doing 
 business; but if the name and residence of the 
 owner are imknown, the person having the pos- 
 session of such property shall cause a notice to 
 be published, containing a description of the 
 property, for the space of six weeks successively, 
 in a newspaper, if there is one, printed and pub- 
 lished in the same county ; if there is no such 
 newspaper, then said notice shall be published 
 in a newspaper printed and pubUshed at the 
 capital of the State; the last pubUcation of such 
 notice shall be at least eighteen days previous 
 
 Notice of sale, 
 how given. 
 
 [403] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 to the time of sale (Ibid., § 2093 ; Rev. Laws, 
 § 2798). 
 
 Affidavit to be 
 made and de- 
 livered to jus- 
 tice. 
 
 §10. 
 
 If the owner or person entitled to such prop- 
 erty does not take the same away, and pay the 
 charges thereon, after sixty days' notice have 
 been given, the consignee or bailee, his agent or 
 attorney, shall make and deUver to a justice of 
 the peace of the same county an affidavit setting 
 forth a description of the property remaining 
 linclaimed, the time of its reception, the pub- 
 lication of the notice, and whether the owner 
 of such property is Imown or unknown (Ibid., 
 § 2099; Rev. Laws, § 2799). 
 
 Justice to 
 make inven- 
 tory. 
 
 Constable to 
 give notice of 
 sale. 
 
 [404] 
 
 §11- 
 
 Upon the delivery to him of such affidavit, 
 the justice shall cause such property to be 
 opened and examined in his presence, and a 
 true inventory thereof to be made, and shall 
 annex to such inventory an order under his 
 hand, that the property therein described shall 
 be sold by any constable of the county, at pub- 
 lic auction {Ibid., §2095; Rev. Laws, §2800). 
 
 §12. 
 
 The constable receiving such inventory and 
 order shall give ten days' notice of the sale, by 
 posting up written notices thereof in three or 
 more places in such county, and shall sell such 
 property at pubHc auction to the highest bidder, 
 in the same manner as provided by law for sale 
 under executions from justices' com-ts (Ibid., 
 §2096; Rev. Laws, §2801). 
 
Appendix. 
 
 §13. 
 
 Upon completing the sale, the constable shall 
 endorse upon the order aforesaid a return of his 
 proceedings thereon, and return the same to the 
 justice, together with the inventory, and the 
 proceeds of the sale after deducting his fees 
 {Ibid., §2097; Rev. Laws, § 2801). 
 
 §14. 
 
 From the proceeds of such sale, the justice 
 shall pay all legal charges incurred in relation 
 to such property, or a ratable proportion of each 
 charge, if the proceeds of said sale are not suf- 
 ficient to pay all the charges, and the balance, 
 if any, he shall immediately pay over to the 
 treasinrer of the county in which the same is 
 sold, and deUver a statement therewith, con- 
 taining a description of the property sold, the 
 gross amount of such sale, and the amount of 
 costs, charges and expenses paid to each person 
 {Ibid., § 2098; Rev. Laws, § 2802). 
 
 §15. 
 
 The coimty treasurer shall make an entry of 
 the amount received by him and the time when 
 received, and shall file in his office such state- 
 ment so delivered to him by the justice {Ibid., 
 §2099; Rev. Laws, § 2802). 
 
 §16. 
 
 If the owner of the property sold, or his legal 
 representatives, shall, at any time within five 
 years after such money is deposited in the 
 county treasury, furnish satisfactory evidence 
 to the treasurer of the ownership of such prop- 
 erty, he shall receive from such treasurer the 
 
 To make re- 
 turn to jus- 
 tice. 
 
 Proceeds of 
 sale, how dis- 
 posed of. 
 
 Duty of coun- 
 ty treasurer. 
 
 Money depos- 
 ited to be de- 
 livered to 
 owner. 
 
 [405] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 Unclaime d 
 money to be- 
 long to coun- 
 ty. 
 
 Perishable 
 property, how 
 sold. 
 
 Pees of jus- 
 tice and con- 
 stable. 
 
 [406] 
 
 amount so deposited with hm (Ibid., § 2100 ; 
 Rev. Laws, § 2803). 
 
 §17. 
 
 If the amount so deposited with any county 
 treasurer' is not claimed by the owner thereof 
 or his legal representatives within the said five 
 years, the same shall belong to the coimty, and 
 may be disposed of as the board of county com- 
 missioners direct (Ibid., § 2101 ; Rev. Laws, 
 § 2803). 
 
 §18. 
 
 Property of a perishable kind and subject to 
 decay by keeping, consigned or left in the man- 
 ner before mentioned, if not taken away within 
 thirty days after it is left, may be sold by giv- 
 ing ten days' notice thereof; the sale to be con- 
 ducted, and the proceeds of the same to be ap- 
 plied, in the manner before provided in this 
 chapter: provided, that any property in a state 
 of decay, or that is manifestly liable immedi- 
 ately to become decayed, may be sinnmarily 
 sold by order of a justice of the peace, after 
 inspection therieof as provided in section twenty 
 of this chapter (Ibid., § 2102; Rev. Laws, 
 §2798). 
 
 §19. 
 
 The fees allowed to any justice of the peace 
 under the provisions of this chapter shall be 
 one dollar for each day's service, and to any 
 constable the same fees as are allowed by law 
 for sale upon an execution, and ten cents per 
 folio for making an inventory of property (Ibid., 
 §2103; Rev. Laws, §2804). 
 
Appendix. 
 
 XXII. 
 
 MISSISSIPPI. 
 Annotated Code of 1902. 
 
 §1. 
 
 Keepers of hotels, boarding houses and res- 
 taurants shall have a hen on the goods and per- Lien, 
 sonal baggage of their guests and boarders to 
 seciu-e the pa3Tnent of any money due from 
 them for board and lodgiag; and may enforce 
 the same by a seizure and sale of such goods 
 and baggage in the manner provided by law for 
 enforcing hens for purchase money of goods 
 (Code, §2697). 
 
 Any seller of personal property or his assigns, Enforcement 
 who shall be about to begin suit for the "* '^^°- 
 purchase money thereof, may file with his dec- 
 laration or evidence of debt an affidavit desig- 
 nating the property sought to be subjected and 
 averring therein the habiUty of the property, 
 in whole or part, for the debt sued on; where- 
 upon the clerk of the court, or justice of the 
 peace in cases before him, shall issue a writ of 
 summons and seizure, conmianding the officer 
 to seize the property and deal with it as in the 
 case of an attachment for debt, and to summon 
 
 [407] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 the defendant as in other cases. The defend- 
 ant may replevy the property as in case of at- 
 tachment against debtors (Ibid., §2720). 
 
 If, upon the trial, it be found that the plain- 
 Trial and tiff is entitled to recover and to subject the 
 ]u gmen . property to the payment of his debt, judgment 
 
 shall be rendered against the defendant for the 
 debt and costs and also for the condemnation 
 and sale of the property for the payment of the 
 same, or such part thereof as it may be found 
 liable for; and if the defendant have given bond 
 for the property, and the judgment and costs 
 be less than the assessed value thereof, judg- 
 ment shall be rendered against the defendant 
 and the sureties on his bond for the debt and 
 costs; but if the judgment be greater than the 
 value of the property, the judgment shall be for 
 the redelivery to the officer of the property, or, 
 in default thereof, for its assessed value and 
 costs. If the plaintiff prove his debt, but fail to 
 establish the lien on the property, he shall have 
 judgment only for the debt, and shall pay all 
 costs incident to the seizinre of the property 
 (Ibid., §2721). 
 
 [408] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 XXIII. 
 
 MISSOURI. 
 Revised Statutes of 1899. 
 
 Hotel, inn and boarding-house keepers shall Lien. 
 have a lien upon the baggage and other valu- 
 ables of their guests or boarders brought into 
 such hotel, inn or boarding house by such guests 
 or boarders, and upon the wages of such guests 
 or boarders, for their proper charges due from 
 such guests or boarders for their accommoda- 
 tion, boarding and lodging, and such extras as 
 are furnished at their request (Rev. Stat., 
 § 4237).! 
 
 §2- 
 
 Hotel, inn and boarding-house keepers may 
 sell for cash the baggage and other valuables 
 of their guests or boarders, upon which they Unclaimed 
 may have a lien for charges as provided in the u^^^^ff ^^^ 
 preceding section, or which may be left with tice, etc! 
 them unclaimed, after having retained posses- 
 
 1 Goods of a third party brought to the inn by a guest 
 are exempt from lien under this section. Wyckoff v. 
 Southern Hotel Co., 24 Mo. App. 382 (1887). This lien 
 may now be enforced by garnishment of guest's wages. 
 Clark V. Haydock, 44 Mo. App. 367 (1891). Wages for 
 the last thirty days' services are exempt. Hodo v. 
 Benecke, 11 Mo. App. 393 (1882). 
 
 [409] 
 
[410] 
 
 Appendix. 
 
 sion of the same for the period of not less than 
 six months, first giving five days' notice of such 
 sale, stating the time, place and terms of sale, 
 by advertisement in a newspaper published in 
 the city or county where said sale is to take 
 place, and if no daily paper is published therein, 
 then by one week's notice in a weekly paper 
 published therein, or by printed or written hand- 
 bills put up at five places in such city or county 
 aforesaid; and any sums of money received 
 from the proceeds of such sale, after pa3dng all 
 charges, and the expense of sale and of storing 
 the articles (which said expense of storage shall 
 be fifty cents for each parcel), shall be paid into 
 the cotmty treasury, and in the city of St. Louis 
 into the city treasury, for the benefit of the 
 owner, if he shall thereafter appear; but if such 
 money be not claimed within one year, it shall 
 go into the school fund of the county or city: 
 Provided, that when such lien is claimed upon 
 the wages of any such guest or boarder, the 
 justice shall notify the party designated by the 
 plaintiff as owing such guest or boarder, that suit 
 has been instituted to enforce such lien, and 
 such notice shall be served in the same manner 
 and have the same force and effect as garnish- 
 ments in attachments, and the party so served 
 shall be required to answer, and shall receive 
 the same fees as provided in section 3456, Re- 
 vised Statutes, "of garnishments." (Ibid., § 
 4238). 2 
 
 2 A judgment for the debt is a prerequisite to enforcing 
 the lien by this process. Goates v. Acheson, 23 Mo. App. 
 255 (1886). And though in the suit a case is not made 
 out for enforcing the lien, a judgment may be given for 
 the amount of debt proved. Hodo v. Benecke, 11 Mo. 
 App. 393 (1882). 
 
Appendix. 
 
 §3. 
 
 No innkeeper in this State, who shall con- 
 stantly have in his inn an iron safe, in good 
 order, and suitable for the safe custody of money, 
 jewelry and articles of gold and silver manu- 
 facture, and of the Uke, and who shall keep a 
 copy of sections 7578 and 7579 printed by itself 
 in large, plain, English type, and framed, con- 
 stantly and conspicuously suspended in the of- 
 fice, barroom, saloon, reading, sitting and parlor 
 room of his inn, and also a copy printed by 
 itself, in ordinary sized plain English type, 
 posted upon the inside of the entrance door of 
 every pubhc sleeping room of his inn, shall be 
 hable for the loss of any such articles aforesaid, 
 suffered by any guest, vmless such guest shall 
 have first offered to deliver such property lost 
 by him to such innkeeper, for custody in such 
 iron safe, and such innkeeper shall have refused 
 or omitted to take it and deposit it in such safe 
 for its custody and to give such guest a receipt 
 therefor {Ibid., § 7578) .^ 
 
 Innkeepers, 
 when not li- 
 able for losses 
 of money, etc. 
 
 §4. 
 
 No innkeeper in this State shall be liable for 
 the loss of any baggage or other property of a 
 guest, caused by fire not intentionally produced 
 
 3 This provision was not complied with where the copy 
 of the statute posted was printed in very small type. 
 Porter v. Gilkey, 57 Mo. 235 (1874). 
 
 Where a copy of the statute has not been posted in the 
 bedroom it is no defence to the innkeeper in a suit by a 
 guest for the loss of the property that the guest had read 
 a copy of the statute on the register. The statute is to 
 be construed strictly, and there is no provision by virtue 
 of which actual notice may take the place of posting. 
 Batterson v. Vogel, 8 Mo. App. 24 (1879). 
 
 Liability for 
 baggage. 
 
 [411] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 For merchan- 
 dise. 
 
 Obtaining 
 board, etc., 
 by false pre- 
 tences. 
 
 [412] 
 
 by the innkeeper or his servants, nor shall he 
 be liable for the loss of any merchandise for sale 
 or sample belonging to a guest, unless the guest 
 shall have given written notice of having such 
 merchandise for sale or sample in his possession 
 after entering the inn, nor shall the innkeeper 
 be compelled to receive such guest with mer- 
 chandise for sale or sample; but innkeepers shall 
 be liable for the losses of their guests, caused by 
 the theft of such innkeeper or his servants, any- 
 thing herein to the contrary notwithstanding.* 
 
 §5. 
 
 Every person who shall obtain board or lodg- 
 ing in any hotel or boarding house by means of 
 any trick or deception or false or fraudulent rep- 
 resentation, or statement or pretence, and shall 
 fail or refuse to pay therefor, shall be held to 
 have obtained the same with the intent to cheat 
 and defraud such hotel or boarding-house keeper, 
 and shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, 
 and upon conviction thereof shall be punished 
 by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or 
 by imprisonment in the county jail or city work- 
 house not exceeding six months, or by both fine 
 and imprisonment (Ibid., § 7580).^ 
 
 * Under this section an irmlceeper is not responsible for 
 the goods of a travelling salesman stolen from the inn, un- 
 less it be shown that the loss was occasioned by the theft 
 or negligence of the innkeeper or his servants, if no written 
 notice of the character of such goods was given him as 
 required, although he knew that the guest had such goods 
 for sale in his room. Fisher v. Kelsey, 121 U. S. 383, 
 30 L. Ed. 930, 7 Sup. Ct. 929 (1887). 
 
 5 This statute is constitutional. State v. Kingsley, 
 108 Mo. 135, 18 S. W. 994 (1891). 
 
 For a proper conviction under the statute relating to 
 false pretences, the defendant must have obtained board 
 
Appendix. 
 
 §6. 
 
 It shall be the duty of every hotel and board- 
 ing-house keeper in this State to post a printed 
 copy of sections 7580 and 7581 in a conspicuous Oopy of sec- 
 place in each room of his or her boarding house, ***"" . *° 
 and no conviction shall be had under the fore- 
 going section until it shall be made to appear 
 to the satisfaction of the court that the provi- 
 sions of this section have been substantially 
 complied with by the hotel or boarding-house 
 keeper making the complaint (Ibid., § 7581). 
 
 by means of false pretences, and the party defrauded 
 must have permitted him to obtain it on the faith of, and 
 in reliance upon, the truth of the false statement; and 
 where the evidence shows that about the time defendant 
 was to leave he made the false promise, substantially all 
 the board having already been obtained, it fails to make 
 out a case. State v. Tull, 42 Mo. App. 324 (1890). 
 
 [413] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 XXIV. 
 
 MONTANA. 
 Annotated Codes of 1895. 
 
 §1- 
 
 Every person, and every agent or officer of 
 any corporation, carr3dng on business as an inn- 
 Duty to re- keeper, or as a common carrier of passengers, 
 ceive gues s. ^j^^ refuses, without just cause or excuse, to 
 receive and entertain any guest, or to receive 
 and entertain any passenger, is guilty of a mis- 
 demeanor (Penal Code, § 655). 
 
 §2. 
 
 An innkeeper is liable for all losses of or in- 
 juries to personal property placed by his guests 
 Innkeeper's under his care, unless occasioned by an irre- 
 * ' ^" sistible superhuman cause, by a public enemy, 
 
 by the negligence of the owner, or by the act 
 of someone whom he brought into the inn (Civil 
 Code, §2500). 
 
 §3. 
 
 If an innkeeper keeps a fireproof safe, and 
 
 gives notice to a guest, either personally or by 
 
 How exempt- putting up a printed notice in a prominent place 
 
 h"ut ™™ *' ™ ^^^ room occupied by the guest, that he keeps 
 
 such a safe, and will not be liable for money, 
 
 [414] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 jewelry, documents, or other articles of unusual 
 value and small compass, unless placed therein, 
 he is not liable, except so far as his own acts 
 contribute thereto, for any loss of, or injury to, 
 such articles, if not deposited with him, and not 
 required by the guest for present use (Ibid., 
 § 2501). 
 
 §4. 
 
 Hotel men, boarding-house and lodging-house 
 keepers, shall have a hen upon the baggage and 
 other property of value of their guests, or 
 boarders, or lodgers, brought into such hotel, 
 inn, or boarding or lodging house by such 
 guests, or boarders, or lodgers, for the proper 
 charges due from such guests, or boarders, or 
 lodgers, for their accommodation, board and 
 lodging, and room rent, and such extras as are 
 furnished at their request, with the right to the 
 possession of such baggage, or other property 
 of value, until all such charges are paid (Ibid., 
 §2502). 
 
 Lien of board- 
 ing and lodg- 
 ing-house 
 keepers. 
 
 §5. 
 
 Whenever any trunk, carpetbag, valise, box, 
 bundle or other baggage, has heretofore come, 
 or shall hereafter come into the possession of 
 the keeper of any hotel, inn, boarding or lodg- 
 ing house, as such, and has remained, or shall 
 remain, imclaimed for the period of six months, 
 such keeper may proceed to sell the same at 
 public auction, and out of the proceeds of such 
 sale, may retain the charges for storage, if any, 
 and the expense of advertising and sale thereof; 
 but no such sale shall be made until the expi- 
 
 Sale of bag- 
 g a g e by 
 boarding and 
 lodging-house 
 keepers. 
 
 [415] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 ration of four weeks from the first publication 
 of notice of sucli sale in a newspaper published 
 in or nearest the city, town, or place in which 
 said hotel, inn, boarding or lodging house is 
 situated. Said notice shall be published once 
 a week, for four successive weeks, in some news- 
 paper, daily or weekly, of general circulation, 
 and shall contain a description of each trunk, 
 carpetbag,, valise, box, bundle, or other bag- 
 gage, as near as may be; the name of the owner, 
 if known; the name of said keeper and time and 
 place of sale; and the expenses incurred for ad- 
 vertising shall be a lien upon such trimk, carpet- 
 bag, vahse, box, bundle, or other baggage, in 
 a ratable proportion, according to the value of 
 such piece of property, or thing, or article sold; 
 and in case any balance arising from such sale 
 shall not be claimed by the rightful owner within 
 one week from the day of said sale, the same 
 shall be paid into the treasury of the county in 
 which such sale took place; and if the same be 
 not claimed by the owner thereof, or his legal 
 representatives, within one year thereafter, the 
 same shall be paid into the general fimd of said 
 county {Ibid., §2503). 
 
 §6. 
 
 Whenever the proprietor or proprietors of any 
 hotel or inn shall provide a safe or other secure 
 How exempt- place of deposit therein for the safe-keeping of 
 b'lit ™™ *' ^"^^ money, jewels, ornaments or other articles 
 of value, belonging to any guest or guests of 
 such hotel or inn, and shall cause to be posted 
 and maintained printed notices thereof in the 
 office or pubhc room, and within every guest's 
 
 [416] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 room of such inn or hotel, the proprietor or pro- 
 prietors thereof shall not be Uable to any such 
 guest or guests who shall neglect to deliver 
 their money, jewels, ornaments, or other articles 
 of value to the proprietor or other person in 
 charge of such safe or place of deposit for de- 
 posit and safe-keeping therein for any loss of 
 such money or other articles which may be sus- 
 tained by such guest by theft or otherwise {Ibid., 
 §2504). 
 
 §7. 
 
 No iimkeeper shall be liable for the loss or 
 destruction by fire of the property received by 
 him from a guest, stored or being, with the 
 knowledge of such, in a barn or other out- 
 building, where it shall appear that such loss 
 or destruction is the work of an incendiary, and 
 occurred without the fault or negUgence of such 
 innkeeper or his servants {Ibid., §2508). 
 
 §8. 
 
 All inn or hotel keepers contemplated in this 
 act, shall be liable for the loss of, or damage to, 
 any baggage or other property of the guests of 
 any hotel or inn by fire, in every case where such 
 is the result of the negligence of the keeper, or 
 his servants {Ibid., § 2509). 
 
 §9 
 
 No hotel or innkeeper shall be hable to any 
 guest for the loss of wearing apparel, goods or 
 personal effects where it shall appear that such 
 loss occurred without the fault or negligence of 
 such hotel keeper or his employees {Ibid., 
 §2510). 
 27 
 
 Limitation of 
 innkeeper's 
 liability. 
 
 Liable for 
 negligence. 
 
 Not liable 
 •without neg- 
 ligence. 
 
 [417] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 §10. 
 
 Every hotel or innkeeper in this State shall 
 have a lien upon the baggage and other valu- 
 Lien of inn- ables and personal property of their guests, 
 eeper. brought into such hotel or inn, for the proper 
 
 charges due from such guests to such hotel or 
 innkeeper, for board, lodging, and such extras 
 as may be furnished to them at their request, 
 and such hotel or innkeeper shall be entitled to 
 hold and maintain possession of such baggage 
 and personal property until such sums so due 
 from such guests shall have been fully paid, and 
 the right to such possession shall be maintained 
 against such guest, his heir, his executors, ad- 
 ministrators, creditors or assigns {Ibid., §2511). 
 
 §11. 
 
 Any hotel or innkeeper who shall have a hen 
 upon any of the goods, baggage or other chattel 
 Enforcement property of his guests may, at the expiration of 
 of lien. gj^ months from the date of the departure of 
 
 such guest from such hotel or inn, sell and dis- 
 pose of the same at pubUc auction and to the 
 highest bidder for cash, or so much thereof as 
 may be necessary to pay the smn due such hotel 
 or innkeeper, together with the cost of storage, 
 advertisement and sale (Ibid., § 2512). 
 
 §12. 
 
 Before proceeding to the sale of the property 
 of any guest, as provided in § 2512 of this act. 
 Notice of sale, such hotel or innkeeper shall cause a notice of 
 such sale, containing a description of the prop- 
 erty to be sold, and the time and place where 
 •such property will be sold, to be pubUshed once 
 [418] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 each week for two successive weeks in a news- 
 paper published in the city or town in which 
 such hotel or inn is situated; but if there be 
 none, then in some newspaper pubhshed nearest 
 such town or city, and in case any balance aris- 
 ing from such sale shall not be claimed by the 
 rightful owner within thirty days from the day 
 of such sale, the same shall be paid into the 
 treasury of the county in which such sale took 
 place; and if such balance be not claimed by 
 the owner thereof, or his legal representatives, 
 within one yeair thereafter, the same shall be 
 paid into the school fimd of such county {Ibid., 
 § 2513). 
 
 §13. 
 
 Any person who shall put up at any inn or 
 hotel, and who shall (except where credit is 
 given by express agreement) procure any food, Defrauding 
 entertainment, or accommodation without pay- i"*" ^^per, 
 ing therefor, and with intent to cheat and de- 
 fraud the owner or keeper thereof out of his pay 
 for the same, or who, with intent to cheat and 
 defraud such owner or keeper out of the pay 
 thereof, shall obtain credit at any hotel or inn 
 for such food, entertainment, or accommodation 
 by means of any false show of baggage or effects 
 brought thereto, or shall with such intent re- 
 move, or cause to be removed, any baggage or 
 effects from any hotel or inn, where there is a 
 hen existing thereon for the proper charges due 
 from such guest for fare and board furnished 
 therein, shall be deemed guilty of a misde- 
 meanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be 
 punished by imprisonment not exceeding three 
 
 [419] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 months, or by a fine not exceeding one hundred 
 dollars, and costs, or both such fine and im- 
 prisoiunent (Ibid., §2514). 
 
 Unlawful to 
 compel em- 
 ployee to 
 board at com- 
 pany board- 
 ing house. 
 
 §14. 
 
 It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, com- 
 pany or corporation now operating, or who shall 
 hereafter operate a boarding house in connection 
 with their general business, either directly or 
 through others, to compel an employee to board 
 in such boarding house against his will (Laws 
 of 1903, chap. 102, § 1). 
 
 §15. 
 
 Any person, firm, company or corporation 
 
 Penalty. violating any of the provisions of this act, shall 
 
 be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon 
 
 conviction thereof shall be fined not less than 
 
 one hundred dollars (Ibid., § 2). 
 
 [420] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 XXV. 
 
 NEBRASKA. 
 
 Compiled Statutes of 1899. 
 
 §1- 
 
 That hereafter every landlord or keeper of a 
 public inn or hotel in this State, who shall con- 
 stantly have in his inn or hotel an iron safe in 
 good order, and suitable for the safe custody 
 of money, jewehy, or other valuable articles 
 belonging to his guests or customers, shall keep 
 posted conspicuously at the ofSce and in other 
 pubUc rooms or halls of his inn or hotel, notices 
 to his guests or customers, that they must leave 
 their money, jewelry, and other valuables with 
 the landlord, his agents or clerk, for the safe- 
 keeping, that he may make safe deposits of the 
 same in the place provided for that purpose 
 (Laws of 1905, chap. 81, § 1). 
 
 D e p si t 
 valuables. 
 
 of 
 
 §2. 
 
 That such landlord, hotel or innkeeper as 
 shall comply with the requirements of the first 
 section of this act, shall not be Uable for any Liability, 
 money, jewelry or other valuables of gold or 
 silver or rare or precious stones that may be 
 lost, if the same is not deUvered to said land- 
 lord, hotel or innkeeper, his agent or clerk, for 
 
 [421] 
 
innkeeper. 
 
 Appendix. 
 
 deposit unless such loss shall occur by the hand, 
 or through the negUgence of the landlord or by 
 a clerk or servant employed by him in such 
 hotel or inn: Provided, that nothing herein con- 
 tained shall apply to such amount of money and 
 valuables as is usual, common and prudent for 
 any such guest to retain in his room or about 
 his person {Ibid., §2).^ 
 
 §3. 
 
 Any person who shall put up at any hotel or 
 inn, restaurant, boarding or lodging house, and 
 Defrauding shall procure any food, entertainment or 
 accommodation, without paying therefor, ex- 
 cept where credit is given by express agreement, 
 with intent to cheat or defraud the owner, or 
 keeper thereof, out of the pay for the same; or 
 who with intent to cheat or defraud such owner, 
 or keeper out of the pay therefor, shall obtain 
 credit at any hotel, inn, restaurant, boarding 
 or lodging house, for such food, entertainment 
 or accommodation, by means of any false show 
 of baggage or effects brought thereto; or who 
 shall with such intent remove, or cause to be 
 removed, any baggage or effects from any hotel, 
 inn, restaurant, boarding or lodging house, while 
 there is a hen existing thereon for the proper 
 charges due from him for fare and board fur- 
 nished therein, shall be punished by imprison- 
 ment not exceeding three months, or by a fine 
 not exceeding one hundred dollars {Ibid., §3). 
 
 1 An innkeeper who does not provide a sufficient safe 
 continues liable as at common law. Dunbier v. Day, 
 12 Neb. 596, 12 N. W. 109, 41 Am. Rep. 772 (1882). 
 
 [422] 
 
Appbndix. 
 
 §4. 
 Whenever any personal property shall be con- 
 signed to, or deposited with, any forwarding 
 merchant, wharf keeper, warehouse keeper. Description 
 tavern keeper, or the keeper of any depot for ** property. 
 the reception and storage of trunks, baggage, 
 and other personal property, such consignee or 
 bailee shall immediately cause to be entered in 
 a book to be provided and kept by him for that 
 purpose, a description of such property, with 
 the date of the reception thereof (Comp. Stat., 
 § 5344). 
 
 §5. 
 
 If such property shall not have been left with 
 such consignee or bailee for the purpose of being 
 forwarded or otherwise disposed of, according 
 to directions received by such consignee or 
 bailee, at or before the time of the reception 
 thereof, and the name and residence of the 
 owner of such property be known or ascer- 
 tained, the person having such property in his 
 custody shall immediately notify such owner, 
 by letter to be directed to him and deposited 
 in a post office to be transmitted by mail, of 
 the reception of such property {Ibid., § 5345). 
 
 Owner. 
 
 §6. 
 
 In case any such property shall remain un- Unclaimed 
 claimed for three months after its reception as Property sale, 
 aforesaid, the person having possession thereof 
 shall cause a notice to be published once in each 
 week for four successive weeks, ia a newspaper 
 published in the same county, if there be one, 
 and if not, then in some paper published at the 
 
 [423] 
 
before jus- 
 tice 
 
 Appendix. 
 
 seat of government, describing such property, 
 and specifying the time when it was received, 
 and stating that unless such property shall be 
 claimed within three months from the first pub- 
 lication of such notice, and the lawful charges 
 thereon paid, the same will be sold according 
 to the statute in such case made and provided 
 {Ibid., §5346). 
 
 §7. 
 
 In case the owner or person entitled to such 
 property shall not, within three months after 
 Proceedings the pubhcation of such notice, claim such prop- 
 erty and pay the lawful charges thereon, includ- 
 ing the expenses of such publication, the person 
 having possession of the property, his agent, or 
 attorney, may make and dehver to any justice 
 of the peace, of the same county, an affidavit, 
 setting forth a description of the property re- 
 maining unclaimed, the time of its reception, 
 the pubhcation of the notice, and whether the 
 owner of such property is known or unknown 
 {Ibid., §5347). 
 
 §8. 
 
 Upon the delivery to him of such affidavit, 
 the justice shaU cause such property to be 
 Inventory. opened and examined in his presence, and a 
 true inventory thereof to be made, and shall 
 make and annex to such inventory an order 
 under his hand that the property therein de- 
 scribed be sold by the sheriff of the county 
 where the same shall be, at pubhc auction, upon 
 due notice {Ibid., §5348). 
 [424] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 §9. 
 
 It shall be the duty of the sheriff receiving 
 such inventory and order, to give ten days' 
 notice of the sale by posting up written notices 
 thereof in three public places in the county or 
 city, and to sell such property at public auction 
 for the highest price he can obtain therefor 
 {IbU., §5349). 
 
 §10. 
 
 Upon completing the sale, the sheriff making 
 the same shall endorse upon the order aforesaid 
 a return of his proceedings upon such order, 
 and the proceeds of the sale after deducting his 
 fees, which shall be the same as upon an exe- 
 cution {Ibid., § 5350). 
 
 Notice. 
 
 SherifE's 
 turn. 
 
 re- 
 
 §11- 
 
 From the proceeds of such sale the justice 
 shall pay the charges and expenses legally in- 
 curred in respect to such property, or a ratable 
 proportion to each claimant if there be not suf- 
 ficient to pay the whole; and such justice shall 
 ascertain and determine the amount of such 
 charges in a summary manner, and shall be 
 entitled to three dollars for each day's services 
 rendered by him in such proceeding {Ibid., 
 § 5351). 
 
 §12. 
 
 Such justice shall deliver to the treasurer of 
 the county in which the property was sold, the 
 affidavit, inventory, and order of sale and re- 
 turn hereinbefore mentioned, together with a 
 statement of the charges and expenses incurred 
 
 Expenses. 
 
 Avails — dis- 
 position. 
 
 [425] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 in respect to such property as ascertained and 
 paid by him, with a statement of his own fees, 
 and shall at the same time pay over to such 
 treasurer any balance of the proceeds of the 
 sale remaining after payment of such charges, 
 expenses, and fees {Ihid., § 5352). 
 
 Duties of 
 treasurer. 
 
 §13. 
 
 The treasurer shall file in his office, and safely 
 keep all the papers so dehvered to him, and 
 make a proper entry of the pajonent to him of 
 any moneys arising from such sale, in the books 
 of his office {Md., § 5353). 
 
 Money paid 
 to owner. 
 
 §14. 
 
 If the owner of the property sold, or his legal 
 representatives, shall, at any time within five 
 years after such moneys shall have been depos- 
 ited in the county treasury, furnish satisfactory 
 evidence of the ownership of such property, he 
 or they shall be entitled to receive from such 
 treasurer the amount deposited with him {Ihid., 
 § 5354). 
 
 Money paid to 
 school fund. 
 
 §15. 
 
 If the amount so deposited with any county 
 treasurer shall not be paid to such owner, or 
 his legal representatives, within the said five 
 years, such county treasurer shall pay such 
 amount into the school fund of the proper 
 county, to be appropriated for the support of 
 schools {IhU., § 5355). 
 
 [426] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 XXVI. 
 NEVADA. 
 
 General Statutes of 1885. 
 
 §1- 
 
 Whenever any person shall leave a hotel or Proprietor 
 lodging house, indebted to the proprietor or ™*y ^^^ ^^- 
 proprietors thereof, and shall remain absent for ^*^®" 
 the period of six months, it shall be lawful for 
 such proprietor or proprietors to sell, or cause 
 to be sold, at public auction, any baggage or 
 property of such person so indebted, or so much 
 thereof as may be necessary to pay such in- 
 debtedness, expenses and charges of sale, which 
 may have been left at such hotel or lodging 
 house by such person (Gen. Stat., § 4960). 
 
 §2. 
 
 All baggage or property, of whatever descrip- 
 tion, left ^at a hotel or lodging house for the 
 period of twelve months, may be sold at public Proceeds, how 
 auction by the proprietor or proprietors thereof, 
 and the proceeds arising from such sale, after 
 deducting the expenses and charges of sale and 
 storage, shall be paid over to the cotmty treas- 
 urer of the county in which such baggage or 
 property is left, to be held by him for the period 
 of six months for the benefit of the owner 
 
 [427] 
 
 disposed of. 
 
Appendix. 
 
 thereof, at which time, if the same is not paid 
 to the owner, or some person legally entitled 
 to the same, it shall be transferred to the school 
 fund of the county (Ibid., §4961). 
 
 Sale s, how 
 made. 
 
 §3. 
 
 All sales made xmder the preceding sections 
 of this act shall be made by a Hcensed auction- 
 eer, or by some constable of the township in 
 which such baggage or property may be left; 
 Provided, that no sale shall be vahd unless a 
 notice of such sale shall be posted up in three 
 public places in such township for the period of 
 twenty days immediately preceding the day of 
 sale, giving a particular description of the prop- 
 erty to be sold, the time and place of such sale, 
 the name of the hotel or lodging house at which 
 such baggage or property may be left, the names 
 of the owner or owners of such baggage or prop- 
 erty, when known, and signed by such auc- 
 tioneer or constable {Ibid., § 4962). 
 
 Baggage here- 
 tofore left 
 may be sold. 
 
 §4. 
 
 It shall be lawful for the proprietor or pro- 
 prietors of any hotel or lodging house, at which 
 any baggage or property may have heretofore 
 been left, to cause the same to be sold under 
 the provisions of this act; provided, that for 
 the purposes of such sale, such baggage or prop- 
 erty shall be considered as left at such hotel or 
 lodging house at the date of the passage of this 
 act (Ibid., §4963). 
 
 [428] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 XXVII. 
 
 NEW HAMPSHIRE. 
 
 Public Statutes of 1901. 
 
 §1- 
 
 No hotel keeper shall be liable for losses sus- 
 tained by his guest, except for wearing apparel, 
 articles worn or carried upon the person to a 
 reasonable amount, personal baggage, and 
 money necessary for travelling expenses and 
 personal use, unless upon delivery or offer of 
 deUvery by such guest of his money, jewelry, 
 or other property to such hotel keeper, his 
 agent or servants, for safe custody: Provided, 
 that a copy of this chapter is posted in the 
 office of the hotel, and in the room of the guest 
 (Pub. Stat., chap. 129, § 1). 
 
 Liability of 
 hotel keeper, 
 how limited. 
 
 §2. 
 
 Any person keeping a boarder, not a mariner 
 or seaman, shall have a lien upon the baggage 
 and effects of such boarder brought to his 
 boarding house until all proper charges for the 
 fare and board of such boarder are paid or 
 tendered {Ibid., chap. 141, § 1).* 
 
 1 This lien does not cover a charge for keeping a horse. 
 Cross V. Wilkins, 43 N. H. 332 (1861). 
 
 Liens of per- 
 sons keeping 
 boarders. 
 
 [429] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 Lien holder 
 may sell prop- 
 erty. 
 
 §3. 
 
 Any person having a lien on personal prop- 
 erty, by pledge or otherwise, where no time 
 is limited for the payment of the debt or re- 
 demption of the property, may sell the same 
 or so much thereof as is needful, at auction, 
 notice of the sale being given as herein re- 
 quired, and from the proceeds he may reim- 
 burse himself for his debt and the expenses 
 incident to the sale (Ibid., § 3). 
 
 Notice of sale, 
 how pub- 
 lished. 
 
 §4. 
 
 Notice of such sale shall be given by posting 
 notices thereof in two or more public places in 
 the town where the property is situate, fourteen 
 days at least before the sale, and if the value 
 of the property exceeds one hundred dollars, by 
 publishing the notice {Ibid., § 5). 
 
 Notice to gen- 
 eral owner. 
 
 §5. 
 
 A notice of the sale shall be served upon the 
 pledgor or general owner, if resident in the 
 county, the same number of days before the 
 sale, stating in writing the time and place of 
 sale, the property to be sold, and the amount 
 of the lien thereon {Ibid., §6). 
 
 Balance to be 
 paid. 
 
 [430] 
 
 §6. 
 
 The balance of the proceeds of sale, if any, 
 after payment of the amoimt of the lien or 
 pledge, and the reasonable expenses incident to 
 the sale, shall be paid to the pledgor, general 
 owner, or person entitled thereto, on demand 
 {Ibid., §7). 
 
Appendix. 
 
 §7. 
 
 The holder of the hen shall cause a copy of 
 such notices and an affidavit of service, with 
 an account of the sale and of the fees and 
 charges thereon, to be recorded in the books 
 of the town where the sale takes place. A 
 certified copy of the record may be used in 
 evidence {Ibid., §8). 
 
 Notices and 
 account of 
 sale recorded. 
 
 §8. 
 
 If any person with intent to cheat or de- 
 fraud the owner or keeper of a hotel, inn, or 
 boarding house, shall procure therein any food, 
 entertainment, or accommodation without pay- 
 ing for it, or shall obtain credit therefor by a 
 false show of baggage or effects brought thereto, 
 or shall remove or cause to be removed from 
 such hotel, inn, or boarding house any baggage 
 or effects while there is a lien upon it for the 
 proper charges due from him for fare and 
 board furnished to him therein at his request, 
 he shall be fined not exceeding twenty dollars, 
 or be imprisoned not exceeding three months 
 {Ibid., chap. 273, § 7). 
 
 Penalty for 
 defrauding 
 keepers of 
 hotels, inns, 
 and boarding 
 houses. 
 
 [431] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 XXVIII. 
 
 NEW JERSEY. 
 
 General Statutes op 1895. 
 
 H o t el, inn 
 and boarding- 
 house keepers 
 to have a lien 
 on all baggage 
 and property 
 of boarders. 
 
 [432] 
 
 All hotel, inn, and boarding-house keepers 
 shall have a lien on all baggage and property- 
 belonging to boarders and lodgers at said hotel, 
 inn, or boarding house, for the amount of their 
 bill or bills due to the proprietor thereof for 
 the hire of rooms or board in said hotel, inn, or 
 boarding house, and shall have the right, with- 
 out the process of law, to retain the same untU 
 the said amount of indebtedness is discharged, 
 and all parties engaging rooms or board in said 
 hotel, inn, or boarding house may be summa- 
 rarily ejected by the proprietor thereof from said 
 premises, upon the aforesaid proprietor giving 
 to said parties so indebted a written notice of 
 three days of the amount of said indebtedness, 
 and their demand for the same, unless said 
 parties shall have entered into any agreement 
 with said hotel, inn, or boarding-house keepers 
 for the mode and manner of payment for 
 room or board other than those announced by 
 notice in said hotel, inn, or boarding house 
 (Gen. Stats., p. 1967, § 48). ^ 
 
 1 A boarding-house keeper has not a lien under this sec- 
 tion on the separate property of a married woman board- 
 
Appendix. 
 
 §2. 
 
 All baggage and property so held by said 
 hotel, inn and boarding-house keeper shall, af- 
 ter the expiration of six months from the date 
 of such detention, be sold at public auction, 
 upon a notice published for three days in a 
 public newspaper pubUshed in the city or town 
 where said hotel, inn, or boarding house shall 
 be kept, and the proceeds thereof shall be ap- 
 plied to the payment of such lien and the ex- 
 penses of such sale, and the balance, if any 
 remaining, shall be paid over to the owner of 
 such property or his representatives; and if said 
 balance is not claimed by such owners within 
 thirty days, then the said balance to be paid 
 over to the overseer of the poorhouse of said 
 city or town for the support of the poor {Ibid., 
 §49). 
 
 §8. 
 
 Whenever the proprietor or proprietors of any 
 hotel, inn, or boarding house shall provide a 
 safe in the office of such hotel, inn, or boarding 
 house, or other convenient place, for the safe- 
 keeping of any money, jewels, or ornaments 
 belonging to the guests or boarders thereof, 
 by posting a notice stating the fact that such 
 safe is provided, in which such money, jewels, 
 or ornaments may be deposited, in the room 
 or rooms occupied by such guest or boarder, 
 in a conspicuous manner, and if such guest or 
 boarder shall neglect to deposit such money, 
 
 ing at the house and living apart from her husband, if the 
 husband has engaged, and by express agreement promised 
 to pay, her board. Baker v. Stratton, 52 N. J. Law, 277, 
 19 AtJ. 661 (1890). 
 28 
 
 Baggage and 
 property may 
 be sold for 
 payment of 
 bUls. 
 
 Proprietors of 
 hotels, etc., 
 not responsi- 
 ble if money 
 and jewels 
 not deposited 
 in safe. 
 
 [433] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 jewels, or ornaments in such safe, the proprietor 
 or proprietors of such hotel, inn, or boarding 
 house shall not be liable for any loss of such 
 money, jewels, or ornaments, sustained by such 
 guest or boarder, by theft or otherwise (Ibid., 
 §50). 
 
 Notice of sale 
 may be pub- 
 lished in 
 newspaper in 
 county. 
 
 §4. 
 
 That in cases where no newspapers shall be 
 published in any city, town^ or township where 
 any hotel, irm, or boarding house shall be kept, 
 the sale provided for in the second section of 
 the act to which this is a supplement may be 
 made upon a notice pubhshed for three days in 
 a public newspaper published in the county where 
 such hotel, inn, or boarding house shall be kept, 
 and circulating in the neighborhood thereof 
 (Ibid., §51). 
 
 Defrauding 
 landlord a 
 misdemeanor. 
 
 §5. 
 
 Any person who obtains any lodging, food, 
 or accommodation at any restaurant, inn, hotel, 
 boarding house or lodging house without paying 
 therefor, with intent to defraud the proprietor 
 or the manager thereof, or who obtains credit 
 at such restaurant, inn, hotel, boarding house 
 or lodging house by the use of any false pre- 
 tence, or who, after obtaining credit or accom- 
 modations at such restaurant, inn, hotel, board- 
 ing or lodging house, absconds or surreptitiously 
 removes his or her baggage therefrom without 
 first paying for his, her or their food, accommo- 
 dations or lodging, is guilty of a misdemeanor 
 (Laws of 1905, chap. 127, p. 241). 
 
 [434] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 XXIX. 
 
 NEW MEXICO. 
 Compiled Laws of 1897. 
 
 §1. 
 
 Any person who shall put up at any hotel, Fraud; on 
 and who shall procure any food, entertainment innkeepers; 
 or accommodation without paying therefor and ^^^ ^' 
 with the intent to cheat or defraud the owner 
 or keeper thereof out of pay for the same, or 
 who with intent to cheat or defraud such owner 
 or keeper out of pay therefor, or shall obtain 
 credit at any hotel or inn for such food, enter- 
 taimnent Or accommodation, by means of any 
 false show of baggage or effects brought thereto, 
 or who shall with such intent, remove or cause 
 to be removed any baggage or effects from any 
 hotel, inn, or boarding house, while there is a 
 lien existing thereon for the proper charges due 
 from him or her for fare and board furnished 
 therein, shall be pimished by imprisonment not 
 exceeding three months in the county jail, or 
 by fine not exceeding one hundred dollars, or 
 both at the discretion of the court (Comp. Laws, 
 § 1375). 
 
 §2. 
 It shall be the duty of all innholders to post Oopj to be 
 up a printed copy of this act in a conspicuous ^"^ * ' 
 
 [435] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 place in each room of their hotel or inn (Ibid., 
 § 1376). 
 
 Liens; inn- 
 keepers and 
 livery k e e p- 
 ers. 
 
 §3. 
 
 Innkeepers and livery-stable keepers, and 
 those who board others for pay, or furnish feed 
 or shelter for the property and stock of others, 
 shall have a lien on the property and stock of 
 such guest or guests, or of those to whom feed 
 or shelter has been furnished while the same is 
 in their possession, and until the same is paid 
 (Ibid., §2239). 
 
 Lien; proce- 
 dure to en- 
 force. 
 
 §4. 
 
 In order to enforce said lien, those who are 
 entitled to the same, as provided by this act, 
 may, after the debt for which the lien is claimed 
 becomes due and payable, serve the party or 
 parties against whom the lien is sought to be 
 enforced, with a written notice, setting forth 
 the amount of the indebtedness, upon what ac- 
 count or cause the same accrued, and that if 
 the same is not paid within ten days after the 
 service of said notice, the property will be ad- 
 vertised and sold to satisfy said indebtedness 
 (Ibid., §2240). 
 
 Property; ad- 
 vertising and 
 sale. 
 
 [436] 
 
 §5. 
 
 If default be made in the payment of the 
 debt, after notice, as provided in section two 
 thousand two hundred and forty, then it shall 
 be lawful for the lien claimant or creditor, as 
 herein provided, to advertise and sell such prop- 
 erty at public auction to the highest bidder for 
 cash after giving twenty days' notice of such 
 
Appendix. 
 
 sale by at least six handbills posted up in pub- 
 lic places in the county in which such sale is 
 to be made; such notices of sale shall set forth 
 the time and place of sale and a description of 
 the property to be sold (Ibid., §2241). 
 
 §6. 
 
 After sale made as provided in section two 
 thousand two hundred and forty-one, the pro- 
 ceeds of such sale shall be applied to the pay- 
 ment of the costs of advertising and making 
 the sale and the satisfaction of the demand of 
 the lien claimant, and the residue, if any, shall 
 be refunded to the lien debtor: Provided, That 
 the lien claimant shall not be precluded from 
 bidding on or purchasing the property of such 
 sale. 
 
 Proceeds, how 
 applied; lien 
 claimant may 
 purchase. 
 
 §7. 
 
 Landlords and common carriers may proceed 
 in the enforcement of liens now allowed them 
 by law in the manner prescribed in the three 
 sections preceding (Ibid., § 2243). 
 
 [437? 
 
Appendix, 
 
 XXX. 
 
 NEW YORK. 
 
 Birdsbye's Revised Statutes, Codes, and General 
 Laws, 1901. 
 
 Liability for 
 loss by fire. 
 
 Value of an- 
 imal de- 
 stroyed. 
 
 [438] 
 
 §1- 
 
 No innkeeper shall be liable for the loss or 
 destruction by fire of property received by him 
 from a guest, stored or being with the knowl- 
 edge of such a guest in a barn or other out- 
 building, where it shall appear that such loss or 
 destruction was the work of an incendiary and 
 occurred without the fault or negligence of such 
 innkeeper (Rev. Stat., etc., p. 1744, § 1).* 
 
 §2- 
 
 No animal belonging to a guest and destroyed 
 by fire while on the premises of any innkeeper, 
 shall be deemed of greater value than three 
 hundred dollars, unless an agreement shall be 
 proved between such guest and innkeeper that 
 a higher estimate shall be made of the same 
 {Ibid., §2). 
 
 iThe negligence intended in the words, "without the 
 fault or negligence of such innkeeper," is that which pre- 
 cedes, induces, or facilitates the fire, and not negligence 
 afterwards. Faucett v. Nichols, 4 Thomp. & C. 597 (1874). 
 
 The burden is on the innkeeper to show that the loss 
 happened without the fault or negligence of the innkeeper. 
 Faucett v. Nichols, 64 N. Y. 377 (1876). 
 
Appe^tdix. 
 
 §3. 
 
 Whenever the proprietor or manager of any 
 hotel, inn or steamboat shall provide a safe in 
 the office of such hotel or steamboat, or other Liability for 
 convenient place for the safe-keeping of any ^°" "*. ^^^' 
 money, jewels or ornaments belonging to the posit; safe. 
 guests of or travellers in such hotel, inn or 
 steamboat, and shall notify the guests or trav- 
 ellers thereof by posting a notice stating the 
 fact that such safe is provided, in which such 
 money, jewels, or ornaments may be deposited, 
 in a pubhc and conspicuous place and manner 
 in the office and public rooms, and in the public 
 parlors of such hotel or inn, or saloon of such 
 steamboat; and if such guest or traveller shall 
 neglect to deliver such money, jewels or orna- 
 ments, to the person in charge of such office 
 for deposit in such safe, the proprietor or man- 
 ager of such hotel or steamboat shall not be 
 liable for any loss of such money, jewels or or- 
 naments, sustained by such guest or traveller 
 by theft or otherwise; but no hotel or steam- 
 boat proprietor, manager or lessee shall be 
 obhged to receive property on deposit for safe- 
 keeping exceeding five hundred dollars in value; 
 and if such guest or traveller shall deliver such 
 money, jewels or ornaments to the person in 
 charge of such office, for deposit in such safe, 
 said proprietor, manager or lessee shall not be 
 liable for any loss thereof, sustained by such 
 guest or traveller by theft or otherwise in any 
 sum exceeding the sum of two hundred and 
 fifty dollars unless by special agreement in writ- 
 ing with such proprietor, manager or lessee 
 (Ibid., §3).^ 
 2 This statute, being in derogation of the common law, 
 
 [439] 
 
etc. 
 
 Appendix. 
 
 §4. 
 
 No hotel keeper shall be liable to any guest 
 Loss of wear- for the loss of wearing apparel, goods or mer- 
 ing apparel, chandise for any sum exceeding the sum of five 
 himdred dollars, where it shall appear that such 
 loss occurred without the fault or negUgence of 
 
 must be strictly construed. Briggs v. Todd, 28 N. Y. 
 Misc. 208, 59 N. Y. Supp. 23 (1899). 
 
 The statutory exemption does not begin until a rea- 
 sonable time after the guest's arrival. Rosenplaenter 
 V. Roessle, 54 N. Y. 262 (1873). And in spite of the 
 provisions of the statute the innkeeper remains liable for 
 valuables stolen from the trunk of a guest after the guest 
 has packed his trunk, locked his room, given notice of 
 his departure, and delivered the key of his room to the 
 clerk to have his trunk brought down. Bendetson v. 
 French, 46 N. Y. 266 (1871). 
 
 Money. — All money comes within the provision of this 
 section, even a reasonable amount for travelling expenses; 
 and the guest keeps such money in his own possession at 
 his own risk. Hyatt v. Taylor, 42 N. Y. 258 (1869), 
 overruling Gile v. Libby, 36 Barb. 70 (1861), and Krohn 
 v. Sweeney, 2 Daly, 200 (1867). 
 
 Jewels and ornaments. — Silver table forks and a silver 
 soup ladle are not jewels and ornaments. Briggs v. Todd, 
 28 N. Y. Misc. 208, 59 N. Y. Supp. 23 (1899). 
 
 Watch. — A watch is not a jewel or ornament, and there- 
 fore need not be deposited with the innlceeper under this 
 section in order to hold the innkeeper responsible for it. 
 Ramaley v. Leland, 43 N. Y. 539, 3 Am. Rep. 728 (1871); 
 Gile V. Libby, 36 Barb. 70 (1861); Krohn v. Sweeney, 
 2 Daly, 200 (1867); Bernstein v. Sweeny, 33 N. Y. Super. 
 Ct. 271 (1871); Becker v. Warner, 90 Hun, 187, 35 N. Y. 
 Supp. 739 (1895). This is true even though the watch 
 is laid itoside the owner's trunk for a short time; it does 
 not therefore become a jewel or ornament. Nor does the 
 fact that a state coat of arms is engraved on the watch, 
 and a picture of the guest's mother is on the inside of the 
 case, convert it into a jewel or an ornament. Briggs v. 
 Todd, 28 N. Y. Misc. 208, 59 N. Y. Supp. 23 (1899). 
 
 Property not included under the description "money, 
 
 jewels and ornaments," including all that which is useful 
 
 or necessary to the comfort and convenience of the guest, 
 
 that which is usually carried and worn as a part of the 
 
 [440] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 such hotel keeper; nor shall be be liable in any 
 sum for the loss of any article or articles of 
 wearing apparel, cane, umbrella, satchel, valise, 
 box, bag, bundle or other chattel belonging to 
 such guest, and not ^-ithin a room assigned to 
 him, unless the same shall be specially intrusted 
 to the care and custody of such hotel keeper 
 or his servants {Ibid., § 4).^ 
 
 ordinary apparel and outfit, or is ordinarily used and is 
 convenient for use by travellers as well in as out of their 
 rooms, is left, as before the statute, at the risk of the 
 innlceeper. Thus a watch is not included. The words 
 of the statute must be taken in their ordinary sense, in 
 the absence of any indication that they were used either 
 in a technical sense or a sense other than that in which 
 they are popularly used. Ramaley v. Leiand, 43 N. Y. 
 539, 3 Am. Rep. 728 (1871). 
 
 Posting notice. The notice must be posted as called 
 for in the act. If it is not so posted the innkeeper con- 
 tinues liable as at common law. Lima v. Dwinelle, 7 
 Alb. L. J. 44 (1873). Printing it at the head of each 
 page of the register is not enough. Ramaley v. Leiand, 
 6 Rob. 358 (1868) ; Kellogg v. Sweeney, 1 Lans. 397 (1869) ; 
 Bernstein v. Sweeny, 33 N. Y. Super. Ct. 271 (1871). If, 
 however, the guest has actual knowledge of the facts 
 contained in the notice, whether by actual information 
 from the innkeeper or by a notice not posted as required 
 by the act, the innkeeper is exempted from liability. 
 Purvis v. Coleman, 21 N. Y. Ill (1860). This actual 
 notice must be unmistakably brought home to the guest. 
 Kellogg V. Sweeney, 1 Lans. 397 (1869); Van Wyck v. 
 Howard, 12 How. Pr. 147 (1856). 
 
 Deposit with the innkeeper. — If the guest fails to make 
 the deposit as required by this section the innkeeper is ex- 
 empt from liability, even if the guest was not negligent. 
 Rosenplaenter v. Roessle, 54N.Y. 262(1873). If, how- 
 ever deposit is waived by the innkeeper he continues 
 liable. Friedman v. Breslin, 169 N. Y. 574, 61 N. E. 1129, 
 affirming S. C, 51 App. Div. 268, 65 N. Y. Supp. 5 (1901.) 
 
 Liability for goods deposited. For goods deposited as 
 provided in this section the innkeeper is liable as at com- 
 mon law. Wilkins v. Earle, 44 N. Y. 172, 4 Am. Rep. 
 655 (1870). 
 
 3 Where an innkeeper provides a row of hooks behind 
 
 [441] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 Registers to 
 be kept by 
 certain hotels, 
 etc. : inspec- 
 tion thereof. 
 
 §5. 
 
 The proprietor or manager of any hotel, tav- 
 ern, inn, boarding or lodging house shall keep 
 a register which shall show the name, residence, 
 date of arrival and departure of their guests, 
 providing such proprietor or manager shall be 
 under a contract with a corporation, associa- 
 tion, partnership or individual by the terms of 
 which such corporation, association, partner- 
 nership or individual is entitled to receive a 
 percentage of the receipts from such business, 
 which register shall be subject to the inspection 
 of any corporation, association, partnership or 
 individual who shall be under a contract with 
 such proprietor or manager by the terms of 
 which such corporation, association, partnership 
 or individual is entitled to receive a percentage 
 of the receipts from such business {Ibid., § 5). 
 
 Innkeepers 
 refusing to re- 
 ceive guest. 
 
 §6. 
 
 A person, who, either on his own account or 
 as agent or officer of a corporation, carries on 
 business as innkeeper, or as common carrier of 
 passengers, and refuses, without just cause or 
 excuse, to receive and entertain any guest, or 
 to receive and carry any passenger, is guilty 
 of a misdemeanor {Ibid., § 6). 
 
 the office desk upon which guests may hang their coats 
 without checks being given therefor, he thereby assumes 
 a duty to care for the same, and is liable for the loss of 
 a coat hung in such place by a guest, in the presence of an 
 employee of the hotel, notwithstanding the provisions of 
 this section. Bradner v. Mullen, 59 N. Y. Supp. 178, 
 27 N. Y. Misc. 479 (1899). 
 
 r442] 
 
Appendix, 
 
 §7. 
 
 A person who obtains any lodging, food or 
 accommodation at an inn, boarding house . or 
 lodging house, except an emigrant lodging house, 
 without paying therefor, with intent to defraud 
 the proprietor or manager thereof, or who ob- 
 tains credit at such an inn, boarding house or 
 lodging house, by the use of any false pretence, 
 or who, after obtaining credit or accommoda- 
 tion at such an inn, boarding house or lodging 
 house, absconds and surreptitiously removes his 
 baggage therefrom without paying for his food, 
 accommodation or lodging, is guilty of mis- 
 demeanor {Ibid., § 7).* 
 
 Frauds on ho- 
 tel keepers. 
 
 §8. 
 
 Every hotel, inn or tavern keeper within this 
 State who shall have any unclaimed article, 
 goods, or thing in his possession for a period 
 of one year, at least, whether a receipt or check 
 for the same may, or may not, have been given 
 to the person or persons who left the same, may 
 proceed to sell the same at public auction and 
 out of the proceeds may retain the expenses of 
 advertising and sale thereof; but no such sale 
 shall be made unless, in case the name and res- 
 idence of the owner shall be known or ascer- 
 tained, notice of such sale be sent to the owner 
 by mail; nor shall any such sale be made imtil 
 the expiration of four weeks from the publica- 
 tion of a notice of such sale in a newspaper 
 published at or nearest the place at which such 
 
 * The crime is not committed unless the fraudulent in- 
 tent exists at the time the board is obtained, and it is 
 obtained by means of the false pretence. People v. 
 Nicholson, 25 N. Y. Misc. 266, 55 N. Y. Supp. 447 (1898). 
 
 Sale of 
 
 claimed 
 
 cles. 
 
 un- 
 arti- 
 
 [443] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 article, goods or thing was left and where such 
 sale is to take place; and said notice shall con- 
 tain a description of such article, goods or thing 
 and the time and place of sale; and the ex- 
 penses incurred for advertising shall be a hen 
 upon such article, goods or thing in a ratable 
 proportion, according to the value of each ar- 
 ticle, package or parcel, if more than one (Ibid., 
 §8). 
 
 §9- 
 
 Such hotel, inn or tavern keeper shall make 
 Disposition an entry of the balance of the proceeds of the 
 of proceeds. gale, if any, of each article, goods or thing left 
 by the same person, as near as the same can be 
 ascertained, and at any time within five years 
 thereafter shall refund any surplus so retained 
 to the owner of such article, goods or thing, 
 his heirs or assigns, on satisfactory proof of 
 such ownership {Ibid., §9). 
 
 Unclaime d 
 proceeds. 
 
 §10. 
 
 In case such balance shall not be claimed by 
 the rightful owner within five years after the 
 sale as above specified then it shall be paid to 
 the county treasurer for the use of the county 
 poor of said county {Ibid., § 10). 
 
 [444] 
 
 §11. 
 
 A keeper of a hotel, apartment hotel,* inn, 
 boarding house ® or lodging house, except an 
 
 5 Apartment hotels were not included in the former 
 act. Shearman v. Iroquois Hotel & A. Co., 42 N. Y. 
 Misc. 217, 85 N. Y. Supp. 365 (1903). 
 
 8 This applies only to houses in which persons are taken 
 to board as a regular business, and not to houses where 
 
Appendix. 
 
 emigrant lodging house, has a lien upon, while Lien, 
 in possession, and may detain the baggage and 
 other property brought upon their premises by 
 a guest, boarder or lodger, for the proper 
 charges due from him, on account of his ac- 
 commodation, board and lodging, and such 
 extras as are furnished at his request. If the 
 keeper of such hotel, apartment hotel, inn, 
 boarding or lodging house knew that the prop- 
 erty brought upon his premises was not, when 
 brought, legally in possession of such guest, 
 boarder or lodger, or had notice that such 
 property was not then the property of such 
 guest, boarder or lodger, a hen thereon does 
 not exist. An apartment hotel within the 
 meaning of this section includes a hotel wherein 
 apartments are rented for fixed periods of time, 
 either furnished or unfurnished, to the occu- 
 pants of which the keeper of such hotel sup- 
 plies food, if required. A guest of an apartment 
 hotel, within the meaning of this section, in- 
 cludes each and every person who is a member 
 of the family of the tenant of an apartment 
 therein, and for whose support such tenant is 
 legally Uable (Laws, 1905, chap. 206).^ 
 
 one or more boarders are kept occasionally only, and on 
 special occasions. Cady v. McDowell, 1 Lans. 484 (1869). 
 
 7 See Barnett v. Walker, 39 N. Y. Misc. 323, 79 N. Y. 
 Supp. 859 (1902). This lien cannot be extended to any 
 charge except for board; for instance, to damages for 
 breach of contract to remain as a boarder. Shafer v. 
 Guest, 6 Rob. 264, 35 How. Pr. 184 (1868). There is no 
 difference in this respect between transient and permanent 
 boarders. Stewart v. McCreedy, 24 How. Pr. 62 (1861). 
 
 The hen does not extend to the goods of a third party, 
 brought to the house by the boarder. Misch v. O'Hara, 
 9 Daly, 361 (1880); Barnett v. Walker, 39 N. Y. Misc. 
 323, 79 N. Y. Supp. 859 (1902). See a different inter- 
 
 [445] 
 
Preservation 
 of life at bath- 
 ing places. 
 
 [446] 
 
 Appendix. 
 
 §12. 
 
 A lodging house shall be taken to mean and 
 include any house or building, or the portion 
 thereof, in which persons are harbored, or re- 
 ceived or lodged for hire for a single night, or 
 less than a week at one time, or any part of 
 which is let to any person to sleep in for any 
 term less than a week (Rev. Stat., p. 446).* 
 
 §13. 
 
 Every keeper or proprietor of a hotel or 
 boarding house, and every other person having 
 for use a bathing house upon any beach or 
 shore of the ocean, for the accommodation of 
 his guests, or of other persons for pay, shall 
 provide for the safety of such bathers two hues 
 of sound, serviceable and strong manilla or 
 hemp rope, not less than one inch in diameter, 
 anchored at some point above high water, at 
 the same distance apart as the'Une of bathing 
 houses, or space fronting on such beach occu- 
 pied by him is in width; and from the two 
 points at which such life lines are so anchored, 
 such line shall be made to extend as far into the 
 surf as bathing is ordinarily safe and free from 
 danger of drowning to persons not expert in 
 
 pretation given to an earlier statute. Jones v. Morrill, 
 52 Barb. 623 (1864). 
 
 So the wife's goods are not held on lien for her own board 
 where the husband is the party responsible for it. Birney 
 V. Wheaton, 5 How. Pr. N. S. 519 (1885); Mcllvane v. 
 Hilton, 7 Hun, 594 (1876). 
 
 8 For special statutes on boarding houses for seamen 
 and emigrants, as to printed schedvile of prices, maximum 
 of lien, requirement of special license, wearing of badges 
 by runners, etc., see Rev. Stat., pp. 1246-1248 (vol. I) 
 and pp. 3210, 3211 (vol.11). 
 
Appendix. 
 
 swimming, and at such points of safety such 
 lines shall be anchored and buoyed. From 
 the two points of such Unes so extended, an- 
 chored and buoyed, a third line shall be ex- 
 tended, connecting the two extremities, and 
 buoyed at such points as to be principally 
 above the surface of the water, thereby enclos- 
 ing a space within such lines and the beach 
 within which bathing is believed to be safe. 
 Every such keeper or proprietor or other such 
 person shall cause to be painted and put up 
 in some prominent place upon the beach, 
 near such bathing houses, the following words: 
 "Bathing beyond the Unes dangerous." Such 
 lines so placed, anchored and buoyed, and such 
 notice so put up, shall continue and be so 
 maintained by every such keeper, proprietor 
 or other person during the entire season of 
 surf bathing. The owner of a bathing house 
 shall not be subject to the provisions of this 
 section where it is used, occupied or maintained 
 by a lessee for hire, but such lessee shall be 
 deemed the keeper or proprietor thereof. Every 
 person violating any provision of this section 
 shall forfeit to the county where the violation 
 occurs the sum of twenty-five dollars for every 
 such violation, and for each day that any such 
 violation is repeated or continued (R. S., 
 p. 2865, § 212). 
 
 §14. 
 
 That all persons within the jurisdiction of 
 this State shall be entitled to the full and equal Equal accom- 
 accommodations, advantages, facilities and priv- modations. 
 ileges of inns, restaurants, hotels, eating houses, 
 bath houses, barber shops, theatres, music halls, 
 
 [447] 
 
Penalties. 
 
 Appendix. 
 
 public conveyances on land and water, and all 
 other places of public accommodation or amuse- 
 ment, subject only to the conditions and lim- 
 itations established by law and applicable alike 
 to all citizens (R. S., p. 3181, §23). 
 
 §15. 
 
 A person who: 
 
 1. Excludes a citizen of this State, by reason 
 of race, color or previous condition of servitude, 
 from the equal enjoyment of any accommoda- 
 tion, facility or privilege furnished by innkeepers 
 or common carriers, or by owners, managers or 
 lessees of theatres or other places of amusement, 
 or by teachers and officers of the common 
 schools and public institutions of learning, or 
 by cemetery associations; or 
 
 2. Denies or aids or incites another to deny 
 to any other person because of race, creed or 
 color, full enjoyment of any of the accommo- 
 dations, advantages, facilities and privileges of 
 any hotel, inn, tavern, restaurant, public con- 
 veyance on land or water, theatre or other 
 place of public resort or amusement, is guilty 
 of a misdemeanor, punishable by fine of not 
 less than fifty dollars or more than five hundred 
 dollars (Penal Code, § 383). 
 
 [448] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 XXXI. 
 
 NORTH CAROLINA. 
 
 §1. 
 
 Every boarding-house keeper who furnishes 
 board or bed or room to any person shall have 
 the right to retain possession of and a hen upon 
 all baggage or other property of such person 
 that may have been brought to such boarding 
 house until all reasonable charges for such room, 
 bed and board are paid (Laws of 1899, chap. 
 645, § 1). 
 
 §2. 
 
 That if such charges are not paid within ten 
 days after they become due then said boarding- 
 house keeper is authorized to sell said baggage 
 or other property at the courthouse door, after 
 first advertising such sale for ten days at said 
 courthouse door, and three (3) other public 
 places in the county, and out of the proceeds 
 of sale to pay the costs and expenses of sale 
 and all costs and charges due for said board, 
 bed or room, and the surplus, if any, pay to 
 the owner of said baggage or other property 
 {Ibid., §2). 
 
 §3. 
 
 That written notice of such sale shaU be 
 served on the owner of such baggage or other 
 29 
 
 B arding- 
 house keepers 
 shall have 
 lien on bag- 
 gage. 
 
 When charges 
 not paid prop- 
 erty may be 
 sold. 
 
 [449] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 Written no- 
 tice of sale 
 shall be 
 served on 
 owner of prop- 
 erty. 
 
 property ten days before such sale, if such 
 owner be a resident of the State, but if such 
 owner be a non-resident of the State, or if his 
 residence be unknown, the publication of such 
 notice ten days at the courthouse door and 
 three (3) other pubhc places in the county 
 shall be sufficient service of the same {Ibid., § 3). 
 
 Innkeeper re- 
 quired to pro- 
 vide suitable 
 accommoda- 
 tions for 
 guests. 
 
 §4. 
 
 Every innkeeper shall at all times provide 
 suitable food, rooms, beds and bedding for 
 strangers and travellers whom he may accept 
 as guests in his inn or hotel (Laws of 1903, 
 chap. 563, § 1). 
 
 When inn- 
 keeper liable 
 for loss. 
 
 Where value 
 of property 
 over $100. 
 
 [450] 
 
 §5. 
 
 Innkeepers shall not be liable for loss, dam- 
 age or destruction of the baggage or property 
 of their guests except in case such loss, dam- 
 age or destruction results from the failure of 
 the innkeeper to exercise ordinary, proper and 
 reasonable care in the custody of such baggage 
 and property, and in case of such loss, damage 
 or destruction resulting from the neghgence and 
 want of care of the said innkeeper he shall be 
 liable to the owner of the said baggage and 
 property to an amount not exceeding one hun- 
 dred dollars: Provided, however, any guest may 
 at any time before a loss, damage or destruc- 
 tion of his property notify the innkeeper in 
 writing that his property exceeds in value the 
 said sum of one hundred dollars, and shall upon 
 demand of the innkeeper furnish him a list or 
 schedule of the same, with the value thereof, 
 in which case the innkeeper shall be Uable for 
 
Appendix. 
 
 the loss, damage or destruction of said prop- 
 erty because of any negligence on his part for 
 the full value of the same: Provided further, 
 that proof of the loss of any such baggage, 
 except in case of damage or destruction by fire, 
 shall be prima facie evidence of the neghgence 
 of said hotel or innkeeper {Ibid., §2). 
 
 Proof of loss 
 prima facie 
 evidence of 
 innkeeper's 
 negligence in 
 case of fire. 
 
 §6. 
 
 It shall be the duty of innkeepers, upon the 
 request of any guest, to receive from said guest 
 and safely keep money, jewelry and valuables 
 to an amount not exceeding five hundred dol- 
 lars; and no innkeeper shall be required to re- 
 ceive and take care of any money, jewelry or 
 other valuables to a greater amount than five 
 hundred dollars: Provided, the receipt given 
 by said iimkeeper to said guest shall have plainly 
 printed upon it this section of this act. No 
 innkeeper shall be Hable for the loss, damage 
 or destruction of any money or jewels not so 
 deposited (Ibid., § 3). 
 
 Safe-keeping 
 of money or 
 valuables on 
 request. 
 
 M a X imum 
 amount. 
 
 Form of re- 
 ceipt. 
 
 Innkeeper 
 not liable for 
 loss, etc., 
 when not de- 
 posited. 
 
 §7. 
 
 No innkeeper shall be liable for loss, damage 
 or destruction of any baggage or property 
 caused by fire not resulting from the negligence 
 of the innkeeper or by any other force over 
 which the innkeeper had no control: Provided, 
 that nothing herein contained shall enlarge the 
 limit of the amount to which the innkeeper 
 shall be hable as provided in the preceding 
 sections of his act (Ibid., § 4). 
 
 Loss by fire, 
 not result of 
 negligence, 
 innkeeper not 
 liable. 
 
 Proviso as to 
 amount of lia- 
 bility. 
 
 [451] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 Printed copy 
 of act and 
 other regfula- 
 tions to be 
 posted in each 
 room. 
 
 Failure, not 
 entitled to 
 provisions of 
 act. 
 
 Not appli- 
 cable when 
 innkeepe r 
 fails to com- 
 ply with sec- 
 tion 5. 
 
 Right of inn- 
 keeper to 
 show that 
 loss occurred 
 from negli- 
 gence of 
 guest, etc. 
 
 §8. 
 
 Every innkeeper shall keep posted in every 
 room of his house occupied by guests, and in 
 the office, a printed copy of this act and of all 
 regulations relating to the conduct of guests; 
 and in case of failure to do so he shall not be 
 entitled to take advantage of any of the pro- 
 visions of this act {Ibid., § 5). 
 
 §9. 
 
 This act shall not apply to innkeepers or 
 their guests when the innkeeper shall not comply 
 with the provisions of section five of this act 
 {Ibid., § 6). 
 
 §10. 
 
 Any innkeeper against whom claim is made 
 for loss sustained by guests may show that such 
 loss resulted from the negligence of such guests 
 or from his failure to comply with the reasonable 
 and proper regulations of the inn {Ibid., § 7). 
 
 [452] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 XXXII. 
 
 NORTH DAKOTA. 
 
 Revised Codes of 1895. 
 
 §1. 
 
 An innkeeper or keeper of a boarding house 
 is liable for all losses or injuries to personal 
 property placed by his guests or boarders under 
 his care, unless occasioned by an irresistible 
 superhuman cause, by a public enemy, by the 
 negUgence of the owner or by the act of someone 
 whom he brought into the inn or boarding 
 house (Rev. Code, § 4029). 
 
 Innkeeper's 
 liability. 
 
 §2. 
 
 If an innkeeper or boarding-house keeper 
 keeps a fireproof safe and gives notice to a 
 guest or boarder, either personally or by put- 
 ting up a printed notice in a prominent place 
 in the room occupied by the guests or boarders 
 that he keeps such a safe and will not be Uable 
 for money, jewelry, documents or other arti- 
 cles of unusual value and small compass unless 
 placed therein, he is not liable, except so far 
 as his own acts contribute thereto for any loss 
 of or injury to such article, if not deposited 
 with him and not required by the guest or 
 boarder for present use (Ibid., § 4030). 
 
 How ex- 
 empted from 
 liability. 
 
 [453] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 §3. 
 
 Lien of ho- Hotel, inn, boarding house and lodging-house 
 tel keepers, keepers shall have a hen upon the baggage and 
 other property of their guests, boarders or 
 lodgers, brought into such hotel, inn, boarding 
 or lodging house by such guests, boarders or 
 lodgers for the proper charges due from such 
 guests, boarders or lodgers for their accommo- 
 dation, board and lodging and room rent and 
 such extras as are furnished at their request 
 and the right to the possession of such baggage 
 or other property until all such charges are 
 paid {Ibid., § 4841). 
 
 §4. 
 
 Whenever any trunk, carpetbag, valise, bun- 
 dle, package or article of property transported 
 When un- or coming into the possession of any railroad, 
 c aune prop- ^^ express company or any other common car- 
 erty may be . . ^ . i ■ •. i, • 
 
 gold. rier m the course oi nis or its busmess as com- 
 
 mon carrier shall remain unclaimed and the 
 legal charges thereon unpaid during the space 
 of six months after its arrival at the point to 
 which it shall have been directed and the owner 
 or person to whom the same is consigned can- 
 not be found upon diligent inquiry or, being 
 found and notified of the arrival of such article, 
 shall refuse or neglect to receive the same and 
 pay the legal charges thereon for the space of 
 three months, it shall be lawful for such com- 
 mon carrier to sell such article at pubHc auction 
 after giving the owner or consignee fifteen days' 
 notice of the time and place of sale through 
 the post office and by advertising in a news- 
 paper published in the county where such sale 
 [454] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 is made and out of the proceeds of such sale to 
 pay all legal charges on such article and the 
 amount over, if any, shall be paid to the owner 
 or consignee upon demand {Ibid., § 4195). 
 
 §5. 
 
 Perishable property which has been trans- 
 ported to its destination and the owner or con- 
 signee notified of its arrival, or being notified, 
 refuses or neglects to receive the same and pay 
 the legal charges thereon, or if upon diligent 
 inquiry the consignee cannot be found, such 
 carrier may in the exercise of a reasonable dis- 
 cretion sell the same at public or private sale 
 without advertising and the proceeds after de- 
 ducting the freight and charges and expenses 
 of sale shall be paid to the owner or consignee 
 upon demand {Ibid., § 4196). 
 
 When perish- 
 able property 
 may be sold. 
 
 §6. 
 
 The provisions of the last two sections shall Applies to ho- 
 apply to hotel keepers and warehousemen {Ibid., ® eepers. 
 § 4197). 
 
 §7. 
 
 A person who obtains any food or accommo- 
 dation at any inn, hotel or boarding house with- 
 out paying therefor, with intent to defraud the 
 proprietor or manager thereof, or who obtains 
 credit at any inn, hotel or boarding house by 
 use of any false pretence, or who, after ob- 
 taining food or accommodations at an inn, ho- 
 tel or boarding house, absconds and surrepti- 
 tiously removes his baggage therefrom without 
 paying for his food and accommodation, is 
 
 Fraudulently 
 obtaining 
 food or ac- 
 commodation 
 at inns. 
 
 :455] 
 
Appendix- 
 
 guilty of a misdemeanor, ana on conviction 
 thereof shall be fined not more than one hun- 
 dred dollars, nor less than five dollars, or im- 
 prisoned in the county jail for not more than 
 thirty nor less than ten days, or both such fine 
 and imprisonment at the discretion of the 
 judge or justice of the peace before whom the 
 trial is held {Ibid., § 7674). 
 
 [456] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 XXXIII. 
 OHIO. 
 
 Bates' Annotated Ohio Statutes, 1906. 
 
 That all persons within the jurisdiction of Civil rights, 
 said State shall be entitled to the full and equal 
 enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, 
 facilities and privileges of inns, restaurants, 
 eating houses, barber shops, pubhc conveyances 
 on land or water, theatres and all other places 
 of pubUc accommodation and amusement, sub- 
 ject only to the conditions and limitations es- 
 tabUshed by law, and appUcable alike to all 
 citizens (Bates' Stat., § 442fr-l). 
 
 §2. 
 
 That any person who shall violate any of the 
 provisions of the foregoing section by denjdng 
 to any citizen, except for reasons appUcable Penalty, 
 alike to aU citizens of every race and color, 
 and regardless of color or race, the fuU enjoy- 
 ment of any of the acconamodations, advan- 
 tages, facilities or privileges in said section 
 enumerated, or by aiding or inciting such denial 
 shall, for every such offence, forfeit and pay a 
 sum not less than fifty ($50) dollars nor more 
 than five hundred ($500) dollars to the person 
 
 [457] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 aggrieved thereby, to be recovered in any court 
 of competent jurisdiction in the county where 
 said offence was committed; and shall also, for 
 every such offence, be deemed guilty of a mis- 
 demeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be 
 fined not less than fifty (|50) dollars nor more 
 than five hundred (1500) dollars, or shall be 
 imprisoned not less than thirty (30) days nor 
 more than ninety (90) days, or both; and pro- 
 vided further, that a judgment in favor of the 
 party aggrieved, or punishment upon an indict- 
 ment, shall be a bar to either prosecution re- 
 spectively {Ibid., §4426-2). 
 
 §3. 
 
 No innkeeper, whether individual, partner- 
 ship or corporation, who constantly has in his 
 Liability for inn a metal safe or suitable vault in good order, 
 and fit for the custody of money, bank notes, 
 jewelry, articles of gold and silver manufacture, 
 precious stones, personal ornaments, railroad 
 mileage books or tickets, negotiable or valuable 
 papers, and bulUon, and who keeps on the doors 
 of the sleeping rooms used by his guests suit- 
 able locks or bolts, and on the transoms and 
 windows of said rooms suitable fastenings, and 
 who keeps a copy of this section printed in dis- 
 tinct type constantly and conspicuously sus- 
 pended in the office and in the ladies' parlor 
 or sitting room, barroom, washroom and in five 
 other conspicuous places in said inn, or in not less 
 than ten conspicuous places in all in said inn, 
 shall be liable for the loss or injury suffered by 
 any guest, unless such guest has offered to dehver 
 the same to such innkeeper for custody, in such 
 [458] 
 
 loss of prop' 
 erty, 
 
Appendix. 
 
 metal safe or vault, and such innkeeper has 
 omitted or refused to take it and deposit it in 
 such safe or vault for custody and to give such 
 guest a receipt therefor. Provided, however, 
 that the keeper of any inn shall not be obHged 
 to receive from any one guest for deposit in 
 such safe or vault any property hereinbefore 
 described exceeding a total value of five him- 
 dred dollars, and shall not be hable for any 
 excess of such property whether received or 
 not; but such innkeeper may by special ar- 
 rangement with a guest receive for deposit in 
 such safe or vault any property upon such 
 terms as they may agree to in writing, but 
 every innkeeper shall be liable for any loss of 
 the above-enumerated articles of a guest in his 
 inn, caused by the theft or negligence of the 
 innkeeper, or any of his servants {Ibid., § 4427).* 
 
 Special ar- 
 Tangements. 
 
 §4. 
 
 The UabiUty of the keeper of any inn whether 
 individual, partnership, or corporation, for loss 
 of or injury to personal property placed by his 
 guests under his care, other than that described 
 in the preceding section, shall be that of a de- 
 positary for hire; provided, however, that in 
 no case, shall such Uability exceed the sum of 
 one hundred and fifty dollars for each trunk 
 and its contents, fifty dollars for each valise 
 
 1 Under this section an innkeeper who has complied 
 with the provisions of the statute is not liable to a guest 
 for the loss by theft of jewelry and money which the guest 
 retained in his possession, in the absence of any proof of 
 negligence on the part of the innkeeper or his servants. 
 A watch and money for travelling expenses come within 
 the provisions of the statute. Lang v. Arcade Hotel Co., 
 9 Ohio Dec. 372, 12 WMy. Law Bull. 250 (1883). 
 
 Iiimitation 
 liability. 
 
 of 
 
 [459] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 and its contents, and ten dollars for each box, 
 bundle or package, and contents, so placed un- 
 der his care, unless he shaU have consented in 
 writing with such guest to assume a greater 
 liabihty (Ibid., § 4427a). 
 
 §6. 
 
 The keeper of any inn, whether individual, 
 Lien. partnership or corporation, shall have a lien on 
 
 the baggage and other property in and about 
 such inn belonging to or under the control of 
 his guests or boarders for the proper charges 
 due him from such guests or boarders for the 
 accommodation, board and lodging, and for aU 
 money paid for or advanced to them, and for 
 such other extras as are furnished at their re- 
 quest, and said innkeeper shall have the right 
 to detain such baggage and other property un- 
 til the amount of such charges is paid, and such 
 baggage and other property shall not be exempt 
 from attachment or execution until such inn- 
 keeper's lien and the cost of satisfying it are 
 Sale of prop- satisfied. The innkeeper shall retain such bag- 
 gage and other property upon which he has a 
 hen for a period of sixty days, at the expiration 
 of which time, if such lien is not satisfied, he 
 may sell such baggage and other property at 
 public auction, after giving ten days' notice of 
 the time and place of sale in a newspaper of 
 general circulation in the county where the inn 
 is situated, and also by mailing a copy of such 
 notice addressed to said guest or boarder at 
 the place of residence registered by him in the 
 register of such inn; and after satisfying the 
 lien and any costs that may accrue, any residue 
 [460] 
 
 erty. 
 
Appendix. 
 
 remaining shall, on demand within six months, 
 be paid to such guest or boarder, and if not 
 so demanded within six months from date of 
 such sale, said residue shall be deposited by 
 such innkeeper with the treasurer of the county 
 in which the inn is situated, together with a 
 statement of the innkeeper's claim, the cost of 
 enforcing same, a copy of the pubhshed notice, 
 and of the amounts received for the goods sold 
 at said sale; said residue shall by said county 
 treasurer be credited to the general revenue 
 fund of said county, subject to a right of said 
 guest or boarder, or his representatives, to re- 
 claim the same at any time within three years 
 of the date of deposit with said treasurer {Ibid., 
 § 4427b). 
 
 Disposal of 
 proceeds. 
 
 §6. 
 
 Any person who shall obtain food, lodging or 
 other accommodation at any hotel, inn, board- 
 ing or eating house with intent to defraud the 
 owner or keeper thereof, shall be fined not ex- 
 ceeding two hundred dollars, or imprisoned in 
 the county jail or city workhouse not exceeding 
 three months, or both (Ibid., § 7076a). 
 
 Defrauding: 
 innkeepers. 
 
 §7. 
 
 Proof that lodging, food or other accommo- 
 dation was obtained by false pretence, or by 
 false or fictitious show or pretence of any bag- 
 gage or other property, or that the person re- 
 fused or neglected to pay for such food, lodging 
 or other accommodation on demand, or that he 
 gave in payment for such food, lodging or other 
 accommodation, negotiable paper on which pay- 
 
 Proof of 
 fraudulent in- 
 tent; agree- 
 ment for de- 
 lay. 
 
 [4611 
 
Appendix. 
 
 ment was refused, or that he absconded without 
 paying or offering to pay for such food, lodging 
 or other accommodation, or that he surrepti- 
 tiously removed or attempted to remove his 
 baggage, shall be prima facie proof of the fraud- 
 ulent intent mentioned in section seven thousand 
 and seventy-six (a) ; but this act shall not apply 
 where there has been an agreement for delay 
 in pajnnent for a period to exceed ten days 
 {Ibid., § 7076b). 
 
 Notice of pro- 
 visions of this 
 act. 
 
 §8. 
 
 It shall be the duty of every hotel, inn, or 
 boarding-house keeper within this State to keep 
 a copy of section seven himdred (thousand) 
 and seventy-six (b) printed in distinct type 
 posted conspicuously in the office, the ladies' 
 parlor or sitting room, barroom, washroom and 
 in five other conspicuous places in said inn, or 
 in not less than ten conspicuous places in aU 
 in said inn {Ibid., § 7076c). 
 
 Theatrical ex- 
 hibitions and 
 tickets. 
 
 [462; 
 
 §9. 
 
 All municipal corporations shall have the 
 following general powers and council may pro- 
 vide by ordinance or resolution for the exercise 
 and enforcement of the same : 
 
 7. To regulate, by license or otherwise, re- 
 strain or prohibit theatrical exhibitions and 
 public shows of whatever name or nature, for 
 which money or other reward is demanded or 
 received; to regulate, by license or otherwise, 
 the business of trafficking in theatrical tickets 
 or other tickets of licensed amusements, by 
 parties not acting as agents of those issuing 
 
Appendix. 
 
 the same, but public school entertainments, 
 lecture courses and lectures on historic, Uterary 
 or scientific subjects shall not come within the 
 provisions of this section {Ibid., § 1536-100). 
 
 [463] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 XXXIV. 
 
 OKLAHOMA. 
 
 Statutes of 1893. 
 
 Liability of 
 keeper of an 
 inn or board- 
 ing house. 
 
 §1. 
 
 An innkeeper or keeper of a boarding house 
 is liable for all losses of, or injuries to, personal 
 property placed by his guests or boarders un- 
 der his care, unless occasioned by an irresist- 
 ible superhuman cause, by a public enemy, by 
 the negligence of the owner, or by the act of 
 someone whom he brought into the inn or board- 
 ing house, and upon such property the innkeeper 
 or keeper of a boarding house has a lien and a 
 right of detention for the payment of such 
 amount as may be due him for lodging, fare, 
 boarding, or other necessaries by such guest or 
 boarder; and the said lien may be enforced by 
 a sale of the property in the manner prescribed 
 for the sale of pledged property (Stat., § 2735). 
 
 How ex- 
 empted from 
 liability. 
 
 [464] 
 
 §2. 
 
 If any innkeeper or boarding-house keeper 
 keeps a fireproof safe, and gives notice to a 
 guest or boarder either personally or by put- 
 ting up a printed notice in a prominent place 
 in the room occupied by the guest or boarder, 
 that he keeps such a safe, and will not be liable 
 
Appendix. 
 
 for money, jewelry, documents or other articles 
 of vmusual value and small compass, unless 
 placed therein, he is not hable except so far 
 as his own acts contribute thereto, for any loss 
 of, or injury to, such article, if not deposited 
 with him, and not required by the guest or 
 boarder for present use {Ibid., § 2736). 
 
 §3. 
 
 Every person who, while lawfully in posses- 
 sion of an article of personal property, renders 
 any service to the owner thereof by labor or 
 skill employed for the protection, safe-keeping 
 or carriage thereof, has a special lien thereon, 
 dependent on possession, for the compensation, 
 if any, which is due to him from the owner 
 for such service {Ibid., § 3210) . 
 
 Lien for serv- 
 ices rendered. 
 
 §4. 
 
 Whenever any trunk, carpetbag, valise, bun- 
 dle, package or article of property transported 
 or coming into the possession of any railroad, 
 or express company, or any other common car- 
 rier in the course of his or its business as com- 
 mon carrier, shall remain unclaimed and the 
 legal charges thereon unpaid during the space 
 of six months after its arrival at the point to 
 which it shall have been directed, and the 
 owner or person to whom the same is consigned 
 cannot be found upon diligent inquiry, or being 
 found and notified of the arrival of such article, 
 shall refuse or neglect to receive the same and 
 pay the legal charges thereon for the space of 
 three months, it shall be lawful for such com- 
 mon carrier to sell such article at public auction, 
 30 
 
 Sale of un- 
 claimed prop- 
 erty may be 
 made, when. 
 
 [465] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 after giving the owner or consignee fifteen days' 
 notice of time and place of sale, through the 
 post office and by advertising in a newspaper 
 published in the county where such sale is made, 
 and out of the proceeds of such sale to pay all 
 legal charges on such articles, and the amount 
 over, if any, shall be paid to the owner or con- 
 signee upon demand {Ibid., § 458). 
 
 §5. 
 
 Act applies to The provisions of this act shall apply to ho- 
 hotel keepers, tel keepers and warehousemen {Ibid., § 460). 
 
 [466] 
 
Appendix, 
 
 XXXV. 
 
 OREGON. 
 Hill's Annotated Laws, 1892. 
 
 §1. 
 
 Hotel keepers, innkeepers, lodging-house keep- Lien on bag- 
 ers-, and boarding-house keepers shall have a lien &*se. 
 upon the baggage, clothing, jewelry, and other 
 valuables of their guests, lodgers, or boarders 
 brought into such hotel, inn, lodging house, or 
 boarding house by such guest, lodger, or boarder 
 for the reasonable charges due from such guests, 
 lodgers, or boarders for their accommodation, 
 board, or lodging, and such extras as are fur- 
 nished at the request of such guest, lodger, or 
 boarder; and such hotel keeper, innkeeper, lodg- 
 ing-house keeper, or boarding-house keeper may 
 retain and hold possession of such baggage, 
 clothing, jewelry, and other valuables until such 
 charges be paid (Hill's Annot. Laws, p. 1908, 
 § 1, revised by Laws of 1903). 
 
 §2. 
 
 If such reasonable charges be not paid within 
 sixty days from the time of furnishing such 
 accommodations, board, lodgings, or extras, the Sale. 
 person having such lien may proceed to sell 
 such baggage or other valuables at public auc- 
 
 [467] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 Notice. 
 
 Costa. 
 
 tion, or a part thereof sufficient to pay such 
 proper charges. Before seUing he shall give 
 notice of such sale by advertisement for three 
 weeks in a newspaper pubhshed in the county, 
 or by posting up notice of such sale in three of 
 the most public places in the city or precinct 
 for three weeks before the time of such sale, and 
 the proceeds of such sale shall be applied, first, 
 to the discharge of such hen and the cost of 
 selling such property, and the remainder, if 
 any, shall be paid over to the owner thereof on 
 demand {Ibid., §2). 
 
 ment. 
 
 §3. 
 
 The provisions of the preceding (preceding) 
 Special agree- sections shall not interfere with any special 
 agreement of the parties {Ibid., § 3) . 
 
 §4. 
 
 Whenever any personal property shall be 
 consigned to or deposited with any forwarding 
 merchant, wharf, warehouse, or tavern keeper, 
 or the keeper of any depot for the reception 
 and storage of trunks, baggage, merchandise, 
 or other personal property, such consignee or 
 bailee shall immediately cause to be entered in 
 a book kept by him a description of such prop- 
 erty, with the date of reception thereof {Ibid., 
 §3712). 
 
 Consignee or 
 depositary to 
 enter receipt 
 of property in 
 book. 
 
 [468] 
 
 §5. 
 
 If such property shall not have been left with 
 such consignee or bailee for the purpose of 
 being forwarded or disposed of- according to 
 directions received by such consignee or bailee 
 
Appendix. 
 
 at or before the time of the reception thereof, When bailee 
 and if the name and residence of the owner **> notify 
 of such property be known to the person having °'T°®' ** '*' 
 such property in his possession, he shall imme- erty. 
 diately notify the owner, by letter directed to 
 him and deposited in the post office, of the 
 reception of such property (Ibid., § 3713). 
 
 §6. 
 
 If any such property shall not be claimed 
 and taken away within one year after the time 
 it shall have been so received, the person hav- 
 ing possession thereof may at any time there- 
 after proceed to sell the same in the manner 
 provided in this title {Ibid., § 3714). 
 
 When bailee 
 may sell prop- 
 erty. 
 
 §7. 
 
 Before any such property shall be sold, if 
 the name and residence of the owner thereof 
 be known, at least sixty days' notice of such 
 sale shall be given him, either personally or by 
 mail, or by leaving a notice at his residence 
 or place of doing business; but if the name and 
 residence of the owner be not known, the per- 
 son having the possession of such property 
 shall cause a notice to be published containing 
 a description of the property for the space of 
 six weeks successively in a newspaper if there 
 be one published in the same county; if there 
 be no newspaper pubHshed in the same county, 
 then said notice shall be pubHshed in a news- 
 paper nearest thereto in the State; the last 
 publication of such notice shall be at least 
 eighteen days previous to the time of sale 
 (Ibid., §3715). 
 
 Notice of sale, 
 when to be 
 given person- 
 ally to owner. 
 
 Notice, when 
 given by pub- 
 lication. 
 
 [469] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 Proceeding 
 when prop- 
 erty not 
 claimed. 
 
 AfSdavit by 
 bailee. 
 
 §8. 
 
 If the owner or person entitled to such prop- 
 erty shall not take the same away and pay the 
 charges thereon after sixty days' notice shall 
 have been given, it shall be the duty of the 
 person having possession thereof, his agent or 
 attorney, to make knd deliver to a justice of 
 the peace of the same county an affidavit set- 
 ting forth a description of the property remain- 
 ing unclaimed, the time of its reception, the 
 publication of the notice, and whether the 
 owner of such property be known or unknown 
 {Ibid., §3716). 
 
 Inventory 
 and order of 
 sale. 
 
 §9. 
 
 Upon the delivery to him of such affidavit, 
 the justice shall cause such property to be 
 opened and examined in his presence, and a 
 true inventory thereof to be made, and shall 
 annex to such inventory an order under his 
 hand that the property therein described be 
 sold by any constable of the precinct where the 
 same shall be at public auction (Ibid., § 3717). 
 
 Sale by con- 
 stable, notice 
 of. 
 
 §10. 
 
 It shall be the duty of such constable receiv- 
 ing such inventory and order to give ten days' 
 notice of the sale, by posting up written notices 
 thereof in three or more places in such pre- 
 cinct, and to sell such property at public auction 
 to the highest bidder, in the same manner as 
 provided by law for sales under execution from 
 justices' courts {Ibid., § 3718). 
 
 [470] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 §11. 
 
 Upon completing the sale, the constable mak- 
 ing the same shall indorse upon the order afore- 
 said a return of his proceedings thereon, and 
 return the same to the justice, together with 
 the inventory and the proceeds of sale, after 
 deducting his fees (Ibid., § 3719). 
 
 Return of con- 
 stable and 
 fees. 
 
 §12. 
 
 From the proceeds of such sale, the justice 
 shall pay all legal charges that have been in- 
 curred in relation to such property, or a ratable 
 proportion of each charge if the proceeds of 
 said sale shall not be sufficient to pay aU the 
 charges; and the balance, if any there be, he 
 shall immediately pay over to the treasurer of 
 the county in which the same shall be sold, 
 and deliver a statement therewith, containing 
 a description of the property sold, the gross 
 amoimt of such sale, and the amount of costs, 
 charges, and expenses paid to each person 
 {Ibid., §3720). 
 
 Justice to pay 
 charges, etc. 
 
 §13. 
 
 The county treasurer shall make an entry of 
 the amount received by him, and the time when 
 received, and shall file in his office such state- 
 ment so delivered to him by the justice {Ibid., 
 §3721). 
 
 §14. 
 
 If the owner of the property sold, or his legal 
 representatives, shall, at any time within five 
 years after such money shall have been depos- 
 ited in the county treasury, furnish satisfactory 
 
 Treasurer to 
 make entry. 
 
 When owner 
 may claim 
 deposit. 
 
 [471] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 evidence to the treasurer of the ownership of 
 such property, he or they shall be entitled to 
 receive from such treasurer the amount so de- 
 posited with him {Ibid., § 3722). 
 
 §15. 
 
 If proceeds K the amount so deposited with any county 
 not claimed. treasurer shall not be claimed by the owner 
 thereof or his legal representatives within the 
 said five years, the same shall belong to the 
 county, and may be disposed of as the county 
 court may direct (Ibid., § 3723). 
 
 Pees of jus- 
 tice and con- 
 stable. 
 
 §16. 
 
 The fees allowed to any justice of the peace 
 under the provisions of this title shall be three 
 dollars for each day's service; and to any con- 
 stable, the same fees as are allowed by law for 
 sales upon an execution, and ten cents a folio 
 for making an inventory of property (Ibid., 
 § 3724). 
 
 §17. 
 
 That any person who shall, with intent to 
 
 defraud, obtain food, lodging or other accom- 
 
 Defrauding modations at any hotel, inn, or boarding house, 
 
 K->„,.ij^„ or who, after having obtained such food, lodg- 
 Doaraing-_ ' ° )& 
 
 house keep- ing, or other acconmiodations at any such ho- 
 ers. tel, inn, or boarding house, shall surreptitiously 
 
 remove his baggage from such hotel, inn, or 
 boarding house, without first paying or tender- 
 ing payment for such food, lodging, or other 
 accommodations, shall be guilty of a misde- 
 Penalty. meaner and upon conviction thereof shall be 
 
 fined not less than twenty ($20) dollars, and 
 [472] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 not more than one hundred ($100) dollars, or 
 imprisoned not less than ten days nor more 
 than fifty days, or both (Laws of 1905, chap. 84, 
 §1). 
 
 §18. 
 
 That it shall be presumptive evidence of such Presumptive 
 intent to defraud if the person so obtaining evidence, 
 such food, lodging, or other accommodations 
 at such hotel, inn, or boarding house shall fail 
 or refuse, on demand by the proprietor or man- 
 ager of such hotel, inn, or boarding house, to 
 pay and satisfy tfie reasonable charges for the 
 same, unless such person shall, before obtaining 
 such food, lodging, or other accommodations, 
 have disclosed to such proprietor or manager 
 his inability to pay and satisfy the same on 
 demand (Ibid., § 2). 
 
 §19. 
 
 That the justice of the peace in each coimty 
 shall have jurisdiction to enforce the provisions 
 of this act {Ibid., § 3). 
 
 [473] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 Refusal to ac- 
 commodate, 
 on account of 
 race or color. 
 
 XXXVI. 
 
 PENNSYLVANIA. 
 
 Beightly's Purdon's Digest of the Statute Laws, 
 1894, WITH Supplement, 1895. 
 
 §1. 
 
 Any person, company, corporation, being 
 owner, lessee or manager of any restaurant, 
 hotel, railroad, street railway, omnibus line, 
 theatre, concert hall, or place of entertainment 
 or amusement, who shall refuse to accommodate, 
 convey or admit any person or persons on ac- 
 count of race or color over their hnes, or into 
 their hotel, or restaurant, theatre, concert hall, 
 or place of amusement, shall, upon conviction 
 thereof, be guilty of a, misdemeanor, and be 
 punished by fine not less than fifty dollars nor 
 more than one hundred dollars (Bright. Purd. 
 Dig., p. 533, § 355). 
 
 §2. 
 
 Every innkeeper shall keep good entertain- 
 ment for man and horse, under penalty of five 
 dollars for every case of neglect {Ibid., p. 1021, 
 §1). 
 
 §3. 
 
 All livery-stable keepers and innkeepers 
 within this commonwealth shall have a lien 
 [474] 
 
 Penalty. 
 
Appendix. 
 
 upon any and every horse delivered to them Lien of inn- 
 to be kept in their stables, for the expense of ^teepers, etc., 
 the keeping; and in case the owner of the said *°' liorsekeep. 
 horse or horses, or the person who delivered 
 them for keeping to the keeper of the livery 
 stable, or innkeeper, shall not pay and dis- 
 charge the said expense, provided it amount 
 to thirty dollars, within fifteen days after de- 
 mand made of him personally, or in case of 
 his removal from the place where such livery 
 stable or inn is kept, within ten days after 
 notice of the amount due, and demand of pay- 
 ment in writing left at his last place of abode, 
 the livery-stable keeper, or innkeeper, may 
 cause the horse or horses aforesaid to be sold 
 at public sale, according to law: and after de- 
 ducting from the amount of sales, the costs of 
 sale and the expense of keeping, shall deUver 
 the residue, upon demand, to the person or the 
 agent of the person who delivered the horse or 
 horses to him for keeping: Provided always, 
 That nothing in this act contained shall be con- 
 strued to impair any right of action, which the 
 said Uvery-stable keepers or innkeepers may 
 have against any person or persons, for the 
 keeping his or their horse or horses {Ibid., 
 p. 1023, § 16) .1 
 
 §4. 
 
 AH proprietor or proprietors of hotels, inns 
 and boarding houses within this commonwealth, Lien on bag- 
 shall have a lien upon the goods and baggage ^*^®' 
 
 1 See Singer Mfg. Co. y. Flannigan, 7 Pa. Co. Ct. 45 
 (1888); Gump v. Showalter, 43 Pa. 507 (1862). A Uvery- 
 stable keeper's lien can be exercised against a horse only 
 for the expense of keeping that particular horse. Mc- 
 Manigle v. Crouse, 1 Walker (Pa.), 43 (1887). 
 
 [475] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 belonging to any sojourner, boarder or boarders, 
 for any amount of indebtedness contracted for 
 boarding and lodging, for any period of time 
 not exceeding two weeks,^ and shall have the 
 right to detain said goods and baggage until 
 the amount of said indebtedness is paid; and 
 at the expiration of three nionths, the said 
 proprietor or proprietors may make application 
 to any alderman or justice of the peace of the 
 proper city, borough or county, who is hereby 
 authorized to issue his warrant to any constable 
 within said city, borough or county, and cause 
 him to expose the said goods and baggage to 
 public sale, after giving at least ten days' no- 
 tice, by public written or printed notices, put 
 up in three or more pubUc places in the ward 
 of said city or borough, or in the township, 
 where said inn, hotel or boarding house is lo- 
 cated; and after he shall have sold the same, 
 he shall make return thereof to the said jus- 
 tice or alderman, who shall, after payment of 
 all costs and the said amount of indebtedness, 
 pay over the balance, if any there be, to the 
 owner or owners of said goods or baggage: 
 Right to re- Provided, That the owner or owners of said 
 goods and baggage shall have the right to re- 
 deem said goods and baggage, at any time 
 within the said three months, upon paying the 
 amount of said indebtedness, and at any time 
 previous to the sale as aforesaid, upon paying 
 also the additional cost established by law for 
 like services {Ibid., § 17). 
 
 2 The words "not exceeding two weeks" are repealed 
 as to Erie County. P. L. 1869, p. 971. 
 
 [476] 
 
 deem. 
 
Appendix. 
 
 §5. 
 
 Whenever the proprietor or proprietors of 
 any hotel, inn or boarding house, shall provide 
 a good, sufficient and secure safe in the office 
 of such hotel or other convenient place, for the 
 safe-keeping of any money, goods, jewelry and 
 valuables belonging to the guests and boarders 
 of such hotel, inn or boarding house, and shall 
 notify the guests and boarders thereof, by plac- 
 ing in every lodging room, parlor and public 
 hall, and other conspicuous places, printed cards 
 or notices, stating the fact that such safe is 
 provided, in which such goods, jewehy and 
 valuables may be deposited, and that the pro- 
 prietor or proprietors thereof will not be re- 
 sponsible for said money, goods, jewelry and 
 valuables, unless deposited in said safe; and if 
 any such guest or boarder shall neglect to de- 
 posit such money, goods, jewelry or valuables 
 in such safe, the proprietor or proprietors afore- 
 said shall not be liable for any loss of such 
 money, goods, jewelry or valuables, sustained 
 by such guest, by theft or otherwise : Provided, 
 That nothing herein contained shall apply to 
 such an amoimt of money, and such articles of 
 goods, jewelry and valuables, as is usual, com- 
 mon and prudent for such guest or boarder to 
 retain in his room, or about his person. {Ibid., 
 § 18)." 
 
 3 Though notice of the requirement of deposit with the 
 innkeeper was not posted on the doors as required by 
 the statute, it might nevertheless be negligence, if the 
 guest had actual notice of the regulation, to cany a large 
 sum of money into his room. Shultz v. Wall, 134 Pa. 
 262, 19 Atl. 742, 26 Wkly. Notes Cas. 57, 19 Am. St. 
 Rep. 686, 8 L. R. A. 97 (1890). 
 
 The proviso as to money, etc., such as it is "usual, 
 
 Innkeepers, 
 etc., may pro- 
 vide place of 
 safe keeping 
 for valuable 
 property. 
 
 How notice 
 thereof to be 
 given. 
 
 Not to be lia- 
 ble therefor, 
 unless depos- 
 ited therein. 
 
 Exceptions. 
 
 [477] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 May give cer- 
 tain notices, 
 and if not 
 complied 
 with, not to 
 be account- 
 able for goods 
 stolen from 
 rooms. 
 
 Proofs. 
 
 §6. 
 
 Whenever the proprietor or proprietors of 
 any hotel, inn or boarding house, shall post in 
 a conspicuous manner as aforesaid, notices re- 
 quiring said guest or boarder to bolt the door 
 of the room or rooms occupied by said guest 
 or boarder, or in leaving the said room or 
 rooms to lock the door and to deposit the keys 
 with the proprietor or the clerk at the ofRce; 
 and if such guest or boaider shall neglect so 
 to do, the proprietor or proprietors as afore- 
 said shall not be liable for any baggage of such 
 guest or boarder, which may be stolen from 
 said room or rooms: Provided, That said pro- 
 prietor or proprietors shall clearly establish the 
 fact of said room or rooms having been left 
 unbolted or unlocked by said guest or boarder, 
 at the time of the loss of said baggage as afore- 
 said (Ibid., § 19). 
 
 Penalty for 
 fraudulently 
 obtaining 
 board, etc. 
 
 [478] 
 
 §7. 
 
 Every person who shall, at any hotel or inn, 
 or boarding house, receive or cause to be fur- 
 nished any food or accommodations, with in- 
 tent to defraud the owner or proprietor of such 
 hotel, inn or boarding house out of the value 
 or price of such food or accommodation, and 
 every person who shall obtain credit at any 
 hotel, inn or boarding house, by the use of any 
 false pretences or device, or by depositing at 
 such hotel, inn or boarding house any baggage 
 
 common and prudent for the guest and boarder to retain 
 in his room or about his person," retains the innlceeper's 
 common-law liability as to such articles. Turner v. 
 Whitaker, 9 Pa. Super. Ct. 83, 43 W. N. C. 375 (1898). 
 
Appendix. 
 
 or property of value less than the amount of 
 such credit, or of the bill by such person in- 
 curred, with such fraudulent intent, and any 
 person who, after obtaining credit or accommo- 
 dation at any hotel, inn or boarding house, 
 shall abscond from such hotel, inn or boarding 
 house, and shall surreptitiously remove his bag- 
 gage or property therefrom, shall (upon con- 
 viction) be adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor, 
 and upon conviction, shall be punished by im- 
 prisonment in the county jail for a term of not 
 more than six months {Ibid., § 20).* 
 
 * The statute makes no distinction between a guest and a 
 permanent boarder, and includes every person who, with 
 intent to defraud, obtains food or accommodations. 
 Commonwealth v. Gough, 3 Kulp, 148 (1884). 
 
 A defendant may be convicted by establishing beyond 
 ■ a reasonable doubt any one of the following five therein 
 enumerated particulars: (1) Where the defendant re- 
 ceives or causes to be furnished any food or accommoda- 
 tions with intent to defraud the proprietor of any hotel, 
 inn, or boarding house out of the price of such food or 
 accommodations; (2) where such defendant obtains credit 
 by the use of false pretence or device; (3) where such 
 defendant deposits any baggage or property .of value, less 
 than the amount of such credit, with such fraudulent in- 
 tent; (4) where such defendant refuses to pay any bill 
 incurred with such fraudulent intent (this includes all bills 
 for acconmiodation at such hotel, other than food); and 
 (5) where any person, after obtaining such credit or ac- 
 commodation, shall abscond and surreptitiously remove 
 his baggage or property. Commonwealth v. Morton, 9 
 Lane. Bar, 79, 6 Luz. Leg. Reg. 207 (1877). The statute 
 punishing surreptitious removal applies to the removal 
 of baggage or of any other property, as in this case a gun; 
 and it applies to such goods obtained by fraud after the 
 act went into effect, though the charges on which they 
 are held were incurred before the passage of the act. 
 Where the guest obtained the property from the inn- 
 keeper by false pretences, it was held to constitute a sur- 
 reptitious removal. Ibid. 
 
 The very language of the act used in an indictment for 
 
 For abscond- 
 ing with bag- 
 gage. 
 
 1 479 J 
 
Appendix. 
 
 Copy 
 
 of 
 
 the 
 
 act 
 
 to 
 
 be 
 
 post 
 
 ed 
 
 in 
 
 rooms 
 
 , 
 
 
 Penalty for 
 overcharges. 
 
 §8. 
 
 Every keeper of a hotel, restaurant, inn or 
 boarding house shall post in a public and con- 
 spicuous place in the office or pubUc room, 
 and in every bedroom occupied by guests in 
 said house, a printed copy of this act, and a 
 statement of the charges or rates of charges by 
 the day, and for meals and items furnished, 
 and for lodging. No charge or sum shall be 
 collected or received by any such person for 
 any services not actually rendered, or for any 
 items not actually delivered, or for a longer 
 term than the person so charged actually re- 
 mained at such place. For any violation of 
 this section, or any provisions in this section, 
 the offender shall forfeit his bill so charged, 
 and upon conviction thereof, be adjudged guilty 
 of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished by 
 imprisonment in the county jail for a term of 
 not more than six months {Ibid., §21).^ 
 
 Sale of for- 
 feited bag- 
 gage. 
 
 [480] 
 
 §9. 
 
 In case of default on the part of the guests 
 in any hotel, inn or boarding house, to redeem, 
 within sixty days, all baggage, et cetera, depos- 
 ited as security for charges incurred, said bag- 
 gage, et cetera, shall be sold at public auction, 
 
 obtaining credit at a hotel by false pretences, is not a 
 sufficient charge of the offence, but the nature and char- 
 acter of the pretences must be alleged, that defendant may 
 know the specific nature of the charge he is compelled 
 to meet. Commonwealth v. Dennis, 1 Pa. Co. Ct. 278 
 (1884). 
 
 6 The posting of the notice required by this section is 
 not necessary for conviction under the preceding section. 
 Commonwealth v. Morton, 6 Luz. Leg. Reg. 207, 9 Lane. 
 Bar, 79 (1877). 
 
Appendix. 
 
 after due notice by publication for five days 
 previous to sale; all excess of proceeds exceed- 
 ing charges shall be held for the owner {Ibid., 
 §22). 
 
 Attachment 
 of wages. 
 
 §10. 
 
 All keepers of hotels, inns, boarding houses 
 and lodging houses, in this commonwealth, 
 in addition to the remedies now provided 
 by law, shall have the right, in suits and 
 actions brought before justices of the peace to 
 recover pay for boarding or lodging, or board- 
 ing and lodging, furnished, to commence such 
 suits and actions by attachment, and thereon 
 to attach only wages due or owing to such 
 persons as may be indebted to them, or any of 
 them, for boarding or lodging, or boarding and 
 lodging, not exceeding in amount the simi due 
 for four weeks; and any sum so due and so 
 attached shall not be paid to the defendant 
 until the judgment, which may be rendered Judgment. 
 against the defendant in pursuance of a sum- 
 mons to him or her directed, which shall issue 
 with such attachment for such amount as may 
 be so legally attached, shall be satisfied; and 
 justices of the peace shall have jurisdiction of 
 attachment proceedings in such case (Ibid., § 23, 
 as amended, P. L. 1905, Act 99, p. 134) .« 
 
 8 Under an act of 1876 wages were allowed to be at- 
 tached for board without giving the debtor the benefit 
 of the ordinary $300 exemption. Hughes v. Jones, 8 
 Kulp, 242 (1896); Thomas v. Glascoe, 2 Pa. Dist. R. 
 711, 13 Pa. Co. Ct. 167 (1892); Smith v. McGinty, 101 
 Pa. 402 (1882); Garden v. Scott, 1 Kulp, 196 (1882); 
 BIythan v. Rescoria, 1 Kulp, 351 (1882); MoGentey v. 
 Keefe, 8 Luz. Leg. Reg. 179 (1879). Under the statute 
 of 1889, however, the ordinary exemption was allowed 
 
 31 [481] 
 
 Justices' ju- 
 risdiction. 
 
Appendix. 
 
 guests. 
 
 XXXVII. 
 PORTO RICO. 
 Revised Statutes and Codes, 1902. 
 
 §1. 
 
 Every person, and every agent or officer of 
 any corporation, carrying on business as an 
 Receiving innkeeper or as a common carrier of passengers, 
 who refuses, without just cause or excuse, to 
 receive and entertain any guest, or to receive 
 and carry any passenger, is guilty of a misde- 
 meanor (Penal Codie, § 324). 
 
 by the courts in some counties. Carnes v. McGuire, 18 
 Pa. Co. Ct. 306 (1896); Thomas v. Glasooe, 2 Pa. Dist. R. 
 711, 13 Pa. Co. Ct. 167 (1892). It was not aUowed m other 
 counties. McCarty v. Dougherty, 16 Pa. Co. Ct. 86 (1895); 
 DiUon V. Treverton, 16 Pa. Co. Ct. 89 (1895). The lien 
 is for four weeks' board only; and eight weeks' board 
 cannot thus be collected by splitting up the judgment 
 and issuing two separate executions, each for two weeks' 
 board. Hawk v. Rock, 14 Pa. Co. Ct. 490 (1894). The 
 procedure requires first a judgment for the amount of the 
 wages, and then an attachment of the wages on the judg- 
 ment. Dillon V. Treverton, 16 Pa. Co. Ct. 89 (1895); 
 McCarty v. Dougherty, 16 Pa. Co. Ct. 86 (1895) ; Thatcher 
 V. Beam, 14 Pa. Co. Ct. 107 (1893); McGinley v. Mc- 
 Donough, 3 Lane. Law Rev. 202, 27 Wkly. Notes Cas. 
 340 (1885); Garden v. Scott, 1 Kulp, 196 (1882). Contra 
 in a few counties. Thomas v. Glascoe, 2 Pa. Dist. R. 
 711, 13 Pa. Co. Ct. 167 (1892); Smith v. Dingus, 2 Pa. 
 Dist. R. 710, 12 Pa. Co. Ct. 299 (1892). A recognizance 
 must be given by the plaintiff; a bond will not take its 
 place. Thomas v. Glascoe, 2 Pa. Dist. R. 711, 13 Pa. 
 [482] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 §2. 
 
 Any person who obtains any food or accom- 
 modation at an inn or boarding house without 
 paying therefor, with intent to defraud the pro- 
 prietor or manager thereof, or who obtains 
 credit at an inn or boarding house by the use 
 of any false pretence, or who, after obtaining 
 credit or accommodation at any iim or board- 
 ing house, absconds and surreptitiously removes 
 his baggage therefrom without pajring for his 
 food or accommodations, is guilty of a misde- 
 meanor {Ibid., §475). 
 
 Fraud on inn- 
 keeper. 
 
 §3. 
 
 The bailee may retain the thing bailed until 
 the full payment of what is due him by reason 
 of the depositum (Civ. Code, § 1682). 
 
 Lien. 
 
 §4. 
 
 The depositum of gdods made by travellers 
 in inns or hostelries shall also be considered a 
 necessary one. The keepers of inns and hos- Liability, 
 telries are liable for them as such bailees pro- 
 vided that notice thereof may have been given 
 to them or to their employees, and that the 
 travellers on their part take the precautions 
 which said iimkeepers or their substitutes may 
 have advised them concerning the care and 
 vigilance of said goods {Hid., § 1685). 
 
 Co. Ct. 167 (1892). The record must show that the 
 plamtiff was the proprietor of an inn or boarding house. 
 Walker v. Kennedy, 7 Pa. Dist. R. 516, 20 Pa. Co. Ct. 
 433 (1898); McCourt v. Brennan, 11 Pa. Co. Ct. 645 
 (1891). It must also show that the debt was for wages. 
 Leiss V. Engard, 8 Pa. Dist. R. 608, 15 Mont. Co. Law 
 Rep. 173, 13 York Leg. Rec. 109 (1899). 
 
 [483] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 §5. 
 
 The liability referred to in the preceding sec- 
 tion shall include damages to the goods of the 
 Same. travellers caused by servants or employees of 
 
 the keepers of inns or hostelries as well as by 
 strangers, but not those arising from robbery 
 or which may be caused by any other case of 
 force majeure {Ibid., § 1686). 
 
 [484] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 XXXVIII. 
 
 RHODE ISLAND. 
 
 General Laws, 1896. 
 
 Any innkeeper who shall provide a suitable 
 safe in his house, for the safe-keeping of any 
 money, jewels, or ornaments, belonging to his 
 guests, and shall notify them thereof by post- 
 ing a printed notice conspicuously in the rooms 
 that such safe has been provided for said pur- 
 pose, shall not be Uable for the loss of any 
 money, jewels, or ornaments, by theft or other- 
 wise, which any guest who has neglected to 
 deposit the same in such safe may sustain (Gen. 
 L., chap. 233, § 19). 
 
 Innkeeper not 
 liable for the 
 loss of money, 
 jewels, or or- 
 naments, by 
 a guest, if he 
 provide a suit- 
 able safe and 
 give notice 
 thereof. 
 
 §2. 
 
 Every person who shall enter a hotel, eating 
 house, restaurant or victualing house, and hav- 
 ing ordered and partaken of food or other re- 
 freshment therein, lodging or accommodation, 
 shall fraudulently evade or attempt to evade 
 payment therefor, shall be fined not exceeding 
 twenty dollars or be imprisoned not exceed- 
 ing thirty days {Ibid., chap. 279, § 51). 
 
 Penalty for 
 evading pay- 
 ment for ac- 
 commodation 
 at hotel, etc. 
 
 [485] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 Persons hav- 
 ing liens on 
 personal prop- 
 erty, may ap- 
 ply to appel- 
 late division 
 of the su- 
 preme court 
 for an order 
 for the sale 
 thereof. 
 
 §3. 
 
 Whoever has a hen at common law for money 
 due him on account of work and labor, care 
 and diligence, or money expended on or about 
 personal property or for storage of personal 
 property or has a lien therefor on such account 
 by reason of any contract expressed or implied, 
 if such money is not paid within thirty days 
 after a demand in writing delivered to the 
 owner or some one of the owners, or left at his 
 usual place of abode, if within this State, or 
 made by letter mailed to him at his usual post 
 office address without the State, may apply by 
 petition in equity to the appellate divisidn of the 
 supreme court in the county where the peti- 
 tioner or some one of the petitioners resides, 
 for an order for the sale of the property in sat- 
 isfaction of the debt: Pnovided, that if the pe- 
 titioner or some one of the petitioners resides 
 in the county of Kent or Bristol, such petition 
 shall be brought in said division in, Providence 
 {Ibid., chap. 206, §28). 
 
 Citation to is- 
 sue, when. 
 
 §4. 
 
 Upon filing the petition, the clerk of said 
 division shall issue a citation to the owner of 
 the property to appear before said court at a 
 time and place designated, to show cause why 
 such lien should not be allowed and enforced by 
 said court for the amount claimed {Ibid., § 29). 
 
 §5. 
 
 What to con- Such citation shall contain the substance of 
 tain, and how ^^g petition and shall be served on the owner 
 by a sheriff or deputy sheriff, at least ten days 
 [486] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 before the retum-day of the citation, by leav- 
 ing an attested copy at the last and usual place 
 of abode of the owner, or by reading the same 
 in his presence and hearing, if he reside in this 
 State. If such owner reside without the State, 
 such citation may be served upon him in the 
 manner prescribed by law for service of sub- 
 poenas on non-resident defendants in suits in 
 equity (Ibid., §30). 
 
 §6. 
 
 If the owner of the property is unknown, such 
 petition may be filed thirty days after the 
 money becomes due, and a citation may issue 
 "to the unknown owner," describing the prop- 
 erty. In such case, or if the residence of the 
 owner is unknown, such citation may be served 
 by pubUcation in such manner as the court may 
 direct (Ibid., §31). 
 
 In case the 
 owner of prop- 
 erty is un- 
 known, cita- 
 tion may be 
 served by 
 publication. 
 
 §7. 
 
 If the owner makes default at the time ap- 
 pointed, or if upon a hearing of the parties it 
 appears that a lien exists upon the property, 
 and that the property ought to be sold for the 
 satisfaction of the debt, the court may make 
 an order for that purpose, and the property 
 may be sold in conformity therewith. The 
 court shall ascertain the amount due up to the 
 time of the entering of the order and any sur- 
 plus of the proceeds of the sale, after satisfjnng 
 the debt and aU costs and charges, shall be paid 
 into the registry of the court for the benefit of 
 the lawful owner thereof {Ibid., § 32). 
 
 Property may 
 be sold, when. 
 
 [487] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 §8. 
 
 The five sections next preceding shall not 
 limit or restrict the right of any party having 
 a lien upon property to hold or dispose of the 
 same in any other manner authorized by law, 
 or by contract of parties {Ibid., § 33). 
 
 [488] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 XXXIX. 
 
 SOUTH CAEOLINA. 
 Code of Laws, 1902. 
 
 §1. 
 
 Whenever and so long as the proprietor or Liability of 
 proprietors of any hotel, inn, or hoarding house innkeeper 
 shall post and keep posted in a conspicuous 
 manner in the room occupied by any guest, a 
 notice requiring such guest to bolt the door of 
 such room, or on leaving his room to lock the 
 door and leave the keys at the office, and also 
 to deposit such money and jewels as are not 
 ordinarily carried upon the person, in the of-^ 
 fice safe, and such guest shall neglect to comply 
 with the requirements of such notice, the pro- 
 prietor or proprietors of such hotel, inn, or 
 boarding house shall not be liable for the loss 
 of the baggage of such guests which may be 
 lost or stolen from said room, or for the loss of 
 such money and jewels not deposited in such 
 safe : Provided, That this section shall not apply 
 to cases in which the proprietor or proprietors 
 of such hotel, inn, or boarding house have by 
 their own negligence contributed to such loss 
 (CivU Code, § 1741). 
 
 [489] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 Procuring 
 board by 
 falsely mak- 
 ing written 
 representation 
 that there is 
 money due a 
 misdemeanor. 
 
 §2. 
 
 Any person who procures board and lodging 
 or board from any boarding house or innkeeper 
 in this State upon the representation in writing 
 that there is money due or to become due to 
 him, to be paid on a future day, out of which 
 he promises to pay for such board and lodging 
 or board, and fails or refuses to so apply such 
 money when collected by him, shall be guilty 
 of a misdemeanor, and on conviction shall pay 
 a fine not exceeding fifty dollars or be impris- 
 soned not more than thirty days : Provided, That 
 if such person shall pay the amount due by him 
 for such board and lodging or board and the 
 costs of the prosecution, the case may be dis- 
 continued, in the discretion of the magistrate 
 issuing the warrant (Crim. Code, §221). 
 
 [490] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 XL. 
 
 SOUTH DAKOTA. 
 
 Annotated Statutes, 1901. 
 
 Shall 
 lien. 
 
 §1. 
 
 An innkeeper or keeper of a boarding house Liability, 
 is liable for all losses of or injuries to personal 
 property placed by his guests or boarders un- 
 der his care, unless occasioned by an irresist- 
 ible, superhuman cause, by pubUc enemy, by 
 the negligence of the owner, or by act of some- 
 one whom he brought into, the inn or boarding 
 house, and upon such property the innkeeper 
 or keeper of a boarding house shall have a lien 
 and right of detention for the pas^nent of such 
 amount as may be due him for lodging, fare, 
 boarding or other necessities by such guest or 
 boarder; ^ and the said hen may be enforced 
 by a sale of the property in the manner pre- 
 scribed in this code for the sale of pledged prop- 
 erty, or as hereinafter provided: 
 
 1. Any person who shall obtain board, lodg- 
 ing or money advances from any hotel or inn- 
 keeper by false or fraudulent representations, 
 and shall fail or refuse to pay for the same 
 
 1 This hen cannot be enforced against the goods of a 
 third party brought to the inn by the guest. McClain 
 V. Williams, 11 S. D. 227, 76 N. W. 930, 74 Am. St. Rep. 
 791, 49 L. R. A. 610 (1898). 
 
 [491] 
 
 have 
 
 How enforced. 
 
 Defrauding 
 hotel or inn- 
 keeper. 
 
Appendix. 
 
 Fraud in use 
 of other than 
 real name. 
 
 Lien, and how 
 enforced, 
 where bag- 
 gage left af- 
 ter fraud. 
 
 when demanded, or within ten (10) days after 
 such demand, shall be held to have obtained 
 the same with the intent to cheat and defraud 
 such hotel and innkeeper, and shall be deemed 
 guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction 
 thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceed- 
 ing one hundred ($100) dollars, or by impris- 
 onment in the county jail or city workhouse not 
 exceeding thirty (30) days. 
 
 2. Any person who shall obtain board or lodg- 
 ing or any other accommodation at any hotel 
 or inn by any other than his or her real and 
 proper name, and fail or refuse to pay for the 
 same when demanded, or within ten (10) days 
 after such demand, shall be held to have ob- 
 tained the same with the intent to cheat or 
 defraud such hotel or innkeeper, and shall be 
 deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon con- 
 viction thereof shall be punished as' provided 
 in this section. 
 
 3. Baggage and other property and effects 
 belonging to any person who, after obtaining 
 board, lodging or other accommodations at any 
 hotel or inn, shall abscond or absent himself 
 or herself from such hotel or inn without having 
 paid for such board, lodging or other accom- 
 modations may, at the expiration of thirty (30) 
 days, be disposed of by the keeper of such hotel 
 or inn at private or public sale, and the net 
 amount realized from such sale shall be cred- 
 ited to the unpaid account of the absconder 
 (Annot. Stat., § 4875). 
 
 [492] 
 
 §2. 
 
 If any innkeeper or boarding-house keeper 
 keeps a fireproof safe, and gives notice to a 
 
ex- 
 
 empted from 
 liability. 
 
 Appendix. 
 
 guest or boarder either personally or by put- How 
 ting up a printed notice in a prominent place 
 in the room occupied by the guest or boarder, 
 that he keeps such a safe, and will not be liable 
 for money, jewelry, documents or other articles 
 of unusual value and small compass, unless 
 placed therein, he is not Uable except so far 
 as his own acts contribute thereto, for any loss 
 of, or injury to, such article, if not deposited 
 with him, and not required by the guest or 
 boarder for present use {Ibid., § 4876). 
 
 §3. 
 
 The sale by a pledgee, of property pledged. Sale by auc- 
 must be made by public auction, in the manner **'"'■ 
 and upon the notice to the public usual at the 
 place of sale, in respect to auction sales of sim- 
 ilar property, and must be for the highest ob- 
 tainable price {Ibid., § 5614). 
 
 §4. 
 
 After a pledgee has lawfully sold property 
 pledged, or otherwise collected its proceeds, he Proceeds of 
 may deduct therefrom the amount due under ^* ®' °T^ ^" 
 the principal obhgation, and the necessary ex- 
 penses of sale and collection; and must pay 
 the surplus to the pledgor, on demand {Ibid., 
 §5617). 
 
 §5. 
 
 Whenever any trunk, carpetbag, vaUse, bundle, Sale of un- 
 
 packaee or article of property transported or claimed prop- 
 
 . . , . . -11 erty, when, 
 
 coming mto the possession of any railroad, or 
 
 express company, or any other common carrier 
 
 in the course of his or its business as common 
 
 [493] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 carrier, shall remain unclaimed and the legal 
 charges thereon unpaid during the space of six 
 months after its arrival at the point to which 
 it shall have been directed, and the owner or 
 person to whom the same is consigned cannot 
 be found upon diligent inquiry, or being found 
 and notified of the arrival of such article, shall 
 refuse or neglect to receive the same and pay 
 the legal charges thereon for the space of three 
 months, it shall be lawful for such common 
 carrier to sell such article at public auction, 
 after giving the owner or consignee fifteen days' 
 notice of time and place of sale, through the 
 post office and by advertising in a newspaper 
 published in the county where such sale is made, 
 and out of the proceeds of such sale to pay all 
 legal charges on such articles, and the amount 
 over, if any, shall be paid to the owner or con- 
 signee on demand {Ibid., §5041). 
 
 §6. 
 
 Act applies to The provisions of this act shall apply to hotel 
 hotel keepers, j^ggpgj-g g^^d warehousemen (Ibid., § 5043). 
 
 [494] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 XLI. 
 
 TENNESSEE. 
 Shannon's Annotated Code, 1896. 
 
 §1. 
 
 The rule of the common law giving a right of Receivingf 
 action to any person excluded from any hotel, g'^^sts. 
 or public means of transportation, or place of 
 amusement, is hereby abrogated; and hereafter 
 no keeper of any hotel, or public house, or car- 
 rier of passengers for hire, or conductors, drivers, 
 or employees of such carrier or keeper, shall be 
 bound, or under any obligation to entertain, 
 carry, or admit any person whom he shall, for 
 any reason whatever, choose not to entertain, 
 carry, or admit to his house, hotel, carriage, or 
 means of transportation, or place of amuse- 
 ment; nor shall any right exist in favor of any 
 such person so refused admission, but the right 
 of such keepers of hotels and public houses,' 
 carriers of passengers, and keepers of places of 
 amusement and their employees to control the 
 access and admission or exclusion of persons to 
 or from their pubUc houses, means of trans- 
 portation, and places of amusement, shall be 
 as perfect and complete as that of any private 
 person over his private house, carriage, or pri- 
 vate theatre, or places of amusement for his 
 iamily (Shannon's Code, § 3046). 
 
 [495] 
 
Appkndix. 
 
 Lien. 
 
 When 
 taches. 
 
 §2. 
 
 Keepers of hotels, boarding houses, and lodg- 
 ing houses, whether licensed or not, shall haVe 
 a lien on all furniture, baggage, wearing ap- 
 parel, or other goods and chattels brought into 
 any such hotel, boarding house, or lodging 
 house, by any guest or patron of the same, to 
 secure the payment by such guest of all sums 
 due for board or lodging (Ibid., §3590). 
 
 §3. 
 
 it at- The lien shall attach in all cases where a lia- 
 bility has been created, without regard to the 
 time of such board or lodging (Ibid., § 3591). 
 
 §4. 
 
 How enforced. Said Hen shall be enforced as other liens are 
 enforced by law (Ibid., § 3592). 
 
 §5. 
 
 Whenever the proprietor of any hotel or inn 
 shall provide a safe in the ofEce in such hotel 
 or inn, or other convenient place, for the safe- 
 keeping of any money, jewels, or ornaments be- 
 longing to the guests of such hotel or inn, or for 
 any samples of merchandise of any kind carried 
 by drummers or commercial travellers, and shall 
 notify the guests thereof by posting a notice 
 (stating the fact that such safe or other con- 
 venient place in which money, jewels, orna- 
 ments, or "samples" may be deposited) in the 
 room or rooms occupied by such guests, in a 
 conspicuous manner, if such guests shall neg- 
 lect to deposit such money, jewels, ornaments, 
 or samples of merchandise in such safe or other 
 convenient place, the proprietor shall not be 
 [496] 
 
 Innkeep er 
 may provide 
 safe for de- 
 posit of val- 
 uables, and 
 avoid liabil- 
 ity. 
 
Appendix, 
 
 liable for any loss of such money, jewels, orna- 
 ments, or samples of merchandise sustained by 
 such guest, by theft or otherwise {Ibid., § 3593).^ 
 
 §6. 
 
 Persons who shall, at any hotel, inn, or board- 
 ing house, order and receive, or cause to be 
 furnished, any food or accommodation, with 
 intent to defraud the owner or proprietor of 
 such hotel, inn, or boarding house out of the 
 value or price of such food or accommodation; 
 and any person who shall obtain credit at any 
 hotel, inn, or boarding house by the use of any 
 false pretence or device, or by fraudulently de- 
 positing at such hotel, inn, or boarding house 
 any baggage or property of value less than the 
 amount of such credit, or of the bill by such 
 person incurred, unless credit be given by ex- 
 press agreement; and any person who, after 
 obtaining credit or accommodation at any ho- 
 tel, inn, or boarding house, shall surreptitiously 
 remove his or her baggage or property there- 
 from, shall, upon conviction, be adjudged 
 guilty of a misdemeanor, and be punished ac- 
 cordingly (Ibid., §3594) .2 
 
 Intent to de- 
 fraud; pen- 
 alty. 
 
 §7. 
 
 Proof that lodging, food, or other accommo- Proof of 
 
 dation, was obtained by false pretence, or by fraudulent in- 
 
 c -I tent. 
 
 false or fictitious show or pretence oi baggage, 
 
 or that the party refused to pay for such food, 
 
 1 A watch and fob is witMn the phrase "jewels and 
 ornaments" in this section. Rains v. Maxwell, 112 Tenn. 
 219; 79 S. W. 114 (1904). 
 
 2 This statute is constitutional. State v. Yardley, 95 
 Tenn. 546, 32 S. W 481 (1895). 
 
 32 [497] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 Baggage may 
 be sold. 
 
 lodging, or accommodation, on demand, or that 
 he absconded without paying or offering to pay 
 for such food, lodging or other accommodations, 
 or that he surreptitiously removed, or attempted 
 to remove, his or her baggage, shall be 'prima 
 facie proof of the fraudulent intent mentioned 
 in section 3594 {Ihid., § 3595). 
 
 §8. 
 
 At any time after thirty days after the person 
 incurring the debt or obligation has left the 
 hotel, inn, or boarding house, and the debt or 
 obligation being still due and unpaid, the owner 
 or proprietor of said hotel, inn, or boarding 
 house may sell, at public auction, for cash, at 
 hotel or boarding house office, any or all bag- 
 gage or property left at said hotel, inn, or board- 
 ing house, to satisfy said debt or obligation, 
 without any process at law or equity, provided 
 that said sale shall be advertised by written or 
 printed posters for at least ten days before said 
 sale {Ihid., § 3596). 
 
 Speculation in 
 theatre tick- 
 ets. 
 
 Penalty. 
 
 [498] 
 
 It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or 
 corporation, to sell or offer for sale any theatre 
 ticket or tickets for a greater price than the 
 price for which same are sold at the box office 
 of the theatre to which said tickets entitle the 
 holders thereof to admission. Any person, firm 
 or corporation violating the provisions of this 
 act shall upon conviction be fined not less than 
 $50.00 and not more than flOO.OO, and be im- 
 prisoned in the county jail or workhouse for a 
 period not to exceed thirty days at the discre- 
 tion of the court (Acts of 1903, chap. 545). 
 
Appendix. 
 
 XLII. 
 
 TEXAS. 
 
 Revised Civil Statutes, 1895. 
 
 §1. 
 
 Proprietors of hotels and boarding houses 
 shall have a special lien upon all property or 
 baggage deposited with them for the amount 
 of the charges against them or their owners if 
 guests at such hotel or boarding house (R. S., 
 § 3318). 
 
 Lien in favor 
 of hotels and 
 boarding 
 houses. 
 
 §2. 
 
 When possession of any of the property em- 
 braced in the four preceding articles has con- 
 tinued for sixty days after the charges accrue, 
 and the charges so due have not been paid, it 
 shall be the duty of the persons so holding said 
 property to notify the owner, if in the State 
 and his residence be- known, to come forward 
 and pay the charges due, and on his failure 
 within ten days after such notice has been given 
 him to pay said charges the persons so holding 
 said property, after twenty days' notice, are 
 authorized to sell said property at public sale 
 and apply the proceeds to the payment of said 
 charges, and shall pay over the balance to the 
 person entitled to the same (Ibid., § 3222). 
 
 When prop- 
 erty may be 
 sold for 
 charges. 
 
 [499] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 When owner 
 lives out of 
 the state or 
 residence is 
 unknown. 
 
 §3. 
 
 If the owner's residence is beyond the State 
 or is unknown, the person holding said prop- 
 erty shall not be required to give the ten 
 days' notice mentioned in the preceding article 
 before proceeding to sell (Ibid., § 3223). 
 
 Balance, how 
 disposed of. 
 
 §4. 
 
 If the person who is legally entitled to re- 
 ceive the balance mentioned in this chapter is 
 not known, or has removed from the State or 
 from the county in which such repairing was 
 done or such property was so held, it shall be 
 the duty of the person so holding said prop- 
 erty to pay the balance to the county treasurer 
 of the county in which said property is held, 
 and take his receipt therefor (Ibid., § 3224). 
 
 What is to be 
 done finally 
 with the bal- 
 ance. 
 
 Defrauding 
 hotels and 
 boarding- 
 house keep- 
 ers. 
 
 [500] 
 
 §5. 
 
 Whenever any balance mentioned in this 
 chapter shall remain in the possession of the 
 county treasurer for the period of two .years 
 unclaimed by the party legally entitled to the 
 same, such balance shall become a part of the 
 county fund of the county in which the prop- 
 erty was so sold, and shall be applied as any 
 other county fund or money of such county is 
 appUed or used {Ibid., § 3225). 
 
 §6. 
 
 Every person who shall obtain board or lodg- 
 ing in any hotel or boarding house by means 
 of any trick or deception or false or fraudulent 
 representations, or statement or pretence, and 
 shall fail or refuse to pay therefor, shall be held 
 
Appendix, 
 
 to have obtained the same with the intent tp 
 cheat and defraud such hotel or boarding-house 
 keeper, and shall be deemed guilty of a misde-^ 
 meanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be 
 punished by a fine not exceeding one hundred 
 dollars or by imprisonment in the coimty jail 
 not exceeding one month, or by both such fine 
 and imprisonment (Laws of 1899, chap. 101, 
 §1). 
 
 §7. 
 
 It shall be the duty of every hotel and board- 
 ing-house keeper in the State to post a printed Posting no- 
 copy of this act in a conspicuous place in each *'•'*• 
 room of his or her hotel or boarding house, and 
 no conviction shall be had under the foregoing 
 section until it shall be made to appear to the 
 satisfaction of the court that the provisions of 
 this section have been substantially complied 
 with by the hotel or boarding-house keeper 
 making the complaint {Ibid., § 2). 
 
 [501] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 XLIII. 
 
 UTAH. 
 
 Revised Statutes, 1898. 
 
 Ranchmen, 
 herders, tav- 
 ern keepers, 
 etc., lien of. 
 
 Any ranchman, farmer, agister, or herder of 
 cattle, tavern keeper, or hvery-stable keeper, 
 to whom any horses, mules, cattle, sheep, or 
 asses, shall be intrusted for the purpose of feed- 
 ing, herding, pasturing, or ranching, shall have 
 a lien upon such animals for the amount that 
 may be due him for such feeding, herding, pas- 
 turing, or ranching, and shall be authorized to 
 retain possession of such animals until the said 
 amount is paid (R. S., § 1401). 
 
 Innkeepers, 
 boarding 
 house, etc., 
 lien of. 
 
 §2. 
 
 Every hotel, tavern, boarding-house keeper, 
 or person who lets furnished rooms, shall have 
 a lien upon the baggage of his patrons, boarders, 
 guests, and tenants for the amount that may 
 be due from any such persons for such boarding, 
 lodging, or rent, and he is hereby authorized 
 to hold and retain possession of such baggage 
 until the amount so due for boarding, lodging, 
 or rent, or either, is paid {Ibid., § 1402). 
 
 [502] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 §3. 
 
 At any time after thirty days after default 
 made in the pajmaent of a debt secured by a 
 hen upon personal property, such lien may be Foreclosure 
 foreclosed by advertisement, upon the notice ^ 
 
 and in the manner provided for the foreclosure 
 of mortgages on personal property: provided, 
 that a copy of the notice shall, at the time of 
 posting or pubhcation, be deUvered to the owner 
 of the property, or if he does not reside in the 
 county, shall be transmitted to him by mail at 
 his usual place of abode, if known. After pay- 
 ing the reasonable expenses of the sale, together 
 with the amount due and the cost of keeping 
 the property up to the time of the sale, the 
 residue, if any, shall be rendered to the owner 
 of the property. If the property be sold by 
 advertisement, a statement shall be rendered 
 to the owner of the property as the law pre- 
 scribes shall be made to a mortgagor, and on fail- 
 ure to render such statement, the henholder 
 shall forfeit to the owner the sum of twenty- 
 five dollars damages. The fees for the publi- 
 cation of notice shall in no case exceed the sum 
 of three dollars, and the fees of the person cry- 
 ing the sale shall be two dollars per day {Ibid., 
 § 1405). 
 
 §4. 
 
 Nothing in this chapter shall take away the 
 right of action of the party to whom such hen Right of ac- 
 is given, for his charges, or for any residue "*°' 
 thereof, after sale of such property (Ibid., 
 § 1406). 
 
 [503] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 Obtaining 
 food, etc., un- 
 der false pre- 
 tences. 
 
 §5. 
 
 Any person who shall put up at any hotel, 
 inn, or boarding house, and shall procure any 
 food, entertainment, or accommodation, with- 
 out paying therefor, except where credit is 
 given by express agreement, with intent to 
 cheat or defraud such owner or keeper thereof 
 out of the pay for the same; or who, with in- 
 tent to cheat or defraud such owner or keeper 
 out of the pay therefor, shall obtain credit at 
 any hotel, inn, or boarding house for such food, 
 entertainment, or accommodation by means of 
 any false show of baggage or effects brought 
 thereto; or who shall with such intent remove 
 or cause to be removed, any baggage, or effects 
 from any hotel, inn, or boarding house, while 
 there is a lien existing thereon for the proper 
 charges due from him for fare and board fur- 
 nished therein, shall be punished by a fine not 
 exceeding one hundred dollars, or by impris- 
 onment in the county jail not exceeding three 
 months (Ibid., § 4470). 
 
 Innkeeper re- 
 fusing guest. 
 
 §6. 
 
 Every person and every agent or officer of 
 any corporation carrying on business as an inn- 
 keeper, or as a common carrier of passengers, 
 who refuses, without just cause or excuse, to 
 receive and entertain any guest, or to receive 
 and carry any passenger, is guilty of a misde- 
 meanor {Ibid., § 4471). 
 
 [504] 
 
 §7. 
 
 Any person attending a theatre, opera house, 
 or an indoor place of amusement as a spectator 
 
Appendix. 
 
 shall remove headwear tending to obstruct the 
 view of any other person. Any person violat- 
 ing any of the provisions of the section shall be 
 subject to a fine of not less than one dollar nor 
 more than ten dollars for each offence, upon 
 conviction thereof {Ibid., §4487). 
 
 High hats to 
 be removed at 
 theatre, etc. ; 
 penalty. 
 
 §8. 
 Every person, body-corporate, agent, man- 
 ager, or employer, doing business in the State 
 of Utah, who by coercion, intimidation, threats 
 or undue influence, compels his employees to 
 board at a particular boarding house, or to 
 trade with or at a particular store, shall be 
 deemed guilty of a misdemeanor (Laws of 1901, 
 chap. 44). 
 
 No person 
 must compel 
 employee to 
 board at par- 
 ticular house 
 or trade at 
 particular 
 store. 
 
 [505] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 XLIV. 
 
 VERMONT. 
 
 Statutes, 1894. 
 
 Innkeeper's 
 duty; license 
 vacated for 
 neglect. 
 
 A person licensed as an innkeeper shall have 
 suitable provisions, lodgings and accommoda- 
 tions for strangers and travellers, and suitable 
 room, hay and provender for their horses and 
 cattle, and a suitable shed or covering for horses 
 near his house, with conveniences in the same 
 for feeding horses; and if said innkeeper neg- 
 lects to be so furnished, the authority granting 
 such license shall vacate the same ^ (Stat., 
 §4723). 
 
 Liability of 
 innke eper, 
 limited. 
 
 [506; 
 
 §2. 
 
 Whenever an innkeeper shall provide a safe 
 in such inn for the safe-keeping of any money, 
 jewels, or ornaments belonging to the guests of 
 such inn and shall give notice thereof by post- 
 ing in a public and conspicuous place and man- 
 ner in the office and public room, and in the 
 public parlors of such inn the fact that such 
 safe is provided in which such money, jewels, 
 or ornaments may be deposited, if a guest shall 
 neglect to deliver such money, jewels, or orna- 
 ments to the person apparently in charge of the 
 
Appendix. 
 
 office of such inn for deposit in such safe, such 
 innkeeper shall not be liable for any loss of 
 money, jewels, or ornaments sustained by such 
 guest, unless such loss shall occur through some 
 want of ordinary care and diligence of such 
 innkeeper. No innkeeper shall be Uable to any 
 guest for the loss of wearing apparel, or per- 
 sonal baggage for any sum exceeding three 
 hundred dollars, unless it shall appear that 
 such loss occurred through want of ordinary 
 care and diligence of such innkeeper {Ibid., 
 § 4728). 
 
 §3. 
 
 No innkeeper shall be hable for loss or dam- 
 age to articles known or used as "samples" 
 belonging to commercial men or other persons 
 occurring other than through want of ordinary 
 care and diligence of such irmkeeper {Ibid., 
 § 4729). 
 
 Maximum lia- 
 biUty. 
 
 Commercial 
 samples. 
 
 §4. 
 
 No innkeeper shall be liable for loss in case of 
 fire or overwhelming force where such innkeeper 
 has exercised ordinary and reasonable care in 
 the custody of the baggage or other property 
 of a guest {Ibid., § 4730). 
 
 Fire or force. 
 
 §5. 
 
 A person who obtains food or lodging for 
 himself, or others, at a hotel, with intent to 
 defraud the owner or keeper thereof, shall be 
 imprisoned not more than three months, or 
 fined not more than fifty dollars {Ibid., § 4961). 
 
 Fraud on ho- 
 tel keeper. 
 
 [5Q7] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 XLV. 
 
 VIRGINIA. 
 
 Code of 1887, Supplement of 1899. 
 
 Lien of inn- 
 keepers, etc. 
 
 Every innkeeper, keeper of an ordinary, board- 
 ing house, and house of private entertainment, 
 shall have a lien upon and may retain posses- 
 sion of the baggage and effects of any guest or 
 boarder, for the amount which may be due 
 him from such guest or boarder for board and 
 lodging, until such amount is paid (Code, 
 §2489). 
 
 Enforcement 
 of liens ac- 
 quired under 
 the three pre- 
 ceding sec- 
 tions, and of 
 the lien of 
 bailees. 
 
 §2. 
 
 Any person having a lien under either of the 
 preceding sections, and any bailee, except such 
 as mentioned in sections twelve hundred and 
 twenty-one and twelve hundred and twenty- 
 two, having a lien as such at common law 
 on personal property in his possession which 
 he has no power to sell for the satisfaction of 
 the lien, if the debt for which the lien exists 
 be not paid within ten days after it is due and 
 the value of the property affected by the lien 
 does not exceed twenty dollars, may sell such 
 property or so much thereof as may be neces- 
 sary, by public auction, for cash, and apply the 
 
 [508] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 proceeds to the satisfaction of the debt and 
 expenses of sale, and the surplus, if any, he 
 shall pay to the owner of the property. Be- 
 fore making such sale, he shall advertise the 
 time, place, and terms thereof, in such manner 
 as to give pubUcity thereto, and also give to 
 the owner, if he be in the county or corpora- 
 tion, ten days' written notice of the same and 
 of the amount claimed to be due. If the owner 
 cannot be found in such county or corporation, 
 posting the notice at three public places therein 
 shall be sufficient service thereof. If the value 
 of the property be more than twenty dollars 
 but does not exceed one hundred dollars, the 
 party having such hen, after giving notice as 
 hereinbefore provided, may apply by petition 
 to any justice of the county or corporation 
 wherein the property is, or, if the value of the 
 property exceed one hundred dollars, to the 
 county or corporation court of such county or 
 corporation, for the sale of the property; and 
 if, on the hearing of the case on the petition, 
 the defence, if any made thereto, and such evi- 
 dence as may be adduced by the parties re- 
 spectively, the court or justice shall be satisfied 
 that the debt and hen are established and the 
 property should be sold to pay the debt, such 
 court or justice shall order the sale to be made 
 by the sheriff or sergeant of the said county or 
 corporation or any constable thereof, who shall 
 make the same and apply and dispose of the 
 proceeds in the same manner as if the sale were 
 made under a writ of fieri facias. If the owner 
 of the property be a resident of this State, the 
 notice required by this section may be served 
 in the mode prescribed by .section thirty- two 
 
 [509] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 hundred and seven. If he be a non-resident, 
 it may be served by posting a copy thereof in 
 three public places in the county or corporation 
 wherein the property is {Ibid., §2491). 
 
 How and 
 when validity 
 of the lien, or 
 claim of other 
 person to the 
 property, is 
 tried. 
 
 §3. 
 
 Any person may file his petition, at any time 
 before the property is sold or the proceeds of 
 sale are paid to the plaintiff under the judg- 
 ment of the justice or court, disputing the va- 
 lidity of the plaintiff's lien thereon, or stating a 
 claim thereto, or an interest in or lien on the 
 same, and its nature; and the justice of the 
 court, as the case may be, shall inquire into 
 such claim, and if it be found that the peti- 
 tioner has title to, or a lien on, or any interest 
 in, such property or proceeds of sale, the jus- 
 tice or court shall make such order as is neces- 
 sary to protect his rights (Ibid., § 2492). 
 
 Appeals, how 
 taken and 
 tried. 
 
 §4. 
 
 Any party may appeal from the judgment of 
 the justice, as in case of warrants for small 
 claims imder chapter one himdred and forty, 
 and such appeal shall be heard and determined 
 in hke manner, as appeals under said chapter 
 (Ibid., §2493). 
 
 Defrauding 
 innkeeper. 
 
 [510] 
 
 §5. 
 
 Whoever puts up at a hotel or boarding house 
 and without having an express agreement for 
 credit procures food, entertainment, or accom- 
 modation without paying therefor and with in- 
 tent to cheat or defraud the owner or keeper 
 of such hotel or boarding house out of the pay 
 
Appendix. 
 
 for the same; or with intent to cheat or defraud 
 such owner or keeper out of the pay therefor 
 obtains credit at a hotel or boarding house for 
 such food, entertainment, or accommodation by 
 means of any false show of baggage or effects 
 brought thereto; or with such intent obtains 
 credit at a hotel or boarding house for such 
 food, entertainment, or accommodation through 
 any misrepresentation or false statement; or 
 with such intent removes or causes to be re- 
 moved any baggage or effects from a hotel or 
 boarding house while there is a hen existing 
 thereon for the proper charges due from him 
 for fare and board furnished therein shall be 
 punished by imprisonment not exceeding three 
 months or by fine not exceeding fifty dollars 
 {Ibid., § 3722b). 
 
 [511] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 XLVI. 
 WASHINGTON. 
 
 General Statutes and Codes, 1891. 
 
 §1. 
 
 Lien. Hereafter all hotel keepers, innkeepers, lodg- 
 
 ing-house keepers, and boarding-house keepers 
 in this State shall have a lien upon the baggage, 
 property, or other valuables of their guests, 
 lodgers, or boarders brought into such hotel, 
 inn, lodging house, or boarding house by such 
 guests, lodgers, or boarders, for the proper 
 charges due from such guests, lodgers, or 
 boarders for their accommodation, board or 
 lodging, and such other extras as are furnished 
 at their request, and shall have the right to re- 
 tain in their possession such baggage, property, 
 or other valuables until such charges are fully 
 paid, and to sell such baggage, property, or 
 other valuables for the payment of such charges 
 in the manner provided in the next succeed- 
 ing section of this title (Gen. Stat., § 2710). 
 
 §2. 
 
 Sale of bag- Whenever any baggage, property, or other 
 
 gage, etc., to valuables which have been retained by any ho- 
 
 satisfy lien; ^^ keeper, innkeeper, lodging-house keeper, or 
 
 boarding-house keeper in his possession by vir- 
 
 [512] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 tue of the provision of the next preceding sec- 
 tion of this title shall remain unredeemed for 
 the period of three months after the same shall 
 have been so retained, then it shall be lawful 
 for such hotel keeper, innkeeper, lodging-house 
 keeper, or boarding-house keeper to sell such 
 baggage, property, or other valuables at public 
 auction, after giving the owner thereof ten days' 
 notice of the time and place of such sale, through 
 the post office, or by advertising in some news- 
 paper published in the county where such sale 
 is made, or by posting notices in three con- 
 spicuous places in such county, and out of the 
 proceeds of such sale to pay all legal charges 
 due from the owner of such baggage, property, 
 or other valuables, including proper charges for 
 storage of the same, and the overplus, if any, 
 shall be paid to the owner upon demand (Ibid., 
 §2711). 
 
 §3. 
 
 No innkeeper who constantly has in his inn 
 an iron safe or suitable vault in good order, 
 and fit for the safe custody of money, bank 
 notes, jewelry, articles of gold and silver manu- 
 facture, precious stones and bullion, and who 
 keeps a copy of this section, printed by itself 
 in large, plain Roman type, and framed, con- 
 stantly and conspicuously suspended in the of- 
 fice, barroom, saloon, reading, sitting, and par- 
 lor room of his inn, and also a copy printed by 
 itself in ordinary sized plain Roman type, posted 
 upon the inside of the entrance door of every 
 public sleeping room of his inn, shall be hable 
 for the loss of any such article suffered by any 
 33 
 
 Responsibil- 
 ity of inn- 
 keepers limit- 
 ed. 
 
 [513] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 guest, unless such guest has first offered to de- 
 hver such property lost by him to such inn- 
 keeper for custody in such iron safe or vault, 
 and such innkeeper has refused or neglected to 
 receive and deposit such property in his safe 
 or vault, and to give such guest a receipt there- 
 for; provided, that all doors to rooms furnished 
 to guests shall be provided with shde bolts in- 
 side of such rooms on all doors; otherwise he 
 shall be liable; but every innkeeper shall be 
 liable for any loss of any of the above-enumer- 
 ated articles by a guest in his inn, when caused 
 by the theft or negligence of the innkeeper or 
 any of his servants {Ibid., § 2712). 
 
 Fraud on ho- 
 tel keepers, 
 etc.; penalty. 
 
 §4. 
 
 A person who obtains any food, lodging or 
 accommodation at a hotel, boarding house, res- 
 taurant, or lodging house, without paying there- 
 for, with intent to defraud the proprietor or 
 manager thereof, or who obtains credit at a 
 hotel, boarding house, or lodging house by the 
 use of false pretence, or who after obtaining 
 board, lodging or accommodations at a hotel, 
 boarding house, restaurant, or lodging house, 
 absconds or surreptitiously removes his bag- 
 gage therefrom without paying for his food, 
 lodging or accommodation, is guilty of a mis- 
 demeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be 
 fined in any sum not less than ten dollars nor 
 more than fifty dollars, or imprisonment in the 
 county jail not less than ten nor more than 
 thirty days (Laws of 1903, chap. 131, § 1). 
 
 [514] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 §5. 
 
 Proof that lodging, food or other accommo- Proof of 
 dation was obtained by false pretence or by fraudulent in- 
 false or fictitious sham or pretence of any bag- 
 gage or other property, or that the person re- 
 fused or neglected to pay for such food, lodging 
 or other accommodation on demand, or that he 
 gave in payment for such food, lodging or other 
 accommodation bank draft on which payment 
 was refused, or that he absconded without pay- 
 ing or offering to pay for such food, lodging or 
 other accommodation, or that he surreptitiously 
 removed or attempted to remove his baggage 
 shall be prima facie proof of the fraudulent 
 intent mentioned in section 1 {Ibid., §2). 
 
 [515] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 XLVII. 
 
 WEST VIRGINIA. 
 Code of 1899. 
 
 Tavern li- 
 censes. 
 
 Fraud on ho- 
 tel keepers, 
 etc. 
 
 Every house where food and lodging is usu- 
 ally furnished to travellers and payment required 
 therefor, shall be deemed a hotel or tavern. 
 Every person licensed to keep a hotel or tavern 
 shall constantly provide the same with lodging 
 and diet for travellers and their servants, and 
 with stableage and provender, or pasturage and 
 provender, as the season may require, for their 
 horses; but if such hotel be in a city, village or 
 town, the council may, if the applicant desire 
 it, dispense with the necessity of providing for 
 horses (Code, chap. 32, § 8). 
 
 §2- 
 
 Every person who shall at any hotel, inn, 
 eating, lodging or boarding house, or restau- 
 rant, receive or cause to be furnished any food 
 or accommodation with intent to defraud the 
 owner or keeper of such hotel, inn, eating, lodg- 
 ing or boarding house, or restaurant, and any 
 person who shall obtain credit at any hotel, 
 inn, eating, lodging or boarding house, or res- 
 taurant, by the use of any false pretence or 
 
 [516] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 device, or by depositing at such hotel, hin, eat- 
 ing, lodging or boarding house, or restaurant, 
 any baggage or property of value less than the 
 amount of such credit, or of the biU by such 
 person incurred, with such fraudulent intent, 
 and any person, who after obtaining credit or 
 accommodation at any hotel, inn, eating, lodg- 
 ing or boarding house, or restaurant, shall ab- 
 scond from such hotel, inn, eating, lodging or 
 boarding house, or restaurant, or shall remove 
 or attempt to remove therefrom any baggage 
 or personal property of any kind subject to the 
 lien hereafter mentioned, with intent to defraud 
 the owner or keeper of such hotel, inn, eating, 
 lodging or boarding house, or restaurant, with- 
 out having first paid, satisfied or arranged all 
 claims or bills for lodging, entertainment or 
 accommodation, shall be guilty of a misde- 
 meanor, and, upon conviction thereof, be fined 
 not less than twenty-five dollars nor more than Penalty, 
 two hundred dollars, and may, at the discretion 
 of the court or justice trying the case, be con- 
 fined in the county jail for a term not less than 
 ten nor more than thirty days. Any justice of 
 the peace for the county wherein the offence 
 was committed, shall have concurrent jurisdic- 
 tion of such offence with the circuit or other 
 courts of said county. The owner or keeper Lien of hotel 
 of any hotel, inn, eating, boarding or lodging »®P^'s, e . 
 house, or restaurant, shall have a hen upon, 
 and may keep possession of, the baggage or 
 other personal property of any kind, of any 
 person or persons which he or they may have 
 therein, for all such claims or bills for lodging, 
 entertainment or accommodation, to the ex- 
 tent only of his said claim or bill; and after 
 
 [517] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 the expiration of three months from the date 
 of the departure of such person or persons, and 
 all or part of such claims remaining unpaid 
 and not arranged, said property or such part 
 thereof as may be necessary shall be sold to the 
 highest bidder for cash, in the same way, upon 
 the same advertisement, and by the same of- 
 ficers, that personal property is now sold on 
 execution; and any money remaining from said 
 sale after satisfying the claim, costs and ex- 
 penses of sale, shall be paid to the person or 
 persons, whose property was sold (Ibid., chap. 
 145, § 32). 
 
 §3. 
 
 It shall be the duty of the keepers of hotels, 
 inns, lodging or boarding houses to exercise due 
 Limitation of care and diligence in providing honest servants, 
 * ' ^' and employees, and to take every reasonable 
 
 precaution to protect the persons and property 
 of his or their guests and boarders, but no such 
 keeper of any hotel, inn, lodging or boarding 
 house, shall be held hable in a greater sum than 
 two hundred and fifty dollars for the loss of 
 any wearing apparel, baggage or other prop- 
 erty, not hereinafter mentioned, belonging to 
 either a guest or boarder, when such loss takes 
 place from the room or rooms occupied by said 
 guest or boarder, and no keeper of a hotel, inn, 
 lodging or boarding house, shall be held hable 
 for any loss on the part of any guest or boarder 
 of jewelry, money or other valuables of like 
 nature : Provided, Such keeper shall have posted 
 in the room or rooms occupied by guests or 
 boarders in a conspicuous place, and in the 
 hotel office and public reception room of such 
 [518] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 hotel, inn, lodging or boarding house, a notice 
 stating the fact that "jewelry, money and other 
 valuables of like nature must be deposited in 
 the office of such hotel, inn, lodging or board- 
 ing house," unless such loss shall take place 
 from such office after such deposit (Ibid., § 33). 
 
 [519] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 iimkeepers. 
 
 XVIII. 
 
 WISCONSIN. 
 
 Annotated Statutes of 1899. 
 
 No innkeeper who shall constantly have in 
 his inn an iron safe, in good order and suitable 
 Liability of for the safe custody of money, jewelry and ar- 
 ticles of gold or silver manufacture and the like, 
 and who shall keep a copy of this and the next 
 succeeding section printed together in large, 
 plain English type, and framed, constantly and 
 conspicuously suspended in the ofSce, barroom, 
 saloon, reading, sitting and parlor rooms of his 
 inn, shall be liable for the loss of any such ar- 
 ticles aforesaid, suffered by any guest, unless 
 such guest shall have first offered to deliver 
 such property lost by him to such innkeeper 
 for custody in such iron safe, and such innkeeper 
 shall have 'refused or omitted to take it and 
 deposit it in such safe for its custody, and 
 give such guest a receipt therefor (Ann. Stat., 
 § 1725).! 
 
 [520] 
 
 1 A watch is within the provisions of this section. 
 Stewart v. Parsons, 24 Wis. 241 (1869). 
 
Appendix. 
 
 §2. 
 
 No innkeeper shall be liable for the loss of 
 any baggage or other property of his guest, 
 caused by fire, not intentional, produced by 
 the innkeeper or any of his servants; but every 
 innkeeper shall be liable for any loss of any 
 guest in his inn, caused by theft or gross neg- 
 ligence of such innkeeper or any of his servants 
 (Ibid., §1726). 
 
 Liability 
 loss of 
 gage. 
 
 for 
 
 §3. 
 
 Every innkeeper, and every keeper of a 
 boarding house shall have a hen upon and re- 
 tain the possession of the baggage and effects 
 of any guest or boarder for the amount which 
 may be due him for board from such guest or 
 boarder, until such amount is paid {Ibid., 
 § 3344) .2 
 
 Liens of inn- 
 keepers and 
 boar ding- 
 house keep- 
 ers. 
 
 §4. 
 
 Every person having a lien given by either 
 of the four last sections, or existing in favor of 
 any bailee for hire, carrier, warehouseman or 
 pawnee, or otherwise, by the common law, may, 
 in case such debt remain unpaid for three 
 months, and the value of the property affected 
 thereby does not exceed one himdred dollars, 
 sell such property at pubHc auction, and apply 
 the proceeds of such sale to the payment of 
 the amount due him, and the expenses of such 
 sale. Notice, in writing, of the time and place 
 of such sale, and of the amount claimed to be 
 due, shall be given to the owner of such prop- 
 
 How lien en- 
 forced. 
 
 a See Nichols v. HaUiday, 27 Wis. 406 (1871). 
 
 [521] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 erty personally, or by leaving the same at his 
 place of abode, if a resident of this State, and 
 if not, by publication thereof, once in each week, 
 for three weeks successively, next before the 
 time of sale, in some newspaper published in 
 the county in which such lien accrues, if there 
 be one, and if not, by posting such notice in 
 three pubhc places in such county. If such 
 property exceed in value one hundred dollars, 
 then such lien may be enforced against the 
 same by action in any court having jurisdic- 
 tion {Ibid., § 3347). 
 
 §5. 
 
 Whenever any personal property shall be con- 
 signed to or deposited with any common car- 
 Unclaimed rier, forwarding merchant, wharfinger, ware- 
 proper y. houseman, innkeeper, or the keeper of any depot 
 for the storage of baggage, merchandise or other 
 personal property, such consignee, or bailee, 
 shall immediately cause to be entered in a 
 proper book kept by him, a description of such 
 property, with the date of the reception thereof; 
 and if the same shall not have been so con- 
 signed or deposited for the purpose of being 
 forwarded or disposed of according to directions 
 received by such consignee or bailee, at or be- 
 fore his reception thereof, he shall immediately 
 notify the owner by mail thereof, if his name 
 and residence be known, or can, with reason- 
 able diligence, be ascertained {Ibid., § 1637). 
 
 §6. 
 Sale. If any such property shall not be claimed 
 
 and taken away within one year after it shall 
 have been so received, the same may be sold 
 [522] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 as hereinafter directed; but when such prop- 
 erty shall be perishable, or subject to decay 
 by keeping, it may be sold if not claimed and 
 taken within thirty days {Ibid., § 1638). 
 
 §7. 
 
 Before any such property except as afore- 
 said, shall be sold, ten days' notice of such sale, 
 if the property be perishable, or subject to de- 
 cay in keeping, and sixty days' notice in other 
 cases, shall be given the owner thereof by the 
 person in possession of such property, either 
 personally or by mail, or by leaving a written 
 notice at his residence or place of business; but 
 if the name and residence of such owner be not 
 known, and cannot with reasonable diligence 
 be ascertained, such notice shall be given by 
 publication thereof for the periods aforesaid 
 respectively, dating from the first publication, 
 at least once in each week, in a newspaper 
 pubhshed in the county, if there be one; and 
 if there be none, then in a newspaper pubhshed 
 in an adjoining county {Ibid., § 1639). 
 
 §8. 
 
 If the owner or person entitled to such prop- 
 erty shall not take the same away and pay the 
 charges thereon, after notice as aforesaid shall 
 have been given, the person having possession 
 thereof, his agent or attorney, shall make and 
 deliver to a justice of the peace of the same 
 town an affidavit, setting forth a description of 
 the property remaining unclaimed, the time of 
 its reception, the publication of the notice, and 
 whether the owner of such property be known 
 or unknown {Ibid., § 1640). 
 
 Notice of sale. 
 
 Proceedings 
 if property 
 not claimed. 
 
 [523] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 §9. 
 
 Upon the delivery to him of such affidavit, 
 the justice shall cause such property to be 
 Inventory. opened and examined in his presence, and a 
 true inventory thereof to be made, and shall 
 annex to such inventory an order imder his 
 hand, that the property therein described be 
 sold by any constable of the city or town where 
 the same shall be, at public auction (Ibid., 
 § 1641). 
 
 Notice of auc- 
 tion sale. 
 
 Ret urn 
 sale. 
 
 of 
 
 Proceeds, 
 how disposed 
 of. 
 
 [524] 
 
 §10. 
 
 The constable receiving such inventory and 
 order shall give ten days' notice of the sale, 
 by posting up written notices thereof in three 
 or more public places in such city or town, and 
 sell such property at public auction to the high- 
 est bidder, in the same manner as provided by 
 law for sales under execution from justices' 
 courts (Ibid., § 1642). 
 
 §11. 
 
 Upon completing the sale, the constable mak- 
 ing the same shall indorse upon the order afore- 
 said a return of his proceedings thereon, and 
 return the same to the justice, together with 
 the inventory and the proceeds of the sale, after 
 deducting his fees {Ibid., § 1643). 
 
 §12. 
 
 From the proceeds of such sale the justice 
 shall pay all legal charges that have been in- 
 curred in relation to such property, or a ratable 
 proportion of each charge, if the proceeds of 
 such sale shall not be sufficient to pay all the 
 
Appendix. 
 
 charges; and the balance, if any there be, he 
 shall immediately pay over to the treasurer of 
 his county, and deliver a statement therewith, 
 containing a description of the property sold, 
 the gross amount of such sale, and the amount 
 of costs, charges and expenses paid to each 
 person. The county treasurer shall file such 
 statement, give a receipt for the money, and 
 properly enter in his books the amount thereof 
 and the date {Ibid., § 1644). 
 
 §13. 
 
 If the owner of the property sold, or his legal 
 representatives, shall at any time within five 
 years after such money shall have been depos- 
 ited in the county treasury, furnish satisfactory 
 evidence to the treasurer, of the ownership of 
 such property, he or they shall be entitled to 
 receive from such treasurer the amount so de- 
 posited with him. If not claimed within said 
 time by the owner or his legal representatives, 
 the same shall belong to the county {Ibid., 
 § 1645). 
 
 Owner, when 
 to have pro- 
 ceeds; when 
 to be paid 
 county. 
 
 §14. 
 
 The fees allowed to any justice of the peace 
 imder this chapter, shall be one dollar for each 
 day's service, and to any constable the same 
 fees as are allowed by law for sales upon exe- 
 cution, and ten cents per folio for making an 
 inventory of property {Ibid., § 1646). 
 
 Officers' fees. 
 
 §15. 
 
 Any person who shall obtain credit at any 
 hotel or boarding house for food, entertairmient 
 
 [525] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 Defrauding 
 innkeeper 
 
 or accommodation, by means of any false show 
 of baggage or effects brought thereto, or who 
 shall, with intent to cheat or defraud the owner 
 or keeper of any such hotel, inn or boarding 
 house, out of the pay for any such food, enter- 
 tainment or accommodation, remove or cause 
 to be removed any baggage or effects from any 
 hotel, inn or boarding house, while there is a 
 lien existing thereon for the proper charges due 
 from him for board and entertainment furnished 
 as aforesaid, shall be punished by a fine not ex- 
 ceeding one hundred dollars, or imprisonment 
 in the county jail not exceeding three months 
 (Laws of 1895, chap. 106). 
 
 Fraudulently 
 obtaining 
 food, etc. 
 
 Complainant 
 shall give se- 
 curity for 
 costs. 
 
 [526] 
 
 §16. 
 
 Any person who obtains any food or accom- 
 modation at any hotel or inn without pajdng 
 therefor, except when credit is given by express 
 agreement, with intent to defraud the propri- 
 etor or manager thereof, or who obtains credit 
 at any hotel or inn by use of any false show or 
 pretence, or who after obtaining credit or ac- 
 commodation at any hotel or inn, absconds or 
 surreptitiously removes his baggage therefrom, 
 without paying for his food and accommoda- 
 tion, shall be punished by fine not exceeding 
 one hundred dollars, or imprisonment in thei 
 county jail not exceeding three months (Laws 
 of 1897, chap. 197, § 1). 
 
 §17. 
 The complainant shall be required to give se- 
 curity for costs, and if he neglects or refuses so 
 to do, no warrant shall be issued under the 
 foregoing section of this act {Ibid., §2). 
 
Appendix. 
 
 §18. 
 
 Actions commenced under this act shall not 
 be settled or compromised in any manner un- 
 less the costs incurred up to the time of such Actions not to 
 settlement or compromise are fully paid and 
 discharged, and if any such settlement or com- are paid, 
 promise be made without such costs being paid 
 as aforesaid, the court before whom such action 
 is brought or is pending shall enter judgment 
 against the complainant for the fuU amount of 
 such costs so remaining unpaid {Ibid., § 3). 
 
 be settled un- 
 less all costs 
 
 [527] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 XLIX. 
 
 WYOMING. 
 
 Revised Statutes of 1899. 
 
 Safe; liability 
 limited. 
 
 §1. 
 
 Every landlord or keeper of a public inn or 
 hotel in this State, who shall keep in his place 
 of business an iron safe, in good order and suit- 
 able for the purpose hereinafter named, and 
 who shall post or cause to be posted in some 
 conspicuous place in his office, and on the in- 
 side of every entrance door to every bed- 
 chamber, the notice hereinafter mentioned, 
 shall not be liable for the loss of any money, 
 jewelry or other valuables belonging to his 
 guests or customers, unless such loss shall occur 
 by the hand or through the negligence of such 
 landlord, or by a clerk or servant employed by 
 him in such hotel or inn; Provided, That noth- 
 ing herein contained shall apply to such amount 
 of money or other valuables as is usually com- 
 mon and prudent for any such guest to retain 
 in his room or about his person (R. S., § 2514). 
 
 Notice. 
 
 [528] 
 
 §2. 
 
 The notice required by the preceding section 
 
 shall be substantially as follows: "Notice is 
 
 hereby given that the proprietor of this house 
 
 keeps an iron safe suitable for the safe deposit 
 
Appendix. 
 
 of money, jewelry, or other valuable articles 
 belonging to his guests and customers, and un- 
 less they leave their money, jewelry, precious 
 stones or other valuables with the landlord, his 
 agent or clerk, in order that he may deposit 
 the same for safe-keeping in such iron safe, he 
 will not be liable for the loss thereof." (Ibid., 
 § 2515). 
 
 §3. 
 
 Any keeper of a hotel or boarding house or 
 lodging house or restaurant shall have a hen 
 upon the baggage or other personal property of Lion. 
 any person who shall have obtained board or 
 lodging or both, from such keeper, for the 
 amount due for such board or lodging, and such 
 keeper is hereby authorized to retain the pos- 
 sesssion of such baggage, or personal property 
 until said amount is paid. If the amount due 
 for such board or lodging is not paid within 
 sixty days from the time the same shall have 
 become due and payable, any such keeper may 
 proceed to have such baggage or other personal 
 property sold for the satisfaction of his hen in 
 the following manner: He shall give ten days' 
 prior notice of the sale of said articles by him Sale, 
 held under his lien, a copy of which he shall 
 immediately transmit, by registered letter, to 
 the owner of the articles at his usual place of 
 abode if known, and he shall post said notices 
 of sale in three conspicuous and public places 
 in the city, town, village or place where said 
 keeper resides, giving a description of the ar- 
 ticles to be sold and the time and place of sale, 
 one of which notices shall be posted in the of- 
 
 34 [529] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 fice of the hotel, lodging house, boarding house 
 or restaurant, if still maintained. At the time 
 mentioned in said notices, the said keeper may- 
 proceed to sell to the highest and best bidder 
 for cash, all of such personal property held im- 
 der the lien, or so much thereof as shall be 
 necessary to pay his claim, and the residue of 
 the unsold property, together with the surplus 
 proceeds of such property sold, if any, he shall 
 surrender to the owner, his heirs or legal rep- 
 resentatives on application therefor {Ibid., 
 § 2860). 
 
 Obtaining 
 board or lodg- 
 ing by false 
 representa- 
 tions. 
 
 Hats off in 
 
 theatre. 
 
 §4. 
 
 It is hereby declared to be a misdemeanor 
 to procure board or lodging, or both, under and 
 by false or fraudulent representations. Every 
 person convicted of such misdemeanor shall be 
 punished by a fine of not more than twenty-five 
 dollars nor less than five dollars, or by impris- 
 onment in the coimty jail not more than thirty 
 days, nor less than five days, or by both; Pro- 
 vided, That the action may be dismissed upon 
 the payment by the defendant, of the amount 
 due for such board or lodging, and the costs of 
 the action {Ibid., § 5145). 
 
 §5. 
 
 Any person attending a theatre, opera house, 
 or an indoor place of amusement as a spectator, 
 shall remove headwear tending to obstruct the 
 view of any other person. Any person violat- 
 ing any of the provisions of this section shall 
 be subject to a fine of not less than one nor 
 more than ten dollars for each offence, upon 
 conviction thereof {Ibid., § 2629). 
 
 [530] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 L. 
 
 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. 
 Code of 1902. 
 
 §1. 
 
 Every innkeeper, keeper of a boarding house, Lien, 
 or house of private entertainment shall have a 
 lien upon and may retain possession of the bag- 
 gage and effects of any guest or boarder for the 
 amount which may be due him from such guest 
 for board and lodging imtil such amount is paid 
 (Code, § 1261). 
 
 §2. 
 
 If the amount due and for which a hen is 
 given by any of the last three sections is not 
 paid after the end of a month after the same 
 is due, and the property bound by said Hen 
 does not exceed the sum of fifty dollars, then 
 the party entitled to such lien, after demand 
 of payment upon the debtor, if he be within 
 the District, may proceed to sell the property 
 so subject to lien at public auction, after giving 
 notice once a week for three successive weeks 
 in some daily newspaper published in the Dis- 
 trict, and the proceeds of such sale shall be 
 apphed, first, to the expenses of such sales and 
 the discharge of such lien, and the remainder, 
 
 Enforcement 
 by sale. 
 
 [531] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 if any, shall be paid over to the owner of the 
 property {Ibid., § 1263). 
 
 Enforcement 
 by bill in 
 equity. 
 
 §3. 
 
 If the value of the property so subject to 
 hen shall exceed the sum of fifty doUars, the 
 proceeding to enforce such hen shall be by 
 bill or petition in equity, and the decree, which 
 shall be rendered according to the due course 
 of proceedings in equity, besides subjecting the 
 thing upon which the lien was attached to sale 
 for the satisfaction of the plaintiff's demand, 
 shall adjudge that the plaintiff recover his de- 
 mand against the defendant from whom such 
 claim is due, and may have execution therefor 
 as at law {Ibid., § 1264). 
 
 Defrauding 
 hotel keeper. 
 
 [532] 
 
 §4. 
 
 Any person who obtains any lodging, food, 
 or accommodation at an inn, boarding house, 
 or lodging house, without paying therefor, 
 with intent to defraud the proprietor or man- 
 ager thereof, or who obtains credit at such 
 an inn, boarding house, or lodging house by 
 the use of any false pretence, or who, after ob- 
 taining credit or accommodation at such an 
 inn, boarding house, or lodging house, absconds 
 or surreptitiously removes his baggage there- 
 from without paying for his food, accommoda- 
 tion, or lodging, shall be deemed guilty of a 
 misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof in 
 the police court of the District of Columbia be 
 fined not more than one hundred dollars or im- 
 prisoned not more than six months, or both, 
 in the discretion of the court {Ibid., § 842). 
 
Appendix. 
 
 LI. 
 
 UNITED STATES. 
 
 Compiled Statutes, 1901. 
 
 §1. 
 
 All persons within the jurisdiction of the 
 United States shall be entitled to the full and 
 equal enjoyment of the accommodations, ad- 
 vantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, pub- 
 lic conveyances on land or water, theatres, and 
 other places of public amusement; subject only 
 to the conditions and Umitations established by 
 law, and applicable alike to citizens of every 
 race and color, regardless of any previous con- 
 dition of servitude (Comp. Stat., § 1977, par. 1). 
 
 Civil 
 Act. 
 
 Rights 
 
 §2. 
 
 That any person who shall violate the fore- 
 going section by denying to any citizen, except 
 for reasons by law applicable to citizens of Penalty. 
 every race and color, and regardless of any pre- 
 vious condition of servitude, the full enjoyment 
 of any of the accommodations, advantages, {gr- 
 cilities, or privileges in said section enumerated, 
 or by aiding or inciting such denial, shall, for 
 every such offence, forfeit and pay the simi of 
 five hundred dollars to the person aggrieved 
 thereby, to be recovered in an action of debt, 
 
 [533] 
 
Appendix. 
 
 with full costs; and shall also, for every such 
 offence, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, 
 and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not 
 less than five hundred nor more than one thou- 
 sand dollars, or shaU be imprisoned not less 
 than thirty days nor more than one year: Pro- 
 vided, That all persons may elect to sue for the 
 penalty aforesaid or to proceed under their 
 rights at common law and by state statutes; 
 and having so elected to proceed in the one 
 mode or the other, their right to proceed in the 
 other jurisdiction shall be barred. But this 
 proviso shall not apply to criminal proceedings, 
 either under this act or the criminal law of any 
 State: And provided further. That a judgment 
 for the penalty in favor of the party aggrieved, 
 or a judgment upon an indictment, shall be a 
 bar to either prosecution respectively {Ibid., 
 par. 2).i 
 
 1 Sections 1 and 2 of this act have been held uncon- 
 stitutional, at least so far as their operation in the several 
 States is concerned, but without deciding whether the 
 law as it stands is operative in the Territories and District 
 of Columbia. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 27 L. 
 Ed. 835 (1883). 
 
 [534] 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED 
 
 [references are to sections.] 
 
 A. 
 
 Abel, Light v., 6 All. N. B. 400 138 
 
 Acheson, Coates v., 23 Mo. App. 255 App. XXIII, S 2 
 
 Adair, Bullock v., 63 111. App. 30 16 
 
 Adams v. Clem, 41 Ga. 65 234 
 
 V. Freeman, 12 Johns. 408 61 
 
 Haff v., 59 Pac. Ill 138, 139, 140, 201 
 
 Hilton v., 71 Me. 19 162 
 
 Pullman P. C. Co. v., 120 Ala. 581 . . 341, 342, 383, 387, 391, 392 
 
 Agricultural Society, Dunn v., 46 Oh. S. 93 322 
 
 Airey v. Pulhnan P. C. Co., 50 La. Ann. 648 370 
 
 Albin V. Presby, 8 N. H. 408 155 
 
 Aldrich, Sibley v., 33 N. H. 553 185 
 
 Alford, Sunbolf v., 3 M. & W. 248 257, 259 
 
 Allen V. Smith, 12 C. B. N. S. 638 232, 233, 272, 275 
 
 Alvord V. Davenport, 43 Vt. 30 261, 269 
 
 American Exp. Co., Jaquith v., 60 N. H. 61 268, 298 
 
 Amey v. Winchester, 68 N. H. 447 134 
 
 Amidon, Read v., 41 Vt. 15 113, 131, 148, 223, 225, 285 
 
 Anderson, Newcombe v., 11 Ont. 665 265, 298 
 
 Andrews, Cross v., Cro. Eliz. 622 112 
 
 Angus V. McLachlan, 23 Ch. D. 330 269, 273 
 
 Anonymous, Godb. 345 19, 70, 71, 98, 282 
 
 Keilw. 50, pi. 4 52 
 
 Moore, 158 153 
 
 1 Roll. Abr. 3, pi. 4 125 
 
 Y. B. 42 Ed. 3, 11, pi. 13 148, 181, 182 
 
 Y. B. 43 Ed. 3, 33, pi. 38 281 
 
 42 Lib. Assis. 260, pi. 17 181 
 
 2 Hen. 4, 3, pi. 9 .' 281 
 
 11 Hen. 4, 33, pi. 60 281 
 
 11 Hen. 4, 45, pi. 18 12, 124, 148, 149 
 
 39 Hen. 6, 18, pi. 24 52 
 
 5 Ed. 4, 2, pi. 20 252 
 
 22 Ed. 4, 49, pi. 15 52 
 
 14 Hen. 7, 22, pi. 4 52 
 
 21 Hen. 7, 14, pi. 19 252 
 
 [535] 
 
Table of Cases Cited. 
 
 [hbferencbs ahe to sections.] 
 
 Appleton V. Welch, 20 N. Y. Misc. 343 304 
 
 Arcade Hotel Co. v. Wiatt, 44 Oh. S. 32 205 
 
 Long v., 9 Ohio Dec. 372 431, 432, App. XXXIII, § 3 
 
 Archer v. Willingrice, 4 Esp. 186 325 
 
 Arents, Pullman P. C. Co. v., 28 Tex. Civ. App. 71 . . . 385, 391 
 
 Armistead v. Wilde, 17 Q. B. 261 223, 227 
 
 Arnold, Lewis v., 4 C. & P. 354 318 
 
 Arthur v. Pullman Co., 44 N. Y. Misc. 229 385 
 
 Askin, Reg. v., 20 U. C. Q. B. 626 252 
 
 Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R., Paddock v., 37 Fed. 841 366 
 
 Atkinson v. Sellers, 5 C. B. N. S. 442 63, 131 
 
 Atwater v. Sawyer, 76 Me. 539 20, 94, 98, 169 
 
 Axon, Newson v., 1 McCord, 509 188 
 
 B. 
 
 Bacon, Jenkins v., Ill Mass. 373 206 
 
 Maloney v., 33 Mo. App. 501 145 
 
 Spice v., 36 L. T. 896 224 
 
 Spicer v., 2 Ex. D. 463 413, 419 
 
 Baehr v. Downey, 133 Mich. 163 190, 234, 235 
 
 Bailey, Shoecraft v., 25 la. 553 . . 139, 226 
 
 Baker v. Dessauer, 49 Ind. 28 186, 188 
 
 V. Stratton, 52 N. J. L. 277 264, App. XXVIII, § 1 
 
 Baldwin v. Webb, 121 Ga. 416 241 
 
 Bales, Pulbnan P. C. Co. v., 80 Tex. 211 368 
 
 Balmoral Hotel Co., McElwaine v., Mont. L. R. 7 S. C. 139 . 232 
 
 Baltimore & O. R. R., Bevis v., 26 Mo. App. 19 383, 388 
 
 Wilson v., 32 Mo. App. 682 . 383 
 
 Bancroft v. Dumas, 21 Vt. 456 . . 46 
 
 Banks v. Oden, 1 A. K. Marsh. 546 242 
 
 Barber v. Harrison, 6 City Hall Rec. 89 201 
 
 Barker, Clancy v., 131 Fed. 161 170, 173, 174 
 
 Clancy v., 98 N. W. 440 172, 282 
 
 Pullman P. C. Co. v., 4 Col. 344 .. . . 365, 402 
 
 Bamett v. Walker, 39 N. Y. Misc. 323 . 265, 298, App. XXX, § 11 
 
 Barney, U. S. v., 3 Hughes, 545 . 258 
 
 Bamum, Pettigrew v., 11 Md. 434 191 
 
 Barrott v. Pullman's P. C. Co., 51 Fed. 796 .. . ... 383 
 
 Bather, Day v., 2 H. & C. 14 183, 232, 233 
 
 Batterson v. Vogel, 8 Mo. App. 24 . . 413, 417, 418, 421, App. XXIII, § 3 
 
 10 Mo. App. 235 224 
 
 Bayley v. Merrill, 10 All. 360 267 
 
 Beal, Bellis v., 2 Esp. 592 325 
 
 Beale v. Posey, 72 Ala. 323 139, 140, 413, 417, App. I, § 3 
 
 [536] 
 
Table of Cases Cited. 
 
 [references are to sections.] 
 
 Beall V. Beck, Fed. Cas. No. 1161 14, 32, 291 
 
 Beam, Thatcher v., 14 Pa. Co. Ct. 107 App. XXXVI, § 10 
 
 Bean, Dunn v., Que. R. 11 Sup. Ct. 538 15, 301, 303 
 
 Beaver, Shoemaker v., 42 Leg. Int. 511 243 
 
 Beck, Beall v., Fed. Cas. No. 1161 14, 32, 291 
 
 Becker v. Haynes, 29 Fed. 441 145, 285, 416, 427 
 
 Beckerv. Wamer, 90Hun, 187 224, 431, App. XXX, §3 
 
 Bedford Hotel Co., Marchioness of Huntly v., 56 J. P. S3 . . . 414, 418 
 
 Beedle v. Morris, Cro. Jac. 224 285 
 
 Belden v. Pulhnan P. C. Co., 43 S. W. 22 384, 389 
 
 Bell, Ex parte, 32 Tex. Cr. 308 325 
 
 V. Mahn, 121 Pa. 225 311, 312 
 
 Clark v., 62 Pa. 529 234 
 
 Bellis V. Beal, 2 Esp. 592 325 
 
 V. Burghall, 2 Esp. 722 325 
 
 Belote, Lusk v., 22 Minn. 468 140, 188, 201 
 
 Bemon v. Watson, 1 RoU Abr. 3 pi. 1 147 
 
 Bendetson v. French, 46 N. Y. 266 426, 427, App. XXX, § 3 
 
 Benecke, Hods v., 11 Mo. App. 393 ... . 279, App. XXIII, §§ 1, 2 
 
 Benner, Buddenburg v., 1 Hilt. 84 224, 296 
 
 Bennett v. Mellor, 5 T. R. 273 Ill, 124, 131 
 
 Benson, State v., 28 Minn. 424 441, 443, App. XXI, § 3 
 
 Berkshire Woolen Co. V. Proctor, 7 Cush. 417 .... 139,191,225,285 
 Bernard v. Lalond, 8 Leg. News, 215 123, 203, 205 
 
 Coggs v., 2 Ld. Raym. 909 182, 281 
 
 Bernstein v. Sweeny, 33 N. Y. Super. 271 . . . 418, 431, App. XXX, § 3 
 Berry, Kelsey v., 42 111. 469 221 
 
 Shaw v., 31 Me. 478 185 
 
 Bethell, Shelley v., 12 Q. B. D. 11 325 
 
 Bevan v. Waters, 3 C. & P. 520 252 
 
 Bevis V. Baltimore & O. R. R., 26 Mo. App. 19 383, 388 
 
 Binns v. Pigot, 9 C. & P. 208 252 
 
 Birch, Dixon v., L. R. 8 Ex. 135 18 
 
 Woodward v., 4 Bush, 510 162 
 
 Bircher, Stanley v., 78 Mo. 245 282, 284 
 
 Bird V. Bird, 1 And. 29 , . Ill, 124 
 
 V. Everard, 4 N. Y. Misc. 104 333 
 
 Bimey v. Wheaton, 2 How. Pr. N. S. 619 . . 249, 264, App. XXX, § 11 
 
 Black V. Brennan, 5 Dana, 310 261, 277 
 
 Block V. Sherry, 43 N. Y. Misc. 342 16, 172, 301, 302 
 
 Sundmacher v., 39 111. App. 553 447, App. XI, § 5 
 
 Blum V. Southern P. P. Co., 1 FUp. 500 . . 341, 342, 383, 386, 387, 388, 391 
 
 Blythan v. Rescorla, 1 Kulp, 351 App. XXXVI, § 10 
 
 Board of Police, Peo. v., 36 N. Y. Misc. 89 46 
 
 Bodwell V. Bragg, 29 la. 232 215 
 
 Bohler v. Owens, 60 Ga. 185 224 
 
 [ 537 ] 
 
Table of Cases Cited, 
 
 [EEPERENCES ABE TO SECTIONS.] 
 
 Bonner v. Welbom, 7 Ga. 296 14, 48, 291 
 
 Bonney, Cutler v., 30 Mich. 259 186, 189 
 
 Boone, Jordan v., 5 Rich. L. 528 190 
 
 Booth, PuUman P. C. Co. v., 28 S. W. 719 .. . 343, 346 ,364, 401, 402 
 
 Berwick, ThrefaU v., L. R. 10 Q. B. 210 261 
 
 Boston V. Schaffer, 9 Pick. 415 326 
 
 Boston & A. R. R., Whicher v., 176 Mass. 275. . 341, 381, 384, 391, 392 
 
 Boston & M. R. R., Bradford v., 160 Mass. 392 89 
 
 Boston Music Hall, Currier v. 135 Mass. 414 322 
 
 Bourgoin v. Hogan, 15 L. Can. R. 424 134 
 
 Bournes, Swan v., 47 la. 501 260 
 
 Bow, Com. v., 177 Mass. 347 325 
 
 Bowell V. DeWald, 2 Ind. App. 303 190, 226 
 
 Bowlin V. Lyon, 67 la. 536 325 
 
 Bradford v. Boston & M. R. R., 160 Mass. 392 89 
 
 Bradley Livery Co. v. Snook, 66 N. J. L. 654 155 
 
 Bradner v. Mullen, 27 N. Y. Misc. 479 ... 148, 423, App. XXX, § 4 
 
 Bragg, Bodwell v., 29 la. 232 215 
 
 Bramstead, Rosse v., 2 Roll. 438 276 
 
 Brand v. Glasse, F. Moore, 158 153 
 
 Brandon, Clifford v. 2 Camp. 358 36,313, 320 
 
 Brandt, Browne v., 1902, 1 K. B. 696 91 
 
 Braun v. Webb, 32 N. Y. Misc. 243 364 
 
 Bremer v. Pleiss, 121 Wis. 61 164, 165 
 
 Brennan, Black v., 5 Dana, 310 261, 277 
 
 McCourt v., 11 Pa. Co. Ct. 645 . ■ App. XXXVI, § 10 
 
 Breslin, Friedman v., 169 N. Y. 574 425, App. XXX, § 3 
 
 Briggs V. Todd, 28 N. Y. Misc. 208 430, 431, App. XXX, § 3 
 
 Brill, Cincinnati v., 7 Oh. N. P. 534 318 
 
 Broadwood v. Granara, 10 Ex. 417 68, 256, 261, 262 
 
 Brooks V. Harrison, 41 Conn. 184 279, App. VI, § 3 
 
 Brown, McKay v., 5 Can. L. J. 91 18, 20 
 
 Markham v., 8 N. H. 523 61, 85, 87, 88, 92, 94 
 
 Mateer v., 1 Cal. 221 152, 185 
 
 Browne v. Brandt, 1902, 1 K. B. 696 . . . . 91 
 
 Brown Hotel Co. v. Burckhardt, 13 Col. App. 59 . . 215, 232, 233, 430 
 
 Brown Shoe Co. v. Hunt, 103 la. 586 265, App. XIII, § 1 
 
 Bruce, Prescott v., 2 Cinn. 58 431 
 
 Brunswick, Duke of, Gregory v., 1 C. & K. 24 320 
 
 Buck V. Webb, 58 Hun, 185 364 
 
 Buckle V. Probasco, 58 Mo. App. 49 144 
 
 Bucky, Cunningham v., 42 W. Va. 671 185, 224, 227, 228 
 
 Buddenburg v. Benner, 1 Hilt. 84 224, 296 
 
 Buffalo Park, Fox v., 21 App. Div. 321 322 
 
 Bullock V. Adair, 63 111. App. 30 16 
 
 Bunn V. Johnson, 77 Mo. App. 596 203 
 
 [538] 
 
Table of Cases Cited. 
 
 [eefbbbnces are to sections.] 
 
 Burbank v. Chapin, 140 Mass. 123 ... . 412, 416, 418, App. XIX, § 13 
 Burckhardt, Brown Hotel Co. v., 13 Col. App. 59 . . 215, 232, 233, 430 
 
 Burgess v. Clements, 4 M. & S. 306 150, 223 
 
 Burghall, Bellis v., 2 Esp. 722 325 
 
 Burkholder, Chase v., 18 Pa. 48 248 
 
 Burnham v. Young, 72 Me. 273 416, App. XVII, § 2 
 
 Burns, Clark v., 118 Mass. 275 37 
 
 Burrows, Treiber v., 27 Md. 130 148, 190, 191, 223, 430, App. XVIII, § 3 
 
 Burton v. Scherpf, 1 All. 133 315, 316 
 
 Bush, Orchard v., 1898, 2 Q. B. 284 63, 131, 135, 136 
 
 Butcher v. Hyde, 10 N. Y. Misc. 275 322 
 
 Butler V. Quilter, 17 T. L. R. 159 183 
 
 Butterfield, Clayton v., 10 Rich. L. 300 ....... . 249, 264 
 
 Buttman v. Dennett, 9 N. Y. Misc. 462 304 
 
 Byers, Hursh v., 29 Mo. 469 252 
 
 c. 
 
 Cady V. McDowell, 1 Lans. 484 298, App. XXX, § 11 
 
 Cain, Pullman P. C. Co. v., 15 Tex. Kv. App. 503 365 
 
 Caldwell v. Tutt, 10 Lea, 258 272 
 
 Callard v. White, 1 Stark. 171 81 
 
 Calye's Case, 8 Coke, 63 62, 154, 183, 211, 221 
 
 Camp V. Wood, 76 N. Y. 92 322, 323 
 
 Com. v., 4 B. Mon. 385 App. XV, § 4 
 
 Campbell v. Pulhnan P. C. Co., 42 Fed. 484 374, 402 
 
 Peo. v., 51 App. Div. 665 325 
 
 Canadian Pao. R. R., Smith v., 34 N. S. 22 362 
 
 Candy v. Spencer, 3 F. & F. 306 148, 225, 285 
 
 Cardinal, Jalie v., 35 Wis. 118 139, 148, 185, 225 
 
 Carhartv. Wainman, 114Ga. 632 142 
 
 Carlisle v. Quattlebaum, 2 Bail. 452 252 
 
 Cames v. McGuire, 18 Pa. Co. Ct. 306 ... . App. XXXVI, § 10 
 Carpenter v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 124 N. Y. 63 . . . 387, 392 
 
 V. Taylor, 1 Hilt. 193 15, 22, 291, 301 
 
 Carr's Case, 1 Roll. Abr. 3 pi. 4 63 
 
 Carter v. Hobbs, 12 Mich. 62 134 
 
 Case V. Fogg, 46 Mo. 44 276 
 
 Cashill V. Wright, 6 E. & B. 891 223, 227 
 
 easier. Fitch v., 17 Hun, 126 134 
 
 Cassedy v. Pulhnan P. C. Co., 17 So. 373 374 
 
 Centlivre v. Ryder, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 273 203, 205 
 
 Chadboum Furnace Co., Johnson v., 89 Mum. 310 16, 187 
 
 Chamberlain v. Masterton, 26 Ala. 371 201, 223 
 
 V. Pulhnan P. C. Co., 55 Mo. App. 474 391 
 
 [539] 
 
Table of Cases Cited. 
 
 [references are to sections.] 
 
 Chamberlain v. West, 37 Minn. 54 416, App. XXI, § 2 
 
 Chamney, Dawson v., 5 Q. B. 164 183 
 
 Chandler v. Haas, 12 York Leg. Reo. 127 285 
 
 Chapin, Burbank v., 140 Mass. 123 . . 412, 416, 418, App. XIX, | 13 
 Chapman, Maltby v., 26 Md. 810 . . . 223, 431, 432, App. XVIII, § 4 
 
 Chase v. Burkholder, 18 Pa. 48 248 
 
 Chauncey v. State, 130 Ala. 71 448, App. I, § 6 
 
 Cheesebrough V. Taylor, 12 Abb. Pr. 227 190 
 
 Chesapeake & O. Ry., Connell v., 93 Va. 44 373 
 
 Chesley, Wiser v., 53 Mo. 547 201, 205 
 
 Chicago, M. & S. P. Ry., McKeon v., 94 Wis. 477 370 
 
 Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., Hillis v., 72 la. 228 383 
 
 Childs' Unique Dairy Co., Harris v., 84 N. Y. S. 260 ... . 35, 306 
 
 Churchill, Stott v., 15 N. Y. Misc. 80 162, 163, 170 
 
 Cincimiati v. Brill, 7 Ohio N. P. 534 318 
 
 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 App. LI, § 2 
 
 Claflin V. Meyer, 75 N. Y. 260 295 
 
 Claghom, Merritt v., 23 Vt. 177 186, 189 
 
 Clair, Gastenhofer v., 10 Daly, 265' Ill, 122 
 
 Clancy v. Barker, 131 Fed. 161 170, 173, 174 
 
 V. Barker, 98 N. W. 440 172, 282 
 
 Clark V. Ball, 62 Pac. 529 .234 
 
 V. Burns, 118 Mass. 275 • 37 
 
 Sasseen v., 37 Ga. 242 188, 190, 191, 223, 224 
 
 Wintermute v., 5 Sandf. 242 14, 15, 231 
 
 Clarke v. Searle, 1 Esp. 25 325 
 
 Murray v., 2 Daly, 102 190,204,206, 231 
 
 Clarkson, Harman v., 22 1). C. C. P. 291 169 
 
 Clary v. Willey, 49 Vt. 55 13 
 
 Classen v. Leopold, 2 Sweeny, 705 185, 224 
 
 Clayton v. Butterfield, 10 Rich. L. 300 249, 264 
 
 Clem, Adams v., 41 Ga. 65 234 
 
 Clements, Burgess v., 4 M. & S. 306 150, 223 
 
 Clerk, Gelley v., Cro. Jac. 188 232 
 
 CMord V. Brandon, 2 Camp. 358 36, 313, 320 
 
 Cloud, State v., 6 Ala. 628 41, 48 
 
 Clute V. Wiggins, 14 Johns. 175 154 
 
 Coates V. Aoheson, 23 Mo. App. 255 . . 277, 279, App. XXIII, §2 
 
 Coats, Fuller v., 18 Ohio St. 343 211,213 
 
 Cochrane v. Schryver, 12 Daly, 174 2.52 
 
 Cockrell, Francisv.,L. R. 5Q. B. 501 322 
 
 Coggs V. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909 182, 281 
 
 Cohen v. Manuel, 91 Me. 274 154 
 
 Colcord, Smith v., 115 Mass. 70 266, 298, App. XIX, § 18 
 
 Coleman v. Foster, 1 H. & N. 37 315 
 
 Jencks v., 2 Sumn. 221 97 
 
 [540] 
 
Table of Cases Cited. 
 
 [BEFERBNCBS ABE TO SECTIONS.] 
 
 Coleman, Purvis v., 21 N. Y. Ill 420, App. XXX, § 3 
 
 Collins, Rex v.. Palmer, 367,- 373 41, 52, 61, 70, 71, 282 
 
 Collister v. Hayman, 71 App. Div. 316 315, 317 
 
 Colton, Com. v., 8 Gray, 488 325 
 
 Com. V. Bow, 177 Mass. 347 325 
 
 V. Camp, 4 B. Mon. 386 App. XV, § 4 
 
 V. Colton, 8 Gray, 488 325 
 
 V. Cuncannon, 3 Brewst. 344 14, 32, 291 
 
 V. Dennis, 1 Pa. Co. Ct. 278 443, App. XXXVI, § 7 
 
 V. Gee, 6 Cush. 174 325 
 
 V. Gough, 3 Kulp, 148 441, App. XXXVI, § 7 
 
 V. Keathley, 82 S. W. 232 48 
 
 V. Keeler, 3 Pa. Dist. 158 325 
 
 V. Mitchell, 2 Pars. 431 61, 70, 82, 83, 84, 85 
 
 V. Morton, 6 Luz. Leg. Reg. 207 442, 450, 451, 452, App. XXXVI, §§ 7, 8 
 
 V. Muir, 38 W. N. C. 328 41 
 
 V. Powell, 10 Phila. 180 318 
 
 V. Reifsnyder, 14 Pa. Co. Ct. 353 325 
 
 V. Shortridge, 3 J. J. Marsh. 638 22, 242, App. XV, § 4 
 
 V. Wetherbee, 101 Mass. 214 17, 66 
 
 Jackson v., 7 Bush, 99 App. XV, § 4 
 
 Compton, Pendergast v., 8 C. & P. 464 56 
 
 Conklin v. Prospect Park Hotel Co., 1 N. Y. S. 406 71 
 
 Connelly. Chesapeake &0. Ry., 93 Va. 44 373 
 
 Cook V. Kane, 13 Or. 482 261, 262 
 
 Cox v., 14 All. 165 95, 137 
 
 Grinnell v., 3 Hill, 485 232, 252, 270, 272 
 
 Seymour v. 53 Barb. 451 234 
 
 Cooney v. Pullman P. C. Co., 121 Ala. 368 383, 389 
 
 Copeland, Nash v., 4 N. S. W. W. N. 41 364 
 
 Corey, Levy v , 1 City Ct. R. Supp. 57 : 103, 171 
 
 Cornell v. Huber, 102 N. Y. App. Div. 293 70 
 
 Corson, Scheffer v., 5 S. D. 233 185, 204 
 
 Cosgrove, Scarbrough v., 1905, 2 K. B. 805 297, 332 
 
 Coskery v. Nagle, 83 Ga. 696 142, 226 
 
 Cotton, Lane v., 12 Mod. 472 12, 52, 182 
 
 Cottrell, Myers v., 5 Biss. 465 . . . 150, 204, 415, 416, App. XX, § 2 
 County H. & W. Co., Strauss v., 12 Q. B. D. 27 . . 89, 123, 143, 203 
 
 Courtney, Quinton v., 1 Hayw. 40 190 
 
 Covington v. Newberger, 99 N. C. 523 262 
 
 Cox V. Cook, 14 All. 165 95, 137 
 
 Gordon v., 7 C. & P. 172' 275 
 
 Coykendall v. Eaton, 55 Barb. 1«8 133, 204, 205, 285 
 
 Crabtree v. Griffith, 22 Up. Can. Q. B. 573 272 
 
 Crapo V. Rockwell, 94 N. Y. S. 1122 139, 181 
 
 Crawley, Turrill v., 13 Q. B. 197 261 
 
 [541] 
 
Table of Cases Cited. 
 
 [references are to sections.] 
 
 Crocker, Neale v., 8 U. C. C. P. 224 132, 252 
 
 Cromwell v. Stephens, 2 Daly, 16 16, 16, 22 
 
 Cross V. Andrews, Cro. Eliz. 622 112 
 
 V. Wilkins, 43 N. H. 332 241, 298, App. XXVII, § 2 
 
 Watson v., 2 Duv. 147 64, 112, 262, 253 
 
 Crossman, Olsen v., 31 Minn. 222 . . . . 188, 413, 418, App. XXI, § 2 
 
 Crouse, McManigle v., 1 Walker, 43 266, App. XXXVI, § 3 
 
 Crown Point, Town of, v. Warner, 3 Hill, 160 22 
 
 Cruikshanks, Rubenstein v., 54 Mich. 199 223, 226 
 
 Crump, Jeffords v., 2 Phila. 500 138, 201, 204 
 
 Cuncannon, Com. v., 3 Brewst. 344 14, 32, 291 
 
 Cunningham v. Bucky, 42 W. Va. 671 185, 224, 227, 228 
 
 Curlander v. Pulhnan P. C. Co., 28 Chic. Leg. N. 68 . . . . 348, 377 
 
 Curran v. Olson, 88 Minn. 307 171, 172 
 
 Currier v. Boston Music Hall, 136 Mass. 414 322 
 
 Ciu-tis V. Dinneen, 4 Dak. 245 175 
 
 V. Murphy, 63 Wis. 4 62, 136, 144 
 
 V. State, 5 Ohio, 324 17 
 
 Cutler V. Bonney, 30 Mich. 269 186, 189 
 
 D. 
 
 Dalby, Dixon v., 11 U. C. Q. B. 79 252 
 
 Dale V. Gibson, 1 Roll. Abr. 3, pi. 3 153, 154 
 
 Daly, Purcell v., 19 Abb. N. C. 301 313, 314, 315, 316, 317 
 
 Danforth v. Pratt, 42 Me. 60 252, 270 
 
 Dansey v. Richardson, 3 E. & B. 143 292, 293, 294 
 
 Dargan v. Pullman P. C. Co., 2 Wills. § 691 341, 387 
 
 Davenport, Alvord v., 43 Vt. 30 261, 269 
 
 Davis V. Gay, 141 Mass. 531 16, 34 
 
 Hutchinson v., 58 111. App. 358 441, 442, 449, 451, App. XI, §§ 6, 6 
 
 Davys v. Douglas, 4 H. & N. 180 325 
 
 Dawley v. Wagner P. C. Co., 169 Mass. 315 . . . 342, 381, 385, 391 
 
 Dawson v. Chamney, 5 Q. B. 164 183 
 
 Day v. Bather, 2 H. & C. 14 183, 232, 233 
 
 V. Simpson, 18 C. B. N. S. 680 311 
 
 Dunbier v., 12 Neb. 596 185, 188, 224, 227, 228, 413, App. XXV, § 2 
 
 Dearlove, Smith v., 6 C. B. 132 252 
 
 Dennett, Buttman v., 9 N. Y. Misc. 462 304 
 
 Dennis, Com. v., 1 Pa. Co. Ct. 278 443, App. XXXVl, § 7 
 
 Depierris, George v., 17 N. Y. Misc. 400 204, 205, 206 
 
 Dessauer, Baker v., 49 Ind. 28 186, 188 
 
 De Wald, Bowell v., 2 Ind. App. 303 190, 226 
 
 Dibdin v. Swan, 1 Esp. 28 319 
 
 Dickerson v. Rogers, 4 Humph. 179 ....... 15, 19, 20, 48, 163 
 
 [542] 
 
Table of Cases Cited. 
 
 [EEPERBNCES ABE TO SECTIONS.] 
 
 Dickinson v. Winchester, 4 Cush. 114 142, 285 
 
 Dickson v. Waldron, 135 Ind. 507 321 
 
 Diehl, Woodruff S. & P. C. Co. v., 84 Ind. 474 . . 341, 342, 381, 387, 388 
 
 Diers, Society for Reformation v., 10 Abb. Pr. N. S. 216 311 
 
 DiUon V. Treverton, 16 Pa. Co. Ct. 89 App. XXXVI, § 10 
 
 Dingus, Smith v., 12 Pa. Co. Ct. 299 App. XXXVI, § iQ 
 
 Dinneen, Curtis v., 4 Dak. 245 175 
 
 Dion, Fogarty v., 6 Quebec L. R. 163 262 
 
 District of Columbia v. Saville, 1 McAr. 581 318 
 
 Dixon V. Birch, L. R. 8 Ex. 135 18 
 
 V. Dalby, 11 Up. Can. Q. B. 79 252 
 
 Lane v., 3 C. B. 776 167 
 
 Doe V. Laming, 4 Camp. 73 15 
 
 Domestic S. M. Co. v. Watters, 50 Ga. 573 263 
 
 Donovan, Hutchinson v., 76 Mo. App. 391 201 
 
 Doorman v. Jenkins, 2 A. & E. 256 205 
 
 Dorian, Fowler v., 24 Barb. 384 223, 226 
 
 Dougherty, McCarty v., 16 Pa. Co. Ct. 86 . . . . App. XXXVI, § 10 
 
 Douglas, Davys v., 4 H. & N. 180 325 
 
 Downey, Baehr v., 133 Mich. 163 190, 234, 235 
 
 Taylor v., 104 Mich. 532 201, 202, 252 
 
 Doyle V. Walker, 26 Up. Can. Q. B. 502 104, 167, 244 
 
 Drew V. Peer, 93 Pa. 234 . . 316 
 
 Drey, Eden v., 17 111. App. 102 142, 190, 191, 228 
 
 Drope V. Thaire, Latch, 126 14 
 
 Duff, McGowan v., 14 Daly, 315 316 
 
 Duluth, City of v. Marsh, 71 Minn. 248 325 
 
 Dumas, Bancroft v., 21 Vt. 456 46 
 
 Dunbier v. Day, 12 Neb. 596 185, 188, 224, 227, 228, 413, App. XXV, § 2 
 
 Dunlap v. Thome, 1 Rich. L. 213 252 
 
 Dunn V. Agricultural Society, 46 Oh. S. 93 322 
 
 v. Bean, Que. R. 11 Sup. Ct. 538 15, 301, 303 
 
 Dunning v. Jacobs, 15 N. Y. Misc. 85 322 
 
 Dupr6, Mami B. C. Co. v., 54 Fed. 646 346, 367, 402 
 
 Duval V. Pullman P. C. Co^, 62 Fed. 265 365 
 
 DwineUe v. New York C. & H. R. R. R., 120 N. Y. 17 375 
 
 Lima v., 7 Alb. L. J. 44 139, 413, 417, App. XXX, § 3 
 
 E. 
 
 Earle, Gildea v., 2 City Ct. R. 122 276, 277 
 
 Wilkins v., 44 N. Y. 172 191, 425, App. XXX, § 3 
 
 Eaton, Coykendall, v. 55 Barb. 188 133, 204, 205, 285 
 
 Eden v. Drey, 17 111. App. 102 142, 190, 191, 228 
 
 Fden Musee, New York v., 102 N. Y. 593 325 
 
 [543] 
 
Table of Cases Cited, 
 [references are to sections.] 
 
 Edgerton, McDonald v., 5 Barb. 560 131, 148, 232 
 
 Edmundson v. Pullman P. C. Co., 92 Fed. 824 363 
 
 Edwards, Jaquet v., 1 Jam. 4 . . 13, 139 
 
 Efron V. Wagner P. C. Co., 59 Mo. App. 641 385, 391 
 
 Ehrman, Pullman's P. C. Co! v., 65 Miss. 383 369 
 
 Eichold, Laird v., 10 Ind. 212 186 
 
 Elcox V. Hill, 98 U. S. 218 223, 416, App. XI, | 2 
 
 ElUott V. Martin, 105 Mich. 506 252 
 
 Emerson, Taxing District v., 4 Lea, 312 325 
 
 Engard, Leiss v., 8 Pa. Dist. 608 App. XXXVI, § 10 
 
 Engle, State v., 156 Ind. 339 441, App.XII, § 2 
 
 Epps V. Hinds, 27 Miss. 657 133, 148, 285 
 
 Ernst V. R. R., 35 N. Y. 9 295 
 
 Everard, Bird v., 4 N. Y. Misc. 104 333 
 
 Ewart V. Stark, 8 Rich. L. 423 252 
 
 Fagan, Russell v., 7 Houst. 389 132, 185 
 
 Falls R. & M. Co. v. Pullman P. C. Co., 6 Ohio Dec. 85. . 341, 381, 388 
 
 Famworth v. Packard, 1 Holt N. P. 209 150 
 
 Faucett v. Nichols, 4 Thomp. & C. 597 414, App. XXX, § 1 
 
 V. Nichols, 64 N. Y. 377 416, App. XXX, § 1 
 
 Fauntleroy, GUes v., 13 Md. 126 191, 234 
 
 Fay V. Pacific Improvement Co., 93 Cal. 253 14, 19, 139, 148, 189, App. IV, §8 
 
 Federal Coffee Palace, Miller v., 15 Vict. L. R. 30 22, 183 
 
 Fell V. Knight, 8 M. <fc W. 269 69, 167, 168, 244 
 
 Fethers, Mowers v., 61 N. Y. 34 151 
 
 Fielding, Pullman's P. C. Co. v., 62 111. App. 577 362 
 
 Filipowski v. Merryweather, 2 F. & F. 285 224 
 
 Fish, Hallenbake v., 8 Wend. 547 282 
 
 Fisher v. Kelsey, 121 U. S. 383 150, 415, App. XXIII, § 4 
 
 Fitch V. easier, 17 Hun, 126 134 
 
 Flannigan, Singer Mfg. Co. v., 7 Pa. Co. Ct. 45 . . 261, App. XXXVI, § 3 
 
 Fletcher, State v., 5 N. H. 257 42, 48 
 
 Fhnt, Parker v., 12 Mod. 254 14, 15, 169, 291 
 
 Florence, Mulliner v., 3 Q. E. D. 484 244, 255, 275, 276 
 
 Sandys v., 47 L. J. C. P. 598 163, 170 
 
 Florida v. Pullman P. C. Co., 37 Mo. App. 598 393 
 
 Fogarty v. Dion, 6 Quebec L. R. 163 262 
 
 Fogg, Case v., 46 Mo. 44 276 
 
 Forbes, Rex v., 1 Cr. & D. 157 320 
 
 Forster v. Taylor, 3 Camp. 49 249 
 
 Fosset, Mosley v., 1 Roll. Abr. 3 153 
 
 Foster, Coleman v., 1 H. & N. 37 315 
 
 [544] 
 
Table of Cases Cited. 
 
 [KErERENCES ARE TO SECTIONS.] 
 
 Fowler v. Dorlon, 24 Barb. 384 223, 226 
 
 V. Holmes, 3 N. Y. Supp. 816 321 
 
 Fox V. Buffalo Park, 21 N. Y. App. Div. 321 322 
 
 V. McGregor, 11 Barb. 41 276, 277 
 
 Francis v. Cockrell, L. R. 5 Q. B. 501 322 
 
 Franklin, Howth v., 20 Tex. 798 13, 186 
 
 Fredericks v. Howie, 1 H. & C. 381 325 
 
 V. Payne, 1 H. & C. 584 325 
 
 Freeman, Adams v., 12 Johns. 408 ... 61 
 
 French, Bendetson v., 46 N. Y. 266 . . . . 426, 427, App. XXX, § 3 
 
 French Opera Assoc, State v., 107 La. 284 . 325 
 
 Freudenstein, Pullman P. C. Co. v., 3 Col. App. 540 . . 341, 342, 381, 393 
 
 Friedman v. Breslin, 169 N. Y. 574 425, App. XXX, § 3 
 
 Fuller V. Coats, 18 Ohio St. 343 211, 213 
 
 Galloway, Meacham v., 102 Tenn. 415 139, 140, 201, 431 
 
 Gandy v. Oellers, 39 W. N. C. 438 325 
 
 Garden v. Scott, 1 Kulp, 196 App. XXXVI, § 10 
 
 Gardner v. Hart, 44 W. R. 527 81 
 
 Pullman P. C. Co. v., 3 Penny. 84 ... . 341, 342, 381, 387, 392 
 
 Garignes, WiUiams v., 30 La. Ann. 1094 . . ... ... 33 
 
 Gartenstein's License, 15 Pa. Co. Ct. 612 . . . . . . . 311 
 
 Gast V. Gooding, 1 Ohio Dec. 315 . . .... 185. 188 
 
 Gastenhofer v. Clair, 10 Daly, 265 . . Ill, 122 
 
 Gavin, Pullman P. C. Co. v., 93 Tenn. 53 341, 342, 382, 387, 388, 401 
 
 Gay, Davis v., 141 Mass. 531 15, 34 
 
 Gaylord, Pullman P. C. Co. v., 9 Ky L. Rep. 58 . . . 342, 383, 387 
 
 Gee, Com. v., 6 Cush. 174 325 
 
 Geiger, Owens v., 2 Mo. 39 222 
 
 Geiss, Sneider v., 1 Yeates, 34 . . . 157 
 
 GeUey v. Clerk, Cro. Jac. 188 232 
 
 George v. Depierris, 17 N. Y. Misc. 400 204, 205, 206 
 
 Gerard, Maxwell v., 84 Hun, 537 . . 534 
 
 Waters v., 94 N. Y. S. 702 234 
 
 Gibson, Dale v., 1 Roll. Abr. 3 153, 154 
 
 Gilbert v. Hoffman 66 la. 205 171 
 
 Gildea v. Earle, 2n,City Ct. R. 122 276, 277 
 
 Gile V. Libby, 36 Barb. 70 185, 412, 432, App. XXX, § 3 
 
 Giles V. Fauntleroy, 13 Md. 126 191, 234 
 
 Gilkey, Porter v., 57 Mo. 235 417, 421, App. XXIII, § 3 
 
 Gillman v. State, 55 Ala. 248 325 
 
 Glascoe, Thomas v., 13 Pa. Co. Ct. 167 App. XXXVI, § 10 
 
 Glasse, Brand v., Moore, 158 153 
 
 35 [ 545 ] 
 
TABL33 OF Cases Cited, 
 [beferbnces are to sections.] 
 
 Gleason, Wear v., 52 Ark. 364 205, 206,- 235 
 
 Glenn v. Jackson, 93 Ala. 342 231 
 
 Goodenow v. Travis, 3 Johns. 427 92 
 
 Gooding, Gast v., 1 Ohio Dec. 315 185, 188 
 
 Goodyear v. Klemm, 5 Austral. Jur. 136 261 
 
 Gordon v. Cox, 7 C. & P. 172 275 
 
 Gough, Com. v., 3 Kulp, 148 441, App. XXXVI, § 7 
 
 Granara, Broadwood v., 10 Ex. 417 68, 256, 261, 262 
 
 Grand Hotel Co., Medawar v., 1891, 2 Q. B. 11 . . 223, 234, 245, 414 
 
 Grand Int. Hotel Co., O'Connor v., 1898, 2 Ir. 92 423 
 
 Grannan v. Westchester Racing Assoc, 16 N. Y. App. Div. 8 . . 41 
 Gray, Healey v. 68 Me. 489 121, 132 
 
 Robins v., [1895], 2 Q. B. 501 68, 256, 261, 262 
 
 Gregory v. Duke of Brunswick, 1 C. & K. 24 320 
 
 Green v. Kousins, 3 Pa. Dist. 302 325 
 
 Greeneburg v. Western Turf Assoc, 140 Cal. 357 41 
 
 Grenaugh, Yorke v., 2 Ld. Raym. 866 132 
 
 Griffin, Westbrooke v., 2 Br. & G. 254 276 
 
 Griffith, Crabtree v., 22 U. C. Q. B. 573 272 
 
 Natbroke v., Moore, 876 232, 276 
 
 Grimstone v. Innkeeper, Hetley, 49 ... 14 
 
 Grinnell v. Cook, 3 Hill, 485 232, 252, 270, 272 
 
 Groesbeck, Missouri Pae. Ry. v., 24 S. W. 702 402 
 
 Grunewald, Stringfellow v., 109 La. 187 169 
 
 Guest, Shafer v., 6 Robt. 264 298, App. XXX, § 11 
 
 Gump V. Showalter, 43 Pa. 507 265, App. XXXVI, § 3 
 
 H, 
 
 Haas, Chandler v., 12 York Leg. Rec 127 285 
 
 Hadley v. Upshaw, 27 Tex. 547 223 
 
 Haff V. Adams, 59 Pac 111 138, 139, 140, 201 
 
 Hager, Spring v., 145 Mass. 186 223, 224 
 
 Hall V. Pike, 100 Mass. 495 138, 139 
 
 Pope v., 14 La. Aim. 324 . 191 
 
 Profflet v., 14 La. Ann. 524 191 
 
 Pullman's P. C. Co. v., 106 Ga. 765 341, 342, 384, 385 
 
 Hallenbake v. Fish, 8 Wend. 547 282 
 
 HaUiday, Nichols v., 27 Wis. 406 298, App. XLVIII, § 3 
 
 Halpin, Wilson v., 30 How. Pr. 124 225 
 
 Hamlin v. Walters, 3 Col. App. 519 273 
 
 Hammerstein, Pattison v., 17 N. Y. Misc. 375 324 
 
 Hammond, Hawthorne v., 1 C. & K. 404 61, 66, 67 
 
 Hampton v. Pullman P. C. Co., 42 Mo. App. 134 383, 387 
 
 Hancock v. Rand, 94 N. Y. 1 138, 140 
 
 [546] 
 
Table of Cases Cited. 
 
 [references are to sections.] 
 
 Handy, Illinois C. R. R. v., 63 Miss. 609 341, 383, 388, 394 
 
 Rex v., 6 T. R. 286 325 
 
 Hardy, St. Louis, A. & T. Ry. v., 55 Ark. 134 352 
 
 Hare v. Henderson, 43 Up. Can. Q. B. 571 176 
 
 Harman v. Clarkson, 22 Up. Can. C. P. 291 169 
 
 Haroldson, Whitemore v., 2 Lea, 312 231, 232, 233 
 
 Harris v. Childs' U. D. Co., 84 N. Y. S. 260 35, 306 
 
 Harrison, Barber v., 6 City Hall Rec. 89 201 
 
 Brooks v., 41 Conn. 184 279, App. VI, § 3 
 
 Hart V. Washington Park, 157 111. 9 322 
 
 Gardner v., 44 W. R. 527 81 
 
 Hartman, Hulbert v., 79 111. App. 289 190, 223, 224 
 
 Harvey, Horner v., 3 N. Mex. 197 138, 140 
 
 Pullman's P. C. Co. v., 101 Ga. 733 .... 383, 384, 391, 393 
 Hatch, Pullman P. C. Co. v., 30 Tex. Ov. App. 303 . 381, 387, 392 
 Havre de Grace Bank, Towson v., 6 H. & J. 47 . . . 186, 283, 285 
 Hawk V. Rock, 14 Pa. Co. Ct. 490 . App. XXXVI, § 10 
 
 Hawley v. Smith, 25 Wend. 642 .. . 153 
 
 Hawthorne v. Hammond, 1 C. & K. 404 . . . . 61, 66, 67 
 
 Hayes v. Opera House Co., 139 Pa. 636. . . . . . 325 
 
 Hayman, CoUister v., 71 App. Div. 316 315, 317 
 
 Haynes, Becker v., 29 Fed. 441 145, 285, 416, 417 
 
 Jacobi v., 14 N. Y. Misc. 15 221 
 
 Hays v. Turner, 23 la. 214 231, 232, 233 
 
 Hayward v. Merrill, 9^ 111. 349 164 
 
 Head, Stewart v., 70 Ga. 449 205 
 
 Healey v. Gray, 68 Me. 489 121, 132 
 
 Heenrich v. Pullman P. C. Co., 20 Fed. 100 374 
 
 Henderson, Hare v., 43 U. C. Q. B. 571 176 
 
 Herbert v. Markwell, W. N. 1882, 112 224 
 
 Herrick v. Wixom, 121 Mich. 384 . 321 
 
 Hess, Metcalf v., 14 lU. 129 186 
 
 Hickman v. Thomas, 16 Ala. 666 252 
 
 Hildebrand, Kisten v., 9 B. Mon. 74 13, 14, 17, 32, 61, 70, 201, 283, 291 
 Hill V. Owen, 5 Blackf. 323 ... . 186 
 
 Elcox v., 98 U. S. 218 223, 416, App. XI, § 2 
 
 Johnson v., 3 Stark, 172 261, 262 
 
 Hillis V. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 72 la. 228 383 
 
 Hilton V. Adams, 71 Me. 19 162 
 
 Mcllvane v., 7 Hun, 594 264, 298, App. XXX, § 11 
 
 Hinds, Epps v., 27 Miss. 657 133, 148, 285 
 
 Hiscock, Trimmer v., 27 Hun, 31 48 
 
 Hobbs, Carter v., 12 Mich. 52 . . 134 
 
 Hobson, Kennard v., 1 Houst. 36 247 
 
 Hodo V. Benecke, 11 Mo. App. 393 ... . 279, App. XXIII, §§ 1, 2 
 
 Hoffman v. Roessle, 39 N. Y. Misc. 787 231 
 
 [ 547 ] 
 
' Table of Cases Cited. 
 
 [references are to sections.] 
 
 Hoffman Gilbert v., 66 la. 205 171 
 
 Hoffman House, Wies v., 28 N. Y. Misc. 225 188 
 
 Hogan, Bourgoin v., 15 L. Can. R. 424 134 
 
 Holder v. Soulby, 8 C. B. N. S. 254 331 
 
 Holland v. Pack, Peck, 151 114 
 
 HoUenbeck, Manning v., 27 Wis. 202 261, 271 
 
 Holman, White v., 44 Or. 180 41, 46, 291 
 
 Holmes v. Moore, 17 L. C. R. 143 203, 205 
 
 Fowler v., 3 N. Y. Supp. 816 321 
 
 Holohan, Tulane Hotel Co. v., 112 Tenn. 214 . . . . 143, 203, 205 
 
 Hook V. Singer Mfg. Co., 11 Natal L. R. 301 261, 262 
 
 Horn, OeUers v., 3 Pa. Super. 537 325 
 
 Homer v. Harvey, 3 N. Mex. 197 138, 140 
 
 Horslow's Case, Y. B. 22 Hen. 6, 21, pi. 38 11, 221, 283 
 
 Horton v. Terininal H. & A. Co., 89 S. W. 363 424 
 
 Hotel Assoc, v. Walters, 23 Neb. 280 163 
 
 Houser v. Tully, 62 Pa. 92 144, 147, 222 
 
 Houston, E. & W. T. Ry. v. Perkins, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 508 . 373 
 
 Howard, Lawrence v., 1 Utah, 142 138, 204, 231 
 
 Needles v., 1 E. D. Smith, 54 146, 285 
 
 Thickstun v., 8 Blaekf. 535 . . 186 
 
 Van Wyck v., 12 How. Pr. 147 ... . 191, 225, App. XXX, § 3 
 
 Howe Machine Co. v. Pease, 49 Vt. 477 186, 190 
 
 Howell v. Jackson, 6 C. & P. 723 102 
 
 Howie, Fredericks v., 1 H. & C. 381 325 
 
 Howth V. Franklin, 20 Tex. 798 ... 13, 186 
 
 Huber, Cornell v., 102 N. Y. App. Div. 293 . 70 
 
 Huffman v. Walterhouse, 19 Ont. 186 272 
 
 Hughes V. Jones, 8 Kulp, 242 App. XXXVI, § 10 
 
 V. Pulhnan's P. C. Co., 74 Fed. 499 363, 402 
 
 Hulbert v. Hartman, 79 111. App. 289 190, 223, 224 
 
 Hulett V. Swift, 33 N. Y. 571 185, 189 
 
 Humphreys, Taylor v., 30 L. J. M. C. 242 63, 125 
 
 Hunt, Brown Shoe Co. v., 103 la. 586 265, App. XIII, § 1 
 
 Huntly, Marchioness of, v. Bedford Hotel Co., 56 J. P. 53 . . 414, 418 
 
 Hunter, Pullman P. C. Co. v., 107 Ky. 519 383, 387 
 
 Hursh v. Byers, 29 Mo. 469 252 
 
 Husband, Peo. v., 36 Mich. 306 276 
 
 Hutchinson v. Davis, 58 111. App. 368 441, 442, 449, 451 
 
 V. Donovan, 76 Mo. App. 391 201 
 
 Hyatt v. Taylor, 42 N. Y. 258 432, App. XXX, § 3 
 
 Hyde, Butcher v., 10 N. Y. Misc. 275 322 
 
 [548] 
 
Table of Cases Cited, 
 [references are to sections.] 
 
 I. 
 
 Illinois, Munn v., 94 U. S. 113 51 
 
 Illinois C. R. R. v. Handy, 63 Miss. 609 341, 383, 388, 394 
 
 Ingallsbee v. Wood, 33 N. Y. 577 132, 204, 205, 295 
 
 Innes, Murphy v., 11 So. Anstr. 56 63 
 
 Innkeeper, Grimstone v., Hetley, 49 14 
 
 Iroquois H. & A. Co., Shearman v., 42 N. Y. Misc. 217 34, App. XXX, § 11 
 
 Irvine, Nurdlinger v., 18 W. N. C. 65 325 
 
 Ivens, Rex v., 7 C. & P. 213 61, 66, 70, 92, 95 
 
 Jacko V. State, 22 Ala. 73 311, 325 
 
 Jackson v. Com., 7 Cush. 99 App. XV, §4 
 
 Glenn v., 93 Ala. 342 231 
 
 Howell v., 6 C. & P. 723 102 
 
 Jones v., 29 L. T. 399 225 
 
 Jacobi V. Haynes, 14 N. Y. Misc. 15 221 
 
 Jacobs V. Latour, 5 Bing. 130 274 
 
 Dunning v., 15 N. Y. Misc. 85 322 
 
 J. 
 
 Jalie V. Cardinal, 35 Wis. 118 139, 148, 185, 225 
 
 Jaquet v. Edwards, 1 Jam. 4 . . 13, 139 
 
 Jaquith v. American Exp. Co., 60 N. H. 61 268, 298 
 
 Jefferson Hotel Co. v. Warren, 128 Fed. 565 223 
 
 Jeffords v. Crump, 2 Phila. 500 138, 201, 204 
 
 Jencks v. Coleman, 2 Smnn. 221 97 
 
 Jenkins v. Bacon, 111 Mass. 373 206 
 
 V. Louisville & N. R. R., 104 Ky. 673 372 
 
 Doorman v., 2 A. & E. 256 205 
 
 Johnson v. Chadboum Furnace Co., 89 Minn. 310 16, 187 
 
 V. HiU, 3 Stark. 172 261, 262 
 
 V. Midland Ry., 4 Ex. 367 65 
 
 V. Reynolds, 3 Kan. 257 139, 201, 204 
 
 V. Richardson, 17 111. 302 186, 188, 190, 214, 226 
 
 V. Willcox, 135 Pa. 217 323 
 
 Bunn v., 77 Mo. App. 596 203 
 
 State v., 65 Me. 362 48 
 
 Jones v. Jackson, 29 L. T. 399 225 
 
 V. MorriU, 52 Barb. 623 ... . 261, 265, 298, App. XXX, § 11 
 
 v. Osbom, 2 Chit. 484 22 
 
 v. Thurloe, 8 Mod. 172 254, 270 
 
 V. Tyler, 1 A. & E. 522 154 
 
 Hughes v., 8 Kulp, 242 App. XXXVI, § 10 
 
 Lord v., 24 Me. 439 42 
 
 Peo. v., 54 Barb. 311 15, 22, 44 
 
 [549] 
 
Table of Cases Cited. 
 
 [eefekences abb to sections.] 
 
 Jones, Washburn v., 14 Barb. 193 .' 162 
 
 Jordan v. Boone, 5 Rich. L. 528 190 
 
 Judah, Younger v.. Ill Mo. 303 56 
 
 K. 
 
 Kane, Cook v., 13 Or. 482 261, 262 
 
 Kates V. Pullman's P. C. Co., 95 Ga. 810 .. . 383, 387, 391, 393, 394 
 
 Katzenberger, Louisville, N. & G. S. R. R. v., 16 Lea, 380 390 
 
 Kean, Louisville v., 18 B. Mon. 9 45, 46 
 
 Keathley, Com. v., 82 S. W. 232 48 
 
 Keefe, McGentry v., 8 Luz. Leg. Reg. 179 ... . App. XXXVl, § 10 
 Keeler, Com. v., 3 Pa. Dist. 158 325 
 
 Siegman v., 4 N. Y. Misc. 528 292, 295 
 
 Kellogg V. Sweeney, 1 Lans. 397 191, 418, App. XXX, § 3 
 
 Kelly V. New York Excise Comrs., 54 How. Pr. 327 15, 16 
 
 Kelsey v. Berry, 42 111. 469 '. 221 
 
 Fisher v., 121 U. S. 383 150, 415, App. XXIII, § 4 
 
 Kennard v. Hobson, 1 Iloust. 36 ... 247 
 
 Kennedy, Walker v., 20 Pa. Co. Ct. 433 App. XXXVI, § 10 
 
 Kent V. Shuokard, 2 B. & Ad. 803 191 
 
 Keyes, Smith v., 2 Th. & C. 650 139, 245 
 
 King, Pec. v., 110 N. Y. 418 41 
 
 Pullman's P. C. Co. v., 99 Fed. 380 365 
 
 Ex parte, 102 Ala. 182 441, App. I, § 6 
 
 Kingsley, State v., IO8M0. 135 . . . 441, 445, 446, 448, App. XXIII, § 5 
 
 Kinsley v. Lake Shore R. R., 125 Mass. 54 394, 395 
 
 Kinzel, Manzy v., 19 111. App. 571 164, 165 
 
 Kirkman v. Shawcross, 6 T. R. 14 55 
 
 Kisten v. Hildebrand, 9 B. Mon. 74 . . 13, 14, 17, 32, 61, 70, 201, 283, 291 
 
 Kleber, Rowland v., 1 Pittsb. 68 312 
 
 Klemm, Goodyear v., 5 Austral. Jur. 136 . . 261 
 
 Knight, Fell v., 8 M. & W. 269 69, 167, 168, 244 
 
 Kcelling, Tombler v., 60 Ark. 62 207, 333 
 
 Kopper v. WilUs, 9 Daly, 460 113, 131 
 
 Komv. Schedler, llDaly, 234 13 
 
 Kousins, Green v., 3 Pa. Dist. 302 325 
 
 Krohn v. Sweeney, 2 Daly, 200 16, 21, 432, App. XXX, § 3 
 
 Krumbholz, McClure v., 9 Pa. Dist. 544 16, 42 
 
 Labold v. Southern Hotel Co., 54 Mo. App. 49 ... . ... 144 
 
 Lacy, Thompson v., 3 B. & Aid. 283 11, 15, 65, 252 
 
 Ladjing, Montgomeiy v., 30 N. Y. Misc. 92 305, 306 
 
 Laird v. Eiohold, 10 Ind. 212 186 
 
 [550] 
 
Table op Cases Cited. 
 
 [rkfebences are to sections.] 
 
 Lake Shore & M. S. R. R., Kinsley v., 125 Mass. 54 ... . 394, 395 
 
 Lalond, Bernard v., 8 Leg. News, 215 123, 203, 205 
 
 Lambert v. Niklaas, 45 W. Va. 527 274 
 
 Laming, Doe v., 4 Camp. 73 15 
 
 Lamond v. Richard, 1897, 1 Q. B. 541 105, 252 
 
 Landis, Pollock v., 36 la. 651 138, 139, 252, 278 
 
 Lane v. Cotton, 12 Mod. 472 12, 52, 182 
 
 V. Dixon, 3 C. B. 776 167 
 
 Lanier v. Youngblood, 73 Ala. 587 20, 188, 215, 223, 224, 413, 417, 421, 
 
 422, App. I, §§ 3, 4 
 La SaUe R. & O. House v. McMaeters, 85 111. App. 677 . . 35, 304, 305 
 
 Latour, Jacobs v., 5 Bing. 130 274 
 
 Lawrence v. Howard, 1 Utah, 142 138, 204, 231 
 
 V. Pulhnan's P. C. Co., 144 Mass. 1 344 
 
 PuUraan P. C. Co. v., 74 Miss. 782 ... . 342, 343, 371, 374, 401 
 
 Leadbitter, Wood v., 13 M. & W. 838 315 
 
 Leathe, Oxford v., 165 Mass. 254 322 
 
 Lee, Pullman P. C. Co. v., 49 III. App. 75 342, 344 
 
 Lehndorif, Rahmel v., 142 Cal. 681 173 
 
 Leiss V. Engard, 8 Pa. Dist. 608 App. XXXVI, § 10 
 
 Leland, Ramaley v., 43 N. Y. 539 431, 432, App. XXX, § 3 
 
 6 Rob. 358 224, App. XXX, § 3 
 
 Stanton v., 4 E. D. Smith, 88 211, 212, 213, 214, 215 
 
 Lemon v. Pulhnan P. C. Co., 52 Fed. 262 342, 344, 402 
 
 Leo, Smith v., 92 Hun, 242 315, 316 
 
 Leoncini v. Post, 13 N. Y. Supp. 825 295 
 
 Leopold, Classen v., 2 Sweeney, 705 185, 224 
 
 Levien v. Webb, 30 N. Y. Misc. 196 372 
 
 Levy V. Corey, 1 City Ct. R. Supp. 57 103, 171 
 
 Lewis V. Arnold, 4 C. & P. 354 318 
 
 V. New York S. C. Co., 143 Mass. 267 386, 390, 392 
 
 Shutt v., 5 Esp. 128 325 
 
 Libby, Gile v., 36 Barb. 70 185, 412, 432, App. XXX, § 3 
 
 Light V. Abel, 6 Allen (N. B.), 400 - .... 138 
 
 LiUie, Nashville C. & S. L. R. R. v., 112 Tenn. 331 395 
 
 Lima v. Dwinelle, 7 Alb. L. J. 44 . . . . 139, 413, 417, App. XXX, § 3 
 
 Lipscomb, Norfolk & W. R. R. v., 90 Va. 137 402 
 
 Long V. Arcade Hotel Co., 9 Ohio Dec. 372 . . 431, 432, App. XXXIII, § 3 
 
 Long Beach Devel. Co., Moore v., 87 Cal. 483 . . . 139 
 
 Lord V. Jones, 24 Me. 439 42 
 
 Loughran, Watson v., 112 Ga. 837 223 
 
 Louisville, City of, v. Kean, 18 B. Mon. 9 45, 46 
 
 Louisville & N. R. R., Jenkins v., 104 Ky. 673 372 
 
 Louisville, N. & G. S. R. R. v. Katzenberger, 16 Lea, 380 ... . 390 
 
 Lowe, Pullman P. C. Co. v., 28 Neb. 239 341, 381 
 
 Lowell L. & H. S. Ry., Thompson v., 170 Mass. 577 321 
 
 [551] 
 
Table of Cases Cited. 
 
 [references are to sections.] 
 
 Lucia V. Omel, 46 App. Div. 200 137 
 
 63 App. Div. 641 185 
 
 Luckett, Toms v., 5 C. B. 23 . . . . .- 34 
 
 Luellin, Rex. v., 12 Mod. 445 62, 93 
 
 Lundie, State v., 47 La. Ann. 1596 325 
 
 Lusk V. Belote, 22 Minn. 468 140, 188,. 201 
 
 Lynar v. Mossup, 36 Up. Can. Q. B. 230 233 
 
 Lyon V. Smith, 1 Morris (la.), 184 13, 19, 20 
 
 Bowlin v., 67 la. 536 325 
 
 M. 
 
 McCarty v. Dougherty, 16 Pa. Co. Ct. 86 . . . App. XXXVI, § 10 
 
 MeClain v. Williams, 11 S. D. 227 265, App. XL, § 1 
 
 McClay v. Nash, 6 Ky. L. Rep. 298 225 
 
 McClellan, Torrey v., 17 Tex. Civ. App. 371 265 
 
 McClure v. Krumbholz, 9 Pa. Dist. 544 16, 42 
 
 McCourt V. Brennan, 11 Pa. Co. Ct. 645 .. . . App. XXXVI, § 10 
 
 McCracken, U. S. v., 3 Hughes, 544 . 258 
 
 McCrea v. Marsh, 12 Gray, 211 315 
 
 McCready, Smith v., 24 How. Pr. 62 298 
 
 Stewart v., 24 How. Pr. 62 App. XXX, § 11 
 
 McDaniels v. Robinson, 26 Vt. 316 132, 187, 188, 232 
 
 28 Vt. 387 .... ^ 132,231,233 
 
 McDonald v. Edgerton, 5 Barb. 560 131, 148, 232 
 
 Pullman P. C. Co. v., 2 Tex. Civ. App. 322 365 
 
 State v., 4 Harr. 555 44 
 
 McDonough, MoGinley v., 27 W. N. C. 340 .. . App. XXXVI, § 10 
 McDowell, Cady v., 1 Lans. 484 . . . 298, App. XXX, § 11 
 
 McDuffie v. Portland & R. R. R., 54 N. H. 30 55, 56 
 
 McElwaine v. Balmoral Hotel Co., Mont. L. R. 7 S. 0. 139 . . . 232 
 
 McElwell, Cady v., 1 Lans. 484 .. . 298 
 
 McGentey v. Keefe, 8 Luz. Leg. Reg. 179 .. . App. XXXVI, § 1 
 McGinley v. McDonough, 27 W. N. C. 340 . . . . App. XXXVI, § 10 
 
 McGinty, Smith v., 101 Pa. 402 App. XXXVI, § 10 
 
 McGowan v. Duff, 14 Daly, 315 316 
 
 McGraw, Peet v., 25 Wend. 653 283 
 
 McGregor, Fox v., 11 Barb. 41 276, 277 
 
 McGuire, Carnes v., 18 Pa. Co. Ct. 306 App. XXXVI, § 10 
 
 McHugh V. Schlosser, 159 Pa. 480 102, 103 
 
 Mcllvane v. Hilton, 7 Hun, 594 264, 298, App. XXX, § 11 
 
 McKay v. Brown, 5 Can. L. J. 91 18, 20 
 
 McKeon v. Chicago, M. & S. P. Ry., 94 Wis. 477 370 
 
 McKeown, Rees v., 7 Ont. App. 521 13 
 
 McLaohlan, Angus v., 23 Ch. D. 330 269, 273 
 
 [552] 
 
Table of Cases Cited. 
 
 [eepekences are to sections.] 
 
 Maclurgan, Nott v., 20 W. N. N. S. W. 135 183, 189 
 
 McMahon, WUlis v., 89 Cal. 156 14, 61 
 
 McManigle v. Grouse, 1 Walker, 43 265, App. XXXVI, § 3 
 
 M'Manus, Ex parte, 6 Austral. L. T. 12 139 
 
 McMasters, La Salle R. & O. House v., 85 lU. App. 677 .. . 35, 304, 305 
 
 McMurray v. Pullman's P. C. Co., 86 111. App. 619 381 
 
 McNulty, Weeks v., 101 Term. 495 163, 170, 176 
 
 Magee v. Pacific Imp. Co., 98 Cal. 678 138, 139 
 
 Mahii, Bell v., 121 Pa. 225 311, 312 
 
 Maloney v. Bacon, 33 Mo. App. 501 145 
 
 Maltby v. Chapman, 25 Md. 310 . . . . 223, 431, 432, App. XVIII, § 4 
 Mann B. C. Co. v. Dupr6, 54 Fed. 646 346, 367, 402 
 
 Searles v., 45 Fed. 330 343, 345, 347, 377 
 
 Manning v. HoUenbeck, 27 Wis. 202 261, 271 
 
 V. Wells, 9 Humph. 746 32, 201, 291 
 
 Manny, Piper v., 21 Wend. 282 .. 154 
 
 Manuel, Cohen v., 91 Me. 274 154 
 
 Manzy v. Kinzel, 19 111. App. 571 164, 165 
 
 Markham v. Brown, 8 N. H. 523 61, 85, 87, 88, 92, 94 
 
 Markwell, Herbert v., W. N. 1882, 112 224 
 
 Marsh, Duluth v., 71 Minn. 248 325 
 
 McCrea v., 12 Gray, 211 315 
 
 Pullman P. C. Co. v., 24 Ind. App. 129 368 
 
 Marshall, Murray v., 9 Col. 482 231, 234 
 
 Martin, EUiott v., 105 Mich. 506 252 
 
 Pulhnan's P. C. Co. v., 92 Ga. 161 381 
 
 95 Ga. 314 382, 383 
 
 Wilson v., 1 Den. 602 248 
 
 Mason v. Thompson, 9 Pick. 280 21, 132, 185, 285 
 
 Mastad v. Swedish Brethren, 83 Minn. 40 321 
 
 Masterton, Chamberlain v., 26 Ala. 371 201, 223 
 
 Mateer v. Brown, 1 Cal. 221 152, 185 
 
 Matthews, Pullman's P. C. Co.v., 74 Tex. 654 382, 391 
 
 State v., 2 D. & B. 424 13 
 
 Maxwell v. Gerard, 84 Hun, 537 234 
 
 Maxwell House Co., Rains v., 79 S. W. 114 . 431, 432, App. XLI, § 5 
 
 Meacham v. GaUoway, 102 Tenn. 415 139, 140, 201, 431 
 
 Mead, Windham v., 4 Leon. 96 153, 154 
 
 Medawar v. Grand Hotel Co., 1891, 2 Q: B. 11 . . 223, 234, 245, 414 
 
 Melenbacker, R. L. Polk & Co. v., 99 N. W. 867 139, 261 
 
 Mellin, Ross v., 36 Minn. 421 121,138,139 
 
 Mellor, Bennett v., 5 T. R. 273 Ill, 124, 131 
 
 Merrill, Bayley v., 10 All. 360 267 
 
 Hayward v., 94 111. 349 164 
 
 Merritt v. Claghom, 23 Vt. 177 186, 189 
 
 Merryweather, Filipowski v., 2 F. & F. 285 224 
 
 [553] 
 
Table of Cases Cited. 
 
 [HEPEREtfCES ARE TO SECTIONS.] 
 
 Messenger v. Pennsylvania R. R., 8 Vr. 531 55 
 
 Metcalf V. Hess, 14 111. 129 186 
 
 Metzger v. Schnabel, 23 N. Y. Misc. 698 139, 140 
 
 Meyer, Claflin v., 75 N. Y. 260 295 
 
 Midland Ry., Johnson v., 4 Ex. 367 i 65 
 
 Walker v., 55 L. T. 489 165 
 
 Miles, West Chester & P. R. R. v., 55 Pa. 209 56 
 
 Milford V. Wesley, 1 Wils. (Ind.) 119 214, 224 
 
 Miller v. Federal Coffee Palace, 15 Vict. L. R. 30 22, 183 
 
 V. Peeples, 60 Miss. 819 233 
 
 Simon v., 7 La. Ann. 360 191 
 
 Singer Mfg. Co. v., 52 Minn. 516 252, 261 
 
 Milliken, Noble v., 74 Me. 225 429, App. XVII, § 3 
 
 Mills V. Shirley, 110 Mass. 158 265, 298, App. XIX, § 18 
 
 Whiting v., 7 U. C. Q. B. 450 70, 105, 139 
 
 Minor v. Staples, 71 Me. 316 153, 207 
 
 Misch V. O'Hara, 9 Daly, 361 265, 298, App. XXX, § 11 
 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Groesbeck, 24 S. W. 702 402 
 
 Mitchell V. Woods, 16 L. T. 676 224 
 
 Com. v., 2 Pars. 431 61, 70, 82, 83, 84, 85 
 
 Monnot, Taylor v., 4 Duer, 116 22 
 
 1 Abb. Pr. 325 191 
 
 Montgomery v. Ladjing, 30 N. Y. Misc. 92 305, 306 
 
 Moore v. Long B. D. Co., 87 Cal. 483 139 
 
 Holmes v., 17 L. C. R. 143 203, 205 
 
 Richmond & M. Ry. v., 94 Va. 493 322 
 
 Williams v., 69 111. App. 618 142 
 
 Morehead, Sneed v., 70 Miss. 690 163 
 
 Morgan v. Ravey, 6 H. & N. 265 183, 282, 284 
 
 Morrill, Jones v., 52 Barb. 623 261, 265, 298, App. XXX, §11 
 
 Morris, Beedle v., Cro. Jac. 224 285 
 
 Morrow v. Pullman P. C. Co., 98 Mo. App. 351 382, 387, 391 
 
 Morse, Woodworth v., 18 La. Ann. 156 186 
 
 Morton, Com. v., 6 Luz. Leg. Reg. 207 442, 450, 451, 452, App. XXXVI, 
 
 §§7,8 
 
 Moser, Overstreet v., 88 Mo. App. 72 131, 172 
 
 Mosley v. Fosset, 1 Roll. Abr. 3, pi. 3 153 
 
 Mosse V. Townsend, 1 Bulst, 207 276 
 
 Mossup, Lynar, v. 36 Up. Can. Q. B. 230 233 
 
 Mowers v. Fethers, 61 N. Y. 34 151 
 
 Muir, Com. v., 38 W. N. C. 328 41 
 
 Mullen, Bradner v., 27 N. Y. Misc. 479 . . . 148, 423, App. XXX, § 4 
 
 MuUiner v. Florence, 3 Q. B. D. 484 244, 255, 275, 276 
 
 Munn V. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 51 
 
 Murchison v.Sergent, 69 Ga. 206 224, 225, 413, 418, 432, App. IX, §7 
 
 Murphy v. Innes, 11 So. Aust. 56 63 
 
 [554] 
 
Table) of Cases Cited. 
 
 [bBFBHENCES are to 9BCTI0Na.] 
 
 Murphy, Curtis v., 63 Wis. 4 62, 136, 144 
 
 Peo. v., 65 App. Div. 123 46 
 
 5 Pai-k, 130 17, 42 
 
 Murray v. Clarke, 2 Daly, 102 190, 204, 206, 231 
 
 V. Marshall, 9 Col. 482 231, 234 
 
 Myers v. Cottrill, 5 Bisa. 465 150, 204, 415, 416, App. XX, § 2 
 
 Pabe v., 5 Oh. S. & C. P. Deo. 578 15 
 
 Southwood v., 3 Bush, 681 14, 291 
 
 N. 
 
 Nagle, Coskery v., 83 Ga. 696 142, 226 
 
 Nash V. Copeland, 4 N. S. W. W. N. 41 364 
 
 McClay v., 6 Ky. L. Rep. 298 225 
 
 Nashville C. & S. L. R. R. v. LilUe, 112 Tenn. 331 395 
 
 Natbroke v. Griffith, F. Moore, 876 232 
 
 National C. P. Assoc, Williams v., 102 N. W. 783 322 
 
 Neal V. Wilcox, 4 Jones L. 146 153, 201 
 
 Neale v. Crocker, 8 Up. Can. C. P. 224 132, 252 
 
 Needles v. Howard, 1 E. D. Smith, 54 146, 285 
 
 Nelson, Pullman P. C. Co. v., 22 Tex. Gv. App. 223 364 
 
 Nevin v. Pullman P. C. Co., 106 III. 222 343, 344, 361, 364, 369, 376, 401 
 
 Newberger, Covington v., 99 N. C. 523 262 
 
 Newcomb v. Anderson, 11 Ont. 665 265, 298 
 
 New Orleans v. North, 12 La. Ann. 205 311 
 
 Newson v. Axon, 1 McCord, 509 188 
 
 Newton v. Trigg, 1 Shower, 268 241 
 
 New York v. Eden Musee, 102 N. Y. 593 325 
 
 New York C. & H. R. R. R., Dwinelle v., 120 N. Y. 17 375 
 
 Piper v., 76 Hun, 44 372 
 
 Thorpe v., 76 N. Y. 402 352 
 
 New York C. S. C. Co., 28 Mo. App. 199 . .381, 382, 383, 387, 391 
 
 New York Excise Comrs., Kelly v., 54 How. Pr. 327 15, 16 
 
 New York, L. E. & W. R. R., Sessions v., 78 Hun, 541 . . 381, 387, 393 
 
 New York, N. H. & H. R. R., Carpenter v., 124 N. Y. 53 . . 387, 392 
 
 New York S. C. Co., Lewis v., 143 Mass. 267 386, 390, 392 
 
 Nichols v. HalUday, 27 Wis. 406 ... . 298, App. XL VIII, §3 
 
 Faucett v., 4 Th. & C. 597 414, App. XXX, § 1 
 
 64 N. Y. 377 416, App. XXX, § 1 
 
 Nicholson, Peo. v., 25 N. Y. Misc. 266 444, App. XXX § 7 
 
 Proctor v., 7 C. & P. 67 64, 241, 252, 253, 278 
 
 Nicol, Ultzen v., 1894, 1 Q. B. 92 304 
 
 Niklass, Lambert v., 45 W. Va. 527 274 
 
 Noble v. Milliken, 74 Me. 225 429, App. XVH, §3 
 
 Norcross v. Norcross, 63 Me. 163 ... . 20, 121, 148, 185, 282, 283 
 
 [555] 
 
Table of Cases Citeb. 
 
 [kBFERENCES ABE TO SECTIONS.] 
 
 Norfolk & W. R. R. V. Lipscomb, 90 Va. 137 402 
 
 North, New Orleans v., 12 La. Ann. 205 311 
 
 Northcraft, Packard v., 2 Met. Ky. 439 148, 186, 215, 225 
 
 Norton, Peo. v., 7 Barb. 477 44 
 
 Nott V. Maclurgan, 20 W. N. (N. S. W.) 135 183, 189 
 
 Nurdlinger v. Irvine, 18 W. N. 0. 65 . 325 
 
 0. 
 
 O'Brien v. Vaill, 22 Fla. 627 231 
 
 Taylor v., Que. R. 24 S. C. 407 . . . - ' 261 
 
 O'Connor v. Grand Int. H. Co., 1898, 2 Ir. 92 423 
 
 Oden, Banks v., 1 A. K. Marsh, 546 242 
 
 Oellers v. Horn, 3 Pa. Super. 537 325 
 
 Gandy v., 39 W. N. C. 438 325 
 
 O'Hara, Misch v., 9 Daly, 361 . . . . 265, 298, App. XXX, § 11 
 
 Olson V. Grossman, 31 Minn. 222 ... . 188, 413, 418, App. XXI, § 2 
 
 Curran v., 88 Minn. 307 171, 172 
 
 Omel, Lucia v., 46 App. Div. 200 137 
 
 53 App. Div. 641 185 
 
 Opera House Co., Hayes v., 139 Pa. 636 325 
 
 Oppenheim v. White Lion Hotel Co., L. R. 6 C. P. 515 224 
 
 Orchard v. Bush, 1898, 2 Q. B. 284 63, 131, 135, 136 
 
 Osborn, Jones v., 2 Chit. 484 22 
 
 Overstreet v. Moser, 88 Mo. App. 72 131, 172 
 
 Owen, Hill v., 5 Blackf. 323 186 
 
 Owens V. Geiger, 2 Mo. 39 222 
 
 Bohler v., 60 Ga. 185 224 
 
 Oxford v. Leathe, 165 Mass. 254 322 
 
 P. 
 
 P. V. Verein, Sebeck v., 64 N. J. L. 624 322 
 
 Pabe V. Myers, 5 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 578 15 
 
 Pacific Improvement Co., Fay v., 93 Cal. 253 14, 19, 139, 148, 189, 
 
 App. IV, § 8 
 
 Magee v., 98 Cal. 678 138, 139 
 
 Pack, Holland v., Peck, 151 114 
 
 Packard v. Northcraft, 2 Met. (Ky.) 439 148, 186, 215, 225 
 
 Packwood, Famworth v., 1 Holt N. P. 209 150 
 
 Paddock v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R., 37 Fed. 841 366 
 
 Palin v. Reid, 10 Ont. 63 231 
 
 Parker v. Flint, 12 Mod. 254, Garth. 417 14, 15, 169, 291 
 
 Parsons, Stewart v., 24 Wis. 241 431, App. XL VIII, § 1 
 
 [556] 
 
Table of Cases Cited. 
 
 [bbfbeences are to sections.] 
 
 Pattison v. Hammerstein, 17 N. Y. Misc. 375 324 
 
 Payne, Fredericks v., 1 H. & C. 684 325 
 
 Pearce v. Spalding, 12 Mo. App. 141 36, 314 
 
 Pearson v. Seattle, 14 Wash. 438 325 
 
 Pease, Howe Mach. Co. v., 49 Vt. 477 186, 190 
 
 Peeples, Miller v., 60 Miss. 819 233 
 
 Peer, Drew v., 93 Pa. 234 316 
 
 Peet V. MoGraw, 25 Wend. 653 283 
 
 Pendergast v. Compton, 8 C. & P. 454 56 
 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy, 102 U. S. 451 375 
 
 Pennsylvania R. R., Messenger v., 8 Va. 531 55 
 
 Peo. V. Board of Police, 36 N. Y. Misc. 89 46 
 
 V. Campbell, 51 N. Y. App. Div. 565 325 
 
 V. Husband, 36 Mich. 306 276 
 
 V. Jones, 54 Barb. 311 15, 22, 44 
 
 V. King, 110 N. Y. 418 41 
 
 V. Murphy, 65 N. Y. App. Div. 123 46 
 
 5 Park Cr. 130 17, 42 
 
 V. Nicholson, 25 N. Y. Misc. 266 444, App. XXX, § 7 
 
 V. Norton, 7 Barb. 477 44 
 
 V. Royal, 23 N. Y. App. Div. 258 325 
 
 V. Willett, 26 Barb. 78 282 
 
 V. Wurster, 14 N. Y. App. Div. 556 .. . 46 
 
 Rodgers v., 86 N. Y. 360 167 
 
 Perkins, Houston E. & W. T. Ry. v., 21 Tex. ttv. App. 508 ... . 373 
 
 Pettigrew v. Bamum, 11 Md. 434 191 
 
 Pfaelzer v. Pullman P. C. Co., 4 W. N. C. 240 342 
 
 PhilUps, Schnitzer v., 95 N. Y. Supp. 478 302 
 
 Pigot, Binns v., 9 C. & P. 208 252 
 
 Pike V. State, 35 Ala. 419 325 
 
 Hall v., 100 Mass. 495 138, 139 
 
 Pinchon's Case, 9 Coke, 87 69 
 
 Knkerton v. Woodward, 33 Cal. 557 14, 15, 17, 19, 32, 121, 139, 213, 291 
 
 Piper V. Manny, 21 Wend. 282 154 
 
 v. New York C. & H. R. R. R., 76 Hun, 44 372 
 
 Pleiss, Bremer v., 121 Wis. 61 164, 165 
 
 Plummer, Saimders v., O. Bridg. 223 284 
 
 PoUock V. Landis, 36 la. 651 138, 139, 252, 278 
 
 PuUman P. C. Co. v., 69 Tex. 120 342, 381 
 
 Pope V. Hall, 14 La. Ann. 324 191 
 
 Porter v. Gilkey, 67 Mo. 235 . . . . . . . 417, 421, App. XXIII, § 3 
 
 Porterfield, Walsh v., 87 Pa. 376 . . '. 188, 228 
 
 Portland & R. R. R., McDuffie v., 54 N. H. 30 65, 56 
 
 Posey, Beale v., 72 Ala. 323 139, 140, 413, 417, App. I, § 3 
 
 Post, Leoncini v., 13 N. Y. Supp. 826 296 
 
 Potter, Walling v., 35 Conn. 183 15, 63, 135, 138 
 
 [557] 
 
Table of Cases Cited. 
 
 [references are to sections.] 
 
 Powell, Com. v., 10 Phila. 180 318 
 
 Pratt, Danfoi-th v., 42 Me. 50 252, 270 
 
 Presby, Albin v., 8 N. H. 408 155 
 
 Prescott V. Bruce, 2 Cinn. 58 431 
 
 Probasco, Buckle v., 58 Mo. App. 49 144 
 
 Proctor V. Nicholson, 7 C. & P. 67 64, 241, 252, 263, 278 
 
 Berkshire Woolen Co. v., 7 Cush. 417 139, 191, 225, 285 
 
 Rockwell v., 39 Ga. 105 144 
 
 Profllet V. Hall, 14 La. Ann. 524 191 
 
 Prospect Park Hotel Co., Conklin v., 1 N. Y. S. 406 71 
 
 Pullman P. C. Co. v. Adams, 120 Ala. 581 341, 342, 383, 387, 391, 392 
 
 V. Arents, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 71 385, 391 
 
 V. Bales, 80 Tex. 211 368 
 
 V. Barker, 4 Col. 344 365, 402 
 
 V. Booth, 28 S. W. 719 343, 346, 364, 401, 402 
 
 V. Cain, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 503 365 
 
 V. Freudenstein, 3 Col. App. 540 . . . 341, 342, 381, 393 
 
 V. Gardner, 3 Penny. 84 341, 342, 381, 387, 392 
 
 V. Gavin, 93 Tenn. 53 341, 342, 382, 387, 388, 401 
 
 V. Gaylord, 9 Ky. L. Rep. 58 342, 383, 387 
 
 V. Hatch, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 303 381, 387, 392 
 
 V. Hunter, 107 Ky. 519 383, 387 
 
 V. Lawrence, 74 Miss. 782 342, 343, 371, 374, 401 
 
 V. Lee, 49 111. App. 75 342, 344 
 
 V. Lowe, 28 Neb. 239 341, 381 
 
 V. McDonald, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 322 365 
 
 V. Marsh, 24 Ind. App. 129 368 
 
 v. Martin, 92 Ga. 161 381 
 
 v. Matthews, 74 Tex. 654 382, 391 
 
 V. Nelson, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 223 364 
 
 V. Pollock, 69 Tex. 120 342, 381 
 
 v. Reed, 75 111. 125 348, 364, 402 
 
 V. Smith, 73 111. 360 15, 341, 342, 381 
 
 V. Smith, 79 Tex. 468 370 
 
 V. Taylor, 65 Ind. 153 365, 367, 401 
 
 Airey v., 50 La. Ann. 648 . . ._ . 370 
 
 Arthur v., 44 N. Y. Misc. 229 385 
 
 Belden v., 43 S. W. 22 384, 389 
 
 Campbell v., 42 Fed. 484 374, 402 
 
 Cassedy v., 17 So. 373 374 
 
 Chamberlain v., 65 Mo. App. 474 391 
 
 Cooney v., 121 Ala. 368 383, 389 
 
 Dargan v., 2 Wills. § 691 341, 387 
 
 Duval v., 62 Fed. 265 365 
 
 Edmundson v., 92 Fed. 824 363 
 
 Falls R. & M. Co. v., 6 Oh. Dec. 85 341, 381, 388 
 
 [558] 
 
Table of Cases Cited. 
 
 [references ABE TO SECTIONS.] 
 
 Pullman P. C. Co. Florida v., 37 Mo. App. 598 393 
 
 Hampton v., 42 Mo. App. 134 383, 387 
 
 Heenrich v., 20 Fed. 100 374 
 
 Lemon v., 52 Fed. 262 342, 344, 402 
 
 Morrow v., 98 Mo. App. 351 382, 387, 391 
 
 Nevin v., 106 111. 222 343, 344, 361, 364, 369, 376, 401 
 
 Pfaelzer v., 4 W. N. C. 240 342 
 
 Scaling v., 24 Mo. App. 29 342 
 
 Simms v., Fed. Cas. No. 12,869a 342 
 
 Sise v., 1 Que. Sup. 9 341, 381, 385 
 
 Steam v., 8 Ont. 171 381, 392 
 
 Stevenson v., 26 S. W. 112 381,390,403 
 
 Tracy v., 67 How. Pr. 154 341, 342, 381, 392 
 
 Welch v., 16 Abb. Pr. N. S. 352 341, 381 
 
 Williams v., 40 La. Ann. 87 374 
 
 Pullman's P. C. Co.v. Ehrman, 65 Miss. 383 369 
 
 V. Fielding, 62 111. App. 577 362 
 
 V. Hall, 106 Ga. 765 341, 342, 384, 385 
 
 V. Harvey, 101 Ga. 733 383, 384, 391, 393 
 
 V. King, 99 Fed. 380 , ~ 365 
 
 V. Martin, 95 Ga. 314 382, 383 
 
 Ban-ott v., 51 Fed. 796 383 
 
 Curlander v., 28 Chic. Leg. N. 68 348,377 
 
 Hughes v., 74 Fed. 499 363, 402 
 
 Kates v., 95 Ga. 810 383, 387, 391, 393, 394 
 
 Lawrence v., 144 Mass. 1 344 
 
 McMurray v., 86 111. App. 619 381 
 
 Whitney v., 143 Mass. 243 342, 391 
 
 Purcell V. Daly, 19 Abb. N. C. 301 313, 314, 315, 316, 317 
 
 Purvis V. Coleman, 1 Bosw. 321 420 
 
 21 N. Y. Ill 420, App. XXX, § 3 
 
 0. 
 
 Quattlebaum, Carlisle v., 2 Bail. 452 252 
 
 Quilter, Butler v., 17 T. L. R. 159 183 
 
 Quinton v. Courtney, 1 Hayw. R. 40 190 
 
 R. L. Polk & Co. v. Melenbacker, 99 N. W. 867 139, 261 
 
 Rahmel v. Lehndorff, 142 Cal. 681 173 
 
 Railroad Co. v. Walrath, 38 Oh. S. 461 375 
 
 Ernst v., 35 N. Y. 9 295 
 
 Rains v. Maxwell House Co., 112 Tenn. 219 . . . 431, 432, App. XLI, § 5 
 
 [559] 
 
Table of Cases Cited. 
 
 [references ABE TO SECTIONS.] 
 
 Ramaley v. Leland, 6 Robt. 358 224, App. XXX, § 3 
 
 43 N. Y. 539 431, 432, App. XXX, § 3 
 
 Rand, Hancock v., 94 N. Y. 1 138, 140 
 
 Randall v. Tuell, 89 Me. 443 48 
 
 Ravey, Morgan v., 6 H. & N. 265 183, 282, 284 
 
 Ray, Shaw v., 1 Cr. & D. 84 148 
 
 Read v. Amidon, 41 Vt. 15 113, 131, 148, 223, 225, 285 
 
 Smith v., 54 How. Pr. 14 292, 293 
 
 Reed v. Teneyck, 103 Ky. 65 252 
 
 Pullman P. C. Co. v., 75 111. 125 348, 364, 402 
 
 Scrivenor v., 6 W. R. 603 167 
 
 Rees V. McKeown, 7 Out. App. 621 13 
 
 Reg. V. Askin, 20 Up. Can. Q. B. 626 252 
 
 V. Rymer, 2 Q. B. D. 136 15, 21, 22, 96, 301 
 
 V. Sprague, 63 J. P. 233 92, 167 
 
 V. Tucker, 2 Q. B. D. 417 325 
 
 Reid, Palin v., 10 Ont. 63 231 
 
 Reifsnyder, Com. v., 14 Pa. Co. Ct. 353 325 
 
 Reinhardt, Willard v., 2 E. D. Smith, 148 14, 32, 185, 291 
 
 Rescorla, Blythan v., 1 Kulp, 351 App. XXXVI, § 10 
 
 Rex V. Collins, Pahner, 367, 373 41, 52, 61, 70, 71, 282 
 
 V. Forbes, 1 Cr. & D. 157 320 
 
 V. Handy, 6 T. R. 286 325 
 
 V. Ivons, 7 C. & P. 213 61, 66, 70, 92, 95 
 
 V. Luellin, 12 Mod. 445 62, 93 
 
 V. Smith, 65 J. P. 521 61 
 
 Reynolds, Johnson v., 3 Kan. 257 139, 201, 204 
 
 Richard, Lamond v., 1897, 1 Q. B. 541 105, 252 
 
 Richardson, Danseyv.,3E.&B. 143 292,293,294 
 
 Johnson v., 17 111. 302 186, 188, 190, 214, 226 
 
 Richmond v. Smith, 8 B. & C. 9 148, 158, 183 
 
 Richmond & M. Ry. v. Moore, 94 Va. 493 322 
 
 Road Drivers' Assoc., Roche v., 96 N. Y. S. 205 241 
 
 Robins v. Gray, 1895, 2 Q. B. 501 68, 256, 261, 262 
 
 Robinson v. Waller, 1 Roll. Abr. 3, pi. 7 133, 285 
 
 V. Walter, 3 Bulst. 269 261 
 
 McDaniels v., 26 Vt. 316 132, 187, 188, 232 
 
 28Vt.387 132,231,233 
 
 Roche V. Road Drivers' Assoc, 96 N. Y. Supp. 205 241 
 
 Rock, Hawk v., 14 Pa. Co. Ct. 490 App. XXXVI, § 10 
 
 Rockwell V. Proctor, 39 G a. 105 144 
 
 Crapo v., 92 N. Y. S. 1122 139, 181 
 
 Rodgers v. Peo., 86 N. Y. 360 167 
 
 Roessle, Hoffman v., 39 N. Y. Misc. 787 231 
 
 Rosenplaenter v., 54 N. Y. 262 .... 427, 432, App. XXX, § 3 
 
 Rogers, Dickerson v., 4 Humph. 179 15, 19, 20, 48, 162 
 
 [560] 
 
Table of Cases Cited. 
 
 [references are to sections.] 
 
 Rommel v. Schambacher, 120 Pa. 579 171, 172 
 
 Root V. New York C. S. C. Co., 28 Mo. App. 199 381, 382, 383, 387, 391 
 Rosenplaenter v. Roessle, 54 N. Y. 262 ... 427, 432, App. XXX, § 3 
 
 Ross V. Mellin, 36 Minn. 421 121, 138, 139 
 
 Rosse V. Bramstead, 2 Roll. R. 438 276 
 
 Rourke, Simpson v., 13 N. Y. Misc. 230 303, 306 
 
 Rowland v. Kleber, 1 Pittsb. 68 312 
 
 Roy, Pennsylvania Co. v., 102 U. S. 451 375 
 
 Royal, Peo. v., 23 App. Div. 258 325 
 
 Rubenstein v. Cruikshanks, 54 Mich. 199 223, 226 
 
 Russell V. Fagan, 7 Iloust. 389 132, 185 
 
 Russellville v. White, 41 Ark. 485 42 
 
 Ryder, Centlivre v., 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 273 203, 205 
 
 Rymer, Reg. v., 2 Q. B. D. 136 15, 21, 22, 96, 301 
 
 S. 
 
 St. Louis, City of, v. Siegrist, 46 Mo. 593 22 
 
 St. Louis A. & T. Ry. v. Hardy, 55 Ark. 134 352 
 
 Sands' Case, F. Moore, 876 232 
 
 Sandys v. Florence, 47 L. J. C. P. 598 163, 170 
 
 Sasseen v. Clark, 37 Ga. 242 188, 190, 191, 223, 234 
 
 Saunders v. Plummer, O. Bridg. 223 284 
 
 Saville, District of Columbia v., 1 McAr. 581 318 
 
 Sawyer, Atwater v., 76 Me. 539 20, 94, 98, 169 
 
 ScaUng V. Pullman P. C. Co., 24 Mo. App. 29 342 
 
 Scarbrough v. Cosgrove, 1905, 2 K. B. 805 297, 332 
 
 Scattergood v. Waterman, 2 Miles, 323 248 
 
 Schaffer, Boston v., 9 Pick. 415 325 
 
 Schambacher, Rommel v., 120 Pa. 579 171, 172 
 
 Schedler, Kom v., 11 Daly, 234 13 
 
 Scheffer v. Corson, 5 S. D. 233 185, 204 
 
 Schermerhom v. Tripp, 2 Caines, 108 20 
 
 Scherpf, Burton v., 1 AU. 133 315, 316 
 
 Schlosser, McHugh v., 159 Pa. 480 102, 103 
 
 Schmidt, Toub v., 60 Hun, 409 203, 205 
 
 Schnabel, Metzger v., 23 N. Y. Misc. 698 139, 134 
 
 Schneps v. Strum, 25 N. Y. Misc. 168 330 
 
 Schnitzer v. Phillips, 95 N. Y. Supp. 478 302 
 
 Schofield V. Wood, 170 Mass. 415 322, 323 
 
 Schryver, Cochrane v., 12 Daly, 174 252 
 
 Scott, Garden v., 1 Kulp, 196 App. XXXVI, § 10 
 
 Scrivenor v. Reed, 6 W. R. 603 167 
 
 Searle, Clarke v., 1 Esp. 25 325 
 
 Searles v. Mann B. C. Co., 45 Fed. 330 343, 345, 347, 377 
 
 36 [ 561 ] 
 
Table of Cases Cited, 
 [references are to sections.] 
 
 Seattle, Pearson v., 14 Wash. 438 325 
 
 Sebeok v. P. V. Verein, 64 N. J. L. 624 . .322 
 
 Sellers, Atkinson v., 5 C. B. N. S. 442 63, 131 
 
 Sergent, Murchison v., 69 Ga. 206 . . 224, 225, 413, 418, 432, App. IX, § 7 
 Sessions v. New York, L. E. & W. R. R., 78 Hun, 541 .. . 381, 387, 393 
 
 Seymour V. Cook, 53 Barb. 451 234 
 
 Shafer v. Guest, 6 Robt. 264 298, App. XXX, § 11 
 
 Sharpe, Walker v., 31 U. C. Q. B. 340 285 
 
 Shaw V. Berry, 31 Me. 478 185 
 
 V. Ray, 1 Cr. & Dix. 84 148 
 
 Shawcross, Kirkman v., 6 T. R. 14 .... 55 
 
 Shearman v. Iroquois H. & A. Co., 42 N. Y. Misc. 217 34, App. XXX, § 11 
 Sheffer v. Willoughby, 163 111. 518 . . . . 15, 169, 301, 302 
 
 Shelley v. Bethell, 12 Q. B. D. 11 . ... 325 
 
 Sherry, Block v., 43 N. Y. Misc. 342 15, 172, 301, 302 
 
 Shirley, Mills v., 110 Mass. 158 . . . . 265, 298, App. XIX, § 18 
 
 Shoecraft v. Bailey, 25 la. 553 139, 226 
 
 Shoemaker v. Beaver, 42 Leg. Int. 511 243 
 
 Shortridge, Com. v., 3 J. J. Marsh. 638 .... 22, 242, App. XV, § 4 
 Showalter, Gump v., 43 Pa. 507 .... 265, App. XXXVI, §3 
 
 Shuckard, Kent v., 2 B. & Ad. 803 191 
 
 Shultz V. Wall, 134 Pa. 262 188, 224 
 
 Shutt V. Lewis, 5 Esp. 128 325 
 
 Sibley v. Aldrich, 33 N. H. 553 185 
 
 Siegman v. Keeler, 4 N. Y. Misc. 528 292, 295 
 
 Siegrist, St. Louis v., 46 Mo. 593 22 
 
 Sights V. Yamalls, 12 Grat. 292 47 
 
 Simms v. Pullman S. C. Co., Fed. Cas. No. 12,869a 342 
 
 Simon v. Miller, 7 La. Ann. 360 191 
 
 Simpson v. Rourke, 13 N. Y. Misc. 230 303, 306 
 
 V. Wood, 105 Mass. 263 325 
 
 Day v., 18 C. B. N. S. 680 311 
 
 Singer Mfg. Co. v. Flannigan, 7 Pa. Co. Ct. 45 . . 261, App. XXXVI, § 3 
 
 V. Miller, 52 Minn. 516 252, 261 
 
 Hook v., 11 Natal L. R. 301 . . . . . . 261, 262 
 
 Sise V. Pullman P. C. Co., 1 Quebec Super. 9 . . 341, 381, 385 
 
 Six Carpenters' Case, 8 Coke, 290 102 
 
 Smith V. Canada P. R. R., 34 N. S. 22 362 
 
 V. Colcord, 115 Mass. 70 266, 298, App. XIX, § 18 
 
 V. Dearlove, 6 C. B. 132 252 
 
 V. Dingus, 12 Pa. Co. Ct. 299 App. XXXVI, § 10 
 
 V. Keyes, 2 Th. & C. 650 139, 245 
 
 V. Leo, 92 Hun, 242 315, 316 
 
 V. McGinty, 101 Pa. 402 App. XXXVI, ' § 10 
 
 V. Read, 54 How. Pr. 14 292, 293 
 
 V. Wilson, 36 Minn. 334 191 225 
 
 [ 562 ] 
 
Table of Cases Cited. 
 
 [references are to sections.] 
 
 Smith, Allen v., 12 C. B. N. S. 638 232, 233, 272, 275 
 
 Hawley v., 25 Wend. 642 153 
 
 Lyon v., 1 Morris, 184 13, 19, 20 
 
 Pullman P. C. Co., 73 111. 360 15, 341, 342, 381 
 
 79 Tex. 468 370 
 
 Rex v., 65 J. P. 521 61 
 
 Richmond v., 8 B. & C. 9 148, 153, 183 
 
 Swann v., 14 Daly, 114 224, 332 
 
 Snead v. Watkins, 1 C. B. N. S. 267 261, 262 
 
 Sneed v. Morehead, 70 Miss. 690 163 
 
 Sneider v. Geiss, 1 Yeates, 34 147 
 
 Snook, Bradley Livery Co. v., 66 N. J. L. 654 155 
 
 Society for Reformation v. Diers, 10 Abb. Pr. N. S. 216 311 
 
 Sonnebom v. Steinan, 85 N. Y. S. 334 246 
 
 Soulby, Holder v., 8 C. B. N. S. 254 331 
 
 Southcote V. Stanley, 1 H. & N. 247 63 
 
 Southern Hotel Co., Labold v., 54 Mo. App. 49 144 
 
 Wyckoff v., 24 Mo. App. 382 265, App. XXIII, § 1 
 
 Southern P. P. C. Co., Blum v., 1 Flip. 500 341, 342, 383, 386, 387, 388, 391 
 
 Southw6od V. Myers, 3 Bush, 681 14, 291 
 
 Spalding, Pearce v., 12 Mo. App. 141 36, 314 
 
 Spencer, Candy v., 3 F. & F. 306 148, 225, 285 
 
 Spice V. Bacon, 36 L. T. 896 224 
 
 Spioer v. Bacon, 2 Ex; D. 463 413, 419 
 
 Sprague, Reg. v., 63 J. P. 233 92, 167 
 
 Spring V. Hager, 145 Mass. 186 223, 224 
 
 Squire v. Wheeler, 16 L. T. 93 419 
 
 Stanley v. Bircher, 78 Mo. 245 282, 284 
 
 Southcote v., 1 H. & N. 247 63 
 
 Stanton v. Leland, 4 E. D. Smith, 88 .... 211, 212, 213, 214, 215 
 
 Stanwood v. Woodward, 38 Me. 192 48 
 
 Staples, Minor v., 71 Me. 316 153, 207 
 
 Stark, Ewart v., 8 Rich. L. 423 252 
 
 State V. Benson, 28 Minn. 424 441, 443, App. XXI, § 3 
 
 V. Cloud, 6 Ala. 628 41, 48 
 
 V. Engle, 156 Ind. 339 441, App. XII, § 2 
 
 V. Fletcher, 5 N. H. 257 42, 48 
 
 V. French Opera Assoc, 107 La. 284 325 
 
 V. Johnson, 65 Me. 362 . 48 
 
 V. KiQgsley, 108 Mo. 135 ... . 441, 445, 446, 448, App. XXUI, § 5 
 
 V. Lundie, 47 La. Ann. 1596 325 
 
 V. McDonald, 4 Harr. (Del.) 555 44 
 
 V. Matthews, 2 Dev. & B. 424 13 
 
 V. Steele, 106 N. C. 766 65, 82, 85, 86, 92, 120 
 
 V. Stone, 6 Vt. 295 11, 22, 42, 46, 47 
 
 v.Tull,42Mo.App.324 445, 448, App. XXIII, § 5 
 
 [563] 
 
Table of Cases Cited. 
 
 [references are to sections.] 
 
 state V. Whitby, 5 Harr. 474 82 
 
 V. Wynne, 1 Hawks, 451 20, 48, 98 
 
 V. Yardley, 95 Tenn. 546 441, App. XLI, § 6 
 
 Chauncey v., 130 Ala. 71 448, App. I, § 6 
 
 Curtis v., 5 Ohio, 324 17 
 
 Gilhnan v., 55 Ala. 248 325 
 
 Jacko v., 22 Ala. 73 311, 323 
 
 Pike v., 35 Ala. 419 325 
 
 Winter v., 30 Ala. 22 18, 48 
 
 Steam v. Pullman Car Co., 8 Ont. 171 381, 392 
 
 Stedman, In re., 14 Phila. 376 43 
 
 Steele, State v., 106 N. C. 766 65, 82, 85, 86, 92, 102 
 
 Steinan, Sonnebom v., 85 N. Y. S. 334 246 
 
 Stephens v. Watson, Salk. 45 41 
 
 Cromwellv., 2Daly, 15 15,16,22 
 
 Stevenson v. Pullman P. C. Co., 26 S. W. 112 381, 390, 403 
 
 Stewart v. Head, 70 Ga. 449 205 
 
 V. McCready, 24 How. Pr. 62 298, App. XXX, § 11 
 
 V. Parsons, 24 Wis. 241 '431, App. XL VIII, § 1 
 
 Stone, State v., 6 Vt. 295 11, 22, 42, 46, 47 
 
 Stott V. Churchill, 15 N. Y. Misc. 80 162, 163, 170 
 
 Strange, Wigan v., L. R. 1 C. P. 175 311 
 
 Stratton, Baker v., 52 N. J. L. 277 264, App. XXVIII, § 1 
 
 Strauss v. County H. & W. Co., 12 Q. B. D. 27 . . . 89, 123, 143, 203 
 
 Stringfellow v. Grunewald, 109 La. 187 169 
 
 Strum, Schneps v., 25 N. Y. Misc. 168 333 
 
 Sunbolf V. Alford, 3 M. & W. 248 257, 259 
 
 Sundmacher v. Block, 39 111. App. 553 447, App. XI, § 5 
 
 Swan V. Bournes, 47 la. 501 260 
 
 Dibdin v., 1 Esp. 28 319 
 
 Swann v. Smith, 14 Daly, 114 224, 332 
 
 Swedish Brethren, Mastad v., 83 Minn. 40 321 
 
 Sweeney, Kellogg v., 1 Lans. 397 191, 418, App. XXX, § 3 
 
 Sweeny, Bernstein v., 33 N. Y. Super. 271 . . 418, 431. App. XXX, § 3 
 
 Krohn v., 2 Daly, 200 16, 21, 432, App. XXX, § 3 
 
 Swift, Hulett v., 33 N. Y. 571 185, 189 
 
 T. 
 
 Taylor v. Downey, 104 Mich. 532 201, 202, 252 
 
 V. Humphreys, 30 L. J. M. C. 242 63, 125 
 
 V. Monnot, 1 Abb. Pr. 325 191 
 
 4 Duer, 116 22 
 
 V. O'Brien, Que. R. 24 S. C. 407 261 
 
 V. Waters, 7 Taunt. 374 315 
 
 [564] 
 
Table of Cases Cited. 
 
 [references are to sections.] 
 
 Taylor, Carpenter v., 1 Hilb. 193 15, 22, 291, 301 
 
 Cheesebrough v., 12 Abb. Pr. 227 190 
 
 Forster v., 3 Camp. 49 249 
 
 Hyatt v., 42 N. Y. 258 432, App.'XXX, § 3 
 
 Pullman P. C. Co. v., 65 Ind. 153 365, 367, 401 
 
 Weisenger v., 1 Bush, 275 . 148,186,191 
 
 Taxing District v. Emerson, 4 Lea, 312 325 
 
 Ten Broeck v. Wells Fargo & Co., 47 Fed. 690 163 
 
 Teneyck, Reed v., 103 Ky. 65 252 
 
 Terminal H. & A. Co., Horton v., 89 S. W. 363 424 
 
 Thaire, Drope v., Latch, 126 14 
 
 Thatcher v. Beam, 14 Pa. Co. Ct. 107 App. XXXVI, § 10 
 
 Thayer, Wade v., 40 Cal. 578 172 
 
 Thickstun v. Howard, 8 Blackf. 535 186 
 
 Thomas v. Glascoe, 13 Pa. Co. Ct. 167 App. XXXVI, § 10 
 
 Hickman v., 16 Ala. 666 252 
 
 West v., 97 Ala. 622 163 
 
 Thompson v. Lacy, 3 B. & Aid. 283 11, 15, 65, 252 
 
 V. Lowell L. & H. S. Ry., 170 Mass. 577 321 
 
 Mason v., 9 Pick. 280 21, 132, 186, 285 
 
 . Thome, Dunlap v., 1 Rich. L. 213 252 
 
 Thorpe v. New York C. & H. R. R. R., 76 N. Y. 402 352 
 
 Threfall v. Borwick, L. R. 10 Q. B. 210 261 
 
 Throckmorton, Vance v., 6 Bush. 41 149, 186, 189, 201 
 
 Thurloe, Jones v., 8 Mod. 172 254, 270 
 
 Todd,Briggsv., 28N.Y.Misc.208 430, 431, App. XXX, § 3 
 
 Toddington, Whalley v., 13 Phila. 2 242 
 
 Tombler v. Koelling, 60 Ark. 62 207, 333 
 
 Toms V. Luckett, 5 C. B. 23 34 
 
 Torrey v. McCleUan, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 371 265 
 
 Toub V. Schmidt, 60 Hun, 409 203, 205 
 
 Townsend, Mosse v., 1 Bulst. 207 276 
 
 Towson V. Havre de Grace Bank, 6 H. & J. 47 186, 283, 285 
 
 Tracy v. PuUman P. C. Co., 67 How. Pr. 154 ... . 341, 342, 381, 392 
 
 Travis, Goodenow v., 3 Johns. 427 92 
 
 Treiber v. Burrows, 27 Md. 130 ... . 191, 430, App. XVIII, §3 
 Treverton, Dillon v., 16 Pa. Co. Ct. 89 .... App. XXXVI, § 10 
 
 Trieber v. Burrows, 21 Md. 320 148, 190, 223 
 
 Trigg V. Newton, 1 Show. 268 241 
 
 Trimmer v. Hiscock, 27 Hun, 31 48 
 
 Tripp, Schermerhom v., 2 Gaines, 108 20 
 
 Trissal, Western U. T. Co. v., 98 Ind. 566 146 
 
 Tucker, Reg. v., 2 Q. B. D. 417 325 
 
 Tuell, Randall v., 89 Me. 443 48 
 
 Tulane Hotel Co. v. Holohan, 112 Tenn. 214 . . . ^ . . 143, 203, 205 
 
 TuU, State v., 42 Mo. App. 324 445, 448, App. XXIII, § 5 
 
 [565] 
 
Table of Cases Cited. 
 
 [eEPEBENCES ABE TO SECTIONS,] 
 
 Tully, Houserv., 62Par92 144,147,222 
 
 Turner v. Whitaker, 9 Pa. Super. 83 . . . 228, 429, App. XXXVI, § 5 
 
 Hays v., 23 la. 214 231, 232, 233 
 
 Turrill v. Crawley, 13 Q. B. 197 261 
 
 Tutt, Caldwell v., 10 Lea, 258 272 
 
 Tyler, Jones v., 1 A. & E. 522 154 
 
 u. 
 
 Ultzen V. Nicol, 1894, 1 Q. B. 92 304 
 
 U. S. V. Barney, 3 Hughes, 545 258 
 
 V. McCracken, 3 Hughes, 544 268 
 
 Upshaw, Hadley v., 27 Tex. 547 223 
 
 V. 
 
 Vaill, O'Brien v., 22 Fla. 627 231 
 
 Vance v. Throckmorton, 5 Bush, 41 149, 186, 189, 201 
 
 Van Wyck v. Howard, 12 How. Pr. 147 . . . 191, 225, App. XXX, § 3 
 Vogel, Batterson v., 8 Mo. App. 24 . . 413, 417, 418, 421, App. XXIII, § 3 
 
 10 Mo. App. 235 224 
 
 Voss V. Wagner P. C. Co., 16 Ind. App. 271 381, 385, 395 
 
 w. 
 
 Wade V. Thayer, 40 Cal. 578 172 
 
 Wagner, Welding v., 1 City Ct. Rep. 66 341, 342, 381 
 
 Wagner P. C. Co., Dawley v., 169 Mass. 315 ... . 342, 381, 385, 391 
 
 Efron v., 59 Mo. App. 641 385, 391 
 
 Voss v., 16 Ind. App. 271 381,385,395 
 
 Wainman, Carhart v., 114 Ga. 632 142 
 
 Waldron, Dickson v., 135 Ind. 507 321 
 
 Walker v. Kennedy, 20 Pa. Co. Ct. 433 App. XXXVI, § 10 
 
 V. Midland Ry., 55 L. T. 489 165 
 
 V. Sharpe, 31 Up. Can. Q. B. 340 285 
 
 Bamett v., 39 N. Y. Misc. 323 ... . 265, 298, App. XXX, § 11 
 
 Doyle v., 26 U. C. Q. B. 502 104, 167, 244 
 
 Wall, Shultz v., 134 Pa. 262 .... 188, 224, 422, App. XXXVI, § 5 
 
 Waller, Robinson v., 1 Roll. Abr. 3 133, 285 
 
 Walling V. Potter, 35 Conn. 183 15, 63, 135, 138 
 
 Walrath, R. R. v., 38 Oh. S. 461 375 
 
 Walsh V. Porterfield, 87 Pa. 376 188, 228 
 
 Walter, Robinson v., 3 Bulst. 269 261 
 
 Walterhouse, Huffman v., 19 Ont. 186 272 
 
 [566] 
 
Table of Cases Cited. 
 
 [kbpebbnces are to sections.] 
 
 Walters, Hamlin v., 3 Col. App. 519 273 
 
 Hotel Assoc, v., 23 Neb. 280 163 
 
 Warbrooke v. Griffin, 2 Br. & G. 254 . . . . - 276 
 
 Warner, Becker v., 90 Hun, 187 224, 431, App. XXX, § 3 
 
 Crown Point v., 3 Hill, 150 22 
 
 Warren, Jefferson Hotel Co. v., 128 Fed. 565 223 
 
 Washburn v. Jones, 14 Barb. 193 162 
 
 Washington Park, Hart v., 157 111. 9 322 
 
 Waterman, Scattergood v., 2 Miles, 323 248 
 
 Waters v. Gerard, 94 N. Y. Supp. 702 261 
 
 Bevan v., 3 C. & P. 520 252 
 
 Taylor v., 7 Taunt. 374 315 
 
 Watkins, Snead v., 1 C. B. N. S. 267 261, 262 
 
 Watson V. Cross, 2 Duv. 147 64, 112, 252, 253 
 
 V. Loughran, 112 Ga. 837 223 
 
 Bemon v., 1 Roll. Abr. 3 147 
 
 Stephens v., Salk. 45 41 
 
 Watters, Domestic S. M. Co. v., 50 Ga. 573 263 
 
 Wear v. Gleason, 52 Ark. 364 205, 206, 235 
 
 Webb, Baldwin v., 121 Ga. 416 241 
 
 Braun v., 32 N. Y. Misc. 243 364 
 
 Buck v., 58 Hun, 185 364 
 
 Levien v., 30 N. Y. Misc. 196 372 
 
 Williams v., 27 N. Y. Misc. 508 381, 383, 387 
 
 Weeks v. McNulty, 101 Tenn. 495 163, 170, 176 
 
 Weisenger v. Taylor, 1 Bush, 275 ' 148, 186, 191 
 
 Welbom, Bonner v., 7 Ga. 296 14, 48, 291 
 
 Welch V. Pullman P. C. Co., 16 Abb. Pr. N. S. 352 341, 381 
 
 Appleton v., 20 N. Y. Misc. 343 304 
 
 Welding v. Wagner, 1 City Ct. Rep. 66 341, 342, 381 
 
 Wells, Manning v., 9 Humph. 746 32,201,291 
 
 Wells, Fargo & Co., Ten Broeck v., 47 Fed. 690 163 
 
 Wesley, Milford v., 1 Wils. 119 . . 214, 224 
 
 West V. Thomas, 97 Ala. 622 163 
 
 Chamberlam v., 37 Minn. 54 416, App. XXI, § 2 
 
 Westbrook v. Griffith, F. Moore, 876 276 
 
 Westchester Racing Assoc, Grannan v., 16 App. Div. 8 41 
 
 West Chester & P. R. R. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209 56 
 
 Western Turf Assoc, Greeneburg v., 140 Cal. 357 41 
 
 Western U. T. Co. v. Trissal, 98 Ind. 566 146 
 
 Wetherbee, Com. v., 101 Mass. 214 17, 66 
 
 Whalley v. Toddington, 13 Phila. 2 242 
 
 Wheaton, Bimey v., 2 How. Pr. N. S. 519 . . 249, 264, App. XXX, § 11 
 
 Wheeler, Squire v., 16 L. T. 93 419 
 
 Whicher v. Boston & A. R. R., 176 Mass. 275 . . 341, 381, 384, 391, 392 
 Whitaker, Turner v., 9 Pa. Super. 83 . . 228, 429, App. XXXVI, § 5 
 
 [567] 
 
Table of Cases Cited, 
 [references are to sections.] 
 
 Whitby, State v., 5 Harr. 494 82 
 
 White V. Hohnau, 44 Or. 180 41, 46, 291 
 
 Callard v., 1 Stark. 171 81 
 
 Russellville v., 41 Ark. 485 42 
 
 White's Case, 2 Dyer, lS8b 124 
 
 White Lion Hotel Co., Oppenheim v., L. R. 6 C. P. 515 224 
 
 Whitemore v. Haroldson, 2 Lea, 312 231, 232, 233 
 
 Whiting V. Mills, 7 Up. Can.. Q.B. 450 70,105,139 
 
 Whitney v. Pullman's P. C. Co., 143 Mass. 243 342, 391 
 
 Wiatt, Arcade Hotel Co. v., 44 Oh. S. 32 205 
 
 Wies V. Hoffman House, 28 N. Y. Misc. 225 188 
 
 Wigan V. Strange, L. R. 1 C. P. 175 311 
 
 Wiggins, Clute v., 14 Johns. 175 154 
 
 Wilcox, Neal v., 4 Jones L. 146 153, 201 
 
 Wilde, Armistead v., 17 Q. B. 261 223, 227 
 
 Wilkins v. Earle, 44 N. Y. 172 191, 425, App. XXX, § 3 
 
 Cross v., 43 N. H. 332 . . ' . . . . 241, 298, App. XXVII, § 2 
 
 Willard v. Reinhardt, 2 E. D. Smith, 148 14, 32, 185, 291 
 
 Willcox, Johnson v., 135 Pa. 217 323 
 
 Willett, Peo. v., 26 Barb. 78 282 
 
 Willey, Clary v., 49 Vt. 55 13 
 
 Williamti v. Garignes, 30 La. Ann. 1094 33 
 
 V. Moore, 69 111. App. 618 142 
 
 V. National C. P. Afesoc, 102 N. W. 783 322 
 
 V. Pullman P. C. Co., 40 La. Ann. 87 374 
 
 V. Webb, 27 N. Y. Misc. 508 381, 383, 387 
 
 McClam v., 11 S. D. 227 265, App. XL, § 1 
 
 Willingrice, Archer v., 4 Esp. 186 325 
 
 WilUs V. McMahon, 89 Cal. 156 14, 61 
 
 Kopper v., 9 Daly, 460 113, 131 
 
 Willoughby, Sheffer v., 163 111. 518 15, 169, 301, 302 
 
 Wilson V. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 32 Mo. App. 682 383 
 
 V. Halpin, 30 How. Pr. 124 225 
 
 V. Martin, 1 Den. 602 248 
 
 Smith v., 36 Minn. 334 191, 225 
 
 Winchester, Amey v., 68 N. H. 447 134 
 
 Dickinson v., 4 Cush. 114 142, 285 
 
 Windham v. Mead, 4 Leon. 96 153, 154 
 
 Winter v. State, 30 Ala. 22 18, 48 
 
 Wintermute v. Clark, 5 Sandf. 242 14, 15, 231 
 
 Wiser v. Chesley, 53 Mo. 547 201, 205 
 
 Wixom, Herrick v., 121 Mich. 384 321 
 
 Wood V. Leadbitter, 13 M. & W. 838 315 
 
 Camp v., 76 N. Y. 92 322, 323 
 
 Ingallabee v., 33 N. Y. 677 132, 204, 205 
 
 36 Barb. 452 295 
 
 [568] 
 
Table of Cases Cited. 
 
 [repebbncbs are to sections.] 
 
 Wood, Schofield v., 170 Mass. 415 322, 323 
 
 Simpson v., 105 Mass. 263 325 
 
 Woodruff S. & P. C. Co. v. Diehl, 84 Ind. 474 . . 341, 342, 381, 387, 388 
 
 Woods, Mitchell v., 16 L. T. 676 224 
 
 Woodward v. Birch, 4 Bush, 510 162 
 
 Pinkerton v., 33 Cal. 567 . . 14, 15, 17, 19, 32, 121, 139, 213, 291 
 
 Stanwood v., 38 Me. 192 48 
 
 Woodworth v. Morse, 18 La. Ann. 156 186 
 
 Wright, CashiU v., 6 E. & B. 891 223, 227 
 
 Wurster, Peo. v., 14 App. Div. 556 46 
 
 Wyckoflf V. Southern Hotel Co., 24 Mo. App. 382 265, App. XXIII, § 1 
 
 44 Mo. App. 367 App. XXIII, §1 
 
 Wynne, State v., 1 Hawks, 451 20, 48, 98 
 
 Y. 
 
 Yardley, State v., 95 Tenn. 546 441, App. XLI, § 6 
 
 Yarnells, State v., 12 Grat. 292 47 
 
 Yorke v. Grenaugh, 2 Ld. Raym. 866 132 
 
 Young, Bumham v., 72 Me. 273 416, App. XVII, § 2 
 
 Younger v. Judah, 111 Mo. 303 56 
 
 Youngblood, Lanier v., 73 Ala. 587 20, 188, 215, 223, 224, 413, 417, 
 
 421, 422, App. I, §§ 3, 4 
 
 [569] 
 
INDEX. 
 
 [refebences are to sections.] 
 
 A. 
 
 ABSENCE, 
 
 guest continues such during temporary, 232. 
 what is temporary, 233. 
 
 ACCIDENT, 
 
 innkeeper's liability for, 136. 
 
 ACCOMMODATION, 
 
 tender of price .must be made, 69. 
 exhausted, 91. 
 obtaining by fraud, 448. 
 
 ACT, 
 
 of God, injury to goods by, 185. 
 
 ACTION, 
 
 for refusal to receive guest, 70. 
 against innkeeper, nature of, 281. 
 
 form of, 282. 
 
 survival of, 284. 
 
 by whom brought, 285. 
 against sleeping car, form of, 401. 
 
 ADMISSION, 
 
 to inns and other places regulated (see Inns, Bestaurants, Theatres.) 
 
 APVERTISING, 
 
 profession of innkeeper by, 19. 
 
 AGENT, 
 
 soliciting of custom by, 19. 
 
 [571] 
 
Index. 
 
 [references are to sections.] 
 
 AISLES, 
 
 of sleeping cars to be lighted, 372. 
 
 continually watched at night, 387, 388. 
 
 ALE, 
 
 house must be licensed, 42n. 
 
 AKCIENT, 
 inns, 1. 
 
 ANIMALS, 
 
 whether must be received, 68. 
 may be placed in stable, 68. 
 
 ANIMUS EEVERTENDI, 
 
 necessary for continuance of relation during absence, 233. 
 
 APARTMENT, 
 
 hotel is not inn, 15. 
 
 difference from inn and lodging house, 34. 
 
 APPLAUD, 
 
 right of spectator to, 320. 
 
 ASIA, 
 
 inns in, 1. 
 
 ASLEEP, 
 
 passenger entitled to special care when, 384. 
 
 ASSIGNMENT, 
 
 of room to guest, 167. 
 
 ATTACHMENT, 
 
 by innkeeper of goods held on lien, 274. 
 
 AUBERGES, 
 of France, 1. 
 
 B. 
 
 BAGGAGE,' 
 
 must be received with guest, 68. 
 
 innkeeper responsible for, 191. 
 
 transfer company, delivery by, to innkeeper, 142?i. 
 
 [572] 
 
Index. 
 
 [hepebences are to sections.] 
 
 BAILEE, 
 
 innkeeper often classed as, 182. 
 responsibility of innkeeper as, 203-205. 
 
 BAILMENT, 
 
 how far necessary for responsibility of innkeeper, 141, 142. 
 innkeeper's liability not based on, 182. 
 of goods to keeper of restaurant, 304-306. 
 
 BAILOR, 
 
 sbould not sue for goods lost at inn, 285. 
 
 BALL, 
 
 resorting to inn, to attend, 134. 
 
 BANKRUPT, 
 
 trader, innkeeper not, 169. 
 
 BANQUET, 
 
 person at inn, to attend, 134. 
 
 BATH, 
 
 house, responsibility of innkeeper for goods in, 153. 
 responsibility of innkeeper for goods lost from, 207. 
 responsibility of keeper of, 333. 
 houses, admission to regulated in California App., IV. 14. 
 
 Iowa, App. XIII. 4. 
 
 New York, App. XXX. 14. 
 
 BED, 
 
 must be dry at boarding house, 294. 
 
 BELL, 
 
 must be provided for upper berth, 362. 
 
 BELL-BOY, 
 
 liability for assault by, 173. 
 
 BERTH, 
 
 right of applicant to, 344. ' 
 
 vacant, 346, 
 
 reservation of, 346, 347. 
 
 ticket for, 348. 
 
 reserved for way stations, 349. 
 
 [ 573 ] 
 
Index. 
 
 [EErERBNCES ABB TO SECTIONS.] 
 
 BERTH — continued. 
 
 failure of reserving passenger to occupy, 350, 
 
 provided If ticket sold for^, 364, 
 
 furnished throughout journey, 365. 
 
 ejection of passenger from, 366. 
 
 riglit to change, 367. 
 
 who may occupy, 368. 
 
 making up, 369. 
 
 duty to passenger to take care of, 376. 
 
 right of passenger to assign or exchange, 377. 
 
 negligence in leaving articles in, 391. 
 
 BILLS, 
 
 soliciting custom by, 19. 
 
 BOAED, 
 
 on failure to furnish, innkeeper not entitled to compensation, 248. 
 obtaining by fraud, 444, 447, 448. 
 
 BOARDER, 
 
 distinguished from guest, 14. 
 difference between, and guest, 138, 140. 
 responsibility of innkeeper for goods of, 201, 202. 
 no lien on goods of, at common law, 252. 
 statutory lien binds from beginning of relation, 266. 
 sale of goods by, does not affect lien, 267. 
 care required in admission of, 295. 
 contributory negligence of, 296. 
 
 BOARDING HOUSE, 
 
 so-called may be inn, 22. 
 
 distinction between, and inn, 32. 
 
 designed for residence, 32. 
 
 transient guests may be entertained, 14n., 32. 
 
 may be regulated by statute, 32. 
 
 may be regulated by law, 41. 
 
 difference between, and inn, 291. 
 
 may be regulated by law, 291. 
 
 responsibility of keeper of, for goods, 292. 
 
 for negligence of servant, 293. 
 nature of care required of keeper of, 294. 
 care in admission of boarders to, 295. 
 special undertaking of keeper of, 297. 
 lien of keeper of, 298. 
 [574] 
 
Index. 
 
 [references are to sections.] 
 
 BOARDING-HOUSE KEEPER, 
 duty to receive guests, 53. 
 has no lien, 252. 
 See Boarding house. 
 
 BOOTS, 
 
 with spikes, wearing of, forbidden in inns in Maine, App. XVII. 12. 
 
 BURDEN, 
 
 of proof on innkeeper to justify ejection, 101. 
 
 that guest has ceased to be a traveller, 105. 
 
 of loss by accident, 190. 
 
 on innkeeper to explain loss, 206. 
 
 of contributory negligence, 223. 
 
 of negligence, 295, 306. 
 
 of negligence in sleeping car, 393. 
 
 under statutory exemptions, 416. 
 
 BUSINESS, 
 
 innkeeper keeps inn as, 6. 
 may be regulated by state, 41. 
 
 BY-LAWS, 
 
 power regulation of business by, 41. 
 
 c. 
 
 CABARETS, 
 of France, 1. 
 
 CALLING, 
 
 of innkeeper a public one, 12. 
 
 CANDLES, 
 
 when must be supplied, 167. 
 
 CAPACITY, 
 
 to become guest, 112. 
 
 CARAVANSERIES, 1. 
 
 CARDS, 
 
 soliciting custom by, 19. 
 
 [575] 
 
Index. 
 
 [references akb to sections.] 
 
 CAEE, 
 
 of good held on lien, 269. 
 
 CAKRIAGE, 
 
 responsibility of innkeeper for, 154. 
 lieu on, 255. 
 
 CARRIER, 
 
 sleeping car not, 342. 
 
 liability of, for injui-y in sleeping car, 375, 
 
 CARRIERS, 
 
 in medieval England, 3. 
 
 coming to solicit patronage at inn, 87. 
 
 CASE, 
 
 action on, against innkeeper, 282. 
 
 CEILING, 
 
 injury from falling, 163, 170. 
 
 CHAMBER, 
 
 not alone in, in medieval inn, 5. 
 See Room. 
 
 CHARGES, 
 
 to be posted in California, App. IV. 12. 
 
 CHECK, 
 
 delivery of to innkeeper, 142, 143. 
 given by innkeeper for goods, 423. 
 
 CITY, 
 
 may grant license, 43. 
 CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS (see Inns, Restaurants, Theatres). 
 
 CLOTHES, 
 
 responsibility of innkeeper for, 141. 
 lien on, 259. 
 
 CLOTHING, 
 
 innkeeper cannot require guest to deposit, 214. 
 held on lien, injury to, 269. 
 
 of passenger, responsibility of sleeping-car company for, 383. 
 [576] 
 
Index, 
 [bepbrbnces are to sections.] 
 COACH, 
 
 running to station for guests, 19. 
 
 COAL CELLAR, 
 
 guest not forced to eat in, 167. 
 
 COAT, 
 
 no Hen on, while worn, 259. 
 
 responsibility of restaurant keeper for, 305, 306. 
 
 See Overcoat. 
 
 COFFEE, 
 
 house is not inn, 15. 
 responsibility of keeper of, 205. 
 palace may be inn, 22. 
 
 COLOE, 
 
 whether traveller may by excluded because of, 65. 
 
 COMFOKT, 
 
 of passenger, sleeping-car company must care for, 361. 
 
 COMMON INN, 11. 
 innkeeper, 12. 
 
 COMPENSATION, 
 
 receipt of does not necessarily make one innkeeper, 13. 
 
 of innkeeper, 57. 
 
 for taking goods of stranger, 204. 
 
 liability to make continues as long as guest remains such, 233. 
 
 of innkeeper must be reasonable, 241. 
 
 amount of, may be fixed by statute, 242. 
 
 fixed by innkeeper, 243. 
 innkeeper entitled to, in advance, 244. 
 when becomes due, 245. 
 when ceases, 246. 
 for what services, 247. 
 
 due only when entire obligation performed, 248. 
 who must pay, 249. 
 secured by lien, 252. 
 for use of sleeping car, 352. 
 
 CONDUCTOR, 
 
 injury to passenger by, 374. 
 of sleeping car, theft by, 382. 
 
 37 [ 577 ] 
 
Index. 
 
 [eepekences are to sections.] 
 
 CONFLICT, 
 
 of laws as to creation of relation of host and guest, 114. 
 as to sleeping cars, 403. 
 
 CONSPIRACY, 
 
 to cry down actor or play, 320. 
 
 CONSTITUTION, 
 
 delegation of power to license not forbidden by, 43. 
 permits regulation of boarding house, 291. 
 
 does not prevent punishment of fraud on innkeeper, App. I. 6n, 
 App. XI. 6n. 
 
 CONTAGIOUS DISEASE, 
 
 guest may be excluded for, 103. 
 
 responsibility of innkeeper for protecting guest from, 171. 
 
 passenger having, removed from sleeping car, 366. 
 
 CONTRACT, 
 
 by unlicensed innkeeper void, 48. 
 
 not necessary to establish relation of host and guest, 111. 
 
 limitation of liability by, 211. 
 
 not necessary for lien, 253. 
 
 suit against innkeeper for breach of, 281, 282. 
 
 damages for breach of, 298. 
 
 limiting liability not by printing notice on register, 418. 
 
 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, 
 
 bars recovery for personal injury, 165. 
 
 what is, 165. 
 
 bars recovery for loss of goods, 223. 
 
 what is, 224. 
 
 failure to lock door or window, 224. 
 
 to deliver valuables to innkeeper, 225. 
 
 to inform innkeeper of value of goods, 226. 
 publicly exhibiting valuables, 227. 
 of boarder, 296. 
 of spectator at theatre, 323. 
 of passenger in sleeping car, 391. 
 
 CONVERSION, 
 
 of goods held on lieu, 275. 
 
 lien set up as defence to, 278. 
 [578] 
 
Index. 
 
 [eeferences abb to sections.] 
 
 CORPORATION, 
 
 conducting inn is innkeeper, 18. 
 
 CORRUPTION, 
 
 in granting license, criminals, 44. 
 
 COSTUME OF GUEST, 
 
 whether ground for exclusion, 92, 167, 
 
 COUNTY COURT, 
 
 may grant license, 43. 
 
 CRIMES, 
 
 against innkeepers, by fraud of guest, 441. 
 statute strictly construed, 442. 
 indictment for, 443. 
 fraud essential, 444. 
 false representation required, 445. 
 pretence made with fraudulent motive, 446. 
 board must be obtained by the pretence, 447, 448. 
 by surreptitious removal of property, 449, 452. 
 removal as evidence of fraud, 449. 
 as substantive offence, 450. 
 what, is surreptitious, 451. 
 posting notice not necessary for, 452. 
 See Fraud. 
 
 CRITICISE, 
 
 right of spectator to, 319. 
 
 CUSTOMARY RATES, 243. 
 
 D. 
 
 DAMAGES, 
 
 for refusal to receive guest, 70. 
 
 for conversion of goods held on lien, 275. 
 
 no lien for, 298. 
 
 for illegal expulsion from theatre, 316. 
 
 for failure to get berth, 364. 
 
 for loss of goods in sleeping car, 383. 
 
 against sleeping-car company, 402. 
 
 [579] 
 
Index. 
 
 [heperencbs ake to sections.] 
 
 DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES, 
 need not be received, 68. 
 
 DAUGHTER, 
 
 not liable for father's board, 249. 
 
 no lien on property of, where credit given to father, 264. 
 
 DAYTIME, 
 
 care necessary in sleeping car during, 385. 
 
 DECLARATION, 
 
 in action against innkeeper, 283. 
 
 DEFENCE, 
 
 lien set up in, 278. 
 
 DELIVERY, 
 
 of goods to servant of innkeeper, 144. 
 
 in customary way, 145. 
 
 by third person, for guest, 146. 
 
 to innkeeper in any other capacity, 147. 
 
 of goods to guest ends lien, 270. 
 
 unless induced by fraud, 271. 
 
 for temporary use, 272. 
 
 DEPOSIT, 
 
 of goods, required by regulation of innkeeper, 213-215. 
 
 what sufficient, 423. 
 
 for safe keeping, 424. 
 
 effect of, 425. 
 
 waiver of, 426. 
 
 of what goods necessary under statute, 428-430. 
 
 of watch, 431. 
 
 of article needed for immediate use, 432. 
 
 DIAMOND, 
 
 responsibility of sleeping oar for, 383. 
 
 DIFFERENCE, 
 
 between guest and boarder, 138-140. 
 
 DINING CAR, 
 
 differs from innkeeper, 37. 
 
 leaving articles in berth when going to, 391. 
 
 [580] 
 
Index. 
 
 [references are to sections.] 
 
 DINING ROOM, 
 
 reception of guest in, 122. 
 riglit of guest to eat in, 167. 
 
 DISCOMFORT, 
 
 of failure to get berth, compensation for, 364. 
 
 DISCRETION, 
 
 in granting license, 45, 46. 
 
 DISCRIMINATION, 
 
 innkeeper must refrain from, 55. 
 what is unreasonable, 56. 
 justification of, 56. 
 
 DISEASE, 
 
 person suffering from, may be excluded, 93. 
 
 DISTURBANCES, 
 
 guest may be excluded for, 102. 
 
 DOG, 
 
 innkeeper liable for injuries by guest's, 81. 
 whether guest may bring, 96. 
 
 DOOR, 
 
 of elevator open, 164. 
 
 notice posted on 215, 417. 
 
 loss of goods from failure to lock, 224. 
 
 of boarding house left open, 293. 
 
 left unlocked, whether contributory negligence, 296. 
 
 DRAWING-ROOM, 
 
 may be let to single person, 345. 
 
 DRINK, 
 
 who resorts to inn for, may be guest, 131. 
 
 DRINKING SALOON, 
 is not inn, 15. 
 
 DRUNK, 
 
 traveller may be excluded because, 92 (see Intoxication). 
 
 [581] 
 
Index. 
 
 [references abb to sections.] 
 
 DYNAMITE, 
 
 whether must be received, 68. 
 
 E. 
 
 EAT, 
 
 guest cannot be forced to, 168. 
 
 EATING, 
 
 house is not inn, 15. 
 
 EJECTION, 
 
 of guest for misconduct, 102. 
 
 for illness, 103. 
 
 for refusal to pay, 104. 
 
 ELEVATOR, 
 
 must be safe, 162. 
 
 well, injury to guest by falling into, 164, 165. 
 
 EMPLOYEE (see Servant). 
 
 ENCLOSED, 
 
 grounds, inn may have, 14. 
 
 ENEMY 
 
 injury to goods by public, 185. 
 
 ENFORCEMENT, 
 
 of lien by sale, 276. 
 . in equity, 277. 
 by setting up as defence, 278. 
 by statute, 279. 
 
 ENGLAND, 
 
 medieval inns in, 1. 
 inns of indigenous growth in, 1. 
 history of inns in, 2. 
 travel in, 3. 
 growth of inns in, 4. 
 
 development of inns from private houses in, 5. 
 history of innkeeper's liability for goods in, 183. 
 [582] 
 
Index, 
 [kepebences are to sections.] 
 ENTERTAIN, 
 
 duty of innkeeper to, 2. 
 
 ENTERTAINMENT, 
 
 houses of public (see Inns). 
 
 EQUALITY, 
 
 of treatment, guests entitled to, 55. 
 does not mean identity, 56. 
 
 EQUITY, 
 
 foreclosure of lien in, 277. 
 
 EUROPEAN, 
 
 plan, house conducted on, is inn, 16. 
 
 EVIDENCE, 
 
 determines whether innkeeper, 13. 
 
 of contributory negligence, 223, 224. 
 
 that guest remains such, 232. 
 
 of reasonable compensation, 241. 
 
 as to reasonable amount of money to carry, 383. 
 
 of negligence in sleeping car, 392. 
 
 EXECUTION, 
 
 exemption of property from, does not prevent lien, 260. 
 levied by innkeeper on goods held on lien, 274. 
 
 EXECUTOR, 
 
 of innkeeper, responsibility of, 284. 
 
 EXEMPLARY, 
 
 damages against sleeping-car company, 402. 
 
 EXEMPTION, 
 
 from execution does not prevent lien, 260. 
 
 EXTORTION, 
 
 innkeeper must not practice, 52. 
 unreasonable rates constitute, 241. 
 
 [583] 
 
Index. 
 
 [references are to sections.] 
 
 F. 
 FALSE, 
 
 representation, obtaining board by, 445. 
 
 FAMILY, 
 
 member of, at inn is guest, 113. 
 
 FARMERS, 
 
 receiving guests for hire not innkeepers, 13. 
 
 FARRIER, 
 
 lien of, 252. 
 
 FATHER, 
 
 whether guest when child entertained, 133. 
 
 must pay daughter's board, 249. 
 
 may sue for loss of his goods by son at inn, 285. 
 
 FILTHT, 
 
 traveller may be excluded because, 92. 
 
 FIRE, 
 
 responsibility for injury by, 163, 176. 
 responsibility for loss for goods by, 187, 189. • 
 exempting froln liability for loss by, 416. 
 
 FIRE ESCAPES, 
 
 injury from lack of, 163. 
 provision of, 176. 
 
 FOOD, 
 
 innkeeper must supply, 6, 15. 
 
 may be separately paid for, 16. 
 
 duty of innkeeper to provide, 54. 
 
 guest at inn need not require, 131. 
 
 in what room supplied, 167. 
 
 duty to furnish, 169. 
 
 innkeeper not insurer of, 169. 
 
 not sold to guest, 169. 
 
 price of fixed by statute, 242. 
 
 at boarding house must be good, 294. 
 
 responsibility of keeper of restaurant for, 302. 
 
 [584] 
 
Index. 
 
 [references are to sections.] 
 
 FORECLOSURE, 
 
 of lien by sale, 276. 
 in equity, 277. 
 by sUtute, 279. 
 
 FOREIGNER, 
 
 presumably guest, 140. 
 
 FORESTS, 
 
 refuge of outlaws in middle ages, 3. 
 
 FORKS, 
 
 innkeeper whether responsible for, 191. 
 
 FORM, 
 
 of action against innkeeper, 282. 
 
 of indictment for fraud on innkeeper, 443. 
 
 FRANCE, 
 inns in, 1. 
 
 FRANCHISE, 
 
 innkeeper has not, 2. 
 
 FRAUD, 
 
 in obtaining accommodation at inn, 136. 
 delivery induced by, does not end lien, 271. 
 upon innkeeper, statute punishing, 441, 442. 
 indictment for, 443. 
 essential to crime, 444. 
 requires false representation, 445. 
 f i-audulent motive, 446. 
 obtaining board by the pretence, 447, 448. 
 suraeptitious removal of property as evidence of, 449. 
 Fraud on Innkeepers, Statutes Punishing in: 
 Alabama, App. I. 6. 
 Arizona, App. II. 7. 
 Arkansas, App. III. 2. 
 California, App. IV. 2. 
 Colorado, V. 3-5. 
 Connecticut, VI. 1. 
 Delaware, VII. 3. 
 
 [585] 
 
Index. 
 
 [eeferences are to sections.] 
 
 PEAUD — continued. 
 
 District of Columbia, App. L. 4. 
 
 Idaho, App. X. 4-6. 
 
 Illinois, App. XI. 5, 6. 
 
 Indiana, App. XIT. 1. 
 
 Iowa, App. XIII. 2, 3. 
 
 Kentucky, App. XV. 8. 
 
 Maine, App. XVII. 8, 9. 
 
 Maryland, App. XVIII. 1. 
 
 Massachusetts, App. XIX. 8. 
 
 Michigan, App. XX. 10. 
 
 Minnesota, App. XXI. 3. 
 
 Missouri, App. XXIII. 5. 
 
 Montana, App. XXIV. 13. 
 
 Nebraska, App. XXV. 3. 
 
 New Hampshire, App. XXVII. 8. 
 
 New Jersey, App. XXVIII. 5. 
 
 Fbaud on Innkeepers Indictable in: 
 
 New Mexico, App. XXIX. 1. 
 
 New York, App. XXX. 7. 
 
 North Dakota, App. XXXII. 7. 
 
 Ohio, App. XXXIII. 6-8. 
 
 Oregon, App. XXXV. 17. 
 
 Pennsylvania, App. XXXVI. 7. 
 
 Porto Rico, App. XXXVII. 2. 
 
 Rhode Island, App., XXXVIII. 2. 
 
 South Carolina, App. XXXIX. 2. 
 
 South Dakota, App. XL. 1. 
 
 Tennessee, App. XLI. 6. 
 
 Texas, App. XLII. 6. 
 
 Utah,, App. XLIII. 5. 
 
 Vermont, App. XLIV. 5. 
 
 Virginia, App. XLV. 5. 
 
 Washington, App. XL VI. 4. 
 
 West Virginia, App. XL VII. 2. 
 
 Wisconsin, App. XLVIII. 15, 16. 
 
 Wyoming, XLIX. 4. 
 
 FRIEND, 
 
 of innkeeper not a traveller, 63. 
 person received as, not guest, 125. 
 
 FURS, 
 
 held on lien, injury to, 269. 
 [586] 
 
Index, 
 [bbpbrences are to sections.] 
 
 G. 
 
 GATES, 
 
 iDn may have, 14. 
 
 GENERAL LIEN, 
 
 not given by law, 253. 
 
 GLOVES, 
 
 responsibility of innkeeper for, 148, 225. 
 
 GOODS, 
 
 must be received with guest, 68. 
 
 GOODS OP GUEST, 
 
 innkeeper to protect against marauders, 181. 
 innkeeper's responsibility for not based on bailment, 182. 
 history of responsibility for, 183, 184. 
 extent of responsibility for, 185-187. 
 loss of, by theft, 188. 
 
 by Are, 189. 
 presumption of negligence in loss of, 190. 
 for what innkeeper responsible, 191. 
 taken by his companion, 221. 
 injured by act of guest himself, 222. 
 lost by contributory negligence, 223-228. 
 when responsibility of innkeeper ceases, 231. 
 innkeeper responsible for, during temporary absence, 232, 233. 
 
 during time for removal, 234. 
 received after departure of guest, 235. 
 lien on (see Lien). 
 
 GEEECE, 
 
 inns in, 1. 
 
 GUEST, 
 
 distinguished from boarder, 14. 
 
 transient, 14. 
 
 who entitled to become, 61. 
 
 whether resident of the town may be, 63. 
 
 right of, to be received at night, 66. 
 
 what goods may bring to inn, 68. 
 
 may be required to pay in advance, 69. 
 
 remedy for refusal to receive, 70. 
 
 [5871 
 
Index. 
 
 [references are to sections.] 
 
 GVEST— continued. 
 
 may demand admittance of another person, 83-85> 
 may do business witli stranger in the inn, 85. 
 excuses for refusal to receive, 91-97. 
 entitled to be received at night, 95. 
 may be excluded for misconduct, 102. 
 
 for illness, 103. 
 
 for refusal to pay, 104. 
 ceasing to be a traveller, may be ejected, 106. 
 how relation of is established. 111. 
 capacity to become, 112. 
 need not be party bound to pay, 113. 
 how received, 121. 
 
 must communicate with innkeeper, 122. 
 need not request both food and lodging, 131. 
 must be personally entertained, 132. 
 master or father of person entei-tained, 133. 
 resorting to inn for banquet or ball, 134. 
 received, though not entitled to admittance, 135. 
 coming for illegal purpose, 136. 
 at inn as result of illegal act, 137. 
 duties of innkeeper to, 161. 
 injury to, by defect of premises, 162-164. 
 barred by contributory negligence, 165. 
 accommodations for, 166. 
 room assigned to, 167, 168. 
 food supplied to, 169. 
 protection of, against personal injury, 170-175. 
 
 against fire, 163, 176. 
 costume of, 167. 
 not entitled to select room, 167. 
 
 may be assigned room where men are smoking to eat in, 167. 
 cannot be forced to eat or sleep, 168. 
 conduct of, regulated by innkeeper, 212. 
 required to deposit valuables, 213-215. 
 goods taken by companion of, 221, 
 act of, injuring goods, 222. 
 when relation ceases, 231. 
 which, must pay, 249. 
 no lien on person of, 257. 
 
 non-compliance by, with requirements of statute, 412. 
 notice of requirements actually given to, 420, 421. 
 
 what constitutes, 422. 
 deposit of goods by, with innkeeper, 423-432. 
 must pay innkeeper's charges, (see Compensation). 
 
 [588] 
 
Index. 
 
 [references are to sectionsJ 
 
 GVEST— continued. 
 
 barred from recovery by contributory negligence (see Contributory 
 
 Negligence), 
 injury to_ goods of (see Goods of Guest), 
 lien on goods of (see Lien). 
 
 H. 
 
 HACKMEN, 
 
 whether may enter inn, 85, 86. 
 
 HALL, 
 
 in middle ages, 5. 
 
 of inn, left dark, 164, 165. 
 
 HEALTH, 
 
 resorting to inn for, 139. 
 
 of passenger, sleeping-car company must care for, 361. 
 
 HIGHWAY, 
 
 responsibility of innkeeper for carraige placed in, 154. 
 
 HISS, 
 
 right of spectator to, 320. 
 
 HOLDER, 
 
 may use theatre ticket, 317. 
 
 HORSE, 
 
 goods transported, on in middle ages, 3. 
 
 innkeeper need not supply accommodation for, It. 
 
 responsibility of innkeeper for, 21, 151. 
 
 guest may bring, 96. 
 
 one sending to inn, whether guest, 132. 
 
 of one not guest, responsibility for, 204. 
 
 lien on, 252, 255. 
 
 no general lien on, 253. 
 
 held on lien may be used, 269. 
 
 HOSPITALITY, 
 
 of private persons distingished from iunkeeping, 13. 
 in middle ages, 4. 
 
 [589 ] 
 
Index. 
 
 [references are to sections.] 
 
 HOTEL, 
 
 whether inn, 14. 
 
 not necessarily inn, 22. 
 
 may be a boarding house, 291. 
 
 HOTEL KEEPER, 
 
 same as Innkeeper, 6. 
 See Innkeeper. 
 
 HOUSES. 
 
 of middle ages, 5. 
 
 of public entertainment (see Inn). 
 
 HUSBAND, 
 
 of innkeeper, injury by, 175. 
 liable for wife's board, 249. 
 
 I. 
 
 ILLNESS, 
 
 guest may be excluded for, 103. 
 
 guest nursed through, must pay compensation, 247. 
 
 INCONVENIENCE, 
 
 guest need not suffer, to care for goods, 223. 
 
 INDICTMENT, 
 
 for corruption in granting license, 44. 
 for illegally keeping inn, 48. 
 for refusal to receiveguest, 70. 
 for fraud on innkeeper, 443. 
 
 INDIGNITY, 
 
 redress of guest for, 172. 
 
 INFANT, 
 
 may become guest, 64, 112. 
 
 INN, 
 
 in the ancient and medieval world, 1. 
 
 indigenous in England, 1. 
 
 history of English, 2. 
 
 necessary for protection and accommodation, 4. 
 
 and tavern, difference, 4. 
 
 [590] 
 
Index. 
 
 [references are to sections.] 
 INN — continued. 
 
 development of, from private house, 5. 
 
 little privacy in medieval, 5. 
 
 development of law of, 6. 
 
 nature of. Chapter II. 
 
 is a public house, 11. 
 
 definition of, 11. 
 
 whether house is, a question of fact, 13. 
 
 distinction between, and boarding house, 14. 
 
 may have enclosed grounds and gates, 14. 
 
 must supply both food and lodging, 15. 
 
 distinction between, and lodging house or apartment hotel, 15. 
 
 and restaurant, 15. 
 on European plan, 16. 
 food at, may be separately paid for, 16. 
 
 may be supplied in restaurant, 16. 
 sign and register, 19. 
 name given to, immaterial, 22. 
 distinction between, and boarding house, 32. 
 
 livery-stable 33. 
 ' lodging-house, 34. 
 
 apartment house, 34. 
 differs from restaurant, 35. 
 
 theatre, 36. 
 
 sleeping and dining car, 37. 
 
 steamboat, 37. 
 may be regulated because of its public nature, 41. 
 right to keep, unresti'icted at common law, 41. 
 license for may be recalled, 42. 
 licensing of, 42-48. 
 punishment for illegally keeping, 48. 
 must be in proper repair, 64. 
 public rooms not open to evei'yone, 82. 
 stranger may call on guest, at, 83-85. 
 persons coming to solicit patronage in, 87. 
 who is guest at, 131, 132. 
 resort to, to attend banquet or ball, 134. 
 reception at, of one not entitled to admittance, 135. 
 resorting to, for illegal purposes, 136. 
 coming to, illegally, 137. 
 
 diflEerence between guest and boarder in, 138-140. 
 responsibility of innkeeper for goods within, 142-152. 
 
 for goods outside, 153-155. 
 doors left open in, 164, 165. 
 lack of light in, 164, 165. 
 
 [591] 
 
Index. 
 
 [rEPEEENCBS ABE TO SECTIONS.] 
 
 INN — continued. 
 
 assignment of rooms in, 167, 168. 
 
 responsibility for fire in, 176. 
 
 to be safe, 162-164. 
 
 rate of compensation sometimes required to be posted, 242. 
 
 difference between, and boarding liouse, 291. 
 
 difiereuce between, and restaurant, 301. 
 
 sleeping car not, 341. 
 
 construction of rooms in regulated in California, App. IV. 4, 5. 
 
 Admission to, begulated in: 
 
 California, App. IV. 14. 
 
 Colorado, App. V. 1. 
 
 Delaware, App. VII. 4. 
 
 Iowa, App. XIII. 4. 
 
 Maine, App. XVII. 1. 
 
 Massachusetts, App. XIX. 1. 
 
 Michigan, App. XX. 14. 
 
 Minnesota, App. XXI. 5. 
 
 Montana, App. XXIV. 1. 
 
 New Tork, App. XXX. 6, 14. 
 
 Ohio, App. XXXIII. 1. 
 
 Pennsylvania, App. XXXVI. 1. 
 
 Porto Rico, App. XXXVII. 1. 
 
 Tennessee, App. XLI. 1. 
 
 Utah, App. XLIII. 6. 
 
 United States, App. LL 1. 
 
 INNKEEPER, 
 In asNEBAL: 
 anomalous position of, 2. 
 law of, forming, 2. 
 
 compelled to receive and entertain, 2. 
 development of law of, 6. 
 undertaking of, 6. 
 definition of, 12. 
 
 distinction between, and private host, 13. 
 distinction one of fact, 13. 
 serves transient guests, 14. 
 may cater to permanent guests, 14. 
 supplies all needs of traveller, 15. 
 need not supply all his desires, 17. 
 
 accommodation for horses, 17. 
 
 wine or liquor, 17. 
 is proprietor of inn, 18. 
 profession of, how made, 19. 
 
 [592] 
 
Index. 
 
 [references are to sections.] 
 
 IKSKEEPBR— continued. 
 
 effect of failure of, to procure license, 20. 
 carrying on other business, 21. 
 failure to deliver valuables to, 226. 
 
 to inform of value of goods, 226. 
 Nature of Business : 
 in public employment, 11, 12, 61, 52. 
 of the obligation of. 111. 
 manages inn at all times, 166. 
 does not sell food, 169. 
 is not a trader, 169. 
 not insurer of food, 169. 
 
 of guest's safety, 170. 
 not in control of guest's person, 173. 
 protector of goods against marauders, 181. 
 may carry on restaurant, 301. 
 may give up business, 71. 
 what lavr governs obligation of, 114. 
 license to, 42-48. 
 unlicensed cannot sue, 48. 
 failure to obtain license cannot protect, 48. 
 indictable for refusal to receive guest, 70. 
 how far may exclude rival, 97. 
 statutes punishing fraud on, 441. 
 Action Against: 
 nature of action against, 281, 282. 
 declaration against, 283. 
 survival of action against, 284. 
 who may sue, 285. 
 
 Difference from other Similar Persons: 
 private host, 13. 
 
 boarding-house keeper, 14, 32, 291. 
 livery-stable keeper, 33. 
 lodging-house keeper, 34. 
 restaurant keeprr, 36, 30. 
 manager of theatre, 86. 
 Duties oft 
 
 to provide adequate facilities, 54. 
 to provide food, 54. 
 to refrain from discrimination, 55. 
 what amounts to uni'easonable discrimination by, 56. 
 to receive guests, 53. 
 must receive all who apply, 61. 
 duty owed only to travellers, 62. 
 must receive married woman or infant, 64. 
 
 38 [ 593 ] 
 
Index. 
 
 [references ABE TO SECTIONS.] 
 
 INNKEEPER— conttnued. 
 Dtjtibs of: 
 
 must be notified of traveller's desire to be received, 67. 
 to receive guest at night, 66. 
 refusal to receive because no license, 98. 
 to receive goods vrith guest, 68. 
 whether must receive stolen goods, 68. 
 to admit strangers not seeking entertainment, 58, 82-88. 
 to make reasonable charges, 57, 241. 
 to receive person in any capacity, 112. 
 to guest, 161. 
 
 to furnish safe premises, 162-165. 
 to furnish accommodations to guest, 166. 
 to supply food, 169. 
 
 to protect guest against personal injury 170-175. 
 to protect guest against fire, 176. 
 Eights : 
 
 may place guests at separate tables, 65. 
 right to receive only a certain class, 65. 
 may require payment in advance, 69. 
 may exclude intruder by force, 82-88. 
 may make exclusive contracts with barbers, etc., 86. 
 may refuse to receive guest because of lack of accommodation, 91. 
 
 because person objectionable, 92. 
 
 because suffering from contagious disease, 93. 
 
 because comes at improper time, 95. 
 
 because brings animal, 96. 
 may waive right to refuse to receive guest, 135. 
 may notref use to receive guest because companions acted improperly, 94. 
 
 because inn unlicensed, 97. 
 right to eject guest, 101-105. 
 to assign room, 167. 
 to control use of room, 168. 
 to make rules for conduct of guest, 212. 
 to require deposit of valuables, 213, 214. 
 notice requiring deposit of goods, 215. 
 Compensation : 
 
 charges must be reasonable, 57, 241. 
 amount of chai'ges fixed by statute, 242. 
 
 by innkeeper himself, 243. 
 may require payment in advance, 244. 
 entitled to compensation when relation established, 245. 
 not entitled to compensation after relation ends, 246. 
 entitled to compensation for what services, 247. 
 
 only if entire obligation performed, 248, 
 
 [594] 
 
Index. 
 
 [references are to sections.] 
 
 INNKEEPER— continued. 
 Compensation: 
 entitled to, from -whom, 246. 
 lieu of (see Lien). 
 Responsibility : 
 
 becomes responsible on receiving guest, 121. 
 not responsible without communication with guest, 122. 
 refusal of, to accept guest, 124. 
 responsibility to third persons, 81. 
 
 to master or father of guest, 133. 
 
 to one attending banquet or ball, 135. 
 
 for assault by servant, 172-175. 
 creation of responsibility for goods, 141. 
 when responsibility for goods begins, 142. 
 
 responsibility for goods conditioned on owner becoming guest, 143. 
 delivery of goods to servant of, 144. 
 
 by custom, 145. 
 
 by third person, 146. 
 
 in another capacity, 147. 
 responsibility extends to goods in possession of guest, 148. 
 goods must be within general dominion of, 149. 
 responsibility for merchandise, 150. 
 
 on special arrangement, 151. 
 
 for goods brought to inn after arrival of guest, 152. 
 
 for goods outside the inn, 153. 
 
 for goods placed outside the inn by, 154. 
 
 for goods placed outside inn by guest, 155. 
 
 for goods of guest not based on bailment, 182. 
 history of responsibility of, in England, 183. 
 
 in United States, 184. 
 responsibility for injury to goods, 185-187. 
 
 for loss of goods by theft, 188. 
 by fire, 189. 
 presumption of negligence of, 190. 
 for what goods responsible, 191. 
 responsibility continues till delivery of baggage to carrier, 234. 
 
 ceases for goods after departure of guest, 231. 
 
 for goods during temporary absence of guest, 232, 233. 
 
 during reasonable time for removal, 234. 
 
 for goods received after departure of guest, 235. 
 
 for goods of boarder, 201, 202. 
 
 for goods of third party, 203. 
 
 for goods taken as matter of business, 204. 
 
 as gratuitous bailee, 205. 
 
 for misdelivery of goods, 206. 
 
 [595] 
 
Index, 
 [repeeences are to sections.] 
 
 INNKEEPEK— cojiiinwed. 
 
 Responsibility : 
 
 for goods in bath house, 207. 
 
 Limitation OP liability: 
 
 limitation of liability by contract, 211. 
 
 statutory limitation of liability of, 411. 
 
 non-compliance with statute by, 413. 
 
 negligence by, affecting statutory liability, 414. 
 
 responsibility of for merchandise under statute, 415, 
 
 burden of proof of negligence of, 416. 
 
 must comply exactly with statute, 417. 
 
 printing notice of exemption on register, 418. 
 erroneously, 419. 
 
 deposit of goods with, 423. 
 
 must be for safe keeping, 424. 
 
 effect of deposit of goods under statute, 425. 
 
 waiver of deposit of goods, 426. 
 
 what goods must be deposited with, 428-432. 
 
 Statutory liability of, in: 
 
 Alabama, App. I. 1. 
 
 Arizona, App. II. 4. 
 
 California, App. IV. 8. 
 
 Georgia, App. IX. 2, 4, 7. 
 
 Iowa, App. XIII. 1. 
 
 Louisiana, App. XVI. 1-3, 6. 
 
 Maine, App. XVII. 2--4. 
 
 Maryland, App. XVIII. 3, 4. 
 
 Massachusetts, App. XIX. 7, 13. 
 
 Michigan, App. XX. 1. 
 
 Missouri, App. XXIII. 4. 
 
 Montana, App. XXIV. 2, 8, 9. 
 
 New York, App. XXX. 1, 2, 4. 
 
 North Carolina, App. XXXI. 5, 7, 10. 
 
 North Dakota, App. XXXII. 1. 
 
 Oklahoma, App. XXXIV. 1. 
 
 Porto Rico, App. XXXVII. 4. 
 
 South Dakota, App. XL. 1. 
 
 Vermont, App. XLIV. 3, 4. 
 
 Wisconsin, App. XL VIII. 1, 2. 
 INSANE, 
 
 person may become guest, 112. 
 INSURER, 
 
 of goods, whether innkeeper is, 185-187. 
 
 of goods of one not guest, innkeeper is not, 201, 
 
 [596] 
 
Index. 
 
 [EEFBKENCE8 ABE TO SECTIONS.] 
 
 INTOXICATION, 
 
 guest may be excluded for, 102. 
 ■whether contributory negligence, 228. 
 cause for ejection from sleeping car, 366. 
 
 ITALY, 
 
 inns in, 1. 
 
 J. 
 
 JEWELS, 
 
 responsibility of sleeping-car company for, 383. 
 loss of, 223. 
 
 JUSTICES, 
 
 sometimes empowered to fix rates, 242. 
 
 E. 
 
 KENT, 
 
 opinion of as to innkeeper's liability, 185. 
 
 KEY, 
 
 . effect of giving to guest, 6, 148, 149. 
 
 KHANS, 1. 
 
 ^KNIVES, 
 
 innkeeper, ■whether responsible for, 191. 
 
 L. 
 
 LAUNDRY, 
 
 exclusive contract for may be made, 86. 
 
 LAW, 
 
 creates obligation of innkeeper, 111. 
 
 ■what, governs, 114. 
 
 ■what applies, in case of sleeping car, 403. 
 
 LIABILITY, 
 
 of sleeping-car company, limitation of, 390. 
 
 [597] 
 
Index. 
 
 [EEFEEENCES ABE TO SECTIONS.] 
 
 LIABILITY OF INNKEEPERS, 
 
 statutory limitation of in general, 411. 
 
 guest's non-compliance not causing loss, 412. 
 
 innkeeper's non-compliance, 413. 
 
 innkeeper's negligence, 414. 
 
 effect on responsibility for merchandise, 415. 
 
 burden of proof in case of, 416. 
 
 requirements must be exactly complied with, 417. 
 
 notice on register, 418. 
 
 notice erroneously printed, 419. 
 
 actual notice of guest, 420, 421. 
 
 what constitutes actual notice, 422. 
 
 what is deposit of goods, 423. 
 
 deposit for safe keeping, 424. 
 
 effect of deposit, 425. 
 
 waiver of deposit, 426. 
 
 during what time effective, 427. 
 
 what goods deposited, 428. 
 
 goods excepted from, 429. 
 
 applying only to certain classes of goods, 430. 
 
 deposit of watch, 431. 
 
 deposit of article needed for immediate use, 432. 
 
 Statutoet Limitation of, in : 
 
 Alabama, App. I. 2-4. 
 
 Arizona, App. II. 5, 6. 
 
 California, App. IV. 9. 
 
 Delaware, App. VII. 1, 2. 
 
 Florida, App. VIIL 2-5. 
 
 Georgia, App. IX. 6. 
 
 Illinois, App. XI. 1, 2. 
 
 Iowa, App. XIII. 1. 
 
 Kentucky, App. XV. 1. 
 
 Louisiana, App, XVI. 4, 5. 
 
 Massachusetts, App. XIX. 6. 
 
 Michigan, App. XX. 2. 
 
 Minnesota, App. XXI. 1, 2. 
 
 Missouri, App. XXIII. 3. 
 
 Montana, App. XXIV. 3, 6, 7. 
 
 Nebraska, App. XXV. 1, 2. 
 
 New Hampshire, App. XXVII. 1. 
 
 New Jersey, App. XXVIII. 3. 
 
 New York, App. XXX. 3. 
 
 North Carolina, App. XXXI. 6. 
 
 North Bakota, App. XXXII. 2. 
 
 Ohio, App. XXXIIL 3, 4. 
 
 [ 598 ] 
 
Index. 
 
 [kbfekences ahb to sections.] 
 
 LIABILITY OF INKKEEPEES— continued. 
 Stattjtobt Limitation of, in: 
 Oklahoma, App. XXXIV. 2. 
 Pennsylvania, App. XXXVI. 5, 6. 
 Ehode Island, App. XXXVIII. 1. 
 South Carolina, App. XXXIX. 1. 
 South Dakota, App. XL. 2. 
 Tennessee, App. XLI. 5. 
 Vermont, App. XLIV. 2. 
 Washington, App. XLVI. 3. 
 West Virginia, App. XL VII. 3. 
 Wisconsin, App. XLVIII. 1. 
 Wyoming, App. XLIX. 1. 
 Statutory in: 
 Alabama, App. I. 1. 
 Arizona, App. I. 4. 
 California, App, IV. 8. 
 Delaware, App. VII. 2. 
 Florida, App. VIII. 2, 3, 4. 
 Georgia, App. IX. 2. 
 Iowa, App. XIII. 1. 
 Kentucky, App. XV. 1. 
 Louisiana, App. XVI. 4. 
 Massachusetts, App. XIX. 6. 
 Michigan, App. XX. 2. 
 Minnesota, App. XXI. 1. 
 Missouri, App. XXIII. 3. 
 Montana, App. XXIV. 3. 
 Nebraska, App. XXV. 1. 
 New Hampshire, App. XXVII. 1. 
 New Jersey, App. XXVIH. 3. 
 New York, App. XXX, 1, 2, i. 
 North Carolina, App. XXXL 6, 7. 10. 
 North Dakota, App. XXXII. 1. 
 Oklahoma, App. XXXIV. 1. 
 Porto Eico, App. XXXVII. 4. 
 South Dakota, App. XL. 1. 
 Vermont, App. XLIV. 3, 4. 
 Wisconsin, App. XLVIII. 1, 2. 
 
 LICENSES, 
 to Inns, 42, 
 
 failure to procure, 20. 
 indictment for keeping inn without, 18 n. 
 how granted, 43. 
 corruption in granting, criminal, 44. 
 
 [599] 
 
Index. 
 
 [ebpebences abb to sections.] 
 
 LICENSES— conJinued. 
 
 how far may be required by mandamus, 44. 
 
 granting of, may be compelled, 45. 
 
 remedy for wrongful refusal to grant, 47. 
 
 punishment for violation of, 48. 
 
 failure to obtain, no ground for refusing guest, 91 
 
 theatre must have, 325. 
 
 tickets are mere, to enter theatre, 315. 
 
 LIEN, 
 
 cannot be enforced by unlicensed innkeeper, 48. 
 
 none on goods of boarder, 252. 
 
 nature of, 251. 
 
 innkeeper entitled to, 252. 
 
 does not require binding contract, 253. 
 
 not general, 254. 
 
 all goods of guest subject to, 255. 
 
 though innkeeper might have excluded them, 256. 
 none, on person of guest, 257. 
 
 on goods which cannot be taken without violation of law, 258. 
 
 on wearing apparel worn by guest, 259. 
 on property exempt from taxation, 260. 
 on goods of third person brought to inn by guest, 261-263. 
 on goods of guest not responsible for charges, 264. 
 statutory, only on goods of guest, 265. 
 when, attaches, 266. 
 not affected by sale of goods by owner, 267. 
 
 by removal of goods to another State, 268. 
 care of goods held on, 269. 
 ended by delivery of goods to guest, 270. 
 
 unless delivery obtained by fraud, 271. 
 
 or for temporary use, 272. 
 
 by payment, 273. 
 effect of attachment of goods by innkeeper, 274. 
 
 of conversion of goods, 275. 
 not foreclosed by sale, 276. 
 foreclosed by bill in equity, 277. 
 may be set up as defence, 278. 
 statutory methods of enforcing, 279. 
 of boarding house, 298. 
 statutory, of boarding-house keepers, 32. 
 of livery-stable keepers, 33. 
 
 of lodging-house keepers, 34. 
 Lien, Statutory in, 
 Arizona, App. II. 1-3. 
 
 [600] 
 
Index, 
 [references are to sEcnoNB.] 
 
 LIEN — continued. 
 
 Lien, Statutory in: 
 
 Arkansas, App. III. 1. 
 
 California, App. IV. 7, 10, 11. 
 
 Colorado, App. V. 6, 7. 
 
 Connecticut, App. VI. 2, 3. 
 
 District of Columbia, App. L. 1-3. 
 
 Florida, App. VIH. 6. 
 
 Georgia, App. IX. 9, 14-17. 
 
 Idaho, App. X. 1-3. 
 
 Illinois, App. XI. 3, 4. 
 
 Indiana, App. XII. 2, 3. 
 
 Iowa, App. XIII. 1. 
 
 Kansas, App. XIV. 1-4. 
 
 Kentucky, App. XV. 5-7. 
 
 Louisiana, App. XVI. 8-12, 14. 
 
 Maine, App. XVII. 7. 
 
 Maryland, App. XVHI. 5, 6. 
 
 Massachusetts, App. XIX. 10-12, 15, 18. 
 
 Michigan, App. XX. 3-9. 
 
 Minnesota, App. XXI. 4, 6-19. 
 
 Mississippi, App. XXII. 1-3. 
 
 Missouii, App. XXni. 1, 2. 
 
 Montana, App. XXIV. 4, 5, 10-12. 
 
 Nebraska, App. XXV. 4-15. 
 
 Nevada, App. XXVI. 1-4. 
 
 New Hampshire, App. XXVU. 2-7. 
 
 New Jersey, App. XXVIII. 1, 2, 
 
 New Mexico, App. XXIX. 3-7. 
 
 New York, App. XXX. 7-12. 
 
 North Carolina, App. XXXI. 1-3. 
 
 North Dakota, App. XXXII. 3-6. 
 
 Ohio, App. XXXIII. 5. 
 
 Oklahoma, App. XXXIV.'3. 
 
 Oregon, App. XXXV. 1-16. 
 
 Pennsylvania, App. XXXVI. 3, 4, 9, 10. 
 
 Porto Eico, App. XXXVII. 3. 
 
 Ehode Island, App. XXXVIII. 3-8. 
 
 South Dakota, App. XL. 1, 3-6. 
 
 Tennessee, App. XLI. 2-4, 8. 
 
 Texas, App. XLII. 1-5. 
 
 Utah, App. XLIII. 1-4. 
 
 Virginia, App. XLV. 1-4. 
 
 Washington, App. XLVI. 1, 2. 
 
 West Virginia, App. XLVIL 2. 
 
 [601] 
 
Index. 
 
 [references are TO.SECTIONa] 
 
 LIEN — continued. 
 
 Lkin, Statutory, in: 
 Wisconsin, App. XLVIII. 2-14. 
 Wyoming, App. XLIX. 3. 
 
 LIWHT, 
 
 injury by lack of, in inn, 164, 166. 
 
 LIMITATION, 
 
 of liability. See Liability, Responsibility. 
 
 by contract not by printing notice on register, 418, 
 
 of liability of sleeping-car company, 390. 
 
 LIQUOE, 
 
 innkeeper need not supply, 17. 
 
 illegally served does npt prevent innkeeper recovering charge for 
 board, 248. 
 
 LIVERY STABLE, 33. 
 
 innkeeper may carry on, 21. 
 
 exclusive contract for may be made, 86. 
 
 responsibility of innkeeper for goods placed in, 154. 
 
 LODGING, 
 
 inn must supply, 15, 16. 
 
 guest at inn need not require, 131. 
 
 guest must pay in advance for one night's, 244. 
 
 LODGING HOUSE, 
 is not inn, 15. 
 difference from inn, 34. 
 is public house, 34. 
 failure to look door in, 224. 
 
 LODGING-HOUSE KEEPER, 
 duty to receive guests, 53. 
 has no lien, 252. 
 responsibility of, 331, 332. 
 
 M. 
 MAIL, 
 
 cannot be interrupted by lien, 258. 
 
 MANAGER, 
 
 of inn not necessarily innkeeper, 17. 
 of theatre may fix prices, 313. 
 
 may admit whom he pleases, 314. 
 
 [602] 
 
Index. 
 
 [keperences are to sections.] 
 MANAGER— continwed. 
 
 of theatre, responsibility of, for safety of spectator, 321. 
 for premises, 322, 
 for goods of spectator, 324. 
 MANDAMUS, 
 
 for granting license, 44, 45. 
 
 MARRIED WOMAN, 
 
 right to be received in inn, 64, 112. 
 
 MASTER, 
 
 whether guest where servant is entertained, 133. 
 may sue for loss of his goods by servant at inn, 285. 
 
 MEDIEVAL INNS, 1. 
 
 MENTAL, 
 
 sufCering, damages for, against sleeping-car company, 402. 
 
 MERCHANDISE, 
 
 responsibility of innkeeper for, 150. 
 efEect of statute on responsibility for, 415. 
 
 MICE, 
 
 injury by, to goods held on lien, 269. 
 
 MILEAGE BOOK, 
 
 responsibility of sleeping car for, 383. 
 
 MILITIA, 
 
 member of, entitled to be received as guest, 94. 
 
 MINERAL, 
 
 specimens not included in " valuables " 215. 
 springs, hotel at, 14. 
 
 MISCONDUCT, 
 
 of guest justifies ejection, 102. 
 
 MISDELIVERY, 
 
 responsibility of innkeeper for, 206. 
 
 MONET, 
 
 innkeeper responsible for, 191. 
 
 responsibility of keeper of cofEee house for, 205. 
 
 innkeeper cannot require guest to deposit, 214. 
 
 [ 603 ] 
 
Index. 
 
 [eEFBEENCBS ABE TO SECTIONS.] 
 
 MONET — continued. 
 
 whether included in " valuables " 215. 
 
 publicly exhibiting, 227. 
 
 responsibility of sleeping-car company for, 383. 
 
 passenger leaving in berth, 391. 
 
 deposit of, under statute, 432. 
 
 MONOPOLY, 
 
 licensing power cannot grant, 46. 
 
 how far innkeeper may establish in other business, 87. 
 
 MOTHS, 
 
 injury by, to goods held on lien, 269. 
 
 MUNICIPAL COEPORATION, 
 may grant license, 42n. 
 
 N. 
 
 NAME, 
 
 given to inn immaterial, 22. 
 
 NEGLIGENCE, 
 
 in loss of goods presumed, 190. 
 
 NEWSPAPER, 
 
 criticism of theatrical performance by, 319. 
 
 NEWS STAND, 
 
 exclusive contract for may be made, 86. 
 
 NIGHT, 
 
 danger of travel at, in middle ages, 3. 
 inn needed for protection at, 4, 181. 
 reception may be demanded at, 66, 95. 
 care necessary in sleeping car during, 386-389. 
 
 NOBLES, 
 
 hospitality of, in middle ages, 4. 
 
 NOTICE, 
 
 of desire to be received as guest, 67. 
 of rule requiring deposit of goods, 215. 
 
 [604] 
 
Index. 
 
 [references are to sections.] 
 
 NOTICE— continued. 
 
 of risk of loss to guest, 226. 
 
 posting of, not necessary for crime of surreptitious remoyal, 462. 
 
 required by statute for limitation of liability, 417. 
 
 printing on register not enough, 418. 
 
 printing erroneously, 419. 
 
 actual, 420, 421. 
 
 what is actual, 422. 
 
 NUISANCE, 
 
 goods constituting, 68. 
 
 NURSING, 
 
 innkeeper entitled to additional compensation for, 247. 
 
 OBJECTIONABLE PERSON, 
 innkeeper may refuse, 92. 
 
 OBLIGATION OF INN, 
 contractual, 111. 
 
 OFFICER IN ARMY, 
 
 pi'esumably guest, 140. 
 
 OPERA HOUSE, 
 is a theatre, 312. 
 
 ORNAMENTS, 
 
 responsibility of sleeping-car company for, 383. 
 
 OUTHOUSE, 
 
 responsibility of innkeeper for carriage placed in, 154. 
 
 OUTLAWS, 
 
 infested roads in middle ages, 3. 
 
 OVERCOAT, 
 
 responsibility of innkeeper for, 148. 
 
 responsibility of innkeeper for burning, 171. 
 
 loss of, in theatre, 324. 
 
 loss of from bath house, 333. 
 
 whether negligent to leave in berth, 391. 
 
 check for, 423. 
 
 [605] 
 
Index, 
 [eepebencbs are to sections.] 
 
 p. 
 
 PACKAGES, 
 
 brought to inn by tradesmen, 146. 
 
 PALESTINE, 
 inns in, 1. 
 
 PAELOR OAR, 344,352. 
 
 PARTNER, 
 
 may sue innkeeper for loss by his fellow-partner, 285. 
 
 PASSENGER, 
 
 duty of sleeping-car company to awaken, 370. 
 
 to protect, 373. 
 duty of, to care for berth, 376. 
 right of, to exchange berth, 377. 
 
 PASTURE, 
 
 responsibility of innkeeper for goods in, 153, 154. 
 
 PAYMENT, 
 
 guest ejected for refusal to make, 104. 
 may be required in advance, 244. 
 lien exists before time for, 266. 
 when made puts end to lien, 273. 
 
 PERMANENT GUESTS, 14. 
 
 PERSON, 
 
 no lien on, 257. 
 
 PET ANIMAL, 
 
 whether guest may bring, 96. 
 
 PIANO, 
 
 whether must be received, 68. 
 
 PISTOLS, 
 
 innkeeper, whether responsible for, 191. 
 responsibility of sleeping car for, 383. 
 
 PLAINTIFF, 
 
 who may be, in action against innkeeper, 285. 
 [606] 
 
Index. 
 
 [RErERENCEa ARE TO SECTIONSj 
 
 PLEASUKE, 
 
 one journeying for, may be traveller, 63. 
 
 PLEASUKE RESORT, 
 hotel at, 14. 
 
 POOR, 
 
 entertainment of, in middle ages, 4. 
 
 PORTER, 
 
 delivery of baggage to, 142, 143. 
 
 liability for assault by, 173. 
 
 delivery of goods to, 203. 
 
 of sleeping car, theft of, 382. 
 
 must care for passenger in upper berth, 362. 
 
 duty as to ventilation of car, 368. 
 
 negligence of, causing injury to passenger, 372. 
 
 assault on passenger by, 374, 375. 
 
 whether negligent in standing outside car, 385, 387. 
 
 in failure to watch aisle, 387. 
 responsibility for luggage carried off by wrong person, 389. 
 contributory negligence no defence in case of theft by, 391, 
 asleep, evidence of negligence, 392. 
 meddling with passenger's goods, 394. 
 taking charge of lost property, 394. 
 
 POSSESSION, 
 
 how far necessary for lien, 251. 
 
 PREMISES, 
 
 responsibility of innkeeper for safety of, 163. 
 of restaurant keeper must be safe, 302. 
 of theatre must be safe, 322. 
 
 PRESUMPTION, 
 
 one is an innkeeper, 13. 
 
 of negligence in loss of goods, 190. 
 
 of performance of duty, 295. 
 
 PRETENCE, 
 
 fraudulent, to obtain board, 446. 
 
 PRICE PAID, 
 
 whether proof of, boarder, 139. 
 
 [607] 
 
Index. 
 
 [refeebnces are to sections.] 
 
 PRICES OF THEATRE, 
 
 right of manager to fix, 313. 
 
 PRIVATE ROOM, 
 
 responsibility of innkeeper for goods in, 150. 
 
 PROFANE, 
 
 traveller may be excluded because, 92. 
 
 PROHIBIT, 
 
 licensing authority cannot, 45. 
 
 PROMISE, 
 
 not a false pretence, 445. 
 
 PROPERTY, 
 
 placing of in inn, does not create obligation, 124. 
 
 PROPRIETORSHIP, 
 
 exclusive contract for may be made, 86. 
 
 PROTECTION, 
 
 inns necessary for, at night, 4. 
 innkeeper must furnish, 6. 
 innkeeper must supply, 15. 
 
 PUBLIC AMUSEMENT, 
 
 place of, regulated by law, 41. 
 
 PUBLIC DUTY, 
 
 of innkeeper owed only to traveller, 62. 
 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT, 
 
 Innkeepers engaged in, 11, 51. 
 duties of, 51. 
 
 PUBLIC ENTERTAINMENT, 
 houses of (see Inns). 
 
 PUBLIC HOUSE, 
 inn is, 11. 
 [608] 
 
Index. 
 
 [repehenobs are to sections.] 
 
 PUBLIC HOUSES, 
 
 not ians, uut in public calling, 31. 
 regulation permitted, 41. 
 
 PUBLIC POLICY, 
 
 basis of innkeeper's peculiar liability, 186. 
 prevents limitation of liability of sleeping car, 390. 
 
 PUBLIC SERVICE, 
 
 innkeeper engaged in, 11. 
 sleeping-car company in, 343. 
 
 R. 
 
 EACE, 
 
 no discrimination because of, 56, 
 
 whether traveller may be excluded, because of, 65, 92. 
 
 RAILING, 
 
 injury from defective, 163. 
 
 RAILROAD COMPANY, 
 
 responsible for injury in sleeping car, 375. 
 
 RAILROAD STATION, 
 
 reception by innkeeper of baggage at, 142, 143. 
 
 RATE, 
 
 of compensation how fixed, 242, 243. 
 sometimes required to be posted, 242. 
 may be fixed by custom, 243. 
 continues until charged, 243. 
 
 READING ROOM, 
 
 right of guest to use, 167. 
 
 RECEIVE, 
 
 duty of innkeeper to, 2. 
 
 « 
 RECEPTION, 
 
 of person in any other capacity than as guest, 125. 
 
 39 [ 609 ] 
 
Index. 
 
 [references are to sections.] 
 
 EEFUSAL, 
 
 to receive guest, remedy for, 70 (see Guest). 
 
 REGISTER, 
 keeping, 19. 
 
 printing notice on, not sufficient, 418. 
 guest liable to pay charges as soon as signing, 245. 
 
 REGULATION, 
 
 of boarding house, 32. 
 
 of livery stable, 33. 
 
 of lodging house, 34. 
 
 of theatre, 36. 
 
 of public house permitted, 41. 
 
 may be exercised by license, 42. 
 
 by innkeeper as to goods received, 68. 
 
 of innkeeper for conduct of guest, 212. 
 
 for deposit of goods, 213, 214. 
 
 notice of, 215. 
 right of sleeping-car company to make, 371. 
 
 RELIGIOUS HOUSES, 
 
 practice of hospitality in, 4. 
 
 REMEDY, 
 
 for refusal to receive guest, 70. 
 against innkeeper, 281, 282. 
 
 REMOVAL, 
 
 of goods to another State does not affect lien, 268. 
 of propei'ty, surreptitious, 449-451. 
 
 REPLEVIN, 
 
 lien as defence in, 278. 
 
 REPUTATION, 
 
 of guest, ground for exclusion, 92. 
 
 RESERVATION, 
 
 of berths, 346-350. 
 
 RESIDENCE, 
 
 whether proof of, boarder, 140. 
 [610] 
 
Index. 
 
 [references are to sections.] 
 
 RESPONSIBILITY, 
 
 of innkeeper anomalous, 2. 
 
 development of law of, 6. 
 
 unaffected by failure to obtain license, 48. 
 
 to third persons, 81. 
 
 wben created, 121-123. 
 
 established by reception of guest, 121. 
 
 requires communication of intention, 122-123. 
 
 compared with that of carrier, 173, 174. 
 
 of innkeeper for guest's goods, 141 et seq. 
 
 ways of creating, 141. 
 
 beginning of, 142. 
 
 result of bailment to innkeeper, 144-147. 
 
 accident to goods in possession of guest, 148. 
 
 only if goods in control of innkeeper, 149. 
 
 if merchandise, 150. 
 
 conditioned on one becoming guest, 143. 
 
 upon special arrangement, 151. 
 
 for goods brought to inn after guest's arrival, 152. 
 
 for goods taken by guest outside inn, 153. 
 
 for goods placed outside inn by innkeeper, 154. 
 
 for goods placed outside inn by guest, 155. 
 
 extent of, 181. 
 
 not based on bailment, 182. 
 
 history of, 183, 184. 
 
 extent of, 185-187. 
 
 for loss of goods by theft, 188. 
 
 by Are, 189. 
 for what goods, 191. 
 for goods of boarder, 201, 202. 
 for goods bailed by stranger, 203. 
 for goods taken as matter of Business, 204. 
 as gratuitous bailee of goods, 205. 
 for misdelivery of goods, 206. 
 for goods in bath house, 207. 
 limitation of by contract, 211. 
 modification of by regulation, 212. 
 ends with termination of relation, 231. 
 ends when guest leaves inn finally, 231. 
 during temporary absence of guest, 232, 233. 
 during reasonable time for removal, 234. 
 for goods received after guest leaves inn, 235. 
 of boarding-house keeper, 292. 
 of restaurant keeper for safety of customer, 303. 
 for goods, 304. 
 
 [611] 
 
Index. 
 
 [rEPBRBNCBS ABE TO SECTIONS.] 
 
 RESPONSIBILITY— coiiMjiued. 
 
 of manager of theatre for safety of spectator, 321. 
 
 of premises, 322. 
 
 for goods of spectator, 324. 
 of lodging-house keeper, 331. 
 
 extent of, 332. 
 of keeper of bath house, 333. 
 
 EESTAUEANT, 
 is not inn, 15. 
 connection of with inn, 19. 
 Innkeeper may carry on, 21. 
 difference from inn, 35. 
 guest at, 122. 
 
 difference between, and inn, 301. 
 duty of keeper of, to customer personally, 302. 
 responsibility of keeper of, for goods of customer, 303-306. 
 
 KESTAURANTS, 
 
 Admission to, kegulatbd in: 
 California, App. IV. 14. 
 Colorado, App. V. 1. 
 Delaware, App. VII. 4. 
 Iowa, App. XIII. 4. 
 Michigan, App. XX. 14. 
 Minnesota, App. XXI. 5. 
 New York, App. XXX. 14. 
 Ohio, App. XXXIII. 1. 
 Pennsylvania, App. XXXVI. 1. 
 
 RESTAURANT KEEPER, 
 
 responsibility for water spilled on guest, lY2ji. 
 
 RIGHTS, 
 
 of inn fixed by law, 41. 
 
 RING, 
 
 responsibility of sleeping car for, 383. 
 
 RIVAL, 
 
 innkeeper, whether may be excluded, 97. 
 
 ROADS, 
 
 condition of, in medieval England, 3. 
 
 [612] 
 
Index, 
 [references are to sections.] 
 
 ROBBERS, 
 
 infested roads in middle ages, 3. 
 innkeeper must protect against, 181. 
 
 ROMAN, 
 
 law, responsibility of innkeepers in, 182. 
 
 ROOF, 
 
 innkeeper must have, 6. 
 
 ROOM, 
 
 assignment of, 167. 
 right to change, 167. 
 
 to use, 168. 
 failure to occupy at night, whether contributory negligence, 228. 
 reservation of, 246. 
 
 RULE (see Regulation). 
 
 SAFE, 
 
 goods stolen from, 201. 
 
 rule requiring deposit of valuables in, 213. 
 
 must be provided by innkeeper to secure limitation of liability, 413. 
 
 SALE, 
 
 of goods by owner does not put end to lien, 267. 
 of goods held on lien by innkeeper, 276. 
 
 SCALPER, 
 
 use of ticket bought from, 317. 
 
 SEAT, 
 
 right of spectator in theatre to empty, 318. 
 
 SECTION, 
 
 right of applicant in car to occupy, 345. 
 
 SECURITY, 
 
 agreement to accept does not put end to lien, 273. 
 
 [613] 
 
Index. 
 
 [repeeences are to sections.] 
 
 SERVANT, 
 
 of innkeeper may be indicted for keeping without license, 18)i, 48. 
 
 duty of innkeeper to provide, 54. 
 
 guest lias no right to services of a particular, 56. 
 
 liow authorized to receive guest, 122. 
 
 delivery of goods to, 144-147. 
 
 liability of innkeeper for assault by, 1Y2. 
 
 acts of, outside the inn, 174. 
 
 theft of goods by, 188. 
 
 of guest, goods taken by, 221. 
 
 of boarding-house keeper, responsibility for, 293. 
 
 of sleeping-car company responsibility of, for act of, 374. 
 
 loss by, 382. 
 
 finding property, 394. 
 
 one sending to inn, whether guest, 132. 
 
 SEWING MACHINE, 
 
 whether must be received, 68. 
 
 SHED, 
 
 responsibility of innkeeper for carriage placed in, 155. 
 
 SHELTER, 
 
 innkeeper must supply, 15. 
 
 SIGN, 
 
 soliciting custom by, 19.- 
 
 usual but not necessary for inn, 19. 
 
 taking down, 71. 
 
 SILVERWARE, 
 
 innkeeper whether responsible for, 191. 
 
 SLEEP, 
 
 guest cannot be forced to, 168. 
 
 SLEEPING CAR, 
 
 is not inn, 15, 37, 341. 
 not a carrier, 842. 
 must serve public, 343. 
 right to berth in, 344. 
 
 section in, 345. 
 vacant berth in, 346. 
 
 [614] 
 
Index. 
 
 [references are to sections.] 
 
 SLEEPING CAR— continued. 
 
 reservation of berth in 346, 347. 
 
 by ticket, 348. 
 
 for way stations, 349. 
 failure of reserving passenger to occupy berth in, 350. 
 duty to put on additional, 351. 
 right to compensation for occupying, 352. 
 appliances for 361, 362. 
 warming and ventilating, 363. 
 providing berth in 364-366. 
 changing berth in, 367. 
 who may occupy berth in, 368. 
 making up berth in, 369. 
 safety of, 372. 
 
 liability of carrier for defect in, 375. 
 evidence of negligence in, 392. 
 burden of proof of negligence in, 393. 
 care of property left in, 394. 
 
 SLEEPIN(S-CAE COMPANY, 
 
 duty of to provide appliances, 361. 
 
 to make upper berth convenient, 362. 
 
 to warm and ventilate car, 363. 
 
 to provide berth for which ticket issued, 364. 
 
 to furnish throughout journey, 365. 
 right of, to eject passenger, 366. 
 
 to change berth, 367. 
 duty of, to make up berth, 369. 
 
 to awaken passengers, 370. 
 
 to provide safe car, 372. 
 
 to protect passengers, 873. 
 right of, to make regulations, 371. 
 liability of, for negligence, 381. 
 loss by theft of servant of, 382. 
 for what goods responsible, 383. 
 amount of care required, 384. 
 negligence of in daytime, 385. 
 
 at night, 386 
 proper watch kept in, 387. 
 loss by theft of passenger in, 388. 
 carrying off another's luggage from, 389. 
 limitation of liability of, 390. 
 contributory negligence of passenger, 391, 
 liability of, as bailee, 395. 
 action against, 401. 
 damages against, 402, 
 
 [615] 
 
Index. 
 
 [references are to sections.] 
 
 SMALLPOX, 
 
 person suffering from may be excluded, 93. 
 
 SPECTATOK, 
 
 right of, to criticise performance, 319. 
 
 to applaud or hiss, 320. 
 manager responsible for safety of, 221. 
 
 for goods of, 324. 
 contributory negligence of, 323. 
 
 SPIKES, 
 
 wearing on boots in inns forbidden in Maine, App. XVII. 12. 
 
 SPOONS, 
 
 innkeeper whether responsible for, 191. 
 
 SPRINGS, 
 
 hotel at medicinal, 14. 
 
 STABLE (see Livery-stable). 
 
 STAGE COACHES, 
 
 rights of travellers in inn to come and depart in, 87. 
 
 STAIRCASE, 
 
 injury by falling down, 165. 
 by defect in, 322. 
 
 STAIRWAY, 
 
 injury by falling from, 163. 
 
 STATEROOM, 
 
 may be let to single person, 345. 
 
 STATUTE, 
 
 may regulate boarding house, 32. 
 
 livery stable, 33. 
 
 lodging-house, 34. 
 
 theatre, 36. 
 confers lien on boarding house keeper, 32. 
 
 livery stable keeper, 33. 
 
 lodging-house keeper, 34. 
 imposing responsibility on innkeeper for guests, 81. 
 may fix amount of compensation, 242. 
 
 [616] 
 
Index. 
 
 [references are to SECTI0N8.J 
 
 STATUTE— co7i«mued. 
 
 enforcement of innkeeper's lien by, 279. 
 
 creating crime of fraud on Innkeepers (see Fraud). 
 
 limiting liability (see Liability). 
 
 STATUTOEY, 
 
 liens do not cover property of third person, 265 (see Lien). 
 
 STEAMBOATS, 
 
 diSer from Innkeepers, 37. 
 
 STEPS, 
 
 must be provided for upper berth, 362. 
 
 STORM, 
 
 injury to goods by, 185. 
 
 STOKY, 
 
 Judge, opinion of as to innkeeper's liability, 184. 
 
 STRANGER, 
 
 coming to inn to call on guest, 84. 
 coming to do business with guest, 85. 
 coming to solicit patronage, 86. 
 right of, in inn forfeited by misconduct, 88. 
 
 SUMMER, 
 
 staying at inn, during, 139. 
 
 SUNDAY, 
 
 reception at inn on, 95, 137. 
 
 SURGICAL INSTRUMENTS, 
 
 innkeeper, vrhether responsible for, 191. 
 
 SURREPTITIOUS, 
 
 removal of property as evidence of fraud, 449. 
 
 as substantive offence, 450. 
 
 what constitutes, 451. 
 
 posting notices not necessary ior, 452. 
 
 SURVIVAL, 
 
 of action against Innkeeper, 284. 
 
 [617] 
 
Index, 
 [references ake to sections.] 
 
 T. 
 
 TASTE, 
 
 of guest need not be satisfied, 167. 
 
 TAVERN, 
 
 difference between, and inn, 4. 
 sometimes synonymous with inn, 22. 
 corruption in licensing, 44. 
 
 THEATRE, 
 
 differs from inn, 36. 
 
 not engaged in public employment, 36. 
 
 THEATRE, 
 
 defiijition of, 311. 
 
 opera house is, 812. 
 
 price of admission to, 313. 
 
 manager may admit whom he pleases to, 314. 
 
 ticket for, a license, 315. 
 
 contains contract not to revoke license, 316. 
 
 how far transferable, 317. 
 
 accommodations secured by, 318. 
 right of spectators to criticise, 319. 
 
 to applaud or hiss, 320. 
 responsibility of manager for safety of spectator, 321. 
 
 for premises, 322. 
 
 for goods of spectator, 324. 
 license for, 32.5. 
 
 Admission to ebgtjlatbd in: 
 California, App. IV. 14-17. 
 Colorado, App. V. 1. 
 Delaware, App. VII. 5. 
 Iowa, App. XIII. 4. 
 Massachusetts, App. XIX. 1, 19. 
 Michigan, App. XX. 14. 
 Minnesota, App. XXI. 5. 
 New York, App. XXX. 14. 
 Ohio, App. XXXIU. 1. 
 Pennsylvania, App. XXXVI. 1. 
 Tennessee, App. XLI. 1. 
 United States, App. LI. 1. 
 
 THEFT, 
 
 responsibility for loss of goods by, 187, 188. 
 in sleeping car by porter, 382. 
 by passenger, 388. 
 
 [618] 
 
Index. 
 
 [bEPBRENCES ABE TO SECTIONS.J 
 
 THIEF, 
 
 may be excluded, 92. 
 
 sharing room with owner of goods lost, 221. 
 
 TICKET, 
 
 to theatre a mere license, 315. 
 
 contains contract not to revoke license, 316. 
 
 how far transferable, 317. 
 
 accommodation secured by, 318. 
 reservation of berth by, 348. 
 whether transfei-able, 348. 
 berth must be provided for holder of, 364. 
 
 TIGER, 
 
 whether must be received, 68. 
 
 TOILET, 
 
 rooms in sleeping car must be accessible at night, 372. 
 passenger leaving behind valuables when going to, 391. 
 
 TORT, 
 
 suit against innkeeper for, 281, 282. 
 
 TRADER, 
 
 innkeeper not, 169. 
 
 TRANSIENT, 
 guests, 14. 
 may be entertained at boarding house, 32. 
 
 TRANSPORTATION, 
 in middle ages, 3. 
 
 TRAVEL, 
 
 common in middle ages, 1. 
 condition of, in medieval England, 3. 
 
 TRAVELLER, 
 
 the subject of innkeeper's undertaking, 6. 
 needs inn at convenient places, 11. 
 innkeeper supplies all needs of, 15. 
 entitled to service of innkeeper, 52. 
 entitled to be admitted as guests, 61. 
 
 [619] 
 
Index. 
 
 [references are to sections.] 
 
 TEAVELLEE— coJi«intte(Z. 
 who is, 63. 
 
 may come to inn at night, 66. 
 
 must notify innkeeper of his desire to be received, 67. 
 guest who ceases to be, may be ejected, 105. 
 not presenting himself as guest, 12,3. 
 refusal of innkeeper to accept as guest, 124. 
 
 TRUNK, 
 
 delivery of to innkeeper, 142. 
 
 TYPE, 
 
 necessary for notice, 417. 
 
 TTPHOID FEVER, 
 
 whether guest may be excluded for, 103. 
 
 TJ. 
 
 UNIT, 
 
 of charge at inn, 244. 
 
 UPPER BERTH, 
 right to, 345. 
 
 appliances provided for use of, 362. 
 injury by falling of, 372. 
 
 USE, 
 
 of goods held on lien by innkeeper, 269. 
 by owner, 272. 
 
 V. 
 
 VALISE, 
 
 passenger leaving in berth, 391. 
 
 VALUABLES, 
 
 failure to deposit, 226. 
 
 VENTILATING, 
 sleeping car, 363. 
 
 .[ 620 ] 
 
Index. 
 [references are to sections.] 
 
 w. 
 
 WAITER, 
 
 spilling water on guest, 172re. 
 
 WAIVEK, 
 
 of deposit of goods by guest, 426. 
 
 WARMING, 
 
 sleeping car, 363. 
 
 WATCH, 
 
 innkeeper cannot require guest to deposit, 214. 
 deposit of, under statute, 431. 
 
 WATER, 
 
 responsibility for spilling on guest, 172?!. 
 
 WATERING PLACE, 
 
 hotel at, whether inn, 14. 
 
 WAY STATION, 
 
 reservation of berth for, 349. 
 
 WEARY TRAVELLER, 
 
 served by innkeeper, 14. 
 
 WEEKLY PAYMENT, 
 
 whether proof of boarder, 139. 
 
 WIFE, 
 
 not liable for board unless credit extended to her, 249. 
 
 no lien on property of, where credit given to husband, 264. 
 
 may occupy berth with husband, 368. 
 
 WINDOW, 
 
 loss of goods from failure to lock, 224. 
 
 WINE, 
 
 innkeeper need not supply, 17. 
 
 [621] 
 
ig