ainrtiFll Cam ^rlynnl Blibraty 
 
Cornell University Library 
 KF 2375.W58 
 
 V.1 
 
 The law of personal injuries on railroad 
 
 3 1924 019 373 533 
 
The original of tiiis book is in 
 the Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924019373533 
 
THE LAW 
 
 OF 
 
 PERSONAL INJURIES ON 
 RAILROADS 
 
 "^ ,u 
 
 EDW. J. ^HITE 
 
 AUTHOR OF MINES AND MINING BEMEDIES, FEBSONAL mjUBIES IN MINES, 
 
 EDITOR THIRD EDITION "tIEDEMAN ON REAL PROPERTY," ETC. 
 
 IN TWO VOLUMES 
 
 VOL. I. INJURIES TO EMPLOYEES 
 VOL. II. INJURIES TO PASSENGERS, LICENSEES AND 
 TRESPASSERS 
 
 VOL. I. 
 
 PUBLISHED BY 
 
 THE F. H. THOMAS LAW BOOK CO. 
 
 ST. LOUIS, MO. 
 
INJUEIE8 TO EMPLOYEES. 
 
PEETAOE. 
 
 The attitude of those attempting the application of the 
 principles of the law to the abstract propositions dealt with 
 in a text book, is entirely different from that occupied by 
 the members of the profession, called upon, in concrete cases, 
 to apply the precedents upon the live issues, to sustain or 
 reject the rights of a litigant. 
 
 In the one case, the consideration of the subject lacks the 
 .suggestion which the facts of every concrete case present, 
 and general discussions are alone attempted, because of the 
 absence of the impetus, prompting the investigation of more 
 minute d&tails. In the other instance, the facts of a given 
 ease ni'ay present totally different issues from those generally 
 considered — as it is a well-known fact that the circum- 
 stances and conditions going to make up the history of a 
 law suit, like the physiognomy of individuals, are rarely 
 the same — but the importance of considering all the prece- 
 dents at hand, on every issue, in a law suit, results in an 
 exhaustive consideration of propositions, perhaps never be- 
 fore adjudicated, in the same way that they are presented to 
 the lawyer. 
 
 This circumstance, in some measure, accounts for the fact 
 that practitioners, in referring to text books, often ifail to 
 find the exhaustive presentations, in every instance, of the 
 legal proposition and precedents that happen to be of ab- 
 sorbing interest in a given case. 
 
 But were the labors of the collaborator of abstract rules 
 and those of the practitioner more identical, time and space 
 would forbid the same exhaustive treatment of the proposi- 
 tions of a given section, in a modern law book, that should 
 be set forth in a lawyer's brief. This furnishes some ex- 
 cuse for what frequently may be thought too cursory ex- 
 aminations of important subjects in text books. 
 
 It was attempted to treat the subjects of the following 
 pages in a way to make them useful to the practitioner. 
 
 It is hoped that a limited practice in the subject of per- 
 
PEEJ'ACE. 
 
 sonal injury cases on railroads may have assisted in giving 
 some utility, from a practical standpoint, to this labor. 
 
 A discussion of the whole subject of personal injuries on 
 railroads is attempted in the tveo volimies, the first treat- 
 ing of personal injuries to all character of railroad employees, 
 arising from the use of the different appliances and received 
 in the various phases of the service, -while the second vol- 
 ume discusses personal injuries received on railroads, by all 
 others, included within the terms, passengers, licensees and 
 
 trespassers. 
 
 A reference to the tablp of contents will give the chap- 
 ter and section headings of the two volumes and the index 
 will be found sufiScient to furnish a ready reference to the 
 different subjects of sections and footnotes. 
 
 In the preparation of these volumes, Labatt, on Master & 
 Servant; Bailey, on Master's Liability for Injuries to the 
 Servant; Buswell, on Personal Injuries; Watson's Damages 
 for Personal Injuries; Black's Accident Law; Patterson's 
 Railway Accident Law; Dresser, on Employer's Liability; 
 Elliott, on Eailroads ; Hutchinson, on Carriers, and Thomp- 
 son, on Negligence, have all been freely consulted. 
 
 Reference in the notes in all cases cited, will be found, 
 to the National Reporter System; The American and Eng- 
 lish Railway Cases; the Lawyers' Reports Annotated; the 
 American State Reports; American Negligence Reports and 
 American Railway Reports, all of which have been found 
 most useful in the collection of the data used in both the 
 text and notes. To all these authors and the Publishers 
 of these reports, due acknowledgment is made. 
 
 The profession has the sincere appreciation of the author 
 for the courteous manner in which it has received his other 
 efforts and he trusts there may be found sufficient of merit 
 in the present work, to justify the labor that it represents, 
 when judged by its utility to the Bar. 
 
 The AtTTHOE. 
 AuEOKA, Mo., 1909, 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 VOLUME L 
 INJURIES TO EMPLOYEES. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 GEINEIBAL CONSIDEEATIOlirS IN ACTIONS FOB PEESONAL IN- 
 
 JUEIES. 
 
 § 1. Actions founded on negligence. 
 
 2. Duty owing plaintiff must be violated. 
 
 3. Rule the same, whether action by -employee or third party. 
 
 4. Essentials of actionable negligence, further considered. 
 
 5. May arise from omission of duty, or commission of wrongful act. 
 
 6. When duty is imposed by statute. 
 
 7. Liability not affected by public character of business. 
 
 8. Legal status of railroad company. 
 
 9. Company must be sized in proper name. 
 
 10. Care required in general. 
 
 11. How affected by character and rise of business. 
 
 12. Ordinary care alone required of railroad companies. 
 
 13. Due care, reasonable care, and ordinary care, explained. 
 
 14. Willfulness, wantonness and recklessness. 
 
 15. Degrees of negligence. 
 
 16. Action may be based upon contract. 
 
 17. Bemedies in contract and tort concurrent. 
 
 18. Authorities announcing a contrary doctrine. 
 
 19. Violated right and injury both essential. 
 
 CHAPTEE II. 
 
 PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INJURY. 
 
 § 20. Defendant's negligence must be proximate cause of injury. 
 
 21. Immediate cause alone considered. 
 
 22. Wrongful act must be the " efficient cause " of injury. 
 
 23. Tests for determining' proximate cause. 
 
 24. Nearness of causation, not time, the controlling- factor. 
 
 vii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 25. BflScient intervening cause. 
 
 26. Negligent act concurring to produce injury. 
 
 27. Wrong need not directly cause injury. 
 
 28. Where injury or cause ought to be anticipated. 
 
 29. Aggravation of injury, without fault of defendant, 
 
 30. Injury in trying to avoid perilous position. 
 
 31. Instructions on proximate cause of injury. 
 
 32. No liability for injury from act of God. 
 
 33. No responsibility for injury due to inevitable accident. 
 
 34. Injuries from natural agencies. 
 
 35. No liability, if public enemy cause injury. 
 
 36. When question of lavp for court. 
 
 37. When a question of fact for the jury. 
 
 38. Injuries, where negligence was proximate cause. 
 
 39. Cases, where negligence held remote cause. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 JUKISDICTION OF ACTION. 
 LAW OF PLACE. 
 
 j 40. Actions both local and transitory. 
 
 41. When action existed at common law. 
 
 42. Statutory actions for death strictl/ construed. 
 
 43. Law of place of accident controls damages. 
 
 44. Death of foreigner — Administrator may sue for. 
 
 45. For injury or death in foreign State. 
 
 46. Negligence and injury in different States. 
 
 47. When remedy exists in either of two States. 
 
 48. Same — Statutes need not be identical. 
 
 49. Death statutes given no extraterritorial effect. 
 
 50. When statute given extraterritorial effect. 
 
 51. Subsequent repeal of statute does not effect. 
 
 52. Penal and compensatory statutes distinguished. 
 
 53. Pleading law of foreign State. 
 
 54. Proving statute of foreign State. 
 
 55. Special limitations applicable to such actions. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 PARTIES TO ACTIONS FOR DEATH. 
 
 56. Only those named by statute can sue. 
 
 57. Must have been right of recovery in deceased. 
 
 viii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 58. Action by or for the widow of the deceased. 
 
 59. Same — Compromise or settlement with widow. 
 
 60. Same — Marriage, divorce or adultery of the widow. 
 
 61. Action by husband of deceased. 
 
 62. Action by father of deceased. 
 
 63. Recovery of penalty not affected by emancipation of child. 
 
 64. Suit by the mother of decedent. ' 
 
 65. Action by children and grandchildren. 
 
 66. Kight of posthumous child to sue for death of parent. 
 
 67. Actions by brothers or sisters of decedent. 
 
 68. Action prosecuted by " heirs at law, or next of kin." 
 
 69. Actions by personal representatives or administrator. 
 
 70. Those dependent for support upon decedent. 
 
 71. Actions by nonresidents. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 EVIDENCE IN KAIL WAY ACCIDENT CASES. 
 
 72. Scope of chapter. 
 
 73. Injury must result from negligent act. 
 
 74. What presumptions are indulged in in such actions. 
 
 75. Rule of evidence — Conflict of laws. 
 
 76. When negligence of defendant presumed. 
 
 77. Defendant's ownership or control must be shown. 
 
 78. Relation of employer and employee must be .shown. 
 
 79. Defendant's notice of defects must be shown. 
 SO. Plaintiff's ignorance of the danger. 
 
 81. Reasonable safety of place or appliance sufficient. 
 
 82. Defective roadbed and track. 
 
 83. Same — ^Condition of track at other places) 
 
 84. Evidence of defective hand-holds. 
 
 85. Knowledge of incompetency of employees must be shown. 
 
 86. Evidence of employee's reputation for care. 
 
 87. Burden of establishing vice-principalship. 
 
 88. Ordinances as evidence of negligence. 
 
 89. Proving assumed risk and contributory negligence. 
 
 90. Enforcement and reasonableness of rules. 
 
 91. What declarations admissible as part of res gestw^ 
 
 92. Displaying injured member to jury. 
 
 93. Physical examination of plaintiff — When ordered. 
 
 94. Evidence of subsequent repairs inadmissible. 
 
 95. Prior or subsequent negligent acts or conditions. 
 
 96. Photographs of place or appliance. 
 
 is 
 
TABLE or CONTENTS. 
 
 § 97. Evidence of prior accidents incompetent. 
 
 98. Expert testimony — What is. 
 
 99. Customs and opinions as to relative methods. 
 
 100. Opinions of medical experts as to permanency oi injury. 
 
 101. When opinions based wholly on history of case. 
 
 102. Bunning oi trains — Train sheets and time-tables as evidence of. 
 
 103. Reports of railway company's employees. 
 
 104. Speed of trains. 
 
 105. Mortality tables, competent when. 
 
 106. When negative evidence is admissible. 
 
 107. Evidence of settlement with other employees incompetent. 
 
 108. Evidence of employer's insurance incompetent. 
 
 109. Evidence must correspond with pleading. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE EXILE RES IPSA 
 
 LOQDITUE. 
 
 § 110. What is demonstrative evidence of negligence. 
 
 111. Need not be specially pleaded. 
 
 112. Pleading facts to bring case within rule. 
 
 113. Limitations of the doctrine. 
 
 114. Trespassers or licensees cannot invoke rule. 
 
 115. The rule applies to plaintiif's negligence. 
 
 116. Collisions between railroad trains. 
 
 117. Injuries to employees from collisions. 
 
 118. Eule cannot be invoked by employee, in federal court. 
 
 119. Eule can be invoked by employees in many State courts. 
 
 120. Does not apply to injuries to employees from collisions. 
 
 121. Injuries to passengers from street car collisions. 
 
 122. Displacement of cars or appliances. 
 
 123. Assaults on passengers by employees. 
 
 124. Injuries from sudden jerks or jolts. 
 
 125. Sudden starting of street car or other public conveyance. 
 
 126. Frightening horses by noise from engine. 
 
 127. Falling of machinery or other objects. 
 
 128. Injuries from caving banks or pits. 
 
 129. Injuries from nurses at hospital. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 ISSUES EOE THE COUET A1X)NE. 
 
 130. Scope of chapter. 
 
 131. Questions of law for the court. 
 
 132. Mised questions of law and fact for court. 
 
 133. When there is total absence of negligence. 
 
 134. Court to decide whether duty owing or not. 
 
 135. Failure to prove negligence alleged. 
 
 136. Whether injury connected projdmately with defendant's negli- 
 
 gence. 
 
 137. Court should determine demurrer to evidence. 
 
 138. When undisputed evidence shows contributory negligence. 
 
 139. Injury due to neglect of coemployee. 
 
 140. Selecting more dangerous way to perform duty. 
 
 141. Jury cannot erect special standards for control of business. 
 
 142. When court should decide necessity for rule. 
 
 143. Beasonableness of rule a judicial determination. 
 
 144. Open, obvious risks assumed as matter of law. 
 
 145. When safety of place a question of law. 
 
 146. When competency of employee a question of law. 
 
 147. When injury from collision a question for the court. 
 
 148. Where evidence disputes physical facts. 
 
 149. Questions of variance for the court. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 JUET ISSUES IN KAILEOAD ACCIDENTS. 
 
 150. Should pass upon disputed issues of fact. 
 
 151. Weight of evidence determined by. 
 
 152. Question of defendant's negligence. 
 
 153. Specific issues in determining defendant's negligence. 
 
 154. Nature and cause of injury. 
 
 155. As to reasonable safety of appliances. 
 
 156. Reasonable safety of place. 
 
 157. When plaintiff's negligence a jury issue. 
 
 158. Whether injury due to negligence of vice-principal. 
 
 159. Capacity in which vice-principal acted. 
 
 160. Issue as to agent's competency. 
 
 161. Issues as to who are coemployees. 
 
 162. Assumption of risk jury issue, when. 
 
 3a 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTSr 
 
 163. Promulgation and enforcement of rule. 
 
 164. Discretion in assessing damages. 
 
 165. Conclusiveness of verdict. 
 
 CHAPTEE IX. 
 
 ELEMEJS^TS AND COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES. 
 
 166. Eight to damages, generally. 
 
 167. Province of court and jury in assessing. 
 
 168. Duty to prevent or keep damages down. 
 
 169. Only damages proximately resulting are recoverable. 
 
 170. What damages are proximate. 
 
 171. Mental anguish alone not basis for damages. 
 
 172. When nominal and substantial damages recoverable. 
 
 173. Compensatory damages only allowed, when. 
 
 174. Elements included in compensatory damages. 
 
 175. Expenses resulting from injury. 
 
 176. Exemplary or punitive damages. 
 
 177. When exemplary damages are recoverable. 
 
 178. When punitive damages should not be allowed. 
 
 179. Pleading exemplary . damages. 
 
 180. Evidence to establish exemplary damages. 
 
 181. Prospective damages for permanent injuries. 
 
 182. Permanent disability must be reasonably certain. 
 
 183. Damages for future pain and suffering. 
 
 184. Loss of earnings in the future. 
 
 185. Special damages must be specially pleaded. 
 
 186. Evidence of plaintiff's condition, circumstances and pursuit 
 
 proper, when. 
 
 187. Evidence in mitigation of damages. 
 
 188. Damages for pecuniary loss to beneficiaries. 
 
 189. What evidence of pecuniary loss competent. 
 
 190. Necessity of dependence upon deceased, for support. 
 
 191. Competent to show habits, character and capacity of decease^. 
 
 192. Competency of mortality tables to show expectancy of life. 
 
 193. Ill health and habits competent in mitigation of damages. 
 
 194. Nothing allowed as a solatium. 
 
 195. Damages for death' of parent. 
 
 196. Recovery for death of husband. 
 
 197. For death of wife. 
 
 198. For death of child. 
 
 199. Medical and funeral expenses. 
 
 200. Exemplary damages for death. 
 
 xU 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 § 201. When nominal damages only recovered for death. 
 
 202. Excessive damages in death actions. 
 
 203. Same — For death of father. 
 
 204. Same — Death of husband. 
 
 205. Same — For death of wife. 
 
 206. Same — For death of child. 
 
 CHAPTEK X. 
 
 GENEEALLT OF EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOTEiE, IN PEBSONAL IN- 
 JURY ACTIONS. 
 
 § 207. Terms applicable to what class. 
 
 208. Pleading relationship of employer aiid employee. 
 
 209. Injury should result from acts of employees charged. 
 
 210. Person causing injury must be employee of company. 
 
 211. Who generally regarded as an employee. 
 
 212. When relation of employer and employee a jury question. 
 
 213. Generally, no liability for neglect or malpractice of physician 
 
 or surgeon. 
 
 214. Same — The rule in the' federal court. 
 
 215. Same — The rule in Florida. 
 
 216. The Indiana rule. 
 
 217. The law in Iowa. 
 
 218. No liability, in Kansas. 
 
 219. Bule the same in Maryland. 
 
 220. Ko liability, in Nebraska. 
 
 221. Tennessee rule the same. 
 
 222. Washington rule. , 
 
 223. Status of volunteers and substituted employees. 
 
 224. Postal clerks and express messengers not employees. 
 
 225. News agents and others carried under contract. 
 
 226. Substituted employer — Train and crew controlled by another. 
 
 227. Injury must occur in course of employment. 
 
 228. When one deemed employee of two or more companies. 
 
 229. Different companies using same track or train. 
 
 230. Joint or several liability of companies jointly operating road. 
 
 231. Liability of connecting and joining roads. 
 
 232. Liability under joint-trafSc arrangement. 
 
 233. Agent causing injury and company both liable. 
 
 234. Employer not liable when negligent employee discharged. 
 
 235. Lessor's liability for injuries to employees of lessee. 
 
 236. Mortgagor not liable for negligence of mortgagee. 
 
 237. Negligence of trustees for bondholders. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 I 238. Road operated by receiver. 
 
 239. Liability of reorganized company. 
 
 240. Liability of consolidated company. 
 
 241. Purchasing company not generally liable. 
 
 242. Holding companies liable for negligence of companies held.' 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 THE VAJBIOUS DUTIES OF THE EMPLOTEE. 
 
 243. Created by law as incidents to relation. 
 
 244. Liability based upon breach of duty. 
 
 245. General duties of the employer. 
 
 246. None of these duties can be delegated. 
 
 247. Same — Protection of employees and charter powers. 
 
 248. Employer held to no greater degree of care than employee. 
 
 249. Reasonable and ordinary care alone required. 
 
 250. Jury cannot set up higher standard than that of ordinary 
 
 use. 
 
 251. Employer not an insurer of his employees. 
 
 252. Reasonably, safe machinery and appliances should be fur- 
 
 nished. 
 
 253. Newest and safest appliances not essential. 
 
 254. Same — Engines and cars. 
 
 255. Same — Scaffolds, lights and ladders. 
 
 256. Injuries from hidden defects in appliances. 
 
 257. Must provide reasonably safe place. 
 
 258. Same — Railroad tracks, bridges and similar structures. 
 
 259. Injuries from defective bridges. 
 
 260. Obstructions on or near track. 
 
 261. Fit and competent employees must be employed. 
 
 262. Duty to employ a sufficient number of employees. 
 
 263. Duty to promulgate rules. 
 
 264. What railway duties require rules and what do not. 
 
 265. Effect of violation of rule by employee. 
 
 266. Duty of inspection. 
 
 267. Same — Hidden defects — Ordinary tools. 
 
 268. Inspection of foreign cars. 
 
 269. Warning to inexperienced employees. 
 
 270. Warnings of cars and tracks to be given, when. 
 
 271. Obligation to repair appliances. 
 
 272. Duty to provide a reasonably safe system. 
 
 273. Necessity for some system to prevent collisions. 
 
 274. Duty to protect employee from weather. 
 
 275. Duty as to employment of infants, 
 xiv 
 
TABLE OJ? C0N1ESTS. 
 
 CHAPTEE XII. 
 
 NEGLIGENCE; OF INDEPENDEJ!TT CONTEAGTOES. 
 
 276. Who considered independent contractor. 
 
 277. Contractors distinguished from employees. 
 
 278. Owner not liable for negligence of contractor. 
 
 279. Acts of contractor's employees. 
 
 280. How existence of relation determined. 
 
 281. Franchise cannot be devolved upon contractor. 
 
 282. Where contractor performs nondelegable duty. 
 
 283. Railway company retaining control or supervision of work. 
 
 284. Where work is inherently dangerous. 
 
 285. Contract for performance of unlawful acts. 
 
 286. Where injury is caused by defective plana. 
 
 287. Acceptance of defective work by contractee. 
 
 288. Appliances furnished by railroad company. 
 
 289. Joint undertaking renders either party liable. 
 
 290. Status of contractor and subcontractor. 
 
 291. Tortious acts of contractor, generally. 
 
 292. Contract between construction Company and railroad com- 
 pany. 
 
 293. 'Management of trains by construction company. 
 
 294. Injuries from frightening teams. 
 
 295. Injuries to passengers by independent contractor. 
 
 296. Injuries to travelers in streets. 
 
 297. Injuries to employees of contractor. 
 
 298. Negligence of railway surgeons. 
 
 299. Railroad hospital — Physicians company agents, when. 
 
 300. Contracts exempting railroad company from liability. 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 INJURIES TO INFANT EMPLOYEES. 
 
 301. How minority affects right of recovery. 
 
 302. Infant representing himself of age. 
 
 303. Employment in violation of parent's instruction. 
 
 304. Damages for death of infant. 
 
 305. Measure of parent's recovery for injury or death of. 
 
 306. Infant's recovery for death of .parent. 
 
 307. Employment a.b0ut daiigerous machinery. 
 
 XV 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 308. When warning is required. 
 
 309. What warning sufficient. 
 
 310. What risks are assumed by infants. 
 
 311. Same — Eisks beyond scope of employment. 
 
 312. Injuries from negligence of coemployees. 
 
 313. Contributory negligence of infants. 
 
 314. Releases by infant employees. 
 
 CHAPTEK XIV. 
 
 HISKS ASSUMED BT EMPLOYEES. 
 
 j 315. Basis of rule of assumption of risks. 
 
 316. Volunteers generally held to assume risks. 
 
 317. Dangers from employer's negligence assumed in some States. 
 
 318. Risks assumed by minors. 
 
 319. Risks from destructive natural sources assumed. 
 
 320. Where work changes the place. 
 
 321. Risks incident to employment are assumed. 
 
 322. Scope and extent of rule. 
 
 323. Illustrations of incidental risks assumed. 
 
 324. Injuries from low bridges, when assumed. 
 
 325. Injuries from properly constructed tracks, switches and cattle 
 
 guards. 
 
 326. Bisks from structures near track, assumed, when. 
 
 327. Eisks from handling machinery, assumed, when. 
 
 328. Risks from movement of trains in company yards assumed. 
 
 329. Risks from excessive speed assumed, in some States. 
 
 330. Flying switch — Shunting cars. 
 
 331. Jerks from taking up slack assumed. 
 
 332. Risks from improperly loaded cars. 
 
 333. Collisions with cattle or teams. 
 
 334. Injuries from use of snow plows — Bucking snow. 
 
 335. Dangers in coupling cars. 
 
 336. Known and obvious risks. 
 
 337. Presumed to know what could be observed. 
 
 338. Risks from open defects in cars assumed, when. 
 
 339. Injuries from lifting cars, rails, etc., assumed. 
 
 340. Working after notice of defect and knowledge of danger. 
 
 341. Notice with dangers connected with place of work, assumed, 
 
 when. 
 
 342. Dangers from open culverts assumed, when. 
 
 343. Notice of defects in machinery and appliances, assumed, when. 
 
 344. Employee with equal knowledge assumes risks, 
 xvi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 345. Extra risks assumed, when. 
 
 346. Extra risks from defective bridges, assumed, when. 
 
 347. Extra risks from operation of cars, assumed, when. 
 
 348. Extra dangers in use of defective cars, assumed, when. 
 
 349. Dangers outside scope of employment, assumed, when. 
 
 350. Dangers from obeying orders of coemployees, assumed, when. 
 
 351. Eisks assumed, notwithstanding promise of repair. 
 
 352. Risks assumed by car and track repairers. 
 
 353. Various injuries due to caving earth banks assumed. 
 
 354. Eisks from negligence of coemployees, assumed, at common 
 
 law. 
 
 355. Additional risks from inclement weather assumed. 
 
 356. Obvious dangers from violation of statutes, assumed, in some 
 
 States. 
 
 357. Risks of accidents are assumed. 
 
 358. Selecting more dangerous way. 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 EISKS NOT ASSUMED BY EMPLOYEES. 
 
 359. Limitations and exceptions to rule. 
 
 360. Risks from negligence not assumed, 
 
 361. Injury in negligent collision not assumed. 
 
 362. Section man working in cut does not assume risks, when. 
 
 363. Injury to brakeman from wild engine, not assumed, when. 
 
 364. Injuries to brakemen and others, handling cars, not assumed, 
 
 when. 
 
 365. Dangerous working place — Caving earth bank. 
 
 366. When risk of injury from low bridges not assumed. 
 
 367. Injury from defective track, not assumed, when. 
 
 368. Injuries from running into open switches. 
 
 369. Injuries from obstructions near track, not assumed, when. 
 
 370. Risks from defective cars, not assumed, when. 
 
 371. Risks from too great speed, not assumed. 
 
 372. Danger must be appreciated, before risk assumed. 
 
 373. Dangers not appreciated or understood, generally not assumed. 
 
 374. Injuries from latent, unknown defects, not generally assumed. 
 
 375. Risks not assumed after promise to repair, when. 
 
 376. Various risks not assumed, after promise to repair. 
 
 377. Extra risks not generally assumed. 
 
 378. Risks outside scope of employment, not generally assumed. 
 
 379. Dangers from orders of vice-principal not assumed. 
 
 380. Risks not assumed by car and track repairers. 
 
 xvii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 § 381. Risks of injuries due to incompetency of employees not as- 
 sumed. 
 
 382. Statutes denying defense of assumed risk. 
 
 383. Statutes regulating defense of assumed risk. 
 
 384. Injuries from flying particles of brittle substances not as- 
 
 sumed, when. 
 
 385. Federal statutes exempting employees of inter-state carriers 
 
 from defense of assumed risks. 
 
 386. Statutes exempting employees from risks of negligence of 
 
 coemployees. 
 
 387. Assumption of risk jury issue, when. 
 
 CHAPTEE XVI. 
 
 CONTEIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OP EMPLOYEES. 
 
 388. Explanation of the defense. 
 
 389. Not confined to parties occupying special relations. 
 
 390. Mutual negligence bars recovery. 
 
 391. Reason for rule denying recovery in such case. 
 
 392. Limits and exceptions to the rule. 
 
 393. Concurrent causes never relieve negligent party. 
 
 394. Ordinary care the test. 
 
 395. Any negligence, contributing to injury, bars recoveiy, 
 
 396. Negligence must contribute proximately to injury. 
 
 397. Illustratioa of proximate and remote negligence. 
 
 398. Doctrine, of last clear chance. 
 
 399. Employee must use ordinary prudence. 
 
 400. Voluntarily selecting more dangerous way. 
 
 401. Effect of employee's negligence. 
 
 402. Contributory negligence of volunteer. 
 
 403. Effect of plaintiff's lack of skill. 
 404i As a defense to statutory negligence. 
 
 405. When intoxication bars recovery. 
 
 406. Remaining in service involving danger. 
 
 407. Employee may assume employer's performance of duty. 
 
 408. Du<y to look and listen for trains. 
 
 409. Failure to guard against known dangers. 
 
 410. Voluntarily assuming position of peril. 
 
 411. Crossing track in front of train. 
 
 412. Standing or walking upon track. 
 
 413. Walking or standing near the track. 
 
 414. Climbing over stationary cars. 
 
 415. Under cars or locomotives, 
 xviii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 416. Crossing bridge in front of train. 
 
 417. Sleeping upon or near tailroad track. 
 
 418. Walking in dangerous place in. dark. 
 
 419. Failure to discover defects in appliances. 
 
 420. Failure to keep appliances under employee's car, in repair. 
 
 421. Unauthorized, use of appliances. 
 
 422. Acts in emergencies or situations of peril. 
 
 423. Collisions due to engineer's negligence. 
 
 424. Injuries from obstructions near the track. 
 
 425. Striking overhead bridge. 
 
 426. Running at immoderate rate of speed. 
 
 427. Injuries from observance or nonobservance of, signals. 
 
 428. Riding in dangerous places. 
 
 429. Boarding moving cars or engines. 
 
 430. Jumping from moving car or engine. 
 
 431. Injuries from loading and unloading cars. 
 
 432. Negligence in operation of hand cars or tricycles. 
 
 433. Kegligence in coupling and uncoupling cars. 
 
 434. Violation of rules in coupling cars. 
 
 43d. Injuries in making couplings, while violating orders. 
 
 436. Employee falling from moving car or engine. 
 
 437. Negligence in disobedience of rules, generally. 
 
 438. Violation of particular rules. 
 
 439. Disobedience of special orders. 
 
 440. Contributory negligence of infant employees. 
 
 441. Pleading contributory negligence. 
 
 442. Contributory negligence as question of law or fact. 
 
 CHAPTER XVII. 
 
 COMPAEATIVE NEGLIGENCEt 
 
 443. Doctrine not generally recognized. 
 
 444. The rule stated. 
 
 445. Origin of the doctrine. 
 
 446. Rule generally denied in the United States. 
 
 447. Burden of proof on the plaintiff. 
 
 448. Act of Congress establishing, as to interstate carriers. 
 
 449. Conflicting decisions concerning, by federal courts. 
 
 450. Held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. 
 
 451. The rule in Georgia, Illinois, Tennessee and other States. 
 
 452. Doctrine limited by late case, in Georgia. 
 
 453. Plaintiff must have exercised "ordinary care, in Illinois. 
 
 454. Rule formedy. obtained in Kansas. 
 
 xix 
 
TABLE OP CONTENTS. 
 
 455. Plaintiflf's negligence " slight " and defendant's " gross.' 
 
 456. When both parties equally negligent. 
 
 457. In case of injuries to passengers. 
 
 458. Injuries at highway crossings. 
 
 459. Instructions on comparative negligence. 
 
 460. Comparative negligence generally a jury issue. 
 
 CHAPTEK XVIII. 
 
 COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON lAW. 
 
 461. Eule of nonliability for negligence of. 
 
 462. Reason for the rule. 
 
 463. Conflict of laws regarding. 
 
 464. Negligence of coemployee an assumed risk. 
 
 465. Scope and extent of the rule. 
 
 466. Volunteer subject to rule. 
 
 467. Illustrations of rule — Erecting scaffolds, repairing bridges, etc. 
 
 468. Negligent operation of engine. ' 
 
 469. Collisions between trains and cars. 
 
 470. Limitations upon rule of nonliability for coemployee's neglect. 
 
 471. Company's negligence concurring to produce injury. 
 
 472. Vice-principal's negligence not assumed. 
 
 473. Character of act determines employer's liability. 
 
 474. Promises or assurances of vice-principal. 
 
 475. Notice to vice-principal, notice to employer. 
 
 476. Dual capacity doctrine. 
 
 477. The department doctrine. 
 
 478. Objections to the department doctrine. 
 
 479. Employees in separate departments. 
 
 480. Employees in same department. 
 
 481. Employees of different companies. 
 
 482. Injuries due to incompetency of employees. 
 
 483. Liability for retention of incompetent or intemperate employees. 
 
 484. Who generally deemed coemployees. 
 
 485. Nature of service the proper test. 
 
 486. Division superintendent, road-master and other division officers... 
 
 487. Employees upon different railroad trains. 
 
 488. Train despatcher and other employees. 
 
 489. Local telegraph operator and other trainmen. 
 
 490. Switchmen, track repairers and trainmen. 
 
 491. Conductors and other employees. 
 
 492. Engineer and other employees on same train. 
 XX 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 § 493. Yardmen, switchmen and other employees. 
 
 494. Status of car inspectors and repairers. 
 
 495. Section foreman and section men. 
 
 496. Flagman and trainmen. 
 
 497. Pullman conductor and porter. 
 
 498. Track repairers and trainmen. 
 
 499. Station agent and other railway employees. 
 
 500. Status of various other employees, in different departments. 
 
 CHAPTEE XIX. 
 
 STATUTES ABOLISHING THE COMMON LAW. 
 
 § 501. Objects and reason's for legislation affecting employers and 
 employees. 
 
 502. Objections to such legislation. 
 
 503. History of legislation regarding. 
 
 504. Constitutionality of such statutes. 
 
 505. Extraterritorial effect of such statutes. 
 
 506. Contracts in contravention .of statutes. 
 
 507. Actions for death, due to eoemployee's negligence. 
 
 508. Injuries received while obeying employer's rules. 
 
 509. Injuries due to negligence of superintendent. 
 
 510. Person controlling car, train, or locomotive. 
 
 511. Negligence of employee controlling any signal, point, or.switoh. 
 
 512. Liability for defects in " ways, works, machinery, or plant." 
 
 513. Statute of Alabama. 
 
 514. The statute of Arkansas. 
 
 515. The civil code of California. 
 
 516. Colorado laws. 
 
 517. Statute of Connecticut. 
 
 518. Florida statute. 
 
 519. The Georgia code. 
 
 520. The safety appliance act of Illinois. 
 
 521. The Indiana statute. 
 
 522. The statute of Iowa. 
 
 523. The general statutes of Kansas. 
 
 524. Kentucky statutes. 
 
 525. The code of Louisiana. 
 
 526. The revised laws of Massachusetts. 
 
 527. Laws of Minnesota. 
 
 528. Laws of Mississippi. 
 
 529. The statute of Missouri. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 530. The Montana code and constitution. 
 
 531. The statute in Nebraska. 
 
 532. The legislation in Nevada. 
 
 533. The laws of New Mexico. 
 
 534. The New York statute. 
 
 535. The North Carolina laws. 
 
 536. The North Dakota code. 
 
 537. The annotated statutes of Ohio. 
 
 538. Constitution of Oklahoma. 
 
 539. Legislation of Oregon. 
 
 540. ^legislation of Pennsylvania. 
 
 541. The Constitution of South Carolina! 
 
 542. South Dakota legislation. 
 
 543. The laws of Texas. 
 
 544. The Federal Employer's Liability Act. 
 
 545. -The United States Safety Appliance Act. 
 
 546. The law of Vermont. 
 
 547. The Virginia Constitution. 
 
 548. The statute of Washington. 
 
 549. The statute of Wisconsin. 
 
 550. The Constitution of Wyoming. 
 
 VOLUME II. 
 
 INJURIES TO PASSENGERS, LICENSEES, AND 
 TRESPASSERS. 
 
 CHAPTER XX. 
 
 THE RELATION OF CAEEIEE AND PASSENGER, GENERALLY. 
 
 551. Who considered passenger carrier. 
 
 552. Who deemed passenger, in law. 
 
 553. Presumption that one is a passenger. 
 
 554. How the relation is created. 
 
 555. Payment of fare, or purchase of ticket. 
 
 556. When relation of passenger begins. 
 
 557. When the relation terminates. 
 
 558. Passenger reaching flifst destination, remaining on train. 
 
 559. Children riding without payment of fare. 
 
 560. Persons riding on wrong train. 
 
 561. Employees' permission to enter train, 
 xxii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 562. Persons riding freight trains or hand cars. 
 
 563. Mail agents held to be passengers. 
 
 564. Express messengers, 
 
 565. Employees, of sleeping car company. 
 
 566. News agents and fruit venders. 
 
 567. Drover traveling with stock." 
 
 568. Employees riding to and from work, 
 
 569. Passenger assisting carrier's employees. 
 
 570. Persons accompanying passengers on train. 
 
 571. Persons obtaining transportation by fraud. 
 
 CHAPTER XXI. 
 
 DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF PASSENGEE CAEEIEBS. 
 
 572. Obligations arising by implication of law. 
 
 573. Carrier not liable as insurer. 
 
 574. Negligence essential to liability. 
 
 575. What constitutes negligence toward passenger. 
 
 576. Presumptions of negligence, in actions by passengers. 
 
 577. Negligence must be proximate cause of injury. 
 
 578. Highest degree of care exacted. 
 
 579. Exceptions to the rule of extraordinary care. 
 
 580. More than ordinary care required. 
 
 581. Liable for slight negligence. 
 
 582. Care such as used by -prudent persons. 
 
 583. Care proportionate to mode of conveyance adopted. 
 
 584. When ordinary care sufficient. 
 
 585. Carrier only held to ordinary care, in England. 
 
 586. Duty toward sick, or insane passengers. 
 
 587. Care toward women and children. 
 
 588. Care toward intoxicated passengers. 
 598. Duty to emploiy competent employees. 
 
 590. Negligence of employees. 
 
 591. Negligence of strangers — Missile thrown through window. 
 
 592. Inevitable accident, or act of God. 
 
 CHAPTEE XXII. 
 
 THE EOADBED AJTD TRACK. 
 
 593. Duty regarding generally. 
 
 594. Degree of care required. 
 
 595. Inspection of track. 
 
 xxiii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 596. Care such as used by cautious persons. 
 
 597. Care in selecting materials. 
 
 598. Liability for injuries caused by defective track. 
 
 599. Negligence presumed, from defective roadway. 
 
 600. Condition of rails and cross-ties. 
 
 601. Care of embankments and cuts. 
 
 602. Failure to fence track. 
 
 603. Duty to provide against ordinary rainfall. 
 
 604. Extraordinary floods. 
 
 605. Duty as to bridges and trestles. 
 
 606. Inspection of bridges. 
 
 607. Care of switches. 
 
 608. Derailment establishes prima facie case. 
 
 609. Landslide raises no presumption of negligence. 
 
 610. Landslide, due to ordinary raiiifall. 
 
 611. Obstructions on or near the track. 
 
 612. Kock falling on track. 
 
 613. Collisions due to slippery rails. 
 
 614. Broken rail — When evidence of negligence. 
 
 615. Spread ox bent rail, causing derailment. 
 
 616. Duty to keep track in repair.. 
 
 617. Care of double track roads. 
 
 618. Acts of public enemy. 
 
 CHAPTEK XXIII. 
 
 STATIONS AND APPEOACHES. 
 
 619. Duty regarding generally. 
 
 620. Degree of care required. 
 
 621. Waiting room for passengers. 
 622: Failure to heat waiting room. 
 
 623. Duty regarding toilet rooms. 
 
 624. Station blown down by storm. 
 
 625. Failure to light station and platform. 
 
 626. Defective platforms, generally. 
 
 627. Collisions with baggage trucks. 
 
 628. Passenger struck by mail sacks. 
 
 629. Defects in premises near station. 
 
 630. Approaches and passageways. 
 
 631. Placing cars across approach to station. 
 
 632; Punning engine or cars between passenger train and station. 
 633. Injuries by falling into cattle guards. 
 
 xxiv 
 
JEiBLE 01- CON.IENXS. 
 
 CHAPTER XXIV. 
 
 CABS, ENGINES AND APPLIANC'BS. 
 
 634. Care to provide. 
 
 635. Bule applied by Supreme Court. 
 
 636. Duty may be enforced by mandamus. 
 
 637. Inspection of cars and engines. 
 
 638. Obligation assumed by company furnishing jnotive power. 
 
 639. Duty to adopt new improvements. 
 
 640. Liability for defective cars or appliances. 
 
 641. Injury from defect in, establishes prima facie case. 
 
 642. Latent defects in. 
 
 643. Carrier's responsibility for negligence of manufacturer. 
 
 644. No liability, on principle, without personal negligence of carrier. 
 
 645. Vehicles or cars owned by others. 
 
 646. Must provide safe place for passenger to ride. 
 
 647. Duty tOj heat coach — Other accommodations. 
 
 648. Injury from failure to light coaches. 
 
 649. Car windows and doors. 
 
 650. Defective baggage-racks, chandeliers, etc. 
 65 L Platforms and steps to cars. 
 
 652. Condition of car wheels. 
 
 653. Insufficient car axles. 
 
 654. Defective brakes. 
 
 655. Iijjury due to defective couplings. , 
 
 656. Duty to provide spark arresters. 
 
 CHAPTER XXV. 
 
 NEGLIGENCE IN THE EQUIPMENT AND OPEEATION OF TEAINS. 
 
 § 657. Care in the equipment and operation of trains, generally. 
 
 658. Bules and regulations governing passengers. 
 
 659. Passengers' notice and violation of rules. 
 
 660. Duty to employ competent employees. 
 
 661. Excessive rate of speed. 
 
 662. Injury from negligent delay in transportation. 
 
 663. Injuries from exposure to weather. 
 
 664. Unusual jerks or jars, in starting or stopping passenger trains. 
 
 665. Same — Injury from, establishes prima facie case. 
 
 666. Same — ^Injury to feeble passenger by jerks or jolts. 
 
 XXV 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 667. Same— Jerks and jolts during transit. 
 
 668. Formation of mixed trains — Statutes controlling. 
 
 669. Care toward passengers on freight trains. 
 
 670. No negligence inferred from jerks or jolts on freight trains. 
 
 671. Duty to give signals. 
 
 672. Running trains too close together. 
 
 673. Operating trains out of time. 
 
 674. Collisions of trains on same track. 
 
 675. Collisions at intersections of two railroads. 
 
 676. Injury from projection on passing train. 
 
 677. Injuries by articles thrown from train. 
 
 678. Care to avoid obstructions. 
 
 679. Injuries from collisions w^ith cattle. 
 
 680. Injury due to overloaded coach. 
 
 681. Injuries from snow and ice on car platforms. 
 
 682. Shutting door on passenger's hand. 
 
 683. Passengers injured while on roads of other companies. 
 
 CHAPTEK XXVI. 
 
 INJURIES IN BOAEDING TRAINS. 
 
 684. Degree of care required. 
 
 685. Reasonable time to enter train. 
 
 686. Failure to stop train at station. 
 
 687. Law exacts reasonable delay only. 
 
 688. Appliances for boarding trains. 
 
 689. Approach and ingress to train. 
 
 690. Duty to furnish seat for passenger. 
 
 691. Moving train while passenger is getting on. 
 
 692. Boarding a moving train. 
 
 693. Same — Negligence in boarding train, when on direction of 
 
 conductor. 
 
 694. No duty to assist passenger to board train, when. 
 
 695. Same — In case of feeble or disabled passenger. 
 
 696. Negligence in assisting passenger. 
 
 697. Aitnouncement or direction to enter train. 
 
 698. Same — Authority of employee of freight train, must be shown. 
 
 699. Invitation to enter cars — Calling "All aboard." 
 
 700. Signals and warnings to passengers boarding trains. 
 
 701. Same — Signals by third persons. 
 
 702. Accidental injuries in boarding cars, assumed. 
 
 XXVI 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTEE XXVII. 
 
 INJTJBIES IN ALIGHTING FEOM TEAINS. 
 
 703. Duty to carry to destination. 
 
 704. Duty to announce stations. 
 
 705. No duty to awaken sleeping passengers. 
 
 706. Duty to stop train at station platform. 
 
 707. Train should be entirely stopped. 
 
 708. Reasonable time to aligbt. 
 
 709. Sick, young or disabled passengers. 
 
 710. Place of egress. 
 
 711. Safe platforms and appliances for alighting. 
 
 712. Same -^ At flag stations. 
 
 713. Assisting passengers to alight. 
 
 714. Warning or instructing passengers of dangers in alighting. 
 
 715. Alighting from moving train. 
 
 716. Alighting from moving train presumptively negligent. 
 
 717. Same — To avoid being carried by station. 
 
 718. Same — Rate of speed as determining negligence of act. 
 
 719. Compelling passenger to alight from train in motion. 
 
 720. Same — In front of train on parallel track. 
 
 721. Starting train while passenger is alighting. 
 
 722. Jerking train while passenger is alighting. 
 
 723. Starting train after reasonable time. 
 
 724. Putting passenger off away from station. 
 
 725. Care toward passengers alighting from freight trains. 
 
 726. Passengers pushed from trains by fellow passengers. 
 
 CHAPTEE XXVIII. 
 
 INJURIES TO PASSENGEES BY EMPLOYEES. 
 
 727. Ground of carrier's liability for. 
 
 728. Liability for torts of employees, generally.. 
 
 729. Wrongful ejection of passenger. 
 
 730. Ejection of sick or disorderly passengers. 
 
 731. Injury from ejection at dangerous place. 
 
 732. Ejecting passenger from moving train. 
 
 733. Injury from excessive force in ejecting, passenger. 
 
 734. Injury must be direct result of wrongful ejection. 
 
 735. Acts within and beyond scope of employment. 
 
 736. What acts of employees within scope of employment. 
 
 xxvii 
 
TABLE -OB' CONTEUTB, 
 
 737. Liability for assaults generally. 
 
 738. Assaults on female passengers. 
 
 739. Punitive damagep for insults or assaults. 
 
 740. Sportive acts or employees. 
 
 741. Communication of contagious disease. 
 
 CHAPTER XXIX. 
 
 INJUEIES BY FELLOW PASSEiNGEKS. 
 
 742. Protection from, generally. 
 
 743. Basis of carrier's liability in such cases. 
 
 744. Degree of care required. 
 
 745. Turbulent or violent passengers should be removed. 
 
 746. Acts of drunken or disorderly passengers. 
 
 747. Discharge of firearms. 
 
 748. Acts of insane passengers. 
 
 749. Liability for assaults by fellow passengers. 
 
 750. Rape committed by fellow passenger. 
 
 751. • Altercations between employees and passengers. 
 
 752. Missile thrown by fellow passenger. 
 
 753. Carrier's knowledge of threatened danger. 
 
 754. Duty of injured passenger to claim carrier's protection. 
 
 755. Passenger with contagious disease. 
 
 756. Right of colored passenger to protection. 
 
 CHAPTER XXX. 
 
 WRONGFUL ACTS OF STKANGEES. 
 
 757. Liability for, generally. 
 
 758. Degree of care to prevent. 
 
 759. No presumption of negligence. 
 
 760. Wrong must have been anticipated. 
 
 761. Assaults that could have been prevented. 
 
 762. Assaults that were not anticipated. 
 
 763. Injuries from stones or missiles. 
 
 764. Throwing switch — Derailment of train. 
 
 765. Obstructions on track. 
 
 766. Violence of intruders at railway stations. 
 
 767. Acts of mob. 
 
 XXVlll 
 
TABLE OP CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTEK XXXI. 
 
 OOHTEIBITTOET NEGLIGESTCE OF PASSENGBiES. 
 
 768. The rule, generally. 
 
 769. Care demanded of passenger. 
 
 770. Passengers under disability. 
 
 771. Must directly contribute to injury. 
 
 772. Boarding wrong car or train. 
 
 773. Disobedience of carrier's rules. 
 
 774. Passing from one car to another. 
 
 775. Crossing track in front of approaching car. 
 
 776. Passengers crossing steam and street railroad tracks. 
 
 777. Riding on freight trains. 
 
 778. Care in boarding cars. 
 
 779. Boarding train in improper manner. 
 
 780. Entering train from wrong side. 
 
 781. Boarding train at improper time. 
 
 782. Boarding train away from station. 
 
 783. Boarding moving trains. 
 
 784. Train moving slowly. 
 
 785. Care in alighting from train. 
 
 786. Alighting on wrong side of train. 
 
 787. Alighting away from station platform. 
 
 788. Alighting from moving train. 
 
 789. Speed* of train as affecting negligence in alighting. 
 
 790. Alighting from moving train at improper time. 
 
 791. Alighting on command of employees. 
 
 792. Jumping to avoid imminent peril. 
 
 793. C^,re in or about station. 
 
 794. Use of premises not intended for passengers' use. 
 
 795. Standing or walking on or near track. 
 
 796. Selecting unsafe place to ride. 
 
 797. Riding on car or engine. 
 
 798. Riding in cupola of caboose. 
 
 799. Standing up in oar. 
 
 800. Standing in car while switching is being done. 
 
 801. Riding on platform of car. 
 
 802. Riding with limbs projecting from window. 
 
 803. Riding in baggage or express car. 
 
 804. Passing between or over stationary cars. 
 
 805. When intoxication a defense. 
 
 806. Conduct in emergencies. 
 
 807. Obeying directions of employees. 
 
 808. Recovery notwithstanding contributory negligence. 
 
 xxix 
 
TABLE OF COBTTiafTS, 
 
 CHAPTEE XXXII. 
 
 LIABILITY OF CONNECTING CAEEIEES. 
 
 I 809. Liability of one carrier for injury on line of another. 
 
 810. Liability of initial carrier, 
 
 811. Carrier using another carrier's facilities or employees. 
 
 812. Injury in car on side track of connecting road. 
 
 813. Liability of carrier having running powers. 
 
 814. Employing another to carry out contract with carrier. 
 
 815. Liability of owner of road or premises. 
 
 816. Liability of company using another's road. 
 
 817. Liability of lessee. 
 
 818. Companies guilty of concurrent negligence. 
 
 819. Stipulations limiting liability of carrier. 
 
 CHAPTEE XXXIII. 
 
 PLEADING ACTIONS FOE INJUEIES TO PASSENGEES. 
 
 820. Relation of passenger must be alleged. 
 
 821. Carrier's negligence must be alleged. 
 
 822. Setting out negligence of railroad company. 
 
 823. General and specific allegations of negligence. 
 
 824. That plaintiff was rightfully on train. • 
 
 825. Negligence in assisting passenger to board train. 
 
 826. Injury due to bad track. 
 
 827. Negligence in management of train. 
 
 828. Failure to heat train. 
 
 829. In actions for assaults. 
 
 830. Failure to provide facilities for alighting. 
 
 831. -Jerking train while passenger alighting. 
 
 832. Failure to stop train at proper place. 
 
 833. Negativing contributory negligence. 
 
 834. Setting up limitations on liability. 
 
 CHAPTEE XXXIV, 
 
 INSTEUCTIONS IN ACTIONS BY PASSENGEES. 
 
 835. On degree of care on carrier's part. 
 
 836. Presumption of negligence from accident. 
 
 837. On burden of proof. 
 XXX 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 838. Defining the term " negligence." 
 
 839. That carrier -is not an Insurer. 
 
 840. Duty toward passenger alighting. 
 
 841. Safety of appliances for alighting from cars. 
 
 842. On contributory negligence of passenger. 
 
 843. Assuming notice of danger of person injured. 
 
 844. On violation of rules. 
 
 845. Confusing recoveries under di£ferent statutes. 
 
 846. Inconsistent instructions. 
 
 CHAPTER XXXV. 
 
 LIMITATIONS OF CAEEIEBS' LIABILITY. 
 
 847. Liability may be confined to own line. 
 
 848. Consideration for limitation of liability. 
 
 849. Limitations inust be reasonable. 
 
 850. Contracts limiting liability for negligence. 
 
 851. Duty and liability toward pass-holder. 
 
 852. Limitations in gratuitous passes. 
 
 853. By printed notices. 
 
 854. Bisks of riding on freight trains. 
 
 855. Contracts of express messengers. 
 
 856. Drovers' passes. 
 
 857. Contracts of mail' agents, 
 
 858. Confiict of laws. 
 
 CHAPTEE XXXVI. 
 
 INJUEIES TO LICENSEES. 
 
 859. Who are licensees, generally. 
 
 860. Duty toward licensees, generally. 
 
 861. Duty toward, further considered. 
 
 862. Duty to maintain premises in safe condition. 
 
 863. Risks assumed by licensees. 
 
 864. Persons working on premises of company. 
 
 865. Persons using premises by invitation. 
 
 866. Persons loading or unloading cars. 
 
 867. Persons accompanying passengers. 
 
 868. Passengers visiting portion of premises not open to public. 
 
 869. Persons on trains. 
 
 870. No invitation implied in absence of mutual interest. 
 
 xxxi 
 
TABXE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 871. Persons having business with the carrier's employees. 
 
 872. Persons using premises for their own convenience. 
 
 873. Persons habitually using railroad premises. 
 
 874. People crossing track. 
 
 875. Using railroad track as footway. 
 
 876. Contributory negligence of licensee. 
 
 CHAPTEE XXXVIL 
 
 IN JUEIES AT GRADE CEOSSINGS. 
 
 877. Care to be observed by railroad company. 
 
 878. Reciprocal care imposed upon company and traveling public. 
 
 879. What constitutes a public crossing. 
 
 880. Care required in cities. 
 
 881. Private or farm crossings. 
 
 882. When railroad entitled to right of way. 
 
 883. Employees may assume that person vrill leave track, when. 
 
 884. -Collisions with teams, generally. 
 
 885. Striking teams that are stalled. 
 
 886. Frightening horses at crossings. 
 
 887. Injuries due to improper appliances on cars. 
 
 888. Two trains operated close together across highway. 
 
 889. When negligence of railroad company a jury issue. 
 
 CHAPTEE XXXVIII. 
 
 INJUEIES AT OVEEHEAD CEOSSINGS AND SUBWAYS. 
 
 890. Liability for defective under-erossings. 
 
 891. No warning necessary at overhead crossing — Massachusetts 
 
 rule. 
 
 892. No duty to give warning at overhead crossing, in Wisconsin. 
 
 893. The reason for the distinction considered. 
 
 894. Same — The rule in Pennsylvania. 
 
 895. A contrary doctrine recognized in Pennsylvania. 
 
 896. The contrary view — Cases holding warning at overhead cross- 
 
 ing necessary. 
 
 897. Signals required at overhead crossings, in California, 
 
 898. Warnings necessary in New York. 
 
 899. Warning required in Kentucky. 
 
 900. Warning required, under Ohio statute. 
 
 901. The rule followed in Tennessee. 
 
 902. Failure to stop, look or listen in approaching. 
 xxxii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTEE XXXIX. 
 
 INJUEIES AT DEFECTIVE CBOSSINGS. 
 
 903. Duty of railroad company in maintenance of. crossings. 
 
 904. Obligation extends to approaches. 
 
 905. Liability to municipality for failure to maintain. 
 
 906. When turnpike company liable for. 
 
 907. Defective, under-crossing — When company not liable. 
 
 908. Duty as to private crossings. 
 
 909. Liability for defective or obstructed crossings. 
 
 910. Neglect of statutory duty regarding. 
 
 911. Baising track above street. 
 
 912. Failure to light obstructed crossing at night. 
 
 913. Failure to restore crossing. 
 
 914. Changing or diverting highway crossings. 
 
 915. When company's negligence a jury issue. 
 
 CHAPTEE XL 
 
 MAINTENANCE OF GATES AND SIGNS. 
 
 916. No duty to erect gates at common law. 
 
 917. Signs should be maintained, independent of statute. 
 
 918. City ordinances requiring maintenance of gates.. 
 
 919. Open gate an invitation to cross track. 
 
 920. Traveler may rely upon gate, when. 
 
 921. Care exacted of traveler where gates are maintained. 
 
 922. Open gate will not excuse traveler's negligence. 
 
 923. Gates should be closed, when trains passing. 
 
 924. Negligence of gate-keeper — Motioning traveler to cross. 
 
 925. Striking traveler with. gate. 
 
 926. Gate opened by third party. 
 
 927. Liability of different companies, maintaining gate. 
 
 928. One company using track of another company. 
 
 929. Crossing gates at private ways. 
 
 930. Jury issues in actions regarding. 
 
 CHAPTEE XLL. 
 
 MAINTENANCE OF FLAGMEN AND .WATCHMEN. 
 
 i 931. Duty to employ generally. 
 932. Not required at common law. 
 
 xxxiii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 933. Duty to maintain may exist, independent of statute. 
 
 934. Ordinances requiring. 
 
 935. Absence of, competent on issue of negligence, when. 
 
 936. At country road crossings. 
 
 937. At crossing of city streets. 
 
 938. Where crossing is unusually dangerous. 
 
 939. When custom binds company to maintain. 
 
 940. Negligence of flagman, generally. 
 
 941. Absence of flagmari invitation to cross. 
 
 942. Backing trains across street, in absence of flagman. 
 
 943. When traveler may assume track is clear. 
 
 944. One company using another company's track. 
 
 945. Duty to maintain, as jury issue. 
 
 CHAPTEE XLIL 
 
 USE OF SIGNALS AND LOOKOUTS. 
 
 i 946. At common law. *" 
 
 947. General, duty to keep lookout. 
 
 948. Ordinances requiring. 
 
 949. Constitutionality, of statutes requiring. 
 
 950. Effect of violating such statutes. 
 
 951. General object of such statutes. 
 
 952. What trains required to give signals, generally. 
 
 953. Failure to signal at cros,sing, negligence. 
 
 954. Failure to signal — When traveler may assume track is clear. 
 
 955. Kind of signals to be given. 
 
 956. When statute Is in the alternative. 
 
 957. When view of track is obstructed. 
 
 958. Giving signals at improper place. 
 
 959. When other precautions required. 
 
 960. Statutes apply to What. roads. 
 
 961. What are public highways, generally. 
 
 962. Signals not required at. private crossings, generally. 
 
 963. Mutual care required .of traveler and. railroad company. 
 
 964. Who may complain of failure to give signals. 
 
 965. Persons walking on or along track. 
 
 966. Persons who know train approaching, not entitled to. 
 
 967. Trespassers and others on railroad track. 
 
 968. Injuries near crossings. 
 
 969. Frightening horses by failure to give . signals, 
 
 970. No duty to check speed, after, giving signals. 
 xxxiv 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 971. Burden of proof. 
 
 972. Negative and positive evidence to establish^ 
 
 973. Instructions concerning duty of. 
 
 974. Jury issues regarding. 
 
 CHAPTEE XLIII. 
 
 EXCESSIVE SPEED AT CROSSINGS. 
 
 975. Common law duty regarding. 
 
 976. Constitutionality of statutes regulating. 
 
 977. Ordinances regulating. 
 
 • 978. General observations concerning. 
 
 979. Ordinary care required. 
 
 980. When excessive speed evidence of negligence. 
 
 981. When speed so great as to render signals useless. 
 
 982. What speed, generally, will be held to be excessive. 
 
 983. When special circumstances require slower trains. 
 
 984. When persons using crossings, may assume speed lawful. 
 985; Speed in cities. 
 
 986; Speed in towns and villages. 
 
 987. Speed of trains at country road crossings. 
 
 988. At dangerous crossings. 
 
 989. Jury issues ' regarding. 
 
 CHAPTER XLIV, 
 
 CONTEIBUTOET NEGLIGENCE OF TEAVELER ON HIGHWAY, 
 
 § 990. General rules underlying. 
 
 991. Care required from traveler In going on track. 
 
 992. Care required of persons under disability. 
 
 993. Where traveler is partially blind. 
 
 994. Traveler's negligence, contributing to injury, bars recovery. 
 
 995. Mutual care to be observed. - 
 
 996. Traveler's negligence must proximately contribute to injury. 
 
 997. How far traveler may assume train will be properly operated. 
 
 998. Place of crossing track. 
 
 999. Failure to observe or heed signals. 
 
 1000. How far traveler may presume that signals will be given. 
 
 1001. Absence of flagman evidence of negligence. 
 
 1002. Open gate an invitation to cross track. 
 
 XXXV 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 1003. The duty to stop, look and listen. 
 
 1004. Care to be observed in looking and listening. 
 
 1005. Traveler should look in both directions. 
 
 1006. Failure to look and listen is negligence, when. 
 
 1007. Looking for special trains, or those out of time. 
 
 1008. Failure to look and listen not affected by company's negli- 
 
 gence. 
 
 1009. Duty to look and listen not affected by failure to give signals. 
 
 1010. Failure to maintain flagman does not afiect duty to look 
 
 and listen. 
 
 1011. Speed of train does not affect duty to look and listen. 
 
 1012. Duty of deaf persons, or those with ears covered, to look for 
 
 trains. 
 
 1013. Duty to stop, when noise affects hearing or crossing ob- 
 
 structed. 
 
 1014. Proper place to stop, look and listen. 
 
 1015. Driving rapidly upon crossing without looking. 
 
 1016. Duty to listen, when track obstructed. 
 
 1017. Driving rapidly on obstructed crossing. 
 
 1018. When track obstructed by steam or smoke. 
 
 1019. When track obstructed by buildings or piles of lumber. 
 
 1020. When track obstructed by passing trains or standing cars. 
 
 1021. Track obstructed by cuts, curves or embankments. 
 
 1022. Track obstructed by weeds, brush or trees. 
 
 1023. When track obscured by dust, fog or snow. 
 
 1024. View of track obscured by umbrella. 
 
 1025. Approaching crossing in covered conveyance. 
 
 1026. Driving upon crossing on dangerously loaded wagon. 
 
 1027. Colliding with train on parallel track. 
 
 1028. Passing under or between stationary cars. 
 
 1029. Crossing track in front of approaching train. 
 
 1030. Crossing in front of train, a jury issue, when. 
 
 1031. Intoxicated person going on track. 
 
 1032. Burden of proof on plaintiff. 
 
 1033. Traveler's duty not affected by company's negligence. 
 
 1034. Injury avoidable by ordinary care. 
 
 1035. When traveler's negligence a question of law for the court. 
 
 1036. When issue of, should bt submitted to jury. 
 
 CHAPTEE XLV. 
 
 THE DOCTEINE OF IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 ) 1037. What the term implies. 
 1038. Basis of the doctrine. 
 
 xxxvi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 1039. Imputed negligence and personal negligence distinguished. 
 
 1040. When cause derived from negligent person. 
 
 1041. Concurrent negligence of another no defense. 
 
 1042. Imputation of negligence of drivers of vehicles, generally. 
 
 1043. Negligence of drivers of public conveyances. 
 
 1044. Persons traveling on railroad cars. 
 
 1045. Occupants of street cars. 
 
 1046. Persons riding in stage coaches. 
 ' 1047. Persons riding in hired vehicles. 
 
 1048. Negligence of excursionists. 
 
 1049. Persons jointly engaged in common enterprise. 
 
 1050. Negligence of coenlployees not imputed. 
 
 1051. Employee's negligence imputed to employer. 
 
 1052. Employee's negligence not imputed to employer's guest. 
 
 1053. Persons riding in private vehicles. 
 
 1054. Injured person in position to control driver. 
 
 1055. Guest riding in private vehicle. 
 
 1056. When negligence of husband imputed to wife. 
 
 1057. Negligence of relatives. Imputed, when. 
 
 1058. Eule as to infants non sui juris. 
 
 1059. When negligence imputed to children sui juris: 
 
 OHAPTEE XLVI. 
 
 WHO DEEMED TEESPASSEES GENERALLY, 
 
 1060. Persons going upon railroad property. 
 
 1061. Company entitled to clear track. 
 
 1062. Persons crossing track, away from crossings. 
 
 1063. Persons walking on tracks. 
 
 1064. Use of track by pedestrians at nighttime. 
 
 1065. When company consents to general use of track. 
 
 1066. License to use track not established by occasional user. 
 
 1067. Persons walking on bridge or trestle. 
 
 1068. Persons on right of way. 
 
 1069. Persons frequenting depot grounds or yards. 
 
 1070. Persons wrongfully upon train. 
 
 1071. Persons wrongfully riding on freight trains. 
 
 1072. Persons wrongfully riding on special trains, cars or engines. 
 
 1073. Whether children, playing upon turntables, are trespassers. 
 
 XXXVll 
 
TABLE ' OP CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTEK XLVII. 
 
 DUTIES AND LIABILITIES TOWAKD TEESPASSEBS. 
 
 g 1074. Eisks assumed by trespassers generally. 
 
 1075. Company's duty toward trespassers generally. 
 
 1076. Distinguished from duty owing passengers or licensees. 
 
 1077. Degree of care required toward trespassers. 
 
 1078. Liable for wanton or willful injury to trespassers. 
 
 1079. Excessive speed as evidence of willful injury to trespasser. 
 
 1080. Trespassers not entitled to signals. 
 
 1081. Trespassers cannot complain of absence of flagman. 
 
 1082. Lookout should be kept for trespassers, when. 
 
 1083. Duty of employees, after discovery of trespasser. 
 
 1084. Duty toward children, drunken persons and persons under 
 
 disability. 
 ,1085. Duty toward deaf persons on the track. 
 
 1086. No duty to keep premises in safe condition. 
 
 1087. Duty toward trespassers on trains. 
 
 1088. Ejection of trespassers from trains. 
 
 CHAPTEE XLVIII, 
 
 CONTBIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF TEESPASSEBS. 
 
 1089. The subject generally. 
 
 1090. Care required of trespasser. 
 
 1091. Negligence must be proximate cause of injury. 
 
 1092. Failure to look and listen for trains. 
 
 1093. Failure to heed warnings or signals. 
 
 1094. Standing on or near track. 
 
 1095. Walking on or near track. 
 
 1096. Walking on railroad bridge or trestle. 
 
 1097. Walking on railroad track in nighttime. 
 
 1098. Deaf person walking on track. 
 
 1099. Lying or sitting on railroad track. 
 
 1100. Falling asleep on railroad track. 
 
 1101. Climbing upon cars. 
 
 1102. Infants climbing upon cars. 
 
 1103. When trespasser can recover, notwithstanding his own negli- 
 
 gence. 
 
 1104. When a question of law for the court. 
 
 1105. When a question of fact for jury, 
 xxxviii 
 
TABLE OP CASES CITED. 
 
 [^References are to sections.] 
 
 Abbott V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. fRO 
 
 Minn. 48S; 16 N. W. Rep. 268), 1006. 
 Abbott V. Dwinnell (74 Wis. 514; 43 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 496), 936-1016. 
 Abbott B. Johnstown, etc., R. Co. (80 N. 
 
 Y. 27), 17. 
 Abbott V. Lake Erie, etc., R. Co. (150 
 
 Ind. 498; 50 N. E. Rep. 729). 1050.' 
 Abbot V. Marion Min. Co. '(112 Mo. App. 
 
 550) 79 ^ 
 
 Abby 'v. Wood (Wash., 86 Pac. Rep, 
 
 558), 206. 
 Abel V. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (103 N. 
 
 Y. 681; 4 N. Y. S. R. 269), 143. 
 Abelson v. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. (105 
 
 S. W. Rep. 81), 799. 
 Abend v. Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. (111.. 
 
 17 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 614), 568. 
 Abrahambn v. 'General Supply, etc., Co. 
 
 (98 N. Y. S. 596; 113 App. Div. 318), 
 
 534. 
 Ackerson z'. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (75 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 676), 504. _ 
 Acme, etc., Co. v. McIIeer (5 Colo. App. 
 
 267), 358. 
 Adams v. Coal Co. (85 Mo. App. 320), 
 
 388. 
 Adams v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (74. Mo. 
 
 663; 7. Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 414), 9\ 
 Adams v. Iron Cliff Co. (78 Mich. 271; 
 
 44 N. W. Rep. 270; 41 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 414), 879. 
 Adams v. Kansas, etc., Co. (85 Mo. App. 
 
 486), 366. 
 Adams v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (82 Ky. 
 
 603; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 380), 787. 
 Adams v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (100 
 
 Mo. 555; 12 S. W. Rep. 637; 41 Am. 
 
 & Eng; R. Cas. 105), 724. 
 Adams v. New York, etc., R. Co. (49 
 
 N. Y. S. R. 854; 66 Hun 634; 21 N. 
 
 Y. Supp. 681), 998. 
 Adams v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. 
 
 (103 S. W. Rep. 725; 83 Ark. 300'). 
 
 398, 416, 1067. 
 Adams v. Union Ry. Co. (80 N. Y. S. 
 -264; 80 App. Div. 136), 122. 
 Adams v. University Hospital (99 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 453), 129. 
 Adkisson's Adm'r v. Louisville, N. & St. 
 
 L. Ry. Co. (110 S. W. Rep. 284), 988. 
 Adolff o. Columbia, etc., Co. (100 M,o. 
 
 App. 199), 311. 
 Aerkfetz v. Humphries (145 U. S. 418; 
 
 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 835; 53 Am, & Eng. 
 
 B, Cas. 159), 412, 408. 
 
 Agulime v. New York, etc., R. Co. (21 R. 
 
 I. 263; 43 Atl. Rep. 63; 14 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. (N. S.), 199), 39. 
 Ahern v. Chicago & E. R. Co. (124 -111, 
 
 Apo. 36), 861, 1070. 
 Ahern v. Minneapolis Ry. Co. (113 N. 
 
 W. 1019), 560. 
 Ahnefeld v. Wabash R. Co. (Ill S. W. 
 
 Rep. 95), 1065. 
 Aiken v. Holyoke, etc., R. Co. (184 Mass. 
 
 269), 398. 
 Aiken v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (130 Pa. 
 
 St. 380; 18 Atl. Rep. 619; 41 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 571), 1003. 
 Aiken v. Smith (54 Fed. Rep. 896), 
 
 145. 
 Akers v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (68 Minn, 
 
 540; 60 Am. & Ene. R. Cas. 30), 869. 
 Alabama R. Co. v. Arnold (84 Ala. 159; 
 
 4 So. Rep. 359; 5 Am. St. Rep. 179, 
 
 354; 80 Ala. 600; 35 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 466), 25, 374. 
 Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Bates (43 So. 
 
 Rep. 98), 684. 
 Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Bonner (39 So. 
 
 Rep. 619), 78. 
 Alabama, etc., R. Co. v, Carmichael (90 
 
 Ala. 19; 8 So. Rep. 87; 44 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 286), 724. 
 Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. - Carroll (97 Ala, 
 
 126; 11 So. Rep. 803), 461, 505. 
 Alabama, etc., v. Chapman "(80 Ala. 615; 
 
 2 So. Rep. 738; 31 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 394), 1095. 
 Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Crocker (131 
 
 Ala. 584; 31 So. Rep. 561), 1073. 
 Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Davis (69 Miss. 
 
 444; 13 So-Rep. 693, 1055. 
 Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Drummond (~'.i 
 
 Miss. 813; 20 So. Rep. 7), 729. 
 Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Frazier (93 Ala. 
 
 45; 9 So. Rep. 303), 91, 186. 
 Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Hawk (72 Ala. 
 
 112; 47 Am. Rep. 403; 18 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas: 194), 671, 801. 
 Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Hill (93 Ala. 
 
 514; 9 So. Rep. 722; 47 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 500), 608, 835. 
 Alahama, etc., R. Co. v. Holmes (75 
 
 Miss. 371; 23 So. Rep. 187; 10 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. [N. S.] 270), 810. 
 Alabama, etc., R. Cor v. Jones (71 Ala. 
 
 487; 16 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 549), 15Z, 
 Alabama, etc., Co. v. Marcus (115 Ala. 
 
 319), 357. 
 Alabama, etc., R. Co. v, Overstreet (85 
 
 Miss. 78; 37 So. Rep. 819), 99. 
 Alabama, etc., R. Co.. v. Stacey (88 
 
 Miss. 463; 9 So. Rep. 349), 712. . 
 
 xxxix 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.] 
 
 Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Summers (6.8 
 
 Miss. 566; 10 So. Rep. 63), 876. 
 Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Vail (Ala. 38 
 
 So. Rep. 184), 109. 
 Alabama, etc., R. Co. v.. Waller (48 
 
 Ala. 469), 470. ^,,.,„ 
 
 Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Williams (78 
 
 Miss. 209; 28 So. Rep. 853; 51 L. R. 
 
 A. 836; 84 Am. St. Rep. 684), 64, 
 
 281. 
 Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Yarbrough (83 
 
 Ala. 838; 3 So. Rep. 447; 3 Am. ijt. 
 
 Rep. 715), 777, 1071. 
 Alabama, Collinsville, etc., Co. ». Pitts 
 
 (13 So. Rep. 135), 309. 
 Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Guest 
 • (Ala., 39 So. Rep. 664), 14. 
 Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Hardy 
 
 (61 S. E. Rep. 71), 973. 
 Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Wil- 
 liams (37 So. Rep. 855), 613. 
 Alabama Steel & Wire Co. v. Griffin (48 
 
 So. Rep. 1034), 613. 
 Alaska Treadwell Gold M., etc., Co. 
 
 V. Whelen (168 U. S. 85), 210. 
 Albert! v. New York, etc., R. Co. (N. Y., 
 
 9 Am. Neg. Cas. 664), 649. 
 Albertson v. Keokuk, etc., R. Co. (48 
 
 Iowa 492), 1068. 
 Albion, etc., Co. v. Denobra (72 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 739; 44 U. S. App. 347; 19 C. 
 
 C. A. 168; 3 Am. & Eng. R. (:as. [N. 
 
 S.] 664), 608. 
 Albion V. Hetrick (90 Ind. 546; 46 Am, 
 
 Rep. 230)^ 1061. 
 Albrecbt v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 
 
 (108 Wis. 630; 84 N. W. Rep. 882), 
 
 338. 
 Albrecht v.. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. (94 
 
 Wis. 397; 69 N. W. Rep. 63), 611. 
 Alcorn v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (108 Mo. 
 
 81; 18 S. W. Rep. 188; 63 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 87), 263, 379. 
 Alden ». New York, etc., R. Co. (26 N. 
 
 Y. 102), 653. 
 Aldrich v. Concord, etc., R. Co. (67 N. 
 
 H. 380; 36 Atl. Rep. 252), 38. 
 Aldrich v. Furnace Co. (78 Mo. 659), 
 
 128, 353, 387. 
 Alecson v. Erie R. Co. (91 N. Y. S. 
 
 1029; 101 App. Div. 395), 273. 
 Alexander v. LouisvfUe, etc, R. Co. (83 
 
 Ky. 589; 85 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 458), 
 
 689, 844. 
 Alexander v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (201 
 
 Pa. 262; 50 Atl. Rep. 991; '48 Ohio 
 
 St. 683; 30 N. E. Rep. 69), 267, 463. 
 Alexander v. Railway Co. (83 Ky. 689), 
 
 269. 
 Alexander v. Richmond, etc., R. Co. (112 
 
 No. Car. 780; 16 S. E. Rep. 896), 
 
 1013. 
 Alexander v. Toronto, etc., Ry. Co. (36 
 
 U. C. L. B. 453), 567. 
 Alexandria, etc„ R. Co. v. Herndon (87 
 
 Va. 193; 18 S.' E. Rep. 289), 626, 711. 
 Allan V. Logan (Utah, 37 Pac. Rep. 
 
 496), 380, 353. 
 Allan V. State, etc., R. Co. (132 N. 
 
 Y. 99; 15 L. R. A. 166), 29. 
 Allen 2'. Hayward (7 0. B. 960), 278. 
 Allen I'. Maine Central R. Co. (82 Me. 
 
 Ill,; 19 Atl. Rep. 106), 395. 
 Xl 
 
 Allen V. Railroad Co. (69 N. H. 271), 
 
 368. 
 Allen V. Transit Co. (183 Mo. 141; 81 
 
 S. W. Rep. 1142), 98. 
 AUender v. Chicagft-, etc., R. Co. (43 
 
 Iowa 276; 14 Am. Ry. Rep. 443), 688. 
 Allender v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (37 
 
 Iowa 264; 8 Am. Ry. Rep. 115), 394. 
 Allerton i'. Bostot), etc., R. Co. (146 
 
 Mass. 241; 16 N. E. Rep. 621; 34 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 863), 557, 1027. 
 Allison V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (42 Iowa 
 
 274), 83. 
 Allison V. Southern Ry. Co. (129 N. C. 
 
 336; 40 S. E. Rep. 91), 379, 495. 
 Allison V. Tap Rock, etc., Co. (78 N. Y. 
 
 S. 69; 75 App. Div. 267); 164. 
 Allyn V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (105 Mass, 
 
 77), 1047. 
 Alston V. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. (1 
 
 Ohio C. D. 353), 66. 
 Alton V. Midland Ry. Co. (19 C. B. N. 
 
 S. 213), 18. 
 Alves V. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. 
 
 (65 Atl. Rep. 261; 27 R. I. 581), 267. 
 American -Bridge Co. v. Seeds (144 Fed. 
 
 Rei). 608), 354, 467. 
 American Car Co. v. Clark (32 Ind. App. 
 
 644; 70 N. E. Rep. 828), 377, 379. 
 Amato V. Northern Pacific R. Co. (40 
 
 Fed. Rep. 561), 416. 
 Ames V. Union, etc., Co. (117 Mass. 
 
 641), 17. 
 Ames V. Waterloo Transit Co. (Iowa, 95 
 
 N. W. Rep. 161), 115. • 
 Ames 7j. Union, etc., R. Co. (117 Mass.' 
 
 509), 62. 
 Anderson v. Bennett (16 Oregon 515: 
 
 19 Pac. Rep. 765; 8 Am. St. Rep. 311: 
 
 38 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 87), 475, 486. 
 Anderson v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (110 
 
 S. W. Rep. 650), 721. 
 Anderson i>. Clark (156 Mass. 368; 29 
 
 N.. E. Rep. 689),. 378. 
 Anderson v. Duckworth (162 Mass. 861), 
 
 108. 
 Anderson v. Fielding (Minn., 99 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 367), 99, 375. 
 Anderson v. Michigan, etc., R. Co. (107 
 
 Mich. 591; 66 N. W. Rep. 585), 498. 
 Anderson v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. (37 
 
 Wis. 381), 45, 506. 
 Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. 
 
 M. Ry. Co. (114 N. W. Rep. 1123),- 
 
 1094. 
 Anderson v. Minnesota, etc., R. Co. (39 
 
 Miiin. 623; 41 N. W. Rep. 104; 38 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 206), 387. 
 Anderson v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. 
 
 (196 Mo. 442; 93 S. W. Ren. 394), 
 
 563. 
 Anderson v. Morrison (28 Minn. 274), 
 
 275. 
 Anderson v. New York, etc., R. Co. (53 
 
 Hun 633; 126 N. Y; 701; 34 N. Y. S. 
 
 R. 1012), 967. 
 Anderson v. Northern Pac. R. Co. 
 
 (Mont., 66 Pac. Rep., 834; 85 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 884), 858, 341. 
 Anderson v. Seropian (147 Cal. 801; 81 
 
 Pac. Rep. 581), 98. 
 Anderson v. Southern Ry. Co. (70 S. C. 
 
 490; 50 S. E. Rep. 202), 80, 381. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.'] 
 
 Anderson v. Winston (31 Fed Rep. 
 
 628), 349. 
 
 Andrews v. Central, etc., R. Co. (86 
 
 Ga. 192; 13 S. E. Repr 213; 45 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 171), 1038. 
 
 Andrews v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (86 
 
 Iowa 677; 53 N. W. Rep. 399; 53 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 252), 608, 184, 495. 
 
 Andrews i'. New York, etc., R. Co. (60 
 
 Conn. 293; 23 Atl. Rep. 566), 877. 
 Andrews v. Railroad Co. (34 Ccftin. 57), 
 
 55 
 Andrist v. Union Pacific R. Co. (30 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 345),. 577. 
 Annaker v. Cliicagq, etc., R. Co. (81 
 
 Iowa 267; 47 N. W. Rep. 68), 937. 
 Annapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Pumphrey (72 
 Md. 82; 19 Atl. Rep. 8; 43 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 599), 962. 
 Annapolis, W. & B. Ry. Co. v. State (65 
 
 Atl. Rep. 434), 962. 
 Annas v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. (67 
 Wis. 46; 27 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 102; 
 30 N. W. Rep. 282; 68 Am. Rep. 848), 
 150, 203. 
 Apoel V. Buffalo, etc., R. Co. (Ill N. 
 Y. 650; 19 N. E. Rep. 93; 20 N. Y. 
 Supp. 90; 40 Hun 632), 325. 
 Arasmith v. Temple (11 111. App. 39), 
 
 277. 
 Archer v. New York,- etc., E. Co. (106 
 
 N. Y. 689; 13 N. E. Rep. 318), 619. 
 Ardesco Oil Co. v. Gilson (63 Pa. St. 
 
 160), 206. 
 Arenschield v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (128 
 Iowa 677; 105 N. 'W. Rep. 200), 80, 
 317. 
 Arkansas, etc., R. Co. v. Griffith (63 Ark. 
 
 491, 39 S. W. Rep. 550), 608. 
 Arkansas, etc., R. Co. v. Timmonds (51 
 Ark. 469; 40 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 698), 599. 
 Arkansas Central R. Co. v. Bennett (102 
 
 S. W. Rep. 198), 663. 
 Arkansas Central R. Co. v. Jackson (70 
 
 Ark. 396; 67 S. W. Rep. 757), 367. 
 
 Arkansas Midland R. Co. v. Can man (52 
 
 Ark. 517; 13 S. W. Rep. 280), 654. 
 
 Armil v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (70 Iowa 
 
 130; 30 N. W. Rep. 43; 28 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 467), 93. 
 
 Armour v. Hahn (111 U. S. 813; 28 L. 
 
 Ed. 440), 353. 
 Armour v. Golkewska (95 111. App. 494), 
 
 344. ' 
 
 Armstrong v, Lancashire, etc., R, Co. (33 
 L. T. 338; L. R. 10 Ex. 47; 44 L. J. 
 Ex. 89; 23 W. R. 296), 1044. 
 Armstrong v. Montgomery St. R. Co. 
 
 (Ala., 36 So. Rep. 349), 29. 
 Armstrong v. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (66 Barb. 437; 64 N. Y. 635), 633. 
 Armstrong v. Oregon, etc., R. Co. (8 
 
 Utah 420; 3^ Pac. Rep. 693), 479. 
 Armsworth v. Southwestern R. Co. (11 
 
 Jur. 768), 67. 
 Arnold i/. Delaware, etc., Co. (135 N. 
 
 P. 16; 25 N. E. Rep. 1064), 353. 
 Arnold v. Illinois, etc., R. "Co. (83 III. 
 
 273), 854. • 
 Arnold v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (22 Ky. 
 
 L. R. 511; 58 S. W. Rep. 370), 362. 
 Arnold v\ Pennsylvania R. Co., 115 Pa. 
 
 St. 135, 970. 
 Arrowsmith v. Nashville, etc., R. Co. (57 
 
 Fed. Rep. 165)^ 563, 817. 
 Artusy v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (73 
 Texas, 191; 11 S. W. Rep. 177; 37 Am. 
 & Eng. -R. Cas. 288), 1086, 1098. 
 Artz V. Chicago, etc-i -R. Co. (44 Iowa 
 284; 38 Iowa 293; 5 Am. Ry. Rep. 
 469), 661, 446, 969. 
 Ash V. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. (72 Md. 
 144; 44 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 676), 47. 
 Ash V. Verlenden (154 Pa. 246; 36 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 374), 119. 
 Ash V. Wilmington, etc., R. Co. (148 
 Pa. St. 133; 23 Atl. Rep. 898), 1003. 
 
 Ashbrook v. Frederick Avenue R. Co. 
 (18 Mo. App. 290), 796. 
 
 Ashmore v. Charleston, etc., Co. (99 111. 
 App. 262), 139. 
 
 Ashworth v. Southern R. Co. (116 Ga. 
 635), 398. 
 
 Atchison, etc., Ry. Co. v. Allen (88 Pac. 
 
 . Rep. 966), 567. 
 
 Atchison, etc., Ry. Co, v. Bancord (71 
 Pac. Rep. . 253), 316. 
 
 Atchison, etc.,. R. Co. v. Betts (10 Colo. 
 431; 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 663; 15 
 Pac. Rep. 821), 50. 
 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Brown (26 Kan- 
 sas 443; 6 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 228), 
 206. 
 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Brown (2 Kan- 
 sas App. 604; 42 Pac. Rep. 588; 2 Am. 
 & Eng. R. Cas. [N. S.] 113), 1070. 
 
 .^tchison, etc., Ry. Co. v. Calhoun (89 
 Pac. Rep. 207), 706,' 1068. 
 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Davis (34 Kan- 
 sas 202; 26 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 305), 
 292, 811. 
 
 Atchison, etc., Ry. Co. c. Dickens (103 
 S. W. Rep. 750), 500. 
 
 Atlantic, etc., R. Co. v. Dunn (19 Ohio 
 St. 162), ;177. - 
 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Elder (57 Kan- 
 sas 312; 46 Pac. Rep. 810), 608. 
 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v, Fajardo (86 
 Pac. Rep. 301), 60. 
 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Farrow (6 Colo. 
 498), 507. 
 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Feehan (47 111. 
 App. 66), 980. 
 
 Atchison, etc., Ry. Co. &. Fronk (87 Pac. 
 Rep. 698), 243. 
 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Gantz (38 Kan- 
 sas 608; 17 Pac. Rep. 54; 34 ^m. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 290), 1087. 
 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Headland (18 
 Colo. 477; 33 Pac. Rep. 185; '58 Am. 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 4),' 553. 
 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Henry (57 Kan- 
 sas 154; 45 Pac. Rep. 576), 446. 
 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Holt (29 Kan- 
 sas 149; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 206). 
 471. 
 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co.- v. Hughes (65 
 Kansas ,491; 40 Pac. Rep. 919), 789. 
 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Kingscott (65 
 Kan. 131; 69 Pac. Rep. 184), 246. 
 
 xli 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.'] 
 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Koehler (37 
 
 Kan. 463; 15 Pac. Rep. 567; 31 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 813^), 504. 
 Atchison, etc., Ry. Co. v. Lindsey (Kan. 
 
 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 78), 567. 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Martin (7 N. 
 
 M. 158; 34 Pac. Rep. 536), 490. 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. McElroy (91 
 
 Pac. Rep. 785; 13 L. R. A. [N. S.] 
 
 630), 632. 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. McGinnis (46 
 
 Kan. 109; 26 Pac. Rep. 453), 173. 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. McKee (37 
 
 Kan. 592; 15 Pac. Rep. 484), 485. 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Moore (29 Kan. 
 
 632; 31 Kan. 197; 11 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 243), 506, ,486. 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Morgen (31 
 
 Kan. 77; 13 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 499), 
 
 950. 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Parry (Kan., 73 
 
 Pac. Rep. 106), 28. 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Parsons (42 III. 
 
 App. 93), 881. 
 Atchison, etc., Ry. Co. v. Pitts (123 111. 
 
 App. 607), 414. 
 Atchison, etc.,. R. Co. v. Plunkett (25 
 
 Kan. 188; 2 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 127), 
 
 332, 349. 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v, Reesman (60 
 
 Fed. Rep. 370; 19 U. S. App. 596; 
 
 9 C. C. A. 20; 23 L. R. A. 768), 602. 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Ringle (80 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 43), 176. 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Roach (36 Kan. 
 
 740; 12 Pac. Rep. 93; 27 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 257), 810. 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Ryan (u2 Kan. 
 
 682; 64 Pac. Rep. 603), 68. 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Salmon (11 
 
 Kan. 83), 117. 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Schroeder (47 
 
 Kan. 315; 27 Pac. Rep. 965), 340. 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Seeley (54 
 
 Kan. 21; 37 Pac. Rep. 104), 499. 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Shean (18 Colo. 
 
 368; 20 L. R. A. 729; 33 Pac. Rep. 
 
 108;. 58 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 360), 567, 
 
 632. 
 Atchison, etc., Ry. Co. v. Sledge (Kan. 
 
 74 Pac. Rep. 1111), 375. 
 Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Sowers 
 
 (Tex. Civ. App. 99 S. W. Rep. 190), 
 
 100. 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. -v. Stanford (12 
 
 Kan. 354),' 26. 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. x/. State (22 Kan. 
 
 1), 949. 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Thul (29 Kan. 
 
 466; 44 Am. Rep. 659; 10 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 783), 93. 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Townsend (39 
 
 Kan. 115; 99 N. W. Rep. 433; 81 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 205; 17 Pac. Rep. 804; 35 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 362), 1016. 
 Atchison, etc., R. ' Co. v. Vincent (56 
 
 Kan. 344; 43 Pac. Rep. 251), 496. 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Wagner (33 
 
 Kan. 660; 7 Pac. Rep. 204; 21 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 637), 374. 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Walz (40 Kan. 
 
 433; 19 Pac. Rep. 787), 966. 
 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Washburn (5 
 
 Neb. 117), 849. 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Weber (33 Kan. 
 
 543; 6 Pac. Rep. 877; 21 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 418), 686, 805. 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Weikal (Kan. 
 
 84 Pac. Rep. 720), 269. 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Wilkie (90 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 775), 886. 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Wilson (48 
 
 Fed. Rip. 57), 471. 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Winston (56 
 
 Kan. 466; 43 Pac. Rep. 777), 251. 
 Atchison, etc., Ry. Co. v. Zeiler (54 
 
 Kan. 340; 38 Pac. Rep. 282), 218. 
 Atkinson v. Goodrich, etc., Co. (60 Wis. 
 
 141; 18 N. W. Rep. 764), 393. 
 Atkyn v. Wabash R. Co. (22 Ohio L. J. 
 
 161; 41 Fed. Rep. 193), 194, 341. 
 Atlanta, etc., R. Co. v. Ayers (63 Ga. 
 
 12), 519. 
 Atlanta, etc., R. Co. v. Dickerson (89 Ga. 
 
 455; 15 S. E. Rep. 534), 790. 
 Atlanta, etc., R. Co. v. Gravitt (93 Ga. 
 
 369; 20 S. E. Rep. 550; 44 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 145; 26 L. R. A. 553), 1058. 
 Atlanta, etc., R. Co. v. Johnson (66 Ga. 
 
 259^, 183. 
 Atlanta, etc., R. Co. v. Kimberly (87 
 
 Ga. 161; 13 S. E. Rep. 277; 47 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 307), 285. 
 Atlanta, etc., R. Co. v. McDilda (126 Ga. 
 
 468; 54 S. E. Rep. 140), 65. 
 Atlanta, etc., R. Co. v. Newton (85 Ga. 
 
 617; 11 S. E. Rep. 776), 191. 
 Atlanta, etc., R. Co. v. Ray (70 Ga. 
 
 674; 22 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 281), 419. 
 Atlanta, etc., R. Co. v. Tanner (68 Ga. 
 
 384), 463. 
 Atlanta, etc., R. Co. v. Venable (65 Ga. 
 
 65; 7 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 35), 65, 196. 
 Atlanta, etc., Ry. Co. v. West (121 Ga. 
 
 641; 49 S. E. Rep. 711; 67 L. R. A. 
 
 701), 301. 
 Atlanta, etc., R. Co. v. Wyly (65 Ga. 
 
 120; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 262), 973. 
 Atlantic City R. Co. v. Goodin (45 L. 
 
 R. A. 673; 62 N. J. L. 397; 42 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 333; 72 Am. St Rep. 652), 632. 
 Atlantic City R. Co. v. Kiefer (66 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 930), 557. 
 Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. t.. Crosby (43 
 
 So. Rep. 318), 801. 
 Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. O'Neill 
 
 (56 S. E. Rep. 986; 127 Ga. 685), 400. 
 Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Powell (127 
 
 Ga. 805; 56 S. E. Rep. 1006), 828. 
 Atlantic Coast, etc., R. Co. v. Ryland 
 
 (Fla. 40 So. Rep. 24), 254. 
 Au V. New York, etc., R. Co. (29 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 72), 194. 
 Augusta R. Co. v. Glover (68 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 269; 18 S. E. Rep. 406), 
 
 71, 190. 
 Augusta Ry., etc., Co. v. Lyle (60 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 1076), 831. 
 Augusta, etc., R. Co. v. McElmurry (24 
 
 Cfa. 75), 461, 978. 
 Augusta, etc., R. Co. w. Randall (85 
 
 Ga. 297; 11 S. E. Rep. 706), 164. 
 Augusta, etc., R. Co. v. Rentz (65 Ga. 
 
 126), 94. 
 Aurelius v. Lake Erie, etc., R. Co. (19 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.] 
 
 Ind. App. 684; 49 N. E. Rep. 857), 
 
 1039. • 
 Austin, etc., R. Co. ■». Anderson (85 
 
 Texas 88: 19 S. W. Rep. 10S5), 168. 
 Austin V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (93 Iowa 
 
 236; 61 N. W. Rep. 849), 872. 
 Austin w. Great Western R. Co. (L. 'R. 
 
 a Q. B. 442; 8 B. & S. 327; 36 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 201; 15 W. R. 863; 16 U T. 
 
 320), 559. 
 Austin V. New Jersey, etc., Co. (43 N. 
 
 Y. 75), 393. 
 Austin V. St. Louis, etc., P. Co. (15 
 
 Mo. App. 197), 74. 
 Autletz V. Smith (97 Minn. 217), 109. 
 Avery v. Dordyke, etc., Co. (70 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 888), 99. ^ 
 
 Avery v. New York, etc., R. Co. (121 
 
 N. Y. 31; 24 N. E. Rep. 20), 658. 
 Axline II. Toledo, W. & V. O. R. Co. 
 
 (138 Fed. Rep. 169), 235. 
 Aycock V. Railway Co. (89 N. C. 321), 
 
 239. 
 Ayers v. New York, etc., R. Co. (158 N. 
 
 Y. 254; 53 N.'^E. Rep. 22), 677. ■ 
 Ayers v. Richmond, etc., R. Co. (84 Va. 
 
 679; 5 S. E. Rep. 582; 33 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 269), 491. 
 Ayylon v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (105 
 
 Mass. 77), 1039. 
 
 Babb V. Oxford, etc., Co. (99 Me. 298; 
 
 59 Atl. Rep. 290), 318. 
 Babcock v. Old Colony R. Co. (150 Mass. 
 
 467; 23 N. E. Rep. 325), 495. 
 Bacon v. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (143 Pa. 
 
 St. 14; 21 Atl. Rep. 1002), 783. 
 Baer ^. Erie R. R. Co. (95 N. Y. S. 
 
 486), 239. 
 Bahr v. Northern Pacific R. Co. (112 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 267), 171. 
 Bahrenburgh v. Brooklyn City R. Co. (56 
 
 N. Y. 652), 1058. 
 Bailey v. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (27 
 
 App. Div. [N. Y.] 305; 50 N. Y. 
 
 Supp. 87), 600. 
 Bailey v. Hartford, etc., R. Co. (66 
 
 Conn.- 444; 16 Atl. Rep. 234; 37 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 483), 877. 
 Bailey v. Kansas City (189 Mo. 503; 87 
 
 S. W. Rep, 1182), 94. 
 Bailey v. Lehigh Valley R. Co. (69 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 998; 220 Pa. St. 516), 1061. 
 Bailey v. New Haven, etc., R. Co. (107 
 
 Mass. 497), 877. 
 Bailey v. Rome, etc., R. Co. (19 N. Y. 
 
 S. R. 666; 49 Hun 377; 3 N. Y. Supp. 
 
 586), 183. 
 Bailey v. Troy, etc., R. Co. (67 Vt. 262), 
 
 286. 
 Bain v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (98 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 241), 549. 
 Baird v. Citizens R. Co. (146 Mo. 265; 
 
 48 S. W. Rep. 78), 304. 
 Baird v. Daly (68 N. Y. 647), 96. 
 Baker v. Balkan (1 Camp. 493), 42. 
 Baker v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (66 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 386), 860. 
 Baker v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (147 
 
 Mo. 140; 48 S. W. Rep. 838), 942. 
 
 Baker v. Manhattan R. Co. (118 N. Y. 
 
 633; 23 N. E. Rep. 886), 172. 
 Baker v. Norfolk & S. R. Co. (66 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 663), 889. 
 Baker v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (142 Pa. 
 
 St. 503; 21 Atl. Rep. 979), 175. 
 Baker v. Philadelphia & Ry. Co. (149 
 
 Fed. Rep. 882), 480. 
 Baker v. Railroad Co. (95 Pa. St. 211), 
 
 271. 
 Baker v. Western, etc., R. Co. (68 Ga. 
 
 699), 343. 
 Baker's Admr. v. Lexington, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (28 Ky. L. R. 140 ,•" 89 S. W. Rep. 
 
 149), 78. 
 Balch V. Grand Rapids R. Co. (67 Mich. 
 
 394; 11 West. Rep. 476; 34 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 884), 202. 
 Baldwin v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (50 
 
 Iowa 680), 370. 
 Baldwin v. Railway Co. (68 Iowa 37; 25 
 
 N. W. Rep. 918), 266. 
 Baldwin v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (63 
 
 Iowa 210: 18 N. W. Rep. 884; 15 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 166; 75 Iowa 297; 39 
 
 N. W. Rep. 507), 485. 
 Baldwin v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. 
 
 (128 Ga. 567; 58 S. E. Rep. 35; IS 
 
 L. R. A. [N. S.] 360), 730. 
 Ball V. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. (93 Va. 
 
 44; 24 S. E. Rep. 467; 57 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 786; 32 L. R. A. 792), 760. 
 Ball V. Megrath (86 Pac. Rep. 382), 257. 
 Ballard v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (51 Mo. 
 . App. 453), 378. 
 Ballard v. Mississippi Oil Co. (81 Miss. 
 
 607; 34 So. Rep. 533; 95 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 476; 62 L. R. A. 407), 604. 
 Ballou V. . Chicago, etc., R. Co. (54 Wis. 
 
 257; 11 N. W. Rep. 559: 41 Am. Rep. 
 
 31; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 480), 343. 
 Balsley v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (119 111. 
 
 68; 8 N. E. Rep. 869; 59 Am. Rep. 
 
 784), 235. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. ii. Abbegglen (84 
 
 N. E. Rep. 566), 1029. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Adams (10 
 
 App. D. C. 97), 1051. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Anderson (85 
 
 Fed. Rep. 413; 29 C. C. A. 235), 37. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Andrews (50 
 
 Fed. Rep. 728; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 523), 93. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Baldwin (144 
 
 Fed. Rep. 63), 47. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Baugh (149 
 
 U. S. 368; 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 914; 37 
 
 L. Ed. 772), 461. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Blocher (27 
 
 Md. 277), 690. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Botelar (38 
 
 Md. 668; 10 Am. Ry. Rep. 506), 187. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Breinig (26 Md. 
 
 378), 572. 
 Baltimore, etc., Co. v. Brown (146 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 24), 473. 
 Baltimore & O. Ry. v. Campbell (28 
 
 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 662), 1065. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. i/. Camp (65 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 952; 13 C. C. A. 233), 489. 
 Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Chambers 
 
 (Ohio, 76 N. E. Rep. 91), 50. 
 
 xliii 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 {Seferenoes are to sections.] 
 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Cumberland 
 
 (176 U. S. 232; SO Sup. Ct. Rep. 280; 
 
 44 L. Ed. 447), 1062. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. f. Depew (40 
 
 OHio St. 121; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 64), 1092. 
 Baltimore & O. Ry. Co. v. Evans (82 N. 
 
 -E. Rep. 77S), 834. . , ^ 
 
 Baltimore, etc.,, R. Co. v. Fitzpatrick (35 
 
 Md. 32), 1028. ' , ,„ 
 
 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Gettle (3 W. 
 
 Va, 376), 68. , , 
 
 Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. •</. Gillard (Ind. 
 
 71 N. E. Rep. 58). 65. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Herold (74 
 
 Md. 510; 22 Atl. Rep. 323; 14 L. R. 
 
 A. 75), 598. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Hobbs (Md. 19 
 
 Am. & Eng. K. Cas. 337); 1016. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Hottman (25 
 
 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 140), 504. 
 Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Hunsucker 
 
 (Ind. 70 N. E. Rep. 556), 267. 
 Baltimore & Pot. R. Co. v. Jones (95 U. 
 
 S. 439; 24 L. Ed. 506), 4. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Jones (158 
 
 Ind. 87; 62 N. E. Rep. 994), 505. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Kane (69 Md. 
 
 11; 13 Atl. Rep. 387; 12 Cent. Rep. 
 
 96), 718, 784. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. ICean (65 Md. 
 
 394;" 5 Atl. Rep. 325; 28 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 580), 392. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Kemp (61 Md. 
 
 619; 48 Am. Rep. 134), 170. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Leapley (65 
 
 Md. 571; 4 Atl. Rep. 891; 27 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 167), 791. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Leonhardt (66 
 
 Md. 70; 5 Atl. Rep. 340; 27 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 194), 773. 
 Baltiiiiore, etc., R. Co. n. Little (149 
 
 Ind. 167; 48 N. E. Rep. 862; 9 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. [N. S.] 427), 511. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Maili (66 Md. 
 
 63; 6 Atl. Rep. 87; 28 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 628), 1029. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. McCarney (12 
 
 Ohio C. C. 543), 564. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. McKenzie (81 
 
 Va. 71; 24 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 395), 
 
 162. 
 Baltimore, etc.j R. Co. !/. Mullen (120 
 
 111. App. 88; ,76 N. E. Rep. 474; 217 
 
 111. 203), 706. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Mulligan (45 
 
 Md. 486), 398. 
 Baltimore, etc., Co. v. Neall (65 Md. 
 
 438; 5 Atl. Rep. 338), 261. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Noell (32 
 
 Gratt. [Va.] 394), 594. 
 Baltimore City R. Co. i'. Nugent (86 Md. 
 
 349; 38 At]. Rep. 779; 39 L. R. A. 
 
 161), 2. 
 BaltimorCj etc., R. Co. v. Owings (65 
 
 Md. 502; 5 Atl. Rep. 329; 28 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 639), 881. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Read (158 Ind. 
 
 26; 62 N. E. Rep. 488), 505. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Reaney (42 
 Md. 117), 393. 
 
 xliv 
 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Rifowitz (89 
 
 Md. S38), 398. 
 Baltimore, etc., Ry. Co. v. Rowan (104 
 
 Ind. 88; 3 N. E. Rep. 627), 258. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. School Dis- 
 trict (96 Pa. St. 66; 2 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 166), 32. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. State (75 Md. 
 
 162; 23 Atl. Rep. 310; 53 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 379), 340. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. State (63 Md. 
 
 135; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 202), 194. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. State (60, Md. 
 
 449; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 149), 
 
 774. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. j/. State (33 Md. 
 
 542), 21. 
 Baltimore, etc., Co. v. State (41 Md. 
 
 268), 219. 
 Baltimore, etc.. R. Co. v. State (79 Md. 
 
 335; 29 Atl. Rep. 518; 47 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 416), 1067. 
 Baltimore Traction Co. v. State (78 Md. 
 
 409; 28 Atl. Rep. 397), 696. ^ 
 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Strickler (51 
 
 Md. 47), 258. 
 Baltimore & A. Ry. Co. «/. Trader (68 
 
 Atl. Rep. 12), 681. 
 Baltimore & Ohio.R. Co. v. Voigt (176 
 
 U. S. 498; 44 L. Ed. 560; 20 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 385), B55. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Walborn (127 
 
 Ind. 142; 26 N. E. Rep. 207), 963. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Whitacre (36 
 
 Ohio St. 627), 917. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Whittington 
 
 (30 Gratt. [Va.] 806),' 412. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Wightman (29 
 
 Gratt. [Va.] 431; 17 Am. Ry. Rep. 
 
 351), 189. 
 Baltzer v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (83 Wis. 
 
 469; 53 N. W: Rep. 885), 136. 
 Bamberg v. International, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (103 N. Y. Supp. 297), 1045. 
 Banchor v. Mansel (47 Me. 58), 868. 
 Bancroft v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (97 
 
 Mass. 275), 795. 
 Bandekow v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. 
 
 (117 N. VV. Rep. 812), 1094. 
 Banderob v. Wisconsin Cent. Ry. Co. 
 
 (113 N. W. Rep. 738), 862. 
 Bane v. Irwin (172 Mo. 306; 62 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 522), 476. 
 Banks v. Wabash R. Co. (40 Mo. App. 
 
 458), 496. 
 Bannon v. New York, etc., R. Co. (98 N. 
 
 Y. S. 770; 112 App. Div. 552), 534. 
 Bard v. Yohn (26 Pa. St. 482), 209. 
 Barden v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (121 Mass. 
 
 426), 799. 
 Bardwell v. Mobile, etc., R. Co. (63 
 
 Miss. 574), 791. 
 Barkdall ii. Pennsylvania R. Co. (Pa. 
 
 13 Atl. Rep. 82), 348. 
 Barker v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (37 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 292; 98 Mo. 60; 11 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 254), 1060. 
 Barker v. Perry (67 Iowa 146; 26 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 100), 92. 
 Barkley v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (96 
 
 Mo. 367; 9 S. W. Rep. 793), 1091. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.} 
 
 Barkman v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (89 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 463), 811. 
 Barksdale v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. (S. 
 
 Car. 56 S. E. Rep. 906), 63. 
 Barnes v. Rumford (96 Me. 315; 52 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 844), 1046. 
 Barnett v. East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (87 Ga. 766; 13 S.' E. Rep. 904), 833. 
 Barney v. Hannibal, etc., Ry. Co. (1S6 
 
 Mo. 392; 28 S. W. Rep. 1069; 26 L. 
 
 R. A. 847), 711. 
 Bamical 'v. Connor (110 Iowa 240), 158. 
 Barr v. Hannibal R. Co. (30 Mo. App. 
 
 248), 956. - 
 Barrett v. Bonham Oil Co. (Texas, 57 S. 
 
 Vf. Rep. 602), 108. 
 Barrett v. Midland R. Co. (1 F. & F. 
 
 361), 881. 
 Barrett v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (4 N. Y. 
 
 S. 127; 21 N. Y. S. R. 109; 121 N. 
 
 Y. 697), 106. 
 Barrett v. Southern Pacific R. Co. (91 
 
 Cal. 296; 27 Pac. Rep. 666; 25 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 186), 1073. 
 Barrett v. Third Avenue R. Co. (45 N. 
 
 Y. 628; 8 Abb. Pr. [N. S.] 205; 1 
 
 Sweeny, 568), 678. 
 Barring^r v. New York, etc., R. Co. (18 
 
 IlunTiSr. Y.] 398), 884. 
 Barron v. Illinois Central R. Co. (1 Biss. 
 , [U. S.] 412), 70. - 
 Barron v. Wisconsin, etc., R. Co. (89 
 
 Wis. 79; 61 N. W. Rep. 303), 892. 
 Barry w. Hannibal, etc., Ry. Co. (98 Mo. 
 
 62; 11 S. W. Rep. 308), 263. 
 Barry v. New York, etc., R. Co. (92 N. 
 
 Y. 289; 28 Hun 441; 13 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 613), 874. 
 Barstow v. Old Colony R. Co. (143 
 
 Kan. 535; 10 N. E. Rep. 255; 28 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 473), 466. 
 Barth v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (142 
 
 Mo. 535; 44 S. W. Rep. 778; 10 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. [N. S.f28), 685. 
 Bartholoniew v. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (102 N. Y. 716; 7 N. E. Rep.), 799. 
 Bartle v. Houghton Co. R. (Jo. (Mich. 
 
 93 N. W. Rep. 620), 125. 
 Bartlett v. Boston, etc., Co. (117 Mass. 
 
 536) 393. 
 Bartlett v. R. R. Co. (148 Mo. L. C. 
 
 139), 109., 
 Bartley *. Metropolitan, etc., R. Co. (148 
 
 Mo. 140: 49 S. W. Rep. 840), 135. 
 Barton v. New York, etc., R. Co. (56 N. 
 
 Y. 660; 1 T. & C. 297), 876. 
 Barton v. Odessa (82 S. W. Rep. 1119), 
 
 131. 
 Bartram v. Sharron (71 Conn. 686; 46 
 
 L. R. A. 144; 43 Atl. Rep. 143; 71 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 225)', 1041. 
 Baskett v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co. (101 
 
 S. W. Rep. 138), 801. 
 Bass V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (36 Wis. 
 
 450; 9 Am. Ry. Rep. 101), 658. 
 Bateman v. New York, etc., R. Co. (47 
 
 Hun 429; 14 N. Y. S. R. 454), 153. 
 Bates V. Nashville, etc., R. Co. (90 Tenn. 
 
 38; 16 S. W. Rep. 1069; 25 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 665), 1073. 
 Bates V. New York, etc., R. Co. (60 
 
 Conri. 259; 22 Atl. Rep. 638), 958. 
 
 Bates z,. Old Colony R. Co. (147 Mass. 
 
 256; 17 N. E. Rep. 633; 34 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 356), 848. 
 Battan v. Alabama, etc., R. -Co. (77 Ala. 
 
 591; 64 Am. Rep. 80; 23 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 514), 738. 
 Batterson ii Chicago, etc., R. Co. (49 
 
 Mich. 184; 13 N. W. Rep. 508; 8 Am. 
 
 6 Eng. R. Cas. 133), 173. 
 
 Battis %'. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (124 Iowa 
 
 483; 103 N. W. Rep. 481), 91. 
 Battishill'i/. Humphreys (64 Mich. 494; 
 
 31 N. W. Rep. 894; 28 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 597), 942. 
 Batton v. South, etc., R. Co. (77 Ala. 
 
 691; 64 Am. Rep. 80; 23 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 514), 761. 
 Bay Shore R. Co. v. Harris (67 Ala. 
 
 6), 182. 
 Bayley v. Eastern R. Co. (125 Mass. 62), 
 
 924. 
 Bayley v. Manchester, etc., R. Co. (L. R. 
 
 7 C. P. 416; L. R. 8 C. P. 148), 736. 
 Baylor v. Railroad Co. (40 N. J. L. 23), 
 
 268. 
 Bauer </. Kansas, etc., R. Co. (69 Mo. 
 
 219), 962. 
 Bauer v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (46 Ark. 
 
 388), 408. 
 Baumstein v. New York City Ry. Co. 
 
 (107 N. Y. S. 23). 728. 
 Baxter v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (104 
 
 Wis. 307; SO rf. W. Rep. 644), 272. 
 Baxter v. St. Louis Transit Co. (103 Mo. 
 
 App. 697; 78 S. W. Rep. 70), 1064. 
 Beach v. Bay St. Co. (30 Barb. 433; 10 
 
 Abb. Pr. 71; 18 How. Pr. 336), 60. 
 Beach v. Southern Ry. Co. (61 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 664, 669), 1092. 
 Bean v. Western, etc., R. Co. (107 N. 
 
 Car. 731; 12 S. E. Rep. 600), 369. 
 Beasley v. Transfer Co. (148 Mo. 413; 
 
 60 S. W. Rep. 87), 357. 
 Beauchamp v. International & G. N. R. 
 
 Co. (56 Texas 239; 9 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 307), 102. 
 Beaumont v. Northern Pacific R. Co. 
 
 (109 Fed. Rep. 532; 48 C. C. A. 629), 
 
 Beaumont Traction Co. u. Dilworth (94 
 
 S. W. Rep. 362), 70. 
 Beaustrom v. Northern Pacific R. Co. (46 
 
 Minn. 193; 48 N. W. Rep. 778), 986. 
 Becht V. Corbin (92 N. Y. 658), 971. 
 Beck V. Quincy, etc., R. Co. (10 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 132), 733. 
 Becke v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (102 
 
 Mo. 644; 13 S. W. Rep. 1053), 1043. 
 Becker v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. . (57 
 
 Fed, Rep. 188), 469. 
 Beckwith v. Cheshire, etc., Ry Co. (143 
 
 Mass.. 68;' 8 N. E. Rep. 876; «7 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 1921. 559. 
 Beckwith v. Ne\i«,York, etc., R. Co. (54 
 
 Hun N. Y. 446; 125 N. Y. 769), 974. 
 Bedford, etc., R. Co. v. Rainbolt (99 
 
 Ind. 651; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 466). 
 
 605. 
 Bedford Quarries Co. v. Baugh (80 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 529), S04. 
 Beehler v. Daniels & Co. (27 L. R. A. 
 
 512), 872. 
 
 xlv 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED, 
 
 [References are to sections.] 
 
 Beers v. Housatonic R. Co. (19 Conn. 
 
 566), 614. 
 Beeson v. Green Mountain R. Co. (57 
 
 Cal. 20), 196. 
 Behen v. Transit Co. (186 Mo. 430; 85 
 
 S. W. Rep. 346), 125. 
 Beiseieel v. New York, etc., R. Co. (34 
 
 N. Y. 622; 40 N. Y. 9), 937. 
 Beiser v. Cliesapealte, etc., R. Co. (29 Jiy. 
 
 L. R. 249; 92 S. W. Rep. 928), 1096. 
 Beker's Admr. v. Lexington, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (Ky. 89 S. W. -Rep. 149), 319. 
 Belding v. Black Hills, etc., R. Co. (b. 
 Dak., 53 N. W. Rep. 750; 58 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 624), 65. 
 Beleal v. Northern Pacific K. Co. (lOB 
 
 N. W. Rep. 33), 536. 
 Belknap v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (49 JN. 
 
 H. 358), 180. ^ ^,„„ 
 
 Bell V. Central Electric Ry. Co. (103 
 
 S. W. Rep. 144), 183. 
 Bell V. Gulf, etc., R. Co. (Texas, 81 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 134), 89. 
 Bell V. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (72 Mo. 
 
 50; 4 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 680), 1083. 
 Bell V. Western, etc., R. Co. (70 Ga. 
 
 566), 349. • „ „, 
 
 Bellamy v. Whitesell (Mo., 100 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 514), 63. , , , 
 
 Bellefontaine R. Co. v. Hunter (33 Ind. 
 
 335),. 1029. 
 Bellefontaine, etc., R. Co. v. Snyder (18 
 
 Ohio St. 399; 24 Ohio St. 670), 1058. 
 Belles V. Jackson (4 Pa. Dist. R. 194), 
 
 275. 
 Bellman v. New York, etc., R. Co. (5 N. 
 
 Y. S. R. 153; 42 Hun 130; 122 N. Y. 
 
 671; 34 N. Y. S. R. 1015), 556. 
 Belt Ry. Co. v. Confrey (209 111. 344; 
 
 70 N. E. Rep. 773), 109. 
 Belten v. Baxter (64 N. Y. 245), 1029. 
 Beltz V. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. (137 
 
 Fed. Rep. 1016), 235. 
 Benage v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. (102 
 
 Mich. 72; 60 N. W. Rep. 286), 39. 
 Bender v. New York, etc., Co. (N. J. 
 
 61 Atl. Rep. 388), 318. 
 Bender v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (137 
 
 Mo. 240; 37 S. W. Rep. 132), 150. 
 Benedick v. Potts (88 Md. 58; 40 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 1067; 34 L. R. A. 478), 118. 
 Benedict v. Chicago Great Western Ry. 
 
 Co. (104 Mo. App. 218; 78 S. W. Rep. 
 
 60). 43. 
 Bengston v. ChicafO, etc., R. Co. (47 
 
 Minn. 486; 50 N. W. Rep. 631), 336. 
 Benignia v, Pennsylvania R. Co. (197 
 
 Pa. St. 384; 47 Atl. Rep. 359), 354. 
 Benn v. Null (65 Iowa 407), 266. 
 Bennett v. Butterfield (70 N. W. Rep. 
 
 410), 872. 
 Bennett v. Grand Trunk R. Co. (3 Ont. 
 
 446; 13 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 627), 968. 
 Bennett v. Long Island R. Co. (81 App. 
 
 Div. 26; 47 N. Y. Supp. 258; 168 N. 
 
 Y. 1; 57 N. E. Rep. 79), 210. 
 Bennett v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (103 
 
 U. S. 677; 26 L. Ed. 835), 870. 
 Bennett v. New Jersey, etc., R. Co. (36 
 
 N. J. L. 225; 13 Am. Rep. 435), 1045. 
 Bennett v. New York, etc., R. Co. (57 
 
 Conn. 422; 18 Atl. Rep. 668; 41 Am. 
 
 xlvi 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 184; 40 N. Y. S. R. 
 
 948; 16 N. Y. Supp. 765; 133 N. Y. 
 
 563; 30 N. E. Rep. 1149), 1059. 
 Bennett v. Northern Pacific R. Co. (2 N. 
 
 Dak. 112), 348. 
 Benson v. Central Pacific R. Co. (98 
 
 Cal. 45; 32 Pac. Rep. 809; 54 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 186), 577. 
 Benson v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. (77 Md. 
 
 535; 26 Atl. Rep. 973), 870. 
 Bentlet v. Georgia ' Pacific R. Co. (86 
 
 Ala. 484; 6 So. Rep. 37), 1096. 
 Bentley v. Loverock (108 111. App. 166), 
 
 878. 
 Benton v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (55 Iowa 
 
 496; 8 N. W. Rep. 330), 198. 
 Bequette v. People's Transportation Co. 
 
 (8 Oregon 200), 461. 
 Bequette v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (86 
 
 Mo. App. 601), 589. 
 Berberich v. Ebach (131 Pa. St. 165; 18 
 
 Atl. Rep. 1008), 287. 
 Berg V. Great Northern R. Co. (70 
 
 Minn. 872; 73 N. W. Rep. 648), 29. 
 Berg V. Parsons (156 N. Y. 109; 60 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 957; 41 L. R. A. 391; 66 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 543), 885. 
 Berg V. Seattle, R. & S. Ry. Co. (87 
 
 Pac. Rep. 34), 273. 
 Bergman v. Altman (127 Iowa 693; 104 
 
 N. W. Rep. 280) 187. 
 Berkson v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (144 
 
 Mo. 211; 45 S. W. Rep. 1119), 334. 
 Berns v. Gaston G. C. (;o.' (27 W. Va. 
 
 285; 55 Am. Rep. 304), 248. 
 Berrigan V. New York, etc., R. R. -Co. 
 
 (131 N. Y. 588; 30 N. E. Rep.. 57), 
 
 263. 
 Berry v. Boston & M. R. Co. (66 Atk 
 
 Rep. 386), 884. 
 Berry r. Central, etc., R. Co. (40 Iowa 
 
 564), 414. 
 Berry v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (128 
 
 Ind. 484; 28- N. E. Rep. 188), 62. 
 Berry v. Missouri, etc., R. Co. (134 Mo. 
 
 223; 86 S. W. Rep. 229), 1071. 
 Berry v. Northeastern R. Co. (72 Ga. 
 
 137; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 575), 908. 
 Berry v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (N. J., 26 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 396; 4 Atl. Rep. 
 
 303), 1001. 
 Berryman v. Cox (73 Mo. App. 67), 739. 
 Bertfeson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (6 Da- 
 kota 313; 40 N. W. Rep. 631), 408. 
 Bertram v. People's Ry. Co. (164 Mo. 
 
 639; 55 S. W. Rep. 1040), 686. 
 Bertram v. Sharon (71 Conn. 686; 43 
 
 Atl. Rep. 143; 71 Am. St. Rep. 225; 
 
 46 L. R.. A. 144), 1056. 
 Besel I/. New York, etc., R. Co. (70 N. 
 
 Y. 171), 469. 
 Bessex v. Railway Co. (45 Wis. 482), 
 
 258. 
 Betchman v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. (65 
 
 S. E. Rep. 140), 898. 
 Bethany v. Lee (124 111. App. 397), 168. 
 Bethmann v. Old Colony R. Co. (165 
 
 Mass. 352; 29 N. E. Rep. 587), 631. 
 Beuhring v. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. (37 
 
 W. Va. 608; 16 S. E. Rep. 435), 461. 
 Beuneman v. Railroad Co. (80 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 379), 686. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.] 
 
 Bevis V. Vanceburg, etc., Co. (Ky., 89 
 
 S. W. Rep. 126), 1055. 
 Bevel v. Newport, etc., Co. (84 W. Va. 
 
 538; 12 S. E. 6ep. 5SS), 953. 
 Beyer v: Railroad Co. (114 Ala. 424; 21 
 
 So. Rep. 952), 349. 
 Bibb V. Norfolk, etc., R. Co. (87 Va. 711; 
 
 14 S. E. Rep. 163; 47 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 651), 267. „ ^ 
 
 Bibb V. Taylor (95 Ga. 615; 23 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 188),, 309. „ ^ 
 
 Bickel V. Pennsylvania R. Co. (66 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 756; 217 Pa. St. 456), 959. ^ 
 Bier v. Hosford (36 Wash. 544; 77 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 867), 89. „ ^ , ^ 
 
 Bierbauer v. New York, etc., R. Co. (15 
 
 Hun 559: 77 N. Y. 588), 202. 
 Bigler v. (jharlotte, etc., R. Co. (94 N. 
 
 Car. 604; 26 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 386), 
 
 395. 
 Bigelow V. Danielson (102 Wis. 470; 78 
 
 N. W. Rep. 599), 358. 
 Bigelow V. Metropolitan, etc., R. Co. (48 
 
 Mo. App. 367), 164. 
 Bigelow V. Reed (51 Me. 325), 33. 
 Bifbee v. Lonaon, etc., R. Co. (18 C. B. 
 
 [N. S.1584; 11 Jur. [N. S.] 745; 34 L. 
 , J. C. P. 182; 13 W. R. 779; 18 L. T. 
 
 146), 931. 
 Biles V. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. (139 
 
 N. C. 628; 52 S. E. Rep. 129), 263. 
 Billjnan v. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. 178 
 
 Ind. 166; 40 Am. Rep. 230; 6 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 41), 170.' 
 Birch V. Benton (26 Mo. 153), 49. 
 Bird V. Flint, etc., R. Co. (86 Mich. 79; 
 
 48 N. W. Rep. 691), 1028. 
 Bird V. Great Northern R. Co. (By Pol- 
 lock, C. B.; 28 L. J. [Exch.] 8), 585. 
 Birkett v. Knickerbocker R. Co. (110 N. 
 
 Y, 504; 18 N. E. Rep. 108), 198. 
 Birmingham, etc., R. Co. v. Alexander 
 
 (93 Ala. 138; 9 So. Rep. 525), 97. 
 Birmingham, etc.. R. Co. v. Baker (132 
 
 Ala. 507; 31 So. Rep. 618), 1050. 
 Birmingham, etc., R. Co. v. Baylor (101 
 
 Ala. 488; 13 So. Ren. 793), 511. 
 Birmingham, etc., R. Co. v. Chesapeake, 
 
 etc., R. Co. (98 Va. 548; 37 S. E. Rep. 
 
 17), 55.,^ 
 Birmingham, etc., R. Co. v. Clay (108 
 
 Ala. 233; 19 So. Rep. 309), 783. 
 Birmingham, etc., kv. Co. v. Dickerson 
 
 (45 So. Rep. 659), 718. - 
 
 Birmingham, etc., R. Co. v. Enslen (Ala., 
 
 89 So. Rep. 74), 100. 
 Birmingham, etc., R. Co. i^. Hinton (Ala., 
 
 37 So. Rep. 635), 27. 
 Birmingham, etc., R. Co. v. Jacobs (Ala., 
 
 13 So. Rep. 408; 55 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 299), 446. 
 Birmingham Ry. Co. v. Jones (45 So. 
 
 Rep. 177), 1062. 
 Birmingham Southern R. Co. v. Kendrick 
 
 (46 So, Rep. 588), 964. 
 Birmingham Ry. Light & Power Co. v. 
 
 Ryan (41 So. Rep. 616), 451. 
 Birmingham v. Rochester City, etc., R. 
 
 Co. 087- N. Y. 18; 32 N. E. Rep. 
 
 995; 68 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 184), 606. 
 Birmingham Ry. Co. v. Wright (44 So. 
 
 Rep. 1037), 822. 
 
 BischoiT V. People's, etc., R. Co. (121' 
 
 Mo. 216; 25 S. W. Rep. 908), 37. 
 Bishop V. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. (48 
 
 Minn. 26; 50 N. W. Rep. 927), 170. 
 Bissell v. New York, etc., R. Co. (29 
 
 Barb. 602; 26 N. Y. 442), 856. 
 Bitner v. Utah, etc., R. Co. (4 Utah 602 ; 
 
 11 Pac. Rep. 620), 953. 
 Black V. Burlington, etc., R. Co. (38 
 
 Iowa 516), 978. 
 Black V. CarroUton, etc., R. Co. (10 La. 
 
 Ann. 83), 661. 
 Black V. D. & R. Canal Co. (22 N. J. 
 
 Eq. 130) 235. 
 Black V. Michigan Cent. R. Co. (Mich., 
 
 109 N. W. Rep. 1052; 13 Detroit Leg. 
 
 N. 863), 206. 
 Black ». New York & R. Co. (79 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 797), 401. 
 Blackstone v. Co. (Mass., 49 -N. E. Rep. 
 
 685), 872.. 
 'Blackwell v. Lynchburg, etc., R. Co. (Ill 
 
 No. Car. 151; 16 S. E. Rep. 12), 962. 
 Blair v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (43 Iowa 
 
 662; 14 Am. Ry. Rep. 575), 375. 
 Blair v. Erie R. Co. (66 N. Y. 313; 23 
 
 Am. Rep. 55), 564. . 
 Blair v. (irand Rapids R. Co. (60 Mich. 
 
 124; 26 N. W. Rep. 855), 784. 
 Blair v. Heible (Mo., 77 S. W. Rep. 
 
 1017), 269. 
 Blair v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. (20 Wis. 
 
 254), 602. 
 Blair v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (27 Fed. 
 
 ' Rep. 176), 74. 
 Blake v. Maine Cent. Ry. Co. (70 Me. 
 
 63), 261. 
 Blaker v. New Jersey, etc., R. Co. (30 
 
 N. J. Eg. 240; 18 Am. Ry. Rep. 81), 
 
 1033. 
 Blamires v. Lancashire, etc., R. Co. (42 
 
 L. J. Ex. 182; L. R, Ex. 283), 652._ 
 Blanchard v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (126 111. 416; 18 N. E. Ref. 799), 
 
 1038. 
 Blank v. Illinois, etc., R. Co. (182 111. 
 
 332; 55 N. E. Rep. 382; 80 111. App. 
 
 475), 564.— 
 Blanton v. Dold (109 Mo. 74), 111. 
 Blessing v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (77 
 
 Mo. 410; 7 Mo. App. 694; 16 Am. & 
 
 Eng; R. Cas. 598), 488. 
 Bleyle v. New York, etc., R. Co. (46 
 
 Hun 675; 118 N. Y. 626; 20 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 877; 22 N. Y. S. R. 993), 967. . 
 Blodgett v. Bartlett (60 Ga. -358), 707. 
 Blomsness v. Puget Sound Ry. Co. (92 
 
 Pac. Rep. 414), 557. 
 Bloom V. Manhattan R. Co. (48 N. Y. 
 
 S. R. 878; Hun 629; 17 N. Y. Supp. 
 812), 183. 
 Bluedorn r. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. 
 
 (108 Mo. 489; 18 S. W. Rep. 1103; 
 32 Am. St. Rep. 615), 1050. 
 Blundell v. Miller, etc., Co. (189 Mo. 
 
 652: 88 S. W. Rep. 103), 360. 
 Boatright v. Northeastern R. Co. (25 So. 
 
 Car. 128), 492. 
 Bodie V. Charleston,, etc., R. Co. (60 S. 
 
 C. 302; 44 S. E. Rep. 943), 99. 
 Boering v. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. (198 
 U. S: 442; 48 L. Ed. 742), 848. 
 
 xlvii 
 
TABLE OI' CASES CITED, 
 
 [lieferenees are to sections. 1 
 
 Bogan V. Carolina Central R. Co. (129 
 
 N. C. 154), 3,98. 
 Bogard v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (100 
 
 Ind. 491), 461. 
 Boggess V. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. (37 
 W. Va. 297; 16 S. E. Rep. 5S5), 791. 
 Bohan f. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. (61 
 
 Wis. 391; 21 N. W. Rep. 241; 19 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 276), 972. 
 Bohn V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (106 Mo. 
 
 429; 17 S. W. Rep. 680), 327. 
 Bokamp v. Chicago & A. Ry. Co. (100 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 689), 262. 
 Boland v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (36 
 
 Mo. 484), 1040. 
 Boldt V. New York, etc., R. Co. (18 N. 
 
 Y. 432), 460. 
 Bolinger v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. (36 
 
 Minn. 418; 31 N. W. Rep. 856; 29 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 408), 197. 
 Boll V. Adirondack R. Co. (22 N. Y. S. 
 
 R. 365; 52 Hun 610; N. Y. Supp. 769), 
 
 1022. 
 Bomar v, Louisiana, etc., R. Co. (42 La. 
 
 Ann. 983; 8 So. Rep. 478), 388. 
 Bond V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (122 Mo. 
 
 App. 207; 99 S. W. Rep. 30; 110 Mo. 
 
 App. 131; 84 S. W. Rep. 124), 570. 
 Bond V. New York, etc., R. Co. (62 N. 
 
 Y. S. R. 637; 23 N. Y. Supp. 450; 69 
 
 Hun 476), 1020. 
 Bonnea v. North Shore R. Co. (93 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 106), 678. 
 Bonner v. Whitcomb (80 Texas 178; 15 
 
 S. W. Rep. 899), 483.' 
 Bonner v. Wingate (78 Texas 333; 14 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 790), 603. 
 Bookman v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. 
 
 (152 Fed. Rep. 686), 1094. 
 Bookrum V. Galveston, etc., R. Co. (57 
 
 S. W. Rep. 919), 246. 
 Boone County v. Mutchler (137 Ind. 140; 
 
 36 N. E. Rep. 534), 1057. 
 Booth v: Boston, etc., R. Co. (73 N. Y. 
 
 38; 67 N. Y. 693), 471. 
 Booth V. Union, etc., R. Co. (126 Iowa 
 
 13; 101 N. W. Rep. 147), 1062. 
 Bordeau t,. Valley Falls Co. (16 R. I. 
 
 448; 17 Atl. Rep. 64), 354. 
 Borough of Metuchen i'. Pennsylvania 
 
 R. Co. (64 Atl. Rep. 484), 890. 
 Boss V. Northern Pac. R. Co. (5 Dak. 
 
 308; 40 N. W. Rep. 590), 668. 
 Boss z'. Providence, etc., R. Co. (15 R. 
 
 I. 149; 1 Atl. Rep. 9; 21 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 364), 786. 
 Boster i'. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. (36 W. 
 
 Va. 318; 15 S. E. Rep. 158; 52 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 357), 658. 
 Bostick V. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. (45 N. 
 
 Y. 712) 35. ■ 
 Boston, etc., R. Co. v. Hurd (108 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 116; 47 C. C. A. 615), 47. 
 Boswell V. Laird (8. Cal. 469; 68 Am. 
 
 Dec. 345), 278. 
 Boucher v. New York & R. Co. (82 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 15), 284. 
 Boulden v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (205 
 
 Pa. St. 264; 64 Atl. Rep. 906), 69. 
 Boulfrois V. United Traction Co. (210 
 
 Pa. St. 263; 2 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 
 
 938), 715. 
 
 xlviii 
 
 Bourgeaulf v. Grand Trunk R. Co. (5 
 
 Mont. Super. 249), 325. 
 Bourke v. .(fork M. R. Co. (4 Ir. L. R. 
 
 682), 188. 
 Bouwmeester v. Grand Rapids, etc., R, 
 
 Co. (63 Mich. 567; 30 N, W. Rep. 
 
 337; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 476), 1083. 
 Bowden v. Jacksonville, etc., R. C;o. (41 
 
 So. Rep. 400), 69. 
 Bowen v. Cljica^o, etc., R. Co. (117 111. 
 
 App. 9; 98 Mo. 268; 8 S. W. Rep. 
 
 230), 351, 467. 
 BoKven v. N,ew York, etc., R. Co. (18 
 
 N. Y. 408), 579. 
 Bower v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (61 Wis. 
 
 457; 21 N. W. Rep. 636; 19 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 301), 1021. 
 Bower v. Peate ,(16 Moak's Eng. R. 374), 
 
 284. 
 Bowers v. Connecticut River R. Co. (162 
 
 Mass. 312: 38 N. E. Rep. 508), 512. 
 £owers v. Union Pacific R. Co. (4 Utah 
 
 216; 7 Pac. Rep. 251), 394. 
 Bowes V. New York, etc., R. Co. (Mass., 
 
 62 N. E. Rep. 949), 380. 
 Bowles V. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. (57 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 131), 947. 
 Bowles V. Indiana R. Co. (27 Ind. App. 
 
 672; 62 N. E. Rep. 94), 228. 
 Bowles V. Rome, etc., R. Co. (46 Hun 
 
 324: 113 N. Y. 643; 21 N.- E. Rep. 
 
 414), 198. 
 Bowlin V. Union Pacific R. Co. (102 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 631), 576. 
 Boyce v. Chipaito & A. Ry. Co. (96 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 670) 942. 
 Boyce v. Wabash, etc., Co. (63 Iowa 70; 
 
 23 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 172; 50 Am. 
 
 Rep. 730), 47. 
 Boytf V. Brazil, etc., Co. (22 Ind. App. 
 
 329; 60 N. E. Rep. 368), 42. 
 Boyd V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (217 III. 
 
 332; 75 N. E. Rep. 496; 108 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 263), 281. 
 Boyd V. Coal Co. (50 N. E. Rep. 368), 
 
 606. 
 Boyd V. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. 
 
 (108 S. W. Rep. 713), 1032. 
 Boyd V. Wabash R. Co. (105 Mo. 371: 
 
 16 S. W. Rep. 909), 883. 
 Boyd V. West Chicago R. Co. (112 111. 
 
 App. 50), 91. 
 Boyden v. Fitchburg, etc., R. Co. (72 
 
 Vt. 89; 47 Atl. Rep. 409), 1049. 
 Boyer v. Eastern Ry. Co. (87 Minn. 367'; 
 
 92 N. W. Rep. 326), 381. 
 Boyle V. New York, etc., R. Co. (151 
 
 Mass. 102; 23 N. E. Rep. 827). 835. 
 Braceville, etc., Co. v. People (147 111. 
 
 66), 382. 
 Bracken r. Pennsylvania R. Co. (32 Pa. 
 
 Super. Ct. 22), 930. 
 Bradburn v. Wabash R. Co. (Mich., 96 
 
 N. W. Rep. 929), 270. 
 Bradbury v. Kingston, etc., Co. (157 Pa. 
 
 St. 231; 27 Atl. Kep. 400), 322. 
 Bradford Construction Co. v. Heflin (88 
 
 Miss. 314; 42 So. Rep. 174; Miss., 12 
 
 L. R. A. [N. S.] 1040), 604. 
 Bradley v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (138 
 
 Mo. 293; 39 S. W. Rep. 763), 128. 
 Bradley v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. (138 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References we to sections.] 
 
 Mo. 293; 39 S. W. Rep. 763), 365. 
 Bradley .v. Nashville, etc., R. Co. (14 
 
 Lea- PTenn.] 374), 350. 
 Bradwdl v. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. (139 
 
 Pa. St. 404; 20 -Atl. Rep. l646), 167. 
 Brady v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (114 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 100; 52 C C. A. 48; 57 L. R. A. 
 
 712), 229. 
 Brady v. New York, etc., R. Co. (184 
 
 Mass. 225; 68 N. E. Rep. 227), 5S6. 
 Brady v. Toledo, etc., R. Co. (81 Mich. 
 
 616; 45 N. W. Rep. 1110), 1016. 
 Bragg v. Metropolitan R. Co. (192 Mo. 
 
 I.e. 354; 91 S. W. Rep. 527), 1011. 
 Braisted v. Brooklyn, etc., R. Co. (46 
 
 N. Y. App. Div. 204; 61 N. Y. S. R. 
 
 674), 285. 
 Branco v. Illinois Central R. Co. (Iowa, 
 
 93 N. W. Rep; 97), 323. 
 Brann v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (53 Iowa 
 
 595; 6 N. W. Rep. 5), 475. 
 Braunen v. Kohomo, etc., R. Co. (115 
 
 Ind. 115; 17 N. E. Rep. 202 j 7 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 411), 1039. 
 Brannock v. Elniore (ll4 Mo. 55; 21 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 451), 298. 
 Brassell zi. New York, etc., R. Co. (84 
 
 N. y. 241; 3 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 380), 79B. 
 Braun v. Union' Rv. Co. (100 N. Y. S. 
 
 1012), 608. 
 Braverman v. Hart (105 N. Y. S. 107), 
 
 1038. 
 Braxton v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (77 
 
 Mo. 455), 948. 
 Brazil Coal Co. v. Gibson (66 N. E. Rep. 
 
 882), 95. 
 Breckenfelder v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. 
 
 79 Mich. 560; 44 N. W. Rep. 957), 
 ' 1027. 
 Breen v. New York, etc., R. Co. (109 N. 
 
 Y. 297), 608. 
 Breen v. St. Louis, etc., Co. (50 Mo. 
 
 App. 202), 278. 
 Brehm v. Great Western R. Co. (34 
 
 Barb. N. Y. 256), 91. ■ 
 Brennan v. Fairhaven, etc., R. Co. (45 
 
 Conn. 284; 29 Am. Rep. 679), 567. 
 Brennan t/. Merchant, etc., Co. (205 
 
 Pa. 258; 54 Atl. Rep. 891), 280. 
 Bresse v. Los Angeles Traction Co. (Cal. 
 
 85 Pac. Rep. 152; 5 L. R. A. [N. S.] 
 
 1069), 1039. 
 Bretherton v. Wood (6 Moore 141; 3 
 
 Brod. & B. 54), 17. 
 Brewer v. Flint, -etc., R. Co. (56 Mich. 
 
 620; 23 N. W. Rep. 440), 335. 
 Brewer v. New York, etc., R. Co. (124 
 
 N. Y. 59; 26 N. E. Rep. 324; 11 L. 
 
 R. A. 483), 564. 
 Brewer v. Tenn., etc., Co. (97 Tenn. 
 
 615; 37 S. W. Rep. 549), 311. 
 Brewster v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (114 
 
 Iowa 144; 86 N. W. Rep. 221; 89 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 348), 463. 
 Brice w Louisville, etc., R. Co. (Ky., 
 
 9 S. W. Rep. 288; 38 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 38), 332. 
 Brick V. Rochester, etc., R. Co. (98 N. Y. 
 
 211; 31 Hun 453; 21 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 605), 352. 
 
 Brickman v. South Carolina R. Co. (8 
 
 So. Car. 173), 69. 
 Bricknell v. New York, etc., R. Co. (120 
 
 N. Y. 290; 24 N. E. Rep. 449; 30 N. 
 
 Y. S. R. 932; 46 Hun 678; 42 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 107), 1042. 
 Brickner v. New York, etc., R. Co. (2 
 
 Lans. N. -Y. 606), 471. 
 Bridge v. Grand Junction R. Co. (3 M. 
 
 K. W. 244), 1043. 
 Bridger v. Ashville, etc., R. Co. (27 So. 
 
 Car. 456; 3 S. E. Rep. 860), 97. 
 Bridges v. North London R. Co. (43 L. 
 
 J. Q. B. 157; L. R. 7 Q. B. 213; 23 
 
 W.Tl. 68; 30 L. T. 844), 629. 
 Bridges v. R. R. Co. (62 B. 377), 33. 
 Bridges v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (6 Mo. 
 
 App. 389), 377. 
 Briggs V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (188 Mass. 
 
 463; 74 N. E. Rep. 667), 88. 
 Briggs V. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. (126 
 
 Fed. Rep. 745; 60 C. C. A. 513), 264. 
 Briggs V. Grand Trunk R. Co. (24 U. 
 
 C. Q. B. 510), 102. 
 Briggs V. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. (52 
 
 Minn. 36; 53 N. W. Rep. 1019), 734. 
 Brightman v. Union, etc., R. Co. (167 
 
 Mass. 113), 39. 
 Brihkmeier v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (69 
 
 Kan. 738; 77 Pac. Rep. 586), 79. 
 Britt V. Carolina Northern R. Co. (56 
 
 S. E. Rep. 910), 500. 
 Britton v. Atlanta, etc., R. Co. (88 No. 
 
 Car. 536; 43 Am. Rep. 749), 743. 
 Brocksmidt v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (Mo. 103 S. W. Rep. 964), 412. 
 Brodeur v. Valley Falls R. Co. (16 R. 
 
 I. 448; 17 Atl. Rep. 54), 478. 
 Bromley v. New York, etc., R. Co. (79 
 
 N. E. Rep. 775). 803. 
 Bronson v. Oakes (76 Fed. Rep. 734; 40 
 
 U. S. App. 413; 22 C C. A. 520), 
 
 648. 
 Brooks V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (135 Mass. 
 
 21; 16 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 346), 790. 
 Brooks V. Buffalo, etc., R. Co. (27 Barb. 
 
 N. Y. 532), 1006. 
 Brooks V. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (35 Mo. 
 
 App. 671), 446. 
 Brooks V. New York, etc., R. Co. (30 
 
 Hun 47), 178. 
 Brooks II. Northern Pac. R. Co. (47 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 687), 338. 
 Brooks o. Southern Pacific R. Co. (64 
 
 Cent. L. J. 52), 448. 
 Brossman ». Lcihigh Valley R. Co. (113 
 
 Pa. St. 4'90; 6 Atl. Rep. 226; 57 Am. 
 
 K«p. 479), 346. 
 Brotnerton v. Manhattan Beach Co. (48 
 
 N«b. 563; 67 N. W. Rep. 479; 69 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 767; 33 L. R. A. 698), 5. 
 Brow V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (157 Mass. 
 
 399; 32 N. E. Rep. 362), 927. 
 Brown v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. (C. C, 
 
 142 Fed; Rep. 911), 473. 
 Brown v. Blaine (41 Wash. 287; 83 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 310), 192. 
 Brown *. Central Pac. R. Co. (Cal., 12 
 
 Pac. Rep. 512), 321. 
 Brown v. Central Pacific R. Co. (72 
 
 Cal. 523; 14 Pac. Rep. 138), 500. 
 
 xlix 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 IReferences are to sections.^ 
 
 Brown v. Chattanooga Co. (101 Tenn. 
 
 262; 47 S. W. Rep. 415), 128. 
 Brown v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (64Wis. 
 342; 11 N. W. Rep. 336; 41 Am. 
 Rep. 41; 3 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 444), 
 703. 
 Brown v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (139 Fed. 
 Rep. 972; 72 C. C. A. 20; 2 L. R. 
 
 A. [N. S.] 106), 746. 
 Brown i/. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (64 Iowa 
 
 652; 21 N. W. Rep. 193), 191. 
 Brown v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (69 Iowa 
 
 161; 28 N. W. Rep.. 487), 334. 
 Brown v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (80 
 
 Wis. 162; 49 NT W. Rep. 807), 787. 
 Brown v. Chicago, etc^ R. Co. (102 
 
 Wis. 137; 77 N. W. Rep. 748; 44 L. 
 
 R. A. 679; 13 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. [N. 
 
 S.] 603), 67. 
 Brown v. Congress, etc., R. Co. (49 Mich. 
 
 163; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 383), 4. 
 Brown v. Griffin (71 Texas 654; 9 
 
 S. W. Rep. 646), 952. 
 Brown v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (66 Mo. 
 
 688; 99 Mo. 310; 12 S. W. Rep. 666), 
 
 186, 736. 
 Brown v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (50 Mo. 
 
 461; 11 Am. Rep. 420), 392. 
 Brown v. La Societe Francaise (138 Cal. 
 
 476; 71 Pac. Rep. 516), 299. 
 Brown v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (Ky. 14 
 
 S. W. Rep. 648; 10 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. N. S. 65), 731. 
 Brown v. Manhattan Ry. Co. (94 N. Y. 
 
 S. 190; 106 App. Div. 895), 125. 
 Brown v. Memphis, etc., R. Co. (4 Fed 
 
 Rep. 37; 7 Fed. Rep. 61; 1 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 247), 165, 658. 
 Brown v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. (23 
 
 Minn. 166; 19 Am. Ry. Rep. 298), 
 
 409. 
 Brown v, Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. (31 
 
 Minn. 653; 18 N. W. Rep. 834), 485. 
 Brown v. Missouri, etc., R. Co. (64 Mo. 
 
 636), 671. 
 Brown v. New York, etc., R. Co. (181 
 
 Mass. 366), 715. 
 Brown v. New York, etc., R. Co. (34 N. 
 
 Y. 404), 679. 
 Brown v. New York, etc., R. Co. (32 
 
 N. Y. 697; 88 Am. Dec. 358), 1046. 
 Brown v. Northern Ohio Traction Co. 
 
 (81 N. E. Rep. 326), 398. 
 Brown v. Northern Pac. R. Co. (Wash. 
 
 86 Pac. Rep. 1053). 117. 
 Brown v. Railroad Co. (59 Kan. 70; 52 
 
 Pac. Rep. 65), 348. 
 Brown v. Ry. Co. (68 N. H. 518), 802. 
 Brown v. Rome, etc., R. Co. (48 Hun 
 
 619; 1 N. Y. Supp. 286; 121 N. Y. 
 
 669), 936. 
 Brown v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (52 
 
 Ark. 120; 12 S. W. Rep. 203), 1083. 
 Brown v. Scarboro, etc., R. Co. (97 Ala. 
 
 316; 12 So. Rep. 289; 58 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 364), 797. 
 Brown v. Southern Pacific R. Co. (7 
 
 Utah 288: 26 Pac. Rep. 679), 492. 
 Brown v. Sullivan (71 Texas 470; 10 
 
 S. W. Rep. 288), 327. 
 Brown v. Texas, etc., R. Co. (42 La. 
 
 Ann. 350; 7 So. Rep. 682), 878. 
 
 Brown v. Union R. Co. (61 Mo. App. 
 
 192), 164. 
 Brown v. Wabash R. Co. (20 Mo. App. 
 
 222), 28. 
 Brown v. Winona, etc., R. Co. (27 Minn. 
 
 162; 6 N. W. Rep. 484; 38 Am. Rep. 
 
 286), 476. 
 Brown v. Yazoo, etc.,' R. Co. (41 So. 
 
 Rep. 383), 598. 
 Browne v. Raleigh, etc., R. Co. ( 108 No. 
 
 Car. 34; 47 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 644; 
 
 12 S. E. Rep. 958), 716. 
 Brownfield v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (107 
 
 Iowa 254; 77 N. W. Rep. 1038), 118. 
 Brownell v- Chicago, etc., R. Co. (107 
 
 Iowa 254; 77 N. W. Rep. 1038), 110. 
 Browning v. Wabash Ry. Co. (124 Mo. 
 
 55; 27 S. W. Rep. 644), 1050. 
 Bruce v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. (83 
 
 Ky. 174), 47. 
 Brundige v. Dodge, etc., Co. (183 Mass. 
 
 100; 66 N. E. Rep. 604). 308. 
 Brunke v. Telephone Co. (115 Mo. App. 
 
 36; 90 S. WT Rep. 753), 95. 
 Brunswick & B. R. Co. v. Hoodenpyle 
 
 (58 S. E. Rep. 705), 886. 
 Bryan v. International, etc., Ry. Co. 
 
 (90 S. W. Kep. 698), 253. 
 Bryan v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (32 
 
 Mo. App. 288), 678. 
 Bryant v. Burliiigton, etc., R. Co. (66 
 
 Iowa 805; 23 NT W. Rep. 678; 55 Am. 
 
 Rep. 275; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 593), 
 
 384. 
 Bryant v Rich (106 Mass.' 180), 727. 
 Bryce v. Burlington, etc., R. Co. (Iowa 
 
 93 N. W. Rep. 275), 338. 
 Brymer !/. Railway Co. (90 Cal. 497; 27 
 
 Pac. Rep. 371), 249. 
 Buchanan v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (35 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 378), 886. 
 Bucher v. New York, etc., R. Co. (98 N. 
 
 Y. 128; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 361), 
 
 788. 
 Buck V. Manhattan R. Co. (15 Daly. N. 
 
 Y. 276; 6 N. Y. Supp. 524; 26 N. Y. 
 
 S. R. 590), 937. 
 Buck V. Manhattan R. Co. (32 N. Y. S. 
 
 R. 61; 10 N. Y. Supp. 107), 837. 
 Buck V. People's Ry., etc., Co. (48 Mo. 
 App. 555; 108 Mo. 179; 18 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 1090), 861. 
 Buckalew v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (107 
 Mo. App. 576; 81 S. W. Rep. 1176), 
 
 Bucki K. Cone (26 Flor. 1; 6 So. Rep. 
 
 160), 4. ^ 
 
 Buckland v. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (Mass. 62 N. E. Rep. 965), 123. 
 Buckler z/. Newman (116 111. App. 546). 
 
 1057. 
 Bucklew V. Central Iowa R. Co. (64 
 
 Iowa 603), 407. 
 Buckley v. Railway Co. (118 N. Y. 640), 
 
 80. 
 Buckner v. Richmond, etc., R. Co. (72 
 
 Miss. 873; 18 So. Rep. 449), 281. 
 Buel V. New York Cent. R. (Jo. (31 N. 
 
 Y. 314; 88 Am. Dec. 271), 39. 
 Bueschingo v. Gas Light Co. (73 Mo. 
 
 219), 140. 
 Buffalo, etc., R. Co. ». O'Hara (3 
 
TaBLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to [sections.'] 
 
 Penn;. IPa.] 190; 9 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Gas. 317), 851. 
 Buffett V. New York, etc., R. Co. (40 
 
 N. Y. 168; aiBrming 36 Barb. 420), 
 
 5S6. 
 Bull V. Mobile, etc., R. Co. (67 Ala. 
 
 206), 469. 
 Bullard v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (64 N. 
 
 H. 27; 27 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 117), 
 
 710. 
 Bullard v. Southern R. Co. (116 Ga. 
 
 644), 398. 
 Bullock V. Houston, etc., R. Co. (Texas, 
 
 .65 S. W. Rep. 184), 557. 
 Bullock V. Wilmington, etc., R. Co. (105 
 
 No. Car. 180; 10 S. E. Rep. 988; 42 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 93), 1034. 
 Bunting v. Central Pacific R. Co. (16 
 
 Nev. 277), 398. 
 Bunting w. Hogsett (139 Pa. St. 363; 21 
 
 Atl. Rep. 31; 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 87), 187. 
 Burbank v. Bethel, etc. Co. (75 Me. 373; 
 
 46 Am. Rep. 400), 285. 
 Burbridge v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (36 Mo. App. 669), 776. 
 Burch V. Southern Pac. R. Co. (140 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 270), 376. 
 Burde v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (100 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 509), 417. 
 Burden v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. (104 
 
 Mich. 101; 62 N. W. Rep. 173), 789. 
 Burger v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (112 
 
 Mo. 238; 20 S. W. Rep. 439), 964. 
 Burgess v. Stowe (Mich., 96 N. W. Rep. 
 
 S9), 108. 
 Burke v. Burke (170 Mass. 499), 314. 
 Burke v. Ireland (20 N. Y. App. Div. 
 
 487; 50 N. Y. Supp. 369; 26 Cyc. Law 
 
 & Proc. Cyc. 1559), 281. 
 Burke v. Manchester, etc., R. Co. (18 
 
 W. R. 694; 22 L. T. 442), 664. 
 Burke V. Manhattan Ry. Co. (96 N. 'Y. 
 
 S. 516; 109 App. Div. 722), 257. 
 Burke v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (51 
 
 Mo. App. 491), 562. 
 Burke v. Norwich, etc., R. Co. (34 Conn. 
 
 474), 292. 
 Burke v. Syracuse, etc., R. Co. (23 N. 
 
 Y. Supp. 458; 69 Hun 21), 142. 
 Burleigh w. St. Louis Transit Co. (102 
 
 S. W. Rep. 621), 1060. 
 Burlington, etc., R. Co. v. Liehe (17 
 
 Colo. 280; 29 Pac. Rep. 175), 249. 
 Burmeister v. New York, etc., Co. (15 J. 
 
 & S. N. Y. 264), 283. 
 Burnes v, Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co. 
 
 (129 Mo. 41), 79. 
 Burnett v. Great North., etc., R. Co. (L. 
 
 R. 10 App. Cas. 147; 54 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 D. 631; 53 L. T. 607; 24 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 647), 686. 
 Burnham v. Wabash R. Co. (91 Mich. 
 
 523; 52 N. W. Rep. 14), 567. 
 Burns v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (69 Iowa 
 
 450; 30 N. W Rep. 26; 28 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 409), 343. 
 Burns o. Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co. (113 
 
 Ind. 169; 16 N. E. Rep. 230), 47. 
 Bums 11. North Chicago R. Co. (65 
 
 Wis. 312; 27 N. W. Rep. 43), 941. 
 
 Burns v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (76 Ark. 
 
 10; 88 S. W. Rep. 824), 411. 
 Burns v. Staten Island R. Co. (10 N. 
 
 Y. S. R. 352; 46 Hun 592), 482. 
 Burr V. Pennsylvania R. Co. (64 N. J. 
 
 L. 30; 44 Atl. Rep. 845), 722. 
 Burrows v. Erie R. Co. (63 N. Y. 556), 
 
 720. 
 Burton v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (39 
 
 Mo. App. 455), 374. 
 Busby V. Philadelphia Traction Co. (126 
 
 Pa. St. 559; 17 Atl. Rep. 895; 42 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 144), 991. 
 Busch V. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. (Minn., 
 
 55 N. W. Rep. 87), 661. 
 Busey v. Hooper (35 Md. 15), 74. 
 Bush 'J. Steinman(l B. & P. 404), 278. 
 Bush V. Union Pacific R. Co. (62 Kan. 
 
 709; 64 Pac. Rep. 624), 1039. 
 Bussell V. Quincy O. & K. C. R. Co. 
 
 (102 S. W. Rep. 613)_, 676. 
 Butcher v. West Virginia, etc., R. Co. 
 
 37 W. Va. 180; 16 S. E. Rep. 457; 
 
 55 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 181), 1034. 
 Butler V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (87 Iowa 
 
 206; 54 N. W. Rep. 208), 522. 
 Butler V. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. (59 Minn. 
 
 135; 60 N. W. Rep. 1090), 789. 
 Butterfield v. Western, etc., R. Co. (10 
 
 Allen 532), 1012. 
 Butts V. National Bank (96 Mo. App. 
 
 168; 72 S. W. Rep. 1083), 1105. 
 Butts V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (98 Mo. 
 
 272; U.S. W. Rep. 754), 1008. 
 Buttner v. Baltimore, Car, etc., Co. (Md., 
 
 60 Atl. Rep. 597), 249. 
 Buxton V. Northeastern R. Co. (3 Q. B. 
 
 549), 602. 
 Buxton V. Northeastern R. Co. (3 Q. B. 
 
 549), 295. 
 Byrd v. Southern Express Co. (51 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 861), 73 
 Byrne v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co. (85 
 
 N. E. Rep. 78), 1027. 
 Byrne v. New York, etc., R. Co. (104 
 
 N. Y. 362; 10 N. ' E. Rep. 539; 68 
 
 Am. Rep. 612), 874. 
 Byrnes v. New York, etc., R. Co. (81 
 
 N. E. Rep. 187; 113 N. Y. 261; 21 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 50; 4 L. R. A. 151), 599. 
 Byrnes v. New York, etc., R. Co. (71 
 
 Hun 209; 24 N. Y. S. 517), 263. 
 
 Caffi V. New York Central, etc., Co. 
 
 (102 N. Y. S. 633), 412. 
 Cagney v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (69 Mo. 
 
 416), 327. 
 Cahill V. Boston & M. R. Co. (190 Mass. 
 
 421; 76 N. E. Rep. 911), 519. 
 Cahill V. Chicago & A. Ry. Co. (103 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 532), 408. 
 Cahill v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. (92 
 
 Ky. 345; IS S. W. Rep. 2; 49 Am & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 390), 1042. 
 Cahill -v. Hilton (IS N. E. Rep. 339), 
 
 145. 
 Cahoon v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (85 
 
 Wis. 570; 65 N. W. Rep. 900), 962. 
 
 li 
 
TABLE OF CASES CflTED. 
 
 [References are to sections.] 
 
 Calcaterra v. lovaldi ■ (100 S. W. Rep. 
 
 675), 194. 
 Caldwell v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (68 Mo. App. 453), 884. 
 Caldwell v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (181 
 
 Mo. 455; 80 S. W. Rep. 897), 73. 
 Caldwell v. New Jersey, etc., Co. (47 
 
 N. Y. S82), 177. 
 Caldwell v. Richmond, etc., R. Co. (89 
 
 Ga. 650; 15 S. E. Rep. 678), 703. 
 Calhoun v. Gulf, etc., R. Co. (84 Texas 
 
 8S6; 19 S. W. Rep. 841), 974. 
 Callahan v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (33 
 
 Iowa 562), 284. . 
 Callahan v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (11 
 
 Fed. Rep. 536), 396. 
 Callahan v. St. Louis, etc., Ter. R. Co. 
 
 (170 Mo. 473; 71 S. W. Rep. 208; 60 
 
 L. R. A. 249; 94 Am. St. Rep. 746; 
 
 194 U. S. 628; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 857; 
 
 48 L. Ed. 1157), 386. 
 
 Callahan v. Warne (40 Mo. 131), 838. 
 Calvo V. Charlotte, etc., R. Co. (23 So. 
 
 Car. 526; 55 Am. Rep. 88; Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 327), 495. 
 Calwell V, Minneapolis, etc., R. Co, (115 
 
 N. W. Rep. 606), 874. 
 Camden, etc., Ri Co. v. Baldauf (16 Pa. 
 
 St. 67), 863. 
 Camden, etc., R. Co. v. Hoosey (99 Pa. 
 
 St. 492; 44 Am. Rep. 120; 6 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 454), 801. 
 Camden Interstate Ry. Co. v. Williams 
 
 (140 Fed. Rep. 985; 72 C. C. A. 680), 
 
 47. 
 Camphell v. Chicago, etc., R. Go. (45 
 
 Iowa 76), 673. 
 Campbell v. Houston, etc., R. Co. (3 
 
 Tex. Unrep. Cas. 473), 66. 
 Campbell v. Illinois Central R. Co. (100 
 
 N. W. Rep. 30), 336. 
 Campbell v. New York, etc., R. Co. (3 
 
 N. Y. Supp. 694; 19 N. Y. S. R. 659; 
 
 49 Hun. 611; 121 N. Y. 669), 1018. 
 Campbell v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (Pa^ 8 
 
 Atl. Rep. 489; 24 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 427), 862. 
 Camphell v. Portland, etc., R. Co. (62 
 
 Me. 562), 869. 
 Campbell v. Pullman Car Co. (48 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 484), 738. 
 Campbell v. Railroad (63 Ga. 488), 451. 
 Canada Southern R. Co. z>. Jackson (17 
 
 Can. Sup. Ct. 316), 413. 
 Canadian, etc., R. Co. v. Chalifoux (22 
 
 Can. S. C. 721), 614. 
 Canadian Pacific R. Co. v. Elliott (137 
 
 Fed. Ren. 904), 265. 
 Canadian Pacific R. Co. v. Johnson (6 
 
 Montr. L. R. 213), 1071. 
 Candee v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (130 
 
 Mo. 142; 31 S. W. Rep. 1029), 883. 
 Candee v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (21 Wis. 
 
 582), 688. 
 Candelaria v. Atchison, etc., R. Co. (N. 
 
 M. 27 Pac. Rep. 497; 48 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 665), 1060. 
 Canfield v. New York, etc., R. Co. (46 N. 
 
 Y. S. R. 911; 19 N. Y. Supp. 839), 
 
 1026. 
 Cannaday v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 
 
 (55 S. E. Rep. 836), 243. 
 
 Hi 
 
 Cannon v. New York, etc., R. Co. (80 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 450), 413. 
 Capper v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (103 
 
 Ind. 305; 2 N. E. Rep. 749; 21 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 525), 473. 
 Carbine v. Bennington, etc., R. Co. (61 
 
 Vt. 348; 17 Atl. Rep. 491; 38 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 45), 341. 
 Card f. Eddy (129 Mo. 510j 28 S. W: 
 
 Rep. 979), 498. 
 Card ». New York, etc., R. Co. (50 
 
 Barb. N. Y. 39), 679. 
 Cardwell v. Gulf, etc., R. Co. (Texas, 88 
 
 S. W. Rep. 423), 269. 
 Carey v. Boston; etc., R. Co. (158 Mass. 
 
 228; 33 N. E. Rep. 512), 338. 
 Carle v, Bangor, etc., R. Co. (43 Me. 
 
 269), 507. 
 Carlisle v. Brisbane (118 Pa. St. 544; 6 
 
 Atl. Rep. 372; 57 Am. Rep. 483), 1041. 
 Carlisle v. Sheldon (38 Vt. 4401, 1066. 
 Carlson v. Oregon, etc., R. Co. (81 Ore- 
 gon 450; 28 Pac. Rep. 497; 53 Am. & 
 
 England R. Cas. 185), 380. 
 Carlton v. Yadkin R. Co. (55 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 429), 683. 
 Carman v. Steelville, etc., R. Co. (4 
 
 Ohio St. 399), 290. 
 Carnegie Steel Company v. Byers (149 
 
 Fed. Rep. 667; 8 L. R. A. [N. S.] 677; 
 
 6 L. R. A. [N. S.] S37), 120. 
 Caron v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (164 Mass. 
 
 623; 42 N. E. Rep. 112), 510. 
 Carpenter v. Buffalo, etc., R. Co. (88 
 
 Hun [N. Y.] 116), 70. 
 Carpenter v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (97 
 
 N. Y. 494; 49 Am. Rep. 540; 31 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 331), 688. 
 Carpenter v. Mexican, etc., R. Co. (39 
 
 Fed. Rep. 315), 374. 
 Carpue v. London, etc, R. Co. (5 Ad. & 
 
 El. [N. S.] 747), 676. 
 Carpue v. Railroad Co. (5 D. B. 747), 
 
 122. 
 Carr v. Eel River R. Co. (98 Cal. 
 
 366; 33 Pac. Rep. 213; 58 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 239), 708. 
 Carr v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (195 
 
 Mo. 214; 98 S. W. Rep.' 824), 1086. 
 Carraher v. Safl Francisco Bridge Co. 
 
 (81 Cal. 98; 28 Pac. Rep. 480), 935. 
 Carrico v. West Virginia, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (35 W. Va. 389; 14 S. E. Rep. 18; 39 
 
 W. Va. 86; 19 S. E. Rep. 571; 84 
 
 L. R. A. 60; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 393), 895. 
 Carrier v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (175 
 
 Mo. 410; 17 Mo. 470; 74 S. W. Rep. 
 
 1002), 883. 
 Carrington v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (88 
 
 Ala. 473; 41 Am. & Eng. Cas. 543; 
 
 6 So. Rep. 910), 1082. 
 Carroll V. East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (88 Ga. 468; 10 S. E. Rep. 163; 41 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 307), 347. 
 Carroll v. Minnesota Valley R. Co. (13 
 
 Minn. SO; 14 Minn. 57), 413. 
 Carroll v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (88 
 
 Mo. 239; 67 Am. Rep. 382; 26 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 268), 856. 
 Carroll v. NevT York, etc., R. Co. (188 
 
 Mass. 837; 65 N. E. Rep. 69), 880. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.'\ 
 
 Carroll v. Staten Island R. Co. (58 N. 
 
 Y. 126; 65 Barb. 32; 7 Am. Ey. Rep. 
 
 S5), 592. 
 Carroll v. Transit Co. (107 Mo. 653; 
 
 17 S. W. Rep. 889; 52 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 273), 796. 
 Carruthers v, Kansas City, etc., R. Co. 
 . (59 Kan. 629; 64 Pac. Rep. 673), 817. 
 Carson v. Federal Street, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (147 Pa. St. 219; 23 Atl. Rep. 369; 
 
 30 Am. St. Rep. 727), 1051." 
 Carson v. Southern Ry. Co. (68 S. C. 
 
 55; 46 S. E. Rep. 625)^ 3-72. 
 Carsten i/. Northern Pacific R. Co. (44 
 
 Minn. 454; 47 N. W. Rep. 69), 729. 
 Carter v. Baldwin (107 IVto. App. 229; 
 
 81 S. W. Rep. 204), 301. 
 Carter r. Berlin, etc., Co. (58 N. H. 52; 
 
 42 Am. Rep. 572), 288. 
 Carter' v. Columbia, etc., R. Co. (19 So. 
 
 Car. 20; 45 Am. Rep. 754; 15 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 414), 1086. 
 Carter v. Dubah, etc., Co. (La., 36 So. 
 
 Rep. 952), 307. 
 Carter ii. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (98 
 
 Ind. 652; 49 Am. Rep. 780; 82 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 360), 1088. 
 Carterville Co. v. Abbott (81 111. App. 
 
 279; 65 N. E. Rep. 131), 404. 
 Carterville v. Cook (16 Am. St. Rep. 248; 
 
 63 Pac. Rep. 54; 43 L. R. A; 649), 234. 
 Cartlich v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co. (108 
 
 S. W. Rep. 584), 721. 
 Cartwright v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (53 
 
 Mich. 606; 18 NT W. Rep. 380; 50 
 
 Am. Rep. 274; 16 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 821), 705. 
 Carwen v. Detroit, etc., R. Co. (61 Mich. 
 
 584), 133. 
 Case V. Cordell L. & Z. Co. (103 Mo. 
 
 App. 477: 78 S. W. Rep. 62), 55. 
 Case V. New York, etc., R. Co. (76 
 
 Hun 627; 27 N. Y. Supp. 496; 57 N. 
 
 Y. S. T. 653), 930. 
 Cass V. Third Avenue R. Co. (20 App. 
 
 Div. 591; 47 N. Y. Supp. 356), 1049. 
 Casey v. Bridge Co. (114 Mo. App. 66), 
 
 838. 
 Casey v. Canadian Pacific R. Co. (15 
 
 Ont. 574; 37 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 172), 
 
 1080. 
 Casey v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (84 Ky. 
 
 79), 462. 
 Casey v. Transit Co. (116 Mo. App. 248; 
 
 206 1^0. 721; 103 S. W. Rep. 1146), 
 
 49, 845. 
 Cashman v. Chase (156 Mass. 342; 31 
 
 N. E. Rep. 4), 509. 
 Casoris Admr. v. Covington, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (Ky., 93 S. W. Rep. 19; 98 S. W. Rep. 
 
 304), 273. ■ 
 Cassidy v. Maine Central R. Co. (76 Me. 
 
 488; 17 Am. & Eng. R. Co. 619), 461. 
 Caswell V. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. (98 
 
 Mass. 194), 30. 
 Catawissa, etc., R. Co. i». Armstrong 
 
 (62 Pa. St. 282), 196. 
 Cashart v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (19 
 
 Mo. App. 113), 106. 
 Cathron v. Fackmg Co. (98 Mo. App. 
 
 343), 118. 
 Cawley v. Winifred, etc., R. Co. (31 W. 
 
 Va. 116; 6 ^. E. Rep. 318), 396. 
 
 Ceamell v. St. Louis Transit Co. (1Q2 
 
 Mo. App. 198; 76 S. W. Rep. 660), 
 
 708. 
 Cecil V. American Steel Co. (129 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 642), 152. 
 Central R. Co. v. AUman (147 111. 
 
 471; 35 N. E. Rep. 785), 104. 
 Central of Georgia R. Co. v, Alexander 
 
 (144 Ala. 257; 40 So. Rep. 484), 184. 
 Central of Georgia Ry. (Jo. v. Barnett 
 
 (44 So. Rep. 392), 1004. 
 Central, etc., R. Co. v. Bateman (76 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 1021), 150. 
 Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Branden- 
 
 burgh (58 S. E. Rep. 668), 412. 
 Central, 'etc., R. (Jo. v. Brinson (70 Ga. 
 
 207; ' 19 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 42J, 
 
 875. 
 Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Clay (69 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 843), 577. 
 Central R. Co. v. Crosby (74 Ga. 737), 
 
 165. 
 Central R. Co. v. DeBray (71 Ga. 406), 
 
 491. 
 Central, etc., R. Co. v. Denson (84 Ga. 
 
 774; 11 S. E. Rep. 1039), 1085. 
 Central, etc., R. Co. v. Dixon (42 Ga. 
 
 327), 1028. 
 Central Trust Co. v. East Tenn., etc., R. 
 
 Co. (69 Fed. Rep. 353), 238. 
 Central R. Co. v. Feller (84 Pa. St. 
 
 226; 18 Am. Ry. Rep. 369), 1018. 
 Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Floyd 
 
 (69 S. E. Rep. 886), 8g8. 
 Central, etc., R. Co. v. Freeman (75 Ga. 
 
 838), 599. 
 Central Ry. Co. v. Geopp (45 So. Rep. 
 
 65), 827. 
 Central Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Gibson 
 
 (Texas, 83 S. W. Rep. 862), 1043. 
 Central R. Co. v. Glass (60 Ga. 441), 
 
 730. 
 Central R. R. v. Gleason (69 Ga. 200), 
 
 451. 
 Central Ry. Co. z,. Goodwin (120 Ga. 83; 
 
 1 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 806), 98. 
 Central, etc., R. Co. v. Grant (46 Ga. 
 
 417; 11 Am. Ry. Rep. 427), 297. 
 Central R. Co. v. Harris (76 Ga. 501), 
 
 577. 
 Central R. Co. v. Haslett (74 Ga. 69), 
 
 343. 
 Central R. Co. v. Henderson (69 Ga. 
 
 716), 519. , 
 Central Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Hoard (49 
 
 S. W. Rep. 142), 39. 
 Central, etc., R. Co. v. Hollinshead (81 
 
 Ga. 208; 7 S. E. Rep. 172), 886. 
 Central, etc., R. Co. v. Huggins (89 Ga. 
 
 494), 5^9. 
 Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Hunter 
 
 (58 S. E. Rep. 154), 1069. 
 Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Hyatt 
 
 (43 So. Rep. 867), 996. 
 Central R. Co. v. Keegan (160 U. S. 
 
 269; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 269; 40 L. Ed. 
 
 418), 461. 
 Central, etc., R. Co. v. Kelley (58 Ga. 
 
 107), 92. 
 Central, etc., R. Co. v. Kenney (68 Ga. 
 
 485; 16 Am. Ry. Rep. 131), 843. 
 Central, etc., R. Co. v. Kent (84 Ga. 
 
 351; 10 S. E. Rep. 965), 88. 
 
 liii 
 
TABLE OP CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.} 
 
 Central, etc., R. Co. v. Kitchens (83 Ga. 
 
 83; 9 S. E. Rep. 887), 401. 
 Central Pass. R. Co. i/. Kuhn (86 Ky. 
 
 578), 946. 
 Central, etc., R. Co. v. Lamb (124 Ala. 
 
 178; 86 So. Rep. 969), 510. 
 Central, etc., R. Co. v. Lanier (83 Ga. 
 
 587; 10 S. E. Rep. 279), 396. 
 Central, etc., R. Co. v. Letcher (69 Ala. 
 
 106; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 115), 
 
 7S8 
 Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. McClifford 
 
 (180 Ga. 90; 47 S. E. Rep. 590), 238. 
 Central Ry. Co. v. McNab (43 So Reo. 
 
 882), 657. 
 Central, etc., R. Co. v. McWhorter (115 
 
 Ga. 476; 42 S. E. Rep. 82), 349. 
 Central, etc., R. Co. v. Miles (88 Ala. 
 
 256; 6 So. Rep. 696; 41 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 150), 708. 
 Central R. Co. v. Moore (24 N. J. I-. 
 
 824), 392. 
 Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Motz (161 
 
 S. E. Rep. 1), 976. 
 Central of Georgia Co. v. North (58 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 647), 971. 
 Central R. Co. v. Passmore (90 Ga. 
 
 203; 15 S. E. Rep. 760), 830. 
 Central, etc., R. Co. v. Perry (58 Ga. 
 
 461; 16 Am. Ry. Rep. 182), 584. 
 Central, etc., R. Co. v. Price (106 Ga. 
 
 176; 38 S. E. Rep. 77; 43 L. R. A. 
 
 402), 28. 
 Central, etc., R. Co. v.- Raiford (82 Ga. 
 
 400; 9 S. E. Rep. 169; 87 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 481), 965. 
 Central, etc., , R. Co. v. Roach (64 Ga. 
 
 635; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 79), 196. 
 Central R. Co. v. ^ouse (77 Ga. 393), 
 
 ■133 
 Central R. Co. v. Russell (75 Ga. 810), 
 
 982 
 Central R. & B. Co. v. Ryles (84 Ga. 
 
 420; 11 S. E. Rep. 499), 394. 
 Central, etc., R. Co. v. Sims (80 Ga. 
 
 749; 7 S. E. Rep. 17.6), 331. 
 Central, etc., R. Co. v. Smith (80 Ga. 
 
 626; 5 S. E. Rep. 778; 34 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 456), 835. , „, 
 
 Central, etc., R. To. v. Smith (74 Md. 
 
 218; 81 Atl. Rep. 706), 784. , 
 Central R. Co. v. Stoermer (51 Fed. 
 Rep. 518; 1 U. S. App. 876; 2 C. C. 
 
 A. 360), 48. , , 
 
 Central, etc., R. Co. v. Strickland (90 
 
 Ga. 562; 16 S. E. Rep. 352; 52 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 216), 658. 
 Central K. Co. v. Swint (73 Ga. 651; 26 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 482), 47. 
 Central, etc., R. Co. v. "Thompson (76 
 
 Ga. 770), 768. 
 Central, etc., R. Co. v. Van Horn (38 
 N. J.L. 133; 13 Am. Ry. Rep. 36), 
 887 
 Central, etc., R. Co. v. Vaughan (93 
 
 Ala. 209; 9 So. Rep. 468), 1067. 
 Central Trust Co. v. Wabash R. Co. (34 
 Fed. Rep. 616; 27 Fed. Rep. 159), 
 980. 
 Central R. Co. v. Whitehead (74 Ga. 
 441), 567. 
 
 liv 
 
 Central R. Co. v. Wood (51 Ga. 515; 8 
 
 Am. Ry. Rep. 9), 175. 
 Cerilles, etc. Co. v. Desserant (178 U. 
 
 S. 570; 9 N. M. 49; 49 Pac. Rep. 807), 
 
 13. 
 Chaffee v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (J04 
 
 Mass. 108), 795. 
 Chaffee v. Consolidated Ry. Co. (88 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 497), 683. 
 Chaffee v. Erie R. Co. (73 N. Y. S. 
 
 908; 66 Aop. Div. 678), 255. 
 Chaffee v. Old Colony R. Co. (17 R. I. 
 
 658; 52 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 366), 715. 
 Chamberlain v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (11 Wis. 238; but see 18 Wis. 700), 
 
 359. 
 Chamberlain v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. 
 
 11 Wis., 238), 220. 
 Chamberlain v. Missouri Pacific R. Co. 
 
 (133 Mo. 587; 33 S. W. Rep. 437; 34 
 
 S. W. Rep. 842), 861. 
 Chamberlain v. Pierson (87 Fed. Rep. 
 
 420; 31 C. C. A. 157; 69 N. S. App. 
 
 S5), 564. 
 Chamberlain v. Wheatland (26 N. Y. S. 
 
 R. 608 J 7 N. Y. Supp. 190), 1046. 
 Champion v. Bostick (18 Wend. 174), 
 
 288. 
 Chandler *. New York, etc., R. Co. (159 
 
 Mass. 689; 36 N. E. Rep. 89), 47. 
 Chandler v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (106 
 
 S. W. Rep. 553), 495. 
 Chapman v. Erie R. Co. (55 N. Y. 679), 
 
 344. 
 Chapman v. New Haven, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (19 N. Y. 341; 75 Am. Dec. 344), 
 
 1044. 
 Chapman v. New York, etc. R. Co. (14 
 
 Hun [N. v.] 484), 106. 
 Charlebois v. Gogebic, etc., R. Co. (91 
 
 Mich. 59; 51 N. W. Rep. 818), 278. 
 Charleston & W. C. Ry. Co. v. Johnson 
 
 (57 S. E. Rep. 1064), 1071. 
 Charlock v. Freel (185 N. Y. 357; 26 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 262), 276. 
 Charlton v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (200 
 
 Mo. 413; 98 S. W. Rep. 529), 506. 
 Charman v. Lake Erie, etc., R. Co. (105 
 
 Fed. Rep. 449), 611. 
 Chase v. Burlington, etc., R. Co. (76 
 
 Iowa 676; 39 N. W. Rep. 196; 38 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 148), 191. 
 Chase zi. Jamestown, etc., R. Co. (15 N. 
 
 Y. S. 36), 97. 
 Chattanooga, etc., R. Co. t/, Huggins (89 
 
 Ga. 494; 15 S. E. Rep. 848; 52 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 473), 827. 
 Chattanooga, etc., R. Co. v. Lawson (101 
 
 Tenn. 406; 47 S. W. Rep. 489; 12 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. [N. S.] 669), 495. 
 Chattanooga El. Ry. Co. v. Moore (Tenn., 
 
 82 S. W. 478), 268. 
 Chattanooga, etc., R. Co. v. Venable (105 
 
 Tenn. 460; 58 S. W. Rep. 861; 61 L. 
 R. A. 886), 568. 
 Chattanooga, etc., R. Co. v. Whitehead 
 
 (89 Ga. 190; 15 S. E. Rep. 44), 281. 
 Check V. Little Miami R. Co. (2 Disney 
 
 [Ohio] 237), 809. 
 Chenall o. Palmer Brick Co. (117 Ga. 
 106; 43 S. E. Rep. 443), 119. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [Beferenoea are to sections.] 
 
 Cheney v. New York, etc., R. Co. (16 
 
 Hun [N. Y.] 415), 947. 
 Cherry v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (191 Mo. 
 
 489), 850. 
 Cherry v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (53 
 
 Mo. App. 499), 729. 
 Cherry v, Louisiana & A. Ry. Co. (46 so. 
 
 Rep. B96), 909. ^ ^ „ u • 
 
 iChesapeake, etc., R. Co. v. Barbour s 
 
 Admr. (ky. 98 S. W. Rep. 938), 1096. 
 Chesapeake, etc., Ry. Co. v. Crank (108 
 
 S. W. Rep. 276), 780. 
 Chesapeake & N. Ry. v. Crews (99 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 868), 947. ^ ^ ^ 
 
 Chesapeake Beach Ry. Co. v. Donahue 
 
 (68 Atl. Rep. B07), 1066. ^ 
 Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Fortune (59 
 
 S. E. Rep. 1095), 570. 
 Chesapeake & O. K. Co. *. Heath (87 
 
 Ky. 661J 9 S. W. Rep. 832), 40. . 
 Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. ti. Higgins 
 
 86 Tenn. 620; 4 S. W. Rep. 47), 71. 
 Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. v. Howard (178 
 
 U. S. 168), 817. ^ ,^ 
 
 Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. v. Lee (84 Va. 
 
 642; 5 i E. Rep. 579), 412. 
 Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. v. McMichael 
 
 (Ky. 15 S. W. Rep. 878), 481. , 
 Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Pace (106 
 
 S. W. Rep. 1176), 877. „. . , , 
 Chesapeake, etc., Ry. Co. v. Pans Admr. 
 
 (69 S. E. Rep. 898), 670. 
 Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. v. Reeves (Ky. 
 
 11 S. W. Rep. 464), 92. 
 Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Robinette 
 
 (107 S. W. Rep. 763), 731. 
 Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. v. Satterfield 
 
 (100 S. W. Rep. 844), 177. 
 Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Wilson's 
 
 Admr. (102 S. W. Rep. 810), 909. 
 Chestnut v. Soutliern Ind. R. Co. (167 
 
 Ind. 609; 62 N. E. Rep. 82), 267. 
 Chewning v. Ensley R. Co. (100 Ala. 
 
 498; 14 So. Rep. 204), 619. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Adimick (38 111. 
 
 App. 412), 206. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Adler (66 111. 
 
 844; 3 Am. Ry. Rep. 278), 971. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Adler (129 111. 
 
 835; 21 N. E. Rep. 846), 1016. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Arnol (144 111. 
 
 261; 88 N. E. Rep. 204; Si Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 411), 673. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Artery (137 U. 
 
 S. 607; 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 129; 44 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 573), 522. 
 Chicago & A. Ry. Co. v. Averill (127 
 
 111. App. 276), 918. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Avery (109 111. 
 
 814; 8 111 App. 183; 17 Am. & Eng. 
 . R. Cas. 649). 360. 
 Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Burt (204 111. 
 
 168; 68 N. E, Rep. 643), 368. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Barrett (16 111. 
 
 App. a7), 657. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Bayfield (37 
 
 Mich. 206), 811. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Becker (128 III. 
 
 645; 21 N. E. Rep. 524). 92. 
 Chicago, etc., R. (Jo. v. Bell (111 111. 
 
 App, 286; 138 111. App. 56), 264. 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Bentz (88 111. 
 
 . App. 486), 1029. 
 
 Chicago, etc„ R. Co. v. Bills (104 Ind. 
 
 13; 3 N. E. Rep. 611), 560. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Birk (99 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 763), 486. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Blank (24 III. 
 
 488), 472. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Blaul (70 111. 
 
 App. 618), 941. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Bliss (6 111. App. 
 
 411), 479. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Boggs (101 Ind. 
 
 522; 51 Am. Rep. 761; 28 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 282), 888. 
 Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Bonifield (8 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 493; 104 111. 223), 
 
 461. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v, Bragonier (119 
 
 111. 51; 7 N. E. Rep. 688), 134. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. ii. Brandau (66 111. 
 
 App. 150)^ 492, ' 
 Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Brethauer 
 
 (126 111. App. 204; 79 N. E. Rep. 287; 
 
 223 111. 521). 733. 
 Chicago, I. & L. R. Co. v. Bryan (75 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 678), 323. 
 Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. c. Bunch 
 
 (102 S. W. Rep. 869), 1068. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Bundy (210 111. 
 
 89; 71 N. E. Rep. 28), 98. 
 Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Burns (104 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 1081), 567. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Byrum (163 111. 
 
 131; 88 N. E. Rep. 578), 708. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Carpenter (56 
 
 Fed. Rep. 461), 99. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Carroll (6 111. 
 
 App. 201; 206 111. 318; 68 N. E. Rep. 
 
 1087), 578. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Cauffman (38 III. 
 
 424), 963. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. u. Chicago (140 111. 
 
 309), 976. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Clark (108 111. 
 
 113; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 261), 99. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co, v. Clark (20 Neb. 
 
 645; 70 111. 276; 42 N. W. Rep. 703: 
 
 88 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 192), 283. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Clark (2 111. 
 
 App. 116), 866. 
 Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Clarkson 
 
 147 Fed. Rep. 397), 411. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Clough (134 111. 
 
 586; 26 N. E. Rep. 664; 29 N. E. Rep. 
 
 184; 33 111. App. 129), 998. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Colwell (3 111. 
 
 App. 646), 458. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Condon (121 III. 
 
 App. 440), 1068. 
 Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Cooper (128 111. 
 
 App. 628), 736. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Coss (73 111. 
 
 894), 689. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Cotton (140 111. 
 
 486), 806. 
 Chicago & A. Ry. Co. v. Cox (145 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 167), 864. 
 Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Croflby 
 
 (109 III. App. 644), 116. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Cross (73 111. 
 
 Iv 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.'] 
 
 394; S14 111. 602; 73 N. E. Rep. 865), 
 
 804. 
 
 Chicago Grt. West. R. Co. v. Crotty (141 
 
 Fed. Rep. 913; 78 C. C. A. 147; 8 
 
 L. R. A. [N. S.] 832), 358. 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Custer (22 111. 
 
 App. 188), 974. , ^ ^ 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Davis (53 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 61; 10 U. S. App. 482; 3 C. C. 
 
 _A. 429; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 461), 
 
 412. 
 Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Daugaard 
 
 (118 111. App. 67), 252. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Daugherty (12 
 
 111. App. 181), 453. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. i/. Des-Lauriers (40 
 
 111. App. 645), 6. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Dewey (26 III. 
 
 265), 414. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Dickson (88 111. 
 431; 21 Am. Ry. Rep. 328), 447. 
 ~ Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Dignham (1 111. 
 App. 162), 787. 
 Chicago & A. R. Co. 7,. Dillon (123 111. 
 760; 15 N. E. Rep. 181; 5 Am. St. 
 Rep. 559; 17 111. App. 355), 896. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Doherty (53 111. 
 
 App. 282), 736. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Donehue (75 111. 
 106), 343. 
 ■ Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Donovan (160 
 Fed. Rep. 826), 942. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Dougherty (110 
 111. 621; 17 N. E. Rep. 1; 19 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 292),. 959. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Dovorak (7 111. 
 
 App. 555), 974. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Dowd (115 111. 
 
 659), 985. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Doyle (60 Miss. 
 977; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 171), 469. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Drake (33 111. 
 
 App. 114), 691. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. f. Driscoll (176 111. 
 330; 52 N. E. Rep. 921; 107 111. App. 
 615; 207 111. 432; 69 N. E. Rep. 620; 
 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. [N. S.] 644), 
 493. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Dunn (52 111. 
 461; 61 111. 385; 12 Am. Ry. Rep. 427), 
 455, 877. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Dunleavy (111., 
 
 39 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 381), 448. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Dynleavy (129 
 111. 132; 22 N. E. Rep. 15; 39 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 381), 861. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Eaton (194 111. 
 
 441; 62 N. E. Rep. 784), 498. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Eininger (114 111. 
 
 79; 29 N. E. Rep. 196), 1081. 
 Chicago, etc., Co. v. Elder (149 111. 173; 
 
 36 N. E. Rep. 565), 602. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Fears (53 111. 
 
 115), 461. 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Felton (125 111. 
 
 458; 17 N. E. Rep. 765; 24 III. App. 
 
 376; 33 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 533), 775. 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Fenn (3 Ind. 
 
 App. 250; 29 N. E. Rep. 790), 1003. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Ferguson (3 
 Co'o. App. 414; 38 Pac. Rep. 684; 86 
 Pac. Rep. 471) 291, 801. 
 
 Ivi 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Few (15 111. 
 
 App. 125), 186. 
 Chicago-Couterville, etc., R. Co. v. Fi- 
 delity & Casualty Co. (130 Fed. Rep. 
 957), 6. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Fietsahur (123 
 
 111. 518; 15 N. E. Rep. 169), 460. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Fisher (141 
 111. 614; 51 N. E. Rep. 406; 49 Kan. 
 460; 30 Pac. Rep. 462), 801, 878. 
 Chicago, etc.; R. CTo. v. Fitzsimmons (40 
 
 111. App. 360), 999. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Flaherty (96 111. 
 
 App. 663), 718. 
 Chicago,, etc., R. Co. v. Flexman (9 111. 
 
 App. 250), 735. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. »/. Florens (32 111. 
 
 App. 365), 884. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Flynn (154 111. 
 
 448; 40 N. E. Rep. 332), 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Gardner (116 111. 
 
 App. 619), 19. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Gates (162 111. 
 
 98; 61 111. App. 211), 651. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Geary (110 111. 
 383; 17 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 606), 343. 
 Chicago, etc., Co. v. Gill (132 111. App. 
 
 310), 973. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Goebel (119 111. 
 
 515), 866. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Goltz (71 111. 
 
 App. 414), 495. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. w. Gomes (46 111. 
 
 App. 255), 183. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Gore (202 111. 
 
 192), 718. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Green (93 111. 
 
 App. 105), 398. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Gregory (58 111. 
 
 272), 479. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Gretzner (46 111. 
 
 74), 886. 
 Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Groner (95 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 1118), 622. 
 Chicago, R; I. & P. R. Co. v. Hamlin 
 (215 111. 525; 74 N. E. Rep. 706), 
 225. 
 Chicago, etc, Co. v. Harney (28 Ind. 
 
 28), 850. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Harrington (192 
 „ 111. 9; 61 N. E. Rep. 622), 1041. 
 Chicago & G. T. R. Co. v. Hart (209 
 111. 414; 70 N. E. Rep. 654; 66 L. R. 
 A. 76), 235. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. k. Harwood (90 111. 
 
 425; 80 111. 88), 447, 455. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. z: Hatch (79 111. 
 
 137), 995. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Hazzard (26 111. 
 
 373), 580. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Hedges (118 Ind, 
 6; 20 N. E. Rep. 530; 37 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 516), 390. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Hedges (105 Ind. 
 398; 7 N. E. Rep. 801; 25 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 550), 1006. 
 Chicago City R. Co. v. Hennessy (16 111. 
 
 App. 153), 2-88. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v, Henry (7 111. 
 
 App. 322), 479. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Hines (132 III. 
 161; 23 N. E. Rep. 1021), 340. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITEI>. 
 
 [References are to sections.^ 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Hoffman (82 111. 
 
 App. 453), 39. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Hogarth (38 111. 
 
 370), 885. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co, v. Holland (122 111. 
 
 461; IS N. E. Rep. 145; 30 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 590), 175. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Honey (68 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 39; 18 C. C. A. 190; 26 L. R. A. 
 
 42), 234. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. House (172 111. 
 
 601; 50 N. E. Rep. 151), 487. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Houston (95 U. 
 
 S. 697), 408. 
 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Howard (45 
 
 Neb. 670; 63 N. W. Rep. 878), 220. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Howell (109 111. 
 
 App. 546; 70 N. E. Rep. 15), 360. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v.- Hoyt (16 111. 
 
 App. 237; 122 III. 369; 12 N. E. Rep. 
 
 225; 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 309), 462, 
 
 479. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Hutchinson (120 
 
 111. 589; 11 N. E. Rep. 855; 38 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 82), 409. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Ingraham (33 
 
 111. App. 351), 882. 
 CHiicago, Burlington & Q. R. Co. v. 
 
 Iowa (94 U. S. 161; 24 L. Ed. 94), 7. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Jaekson (55 111. 
 
 492), 475. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Jacobs (63 111. 
 
 178), 937. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Jennings (157 
 
 111. 874; 41 N. E. Rep. 629), 1001. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Johnson (116 
 
 111. 206; 4 N. E. Rep. 381), 455. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Johnston (103 
 
 111. 518; 8 Am. & Enb. R. Cas. 285), 
 
 15. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Knapp (Texas, 83 
 
 S. W. Rep. 233), 98. 
 Chicago V. Keefe (114 111. 230; 47 111. 
 
 108), 190, 480. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Kellogg (54 Neb. 
 
 127; 74 N. W. Rep. 454; 55 Neb. 748; 
 
 76 N. W. Rep. 462), 494, 118. 
 Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Kimmel (221 
 
 111. 547; 77 N. E. Rep. 936), 869. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Kinnare (115 
 
 111. App. 132), 99. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Koehler (47 111. 
 
 App. 147), 783. 
 Chicago R. Co. v. Korando (129 111. App. 
 
 620), 929. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Kowalski (92 
 
 Fed; Rep. 310; 34 C. C. A. 1), 1058. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Krahlenbuhl (65 
 
 Neb. 889; 91 N. W. Rep. 880; 59 L. 
 
 R. A. 920), 1073. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Kruger (23 111. 
 
 App. 639; 124 111. 457), 453. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Kuster (22 III. 
 
 App. 188), 991. 
 Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Landauer (36 
 
 Neb. 642; 54 N. W. Rep. 976; 54 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 640), 781. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Lane (130 111. 
 
 116; 82 N. E. Rep. 513; 30 111. App. 
 
 437), 936. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Lammert (12 
 
 111. App. 408), 466. 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. c. La Porte (Ind., 
 
 71 N. E. Rep. 166), 69. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. 'Llauber (9 111. 
 
 App. 613), 801. 
 Chicago, etc., v. Leach (104 111. App. 
 
 30), 321. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Lee (60 111. 501; 
 
 68 111. 576; 87 111. 454), 946. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v, Legekraus (91 
 
 N. W. Rep. 358), 60. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Lewis (145 111. 
 
 67; 5 111. App. 242; 33 N. E. Rep. 
 
 960; 58 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 126), 
 
 600. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Logue (47 HI. 
 
 App. 298), 974. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Lonergan (118 
 
 111. 41; 7 N. E. Rep. 55; 88 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 491), 381. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Louderback (135 
 
 111. App. 383), 991. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v.' Lowell (161 U. 
 
 S. 209; 38 L. Ed. 131; 14 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 281), 632. 
 Chicago Union Traction Co. v, Lowren- 
 
 rosen (125 111. App. 194; 78 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 813; 888 111. 606), 883. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Lundstrora (16 
 
 Neb. 354; 49 Am. Rep. 718; 20 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 198; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 628), 
 
 490. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Mahoney (4 111. 
 
 App. 268), 419. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Mann (111 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 379), 562. 
 Chicago, etc.. R. Co. z'. Marshall (Ind., 
 
 175 N. E. Rep. 973), 26. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Mason (27 111. 
 
 App. 450), 455. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. May (108 HI. 
 
 288; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 320), 190. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. McAra (52 111. 
 
 896), 679. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. McCandish (79 
 
 N. E. Rep. 903), 877. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. McCarthy (61 HI. 
 
 App. 300), 1067. 
 Chicago Union Traction Co. v. McClevey 
 
 (186 111. App. 81), 787. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. McDaniel (134 
 
 Ind. 166; 38 N. E. Rep. 788), 864. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. r. McGraw (88 
 
 Colo. 363; 45 Pac. Rep. 383), 265. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. McKean (40 HI. 
 
 818), 451. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. McKnight (16 III. 
 
 App. 596), 966. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. i/. McLain (94 III. 
 
 lOT), 488. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. McLallen (84 111. ^ 
 
 109), 486. ^ 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. McLarren (84 
 
 111. 110), 143. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. McLaughlin (119 
 
 U. S. 566; 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1366), 504. 
 Chicago V. McLean (133 111. 148; 24 
 
 N. E. Rep. 627;' 8 L. R. A. 765), 
 
 185. 
 Chicago Tr. Co. v. Mee (218 111. 9; 75 
 
 N. E. Rep. 800; 119 111. App. 332), 
 
 116. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Mehlsack (131 
 
 Ivii 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITEIV. 
 
 {References are to seetioils.'] 
 
 in. 61; 22 N. E. Rep. 813; 41 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 60), 1087. , ^„ 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Merckes (36 111. 
 
 App. 195), 401. 
 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Merriam (95 111. 
 
 App. 628), 266. 
 Chicago, etc., v. Meyers (168 111. 139; 
 
 48 N. E. Rep. 66), 284. 
 Chicago, etc., K. Co. f. Michie (83 111. 
 
 427), 561. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Miller (46 Mich. 
 
 632; 9 N. W. Rep. 841; 6 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 89), 1021. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Mock (72 111. 
 
 141), 456. 
 Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Moran (129 
 
 111. App. 38), 660. 
 Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Moranda (108 
 
 111. 576), 261. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Morris (26 111. 
 
 400), 68. 
 Chicago Ry. Co. v. Mumford (21 Alb. L. 
 
 J. 214), 126. ~ 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Murray (62 111. 
 
 326; 7 Am. Ry. Rep. 308), 466. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Notzki (66 111. 
 
 455), 999. 
 Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. O'Brien 
 
 132 Fed. Rep. 593; 67 C. C. A. 421), 
 
 118. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. O'Connor (13 
 
 111. App. 62; 119 111. 586; 9 N. E. Rep. 
 
 263; 19 111. App. 691), 455, 459. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. O'Donnel (109 
 
 111. App. 616; 69 N. E. Rep. 882), 26. 
 Chicago Terminal, etc., R. Co. v. O'Don- 
 
 nell (114 111. App. 346; 72 N. E. Rep. 
 
 1133), 69. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. u. Olsen (12 111. 
 
 App. 245), 409. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Osceuring (4 111. 
 
 App. 533), 493. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Ostrander (116 
 
 Ind. 269; 32 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 361; 
 
 15 N. E. Rep. 227), 152. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Payne (59 111. 
 
 534: 49 111. 499; 11 Am. Ry. Rep. 
 
 157), 985. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. People (105 111. 
 
 657; 120 III. 667; 13 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 42), 686, 886. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Perkins (126 111. 
 
 127; 17 N. E. Rep. 1), 877. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Pillsbury (123 
 
 111. 9; 14 N. E. Rep. 23; 5 Am. St. 
 
 Rep., 483), 744. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Pondrom (51 
 
 111. 333), 457. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Pontius (62 Kan. 
 
 264; 34 Pac. Rep. 739; 157 U. S. 209; 
 
 39 L. Ed. 675), 504. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Pulliam (111 111. 
 
 App. 305), 106. 
 Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Pural (127 III. 
 
 App. 662; 79 N. E. Rep. 686; 224 111. 
 
 324), 576. 
 Chicago, etc., Co. v. Rainneger (140 III. 
 
 334; 29 N. E. Rep. 1106; 33 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 249), 307. 
 Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Ralston (93 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 692), 583. 
 
 Iviii 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Rathneau (80 N. 
 
 E.' Rep. 119; 226 111. 278), 500. 
 Chicago Terminal R. Co. v. Reddick (82 
 
 N. E. Rep. 598; 230 111. 105), 473. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Reilly (212. 111. 
 
 506; 72 N. E. Rep. 454; 40 III. App. 
 
 416), 114, 773. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Riley (145 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 137), 260. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Robinson (106 
 
 111. 142; 19 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 396), 
 
 972. • 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Rogers (17 111. 
 
 App. 638), 463. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Rood (163 111. 
 
 477; 46 N. E. Rep. 238), 676. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Ross (112 U. S. 
 
 377; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 184; 28 L. Ed. 
 
 787), 461. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. ii. Rush (84 III. 
 
 570), 468. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Ryan (131 111.. 
 
 474; 70 III. 211; 23 N. E. Rep. 385; 
 
 43 Am; & Eng. R. Cas. 396), 398, 1021. 
 Chicago Tr. Co. v. Sawnsch (218 III. 
 
 130; 76 N. E. Rep. 797; 1 L. R. A. 
 
 [N. S.] 670), 471. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Scanlan (170 111. 
 
 106), 246. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Scales (90 111. 
 
 686), 620. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Schaefer (121 
 
 111. App. 334), 169. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Schmitz (211 III. 
 
 446; 71 N. E. Rep. 1060), 77. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Shannon (43 111. 
 
 338), 68. 
 Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Shreve (128 111. 
 
 App. 462; 80 N. E. Rep. 1049; 226 111. 
 
 530), 703. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Smith (80 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 716), 985. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Smith (124 111. 
 
 App. 627), 986. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Smith (69 111. 
 
 App. 69), 1043. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. z'. Smith (46 Mich. 
 
 504; 4 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 635), 1084. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Snyder (117 III. 
 
 376, 18 111. App. 640; 7 N. E. Rep. 
 
 604; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 611), 465. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Spiker (134 Ind. 
 
 380; 33 N. E. Rep. 280; 65 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 200), 104. 
 Chicago & C. R. Co. v. Stamps (26 111. 
 
 App. 219), 872. 
 Chicago V. Stearns (105 111. 664), 459. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Steckman (125 
 
 111. App. 299), 186. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. t. Stevens (189 111. 
 
 266; 59 N. E. Rep. 677), 369. 
 'Chicago, etc., Co. v. Stewart (77 111. 
 
 App. 66), 715. 
 Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Stibbs (87 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 293), 578. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. i. Still (19 111. 
 
 499), 468. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Stroud (114 III. 
 
 App. 479), 116. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Stube (15 111. 
 
 App. 39), 163. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.} 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Stumps (69 III. 
 Chicago, etc.,' R. Co. i-. Sullivan (148 111. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. n. Sullivan (63 111. 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Sullivan (17 N. 
 
 E. Rep. «0), 167. ^ ,„„ „ . 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Sutton (63 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 394; 11 C. C. A. 861), 26. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Swan (176 111. 
 
 424: 52 N. E. Rep. 916; 12 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. [N. S.] 674), 490. 
 Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Sweeney 
 
 (62 111. 330), 461. ^ ,,. T„ 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Swett (46 111. 
 
 197) 201 
 Chicago, etc., , R. Co. v^- Tackett (Ind., 
 . 71 N. E. Rep. 624), 338. 
 Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Theorell 
 
 (120 111. App. 490), 265. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Thompson (99 111. 
 
 App. 277), 487. , ,„ 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. t. Thurston (11 111. 
 
 App. 631), 463. „ , , 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Touhy (26 111. 
 
 App. 99), 476. . , 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Travis (44 111. 
 
 App. 466), 375. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Trayes (33 111. 
 
 App. 307), 806. . , ,„ 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Tnplett (38 111. 
 
 482), 1012. _ ^ ,,. 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Trotter (60 Miss. 
 
 442), 689. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Tuite (44 111. 
 
 App. 535), 46ff. „ „ „ 
 
 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Van Pat- 
 ten (64 111. 610; 74 111. 91), 451, 466. 
 Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. 'v. Boelker (129 
 
 Fef Rep. 628), 385. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Voight (9 Am. 
 
 Neg. Cas: 891), 663. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Wagoner (90 111. 
 
 App. 566), 677. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Wall (93 111. 
 
 App. 411), 1053. 
 Chicago St A. Ry. Co. v. Walters (217 
 
 111. 87; 76 N. E. Rep. 441), 79. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. o. Ward (61 111. 
 
 130; 12 Am. Ry. Rep. 434), 852. 
 Chicago, etc., v. Warner (123 111. 88; 14 
 
 N. X Rep. 806), 447. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Warner (108 111. 
 
 688; 18 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 100), 
 
 164. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Watkins (43 
 
 Kan. 60; 28 Pac. Rep. 985), 167. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Wheelbarger (88 
 
 Pae. Rep. 531), 1014. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. White (110 111. 
 
 App. 83), 91. • • 
 Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. White (209 111. 
 
 124; 70 N. E. Rep. 588), 364. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. w. Wilcox (21 L. 
 
 R. A. 76), 1087. 
 Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Wild (109 111. 
 
 App. 38), 341. 
 Chicago, etc, R. Co. v. Wilgus (40 Neh. 
 
 660; 58 N. W. Rep. 1186), 861. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Willard (111 111. 
 
 App. 285). 28. 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Wilson (133 111. 
 
 55; 24 N, E. Rep. 556; 43 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 163), 955. 
 Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Wise (106 111. 
 
 App. 174; 206 111. 453; 69 N. E. Rep. 
 
 500), 161. 
 Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Wisker (71 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 223; 72 N. E. Rep. 614), 511. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Wooldrige (32 
 
 111. App. -837), 793. 
 Chicago & A. Ry. Co. v. Wright (130 
 
 111. App. 818), 940. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Young (26 111. 
 
 App. 116), 479. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Zernecke (69 
 
 Neb. 689; 82 N. W. Rep. 26), 608. 
 Chick V. Southwestern R. Co. (57 Ga. 
 
 367), 68. 
 Childs V. Pennsylvania R. Co. (160 Pa. 
 
 St. 73; 24 Atl. Rep. 341), 981. 
 Chilton V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (114 
 
 Mo. 88; 81 S. W. Rep. 467), 668. 
 Chisholm v. Manhattan Ry. Co. (101 N. 
 
 Y. S. 622), 464. 
 Chitty V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (148 
 
 Mo. 64; 49 S. W. Rep. 868), 806. 
 Choate v, Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (67 
 
 Mo. App. 105), 666. 
 Choctaw, etc., Ry. Co. v. Doughty (91 
 
 S. W. Rep. 768), 614. 
 Choctaw, etc., Ry. Co. v. Jones (Ark., 
 
 93 S. W. Rep. 244), 379. 
 Choctaw, etc., R. Co. v. Holloway (114 
 
 Fed. Rep. 458; 62 C. C. A. 260), 26. 
 Choctaw O. & G. R. Co. v. Jones (Ark., 
 
 4 L. R. A. [N. S.] 837), 379. 
 Chbctaw, etc., Ry. Co. v. McDade (112 
 
 Fed. Rep. 888; 50 C. C. A. 591; 191 
 
 U. S. 64; 48 L.Ed. 96), 369. 
 ChoUette v. Omaha, etc., R. Co. (26 Neb. 
 
 159; 41 N. W. Rep. 1106), 819. 
 Choppin V. New Orleans, etc., R. Co. (17 
 
 La. Ann. 19), 164. 
 Christensen v. Rio Grande, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (Utah, 74 Pac. Rep. 876), 341. 
 Christian v. Columbus, etc., R. Co. (79 
 
 Ga. 460; 38 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 261; 
 
 7 S. E. Rep. 216), 40. 
 Christiansen v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (67 
 
 Minn. 94; 69 N. W. Rep. 640), 38. . 
 Christie v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (60 
 
 Minn. 161; 63 N. W. Rep. 482), 619. 
 Christie v. Griggs (2 Camp. 79), 133. 
 Christy v. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. (35 
 
 W. Va. 117; 12 S. E. Rep. 1111), 1077. 
 Christy ii. Elliott (216 111. 31; 74 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 1035; 108 Am. St. Rep. 196; 1 
 
 L. R. A. tN. S.I 315), 1065. 
 Church V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (119 Mo. 
 
 8P3; 83 S. W7 1066), 1104. ■ 
 Chureih v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (50 
 
 Minn. 818; 53 N. W. Rep. 647), 316. 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Adam (Ky., 
 
 18 S. W. Rep. 428), 66. 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Bravard (Ind., 
 
 76 N. E. Rep. 899), 123. 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Butler (103 
 
 Ind. 31; 2 N. E. Rep. 138; 28 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 362), 1033. 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Carper (112 
 
 Ind. 36; 13 N. E. Rep. 183; 31 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. [N. S.] 633), 500. 
 
 lix 
 
TABLE or CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.] 
 
 Cincinnati & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Champ 
 
 (104 S. W. Rep. 988; 31 Ky. Law 
 
 Rep. 1054), 889. 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Clark (57 
 
 Fed. Rep. 125), 489. 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Cooper (120 
 
 Ind. 469; 22 N. E. Rep. 340; 6 L. R. 
 
 A. 241), 734. 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Duffrain (36 
 
 III. App; 352), 788. 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Eaton (94 
 
 Ind. 474), 39. 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Gaines (104 
 
 Ind. 526; 4 N. E. Rep. 34; 64 Am. 
 
 Rep. 334), 902. 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Gray (101 
 
 Fed. Rep. 623'; 41 C. C. A. 685; 50 
 
 L. R. A. 47), 493. 
 Cincinnati & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Gibony 
 
 (100 S. W. Rep. 216), 621. 
 Cincinnati & N. O. Ry. Co. v. Hill's 
 
 Admr. (89 S. W. Rep. 623; 28 Ky. L. 
 
 R. 530), 270. 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Howard (124 
 
 Ind. 280; 24 N. E. Rep. 892), 91. 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v, Kassen (49 
 
 Ohio St. 230; 31 N. E. Rep. 282; 16 
 
 L. R. A. 674; 52 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 427), 575. 
 Ciiicinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Lang (118 
 
 Ind. 679; 21 N. E. Rep. SIT; 38 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 25), 471. 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Long (112 
 
 Ind. 166; 13 N. E. Rep. 659; 31 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 138), 397. 
 Cincinnati, etc., -R. Co. v. Madden <134 
 
 Ind. 462; 34 N. E. Rep. 227), 845. 
 Cincinnati, etc., Ry. Co. v, Maley's 
 
 Admr. (25 Ky. L. R. 690; 76 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 334), 380. 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. McMullen (117 
 
 Ind. 439; 20 N. E. Rep. 287; 38 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 165), 90. 
 Cincinnati Ry. Co. v. Mounts (104 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 748), 622. 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Murray (53 
 
 Ohio St. 570; 42 N. E. Rep. 596; 30 
 
 L. R. A. 608), 136. 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Peters (80 
 
 Ind. 168; 6 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 126), 
 
 833. 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Phinney (Ind. 
 
 77 N. E. Rep. 296), 357. 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Previtt (92 
 
 Kjr. 223; 17 S. W. Rep. 484), 58. 
 Cincinnati, etc., Ry. Co. v, Rhodes (102 
 
 S. W. Rep. 321), 866. 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Roberts (110 
 
 Ky. 856; 62 S. W. Rep. 901), 492. 
 Cincinnati, etc., Co. v. Robertson (139 
 
 Fed. Rep. 519), 327. 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Roesch (126 
 
 Ind. 445; 26 N. E. Rep. 171), 243. 
 Cincinnati, etc., Ry. Co. v. Salzman 
 
 (62 Ohio St. 658; 40 N. E. Rep. 891; 
 
 49 Am. St. Rep. 746; 31 L. R. A. 
 
 861), 669. 
 Cincinnati, etc., Ry. Co. v. South Fork, 
 
 etc., Co. (139 Fed. Rep. 528; 1 L. 
 
 R. A. [N. S.] 533), 76. 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Thiebald (114 
 
 Fed. Rep. 918; 52 C. C. A. 538), 69. 
 
 k 
 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Walrath (38 
 
 Ohio St. 461), 566. 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. f. Wright (54 
 
 Ohio St. 181; 43 N. E. Rep. 688; 38 
 
 L. R. A. 340), 1043. 
 Cirello w. Metropolitan, etc., Co. (88 N. 
 
 Y. S. 932), 96. 
 Citizens Ry. Co. v. Carey (66 Ind. 396), 
 
 125. 
 Citizens R. Co. v. Twiname (111 Ind. 
 
 587; 13 N. E. Rep. 56; 30 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R, Cas. 616), 834. 
 Citizens, etc., R. Co. v. Willoby (134 
 
 Ind. 563; 33 N. E. Rep. 627; 68 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 485), 92. 
 City, etc., R. Co. v, Conery , (61 Ark. 
 
 381: 33 S. W. Rep. 426; 31 L. R. A. 
 
 366), 26. 
 City R. Co. V. Lee (50 N. J. L. 436; 14 
 
 Atl. Rep. 883; 7 Am. St. Rep. 798), 
 
 807. 
 City, etc., R. Co. v. Moor£ (80 Md. 348; 
 
 30 Atl. Rep. 643; 45 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 345)^ 282. 
 Clampit V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (84 
 
 Iowa 71; 50 N. W. Rep. 673; 49 Am. 
 . & Eng. R. Cas. 468), 947. 
 Clancy v. Transit Co. (192 Mo. 615), 
 
 115. 
 Clapp V. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. (36 
 
 Minn. 6; 89 N. W. Rep. 340), 97. 
 Clark V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (128 Mass. 
 
 1; 1 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 134), 408. 
 Clark v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (64 N. H. 
 
 386; 10 Atl. Rep. 676; 31 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 548), 986. 
 Clark V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (127 Mo. 
 
 208; 89 S. W. Rep. 1013), 599. 
 Clark V. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (136 Mo. 
 
 202), 283. 
 Clark V. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. (179 
 
 Mo. 66; 77 S. W. Rep. 882), 269. 
 Clark V. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (48 
 
 Kan. 654; 29 Pac. Rep. 1138), 344. 
 Clark V. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (35 
 
 Kan. 354), 991. 
 Clark v. New York, etc., R. Co. (40 Hun 
 
 606; 8 N. Y. S. R. 249; 113 N. Y. 
 
 670; 21 N. E. Rep. 1116; 83 N. Y. 
 
 S. R. 994), 1108. 
 Clark V. Northern Pacific R. Co. (47 
 
 Minn. 380; 60 N. W. Rep. 365), 1016. 
 Clark V. Northern Pac. R. Co. (Wash., 
 
 69 Pac. Rep. 636), 64. 
 Clark V. Pacific R. Co. (39 Mo. 184), 35. 
 Clark V. Richmond, etc., R. Co. (78 Va. 
 
 709; 18 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 78), 324. 
 Clark V. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. (88 Minn. 
 
 128; 9 N. W. Rep. 581; 8 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 240), 341. 
 Clark V. Seoul (137 Mass. 880), 393. 
 Clark V. Van Vleck (118 N. W. Rep. 
 
 648), 198. 
 Clark V. Vermont, etc., R. Co. (88 Vt. 
 
 103), 879. 
 Clark V. Wilmington, etc., R. Co. (109 
 
 N. Car. 430; 14 S. E. Rep. 43; 48 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 646), 153. 
 Clarke v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (138 Ind. 
 
 199; 31 N. E. Rep. 808), 480. 
 Clay V. Central, etc., R. Co. (84 Ga. 
 
 346), 64. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [Beferenoes are to sections.] 
 
 Clay V. Railroad (56 111. App. S35), 158. 
 Claypool V. Wigmore (Ind., 71 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 509), 20. 
 Claxton V. Lexington, etc., R. Co. (13 
 
 Bush.- 636; 17 Am. Ry. Rep. 12), 200. 
 Claxton's Admr. v. Lexington, etc., R. 
 
 Co. (13 Bush. 636), 98. 
 Cleary v. Long Island R. Co. (66 N. Y. 
 
 S. R. 568; 64 App. Div. 884), 348. 
 Cleary v. Transit Co. (108 Mo. App. 
 , 433; 83 S. W. Rep. 1029), 119. 
 Cleaver v. Louisville, etc;, R. Co. (100 
 
 S. W. Rep. 223), 167. 
 Cleghorn v. New York, etc., R. Co. (56 
 
 N. Y. 44), 173. 
 Clem II. Wabash R. Co. (72 Mo. App. 
 
 433), 1065. 
 Clemens v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co, (53 
 
 Mo. 366), 37. 
 Clements v. Alabama, etc., R. Co. (127 
 
 Ala. 166; 28 So. Rep. 643), 612. 
 Cleveland) etc., R. Co. v. Arbaugh (47 
 
 111. App. 860), 1029. 
 Cleveland & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Austin 
 
 (127 111. App. 281), 473. 
 Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Ballentine (56 
 
 U. S. App. 266; 84 Fed. Rep. 935; 28 
 
 C. C. A. 572), 2. 
 Cleveland, etc., Ry. Co. v. Bergschicker 
 
 (69 N. E. Rep. 1000), 521. 
 Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Bertrand (11 
 
 Ohio St. 467), 1071. 
 Cleveland, etc., Ry. Co. v. Carr (95 
 ''111. App. 676), 339. 
 Cleveland v. Central R. Co. (73 Ga. 
 
 793), 204. 
 'Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v, Crawford (24 
 
 OhiQ*St. 631; 16 Am. Rep. 633), 1040. 
 Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Curran (19 
 
 Ohio St. 1; 2 Am. Rep. 362), 567. 
 Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Doerr (41 111. 
 
 App. 630), 88D. 
 Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Dukeman (130 
 , 111. App. 105), 1032. 
 Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Elliott (28 
 
 Ohio St. 340), 1006. 
 Cleveland, etc., R. Co. i/. Terry (8 Ohio 
 
 St. 570), 1012. 
 Cleveland, etc., Ry. Co. v. Haas (Ind., 
 
 74 N. E. Rep. 1003), 869. 
 Cleveland, etc., Ry. Co. v. Hadley (84 
 
 N. E. Rep. 13), 769. 
 Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Halbert (179 
 
 111. 196; 63 N. E. Rep. 623; 75 111. 
 
 App. 592), 896. 
 Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Henry (80 
 
 N. E. Rep. 636), 848. 
 Cleveland, etc., Ry. Co. v. Houghland 
 
 (86 N. E. Rep. 369), 1023. 
 Cleveland, etc., Ry. Co. v. Keary (3 
 
 Ohio St. 201), 300. 
 Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Ketchum (133 
 
 Ind. 346; 33 N. E. Rep. 116; 19 L. 
 
 R. A. 339), 563. 
 Cleveland, etc., ,R. Co. v. Lee (154 Ind. 
 
 430), 398. 
 Cleveland, etc., R. Co. «-. Lindsay (109 
 
 111.. App. 533), 80. 
 Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Mauson (SO 
 
 Ohio St. 451), 1058. 
 Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. McHenry (47 
 
 111, App. 301), 664. 
 
 Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Newell (75 
 
 Ind. 542; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 377), 
 
 661. 
 Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Newell (104 
 ■ Ind. 864), 181. 
 Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Osgood (Ind., 
 
 70 N. E. Rep. 839), 69. 
 Cleveland, etc., Ry. Co. v. Patterson (75 
 
 N. E. Rep. 875), 20/ 
 Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Richey (43 
 
 111. App. 247), 974. 
 Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Rowan (66 
 
 Pa. St. 393), 199. 
 Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Schneider (45 
 
 Ohio St. 678; 17 N. E. Rep. 321; 35 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 334), 922. 
 Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Selsor (55 111. 
 
 App. 686), 249. 
 Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Snow (Ind., 74 
 
 N. E. Rep. 908), 249. 
 Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Somers (24 
 
 Ohio Clr. Ct. R. 67), 338. 
 Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Walter (45 
 
 111. App. 642), 419. 
 Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Ward (147 Ind. 
 
 256; 46 N. E. Rep. 336), 266. 
 Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Workman (66 
 
 Ohio St. 509; 64 N. E. Rep. 682), 349. 
 Cleveland, etc., R. Co. i/. Wynant (114 
 
 Ind. 525; 17 N. E. Rep. 118; 35 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 388), 97. 
 Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Wynant (134 
 
 Ind. 681; 55 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 80; 
 
 34 N. E. Rep. 669), 161. 
 Cliff V. Midland R. Co. (L. R., 6 Q. B. 
 
 258; 18 W. R. 456; 22 L. T. 382), 
 
 930. 
 Clifford V. Old Colony R. Co. (141 Mass. 
 
 664; 6 N. E. Rep. 761), 498. 
 Close V. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. (73 
 
 Mich. 647; 41 N. W. Rep. 888; 37 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 582), 1020. 
 Clotworthy v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (80 
 
 Mo. 880; 81 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 371), 
 
 789. 
 Clow V. Pittsburg Traction Co. (87 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 1004), 699. 
 Clowdis V. Fresno, etc., Co. (118 Cal. 
 
 316; 50 Pac. Rep. 373), 884. 
 Clowers v. Wabash, etc., R. Co. (81 Mo. 
 
 App. 213), 374. 
 Clussman v. Long Island R. Co. (9 Hun 
 
 618; 73 N. Y. 606), 630. 
 Clymer v. Railway Co. (6 Blatchf. 317), 
 
 229. 
 Clyde V. Richmond, etc., R. Co. (69 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 673), 488. 
 Coakley*'». Boston, etc., R. Co. (33 N. 
 . E. Rep. 930), 962. 
 Coal Creek Mining Co. v. Davis (90 
 
 Tenn. 711; 18 S. W. Rep. 387), 477. 
 Coal Co. V. Polland (62 N. E. Rep. 492). 
 
 506. 
 Coates V. Burlington, etc., R. Co. (62 
 
 Iowa 486; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 266), 341. 
 Cobb V. Great Western R. Co. (1 Q B 
 
 459; 58 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 169), 767. 
 Cobb V. Lindell Ry. Co. (149 Mo. 135; 
 
 50 S. W. Rep. 310), 678. 
 Cobb V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (149 
 
 Mo. 609; 50 S. W. Rep. 894; 13 Am. 
 
 Ixi 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 ^References are to sections.'] 
 
 6 Eng. R. Cas. [N. S.] 632), 500. 
 Cockle V. London, etc., R. Co. (L. E., 
 
 7 C. P. 321; 41 L. J. C. P. 140; 27 L. 
 T. 320; 20 W. R. 754), 714. 
 
 Cody V. Market St. Ry. Co. (Cal., 82 
 
 Pac. Rep, 666), 125. 
 Cody ■!/. New York, etc., R. Co. (151 
 
 Mass. 462; 24 N. E. Rep. 402; 7 L. 
 
 R. A. 843), 803. 
 Coe V. Van Why (33 Colo. 315; 80 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 894), 98. 
 Coe V. Washington Mills (149 Mass. 543; 
 
 21 N. E. Rep. 966), 299. 
 Coffee V. New York, etc., R. Co. (155 
 
 Mass. 21; 28 N. E. Rep. 1128; 48 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 370), 99. 
 Coffin V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (22 Mo. 
 
 App. 601), 956. 
 Coffman v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (18 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 1012), 461. 
 Cogan V. Cass Ave R. Co. (101 Mo. App. 
 
 179; 73 S. W. Rep. 738), 392. 
 Cogbill V. Louisville & N. R. Co. (44 
 
 So. Rep. 683), 513. 
 Cogdell V. Southern Ry. Co. (129 N. C. 
 
 398; 40 S. E. Rep. 202), 382. 
 Coggs V. Bernard (2 Lord Raymond 
 
 909), 15. 
 Cogswell V. Oregon, etc., R. Co. (6 Ore- 
 gon 417), 1098. 
 Cohen v. Eureka, etc., R. Co. (14 Nev. 
 
 376), 980. 
 Cohen v. Hamblin, etc., Co. (186 Mass. 
 
 644; 71 N. E. Rep. 948), 318. 
 Cole. V. Blue Ridge Ry. Co. (S. C, 55 
 
 S. E. Rep. 126), 117. 
 Cole V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (71 Wis. 
 
 114; 37 N. W. Rep. 84; 5 Am. St. «ep. 
 
 201; 33 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 271), 464. 
 Cole V. St. Louis Tr. Co. (183 Mo. 81; 
 
 81 S. W. Rep. 1138), 360. 
 Colegreve v. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (20 N. Y. 492), 675. 
 Coleman v. Charleston, etc., Ry. Co. (138 
 
 N. Car. 354), 663. 
 Coleman v. Georgia, etc., R. Co. (84 Ga. 
 
 1; 10 S. E. Rep. 498; 40 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 690), 570. 
 Coleman v. Himmerberger-Harrison Co. 
 
 (Mo., 79 S. W. Rep. 981), 78. 
 Coleman v. Mechanics Iron Co. (2 Am. 
 
 Neg. Rep. 374), 95. 
 Coleman v. New York, etc., R. Co. (106 
 
 Mass. 160), 749. 
 Coleman v. Riches (16 C. B. 104; 81 E. 
 
 C. L. 487), 209. 
 Coleman v. South, etc., R. Co. (4 H. & 
 
 C. 699), 682. 
 Coleman v. Yazoo, etc., R. Co. (43 So. 
 
 Rep. 473), 737. 
 Coles V. Union Ter. Ry. Co. (Iowa, 99 
 
 N. W. Rep. 108), 369. 
 Coley V. Kansas City So. Ry. Co. (Texas, 
 
 95 S. W. Rep. 96), 335. 
 Coley V. North Car. R. Co. (129 N. Car. 
 
 407; 40 S. E. Rep. 195), 243. 
 Collett V. London, etc., R. Co. (16 Q. 
 
 B. 984; 15 Jur. 1053; 20 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 411), 563. 
 Collier v. Great Northern R. Co. (40 
 
 Wash. 639; 82 Pac. Rep. 935), 229. 
 
 Ixii 
 
 Collins V. Burlington, etc., R. Co. (83 
 
 Iowa 346; 49 N. W. Rep. 848), 412. 
 Collins V, East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (9 Heisk. [Tenn.] 841), 166. 
 Collins V. Long Island R. Co. (29 J. & 
 
 S. N. Y. 154; 18 N. Y. Supp. 779), 
 
 1047. 
 Collins V. New York, etc., R. Co. (24 
 
 N. Y. Supp. 1090; 56 N. Y. S. R. 82; 
 
 71 Hun 504), 1060. 
 Collins V. New York, etc., R. Co. (23 
 
 T. & S. [N. Y.] 31; 8 N. Y. S. R. 764; 
 
 112 N. Y. 665; 20 N. E. Rep. 413), 
 
 864. 
 Collins V. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. (30 
 
 Minn. 31; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 150), 
 
 469. 
 Collins V. Southern Ry. Co. (42 So. Rep. 
 
 167), 664. 
 Collins V. Texas, etc., R. Co. (15 Texas 
 
 Civ. App. 169; 39 S. W. Rep. 643), 
 
 818 ' 
 
 Collins V. Toledo, etc., R. Co. (80 Mich. 
 
 390; 46 N. W. Rep. 178), 630. 
 Collis V. Selden (3 C. P. 495), 18. 
 Collyer v, Pennsylvania R. Co. (49 N. 
 
 J. L. 59; 6 Atl. Rep. 437), 467. 
 Colorado, etc., R. Co. v. Andrews (11 
 
 Colo. App. 205; 63 Pac. Rep. 518), 609. 
 Colorado, etc., R. Co. v. Holmes (6 
 
 Colo. 616; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 410), 
 
 391. 
 Colorado, etc., R. Co. v. Naylor (17 
 
 Colo. 501; 30 Pac. Rep. 249), 380. 
 Colorado, etc.; R. Co. v. O'Brien (16 
 
 Colo. 219; 27 Pac. Rep. 701; 48 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 235), 372. 
 Colorado, etc., R. Co. v, Ogden (3 Colo. 
 
 499), 373. 
 Colorado, etc., R. Co. v. Thomas (33 
 
 Colo. 517; 81 Pac. Rep. 801; 70 L. R. 
 
 A. 681), 1039. 
 Colorado Springs- Electric Co. v, Soper 
 
 (88 Pac. Rep. 16l), 1058. 
 Columbia & Puget Sound R. R. Co. v. 
 
 Hawthorne (144 U. S. 202; 36 L. Ed. 
 
 405), 95. 
 Columbus, etc., R. Co. v. Arnold (31 Ind. 
 
 174), 476. 
 Columbus, etc., R. Co. v. Bridges (86 
 
 Ala. 448; 5 So. Rep. 864; 38 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 136), 346. 
 Columbus, etc., R. Co. w. Erick (51 Ohio 
 
 St. 146; 37 N. E. Rep. 128), 494. 
 Columbus, etc., R. Co. v, Farrell (31 
 
 Ind. 408), 704. 
 Columbus, etc., R. Co. v. Powell (40 Ind. 
 
 37), 560. 
 Columbus, etc., R. Co. v. Troesch (68 
 
 111. 545), 482. 
 Columbus, etc., R. Co. v. Wood (86 Ala. 
 
 164; 6 So. Rep. 463), 1084. 
 Commonwealth v. Boston, etc., R. Co, 
 ■ (121 Mass. 36), 68. 
 Commonwealth v. Boston, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (101 Mass. 201), 916. 
 Commonwealth v. Boston, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (129 Mass. 500; 1 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 457), 720. 
 Commonwealth v. Fitchburg, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (126 Mass. 472), 661. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.'] 
 
 Commonwealth Co. v. Rose (314 111. -545; 
 
 73 N. E. Rep. 780; 114 111. App. 
 
 181), 33. 
 Commonwealth v. Vermont, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (108 Mass. 7), 825. 
 Condiff V. Kansas City, etq., R. Co. (45 
 
 Kan. 286; 25 Pac. Rep. 562; 48 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 417), 410. 
 Condon v. Missouri Pacific R. Co. (78 
 
 Mo. 567), 494. 
 Condran v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (67 
 , Fed. Rep. 522), 1070. 
 Cone V. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (81 N. 
 
 Y. 206; 37 Am. Rep. 491; 2 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 57), 471. 
 Cones V. Cincinnati, etc., R, Co, (114 
 
 Ind. 328; 16 N. E. Rep. 638), 1015. 
 Congrave v. Southern Pacific R. Co. (88 
 
 Cal. 360; 26 Pac. Rep. 175; 48 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 337), 461. 
 Conklin v. New York, etc., R. Co. (43 
 
 N. Y. S. R. 414; 63 Hun 628; 17 N. 
 
 Y. Supp. 651), 1018. 
 Conley v. Cincinnati, etc., R, Co. (41 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 537; 89 Ky. 402; 
 
 12. S. W. Rep. 764), 58. 
 Conley v. Richmond, etc., R. Co. (109 
 
 No. Car. 692; 14 S. E. Rep. 303; 52 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 490), 820. 
 Conlon V. Eastern R. Co. (135 Mass. 
 
 195; 15 Am, &,Eng. R. Cas. 99), 288. 
 Conlon V. -New York, etc., R. Co. (74 
 
 Hun 116; 56 N. Y. S. R. 316), 866. 
 Conlon o. Oregon, etc., R. Co. (23 Ore- 
 
 fon 499; 32 Pac. Rep. 397-; 53 Am. 
 : Eng. R. Cas. 356), 380. 
 Connell v.. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. (93 
 
 Va. 44; 32 L. R. A. 792; 24 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 467; 67 Am. St. Rep. 786), 763. 
 Connelly v. Manhattan R. Co. (68 Hun 
 
 [N. Y.] 466), 592. 
 Connelly v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. (38 
 
 Minn. 80; 35 N. W. Rep. 582), 600. 
 Conner v. Burlington, etc., R. Co. (74 
 
 Iowa 383; 37-N. W. Rep. 966), 371. 
 Connolly v. Crescent City R. Co. (41 La. 
 
 Ann. 67; 5 So. Rep. 259; 3 L. R. A. 
 
 153), 730. 
 Connolly v. New York, etc., R. Co. (158 
 
 Mass. 8;- 32 N. E. Rep. 937), 632. 
 Connolly v. Union Sewer Co. (184 U. S. 
 
 540), 504. 
 Connor v. Burlington, C. R. & N. Ry. 
 
 Co. (71 Iowa 490; 32 N. W. Rep. 466; 
 
 60 Am. St. Rep. 814), 3. 
 Connor v. Concord, etc., R. Co. (67 N. 
 
 H. 311; SO Atl. Rep. 1121), 576. 
 Connor v. Blmira, etc., R. Co. (92 Hun 
 
 339; 36 N. Y. S. 926), 39. 
 Conover v. Neher Ross Co. (38 Wash. 
 
 172; 80 Pac. Rep. 881), 86. 
 Conroy v. Detroit Ry. Co. (Mich., 108 
 
 N. W. Rep. 641), 125. 
 Conroy v. Pennsylvania R.Xo. (1 Pittsb. 
 
 [Pa.] 440), 771. 
 Consolidated, etc., R. Co. v. Behr (69 
 
 N. J. L. 477; 37 Atl. Rep. 142), 1069. 
 Consolidated C. Co. i/. " Fleishbein (109 
 
 111. App. 609; 207 111. 593; 69 N. E. 
 
 Rep., 908), 161. 
 Consolidated, etc., R. Co. v. Hannei (146 
 
 111. 614; 35 N. E. Rep. 162), 176. 
 
 Consolidated Traction Co. v. Hoimarlc 
 
 (60 N. J. L. 456; 38 Atl. Rep. 684), 
 
 1049. 
 Consolidated Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. 
 
 Osborne (66 Kan. 393; 71 Pac. Rep, 
 
 838), 87. 
 Consolidated, etc., Ref. Co. v. Peterson 
 
 (8 Kan. App. 316), 368. 
 Content v. Railroad Co. (165 Mass. 267; 
 
 43 N. E. Rep. 94), .326. 
 Continental, etc., Co. v. Stead (95 U. 
 
 S. 161), 980. 
 Conway v. Philadelphia, etc., R, Co. (17 
 
 Phila. [Pa.] 71), 919. 
 Conway v. Troy, etc., R. Co. (41 Hun 
 
 [N. Y.] 639; 1 N. Y. S. R. 587), 1030. 
 Cook V. Central R. Co. (67 Ala. 533), 
 
 961. 
 Cook V. Clay Hill R. Co. (60 Cal. 604; 
 
 6 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 175), 191. 
 Cook V. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (63 Mo. 
 
 397), 150. 
 Cook V. New York, etc., R. Co. (119 N. 
 
 Y. 653; 29 N. Y. S. R. 994), 366. 
 Cook V. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. (34 Minn. 
 
 157; 24 N. W. Rep. 311), 311. 
 Cooke V. Lorance Co. (33 Hun 361), 275. 
 Coolbroth v. Maine C. R. Co. (77 Me. 
 
 165; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 599), 321. 
 Coombs V. Fitchburg, etc., R. Co. (156 
 
 Mass. 200; 30 N. E. Rep. 1140; 53 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 363), 328. 
 Cooney v. Commonwealth, etc., Ry. Co. 
 
 (&1 N. E. Rep. 905), 482. 
 Coontz V. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (116 
 
 Mo. 669; 22 S. W. Rep. 672), 186. 
 Cooper V. Atlantic Coast Line R, Co. 
 
 (69 S. E. Rep. 704), 670. 
 Cooper V. Central R. Co. (44 Iowa 134), 
 
 492. 
 Cooper V. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. (66 
 
 Mich. 261; 33 N. VV. Rep. 306), 166. 
 Cooper V. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. (23 
 
 Wis. 668), 482. 
 Cooper V. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. (24 W. 
 
 Va.-37), 500. 
 Copeland tj. Southern, etc., R. Co. (61 
 
 Ala. 376), 414. 
 Copley V. New Haven, etc., R. Co. (136 
 
 Mass. 6; 19 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 373), 
 
 1030. 
 Coppins V. New York, etc., R. Co. (188 
 
 NT Y. 557; 26 N. E. Rep. 916; 44 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 618), 482. 
 Corbett v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (26 
 
 Mo. App. 621), 478. 
 Corcoran v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (133 
 
 Mass. 507), 399. 
 Corcoran v. Concord, etc., ^. Co. (56 
 
 Fed. Rep. 1014), 1088. 
 Corcoran v. Holbrook (59 N. Y. 617; 17 
 
 Am. Rep. 369), 247. 
 Corcoran v. New York, etc., R. Co. (46 
 
 App. Div. 201; 61 N. Y. Supp. 672), 
 
 493. 
 Corcoran v. New York, etc., R. Ce. (19 
 
 Hun [N. Y.] 368), 1106. - 
 Corcoran v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (105 
 
 Mo. 399; 16 S. W. Rep. 411), 414. 
 Corning Steel Co. v. Pohlplotz (Ind., 64 
 
 N. Y. 535) 961. 
 Cordell 'v. New York, etc., R. Co. (70 N. 
 
 Ixiii 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.'] 
 
 Y. 119: 18 Am. Ry. Rep. 511), 1019. 
 Core V. Ohio River R. Co. (38 W. Va. 
 
 466; 18 S. E. Rep. 596), 485. 
 Corliss V. Worcester, etc., R. Co. (63 
 
 N. H. 404; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 208), 201. 
 Corning Steel Co. v. Pohlplotz (Ind. 64 
 
 N. W. Rep. 476), 6. 
 Cornman v. E. C. Ry. Co. (4 H. & N. 
 
 78), 39. 
 Cornman v. London, etc., Co. (4 Hurl. 
 
 & N. 781, 786), 604. 
 Cornwall v. Charlotte, etc., R. Co. (97 
 
 N. Car. 11; 2 S. E. Rep. 659), 392. 
 Correll zi. Burlington, etcs R. Co. (38 
 
 Iowa 120), 984. 
 Corrister v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co, (25 
 
 Mo. App. 619), 169. 
 Corwin v. New York, etc., R. Co. (13 N. 
 
 Y. 42), 602. 
 Cosgrove v. New York, etc., R. Co. (6 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 35; 87 N. Y. 88; 
 
 41 Am: Rep. 355), 969. 
 Cosgrove v. New York, etc., R. Co. (18 
 
 Hun 329), 953. 
 Costello V. Syracuse, etc., R. Co. (65 
 
 Barb. [N. Y.] 92; 55 N. Y. 641), 
 
 887. 
 Costikyan v. Rome, etc., R. Co. (18 N. 
 
 Y. Supp. 683), 665. 
 Cott V. Lewiston R. Co. (36 N. Y. 214), 
 
 903. 
 Cotton V. Willmar & S. F. Ry. Co. (109 
 
 N. VV. Rep. 835), 1047. 
 Cotton v. Wood (8 C. B. N. S. 568; 98 
 
 E. C. L.), 2. 
 Cottrell V. Pawtucket St. Ry. Co. (65 
 
 Atl. Rep. 269; 27 R. L 665), 796. 
 Couch V. Charlotte, etc., R. Co. (22 So. 
 
 Car. 657; 88 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 831), 
 
 323. 
 Coudy V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (13 Mo. 
 
 App, 587; 85 Mo. 79), 664. 
 Coughlan v. Cambridge (166 Mass. 268; 
 
 44 N. E. Rep. 218), 226.- 
 Coughlan v, Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (67 Atl. Rep. 148), 200. 
 Coullard v. Tecumseh, etc., Co. (151 
 
 Mass. 85), 308. 
 Countryman v. East Tennessee,^ etc., R. 
 
 Co. (89 Ga. 835; 16 S. E. Rep. 84), 
 
 418. 
 County V. Pacific Coast Co. (53 Atl. Rep. 
 
 386), 56. 
 Course v. New York, etc., R. Co. (17 N. 
 
 Y. S. R. 715; 49 Hun 609; 2 N. Y. 
 
 Supp. 312), 852. 
 Cousins 7'. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. (96 
 
 Mich. 386; 66 N. W. Rep. 14), 783. 
 Covcy r. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (86 Mo. 
 . 635), 251. 
 Covington, etc., Co. ^v. Steinbrock (61 
 
 Ohio St. 215; 55 N. E. Rep. 618; 76 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 375), 282. 
 Covington Transfer Co. v. Kelly (36 
 
 Ohio St. 86; 38 Am. Rep. 558; 3 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 336), 1043. 
 Covington v. Western R. 'Co. (81 Ga. 
 
 273; 6 S. E. Rep. 693; 34 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 469), 790. 
 Cowan V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (80 Wis. 
 
 284; 50 N. W. Rep. 180), 471. 
 
 Ixiv 
 
 Cowan V. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. (80 
 
 Wis. 284: 60 N. W. Rep. 180), 393. 
 Cowan V. Union Pacific R. Co. (35 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 43), 602. 
 Coward i/. East Tenn., etc., R. Co. (16 
 
 Lea. [Tenn.] 225; 67 Am. Rep. 226), 
 
 849. 
 Cowles v. New York & H. R. Co. (66 
 
 Atl. Rep. 1020, 1024), 903. 
 Cowles V. Richmond, etc., R. Co. (84 N. 
 
 C. 309; 37 Am. Rep. 620; 2 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 90), 475. 
 Cox's Admr. v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 
 
 (104 S. W. Rep. 288; 31 Ky. Law 
 
 Rep. 875), 883. 
 Cox V. Chicago, etc^ R. Co. (102 Iowa 
 
 711; 72 N. W. Rep. 301; 9 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. [N. S.] 604), 80. 
 Cox V. Great Western R. Co. (L. R., 9 Q. 
 
 B. 106; 6 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 485; 
 
 43 & 44 Vict. 42), 803. . 
 Coy V. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (86 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 468), 412. 
 Coyle V. Long Island R. Co. (33 Hun 
 
 [N. Y.] 37), 945. 
 Coyne v. Union Pacific R, Co. (133 U. 
 
 S. 370; 33 L. Ed. 651), 339. 
 Coyne v. United Ry. Cos. (Mo. App. 98 
 
 S. W. Rep. 110), 208. 
 Craddock v, Louisville, etc., R. Co. (Ky. 
 
 16 S. W. Rep. 126), 411. 
 Craig V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (54 Mo. 
 
 App. 523), 321. 
 Craig V. Mt. Carbon R. Co. (45 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 448), 1072. 
 Crater v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (36 Wis.- 
 
 757), 735. 
 Cramer v. Springfield, etc., R. Co. (112 
 
 Mo. App. 350; 87 S. W. Rep. 84), 557. 
 
 Cranch v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co. (78 
 
 <N. E. Rep. 1078; 186 N. Y. 310), 411. 
 
 Crandall v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (Minn., 105 N. W. Rep. 185), 649. 
 Crane v. Chicago, etc., Ry. . Co. (Iowa, 
 
 99 N. W. Rep. 169), 338. 
 Crane v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (87 Mo, 
 
 688; 26 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 440), 94. 
 Crane v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (67 Atl. 
 
 Reo. 877), 889. 
 Crank v. Forty-Second Street R. Co. (6 
 
 N. Y. Supp. 229), 183. 
 Cranston v. New York, etc., R. Co. (125 
 
 N. Y. 724; 32 N, Y. S. R. 592; 67 
 
 Hun 590), 967. 
 Craps V. Syracuse (183 N. Y. 395; 76 
 
 N. E. Rep. 465, 1092), 55. 
 Cratt V. Albermarle, etc., Co. (133 No. 
 
 Car. 151; 43 S. E. Rep. 597), 280. 
 Craven v. Central Pac. R. Co. (72 Cal. 
 
 346), 104. 
 Craven v. Mayers (165 Mass. 271; 42 
 
 N. E. Rep. 1131), 223. 
 Crawford v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. (26 
 
 Ohio St. 580; 13 Am. Ry. Rep. 387), 
 
 669. 
 Crawford v. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (23 
 
 .T. & S. 262; 121 N. Y. 652; 24 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 1093), 1051. 
 Crawford v. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (13 
 
 N. Y. S. R. 298), 955. 
 Crawford v. New York, etc., R. Co. (33 
 
 Ohio Cir. Ct. 207), 348. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.] 
 
 Crawford !/. United Ry. Co. (Md., 61 
 
 Atl. Rep. 287), 266. 
 Crebarry ti. Transit Co. (28 N. Y. S. 
 
 291; 77 Hun 74), 255. 
 Creech v. Charleston, etc., R. Co. (66 
 
 So. Car. 528), 718. 
 Creed v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (86 Pa. 
 
 St 139) 771 
 Cregg V. dhicago, etc., R. Co. (91 Mich. 
 - 624; 52 N. W. Rep. 62), 377. 
 Crew v: St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (20 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 87), 483. 
 Crine v. East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. (84 
 
 Ga. 651;' 11 S. E. Rep. 55«), 669. 
 Crispin v. Babbitt (81 N. Y. 616), 461. 
 Crissey v. Railroad Co. (75 Pa. St. 83), 
 
 125. 
 Criswell v. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. (30 W. 
 
 Va. 798; 6 S. E. Rep. 31; 33 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 232), 486. 
 Cronk v. Wabash R. Co. (123 Iowa 349; 
 
 98 N. W. Rep. 884), 83. 
 Croom V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (52 Minn. 
 
 296; 53 N. W. Rep. 1128), 586. 
 Cross V. Illinois Cent. R. Co. (110 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 290), 922. 
 Cross V, Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (56 
 
 Mo. App. 674), 559. 
 Crow V. Wabash, etc., R. Co. (23 Mo. 
 
 App. 357), 1078. 
 Crowe V. New York, etc., R. Co. (70 
 
 Hun 37; 53 N. Y. S. R. 558; 23 N. 
 
 Y. Supp. 1100), 827. 
 Crowley v. Appleton, (148 Mass. 98; 18 
 
 N. E. Rep. 675), 274. 
 Crowley v. Burlington, etc., R. Co. (65 
 
 Iowa 658; 20 N. W. Rep. 467; 22 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 918), 408. 
 Crowley v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (21 
 
 Ky. L. R. 1434; 55 S. W. Rep. 434), 
 
 398 
 Crowley v. Pacific Mills (148 Mass. 228; 
 
 19 N. E. Rep. 344), 269. 
 Crown V. Orr (140 N. Y. 450), 80. 
 Crumpley v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (98 
 
 Mo. 34; 11 S. W. Rep. 244; 111 Mo. 
 
 152; 19 S. W. Rep. 820), 200. 
 Crumpley v, Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (19 
 
 S. W. Rep. 820), 971. 
 Crutchfield v. Richmond, etc., R. Co. (76 
 ■ N. Car. 320), 471. 
 Crutchfield v. Richmond, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (78 N. Car. 300; 16 Am. Ry. Rep. 
 
 212) 399. 
 Cryder v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. 
 
 (152 Fed. Rep. 417), 327. 
 Cuddy V. Horn (46 Mich. 596; 10 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 32; 41 Am. Rep. 178), .1048. 
 Cupp V. Newark, etc., R. Co. (35 N. J. 
 
 L. 17; 10 Am. Rep. 205), 279. 
 Cruty V. Erie, etc., R. Co. (3 T. & C. 
 
 N. Y. 244), 323. 
 Culberson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (50 
 
 Mo. App. 556), 708. 
 Culbertson v. Metropolitan, etc., R. Co. 
 
 140 Mo. 35; 36 S. W. Rep. 834), 200. 
 Culhane v. New York, etc., R. Co. (60 
 
 N. Y. 133; 10 Am.. Ry. Rep. 142), 931. 
 Cullan V. Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. (84 
 
 Mo. App. 340), 708. 
 Cullen V. Delaware, etc., Co. (113 N. 
 
 Y. 667; 21 N. E. Rep. 716), 1009. 
 
 Cullen V. Norton (126 N. Y. 1; 26 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 905), 476. 
 Cully V. Northern Pac. R. Co. (36 Wash. 
 
 241; 77 Pac. Rep. 202), 73. 
 Culpepper v. Northeastern R. Co. (90 
 
 Texas 627; 40 S. W. Rep. 386), 491. 
 Culver V. South Haven, etc., R. Co. (144 
 
 Mich. 254; 107 N. W. Rep. 908; 109 
 
 N. W. Rep. 256), 95. 
 Culver V. South Haven, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (Mich., 101 N. W. Rep. 663), 258. 
 Cumberland, etc., R. Co. v. Magnus (61 
 
 Md. 63; 18 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 182), 
 
 789 
 Cumberland, etc., R. Co. v. Scally (27 
 
 Md. 689), 139. 
 Cumberland, etc., R. Co. v. State (44 
 
 Md. 283; 45 Md. 229), 480. 
 Cummings v, Brooklyn R. Co. (104 N. 
 
 Y. 669), 916. 
 Cummings v. Evansville, etc., R. Co. (115 
 
 Ind. 417; 18 N. E. Rep. 6; 36 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 147), 74. 
 Cunnmgham v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (5 
 
 McCreary [U. S.] 465; 17 Fed. Rep. 
 
 882; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 217), 410. 
 Cunningham v. International, etc., .R. 
 
 Co. (51 Texas 503; 52 Am. Rep. 632), 
 
 281. 
 Cunningham v. Union Pacific R. Co. (4 
 
 Utah 206; 7 Pac. Rep. 795), 92. 
 Curl 7/. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (63 Iowa 
 
 417; 16 N. W. Rep. 69; 11 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 85), 92. 
 Curley v. Illinois, etc., R. Co. (40 La. 
 
 Ann. 810; 6 So. Rep. 103), 880. 
 Curran v. Merchants, etc., Co. (130 
 
 Mass. 374), 302. 
 Currans v. Seattle & S. F. Ry. Co. (76 
 
 Pac. Rep. 87), 157. 
 Currelli v. Jackson (77 Conn. 115; 58 
 
 Atl. Rep. 762), 79. 
 Curtis V. Central R. Co. (8 McLean U. 
 
 S. 401 i, 580. 
 Curtis V. Detroit, etc., R. Co. (27 Wis. 
 
 168; 5 Am. Ry. Rep. 368), 778. 
 Curtis V. McNail (173 Mo. 270; 73 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 167), 157. 
 Curtis V. Railroad Co.- (18 N. Y. 538), 
 
 122. 
 Curtis V. Rochester, etc., R. Co. (18 N. 
 
 Y. 634; 75 Am. Dec. 268), 765. 
 Curtis V. Southern Ry. Co. (61 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 539), 875. 
 Cushman v. Cushman (61 N. E. Rep. 
 
 262), 145. 
 Cusick V. Adams (115 N. Y. 55), 1076. 
 Cusick V. Adams (N. Y., 21 N. E. Rep. 
 
 673), 872." 
 Cutridge v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (105 
 
 Mo. 520; 16 S. W. Rep. 943), 419. 
 Cypher v. Railroad Co. (149 Pa. St. 
 
 359; 24 Atl. Rep, 225), 265. 
 Czezewzka v. Benton, etc., Ry. Co. (121 
 
 Mo. 201; 25 S. W. Rep. 911), 304. 
 
 Dacey v. Old Colony R. Co. (153 Mass. 
 
 112; 26 N. E. Rep. 437), 526. 
 Daggett V. Illinois, etc., R. Co. (34 
 
 Iowa 284), 797. 
 
 IXY 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 {^References are to sections.] 
 
 Dahlstrom v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. 
 
 Co. (96 Mo. 99; 8 S. W. Rep. 777; 
 
 35 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 387), 1077. 
 Dahlstrom v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (108 
 
 Mo. 525; 18 S. W. Rep. 919), 977. 
 Daignau v. Grand Trunk R. Co. (153 
 
 Fed. Rep. 593), 183. 
 Daily v. Richmond, etc., R. Co. (106 
 
 No. Car. 301: 11 S. E. Rep. 320; 42 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 124), 1084. 
 Dale V. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (73 N. Y. 
 
 408), 94. 
 Daley V. Norwich, etc., R. Co. (26 Conn. 
 
 691), 1091. 
 Da:las, etc., R. Co. v. Able (72 Texas 
 
 150; 9 S. W. Rep. 871; 37 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 453), 913. 
 Dallas V. Gulf, etc., R. Co. (61 Texas 
 
 196; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 575), 
 
 354 
 Dallas Ry. Co. v. Hardy (86 S. W. Rep. 
 
 1053), 184. 
 Dallas, etc., R. Co. z;. McAlister (90 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 933), 175. 
 Dallas, etc., R. Co. v. Spicker (61 Texas 
 
 427; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 160; 48 
 
 Am. Rep. 297), 60. 
 Dalton t: Atlantic, etc., R. Co. (4 Hughes 
 
 U. S. 180), 341. 
 Dalton z: Railroad (114 Iowa 257; 86 
 
 N. W. Rep. 272), 961. 
 Daly ?■. New Jersey, etc., R. Co. (155 
 
 Mass. 1; 29 N. E. Rep. 507), 68. 
 Datnrill v. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. (27 
 
 Mo. App. 202), 1011. 
 Dana v. New York, etc., R. Co. (23 
 
 Hun [^. Y.] 473). 489. 
 Dandie v. Southern Pacific R. Co. (42 
 
 La. Ann. 686; 7 So. Rep. 792), 400. 
 Dando v. Home, etc., Tel. Co. (103 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 103), 194. 
 Daniel v. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. (36 
 
 W. Va. 397; 15 S. E. Rep. 162; 16 
 
 L. R. A. 383; 63 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 503), 475. 
 . Daniel z'. Metropolitan, etc., R. Co. (6 
 
 H. L. Cas. 45; 20 W. R. 37; 40 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 121; 24 L. T. 815), 291. 
 Daniel v. Metropolitan, etc., R. Co. (3 
 
 C. P. 591: 37 L. J. C. P. 280), 279. 
 Daniels v. New York, etc., R. Co. (26 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 253; 13 L. R. A. 248; 
 
 154 Mass. 349; 28 N. E. Rep. 283), 
 
 1073. 
 Daniels v. Savannah, etc., R. Co. (86 Ga. 
 
 345; 12 S. E. Rep. 365), 64. 
 Daniels v. Union Pacific R. Co. (6 Utah 
 
 3.57; 23 Pac. Rep. 762), 479. 
 Darracott v. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. (83 
 
 Va. 288; 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 157), 
 
 410. 
 Darrigan v. New York, etc., R. Co. (52 
 
 Conn. 285; 62 Am. Rep. 590; 23 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 438), 488. 
 Darwin v. Charlotte, etc., R. Co. (23 
 
 So. Car. 631; 65 Am. Rep. 32), 392. 
 Daub V. Northern Pacific R. Co. (18 
 
 Fed. Rep. 625), 401. 
 Daugherty v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. 
 
 Co. (114 N. W. Rep. 902), 1072. 
 Daume v. Chicago, etc., R. (To. (72 Wis. 
 
 623; 40 N. W. Rep. 394; 7 Am. St. 
 
 Ixvi 
 
 Rep. 879; 36 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 416), 
 942. . 
 Davey ». London, etc., R. Co. (12 Q. 
 
 B. D. 70; 35 L. J. Q. B. D. 68), 994. 
 Davey v. London, etc., R. Co. (L. R., 11 
 
 Q. B. D. 213; 14 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 660), 1009. 
 Davidon v. Cornell (132 N. Y. 228; 80 
 
 N. E. Rep. 573;. 43 N. Y. S. R. 887), 
 
 372. 
 Davidson v. Davidson (46 -Minn. 117; 
 
 48 N. W. Rep. 560), 119. 
 Davidson v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. (171 
 
 Pa. 622, ■•S3 Atl. Rep. 86), 110. 
 Davidson v. Southern Pacific R. Co, (44 
 
 Fed. Rep. 476), 175. 
 Davies v. People's Ry. Co. (159 Mo. 1: 
 
 67 Mo. App. 698; 59 S. W. Rep. 982), 
 
 412. 
 Davies v. Southern Pacific R. Co. (98 
 
 ■Cal. 19; 32 Pac. Rep. 708), 476. 
 Davis ». -Atlanta, etc., R. Co. (63 S. C. 
 
 370, 577; 41 S. E. Rep. 468, 892), 227. 
 Davis V. Baltimore, ets., R. Co. (182 Pa. 
 
 St. 314; 26 Atl. Rep. 498), 331. 
 Davis V. Button (78 Cal. 247; 18 Pac 
 
 Rep. 133; 20 Pac. Rep. 645), 551. 
 Davis V. Camden G. & W. Ry. Co. (63 
 
 Atl. Rep. 843), 801. 
 Davis V. Central Vermont R. Co. (55 Vt. 
 
 84; 45 Am. Rep. 590), 475. 
 Davis V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (58 Wis. 
 
 646; 17 N. W. Rep. 406; 46 Am. Rep. 
 
 667; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 424), 1068. 
 Davis V. Columbia, etc., R. Co. (21 S. 
 
 C. 93; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 440), 
 189. 
 
 Davis V. Concord, etc., R. Co. (56 Vt. 
 
 84; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 173), 500. 
 Davis V. Detroit, etc., R. Co. (20 Mich. 
 
 105), 344. 
 Davis V. Guarnieri (45 Ohio St. 470; 15 
 
 N. E. Rep. 350; 4 Am. St. Rep. 548), 
 
 1066. 
 Davis V. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (46 
 
 Mo. App. 180), 1030. 
 Davis V. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (97 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 1122), 874. 
 Davis V. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (69 
 
 Miss. 136; 10 So. Rep. 460), 774. 
 Davis V. Mercer, etc., Co. (164 Ind. 
 
 413; 73 N. E. Rep. 899), 20. 
 Davis V. New York, etc., R. Cij. (143 
 
 Mass. 301; 68 Am. Rep. 138; 28 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 223; 9 N. E. Rep. 
 
 816), 45. 
 Davis V. New York, etc., R. Co. (47 N. 
 
 Y. 400; 2 Am. Ry. Rep. 394), 1006. 
 Davis V. New York, etc., R. Co. (169 
 
 Mass. 632; 34 N. E. Rep. 1070), 610. 
 Davis zi. Oregon, etc., R. Co. (8 Oregon 
 
 172), 405. 
 Davis V. Pennsylvania R. Co. (34 Pa. 
 
 Super. Ct. 388), 933. 
 Davis V. Railroad Co. (159 Mo. 1), 408. 
 Davis V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (63 Ark. 
 
 117; 13 S. W. Rep. 801; 44 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 690), 374. 
 Davis z: Seaboard, etc., R. Co. (136 N. 
 
 C. 115; 48 S. E. Rep. 591), 96. 
 Davis V. Southern Pacific R. Co. (98 Cal. 
 
 19; 33 Pac. Rep. 708), 485. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.} 
 
 Dawson v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (150 
 
 Mass. 127: 30 N. E. Rep. 466), 781. 
 Dawson v. Chicago, etc., K. Co. (79 Mo. 
 
 296). 850. 
 Dawson v. . Louisville, etc., R. Co. (11 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 134), 174. 
 Dawson V. ISew York, etc., Co. (52 N. 
 - Y. Supp. 133; 31 App. Div. 537), 080. 
 Dawson v. Transit Co. (102 Mo. App. 
 
 277; 76 S. W. Rep. 689), 718. 
 Day V. Citizens, etc., Co. (81 Mo. App. 
 
 471), 313. 
 Day 'J. Missouri, etc., R. Co. (112 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 1019), 955. 
 Day V. Owen (5 Mich. 520), 820. 
 Day V. Toledo, etc., R. Co. (42 Mich. 
 
 623; 4 N. W. Rep. 203; 2 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 126), 348. 
 Dayharsh v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (103 
 
 Mo. 570; 23 Am. St. Rep. 900; 15 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 554), 158. 
 Deakin o. Illinois Cent R. Co. (127 111. 
 
 App. 258), 861. . 
 Dealey v.' Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. (Pa. 
 
 4 Atl. Rep. 170), 499. 
 Dealey v. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. (Pa., 
 
 Rep. 824), 199. 
 Dean v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (129 Pa. 
 
 St. 514; XS Atl. Rep. 718; 15 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 733; 6 L. R. A. 143), 1039. 
 Dean v. Railroad (199 Mo. 1. c. 408; 97 
 
 S. W. Rep. 910), 1058. 
 Dean v, Woodenware Co. (107 Mo. App. 
 
 167), 162. 
 Deane ». Clayton (7 Taunt. 489), 1073. 
 Deane v. Transit Co: (192 Mo. 575; 91 
 
 S. W. Rep. 505), 775. 
 Deans v. Wilmington, etc., R. Co. (107 
 
 No. Car. 686; 18 S. E. Rep. 77; 45 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 45), 1084. 
 Deayill v. Southern Pacific R. Co. (50 
 
 Cal. 383; 12 Am. Ry. Rep. 180), 1091. 
 Debbins v. Old Colony R. Co. (154 Mass. 
 
 402; 28 N. E. Rep. 274; 47 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 531), 1018. 
 DeBolt V. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (123 
 
 Mo. 496; 27 S. W. Rep. 675), 859. 
 Decatur Car, etc., Co. v. Mehafley (Ala., 
 
 29 So. Rep. 646), 20. 
 Decatur Car Mfg. Co. v. Terry (Ala., 
 
 41 So. Rep. 829), 270. 
 Deckard v. Wabash R. Co. (Mo., 85 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 982), 127. 
 Decker v. Chicago & St. P. Ry. Co. (112 
 
 N. W. Rep. 901), 563. 
 DeForrest v. Jewett (88 N. Y. 264; 8 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 495), 326. 
 DeGarcia v. San Antonio, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (77 S. W. Rep. 275), 60. 
 Degg V. Midland R. Co. (1 H. & N. 773 ; 
 
 8 Jur. [N. S.] 395; 26 L. J. Ex. 171), 
 
 466. 
 DeGraff v. Railway Co. (76 N. Y. 125), 
 
 266. 
 DeGroff v. New York, etc., R. Co. (70 
 
 N. Y. 125), 307. 
 DeHam v. Mexican Nat. R. Co. (Texas, 
 
 22 S. W. Rep. 249), 44. 
 Deibold v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (50 N. 
 
 J. L. 478; 14 Atl. Rep. 576), 1094. 
 DeKay v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (41 Minn. 
 
 178; 43 N. W. Rep. 182; 4 L. R. A. 
 
 632; 39 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 463), 775. 
 
 Delamater ». Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. (24 
 
 Wis. 578), 785. 
 De La Pena v. Railroad (Texas, 74 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 68), 872. 
 Delaplain v. Kansas City, etc., Co. (109 
 
 Mo. App. 1. c. 113; 83 S. W. Rep. 
 . 72), 234. 
 Delaware, etc., R. Co. v. Cadow (120 
 
 Pa. St. 559; 14 Atl. Rep. 450; 36 
 
 Am.. & Eng. R. Cas. 405), 1095. 
 Delaware, etc., R. Co. v. Converse (139 
 
 U. S. 469; 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 509; 49 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 328), 1086. . 
 Delaware, etc., R. Co. v. Devore (114 
 
 Fed. Rep. 155: 52 C. C. A. 77), 1058. 
 Delaware & H. Co. v. Larnard (161 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 520), 921. 
 Delaware, etc., Co. v. Nuttall (119 Pa. 
 
 St. 149; 13 Atl. Rep. 65), 252. 
 Delaware, etc., R. Co. v. Perrett (60 N. 
 
 J. L. 889; 40 Atl. Rep. 1131), 787. 
 Delaware, etc., R. Co. v. Taffey (38 N. 
 
 J. L. 525; 13 Am. Ry. Rep. 75), 940. 
 Delaware, etc., R. Co. v. Trautwein (62 
 
 L. J. L. 169; 19 Atl. Rep. 178;' 41 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 187), 619. 
 Delaware, etc., R. Co. v. Walsh (47 N. T. 
 
 L. 548), 729. 
 Delaware, etc., R. Co. v. Webster (6 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 841; 27 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 160), 
 
 791. 
 Delaware & H. R. Co. v. Wilkins (153 
 
 Fed. Rep. 845), 412. 
 Dell V. M:cGrath (92 Minn. 187; 99 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 629), 98. 
 DeLoge v. New York, etc., R. Co. (98 
 
 Hun 149; 36 N. Y. Supp. 697; 167 
 
 N. Y. 688; 51 N. E. Rep. 1090), 1065. 
 Del Sejnore ii. Halliman (153 N. Y. 
 
 274; 47 N. E. Rep. 308), 128. 
 DeMaley v. Morgen, etc., R. (jo. (45 La. 
 
 Ann. 1329; 14 So. Rep. 61; 58 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 448), 801. 
 DeMase v. Oregon, etc., Ry. Co. (40 
 
 Wash. 108; 82 Pac. Rep. 170), 253. 
 Demers v. Marshall (172 Mass. 548; 52 
 
 N. E. Rep. 1066; 69 N. E. Rep. 464), 
 
 145. 
 Deni, v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (181 Pa. 
 
 St. 685; 87 Atl. Rep. 658; 59 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 676), 69. 
 Deming i>. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (80 Mo. 
 
 App. 152), 685. 
 Denman v. Johnson (85 Mich. 387; 48 
 
 N. W. Rep. 666), 105. 
 Denman v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. (26 
 
 Minn. 357; 4 N. W. Rep. 606), 1031. 
 Dennick v. Central R. Co. (108 U. S. 
 
 11), 47. 
 Dennis v. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. (165 Pa. 
 
 St. 624; 31 Atl. Rep. 62), 680. 
 Denny v. New York Central R. Co. (13 
 
 Gray 481), 32. 
 Denton v. Great Northern R. Co. (5 El. 
 
 & Bl. 860; 25 L. J. Q. B. 189), 102. 
 Denver & R. G. Co. v. Burchard (Colo., 
 
 86 Pac. Rep. 749), 270. 
 Denver, etc., R. Co. v. DriscoU (18 Colo. 
 
 520; 21 Pac. Rep. 708; 38 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 105), 472. 
 Denver, etc., R. Co. v. Dwyer (3 Colo. 
 
 App. 408), 898. 
 Denver, etc., R. Co. u. Harris (128 U. 
 
 Ixvii 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.'] 
 
 S. 697; 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 692), 
 
 177 
 Denver, etc., R. Co. v. Hodgson (18 
 
 Colo. 117; 31 Pac. Rep. 954), 1003. 
 Denver, etc., R. Co. v. Norgate (141 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 247; 72 C. C. A. 365), 356. 
 Denver Cit. Co. v. Norton (141 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 599; 73 C. C. A. 1), 1041. 
 Denver, etc., R. Co. v. Pickard (8 Colo. 
 
 163; 6 Pac. Rep. 149; 18 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 284), 784. ^ , . ,„ ^ , 
 
 Denver, etc., R. Co. v. Pilgrim (9 Colo. 
 
 App. 86; 47 Pac. Rep. 657), 609. 
 Denver, etc., Co. v. Reid (22 Colo. 349; 
 
 45 Pac. Rep. 378), 446. 
 Denver, etc., R. Co. v. Ryan (17 Colo. 
 
 98; 28 Pac. Rep. 79), 1005. 
 Denver, etc., R. Co. v. Scott (Colo., 81 
 
 Pac. Rep. 763), 338. 
 Denver, etc., R. Co. v. Vitello (Colo., 81 
 
 Pac. Rep. 766), 98. . , „ 
 
 Denver, etc., R. Co. v. Warring (86 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 305), 69. , , , 
 
 Denver, etc., R. Co. v. Woodward (4 
 
 Colo. 1), 192. 
 Deppe V, Chicago, etc., R. Co. (36 Iowa 
 
 62), 482. „ , 
 
 Depuy V. Chicago, etc.. R. Co. (110 Mo. 
 
 App. 110; 84 S. W. Rep. 103), 360. 
 Derby v. Kentucky, etc., R. Co. (Ky., 4 
 
 S. W. Rep. 303), 337. 
 Dering v. New York, etc., R. Co. (50 
 
 N. Y. S. R. 832; 67 Hun 650; 23 N. 
 
 Y. Supp. 344), 411. 
 Derr v. Lehigh Valley R. Co. (158 Pa. 
 
 St. 366; 27 Atl. Rep. 1002), 50. 
 De Santes v. New York, N. H. & H. R. 
 
 "Co. (103 N. Y. S. 849), 500. 
 Deschner v. St. Louis & M. R. R. Co. 
 
 (98 S. W. Rep. 737), 22. 
 Deserant v. Coal, etc. R. Co. (178 U. S. 
 
 409; 44 L, Ed. 1127), 958. 
 Detrich v. Metropolitan R. Co. (102 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 1044), 170. 
 Detroit, etc., R. Co. v. Curtis (23 Wis. 
 
 152), 842. 
 Detroit, etc., Co. c. Grable (94 Fed. Rep. 
 
 73), 327. 
 Detroit, etc., R. Co. v. Van Steiberg (17 
 
 Mich. 99), 104. 
 De Vane v. Atlanta & A. R. Co. (Ga., 
 
 60 S. E. Rep. 1079), 560. 
 Deverson v. Eastern R. Co. (58 N. H. 
 
 129), 91. 
 Devine v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (159 Mass. 
 
 348; 34 N. E. Rep. 639), 479. 
 Devitt V. Railroad (50 Mo. 302), 311. 
 DeVitto V. Craig (165 N. Y. 378; 69 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 141), 365. 
 Devlin v. Smith (89 N. Y. 470), 255. 
 Devlin v. Wabash, etc., R. Co. (87 Mo. 
 
 546; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 524), 419. 
 Devoe v. New York, etc,^ R. Co. (76 N. 
 
 Y. S. 136; 70 App. Div. 495), 265. 
 Devoy v. St. Louis Transit Co. (192 Mo. 
 
 197; 91 S. W. Rep. 140), 654. 
 Dewald v. Kansas City, etc^ Ry. Co. (44 
 
 Kan. 586; 47 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 557), 720. 
 Dewey v. Detroit, etc., R. Co. (97 Mich. 
 
 329; 56 N. W. Rep. 756; 52 N. W. 
 
 Ixviii 
 
 942; 16 L. R. A. 342; 63 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 550), 494. 
 Dewire v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (148 
 
 Mass. 343; 19 N. E. Rep. 523; 2 L. 
 
 R. A. 166; 37 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 57), 656. 
 De Prisco v. Wilmington, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (67 Atl. Rep. 906),' 91. 
 Deyo V. New York, etc., R. Co. (18 N. 
 
 Y. 534; 75 Am. Dec. 268), 764. 
 Deyo V. New York, etc., R. Co. (34 N. 
 
 Y. 9), 698. 
 Diamond Block Coal Co. v, Cuthbertson 
 
 (Ind., 67 N. E. Rep. 668), 208. 
 Dice V, Williamette, etc., Co. (8 Oregon 
 
 60), .657. 
 Dickens v. New York, etc., R. Co. (1 
 
 Abb. App. Dec. 604), 201. 
 Dickens v. New York, etc., R. Co. (23 
 
 N. Y. 158), 61. 
 Dickinson v. Northeastern R. Co. (2 H. 
 
 & C. 736; 33 L. J. Ex. 91; 12 W. R. 
 
 62; 9 L. T. 299), 64. 
 Dickinson v. Port Huron, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (83 Mich. 43; 18 N. W. Rep. 653; 21 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 456), 611. 
 Dickinson v. West End R. Co. (177 
 
 Mass. 366; 59 N. E. Rep. 60; 83 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 284; 52 L. R. A. 326), 568. 
 Dickson v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (104 
 
 Mo. 491 ; 16 S. W. Rep. 381), 940. 
 Dickson v. Omaha, etc., R. Co. (124 
 
 Mo. 140; 27 S. W. Rep. 476; 25 L. 
 
 R. A. 320), 602. 
 Diebold v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (50 N. 
 
 J. L. 478; 14 Atl. Rep. 676), 859. 
 Diehl V. Lehigh, etc., Co. (140 Pa. St. 
 
 487; 21 AtlT iRep. 430), 345. 
 Diekman v. Morgen's, etc., R. Co. (40 
 
 La. Ann. 787; 5 So. Rep. 76), 999. 
 Diesen v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (43 Minn. 
 
 454; 46 N. W. Rep. 864). 105. 
 Diggs V. Louisville N. R. Co. (168 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 97), 704. 
 Dillon V. Connecticut River R. Co. (154 
 
 Mass. 478: 28 N. E. Rep. 899), 1078. 
 Dillon V. Manhattan R. Co. (16 N. Y. 
 
 S. R. 767; 49 Hun 608; 1 N. Y. Supp. 
 
 679), 685. 
 Dillon V. Union Pacific R. Co. (3 Dill. 
 
 U. S. 319), 461. 
 Dimick v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (80 111. 
 
 338), 1022. 
 Dimmey v. Wheeling, etc., R. Co. (27 
 
 W. Va. 32), 394. 
 Dimmitt v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (40 
 
 Mo. App. 654), 792. 
 Dinwiddle -v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (9 
 
 Lea [Tenn.] 309; 16 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 483), 657. 
 Disher v. New York, etc., R. Co. (41 
 
 Hun [N. Y.] 37; 114 N. Y. 619; 21 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 415), 321. 
 Distler v. Long Island R. Co. (151 N. 
 
 Y. 424: 46 N. E. Rep. 937; 35 L. R. 
 
 A. 762), 783. 
 Dist. of Columbia v. Arms (107 U. S. 
 
 519; 2 Supp. Ct. 840; 27 L. Ed. 
 
 618), 95. 
 Ditberner v. Chicagp, etc., R. Co. (47 
 
 Wis. 188; 2 N. W. Rep. 69), 649. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.'] "' 
 
 Dixon V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (109 Mo. 
 
 413: J9 S. W. Rep. 412; 53 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. S89), 139. 
 Dixon V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (104 Mo. 
 
 418; 16 S. W. Rep. 409; 109 Mo. 413; 
 
 19 S. W. Rep. 418; 63 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 689), 461. 
 Dlauhi V. St. Louis, etc, R. Co. (105 
 
 Mo. 645; 16 S. W, Rep. 281; 13.9 Mo. 
 
 291; 40 S. W. Rep. 890; 37 L. R. A. 
 
 406; 60 Am, St. Rep. 676), 389. 
 Dobbin v. Brown (101 N. Y. 188, 193; 
 
 23 N. E. Rep. 537), 119. 
 Dobbin v. Railroad Co. (81 N. C. 446; 31 
 
 Am. Rep. 512), 360. 
 Dobyns v, Yazoo, etc., R. Co. (43 So. 
 
 Rep. 931), 19^- 
 Dodge V. Boston, etc., Co. (148 Mass. 
 
 207; 19 N. E. Rep. 373), 619. 
 Dodge V. Burlington, etc., R. Co. (34 
 
 Iowa 276; 5 Am. Ry. Rep. 507), 917, 
 Dqggett V. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. (134 
 
 Iowa 690; 112 N. W. Rep. 171; 13 L. 
 
 R. A. [N. S.] 364), 732. 
 Doggett V. Richmond, etc., R. Co. (78 
 
 N. Car. 305; 16 Am. Ry. Rep. 193), 
 
 390. 
 Doing o. New Yorlt, etc., R. Co. (73 
 
 Hun 270; 26 N. Y. Supp. 405), 142. 
 Dolan V. Boot, etc.. Mills (185 Mass. 
 
 576; 70 N. E. Rep. 1025), 99. 
 Dolan V. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (71 N. 
 
 Y. 285), 940. 
 Dolan V. Sierra Ry. Co. (135 Cal. 436; 
 
 67 Pac. Rep. 686), 258. 
 DorarJU v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (27 
 
 Mo. App. 208), 1006. 
 Donahue v. Old Colony R. Co. (153 
 
 Mass. 356; 26 N. E. Rep. 868), 510. 
 Donahue v. Wabash R. Co. (83 Mo. 660; 
 
 53 Am. Rep. 594), 410. 
 Donaldson v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. (21 
 
 Minn. 293; 20 Am. Ry. Rep. 16), 
 
 1094. 
 Donaldson v, Mississippi, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (18 Iowa 280), 105. 
 Donk Bros., etc., Co. v. Peters (95 111. 
 
 App. 193; 61 N. E. Rep. 830), 154. 
 Donnegan v. Erhardt (119 N. Y. 468; 
 
 23 N. E. Rep. 1051; 7 R. A. 627), 
 
 260. r > ,, 
 
 Donnely v. Brooklyn City R. Co. ~(109 
 
 N. Y. 16; 15 N. E. Rep. 733; 34 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 103), 139. 
 Donnelly v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (161 
 
 Mass. 210; 24 N. E. Rep. 38; 42 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 182), 1020. 
 Donohue v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (Mass., 
 
 69 N. E. Rep. 663), 369. 
 Donohue v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (91 
 
 Mo. 367; 2 S. W. Rep. 424; 88 Am, 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 673), 1019. 
 Donovan i: Boston, etc., R. Co. (168 
 
 Mass. 460; 33 N. E. Rep. 583), IDS. 
 Donovan v. Manhattan R. Co. (49 N. Y. 
 
 S. R. 728; 21 N. Y. Supp. 457), 176. 
 Dooley v. Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. (110 
 
 S. W. Rep. 135), 866. 
 Dooley v. Mobile, etc., R. Co. (69 Miss. 
 
 648; 12 So. Rep.' 966), 1078. 
 Doreraus v. Root (23 Wash. 1. c. 715; 63 
 
 Pac. Rep. 574; 54 L. R. A. 649), 234. 
 
 Dorman v. Broadway, etc., R. Co. (16 
 
 N. Y. S. R. 753; 1 N. Y. Supp. 334), 
 
 198. 
 Dorrah v. Illinois, etc., R. Co. (65 Miss. 
 
 14; 3 So. Rep. 36; 7 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 629; 30 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 570), 704. 
 Dorsey v. Phillips Const.- Co. (42 Wis. 
 
 583; 15 Am. Ry. Rep. 148), 341. 
 Doss V, Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. (59 Mo. 
 
 27; 21 Am. Rep. 371; 8 Am. Ry. Rep. 
 
 468), 670. 
 Dorsett v. St. Paul, etc., Co. (40 Wash. 
 
 876; 82 Pa. Rep. 873), 85. 
 Dotta V. Northern Pacific R. Co. (3.6 
 
 Wash. 506), 398. 
 Dougan f. Champlain Tr. Co. (56 N. Y. 
 
 1), 94. 
 Dougherty v. Chicago & St. P. Ry. Cfl. 
 
 (114 N. W. 908), 698. . 
 Dougherty v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (86 
 
 111. 467; 17 Am. Ry. Rep. 489). 789. 
 Dougherty v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (104 
 
 N. W. Rep. 678), 186. 
 Dougherty v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (128 Mo. 33; 30 S. W. Rep. 317; 49 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 636), 651. 
 Dougherty v, Missouri, etc., R. Co. (97 
 
 Mo. 647; 11 S. W. Rep. 851; 8 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 900; 81 Mo. 325; 51 Am. Rep. 
 
 239), 596. 
 Dougherty v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co. (213 
 
 Pa. 346; 65 Atl. Rep. 926), 122. 
 Douglas & G. R. Co. v. Swindle (59 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 600), 827. 
 Douglas V. Texas, etc., R. Co. (63 Texas 
 
 564), 478. 
 Dover 7'. Mississippi River, etc., R, Co. 
 
 (100 Mo. App. 330; 73 S. W. Rep. 
 
 898), 368. 
 Dow V. Kansas Pacific R. Co. (8 Kan. 
 
 642; 5 Am. Ry. Rep. 401), 470. 
 Dowd V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (84 Wis. 
 
 106; 64 N. W. Rep. 24; 58 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 18), 670. ' 
 
 Dowd I/. Erie R. Co. (N. J., 67 Atl. Rep. 
 
 848), 372. 
 Dowell V. Burlington, etc., R. Co. (63 
 
 Iowa 629), 334. 
 -Dowell V. Guthrie (116 Mo. 646; 28 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 893), 1105. 
 Dowling V. Allen (108 Mo. 813; 14 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 751), 308. 
 Downey v. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. (28 
 
 W. Va. 732), 778. 
 Downey v. Low (22 App. Div. 460; 48 
 
 N Y. S. 207), 284. 
 Downey v. Sawyer (167 Mass. 418; 32 
 
 N. E. Rep. 664), 346. 
 Doyle V. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (96 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 800), 561. 
 Doyle V. Pennsylvania R. Co. (139 N. 
 
 Y. 637; 34 N. E. Rep. 1063), 1036. 
 Doyle V. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. (48 Minn. 
 
 79; 43 N. W. 787; 41 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 376), 99. 
 Drain v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (86 Mo. 
 
 574), 1104. 
 Drake v. Chicago, etc., R. C. (51 Mo. 
 
 App. 662) 994. 
 Drake uoChicago, etc., R. Co. (63 Iowa 
 
 302; 19 N. W. Rep. 815; 17 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 45), 74. 
 
 Ixix 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [Referenies are to sections.} 
 
 Drake v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (137 Pa. 
 
 St. 352; ZO Atl. Rep. 994), 778. 
 Drake v. Antonio, etc., Ry. Co. (Texas, 
 
 89 S. W. Rep. 407), 253. 
 Drake v. Union Pac. R. Co. (2 Idaho 
 
 453; 21 Pac. Rep. 560), 336. 
 Drawdy v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 
 
 (58 S. E. Rep. 980), 1029. 
 Drew V. Central Pacific R. Co. (51 Cal. 
 
 425; 12 Am. Ry. Rep. 282), 557. 
 Drew V. Sixth Avenue R. Co. (26 N. 
 
 Y. 49), 208. 
 Dreyfus v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (102 
 
 S. W. Rep. 53), 170. 
 DriscoU V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (97 111. 
 
 App. 668; 176 111. 330; 52 N; E. Rep. 
 
 921; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. [N. S.] 
 
 644), 493. 
 Drogmund v. Metropolitan R. Co. (122 
 
 Mo. App. 154; 98 S. W. Rep. 1091), 
 
 554. 
 Dryden v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (811 Pa. 
 
 St. 620; 61 Atl. Rep. 849), 1039. 
 Drymala v. Thompson (26 Minn. 40; 1 
 
 N. W. Rep. 255), 479. 
 Duame v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (72 Wis. 
 
 523; 40 N. W. Rep. 294; 7 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 879; 85 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 416), 
 
 700. 
 Dube V. The Queen (3 Can. Exch. 147), 
 
 653. 
 Duckworth v. Johnson (4 H. & N. 653; 
 
 5 Jur. EN. S.] 630; 29 L. J. Ex. 85), 
 
 Duff 'v. Allegheny Valley R. Co. (91 
 Pa. St. 458; 36 Am. Rep. 675; 2 Am. 
 
 6 Eng. R. Cas. 1), 1084. 
 
 Duff V. Great Northern R. Co. (Ir. L. 
 
 R., 4 C. L. 178), 852. 
 Duffy V. Atlantic, etc., R. Co. (56 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 567), 882. 
 Duffy V. Kivilin (98 III. App. 483; 63 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 503), 139. 
 Duffy V. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (19 
 
 Mo. App. 380), 985. 
 Duffy V. New York, etc., R. Co. (Mass., 
 
 77 N. E. Rep. 1031), 358. 
 Dugan's Admr, v, Chesapeake, etc., R. 
 
 Co. (24 Ky. L. R. 1754; 72 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 291), 1100. 
 Duggan V. Boston & M. R. R. (66 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 829), 992. 
 Duke V. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (99 
 
 Mo. 347; 12 S. W. Rep. 636), 175. 
 Dulaney v. R. R. Co. (21 Mo. App. 
 
 597), 304. 
 Dullnig V. Duerler, etc., Co. (87 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 338), 120. 
 Duncan v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (60 S. 
 
 E. «ep. 189), 871. 
 Duncan v. Mame C. R. Co. (IIS Fed. 
 
 Rep. 608), 862. 
 Duncan v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (46 
 
 Mo. App. 207), 1001. 
 Duncan r. New York, etc., R. Co. (67 
 
 Conn. 266; 34 Atl. Rep. 1041), 1001. 
 Duncan v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (44 
 
 So. Rep. 418), 14. 
 Dundon v. New York, etc., R. Co. (67 
 
 Conn. 266; 34 Atl. Rep. 1041), 941. 
 Dunkerley v. Webemdorfer, etc., Co. (N. 
 
 J., 58 Atl. Rep. 94), 375. 
 Dunkman i: Wabash R. Co. (95 Mo. 
 
 832; 4. S. W. Rep. 670), 398. 
 
 Ixx 
 
 Dunlap V, Richmond, etc., R. Co. (81 
 
 Ga. 136; 7 S. E. Rep. 283), 79. 
 Dunn V. Cass Avenue, etc., R. Co. (21 
 
 Mo. App. 188), 136. 
 Dunn ». Chicago, etc., R. Co. (107 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 616), 582. 
 Dunn V. Grand Trunk R. Co. (58 Me. 
 
 187), 561. 
 Dunn V. McNamee (59 N. J. L. 498; 37 
 
 Atl. Rep. 61), 307. 
 Dunn V. New Jersey, etc., R. Co. (71 N. 
 
 J. L. 21; 58 Atl. Rep. 164), 683. 
 Dunn V. Oregon Short Line R. Co. (28 
 
 Utah 478; 80 Pac. Rep. 311), 339. 
 Dunn V. Pennsylvania R. Co. (20 Phila. 
 
 Pa. 258), 181. 
 Dunn V. Seaboard R. Co. (78 Va. 645; 
 
 49 Am. Rep. 388 ; 16 Am." & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 363), 802. 
 Dunphy v. Boston El. Ry. Co. (Mass., 
 
 78 N. E. Rep. 479), 273. 
 Durant v. Coal Co. (97 Mo. 62; 10 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 484), 366. 
 Durbin v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. 
 
 (80 N. E. Rep. 219), 57.- 
 Durbin v. Oregon, etc., R. Co. (17 Ore. 
 
 5; 17 Pac. Rep. 6; 11 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 778; 32 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 149), 
 
 1016. 
 Duree v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (Iowa, 92 
 
 N. W. Rep. 890), 321. 
 Durkee v. Central Pac. R. Co. (56 Cal. 
 
 388), 68. 
 Durkee v. Central/ etc., R. Co. (69 Cal. 
 
 633; 11 Pac. Rep. 130; 58 Am. Rep. 
 
 562), 92. 
 Dutro V. Metropolitan, etc., R. Co. (Ill 
 
 Mo. App. 858; 86 S. W. Rep. 915), 79. 
 Duval V. Atlantic Coast, etc., R. Co. 
 
 134 N. Car. 331; 46 S. E. Rep. 750; 
 
 101 Am. St. Rep. 830; 65 L. R. A. 
 
 782), 1043. 
 Duval V. Hunt (34 Fla. 85; 15 So. Rep. 
 
 876). 518. 
 Dwinelle v. New York, etc., R. Co. (120 
 
 N. Y. 117; 84 N. E. Rep. 319; 8 L. R. 
 
 A. 224), 557. 
 Dwyer v. American Exp. Co. (82 Wis. 
 
 307; 52 N. W. Rep. 304; 53 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 618), 139. 
 Dwyer v. Express Co. (88 Wis. 318), 
 
 159 
 Dyas 'v. Southern Pac. R. Co. (73 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 978), 96. 
 Dye V. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (130 N. 
 
 Y. 671; 29 N. E. Rep. 380; 53 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 286), 97. 
 Dyer v. Erie R. Co. (71 N. Y. 828), 974. 
 Dyerson v. Union Pac. R. Co. (87 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 680), 413. 
 Dysart n. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (145 
 
 Mo. 83; 46 S. W. Rep. 751), 492. 
 Dysinger v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. (93 
 
 Mich. 646; 53 N. W. Rep. 828), 335. 
 Dyson v. New York, etc., R. Co. (57 
 
 Conn. 9; 17 Atl. Rep. 137), 883. 
 
 Eads V. Metropolitan R. Co. (43 Mo. 
 App. 546), 735. 
 
 Early v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. (06 
 Mich. 449; 33 N. W. Rep. 813; 30 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 163), 97. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sectiorte.} 
 
 Eason v. Sabine, etc., R. Co. (05 Texas 
 
 677), 316. 
 East, etc., R. Co. v. Sims (80 Ga. 807; 
 
 6 S. E. Rep. 595), 309. 
 East Line, etc., R. Co. v. Culberson (72 
 
 Texas 375), 281. 
 East Line, etc., R. Co. o. Lee (71 Texas 
 
 5S8-; 9 S. W. Rep. 904), 817. 
 East Line, etc., R. Co. v. Rushing (69 
 
 Texas 306; 6 S. W. Rep. 834; 34 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 367), 666. 
 East Line R. Co. v. Smith (65 Texas 
 
 167), 202. 
 East St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Altgen 
 
 (210 111. 213; 71 N. E. Rep. 377), 77. 
 East St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Enright 
 
 (47 111. App. 494), 475. 
 East St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. McElroy 
 
 (29 111. App. 504), 419.- 
 East St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. O'Hara 
 
 (59 111. App. 649), .493. 
 East St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Zink (82 
 
 N. Ev Rep. 283; 229 111. 180) 835. 
 East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. Atlanta, 
 
 etc., R. Co. (49 Fed. Rep. 608), 40. 
 East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. Collins 
 
 (85 Tenii. 227; 1 S. W. Rep. 883.), 
 
 492. 
 East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. i^. Connor 
 
 (15 Lea- [Tenn.] 254), 787. 
 East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. DeAr- 
 
 mond (86 Tenn. 73; 5 S. W. Rep. 
 
 600; 6 Am. St. Rep. 816), 489. 
 East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. Deaver 
 
 (79 Ala. 216), 678. 
 East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. Duggan 
 
 (51 Ga. 212; 6 Am. Ry. Rep. 195), 
 
 519. 
 East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. Feathers 
 
 (10 Lea [Tenn.] 103; 15 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 446), 886. 
 East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. Fleet- 
 wood (16 S. E. Rep. 778), 739. 
 East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. Gurley 
 
 18 Lea [Tenn.] 46; 17 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 568), 373. 
 East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. Holmes 
 
 (97 Ala. 332; 12 So. Rep. 286; 58 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 252), 787. 
 East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. Hughes 
 
 (Ga. 17 S. E. Rep. 949; 68 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 373), 791. 
 East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. Hull 
 
 (Tenn., 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 495), 
 
 448. 
 East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. King (81 
 
 Ala. 177; 2 So. Rep. 163; 31 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 385), 969. 
 East Tennessee R. Clo. v. Lockhart (79 
 
 Ala. 316), 25. 
 East Tennessee R. Co. v. Maloy (77 Ga. 
 
 Ala. 177; 2 So. Rep. 152; 31 Am.j & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 352), 451. 
 East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. Markens 
 
 (88 Ga. 60; 13 S. E. Rep. 855; 14 L. 
 
 R. A. 281), 1043. 
 East Tennessee R. Co. ». Massingill (15 
 
 Lea [Tenn.] 328), 703. 
 East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. Mitchell 
 
 (11 Heisk. 400), 193. 
 East Tennessee, etc., Co. v. Perkins (88 
 
 Ga. 1; 13 S. E. Rep. 952), 321. 
 
 East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. &. Reynolds 
 
 (93 Ga. 570; 20 S. E. Rep. 70), 39. 
 East ■ Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. Rush 
 
 15 Lea [Tenn.] 146), 492. 
 East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. Toppins 
 
 (10 Lea [Tenn.] 58; 11 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 222), 419. 
 East Tennessee, etc^ R. Co. v. Watson 
 
 (94 Ala. 634; 10 So. Rep. 228), 630. 
 East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. Winters 
 
 (85 Tenn. 240; 1 S. W. Rep. 790), 
 
 661. 
 Easton v. Houston, etc., R. Co. (32 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 893), 492. 
 Eaton V. Boston & Lowell R. Co. (11 
 
 Allen '600), 17. 
 Eaton V. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (57 N. 
 
 Y. 388; 15 Am. Rep. 613), 661. 
 Eaton V. European R. Co. (59 Me. 520; 
 
 8 Am. Rep. 430), 283. ,, 
 
 Eaton V. Fitchburg, etc., R. Co. (129 
 
 Mass. 364; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 183), 
 
 933 "" 
 
 Eaton V. New Yorls Cent. & H. R. R. 
 
 Co. (109 N. Y. Supp. 419), 110. 
 Eaton V. Railroad (67 N. Y. 382; 18 
 
 Am. -Law. Reg. 672), 698. 
 Eberts v. Detroit, etc., Ry. Co. (115 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 43), 848. 
 Eckart v. Long Island R. Co. (57 Barb. 
 
 ;565; 43 N. Y. 502), 806. 
 Eckhard v. Transit Co. (190 Mo. 693; 
 
 89 S. W. Rep. 602), 115. 
 Eckherd r, Chicago, etc., R. Co. (70 
 
 Iowa 363; 30 N. W. Rep. 615; 27 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 114), 787. 
 Eckert v. Great Northern Ry. Co. (116 
 
 N. W. Rep. 1024), 866. 
 Eckles v: Norfolk, etc., , R. Co. (96 Va. 
 
 69; 26 S. E. Rep. 546), 600. 
 Eddy V. Powell (49 Fed. Rep. 814; 4 
 
 U. S. App. 259; 1 C. C. A. 448), 1027, 
 Eddy V. Rider (79 Texas 6.3), 658. 
 Eddy.ti Wallace (49 Fed. Rep. 801; i 
 
 U. S. App. 264; 1 C. C. A. 436; 68 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 266), 184. 
 Eden v. Railway Co. (14 B. Mon. 165), 
 
 Ederly v. \^cksburg, etc., Co. (112 La. 
 
 728; 36 So. Rep. 664), 229. 
 Edgar v. Castello (14 So. Car. 20), 62. 
 Edge V. Southwest Missouri Electric Ry. 
 
 Co. (104 S. W. Rep. 90), 488. 
 Edgerly v. Union St. K. Co. (67 N. H. 
 
 318), 398. 
 Edginton v. Burlington, etc., R. Co. (116 
 
 Iowa 410; 90 NT W. Rep. 95; 57 L. 
 
 R. A. 561), 38. 
 Edmunds v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (3 
 
 Mo. App. 603) 176. 
 Edmundston v. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co, 
 
 (23 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 423), 292. 
 Edward's Admr. v. Chesapeake & O. 
 
 Ry. Co. (108 S. W. Rep. 303), 1080. 
 Edwards v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (94 
 
 Mo. App. 36; 67 S. W. Rep. 960), 
 
 940. 
 Eels V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (58 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 903), 849. 
 Egan V. Dry Dock, etc., R. Co. (18 N. 
 
 Y. App. Div. 556; 42 N. Y. S. 188), 
 
 266. 
 
 Ixxi 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References- are to sections.l 
 
 Eggman v. St. -Louis, etc., R. Co. (47 
 
 Til. App. 507), 1065. 
 Egmann v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (65 
 
 111. App. 346), 493. 
 Ehrishman v. East Harrisburg, etc., R. 
 
 Co. (160 Pa. St. 180; 24 Atl. Rep. 
 
 596; 51 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 190), 
 
 1003. 
 Eichelburger v. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (Ohio, 9 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 158), 74. 
 Eichorn ». New Orleans, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (114 La. Ann. 712; 38 So. Rep. 826), 
 
 65. 
 Eighing v. Union Pacific Ry. Co. (93 
 
 Iowa 538; 61 N. W. Rep. 1056; 27 L. 
 
 R. A. 296), 217. 
 Eikenberry v. Transit Co. (103 App. 
 
 442; 80 S. W. Rep. 360), 690. 
 Eilert v. Green Bay R. Co. (48 Mo. 
 
 606), 963. 
 Eingarten i>. Illinois, etc., Co. (94 Wis. 
 
 70; 68 N. W. Rep. 664; 59 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 859; 34 L. R. A. 503), 463. 
 Eldridge v. Long Island R. Co. (1 Sandf. 
 
 [N. Y.] 89), 822. 
 Elgin J. & E. R. Co. v. Hoadley (122 
 
 111. App. 165; 77 N. E. Rep. 151; S20 
 
 III. 462), 950. 
 Elgin, etc., R. Co. v. Lawlor (82 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 407; 229 111. 621), 877. 
 Elgin, etc., R. Co. v. Raymond (148 III. 
 
 241; 36 N. E. Rep. 729), 998. 
 Elgin, A. & S. Traction Co. v. Wilson 
 
 (120 111. App. 371; 75 N. E. Rep. 436, 
 
 217 111. 47), 33; 
 Eliot V. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (102 
 
 S. W. Rep. 532), 399. 
 Elkins V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (115 Mass. 
 
 190; 7 Am. Ry. Rep. 456), 1012. 
 Ell V. Northern Pacific R. Co. (1 N. Dak. 
 
 336; 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 318), 478. 
 EUedge v. National City R. Co. (100 
 
 Cal. 282; 34 Pac. Rep. 720), 485. 
 Ellet w. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (76 Mo. 
 
 518; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 183), 32. 
 Ellinger v. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. (163 
 
 Pa. St. 215; 25 Atl. Rep. 1132; 58 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 429) „ 591. 
 Elliot V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (67 Mo. 
 
 272) 271. 
 Elliott 'w. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (5 Dak. 
 
 523; 41 N. W. Rep. 758; 3 L. R. A. 
 
 363; 38 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 62), 1092. 
 Elliott V. Railroad (150 N. S. 245), 412. 
 Ellis V. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. (53 
 
 Fla. 650; 40 So. Rep. 213; 13 L. R. 
 
 A. N. S. 320), 636. 
 Ellis V. Great Western R. Co. (L. R., 9 
 
 C. P. 661; 43 L. J. C. P. 304; 31 L. 
 
 T. 814), 972. 
 Ellis V. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. (138 
 
 Pa. St. 506; 21 Atl. Rep. 140), 988. 
 Ellis V. New York, etc., R. Co. (95 N. 
 
 Y. 646), 471. 
 Ellis V. Southern Ry. Co. (163 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 686), 1095. 
 Ellis V. Wabash R. Co. (17 Mo. App. 
 
 126), 908. 
 Ellis V. Waldron (19 R. I. 369; 33 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 869), 120. 
 Elmgren v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. 
 
 Co. (112 N. W. Rep. 1067), 388. 
 
 Ixxii 
 
 EI Paso Electric Ry. Co. v. Boer (108 
 
 S. W. Rep. 199), 721. 
 El Paso, etc., Ry. Co. v. Vizard (Texas, 
 
 88 S. W. Rep. 457), 372. 
 Ellsworth V. Metheny (104 Fed. Rep. 
 
 119; 44 C. C. A. 484; 51 L. R. A. 
 
 389), 227. 
 Ely V. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. (27 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 970; 158 Pa. St. 233), 1014. 
 Ely V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (77 Mo. 
 
 34; 16 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 342), 32. 
 Elyton Land Co. v. Mingea (89 Ala. 
 
 621; 780 Rep. 666; 43 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 309), 1043. 
 Emma Cotton, etc., Co. z'. Hale (56 Ark. 
 
 232; 19 S. W. Rep. 600), 345. 
 Emmerson v. Fay (94 Va. 60; 26 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 386), 288. 
 Enches v. New York, etc., R. Co. (135 
 
 Pa. St. 194; 19 Atl. Rep. 939), 788. 
 Endress z'. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (117 N. Y. 640; 22 N. E. Rep. 1130), 
 
 1005.' 
 England v. Boston, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (15S Mass. 490; 27 N. E. Rep. 1), 704. 
 Engle V. New York, etc., R. Co. (160 
 
 Mass. 260; 35 N. E. Rep. 547; 22 L. 
 
 R. A. 283), 512. 
 Enjrleking v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (187 Mo. 168; 86 S. W. Rep. 89), 412. 
 English V. Amidon (72 N. H. 301; 56 
 
 Atl. Rep. 548), 246. 
 English ?', Chicago, etc., R. Co. (24 
 
 Fed. Rep. 906), 349. 
 Enos V. Rhode Island R. Co. (R. I., 
 
 67 Atl. Rep. 6; 12 L. R. A. [N. S.] 
 
 244), -568. 
 Enright v. Toledo, etc., R. Co. (93 Mich. 
 
 409; 63 N. W. Rep. 536), 468. 
 Ensley R. Co. v. Chewning (93 Ala. 24; 
 
 9 So. Rep. 458; 50 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 46), 626. 
 Ephland v. Missouri, etc., R. Co. (137 
 
 Mo. 187; 57 Mo. App. 147; 88 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 926; 35 L. R. A. 109; 7 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. [N. S.] 579), 693. 
 Eppendorf v. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (69 N. Y. 195), 692. 
 Epperson v. Postal Tel., etc., Co. (155 
 
 Mo. 346; 50 S. W. Rep. 795; 55 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 1050), 823. 
 Eppstein v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (197 
 
 Mo. 734; 94 S. W. Rep. 967), 1065. 
 Erickson v, Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. (93 
 
 Mich. 414; 53 N. W. Rep. 393), 485. 
 Erickson i'. Monson, etc. (100 Me. 107; 
 
 60 Atl. Rep. 708), 115. 
 Erickson v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. (41 
 
 Minn. 500; 43 N. W. Rep. 332; 5 
 
 L. R. A. 786), 408. 
 Erie v. Caulkins (85 Pa. St. 247; 27 
 
 Am. Rep. 642),' 300. 
 Erie R. (To. z: Farrell (147 Fed. Rep. 
 
 220), 977. 
 Erie R. Co. v. Kane (155 Fed. Rep. 
 
 118), 537. 
 Erie R. Co. v. McCormiclc (69 Ohio St. 
 
 45; 68 N. E. Rep. 571), 326. 
 Erie City R. Co. v. Schuster (113 Pa. 
 
 St. 412; 6 Atl. Rep. 269; 57 Am. Rep. 
 
 471), 1058. 
 Ergott V. New York (96 N. Y. 264), 27. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.} 
 
 Ernst V. Hudson River R. Co. (39 N. 
 
 Y. 61; 30 How. Pr. 84), 939. 
 Ernest v. Hudspn River R. Co. (85 N. 
 
 Y. 9; 38 How. Pr. 61), 954. 
 Erwin v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co.- (04 
 
 Mo. App. 289; 08 S. W. Rep. 88), 
 
 6T0. 
 Erwin v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (96 
 
 Mo. 290; 9 S. W. Rep. 677), 948. 
 Eskridge v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. (89 
 
 Ky. 807; IS S. W. Rep. 580; 42 Am. 
 
 & Eng. H. Cas. 176), 953. 
 Esrey v. Southern Pacific R. Co. (88 
 
 Cal. 399; 2'6 Pac. Rep. 211), 392. 
 Estcs V. Missouri Pacific R. Co. (110 
 
 Mo. App. 726; 111 Mo. App. 1; 85 
 
 S. W. Kep. 627; 85 S. W. Rep. 909), 
 
 678. 
 Eureka Springs R. Co. v. Timmonds (51 
 
 Ark. 459: 11 S. W. Rep. 690; 40 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 698), 816. 
 Evans v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co. (62 Mo. 
 
 49), 897. 
 Evans v. Cliieago, etc., R. Co. (109 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 79), 862. 
 Evans, etc., Co.-ii. Crawford (Neb., 93 
 
 N. W. Rep. 177), 308. 
 Evans, etc., Co. V. Crawford (Neb., 94 
 
 N. W. Rep. 814), 319. 
 Evans v. Interstate Transit Co. (108 
 
 Mo. 594), 626. 
 Evans o. Iron, etc., Co. (42 Fed. Rep. 
 
 519), 307. 
 Evans v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. (88 
 
 Mich. 442; 60 N. W. Rep. 886;, 919. 
 Evans v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. (12 
 
 Hun [N. Y.] 289), 807. 
 Evans v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (70 
 
 Miss. 627; 12 So. Rep. 681), 628. 
 Evans v. .Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. (88 
 
 Mich. 444; 50 S. W. Rep. 386; 14 
 
 L. R. A. 223), 941. 
 Evans v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (11 Mo. 
 
 App. 463), 784. 
 Evans ». St. Paul, etc., R. Co. (88 
 
 Mich. 444; 60 N. W. Rep. 386; 14 L. 
 
 R. A. 223), 1001. 
 Evans ». Wabash R. Co. (178 Mo. 608; 
 
 77 S. W. Rep. 615), 323. 
 Evansville, etc., R. Co. v. Crist (116 
 
 Ind. 446; 19 N. E. Rep. 810), 104. 
 Evansville, etc., R. Co. v. Griffin (100 
 
 Ind. 221; 50 Am. Rep. 788), 862. 
 Evansville, etc., R. Co. v. Guyton (115 
 
 Ind. 460; 17 N. E. Rep. 101; 38 Am. 
 
 & Ene. R. Cas. 811), 482. 
 Evansville, etc., R. Co. v. Henderson 
 
 (134 Ind. 636; 88 N. E, Rep. 1021), 
 
 492. 
 Evansville, etc., R. Co. v. Hiatt (17 
 
 Ind. 102), 1046. 
 Evansville, etc., R. Co. v. Kyte (6 Ind. 
 
 App. 62; 32 N. E. Rep. 1134), 734. 
 Evansville, etc., R. Co. v. Lowdermilk 
 
 (15 Ind. 120), 67. 
 Evansville & T. H. R. Co. v. Yeager 
 ^ (83 N. E. Rep. 742), 1072. 
 Evarta v. Santa "Barbara Ry. Co. (80 
 
 Pac. Rep. 830), 204. 
 Evensen v. Lexington, etc., R. Co. (187 
 
 Mass. 77; 72 N. E. Rep. 865), 1039. 
 Everett v. Oregon, etc., R. Co. (9 Utah 
 
 840; 34 Pac. Rep. 289), 667. 
 
 Everhart v. Terre Haute, etc., R, Co. 
 
 (78 Ind. 292: 41 Am. Rep. 667; 4 
 
 Am. & Enj;. R. Cas. 599), 466. 
 Evers v, Wiggins Ferry Co. (116 Mo. 
 
 App. 130; 92 S. W. Rep. 118), 660. 
 Everts V. Santa Barbara Consolidated R. 
 
 Co. (86 Pac. Rep.. 830), 194. 
 Ewald V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (70 Wis. 
 
 420; 36 N. W. *ep. 12; 5 Am. M. 
 
 Rep. 178), 568. 
 Ewald V. Michigan Cent, R. Co. (107 
 
 111. App. 294), 323. 
 Ewan V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (38 Wis. 
 
 618), 961. 
 Ewing V. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. (147 
 
 Pa. St. 40; 23 Atl. Rep. 340; 48 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 606), 171. 
 Exton V. Central R. (Jo. (63 N. J. L. 
 
 366; 46 Atl. Rep. 1099; 66 L. R. A. 
 
 508), 744. 
 
 Faber v. Reiss, etc., Co. (124 Wis. 654; 
 
 102 N. W. 1049), 100. 
 Faber v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. (29 Minn. 
 
 465; 13 N. W. Rep. 902; 8 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 277), 1019. 
 Fagin v. Rhode Island R. Co. (27 R. I. 
 
 51; 60 Atl. Rep. 672), 116. 
 Fagundes v. Central Pacific R. Co. (79 
 
 Cal. 97; 21 Pac. Re^. 437), 500. • 
 Fairbank Canning. Co. v. Innes (24 111. 
 
 App. 83;' 126 111. 410; 1.7 N. E. Rep. 
 
 720), 120. 
 Fairchild v. Stage Co. (13 Cal. 599), 122. 
 Fairmount & Arch St. Ry. Co. v. Stut- 
 
 ler (54 Pa. St. 375), 18. 
 Faith V. New York Central, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (185 N. Y. 556; 77 N. E. Repi 1186; 
 
 95 N. Y. S. 774; 109 App. Div. 222), 
 
 684. 
 Falk V. New York, etc., R. Co. (N. J., 
 
 29 Atl. Rep. 157; 58 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 191), 710. 
 Falls V. San Francisco, etc., R. Co. (97 
 
 Cal. 114; 81 Pac. Rep. 901), 685. 
 Fanning v. St. Louis Transit Co. (103 
 
 Mo. App. 151; 78 S. W. Rep. 62), 661. 
 Farber v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (116 
 
 Mo. 81; 22 S. W. Rep. 631), 1087. 
 Farley v. Harris (40 Atl. Rep. 798), 
 
 896. 
 Farley v. Wilmington, etc., R. Co. (3 
 
 Penn.-Del. 581; 62 Atl. Rep. 643), 
 
 1055. 
 Farlow v. Kelly (108 U. S. 288; 2 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 555; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 104), 674. 
 Farmer v. Central Iowa R. Co. (67 Iowa 
 
 186: 24 N. W. Re->. 895), 397. 
 Farmer v. Wilmington, etc., R. Co. (88 
 
 N. Car. 664; SO Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 481), 390. 
 Farrell v.' Citizens' Light & Ry. Co. (114 
 
 N. W. Rep. 1063), 722. 
 Farrell v. Gireat Northern Ry. Co. (Ill 
 
 N. W. Rep. 388), 578. 
 Farrier v. Colorado Springs Rapid 
 
 Transit Ry. Co. (95 Pac. Rep. 294), 
 
 742. 
 Farwell v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (4 Mete. 
 
 [Mass.] 49, 55), 316. 
 
 Ixxiii 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED, 
 
 ^References are to sections.'] 
 
 Farwell v. Railroad Co. (8 Allen 441), 
 
 311. 
 1-asini v. N. Y. Cent, etc., R. Co. (96 
 
 X. Y. S. 415; 109 App. Div. 404), 
 
 528. 
 Faulkner v. Erie R. Co. (49 Barb. N. Y. 
 
 324), 478. 
 Faust V. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. (191 
 
 Pa. St. 420; 43 Atl. Rep. 329), 1052. 
 Favor v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (114 Mass. 
 
 350; 19 Am. Rep. 364), 891. 
 Fawcett v. York, etc., R. Co. (16 Q. B. 
 
 610; 15 Jur. 173; 20 L. J. Q. B. 
 
 223), 923. 
 Fay V. Minneapolis, St. P. M. Ry. Co. 
 
 .(Ill N. W. Rep. 683), 886. 
 Feagin ». Gulf, etc., R. Co. (100 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 346), 691. 
 Fearns v. New York, etc., R. Co. (186 
 
 Mass. 529: 72 N. E. Rep. 68), 258. 
 'Fearous v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (180 
 
 Mo. 208; 79 S. W. Rep. 394), 398. 
 Feary v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. (162 Mo. 
 
 75; 62 S. W. Rep. 452), 657. 
 Fechley v. Traction Co. (119 Mo. App. 
 
 358; 96 S. W. Rep. 421), 1039. 
 Feeney v. Long Island R. Co. (116 N. 
 
 Y. 375; 22 N. E. Rep. 402; 26 N. Y. S. 
 
 R. 729; 42 Hun 657; 6 L. R. A. 644; 
 
 39 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 639), 172. 
 Fehurich v. Michigan, etc., R. Co. (87 
 
 Mich. 606; 49 N. W. Rep. -890), 1029. 
 Felder v. Columbia, etc., K. Co. (21 So. 
 
 Car. 35; 53 Am. Rep. 666; ^7 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 264), 809. 
 Felder v, Louisville, etc., R. Co. (2 
 
 McMull [So. Car.] 403), 1100. 
 Feldheim v. Brooklyn, etc., K. Co. (107 
 
 N. Y. S. 413), 801. 
 Feldschneider v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (99 N. W. Rep. 1034), 122. 
 Fell V. Rich Hill, etc., Co. (23 Mo. App. 
 
 216), 288. 
 Felsch V. Babb (101 N. W. Rep. 1011), 
 
 92. 
 Felton V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (69 Iowa 
 
 677; 29 N. W. Rep. 618; 27 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 229), 749. 
 Ferguson v. Central R. *Co. (67 Atl. Rep. 
 
 608), 496. 
 Ferguson v. Columbus, etc., R. Co. (77 
 
 Ga. 102), 1073. 
 Ferguson v, Delaware, etc., Co. (58 Atl. 
 , Rep. 74), 70. 
 Ferguson v. Grand Trunk R. Co. (Rap. 
 
 Jud. Que., 80 C. S. 54), 843. 
 Ferguson v. Railway Co. (71 S. C. 352 ; 
 
 52 S. E. Rep. 138), 64. 
 Ferguson v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. 
 
 (100 S. W. Rep. 537), 676. 
 Ferguson v. Virginia & C. R. Co. (13 
 
 Nev. 184), 872. 
 Ferguson v. Wisconsin, etc., R. Co. (63 
 
 Wis. 146; 23 N. W. Rep. 123; 19 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 286), 74. 
 Ferren v. Ry. Co. (143 Mass. 197; 9 
 
 N. E. Rep. 608), 243. 
 Fewings v. Mendenhall (88 Minn. 836; 
 
 93 N. W. Rep. 187; 97 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 519; 60 L. R. A. 601), 758. 
 Field V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (4 Mc- 
 
 Ixxiv 
 
 Crary [U. S.]_573; 8 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 425; 14 Fed. Rep. 332), 917. 
 Field V. Middlesex R. Co. (109 Mass. 
 
 398), 660. 
 Fielder v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (107 
 
 Mo. 645: 18 S. W. Rep. 847; 64 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 162), 1079. 
 Fiero v. New York, etc., R. Co. (71 
 
 Hun [N. Y.] 213), 406. 
 Filbert v. Delaware, etc., Co. (121 
 
 N. Y. 807; 23 N. E. Rep. 1104), 498. 
 Filbert v. New York, etc, Ry. Co. (88 N. 
 
 Y. S. 438; 95 App. Div. 199), 254. 
 Filer f. New York, etc., R. "Co. (49 N. 
 
 Y. 42; 3 Am. Ry. Rep. 460), 188. 
 Files V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (149 Mass. 
 
 204; 21 N. E. Rep. 311), 1071. 
 Fillingham v. St. Louis Transit Co. (102 
 
 Mo. App. 673; 77 S. W, Rep. 314), 
 
 667. 
 Fink V. Missouri, etc., Co. (82 Mo. 276; ' 
 
 lO Mo. App. 61), 276. 
 Finlayson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (1 
 
 Dill. [U. S.] 679), 1090. 
 Finklestein v. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (41 Hun [N. Y.] 34; 2 N. Y. S. 
 
 R. 680), 959. 
 Finley v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (71 Minn. 
 
 471; 74 N. W. Rep. 174), 1066. 
 Finnell v. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (42 N. 
 
 Y. S. R. 354), 325. 
 Firebaugh v. Seattle, etc., El. Co. (40 
 
 Wash. 658; 82 Pac. Rep. 995), 181. 
 Fishburn v. Burlington & N. W. R. Co. 
 
 (127 Iowa 483; 103 N. W. Rep. 481), 
 
 26. 
 Fisher's Admr. .v. Chesapeake & O. R. 
 
 Co. (Va., 52 S. E. Rep. 373), 249. 
 Fisher v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (77 
 
 Mich. 646; 43 N. W. Rep. 926), 336. 
 Fisher v. Delaware, etc., Co. (153 
 
 Pa. St. 379; 26 Atl. Rep. 18), 308. 
 Fisher v. Metropolitan R. Co. (34 Hun 
 
 N. Y. 433), 178. 
 Fisher v. Oregon, etc., R. Co. (22 Ore. 
 
 533; 30 Pac. Rep. 435; 16 L. R. A. 
 
 519; 63 Am. & Enjg. R. Cas. 539), 485. 
 Fisher vs West Virginia, etc., R. Co. (19 
 
 S. E. Rep. 578; 58 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 337), 405. 
 Fisk V. Central Pac. R. Co. (72 Cal. 
 
 38; 13 Pac. Rep. 144), 308. 
 Fisk V. Fitchburg, etc., R. Co. (158 
 
 Mass. 238; 33 N. E. Rep. 610), 326. 
 Fitzgerald v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (156 
 
 Mass. 293; 31 N. E. Rep. 7), 139. 
 Fitzgerald v. Honkomp (44 111. App. 
 
 366), 379. 
 Fitzgerald v. Long Island R. Co. (117 
 
 N. Y. 653; 22 N". E. Rep. 1133; 27 
 
 N. Y. S. R. 980; 21 N. Y. S. R. 942; 
 
 3 N. Y. Supp. 230), 919: 
 Fitzgerald v. Long Island R. Co. (10 N. 
 
 Y. S. R. 433; 45 Hun 691; 117 N. Y. 
 
 653), 1008. 
 Fitzgerald v. New York, etc., R. Co. (36 
 
 N. Y. S. R. 756), 346. 
 Fitzgerald v. Paper (To. (30 Miss. 
 
 Rep. 438; 62 N. Y. S. R. 597), 356. 
 Fitzgerald v. Railroad Co. (59 Hun 286; 
 
 85 N. Y. S. R. 205), 356. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 IReferences are to seetiona.'l 
 
 Fitzgerald v. Southern R. Co. (N. C. 6 
 
 L. R. A. [N. S.] 337), 119. 
 Fitzhugh V. Boston & M. E. R. (80 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 798), 411. 
 Fitzjohn v. St. Louis Tr. Co. (183 Mo. 
 
 74; 81 S. W. Rep. 907), 150. 
 Fitzmaurice v. New York & H. R. R. 
 
 Co. (78 N. E. Rep. 418), 571. 
 Fitzpatrick v. New Albany, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (7 Ind. 436), 479. 
 Flaherty v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. (39 
 
 Minn. 3S8; 40 N. W. Rep. 160; 1 L. 
 
 R. A. 680), 1043. 
 Flanagan v. New York, etc., R. Co. (70 
 
 App. Div. 605; 75 N. Y. Supp. Z85; 
 
 173 N. Y. 631; 66 N. E. Rep. 1108), 
 
 1056. 
 Flanagan v. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (5 Silv. Sup. Ct. [N. Y.] 495), 706. 
 Flanagan v. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (181 Pa. St. 287; 87 Atl. Rep. 341), 
 
 630. 
 Flanagan v. Smelting Co. (63 N. J. L. 
 
 647; 44 Atl. Rep. 762), 256. 
 Flanders v. Ry. Co. (51 Minn. 193; 53 
 
 N. W. Rep. 644), 268. 
 Flannagan v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (60 
 
 Wis. 462; 7 N. W. Rep. 337), 844. 
 Flannegan v. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (40 W. Va. 436; 21 S. E. Rep. 1028), 
 
 489. 
 Flansberg v. Heuwood, etc., Co. (190 
 
 Mass. 125; 76 N. E. Rep. 699), 260. 
 Fleming v. Brooklyii, etc., R. Co, (1 
 
 Abb. N. Cas [N. Y.] 433), 869. 
 Fleming v. Bushnell (67 N. Y. Supp. 
 
 230), 146. 
 Fleming v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (89 
 
 Mo. App. 129), 674. 
 Fleming v: Pittsburg, etc., R. Co; (158 
 
 Pa. St. 130; 27 Atl. Rep. 858; 22 L. 
 
 R. A. 351; 38 Am. St. Rep. 835), 
 
 759. 
 Fleming v. St. Paul, etc., ' R. Co. (27 
 
 Minn. 411; 6 N. W. Rep. 448), 341. 
 Fleming v.- Western Pacific R. Co. (49 
 
 Cal. 253; 7 Am. Ry. Rep. 265), 1023. 
 Fletcher v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co. (64 
 
 Mo. 484), 389. 
 Fletcher v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. (168 
 
 U. S. 136; 42 L. Ed. 411; 18 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 35), 668. 
 Fletcher v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (1 Allen 
 
 [Mass.] 9), 866. 
 Fletcher v. Fitchburg, etc., R. Co. (149 
 
 Mass. 127; 3 L. R. A. 743; 21 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 302), 1020. 
 Flike V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (53 N. Y. 
 
 663), 472. 
 Flint V. Norwich, etc., Co. (34 Conn. 
 
 564), 749. 
 Flint V. Norwich, etc., R. Co. (110 Mass. 
 
 222), 886. 
 Flint, etc., R.. Co. v. Stark (38 Mich. 
 
 714), 697. 
 Flood v. London West (23 On t.. App. 
 
 Rep. 530), 1047. 
 Florence, etc., R. Co. v. Whipps (Colo., 
 
 138 Fed. Rep. 13), 852. 
 Flori V. St. Louis (3 Mo. App. 231), 
 
 1066. 
 Florida, etc., R. Co. v. Hirst (30 Fla. 
 
 1} 11 So. Rep. 606; 52 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 409), 658. 
 Florida, etc., R. Co. z/. Sullivan (120 
 
 Fed. Rep. 799; 67 C. C. A. 167; 61 
 
 L. R. A. 410), 47. 
 Florida, etc., Ry. Co. v. Wade (43 So. 
 
 Rep. 776), 734. 
 Florida, etc., R. Co. v. Webster (25 
 
 Fla. 394 6 So. Rep. 714), 600. 
 Flower v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (69 Pa. 
 
 St. 810), 466. 
 Floytroupe v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (163 
 
 Mass. 158; 39 N. E. Rep. 797), 789. 
 Flynn v. Bridge Co. (42 Mo. App. 629), 
 
 256. 
 Flynn v. Erie Co. (12 N. Y. St. Rep. 
 
 88), 276. 
 Flynn v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (78 
 
 Mo. 196; 18 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 23), 
 
 373 
 Flynn v. Transit Co. (113 Mo. App. 
 
 186; 87 S. W. Rep. 560), 737. 
 Foearty v. St. Louis Transfer Co. (180 
 
 Mo. 490; 79 S. W. Rep. 664), 463. 
 Foearty v. Southern Pac. Co. (91 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 60), 500. 
 Fogus -i/. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (60 Mo. 
 
 App. 260), 99. 
 Foley V. Boston & M. R. R. Co. (79 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 766), 796. 
 
 Foley V. California, etc., Co. (116 Cal. 
 
 184; 49 Pac. Rep. 48), 311. 
 Foley V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (48 Mich. 
 
 622; 12 N. W. Rep. 879; 42 Am. 
 
 Eep. 481; 6 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 161), 
 
 347. 
 Foley V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (64 Iowa 
 
 644; 21 N. W. Rep. 124), 528. 
 Folk V. Schaeffer (186 Pa. 253; 40 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 401), 119. 
 Follman v. Mankato (35 Minn. 522; 29^ 
 
 N. W. Rep. 317; 69 Am. Rep. 340), 
 
 1067. 
 Foran v. New York, etc., R. Co. (64 
 
 Hun [N. Y.] 610; 46 N. Y. S. R. 
 
 423; 19 N. Y. Supp. 417), 1018. 
 Forbes v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (113 
 
 N. W. Rep. 477), 668. 
 Ford V. Central, etc., R. Co. (69 Iowa 
 
 627; 21 N. W. Rep. 687; 17 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 599), 74. 
 Ford V. Fitchburg, etc., Co. (110 Mass. 
 
 240), 263. 
 Ford V. Lake Shore, rtc, R. Co. (124 
 
 N. Y. 493; 26 N. E. Rep. 1101; 48 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 201), 360. 
 Ford V. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. (36 N. 
 
 Y. S. R. 494), 142. 
 Ford V. London, etc., R. Co. (2 F. & 
 
 F. 730), 679. 
 
 Ford V. Providence Co. (Ky., 99 S. 
 - W. Rep. 611), 92. 
 Fordham v. London, etc., R. Co. (L. R., 
 
 4 C. P. 619; 38 L. J. C. P. 324; 17 W. 
 
 E. 896; L. R., 3 C. P. 368; 37 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 176), 682. 
 Fordyce v. Beecher (2 Texas Civ. App. 
 
 29; 21 S. W. Rep. 179), 176. 
 Fordyce i-.Brinley (58 Ark. 206; 24 S. 
 
 W. Eep. 250), 494. 
 Fordyce v. Chancey (2 Texas Civ. App. 
 
 24; 21 S. W. Rep. 181), 94. 
 
 Ixxv 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.'] 
 
 Fordyce v. Jackson (56 Ark. 694; 80 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 628, 697), 679. „ ^,, 
 
 Fordyce v. Key (74 Ark. 19; 84 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 797), 98. 
 Fordyce v. Lowman (57 Ark. 160; 80 
 
 S. W. Rep. 1090), 347. 
 Fordyce i;. McCants, (55 Ark. 384; 18 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 371), 206. 
 Fordyce v. Mc(;ants (51 Ark. 609; 11 
 
 S. W. Rep. 694), 198. 
 Fordyce v. Merrill (5 S. W. Rep. 389), 
 
 686. 
 Fordyce v. Withers (20 S. W. Rep. 766), 
 
 184. 
 Fore T/. Chicago & Alton R. Co. (114 
 
 Mo. App. 651; 89 S. W. Rep. 1034), 
 
 269. 
 Foreman v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (159 
 
 Pa. St. 641; 28 Atl. Rep. 358), 804. 
 Forepaugh v. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (188 
 
 Pa. St. 217; 18 Atl. Rep. 503; 15 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 672; 6 L. R. A. 608), 
 
 463. 
 Forsyth v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (103 
 
 Mass. 510), 793. 
 Ft. Wayne, etc., R. Co. v. Beyerle (110 
 
 Ind. 100; 11 N. E. Rep. 6; 28 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 306), 304. 
 Ft. Wayne, etc., R. Co. v. Gruff (132 
 
 Ind. 13; 31 N. E. Rep. 460), 419. 
 Ft. Worth, etc., R. Co. v. Floyd (Texas, 
 
 21 S. W. Rep. 544), 60. 
 Ft. Worth, etc., R. (So. v. Gribble (102 
 
 S. W. Rep. 157), 659. 
 Ft. Worth, etc., R. Co. v. Mackey (83 
 
 Texas 410; 18 S. W. Rep. 949), 470. 
 Ft. Worth, etc., Ry. Co. v. Morris (101 
 
 S. W. Rep. 1038), 886. 
 Ft. Worth, etc., R. Co. v. Ramp (70 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 508), 367. 
 Ft. Worth, etc., Ry. Co. v. Smith 
 
 (Texas, 87 S. W. Rep. 371), 380. 
 Ft. Worth, etc., R. Co. v. Thompson (2 
 
 Texas Civ. App. 170; 21 S. W. Rep. 
 
 137), 367. 
 Ft. Worth, etc., Ry. Co. v. Work (100 
 
 S. W. Rep. 962), 681. 
 Fortune v. Missouri R. Co. (10 Mo. 
 
 App. 852), 666. 
 Foss V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (N. H. 21 
 
 Atl. Rep. 288; 47 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 666), 724. 
 Foster v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (Iowa, 
 
 102 N. W. Rep. 422), 375. 
 Foster v. Lake, etc., R. Co. (108 111. 
 
 App. 113), 358. 
 Foster v. Minnesota, etc., R. Co. (14 
 
 Minn. 360), 478. 
 Foster v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (115 Mo. 
 
 105; 21 S. W. Rep. 916), 158. 
 Foster v. New York, etc., R. Co. (187 
 
 Mass 81; 78 N. E. Rep. 331), 360. 
 Foulkes V, Metropolitan, etc., R. Co. (5 
 
 C. P. D. 157; 49 L. J. C. P. D. 361; 
 
 42 L. T. 345; 28 W. R- 526), 813. 
 Fournet v. Morgan, etc., R. Co. (43 La. 
 
 Ann. 1202; 11 So. Rep. 541), 788. 
 Fowler v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (61 Wis. 
 
 159), 498. 
 Fowler v. Sacks (7 Mackey [D. C] 507; 
 
 7 L. R. A. 649), 288. 
 
 Ixxvi 
 
 Fox V. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (85 Mo. 
 
 679), 999. 
 Fox V. Peninsular Lead Works (84 
 
 Mich. 676; 48 N^ W. Rep. 803), 869. 
 Fox V. Peninsular, etc., Co. (98 Mich. 
 
 243; 52 N. W. Rep. 683), 106. 
 Fox V. White Lead Works (84 Mich. 
 
 676; 48 N. W. Rep. 203), 309. 
 Fraker v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. (32 
 
 Minn. 54; 19 N. W. Rep. 349; 15 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 866), 387. 
 Francis v. Kansas City, etc., Ry. Co. 
 
 (110 Mo. 387; 19 S. W. Rep. 935), 90. 
 Francis v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (6 Mo. 
 
 App. 7), 577. 
 Frandsen v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (36 
 
 Iowa 372), 622. 
 Frangoise v. Horton & Hemenway (86 
 
 R. I. 291; 58 Atl. Rep. 949), 356. 
 Frank Bird Transfer Co. ii. Krug (30 
 
 Ind. App. 602; 65 N. E. Rep. 309), 
 
 1047. 
 Frank v. Otis (15 N. Y. St. Rep. 681), 
 
 10. 
 Frank v. Transit Co. (99 Mo. App. 323, 
 
 73 S. W. Rep. »39), 392. 
 Franklin v. Atlanta, etc., R. Co. (54 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 578; 74 S. C. 338), 742. 
 Franklin v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. 
 
 (97 Mo. App. 473; 71 S. W. Rep. 
 . 540), 164. 
 Franklyn v. Southeastern R. Co. (3 H. 
 
 & N. 811; 4 Jur. £N. S.] 665; 89 L. 
 
 J. Ex. 85), 68. 
 Franklin v. Southern R. Co. (85 Cal. 63; 
 
 24 Pac. Rep. 723), 580. 
 Franklin v. Winona, etc., R. Co. (37 
 
 Minn. 409; 34 N. W. Rep. 898; 5 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 856; 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 811), 471. 
 Fraser v. Lumber Co. (42 Minn. 520; 
 
 44 N. W. Rep. 878), 855. 
 Frazer i>. South, etc., R. Co. (81 Ala. 
 
 185; 1 So. Rep. 85; 88 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 565), 74. 
 Frazier v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (38 Pa. 
 
 St 104), 85. 
 Fredericks v. Northern, etc., R. Co. (167 
 
 Pa. St. 103; 27 Atl. Rep. 689; 22 L. 
 
 R. A. 306; 68 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 91), 764. 
 Freeman v. Detroit, etc., R. Co. (66 
 
 Mich. 677; 32 N. W. Rep. 833; 30 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 623), 686. 
 Freeman v. Duluth, etc., R. Co. (74 
 
 Mich. 86; 41 N. W. Rep. 872; 3 L. 
 
 R. A. 594; 37 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 501), 938. 
 Freeman v. Illinois, etc., R. Co. (107 
 
 Tenn. 340; 64 S. W. Rep. 1), 487. 
 Freeman v. M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (38 
 
 Minn. 443; 7 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 410), 235. 
 Freemont v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (98 N. 
 
 Y. S. 179; 111 App. Div. 831), 264. 
 French v. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. (39 
 
 Md. 574; 10 Am. Ry. Rep. 474), 1083. 
 Friar v. Orange & N. W. Ry. Co. (101 
 
 S. W. Rep. 274), 737. 
 Frick V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (75 Mo. 
 
 595; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 880), 880. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.] 
 
 Friedman v. Horn (104 N. Y. S. R. 745), 
 
 175. 
 Friel v. Railroad Co. (IIB Mo. 603; 22 
 
 S. W. Rep. 498), 252. 
 Frink v. Potter (III., 9 Am. Neg. Gas. 
 
 200; 17 111. 406), 614, 653. 
 Frost V. Eastern R. Co. (64 N. H. 220; 
 
 9 Atl. Rep. 790; 10 Am. St. Rep. 396), 
 
 1073. ^ , 
 
 Frost V. Grand Trunk R. Co. (10 Allen 
 
 [Mass.] 787), 633. 
 Frost V. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. (96 
 
 Mich. 470; 56 N. W. Rep. 19), 885. 
 Fry V. Dubuque, etc., R. Co. (45 Iowa 
 
 416), 183. ^ „„ 
 
 Fry V. Great Northern Ry. Co. (Mmn., 
 
 103 N. W. Rep. 733), 271. , 
 Frye v. St. Loiiis, etc., R. Co. (200 Mo. 
 
 377; 98 S. W. Rep. 566), 93. 
 Fuchs V. St. Louis (138 Mo. 168; 31 
 
 S. W. Rep. 115), 110. 
 Fugate V. Carter (6 Mo. 267), 181. 
 Fulks i: St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (Ill Mo. 
 
 343; 19 S. W. Rep. 818), 691. 
 Fuller V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (133 Mass. 
 
 49'l; 14 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 695), 955. 
 Fuller ». Jackson (92 Mich. 197; 52 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 1075), 185. 
 Fuller V. Jamestown, etc., R. Co. (75 Hun 
 
 273; 26 N. Y. Supp. 1078), 92. 
 Fuller ii. Jewett (80 N. Y. 46; 1 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 109), 473. 
 Fuller V. Naugatuck, etc., R. Co. (21 
 
 Conn. 557), 582. 
 Fullerton v. Pordyce (121 Mo. 1; 2S S. 
 
 W. Rep. 587; 42 Am. St. Rep. 516; 144 
 
 Mo. 519; 44 S. W. Rep. 1053), 793. 
 Fullerton v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (84 
 
 Mo. App. 498), 669. 
 Fulton County, etc., R. Co. ■</. Butler 
 
 (48 III. App. 801), 1031. 
 Fulton County R. Co. v. McConnell (87 
 
 Ga. 766); 13 S. E. Rep. 828), 296. 
 Fulton V. Star Mining Co. (133 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 193), 6. 
 Fulton V. Wilmington, etc., Co. (133 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 193; 68 L. R. A. 168), 88. 
 Funston v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (61 
 
 Iowa 452; 16 N. W. Rep. 518; 14 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 640), 324. 
 Furnish v, Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. 
 
 (102 Mo. 488, 669; 15 S. W. Rep. 315; 
 
 13 S. W. Rep. 1044; 22 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 781, 800), 764. 
 Fusili V. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (46 
 
 Mo. App. 535), 943. 
 
 G 
 
 Gabrial v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (121 
 
 111. App. 614), 114. 
 Gabrial v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (112 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 713), goo. 
 Gadsden,^ etc., R. Co. v. Causler (97 Ala. 
 
 235; 12 So. Rep. 439; 68 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 268), 589. 
 Gaftney v. New York, etc., R. Co. (15 
 
 R. r. 456; 7 Atl. Rep. 284; 31 Am. S 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 285), 499. 
 Gahagan v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (Mass., 
 
 1 Allen 187), 99. 
 
 Gahagan v. New York, etc., R. Co. (1 
 
 Allen 187), 414. 
 Gale »." New York, etc., R. Co. (76 N. 
 
 Y. 594; 13 Hun 1), 903. 
 Galena, etc., K. Co. v. Fay (16 111. 558), 
 
 457. 
 Galena, etc., R. Co. v. Jacobs (20 111. 
 
 478), 1062. 
 Galena, etc., R. Co. v. Loomis (13 111. 
 
 648), 949. 
 Galena, etc., R, Co. u. Yarwood (15 111. 
 
 468), 792. 
 Galena, etc., R. Co. v. Yarwood (17 111. 
 
 509), 806. 
 Gall V. Beckstein (173 111. 187), 158. 
 Gallagher v. Edison Co, (72 Mo. App, 
 
 576), 127. 
 Galligan v. Mfg. Co. (143 Mass. 527; 10 
 
 N. E. Rep. 171), 870. 
 Galligan v. Metropolitan R. Co. (33 Misc. 
 
 87; 69 N. Y. Supp. 180), 1050. 
 Gallin v. London, etc., R. Co. (10 Q. B. 
 
 212; 12 Moak's Eng. 268), 567. 
 Galloway v. Chicago, etc., R. .Co. (Iowa, 
 
 54 N. W. Rep. 447; 58 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 245), 791. 
 Galow V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (131 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 242), 257. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Alberti (103 
 
 S. W. Rep. 699), 722. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Arispe (81 
 
 Tex. 517; 17 S. W. Rep. 47; 48 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 350), 328. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Bean (99 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 721), 852. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Busch (Tex., 
 
 65 S. W. Rep. 681), 266. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Cassinelli 
 
 (Tex., 78 S. W. Rep. 247), 328. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Chambers (73 
 
 Tex. 296; 11 S. W. Rep. 279), 28. 
 Galveston^ etc., R. Co. v. Cooper (8 
 
 Tex. Civ. App. 42; 20 S. W. Rep. 
 
 990), 664. 
 Galveston Ry. Co. !/. Crier (100 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 1177), 592. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Croskell (Tex., 
 
 251 S. W. Rep. 486), 26. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Davis (4 Tex. 
 
 Civ. App. 468; 45 S. W. Rep. 956; 12 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. [N. S.] 832), 507. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Davis (Tex., 
 
 65 S. W. Rep. 217), 267. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Drew (59 Tex. 
 
 10; 46 Am. Rep. 261), 340. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Dyncan (88 
 
 Tex. 611), 866. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Farmer (73 
 
 Tex. 85; 11 S. W. Rep. 156), 499. 
 Galveston, 'etc., R. Co. v. Fink (99 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 204), 685. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Fitzpatrick 
 
 (Tex., 83 S. W. Rep. 406), 90. 
 Galveston Ry. Co. v. Garcia (100 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 198), 608. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Garrett (73 
 
 Tex. 262; 13 S. W..Rep. 68), 845. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Gormley (91 
 
 Tex. 393; 43 S. W. Rep. 877), 249. 
 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Gormley (Tex. 
 
 Civ. App., 27 S. W. Rep. 1051), 11. 
 
 Ixxvii 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITEOJ. 
 
 {References are to sections.] 
 
 Galveston, etc., E. Co. v. Hewitt (67 
 
 Tex. 473; 3 S. W. Rep. 705), 947. 
 Galveston, etc., Ry. Co. v. Hitzfelder 
 
 (Tex., 66 S. W. Rep. 707), 379. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Kutoc (73 Tex. 
 
 643; 11 S. W. Rep. 127; 13 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 327; 37 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 470), 
 
 64. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. </. Lempe (59 Tex. 
 
 19) 332. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. LaGierse (51 
 
 Tex. 189), 167. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Levy (Tex., 
 
 79 S.W. Rep. 879), 88. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Manns (Tex., 
 
 84 S. W. Rep. 354), 258. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Masterson (91 
 
 Tex. 385; 51 S. W. Rep. 1091), 493. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Matula (79 
 
 Tex. 577; 15 S. W. Rep. 573), 197. 
 Galveston & S. A. Ry. Co. v.- Matzdorf 
 
 (107 S. W. Rep. 888), 621. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Metula (Tex., 
 
 19 S. W. Rep. 376), 994. 
 Galveston & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Murray (99 
 
 S. W. Rep. 144), 989. 
 Galveston H. N. R. Co. v. Newport 
 
 (Tex., 65 S. W. Rep. 657), 258. 
 Galveston, etc., R. v. Nolan (53 Tex., 
 
 139; 3 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 387), 69. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Parish (Tex., 
 
 .93 S. W. Rep. 682), 268. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Porfert (72 
 
 Tex. 344; 37 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 540; 
 
 10 S. W. Rep. 207), 1017. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Polk (63 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 343), 65. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Quay (Tex., 
 
 66 S. W. Rep. 219), 273. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. t. Sanchez (Tex., 
 
 65 S. W. Rep. 893), 387. - 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Scott (18 Tex. 
 
 Civ. App. 321; 44 S. W. Rep. 589). 29. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Smith (Tex., 
 
 93 S. W. Rep. 184; 98 S. W. Rep. 
 
 240), 79. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. »-. Smith (59 
 
 Tex. 406), 789. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Smith (76 
 
 Tex. 611; 13 S. W. Rep. 562; 44 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 598), 473. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Still (100 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 176), 184. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. u. Sullivan (29 
 
 Tex. Unrep. Cas. 315), 406. 
 Galveston, etc., Co. v. Thompson (76 
 
 Tex. 235; 13 S. W. Rep. 60), 311. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. z>. Thornberry 
 
 (Tex., 17 S. W. Rep. 521), 822. 
 Galveston, etc., Ry. Co. v. Tuckett (Tex., 
 
 25_S. VV. Rep. 150), 663. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Walker (Tex., 
 
 76 S. W. Rep. 228), 342. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Walker (106 
 
 S. W. Rep. 705), 922. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Welsh (Tex., 
 
 22 S. W. Rep. 957), 661. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Young (100 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 993), 655. 
 Gamel v. Monfort (Tex., 81 S. W. Rep. 
 
 1029), 99. 
 Gann v. Railroad (101 Tenn. 880), 158. 
 
 Ixxviii 
 
 Gannon v. Gas Co. (145 Mo. 502; 46 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 968; 47 S. W. Rep. 907; 43 
 
 L. R. A. 505), 119. 
 Gardner v. Bennett (6 J. & S. [N. Y.] 
 
 197), 91. 
 Garldner k. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. (17 
 
 111. App. 262), 4S3. 
 Gardner v. Detroit, etc., R. Co. (97 
 
 Mich. 240; 56 N. W. Rep. 603), 
 
 1003. 
 Gardner v. Michigan Central R. Co. (58 
 
 Mich. 584; 26 N. W. Rep. 301), 354! 
 Gardner v. New Haven, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (Conn., 18 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 170), 
 
 571. 
 (Gardner v. New York, etc., R. Co. (17 
 
 R. I. 790), 45. 
 Gardner v. Railway Co. (150 U. S. 349), 
 
 311. 
 Gardner v. Waycross R. Co. (94 Ga. 538; 
 
 19 S. E. Rep. 757), 667. 
 Garland v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (8 III. 
 
 App. 571), 1020. 
 Garrahy r. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (25 
 
 Fed. Rep. 858), 479. 
 Garrett v. People's Ry. Co. (64 Atl. Rep. 
 
 854), 393. 
 Garrow i'. Miller (72 Vt. 284; 47 Atl. 
 
 Re[). 1087), 265. 
 Garteiser v. Galveston, etc., R. Co. (3 
 
 Tex. Civ. App. 230; 21 S. W. Rep. 
 
 631), 1049. 
 Gartland v. Toledo, etc., R. Co. (67 111. 
 
 498), 465. 
 Cartridge v. Railway Co. (105 Mo. 520; 
 
 16 S. W. Rep. 943), 256. 
 Garvik v. Burlmgton, etc., Ry. Co. (108 
 
 N. W. Rep. 327), 738.. 
 Gassaway v. Georgia Southern Ry. Co. 
 
 (69 Ga. 347), 278. 
 Gasway v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co. (58 Ga. 
 
 215; 16 Am. Ry. Rep. 99), 177. 
 Gates V. Burlington, etc., R. Co. (39 
 
 Iowa 45), 392. 
 Gates V. Chicago, etc., ■ R. Co. (2. S. Da- 
 kota 482; 60 N. W. Rep. 907; 58 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 245), 461. 
 Gates V. Quincey C- Ry- Co. (102 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 50), 555. 
 Gates V. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. (28 Minn. 
 
 110; 2 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 237), 32. 
 Gaudet v. Stansfield (182 Mass. 451; 65 
 
 N. E. Rep. 850), 308. 
 Gaulden v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co. (106 
 
 La. 409; 30 So. Rep. 889), 852. 
 Gave'tt V. Manchester, etc., R. Co. (16 
 
 Gray [Mass.] 501), 788. 
 Gavigan v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. (110 
 
 Mich. 71; 67 N. W. Rep. 1097; 5 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. [N. SJ 583, 495. 
 Gayle v, Missouri, etc., Cfo. (177 Mo. 427; 
 
 76 S. W. Rep. 987), 161. 
 Gayner v. Old Colony R. Co. (100 Mass. 
 
 208), 557. 
 Geart v. Metropolitan R. Co. (84 App. 
 
 Div. 614; 88 N. Y. Supp. 1016; 177 
 
 N. Y. 535; 69 N. E. Rep. 1123), 1050. 
 Gee V. Metropolitan, etc., R. Co. (21 W. 
 
 R. 684; L. R. 8 Q. B. 161; 42 L. J. Q. 
 
 B. 105; 28 L. T. 282). 799. 
 Gee V. Northern Pac. R. Co. (30 Wash. 
 
 654; 71 Pac. Rep. 182), 38, 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.'] 
 
 Gehring v. Atlantic City R. Co. (68 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 61), 992. 
 Geis V. Tennessee Coal, Iron, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (Ala., 39 So. Rep. 301), 367. 
 Geoghagan v. Atlas Steamship Co. (51 
 N. Y. S. R. 868; 83 N. Y. Supp. 749), 
 .54. 
 Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. Blanton (84 
 
 Ala. 154; 4 So. Rep. 681), 971. 
 Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. Brooks (84 Ala. 
 
 138; 4 So. Rep. 289), 512. 
 Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. Cartledge (116 
 .Ga. 164; 42 S. E. Rep. 405; 59 L. R. 
 
 A. 118), 29. 
 Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. Cox (61 Ga. 
 
 ,455), 962. 
 Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. Daniels (89 Ga. 
 
 463; 16 S. E. Rep. 538), 965. 
 Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. Davis (92 Ala. 
 
 .300; 9 So. Rep. 252), 258. 
 Georgia Pac. R. Co. i'. Dooley (86 Ga. 
 
 294; 12 S. E. Rep. 923; 48 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 437), 99. 
 Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. Evans (87 Ga. 
 
 673; 13 S. E. Rep. 680), 883. 
 Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. Friddell (70 Ga. 
 
 489; 7 S. E. Rep. 214), 230. 
 Georgia R. & B. Co. v. Garr (67 Ga. 
 
 277), 60. 
 Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. George (92 Ga. 
 
 .760; 19 S, E. Rep. 813), 29. 
 Georgia, etc., R. Co., v. Homer (73 Ga. 
 
 251; 27 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 186), 678. 
 Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. Hughes (87 Ala. 
 
 610; a So. Rep. 413; 39 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 674), 1043. 
 Georgia R. Co. ■w. Ivey (73 Ga. 499; 28 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 392), 519. 
 Georgia Pacific R. Co. v. Lee (92 Ala. 
 
 262; 9 So. Rep. 230), 1020. 
 Georgia R. & Co. v. Lloyd (59 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 801), 632. 
 Georgia Ry. Co. v. McAllister (54 S. E. 
 
 .Rep. 957), 710. 
 Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. McCurdy (45 Ga. 
 
 288), 791. 
 Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. Murden (86 Ga. 
 
 .434; 12 S. E. Rep. 630), 669. 
 Georgia, etc., R. Co. i'. Nelms (83 Ga. 
 
 70; 9 S. E. Rep. 1049; 39 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 365;- 29 Cent. L.J. 352), 97. 
 Georgia, etc., R. Co. v: (Daks (62 Ga. 
 
 410: 7 Am. Rv. Rep. 143), 40. 
 Georgia Pacific S. Co. v. O'Shields (90 
 
 Ala. 29; 8 So. Rep. 248), 1006. 
 Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. Pittman (73 Ga. 
 
 325; 26 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 474), 
 
 196. 
 Georgia Pac. Ry. Co. v. Propst (83 Ala. 
 
 518; 3 So. Rep. 764), 253. 
 Georgia Ry. Co. v. Reeves (123 Ga. 697; 
 
 61 S. E. Rep. 610), 125. 
 Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. Rhodes (66 Ga. 
 
 645), 372. 
 Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. Robinson (68 
 
 Miss. 643; 10 So. Rep. 60), 687. 
 George v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (34 
 
 Ark. 613; 1 Am. & Eng; R. Cas. 294), 
 
 768. 
 Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. Underwood. (90 
 
 Ala. 49; 8 So. Rep. 116; ii,dhiir & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 367), 802. yr 
 
 Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. West (66 Miss. 
 
 310; 6 So. Rep. 207), 789. 
 Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. Wynn (42 Ga. 
 
 331), 61. 
 Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. Williams (69 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 846), 976. 
 Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. Williams (74 Ga. 
 
 723), 968. 
 Gerety v. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. (81 
 
 Pa. St. 274; 16 Am. Ry. Rep. 164), 
 
 1029. 
 Gerhart v. Wabash Ry. Co. (110 Mo. 
 
 App. 105), 625. 
 Gerlach v. Edelmeyer (88 N. Y. 645), 
 
 120. 
 Germain v. Montreal, etc., R. Co. (6 
 
 Low. Can. 178), 640. 
 German v. Brooklyn, etc., R. Co. (95 N. 
 
 Y. S. 557), 121. 
 German v. Suburban Transit Co. (13 N. 
 
 Y. Supp. 897; 37 N. Y. S. R. 360), 
 
 411. 
 Gerstle v. Union Pacific R. .Co. (23 Mo. 
 
 App. 361), 801. 
 Gerstner v. New York, etc., R. Co. (80 
 
 N. Y. S. R. 1063; 81 App. Div. 562), 
 
 338. 
 Gerstner v. New York, etc., R. Co. (178 
 
 N. Y. 627; 71 N. E. Rep. 1131), 267. 
 Gesas v. Oregon Short Line R. Co. (93 
 
 Pac. Rep. 274), 1028. 
 Gessley v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (32 
 
 Mo. App. 413), 866. 
 Geyeke v. Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (67 Mich. 589; 24 N. W. Rep. 676; 
 
 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 561), 171. . 
 Gheer v. Union Ry. Co. (103 N. Y. S. 
 
 R. 88), 167. 
 Giacomo v. New York, etc., R. Co. (81 
 
 N. E. Rep. 899), 916. 
 Gibney v. Transit Co. (103 S. W. Rep. 
 
 43), 175. 
 Gibson v. Erie, etc., R. Co. (63 N. Y. 
 
 449; 20 Am. Rep. 552), 326. 
 Gibson v. Midland R., Co. (2 Ont. 658; 
 
 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 507), 64. - 
 Gibson v. Northern, etc., R. Co. (88 Hun 
 
 N. Y. 889), 494. 
 Gibson zj., Oregon, etc., R. Co. (23 Ore- 
 gon 493; 32 Pac. Rep. 295), 416. 
 Gibson v. Pacific R. Co. (46 Mo. 163), 
 
 482. 
 Gidionsen v. Union Depot R. Co. (129 
 
 Mo. 398; 31 S. W. Rep. 800), 661. 
 Gila Valley, etc., R. Co. v. Lyon (Ariz., 
 
 71 Pac. Rep. 967), 154. 
 Gilberson v. Bangor, etc., R. Co. (89 
 
 Me. 337; 36 Atl. Rep. 400), 115. 
 Gilbert v. Burlington, etc., R. Co. (188 
 
 Fed. Rep. 689), 368. 
 Gilbert v. North London -'R. Co. (1 C. 
 
 & E. 31), 642. 
 Gill V. Rochester, etc., R. Co. (37 Hun 
 
 [N. Y.] 107), 731. 
 Gillat? V. Railroad Co. (93 Me. 80; 44 
 
 Atl. Rep. 363), 366. 
 Gillenwater v. Madison, etc., R. "Co. (6 
 
 Ind. 339), 589. 
 Gillespie v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (6 Mo. 
 
 App. 554). 604. 
 Gillett V. Western R. Corp. (8 Allen 
 
 [Mass.] 660), 906. 
 
 Ixxix 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.] 
 
 Gilliland v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (19 Mo. 
 
 App. 411), 25. 
 Gillin V. Patten, etc., R. Co. (93 Me. 
 
 80; 44 Atl. Rep. 361)^ 325. 
 Gillingham v. Ohio River R. Co. (35 
 
 W. Va. 588; 14 S. E. Rep. 243; 14 L. 
 
 R. A. 798; 61 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 222), 551. 
 Gillis V. Pennsylvania R. Co. (59 Pa. St. 
 
 129), 1074. 
 Gillshannon v. Stony Brook R. Co. (10 
 
 Cush. [Mass.] 228), 568. 
 Gilraan v. Railroad Co. (13 Allen 
 
 433), 85. 
 Gilmore z>. Houston Electric Co. (102 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 168), 573. 
 Gilmore v. Northern Pacific R. Co. (9 
 
 Sawy. U. S. 558; 18 Fed. Rep. 866), 
 
 477. 
 Gilmore v. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. (154 
 
 Pa. St. 375; 25 Atl. Rep. 774), 630. 
 Gilson w. Jackson County R. Co. (76 Mo. 
 
 282; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 132), 582. 
 Giordano v. Brandywine, etc., Co. (Del., 
 
 62 Atl. Rep. 332), 308. 
 Giraudi v. Electric, etc., Co. (107 Cal. 
 
 120; 40 Pac. Rep. 108; 24 L. R. A. 
 
 596), 113. 
 Givens v. Kentucky & R. Co. (89 Ky. 
 
 231; 12 S. W. Rep. 267), 69. 
 Glang V. Alabama, etc., Co, (141 Ala. 
 
 537; 37 So. Rep. 784), 94. 
 Glanz V. Chicago & C. R. Co. (Iowa, 
 
 93 N. W. Rep. 675), 38. 
 Glaser v. Rothschild (106 Mo. App. 418), 
 
 872. 
 Glasgow V, Metropolitan R. Co. (191 Mo. 
 
 374; 89 S. W. Rep. 915), 168. 
 Glass V. Memphis, etc., R. Co. (94 Ala. 
 
 581; lO So. Rep. 215), 74. 
 Glasscock v. Central Pacific R. Co. (73 
 
 Cal. 137; 14 Pac. Rep. 518), 408. 
 Glassey v. Bentonville, etc., R. Co. .(57 
 
 Pa. St. 172), 1058. 
 Glassey v, Worcester Con., etc., R. Co, 
 
 (186 Mass. 315; 70 N. E. Rep. 
 
 199), 39. 
 Gleason v. New York, etc., R. Co. (169 
 
 Mass. 68; 34 N. E. Rep. 79), 325. 
 Gleeson v. Virginia Midland R. Co. (140 
 
 U. S. 436, 445; 35 L. Ed. 458), 608. 
 Glenn v. Columbia, etc., R. Co. (21 S. 
 
 C. 466), 20. 
 Glover V. Atchison, etc., Ry. Co. (108 
 
 S. W. Rep. 106), 733. 
 Glover v. Bolt & Nut Co. (153 Mo. 827; 
 
 56 S. W. Rep. 88), 146. 
 Glushing v. Sharp (96 N. Y. 676; 19 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 372), 1026. 
 Glynn v. Central R. Co. (Mass., 66 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 698), 231. 
 Goble V. Kansas City (14 Mo. 470; 50 
 
 S. W. Rep. 84), 96. 
 Goddard v. (Jrand Trunk R. Co. (67 Me. 
 
 202), 735. 
 Goddard v. Grand Trunk R. Co. (2 Am. 
 
 Rep. 39), 177. 
 Godfrey v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. (42 So. 
 
 Rep. 671), 267. 
 Godfrey v. Inman Co. (31 Atl. Reo. 
 
 6), 145. ^ 
 
 Ixxx 
 
 (Godfrey v. St. Louis Tr. Co. (Mo., 81 
 
 S. W. Rep. 1230), 265. 
 Goetz V. Hannibal, etc., R. Co, (50 Mo. 
 
 472), 848. 
 Goff's Admr. v. Norfolk & Western R. 
 
 Co. (36 Fed. Rep. 299), 275. 
 Coins V. Chicago R. I. & Pac. R. Co. 
 
 37 Mo. App. 281. 
 
 Goldberg v. New YOrfc, etc., R. Co. (133 
 
 N. Y. 661; 30 N, E. Rep. 597; 44 N. 
 
 Y. S. R. 71), 632. 
 Goldberg v. New York, etc., R. Co. (54 
 
 N. Y. S. R. 90; 71 Hun 618; 133 N. 
 
 Y. 561), 786. 
 Golden v. Clinton (54 Mo. App. 100), 95. 
 Goldwaithe ' 2/. R. R. (160 Mass. 664), 
 
 311. 
 Gonzales v. New York, etc., R. Co. (39 
 
 How. Pr. N. Y. 407), 102. 
 Good v. Johnson (88 Pac. Rep. 439), 291. 
 Goodes V. Railroad Co. (162 Mass. 287; 
 
 38 N. £. Rep. 600), 826. 
 Goodfellow V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (106 
 
 Mass. 461), 408. 
 Goodlander, etc., Co. v. Standard Oil 
 
 Co. (63 Fed. Rep. 400; 11 C. C. A. 
 
 253; 27 L. R. A. 538), 22. 
 Goodloe V. Memphis, etc., R. Co. (107 
 
 Ala. 233; 18 So. Rep. 166; 64 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 67; 29 L. R. A. 729), 740. 
 Goodloe V. Metropolitan R. Co. (120 Mo. 
 
 App. 194), 608. 
 Goodman v. Delaware, etc., Co. (167 Pa. 
 
 St. 332; 31 Atl, Rep. 670), 487. 
 Goodrich v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (152 Mo. 222; 53 S. W. Rep. 917), 
 
 229. 
 Goodrich v. New York, etc., R. Co. (116 
 
 N. Y. 398; 22 N. E. Rep. 897; 26 N. 
 
 Y. S. R. 767; 6 L. R. A. 750), 328. 
 Goodsell V. Taylor (41 Minn. 207; 42 
 
 N. W. Rep. 873), 74. 
 Goodwell V. Montana, etc., R. Co. (18 
 
 Mont. 293; 45 Pac. Rep. 210; 4 Am. 
 
 & Eftg. R. Cas. [N. S.] 419), 495. 
 Goodwin v. Bodcaw, etc., Co. (109 La. 
 
 1060; 34 So. Rep. 74), 841. 
 Goodwin V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (84 Me. 
 
 203; 24 Atl. Rep. 816). 801. 
 Goodwin v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (75 Mo. 
 
 73; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 460), 661. 
 Gordon v. Grand St. R. Co. (40" Babr. 
 
 [N. Y.] 646), 552. 
 Gorham. i: Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (113 
 
 Mo. 408; 20 S. W. Rep. 1060), 181. 
 Gorman v. Des Moines Brick Co. (99 
 
 Iowa 257; 68 N. W. Rep. 674), 145. 
 Gorman v. Hand Brewing Co. (66 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 209; 28 R. I. 180), 204. 
 Gorman v. Milliken (92 N. Y. S. 1126; 
 
 102 App. Div. 617), 127. 
 Gorman v. Railroad (78 Iowa 609; 43 
 
 N. W. Rep. 803), 85. 
 Goronsson v. Riter, etc., Co. (186 Mo. 
 
 300; 85 S. W. Rep. 338), 120. 
 Gorton v. Erie R. CTo. (45 N. Y. 660), 
 
 1009. 
 Gorton v. Harmon (118 N. W. Rep. 443; 
 
 15 Detroit Leg. N. 250), 987. 
 Goshen v. England (119 Ind. 368; 21 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 977), 168. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.} 
 
 Goss p. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (50 Mo. App. 
 
 626), 306. 
 .Gothard v. Alabama, etc., R. Co. (67 
 
 Ala. 114), 1016. 
 Gotlieb V. New York, etc., R. Co. (100 
 ■ N. y. 462; 3 N. E. Rep. 344; 24 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 421), 870. 
 Gottlieb V. North Jersey Co. (58 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 1088), 61. 
 Gould V. Railway Co. (66 Iowa 590; 24 
 
 N. W. Rep. 227), 258. 
 Government, 'etc., R. Co. v. Hanlon (53 
 
 Ala. 70), 392. 
 Gowen v. Harley (56 Fed. Rep. 973), 
 
 323. 
 Gradiii v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. (30 
 
 Minn. 217; 14 N. W. Rep. 881; 11 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 644), 1070. 
 Graefl v. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. (Pa., 
 
 28 Atl. Rep. 1107; 68 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 431), 590. 
 Graemlich v. Railroad Co. (9 Phila. [Pa.] 
 
 78), 872. 
 Graf v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (94 Mich. 
 
 579; »54 N. W. Rep. 388), 883. 
 Graham v. Badger (164 Mass. 42; 41 
 
 N. £. Rep. 61), 119. 
 Graham v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (156 
 
 Mass. 4; SO N. E. Rep. 359), 84. 
 Graham v. Chicago, etc., R. (io. (Tex., 
 
 91 S. W. Rep. 1081), 338. 
 Graham v. McNeal (20 Wash. 466; 55 
 
 Pac. Rep. 631; 43 L. R. A. 300; 12 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. [N. S.] 149), 690. 
 Graham v. Toronto, etc., R. Co. (23 U. 
 
 C. C. P. 541), 568. 
 Gram v. Northern Pac. R. Co. (1 N. D. 
 
 252) 37 
 Grand 'v. Railroad Co. (83 Mich. 664; 
 
 47 N. W. Rep. 837; 11 L. RV A. 402), 
 
 356._ 
 Grandin v. Southern Pac. R. Co. (Utah, 
 
 85 Pac. Rep. 357), 854. 
 Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co. v. Boyd (65 
 
 Ind. 626), 673. 
 Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co. v. Ellison 
 
 (117 InJ. 234; 20 N. E. Rep. 135; 39 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 480), 590. 
 Grand Rapids, ' etc., R. Co. v. Huntley 
 
 38 Mich. 537), 678. 
 Grand Rapids R. Co. v. Martin (41 
 
 Mich. 667), 186. 
 Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co. v. ^tite (27 
 
 Ind. App. 120; 60 N. E. Rep. 1000), 
 
 508. 
 Grand Rapids Chair Co. v. Rannells (77 
 
 Mich. 104; 35 Cent. Law J. 242), 382. 
 Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co. v. Showers 
 
 (71 Ind. 451; 2 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 9), 801. 
 Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Cummings (106 
 
 U. S. 700), 471. 
 Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Flagg (156 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 859), 1078. 
 Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives (144 U. 
 
 S. 417; 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 679), 249. 
 Grand Trunk Co. v. Richardson (91 U. 
 
 S. 454; 28 L. Ed. 367), fl9. 
 Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Rosenberg (9 
 
 Can. S. C. 311; 19 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 8; 16 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 448), 
 
 886. 
 
 Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Sibbald (20 Can. 
 
 Sup. Ct. 259: 18 Ont. App. 184), 9(i9. 
 Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. State (82 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 1017), 932. 
 Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Stevens (95 U. 
 
 S. 660; 24 L. Ed. 626), 7. 
 Graney v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (38 
 
 S. W. Rep. 989; 140 Mo. 89; 41 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 246: 38 L. R. A. 633; 157 
 
 Mo. 666; 67 S. W. Rep. 276; 50 L. R. 
 
 A. 153), 977. 
 Granger v. Boston, etc., R. Co". (146 
 
 Mass. 276; 16 N. E. Rep. 619), 999. 
 Grannis v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (81 
 
 Iowa 4*4; 46 N. W. Rep. 1067),- 245.. 
 Grant v. Raleigh, etc., R. Co. (108 N. 
 
 Car. 462; 13 S. E. Rep. 209), 83. 
 Gratiot v. Missouri Pacilic R. Co. (116 
 
 Mo. 450; 21 S. W. Rep. 1094; 55 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 108), 953. 
 Grattis v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (153 
 
 Mo. 380; 55 S. W. Rep. 108; 48 L. 
 
 R. A. 399; 77 Am. St. Rep. 721), 364. 
 Gravelle v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. (3 
 
 McCrary, U. S. 352; 10 Fed. Rep. 
 
 711), 486. 
 Graves v. Baltimore & N. Y. Ry. Co. (69 
 
 Atl. 971), 889. 
 Graville v. Manhattan R. Co. (105 N. Y. 
 
 626; 12 N. E. Rep. 51; 34 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 375), 801. 
 Gray v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (168 Mass. 
 
 20; 46 N. E.- Rep. 397), 731. 
 Gray v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. (11 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 683), 668. 
 Gray v. Columbia River & O. R. R. Co. t 
 
 (88 Pac. Rep. 297), 552. 
 Gray v. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. (24 
 
 Fed. Rep. 168; 23 Blatchf. U. S. 265; 
 
 22 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 351), 481. 
 Gray v. Rochester City R. Co. (61 Hun 
 .212; 15 N. Y. Supp. 927; 40 N. Y. S. 
 ■ R. 715), 598. 
 Grayson, etc., Co. z/. Carter (Ark., 88 
 
 S. W. Rep. 697), 352. 
 Greany v. Long Island R. Co. (101 N. 
 
 Y. 419; 6 N. E. Rep. 425; 24 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 473), 1004. 
 Great Northern R. Co. v. Harrison (10 
 
 Exch. 376), 671. 
 Great Western R. Co. v. Baird (1 M. 
 
 P. C. C. [N. S.] 101), 585. 
 Great Western R. Co. v. Blake (7 H. 
 
 & N. 987), 683. 
 Green v. Brainard, etc., Ry. Co. (85 
 
 Minn. 318; 88 N. W. Rep. 974), 332. 
 Green v. Cross (79 Tex.* 130; 16 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 220), 341. 
 Green v. Eastern R. Co. (62 Minn. 79; 
 
 63 N. W. Rep. 808), 969. 
 Green v. Erie R. Co. (11 Hun 333), 21. 
 Green v. Hudson River R. Co. (2 Abb. 
 
 App. Dec. N. Y. 277; 16 How. Pr. N. 
 
 Y. 263; 31 Barb. 260), 61. 
 (3reen v. Hudson River R. Co. (32 Barb. 
 
 26; 30 How. Pr. 592), 197. 
 Green v. Los Angeles, etc., R. Co. (143 
 
 Cal. 31), 398. 
 Green v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (94 Ky. 
 
 169), 484. 
 Green v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co. (99 
 
 S. W. Rep. 28), 721. 
 
 Ixxxi 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to seotions.'i 
 
 Green v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (192 
 
 Mo. 1. c. 141; 90 S. W. Rep. 805), 
 
 1011. 
 Green v. Missouri, etc., R. Co. (121 Mo. 
 
 App. 720; 99 S. W. Rep. 28), 854. 
 Green t'. Pennsylvania R. Co. (36 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 06), 173. 
 Green z: Railroad Co. (28 Barb. 9), 61. 
 Green v. Soule (145 Cal. 96; 78 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 337), 290. 
 Green v. Southern Ry. Co. (72 S. C. 
 
 398r 52 S. E. Rep. 45), 127. 
 Green v. Western, etc., Co. (30 Wasll. 
 
 87; 70 Pac. Rep. 310), 506. 
 Greenleaf v. Dubuque, etc., R. Co. (33 
 
 Iowa 52), 397. 
 Greenleaf v. Illinois C. R. Co. (29 
 
 Iowa 14), 152. 
 Greenlee i: East Tenn., etc., R. Co. (5 
 • Lea [Tenn.] 418; 4 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Gas. 351), 59. 
 Greeley v. State (88 N. Y. S. 468; 94 
 
 App. Div. 605), 32. 
 Greenwald v. Marquette, etc., R. Co. (49 
 .Mich. 197; 13 N. W. Rep. 513; 8 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 133), 600. 
 Greenwell k. Crow (73 Mo. 638), 99. 
 Greenwood r. Pennsylvania R. Co. (124 
 
 Pa. St. 572; 17 Atl. Rep. 186), 1033. 
 Greer v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (94 Ky. 
 
 169; 21 S. W. Rep. 649), 524. 
 Gregg v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (94 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 911), 775. ■ 
 Gregory v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. (112 
 
 Ind. 385; 14 N. E. Rep. 228; 31 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 440), 1078. 
 Gregory v. New York, etc., R. Co. (8 
 
 N. Y. Supp. 525; 28 N. Y. S. R. 726), 
 
 182. 
 Gribben v. Yellow Aster, etc., M, Co. 
 
 (142 Cal. 248; 75 Pac. Rep. 839), 140. 
 Gross V. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (109 
 
 Mo. App. 716; 84 S. W. Rep. 122), 
 
 557. 
 Grote' V. Chester, etc., R. Co. (2 Exch. 
 
 251; 5 Railw. Cas. 649), 605. 
 GrQws V, Maine, etc., R. Co. (67 Me. 
 
 100), 661. 
 Gruber v. Washington, etc., R. Co. (92 
 
 N. Car. 1; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 438), 551. 
 Gruendahl v. Consolidated, etc., Co. (108 
 
 111. App. 644), 161. 
 Griifin v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (148 Mass. 
 
 143; 19 N. E. Rep. 166), 393. 
 'Griffin v. California Elec. Co. (1 Cal. 
 
 App. 678; 82' Pac. Rep. 1084), 125. 
 Griffin v. Flank (95 N. Y. S. 546), 127. 
 Griffin v. Ohio, etc., R. Co. (124 Ind. 
 
 326; 24 N. E. Rep. 888), 321. 
 Griffin v. Utica, etc., R. Co. (41 Hun 
 
 448; 3 N. Y. S. R. 155), 810. 
 Griffith V. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. (44 
 
 Fed. Rep. 674; 159 U. S. 603; 16 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 105; 40 L. Ed. 274), 1039. 
 Griffith V. Denver Con. Tr. Co. (14 Colo. 
 
 App. 504), 398. 
 Griffith V. Lexington Ter. R. Co. (124 
 
 Ga. 553; 63 S. E. Rep. 97), 858. 
 Griffith V. Missouri, etc., R. Co. (98 Mo. 
 
 168; 11 S. W. Rep. 559), 693. 
 
 Ixxxii 
 
 Griffith V. Utica, etc., R. Co. (43 N. Y. 
 
 S. R. 835; 137 N. Y. 566), 100. 
 Griggs V. l^eckenstein (14 Minn, 81; 
 
 100 Am. Dec. 199^, 1041. 
 irill V. Iron, etc., Co. 
 P. 160), 4 
 
 (L. C. R., 1 C. 
 
 Grimes v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (3 Ind. 
 
 App. 673; 30 N. E. Rep. 200), 26. 
 Grimes v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (136 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 72), 102. 
 Grimsley z'. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 
 
 (57 S. E. Rep. 943), 591. 
 Grippen v. New York, etc., R. Co. (40 
 
 N. Y. 46), 945. 
 Griswold v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. ^64 
 
 Wis. 652; 26 N. W. Rep. 101, 23 Am. 
 
 6 Eng. R. Cas. 463), 570. 
 Griswold v. New York, etc., R. Co. (44 
 
 Hun 836; 115 N. Y. 61), 183. 
 Griswold zi. New York, etc., R. Co. (53 
 
 Conn. 371; 4 Atl. Rep. 261; 55 Am. 
 
 Rep. 115; 26 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 280), 851. 
 Guenther v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (108 
 
 Mo. 18; 18 S. W. Rep. 846), 411. 
 Guffey V. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (53 Mo. 
 
 App. 462), 670. 
 Guggenheim zj. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (57 Mich. 488; 24 N. W. Rep. 827; 22 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 546), 1020. 
 Guggenheim v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (66 Mich. 150; 43 N. W. Rep. 101; 
 
 32 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 89), 933. 
 Guild V. Pringle (130 Fed. Rep. 419), 91. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Anderson (76 Tex. 
 
 244; IS S. W. Rep. 196; 42 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 160), 1018. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Baird (75 Tex. 
 
 263; 40 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 160). 847. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. K. Blockman (39 So. 
 
 Rep. 479), 528. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Blohn (78 Tex. 637; 
 
 11 S. W. Rep. 867; 4 L. R. A. 764), 
 
 461. 
 Gulf, etc., Ry. Co. v. Booth (97 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 128), 721. 
 Gulf, etc., Ry. Co. v. Boyce (87 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 395), 83. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Brentford (79 Tex. 
 
 619; 15 S. W. Rep. 561), 376. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Butcher (83 Tex. 
 
 309; 18 S. W. Rep. 583), 620. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Calvert (U Tex. 
 
 Civ. App. 297; 32 S. W. Rep. 246), 
 
 499. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Campbell (76 Tex. 
 
 174; 13 S. W. Rep. 19; 41 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 100), 562. 
 Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. z: Coleman (112 
 
 S. W. Rep. 690), 1082. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Compton (75 Tex. 
 
 667; 13 S. W. Rep. 067; 44 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 637), 64. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. z: Coon (00 Tex. 730; 
 
 7 S. W. Rep. 492), 16S. 
 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Cooper (Tex., 77 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 263), 269. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Darby (28 Tex. Civ. 
 
 App. 413; 67 S. W. Rep. 446), 243. 
 Gulf, etc., Ry. Co. v. Davis (Tex., 80 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 253), 872. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.] 
 
 Gulf, etc., R.-Co. V. Dawkins (77 Tex. 
 
 328: 13 S. W. Rep. 988), 559. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Dorsey (66 Tex. 
 
 148: 25 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 446), 230. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Ellis (165 U. S. 
 
 f50), 504. , „ 
 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Evansick (63 Tex. 
 
 54), 97. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Flake (1 Tex. Civ. 
 
 App. 99), 283. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Fox (Tex., 6 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 569; 33 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 543), 691. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Gordon (70 Tex. 
 
 80; 7 S. W. Rep. 695), 184. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Greenlee (62 Tex. 
 
 344; 23 Am. & Eng. R. Cas, 822), 917. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Harriett (80 Tex. 
 
 73; 15 S. W. Rep. 556), 100. 
 Gulf, etc., Ry. Co. v. Hays (Tex., 89 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 29), 85. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Hulett (92 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 454), 317. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. i». Johnson (1 Tex. 
 
 Civ. App. 103; 20 S. W. Rep. 1123), 
 
 203. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Johnson (83 Tex. 
 
 628; 19 S. W. Rep. 151),, 471. 
 Gulf, etc.. R. Co. V. Jones (76 Tex. 350; 
 
 13 S. W. Rep. 374), 301. 
 Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe R. Co. v. 
 
 Josey (Tex., 95 S. W. Rep. 688), 26. 
 Gulf, etc.. R. Co. V. ICillebrew (Tex., 20 
 
 S. W. Rep. 182), 802. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Larkin (Tex., 80 
 
 S. W. Rep. 94), 266. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Levy (59 Tex. 563), 
 
 166. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Looney (85 Tex. 
 
 158; 19 S. W. Rep. 1039; 62 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 197), 847. 
 Gulf,, etc., R. Co. V. McGowan (65 Tex. 
 
 640; 26 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. ^574), 850. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Montgomery (85 
 
 Tex. 64; 19 S. W. Rep. 1015), 92. 
 Gulf, etc.. R. Co. V. McMannewitz (70 
 
 Tex. 73; 8 S. W. Rep. 66; 34 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 428), 837. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. McWhirter (77 
 
 Tex. 356; 14 S. W. Rep. 26; 19 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 755), 1073. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Miller (79 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 709), 229. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Newman (Tex., 84 
 
 S. W. Rep. 790), 270. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Norfleet (78 Tex. 
 
 321; 14 S. W. Rep. 703; 45 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 207), 93, 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Pendry (87 Tex. 
 
 653; 47 Am. St. Rep. 125; 29 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 1038), 1045. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Pomeroy (67 Tex. 
 
 498; 3 S. W. Rep. 722), 603. 
 Gulf & Ry. Co. V. Redeker (100 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 362), 662. 
 Gulf, etc., R, Co. V. Redeker (75 Tex. 
 
 310; 12 S. W. Rep. 856; 41 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 296), 301. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Ryan (69 Tex. 665; 
 
 7 S. W. Rep. 83; 33 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 289), 640. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Schreider (88 Tex. 
 
 152; 30 S. W. Rep. 902; 28 L. R. A. 
 
 538), 115. 
 Gulf, etc., Ry. Co. v. Schwab (Teji., 21 
 
 S. W. Rep. 706), 261. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Shelton (72 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 166), 230. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Lilliphant (70 Tex. 
 
 623; 8 S. ,W. Rep. 673), 360. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Smith (Tex., 11 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 1104), 823. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. r. Wallen (65 Tex. 
 
 568; 26 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 219), 793. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Walters (107 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 369), 869. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Warner (89 Tex. 
 
 475; 35 S. W. Rep. 364), 493. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. ». Warner (22 Tex. 
 
 Civ. App. 167; 64 S. W. Rep. 1004), 
 
 367. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Wells (Tex., 16 S. 
 
 W. Reo. 1025), 345. 
 Gulf, etc., Ry. Co. v. Whisenhunt (81 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 332), 384. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Williams (72 Tex. 
 
 169; 12 S. W. Rep. 172; 39 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 292), 338. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Willoughby (Tex., 
 
 81 S. W. Rep. 829), 91. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Wilson (79 Tex. 
 
 371; 15 S. W. Rep. 280), 555. 
 Gumb V. Twenty-third St. R. Co. (114 
 
 N. Y. 411; 21 N. E. Rep. 993; 43 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 315), 185. 
 Gumz V. Chicago, etc., R. C^o. (52 Wis. 
 
 672; 10 N. W. Rep. 11; 6 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 583), 549. 
 Gunderman v. Missouri, etc., R. Co. (58 
 
 Mo. Apo. 380, 381), 868. 
 Gunn V. New York, etc., R. Co. (171 
 
 Mass. 417; 50 N. E. Rep. 1031), 513. 
 Gunther v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (95 
 
 Mo. 286; 8 S. W. Rep. 371; 34 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 47), 876. 
 Gurley z'. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (104 
 
 Mo. 211; 16 S. W. Rep. 11), 874. 
 Gurney v. Grand Trunk R. Co. (37 N. 
 
 Y. S. R. 657; 138 N. Y. 638), 47. 
 Gustafson z: Young (86 N. Y. S. 851; 91 
 
 App. Div. 433), 97. 
 Gutridge v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (105 
 
 Mo. 520; 16 S. W. Rep. 943), 84. 
 Guyer v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (174 
 
 Mo. 344; 73 S. W. Rep. 584), 1014. 
 Gwyn V. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. (165 
 
 Fed. Rep. 88); 724. 
 Gyles V. Southern Ry. Co. (60 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 433; 79 S. C. 176), 692. 
 
 Haas V. Buffalo, etc., R. Co. (40 Hun 
 
 [N. Y.] 145), 335. 
 Haas -if. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (41 Wis. 
 
 44), 984. 
 Haas V. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. (97 111. 
 
 App. 624), 262. 
 Haas V. Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co. (47 
 
 Mich. 401; 11 N. W. Rep. 216; 8 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 268), 917. 
 Haase v. Oregon, etc., R. Co. (19 Ore- 
 gon 354; 24 Pac. Rep, 238; 44 Am. 
 
 . _ _ ^ ^gg 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 360), 
 
 Ixxxiii 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.'] 
 
 Haas V. St Louis & S. F. R. Co. (106 
 
 S. W. Rep. 599), 651. 
 Haas V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (Ill Mo. 
 
 App. 706; 90 S. W. Rep. 1155), 119. 
 Hach V. St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry. Co. 
 (117 Mo. App. 11; 93 S. W. Rep. 
 
 825), 267. 
 Hackett v. Western Union Tel. Co. (80 
 . Wis. 187; i9 N. W. Rep. 822), 296. 
 Hackford v. New York, etc., R. Co. (53 
 
 N. Y. 654), 1035. 
 Haden v. Sioux City, etc., R. Co. (Iowa, 
 
 48 N. W. Rep. 733), 408. 
 Hadencamp v. Second Avenue R. Co. (1 
 
 Sweeney [N. Y.] 490), 646. 
 Hafner v. Transit Co. (197 Mo. 196; 94 
 
 S. W. Rep. 291), 775. 
 Hagan v. Chicago, etc., R. Co, (59 Wis. 
 
 139; 17 N. W. Rep. 632; 15 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 439), 875. 
 Hagan v. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. (5 
 
 Phila. [Pa.] 179), 982. 
 Hagan v. Providence R. Co. (3 R. I. 
 
 88), 178. 
 Hagar V. Terminal R. Ass'n (105 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 744), 326. 
 Haggblad v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co. 
 
 (102 N. Y. S. 1039), 534. 
 Haggerty v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (141 
 
 Fed. Rep. 966; 73 C. C. A. 282), 342. 
 Haggerty v. Ry. Co. (100 Mo. App. 424; 
 
 74 S. W. Rep. 456), 129. 
 Haigh V. Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. 
 
 (52 L. J. Q. B. D. 640; 49 L. T. 
 
 802), 57. 
 Hailey'w. Texas, etc., Ry. Co. (La. Ann., 
 
 37 So. Rep. 131), 366. 
 Hajsek v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (68 Neb. 
 
 539; 94 N. W. Rep. 609), 1053. 
 Hajsek v, Chicago, etc., R. Co, (6 Neb. 
 
 67; 97 N. W. Rep. 327), 1039. 
 Haldan v. Great Western R. Co. (30 U. 
 
 C. C. P. 89), 779. 
 Haley v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. 
 
 Co. (21 Iowa 15), 39. 
 Haley v. Mobile, etc., R. Co. (7 Baxt. 
 
 239;'8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 641), 200. 
 Halferty v. Wabash R. Co. (88 Mo. 90), 
 
 947. 
 Hall V. Brown (54 N. H. 495; 11 Am. 
 
 Ry. Rep. 231), 928. 
 Hall V. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (149 Fed. 
 
 Ren. 564), 449. 
 Hall V. Galveston, etc., R. Co. (39 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 18), 489. 
 Hall V. McFadden (19 New Brun. 340), 
 
 686. 
 Hall V. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (74 Mo. 
 
 298; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 106), 475. 
 Hall V. Northeastern R. Co. (L. &., 10 
 
 Q. B. 437), 850. 
 Hall V. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. - (111 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 609), 788. 
 Hallihan v. Hannibal, etc^ R. Co. (71 
 
 Mo. 117; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 117), 408. 
 Hallower v. Henley (6 Cal. 209), 10. 
 Halton V. Southern R. Co. (127 N. C. 
 
 255; 37 S. E. Rep. 262), 491. 
 Ham V. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (155 Pa. 
 
 St. 548; 20 L. R.'A. 682), 731. 
 
 Ixxxiv 
 
 Hamblin v. New York, etc., R. Co. (81 
 
 N. E. Rep. 258), 1025. 
 Hamilton v. Galveston, etc., R. Co. (54 
 
 Tex. 656; i Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 528), 
 
 301. 
 Hamilton v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. /(39 
 
 Kan. 66; 18 Pac. Rep. 87), 66. 
 Hamilton v. Iron Mountain R. Co. (4 
 
 Mo. App. 564), 485. 
 Hamilton v. Kansas City & Southern Ry. 
 
 Co. (100 S. W. Rep. 671), 118. 
 Hamilton v. Louisiana, etc., Ry. Co. 
 
 (La., 41 So. Rep. 660), 259. 
 Hamilton v. Mendota, etc., Co. (Iowa, 
 
 94 N. W. Rep. 282), 166. 
 Hamilton v. Metropolitan St. R. Co. (114 
 
 Mo. App. 604; 89 S. W. Rep. 893), 
 
 126. 
 Hamilton v. Michigan Cent. R. Co. 
 
 (Mich., 97 N. W. Rep. 392), 257. 
 Hamilton v. Morgen's, etc., R. Co. (42 
 
 La. Ann. 824; 8 So. Rep. 586), 166. 
 Hamilton v. Richmond, etc., R. Co. (83 
 
 Ga. 346; 9 S. E. Rep. 670), 418. 
 Hamilton v. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. (118 
 
 Fed. Rep. 92), 506. 
 Hamilton v. Texas, etc., R. Co. (64 
 
 Tex. 251), 570. 
 Hamman v. Coal, etc., Co. (156 Mo. 232; 
 
 56 S. W. Rep. 1091), 162. 
 Hammet v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (89 
 
 Mo. App. 354), 629. 
 Hammond, etc., Ry. Co. v. Antonia (83 
 
 N. E. Rep. 766), 718. 
 Hammond -u. Chicago, etc., K. Co. (83 
 
 Mich. 334; 47 N. W. Hep. 965; 48 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 377), 
 Hammond v. Northeastern R. Co. (6 So. 
 
 Car. 130), 663. 
 Hampel f. Detroit, etc., R. Co. (138 
 
 Mich. 1; 100 N. W. Rep. 1002; 108 
 
 Am. St Rep. 276), 1059. 
 Hancock v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co. (124 
 
 N. Car, 222; 32 S. E. Rep. 679), 504. 
 Hand v. Mississippi Central R. R. Co. 
 
 (50 Miss. 178), 3. 
 Handelun v. Burlington, etc., R. Co. (72 
 
 Iowa 709; 32 N. W. Rep. 4), 522. 
 Handley v. Houston, etc., R. Co. (2 
 
 Tex. Unr. Cas. 282), 1070. 
 Haney v. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. (38 
 
 W. Va. 570; 18 S. W. Rep. 748), 490. 
 Hanheide v. Transit Co. (104 Mo. App. 
 
 323; 78 S. W. Rep. 820), 392. 
 Hankins v. New York, etc., R. Co. (142 
 
 N. Y. 416; 37 N. E. Rep. 466; 59 N. 
 
 Y. S. R. 802; 25 L. R. A. 396), 488. 
 Hanks v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (147 
 
 Mass. 495; 18 N. E. Rep. 218; 35 
 
 Am. & Enp. R. Cas. 321), 1030. 
 Hanks v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (60 Mo. 
 
 App. 274), 695. 
 Hanley v. Grand Trunk R. Co. (62 N. 
 
 H. 274), 139. 
 Hanlon v. Central R. Co. (79 N. E. Rep. 
 
 846; 187 N. Y. 73), 713. 
 Hanlon v. Missouri Pacific R. Co. (104 
 
 Mo. 381; 16 S. W. Rep. 233), 1094. 
 Hanna %: Grand Trunk R. Co. (41 III. 
 
 App. 116), 48. 
 Hanna v. Granger (18 R. I. 607), 168. 
 
TABLE OP CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.'i 
 
 Hanna v. Railroad Co. (33 Ind. 113), 55. 
 Hannibal, etc., Co. v. Fox (31 Kan. 
 
 680; 3 Pac. Rep. 380; 15 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 325), 485. 
 Hannibal, etc., R. R. Co. v. Kanaley (30 
 
 Kan. 1; 17 Pac. Rep. 324), 263. 
 Hannibal, etc., R. Co. v. Martin (111 
 
 111. 219; 11 111. App. 386), 666. 
 Hanover R. Co. v. Coyle (55 Pa. St. 
 
 396), 91. 
 Hanrathy v. Northern C. R. Co. (46 Md. 
 
 280; 18 Am. Ry. Rep. 188), 349. 
 Uansell, etc., Co. v. Cfark (214 111. 399; 
 
 73 N. E. Rep. 787), 360. 
 Hansley v. Jamesville, etc., R. Co. (115 
 
 N. C. 602; 117 N. C. 565; 23 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 443; 32 L. R. A. 543), 593. 
 Hanson v. Mansfield, etc., R. Co. (38 
 
 La. Ann. Ill; 58 Am. Rep. 162), 690. 
 Hanson i', Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. (37 
 
 Minn. 355; 34 N. W. Rep. 823; 32 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 13), 1036. 
 Hard v. Vermont R. Co. (32 Vt. 473), 
 
 461. 
 Harden v. New York, etc., R. Co. (17 
 
 J. & S. [N. Y.] 503), 418. 
 Hardenburgh v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (39 Minn. 3; 38 N. W. Rep. 625; 18 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 610; 34 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 359), 690. 
 Hardin v. Ft. Worth, etc., Ry. Co. (100 
 
 S. W. Rep. 995), 669. 
 Harding v. Transfer Co. (80 Minn. 504; 
 
 83 N. W. Rep. 395), 365. 
 Hardt v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co. 
 
 (110 N. W. Rep. 427), 386. 
 Hardy v. North Carolina R. Co. (74 N. 
 
 Car. 734; IS Am. Ry. Rep. 121), 601. 
 Harkins v. Pennsylvania K. Co. (15 
 
 Phila. [Pa.] 286), 64. 
 Harkins ir. Pullman Car Co. (68 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 724), 196. 
 Harlan i\ St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (64 
 
 Mo. 480; 17 Am. Ry. Rep. 300), 1034. 
 Harley v. Aurora, etc., Ry. Co. (188 111. 
 
 App. 643), 669. 
 Harold v. Great Western R. Co. (14 L. 
 
 T. [N. S.] 440), 787. 
 Harper v, Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. (47 
 
 Mo. 680), 158. 
 Harper i'. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. (44 
 
 MTo. 488), 602. 
 Harper v. Newport News, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (Ky., IS S. W. Rep. 346; 44 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 653), 228. 
 Harper v. Pittsburg & R. Co. (68 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 831; 219 Pa. 868), 689. 
 Harper ». Railroad Co. (90 Ky. 359; 
 
 14 S. W. Rep. 346), 289. 
 Harr v. New York & H. R. R. Co. (13 
 
 N. Y. St. Rep. 227), 10. 
 Harrill v. South Carolina & G. R. Co. 
 
 (136 N. C. 601; 47 S. E. Rep. 730), 
 
 233 
 Harriil v. South Carolina Ry. Co. (132 
 
 N. Car. 665; 44 S. E. Rep. 109), 47. 
 Harriman v. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (Ohio, 32 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 37), 5. 
 Harriman v. Railroad Co. (45 Ohio St. 
 
 11: 12 N. E. Rep. 451), 25. 
 Harrington v. Los Angeles, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (140 Cal. 614), 398. 
 
 Harrington v. Railroad (104 Mo. App. 
 
 663; 78 S. W. Rep. 662), 339. 
 Harris ii. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (89 Mo. 
 
 233; 1 S. W. Rep. 325; 58 Am. Rep. 
 
 Ill), 670. 
 Harris v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (40 
 
 Mo. App. 255), 865. 
 Harris v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co. (88 Va. 
 
 560; 14 S. E. Rep. 635), 491. 
 Harrison v. Alabama Mid. R. Co. (144 
 
 Ala. 246; 40 So. Rep. 394), 243. 
 Harrison v. Central R. Co. (31 N. J. 
 
 L. 893), 139. 
 Harrison v, Denver, etc., R. Co. (7 Utah 
 
 523; 27 Pac. Rep. 728), 378. 
 Harrison v. Detroit, etc., R. Co. (79 
 
 Mich. 409; 44 N. W. Rep. 1034; 41 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 398), 500. 
 Harrison v. London, etc., R. Co. (1 C. 
 
 & E. 640), 61. 
 Harrison v. Northeastern R. Co. (82 W. 
 
 R. 336; 29 L. T. 844), 874. 
 Harrison v. Sutter, etc., R. Co. (134 
 
 Cal. 649; 66 Pac. Rep. 787; 65 L. R. 
 
 A. 608), 26. 
 Harrold v. Great Western R. Co. (14 
 
 L. T. 440), 602. 
 Harwich v. Hawes (202 111. 334; 67 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 13), 168. 
 Harshman v. Northern Pac. R, Co. (103 
 
 N. W. Rep. 412), 62. ■ 
 Hart V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (56 Iowa 
 
 166; 7 N. W. Rep. 9), 935. 
 Hart f. Devereux (41 Ohio St. 666), 997. 
 Hart V. Naumberg (123 N. Y. 641; 85 
 
 N. E. Rep. 385), 266. 
 Hart V. West Side R. Co. (86 Wis. 
 
 483; 67 N. W. Rep. 91), 732. 
 Hartan v. Eastern R. Co. (114 Mass. 
 
 44), 810. 
 Hartfield v. Roper (81 Wend. 616; 34 
 
 Am. Dec. 273), 1058. 
 Hartford Deposit Co. v. SoUitt (172 111. 
 
 888; 50 N. E. Rep. 178; 64 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 35), 120.. 
 Hartford v. Northern Pac. R. Co. (91 
 
 Wis. 374; 64 N. W. Rep. 1033), 887. 
 Hartman v. Chicago G. W. Ry. Co. (110 
 
 N. W. Rep. 10), 987. 
 Hartman v. Clark (9S N. Y. S. 314; 104 
 
 App. Div. 62), 33. 
 Hartwell v. Northern Pacific Co. (6 Da- 
 kota 463; 41 N. W. Rep. 738; 3 L. 
 
 R. A. 342; 37 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 635), 848. 
 Hartwig v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (49 
 
 Wis. 358; 1 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 65), 
 
 700. 
 Harty v. Central R. Co. (48 N. Y. 471), 
 
 951. 
 Hartzig v. Lehigh Valley R. Co. (154 
 
 Pa. St. 364; 26 Atl. Rep. 310), 787. 
 Harvet v. New York, etc., R. Co. (33 
 
 N. Y. S. R. 817; 67 Hun 689), 469. 
 Harvey v. Eastern R. Co. (116 Mass. 
 
 269), 783. 
 Harvey v. New York, etc., R. Co. (19 
 
 Hun [N. Y.] 566), 94. 
 Harvey v, Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. (74 
 
 Mo. 541), 850. 
 Haskin v. New York, etc., R. Co. (86 
 
 Barb. 129; 56 N. Y. 608), 483. 
 
 IXXXY 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.'\ 
 
 Haskins v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (58 
 
 Mo. 302), 71. ^ , tj /- 
 
 Hassenger v. Michigan Central «• t-o- 
 
 (48 Mich. 806; 12 N. W. Rep. 155; 
 
 42 Am. Rep. 470; 6 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Gas. 59), 392. 
 Hathaway v. East Tennessee, etc., K. Co. 
 
 (29 Fed. Rep. 489), 133. 
 Hathaway ». Railway Co. (51 Micli. 253; 
 
 16 N. W. Rep. 634), 268. 
 Hatter f. Illinois C. K. Co. (69 Miss. 
 
 042; 13 So. Rep. 887), SJT!. 
 Haughey ». Pittsburg Rys. Co. (210 Fa. 
 
 367; 59 Atl. Rep. 112>. 68. 
 Haurahan v. Manhattan, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (24 N. Y. S. R. 790; 63 Hun 420; 
 
 ISO N. Y. 688; 29 N. E. Rep. 
 
 Hauser'o. Central R. Co.. (147 Pa. St. 
 
 440; 23 Atl. Rep. 766), 408. 
 Havens v. Rhode Island; ete., R. Co. (26 
 
 R. I. 48; S8 Atl'. Rep. 247), 92. 
 Hawiland f. Kansas Gityj, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (172 Mo. 106; 72 S. W. Rep. 615), 
 
 339. 
 Hawes- v. Boston Etevated Ry. Co. (78 
 
 N. E. Rep. 480), 651. „ , „„ 
 
 Hawes v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (103 
 
 Mo. 60; 15 S. W. Rep. 751), 164. 
 Hawk V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (147 111. 
 
 399; 35 N. E. Rep. 139), 388. 
 Hawk V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (108 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 1119), 562. „ ,„ . 
 
 Hawk K. Pennsylvania R. Co. (Fa., 11 
 
 Atl. Rep. 459; 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 268), 321. . „ ■ 
 
 Ha.wkin9 v. Central of Georgia R. Co. 
 
 (119 Ga. 159; 46 S. E. Rep. 82), 241. 
 Ha-wley v. Chicago, etc, R. Co. 71 Iowa 
 
 717; 29 N. WT Rep. 787), 413. 
 Haworth v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (94 Mo. App. 2ai&; e» S. W. Rep. 
 
 Ill), 495v 
 Haxton v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (190 
 
 Mo. 53; 88 S. .W. Rep. 714), 171. 
 Hayden v. Brooklyn Electric R. Co. (44 
 
 N. Y. S. R. 377; 17 N. Y. Supp. 352), 
 
 148. 
 Hayden v. Missonrt Pacific Hy. Co. (124 
 
 Mo. 566;. 28 &. W. Kep. 74), 1006. 
 Hayden v. Ry. Co. (1^4 Mo. 5e7)v 115. 
 Hayden v. Sioux Cits, etc, H. Co. 
 
 (Iowa, 48 N. W. Rep. 733), 105. 
 Hayes v. ChfcM^, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. 
 
 (Wis., Ill ^I^ W. Rep. 471), 206. 
 Hayes v. M. C. R. ©». (Ill U. S. 228; 
 
 15 Am. & Ene. R, Cas. 394), 38. 
 Hayes v. New York, etc., R. Co. (105 
 
 N. Y. S. 592), *92:.. 
 Hayes v. New York, etc., Ry. Co. (187 
 
 Mass. 182; 72 N. E. Rep. 841), 255. 
 Hayes v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (15 Mo. 
 
 App. 583), 180. 
 Hayes v. Western, etc., R. Co. (3 Cush. 
 
 IMasa] 270), 491. 
 Hayne v. Union Ry. Co. (189 M!as9. 651; 
 
 76 N, E. Rep. 219;. S L. R. A. [N. S.] 
 
 605), 740. 
 Hays, ». (^inesville, etc, R. Co. (70 Tex. 
 
 602 i 8 S. W. Rep. 491; 34 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 97), 398. 
 
 Hays' V. Wabash R. Co. (51 Mo. App. 
 
 438), 705. ^ ^^ 
 
 Haywood v. Galveston, etc., R. Co. (Tex., 
 
 85 S. W. Rep. 433), 35L 
 Ha,ywood v. New York, etc., R. Co. (35 
 
 N. Y. S. R. 748; 59 Hun 617; 13 N. 
 
 Y. Supp. 177; 128 N. Y. 596), 926. 
 Hayzel v. Columbia, etc., R. Co. (19 
 
 App. Cas. [D. C] 359), 364. 
 Hazard v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (1 Bliss. 
 
 U. S. 603), 769. 
 Head ». Georgia, etc., R. Co. (79 Ga. 
 
 358), 17. , 
 
 Heald v. Thing (45 Me. 395), 101. 
 Healey v. Buffalo, etc., R. Co. (97 N. 
 
 Y. S. 801: 111 App. Div. 618), 267. 
 Heaney v.. Long Island R. Co. (9 N. 
 
 Y. S. R. 707), 981. 
 Heaney v. Long Island R. Co. (112 N. 
 
 Y. 122; 19 S. E. Rep. 422; 37 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 529), 940. 
 Hearne v. Southern Pacific R. Co. (50 
 
 Cal. 482; 12 Am. Ry. Rep. 181), 996. 
 Heath v. Glenn Falls R. Co. (90 Hun 
 
 560; 71 N. Y. S. R. 29; 36 N. Y. 
 
 Supp. 22). 806. 
 Heaton v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (66 
 
 Mo. App. 479), 779; 
 Heaven v. Pender (112 B. D. 507), 4. 
 Hebblethwaite v. Old Colony St. Ry. Co. 
 
 (78 N. E. Rep. 477), 576. 
 Hecht V. Ohio, etc., R. Co. (132 Ind. 
 
 807; S2 N. E. Rep. 302; 64 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 75), 69. 
 Heddlea v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (77 Wis. 
 
 228: 46 N. W. Rep. 115), 883. 
 Heddles v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (74 
 
 Wis. 239; 42 N. W. Rep. 237; 39 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 645), 933. 
 Hedge v. WjUiams (131 CaL 455; 63 
 
 Pac. Rep. 721; 82 Am. St. Rep. 366), 
 
 298. 
 Hedges v. Kansas City (18 Mo. App. 
 
 62), 1056. 
 Hedbim v. Holy Terror Min. Co. (S. D., 
 
 92 N. W. Rep. 31), 108. 
 Hedrick v. Ilwaco, etc., R. Co. (4 Wash. 
 
 400), 62. 
 Hedrick v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (195 
 
 Mo. 104; 93 S. W. Rep. 268), 331. 
 Heffermaic v. Northern Pac. R. Co, (45 
 
 Minn. 471; 48 N. W. Rep. 1), 327. 
 Heffernon v. North Pac R. Co. (45 
 
 Minn. 471; 48 N. W. Rep. 1), 343. 
 Heifinger v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (43 Minn. 603; 46 N. W. Rep. 1131), 
 
 413. 
 Heseman v. Western R. Co. (13 N. Y. 
 
 9; 16 Barb. S6S>, 640. 
 Heiddberg v. St; Francois County (100 
 
 Mo. 74\ 959. 
 Heine w. (Chicago, etc., R. Co. (68 Wis. 
 
 525; 17 N. W. Rep. 420), 484. 
 Heinlein v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (147 
 
 Mass. 136)', 869. 
 Heinmiller v. Winston (107 N. W. Rep. 
 
 1102; 6 L. R. A. [N. S.] 150), 903. 
 Heinzle v. Metropolitan R. Co. (182 Mo. 
 
 568; 81 S. W. Rap. 948), 989. 
 Heiter v. East St. Louis, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (63 Mo. App. 331), 1078. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 IReferences are to sections.] 
 
 Heldmaier v. Cobbs (195 lU. 178; 62 N. 
 
 E. Rep. S53), 827. 
 Hielknuth v. Katscbbe C3S IlL App. 
 
 21), 92. 
 Helton V. Alabama Midland R. Co. (97 
 
 Ala. 275; 13 So. Rep^ 276). 75. 
 Hemmingway v, Chicago, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (67 Wis. 668; 31 N. W. Rep. 268; 28 
 
 Am. & Eng, R. Cas. 216), 72*. 
 Hempsey v. Railroad (88 Mo. 348),. 124. 
 Hemp&tock v. Lackawanna, etc., Co. (90 
 
 N. y. S. eeS: 98 App. Div. 332), 167. 
 Henderson v. Coons (31 1-Uw App. T5), 
 
 325. 
 Henderson v. Dade, etc., Co. (100 Ga. 
 
 568; 28 S. E. Rep. 851; 40 L. R. A. 
 
 95), 28. 
 Henderson v.. (Jalvestoii, etc., R, Co. (38 
 
 S. W. Rep. 1136), 623. 
 Henderson v. Kansas City (177 Mo. 477; 
 
 76 S. W. Rep. i045), 78. 
 Henderson v. Kentucky, etc., R. Co. (86 
 
 Ky. 389; 5 S. W. Rep. 975), 68. 
 Henderson v. Railroad Co. (86 Ky. 389; 
 
 5 S. W. Rep. 875), 64. 
 Henderson v. Texas, etc., R. Co. (42 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 1030), 647. 
 Henderson v. Walker (55 Ga. 481), 519. 
 Hendricks v. W. & A. R. Co. (58 Ga. 
 
 467), 451. 
 Hendrickson v. Great Northern R, Co. 
 
 (49 Minn. 245; 51 N. W. Rep. 1044), 
 
 954. 
 Hendrix v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (45 
 
 Kan. 377; 25 Pac. Rep. 893), 1087. 
 Hennesy v. Brooklyn, etc., R. Co. (73 
 
 Hun 569; 26 N. Y. Supp. 321>, 10S6. 
 Hennessey v. Brooklyn City R. Coi (8 
 
 App. Div. 206; 39 N. Y. Supp. 805), 
 
 1058. 
 Hennessy v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (173 
 
 Mo. 86; 73 $. W. Rep. 162), 209. 
 Henry v. Bond (34 Fed. Rep. 101), 835. 
 Henry v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. (67 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 426), 4. 
 Henry v. Grand Avenue R. Co. (113 Mo. 
 
 525; 21 S. W. Rep. 814), 990. 
 Henry v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. (49 
 
 Mich. 495; 13 N. W. Rep. 838; 8 Am. 
 
 6 Eng. R. Cas. 110), 468. 
 
 Henry v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (76 Mo. 
 
 288; 43 Am. Rep. 762), 1105. 
 Henry v. Sioux City, etc., R. Co. (66 
 
 Iowa 62; 23 N. W. Rep. 860; 21 Ani. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 644), 348. 
 Henry v. Southern, etc., R. Co. (50 Cal. 
 
 183), 89^ 
 Henry v. Staten Island R. Co. (81 N. Y. 
 
 373; 2 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. OO'), 500. 
 Henry v. Waibash R. Co. (109 Mo. 488; 
 
 19 S. W. Rep. 839), 471. 
 Henson v. Armour, etc., Co. (Mo., 88 
 
 S. W. Rep. 166), 319. 
 Henze v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (71 Mo. 
 
 636), 1016. 
 Herbert v. Delaware,, etc., R. Co. (136 
 
 N. Y. 655; 32 N. E. Rep. 1016; 49 
 
 N. Y. S. R. 916; 41 N. Y. S. R. 860; 
 
 62 Hun 618: 16 N. Y. Supp. 561), 142. 
 Herbert v. Mound City, etc., Co. (90 
 
 Mo. App. 305), 308. 
 Herbert v. Northern Pac. R. Co. (3 Dak. 
 
 38; 13 N. W. Rep. 349; 8 Am^, & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 85), 321, 
 Hermann v. New York, etc, R. Co. (137 
 
 N. Y. 568; 3S N. E.. Rep. 337), 
 
 946. 
 Herrick v. Minneapolis,^ etc., R. Co. (31 
 
 Minn. 11), 48. 
 Herring v. Galveston & Ry, Co. (108 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 977), 562. 
 Herring v. Wabash R/Co. (80 Mo. App. 
 
 568), 950. 
 Herring v. Wilmington, etc., R. Co. (10 
 
 Ired. [No. Car.] 402.; 51 Am. Dec. 
 
 396), 1084. 
 Hershey. v. Mill Creek Township (Pa., 
 
 9 AtL Rep. 45Z; 6 Sadler 469), 1039. 
 Hesse v. National, etc., Co. (66 N. J. 
 
 L. 658; 52- Atl. Rep. SS4), 310. 
 Hestorwille Pass, R. Co. v. Connell (88 
 
 Pa. St. 520), 1084. 
 Hetherington v. Northeastern R. Co. (L. 
 
 R., 9 Q. B. D. 160; 6 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 490J, 188. 
 Hewitt V. Flint, etc., R. Co. (67 Mich. 
 
 61; 34 N. W. Rep. 659; 31 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 249), 406. 
 Hicke V. Taffie (99 N. Y. 204; 1 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 685; 52 Am. Rep. 19), 275. 
 Hickey v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (14 Al- 
 len 429), 692. 
 Hickey v. Taafe (105 N. Y. 26), 80. 
 Hickman v. Missouri Paciiic Ry. Co. (22 
 
 Mo. App. 344), 806. 
 Hickman v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (91 
 
 Mo. 433; 4 S. W. Rep. 127), 788. 
 Hickman v. Union Depot R. Co. (47 
 
 Mo. App. 65), 10S4. 
 Hicks V. Citizens R. Co. (124 Mo. 115; 
 
 27 S. W. Rep. 542; 25 L. R. A. 508), 
 
 1056. 
 Hicks V. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (101 
 
 Mo. 36; 13 S. W. Sep. 946), 996. 
 Hicks V. Missouri Pacific Hy. Co. (46 
 
 Mo. App. 304), 1095. 
 Hicks V. Pacific H. Co. (64 Mo. 430; 17 
 
 Am. Ry. Rep. 273), 877. 
 Hicks V. Southern Ry. Co. (63 S. C. 
 
 559; 41 a E. Rep. 753), 381. 
 Higgins V. Central R. Co. (155 Mass. 
 
 176; 29 N. E. Rep. 534; 48 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 512'), 47. 
 Higgins V. Cherokee, etc., R. Co. (73 
 
 Ga. 149; 27 Am.. & Eng. R. Cas. 218), 
 
 799. 
 Higgins V. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (36 
 
 Mo. 418), 608. 
 Higgins V. Missouri Pacific R. Co. (104 
 
 Mo, 413; 16 S. W. Rep. 409), 483. 
 Higgins, etc., v. O'Keefe (79 Fed. Rep. 
 
 900; 51 tr. S. App. 74; 25 C. C. A. 
 
 220) „ S07. 
 Higgins V. St. Louis & Sub. Ry. Co. (197 
 
 Mo. 301; 95i S. W. Rep^ 863), 507. 
 Higgins V. Traction Co. (89 N. Y. S. 
 
 76; 96 App. Div. 69>, 100. 
 Higgins V. Turnpike Co. (46 N. Y. 27), 
 
 735. 
 High V. Carotina R. Co. (112 No. Car. 
 
 386; 17 S. E. Rep. 79), 1094. 
 Highland Avenue R. Co. v. Burt (92 
 
 Ala. 291; 9 So. Rep. 410; 48 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 56), 723. 
 
 Ixxxvii 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.'] 
 
 Highland Ave. R. Co. v. Miller (120 
 
 . Ala. 535), 369. 
 
 Highland Avenue R. Co. ,v. Sampson (91 
 
 Ala. 660; 8 So. Rep. 778), 1011. 
 Highland Ave. R. Co. v. Waters (91 
 
 Ala. 435; 8 So. Rep. 357), 404. 
 Highland Avenue R. Co. v. Winn (93 
 
 Ala. 306; 9 So. Rep. 509), 788. 
 Higley v. Gilmer (3 Mont. 90), 1076. 
 Hill V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (78 N. H. 
 
 518; 57 Atl. Rep. 924), 90. 
 Hill v. Chicago City Ry. Co. (126 111. 
 
 App. 152), 834. 
 Hill V. Gust (55 Ind. 45), 308. 
 Hill V. Lake Shore, etc., Ry. Co. (22 
 
 Ohio Cir. Ct Rep. 291; 12 O. C. D. 
 
 241), 264. 
 Hill ■a. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (9 Heisk. 
 
 823; 19 Am. Ry. Rep. 400), 1080. 
 Hill v. Port Royal, etc., R. Co. (31 So. 
 
 Car. 393; 10 S. E. Rep. 91; 39 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 607; 5 L. R. A. 349), 907. 
 Hill V. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. (109 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 523), 708. 
 Hill V. Scott (38 Mo. App. 370), 119. 
 Hill V. Southern Pac. R. Co. (23 Utah 
 
 94; 63 Pac. Rep. 814), 245. 
 Hill V. Street Ry. Co. (109 N. Y. 239), 
 
 121. 
 Hillman v. Georgia R., etc., Co. (56 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 68; 126 Ga. 814), 749. 
 Hillman v. Gray's Point Ter. Ry. Co. 
 
 (99 Mo. App. 271; 73 S. W. Rep. 
 
 220), 149. 
 Hilts V. Railway Co. (65 Mich. 437; 21 
 
 N. W. Rep. 878), 85. 
 Hilz V, Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (101 
 
 Mo. 36; IS S. W. Rep. 946), 951. 
 Himrod, etc., Co. 'J. Clark (99 111. App. 
 
 332; 197 111. 514), 34. 
 Hinkle v. Richmond, etc., R. Co. (109 
 
 No. Car. 472; 13 S. E. Rep. 884), 999. 
 Hinton v. Dibbin (2 Ad. & El. [N. S.] 
 
 661), 15. 
 Hinzeman v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. 
 
 (199 Mo. 66), 92. 
 Hipsley v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (88 
 
 Mo. 348; 27 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 287), 94. 
 Hirsch t/. New York, etc., R. Co. (6 N. 
 
 Y. Supp. 162; 63 Hun 633; 125 N. 
 
 Y. 701), 632. 
 Hirschkovitz v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (138 
 
 Fed. Rep. 438), 71. 
 Hissong V. Richmond, etc., R. Co. (91 
 
 Ala. 514; 8 So. Rep. 776), 510. 
 Hite V. Metropolitan R. Co. (130 Mo. 
 
 137; 31 S. W. Rep. 262; 32 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 33; 51 Am. St. Rep. 565), 641. 
 Hittie V. Republican Valley R. Co. (19 
 
 Neb. 620; 29 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 586), 292. 
 Hixson V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (80 Mo. 
 
 336), 1019. 
 Hoag V. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. (85 
 
 Pa. St. 293), 23. 
 Hoag V. New York, etc., R. Co. (Ill 
 
 N. Y. 202; 18 N. E. Rep. 648). 1056. 
 .Hoar V. Maine Centra] R. Co. (70 Me. 
 
 66) 652. 
 Hobbi'tt V. London, etc., R. Co. (4 Exch. 
 
 254), 278. 
 Hobbs V. Atlantic, etc., R. Co. (107 N. 
 
 Ixxxviii 
 
 C. 1; 12 S. E. Rep. 124; 44 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 592), 492. 
 Hobbs V. Eastern R. Co. (66 Me. 572; 
 
 19 Am. Ry. Rep. 210), 206. 
 Hobbs V. L. & S. W. Ry. Co. (L. R., 10 
 
 Q. B. Ill), 39. 
 Hobbs V. McLean (117 U. S. 567; 6 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 870), 858. 
 Hoben ij. Burlington, etc., R. Co. (20 
 
 Iowa 662), 475. 
 Hobson V. New Mexico, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (Ariz., 11 Pac. Rep. 546; 28 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 360), 479. 
 Hocker v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (96 
 
 S. W. Rep. 526), 1094. 
 Hodges V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (71 
 
 Mo. 50), 962. 
 Hodges V. Southern Pac. Co. (86 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 620), 557. 
 Hodges V. Transit Co. (107 No. Car. 
 
 576; 12 S. E. Rep. 897), 781. 
 Hodgkins v. Eastern R. Co. (119 Mass. 
 
 419; 9 Am. Ry. Rep. 271), 499. 
 Hodnett v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (156- 
 
 Mass. 86; 30 N. E. Rep. 224), 70. 
 Hoes V. New York, etc., R. Co. (77 N. 
 
 Y. S. 117; 73 App. Div. 363), 69. 
 Hoff V. Shockley (122 Iowa 720; 98 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 573; 101 Am. St. Rep. 289; 
 
 64 L. R. A. 638), 278. 
 Hoffbauer v. Davenport, etc., R. Co. (52 
 
 Iowa 342; 3 N. W. Rep. 121), 658. 
 Hoffman v. Fitchburg, etc., R. Co. (67 
 
 Hun [N. Y.] 581; 61 N. Y. S. R. 
 
 245; 22 N. Y. Supp. 463), 1019. 
 Hoffman v. Foundry Co. (51 Pac. Rep. 
 
 385), 146. 
 Hoffman v. Metropolitan, etc., R. Co. (51 
 
 Mo. App. 273), 104. 
 Hoffman v. New York, etc., R. Co. (87 
 
 N. Y. 25; 41 Am. Rep. 337; 4 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 637), 1088. 
 Hoffman v. New York, etc., R. Co. (75 
 
 N. Y. 605; 13 Hun 589), 633. ^ 
 Hoffman v. Northern Pac. R. Co. (45 
 
 Minn. 53; 47 N. W. Rep. 312), 176. 
 Hofnagle v. New York, etc., R. Co. (56 
 
 N. Y. 608), 485. 
 Hofnauer v. White, etc., Co. (186 Mass. 
 
 47; 70 N. E. Rep. 1038), 269. 
 Hogan V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (59 Wis. 
 
 139; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 439; 17 
 
 N. W. Rep. 632), 162. 
 Hogan V. Citizens Ry. Co. (150 Mo. 36; 
 
 51 S. W. Rep. 473), 404. 
 Hogan V. Northern Pacific Co. (53 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 619; 63 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 384), 312. 
 Hogart V. Evansville, etc., R. Co. (3 
 
 Ind. App. 437; 29 N. E. Rep. 941), 
 
 1021. 
 Hogue V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (32 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 365), 910. 
 Holbrook v. Aldrich (168 Mass. 16; 46 
 
 N. E. Rep. 116; 60 Am. St. Rep. 364; . 
 
 36 L. R. A. 493), 1073. 
 Holbrook v. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (12 N. Y. 236), 699. 
 Holbrook v. Utica, etc., R. Co. (12 N. 
 
 Y. 236), 601. 
 Holden v. Fitchburg, etc., R. Co. (129 
 
 Mass. 268; 37 Am. Rep. 343; 2 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 94), 467. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.'] 
 
 Holden v. James (11 Mass. 404), 504. 
 Holden v. Missouri, etc., R. Co. (177 Mo. 
 
 456; 76 S. W. Rep. 1045), 1039. 
 Hole V. Sittingbourne, etc., R. Co. (6 
 
 H. & N. 488; 30 L. J. Exch. 81; 3 L. 
 
 T. Rep. [N. S.] 750), 278. 
 Holland o. Brown (13 Saw. 284). 199. 
 Holland v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (18 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 243; 6 McCrary [U. S.] 649), 
 
 408. 
 Holland v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (109 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 19), 977. 
 Holland v. Missouri Pacific- Ry. Co. (210 
 
 Mo. 338; 113 S. W. Rep. 498), 1006.' 
 Holland ». St. Louis, etc.. R. Co. (105 
 
 Mo. App. 117; 79 S. W. Rep. 508), 
 
 655. 
 Holland v. Southern Pacific R. Co. (100 
 
 Cal. 240; 34 Pac. Rep. 666), 492. 
 Holland v, Tennessee, etc., R. Co. (91 
 
 Ala. 444; 8 So. Rep. 524), 482. 
 Hollins V. New Orleans R. Co. (44 So» 
 
 Rep. 159), 947. 
 Hollman v. Houston, etc.,.: R, Co. (2 Tex, 
 
 Unrep. Cas. 557), 778. 
 HoUoway v. Kansas C^ity (184 Mo. 35, 
 
 39), 101. 
 Hollweg V. Telephone Co. (195 Mo. 149, 
 
 157; 93 S. W. Rep. 262), 476. 
 Holly V. Atlantic?, etc, R. Co. (61 Ga. 
 
 215), 749. 
 Holmes v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (Neb., 
 
 103 N. W. Rip. 77), 364. 
 Holmes v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (69 Mo. 
 
 636), 845. 
 Holmes v. Leadbetter (95 Mo. App. 419; 
 
 69 S. W. Rep. 23), 137. 
 Holmes v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (105 
 
 S. W. Rep. 624), 874. 
 Holmes v. Oregon, etc., R. Co. (6 Sawy. 
 
 tU. S.) 262; B Fed. Rep. 76), 805. 
 Holmes v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (66 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 412), 959. 
 Holmes v. Southern Pacific R. Co. (97 
 
 Cal. 161; 31 Pac. Rep. 834), 398. 
 Holstine v. Oregon, etc., R. (io. (8 Ore- 
 gon 164), 451. 
 Holt V. Southwest Ry. (84 Mo. App. 
 
 462), 714. 
 Holton V. London, etc., R. Co. (1 C. & 
 
 E. 548), 640. 
 Hoitz V. Railroad Co. (69 Minn. 524), 
 
 169. 
 Holwerson v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (157 
 
 Mo. 216; 57 S. W. Rep. 770; 50 L. R. 
 
 A. 850), 808. 
 Holyoke w. Grand Trunk R. Co. (48 N. 
 
 H. 541), 83. 
 Holzab V. New Orleans, etc., R. Co. (38 
 
 La. Ann. 185; 58 Am. Rep. 177), 1045. 
 Honeyman v. Oregon, etc., R. Co. (13 
 
 Oregon 352; 25 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 380), 849. 
 Hood V. Lehigh Valley R. Co. (78 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 1105), 411. ■ 
 Hooghkirk v. Delaware, etc.. Canal Co. 
 
 (63 How. Pr. [N. Y.] 328), 206. 
 Hook V. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (162 
 
 Mo. 569; 63 S. W. Rep. 360), 1035. 
 Hooker v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (76 Wis. 
 
 642; 44 N. W. Rep. 1085; 41 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 498), 92. 
 
 Hooper v. Bacon (64 Atl. Rep. 950), 29. 
 Hooper v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (81 Me. 
 
 260; 17 Atl. Rep. 64; Lindeman v. 
 
 New York, etc., R. Co. (42 Hun 306; 
 
 3 N. Y. S. R. 731), 1002. 
 Hooper v. Johnstown, etc., R. Co. (36 
 
 N. Y. S. R. 503; 13 N. Y. Supp. 151; 
 
 59 Hun 121; 128 N. Y. 613; 28 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 262), 1086. 
 Hooper v. London, etCy R. Co. (50 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 103; 45 J. P. 223; 29 W. R. 
 
 241; 43 L. T. 570), 813. 
 Hoosier, etc., Co. v. McCain (133 Ind. 
 
 231; 31 N. E. Rep. 956), 322. 
 Hoover v. Beech Creek R. Co. (154 Pa. 
 
 St. 362; 26 Atl. Rep. 315), 491. 
 Hoover v. Chicago R. I. & C. R. Co. 
 
 (Tex., 89 S. W. Rep. 1084), 266. 
 Hopkins v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co. (36 
 
 N. H. 9), 177. 
 Hopper V. Denver & R. G. Co. (155 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 273), 576. 
 Horn V. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. (4 C. 
 
 C. A. 346; 54 Fed. Rep. 301; 6 U. S. 
 
 App. 381), 1025. 
 Horn V. Southern Ry. (58 S. E. Rep. 
 
 963), 586. 
 Hornsby v. Eddy (56 Fed. Rep. 461), 
 
 523. 
 Horstein v. United Railways Co. (1'95 
 
 Mo. 440; 92 S. W. Rep. 884; 97 Mo. 
 
 App. 271), 769. 
 Horton v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. (58 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 99'3), 482. 
 Hosic V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (75 Iowa 
 
 683; 37 N. W. Rep. 936), 373. 
 Hosmer v. Old Colony R. Co. (156 
 
 Mass. 506; 31 N. E. Rep. 652), 564. 
 Hot Springs, etc., R. Co. v. Delaney (65 
 
 Ark. 177; 46 S. W. Rep. 351), 729. 
 Hot Springs v. Hildreth (72 Ark. 572; 
 
 82 S. W. Rep. 246), 91. 
 Hough V. Texas, etc., R. Co. (100 U. S. 
 
 213; 21 Am. Ry. Rep. 461), 475. 
 Houghkirk, etc., R. Co. (92 N. Y. 219; 
 
 44 Am. Rep. 370), 955. 
 Houghton V. ' Loma Prieta Co. (93 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 377), 292. 
 Houser v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (60 
 
 Iowa 230; 14 N. W. Rep. 778; 46 
 
 Am. Rep. 66; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 500), 522. 
 Housner v. Huston, etc., R. Co. (27 N. 
 
 Y. Supp. 365; 57 N. Y. S. R. 628), 
 
 198. 
 Housman v. Hope (20 Mo. App. 193), 
 
 131. 
 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Baker (57 Tex. 
 
 419; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 667), 62. 
 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Barranger (Tex., 
 
 14 S. W. Reo. 242), 348. 
 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Boozer (2 Tex. 
 
 Unrep. Cas. 452), 1060. 
 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Brin (77 Tex. 
 
 174; 13 S. W-. Rep. 886), 675. 
 Houston V. Brush (66 Vt. 331; 29 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 380), 119. 
 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Clemmons (55 
 
 Tex. 88; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 396), 
 
 803. 
 Houston R. Co. v. Cluck (Tex., 84 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 852), 96. 
 
 Ixxxix- 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED, 
 
 [References are to sections.] 
 
 Houston, etc., R. Co. «/. Conrad (62 
 
 Tex. 687), 401. 
 Houston, etc., E. Co. v. Corbett (49 Tex. 
 
 573), 446. 
 Houston, etc., R. Co. z". Cowser (57 Tex. 
 
 395), 178. 
 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Dial (135 Ala. 
 
 168; 33 So. Rep. 268), 154. 
 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Fanning (T«x., 
 
 93 S. W. Rep. 344), 273. 
 Houston, etc., R. Co. i: Fowler (56 Tex. 
 
 452; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 504), 349. 
 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Gaither (Tex., 
 
 43 S. W. Rep. 866), 210. 
 Houston V. Gilmore (62 Tex. 391), 471. 
 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Hampton (64 
 
 Tex. 427; 88 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 891), 
 
 563. 
 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Harnett (Tex., 
 
 48 S. W. Rep. 773), 249. 
 Houston, etc., K. Co. v. Hollis (2 Tex. 
 
 Civ. App. 169), 187. 
 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Johnson (103 
 
 S. W. Rep. 239), 728. 
 Houston, etc, R. Co. v. Leslie (57 Tex. 
 
 83; 9 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 407), 170. 
 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. McNamara (59 
 
 Tex. 855), 372. 
 Houston, etc., R. Co. i/. Meador (50 
 
 Tex. 77), 282. 
 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Miller (51 Tex. 
 
 270), 301. 
 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Moore <49 Tex. 
 
 31; 30 Am. Rep. 98), 561. 
 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Myers (55 Tex. 
 
 110; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 114), 343. 
 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Nixon (52 Tex. 
 
 19), 950. 
 Houston, etc., R. Co. v, Norris (Tex., 
 
 41 S. W. Rep. 708), 608. 
 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. O'Hara (64 Tex. 
 
 600), 352. 
 Houston, etc., Ry. Co. v. Oram (49 Tex. 
 
 341), 268. 
 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Patton (Tex., 9 
 
 S. W. Rep. 176), 86. 
 Houston & G. N. R. Co. v. Randall (50 
 
 Tex. 261), 164. 
 Houston R. Co. v. Reichart (87 Tex. 
 
 539; 29 S. W. Rep. 1040), 1050. 
 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Richards (59 
 
 Tex. 373; 18 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 70), 
 
 1097. 
 Houston, etc., R. Co. „. Rider (67 Tex. 
 
 267), 465. 
 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Schmidt (61 
 
 Tex. 888; 21 Am. & En«. R. Cas. 
 
 345), 781. 
 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Simpkins (54 
 
 Tex. 615; 6 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 11), 
 
 1088. 
 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Smith (52 Tex. 
 
 178), 388. 
 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Stewart (92 
 
 Tex. 540; 50 S. W. Rep. 333), 488. 
 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Talley (Tex., 39 
 
 S. W. Rep. 206), 493. 
 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Turner (Tex., 
 
 91 S. W. Rep. 562), 273. 
 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Turner (Tex., 
 
 98 S. W. Rep. 1074), 386. 
 
 XC 
 
 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Van Bayless (1 
 
 Tex. Civ. App. 247), 285. 
 Houston V. Vicksburg, etc., R. Co. (39 
 
 La. Ann. 796; 8 So. Rep. 662; 34 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 76), 661. 
 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Wilson (60 Tex. 
 
 148), 957. 
 Houts V. Transit Co. (108 Mo. App. 
 
 686; 84 S. W. Rep.' 161), 79. 
 Hovarka v. Transit Co. (191 Mo. 441; 
 
 90 S. W. Kep. 1142), 115. 
 Hoveland v. Marine Ry., etc., Co. (41 
 
 Wash. 164; 82 Pac. Rep. 1090), 382. 
 Hover v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (25 Ohio 
 
 St. 667), 47. 
 Hovins V, 'Cincinnati, etc., R. Co, (107 
 
 S. W. Rep. 814), 989. 
 Howard v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. (68 
 
 Atl. Rep. 848; 219 Pa. 358), 1036. 
 Howard v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. (28 
 
 Ky. L. R. 891; 90 S. W. Rep. 950), 
 
 865. 
 Howard, etc., Co. v. Davis (76 Tex. 630; 
 
 13 S. W. Rep. 665), 184. 
 Howard v. Delaware, etc., Co. (40 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 195; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 473), 
 
 801. 
 Howard v. Denver, etc., R. Co. (86 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 837; 84 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 448), 
 
 492. 
 Howard v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. (207 U. 
 
 5. 463; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141), 447. 
 Howard v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (41 
 
 Kan. 403; 81 Pac. Rep. 867; 37 Am. 
 
 6. Eng. R. Cas. 558), 1028. 
 Howard v. Legg (110 Ind. 479; 11 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 612), 203. 
 Howard v. McCabe (112 N. W. Rep. 
 
 305), 192. 
 Howard v. Northern Central R. Co. (49 
 
 Hun 605; 1 N. Y. Supp. 628), 1007. 
 Howard v. Railway Co. (173 Mo. 524; 73 
 
 S. W. Rep. 467), 119. 
 Howard v. Savannah, etc., R. Co. (84 
 
 Ga. 711; 11 S. E. Rep. 452), 134. 
 Howd V. Mississippi R. Co. (50 Miss. 
 
 178), 354. 
 Howe V. Finch (11 Q. B. Div. 187), 
 
 512. 
 Howe v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. (62 
 
 Minn. 71; 64 N. W. Rep. 102; 54 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 616; 30 L. R. A. 684), 1056. 
 Howe V. Northern Pac. R. Co. (Texas, 
 
 70 S. W. Rep. 33S), 116. 
 Howland v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. (54 
 
 Wis. 226; 11 N. W. Rep. 529; 5 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 678), 469. 
 Howland v. Railroad (115 Cal. 487; 47 
 
 Pac. Rep. 225), 95. 
 Hoye V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (67 Wis. 
 
 1; 89 N. W. Rep. 646), 1036. 
 Hoye V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (68 Wis. 
 
 666; 83 N. W. Rep. 14; 19 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 347), 953. 
 Hoye V. Great Nofthern Ry. Co. (120 
 
 Fed. Rep. 712), 889. 
 Hoyt V. New York, etc., R. Co. (118 
 
 N. Y. 399; 83 N. E. Rep. 565), 991. 
 Hubbard v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (34 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 459), 971. 
 Huber v. La Crosse, etc., R. Co. (92 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.] 
 
 Wis. 686; 66 N. W. Rep. 708; 31 L. 
 
 R. A. 683), 28. 
 Hubener v. New Orleans, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (S3 La. Ann. 492), 692. 
 Huckshold V. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (90 
 
 Mo. 518: 8- S. W. Rep. 794; 28 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 659), 953. 
 Huckshold V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (90 
 
 Mo. 648; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 659), 
 
 960. 
 Hudson V. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 
 
 (65 S. E. Rep. 103), 28. 
 Hudson V. Ocean Steamship Co. (110 
 
 N. y. 625; 17 N. E. Rep. 342), 364. 
 Hudson ». Wabash R. Co. (.38 Mb. App. 
 
 867), S89. 
 Hudson V. Wabash R. Co. (101 Mo. 13;: 
 
 14 S. W. Rep. 16; 123 Mo. 445; 27 
 
 S. W. Rep. 717), 414. 
 Huelsenkamp v. Citizens R. Co. (37 Mo. 
 
 537; 90 Am. Dec. 399), 657. 
 HuJE V. Ames (16 Neb. 139), 19 N, W. 
 
 Rep. 623; 49 Am. Rep, 716)", 1056. 
 Huff V. Austin (46 Ohio St. 886; 21 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 864; 15 Am. Si. Rep. 613), 
 
 120. 
 Huffman v. Railway C78 Mo. .50) 261. 
 Hufford V. Grand Rapids R. Co. (64 
 
 Mich. 631; 31 N. W. Rep. 544), 659. 
 Huggart V. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (134 
 
 Mo. 673; 36 S. W. Rep. 22C), MflB. 
 Huggins V. Southern Ry. Co. (Ala., 41 
 
 So. Rep. 856), 368. 
 Hughes V. Bojjer Watts 666), 210. 
 Hughes V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. <Iowa, 
 
 65 N. W. Rep. 470), 953. 
 Hughes V. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. (39 
 
 Ohio St. 461; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 100), 283. 
 Hughes 71. Maiden, etc., R. Co. (168 
 
 Mass. 396), 145. 
 Hughes 7/. New York, etc., R. Co. (4 J. 
 
 & S. [N. Y.] 222), 74. 
 Hughes V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (127 
 
 Mo. 447; 30 S. W. Rep. 127), 677. 
 Hughes V. Winona, etc., R. Co. (27 
 
 Minn. 137; 6 N. W. Rep. 653), 399. 
 Hughson V. Richmond, etc., R. Co. (2 
 
 App. [D. C.]-98; 22 Wash. L. Kep. 
 
 815), 565. 
 Huhn V. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. <'92 
 
 Mo. 440: 4 S. W. Rep. 937; 31 Am. 
 
 & Engi R. Cas. 231), 419. 
 Hulbert v. New York, etc., R. Co. (40 
 
 N. Y. 146), 629. 
 Hulehan v. Green Bay, etc., R. Co. (68 
 
 Wis. 520; 32 N. W. Rep.~ 529), 369. 
 Hulitt V. Railroad (67 Mo. 241), 140. 
 Hull !S. Kansas City (54 Mo. 698), 393. 
 Hull V. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (Wash., 
 
 136 Fed. Rep. 163; 69 C. C. A. 151), 
 
 354. 
 Hummer's Adm'r i/. Louisville, etc., R. 
 
 Co. (108 S. W. Rep. 885), 9*7. 
 Hungerford v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (41 
 
 Mmn. 444; 43 N. W. Rep. 324; 41 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 269), 419. 
 Hunn V. Michigan, etc., R. Co. (78 Mich. 
 
 613; 44 N. W. Rep. 502; 7 L. R. A. 
 
 600; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 462), 485. 
 Hunnicutt v. Georgia, etc., R. Co. (85 
 
 Ga. 196; 11 S. E. Rep. 680), 304. 
 
 Hunt V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (26 Iowa 
 
 363), 461. 
 Hunt V. Kile (98 Fed. Rep. 49), 136. 
 Hunt V. Missouri R. Co. (14 Mo. App. 
 
 160), 050. 
 Hunt V. Pennsylvania R. Co. (51 Pa. 
 
 St. 475),, 297. 
 Hunt V. Railway Co. (14 Mo. App. 160), 
 
 119. 
 Hunter 7/. Cooperstown, etc., E. Co. (112 
 
 N. Y. 371; 19 N. E. Rep. 820; 21 
 
 N. Y. S. R. 1; 37 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 74), 784. 
 Hunter v. Railroad Co. (S. Car., 61 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 860), 647. 
 Hunter v. Stewart (47 Me. 419), 39. 
 Huntington, etc. R. Co. v. Decker (82 
 
 Pa. St. 119; 15 Am. Ry. Rep. 425), 
 
 482. 
 Huntoon v. Trumtull (12 Fed. Rep. 
 
 «44), 1QS6. 
 Huntzicker. ». Illinois Cent. R. Co. (129 
 
 Fed. Rep. 648), 223. 
 Hurlburt v. Wabash R. Co. (130 Mo. 
 
 657; 31 S. W. Rep. 1051), 229. 
 Hurley v. Brewing Co. <13 App Div. 
 
 [N v.] 167; 43 N. Y. Supp. 269), 1045. 
 Hurley - v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. (120 
 
 Mo. App. 262; 96 S. W. Rep. 714), 
 
 685. 
 Hurst V. Detroit, etc., R. Co. (84 Mich. 
 
 639; 48 N. W. Rep. 44), 198. 
 Hurst ». Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (163 
 
 Mo. 309; 63 S. W. Rep. 695), 367. 
 Hurt .V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (94 Mo. 
 
 255; 7 S. W. Eep. 1; 34 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 422), 392. 
 Hurt V. Southern R. Co. (40 Miss. 391), 
 
 656. 
 H&aton City R. Co. v. Sciacca (;80 Texas 
 
 350; 16 S. W. Rep. 31), 198. 
 Hutchins tt. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. (44 
 
 Minn. 5; 46 N. W. Rep. 79), 44. 
 Hutchinson v. York, etc., R. Co. (5 Ex. 
 
 343; 19 L. J. Ex. 296; 6 Ry. Cas. 
 
 680), 461. 
 Hutson V. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (50 
 
 Mo. App. 300), 495. 
 Hutson V. Southern California Ry. Co. 
 
 (89 Pac. Rep. 1093), 984. 
 Hyatt 7/. Hannibal & St. Joe R. Co. (19 
 ' Mo. App. 287), 274. 
 Hyde v, Missouri Pacific R. Co. (110 
 
 Mo. 272: 1.9 S. W. Rep. 488; 64 Am. 
 
 .& E-ng. R. Cas. 167), 873. 
 Hyde v. Wabasli, etc., R. Co. (61 Iowa 
 
 441; 16 N. W. Rep. 351; 47 Am. Rep. 
 
 820; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 508), 46. 
 Hydes Ferry O. v. Yates (108 Tenn. 
 
 428; 67 S. W. Rep. 69), 1055. 
 Hynson .1'. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (Texas, 
 
 86 S. W. Rep. 928), 325. 
 
 larussi v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (j55 
 
 Fed. Rep. 654), 523. 
 Ide V. Fiatcfaer (194 111. 552; 62 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 814), 387. 
 Ihl V. Forty Second St. R. Co. (47 N. 
 
 Y. 317; S Am. Ry. Rep. 409), 188. 
 
 'CI 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.'] 
 
 Hick V. Flint, etc., R. Co. (67 Mich. 632; 
 
 35 N. W. Rep. 708), 343. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Able (59 111. 131; 
 
 11 Am. Ry. Rep. 154), 790. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Ackerman (144 
 
 Fed. Rep. 959), 411. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Axley (47 111. 
 
 App. 307), 697. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Baches (55 111. 
 
 379; 1 Am. Ry. Rep. 585), 456. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Barron (5 Wall. 
 
 U. S. 90), 815. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Beard (49 111. 
 
 App. 23S), 1079. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Benton (69 HI. 
 
 174), 974. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Bentz (99 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 657; 40 C. C. A. 56), 489. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Bishop (76 Miss. 
 
 758: 25 So. Rep. 867), 500. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Brookshire (3 111. 
 
 App. 825), 451. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Browni (5 Wall. 
 
 90), 199. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. -u. Brown (107 111. 
 
 App. 512), 341. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. -u. Buckner (28 111. 
 
 299) 1012. 
 Illinois, etc.,' R. Co. i: Burton (79 S. 
 W. Rep. 602; 25 Ky. L. R. 1916), 265. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Cheek (152 Ind. 
 
 663; 53 N. E. Rep. 641), 783. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Coffee (205 111. 
 
 206: 63 N. E. Rep. 751), 157. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. (Zoley (28 Ky. 
 L. R. 336; 89 S. W. Rep. 234; 1 L. 
 R. A. [N. S.] 370), 233. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. i/. Cotter (103 S. 
 
 W. Rep. -279), 692. . 
 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. i,. Coughlin (132 
 Fed. Rep. 801; 65 C. C. A. 101), 267. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Cragin (71 111. 
 
 177), 49. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Crudup (63 Miss. 
 
 291), 851. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. i/. Cruse (96 S. W. 
 
 Rej). 821), 713. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Davenport (177 
 
 111. 110; 52 N. E. Rep. 66), 733. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Davidson (76 
 Fed. Rep. 617; 46 U. S. App. 300), 
 626. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Dick (91 Ky. 
 
 434; 15 S. W. Rep. 665), 1062. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Downs (122 111. 
 
 App. 545), 669. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Ebert (74 111. 
 
 399), 937. 
 Illinois, etc;, R. Co. v. Emerson (Miss., 
 
 40 So. Rep. 818), 341. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Frelka (110 111. 
 
 498), 229. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Glover (Ky., 71 
 
 S. W. Rep. 630), 718. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Goddard (72 111. 
 
 567), 1005. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Godfrey (71 111. 
 
 500), 1063. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. „. Hall (72 111. 
 
 222), 1095. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. i. Hamill (80 N. 
 E. Rep. 746 ;_ 226 111. 88), 973. | 
 
 xcii 
 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Hammar (85 HI. 
 
 526), 451. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. -u. Hammer (72 111. 
 
 353), 173. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Hetherington (83 
 
 IlL 610), 1065. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Hilliard (99 Ky. 
 
 684; 37 S. W. Rep. 75), 494. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Hosier (45 111. 
 
 App. 206), 492. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Houchins (28 Ky. 
 L. R. 499; 89 S. W. Rep. 530; 1 L. 
 R. A. [N. S.] 375), 233. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Hunter (70 Miss. 
 
 471; 12 So. Rep. 482), 528. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Hutchinson (47 
 
 111. 408), 1084. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Johnson (95 HI. 
 
 App. 54; 61 N. E. Rep. 334), 379. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. w. Johnson (123 111. 
 App. 300; 77 N. E. Rep. 592; 221 HI. 
 42), 719. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Johnson (77 
 Miss. 727; 28 So. Rep. 753; 51 L. R. 
 A. 837), 67. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Jones (11 111. 
 
 App. 324), 340. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Jones' Admr. 
 
 (80 S. W. Rep. 484), 269. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Keene (72 HI. 
 
 512), 492. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Kerr (125 III. 
 
 Apg. 363), 734. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Langan (76 S. 
 
 _W. Rep. 32; 85 Ky. L. R. 600), 262. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Leisure's Admr. 
 (90 S. W. Rep. 269; 88 Ky. L. R. 
 768), 260. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Lence (100 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 216), 178. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Lucas (42 So. 
 
 Rep. 607), 871. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. «-. Lutz (84 111. 
 
 598), 787. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. ». McCoIIum (122 
 
 111. App. 631), 116. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. i,. Mcintosh (80 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 494), 269. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. i,. McLeod (78 
 Miss. 334; 29 So. Rep. 76; 84 Am. St 
 Rep. 630; 52 L. R. A. 954), 1039. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. McMillion (129 
 
 111. App. 27, 37), 552. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Meacham (91 
 Tenn. 428; 19 S. W. Rep. 232), 1072. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Mercer (28 Ky. 
 
 L. R. 3; 88 S. W. Rep. 1054), 367. 
 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Minor (69 Miss. 
 
 710; 11 So. Rep. 101; 16 L. R. A. 
 
 627; 52 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 441), 747. 
 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Moffitt (67 111 
 
 431), 451. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Morris (28 Ky. 
 
 L. R. 966; 90 S. W. Rep. 979), 192. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Neer (26 111. 
 
 ApiJ. 356), 453. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Noble (142 111 
 
 578), 1063. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. North (97 III. 
 
 App. 124), 387. 
 Illinois etc., R. Co. v. Nowickiki (46 
 111. App. 666), 412. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITEDi 
 
 [Beferenoes are to sections.l 
 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. O'Connell- (160 
 
 111. 636; 43 N. E. Rep. 704), 651. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. People (143 111. 
 
 434; 33 N. E. Rep. 173), 686. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Pirtle (47 111. 
 
 App. 498), 492. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Porter (94 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 666), 563. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Prickett (109 111. 
 
 App. 468; 210 111. 140; 71 N. E. Rep. 
 
 435), 76. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Read (37 111. 
 
 484), 850. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Ring (119 111. 
 
 App. 294), 480. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Ruska (200 111. 
 
 2S0: 65 N. E. Rep. 734), 308. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Satkowski (107 
 
 111. App. 524), 341. 
 Illinois, etc., R, Co. v, Simmons (38 111, 
 
 242) 455. 
 Illinois', etc.', R. Co. </. Slater (129 111. 
 
 91; 21 N. E. Rep. 675; 28 111. App. 
 
 73), 949. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Smiesni (104 111. 
 
 App. 194), 31. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Smith (111 111. 
 
 App. 177), 100. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Stewart (Ky., 58 
 
 S. W. Rep. 596), 493. 
 Illinois, etc., R. C^o. v. Thompson (112 
 
 111. App. 463; 210 111. 226; 71 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 328), 377. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. „. Warren (149 
 
 Fed. Rep. 658), 704. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Warriner (82 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 246; 2S9 111. 91), 1058. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Walsh (132 111. 
 • 490; 31 So. Rep. 470), 509. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Welden (52 111. 
 
 290), 203. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. w. Welsh (52 111 
 
 183), 341. 
 lUihois, etc., R. Co. v. Whitmore (43 111. 
 
 420), 658. 
 Illinois, etc., R.' Co. v. Willis' Admr. 
 
 (97 S. W. Rep. 21), 966. 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Young (97 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 1115), 269. 
 Ilwaco, etc., R. Co. v. Hedrick (1 Wash. 
 
 446; 25 Pac. Rep. 335; 22 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 169), 1073. 
 Imhoff V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (20 Wis. 
 
 344), 677. 
 Imhoff V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (22 Wis. 
 
 681), 632. 
 Independence v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. 
 
 (86 Mo. App. 686), 903. 
 Indiana, etc., R. Co. v. Barnhart (115 
 
 Ind. 399; 16 N. E. Rep. 121),. 863. 
 Indiana, etc., R. Co. v. Gray (19 Ind. 
 
 App. 666; 48 N. E. Rep. 803), 276. 
 Indiana, etc., R. Co. -v. Greene (106 
 
 Ind. 279; 6 N. E. Rep. 603: 66 Am. 
 
 Rep. 736; 26 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 322), 
 
 Indiana, etc., R. Co. v. Hammock (113 
 Ind. 1; 14 N. E. Rep. 737; 32 Am. & 
 Eng. (jas. 127), 1009. 
 
 Indiana, etc., R. Co. v. Mumby (21 Ind. 
 48), 850. 
 
 Indiana Car Co. ii.. Parker (100 Ind. 
 
 181), 485. 
 Indiana, etc., R. Co. v. Wheeler (115 
 
 Ind. 253; 17 N. E. Rep. 663), 883. 
 Indianapolis, etc., Co. v. Andis (72 N. 
 
 E. Rep 145), 621. 
 Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Allen (31 
 
 Ind. 394), 853. 
 Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v, Anthony (43 
 
 Ind. 188), 736. 
 Indianapolis, etc., R. Co, v. Blackman 
 
 (63 III. 117; 7 Am. Ry. Rep. 56), 974. 
 Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Boettcher 
 
 (131 Ind. 82; 28 N. E. Rep. 551), 
 
 392. 
 Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Boyd (9 Am. 
 
 Negj Cas. 289)," 853. 
 Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Bush (101 
 
 Ind. 682), 187. 
 Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Evans (88 
 
 111. 63; 21 Am. Ry. Rep. 284), 447. 
 Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Flanigan 
 
 (77 III. 365), 348. 
 Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Foreman 
 
 (162 Ind. 86; 69 N. E. Rep. 669; 102 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 185), 568. 
 Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Hall (106 
 
 in. 371), 661. 
 Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Hamilton 
 
 (44 Ind. 76), 946. 
 Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Hendricks 
 
 (128 Ind. 462; 28 N. E. Rep. 58), 
 
 602. 
 Indianapolis, etc., R. Go. v. Horst (93 U.- 
 
 S. 269), 124. 
 Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Houlihan 
 
 (157 Ind. 494; 60 N. E. Rep. 943), 
 
 504. 
 Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. zi. Johnson 
 
 (163 -Ind. 618; 72 N. E. Rep. 571), 
 
 1056. 
 Indianapolis St. Ry. Co. i,. Kane (80 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 841), 621. 
 Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Lawn (30 
 
 Ind. App. 615; 66 N. E. Rep. 508), 
 
 77. 
 Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Love (10 
 
 Ind. 554), 915. 
 Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. McLin (82 
 
 Ind. 435; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 237), 
 
 1016. 
 Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Pitzer (109 
 
 Ind. 179: 68 Am. Rep. 387; 25 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 313), 586. 
 Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Rutherford 
 
 (29 Ind. 82), 802. 
 Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Schmidt 
 
 (163 Ind. 360; 71 N. E. Rep. 201), 91. 
 Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Smith (78 
 
 III. 112), 909. 
 Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Staples (62 
 
 111. 313; 7 Am. Ry. Rep. 365), 957. 
 Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Stout (53 
 
 Ind. 143), 1040. 
 Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Taylor (164 
 
 Ind. 155; 72 N. E. Rep. 1045), 91. 
 Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Toy (91 111. 
 
 474), 852. 
 Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Watson (114 
 
 Ind. 20; 14 N. E. Rep. 721; 33 Am. 
 
 & Eng. Cas. 334), 375. 
 
 xcm 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 {References are to sections.] 
 
 Ingalls V. Bills (Mass., 9 Am. Neg. Gas. 
 
 426), 653. ,, _, „. 
 
 Ingalls V. Bills (9 Mete. [Mass.] 1, 15), 
 
 S98. 
 Inge V. Murphy (10 Ala. 886), 463. 
 Iniersol v. R. R. Co. (8 Allen 438), 235. 
 Ingram v. Lehigh, etc., R. Co. (148 Pa. 
 
 St. 177; 23 Atl. Rep. 1001), 410. 
 In r« Lowham's Estate (85 Pac. Rep. 
 
 445), 47. 
 International, etc., E. Co. v. Addison 
 
 97 S. W. Rep. 1037), 685. 
 International, etc., E. Co. v. Anderson 
 (15 Texas Civ. App. 180; 53 S. W. 
 Rep. 606), 696. 
 International, etc., R. Co. v. Armstrong 
 
 (Texas, 23 S. W. Rep. 236), 807. 
 International, etc., R. Co.. v. Botkin (85 
 
 S. W. Rep. 1163), 65. 
 International & G. N. R. Co. v. Bell (75 
 
 Tex. 50; 12 S. W. Rep. 321), 249. 
 International & G. N. R. Co. v. Bnce 
 
 (Texas, 97 S. W. Rep. 461), 265. 
 International, etc., R. Co. v. Copeland 
 
 (60 Texas, 326), 799. 
 International & G. N. R. Co. v. Cruse- 
 turner (98 S. W. Rep. 423), 647. 
 International, etc., R. Co. v. Dyer (76 
 
 Texas 166; 13 S. W. Rep. 377). 991. 
 International & G. N. R. Co. v. Pigures 
 
 (Texas, 89 S. W. Rep. 780), 339. . 
 International, etc., R. Co. ». Folliard 
 
 (66 Texas 603), 734. 
 International, etc., R. Co. v. Garcia (75 
 
 Texas 683; 13 S. W. Rep. 223), 392. 
 International & G. N. R. Co. v. Gilbert 
 (64 Texas 5S64 22 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 405), 165. 
 International, etc., R. Co. v. Gorman (2 
 
 Texas Civ. App. 679), 783. 
 International, etc., R. Co. z: Graves (59 
 
 Texas 330) 997. 
 International, etc., R. Co. v. Gray (65 
 Texas 32; 87 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 318), 
 674. " 
 International, etc., R. Co. v. Halloren 
 (53 Texas 46; 37 Am. Rep. 744; 3 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas 343), 603. 
 International Ry. Co. v. Harder (Texas, 
 
 81 S. W. Rep. 356), 663. 
 International, etc., R. Co. v. Harrison 
 (97 Texas 611; 80 S. W. Rep. 1139), 
 647. 
 International, etc., R. Co. v. Hassell (62 
 Texas 266; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Co. 
 315), 791. 
 International, etc., R. -Co, v, Hawes 
 
 (Texas, 64 S. W. Rep. 326), S66. 
 International & G. N. R. Co. v. Hays 
 (Texas Civ. App., 98 S. W. Rep. 911), 
 206. 
 International, etc., R. Co. v. Hester (64 
 Texas 401; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 535), 322. 
 International, etc^ R. Co. v. Hinzie (82 
 
 Texas 623; 18 S. W. Rep. 681), 313. 
 International & G. N. R. Co. r. Howell 
 
 (105 S. W. Rep. 660), 962. 
 International, etc., R. Co. v. Hu^n (100 
 
 S. W. Rep. 1000), 582. 
 International, etc., R. Co. v. Irvine 
 
 (Texas, 23 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 518), 
 661. 
 International & G. N. R. Co. v. Jacobs 
 
 (Texas, 84 S. W. Rep. 288), 273. 
 International, etc., R. Co. v. Johnson 
 (23 Texas Civ. App. 160; 56 S. W. 
 Kep. TT2), 368. 
 International, etc., R. Co. v. Johnson 
 
 (96 S. W. Rep. 595), 622. 
 International, etc., R. Co. ». Jordan (1 
 Texas Civ. App. 494; 10 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 801), 1089. 
 International & G. N. R. Co. v. Keman 
 
 (78 Texas 894; 9 L. R. A. 703), 24«. 
 International, etc., R. Co. v. Keuhn <2 
 Texas Civ. App. 210; SI S. W. Rep. 
 68), 972. 
 International, «tc., R. Co. v. . Kuehn (70 
 Texas 582; 8 S. W. Rep. 484; 35 Am. 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 421), 60. 
 International Nav. Co. v. Lindstrom (123 
 
 Fed. Rep. 475), 65. 
 International, etc., R. Co. v. McCarthy 
 
 (64 Texas 632), 336. 
 International, etc., R. Co. v. McDonald 
 (75 Texas 41; 12 S. W. Rep. 860; 4S 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 211), 200. 
 International, etc., R. Co. v. McGhee 
 
 (Texas, 81 S. W. Rep. 804), 98. 
 International, etc., R". Co. v. McVey 
 (Texas, 81 S. W. Rep. 991; 83 S. 
 W. Rep. 84), 386. 
 International, etc., R. Co. v. Moneyhan 
 
 (76 S. W. Rep. 803), 368. 
 International, etc., R. Co. v. Ormond 
 (64 Texas 486; 27 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 139), 203. 
 International & G. N. R. Co. v. Penn ., 
 
 (Texas, 79 S. W. Rep. 624), 96. 
 International, etc., R. Co. v. Reeves 
 
 (Texas, 79 S. W. Rep. 1099), 372. 
 International, etc^ R. Co. v. Ryan (82 
 
 Texas 666: 18 S. W. Rep. 219), ^27. 
 International & G. N. R. Co. v. Sipole 
 
 (29 S. W. Rep. 686), 38. 
 International, etc., R. Co. v. Smith 
 (Texas, 14 S. W. Rep. 642; 44 Am. 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 824), 92. 
 International, etc., R. Co. z'. Smith (62 
 Texas 252; 19 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 21), 392. 
 International, etc., R. Co. v. Stephenson 
 <22 Texas Civ. App. 220; 54 S. W. 
 Rep. 1086), 369. 
 International, etc., R. Co. v. Still (88 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 257), 504. 
 International, etc., R. Co. v. Story 
 
 (Texas, 62 S. W. Rep. 130), 348. 
 International, etc., R. Co. v. Turner (3 
 Texas Civ. App. 487; 23 S. W. Rep. 
 146), 845. 
 International, -etc., R. Co. v. Underwood 
 (34 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 570; 67 
 Texas 589: 4 S. W. Rep. 216), 824. 
 International, etc., R. Co. v. Underwood 
 (64 Texas 463; 27 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 240), 835. 
 International, etc., R. Co. v. Welsh (86 
 Texas 204; 24 S. W. Rep. 390; 68 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 70), 678. 
 International, etc., R. Co. z'. Wilkes (68 
 
 XCIV 
 
TABLE OV CASES CITED. 
 
 IBeferences are to sections.'] 
 
 Texas 617; 84 Am. & Eng. R. Gas. 
 
 831), 165. 
 International, etc., R. Ca n. Williams 
 
 (82 Texas 342; 18 S. W. Sep. 700), 
 
 249. 
 International & G. N. R. Co. v. Wray 
 
 (Texas, 96 S. W. Rep. 74), 208. 
 Interstate T. R. C. R. Co. v. Fox (Kan., 
 
 SI Pac. Rep. 797), 270. 
 Interurhan Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Han- 
 cock (78 N. E. Rep. 964), 578. 
 lonnone v. New York, etc., R. Co. (21 
 
 R. I. 462; 44 Atl. Rep. 592; 79 Am. 
 
 Rep. 812; 46 L. R. A. 730), 568. 
 Iowa G. M. Co. V. Diefenthaler (76 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 981), 89. 
 Irish V. Northern, etc., R. Co. (4 Wash. 
 
 48; 29 Pac. Rep. 845), 778. 
 Iron R. Co. v. Mowry (36 Ohio St. 418; 
 
 38 Am. Rep. 597), 806, 
 Irvine v. Flint, etc., R. Co. (89 Mich. 
 
 416; 60 N. W. Rep. 1008; 53 Am, & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 210), 321. 
 Isaacs V. Southern Pac. R. Co. (49 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 797), 94. 
 Isaacs V. Strainka (95 Mo. 517; 8 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 427), 106. 
 Isaacson v. New York, etc., R. Co. (94 
 
 N. Y. 278), 295. 
 Isabel V. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (60 Mo. 
 
 476), 1058. 
 Isbell V. New York, etc., R. Co. (27' 
 
 Conn. 393), 398. 
 Israel t\ Clark (4 Esp. 259), 680. 
 Ivens V. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. (103 Ind. 
 
 27; 2 N. £. Rep. 134; 23 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R, Cas. 258), 1080. 
 Ives V. Wisconsin, etc., Ry. Co. (128 
 
 Wis. 397; 107 N; W. Rep. 45S), 329. 
 Ivy V. East Tennessee, etc-, R. Co. (88 
 
 Ga. 71; 13 S. E. Rep. »47), 1034. 
 
 Jackson V. Alabama, etc., R. Co, (76 
 
 Miss. 703; 26 So. Sep. 353,; 14 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. [N. S.] 392), 731. 
 Jackson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (62 Wis. 
 
 160), 20. 
 Jackson v. Crilly (16 Colo. 103; 26 
 
 Pac. Rep. 331), 796.' 
 Jackson, etc., Co. v. Cunningham (141 
 
 Ala. 206; 37 So. Rep. 446), 96. 
 Jackson v. Galveston, etc., R. Co. (90 
 
 Texas 372; 37 S. W. Rep, 786), 25. 
 Jackson v. Grand Avenue Ry. Co. (118 
 
 Mo. 199; 24 S. W. Rep. 192V 664. 
 Jackson v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (157 
 
 Mo. 621; 68 S. W. Rep. 32; 80 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 660), 883. 
 Jackson zi. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (31 
 
 Kan. 761; 8 Pac. Rep. 601; 15 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 178), 343. 
 Jackson v. Metropolitan, etc., Ry. Co. 
 
 (26 W. R. 175; L. R., 2 C. P. D. 
 
 126; 46 L. T. C. P. 376; 25 W. R. 
 
 661; 36 L. T. '485; L. R., 10 C. P. 
 
 49; 44 L. J. C. P. 83; 31 L. T. 476; 
 
 23 W. R. 78), 682. 
 Jackson v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (104 
 
 Mo. 452; 16 S. W. Rep. 413), 749. 
 Jackson v. Mobile & O. R. Co. (42 So. 
 
 Rep. 236), 411. 
 
 Jackson v. North Carolina, etc., R, Co. 
 (13 hen [Tenn.] 491; 19 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 433), 39. 
 Jackson, v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (43 
 
 Mo. App. 324), 602, 
 Jackson v. Southern Ry. (56 S. E. Rep. 
 
 606; 77 S. C. 860), 482. 
 Jackson v. Street Ry. Co. (118 Mo. 224), 
 
 121. 
 Jacksonville, etc., R. Co. v. Galvin (29 
 
 Fla. 636; 11 So. Rep. 231; 63 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 3.41), 323. 
 Jacksonville, etc., R, Co. x*. Southworth 
 
 (135 111. 250; 25 N. E. Rep. 1093), 83. 
 Jacob V. Flint, etc., R. Co. (105 Mich. 
 
 460; 63 N. W. Rep, '602), 789. 
 Jacobs V. Louisville R. Co. (10 Bush. 
 
 Ky. 263), 176. 
 Jacobsen v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (41 
 
 Minn. 206; 42 N. W. Rep. 938), 412. 
 Jacobsan v. St. Paul, etc., E. Co. (41 
 
 Minn. -206), 866. 
 Jacobsan v. Transit Co. (106 Mo, App. 
 
 SS9; 80 S. W. Rep. 3fl9), 708. 
 Jacobus V. St; Paul, etc., R. Co. (20 
 
 Minn. 125), 64. 
 Jacvies V. Bridgeport, etc., Ti. Co. (41 
 
 Conn, ei: 6 Am. %. Rep. 1), 187. 
 Jacquin v. Grand Avenue R. Co. (67 Mo. 
 
 App, 320), 664. 
 James v. Christie (18 Mo. 168), 48. 
 James v. Richmond, etc., R. Co. (92 
 
 Ala, 231; 9 So. Rep. 336), 201. 
 Jamison v. San Jose, etc., R. Co. (55 
 
 Cal. 693; 3. Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 350), 
 
 4. 
 Jancko v. West Coast, etc., Co. (34 
 
 Wash: 556; 76 Pac. Rep. 7«), 307. 
 J.anowicz v. Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. (124 
 
 in. App. 149), 1078. 
 Jansen v. Southern Pac. Co. (89 Pac 
 
 Rep. 616), 39S. 
 Jarman v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (98 
 
 Mich. 13S; 57 N. W. Rep. 32), 487. 
 Jarrett v. Atlanta, etc., R. Co. (83 Ga. ' 
 
 347; 9 S. E. Rep. 681), 789. 
 Jefferson & N. W. Ky. Co. v. Woods 
 
 > (Texas, 64 S. W. Rep. 830), 258. 
 Jeffersonville, etc., K. Co. ». Goldsmith 
 
 (47 Ind. 43; 8 Am. Ry. Rep. 316), 
 
 1074. 
 Jeffersonville, etc., R. Co. v. Hendricks 
 
 (26 Ind. 228), 833. 
 Jeffersonville, etc., R. Co. «/. Parmalee 
 
 (61 Ind. 42), 557. 
 Jeffersonville, etc., R. Co. v. Riley (39 
 
 Ind. 568; 10 Am. Ry. Rep. 325), 202. 
 Jeffersonville, etc., R. Co. v. Swift (26 
 
 Ind. 469), 791. 
 Jeffrey v. Keokuk, etc., R. Co. (56 Iowa 
 
 546; 9 N. W. Rep. 884; 5 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 668), 416. 
 Jemming v. Great Northern Ry. Co. (96 
 
 Minn, 302; 104 N. W. Rep. 1079; 1 
 
 L. R. A. [N. S.] 696), 527. 
 Jemnienski v. Lobdell Car Wheel- Co. 
 
 (Del., 63 Atl. Rep. 935), 258. 
 Jennings v. Grand Trunk R. Co. (15 
 
 Ont. App. 47,7), 564. 
 Jennings v. Philadelphia & W. Ry. Co. 
 
 (89 App. [D. C] 219), 481. 
 Jennings v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (99 
 
 Mo. 394; 11 S. W. Rep. 999), 918. 
 
 XCV 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to secUons.'\ 
 
 Jennings v. St, LouiSj etc., - R. Co. (113 
 
 Mo. 268; 20 S. W. Rep. 490), 995. 
 Jennings v. Tacoma, etc., R. Co. (7 
 
 Wash. 275; 34 Pac. Rep. 9S7), 419. 
 Jensen v. Cliicago, etc., R. Co. (86 Wis. 
 
 589; 67 N. W. Rep. 369; 82 L. R. A. 
 
 680), 892. 
 Jensen v. Omaha, etc., R. Co. (116 Iowa 
 
 404; 88 N. W. Rep. 952), 228. 
 Jewell V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (64 Wis. 
 
 610; 41 Am. Rep. 63; 6 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 379), 788. 
 Jewell V. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. (55 N. 
 
 H. 84), 209. 
 Jewett V. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (50 
 
 Mo. App. 647), 74. 
 Johns V. Charlotte, etc., R. Co. (39 So. 
 
 Car. 162; 17 S. E. Rep. 698; 20 L. R. 
 
 A. 620), 620. 
 Johns V. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. (23 Ohio 
 
 Cit. Ct. R. 442), 356. 
 Johnson v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (83 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 874), 1099. 
 Johnson v. Boston & M. R. Co. (Vt, i L. 
 
 R. A. [N. S.] 856), 259. 
 Johnson v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. (38 
 
 W. Va. 206; 18 S. E. Rep. 573), 399. 
 Johnson v. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. (36 
 
 W. Va. 73; 14 S. E. Rep. 432), 494. 
 Johnson v. Chicago, etc., R. (So. (58 
 
 Iowa 348; 12 N. W. Rep. 329; 8 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 206), 728. 
 Johnson V. Chicago, ' etc., R. Co. (64 
 
 Wis. 423; 25 N. W. Rep. 223; 25 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 338), 189. 
 Johnson v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. (11 
 
 Ohio C. C. 553), 490. 
 Johnson v. Coal Cq. (76 Pac. Rep. 1089), 
 
 98. 
 Johnson v. Concord, etc., R. Co. (46 N. 
 
 H. 213), 99. 
 Johnson v. Guffey Petroleum Co. (83 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 874), 1099. 
 Johnson v. Great Northern Ry. Co. (94 
 
 Pac. Rep. 896), 869. 
 Johnson v. Gn\i, etc., R. Co. (2 Texas 
 
 Civ. App. 139; 81 S. W. Rep. 274), 
 
 1059. 
 Johnson v. Interurban St. Ry. Co. (88 
 
 N. Y. S. 866), 136. 
 Johnson v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (91 
 
 Ky. 861; 25 -S. W. Rep. 754; 13 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 623), 1012. 
 Johnson v. Manhattan, etc., R. Co. , (52 
 
 Hun 111), 97. 
 Johnson v. Metropolitan, etc., Ry. Co. 
 
 (10'4 Mo. App. 588), 127. 
 Johnson v. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. (114 
 
 Pa. St. 443; 7 Atl. Rep. 184), 261. 
 Johnson v. Railway Co. (36 W. Va. 73; 
 
 14 S. E. Rep. 432), 118. 
 Johnson v. Richmond, etc., R. Co. (84 
 
 Va. 713; 5 S. E. Reo. 707), 465. 
 Johnson's Admx. v. Richmond, etc., R. 
 
 Co. (86 Va. 975; H S. E. Rep. 829), 
 
 506. 
 Johnson v. St. Joseph Terminal Ry. Co. 
 
 (101 S. W. Rep. 641), 413. 
 Johnson v. St. Paul City R. Co. (67 
 
 Minn. 260; 69 N. W. Rep. 900; 36 L. 
 
 R. A. 586), 1067. 
 
 xevi 
 
 Johnson v. Seattle, etc., R. Co. (39 
 
 Wash. 811; 81 Pac. Rep. 706), 61. 
 Johnson v. Southern Pacific R. Co. (1 
 
 L. R. A. [N. S.] 307), 897. 
 Johnson v. Southern Pac. R. Co. (117 
 
 Fed. Rep. 468; 54 C. C. A. 508), 254. 
 Johnson v. Superior Rapid Transit Co. 
 
 (91 Wis. 833; 64 N. W. Rep. 763), 
 
 1063. 
 Johnson v. Texas & G. Ry. Co. (100 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 806), 878. 
 Johnson v. Union Pac. Co. (28 Utah 
 
 46; 76 Pac. Rep. 1089), 98. 
 Johnson v. Atchison, etc., R. Co. (117 
 
 Mo. App. 308), 838. 
 Johnston v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (78 Vt. 
 
 344; 68 Atl. Rep. 1021), 341. 
 Johnston v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. (7 
 
 Ohio St. 336), 69. 
 Johnston v. Oregon, etc., R. Co. (23 Ore. 
 
 94; 31 Pac. Rep. 283), 92. 
 Joh&ston V. Phcenix Bridge Co. (169 
 
 N. Y. 581; 62 N. E. Rep. 1096), 286. 
 Johnston v. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. (114 
 
 Pa. St. 443; 7 Atl. Rep. 184), 461. 
 Johnston v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. (43 
 
 Minn. 53; 44 N. W. Rep. 884; 41 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 293), 369. 
 Johnston v. Truesdale (46 Minn. 345; 
 
 48 N. W. Rep. 1136), 1092. 
 Johnston v. West Chester R. Co. (70 Pa. 
 
 St. 257), 718. 
 Johnston v. Western, etc., R. Co. (55 
 
 Ga. 133), 343. 
 Johnstown Steel Co. v. Shields (146 111. 
 
 603; 34 N. E. Rep. 834), 118. 
 Joliet, etc., R. Co. v. Call (143 111. 
 
 177), 93. 
 Joliet V. Seward (86 111. 402; 29 Am. 
 
 Rep. 35), 1056. 
 Joliet Steel Co. v. Shields (146 111. 
 
 603; 34 N. E. Rep. 1108), 495. 
 Joliet, etc., E. Co. v. Velie (111., 26 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 1086), 376. 
 Jones V. Boyce (1 Starkie 493), 30. 
 Jones V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (42 
 
 Minn. 183; 43 N. W. Rep. 1114; 41 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 169), 791. 
 Jones V. Grand Trunk R. Co. (18 Can. 
 
 Sup. Ct. 696j 16 Ont. App. 37), 874. 
 Jones v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. (104 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 268; 31 Ky. Law. Rep. 825), 
 
 1028. 
 Jones V. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (178 
 
 Mo. 528; 77 S. W. Rep. 890), 380. 
 Jones V. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. (49 
 
 Mich. 573; 14 N. W. Rep. 551; 8 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 881), 378. 
 Jones V. New York, etc., R. Co. (156 
 
 N. Y. 187; 90 Hun 605; 50 N. E. Rep. 
 
 866; 41 L. R. A. 490), 782. 
 Jones V. Philadelphia Traction Co. (185 
 
 Pa. St. 75; 39 Atl. Rep. 889), 286. 
 Jones V. Phillips (39 AiK. 17; 43 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 264), 310. 
 Tones v. R. R. (20 R. I. 810), 96. 
 Jones V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (125 Mo. 
 
 666; 28 S. W. Rep. 883; 46 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 514; 26 L. R. A. 718), 565. 
 Jones V. Seligman (N. Y., 3 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 236), 602. 
 
TABLE OB" GASES CITED 
 
 [References are to sections.'] 
 
 Jones .», Sibley, etc., R. Co. (46 So. Rep. 
 
 61), 1077. 
 Jones V. Wabash Ry. Co. (17 Mo. App. 
 
 IBS), 669. 
 Jordan v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. (89 
 
 Ky. 40; 11 S. W. Rep. 1013), 58. 
 Jordan v. Hannibal (87 Mo. 673), 132. 
 Jordan v. New York, etc., R. Cfo. (165 
 
 Mass. 346; 43 N. E. Rep. Ill; 38 L: 
 
 R. A. 101), 633. 
 Jordan v. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. (99 
 
 S. W. Rep. 492), 122. 
 Joseph v.. Metropolitan R. Co. (129 Mo. 
 
 App. 603; 111 S. W. Rep. 864), 823. 
 Joyce V. Los Angeles Ry. Co. (147 Cal. 
 
 274; 82 Pac. Rep. 204), 125. 
 Junction Co. v. Ench (111 111. App. 
 
 346), 90. 
 June V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (153 Mass. 
 
 79; 26 N. E. Rep. 238), 859. 
 Justice V. Pennsylvania R. Co. (130 Ind. 
 
 321; 80 N. E. Rep. 303; 53 Am, & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 604), 139. 
 
 Kain ». Smith (80 N. Y. 458; 2 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 545), 230. 
 Kahn v. McNulta (147 U. S. 238), 268. 
 Kahl V. Memphis, etc., R. Co. (95 Ala. 
 
 337; 10 So. Rep. 661), 49. 
 Kalbus V. Abbott (77 Wis. 621; 46 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 810), 940. 
 Kaminski v. Tudor Iron Works (167 Mo. 
 
 462), 99. 
 Kane v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (198 Mass. 
 
 386; 78 N. E. Rep. 485), 1039. 
 Kane ». Erie R. Cor (148 Fed. Rep. 
 
 688; 73 C. C. A. 672), 537. 
 Kane v. New York, etc., R. Co. (132 N. 
 
 Y. 160; 30 N. E. Rep. 256; 43 N. Y. 
 
 S. R. 494; B6 Hun 648; 31 N. Y. S. 
 
 R. 741; 9 N. Y. Supp. 879)., 921. 
 Kane v. Northern, etc., R. Co. (128 N. 
 
 S. 91; 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 16), 419. 
 Kane v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (Mo. 
 
 App., 87 S. W. Rep. 571), 353. 
 'Kane v. Savannah, > etc., R. Co. (85 Ga. 
 
 858; 11 S. E. Rep. 493), 378. 
 Kankakee, etc., R. Co. v. Fitzgerald (17 
 
 111. App. 625), 169. 
 Kansas City, etc., S. R. Co. v. Allen (67 
 
 Pac. Rep. 486), 135. 
 Kansas City, etc., R.- Co. v. Becker (53 
 
 S. W. Rep. 406), 514. 
 Kansas, etc., Co. v. Brownlie (60 Ark 
 
 582), 146. 
 Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Butler (Ala. 
 
 38 So. Rep. 1024), 100. - " 
 
 Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Burton (97 
 
 Ala. 240;. 12 So. Rep. 88; 53 Am. & 
 . Eng. R. Cas. 115), 882. 
 Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Campbell 
 
 (6 Kan. App. 417; 48 Pac. Rep. 817), 
 
 667. 
 Kansas City, etc., Ry. Co. v. Crocker (95 
 
 Ala. 418; 11 So.- Rep. 868), 513. 
 Kansas Pacific R. Co. v. Cutter (19 Kan. 
 
 83), 196. 
 Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Daughtry 
 
 (88 Tenn. 781; 13 S. W. Rep. 698; 
 
 46 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 69), 200. 
 
 Kansas City Southern Ry.- Co. ». Davis 
 
 (103 S. W. Rep. 603), 704. 
 Kansas, etc., R. Co. v. Dorough (72 
 
 Texas 108; 10 S. W. Rep. 711), 783. 
 Kansas City v. Ferd Heim, etc., Co. (98 
 
 Mo. App. 590; 73 S. W. Rep. 302), 
 
 138. 
 Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Fite (67 
 
 Miss. 373; 7 So. Rep. 223), 172. 
 Kansas, etc., Co. v. Fitzsimmons (18 
 
 Kan. 34; 15 Am. Ry. Rep. 220), 293. 
 Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Fitzsim- 
 mons (22 Kan. 686; 31 Am. Rep. 203), 
 
 1073. 
 Kansas City, etc., R. Co. i. Flippo (138 
 
 Ala. 487; 35 So. Rep. 457), 385. 
 Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Kelly (36 
 
 Kan. 656; 14 Pac. Rep. 172), 1087. 
 Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Kier (41 
 
 Kan. 661; 21 Pac. Rep. 770; 38 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 119), 523. 
 Kansas, etc., R. Co. v. Little (19 Kan. 
 
 267; 17 Am. Ry. Rep. 455), 475. 
 Kansas City & O. Ry. Co. v. Loosley 
 
 (90 Pac. Rep. 990), 276. 
 Kansas, etc., R. Co. v. Lundin (3 
 
 Colo. 94), 601. 
 Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. McGinty (88 
 
 S. W. Rep. 1001), 40. 
 Kansas, etc^ R. Co. v. Merrill (65 Kan. 
 
 436; 70 Pac. Rep. 358; 59 L. R. A. 
 
 711), 39. 
 Kansas, etc., R. Co. v. Miller (2 Colo. 
 
 442; 20 Am. Ry. Rep. 245), 69. 
 Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Orton (67 
 
 Kan. 848; 73 Pac. Rep. 63), 656. 
 Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Owens (68 
 
 Ark. 397; 24 S. W. Rep. 1076), 789. 
 Kansas, etc., R. Co. v. Peavey (34 Kan. 
 
 472; 8 Pac. Rep. 780), 483. 
 Kansas, etc., R. Co. v. Peavey (29 "Kan. 
 
 169; 44 Am. Rep. 630; 11 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 260), 506.. 
 Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Phillipps (98 
 
 Ala. 159; IS So. Rep. 65), 172. 
 Kansas, etc., R. Co. v. Pointer (14 Kan. 
 
 37), 947. 
 Kansas, etc., R. Co. v. Pointer (9 Kan. 
 
 620),. 873. 
 Kansas, etc., R. Co. v. Salmon (11 Kan. 
 . 83), 461. 
 Kansas City, etc., R. Co. ii. Saunders (98 
 
 Ala. 293; 13 So. Rep. 57; 58 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 140), 590. 
 Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Simpson (30 
 
 Kan. 645; 46 Am. Rep. 104; 16 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 158), 849. 
 Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Stoner (51 
 
 Fed. Rep. 649; 2 C. C. A. 437; 52 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 462; 49 Fed. Rep. 
 
 209; 4 U. S. App. 109; 1 C. C. A. 
 
 231), 675, 
 Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Thornhill 
 
 (Ala., 37 So. Rep. 412), 379. 
 Kansas, etc., R. Co. v. Twombly (3 Colo. 
 
 125; 21 Am. Ry. Rep. 447), 412. 
 Kansas, etc., R. Co. v. Ward (4 Colo. 
 
 30), 1095. 
 Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Webb (97 
 
 Ala. 157; 11 So. Rep. 888), 108. 
 Kaplowitz V, Interborough Rapid Tran- 
 sit Co. (103 N. Y. S. 721), 630. 
 
 xcvii 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sectiona.1 
 
 Karl V. Juniata County (806 Pa. St. 633; 
 
 56 Atl. Rep. 78),. %-W. 
 Karle v. Kansas City, etc.. R. Co. (55 
 
 Mo. 476), MS. 
 Earn v. Illinois Southern Ry. Coi (U4 
 
 Mo. App. 162; 89 S. W. Rep. 346), 
 
 241. 
 Karr w. Milwaukee Traction Co. (113 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 62), 689. 
 Kascsak v. Central R. Co. (101 N. V- 
 
 Kas'tle i;. 'Wab'ash R. Co. (114 Mieh. 43; 
 
 72 N, W. Rep. 28), 4W.. 
 Katzenberger v. Laivo (90 Tenn. 235; 16 
 
 5 W. Rep. 611; 50 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 443), 961. . „ ^ ,„, „ -^ 
 
 Kay V. Pennsylvania R. Co. (65 Pa. St. 
 
 269; 3 Am. Rep. 6S8), 1058. 
 Keagy ■«. New York & B. R. Co. (66 AU. 
 
 Rep. 1024), 90S. 
 Kean v. Baltimore, etc.. R. Co. (61 Mf 
 
 154; 19 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 321), 
 
 Ke^ne'r/. Waterford (130 N. Y. 188), 
 
 136 
 Kearney v. Lindell R. Co. (15 Mo. App. 
 
 576), 394. ^ _ 
 
 Kearney v. Railway (5 Q. B. 411; L. K., 
 
 6 Q. B. 759), 129. 
 
 Keatmg ». Manhattan R. Co. (97 N. Y. 
 
 S. 137; 110 App. Div. 108), 264. 
 Keating ii. New York, etc., R. Co. (49 
 
 N. Y. 673; » Lans. 469), 700. 
 Keck V. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. (206 
 
 Pa. 501; 56 Atl. Rep. 47). 229. 
 Keefe v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (142 Mass. 
 
 251; 7 N. E. Rep. 874; 27 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Co. 137), 619. 
 Keefe ». New York Cent, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (95 N. Y. S. 888; 109 App. Div. ISO), 
 
 482. 
 Keen v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (108 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 1125), 727. 
 Keep V. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. (3 
 
 McCrary [U. S.] 208; 9 Fed. Rep. 
 
 625), 584. 
 Keep Ti. Union, etc., R. Co. (9 Fed. Rep. 
 
 625; 3 McCrary [U. S.] 208), 6S8i 
 Kehler v. Schwenk (144 Pa. St. 348; 
 
 22 Atl. Rep. 910), 400. 
 Kehler v. Schwenk (151 Pa. St. 505; 25 
 
 Atl. Rep. 130), 302. 
 Keiley v. Th-e Alliance (44 Fed. Rep. 
 
 97), 172. 
 Keim v. Union Ry. Co. (90 Mo. 314; 2 
 
 S. W. Rep. 427), 977. 
 Keith V. New Haven, etc., R. Co. (140 
 
 Mass. 1758; 3 N. E. Rep. 28), 268. 
 Keith V. Wisconsin Gent. R. Go. (Wis., 
 
 9? N. W. Rep. 217), 269. 
 Kellar v. Sioux City, etc., R. Co. (27 
 
 Minn. 178 r 6 N. W. Rep. 486), 708. 
 Kelleher v. Railroad Co. (80 Wis. 586; 
 
 50 N. W. Rep. 943), 369. 
 Keller v. Hestonville, etc., R. Co. (149 
 
 Pa. St. 65; 24 Atl. Rep. 159), 7r& 
 Keller v. Kansas City, St. L., etc., R. 
 
 Co. (135 Fed. Rep. 202), 235. 
 Kelley V. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (101 
 
 Mo. 67; IS S. W. Rep. 806; 43 Am. 
 
 & Engi R. Cas. 186), 398. 
 
 Keltey v. Railroad Co. (35 Minn. 4«0i 
 
 29 N. W. Rep. 173), 348. 
 KeUey ». Washmgton, etc., Co. (107 Mo. 
 
 App. 490; 81 S. W. Rep. 631), 1105. 
 Kellogg v.. New York, etc., R. Co. (79 
 
 N. Y. 72), 1003. 
 Kellow V. Central Iowa R. Co. (68 Iowa 
 
 470; 23 N. W. Rep. 740; 21 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 485), 578. 
 Kelly V. Abbott (63 Wis. 307; 23 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 89a; 53 Am. Eep. 292; 21 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 633), 336. 
 Kelly V. Baltimore^ etc., R. Co. (Pa., 11 
 
 Atl. Rep. 6S9), 3«9. 
 Kelly V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (35 Minn. 
 
 490; 29 N. W. Rep. 173), 354. 
 Kelly V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (88 Mo. 
 
 634), 1016. 
 Kelly -v. Duluth, etc., R. Co. (92 Mich. 
 
 19; 52 N. W. Rep. 81), 947. 
 Kelly V. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (75 Mo. 
 
 138; 13 Am. & Eng. R. Gas. 638), 
 
 1029. 
 Kelly V. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (70 Mo. 
 
 604), 788. 
 Kelly v. Manhattan R. Co. (112 N. Y. 
 
 443; 21 N, Y. S, R. 507; iO N. E. 
 
 Rep. 383; 3 L. R. A. 74), 579. 
 Kelly V. Michigan, etc., R. Co. (65 
 
 Mich. 186; 31 N. W. Rep. 904; 28 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 633), 878. 
 Kelly V. New Yorki etc., R. Co. (109 N. 
 
 Y. 44; 15 N. E. Rep. 879), 649. 
 Kelly V. Parker-Washington Co. (107 Mo. 
 
 App. 490; 81 S. W. Rep. 631), 97. 
 Kelly V. Railroad (48 Fed, Rep. 663), 
 
 306. 
 Kelly V. St Paul, etc., R. Co. (29 
 
 Minn., 16 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 93; 
 
 11 N. W. Rep. 67), 1088. 
 Kelly V. Twenty-second Street R. Co. 
 
 (14 Daily 418; 14 N. Y. S. R. 699), 
 
 208. 
 Kelly v. Union, etc., R. Co. (11 Mo. 
 
 App. 1), 412. 
 Kelsall V. New York & H. R. Co. (82 N. 
 
 E. Repi 674), 971. 
 Kelsay v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (129 
 
 Mo. 362; 30 S. W. Rep.. 339), 1003. 
 Keltom V. St Louis, etc., R. Co. (116 
 
 Mo. App. 281; 92 S. W. Rep. 518), 
 
 881.' 
 Kendall v. Boston (118 Mass. 834), 650. 
 Kend-riek v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (81 
 
 Mo. 521), 989. 
 Kennayde v. Pacific R. Co. (45 Mo. 
 
 255), 1000. 
 Kennedy v. Chase (119 Cal. 637), 844. 
 Kennedy n. Delaware & G. Co. (58 Atl. 
 
 Rep. sas), 62. 
 Kennedy v. Kansas City, St J. & C. B. 
 
 R. Co. (190 Mo. 424; 89 S. W. Rep. 
 
 370), 269i 
 Kennedy v. New York, etc., R. Co. (35 
 
 Hun [N. Y.] 186), 64. 
 Kennedy v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (Pa., 
 
 17 Atl. Rep. 7), 352. 
 Kennedy v. Rochester, etc., R. Co. (130 
 
 N. Y. 654; 29 N. E. Rep. 141), 92. 
 Kennedy v. Central R. Co. (61 Ga. 590), 
 
 4196. 
 
 XGVlll 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.'] 
 
 Keimey v^ Haimibal & St. Joseph Ry, 
 
 Co. (105 Mo. «70; 15 S. W; Re?. 883; 
 
 16 S. W. Rep. 837), 507. 
 Kenney v. Meddaugn (118 Fed. Rep. 
 
 209; 55 C. C A. 115), 260. 
 Kenney v. New York, etc., R. Co. (125 
 
 N. Y. 422; 26 N. E. Rep. 626), 564. 
 Kent V. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. (45 Ohio 
 
 Si. 284; 12 N. E. Rep. 798; 31 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 125), 853. 
 Kentucky, etc., R. Co. v. AckJey (87 Ky. 
 
 278t 8 S. W. Rep., 691; 12 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 480), 174. 
 Kentucky,, etc.,, R. Co. v. Commonwealth 
 
 (Ky., 18 S. W. Rep. 368), 934. 
 Kmtucky, etc.,, R. Co. v. McGinty (Ky., 
 
 14 S. W. Rep. 601), 62. 
 Kentucky, etc., R. Co. v. Quinkert (2 
 
 Ind. App. 244; 28 N. E. Rep. 338), 
 
 769v 
 Kentucky, etc., R. Co. v. Thomas (79 
 
 Ky. 160), 803. 
 Kentucky, etc., R. Co. v. Wainwright 
 
 (13 S. W. Rep. 438), 58. 
 Kentucky v. Winchester's Ex'r (105 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 167), 959. 
 Keokuk, etc., Co. v. Henry (B& III. 264), 
 
 WOi 
 Kepner v. Traction Co. (IBS Pa; 24; 38 
 
 Atl. Rep. 416), 119. 
 Kedin v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (50 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 185; S3 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 630), 491. 
 Kerrigan v. Southern Pacific R. Co. (81 
 
 Call 24&; 22 Pac. Rep. 677; 41 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 28), 809. 
 Kersey v. Kansas City, etc., Ri Go. (79 
 
 Mo. 3162; 17 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 638), 
 
 500. 
 Keinvhacker v. Cleveland, etc., E. Co. (S 
 
 Ohio St. 172>, 394. 
 Kesler v. Smith (B6 N. Car. 154), 191. 
 Kessler v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co. (3 
 
 Appi Div. 426; 38 N.. Y. Supp. 799), 
 
 1048. „ , 
 
 Kessler v. Newi York, etc., R. Co. (61 
 
 N. Y. 538), 295. 
 Keyes v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (Pai, 3 
 
 Atl. Rep. 15), 412. 
 Kibbe v. Stevenson Iron Mining- €o. 
 
 (136 Fed. Rep. 14T; 69 C. C. A. 145), 
 
 504. 
 Kidwell V. Houston^ etc., R. Co. (3 
 
 Woods [U. S.] 313), 483. 
 Kilken v. New York Cfentral R. Co. (177 
 
 N. Y. 566; 69 N. E. Rep. 1125 j 78 N. 
 
 Y. S. R. 568; 76 App. Div. 629), 356. 
 Killian v. Augusta, etc., B. Co. (79 Ga. 
 
 234; 4 S. E. Rep. 166), 191. 
 Killian v. Chicago, etc., E'. Co. (86 Mo. 
 
 App. 473), 39. 
 Killian v. Georgia, etc., R. Co. (97 Ga. 
 
 727; 25 S. E. Rep. 384), 709. 
 KilKan. v. Southerny etc^ R. Co. (128 
 
 N. Car. 261: 38 S. E. Rep. 873), 62. 
 Eillien v. Hyde (63 Fed. Rep. 172), 247. 
 Killilea v. Horseshoe Co. (74 Pac. Rep. 
 
 167), 14S. 
 Kilpatrick v. Choctaw, etc., R. Co. (195 
 
 U. S. 624; 49 L. Ed. 349), 252. 
 Kilpatrick v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (140 
 
 Fib St. 602; 21 Atl. Rep. 408), 789. 
 
 Kiminitsky v. Northeastern R. Co. (25 
 
 So. Car. 63), 949. 
 Kincaid v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (62 
 
 Mo. App. 365), 25. 
 Kincaid v. Railway Co. (22 Or. 36; 29 
 
 Pac. Rep. 3), lis. 
 King V. Boston & W. R. Co. (63 Mass. 
 
 [9 Cnsh.J 112), 10. 
 King V. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (98 
 
 Mo. 235; 11 S. W. Rep. 563), 200. 
 King V. New York, etc., R. Co. (66 N. 
 
 Y. 181; 23 Am. Rep. 37), 288. 
 King V. Ohio, etc., R. Co. (11 Bliss [N. 
 
 S.] 362; 14 Fed. Rep. 277; 8 Am. & 
 
 Eng, R. Cas. 119), 477". 
 King V. Ohio, etc., R. Co. (22 Fed. Rep. 
 
 418; 18 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 386), 
 
 74,7. 
 King J,. Oregon R. Co. (93 Pac. Rep. 
 
 141), 882., 
 King V. Railroad (98 Mo. 235; 11 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 563), 607. 
 King V. Wabash R. Co. (109 S. W. Rep. 
 
 671), 1029. 
 King V, Woodstock Iron Co. (42 So. 
 
 Rep. 27), 269. 
 Kiiuney v. Central, etc., Co. (32 N. J. 
 
 L. 409; 34 N. J. L. 513), 860. 
 Kinney v. Corbin (132 Pa. St. 341; 19 
 
 Atl. Rep. 141), 400. 
 Kinney v. Crocker (18 Wis. 74), 937. 
 Kinney v, Louisville, etc., R. Co. (99 
 
 Ky. 69; 34 S. W. Rep. 1066), 744. 
 Kinsley v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (135 
 
 Mass. 54) 666. 
 Kinsley v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. (125 
 
 Mass. 54), 736. 
 Kinzel v. Atlanta, etc., Ry. Co. (137 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 480), 367. 
 Kirk V. Atlanta, etc., R. Co. (N. C, 25 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 607), 485. 
 Kirk V. Atlanta, etc., R. Co. (94 N. C. 
 
 625; 55 Am. Rep. 621), 494. 
 Kirkland v. Charleston, etc., Ry. Co. (60 
 
 S. E. Rep. 668), 814. 
 Kirkpatrick v. Choctaw, etc., R. Co. (195 
 
 U. S. 624; 49 L. Ed. 349; 121 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 11; 57 C. C. A. 253), 342. 
 Kirkpatrick v. Grand Trunk R. Co. (Vt., 
 
 52 Atl. Rep. 531), 382. 
 Kissenger v. New York, etc., R. Co. (36 
 
 N. Y. 538; 6 Am. Ry. Rep. 154), 
 
 940.^ 
 Kittecingham' r. Sioux City, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (62 Iowa 286; 17 N. W. Rep. 585), 
 
 406. 
 Khron V. Brock (144 Mass. 516; 11 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 748), 287. 
 Klages V. Gillett-Herzog Mfg. Co. (86 
 
 Minn. 458; 90 N. W. Rep. 1116; 26 
 
 Enc. Law & Proc. [Cyc] 1552), 290. 
 Klanowski v. Grand Trunk R. Co. (67 
 
 Mich. 525; 24 N. W. Rep. 801; 21 
 
 Am-. & Eng. R. Cas. 648), 192. 
 Klanowski v. Grand Trunk R. Co, (64 
 
 Mich. 279; 31 N. W. Rep. 276), 983. 
 Klebe v. Parker Distilling Co. (207 Mo. 
 
 480; 106 S. W. Rep. 1057; 13 L. R. A. 
 
 [N. S.] 140), lis. 
 Klein v. Jewett (26 N. J. Eq. 474; 27 
 
 N. J. Eq. 650), 580. 
 Kleiner v. Third Ave. R. Co. (36 App. 
 
 xcix 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.'] 
 
 Div. 191; 55 N. Y. Supp. 394; 162 
 
 N. Y. 193, 645; 56 N. E. Rep. 497; 57 
 
 N. E. Rep. 1114), 1039. 
 Kline v. Central Pacific R. Co. (37 Cal. 
 
 400), 392. 
 Kline v. Santa Barbara Consol. Ry. Co. 
 
 (90 Pac. Rep. 125), 592. 
 Klingaman v. Fish, etc., Co. (S. D., 102 
 
 N. W. Rep. 601), 91. 
 Klinger v. United Traction Co. (87 N. 
 
 Y. S. 864; 92 App. Div. 100), 122. 
 Klockenbrink v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (172 Mo. 678; 72 S. W. Rep. 900), 
 
 392. 
 Klockenbrink v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (81 Mo. App. 351, 409), 39. 
 Klos V. Hudson River, etc., C^. (79 N. 
 
 Y. S. 156; 77 App. Div. 566), 308. 
 Knahtla v. Oregon, etc., R. Co. (21 
 
 Oregon 136; 27 Pac. Rep. 91), 471. 
 Knapp V. Dagg (18 How. Pr. 165), 1057. 
 Knapp 11. Sioux City R. Co. (71 Iowa 41; 
 
 32 N. W. Rep. 18), 323. 
 Knapp V. Sioux City, etc., R. Co. (65 
 ■ Iowa 91; 18 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 60), 
 
 38 
 Knight -u. Albert (6 Pa. St 472; 47 Am. 
 
 Dec. 478), 1073. 
 Knight V. Cooper (36 W. Va. 232; 14 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 999), 3. 
 Knight V. Fox (1 E. L. & E. R. 477; 
 
 20 L. J. [N. S.] Exch. 65; 14 Jur. 
 
 963), 278. 
 Knight I/. Ponchartrain- & R. Co. (23 
 
 La. Ann. 462), 692. 
 Knight V. Portland R. Co. (56 Mo. 234), 
 
 557. 
 Knight V. West Jersey R. Co. (108 Pa. 
 
 St. 250; 26 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 485), 
 
 47. 
 Knights Templars, etc^ Co. v. Crayton 
 
 (209 HI. 550; 70 N. E. Rep. 1066), 100 
 Knightstown v. Musgrove (116 Ind. 121; 
 
 18 N. E. Rep. 452; 9 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 827), 1055. 
 Knisley v. Pratt (148 N. Y. 372; 42 
 
 N. E. Rep. 986; 32 L. R. A. 367), 356. 
 Knowlton z: Erie R. Co. (19 Ohio St. 
 
 260) ; Alexander v. Pennsylvania R. 
 
 Co. (48 Ohio St. 623), 858. 
 Knox V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (185 Mass. 
 
 602); 71 N. E. Rep. 90), 1055. 
 Knoxville, etc., R. Co. v. Acuff (92 
 
 Tenn. 26; 20 S. W. Rep. 348), 69. 
 Koch V. Fox (71 N. Y. App. Div. 288; 
 
 75 N. Y. Supp. 913), 282. 
 
 Koch V. Sackmann, etc., Ca. (9 Wash. 
 
 405; 37 Pac. Rep. 703), 286. 
 Koegel V. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (181 
 
 Mo. 379; 80 S. W. Rep. 905), 1078. 
 Koehler v. Rochester, etc., R. Ca. (66 
 
 Hun [N. Y.] 566; 60 N. Y. S. R. 
 
 619; 21 N. Y. S.upp. 844), 1013. 
 Kohn V. McNulta (147 U. S. 238; 13 
 
 Sup. Ct. Rep. 298), 335. 
 Kohner v. Capital Co. (22 App. D. C. 
 
 181; 62 L. R. A. 875), 123. 
 Kolb V. Transit Ca. (102 Mo. App. 143; 
 
 76 S. W. Rep. 1050), 392. 
 
 Kbons V. Railroad Co. (65 Mo. 592), 
 
 99. 
 Kocns V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (65 Mo. 
 
 692), 1073. 
 
 Kqpf V. Monroe, etc, O. (Mich., 95 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 72), 308. 
 Koplite V. St. Paul (86 Minn. 373; 90 
 
 N. W. Rep. 794; 58 L. R. A. 74), 
 
 1048. 
 Korrady v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (131 Ind. 261; 29 N. E. Rep. 1069), 
 
 392. 
 Kostendader v. Pierce (37 Iowa 645), 
 
 74. 
 Kowolski V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (84 
 
 Fed. Rep. 586; 34 C. C. A. 1; 92 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 310), 1058. 
 Kragg V. Atlanta, etc, R. Co. (77 (3a. 
 
 202; 4 Am. St. Rep. 79), 91. 
 Kramer v. San Francisco, etc., R. O). 
 
 (25 Cal. 434), 69. 
 Kranz v. Long Island, etc., R. Co. (33 
 
 N. Y. S. R. 46), 365. 
 Kraus v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (139 Pa. 
 
 St. 272; 20 Atl. Rep. 993), 1020. 
 Krause v. Morgen (52 Ohio St. 325; 40 
 
 N. E. Rep. 886), 6. 
 Kraut V. Frankford, etc, R. Co. (160 
 
 Pa. 327; 28 Atl. Rep. 783), 26. 
 Krebbs v. Oregon, etc., Ry. Co. (40 
 
 Wash. 183; 82 Pac Rep. 130), 260. 
 Kreis v. Missouri Pac R. Co. (131 Mo. 
 
 533; 33 S. W. Rep. 1150), 1104. 
 Kreuger v. Louisville, etc, R. Co. (Ill 
 
 Ind. 51; 11 N. E. Rep. 957; 31 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 329), 476. 
 Kreuziger v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (73 
 
 Wis. 158), 186. 
 Krogg V. Atlanta, etc, R. Co. (77 Ga. 
 
 202; 4 Am. St. Rep. 79), 485. 
 Kroy V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (32 Iowa 
 
 357; 10 Am. Ry. Rep. 48), 381. 
 Krueger v. Louisville, etc, R. Co. (Ill 
 
 Ind. 51; 11 N. E. Rep. 957; 31 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 329), 485. 
 Krumm v. St. Louis, etc, R. Co. (71 
 
 Ark. 590; 76 S. W. Rep. 1075), 800. 
 Kuehn v. Missouri, etc., R. C^. (10 
 
 Tex. Civ. App. 649; 32 S. W. Rep. 
 
 88), 1040. 
 Kuhlen v. Boston, etc, R. Co. (Mass., 
 
 79 N. E. Rep. 815), 282. 
 Kuhn V. Jewett (34 N. J. E<;. 647), 
 
 169. 
 Kuhns V. Wisconsin, etc., R. Co. (70 
 
 Iowa 661; 31 N. W. Rep. 868), 343. 
 Kuiawa v. Chicago, etc., St. Ry. Co. 
 
 (116 N. W. Rep. 249), 971. 
 Kumler v. Junction R. Co. (33 Ohio St. 
 
 150), 492. 
 Kummer v. Christopher, etc., R. Co. (46 
 
 K. Y. S. R. 386; 20 N. Y. S. 116), 
 
 106. \ 
 
 Kunz V. Oregon R. & Nav. Co. (94 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 504), 977. 
 Kurt V. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. 
 
 (Ill N. Y. S. 859), 982. 
 Kutchera v. Goodwillie (93 Wis. 448; 67 
 
 N. W. Rep. 729), 307. 
 Kurtner v. Lindell Ry. Co. (29 Mo. 
 
 Ajjp. 502), 1045. 
 Kwiotkowski v. Grand Trunk R. Co. 
 
 (70 Mich. 549; 38 N. W. Rep. 464), 
 
 1003. 
 Kyne 7*. Wilmington, etc., R. Co. (8 
 
 Houst. [Del.] 185; 14 Atl. Rep. 922), 
 
 1058. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.'] 
 
 Lacey v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (152 
 
 Fed. Rep. 134), 942. 
 Lackawanna, etc., R. Co. -u. Chenoweth 
 
 (52 Pa. St. 382), 602. „ „ , „ 
 La Croy v. New York, etc., R. Co. (132 
 
 N. Y. 570; 30 N. E. Rep. 391), 263. 
 Ladd V. Brocton St. Ry. Co. (Mass., 62 
 
 N. E. Rep. 730), 326. 
 Ladd V. Foster (12 Sawy. [U. S.] 547; 
 
 31 Fed. Rep. 827), 806. 
 Ladouceur v. Northern Pacific R. Co. 
 
 (6 Wash. 280; 33 Pac. Rep. 656, 
 
 1080), 1022. 
 Laflin v. Buffalo, etc., R. Co. (106 N. 
 
 Y. 140; 12 N. E. Rep. 599), 266. 
 Lagrone v. Mobile, etc., R. Co. (67 Miss. 
 
 592; 7 So. Rep. 432), 495. 
 Lahey w. Ottman (25 N. Y. Supp. 897; 
 
 66 N. Y. S. R. 109; 73 Hun 63), 92. 
 Laicher v. New Orleans, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (28 La. Ann. 320), 1098. 
 Laine v. Colder (8 Pa. St. 479), 802. 
 Laird v. Connecticut, etc., R. Co. (62 
 
 N. H. 254; 43 Am. & Eng. R. Cas.- 
 
 63), 47. 
 Lake Erie, etc., R. Co. v. Charman (67 
 
 N. E. Rep. 923), 69. 
 Lake Erie, etc., R. Co. v. Craig (73 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 642; 19 C. C. A. 631), 37. 
 Lake Erie, etc., R. Co. v. Mays (4 Ind. 
 
 App. 413: 30 N-. E. Rep. 1106), 1070. 
 Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. Moore (81 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 85), 977. 
 Lake Erie R. Co. v. Mugg (132 Ind. 
 
 168: 31 N. E. Rep. 564), 189. 
 Lake Erie, etc., R. Co. v. People (42 111. 
 
 App. 387), 686. 
 Lake Erie, etc., R. Co. v. Pike (31 111. 
 
 App. 90), 1059. 
 Lake Shore, etc., Co. v. Baldwin (10 O. 
 
 C. D. 333), 302. 
 Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Bangs (47 
 
 Mich. 470; 11 N. W. Rep. 276; 3 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 426), 787. 
 Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Berlink (2 
 
 III. App. 487), 455. 
 Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Blanchard 
 
 (15 III. App. 682), 1090. 
 Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Boderer (139 
 
 111. 596; 29 N. E. Rep. 692; 54 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 177), 1078. 
 Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Boyd (Ind., 
 
 43 N. E. Rep. 667), 1053. 
 Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Boynts (16 
 
 Ind. App. 640; 45 N.. E. Rep. 812), 
 
 1055. 
 Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Brown (84 
 
 N. E. Rep. 25), 878. 
 Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Brown (183 
 
 111. 162; 14 N. E. Rep. 197; 31 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 61), 457. 
 Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Cincinnati 
 
 R. Co. (30 Ohio St. 604). 976. 
 Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Clark (41 111. 
 
 App. 343), 74. 
 Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Clemens (5 
 
 111. App. 77), 991. 
 Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Fitzpatrick 
 
 (31 Ohio St. 479), 153. 
 
 Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Frantz (127 
 
 Pa. St. 297; 18 Atl. Rep. 22; 39 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 628), 921. 
 Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Hart (87 111. 
 
 529; 19 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 849), 
 
 1092. 
 Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Johnsen 
 
 (35 111. App. 430; 135 111. 641; 26 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 510), 952. 
 Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. -u. Knittal (33 
 
 Ohio St. 468), 381. 
 Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. u. Lavellay (36 
 
 Ohio St. 221), 263. 
 Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. McCormick 
 
 (74 Ind. 440; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 474), 377. 
 Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Mcintosh 
 
 (140 Ind. 261; 38 N. E. Rep. 476), 
 
 1056. 
 Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Miller (25 
 
 Mich. 274; 5 Am. Ry. Rep. 478), 
 
 1019. 
 Lake Shore & Northern R. R. v. Nor- 
 ton (24 Pa. St. 465), 451. 
 Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Parker (131 
 
 111. 657; 33 111. App. 405; 23 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 837; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 339), 
 
 396. 
 Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Patterson 
 
 (144 Ind. 214; 42 N. E. Rep. 480), 
 
 736. 
 Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Pinchin (112 
 
 Ind. 698; 13 N. E. Rep. 677; 31 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 428), 414. 
 Lake Snore, etc., R. Co. v. Prentiss (147 
 
 U. S. 101; 58 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 436), 178. 
 Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Rosenweig 
 
 (113 Pa. St. 519; 6 Atl. Rep. 645), 
 
 177. 
 Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Ryan (70 
 
 111. App. 46), 243. 
 Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Spangler (44 
 
 Ohio St. 471; 8 N. E. Rep. 467; 28 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 319), 472. 
 Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Stupak (123 
 
 Ind. 210; 23 N. E. Rep. 246; 41 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 382), 483. 
 Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Whidden (23 
 
 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 85), 341. 
 Lakin v. Oregon, etc., R. Co. (15 
 
 Oregon 220; 15 Pac. Rep. 641; 34 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 600), 590. 
 Lalor V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (62 III. 
 
 401), 379. 
 Lapsley v. Union Pacific R. Co. (50 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 172; 51 Fed. Rep. 174), 945. 
 Lamb v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (147 
 
 Mo. 171; 48 S. W. Rep. 659; 61 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 81), 1104. 
 Lambert v. Pulp Co. (72 Vt. 278; 47 
 
 Atl. Rep. 1086), 265. 
 Lambeth v. North Carolina R. Co. (66 
 
 N. Car. 494), 578. 
 Lambkin o. Southeastern R. Co. (5 App. 
 
 Cas. 552), 32. 
 Lamkin v. Vicksburg, etc., R. Co. (42 
 
 La. Ann. 997; 8 So. Rep. 630), 732. 
 Lammers v. Great Northern R. Co. (82 
 
 Minn. 120; 84 N. W. Rep. 728), 1056. 
 Lammert v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (9 III. 
 
 App. 388), 824. 
 
 CI 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.'] 
 
 Lancaster v. Connecticut, etc., Co. (92 
 
 Mo. 460; 5 S. W. Rep. 23; 1 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 739), 286. 
 Landon v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (92 III. 
 
 App. 216), 1046. 
 Lane v. Choctaw, etc., R. Co. (91 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 883), 646. 
 Lane v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co, (132 
 
 Mo. 4; 33 S. W. Rep. 1128), 1022. 
 Lane v. New York, etc., R. Co. (94 N. 
 
 Y. S. 988; 107 App. Div. 166), 264. 
 Lane v. Ohio & M. R. Co. (6 Ohio 39), 
 
 12. 
 Lang V. Haliday, etc., R. Co. (49 Iowa 
 
 469), 917. 
 Lang V. New York, etc., R. Co. (125 N. 
 
 Y. 656), 736. 
 Langan v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (72 
 
 Mo. 398; 3 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 355), 
 
 408. 
 Langan v. Tyler (114 Fed. Rep. 716), 
 
 223. 
 Langhoff v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co, (19 
 
 Wis. 489), 984. 
 Langley v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. (74 N. 
 
 Y. S. 857), 126. 
 Langley v. R. R. Co. (10 Gray 103), 235. 
 Langlois v. Buffalo, etc., R. Co. (19 
 
 Barb. [N. Y.] 364), 608. 
 Langlois v. Maine Central R. Co. (84 
 
 Me. 161; 24 Atl. Rep. 804, 482. 
 Laning v. New York, etc., R. Co. (49 
 
 N. Y. 521), 344. 
 Lanning v. Chicago Great Western Ry. 
 
 Co. (94 S. W. Rep. 491), 500. 
 Larabee v. New York,, etc., R. Co. (182 
 
 Mass. 348; 66 N. E. Rep. 1032), 385. 
 Larkin v. Burlington,, etc., R. Co. (85 
 
 Iowa 492; 52 N. W. Rep. 480), 1043. 
 Larkin v. New York, etc., R. Co. (138 
 
 N. Y. 634; 33 N. E. Rep. 1084; 46 
 
 N. Y. S. R. 658; 19 N. Y. Supp. 
 
 479), 1062. . 
 Larkin v. O'Neill (48 Hun 591; 1 N. Y. 
 
 Supp. 232), 95. 
 Larkin v. Williamette Valley R. Co. (13 
 
 Oregon 436; 11 Pac. Rep. 68; 57 Am. 
 
 Rep. 25; 26 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 611), 
 
 295. 
 Larmore v. Crown Point, etc., Co. (101 
 
 N. Y. 391: 56 Am. Rep. 718), 860. 
 Larow V. New York, etc., R. Co. (61 
 
 Hun [N. Y.] 11; 40 N. Y. S. R. 86; 
 
 15 N. Y. Supp. 384), 141. 
 Larson v. American, etc., Co. (40 Wash. 
 
 224; 82 Pac. Rep. 294; 111 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 904), 290. 
 Larson v. Metropolitan, etc., R. Co. (110 
 
 Mo. 234; 19 S. W. Ren. 416; 16 L. 
 
 R. A. 330; 33 Am. St. Rep. 439), 279. 
 Larson v. Pittsburg, etc., Co. (71 Mo. 
 
 App. 512), 320. 
 Larson v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. (43 
 
 Minn. 423; 45 N. W. Rep. 722; 44 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 529), 343j 
 Larson v. Salt Lake City (97 Pac. Rep. 
 
 483), 93. 
 Lary v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. (78 Ind. 
 
 323; 41 Am. Rep. 672; 3 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 498), 1069. 
 Lasalle v. Kostka (190 111. 130; 60 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 72), 319. 
 
 cii 
 
 Lasky v. Canadian Pacific R. Co. (83 
 
 Me. 461; 22 Atl. Rep. 367), 488. 
 Latham v. Staten Island Ry. Co. (150 
 
 Fed. Rep. 235), 932. 
 Latimer v. Metropolitan R. Co. (103 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 1102), 186. 
 Latremonville v. Bennington, etc., R. 
 
 Co. (63 Vt. 336; 48 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 265; 28 Atl. Rep. 656), 133. 
 Lathrop v. Fitchburg R. Co. (150 Mass. 
 
 423), 335. 
 Laub V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (118 Mo. 
 
 App. 488; 94 S. W. Rep. 550), 557. 
 Laubneim v. Royal Netherland Co. (107 
 
 N. Y. 228; 13 N. E. Rep. 781), 298. 
 Laughlin v. Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (62 Mich. 220; 28 N. W. Rep. 873; 26 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 377), 83. 
 Laughlin v. State (105 N. Y. 159), 507. 
 Laughran v. Brewer (113 Ala. 609; 81 
 
 So. Rep. 415), 508. 
 Lauterer v. Manhattan R. Co. (128 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 640), 716. 
 Laveile v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. (40 
 
 Minn. 249; 41 N. .W. Rep. 974; 38 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 115), 527. 
 Lawler v. Androscoggin R. Co. (62 Me. 
 
 463), 476. 
 Lawless v. Connecticut, etc., R. Co. (136 
 
 Mass. 1; 18 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 96), 
 
 491. 
 Lawrenceburg, etc., R. Co. v. Montgom- 
 ery (7 Ind. 474), 771. 
 Lawson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (64 
 
 Wis. 447; 24 N. W. Rep. 618; 64 Am. 
 
 Rep. 634; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 249), 196. 
 Lay V. Richmond, etc., R. Co. (106 No. 
 
 Car. 404; 11 S. E. Rep. 412; 48 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 110), 1077. 
 Leach v. Oregon, etc., R. Co. (89 Utah 
 
 286; 81 Pac. Rep. 90), 91. 
 Leahey v. Cas Avenue, etc., R. Co. (97 
 
 Mo. 165; 10 S. W. Rep. 58), 98. 
 Leake v. Rio Grande, etc., R. Co. (9 
 
 Utah 246; 33 Pac. Rep. 1046), 1036. 
 Leary v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (1S9 Mass. 
 
 680; 2 N. E. Rep. 116; 52 Am. Rep. 
 
 733; 23 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 383), 345. 
 Leavenworth v. Hatch (57 Kan. 57; 45 
 
 Pac. Rep. 65; 67 Am. St. Rep. 309), 
 
 1053. 
 Leavenwqrth, etc., R. Co. v. Rice (10 
 
 Kan. 426), 996. 
 Leavitt v. Bangor, etc., R. Co. (89 Me. 
 
 509; 36 Atl. Rep. 998; 36 L. R. A. 
 
 382), 278. 
 Leavitt v. Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. (5 
 
 Ind. App. 513), 934. 
 Leazott v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (70 N. 
 
 H. 5; 45 Atl. Rep. 1084), 348. 
 LeBarron v. East Boston Co. (11 Allen 
 
 316), 610. 
 Leduc V. Northern Pac. R. Co. (Minn., 
 
 100 N. W. Rep. 108), 263. 
 Lee II. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. (54 
 
 S. E. Rep. 678), 264. 
 Lee V. Central & R. Co. (86 Ga. 231; 
 
 12 S. E. Rep. 307), 325. 
 Lee V. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. (Ky., 
 
 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 60), 339. 
 Lee V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (80 Iowa 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITEOJ. 
 
 {Beferences are to sections.'] 
 
 172; 45 N. W. Rep. 739; 45 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 157), 974. 
 Lee V. Detroit, etc., R. Co. (62 Mo. 
 
 665), 158. 
 Lee V. Market St R. Co. (135 Cal. 
 
 293), 398. 
 Lee V. Michigan, etc., R. Co. (87 Mich. 
 
 574; 49 N. W. Rep. 909; 48 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 356), 483. 
 Lee V, Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (195 Mo. 
 
 400; 92 S. W. Rep. 614), 463. 
 Lee V. Northern Pac. Ry.- Co. (Wash., 
 
 81 Pac. Rep. 834), 323. 
 Lee V. R. R. Co. (1 Am. Neg. Rep. 
 
 60), 339. 
 Lee V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (112 Mo. 
 
 App. S72; 87 S. W. Rep. 12), 266. 
 Legee v. Nev York & H. R. Co. (83 
 
 W. E. Rep. 367), 557. 
 Leggett V. Western, etc., R. Co. (143 Pa. 
 
 St. 39; 21 Atl. Rep. 996), 708. 
 Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Brandmaier (113 
 ■ Pa. St. '610; 6 Atl. Rep. 838), 963. 
 Lehigh Valley R. Co. v, Delachesa (145 
 
 Fed. Rep, 617), 242. 
 Lehigh Iron Co. v. Rupp (100 Pa. St. 
 
 95; 7 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 25), 63. 
 Lehman v. Louisiana, etc., R. Co. (37 
 
 La. Ann. 705), 704. 
 Lehr v. Steinway, etc., R. Co. (118 N. 
 
 Y. 556; 44 Hun 627; 23 N. E. Rep. 
 
 889), 576. 
 Leishman v. Union Iron Works (83 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 30), 515. 
 Leitner v. Grieb (104 Mo. App. 173; 77 
 
 S. W. Re^. 764), 339. 
 I.eMay v, Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (105 
 
 Mo. 361; 16 S. W. Rep. 10491 1062. 
 Lemon v. Chansler (68 Mo. 340; 30 Am. 
 
 Rep. 799), 567. 
 Lenix v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (76 
 
 Mo. 86), 994. 
 Lennox v. Interurban R. Co. (93 N. Y. 
 
 S. R. 230; 104 App. Div. 110), 182. 
 Lent V. New York, etc., R. Co. (120 
 
 N. Y. 467; 24 N. E. Rept 653; 31 N. 
 
 Y. S. R. 638; 44 A-m. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 373), 774. 
 Leonard v. Columbia, etc., Co. (84 N. Y. 
 
 48), 47. 
 Leonard v. New York, etc., R. Co. (10 
 
 J. & S. [N. Y.] 225), 1027. 
 Lepalla v. Cleveland, etc., Co. (Mich., 
 
 81 N. W. Ren. 558), 358. 
 Le Pierre v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (99 
 
 Mich. 21S^, 484. 
 Lesan v. Maine, etc., R. Co. (77 Me. 
 
 85; 23 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 245), 883. 
 Leslie w. Rich Hill, etc., Co. (110 Mo. 
 
 31; 19 S. W. Rep. 308), 14. 
 Leslie v. Wabash R. Co. (88 Mo. 50; 26 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 229), 573. 
 Levelsmeyer v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (114 Mo. App. 418), 1094. 
 Levey v. Bigelow (6 Ind. App. 677; 34 
 
 N. E. Rep. 128), li5. 
 Lewes v. Crane & Sons (78 Vt. 216; 62 
 
 Atl. Rep. 60), 184. 
 Lewin v. Lehigh Valley R. Co. (41 App. 
 
 Div. 89; 68 N. Y. Supp. 113), 10S6. 
 Lewis V. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. (38 Md, 
 
 688; 10 Am. Ry. Rep. 521), 1028. 
 
 Lewis V. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (145 N. 
 
 Y. 508; 40 N. E. Rep. 248), 789. 
 Lewis V. Eastern R. Co. (40 N. H. 187), 
 
 886. 
 Lewis V. Flint, etc., R. Co. (54 Mich. 55; 
 
 19 N. W. Rep. 744; 52 Am. Rep. 790; 
 
 18 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 263), 677. 
 Lewis B. London, etc., R. Co. (L. R., 
 
 9 Q. B. 66; 43 L. J. Q. B. 8; 30 L. 
 
 T. [N. S.3 844), 704. 
 Lewis V. Long Island, etc., R. Co. (162 
 
 N. Y. 52; 56 N. E. Rep. 548), 1061. 
 Lewis V. Mayesville, etc., R. Co. (25 Ky. 
 
 L. R. 948; 76 S. W. Rep. 526), 235. 
 Lewis V. New York, etc., R. Co. (183 
 
 N. Y. 496; 26 N. E. Rep. 357; 52 
 
 Hun 614), 961. 
 Lewis V. St, Louis, etc., R. Co. (59 Mo. 
 
 496; 8 Am. Ry. Rep. 450), 495. 
 Lewis V. Seifert (116 Pa. St. 628; 11 
 
 Atl. Rep. 514), 863. 
 Lewis V. Vicksburg, etc., R. Co. (114 
 
 La. 161; 38 So. Rep. 92), 273. 
 Lexington Ry. Co. v. Herring (96 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 558), 558. 
 Leyh v. Newburg, etc., R. Co. (N. Y., 6 
 
 Am. Neg. Rep. 361), 649. 
 Libby v. Maine Central R. Co. (85 Me. 
 
 34; 26 Atl. Rep. 943; 58 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 81), 603. 
 Lierman v. (Chicago, etc., R. Co. (82 
 
 Wis. 286; 52 N. W. Rep. 91), 196. 
 Limerick Bank v. Howard (71 N. H. 
 
 13; 51 Atl. Rep. 641; 93 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 489), 463. 
 Lien v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (79 Mo. 
 
 App. 475), 1014. 
 Lightfoot V. Winnebago Traction Co. 
 
 (123 Wis. 479; 108 N. W. Rep. 30), 
 
 1053. 
 Limekiller v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (33 
 
 Kan. 83; 5 Pac. Rep. 401; 19 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 184), 71. 
 Lincoln Ry. Co. v. Cox (48 Neb. 807; 
 
 67 N. W. Rep. 740), 118, 
 Lincoln v. Saratoga, etc., R. Co. (23 
 
 Wend. 425), 172. 
 Lincoln Traction Co. v. Shepard (Neb., 
 
 104 N. W. Rep. 882), 126. 
 Lindeman v. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (46 Hun 679; 11 N. Y. S. R. 837), 
 
 919. 
 Ljnder v. Transit Co. (IDS Mo. App. 
 
 574; 77 S. W. Rep. 997), 838. 
 Lindsay v. New York, etc., Ry. Co. (112 
 
 Fed. Rep. 384; 50 C. C. A. 898), 
 
 348. 
 Lindsay v. Norfolk & S. R. Co. (N. C, 
 ' 43 S. E. Rep. 511), 260. 
 Lindsay v. Oregon Short Line R. Co. 
 
 (90 Pac. Rep. 984), 739. 
 Lindsay v. Tioga, etc., Co. (108 La. 
 
 468; 32 So. Rep. 464), 308. 
 Lindsey v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (86 
 
 App. Diy. 603), 563. 
 Lindvall v. Woods (41 Minn. 818; 4 
 
 L R.- A. 793; 42 N. W. Rep. 1080; 
 
 39 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 339), 480. 
 Ling V. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. (50 Minn. 
 
 160; 52 N. W. Rep. 378), 467. - 
 Lining v, Illinois & R. Co. (81 Iowa 
 
 246), 29. 
 
 ciii 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [,References are to sections.'] 
 
 Link V. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (107 Ky. 
 
 370: 54 S. W. Rep. 184), 492. 
 Linnehan v. Rollins (137 Mass. 123; SO 
 
 Am. Rep. 287), 283. 
 Linton Coal, etc., Co. v. Persons (15 
 
 Ind. App. 89; 43 N. E. Rep. 651), 
 
 319. 
 Lipschulz V. Ross (84 N. Y. S. 632), 
 
 108. 
 Little V. Central, etc., Tel. Co. (213 
 
 Pa. St. 229; 62 All. Rep. 848), 1048. 
 Little V. Hackett (116 V. S. 366; 29 
 
 L. Ed. 652; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 391), 
 
 1047. 
 Little V. Southern Ry. Co. (120 Ga. 
 
 347: 47 S. E. Rep. 953), 263. 
 Littlejohn v. Central R. Co. (74 Ga. 
 
 396), 413. 
 Littlejohn v. Fitchburg R. Co. (148 
 
 Mass. 478; 20 N. E. Rep. 103), 811. 
 Little Miami R. Co. v. Fitzpatrick (42 
 
 Ohio St. 318), 461. 
 Little Miami R. Co. v. Stevens (20 
 
 Ohio St. 415), 491. 
 Little Miami R. Co. -v. Wetmore (19 
 
 Ohio St. 110), 736. 
 Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Askins (46 
 
 Ark. 423), 789. 
 Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Barker (33 
 
 Ark. 350), 206. 
 Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Barry (58 
 
 Ark. 198; 23 S. W. Rep. 1097; 25 L. 
 
 R. A. 386), 488. 
 Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Cavenesse 
 
 (48 Ark. 106; 2 S. W. Rep. 505), 769. 
 Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Cullen (54 
 
 Ark. 431; 16 S. W. Rep. 169), 1029. 
 Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Duffey (35 
 
 Ark. 602; 4 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 637), 461. 
 Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Eubanks (48 
 
 Ark. 460; 3 S. W. Rep. 808; 31 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 176), 325. 
 Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Harrell (58 
 
 Ark. 454; 25 S. W. Rep. 117), 1041. 
 
 Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Haynes (47 
 
 'Ark. 497; 1 S. W. Rep. 774; 28 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 572), 1078. 
 Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Hopkins (54 
 
 Ark. 213), 599. 
 Little. Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Lawton (55 
 
 Ark. 428; 18 S. W. Rep. 543; 62 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 260), 570. 
 Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Leverett (48 
 
 Ark. 333; 3 S. W. Rep. 50; 28 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 459), 374. 
 Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Miles (40 
 Ark. 298; 48 Am. Rep. 10; 13 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 10), 578. 
 Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Mosely (56 
 
 Little Rock, etc, R. Co. v. Tankersly 
 
 (54 Ark. 25; 14 S. W. Rep. 1099), 
 
 788. 
 Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Townsend 
 
 (41 Ark. 382; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 619), 322. 
 Little Rock, etc., R. Co. -v. Wilson (90 
 
 Tenn. 871; 16 S. W. Rep. 613), 952. 
 Livingston v. Wabash R. Co. (l70 Mo. 
 
 452; 71 S. W. Rep. 136), 883. 
 Lochat v. Lutz (Ky., 22 S. W. Rep. 
 
 218), 872. 
 
 civ 
 
 Lochbaum v. Oregon, etc., R, Co. (104 
 
 Fed. Rep. 852: 44 C. C. A. 220), 495. 
 
 Locke V. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. (15 
 
 Minn. 350), 962. 
 Locke V. Sioux City, etc., R. Co, (46 
 
 Iowa 109), 202. 
 Lockhart v. Lichtenthaler (46 Pa. St. 
 
 151), 1044. 
 Lockhart v. Little Rock, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (40 Fed. Rep. 631), 230. 
 Lockwood V. Belle City R. Co. (92 Wis. 
 
 97; 65 N. W. Rep. 866), 1057. 
 Lockwood V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (55 
 
 Wis. 50), S45. 
 Lockwood V. New York, etc., R. Co. (98 
 
 N. Y. 523), 188. 
 Loeffler v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (96 
 
 Mo. 267; 9 S. W. Rep. 580), 410. 
 Loehring v. Westlake Const. Co. (118 
 Mo. App. 163; 94 S. W. Rep. 747), 
 276. 
 Logan V. Metropolitan R. Co. /(1S3 Mo., 
 
 582; 82 S. W. Rep. 126), 95. 
 Lombard v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (47 
 
 Iowa 494), 522. 
 Lomer v. Segal (30 Vt. 66), 43. 
 London, etc., R. Co. v. Hellawell (26 
 
 L. T. 557), 664. 
 
 Long V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (48 Kan. 
 
 28; 28 Pac. Rep. 977; 15 L. R. A. 
 
 319; 63 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 45), 741. 
 
 Long V. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (57 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 802), 643. 
 Long v. Coronado R. Co. (96 Cal. 269; 
 
 31 Pac. Rep. 170), 139. 
 Long V. Home (1 Car. & P. 612), 680. 
 Long V. Lehigh Valley R. Co. (130 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 870), 852. 
 Long V. Milford (137 Pa. St. 122; 20 
 
 Atl. Rep. 425), 446. 
 Long V. Moon (l07 Mo. 334; 17 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 810), 276. 
 Long V. Pacific - Ry. Co. (65 Mo. 225), 
 
 494. 
 Longabaugh v. Virginia City R. Co. (9 
 
 Nev. 271), 892. 
 Longmore v. Great Western R. Co. (19 
 
 C. B. [N. S.] 183), 630. 
 Long's Admr. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. 
 (24 Ky. L. R. 567; 58 L. R. A. 237; 
 68 S. W. Rep. 1095), 379. 
 Lookout Mt., etc., Co. v. Lea (Ala., 39 
 
 So. Rep. 1017), 481. 
 Looram v. Second Avenue, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (11 N. Y. S. R. 652), 172. 
 Loranger v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. 
 (104 Mich. 80; 62 N. W. Rep. l37), 
 600. 
 Lord V. Boston & M. R. Co. (65 Atl. 
 
 Rep. Ill), 270. 
 Lord V. Pueblo, etc., R. Co. (12 Colo. 
 • 390; 21 Pac. Rep. 148), 411. 
 Lorentz v. Robinson (61 Md. 64), 3. 
 Loring v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (128 
 
 Mo. 359; 31 S. W. Rep. 6), 412. 
 Lorsbee v. New York, etc., R. Co. (183 
 Mass. 348; 66 N. E. Rep. 1032), 385. 
 Loso V, Lancaster County (Neb., 109 N. 
 W. Rep. 752; 8 L. R. A. [N. S.] 
 618), 1048. 
 Loucks V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (.■?1 
 Minn. 626; 19 Am. & Eng, R. Cas. 
 305j 18 N. W. Rep. 651), 946. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.] 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Ader (110 
 
 Ind. 376; 11 N. E. Rep. 437), 395. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Allen (47 III. 
 
 App. 465), 343. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Allen (78 
 
 Ala. 494; 88 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 614), 
 
 513. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. ». Armstrong 
 
 (105 S. W. Rep. 473), 1049. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Ballard (85 
 
 Ky. 307; 3 S. W. Rep. 530; 7 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 600; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 135), 590. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Bates (146 
 
 Ind. 564; 45 N. E. Rep. 108), 494. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Berry (2 Ind. 
 
 App. 427; 28 N. E. Rep. 714), 344. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co.>. Bisch (120 Ind. 
 
 549; 33 N. E. Rep. 204; 41 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 89), 669. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Black (89 Ala. 
 
 313; 8 So. Rep. 246; 45 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 38), 1083. 
 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Bodine (59 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 740), 269. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Boland (96 
 
 Ala. 626; 11 So. Rep. 667; 53 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 169), 348. 
 Louisville & N. R. Co. J/. Bouldin (121 
 
 Ala. 197; 25 So. Rep. 903), 269. 
 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Breeden's 
 
 Admr. (S3 Ky. L. R. 1021, 1763; 64 
 
 S. W. Rep. 667), 232. 
 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Brice (84 Ky. 
 
 298; 1 S. W. Rep. 488), 254. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Brooks (83 
 
 Ky. 129), 462, 492. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Buck (116 
 
 Ind. 666; 19 N. E. Rep. 453; 2 L. R. 
 
 A. 620; 38 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 162), 
 
 374. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co, v. Burke (6 
 
 Coldw. [Tenn.] 45), 404. 
 Louisville & N. Ry. Co. v. Campbell (97 
 
 Ala. 147; 12 So. Rep. 574), 119. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Case (9 Bush. 
 
 [Ky.] 728), 1045. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Cavens (9 
 
 Bush. [Ky.] 659), 462. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Chaffin (84 Ga. 
 
 519; 11 S. E. Rep. 891), 69. 
 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Cheatham (100 
 -S. W. Rep. 902), 282. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. ii. Christian Moe 
 
 Brewing Co. (43 So. Rep. 723), 985. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Coleman (86 
 
 Ky. 556; 6 S. W. Rep. 876; 31 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 390), 1Q83. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Collins (2 
 
 Duv. [Ky.] 114), 461. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Commonwealth 
 
 (80 Ky. 143: 44 Am. Rep. 468; 14 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 613), 982. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v Connor (9 
 
 Heisk. [Tenn.] 19; 19 Am. 'Ry. Rep. 
 
 368), 69. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Connor ' (3 
 
 Baxt. 383; 21 Am. Ry. Rep. 194), 193. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co-, v. Cooper , (68 
 
 Miss. 368; 8 So. Rep. 747), 1096. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Cooper (Ky., 
 
 6 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 6), 1085. 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Conroy (63 
 
 Miss. 562), 311. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v, Coppage (Ky., 
 
 13 S. W. Rep. 1086), 62. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Cottengim (104 
 
 5. W. Rep. 280; 31 Law Rep. 871), 
 555. 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. ■ Co. v. Crank (119 
 
 Ind. 542; 21 N. E. Rep. 31; 4 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 158), 570. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Creek (130 
 
 Ind. 139; 29 N. E. Rep. 481; 14 L. 
 
 R. A. 733), 1066. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Crunk (119 
 
 Ind. 642; 21 N. E. Rep. 31; 41 Am. 
 
 6. Eng. 8. Cas. 158), 789. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Dancy (Ala., 
 
 11 So. Rep. 796), 724. 
 Louisville & St. L. R. Co. v. Davis (106 
 
 S. W. Rep. 304), 877. 
 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Deason (96 
 
 S. W. Rep. 1115), 732. 
 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Dickey (104 
 
 S. W. Rep. 329), 185. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Dillard (114 
 
 Tenn. 240; 86 S. W. Rep. 313), 364. . 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Dougherty (108 
 
 S. W. Rep. 336), 631. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Douglas (69 
 
 Miss. 733; 11 So. Rep. 933; 30 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 682), 740. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Earl (94 Ky. 
 
 368; 22 S. W. Rep. 607), 91. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Ellis (97 Ky. 
 
 330; .80 S. W. Rep. 979), 730. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Eves (1 Ind. 
 
 App. 224; 27 N. E. Rep. 680), 394. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Falvey (104 
 
 Ind. 409; 3 N. E. Rep. 489; 33 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 522), 168. 
 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Farris (100 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 870), 866. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Faylor (126 
 
 Ind. 126; 25 N. E. Rep. 869), 851. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Finn (16 Ky. 
 
 L. R. 57), 744. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Fleming (14 
 
 Lea. [Tenn.] 128; 18 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 347), 586. 
 Louisvillei etc., R. Co. v. Fox (11 Bush. 
 
 [Ky.] 495), 83. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Frawley (110 
 
 Ind. 18; 9 N. E. Rep. 594; 28 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 308), 359. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. French (69 
 
 Miss. 121; 12 So. Rep. 338), 961. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Gardner (1 
 
 Lea [Tenn.] 688), 973. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Goetz (79 Ky. 
 
 442; 43 Am. Rep. 227; 14 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 627), 956. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co; v. Goodykoontz 
 
 (119 Ind. Ill), 62. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Goss (137 Ala. 
 
 319; 34 So.- Rep. 1007), 613. 
 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Goulding (42 
 
 So. Rep. 854), 980. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Gower (85 
 
 Tenn. 465; 3 S. W. Rep. 824; 31 Am. 
 
 & Ene. R. Cas. 168), 332. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Graham (124 
 
 Ind. 89; 24 N. E. Rep. 668), 475. 
 
 OV 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [Referenees are to sections.'] 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Guinan (11 
 
 Lea [Tenn.] 98; 47 Am. Rep. 879; 13 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 37), 176. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Hairston (97 
 
 Ala. 361; 12 So. Rep. 899), 1063. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. ». Hale (103 
 
 Ky. 600; 44 S. W. Rep. 213; 42 L. 
 
 R. A. 293; 10 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 [N. S.] 73), 690. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Hall (87 Ala. 
 
 708; 6 So. Rep. 277; 4 L. R. A. 710; 
 
 39 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 298), 399. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Hall (91 Ala. 
 
 112; 8 So. Rep. 371; 48 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 170), 406. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Hanning (131 
 
 Ind. 528: 31 N. E. Rep. 187; 53 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 452), 321. 
 Louisville, etc., Co. v. Hart (92 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 951), 98. ■ 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Hawthorne (45 
 
 111. App. 635), 479. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Hawthorne 
 
 (147 111. 226; 35 N. E. Rep. 534), 
 
 492. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Head (80 Ind. 
 
 117; 4 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 619), 947. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Heck (151 
 
 Ind. 292; 50 N. E. Rep. 988; 11 Am. 
 
 & Eng. k. Cas. [N. &] 382), 488. 
 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Helm (89 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 700; 28 Ky. L. R. 603), 495. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Hendricks (128 
 
 Ind. 462; 28 N. E. Rep. 58), 104. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Henley (92 
 
 Tenn. 208; 721 S. W. Rep. 326), 376. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Hine (121 
 
 Ala. 234; 14 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. [N. 
 
 S.] 382), 39. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Hocker (111 
 
 Ky. 707; 64 S. W. Rep. 638; 65 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 119), 414. TT ,- . 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. f. Hoskin s 
 
 Admr. (108 S. W. Rep. 305), 875. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Howard (82 
 
 Ky. 212; 19 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 98), 
 
 861. 
 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Hubbard (41 
 
 So. Rep. 814), 903. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Jackson (106 
 
 Tenn. 438; 61 S. W. Rep. 771), 499. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Johnson (108 
 
 Ala. 62; 19 So. Rep. 511; 31 L. R. 
 
 A. 372), 730. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Johnson (92 
 
 Ala. 204; 9 So. Rep. 269; 47 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 611)^ 1070. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Johnson (44 
 . 111. App. 56), 453. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Johnson (81 
 
 Fed. Rep. 679; 63 U. S. App. 381), 
 
 136. 
 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Jones (Fla., 
 
 34 So. Rep. 246), 66. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Jones (83 
 
 Ala. 376; 3 So. Rep. 902; 34 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 417), 639. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Jones (108 
 
 Ind. 551), 608. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Joshlin (110 
 
 S. W. Rep. 382), 950. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Katzenberger 
 
 cvi 
 
 (16 Lea [Tenn.] 380; 86 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 334), 665. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Keefer (146 
 
 Ind. 21; 44 N. E. Rep. 796; 38 L. R. 
 
 A. 93), 864. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Kelly (92 Ind. 
 
 371; 47 Am. Rep. 149; 13 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 1), 690. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Kenley (92 
 
 Tenn. 207; 21 S. W. Rep. 326), 474. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v, Lahr (86 
 
 Tenn. 336; 6 S, W. Rep. 663), 476. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v, Lawler (107 
 
 S. W. Rep. 702), 689. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Lee (47 111. 
 
 App. 384), 965. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Lee (97 Ala. 
 
 325; 12 So. Rep. 48J, 790. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Logan (88 
 
 Ky. 232; 10 S. W. Rep. 655), 730. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Long (Ky., 
 
 22 S. W. Rep. 747), 674. 
 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Lowe (80 S. 
 
 \V. Rep. 768) 269. 
 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Lowe (Ky., 6 
 
 S. W. Rep. 736), 273. 
 Louisville, etc^ R. Co. v. Lucas* Admr. 
 
 (98 S. W. Rep. 308), 478. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Lucas (119 
 
 Ind. 683; 21 N. E. Rep. 968), 710. 
 Louisville, etc., R. C^. v. Mahoney (7 
 
 Bush. [Ky.] 236. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Marriott (Ky., 
 
 19 Am, & Eng. R. Cas. 609), 104. 
 Louisville, etc., K. Co. v. Martin (87 
 
 Tenn. 398; 10 S. W. Rep. 772; 3 L. 
 
 R. A. 282), 469. 
 Loiiisville, etc., R. Co. v. Mask (64 
 
 Miss. 738; 2 So. Rep. 360), 708. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. McCoy (81 Ky. 
 
 403; 16 Am. & En«. R. Cas. 277), 406. 
 Louisville, etc... R. Co. v. McNary's 
 
 Admr. (108 S. W. Rep. 898), 983. 
 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mertz (Ala., 
 
 40 So. Rep. 60), 126. 
 Louisville, etc^ R. Co. v. Miller (Ind., 
 
 37 N. E. Rep. 343; 68 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 304), 106. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Minogue (90 
 
 Ky. 369; 14 S. W. Rep. 357), 582. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Mitchell (87 
 
 Kjr. 327), 491. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. MoUoy (Ky., 
 
 91 S. W. Rep. 685), 1039. " 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Mothershed 
 
 (97 Ala. 261; 12 So. Rep. 714), 105. 
 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mulder (42 
 
 So. Rep. 742), 682. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Murphy (9 
 
 Bush. [Ky.] 628), 1068. 
 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Neltschi's 
 
 Exrs. (97 S. W. Rep. 14), 983. 
 Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Nitsche 
 
 (126 Ind. 229; 26 N. E. Rep. 51), 37. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Orr (91 Ala. 
 
 648; S So. Rep. 360), 400. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Orr (94 Ala. 
 
 602; 10 So. Rep. 167), 90. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Patterson (69 
 
 Miss. 421; 13 So. Rep. 697), 690. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Payne (104 
 
 S. W. Rep. 762), 706. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.] 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Pearson (97 
 
 Ala. 811; 18 So. Rep. 176), 400. 
 Louisville, etc.. R. Co. v. Pedigo (108 
 
 Ind. 481; 8 N. E. Rep. 637; 87 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 310), 605. 
 Louisville, etc., B. Co. v. Petty (67 
 
 Miss. 255: 7 So. Rep. 351; 41 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. .444), 354. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Phillipps (118 
 
 Ind. 59; 13 N. E. Rep. 133; 31 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 432), 888. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Potts (98 Ky. 
 
 30; 17 S. W. Rep. 185), 408. 
 Louisville & N. S. R. Co. v. Reagan (96 
 
 Tenn. [18 Pickje] 128; 33 S. W. Rep. 
 
 1050), 41. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. ^. Reynolds (24 
 
 Ky. L. R. 1402; 71 S. W. Rep. 516), 
 
 759, 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Richardson 
 
 (100 Ala. 232: 14 So. Rep. 809), 498. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Ricketts (Ky., 
 
 19 S. W. Rep. 188), 786. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Ritter (85 Ky. 
 
 368; 3 S. W. Rep. 591; 88 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R: Cas. 167), 611. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Robertson (9 
 
 Heisk. [Tenn.] 276), 404. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Robinson (Ala., 
 
 37 So. Rep. 431), 55. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Rush (187 Ind. 
 
 545; 86 N. E. Rep. 1010), 198. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Sandford (117 
 
 Ind. 265; 19 N. E. Rep. 770), 341. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Sawyer (86 
 
 S. W. Rep. 386), 901. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Schmetzer 
 
 (Ky., 88 S. W. Rep. 603), 97. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Schmidt (134 
 
 Ind. 16; 33 N. E. Rep. 774; 55 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 188), 886. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Schmidt (8 
 . Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 248), 886. 
 Louisville, etc„ R. Co. v. Schuster (Ky., 
 
 35 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 407; 7 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 874), 1034. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Shanks (94 
 
 Ind. 698; 19 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 88), 
 
 173., 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co, v. Sheets (Ky., 
 
 13 S. W. Rep. 848; 41 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 470), 477, 
 Louisville, etc., R; Co. v. Shire's Admr. 
 
 (108 111. 617), 451. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co, v. Sickings (5 
 
 Bush. [Ky.] 1), 173. 
 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Simpson's 
 
 Admr. (23 Ky. L. R. 1075; 64 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 750), 873. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Smith (129 
 
 Ala. 53; 30 So. Rep. 571), 323. 
 Louisville,, etc., R. Co. v. Snyder (117 
 
 Ind. 435; SO N. E. Rep. 284; 3 L. R. 
 
 A. 434; 37 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 137), 
 
 605. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Southwick (16 
 
 Ind. App. 486; 44 N. E. Rep. 263), 
 
 touisville, etc., R. Co. v. Stacker (86 
 Tenn. 343; 6 S. W. Rep. 737; 6 Am. 
 St. Rep. 840), 568. 
 
 LouisviUe, etc., R. Co. v. Stewart (56 
 Fed. Rei>. 808), 92. 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Stommel (128 
 
 Ind. 35; 85 N. E. Rep. 863), 1009. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Sullivan (81 
 
 Ky. 634; 16 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 390) 390 
 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Survant (44 
 
 S. W. Rep. 88), 269. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Taylor (186 
 
 Ind. 126; 2« N. E. 'Rep. 869), 674. 
 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Thomas (87 
 
 Miss. 600; 40 So. Rep. 857), 258. 
 Louisville, etc., R. -Co. v. Thompson 
 
 (107 Ind. 442; 8 N. E. Rep. 18; 57 
 
 Am. Rep. 120; 87 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 88), 851. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Thompson (64 
 
 Miss. 584; 1 So. Rep. 840; 30 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 541), 631. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Tow (Ky., 63 
 
 S. W. Rep. 27; 66 L. R. A. 941), 883. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Trammel (93 
 
 Ala. 350), 194. . 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Treadway (148 
 
 Ind. 475; 40 N. E. Rep. 807), 625. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Tucker's 
 
 Admr. (23 Ky. L. R. 1929; 65 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 453), 366. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Utz (133 Ind. 
 
 866; 38 N. E. Rep. 881), 
 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Vincent (95 
 
 S. W. Rep. 179), 263. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Wade (35 So. 
 
 Rep. 863), 518. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. \Vagner (153 
 ■ Ind. 480: 53 N. E. Rep. 927; 14 Am. 
 
 & Eilg. R. Cas. [N. S.] 706), 508. , 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co.- it. Wallace (90 
 
 Tenn. 53; 15 S. W. Rep. 981), 398. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v, Watkins (Ky., 
 
 13 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 89), 1093. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Webb (90 Ala. 
 
 185; 8 So. Rep. 618; 49 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 437), 943. 
 Louisville & C. B. Co. v. Wiesan (31 Fla. 
 
 700), -27. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Willis (83 Ky. 
 
 57), 304. 
 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Wilson (100 
 
 S. W. Rep. 302), 924. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Wolfe (80 Ky. 
 
 Louisville, ' etcr, R. Co. v. Wood (113 
 
 Ind. 544; 14 N. E. Rep. 573; 16 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 197), 664. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Wright (115 
 
 Ind. 378; 16 N. E. Rep. 145; 38 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 41), 97. 
 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. York (138 
 
 Ala. 305; 30 So. Rep. 676), 264. 
 Loushay v. Erie R. Co. (88 N. Y. S. R. 
 
 446; 95 App. Div. 108), 338. 
 Lovejoy v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (125 
 
 Mass. 79), 326. 
 Lovell V, Kansas City So. Ry. Co. (121 
 
 Mb. App. 466; 97 S. W. Rep. 193), 
 
 866. '^ 
 Lowden v. Pennsylvania Co. (82 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 941), 991. 
 Lowell V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (23 Pick. 
 
 [Mass.] 24; 34 Am. Dec. 23), 283. 
 Lbwenstein v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. 
 
 (110 Mo. App. 689; 117 Mo. App. 
 
 372), 881. 
 
 evil 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 IReferences are to sections.'] 
 
 Lowenstein ». Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. 
 
 (Mo. App., 113 S. W. Rep. 1012), 
 
 1069. 
 Lowery %: Ry. Co. (99 N. Y. 158), 38. 
 Loyd V. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (53 Mo. 
 
 509; 12 Am. Ry. Rep. 474), 833. 
 Lucas V. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. (33 
 
 Wis. 41), 561. , ^ 
 
 Lucas V. New Bedford R^ Co. (6 Gray 
 
 [Mass.] 64), 570. „ ^ _, 
 
 Luce V. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. (67 
 
 Iowa 75; 24 N. W. Rep. 600), 604. 
 Luebke v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (69 
 
 Wis. 127; 17 N. W. Rep. 870; 48 Am. 
 
 Rep. 483; 15 Am, & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 183) 475 
 Luebke v. Railway Co. (63 Wis. 91; 23 
 
 N. W. Rep. 136), 263. 
 Luman t. Golden Ancient Channel Min. 
 
 Co. (74 Pac. Rep. 30), 98. 
 Lung Chung v. Northern Pac. R. Co. 
 
 (19 Fed. Rep. 254; 10 Saw. [N. S.] 
 
 17; 16 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 548), 52. 
 Lunt V. London, etc., R. Co. (1 Q. B. 
 
 277; 12 Jur. [N. S.] 409; 35 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 105; 14 W. R. 497; 14 L. T. 
 
 225) 929. 
 Lutz V. Atlantic . etc., R. Co. (N. Mex., 
 
 30 Pac. Rep. 918; 63 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 478), 139. 
 Lusby V. Atchison, etc., R. Co. (41 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 181; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 93), 651. 
 Luse I'. Union Pacific R. Co. (57 Kan. 
 
 361; 46 Pac. Rep. 768), 708. 
 Lustig v. New York, etc., R. Co. (48 
 
 N. Y. S. R. 916), 188. 
 Lyman t. Boston, etc., R. Co. (N. H., 
 
 80 Atl. Rep. 976; 45 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 163), 104. 
 Lynch v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (159 Mass. 
 
 536; 34 N. E. Rep. 1078), 265. 
 Lynch v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (106 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 68), 492. 
 Lynch v. Mayor, etc. (47 Hun .[N. Y.] 
 
 524; 15 N. Y. S. R. 103), 405. 
 Lynch v. Metropolitan Ry. Co, <112 Mo. 
 
 433; 20 S. W. Rep. 642), 1000. 
 Lynch v. St. Joseph, etc., R. Co. (Ill 
 
 Mo. 601; 19 S. W. Rep. 1114), 1063. 
 Lynfield v. Old Colony R. Co. (64 Mass. 
 
 562; 87 Am. Dec. 124), 946. 
 Lyon V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (107 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 386), 50. 
 Lyon z', Charleston- etc., Ry. (58 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 18; 77 S. C. 328), 496. 
 Lyon V. (iumberland Valley R. Co. (83 
 
 Pa. St. 384), 469. 
 Lyon V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (6 Mo. 
 
 App. 516, 517), 918. 
 Lyons v. Erie R. Co. (57 N. Y. 489), 29. 
 Lyttle V. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (84 Mich. 
 
 889; 47 N. W. Rep. 673), 269. 
 
 M 
 
 Mabry v. North Carolina R. Co. (139 N. 
 C. 388; 52 S. E. Rep. 124), 535. 
 
 McAdoo V, Richmond, etc., R. Co. (105 
 No. Car. 140; 11 S. E. Rep. 316; 41 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. .524), 1092. 
 
 McAfee v, Vicksburg, etc., R. Co. (42 
 
 cviii 
 
 La. Ann. 790; 7 So. Rep. 720), 693. 
 McAllister v, Burlington, etc., R. - Co. 
 
 (64 Iowa 395; 19 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 108), 1096. 
 McAuley v. New York Cent. R. Co. (97 
 
 N. Y. S. 631; 111 App. Div. 117), 268. 
 McAunich v. Mississippi, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (20 Iowa 338), 504. 
 McBride v. Berman (Ark., 94 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 913), 68. 
 McBride v. Des Moines, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (Iowa, 109 N. W. Rep. 618), 1043. 
 McBride v. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. (5 
 
 Ind. App. 482; 32 N. E. Rep. 679), 
 
 419. 
 McBride v. Northern Pacific R. Co. (19 
 
 Oregon 64; 23 Pac. Rep. 814; 48 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 146), 1016. 
 McCabe v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (88 
 
 Wis. 631; 60 N. W. Rep. 860), 859. 
 McCabe v. Dry Dock, etc., R. Co. (15 
 
 Daly 504; 8 N. Y. Supp. 336; 28 N. 
 
 Y. S. R. 879), 92. 
 Mc(iabe v. Montana Cent. R. Co. (Mont., 
 
 76 Pac. Rep. 701), 249. 
 McCabe & Steen Const. Co. v. Wilson 
 
 (87 Pac. Rep. 320), 252. 
 McCafferty v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (193 
 
 Pa. St. 339; 44 Atl. Rep. 435), 693. 
 McCafferty v. Spuyton-Duville, etc., R. 
 
 Co. (61 N. Y. 178), 291. 
 McCaffrey v. Delaware, etc., Co. (41 N. 
 
 Y. S. R. 221; 16 N. Y. Supp. 495; 
 
 137 N. Y. 568; 33 N. E. Rep. 339), 
 
 1062. 
 McCaffrey v. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (137 
 
 N. Y. 568; 33 N. E. Rep. 339; 62 
 
 Hun 618), 
 McCall V. New York, etc., R. Co. (54 
 
 N. Y. 642), 1025. 
 McCallum v. Long Island R. Co. (38 
 
 Hun [N. Y.] 569), 1045. 
 McCann v. Kings County R. Co. (46 
 
 N. Y. S. R. 327; 19 N. Y. Supp. 668), 
 
 894. 
 McCa'rragher v. Rogers (120 N. Y. 586; 
 
 84 N. E. 812), 95. 
 
 McCarthy v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (18 
 
 Kan. 46), 49. 
 McCarthy v. Muir (50 III. App. 610), 
 
 255. 
 MacC'arthy ■o. Whitcomb (110 Wis. 113; 
 
 85 N. W. Rep. 707), 139. 
 McCarty v. Railway Co. (105 Mo. App. 
 
 596; 80 S. W. Rep. 7), 119. 
 McCaslin ii. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. (93 
 
 Mich. 653; 52 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 290; 63 N. W. Rep. 724), 790. 
 McCauley v. Tennessee, etc, R. Co. (93 
 
 Ala. 366; 9 So. Rep. 611; 47 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 580), 568. 
 McCawley v. Furness R. Co. (L. R., 8 
 
 Q. B. 67), 850. 
 McCawley v. Ry. Co. (4 Moak's Eng. 
 
 818; L. R., 8 Q. B. 67), 667. 
 McChesney v. Panama R. Co. (49 N. 
 
 Y. S. R. 148; 21 N. Y. Supp. 207), 
 
 488. 
 McClanahan v, Vicksburg, etc, R. Co. 
 
 (in La. Ann. 781), 398. 
 McClaren v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (80 
 
 Wis. 280; 49 N. W. Rep. 963), 268. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.l 
 
 McClal?en v. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (83 Ind. 319; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 817), 1074. 
 McClary v. Sioux City R. Co. (3 Neb. 
 
 44), 610. 
 McClellan v. Long Island R. Co. (20 
 
 J. & S. [N. Y.] 23; 107 N. Y. 623; 
 
 13 N. E. Rep. 939. 
 McClelland v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (94 
 
 Ind. 276; 18 Am. k Eng. R. Gas. 
 . 260), 39. 
 McChntock v. Pennsylvania, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (21 W. N. C. 133), 715. 
 McCook V. Dublin R. Co. (58 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 491). 565. 
 McCodl V. Lucas, etc., Co. (80 • W. N. 
 
 C. 261; 84 Atl. Rep. 350), 303. 
 McCombs V. Ry. Co. (130 Pa. St. 182; 
 
 18 Atl. Rep. 613), 252. 
 McCorkle v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. 
 
 (Iowa, 18 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 166), 
 
 667. 
 McCormick v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (50 Mo. App. 109), 106. 
 McCormick v. Nassau, etc., R. Co. (18 
 
 App. Div. 333; 46 N. Y. Supp. 230), 
 
 1060. „ , 
 
 McCoy V. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (36 
 
 Mo. App. 446), 815. 
 McCoy V. Central of Georgia Ry. Co. 
 
 (62 S. E. Rep. 297), 962. 
 McCoy V. Westborough (172 Mass. 504; 
 
 52 N. E. Rep. 1064), 509. 
 McCrary v. Ilfinois Central R. Co. (3 
 
 Neb. 44), 32. 
 McCray v. Galveston, etc., R. Co. (89 
 
 Tex. 168; 34 S. W. Rep. 35; 3 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. [N. J.] 276), 110. 
 McCreary v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (166 
 
 Mass. 316; 81 N. E. Rep. 126), 1078. 
 McDade o. Washington, etc., R. Co. (5 
 
 Mackey [D. C] 144; 26 Am. & Eng. 
 ■ R. Cas. 326), 151. 
 McDaniel v. Highland Avenue R. Co. 
 
 (90 Ala. 64; 8 So. Rep. 41), 772. 
 McDermon v. Southern Pacific R. Co. 
 
 (122 Fed. Rep. 669), 529. 
 McDei-mott v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (82 
 
 Wis. 246; 52 N. W. Rep. 86), 785. 
 McDermott v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (87 
 
 Mo. 285; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 628; 
 
 73 Mo. 616; 2 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 86; 39 Am. Rep. 636), 483. 
 McDermott v. Iowa Falls R. Co. (Iowa, 
 
 47 N. W. Rep. 1037), 302. 
 McDermott v. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (28 Hun 825; 97 N. Y. ?54), 862. 
 McDermott v. Pacific R. Co. (30 Mo. 
 
 115), 139. 
 McDermott v. Railway Co. (73 Mo. 516), 
 
 261. 
 McDonald v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (87 
 
 Me. 466; 82 Atl. Rep. 1010; 2 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. [N. S.] 293), 789. 
 McDonald v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (41 
 
 Minn. 439; 43 N. W. Rep. 380), 406. 
 McDonald v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (26 
 
 Iowa 124), 782. 
 McDonald v. Covington, etc., R. Co. (107 
 
 Sj^ W. Rep. 726), 916. ' 
 McDonald v. Illinois R. Co. (88 Iowa 
 
 345; 56 N. W. Rep. 102), 625. 
 
 McDonald v. International, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (22 S. W. Rep. 939; 86 Tex. 1; 55 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 280), 446. 
 McDonald v. Kansas. City, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (127 Mo. 38; 29 S. W. Rep. 848), 789. 
 McDonald v. Long Island R. Co. (116 
 
 N. Y. 546; 22 N. E. Rep. 1068; 43 
 
 Hun 637), 708. 
 McDonald v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co. 
 
 (93 App. Div. [N. Y.] 288), 398. 
 McDonald v. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (186 Mass. 474; 72 N. E. Rep. 55), 
 
 106. 
 McDonald v. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (Mass., 78 N. E. Rep. 548), SiS. 
 Mac Donald v. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (63 Hun 687; 46 N. Y. S. R. 711), 
 
 492. 
 McDonald v. Pittsburg, etc., R.^ Co. (144 
 
 Ind. 469; 43 N. E. Rep. 447; 32 L. 
 
 R. A. 309; 65 Am. St. Rep. 185), 69. 
 McDonnell v. New York, N. H. & H. R. 
 
 R. (78 N. E. Rep. 648), 255. 
 McDowell V. Georgia R. Co. (60 Ga. 
 
 380), 62. 
 McElroy v. Nashua & Lowell R. Co. (4 
 
 Cush. 408), 17. 
 McFadden v, Santa Anna, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (11 L. R. A. 252; 87 Cal. 464; 25 
 
 Pac. Rep. 681), 1056^. 
 McFee v. Vicksburg, etc., R. Co. (42 La. 
 
 Ann. 790; 7 So. Rep. 720), 600. 
 McGee v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (92 
 
 Mo. 208; 4 S. W. Rep. 739; 81 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 1), 562. 
 McGeehan v. Lehigh Valley R. Co. (149 
 
 Pa. St. 188; 24 Atl. Rep. 205; 50 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 82), 795. 
 McGhee v. Willis (Ala., 82 So. Rep. 
 
 301; 134 Ala. 281), 23£. 
 McGill V. Michigan & C. Co. (144 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 788), 23. 
 McGill V. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. (162 
 
 Pa. St. 331; 26 Atl. Rep. 540), 1014. 
 McGinney v. Canadian Pacific R. Co. (7 
 
 Man. 161), 785. 
 McGinnis- v. Canadian So. R. Co. (49 
 
 Mich. 466; 13 N. W. Rep. 819; 8 Am, 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 135), 801. 
 McGinnis v. Chicago, R. I., etc., R. Co. 
 
 (Mo., 98 S. .W. Rep. 690), 284. 
 McGinnis v. Missouri Car, etc., Co. (174 
 
 Mo. 225; 78 S. W. Rep. 586; 97 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 553), 49. 
 McGinnis v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (21 Mo. 
 
 App. 399), 787. 
 Mc(xinnis v. Rigby, etc., Co. (Mb., 99 
 
 S. W. Rep. 4), 888. 
 McGofHn V. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (Mo., 
 
 47 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 491), 663. 
 McGovern v. Central, etc., R. Co. (123 
 
 N. Y. 280; 26 N. E. Rep. 378; 53 
 
 Hun 635), 360. 
 McGovem v. Interurban R. Co. (Iowa, 
 
 lllN. W. 412; 13 L. R. A. [N. S.] 
 
 476), 710. 
 McGovern v. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (67 N. "ir. 417; 15 Am. Ry. Rep. 
 
 119), 1003. 
 McGovern v. Railway Co. (123 N. Y. 
 
 289; 25 N. E. Rep. 878), 263. 
 McGowan v. International, etc., R. Co. 
 
 CIX 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.'] 
 
 (85 Tex. S89; 20 S. W. Rep. 80), 194. 
 McGowan v. La Plata Min. & Sm. Co. 
 
 (9 Fed. Rep. 861), 269. 
 McGowen v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (61 
 
 Mo. 532), 474. 
 McGrath v. Hudson River R. Co. (19 
 
 How. Pr. [N. Y.] 211; 32 Barb. 144), 
 
 1007. 
 McGrath v. New York, etc., R. Co. (59 
 
 N. Y. 468), 932. 
 McGrath v. New York, etc., R. Co. (1 
 . T. & C. [N. YO 243), 944. 
 McGrath v. St. Louis Transit Co. (94 
 
 S. W. Rep. 872), 113. 
 McGregor v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (212 
 
 Pa. 482; 61 Atl. Rep. 1017), 252. 
 McGuire v. Chicago & E. I. R. Co. (120 
 
 111. App. Ill), 861. 
 McGuire v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (108 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 908), 504. 
 McGuire v, Vicksburg, etc., R. Co. (46 
 
 La. Ann. 1543; 16 So. Rep. 457), 1040. 
 McGuirk v. Shattuck (160 Mass. 45; 35 
 
 N. E. Rep. 110; 39 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 454), 568. 
 McHugh V. Manhattan R. Co. (179 N. 
 
 Y. 378; 72 N. E. Rep. 312), 534. 
 McHugh V. Transit Co. (190 Mo. 85; 
 
 88 S. W. Rep. 853), 91. 
 Mclntire, etc., %y. Co. v. Bolton (43 
 . Ohio St. 224), 569. 
 Mclntire v. New York, etc., R. Co. (37 
 
 N. Y. 295), 197. 
 Mcintosh V. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. 
 
 (103 Mo. 340), 42. 
 McKaig V. Northern Pacific R. Co. (42 
 
 Fed. Rep. 288), 489. 
 McKee v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (83 
 
 Iowa 616; 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 164), 340. . 
 McKeen 'j. Citizens R. Co. (42 Mo. 
 
 79), 173. 
 McKeigue v. Janesville (68 Wis. 50; 31 
 
 N. W. Rep. 298), 189. 
 McKelvy v. Burlington, etc., R. Co. (84 
 
 Iowa 455; 51 N. W. Rep. 172; 49 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 477), 909. 
 McKenley v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (43 
 
 Iowa 641; 14 Am. Ry. Rep. 495), 930. 
 McKenna v. Hudson R. Co. (64 N. J. 
 
 L. 106; 45 Atl. Rep. 776), 685. 
 McKenna v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (54 
 
 Mo. App. 161), 413. 
 McKernan v. Detroit, etc., Ry. Co. (138 
 
 Mich. 519; 101 N. W. Rep. 812; 68 
 
 L. R. A. 347), 1050. 
 McKimble v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (139 
 
 Mass. 542; 2 N. E. Rep. 97; 21 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 213), 557. 
 McKimble ■v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (141 
 
 Mass. 463), 787. 
 McKinley ij. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (40 
 
 Mo. App. 449), 279. 
 McKiVergan v. Alexander, etc., Lumber 
 
 Co. (102 N. W. Rep. 332), 549. 
 McKnight v. Iowa, etc., R. Co. (43 
 
 Iowa 709; 32 N. W. Rep. 4), 522. 
 McKune v. California, etc., R. Co. (66 
 
 Cal. 302; 17 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 589), 
 
 488. 
 McLain v. Brooklyn, etc., R. Co. (116 
 
 N. Y. 459; 22 N. E. Rep. 1062; 40 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 254), 186. 
 
 CX 
 
 McLain v. Xhicago & N. W. Ry. Co. 
 
 (121 111. App. 614), 874. 
 McLain v. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. (Mo. 
 
 App., Ill S. W. Rep. 835), 737. 
 McLaren v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co. 
 
 (83 N. E. Rep. 1088), 630. 
 McLaren 'Z'. Williston (48 Minn. 299; 51 
 
 N. W. Rep. 373), 348.- 
 McLarin v. Atlanta, etc., R. Co. (85 
 
 Ga. 504; 11 S. E. Rep. 840), 789. 
 McLean v. Burbank (11 Minn. 277), 634. 
 McLean v. Pere Marquette R. Co. 
 
 (Mich., 100 N. W. Rep. 748; 11 De- 
 troit Leg. News 358), 369. 
 McLeod V. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (125 
 
 Iowa -270; 101 N. W. Rep. 77), '522. 
 McLeod V. Connecticut, etc., ■ R. Co. (58 
 
 Vt. 727; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 644), 47. 
 McLeod V. Ginther (80 Ky. 399; 8 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 162), 92. 
 McLeod V. New York, etc., R. Co. (191 
 
 Mass. 389; 77 N. E. Rep. 715), 326. 
 McMahon v. Davidson (18 Minn. 357), 
 
 1041. 
 McMahon v. Northern R. Co. (39 Md. 
 
 438), 1028. 
 McMahon v. Walsh (43 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 
 
 (11 J. & S. 36), 3. 
 McManus v. Crickett (1 East. 106), 727. 
 McManus v. Oregon Short Line R. Co. 
 
 (94 S. W. Rep. 743), 364. 
 McManamee v. Missouri Paciiic Ry. Co. 
 
 (135 Mo. 440; 37 S. W. Rep. 119), 
 
 1095. 
 McMarshall -a. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (80 
 
 Iowa 757; 45 N. W. Rep. 1065), 408. 
 McMaster v. Illinois, etc., R. Co. (65 
 
 Miss. 264; 4 So. Rep. 59; 7 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 653; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 486), 491. 
 McMasters v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (3 
 
 Pittsb. [Pa.] 1), 283. 
 McMillan v. Grand R. Co. (130 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 887), 76. 
 McMillan v. Spider Lake, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (Wis., 91 N. W. Rep. -979; 60 L. R. 
 
 R. 589), 69. 
 McMurtry v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (67 
 
 -Miss. 601; 7 So. Rep. 401), 779. 
 McNair v. Manhattan, etc., R. Co. (28 
 
 N. Y. S. R. 840; 51 Hun 644; 183 N. 
 
 Y. 664; 34 N. Y. S. R. 1010), 93. 
 McNamara v. Great Northern R. Co. (61 
 
 Minn. 296; 63 N. W. Rep. 726), 1070. 
 McNamara v. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (136 N. Y. 650; 32 N. E. Rep. 765; 
 
 49 N. Y. S. R. 395), 1021. 
 McNaughton v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. (113 
 
 N. W. Rep. 844), 621. 
 McNeil V. Crucible Steel Co. (207 Pa. 
 
 St. 493; 66 Atl. Rep. 1067), 298.- 
 McNeil V. New York, etc., R. Co. (71 
 
 Hun 24; 24 N. Y. Supp. 616), 325. 
 McNown V. Wabash R. Co. (55 Mo. App. 
 
 585), 991. 
 McNulta V. Ensch (134 111. 46; 24 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 631; 31 111. App. 100), 704. 
 McNulty V. Pennsylvania R. Co. (182 
 
 Pa. St. 479; 38 Atl. Rep. 624; 61 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 721; 38 L. R. A. 376). 568. 
 McNulty V. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. 
 
 (101 S. W. Rep. 1082), 971. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 IReferences are to sections.] 
 
 McPadden v. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (44 N. Y. 478), 598. 
 McPeak v. Missouri, etc., R. Co. (las 
 
 Mo. 617; 30 S. W. Rep. 170), 806. 
 McPhee v. Scully (163 Mass. 216; 39 
 
 N. E. Rep. 1007), 509. 
 McPheeters v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (45 
 
 Mo. 26), 851. „ , 
 
 McPherson v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (97 
 
 Mo. 253; 10 S. W. Rep. 846), 195. 
 McQuade V. Manhattan R. Co. (21 J. 
 
 &. S. [N. Y.] 91; 109 N. Y. 636; 16 
 
 N. E. Rep. 681), 700. , „„ „ 
 
 McQuade v. Suburban Ry. Co. (200 Mo. 
 
 IM; 98 S. W. Rep. 552), 507. 
 McQueen v. Central Branch R. Co. 
 
 (Kan., 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 226), 
 
 McQuerry v. Metropolitan R. Co. (117 
 
 Mo. App. 262), 737. „ ^ . „„ 
 
 McQuiean v. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (129 
 
 N: y. 50; 29 N. E. Rep. 235; 41 N. 
 
 Y. S. R. 382; 60 Hun 576; 48 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 490), 93. ., „ ^ .„, 
 McQuilken v. Central Pacific R. Co. (64 
 
 (5l. 463; 2 Pac. Rep. 46; 16 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 353), 786. „ ^ 
 McQuillen v. Central, etc., R. Co. (64 
 
 Cial. 463; 2 Pac. Rep. 46; 16 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 353), 771. 
 McRea ■a. Wilmington, etc., R. Co. (88 
 
 N. Car. 626; 43 Am. Rep. 745; 18 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 316), 659. 
 McVeety v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. (45 
 
 Minn. 268; 47 N. W. Rep. 809; 47 
 
 Am.. & Eng. R. Cas. 471), 554. 
 Machine Co. v. Keifer (134 111. 481), 
 
 238 
 Mack" V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (101 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 142), 495. 
 Mack V. Lombard, etc., R. Co. (18 
 
 Wash. 84), 29. . 
 Mackay v. Central R. Co. (14 Blatchf. 
 
 65; 4 Fed. Rep. 617), 49. 
 Mackey v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co, (8 
 
 Mackey [D. C] 882), 654. 
 Mackey v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (5 
 
 McCrary (V. S.] 538), 582. 
 Macklin v. New Jersey Co. (7 Abb. Pr. 
 
 N. S. [N. Y.] 229), 853. 
 Macklin v. Railway Co. (68 N. W. Rep. 
 
 999) 80 
 Macklin zi.' Railway Co. (135 Mass. 801), 
 
 268. 
 Mackowik v. Kansas City, St. J. & C. B 
 
 R. Co. (94 S. W. Rep. 256), 412. 
 Macon, etc., R. Co. v. Davis (27 Ga. 
 
 113), 451. 
 Macon, etc., R. Co. v. Davis (18 Ga. 
 
 679), 877. 
 Macon, etc., R. Co. i/. Johnson (38 Ga. 
 
 409), 92. 
 Macon Ry. Co. v. Mason (183 Ga. 773; 
 
 51 S. E. Rep. 569), 184. 
 M«con, etc., R. Co. v. Moore (108 Ga. 
 
 84; 33 S. E. Rep. 889; 15 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. [N. S.] 848), 686. 
 Macon & S. R. Co. v. Moore (54 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 700), 731. 
 Macon, etc., R. Co. v. Wynn (19 Ga. 
 
 440), 994. 
 Macy V. St. .Paul, etc;, R. Co. (35 Minn. 
 
 200; 28 N. W. Rep. 849), 471. 
 
 Madden v. Chesapeake, «tc., R. Co. (28 
 
 W. Va. 610; 57 Am. Rep. 695), 477. 
 Madden v. Missouri, etc., R. Co. (50 Mo. 
 
 App. 666), 576. 
 Madden v. Pott Royal, etc., R. Co. (35 
 
 So. Car. 381; 52 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 886), 830. 
 Maddox v. London, etc.,- R. Co. (38 L. 
 
 T. 458), 688. 
 Madison v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (60 
 
 Mo.. App. 509), 602. 
 Madole w. Denver R. Co. (Colo., 62 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 964), 367. 
 Mad River R. Co. v. Barber (5 Ohio St. 
 
 541), 472. 
 Magee v. Northern Pacific R. Co. (78 
 
 Cal. 430). 602. 
 Magee v. Oregon, etc., R. Co. (46 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 734), 729. 
 Magrane v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (183 
 
 Mo. 119; 81 S. W. Rep. 1158), 15. 
 Maguin v. Dinsmore (56 N. Y. 168), 15 
 Maguire v. Fitzburg, etc., R. Co. (146 
 
 Mass. 379; 15 N. E." Rep. 904; 34 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 146), 397. 
 Maguire v. Railroad (115 Mass. 839), 95. 
 Maguire v. Transit Co. (103 Mo. App. 
 
 459; 78 S. W. Rep. -838), 685. 
 Mahaney v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (108 
 
 Mo. 191; 18 S. W. Rep. 895), 406. 
 Maher v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co. (64 Mo. 
 
 267; 17 Am. Ry. Hep. 831), 996. 
 Maher v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (158 Mass. 
 
 36), 399. 
 Maher v. Central Park R. Co. (67 N. 
 
 Y. 55), 699. 
 Maher v. Metropolitan St Ry. Co. (92 
 
 N. Y. S. 825; 108 App. Div. 517), 
 
 116. ' 
 Maher v. Union Pacific R. Co. (106 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 309; 45 C. C. A. 301), 487. 
 Maher v. Winona & C. R. Co. (31 Minn. 
 
 401; 13 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 578), 886. 
 Mahlen v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. (49 
 
 Mich. 585; 14 N. W. Rep. ' 556; 14 , 
 
 Am. & Ene. R. Cas. 687), 411. 
 Mahler v. Norwich, .etc., R. Co. (35 N. 
 
 Y. 358), 49. 
 Mahoney v. Bay State Co. (184 Mass. 
 
 887; 68 N. E. Rep. 834), 360. 
 Mahoney v. Metropolitan, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (104 Mass. 73), 1036. 
 Mahoney v. New York, etc., R. Co. (39 
 
 N. Y. S. R. 911; 60 Hun 586; 131 N. 
 
 Y. 683), 419. 
 Major V. Burlington, etc., - R. Co. (115 
 
 Iowa 309; 88 N. W. Rep. 815), 61. 
 Malcolm v. Richmond, etc., R. Co. (106 
 
 N. ■ Car. 63; 11 S. E. Rep. 187; 44 
 . Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 379), 671. 
 Maleck v. Tower Grove R. Co. (57 Mo. 
 
 18), 787. 
 Malhada v. Brooklyn, etc., R. Co. (30 
 
 N. Y. 370), 92. 
 Mallett V. Schlosser (119 111. App. 859), 
 
 249. 
 Malloy V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (173 
 
 Mo. 75; 73 S. W. Rep.. 159), 209. 
 Malloy V. New York, etc., R. Co. (58 
 
 Barb. 188),* 187. 
 Malloy >. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (173 
 
 Mo. 75; 73 S. W. Rep. 159), 608. 
 Malone v. Burlington, etc., R. Co. (61 
 
 cxi 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.'^ 
 
 Iowa 326; 16 N. W. Rep. 203; 47 
 
 Am. Rep. 813; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Gas. 
 ' 165), 522. 
 Maloney v. Florence, etc., R. Co. (89 
 
 Pac. Rep. 649), 486. 
 Malott V. Central Trust Co. (79 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 369), 563. 
 Maltby v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (52 
 
 Mich. 108; 17 N. W. Rep. 717; 13 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 606), 909. 
 Manchester, etc., R. Co. v. FuUerton (14 
 
 C. B. [N. S.] 64; 11 W. R. 754), 886. 
 Manchester, etc., Co. v. Polk (115 Ga. 
 
 542; 41 S. E. Rep. 1015), 310. 
 Maney v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (49 111. 
 
 App. 105), 968. 
 Mangum v. North Carolina R. Co. (N. 
 
 C, 58 S. E. Rep. 913; 13 L. R. A. 
 
 [N. S.] 589), 627. „ , „ „ 
 
 Manigold v. Black River Co. (84 N. Y. 
 
 S. 861; 81 App. Div. 381), 108. 
 Manion v. Lake Erie & W. Ry. Co. 
 
 (80 N. E. Rep. 166), 875. 
 Manly v. Wilmington, etc., R. Co. (74 
 • N. Car. 655; 13 Am. Ry. Rep. 105), 
 
 391 
 Mann K. Belt Line R. Co. (128 Ind. 138; 
 
 26 N. E. Repf 819), 1004. 
 Mann v. Central Vermont R. Co. (55 Vt. 
 
 484; 45 Am. Rep.. 628; 14 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 620), 903. 
 Mann v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (86 Mo. 
 
 347), 872. ^ , „ 
 
 Mann v. Missouri, etc., R. Co. (100 b. 
 
 W. Rep. 566), 417. 
 Manning v. Burlmgton, etc., R. Co., (64 
 
 Iowa 240; 20 N. W. Rep. 169), 622. 
 Manning v, Tacoma Ry., etc., Co. (34 
 
 Wash. 406; 75 Pac. Rep. 994), 64. 
 Manning v. Railroad Co. (105 Mich. 
 
 260; 63 N. W. Rep. 312), 326. 
 Manning v. Railroad (16 L. R. A. 271), 
 
 872. 
 Mansen v. Eddy (3 Texas Civ; App. 
 
 148; 22 S. W. Rep. 66), 333. 
 Manser v. Eastern, etc., R. Co. (3 L. 
 
 T. 585), 652. 
 Mansfield,- etc., Co. v, McEnry (36 Am. 
 
 Rep. 664), 191. 
 Manville v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. (11 
 
 Ohio St. 417), 500. 
 Marable v. Southern Ry. Co. (55 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 355), 683. 
 Marble v. Worcester (4 Gray 305), 21. 
 Marbourg v, Seattle, etc., Ry. Co. (94 
 
 Pac. Rep. 649), 786. 
 Marbury, etc., Co. v, Westbrook (121 
 
 Ala. 179), 302. 
 Mareau v. New York, etc., R. Co. (167 
 
 Pa. St. 220; 31 Atl. Rep. 662), 446. 
 Marion v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (64 
 
 Iowa 568; 21 N. W. Rep. 86), 91. 
 Markey v. Louisiana & M. R. Go. (185 
 
 Mp. 348; 84 S. W. Rep. 61), 235. 
 Markham v. Houstoti, etc., R. Co. (73 
 
 Texas 247; 11 S. W. Rep. 131), 1041. 
 Mark v. Petershurg, etc., R. Co. (88 Va. 
 
 1; 13 S. E. Rep 299; 49 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 418), 998.. 
 Markowitz v. Metropolitan' R. Co. (186 
 
 Mo. 350; 85 S. W. Rep. 351; 69 L. R. 
 
 A. 389), 1053. 
 
 cxii 
 
 Marks v. Fitchburg, etc., R. Co. (155 
 
 Mass. 493; 29 N. E. Rep. 1148), 889. 
 Marks v. Harriett Mills (138 N. C. 287; 
 
 47 S. E. Rep. 432), 99. 
 Marland v. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. (123 
 
 Pa. St. 487; 16 Atl. Rep. 624), 1029. 
 Marquette v. Chicago, etc., R. (Jo. (33 
 
 Iowa 562), 746. 
 Mars V. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (54 Hun 
 
 625; 28 N. Y. S. R. 228; 8 N. Y. 
 
 Supp. 107), 674. 
 Marsh v. Kansas City, etc., R. C^. (104 
 
 Mo. App. 677; 78 S. W. Rep. 284), 
 
 1065. 
 Marsh v. Western, etc., Ry. Co. (204 
 
 Pa. St. 229; 53 Atl. Rep. 1001), 58. 
 Marshall v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (145 
 
 Mass. 164; 13 N. E. Rep. 385; 31 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 18), 99. 
 Marshall v. Nashville, etc., R. Co. (101 
 
 S. W. Rep. 419), 852. 
 Marshall v. St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry. 
 
 Co. (Ark., 94 S. W. Rep. 56), 341. 
 Marshall v. York, etc., R. Co. (21 L. 
 
 J. N. S. C. 34), 17. 
 Marshall v. Wabash R. Co. (120 Mo. 
 
 275; 25 S. W. Rep. 179), 64. 
 Martin v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (77 
 
 Miss. 720; 27 So. Rep. 646), 349. 
 Martin v. New York, etc., R. Co. (27 
 
 Hun [N. Y.] 632; 97 N. Y. 628), 980. 
 Martin v. New York, etc., R. Co. (50 
 
 N. Y. S. R. 663; 66 Hun 636; 21 N. 
 
 Y. Supp. 191), 1017. 
 Martin v. New York, etc., R. Co. (103 
 
 N. Y. 626; 9 N. E. Rep. 505), 92. 
 Martin v. Pittsburg, etc., R. Cx). (203 
 
 U. S. 284; 61 L. Ed. 184; 87 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 100), 504. 
 Martin v. Southern Ry. Co. (58 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 3; 77 S. C. 370), 717. 
 Martin v. Wabash Ry. Co. (142 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 660; 73 C. C. A. 646), 266. 
 Martinez v. Gerber (3 Scott N. R. 306), 
 
 18. 
 Marty v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (38 Minn. 
 
 108; 35 N. W. Rep. 670; 32 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 107), 1005. 
 Marvin v. Maysville, etc., R. Co. (49 
 
 Fed. Rep. 436), 71. 
 Maryland v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. (1 
 
 Hughes U. S. 337), 461. 
 Maryland, etc., R. (Jo. v. Neubeur (62 
 
 Md. 391; 19 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 261), 
 
 936. 
 Mary, etc., R. Co. v. Chambliss (97 Ala. 
 
 171: 11 So. Rep. 897; 53 Am. & Eng. 
 
 254), 105. 
 Mase V. Northern Pacific R. Co. (67 
 
 Fed. Rep. 283), 491. 
 Mason v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (27 
 
 Kan. 83; 41 Am. Rep. 405; 6 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 1), 1067. 
 Mason v. Richmond, etc., R. Co. (Ill 
 
 N. C. 482; 16 S. E. Rep. 698; 53 ASn. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 183), 491. 
 Mason, etc., R. Co. v. Yockey (103 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 266; 43 C. C. A. 228), 261. 
 Masser v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (68 Iowa 
 
 602; 27 N. W. Rep. 770), 1063. 
 Massie v. Peel Splint, etc., Co. (41 W. 
 
 Va. 620.; 24 S. E. Rep. 644), 31L 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to ■sections.] 
 
 Massoth V. Delaware, etc., Co. (64 N. Y. 
 
 524), 979. 
 Martin v. Atchison, etc., R. Co. (166 
 
 U. S. 399; 41 L. Ed. 1051; 17 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 603), 568. 
 Martin v. California, etc., R. Co. (94 
 
 Cal. 326), 338. 
 Martin v. (Chicago & N. W. R. Co. (194 
 
 111. 138; 62 N. E. Rep. 599), 273. 
 Martin v. Chicago Ry. Co. (91 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 1034: 59 L. R. A. 698), 329. 
 Martm v. Chicago, etc.; -R. Co. (Iowa, 
 
 87 N. W. Rep. 654), 355. 
 Masterson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (58 
 
 Mo. App. 572), 1016. 
 Masterson v. Macon City, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (88 Ga. 436; 14 S. E. Rep. 591), 791. 
 Masterson v. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (84 N. Y. 247), 1042. 
 Mathew i: Wabash R. Co. (115 Mo. 
 
 App. 468), 678. 
 Mathew v. Wabash R. Co. (Mo. App., 
 
 78 S. W. Rep. 271), 695. 
 Mathieson v. Omaha, etc., R. Co. (Neb., 
 
 97 N. W. Rep. 243), 88. 
 Matlock V. Williamsville, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (Mo., 95 S. W. Rep. 849), 63. 
 Matson v. Baird (3 App. Cas. 1082; 3 
 
 Ry. & T. C. Cas. 17), 916. 
 Matson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (68 
 
 Iowa 22: 25 N. W. Rep. 911), 522. 
 Malta V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (69 Mich. 
 
 109; 37 N. W. Rep. 54; 32 Am. & 
 , Eng. R. Cas. 71), 446. 
 Matteson v. New York, etc., R. Co. (62 
 
 Barb. 364), 183. 
 Matteson v. Southern Pac Co. (92 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 101), 883. 
 Maury i>. Talmadge (2 McLean U. S. 
 
 157, 158), 680. 
 Matze V. New York, etc., R. Co. (1 Hun 
 
 [N. Y.] 417; 3 T. & C. 513), 967. 
 Mauer v. Ferguson (44 N. Y. St. Rep. 
 
 372), 255. 
 Mauerman v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (41 
 
 Mo. App. 348), 876. 
 Maverick v. Ry. Co. (36 N. Y. 378), 
 
 Mayer v. New York, etc., R. Co. (132 
 
 N. Y. 579; 29 N. Y. S. R. 183), 961. 
 Mayes v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (63 Iowa 
 
 662; 14 N. W. Rep. 340; 8 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 527), 325. 
 Maynard v. Oregon, etc., R. Co. (Ore., 
 
 78 Pac. Rep. 983), 96. 
 Mayo V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (104 Mass. 
 
 137), 1S3. 
 Maysville, etc., R. Co. v. Herrick (13 
 
 Bush. [Ky] 122), 177. 
 Maysville, etc., R. Co. v. McCabe (26 
 
 Ky.^L. R. 632; 82 S. W. Rep. 233), 
 
 Maxey v. Missouri Pacific R. Co. (113 
 
 Mo. 1; 20 S. W. Rep. 664), 962. 
 Maxey ». Railroad Co. (113 Mo. 1), 
 
 408. 
 Maxwell v. Zdariski (93 111. App. 334), 
 
 159. 
 Meade ii. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (68 Mo. 
 
 App. 92), 26. 
 Meador v. Missouri, etc., R. Co. (68 
 
 Kan. 865; 61 Pac. Rep. 442), 608. 
 
 Meehan v. Atlas, etc., Co, (87 N. Y. S. 
 
 1031; 94 App. Div. 306), 307. 
 Meehan w. Great North. Ry. Co. (101 
 
 N. W. Rep. 183), 871. 
 Meehan v. Holyoke Ry. Co. (186 Mass. 
 
 511; 78 N. E. Rep. 61), 383. 
 Meehan v. St. Louis, M. & S. E. R. Co. 
 
 (114 Mo. App. 396; 90 S. W. Rep. 
 
 102), 362. 
 Meek v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (38 Ohio 
 
 Sy. 632; 13 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 643), 977. 
 Meeks v. Ohio River R. Co. (58 W. 
 
 Va. 99), 398. 
 Meeks v. Southern Pacific R. Co. (56 
 
 Cal. 513; 38 Am. Rep. 67; 8 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 314), 308. 
 Mefford v. Missouri, etc., R. Co. (121 
 
 Mo. App. 647), 608. 
 MefFord v. Missouri, etc., Ry. Co, (97 
 
 S. W. Rep. «02), 826. 
 Meier v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (64 Pa. 
 
 St. 225), 676. 
 Melchert v. Smith Co. (140 Pa. St. 448; 
 
 21 Atl. Rep. 755), 309. 
 Mellor V, Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (105 
 
 Mo. 455; 16 S. W. Rep. 849; 10 L. 
 
 R. A. 36; 14 S. W. Rep. 758), 563. 
 Meloy V, Chicago, etc., R. Co. (Iowa, 
 
 37 N. W. Rep. 335; 33 Am. & Eng. 
 
 Cas. 358), 104. 
 Melton V. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. (61 
 
 S. E. Rep. 39), 962. 
 Melville v. Missouri River, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (48 Fed. Rep. 820), 328. 
 Melville w. Railway Co. (48 Fed. Rep. 
 
 880), 861. 
 Melzer v. Peninsular Car Co. (76 Mich. 
 
 94; 42 N. W. Rep. 1078), 336. 
 Membery v. Great Western R. Co. (14 
 
 App. Cas. 179), 330. 
 Memphis, etc., R. Co. v. Copeland (61 
 
 Ala. 376), 391. 
 Memphis R. Co. w. Graham (94 Ala. 
 
 545; 10 So. Rep. 283; 53 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 396), 163. 
 Memphis, etc., R. Co. v. Jobe (69 Miss. 
 
 452; 10 So. Rep. 672), 411. 
 Memphis, etc., R. Co. v. Reeves (77 U. 
 
 S. [10 Wall.] 176: 19 L. Ed. 909, 
 
 913), 610. 
 Memphis, etc., R. Co. v. Salinger (46 
 
 Ark. 528), 801. 
 Memphis, etc., R. Co. v. Stringfellow 
 
 (44 Ark. 388; 51 Am. Rep. 598; 81 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 374), 704. 
 Memphis, etc., R. Co. v. Thomas (51 
 
 Miss. 637), 482. . 
 Memphis, etc., R. Co. v. Whitfield (44 
 
 Miss. 466), 395. 
 Memphis, etc., R. Co. v. Womack <84 
 
 Ala. 149; 4 So. Rep. 618; 37 Am'. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 308), 92. 
 Menard v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (150 
 
 Mass. 386; 38 N. E. Rep. 214), 97. 
 Mendizabal v. New York Cent. R. Co. 
 
 (85 N. Y. S. 896; 89 App. Div. 386), 
 
 260. 
 Meng V. St. Louis, etc.. R. Co. (108 
 
 Mo. App. 553; 84 S. W. Rep. 213), 
 
 98. 
 Mensch v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (150 Pa. 
 
 cxiii 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.^ 
 
 St 598 J 25 Atl. Rep. 31; 53 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Gas. 198), 332. 
 Mercer v. Cincinnati Northern R. Co. 
 
 (115 N. W. Rep. 733; 15 Detroit Leg. 
 
 N. 35), 709. 
 Merchants, etc., Co. v. Burns (Tex., 
 
 74 S. W. Rep. 758; 72 S. W. Rep. 
 
 626), 26. 
 Merino v. Lehmaier (173 N. Y. 530; 66 
 
 N. E. Rep. 572), 318. 
 Merkle v. New York, etc., R. (x>. (49 
 
 N. J. L. 473; 9 Atl. Rep. SO), 1025. 
 Merrifield v Maryland, etc., Co. (143 
 
 Cal. 64; 76 Pac. Rep. 710), 318. 
 Merrill v. Eastern R. Co. (139 Mass. 
 
 238: 1 N. E. Rep. 648; 62 Am. Rep. 
 
 706), 566. 
 Merrill v. Oregon Short Line R. Co. 
 
 (Utah, 81 Pac. Rep. 85), 327. 
 Merryman v, Chicago Great Western Ry. 
 
 Co. (113 N. W. Rep. 367), 626. 
 Merwin v. Manhattan R. Co. (48 Hun 
 
 608; 113 N. Y. 689), 619. 
 Merz V. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co, (14 
 
 Mo. App. 459), 1078. , 
 Messenger v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (36 
 
 N. J. L. 407), 949. 
 Messenger v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (64 
 
 Atl. Rep. 682), 922. 
 Metcalfe v. Rochester, etc., R. Co. (12 
 
 App. Div. 147; 42 N. Y. Supp. 661), 
 
 1958. 
 Meteer v. Manhattan R. Co. (63 Hun 
 
 533; 45 N. Y. S. R. 704; 18 N. Y. 
 
 Supp. 561), 182. 
 Metropolitan R. Co. v. Dick (87 IIU 
 
 App. 40), 281. 
 Metropoltain, etc., Ry. Co. v. Fortin (107 
 
 III. App. 187), 381. 
 Metropolitan, etc., Ry. Co. v. Fortin 
 
 (203 111. 464; 67 N. T. Rep. 977), 
 
 381. 
 Metropolitan R. Co. v. Jackson (L. R., 
 
 3 App. Cas. 193), 685. 
 Metropolitan R. Co. v. Powell (89 Ga. 
 
 601; 16 S. E. Rep. 118), 1043. 
 Metropolitan, etc., Ry. Co. v. Warren 
 
 (86 Pac. Rep. 131), 676. 
 Mexican, etc., R. Co. v. Jackson (118 
 
 Fed. Rep. 549; 66 C. C. A. 815), 
 
 243. 
 Mexican, etc., R. Co. v. Knox (114 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 73^ 63 C. C. A. 21), 386. 
 Mexican, etc, R. Co. v. Meddlegge (76 
 
 Tex., 634; 13 S. W. Rep. 257), 166. 
 Mexican, etc., R. Co. zi. Mussetts (86 
 
 Tex., 708), 28. 
 Mexican, etc^ R. Co. v. Shean (Tex., 
 
 18 S. W. Rep. 161), 332. 
 Mexican, etc., R. Co. v. Townsend (114 
 
 Fed. Rep. 739; 52 C. C. A. 369). 118. 
 Meyer v. Detroit, etc., Ry. Co. (Mich., 
 
 106 N. W. Rep. 888; 12 Det. Leg. N. 
 
 843), 323. - 
 Meyer v. Ladewig (110 N. W. Rep. 419), 
 
 267. 
 Meyer v. Midland Pacific R. Co. (2 Neb. 
 
 319), 293. 
 Meyer v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. (93 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 6), 31. 
 Meyers !'. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (2 
 
 Neb. 320), 33. 
 
 cxiv 
 
 Meyer v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co.~ (54 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 116; 10 N. S. App. 677: 4 C. 
 
 C. A. 221; 68 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 Ill), 586. 
 Meyer v. Second Ave. R. C^. (8 Bosw. 
 
 [N. Y.] 305), 153. 
 Meyers v. Central R. Co. (67 AtL Rep. 
 
 620; 218 Pa. St. 305), 974. 
 Meyers v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (103 
 
 Mo. App. 268; 77 S. W. Rep. 149), 
 
 388. 
 Meyers v. Highland Boy G. M. Co. (77 
 
 Pac. Rep.' 743), 96. 
 Michigan, etc., R. Co. v. Austin (40 
 
 Mich. 247), 325. 
 Michigan v. Boeckling (122 Ind. 39; 23 
 
 N. E. Rep. 518), 1043. 
 Michigan, etc., R. Co. v. Campau (35 
 
 Mich. 468; 15 Am. Ry. Rep. 314), 
 
 1092. 
 Michigan, etc., R. Co. v. Oileman (28 
 
 Mich. 440; 12 Am. Ry. Rep. 59), 
 
 788. 
 Michigan, etc, R. Co. v. Dolan (32 
 
 Mich. 610), 10. 
 Michigan, etc., R. Co. v. Gilbert (46 
 
 Mich. 176; 9 N. W. Rep. 243; 9 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 230), 483. 
 Michigan, etc., R. Co. v. Smithson (45 
 
 Mich. 212; 7 N. W. Rep. 791; 1 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 101), 335. 
 Mickee !■ Wood, etc., R. Co. (70 Hun 
 
 [N. Y.] 456; 63 N. Y. S. R. 689), 368. 
 Midland Valley R. Co. v. Hamilton (104 
 
 S. W. Rep. 840), 588. 
 Middle Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. Barnett 
 
 (104 Ga. 582; 30 S. E. Rep. 771; 12 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. [N. S.] 532), 245. 
 Middlesborough, etc^ R. Co. v. Webster 
 
 (Ky., 50 S. W. Rep. 843: 14 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. [N. S.] 209), 690. 
 Mielke v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (Wis., 
 
 79 N. W. Rep. 22), 353. 
 Mikos V. New York Cent., etc., R. Co. 
 
 (102 N. Y. S. 995), 634. 
 Milbur V. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (86 
 
 Mo. 104; 29 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 244), 
 
 388 
 Miles' V. Fonda, etc., R. Co. (86 Hun 
 
 608; 33 N. Y. Supp. 729), 1039. 
 Miller v. American Bridge Co. (65 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 1109; 216 Pac St. S59), 476. 
 Miller v. Atlanta, etc., R. Co. (58 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 439), 664. 
 Miller v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (N. H., 
 
 61 AtL Rep. 360), 366. 
 Miller v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (90 Mich. 
 
 230; 51 N. W. Rep. 370), 492. 
 Miller v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (116 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 794), 801. 
 Miller v. Chicago & A. R. Co. (62 App. 
 
 252), 150. 
 Miller v. Detroit, etc., Ry. Co. (Mich., 
 
 95 N. W. Rep. 718), 342. 
 Miller v. East Tennessee, etc. R. Co. 
 
 (93 Ga. 630; 21 S. E. Rep. 153), 787. 
 Miller v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (128 
 
 Ind. 97; 27 N. E. Rep. 339; 25 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 416), 1066. 
 Miller v. Merritt (211 Pa. St. 127; 00 
 
 Atl. Rep. 508). 283. 
 Miller v. Michigan, etc., R. Co. (123 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.} 
 
 Mich. 374; 82 N. VV. Rep. 68), 499. 
 Miller v. Minnesota, etc., R. Co. (76 
 
 Iowa 655; 39 N. W. Rep. 188; 38 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 234), 293. 
 Miller v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (109 
 
 Mo. 360; 19 S. W. Rep. 68; 53 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 598), 472. 
 Miller v. New York, etc., R. Co. (125 
 
 N. Y. 118; 26 N. E. Rep. 35), 817. 
 Miller v. Ohio, etc., R. Co. (24 111. 
 
 App. 326), 492. 
 Miller v. Railway Co. (C. C, 65 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 305), 299. 
 Miller ii. St Louis, etc., R. Co. (5 Mo. 
 
 App. 471), 678. 
 Miller v. Southenj Pacific R. Co. (20 
 
 Ore. 285: 86 Pac. Rep. 70; 48 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 294), 490. 
 Miller v. Southwestern R. Co. (55 Ga. 
 
 143), 58. 
 Miller v. Steamship Co. (118 N. Y. 
 
 200), 596. 
 Miller V. Union Pacific R. Co. (5 Mc- 
 
 Crary U. S. 300; 17 Fed. Rep. 67), 
 . 475. 
 Milliman v. New York, etc., R. Co. (66 
 
 N. Y. 6'42; 4 Hun 409; 6 T. & C. 
 
 585), 588. 
 Mills V. Missouri, etc., R. Co. (Tex., 
 
 57 S. W. Rep. 291), 715. 
 Mills V. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (Mo., 94 
 
 S. W. Rep. 973), 273. 
 Millsap V. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (69 
 
 Miss. 423; 13 So. Rep. 696), 488. 
 Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. v. Arms (91 N. 
 
 S. 495), 15. 
 Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. ■«/. Hunter (11 
 
 Wis. 160), 911. 
 Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. v. Kellogg .(94 
 
 U. S. 474), 393. 
 Minahan v. Grand Trunk R. Co. (138 
 
 Fed. Rep. 37), 122. 
 Minden v. Vedene (Neb., 101 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 330), 92. 
 Miner v. Railroad (153 Mass. 398), 311. 
 Minter v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (Iowa, 
 
 96 N. W. Rep. 1108), 354. 
 Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Herrick (127 
 
 U. S. 210), 504. 
 Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Huntley 
 
 (Mich., 9 Am. Neg. Cas. 472), 653. 
 Minnesota, etc., R. Co. v. Kline (199 
 
 U. S. 593; 26 Sup. Ct Rep. 159), 
 
 504. 
 Minneapolis & St. Paul R. Co. ». Kel- 
 logg (94 U. S. 469), 83. 
 Minnier ii. Sedalia, etc, R. Co. (167 
 
 Mo. 99; 66 S. W. Rep. 1092), 162. 
 Minock v. Detroit, etc., R. Co. (97 Mich. 
 
 425; 56 N. W. Ren. 780), 704. 
 Minster v. Citizens R. Co. (53 Mo. App. 
 
 276), 175. 
 Minty V. Union Pac. R. Co. (2 Idaho 
 
 437; 21 Pac. Rep. 660), 383. 
 Missimer v. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (17 Phila. [Pa.] 172), 649. 
 Mississippi Central R. Co. v. Hardy 
 
 (Miss., 41 So. Rep. 605), 258. 
 Mississippi, etc., R. Co. v. Harrison (66 
 
 Miss. 419; 6 So. Rep. 319; 39 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 449), 707. 
 Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Abend (107 111 
 
 41), S75, 
 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Baker (Tex., 
 
 81 S. W. Rep. 67), 375. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v, Barnes (95 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 714), 500. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. z/. Bridges (74 
 
 Tex. 520; 12 S. W. Rep. 210; 39 Am. 
 
 & En?. R. Cas. 604), 908. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Brown (101 
 
 S. W. Rep. 464), 875. 
 Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Brown (Tex., 
 
 18 S. W. Rep. 670j, 873. 
 Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Bussey (66 
 
 Kan. 735; 71 Pac. Rep. 261), 1039. 
 Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Byrd (Tex., 
 
 89 S. W. Rep. 991), 647. 
 
 Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Collier (62 
 
 Tex. 318; 18 Am. & Eng. R. Co. 281), 
 
 661. 
 Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Columbia (69 
 
 Pac. Rep. 338), 39. 
 Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Crane (13 Tex. 
 
 Civ. App. 486; 35 S. W. Rep. 797), 
 
 379. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Crenshaw (71 
 
 Tex. 340; 9 S. W. Rep. 262), 374. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Criswell (108 
 
 S. W. Rep. 806), 686. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Crum (Tex., 81 
 
 S. W. Rep. 78), 372. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Dean (89 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 797), 543. 
 Missouri, etc., Co. v. Dillon (206 111. 
 
 145; 69 N.E. Rep. 12), 161. 
 Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Door (Kan., 85 
 
 Pac. Rep. 533), 79. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Dumas (Tex., 
 
 93 S. W. Rep. 493), 372. 
 Missouri, etc., Ky. Co. v. Dunbar (108 
 
 S. W. Rep. 500), 686. 
 Missouri, etc., R. Co. v, Dwyer (36 Kan. 
 
 58), 494. 
 Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Eagin (72 Tex. 
 
 127; 9 S. W. Rep. 749; 2 L. R. A. 
 
 75), 99. 
 Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Elliott (102 
 
 Fed. Rep. 96; 42 C. C. A. 1«8), 488. 
 Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Evans (71 Tex. 
 
 361; 9 S. W. Rep. 385; 37 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 144), 1084. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Go. v. Ferch (Tex. 
 
 Civ. App., 36 S. W. Rep. 487), 847. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Foreman (73 
 ■ Tex. 311; 11 S. W. Rep. 386), 557. 
 Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Foreman (Tex., 
 
 46 S. W. Rep. 834), 719. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. ii. Freeman (73 
 
 S. W. Rep. 548), 63. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Gearheart (Tex., 
 
 81 S. W. Rep. 325), 378. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Green (89 
 
 Pac. Rep. 1042), 523. 
 Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Greenwood 
 
 (Tex., 89 S. W, Rep. 810), 73. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Hagan (Tex., 
 
 93 S. W. Rep. 1014), 266. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Haley (85 
 
 Kan. 35; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 594), 
 
 S04. 
 Missouri, etc^ R. Co. v. Hansom (Tex., 
 
 90 S. W. Rep. 1132), 254. 
 Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Hennessey (20 
 
 Tex. Civ. App. 316; 49 S. W. Rep. 
 917), 38. 
 
 CXV 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 IJteferenoes are to sections.'] 
 
 Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Hennessey (76 
 
 Tex. 155), 94. 
 Missouri, etc., R. Co. w. Henry (75 
 
 Tex. 220; 12 S. W. Rep. 820), 64. 
 Missouri, etc., R. Co. w. Hibbitts (Tex., 
 
 109 S. W. Rep. 228), 737. 
 Missouri, etc., R. Co. w. Hines (Tex., 
 
 40 S. W. Rep. 152), 490. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Holcomb (44 
 
 Kan. 332; 24 Pac. Rep. 467; 44 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 303), 669. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Hollan (107 
 
 S. W. Rep. 642), 890. 
 Missouri, etcy Ry. Co. v. Hutchens 
 
 (Tex., 80 S. W. Rep. 416). 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Ivey (Tex., 
 
 37 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 46), 567. - 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Johnson (72 
 
 Tex. 95; 10 S. W. Rep. 325); 37 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 128), 616. 
 Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Jones (35 Tex. 
 
 Civ. App. 584; 80 S. W. Rep. 862), 
 
 91. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Jones (75 
 
 Tex. 161; 12 S. W. Rep. 972; 41 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 363), 230. 
 Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Keaveney (80 
 
 S. W. Rep. 387), 107. _ , ^^ 
 Missouri, etc„ R. Co. v. Keefe (Tex., 
 
 84 S. W. Rep. 679), 367. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. King (2 Tex. 
 
 Civ. App. 122; 20 S. W. Rep. 1014; 
 
 23 S. W. Rep. 917), 301. 
 Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Lamothe (76 
 
 Tex. 219; 13 S. W. Rep. 194), 90. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Lee (35 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 364; 70 Tex. 496; 7 
 
 S. W. Rep. 857), 951. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Lehmberg (76 
 
 Tex. 61; 12 S. W. Rep. 838), 202. 
 Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Lewis (24 Neb. 
 
 848; 40 N. W. Rep. 401; 2 L. R. A. 
 
 67), 47. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Long (81 Tex. 
 
 253; 16 S. W. Rep. 1016), 714. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Lyde (57 Tex. 
 
 505; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 188), 
 
 186. 
 Missouri, etc., R. Co,-i'. Lynch (90 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 511), 266. 
 Missouri, etc., R. Co. v, Lyons (54 Neb. 
 
 633; 75 N. W. Rep. 31), 493. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Mackey (127 
 
 U. S. 205; 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1161; 33 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 390), 604. 
 Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Mackey (33 
 
 Kan. 298; 6. Pac. Rep. 291; 22 Am. 
 
 & En;;. R. Cas. 306), 523. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. McCally (41 
 
 Kan. 639; 21 Pac. Rep. 574), 400. 
 Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. McElyea (71 
 
 Tex. 386; 9 S. W. Rep. 313), 246. 
 Missouri, etc., R." Co. v. Mitchell (75 
 
 Tex. 77; 12 S. W. Rep. 810; 41 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 224), 83. 
 Missouri, etCy R. Co. v. Mitchell (Tex., 
 
 79 S..W. Rep. 94), 666. 
 Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Moody (Tex., 
 
 79 S. W. Rep. 856), 92. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. -Co. v. Moseley (57 
 
 Fed. Rep. 921), 876. 
 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Neiswanger 
 
 (41 Kan. 621; 21 Pac. Rep. 582), 625. 
 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Nichols (8 
 
 Kan. 505), 225. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Owens (75 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 579), 235. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. z/. Peregoy (36 
 
 Kan. 424; 14 Pac. Rep. 7), 164. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Perry (95 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 42), 649. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Pierce (33 
 Kan. 61; 5 Pac. Rep. 378; 19 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 318), 961. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry, Co. v. Price (106 
 
 S. W. Rep. 700), 557. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Raney (99 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 589), 621. 
 Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Reasor (28 Tex. 
 Civ. App. 302; 68 S. W. Rep. 332), 
 224. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Schroeder (100 
 
 S. W. Rep. 808), 583. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Smith (99 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 743), 543. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Somers (71 
 
 Tex. 700), 343. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Texas, etc., 
 
 R. Co. (38 Fed. Rep. 816), 491. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Texas Pacific 
 
 R. Co. (41 Fed. Rep. 316), 1043. 
 Missouri; etc., R. Co. v. Thomas (Tex., 
 
 28 S. W. Rep. 139), 1067. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Thompson (11 
 Tex. Civ. App. 658; 33 S. W. Rep. 
 718), 41. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Walden (Tex., 
 
 66 S. W. Rep. 584), 360. 
 Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Watts (63 Tex. 
 549; 22 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 277), 
 821. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Weisen (65 
 
 Tex. 443), • 1103. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. w. Williams (75 
 
 Tex. 4; 12 S. W. Rep. 835), 407. 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Wise (106 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 465), 473: 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Wortham (7S 
 Tex. 25; 10 S. W. Rep. 741; 3 L. R. 
 A. 368; 37 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 82), 
 711. 
 Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Wylie (Tex., 
 
 33 S. W. Rep. 771), 238. 
 Mitchell V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (114 
 
 N. W. Rep. 622), 608. 
 Mitchell V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (51 
 Mich. 236; 16 N. W. Rep. 388; 47 
 Am. Rep. 566; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 163), 787. 
 Mitchell V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (108 
 Mo. App. 142; 83 S. W. Rep. 289), 
 379. 
 Mitchell V. New York, etc., R. Co. (2 
 Hun 535; 6 T. & C. 122; 64 N. Y. 
 655), 201. 
 Mitchell V. Pennsylvania R. Co. (Pa., 1 
 
 Am. Law Reg. 717), 606. 
 Mitchell V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (122 
 
 Mo. App. 60), 884. 
 Mitchell V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (97 
 
 S. W. Rep. 552), 411. 
 Mitchell V. Southern Pac. R. Co. (87 
 
 CXVl 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.'] 
 
 Cal. 62; 25 Pac. Rep. 845; 11 L. R. 
 
 A. :30), 39. 
 Mitchell V. United Ry. Cos. (125 Mo. 
 
 App. 1), 737. 
 Mitchell V. Wabash R. Co. (97 Mo. App. 
 
 «1; 76 S. W. Rep. 647), 254. 
 Mixter v. Coal Co. (158 Pa. 395; 85 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 342), 118. 
 Moakler v. Williamette Valley R. Co. 
 
 (18 Ore. 189; 41 Am. &.Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 135), 808. 
 Moberly v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (17 Mo. App. 518; 98 Mo. 183; 11 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 569), 1014. 
 Moberly v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (98 
 
 Mo. 183; 11 S. W. Rep. 669), 1004. 
 Moberly v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (98 
 
 Mo. 183; 11 S. W. Rep. 569), 1000. 
 Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. AShcraft (48 
 
 Ala. 15), 97. 
 Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. Beasley (119 
 
 111. App. 18), 327. 
 Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. Blakely (59 Ala. 
 
 471), 1083. 
 Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. Davis (130 111. 
 
 146; 22 N. E. Rep. 850; 42 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 70), 974. 
 Mobile, etcy R. Co. v. George (94 Ala. 
 
 199; 10 So. Rep. 145), 181. 
 Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. Healy (100 111. 
 
 App. 586), 328. 
 Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. Holborn (84 Ala. 
 
 133; 4 So. Rep. 146), 404. 
 Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. Hopkins (41 Ala. 
 
 486), 860. 
 Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. Klein (43 111. 
 
 App. 63), 792. 
 Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. McArthur (43 
 
 Miss. 180), 663. 
 Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. Smith (59 Ala. 
 
 846), 461. 
 Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. Thomas (48 Ala. 
 
 672), 478. 
 Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. Vallowe (115 111. 
 
 App. 681; 814 111. 184; 73 N. E. Rep. 
 
 416), 360. 
 Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. Walty (69 Miss. 
 
 146; 13 So. Rep. 885), 198. 
 Moebus V. Herrman (108 N. Y. 349; 16 
 
 N. E. Rep. 415), 1005. 
 Molaskee v. Ohio, etc., Co. (86 Wis. 22), 
 
 146. 
 Mollhoff V. Chicago R. I. & P. R. Co. 
 
 (82 Pac. Rep. 733), 464. 
 Monaghan v. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (9 N. Y. S. R. 672; 45 Hun. 113). 
 
 489. 
 Montgomery v. Alabama, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (97 Ala. 305; 12 So. Rep. 170), 1030. 
 Montgomery, etc., R. Co. v. Barringer 
 
 (109 111. App. 185), 338. 
 Montgomery, etc., R. Co. v. Boring (51 
 
 Ga. 682), 169. 
 Montgomery v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (109 Mo. App. 83 S. W. Rep. 66), 
 
 367. 
 Montgomery, etc., R. Co. v. Mallette (92 
 
 Ala. 209; 9 So. Rep. 363), 589. 
 Montgomery v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 
 
 (188 Mo. 495), 88. 
 Montgomery v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. 
 
 (181 Mo. 477; 79 S. W. Rep. 930), 
 
 940. 
 Montgomery, etc., Co. v, Montgomery, 
 
 etc., R. Co. (86 Ala. 372; 5 So. Rep. 
 
 735), 282. 
 Montgomery, etc., R. Co. v. Smith (Ala., 
 
 39 So. Rep. 575), 288. 
 Montgomery, etc., R. Co. v. Stewart (91 
 
 Ala. 481; 8 So. Rep. 708), 664. 
 Montgomery, etc., R. Co. v. Thompson ^ 
 
 (71 Ala. 448; 54 Am. Rep. 78), 1069. 
 Montgomery, etc., Co. v. Whatley (44 
 
 So. Rep. 638), 746. 
 Moody V. Peterson (11 111. App. 180), 
 
 455. 
 Moon Anchor Con. Co. v, Hopkins (111 
 
 Fed. Rep. 298; 49 C. C. A. 347), 145. 
 Moon V. Northern Pac. R. Co. (46 Minn. 
 
 106; 48 N. W. Rep. 679; 48 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 195) 163. 
 Moon V. Pere Marquette R. Co. (143 
 
 Mich. 186, 136; 106 N. W. Rep. 715), 
 
 96. 
 Mooney v. Hudson River R. Co. (5 
 
 Robt. 548), 1043. 
 Moore v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (169 Mass. 
 
 399; 34 N. E. Rep. 366), 408. 
 Moore v. Central R. Co. (47 Iowa 688), 
 
 977. 
 Moore v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (59 Miss. 
 
 243; 9 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 401), 92. 
 Moore v, Columbia, etc., R. Co. (38 So. 
 
 Car. 1; 16 S. E. Rep. 781; 58 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 493), 1070. 
 Moore v. Edison, etc., R. Co. (43 La. 
 
 Ann. 798: 9 So. Rep. 433), 802. 
 Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co. (135 
 
 Fed. Rep. 67; 67 C. C. A. 541), 528. 
 Moore ii. ICansas City, etc., R. Co. (146 
 
 Mo. 580; 48 S. W. Rep. 487), 140. 
 Moore v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (l26 
 
 Mo. 865; 89 S. W. Rep. 9), 1095, ' 
 Moore v. Lindell Ry. Co. (176 Mo. 628; 
 
 75 S. W. Rep. 672), 388. 
 Moore v. New York, etc., R. Co. (42 
 
 N. Y. S. R. 489; 68 Hun 681; 39 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 628), 1001. 
 Moore v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co. (87 Va. 
 
 489; 12 S. E. Rep. 968), 413. 
 Moore v. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. (108 
 
 Pa. St. 349), 978. 
 Moore v. Saginaw, etc., R. Co. (115 
 
 Mich. 103; 78 N. W. Rep. 1118), 
 
 667. 
 Moore v. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co., (La. 
 
 Ann., 38 So. Rep. 913), 336. 
 Moore v. Southern Ry. Cjo. (N. C, 63 
 
 S. E. Rep. 746), 862. 
 Moore v. Transit Co. (194 Mo. 1; 92 
 
 S. W. Rep. 390), 776. 
 Moore v. Wabash R. Co. (85 Mo. 588; 
 
 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 609), 486. 
 Moorman v. Atchison, etc., R. Co. (l05 
 
 Mo. App. 711; 78 S. W. Rep. 1089), 
 
 666. 
 Moran v. Nashville, etc., R. Co. (2 
 
 Baxt. [Tenn.] 379), 973. 
 Moran v. New York, etc., R. Co. (67 
 
 Barb. [N. Y.] 96), 492. 
 Moran -v. Rockland, etc., R. Co. (99 
 
 Me. 127; 68 Atl. Rep. 676), 264. 
 
 CXVll 
 
TABLE OP CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.'] 
 
 Morbly v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (Iowa, 
 
 89 N. W. Rep. 105), 381. 
 Morehead v. Yazoo, etc., R. Co. (Miss., 
 
 36 So. Rep. 151), 328. 
 Horeland v. Boston R. Co. (141 Mass. 
 
 31; 1 N. E. Rep. 909), 620. 
 Morgan v. Bowman (22 Mo. 538), 278. 
 Morgan v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. (Ky., 
 
 105 S. W. Rep. 961; 15 L. R. A. N. 
 
 S. 790), 811. 
 Morgan v. Hudson River, etc., Co. (133 
 
 N. y. 666; 31 N. E. Rep. 234), 263. 
 Morgan v. Smith (159 Mass. 670; 85 
 
 N. E. Rep. 101), 276. 
 Morgan v. Southern Pacific R. Co. (95 
 
 Cal. 610;' 64 Am. & Eng. R. CaS. 101; 
 
 30 Pac. Rep. 603), 206. 
 Morgan v. Wabash R. Co. (159 Mo. 
 
 262; 60 S. W. Rep. 195), 1065. 
 Moreen v. Camden, etc., R. Co. (Pa,, 16 
 
 Afl. Rep. 353), 786. 
 Morgen v. Norfolk Southern E. Co. (98 
 
 No. Car. 247), 886. 
 Morgen v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (19 
 
 Blatchf. U. S. 239; 7 Fed. Rep. 78), 
 
 871. 
 Morgen v. Southern Pacific R. Co. (96 
 
 Cal 610: 30 Pac. Rep. 603; 64 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 101), 194. 
 Morgen v. Vale of Neath R. Co. (B. & 
 
 S., 736; 35 L. J. Q. B. 23; 13 L. T. 
 
 664), 497. 
 Morgen v. Wabash R. Co. (159 Mo. 262; 
 
 00 S. W. Rep. 195), 1076. 
 Morissette v. Canadian Pac. R. Co. (74 
 
 Vt. 232; 52 Atl. Rep. 520), 369. 
 Morley v. Great Western R. Co. (16 U. 
 
 C. Q. B. 504), 202. 
 Morris, etc., R. Co. v. Ayres (29 N. J. 
 
 L. 393), 658. 
 Morris V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (15 Am. 
 
 Neg. Rep. 8), 408. 
 Morris v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (65 Iowa 
 
 727; 19 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 180; 54 
 
 Am. Rep. 39), 47. 
 Morris v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (26 
 
 Fed. Rep. 22), 882. 
 Morris v. Duluth, etc., R. Co. (108 
 
 Fed. Rep. 747; 47 C. C. A. 661), 358. 
 Morris v. Eastern Ry. Co. (88 Minn. 
 
 112; 92 N. W. Rep. 535), 267. 
 Morris, etc., R. Co. v. Haslan (33 N. 
 
 J. L. 147), 1023. 
 Morris v. Metropolitan R, Co. (63 App. 
 
 Div. 78; 71 N; Y. Supp. 321; 170 N. 
 
 Y. 692; 63 N. E. Rep. 1119), 1062. 
 Morris v. New York, etc., R. Co. (106 
 
 N. Y. 678; 13 N. E. Rep. 456; 36 
 
 Hun 647), 584. 
 Morrison v. Erie Co. (56 N. Y. 302; 
 
 6 Am. Ry. Rep. 166), 790. 
 Morrison v. San Pedro, etc., R. Co. (88 
 
 Pac. Rep. 998), 473. 
 Morrissey v. Eastern R. Co. (126 Mass. 
 
 377), 1084. 
 Morrow v. Pullman Palace Car Co. (98 
 
 Mo. App. 851; 73 S. W. Rep. 281), 
 
 137. 
 Morrow v. Southern Ry. Co. (61 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 62y, 1080. 
 Morse v. Erie R. Co. (65 Barb. N. Y. 
 
 490), 1004. 
 Morse V. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. (30 
 
 cxviii 
 
 Minn. 465; 16 N. W. Rep. 858; 11 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 168), 334. 
 Morse v. Richmond (41 Vt. 435), 393. 
 Moses V. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (39 La. 
 
 Ann. 649; 2 So. Rep. 567; 30 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 666), 626. 
 Mosgrove v. Coal Co. (Iowa, 81 N. 
 
 WT Rep. 227), 356. 
 Mosher v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (127 
 
 U. S. 393), 847. 
 Moskovitz V. Lighte (68 Hun lOS), 
 
 206. 
 Moss V. Johnson (22 111.. 633), 568. 
 Moss V. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (49 Mo. 
 
 167; 1 Am. Ry. Rep. 676), 464. 
 Moster v. Terminal R. Ass'n (106 111. 
 
 App. 494), 341. 
 Mott V. Central R. Co. (70 Ga. 680; 48 
 
 Am. Rep. 696), 66. 
 Mott V. Southern Ry. Co. (131 N. C. 
 
 234; 42 S. E. Rep. 601), 386. 
 Mounce v. Lodwick Lumber Co. (91 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 240), 643. 
 Mt. Olive, etc., Co. v. Herbeck (92 111. 
 
 App. 441; 60 N. E. Rep. 106), 356. 
 Mountain Copper Co. v. Van Buren (123 
 
 Fed. Rep. 61), 128. 
 Moyer v. Ramsey-Brisbane Co. (119 Ga. 
 
 734; 46 S. E. Rep. 844), 109. 
 Muelhauser v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (91 
 
 Mo. 332: 2 S. W. Rep. 315; 28 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 157), 665. 
 Mueller ii. Northwestern, etc., Co. (IW 
 
 Wis. 326; 104 N. W. Rep. 67), 97. 
 Muench v. Heineman (Wis., 96 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 800)^ 872. 
 Muhl V. Michigan So. R. Co. (10 Ohio 
 
 St 272), 64. 
 Muirhead v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (19 
 
 Mo. App. 634), 344. 
 Muldoon V. Seattle, etc., R. Co. (22 
 
 L R. A. 794; 10 Wash. 311; 38 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 996; 7 Wash. 528; 36 Pac. Rep. 
 
 422; 58 Am.. & Eng. R. Cas. 646). 
 
 851, 862. 
 Muldowney v. Illinois, etc., R. Co. (39 
 
 Iowa 615; 8 Am. Ry. Rep. 487), 340. 
 Mulhall V. O'Fallon (176 Mass. 266; 57 
 
 N. E. Rep. 386; 54 L. R. A. 934; 70 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 309), 69. 
 Mulhausen v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co (91 
 
 Mo. 332; 2 S. W. Rep. 315; 28 Am. 
 
 & En^. R. Cas. 157), 661. 
 Mulhernn v. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (81 
 
 Pa. St. 366; 15 Am. Ry. Rep. 456), 
 
 413. IV), 
 
 Mullen V. Owosso (100 Mich. 103; 58 
 
 N. W. Rep. 663; 43 Am. St Rep. 
 
 436; 23 L. R. A. 693), 1068. 
 Mullen V. Wisconsin, etc., R. Co. (46 
 
 Minn. 474; 47 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 649). 749. 
 Munich V. Brocker (97 S. W. Rep. 549). 
 
 278. "^ 
 
 Mulligan o. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (129 N.Y. 606; 29 N. E. Rep. 952; 
 
 42 N. Y. S. R. 88; 53 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 47), 736. 
 Mullins V. Siegel, etc., Co. (183 N. Y. 
 
 129; 75 N. E. Rep. 1112). 285. 
 Mumford v. Chicago, R. I. & P Ry. Co. 
 
 (128 Iowa 685; 104 N. W. Rep. 1136), 
 
 849. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.] 
 
 Mumma v. Easton & A. R. Co. (65 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 208), 110. 
 Munger v. Sedalia (66 Mo. App. 629), 
 
 10S6. 
 Munro v. Pacific Coast R. Co. (84 Cal. 
 
 515; 24 Pac. Rep. 303), 191. 
 Muntz V. Algiers & G. R. Co. (115 La. 
 
 437; 38 So. Rep. 410), 235. 
 Murch V. Concord R. Co. (89 N. H. 9; 
 
 61 Am. Dec. 631), 395. 
 Murtfelt V. New York, etc., R. Co. (102 
 
 N. Y. 703; 7 N. E. Rep. 404; 34 
 
 Hun 632; 25 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 144), 291. 
 Murpliy V. Atlanta, etc., R. Co. (89 Ga. 
 
 832; 15- S. E. Rep. 774), 592. 
 Murphy v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (88 N. 
 
 Y. 146; 24 Hun 142; 59 Hun. Pr. 
 
 197; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 510), 
 
 468. 
 Murphy v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (133 
 
 Mass. 121; 14 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 675), 881. 
 Murphy v. Galveston, H. & N. Ry. Co. 
 
 96 S. W. Rep. 940), ^65. 
 Murphy k. Holbrook (20 Ohio St. 137), 
 
 Murphy v. New York, etc., R. Co. (187 
 
 Mass. 18; 72 N. E. Rep. 330), 379. 
 Murphy v. New York, etc., R. Co. (118 
 
 N. Y. 527; 23 N. E. Rep. 818), 407. 
 Murphy v. New York, etc., R. Co. (8 
 
 N. Y. 445; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 490; 
 
 25 Hun 311), 199. 
 Murphy v. New York, etc., R. Co. (29 
 
 Conn. 496), 200. 
 Murphy v. New York, etc., R. Co. (66 
 
 Barb. [N. Y.] 125), 83. 
 Murphy v. Rome, etc., R. Co. (32 N. 
 
 Y. S. R. 381; 10 N. Y. Supp. 354; 56 
 
 Hun 645), 790. 
 Murphy v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (43 
 
 Mo. App. 351), 692. 
 Murphy v. Wabash R. Co. (115 Mo. 11; 
 
 21 S. W. Rep. 862), 326. 
 Murray v. Boston Ice Co. (180 Mass. 
 
 165; 61 N. E. Rep. 1001), 1043. 
 Murray v. Central City R. Co. (66 Barb. 
 
 [N. Y.] 43; 51 N. Y. 666), 389. 
 Murray v.- Dwight (l61 N. Y. 301; 55 
 
 N. E. Rep. 901), 226. 
 Murray v. Lehigh Valley R. Co. (66 
 
 Conn. 512; 34 Atl. Rep. 606; 32 L. 
 
 R. A. 539), 818. 
 Murray v. Metropolitan R. Co. (27 L. 
 
 T. 762), 649. 
 Murray v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (101 
 
 Mo. 236; 13 S. W. Rep. 817), 963. 
 Murray v. New York, etc., R. Co. (66 
 
 Conn. 512; 34 Atl. Rep. 506; 32 L. 
 
 R. A. 539), 683. 
 Murray v. Railroad Co. (101 Mo. 236), 
 
 136. 
 Murray i;. Richmond, etc., R. Co. (93 
 
 No. Car. 92), 391. 
 ^Sr^ K- Usher (117 N. Y. 542; 23 
 
 N. E. Rep. 564; 27 N. Y. S. R. 938), 
 
 Murtaugh I-. New York, etc., R. Co. (23 
 N. Y. S. R. 636; 3 N. Y. Supp. 483), 
 
 374. • 
 
 Murtaugh v New York, etc., R. Co. (49 
 Hun 466), 27. 
 
 Murtaugh v. St. Louis (44 Mo. 480), 
 
 299. 
 Muster v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (61 Wis. 
 
 385; 21 N. WT Rep. 223; 49 Am. Rep. 
 
 41; 18 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 113), 590. 
 Muth V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (87 Mo. 
 
 App. 422), 657. 
 Myers v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. (150 
 
 Pa. St. 386; 24 AtL Rep. 747), 1003. 
 Myers v. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. (113 
 
 111. 386; 1 N. E. Rep. 899), 408. 
 Myers v, San Francisco (42 Cal. 215); 
 
 200. 
 Mynning v. Detroit, etc., R. Co. (67 
 
 Mich. 677), 138. 
 Mynning v. Detroit, etc., R. Co. (59 
 
 Mich. 257; 26 N. W. Rep. 514; 23 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 317), 446. 
 
 N 
 
 Nadau v. White River, etc., Co. (76 
 
 Wis. 120; 43 N. W. Rep. 1135), 245. 
 Nagle V. California Southern R. Co. (88 
 
 (Tal. 86; 25 Pac. Rep. 1106), 787. 
 Nagle V, Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (75 
 • Mo. 653; 42 Am. Rep. 418; 10 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 702), 168. 
 Nail V. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (129 
 Ind. 260; 28 N. E. Rep. 183, 611; 48 
 Am. & Eng. B. Cas. 309). 378. 
 N'alley v. Hartford Co. (51 Conn. 624; 
 
 50 Am. Rep. 47), 95. 
 Nance v. Carolina R. Co. (94 No. Car. 
 
 619), 790. 
 Narramore v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. (96 
 Fed. Rep. 298; 37 C. C. A. 499; 48 
 L. R. A. 68), 382.1 
 Nary v. New York, etc., R. Co. (29 N. 
 Y. S. R. 630; 9 N. Y. Supp. 153; 55 
 Hun 612; 125 N. Y. 759; 27 N. E. 
 Rep. 408), 470. 
 Nash V. Downing (93 Mo. App. 156), 
 
 99. 
 Nash V. New York, etc., R. Co. (34 N. 
 Y. S. R. 788; 3 Silv. App. 315), 1015. 
 Nash V. New York, etc., R. Co. (14 N. 
 
 Y. S. R. 531), 1005. 
 Nash w. New York, etc., R. Co. (125 N. 
 
 Y. 715: 51 Hun 694), 409. 
 Nash V. Richmond, etc., R. Co. (82 Va. 
 
 65), 1025. 
 Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. 
 Bean's Exr's (110 S. W. Rep. 328), 
 1094. 
 Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Carroll (6 
 Heisk. [Tenn.] 347; 18 Am. Ry. Rep. 
 20), 395. 
 Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. David (6 Heisk. 
 
 261), 604. 
 Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Eakin (6 Caldw. 
 
 [Tenn.] 582), 54. 
 Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Foster (10 
 Lea [Tenn.] 351; 11 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 180), 505. 
 Nashville, etc., R. ^ Co. v. Ganns (101 
 „Tenn 380; 47 S. W. Rep. 493), 495. 
 Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Handman (13 
 
 Lea [Tenn,] 423), 468. 
 Nashville, C. & St. L.'Ry. v. Hayes (99 
 
 S. W. Rep. 362), 260. 
 Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Jones (9 
 
 cxix 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.} 
 
 Heisk. [Tenn.] 27; 19 Am. Ry. Rep. 
 
 261), 480. 
 Nashville, etc., R. Co. ii. McDaniel (12 
 
 Lea [Tenn.] 386), 227. 
 Nashville, etc., R. Co. v, Messine (1 
 
 Sneed. [Tenn.] 220), 561. 
 Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Miller (120 
 
 Ga. 453; 47 S. E. Rep. 959), 91. 
 Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Reynolds 
 
 (41 So. Rep. 1001), 979. 
 Nashville, etc., E. Co. v. Prince (8 
 
 Heisk. 680), 193. 
 Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Smith (6 Heisk. 
 
 [Tenn.] 174), 173. 
 Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Stearns (9 
 
 Heisk. LTenn.] 58), 177. 
 Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Stevens (9 
 
 Heisk. [Tenn.] 12; 19 Am. Ry. Rep. 
 
 363), 165. 
 Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Sprayberry (8 
 
 Baxt. [Tenn.] S41), 810. 
 Nashville, etc., R. (5o. v. Sprayberry (9 
 
 Heisk. [Tenn.] 858; 20 Am. Ry. Rep. 
 
 65), 47. 
 Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Troxlee (1 Lea 
 
 [Tenn.] 520), 678. 
 Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Wheeler 
 
 (Tenn., 4 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 633), 
 
 365. 
 Natchez, etc., Co. v. Mullins (67 Miss. 
 
 672; 7 So. Rep. 542), 59. 
 Nattress v. Philadelphia, etc^ R. Co. 
 
 (150 Pa. St. 627; 24 Atl. Rep. 753), 
 
 417. 
 Nauss V. Boston & M. R. Co. (81 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 280), 866. 
 Nave V, Alabama, etc., R. Co. (96 Ala., 
 
 264; 11 So. Rep. 391; 54 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 151), 408. 
 Naylor v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (53 Wis. 
 
 661; 1] N. WT Rep. 24; 5 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 460), 341. 
 Naylor v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (Wis., 2 
 
 N. W. Rep. 24), 353. 
 Naylor V. New York, etc., R. Co. (33 
 
 Fed. Rep. 801), 322. 
 Naylor v. Ry. Co. 53 Wis. 661; 11 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 24), 243. 
 Naylor v. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. (26 
 
 Ohio Cir. Ct. 277), 71. 
 Neagle v. Syracuse, etc., R. Co. (95 N. 
 
 Y. S. 884; 109, App. Div. 339), 
 
 367. 
 Neal V. Railroad Co. (57 Minn. 366; 59 
 
 N. W. Rep. 312), 157. 
 Neal V. Rendall (98 Me. 69; 56 'Atl. 
 
 Rep. 209; 63 L. R. A. 668), 1056. 
 Nebauer v. Great Northern R. Co. 
 
 (Minn., 99 N. W. Rep. 620), 47. 
 Nebauer 7>. New York, etc., R. Co. (101 
 
 N. Y. 607; 4 N. E. Rep. 125), 139. 
 Needham v. Grand Trunk R. Co. (38 
 
 Vt. 294), 45. 
 Needham v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (85 
 
 Ky. 423; 3^ S. W. Rep. 797), 152. 
 Neeley v. Southwestern, etc., Co. (13 
 
 Okl. 356; 75 Pac. Rep. 637; 64 L. R. 
 
 A. 145), 246. 
 Neet V. Burlington, etc., R. Co. (106 
 
 Iowa 248), 898. 
 Nehrbas v. Central Pacific R. Co. (68 
 
 cxx 
 
 Cal. 320; 14 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 670), 
 
 806. 
 Neiman v, Delaware, etc., R. Co. (149 
 
 Pa. St. 92; 24 Atl. Rep. 96), 1013. 
 Neilon v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (85 
 
 Mo. 599; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 386), 
 
 483. 
 Nejus V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (47 Minn. 
 
 92; 49 N. W. Rep. 527), 522. 
 Nelson v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co. (68 Mo. 
 
 593), 789. 
 Nelson v. Central, etc., R. Co. (88 Ga. 
 
 885; 14 S. E. Rep. 210), 419. 
 Nelson v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. (88 
 
 Va, 971; 54 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 82; 
 
 14 S. E. Rep. 838), 68. 
 Nelson v, Chicago, etc., R. Co. (73 Iowa 
 
 576;. 35 N. W. Rep. 611), 622. 
 Nelson v. Galveston, etc., R. Co. (78 
 
 Tex. 621: 14 S. W. Rep. 1021; 48 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 8), 66. 
 Nelson v. Lehigh Valley, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (50 N. Y. S. 63; 25 App. Div. 535), 
 
 113. 
 Nelson v. Metropolitan R. Co. (88 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 781), 175. , 
 
 Nelson v. Oil (Tity R. Co. (%07 Pa. St. 
 
 363; 56 Atl. Rep. 933), 328. 
 Nelson v. Union, etc., R. Co. (26 R. I. 
 
 251; 58 Atl. Rep. 780), 97. 
 Nelson v. Vermont, etc., R. Co. (86 Vt. 
 
 717), 815. 
 Nesbit V. Garner (75 Iowa 314; 39 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 816; 9 Am. St. Rep. 486; 1 
 
 L. R. A. 168), 1065. 
 Netelle v. Railroad (56 Fed. Rep. 261), 
 
 56. 
 New Albany, etc., Co. v. Cooper (131 
 
 Ind. 363; 30 N. E. Rep. 294), 291. 
 Newcomb v. New York, etc., Ry. Co. 
 
 169 Mo. 409; 69 S. W. Rep. 348), 715. 
 Newcomb v. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (188 Mo. 687; 81 S. W. Rep. 631), 97. 
 New England R. Co, v. Conroy (176 
 
 U, S. 323; 44 L. Ed. 181), 491. 
 Newhard v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (153 
 
 Pa. St. 417; 26 Atl, Rep. 105; 56 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 858), 888. 
 New Jersey Co. v. Brockett (121 U. S. 
 
 637; 30 L. Ed, 1049), 736. 
 New Jersey R, Co. v. Kennard (21 Pa. 
 
 St. 203), 802. 
 New Jersey, etc., R. Co. v. Nichols (33 
 
 N. J. L, 343), 186. 
 New Jersey, etc., R. Co. v. Pollard (22 
 
 Wall. [tJ. S.] 341; 22 L. Ed. 877), 
 
 666. 
 New Jersey, etc., R. Co. i/. West (38 N. 
 
 J. L. 91), 990. 
 New Jersey, etc., R. Co, v. Young (49 
 
 Fed. Rep. 723; 1 U. S. App. 96; 1 C. 
 
 C. A. 428), 397. 
 Newman v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (80 
 
 Iowa 672'; 45 N, W. Rep. 1054; 44 
 
 Am. & Eng. R, Cas. 665), 397. 
 New Orleans, etc, R. Co. v. Allbriton 
 
 (38 Miss. 242), 180. 
 New Orleans, etc, R. Co. i;. Bailev (40 
 
 Miss. 395), 177. 
 New Orleans, etc., R. Co. v. Burke (53 
 
 Miss. 200; 9 Am. Ry. Rep. 308), 745. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.} 
 
 New Orleans, etc., R. Co. v. Harrrison 
 
 (48 Miss. 113), 166. 
 New Orleans, etc., R. Cq. v. Hughes (49 
 
 Miss. 268), 331. 
 New Orleans, etc., R. Co. v. Hurst (36 
 
 Miss. 660), 176. 
 New Orleans & N. E. R. R. Co. v. 
 Topes (142 U. S. 18; IS Supt. Ct. 
 109; 35 L. Ed. 919), 834. 
 New Orleans, etc., R. Co. v. Reese (61 
 
 Miss. 581), S76. 
 New Orleans, etc., R. Co. v. Statham (43 
 
 Miss. 008), 178. 
 Newport, etc., R. Co. v. Carroll (31 S. 
 
 WT Rep. 132; 17 Ky. L. R. 374), 92. 
 Newport, etc., Co. v. Dentzel (91 Ky. 
 
 42; 14 S. W. Rep. 958), 152. 
 Newport News, etc., R. Co. v. Howe (52 
 Fed. Rep. 362; 6 U. S. App. 172; 3 
 C. C. A. 121), 1031. 
 Newsom v. Georgia, etc., R. Co. (63 Ga. 
 
 339), 99. 
 Newsom v. Georgia R. Co. (66 Ga. 67), 
 
 92. 
 Newton v. New York, etc., R. Co. (89 
 
 N. Y. S. 23; 96 App. Div. 81), 366. 
 Newton v. New York, etc., R.- Co. (94 
 N. Y. S. R. 835; 106 App. Div. 415), 
 171. 
 New York, etc., R. Co. v. Ball (58 N. 
 
 J. L. 283; 21 Atl. Rep. 1053), 673. 
 New York, etc., R. Co. v. Bell (113 Pa. 
 St. 400; 4 Atl; Rep. 50; 38 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 338), 478. 
 New York, etc., R. Co. v. Callahan (81 
 
 N. E. Rep. 670), 674. 
 New York, etc., R. Co. v. Cooper (85 
 Va. 939; 9 S. E. Rep. 321; 37 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 33), 1043. 
 New York, etc., R. Co. v. Cleybourne 
 (69 Md. 360; 16 Atl. Rep. 208; 1 L. 
 R. A. 541), 789. 
 New York, etc., Co. v. Diffendaffer (135 
 
 Fed. Rep. 893), 343. 
 New York, etc., R. Co. v. Doane (115 
 Ind. 435; 17 N. E. Rep. 913; 7 Am. 
 St. Rep. 451; 1 L. R. A. 157), 669. 
 New York, etc., R. Co. w. Enches (137 
 Pai St. 316; 39 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 444; 17 , Atl. Rep. 991), 788. 
 New York, etc., R. Co. v. Hyde (56 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 188; 5 C. C. A. 461), 493. 
 New York, etc., R. Co. v. Kellams (Va., 
 
 33 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 114), 661. 
 New York, etc., R. Co. v. Kistler (66 
 Ohio St. 336; 64 N. E. Rep. 130), 
 1059. 
 New York, etc., R. Co. v. Leahman (54 
 N. T. L. 303; S3 Atl. Rep. 691), 959. 
 New York, etc., R. Co. v. Lockwood (17 
 Wall. 357; 84 U. S. 673; 21 L. .Ed. 
 627), 856. 
 New York, etc., R. Co. j. Lyon (119 Pa. 
 
 St. 334; 13 Atl. Rep. 305),. 343. 
 New York, etc., R. Co. v. Price (159 
 
 Fed. Rep. 330), 916. 
 New York, etc., R. Co. v. Randel (47 
 N. J. L. 144; 23 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 308), 967. 
 New York, etc., R. Co. v. Rapp (Ohio, 
 
 11 L. R. A. [N. S.] 413), 265. 
 New York, etc., R. Co. v. Seylott (18 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 162), 563. 
 
 New York, etc., R. Co. v. St'einbrenner 
 (47 N. J. L. 161; 23 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 330), 1043. 
 
 New York, etc., R. Co. v. Vick (N. Y., 
 
 17 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 609), 568. 
 New York, etc., R. Co. v. Winters (143 
 
 U, S. 60; 86 L. Ed. 71; 12 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 356), 739. 
 Niantic Coal Co. v. Leonard (126 111. 
 
 216), 14. 
 Nicholas v. Burlington, etc., R. Co. 
 
 Minn. (80 N. W. Rep. 776), 47. 
 Nichols V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (90 
 
 Mich. 203; 51 N. W. Rep. 364; 53 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 304), 705. 
 Nichols V. Dubuque, etc., R. Co. (68 
 
 Iowa. 732; 28 N. W. Rep. 44; 27 Am. 
 
 ft Eng. R. Cas. 183), 790. 
 Nichols V. Great Western R. Co. (37 U. 
 
 C. Q. B. 383), 1004. ■ 
 Nichols V. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (Ky., 
 
 6 S. W. Rep. 339; 34 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 37), 1085. 
 Nichols V. Pere Marcjuette R. Co. (108 
 
 N. W. Rep. 1016), 267. 
 Nichols V. Washington, etc., R. Co. (83 
 
 Va. 99; 5 S. E. Rep. 171; 6 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 267; 32 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 27), 
 
 863. 
 Nicholson v. Erie, etc., R. Co. (41 N. Y. 
 
 635), 4. 
 Nicholson v. Lancashire, etc., R. Co. (3 
 
 H. & C. 634; 34 L. J. Ex. 84; IS L. 
 
 T. 391), 626. 
 Nicholson v. Transylvania R. Cp. (138 
 
 N. C. 516; 51 S. E. Rep. 40), 535. 
 Nieto V. Clark (1 Cliff. [U. S.] 145), 
 
 738 
 Nix v. Texas, etc., R. Co. 83 Tex. 473; 
 
 18 S. W. Rep. 571), 485. 
 
 Nixon V. Hannibal, etc., Ry. Co. (141 
 
 Mo. 439; 42 S. W. Rep. S43), 1011. ■ 
 Noe V. Rapid R. Co. (133 Mich. 153; 
 
 94 N. W. Rep. 743), 663. 
 Nolan V. Metropolitan, etc., R. Co. (73 
 
 N. Y. S. 501; 66 App. Div. 184), 39. 
 Nolan V. Montana, etc., R. Co. (25 Mont. 
 
 107; 63 Pac. Rep. 926), 261. 
 Nolan V. New York, etc., R. Co. (63 
 
 Conn. 461; 4 Atl. Rep. 106; 25 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 343), 1084. 
 Nolan V. Shickle (3 Mo. App. 300), 137. 
 Nponan v. Consolidated Tr. Co'. (64 N. 
 
 J. L. 679; 46 Atl. Rep. 770), 1055. 
 Noonan v. New York, etc., R. Co. (62 
 
 Hun 618; 42 N. Y. S. R. 41; 16 N. 
 
 Y. Supp. 678; 131 N. Y. 594; 30 K. 
 
 E. Rep. 67), 1005. 
 Nolton 1/. Western R. Co. (15 N. Y. 
 
 444; 10 Hun Pr. 97), 563. 
 Nord V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (Mont., 75 
 
 Pac. Repi^ 681), 89. 
 Nordquist v. Great Northern R. Co. (95 
 
 N. W. Rep. 322), 408. 
 Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Bell (53 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 700), 263. 
 Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Burge (84 Va, 
 
 63; 4 S. E. Rep. SI; 33 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 101), 1004. 
 Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Cottrell (83 Va. 
 
 512; 3 S. E. Rep. 183; 31 Am. & Eng, 
 
 R. Cas. 835), 331. 
 
 cxxi 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED, 
 
 [S,eference.8 are to sections.'] 
 
 Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Dean's Adm'x 
 
 (69 S. E. Rep. 389), 1078. 
 Norfolk, etc., R. Go. v. Donnelly (88 Va. 
 
 853; 14 S. E. Rep. 693; 53 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Gas. 671), 498. 
 Norfolk, etc., R. Go. v. Ferguson (79 Va. 
 
 241), 796. 
 Norfolk V. Galligher (89 Va. 639), 853. 
 Norfolk & Western R. Go. v. Gesswine 
 
 (144 Fed. Rep. 58), 99. 
 Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Graham (96 Va. 
 
 430; 31 S. E. Rep. 604), 845. 
 Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Groseclose (88 
 
 Va. 267; 13 S. E. Rep. 454), 566. 
 Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Harman (83 Va. 
 
 663; 8 S. E. Rep. 861), 1093. 
 Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Hoover (79 Md. 
 
 283; 29 Atl. Rep. 994; 25 L. R. A. 
 
 710), 488. , , 
 
 Norfolk, etc., Ry. Go. v. Lipscomb (90 
 
 Va. 137), 663. 
 Norfolk, etc., R. Go. v. McDonald (88 
 
 Va. 352; 13 S. E. Rep. 706), 348. 
 Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Prinnell (Va^ 3 
 
 S. E. Rep. 96; 30 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 574), 664. 
 Norfolk, etc., R. Go. v. Stevens (97 Va. 
 
 631; 34 S. E. Rep. 525; 46 L. R. A. 
 
 367), 876. 
 Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Thomas (90 Va. 
 
 806; 17 S. E. Rep. 884), 245. 
 Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Wysor (82 Va. 
 
 250; 26 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 234), 659. 
 Norfolk & West. Ry. Go. v. Cheatwood's 
 
 Adm'r (103 Va. 366; 49 S. E. Rep. 
 
 489), 260. 
 Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Cromer's Exec. 
 
 (99 Va. 763; 40 S. E. Rep. 64), 258. 
 Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Poole's Adm'r 
 
 (40 S. E. Rep. 627), 858. 
 Norfolk & Western R. Co. i>. Spratley 
 
 (103 Va. 379; 49 S. E. Rep. 602), 100. 
 North Birmingham R. Co. v. Galderwood 
 
 (89 Ala. 247; 7 So. Rep. 360), 398. 
 North Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Aufmann 
 
 (221 111. 614; 77 N. E. Rep. 1120), 
 
 379. 
 North Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Cook (146 
 
 111. 851; 33 N. E. Rep. 958), 683. 
 North Chicago R. Go. v. Dudgeon (69 
 
 111. App. 67), 278. 
 North (Chicago R. Go. v. Dudgeon (184 
 
 111. 476; 66 N. E. Rep. 796), 281. 
 North Chicago Co. v. Johnson (114 111. 
 
 67), 470. 
 North Chicago R. Go. v. Olds (40 111. 
 
 App. 481), 1088. 
 North Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Kirk (90 
 
 Pa. St. 15; 1 Am. & Eng. R. Gas. 46), 
 
 198. 
 Northeastern, etc., R. Co. v. Chandler 
 
 (84 Ga. 37; 10 S. E. Rep. 586), 105. 
 North Eastern R. Co. v. Wanless (43 L. 
 
 J. Q. B. 185; L. R., 7 H. L. Cas. 12; 
 
 22 W. R. 661; 30 L. T. 275; L. R., 6 
 
 Q. B. 481), 919. 
 Northern, etc., R. Go. v. O'Connor (76 
 
 Md. 207; 24 Atl. Fep. 449; 16 L. R. 
 
 A. 449; 68 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 176), 
 
 658. 
 North. Ala., etc., Co. v. Beacham (Ala., 
 
 37 So. Rep. 227), 807. 
 
 cxxii 
 
 Northern Alabama Ry. Go. v. Key (4S 
 
 So. Rep. 794), 413. 
 
 Northern Alabama R. Co. v. Mansell 
 
 (138 Ala. 848; 36 So. Rep. 469), 
 
 Northern Ala. R. Co. v. Shea (Ala., 37 
 
 So. Rep. 7961, 367. 
 Northern Cent. R. Go. v. Husson (101 
 
 Pa. St. 1), 141. 
 Northern (Jentral R. Co. v. State (29 
 
 Md. 480), 21. 
 Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Adams (192 
 
 U. S. 441; 48 L. Ed. 513), 848. 
 Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Amato (49 
 
 Fed. Rep. 881; 144 U. S. 466; 18 Sup. 
 
 Ct. Rep. 740), 1105. 
 Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Babcock 
 
 (164 U. S. 190; 14 Sup. Ct Rep. 978; 
 
 38 L. Ed. 958), 43. 
 Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Behling (67 
 
 Fed. Rep. 1037), 627. 
 Northern Pac. R. Co. v, Gharless (51 
 
 Fed. Rep. 662; 7 U. S. App. 369; 
 
 2 G. C. A. 380; 61 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas 198) 381 
 
 Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Gharless (162 
 
 U. S. '359; 40 L. Ed. 999), 498. 
 Northern Pac. Ry. Go. v. Dixon (139 
 
 Fed. Rep, 737), 113. 
 Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Dixon (194 U. 
 
 S. 338; 48 L. Ed. 1006), 489. 
 Northern Pacific R. Co- v. Hambly (154 
 
 U. S. 349; 14 Sup. Gt. Rep. 983; 38 
 
 L. Ed. 1009), 461. 
 Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Herbert (116 
 
 U. S. 648; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 590; 29 
 
 L. Ed. 765), 461. 
 Northern Pacific R. Co. v.' Hess (2 
 
 Wash. 383; 86 Pac. Rep. 866; 48. Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Gas. 91), 833. 
 Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Holmes (3 
 
 Wash. 543; 18 Pac. Rep. 76), 882. 
 Northern Pacific R. Go. v, Kavanaugh 
 
 (51 Fed. Rep. 517), 491. 
 Northern Pacific R. Go. v. Mase (63 
 
 Fed. Rep. 113; 11 G. C. A. 63), 487. 
 Northern Pac. R. Go. v. Nichols (50 
 
 Fed. Rep. 718; 4 U. S. App. 369), 863. 
 Northern Pacific R. Co. v. O'Brien (1 
 
 Wash. 599; 81 Pac. Rep. 38), 147. 
 Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Peterson (162 
 
 U. S. 346; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 848; 40 
 
 L. Ed. 994), 461. 
 Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Peterson (51 
 
 Fed. Rep. 182; 4 U. S. App. 574; 2 
 
 C. C. A. 157), 505. 
 Northern Pacific R. Co. v, Peterson (55 
 
 Fed. Rep. 940), 1021. 
 Northern Pacific R. Go. v. Porier (167 
 
 U. S. 48; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 741; 42 
 
 L". Ed. 72), 461. 
 Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Sullivan (63 
 
 Fed. Rep. 219; 10 U. S. App. 473; 
 
 3 C. C. A. 606), 401. 
 
 Northern Pac. R. Go. v. Tynan (119 
 
 Fed. Rep. 288), 254. 
 Northwestern R. Co. v. Hack (66 111. 
 
 238), 736. 
 Norton v. Consolidated Ry. Co. (63 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 10B7\ 668. 
 Norton v. Eastern R. Co. (113 Mass. 
 
 366),. 969. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.] 
 
 Norton v. Galveston, etc., Ry. Co. (108 
 
 S. W. Rep. 1044), 836. 
 Norton v. Kramer (180 Mo. 636; 79 
 
 S. W. Rep. 699), 9S. . 
 Norton v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (40 
 
 Mo. App. 642), 166. , ^, 
 
 Nowakowsiti v. Detroit, etc., Co. (89 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 956; 9 Det. Leg. N. 25), 145. 
 Norwood V. Raleigh, etc., R. Co. (Ill 
 
 No. Car. 236; 16 S. E. Rep. 4), 1099. 
 Nosier v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (73 
 
 Iowa 286; 34 N. W. Rep. 860), 1003. 
 Noyes v. Boscawen (64 N. H. 361; 10 
 
 Atl. Rep. 690), 1043. , „ 
 
 Nugent V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (80 Me. 
 
 62; 12 Atl. Rep. 797), 229. 
 Nugent V. Brooklyn El. R. Co. (72 N. 
 
 Y. S. 67; 64 App. Div. 351), 255. 
 Nugent V. Milling Co. (131 Mo. 253; 33 
 
 S. W. Rep. 428), 148. 
 Nugent V. Smith (1 C. P. D. 444), 82. 
 Nunn V. Georgia, etc., R. Co. (71 Ga. 
 
 710; 51 Am. Rep. 284), 704. 
 Nutter V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (60 N. 
 
 H. 483), 104. 
 
 Oakes v. Mase (165 U. S. 363), 478. 
 Oakland R. Co. v. Fielding (48 Pa. St. 
 
 320), 909. 
 Oates V. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co. (168 
 
 Mo. 635; 68 S. W. Rep. 906; 68 L. 
 
 R. A. 447), 392. 
 Oates V. Unidn Pac. R. Co. (104 Mo. 
 
 514; 16 S. W. Rep. 487), 49. 
 O'Bannon's Admr. v. Louisville, etc., R. 
 
 Co. (9 Ky. L. R. 706; 6 S. W. Rep. 
 
 434), 355. 
 Obertoni v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (186 
 
 Mass. 481; 71 N. E. Rep. 980; 67 L. 
 
 R. A. 422), 120. 
 O'Brien v. American, etc., Co. (58* N. 
 
 J. L. 291; 21 Atl. Rep. 224), 472. 
 O'Brien v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (138 
 
 Mass. 387; 52 Am. Rep. 279), 461. 
 O'Brien v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (15 
 
 Gray [Mass.] 20), 736. 
 O'Brien v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (116 
 
 Fed. Rep. 502), 506. 
 O'Brien v. Cunard S. S. Co. (154 Mass. 
 
 372; 28 N. E. Rep. 266; 13 L. R. A. 
 
 329), 29. 
 O'Brien v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. 
 
 (Tex., 82 S. W. Rep. 319), 267. 
 O'Brien v. Transit Co. (110 S. W. Rep. 
 
 705), 737. 
 Oceanic, etc., H. Co. v. Compania 
 
 Translantigue, etc., Co. (134 N. Y. 
 
 461; 31 N. E. Rep. 987; 30 Am. St 
 
 Rep. 685), 234. 
 Och v. Missouri, etc., R. Co. (130 Mo. 
 
 27; 31 S. W. Rep. 962; 36 L. R. A. 
 
 442), 649. 
 O'Connell v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. (20 
 
 Md. 212), 464. 
 O'Connell v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (106 
 
 Mo. 482; 17 S. W. Rep. 494), 682. 
 O'Connor v. Illinois Central R. Co. (44 
 
 La. Ann. 839; 10 So. Rep. 678), 1086. 
 O'Connor v. Missouri Paciiic R. Co. (94 
 
 Mo. 160; 4 Am. St. Rep. 364; 7 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 106), 947. 
 
 Odell V. New York, etc^ R. Co. (120 
 
 N. Y. 323; 24 N. E. Rep. 478), 406. 
 Odin Coal Co. v. Denman (186 111. 413; 
 
 67 N. E. Rep. 192; 76 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 46), 14. 
 O'Donnell v, Allegheny Valley R. Co. 
 
 (69 Pa. St 239), 803. 
 O'Donnell v. Baum (38 Mo. App. 245), 
 
 256. 
 O'Donnell v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (197 Mo. 110, 117; 95 S. W. Rep. 
 
 196), 654. 
 O'Donnell v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. 
 
 (7 Mo. App. 190), 1089. 
 O'Donnell v. Providence, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (6 R. I. 211), 966. 
 O'Donnell v. Rhode Island R. Co. (28 
 
 R. L 245; 66 Atl. Rep. 578), 168. 
 O'Flaherty v. Union R. Co. (45 Mo. 
 
 70), 1058. 
 O'Gara v. St Louis Transit Co. (103 
 
 S. W. Rep. 64), 582. 
 Ogle V. Mills (139 N. Y. 458), 308. 
 Oglesby v. Railway Co. (177 Mo. 272; 
 
 76 S. W. Rep. 623), 119. 
 O'Hare v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (96 Mo. 
 . 662; 9 S. W. Rep. 23), 103. 
 Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. AUender (47 111. 
 
 App. 484). 801. 
 Ohio, etc., Ry. Co. v. Collern (73 Ind. 
 
 261), 261. 
 Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Crosby (107 Ind. 
 
 32; 7 N. E. Rep. 373; 27 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 339), 181. 
 Ohio, etc.,' Ry. Co. v, Dickerson (69 
 
 Ind. 317), 670. 
 Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Dunbar (20 111. 
 
 385), 816. 
 Ohio, etc., R. Co. j/. Early (141 Ind. 
 
 73; 40 N. E. Rep. 257; 28 L. R. A. 
 
 546), 216. 
 Ohio, etc., R. Co. »/. Giillett (15 Ind. 
 
 487), 394. 
 Ohio,- etc., R. Co. v. Hammersley (28 
 
 Ind. 371), 359. 
 Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Hatten (60 Ind. 
 
 12), 832. 
 Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Hecht (115 Ind. 
 
 443; 17 N. E. Rep. 297; 34 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 447), 174. 
 Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. McClelland (25 
 
 111. 140), 976. 
 Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. McDonald (5 Ind. 
 
 App. 108; 31 N. E. Rep. 836), 952. 
 Ohio, etc., R. Co. v,' Metropolitan St. 
 
 Ry. Co. (103 S. W. Rep. 142), 715i 
 Ohio, etc., R. Co. zi. Muhling (30 111. 
 
 1), 568. 
 Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Pearcy (128 Ind. 
 
 197; 27 N. E. Rep. 479), 406. 
 Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Reed (40 111. App. 
 
 47), 972. 
 Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Robb (36 111. App. 
 
 627), 492. 
 Ohio, etc., R. Co. k. Schiebe (44 111. 
 
 460), 785. 
 Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Selby (47 Ind. 
 
 471; 8 Am. Ry. Rep. 177), 826. 
 Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Simms (43 111. 
 
 App. 260), 628. 
 Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Smith (6 Ind. App. 
 
 560; 32 N. E. Rep. 809), 833. 
 Ohio, etc.) R. Co. v. Stansberty (132 
 
 cxxiii 
 
TABLE OE CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.'] 
 
 Ind. 533; 32 N. E. Rep. 818), 793. 
 Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Stein (140 Ind. 
 
 61; 39 N. E; Rep. 246), 493. 
 Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Stratton (78 111. 
 
 88), 787. 
 Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Trowbridge (126 
 
 Ind. 391; 26 N. E. Rep. 64; 45 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 200), 27. 
 Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Tyndall (13 Ind. 
 
 366), 57. 
 Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Voight (122 Ind. 
 
 288; 23 N. E. Rep. 774), 576. 
 Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Walker (113 Ind. 
 
 196; 15 N. E. Rep. 234; 32 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 121), 882. 
 Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Wangelin (43 111. 
 ■ App. 324), 190. 
 Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Watson (Ky., 21 
 
 S. W. Rep. 244; 58 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 418), 669. ^^, , 
 
 Ohlenkamp v. Union Pac. R. Co. (Utah, 
 
 67 Pac. Rep. 411), 109. 
 Oil City Co. v. Boundy (122 Pa. St. 
 
 449; 15 Atl. Rep. 865), 895. 
 O'Keefe v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (32 
 
 Iowa 467), 446. 
 Old Colony R. Co. v. Tripp (147 Mass. 
 
 35; 17 N. E. Rep. 89; 33 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 497), 263. 
 ■Oldenburg v. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (124 NT Y. 414; 26 N. E. Rep. 1021), 
 
 921. 
 Oldfie'ld V. New York, etc., R. Co. (14 
 
 N. Y. 310), 202. 
 Olds V. New York, etc., R. Co. (172 
 
 Mass. 72), 670. 
 O'Leary v. Railroad (62 III. App. 641), 
 
 161. 
 Oliver V. Denver, etc., Tr. Co. (13 
 
 Colo. App. 543), 398. 
 Oliver v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (43 La 
 
 Ann. 804; 9 So. Rep. 431; 47 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 676), 801. 
 Oliver V. New York, etc., R. Co. (1 
 
 Edm. Sel. Cas. [N. Y.] 689), 605. 
 Oliver v. Ohio River R. Co. (42 W. Va. 
 
 703; 26 S. E. Rep. 444), 251. 
 Olsen V. Citizens Ry. Co. (152 Mo. 431; 
 
 64 S. W. Rep. 470), 660. 
 Olsen i: Cook Inlet, etc., Co. (121 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 726; 58 C. C. A. 146), 167. 
 Olsen V. Maple Grove, etc., M. Co. 
 
 (Iowa, 87 N. W. Rep. 736), 145. 
 Olsen ». Oregon, etc., R. Co. (9 Utah 
 
 129; 33 Pac. Rep. 623), 953. 
 Olsen V. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. (38 
 
 Minn. 117; 35 N. W. Rep. 866; 33 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 386), 406. 
 Olson V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (71 N. 
 
 H. 427; 62 Atl. Rep. 1097), 164. 
 Olson v. Luck (103 Wis. 33; 79 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 29), 1063. 
 Olson V. McMullen (34 Minn. 94; 24 
 
 N. W. Rep. 318), 34. 
 Omaha R. Co. v. Boesen (Neb., 105 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 303), 122. 
 Omaha, etc., R. Co. v. Doolittle (7 Neb. 
 
 481), 394. 
 Omaha, etc., R. Co. v. Hargadine (5 
 
 Neb. 418; 98 N. W. Rep. 1071), 283. 
 Omaha, etc., R. Co. v. Martin (14 Neb. 
 
 296; 16 N. W. Rep. 696; 19 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 236), 879. 
 
 cxxiv 
 
 Omaha, etc., R. Co. v. Morgan (40 Neb. 
 . 604; 69 N. W. Rep. 8ll, 229. 
 Omaha, etc., Co. v. Murray (112 111. 
 
 App. 233), 120. 
 Omaha, etc., R. Co. v. O'Donnell (22 
 
 Neb. 476; 35 N. W. Rep. 235), 1036. 
 O'Maley v. Gaslight Co. (168 Mass. 
 
 135; 32 N. E. Rep. 1119; 47 L. R. 
 
 A. 161), 356. 
 O'Malley v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (113 
 
 Mo. 319), 79. 
 O'Malley v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (53 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 280), 136. 
 O'Malley v. New York, etc., R. Co. (51 
 
 N. Y. S. R. 366; 67 Hun 130; 22 N. 
 
 Y. Supp. 48), 419. 
 O'Malley v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. (43 
 
 Minn. 289; 45 N. W. Rep. 440), 1073. 
 O'Mara v. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (18 
 
 Hun [N. Y.] 192), 1028. 
 O'Mara v. New York, etc., R. Co. (18 
 
 Hun [N. Y.-] 193), *14. 
 O'Meara k. Hudson River R. Co. (38 
 
 N. Y. 445), 206. 
 O'Mellia v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. 
 ,(115 Mo. 205; 21 S. W. Rep. 503), 
 
 343. 
 Ominger v. New York, etc., R. Co. (4 
 
 Hun [N. Y.] 159), 300. 
 Onderdonk v. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (74 Hun 42; 26 N. Y. Supp. 310; 66 
 
 N. Y. S. R. 190), 710. 
 O'Neal V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (132 
 
 Ind. 110; 31 N. E. Rep. 669), 336. 
 O'Neal V. St. Loiiis, etc., R. Co. (3 
 
 McCrary [U. S.] 423; 9 Fed. Rep. 
 
 337) 321. 
 O'Neill II. Blase (94 Mo. App. 648; 68 
 
 S. W. Rep. 764), 283. 
 O'Neill V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (Neb., 
 
 92 N. W. Rep. 731; 60 L. R. A. 
 
 443), 262. 
 O'Neill V. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. (130 
 
 Fed. Rep. 204), 568. 
 Openshaw v. Utah, etc., R. Co. (6 Utah 
 
 132), 491. 
 Oppenheimer v. Manhattan R. Co. (63 
 
 Hun [N. Y.] 633), 732. 
 Orcutt V. Century Bldg. Co. (201 Mo. 
 
 424; 99 S. W. Rep. 1062; 8 L. R. A. 
 
 [N. S.] 929), 299. 
 O'Reilly v. Long Island R. Co. (44 N. 
 
 Y. Supp. 264; 15 App. Div. 79), 630. 
 O'Reilly v. New York, etc., R. Co. (16 
 
 R. I. 388; 17 Atl. Rep. 906; 42 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 60; 6 L. R. A. 719; 
 
 29 Cent. L. J. 210), 62. 
 Oregon, etc., R. Co. v. Frost (74 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 965: 21 C. C. A. 186; 44 U. S. 
 
 App. 606), 489. 
 Orendorff v. Terminal R. Assn. (Mo. 
 
 App., 92 S. W. Rep. 148), 529. 
 Orman v. Salvo (117 Fed. Rep. 233; 54 
 
 C. C. A. 266), 308. 
 Ormond v. Hays (60 Tex. 180), 840. 
 Ormsbee v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (14 R. 
 
 I. 102; 51 Am. Rep. 354), 1009. 
 O'Rourke v. Lindell Ry. Co. (142 Mo. 
 
 342; 44 S. W. Rep. 254). 1045. 
 Osteen v. Southern Ry. (Carolina Div., 
 
 57 S. E. 196), 1012. 
 O'Sullivan v. Chicago, etc., R; Co. (23 
 
 III. App. 646), 229. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.] 
 
 O'Toole V. Central, etc., R. Co. (18 
 
 N. Y. Supp. 847; 85 N. Y. S. R. 
 
 591; 128 K. Y. 697), lOSl. 
 O'Toole V. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. (158 
 
 Pa. St. 99: 27 Atl Rep. 787; 33 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 830; 22 L. R. A. 606), 1039. 
 Ott V. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. (18 
 
 Ohio Cir. Ct. 395; 10 O. C. D. 83), 50. 
 Ouverson v. Grafton (6 N. D. 281; 65 
 
 N. W. Rep. 676), 1055. 
 Overby v. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. (37 
 
 W. Va. 524; 16 S. E. Rep. 813; 63 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 417), 890. 
 Oviatt V. Dakota, etc., R. Co. (43 Minn. 
 
 300; 45 N. W. Rep. 486), 668. 
 Owen V. Great Western R. Co. (46 L. 
 
 J. Q. B. D. 486; 36 L. T. 850), 787. 
 Owen V. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (68 Mo. 
 
 386), 1105. „ , , ,^ 
 
 Owen V. Hudson River R. Co. (35 N. Y. 
 
 616; 7 Bosw. 329), 994. 
 Owens V. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (95 
 
 Mo. 169: 8- S. W. Rep. 360; 33 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 624), 840. 
 Owens V. Pennsylvania R. Co. (41 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 187), 962. , , . 
 
 Owens V. Wabash R. Co. (84 Mo. App. 
 
 148, 148), 717. 
 Oyler v. Quincy, etc., R. Co. (118 Mo. 
 
 App. 375; 88 S. W. Rep. 162), 602. 
 Oyster v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (Neb., 
 
 91 N. W. Rep. 699; 69 L. R. A. 291), 
 
 243. 
 Ozanne v. Illinois Cent. R. (Jo. (151 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 900), 646. 
 
 Pacheco v. Mfg. Co. (113 Cal. 641; 45 
 
 Pac. Rep. 833), 95. 
 Packard v. Hannibal & R. Co.. (181 Mo. 
 
 421; 80 S. W. Rep. 951), 61. 
 Paddock v. Atchison, etc., R. Co. (37 
 
 Fed, Rep. 841; 4 L. R. A. 231), 780. 
 Padgitt V. Moll (159 Mo. 148; 81 Am. 
 
 St Rep. 847; 62 L. R. A. 854; 60 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 121), 678. 
 Paducah, etc., R. Co. v. HoeU (12 
 
 Bush. [Ky.] 41; 18 Am. Ry. Rep. 
 
 338), 955. 
 Paducah, etc., R. Co. v. Letcher (Ky., 
 
 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 61), 163. 
 Pagan v. Southern Ry. Co. (59 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 82), 473. 
 Pagels V. Myers (193 III. 172; 61 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 1111), 161. 
 Pahlan v. Detroit, etc., R. Co. (122 
 
 Mich. 232; 81 N. W. Rep. 103), 245. 
 Pakalinsky v. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (82 N. Y. 424; 2 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 261), 961. 
 Faland v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (44 La. 
 
 Ann. 1008; 11 So. Rep. 707), 388. 
 Palmer Brick Co. v. Chenall (119 Ga. 
 
 887; 47 S. E. Rep. 329), 118. 
 Palmer v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (112 
 
 Ind. 250: 14 N. E. Rep. 70; 31 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 364), 873. 
 Palmer v. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (120 
 
 N. Y. 170; 24 N. E. Rep. 302; 80 N. 
 
 Y. S. R. 817; 46 Hun 486; 11 N. 
 
 Y. S. R. 872; 44 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 898), 637. 
 
 Palmer v. Harrison (57 Mich. 182), 308. 
 Palmer v. Michigan, etc., R. Co. (93 
 
 Mich. 363; 63 N. W. Rep. 397), 485. 
 Palmer v. New York, etc., R. Co. (118 
 
 N. Y. 834; 19 N. E. Rep. 678), 1001. 
 Palmer v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (ill N. 
 
 Y. 488; 18 N. E. Rep. 859; 2 L. R. 
 
 A. 262; 3 Thompson on Neg. 2786, 
 
 p. 862), 637. 
 Palmer v. Utah, etc., R. Co. (8 Idaho 
 ' 890; 18 Pac. Rep. 425), 472. 
 Pannell v. Nashville, etc., R. Co. (97 
 
 Ala. 298: 12 So. Rep. 236; 56 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 92), 1028. 
 Pannell v. Potomac, etc., R. Co. (Va., 
 
 53 S. E. Rep. 113; 4 L. R. A. [N. S.] 
 
 80), 1073. 
 Paris & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Calvin (103 
 
 S. W. Rep. 428), 886. 
 Parish v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. 
 
 (Tex., 76 S. W. Rep. 834), 270. 
 Parker v. Georgia, etc., Ry. Co. (83 Ga. 
 
 639; 10 S. E. Rep. 233), 268. 
 Parker v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (109 
 
 Mo. 362: 19 S. W. Rep. 1119; 50 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 521), 469. 
 Parker v. New York, etc., R. Co. (18 
 
 R. I. 773; 30 Atl. Rep. 849), 493. 
 Parker v. Publishing Co. (69 Me. 173), 
 
 870. 
 Parker v. Railroad (91 Mo. 86), 304. 
 Parker v. Wilmington, etc., R. Co. (86 
 
 No. Car. 281; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 420), 950. 
 Parkes v. Seasongood (162 Fed. Rep. 
 
 683), 207. 
 Parkhurst v. Johnson (50 Mich. 70; 15 
 
 N. W. Rep. 107), 269. 
 Parmelee v. Farro (22 111. App. 467), 
 
 456. 
 Parody tf. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (5 Mc- 
 
 Crary [U. S.] 38; 15 Fed. Rep. 205), 
 
 375. 
 Parrish *. Pensacola, etc., R. Co. (28 
 
 Fla. 861; 9 So. Rep. 696), 461. 
 Parrott v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (127 
 
 Iowa 419; 103 N. W. Rep. 352), 283. 
 Parsons v. Hammond Co. (96 Mo. App. 
 
 372; 70 S. W. Rep. 519), 154. 
 Parsons v. Missouri Pacific 1R. Co. (94 
 
 Mo. 886; 6 S. W. Rep. 464), 194. 
 Parsons v. New York, etc., R. Co. (113 
 
 N. Y. 865; 21 N. E. Rep. 146; 22 N. 
 
 Y. S. R. 697; 48 Hun 615; 3 L. R. 
 
 A. 683), 557. 
 Parsons v. New York Central R. Co. 
 
 (37 Hun [N. Y.] 128), 720. 
 Parvis v. Philadelphia, etc., iR. Co. (Del., 
 
 17 AtlT Rep. 702), 394. 
 Passameneck v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (98 Ky. 196; 32 S. W. Rep. 620), 
 
 1040. 
 Pastoris v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. (Pa., 
 
 24 Atl. Rep. 283), 786. 
 Patchell V. North Western Co. (6 Ir. C. 
 
 L. 117), 679. 
 Paterson v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit 
 
 Co. (67 Atl. Rep. 616), 801. 
 Pattee v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (6 Da- 
 kota 267: 88 N. W. Rep. 436; 34 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 399), 698. 
 Patten v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (32 Wis. 
 
 624), 37. 
 
 exxv 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.1 
 
 Patterson v. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. (76 
 
 Pa. St. 389), 376. 
 Patterson v.. South, etc., R. Co. (89 
 
 Ala. 318; 7 So. Rep. 437), 173. 
 Patterson v. Wabash, etc.^ R. Co. (54 
 
 Mich. 91; 19 N. W. Rep. 761; 18 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 130), 817. 
 Patton V. Central, etc., R. Co. (73 Iowa 
 
 306; 35 N. W. Rep. 149, 987. 
 Patton V. East Tennessee, jetc, R. Co. 
 
 (89 Tenn. 370; 15 S. W. Rep. 919; 
 
 48 Am.. & Eng. R. Cas. 581), 1105. 
 Patton V. Southern R. Co. (82 Fed. Rep. 
 
 979; 43 U. S. App. 576; 27 C. C. A. 
 
 287), 4. 
 Patton V. Texas & P. Ry. Co. (179 U. 
 
 S. 658; 45 L. Ed. 361; 21 Sup. Ct. 
 
 Rep. 275), 118. 
 Patton V. Western, etc., R. Co. (96 N. 
 
 Car. 455; 1 S. E. Rep. 863; 31 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 298), 495. 
 Paul V. Salt Lake, etc., R. Co. (Utah, 
 
 83 Pac. Rep. 663), 125. 
 Paulmier v. Erie R. Co. (34 N. J. L. 
 
 151), 206. 
 Pawlett V. Rutland, etc., R. Co. (28 Vt. 
 
 297), 283. , ,, 
 
 Payne v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (129 Mo. 
 
 405; 31 S. W. Rep. 885), 404. 
 Payne v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (44 Iowa 
 
 236), 917. 
 Payne v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (139 Mo. 
 
 405; 31 S. W. Rep. 885), 150. 
 Payne v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. (155 
 
 Fed. Rep. 73), 952. 
 Payne v. Railway Co. (136 Mo. 562), 
 
 313 
 Payne v. Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. (157 
 
 Ind. 616; 66 L. R. A. 472; 62 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 472), 852. ■- 
 Payne v. Troy, etc., R. Co. (83 N. Y. 
 
 572; 6 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 54), 915. 
 Paynter v. Traction Co. (67 N. J. L. 
 
 .619; 52 Atl. Rep. 367), 114. 
 Peabody v. Oregon, etc., R. Co. (21 
 
 Oregon 121; 26 Pac. Rep. 1063; 47 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 698), 74. 
 Pearl v. Omaha, etc., R. Co. (Iowa, 88 
 
 N. W. Rep. 1078), 386. 
 Pearl v. West End R. Co. (176 Mass. 
 
 177; 57 N. E. Rep. 339; 49 L. R. A. 
 
 826; 79 Am. St. Rep. 330), 283. 
 Pearsall v. New York Cent. R. Co. (83 
 
 N. E. Rep. 752; 189 N. Y. 474), 493. 
 Pearson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (47 
 
 Minn. 9; 49 N. W. Rep. 302; 48 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 364), 527. , 
 Pearson v. Duane (4 Wall. [U. S.] 605), 
 
 586. 
 Pease v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (61 Wis. 
 
 163; 20 N. W. Rep. 908; 17 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 527), 491. 
 Peaslee v. Fitchburg, etc., R. Co. (152 
 
 Mass. 166; 36 N. E. Rep. 71), 487. 
 Peck V. Michigan, etc., R. Co. (67 
 
 Mich. 3; 23 N. W. Rep. 466; 19 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 257), 940. 
 Peck V. New York, etc., R. Co. (70 N. 
 
 Y. 687), 736. 
 Peck V. New York, etc., R. Co. (14 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 633; 60 Conn. 379), 
 
 1066. 
 
 CXXVI 
 
 Peck ». Springfield Traction Co. (110 
 
 S. W. Rep. 669), 708. 
 Pelmer v. Philadelphia,' etc., R. Co. (66 
 
 Atl. Rep. 1127), 200. 
 Pembroke v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (32 
 
 Mo. App. 61), 861. 
 Pence v. California, etc., R. Co. (27 
 
 Utah 378; 75 Pac. Rep. 934). 
 Pence v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (79 Iowa 
 
 389; 44 N. W. Rep. 686; 42 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 126), 104. 
 Pence v. Wabash R. Cfo. (116 Iowa 279), 
 
 719. 
 Peniston v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (34 La. 
 
 Ann. 777; 44 Am. Rep. 444), 630. 
 Penney v.' Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 
 
 (133 No. Car. 221; 46 S. E. Rep. 
 
 563; 63 L. R. A. 497), 751. 
 Pennington v. Detroit, etc., R. Co. (90 
 
 Mich. 505; 61 N. W. Rep. 634), 348. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Adams (56 Pa. 
 
 St. 499), 70. 
 Pennsylvania, etc., Co. v. Anderson (94 
 
 Pa. St. 351), 32. 
 Pennsylvania, etc., R. Co. v. Aspell (33 
 
 Pa. St. 147), 692. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. -u. Bachs (133 HI. 
 
 256; 24 N. E. Rep. 663), 336. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Bartom (54 Pa. 
 
 St. 496), 202. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Barnett (59 Pa. 
 
 St. 259; 98 Am. Dec. 346), 902. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Beale (73 Pa. 
 
 St. 504; 6 Am. Ry. Rep. 158), 1016. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. w. Bock (93 Pa. 
 
 St. 427), 1058. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Books (57 Pa. 
 
 St. 339; 98 Am. Dec. 234), 663. 
 Pennsylvania, etc., R. Co. v. Brannen 
 
 (17 W. N. C. [Pa.] 227), 38. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Bray (126 Ind. 
 
 229; 25 N. E. Rep. 439), 729. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Brigham (29 
 
 Ohio St. 374), 32. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v, Bruce (102 Pa. 
 
 St 33), 7. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Butler (57 Pa. 
 
 St. 336), 194. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Chapman (220 
 
 111. 428; 77 N. E. Rep. 348), 243. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Congdon (134 
 
 Ind. 226), 80. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Coon (111 Pa. 
 
 St. 430;. 3 Atl. Rep. 234), 977. 
 Pennsylvania, etc., R. Co. v. Dean (92 
 
 Ind. 469; 18 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 188), 824. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Gibson (96 Pa. 
 
 St. 83), 641. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Gilliland (56 Pa. 
 
 St. 445), 32. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Goodenough (55 
 
 N. J. L. 577; 28 Atl. Rep. 3; 22 L. 
 
 R. A. 460), 1056. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Goodman (62 Pa. 
 
 St. 329), 197. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hammilt (56 N. 
 
 J. L. 370; 29 Atl. Rep. 161; 24 L. 
 
 R. A. 531), 620. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Henderson (51 
 
 Pa. St. 315), 856. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hensil (70 Ind. 
 
TABLE OP CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.] 
 
 S69; 36 Am. Rep. 188; 6 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Gas. 79), 934. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hinds (53 Pa. 
 
 St. 512), 738. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hoagland (78 
 
 Ind. 203; 3 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 436), 
 
 787. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Horst (110 Par 
 
 St. 226), 138. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Howard (178 
 
 U. S. 163; a L. Ed. 1015), 683. - 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Jones (Pa., 123 
 
 Fed. Rep. 753), 367. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Keane (41 III. 
 
 App. 317), 795. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. i). Keane (143 111. 
 
 172; 32 N. E. Rep. 260), 190. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Keller (67 Pa. 
 
 St. 300), 64. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. i). Kennard (10 
 
 Am. Neg. Cas. 151), 649. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. ti. Kilgore (32- Pa. 
 
 St. 292) 708. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. j/. Krick (47 Ind. 
 ' 368), 995. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Langdon (92 Pa. 
 
 St. 21j .1 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 87), 
 
 803. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Langedorf (48 
 
 Ohio St. 316; 28 N. E. Rep. 172; 49 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 317), 410. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Lewis (79 Pa. 
 
 St. 33), 878. , , ^ 
 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Long (94 Ind. 
 
 250; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 345), 
 
 801. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. </. Lynch (90 111. 
 
 833), 340. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Lyons (129 
 
 Pa. St. 113; 18 Atl. Rep. 759; 41 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 154), 676. 
 Pennsylvania, etc., R. Co. v. Mahoney 
 
 (8 Ind. 441), 852. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Manon (123 
 
 Ind. 415; 23 N. E. Rep. 973; 7 L. R. 
 
 A. 687), 619. , , , 
 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Manon (104 Ind. 
 
 289; 27 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 132), 
 
 557. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Maroney (22 
 
 Ohio Cir. Ct. 469; 12 O. C. D. 366), 
 
 273. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Matthews (36 
 
 N. J. L. 531), 938. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. McCaffrey (173 
 
 III. 169; 50 N. E. Rep. 713), 708. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. McCaffrey, 149 
 
 Fed. Rep. 404), 591. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. McCann (54 
 
 Ohio St. 10; 42 N. E. Rep. 768; 56 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 696), 50. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. McClosky (23 
 
 Pa. St. 526), 850. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. McKinney (124 
 
 Pa. St. 462; 37 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 153), 693. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Myers (136 
 
 Ind. 242:1, 861. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Mooney (126 
 
 Pa. St. 244; 17 Atl. Rep. 590; 39 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 012), 1003. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Morel (40 Ohio 
 
 St. 338), 1016. 
 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Newmeier " (129 
 
 Ind. 401 : 28 N. E. Rep. 860 ; 52 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 454), 669. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Ogier (35 Pa. 
 
 St. 60), 200. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. O'Shaughnessv 
 
 (122 Ind. 688; 23 N. E. Rep. 675; 
 
 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 479), 411. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Peters (116 Pa. 
 
 St. 206; 9 Atl. Rep. 317), 4. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Price (96 Pa. 
 
 St. 256; 1 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 234), 
 
 481. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Righter (42 N. 
 
 J. L. 180; 2 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 220), 1009. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Roney (89 Ind. 
 
 453), 451. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Rothgeb (32 
 
 Ohio St. 66), 1009. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Roy (102 U. S. 
 
 451; 26 L. Ed. 141), 565. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v, Sinclair (62 
 
 Ind. 301), 392. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Sloan (125 111. 
 
 72; 17 N. E. Rep. 37; 35 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 440), 940. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Snyder (55 Ohio 
 
 St. 342; 45 N. E. Rep. 559), 38. 
 Pennsylvania, etc., R. Co. v. Staley (41 
 
 Ohio St. 188; 19 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 381), 39. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. State (61 Md. 
 
 108; 19 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 326), 940. 
 Pennsylvania C. Co. v. Stegemeier (118 
 
 Ind. 805; 20 N. E. Rep. 843; 10 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 186), 941. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Stinger (78 Pa. 
 
 St. 226), 4. 
 Pennsylvania, etc., R. Co. v. Taylor (104 
 
 Pa. 806), 39. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Wachter (60 Md. 
 
 395; 16 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 187), 483. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Werner (89 Pa. 
 
 St. 69), 1012. 
 Pennsvlvania R. Co. v. White (88 Pa. 
 
 St. 327), 632. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Whitman (111 
 
 Ind. 212; 12 N. E. Rep. 380; 31 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 149), 485. 
 Pennsylvania, etc., R. Co. v. Witte (15 
 
 Ind. App. 583; 43 N. E. Rep. 319), 
 
 319. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. t/, Woodworth (26 
 
 Ohio St; 685), 17. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Yost (104 Pa. 
 
 St. 26), 301. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Zebe (37 Pa. 
 
 St. 420; 88 Pa. St. 318), 786. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Zink (126 Pa. 
 
 St. 288; 17 Atl. Rep. 614), 374. 
 People V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (70 N. 
 
 Y. 670), 949. 
 People V. Douglas (87 Cal. 281; 25 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 417), 553. 
 People V. Murphy (101 N. Y. 126), 101. 
 People V. New York Central R. Co. (13 
 
 N. Y. 78), 890. 
 People V. North Car. R. Co. (N. C, 49 
 
 S. E. Rep. 87), 273. 
 Peoria, etc., R. Co. K.-Clayberg (107 111. 
 
 644; 16 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 856), 
 
 946. 
 
 cxxvii 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.] 
 
 Peoria, etc., R. Co. v. Foltz (13 111. App. 
 
 S36), 971. 
 Peoria, etc., R. Co. »/. Hermann (39 
 
 111. App. 287), 933. * 
 
 Peoria, etc., R. Co. v. Johns (43 111. 
 
 App. 83), 492. 
 Peoria, etc., R. Co. v. Lane (83 111. 
 
 448), 803. 
 Peoria, etc., R. Co. v. Loomis (20 111. 
 
 236), 176. 
 Peoria, etc., R. Co. v. Puckett (42 111. 
 
 App. 642), 346. 
 Peoria, etc., R. Co. v. Reynolds (88 111. 
 
 418; 21 Am. Ry. Rep. 324), 616. 
 . Peoria, etc., R. Co. v. Rice (46 lU. App. 
 
 60; 144 111. 227; 33 N. E. Rep. 
 
 961), 93. 
 Peoria, etc., R. Co. v. Siltman (88 111. 
 
 529), 953. 
 Peoria, etc., R. Co. v. Stillman (88 111. 
 
 529; 21 Am. Ry. Rep. 362), 967. 
 Pere Marquette R. Co. v. Strange (84 
 
 N. E. Rep. 819), 775. 
 Perez k. New Orleans, etc., R. Co. (47 
 
 La. Ann. 1391; 17 So. Rep. 869), 
 
 1048. 
 Perigo V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (62 Iowa 
 
 276; 3 N. WT Rep. 43), 341. 
 Perigo w. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (65 Iowa 
 
 326; 7 N. W. Rep. 627), 406. 
 Perkins v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (60 
 
 Miss. 726; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 242), 699. 
 Perkins v. Citizens R. Co. (55 Mo. 201), 
 
 Perkins v. Missouri, etc., R. Co. (65 
 
 Mo. 201), 1088. _ ^ , 
 
 Perkins v. New York, etc., R. Co. (24 
 
 N. Y. 196), 848. , „ 
 
 Perkins v. Wabash R. Co. (84 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 677; 233 111. 458), 918. 
 Perry v. Cfentral R. Co. (66 Ga. 746), 
 
 169. 
 Pershing v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (71 
 
 Iowa 661; 32 N. W. Rep. 488; 84 
 
 Am. & Erig. R. Cas. 405), 597. 
 Persigner v. Wabash R. Co. (82 Mo. 
 
 197), 989. 
 Peschel v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (68 Wis. 
 
 388; 21 N. W. Rep. 269; 17 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 646), 461. 
 Peterman v. Northern Pac. R. Co. (105 
 
 Fed. Rep. 336), 64. 
 Peters v. McKay & Co. (136 Cal. 73; 
 
 68 Pac. Rep. 478), 154. 
 Peters v. Mariette, etc., R. Co. (42 Ohio 
 
 St. 275), 849. 
 Peterson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (67 
 
 Mich. 102; 34 N. W. Rep. 260; 31 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 292), 461. 
 Peterson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (64 
 
 Mich. 621), 21. 
 Peterson v. Chicago etc., R. Co. (Wis., 
 
 32 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. [N. S.] 286), 
 
 852. 
 Peterson v. Philadelphia B. & W. R. Co. 
 
 (66 Atl. Rep. 660), 473. 
 Peterson v. Rushford (41 Minn. 290), 
 
 148. 
 Peterson v. St. Louis Transit Co. (199 
 
 Mo. 341; 97 S. W. Rep. 860), 1067. 
 Peterson v. South & W. R. R. (55 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 618) ,871. 
 
 cxxviii 
 
 Peterson v. Traction Co. (23 Wash. 615; 
 
 63 Pac. Rep. 639), 243. 
 
 Petrie v. Columbia, etc., R. Co. (29 
 
 So. Car. 303; 36 Am. & En". R. Cas. 
 
 430; 7 S. E. Rep. 616), 70. 
 
 Petty V. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (88 Mo. 
 
 306; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 618), 964. 
 
 Phelps V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (Mich., 
 
 81 N. W. Rep. 101), 326. 
 Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Anderson 
 (72 Md. 619; 20 Atl. Rep. 2; 8 L. L. 
 A. 678), 619. 
 Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Anderson 
 
 (44 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 346), 599. 
 Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Anderson 
 (94 Pa. St. 361; 39 Am. Rep. 787; 6 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 407), 663. 
 Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Bowyer (97 
 
 Pa. St. 91), 1044. 
 Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Brown (49 
 
 U. S. App. 101), 866. 
 Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Derby (14 
 
 How. 468; 14 L. Ed. 502), 635. 
 Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Hahn (Pa., 
 12 Atl. Rep. 479; 32 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 24)^ 291. 
 Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Hoagland 
 
 (66 Md. 149; 7 Atl. Rep. 106), 969. 
 Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Hoflich (62 
 Md. 300: 50 Am. Rep. 223; 18 Am. 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 3r3), 176. 
 Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. HummtU 
 (44 Pa. St. 375; 84 Am. Dec. 457), 
 759 
 Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Killipps (88 
 
 Pa. St. 405), 941. 
 Philadelphia & R. R. Co. v. Klutt (148 
 
 Fed. Rep. 818), 398. 
 Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. McCormick 
 (124 Pa. St. 427; 16 Atl. Rep. 848), 
 704. 
 Philadelphia Tr. Co. v. Orbann (119 
 Pa. St. 37; 12 Atl. Reo. 816; 34 Am. 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 432), 178. 
 Philadelphia, etc., R. C-o. v. Quigley (62 
 U. S. 21; 17 How. 210; 16 L. Ed. 76), 
 735. 
 Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Spearen 
 
 47 Pa. St. 800), 888. 
 Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. State (58 
 Md. 872; 10 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 792), 
 326. 
 Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Stebbine 
 (62 Md. 504; 19 Am, & Eng. R. Cas. 
 36), 977. 
 Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. j/. Stinger (78 
 
 Pa. St. 219), 886. 
 Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. v. Winkler 
 
 (56 Atl. Rep. 118), 264. 
 Philby V. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. (89 
 
 Pac. Rep. 468), 199. 
 Phillipps V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (64 
 Wis. 476; 25 N. W. Rep. 644; 28 Am. 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 468), 488. 
 Phillipps V. East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. 
 (87 Ga. 272; 13 S. E. Rep. 644: 48 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 61), 1096. 
 Phillipps V. London, etc., R. Co. (27 
 
 W-. R- 797: 40 L. T. 813), 105. 
 Phillipps V. New York, etc., R. Co. (25 
 N. Y S, R. 91; 6 N. Y. Supo. 621: 
 
 38 N. Y. S. R. 675), 1069. -^ 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED, 
 
 [Beferences are to sections.} 
 
 Phillipps V. Northern, etc., R. Co. (41 
 
 N. y. S. R. 780; 16 N. Y. S. 909), 
 
 782. 
 Phillipps V. Renssealer, etc., R. Co. (57 
 
 Barb. 646; 49 N. Y. 177; 8 Am. Ry. 
 
 Rep. 477),. 780. 
 Phillipps V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (Mo., 
 
 Ill S. W. Rep. 112, 113), 300. 
 Phillipps V. Saratoga, etc., R. Co. (49 
 
 N. Y. 177), 692. 
 Phillipps V. Washington & R. Ry. Co. 
 
 (65 Atl. Rep. 422), 987. 
 Philpott V. Missouri Pac. R. Co. . (85 
 
 Mo. 164; 27 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 323) 71 
 Phinne'y v.' Illinois Cent. R. Co. (98 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 358), 386. 
 Fhippin v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (196 
 
 Mo. 321; 93 S. W. Rep. 410), 589. 
 Pickens v. Decker (21 Ohio St 212; 
 
 8 Am. Rep. 55), 283. 
 Pickett V. Southern Ry. Co. (69 S. C. 
 
 445; 48 S. E. Rep. 466), 240. 
 Pidcock V. Union Pac. R. Co. (5 Utah 
 
 612; 19 Pac. Rep. 191; 1 L. R. A. 
 
 131), 369. 
 Pieart v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (82 Iowa 
 
 148; 47 N. W. Rep. 1017), 876. 
 Pierce v. Central R. Co. (73 Iowa 140; 
 
 34 N. W. Rep. 783), 504. 
 Pierce's Admr. v. Union Pacific Ry. 
 
 Co. (66 Fed. Rep. 44; 13 C. C. A. 
 
 823; 82 U. S. App. 48), 214. 
 Piermerini v. New York, etc., Ry. Co. 
 
 (191 Mass. 9; 77 N. E. Rep. 306), 
 
 526. ^ ^, 
 
 Pierson v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (Iowa, 
 
 102 N. W. Rep. 149), 372. 
 Pierson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (Iowa, 
 
 88 N. W. Rep. 505), 90. 
 Pike V. Boston Elevated Ry. Co. (78 
 
 N. E. Rep. 497), 853. 
 Pike V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (39 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 754), 968. 
 Pike V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (41 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 95), 473. 
 Pike V. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. (39 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 255), 21. 
 Pilkington v. Railway Co. (70 Tex. 226; 
 
 7 S. W. Rep. 805), 263. 
 Pill V. Brooklyn R. Co. (27 N. Y. Supp. 
 
 230; 57 N. Y. S. R. 783), 184. 
 Pine Bluff Co. v. Schneider (62 Ark. 
 
 109: 34 S. W. Rep. 547; 33 L. R. A. 
 
 366), 1051. 
 Pinney v. Missouri, etc., R. Co. (71 Mo. 
 
 App. 577), 947. 
 Pineo V. New York, etc., R. Co. (34 
 
 Hun [N. Y.] 80), 206. 
 Piper V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (77 Wis. 
 
 247; 46 N. W. Rep. 165), 997. 
 Piper V. New York, etc., R. Co. (76 
 
 Hun 44; 59 N. Y. S. R. 629; 27 N. Y. 
 
 Supp. 593), 648. 
 Piquegno v. Railroad Co. (62 Mich. 40; 
 
 17 N. W. Rep. 232; 50 Am. Rep. 
 
 243), 355. 
 Pitcher o. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. (16 
 
 N. Y. Supp. 62; 33 N. E. Rep. 339), 
 
 780. 
 Pitts 1,. New York, etc., R. Co. (79 
 
 Hun 546; 29 N. Y. Supp. 871), 1048. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Adams (105 
 
 Ind. 151; 5 N. E. Rep. 187; 23 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 408), 308. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Andrews (39 
 
 Md. 329; 10 Am. Ry. Rep. 485), 802. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Aspell (83 Pa. 
 
 St. 147), 715. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Board (121 111. 
 
 App. 49), 498. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Brigham (29 
 
 Ohio St. 374), 624. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Brown (67 Ind. 
 
 45), 949. 
 Pittsburg, etc., Ry.. Co. u. Collins (80 
 
 N. E. Rep. 415), 621. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Devinney (17 
 
 Ohio St. 197), 491. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Dunn (56 Pa. ^ 
 
 St. 880), 903. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Van Dyke (57 
 
 Ind. 576; 18 Am. Ry. Rep. 454), 586. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Evans (58 Pa. 
 
 St. 260), 967. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Gilliland (56 
 
 Pa. St. 445), 604. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Henderson (37 
 
 Ohio St. 649; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 529), 476. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Henly (48 
 
 Ohio St. 608; 29 N. E. Rep. 575; 53 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 194), 328. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Kirk (102 
 
 111. App. 428; 66 N. E. Rep. 829), 
 
 379. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Hinds (53 Pa. 
 
 St. 512; 91 Am. Dec. 824), 743. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Kirk (102 
 
 Ind. 399; 1 N. E. Rep. 849; 52 Am. 
 
 Rep. 676), 481. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Krause (30 
 
 Ohio St. 222; IB Am. Ry. Rep. 298), 
 
 869. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Lamphere (137 
 
 Fed. Rep. 20), 99. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Lewis (33 
 
 Ohio St. 196), 472. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Lightheiser 
 
 (78 KT E. Rep. 1033), 412. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Lyon (123 Pa. 
 
 St. 140; 16 Atl. Rep. 607; 37 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 231), 668. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Mahoney (148 
 
 Ind. 196; 46 N. E. Rep. 917; 47 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 464; 40 L. R. A. 101), 664. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Martin (82 
 
 Ind. 476; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 253), 
 - 1021. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Maurer (81 
 
 Ohio St. 421), 914. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. ■</. McClurg (66 
 
 Pa. St. 294), 802. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Moses (Pa., 2 
 
 Atl. Rep. 188; 24 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 296), 914. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Nelson (51 
 
 Ind. 150), 643. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Nicholas (Ind., 
 
 73 N. E. Rep. 195; 74 N. E. Rep. 
 
 626), 379. 
 Pittsburg C. C, etc., R. Co. v. Nicholas 
 
 (165 Ind. 679; 76 N. E. Rep. 522), 
 
 273. 
 Pittsburg, etc, R. Co. v. Nuxum (50 
 
 Ind. 141; 9 Am. Ry. Rep. 396), 686. 
 
 cxxix 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References a/re to sections.'] 
 
 Pittsburg, etc., Ry. Co. v. Parish (Ind., 
 
 68 N. E. Rep. S14), 860. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v.. Pearson (72 
 
 Pa. St. 169), 1058. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Pillow (76 Pa. 
 
 St. BIO; 18 Am. Rep. 424), 744. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Powers (74 
 
 111. 341), 477. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Puszdrakiewicz 
 
 (129 111. App. 295). 877. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Ranney (37 
 
 Ohio St. 665; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 533), 472. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Ruby (38 Ind. 
 
 294; 10 Am. Rep. Ill), 95. 
 Pittsburg, etc, R. Co. v. Schepman (84 
 
 N. E. Rep. 988; 82 N. E. Rep. 998), 
 
 668. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Sentmeyer (93 
 
 Pa. St. 276), 345. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Simons (Ind., 
 
 76 N. E. Rep. 883), 19. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Slusser (19 
 
 Ohio St. 157), 177. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Spencer (98 
 
 Ind. 186; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 478), 675. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R.. Co. v. Sullivan (141 
 
 Ind. 83; 50 Am. St. Rep. 813; 40 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 138; 27 L. R. A. 840), 212. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Taylor (104 
 
 Pa. St. 306; 49 Am. Rep. 680), 179. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. V. Theobald (51 
 
 Ind. 246), 827. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Thompson (56 
 
 111. 138; 3 Am. Ry. Rep. 454), 583. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Vining (27 
 
 Ind. 673), 1058. 
 Pittsburg, etc., Ry. Co. v. Warrum (82 
 
 N. E. Rep. 934), 882. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Williams (74 
 
 Ind. 462), 614. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Wright (80 
 
 Ind. 182; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 628), 92. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Yundt (78 Ind. 
 
 373; 41 Am. Rep. 580; 3 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 502), 1004. 
 Plant V. Midland R. Co. (21 L. T. 836), 
 
 787. 
 Planz V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (167 Mass. 
 
 377; 32 N. E. Rep. 366), 807. 
 Platz V. Cohoes (24 Hun 101; 89 N. Y. 
 
 219; 42 Am. Rep. 286), 1066. 
 Pleasants v. Raleigh, etc., R. Co. (121 
 
 N. Car. 492; 28 S. E. Rep. 267; 61 
 
 Am. St.- Rep. 674), 487. 
 Pleasants v. Raleigh, etc., R. Co. (95 
 
 N. Car. 195), 343. 
 Plefka V. Knapp, Stout & Co. (145 Mo. 
 
 316; 46 S. W. Rep, 974), 127. 
 Plummer v. Dill (166 Mass. 426; 81 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 128; 32 Am. St. Rep. 463), 
 
 870. 
 Plunkett V. Railway Co. (105 Ga. 203), 
 
 869. 
 Pocahontas Co. v. Ruke's Admr. (61 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 449), 71. 
 Poff v. New England, etc., R. Co. (72 
 
 N. H. 164; 55 Atl. Rep. 891). 65. 
 Poling V. Ohio River R. Co. (38 W. 
 
 Va. 645; 18 S. E. Rep. 782), 590. 
 
 cxxx 
 
 Pollich V. Sellers (42 La. Ann. 623; 
 
 7 So. Rep. 786), 345. 
 Pollock V. Eastern R. Co. (124 Mass. 
 
 158), 886. 
 Pomroy v. Bangor & Aroostook R. Co. 
 
 (67 Atl. Rep. 661), 584. 
 Pool V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (66 Wis. 
 
 227; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 360; 14 
 
 N. W. Rep. 46), 152. 
 Pool V. Southern Pacific R. Co, (7 Utah 
 
 303; 26 Pac. Rep. 654), 490. 
 Poole V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (89 Ga. 
 
 320; 16 S. E. Rep. 321), 685. 
 Poole V. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (35 
 
 Hun [N. Y.] 29), 296. 
 Poole V. Georgia, etc., R. Co. (89 Ga. 
 
 320; 15 S. E. Rep. 321), 686. 
 Poole V. North Carolina R. Co. (No. 
 
 Car., 8 Jones 340), 1085. 
 Porter v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (80 
 
 Mich. 156: 44 N. W. Rep. 1054), 724. 
 Porter v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (71 
 
 Mo. 66; 36 Am. Rep. 464; 2 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 44), 374. 
 Porter v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (97 
 
 S. W. Rep. 880), 411. 
 Porter v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (199 
 
 Mo. 82). 846. 
 Porter v. Railroad (Mich., 4 Am. Neg. 
 
 Cas. 96), 654. 
 Porter v. Western, etc., R. Co. (97 N. 
 
 C. 66; 2 Am. St. Rep. 272; 2 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 580), 483. 
 Portland v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co. (66 
 
 Me. 486), 906. 
 Portuchek v. Wabash R. Co. (101 Mo. 
 
 App. 52: 74 S. W. Rep. 3681 670. 
 Post V. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. (Mo., 
 
 97 S. W. Rep. 233), 249. 
 Potter I/. Bunnell (20 Ohio St. 150), 
 
 914. 
 Potter V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (46 Iowa 
 
 399; 16 Am. Ry. Rep. 57), 522. 
 Potter V. Chicago, etc.. R. Clo. (21 Wis. 
 
 372; 22 idem 616), 198. 
 Potter V. Detroit, etc., R. Co. (Mich., 
 
 81 N. W. Rep. 80; 82 N. W. Rep. 
 
 245), 369. 
 Potter V. Flint, etc., R. Co. (68 Mich. 
 
 82; 28 S. W. Rep. 714), 1029. 
 Potter V. New York, etc., R. Co. (136 
 
 N. Y. 77; 48 N. Y. S. R. 843; 38 
 
 N. E. Rep. 603), 494. 
 Potts V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (33 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 610), 173. 
 Poucher v. New York, etc., R. Co. (49 
 
 N. Y. 263), 860. 
 Powell V. Augusta, etc., R. Co. (77 Ga. 
 
 192; 3 S. E. Rep. 757), 92. 
 Powell V. Missouri Pacific R. Co. (76 
 
 Mo. 80; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 467), 
 
 661. 
 Powell V. New York^ etc., R. Co. (109 
 
 N. Y. 613; 15 N. E. Rep. 891; 14 IN, 
 
 Y. S. R. 74; 38 Hun 640), 1023. 
 Powell V. Sherwood (162 Mo. 606; 63 
 
 S. W. Rep. 486), 504. 
 Powell V. Steel Co. (98 Wis. 36; 73 
 
 N. W. Rep. 573), 366. 
 Powell V. Virginia, etc., Co. (88 Tenn. 
 
 692; 13 S. W. Rep. 691; 17 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 925), 290. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.] 
 
 Powers V. Boston (154 Mass. 60; 87 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 995), 153. 
 Powers ». New York, etc., E. Co. (14 
 N. Y. Supp. 408; 60 Hun 19; 128 N. 
 Y. 669; 29 N. E. Rep. 148), 133. 
 Powers V. R. R. (175 Mass. 466; 66 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 710), 96. 
 Praeger v. Bristol, etc., R. Co. (24 L. 
 
 T. 105), 714. 
 Prather v. Railway Co. (80 Ga. 427; 
 
 9 S. E. Rep. 530), 143. 
 Pratt, etc., Co. v. Brawley (83 Ala. 
 371; 3 So. Rep. 565; 3 Am. St. Rep. 
 571), 1040. 
 Pratt V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (38 Minn. 
 
 455; 38 N. Vf. Rep. 356), 675. 
 Pratt v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. (45 
 ' N. Y. S. R. 715; 63 Hun 616; 18 N. 
 Y. Supp. 682; 136 N. Y. 654; 32 N. 
 E. Rep. 1016), 4rt. 
 Pratt V. .Prouty (153 Mass. 333), 308. 
 Prendegast v. New York, etc., R. C-o. 
 
 (58 N. Y. 652), 1080, 
 Prescott, etc., R. Co. v. Rees (Ariz., 28 
 
 Pac. Rep. 1134), 446. 
 Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Herath (110 
 
 111. App. 596), 79. 
 Prewitt V. Eddy (115 Mo. 283; 21 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 742), 411. 
 Price V. Central of Georgia Ry. Co. (124 
 Ga. 899; 49 S. E. Rep. 683; 53 S. E. 
 Rep. 455), ■270. 
 Price V. Detroit, etc., R. Co. (145 U. 
 
 S. 65), 488. „ , ^, 
 
 Price V. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (77 Mo. 
 
 508; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 168), 417. 
 
 Price V. Pennsylvania R. Co. (113 U. 
 
 S. 218; 18 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 273), 
 
 563. 
 
 Price V. Richmond, etc., R. Co. (38 So. 
 
 Car. 199; 17 S. E. Rep. 732), 102. 
 Price V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (72 Mo. 
 414; 3 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 365), 789. 
 Prideaux v. Mineral Point (43 Wis. 513; 
 
 28 Am. Rep. 658), 1043. 
 Priestly v. Fowler (3 M. & W. 1), 139. 
 Prince v. International, etc., R. Co. (64 
 Tex. 144; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 152), 662. 
 Pringle ». Chicago, etc., R. Co. (64 Iowa 
 613; 21 N. W. Rep. 108; 18 Am. & 
 Eng; R. Cas. 91), 407. 
 Proctor II. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (64 
 Mo. 112; 9 Am. Ry.Rep. 440), 482. 
 Proctor V. San Antonio, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (62 S. W. Rep. 939), 65. 
 Proud V. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. (64 
 N. J. L. 702: 46.AtI. Rep. 710), 637. 
 Pruitt V. Hannibal & St. Joe R. Co. (62 
 
 Mo. 527), 35. . 
 Pueschell v. K. C, etc. (79 Mo. App. 
 
 459) 313. 
 Puff v. Lehigh Valley R. Co: (71 Hun 
 
 [N. Y.] 577), 1027. 
 Pulcino V, Long Island R. Co. (109 
 
 N. Y. S. 10761, 930. 
 Pullman Car Co. v. Barker (4 Colo. 
 
 344), 169. 
 Pullman Car Co. v. Blume (109 HI. 
 
 SO), 29. 
 Pullman Car Co. v. Harkins (55 Fed. 
 Rep. 932), 471. 
 
 Pullman Car Co. v. Laack (143 111. 242; 
 
 32 N. E. Rep. 286), 360. 
 Pullman Co. v. Norton (Tex., 91 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 841), 645. 
 Pullman Co. v. Stearn (41 So. Rep. 
 
 383), 557. 
 Pullman Car Co. ■^. Woodfolk (121 111. 
 
 App. 321), 497. 
 Purcell v: Richmond, etc., R. Co. (108 
 
 No. Car. 414; 12 S. E. Rep. 954; 47 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 457), 832. 
 Purcell V. Southern R. Co. (ll9 N. Car. 
 
 728; 26 S. E. Rep. 161), 491. 
 Purdy V. Rome, etc^ R. Co. (135 N. 
 
 Y. 209; 26 N. E. Rep. 255), 506. 
 Purinton v, Maine Central R. Co. (78 
 
 Me.- 569; 7 Atl. Rep. 707), 947. 
 Purkey v. Southern Tr. Co. (W. Va., 
 
 60 S. E. Rep. 765), 341. 
 Purl V. St Louis, etc., R. Co. (72 Mo. 
 
 168; 6 Am. & Eng. R: Cas. 27), 1021. 
 Pursley v. Bridge Works (67 N. Y. S. 
 
 719; 56 App. Div. 71; 168 N. Y. 689; 
 
 60 N. E. Rep. 1119), 255. 
 Purvis V. Buffalo, etc., R. Co. (68 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 189; 219 Pa. St. 195), 785. 
 Putnam v. Broadway, etc., R. Co. (15 
 
 Abb. Pr. [N. S.] N. Y. 383), 753. 
 Putnam v. Broadway R. Co. (55 N. Y. 
 
 113), 224. 
 Putnam v. Southern Pac. R. Co. (21 
 
 Oregon 230; 27 Pac. Rep. 1033), 64. 
 Pyle V. Clark (75 Fed. Rep. 644; 2.5 
 
 C. C, A. 190; 45 U. S. App. 260; 
 
 79 Fed. Rep. 744), 1053. 
 Pyne v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (54 Iowa 
 
 223; 6 N. W. Rep. 281; 37 Am. Rep. 
 
 198), 522. 
 
 Quackenbush v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (73 Iowa 458; 35 N. W. Rep. 523; 34 
 
 Am. & Eng. R, Cas. 545), 664. 
 Quackenbush v. Wisconsin, etc., R. Co. 
 
 62 Wis. 411), 507. 
 Quarman v. Burnett (6 M. & W. 499), 
 
 1047. 
 Quibell V. Union Pac. R. Co. (7 Utah 
 
 122; 25 Pac. Rep. 734), 133. 
 Quick V. Indianapolis, etc.. R. Co. (130 
 
 111. 334; 22 N. E. Rep. 709), 145 
 Quigley V. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (142 
 
 Pa. St. 388; 21 Atl. Rep. 827), 951. 
 Quill V. New York, etc., R. Co. (16 
 
 Daly [N. Y.] 313; 32 N. Y. S. R. 
 
 612; 126 N. Y. 629), 996. 
 Quimby v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (150 
 
 Mass. 365; 23 N. E. Rep. 205; 5 L. 
 
 fk):-sit'' "" ^■"- * ^"^- «• ^''=- 
 
 Quincy, etc., R. Co. v. Gnuse (137 HI. 
 
 264; 27 N. E. Rep. 190), 92. 
 Quincy Mining Co. v. Kitts (42 Mich 
 ^35; 3 N. W. Rep. 240), 119. 
 Quinn V. Kansas Citv, M. & B. R 
 
 Co. (94 Tenn. [10 Pickle] 713; 30 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 1036; 45 Am. St. Rep. 767- 
 ^28 L. R.. A. 652), 221. 
 Qumn V. Manhattan R. Co. (7 N. Y S 
 
 R. 262), 791. 
 Quinn v. Nashville, etc., R. Co. (74 
 
 CXXXl 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections."] 
 
 lean. 713; 46 Am. St. Rep. 767), 
 
 298 
 Quinii V. New York, etc., R. Co. (175 
 
 Mass. 150; 55 N. E. Rep. 891), 326. 
 Quinn v. South Carolina R. Co. (29 So. 
 
 Car. 381; 7 S. E. Rep. 614; 1 L. R. 
 
 A. 682; 37 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 166), 
 
 802. 
 
 Raben v. Central Iowa R. Co. (73 Iowa 
 
 579; 35 N. W. Rep. 645; 33 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 520), 713. 
 Raben v. Central Iowa R. Co. (74 Iowa 
 
 732j 34 N. W. Rep. 621; 31 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 46), 694. 
 Rabostelli v. New York, etc., R. Co. (33 
 
 Fed. Rep. 796; 34 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 516), 775. 
 Racine v. New York, etc., R. Co. (70 
 
 Hun 453; 63 N. Y. S. R. 680; 84 N. 
 
 Y. Supp. 388), 874. 
 Rader's Admx. v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 
 
 (104 S. W. Rep. 774), 1079. 
 Radley v. London, etc., R. Co. (L. R., 
 
 1 App. Cas. 764; 46 L. J. Ex. D. 873; 
 
 35 L. T. 637; 26 W. R. 147), 398. 
 Rafferty v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (91 
 
 Mo. 33; -3 S. W. Rep. 393), 74. 
 Ragon V. Toledo, etc., R. Co. (97 Mich. 
 
 266; 66 N. W. Rep. 612), 341. 
 Ragsdale v. Northern Pacific R. Co. (42 
 
 Fed. Rep. 383), 491. 
 Rahm- v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (108 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 370), 463. 
 Railroad v. Adams (105 Ind. 151), 311. 
 Railroad v. AUbriton (38 Miss. 242), 
 
 116. 
 Railroad v. Austin (69 111. 426), 306. 
 Railroad Co. ii. Barber (5 Ohio St. 
 
 641), 311. 
 Railroad Co. v. Beggs (85 111. 80), 122. 
 Railroad Co. v. Crumpley (122 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 425; 59 C. C' A. 51), 694. 
 Railroad Co. v. Eraid (1 Moo. P. C. C. 
 
 [N. S.] 101), 122. 
 Railroad Co. v. Fort (84 U. S. 555), 
 
 269. 
 Railroad v. Frawley (110 Ind. 18; 9 
 
 N. E. Rep. 594), 310. 
 Railroad Co. v. Hennessey (96 Fed. Rep. 
 
 713; 38 C. C. A. 307), 348. 
 Railroad Co. v. Hester (64 Tex. 401), 
 
 355. 
 Railroad Co. v. Jackson (65 Fed. Rep. 
 
 48; 27 U. S. App. 619; 18 C. C. A. 
 
 607), 252. 
 Railroad Co. v. Knause (39 111. 872), 
 
 228. 
 Railroad Co. v. May (108 111. 298), 158. 
 Railroad Co. v. Peterson (156 Ind. 364; 
 
 59 N. E. Rep. 1044), 366. 
 Railroad Co. v. Pollard (22 Wall. 341), 
 
 122. 
 Railroad v. Sanders (86 Ry. 269; 5 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 663), 55. 
 Railroad v. Shires (108 111. 630), 101. 
 Railroad Co. v. Smith (9 Lea 686), 311. 
 Railroad v. Smith (82 Ga. 236; 8 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 311), 355. 
 Railroad v. Shaw (116 Fed. Rep. 621; 54 
 
 C. C. A. 77), 412. 
 
 cxxxii 
 
 Railroad v. Torrey (58 Ark. 217), 158. 
 Railroad Co. v. Trimble (35 N. E. Rep. 
 
 716), 80. 
 Railroad v. Walker (11 Heisk. 383; 
 . Beach. Con. Neg. 97), 461. 
 Railroad v. Weldon (52 111. 290), 307. 
 Railroad v. Winans (17 How. 30; 68 
 
 U. S. 27), 235. 
 Railroad Co. v. Wightman (29 Gratt. 
 
 431), 122. 
 Railroad Co. v. Young (49 Fed. Rep. 
 
 723) 311. 
 Railway v. Babcock (152 U. S. 190), 311. 
 Railway v. Brown's Admr. (49 U. S. 
 
 App. 101; 79 Fed. Rep. 257; 24 C. C. 
 
 A. 659), 412. 
 Railway Co. v. Chewning (93 Ala. 24; 
 
 50 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 46), 208. 
 Railway Co. v.- Davis (92 Ala. 300), 208. 
 Railway v. Duncan (8» Tex. 611; 32 
 
 S. W. Rep. 878), 412. 
 Railway Co. v. Fort (17 Wall. [U. S.] 
 
 553), 311. 
 Railway Co. v. Hawkins (98 Ala. 241), 
 
 208. 
 Railway Co. ij. Mowery (36 Ohio St. 
 
 418), 116. 
 Railway Co. v. Shacklett (105 111. 364), 
 
 228. 
 Railway Co. v. Thompson (56 111. 138), 
 
 122. 
 Rainey u. New York, etc., R. Co. (23 
 
 N. Y. Supp. 80; 68 Hun 495), 920. 
 Rains v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (71 Mo. 
 
 164; 6 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 610), 390. 
 Raisor v. Chicago & A. R. Co. (117 
 
 111. App. 488; 215 111. 47; 74 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 69), 50. 
 Rammg v. Metropolitan, etc^ R. Co. 
 
 (157 Mo. 477; 57 S. W. Rep. 268), 
 
 697. 
 Ramsbottom v. Atlantic Coast, etc., R. 
 
 Co. (138 N. C. 38; 50 S. E. Rep. 
 
 448), 80. 
 Ramsden v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (104 
 
 Mass. 117), 727. 
 Ramsey v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (89 
 
 Ky. 99; 80 S. W. Rep. 162), 984. 
 Randall v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. (109 
 
 U. S. 478; 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 228; 15 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 243), 480. 
 Randall v. Connecticut River R. Co. 
 
 (132 Mass. 269), 1018. 
 Randall v. Richmond, etc., R. Co. (104 
 
 No. Car. 410; 10 S. E. Rep. 691; 
 
 42 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 603), 996. 
 Randolph v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. (102 
 
 S. W. Rep. 1086), 684. 
 Randolph v. Riordan (155 Mass. 331; 
 
 29 N. E. Rep. 683), 1047. 
 Randolph v. Quincy, etc., R. Co. (107 
 
 S. W. Rep. 1029), 856. 
 Ransier v. Minneapolis, etc^ R. Co. (32 
 
 Minn. 331; 80 N. W. Rep. 332; 21 
 
 Am. & En^. R. Cas. 601), 419. 
 Ransom v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (62 Wis. 
 
 178; 28 N. W. Rep. 147; 61 Am. Rep. 
 
 718; 19 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 16), 951. 
 Rapp V. St. Joseph, etc., R. Co. (106 
 
 Mo. 423; 17 S. W. Rep. 487), 200. 
 Rapp V. Transit Co. (190 Mo. 144; 88 
 
 S. W. Rep. 865), 1077. 
 Rapson v. Oibitt (9 M. & W. 710), 278. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.} 
 
 'RastxMSseh v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (65 
 
 Iowa 836; 81 N. W. Rep. 583; 18 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cae. 54), 341. 
 Ravenna v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (45 
 
 Oliio St. 118; 18 N. E. Rep. 445), 934. 
 Ravenscraft v, Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. 
 
 (27 Mo. App. 617), 133. 
 Rawlings v. Wabash Ry. Co. (97 Mo. 
 
 App. 515, 518), 559. 
 Rawson v. Kansas City Ry. Co. (107 
 
 S. W. Rep. 1101), 621. 
 Rawson v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (189 
 
 Mo. App. 613; 111 S. W. Rep. 834), 
 
 821 
 Ray V. Pecos, etc., R. Co. (80 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 118), 229. 
 Ray 1). Pecos, etc., R. Co. (Tex., 88 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 466), 24. 
 Raybum v. Central R. Co. (74 Iowa 
 
 637; 35 N. W. Rep. 606; 38 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 520), 504. 
 Raymond v. Burlington, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (65 Iowa 152; 17 N. W. Rep. 923; 
 
 18 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 217), 578. 
 Raymond v, Danbury, etc., R. Co. (14 
 
 Blatchf. [U. S.] 133), 167. 
 Raymond v. Portland R. Co. (100 Me. 
 
 529; 62 Atl. .Rep. 602), 13. 
 Rea V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (Tex., 
 
 73 S. W. Rep. 555), 33. 
 Read v. Great Eastern R. Co. (9 B. & 
 
 S. 714; 37 L. J. Q. B. 278), 57. 
 Read v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. 
 
 Co. (107 N. Y. S. 1068), 1004. 
 Read v. Suburban, etc., R- Co. (115 Ga. 
 
 366; 41 S. E. Rep. 629), 1051. 
 Reading, etc., R. Co. v. Ritchie (102 
 
 Pa. St. 426; 19 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 867), 661. 
 Reading v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (58 N. 
 
 J. L. 264; 19 Atl. Rep. 321), 164. 
 Reading Township v. Telfer (67 Kan. 
 
 798; 48 Pac. Rep. 134; 57 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 3S5), 1056. 
 Reagan v. Transit Co. (180 Mo. 117; 
 
 79 S. W. Rep. 435), 708. 
 Reardon v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. 
 
 (114 Mo. 384; 21 S. W. Rep. 731), 
 
 186. 
 Reardon v. Thompson (149 Mass. 267; 
 
 21 N. E. Rep. 369), 870. 
 Reary v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (40 
 
 La. Ann. 32; 30 So. Rep. 390; 8 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 497; 34 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 277), 792. 
 Receiver v. Jackson (56 Ark. 594; 20 
 
 S. W. Rep. 628), 608. 
 Redding v. Central, etc., R. Co. (68 
 
 N. J. L. 643; 64 Atl. Rep. 431), 632. 
 Redding v. South Carolina R. Co. (3 So. 
 
 Car.) 153. 
 Reddington v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (78 
 
 N. W. Rep. 800), 504. 
 Redhead' v. Midland R. Co. (8 B. & S. 
 
 371; 36 L. J. Q- B. 181; L. R., 2 Q. 
 
 B. 412; 15 W. R. 831; 16 L. T. 485; 
 
 9 B. & S. 519; L. R., 4 Q. B. 379; 38 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 169; 20 L. T. 682; 17 W. 
 
 R. 737), 652. 
 Redigan v. Railroad Co. (Mass., 28 N. 
 
 E. Rep: 1134; 14 L. R. A. 276), 872. 
 Redmond v. Lumber Co. (96 Mich. 545: 
 
 101 N. W. Rep. 1904), 118. 
 
 Redmond v. Metropolitan, etc., R, Co. 
 
 (185 Mo. 1; 84 S. W. Rep. 26), 91. 
 Redmond v. Rome, etc., R. Co. (56 Hun 
 
 645; 31 N. Y. S. R. 366; 10 N. Y. 
 
 Supp. 330), 1092. 
 Redner v. Lehigh, etc., R. Co. (73 Hun 
 
 562; 26 N. Y. Supp. 1050; 56 N. Y. 
 
 S. R. 230), 689. 
 Reed v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (74 Iowa 
 
 188; 37 N. W. Rep. 149), 1003. 
 Reed v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (57 Iowa 
 
 23; 10 N. W. Rep. 285; 8 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 180), 175. 
 Reed v. Duluth, etc., R. Co. (Mich., 
 
 59 N. W. Rep. 144; 68 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 77), 724. 
 Reed v. Misosuri Pacific R. Co. (94 
 
 Mo. App. 371; 68 S. W. Rep. 364), 
 
 287. 
 Reed v. New York, etc., R. Co. (56 
 
 Barb. [N. Y.] 493), 600. 
 Reed v. New York & Q. C. Ry. Co. 
 
 (102 N. Y. S. 19), 729. 
 Reed v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (56 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 184), 771. 
 Reed v. Railroad (45 N. Y. 574), 101.. 
 Reed v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (107 Mo. 
 
 App. 238; 80 S. W. Rep. 919). 948. 
 Reed i/. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (60 Mo. 
 
 199) 35. 
 Reed v. Southern Ry. Co. (55 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 218; 76 S. C. 162), 541. 
 Reed v. Stockmeyer (74 Fed. Rep. 186), 
 
 158. 
 Reedie v. London, etc., R. Co. (4 Exch. 
 
 244: 20 L. J. Exch. .65; 26 Enc. Law 
 
 & Proc. [Cyc] 1553), 278. 
 Reeks v. New York, etc., R. Co. (7^ N. 
 
 Y. 59), 749. 
 Reeves v. Delaware, Lackawanna & W. 
 
 R. Co. (30 Pa. St. 464), 451. 
 Reeves v. (Jalveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. 
 
 (98 S. W. Rep. 929), 400. 
 R?gan V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (93 
 
 Mo. 348; 6. S. W. Rep. 371), 245. . 
 Regler v. Charlotte, etc., R. Co. (94 No. 
 
 Car. 604; 26 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 386), 884. 
 Reibel v, Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. (114 
 
 Ind. 476; 17 N. E. Rep. 107), 590. 
 Reid V. Railroad (81 Ga. 694; 8 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 629), 119. 
 Reid V. New York, etc., R. Co. (63 
 
 Hun 630; 17 N. Y. Supp. 801; 44 N. 
 
 Y. S. R. 688), 935. 
 Reinke v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (145 
 
 Fed. Rep. 988), 530. 
 Reiser v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (152 Pa. 
 
 St. 38; 25 Atl. Rep. 175), 261. 
 Reiss V. Wilmington City Ry. Co. (67 
 
 Atl. Rep. 153), 573. 
 Reiter-Conley Co. v. Hamlin (144 Ala. 
 
 192; 40 So. Rep. 280), 184. 
 Reiter v. Winona, etc., Co. (72 Minn. 
 
 225; 75 N. W. Rep. 219), 128. 
 Relyea v, Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (112 
 
 Mo. 86; 20 S. W. Rep. 480; 63 Am. 
 
 & Eng. Cas. 578), 479. 
 Rembe v. New York, etc., R. Co. (102 
 
 N. Y. 721; 7 N. E. Rep. 797; 2 N. 
 
 Y. S. R. 498; 32 Hun 68), 1012. 
 Remer v. Long Island R. Co. (1 N. Y. 
 
 Supp. 124; 48 Hun. 352; 15 N. Y. 
 
 cxxxiii 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to seetions.] 
 
 S. R. 884; 113 N. Y. 669: 23 N. Y. 
 S. R. 994; 81 N. E. Rep. 1116), 
 
 1077. 
 Renfro v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (86 Mo. 
 
 802), 46S. 
 Renlund v. Commodore, etc., Co. (89 
 
 Minn. 41; 93 N. W. Rep. 1057), 159. 
 Renneker v. South Carolina R. Co. (20 
 
 So. Car. 219; 18 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 149), 793. 
 Reno V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (180 
 
 Mo. 483; 79 S. W. Rep. 464), 1011. 
 Renwick v. New York, etc., R. Co. (36 
 
 N. Y. 132; 34 How. Pr. 91), 1014. 
 Reoublic, etc., Co. v. Ohler (68 M. E. 
 
 Rep. 901), 384. 
 Retan v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. (94 
 
 Mich. 146; 53 N. W, Rep. 1094), 
 
 1030. 
 Revolinsky v. Adams Coal Co. (95 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 122), 95. 
 Reyburn v. Central Iowa R. Co. (74 
 
 Iowa 637; 85 N. W. Rep. 606), 783. 
 Reyburn v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. 
 
 (187 Mo. 665; 86 S. W. Rep. 174), 
 
 .1061. 
 Reynolds v. St. Louis Transfer Co. (189 
 
 Mo. 408; 88 S. W. Rep. 50), 555. 
 Rheiner v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (36 
 
 Minn. 170), 1094. 
 Rhodes v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (68 
 
 Mich. 263; 25 N. W. Rep. 182; 21 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 659), 1014. 
 Riccio V. New York, N. IL, etc. R. Co. 
 
 (189 Mass. 358; 75 N. E. Rep. 704), 
 
 269. 
 Rice V. Kansas, etc., R. Co. X63 Mo. 
 
 314), 860. 
 Rice -n. Smith (171 Mo. 331; 71 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 123), 276. 
 Rice V. Wabash R. Co. (92 Mo. App. 
 
 35), 529. 
 Rich V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (149 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 79), 876. 
 Rich V. New York, etc., R. Co. (87 N. 
 
 Y. 388), 16. 
 Richards v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (81 
 
 Iowa 426; 47 N. W. Rep. 63; 45 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 64), 875. 
 Richards v. Great Eastern R. Co. (28 
 
 L. T. 711), 649. 
 Richardson v. Corlean Hill Coal Co. 
 
 (10 Wash. 648; 89 Pac. Rep. 96), 222. 
 Richardson v. Great Eastern R. Co. 
 
 (24 W. R. 907; L. R., 1 C. P. D. 342), 
 
 637. 
 Richardson v. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (61 Hun 624; 133 N. Y. 563; 30 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 1148; 44 N. Y. S. R. 930), 
 
 940. 
 Richardson ■v. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (45 N. Y. 846), 959. 
 Richardson v. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (98 Mass. 85), 49. 
 Richardson v. Wilmihgton, etc., R. Co 
 
 (8 Rich. [So. Car.] 120), 1100. 
 Richey v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (7 
 
 Mo. App. 160), 1021. 
 Richey v. Southern Ry. Co. (69 S. C 
 
 387; 48 S. E. Rep. 285), 267. 
 Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Allison (86 
 
 Ga. 145; 12 S. E. Rep. 352; 48 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cap. 101), 174. 
 
 cxxxiv 
 
 Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Burnsed (70 
 
 Miss. 437; 12 So. Rep. 958), 1087. 
 Richmond v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (87 
 Mich. 374; 49 TJ. W. Rep. 621; 49 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 867), 1005. 
 Richmond, etc., R. Co. v, Childress (88 
 Ga. 719; 9 S. E. Rep. 608; 3 L. R. 
 A. 808; 41 Am, & Eng. R. Cas. 216), 
 93 
 Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Elliott (149 
 
 XJ. S. 266), 266. 
 Richmond, etc., R, Co. v, Hammond 
 
 (93 Ala. 181; 9 So. Rep. 577), 510. 
 Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Hissong (97 
 
 Ala. 187; 13 So. Rep. 209), 105. 
 Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Howard (79 
 
 Ga. 44; 3 S. E. Rep. 420), 1034. 
 Richmond, etc., R. Co. v, Jefferson (58 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 438), 756. 
 Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Johnson (89 
 
 Ga. 660;. 16 S. E. Rep. 908), 957. 
 Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Jones (98 Ala. 
 
 218; 9 So. Rep. 276), 853. 
 Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Moffett (88 
 
 Va. 785; 14 S. E. Rep. 370), 606. 
 Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Morris (31 
 
 (3ratt. [Va.] 200), 388. 
 Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Norment (84 
 
 Va. 167; i S. E. Rep. 211), 184. 
 Richmond v. Quincy, etc., R. Co. (49 
 
 Mo. App. 104), 708. 
 Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Risdon (87 
 Va. 335; 12 S. E. Rep. 786; 48 Am. 
 • & Eng. R. Cas. 244), 325. 
 Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Scott (86 Va. 
 902; 11 S. E. Rep. 404; 44 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 418), 682. 
 Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Scott (88 Va. 
 958; 14 S. E. Rep. 763; 62 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 405), 833. 
 Richmond v. Sitterling (lOl Va. 354; 
 43 S. E. Rep. 562; 66 L. R. A. 445), 
 290. 
 Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Smith (92 
 
 Ala. 237; 9 So. Rep. 283), 787. 
 Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Tribble (24 
 ?,:t^V^^P- ^''8; 3 Am; & Eng. R. Cas. 
 [N. S.] 632), 39. 
 Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Vance (93 
 
 Ala. 144; 9 So. Rep. 674), 177. 
 Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Weems (97 
 
 Ala. 270; 12 So. Rep. 186), 163. 
 Richmond, etc., R. Co. ». Williams (86 
 
 Va. 166; 9 S. E. Rep. 990), 491. 
 Rickard v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (141 
 Fed. Rep. 905; 73 C. C. A. 139), 99. 
 Ricker v. Central Railroad Co. (N. J.. 
 
 64 Atl. Rep. 1068), 488. 
 Ricketts V. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. (33 
 W. Va. 433; 10 S. E. Rep. 801; 41 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 42), 178. 
 Ricks V. Georgia Southern R. Co. (118 
 Ga. 259; Harvey v. Easton R. Co. 
 116 Mass. 269), 716. 
 Ridenhour v. Kansas City R. Co. (102 
 
 Mo. 270; 13 S. W. Rep. 889), 666. 
 Rider v. Syracuse, etc., R. Co. (171 N. 
 
 Y. 139), 398. 
 Ries V. Transit Co. (179 Mo. 1; 77 
 
 S. W. Rep. 734), 392. 
 Rigby V. Hewitt (5 Exch. 240), 1046. 
 Rigg V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (158 Mass. 
 809; 83 N. E. Rep. 512), 413. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.] 
 
 Riggs V. Metropolitan Ry. Co. (115 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 969), 1100. 
 Riggs V. St. Francois, etc., R. Co. (180 
 
 Mo. App. 368; 96 S. W. Rep. 707), 
 
 608. „ , 
 
 Rieler v. Charlotte, etc., R. Co. (94 No. 
 
 Car. 604), 1089. 
 Riley V. Chicago & Q. Ry. Co. (Ill N. 
 
 W. Rep. 847), 567. 
 Riley ". Connecticut River R. Co. (135 
 
 Mass. 298; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 181), 399. 
 Riley v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (133 
 
 Fed. Rep. 904), 385. 
 Riley v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (68 
 
 Mo. App. 658), 1078. 
 Riley v. West Virginia R. Co. (87 W. 
 
 Va. 145^ 381. 
 Rine v. (Thicago, etc., R. Co. (88 Mo. 
 
 392), 1061. 
 Ring V. Cohoes (77 N. Y. 83), 27. 
 Ring V. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (118 Mo. 
 
 230), 476. 
 Ringue v. Oregon, etc., Co. (75 Pac. 
 . Rep. 703), 78. „ , 
 
 Rintoul V. New York, etc., R. Co. (21 
 
 Blatchf. U. S. 439; 17 Fed. Rep. 
 
 90S), 849. 
 Rio Grande, etc., R. Co. v. Lynch (66 
 
 S. W. Rep. 718), 335. 
 Riska V. ttaion Depot Ry. Co. (180 
 
 Mo. 168; 79 S. W. Rep. 445), 507. 
 Ritger v. Milwaukee (99 Wis. 190; 74 
 
 N. W. Rep. 815), 1053. 
 Riverton Coal Co. v. Shepard (207 111. 
 
 395; 69 N. E. Rep. 981), 6. 
 Riverton, ^tc., R. Co. v. Shepard (111 
 
 111. App. 894; 807 HI. 395; 60 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 921), 88. 
 Roach V. Western, etc., R. Co. (93 
 
 Ga. 785: 21 S. E. Rep. 67), 1055. 
 Robb V. Hackler (23 Wend. 50), 101. 
 Robbins v. Big Circle Co. (Mo., 79 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 480), 155. 
 Roberts v. Alexandria, etc., R. Co. (83 
 
 Va! 312; 2 S. E. Rep. 518), 952. 
 Roberts v. Central, etc., R. Co. .(124 
 
 Fed. Rep. 471), 61. 
 Roberts v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (33 
 
 Minn. 218; 22 N. W. Rep. 389), 490. 
 Roberts v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (35 
 
 Wis. 679), 915. 
 Roberts v. Fielder Salt Works, 78 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 618), 158. 
 Roberts v. Johnson (58 N. Y. 613), 
 
 125. 
 Roberts v. Port Blakely, etc., Co. (30 
 
 Wash. 85; 70 Pac. Rep. Ill), 164. 
 Robertson v. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (22 Barb. [N. Y.] 91), 561. 
 Robertson v. Terre Haute, etc. R. Co. 
 
 (78 Ind. 77; 41 Am. Rep. 552; 8 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 175), 488. 
 Robertson v. Wabash R. Co. (152 Mo. 
 
 382; 53 S: W. Rep. 1082), 703. 
 Robinson v. Georgia, etc., R. Co. (117 
 
 Ga. 168; 43 S. E. Rep. 452), 64.' 
 Robinson v. Houston, etc., R. Co. (46 
 
 Tex., 640; IS Am. Ry. Rep. 303), 
 
 354. 
 Robinson v. Metropolitan, etc., R. Co. 
 
 91 App. Div. 158; 86 N. Y. Supp. 
 
 442; 179 N. Y. 593; 78 N. E. Rep. 
 
 1150), 1059. 
 Robinson v. New York, etc., R. Co. (66 
 
 N. Y. 11), 1048. 
 Robinson v. Railroad (7 Gray [Mass.] 
 
 92), 95. 
 Robinson, etc., R. Co. v. Railway (67 
 
 Mo. 494), 60a. 
 Robinson v. St. Johosbury & L. C. R. 
 
 Co. (66 Atl. Rep. 814), 564. 
 Robinson v. United States,- etc., Ass'n 
 
 (138 Mich. 659; 94 N. W. Rep. 211; 
 
 102 Am. St. Rep. 436), 649. 
 Robinson v. Western Pacific R. Co. (48 
 
 Cal. 409), 947. 
 Robostelli v. New York, etc., R. - Co. 
 
 (33 Fed. Rep. 796; 34 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 515), 638. 
 Roche V. Denver & R. G. R. Co. (73 
 
 Pac. Rep. 880), 79. 
 Roche V. Llewellen Iron Co. (140 Cal. 
 
 563; 74 Pac. Rep. 147), 97. 
 Rock Island v. Van Landschoot (78 111. 
 
 485), 1056. 
 Rockford, etc., R. Co. v. Byam (80 111. 
 
 588), 991. 
 Rockford, etc., R. Co. v. Coultas (67 
 
 111. 398), 801. 
 Rockford, etc.,, R. Co. ». Delaney (88 
 
 HI. 198), 198. 
 Rockford, etc., R. Co. v. Hillmer (72 
 
 111. 235), 1019. 
 Roddy V. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. 
 
 (104 Mo. 834; 15 S. W. Rep. 1112; 
 
 18 L. R. A. 746; 24 Am. St. Rep. 
 
 333), 860. 
 Roden v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (133 III. 
 
 72; 84 N. E.,Rep. 426; 30 111. App. 
 
 364), 1081. 
 Rogers v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (Ark., 
 
 89 S. W. Rep. 468; 1 L. R. A. (N. 
 
 S.] 1145). 647. 
 Rodman v. Missouri Pac. Ry. .Co. (65 
 
 Kan. 645; 70 Pac. Rep. 642; 59 L. 
 
 R. A. 704), 55. 
 Rodrian v. New York, etc., R. Co. (125 
 
 N. Y. 526; 86 N. E. Rep. 741; 35 N. 
 
 Y. S. R. 814), 1005. 
 Rodrian v. New York, etc., R. Co. (28 
 
 N. Y. S. R. 625; 7 N. V. Supp. 811), 
 
 954. ' ' 
 
 Roe V. Jerome (18 Conn. 158), 463. 
 Roe V. Winston (86 Minn. 77; 90 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 122), 210. 
 Rogers v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (117 III. 
 
 116), 388. 
 Rogers v. Florence, etc., R. Co. (31 So. 
 
 Car^ 378; .9 S. E. Rep. 1059; 39 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. C?s. 348), 280. 
 Rogers v. Galveston, etc., R. Co. (76 
 
 Tex. 502; 13 S. W. Rep. 540), 343. 
 Rogers v. Kennebec S. B. Co. (86 Me. 
 
 261; 25 L. R. A. 491; 29 Atl. Rep. 
 
 1069), 858. 
 Rogers V. Rio Grande Western R. Co. 
 
 (90 Pac. Rep. 1075), 200. 
 Rogers i>. West Jersey & S. R. Co. (68 
 
 Atl. Rep. 148), 935. 
 Rohback v. Pacific R. Co. (43 Mo. 187). 
 
 492. 
 Roland v. Railroad (80 Mo. App. 463), 
 
 311. 
 
 CXXXV 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.] 
 
 Roll V. Northern C. R. Co. (15 Hun 
 
 [N. Y.] 496; 80 N. Y. 647), 399. 
 Roman v. Boston, etc., Co. (87 Mo. App. 
 
 186), 150. 
 Rome, etc., R. Co. v. Chasteen (88 Ala. 
 
 591; 7 So. Rep. 94; 40 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 559), S77. 
 Rome, etc., Ry. Co. v. Keel (60 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 468), 698. 
 Rome, etc., R. Co. v. Tolbert (85 Ga. 
 
 447; 11 S. E. Rep. 849), 1090. 
 Romick v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (62 
 
 Iowa 167; 17 N. W. Rep. 458; 15 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 888), 398. 
 Rook V. N. J., etc., Co. (76 Hun [N. Y.] 
 
 54; 148 N. Y. 758; 43 N. E. Rep. 
 
 989), 286. 
 Root i>. Kansas City, etc., Ry. Co. (195 
 
 Mo. 348; 98 S. W. Rep. 681; 6. L. 
 
 R. A. [N. S.] 212), 463. 
 Rose V. Des Moines Valley R. Co. (39 
 
 Iowa 246: 9 Am. Ky. Rep. 7; 80 Am. 
 
 Ry. Rep. 386), 808. 
 Roseman v, Carolina, etc., R. Co. (112 
 
 No. Car. 709; 16 S. E. Rep. 766; 52 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 038; 19 L. R. A. 
 
 387), 734. 
 Roseman v. Southern Ry. Co. (66 S. 
 
 C. 91; 44 S. E. Rep. 574), 354. 
 Rosen v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (83 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 300; 49 U. S. App. 647; 27 C. 
 
 C. A. 534; 7 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law 
 
 [2 Ed.] 370), 4. 
 Rosenbaum v. St. Paul, etc^ R. Co. (38 
 
 Minn. 173; 34 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 274; 36 N. W. Rep. 447), 568. 
 Rosenberg, etc., R. Co. v. Third. Ave. 
 
 R. Co. (61 N. Y. S. 1052), 557. 
 Rosenkranz v. Lindell R. Co. (108 Mo. 
 
 9; 18 S. W. Rep. 890), 184. 
 Rosne v. Erie R. Co. (136 Fed. Rep. 
 
 311; 68 C. C. A. 155), 273. 
 Ross V. Double Shoals, etc., Co. (68 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 121; 1 L. R. A. [N. S.] 298), 
 
 73. 
 Ross V. Great Northern R. Co. (Ill N. 
 
 W. Rep. 951), 170. 
 Ross V. New York, etc., R. Co. (5 
 
 Hun 488; 74 N. Y. 617), 668. 
 Ross V. North. Pac. Ry. Co. (5 Dak. 
 
 308; 40 N. W. Rep. 690), 268. 
 Ross V. Walker (139 Pa. St. 42; 21 
 
 Atl. Rep. 167), 309. 
 Roth V. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. (21 
 
 Wis. 256), 1018. 
 Rou I/. Blodgett, etc., R. Co. (85 Mich. 
 
 519; 48 N; E. Rep. 1092), 375. 
 Rounds V. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (64 
 
 N. Y. 189; 21 Am. Rep. 597), 153. 
 Roundtree v. Charleston, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (72 S. C. 474; 52 S. E. Rep. 231) 
 
 149. 
 Rouston V. Detroit United Ry. (115 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 62), 654. 
 Routledge v. Rambler Automobile Co. 
 
 (95 S. W. Rep. 749), 1049. 
 Eowdin v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (208 
 Pa. St. 623; 57 Atl. Rep. 1125), 666. 
 Rowe V. Southern California R. Co. 
 
 (Cal., 87 Pa. Rep. 220), 388. 
 Rowell V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (68 N. 
 H. 868; 44 Atl. Rep. 488), 733. 
 
 CXXXVl 
 
 Rowen v. New York, etc., R. Co. (59 
 
 Conn. 364; 21 Atl. Rep. 1073), 392. 
 Rowland v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. 
 
 (20 Mo. App. 463), 476. 
 Rowley v. Clhicago, etc., R. Co. (116 
 
 N. W. Rep. 866), 873. 
 Rowley v. London, etc., R. Co. (29 L. 
 T. 180; L. R., 8 Ex. 821; 21 W. R. 
 869), 67. 
 Roxbury v. Central Vermont R. Co. 
 
 (60 Vt. 121; 14 Atl. Rep. 98), 905. 
 Royster v. Southern Ry. Co. (61 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 179), 1029. 
 Rozwadosfski v. International, etc., R. 
 Co. (1 Tex. Civ. App. 487; 20 S. W. 
 Rep. 872), 657. 
 Rozzelle v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (79 
 
 Mo. 351), 602. 
 Rucker v, Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (61 
 Tex., 499; 81 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 846), 97. 
 Rudard v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. 
 
 (88 Ky. 280; 11 S. W. Rep. 70), 6. 
 Rummel v. Dilworth (131 Pa. St. 509), 
 
 309. 
 Rumpel V. Railroad (36 Pac. Rep. 700; 
 
 28 L. R. A. 726; 4 Idaho 13), 95. 
 Rumsey v. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (6 
 Kulp [Pa.] 359; 63 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 376), 341. 
 Rumsey v. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (161 
 
 Pa. St. 74; 85 Atl. Rep. 37), 333. 
 Runt p. lUmois Cent. R. Co. (Miss., 41 
 
 So. Rep. 1), 50. 
 Ritpard v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. (88 
 
 Ky. 280; 7 L. R. A. 316), 902. 
 Rush V, Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (36 
 Kan. 129; 12 Pac. Rep. 682; 28 Am. 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 484), 341. 
 Russ V. The War Eagle (14 Iowa 363), 
 
 571. 
 Russ V. Wabash R. Co. (112 Mo. 46; 
 
 20 S. W. Rep. 472), 495. 
 Russell V. Atchison, etc., R. Co. (70 Mo. 
 
 App. 88), 962. 
 Russell V. Hudson River R. Co. (17 N. 
 
 Y. 134), 568; 
 
 Russell V. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co. (32 
 
 Minn. 230: 20 N. W. Rep. 147), 372. 
 
 Russell V. New York, etc., R. Co. (89 
 
 N. Y. S. 4295 96 App. Div. 151), 94. 
 
 Russell V. Tillottson (4 N. E. Rep. 
 
 231), 145. 
 Rutledge v, Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. 
 (183 Mo. 181; 24 S. W. Rep. 1053), 
 492. 
 Rutledge v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. 
 110 Mo. 312; 19 S. W. Rep. 38), 
 331. 
 Ryall V. Central Pacific Ry. Co. (76 
 
 Cal. 474; 18 Pac. Rep. 430), 413. 
 Ryan v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (00 111. 
 
 171; 12 Am. Ry. Rep. 327), 479. 
 Ryan v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (116 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 197), 866. 
 Ryan v. Cumberland Valley R. Co. (23 
 
 Pa. St. 284), 568. 
 Ryan v. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (99 N. 
 
 Y. S. 794; 114 App. Div. 268), 264. 
 Ryan v. Long Island, etc., R. Co. (61 
 Hun 607; 22 N. Y. S. R. 655; i N. Y. 
 Supp. 881), 341. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.'] 
 
 Ryan v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (13a Pa. 
 
 St. 304; 19 Atl. Rep. 81), 894. 
 Ryan v. Railroad Co. (169 Mass. 867; 
 
 47 N. E. Rep. 877), 326. 
 Ryan v. Third Ave. R. Co. (86 N. Y. 
 
 S. R. 1070; 92 App. Div. 306), 321. 
 Ryker v. VisMi York, etc., R. Co, (72 N. 
 
 Y. S. R. 168; 64 App. Div. 357), 
 
 373. 
 
 s 
 
 Sabine, etc., R. Co. v. Dean (76 Tex. 
 
 73; 13 S. W. Rep. 45), 1013. 
 Sabine, etc., R. Co. v. Ewing (1 Tex. 
 
 Civ. App. 531; 21 S. W. Rep. 700), 
 
 492. 
 Sachau v. Miller, etc., Co. (138 Iowa 
 
 387; 98 N. W. Rep. 900), 307. 
 Sachrowitz v, Atchison, etc., R. Co. (37 
 
 Kan. 212; 34 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 382), 749. 
 Backer v. Waddell (Md., 56 Atl. Rep. 
 
 399), 280. 
 Sackewitz v. Am. Biscuit Co. (78 Mo, 
 
 App. 151), 120. 
 Sadowski v. Michigan Car Co. (84 
 
 Mich. 100; 47 N. W. Rep. 598), 470. 
 Saeger v. Wabash R. Co. (110 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 686), 708. 
 Safford k. Green Island (74 Hun 306; 
 
 56 N. Y. S. R. 269; 26 N. Y. Supp. 
 
 669), 136. I 
 
 Sage V. Baltimore & O. R. Co. (67 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 985; 219 Pa. 129), 482. 
 Sahaibe v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. (97 
 
 Mich. 318; 56 N. W. Rep. 565), 265. 
 St. Clair, etc., R. Co. ii. Eadie' (43 
 
 Ohio St. 91; 54 Am. Rep. 144; 23 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 269), 1043. 
 St. Clair v. Sit. Louis, etc. R. Co. (122 
 
 Mo. App. 519; 99 S. W. Rep. 775), 
 
 668. 
 St. Joseph, etc., R. Co. v. Wheeler 
 
 (Kan., 26 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 173), 
 
 561. ■ 
 St. Lawrence, etc., R. Co. v. Lett (11 
 
 Can. Sup. Ct. 422; 26 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 454), 197. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Adcock (52 
 
 Ark. 406; 12 S. W. Rep. 874; 40 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 682), 668. 
 St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Ames (Tex., 
 
 94 S. W. Rep. 1112), 271. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Andres (16 
 
 111. App. 298), 395. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Arnold (Tex. 
 
 87 S. W. Rep. 173), 94. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Baker (67 
 ^ Ark. 531; 55 S. W. Rep. 941), 789. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Barnett (65 
 
 Ark. 265; 45 S. W. Rep. 550), 626. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Barrett (Tex., 
 
 78 S. W. Rep. 884), 332. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. BelJ (81 111. 
 
 76; 85 Am. Rep. 269), 1073. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Berryhill (3 
 
 Tex. Civ. App. 387), 686. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Coj v. Biggs (53 111. 
 
 App. 650), 499. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Billingsley 
 
 (96 S. W. Rep. 367), 668. 
 
 St. Louis R. Co. V. Boyer (97 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 1070), 694. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Boyles (Ark., 
 
 95 S. W. Rep. 783), 386. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Brennen (80 
 
 111. App. 555), 400. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. u. Britz (72 111. 
 
 256), 455. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Burrows (Kan.. 
 
 61 Pac. Rep. 439), 576. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Callahan (194 
 
 U. S. 628; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 857; 
 
 48 L. Ed. 1167), 529. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. .Cantrell (37 
 
 Ark. 619; 40 Am. Rep. 105; 8 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 198), 711. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Carlisle (75 
 
 Ark. 660;, 88 S. W. Rep. 584), 328. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Carr (47 111. 
 
 App. 363), 805. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. u. Corgan (49 111. 
 
 App. 289), 381. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Crosnoe (72 
 
 Tex., 79; 10 S. W. Rep. 342; 37 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 313), 874. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Davis (55 Ark. 
 
 468; 18 S. W. Rep. 628), 198. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Davis (54 Ark. 
 
 389; 15 S. W. Rep. 896), 341. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Dewees (Kan., 
 
 153 Fed. Rep. 56), 395. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Dowgiallo (101 
 
 S. W. Rep. 412), 737. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Doyle (Tex., 
 
 25 S. W. Rep. 461), 298. 
 St, Louis, etc., R. Co. ■». Dunn (78 111. 
 
 197),. 943. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. -v. Fairbourne (48 
 
 Ark. 491), 861. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. „. Farr (66 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 994), 196. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Ferrell (106 
 
 S. W. Rep. 263), 411. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Finley (79 
 
 Tex. 85; 15 S. W. Rep. 266), 708. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Freeman (36 
 
 Ark. 41; 4 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 608), 
 
 396. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Fritts (108 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 841), 866. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Gaines (46 
 
 Ark. 555), 494. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Gordon (167 
 
 Mo. 71; 67 S. W. Rep. 742), 908. 
 St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Green (10.7 
 
 S. W. Rep. 168), 694. ^ 
 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Hackett (58 
 
 Ark. 581; 24 S. W. Rep. 881), 246. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Hatiey (Tex., 
 
 94 S. W. Rep. 386), 647. 
 St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Harmon (109 
 
 S. W. Rep.. 895), 568. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Harper (44 
 
 Ark. 624), 471. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Henson (61 
 
 Ark. 302; 32 S. W. Rep. 1079), 490. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Hill (94 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 914), 258. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Holman (155 
 
 III. 21; 39 N. E. Rep. 673), 494. 
 St. Louis, etc/, R. Co. v. Hook (Ark. 
 
 104*8. W. Rep. 217), 622. 
 
 cxxxvii 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [Ueferpnoes are to sectiona.l 
 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Irwin (37 Kan. 
 
 701; 16 Pac. Rep. 146), 381. 
 .St. Louis, S. W. R. Co. v. Jacobson 
 
 (Tex., 66 S. W. Rep. Ill), 273. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v.. Johnson (59 
 
 Ark. 1?2; 26 S. W. Rep. 693), 032. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Johnson ' (78 
 
 Tex. 636; 15 S. W. Rep. 104), 203. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Kelton (28 
 
 Tex. Civ. App. 137; 66 S. W. Rep. 
 
 887), 492. • 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Kelton (55 
 
 Arlt. 483; 18 S. W. Rep. 933), 375. 
 St. Louis, etc, R. Co. v. Kilpatrick (67 
 
 Ark.- 47;~54 S. W. Rep. 971), 729. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Knott (54 
 
 Ark. 424; 16 S. W. Rep. 9), 283. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Le^mons (102 
 
 S. W. Rep. 363), 184. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Ledbetter (46 
 
 Ark. 246), 1101. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Lemon (83 
 
 Tex. 143; 18 S. W. Rep. 331), 485. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Lester (46 
 
 Ark. 236), 849. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Mackie (71 
 
 Tex. 491; 9 S. W. Rep. 461; 37 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 94; 1 L. R. A. 
 
 667), 164. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. McClain (80 
 
 Tex. 85; 15 S. W. Rep. 789), 419. 
 St, Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Madden (93 
 
 Pac. Rep. 586), 281. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Madry (57 
 
 Ark. 306; 21 S. W. Rep. 472; 58 Am. 
 . & Eng. R. Cas. 827), 195. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. McLain (80 
 
 Tex. 85; 15 S. W. Rep. 789), 467. 
 St. Louis, etc. R. Co. v. Manley (58 111. 
 
 .300), 884. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Marker (41 
 
 Ark. 642), 337. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Marshall (78 
 
 Mo. 610), 39. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Ma'thias (50 
 
 Ind. 65; 8 Am. Ry. Rep. 381), 1011. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Mitchell (67 
 
 Ark. 418; 21 S. W. Rep. 883), 608. 
 St. Louis 1. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Mize 
 
 (Ark., 95 S. W. Rep. 488), 268. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. zi. Monday (49 
 
 Ark. 267-. 4 S. W. Rep. 782; 31 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 424), 413. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Moore (14 111. 
 
 , App. 610), 597^ 
 it. Louis, 
 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Morgert (4S 
 
 Ark. 318), 482. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Murray (55 
 
 Ark. 248; 18 S. W. Rep. 50; 16 L. 
 
 R. A. 787), 39. 
 St. Louis Rv. Co. V. Mynott (102 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 380), 737. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Needliam (52 
 
 Fed. Rep. 371; 10 U. S. App. 339; 
 
 3 C. C. A. 129; 54 Am. & Eng. K. 
 
 Cas. 88), 65. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Needham (63 
 
 Fed. Rep. 107; 11 C. C. A. 66; 86 L. 
 
 R. A. 833), 498: 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Neely (101 
 
 •S. W. Rep. 481), 682. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Parks (97 
 
 cxxxviii 
 
 Tex. 131; 76 S. W. Rep. 740; 90 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 343), 656. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Payne (13 Am. 
 
 & En^. R. Cas. 632), 886. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Persons (49 
 
 Ark. 182: 4 S. W. Rep. 755; 30 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 667), 708. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Pitcock (101 
 
 S. W. Rep. 725), 851. 
 St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Pope (Tex., 
 
 86 S. W. Rep. 5), 380. 
 
 St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Portis (99 
 
 S. W. Rep. 66), 1014. 
 St. Louis, etc, R. Co. v. Raines (111 
 
 S. W. Rep. 262), 1099. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Rea (Tex., 
 
 87 S. W. Rep. 324), 338. 
 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Reagen (52 
 
 111. App. 488), 738. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Rexroad (Ark., 
 
 58 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 615). 682. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Rice (61 Ark. 
 
 467: 11 S. W. Rep. 699; 4 L. R. A. 
 
 173), 494. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Rickman (65 
 
 Ark. 138; 45 S. W. Rep. 56;, 495. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Ritz (Kan., 
 
 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 35), 292. . 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Robbins (67 
 
 Ark. 377; 21 S. W. Rep. 886), 202. 
 St. Louis, etc.,- R. Co. ». Rosenberry 
 
 (45 Ark. 266), 768. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Sharp (3 Tex. 
 
 Civ. App. 394), 1094. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Shaw (110 
 
 Fed. Rep. 621), 866. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. ShiiBett (98 
 
 Tex. 326; 83 S. W. Rep. 677), 1096. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Smitli (90 b. 
 
 W. Rep. 926), 529. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Smith (86 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 943), 184. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. r/. Snell (100 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 67), 667. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. State (22 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 918), 956. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. State (56 
 
 Ark. J66; 19 S. W. Rep. 672; 56 
 
 Ark. 200), 949. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Sweet (57 
 
 Ark. 287; 21 S. W. Rep. 687), 683. 
 St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Tomlinson 
 
 (94 S. W. Rep. 613), 947. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Trigg (74 Mo. 
 
 174), 39. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Triplett (54 
 
 Ark. 289; 15 S. W. Rep. 831; 48 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 283), 376. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Valarius (56 
 
 Ind. 511; 18 Am. Ry. Rep. 116). 313. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. VesUl (Tex., 
 
 86 S. W. Rep. 790), 360. 
 St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Bricker 
 
 (Kan., 69 Pac. Rep. 328), 238. 
 St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Bussong (90 
 
 S. W. Rep. 73), 543. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Vickers (122 
 
 U. S. 360), 105. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Weaver (35 
 
 Kan. 412; 11 Pac. Rep. 408; 28 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 341), 94. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Welsh (78 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITEaj, 
 
 [References are to sections. 1 
 
 Tex. 298; 10 S. W. Eep. 529; 2 L. R. 
 
 A. 839), 190. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Whittier (74 
 
 Fed. Rep. 296), 783. 
 St Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Wilkerson (46 
 
 Arl(. 613), 1103. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Willis (38 Kan. 
 
 330; 16 Pac. Rep. 728; 83 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 397), 892. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Yonley (53 
 
 Ark. 603: 14 S. W. Rep. 800; 45 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 678), 284. 
 St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. i. An- 
 . drews (96 S. W. Rep. 183), 255. 
 St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Block 
 
 (Ark., 95 S. W. Rep. 165), 206. 
 St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Cain 
 
 (104 S. W. Rep. 533), 1083. 
 St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Caraway 
 
 (91 S. W. Rep. 749), 263. 
 St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Dillard 
 
 (94 S. W. Rep. '617), 408. 
 St. Louis, I. M. * S. Ry. Co. v. Dupree 
 
 (105 S. W. Rep. 878), 514. 
 St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Hatch 
 
 (94 S. W. Rep. 671), 591. 
 St. Louis,. I. if & S. Ry. Co. v. Hud- 
 son (110 S. W. Rep. 590), 875. 
 St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Lon. 
 
 don (102 S. W. Rep. 212), 41^. 
 St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Mc- 
 
 Cormick (71 Tex. 660; 9 &. W. Rep. 
 
 640),. 50. 
 St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. V. Touhey 
 
 (67 Ark. 209; 54 S. W. Rep. 677; 77 
 ■ Am. St. Rep. 109), 360. 
 St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. p. 
 
 Adams (112 S. W. Rep. 186), 967. 
 St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. v. Arnold (87 
 
 S. W. Rep. 173), 95. 
 St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. v. Corrigan 
 
 (Tex., 81 S. W. Rep. 564), 268. 
 St.- Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. k. Cun- 
 ningham (106 S. W. Rep. 407), 646. 
 St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Davis 
 
 (110 S. W. Rep. 939), 1102. 
 St. Louis, S. W. Ry. Co. V. Dempsey 
 
 (Tex., 89 S. W. Rep. 789), 323. 
 St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. k. Fus- 
 
 sell (97 S. W. Rep. 832), 565. 
 St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. v. Harkie (88 
 
 S. W. Rep. 506), 122. 
 St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. Kelton (Tex., 66 
 
 S. W. Rep. 887), 268. 
 St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Ken- 
 nedy (96 S. W. Rep. 663), 721. 
 St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas 
 
 V. Kern (100 S. W. Rep. 971), 406. 
 St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. </. 
 
 Moore (107 S. W. Rep. 668), 933. 
 St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co, v. Mor- 
 gan (98 S. W. Rep. 408), 669. 
 St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Pope 
 
 (97 S. W. Rep. 634), 407. 
 St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Rowe 
 
 (Tex., 86 S. W. Rep. 1059), 20. 
 St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Smith 
 
 (Tex., 107 S. W. Rep. 638), 904. 
 St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. v. Spivey (Tex., 
 
 76 S. W. Rep. 748), 270. 
 St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. 
 
 Thornton (103 S. W. Rep. 437), 543. 
 St. Louis Stock Yards Co. v. Burns (97 
 
 111. App. 175), 328. 
 St. Paul, etc., Co. ti. Ware (6 Wall. 
 
 [U. S.I 566; ai L. Ed. 485) 300. 
 Sakewitz v. American, etc., Co. (78 Mo. 
 
 App. 144), 127. 
 Sala V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (85 Iowa 
 
 678; 62 N. W. Rep. 664), 1001. 
 Saldana v. Galveston, etc., R. Co. (43 
 
 Fed. Rep. 862), 966. 
 Salliott V. King Bridge Co. (122 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 378; 68 C. C. A. 466; 65 L. R. A. 
 
 620), 878. 
 Salmon v. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (9 Vt. 
 
 6), 4. 
 Salter v. Mersereau (64 N. Y. 138), 292. 
 Salter v. Utica, etc., R. Co. (75 N. Y. 
 
 273), 1006. 
 Salter v. UticB, etc., R. Co. (88 N. Y. 
 
 42; 8 -Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 437), 979. 
 Salter v. Utica, etc., R. Co. (69 N. Y. 
 
 631), 1012. 
 Saltonstall v. Stockton (Taney [U. S.] 
 
 11), 806. 
 Sams V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (174 Mo. 
 
 63; 73 S. W. Rep. 686; 61 L. R. A. 
 
 475), 529. 
 Samuels v. Richmond, etc., R. Co. (35 
 
 So. Car. 493; 14 S. E. Rep. 943; 52 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 315), 179. 
 San Antonio R. Co. v. Bennett (76 Tex. 
 
 151; 13 S. W. Rep. 319), 192. 
 San Antonio, etc., Ry. Co. v. Brock 
 
 (Tex., 80 S. W. Rep. 422), 361. 
 San Antonio, etc., R. Co. v. Clark (Tex., 
 
 63 S. W., Rep. 646), 328. 
 San Antonio, etc., Ry. Co. v, Drake 
 
 (Tex., 86 S. W. Rep. 447; 89 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 107), 263. / 
 
 San Antonio, etc., Ry. Co. v. Hahl 
 
 (Tex., 83 S. W. Rep. 27), 271. 
 San Antonio, etc., R. Co. v. Harding (11 
 
 Tex. Civ. App. 497; 33 S. W: Rep. 
 
 373; 3 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. [N. S.] 
 
 389), 487. 
 San Antonio & A". P. Ry. Co. v. Heller 
 
 (11 Tex. Civ. App. 569; 32 S. W. Rep. 
 
 847), 6L. 
 San Antonio, etc., R. Co. v. Lindsay 
 
 (Tex., 65 S. W. Rep. 668), 267. 
 San Antonio, etc., R. Co. v. Lynch 
 
 (Tex., 56 S. W. Rep. 617), 604. 
 San Antonio, etc., R. Co. v. McMillan 
 . (102 S. W. Rep. 103), 1104. 
 San Antonio, etc., R. Co. v. Robinson 
 
 (73 Tex. 277; 11 S. W. Rep. 327), 
 
 92. 
 San Antonio, etc., R. Co. v. Taylor 
 
 (Tex., 35 S. W. Rep. 866), 490. 
 San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co. v. Trigo 
 
 (101 S. W. Rep. 264), 842. 
 San Antonio, etc., R. Co. v. Wallace (76 
 
 Tex. 636; 44 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 564; 
 
 13 S. W. Rep. 565), 397. 
 San Antonio, etc., R. Co. v. Waller 
 
 (Tex., 65 S. W. Rep. 210), 360. 
 San Antonio, etc., Co. v. Wilson (Tex., 
 
 19 S. W. Rep. 910), 382. 
 Sanborn v. Atchison, etc., R. Co. (35 
 
 Kan. 292; 10 Pac. Rep. 860), 307. 
 
 CXXXIX 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.'] 
 
 Sanborn v. Detroit, etc., R. Co. (91 
 
 Mich. 588; 68 N. W. Rep. 163; 50 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 114), 962. 
 Sanchez v. San Antonio, etc., R. Co. (3 
 
 Co. (198 Mo. 491; 96 S. W. Rep. 
 
 2«), 796. „ . „ ^ 
 
 Sanders v. Central of Georgia Ky. Co. 
 
 (128 Ga. 763; 61 S. E. Rep. 728), 
 
 462. 
 Sanders v. Southern R. Co. (107 Ga. 
 
 138), 789. . „ ., „ ^ 
 
 Sanderson v. Missouri Pacific Ky. Co. 
 
 (64 Mo. App. 666), 715. ^ ^ „ 
 Sands v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (47 So. 
 
 Rep. 383), 1029. „ ^ , „ 
 
 Sanford v. Pawtucket, etc., R. Co. (19 
 
 R. I. 587; 36 Atl. Rep. 67; 33 L. R. 
 
 A. 664; 4 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. [N. S.] 
 ■318), 281. 
 Sanguinette v. Mississippi River, etc., R. 
 
 Co. (196 Mo. p. 491; 95 S. W. Rep. 
 
 386), 1014. 
 Sanker v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (208 Pa. 
 
 St. 609; 65 Atl. Rep. 883), 328. 
 Sanks v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (112 111. 
 
 App. 385), 109. 
 Sante Fe Pacific R. Co. v. Holmes (136 
 
 Fed. Rep. 66; 68 C. C. A. 034; 202 U. 
 
 S. 438; 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 676; 50 L. 
 
 Ed. 1094), 273. . ^ , 
 
 Sargent v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (114 
 
 Mo. 348; 21 S. W. Rep. 823; 19 L. K. 
 
 A. 460), 793. 
 Sauerboin v. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (23 N. Y. Supp. 478; 68 N. Y. S. R. 
 
 784; 141 N. Y. 663), 974. 
 Sauls V. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (Tex., 
 
 81 S. W. Rep. 89), 352. 
 Sauter v. New York, etc., R. Co. (66 
 
 N. Y. 50; 6 Hun 446), 782. 
 Savage v. Marlborough, etc., R. Co. (186 
 
 Mass. 203: 71 N. E. Rep. 531), 116. 
 Savage v. Nassau, etc., R. Co. (168 N. 
 
 Y. 680; 61 N. E. Rep. 1134), 500. 
 Savannah, etc., R. Co. v. Boyle (115 Ga. 
 
 836; 48 S. E. Rep. 242; 59 L. R. A. 
 
 104), 762. 
 Savannah, etc., R. Co. v, Flannaghan 
 
 (88 Ga. 679; 9 S. E. Rep. 471; 39 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 661), 96. 
 Savannah, etc., R. Co. v. Folks (76 Ga. 
 
 •587), 844. 
 Savannah, etc., R. Co. v. Harper (70 Ga. 
 
 119), 166. 
 Savannah, etc., R. Co. v. Holland (82 
 
 Ga. 267; 10 S. E. Rep. 200; 41 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 196), 179. 
 Savannah, etc., R. Co. v. Meadows (95 
 
 Ala. 137; 10 So. Rep. 141), 1068. 
 Savannah, etc., R.' Co. v. Phillips (90 
 
 Ga. 829; 17 S. E. Rep. 82), 283. 
 Savannah, etc., R. Co. v. Shearer (68 
 
 Ala. 672; 80 Am. Ry. Rep. 461), 200. 
 Savannah, etc., R. Co. v. Stewart (71 
 
 Ga. 427), 680. 
 Savannah, etc., R. Co. v. Watts (82 Ga. 
 
 889; 9 S. E. Rep. 189), 789. 
 Savannah, etc., R. Co." v. Williams - (117 
 
 Ga. 414; 43 S. E. Rep. 751; 61 L. R. 
 
 A. 249), 619. 
 Sawyer v. Arnold (90 Me. 369; 38 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 838), 108. 
 
 cxl 
 
 Sawyer v, Hannibal, etc., R. Co, (87 Mo. 
 
 840), 618. 
 Sawyer v. Roanoke R. & Lumber Co. 
 
 (58 S. E. Rep. 598), 398. 
 Sawyer v. Rutland R. Co. (27 Vt. 870), 
 
 481. 
 Saxe V. Wolworth, etc., Co. (191 Mass. 
 
 838; 77 N. E. Rep. 883), 341. 
 Saxton V. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (98 . 
 
 Mo. App. 494; 72 S. W. Sep. 717), 
 
 570. 
 Scagel V. Cl;iicago, etc., R. Co, (83 
 
 Iowa 880; 49 N. W. Rep. 990), 105. 
 Scanlon v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (147 
 
 Mass. 484; 18 N. E. Rep. 809; 38 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 48), 887. 
 Scanlon v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (140 
 
 Mass. 84; 2 N. E. Rep. 787), 910. 
 Scanlon v. Railroad Co. (147 Mass. 484; 
 
 18 N. E. Rep. 809), 369. 
 Scarborough v, Alabama Midland R, Co. 
 
 (94 Ala. 497; 10 So. Rep. 816), 895. 
 Schadewald v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (56 Wis. 569; 18 N. W. Rep. 468), 
 
 196. 
 Schaefert v. Chicago, etc., R. C^. (62 
 
 Iowa 684; 17 N. W. Rep. 893), 1083.. 
 Schaeffer v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (128 
 
 Mo. 64; 30 S. W. Rep. 331), 687. 
 Schaeffer v. Washington, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (105 U. S. 851; 26 L. Ed. 1070), 702. 
 Schaible n..Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. (97 
 
 Mich. 318; 66 N. W. Rep. 665), 408. 
 Schafery v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (62 
 
 Iowa 624), 1017. 
 Schaldewald v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (56 Wis. 569; 18 N. W. Rep. 458), 
 
 341. 
 Scharf v. Southern 111., etc., Co. (115 
 
 Mo. App. 157; 92 S. W. Rep. 126), 
 
 276. 
 Schaub V. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (106 
 
 Mo. 74; 16 S. W. Rep. 984), 400. 
 Schauk V. Northern C. R. Co. (26 Md. 
 
 468), 482. , 
 Scheffler v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. (32 
 
 Minn. 618; 21 N. W. Rep. 711; 19 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 173), 105. 
 Schermerhorn v. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (63 N. Y. S. 279; 33 App. Div. 17), 
 
 87. 
 Schilfler v. Chicago, etc., R'. Co. (96 
 
 Wis. 141; 71 N. W. Rep. 97; 8 Am. ' 
 
 &. Eng. R. Cas. [N. S.] 182), 789. 
 Schilling V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (71 
 
 Wis. 266; 37 N. W. Rep. 414; 40 N. 
 
 60) ^1092^"' ** '^'"' * '^"®" "*■ ''*'■ 
 Schilling v. Winona, etc., R. Co, (66 
 
 Minn. 268; 68 N. W. Rep. 1083), 725. 
 bchindler v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. (87 
 
 Mich. 400; 49 N. W. Rep. 670), 874. 
 Schlemmer v. Buffalo, etc., R. Cfo. (27 
 
 U. S. Sup. 407; 61 L. Ed. 689; 207 
 
 Pa. 198; 56 Atl. Rep. 417), 888. 
 Schlereth v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. 
 
 (96 Mo. 609), 846. 
 Schlereth v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. 
 
 (115 Mo. 87; 21 S. W. Rep. 1110), 
 
 Schmidt v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (88 111. 
 405), S. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 {References are to sections.] 
 
 Schmidt v, Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (191 
 
 Mo. '215; 90 S. W. Rep. 136), 1011. 
 Schmidt v. North Jersey R. Co. (66 N. 
 
 J. L. «4), 719. 
 Schmidt v. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (149 Pa. St. 357; 24 Atl. Rep. 218), 
 
 1027. 
 Schmolza v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. iSZ 
 
 Wis. 669; 53 N. W. Rep. 743; 54 N. 
 
 W. Hep. 106),' 1007. 
 Schonat^ v. Railroad Co. (160 Fa. St. 
 
 602^ 28 Atl. Rep. 958), 65. 
 Schneider v. American Bridge Co. (79 
 
 N. Y. S. 634; 78 App. Div. 163), 114. 
 Schneider & Co. v. Carlin (120 111. App. 
 
 538), 479. 
 Schneider v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. 
 
 (Mo., 94 S. W. Rep. 730), 208. 
 Schneider v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. 
 
 (75 Mo. 295), 946. 
 Schneider v. Second Avenue R. Co. (39 
 
 N. Y. S. R. 370), 637. 
 Schofield V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (2 
 
 McCrary [U. S.] 268), 995. 
 Schofield V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (114 
 
 U. S. 615; 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1125; 19 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. CTas. 358), 1006. 
 Scholes V. North London R. Co. (21 L. 
 
 T. 835), 170. 
 Schopman v, Boston, etc., R. Co. (9 Cush. 
 
 CMass.] 24),, 638. 
 Schroeder v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (41 
 
 Iowa 344; 47 Iowa 375), 604. 
 Schroeder v. Chicago, etc, R. Co. (108 
 
 Mo. 322: 18 S. W. Hep- 1094; 53 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. CalS. 436), 410. 
 Schron v. Staten Island R. Co. (16 
 
 App. Div. Ill; 45 N. Y. Supp. 124), 
 
 1049. 
 Schulte V. Louisville & N. R. Co. (108 
 
 S. W. Rep. 941), 919. 
 Schultz V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (48 Wis. 
 
 375; 4 N. W. TJep. 399), 475. 
 Schultz V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (Wis., 
 
 92 N. W. Rep. 377), 154. 
 Schultz V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (67 Wis. 
 
 616; 31 N. W. Rep. 321; 58 Am. Rep. 
 
 881; "88 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 404), 
 
 332. ( 
 
 Schultz V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (44 Wis. 
 
 638; 18 Am. Ry. Rep. 146), 399. 
 Schultz V. Chicago, etc., H. Co. (40 Wis. 
 
 589), 212. 
 Schultz V. Missouri Pac. H. Co. (32 Mo. 
 
 App. 438). 150. 
 Schultz V. Moon (33 Mo. App. 329), 
 
 1038. 
 Schultz a. Old Colony R. Co. (Mass., 
 . 79 N. E. Rep. 873; 8 L. R. A. [N. S.] 
 
 697), 1042. 
 Schultz V. Pacific R. Co.' (36 Mo. 13), 
 
 681. 
 Schultz V. Union, etc., R. Co. (181 N. 
 
 Y. 33; 73 N. E. Rep. 491), "98. 
 Schumaker v. St. Paul & D. R. Co. (46 
 
 Minn. 39; 48 N. W. Rep. 559; 18 L. 
 
 R. A. 267), 274. 
 Schutt I-. Cumberland Valley R. Co." (149 
 
 Pa. St. 266; 24 Atl. Rep. 305), 79S. 
 Schwab V. Railway Co. (106 Mo. 368), 
 
 265. 
 Schwanenfeldt v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (115 N. W. Rep. 885), 985. 
 
 Schwartz v. Hudson River Co. (4 Robt; 
 
 [N. Y.] 347), 931. 
 Schwartz v. Interborough Rapid Transit 
 ' Co. (103 N. Y. S. 80), 737. 
 Sehwarz v. Delaware, L. & W^ R. Co. 
 
 (67 Atl. Rej. 213), 97. 
 Scidmore v. Railroad (89 Wis. 188; 61 
 ■ N. W. Rep. 765), 369. 
 Scnllin v. Wabash R. Co. (184 Mo. 707; 
 
 83 S. W. Rep. 760), 1094. 
 Scully V. New York, etc., R. Co. (80 
 
 Hun 197; 61 N. Y. S. R. 804; 151 N. 
 
 Y. 678; 46 N. E. Rep. 1151), 789. 
 Scott V. Dock Co. (11 Jur. [N. S.] 1108), 
 
 665. 
 Scott V. London Dock (3 Hurl. & Colt. 
 
 596), 120. 
 Scott V. Oregon, etc., R. Co. (14 
 
 Oregon 211; 13 Pac. Rep. 98; 28 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 414), 345. 
 Scott V. Wilmington, etc., R. Co. (96 
 
 No. Car. 488; 2 S. E. Rep. 151), 
 
 1006. 
 Scott V. Woods (IS N. Y. Week. Dig. 
 
 441), 1069. 
 Seaboard Air Line v. Chapman (62 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 488), 1077. 
 Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Scarborough 
 
 (48 So. Rep. 706), 555. 
 Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Shanklin 
 
 (148 Fed. Rep. 342), 863. 
 Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Smith (43 So. 
 
 Rep. 235), 412. 
 Seaboard Air Line Ry. „. Smith (59 S. 
 „ E. Rep. 199), 731. 
 Seaboard, etc., R. Co. v. Spencer (111 
 
 Ga. 868; 36 S. E. Rep. 921), 33. 
 Seaboard, etc., R. Co. v. Woodson (98 
 
 Ala. 378; 11 So. Rep. 733), 178. 
 Scale V. Railroad Co. (65 Tex. 274), 88. 
 Seaman v. Koehler (182 N. Y. 646; 85 
 
 N. E. Rep. 353), 1050. 
 Searle v. Kanawha, etc., R. Co. (32 W. 
 
 Va. 370) 9 S. E. Rep. 848; 37 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 179), 593. 
 Searle v. Laverick (L. R., 9 Q. B. 182; 
 
 *3 L. J. Q. B. 43; 30 L. T. 89; 82 
 . W. R. 367), 652. 
 Searles v. Railway (101 N. Y. 662; 5 
 
 N. E. Rep. 66), 119. 
 Sears v. Eastern, etc., R. Co. (14 
 
 Allen [Mass.] 433), 102. 
 Sears v. Seattle, etc., R. Co. (Wash., 
 
 33 Pac. Rep. 390), 661. 
 Seaver ii. Boston, etc., R. Co. (14 Gray 
 
 [Mass.] 466), 568. 
 Seay v. Sanders (88 Mo. App. 478), 984. 
 Secord v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. (5 Mc- 
 Crary [U. S.] 515; 18 Fed. Rep. 221), 
 
 561. 
 Seefeld v. Chicago, itc, R. Co. (70 Wis. 
 
 216; 35 N. W. Rep. 878; 32 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 109), 991. 
 Seery v. Gulf, etc., Ry. Co. (Tex., 77 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 950), 317. 
 Seital V. Middlesex, etc., R. Co. (109 
 
 Mass. 398), 608. 
 Seiter v. Bischoff (63 Mo. App. 157), 
 
 IM. 
 Seldomridge v. Railway Co. (46 W. Va. 
 
 569), 368. 
 Selfey V. Railway Co. (6 Utah 319; 83 
 
 Pac!. Rep. 751), 378. 
 
 cxli 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED, 
 
 [References are to sections.'] 
 
 Self V. London, etc., R. Co. (48 L. T. 
 
 173), 81B. 
 Sellers v. Cleveland & St. L. Ry. Co. 
 
 (SI N. ,E. Hep. 1087), 718. 
 Selma, etc., R. Co. v. Lacey (49 Ga. 
 
 106), 44. 
 Selman v. Gulf, etc., R. Co. (101 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 1030), 788. 
 Sembler v. Cowperthwait (N, Y. Sup., 
 103 N. Y. S. 979; 63 Mjsc. Rep. 28), 
 206. 
 Senf V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (112 Mo. 
 
 App. 74; 86 S. W. Rep. 887), 557. 
 Seney v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (125 
 
 Iowa 290; 101 N. W. Rep. 76), 01. 
 Senior v. Ward (28 L. J. Q. B. 139), 6. 
 Senn v. Southern R. Co. (108 Mo. 142; 
 
 18 S. W. Rep. 1007), 92. 
 Serano v. New York, etc., R. Co. (80 
 
 N. E. Rep. 1025; 188 N. Y. 156), 982. 
 Serenson v. Northern Pac. R. Co. (45 
 
 Fed. Rep. 407), 68. 
 Setterstorm v. Railroad Co. (Minn., 14 
 
 Am. Neg. Rep. 106), 408.- 
 Severy v. Nicherson (120 Mass. 306; 21 
 
 Am. Rep. 514), 860. 
 Sevier v. Vicksburg, etc., R. Co. (61 
 
 Miss. 8; 48 Am. Rep. 74; 18 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 245), 705. 
 Sexton V. Turner, (89 Va. 341; 15 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 868), 396. 
 Seybolt v. New York, etc., R. Co. (95 
 
 N. Y. 562; 31 Hun 100; 47 Am. Rep. 
 
 76; 18 Am. & Eng." R. Cas. 162), 857. 
 Seymour v. Chicago, etc., R. C)o. C3 
 
 Biss. [U. S.] 43), 581. ' 
 
 Seymour v. Citizens Ry. Co. (114 Mo. 
 
 266; 81 S. W. Rep. 739), 678. 
 Shaber v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. (2 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 185; 28 Minn. 103; 9 
 
 N. W. Rep. 675), 917. 
 Shackelford v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (84 Ky. 43; 4 Am. St. Rep. 189; 88 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 591), 1079. 
 Shafer v. Lehigh Valley R. Co. (86 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 107,8), 923. 
 Shaffert V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (68 
 
 Iowa 624; 17 N. W. Rep. 893), 969. 
 Shandrew iv. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (143 
 
 Eed. Rep. 380; 73 C. C. A. 430), 118. 
 Shanks v. Springfield Traction Co. (101 
 
 Mo. Appi 708; 74 S. W. Rep. ' 386), 
 
 808. 
 Shannon v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (78 Me. 
 
 52; 3 Atl. Rep. 678; 83 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 511), 556. 
 Shannon's Admr. v. Louisville, etc., R. 
 
 Co. (Ky., 70 S. W. Rep. 626), 326. 
 Shareman v. Trahsit Co. (103 Mo. Add. 
 
 615; 78 S. W. Ren. 846), 666. 
 Sharp V. Gray (9 Bing. 467; 2 M. & 
 
 S. 621), 653. 
 Sharp I/. Railroad (161 Mo. 241), 408. 
 Shaw V. Bambrick Bates Co. (102 Mo. 
 
 App. 666; 77 S. W. Rep. 96), 87. 
 Shaw V Charleston (50 S. E. Rep. 
 
 627), 62. 
 Shaw V. Jewett (86 N. Y. 616; 6 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. Ill), 1000. 
 Shaw r. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (104 
 
 Mo. 648; 16 S. W. Rep. 842), 1067. 
 Shaw V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (123 
 
 cxlii 
 
 Mich. 639; 88 N. W. Rep. 618; 81 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 830; 49 L. R. A. 308), 
 
 677. 
 Shaw 7/. Salt Lake R. Co. (21 Utah 76), 
 
 398. 
 Shea V. New York, etc., R. Co. (173 
 
 Mass. 177; 63 N. E. Rep. 396), 510. 
 Shea V. Potrero, etc., R. Co. (44 Cal. 
 
 414; 5 Am. Ry. Rep. 448), 180. 
 Sheehan v. New York, etc^ R. Co. (91 
 
 N. Y. 338; 13 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 835), 475. 
 Sheffield v. Rochester, etc., R. Co. (31 
 
 Barb. [N. Y.] 339), 1035. 
 Sheffler v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. (38 
 
 Minn. 518; 21 N. W. Rep. 711; 19 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. ITS), 1082. 
 Shelby v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. (85 Ky. 
 
 284; 3 S. W. Rep. 167), 967. 
 Shemwell v. Owensboro, etc., Ry, Co. 
 
 (Ky., 78 S. W. Rep. 448), 375. 
 Shenandoah Valley, etc., R. Co. v. Lu- 
 
 cado's Admr. (86 Va. 390; 10 S. E.- 
 
 Rep. 423), 863. 
 Shenandoah Valley R. Co. zi. Moose (88 
 
 Va. 837), 771. 
 Shepard v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (158 
 
 Mass. 174; 33 N. E. Rep. 508), 495. 
 Shepard v. Buffalo, etc., R. Co. (35 N. 
 . Y. 641), 602. 
 Shepard v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (86 
 
 Mo. 629; 56 Am. Rep. 390), 93. 
 Shepard v. New York, etc., R. Co. (44 
 
 N. Y. S. R. 816; 63 Hun 634; 18 N. 
 
 Y. Supp. 666), 148. 
 Shepard v. St. Louis Tr. Co. (189 Mo. 
 
 362; 87 S. W. Rep. 1007), 373. 
 Sheridan v. Brooklyn, etc., R. Co. (36 
 
 N. Y. 39; 34 How. Pr. 317), 769. 
 Sheridan v. Interborough Rapid Transit 
 
 Co. (100 N. Y. S. 831), 855. 
 Sherley v. Billings (8 Bush. [Ky.] 147), 
 
 Sherman v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (78 
 
 Mo. 62; 37 Am. Rep. 483; 4 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 689), 561. 
 Sherman v. Railroad Co. (34 Minn. 269: 
 
 25 N. W. Rep. 593), 335. 
 Sherman v. Rochester, etc., R. Co (17 
 
 N. Y. 153), 491. 
 Sherman v. Stage Co. (24 Iowa 615). 
 
 800. 
 Sherman v. Toronto, etc., R. Co. (34 N. 
 
 C. Q. B. 451), 568. 
 Sherman v. Western Stage Co. (84 Iowa 
 
 515), 305. 
 Sherry I/. New York, etc., R. Co. (104 
 
 N. Y. 663), 394. 
 Sherrin v. St. Joseph, etc., R. Co. (103 . 
 
 Mo. 878; 15 S. W. Rep. 443), 469. 
 t)her*ood v. Chicago; etc., R. Co, (83 
 
 Mich. 374; 46 N. W. kep. 773; 44 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 337), 175. 
 Shields V. Kansas City, etc., Ry. Co. 
 
 87 Mo. App. 687), 323. 
 Shields V. New York, etc., R. Co. (4 
 
 Silv. App. 162; SO N. E. Rep. 696), 
 
 ^H'^\,^- J^''^^'^° Co. (173 Mass. 558; 
 
 54 N. E. Rep. 245), 308. 
 Shmners v. Prof. Locks, etc., Co. (154 
 
 Mass. 168; 12 L. R. A. 554), 94. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.] 
 
 Sbippy V. Au Sable (85 Mich. 380; 18 
 
 N. W. Rep. 684), 1058. 
 Shoemaker v, Bryant Lumber, etc., Co. 
 
 (27 Wash. 637), 108. 
 Shoemaker v. Kingsbury (12 Wall. [U. 
 
 S.] 369), 551. 
 Shoner v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (130 
 
 Ind. 170j 28 N. E. Rep. 616; 29 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 775), 408. 
 Shore v. Bridge Co. (Mo., 86 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 905), 360. 
 Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Johnson (135 111. 
 
 641; 86 N. E. Rep. 610; 36 111. App. 
 
 430), 931. 
 Shouler v. Omaha, etc., Ry. Co. (87 Mo. 
 
 App. 624), 608. 
 Shufelt V. Flint, etc., R. Co. (96 Mich. 
 
 327; 65 N. W. Rep. 1013), 1021. 
 Shuler v. Omaha, etc., R. Co. (87 Mo. 
 
 App. 633), 116. 
 Shumaker v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. (46 
 
 Minn. 39; 48 N. W. Rep. 559), 37. 
 Shunl's Admx. v. Rutland R. Co. (69 
 
 Atl. Rep. 945), 1032. 
 Shuster v. Philadelphia B. & W. R. Co. 
 
 (Del., 62 Atl. Rep. 689), 264. 
 Sibley v. Ratcliff (60 Ark. 477; 8 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 686; 37 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 296), 
 
 1083. 
 Sidekum v. Wabash, etc., R. Co. (93 
 
 Mo. 400; 4 S. W. Rep. 701; 30 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 640), 83. 
 Siefka v. Manhattan R. Co. (27 J. & 
 
 S. 444; 39 N. Y. S. R. 366), 166. 
 Siegel, (Jooper & Co. v. Trecka (116 111. 
 
 App. 66; 76 N. E. Rep. 1053), 20. 
 Siegel V. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. (79 
 
 Wis. 404; 48 N. W. Rep. 488), 1012. 
 Sievers v. Eyre (122 Fed. Rep. 734), 
 
 534. 
 Sigman v. Southern Ry. Co. (136 N. 
 
 C. 181; 47 S. E. Rep. 420), 536. 
 Simeone v. Lindsay (65 Atl. Rep. 778), 
 
 181. ' 
 Simkoff V. Lehigh Valley R. Co. (83 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 15; 190 N. Y. 266), 1036. 
 Simmons v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (110 
 
 111. 340; 18 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 60), 
 
 399. 
 Simmons v, Louisville, etc., R. Co. (Ky., 
 
 18 S. W. Rep. 10240, 328. 
 Simmons v. Southern Tr. Co. (207 Pa. 
 
 St. 589; 57 Atl. Rep. 46), 341. 
 Simonds v. Georgia Iron Co. (133 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 776), 109. 
 Simpson v. Manhattan, etc., R. Co. (17 
 
 K. Y. S. «. 68; 1 N. Y. Supp. 
 
 673), 94. 
 Sims V. East, etc., R. Co. (84 Ga. 152; 
 
 10 S. E. Rep. 543), 308. 
 Sims V. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. (116 
 
 Mo. App. 672; 92 S. W. Rep. 909), 
 
 1003. 
 Simms v. South Carolina, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (27 Sa Car. 268; 3 S. E. Rep. 301 ; 
 
 30 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 571), 713. 
 Sinclair v, Chicago, etc., R. Co. (133 
 
 Mo. 233; 34 S. W. Rep. 76), 1061. 
 Sinclair, etc., Co. v. Waddle (200 111. 
 „.17; 66 JJ. E. Rep.. 437), 154. 
 Sioux City, etc., R. Co. v. Finlayson (16 
 
 Neb. 678; 49 Am. Rep. 724), 419. 
 Sioux City, etc., R. Co. v. Stout (17 
 
 Wall. 667; 21 L. Ed. 745), 1073. 
 Sipple zi. Laclede Gaslight Co. (102 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 608), 204. 
 Sira V. Wabash R. Co. (115 Mo. 127; 
 
 SI S^ W. Rep. 906; 68 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 688), 746. 
 Sites V. Knott (96 S. W. Rep. 206), 883. 
 Sizer v. Syracuse, etc.J R. Co. (7 Lans. 
 
 [N. Y.] 67), 464. 
 Skidmore v. West Virginia, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (W. Va., 23 S. E. Rep. 713), 363. 
 Skiles V. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. (108 
 
 S. W. Rep. 1082), 835. 
 Skinner v. Atchison, etc., R. Co. (39 
 
 Fed. Rep. 188), 702. 
 Skinner v. Central Vt. Ry. Co. (73 Vt 
 
 336; 50 Atl. Rep. 1099), 330. 
 Skinner v. Railroad Co. (6 Exch. 786), 
 
 122. 
 Skipp V. Eastern, etc., Ry. Co. (9 Ex. 
 
 228; 23 L. J. Ex. 23; 3 C. L. R. 
 
 186), 146. 
 Skipton V. St. Joseph; etc., R. Co. (82 
 
 Mo. App. 134), 883. 
 Skirvin v. L. & N. R. R. (100 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 308; 30 Ky. Law Rep. 1208), 
 
 414. 
 Skottowe V, Oregon, etc., R. Co. (23 
 
 Oregon 430; 30 Pac. Rep. 222; 16 L. 
 
 R. A. 693), 625. 
 Slack V. Northern Central R. Co. (25 
 
 Md. 462), 461. 
 Slanahan v. Transit Co. (109 Mo. App. 
 
 228; S3 S. W. Rep. 788), 695. 
 Slater v. Burlington, etc., R. Co. (71 
 
 Iowa 209; 32 N. W. Rep. 264), 1068. 
 Slater v.. Jewett (85 N. Y. 61; 39 Am. 
 
 Rep. 627; 6 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 515), 
 
 488. 
 Slater v. Mexican Nat. R. Co. (115 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 59,3; 63 C. C. A. 239; 194 U. S. 
 
 120; 48 L. Ed. 900), 50. 
 Slatten v. Des Moines, etc., R. Co. (28 
 
 Iowa 148), 166. 
 Slatterly v. New York, etc., R. Co. (21 
 
 N. y. S. R. 552; 61 Hun 638; i 
 
 N. Y. Supp. 910), 466. 
 Slattery v. Toledo, etc., R. Co. (23 Ind. 
 
 81), 600. 
 Slaughter v. Metropolitan R. Co. (116 
 
 Mo. 269; 23 S. W. Rep. 760; 58 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 604), 185. 
 Slavens v. Northern Pac. R. Co. (97 
 
 Fed. Rep. 256; 38 C. C. A. 151), 317. 
 Slavin v. New York, etc., R. Co. (63 
 
 Conn. 673), 401. 
 Sleete v. Great Northern R. Co. (53 
 
 Minn. 341; 65 N. W. Rep. 137), 476. 
 Slema, etc., R. Co. v. Lacy (43 Ga. 
 
 Sliney v. Duluth. etc., R. Co. (46 Minn. 
 
 384; 49 N. W. Rep. 187), 347. 
 Sloan V. Georgia, etc., R. Co. (86 Ga. 
 
 15; 12 S. E. Rep. 179), 263. 
 Sloss-Sheffield Co. v. Mobley (139 Ala. 
 
 425; 3« So. Rep. 181). 162. 
 Sluder v. Transit Co. (189 Mo. 107: 88 
 
 S. W. Rep. 648; 6 L. R.. A. [N. S.] 
 
 186), 1039. 
 
 cxliii 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 IReferences are to sections.} 
 
 Sly V. Edgley (6 Esp. 6), 378. 
 
 Sly V. Union Depot Ry. Co. (134 Mo. 
 
 681; 86 S. W. Rep. 2S6). 692. 
 Smallwood v. Baltimore & O. R.Co. (64 
 
 Atl. Rep. 788; 215 Pa. 640), 600. 
 Smkllwood t. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. (20 
 
 Am. Neg. Rep. 718), 666. 
 Smedis v. Brooklyn, etc., R. Co. (88 
 
 N. Y. 18; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 446), 
 
 973. 
 Smith V. Atchison, etc., R. Co. (122 Mo. 
 
 App. 86), 171. 
 Smith V. Atlanta, etc^ R. Co. (130 N. 
 
 C. 844; 42 S. E. Rep. 139), 236. 
 Smith V. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. (158 
 
 Pa. St. 82; 27 Atl. Rep. 847), 1014. 
 Smith J/. Benick (87 Md. 610; 41 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 59; 42 L. R. A. 277), 284. 
 Smith V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (73 N. 
 
 H. 326; 61 Atl. Rep. 359), 273. 
 Smith I/. Box Co. (193 Mo. 716; 92 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 394), 269. 
 Smith V. Burlington, etc., R. Co. (59 
 
 Iowa 73; 12 N. W. Rep. 763; 6 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 149), 622. 
 Smith V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (108 Mo. 
 
 243; 18 S. W. Rep. 971; 52 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 483), 664. 
 Smith V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (56 Iowa 
 
 33; 7 N. W. Rep. 398), 804. 
 Smith V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (91 Wis. 
 
 603; 65 N. W. Rep. 183), 494. 
 Smith V. Citizens R. Co. (52 Mo; App. 
 
 36), 1003. 
 Smith V. Electric Co. (188 Mass. 371; 74 
 
 N. E. Rep. 664), 271. 
 Smith V. Empire State M. & D. Co. (127 
 
 Fed. Rep. 462), 40. 
 Smith V. Erie R. Co. (67 N. J. L. 636; 
 
 52 Atl. Rep. 634), 367. 
 Smith V. Fordyce (190 Mo. 1; 88 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 679) 249. 
 Smith V. Great Eastern, etc., R. Co. (L. 
 
 R., 2 C. P. 4), 766. 
 Smith V. Gulf, etc., R. Co. (Tex., 65 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 83), 79. 
 Smith V. Hestonville, etc., R. Co. (92 
 
 Pa. St. 460), 1058. 
 Smith V. Humeston, etc., R. Co. (78 
 
 Iowa 588; 43 N. W. Rep. 545; 41 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 278), 622. 
 Smith V. Irwin (61 N. J. L. 607; 18 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 852), 801. 
 Smith V. Lancashire, etc., R. Co. (1 Q. 
 
 B. 141; 79 L. T. [N. S.] 633; 68 L. 
 
 J. Q. B. 61; 47 Weekly Rep. 146), 
 
 227. 
 Smith V. Los Angeles, etc., R. (98 Cal. 
 
 210), 22. 
 Smith V. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (124 
 
 Ind. 394: 24 N. E. Rep. 753), 829. 
 Smith 1/. L. & S. W. R. Co. (L. R., 
 
 6 C. P. 14), 23. 
 Smith V. Maine, etc., R. Co. (87 Me. 
 
 339; 32 Atl. Rep. 967), 1039. 
 Smith V. Manhattan R. Co. (45 N. Y. 
 
 S. R. 865), 728. 
 Smith V. Memphis, etc., R. Co. (18 
 
 Fed. Rep. 304), 469. 
 Smith V. Michigan Central R. Co. (73 
 
 N. E. Ren. B28), 67. 
 Smith V. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. (32 
 
 Minn. 1), 666. 
 
 cxliv 
 
 Smith *. Minneapolis, etc, R. Co. (32 
 
 Minn. 1), 641. 
 Smith V. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co, 
 
 (96 Fed. Rep. 604), 231. 
 Smith V. New York, etc., R. Co. (11 
 
 N. Y. S. R. 795; 46 Hun 679), 1029. 
 Smith V. New York, etc., R. Co. (44 
 
 N. Y. S. R. 66; 63 Hun 624 j 137 N. 
 
 Y. 668), 418. 
 Smith zi. New York, etc., R. Co. (4 App. 
 
 Div. 493; 88 N. Y. Supp. 666; 89 
 
 N. Y. Sujjp. 1119), 1051. 
 Smith V. New York, etc., R. Co. (38 
 
 Hun [N. Y.] 33), 1039. 
 Smith V. Norfolk, etc., R. Co. (114 No. 
 
 Car. 788; 60 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 102), 861. 
 Smith V. North Carolina (N. C, 61 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 866), 708. 
 Smith V. Peninsular Car Works (60 
 
 Mich. 501; 27 N. W. Rep. 662; 1 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 642), 406. 
 Smith V. Potter (46 Mich. 258; 9 N: W. 
 
 Rep. 273), 268. 
 Smith V. Potter (46 Mich. 258; 9 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 873; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 140), 462. 
 Smith V. Railway Co. (113 Mo. 70; 20 
 
 S. W. Rep. 896), 119. 
 Smith V. Railway Co. (48 L. R. A. 392), 
 
 262. 
 Smith V. Railway Co. (42 Wis. 620), 
 
 266. 
 Smith V. Rock Island & L. Co. (44 So. 
 
 Rep. 290), 466. 
 Smith V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (151 
 
 Mo. 391; 52 S. W. Rep. 378; 14 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. [N. S.] 609), 493. 
 Smith V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (9 Mo. 
 
 App. 598: 85 Mo. 418), 811. 
 Smith V. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. (30 
 
 9 Am. 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 Minn. 169; 
 
 862), 30. 
 Smith V. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. (44 
 
 Minn. 17; 46 N. W. Rep. 149), 527. 
 Smith V. Savannah, etc., R. Co. (84 Ga, 
 
 698: 42 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 105; 11 
 
 S. E. Rep. 456), 153. 
 Smith V. Simmons (103 Pa. St. 32; 49 
 
 Am. Rep. 113), 276. 
 Smith V. Sioux City R. Co. (15 Neb. 
 
 583; 19 N. W. Rep. 688; 17 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 561), 486. 
 Smith V. Texas & Pac. R. Co. (68 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 151), 39. 
 Smith V. Thomas, etc., Co. (N. J., 64 
 
 Atl. Ren. 562), 308. 
 Smith V. Union Ry. Co. (61 Mo. 588), 
 
 388 
 Smith V. Wabash R. Co. (92 Mo. 369; 
 
 4 S. W. Rep. 129; 81 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 331), 488. 
 Smith V. Wabash, etc., R. Co. (19 Mo. 
 
 App. 120), 106. 
 Smith V. Wilmington, etc., R. Co. (129 
 
 N. C. 178; 39 S. E. Rep. 806), 379. 
 Smith V. Winonsf, etc., R. Co. (42 Minn. 
 
 87; 43 N. W, Rep. 968; 41 Am. & 
 
 Erig. R. Cas. 289), 386. 
 Smotherman v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (29 Mo. App. 266), 670. 
 Smithers v. Wilmington City Ry. Co. 
 
 (67 Atl. Rep. 167), 634. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.^ 
 
 Smith's Adrar. v. Illinois, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (90 S. W. Rep. 264; 88 Ky. Rep. 
 
 723), 1067. 
 Smithson v. Southern, etc., R. Co. (37 
 
 Oregon 74; 60 Pac. Rep. 907), 708. 
 Smoot V. Mobile, etc., R. Co. (67 Ala. 
 
 13), 461. 
 Snellen v. Kansas, etc., R. Co. (Ark., 
 
 102 S. W. Rep. 193), 265. 
 Snibere v. Falk (98 Mo. App. 646; 72 
 
 S. W. Rep. 947), 162. 
 Snoniker v. Great Northern R. Co. (76 
 
 Minn. 306), 398. 
 Snow V. Fitchburg, etc., R. Co. (136 
 
 Mass. 558; 49 Am. Rep. 40; 18 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 161), 628. 
 Snow V. Housatonic R. Co. (8 AUefl 
 
 [Mass.] 447), 340. 
 Snow V. New York, etc., R. Co. (185 
 
 Mass. 321; 70 N. E. Rep. 205), 39. 
 Snowden v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (151 
 
 Mass. 220; 24 N. E. Rep. 40), 774. 
 Snyder v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (60 
 
 Mo. 413; Eaton v. New York, etc., R. 
 
 Co., 57 N. Y. 382), 698. 
 Snyder v. Natchez, etc., R. Co. (42 La. 
 
 Ann. 302; 7 So. Rep. 582; 44 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 278), 553. 
 Snyder v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (205 Pa. 
 
 619; 55 Atl. Rep. 778), 260. 
 Snyder v. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. (11 W. 
 
 Va. 14; 18 Am. Ry. Ren. 154), 388. 
 Snyder v. Wheeling, etc., R. Co. (43 W.' 
 
 Va. 661; 28 S. E. Rep. 733; 39 L. 
 
 R. A. 499), 110. 
 Sobieski v. St. Paul, etc^ R. Co. (41 
 
 Minn. 169; 42 N. W. Rep. 863), 90. 
 Soeder v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (100 
 
 Mo. 678; 13 S. W. Rep. 714), 406. 
 Soldanels v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. 
 
 (23 Mo.' App. 516), 301. 
 Solen V. Virginia, etc., R. Co. (13 Nev. 
 
 106), 955. 
 Solomon R. Co. v. Jones (30 Kan. 601; 
 
 2 Pac. Rep. 657; 15 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 201), 623. 
 Soloman v. Manhattan R. Co. (103 N. 
 
 Y. 437; 9 N. E. Rep. 430; 56 Am. 
 
 Rep. 843; 27 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 165), 783. 
 Somonson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (49 
 
 Iowa 87), 186. 
 Songstad v. Burlington, etc., R. Co. (5 
 
 Dak. 617; 41 N. W. Rep. 755; 38 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 211), 323. 
 Sonneborn, etc., Co. v. Southern R. Co. 
 
 (66 S. C:. 602; 44 S. E. Rep.' 77), 32. 
 Soule V. New York, etc., R. Co. (24 
 
 Conn. 575), 69. 
 Soutar V. Electric R. Co. (68 Minn. 
 
 18), 159. 
 South Alabama R. Co. v. Sullivan (59 
 
 Ala. 278), 456. 
 South Carolina R. Co. v. Nix (68 Ga. 
 
 672), 47. 
 South Covington R. Co. v. Berry (93 
 
 Ky. 43; 18 S. W, Rep. 1026; 60 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. igi), 934. 
 South Covington R. Co. v. Cleveland 
 
 (100 S. W. Rep. 283), 177. 
 South Covington R. Co. v. Ware (84 
 
 Ky. 267; 1 S. W. Rep. 493; 27 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. C*6. 206), 185. 
 
 South Florida R. Co. v. Price (38 Fla. 
 
 46; 13 So. Rep. 638), 815. 
 South Florida R. Co. v. Rhodes' (85 
 
 Fla. 40; 5 So. Rep. 633; 3 L. R. A. 
 
 733; 37 Am. & Eng. R. C;as. 100), 668, 
 South Florida R. Co. v. Weese (32 I'la. 
 
 818; 13 So. Rep. 436), 340. 
 South Indiana R. Co. v. Harrell (Ind., 
 
 68 N. E. Rep. 262), 604. 
 South Side, etc., R. Co. v. Trick (117 
 
 Pa. 390; 11 Atl. Rep. 627), 36. 
 South, etc., R. Co. v. Donovan (84 Ala. 
 
 141; 4 So. Rep. 142; 36 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 151), 1016. - 
 South, etc., R. Co. v. Huffman (76 Ala. 
 
 492; 52 Am. Rep. 349), 854. 
 South, etc., R. Co. v. Schauffer (75 Ala. 
 
 136; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 405), 791. 
 South, etc., R. Co. v. Thompson (62 
 
 Ala. 494), 988. 
 Southcote V. Stanley (1 Hurl. & N. 247), 
 
 860. 
 Southeast, etc., R. Co. v. Stotler (43 
 
 111. App. 94), 1092. 
 Southerland v. Troy, etc., R. Co. (28 N. 
 
 Y. S. R. 201; 126 N. Y. 737; 54 Hun 
 
 639), 146. 
 Southern Kansas E. Co. v. Crocker (41 
 
 Kan. 747; 21 Pac. Rep. 786; 38 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 203}, 376. 
 Southern Kansas R. Co. v. Moore (49 
 
 Kan. 616; 31 Pac. Rep. 138), 345. 
 Southern Kansas R. Co. v, Peavey (4^ 
 
 Kan. 462: 29 Pac. Rep. 593), 787. 
 Southern Kan. R. R. v. Robbins (43 
 
 Kan. 145; 23 Pac. 113), 95. 
 Southern Kansas, etc., R. Co. v. Sage 
 
 (80 S. W. Rep. 1038), 229. 
 Southern Kansas R. Co. v, Sanford (45 
 
 Kan. 372; 25 Pac. Rep. 891; 47 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 615), 1088. 
 Southern Kansas R. Co. v. ' Walsh (45 
 
 Kan. 653; 26 Pac. Rep. 46; 47 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 493), 594. 
 Southern Ohio R. -Co. v. Morey (47 Ohio 
 
 St. 207; 24 N. E. Rep. 869; 7 L. R. 
 
 A. 701; 43 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 97), 
 
 284. 
 Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Gloyd (Utah, 
 
 138 Fed. Rep. 388), 342. 
 Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Hetzer (135 
 
 Fed. Rep. 272; 68 C. C. A. 26), 85. 
 Southern Pacific R, Co. v. Lafferty (57 
 
 Fed. Rep. 536), 401. 
 Southern Pacific R. Co. v. Pool (160 U. 
 
 S. 438), 865. 
 Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Seley (168 U. 
 
 S. 145; 38 L. Ed. 391), 325. 
 Southern Pacific R. Co. v. Winton (Tex., 
 
 66 S. W. Rep. 477), 378. 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Stanford's Admr. 
 
 (64 S. E. Rep. 1), 83. 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Blevins (130 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 688), 521. 
 Southern R. Co. v. Bonner (141 Ala. 
 
 617; 37 So. Rep. 708), 100. 
 Southern, etc., Co. v. Bradley (58 Tex. 
 
 587), 800. 
 Southern Ry. Co. %■. Brewer (105 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 160), 607. 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Burgess (42 So. 
 
 Rep. 35), 562. 
 Southern Ry. Co. ^■. Carson (68 G. C, 
 
 cxlv 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to seetions.] 
 
 56; 48 S. E. Rep. 526; 194 U. S. 136; 
 
 48 L. Ed. 907), 385. 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Cheaves (36 So. 
 
 Reo. 691), 528. 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Clark (Ky., 105 
 
 S. W. Rep. 385), 414. 
 Southern R. Co. v. Clifford (110 Ky. 
 
 727; 62 S. W. Rep. 614), 600. 
 Southern, etc., R. Co. v. Cook (121 
 
 Ga. 416; 49 S. E. Rep. 287), 328. 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Craig (113 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 76), 273. 
 Southern, etc., R. Co. v. CuUen (122 111. 
 
 App. 293; 77 N. E. Rep. 470; 221 111. 
 
 392), 667. 
 Southern Ry. Co. >/. Cunningham (123 
 
 Ga. 90; 50 S. E. Rep. 979), 122. 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Cunningham (44 
 
 So. Kep. 658), 583. 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Elliott (82 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 1061; 81 N. E. Rep. 1180), 492. 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Fisk (159 I<ed. 
 
 Rep. 373), 878. 
 Southern R. Co. v. Flynt (58 S. E. Rep. 
 
 374), 964. 
 Southern Ry. Co. i/. GuUatt (43 So. Rep. 
 
 577), 412. 
 Southern R. Co. v. Guyton (122 Ala. 
 
 231; 25 So. Rep. 34), 227. 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Hansbrough's 
 
 Admx. (60 S. E. Rep. 68), 878. 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Harrell (161 Ind. 
 ,689; 63 L. R. A. 460; 68 N. E. Rep. 
 
 262), 381. 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Hart (23 Ky. L. 
 
 R. 1054; 64 S. W. Rep. 650), 379. 
 Southern Ry. Co. *. Hobbs (43 So. Rep. 
 
 844), 955. 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Holbrook (124 Ga. 
 
 679), 39. 
 Southern R. Co. v. Jones (56 S. E. Rf- 
 
 155), 1019. 
 Southern R. Co. v. Kendrick (46 So. 
 
 Rep. 588), 879. 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. E^ing (57 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 687), 1056. 
 Southern, etc., R. Co. v. Kinsdale (38 
 
 Kan. 507; 16 Pac. Rep. 937; 34 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 256), .659. 
 Southern Ry. Co. z: Lambert (116 111. 
 
 App. 52), 358. 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Lee (101 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 307), 669. 
 Southern Ry. Co. i/. Logan (S. C, 138 
 
 Fed. Rep. 725), 351. 
 South, etc., R. Co. v. McLendon (63 
 
 Ala. 266), 182. 
 Southern R. Co. v. Mitchell (98 Tenn. 
 
 27; 40 S. W. Rep. 72), 708. 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Morris (42 So. 
 
 Rep. 19), 904. 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Mouchet (59 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 927), 909. 
 Southern, etc., R. Co. v. Nix (68 Ga. 
 
 572), 38. 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Otis' Admr. (78 
 
 S. W. Rep. 480; 25 Ky. L. R. 1686), 
 
 269. 
 Southern R. Co. z: Prather (119 Ala. 
 
 688; 24 So. Rep. 836; 14 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. [N. S.] 832), 38. 
 Southern Ry. v. Reynolds (55 S. E. Rep. 
 
 1039), 889. 
 
 cxlvi 
 
 Southern R. Co. v. Rice (38 Kan. 398; 
 
 16 Pac. Rep. 817), 732. 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Roach (78 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 201), 777. 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Sandford (45 Kan. 
 
 372; 86 Pac. Rep. 891; 11 L. R. A. 
 
 432), 73S. 
 Southern Railway Co. v. Simmons (105 
 
 Va. 651; 55 S. E. Rep. 469), 545. 
 Southern R. Co. v. Simpson <1S1 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 705; 65 C. C. A. 563), 94. 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Sittasen (Ind. App., 
 
 74 N. E. Rep. 898), 235. 
 Southern" Ry. Co. v. Smith (59 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 372), 484. 
 Southern Ry. Co. zf. Stewart (45 So. 
 
 Rep. 51), 1082. 
 Southern R. Co.- v. Stewart (108 111. 
 
 App. 652), 87. 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Stockdon (58 S. E. 
 
 -ep. 713). 411. 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Stutts (Ala., 144 
 
 Fed. Rep. 948), 389. 
 South, etc., Co. V. Sullivan (69 Ala. 
 
 272), 458. 
 Southern R. Co. v. Thomas (Ky., 92 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 578), 414. 
 Southern R. Co. v. Webb (116 Ga. 152; 
 
 42 S. E. Rep. 395; 59 L. R. A. 109), 
 
 25. 
 Southern R. Co. Z'. Wiley (Miss., 41 So. 
 
 Rep. 511), 271. 
 Southern R. Co. v. Williams (Miss., 36 
 
 So. Rep. 394X 715. 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Winchester's Ex. 
 
 (105 S. W. Rep. 167), 947. 
 Southwestern R. Co. v. Paulk (24 Ga. 
 
 356), 792. 
 Southwestern, etc., Co. v. Woughter (56 
 
 Ark. 206; 19 S. W. Rep. 575), 321. 
 Southwestern R. Co. v. Singleton (67 
 
 Ga. 306), 807. 
 Southwestern R. Co. v. Singleton (66 
 
 Ga. 252), 772. 
 Sowden v. Idaho, etc., Co. (55 Cal. 
 
 443), 359. 
 Spain z>. St. Louis & San Francisco R. 
 
 R. Co. (64 Cent. Law J. 269), 449. 
 Spanake v. Philadelphia, etc., R. ■ Co. 
 
 (148 Pa. St. 184; 23 Atl. Rep. 1006), 
 
 495. 
 Spangler v. B. & O. R. Co. (213 Pa. 
 
 320 ( 62 Atl. Rep. 919), 266. 
 Spangler v. St. Joseph, etc., R. Co. (68 
 
 Kan. 47; 74 Pac. Rep. 607; 104 i^im. 
 
 St. Rep. 391; 63 L. R. A. 034), 752. 
 Spannagle z/. Chicaeo, etc., R. Co. (31 
 
 111. App. 460), 869. 
 Sparks v. Kansas City S. & M. R. Co. 
 
 (31 Mo. App. Ill), 304. 
 Spaulding v. Metropolitan R. Co. (129 
 
 Mo. App. 607; 111 S. W. Rep. 960), 
 
 Spear v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (119 Pa. 
 
 St. 68), 609. 
 Speed V. Atl. & Pac. R. R. Co. (71 Mo. 
 
 303; 2 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 77), 235. 
 Spellman v. Lincoln, etc., R. Co. (36 
 
 Neb. 890; 58 A^. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 297; 56 N. W. Rep. 270), 580. 
 Spellman v. Transit Co. (36 Neb. 890: 
 
 55 N. W. Rep. 270; 58 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 297), 581. , 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.] 
 
 Spencer v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. (4 
 
 Mackey [D. C] 138; 64 Am. Rep. 
 
 369) 398 
 Spencer n. 'Brooks (97 Ga. 681 j 26 S. 
 
 £. Rep: 480; 6 Am. & £ng. R. Gas. 
 
 [N. S.] ?08), 491. 
 Spencer v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (105 
 
 Wis. 311; 81 N. W. Rep. 407), 759. 
 Spencer v. Illinois, etc., R. Co. (29 Iowa 
 
 298), 946. 
 Spencer v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co.' (17 
 
 Wis. 487), 802. • 
 Spencer v. New York, etc., R. Co; (51 
 
 N. Y. S. R. 386;, 67 Hun 196), 336. 
 Spencer v. Ohio, etc., R. Co. (130 Ind. 
 
 181; 29 N. E. Rep. 915), 415. 
 Spencer v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. (21 
 
 Minn. 362), 186. 
 Spicer v, Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. (34 
 
 W. Va. 514; 12 S. E. Rep. 563; 46 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 28), 1077. 
 Spilane v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (135 
 
 Mo. 414; 37 S. W. Rep. 198; 58 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 580), 934. 
 Spillane v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (Ill 
 
 Mo. 555; 20 S. W. Rep. 293), 1036. 
 Spisak V. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. (152 
 
 Pa. St. 281; 25 Atl. Rep. 497), 540. 
 Spiva V. Osage Coal, etc., Co. (88 Mo. 
 
 68), 6. 
 Spohn V. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (87 
 
 Mo. 74; 101 Mo. 417; 14 S. W. Rep. 
 
 880), 740. 
 Spooner v. Brooklyn City R. Co. (54 
 
 N. Y. 230; 13 Am. Rep. 570), 1041. 
 Spooner v. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (116 
 
 N. Y. 22; 2i N. E. Rep. 696: 41 Hun 
 
 643; 39 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 599), 915. 
 Spoonick v. Backus-Brooks Co. (89 
 
 Minn. 364), 109. 
 Spotts V. Wabash Ry. Co. (Ill Mo. 
 
 380; 20 S. W. Rep. 190; 33 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 631), 866. 
 Sprague v. Smith (29 Vt. 421), 811. 
 Spring Valley Co. v. Patting (111., 71 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 371), 606. 
 Spring Valley Co. v. Robias (207 111. 
 
 226; 69 N. E. Rep. 926), 161. 
 Spring Valley Coal Co. v. Rowatt (196 
 
 111. 166; 63 N. E. Rep. 649), 620. 
 Springer v. Ford (189 111. 430; 69 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 953; 52 L. R. A. 930; 82 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 464), 120. 
 Springer Trans. Co. v. Smith (16 Lea 
 
 [Tenn.] 498; 1 S. W. Rep. 280), 574. 
 Springside Coal Co. v. Patting (111., 71 
 
 N. E. Rep. 371), 866. 
 Sprong V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (68 N. Y. 
 
 66; 9 Am. Ry. Rep. 475), 397. 
 Staal V. Grand Street R. Co. (107 N. 
 
 Y. 626; 13 N. E. Rep. 624; 31 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 21), 172. 
 Staal i: Grand Rapids R. Co. (67 Mich. 
 
 239; 23 N. W. Rep. 795), 203. 
 Stack V. New York, etc., R. Co. (89 
 
 N. Y. S. 112: 96 App. Div. 575), 88. 
 Stackpole v. Wray (74 App. Div. 310; 
 
 77 N. Y. Supp. 633), 119. 
 Stackus V. New York, etc., R. Co. (79 
 
 N. Y. 464; 7 Hun 559), 1025. 
 Staefller v. Menasha, etc., Co. (Ill Wis. 
 
 483; 87 N. W. Rep. 480), 55. 
 
 Stafford v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (114 
 
 111. 244; 2 N. E. Rep. 186), 340. 
 Stafford v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (23 
 
 Mo. App. 333), 626. 
 Stabler v. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. (199 
 
 Pa. St. 383: 49 Atl. Rep. 273), 66. 
 Stanley v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (112 
 
 Mo. App. 601; 87 S. W. Rep. 112), 
 
 176. 
 Stanton, etc., Co. v. Fischer (119 111. 
 
 App. 284), 56. 
 Stanton v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (91 
 
 Ala. 382), 886. 
 Stanley v. London, etc., R. Co. (4 H. & 
 
 C. 93; L. R., 1 Ex. 21; 11 Jur. [N. S.] 
 
 954; 35 L. J. Ex. 7; 14 W. R. 132; 
 
 13 L. T. 406), 919. 
 Starer v. Stem (100 App. Div. 393; 91 
 
 N. Y. Supp. 821), 119. 
 Starr v. Southern Ry. Co. (61 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 736), 872. 
 State V. Atchison, etc., R. Co. (150 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 442),. 646. 
 State V. Baltimore & O. R. Co. (30 Md. 
 
 47), 395. 
 State V. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. (69 
 
 Md. 839: 14 Atl. Rep. 688; 35 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 412), 966. 
 State V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (58 N. H. 
 
 410), 104. 
 State V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (80 Me. 
 
 430; 15 Atl. Rep. 36; 36 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 356), 919. 
 State V. Clark (29 N. J. L. 98), 14. 
 State V. Dusenberry (112 Mo. 278J. 98. 
 State V. East Orange (41 N. J. L. 127), 
 
 931. 
 State, ex rel, Delaware, etc., R. Co. v. 
 
 East Orange (41 N. J. L. 127), 934. 
 State, ex rel. Essex v. Kansas City, etc., 
 
 R. Co. (70 Mo. App. 634), 106. 
 State, ex rel. v. Missouri Pacific R. Co. 
 
 (149 Mo. J04; 50 S. W. Rep. 278), 
 
 960. 
 State V. Foley (144 Mo. 600), 98. 
 State V. Grand Trunk R. Co. (68 Me, 
 
 176; 4 Am. Rep. 258), 667. 
 State V. Greene (95 Md. 217; 52 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 673), 117. ' 
 
 State V. Hoopes (14 Atl. Rep. 658), 145. 
 State II. Julow (129 Mo. 163; 31 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 781; 29 L. R. A. 257; 60 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 443), 382. 
 State V. Loomis (115 Mo. 307; 22 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 350), 382. 
 State V. Maine, etc., R. Co. (76 Me. 
 
 357; 49 Am. Rep. 622; 19 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 312), 1029. 
 State V. Manchester, etc., R. Co. (52 
 
 N. H. 628, 552), 20. 
 State V. Missouri Fir, etc., Co. (181 
 
 Mo. 636; 80 S. W. Rep. 933), 382. 
 State !■. Overton (24 N. J. L. 435), 263. 
 State V. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. (47 
 
 Md. 76; 18 Am. Ry. Rep. 253), 936. 
 State V. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. (Md., 
 
 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 481), 1067. 
 State V. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. (45 Md. 
 
 41), 49. 
 State V. Railway Co. (67 Me. 479), 236. 
 State V. St. Joseph, etc., R. Co. (46 
 
 Mo. App. 466), 960. 
 
 cxlvii 
 
TABLE OF CAS3ES CITED. 
 
 [Beferenees are to sections.] 
 
 State V. South Baltimore Car Works 
 
 (Md., 68 Atl. Rep. 447), 852. 
 State V. Union, etc., R. Co. (70 Md. 
 69; 18 Atl. Rep. 1032; 42 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 167), 1036. 
 State V. Western Maryland R. Co. (63 
 Md. 433; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 608), 
 851. 
 State V. Wisconsin Cent. Ry. Co. (113 
 
 N. W. Rep. 968), 976. 
 Steamboat New World v. King (16 How. 
 
 469; 14 L. Ed. 1019), 16. 
 Steamship Belgenland v. Jansen (114 
 
 U. S. 865), 738. 
 Stearns v. Ontario Spinning Co. (184 
 Pa. 619; 39 Atl. Rep. 292; 39 L. R. 
 A. 842; 63 ATn. St. Rep. 807), 120. 
 State V. Central R. Co. (43 Iowa 109), 
 
 408. 
 Steele v. Southeastern R. Co. (16 C. B. 
 
 650; 81 E. C. L. 650), 278. 
 SteSe V. Old Colony R. Co. (166 Mass. 
 
 262; 30 N. E. Rep. 1137), 526. 
 Steffen v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. (46 
 Wis. 269; 60 N. W. Rep. 348), 321. 
 Steffenson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (45 
 Minn. 365; 48 Minn. 286; 47 N. W. 
 Rep. 1068; 51 N. W. Rep. 610), 627. 
 Stein bruner v. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. 
 (146 Pa. St. 680; 23 Atl. Rep. 239), 
 192. 
 Steiner v. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. (134 
 Pa. St. 199; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 536), 886. „ , 
 
 Stephan v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. (106 
 
 111. App. 18), 55. ^ ^ 
 
 Stephani ii. Southern, etc., R. Co. (19 
 Utah 196: 57 Pac. Rep. 34; 14 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. [N. S.] 675), 498. 
 Stephens v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (86 
 Mo. 221; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 538), 
 378. 
 Stephens v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (96 
 Mo. 207: 9 S. W. Rep. 589; 88 Am. 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 110), 178. 
 Stephens v. Nashville, etc., R. Co. (10 
 Lea [Tenn.] 448; 11 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 671), 69. 
 Stephens v. Nichols (165 Mass. 472), 
 
 872. 
 Stepp V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (85 Mo. 
 
 229), 1009. 
 Sterger v. Van Sticklen (132 N. Y. 
 
 499), 872. 
 Stern v. La Campagnie Generale Tran- 
 
 atlantique (110 Fed. Rep. 996), 68. 
 Stetler v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (46 Wis. 
 
 497; 21 Am. Ry. Rep. 402), 471. 
 Stevens v. Boston,- etc„ R. Co. (184 
 
 Mass. 476; 69 N. E. Rep. 338), 94. 
 Stevens v. Central R. Co. (80 Ga. -19; 
 6 S. E. Rep. 253; 34 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 418), 100. 
 Stevens v. Gair (98 N. Y. S. 303; 109 
 
 App. Div. 621), 366. 
 Stevens v. Kansas City Ry. Co. (105 
 
 S. W. Rep. 26), 823. 
 Stevens v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (67 
 
 Mo. App. 366), 942. 
 Stevens v, Oswego, etc., R. Co. (18 N. 
 
 Y. 422), 950. 
 Stevens v. Woodward (6 Q. B. D. 318), 
 209. 
 
 cxlviii 
 
 Stevick V. Northern Pac. R. Co. (89 
 
 Wash. 801; 81 Pac. Rep. 1001),. 234. 
 Stewart v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (146 
 
 Ma«s. 60S; 16 N. E. Rep. 466; -34 Am, 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 499), 774. 
 Stewart v. Brooklyn, etc., R. Co. (90 
 
 N. Y. 691), 736. 
 Stewart v. California, etc., R. Co. (131 
 
 Cal. 125; 63 Pac. Rep. 177; 52 L. R. 
 
 A. 208), 278. 
 Stewart v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. (89 
 
 Mich. 316), 863. 
 Stewart v. Everts (76 Wis. 36; 44 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 1092; 44 Am. & Enc. R. Cas. 
 
 813), 83. 
 Stewart v. International, etc., R. Co. (.63 
 
 Tex. 289; iS, Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 497), 880. 
 Stewart v. Louisville & R. Co. (83 Ala. 
 
 493; 4 So. Rep. 873), 69. 
 Stewart v. New York, etc., R. Co. (8 
 
 N. Y. Supp. 19), 344. 
 Stewart v. Raleigh, etc., R. Co. (N. C, 
 
 53 S. E. Rep. 877), 273. 
 Stewart v. Texas & P. R. Co. (La. Ann., 
 
 37 So. Rep. 129), 379. 
 Stewart v. Walterboro & W. R. Co. (64 
 
 S. C. 92; 41 S. E. Rep. 827), 240. 
 Stiles V. Atlanta, etc., Ry. Co. (65 Ga. 
 
 370; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 195), 670. 
 Stockmeyer v. Reed (55 Fed. Rep. 259. 
 Stockwell V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (131 
 
 Fed. Rep. 153), 60. 
 Stoddard v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (181 
 
 Mass. 422; 63 N. E. Rep. 927), 645. 
 Stodder v. New York, etc., R. Co. (60 
 
 Hun [N. Y.] 221; 19 N. Y. S. R. 
 
 772; 121 N. Y. 666), 607. 
 Stoeckman v. Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (15 Mo. App. 603), 327. 
 Stoher v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (91 
 
 Mo. 609; 4 S. W. Rep. 389; 81 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 229), 83. 
 Stokes V. Saltonstill (IE Pet. 181), 635. 
 Stone V. Cheshire, etc., R. Co. (19 N. 
 
 H. 427), 283. 
 Stone V. Chicago, etc., B. Co. (47 Iowa 
 
 82; 17 Am. Ry. Kep. 461), 567. 
 Stone V. Lewiston, etc., R. Co. (99 Me. 
 
 243; 89 Atl. Rep. 56), 96. 
 Stone V. Pennsylvania R. Co. (132 Pa. 
 
 St. 206; 19 Atl. Rep. 67; 41 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 622), 640. 
 Stone V. Railroad (88 Wis. 98), 101. 
 Stone V. Union Pac. R. Co. (89 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 715, 723), 471. 
 Stoneman v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co. (58 
 
 Mo. 503), 948. 
 Stoner v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (98 Ind. 
 
 384; 49 Am. Rep. 764; 21 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 340), 782. 
 Story V. Concord, etc., R. Co. (70 N. H, 
 
 364; 48 Atl. Rep. 288), 229. 
 Stotler V. Chicago & A. Ry. Co. (103 
 
 S. W. Rep. 1), 411. 
 Stotler V. Chicago & A. R. Co. (98 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 609), 233. 
 Stowe V. LeConnor Transfer Co. (39 
 
 Wash. 27; 80 Pac. Rep. 856), 175. 
 Strand v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (64 Mich. 
 
 380; 34 N. W. Rep. 712; 31 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 54), 785. 
 Strand v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (64 Mich. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections. "^ 
 
 816: 31 N. W. Rep. 184; 28 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Gas. 813), 790. 
 Strange v. Bodcaw, etc., Co. (Ark., 96 
 
 S. W. Rep. 152), 26. 
 Stratton v. Central City R. Co. (95 111. 
 25: 1 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 115), 455. 
 Straub v. Soderer (53 Mo. 38), 989. 
 Straueh v. Detroit, etc., R. Co. (65 
 Mich. 706; 36 I^. W. Rep. .161; 32 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 164) 1006. 
 Straus V. Kansas City, etc.. R. Co. (75 
 
 Mo. 185; 6 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 384), 
 
 393. 
 Strauss v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (86 
 
 Mo. 421; 75 Mo. 185; 27 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 170). 708. „ _ ,^„ 
 
 Strauss v. New York, etc., K. Co. (87 
 
 N. Y. S. 67; 91 App. Div. 683), 268. 
 Strauss v. Railroad (17 Fed. Rep. 
 
 209), 32. . „ , . „ 
 
 Street v. Railroad Co. (14 Am. Neg. 
 
 Rep. 644), 408.„ 
 Street's Western Car, etc., Co. v. Bonan- 
 
 der (97 111. App. 601; 63 N. E. Rep. 
 
 688), 380. 
 Stringer v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (96 
 
 Mo. 299; 9 S. W. Rep. 906), 1101. 
 Stroble v. Chicago, etc.. R. Co. (70 Iowa 
 
 655; 31 N. W. Rep. 63; 28 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 510), 522. 
 Strode v. Soderer (53 Mo. 38), 1086. 
 Strong V. Sacramento, etc., R. Co. (61 
 
 Cal. 326; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 273), 
 
 977. 
 Strottman v. St. Louis, etc., Ry, Co. 
 
 (Mo., 109 S. W. Rep. 769), 529. 
 Struble v. Burlington, etc., R. Co. .(Iowa, 
 
 lOS N. W. Rep. 142), 273. 
 Stuart V. Ry. Co. (163 Mass. 391; 40 
 
 N. E. Rep. 180), 310. 
 Stubbs V. (Jmaha, etc., R. Co. (85 Mo. 
 
 App. 198), 529. 
 Stubley V. London, etc., R. Co. (4 H. 
 
 & C. 83; L. R.j 1 Ex. 13; 11 Jur. 
 
 [N. S.] 954; 35 L. J. Ex. 3; 14 W. R. 
 
 133; 13 L. T. 376), 931. 
 Studenroth v, Hammond, etc., Co. (106 
 
 Mo. App. 480; 81 S. W. Rep. 487), 
 
 875. 
 Studeroth v. Hammond Co. (106 Mo. 
 
 App. 480; 81 S. W. Rep. 487), 109. 
 Studley v. St. Paul, etc.. R. Co. (48 
 
 Minn. 249: 51 N. W. Rep. 115), 1039. 
 Stultz V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (73 Wis. 
 
 147; 40 N. W. Rep. 653; 37 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 187), 183. 
 Sturgeon v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (6S 
 
 Mo. 569), 850. 
 Sturgis V. Detroit, etc., R. Co. (72 Mich. 
 
 619; 40 N. W. Rep. 914), 1074. 
 Suber v. Georgia, etc., R. Co. (98 Ga. 
 
 42; 23 S. E. Rep. 387), 789. 
 Sullivan v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (72 
 
 Mo. 195), 106. 
 Sullivan v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (97 
 
 Mo. 113; 10 S. W. Rep. 852), 479. 
 Sullivan v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (117 
 
 Mo. 214; 23 S. W. Rep. 149), 876. 
 Sullivan v. New York, etc., R. Co. (62 
 
 Conn. 209; 85 Atl. Rep. 711), 485. 
 Sullivan v. Old Colony R. Co. (18 N. 
 
 £. Rep. 678), 730. 
 
 Sullivan v. Oregon, etc., R. Co. (18 Ore- 
 
 fon 392; 7 Pac. Rep. 608; 21 Am. & 
 :ng. R. Cas. 391), 98. 
 Sullivan v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (30 Pa. 
 
 St. 839), 599. 
 Sullivan v. Ry. Co. (133 Mo. 1). 592. 
 Sullivan v. Seattle Electric Co. (86 Pac 
 
 Rep. 786), 688. 
 Sullivan v. Tioga, etc., R. Co. (113 N. 
 
 Y. 634; 8 Am. St. Rep. 793; 20 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 569). 481. 
 Sullivan v. Toledo, etc., R. Co. (58 Ind. 
 
 36), 469. 
 Summerhays v. Kansas Pacific R. Co. (2 
 
 Colo. 484: 30 Am. Ry. Rep. 359), 461. 
 Sunnyside Coal Co. v. Perry Center (100 
 
 111. App. 546), 506. 
 Suppard v. Agnew (191 111. 439; 61 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 393). 262. 
 Supple V. Agnew (191 111. 439; 61 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 392), 161. 
 Sutherland v. Great Western R. Co. (7 
 . U. C. C. P. 409). 851. 
 Sutherland v. New York, etc., R. Co. (9 
 
 J. & S. [N. Y.] 17), 931. 
 Suttle V. Choctaw, etc., Ry. Co. (144 
 
 Fed. Rep. 668), 358. 
 Sutton V. New York, etc., R. Co. (66 
 
 N. Y. 243), 874. 
 Swaddle v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (118 
 
 Mo. 268; 24 S. W. Rep. 140), 498. 
 Swanson v. Great Northern Co. (68 
 
 Minn. 184; 70 N. W. Rep. 978), 188. 
 Swartwood's Guardian v. Louisville, etc., 
 
 R. Co. (Ill S. W. Rep. 305), 1108. 
 Sweat V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (156 Ma:s. 
 
 284; 31 N. E. Rep. 296). 82. 
 Sweeney v. Central Pac. R. Co. (57 Cal. 
 
 15; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 151), 336. 
 Sweeney v. Gulf, etc., R. Co. (84 Tex. 
 
 433; 19 S. W. Rep. 555), 472. 
 Sweeney v. Old Colony R. Co. (10 Al- 
 len [Mass.] 368), 862. 
 Sweeny v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (10 Allen 
 
 372), 1076. 
 Sweeney v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (128 
 - Mass. 5; 1 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 138), 
 
 416. 
 Sweeny v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (150 
 
 Mo. 385; 61 S. W. Rep. 683), 838. 
 Sweeny v. New York, etc., R. Co. (25 
 
 N. Y. S. R. 698; 6 N. Y. Supp. 528; 
 
 117 N. Y. 642; 22 N. E. Rep. 1131), 
 
 381. 
 Sweet V. Railroad Co. (87 Mich. 559; 
 
 49 N. W. Rep. 888). 369. 
 Swift, etc., Co. V. Johnson (138 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 867), 64. 
 Swift V. Staten Island R. Co. (123 N. 
 
 Y. 645; 25 N. E. Rep. 378; 33 N. Y. 
 
 S. R. 604; 52 Hun 614; 45 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 180), 1004. 
 Swigert v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (75 
 
 Jfo. 475; 9 Am. & Eng. R. Cas.- 382), 
 
 691. 
 Swisher v. Illinois, etc., R. Co. (183 111. 
 
 533; 55 N. E. Rep. 555). 487. 
 Sykes v. Northeastern R. Co. (44 L. J. 
 
 C. P. 191; 32 L. T. 199; 23 W. R. 
 
 i7S), 70. 
 Sykes v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. (178 
 
 Mo. 693; 77 S. W. Rep. 723), 268. 
 
 cxlix 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.l 
 
 Syme v- Richmond, etc., R. Co. (113 
 No. Car. S68; 18 S. E. Rep. 114), 
 109!2. 
 
 Taber v. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (71 N. 
 
 Y. 489j i Hun 765), 810. 
 Tabler T/. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (93 
 
 Mo. 79; 6 S. W. Rep. 810; 31 Am. 
 
 a Eng. R. Cas. 184), 788. 
 Tabor v. Missouri Valley R. Co. (46 Mo. 
 
 353), 1000. 
 Tagg V. McGeorge (156 Pa. St. 368; 
 
 86 Atl. Rep. 671), 269. 
 Tall V. Baltimore, etc., Co. (90 Md. 
 
 848; 44 Atl. Rep. 1007; 47 L. R. A. 
 
 A. 180), 744. 
 Tankham v. Sawyer (158 Mass. 486), 
 
 308. 
 Tanner v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (60 
 
 Ala. 681), 391. 
 Tanner v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (161 
 
 Mo. 497; 61 S. W. Rep. 826), 1089. 
 Tarball v. Rutland, etc., R. Co. (73 Vt. 
 
 347; 51 Atl. Rep. 6), 843. 
 Tateman v. Railway Co. (96 Mo. App. 
 
 448; 70 S. W. Rep. 614), 119. 
 Taylor v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 
 
 (59 S. E. Rep. 641), 557. 
 Taylor v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. (33 
 
 W. Va. 89; 10 S. E. Rep. 29; 39 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 259), 6. 
 Taylor v. Carew (142 Mass. 470), 6. 
 Taylor v. Central R. Co. (79 Ga. 330), 
 
 804. 
 Taylor v. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (113 Pa. 
 
 St. 168; 8 Atl. Rep. 43; 28 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 666), 875. 
 Taylor v. Dunn (80 Tex. 658; 16 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 738), 286. 
 Taylor v. Evansville, etc., R. Co. (181 
 
 Ind. 184; 22 N. E. Rep. 876; 6 L. 
 
 R. A. 684; 41 Alb. L. J. 173; 41 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 437), 472. 
 Taylor v. Grand Trunk R. Co. (48 N. 
 
 H. 304), 640. 
 Tavlor v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (26 
 
 Mo. App. 336), 785. 
 Taylor v, Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (86 
 
 Mo., 457; 16 S. W. Rep. 206), 899. 
 Taylor v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (78 Ky. 
 
 848; 7 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 23), 49. 
 Taylor v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (60 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 765), 620. 
 Taylor v. Railroad (185 Mo. 255), 100. 
 Taylor v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (83 
 
 Mo. 386), 91. 
 Taylor, etc., R. Co. v. Taylor (79 Tex. 
 
 104; 14 S. W. Rep. 918), 346. 
 Taylor, etc., R. Co. v. Warner (Tex., 
 
 60 S. W. Rep. 442>, 1069. 
 Taylor, etc., R. Co. v. Warner (88 Tex. 
 
 642; 32 S. W. Rep. 868). 887. 
 Taylor v. Western Pac. R. Co. (45 Cal. 
 
 383), 160. 
 Teakle v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R. 
 
 Co. (90 Pac. Rep. 402), 1029. 
 Teal V. American Mining Co. (87 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 887), 289. 
 Teal V. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. (96 Minn. 
 
 379; 104 N. W. Rep. 945), 116. 
 
 Telephone Co. v. Loomis (87 Tenn. 604: 
 
 11 S. W. Rep. 356), 811. 
 Telfer v. Northern, etc., R. Co. (80 N. 
 
 J. L. 188), 661. 
 Tennenbrook v. Southern, etc., R, Co. 
 
 (60 Cal. 269; 6 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 8), 1096. 
 Tennery v. Pippinger (1 Phila. [Pa.] 
 
 548), 574. 
 Tennessee C. I. & R. Co. v. Bridges (39 
 
 So. Rep. 902), 860. 
 Tennessee, etc., Co. v. Currier (108 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 19; 47 C. C. A. 161), 150. 
 Tennessee, etc., R, Co. v. Hayes (97 
 
 Ala. 201; 18 So. Rep. 98), 311. 
 Tennis v, Inter-State, etc., R. Co. (45 
 
 Kan. 603), 413. 
 Terminal Transfer Co. v. Helberg (124 
 
 111. App. 113), 411. 
 Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. v. Brunker 
 
 (188 Ind. 548; 26 N. E. Rep. 1T8), 
 
 93. 
 Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. v. Buck 196 
 
 Ind. 346: 49 Am. Rep. 168; 18 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 2S4), 708. 
 Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. v. Clark (73 
 
 Ind. 168; 6 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 84), 
 
 661. 
 Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. j. Clenn (183 
 
 Ind., 16; 23 N. E. Rep. 965; 42 Am. 
 
 &' Eng. R. Cas. 966; 7 L. R. A. 
 
 688), 94. 
 Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. v. Graham 
 
 (95 Ind. 286; 48 Am. Rep. 719; 18 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 77), 1078. 
 Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. v. Jackson (81 
 
 Ind. .19; 6 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 178), 
 
 590. 
 Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. v. Mansberger 
 
 (66 Fed. Rep. 196; 12 C. C. A. 
 
 574), 39. 
 Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. v. McMurray 
 
 (98 Ind. 368; 49 Am. Rep. 762; 88 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 871), 1043. 
 Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. v, Rittenhousc 
 
 (28 Ind. App. 633; 62 N. E. Rep. 
 
 295), 498. 
 Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. v. Sheets (155 
 
 Ind. 74; 66 N. E. Rep. 434), 676. 
 Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. v. Sherwood 
 
 (188 Ind. 129), 849. 
 Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. v. Voelker 
 
 (189 111. 540; 22 N. E. Rep. 20; 39 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 615), 958. 
 Terry v. Tewett (78 N. Y. 338), 661. 
 Terry v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (89 Mo. 
 
 686; 1 S. W. Rep. 746), 966. 
 Teteur v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (77 Wis. 
 
 605; 46 N. W. Rep. 897), 66. 
 Tetherow v. St. Joseph, etc., R. Co. (98 
 
 Mo. 74; 11 S. W. Rep. 310), 909. 
 Texas & K. O. Ry. Co. v. Conway (98 
 
 S. W. Rep. 1070), 263. 
 Texas & N. O. Ry. Co. v. Crowder (61 
 
 Tex. 262), 275. 
 Texas & N. 0. R. Co. v. Kelly (Tex., 
 
 80 S. W. Rep. 1073), 257. 
 Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Sherman (Tex., 
 
 87 S. W. Rep. 887), 2S2. 
 Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Walton (104 
 
 S. W. Rep. 415), 548. 
 Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Barrett (166 U. 
 
 Cl 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.'] 
 
 S. 617; 17 Sup. Ct. 707; 41 L. Ed. 
 
 1136), 119. 
 Texas & P. Ry. v. Beezly (101 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 1061), 634. 
 Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Beh"mer (189 
 
 U. S. 468; 47 L. Ed. 906), 4. 
 Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Brick (Tex., 18 
 
 S. W. Rep. 947), 303. 
 Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Carlin (189 U. 
 
 S. 864; 47 L. Ed. 849), -473. 
 Texas & Pac. Coal Co. v. Connaughton 
 
 (20 Tex. Civ. App. 648; 60 S. W. Rep. 
 
 173), 899. 
 Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Cox (146 U. S. 
 
 693; 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 906), 71. 
 Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. French (86 
 
 Tex. 96: 83 S. W. Rep. 642), 128. 
 Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Hemphill (Tex., 
 
 86 S. W. Rep, 360), 249. 
 Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Hoffman (83 
 
 Tex. S86j 18 S. W. Rep. 741), 249. 
 Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. McKenzie (70 
 
 S. W. Rep. 237), 31. 
 Texas & Pac. R. Co. ii. Mosely (68 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 48), 38. 
 Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Shivers (106 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 894), 947. 
 Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Whiteley (96 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 109), 718. 
 Texas Central R. Co. -u. Bender (Tex., 
 
 75 S. W. Rep. 661), 338. 
 Texas Central R. Co. v. George (89 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 1091), 254. 
 Texas Mexican Ry. Co. v. De Hernan- 
 dez (108 S. W. Rep. 766), 973. 
 Texas Mexican Ry. - Co. v. Higgins (99 
 
 S. W. Rep. 800), 204. 
 Texas Midland R. Co. v. Byrd (Tex., 90 
 
 S. W. Rep. 185), 1096. 
 Texas Midland R. v. Byrd (110 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 199), 1096. 
 Texas Midland R. Co. v. Griggs (Tex., 
 
 106 S. W. Rep. 411), 282. 
 Texas Midland R. Co. v. Ritchey (108 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 732), 781. 
 Texas Snort Line R. Co. t/. Waymire 
 
 (89 S. W. Rep. 468), 266. 
 Texas Trunk R. Co. v. Ayers (83 Tex. 
 
 868; 18 S. W. Rfep. 684), 181. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Anderson (61 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 424), 31. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Bailey (83 Tex. 
 
 19; 18 S. W. Rep. 481), 952. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Barfield (Tex., 
 
 3 S. W. Rep. 665), 1097. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Barron (78 Tex. 
 
 421; 14 S. W. Rep. 698), 601. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Berry (67 Tex. 
 
 238; 5 S. W. Rep. 817; 31 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 147), 469. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Best (66 Tex. 116; 
 
 18 S. W. Rep. 284), 867. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Bingham (8 Tex. 
 
 Civ. App. 278; 81 S. W. Rep. 569), 
 
 707. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Bradford (66 Tex. 
 
 738; 8 S. W. Rep. 595; 88 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 479), 419. 
 Texas, etc., R.-Co. v. Bryant (56 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 799), 958. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Carlton (60 Tex. 
 
 897; 16 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 360), 301. 
 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Chapman (67 Tex. 
 
 75), 886. 
 Texas, etc.. R. Co. v. Crowder (70 Tex. 
 
 822; 7 S. W. Rep. 709), 98. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Curlin (13 Tex. 
 
 Civ. App. 605), 4. 
 Texas, etc., R; Co. v. Curry (64 Tex. 
 
 85; 81 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 448), 185. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Davidson (68 Tex. 
 
 370; 4 S. W. Rep. 636), 691. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. DeMilley (60 Tex. 
 
 194), 83. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Dudley (1 Tex. 
 
 Civ. App. 871), 877. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Easton (8 Tex. 
 
 Civ. App. 378; 81 S. W. Rep. 576), 
 
 479. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. French (Tex. Civ. 
 
 App., 88 S. W. Rep. 866), 403. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Garcia (68 Tex. 
 
 88o; 81 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 384), 787. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Geiger (79 Tex. 
 
 13; 15 S. W. Rep. 814), 804. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Hamilton (66 Tex. 
 
 92; 86 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 182), 662. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Harrington (98 
 
 S. W. Rep. 653), 842. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Harrington (62 
 
 Tex. 597; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 571), 
 
 478. 
 Texas, etc., Ry. Co. v. Hervey (89 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 1096), 543. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. u. Humble (97 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 837), 621. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Johnson (2 Tex. 
 
 Civ. App. 164), 742. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Jumper (84 Tex. 
 
 Civ. App. 671; 60 S. W. Rep. 797), 
 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Juneman (71 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 939; 18 C. C. A. 394'^ 282. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Kane (15 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 818), 376. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Kelley (Tex., 80 
 
 S. W. Rep. 79), 369. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Kirk (68 Tex. 
 
 827), 471. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Lester (76 Tex. 
 
 56; 18 S. W. Rep. 955), 206. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Lowry (61 Tex. 
 
 149), 947. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. -v. Martin (60 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 803), 65. 
 Texas, etc., Ry. Co. v. McCraw (95 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 88), 643. 
 Texas, etc^ R. Co. v. Miller (79 Tex. 
 
 78; 16 S. W. Rep. 864), 557. 
 Texas, etc., Ry. Co. v. Miller (Tex., 81 
 
 S. W. Rep. 635), 339. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Minnick (67 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 362), 341. 
 Texas &. P. Ry. Co. v. Modawell (151 
 
 Fed. Rep. 481), 1075. 
 Texas, etc.. R. Co. v. Moore (8 Tex. 
 
 Civ. App. 889; 27 S. W. Rep. 962), 
 
 889. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Moran (66 Tex. 
 
 133; 25 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 539), 167. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Nunn (98 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 963), 782. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Overall (82 Tex. 
 
 847; 18 S. W. Rep. 148), 799. 
 
 cli 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.'] 
 
 Texas, etc., Ey. Co. v. Putnam (ISO Fed. 
 
 Rep. 754; 57 C. C. A. 68), 386. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Reed (88 Tex. 
 
 439- 31 S. W. Rep. 1068), 28. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Roberts (2 Tex. 
 
 Civ. App. Ill; 20 S. W. Rep. 960), 
 
 1080. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. i/. Rogers (57 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 378), 337. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Scarborough (104 
 
 S. W. Rep. 408), 401. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Scott (64 Tex. 
 
 649), 668. 
 Texas, etc^ R. Co. *. Scruggs (Tex., 58 
 
 S. W. Rep. 186), 493. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Smith (Tex., 10 
 
 Am. Neg. Cas. 326), 649. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Smith (114 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 728; 62 C. C. A. 360), 543. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Stewart (1 Tex. 
 
 Civ. App. 642; 20 S. W. Rep. 962), 
 • 835. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Storey (Tex., 83 
 
 S. W. Rep. 852), 752. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Suggs (62 Tex. 
 
 323; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 476), 637. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Tattman (Tex., 
 
 31 S. W. Rep. 333), 493. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Thompson (Tex., 
 
 77 S. W. Rep. 439), 602. 
 Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Utley (66 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 311), 270. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Vallie (60 Tex. 
 
 481), 369. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Wagner (2 Tex. 
 
 Civ. App. 291), 416. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Whitmore (58 
 
 Tex. 276; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 195), 475. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Wright (62 Trx. 
 
 515; 23 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 304), 969. 
 Thacher v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (159 
 
 Ind. 82; 64 N. E. Rep. 605), 495. 
 Thacher v. Great Western R. Co. (4 U. 
 
 C. C. -P. 543) 653 
 Thayer" z;. Flint,' etc.,' R. Co. (93 Mich. 
 
 150; 53 N. W. Rep. 216), 977. 
 Thayer v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (22 
 
 Ind. 26), 476. 
 Thayer v. Smolty Hollow Co. (98 N. W. 
 
 Rep. 718), 79. 
 The bernina (L. R., Ig P. D. 58; L. R., 
 
 13 App. Cas. 1), 1043. 
 The Chico (140 Fed. Rep. 668), 253. 
 The City of Alexandria (17 Fed. Rep. 
 
 390), 43. 
 The Edwin (87 Fed. Rep. 540), 95. 
 Theleman v. Mueller (73 Iowa 108; 34 
 
 N. W. Rep. 765), 461. 
 The New World v. King (16 How. 469), 
 
 635. 
 Thirteenth, etc., R. Co. f. Boudrox (92 
 
 Pa. St. 476; 37 Am. Rep. 707; 2 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 30), 771. 
 Thomas v. Altoona, etc., R. Co. (191 
 
 Pa. St. 361; 43 Atl. Rep. 215), 279. 
 Thomas v. Charlotte, etc., R. Co. (38 
 , So. Car. 485; 17 S. E. Rep. 226), 703. 
 Thomas v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (86 
 
 Mich. 496; 49 N. W. Rep. 547), 104. 
 Thomas v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. (97 
 
 Fed. Rep. 245), 493. 
 Thomas v. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (19 
 
 clii 
 
 Blatchf. [U. S.] 533; 8 Fed. Rep. 
 
 729), 1020. ,, ,r T, 
 
 Thomas v. London, etc., R. Co. (L. R., 
 
 6 Q. B. 226), 683. 
 Thomas v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (109 
 
 Mo. 187; 18 S. W. Rep. 980; 53 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 146), 335. 
 Thomas v. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. (148 
 
 Pa. St. 180; 2? Atl. Rep. 989; 15 L. 
 
 R. A. 416), 759. 
 Thomas v. Raleigh, etc., R. Co. (129 N. 
 
 C. 392; 40 S. E. Rep. 201), 382. 
 Thomas v. W. J. Ry. Co. (101 U. S. 
 
 71; 11 Otto 71; 25 L. Ed. 950), 236. 
 Thomason v. Southern Ry. Co. (72 S. 
 
 C. 1; 51 S. E. Rep. 443), 176. 
 Thompson v. Belfast, etc., R. Co. (5 Ir. 
 
 C. L. 617), 713. 
 Thompson v. Chappell (91 Mo. App. 
 
 297), 386. 
 Thompson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (4 Mc- 
 
 Crary [U. S.] 629; 14 Fed. Rep. 564), 
 
 379. 
 Thompson v. Flint, etc., R. Co. (57 
 
 Mich. 300; 23 N. W. Rep. 820; 23 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 289), 1035. 
 Thompson v. Great North. R. Co. (79 
 
 Minn. 291; 82 N. W. Rep. 637), 254. 
 Thompson v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (84 Mich. 281; 47 N. W. Rep. 684), 
 
 492. 
 Thompson v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (91 
 
 Ala. 496; 8 So. Rep. 406; 11 L. R. 
 
 A. 146), 298. 
 Thompson v. Missouri, etc., R. Co. (93 
 
 Mo. App. 648; 67 Sv W. Rep. 693), 
 
 992. 
 Thompson v. New Orleans, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (60 Miss. 316) 724. 
 Thompson v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (215 
 
 Pa. St. 113; 64 Atl. Rep. 323), 1060. 
 Thompson v. St. Louis, etc., R. (io. 
 
 (Mo., 86 S. W. Rep. 465), 122. 
 Thompson v. Toledo, etc., R. Co. (91 
 
 Mich. 256; -51 N. W. Rep. 996), 94. 
 Thornton r. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. (131 
 
 Ind. 492; 31 N. E. Rep. 185), 1006. 
 Thorpe v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (89 
 
 Mo. 650; 2 S. W. Rep. 3), 406. 
 Thrall v. Carme (24 N. Y. S. R. 270; 
 
 5 N. Y. Supp. 244), 808. 
 Thrussell v. llandyside (20 Q. B. D. 
 
 359), 378. 
 Thurston v. Union Pacific R. Co. (4 
 
 Dill. [U. S.] 321), 586. 
 Thweatt v. Houston, etc., R. Co. (31 Tex. 
 
 Civ. App. 227; 71 S. W. Rep. 976), 
 
 762. 
 Thyng v. Fitchburg, etc., R. Co. (156 
 
 Mass. 13; 30 N. E. Rep. 169), 610. 
 Tibbett v. Knox, etc., R. Co. (62 Me. 
 
 437), 300. 
 Tibbey v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (82 
 
 Mo. 292), 669. 
 Tiernay v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (84 Iowa 
 
 641; 6 N. W. Rep. 175), 946. 
 Tiemey v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. (33 
 
 Minn. 311; 23 N. W. Rep. 229; 53 
 
 Am. Rep. 35; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 545), 474. 
 Tilburg V. Northern Cent. Ry. Co. (66 
 
 Atl. Rep. 846), 781. 
 Tillery w. Bond (38 Fed. Rep. 825), 706. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED, 
 
 [References are to sections.1 
 
 Tilley v. Hudson River R. Co. (24 N. 
 
 y. 474), 197. 
 Tillman v. St. Louis Transit Co. (lOS 
 
 Mo. App. 553; 77 S. W. Rep. 380), 
 
 657. 
 Tillotson V. Texas, etc., R. Co. (44 La. 
 
 Ann. 95; 10 So. Rep. 400; 53 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 104), 307. 
 Tilson V. Maine Cent. R. Co. (67 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 407), 492. 
 Timlow V. Pennsylvania R. Co. (99 Pa. 
 
 St. 284), 7. 
 Timpson v. Manhattan R. Co. (24 N. Y. 
 
 S. R. 629; 62 Hun 489; 6 N. Y. Supp. 
 
 684), 657. 
 Tingle v. Long Island R. Co. (96 N. Y. 
 
 S. 865; 109 App. Div. 793), 500. 
 Tinsley v. Western Union Co. (S. 'C, 
 
 51 S. E. Rep. 913; 72 S. C. 350), 14. 
 Titcomb v. Fitchburg, etc. R. Co. (2 Al- 
 len 254), 33. 
 Titus V. Bradford, etc., R. Co. (136 Pa. 
 
 St. 618; 20 Atl. Rep. 517), 347. 
 Tobin V. Cable Co. (Cal., 34 Pac. Rep. 
 
 124; 58 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 223), 
 
 768. 
 Tobin V. Ceiit. Vt. Ry. Co. (185 Mass. 
 
 337; 70 N. E. Rep. 431), 238. 
 Tobin V. Missouri Pac. K. Co. (18 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 996), 163. 
 Todd V. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (126 
 
 Mo. App. 692; lOJ S. W. Rep. 671), 
 
 112. 
 Todd V. Old Colony R. Co. (3 Allen 
 
 [Mass.] 18), 802. 
 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Apperson (49 III. 
 
 480), 696. 
 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Baddeley (64 111. 
 
 19), 709. 
 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Beggs (85 III. 
 
 80), 1070. 
 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Black (88 111. 
 
 112), 268. 
 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Brooks (81 111. 
 
 245), 571. 
 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Cline (135 III. 
 
 41; 26 N. E. Rep. 846; 45 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 160), 453. 
 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Connolly (149 
 
 Fed. Rep. 398), 68. 
 Toledo, etc., R. .Co. v. Conroy (39 111. 
 
 App. 351), 276. 
 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Crittenden (42 
 
 111. App. 469), 1056. 
 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Deacon (63 111. 
 
 91; 7 Am. Ry. Rep. 150), 976. 
 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Durkin (76 III. 
 
 396), 354. 
 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Eatherton (20 
 
 Ohio C. C. 297), 1039. 
 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Eddy (72 111. 
 
 138), 168. 
 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Foster (43 111. 
 
 416), 968. 
 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Goddard (25 Ind. 
 
 185), 390. 
 Toledo, etc., R. Co. </. Jones (76 111. 
 
 311), 950. 
 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Jump (50 Ohio 
 
 St. 661; 36 N. E. Rep. 1054), 900. 
 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Miller (76 111. 
 
 278), 987. 
 
 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. O'Connor (77 III. 
 
 391), 477. 
 Toledo & W. R. Co. v. Pavey (79 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 529), 521. 
 Toledo, etc., R. Co. „. Rumbold (40 111. 
 
 143), 683. 
 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Shuckman (50 
 
 Ind. 42), 932. 
 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Spencer (06 111. 
 
 529), 455. 
 Toledo & -W. R. Co. v. Stevenson (122 
 
 111. App. 654), 625. 
 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Wingate (143 
 
 Ind. 125: ,37 N. E. Rep. 274), 626. 
 ToUit V. -Sherstone (5 M. & W. 283), 
 
 18. 
 Tollman v. Reed (115 Mich. 71; 72 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 1104), 463. 
 Tomkins -u. Clay Street R. Co. (66 Cal. 
 
 163; 4. Pac. Rep. 1165), 1041. 
 Toms V. Buffalo Crek R. Co. (70 Hun 
 
 84; 53 N. Y. S. R. 640; 23 N. Y. 
 
 Supp. 1112), 468. 
 Toomey v. Eureka Works (89 Mich. 
 
 249; 60 N. W. Rep. 850), 118. 
 Toomey v. Southern, etc., R. Co. (86 
 
 Cal. 374: 24 Pac. Rep. 1074), 1063. 
 Toner v. Chicago, etc;., R. Co. (69 Wis. 
 
 188; 31 N. W. Rep. 104; 28 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 449), 482. 
 Torpey v. Grand Trunk R. Co. (20 N. 
 
 C. L. B. 446), 668. 
 Torrey ». Boston, etc., R. Co. (147 
 
 Mass. 412; 18 N. E. Rep. 213), 801. 
 Toten V. Pennsylvania R. Co. (11 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 664), 461. 
 Towle V. Stimson Co. (Wash., 74 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 471), 156. 
 Traction Co. v. MoFall (28 Ohio Cir. 
 
 Ct. R. 362), 586. 
 Traction Co. v. Wilson (120 III. App. 
 
 371; 75 N. E. Rep. 436; 217 111. 47), 
 
 661. 
 Tracy v. Troy, etc., R. Co. (38 N. Y. 
 
 433; 55 Barb. 529), 602. 
 Trakal v. Heusner Co. (204 111. 179; 
 
 68 N. E. Rep. 399), 269. 
 Transportation Co. v. Downer (11 Wal- 
 lace 129), lie. 
 Transportation Co. v. UUman (89 111. 
 
 244), 237. 
 Traphagen v. Erie R. Co. (64 Atl. Rep. 
 
 1072), 651. 
 Trask v. California, etc., R. Co. (63 Cal. 
 
 96; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 192); 471. 
 Traux v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (83 Wis. 
 
 547; 53 N. W. Rep. 842), 872. 
 Travers v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (63 
 
 Mo. 421), 736. 
 Treadwell v. Whittier (80 Cal. 574; 22 
 
 Pac. Rep. 266), 639. 
 Treadwell v. Whittier (6 L. R. 498), 
 
 120. 
 Tremantle v. North Star, etc., Co. (57 
 
 Minn. 52), 308. 
 Trenton, etc., R. Co. v. Cooper (60 
 
 N. J. L. 219; 37 Atl. Rep? 730; 38 L. 
 
 R. A. 637), 110. 
 Treux J/. Erie R. Co. (4 Lans. [N. Y.] 
 
 198), 674. 
 Trinity, etc., R. Co. ii. Mitchell (72 
 
 Tex. 609; 10 S. W. Rep. 698), 482. 
 
 cliii 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.1 
 
 Trinity, etc., R. Co. v. O'Brien. 18 
 
 Tex. Civ. App. 690; 46 S. W. Rep. 
 
 389), 679. 
 Tripp V. Gifford (155 Mass. 108), 314. 
 Trotten v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (11 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 564), 175. 
 Trotter v. St. Louis & Sub. Ry. Co. 
 
 (Mo. App., 99 S. W. Rep. 608), 119. 
 Trow V. Vermont, etc., R. Co. (24 Vt. 
 
 487), 398. 
 Troy I/. Cape Fear, etc„ R. Co. (99 N. 
 
 Car. 298; 6 S. E. Rep. 77; 6 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 531; 34 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 13), 398. 
 Truitt V. Hannibal & St. Joe R. Co. (62 
 
 Mo. 527), 32. 
 Tucker v. American Car & Foundry Co.. 
 
 (67 Atl. Rep. 616), 482. 
 Tucker v. Duncan (9 Fed. Rep. 867; 6 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 268), 166. 
 Tucker v. New York, etc., R. Co. (124 
 
 N. Y. 308; 26 N. E. Rep. 916), 991. 
 Tucker v. Northern Pacific Co. (41 
 
 Ore. 82; 68 Pac. Rep. 426), 332. 
 Tuff V. Warman (5 C. B. N. S. 573), 
 
 388 
 Tuley' V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (41 Mo. 
 
 App. 432), 798. 
 TulUr V. Talbot (23 111. 357), 693. 
 Tullis V. Lake Erie, etc., R. Co. (175 
 
 U. S. 348), 504. 
 Turess v. New York, etc., R. Co. (61 
 
 N. J. L. 320; 40 Atl. Rep. 614), 
 
 1073. 
 Turley v. Atlanta, etc., Ry. Co. (56 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 748), 717. 
 Turner v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (158 
 
 Mass., 261; 33 N. E. Rep. 520), 864. 
 Turner v. Detroit Southern R. Co. 
 
 (Mich., 100 N. W. Rep. 268), 254. 
 Turner v. Great Eastern R. Co. (33 L. 
 
 T. 431), 481. 
 Turner v. Haar (114 Mo. 336, 347; 21 
 
 S. W. Rep. 737; 180. 
 Turner v, Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (74 
 
 Mo. 602; 6 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 38), 
 
 1033. 
 Turner v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (78 
 
 Mo. 678; 19 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 506), 956. 
 Turner v. St. Clair Tunnel Co. (Ill 
 
 Miq^. 678; 70 N. W. Rep. 146; 66 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 397; 36 L. R. A. 134), 
 
 463. 
 Tuttle V. Atlantic City R. Co. (49 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 450), 30. 
 Tuttle V. Detroit, etc., R. Co. (128 U. 
 
 S. 189; 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1166; 31 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 217), 348. 
 Twitchell v. Grand Trunk R. Co. (39 
 
 Fed. Rep. 419), 325. 
 Twomley v. Central Park R. Co. (69 
 
 N. Y. 158; 18 Am. Ry. Rep. 113), 
 
 798 
 Tyler v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (157 Mass. 
 
 336; 32 N. E. Rep. 229), 1001. 
 Tyler v. New York, etc., R. Co. (137 
 
 Mass. 838; 19 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 296), 1081. 
 Tyler v. Old Colony R. Co. (157 Mass. 
 
 336; 32 N. E. Rep. 287), 956. 
 Tyrrell v. Eastern R. Co. (Ill Mass. 
 
 546), 611. 
 
 cliv 
 
 u 
 
 Ubelman z/. American, etc., Co. (209 Pa. 
 
 398; 58 Atl. Rep. 849), 88. 
 Ulini V. New York, etc., R. Co. (101 
 
 N. Y. 98; 4 N. E. Rep. 636; 23 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 3), 74. 
 Ulrich o. New York, etc., R. Co. (108 
 
 N. Y. 80; 15 N. E. Rep. 60; 8 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 369), 868. 
 Umback v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. (83 
 
 Ind. 191; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 98), 
 
 313. - 
 Underwood v. Metropolitan St. Ry, Co. 
 
 (102 S. W. Rep. 1045), 842. 
 Unger v. Philadelphia, B. & W. R. Co. 
 
 (66 Atl. Rep. 235;' 217, Pa. 106), 
 
 1036. 
 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Adams (33 Kan. 
 
 427; 6 Pac. Rep. 529; 19 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 376), 1009. 
 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Artist (60 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 365; 9 C. C. A. 14; 19 U. S. 
 
 App. 612), 814. 
 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Billeter (28 
 
 Neb. 422; 44 N. W. Rep. 483; 41 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 431), 477. 
 Union Pacific R. Co. v, Botsford (141 
 
 U. S. 250; 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1000; 47 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 406), 93. 
 Union Pac. R. Co. v. Callaghan (56 
 
 Fed. Rep. 988; 19 C. C. A. 205), 22. 
 Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Connolly (109 
 
 N. W. Rep. 368), 929. 
 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Estes (37 Kan. 
 
 715; 16 Pac. Rep. 131), 403. 
 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Evans (52 Neb. 
 
 50; 71 N. W. Rep. 1062), 619. 
 Union Paeific R. Co. v. Fort (17 Wall. 
 . [U. S.] 653), 476. 
 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Gallagher (114 
 
 111. 325), 731. 
 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Greary (52 Kan. 
 
 308; 34 Pac. Rep. 887), 498. 
 Union Pacific R. Co. v. House (1 Wyom. 
 
 27), 176. 
 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Jones (49 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 343; 4 U. S. App. 115), 183. 
 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Kelly (4 Colo. 
 
 App. 325; 35 Pac. Rep. 923), 600. 
 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Lapsley (51 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 174; 8 C. C. A. 149; 4 U. S. 
 
 App. 542; 16 L. R. A. 800), 1057. 
 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Mertes (35 Neb. 
 
 204; 52 N. W. Rep. 1099), 398. 
 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Milliken (8 Kan. 
 - 647), 482. 
 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Monden (50 
 
 Kan. 539; 31 Pac. Rep. 1002; 53 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 363), 343. 
 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Nichols (8 Kan. 
 
 605;. 12 Am. Rep. 476), 564. 
 Union Pacific R. Co. v. O'Brien (49 
 
 Fed. Rep. 638; 4 U. S. App. 221; 
 
 1 C. C. A. 354), 367. 
 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Rollins (5 Kan. 
 
 167), 133. 
 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Rosewater (157 
 
 Fed. Rep. 168), 941. 
 Union Pac. R. Co. u. Springsten (41 
 
 Kan. 784; 21 Pac. Rep. 774), 863. 
 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Young (19 Kan. 
 
 488), 246. 
 
TABLE or CASES CITED. 
 
 [Beferences are to sections.'] 
 
 Union, etc., R. Co. ^. Hand (7 Kan. 380; 
 1 Am. Ry. Rep. 548), 694. 
 
 "r"32r39t%riooirii i%' ct 
 
 Un'loS; etc.^/E"'co. .. Kallahr (12 111. 
 
 UnISS; So.!' R.''co. .. Roark (10 111. 
 
 Un1SS-R."^a Estate (r| Md. 153: 19 
 Atl. Rep. 449; 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 Un"n'T?.^Co. ^. Sawusch (218 111 130; 
 
 76 N. E. Rep. 797; 1 L. R. A. [N. S.] 
 
 670). 246. „ ... ,„„ „ 
 
 Union Traction Co. v. Sullivan (76 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 116), 184. • 
 
 Union Trust Co. v. Thomason (55 K.an. 
 
 1; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 689), 523. 
 United Railroad, etc., Co. K. Biedler (98 
 
 Md. 664; 66 Atl. Rep. 813), 105S. 
 United States v. Central Pacific R.„ Co. 
 
 (118 U. S. 235; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1038), 
 
 United States v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (149 Fed. Rep. 486), 545. . 
 
 United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 
 
 V. Des Moines Nat. Bank (145 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 273), 23. 
 United States v. Great Northern R. Co. 
 
 (150 Fed. Rep. 229), 545. 
 United States, etc., Co. v. Wilder (116 
 
 111. 100; 6 N. E. Rep. 92; 25 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 414), 381. 
 Urias v. Pennsylvania R. Co (152 Pa. 
 
 St. 826; 25 Atl. Rep. 566), 1014. 
 Usher v. West Jersey R. Co. (126 Pa. 
 
 St. 206; 17 Atl. Rep. 597; 41 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 508), 62. 
 
 Vail V. Jacobs (62 Mo. 130), 106. 
 Valente v. Sierra Ry. Co. (91 Pac. Rep. 
 
 481), 676. 
 Valin V. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. (82 
 
 Wis. 1-; 51 N. W. Rep. 1084). 876. 
 VaHance ii. Boston, etc., K. Co. (55 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 364), 916. 
 Valley v. Hall (184 Mass. 358; 68 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 829), 78. 
 Vallo V. U. S. Express Co. (147 Pa. St. 
 
 404; 23 Atl. Rep. 594), 168. 
 Van Amburg ». Vicksburg, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (37 La. Ann. 650; 55 Am. Rep. 617), 
 
 491. 
 Van Avery v. Union Pacific R. Co. (35 
 
 Fed. Rep. 40), 492. 
 Van Blarcom v. Central R. Co. (N. J. 
 
 64 Atl. Rep. Ill), 271. 
 Van DerhoSE v. New York Cent. R. Co. 
 
 (84 N. Y. S. 650; 88 App. Div. 418), 
 
 257. 
 Vandeventer v. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (27 Barb. 244), 45. 
 Vandewater v. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (135 N. Y. 583; 32 N. E. Rep. 636; 
 
 49 N. Y. S. R. 55), 962. 
 Vandewater v. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (74 Hun 32; 56 N. Y. S. R. 208), 
 
 881. 
 
 Van Gent v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (80 
 
 Iowa 626; 45 N. W. Rep. 913), 191. 
 Van Horn v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (42 
 Hun [N. Y.] 654; 113 N. Y. 634; 20 
 
 N. E. Rep. 878; 22 N. Y. S. R. 994), 
 
 327. 
 Van Horn v. Burlington, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (69 Iowa 33; 12 N.W. Rep. •752; 7 
 . Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 691),. 104.- 
 Van Horn v. St. Louis Transit Co. (Mo., 
 
 95 S. W. Rep. 326), 408. 
 Vannata v. Central, etc., R. Co. (154 
 
 Pa. St. 262; 26 Atl. Rep. 384), 481. 
 Van Ostran v. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (36 Hun [N. Y.] 590; 104 , N. Y. 
 
 683), 788. ^ _ 
 
 Van Riper v. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (71 N. J. 345; 69 Atl. Rep. 26), 88. 
 Vant V. Roelofs (66 Atl. Rep. 749), 473. 
 Vant Hul v. Great Northern R. Co. (90 
 
 Minn. 329; 96 N. W. Rep. 789), 252. 
 Van Tassell v. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (1 Miss. 299; 48 N. Y. S. R. 767; 20 
 
 N. Y. Supp. 708), 370. . 
 Van Vactor's Admr. v. Louisville & N. 
 
 R. Co. (23 Ky. L. R. 1743; 66 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 4), 55. „ ^ ,^„ 
 
 Van Wickle v. Manhattan R. Co. (23 
 
 Blatchf. [U. S.] 422; 32 Fed. Rep. 
 
 278), 468. 
 Van Wort v. New Brunswick, etc., K. 
 
 Co. (27 N. Brun. 69), 969. 
 Vartanian v. New York, etc., R. Co. (25 
 
 R. I. 398; 66 Atl. Rep. 184), 374. 
 Vary v. Burlington, etc., R. Co. (42 
 
 Iowa 246), 228. . „ ^ 
 
 Vassor v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 
 
 (54 S. E. Rep. 849). 661. 
 Vaughan v. California, etc., R. Co. (83 
 
 Cal. 18; 23 Pac. Rep. 216), 852. 
 Vautrain v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (8 
 
 Mo. App. 588; 78 Mo. 44), 479. 
 Vawter v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (84 Mo. 
 
 679; 54 Am. Rep. 105; 19 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 176), 47. 
 Veazie v. Penobscot, etc., R. Co. (49 
 
 Me. 119), 914. 
 Vecchioni v. New York, etc., Ry. Co. 
 
 (191 Mass. 9; 77 N. E. Rep. 306), 
 
 S26. 
 Vedder v. Fellows (20 N. Y. 126), 143. 
 Vessels v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co. (108 
 
 S. W. Rep. 678), 801. 
 Vicars v. Wilcox (8 East. 1; 2 Greenl. 
 
 Evid. 210), 24. 
 Vickery v. Omaha, K. C. & E. R. Co. 
 
 (93 Mo. App. 1), 9. 
 Vick V. New York, etc., R. Co. (95 
 
 N. Y. 267; 17 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 609), 139. 
 Vicksburg, etc., R. Co. v. McGowan (62 
 
 Miss. 682), 391. 
 Vicksburg v. McLain (67 Miss. 4; 6 So. 
 
 Rep. 774), 198. 
 Vicksburg, etc., R. Co. v. O'Brien (119 
 
 U. S. 99), 92. 
 Vicksburg, etc., R. Co. v. Putnam (118 
 
 N. S. 545; 27 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 291), 105. 
 Victor, etc., Co. v. Muir (20 Colo. 320; 
 
 38 Pac. Rep. 378; 26 L. R. A. 435), 
 
 366. 
 
 clv 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.'] 
 
 Victor V. Pennsylvania R. Co. (164 Pa. 
 
 St. 105; 30 Atl. Rep. 381), 789. 
 Victorian Ry. Co. o. Coultas (13 App. 
 
 Cas. 228; 6 Ry. & C. T. Cas. 68), 
 
 171. 
 Viets z,. Toledo, etc., R. Co. (55 Mich. 
 
 120; 20 N. W. Rep. 818; 18 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 11), 301. 
 Vimont v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (71 Iowa 
 
 58; 32 N. W. Rep. 100; 28 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 210), 791. 
 Vincennes v. Thuis (28 Ind. App. 523; 
 
 63 N. E. Rep. 315), 1039. 
 Vincennes, etc., Co. v. White (Ind., 24 
 
 N. E. Rep. 745), 353. 
 Vindicator Consolidated, etc., Co. v. 
 
 Firstbrook (86 Pac. Rep. 313), 504. 
 Vinson v, Los Angeles & Pac, R. Co. 
 
 (2 Pac. Rep. 53; 147 Cal. 479), 486. 
 Vinton v. Middlesex R. Co. (11 Allen 
 
 [Mass.] 804), 588. 
 Vion V. Brooks-Scanlon Lumber Co. (99 
 
 Minn. 97), 109. 
 Virginia, etc., R. Co. v. Glower's Admr. 
 
 (102 Va. 867; 47 S. E. Rep. 1003), 
 
 647. 
 Virginia, etc., Ry. Co. v. Hawk (160 
 
 Fed. Rep. 348), 964. 
 Virginia, etc., R. Co. v. Sangor (15 
 
 Gratt. [Va.] 230), 594. 
 A^irginia, etc., R. Co. v. Sayers (26 
 
 Gratt. [Va.] 328). -92. " 
 Virginia, etc., R. Co. v. White (84 Va. 
 
 498; 5 S. E. Rep. 578; 34 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 22), 398. 
 Virginia Midland R. Co. v. Boswell (82 
 
 Va. 932; 7 S. E. Rep. 383), 1084. 
 Virginia Midland R. Co. v. Roach (83 
 
 Va. 37B; 5 S. E. Rep. 175; 34 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 271), 1071. 
 Virginia Midland R. Co. v. Washington 
 
 (86 Va. 629; 10 S. E. Rep. 927; 43 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 688), 817. 
 Vito V. West Chester & Electric Ry. Co. 
 
 (66 Atl. Rep. 669), 500. 
 Voak V. Northern, etc., R. Co. (76 N. Y. 
 
 320), 951. 
 Voelker v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (129 
 
 Fed. Rep. 622), 271. 
 Voigt V. Baltimore, etc., Ry. Co. (176 
 
 U. S. 498), 508. 
 Vosburg V. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (94 N. Y. 378), 265. 
 Vose V. Lancashire, etc., R. Co. (2 H. 
 
 & N. 728; 4 Jur. [N. S.] 364; 24 L. 
 
 & Ex. 244), 461. 
 Voshefsky v. Hillside Coal Go. (21 App. 
 
 Div. 168: 47 N. Y. Supp. 886), 463. 
 
 w 
 
 Wabash R. Co. v. Burris (111 111. App. 
 
 - 258), 249, 
 
 Wabash R. Co. -v. Coble (118 111. 116), 
 
 973. 
 Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Conkling (15 111. 
 
 App. 167), 328. 
 Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Deardruff (14 
 
 III. App. 401), 332. 
 Wabash R. Co. v. Elliott (98 111. 481; 
 
 4 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 661), 899. 
 Wabash, etc, R. Co. v. Farver (111 Ind. 
 
 clvi 
 
 196; 12 N. E. Rep. 296; 31 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. ,Cas. 134), 294. 
 Wabash R. Co. v. Fox (Ohio 69 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 888; 64 Ohio St. 133), 50. 
 Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Hawk (121 111. 
 
 259; 12 N. E. Rep. 253; 81 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 306), 472. 
 Wabash R. R. Co. v. Hencks (91 111. 
 
 406), 461. 
 Wabash R. Co. v. Hicks (13 111 App. 
 
 «07), 990. 
 Wabash R. Co. v. Jellison (124 111. App. 
 
 652), 566. 
 Wabash R. Co. v. Jones (5 111. App. 
 
 607), '459. 
 Wabash R. Co. v. Keim (42 111. App. 
 
 272), 74. 
 Wabash R. Co. v. Kithcart (149 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 108), 273. 
 Wabash, etc., R. Co. -v. Koenigsam (13 
 
 111. App. 506), 605. 
 Wabash R. Co. v. Krugh (13 111. App. 
 
 431), 883. 
 Wabash R. Co. ». McDaniels (107 U. S. 
 
 454; 2 Sup. Ct. Ren. 932), 249. 
 Wabash R. Co. v. Mathew (199 U. S. 
 
 606; 60 L. Ed. 829), 578. 
 Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Moran (13 111. 
 
 App. 72), 468. 
 Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Peyton (106 111. 
 
 634; 46 Am. Rep. 705; 18 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 1), 167. 
 Wabash R. Co. v. Probst (92 111. App. 
 
 485), 368. 
 Wabash, etc., R. Co. V. Rector (104 111. 
 
 296) 692 
 Wabash R.' Co. v. Savage ,(110 Ind. 
 
 166), 736. 
 Wabash R. Co. v. Schevers (18 111. 
 
 App. 52J, 202. 
 Wabash R. Co. v. Shacklett (105 III. 
 
 364; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 106), 
 
 676. 
 Wabash R. Co. v. Thomas (117 111. 
 
 App. 110), 368. 
 Wabash R. Co. i/. Thompson (10 III. 
 
 App. 271), 404. 
 Wabash R. Co. v. Trust Co. (23 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 738), 997. 
 Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Wallace 
 
 (110 111. 114; 19 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 359), 461. 
 Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Weisback (14 
 
 111. App. 625), 453. 
 Waddell v. Metropolitan R. Co. (88 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 765), 183. 
 Wadsworth v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (182 
 
 Mass. 572; 66 N. E. Rep. 421), 759. 
 Waechter v. St. Louis, etc., R. Go. (88 
 
 S. W. Rep., 147), 178. 
 Wagner v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 
 
 (61 S. E. Rep. 171), 626. 
 Wagner v. Boston, etc., Ry. Co. (188 
 
 Mass. 487; 74 N. E. Rep. 919), 374. 
 Wagner v. Elevated R. <;o. (188 Mass. 
 
 437; 74- N. E. Rep. 919), 243. 
 Wagner v. Lament (136 Mich. 521; 98 
 
 ^f. W. Rep. 1), 94. 
 Wagner v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (97 
 
 Mo. 10 S. W. Rep. 480; 3 L. R. A. 
 
 156), 670. 
 Wagner v. New York, etc., R. Go. (86 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.] 
 
 N. Y. S. R. 9S1; 93 App. Div. 14), 
 
 341. 
 Wagner v. New York, etc., R. Co. (78 
 
 N. Y. S. 696; 76 App. Div. 658), 
 
 254. 
 Wagoner v. Wabash R. Co. (94 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 893), 682. 
 Wait V. Omaha, etc., Ry. Co. (165 Mo. 
 • 612; 65 S. W. Rep. 1028), 331. 
 Waite V. Northeastern R. Co. (3 El. Bl. 
 
 & El. 719), 1058. 
 Wakefield v. Connecticut, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (87 Vt. 380), 964. 
 Waldhier v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (87 
 
 Mo. 37), 419. 
 Waldhier v. Railroad (71 Mo. 515), 
 
 136. 
 Walker v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (128 
 
 Mass. 8), 486. 
 Walker v. Carolina Central R. Co. (135 
 
 N. C. 738; 47 S. E. Rep. 675), 382. 
 Walker v. Erie R. Co. (63 Barb. [N. Y.] 
 
 260), 576. 
 Walker v. Gillett (59 Kan. 814; 52 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 442; 10 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. [N. 
 
 S.] 140), 491. 
 Walker v. Louis Werner, etc., Co. (Ark., 
 
 88 S. W. Rep. 988), 899. 
 Walker v. Vicfcsburg, etc., R. Co. (41 
 
 La. Ann. 795; 6 So. Rep. 916; 7 L. 
 
 R. A. Ill; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 172), 787. 
 Walker v. Vicksburg, etc., R. Co. (La., 
 
 34 So. Rep. 749), 66. 
 Walkowski v. Penokee, etc.. Con. Mines 
 
 (115 Mich. 629; 73 "N. W. Rep. 95; 
 
 41 L. R. A. 33), 146. 
 Wallace v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (72 N. 
 
 H. 504; 67 Atl. Rep. 913), 263. 
 Wallace v. Central, etc., Ry. Co. (63 Hun 
 
 638; 18 .N. Y. S. 280), 868. 
 Wallace v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (99 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 1135), 67. 
 Wallace v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (74 
 
 Mo. 694), 661. 
 Wallace v. Western, etc., R. Co. (98 N. 
 
 Car. 494; 4 S. E. Rep. 603; 8 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 846; 84 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 663), 
 
 669. 
 Wallace v. Western, etc., R. Co. (104 
 
 No. Car. 442; 10 S. E. Rep. 668; 41 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 812), 182. 
 Wallace v. Western, etc., R. Co. (101 
 
 No. Car. 454; 8 S. E. Rep. 166; 37 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 159), 799. 
 Wallace v. Wilmington, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (Del., 18 Atl. Rep. 818), 620. 
 Waller v. Hannibal, etc., Ry. Co. (83 
 
 Mo. 608), 715. 
 Waller v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (59 
 
 Mo. App. 410), 626. 
 Walling V. Trinity & Brazos Valley Ry. 
 
 Co. (106 S. W. Rep. 417), 651. 
 Walsh V. Fitchburg, etc., R. Co. (145 
 
 N. Y. 301; 39 N. E. Rep. 1068; 45 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 616; 27 L. R. A. 724), 
 
 1078. 
 Walsh V. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (108 
 
 Mo. 582; 14 S. W. Rep. 873), 104. 
 
 Walsh V. New York, etc., R. Co. (160 
 
 • Mass. 571; 36 N. E. Rep. 684; 39 
 
 Am. St. Rep. 614), 463. 
 
 Walter v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (39 
 
 Iowa 33; 9 Am. Ry. Rep. 78; 20 Am. 
 
 Ry. Rep. 319), 786. 
 Walters v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (36 
 
 Iowa 458), 62. 
 Walters v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (41 
 
 Iowa 71), 198. 
 Walthers zi. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (72 III. 
 
 App. 354), 716. 
 Wamsley v. Cleveland, etc., Ry. Co. (88 
 
 N. E. Rep. 490), 985. 
 Wandell v. Corbin (17 N. Y. S. R. 18; 
 
 1 N. Y. Supp. 796), 557. 
 Wanless v.' Northeastern R. Co. (25 L. 
 
 T. 103) 983. 
 Warburton v. Great Western R. Co. (2 
 
 Ex. 80; 36 L. J. Ex. 9; 4 H. & C. 
 
 695; 16 W. R. 108; 15 L. T. 361), 
 
 481. 
 Ward V. Bonner (80 Tex. 168; 16 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 806), 333. 
 Ward V. Brooklyn Heights, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (104 N. Y. Supp. 96; 115 App. Div. 
 104), 1055. 
 Ward V. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. (39 
 
 W. Va. 46; 19 S. E. Rep. 389), 500. 
 Ward V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (85 Wis. 
 
 601; 65 N. W. Rep. 771), 104. 
 Ward V. Manhattan Ry. Co. (88 N. Y. 
 
 S. R. 768; 95 App. Div. 437), 383. 
 Ward V. Railway Co. (29 Wis. 148), 
 
 249. 
 Warden v. Humeston, etc., R. Co. (72 
 
 Iowa 201; 33 N. W. Rep. 629), 69. 
 Warden v. Humeston, etc., R. Co. (76 
 
 Iowa 310; 41 N. W. Rep. 26), 192. 
 Warden v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (35 
 
 Mo. App. 631), 784. 
 Warden v. Railroad Co. (94 Ala. 277; 
 
 10 So. Rep. 876; 14 L. R. A. 552), 
 
 349. 
 Warden v. Railway Co. (137 Mass. 
 
 204), 249. 
 Warner v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. (168 
 
 U. S. 339; 42 L. Ed. 491), 638. 
 Warner v. Erie R. Co. (39 N. Y. 468), 
 
 461. 
 Warner v. New York R. Co. (44 N. 
 
 Y. 466), 661. 
 Warren v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (113 
 
 Mo. App. 498; 87 S. W. Rep. 685), 
 
 360. 
 Warren v. Fitchburg, etc., R. Co. (8 
 
 Allen [Mass.] 287), 552. 
 Warren v. Southern, etc., R. Co. (37 
 
 Kan. 408; 16 Pac. Rep. 601; 31 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 10), 779. 
 Washburn v. Nashville, etc., R. Co. (3 
 
 Head. [Tenn.] 638), 479. 
 Washington A. & G. R. Co. v. Brown 
 
 (84 U. S. 463; 17 Wall. 445; 21 
 
 Ed. 675), 236. 
 Washington v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 
 • (17 W. Va. 190; 10 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 749), 4. 
 Washington, etc., Ry. Co. v. Chapman 
 
 (26 App. [D. C] 472), -576. 
 Washington, etc., R. Co. v. Harmon (147 
 
 U. S. 571; 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 567), 
 
 708. 
 Washington, etc., R. Co. v. Hickey 
 
 (168 U. S. 681; 41 L. Ed. 1101), 33. 
 
 clvii 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.] 
 
 Washington, etc., Ry. Co. v. McDade 
 
 (136 TJ. S. 554), 141. 
 Waterman v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. tSZ 
 
 Wis. 613; 58 N. W. Rep. 247; 68 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 598), 183. 
 Watkins v. Birmingham, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (120 Ala. 147), 789. 
 Watson V. Coal Cfo. (68 Mo. App. 866), 
 
 128. „ 
 
 Watson V. Erie R. Co. (8 Ohio- N. P. 
 
 18; 10 Ohio S. & C. P. 464), 88. 
 Watson V. Georeia, etc., R. Co. (81 
 
 Ga. 476; 7 S. E. Rep. 864), 787. 
 Watson V. Houston, etc., R. Co. (58 
 
 Tex. 434; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 , 313), 358. 
 Watson V. Kansas, etc., Co. (58 Mo. 
 
 App. 366), 380. 
 Watson V. Manitou & Pike's Peak Ry. 
 
 Co. (98 Pac. Rep. 17), 861. 
 Watson V. Mound City, etc.. Railroad 
 
 (133 Mo. 846; 34 S. W. Rep. 573), 
 
 136. 
 Watson V. Wabash, etc., R. Co. (66 
 
 Iowa 164; S3 N. W. Rep. 380; 19 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 114), 1069, . 
 Watts V. Camours (115 U. S. 353), 
 
 868. 
 Watts V. Hart (7 Wash. 178; 34 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 483, 771), 350. 
 Waxahachie Oil, etc., Co. v. McLain 
 
 (Tex., 66 S. W. Rep. 826), 308. 
 Way V. Chicago, etc., R. C^o. (73 Iowa 
 
 463; 35 N. W. Rep. 525; 84 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 286), 667. 
 Wayne, etc., R. Co. v. Gildersleeve (33 
 
 Mich. 133), 348. 
 Weaver v. Columbus, etc., Ry. Co. (81 
 
 N. E. Rep. 180), 967. 
 Weaver v. Southern Ry. Co. (66 S. E. 
 
 Rep. 657; 76 S. C. 49), 411. 
 Webb V. Denver, etc., R. Co. (7 Utah 
 
 363; 26 Pac. Rep. 981), 486. 
 Webb V. East Tenn. R. Co. (88 Tenn. 
 
 119; 18 S. W. Rep. 428; 48 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 44), 58. 
 Webb V. Gulf, etc., R. Co. (Tex., 65 
 
 S. W. Rep. 684), 339. 
 Webb V. Penobscot, etc., R. Co. (57 Me. 
 
 119), 946. 
 Webb V. Portland R. Co. (57 Me. 117), 
 
 877. 
 Webb V. Richmond, etc., R. Co. (97 
 
 N. C. 387; 8 S. E. Rep. 440), 485. 
 Weber v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (100 
 
 Mo. 194; 18 S. W. Rep. 804; 18 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 641; 7 L. R. A. 819), 708. 
 Weber v. New York, etc., R. Co. (68 
 
 N. Y. 451), 916. 
 Webster v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. (105 
 
 S. W. Rep. 946), 862. 
 Webster v. Fitchbure, etc., R. Co. (161 
 
 Mass. 898; 37 NT E. Rep. 165; 58 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 1), 552. 
 Webster v. Hudson River R. Co. (38 
 
 N. Y. 860), 1041. 
 Webster v. Norwegian, etc., Co. (137 
 
 Cal. 399; 70 Pac. Rep. 876), 69. 
 Webster v. Rome, etc., R. Co. (115 N. 
 
 Y. 118; 21 N. E. Rep. 726). 803. 
 Weed V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (Neb., 
 
 99 N. W. Rep. 887), 849. 
 
 clviii 
 
 Weed V. Railroad Co. (17 N. Y. 362), 
 
 663. 
 Week V. Fremont, etc., Co. (3 Wash. 
 
 629; 29 Pac. Rep. 216), 344. 
 Weeks v. New Orleans, etc., R. Co, (32 
 
 La. Ann. 616), 405. 
 Weeks v. New Orleans, etc., R. Co. (40 
 
 La. Ann. 800; 6 So. Rep. 78; 8 Am. 
 
 St. Rep. 560), 795. 
 Weeks v. New York, etc., R. Co. (72 
 
 N. Y. 50; 9 Hun 669; 88 Am. Rep. 
 
 104), 767. 
 Weeks v. Scharer (111 Fed. Rep. 330; 
 
 49 C. C. A. 378), 354. 
 Weger v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. (68 Pa. 
 
 [5 P. F. Sm.] 460), 3. 
 Weideman v. Tacoma, etc., R. Co. (7 
 
 Wash 517; 35 Pac. Rep. 414), 98. 
 Weightman v. Washington (66 U. S. 
 
 39) 133 ' 
 
 Weile'r v. 'Manhattan R. Co. (6 N. Y. 
 
 Supp. 320), 183. 
 Weisser v. Southern Pac. R. Co. (88 
 
 Pac. Rep. 43B). 500. 
 Weist V. Coal Cr. R. Co. (Wash., 84 
 
 Pac. Rep. 786), 78. 
 Welch V. New York, etc., R. Co. (43 N. 
 
 Y. S. R. 968; 63 Hun 686), 848. 
 Weldon v. Third Ave. R. Co. (3 App. 
 
 Div. 370; 38 N. Y. Supp. 806), 1057. 
 Weller v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (120 
 
 Mo. 636; 83 S W. Rep. 1061; 86 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 632), 1011. ^ 
 Weller v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (164 
 
 Mo. 180; 64 S. W. Rep. 141; 86 
 
 Am. St Rep. 692), 996. 
 Wellman v. Oregon, etc., R. Co. (21 
 
 Ore. 630; 28 Pac. Rep. 625), 498. 
 Wellmeyer v. St. Louis Transit Co. (96 
 
 S. W. Rep. 925), 801. 
 Wells V. Burlington, etc., R. Co. (66 
 
 Iowa S20), 381. 
 Wells z/. Denver, etc., R. Co. (7 Utah 
 
 482; 27 Pac. Rep. 688), 191. 
 Wells V. New York, etc., R. Co. (84 N. 
 
 Y. 181), 848. 
 Welsch V. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (72 
 
 Mo. 451; 37 Am. Rep. 440; 6 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 75), 931. 
 Welsh V. Alaliama, etc., R. Co. (70 
 
 Miss. 20; 11 So. Rep. 728), 404. 
 Welsh V. Butts (802 Pa. 69; 51 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 691), 309. 
 Welsh V. New York, etc., R. Co. (176 
 
 Mass. 398: 67 N. E. Rep. 668), 611. 
 Welsh V. West Jersey R. Co. (68 N. J. 
 
 L. 655; 48 Atl. Rep. 736; IS Am. & 
 
 Eng. Cas. [N. S.I 674), 786. 
 Wendall v. C3iicago & Alton R. Co. (100 
 
 Mo. App. 656; 76 S. W. Rep. 689), 
 
 166. 
 Wendell v. New York, etc., R. Co. (91 
 
 N. Y. 420), 1005. 
 Wengler v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co, (16 
 
 Mo. App. 498), 1009. 
 Wennecker v. Missouri, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (169 Mo. 692; 70 S. W. Rep. 146), 
 
 566. 
 Wentworth v. Duffy (68 Mo. App. 613), 
 
 1106. 
 Wentworth v. Eastern, etc., R. Co. (148 ■ 
 Mass. 248; 9 N. E. Rep. 668), 99. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 IReferenoes are to sections.} 
 
 Werle v. Long Island R. Co. (98 N. Y. 
 
 660; 21 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 429), 
 
 801. 
 Wertheimer v. Saunders (96 Wis. 673; 
 
 70 N. W. Rep. 884; 37 L. R. A. 146), 
 
 284. 
 Wesley i/. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (84 
 
 Iowa 441; 61 N. W. Rep. 163), 1022. 
 West Chester, etc., R. Co. v. McElwee 
 
 (67 Pa. St. 311), 94. 
 West Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Anderson 
 
 (200 111. 389; 65 N. E. Rep. 717), 
 
 229 
 West Chicago R. Co. v. Binder (52 111. 
 
 App. 420), 784. 
 West Chicago R. Co. v. Dougherty (110 
 
 111. App. 204; 209 111. 241; 70 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 686), 1050. 
 West Chicago, etc., R.- Co. v. DedlofE 
 
 (92 111. App. 547), 1039. 
 West Chicago R. Co. v. Martin (47 111. 
 
 App. 610), 675. 
 West Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Peters 
 
 (196 111. 298; 63 N. E. Rep. 662), 
 
 1056. 
 West Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Piper (165 
 
 III. 325; 64 111. App. 605; 46 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 186), 1044. 
 West V. St. Louis, etc. Co. (63 III. 545), 
 
 236. 
 West Hamshire Co. v. Great Eastern R. 
 
 Co. (64 L. J. Q. B. [N. S.] 340), 623. 
 Westbrook v. Mobile, etc., R. Co. (66 
 
 Miss. 660; 6 So. Rep. 321), 1058. 
 Westcott V. New York, etc., R. Co. (163 
 
 Mass. 460; 87 N. E. Rep. 10), 340. 
 Westerkamp v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. 
 
 Co. (92 Pac. Rep. 687), 1011. 
 Western Anthracite Co. v. Beaver (95 
 
 111. App... 95; 61 N. E. Rep. 335), 6. 
 Western A. R. Co. v. Strong (62 Ga. 
 
 461; 8 Am. Ry. Rep. 13), 58. 
 Western Maryland R. Co. v. Herold 
 
 (74 Md. 519; 22 Atl. Rep. 323), 788. 
 Western Steel Car & Foundry Co. v. 
 
 Nowalaniak (135 111. App. 137), 948. 
 Western Union R. Co. v. Fulton (64 
 
 111. 271), 960. 
 Western Union Tel. Co. v. McGill (57 
 
 Fed. Rep. 699), 68. 
 Western, etc., R. Co. v. Atlanta (74 Ga. 
 
 774; 19 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 233), 
 
 961. 
 ,Western, etc., R. Co. -v. Bishop (50 Ga. 
 
 465), 860. 
 Western, etc., R. Co. v. Drysdale (51 
 
 Ga. 644; 7 Am. Ry. Rep. 343), 177. 
 Western, etc., R. Co. v. Jones (65 Ga. 
 
 631; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 867), 
 
 968. 
 Western, etc., R. Co. v. Moran (116 
 
 Ga. 441; 42 S. E. Rep. 737), 338. 
 Western, etc., Ry. Co. v. Russell (Ala., 
 
 39 So. Rep. 311), 258. 
 Western, etc., R. Co. v. Sistrunk (85 
 
 Ala. 352; 5 So. Rep. 79), 976. 
 Western, etc., R. Co. v. Turner (78 Ga. 
 
 898: 53 Am. Rep. 842; 88 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 456), 178. 
 Western, etc., R. Co. v. Voils (98 Ga. 
 
 446; 26 S. E. Rep. 483; 36 L. R. A. 
 
 665), 696. 
 
 Western R. Co. v. Young (51 Ga. 489; 7 
 
 Am. Ry. Rep. 352), 789. 
 Western, etc., R. Co. v. Young (81 Ga. 
 
 397; 7 S. E. Rep. 912; 37 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 489), 60. 
 Waston V. Lackawana Co. (105 Mo. App. 
 
 702), 404. 
 Whalen v. Areata, etc. R. Co. (92 Cal. 
 
 669; 28 Pac. Rep. 833),. 998. 
 Whalen v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (75 Iowa 
 
 563; 39 N. W. Rep. 894; 38 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 141), 522. 
 Whalen v. Illinois, etc., R. Co. (16 111. 
 
 App. 320), 374. 
 Whalen v. Mad River R. Co. (8 Ohio 
 
 St. 249), 468. 
 Whalen v. Michigan, etc., R. Co. (114 
 
 Mich. 512; 72 N. W. Rep. 323), 500. 
 Whalen v. New York, etc., R. Co. (68 
 
 Hun 431; 35 N. Y. S. R. 566; 18 JST. 
 
 Y. Supp. 587), 1001. 
 Whalen v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (60 
 
 Mo. 383; 9 Am. Ry. Rep. 284), 771. 
 Wheaton v. North Beach R. Co. (36 
 
 Cal. 690), 588. 
 Wheelan v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (85 
 
 Iowa 167; 58 N. W. Rep. 119; 49 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 693), 191. 
 Whelan v. Georgia, etc., R. Co. (84 Ga. 
 
 506; 10 S. E. Rep. 1091; 44 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 335), 788. 
 Whelan v. Rio Grande, etc., R. Co. (Ill 
 
 Fed. Rep. 326), 64. 
 Whelen v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (75 
 
 Wis. 654; 44 N. W. Rep. 849; 41 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 558), 875. 
 Whelen v. New York, etc., R. Co. (38 
 
 Fed. Rep. 15), 922. 
 Wheeler v. San Francisco R. Co. (31 
 
 Cal. 46), 810. 
 Wheeling & L. E. Ry. Co. v. Parker 
 
 (29 Ohio Civ. St. R. 1), 959. 
 Wheeling, etc., R. Co. v. Suhrwiar (67 
 
 Ohio St. 497; 67 N. E. Rep. 1100), 
 
 1055. 
 Wheelock v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (105 
 
 Mass. 803), 638. 
 Whelton v. West End R. Co. (178 Mass. 
 
 555; 52 N. E. Rep. 1078), 609. 
 White V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (136 Mass. 
 
 321), 596. 
 White V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (144 Mass. 
 
 404; 11 N. E. Rep. 552; 30 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 615), 650. • 
 White V. Central R. Co. (83 Ga. 596; 
 
 10 S. E. Rep. 273), 876. 
 White B. Fitchburg, etc.,' R. Co. (136 
 
 Mass. 321; 18 Am. &, Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 140), 678. 
 White V. Green (Tex., 82 S. W. Rep. 
 
 329) 886 ' 
 
 White ' V. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. (61 
 
 Wis. 536; 21 N. W. Rep. 584; 50 Am. 
 
 Rep. 164; 18 Am. & Eng. R. Cas.), 93. 
 White v. Rio Grande, etc., R. Co. (Utah, 
 
 71 Pac. Rep. 593), 40. 
 White V. Southern R. Co. (183 Ga. 353; 
 
 61 S. E. Rep. 411), 91. 
 White V. Wabash R. Co. (34 Mo. App. 
 
 57), 878. 
 White V. Whitman Co. (58 Hun 381; 18 
 
 N. Y. Supp. 188; 131 N. Y. 631; 30 
 
 N. E. Rep. 236), 275. 
 
 clix 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITEOJ. 
 
 [Befefencea are to sections.'] 
 
 White V. Wilmington City R. Co. (Del., 
 
 63 Atl. Rep. 931), 33. 
 Whitehead v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (8Z 
 
 Mo. App. 60), 884. 
 Whitehead v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (99 Mo. 863: 11 S. W. Rep. 751; 6 
 
 L. R. A. 409), 670. 
 Whitelaw v. Memphis, etc., R. Co. (16 
 
 Lea [Tenn.] 591j 1 S. W. Rep. 87), 
 
 808. 
 Whitford v. Panama R. Co. (83 N. Y. 
 
 467), 48. 
 Whitley v. Chicago,' B. & Q. Ry. Co. 
 
 (83 S. W. Rep. 68; 109 Mo. App. 123), 
 
 408. 
 Whitlow V. Nashville, etc., R. Co. (Tenn., 
 
 84 S. W. Rep. 618), 47. 
 Whitman v. Fisher (98 Me. 577; 67 
 
 Atl. Rep. 895), 1056. 
 Whitman v. Wisconsin, etc., R. Co. (58 
 
 Wis. 408: 17 N. W. Rep. 184; 12 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 214T, 468. 
 Whitmore v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (150 
 
 Mass. 477; 28 N. E. Rep. 220), 412. 
 Whitney v. Maine, etc., R. Co. (69 Me. 
 
 208), 995. 
 Whitney v. Texas -Cent. R. Co. (110 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 70), 1069. 
 Whitaker v. Eighth Ave., etc., R. Co. (51 
 
 N.- Y. 895), 92. 
 Whittaker v. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (49 
 
 Hun 400; 22 N. Y.- S. R. 405), 471. 
 Whittaker v. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (186 
 
 N. Y. 544; 27 N. E. Rep. 1042), 263. 
 Whittaker v. Helena (14 Mont. 124; 85 
 
 Pac. Rep. 904; 43 Am. St. Rep. 621), 
 
 1063. 
 Whittelsey v. Burlington, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (121 Iowa 697; 90 N. W. Rep. 
 
 516), 97. 
 Whitton V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (2 
 
 Biss. [U. S.] 282), 205. 
 Wichita, etc., R. Co. v. Davis (37 Kan. 
 
 743; 16 Pac. Rep. 78; 32 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 65), 1036. 
 Wiggin V. St. Louis (136 Mo. 668; 37 
 
 S. W. Rep. 528), 285. 
 Wightman v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (73 
 
 Wis. 169; 40 N. W. Rep. 689; 2 L. 
 
 R. A. 186), 668. 
 Wilburn v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (48 
 
 Mo. App. 224), 657. 
 Wilburn v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (36 
 
 Mo. App. 203), 714. 
 Wild V. Oregon, etc., R. Co. (21 Oregon 
 
 159; 27 Pac. Rep. 954), 321. 
 Wilds V. Brunswick, etc., R. Co. (82 
 
 Ga. 667: 9 S. E. Rep. 695), 1097. 
 Wilds V. Hudson River R. Co. (84 N. Y. 
 
 432), 451. 
 Wilds V. Hudson River R. Co. (89 N-. Y. 
 
 316, 886), 661. 
 Wilkes V. Buffalo Ry. Co. (65 Atl. Rep. 
 
 787), 568. 
 Wilkins v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (101 
 
 Mo. 98: 18 S. W. Rep. 893). 1028. 
 Wilkinson, etc., Co. v. Dickinson (86 
 
 Ind. App. 280; 73 N. E. Rep. 967), 
 
 85. 
 Wilburn v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (36 
 
 Mo. App. 203), 832. 
 Willetts V. Buffalo, etc., R. Co. (14 Barb. 
 
 [N. Y.]. 686), 389. 
 
 clx 
 
 Willfong V. Omaha, etc., R. Co. (116 
 
 Iowa 548; 90 N. W. Rep. 358), 1056. 
 Williams v. Alaska, etc., Co. (8 Alaska 
 
 43), 204. 
 Williams v. Belmont, etc., Co. (55 W. 
 
 Va. 84; 46 S. E. Rep. 808), 317. 
 Williams v. Car Co. (40 La. Ann. 417), 
 
 595. 
 Williams v. Chicago, etc.. R. Co. (106 
 
 Mo. App. 61; 79 S. W. Rep. 1167), 43. 
 Williams v. Chicago, etc., K. Co. (64 
 
 Wis. 1; 24 N. W. Rep. 423), 401. 
 Williams v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (l36 
 
 111. 491; 26 N. E. Rep. 661; 32 111. 
 
 App. 339), 964. 
 Williams v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (Ill 
 
 N. W. Rep. 5961, 878. 
 Williams v. Choctaw & R. Co. (149 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 104), 413. 
 Williams v. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (116 
 
 N. Y. 628; 22 N. E. Rep. 1117; 41 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 854), 341. 
 Williams v. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (2 
 
 N. Y. Supp. 436; 18 N. Y. S. R. 857; 
 
 60 Hun 600), 347. 
 Williams v. Fresno, etc., Co. (96 Cal. 
 
 14; 80 Pac. Rep. 961; 31 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 178), 284. 
 Williams v. Great Northern R. Co. (68 
 
 Minn. 55), 101. 
 Williams v. Iowa Central R. Co. (96 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 774), 532. 
 Williams v. Kansas City, 
 
 (96 Mo. 275; 9 S. W. Rep. 573; 37 
 
 Sansas City, etc. R. Co. 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 329), 843. 
 Williams v. Louisville, etc.j R. Co. (23 
 
 Ky. L. R. 1124; 64 S. W. Rep. 738), 
 
 342. 
 Williams v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (43 
 
 So. Rep. 676), 686. 
 Williams v. Missouri Pacific R. Co. (109 
 
 Mo. 476; 18 S. W. Rep. 1098), 488. 
 Williams v. Mobile, etc., R. Co. (Miss., 
 
 19 So. Rep. 90), 1070. 
 Williams v. Nally (80 Ky. L. R. 244; 
 
 45 S. W. Rep. 874), 92. 
 Williams v. Nashville (Tenn.. 63 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 231), 878. 
 Williams v. Northern, etc., Co. (Minn., 
 
 118 Fed. Rep. 882), 382. 
 Williams v. Quebec S. S. Co. (126 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 591), 66. 
 Williams v. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. (96 
 
 S. W. Rep. 307), 739. 
 Williams v. Southern Pacific R. Co. (9 
 
 Pac. Rep. 152; 11 Pac. Rep. 849), 
 
 1084. 
 Williams v. Southern R. Co. (68 S. C. 
 
 369; 47 S. E. Rep. 706), 91. 
 Williams v. South, etc., R. Co. (91 Ala. 
 
 636; 9 So. Rep. 77), 62. 
 Williams v. Texas, etc., R. Co. (60 Tex. 
 
 205), 1058. 
 Williams v. Vanderbilt (28 N. Y. 217), 
 
 668. 
 Williamson v. Central (66 S. E. Rep. 
 
 119), 661. 
 Williamson v. Grand Trunk Ry. (17 Up. 
 
 Can. [C. P.] 616), 39. 
 Williamson v. Sheldon, etc., Co. (66 Vt. 
 
 f27), 808. 
 Williard v. Spartanburg, etc., R. Co. (124 
 
 Fed. Rep. 796), 236. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.'] 
 
 Willis V. Long Island R. Co. (32 Barb. 
 
 398), 774. „ „ 
 
 Willis V. Long Island R. Co. (34 N. Y. 
 
 670), 801. „ , _ 
 
 Willis V. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (61 Tex. 
 
 438; 23 Am. & Eng. R., Cas. 379), 44. 
 Willmott V. Consolidated, etc„ Ry. Co. 
 
 (106 Mo. 635; 17 S. W. Rep. 490), 
 
 861. 
 Willoaghby v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (37 
 
 Iowa 432), 995. „ , 
 
 Wills V. Cape Girardeau, etc., R. Co. (44 
 
 Mo. App. 51), 407. 
 Wilmington Star Mining Co. v. Fulton 
 
 (27 U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep. 412), 388. 
 Wilmuth's Admr. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. 
 
 (76 S. W..Rep. 193V 269. 
 Wilsey v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (83 Ky. 
 
 511), 729. 
 Wilsie V. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (83 
 
 Ky. 511), 557. 
 Wilson V. Earner L., etc., Co. (108 La. 
 
 Ann. 590: 32 So. Rep. 460J, 64. 
 Wilson V. Brett (11 M. & W. 115), 15. 
 Wilson V. Louisville & N. R. Co. (85 
 
 Ala. 269: 4 So. Rep. 701), 162. 
 Wilson V. Madison, etc., R. Co. (18 Ind. 
 
 226), 491. 
 Wilson t/. Middlesex R. Co. (107 Mass. 
 
 108; 126 Mass. 130), 561. 
 Wilson V. New Orleans, etc., R. Co. (68 
 
 Miss. 9; 8 So. Rep. 330), 785. 
 Wilson V. New York, etc., R. Co. (18 
 
 R. L 598; 29 Atl. Rep. 300), 1053. 
 Wilson V. Northern Pac. R. Co. (26 
 
 Minn. 278: 3 N. W. Rep. 333), 39. 
 Wilson V. Rochester, etc., R. Co. (16 
 
 Barb. [N. Y.) 167), 886. 
 Wilson V. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. 
 
 (58 S. E. Rep. 1019), 641. 
 Wilton V. Northern R. Co. (5 Ont. 490), 
 
 957 
 Winchell v. Abbott (77 Wis. 371), 945. 
 Winchell v. New York Cent. & H. R. 
 
 Co. (105 N. Y. S. 425), 664. 
 Winkler v. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (Del., 63 Atl. Rep. 90), 264. 
 Winkler v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (21 
 
 Mo. App. 99), 172. 
 Winnegar v. Central Pass. R. Co. (85 
 
 Ky. 547; 4 S. W. Rep. 237; 34 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 462), 745. 
 Winnt V. International, etc., R. Co. (74 
 
 Tex. 32; 11 S. W. Rep. 907), 66. 
 Winona, etc., Co. v. Hohlquist (51 III. 
 
 App. 507), SOD. 
 Winship v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (170 
 
 Mass. 464; 49 N. E. Rep. 647), 677. 
 Winslow V. Boston, etc., K. Co. (11 N. 
 
 Y. S. R. 831). 1075. 
 Winstanley v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (72 
 
 Wis, 375; 39 N. W. Rep. 867; 35 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 370), 946. 
 Winterbottom v. Wright (10 M. & W. 
 
 109), 18. . 
 Winters v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (39 
 
 Mo. 468), 802. 
 Wisconsin, etc., R. Co. v. Ross (142 111. 
 
 9; 31 N. E. Rep. 412; 43 111. App. 
 
 464; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 73), 598. 
 Wise V. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (91 Ky. 
 
 637), 737. 
 
 Wise Terminal Co. v. McCormick (Va., 
 
 51 S. E. Rep. 731), 27. 
 Withers v. North Kent R. Co. (27 L. 
 
 J. tExch.] 417), 685. 
 Withers v. Railway (3 H. & N. 969), 32. 
 Wiwirowski v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (124 N. Y. 420; 26 N. E. Rep. 1023; 
 
 36 N. Y. S. R. 405), 1003. 
 Woas V. Transit Co. (198 Mo. 664; 96 
 
 S. W. Rep. 1017; 7 L. R. A. [N. S.] 
 
 231), 758. 
 Wolf V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (Ill N. 
 
 W. 514), 787. 
 Wolf v. Chicago Union Tr. Co. (119 111. 
 
 App. 481), 116. 
 Wolsey T/. Railroad Co. (33 Ohio St. 
 
 234), 143. 
 Womack v. Central R. Co. (80 Ga. 132; 
 
 5 S. E. Rep. 63); 61. 
 
 Womble v. Merchants Co. (135 N. C. 
 
 474; 47 S. E. Rep. 493), 119. 
 Wonder v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. (32 
 
 Md. 411), 600. * 
 
 Wood V. Central, etc., R. Co. (84 Ga. 
 
 363; 10 S. E. Rep. 967). 647. 
 Wood V. Georgia, etc., R. Co. (84 Ga. 
 
 363; 10 S. E. Rep. 967), 150. 
 Wood V. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. (49 
 
 Mich. 370; 13 N. W. Rep. 779; 8 Am. 
 
 6 Eng. R. Cas. 478), 664. 
 Wood V. Luscomb (23 Wis. 287), 228. 
 Wood V. Metropolitan, etc., R. Co. (181 
 
 Mo. 433 ; 81 S. W. Rep. 152), 10/). 
 Wood V. Rio Grande R. Co. (Utah, 79 
 
 Pac. Rep. 182), 246.- 
 Wood V. Wilmington City Ry. Co. (64 
 
 Atl. Rep. 246), 110. 
 Wooden v. Western, etc., R. Co. (46 
 
 N. Y. S. R. 77; 43 N. Y. S. R. 
 
 218), 374. 
 Wooden v. Western, etc., R. Co. (25 N. 
 
 Y. Supp. 977; 6 Misc. 537), 379. 
 Wooden v. Western, etc., R. Co. (126 
 
 N. Y. 10; 26 N. E. Rep. 1060), 48. 
 Wooden v. Western, etc., R. Co. (147 
 
 N. Y. 508; 70 N. Y. S. R. 83; 42 N. 
 
 E. Rep. 199), 491. 
 Woodman v. Metropolitan R. Co. (149 
 
 Mass. 336; 21 N. E. Rep. 482; 38 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 484), 285. 
 Woods' Admr. v. Southern Ry. Co. (Va., 
 
 62 S. E. Rep. 371), 262. 
 Woods V. Missouri, etc., R. Co. (51 Mo. 
 
 App. 600), 94. 
 Woods V. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. (36 
 
 Wash. 658; 79 Pac. Rep. 309), 348. 
 Woods V. Southern Pacific R. Co. (9 
 
 Utah 146: 33 Pac. Rep. 628), 801. 
 Woodstock Iron Works v. Cline (43 So. 
 
 Rep. 362), 188. 
 Woodward Iron, etc., Co. v. Cook (124 
 
 Ala. 343), 312. 
 Woodward v. Kentucky C. R. Co. (Ky., 
 
 16 S. W. Rep. 178), 1080. 
 Woodward v. Michigan So., etc., R. Co. 
 
 (10 Ohio St. 121), 49. . 
 Woodward v. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (106 N. -Y. 369; 13 N. E. Rep. 424; 
 
 32 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 137), 1006. 
 Woodworth v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co. (5 
 
 McCrary [U. S.] 674; 1,8 Fed. Rep. 
 
 $82), 336. 
 
 clxi 
 
TABLB* OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.} 
 
 Woolery v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (lOT* 
 
 Ind. 381; 8 N. E. Rep. 286; 67 Am. 
 
 Rep. 114; 27 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 210), 789. 
 Woodley v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. (8 
 
 Mackey [D. C] 64a)J943. 
 Wooley V. Grand St.,l^etc., R. Co. (83 
 
 N. Y. 121; 3 Ami & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 398^ 97. ' 
 
 Woolsey v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co. (108 
 
 N. Y. S. 16), 651. 
 Woolwine v, Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. (36 
 
 W. Va. 329; 15 S. E. Rep. 81; 50 
 
 Am. & Eng. R, Cas. 37), 859. 
 Wooster v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (74 
 
 Iowa 593; Sfii Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 152), 398. '' 
 Worcester v.j Galveston, etc., R. Co. 
 
 (Tex., 91 S. W. Rep. 339), 386. 
 Worden v. Hinnesboy & S. Ry. Co. (78 
 
 Iowa 201; 33 N. W. Rep. 629), 3. 
 Worden Vi Humesfon, etc., R. Co. (76 
 
 Iowa 310; 41 N. W. Rep. 26), 83. 
 Worheide v. Missouri, etc., Co. (32 Mo. 
 
 App. 367), 337. 
 Wormell v. Maine C. R. Co. (79 Me. 
 
 397; 10 Atl. Rep. 49; 31 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 272), 399. 
 Wormington v. Atchison, etc., R. Co. (46 
 
 Mo. App. 159), 483. 
 Worthington v. Central Vermont R. Co. 
 
 (64 Vt. 107; 23 Atl. Rep. 590; 15 L. 
 
 R. A. 326; 62 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 384), 801. 
 Worthragton v. Coforth (Ala., 26 So. 
 
 Rep. 631), 308. 
 Wright V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (142 Mass. 
 
 296; 7 N. E. Rep. 866; 88 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 65^), 861. 
 Wright V. Boston & M. R. R. (65 Atl. 
 
 Rep. 687), 1032. 
 Wright V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (129 
 
 Mass. 440; 2 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 121), 1062. 
 Wright V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (87 111. 
 
 App. 212), 26. 
 Wright V, Chicago, etc., R. Co. (Ind., 
 
 66 N. E. Rep. 464), 369. 
 Wright V. Great Northern R. Co. (L. R., 
 
 8 Ir. 257), 775. 
 Wright V. Illinois Cent. R. Co. (119 III. 
 
 App. 132), 464. 
 Wright V. London, etc., R. Co. (33 L. ' 
 
 T. 830; L, R., 1 Q. B. D. 252; 45 
 
 L. J. Q. B. 670), ^4. 
 Wright V. Maiden, etc., R. Co. (4 Allen 
 
 283), 1058. 
 Wright V. Midland R. Co. (42 L. J. Ex. 
 
 89; L. R., 8 Ex. 137; 21 W. R. 460; 
 
 29 L. A. 436), 674. 
 Wright V. Pennsylvania R. Co. (3 Pittsb. 
 
 [Fa.] 116), 679. 
 Wright V. Southern Ry. Co. (127 N. C. 
 
 227; 37 S. E. Rep. 221), 119. 
 Wright V. Southern R. Co. (123 N. Car. 
 
 880; 81 S. E. Rep. 652; 12 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. [N. S.l 717), 498. 
 Wrightsville, etc., R. Co. v. Lattimore 
 
 (118 Ga. 581; 45 S. E. Rep. 463), 341. 
 Wurtenberger v. Metropolitan St. Ry. 
 
 Co. (Kan„.75 Pac. Rep. 1049), 379. 
 Wutilla v. Duluth Lumber Co. (37 Minn. 
 
 clxii 
 
 153; 33 N. W. Rep. 551; 5 Am. St. 
 ' Rep. 832), 307. 
 Wyatt K. Citizens Ry. Co. (65 Mo. 486), 
 
 784. 
 Wyatt V. Great Western R. Co. (6 B. 
 
 & S. 709; 34.L. T. Q. B. 204), 1008. 
 Wyman v. New York, etc., R. Co. (46 
 
 Me. 162), 683. 
 Wymore v. Wahaska County (78 Iowa 
 
 396; 43 N. W. Rep. 864; 16 Am. St. 
 
 Rep. 449; 6 L. R. A. 545), 1068. 
 Wynne v. Conklin (86 Ga. 40; 12 S. 
 
 E. Rep. 183), 269. 
 Wysocki v. Wisconsin, etc., Co. (121 
 
 Wis. 96; 98 N. W. Rep. 950), 87. 
 
 • Y 
 
 Yahn v. Ottumwa (60 Iowa 429; 15 N. 
 
 W. Rep. 257), 1066. 
 Yager v. Receivers (4 Hughes [U. S.l 
 
 192), 467. 
 Yancey w.' Wabash R. Co. (93 Mo. 437, 
 
 438; 6 S. W. Rep. 872), 1084. 
 Yarnell v. Kansas City, etc., Ry. Co. 
 
 (113 Mo. 670; 21 S. W. Rep. 1; 18 
 
 L. R. A. 699), 570. 
 Yarnell v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (75 
 
 Mo. 675), 838. 
 Yarnold v. Bowers (186 Mass. 396; 71 
 
 N. E. Rep. 799), 1049. 
 Yates V. Covington (83 S. W. Rep. 
 
 698), 97. 
 Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Byrd (42 So. 
 
 Rep. 286), 801. 
 Yeaton v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (136 Mass. 
 
 418; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 263), 321. 
 Yeaton v. Railroad Corp. (145 Mass. 
 
 418), 348. 
 Yeomans v. Contra Costa Nav. Co. (44 
 
 Cal. 71), 666. 
 Yerkes v. Keokuk, etc., Co. (7 Mo. App. 
 
 265), 634. 
 Yerkes v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (112 
 
 Wis. 184; 88 N. W. Rep. 33), 377. 
 Yess V. Chicago, etc., Co. (184 Wis. 406; 
 
 102 N. W. Rep. 948), 20. 
 Yeull V. Sioux City & Pac. R. Co. (66 
 
 Iowa 346; 83 N. W. Rep. 736), 276. 
 York V. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. 
 
 (98 Iowa 644; 67 N. W. Rep. 674), 
 
 217. 
 York V. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (117 
 
 Mo. 406; 22 S. W. Rep. 1081), 158. 
 York V. Maine, etc., R. Co. (84 Me. 
 
 117; 24 Atl. Rep. 790), 1028. 
 YouU ti. Sioux City, etc., R. Co. (60 
 
 low? 846: 28 N. W. Rep. 736; 21 Am. 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 589), 330. 
 Young V. Burlington, etc., Co. (79 Iowa 
 
 415; 44 N. W. Rep. 693), 255. 
 Young V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (100 Iowa 
 
 357), 73 6. 
 Young V. Detroit, etc., R. Co. ^66 Mich. 
 
 430; 23 N. W. Rep. 67; 19 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 417), 1030. 
 Young V. Metropolitan R. Co. (103 S. 
 
 W. Rep. 135), 186. 
 Young V. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (93 
 
 Mo. App. 273), 695. 
 Young V. New Jersey R. Co. (46 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 160), 471. 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 [References are to sections.} 
 
 Youne v. New York, etc., R. Co. (30 
 
 Barb. 889), S98. 
 Young V. New York, etc., R. Co. (171 
 
 Mass. 33; 50 N. E. Rep. 455; 41 L. 
 
 E. A. 193), S66. 
 Young v.. New York, etc., R. Co. (107 
 
 N. Y. 500; 14 N. E. Rep. 434; 32 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 130), 1005. 
 Young V. Old Colony R. Co. (156 Mass. 
 
 178; 30 N. E. Rep. 560), 1062. 
 Young V. Railroad Co. (69 N. H. 356), 
 
 368. 
 Youngblood v. South Car. R. Co. (60 S. 
 
 C. 9; 38 S. E. Rep. 232), 382. 
 Yownley v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (53 
 
 Wis. 626), 4. 
 
 Zahn V. Milwaukee, etc., Ry. Co. (Wis., 
 
 89 N. W. Rep. 889), 335. 
 Zeccardi v. Yonkers R. Co. (83 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 31), 557. 
 
 Zeigler v. Danbury, etc., R. Co. (53 
 
 Conn. 543; 23 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 
 400). 482. 
 Zeigler v. Northeastern R. Co. (8 So. 
 
 Car. 221), 884. 
 Zimmerman v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (71 
 
 Mo. 476; 2 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 191), 
 
 1003. 
 Zimmerman v. Union R. Co. (3 App. 
 
 Div. 819; 38 N. Y. Supp. 362), 1039. 
 Zipperlen v. Southern Pac. Co. (93 Pac. 
 
 Rep. 1049), 969. 
 Zirkle v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (14 
 
 Am. Neg. Rep. 61), 408. 
 Zoebisch v. Tarhell (10 Allen 385), 794. 
 Zongker v. People's R. Co. (110 Mo. 
 
 App. 382; 86 S. W. Rep. 4J6), 184. 
 Zuccarello v. Nashville, etc., R. Co. (3 
 
 Baxt. [Tenn.] 364), 900. 
 Zumalt V. Kansas City, etc., Ry. Co. (175 
 
 Mo. 888; 74 S. W. Rep. lOlS), 388. 
 Zumwalt V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (35 Mo. 
 
 App. 661), 844. 
 
 clxiii 
 
THE LAW 
 
 OF 
 
 PEESONAL INJURIES ON EAILEOADS. 
 
 VOLUME I. 
 INJURIES TO EMPLOYEES. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 GENEKAL CONSIDEEATIONS IN ACTIONS POB PERSONAL IN- 
 JURIES. 
 
 § 1. Actions founded on negligence. 
 
 2. Duty owing plaintiff must be violated. 
 
 3. Rule the same, whether action by employee or third party. 
 
 4. Essentials of actionable negligence, further considered. 
 
 5. May arise from omission of duty, or commission of wrongful act, 
 
 6. When .duty is imposed by statute. 
 
 7. Liability not affected by public character of business. 
 
 8. Legal status of railroad company. 
 
 S. Company must be sued in proper name. 
 
 10. Care required in general. 
 
 11. How affected by character of business. 
 
 12. Ordinary care alone required of railroad companies. 
 
 13. Due care, reasonable care, and ordinary care, explained. 
 
 14. Willfulness, wantonness and recklessness. 
 
 15. Degrees of negligence. 
 
 16. Action may be based upon contract. 
 
 17. Remedies in contract and tort concurrent. i 
 
 18. Authorities announcing a contrary doctrine. 
 
 19. Violated right and injury both essential. 
 
 § 1. Actions founded on negligence. — Personal injury 
 actions, in ■whatever vocation of life arising, in order to be 
 successfully maintained in the courts, must be grounded upon 
 I-l 1 
 
§ 2 GENEBAL, CONSIDEEATIONS. 
 
 the negligence of the one causing the injury. The law of 
 negligence is a branch of the general law of torts and the 
 meaning of these terms is definitely or indefinitely explained 
 by lexicographers and law writers. 
 
 A tort, in the strictest legal sense, is a wrongful act, caus- 
 ing an injury, which gives a right of action, otherwise than 
 by contract.^ In the sense that a negligent act is the breach 
 of a duty imposed by law, such negligent act is a tort; ^ 
 but where the negligent act is not one resulting from a viola- 
 tion of a duty imposed by law, but rather consists in the 
 breach of a duty imposed by contract, the negligence could 
 not be said to belong to the law of torts.^ In a suit to redress 
 a wrong made such by the law itself the action would be 
 called one ex delicto, while an action for negligence based 
 upon the violation of a duty imposed by contract, would be 
 an action ex contractu. Torts are, therefore, confined or de- 
 nominated actions ex delicto, and, in this sense the term is or 
 may be narrower than the term negligence, as the latter may 
 include or be based upon acts that come within the other di- 
 vision of civil actions,* as well as those strictly known as ac- 
 tions ex delicto. 
 
 § 2. Duty owing plaintiff must be violated. — The neglect, 
 or negligent act, resulting in an injury to the person of the 
 plaintiff, or to the one for whose injury or death he sues, in 
 order to furnish the basis of an action, must be what is 
 known as actionable negligence, as distinguished from a mere 
 abstract negligent act, which might, or might not, be the 
 basis of a cause of action, according to the relation of the 
 parties and the circumstances under which the injury was 
 
 iMoak's Underhill on Torts 23; Addison Torts 2; 2 Bouv. Law 
 Diet. 600; Cooley Torts 3; Hillard Torts 1. 
 2 Ante idem. 
 
 a Blade's Law & Pr. Aeo. Cas., § 2, p. 2. 
 
 * Shearm & Eedf. on Neg., § 4; idem (5 ed.) § 22; Cooley on Torts 90, 
 2 
 
GENERAL CONSIDEEATIOlirS. § 2 
 
 received. A wrongful act, causing an injury to an em- 
 ployee, or one occupying some other relation, from which a 
 duty of protection in that relation would flow, might furnish 
 the basis of a cause of action for such resulting injury, but 
 as to a trespasser, who occupied no relation from which such 
 duty would spring, the same act would not afford a right to 
 sue. Hence, it is that the negligence which must exist to 
 furnish a cause of action, is the violation of some right on 
 the part of the plaintiff, or the breach of some duty owing to 
 him by the defendant. However great the injury received, 
 if there was no breach of duty on the part of defendant ow- 
 ing to the injured party, there would be no civil liability 
 therefor, but, in such case, the rule damnum absque injuria 
 would be applicable.^ 
 
 In all personal injury actions, therefore, where a recovery 
 can be sustained, there must be combined, both the breach 
 of d,uty owing to the plaintiff and the injury resulting from 
 such breach. This result follows, necessarily, from the very 
 nature of the action, for whether the plaintiff declares in tort, 
 or upon a contract, a breach of duty must be shown and the 
 resulting injury, as the measure of the defendant's liability. 
 Without establishing both these elements, the plaintiff in a 
 personal injury action, would show no more right to a re- 
 covery, than could a perfect stranger to a violated contract 
 who was not damaged by reason of the breach of such con- 
 tract.® 
 
 6 Shearm. & Eedf. on Neg., § 3 (5 ed.) ; Wharton on Neg., § 24; Bus- 
 well, Per. Inj., § 3; Watson, Dam. Per Inj., § 3, p. 2. 
 
 Thompson on Neg. (2 ed.) § 3, p. 5; Baltimore City Pass E. Co. 
 V. Nugent, 86 Md., 349; 38 Atl. Eep. 779; 39 L. E. A. 161; Cleveland, 
 etc., E. Co. V. Ballentine, 56 U. S. App. 266; 84 Fed. Eep. 935; 28 C. 0. 
 A. 572. Can be no actionable negligence, without breach of legal duty 
 to injured person. Eush v. Missouri Pac. E. Co. (Kan.), 28 Amer. & 
 Eng. E. Cas. 484. 
 
 In Cotton V. Wood (8 C. B. N. S. 568; 98 E.' C. L.), Erie, C. 
 J., laid it down as a fundamental rule that, " unless it be shown 
 
 3 
 
§ § 3, 4 GENERAL CONSIDEEATIONS. 
 
 § 3. Rule the same, whether action by employee or third 
 party. — While in some courts it is held that an employee is 
 not entitled to the same remedies for a personal injury as a 
 passenger is entitled to/ where the personal negligence of the 
 employer has caused an injury to his employee, the employ- 
 er's liability to his employee is generally held to be the same 
 as if the employee were a third party.^ 
 
 An employee could not recover from his employer for 
 injuries received in his service unless the employer is charge- 
 able with negligence in respect to the act causing the injury,® 
 any more than a third person could recover, in the absence 
 of some act of negligence, as a basis for the action,'" and 
 in an action by an employee for the negligence of the em- 
 ployer, as in an action for a personal injury to a passenger, 
 the test of liability is the negligence of the employer, not the 
 danger of the employment, though the danger may help to 
 determine the degree of care required from the employer. '^ 
 
 § 4. Essentials of actionable negligence further consid- 
 ered. — Actionable negligence may be said to be the failure 
 to use such care, in the discharge of a given duty, as the 
 
 that there existed some duty owing from the defendant to the plaintiff, 
 and that there has been a breach of that duty," there is no proof of 
 negligence. 
 
 7 Weger v. Pennsylvania E. R. Co., 55 Pa. (5 P. F. Sm.) 460. 
 
 sMcMahon v. Walsh, 43 N. Y. Sup. Ct. (11 J. & S.) 36; Lorentz v. 
 Robinson, 61 Md. 64; Killien v. Hyde, 63 Fed. Rep. 172. 
 
 oHand v. Mississippi Central R. R. Co., 50 Miss. 178; Connor v. 
 Burlington, C. R. & N. Ry. Co., 71 Iowa 490; 32 N. W. Rep. 465; 60 
 Araer. St. Eep. 814. 
 
 10 Killien v. Hyde, supra; Worden v. Hinnesbby & S. Ey. Co., 72 
 Towa 201; 33 N. W. Eep. 629. 
 
 11 Knight V. Cooper, 36 W. Va. 232; 14 S. E. Rep. 999. The danger 
 does not affect th^ degree of care required, but it does the quantum of 
 diligence. Galveston H. & L. A. Co. v. Gormley, 91 Texas 393; 43 S. W. 
 Rep. 877. 
 
GENERAL CONSIDEBATIONS. § 4: 
 
 law imposed, as a result of which an injury is directly sus- 
 tained by the one toward whom the duty existed. ^^ 
 
 It is only a consideration and recognition of the full im- 
 port of the word du^ that one of the essential elements of 
 the definition will be observed. Whenever the absence of 
 care, such as duty requires, under the circumstances, to h,e 
 exercised, exists, then negligence can be said to be present, 
 if there is also an injury, traceable directly to such want of 
 care.^'' 
 
 The obligation may either attach to a wrongful act, or an 
 omission, but whether the negligence arises from the doing 
 or omission to do that which the law requires, it is the ab- 
 sence of care that denominates the act a negligent act, or oth- 
 erwise, when there is a resulting injury, directly connected 
 therewith.-'* 
 
 If it should be objected that this definition does not spe- 
 cifically define the degree of care, the absence of which may 
 amount to negligence, in a given case,^^ it may be properly 
 replied, that the application of the term to a person sought to 
 be charged, who may occupy a given relation in life, by the 
 further definition of the different ingredients of the term, 
 is, in no respect, au essential of the definition of the general 
 term. The degree of care which the law imposes as a duty, 
 xs that care which a reasonable and prudent man would 
 
 12 For various definitions, see Wharton on JjTeg., § 3 ; Shearm. & 
 Eedf . on Neg. ( 5 ed. ) § 3 ; Deering on Neg., § 1 ; Cooley on Torts 630 ; 
 Ray on Neg., § 183; Eapalje, Law Diet. (vol. 2) p. 860; Webster's 
 Diet.; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Peters, 116 Pa. St. 206; 9 Atl. Rep. 
 317; Henry v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co., 67 Fed. Rep. 426; Rosen v. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co., 83 Fed. Rep. 300 ; 49 U. S. App. 647 ; 27 C. C. A. 
 534; 7 Amer. & Eng. Ene. Law (2 ed.) 370; Salmon v. Delaware, etc., 
 R. Co., 9 Vt. 5; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Curlin, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 505. 
 
 13 1 Thompson on Neg., § 1, p. 3, and cases cited. 
 
 1* In this sense, as Judge Thompson observes, it is " a sin of omission 
 merely," in either case. See Bucki v. Cone, 25 Fla. 1 ; 6 So. Rep. 160. 
 
 15 Judge Thompson urges this objection against such definitions as the 
 alj9ve. 1 Thompson on Neg., § 2, p. 4. 
 
 5 
 
§ 4 GENEBAL CONSIDEBATIONS. 
 
 ordinarily bestojv, under the circumstances of each case;^' 
 this -is the measure of care, or the standard by which the 
 duty imposed by law is determined, by the triers of the 
 facts,^'' but regardless of how this standard may be applied, 
 it is the absence of this care which constitutes negligence and 
 the method by which its existence is determined is no essen- 
 tial of the definition of the term. 
 
 10 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Coon, 111 Pa. St. 430; Ellis v. Lake Shore, 
 etc., E. Co., 138 Pa. St. 506; 21 Atl. Rep. 140; Patton v. Southern R. 
 Co., 82 Fed. Rep. 979; 42 U. S. App. 576; 27 C. C. A. 287; Hearn v. 
 Pender, L. R. 11 Q. B. D. 503; Yownley v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 53 Wis. 
 626; Brown v. Congress, etc., R. Co., 49 Mich. 153; Nicholson v. Erie, 
 etc., R. Co., 41 N. Y. 525; Nolan v. N. Y., etc., R. Co., 53 Conn. 461; 
 1 N. E. Rep. 826. 
 
 17 1 Thompson on Neg., § 2, p. 4. 
 
 In Pennsylvania W. & B. R. Co. v. Stinger (78 Pa. St. 225), Paxson, 
 J., defines negligence as follows : " The absence of care, according to 
 the circumstances." 
 
 Willes, J., defines it as follows: "The absence of such care as it 
 was the duty of defendant to use." Grill v. Iron, etc., Co. L. C. R. 1 C. 
 P. 160. Mr. Patterson, in his analytical work on Railroad Accident 
 Law, defines actionable negligence as " a nonperformance of duty, 
 causing injury to the person to whom the duty is owing." Patterson 
 on Railroad Aec. Law, p. 7. 
 
 Brett, M. R., in Heaven v. Pender (11 Q. B. D. 507), gives the fol- 
 lowing definition, that is very hard to improve upon, viz., " The neglect 
 of the use of ordinary care or skill, toward a person to whom the de- 
 fendant owes the duty of observing ordinary care and skill, by which 
 neglect, the plaintiff, without contributory negligence on his part, has 
 suffered injury." • 
 
 For varying definitions, substantially like the above, see, Washington 
 v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 17 W. Va. 190; 10 Am. & Eng. R. Cas., 149; 
 Jamison v. San Jose etc., E. Co., 55 Cal. 593 ; 3 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 350 ; 
 Johnson v. W. C. & P. R. Co., 70 Pa. St. 366 ; Baltimore & Pot. R. Co. v. 
 Jones, 95 U. S. 439; 24 L. Ed. 5(56, giving a concise definition, by Mr. 
 Justice Swayne; Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Behymer, 189 U. S. 468; 47 L. 
 Ed. 905; Texas & Pac. E. Co. v. Barrett, 166 U. S. 617; 41 L. Ed. 1136. 
 For additional definitions of negligence, in actions for injuries on rail- 
 roads, see the following cases: Nolan v. N. Y., etc., R. Co. (Conn,), 25 
 Amer. & Eng. R. Cas. 342; Carter v. Columbia & C. ,R. Co. (S. C), 15 
 Amer. & Eng. R. Cas. 414; Brown v. Congress, etc., R. Co. (Mich.), 8 
 Amer. & Eng. R. Cas. 383. 
 
 6 
 
GENEEAL CONSIDEEATIONS. §§ 5, 6 
 
 § 5. May arise from omission, of duty or commission of 
 wrongful act. — It is elementary that the failure to use such 
 care as the law imposes for the protection of those members 
 of the human family likely to be injured by a failure thereof, 
 which can be legally denominated as negligence or neglect, 
 may either consist in the commission of a wrongful act, when 
 the doing of the act is prohibited by the law, or the failure 
 to act, when action is the mandate of the law, under the 
 circumstances of the given case.^® 
 
 An omission of duty which would render one liable for an 
 injury resulting therefrom, would arise in any case where 
 activity would be essential for the proper protection of the 
 injured person, such as an inspection, or inquiry, or warning 
 of the impending danger, if the law, under the circum- 
 stances and situation of the parties, required such an act to 
 be done, as the proper test of due care.^* On the other 
 hand, the violation of duty is equally as apparent, when with 
 knowledge of the danger brought home to the wrongdoer 
 the duty imposed by the law for the protection of the in- 
 jured person through recklessness, wantonness or actual in- 
 tent to do wrong, is knowingly violated, by some overt act.^" 
 
 § 6. When duty is imposed by statute. — Whether the given 
 act, resulting in an injury, is one denominated negligent, by 
 express legislative act, or is one violative simply of the 
 measure of care erected by the law, in the absence of such 
 express legislation, the principle is the same, for the act 
 
 18 Thompson Neg., § 1, p. 3; Brotherton v. Manhattan Beach Co., 48 
 Neb. 563; 67 N. W. Eep. 479; 69 N. W. Rep. 757; 33 L. E. A. 598. 
 
 i» Schmidt V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 83 111. 405. 
 
 20 1 Thompson Neg., § 8, pp. 9 and 10. " If the negligence of the de- 
 fendant be the proper cause of the injury to the plaintiff, it is of no 
 consequence whether it be of omission or commission." Harriman v. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Go. (Ohio), 32 Amer. & Eng. R. Cas. 37. 
 
§ 6 GENEiL<\.L CONSIDEEATIONS. 
 
 is none the less a violation of lega.1 duty imposed and the 
 result of the act is to submit the wrongdoer to a legal 
 charge of negligence.. ^^ 
 
 Some authors, notably the late Judge Thompson, place 
 such emphasis upon this particular kind of negligence, i. e., 
 the violation of statutory duty, as to distinguish it from all 
 other kinds of negligence and defend the rule by vyhich the 
 violations of such express duties are made conclusive acts 
 of negligence. ^^ Some State courts also hold that the viola- 
 tion of . such express duties is such conclusive evidence of 
 negligence, as to prevent the defense of assumption of the 
 risk or even contributory negligence on the part of the, in- 
 jured person.^* But such decisions are manifestly at vari- 
 ence with the elementary rules of law underlying the liability 
 for damages based upon negligence, for if the wrongful act 
 of the injured person, rather than the wrongful act or 
 neglect of another, was the approximate cause of the injury, 
 then his contributory negligence ought to prevent a recovery, 
 whether the breach of duty was such as may be denominated 
 common law, statutory or ordinance duty.^* 
 
 When a duty imposed by law is carried out in all the es- 
 sentials in "accordance with the statute or ordinance imposing 
 
 21 Dresser, Emp. Liab., §§ 51, 116; Victor Co. v. Muir, 20 Colo. 320; 
 Matta V. Chicago, etc., Co., 69 Mich. 109; Taylor v. Carew, 142 Mass. 
 470; Spiva v. Osage Coal, etc., Co., 88 Mo. 68 Senior v. Ward, 28 L. J. 
 Q. B. 139; Corning Steel Co. v. Pohlplotz (Ind.), 64 N. W. Eep. 476j 
 Krause v. Morgen, 52 Ohio St. 325 ; 40 N. E. Rep. 886. 
 
 22 1 Thompson Neg., §§ 10, 11, 12, pp. 12, 13. 
 
 23 Contributory negligence is not a defense to the breach of statutory 
 duty, in Illinois. Riverton Coal Co. v. Shepard, 207 111. 395; 69 N. E. 
 Rep. 921; Western Anthracite Co. v. Beaver, 95 111. App. 95; 61 N. 
 E. Rep. 335 ; Chicago, etc., Co. v. Des Lauriers, 40 111. App. 645 ; Fulton 
 V. Star Mining Co., 133 Fed. Rep. 193; Chicago-Coulterville, etc., Co. v. 
 Fidelity & Casualty Co., 130 Fed. Rep. 957; White, Per Inj. in Mines, 
 § 254, pp. 260, 261 and cases cited. 
 
 2*'Dresser, Emp. Liab,, §§ 51, 116; White, Per. Inj. in Mines, § 254, 
 jind cases cited, 
 
 8 
 
GENEEAL CONSIDEEATIONS. § 7 
 
 such duty, no liability will result from a subsequent injury 
 on account of such compliance with tha law or ordinance, for 
 it would be manifestly unjust to erect a measftre of care, 
 for the noncompliance with which a liability would be im- 
 posed and then hold the party complying with such imposed 
 duty, as though no such standard of care had been erected 
 as a gauge for his conduct. ^^ 
 
 § 7. Liability not affected by public character of business. — 
 
 The fact that the business of a railroad company is a branch 
 of the public service,^® and, as such, is subject to such limi- 
 tations upon its charter power as may be prescribed lay the 
 State, and to such regulations, under the police power of the 
 State, as may be necessary to protect the lives, limbs and 
 health of the general public, or the convenience of the travel- 
 ing public, does not in the least affect its liability for a per- 
 sonal injury resulting from the. operation of the road, or the 
 enjoyment of its quasi-puhlic franchises.^' 
 
 Companies organized for railroad purposes, in the law, are 
 none the less private corporations,^* and in actions for per- 
 sonal injuries the liability of such companies is judged by 
 the same rules of law that obtain in actions against private 
 individuals ; in both cases, a duty owing the injured person 
 must be established and a breach of that duty, as a direct re- 
 
 25 Taylor v. Baltimore & Ohio E. Co., 33 W. Va. 39; 10 S. E. Rep. 
 29; 39 Amer. & Eng. E. Gas. 259; Eudard v. Chesapeake & Ohio 
 R. Co., 88 Ky. 280; 11 S. W. Rep. 70; 1 Thompson Neg., § 9, p. 11. 
 
 20 Grand Trunk E. Co. v. Stevens, 95 U. S. 660; 24 L., Ed. 525. 
 
 27 In Chicago, Burlington & Q. E. Co. v. Iowa (94 U. S. 161; 24 
 L. Ed. 94), Waite, C. J., speaking for the court, said: "This company, 
 in the transaction of its business, has the same rights, and is subject 
 to the same control as private individuals, under the same circum- 
 stances." 
 
 28 Pennsylvania & L. E. E. Co. v. Bruce, 102 Pa. St. 23; Timlow v. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co., 9"9 Pa, St. 284; Patterson, Ey. Ace. Law, p. 4. 
 
■ § 8 GENEKAL COJS'SIDEEATIONS. 
 
 suit of which the injury was sustained, or no legal liability 
 is shown. ^® > 
 
 § 8. legal status of railroad company.— In personal injury 
 actions, based upon negligence, a railroad company in a court 
 of justice, occupies identically the same relation to the law 
 suit, to which it is made a party defendant, as any individual 
 employer of employees. No greater or less degree of evi- 
 dence is, or should be required, to establish a case of per- 
 sonal negligence against a railroad company than against 
 an individual, sued upon a similar cause of action and when 
 a cause of action is submitted to a jury upon a less degree 
 of proof, in a railroad case, than a similar cause would be 
 submitted, in the case of an individual employer, or when a 
 verdict is returned, upon evidence that would not establish 
 a liability in the case of an individual defendant, then the 
 officials of the court have somewhere grievously failed in 
 the performance of their sacred duties, and like a private offi- 
 cial who varies from the performance of his duty, either 
 from prejudice or favor, to the detriment of his private char- 
 acter, so each variance from its legal duty by a court in 
 any class of litigation, correspondingly affects the high char- 
 acter of the court and the respect of the masses for all courts. 
 In other words, since corporations 6ccupy the same legal 
 status as individuals, theoretically, before the courts, unless 
 they are accorded the same rights, there is a manifest failure 
 of justice, and as courts are organized to see that justice 
 prevails there should be no limit to the beneficent perform- 
 ance of this duty. Nothing but legal precedents and stern 
 duty should prompt the court in railroad litigation, and the 
 defendant railroad company in a personal injury action 
 should be accorded the same rights, and no more, that any 
 individual citizen would enjoy, under the same, or similar 
 circumstances. 
 
 2» Rush V. Missouri Pac. E. Co. (Kan.), 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 484. 
 10 
 
GENEEAL CONSIDERATIONS. §§9) 10 
 
 § 9. Company must be sued in proper name. — It is elemen- 
 tary, that a railroad company, or other corporation, can only 
 be brought into court, by an action and process in its cor- 
 rect corporate name, for service on such defendants is always 
 of a constructive nature and unless it is sued in its correct 
 name, no jurisdiction over it will be acquired, as it Avould 
 be in a suit against an individual under an irregular or 
 erroneous name, if it was idem sonans. 
 
 It may be taken for granted that the compaijy is a differ- 
 ent thing from the railroad or railway, for the latter con- 
 sists of nothing but the ties, rails, roadbed and things that 
 go to make up the property of the company. In a Missouri 
 case *" suit was filed against the railroad, rather than against 
 the company, of the same name, and on a default judgment 
 being appealed, it was held that no jurisdiction was acquired 
 over the defendant. 
 
 § 10. Care required in general.— An employer is bound to 
 use reasonable care and diligence to prevent accident or in- 
 jury to his employees, in the cause of the service they are 
 engaged to render and if he fails to do so, he will be held 
 responsible in damages.^^ An employer is required to take 
 such precaution for the safety of his employees as a careful 
 and prudent man wiould take, under similar circumstances.*^ 
 He should use all reasonable care, diligence and caution, in 
 providing for the safety of his employees.** 
 
 But employers are bound only to use such ordinary and 
 reasonable care and precaution, for the safety of their em- 
 ployees as the nature and dangers of the business admit of 
 and demand,** and no liability on the part of an employer, 
 
 80 Vlckery v. Omaha, K. C. & E. R. Co., 93 Mo. App. 1. 
 
 31 Hallower v. Heiiley, 6 Cal. 209. 
 
 32Harr v. New York & H. R. R. Co., 13 N. Y. St. Rep. 227. 
 
 83 Frank v. Otis, 15 N. Y. St. Rep. 681. 
 
 3* Michigan Central R. Co. v. Dolan, 32 Mich. 510. 
 
 11 
 
§§ 11, 12 GENERAL CONSIDEKATIONS. 
 
 for an injury to his employee, in the regular scope of his 
 employment, can be predicated upon an obligation extending 
 beyond the use of ordinary care and diligence.^® 
 
 § 11. How affected by character and risk of business. — The 
 
 term negligence is a relative term and must necessarily de- 
 pend upon the particular facts and circumstances of each 
 case. What would not constitute a careless act, in a business 
 attendant with little or no danger, might be considered a 
 very negligent act, where the lives or limbs of individuals 
 were apt to be lost or injured as a result thereof. Hence, it 
 is, that negligence, as between employer and employee, should 
 be measured by the character and risk of the business en- 
 gaged in and the degree of care, of all parties, is held to be 
 higher, when the lives and limbs of themselves and others 
 are apt to be endangered, by their acts, than in ordinary 
 
 § 12. Ordinary diligence only required of railroad compa- 
 nies. — In legal contemplation, a railroad company occupies 
 the same status as any other employer of men and no greater 
 degree of care is required on the part of railroads, to prevent 
 injuries to their employees, than exists in the case of any 
 other employer. The degree of diligence required of rail- 
 road companies, in regard to the safety of their employees, 
 is simply ordinary diligence,*'' regard being had, of course, 
 to the nature of the particular branch of the business where 
 the employee was engaged, and the dangers of the service 
 he was rendering.** 
 
 35 King V. Boston & W. R. Co., 63 Mass. (9 Cush.) 112. 
 
 36 Galveston, etc., E. Co. v. Gonnley '(Tex. Civ. App.), 27 S. W. Eep. 
 1051. 
 
 37 Lane v. Ohio & M. E. Co., 6 Ohio, § 39. 
 
 38 Michigan Cent. E. Co. v. Dolan, 32 Mich. 510, 
 
 13 
 
GEKERAL CONSIDERATIONS. §§ 13, 14 
 
 § 13. " Due care," " reasonable care " and " ordinary care," 
 explained. — The degree of care, due from an employer to his 
 employees does not vary with the diminution or the increase 
 of the danger, but the quantum of diligence does differ, under 
 different conditions.^* The terms, " due care," " reasonable 
 care " and " ordinary care " are all used interchangeably 
 by the courts and text writers, to indicate that measure of 
 duty required of the employer, under the different and vary- 
 ing terms of his employment, without regard to the danger 
 in the given service,*" and except as to duties made absolute 
 by the law, in which ease no other standard than that re- 
 quired by the law will control,*' if the defendant has used 
 such care as an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person ex- 
 ercises, with respect to his own affairs, under like circum- 
 stances, he has discharged the full measure of his legal 
 accountability and no responsibility in addition to this can 
 result.*^ 
 
 § 14. Willfulness, wantonness or recklessness. — Ordinary 
 care being that degree of care or diligence which every rea- 
 sonably prudent man takes under similar circumstances, it 
 would seem that wantonness or recklessness would be that 
 conduct that a reckless or wanton man would be guilty of, 
 but this is not the standard the law erects to determine such 
 conduct by. Slight negligence not being incompatible with 
 
 3» Galveston H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Gormley, 91 Texas 393; 43 S. W. 
 Eep. 877. 
 
 Reasonable care is such eare as a person or ordinary prudence would 
 take under similar circumstances to avoid accidents, in view of the risks 
 incurred.' Eeiss v. Wilmington City Ry. Co. (Del. Super. 1907), 67 
 Atl. Rep. 153. 
 
 *» Raymond v. Portland R. Co., 100 Me. 529 ; 62 Atl. Eep. 602. 
 
 iiCerilles, etc. Co. v. Desserant, 178 U. S. 570; 9 N. M. 49; 49 Pac. 
 Eep. 807. 
 
 *2 Raymond v. Portland R. Co., supra; Sanders v. Central of Georgia 
 R. Co., 123 Ga. 763; 51 S. E. Rep. 728. 
 
 13 
 
§ .15 GEJSTEEAL CONSIDEKATIONS. 
 
 the exercise of mere ordinary care,^* neither would the ab- 
 sence of ordinary care show willfulness, wantonness or reck- 
 lessness, but to establish the absence of such care as would 
 show willfulness or wantonness, it would seem to require 
 more than a mere absence of ordinary care.** To constitute 
 wanton negligence it is essential that the act done or omitted 
 must have been done or omitted with a present knowledge 
 that injury would result therefrom,*^ for without this con- 
 sciousness the omission would be absence of care albne. 
 Hence, it is, that a mere inadvertent failure to observe due 
 care indicates mere negligence, but a conscious failure to ob- 
 serve due care constitutes willfulness.*^ 
 
 But while willfulness is judicially held to be a conscious 
 act of the mind and not a mere inadvertence,*^ a wrongful 
 intent is not essential to constitute willfulness, and hence the 
 defendant is not permitted to testify to a lack of such intent 
 to overcome the evidence going to establish willfulness on his 
 part.*8 
 
 § 15. Degrees of negligence.— In an early English case,*' 
 
 •laMallett v. Schlosser, 119 111. App. 259. 
 
 " In order to cronstitute willfulness or wantonness or reckless indiffer- 
 ence to probable consequences, the act done or omitted must be done or 
 omitted with a knowledge or a present consciousness that injury will 
 probably result; and this consciousness is not to be implied from mere 
 knowledge of the elements of the dangerous situation a person may 
 be in and negligent and inadvertent acts in respect of the peril." Dun- 
 can V. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. (Ala. 1907), 44 So. .Rep. 418. 
 
 "Leslie v. Rich Hill, etc., Co., 110 Mo. 31; 19 S. W. Rep. 308; State 
 V. Clark, 29 N. J. L. 98; Niantic Coal Co. v. Leonard, 126 111. 216 j 
 White, Per Inj. in Mines, § 344, and cases cited. 
 
 *5 Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Guest (Ala.), 39 So. Rep. 654. 
 
 <»Tinsley v. Western Union Co. (S. C), 51 S. E. Rep. 913; 72 S. C. 
 350. 
 
 47 Odin Coal Co. v. Denman, 185 111. 413; 57 N. E. Rep. 192; 76 
 Am. St. Rep. 45; Leslie v. Rich Hill Coal Co., 110 Mo. 31; 19 S. W. 
 Rep. -308. 
 
 48 Ante idem. 
 
 *»Coggs V. Bernard, 2 Lord Raymond, 909. 
 14 
 
geNe&al coNsiuekationS. § 16 
 
 Lord Holt, C. J., defined negligence as consisting in three 
 degrees, or kinds, viz., slight, ordinary and gross and it is 
 presumed that this division was based upon the Roman law 
 of negligence, but upon this subject Mr. Wharton expresses 
 himself ^" as of the opinion that this division did not exist, 
 under the Eoman law, but owes its origin to the refinements 
 of the Middle Ages, and Judge Thompson, without hesita- 
 tion, states that he has always been ignorant and indifferent 
 as to the origin or knowledge of any of the degrees of negli- 
 gence.®^ 
 
 In most of the United States the courts do not adhere to 
 the classification of degrees of negligence,®^ further, perhaps, 
 than to divide it into negligence and willfulness or wanton- 
 ness.®* The courts of Missouri recognize this latter divi- 
 sion, under what is known as the humanitarian doctrine, 
 under which a railroad company is not held liable for an 
 injury for a mere failure to discover a trespasser, by reason 
 of a want of ordinary care, but only for a willful or inten- 
 tional or wanton injury, after his presence is discovered.®* 
 
 60 1 Wharton Neg. (2 ed.) §§ 50, 63. 
 51 1 Thompson Neg., § 18, p. 18, 
 
 62 Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. v. Arms, 91 U. S. 495; Perkins v. N. Y., 
 etc., R. Co., 24 N. Y. 207; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Johnston, 103 111. 
 5l2; 8 Amer. & Eng. R. Cas. 225; McAdoo v. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 
 105 N. C. 140; 1 Thompson Neg. § 19, p. 20. 
 
 63 State V. Boston, etc., R. Co., 58 N. H. 408; 1 Thompson Neg., p. 
 22, § 21. 
 
 6*Holwerson v. St. Louis, etc., -R. Co., 157 Mo. 216 and cases cited. 
 
 The term slightest degree of negligence should be avoided, as there 
 are no degrees of negligence in Missouri. Magrane v. .St. Louis, etc., R. 
 Co., 183 Mo. 119; 81 S. W. Rep. 1158. 
 
 The consensus of judicial opinion is that it is and has always been 
 found impractical to consider negligence as consisting of different de- 
 grees. Why divide into degrees the breach of that duty which will 
 render the defendant liable, if the want of care which the eircum 
 stances of the case requires, exists? 
 
 "In each case, the negligence, whatever epithet we give it, is fail- 
 ure to bestow the care and skill which the situation demands; and, 
 
 15 
 
§ 16 GEJVTERAL CONSIDERATIONS. 
 
 § 16. Action may be based upon contract. — An action lot 
 personal injuries may be based upon a contract, if there is 
 an agreement imposing a legal duty upon one person for the 
 protection of another. In such case, the duty imposed by 
 contract, is the same as that imposed by the law itself and the 
 breach of that duty would constitute a tort, founded upon a 
 contract.''® 
 
 An illustration of such a liability is found in the case of 
 the contract of the carrier of a person, for hire; for the 
 breach of such a contract an action would lie against the 
 carrier for a negligent injury to the passenger.®* But ordi- 
 narily, the essence of the action for the tort consists in the 
 violation of the duty owed the individual, as a thing differ- 
 ent from the obligation assumed under the terms of the con- 
 tract.®'' The law, in the case above instanced, would create 
 
 hence, it is more strictly accurate, perhaps, to call it simply negli- 
 gence." This was the language of Justice Bradley, in New York Cent., 
 etc., R. Co. V. Lockwood, 84 U. S. 384; 17 Wall. 357, 384; 21 L. Ed. 
 627. The Supreme Court characterized as impractical, in another 
 case, any distinctions between the degrees of negligence. Milwaukee 
 & St. P. E. Co. V. Arms, 91 U. 8. 495; 23 L. Ed. 374; Steamboat New 
 World V. King, 16 How. 469; 14 L. Ed. 1019. 
 
 Lord Cranworth " could see no difference between negligence and 
 gross negligence; that it was the same thing, with the addition of a 
 vituperative epithet.'' Wilson v. Brett, 11 M. & W. 115, and Lord 
 Denman, observed, in Hinton v. Dibbin (2 Ad. & El. N. S. 661), that 
 " It may well be doubted whether between gross negligence and negli- 
 gence merely, any intelligible distinction exists." 
 
 With these observations and such cumulative evidence of the expe- 
 rience of the courts, it is the more surprising that any legislative 
 body would attempt to establish these distinctions, which can only 
 be productive of confusion and no good results. 
 
 OS Addison on Torts 13; Cooley on Torts 90; Rich v. N. Y., etc., 
 R. Co., 87 N. Y. 382. 
 
 no Philadelphia, etc., R. C. v. Derby, 14 How. (U. S.) 468; Thompson 
 Carr. Pass. 31; 3 Thompson on Neg., § 2720, p. 187; Thompson Carr. 
 Pass. 175. 
 
 57 Rich V. N. Y., etc., R. C, 87 N. Y. 382; 3 Thompson on Neg., § 
 2720, p. 187. 
 
 16 
 
GESfEBAL CONSlDE&ATlOifS. § 17 
 
 the duty out of its regard for human life and its recognition 
 would not depend upon the terms of the contract of carriage. 
 Where there is such a contract, it is held that the liability 
 based upon the duty which the law exacts, is equal with that 
 assumed by the contract, but whether the action is founded 
 upon the contract, or the breach of public duty, the* evi- 
 dence to sustain the action, in either form, would be sub- 
 stantially the same.^* 
 
 § 17. Eemedies in contract and tort concurrent.— < Where 
 there is a contract relation between the parties, such as that 
 which exists between a carrier for hire and a passenger, 
 since the liability may rest either upon the obligation im- 
 posed by the contract,vOr the breach of duty due to the pas- 
 senger in common with the general public, in case of an 
 injury during the existence of the contractual relation, the 
 injured party could either sue in tort, for the breach of the 
 public duty, or maintain an action iipon the contract, for the 
 violation of the obligation assumed thereby.^^_ The contract, 
 as in the case of an injured passenger for hire, would 
 
 68 3 Thompson on Neg., § 2720, p. 188; Thompson Carr. Pass. 197; 
 Carroll v. Staten Island, etc., E. C, 58 N. Y. 126; Rich v. N. Y., etc., 
 E. Co., 87 N. Y. 382. 
 
 09 In McElroy v. Nashua & Lowell R. Co. (4 Cush. 403), Shaw, C. J. 
 observed : " It is at the election of the plaintiff to declare in assumpsit 
 and rely on the promise, or to declare in tort and rest on the breach of 
 duty." See, also, Eaton v. Boston & Lowell R. Co., 11 Allen 500; Ames 
 V. Union, etc., E. Co., 117 Mass. 541; Buswell on Per Inj., § 5, p. 4. 
 In Bretherton v. Wood (6 Moore, 141; 3 Brod. & B. 54), the plaintiff 
 was a passenger for hire in a stage coach and was injured by the over- 
 turning of the coach, through the defendants' negligence. It was main- 
 tained, by the defendants, that the contract prevented the action, but 
 the court held not, because the action was founded upon a breach of 
 duty imposed by the " custom of the realm," which was, in fact, a 
 breach of the law. The same doctrine was recognized in Marshall v. 
 York, etc., R. Co., 21 L. J. (N. S.) C. P. 34. Where two parties are 
 jointly interested in a tort, one of them alone cannot waive the tort 
 and sue in assumpsit. Seay v. Sanders, 88 Mo. App. 478. 
 
 1-2 ~ 17 
 
§ 18 GENERAL CONSIDEEATIONS. 
 
 furnish evidence of the relation that the passenger occupied, 
 from which the law would create the duty, for the violation 
 of which the action could he maintained; but as the duty 
 is one which the law creates, upon grounds of public policy, 
 the contract would not affect the character or, extent of this 
 dutyi, but would be competent only to establish the relation 
 from which the duty would arise.®" This is the generally 
 prevailing rule, in the United States, but there will be refer- 
 ences made thereto in subsequent pages. 
 
 § 18. Authorities annoTinoing a contrary doctrine.— Upon 
 this well settled principle of the law of negligence, as upon 
 many other doctrines, the cases have not always been har- 
 monious, but both in. England and in the United States it 
 has been announced by the courts that where a contract estab- 
 lished the relation, of the parties, their rights were limited 
 by the specific provisions of the agreement and in case of a 
 personal injury, received "during the existence of the con- 
 tractual relation, no right of action would result, upon mere 
 grounds of public policy, but the right to recover for such 
 injury would be determined by the special provisions of the 
 contract. 
 
 For instance, it was held in an English case, that an em- 
 ployer could not maintain an action against a carrier of pas- 
 sengers for hire, for an injury to his employee, as a result of 
 which he sustained a loss of service, as the employer was not 
 a party to the contract of carriage and the employee's rights 
 would be governed thereby and not by a public duty owing to 
 
 60 Ames v. Union, etc., R. Co., 117 Mass. 541; 3 Bl. Com. 142; Abbott 
 V. Johnstown, etc.,.E. C, 80 N. Y. 27; Files v. Boston, etc., R. C, 149 
 Mass. 204; Price v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 113 U. S. 218; Head v. Geor- 
 gia, etc., R. C, 79 Ga. 358; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Butler, 57 Pa. St. 
 335; Ross V. Des Moines Valley, etc., R. Co., 39 lovi'a 246; New York 
 Central R. Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. 
 Woodworth, 26 Ohio St. 585; Philadelphia & Reading E. Co. v. Derby, 
 14 How. 468. 
 
 18 
 
GENEllAL COJfSlDEfeATIOSfS. § 19 
 
 Hhri by the carrier.''^ Other English cases have been decMed 
 upon similar principles and a recovery for personal injuries 
 denied, where a contract existed, unless a right of recovery 
 could be based .thereon, independently of the public duty 
 owing to the injured person.®^ Some of the cases in the 
 United States have followed this doctrine ®^ and in some ad- 
 judications the doubtful reasoning is even advanced that 
 while a given act might be regarded as a tort, or breach of 
 legal duty sufficient to support an action, in the absence of a 
 contract, the same act would lose the character of a tort, if 
 there was a contract between the parties, and the contract 
 alone,' in such case, would govern the right to recover for an 
 injury received.®* 
 
 § 19. Violated right and injury both essential. — The mere 
 proof of negligence, without a violation of some duty owing 
 to the plaintiff by the defendant, together with an injury 
 as a result thereof, will not justify a recovery against an em- 
 
 61 Alton V. Midland Ey. Co., 19 C. B. (N. S.) 213. This case is 
 apparently opposed to the case of Bretherton v. Wood, 6 Moore, 141 ; 3 
 Brod. & B. 54. 
 
 02 Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109; Collis v. Selden, 3 
 C. P. 495; Tollit v. Sherstone, 5 M. & W. 283. 
 
 83Fairmount & Arch St. Ey. Co. v. Stutler, 54 Pa. St. 375. The 
 approval of this doctrine in this case is said to be mere obiter dictum. 
 Buswell on Per. Inj., § 11, p. 15. 
 
 84 See Martinez v. Gerber, 3 Scott, N. E. 306; Alton v. Midland Ey. 
 Co., 19 C. B. (N. S.) 213; Gallin v. London & N. W. Ey. Co., 44 L. J. 
 Q. B. 89. 
 
 The Supreme Court of Massachusetts in the case of Fitzmaurice v. 
 New York, New Haven & Hartford E. Co., (78 Northeastern Eeporter, 
 418), makes a decision upon the interesting question of whether a person 
 is being carried as a passenger. In this case the person injured as the 
 result of a collision had obtained a ticket by presenting to the agent 
 a forged certificate to the effect that she was under eighteen, and n 
 pupil in a certain school, the railroad having contracted to convey 
 pupils at reduced rates. The holding is to the effect that the carriage 
 o,f the person was brought about by fraud and that she was not a 
 passenger. 
 
 19 
 
§ 19 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS. 
 
 ployer in. an action for personal injuries. In all cases, it is 
 essential that there should be combined both a breach of duty 
 to the plaintiff and an injury resulting proximately from 
 such violated duty. " This result follows, necessarily, from 
 the very nature of the action for personal injuries, for 
 whether the plaintiff declares in tort, or upon a contract, a 
 breach of duty must be shown and the resulting injury, as 
 the measure of the defendants' liability." *° Unless the 
 plaintiff in such an action establishes both of these essentials 
 to the action, he would show no more right of recovery than 
 would a mere stranger to a violated contract, who, of course, 
 would not be able to show any damages from the breach 
 thereof, to himself."" It is generally required that . the 
 breach of duty must be alleged, not merely by the statement 
 of the conclusion, but from an averment of facts from which 
 the duty follows, as a matter of law "^ and the pleading and 
 proof must both show that the omission of the particular duty 
 owing to the plaintiff caused the injury sued for, or no liabil- 
 ity will be made to appear."* This suggests the necessity of 
 showing the legal connection between the breach of duty 
 alleged and the injury to the plaintiff, which will be dis- 
 cussed in the next chapter. 
 
 SB White, Per. Inj. in Mines, § 8, and cases cited; Black's Law & 
 Pr. Ace. Cas., § 17. 
 
 00 Black's Law & Pr. Aec. Cas., § 17; Watson, Dam. Per. Inj., § 2; 
 Buswell, Law Per. Inj., § 3. 
 
 OT Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Gardner, 116 111. App. 619. 
 
 08 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Simons (Ind.), 76 N. E. Rep. 883. 
 
 20 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INJUET. 
 
 § 20. Defendant's negligence must be proximate cause of injury. 
 
 21. Immediate cause alone considered. 
 
 ,22. Wrongful act must be the " efficient cause " of injury. 
 
 23. Tests for determining proximate cause. 
 
 24. Nearness of causation, not time, the controlling factor. 
 
 25. Efficient intervening cause. 
 
 26. Negligent act concurring to produce injury. 
 
 27. Wrong need not directly cause injury. 
 
 28. Where injury or cause ought to be anticipated. 
 
 29. Aggravation of injury, without fault of defendant. 
 
 30. Injury in trying to avoid perilous position. 
 
 31. Instructions on proximate cause of injury. 
 
 32. No liability for injury from act of God. 
 
 33. No responsibility for injury due to inevitable accident. 
 
 34. Injuries from natural agencies. 
 
 35. No liability, if public enemy cause injury. 
 
 36. When question of law for court. 
 
 37. When a question of fact for the jury. 
 
 38. Injuries, where negligence was proximate cause. 
 
 39. Cases, where negligence held remote cause. 
 
 § 20. Defendant's negligence must be proximate cause of 
 injury. — It being a condition of the plaintiff's right of re- 
 covery, for a personal injury, that the defendant has failed 
 to discharge a specific duty owing to him, in order to legally 
 prove a breach of such duty; sufiicient to sustain a recovery, 
 by the plaintiff, it is incumbent upon him to establish that 
 the negligence of the defendant, alleged by him as the cause 
 of the injury, was in fact directly responsible therefor. This 
 essential element of' every personal injury action is what the 
 courts and law writers generally term the doctrine of prox- 
 imate cause. The proximate cause of the injury is generally 
 
 21 
 
§ 20 PHOXJMATE CAUSE. 
 
 held to be that particular cause that occasioned the injury, 
 or which could be naturally expected to produce it.^ Under 
 this doctrine, if the negligence of the defendant, alleged as 
 the cause of the injury, is found to be the direct cause that 
 produced it, the defendant -would be liable therefor; ^ but if 
 it appears that two or more causes concurred to produce the 
 injury, and the defendant would be responsible for but one of 
 such causes, and it catinot be determined which produced the 
 injury, there, would be no liability shown, for the reason 
 that the damage would not be legally connected with the act 
 for which the defendant would be responsible.^ 
 
 1 " The proximate cause is to be defined, generally, as the cause which 
 led to, or might naturally be expected to j/roduce the result." Buswell, 
 Per. In]'., § 97, p. 134; 1 Thompson, Neg., § 47; Henry v. Southern 
 Pac. R. Co., 50 Cal. 183 ; Doggett v. Richmond, etc., R. Co.', 78 N. C. 305; 
 
 2 State V. Manchester, etc., R. Co., 52 N. H. 628, 552; Jackson v. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co., 52 Wis. 150. 
 
 8 Marble v. Worcester, 4 Gray 395 ; Larson v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 
 43 Minn. 488; 45 N. W. Rep. 1096; Cox v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 102 
 Iowa 711; 72 N. W. Rep. 301; 9 Am. & Eng. R, Cas. (N. S.), 604; 
 Glenn v. Columbia, etc., R. Co., 21 S. C. 466. 
 
 A proximate cause of an injury is the cause which sets in motion 
 the chain of circumstances leading up to the injury. Cleveland, etc., R. 
 Co. V. Carey (Ind.), 71 N. E. Rep. 244. 
 
 An efficient and adequate cause of an injury is to be taken as the 
 proximate cause thereof, unless another independent and intervening 
 cause has produced the injury. Davis v. Mercer, etc., Co., 164 Ind. 413; 
 73 N. B. Rep. 899. • 
 
 The proximate cause of an injury is that event, which, as a natural 
 and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new and independent cause, 
 produces that event, and without which that event would not have 
 happened. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Lindsay, 109 111. App. 533; Clay- 
 pool V. Wigmore (Ind.), 71 N. E. Rep; 509. 
 
 That the injury resulted, in continuous sequence; that it would not 
 have occurred without the negligent act and that it might have been 
 foreseen as a result from such negligent act, are all necessary, to con- 
 stitute proximate cause. Ramsbottom v. Atlantic Coast, etc., R. Co., 
 138 N. C. 38; 50 S. E. Rep. 448; St. Louis, Southwestern R. Co. v. 
 Rowe (Tex.), 86 S. W. Rep. 1059. 
 
 To constitute actionable negligence, there must be not only a casual 
 connection between the action complained of and the injury suffered, but 
 22 
 
PEOXIMATE CAUSE. § 21 
 
 § 21. Immediate cause alone considered. — Since it would 
 be extremely impractical, in the administration of the law, 
 for the court, with the accuracy of a metaphysician, to trace 
 back to its primal cause, or origin, the sequence of events that 
 culminated in the injury to the plaintiff, the last or efficient 
 cause, for the purpose of judicial iiivestigation, is alone re- 
 garded as the proximate or controlling cause of the injury.* 
 " It were infinite for the law to consider . the causes of 
 causes, and their impulsion of each other ; therefore it con- 
 tenteth itself with the immediate cause, and judgeth of acts 
 
 such connection must be by unbroken sequence, so that the negligence 
 must be not only a caUse, but the' proximate cause of the injury. De- ' 
 catur Car, etc., Co. v. Mehaffey (Ala.), 29 So. Kep. 646. 
 
 Proximate eaUse is "held to be the nearest, cause; the immediate 
 cause; that cause in which there is, nothing intervening between it and 
 the injury and the negligence of the defendant; to give a cause of action 
 must be such a cause. Anderson v. Southern Ry. Co., 70 S. C. 490; 50 
 S. E. Eep. 202. But see Siegel, Cooper & Co. v. Treoka, 115 111. App. 
 56; 75 N.E. Rep. 1053. 
 
 The proximate cause need not be the immediate cause of the injuryi 
 Yess V. Chicago, etc., Co., 124 Wis. 406; 102 N. W. Rep. 942. 
 
 The question of proximate or remote cause often arises under a 
 variety of circumstances. In a recent Indiana case, an engineer was 
 injured by the bursting of a water gauge. The gauge was riot de- 
 fective, but broken window panes, replaced with boards, compelled him 
 to hold his face nearer the water gauge then he would have had to do 
 if the window had been pjined with glass, and the negligence of the 
 company in permitting the panes to remain out was held the approxi- 
 mate cause of the injury. Cleveland, etc., Ry.' Co. v. Patterson, 75 N. 
 E. Rep. .875. It would seem that the breaking o"f a perfect gauge could 
 not have been anticipated. 
 
 * " Perhaps no event can occur which may be considered as insulated 
 and independent; every event is itself the effect of some cause, or com- 
 bination of causes, and, in its turn, becomes the cause of many ensuing 
 consequences more or less immediate or remote. The law, however, 
 looks to a practical rule, * * * and on account of the difficulty of 
 unraveling a combination of causes, and of tracing each result, * » » 
 the law has adopted the rule of regarding the proximate and not the 
 remote cause of the occurrence which is the subject of inquiry." 
 Shaw, C. J., in Marble v. Worcester, 4 Gray 305. - 
 
 2^ 
 
§ 22 PKOXIMATE CAUSE. 
 
 by that, without looking to any further degree." ^ This 
 terse statement of the reason for the rule, by Lord Bacon, 
 finds many amplifications in the adjudicated cases and prece- 
 dents, by which the rule has been crystallized that in the eye 
 of the law that cause is alone essential which is the true, real 
 and efficient cause ; ® the particular wrongful or negligent act, 
 in the chain of events, that directly contributed to produce 
 the given injury.^ If the negligent act charged is too re- 
 mote from the injury for it to be directly connected there^ 
 with, in the natural sequence of events, as the controlling 
 cause, then such negligence could not be said to be the im- 
 mediate, or proximate cause of the injury.® 
 
 § 22. Wrongful act must be the " efficient " cause of in- 
 jury. — The proximate cause of an injury is sometimes said 
 to be that cause which, as a natural and continuous sequence, 
 unbroken by any controlling intervening cause, produces the 
 injury and without which it would not have occurred.* Or, 
 as expressed judicially " the proximate cause is the efficient 
 cause, the one that necessarily sets the other causes in opera- 
 tion. . The causes that are merely incidental, or instruments 
 of the superior or controlling agency are not proximate 
 causes, are not the responsible ones, though they may be 
 nearer in time to 'the result." ^° The efficient cause is not 
 always the cause nearest in time to the injury, for quite fre- 
 quently the nearest cause is not the efficient cause at all ; the 
 
 Maxims of Law, 1. 
 
 8 Marble v. Worcester, supra. 
 
 7 Northern Central E. Co. v. State, 29 Md. 420 ; Baltimore & 0. R. 
 Co. V. State, 33 Md. 542; Green v. Erie R. Co., U Hun 333; Peterson 
 V. Chicago & M. R. Co., 64 Mich. 621. 
 
 8 Pike V. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 39 Fed. Rep. 255. 
 
 » Smith V. Los Angeles, etc., R. Co., 98 Cal. 210; Goodlander, etc., Co. 
 V. Standard Oil Co., 63 Fed. Rep. 400; 11 C. C. A. 253; 27 L. R. A. 
 538. 
 
 10 Goodlander, etc., Co. v. Standard Oil Co., supra. 
 24 
 
PKOXIMATE CAUSE. § 23 
 
 act causing the injury must be the nearest in causation to the 
 injury, without reference to the time of the injury. The 
 active, procuring cause, of which the injury is a natural or 
 probable consequence, is the efficient cause. ^^ 
 
 § 23. Tests for determining proximate cause.^ The United 
 States Supreme Court has held that no cause can be legally 
 considered the proximate cause of an injury, unless there is 
 a direct connection between the negligent act and the injury. 
 The reasoning of Mr. Justice Strong, speaking for the court, 
 in a leading case, may well be regarded as a classic in the 
 law of probable and remote cause, and because of the clear 
 exposition of the subject, is quoted in the note.^^ If the in- 
 jury could not have been foreseen as a natural or probable 
 result of the alleged negligent act, it is not, generally, held to 
 be the proximate result of such act.'^* In order to warrant 
 
 "Union Pac. E. Co. v. Callaghan, 56 Fed. Eep. 988; C. C. A. 205. 
 
 An instruction that " proximate cause means the nearest cause, the 
 immediate cause, in which there is nothing intervening between it and 
 the effect, or the injury complained of, and that the negligence of the 
 defendant relied on would not give the plaintiff the right to recover, un- 
 less it was such proximate cause, is held to be proper, in South Caro- 
 lina." Anderson v. Southern Ry. Co., 70 S. C. 490; 50 S. E. Rep. 202. 
 
 Mere proof of negligence is not sufficient to support a verdict in an 
 action for personal injuries. Such negligence must be the proximate 
 cause of the injury. Deschner v. .St. Louis & M. E. E. Co. (Mo. 1906), 
 98 S. W. Eep. 737. 
 
 12 « We do not say that even the natural and probable consequences 
 of a wrongful act or bmission are, in all cases, to be chargeable to the 
 misfeasance or nonfeasance. They are not, when there is a sufficient 
 and independent cause operating between the wrong and the injury. In 
 such a case the resort of the sufferer must be to the originator of the in- 
 termediate cause. "But when there is no intermediate efficient cause, 
 the original wrong must be considered as reaching to the effect and 
 proximate to it. The inquiry must, therefore, always be, whether there 
 was any intermediate cause disconnected from the primary fault and 
 self-operating, which produced the injury." Minneapolis & St. Paul 
 R. Co. V. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469. 
 
 isHoag V. Lake Shore, etc., E. Co., 85 Pa. St. 293; United States 
 
 25 
 
§ 24 PEOXIMATE CAUSE. 
 
 a finding that negligence, or an act not ambuhtiiig to wanton 
 ■wrong, is the proximate cajise of an injury, therefore, it must 
 appear that the injury is the natural and probable conse- 
 quence of the negligent or wrongful act, and that it ought to 
 have been foreseen, in the light of attendant circumstances.^* 
 If the alleged act of negligence would not have produced the 
 injury but for the interpbsitiori of an independent cause, 
 which could not have been reasonably anticipated, but which 
 turned aside the natutal sequence of events, and produced 
 the result, such negligent act is not the proximate cause of 
 the injury and is not actionable. The intervening cause, in 
 such case, is the only proximate cause.-' ^ 
 
 § 24. Nearness of causation, not time, the controlling fac- 
 tor.' — It is not essential that the event which contributed to 
 produce the injury should be the nearest thereto in point of 
 time, but that it should have been the most directly connected 
 in point of causation to the injury, in ordef for the event to 
 be considered the proximate cause of the injury.^ ^ The con- 
 dition nearest in time or space to the injury is not always 
 the controlling cause thereof, but the agency producing it 
 may be comparatively remote in time or space, yet if suffi- 
 ciently near, in the order of causation, to the resulting in- 
 
 Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Dea Moines Nat. Bank, 145 Fed. Rep. 273. 
 But see contra, Smith v. L. & S. W. K. Co., L. K. 6 C. P. 14. 
 
 "McGill V. Michigan S. S. Co., 144 Fed. Rep. 788. 
 
 15 American Bridge Co. v. Seeds, 144 Fed. Rep. 605. 
 
 18 In point of time, the negligent act need not be the nearest to 
 the injury, but such negligent act as actively aided to produce the in- 
 jury; and the fact that another cause contributed to produce the 
 injury also, will not prevent a recovery, if the negligence of the 
 defendant was the efficient cause of the injury. Ray v. Pecos, etc., R. ' 
 Co. (Tex.), 88 S. W. Rep. 466. 
 
 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Callaghan, 56 Fed. Rep. 988; 6 C. C. A. 
 205; 1 Thompson on Neg., § 48. 
 
 26 
 
PEOXIMATE CAUSE. § 25 
 
 jury, the negligent act will be held the proximate cause.*'' 
 But while the authorities hold that in the inquiry for the con- 
 trolling cause, the conditions at the time of the injury, will, 
 not be looked to alone, it is not to be concluded that the 
 cases authorize the statement that the search will be extended 
 for an indefinite period, either in time or space, for it is 
 generally held that there must be such proximity in the or- 
 der of events, as to enable the court or jury to plainly 'in- 
 dividualize the alleged injurious act from other causes or 
 events that m^ have conduced to produce the result.** 
 
 § 25. Efficient intervening cause. — When a new, independ- 
 ent cause, not under the control of the alleged wrongdoer, 
 intervenes between the alleged wrongful act and the injury, 
 if such intervening cause is not a consequence of the original 
 wrongful act and could not have been foreseen by the exer- 
 cise of ordinary care and but for such intervening cause, the 
 injury to the plaintiff would not have resulted, then the inter- 
 vening cause will be taken to be the proximate cause of the 
 injury and no recovery can be had from the party who is not 
 responsible for such independent cause.*® 
 
 But if the intervening events could, by the exercise of rea- 
 sonable care, have- been foreseen by the wrongdoer, th^n 
 
 17 Eckert v. Long Island, etc., R. Co., 43 N. Y. 502 ; Henry v. Cleve- 
 land, etc., R. Co., 67 Fed. Rep. 426. 
 
 IS Vicars V. Wilcox, 8 East. 1; 2 Greenl. Evid. 210. 
 
 The negligence of defendant need not be the sole cause or the nearest, 
 in point of time, if the' injury would not have happened but for the 
 negligence arid it is closely connected in the order of events. ' Siegel, 
 Cooper & Co. v. Trecka, 115 111. App. 56; 75 N. E. Rep. 1053. 
 
 10 This is practically the language and conclusion reached by 
 the Supreme Court of Kansas, in Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co. 
 v. Stanford, 12 Kansas 354; American Bridge Co. v. Seeds, 144 Fed. 
 Rep. 788 ; Harriman v. Railroad Company, 45 Ohio St. 11 ; 12 N. E. Rep. 
 451; Kincaid v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 62 Mo. App. 365; South Side, 
 etc., R. Co. v. Trich, 117 Pa. 390; 11 Atl. Rep. 627;' Jackson v. Galves- 
 ton, etc., R. Co., 90 Texas, 372; 37 S. W. Rep. 786. 
 
 27 
 
§ 26 PKOXIMATE CAUSE. 
 
 any number of independent causes may have arisen between 
 the original wrongful act and the injury and it will not affect 
 the resulting liability of the author of the original wrongful 
 act, for every intermediate result, in the sequence of causa- 
 tion, will be regarded as the proximate effect of the first 
 wrongful act.^" 
 
 Some of the cases go so far as to hold that even if the in- 
 tervening cause could not have been foreseen, yet if it is 
 the direct result of the original negligent act of the defendant, 
 or the result of agencies put in operation by such wrongful 
 act, it will be regarded as a proximate cause of such con- 
 sequences and the defendant will be liable for the ultimate 
 result, produced by the intervening causes set in motion by 
 the original wrongful act.^^ 
 
 § 26. Negligent act concurring to produce injury. — If the 
 injury is the direct result of the wrongful act of the de- 
 fendant and could have been anticipated as the probable and 
 natural result. of such negligent act, the defendant would be 
 liable therefor, even if such act was not the sple cause of the 
 injury. A recovery may be had for negligence which con- 
 tributed to the injury complained of and it is not necessary 
 that the negligence alleged should have beeii the sole cause of 
 
 20 Wright V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 27 111. App. 212; Atchison, etc., R. 
 Co. V. Stanford, supra. 
 
 21 Billman v. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co., 76 Ind. 106; 40 Amer. Rep. 
 230; Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Arnold, 80 Ala. 600; Union, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Evans, 52 Neb. 50; 71 N. W. Rep. 1062; East Tenn. R. Co. v. Lock- 
 hart, 79 Ala. 315; Gilliland v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 19 Mo. App. 411. 
 
 If an intervening act is such a one that its probable or actual con- 
 sequence ought to have been foreseen by the original wrongdoer, the 
 casual connection is not broken and the original wrongdoer is responsi- 
 ble for all the consequences resulting from the intervening act. South- 
 ern Ry Co. V. Webb, 116 Ga. 152; 42 S. E. 395; 59 L. R. A. 109. 
 
 A prior and remote cause cannot be the basis of an action, though the 
 remote cause gave rise to the event which occasioned the injury, if there 
 was, between such cause and the injury, an independent, unrelated, 
 28 
 
fSpXlMATE CAUSE. § 27 
 
 the injury.*^ In such case the negligence -would be held a 
 concurrent proximate cause of the injury.^* 
 -So, -where t-wo causes combined to produce an injury and 
 both are proximate in their character, the one being the result 
 of negligence of the defendant and the other an occurrence 
 as to -which neither the plaintiff nor the defendant -was at 
 fault, the defendant -would be liable, if the injury -would not 
 have happened but for his negligence,^* And if the injury is 
 the result of t-wo or more causes, all of -which can be traceable 
 to the negligence of the defendant, he -would be liable therefor 
 and the question of probable or remote cause -would not enter 
 into the question.^® Nor -would it defeat the plaintiff's action 
 that the injury resulted from the concurrent negligence of the 
 defendant and another, for neither of the -wrongdoers could 
 relieve himself by setting up the negligence of the other.^" 
 
 § 27. Wrong need not directly cause injury. — If the 
 ■wrongful act of the defendant is one but for -which the in- 
 jury -would not have occurred to the plaintiff, the defendant 
 -will be liable for the resulting damage therefrom even 
 though such -wrongful act "was not the direct cause of the 
 injury, but other causes concurred to bring it about, in the 
 
 efficient cause therefor. Missouri Pae. E. C. v". Columbia (Kan.), 69 
 Pac. Rep. 338. 
 
 Where a boy was injured as a result of the negligence of the rail- 
 road company in leaving its snow fence in a defective condition 
 whereby it fell upon him, his act in raising it up, at a time before the 
 injury, is not such an independent cause as will prevent a recovery. 
 Fishburn v. Burlington & N. W. R.'Co., 127 Iowa 483; 103 N. W. Rep. 
 481. 
 
 22 Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe E. Co. v. Josey (Tex.), 95 S. W. Rep. 
 688. 
 
 23 Strange v. Bodcaw, etc., Co. (Ark.), 96 S. W. Rep. 152. 
 
 24 This is the reasoning of the court, in Grimes v. Louisville, etc., R. 
 Co., 3 Ind. App. 573; 30 N. E. Rep. 200. 
 
 25 Kraut V. Frankford, etc., R. Co., 160 Pa. 327; 28 Atl. Rep. 783. 
 
 26 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Sutton, 63 Fed. Rep. 394; U C. C. A. 251; 
 
 29 
 
§ 27' f fiOXlMATE CAUSfi. 
 
 sequence of events. The Supreme Court of Indiana has 
 noted this distinction by the use of the following language: 
 " There must be some connection between the effect and 
 the cause — between the injury and the wrong. It is not 
 
 City, etc., R. Co. v. Conery, 61 Ark. 381; 33 S. W. Rep. 426; 31 1. R. A. 
 365; Meade v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 68 Mo. App. 92; Colgrove v. New 
 Haven, etc., R. Co., 20 N. Y. 492 ; Galveston, etc., R. Co. v, Croskell 
 (Tex.), 25 S. W. Rep. 486. . , 
 
 In an action for an injury received in a collision between the train 
 of a defendant railroad company and a street car, where it is alleged 
 that the injury resulted Irom the concurrent negligence of both 'lom- 
 panies, there is no presumption of negligence, as against either com- 
 pany. Harrison v. Sutter, etc., R. Co., 134 Cal. 549; 66 Pac. Rep. 787; 
 55 L. R. A. 608. 
 
 A railroad company is liable for an injury resulting from the con- 
 current negligence of such company's agent and another cause, the same 
 as if such injury resulted entirely from its negligence. Choctaw, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Holloway, 114 Fed. Rep. 458; 52 C. C. A. 260. 
 
 Where a railroad company had customarily whistled in approach- 
 ing a yard and the deceased was thrown from a platform over the 
 tracks by the smokestack striking the cable holding it in place, the neg- 
 ligence in failing to whistle, was held to be a concurring cause of the 
 accident and the company held liable. Merchants, etc., Co. v. Burns 
 (Tex.), 74 S. W. Rep, 758; 72 8. W. Rep. 626. 
 
 Negligence in permitting a pile of stones to remain close to a railroad 
 track, as a result of which a conductor, mounting a car, is struck and 
 thrown under the car, is such act of concurrent negligence as to render 
 the company liable, in Illinois. North Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Dudgeon, 
 184 111. 477; 56 N. E. Rep. 706. 
 
 Where one is injured by the concurring negligence of two different 
 parties, they may be sued separately or jointly. Ray v. Pecos, etc., R. 
 Co., 88 S. W. Rep. 466; Siegel, Cooper & Co. v. Trecka, 115 111. App. 
 56; 75 N. B. Rep. 1053. 
 
 Where the injury results from the negligence of two parties, it is 
 enough to justify a recovery, that the act of the party charged was an 
 efficient cause of the injury, without which it would not have happened. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. O'Donnell, 109 111. App. 616; 69 N. E. Rep. 
 882. 
 
 Where the negligent conduct o{ several, at the same time and place, 
 combined in causing the injury, they acting in concert, it is not essen- 
 tial that they must have acted by a preconcerted arrangement, but 
 all are liable for the injury. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Marshall (Ind.), 
 75 N. E. Rep. 973. 
 
 30 
 
PEOXIMATE CAUSE; § 2g 
 
 necessary, however, that there should he a direct connection 
 between the wrong and the injury^ It is enough if it appears 
 that, but for the "\^rong, no injury would have occurred', and 
 that the injury was one which might have been antici- 
 pated." 27 
 
 But it must not be concluded,' "from the foregoing state- 
 ment, that the defendant could be held liable, unless he was 
 the author of an act which, had it not happened, the injury 
 would nbt 'have followed. Although there may be different 
 causes for an injury and the defendant may not be the author 
 of all such causes, if he is the party through whose agency 
 one of the efficient causes thereof resulted, and, without this 
 cause, the injury would not have occurred, he will be held lia- 
 ble ; *^ but if several causes combine to produce the injury 
 and each may be regarded as an efficient cause, without which 
 it would have been prevented, the accident may be regarded 
 as having proceeded from all such causes combined, but it 
 could not be traced to a cause which did not contribute to 
 produce it.^^ 
 
 § 28. Where injury or cause ought to be anticipated. — 
 
 Where the injury to the plaintiff is not only the result of the 
 
 The absence of lights on rear of an engine tender will not be held to 
 be the proximate cause of an injury to an employee in getting on the 
 engine, where he admits that he both saw and heard the engine before 
 attempting to get on. Wise Terminal Co. v. McCormick (Va.), 51 S. E. 
 Rep. 731. 
 
 27 Ohio, etc., E. Co. v. Trowbridge, 126 Ind. 391; 26 N. E. Eep. 64; 45 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 200. 
 
 28 Sche^merhorn v. New York, etc., R. Co., 53 N. Y. S. 279 ; 33 App. 
 Div. 17. 
 
 2»Murtaugh v. New York, etc., Co., 49 Hun 456; Ergott v. New 
 York, 96 N. Y. 264; Ring v. Cohoes, 77 N. Y. 83; 1 Thompson on 
 Neg., § 56; Louisville & C. B. Co. v. Wilson, 21 Fla. 700. 
 
 In an action for damages for injury to a child in a fire, caused by the 
 defendant, it is no defense that after the child was safely rescued, 
 it returned to ' the burning building, and thus received its injuries^ 
 Birmingham, etc., E. Co. v. Hinton (Ala.), 37 So. Eep. 635. 
 
 31 
 
§ 28 ^aoXlMATl! CAUS£. 
 
 defendant's negligent or wrongful act, in the natural or prob- 
 able sequence of events, but the injury ought to have been 
 anticipated as a result of such wrongful conduct, on de- 
 fendant's part, then the defendant is liable for all damages 
 to him resulting from such injury.*" Nor will the defendant 
 be excused for an injury resulting from his own and an 
 intervening act of another, if such intervening act ought to 
 have been reasonably anticipated to result as an intermediate 
 cause of the injury, in the natural or probable order of 
 events.*^ 
 
 But before the defendant, in any case, can be held respon- 
 sible for an act occasioning an injury to another, either as a 
 direct result of his own act, ,or when it is considered with 
 reference to the act of another, either the injury or the act 
 causing it must have been one which could reasonably have 
 been anticipated to follow. An employer would not be liable 
 for a rape, committed by a convict employee, as a result of 
 such employee not having been confined at the time or 
 guarded ; *^ a railroad company would not be liable for a rape 
 committed on a female, who had been wrongfully removed 
 or ejected from its train, by its employees, as such an act 
 could not have been foreseen to follow as a result of its 
 negligent act ; ** it could not be anticipated that children 
 would run in front of a train ,which had been negligently 
 separated,** or that a lamp would explode in a hotel where 
 a passenger had been negligently left, instead of at her des- 
 
 30 Texas, etc., K. Co. v. Eeed, 88 Tex. 439; 31 S. W. Bep. 1058; 
 Huber v. La Crosse, etc., R. Co., 92 Wis. 636; 66 N. W. Kep. 708; 31 
 L. B. A. 583. 
 
 81 Brown v. Wabash B. Co., 20 Mo. App. 222 ; Mexican Central E. Co. 
 V. Mussetts, 86 Tex. 708; Scale v. Bailroad Co., 05 Tex. 274. 
 
 32 Henderson v. Dade, etc., Co., 100 Ga. 568; 28 S. E. Rep. 251; 40 L. 
 E. A. 95. 
 
 33 Henderson v. Dade, etc., Co., 100 Ga. 568 ; Graney v. St. Louis, etc., 
 R. Co., 140 Mo. 89; 41 S. W. Eep. 246. 
 
 84 Galveston, etc., E. Co. v. Chambers, 73 Tex. 296; 11 S. W. Eep. 279. 
 
 32 
 
t'EOXIMATE CAUSE. § 29 
 
 tmation by a railroad company,^" for in all of these cases the 
 injury could not have been reasonably expected to follow the 
 negligence counted upon. 
 
 It is held, in Minnesota,*® that even if the specific injury 
 could not have been anticipated, the defendant will never- 
 theless be liable, if any injury ought to have been foreseen, 
 but this rule is doubted by good authority.®^ 
 
 § 29. Aggravation of injury without fault of defendant. — 
 
 Since the party causing an injury is only liable for the direct 
 consequences of his own wrongful act, although such an. act 
 may directly cause an injury, if, after such injury was sus- 
 tained, it was aggravated or increased by the acts of the plain- 
 tiff himself, or others, for whose acts the defendant was not 
 responsible, he would not be liable Tor this condition, which 
 did not result from any act of his.** This statement applies 
 as well to an act for which the defendant was not responsible, 
 occurring at the time of the infliction of an injury by another 
 person, as it does to an aggravation of the injury subse-- 
 
 35 Central, etc., R. Co. v. Price, 106 Ga. 176; 32 S. E. Rep. 77; 43 L. 
 R. A. 402. 
 s« Schumaker v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 46 Minn. 39. 
 
 87 1 Thompson on Neg., §§ 59, 60. 
 
 To be the proximate cause of an injury, the negligence must have 
 been such that a person of ordinary prudence would have foreseen 
 that some injury would likely result, if not the specific injury sus- 
 tained. Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Parry (Kan.), 73 Pao. Rep. 105. 
 
 It is held, in Illinois, that negligence may be the proximate cause 
 of an injury even though the injury could not have been anticipated. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Willard, 111 111. App. 225. 
 
 Where an act is negligent, the person committing it is. liable for any 
 injury proximately resulting therefrom if he should have anticipated 
 that some injury would be liable to happen from the negligence, 
 though the particular manner in which the injury occurred was not 
 reasonably to have been anticipated. Hudson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. 
 Co. (N. C. 1906), 55 S. E. Rep. 103. 
 
 88 Mack V. Lombard, etc., R. Co., 18 Wash. 84 ; Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. 
 George, 92 Ga. 760; 19 S. E. Rep. 813. 
 
 1-3 33 
 
§ 2& PROXIMATE CAUSE. 
 
 quently, by some act of the plaintiff, and for such increased 
 injury the original wrongdoer could not be held. 
 
 The wrongful ejection of a passenger, by the defendant's 
 employees, whereby he was injured, would not be connected 
 with a subsequent striking of the injured person by another 
 train some time later ; ^* a person causing an injury is never 
 liable for an aggravation of such injury by the negligence of 
 the injured person himself ; *" nor would the author of a slight 
 injury be liable for the death of the injured person, caused by 
 the mistake of his physician in giving him poison, instead of 
 medicine.*^ 
 
 But if the injured person has used ordinary care in the 
 employment of a physician, he or his representatives could 
 recover, although his injuries were increased or his death re- 
 sulted, because of the negligence or mistake of such physician, 
 since the law makes allowance for the inexact science of medi- 
 cine and on grounds of public policy, the author of an injury 
 is not permitted to escape liability therefor by establishing 
 that an injury occasioned by his negligence was aggravated 
 by reason of the mistake or lack of skill of another, whom 
 the plaintiff or injured person employed in the exercise of 
 ordinary care, in an effort to be cured.*^ 
 
 39 Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. George, supra; 1 Thompson on Neg., § 65. 
 
 40 Henry v. Southern, etc., R. Co., 50 Cal. 183. But if instead of be- 
 ing negligent himself, the injured person simply acted under the stress 
 of excitement, or innocent of any danger, his act will not be held to 
 preclude a recovery by him. Liming v. Illinois, etc., R. Co., 81 Iowa 
 246; Berg v. Great Northern E. Co., 70 Minn. 272; 73 N. W. Rep. 648. 
 
 41 Thompson v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 91 Ala. 496; 8 So, 
 Rep. 406; 11 L. R. \. 146. 
 
 42 Pullman Car Co. v. Blume, 109 111. 20; Lyons v. Erie R. Co., 57 N. 
 Y. 489; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Doyle (Tex.), 25 S. W. Rep. 461;. 
 Sauter v. New York Central & Hudson River R. Co., 06 N. Y. 50. 
 
 Although a railway company is negligent and the plaintiflf is free 
 from negligence, if his injury is the direct result of an innocent act, on 
 his part, there is no liability. Georgia Southern, etc., R. Co. v. Cart- 
 ledge, 116 Ga. 164; 42 S. B. Rep. 405; 59 L. R. A. 118. 
 34 
 
PEOXIMATE CAUSE. § 30 
 
 § 30. Injury in trying to avoid perilous position.— Where 
 one,, by negligence, puts another under a reasonable appre- 
 hension of personal physical injury, and, in a reasonable ef- 
 fort to escape from the impending peril, the latter sustains a 
 physical injury, a right of action arises to recover for the 
 physical injury and mental disorder naturally incident t-o its 
 occurrence. Under this rule, it is held in New Jersey, that 
 where a woman, crossing the street, saw a car approaching 
 at a rapid speed, after it had been negligently derailed, and 
 she ran for safety and in her flight fell and was injured as a 
 result of the fall, that she could recover damages received by 
 the fall.« 
 
 If the negligence of the railroad company has placed a per- 
 son in a position where he will be obliged to adopt the alterna- 
 tive of a precipitous course, or remain in a position of cer- 
 
 One is liable for the death of another if the injury caused blood 
 poison, from which the deceased died. Armstrong v. Montgomery St. 
 R. Co. (Ala.), 26 So. Rep. 349. 
 
 A party' who has the least opportunity of avoiding an accident is not 
 excused by the negligence of another. His negligence, in such ease, and 
 not the other's act, is the proximate cause. Elockenbrink v. St. Louis, 
 etc., R. Co., 81 Mo. App. 351, 409. 
 
 The mangling of a passenger's foot, through the negligence of a rail- 
 road company, is not the proximate cause of an injury from a rectal in- 
 jection of coffee, by its physician. Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Scott, 18 
 Tex. Civ. App. 321 ; 44 S. W. Rep. 589. See, also, Allan v. State, etc., R. 
 Co., 132 N. Y. 99; 15 L. R. A. 166; Secord v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 18 
 Fed. Rep. 221; O'Brien v. Cunard S. S. Co., 154 Mass. 372; 28 N. E. 
 266; 13 L. R. A. 329. 
 
 In Hooper v. Bacon (64 Atl. Rep. 950), the Supreme Judicial Court 
 of Maine holds that, in a suit to recover damages for personal in- 
 juries, if the plaintiff employed a surgeon of ordinary professional 
 knowledge and skill, and followed his directions, he is entitled to re- 
 cover compensation for all the damages sustained, though the surgeon 
 may not have used the requisite skill, or may have erred in judgment, 
 and by unskillful treatment have prevented the plaintiff from recovery 
 from the injury as soon or as perfectly as he would have recovered 
 under skillful treatment. 
 
 «Tuttle V. Atlantic City E. Co., 49 Atl. Rep. 450. 
 
 35 
 
§ 31 PROXIMATE CAUSE. 
 
 tain peril, it will be liable, if, in a vain attempt to avoid 
 injury, the plaintiff sustains a greater injury than he would 
 otherwise have done ; but if the injured person's act resulted 
 from a rash apprehension of danger, when none in fact ex- 
 isted, and the resulting injury is to be traced directly to such 
 rash act on his part, this will be held to be the proximate 
 cause of his injury, instead of the negligence of the de- 
 fendant, and he will be denied a recovery therefor.** 
 
 § 31. Instructions on proximate cause of injury. — It has 
 
 been held, in South Carolina, that an instruction defining 
 proximate cause, as the immediate cause ; that cause in which 
 there is nothing intervening between it and the effect, or the 
 injury, to the plaintiff, and unless the cause alleged as the 
 basis of the injury was such a cause there could be no recov- 
 ery, was properly given.*® And an instruction that if the 
 jury believe, from the evidence, that the whole occurrence was 
 a mere accident, without negligence on the part of defendant, 
 the verdict should be for defendant, is proper,*"' for a purely - 
 accidental occurrence, causing injury, without the fault of 
 the person to whom it is attributable, is not actionable. 
 
 But in Wisconsin, it is held to be error to define proximate 
 cause as the direct and natural or direct and producing 
 cause, without the existence of which the injury would not 
 have occurred, since it is sufficient to constitute proximate 
 cause that the effect follows naturally and probably, though 
 
 <4 Caswell V. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 98 Mass. 194; Georgia, etc., E. 
 Co. V. Rhodes, 56 Ga. 645; Smith v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 30 Minn. 169; 
 9 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 262 ; Iron, etc., R. Co. v. Mowery, 36 Ohio St. 418 ; 
 3 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 361; Buel v. New York Central, etc., R. Co., 31 N. 
 y. 314; Wilson v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 26 Minn. 278; Jones v. Boyce, 
 1 Starkie 493; Patterson, Ry. Ace. Law, pp. 14, 15. 
 
 4» Anderson v. Southern Ry. Co., 70 S. C. 490; 50 S. E. Rep. 202. It 
 was held error to refuse substantially a similar charge, in Texas. 
 Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. McKenzie, 70 S. W. Rep. 237. 
 
 48 Illinois Central R. Co. v. Smiesni, 104 111. App. 194. 
 36 
 
PROXIMATE CAUSE, § 32 
 
 not directly and immediately.*'^ And it is also held to be 
 erroneous to tell the jury that the cause, to be a proximate 
 cause, ought to be one that an ordinarily prudent person, 
 " would " have reasonably foreseen, as necessary foresight 
 was held to be too high a standard to use in the measuring 
 of those events which will give a cause of action, in the regu- 
 lar or probable sequence of events.*® And where the defense 
 is that the injury resulted from an act of God, it is error to 
 tell the jury that " if the defendant used ordinary care to 
 prevent the injury and such injury was caused by an act of 
 God, and not by want of care," the jury should find for the 
 defendant, for the defendant was entitled to a verdict if the 
 injury was caused by an act of God, regardless of whether 
 or not it used ordinary care.*® 
 
 § 32. No liability for injury from act of God. — Where the 
 injury to the plaintiff, instead of being traceable to some 
 wrongful act or neglect on the part of the defendant, is 
 the result of natural causes, directly and entirely, " without 
 human intervention," which could not have been avoided by 
 any amount of care or foresight, there is no liability for 
 such an injury.^" 
 
 This is the general rule established by an almost unbroken 
 line of decisions in the United States and England.^^ If 
 
 <i Meyer v. Milwaukee, etc., E. Co., 93 N. W. Eep. 6; Baxter v. Chi- 
 cago & N. W. Ry. Co., 104 Wis. 307; 80 N. W. Eep. 644. 
 *s Meyer v. Milwaukee, etc., E. Co., supra. 
 <» Texas, etc., E. Co. v. Anderson, 61 S. W. Eep. 424. 
 
 60 Withers v. Eailway Company, 3 H. & N. 969 ; Nugent v. Smith, 1 
 C. P. D. 444; Patterson, Ey. Ace. Law, p. 29. 
 
 61 Baltimore & Ohio B. E. Co. v. School District, 96 Pa. St. 65; 2 
 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 166; Pennsylvania, etc., Co. v. Anderson, 94 Pa. St. 
 351; Pennsylvania, etc., Co. v. Brigham, 29 Ohio St. 374; International 
 & Great Northern E. Co. v. Halloren, 53 Texas 46; 3 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 
 343; Denny v. New York Central E. Co., 13 Gray 481; Gates v. St. 
 Paul, etc., R. Co., 28 Minn. llO; 2 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 237, but see 
 
 37 
 
§ 32 PEOXIMATE CAUSE. 
 
 the company's negligence has not superinduced the injury, 
 one suffering damage from the effects of an unprecedented 
 flood, whereby a railroad grade,''* or bridge,"* is carried 
 away; or if a station ®* or a train ""is wrecked as the result 
 of a cyclone, no recovery can be had from the company. 
 And if the phenomena causing the injury is of such un- 
 precedented character as to come within the definition of an 
 act of God, it is immaterial that it may recur in a short 
 time after the first injury resulted. It is not essential that 
 it should be unique, if it could not reasonably have been an- 
 ticipated, for, as said, in a Pennsylvania case, " If all were 
 extraordinary, * * * the surprise at the second and third 
 could not be less than at the first, and it was still more sur- 
 prising that they should come in this rapid succession." "* 
 
 But if the negligence on the part of the railway company 
 concurs with the act of God to bring about the injury, a lia- 
 bility could be predicated thereon, for it is only where the 
 injury results solely from an act of God that there is no 
 liability. This exception to the rule is illustrated by a Mis- 
 souri case, where a liability was held to exist from a wreck 
 caused by the washing away of an embankment, admitted to 
 have been caused by an unprecedented flood, but the company 
 had failed to have its roadbed or bridge examined or in- 
 spected before the rain ; ^^ the same result would follow, if 
 the defendant's negligence weakened the structure,"* or if 
 
 contra, Kansas & Pac. R. Co. v. Miller, 2 Colo, 442, not a well-considered 
 case. 
 
 B2 Withers v. Eailway Co., 3 H. & N. 969; Ely v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. 
 77 Mo. 34 ; 16 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 342. 
 
 63 Lambkin v. Southeastern R. Co., 5 App. Cas. 552. 
 
 Bi Pennsylvania, etc., R. Co. v. Brigham, 29 Ohio St. 374. 
 
 ooMcCrary v. Illinois Central R. Co., 3 Neb. 44. 
 
 BO Pennsylvania, etc., R. Co. v. Gilliland, 56 Pa. St. 445. 
 
 B7 Ellet v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 76 Mo. 518; 12 Am. & Eng. R> Cas. 
 183; Truitt v. Hannibal & St. Joe R. Co., 62 Mo. 527; Strauss v. Rail- 
 road, 17 Fed. Rep. 209. 
 
 B8 Davis V. Railroad Co., 55 Vt. 84; 11 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 173. 
 
 3a 
 
PROXIMATE CAUSE. § 33 
 
 the injury could have been avoided, after the natural phenom- 
 ena causing the damage, if due care had been exercised on the 
 defendant's part.^' 
 
 § 33. No responsibility for injury due to inevitable acci- 
 dent. — An accident is generally defined to be " an unforeseen 
 occurrence." *" Since it is essential in order to establish 
 negligence, that the defendant, by the exercise of ordinary 
 care, could have prevented the injury, if the cause of the 
 injury could not have been anticipated, it is usually held to 
 be an accident, for which no responsibility exists.®^ 
 
 A child, -whose presence was not known to the train crew, 
 who is thrown from the train while it is rounding a curve, is 
 held to have met his injury as the result of an accident ; ®^ this 
 would also be true as to a boy, hid by the side of the road- 
 bed, whose presence was not discovered by the engineer in 
 time to stop the train.®^ In .these and similar cases, where 
 no amount of human foresight or care could prevent the in- 
 jury, there is held to be no liability.^* 
 
 But where the injury is not caused solely by an unforeseen 
 occurrence, but is, in part due to the negligence of the de- 
 
 00 Lambkin v. S. B. Ey. Co., 5 App. Cas. 352. - 
 
 An act of God means inevitable accident, without the intervention of 
 man, or the public enemy. Sonneborn, etc., Co. v. Southern R. Co., 65 
 S. C. 502; 44 S. E. Rep. 77. 
 
 That an unusual rain had overflowed an embankment and washed the 
 dirt out from under the cross ties cannot be regarded as an act of God, 
 to the extent of relieving the company for its negligence in failing 
 to provide a drain to carry off the water. Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Boyce, 87 
 S. W. Rep. 395. 
 
 One is not relieved fro,m the effects of an injury to which his negli- 
 gence contributed, although an act of God concurred to produce the dam- 
 age. Greeley v. State, 88 N. Y. S. 468; 94 App. Div, 605. 
 
 «» Black's Law k Pr. Ace. Gas., p. 17; Patterson, Ry. Ace. Law, p. 35. 
 
 »i Ante Idem. 
 
 «2 State V. Baltimore & Ohio E. Co., 24 Md. 84. 
 
 «s Meyers v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 2 Neb. 320. 
 
 8* White v. Wilmington City R. Co. (Del.), 63 Atl. Rep. 931. 
 
 39 
 
§ 34 PEOXIMATE CAUSE. 
 
 fendant, unless the injury would have happened in the ab- 
 sence of such negligence, the defendant will be liable therefor, 
 since his negligence would be held an approximate, con- 
 curring cause of the injury.®** This doctrine, however, is 
 denied in some States and in England.** 
 
 § 34. Injuries from natural causes. — If the injury to the 
 plaintiff is shown to have resulted from a natural cause, be- 
 yond the power of any man to control, there is no responsi- 
 bility therefore, on the defendant's part, for no man is charge- 
 able for the effects of an injury from natural agencies alone, 
 but every one is held to the effects of an injury received by 
 coming in contact with natural laws and charged with a 
 knowledge thereof, as a matter of law. Even if the de- 
 fendant's act conduced to produce the injury, if the conduct 
 
 05 Titoomb v. Fitchburg, etc., R. "Co., 12 Allen 254 ; Washington, etc., 
 E. Co. V. Hickey, 166 U. S. 521; 41 L. Ed. 1101; Grimes v. R. E., 3 Ind. 
 App. 573 ; 30 N. E. Rep. 200. 
 
 00 Bigelow V. Eeed, 51 Me. 325; Bridges v. R. R. Co., 6 Q. B. 377. 
 
 Where the injury was due purely to an accident, a verdict based 
 thereon ought to be set aside. Seaboard, etc., R. Co. v. Spencer, 111 
 Ga. 868; 36 S. E. Rep. 921. 
 
 Negligence is not imputable to an accident not the reasonable, natural 
 or probable result, which ought to have been foreseen. Hartman v. 
 Clark, 93 N. Y. S. 314; 104 App. Div. 62. 
 
 Where injuries are the result of an accident and there is no negligence 
 on the part of the plaintiff, or the defendant, there can be no re- 
 covery. Rea V. St. Louis, etc., E. Co. (Tex.), 73 S. W. Rep. 555. 
 
 An inanimate thing or an inevitable accident contributing to pro- 
 duce an injury, will not prevent a recovery, if defendant's negligence 
 was the efficient cause thereof. Commonwealth Electric Co. v. Rose, 214 
 111. 545; 73 N. E. Rep. 780; 114 111. App. 181. 
 
 It is no defense to an action for injuries occurring by reason of 
 the negligence of the defendant that the negligent or tortious act of a 
 third person or an inevitable accident or an inanimate thing con- 
 tributed to cause the injury to the plaintiff, if the negligence of the 
 defendant was an efficient cause without which the injury would not 
 have happened. Elgin, A. & S. Traction Co. v. Wilson, 120 HI. App. 
 371, judgment affirmed 75 N, E, Rep, 436, 217 III 47 
 40 
 
PKOXIMATE CAUSE. § 35 
 
 could not be characterized as negligent, as where an embank- 
 ment or cut in a railroad was not properly shored up, but 
 the fall of the earth or rock resulted from some other force, 
 subjecting it to the natural law of gravitation, there would 
 be no responsibility for an injury to an employee from such 
 falling earth or rock.®'^ But t» exempt the defendant from 
 liability for an injury from natural agencies, the direct 
 cause of the injury must have been such natural force, in- 
 stead of the negligence of the defendant, and if he had been 
 guilty of some act or omission, but for which the injury 
 would not have resulted, then his negligence would be suffi- 
 cient upon which to predicate a liability, notwithstanding the 
 presence of natural forces contributing thereto. If a knowl- 
 edge of the unsupported cut or embankment could be brought 
 home to the defendant and the necessity of proper support 
 therefor, in order to render it reasonably safe, then his negli- 
 gence in failing to properly sustain the same, would furnish 
 a cause of action to the one injured as result thereof, and 
 the mere concurrence of a natural force would not prevent 
 a recovery.®^ 
 
 § 35. No liability,«.if public enemy cause injury. — Anal- 
 ogous to the doctrine that no one is responsible for an injury 
 resulting from an act of God, is the rule of law that no per- 
 son is liable for an injury to another, if, instead of being 
 due to the negligent act of the person charged, the injury 
 was really caused by an act of the public enemy. 
 
 This principle is well illustrated by the Missouri case,®® 
 where a railway bridge was burned by an armed force of 
 
 »f Eassmussen v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 65 Iowa 236; Bradley v. Chi- 
 cago, etc., E. Co., 138 Mo. 293; Olson v. McMullen, 34 Minn. 94; 24 
 N. W. Eep. 318. 
 
 68 Bradley v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., supra; Himrod, etc., Co. v. Clark, 
 99 111. App. 332; 197 111. 514. 
 
 »9 Sawyer v. Hannibal & St, Joe E. Co., 37 Mo. 240. 
 
 41 
 
§ 36' PEOXIMATK CAUSE. 
 
 4. 
 
 men, who were in open rebellion against the Government, 
 and a train, without notice of the burned bridge being 
 brought home to the agents in charge thereof, was wrecked 
 and the injury to the plaintiff resulted. There was held to 
 be no liability. The rule would be different, however, if the 
 agents of the road in charge of the train, had received knowl- 
 edge that the enemy expected or were liable to attack a train, 
 for in such a case, the injury would not result solely from 
 the act of the enemy, but from the conciirrent negligence of 
 the defendant and the act of the enemy and in this in- 
 stance, the defendant would be liable, the same as he would 
 be where the injury resulted from two concurrent causes and 
 his negligence was one of those causes.'"^ 
 
 § 36. When question of law for court. — Where the evi- 
 dence as to the cause of the injury is practically all one way, 
 or the cause is so apparent that no two reasonable men would 
 differ as to the event or chain of events which led up to and 
 culminated in the injury, then the court, as a matter of law, 
 ought to say whether the cause alleged was or was not the 
 proximate cause of the injury. '^^ The question of proximate 
 cause is not essentially different from other issues to be de- 
 cided and where the facts are not conflicting, or are admitted, 
 then the court should say whether or not the cause alleged 
 was the proximate cause. ''^ It would be also within the 
 province of the court to determine, in the first instance, 
 whether or not the testimony offered by the plaintiff was suf- 
 ficient to establish that the negligence of the defendant 
 
 70 Clark v. Pacific E. Co., 39 Mo. 184; Pruitt v. Hannibal & St. Joe 
 R. Co., 62 Mo. 527; Reed v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 60 Mo. 199; Bostick 
 V. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 45 N. Y. 712. 
 
 71 Dunn V. Cass Avenue, etc., R. Co., 21 Mo. App. 188; South Side, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Trick, 117 Pa. 390; Hoag v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., 85 
 Pa. 293. 
 
 72 South Side, etc., R. Co. v. Trick, 117 Pa. 390; 11 Atl. Rep. 627. 
 
 42 
 
PEOXIMATE CAUSE. § 37 
 
 was the proximate cause of the injury, or whether or 
 not it tended to prove this fact J* This is always the prov- 
 ince of the court, in the determination of the basic fact, 
 whether or not the plaintiff has a cause of action sufficient 
 to justify its submission to the jury. And if the undisputed 
 evidence clearly establishes that the injury was due to an- 
 other unrelated, independent cause, than the negligence of the 
 defendant alleged,''^* or if the cause of the injury is estab- 
 lished to be one wholly different from that alleged, in either 
 event, there would be such a failure to establish the negli- 
 gence alleged, as to constitute a failure of the cause, and 
 the court should take the case from the jury. The trained 
 judicial mind usually is better qualified to judge of the con- 
 nection of causes, under the legal rules of evidence than a 
 jury, composed often of men withcajt experience in such 
 matters, and for this reason the rule is held to be that where 
 the testimony is clear that the cause of the injury was dif- 
 ferent from that alleged as the ground of recovery, it is the 
 duty of the court to pass upon the question, not to submit 
 the issue to the jury.'^^ 
 
 § 37. When a question of fact for the jury. — As in every 
 other issue submitted in an orderly way, to a court, it may 
 be said that where the facts are so conflicting that reasonable 
 men might differ as to the cause of an injury, then the court 
 ought to submit the determination of the question of what 
 was the proximate cause of such injury to the jiiry.'^® Some 
 
 '8 Cincinnati, etc., E. Co. v. Murray, 53 Ohio St. 570 ; 42 N. E. Hep. 
 596; 30 L. R. A. 508; 1 Thompson, Neg., § 162. 
 
 7< South Side, etc., E. Co. v. Trick, 117 Pa. 390; 11 Atl. Rep. 627. 
 
 "Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Johnston, 81 Fed. Rep. 679; 53 IT. S. 
 App. 381. 
 
 '8 Patten v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 32 Wis. 524, where the court held 
 that whether a failure to keep a station lighted was proximate cause 
 of injury should be submitted to jury. See, also, BischofT v. Peoples, 
 etc., E. Co., 121 Mo. 216; 25 S. W. Eep. 908; Lake Erie, etc., R. Co. v. 
 
 43 
 
§ 37 PROXIMATE CAUSE. 
 
 courts have held that the determination of such a question is 
 peculiarly a question for the jury, in the consideration of a 
 cause to look at the acts as they occur as shown by the evi- 
 dence and trace the injury to its source or primal cause. ''^ 
 Judge Thompson contends that the question should be deter- 
 mined by the average experience of mankind, as possessed by 
 a jury ; ''^ some courts hold that it is not a matter of science 
 or one requiring a trained judicial mind,^® and others say, 
 in every instance the question is for the jury to determine 
 whether or not the evidence shows a connection between the 
 cause alleged and the injury.*" It may be admitted that this 
 question is not one requiring peculiar science or legal acumen 
 or training to solve, yet, since the knowledge of what causes 
 may legally enter into a consideration of the question, when 
 legally considered, and what evidence is essential to legally 
 establish a given fact and what proof is required to establish 
 a case, are all elements bearing upon the proper determination 
 of this question, it would not seem that the court, possessing 
 these qualifications and selected by the people or the chief 
 executive to try such issues, because of these very qualifica- 
 tions, would, because possessing them, be less competent than 
 the average jury, to consider such issues. This is not the 
 true rule. The issue is not essentially different from other 
 issues; if there is a dispute in the evidence, or if there is 
 
 Craig, 73 Fed. Rep. 642; 19 C. C. A. 631; Baltimore, etc., E. Co. v. 
 Anderson, 85 Ted. Rep. 413; 29 -C. C. A. 235. 
 
 '7 Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469 ; Brown v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. Co., 54 Wis. 342; Schumal^er v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 46 Minn. 
 39; 48 N. W. Rep. 559; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Nitsche, 126 
 Ind. 229; 26 N. E. Rep. 51. 
 
 78 1 Thompson on Neg., § 161, p. 158. 
 
 TO Clemens v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 53 Mo. 366; Gram v. Northern 
 Pac. R. Co., 1 N. D. 252. 
 
 80 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Kemp, 61 Md. 619. This is not the law. 
 It is always for the court to say whether there is a prima fade case 
 made. For illustrations of numerous jury cases, where it was held that 
 issue was properly submitted, see 1 Thompson on Neg., §§ 163, 164, 
 
 U 
 
PKOXIMATE CAUSE. § 38 
 
 doutt as to the cause, the question should be submitted to 
 the jury. If there is not, the court should decide it, as a 
 matter of law. 
 
 § 38. Injuries where negligence was proximate cause. — 
 Where the railroad permits its track to get in a defective con- 
 dition, as a result of which a train is derailed or wrecked, 
 this is generally held to be such a proximate cause of an in- 
 jury to the engineer or train crew, as to support an action 
 therefor.®^ The absence of hand-holds,*^ a defective bra~ke 
 beam ** or any other defect in a car, directly contributing to 
 produce an injury, will be held the proximate cause thereof, 
 both as to employees of the initial and connecting carrier, 
 if an inspection by the latter has not resulted prior to the 
 injury.** [Failing to maintain the statutory stock fence, as 
 a result of which stock derailed a train, was held, in Mis- 
 souri, to be the proximate cause of an injury to the engineer, 
 of the wrecked engine.*^ And, generally, whenever the act 
 of the company, or any of its employees, contributes to pro- 
 duce an injury to another employee, such act will be held 
 to render the company liable, if the statutory fellow-servant 
 rule obtains, the same as if the company had been negligent 
 
 siKnapp V. Sioux City, etc., E. Co., 65 Iowa, 91; 18 Am. & Eng. E. 
 Cas. 60; Aldrich v. Concord, etc., E. Co., 67 N. H. 380; 36 Atl. Eep. 
 252; Patterson, Ey. Aec. law, p. 26. 
 
 82 International & Gr. N. E. Co. v. Sipole, 29 S. W. Eep. 686. 
 
 83 Cone V. Delaware, etc., E. Co., 81 2Sr. Y. 206 ; Booth v. Boston, etc., 
 E. Co., 73 N. Y. 38; Eansier v. Minneapolis, etc., E. Co., 32 Minn. 331. 
 
 84 Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Snyder, 55 Ohio St. 342 ; 45 N. E. Eep. 559. 
 
 85 Dickson v. Omaha, etc., E. Co., 124 Mo. 140; 27 S. W. Eep. 476; 
 25 L. E. A. 320. 
 
 The United States Supreme Court even upheld a verdict caused by 
 the running into a boy, who strayed on its track, by reason of its failure 
 to construct a fence around a public park, as required by statute, to 
 keep out stock. Hayes v. M. C. E. Co., Ill U. S. 228; 15 Am. & Eng. 
 E. Cas. 394. 
 
 45 
 
§ 38 PROXIMATE CAUSE. 
 
 in the failure to maintain or repair a tool or appliance neces- 
 sary in the service.*® 
 
 And for direct injuries to third parties from the negli- 
 gence of its employees, such as injuries from a runaway, 
 caused by the negligent blowing of the locomotive whistle ; ^'^ 
 injuries resulting to female passengers, from being carried 
 past their stations and ejected,** or injuries to male passen- 
 gers, after being ejected, where the injuries are not the re- 
 sult of another intervening, independent cause,*" or injuries 
 sustained in putting out fires set by the locomotive,®" in all 
 such cases, there is held to be a liability. 
 
 80 Christianson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 67 Minn. 94; 69 N. W. Rep. 
 640; 1 Thompson on Neg., § 108. 
 
 87 Pennsylvania, etc., R. Co. v. Brannen, 17 W. N. C. (Penn.) 227; 
 Patterson Ry. Ace. Law, p. 26; Lowery v. Ry. Co., 99 N. Y. 158. 
 
 88 Brown v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 54 Wis. 342; 3 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 444. 
 
 80 Southern, etc., R. Co. v. Nix, 68 Ga. 572. 
 
 ooGlanz v. Chicago, etc., R. Co.- (Iowa), 93 N. W. Rep. 575. 
 
 It is held, in Iowa, that the fact that a child is injured on a turn- 
 table, as a result of the turning of the table by its playmates, will not 
 relieve the railroad company, since it is negligent in maintaining such 
 a dangerous machine, attractive to children. Edginton v. Burlington, 
 etc., R. Co., 116 Iowa 410; 90 N. W. Rep. 95; 57 L. R. A. 561. 
 
 Negligence of a railroad in starting a fire on plaintiff's premises, was 
 held the proximate cause of an injury received while putting it out. 
 Glanz V. Chicago & C. R. Co. (Iowa), 93 N. W. Rep. 575. 
 
 Negligence in leaving machinery unguarded, was held the proximate 
 cause of an injury to an employee, who fell and in trying to sustain 
 himself caught hold of an unguarded cog. Gee v. Northern Pac. R. 
 Co., 30 Wash. 654; 71 Pac. Rep. 182. 
 
 Where the defendant's negligence caused plaintiff's team to run away • 
 and in trying to hold it, the line broke, which was really the cause 
 of his falling from his wagon, the company was none the less liable, 
 in Texas, as if it could have foreseen such a result. Texas & Pac. R. 
 Co. V. Moseley, 58 S. W. Rep. 48. 
 
 Where the negligence of employees in carrying a passenger past his 
 station, results in exposure to the elements, from which sickness results, 
 it is held to result proximately from the wrongful expulsion. Missouri 
 K. & T. R. Co. V. Hennessy, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 310; 49 S. W. Rep. 917. 
 
 Allowing cars to remain on a double track road, so as to necessitate 
 46 
 
PeoximaTe causb. § 39 
 
 § 39. Cases where negligence held remote cause. — The 
 
 rule is quite general that if two distinct causes contribute to 
 produce an injury, ■wholly unrelated each to the other, one of 
 such causes must be held the proximate cause and the other 
 the remote cause of the injury.®^ The proximate cause, to 
 render the defendant liable, must be the wrongful act of the 
 defendant, or its employees, or no cause of action for such 
 an-^njury can be maintained. A defective coupling pin, 
 which causes the parting of a train, will'not be held the prox- 
 imate cause of an injury to a brakeman, received while going 
 between the broken train to couple it, in violation of a known 
 rule of his employer ; ®^ a failure to have the customary num- 
 ber of brakemen on a train when an employee was injured, 
 making a coupling, will give no right of action, as the absence 
 of the required force was not connected with the injury ; ®* a 
 brakeman's death from being struck by a gate, negligently left 
 open, but while he was riding a brake beam, instead of riding 
 in the cab, where he ought to have been, was held to be due to 
 his own and not the company's negligence,^* and a hole in a 
 car could not be termed the proximate cause of an injury to 
 a brakeman who was hurt by the conductor letting a heavy 
 piece of freight fall against him, while assisting to unload a 
 car.®^ The negligence of the company will not, generally, 
 be held to be the proximate cause of an injury to an employee, 
 caused by the intervening negligence of a coemployee, in the 
 absence of a statute imposing such a liability,®* nor will the 
 
 a short turn with a wagon, may be deemed the cause of an injury re- 
 ceived from being thrown from the wagon, while turning it. Southern 
 R. Co. V. Prather, 119 Ala. 588; 24 So. Rep. 836; 14 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. (N. S.) 832. 
 
 »i Missouri Pae. R. Co. v. Columbia (Kan), 69 Pac. Rep. 338. 
 
 82 Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Tribble, 24 S. E. Rep. 278 ; 3 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. (N. S.) 632. 
 
 93 Connor v. Elmira, etc., R. Co., 92 Hun 339; 36 N. Y. S. 926. 
 
 91 Benage v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., 102 Mich. 72 ; 60 N. W. Rep. 286. 
 
 95 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Southwick (Ind.), 44 N. E. Rep. 263. 
 
 98 East Tenn., etc., R. Co. v. Reynolds, 93 Ga. 570; 20 S. E. Rep. 70; 
 
 47 
 
§ 39 PROXIMATE CAUSE. 
 
 company be liable for injuries to third parties, -unless the in- 
 jury can be traced directly to the negligence of its employees. 
 Accordingly, injuries to the public, in attempts to avoid 
 a blocked street by climbing, or driving around standing 
 cars ; *'' injuries to passengers, after being ejected from the 
 train, which could not have been foreseen, or anticipated ; ^* 
 injuries received by drunken passengers, as a result of their 
 intoxication,^® or injuries to passengers by third persons, or 
 other passengers, are not, generally, injuries for which dam- 
 ages can be recovered from the railroad company.^ 
 
 Terre Haute, etc., E. Co. v. Mansberger, 65 Fed. Rep. 196 ; 12 C. C. A. 
 574; 1 Thompson on Neg., § 109. 
 
 07 Pennsylvania, etc., E. Co. v. Taylor, 104 Penn. 306; Pennsylvania, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Staley, 41 Ohio St. 188; 19 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 381; 
 Jaclcson v. North Carolina, etc., R. Co., 13 Lea (Tenn.), 491; 19 Am. 
 & Eng. E. Cas. 433; Patterson Ey. Ace. Law, p. 24. 
 
 osHobba v. L. & S. W. Ey. Co., L. E. 10 Q. B. Ill; St. Louis, etc., E. 
 Co. V. Marshall, 78 Mo. 610; St. Louis, etc., E. Co. v. Trigg, 74 Mo. 174; 
 Cincinnati, etc., E. Co. v. Eaton, 94 Ind. 474; Brown v. Chicago & 
 C. E. Co., 54 Wis. 342; Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Fleming, 14 Lea 
 (Tenn.), 128. 
 
 89 McClelland v. Louisville, etc., E. Co., 94 Ind. 276 ; 18 Am. & Eng. 
 E. Cas. 260; Haley v. Chicago & Northwestern Ey. Co., 21 Iowa, 15. 
 
 1 Cornman v. E. C. Ey. Co., 4 H. & N. 78 ; Hunter v. Stewart, 47 
 Me. 419; Williamson v. Grand Trunlt Ey. Co., 17 Up. Can. (C. P.) 615; 
 Patterson, Ey. Ace. Law, p. 25. 
 
 Where two distinct causes, wholly unrelated, contribute to produce 
 an injury, one must be the proximate cause and the other the remote 
 cause. Missouri Pao. E. Co. v. Columbia, 69 Pac. Eep. 338. 
 
 Where an employee places his hand on a railroad track and gets 
 it crushed by a car, this act of his and not the speed of the car, is 
 the cause of his injury. Nolan v. Metropolitan, etc., E. Co., 72 N. Y. S. 
 501 ; 65 App. Div. 184. 
 
 A brafceman who was kicked by a horse, which run from a stock 
 car, while he was attempting to fasten the door, cannot recover from 
 the company, as the kick of the horse was the proximate cause of his 
 injury, although the door was defective. Smith v. Texas & Pac. E. Co., 
 58 S. W. Eep. 151. 
 
 In an action for injury from a defective car, delivered by a connecting 
 carrier, such carrier will not be liable after an inspection by the re- 
 ceiving carrier, as its negligence will be held too remote. Missour; 
 48 
 
PROXIMATE CAUSE. § 39 
 
 K. & T. B. Co. V. Merrill, 65 Kan. 436; 70 Pac. Eep. 358; 59 L. R. A. 
 711. 
 
 A railway train may be operated at an improper rate of speed, but 
 this will not be held to be the proximate cause of crushing the plaintiff's 
 hand, if he laid it in front of the train. His own act occasioned the 
 injury. Nolan v. Metropolitan, etc., E. Co., 173 N. Y. 604; 66 N. E. Rep. 
 1112. 
 
 One injured in a railroad collision, as a result of which dizziness 
 was a consequence, cannot recover for an injury received from a fall, 
 while laboring under such dizziness, as it is too remote. Snow v. New 
 York, etc., R. Co., 185 Mass. 321; 70 N. E. Rep. 205. 
 
 A railway company will not be liable for an object left in the high- 
 way, which was rolled against plaintiff's carriage, as a result of which 
 the injury was sustained. Glassey v. Worcester Con., etc., R. Co., 185 
 Mass. 315; 70 N. E. Rep. 199. 
 
 Injuries from jumping from a moving train can never be traced to 
 the negligence of the company. Central Texas, etc., E. Co. v. Hoard, 
 49 S. W. Eep. 142; St. Louis & S. P. R. Co. v. Murray, 55 Ark. 248; 
 18 S. W. Eep. 50; 16 L. R. A. 787; St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. 
 Madry, 57 Ark. 306; 21 S. W. Eep. 472; Mitchell v. Southern Pac. R. 
 Co., 87 Cal. 62; 25 Pac. Rep. 245; 11 L. R. A. 130; Southwestern R. 
 Co. v. Paulk, 24 Ga. 356; Wilson v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 26 Minn. 
 278; 3 N. W. Eep. 333; Dimmitt v. Hannibal & St. Joe R. Co., 40 Mo. 
 App. 654; Buel v. New York Cen,t. R. Co., 31 N. Y. 314; 88 Am. Dec. 
 271. 
 
 The negligence of a boy in jumping from a train, not the com- 
 pany's failure to discover him, is the cause of his injury. Chicago 
 & C. R. Co. V. Hoffman, 82 111. App. 453; Brightman v. Union, etc., 
 E. Co., 167 Mass. 113; Schiffer v. Chicago & C. R. Co., 96 Wis. 141. 
 
 The act of one alighting from a train is the cause of his injury, 
 not the fact that employees left the train gate open. Aguline v. New 
 York, etc., E. Co., 21 E. I. 263; 43 Atl. Eep. 63; 14 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. (N. S.) 199. 
 
 The postponement of his marriage is not the proximate result of 
 plaintiff's ejection from defendant's train. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. 
 Hine, 121 Ala. 234; 14 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 382. 
 
 Mere failure to give statutory signals of the movements of a switch 
 engine, crossing a street, will not enable an injured traveler to recover, 
 who crosses without stopping, as his negligence is the proximate cause 
 of his injury. Killian v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 86 Mo. App. 473. 
 
 1-4 49 
 
CHAPTEK III. 
 
 JUEISDICTION OF ACTIOIT. 
 LAW OF PLACE. 
 
 § 40. Actions both local and transitory. 
 
 41. When action existed at common law. 
 
 42. Statutory actions for death strictly construed. 
 
 43. Law of place of accident controls damages. 
 
 44. Death of foreigner — Administrator may sue for. 
 
 45. For injury or death in foreign State. ^ 
 
 46. Negligence and injury in different States. 
 
 47. When remedy exists in either of two States. 
 
 48. Same — Statutes need not be identical. 
 
 49. Death statutes given no extraterritorial eflfeet. 
 
 50. When statute given extraterritorial effect. 
 
 51. Subsequent repeal of statute does not effect. 
 
 52. Penal and compensatory statutes distinguished. 
 
 53. Pleading law of foreign State. 
 
 54. Proving statute of foreign State. 
 
 55. Special limitations applicable to such actions. 
 
 § 40. Action both local and transitory. — An action for the 
 death of a person, caused by the -wrongful act of. a railroad 
 company is said, in a Kentucky case, to he both local and 
 transitory. It is transitory in the sense that it may be in- 
 stituted in another county than that in which the tort was 
 committed and its chief officer and agent, if the officer is 
 named by the statute upon whom service must be made, may 
 be found, and it is local at the option of the plaintiff.^ 
 
 The action need not be filed in the county where the 
 death or injury occurred, and regardless of the place where 
 
 1 Chesapeake & 0. E. Co. v. Heath, 87 Ky. 651; 9 S. W. Eep. 832; 
 White v. Eio Grande, etc., E. Co. (Utah), 71 Pac. Eep. 593. 
 50 
 
JtrElSDICTIOlsr LAW Q-e PLACE. § 41 
 
 the principal office or place of business of the defendant is ^ 
 located, or the place where the contract of employment was 
 made, the action is generally permitted to be brought in any 
 county where a valid service of process upon the defendant 
 can be had.^ 
 
 § 41. When action existed at common law. — Where the 
 right of action for a personal injury on a railroad exists by. 
 virtue of the common law, an action for such injury 
 may be brought in a State where the common law obtains, 
 although the injury was received in another State. Ac- 
 cordingly, it is held, in Texas, in an action in that State, by 
 an employee, for injuries received in another State, that the 
 case will be determined according to the common law of 
 Texas, although both plaintiff and defendant are residents of 
 the other State where the injuries occurred.* And it i§ 
 also held, in Tennessee, that an action may be brought in 
 that State, for injuries received by an employee in another 
 State, without alleging the decisions and laws of the State 
 where the injury occurred, if the right of action existed at 
 common law.* 
 
 2 Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. Oaks, 52 Ga. 410; 7 Am. Ey. Eep. 143; East 
 Tenn. & G. R. Co. v. Atlanta, etc., E. Co., 49 Fed. Eep. 608; Christian 
 V. Columbus, etc., E. Co., 79 Ga. 460; 38 Am. & Bng. R. Cas. 261; 
 7 S. E. Eep. 216. 
 
 In Louisiana, under the Practice Code, an action for death against 
 a railroad for wrongful death, may be brought in the parish where 
 the injury was inflicted. Houston v. Vicksburg, etc., E. Co., 39 La. 
 Ann. 796; 34 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 76; 2 So. Eep. 562. 
 
 An action for death under the Arkansas statute was held to be a 
 transitory action. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. McGinty, 88 S. W. Rep. 
 1001. See, also. Smith v. Empire State M. & D. Co., 127 Fed. Rep. 
 462. 
 
 3 Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 11 Texas Civ. App. 658; 
 33 S. W. Rep. 718. 
 
 ■1 Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Reagan, 96 Tenn. (12 Pickle) 128; 
 33 8. W. Rep. 1050. 
 
 51 
 
§ § 42, 43 JUEISDICTION LAW OF PLACEi. 
 
 § 42. Statutory actions for death strictly construed.— As 
 
 a general rule, all statutes creating a cause of action for 
 injuries causing the death of the injured party are strictly 
 construed, for the reason that all such acts are in contraven- 
 tion of the common-law rule that actions for personal injuries 
 resulting in death did not survive the death of the injured 
 person.^ 
 
 The right to sue, for injuries resulting in death, is limited 
 to those expressly named in the statute creating the cause of 
 action and no one can sue for damages resulting from the 
 death of a person injured through the negligence of a rail- 
 road company, or its agents, unless specially named in the 
 statute as empowered to sue for the death of such person." 
 
 § 43. law of place of accident controls damages. — The 
 
 damages recoverable from an employer for the death of his 
 employee, caused by his negligence, are controlled by the 
 law of the place where the contract of employment was 
 made, and where the accident occurred, regardless of the fact 
 that the death occurred and the action is brought in another 
 State. ^ 
 
 Where the action is brought in one State, for death in an- 
 other, the' parties entitled to sue depend upon the law of the 
 State where the death occurred and not where the suit is in- 
 
 5 Baker v. Balken, 1 Camp. 493; James v. Christie, 18 Mo. 162; 
 Parsons v. Missouri Paciflo Ey. Co., 94 Mo. 286; Buswell, Per. Inj., 
 §§ 15 to 18. 
 
 Personal representatives are not entitled to sue, unless specially 
 named. Mcintosh v. Missouri K. & T. R. Co., 103 Mo. 340; Boyd v. 
 Brazil, etc., Co., 22 Ind. App. 320; 50 N. E. Rep. 368. 
 
 7 Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Babcock, 154 U. S. 190; 14 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 978; 38 L. Ed. 958; The City of Alexandria, 17 Fed. Rep. 390. 
 
 An action for personal injuries received in Iowa, where the suit 
 is filed in Missouri, is governed by the law of Iowa. Benedict v. 
 Chicago Great Western Ry. Co., 104 Mo. App. 218; 78 S. W. Rep. 60; 
 Williams v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 106 Mo. App. 61; 79 S. W. Rep. 1167. 
 
 52 
 
JUEISDICTION LAW OP PLACE. §§44,45 
 
 stituted.* And the defendants, in actions for death by 
 wrongful act, also depend entirely upon the statute creating 
 the liability, and whether the liability is imposed under a 
 domestic or foreign statute, its provisions as to parties plain^ 
 tiff and defendant must be followed.^ 
 
 § 44. Death of foreigner — Administrator may sue for. — 
 Where a nonresident of a State, where an injury resulting 
 in death, under the statute of the State where the death oc- 
 curs, is within the protection of the statute of the State 
 where the death occurred and there would be no one com- 
 petent to sue for such death, but such statute permits an ad- 
 ministrator to sue therefor, the Probate Court of the county 
 where the death occurred would have jurisdiction to appoint 
 an administrator for the purpose of suing for the wrongful 
 death of the deceased, although he was not an inhabitant of 
 the State, or left no property therein.^" 
 
 But of course, his representative could not recover in one 
 State, for the wrongful killing of a person by a railroad, 
 where the act was done in another State and the laws of the 
 State where the killing occurred would give the plaintiff no 
 remedy therefor, ^^ 
 
 § 45. For injury or death in foreign State. — In an action 
 for death, where the injury or death occurred in a different 
 
 8 Usher, v. West Jersey Co., 126 Pa. St. 206; Lomer v. Segal, 30 
 Vt. 66; Johnson v. Union Pac. Co. (Utah 1904), 76 Pac. "Rep. 1089. 
 A right of action, in Missouri, for a negligent injury inflicted in Iowa, 
 is governed by the law of Iowa. Williams v. Chicago, R. I. & P. E. Co. 
 (Mo. App. 1(904), 106 Mo. App. 61; 79 S. W. Rep. 1167. 
 
 » Williams v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., supra; Black's Law and 
 Prae. Ace. Cas., §§ 146, 147. 
 
 loHutchins v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 44 Minn. 5; 46 N. W. Rep. 79. 
 
 "Selma, etc., E. Co. v. Lacey, 49 Ga. 106; Willis v. Missouri Pac. 
 R. Co., 61 Texas, 432; 23 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 379; St. Louis, L M. & S. 
 Ry. Co. V. McCormick, 71 Texas 660; DeHam v. Mexican Nat. R. Co. 
 (Texas), 22 S. W. Rep. 249. 
 
 53 
 
§46 JUBlSraOTION LAW OF PLACE. 
 
 State than that wherein the action is brought, the wrong 
 causing the death must generally be actionable under the 
 law of the State where it occurs and also in the State where 
 the suit is brought, or otherwise there is no cause of action.'^ 
 A person cannot recover, in the courts of one State, for a 
 wrongful killing, by a railroad, where the act was done in 
 another State, under whose laws the plaintiff could not have 
 recovered. ^^ Such a right of action may be prosecuted in 
 another State, only when the two States have substantially 
 similar statutes ^ * and it must generally be both alleged and 
 proved that an action would lie under the law of the State 
 where the injury occurred, ■^^ 
 
 § 46. Same — Negligence and injury in different States. — 
 The rule that the law of the place of the injury governs the 
 damages recoverable therefor, is not affected by the fact that 
 the negligent act which occasioned the injury may have been 
 committed in a different State than that where the injury 
 was received. Where' a railroad engineer, running through 
 the States of Mississippi and Tennessee, was killed by a 
 collision in Tennessee, the omission of a duty in Mississippi, 
 
 12 Burns v. Grand Rapids, etc., E. Co., 113 Ind. 169; 15 N. E. Rep. 
 230; Richardson v. New York, etc., R. Co., 98 Mass. 85; Anderson v. 
 Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 37 Wis. 321; O'Reilly v. New York, etc., R. 
 Co., 42 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 50; 16 R. I. 388; 17 Atl. Rep. 906; 6 
 L. R. A. 719; Gardner v. New York, etc., R. Co., 17 R. I. 790; Need- 
 ham V. Grand Trunk R. Co., 38 Vt. 294 ; Davis v. New York, etc., R. 
 Co., 143 Mass. 301; 58 Am. Rep. 138; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 223; 
 9 N. E. Rep. 815. 
 
 13 St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. McCormick, 71 Texas, 660; Willis 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 61 Texas 432; 23 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 379. 
 
 "O'Reilly v. New York, etC;, R. Co., 16 R. I. 388; 17 Atl. Rep. 906; 
 42 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 50; 6 L. R. A. 719. 
 
 IB Vandeventer v. New York, etc., R. Co., 27 Barb. 244; Hyde v. 
 Wabash, etc., R. Co., 61 Iowa 441; 16 N. W. Rep. 351; 47 Am. Rep. 
 820; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 503; Hamilton v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 
 39 Kansas, 56; 18 Pac. Rep. 57. 
 
 54 
 
JUEISDICTIOW LAW OF PLACE. § 47 
 
 which really occasioned the injury, was held not to have the 
 effect of transferring the cause of action, because the conse- 
 quence of the wrongful act was manifested physically in the 
 State of Tennessee, and that was where the cause of action 
 accrued and the. right of recovery was held to be determined 
 by the laws of Tennessee.^* 
 
 § 4Y. When remedy exists in either of two States. — Where 
 a person is killed by the wrongful act of a railroad in one 
 State and the courts of another State are endowed with juris- 
 diction in a similar action, and the statutes of both States 
 are alike on the subject, the action may be brought in the 
 courts of the other State as well as in the courts of the 
 State where the death occurs.^'' The existence of a similar 
 statute in the latter State is sufficient evidence of the legis- 
 lative policy of the State, inimical to that of the State where 
 the accident occurred and hence the action cannot be held to 
 be opposed to the public policy of the State where the right 
 is attempted to be enforced.^* 
 
 If the right of action is given an administrator of the 
 State where the death occurred and such action is not op- 
 
 16 Chicago, St. L. & N. O. R. Co. v. Doyle, 60 Miss. 977. 
 
 17 Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. McMullen, 117 Ind. 439; 38 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 165; 20 N. E. Rep. 287; Hecht v. Ohio, etc., R. Co., 132 Ind. 
 507; Dennick v. Central R. Co., -103 U. S. 11; Bruce v. Cincinnati, etc., 
 R. Co., 83 Ky. 174; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Doyle, 60 Miss. 977; 8 
 Am. & -Eng. R. Cas. 171; Burns v. Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co., 113 
 Ind. 169; 15 N. E. Rep. 230; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Lewis, 24 Neb. 
 848; 40 N. W. Rep. 401; 2 L. R. A. 67; Stoeckman v. Terre Haute, 
 etc., R. Co., 15 Mo. App. 503; Ash v. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 72 Md. 
 144; 44 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 676; Vawter v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 
 84 Mo. 679; 54 Am. Rep. 105; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Crudup, 63 Miss. 
 291; McLeod v. Connecticut, etc., R. Co., 58 Vt. 727; 28 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 644; Laird v. Connecticut, etc., R. Co., 62 N. H. 254; 43 Am. 
 & Eng. R. Cjs. 63; Nelson v. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co., 88 Va. 971. 
 
 "Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Doyle, 60 Miss. 977; 8 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 171. 
 
 55 
 
§47 JUEISDICTION LAW, or PLACE. 
 
 posed to the public policy of the State where the action is 
 filed, the administrator of the latter State can sue,^** regard- 
 less of the administration in the State of the homicide. ^° 
 
 19 Illinois C. R. Co. v. Crudup, 63 Miss. 291; Dennick v. Central R. 
 Co., 103 U. S. 11. 
 
 20 Gurney v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 37 N. Y. S. R. 557; 138 N. Y. 638; 
 Leonard v. Columbia, etc., Co., 84 N. Y. 48. 
 
 It is held, in the following cases, that an action may be prosecuted 
 in one State, for death in another, where the statutes of the two States 
 were similar. Central R. Co. v. Swint, 73 Ga. 651; 26 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 482; South Carolina R. Co. v. Nix, 68 Ga. 572; Knight v. West 
 Jersey R. Co., 108 Pa. St. 250; 26 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 485; Leonard v. 
 Columbia St. Nav. Co., 84 N. Y. 48; Nelson v. Chesapeake & Ohio 
 Co., 88 Va. 971; Dennick y. Central R. Co., 103 U. S. 11; Morris v. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co., 65 Iowa 727; 19 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 180; 54 
 Am. Rep. 39 ; Stoeckman v. Terre Haute, etc., R. Co., 15 Mo. App. 503 ; 
 Jones V. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 178 Mo. 628; 77 S. W. Rep. 890; 
 Lee V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 195 Mo. 418; 92 S. W. Rep. 614; Burns v. 
 Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co., 113 Ind. 169; Boyce v. Wabash, etc., Co., 
 63 Iowa 70; 23 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 172; 50 Am. Rep. 730; Higgins v. 
 Central R. Co., 155 Mass. 176; Illinois Central R. Co. v. Crudup, 63 
 Miss. 291; Chandler v. New York, etc., R. Co., 159 Mass. 589; 35 
 N. E. Rep. 89 ; Hover v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 25 Ohio St. 667 ; Missouri 
 Pac. R. Co. V. Lewis, 24 Neb. 848; Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Sprayberry, 
 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 852; 20 Am. Ry. Rep. 55. 
 
 The statutes of Ohio and Kentucky are so similar that a Kentucky 
 administrator is held competent to sue for the death of his intestate 
 in Ohio. Camden Interstate Ry. Co. v. Williams, 140 Fed. Rep. 985; 
 72 C. C. A. 680. 
 
 A suit may also be maintained in .Ohio, for a death in a foreign 
 State, although the next of kin are also all aliens. Baltimore & Ohio 
 R. Co. V. Baldwin, 144 Fed. Rep. 53. 
 
 And in the following cases, it was held that action could be main- 
 tained in one State, for death occurring in another. Denver, etc., R. 
 Co. v. Warring (Colo.), 86 Pac. Rep. 305; In re Lo wham's Estate, 
 85 Pac. Rep. 445; Strauss v. New York, etc., R. Co., 87 N. Y. S. 67; 
 91 App. Div. 583; Nebauer v. Great Northern R. Co. (Minn.), 99 
 N. W. Rep. 620; Whitlow v. Nashville, etc., R. Co. (Tenn.), 84 S. W. 
 Rep. 618; Florida Cent. R. Co. v. Sullivan, 120 Fed. Rep. 799; 57 
 C. C. A. 167; 61 L. R. A. 410; Harrill v. South Carolina Ry. Co., 132 
 N. Car. 655; 44 S. E. Rep. 109; Boston, etc., R. Co. v. Hurd, 108 Fed. 
 Rep. 116; 47 C. C. A. 615; Nicholas v. Burlington, etc., R. Co. (Minn.), 
 80 N. W. Rep. 776. 
 
 56 
 
JUEISDICTIOK LAW OF PLACE. §§48,4:9 
 
 § 48. Same — Statutes need not be identical. — The statutes 
 of the State where the death occurred and where the action 
 is instituted need not be alike in all their details, in order to 
 permit the action in the latter State, but it is usually held to 
 be sufficient if they are of similar import and character and 
 are founded upon the same principles and possess the same 
 general objects and attributes. ^^ 
 
 Accordingly, it is held that an administrator of a resident 
 of Massachusetts, may sue in that State for the death of his 
 intestate in Connecticut, although the details of the statutes 
 as to the procedure incidental to the recovery, differ in the 
 two States.^ ^ And in an action in Illinois, for a death oc- 
 curring in Canada, it is held not to affect the question of 
 jurisdiction in the former State that the statutes of the two 
 countries differ as to the distribution of the sum recovered 
 or the amount of the recovery.^* 
 
 § 49, Death statutes given no extraterritorial effect. — The 
 weight of authority leans toward the proposition that statutes 
 giving a right of action for death caused by the wrongful 
 act, neglect or omission of another, can only be enforced in 
 the jurisdiction where the right of action accrues and such 
 right, being purely statutory, the statutes can have no extra- 
 territorial effect and if attempted to be administered outside 
 
 21 Wooden v. Western, etc., E. Co., 126 N. Y. 10; 26 N. E. Rep. 
 1050; Hanna v. Grand Trunk E. Co., 41 111. App. 116; Herrick v. 
 Minneapolis, etc., K. Co., 31 Minn. 11; Morris v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 
 65 Iowa 727; 23 N. W. Eep. 143; 19 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 180; 54 Am. 
 Eep. 39; Whitford v. Panama E. Co., 23 N. Y. 467; Lee v. Missouri 
 Pac. E. Co., 195 Mo. 418; 92 S. W. Eep. 614; Jones v. Kansas City, 
 etc., E. Co., 178 Mo. S28; 77 S. W. Eep. 890. 
 
 22 Lee V. Missouri Pac. E. Co., 195 Mo. 418; 92 S. W. Eep. 614; 
 Higgins V. Central, etc., E. Co., 155 Mass. 176; 29 N. E. Rep. 534; 
 48 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 512. 
 
 23 Hanna v. Grand Trunk E. Co., 41 111. App. 116; Jones v. Kansas 
 City, etc., E. Co., 178 Mo. 528; 77 S. W. Rep. 890. 
 
 57 
 
§ 50 JUKISDICTION LAW OF PLACE. 
 
 the jurisdiction where enacted, this can only be done on prin- 
 ciples of comity.^'' 
 
 Unless the statutes of the State where the action is brought 
 recognize a right of action by the personal representatives of 
 the deceased, an administrator appointed in that State cannot 
 maintain an action in the courts there, under the statutes 
 of another State, authorizing personal representatives to 
 maintain actions for death by wrongful act, for the benefit 
 of the widow or next of kin.*® Nor would the right of 
 action be affected although the injured party was a citizen 
 of and died in the State where the action was instituted, for 
 the effectsi of the injury received in another State.** 
 
 § 50. When statute given extraterritorial effect. — Ap- 
 parently at variance with the rule that the law of "the State 
 
 2*Vawter v. Missouri Pae. E. Co., 84 Mo. 679; 19 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 176; 54 Am. Rep. 106; Gates v. Union Pac. R. Co., 104 Mo. 514; 
 16 S. W. Rep. 487; McGinnis v. Missouri Car, etc., Co., 174 Mo. 225; 
 73 S. W. Rep. 586; 97 Am. St. Rep. 553; Casey v. Transit Co., 116 
 Mo. App. 248; Ash v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 72 Md. 144; 44 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 676; 19 Atl. Rep. 643; McCarthy v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 
 18 Kansas 46; Boyce v. Wabash, etc., R. Co., 63 Iowa 70; 23 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 172; 50 Am. Rep. 730; Vandeventer v. New York, etc., R. 
 Co., 27 Barb. 244; Mahler v. Norwich, etc., R. Co., 35 N. Y. 352; 
 Hover v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 25 Ohio St. 667 ; Usher v. West Jersey 
 R. Co., 126 Pa. St. 206; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 508; 17 Atl. Rep. 597. 
 
 25 Woodward v. Michigan So., etc., R. Co., 10 Ohio St. 121 ; Mackay 
 v. Central R. Co., 14 Blatehf. 65; 4 Fed. Rep. 617; Taylor v. Pennsyl- 
 vania R. Co., 78 Ky. 348; 7 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 23; Illinois, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Cragin, 71 111. 177. 
 
 28 McCarthy v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 18 Kansas 46; Richardson v. 
 New York, etc., R. Co., 98 Mass. 85. 
 
 In the following cases,, it is held that no action can be maintained 
 in one State, for death in another, where the statutes giving the right 
 are dissimilar. Kahl v. Memphis, etc., R. Co., 95 Ala. 337; 10 So. 
 Rep. 661; State v. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co., 45 Md. 41; Ash v. Baltimore 
 & Ohio Co., 72 Md. 144; 19 Atl. Rep. 643; 44 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 676; 
 Richardson v. New York, etc., R. Co., 98 Mass. 85; Davis v. New 
 York, etc., R. Co., 143 Mass. 301; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 223; 58 
 58 
 
JUBISDICTION LAW OF PLACE. § 51 
 
 where the injury was received, as the law of the place where 
 the cause of action accrued, governs the right pf the injured 
 person to recover, is a recent Ohio case, practically giving 
 extraterritorial effect to the statute of that State, regulating 
 the kind of appliances to be used on railroads in that State. 
 The statute ^^ making a failure to employ the appliances 
 specified, prima facie evidence of negligence, was held not 
 only to apply to railroads wholly within the State, but also 
 as to railroads any part of whose lines extended into the 
 State of Ohio, whether the injury complained of was received 
 within or without the State.^* 
 
 § 51. Subsequent repeal of statute does not affect. — After 
 a right of action, given by a statute of the State where an 
 injury occurred, accrues to one by virtue of an injury in 
 such State, the right of action for the injury so received 
 is not affected by a subsequent repeal of the statute, but is 
 
 Am. Kep. 138; Vawter v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 84 Mo. 679; 19 Am. 
 & Eng. K. Cas. 176; 54 Am. Rep. 105; Gates v. Union Pac. R. Co., 104 
 Mo. 514; 16 S. W. Rep. 487; McGinnis v. Missouri Car, etc., Co., 174 
 Mo. 225; 73 S. W. Rep. 586; Woodard v. Michigan Southern R. Co., 
 10 Ohio St. 121 ; Vandeventer v. New York, etc., R. Co.,, 6 Abb. Pr. 
 239; Beach v. Bay St. Co., 30 Barb. 433; 10 Abb. Pr. 71; 18 How. Pr. 
 335; Whitford v. Panama R. Co., 23 N. Y. 465; Atchison, etc., R. Co. 
 V. Betts, 10 Colo. 431; 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 563; 15 Pac. Rep. 821; 
 Gurney v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 37 N. Y. S. R. 557; 13 N. Y. Supp. 
 645- Derr v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 158 Pa. St. 365; 27 Atl. Rep. 1002; 
 St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. McCorinick, 71 Texas 660; 9 S. W, 
 Rep. 540; Runt v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. (Miss.), 41 So. Rep. 1; Raisor v. 
 Chicago & A. R. Co., 117 111. App. 488; 215 111. 47; 74 N. E. Rep. b9; 
 Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Chambers (Ohio), 76 N. E. Rep. 91; 
 Stoekwell v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 131 Fed. Rep. 153; Slater v. Mexican 
 Nat. R. Co., 115 Fed. Rep. 593; 53 C. C. A. 239; 194 U. S. 120; 48 L. 
 Ed. 900; Wabash R. Co. v. Fox (Ohio), 59 N. E. Rep. 888; 64 Ohio 
 St. 133; Lyon v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 107 Fed. Rep. 386; Ott v. Lake 
 Shore, etc., R. Co., 18 Ohio Cir. Ct. 395; 10 0. C. D. 85. 
 
 27 Act April 2, 1890; 1897 Ohio Laws, p. 149. 
 
 28 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. McCann, 54 Ohio St. 10; 42 N. E. Rep. 768; 
 56 Am. St. Rep. 695. 
 
 59 
 
§ 52 JUBISmCTION LAW OF PLACE. 
 
 left the same aftthough the statute were still in effect, for as 
 to the right accruing by virtue of the injury and the provi- 
 sions of the statute, no subsequent repeal of the statute would 
 be operative, but the right would remain the same as though 
 the statute were still in force.^® 
 
 § 52. Penal and compensatory statutes distinguished. — 
 
 The law of the place of death governing actions for wrongful 
 death, and not that of the forum,*" the right to sue depends 
 upon the provisions of the law at the place where the death 
 occurred. The right to sue is not merely part of the remedy, 
 but the right is conferred by statute and the right is governed 
 by the law of the State where the death occurred, or the in- 
 jury was received, resulting in death. *^ If the statute giv- 
 ing a right to sue, at the place where the death or injury oc- 
 curred, is a penal statute, no action could be maintained un- 
 der it in any other State,*^ but if the statute giving the 
 right is not penal, but compensatory, since an action in any 
 State, where a recovery was had, would prevent an action 
 in any other State, a suit could be maintained in a State 
 other than that in which the right of action accrued.** 
 
 2° This is particularly true if there has been a subsequent amendment 
 or re-enactment of the statute. San Antonio & A. P. Ey. Co. v. Heller, 
 11 Tex. Civ. App. 569; 32 S. W. Rep. 847. 
 
 30 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Doyle, 60 Miss. 977 ; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Gas. 
 171; Lung Chung v. Northern Pac. E. Co., 19 Fed. Rep. 254; 10 Saw. 
 (U. S.) 17; 16 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 548; McMaster v. Illinois C. R. 
 Co., 65 Miss. 264; 4 So. Rep. 59; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 486; 7 Am. 
 St. Rep. 653. 
 
 31 Usher v. West Jersey E. Co., 126 Pa. St. 206; 17 Atl. Eep. 597; 
 
 41 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 508. 
 
 32 0'Eeilly v. New York, etc., E. Co., 16 R. I. 388; 17 Atl. Eep. 906; 
 
 42 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 50; 6 L. E. A. 719; 29 Cent. L. J. 210. 
 
 33 Nelson v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 88 Va. 971; 54 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 82; 14 S. E. Rep. 838. 
 
 A statute of a. sister State, providing for the recovery of $3,000.00 
 without proof of damages, is held to be penal and opposed to the 
 60. 
 
JCEISDICTION LAW OF PLACE. §§ 53, 54 
 
 § 53. Pleading law of foreign State. — As the presumption 
 is generally indulged in that the common law obtains in a 
 foreign State, unless the plaintiff in an action for wrongful 
 death in another State, alleges the existence of a statute giv- 
 ing the right of action, and shows that it is similar tO that 
 of the State where the suit is filed, his petition will not state a 
 cause of action.^* The existence of the statute in the State 
 where the right of action is alleged to have accrued, is the 
 basis of the right to sue in the other jurisdiction and such 
 statute must be pleaded like any other fact which is essential 
 to the maintenance of the action.^" The pleading must 
 show that the action is prosecuted in the name of the party 
 to whom the right of action belongs, under the law of the 
 State where the right accrued, and if it does not do so, no 
 cause of action will be held to be stated.^® 
 
 § 54. Proving statute of foreign State. — As the common 
 law is presumed to obtain at the place of the killing, in the 
 absence of evidence to the contrary,*''^ no recovery can gen- 
 erally be had for the wrongful killing of a person, outside 
 the State where the action is instituted, without proof that 
 the action was allowed by the law of the place where the 
 killing occurred.^* And the proof is not alone confined to 
 
 public policy of Illinois. Eaisor v. Chicago & Alton E. Co., 117 III. 
 App. 488; 215 111. 47; 74 N. E. Rep. 69. 
 
 3*Selma, etc., R. Co. v. Lacy, 43 Ga. 461; O'Reilly v. New York, 
 etc., R. Co., 16 R. I. 388; 17 Atl. Rep. 906; 6 L. R. A. 719; 42 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 50; Debevoise v. New' York, etc., R. Co., 98 N. Y. 377; 
 25 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 335 ; 50 Am. Rep. 683. 
 
 35 O'Reilly v. New York, etc., R. Co., 16 R. I. 388; 17 Atl. Rep. 906; 
 6 L. R. A. 719; 42 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 50. 
 
 36 Wooden v. Western, etc., R. Co., 126 N. Y. 10; 26 N. E. Rep. 1050. 
 
 37 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Schroeder, 18 111. App. 328; O'Reilly v. 
 New York, etc., R. Co., 16 R. S. 388; 17 Atl. Rep. 906; 6 L. R. A. 719; 
 42 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 50; Selma, etc., R. Co. v. Lacy, 43 Ga. 461. 
 
 ssGeoghagan v. Atlas Steamship Co., 51 N. Y. S. R. 868; 22 N. Y. 
 Supp. 749; Debevoise v. New York, etc., R. Co., 98 N. Y. 377; 25 
 
 61 
 
§ 55 JUaiSDiCTION LAW OF PLACE. 
 
 the fact that a right of action for the death is given by the 
 law of the State where the death occurred, but it must go 
 further and show that the person who sues is the person to 
 whom the right of action is given by such State and that the 
 statute of such State is similar to that of the State where 
 the suit is filed.^® 
 
 § 55. Special limitations applicable to such actions. — As a 
 general rule, where the statute giving an action for death by 
 wrongful act provides that the action therefor must be insti- 
 tuted within a certain period after the cause of action ac- 
 crues, such limitations are not held to be mere limitations 
 upon the remedy, applicable in the forum where the suit is 
 instituted, according to the general statutes of limitation for 
 similar actions, but are held to be express conditions on the 
 right of action itself, which must be given effect in every 
 forum where the right of action under the statute is attempted 
 to be enforced.*" 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas- 33d; 50 Am. Rep. 683; Leonard v. Columbia Steam 
 Nav. Co., 84 N. Y. 48; Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Eakin, 6 Caldw. 
 (Tenn.) 582. 
 
 89 Wooden v. Western, etc., R. Co., 126 N. Y. 10; 26 N. E. Rep. 
 1050; McDonald v. Mallory, 77 N. Y. 546; Kahl v. Memphis, etc., R. 
 Co., 95 Ala. 337; 10 So. Rep. 661; Central R. Co. v. Swint, 73 Ga. 
 651; 26 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 482; South Carolina R. Co. v. Nix, 68 
 Ga. 572; Ash v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 72 Md. 144; 19 Atl. Rep. 
 643; 44 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 676; St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. 
 McCormick, 71 Texas 660; 9 S. W. Rep. 540; Knight v. West Jersey 
 R. Co., 108 Pa. St. 250; 26 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 485. 
 
 <o Birmingham v. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co., 98 Va. 548 ; 37 S. E. Rep. 
 17; Alston V. Cleveland, etc., R. Co., 1 Ohio C. D. 353; International 
 Nav. Co. V. Lindstrom, 123 Fed. Rep. 475; Staunton, etc., Co. v. 
 Fischer, 119 111. App. 284; Stern v. La Campagnie Generale Transat- 
 lantique, 110 Fed. Rep. 996; Van Vactor's Admr. v. Louisville & N. R. 
 Co., 23 Ky. L. R. 1743; 66 S. W. Rep. 4; Staeffler v. Menasha, etc., Co., 
 Ill Wis. 483; 87 N. W. Rep. 480; Atlantic, etc., R. Co. v. McDilda, 
 125 Ga. 468; 54 S. E. Rep. 140; Case v. Cordell L. & Z. Co. 103 Mo. 
 App. 477; 78 S. W. Rep. 62; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Robinson (Ala.), 
 
 62 
 
JU&ISDICTION LAW OE* PLACE. § 55 
 
 But where the period of limitation dates from the time 
 the cause of action accrues and the right of action is given 
 an administrator, the statute would only commence to run 
 from the date of the letters of administration, as no action 
 would accrue until there was a person competent to sue, 
 under the statute.*^ Where the period of limitation, how- 
 ever, dates from the time of the death of the deceased, this 
 is held to be so far a condition essential to the enforcement 
 of the right, that no action based on the statute can be main- 
 tained after the period of limitation and the time will not 
 be extended to cover the appointment of an administrator to 
 sue for the wrongful death.*^ 
 
 37 So. Eep. 431; Rodman v. l^issouri Pac. Ey. Co., 65 Kansas 645; 70 
 Pao. Eep. 642; 59 L. E. A. 704. 
 
 *i Craps, V. Syracuse, 183 N. Y. 395; 76 N. E. Eep. 465, 1092; 
 Stephan v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., 106 111. App. 13; Andrews v. 
 Eailroad Co., 34 Conn. 57; Railroad v. Sanders, 86 Ky. 259; 5 S. W. 
 Rep. 563. 
 
 *2 Williams v. Quebec S. S. Co., 126 Fed. Eep. 591; Poff v. New 
 England, etc., Co., 72 N. H. 164; 55 Atl. Eep. 891; Netelle v. Railroad, 
 56 Fed. Eep. 261; Hanna v. Eailroad Co., 32 Ind. 113. 
 
 In New Jersey, the action is commenced when process is placed in 
 the officer's hands to be served. County v. Pacific Coast Co., 53 Atl. 
 Eep. 386. 
 
 63 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 PARTIES TO ACTIONS FOE BEATH. 
 
 § 56. Only those named by statute can sue. 
 
 57. Must have been right of recovery in deceased. 
 
 58. Action by or for the widow of the deceased. 
 
 59. Same — Compromise or settlement with widow. 
 
 60. Same — Marriage, divorce or adultery of the widow. 
 
 61. Action by husband of deceased. 
 
 62. Action by father of deceased. 
 
 63. Recovery of penalty not aflfeeted by emancipation of child. 
 
 64. Suit by the mother of decedent. 
 
 65. Action by children and grandchildren. 
 
 66. Eight of posthumous child to sue for death of parenf. 
 
 67. Actions by brothers or sisters of decedent. 
 
 68. Action prosecuted by " heirs at law, or next of kin." 
 
 69. Actions by personal representatives or administrator. 
 
 70. Those dependent for support uoon decedent. 
 
 71. Actions by nonresidents. 
 
 § 56. Only those named by statute can sue. — As the right 
 to recover damages for -wrongful death is purely statutory 
 and did not exist at common law, but the cause of action died 
 ■with the person of the deceased, where there is a statute giv- 
 ing the cause of action for wrongful death and designating 
 the persons competent to sue therefor, those alone named in 
 the statute can sue for the death and must ordinarily do so 
 within the time named in the statute giving the right of ac- 
 tion.^ 
 
 Where the cause of action is made, by statute, to survive 
 to the widow, heir or personal representative of the deceased, 
 
 1 Gates V. Union Pacific R. Co., 104 Mo. 514; 16 S. W. Rep. 487; 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Vining, 27 Ind. 513; Campbell v. Houston, etc., 
 R. Co., 2 Tex. Unrep. Cas. 473. 
 
 64 
 
PARTIES TO ACTIONS FOE DEATH. § 57 
 
 there can be no action maintained by any person other than 
 the widow, heir, or personal representative,* and where the 
 cause of action is limited to the " surviving husband, widow, 
 or heirs of his or her body," * a parent of the deceased could 
 not maintain the action, because not specially named in the 
 statute.* And where the right of action is given, by statute, 
 to the husband or wife of the deceased, for a definite period, 
 after which it is made to vest absolutely in the surviving 
 minor children, or some other class, the right thus confei:red 
 is held to be a conditional right and the plaintiffs, in such 
 an action, must bring themselves clearly within the pre- 
 scribed conditions necessary to confer the right of action, 
 or no cause of action can be maintained.® 
 
 § 5Y. Must have been right of recovery in deceased. — As a 
 general rule, to entitle anyone to sue for the wrongful death 
 of another, there must have been a right of action in the 
 deceased, at the time of the death, pr the death must have 
 been so effected as to have enabled him to sue therefor, had 
 he survived the injury. 
 
 No independent cause Of action was given by Lord Camp- 
 bell's Act,® but a mere transmission of the right of action, 
 when there was, at the time of the death, a subsisting cause 
 of action.'' In order to maintain an action, under this orig- 
 
 2 Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Adam (Ky.), 13 S. W. Rep. 428. 
 
 3 See Constitution Texas, art. 16, § 26. 
 
 iWinnt V. International, etc., R. Co., 74 Texas 32; 11 S. W. Rep. 
 907. 
 
 5 Hamilton v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 39 Kansas 56 ; 18 Pac. Rep. 57. 
 
 Where a right of action is given to particular persons by statute, 
 for the death of another, it cannot be exercised by any other persons, 
 although they may be sole beneficiaries. Harshman v. Northern Pac. 
 R. Co. (N. D.), 103 N. W. Rep. 412; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Jones 
 (Fla.), 34 So. Rep. 246. 
 
 8 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93. 
 
 7 Read v. Great Eastern R. Co., 9 B. & S. 714; 37 L. J. Q. B. 278. 
 
 I_g 65 
 
§ 5S PA&TIEH TO ACTIONS 376E DEATH. 
 
 inal statute, therefore, it must appear that the deceased, if 
 he had survived the injury, would have been entitled to re- 
 cover.* This construction is generally followed as to all 
 modern statutes patterned after the statute above referred to, 
 and the right of action conferred by the statute, upon the 
 representatives of a person whose death is caused by the 
 wrongful act of another, arises only in cases where the de- 
 ceased might have maintained an action for the injury, had 
 he lived.* 
 
 § 58. Action by or for the widow of the deceased. — As 
 many of the statutes giving a right of action for wrongful 
 death, in the various States, originally stood, the es;istence 
 of a widow or children, was essential to the maintenance of 
 the cause of a-Ction,^" and the recovery was either given to 
 them direct, or for -their benefit. ^^ In many States, there 
 
 8 Haigh V. Royal Mail Steam Packet Co., 52 L. J. Q. B. D. 640 ; 49 
 L. T. 802; Armsworth v. Southeastern R. Co., 11 Jur. 758; Rowley v. 
 London, etc., R. Co., 29 I,. T. 180; L. R. 8 Ex. »21; 21 W. R. 869. 
 
 »Ohio, etc., R. Co. V. Tyndall, 13 Ind. 366; Evansville, etc., R. Co. 
 V. Lowdermilk, 15 Ind. 120; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Berry, 67 Texas 238; 
 5 S. W. Rep. 817; 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 147. 
 
 Rev. Laws, ch. Ill, § 268, giving a right of action for death of one 
 killed by a train at a grade crossing, will not avail where the person 
 had turned from the side of the highway where it crossed the railroad, 
 and, having passed upon the company's right of way, was walking on the 
 roadbed when struck by a train. DUrbin v. New York, N. H. & H. R. 
 Co. (Mass. 1907), 80 N. E. Rep. 219. 
 
 A right of action in the deceased is an essential, under the Wis- 
 consin statute. Robertson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 99 N". W. Rep. 433; 
 Wallace v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 99 N. W. Kep. 1135. 
 
 10 Miller v. Southwestern R. Co., 55 Ga. 143 ; Chiea:go, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Morris, 26 III. 400; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Shannon, 43 111. 338; 
 Munro v. Pac. Coast R. Co., 84 Cal. 515; 24 Pac. Rep. 303; Henderson 
 V. Kentucky, etc., R. Co., 86 Ky. 389; 5 S. W. Rep. 975; Conley v. 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., 89 Ky. 402; 12 S. W. Rep. 764; 41 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 537. 
 
 "Conley v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., 89 Ky. 402; 12 S. W. Rep. 764; 
 
 66 
 
PAETIES TO ACTIONS FOR DEATH. § 58 
 
 can be no recovery by a personal representative, against a 
 railroad company, for wrongful death, where the decea,sed 
 leaves neither widow nor children,^^ and where the right 
 of action is not given directly to the widow, if the recovery 
 by the personal representative is for her benefit, it is essential 
 to the maintenance of the cause of action that there be a 
 widow and the fact must be set up in the complaint, or no 
 cause of action is alleged. -^^ 
 
 Where the cause of action is given first to the widow, no 
 action can be maintained by the administrator or other par- 
 ties, unless she declines to sue.^* She may forfeit or release 
 the right to sue, however, in favor of the class next entitled 
 to maintain the action, or to the administrator;^® On the 
 other hand, if the right of action is vested in the adminis- 
 trator, for the benefit of the widow and children, the widow 
 could not alone maintain an action,^® nor could she sue for the 
 death of her husband occurring in a foreign State, where, 
 by the statute of the State, where the action was instituted, 
 the suit could only be prosecuted in the name of the adminis- 
 trator, or personal representatives.^^ 
 
 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 537; Henderson v. Kentucky, etc., R. Co., 86 
 Ky. 389; 5 S. W. Rep. 875. 
 
 12 Kentucky, etc., R. Co. v. Wainwright, 13 S. W. Rep. 438; Cincin- 
 nati, etc., R. Co. V. Previtt, 92 Ky. 223; 17 S. W. Rep. 484; Jordan v. 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., 89 Ky. 40; 11 S. W. Rep. J013. 
 
 13 Serenson v. Northern Pac. R. Co.,- 45 Fed. Rep. 407. 
 i*Belding v. Black Hills, etc., R. Co. (S. Dak.), 52 Am. & Eng. R. 
 
 Cas. 624; 53 N. W. Rep. 750. 
 15 Webb V. East Tenn, R. Co., 88 Tenn. 119; 12 S. W. Rep. 428; 
 
 42 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 44. 
 
 1-8 Western A. R. Co. v. Strong, 52 Ga. 461 ; 8 Am. Ry. Rep. 13. 
 
 "Usher v. West Jersey R. Co., 126 Pa. St. '206; 17 Atl. Rep. 597; 
 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 508. 
 
 Although the deceased leaves widow and children both surviving, 
 in Pennsylvania, the action must be brought by the widow alone. 
 Haughey v. Pittsburg Ry. Co., 210 Pa. 367; 59 Atl. Rep. 1112; Marsh 
 V. Western,, etc., Ry. Co., 204 Pa. St. 229; 53 Atl. Rep. 1001. 
 
 67 
 
§§ 59, 60 PARTIES TO ACTIONS FOR DEATH. 
 
 § 59. Same -^ Compromise or settlement with widow of de- 
 ceased. — It is held, in Mississippi, where the cause of action 
 is given to the widow, for the benefit of herself and her 
 children, that although the apportionment of damages enures 
 to the benefit of the children, equally with the wife, that the 
 widow alone has the right of action and she can comproinise 
 or accept a less sum than the amount recovered in the trial 
 court, pending the determination of the cause on appeal, 
 and^the children will be bound by the settlement so made.^* 
 And where the widow sues for herself and the children, as 
 in Tennessee, it is held that she can dismiss the action, with- 
 out the consent of the children or their guardian, and they 
 will be bound by her action in so doing, as she is given the 
 sole right of action, by the statute, although the recovery 
 is for the benefit of herself and others.^® In case the right 
 of action is given the administrator of the deceased, how- 
 ever, for the benefit of the widow and her children, she is not 
 permitted to settle or compromise without the consent of the 
 administrator, for the cause of action not being vested in 
 her, she is not able to dispose of it, although permitted under 
 the law to participate in the recovery.^'* — 
 
 § 60. Same — Marriagfe, divorce or adultery of the 
 widow. — Under the statutes of Georgia ^^ and Texas,'^^ the 
 
 18 Natchez, etc., Co. v. Mullins, 67 Miss. 672; 7 So. Rep. 542; 
 Stephens v. Nashville, etc., R. Co., 10 Lea (Tenn.), 448. 
 
 18 Greenlee v. East Tenn., etc., R. Co., 5 Lea (Tenn.), 418; 4 Am. & 
 Eng. R. -Caa. 351; Stephens v. Nashville, etc., R. Co., 10 Lea (Tenn.), 
 448; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 671. 
 
 aoKnoxville & C. R. Co. v. Acuff, 92 Tenn. 26; 20 S. W. Rep. 348; 
 Yelton V. Evansvillej etc., R. Co., 33 N. E. Rep. 629 ; 54 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 69. , 
 
 21 Georgia R. & B. Co. v. Garr, 57 Ga. 277, distinguished in Western, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Young, 81 .Ga. 397; 7 S. E. Rep. 912; 37 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 489. 
 
 22 International, etc., R. Co. v. Kuehn, 70 Texas 582; 8 S. W. Rep. 
 484; 35 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 421. 
 
 68 
 
PARTIES TO ACTIONS FOB, DEATH. § 61 
 
 right of the widow to sue for the wrongful death of her hus- 
 band, is held not to be affected by her subsequent marriage. 
 The fact that -the wife has been living separate and apart 
 from her husband will not, of itself, deprive her of her right 
 to recover for his homicide, provided the conjugal relation 
 continued to exist between them at the time of his death, 
 and she had done nothing, by her own wrong, to forfeit her 
 right to recover for his death. ^* But where the wife is liv- 
 ing in a state of prostitution, separate and apart from her 
 husband, at the time of his death, having forfeited, by her 
 own wrongful act, the right to support from him, she is held 
 also to have forfeited the right to recover damages from a 
 railroad company, for the negligent killing of her husband.^* 
 
 J 61. Action by hugband of deceased. — In Missouri, the 
 husband of a wife who meets her death, because of the 
 wrongful act or neglect of a railroad company is, by statute, 
 entitled to sue therefor,*^ but this is not the rule obtaining 
 generally in the United States. 
 
 In some States the action cannot be maintained by the 
 husband for the wrongful death of his wife and the rule is the 
 same whether the suit is to recover for the wrongful death, ^^ 
 
 23 Dallas, etc., R. Co. v. Spicker, 61 Texas 427 ; 21 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 160; 48 Am. Rep. 297. 
 
 21 Ft. Worth, etc., R. Co. v. Floyd (Texas), 21 S. W. Rep. 544. 
 
 Although separated from her husband and he has not supported her 
 for some time before his death, the widow is entitled to sue in Texas 
 if she has not done anything on her part to fprfeit the right. DeGarcia 
 V. San Antonio, etc., R. Co., 77 S. W. Rep. 275. 
 
 The fact that the widow had subsequently remarried, was held not 
 to eflFect her right of recovery, in Nebraska. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Legekrans, 91 N. W. Rep. 358. 
 
 25 Session Laws, Missouri, 1905, p. 137; Packard v. Hannibal, etc., 
 R. Co., 181 Mo. 421; 80 S. W. Rep. 951. 
 
 28 Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. Wynn, 42 Ga. 331; Womack v. Central 
 R. Co., 80 Ga. 132; 5 S. E. Rep. 63; Gottlieb v. North Jersey Co., 
 
 69 
 
§ 62 PARTIES TO ACTIONS FOB DEATH. 
 
 or for the loss of services of the deceased wife.^^ 
 The husband is not permitted to sue, for the instant killing 
 of his wife, in lowa.^^ He is not permitted to sue alone, in 
 Georgia, but must join with him the deceased wife's surviv- 
 ing children, although adults.^" He was denied a recovery, 
 in Washington,^" but was permitted to recover, in New York, 
 as administrator of his wife, although his recovery was con- 
 fined to his loss of service as her " next of kin." ^^ The Fed- 
 eral Court, in Kansas, construing the statute of that State, 
 denied him a recovery as " next of kin " of deceased,*^ but 
 the Supreme Court of the State held that he could sue as 
 " next of kin " of his deceased wife.*^ And a husband, liv- 
 ing apart from his wife, was denied a recovery of damages 
 for her death, under Lord Campbell's Act.^* 
 
 § 62. Action by father of deceased. — Under Lord Camp- 
 
 58 Atl. Rep. 1088; Major v. Burlington, etc., E. Co., 115 Iowa. 309; 
 88 N. W. Eep. 815. 
 
 27 Bickens v. New York, etc., R. Co., 23 N. Y. 158 ; Green v. Hudson 
 River R. Co., 2 Abb. App. Dec. (X. Y.» 277. 
 
 2SSeney v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 125 Iowa 290; 101 N. W. Rep. 76. 
 
 2» Roberts v. Central, etc., R. Co., 124 Fed. Rep. 47 1. 
 
 30 Under the statute of Washington, a surviving husband is given nu 
 cause of action for the death of his wife. Johnson v. Seattle, etc., 
 Elec. Co., 39 Wash. 211; 81 Pac. Rep. 705. 
 
 31 Dickens v. New York, etc., K. Co., 23 N. Y. 158. 
 
 32 Western Union Tel. Co. v. McGill, 57 Fed. Rep.. 699. 
 
 S3 The surviving husband, within the provisions of the Code of 
 Kansas, is held to be the " next of kin " to his deceased wife, so as to 
 enable him to sue for her death. Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Townsend, 
 81 Pac. Rep, 205. 
 
 8* Harrison v. London, etc., R. Co., 1 C. & E. 540. 
 
 A husband was held not entitled to recover, for the instant killing of 
 his wife, in Iowa. Seney v. Chicago, etc., R. Co.,. 125 Iowa 290; 
 101 N. W. Rep. 76; Major v. Burlington, etc., R. Co., 115 Iowa 309; 
 88 N. W. Rep. 815. See, also, Womack v. Railroad, 80 Ga. 132; 5 
 S. E. Rep. 63; Eden v. Railway Co., 14 B. Mon. 165; Green v. Railroad 
 Co., 28 Barb. 9; Gottlieb v. North Jersey Co., 58 Atl. Eep. 1088. 
 
 70 
 
PARTIES TO ACTIONS FOK DEATH. § 62 
 
 bell's Act/® a father was not entitled to sue for the death 
 of his son, unless by his death he sustained a pecuniary loss.*® 
 Where the right of action is given to the " widow, heir or 
 personal representative " of the deceased, the father is not 
 entitled to sue ^"^ and there can be no recovery by the father, 
 for the death of his deceased minor son, where the statute 
 gives the right of action, first to his widow and next to his 
 children, unleSs it is both alleged and proved that those 
 first entitled to the cause of action do not in fact exist.** 
 
 As the parent is entitled to the services of his child dur- 
 ing its minority, and hence has a legal interest in its earn- 
 ings during minority, the most generally adopted provision, 
 with reference to the father's right to sue for the death of 
 his son, is that giving him a right to sue for the death of his 
 minor children.*^ Under such a statute the recovery is lim- 
 ited to the reasonable earnings of the child, during its minor- 
 ity,*" for beyond this the father would have no legal claim.*^ 
 Under some statutes, however, the father is entitled to re- 
 qover whatever damages he could show that he had sus- 
 
 35 9 & 10 Vict., eh. 93. 
 
 ssSykes v. Northeastern R. Co., 44 L. J. C. P. 191; 32 L. T. 199; 
 23 W. E. 473; Franklyn v. Southeastern R. Co., 3 H. & N. 211; 4 Jur. 
 N. S. 565; 29 L. J. Ex. 25. 
 
 37 Kentucky, etc., R'. Co. v. McGinty (Ky.), 14 S. W. Rep. 601; 
 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Baker, 57 Texas .419; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 667; Williams v. South, etc., R. Co., 91 Ala. 635; 9 So. Rep. 77; 
 Edgar v. Costello, 14 So. Car. 20; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Coppage 
 (Ky.), 13 S. W. Rep. 1086. 
 
 38 Sparks v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 31 Mo. App. 111. 
 
 8» Session Laws, Mo. 1905, p. 137; Ky. Gen. St., eh. 57; Miss. Code, 
 § 1510; Amos V. Mobile & 0. R. Co., 63 Miss. 509. 
 
 ^0 Parsons v. Missouri Pae. R. Co., 94 Mo. 286 ; McDowell v. Georgia 
 R. Co., 60 Ga. 320 ; Chick v. Southwestern R. Co., 57 Ga. 357 ; State v. 
 Baltimore & O. R: Co., 24 Md. 84; Walters v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 
 36 Iowa 458; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Zebe, 33 Pa. St. 318; Hedrick v. 
 llwaco, etc., R. Co., 4 Wash. 400. 
 
 *i Parsons v. Missouri Pac. Ri Co., 94 Mo. 286 ; State v. Baltimore 
 & 0, R, Co., 24 M'd. 84, 
 
 71 
 
§ 63 PABTIES TO ACTIONS FOE DEATH. 
 
 tained, by reason of the death of his child; *^ the action for 
 loss of services is given to him, independently of the cause 
 of action to the administrator of the decedent, in some 
 States,*^ and in' still others, the father could sue only as 
 administrator of his deceased son, and then, only after proof 
 of the emancipation of his son. 
 
 44 
 
 § 63. Eecovery of penalty not affected by emancipation of 
 child. — While the parent of an adult child, who was un- 
 married, in Missouri, had no cause of action for the wrong- 
 ful death of such child, prior to the act of 1905,*^ it does 
 not follow that the parent would be deprived of a right of 
 action for the death of his minor child, by the mere act of 
 emancipating the child, if he was killed under such circum- 
 stances as to bring the case under the penalty section of the 
 wrongful death act of that State.*® 
 
 Parents suing for the wrongful death of a child do not 
 sue by virtue of a relationship of employer and employee ; the 
 
 42 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Baker, 57 Texas, 419; 11 Am. & Eng, R. 
 Cas. 667; Frank v. New Orleans, etc., R. Co., 20 La. Ann. 25. 
 
 43Hedrick v. Ilwaco, etc., R. Co., 4 Wash. 400; 30 Pae. Rep. 714; 
 Louisville & C. R. Co. v. Goodykoontz, 119 Ind. Ill; Durkee v. Central 
 Pac. R. Co., 56 Cal. 388. 
 
 4* Berry v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 128 Ind. ,484; 28 N. B. Rep. 182. 
 
 A father is not permitted to recover for the death of a minor child 
 in Delaware. Kennedy v. Delaware & C. Co., 58 Atl. Rep. 825. 
 
 The father is given no cause of action, for the death of his minor 
 son, under the statute of North Dakota. Harshman v. Northern Pac. 
 R. Co., 103 N. W. Rep. 412. 
 
 A father is not allowed to maintain suit for the wrongful death of 
 his son in North Carolina. Killian v. Southern, etc., R. Co., 128 N. 
 Car. 261; 38 S. E. Rep. 873. 
 
 In the absence of evidence that deceased contributed pecuniary assist- 
 ance or support to his father, the father is held to have no right of 
 action, in Texas. Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Freeman, 73 S. W. Rep. 542. 
 
 A father cannot sue for the negligent killing of his child, in West 
 Virginia. Shaw v. Charleston, 50 S. E. Rep. 527. 
 
 *' Parsons v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 94 Mo. 284. 
 
 46 Matlock V. Williamsville, etc., R. Co. (Mo.), 95 S. W. Rep. 849, 
 
 72 
 
PAETIES TO ACTIONS EOK DEATH. § 64 
 
 action is based on the tort and the right which the child 
 would have had, if he had survived the injury.*^ In an ac- 
 tion by a father, therefore, suing to recover for the death 
 of his minor son, under a statute providing that whenever 
 any person shall die from an injury due to the negligence of 
 a railroad corporation, the corporation shall " forfeit " the 
 sum of $5,000.00, the fact that the parent had emancipated 
 the son, prior to his death, would constitute no defense to the 
 action,** in Missouri. But in Pennsylvania, the existence 
 of the family relation is held to be essential to the main- 
 tenance of the action and if the child is either of age, or 
 emancipated, and living apart from his parents, this will 
 defeat an action by- the parents, for his death.** 
 
 § 64. Suit by the mother of decedent. — In many of the 
 United States, for the homicide, by the negligence of a rail- 
 road company, of her child, provided he was unmarried and 
 childless, a mother may recover, where the child contributed- 
 to her support and she was substantially dependent upon the 
 child for support. ^^ In some of the States, the dependency 
 for support is not an essential of the right to sue and the 
 cause of action is vested in the mother, if there are no chil- 
 dren, or a widow. ^^ 
 
 *' Bellamy v. Whitesell (Mo.), 100 S. W. Rep. 514. 
 
 It is not essential, in an action for wrongful death, to a recovery 
 of damages, that there should be a pecuniary loss sustained by those 
 for whose benefit the action is brought, though such loss may be 
 proved as an element of damages. Barksdale v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. 
 (S. Car.), 56 S. B. Rep. 906. 
 
 *8 Matlock V. Williamsville, etc., R. Co. (Mo.), 95 S. W. Rep. 849. 
 
 <» Lehigh Iron Co. v. Rupp, 100 Pa. St. 95; 7 Am. & Eng. R. Caa. 25; 
 Matlock V. Williamsville, etc., R. Co. (Mo.), 95 S. W. Rep. 849. 
 
 BO Daniels v. Savannah, etc., R. Co., 86 Ga. 236; 12 S. B. Rep. 365; 
 Clay v. Central, etc., R. Co., 84 Ga. 345; Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Johnston, 89 Ga. 560. 
 
 Bi Session Laws, Missouri, 1905, p. 137; Green v. Hudson River R. Co., 
 16 How, Pr. (N. Y.) 263; 31 Barb, 260; Putnam v. Southern Pac. R. 
 
 73 
 
§ 64 PAETIES TO ACTIONS FOB DEATH, 
 
 As in the case of the father, the basis of the mother's 
 right of action is her legal duty to support her minor chil- 
 dren, from which the law recognizes the correlative right to 
 their services during minority.^'* Her right of action is gen- 
 erally limited to actions for the death of her minor children^ 
 therefore,®' unless the statute is so broad as to include within 
 its terms, a right on the part of the mother who is dependent 
 for support upon the deceased, regardless of the age of her 
 child.®* 
 
 It is held, in Georgia,®® that the fact that the mother was 
 living apart from her husband with her minor son, on whom 
 she was dependent for support at the time of his death, would 
 not prevent an action by her, where the -suit was brought in 
 her name and that of her husband jointly. But in Missis- 
 sippi, where a statute first gave a right of action to the widow 
 or children and then to the father or husband and subse- 
 quently provided for an action by a parent for the death 
 of a child, it was held to apply to the father only and the 
 mother was held not entitled to sue for the death of her 
 
 Co., 21 Oregon 230; 27 Pao. Rep. 1033; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Henry, 
 75 Texas 220; 12 S. W. Rep. 828. 
 
 52 Kennedy v. New York, etc., R. Co., 35 Hun (N. Y.) 186; Green v. 
 Hudson River R. Co., 16 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 263; 31 Barb. 260; Gulf, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Compton, 75 Texas 667; 1? S. W. Rep. 667; 44 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 637; Parsons v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 94 Mo. 286; State v. 
 Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 24 Md. 84 ; Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Kutoc, 72 
 Texas 643; 76 id. 473; 11 8. W. Rep. 127; 13 S. W. Rep. 327; 37 Am. 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 470. 
 
 03 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Keller, 67 Pa. St. 300; Kennedy v. New 
 York, etc., R. Co., supra; Parsons v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 94 Mo. 286; 
 State v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 24 Md. 84. 
 
 =4 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Keller, 67 Pa. St. 300. 
 
 55 East Tennessee, etc., R. Co; v. Maloy, 77 Ga. 237 ; 2 S. E. Rep. 941 ; 
 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 352. 
 
 Neither the divorce nor subsequent re-marriage of the mother affects 
 her right to recover for the death of her minor child, in some juris- 
 dictions. Wilson v. Bamer L., etc., Co., 108 La. Ann. 590; 32 So. Rep. 
 460; Clark v. Northern Pac. R. Co. (Wash,), 69 Pac. Rep. 636, 
 74 
 
PARTIES TO ACTIONS FOR DEATH. § 65 
 
 child. ^® It is also held, construing Lord Campbell's Act, 
 that the mother of an illegitimate child has no right to sue 
 for his "wrongful death,®^ and this same construction is fol- 
 lowed by some of the States in the United States, under 
 similar statutes,®® while others hold that an illegitimate child 
 comes within the term " children," giving a parent a right 
 to sue for his death. ''^ 
 
 § 65. Action by children and grandchildren. — Where a 
 cause of action is given to the husband or wife, for six 
 months, and, if he or she fails to sue, then to the minor 
 children, the action is not vested in the wife and children 
 concurrently, but in the wife absolutely, for the period named 
 
 56 Amos V. Mobile & Ohio R. Co., 63 Miss. 509. 
 
 The mother cannot sue, under the Minnesota statute, during the 
 lifetime of the father. Swift, etc., Co. v. Johnson, 138 Fed. Kep. 867. 
 
 57 Gibson v. Midland E. Co., 2 Ont. 658; 15 Am. & Eng. E._ Cas. 507; 
 Dickinson v. Northeastern R. Co., 2 H. & C. 735; 33 L. J. Ex. 91; 12 
 W. E. 52; 9 L. T. 299. 
 
 ssHarkins y, Pennsylvania R. Co., 15 Phila. (Pa.) 286; Marshall v. 
 Wabash R. Co., 46 Fed. Eep. 269. 
 
 The mother has no cause of action, for the death of her illegitimate 
 child, in South Carolina, Georgia, or Mississippi. - Ferguson v. Ey. Co., 
 71 S. C. 352; 51 S. E. Eep. 138; Eobinson v. Georgia, etc., E. Co., 117 
 Ga. 168; 43 S. E. Eep. 452; Alabama, etc., E. Co. v. Williams, 78 Miss. 
 209 ; 28 So. Eep. 853 ; 51 L. E. A. 836 ; 84 Am. St. Eep. 624. But see, 
 contra, Marshall v. Wabash E. Co., 120 Mo. 275; 25 S. W. Eep. 179. 
 
 59 Muhl V. Michigan So. E. Co., 10 Ohio St. 272. 
 
 The Code of Washington (2 Ball's Ann. Code & St., § 4828), giving 
 the cause of action, to the decedent's " heirs and personal representa- 
 tives," was held to give no cause of action, to the mother of an adult 
 son, although dependent for support. Manning v. Tacoma Ey., etc., 
 Co., 34 Wash. 406; 75 Pac. Eep. 994; Henderson v. Eailroad Co., 86 
 Ky. 389; 5 S. W. Rep. 875. 
 
 It is held, under the Montana statute, that the mother cannot sue 
 alone, where the father is alive but fails to join in the action. Whelan 
 V. Eio Grande, etc., E. Co., Ill Fed. Eep. 326. 
 
 A mother can sue in her own name, for the death of her unmarried 
 adult son, in Washington. Peterman v. Northern Pac. E. Co., 105 
 Fed. Eep. 335. 
 
 75 
 
§ 65 PAKTIES TO ACTIONS FOE DEATH. 
 
 and the children cannot sue until after the period within 
 which the wife is given the cause of action.*" And where 
 the widow of the deceased sues within the period to her 
 limited, this is such an election to appropriate the cause of 
 action, as to deprive the children of any subsequent action, 
 although the widow- had sued the wrong defendant and had 
 failed to recover in her action.®^ 
 
 Minor children are given a cause of action in some States, 
 on the theory that by the death of the parent they are de- 
 prived of their legal right to support, during their minor- 
 ity.*^ In others, they are denied a right of action,"* while in 
 some others, they are permitted to sue jointly with the sur- 
 viving parent.** In Texas, the child must be able to show 
 some pecuniary interest in the parent's life, to enable him 
 to recover.** Adult children are given a right of action in 
 Pennsylvania,** but they are denied a recovery in Missouri,*^ 
 Indiana*® and Georgia,** while the majority of the child 
 
 80 R. S. Mo. 1899, § 2864; Packard v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 181 
 Mo. 421; 80 S. W. Rep. 951. 
 
 81 Packard v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 181 Mo. 421 ; 80 S. W. Rep. 951. 
 S"ee, also, Belding v. Black Hills, etc., R. Co. (S. Dak.), 53 N. W. 
 Rep. 750; 52 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 624. 
 
 «2Eiohorn v. New Orleans, etc., R. Co., 114 La. Ann. 712; 38 So, 
 Rep. 526; Atlanta, etc., R. Co. v. Venable, 65 Ga.'S5; 7 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 35. 
 
 88 Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Gillard (Ind.), 71 N. E. Rep. 58. 
 
 o*8t. Louis, etc., K. Co. v. Needham, 52 Fed. Rep. 371; 10 U. S. 
 App. 339; 3 C. C. A. 129; 54 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 88. 
 
 85 Where the children cannot show some pecuniary interest in the 
 life of their father, no cause of action accrues on his death, in Texas. 
 Proctor V. San Antonio, etc., R. Co., 62 S. W. Rep. 939. And the 
 same rule applies to an action for death of their mother. Galveston, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Polk, 63 S. W. Rep. 343. 
 
 00 The right of adult children to recover in Pennsylvania, for the 
 death of their parent, is established by the following cases: Stabler v. 
 Philadelphia, etc., R. Co., 199 Pa. St. 383; 49 Atl. Rep. 273; Schnatz v. 
 Railroad Co., 160 Pa. St. 602 ; 28 Atl. Rep. 958. 
 
 8T Parsons v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 94 Mo. 286. 
 
 88 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Vining, 27 Ind. 513. 
 
 soMott V. Central R. Co., 70 Ga. 680; 48 Am. Rep. 595, 
 76 
 
PAETIES TO ACTIONS FOK DEATH. § 66 
 
 is held not to affect his right of recovery, in Texas''" and 
 Wisconsin.'^ 
 
 But under a statute giving a right of action to children, 
 no right, hy analogy, can be recognized on the part of the 
 grandchildren, for the death of their grandparent. '^^ 
 
 § 66. Bight of posthumous child to sue for death of parent. 
 — A posthumous child is entitled to recover damages for the 
 death of his father, resulting from injuries inflicted through 
 the negligence of a railroad company, under the Texas stat- 
 ute,''^ providing that an action on account of injuries caus- 
 ing death shall he for the " sole and exclusive benefit of the 
 surviving children," as the term " children " used in the 
 statute is held sufficiently broad to include a posthumous 
 child.''* Nor v?ould the fact that immediately following 
 
 70 Galveston, etc.,*R. Co. v. Kutae, 72 Texas 643; 11 S. W. Rep. 127; 
 id., 76 Texas 473; 13 S. W. Rep. 327; 37 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 470. 
 "Teteur v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 77 Wis. 505; 46 N. W. Rep. 897. 
 
 72 Under a statute giving a right of action to children, the grand- 
 children of the deceased £ave no right of action for the death of 
 their grandparent. Walker v. Vicksburg, etc., R. Co. (La.), 34 So. 
 Rep. 749. 
 
 An infant son cannot sue in Indisina, under a statute giving the 
 right of action to the personal representative of the deceased. Baltimore 
 & Ohio R. Co. V. Gillard, 71 N. E. Rep. 58, construing Burns' Ann. 
 St. 1901, § 285. 
 
 In an action for death of the wife and mother, in Georgia, the 
 husband cannot sue alone, if there are surviving children, but they 
 must be joined with him in the action, although adults.- Roberts v. 
 Central, etc., R. Co;, 124 Fed. Rep. 471. 
 
 A daughter, though married, can sue for the death of her father, 
 in Texas. Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Martin, 60 S. W. Rep. 803. 
 
 Where a daughter, although married, was abandoned by her husband 
 and secured nothing from him and was living with her parents at the 
 time of her mother's death and was only 16 years old, she was held 
 competent to sue, in Texas, for her mother's death. International, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Botkin, 85 S. W. Rep. 1163. 
 
 73 Rev. St. Texas, art. 2903. 
 
 74 Nelson v. Galveston, etc., R. Co., 78 Texas 621; 14 S. W. Rep. 
 1021; 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 8. 
 
 11 
 
§§ 67, 68 PAETIES- TO ACTIONS FOB DEATH. 
 
 the death of the father, the mother of the child was alive 
 and able to maintain an action for the death of her, husband, 
 the father of the child, be sufficient to set the statute of limi- 
 tations in force, so as to deny the right of action to such 
 posthumous child.''^ 
 
 § 67. Actions by brothers or sisters of decedent. — The 
 
 brothers and sisters of the deceased cannot recover damages 
 from the wrongdoer, under the Wisconsin statute,"'" giving a 
 cause of action to the husband or widow of the deceased, if 
 there be one, otherwise to the lineal descendants or ancestors, 
 as the sisters or brothers do not come within the description 
 of persons -made competent by the statute to sue for wrongful 
 death." 
 
 And where, by statute, an action is expressly given to the 
 brothers or sisters of the decedent, this would not be held, 
 generally, to confer a right of action for the death of an 
 illegitimate brother or sister.''® 
 
 § 68. Action prosecuted by " heirs at law," or " next of 
 kin." — With the growing tendency of modem legislatures 
 to extend the causes of action for damages against corpora- 
 tions, the legislation is not alone confined to the legal basis of 
 recovery, but enlarges the class of persons entitled to recover, 
 
 '6 Nelson v. Galveston, etc., E. Co., supra. 
 
 78 Wisconsin R. S. 1898, §§ 4255, 4256. 
 
 T7 Brown v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 102 Wis. 137; 77 N. W. Be.p. 748; 
 44 L. R. A. 579; 13 Am. & Bng. R. Cas. (N. S.)603. 
 
 78 Under the Mississippi statute, giving a right of action to the 
 brothers or sisters of deceased, no right of action Is acquired for the 
 death of an illegitimate sister. Illinois Central R. Co. v. Johnson, 77 
 Miss. 727; 28 So. Rep. 753; 51 L. E. A. 837. 
 
 A woman residing with her nephews and a brother, to whom she 
 contributed for their support, without legal obligation resting on her so 
 to do, was held, by her death, to give them a cause of action, in 
 Indiana. Smith v. Michigan Central R, Co., 73 N. E. Rep. 928. 
 
 78 
 
PARTIES TO ACTIONS TOE DEATH. | 68 
 
 and it is quite common for statutes to provide for a recovery, 
 in actions for wrongful death, not alone by the classes made 
 competent to sue by the early statutes, but, in case of their 
 absence, by the " heirs at law " of the decedent, or his " next 
 of kin." The extreme of this legislation was enacted, in 
 Missouri, in 1905, by an- act giving a cause of action for 
 death to all the classes theretofore recognized as competent to 
 sue and, in case none such survived the decedent, then to his 
 administrator. A penal recovery in the maximum of $10,- 
 000.00 was provided for and the State so far abdicated its 
 right to fix the penalty to the trial jury, as to authorize them 
 to fix the recovery, without any basis whatever therefor, at 
 any sum between two and ten thousand dollaTS.''® This act 
 was amended, however, in this latter particular, by the next 
 legislature, which provided a pecuniary basis of recovery.*" 
 In Arkansas, where there is no personal representative of a 
 decedent, killed by wrongful act, under the statute of that 
 State,* ^ appropriating the recovery for the benefit of the 
 widow and " heirs at law," the widow and heirs must sue 
 jointly for the wrongful death *^ and a similar construction 
 was placed .upon the statute of Ohio,*^ and in the absence 
 of a wife and children, or the class first given the cause of 
 action, if there are both parents and brothers and sisters sur- 
 viving, the action must be brought for their joint benefit 
 and the parents cannot be excluded, although the decedent's 
 personal estate would have passed, by descent, to his brothers 
 and sisters^alone.** The reason for this construction is that 
 there can be but one action for wrongful death and after an 
 
 TO Session Laws Missouri, 1905, p. 137. 
 
 80 Session Laws, Missouri, 1907, p. 124. , 
 
 «i Kirby's Digest, §§ 6289, 6290. . 
 
 82MeBride v. Berman (Ark.), 94 S. W. Rep. 913. 
 
 S3 Ohio Rev. St, 1906, §§ 4153, 4159. 
 
 a* Toledo, etc., R. Co. v, Connolly, 149 Fed, Rep. 398. 
 
 79 
 
§ 68 PARTIES TO ACTIONS FOB. DEATH, 
 
 appropriation of tte cause of action, by those competent to 
 sue, no others could maintain a suit.*° 
 
 SB Case V. Cordell etc. Co., 103 Mo. App. 477. 
 
 " Where there is no personal representative of a decedent killed 
 by wrongful act, an action for his death, under Kirby's Dig., §§ 6289, 
 6290, giving a right of action for death by wrongful act, and pro- 
 viding that the same shall be brought by the " heirr at law " of de- 
 cedent where there is no personal representative, and the amount 
 recovered sfiall be for the benefit of the widow and next of kin, must 
 be brought by the widow and the heirs at law of decedent; the words 
 " heirs at law " in the statute including those receiving a distributive 
 part of the estate and the beneficiary of the action, and the statute 
 intending the bringing only of one action for a person's death." Mc- 
 Bride v. Herman (Ark. 1906), 94 S. W. Rep. 913; Berman v. McBride, . 
 id. 
 
 " Under the Ohio wrongful death act, providing that the recovery 
 shall be for the exclusive benefit of the wife or husband, and children, 
 or if there be neither of them, then of the parents and next of kin 
 of the person whose death shall be so caused, the recovery to be ap- 
 portioned among the beneficiaries with reference to their age and con- 
 dition and the laws of descent and distribution of personal estates left 
 by persons dying intestate, where decedent died leaving a father and 
 mother and brothers and sisters, the action was properly brought for 
 their joint benefit, and not for the benefit of decedent's next of kin, 
 excluding his parents, though on decedent's death his personal estate 
 would have passed to his brothers and sisters, and not. to his father 
 and mother, as provided by Ohio Rev. St. 1906, §§ 4153, 4159." To- 
 ledo, St. L. & W. R. Co. V. Connolly (U. S. C. C. A., Ohio, 1907), 149 
 Fed. Rep. 398. 
 
 Under the Massac^jusetts statute, there can be no recovery, by the 
 " next of kin," unless there is living a widow or children. Common- 
 wealth V. Boston, etc., R. Co., 121 Mass. 36. 
 
 But dependency of support need not be legal dependency, under this 
 statute. Daly v. New Jersey, etc., R. Co., 155 Mass. 1 ; 29 N. E. Rep. 
 507. 
 
 The mother is within the " next of kin " statute in West Virginia. 
 Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Gettle, 3 W. Va. 376. 
 
 In Kansas, it is only where there are no children or widow, that the 
 "next of kin" can sue. Western Union Tel. Co. v. McGill, 57 Fed. 
 Rep. 699. 
 
 The term " next of kin " is not confined to any particular degree of 
 consanguinity, in Illinois. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Shannon, 43 111. 
 338. 
 
 80 
 
PABtlES TO ACTIONS S'OK DEATH. § 69 
 
 § 69. Actions by personal representative or administrator. 
 — In the absence of the~ classes first qualified to sue for 
 wrongful death, such as " next of kin " or " jjeirs at law," it 
 is provided, in many States, that the personal representative 
 or administrator of the decedent may maintain the action 
 for his death.** 
 
 An administrator of a deceased minor can, tinder the 
 statutes of Florida, recover for the death of his intestate, 
 caused by the wrongful act of a corporation or its agents, 
 where such minor leaves neither widow, nor minor child nor 
 children, nor any person dependent upon him for support.*^ 
 A right of action is conferred by the laws of New Mexico, 
 upon the personal representative of a railway employee, who 
 met his death by reason of the negligent failure of the em- 
 ployer to maintain a sufficient number of men to guard the 
 track against falling rock from the hillside adjoining the* 
 right of way *® and the administrator of an employee is au- 
 thorized, by the laws of Kansas, to recover for the death of 
 his intestate.*® 
 
 The phrase "next of kin," is held, in Kansas, to mean those rela- 
 tions who inherit according to the statute of descent and distribution. 
 Atchison, etc., K. C. v. Ryan, 62 Kansas 682; 64 Pac. Eep. 603. 
 
 8«Sess. Laws, Missouri, 1905, p. 137; Comp Laws, N. M. §§ 
 3216; Rev. St. Fla. 1892, §§ 2342, 2343; Code, Civil Proc. Kansas, § 
 422; Kirby's Digest. Ark. §§ 6289; et sub.; Ohio Rev. St. 1906) 4153, 
 et sul. 
 
 87Bowden v. Jacksonville, etc., R. Co., 41 So. Rep. 400. 
 
 88 Denver, etc., R. Co. v. Warring, 86 Pac. Eep. 305. 
 
 8» Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Fajardo, 86 Pac. Eep. 301. 
 
 The personal representative, or administrator, is held to be the only 
 competent party .to sue, in the following eases: Stewart v. Louisville, 
 etc., R. Co., 83 Ala. 493; 4 So. Rep. B73; Georgia Pac. R. Co. v. 
 Propst, 83 Ala. 518; 3 So. Rep. 476; Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Town- 
 send, 41 Ark. 382; 21 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 619; Kramer v. San Fran- 
 cisco, etc., E. Co., 25 Cal 434; Kansas Pac. R. Co. v. Miller, 2 Colo. 
 442; 20 Am. Ry. Rep. 245; Soule v. New York, etc., R. Co., 24 Conn. 
 575; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Chaffin, 84 Ga. 519; 11 S. E. Rep. 891; 
 Hecht V. Ohio, etc., R. Co., 132 Ind. 507; 32 N. E. Rep. 302; 54 Am. & 
 1-6 81 
 
§ 70 iPAfiTlES TO ACTIONS FOK DEATH. 
 
 § 70. Those dependent for support upon deceased. — Under 
 some of the statutes giving a cause of action for death, the 
 right of action^ in the absence of widow or others of the 
 preferred class, is given to those dependent for support 
 upon the deceased. The dependency, as such statutes are 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 75; Warden v. Humeston, etc., R. Co., 72 Iowa 201; 33 
 N. W. Rep". 629; Givens v. Kentucky, etc., E. Co., 89 Ky. 231; 12 
 S. W. Rep. 257; Vicksburg, etc., E. Co. v. Phillips, 64 Miss. 693; 2 
 So. Rep. 537 ; 30 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 587 ; Crumpley v. Hannibal, etc., 
 E. Co., 98 Mo. 34; U S. W. Rep. 244; 37 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 357; 
 Johnston v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co., 7 Ohio St. 336; Brickman v. 
 South Carolina, R. Co.,. 8 So. Car. 173; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Connor, 9 Heisk (Tenn.), 19; 19 Am. Ry. Rep. 368; Galveston, etc., 
 R. V. Nolan, 53 Texas 139;' 3 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 387; Dimmey v. 
 Wheeling, etc., R. Co., 27 W. Va. 32. 
 
 An administrator is not permitted to sue, in many States, for the 
 benefit of nonresident alien next of kin, or relatives of the de- 
 ceased. Cleveland, etc., E. Co. v. Osgood (Ind.), 70 N. E. Eep. 839; 
 Deni v. Pennsylvania E. Co., 181 Pa. St. 525; 37 Atl. Eep. 558; 59 
 Am. St. Eep. 676; McMillan v. Spider Lake, etc., E. Co. (Wis.), 91 
 N. W. Eep. 979; 60 L. R. A. 589; Mulhall v. O'Fallon, 176 Mass. 266; 
 57 N. E. Eep. 386; 54 L. E. A. 934; 79 Am. St. Rep. 309; McDonald v. 
 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co., 144 Ind. 459; 43 N. E. Rep. 447; 32 L. E. A. 
 309; 55 Am. St. Rep. 185. 
 
 Where the administrator is given a right to sue, for the benefit of 
 certain persons, named in the statute, no action can be maintained by 
 the administrator, in the absence of the persons named. Chicago, 
 etc., B. Co. V. La Porte (Ind.), 71 N. E. Eep. 166. 
 
 In California, the administrator can sue only when there are heirs, 
 for whose benefit the action is to be maintained. Webster v. Nor- 
 wegian, etc., Co., 137 Cal. 399; 70 Pao. Eep. 276. 
 
 An administrator of deceased is the only person entitled to sue 
 for the death, in Illinois. Chicago Terminal, etc., E. Co. v. O'Donnell, 
 114 111. App. 345; 72 N". E. Eep. 1133. 
 
 Either a temporary administrator or the general administrator of 
 the decedent, can sue for his intestate's wrongful death, in Indiana. 
 Lake Erie, etc., R. Co. v. Charman ; 67 N. E. Rep. 923 ; Louisville, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Chaffln, 84 Ga. 519; 11 S. E. Rep. 891. 
 
 A New Jersey administrator is held competent to sue in Pennsylvania 
 for the death of his intestate in that State. Boulden v. Pennsylvania 
 R. Co., 205 Pa. St. 264; 54 Atl. Rep. 906. See. also, Cincinnati, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Thiebald, 114 Fed. Rep. 918; 52 C. C. A. 538; Hoes v. 
 New York, etc., R. Co., 77 N. Y. S. 117; 73 App. Div. 363. 
 8 2 
 
PARTIES TO ACTIONS FOE DEATH. § YO 
 
 generally construed, is not a mere voluntary support but the 
 dependency is usually restricted to those occupying a legal 
 dependency, or those toward "whom the deceased owed some 
 duty to support, as distinguished from a mere charitable or 
 voliintary impulse. Under the Massachusetts statute,*" an 
 invalid sister, unable to work regularly or earn enough to 
 pay her doctor bills, who had received an average of thirty 
 or thirty-five dollars a month for a period of several years, 
 from the deqeased, and who in fact received her support from 
 him and was dependent upon him for support, was held to 
 come within the protection of the statute and was entitled 
 to maintain an action for her brother's death, due to his em- 
 ployer's negligence.®^ But it was held, under the same 
 statute, that a half-sister, who did not live with her deceased 
 brother, but resided in her own home, with her two children, 
 but who was visited occasionally by her brother, who some- 
 times gave her money and paid her rent, was not so legally-de- 
 pendent upon him, as to enable her to maintain an action 
 against his employer for his death.®^ 
 
 Where the right of action is given to the children of the 
 deceased, without reference to the condition of their de- 
 pendency for support, the dependency of support is not a 
 prerequisite to maintain the action,*^ but there must gen- 
 erally be some reasonable expectation of a pecuniary ad- 
 
 »o Massachusetts St. 1887, eh. 270, § 2. 
 
 01 Daly V. New Jersey, etc., Co., 155 Mass. 1; 29 N. E. Rep. 507. 
 
 92Hodnett v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 156 Mass. 86; 30 N. E. Rep. 224. 
 
 03 Barron v. Illinois Central R. Co., 1 Biss. (U. S.) 412; Petrie 
 V. Columbia, etc., R. Co., 29 So. Car. 303; 35 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 430; 7 S. E. Rep. 515. 
 
 " Under the statute giving children a right of action for negligence 
 causing the death of their father, the right of action is not limited 
 to minors or to such children as cannot support themselves, nor is it 
 necessary to prove that the father actually contributed anything to 
 the support of his children." Beaumont Traction Co. v. Dilworth 
 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906), 94 S. W. Rep. 352. 
 
 83 
 
 y 
 
§ 71 PAETIES TO ACTIONS FOE DEATH. 
 
 vantage from a person bearing the family relation, for the 
 death of the party from whom it arose, to sustain a cause 
 of action,** and if the only pecuniary benefit the plaintiff 
 had in the life of the deceased was derived by virtue of a 
 contractual relation, the action could not be maintained.®" 
 
 § 71. Actions by nonresidents. — The right of nonresi- 
 dents to sue for the wrongful death of their decedent beyond 
 the limits of the State where the action is filed, has already 
 been discussed in considering the jurisdictions of various 
 actions,** As there presented, in order for a nonresident to 
 sue beyond the limits of the State where the death occurred, 
 the statute of the State where the action is brought must 
 generally authorize actions by the same class of persons, or 
 authorize the particular action filed, or no such right will 
 be recognized, by implication.*'^ Such right is not generally 
 recognized as an asset of the decedent's estate, upon which 
 administration, in the case of a nonresident, can be ob- 
 tained.** 
 
 In some States, however, where the action is attempted to 
 be prosecuted by a class of persons similar to those author- 
 ized to sue by the law of the State where the suit is filed, the 
 right to prosecute the action is recognized as a matter of 
 comity. In Tennessee, an action may be prosecuted by a 
 1 
 
 0* Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Adams, 65 Pa. St. 499; Carpenter v. 
 Buffalo, etc., R. Co., 38 Hun (N. Y.) 116. 
 
 06 Sykes v. Northeastern R. Co., 44 L. J. C. P. 191 ; 32 L. T 199 ; 23 
 W. R. 473. 
 
 A petition in an action by a parent, which fails to allege any loss of 
 services by the parent, but only seeks a recovery for burial expenses, 
 is held to be fatally defective, in New Jersey. Ferguson v. Delaware, 
 etc., Co., 58 Atl. Rep. 74. 
 
 08 See chapter, Jurisdiction of Aotiona, Law of Place. 
 
 »T Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Osgood (Ind.), 70 N. E. Rep. 839; Deni 
 V. Pennsylvania R. Co., 181 Pa. St. 525; 37 Atl. Rep. 558; 59 Am. St. 
 Rep. 676. 
 
 08 Marvin v. Maysville, etc., R. Co., 49 Fed. Rep. 436. 
 84 
 
PAETIES TO ACTIONS TOE DEATH. § 71 
 
 nonresident, where her husband had been killed by the negli- 
 gence of a railroad in another State, while in its employ- 
 ment, although the deceased was also a nonresident and the 
 contract of employment was entered into out of the State of 
 Teimessee.*^ And a similar holding obtains in Georgia^ and 
 Kentucky.^ A foreign administrator is authorized to sue 
 for the death of his decedent, in some States,* but he is gen- 
 erally not permitted to rciaintain the action where he is pro- 
 hibited from prosecuting the same action in the State of his 
 appointment.* 
 
 09 Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Higgins, 85 Tenn. 620; 4 S. W. Rep. 
 47. 
 
 1 Augusta R. Co. v. Glover, 58 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 269; 18 S. E. Rep. 
 406. See, also, Philpott v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 85 Mo. 164; 27 Am. 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 323. 
 
 2 Marvin v. Maysville, ete., R. Co., 49 Fed. Rep. 436. 
 
 3 Central R. Co. v. Swint, 73 Ga. 651; 26 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 482; 
 South Carolina R. Co. v. Nix, 68 Ga. 572; Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Shack- 
 lett, 105 111. 364; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 166; JefiEersonville, etc., R. Co. 
 v. Hendricks, 41 Ind. 48. 
 
 iLimekiller v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 33 Kansas 83; 5 Pac. Rep. 
 401; 19 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 184; Vawter v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 84 
 Mo. 679; 54 Am. Reii. 105. 
 
 Nonresident beneficiaries are held entitled to sue for the death of 
 their decedent, under the Ohio statute. Naylor v. Pittsburg, etc., R. 
 Co.,. 26 Ohio Cir. Ct., 277. See,, also, in New York, Hirschkovitz v. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co., 138 Fed. Rep. 438. And in Virginia, Pocahontas 
 Co. V. Ruke's Admr., 51 S. E. Rep. 449. 
 
 A suit may be brought in one State, for death of plaintiff's decedent, 
 in another, in the federal courts, sitting in the latter State, if the act 
 where the death occurred is not inconsistent with the law of the State 
 where the action is instituted. Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Cox, 145 U. S. 
 593; 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 905. 
 
 85 
 
CHAPTEK V. 
 
 EVIDENCE IN EAILWAY ACCIDENT CASES. 
 
 § 72. Scope of chapter. 
 
 73. Injury must result from negligent act. 
 
 74. What presumptions are indulged in in such actions. 
 
 75. Eule of evidence — Conflict of laws. 
 
 76j When negligence of defendant presumed. 
 
 77. Defendant's ownership or control must be shown. 
 
 78. Relation of employer and employee must be shown. 
 
 79. Defendant's notice of defects must be shown. 
 
 80. Plaintiff's ignorance of the danger. 
 
 81. Reasonable safety of place or appliance sufficient. 
 
 82. Defective roadbed and track. 
 
 83. Same — Condition of track at other places. 
 
 84. Evidence of defective hand-holds. 
 
 85. Knowledge of incompetency of employees must be shown. 
 
 86. Evidence of employee's reputation for care. 
 
 87. Burden of establishing vice-principalship. 
 
 88. Ordinances as evidence of negligence. 
 
 89. Proving assumed risk and contributory negligence. 
 
 90. Enforcement and reasonableness of rules. 
 
 91. What declarations admissible as part of res gestce. 
 
 92. Displaying injured member to jury. 
 
 93. Physical examination of plaintiff — When ordered. 
 
 94. Evidence of subsequent repairs inadmissible. 
 
 95. Prior or. subsequent negligent acts or conditions. 
 ' 96. Photographs of place or appliance. 
 
 97. Evidence of prior accidents incompetent. 
 
 98. Expert testimony — What is. 
 
 99. Customs and opinions as to relative methods. 
 
 100. Opinions of medical experts as to permanency of injury. 
 
 101. When opinions based wholly on history of case. 
 
 102. Running of train; — Train sheets and time-tables as evidence of. 
 
 103. Reports of railway company's employees. 
 
 104. Speed of trains. 
 
 105. Mortality tables, competent when. 
 
 86 
 
EVIDENCE IN RAILWAY CASES. §§ T2, Y3' 
 
 §106. When negative evidence is admissible. • 
 
 107. Evidence of settlement with other employees incompetent. 
 
 108. Evidence of employer's insurance incompetent. 
 
 109. Evidefiiee must correspond with pleading. 
 
 § 72. Scope of chapter. — It is not the intention in this 
 chapter, to attempt to discuss all the questions arising in 
 raiiway accident cases, or to cite all the authorities bearing 
 upon any particular phase of the law of evidence underlying 
 such cases, as distinguished from other personal injury ac- 
 tions, but only to cite authorities upon some of the questions 
 that customarily arise in the trial of personal injury actions 
 against railroads, both on the part of the plaintiff and for 
 the defendant, in such cases, in order to furnish to the prac- 
 titioner some ready precedents, in the preparation or trial 
 of his case. There is no difference in the law of evidence, 
 as applied to personal injury actions against railroads and 
 the law of 'evidence in personal injury actions in other voca- 
 tions,^ except in so far as the public character of the busi- 
 ness of such companies and the dangerous and powerful 
 agencies employed in the business, have made new rules or 
 decisions necessaryj in the recognition, by the courts of the 
 principles of the law, necessary for the protection of the 
 lives and limbs of citizens. 
 
 § Y3. Injury must result from negrligent act. — Both in 
 the opening chapter, discussing the el^nents of actionable 
 negligence, and the chapter on proximate and remote cause, 
 it will be seen that in order for the plaintiff to recover in 
 any case, for an injury alleged to be due to the act of another, 
 he must be able to establish both a breach of duty toward 
 himself, by the one charged with such injury and that his 
 injury, resulted, proximately, from such breach of duty, or 
 
 1 For discussion of the law of evidence as applied to actions for 
 personal injuries in mines, see White, Per, Inj. in Mines, §§ 69 to 100. 
 
 87 
 
§ 74 EVlDEifCE IN BAIL WAY CASES. 
 
 negligent aet. In other words, both by his pleading and his 
 proof, the plaintiff must connect his injury with the negli- 
 gent act of the defendant, alleged as the cause of such in- 
 jury." 
 
 The burden of proof is always on the plaintiff, to show 
 these essential facts, whether the circumstances are such as to 
 raise a presumption of negligence from the happening of the 
 accident, or not. The doctrine res ipsa loquitur does not re- 
 lieve the plaintiff of the burden of proof in the case, or raise 
 any presumption in the plaintiff's favor, but would only carry 
 the cause to the jury, permitting it to infer negligence and 
 find, on all the evidence, whether the plaintiff had sustained 
 his burden of proof, or not.* 
 
 § 74. What presumptions are indulged in in such actions. — 
 
 It will not be attempted, in this limited space, to give all 
 the presumptions that the courts will indulge, in personal 
 injury actions, for text books have been written on pre- 
 sumptive evidence, but some of the presumptions of fact that 
 courts will receive, in actions for personal injuries against 
 railroads, will be given. 
 
 The incorporation of a railroad company is presumed ; ^ it 
 
 2Byrd v. Southern Express Co. (N. C. 1905), 51 S. E. Kep. 851. 
 
 Burden is always oh an employee to establish that his injury was 
 due to the defendant's negligence. Missouri K. & T. R. Co. v. Green- 
 wood (Texas), 89 8. W. Rep. 810. 
 
 The burden of proving defendant's negligence is on the plaintiff. 
 Cully V. Northern Pac. R. Co., 35 Wash. 241; 77 Pac. Rep. 202. 
 
 sRoss V. Double Shoals, etc., Co. (N. C. 1905), 52 S. E. Rep. 121; 
 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 298. 
 
 The " fellow-servant law " of Missouri, does not dispense with the 
 proof of an injury due to an act of a coemployee, before negligence can 
 be successfully charged against the company. Caldwell v. Missouri Pac. 
 R. Co., 181 Mo. 455; 80 S. W. Rep. 897. 
 
 *Cummings v. Evansville, etc., R. Co., 115 Ind. 417; 18 N. E. Rep. 
 6; 36 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 147; Kostendader v. Pierce, 37 Iowa 645; 
 Busey v. Hooper, 35 Md. 15. 
 
 88 
 
evidence' is railway cases. § 74 
 
 is presumed that the railroad company is lawfully in posses- 
 sion of its right of way ; ° that one is employed in the ca- 
 pacity in which he acts ; ® that employees did their duty ; '' 
 that employees are competent ; * that proper regulations for 
 the management of the business had been adopted ; " that a 
 state of facts shown to exist has continued for a reasonable 
 time; ^^ that the common law is in force in other jurisdic- 
 tions ; ^^ that persons are in the possession of their normal 
 faculties ^^ and, that the owner of a railroad track is en- 
 gaged in the operation thereof. ^^ 
 
 There are many other presumptions that the courts have 
 held will be received in such cases, but specific works upon 
 
 the subject of evidence must be consulted for all such. 
 
 B Glass V. Memphis, etc., R. Co., 94 Ala. 581; 10 So. Rep. 215; Drake 
 V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 63 Iowa 302; 19 N. W. Rep. 215; 17 Am. & 
 Bng. R. Cas. 45; Rafferty v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 91 Mo. 33; 3 S. W. 
 Rep. 393; Uljni v. New York, etc., R. Co., 101 N. Y. 98; 4 N. E. Rep. 
 536; 23 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 3. 
 
 6 Hughes V. New York, etc., R. Co., 4 J. & S. (N. Y.) 222; Hoffman 
 V. New York, etc., R. Co., 12 J. & S. 1 ; Lampkins v. Vicksburg, etc., R. 
 Co., 42 La. Ann. 997; 8 So. Rep. 530; 47 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 622; 
 Austin V. St. Louis, etc., P. Co., 15 Mo. App. 197. 
 
 I Jewett V. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 50 Mo. App. 547. 
 
 s Potter V. New York, etc., R. Co., 136 N. Y. 77; 32 N. E. Rep. 603. 
 
 » Potter V. New York, etc., R. Co., 136 N. Y. 77, 32 N. E. Rep. 603. 
 
 loHaskins v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 58 Mo. 302; Wabash R. Co. v. 
 Keim, 42 111. App. 272; Goodsell v. Taylor, 41 Minn. 207; 42 N. W. 
 Rep. 873. 
 
 II Eichelburger v. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. (Ohio), 9 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 158. 
 
 laFrazer v. South, etc., R. Co., 81 Ala. 185; 1 So. Rep. 85; 28 Am. 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 565; Ford v. Central, etc., R. Co., 69 Iowa 627; 21 N. W. 
 Kep. 587; 17 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 599. 
 
 13 Blair v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 27 Fed. Rep. 176 ; Lake Shore, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Clark, 41 111. App. 343; Peabody v. Oregon, etc., R. Co.^ 21 
 Oregon 121; 26 Pac. Rep. 1053; 47 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 598; Walsh v. 
 Missouri Pac. R. Co., 102 Mo. 582; 14 S. W. Rep. 873; Ferguson v. 
 Wisconsin, etc., R. Co., 63 Wis. 145; 23 N. W. Rep. 123; 19 Am, & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 285. 
 
 89 
 
§§ 75, 76 EVIDENCE IN RAILWAY CASES. 
 
 § 75. Bule of evidence — Conflict of laws. — As a general 
 rule, in the trial of an action in one State, for an injury oc- 
 curring in another State, the rules of evidence and practice 
 and the conduct of the trial will be governed by the law of the 
 forum. 
 
 Accordingly, it was held, in Alabama, that the law of an- 
 other State, where the injury to the plaintiff occurred, 
 prescribing a rule of evidence for the enforcement of the 
 cause of action, which was in opposition to the rule prevail- 
 ing in Alabama, would not be applied in a suit brought in 
 the State of Alabama.'* 
 
 § 76. When negligence of defendant presumed. — Whether 
 the happening of an injurious accident raises a presumption 
 that it was due to some negligent act or acts, upon the de- 
 fendant's part, depends upon the nature of the accident and 
 the surrounding circumstances which characterize, it and the 
 relation of the parties, as affecting the measure of care re- 
 quired from the one sought to be charged. While the mere 
 happening of an accident, producing injury, does not raise 
 such a presumption, it may reasonably be ascribed to negli- 
 gence, if it was not such an injury as would have occurred, 
 had due care been exercised by the defendant.'^ 
 
 1* Helton V. Alabama Midland R. Co., 97 Ala. 275; 12 So. Rep. 276. 
 
 16 Cincinnati, etc., Ry. Co. v. South Fork, etc., Co., 139 Fed. Rep. 528; 
 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 533. 
 
 The mere fact of youth in an employee will raise no presumption 
 of negligence, in case of an injury, in an action against his employer, 
 as the burden of proving negligence is on the plaintiff, as in other 
 cases. McMillan v. Grand R. Co., 130 Fed. Rep. 827. 
 
 In an action by an engineer for injuries from a boiler explosion, 
 before the fact of the explosion will raise the presumption of negligence 
 on the employer's part, it must appear that the engineer was not 
 himself guilty of negligence. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Prickett, 109 
 111. App. 468; 210 111. 140; 71 N. E. Rep. 435. 
 
 90 
 
EVIBEOSrCE IN KAIL WAY CASES. §§ 77, 78 
 
 § 77. Defendant's ownership. or control must be shown. — 
 Before a liability will result for an injury on a railroad, the 
 evidence of the plaintiff must show either oAvnership of the 
 place or appliance causing the injury, by the defendant, or 
 such control or authority over the same as would render the 
 defendant responsible for the condition causing the injury.^" 
 
 It has been held competent to establish ownership or con- 
 trol of the appliance causing the injury, sufficient to render 
 the defendant liable therefor, by showing that the defend- 
 ant's name was on the engine which injured the plaintiff; ^"^ 
 that the defendant was generally regarded as the owner of 
 the railroad where the injury was received; ^* or that it 
 had sent its surgeon or physician to render medical or surgi- 
 cal aid and assistance to the plaintiff.^® 
 
 Erom this it will be seen that the rule requiring proof 
 of ownership or control of the place or appliance causing the 
 injury is not enforced with great strictness, but if there is a 
 total absence of proof of the defendant's ownership or control 
 of the cause of the injury, there would be an absence of one 
 of the essentials of a cause of action.^" 
 
 § 78. Relation of employer and employee must be shown. — 
 
 Where the injury to the plaintiff was received while he occu- 
 pied the relation of an employee of the defendant, the evi- 
 dence must show that such relation existed, since it would 
 only result from the duty owing to him as such employee that 
 the conclusion that the breach of that duty would amount 
 
 18 Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Lawn, 30 Ind. App. 515 ; 66 N. B. 
 Eep. 508. 
 
 "East St. Louis, etc., E. Co. v. Altgen, 210 111. 213; 71 N. E. Eep. 
 377. 
 
 18 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Schmitz, 211 111. 446; 71 N. E. Eep. 1050. 
 
 "Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Carroll, 206 111. 318; 68 N. E. Rep. 1087. 
 
 20 Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Xawn, 30 Ind; App. 515; 66 N. E. 
 Eep. 508. 
 
 91 
 
§ 78 EVIDENCE. IN EAILWAY CASES. 
 
 to actionable negligence, could be indulged in. Hence, un- 
 less the relation is admitted by the pleadings, it is always 
 necessary to show by the evidence that this relation did 
 exist in order to show one of the essential elements of negli- 
 gence on the defendant's part.^^ 
 
 But it is not necessary for the plaintiff to establish, by 
 direct evidence, that such relation existed, but it is sufficient 
 if from all the facts and circumstances submitted to the 
 court -or jury, it can be ascertained, with reasonable cer- 
 tainty that such relation did exist, as where it appeared that 
 the plaintiff' was performing work and labbr for the de- 
 fendant, on his property, or about his business, and that this 
 was done with the consent of the defendant and that the in- 
 jury was received while discharging duties that enured to 
 the benefit of the defendaot, with his knowledge and con- 
 sent; this will be ordinarily sufficient, from which the law 
 will imply a promise to pay for such services, so rendered' 
 and from which the conclusion can be drawn that the plain- 
 tiff was an employee of the defendant.*^ 
 
 21 Valley v. Hall, 184 Mass. 358; 68 N. E. Eep. 829; Henderson v. 
 Kansas City, 177 Mo. 477; 76 S. W. Hep. 1045. 
 
 Evidence that an injured switchman was engaged in straightening 
 a bent link and defendant's foreman knew his location is admissible. 
 Alabama, etc., E. Co. v. Bonner, 39 So. Eepi 619. 
 
 22 Eingue v. Oregon, etc., Co., 75 Pac. Eep. 703. 
 
 Mere request of a foreman that the injured or deceased alleged em- 
 ployee perform certain service is not sufficient evidence from which it 
 can be held that the relation of employer and employee existed. Baker's 
 Admr. v. Lexington, etc., E. Co., 28 Ky. L. E. 140; 89 S. W. Eep. 149. 
 
 To create the relation of employer and employee there must be a 
 contract, or some act on the part of the one impliedly recognizing the 
 other as his employee. One engaged by an unauthorized employee 
 is a mere volunteer, to whom no duty is due, except not to wantonly 
 injure him, after discovery of his danger. Atlanta, etc., Ey. Co. v. 
 West, 121 Ga. 641; 49 S. E. Eep. 711; 67 L. E. A. 701. 
 
 As to a mere volunteer, there is not the duty to adopt means to 
 avoid injury, that obtains toward an employee, but only care to avoid 
 injury, after discovery of his peril, need be exercised, although the 
 92 
 
EVIDENCE IN RAILWAY CASES. § 79 
 
 § 79. Defendant's notice of defects must be shown. — It be- 
 ing not only essential to show the defect from which the 
 injury resulted, but also the fact that defendant had knowl- 
 edge thereof a sufficient length of time to have enabled him, 
 in the exercise of due care, to have repaired it, or that it 
 had existed for a length of time sufficient for him to have 
 acquired such knowledge, in the Zeroise of ordinary care, 
 these facts must also appear before a prima facie case is es- 
 tablished by the plaintiff.^* 
 
 But the law will imply notice from a defect that has ex- 
 isted a sufficient length of time for the employer, in the exer- 
 cise of ordinary care, to have discovered the defect, and 
 hence, it is not essential in every case to prove actual notice, 
 provided facts are shown from which notice can be legally 
 inferred.^* In Missouri, proof of notice of a defect on the 
 day of the accident, is held not to be sufficient to show negli- 
 gence, where it would ordinarily have taken longer than this 
 to remedy the defect ^^ and a period of from three to six days, 
 after the defect was known to exist, by the employee, unac- 
 
 volunteer is a minor. Atlanta, etc.. By. Co. v. West, 121 Ga. 641; 
 49 S. E. Rep. 711; 67 L. R. A. 701. 
 
 Where the evidence shows that the plaintiff was a minor and when 
 he entered the employer's service, his father forbid his employment 
 on a train and that he was injured when so engaged, it was held 
 improper to show emancipation by the father, and the relation of em- 
 ployer and employee was held not to exist. Coleman v. Himmerberger- 
 Harrison Co. (Mo.), 79 S. W. Rep. 981. 
 
 Where an employer lends his employee to a third person, to render 
 some particular service, he is, as to such service, the employee of 
 the third person, though he remains the general employee of his em- 
 ployer. Weist V. Coal Cr. R. Co. (Wash.), 84 Pac. Rep. 725. 
 
 !!3Burnes v. Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co., 129 Mo. 41; O'Malley v. 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 113 Mo. 319. 
 
 2*Hamman v. Central, etc., Co., 156 Mo. 232; Currelli v. Jackson, 
 77 Conn. 115; 58 Atl. Rep. 762. 
 
 20 Abbot V. Marion Min. Co., 112 Mo. App. 550, holding that where 
 knowledge of a situation is relied, upon to show culpability, it must 
 be shown to be prior knowledge, with time to remove the danger. 
 
 93 
 
§ 79 EVIDENCE IN EAILWAY CASES. 
 
 companied by notice at all, on the employer's part, was held 
 insufficient in lowa.^® An employee injured by stumbling 
 over a grain door, left by the side of a railroad track, can- 
 not recover, in the absence of evidence of defendant's knowl- 
 edge of such obstruction; ^'' nor could an employee injured 
 by smoke in a tunnel, sustain a verdict, unless the evidence 
 showed defendant's prior notice of the existence of such 
 smoke. ^^ 
 
 20 Thayer v. Smoky Hollow Co., 98 N. W. Rep. 718. 
 
 27 Burnea v. Kansas City, etc., E. K. Co., 129 Mo. 41. 
 ' 28 O'Malley v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 113 Mo. 320. 
 
 In Burnes v. Railroad, supra, Judge Gantt, said : " The rule in this 
 State, in this^ class of cases, requires the servant to show the unsafe 
 place or defective machinery, and that the master knew of the unsafe 
 condition, or that the exercise of ordinary care, on the master's part, 
 would have discovered the defect. Beginning with the well-considered 
 case Of Gibson v. Railroad (46 Mo. 163), this has been the uniform 
 ruling in this State." Elliott v. Railroad, 67 Mo. 272; Crane v. Rail- 
 road, 87 Mo. 588 ;' Gutridge v. Railroad, 94 Mo. 468 ; Bowen v. Railroad, 
 95 Mo. 268. 
 
 Knowledge or an opportunity to know of a defect in an appliance, 
 is essential to a liability. Smith v. Gulf, etc., R. Co. (Texas), 65 S. W. 
 Rep. 83. 
 
 And notice to a coemployee of a defect is not notice to the em- 
 ployer. Chicago, etc., R. Co- v. Merriam, 95 111. App. 628. 
 
 Evidence of notice to a vice-principal is competent to show notice 
 to the employer himself. Dutro v. Metropolitan, etc., R. Co., Ill Mo. 
 App. 258; 86 S. W. Rep. 915. 
 
 No recovery can be had for an injury from a defective drawhead, 
 without proof of notice of such condition to the company. Welch v. 
 New York, etc., R. Co., 43 N. Y. 958; 17 N. Y. S. 342. 
 
 Without notice to a company of a bad track of another road and 
 the inadaptability of its engine to such track, no recovery can be had 
 for an injury therefrom. Dunlap v. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 81 Ga. 136; 
 7 S. E. Rep. 283. 
 
 No liability will result from an injury from a defective ladder or 
 hand-hold to a car or engine, unless the evidence shows that it had 
 existed a sufficient time for the employer, in the due course of the 
 business, to have acquired notice thereof and repaired it. Missouri 
 Pac. R. Co. V. Door (Kan.), 85 Pac. Rep. 533; Galveston, etc., R. Co. 
 V. Smith (Texas), 93 S. W. Rep. 184; 98 S. W. Rep. 240. 
 
 94 
 
EVIDENCE IN RAILWAY CASES. § 80 
 
 § 80. Plaintiff's ignorance of the danger. — In most of the 
 States it is not essential for the plaintiff, in an action for a 
 personal injury, to establish that he was wholly ignorant of 
 the defect that occasioned the injury, but for the employer's 
 defense of assumed risk to prevail — in case this is the de- 
 fense — the employer himself must establish that the plain- 
 tiff had notice of the defect causirig the injury, as well as 
 the danger resulting therefrom.^® But where the defect in 
 the appliance or place is so glaring as to bring notice home to 
 the injured employee, as where an appliance is obviously 
 defective, then the law will imply that the injured plaintiff 
 had the same notice that everyone who came in contact with it 
 must have and such notice will be imputed to him, in law, 
 
 Knowledge for a month, of a defective track, is sufficient to impart 
 notice thereof, in law. Houts v. Transit Co., . 108 Mo. App. 686 ; 84 
 S. W. Rep. 161. 
 
 To bring to a company notice of a defective car, it is not essential 
 that notice be given the person named by its rules with duty of seeing 
 to the safety of such car. Chicago & A. Ry. Co. v. Walters, 217 111. 87 ; 
 75 N. E. Rep. 441. 
 
 Where a railroad brakeman was killed, by the unsafe condition of 
 a car load of logs, it is held, in Colorado, that the company is liable, 
 if it could have known of such unsafe condition of the load, although 
 actual notice is not shown. Roche v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 73 Pac. 
 Rep. 880. . 
 
 Notice to a railroad of a defect in a coupling appliance was presumed, 
 in Kansas. Brinkmeier v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 77 Pac. Rep. 586. 
 
 It is held, in Kansas, that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, 
 an employer is presumed to have notice of defects in his appliances. 
 Brinkmeier v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 69 Kan. 738; 77 Pac. Rep. 586. 
 
 And, in Illinois, it is held that an employee is presumed to have no 
 such knowledge. Pressed Steele Car Co. v. Herath, 110 111. App. 596. 
 
 This latter presumption is indulged in, in the presence of the fact 
 that the employee comes in closer contact with the appliances with 
 which he works than his employer; that he has more frequent means 
 of information, and working with an appliance, ought to know its con- 
 dition, for his own safety, better than one who entrusts, him with its 
 use. Such a presumption is unreasonable. 
 
 2i>Hamman v. Central, etc., Co., 156 Mo. 232; Cole v. St. Louis, etc., 
 Co., 183 Mo. 81 ; 81 S. W. Rep. 1138. 
 
 95 
 
§ 81 EVIDENCE IN BAILWAY CASES. 
 
 from such knowledge and it -would prevent his recovery .3* 
 An employee is charged in law with a notice of all conditions 
 surrounding him, which he cannot fail to see and know and 
 he is bound to know and consider such surroundings, with 
 reference to his personal safety. If, as a matter of fact, 
 the presence of danger would be suggested -by the appearances 
 of his surroundings, to a man of ordinary prudence, he 
 should give notice of such impending danger to his employer 
 and, failing to do this, he could not recover for an injury 
 received from the threatened obvious danger.®^ 
 
 § 81. Reasonable safety of place or appliance sufficient. — 
 
 The employer being negligent only when it can be established 
 that he has failed to use suchr care as ordinarily prudent men 
 in the same business use in the management of their af- 
 fairs, it is never held that he is negligent when he uses such 
 appliances or places, in his business, as ordinarily careful 
 men in the same business customarily use. Evidence on 
 
 30 Eenfro v. Eallroad Co., 86 Mo. 302 ; Jackson v. Railroad, 104 Mo. 
 448; Aloorn v. Railroad, 108 Mo. 81; Railroad Co. v. Trimble, 35 N. 
 E. Rep. 716; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Congdon, 134 Ind. 226; Macklin v. 
 Railway Co., 58 N. W. Rep. 999; Hickey v. Taafe, 105 N. Y. 26; Buck- 
 ley V. Railway Co., 113 N. Y. 540; Crown v. Orr, 140 N. Y. 450; Pratt 
 V. Prouty, 153 Mass. 333; Nugent v. Milling Co., 131 Mo'. 241. 
 
 31 Montgomery, etc., Co. v. Barringer, 109 111. App. 185; Nugent v. 
 Milling Co., 131 Mo. 241. 
 
 An employee injured while on a track, by an engine, must allege, 
 in Illinois, a want of notice to himself, of the fact of the appitaach 
 of the engine. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Bell, 111 111. App. 280. 
 
 The burden of proving all the facts from which the conclusion of an 
 assumption of the risk will result, is on the employer. Missouri, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Jones (Texas), 80 S. W. Rep. 852. 
 
 Under an allegation of assumed risk, the burden of establishing this 
 defense is on the defendant. Arenschield v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 128 
 Iowa 677; 105 N. W..Rep. 200. 
 
 The employer must show the employee's knowledge of danger and 
 unless he proves it, it is not presumed. Pressed Steel Car Co. v. 
 Herath, 110 111. App. 596. 
 
 96 
 
fiVlDENCE IN EAILWAY CASES. § 82 
 
 his p^rt that his appliances or places for work were such as 
 were in ordinary use by such men, is, therefore, usually held 
 to be sufficient evidence with which to meet the charge that 
 such appliances or places were dangerous or defective.®^ 
 
 Where the appliances are such as usually are used by or- 
 dinarily prudent men in the same business, they are held 
 to come up to the legal standard of appliances that are rea- 
 sonably safe for the purpose for which they are utilized and 
 after proof of such place or appliance, as the one causing 
 the injury, if there is no countervailing proof, it would 
 ordinarily be a duty of the court to hold that the employee 
 could not recover,** or if the evidence on this issue was con- 
 flicting it would be the duty of the court to advise the jairy, 
 by proper instruction, that such was the standard of ordinary 
 care and no employer could be held negligent who came up 
 to this legal standard,*^ 
 
 § 82. Defective roadbed and track. — In an action for an 
 injury from a derailment caused by an alleged defective road- 
 bed and track, at the place where the derailment occurred, 
 evidence that at a point a considerable distance before the 
 place of the disaster was reached which had previously 
 caused similar trouble, was found to be in good condition 
 and was watched by section forces, and that the track at the 
 place of the disaster was considered safe, should be admitted 
 on behalf of the defendant, to rebut the evidence of notice 
 
 32 Bohn y. Chicago & Alton E. Co.,- 106 Mo. 429 ; Pence v. California, 
 etc., Co., 27 Utah, 378; 75 Pac. Eep. 934. 
 
 33 Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Dixon, 139 Fed. Rep. 737; Fore v. Chicago 
 & Alton R. Co., 114 Mo. App. 551 ; 89 S. W. Rep. 1034. 
 
 3* If the employee injured is not a person of ordinary skill, it will 
 usually be a question of whether the machine used by him was reason- 
 ably safe for one of his experience. Chicago & C. E. Co. v. Daugard, 
 118 111. App. 67. 
 
 1—7 97 
 
§ 83 EVIDENCE IN RAILWAY CASES. 
 
 of a dangerous or defective track, at the place of the in- 
 jury.='^ 
 
 And, generally, where an accident occurred at a particular 
 place, evidence is admissible of the condition of the track, 
 in the neighborhood of that place, either to establish a de- 
 fective condition, or to show a proper condition of the same.** 
 
 § 83. Same — Condition of track at other places than where 
 injury occurred. — It would seem, under the strict rule of 
 pleading and proof which obtains in personal injury actions, 
 that under an allegation of an unsafe place and a resulting 
 injury, at a certain portion of a railroad track, that it would 
 be incompetent to establish an unsafe or dangerous track 
 at any other place and many of the cases hold that this cannot 
 be done,*'' any more than one could allege an injury from 
 one appliance or place and recover on proof of an injury due 
 to a wholly different place or appliance. 
 
 But apparently for erroneous reasons, this class of seem- 
 
 ss Central, etc., R. Co. v. Kent, 84 Ga. 351 ; 10 S. E., Rep. 965. 
 
 38 Sweat V. Boston, etc., R. Co., 156 Mass. 284; 31 N. E. Rep. 296. 
 
 37 The condition of a track after a derailment, but before repair, 
 may be shown, but not if months elapse, or the condition ij changed. 
 6ronk V. Wabash R. Co., 123 Iowa 349 ; 98 N. W. Rep. 884. 
 
 The condition of a railroad track at a place other than that where 
 an injury occurred is not admissible, in Pennsylvania. Briggs v. Rail- 
 road, 206 Pa. 564; 56 Atl. Rep. 36. 
 
 The condition of track at other times or places than alleged in 
 petition, was held incompetent, in the following cases: Sidekum v. 
 Wabash, etc., R. Co., 93 Mo. 400; 4 S. W. Rep. 701; 30 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 640; Grant v. Raleigh, etc., R. Co., 108 N. Car. 462; 13 S. E. 
 Rep. 209; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Fox, 11 Bush (Ky.), 495; Stewart 
 V. Everts, 76 Wis. 35; 44 N: W. Rep. 1092; 44 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 313; 
 Laughlin v. Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co., 62 Mich. 220; 28 N. W.'Rep. 
 873 ; 26 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 377 ; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Mitchell, 75 
 Texas 77; 12 S. W. Rep. 810; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 224; Little Rock, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Eubanks, 48 Ark. 460; 3 8. W. Rep. 808; 31 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 176; Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co. v. Huntley, 38 Mich. 537; 
 Stoher v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 91 Mo. 509; 4 S. W. Rep. 389; 31 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 229. 
 
 98 
 
EVIDENCE IN RAILWAY CASES. § 84 
 
 ingly incompetent evidence is admissible, in some of the 
 States, as where it was held competent, in order to show the 
 surrounding circumstances, or to prove constructive or actual 
 notice to the railway company,^® as if evidence o'f notice of 
 a condition at one time or place would raise any presump- 
 tion of a like notice of a wholly different place or condition. 
 
 § 84. Evidence of defective hand-holds. — In an action for 
 an injury due to an absence of hand-holds on a tank car, 
 used by the defendant, it is held competent, in Massachusetts, 
 to show that they would be conveniient and useful and that 
 other similar cars, belonging to the defendant, have them, as 
 this is held to be a circumstance for the jury to consider, in 
 determining the presence or absence of negligence, on defend- 
 ant's part.^* 
 
 It is also held to be competent, in Missouri, where the in- 
 
 38 The condition of a railroad track at points other than where the 
 accident occurred, was held admissible, in the following cases: Jack- 
 sonville, etc., R. Co. V. Southworth, 135 111. 250; 25 N. E. Rep. 1093; 
 Allison V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 42 Iowa 274; Worden v. Humeston, 
 etc., R. Co., 76 Iowa 310; 41 N. W. Rep. 26; Ohio Valley, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Watson, 93 Ky. 654; 21 S. W. Rep. 244; Holyoke v. Grand Trunk R. 
 Co., 48 N. H. 541; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. DeMilley, 60 Texas 194; 
 Murphy v. New York, etc., R. Co., 66 Barb. (N. Y.) 125. 
 
 In an action for injury to an engineer from a low joint in a track, 
 evidence that all the ties in the cut were rotten, is held to be com- 
 petent to show the surrounding circumstances and conditions and also 
 to show notice to the defendant, or facts from which it could have been 
 derived. Southern Ry. Co. v. Sittasen (Ind.), 74 N. E. Rep. 898. 
 
 Evidence of severe rain storms about the same time as a storm which 
 washed out the roadbed, causing the injury to plaintiff, is held com- 
 petent, in Texas, to show that it should' have been anticipated and its 
 - effects provided for. Gulf, etc., Ry. Co. v. Boyce, 87 S. W. Rep. 395. 
 
 Evidence that switch lights were used on other portions of the 
 defendant railroad company's road and on other roads quite generally 
 at such places as that where plaintiff was injured, was held com- 
 petent, in Virginia. Southern Ry. Co. v. Blanford's Admr., 54 S. E. 
 Rep. 1. 
 
 39 Graham v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 156 Mass. 4; 30 N. E. Rep. 359. 
 
 99 
 
§ 85 EVIDENCE IN EAILWAY CASES. 
 
 jury is alleged to result from a defective hand-hold, to per- 
 mit the plaintiff to show the manner in which the hand-hold 
 was fastened to the car and the condition of the screws and 
 wood, imniediately after the injury to the plaintiff.*" 
 
 § 85. Knowledge of incompetency of coemployee must be 
 shown. — Where the injury which furnishes the basis of the 
 action is alleged to be the result of the incompetency of a co- 
 employee, it is essential to show that the employer had notice 
 of the incompetency, or that if he had exercised reasonable 
 care, he would have learned of such incompetency, or no 
 liability on the part of the employer will result,*^ In short, 
 the same rule, so far as the burden of proof and the essen- 
 tials of showing facts from which negligence in the particu- 
 lar case will result, applies to this kind of a case as that which 
 obtains in the case of an injury from a defective machine, or 
 appliance, or a failure to furnish a reasonably safe place to 
 work. In all such cases, before negligence can be said to 
 exist, a notice of the facts from which the duty would spring, 
 must be shown to exist, or facts from which this notice would 
 be inferred, in law. 
 
 The presumption is that the employer has performed his 
 duty in the employment of competent employees *^ and when 
 it is shown that an employee was competent when employed, 
 he is presumed to continue competent.'*^ Such presumption, 
 of course, may be overcome by proof of facts from which 
 
 40Gutridge v. Missouri Pacific Ey. Co., 105 Mo. 520; 16 S. W. Eep. 
 943. 
 
 41 Harper v. Railroad Co., 47 Mo. 567 ; Moss v. Railroad Co., 49 Mo. 
 167; Blake v. Railroad, 70 Me. 63; Gorman v. Railway Co., 78 Iowa 
 509; 43 N. W. Eep. 303; Coppins v. Railway Co., 122 N. Y. 563; 25 
 N. E. Rep. 915. 
 
 There is a presumption of the competency of coemployees. Wilkin- 
 son, etc., Co. V. Dickinson, 35 Ind. App. 230; 73 N. E. Eep. 957. 
 
 42 Bailey, Mas. Liab. Inj. Serv., p. 55. 
 
 *3 Michigan Central Ey. Co. v. Gilbert, 46 Mich. 176; 9 N. W. Rep. 
 243. 
 
 100 
 
EVIDENCE IN RAILWAY CASES. 
 
 notice and incompetency both would result, but this must 
 be done, in every case, to justify a recovery. Proof of con- 
 tinued intoxication,** numerous incompetent acts, with the 
 •knowledge of the employer, or such a series of incompetent 
 acts,*** or intoxication, as to inforni the employer, if he had 
 used reasonable care, will usually overcome the presumption 
 of due care, upon the part of the employer and competency 
 on the part of the employee. And if several such acts have 
 been shown, it is usually held to be a question for the jury 
 to determine whether, under the facts of the case, the em- 
 ployer had notice of the incompetency of the given employee, 
 or ought to have known of his incompetency, by the exercise 
 of due care on his part.*® 
 
 '**6ilinan v. Eailroad Co., 13 Allen, 433; Laning v. Railway Co;, 
 49 N. Y. 521; Hilts v. Railway Co., 55 Mich. 437; 21 N. W. Rep. 878. 
 
 45 Incompetency will not be shown by proof of one careless act. 
 Melville v. Railway Co., 48 Fed. Rep. 820; Houston, etc., Ry. Co. v. 
 Patton (Tex.), 9 S. W. Rep. 175; Michigan Central Ey. Co. v. Gilbert, 
 supra; Lake Shore, etc., Ey. Co. v. Stupak, 123 Ihd. 210; 23 N. E. Rep. 
 246. 
 
 *» Michigan Central Ry. Co. v. Gilbert, supra; Bailey, Mas. Liab. Inj. 
 Serv., p. 57. 
 
 It is error to exclude the evidence of a superintendent that when he 
 employed the conductor, whose incompetency is alleged as the cause 
 of the accident, he did not know that he was incompetent. Frazier v. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co., 38 Pa. St. 104. 
 
 And after evidenie that an employee was competent when employed, 
 it is held, in New York, that he is presumed to continue competent. 
 Chapman v. Brie E. Co., 55 N. Y. 579. 
 
 Evidence of notice to a conductor of different acts of negligence on 
 the part of an alleged incompetent brakeman, was held competent to 
 show knowledge of such incompetency on the employer's part, in Texas. 
 Gulf, etc., Ry. Co. v. Hays, 89 S. W. Rep. 29. 
 
 Evidence that an alleged incompetent brakeman the night before the 
 injury was " out with the girls " is error. Gulf, etc., Ey. Co. v. Hays 
 (Texas), 89 S. W. Eep. 29. 
 
 Specific acts of negligence or of drunkenness, or lack of skill, are 
 inadmissible to prove incompetency of an employee, unless the em- 
 ployer is shown to have had notice thereof. Southern Pae. R. Co. v. 
 Hetzer, 135 Fed. Rep. 272; 68 C. C. A. 26. 
 
 101 
 
§ 86 EVIDENCE IN RAILWAY CASES'. 
 
 § 86. Evidence of employee's reputation for care. — Where 
 the ground of negligence alleged is the employment or reten- 
 tion of an incompetent or unskilled employee in the service, 
 ■whose act caused the injury, since the basis of the negli- 
 gence charged is the known employment or retention of an 
 incompetent employee, it is sometimes held competent, to 
 meet the evidence to show notice of such incompetency, on 
 the employer's part, by evidence of the general reputation of 
 the employee, whose reputation for care is attacked, as being 
 a careful man. This was held to be competent evidence, in 
 a Khode Island case,*'' and, in Texas, when an employee's 
 reputation for care is attacked, it is held to be competent 
 for him to show a general custom for the performance of the 
 duty he was performing at time of the injury, in the same 
 way that he was performing it, when the injury occurred,*® 
 but further than this it is doubted if evidence of reputation 
 is competent, in an action for negligence, although, in an 
 Illinois case, where both an engineer and his fireman were 
 killed in an explosion, and more direct proof of his care 
 and prudence could not be had, it w^s held competent to 
 
 Evidence of other specific acts of negligence on the part of an alleged 
 incompetent vice-principal, was held competent, in Washington, in 
 order to show notice thereof to his employer. Dossett v. St. Paul, etc., 
 Co., 40 Wash. 276; 82 Pac. Kep. 273. 
 
 Where the ground of negligence is the incompetency of an engineer, 
 it was held competent, in Washington, to show two prior negligent acts 
 on the same engineer's part, where the employer had notice thereof. 
 Conover v. Neher Eoss Co., 38 Wash. 172; 80 Pac. Rep. 281. 
 
 17 Evidence of a deceased engineer's reputation for care is admissible 
 to rebut evidence of his negligence, in a boiler explosion. Illinois, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Prickett, 210 111. 140; 71 N. E. Rep. 435; Havens v. Rhode 
 Island Co., 26 R. I. 48; 58 Atl. Rep. 247. 
 
 The general reputation for care among railroad men, of an alleged 
 incompetent brakeman, was held competent, in Texas. Gulf, etc., Ry. 
 Co. V. Hays, 89 S. W. Rep. 29. 
 
 *8 International, etc., R. Co. v. Penn, 79 S. W. Rep. 624. 
 
 103 
 
EVlDETfCE IN RAILWAY CASES. § 87 
 
 establisli his general reputation as " a sober, careful and 
 competent engineer." *® 
 
 § 87. Burden of establishing vice-principalship. — At com- 
 mon law all coemployees engaged in the common service were 
 presumed to be coemployees and this presumption obtained, 
 regardless of the grade of the service,^" and hence it is in- 
 cumbent upon the plaintiff who alleges- that he was injured 
 as a result of the negligence of an employee, delegated by the 
 employer with power of control, to establish this affirmative 
 allegation.^^ The facts going to show the delegation of the 
 power of supervision or control are generally required to be 
 proved by the plaintiff.^^ 
 
 If the negligence charged is that of a wrong order, at the 
 time of the injury, then the proof must show that the plain- 
 tiff was acting under such order when injured and if this 
 does not appear there would be a material variance between 
 the pleading and the proof.^* 
 
 But notwithstanding the general rule at common law that 
 all employees in the same common employment were con- 
 
 4» Illinois Central E. Co. v. Prickett, 210 111. 140; 109 111. App. 468; 
 71 N. E. Rep. 435. 
 
 After proof of the incompetency of an employee, his general reputa- 
 tion among those acquainted with him is competent to bring home 
 notice of his incompetency to the employer; but reputation of only a 
 few of those who knew him, including a part only of those who knew 
 his character, was held to be incompetent, in Utah. Southern Pac. E.. 
 Co. V. Hetzer, 135 Fed. Rep. 272; 68 C. C. A. 26. 
 
 soCooley, Torts, p. 640. 
 
 51 Shaw V. Barabrick Bates Co., 102 Mo. App. 666 ; 77 S. W. Rep. 96 ; 
 Boyd V. Blumenthal (Del.), 52 Atl. Rep. 330. 
 
 In determining whether an alleged vice-principal was, in fact, such, it- 
 is competent to show that he directed employees and the repair of 
 appliances. Wysocki v. Wisconsin, etc., Co., 121 Wis. 96; 98 N. W. 
 Rep. 950. 
 
 ^^ Ante idem. 
 
 63 Bohn V. Chicago & Alton R. Co., 106 Mo. 434. 
 
 :o3 
 
§ 88 EVIDEIirCE IN EAILWAY CASES. 
 
 sidered as coemployees, it is held, in lUinois,^^ that the 
 burden of establishing that the plaintiff was injured by the 
 negligence of a coemployee is upon the defendant, as this 
 would come within the rule requiring the defendant to es- 
 tablish the defense of assumed risk, by facts from which the , 
 relation showing an assumption of the risk would appear,, 
 but the opinion loses sight of the rule by which such de- 
 fense would be made out, in the absence of evidence, by the 
 legal presumption that ought to obtain, in the absence of a 
 counter showing. 
 
 § 88. Ordinances as evidence of negligence. — The viola- 
 tion of an ordinance by the defendant is not conclusive proof 
 of the defendant's negligence, but is to be considered along 
 with other evidence of the negligence by the court and jury, 
 going to establish such conduct as will show a want of or- 
 dinary care on his part. The Supreme Court of Pennsyl- 
 vania, in a recent case, tersely states the rule as follows: 
 " Ordinances and their violation are admissible, not as sub- 
 stantive and sufficient proof of the negligence of the defend- 
 ant, but as evidence of municipal expression of opinion, on 
 a matter as to which the municipal authorities had acted, that 
 the defendant was negligent and are to be taken into consid- 
 eration with all the other facts in the case." ®® Ordinances 
 limiting the speed of trains within a municipal corporation ; 
 those providing for warning by bell or whistle, at street cross- 
 ings, and those providing for flagmen, or gatemen, at cross- 
 ings, are all admissible in evidence, for the purpose of estab- 
 lishing the negligence of the defendant, but they are not 
 conclusive proof thereof.®® 
 
 B* Southern R. Co. v. Stewart, 108 111. App. 652. See, also, Con- 
 solidated Kansas City, etc., E. Co. v. Osborne, 66 Kan. 393; 71 Pac. 
 Kep. 838. 
 
 55 Ubelman v. American, etc., Co., 209 Pa. 398 ; 58 Atl. Rep. 849. 
 
 58 Galveston, etc., E. Co. v. Levy (Texas), 79 S. W. Rep. 879; 
 Mathieson v. Omaha, etc., R. Co, (Neb.), 97 N. W. Rep. 243, 
 104 
 
EVIDENCE IN EAILW AY " CASES. §89 
 
 In Illinois, it is held that the absence of a gate is 
 such a conclusive invitation to a traveler to cross a railroad 
 track, where an ordinance provides a gate shall be maintained, 
 that no contributory negligence of the traveler will prevent 
 the conclusion of negligence on the defendant's part,^'' but in 
 this State contributory negligence is no defense to ordinance 
 or statutory negligence — although the negligence of the 
 plaintiff is the direct cause of the injury — ^* and this rule 
 is not followed in Missouri, or many other States, but the 
 violation of an ordinance requiring a flagman,^® like that 
 requiring a warning by bell or whistle, would be only some 
 evidence of negligence on the defendant's part and if the 
 plaintiff's negligence, notwithstanding such negligence of the 
 defendant, was shown to have contributed to the injury, there 
 could be no recovery.®" 
 
 § 89. ^Proving assumed risk and contributory negligence. — 
 The burden of proof is on the defendant to establish the 
 special defenses of contributory negligence or assumed risk, 
 as the party holding the affirmative of any issue is always 
 bound to establish the facts upon which such issue depends."' 
 
 B7 Chicago, etc., B. Co. v. Schmitz, 211 111. 446; 71 N. B. Rep. 
 1050; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Wise, 206 111. 453; 69 N. E. Rep. 500. 
 
 BsRiverton, etc., Co. v. Shepard, 111 111. App. 294; 207 111. 395; 
 69 N. E. Rep. 921; Fulton v. Wilmington, etc., Co., 133 Fed. Rep. 193; 
 68 L. R. A. 168. 
 
 6» Montgomery v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 182 Mo. 495. 
 
 eoBriggs v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 188 Mass. 463; 74 N. E. Rep. 667; 
 Van Riper v. New York, etc., R. Co., 71 N. J. L. 345; 59 Atl. Rep. 26; 
 Watson V. Erie R. Co., 8 Ohio N. P. 18; 10 Ohio S. & C. P. 454j Stack 
 y. New York, etc., R. Co.', 89 N. Y. S. 112; 96 App. Div. 575. 
 
 oiNord V. Boston, etc., M. Co. (Mont.), 75 Pac. Rep. 681; Missouri, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Jones (Texas), 80 S. W. Rep. 852; Arenschield v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. Co., 128 Iowa 677; 105 N. W. Rep. 200. 
 
 Under a general allegation of contributory negligence, any evidence 
 is admissible going to show negligence on the plaintiflF's part. Bell v. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. (Texas), 81 S. W. Rep. 134. 
 
 105 
 
§ 90 ETIDENCE IN EAILWAY CASES. 
 
 This does not mean, however, that the defendant is always 
 required to offer evidence on his side of the case, for if the 
 defense of either assumed risk or contributory negligence is 
 established by the evidence of the plaintiff himself, the de- 
 fendant would be entitled to a direction of the verdict, for 
 the facts thus presented should not be ignored by the court, 
 although established by the evidence of the plaintiff him- 
 self.«2 
 
 § 90. Evidence of enforcement and reasonableness of rule. — 
 Before a rule of the railway company will constitute a de^ 
 fense to an action for personal injury received by an em- 
 ployee while violating such rule, it must generally be shown 
 that the rule was properly promulgated ; that it was enforced 
 and that it was a reasonable rule.®^ 
 
 Whether the rule is reasonable and intelligent or not, is 
 generally a question of law for the court, but the application 
 of the rule to the duty that was being performed by the em- 
 ployee at the time of his injury is a question of fact for 
 the jury.®* If it is shown that a reasonable rule, properly 
 promulgated and enforced, was being violated at the time 
 of the injury to the employee this will be held competent 
 evidence going to show the contributory negligence on the 
 part of the injured employee,"® but if the violation of the 
 rule did not occasion or was not connected with the injury, 
 or the violation of the rule was caused by an accident or un- 
 avoidable occurrence on his part, it would not constitute a 
 bar to a recovery by the employee.®® 
 
 62 Iowa G. M. Co. V. Diefenthaler, 76 Pac. Rep. 981; Bier v. Hosford, 
 35 Wash. 544; 77 Pac. Eep. 867; Epperson v. Postal Tel., etc., Co., 155 
 Mo. 372; Schlereth v. Railway Co., 96 Mo. 509. 
 
 63 Johnson v. Union Pac. Co., 76 Pac. Rep. 1089. 
 
 «*LeDuc V. Northern Pac. R. Co. (Minn.), 100 N. W. Rep. 108; 
 Francis v. Kansas City, etc., Ry. Co., 110 Mo. 387; 19 S. W. Rep. 935, 
 85Sehaub v. Hannibal, etc., Ry. Co., 106 Mo. 74. 
 66 Junction Co. v. Bnch, 111 111. App. 346, 
 
 106 
 
EVIDENCE IN RAILWAY CASES. § 91 
 
 § 91. What declarations admissible as part of res gestae. — 
 
 As a general rule to make acts or declarations admissible in 
 connection with the other evidence of a personal injury, al- 
 leged to be due to the negligence of the defendant, such acts 
 or declarations must be so intimately connected with the 
 transactions causing the injury that they have a tendency 
 to illustrate or explain it, as a part of the occurrence itself.®^ 
 If, instead of occurring contemporaneously with, or immedi- 
 
 Parol proof of a railroad's rules is incompetent. Cincinnati, etc., 
 R. Co. v., McMuUen, 117 Ind. 439; 20 N. E. Rep. 287; 38 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 165; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Lamothe, 76 Texas 219; 13 S. W. 
 Rep. 194; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Orr, 94 Ala. 602; 10 So. Rep. 167; 
 Sobieski v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 41 Minn. 169; 42 N. W. Rep. 863; 
 Price V. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 38 So. Car. 199 ; 17 N. E. Rep. 732. 
 
 The defendant's rules are admissible, although not pleaded. Galves- 
 ton, etc., R. Co. V. Fitzpatriek (Texas), 83 S. W. Rep. 406; Pierson v. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. (Iowa), 88 N. W. Rep. 505. 
 
 It is always competent to establish the promulgation of rules or 
 the fact that an employee's attention was called theretp. Huggins v. 
 Railway Co. (Ala.), 41 So. Rep. 856; Worcester v. Galveston, etc., R. 
 Co. (Texas), 91 S. W. Rep. 339. 
 
 The law presumes that all necessary rules were prescribed and the 
 plaintiff must rebut this legal presumption by proof of the necessity 
 for the rule relied upon. Hill v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 72 N. H. 518; 
 57 Atl. Rep. 924. 
 
 Before constant violation of a rule will amount to a, waiver by the 
 company, it must be shown that it had knowledge of such violation 
 by its employees. Wallace v. Boston, etc, R. Co., 72 N. H. 504; 57 
 Atl. Rep. 913. 
 
 Evidence that car repairers on the defendant's railroad when they 
 worked in a car or about it, did not place the flags required by a rule, 
 at one or both ends of such car, but that they only complied with such 
 rule when they -worked under the car, is not competent to show a 
 customary violation of the rule, with the knowledge of the defendant. 
 Canadian Pac. R. Co. v. Elliott, 137 Fed. Rep. 904. 
 ' 67 Williams v. Southern R. Co., 68 S. C. 369 ; 47 S. E. Rep. 706 ; 
 Redmond v. Metropolitan, etc., R. Co., 185 Mo. 1; 84 S. W. Rep. 26; 
 Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Miller, 120 Ga. 453; 47 S. B. Rep. 959; 
 Battis V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 124 Iowa 483; 103 N. W. Rep. 481; 
 Estes V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 110 Mo. App. 725; McHugh v. Transit 
 Co., 190 Mo. 85; 88 S. W. Rep. 853; Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. 
 gchpiidt, 163 Ind. 360; 71 N. E. Rep. 201. 
 
 107 
 
§ 91 EVIDENCE IN KAILWAY CASES. 
 
 ately following the accident, such acts or declarations are so 
 remote as to be more properly classed as mere narrations of 
 the completed event, they are not admissible, as a part of the 
 original transaction.®* It is held, in an action for injuries 
 due to a failure to follow proper train orders, that the orders 
 are admissible as part of the res gestae j ®® the declarations of 
 a child while being removed from under a car, were held ad- 
 missible,''** as were declarations or acts within five minutes,'* 
 or a longer time, if forming a part of the occurrence produc- 
 ing the injury.''^ But the remarks of a passenger to the 
 operatives of a train, about an injury which occurred while 
 it was in motion, after the train had stopped, are not admis- 
 sible as a part of the res gestce ; '^ nor are statements of the 
 extent of the injury received or the pain caused thereby ; '* 
 declarations made in response to direct questions, asked after 
 the completion of the injury ; ''^ or statements made at a time 
 or place reinoved from the scene of the injury,''® or made 
 under circumstances such as to indicate that they are in- 
 tended to be used as evidence,'''' for in all such cases the acts 
 
 68 Di Prteco v. Wilmington, etc., E. Co. (Del.), 57 Atl. Rep. ^06. 
 6» Wallace v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 72 N. H. 504; 57 Atl. Rep. 913. 
 
 70 Di Frisco v. Wilmington, etc., R. Co., 57 Atl. Rep. 906; Chicago, 
 etc., R. Co. V. White, 110 111. App. 23. 
 
 71 Leach v. Oregon, etc., R. Co., 29 Utah 285; 81 Pac. Rep. 90; 
 Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Jones, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 584; 80 S. W. Rep. 
 852. 
 
 72 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Willoughby (Texas), 81 S. W. Rep. 829. 
 
 73 Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Taylor, 164 Ind. 155; 72 N. E. Rep. 
 1045. 
 
 74Klingaman v. Fish, etc., Co. (S. D.), 102 N. W. Rep. 601. 
 
 75 Guild V. Pringle, 130 Fed. Rep. 419 ; Hot Springs, etc., E. Co. v. 
 Hildreth, 72 Ark. 572; 82 S. W. Rep. 245; White v. Southern R. Co., 
 123 Ga. 353; 51 S. E. Rep. 411; Boyd v. West Chicago R. Co., 112 111. 
 App. 50. 
 
 70 Redmond v. Metropolitan, etc., R. Co., 185 Mo. 1 ; 84 S. W. Rep. 26. 
 , 77 De Frisco v. Wilmington, etc., E. Co., 57 Atl. Rep. 906. 
 
 The declaration of the injured person, made at the moment of the 
 accident, that she alone was to blame, is competent, as part of th^ 
 10$ 
 
• EVIDENCE IN EAILWAT CASES. , § 92 
 
 or declarations cannot properly be said to be a part of the 
 original transaction. 
 
 § 92. Displaying injured member to jury. — The admissi- 
 bility of the injured member, by displaying it in evidence 
 
 res gestcB. DeMaley v. Morgen's, etc., R. Co., 45 L. Ann. 1329; 14 So. 
 Rep. 61; 58 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 448. 
 
 Under an allegation of an unsafe bridge to run trains over, the 
 speed of trains run over the bridge is held competent as part of the 
 res gestcB. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Pedigo, 108 Ind. 481; 8 N. E. 
 Rep. 627; 27 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 310. 
 
 The following acts and declarations have been held competent, as 
 part of the res gestce:. To show that defendant's engineer was intox- 
 icated at time of wreck, Hobson v. New Mexico, etc., R. Co. (Ariz.), 
 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 360; 11 Pac. Rep. 545; the rate of speed at 
 time of an injury, Taylor v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 83 Mo. 386; that no 
 signal was given at the backing of a car, Spotts v. Wabash, etc., R. Co., 
 Ill Mo. 380; 20 S. W. Rep. 190; statements of conductor a few moments 
 before a collision, Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Holland, 122 111. 461; 13 N. E. 
 Rep. 145; 30 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 590; what had been said by a pas- 
 senger as to his destination, Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Howard, 124 
 Ind. 280; 24 N. E. Rep. 892; the telegraphic correspondence between 
 train dispatcher and engineer, before a, collision, Deverson v. Eastern 
 R. Co., 58 N. H. 129 ; orders of brakeman for passenger to " hurry up," 
 while alighting, Waller v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 83 Mo. 608; admoni- 
 tions of other passengers to a boy about to jump from a moving train, 
 Hemminway v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., -72 Wis. 42; 37 N. W. Rep. 804; 
 33 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 511; 7 Am. St. Rep. 823; declarations of a 
 decedent as to cause of injury, made at time and place thereof, 
 Stoeekman v. Terre Haute, etc., R. Co., 15 Mo. App. 503; Gardner v. 
 Bennett, 6 J. & S. (N. Y.) 197; statements made by a brakeman, 
 at time of an assault, Marion v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 64 Iowa 568; 
 21 N. W. Rep. 86; Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Frazier, 93 Ala. 45; 9 
 So. Rep. 303; statements made by a civil engineer in repairing an 
 embankment, that it was not properly constructed, Brehm v. Great 
 Western R. Co., 34 Barb. (N". Y.) 256; declarations of defendant's 
 engineer, causing the injury, made at the time of injury, Hanover 
 R. Co. v. Coyle, 55 Pa. St. 396; Vicksburg, etc., R. Co. v. O'Brien, 
 119 U. S. 99; statement of the defendant's manager, as to cause of 
 disaster, Kragg v. Atlanta, etc., R. Co., 77 Ga. 202 ; 4 Am. St. Rep. 79 ; 
 what was said by employee when he fell, after fatal injury, Louisville, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Earl, 94 Ky. 368; 22 S. W. Rep. 607; that no complaints 
 
 109 
 
§ 92 , E.VIDENCE IN BAILWAY CASES. * 
 
 before the jury, is generally classified as demonstrative evi- 
 dence of the injury and in personal injury actions, such' tes- 
 timony is usually held to be competent. The better rule may 
 perhaps be said to be that such evidence is admitted, but is 
 
 were made of an alleged injury, at the time, to those present, Fuller v. 
 Jamestown, etc., R. Co., 75 Hun 273; 26 N. Y. Supp. 1078; the state- 
 ment by a passenger, immediately after an injury, that he was made 
 to alight from a moving train. International, etc., R. Co. v. Smith 
 (Texas), 14 S. W. Rep. 642; 44 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 324; an admission 
 of a foreman that he expected the injury to an employee, just after 
 it occurred, Elledge v. National City, etc., R. Co., 100 Cal. 282; 34 
 Pac. Rep. 720; statements of the engineer directly after a collision, 
 McLeod V. Ginther, 80 Ky. 399; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 162; Hooker 
 V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 76 Wis. 542; 44 N. W. Rep. 1085; 41 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 498; and statements of a traveler immediately after a 
 collision at a crossing, Quiney, etc., R. Co. v. Gnuse, 137 111. 264; 
 27 N. E. Rep. 190. , 
 
 But the following acts and declarations have been held to be in- 
 competent, as a part of the res gestce, viz: What an engineer had 
 said before an accident about his engine being defective, Louisville, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Stewart, 56 Fed. Rep. 808; or what brakemen said about 
 brakes on the cars, prior to an accident, Virginia, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Sayers, 26 Gratt (Va.) 328; details of how an injury had happened 
 by the injured party, after the accident, Johnston v. Oregon, etc., R. 
 Co., 23 Oregon 94; 31 Pac. Rep. 283; Sullivan v. Oregon, etc., R. Co., 
 12 Oregon, 392; 7 Pac. Rep. 508; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 391; Chicago, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Becker, 128 111. .545; 21 N. E. Rep. 524; what the 
 trainmen said right after the accident, Memphis, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Womack, 84 Ala. 149; 4 So. Rep. 618; 37 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 308; 
 Adams v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 74 Mo. 553; 7 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 414; Leahey v. Cas Avenue, etc., R. Co., 97 Mo. 165; 10 S. W. Rep. 58; 
 the declarations of a bystander, running to relief of injured person. 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Montgomery, 85 Texas 64; 19 S. W. Rep. 1015; 
 the self-serving acts or statements of injured person, made after the 
 •accident, Kennedy v. Rochester, etc., R. Co., 130 N. Y. 654; 29 N. E. 
 Rep. 141; Newsom v. Georgia R. Co., 66 Ga. 57; Lahey v. Ottman, 
 25 N. Y. Supp. 897; 56 N. Y. S. R. 109; 73 Hun 63; Whitaker v. 
 Eighth Ave., etc., R. Co., 51 N. Y. 295; Martin v. New York, etc., R. 
 Co., 103 N. Y. 626; 9 N. E. Rep. 505; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Johnson, 
 36 111. App. 564; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Crowder, 70 Texas 222; 7 S. 
 W. Rep. 709; declarations of employees as to cause of accident, after 
 it had occurred, St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Sweet, 57 Ark. 287; 21 S. W. 
 Rep. 587; Weideman v. Tacoma, etc., R. Co., 7 Wash. 517; 35 Pac. 
 110 
 
EVIDENCE IN RAILWAY CASES. . § 92 
 
 largely in the discretion of the court, for if the display of the 
 injured member would be obscene or indecent, it would not 
 be held to be a violation of the discretion of the court to re- 
 Rep. 414; San Antonio, etc., K. Co. v. Bobinson, 73 Texas 277; 11 
 S. W. Rep. 327; Curl v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 63 Iowa 417; 16 N. W. 
 Rep. 69; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 85; a statement of a coemployee as 
 to the cause of plaintiff's injury, made after the accident, Hellmuth v. 
 Katschke, 35 111. App. 21; Chicago, et6., R. Co. v. Becker, 128 111. 545; 
 a traveler's statement after a collision at a crossing, to his> driver, 
 McCabe v. Dry Dock, etc., R. Co., 15 Daly 504; 8 N. Y. Supp. 336; 
 28 N. Y. S. R. 879; what the conductor had said at the next station 
 after an accident, Central, etc., R. Co. v. Kelly, 58 Ga. 107; Alabama, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Hawk, 72 Ala. 112; 18 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 194; 47 
 Am. Rep. 403; declarations of injured person or employees made five 
 minutes after injury, Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Hammand, 93 Ala. 181; 
 9 So. Rep. 577; Durkee v. Central, etc., R. Co., 69 Cal. 533; 11 Pae. 
 Rep. 130; 58 Am. Rep. 562; statements of injured person or third 
 parties made from a half of an hour to an hour after injury, Chosa- ■ 
 peake, etc., R. Co. v. Reeves (Ky.), 11 S. W. Rep. 464; Vicksburg, 
 etc., R. Co. v. O'Brien, 119 U. S. 99; Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Wright, 
 80 Ind. 182; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 628; Savannah, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Holland, 82 Ga. 257; 10 S. E. Rep. 200; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 196; 
 Armil v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 70 Iowa 130; 30 N. W. Rep. 42; 28 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 467, or any statements made several days after 
 the injury occurred. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. State, 75 Md. 526; 
 24 Atl. Rep. 14; Macon, etc., R. Co. v. Johnson, 38 Ga. 409; Powell v. 
 Augusts^, etc., R. Co., 77 Ga. 192; 3 S. E. Rep. 757; Moore v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. Co., 59 Miss. 243; 9 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 401. 
 
 A statement of a manager of a railroad to a subordinate employee 
 the day after an injury, due to the negligence of a certain employee, 
 that such employee was incompetent, is not admissible in evidence, 
 in Rhode Island. Havens v. Rhode Island, etc., R. Co., 26 R. I. 48; 
 58 Atl. Rep. 247. 
 
 Upon the competency, of an inquiry by a section-man, as to the 
 cause of his injuries, upon recovery of consciousness, the Supreme 
 Court of Missouri, in the recent case of Hinzeman v. Missouri Pacific 
 Ry. Co. ( 199 Mo., p. 66 ) , said : " The office given that remark by 
 this court, was that it was competent, and potent as tending to show 
 Hinzeman had no knowledge or notice of the oncoming train. We 
 remain satisfied with the significance we attached to that remark. 
 It was made on the spot and in the presence of witnesses to the 
 transaction. His mind apparently took up the thread of his life 
 precisely at the point it was broken, when struck by the locomotive 
 
 111 
 
§ 92 , EVIDENCE IN BAILWAT CASES. 
 
 jeet such evidenca^^ If the injured member of the plain- 
 tiff's body could not be said to be of such part thereof as to 
 be improper to expose in public, then it is generally held to 
 be proper to permit the display of the injuries to the jury ''^ 
 and while such displays may be calculated to appeal to the 
 passions or emotions of the jury, it is a sufficient reply to 
 such objections that this is the primary or demonstrative evi- 
 dence of the injury — an essential element of the plaintiff's 
 case — and for this reason the evidence cannot be rejected, 
 for, as recently said by the Kentucky court : " Evidence of 
 this character is really the best evidence obtainable of the 
 extent and character of the injury that the person seeking 
 damages has sustained and the jury have the right to be 
 aided in making up their verdict by a personal view of the 
 , injured member." *" 
 
 and the first instinctive and spontaneous inquiry was, " What hit me? " 
 that meant he did not know. The exclamation was part of the res 
 gestcB and, therefore, was properly admitted and is lodged in the case 
 for what -it is worth." 
 
 See, also, on former appeal, Einzeman v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 
 182 Mo. 611; 81 S. W. Rep. 1134. 
 
 But the supposed statement of an engineer, on arriving at the next 
 station that he had " knocked a hoho " off the track, was held in- 
 competent, as part of the res gestce, in Frye v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 
 200 Mo. 377; 98 S. W. Rep. 566. 
 
 78 " It is competent for the plaintiff to exhibit the injured member 
 to the jury, and this he may do, upon the request of his counsel, or 
 of the adverse party — provided that the exhibition does not violate 
 any rule of propriety or decency. Whether it does so or not, is, of 
 course, a question that must be left largely in the discretion of the 
 trial judge." Ford v. Providence Co. (Ky.), 99 S. W. Rep. 611. 
 
 '9 Such as an amputated leg. Ante idem. 
 
 80 Newport, etc., R. Co. v. Carroll, 31 S. W. Rep. 132; 17 Ky. L. R. 
 374; Williams v. Nally, 20 Ky. L. R. 244; 45 S. W. Rep. 874; Ford v. 
 Providence Co., 99 S. W. Rep. 611. 
 
 The practice of permitting a physician to exhibit the injuries of 
 plaintiff to jury, is approved in the following cases: Citizens, etc., 
 R. Co. v. Willoby, 134 Ind. 563; 33 N. E. Rep. 627; 58 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 485; Cunningham v. Union Pacific R. Co., 4 Utah 206; 7 Pac. 
 
 112 
 
EVIDEOSrCE m RAILWAY CASES. § 93 
 
 § 93. Physical examination of plaintiff — When ordered. — 
 
 In many jurisdictions, in an action for damages for personal 
 injuries, "where the nature and extent of the injuries is an 
 issue in the cause, the plaintiff may be required by the eourt,- 
 upon the defendant's application, to submit to a surgical ex- 
 amination, to ascertain the character and extent of the in- 
 juries for which damages are claimed.*^ 
 
 Where the right to compel such an examination is recc^- 
 nized, the court would not be warranted in refusing the ex- 
 amination by a committee of representative and disinterested 
 physicians, merely because the plaintiff happened to be a 
 young lady of delicate and refined -feelings, as her right to 
 damages and the nature of her injuries were none the less 
 
 Kep. 795; Barker v. Perry, 67 Iowa 146; 25 N. W. Eep. 100; Malhado 
 V. Brooklyn, etc.; E. Co., 30 N. Y. 370. 
 
 A proper exhibition of an injured person's deformity was held com- 
 petent evidence in the following cases: Missouri, etc., E,. Co. v. 
 Moody (Texas), 79 S. W. Eep. 856; Minden v. Vedene (Neb.), 101 
 N. W. Kep. 330. 
 
 But a dramatic exhibition was held a ground for reversal, in 
 Nebraska, in Felach v. Babb, 101 N. W. Eep. 1011. 
 
 Amputated parts of the body were held competent to be admitted 
 in evidence, in California, in Anderson v. Seropian, 147 Gal. 201; 
 81 Pac. Eep. 521. It is also held competent to exhibit clothing worn 
 by the deceased, at time of his death, in Alabama. Northern Alabama 
 E. Co. V. Mansell, 138 Ala. 548; 36 So. Eep. 459. 
 
 But it is held to be reversible error, to send the jury out of the 
 presence of the court, to make a physical examination of the plaintiff, 
 in Fordyce v. Key, 74 Ark. 19; 84 S. W. Eep. 797. 
 
 It was held to be competent, in Missouri, to introduce clothing of 
 one who had been run over by a car. Senn v. Southern E. Co., 108 
 Mo. 142; 18 S. W. Kep. 1007. 
 
 81 Atchison, etc., E. Co. v. Thul, 29 Kansas 466; 44 Am. Eep. 659; 
 10 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 783; Lloyd v. Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 53 Mo. 
 515; Alabama, etc., E. Co. v. Hill, 90 Ala. 71; 8 So. Eep. 90; 44 
 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 441; Schroeder v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 47 Iowa 
 375; 14 Am. Ry. Eep. 359; White v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 61 Wis. 
 536; 21 N. W. Eep. 524; 50 Am. Eep, 154; 18 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 213; McNair v. Manhattan, etc., E. Co., 22 N. Y. S. E. 840; 51 Hun 
 644; 123 N. Y. 664; 34 N. Y. S. E. 1010. 
 
 1—8 113 
 
§ 93 EVIDENCE IN RAILWAY CASES. 
 
 an issue in the cause,' upon which the defendant was held en- 
 titled to some evidence.*^ 
 
 The United States Supreme Court holds ** that there is 
 no power on the part of the federal courts, on the application 
 of the defendant in advance of the trial, to order the plaintiff 
 to submit to a physical examination of his person, and it is 
 likewise held in many States that no such power exists, on 
 the part of the court, in the absence of a statute on the sub- 
 ject.** 
 
 In still other States the right to compel a physical exam- 
 ination of the injured person, is held to be a matter of sound 
 discretion, on the part of the trial court, which will not be 
 interfered with, in the absence of evidence of a clear abuse 
 of the discretion,*' and the selection of the experts to conduct 
 tbe examination is generally held to rest entirely within the 
 discretion of the trial judge, who is not required to yield 
 to the suggestions or wishes of either party to the cause.*® 
 
 82 Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Hill, 90 Ala. 71; 8 So. Rep. 90; 44 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 441. 
 
 83 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250; 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 1000; 47 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 406. 
 
 84 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Andrews, 50 Fed. Rep. 728; 53 Am. 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 523; Joliet.etc, R. Co. v. Call. 143 III. 177; 
 McQuigan v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 129 N. Y. 50; 29 N. E. Rep. 235; 
 41 N. Y. S. R. 382; 60 Hun 576; 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 490; Penn- 
 sylvania R. Co. V. Newmeyer, 129 Ind. 401; 28 N. E. Rep. 860; 52 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 454; Peoria, etc., R. Co. v. Rice, 46 111. App. 60; 
 144 111. 227; 33 N. E. Rep. 951; Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Norfleet, 78 Texas 
 321; 14 S. W. Rep. 703; 45 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 207; Chicago, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Holland, 122 111. 461; 13' N. E. Rep. 145; 30 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 590. See N. Y. Act, 1893, ch. 721. 
 
 85 Shepard v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 85 Mo. 629 ; 55 Am. Rep. 390 ; 
 Sidekum v. Wabash R. Co., 93 Mo. 400; 4 S. W. Rep. 701; 30 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 640; Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Childress, 82 Ga. 719; 
 9 S. B. Rep. 602; 3 L. R. A. 808; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 216; Terre 
 Haute, etc., R. Co. v. Brunker, 128 Ind. 542; 26 N. E. Rep. 178. 
 
 88 Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Hill, 93 Ala. 514; 9 So. Rep. 722. 
 "The Supreme Court of Utah has in a carefully considered opinion 
 aligned itself with those courts which deny their power in a personal 
 114 
 
EvrDENCE IN RAILWAY CASES. § 9^: 
 
 § 94. Evidence of subsequent repairs inadmissible. — As the 
 burden rests upon the plaintiff, of establishing, by a pre- 
 ponderance of the evidence, the negligence of the defendant, 
 as the proximate cause of the injury to him, this burden is 
 
 injury case to order the plaintiff to submit to a physical examination 
 by disinterested .physicians. Larson v. Salt Lake City, 97 Pac. Eep. 
 483. In this course the court is following the lead of well-reasoned 
 recent cases upon a question wherein there is a considerable amount 
 of conflict. The court finds n» weight in the suggestion that the 
 power is essential to the administration of justice in order to prevent 
 fraud, an argument advanced in 3 Wigmore on Evidence, p. 3020; 
 Railway Co. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 258, in the dissenting opinion of 
 Brewer and Brown, JJ.; and in the earliest case before a court of 
 last resort upholding the power, Schroeder v. Chicago, etc., K. Co., 
 47 Iowa 375, decided in 1877. 
 
 Such arguments, says the Utah court, ' may all be cogent reasons 
 and appropriate addresses to be considered by legislative bodies why 
 courts ought to have such a power and why it ought to be exercised 
 by them; but they are very far from pointing out anything which in 
 anywise tends to show from what source such a, power is derived, 
 or by what authority it may be lawfully exercised. It is readily 
 conceded that the ' end of litigation is justice, and that knowledge 
 of the truth is essential thereto,' and that courts are organized ' to 
 establish and enforce equal and exact justice ' between the litigants. 
 Such plastic phrases and pointless truisms, however, do not argue 
 anjfthing nor elucidate oil answer the point of inquiry.' The powers 
 of courts are not measured by their own opixiion of what will promote 
 justice, but by the constitution and statutes of the State along with 
 the common law. In none of these sources is found a power to 
 compel the plaintiff to submit to a physical examination in advance of 
 the trial. 
 
 The court intimates, however, that when at the trial the plaintiff 
 has testified in his own behalf he. may, as a part of his cross-examina- 
 tion and as a part of his testimony, be required at the defendant's 
 request to exhibit hia injuries to the jury, when the exhibition is free 
 from indecency. Further, 'though the plaintiff does not take the 
 stand, but evidence has been given in ,his behalf concerning his in- 
 juries, he may nevertheless be called by either party in a proper case 
 to exhibit the injured parts as corroborating or affecting the testimony 
 which has been given concerning the injuries.' We doubt whether 
 these dicta, though elaborated at some length, are reconcilable with 
 the reasoning which lies at the basis of the actual decision." — Law 
 Notes, December 1908. 
 
 115 
 
§ 94 evid:6nce in bailway cases. 
 
 not discharged by evidence which does not show a negligent 
 condition to have existed at the time of the injury and it 
 manifestly can have no bearing upon this issue what course 
 the defendant may have pursued subsequent thereto, in the 
 way of repairing the place or appliance causing the injury. 
 Such repairs would not, in any way, go to prove that the 
 place or appliance was not reasonably safe, at the time of 
 the injury, for a reasonably safe place or appliance can be 
 repaired as well as a dangerous place and the fact that the 
 repairs would change the condition that existed at the time 
 of the injury, after such changed condition, could throw 
 no light upon the condition then existing and such evidence 
 could only operate to punish the employer for his care or 
 vigilance for the protection of his employees, before the 
 trial jury, without in any way meeting the issue for the court 
 to decide, hence, such evidence is very generally -held to be 
 incompetent.*^ Notwithstanding the general rule, however, 
 the United States Supreme Court, in a recent case, held that 
 it was not error, in the trial of an action for the death of a 
 trainman, killed by coming in contact with a water spout, al- 
 leged to have been located too near the track, to permit the 
 plaintiff to show that, after the death the spout was con- 
 structed at a greater distance from the track, where the trial 
 court charged that such incompetent evidence was only re- 
 ceived for the purpose of testing the correctness of the meas- 
 urements of the defendant, offered to establish that the spout 
 was not originally located dangerously near the track.®* The 
 
 sTGlang V. Alabama, etc., Co., 141 Ala. 537; 37 So. Eep. 784; 
 Stevens v. Boston, etc., E. Co., 184 Mass. 476; 69 N. E. Rep. 338; 
 Wager v. Lamont, 135 Mich. 521; 98 N. W. Rep. 1; Bailey v. Kansas 
 City, 189 Mo. 503; 87 S. W. Eep. 1182; Russell v. New York, etc., 
 R. Co., 89 N. y. S. 429; 96 App. Div. 151; Southern R. Co. v. Simpson, 
 131 Fed. Rep. 705; 65 C. C. A. 563; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Arnold 
 (Texas), 87 S. W. Rep. 173. 
 
 88 Choctaw, Oklahoma & Gulf Ry. Co. v. McDade, 191 tJ. S. 64; 48 
 L. Ed. 96. 
 
 116 
 
EVIDENCE IN KAlLWAY CASES. § 94 
 
 prejudicial nature of ttis evidence is readily to be appre- 
 ciated and notwithstanding the eminent authority for the 
 admission of such testimony, it is doubtful if such incom- 
 petent and prejudicial evidence should be admitted, because 
 offered for an alleged legitimate reason. Good reasons can 
 always be given for the admission of incompetent evidence. 
 
 The same eminent tribunal which rendered the decision in the 
 McDade ease, supra, in Columbia, etc., R. Co. v. Hawthorne (144 U. S. 
 202), used this language: "It is now settled, upon much considera- 
 tion, by the decisions of the highest courts of most of the States, in 
 which the question has arisen, that the evidence is incompetent, 
 because the taking of such precautions against the future is not to 
 be construed as an admission of responsibility for the past, has no 
 legitimate tendency, to prove that the defendant had been negligent 
 before the accident happened, and is calculated to distract the minds 
 of the jury from the real issue and to create a prejudice against the 
 defendant." If such effect was to be given to this character of proof 
 in this case, it is difficult to see why it should not have been given" 
 the same incompetent evidence in the McDade case. The court, in 
 the Columbia, etc., E. Co., case cites the following cases, viz.,- Morse 
 V. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co., 30 Minn. 465; Ely v. St. Louis, etc., R. 
 Co., 77 Mo. 34; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Hennesey, 75 Texas 155; Terre 
 Haute, etc., E. Co. v. Clem, 123 Ind. 15; Shinners v. Prop. Locks, 
 etc., Co., 154 Mass. 168; 12 L. R. A. 554. 
 
 Proof of increased precautions or subsequent repairs was held com- 
 petent in the following cases: To show that a, street crossing was 
 repaired, Shaber v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 28 Minn. 103; 9 N. W. Rep. 
 575; 2 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 185; that a sharp curve had been altered, 
 Augusta, etc., R. Co. v. Renz, 55 Ga. 126; abandonment of a danger- 
 ous-car. Crane v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 87 Mo. 588; 25 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 440; employment of additional men, Harvey v. New York, etc., 
 E. Co., 19 Hun (N. Y.) 556; repair of .station platform, Bateman v. 
 New York, etc., R. Co., 47 Hun 429; 14 N. Y. S. R. 454; removal of a 
 rotten platform, Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Henderson, 51 Pa. St. 315; 
 removal of track to a greater distance from obstruction. West Chester, 
 etc., R. Co. V. McElwee, 67 Pa. St. 311, or increase in size of a water- 
 way, St. Louis, etc., E. Co. v. Weaver, 35 Kansas 412; 11 Pac. Rep. 
 408; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 341. But see, contra, Columbia, etc., E. 
 Co. V. Hawthorne, 144 U. S. 202; subsequent repairs of a gate, ^oods 
 V. Missouri, etc., R. Co., ,51 Mo. App. 500, and the subsequent repair 
 of an appliance an employee was required to use. Atchison, etc., R. 
 Co. V. McKee, 37 Kansas 592; 15 Pac. Rep. 484. 
 
 Additional precautions or repairs was held to be incompetent, in 
 
 117 
 
I 95 EVIDENCE IX RAILWAY CASES. 
 
 § 95, Prior or subsequent negl^nt acts or conditions. — 
 Where the evidence shows that the conditions have not heen 
 changed or altered since a given state or condition was shown 
 to exist, then evidence of prior conditions is competent, as 
 going to show the condition at the time of an injury,*® but 
 the condition or altered state of a place or appliance caus- 
 ing an injury, subsequent to the date of such injmy is very 
 generally held to be incompetent to be shown.®" The rea- 
 son for this rule is manifest, for the plaintiff is bound to 
 show a negligent condition at the time of his injury, and the 
 condition at a subsequent period would be wholly irrelevant 
 to the issue upon which the liability would depend. 
 
 the following cases: Subsequent repairs, generally not admissible, 
 Cleveland, etc., E. Co. ▼. Doerr, 41 111. App. 530; Gulf, etc., K. Co. v. 
 Compton, 75 Texas 667; 13 S. W. Rep. 667; 44 Am. 4 Eng. R. Cas. 
 637; Atchison, etc., K. Co. v. Parker, 55 Fed. Rep. 595; Columbia, etc., 
 R. Co. y. Hawthorne, 144 U. S. 202; Morse v. Minneapolis, etc., R. 
 Co., 30 Minn. 465; 16 N. W. Rep. 358; Shinners v. Prop. Locks & 
 Canals, 154 Mass. 168; 28 N. E. Rep. 10; Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Clem, 123 Ind. 15; 23 N. E. Rep. 965; 42 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 229; 
 7 L. R. A. 588; held, not admissible to show different construction of 
 bridge, when rebuilt, Isaacs v. Southern Pac. E. Co., 49 -Fed. Rep. 797 ; 
 to show repair of railroad track, Jacques v. Bridgeport, etc., B. Co., 
 41 Conn. 61; Hipsley v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 88 Mo. 348; 27 Am. 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 287; Sidekum v. Wabash R. Co., 93 Mo. 400; 30 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 640; Mahaney v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 108 Mo. 
 191; 18 S. W. Rep. 995; Dougan v. Champlain Tr. Co., 56 N. Y. 1; 
 Fordyee v. Chancy, 2 Texas Civ. App. 24; 21 S. W, Rep. 181; Knapp 
 V. Sionx Ciiy, etc., R. Co., 71 Iowa 41; 32 N. W. Rep. 18; removal of 
 a building, near the track, Thompson v. Toledo, etc., R. Co., 91 Mich. 
 255; 51 N. W. Rep. 995; the replacement of a wooden bridge by an 
 iron one. Dale v. Delaware, etc., E. Co., 73 X. Y. 468,- or the spreading 
 of ashes or cinders over ice formed on a station platform. Simpson 
 V. Manhattan, etc., R. Co., 17 N. Y. S. E. 68; 1 X. Y. Supp. 673. 
 
 89 Johnson v. Union Pac. Co. (Utah), 76 Pac. Rep. 1089; Brazil 
 Coal Co. V. Gibson, 66 N. E. Eep. 882 ; Revolinsky v. Adams Coal Co., 
 95 N. W. Rep. 122. 
 
 sodbble V. Kansas City, 148 Mo. 470; 50 S. W. Rep. 84; Meyers v. 
 Highland Boy G. M. Co., 77 Pac. Rep. 743. 
 
 118 
 
EVIDENCE IN RAILWAY CASES. § 95 
 
 Where the defense is contributorj negligence on the plain- 
 tiff's part, it is held competent to show prior negligent acts 
 on his part, as this is held competent as affecting his conduct 
 at the time of the injury, for it is not always to be said that 
 one who is customarily negligent is to be considered only 
 careful when injured and such injury is shown as a basis for 
 a liability by which another can be made to respond in dam- 
 ages.®^ One or two negligent acts, however, would not 
 throw light upon the conduct of the party at another time, 
 unless connected therewith in some way and it is never com- 
 petent to establish a negligent reputation in such cases, by 
 mere general repute or opinion evidence.®* 
 
 01 International & G. N. R. Co. v. Penn (Texas), 79 S. W.,Rep. 624; 
 Coleman v. Mechanics Iron Co., 2 Am. Neg. Kep. 374. 
 
 ozGoble V. Kansas City, 1^8 Mo. 470 j 50 S. W. Eep. 84. 
 
 In discussing the question of the admissibility of evidence of prior 
 negligent acts or injuries, Judge Goode, in the recent case of Cal- 
 oaterra v. lovaldi, (100 S. W. Eep. 676), used the following language 
 and authorities: 
 
 " Evidence th'at a defect in a sidewalk, street, machinery, or appliance 
 which is alleged to have caused an injury in suit had caused injuries 
 to other persons before is held by some courts to be competent, while 
 others hold the contrary, as will be seen by comparing the following 
 authorities: Dist. of Columbia v. Arms, 107 U. S. 519, 2 Sup. Ct. 840, 
 27 L. Ed. 618; McCarragher v. Rogers, 120 N. Y. 526, 24 N. E. 812; 
 Morse V. Railroad, 30 Minn. 465, 16 N. W. 358; Hanrahan v. Railroad, 
 6 N. Y. Supp. 395, 53 Hun 420; Larkin v. O'Neill, 48 Hun 591, 1 N. Y. 
 Supp. 232; PachecQ v. Mfg. Co., 113 Cal. 541, 45 Pac. 833; Rowland v. 
 Railroad, 115 Cal. 487, 47 Pac. Rep. 225; Rumpel v. Railroad, 35 Pac. 
 700, 22 L. R. A. 725, 4 Idaho 13; Pittsburg, etc., R. R. v. Ruby, 38 Ind. 
 294, 10 Am. Rep. Ill; Dalton v. Railroad, 114 Iowa 257, 86 N. W. 
 Rep. 272; Robinson v. Railroad, 7 Gray (Mass.) 92; Maguire v. 
 Railroad, 115 Mass. 239; Southern Kan. R. R. v. Robbins, 43 Kan. 145, 
 23 Pac. 113; Shearman & Redfield, Negligence (5 ed.), § 50b, and 
 note 2; 1 Wigmore, Evidence, § 199, and note 1. In this State' the 
 admissibility of previous accidents at a defective place in a sidewalk 
 was oondered in Goble v. Kansas City, 148 Mo. 470, 50 S. W. Rep. 84, 
 and such evidence ruled to be inadmissible, in effect overruling Golden 
 V. Cliuton, 54 Mo. App. 100. In the opinion in the Goble case the 
 Supreme Court noticed the- conflict in the decisions, and said the 
 
 119 
 
§ 96 EVIDENCE IN BAIL WAY CASES. 
 
 § 96. Same — Photographs of the place or appliance caus- 
 ing injnry. — The courts generally admit accurate photo- 
 graphs of the place or appliance causing an injury, upon 
 
 weight of authority was that such evidence should be excluded as 
 tending to divert the minds of the jury from the question to be 
 decided to collateral issues, create a prejudice in their miads against 
 the defendant, and surprise him with an issue the pleadings did not 
 present. Those, in substance, are the grounds on which text-writers 
 state that such testimony is held inadmissible in most jurisdictions." 
 1 Greenleaf, Evidence (16 ed.), § 14a. The competency of a collateral 
 fact in a given case turns, as we have said, on whether or not the 
 court deems its bearing on the main issue to be so intimate and 
 valuable that the objections to collateral evidence may be disregarded. 
 Obviously there will often be a diversity of views on such a matter. 
 Hence the conflict in the opinions dealing with the subject. Likely 
 proof of a negligent custom is admissible as tending to show negligence 
 in an alleged instance of the custom. 1 Wigmore, Evidence, § 97; 
 Brunke v. Telephone Co., 115 Mo. App. 36, 90 S. W. Kep. 753. 
 
 Judge Thompson, in his work on Negligence (Thompson, Neg., vol. 6, 
 § 7870, p. 764), states the rule as follows: 
 
 " But in such cases the evidence will be received only where it is 
 clear that the condition of the place or appliance has not changed 
 meanwhile." 
 
 See The Edwin, 87 Fed. Rep. 540; Powers v. K. R., 175 Mass. 466; 
 56 N. E. Rep. 710; Jones v. R. R., 20 R. I. 210; see also Columbia & 
 Puget Sound R. R. Co. v. Hawthorne, 144 U. S. 202 ; 36 L. Ed. 405. 
 
 Where the evidence shows that conditions have not changed after 
 an injury, up to the time the evidence of the subsequent condition 
 refers to, it is held that such evidence is admissible, in. the following 
 cases, in order to show what the condition was at the time of the 
 accident. Jackson, etc., Co. v. Cunningham, 141 Ala. 206; 37 So. Rep. 
 445; Logan v. Metropolitan R. Co., 183 Mo. 582; 82 S. W. Rep. 126; 
 Norton v. Kramer, 180 Mo. 536; 79 S. W. Rep. 699. 
 
 Evidence of condition of track after an accident, without some 
 showing that the condition had not been changed, is error. Culver 
 V. South Haven, etc., R. Co., 144 Mich. 254; 107 N. W. Rep. 908; 
 109 N. W. Rep. 256. 
 
 Proof of the method adopted at a station to stop a train, at the 
 first stop after an injury at same station, was held error, in Michigan. 
 Moon V. Pere Marquette R.Co., 143 Mich. 125, 136; 106 N. W. Rep. 715. 
 
 It is held competent, in Georgia, that after a homicide, the engines 
 of the defendant were run more slowly than before the death. Savan- 
 nah, etc., R. Co. V. Flannaghan, 82 Ga. 579; 9 S. E. Rep. 471; 39 Am 
 120 
 
BVIDEIirCE IN BAILWAY CASES. § 96 
 
 evidence that the same are true likenesses of the conditions 
 exposed to the camera and as the same conditions cannot al- 
 ways be had at the time of the photographs and the time an 
 accident occurred, with the evidence of the altered condi- 
 tion before it, the court will generally admit the photograph 
 in evidence, although the "conditions are different from those 
 existing when the injury happened, where such changed con- 
 ditions are also shown. In a well-considered California 
 case,®* an employee was killed by the fall of a derrick and a 
 photograph of the appliance was made from an exposure had 
 a few days after the injury to the deceased; at the time of 
 the photegraph the workmen were engaged in repairing the 
 appliance and the place, but this fact, shown by the evidence 
 was not held to affect the admissibility of the photograph 
 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 661. But see, contra, Baird v. Daly, 68 N. Y. 547; 
 Nalley v. Hartford Co., 51 Conn. 524; 50 Am. Kep. 47. 
 
 Where there is evidence that grass and weeds obscured a switch, 
 it was held, in Texas, that it was competent for the defendant to 
 show, in rebuttal, that the morning after the injury, ■ no grass or 
 weeds were apparent and there was no evidence of any fresh cut 
 grass or weeds. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. v. Arnold, 87 S. W. Rep. 173. 
 
 osDyas v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 73 Pac. Rep. 972. 
 
 Without proper verification of the model or photograph, it is not 
 admissible. Stone v. Lewiston, etc., R. Co., 99 Me. 243; 59 Atl. Rep. 
 56; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Cross, 113 111. App. 547; Houston, etc.,. 
 R. Co. V. Cluck (Texas), 84 S. W. Rep. 852. 
 
 If capable of verbal description, a photograph of the place is held 
 not to be admissible, in New York, in Cirello v. Metropolitan, etc., Co., 
 88 N. Y. S. 932. 
 
 It must be shown that there has been no change in the condition 
 after the accident and before the photograph is taken^ Maynard v. 
 Oregon, etc., R. Co. (Or.), 78 Pac. Rep. 983; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Cross, 214 111.. 602; 73 N. E. Rep. 865. 
 
 A court in Maine condemns the practice of admitting photographs 
 of people in assumed positions. Babb v. Oxford, etc., Co., 59 Atl. Rep. 
 290. 
 
 But photographs of a decedent whose death is caused by a wrongful 
 act, taken just before and just after the injury, were held admissible, 
 in North Carolina. Davis v. Seaboard, etc., R. Co., 136 N. C. 115; 
 48 S. E. Rep. 891. 
 
 121 
 
§ 97 EVIDENCE IN EAILWAY CASES. 
 
 in evidence, as showing the true conditions, in other respects, 
 at the time of the injury. 
 
 § 97. Evidence of prior accidents incompetent — When. — 
 
 The liability of the employer or carrier, depending upon 
 • the existence of a negligent condition, causing the injury to 
 the plaintiff, it is no proof that such condition existed, to^ 
 establish that similar accidents had occurred before, for in- 
 juries may result from other causes than the defendant's neg- 
 ligence, and hence, it is very generally held that proof of 
 prior accidents at the same place, or with the same appliance, 
 is incompetent.®* ' 
 
 And for the reason that a negligent place or appliance may 
 be used for a long time, by the exercise of a high degree of 
 care, without accident, it is likewise incompetent for the de- 
 fendant to attempt to establish due care as to a given place 
 or appliance, by proof that same had been used for a long 
 time, without resulting accidents.'® 
 
 But although evidence of other accidents is generally held 
 incompetent to show a negligent condition, where the proof 
 shows that the condition has existed for a long time, it is 
 sometimes held competent to show other accidents for the 
 purpose of showing constructive notice of the condition, to 
 the defendant ®® and, in Kentucky, it is held that proof of 
 other accidents, is competent to show a negligent condition 
 that ought to have been known by the defendant.®^ 
 
 »4Gustafson v. Young, 86 N. Y. S. 851; 91 App. Div. 433; Cohen v. 
 Hamblin, etc., Co., 186 Mass. 544; 71 N. E. Ecp. 948; Mueller v. 
 "Northwestern, etc., Co.,. 125 Wis. 326; 104 N. W. Rep. 67; Roche v. 
 Llewellen Iron Co., 140 Cal. 563; 74 Pac. Rep. 147. 
 
 95 Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. Vallowe, 214 lU. 124; 73 N. E. -Rep. 416; 
 Kelly V. Parker- Washington Co., 107 Mo. App. 490; *81 S. W. Rep. 631; 
 Neweomb v. New York, etc., R. Co., 182 Mo. 687; 81 S. W. Rep. 631. 
 
 96 Nelson v. Union, etc., R. Co., 25 R. I. 251; 58 Atl. Rep. 780; 
 Whittelsey v. Burlington, etc., R. Co., 121 Iowa 597; 90 N. W. Rep. 
 516. , 
 
 97 Yates V. Covington, 83 S. W. Rep. 592. 
 
 122 
 
EVIDENCE IK RAILWAY CASES. §'98 
 
 § 98. Expert testimony — What is. — An expert has been 
 defined to be " one possessing, in regard to a particular sub- 
 ject or department of human activity, knowledge not ae- 
 
 Evidence of other similar accidents were held admissible in the 
 following cases: Of other injuries from the same appliance, caused 
 by the same defect, Morse v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co., 30 Minn. 465; 
 16 N. W. Rep. 358; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 168; Clapp v. Minneapolis, 
 etc., R. Co., 36 Minn, 6; 29 N. W. Rep. 340; Dye v. Delaware, etc.,^R. 
 Co., 130 N. Y. 671; 29 N. E. Rep. 320; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 28B; 
 to show that other trains were ditched on the same track, within a 
 period of a few weeks prior to the injury complained of, Mobile, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Ashcraft, 48 Ala. 15; evidence that other passengers aside 
 from the plaintiff, had met with similar injuries on a defective station 
 platform, Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Neiswanger, 41 Kan. 621; 21 Pac. 
 Rep. 582; 39 Am. & Eng. R. ,Cas. 471; or a defective ear step, Hanra- 
 han V. Manhattan, etc., R. Co., 24 N. Y. S. ~R. 790; 53 Hun 420; 130 
 N. Y. 658; 29 JST. E. Rep. 1033; Chase v. Jamestown, etc.,-R. Co., 
 15 N. Y. S. 35; to show similar injuries to other travelers, at a 
 defective crossing, Birmingham, etc., R. Co. v. Alexander, 93 Ala. 133 ; 
 9 So. Rep.- 525; Wooley v. Grand St., etc., R. Co., 83 N. Y. 121; 3 Am. 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 398; that other children had been similarly injured on 
 defendant's turntable. Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Evansick, 63 Texas 54, and 
 that other employees had received siinilar injuries from the same 
 defective bridge, Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Wright, 115 Ind. 378; 16 
 N. E. Rep. 145; 38 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 41. 
 
 But evidegace of other similar accidents were held incompetent, in 
 the following cases: To show other injuries from the same place 
 or appliance, Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Wynant, 114 Ind. 525; 17 N. E. 
 Rep. 118; 35 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 328; Early v. Lake Shore, etc., R. 
 Co., 66 Mich. 449; 33 N. W. Rep. 813; 30 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 16^; 
 other injuries after that to the plaintiff, Johnson v. Manhattan, etc., 
 R. Co., 52 Hun 111; evidence of other similar injuries to other pas- 
 sengers, Davis V. Oregon, etc., R. Co., 8 Oregon 172; that other trains 
 had broken in two, Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Schmetzer (Ky.), 22 S. 
 W. Rep. 603; that other travelers T)n the same crossing had been 
 injured by failure to ring the bell or sound the whittle, Menard v. 
 Boston,- etc., R. Co., 150 Mass. 386; 32 N. E. Rep. 214; other injuries 
 on turntable, not shown to have been brought to attention of the 
 defendant, Bridger v. Ashville, etc., R. Co., 27 So. Car. 456; 3 S. E. 
 Rep. 860, or other injuries from the chipping of other hammers, not 
 shown to have been of the same metal, as none of these accidents would 
 be material or competent for any purpose, as against the defendant, 
 Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. Nelms, 83 Ga. 70; 9 S. E. Rep. 1049; 39 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 355; 29 Cent. L. J. '352. 
 
 123 
 
§ 98 EVIDENCE IN EAILWAY CASES. 
 
 quired by ordinary persons." ** An expert is elsewhere said 
 to be one " who can see all sides of a' subject." ®® His knowl- 
 edge may be derived either from experience or from study 
 and direct mental application and, in either case, if he is 
 possessed of more than the average knowledge on the subject 
 upon which he qualifies, he will be classed as an expert. 
 
 Such persons, shown to possess technical or peculiar knowl- 
 edge on the subject undergoing investigation, are generally 
 allowed to give their opinions whenever the question or issue 
 is such as the jurors would be unable to correctly decide, 
 without the aid of such opinions.^ If the subject is one of 
 common experience and observation, about which the jury 
 would know as much as any other man, then opinion evidence 
 cannot be introduced and it is generally held to be incompe- 
 tent to give opinions upon the issues in a case before a court, 
 regardless of the common or uncommon nature of the issue, 
 unless the question at issue is one of science or skill, for 
 otherwise the opinion evidence would encroach directly upon 
 the province of the jury and amount to a complete usurpa- 
 tion of their functions.^ 
 
 »8 12 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law (2 ed.), p. 422. 
 
 88 Ford V. Providence, etc., Co. (Ky.), 99 S. W. Rep. 611. 
 
 1 Ford V. Providence Co., supra, 12 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 440; 
 Louisville, etc., Co. v. Hart, 92 S. W. Rep. 951; Claxton's Admr. v. 
 Lexington, etc., R. Co., 13 Bush. 636. 
 
 2 Ford V. Providence, etc., Co., 99 S. W. Rep. 611. 
 
 " That which is within the common knowledge of mankind is not 
 the proper subject of expert testimony." State v. Dusenberry, 112 
 Mo. 278. See, also, State v. Foley, 144 Mo. 600; 6 Thompson Neg., §§ 
 7747-7748 and cases cited; JohnSon v. Coal Co., 76 Pac. Rep. 1089; 
 Luman V. Golden Ancient Channel Min. Co., 74 Pac. Rep. 30. 
 
 In Haviland v. Railway Company (172 Mo. 115), the plaintiff 
 claimed to have strained his back in carrying a steel rail, which was 
 shown to weigh about 600 pounds ; it was contended that the defendant 
 should have provided more men to carry it and upon the safety of 
 carrying it with the force of men provided, the plaintiff introduced 
 expert testimony to establish that such a force could not safely carry 
 such a weight. The trial court afterwards struck out this pretended 
 124 
 
EVIDENCE IN EAILWAY CASES. § 99 
 
 § 99. Customs and opinions as to relative methods. — Upon 
 the issue of what ordinarily prudent men in the Same business 
 do in a given case for .the protection of their employees, it 
 is held proper to show the custom in force among ordinarily 
 
 expert evidence and upon this action, the Supreme Court of Missouri, 
 speaking through Marshall, J., said: 
 
 " This is the expert testimony that the court struck out. And is 
 it surprising that the court did so? Is any court obliged to believe 
 any such absurd testimony, or to allow any such manifest nonsense to 
 go to the jury? Is it not an insult to common intelligence to be asked 
 to believe that a section-hand can only lift thirty-seven and a half 
 pounds? Or that such a section-hand can only push a seventy-five 
 pound weight up a greased incline plane of about forty degrees? 
 
 " It is too obvious for debate that such testimony shows conclu- 
 sively that the witness was not an expert or else that he was playing 
 upon the credulity or gullibility of the jury. The court properly 
 struck out such testimony." Haviland v. Railroad Co., 172 Mo., p. 115. 
 See, also. Central Ey. Co. v. Goodwin, 120 Ga. 83; 1 Am. & Bng. Ann. 
 Cas., p. 806. 
 
 The following matters have been held incompetent as opinion evidence, 
 i. e., What the witness would have done, under like circumstances, 
 Denver, etc., R. Co. v. Vitello (Colo.), 81 Pac. Rep. 766; what was the 
 cause of a derailment of a train, Schultz v. Union, etc., E. Co., 181 N. Y. 
 33; 73 N. E. Rep. 491; whether a passenger could safely stand on a 
 foot board of a car, Allen v. Transit Co., 183 Mo. 141; 81 S. W. Rep. 
 1142; whether the alignment of a track would be disturbed by the drag- 
 ging of a car, Cronk v. Wabash R. Co., 123 Iowa 349 ; 98 N. W. Rep. 
 884, or whether the method employed was reasonably safe, or the 
 appliances in a proper condition. Johnson v. Union Pac. Co., 28 
 Utah 46; 76 Pac. Rep. 1089; Coe v. Van Why, 33 Colo. 315; 80 Pac. 
 Rep. 894. 
 
 The following subjects have been held the proper subject of expert 
 opinion, vie., the speed of trains, International, etc., R. Co. v. McGhee 
 (Texas), 81 S. W. Itep. 804; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Bundy, 210 111. 
 39; 71 N. E. Rep. 28; the sufficiency of a force employed to do the 
 work delegated, Dell v. McGrath, 92 Minn. 187 ; 99 N. W. Rep. 629 ; the 
 time required to stop a train, where familiarity with the grade and 
 methods is shown, Meng v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 108 Mo. App. 553; 
 84 S. W. Rep. 213; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Kapp (Texas), 83 S. W. 
 Rep. 233; the relative safety of blocked and unblocked switch frogs. 
 Sehroeder v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 128 Iowa, 365; 103 N. W. Rep. 
 985; how switch points should be placed, Buckalew v. Chicago, etc., 
 R. Co., 107 Mo. App. 575; 81 S. W. Rep. 1176, or the necessity and 
 
 125 
 
§ 99 EVIDENCE tn EA.ILWAY CASES. 
 
 prudent men in the same business/ for this throws some 
 light upon tbe issue whether or not the defendant has used 
 due care in the premises. But to make such evidence com- 
 petent it must appear that the custom is a general custom, 
 as distinguished from a usage of one or more employers and 
 it should also be shown that the' custom was in force among 
 employers of usual care or prudence, for otherwise the evi- 
 dence of a custom among men/ pf known careless methods or 
 exceedingly careful practices would throw no light at all 
 upon this issue.* ' 
 
 Evidence, by alleged experts of the relative safety, in their 
 opinions, between different methods or customs, is always 
 incompetent, for the reason that this encroaches upon the 
 province, of the jury and asks of such witnesses the decision 
 of the very issue for the jury to determine.^ The proper 
 
 manner of placing tell-tales over a bridge, Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Lamphere, 137 Fed. Rep. 20. 
 
 3 Illinois Central R. Co. v. Prickett, 210 111. 140; 109 111. App. 468-; 
 71 N. E. Rep. 435; Bohn v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 106 Mo. 429; Ander- 
 son V. Fielding (Minn), 99 N. W. Rep. 357; Hamilton v. Mendqta Co. 
 (Iowa), 94 N. W. Rep. 282; Koons v. R. R. Co., 65 Mo. 592; Greenwell 
 V. Crow, 73 Mo. 638; Grand Trunk Co. v. Richardson, 91 U. S. 454; 23 
 L. Ed. 357. 
 
 iDolan V. Boot, etc.. Mills, 185 Mass. 576; 70 N. E. Rep. 1025; 
 Gamel v. Monfort (Texas), 81 S. W. Rep. 1029; Marks v. Harriett 
 Mills, 135 N. C. 287; 47 S. E. Rep. 432. 
 
 B Nash V. Downing, 93 Mo. App. 156 ; Johnson v. Union Pac. Co. 
 (Utah), 76 Pac. Rep. 1089; Avery v. Dordyke, etc., Co., 70 N. E.'Rep. 
 888; but see, Kaminski v. Tudor Iron Works, 167 Mo. 462. 
 
 The Missouri Appellate Court admitted comparison of methods in 
 moving a heavy piece of machinery in Fogus v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 
 50 Mo. App. 250. 
 
 Proof of custom has been held competent in the following cases: 
 To show that old rails were generally placed in side tracks; Doyle v. 
 St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 42 Minn. 79; 43 N. W. Rep. 787; 41 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 376; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Carpenter, 56 Fed. Rep. 451; the 
 custom as to locking turntables; Bridger v. Ashville, etc., R. Co., 
 27 So. Car. 456; 3 S. E. Rep. 860; 13 Am. St. Rep. 653; where trains 
 are usually stopped; McGee v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 92 Mo. 208; 4 S. 
 
 126 
 
EVIDENCE IN KAILWAY CASES. § 100 
 
 determination of the issue of negligence depends upon facts, 
 not conclusions, or opinions wliich of themselves solve such 
 issue. 
 
 § 100. Opinions of medical experts as to permanency of in- 
 juries. — As it is impossible to get any better evidence than 
 
 W. Rep. 739; 31 Am. & Eng. E. Gas. 1; that passengers were carried on 
 freight trains; McGee v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 92 Mo. ^08; that 
 telegrams by engineers were not always reduced to writing; Deverson 
 V. Eastern, etc., R. Co., 58 »N. H. 129; that a railroad station was 
 usually lighted, Wentworth v. Eastern, etc., E. Co., 143 Mass. 248; 9 
 N. E. Rep. 563, and that it was not customary for a given road to 
 inspect ears coming from a given direction, at a certain place. Coffee 
 V. New York, etc., R. Co., 155 Mass. 21; 28 N. E. Rep. 1128-; 48 Am. 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 370. 
 
 Evidence of a given custom was held incompetent in the following 
 cases: To show the average length of trains at a, given season of the 
 year; Newsom v. Georgia, etc., R. Co., 62 6a. 339; to establish the 
 usual way roadbeds are constructed; Gieorgia Pac. R. Co. v. Dooley, 
 86 Ga. 294; 12 S. E. Rep. 923; 48 Am. & Eng. Cas.. 437; the usual 
 way a street or highway is crossed by trains; Gahagan v. Boston, 
 etc., R. Co. (Mass.), 1 Allen 187; the method pursued by a conductor 
 in taking up tickets; Marshall v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 145 Mass. 164; 
 13 N. E. Rep. 385; 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 18; Johnson v. Concord, etc., 
 R. Co., 46 N. H. 213, or that railroads always required stock shippers 
 to release them frbm liability for being carried free. Missouri Pac. 
 R. Co." V. Eagin, 72 Texas,' 127; 9 S. W. Rep. 749; 2 L. R. A. 75. 
 
 Regardless of the custom of other roads, the charge of negligence re- 
 mains a question for the jury, so it is error to instruct that it is 
 negligence for defendant to run its trains backwards, without a watch- 
 man thereon, although this is shown not to be the general custom of 
 railroads, as it is the province of the jury to say whether or not the 
 defendant's conduct was negligence, regardless of the conduct of other 
 roads. Rickard v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 141 Fed. Rep. 90?; 73 C. C. A. 
 139. 
 
 An employee cannot state that it was his custom to always, examine 
 bridges and culverts on the road. Central, etc., R. Co. v. Kant, 84 Ga. 
 351; 10 S. E. Rep. 965? 
 
 Evidence of the customary way of coupling and uncoupling cars at 
 a switch is held incompetent, in Illinois. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Clark 
 108 111. 113; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 261. 
 
 A witness familiar with different appliances in use on railroads 
 
 127 
 
§ 100 EVIDENCE IN RAILWAY CASES. 
 
 the opinions of medical experts upon the probable duration 
 or permanency of an injury, since the cause cannot be held 
 open, indefinitely, for time and the processes of nature to 
 develop such fact, it is generally held to be competent for a 
 physician to give his opinion as to the extent or permanency 
 of the injury and the future effects upon the injured per- 
 
 was permitted to state the relative safety of diflFerent appliances but 
 not the superiority of those of one road over that of another. Norfolk 
 & W. R. Co. V. Bell (Va.), 52 S. E. Rep. 700. 
 
 Evidence that an inspection of a tender was of the kind and character 
 in use on other roads in the country and that the inspector knew 
 that his son would go out on the engine, is relevant. Hoover v. 
 Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (Texas), 89 S. W. Kep. 1084. 
 
 Evidence of custom of brakemen is admissible to show that the 
 plaintiff, a brakeman, was not negligent. International, etc., R. Co. 
 V. Penn (Texas), 79 S. W. Rep. 624. 
 
 It is error, in a suit by a section man, injured while near the rail- 
 road track, to permit his coemployees to testify that they relied 
 upon the defendant's custom to ring the bell or blow the whistle, as a 
 warning to them. Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Gesswine, 144 Fed. Rep. 
 56. 
 
 Evidence of the existence of a custom of a railway company to 
 notify regular trains of the location of work trains, is admissible, as 
 the custom would be regarded as an incident of the business and 
 have the force and effect of a rule. Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Hays (Texas), 
 89 S. W. Rep. 29. 
 
 Upon the issue of a necessity for blocking rails in a switch yard, 
 evidence of a general custom as to use of blocking in similar yards 
 is admissible, but evidence of what one or two railroads did, was im- 
 proper. Lee V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 195 Mo. 400; 92 S. W. Rep. 614. 
 
 In the following cases, it is held competent to show conditions and 
 methods used by other employers: Alabama, etc., R. Co., v. Overstreet, 
 85 Miss. 78; 37 So. Rep. 819; Bodie v. Charleston, etc., R. Co., 66 S. C. 
 302; 44 S. E. Rep. 943; Schroeder v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 128 Iowa 
 365; 103 N. W. Rep. 985. 
 
 Evidence of the custom of other roads, as to inspection of engines 
 and cars, must be limited to those where reasonably safe methods are 
 used. Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Prickett, 210 111. 140; 71 N. E. Rep. 435. 
 
 Evidence that blocked switch frogs were commonly used safety devices 
 was held competent, in Iowa, in Schroeder v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 103 
 N. W. Rep. 985. 
 
 Evidence that other railroads put old rails in side tracks is im- 
 material. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Kinnare, 115 111. App. 132. 
 128 
 
EVIDENCE IN RAILWAY CASES. "§ 100 
 
 son.'' It is held, in Alabama, that it is also competent to 
 ask the medical expert what will be the probable effects of 
 the injury, if any, upon other organs of the body '' and it is 
 quite generally held to be competent for the physician to 
 state whether or not, in his opinion, 'the injury could have 
 been caused by the accident, or what could have caused it.* 
 
 Medical experts, however, as such, are not permitted to 
 give their opinions about other matters than those requiring 
 medical skill or knowledge, unless they also qualify as to 
 such other matters,^ nor are they qualified to enter the realm 
 of speculation and give their opinions in response to ques- 
 tions calling for speculative evidence, such as whether or not 
 the injury would be likely to produce some other condition, 
 not then existing, for the reason that verdicts cannot be based 
 upon speculations of medical experts any more than upon 
 similar incompetent evidence of other experts, and physicians, 
 like other experts, are confined to legitimate facts, as the 
 basis of their opinions.^" 
 
 "In an action for injuries to a railroad brakeman while riding on 
 the pilot of the engine of his train, evidence that it was the custom of 
 defendant's employees to ride on the pilots of defendant's engines while 
 engaged in switching in the yards was admissible, without proof that 
 defendant had knowledge thereof. Atchison, T. & S. F^ Ey. Co. v. 
 Sowers, (Tex. Civ. App.) 99 S. W. Rep. 190. 
 
 «St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Rea (Xexas), 87 S. W. Rep. 324; Norfolk 
 & Western E. Co. v. Spratley, 103 Va. 379 1 49 S. E. Rep. 502 ; Kansas 
 City, etc., R. Co. v. Butler (Ala.), 38 So. Rep. 1024. 
 
 7 Southern E. Co. v. Bonner, 141 Ala. 517 ; 37 So. Rep. 702. See, also, 
 Faber v. Reiss, etc., Co., 124 Wis. 554; 102 N. W. Rep. 1049. 
 
 8 Wood v. Metropolitan, etc., R. Co., 181 Mo. 433; 81 S. W. Rep. 152; 
 Redmond v. Metropolitan, etc., R. Co., 185 Mo. 1; 84 S. W. Rep. 26; 
 Illinois Central R. Co. v. Smith, 111 111. App. 177; Birmingham, etc., 
 R. Co. v. Enslen (Ala.), 39 So. Rep. 74. 
 
 9 Knights Templars, etc., Co. v. Crayton, 209 111. 550; 70 N. E. Rep. 
 1P66. 
 
 10 Higgins v. Traction Co., 89 N. Y. S. 76 ; 96 App. Div. 69. 
 
 A physician can state the condition of an injured person, both 
 before and after the injury and the future effects thereof. Gulf, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Harriett, 80 Texas 73; 15 S. W. Rep. 556; Powell v. Augusta, 
 1—9 • 139 
 
§ lOr EVIDEisrCJi IN KAiLWA-i!- CASeS. 
 
 § 101. Same — Opinions based wholly oil history of case 
 by plaintiff incompetent. — While it is competent for a med- 
 ical expert to give his opinion as to the nature, extent and 
 permanency of the plaintifi's injuries, and he is permitted 
 to base that opinion in part upon the history of the case, 
 as he receives it from the injured person, as well as present 
 exclamations or acts and declarations, showing pain, in con- 
 nection with the objective symptoms present,^^ it is very 
 generally held incompetent to permit a medical expert to 
 base his opinion entirely upon the history of the case as given 
 him by the plaintiff, or on what he has learned wholly from 
 the plaintiff, in the absence of objective evidences or symp- 
 toms of the injury, for this is basing his opinion wholly upon 
 the self-serving declarations of the witness and would be 
 making of him a mere medium for the introduction of other- 
 wise incompetent hearsay testimony. ^^ 
 
 etc., R. Co., 77 Ga. 192; 3 S. E. Rep. 757; Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Yarbaugh, 83 Ala. 238; 3 So. Rep. 447; Stevens v. Central R. Co., 
 80 Ga. 19; 5 8. E. Rep. 253; 34 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 413; Griffith v. 
 Utica, etc., R. Co., 43 N. Y. S. R. 835; 137 N. Y. 506; Heddles v. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co., 77 Wis. 228; 46 N. W. Rep. 115. 
 
 "Taylor v. Railroad, 185 Mo. 255; Holloway v. Kansas City, 184 
 Mo. 35; 39; Williams v. Great Northern R. Co., 68 Minn. 55; Stone v. 
 Railroad, 88.Wis. 98 ; People v. Murphy, 101 N. Y. 126 ; Heald v. Thing, 
 45 Me. 395; Railroad v. Shires, 108 111. 630; Davidson v. Cornell, 1.32 
 N. Y. 238; Robb v. Hackler, 23 Wend. 50; Reed v. Railroad, 45 N. Y. 
 574; Thayer's Cas. Evid. (2 ed.), p. 593; Greenl. Evid. (16 ed.), §§ 
 162a, 162b. 
 
 12 In People v. Murphy (101 N. Y. 126), a physician called aa an 
 expert was permitted to give his opinion as to the physical condition of 
 a woman then upon trial for crime, based upon what he had observed of 
 her case and upon her narrative of the facts and it was held error. The 
 court said: 
 
 " The opinion of the expert that a crime had been committed founded 
 upon the narrative of the woman of previous facts, which narrative was 
 in itself, inadmissible, and remained undisclosed, was given to the jury. 
 Necessarily it carried with it damaging inferences of what that narra- 
 tive of facts was, and drove the accused to the alternative of omitting 
 all cross-examination as to the concealed basis of the opinion or admit- 
 ting inadmissible and incompetent evidence." 
 130 
 
EVIDENCE IN RAILWAY CASES. § 102 
 
 § 102. Running of trains — Train sheets and time cards as 
 evidence of. — Where the time at which a particular train 
 passed a given station or the customary time for the running 
 of a given train, is in issue in a personal injury action, it is 
 competent to establish the train time, either by someone 
 who saw the train, and knows the facts, or by the properly 
 authenticated or verified records of the company, as to the 
 running of its trains. 
 
 And the Supreme Court of Maine held similar expert testimony in- 
 admissible, and in a well-considered case (Heald v. Thing, 45 Me. 
 395), in considering the reasons why sucli evidence was improper, the 
 court said: 
 
 " In this case, while it is admitted that the declarations above re- 
 ferred to were -properly excluded, it is strenuously contended that an 
 opinion based wholly upon them (for the witness was permitted to give 
 his opinion based upon his own examination and observation), should 
 go to the jury as competent evidence, upon which they would be author- 
 ized to act, upon the ground that the witness, being a person of skill, 
 is authorized to determine the proper sources, in connection with his 
 personal examination, from which to derive those opinions. The propo- 
 sition contains two fundamental errors: First, it makes the witness 
 decide the question of the competency of evidence, thus putting him in 
 the place of the court. Next, while it excludes the declaration as in- 
 competent testimony to go to the jury, it receives, as competent evi- 
 dence, the opinion based upon that incompetent testimony, thus attempt- 
 ing to elevate the stream above the fountain; to make a corrupt tree 
 bring forth good fruit." 
 
 And in Davidson v. Cornell (132 N. Y. 238), the court also said, as 
 to such medical testimony, based on incompetent testimony: 
 
 " In the present case, the declarations in question, of plaintiff, were 
 not instinctive, nor were they made to the physician with a view to 
 medical treatment. They consisted, not of exclamations of present pain 
 or suffering, but were the plaintiff's statements, so far as called for, by 
 the doctor, of the effect upon him of the injury and the consequences 
 which had followed in such respects from the time it occurred, a period 
 of nearly fifteen months. This was hearsay, and is very different from 
 that of a medical witness as to the expressions by a patient, or person, 
 suffering from injury or disease, indicating pain or distress, or ex- 
 pressive of the present state of his feelings in that respect. We think 
 the reception of the evidence was error. And although the plaintiff 
 testified to the truth of the statements made to the doctor, his evidence 
 did not cure ^he error. The character of his injuries was an im- 
 
 131 
 
§ 103 EVIDENCE IN EAILWAY CASES. 
 
 In a recent case, in Texas, -where a section man was 
 killed while removing a push car from a track, by being 
 struck by a regular train, it was permitted his widow to tes- 
 tify to the regular schedule time for the train to pass and 
 also that h second train which usually passed the same place 
 was late.^^ Train sheets, shown to have been made from 
 the train dispatcher's records, are competent evidence of the 
 running of a given train, at a stated time,^* and public time 
 cards, issued for general circulation, have been held compe- 
 tent to show the regular running of trains,'® but the better 
 rule is that such time tables are only representations to the 
 public of the running of its trains,'® by a railroad company 
 and as they are'' subject to constant change and alteration and 
 trains are not frequently run in accordance with public time 
 cards, they are, at best, but poor evidence of the running of 
 a given train ''^ and should not be admitted where better evi- 
 dence of the running of the train can be had. 
 
 § 103. Keports of railway company's employees. — In an 
 
 portant fact, bearing upon the question of damages, and although his 
 evidence may have constituted the basis in part, at least, of a hypotheti- 
 cal question, for the opinion of the doctor, it cannot be said that the 
 evidence given by the latter of the plaintiff's declarations, were not 
 prejudicial to the defendant.'' 
 
 13 International, etc., R. Co. v. McVey, 81 s! W. Eep. 991. 
 
 1* Donovan v. Boston, etc., E. Co., 158 Mass. 450; 33 N. E. Eep. 583. 
 
 15 Grimes v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 36 Fed. Rep. 72; Gonzales v. New 
 York, etc., R. Co., 39 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 407; Sears v. Eastern, etc., R. 
 Co., 14 Allen (Mass.) 433; Denton v. Great Northern R. Co., 5 El. & Bl. 
 800; 25 L. J. Q. B. 129. 
 
 lOBriggs V. Grand Trunk R. Co., 24 U. C. Q. B. 510; Beauchamp v. 
 International & G. N. R. Co., 56 Texas 239; 9 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 307. 
 
 ii" Denver, etc., R. Co. v. Pickard, 8 Colo. 163; 18 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 284; 6 Pae. Rep. 149; Price v. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 38 So. Car. 
 199; 17 S. E. Rep. 732. 
 
 The time tables and train sheets used on the day of the injury to an 
 engineer, were held competent to show the running of the defendant's 
 trains, on that day, <in North Carolina. Stewart v. Raleigh, etc., Air 
 Line R. Co., 53 S. E. Rep. 877. 
 
 132 
 
EVIDENCE IN RAILWAY CASES. § 104 
 
 action for an injury, from a collision between two engines, in 
 Missouri, it was held that the rejTort by an agent of the de- 
 fendant company, to the division superintendent, was admis- 
 sible in evidence, where it appeared that such reports were 
 customary, after similar accidents, for the purpose of show- 
 ing that at the time of the collision, the engineer of one of 
 the engines permitted it to be run by other than an employee 
 of the company, who was incompetent and unable to manage 
 it, thereby causing the collision.-'* 
 
 But in an action by an employee for injuries deceived 
 while in the service of a railroad company, a report that he 
 may have made, giving the facts and details of the accident 
 and how his injury was caused, is not admissible in his fa- 
 vor, for this would be permitting him to introduce, in his 
 favor, a self-serving declaration of his own.-'** 
 
 § 104. Speed of trains. — When properly in issue in a 
 given case, it is generally held competent to establish the 
 speed of trains by any one familiar therewith, whether ex- 
 perts or not.^" 
 
 Both as regards the negligence of the defendant and the 
 contributory negligence of the plaintiff, the question of the 
 speed of a given train is often material to be shown. To 
 ascertain the speed of a train, it is not only competent to 
 
 18 O'Hare v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 95 Mo. 662 ; 9 S. W. Rep. 23. 
 
 18 Howard v. Savannah, etc., R. Co., 84 Ga. 711; 11 S. E. Rep. 452. 
 
 20 Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v.-Webb, 97 Ala. 157; 11 So. Rep. 888; 
 Hoffman v. Metropolitan, etc., R. Co., 51 Mo. App. 273; Louisville, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Hendricks, 128 Ind. 462; 28 N. E. Rep. 58; Detroit, etc., R. 
 Co. V. Van Steiberg, 17 MichJQd; Thomas v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 86 
 Mich. 496; 49 N. W. Rep. 547; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Dillon, 123 111. 
 570; 32 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 1; Evansville, etc., R. Co. v. Crist, 116 Ind. 
 446; 19 N. E. Rep, 310; Van Horn v. Burlington, etc., R. Co., 59 Iowa, 
 33; 12 N. W. Rep. 752; 7 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 591; Pence v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. Co., 79 lo-wa 389 ; 44 N. W. Rep. 686 ; 42 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 126; Walsh v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 102 Mo. 582; 14 S. W. Rep. 873; 
 Ward V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 85 Wis. 601; 55 N. W. Rep. 771. 
 
 133 
 
§ 105 EVIDENCE IN KAILWAY CASES. 
 
 offer the opinions of witnesses familiar therewith, but also 
 the schedule time of a train over its entire run may be 
 shown; ^^ the distance and time consumed by a round trip 
 of the train ^^ or the time made just before or after a given 
 place was passed/* as bearing upon the rate of speed made 
 at such place. 
 
 Eut evidence of the speed of other trains than that in is- 
 sue,** or the speed of the same train at other places where 
 the conditions were different*^ or opinions of the speed of a 
 given train, reached by comparisons with other trains,^^ is 
 generally held incompetent, as would be the distance within 
 which a given train was stopped, where the witness did not 
 show a knowledge of the speed of the train.*'' 
 
 § 105. Mortality tables competent when. — In an action 
 for damages for wrongful death, or where loss of earning 
 capacity is set up as one of the elements of damage and the 
 claim is made of compensation for permanent injury, it is 
 material to determine the life expectancy of the decedent 
 or injured person and for this purpose standard tables of 
 mortality are generally held competent evidence.** 
 
 21 Nutter V. Boston, etc., R. Co., 60 N. H. 483. 
 
 22 Central E. Co. v. Allman, 147 111. 471; 35 N. E. Rep. 725. 
 
 23 Lyman v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (N. H.), 20 Atl. Rep. 976; 45 Am. & 
 Eng. R.'Cas. 163 ; Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Kutac, 76 Texas 473 ; 13 8. 
 W. Rep. 327; 37 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 470; Savannah, etc., R. Co. v. Flan- 
 nagan, 82 Ga. 579; 9 S. E. Rep. 471; 39 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 661; 
 Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Selby, 47 Ind. 471 ; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Spiker, 
 134 Ind. 380; 33 N. E. Rep. 280; 55 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 200. 
 
 2iMeloy V. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (Iowa), 37 N. W. Rep. 335; 33 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 358. 
 
 25 State V. Boston, etc., R. Co., 58 N. H. 410; Craven v. Central Pac. 
 R. Co., 72 Cal. 345; Shaber v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 28 Minn. 103. 
 
 ze Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co. v. Huntley, 38 Mich. 537. 
 
 27 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Marriott (Ky.), 19 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 509. 
 
 28 Tables of mortality are admissible in evidence, but are not abso- 
 lute guides to the jury. Vicksburg, etc., R. Co. v. Putnam, 118 y. S, 
 
 134 
 
EVIDENCE IN EAILWAY CASES. § 106 
 
 In England, it has been held, that in a case where the 
 life expectancy of a person is in issue, it is competent to 
 establish by a skilled insurance agent, familiar with differ- 
 ent life tables, the probable duration of the life in question,^® 
 but the witness would have to show a familiarity with the 
 subject, the same as any other expert, before he wpuld be 
 qualified to state his opinion thereon, and if his experience 
 was not sufficient to enable him to be classed as an expert, his 
 opinion would ijot be competent.^" 
 
 § 106. When negative evidence is admissible. — From 
 the very nature of the two kinds of proof, positive evidence 
 is entitled to more weight than evidence of a negative char- 
 acter,*^ but this is rather a question of the weight of such 
 testimony, than one of admissibility, for where persons are 
 
 545; 27 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 291; St.. Louis, etc., K. Co. v. Vickers, 122 U. 
 S. 360; Mary, etc., R. Co. v. Chambliss, 97 Ala. 171; 11 So. Rep. 897; 
 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 254; Diesen v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 43 Minn., 
 454; 45 N. W. Rep. 864. 
 
 The Carlisle Tables, in the Encyclopaedia, are admissible. Hayden v. 
 Sioux City, etc., E. Co. (Iowa), 48 N. W. Eep. 733; Northeastern, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Chandler, 84 Ga. 37; 10 S. E. Rep. 586; Scheffler v. Minneapi- 
 olis, etc., R. Co., 32 Minn. 518; 21 N. W. Rep. 711; 19 Am. & Eng. E. 
 Cas. 173 ; Scagel v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 83 Iowa 380 ; 49 N. W. Eep. 
 990. 
 
 And so are the American Tables of Mortality. Richmond, etc., R. 
 Co. V. Hissong, 97 Ala. 187; 13 So. 'Rep. 209; or similar tables, 
 adopted by legislative act. Denman v. Johnson, 85 Mich. 387; 48 N, W. 
 Rep. 565; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v.' Miller (Ind.); 37 N. E. Rep. 343; 58 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 304. 
 
 29 Rowley v. London, etc., R. Co., 42 L. J. Ex. 153; 29 L. T. 180;^ 
 Phillipps V. London, etc., R. Co., 27 W. R. 797; 40 L. T. 813. 
 
 so Donaldson v. Mississippi, etc., R. Co., 18 Iowa 280. 
 
 Courts will take judicial notice of the American Tables of Mortality, 
 in estimating the probable length of human life. Louisville, etc., R. 
 Go. V. Mothershed, 97 Ala. 261 ; 12 So. Rep. 714. 
 
 SI Vail V. Jacobs, 62 Mo. 130; Sullivan v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 72 
 Mo. 195; Cathart v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 19 Mo. App. 113; Smith v. 
 Wabash, etc., R, Co., 19 Mo, App. 120, 
 
 135 
 
§ 106 EVIDENCE IN BAILWAY OASES. 
 
 SO situated as to have heard certain sounds, or to have seen 
 certain things, the evidence of those persons that they did not 
 see or hear such things is entitled to be received along with 
 the positive evidence of those v?ho did see or hear the same.^* 
 Of course the opportunity to see or hear, the distance re- 
 moved from the scene of action and other facts and circum- 
 stances may more or less affect or destroy the weight of such 
 negative evidence,*^ and if the distanpe.of a witness is so 
 far removed from the scene or noise described that he could 
 not see or hear what others described, then the negative state- 
 ment that he did not hear or see the same, would be inad- 
 missible as any evidence at all.^* But while the positive 
 evidence of witnesses of equal credibility is entitled to more 
 weight than the mere negative statements of others wlfo did 
 not see or hear the things testified to,^'' it is not always proper 
 to give a charge to the jury that afiSrmative proof is entitled 
 to the greater weight, for this depends upon the interest and 
 character of the different witnesses, their opportunity for 
 knowing the facts and so many other circumstances that the 
 charge should not overlook.^" 
 
 Negative evidence that bell or whistle was not heard by witnesses 
 in a position to have heard it, is generally admissible. McDonald v. 
 New York, etc., R. Co., 186 Mass. 474; 72 N. E. Rep. 55; Chicago, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Pulliam, 111 111. App. 305. 
 
 82 Statements of a plaintiff's neighbors that he did not make any 
 complaint over an alleged injury are competent. Barrett v. Pennsyl- 
 vania R. Co., 4 N. Y. S. 127; 21 N. Y. S. R. 109; 121 N. Y. 697; 
 Kummer v. Christopher, etc., R. Co., 46 N. Y. S. R. 386; 20 N. Y. S. 
 116. 
 
 88 Culhane v. New York, etc., R. Co., 50 N. Y. 133; Cathcart v. Hanni- 
 bal, etc., R. Co., 19 Mo. App. 113; Bigelow v. Metropolitan, etc., R. Co., 
 48 Mo. App. 367. 
 
 3* Chapman v. New York, etc., R. Co., 14 Hun (N. Y.) 484; Fox v. 
 Penninsular, etc., Co., 92 Mich. 243; 52 N. W. Rep. 623. 
 
 30 Isaacs v. Strainka, 95 Mo. 517; 8 S. W. Rep. 427. 
 
 30 State, ex rel. Essex v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 70 Mo. App. 634; 
 McCormick v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 50 Mo. App. lOD, 
 
 13^ 
 
EVIDENCE IK KAILWAY CASES. § § 107, 108 
 
 § 107. Evidence of settlement MTith other employees in- 
 competent. — The plaintiff's . right of recovery depending 
 upon his ability to show that his injury resulted from the 
 negligence of the defendant, it is apparent that the fact that 
 his employer may have compromised or settled with other 
 employees, hurt in the same accident, cannot be a fact in aUy 
 way germane to the plaintiff's case, yet this proposition has 
 been passed on by -a Texas court and in ^an action where a fire- 
 man claimed that his injury resulted from the negligence of 
 the engineer in failing to keep a constant lookout ahead to dis- 
 cover the presence of obstructions on the track, it was held 
 to be incompetent to show that the company had settled with 
 the engineer for injuries growing out of the same accident.^^ 
 
 § 108. Evidence of employer's insurance incompetent. — It 
 is not generally held to be competent to show that the em- 
 ployer is defending the action of an employee for personal 
 injuries, through the intervention of an insurance company, 
 as this* could not affect the right of the plaintiff to recover, 
 or establish the ground upon which a recovery would depend, 
 but could only result in prejudice on the part of the jury 
 against the defendant, by the proof of a fact in no way con- 
 nected with the case.** In a New York case the mere ask- 
 ing of a question, by plaintiff's counsel, of a physician for 
 the defendant, if he was not paid for his services by an in- 
 surance company, was held to constitute reversible error, al- 
 though the question was excluded as incompetent, it being 
 held that such question was calculated to prejudice the case of 
 the defendant, by an incompetent and outside matter and 
 
 3T Missouri, etc., E. Co. v. Keaveney, 80 S. W. Rep. 387. 
 
 38 Roche V. Llewellyn Iron Works, 140 Cal. 563; 74 Pac. Rep. 147; 
 Sawyer v. Arnold, 90 Me. 369; 38 Atl. Rep. 333; Anderson v. Duck- 
 worth, 162 Mass. 251 ; Barrett v. Bonham Oil Co. (Texas), 57 S. W. Rep. 
 602; Lipschulzv, Ross, 84 N. Y. S. 632. 
 
 137 
 
§ 109 EVIDENCE IN RAILWAY CASES. 
 
 that a verdict obtained by such methods could not be allowed 
 to stand.*® 
 
 § 109. Evidence must correspond with pleading. — In per- 
 sonal injury actions, the rule is strictly enforced that the 
 
 38 Manigold v. Black River Co., 84 N. Y. S. 861 ; 81 App. Div. 381. 
 But see, Hedlum v. Holy Terror Min. Co. (S. D.), 92 N. W. Rep. 31; 
 Burgess v. Stowe (Mich.),' 96 N. W. Rep. 29. 
 
 Upon the various devices and practices resorted to by damage suit 
 litigants, to avoid this rule and to take advantage of the known preju- 
 dice of trial juries against corporations and insurance, companies in 
 particular, the following contributed article from Law Notes, for May, 
 1908 (pages 28 and 29), may be read with some interest. 
 
 " A great deal of ingenuity has sometimes been exercised by counsel 
 in actions by servants against masters to recover damages for personal 
 injuries, to get before the jury the fact that the master in the particular 
 case is protected by employer's liability insurance and will not be 
 obliged to pay the damages which may be assessed against him. The 
 courta-have, of course, uniformily held that the fact that the defendant 
 in such an action is insured cannot be, considered by the jury in con- 
 nection with the question of the defendant's negligence. The argument 
 that a master who is insured is not so likely to exercise care to protect 
 his servants from injury as a master who is not insured has never been 
 recognized as a sufficient reason for admitting evidence of the fact of 
 insurance. See the note to Coe v. Van Why (Colo.), 3 A. & E. Ann. 
 Cas. 525. 
 
 It is difficult to conceive how the courts could have reached any other 
 conclusion. This is a specious argument at the best, and besides it is 
 probable that the companies who issue this class of insurance are suf- 
 ficiently alive to their own interests to see to it that the employers 
 whom they insure do not neglect the precautions which are generally 
 recognized as necessary for the protection of their employees from 
 accident. 
 
 A very ingenious way of so conducting a cross examination of a 
 witness fqr the defense as to make the defendant's insurance against 
 liability to employees admissible in evidence is illustrated in the case 
 of Shoemaker v. Bryant Lumber, etc., Co., 27 Wash. 637. At the trial 
 .of this case a witness for the defendant was asked if he was not an 
 officer of the defendant company. He answered that he was and that 
 he owned about one-tenth of the capital stock of the company. The 
 witness was then asked if he would have to pay his proportion of any 
 judgment which might be rendered against the company. The answer 
 138 
 
EVIDENCE IN RAILWAY CASES. § 109 
 
 proof must correspond with the negligence alleged, and if 
 there is a material varience between the pleading and the 
 proof, the defendant will be protected, if timely objection is 
 urged. Different methods of taking advantage of such vari- 
 ence is provided in different States, but the practice in this 
 regard will not be noted here. An allegation of negligence 
 
 was that he would. He was then asked : " Would- your company have 
 to pay it ? " His answer was, " Yes, sir." Thereupon the following 
 question was asked : " Is it not a fact that, if judgment is recovered 
 against this company, some other company will have to pay this Judg- 
 ment? " The trial court allowed the question to be asked, and the 
 ruling was sustained on appeal, on the ground that the interest of the 
 witness, as affecting his credibility, was material to go to the jury. 
 ' The question objected to went directly to the credibility of the wit- 
 ness. He had already said that, if a judgment was obtained against 
 the defendant, he would have to pay his proportion of it. This showed 
 that he had a financial interest in the case. If Jie should answer the 
 question in the negative, the evidence of interest, as affecting credibility, 
 would be for the jury to consider. If he should answer in the affirma- 
 tive, as he' did in this instance, the inconsistent statements of the wit- 
 ness were proper to go to the jury, as affecting his credibility and the 
 accuracy of his testimony generally.' 
 
 In examining jurors in cases of this character counsel for the plain- 
 tiffs have sometimes asked them whether they were interested in em- 
 ployer's liability insurance companies in which the defendants were 
 insured. Very naturally this has given rise to complicated and per- 
 plexing questions. There can be no doubt that where it appears that 
 such questions are asked simply for the purpose of bringing the fact 
 that the defendant is insured to the attention of the jury, the subtlety 
 of counsel will amount to misconduct constituting a ground for re- 
 fusing to proceed with the trial, or, if this is not done, a ground for 
 reversal. But where it cannot be shown but that counsel is in good 
 faith e'ndeavoring to secure an impartial jury, the question arises as to 
 whether the belligerent charges of sharp practice on the part of the 
 defendant's counsel, or the latent suspicions of the court, can be given 
 effect. There are decisions by intermediate appellate courts to the 
 effect that jurors cannot be asked questions of this character. But in 
 later and better-considered cases by courts of last resort it is held 
 that, where there is nothing to show a lack of good faith, the court may 
 permit counsel for the plaintiff, in an action for personal injuries 
 against his employer, to show that the defendant is indemnified by an 
 accident insurance company, and to inquire of each juror upon his 
 
 139 
 
§ 109 EVIDENCE IN RAILWAY CASES. 
 
 arising from placing the plaintiff at work in a dangerous 
 place, without warning or notice of the danger, is not sus- 
 tained by proof of an injury from a defective appliance or 
 place ; *" nor could a recovery be had upon the ground of a 
 negligent order or direction of a vice-principal, or foreman, 
 where the ground of negligence alleged was the furnishing 
 of an improper and dangerous appliance,*^ as this ground of 
 negligence would not advise the defendant of the nature of 
 
 voir dire if he is a stockholder, or in any manner interested, in the 
 insurance company." Spooniek v. Backus-Brooks Co., 89 Minn. 354; 
 Antletz V. Smith, 97 Minn. 217; Vion v. Brooks-Scaiilon Lumber Co., 
 99 Minn. 97; Farber v. C. Eeiss Coal Co. (1905), 124 Wash. 554, 102 N. 
 W. Kep. 1042." 
 
 40 Where the death of a brakeman was alleged to be due to a sud- 
 den jolt caused by a sudden application of thp air brakes by the con- 
 ductor, and there was no allegation of defective coupling, evidence on 
 this fact was inadmissible. Ohlenkamp v. Unicai Pac. R. Co. (Utah), 
 67 Pac. Eep. 411; Moyer v. Ramsey-Brisbane Co., 119 Ga. 734; 46 S. 
 E. Rep. 844; Studeroth v. Hammond Co., 106 Mo. App. 480; 81 S. W. 
 Rep. 487; Palmer Brick Co. v. Chenal (Ga.), 47 S. E.' Rep. 329; 
 Simonds v. Georgia Iron Co., 133 Fed. Rep. 776. 
 
 In an action for an injury from a trainman coming in contact with a 
 telegraph pole erected dangerously near the track, it is not a variance 
 that the proof shows it was erected by another company; where the 
 petition alleges that defendant permitted it to be erected near its track. 
 Illinois Ter. R. Co. v. Thompson, 210 111. 226; 71 N. E. Rep. 328; Belt 
 Ry. Co. V. Confrey, 209 111. 344; 70 N. E. Rep. 773. 
 
 41 Bohn V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 106 Mo. 429. 
 
 Where a petition alleges a failure to give necessary and suitable 
 orders, it is held incompetent, in Illinois, to prove the giving of 
 negligent or improper orders. Banks v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 112 111. 
 App. 385. 
 
 Where a defective track is tht sole cause of the injury alleged it is 
 held to be no variance to show the rate of speed of the train. Chicago, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Clark, 26 Neb. 645; 42 N. W. Rep. 703; 38 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 192. 
 
 Evidence of a remark by the defendant's foreman, that if the plain- 
 tiff did not " get a move on him," he would get laid off, is not evidence 
 of a negligent order to do the work being done. Alabama, etc., R. Co. 
 V. Vail (Ala.), 38 So. Rep. 124. 
 
 It was said by the Supreme Court of Missouri in Bartlett v, R. R, 
 Co. (148 Mo. 1. c. 139) : 
 
 140 
 
EVIDENCE IN BAIL WAY CASES, § 109 
 
 the proof offered to sustain a recovery, upon the other ground 
 and it would be entitled to know the ground of recovery re- 
 lied upon, in order to properly prepare its defense. 
 
 " This is a specific charge of a specific act, » » * -which was 
 susceptible of positive and direct proof and excludes any idea or in- 
 tention of the pleader to rely upon general negligence, but on the con- 
 trary, expressly limits him to proof of the specific negligence alleged.". 
 
 See, also, Moyer v. Stone Co., 119 Ga. 734; 46 S. E. Eep. 844; 
 Simonds v. Coal & Iron Co., 133 Fed. Eep. 776. - 
 
 141 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 DEMONSTEATIVE EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE EULE-BES IPSA 
 
 LOQUITUE. 
 
 § 110. What is demonstrative evidence of negligence. 
 
 111. Need not be specially pleaded. 
 
 112. Pleading facts to bring case within rule. 
 
 113. Limitations of the doctrine. 
 
 114. Trespassers or licensees cannot invoke rule. 
 
 115. The rule applies to plaintiff's negligence. 
 
 116. Collisions between railroad trains. 
 
 117. ' Injuries to employees from collisions. 
 
 118. Rule cannot be invoked by employee, in federal court. 
 
 119. Rule can be invoked by employees in many State courts. 
 
 120. Does not apply to injuries to employees from collisions. 
 
 121. Injuries to passengers from street car collisions. 
 
 122. Displacement of cars or appliances. 
 
 123. Assaults on f)assengers by employees. 
 
 124. Injuries irom sudden jerks or jolts. 
 
 125. Sudden starting of street car or other public conveyance. 
 
 126. Frightening horses by noise from engine. . 
 
 127. Falling of machinery or other objects. 
 
 128. Injuries froJn caving banks or pits. 
 
 129. Injuries from nurses at hospital. 
 
 § 110. What is demonstrative evidence of negligence.— 
 
 Although the right of the plaintiff to recover in a personal 
 injury action depends upon his ability to establish a breach 
 of duty owing to him by the defendant, as the cause of his 
 injury and the burden of proving this fact is placed by the 
 law upon the plaintiff, there are certain cases where the^ facts 
 and circumstances connected with the injury itself, furnish 
 such evidence of this breach of duty on the defendant's part, 
 as to constitute a prima facie case of negligence and, unless 
 explained by the defendant, in a manner consistent with right 
 142 
 
fiULE EES itSA LOQuiTUE, | 110 
 
 conduct on his part, to be held a sufficient discharge of the 
 burden of establishing an affirmative case, on the plaintiff's 
 part. This demonstrative evidence of negligence ^ which is 
 held sufficient to justify a recovery, arising from the mere 
 narratioif of the facts and circumstances in connection with 
 the injury, when unexplain'ed, is held to apply in that class 
 of cases where the narration of such facts and circumstances 
 not only furnishes evidence of the fact of the injury, but also 
 of the breach of duty on the defendant's part, sufficient to 
 constitute a prima facie case of negligence. In such cases, 
 the doctrine, known to the law of negligence as res ipsa lo- 
 quitur, is held to apply, or, as this Latin phrase would mean 
 in English, " the thing itself speaks." ^ 
 
 1 Referring to such evidence of negligence as demonstrative evidence, 
 Judge Thompson, says : " I have ventured to call it demonstrative 
 evidence of negligence; for, although the evidence must always be de- 
 tailed by the mouths of witnesses, yet when the facts are thus disclosed, 
 they either demonstrate negligence, conclusively, or tend to demon- 
 strate it, subject to explanation by the defendant, sho^ving that his 
 conduct was consistent with due care." 1 Thompson, Neg., § 15, p. 16; 
 
 " The principle of res ipsa loquitur is that when, through any in- 
 strumentality or agency under the management of a defendant or his 
 servants, there is an occurrence injurious to the plaintiff, which, 
 in the ordinary course of things, would not take place if the person in 
 control were exercising due care, the occurrence itself, in the absence 
 of explanation, affords prima facie evidence of a want of due care." 
 Mumma v. Easton & A. R. Co. (N. J. 1906), 65 Atl. Rep. 208. 
 
 2 The doctrine is applied or explained in the following cases : ' Fuehs 
 v. St. Louis, 133 Mo. 168; 31 S. W. Eep. 115; Davidson v. Lake Shore, 
 etc., R. Co., 171 Pa. 522; 33 Atl. Eep. 86; Brownell v. Chicago, etc. 
 R. Co., 107 Iowa 254; 77 N. W. Rep. 1038; Snyder v. Wheeling, 
 etc., R. Co., 43 W. Va. 661; 28 S. E. Rep. 733; 39 L. R. A. 499; St 
 Louis, etc.„R. Co. v. Mitchell, 57 Ark. 418; 21 S. W. Rep. 883; Tennes 
 see, etc., R. Co. v. Bays, 97 Ala. 201; 12 So. Rep. 98; Trenton, etc., R 
 Co. V. Cooper, 60 N. J. L. 219; 37 Atl. Rep. 730; 38 L. R. A. 637 
 McCray v. Galveston, etc., R. Co., 89 Tex. 168; 34 S. W. Rep. 35; 3 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 276. 
 
 ' Under the rule res ipsa loquitur, negligence may be inferred from 
 the accident and the attending circumstances. Eaton v. New York Cent. 
 &. H. R. R. Co., 109 N. y. Supp. 419. 
 
 143 
 
§ 111. EULE EES IPSA LOQUITTJE. 
 
 § 111. Need not be specially pleaded. — The application 
 of the principle res ipsa loquitur depends upon the particu- 
 lar facts of each case. The principle does not apply to every 
 case of injury, but only to those where the mere occurrence 
 of the injury, of itself, in the law, implies a breach of legal 
 duty on the defendant's part also. This presumption of 
 negligence, from the proof of such a state of facts, is condi- 
 tioned on the absence of other evidence of negligence, not on 
 the absence of proper averments of negligence in the peti- 
 tion.* The rule is that a party may take advantage of the 
 doctrine res ipsa loquitur, even though his pleading sets out 
 specifically the facts of the negligence complained of, pro- 
 vided that the facts set out in the pleading are the ones which 
 the legal inference of negligence fairly tends to establish, but 
 before the evidence can be said to establish a case wherein the 
 rule would apply, there must be, in addition to the proof of 
 the injury, something in connection therewith which tends 
 to show some neglect on the defendant's part, or an omission 
 
 " Where an accident itself, with all its surroundings, speaks in such 
 way and is of such character as to show negligence on the part of de- 
 fendant, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies, and plaintiffs are 
 entitled to recover in the absence of other proof." Wood v. Wil- 
 mington City Ry. Co., 64 Atl. Rep. 246. 
 
 8 The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not relieve plaintiff of the 
 burden of the issue, nor raise a presumption in plaintiff's favor, but 
 it merely carries the case to the jury, permitting it to infer negligence 
 and find, on all the evidence, whether the- plaintiff has sustained his 
 burden of proof. Ross v. Double Shoals, etc., Co. (N. C), 52 S. E. 
 Rep. 121; 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 298. 
 
 " There must be something in them which, unexplained, ' speaks for 
 itself — which tends to show some neglect or omission of duty, as the 
 proximate cause of the injury.* The principle does not apply to every 
 cause of injury or accident, but only to those whose mere occurrence 
 implies a breach of duty.* The legal presumption, when applicable, is 
 conditioned on the absence of other evidence of negligence not on the ab- 
 sence of averments of negligence in the petition." Judge Bond, in Gal- 
 lagher v. Edison, etc., Co., 72 Mo. App., pp. 579, 580. 
 
 144 
 
RULE EES IPSA LOQUITUR. § 112, 113 
 
 of duty, which is the proximate cause of the injury com- 
 plained of.* 
 
 § 112. Pleading facts to bring case within the rule. — In 
 
 a recent Missouri case, the Kansas City Court of Appeals 
 considered the right of a passenger to recover under the 
 rule res ipsa loquitur, for an injury due to the sudden stop- 
 ping of the train, where the rule was not invoked in the 
 pleading, but other specific allegations of negligence on the 
 ■part of the carrier, were relied upon. 
 
 In discussing this , phase of the case. Presiding Judge 
 Broaddus, speaking for the court, said : " However, the rule 
 cannot be applied to this case, for the reason that the plain- 
 tiff relied solely for recovery upon the alleged negligent act 
 of defendant, in suddenly stopping its train with unusual 
 violence, which, as has been stated, was a proper thing to do 
 in order to avert the peril of a collision with an approaching 
 freight train. The rule is too well settled in this State to 
 cite precedents to show that where a plaintiff, in his petition 
 and instruction relies upon certain specific allegations of 
 negligence he will not be entitled to recover for other or dif- 
 ferent causes of negligence, or upon the theory of res ipsa 
 loquitur." " 
 
 § 113. limitations of the doctrine. — It is not to be pre- 
 sumed from the foregoing explanation of this doctrine that 
 the rule will apply in any abstract case, from the mere nar- 
 ration of an injury, connected with some act on the defend- 
 ant's part, or caused by the acts of his employee's, but only 
 to those cases where the facts and circumstances connected 
 with such injury are sufficient to connect some wrongful or 
 
 * Turner v. Haar, 114 Mo. 335; Blanton v. Bold, 109 Mo. 74; Whit- 
 taker Smith's, Neg., § 419, p. 522. 
 
 6 Todd V. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 126 Mo. App.,- 684, p. 692 ; 105 S. 
 W. Rep. 671. 
 
 l-io 145 
 
§ 113 EULE EES IPSA LOQUITUR. 
 
 negligent act of the defendant, with the injury, as the effi- 
 cient cause thereof. 
 
 In other words, it is only where " the thing " is shown to 
 be under the management of the defendant, or subject to his 
 control, or that of his employees, and the accident is such a 
 one, as, in the ordinary course of events, would not have oc- 
 curred if those having charge thereof had used proper care, 
 that " it " will be held to " speak," within the rationale of 
 this doctrine, sufficient to afford reasonable evidence that the 
 accident was due to the negligence of the defendant, in the 
 absence of other explanation.® Hence, the details connected 
 with an injury may leave no doubt in the mind of the court 
 that it was caused by an act of the defendant's or an act of 
 his employee's, yet, if the cause of the injury is not an act 
 that could be said to be a breach of legal duty owing by him 
 to the plaintiff, but is an act consistent with proper and legal • 
 conduct on the defendant's part, " the thing itself " would 
 not be held to " speak " in a manner sufficient to denominate 
 such otherwise careful conduct as negligence, and the neces- 
 sary evidence of a breach of legal duty on the defendant's 
 part, would still be wanting, uiiless shown by other facts than 
 the mere details of the injury itself.'^ 
 
 8 This is, practically, the explanation of the Latin formula, given 
 by Erie, J.,' in Scott v. London Docks Company (3 Hurl. & Colt. 596), 
 an opinion that has been denominated as a " legal classic." 1 Thomp- 
 son, on Neg., § 15, p. 16. 
 
 " Where, in an action for personal injuries, the facts are such that 
 an inference that the accident was due to a cause other than the neg- 
 ligence of defendant could be drawn as reasonably as an inference that 
 the accident resulted from defendant's negligence, the doctrine of res 
 ipsa loquitur does not apply, and plaintiff cannot rely upon mere proof 
 of the fact and circumstances, and require defendant to show that he 
 was not negligent." McGrath v. St. Louis Transit Co. (Mo. 1906), 94 
 S. W. Rep. 872. See, also, Cathron v. Packing Co., 98 Mo. App. 343. 
 
 T Davidson v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., 171 Pa. 522; 33 Atl. Rep. 
 86; Snyder v. Wheeling, etc., R. Co., 43 W. Va. 661; 28 S. E. Rep. 733; 
 39 L. R. A. 499; Nelson v. Lehigh Valley, etc., R. Co., 50 N. Y. S. 
 146 
 
BULE SES 1?SA LOQUlTUE. §| 114, 115 
 
 § 114, Trespassers or licensees cannot invoke rule. — Since 
 the principle res ipsa, loquitur applies only when the thing 
 shown speaks of the negligence of the defendant,* and not 
 merely of the happening of the accident or injury to the 
 plaintiff, it is always essential for the application of the 
 rule that connected with the accident or injury to the plain- 
 tiff, the facts must show a breach of legal' duty on the 
 defendant's part and, for this breach of duty to arise, 
 the defendant must occupy such a relation toward the 
 injured person as to create a duty toward him. The 
 principle would not apply, therefore, in favor of one who 
 is a mere trespasser, or licensee, for the obvious reason that 
 as to such a person the defendant would owe no fixed duty to 
 keep his premises or property in a safe condition, and hence, 
 a trespasser or licensee, under 'a mere naked license, could 
 not invoke the rule res ipsa loquitur.^ 
 
 § 115. The rule applies to plaintiff's negligence. — The rule 
 res ipsa loquitur is not a one-sided rule, nor does it apply only 
 
 63; 25 App. Div. 535; Giraudi v. Electric, etc., Co., 107 Cal. 120; 40 
 Pae. Rep. 108; 24 L. E. A. 596. ' 
 
 The Federal Court, in Minnesota, has recently held that the rule res 
 ipsa loquitur never applied in cases between employer and employee. 
 Northern Pac. Ey. Co. v. Dixon, 139 Fed. Eep. 737. 
 
 sPaynter v. Traction Co.,. 67 N. J. L. 619; 52 Atl. Rep. 367; State 
 V. Greene, 95 Md. 217; 52 Atl. Eep. 673. 
 
 The rule of res ipsa loquitur applies to a passerby, on a public street, 
 struck on the head by a falling iron bar, under control of defendant. 
 Schneider v, American Bridge Co., 79 N. Y. S. 634 ; 78 App. Div. 163. 
 
 »McLain v. Chicago & N. W. Ey Co., 121 111. App. 614; Gabriel v. 
 Chicago & N. W. Ey Co., 121 111. App. 614. The doctrine of res ipsa 
 loquitur does not apply in favor of one who is a trespasser, or one who 
 is at the place of injury under a permission or mere naked license. Mc- 
 Lain v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 121 111. App. 614; Gabriel v. Same, id. 
 
 There is no presumption of negligence from an injury to a third* 
 party, standing so close to a railroad track as to he struck by a pro- 
 truding scantling on a ear, as the negligence would rather be his, than 
 the company's. Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Eeilly, 212 111. 506; 72 N. E. 
 Rep. 454. 
 
 14Y 
 
I 115 BULE EES Ipsa LOQUlTUft. 
 
 to tie defendant's side of the case, but in cases where " the 
 thing itself speaks " it speaks as well against, as for the 
 plaintiff. Accordingly, if, in proving the circumstances of 
 the accident, the plaintiff's evidence conclusively shows a 
 condition from which it could only be inferred that he had 
 himself caused the injury by his negligence or where his own 
 act contributed actively to bring it about, the prima facie 
 case would be made out for the defendant and he would not 
 be entitled to go to the jury.^" This result would follow 
 where the' plaintiff tried to cross directly in front of an ap- 
 proaching train or car ; ^ ^ or where he failed to use ordinary 
 care to avoid a collision.-'^ But the presumption would ob- 
 tain that the plaintiff was in the exercise of reasonable care 
 and before he could be held to be negligent, as a matter of 
 law, the facts must show ia condition where no two reasonable 
 minds would differ as to the cause of his injury, or it would 
 be a question for the jury.^^ Where, however, there is direct 
 evidence of the surrounding circumstances of the injury, the 
 presumption of proper care for his safety, will not be in- 
 dulged in, if inconsistent with the conditions shown by the 
 evidence, but the plaintiff will be held negligent, as matter of 
 law, if his evidence shows this condition to exist.^* And 
 where an employee was violating a known rule of the em- 
 
 loGflberson v. Bangor, etc., E. Co., 89 Me. 337; 36 Atl. Rep. 400; 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Schreider, 88 Tex. 152; 30 S. W. Rep. 902; 28 L. 
 E. A, 538; 1 Thompson, on Neg., § 395, p. 377. 
 
 "Huggart V. Ry. Co., 134 Mo. 673; Hayden v. Ry. Co., 124 Mo. 567; 
 Fanning v. Transit Co., 103 Mo. App. 151 ; Clancy v. Transit Co., 192 
 Mo. 615. 
 
 12 Holwcrson v. Ry. Co. 157 Mo. 316. 
 
 isEckhard v. Transit Co., 190 Mo. 593; 89 S. W. Rep. 602; Teal v. 
 St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 96 Minn. 379; 104 N. W. Rep. 945. Crossing two 
 hundred feet in advance of an approaching street car, cannot be held 
 negligence, as matter of law, in Missouri. Hovarka v. Transit Co., 191 
 Mo. 441 ; 90 S. W. Rep. 1142. 
 
 "Ames V. Waterloo Transit Co. (Iowa), 95 N. W. Rep. 161. 
 
 148 
 
EULE KES IPSA LOQUITUR. § 116 
 
 ployer, at the time of the injury, the presumption of his 
 negligence will obtain.^® 
 
 § 116. Collisions between railroad trains. — The rule being, 
 when an accident proceeds from, an act of such a character, 
 that when due care is taken, in its performance, no injury 
 ordinarily ensues from it, in similar cases, it will be pre- 
 sumed to have been negligent,^® is held to apply to an injury 
 resulting from a collision between railroad trains, ^^ and 
 hence, in the trial of an action for damages from a collision 
 of trains, by a passenger, the mere fact of a collision be- 
 tween the trains will be held to be negligence on the defend- 
 ant's part, unless explained or properly excused by it. 
 
 In a recent case, in Missouri,^® the Supreme Court had 
 
 isErickson v. Monson, etc., 100 Me. 107; 60 Atl. Rep. 708. 
 
 10 Shuler v. Omaha, etc., R. Co., 87 Mo. App., 623 ; Clark v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. Co., 127 Mo. 197; Transportation Co. v. Downer, 11 Wallace 
 129; Patterson Ry. Aoo. Law, § 375. ^ 
 
 17 Shuler v. Omaha, etc., R. Co., 87 Mo. App. 623; Railway Co. v. 
 Mowery, 36 Ohio St. 418; Railroad v. Allbritton, 38 Miss. 242. 
 
 18 Clark V. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 127 Mo. 208. 
 
 Where an injury results from a collision, the doctrine of res ipsa 
 loquitur applies, notwithstanding there was no contractual relation 
 between the plaintiff and the defendant. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Mo- 
 Collum, 122 111. App. 531. 
 
 The fact of a collision was held to establish a prima facie case, 
 against a passenger carrier, in the following cases: Magrane v. St. 
 Louis, etc., R. Co. 183 Mo. 119; 81 S. W. Rep. 1158; Savage v. Marl- 
 borough, etc., R. Co., 186 Mass. 203; 71 N. B. Rep. 531; Chicago Union 
 Traction Co. v. Crosby, 109 111. App. 644; Elgin, etc.. Traction Co. v. 
 Wilson, 217 III. 47; 75 N. B. Rep. 76; Howe v. Northern Pao. R. Co. 
 (Texas), 70 S. W. Rep. 335. 
 
 But unless both agencies are under control of carrier, collision is 
 held, in Illinois, to raise no presumption, in the following cases : Wolf 
 y. Chicago Union Tr. Co'., 119 111. App. 481; Chicago Tr. Co. v. Mee, 
 218 111. 9; 75 N. E. Rep. 800; reversing 119 111. App. 332; Chicago, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Stroud, 114 111. App. 479. See, also, Fagin v. Rhode Island R. 
 Co., 27 R. I. 51; 60 Atl. Rep. 672; Maher v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., ' 
 92 N. Y. S. 825; 102 App. Div. 517. 
 
 149 
 
§ 117 BULB EES IPSA LOQUITTJE. 
 
 before it the cause of an injured passenger on the defendant's 
 train, whose injuries resulted from a collision with a train 
 of another company, running into the defendant's train, while 
 it stood on a railroad crossing. The trial court had instructed 
 the jury that the fact of the collision, under these circum- 
 stances, raised a presumption of negligence against the de- 
 fendant and, if unexplained, the plaintiff was entitled to 
 recover. Considering this instruction, the court, speaking 
 by Judge Gantt, said : " The obligation of a steam railway 
 carrier, to its passengers, is, as far as it is capable by human 
 care and foresight, to carry them safely, and it is responsible 
 for all injuries to its passengers from any, even the slightest 
 neglect, and when the passenger suffers injury from the 
 breaking doven or overturning of the coach, the prima facie 
 presumption is that it was occasioned by some negligence of 
 the carrier, and the burden is cast upon the carrier to rebut 
 and establish that there has been no negligence on its part 
 and that the injury was occasioned by inevitable accident or 
 by some cause which human precaution and foresight could 
 not have averted." The instruction was approved and the 
 judgment of tiie trial court was affirmed. 
 
 § 117. Injuries to employees from collisions. — Under the 
 common law doctrine of assumption of risks due to the negli- 
 gence of coemployees, an injury from a collision would not • 
 give an employee a cause of action, without establishing 
 something more than the mere fact of an injury from a col- 
 lision of the defendant's trains, since the collision and con- 
 sequent injury may as well have resulted from the negligent 
 act of one of the plaintiff's coemployees, as from the act of 
 some chief oflBcer, or vice^principal, or the defendant itself. 
 Mere proof of the collision would not establish which of these 
 were culpable and hence the rule res ipsa, loquitur would not 
 apply. i» 
 
 10 The doctrine res ipsa loquitur is applicable only when the thing 
 150 
 
EULE EES IPSA LOQUITUR. § 118 
 
 But in those States where the rule has been adopted by 
 legislative act, allowing the employee to recover from his em- 
 ployer in an action for injuries from the negligence of his 
 coemployees, this common law rule would not apply and the 
 fact of an injury due to a collision, would make out a prima 
 facie case of negligence on the employer's part, for the em- 
 ployer being liable whether the negligence was its own, or 
 that of a coemployee with the injured person, since the col- 
 lision could only result from a negligent act, the mere proof 
 of a collision would raise the presumption, in the absence of 
 other explanation, that the injury was due to a breach of duty 
 owing to the plaintiff and his right to recover would be the 
 same as if he had been a passenger.^" But of course this 
 rule would not apply if the proof of the injury establ^hed 
 that the cause thereof was the negligence of the plaintiff him- 
 self, for in such case, the presumption would be against him, 
 rather than for him and without other evidence, the defend- 
 ant would be entitled to a peremptory instruction for a ver- 
 dict.2i 
 
 § 118. Rule cannot be invoked by employee in federal 
 conrts. — The United States Supreme Court and the courts 
 of many of the various circuits, in the federal judiciary, in 
 
 shown speaks of the negligence of the defendant, not merely of the 
 happening of the accident. Paynter v. Traction Co., 67 N. J. L. 619; 
 52 Atl. Rep. 367; State v. Greene, 95 Md. 217; 52 Atl. Rep. 673; 
 Atchison, etc., R. Go. v. Salmon, 11 Kansas 83; Shuler v. Omaha, etc., 
 Ry. Co., 87 Mo. App. 623. 
 
 20 " Proof of collision of trains makes a prima fade case for an 
 employee against the company, equally as well as if he had been a 
 passenger." Shuler v. Omaha, etc., R. Co., 87 Mo. App. 624. But this 
 is only true, because of § 2873, R. S. Mo. 1899. ' Stubbs v. Kansas City, 
 etc., R. Co., 85 Mo. App. 192; Lee v. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co., 112 Mo. 
 App. 372; 87 S. W. Rep. 12; St. Clair v. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co., 99 
 S. W. Rep. 775. 
 
 21 Brown v. Northern Pac. R. Co. (Wash.), 86 Pac. Rep. 1053; Cole 
 V. Blue Ridge Ry. Co. (S. C), 55 S. E. Rep. 126. 
 
 151 
 
§ 118 EULE EES IPSA LOQUITUR. 
 
 the United States, have held that the rule res ipsa loquitur 
 does not apply to injuries received by an employee -while in 
 the service of his employer. ^^ 
 
 There is, of course, a broad distinction between cases of 
 injuries between employees and their employers and those 
 between passengers and carriers, so far as this rule of evi- 
 dence is concerned, growing out of the difference in the de- 
 gree of duty owed respectively,^ to a passenger and to an 
 employee,^ ^ but the State courts where the doctrine is applied 
 in favor of employees, the same as toward passengers, reply 
 to this suggestion of the federal courts, with the statement 
 that the doctrine is not dependent upon a contractual relation, 
 between the injured one and the person causing the injury, 
 but only upon the physical facts and circumstances in con- 
 nection with the injury.^* In view of the growing tendency 
 of the State courts to extend the application of the doctrine, 
 it may well be doubted, aside from the persuasive authority 
 of the well-considered decisions of the federal courts, if it 
 would not be well for the courts of the States to keep within 
 narrow limits, if not to deny, the applicability of the doc- 
 trine to all classes of actions by employees."® 
 
 22Patton V. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 179 U. S. 658; 45 L. Ed. 361; 
 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 275; Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Dixon, 139 Fed. Rep. 
 737; Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. O'Brien, 132 Fed. Rep. 593; 67 C. 
 C. A. 421; Shandrew v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 142 Fed. Rep. 320; 73 
 C. C. A. 430; Mexican Cent. R. Co. v. Townsend, 114 Fed. Rep. 739; 
 52 C. C. A. 369. 
 
 23 See well-written article on this subject in vol. 13, Case & Com- 
 ment, No. 9, p. 123. 
 
 21 Ante idem. 
 
 25 This is, practically, the conclusion of the Supreme Court of 
 Georgia, in the recent well-considered case of Palmer Brick Co. v. 
 Chenall, 119 Ga. 837; 47 S. E. Rep. 329. 
 
 Judge Ellison, of the Court of Appeals, in Missouri, has recently 
 considered the Missouri cases, bearing upon the application of the 
 doctrine res ipsa loquitur, to employees, in the late ease of Hamilton v. 
 Kansas City & Southern Ry. Co. (100 S. W. Rep. 671), and goes into 
 
 152 
 
EULE RES IPSA LOQUITTIE. § 119 
 
 § 119. Rule can be invoked by employees in many State 
 courts. — Many of the courts of the States, however, do not 
 follow the rule of the federal courts in the application of the 
 
 the subject so extensively that it will not be out of place to quote at 
 length from his opinion. He says: 
 
 " But the question in this case is, whether an employee may call such 
 presumption to his aid. The plaintiff insists that he may. He contends 
 that it is a rule of evidence with no existing reason why it should not 
 be applicable to a servant as well as a passenger. We think that there 
 is good reason for applying the rule to the latter class, and not to the 
 servant. The passenger does not assume risks while the servant does. 
 The instances of nonliability for injury to a passenger (in the absence ■ 
 of contributory negligence) are rare. The instances of liability to the 
 servant are not nearly so frequent. The passenger is helpless, and he 
 necessarily places himself in the carrier's hands. He knows nothing of 
 the carrier's machinery, nor his methods, and it is impractical for him 
 to ascertain. Whereas the servant is a part of the carrier's service. He 
 has opportunity in a vastly greater degree than the passenger to ascer- 
 tain the causes which led to his injury. The greater part of what we 
 have just stated as to a passenger applies with equal reason to a stranger 
 who may suffer injury; and so we find the courts extending the pre- 
 sumption to him in aid of his evidence against the party he charged 
 with the wrong. The foregoing considerations have occurred to us as 
 good reasons for a distinction between classes of persons. That the law 
 has not granted the benefit of this presumption to a servant, and that it 
 holds him to the necessity of an affirmative showing of n^ligenee, is 
 sustained by the great weight of authority: Johnstown Steel Co. v. 
 Shields, 146 111. 603; 34 N. E. Rep. 234; Mister v. Coal Co., 152 
 Pa. 395; 25 Atl. Rep. 342; Redmond v. Lumber Co., 96 Mich., 545; 
 101 N. W. Rep. 1904; Toomey v. Eureka Works, 89 Mich. 249; 50 
 N. W. Rep. 850; Huff v. Austin, 46 Ohio St. 386; 21 N. E. Rep. 864; 
 15 Am. St. Rep. 234; Lincoln Ry. Co. v. Cox, 48 Neb. 807; 67 N. W. 
 Rep. 740; Chicago Ry. Co. v. Kellogg, 55 Neb. 748; 76 N. W. Rep. 
 462; Kincaid v. Railway Co., 22 Or. 35; 29 Pac. Rep. 3; Johnson 
 V. Railway Co., 36 W. Va. 73 ; 14 S. E. 432 ; Brownfleld v. Chicago, etc.. 
 Railway Co., 107 Iowa 254; 77 N. W. Rep. 1038; Benedick v. Potts, 
 88 Md. 52; 40 At]. Rep. 1067; 56 L. R. A. 478. 
 
 " There is, however, authority based on the best of reason, showing 
 that the servant's case may be made out by mere proof of the 
 occurrence which caused the injury in those instances where the 
 occurrence itself, without the aid of a presumption, shows negligence. 
 In case of a passenger, as we have seen, the occurrence itself may not 
 show negligence and the presumption comes to his relief. But, in 
 
 153 
 
§ 119 EULE KES IPSA LOQUITUE. 
 
 doctrine res ipsa loquitur in the ease of injuries by employees, 
 but hold that the rule applies as well to those occupying the 
 
 the servant's case, if the occurrence is of that nature, which, of itself, 
 shows negligence without the aid of a presumption, he may, as just 
 stated, make a case by showing the occurrence only. Thus, where the 
 employer tied the knot in a rope used iii hoisting a hood for the top 
 of a smokestack, which immediately became untied in the hoisting, it 
 was held in Folk v. Schaeffer, 186 Pa. 253; 40 Atl. Rep. 401 (a court 
 holding strictly to the rule that res ipsa loquitur does not apply in 
 favor of servants), that it was sufficient prima facie evidence of negli- 
 gence. The occurrence shown may be of that nature which could not in 
 any degree of probability have happened without a negligent cause. Its 
 proof is tantamount to the direct and affirmative proof of negligence. 
 " We have thus far discussed the case without referring to what has 
 been said of kindred questions in this State. We have done so for 
 the reason that there has been presented to us a number of decided 
 cases, from the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals, by the 
 respective counsel which, as each insists, determines the matter in his 
 favor. We find that a number of those to which plaintiff refers are 
 passenger cases, which do not aid us in determining the case of a 
 servant. These are Dougherty v. Railway Co., 9 Mo. App. 478, and 
 81 Mo. 325; 51 Am. Rep. 239; Kelly v. Railway Co., 113 Mo. App. 468; 
 87 S. W. Rep. 583; and Hunt v. Railway Co., 14 Mo. App. 160. A 
 numher of other cases cited involved the rule as applied to u. stranger, 
 vis., Gannon v. Gas Co., 145 Mo. 502 ; 46 S. W. Rep. 968 ; 47 S. W. Rep. 
 907; 43 L. R. A. 505; Hill v. Scott, 38 Mo. App. 370; Seiter v. Bischoff, 
 63 Mo. App 157; Gallagher v. Illuminating Co., 72 Mo. App. 576; 
 Cleary v. Transit Co., 108 Mo. App. 433; 83 S. -W. Rep. 1029; Tateman 
 V. Railway Co., 96 Mo. App. 448; 70 S.' W. Rep. 514. In McCarty v. 
 Railway Co., 105 Mo. App. 596; 80 S. W. Rep. 7, the plaintiff was not 
 a servant. These also, as we have shown, are not applicable. But 
 some of plaintiff's citations are cases in which a servant brought the 
 action. They are Blanton v. Dold, 109 Mo. 64; 18 S. W. Rep. 1149; 
 Stoher v. Railway CO., 91 Mo. 509; 4 S. W. Rep. 389; Kelly 
 v. Railway Co., 105 Mo. App. 365; 79 S. W. Rep. 973. It 
 will, however, he noticed that in each of the latter cases it was 
 considered that proof of the occurrence was, itself, proof of negligence. 
 In Blanton v. Dold, Judge Barclay said: 'But some catastrophes are 
 of a nature such as carry, in a mere statement of their occurrence, 
 an implication of some neglect.' Stoher v. Railway Co. contains noth- 
 ing in aid of the plaintiff. The engine upon which Stoher was fireman 
 was thrown from the track by reason of a small culvert giving way 
 after a heavy rain. The court, in speaking of the evidence in the 
 154 
 
KULE EES IPSA LOQUITUR. § 119 
 
 relation of employees, as to those held to be passengers.^® 
 The rule is held to be governed, in its application, by the 
 physical facts and circumstances in connection with the in- 
 case in respect to the condition of the culvert and its suflScieney to 
 carry off the waters collecting in time of heavy rains, stated that 
 ' the sudden giving way of a part of the structure is, if unexplained, 
 some evidence of negligence in its construction.' Nothing was intended 
 by that statement more than that it was some evidence in the way of 
 a link connected with the other evidence in the case. In the last of the 
 cases just cited (Kelly v. Railway Co.) the St. Louis Court of Appeals, 
 in keeping with the rule stated in Blanton v. Bold, held that, to make 
 the master liable' by mere proof of the occurrence, it must be such an 
 occurrence 'as carries proof of negligence, on its face.' 
 
 " We do not believe it ought to be said that any of these cases afford 
 ground for the position that a servant may be aided by a. presumption 
 in making out his case. It is necessary that he produce tangible 
 evidence of his master's negligence, and this, as we have just seen, the 
 occurrence itself may in some instances supply for him. We think the 
 cases in our appellate courts cannot be carried further than that. In 
 so construing and distinguishing them we find Ihem in harmony with 
 the view taken by the Supreme Courts of Pennsylvania and other 
 States. Furthermore, this view is borne out by other cases in the 
 Supreme. Court." 
 
 The cases referred to by the Supreme Court are those of Smith v. 
 Ey. Co. (113 Mo. 70; 20 S. W. Kep. 896), in which Judge Gantt held 
 that an employee was entitled to no presumption of negligence, from 
 the mere proof of an injury, in any case; that of Howard v. Railway 
 Co. (173 Mo. 524; 73 S. W. Rep. 467), where Judge Fox held that 
 the fact that a handle bar of a car broke was not evidence of negli- 
 gence, without proof of a defective condition and that of McGrath v. 
 Transit Co. (197 Mo. 97; 9* S. W. Rep. 872), in which Judge Graves 
 held that an employee could not invoke the rule, but in every case 
 evidence of negligence must be produced on the employer's part, unless 
 the circumstances in connection with the injury themselves showed his 
 negligence, without any doubt. In the latter case, the court quotes 
 and approves a similar holding by the Maryland court, in Benedick v. 
 Potts, 88 Md. 52; 40 Atl. Rep. 1067; 41 L. R. A. 478. 
 
 The doctrine res ipsa loquitur is held, in Fitzgerald v. Southern R. 
 Co. (N. C), 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 337, to apply where one employed 
 in earing for a locomotive is injured by a heavy lump of coal falling 
 in the process of transferring it from an adjoining car to the tender 
 of the locomotive. 
 
 28 Wright V. Southern Ry. Co., 127 N. C. 227; 37 S. E. Rep. 221; 
 
 155 
 
§ 119 EULE. EES IPSA LOQUITTJB. 
 
 jury,- rather than the relation of the parties who receive and 
 cause the injury and the reasoning of the courts is that there 
 is nothing in the relation of employer and employee, to 
 deny the application of the rule. Some of the more recent 
 cases, where the question has been raised, so reason.^'' But 
 the adjudications by the federal judiciary has tended to 
 ascribe to the rule a narrower scope, as between employer 
 and employee, than as between carrier and passenger, if not 
 entirely to deny its applicability to the former class 
 of cases, ^* and the Supreme Court of Georgia, in a re- 
 cent well-considered case, has perhaps correctly stated the 
 present trend of the State decisions, on this question, in the 
 following language : " The maxim, res ipsa loquitur, is ap- 
 plicable, under certain circumstances, in suits by a servant 
 against his master, for damages resulting from the master's 
 negligence. The maxim, is, however, very rarely applicable 
 to such cases, and only where the manner of the occurrence 
 producing the injury, or the attendant circumstances, are 
 such that the jury may reasonably infer that the occurrence, 
 could not have taken place unless the master was lacking in 
 diligence, as to instrumentalitie'S, place of work or fellow 
 servants." ^® 
 
 Womble v. Merchants Co., 135 N. C. 474; 47 S. E. Eep. 493; Houston 
 V. Brush, 66 Vt. 331; 29 Atl. Rep. 380; Graham v. Badger, 164 Mass. 42; 
 41 N. B. Eep. 61; Chenall v. Palmer Brick Co., 117 Ga. 106; 43 S. E. 
 Rep. 443; St. Clair v. St. Louis & S. F. R. R. Co. (Mo. App.), 99 
 S. W. Eep. 775; Haas v. St. Louis & Sub. Ry. Co., Ill Mo. App. 706; 
 90 S. W. Eep. 1155; Blanton v. Dold, 109 Mb. 64; 18 S. W. Eep. 1149; 
 Lee V. St. Louis, etc., Ey. Co., 112 Mo. App. 372; 87 S. W. Eep. 12. 
 But see, contra, Smith v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 113 Mo. 70; 20 S. W. 
 Rep. 896; Trotter v. St. Louis & Sub. Ry. Co. (Mo. App.), 99 S. W. 
 Eep. 508. 
 
 27 St. Clair v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., supra, by Nortoni, J. 
 
 28 Vol. 13, No. 9, Case & Comment, for February, 1907, p. 122. 
 20 Palmer Brick Co. v. Chenall, 119 Ga. 837; 47 S. E. Eep. 329. 
 The mere fact of the relation of employer and employee is not suffi- 
 cient to render the doctrine res ipsa loquitur inapplicable between them. 
 
 156 
 
feUlE KES itSA LO^UlTUS, § 120 
 
 § 120. Does not apply to injuries to employees from ex- 
 plosions. — Notwithstanding the high degree of care required 
 from the employer of men whose work consists in handling 
 
 Where a collision occurred between two trains of a railroad company 
 so that an employee, riding upon one of said trains in going to and 
 from his work was injured, and the circumstances were such as to show 
 the accident presumably would not have happened if due care had been 
 exercised, the principle of res ipsa loquitur applied. St. Clair v. St. 
 Louis, etc., E. Co., 122 Mo. App. 519. 
 
 The disputed question as to the applicability of the maxim, Res ifpsa 
 loquitur, in favor of an injured employee, is answered in Klebe v. 
 Parker Distilling Co., 207 Mo. 480; 105 S. W. Eep. 1057; 13 L. E. A. 
 (N. S.) 140, by holding that it may apply in a proper case, but only 
 as a last resort to prevent miscarriage of justice, when direct and 
 positive proof by living witnesses cannot be had. It was denied on 
 the facts of the case, where the accident resulted from the breaking of 
 an elevator rope or cable. 
 
 In discussing the application of the rule in the case of an injury 
 to an employee, after pointing out the reasons for the nonapplieatibn 
 of the doctrine in cases between employer and employee, because of 
 the knowledge of the conditions by the employee, as well as the em- 
 ployer, Judge Woodson, for the Missouri Supreme Court, in the recent 
 case of Klebe v. Parker Company (105 S. W. Eep. 1057), said: 
 
 " Based upon the reasons just stated, a majority of the courts of 
 this country, including the Supreme Court of the United States, make 
 the broad statement, without qualification, that the rule mentioned 
 has no application to master and servant." 
 
 The following are some of the many cases which so hold: Bowen 
 V. Eailroad, 95 Mo. 268; 8 S. W. Eep. 230; Oglesby v. Eailway Co., 177 
 Mo. 272; 76 S. W. Eep. 623; Fuchs v. City of St. Louis, 167 Mo. 620; 67 
 S. W. Eep. 610; 57 L. E. A. 136; Patton v. Texas Ey. Co., 179 U. S. 
 658; 21 Sup. Ct. 275; 45 L. Ed. 361; Texas Pac. Ey. v. Barrett, 166 
 U. S. 617; 17 Sup. Ct. 707; 41 L. Ed. 1136; Shandrew v. Eailway, 142 
 Fed. Eep. 320; 73 C. C. A. 430; Ash v. Verlenden, 154 Pa. 246; 26 Atl. 
 Eep. 374; Stackpole v. Wray, 74 App. Div. 310; 77 N. Y. Supp. 633; 
 Searles v. Eailway, 101 N. Y. 662 ; 5 N. E. Eep. 66 ; Dobbins v. Brown, 
 119 N. Y. 188-193; 23 N. E. Eep. 537; Quincy Mining Co. v. Kitts, 42 
 Mich. 35; 3 N. W. Eep. 240; Brownfield v. Eailway, 107 Iowa 254; 77 
 N. W. Eep. 1038; Kepner v. Traction Co., 183 Pa. 24; 38 Atl. Eep. 
 416; Louisville & N. Ey. Co. v. Campbell, 97 Ala. 147; 12 S. Eep. 
 574; Starer v. Stern, 100 App. Div. 393; 91 N. Y. Supp. 821; Eeid 
 V. Eailroad, 81 Ga. 694; 8 S. E. Rep. 629; Davidson v. Davidson, 46 
 Minn. 117; 48 N. W. Eep. 560; Bohn v. Eailway Co., 106 Mo. 
 
 157 
 
§ 120 EULE EES IPSA LOQtrlTUB. 
 
 dynamite or other dangerous explosives,*" the same high de- 
 gree of care for their own protection is so far required on 
 the part of such employees, that in case of an injury from an 
 explosion to employees, while they are handling such explo- 
 sives, or discharging the duties of the employer, there is held 
 to be no presumption of negligence on the part of the em- 
 
 429; 17 S. W. Eep. 580; Huff- v. Austin, 46 Ohio St. 386; 21 N. E. 
 Rep. 864; 15 Am. St. Eep. 613. While the Missouri cases above 
 cited broadly state that the rule has no application to master 
 and servant, yet it was not necessary for a proper determination of 
 those cases to state the rule so broadly. In those cases this court held, 
 and properly so, that the rule did not apply to the facts of those par- 
 ticular cases, but it did not intend to hold that it vras a universal rule, 
 without limitations or exceptions ; tSut, upon the contrary, we have 
 several times held that there were cases where the rule did apply, 
 and the same ruling has been made by many other courts of respecta- 
 bility, Blanton v. Bold, 109 Mo. 74; 18 S. W. Eep. 1149; Turner v. 
 Haar, 114 Mo. 335; 347; 21 S. W. Eep. 737; Sackewitz v. Am. Biscuit 
 Co., 78 Mo. App. 151; Johnson v. Eailway, 104 Mo. App. 588-592; 78 
 S. W. Eep. 275 ; Scott v. London Dock, 3 Hurl. & Colt. 596 ; Kearney v. 
 Eailway, 5 (Q. B.) 411, and L. E. 6 Q. B. 759; Ellis v. Waldron, 19 
 E. I. 369 ; 33 Atl. Rep. 869 ; Fairbank Canning Co. v. Innes, 24 111. App. 
 33, affirmed in 125 111. 410; 17 N. E. Eep. 720; Gerlach v. Edelmeyer, 88 
 N. Y. 645; Hartford Deposit Co. v. Sollitt, 172 111. 222; 50 N. E. Eep. 
 178; 64 Am. St. Rep. 35; Springer v. Ford, 189 111. 430; 59 N. E. Rep. 
 953; 52 L. R. A. 930; 82 Am. St. Eep. 464; Treadwell v. Whittier, 5 
 L. R. 498; Labatt on Master and Servant, § 834, and cases cited; Steams 
 V. Ontario Spinning Co., 184 Pa. 519; 39 Atl. Rep. 292; 39 L. R. A. 
 842; 63 Am. St. Rep. 807; Grant v. Railway Co., 108 N. C. 462; 13 S. 
 E. Eep. 209. Having shown that the rule is in force in certain cases 
 between master and servant, it now becomes our duty to determine 
 whether or not the facts of this ease bring it within its operation." 
 
 For diametrically opposite rule, as applied in the federal courts, 
 see the recent case of Carnegie Steel Company v. Byers, 149 Fed. Rep. 
 667; 8 L. E. A. (N. S.) 677. And for note on same proposition, see 
 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 337. 
 
 30 Mather v. Rillston, 156 U. S. 391; 39 L. Ed. 464; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 464. See, for discussion of employer's duty, as regards explosives in 
 mines and other places, White, Per. Inj. Mines, §§ 32, 155, 255, 475, 
 and cases cited. 
 
 158 
 
EULE HES IPSA LoQtriT-nB § 121 
 
 ployer,^' for, in every case, where the injury may as well have 
 resulted from one or more causes, it is always incumbent 
 -upon the employee to show a prima facie right of recovery, 
 to establish that the injury was due to a negligent act on 
 the defendant's part.^^ Nor would an injury to a licensee, 
 or trespasser, caused by an explosion on the defendant's 
 premises, raise a presumption of negligence on the latter's 
 part,^* but an injury to a passenger, during transit, from 
 an explosion of substances under the carrier's control, would 
 raise a legal presumption of negligence on the carrier's 
 part.*^ 
 
 § 121. Injury to passengers from street car collision. — The 
 rule that a passenger of a steam railway establishes a prima, 
 facie ease in tracing an injury to a collision of the cars in 
 which he was riding, is held to apply with equal force to a 
 collision between street cars, or wagons and street cars, and 
 the proof of such a collision will ordinarily raise the pre- 
 sumption of negligence, sufficient to justify a verdict, if the 
 cause of the collision is not explained.^^ 
 
 In a recent Missouri case,'® the Supreme Court considered 
 the liability of the defendant for an injury to a passenger on 
 a street car, shown to have collided with a fire wagon, being 
 rapidly driven to a fire at the time of the collision. The de- 
 
 81 Omaha, etc., Co. v. Murray, 112 111. App. 233; Dullnig v. Duerler, 
 etc., Co., 87 S. W. Kep. 332. 
 
 saGoronsson v. Rlter, etc., Co., 186 Mo. 300; 85 S. W. Rep. 338; 
 Meehan v. Great No. E. Co. (N. D.), 101 N. W. Eep.' 183; Chicago, etc., 
 B. Co. V. O'Brien, 132 Fed. Eep. 593; 67 C. C. A. 421. 
 
 asObertoni v. Boston, etc., E. Co., 186 Mass. 481; 71 N. E. Eep. 980; 
 67 L. R. A." 422. 
 
 siFirebaugh v. Seattle, etc.. El. Co., 40 Wash. 658; 82 Pac. Rep. 
 995; German v. Brooklyn, etc., E. Co., 95 N. Y. S. 557. 
 
 3B Jackson v. Street Ry. Co., 118 Mo. 224; Hill v. Street Ry. Co., 
 109 N. Y. 239; Booth on Street Ry. Law, § 361; Clark v. Railroad, 
 127 Mo. 210. 
 
 soOlsen v. Citizens Ry. Co., 152 Mo. 426. 
 
 159 
 
§ 122 , EtTLE EES IPSA LOQUITXTB. 
 
 fendant contended that the proof did not make out a prima 
 facie ease of negligence on its part, as the evidence of the 
 accident showed conclusively that the firemen in charge of 
 the fire wagon were to blame, from the fact of the great 
 speed with which they were driving on the public highway. 
 The court, however, held that the proof of the collision made 
 out a prima facie case of negligence, on behalf of the passen- 
 ger, Judge Gantt, observing : " The plaintiff being abso- 
 lutely free from negligence, on her part, and the collision 
 having occurred and injured her, we think a prima facie 
 case was made and the court did not err in refusing to de- 
 clare the law, as asked by the defendant, even though plain- 
 tiff had not herself invoked this presumption." ^'' 
 
 § 122. Displacement of cars or appliances. — The care re- 
 quired of carriers, for the protection of their passengers, is 
 so great that it is held, in Wisconsin,^* and quite generally, 
 that the mere fact that a train parts, in transit, as a result 
 of which passengers are injured, is suflacient to raise a pre- 
 sumption of negligence against the carrier. So, it was held, 
 in New York,^® where the first two v?heels of a street car 
 passed safely over a switch, and the other two wheels were 
 displaced, whereby a passenger was injured, under the doc- 
 trine res ipsa loquitur, the street car company was 
 bound to explain the accident, or pay damages. And in Mis- 
 souri, the rule was held to apply, to a hand rail, on a street 
 car, in the hand of a passenger, which suddenly gave way, 
 while he was struggling to regain his position on the moving 
 
 s^Olsen V. Citizens Ry. Co., 152 Mo. 432. 
 
 The rule doea not obtain in an accident to a passenger of a street 
 car, who alights and steps around in front of a rapidly approaching 
 car he had failed to look for. Horstein v. United Rys., 97 Mo App 
 271; 70 S. W. Rep. 1105. 
 
 S8 Feldschneider v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 99 N. W. Rep. 1034. 
 
 soKlinger v. United Traction Co., 87 N. Y. S. 864; 92 App. Div. 100 
 160 
 
EULE EES IPSA LOQUlTUfi. § 123 
 
 car, "which had been suddenly started.*" And, in Pennsyl- 
 vania, the presumption of negligence on defendant's part, 
 is held to obtain, where an injury on a street car is shown 
 to have resulted from a. broken brake chain,*^ and the same 
 result would follow in case of an injury by being struck in 
 the face by a brake handle, suddenly revolving,*^ or the giv- 
 ing down of a trap door, in a street car.** 
 
 § 123. Assaults on passengers by employees.— The fact of 
 an assault on a passenger, otherwise unexplained by the 
 evidence, or apparently without excuse or justification, is so 
 inconsistent with the high degree of care required by a car- 
 lo MeCarty v. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 80 S. W. Eep. 7. 
 
 *i Dougherty v. Pittsburgh Eys. Co., 213 Pa. 346; 62 Atl. Eep. 926. 
 
 *a Thompson v. St. Louis, etc., E. Co. (Mo.), 86 S. W. Eep. 465. 
 
 *3 Jordan v. St. Louis, etc., E. E. Co., 99 S. W. Eep. 492. 
 
 The derailment of a passenger train was held to raise the pre- 
 sumption of negligence against the carrier, in the following cases: 
 Cronk v. Wabash E. Co., 128 Iowa 349; 98 N. ^ Eep. 884; Logan v. 
 Metropolitan, etc., E. Co., 183 Mo. 582 ; 82 S. W. Eep. 126 ; Cincinnati, 
 •etc., E. Co. V. Bravard (Ind.), 76 N. E. Eep. 899; Minahan v. 
 Grand Trunk E. Co., 138 Fed. Eep. 37 ; Southern Ey. Co. v. Cunning- 
 ham, 123 Ga. 90; 50 S. E. Eep. 979; St. Louis S. W. Ey. Co. v. Harkie, 
 88 S. W. Eep. 506; Adams v. Union Ey. Co., 80 N. Y. S. 264; 80 App. 
 Div. 136. 
 
 The breaking down or failure of the carrier's vehicle was held to 
 raise a prima facie case of negligence, in the following cases: Christie 
 V. Griggs, 2 Camp. 79; Eailroad Co. v. Eraid, 1 Moo. P. C. C. (N. S.) 
 101; Carpue v. Eailroad Co., 5 Q. B. 747; Bowen v. Eailroad Co., 18 
 N. y. 408; Curtis v. Eailroad Co., 18 N. Y. 538; Eailroad Co. v. 
 Wightman, 29 Gratt. 431; Sullivan v. Eailroad Co., 30 Pa. St. 234; 
 Eailroad Co. v. Beggs, 85 111. 80; Eailway Co. v. Thompson, 56 111. 138. 
 
 Derailment has been held to raise no presumption of negligence, in 
 the following cases: Omaha E. Co. v. Boesen (Neb.), 105 N. W. Eep. 
 303; Buckland v. New York, etc., E. Co. (Mass.), 62 N. E. Eep. 955. 
 
 And an error of the carrier or its employees was held to establish a 
 prima fade case in the following cases: Skinner v. E. E. Co., 5 Exch. 
 786; Eailroad Co. v. Pollard, 22 Wall. 341; Holbrook v. Ey. Co., 12 
 N. Y. 236; Fairchild v. Stage Co., 13 Cal. 599, all cited by Judge 
 Thompson, in Dougherty v. Missouri Pac. Ey. Co., 9 Mo. App. 480, 481. 
 
 I-ll 161 
 
§ 124 btiLE BBS IPSA toQulTUa. 
 
 rier, for the protection of its passengers, that when unex- 
 plained, such a showing will raise a presumption of negli- 
 gence, against the defendant, under the doctrine res ipsa lo- 
 quitur.** This unusual occurrence on the part of a passen- 
 ger carrier's employees, was held to make out a prima facie 
 case where a conductor violently struck a passenger in the 
 face.^s 
 
 § 124. Injuries from sudden jerks or jolts. — While the rule 
 of law governing the passenger carrier's liability is the same, 
 whether the passenger is carried upon a freight or passenger 
 train, so far as injuries from negligence of the carrier, is con- 
 cerned,*® the manner of construction and operation of the 
 two classes of trains is so different as to occasion a different 
 rule, in the case of injuries from sudden jerks or jolts, on 
 the two kinds of trains. , 
 
 In the operation of passenger trains, sudden jolts or jerks 
 are so unusual, on account of the air brakes and improved 
 facilities used in such service, that injuries from sudden 
 jerks or jars have been held actionable, under the rule res 
 ipsa loquitur.*'^ 
 
 4* Kohner v. Capital Co., 22 App. B. C. 181 ; 62 L. R. A. 875. 
 
 *B Kohner v. Capital Traction Co., supra. 
 
 A presumption of negligence, against' a carrier, is held, in Kentucky, 
 to arise, for an injury to one waiting at a station to take a passenger 
 train, when he was struck by a piece of coal, thrown from the tender 
 of a passing engine. Louisville & N. E. Co. v. Reynolds, 71 S. W. 
 Rep. 516. 
 
 46 Erwin v. Railway Co., 94 Mo. App. 289 ; Portuchek v. Wabash 
 Ry. Co., 101 Mo. App. 52; Condy v. Railroad Co., 85 Mo. 79; Hemp- 
 sey V. Railroad, 88 Mo. 348. " Life and limb are as valuable and 
 there is. the sam^ right to safety, in the caboose, as in the palace 
 car." Justice Swayne, in Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Horst, 93 U. 
 S. 296. 
 
 47 Moorman v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., 105 Mo. App. 719; Barth v. 
 Ry. Co., 142 Mo. 550. In Moorman v. Ry. Co., it is said : " In 
 Dougherty v. Railway, 81 Mo. 325, it was said: 'Where the vehicle 
 or conveyance is shown to be under the control or management of 
 
 162 
 
EULE EES IPSA LOQUITTJE.. 
 
 125 
 
 But this rule is held not to obtain in the case of freight 
 trains, where the manner of coupling causes from three to 
 five inches of slack in the coupling appliance of each car ** 
 and the slack in a train of usual length is such, on the slow- 
 ing down of the engine, or sudden stopping or starting of the 
 train, to jerk and jolt the rear cars, so as to throw a person off 
 his feet. In traveling by such trains, sudden jerks and jars 
 are incident to the travel, as usually carried on and for this 
 reason, a mere injury from a sudden jerk or jolt is not held 
 to render the carrier liable, under the rule res ipsa loquitur, 
 but, on the contrary, the carrier is not generally held respon- 
 sible at all for such injuries.*® 
 
 § 125. Sudden starting of street car or other public con- 
 veyance. — The St. Louis Court of Appeals, in an opinion by 
 Judge Thompson, held that where a horse car was started" 
 before a passenger had time to be seated in the car, as a re- 
 sult of which he was thrown against the side of the car and 
 his hand was badly cut in the glass of the car window, this 
 made out a prima facie case of negligence against the carrier, 
 without other proof of negligence on its part.®" In a New 
 York case,^^ the plaintiff, a fleshy woman, was getting out 
 of the defendant's omnibus when the horses suddenly started 
 
 the carrier, or his servants, and the accident is such, as, under an 
 ordinary course of things, does not happen, * * * it affords reason- 
 able evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the 
 accident arose for want of care.' And no good reason is seen why 
 the application of this rule may not be invoked in resolving the 
 question now before us." 
 
 *8 This was the evidence in this case. Erwin v. Kansas City, etc., 
 Ey. Co., 94 Mo. App. 296. 
 
 *o Portuchek v. Wabash Ey. Co., 101 Mo. App. 55; Wait v. Railway, 
 165 Mo. 612; 65 S. W. Eep. 1028; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Arnol, 144 
 111. 201; Olds V. New York, etc., E. Co., 172 Mass. 72; Erwin v. Kansas 
 City, etc., Ey. Co., 94 Mo. App. 289 ; Guffey v. E. E., 53 Mo. App. 462. 
 
 50 Dougherty v. Missouri Pacific By. Co., 9 Mo. App. 478. 
 
 Bi Eoberts v. Johnson, 58 N. Y. 613. 
 
 163 
 
§ 125 EULE EES IPSA LOQUITUR. 
 
 and she was thrown to the ground an^ badly injured. The 
 court held that this showed, prima facie, " either that the 
 horses were unsuitable for such service, or the driver incom- 
 petent or negligent in the performance of his duty. If the 
 starting of the' horses was attributable to some other cause, 
 for which the defendants were not responsible, h was for 
 them to show it." And these cases are in accordance with 
 the general rule applied to this class of public carriers. 
 Street railways are common carriers of passengers, the same 
 as steam railroads, and are held to the same degree of diligence 
 for the protection of their patrons ; ^^ if an injury occurs un- 
 der such circumstances as to raise the presumption that it 
 could only have arisen as a result of negligence, the defend- 
 ant will be held prima facie liable for such an injury and the 
 rule res ipsa loquitur yfill apply. Such carriers are held to a 
 very high degree of care for the protection of .their passen- 
 gers and if a passenger is injured from the starting of a car 
 before he has time to alight,^^ or the car is stopped and a pas- 
 senger alights in front of a rapidly approaching vehicle, as 
 a result of which he is injured,®* the defendant is, prima 
 facie, liable for such injuries. 
 
 But the mere fact of an accident to a passenger, during 
 transit, by a common carrier, without more, is not sufficient 
 evidence upon which to base a verdict and unless the facts 
 showing the injury are such as to leave the presumption that 
 the cause of the injury was the negligence of the defendant, 
 there could be no recovery. ®® 
 
 B2 Citizens Ry. Co. v. Carey, 56 Ind. 396 ; Chicago Ry. Co. v. Mum- 
 ford, 21 Alb. L. J. 214; Maverick v. Ry. Co., 30 N. Y. 378. 
 
 B3 Crissey v. Railroad Co., 75 Pa. St. 83. 
 
 54 Maverick v. Railroad Co., 36 N. Y. 378. 
 
 65 Curtis V. R. R., 18 N. Y. 536 ; Brehm v. Ry. Co., 34 Barb. 256. 
 
 The sudden stopping or starting of ears was held to raise a pre- 
 sumption of negligence on carrier's part, in following cases: Paul v. 
 Salt Lake, etc., R. Co. (Utah), 83 Pae. Rep. 563; Lincoln Traction Co. 
 V. Shepard (Neb.), 104 N. W. Rep. 882; Hamilton v. Metropolitan St, 
 164 
 
EULE EES IPSA LOQUITUK. §§ 126, 127 
 
 § 126. Frightening horses by noise from engine. — To carry 
 a case to the jury, under the doctrine res ipsa loquitur, the 
 evidence must tend to establish that the negligence of the de- 
 fendant was at least the proximate cause of the injury and 
 where the evidence shows a state of facts equally as consistent 
 with proper care, on defendant's part, as with his negligence, 
 the rule has no application. Hence, where the injuries to 
 plaintiff resulted from being thrown from a wagon by reason 
 of a frightened team, caused by an engine letting off steam, 
 it is not sufficient to make 'out a prima facie case, to simply 
 establish the fact of the frightening of the team, by the es- 
 caping steam, but it must be shown that the noise made by 
 the engine was unusual or unnecessary, in the skillful op- 
 eration of the engine, before the agent in charge thereof could 
 be held guilty of any negligence.®^ But in South Dakota, 
 the injuring or killing of a traveler's horse, at a public high- 
 way, is held to establish a prima facie case for the plaintiff, 
 which, if not explained by the defendant, will enable the 
 plaintiff to uphold a verdict for the value of such horse. ®^ 
 
 § 127. Falling of machinery or other objects. — The mere 
 fact of an injury, nnder circumstances which would not raise 
 
 R. Co., 114 Mo. App. 504; 89 S. W. Bep. 893; Joyce v. Los Angeles Ry. 
 Co., 147 Cal. 274; 82 Pac. Rep. 204; Cody v. Market St. Ry. Co. (Cal.), 
 82 Pac. Rep. 666; Griffin v. California Eleo. Co., 1 Cal. App. 678; 82 
 Pac. Rep. 1084; Georgia Ry. Co. v. Reeves, 123. Ga. 697; 51 S. E. 
 Rep. 610; Langley v. Metropolitan Ry. Co., 74 N. Y. S. 857; Bartle v. 
 Houghton Co. R. Co. (Mich.), 93 N. W. Rep. 620. 
 
 But not, in the following cases: Brqwn v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 94 
 N. Y. S. 190; 105 App. Div. 395; Young v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (Mo.), 
 84 S. W. Rep. 175; Behen v. Transit Co., 186 Mo. 430; 85 S. W. Rep. 
 346; Conroy v. Detroit Ry. Co. (Mich.), 102 N. W. Rep. 641. 
 
 In New York, the sudden stopping of a car, by which a passenger 
 was thrown against a car window and injured was held not to raise 
 a presumption of negligence on defendant's part, in Johnson v. Inter- 
 urban St. Ry. Co., 88 N. Y. S. 866. 
 
 66 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mertz (Ala.), 40 So. Rep. 60. 
 
 B7 Pougherty v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 104 N. W. Rep. 672. 
 
 J65 
 
§ 127 EULB EES IPSA LOQUITUE. 
 
 the legal presumption that it was caused proximately by the 
 defendant's negligence, is never suiBcient for the application 
 of the rule res ipsa loquitur. Hence, the mere fact of an 
 injury, shown to have been caused by the falling or breaking 
 of machinery, which the defendant was having operated, 
 without other explanation of the cause of such fall or break- 
 ing, would not raise the presumption that the injury was 
 caused by the negligence of the defendant.^* A part of the 
 machine may have been removed by the plaintiff himself, or 
 his coemployees and this presumption is just as logical as 
 that the defendant had removed or injured the machine and 
 more so, where the plaintiff was himself in charge of the 
 machine. 
 
 But where, from the peculiar facts of the case, the falling 
 of the machinery or other object, would raise a presumption 
 of negligence on the defendant's part,®® or, from the facts 
 established, it is apparent that the injury was caused by an 
 adequate cause and that such cause was the breach of a legal 
 duty owing the plaintiff by the defendant, then the rule 
 would be held to apply, and no further proof of the negli- 
 gence would be required than the circumstances connected 
 with the injury.®" An injury from a falling lamp, under 
 the control of the defendant,*^ a falling timber, placed 
 against an immovable upright,®^ a heavy iron " crowbar," 
 thrown upon the plaintiff's head, in the defendant's prem- 
 ises ; ®* a brick, from the overhead bridge of a railway com- 
 pany, falling upon a traveler's head, while a train was pass- 
 ing over the bridge,"* have all been held to be cases where 
 
 Bspiefka V. Knapp, Stout & Co., 145 Mo. 316; 46 S. W. Rep. 974. 
 68 See Gallagher v. Edison Co., 72 Mo. App. 576, and cases cited, 
 so Sakewitz v. American, etc., Co., 78 Mo. App. 144. 
 
 61 Gallagher v. Edison Co., 72 Mo. App., 576. 
 
 62 Sakewitz v. American, etc., Co., 78 Mo. App. 144. 
 
 83 Johnson v. Metropolitan, etc., Ry. Co., 104 Mo. App. 588. 
 64 Kearney v. Railway Co., L. R. 5 Q. B. 411 and L. R. 6 Q. B. 759. 
 Where there is an accident from the breaking of a machine, used 
 166 
 
EULE EES IPSA LOQUITUR. § 128 
 
 the facts showed a state of facts sufficient to raise the pre- 
 sumption that the injury was due to the negligence of the de- 
 fendant and if unexplained, would entitle the injured person 
 to a verdict. 
 
 § 128. Injuries from caving banks or pits. — The cavo-in of 
 a railroad cut or embankment or of a ditch or other excava- 
 tion, from which the plaintiff received injuries, may or may" 
 not have heen caused by the defendant's negligence and, 
 ordinarily, since the falling of such an earth bank may as 
 well have resulted from natural forces or natural laws, as 
 from any negligence on the defendant's part, an injury from 
 such a cause, would not, generally, be held to be within the 
 rule where any legal presumption would obtain against the 
 defendant, from facts showing the falling of such bank and 
 the resulting injury to the plaintiff.®^ In a well-considered 
 case, in California, by the federal court, the rule res ipsa 
 loquitur was held not to apply to an injury from a cave-in, 
 and the mere fact of an injury to the plaintiff, from such a 
 cause, was held not to make out a prima facie case against 
 
 by an employee, and there is neither proof of defects in the machine 
 nor error in its use, the law will not draw the inference that the ma- 
 chine was defective or that there was lack of care in its use. Green 
 V. Southern Ry Co., 72 S. C. 398; 52 S. E. Kep. 45; Stackpole v. Wray, 
 182 N. Y. 567; 75 N. E. Eep. 1134; Griffin v. Flank, 95 N. Y. S. 546. 
 
 The fact that staging, on which plaintiff was at work, gave way and 
 fell, was held to raise no presumption of negligence on the employer's 
 part, in Iowa. Bergman v. Altman, 127 Iowa 693 ; 104 N. W. Rep. 280. 
 But see Gorman v. Milliken, 92 N. Y. S. 1126; 102 App. Div. 617. 
 
 An injury to a railroad section hand, by the slipping of a pike maul 
 from the helve, raises no presumption of negligence against his em- 
 ployer. Deckard v. Wabash E. Co. (Mo.), 85 S. W. Rep. 982. 
 
 85 Bradley v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 138 Mo. 294; 39 S. W. Rep. 763; 
 Aldrich v. Furnace Co., 78 Mo. 559; Bro^vn v. Chattanooga Co., 101 
 Tenn. 252; 47 S. W. Eep. 415; Olsen v. McMullen, 34 Minn. 95; Swan- 
 son V. Great Northern Co., 68 Minn. 184 ; 70 N. W. Eep. 978 ; Del. Sej- 
 nore v. Halliman, 153 N. Y. 274; 47 IST. E. Rep. 308; Hughes v. Maiden, 
 etc., Co., 168 Mass. 396. 
 
 167 
 
§ 129 EULE EES IPSA LOQUITTJK.. 
 
 the defendant, as the cave-in may have been caused by nat- 
 ural causes, vs^ithoiit the intervention of any neglect on the 
 defendant's part.*" And, in Missouri, an injury from the 
 fall of an embankment in a railroad cut, was held to raise 
 no presumption of negligence against the defendant, but the 
 plaintiff was required to produce evidence of a breach of 
 duty owing to him by the defendant, before a recovery 
 could be had.®'' And if the work of the plaintiff was of 
 such a character as to cause the earth bank to fall, as where 
 he was himself engaged in a work of excavation, or actively 
 put in operation the familiar law of gravitation, instead of 
 any presumption of negligence obtaining as against the de- 
 fendant, the proof of such a state of facts would generally 
 preclude a recovery by the plaintiff.®*, 
 
 § 129. Injuries from negpligence of nurses at hospital. — The 
 
 rule res ipsa loquitur was recently considered by the Kansas 
 City Court of Appeals, in Missouri, in a case where the 
 plaintiff was injured by the negligence of nurses in a hos- 
 pital."® The case was one of first impression in the State 
 and the injuries sued for were alleged to have resulted from 
 severe burns on the plaintiff's body and limbs, caused by hot 
 water bottles, placed against his flesh by the nurses, while 
 he was still under the influence of an anesthetic, gi-ven for 
 the purpose of an operation, which had just been performed. 
 The decision was by Judge Ellison, one of the ablest judges 
 
 66 Mountain Copper Co. v. Van Buren, 123 Fed. Rep. 61. 
 
 67 Bradley v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 138 Mo. 293; 39 S. W. Rep. 763. 
 
 68 Texas & Pac. R. Co. y. French, 86 Texas, 96 ; 23 S. W. Rep. 642 ; 
 Aldrich v. Furnace Co., 78 Mo. 559; Watson v. Coal Co., 52 Mo. App. 
 366; Brown v. Chattanooga Co., 101 Tenn. 252; 47 S. W. Rep. 415; 
 Beiter V. Winona, etc., Co., 72 Minn. 225; 75 N. W. Rep. 219. See 
 for list of oases on cave-in in mines, etc., White, Per. Inj., Mines, 88 
 141, 153. 
 
 OS Adams v. UniVersitjr Hospital, p9 g, W, Rep, 453, 
 
 1^8 
 
EULE EES IPSA LOQUITUR. § 129 
 
 in tliat State, and in the course of his opinion, the court ob- 
 served : " We will say, at the outset, that, if the defendant's 
 liability is to be ascribed to the negligence of its nurses, the 
 manner of his injury was such as to authorize the rule of 
 res ipsa loquitur to be invokedJ" 
 
 And if such liability is to be based upon the negligence of 
 defendant in selecting competent nurses, that rule will also 
 apply. For, in either case, the injury is of itself, a suffi- 
 cient showing, unexplained, that it resulted from one or the 
 other of these sources of negligence, and we see no reason 
 why the defendant (if liable at all) should not be held to 
 be obliged to exculpate itself, by showing, in the latter 
 instance, that it had used proper care in the selection of its 
 nurses, as it would, in the former, by showing that the 
 nurses had not, themselves, been negligent." 
 
 The court then held that the defendant in that case was 
 not liable, because of the fact that it was a charitable insti- 
 tution, but that if the rule of liability would otherwise ap- 
 ply, that the acts of the nurses, unexplained, was, of itself, 
 sufficient evidence of negligence to bring the case within the 
 rule of res ipsa loquitur J^ 
 
 ToOlsen V. Ey. Co., 152 Mo. 426; 54 S. W. Rep. 470; Johnson v. 
 Railway Co., 104 Mo. App. 588; 78 S. W. Rep. 275; Dougherty v. Ry. 
 Co., 9 Mo. App. 478; Haggerty v. Ry. Co., 100 Mo. App. 424; 74 S. W. 
 Rep. 456. 
 
 '1 Adams' v. University Hospital, 99 S. W. Rep. 453. 
 
 169 
 
OHAPTEE VII. 
 
 ISSUES FOB THE COUET ALONE. 
 
 § 130. Scope of chapter. 
 
 131. Questions of law for the court. 
 
 132. Mixed questions of law and fact for court. 
 
 133. When there is total absence of negligence. 
 
 134. Court to decide whether duty owing or not. 
 
 135. Failure to prove negligence alleged. 
 
 136. Whether injury connected proximately with defendant's negli' 
 
 gence. 
 
 137. Court should determine demurrer to evidence. 
 
 138. When undisputed evidence shows contributory negligence. 
 
 139. Injury due to neglect of coemployee. 
 
 140. Selecting more dangerous way to perform duty. 
 
 141. Jury cannot erect special standards for control of business. 
 
 142. When court should decide necessity for rule. 
 
 143. Reasonableness of rule a judicial determination. 
 
 144. Open, obvious risks assumed as matter of law. 
 
 145. When safety of place a question of law. 
 
 146. When competency of employee a question of law. 
 
 147. When injury from collision a question for the court. 
 
 148. Where evidence disputes physical facts. 
 
 149. Questions of variance for the court. 
 
 § 130. Scope of chapter. — Under the gro-wing tendency to- 
 ward damage suit litigation in- the United States and the 
 not uncertain demand of those representing the plaintiffs 
 in such suits for a broader construction of the law of negli- 
 gence and the submission to the jury of almost every con- 
 ceivable issue which arises in such cases, it becomes im- 
 portant to ascertain, what, if any issues should be withheld 
 from the jury, within proper limitations, in the orderly 
 administration of the law and what should be decided by 
 the court. If any issues should be determined by the court, 
 J70 
 
ISSUES FOE THE COUET. § 131 
 
 as such, as distinguished from the unskilled jurymen who 
 often determine questions which come up in the trial of per- 
 sonal injury actions, in case such issues are not decided by 
 the court, but are submitted to a jury, then those possessing 
 no qualification to decide such issues are apt to decide wrong 
 as often as they may decide right and in such case there is 
 apt to be a failure of justice, for if the right prevails at 
 all, it is more or less a matter of haphazard or guess. Mani- 
 festly, it is of primal importance that -issues which should 
 be determined by the court should not be submitted to a 
 jury, for under the practice most generally prevailing, a 
 decision by them as to issues held properly submitted, is 
 held final upon appellate tribunals and if an issue is wrongly 
 given to a jury, instead of the court, in case of a wrong 
 decision upon such issue, there is no redress. It is there- 
 fore equally as important for the court to determine the 
 issues that ought to be determined by it, as to submit the 
 issues properly submitted to the jury, for their decision, 
 and, with a view of determining what issues should be thus 
 withheld from the jury, in the trial of personal injury ac- 
 tions against railroads, the author presents the subject mat- 
 ter of this chapter. 
 
 § 131. ftuestions of law for the court. — Since juries are 
 not learned in the law, it would be manifestly improper to 
 submit to them the determination of questions of law. 
 Hence, it is very generally held that the duty of passing upon 
 the facts belongs to the jury, while the duty of passing upon 
 the law of the case being tried, belongs alone to the court. ^ 
 It is error for the court to give to the jury instructions that 
 refer to them determination of legal issues.^ 
 
 iCoudy V. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ey. Co., 85 Mo. 79; Housman v. 
 Hope, 20 Mo. App. 193. 
 
 2 Fugate V. Carter, 6 Mo. 267. 
 
 171 
 
§§ 132, 133 ISSUES FOB THE COTJBT. 
 
 The court, in the first instance, should determine whether 
 there is any evidence warranting the submission of any is- 
 sue of fact to the jury and if there is not, then there is noth- 
 ing for a jury to decide.^ When there arg no issues of fact 
 for the jury, but the only controversies are over matters 
 or issues of law, whether they refer to the application or 
 interpretation of an ordinance,* or a foreign ® or domestic 
 law,® then all such issues of law should be determined by 
 the court. 
 
 § 132. Mixed questions of law and fact for court. — As 
 
 pourts, because learned in the law, are not, thereby neces- 
 sarily rendered incompetent to pass upon issues of fact, but 
 are nevertheless qualified to decide issues of fact as well as 
 the average jury, but juries, although qualified to 'pass upon 
 issues of fact, are incompetent to pass upon legal issues, be- 
 cause not learned in the law, it is generally held that the 
 fact that an issue of fact is also involved with one of law, 
 will not render the court incompetent to settle such mixed' 
 question of law and fact, but that the fact that a proposi- 
 tion of law is involved will render a jury incompetent to de- 
 termine such mixed question. It is therefore quite generally 
 held that when the proper solution of a proposition arising 
 in the trial of a law suit, depends upon a mixed question 
 of law and fact, it is a question for the court and not for the 
 jury, to decide.'' 
 
 § 133. When there is total absence of negligence. — When 
 
 sHillman v. Gray's Point Ter. Ry. Co., 99 Mo. App. 271; 73 S. W. 
 Eep. 220;!.: »; ■ 
 
 <( Barton v. Odessa, 82 S. W. Rep. 1119. 
 
 B Slaughter v. Met. St. Ry. Co., 116 Mo. 269; 23 S. W. Rep.' 760. 
 
 « State, to use of Goddard v. Rayburn, 31 Mo. App. 385. 
 
 ^ Jordan v. Hannabal, 87 Mo. 673 ; Kansas City v. Ferd Heim, etc., 
 Co., 98 Mo. App. 590; 73 S. W. Rep. 302, 
 
 1Y2 
 
ISSUES FOB THE COUET. § 133 
 
 the evidence for the plaintiff fails to show any negligence 
 at all on the defendant's part, the court should nonsuit the 
 plaintiff, or direct a verdict for the defendant.® Some of 
 the cases hold that it is not enough for the plaintiff to show 
 a mere scintilla of evidence going to establish the negligence 
 of the plaintiff, but to enable him to have his cause submitted 
 to the jury, he must introduce evidence of negligence amount-' 
 ing to more than a mere scintilla of proof.® This rule, of 
 course, is very flexible in its application, for evidence that 
 might seem to be a mere scintilla of proof, to one court, to 
 another might seem as strong as proof of holy writ, 
 hence, this rule is not generally adopted.^" But it is very 
 generally held that where no fair. inference of negligence on 
 the defendant's part, can be drawn from the evidence of 
 the plaintiff, assuming that evidence to be true and placing 
 a favorable interpretation thereon, then the cause should be 
 withheld from the jury.^ ^ 
 
 8 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Jones, 95 U. S. 439 ; Weightman v. 
 Washington, 66 U. S. 39; Eavenscraft v. Missouri Pacific Ey. Co., 27 
 Mo. App. 617. 
 
 9 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Horst, 110 Pa. St. 226; Carver v. Detroit, 
 etc., E. Co., 61 Mich. 584; Central R. Co. v. Rouse, 77 Ga. 393; Mayo 
 V. Boston, etc., E. Co., 104 Mass. 137. 
 
 10 Central R. Co. v. Rouse, 77 Ga. 393. 
 
 11 Hathaway v. Bast Tennessee, etc., R. Co., 29 Jed. Red. 489. 
 
 Where the evidence in a case is equally as consistent with an ab- 
 sence of negligence as with a presence of negligence, it is error to submit 
 the issue to the jury. Bailey v. Eome, etc., E. Co., 19 N. Y. S. E. 656; 
 49 Hun. 377; 3 N. Y. Supp. 585; Downey v. Sawyer, 157 Mass. 418; 
 32 N. E. Eep. 654. 
 
 It is the duty of the jury to determine whether negligence exists in a, 
 given case, but it is the duty of the court to determine whether there 
 is sufiBcient evidence to justify a submission to the jury and a mere 
 scintilla of evidence will not justify such submission. Powers v. New 
 York, etc., E. Co., 14 N. Y. Supp. 408; 60 Hun 19; 128 N. Y. 659; 29 
 N. E. Eep. 148 ; Union Pac. E. Cd. v. Eollins, 5 Kansas 167 ; Quibell v. 
 Union Pac. E. Co., 7 Utah 122; 25 Pac. Rep. 734; Latremouille v. 
 Bennington, etc., R. Co., 63 Vt. 336; 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 265; 22 
 Atl. Rep. 656. 
 
 1Y3 
 
§§134,135 ISSUES FOB THE COURT. 
 
 § 134. Court to decide whether duty owing or not. — 
 
 Whether the relation of the parties plaintiff or defendant is 
 such as to raise the duty on the part of the defendant upon 
 which the plaintiff's action is based, where the evidence of 
 that relation is undisputed, is a question of law for the 
 court. ^^ 
 
 • It is not a question for the jury, as to what the plaintiff 
 may have believed the defendant's duty toward him to have 
 been, but a question of what it really was, that concerns the 
 court, hence, it is incompetent to establish that when he ac- 
 cepted employment as a car inspector the plaintiff believed 
 that he would be protected in the performance of his duty.^* 
 His judgment about the protection to which he was entitled 
 might be governed by an entirely different standard than that 
 erected by the law. 
 
 § 135. Failure to prove negligence alleged. — The right of 
 the plaintiff to recover in a personal injury action, depending 
 upon the ability of the plaintiff to establish the specific 
 ground of negligence alleged, instead of some other or differ- 
 ent wrongful act, if the proof does not show the negligent act 
 complained of, there can be no recovery. The defendant 
 is only called upon to answer for the specific wrongful act 
 set out in the petition and xjannot be held liable on proof of 
 some other wrongful act or neglect and if there is a failure 
 to prove the specific ground of negligence alleged this will 
 justify a peremptory charge to the jury to find the issues 
 for the defendant.^* 
 
 12 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Bragonier, 119 111. 51; 7 N. E. Rep. 688. 
 
 13 Howard v. Savannah, etc., R. Co., 84 Ga. 711; 11 S. E. Rep. 452. 
 1* Watson V. Mound City, etc.. Railroad, 133 Mo. 246 ; 34 S. W. Rep. 
 
 573; Waldhier v. Railroad, 71 Mo. 515; Schneider v. Railroad, 75 Mo. 
 295; Hite v. Railroad, 130 Mo. 132; 31 S. W. Rep. 262; Leslie v. Rail-' 
 road, 88 Mo. 50; Ely v. Railroad, 77 Mo. 34; MoManamee v. Railroad, 
 135 Mo. 447; 37 S. W. Rep. 119. 
 
 1Y4 
 
IsstJes toa th£ CouRt. §136 
 
 A recent Missouri decision ^^ illustrates this rule of law. 
 The negligence charged in the petition was that of the 
 " gripman," in negligently operating the car, so as to cause 
 it to jerk or lurch, throwing the plaintiff off. Of this direct 
 allegation, the court said : " This is a specific charge of a 
 specific act, on the part of the gripman, which was suscepti- 
 ble of positive and direct proof, and excludes any idea or 
 intention of the pleader to rely upon general negligence, but 
 on the contrary expressly limits the plaintiff to proof of the 
 specific negligence alleged." And, the evidence establishing 
 that the gripman had done nothing at all to make the car 
 lurch, but that it was a customary jerk or lurch, in no way 
 due to his act, as alleged, the court observed : " This was 
 practically all the evidence adduced by the plaintiff, to sus- 
 tain the issue of carelessness and negligence, on the part of 
 the gripman, in operating the car. To state it is all that is 
 necessary to conclusively demonstrate that the plaintiff ut- 
 terly failed to make out a prima facie case, such as entitled 
 him to go to the jury." ^^ 
 
 § 136. Whether injury connected proximately with defend- 
 ant's negligence. — The court does not perform its full duty, 
 even though the plaintiff's evidence shows that the defendant 
 was guilty of negligence, or of the specific negligence in the 
 petition alleged, unless it also ascertains, .before submitting 
 the cause to the jury, whether or not the evidence tends to 
 show that such negligence was the proximate cause of the 
 injury complained of. It is the primary duty of the court, 
 in all jury trials, to ascertain if the evidence tends to estab- 
 
 15 Bartley v. Metropolitan, etc., E. Co., 148 Mo. 140 ; 49 S. W. Eep. 
 840. 
 
 18 Bartley v. Metropolitan, etc., R. Co., 148 Mo. 140; 49 S. W. Eep. 
 840. See, also, Kansas City, etc., S. E. Co. v. Allen, 67 Pac. Eep. 436; 
 Hunt V. Kile, 98 Fed. Eep. 49; Moyer v. Eamsey-Brisbane Co., 119 Ga. 
 744; 46 S. E. Eep. 844. 
 
 175 
 
§ 137 ISSUES FOB THE COURT. 
 
 lish the basic allegation of the petition, before submitting 
 the case to the jury, for if it does not, there is properly no 
 issue for the jury to decide and the cause should not be sub- 
 mitted.^^ It is therefore a question of law for the court to 
 determine whether or not the evidence of the plaintiff tends 
 to establish that the injury was caused by the negligence al- 
 leged in the petition ^® and if the evidence clearly shows that 
 the negligence alleged was not the proximate cause of the in- 
 jury,^* or that the injury resulted from an independent inter- 
 vening cause,^° or if, from all the facts, the court is unable 
 to determine whether or not the defendant's negligence 
 caused the injury,^^ the court should withdraw the case from 
 the jury. But if the evidence on the issue whether or not 
 the negligence alleged was the cause of the injury, is con- 
 flicting, or if the question is one, in the opinion of the judge, 
 that could be decided differently by different minds, then the 
 cause on this issue should be submitted for the determina- 
 tion of the jury. ^2 
 
 § 137. Court should determine demurrer to evidence. — It 
 
 is the province of the court to determine whether the evidence 
 
 17 Where there was a total absence of evidence that the defective con- 
 dition of a spur track caused an injury, it was held error to submit to 
 the jury the determination of the proximate cause thereof. Baltzer v. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co., 83 Wis. 459; 53 N. W. Kep. 885. See, also, 
 1' Thompson, on Neg. (2 ed.), § 162, p. 159. 
 
 18 Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Murray, 53 Ohio St. 570; 42 N. E. Rep. 
 596; 30 L. R. A. 508; O'Malley v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 53 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 280; Dowell v. Guthrie, 99 Mo. 653; Murray v. Railroad 
 Co., 101 Mo. 236 ; Boland v. Railway Co., 36 Mo. 484. 
 
 19 Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Johnson, 81 Fed. Rep. 679; 53 U. 
 S. App. 381; 1 Thompson on Neg. (2 ed.), § 162, p. 159. 
 
 20 South Side, etc., R. Co. v. Trich, 117 Pa. St. 390; Hoag v. Lake 
 Shore, etc., R. Co., 85 Pa. St. 293. 
 
 21 Safford v. Green Island, 74 Hun 306; 56 N. Y. S. R. 269; 26 N. Y. 
 Supp. 669; 1 Thompson on Neg. (2 ed.), § 162, p. 159. 
 
 22 Keane v. Waterford, 130 N. Y. 188 ; Dunn v. Cass Avenue, etc., R. 
 Co., 21 Mo. App. 188. 
 
 176 
 
Issues »oe. the court. § ISS 
 
 of the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case against the de- 
 fendant, or such a state of facts as to constitute any issue of 
 fact sufficient to justify a submission of the cause to the 
 jury.^^ Where the defendant demurs to the plaintiff's evi- 
 dence, the court should apply the law to the facts and in 
 making this application, the court has to decide what in- 
 ferences are legitimate from the facts proven and whether 
 or not the facts and legitimate inferences support the issues.^* 
 In passing on a demurrer, a court is not at liberty to make 
 inferences of fact in favor of the defendant, to overthrow 
 either presumptions of law or inferences of fact in favor of 
 the plaintiff. But in passing upon a demurrer to the evi- 
 dence, where the plaintiff's evidence excludes any fair infer: 
 ence warranting a recovery, the court should then sustain 
 the demurrer and instruct the jury to find for the de- 
 fendant^s 
 
 § 138. When undisputed evidence shows contributory negli- 
 gence. — When the evidence either for the plaintiff or for the 
 defendant is such as to show that the plaintiff was guilty 
 of contributory negligence, or when all the testimony in the 
 case, with the most favorable inferences to be drawn there- 
 from, indicates the carelessness of the plaintiff, contributing 
 to the injury, then the court should withdraw the issues from 
 the jury.^® If the facts introduced in evidence at the trial 
 furnish conclusive proof of the plaintiff's negligence, con- 
 tributing to the injury complained of, this presents a case 
 where the conclusion of law attaches as a necessary legal 
 inference from the facts established.^^ The plaintiff main- 
 
 2S Nolan v. Shickle, 3 Mo. App. 300. 
 2*Frick V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 75 Mo. 595. 
 
 25 Morrow v. Pullman Palace Car Co., 98 Mo. App. 351 ; 73 S. W. 
 Eep. 281 ; Holmes v. Leadbetter, 95 Mo. App. 419 ; 69 S. W. Rep. 23. 
 28 Mynning v. Detroit, etc., R. Co., 67 Mich. 677. 
 2' Steamship Belgenland v. Jansen, 114 U. S. 355. 
 ; 1-12 117 
 
§ 139 ISSUES FOE THE COTJET. 
 
 taining his cause upon the sole theory of a wrongful act of 
 the defendant producing the injury, h^ is clearly without a 
 remedy when the facts proven establish an injury, due to his 
 own wrongful act. But where .the evidence of the plaintiff's 
 negligence is conflicting, or if the facts showing his negli- 
 gence are undisputed and reasgnable men would differ as to 
 the wrongful character of his acts, this would present such an 
 issue of fact as would make it proper to submit the question 
 of plaintiff's negligence to the jury.^^ 
 
 § 139. Injury due to neglect of coemployee. — In the ab- 
 sence of a statute changing the common law rule that an 
 employee assumes the risk of injury; from the negligence of 
 his coemployees, by virtue of his contract of employment, 
 where the evidence shows, without dispute, that the relation 
 of coemplOyee exists between the plaintiff and the employee 
 causing the injury, a peremptory instruction should be given 
 for the defendant.^® This is the general rule in all States 
 where the common law rule of nonliability for the negligence 
 of coemployees has not been abrogated by special statute.^" 
 
 28 Dougherty v. Missouri Pacific Ey. Co., 97 Mo. 647; Nugent v. 
 Boston, etc., R. Co., 80 Me. 62. 
 
 29 Priestley v. Fowler, 3 JVl. & W. 1 ; Neubauer v. New York, etc., R. 
 Co., 101 N. Y. 607; 4 N. E. Rep. 125; Hanley v. Grand Trunk E. Co., 
 62 N. H. 274; Hard v. Vermont, etc., R. Co., 32 Vt. 473; Crispin v. 
 Babbitt, 81 N. Y. 516; Duffy v. Kivilin, 98 111. App. 483; 63 N. E. 
 Rep. 503; MacCarthy v. Whitcomb, 110 Wis. 113; 85 N. W. Rep. 707; 
 Ashmore v. Charleston, etc., Co., 99 111. App. 262; Shaw v. Bambrick- 
 Bates Co. (Mo. App.), 77 S. W. Rep. 96. 
 
 30 Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126; 11 So. Rep. 803; 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Triplett, 54 Ark. 289; 15 S. W. Rep. 831; 
 48 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 283; Long v. Coronado R. Co., 96 Cal. 269; 31 
 Pac. Rep. 170; Congrave v. Southern Pac. E. Co., 88 Cal. 360; 26 
 Pac. Rep. 175; 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 33T; Summerhays v. Kansas Pac. 
 R. Co., 2 Colo. 484; 20 Am. Ry. Rep. 359; Herbert v. Northern Pac. 
 R. Co., 3 Dak. 38; 13 N. W. Rep. 349; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 85; 
 Stafford v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 114 111. 244; 2 N. E. Rep. 185; 
 Justice V. Pennsylvania E. Co., 130 Ind. 321; 30 N. E. Rep. 303; 53 
 
 178 
 
ISSUES FOE THE OOUST. § 140 
 
 Of course it would not be the negligence of tiie employee, 
 but of tbe employer, himself, if incompetent employees had 
 been knowingly engaged, and this rule would not obtain, but 
 where due diligence has been used in the employment of the 
 employee causing the injury and the accident results pri- 
 marily from the negligence of such employee, there is no lia- 
 bility on the employer's part, for the good and sufficient rea- 
 son that the employer is only responsible for the wrongful 
 acts of his agents, or those of himself, and as between com- 
 mon employees, no one of them, as between himself and his 
 coequals, is the employer's agent and he would not be liable 
 to any one of them for injuries due to the acts or omissions 
 of any other.** 
 
 § 140. Selecting more dangerous way to perform duty. — 
 
 There are numerous railroad accident cases, for injuries to 
 
 Am. & Eng. B. Cas. 604; Kansas Fac. K. Co. v. Salmon, 11 Kansas 83; 
 McLeod V. Ginther, 80 Ky. 399; 8 Am. & Eng. K. Cas. 162; Cassidy v. 
 Maine Cent. R. Co., 76 Me. 488; 17 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 519; Cumber- 
 land, etc., I. R. Co. V. Scally, 27 Md. 589; Fitzgerald v. Boston, etc., 
 R. Co., 156 Mass. 293; 31 N. E. Rep. 7; Hunn v. Michigan, etc., R. Co., 
 78 Mich. 513; 44 N. W. Rep. 502; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 452; 7 
 L. R. A. 500; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Petty, 67 Miss. 255; 7 So. Rep. 
 351; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 441; McDermott v. Pacific R. Co., 30 
 Mo. 115; Dixon v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 109 Mo. 413; 19 S. W. Rep. 
 412; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 589; Harrison v. Central R. Co., 31 N. J. 
 L. 293; Lutz V. Atlantic, etc., R. Co. (N. Mex.), 30 Pac. Rep. 912; 
 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 478; Vick v. New York, etc., R. Co., 95 N. Y. 
 267; 17 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 609; Donnely v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 
 109 N. Y. 16; 15 N. E. Rep. 733; 34 Am. & Eng. R; Cas. 103; Hobbs 
 V. Atlantic, etc., R. Co., 107 N. Car. 1; 12 S. E. Rep. 124; Little 
 Miami R. Co. v. Pitzpatrick, 42 Ohio St. 318; Mensch v. Pennsylvania 
 R. Co., 150 Pa. St. 598; 25 Atl. Rep. 31; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 198; 
 GuU, etc., R. Co. v. Blohn, 73 Texas 637; 11 S. W. Rep. 867; 4 L. R. A. 
 764; Dwyer v. American Exp. Co., 82 Wis. 307; 52 N. W. Rep. 304; 
 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 612. 
 
 31 Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Hammersley, 28 Ind. 371; Chicago, etc., R. 
 Co. V. Hoyt, 16 111. App. 237; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Ross, 112 U. S. 
 377. 
 
 179 * 
 
§ 141 ISSUES FOE THE OOUKT. 
 
 employees where the courts hold that it was the duty of the 
 trial court to .take the case from the jury, because the evi- 
 dence showed that the employee had voluntarily selected the 
 more dangerous of two or more ways to perform his work.*^ 
 In a recent Missouri case,^* the plaintiff, a switchman, in 
 a railroad yard, was engaged in coupling two freight cars, 
 with drawheads of unequal height, with a straight link, in- 
 stead of a crooked one, as should have been provided. His 
 hand was crushed, as a result of the cars coming together, 
 while making the coupling. He admitted that he could have 
 propped up the lower drawhead and made the coupling with- 
 out holding it in place with his hand, but did not have time 
 to do this, as he thought. His selection of the more danger- 
 ous way to perform his duty was held to prevent his recov- 
 ery, as a matter of law. 
 
 § 141. Jury cannot consider special standards for control of 
 business. — The proper standard which the legal experience 
 of the ages has found best adapted as the test for determin- 
 ing the actionable negligence of an employer for a failure 
 to discharge his implied duty owing to his employee, by 
 which an injury is sustained, is that of ordinary or cus- 
 tomary use of the business wherein the . accident occurred. 
 Any higher standard than this should not be placed upon the 
 employer and no different test should be submitted to the 
 trial jury to judge of his acts in a given case. 
 
 As observed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in a 
 leading case : " No man is held to a higher degree of skill 
 
 32 Nor is thia rule confined to railroad cases only, but applies to 
 other vocations as well. See White, Per. Inj. in Mines, § 138, p. 146; 
 1 Bailey, Mas. Liab. Inj. Serv., §§ 1121, 1123; Hulitt v. Kailroad, 67 
 Mo. 241 ; Weber v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 100 Mo. 201 ; Buesching 
 V. Gas Light Co., 73 Mo. 219; Yancey v. Railroad Co., 93 Mo. 433; 
 Gribben v. Yellow Aster, etc., M. Co., 142 Cal. 248; 75 Pae. Rep. 839. 
 
 33 Moore v. Kansas City, etc., E. Co., 146 .Mo. 580; 48 S. W. Rep. 487. 
 
 180 
 
ISSUES FOE THE COUET. § 142 
 
 than the fair average of his trade or profession and the stand- 
 ard of due care is the conduct of the average prudent man. 
 The test of negligence, as to employers, is the same; and, 
 however strongly they may he convinced that there is a better 
 or less dangerous way, no jury can be permitted to say that 
 the usual and ordinary way, commonly adopted by those in 
 the same business, is a negligent way, for which liability 
 . shall be imposed. Juries must necessarily determine the re- 
 sponsibility of individual conduct, but they cannot be allowed 
 to set up a standard which shall, in effect, dictate the customs 
 or control the business of the community." ^*, Upon grounds 
 of sound policy, this is a decision that should be followed, 
 for it is based upon the most saliftary legal principles. 
 
 § 142. When court should decide necessity for rule. — In 
 the absence of evidence of the general' or customary use or 
 adoption by other railroads of a given rule or method of 
 business, or of the necessity of such a rule for the reasonable 
 protection of its employees by a railroad company, it is gen- 
 erally held to be improper to submit the -issue of the necessity 
 of such rule to a jury, but the court should decide, as matter 
 
 3* Titus V. Railway Co., 136 Pa. St. 618; 20 Atl. Eep. 517; North- 
 ern Cent. Ey. Co. v. Husson, 101 Pa. St. 1. See, also, Washington, 
 etc., Ey. Co. v. McDade, 135 U. S. 554; Louisville, etc., Ey. Co. v. 
 Allen, 78 Ala. 494. 
 
 The absurd consequences that would result from any other test than 
 that of ordinary use, is thus presented by Judge Bailey : " If the 
 party, according to his peculiar notion, should adopt a device not in 
 common use, and injury should flow therefrom, he would be embar- 
 rassed in defending, upon the ground that he acted thus in the exercise 
 Of ordinary care." Bailey, Mas., Liab. Inj. Serv., p. 30. See, also, 
 Tuttle V. Ey. Co., 122 U. S. 194; Eandall v. Eailway Co., 109 U. S. 482. 
 
 In the absence of proof by experts or others tha.t a given method 
 of railroading is safe or unsafe, it is error to let a jury speculate 
 about it by a verdict. Herbert v. Delaware, etc., E. Co., 41 N. Y. S. E. 
 860; 62 Hun 618; 136 N. Y. 655; 32 N. E. Eep. 1016; 49 N. Y. S. E, 
 916; Larow v. New York, etc., E. Co., 61 Hun (N. Y.) 11. 
 
 181 
 
§ 143 ISSUES FOE THE COUET. 
 
 of law, that the absence of such a rule is not a negligent act 
 on the employer's part. 
 
 Where the rules of a compahy required car repairers to 
 place a flag at the end of the disabled car and to inform 
 themselves of the rules of the company and pursue the safe 
 course when in doubt, it was held in New York that such 
 company was not negligent in failing to provide additional 
 rules for the information and government of its car repair- 
 ers.^^ In the absence of evidence of the necessity of such a 
 rule, or its adoption by railroads generally, it was held to be 
 error, to submit to a jury the necessity of a rule preventing 
 a switch engine from entering a switch when another car 
 or engine was upon said switch, without notice to the crew 
 of such engine or car ; ^* it was also held to be error to sub- 
 mit to a jury the necessity of adopting a given method or 
 rule as to movement of engines in railroad yards ; *^ to sub- 
 mit the necessity of requiring lights in yards, on stationary 
 cars, to prevent collisions,** or the necessity of rules pre- 
 venting the improper opening of switches, by employees,^" 
 in the absence of evidence of the general adoption or neces- 
 sity of such a rule. 
 
 § 143. Keasonableness of rule a judicial determination.— 
 
 3B Corcoran v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 126 N. Y. 673 ; 27 N. E. Rep. 
 1022; 28 N. Y. S. R. 251; 4 Silv. App. 483. 
 
 soLarow v. New York, etc., R. Co., 40 N. Y. S. R. 26; 61 Hun 11; 
 15 N. Y. Supp. 384; Abel v. Delaware, etc., E. Co., 103 N. Y. 581; 4 
 N. Y. S. R. 269; Ford v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., 36 N. y. S. R. 494; 
 Doing V. New York, etc., R. Co., 73 Hun 270; 26 N. Y. Supp. 405; 
 Berrigan v. New York, etc., R. Co., 131 N. Y. 582. 
 
 37 Herbert v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 136 N. Y. 655; 32 N. E. Rep. 
 1016; 49 N. Y. S. R. 916; 41 N. Y. S. R. 860; 62 Hun 618; 16 N. Y. 
 Supp. 561. 
 
 asShepard v. New York, etc., R. Co., 44 N. Y. S. R. 816; 63 Hun 
 634; 18 N. Y. Supp. 665; Houghkirk v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 92 N. Y. 
 220. 
 
 3» Burke v. Syracuse, etc., R. Co., 23 N. Y. Supp. 458; 69 Hun 21. 
 182 
 
ISSUES FOE THE COUKT. § 144 
 
 The issue, when raised in the trial of a personal injury 
 action, of whether or not a duly promulgated rule of the em- 
 ployer is a reasonable rule, under all the circumstances, is 
 so far dependent upon a correct understanding of the law 
 and the legal rules by which such issues are determined, as 
 to make it an issue for the court.*" When judged according 
 to legal precedents, the einployer is not harassed by the con- 
 flicting decisions of juries as to whether his rules are to be 
 enforced or not, nor is the employee embarrassed by the 
 dubious character of the holding as to what his duties should 
 be, but such rules may be reduced to a certainty, which is a 
 fact cited by one eminent authority, to show why such issues 
 should be determined by the court.*^ 
 
 In Illinois,*^ New York,*^ Iowa ** and Tennessee,*^ the 
 reasonableness of a given rule is held to be a question for 
 the court; where the facts are undisputed it is held to be 
 for the court, in Massachusetts;*^ it is held to be a jury 
 question, in New Jersey *^ and Georgia *® and a mixed qufes-. 
 tion of law and fact in Wisconsin *® and Michigan. ^^ 
 
 § 144. Open, obvious risks assumed as matter of law. — 
 
 Where the undisputed evidence shows that the injury was 
 caused by a risk of the service not resulting from the em- 
 ployer's negligence, but one that was perfectly open and 
 obvious to the employee, then the employer has a right, in 
 
 *» Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. MeLarren, 84 111. 110; Wolsey v. Railroad 
 Co., 33 Ohio St. 234. ' ' 
 
 11 Bailey, Mas. Liab. Inj. Serv., p. 75. 
 42 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. MeLarren, 84 111. 110. 
 43Vedder v. Fellows, 20 N. Y. 126. 
 44Hoflfbauer v. Railway Co., 52 Iowa 342. 
 *6 Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Fleming, 14 Lea. (Tenn.) 128. 
 48 Old Colony R. Co. v. Tripp, 147 Mass. 35; 17 N. E. Rep. 89. 
 
 47 State V. Overton, 24 N. J. Law 435. 
 
 48Prather v. Railway Co., 80 Ga. 427; 9 S. E. Rep. 530. 
 
 48 Bass V. Ry. Co., 36 Wis. 459. 
 60 Day V. Owen, 5 Mich. 520. 
 
 1&3 
 
§ 145 ISSUES FOE THE COUKT. 
 
 law, to conclude that he -would notice- that which was ap- 
 parent to all men and if the employee is injured from com- 
 ing in contact with a dangerous appliance or place that any 
 one could perceive, hy due perception or observation, there 
 is no liability on the employer's part for such an injury.^^ 
 
 § 145. When safety of place a question of law. — When the 
 undisputed evidence, in an action for an injury due to work- 
 ing in an alleged unsafe place, shows that the place of work 
 was such as was reasonably safe, or such as was customarily 
 furnished by reasonably prudent men in the same business,^^ 
 
 Whether a rule adopted by a railroad company for the protection 
 of its employees is a reasonable regulation, or not, is a question of 
 law for the court and it should not be submitted to the jury. Memphis, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Graham, 94 Ala. 545 ; 53" Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 396 ; 10 
 So. Rep. 283; Quick v. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co., 130 111. 334; 22 
 N. E. .Rep. 709 ; Southerland v. Troy, etc., R. Co., 28 N. Y. S. E. 201 ; 
 54 Hun 639; 125 N. Y. 737. 
 
 51 Nugent V. Milling Co., 131 Mo. 241; 33 S. W. Rep. 428; Glover v. 
 Bolt & Nut Co., 153 Mo. 327; 55 S. W. Rep. 88; Demers v. Marshall, 
 172 Mass. 548; 52 N. E. Rep. 1066; 59 N. E. Rep. 454; Levey v. 
 Bigelow, 6 Ind. App. 677; 34 N. E. Eep. 128; Gorman v. Des Moines 
 Brick Co., 99 Iowa 257; 68 N. W. Rep. 674; Labatt, Mas. & Serv., 
 §§ 339, 442; Richmond L. & R. Co. v. Weems, 12 So. Rep. 186; Gofrey 
 V. Inman Co., 31 Atl. Rep. 6; Cahill v. Hilton, 13 N. E. Rep. 339; 
 Stall V. Hoopes, 14 Atl. Rep. 658; Hoffman v. Foundry Co., 51 Pac. 
 Rep. 385; Aiken v. Smith, 54 Fed. Rep. 896; Fleming v. BushncU, 
 57 N. Y. Supp. 230; Cushman v. Cushman, 61 N. E. Rep. 262; 
 Killilea v. Horseshoe Co., 74 Pac. Rep. 157; Russell v. Tillottson, 4 
 N; E. Rep. 231; Downey v. Sawyer, 32 N. E. Rep. 654; Smith v. Box 
 Co., 92 S. W. Rep. 394. 
 
 Where an employee is injured by a defect in an appliance about 
 which he worked several months, without complaint, he cannot recover. 
 Skipp V. Eastern Co. Ry. Co., 9 Ex.- 223; 23 L. J. Ex. 23; 3 C. L. R. 185. 
 
 Where the evidence shows that the injury was due to a risk of the 
 business, the case should not be submitted to the jury. Steffen v. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co., 46 Wis. 259; 21 Am. Ry. Rep. 385; Ballou v. 
 Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 54 Wis. 257; 41 Am. Rep. 31; 5 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 480. 
 
 62 Nowakowski v. Detroit, etc., Co., 89 N. W. Rep. 956; 9 Det. 
 Leg. N. 25; White, Per. Inj. in Mines and cases cited, § 145, p. 150. 
 
 184 
 
ISSUES FOK THE COUKT. § 146 
 
 or that the plaintifE, at the time of his injury, was engaged 
 in making an unsafe place safe, or in changing the place of 
 work, by the very nature of his work,®* and that the con- 
 tinuance of his work occasioned the injury, it is the duty 
 of the court to take the case from the jury. An illustration 
 of this rule of law is the case where the employee is engaged 
 in excavating a bank of earth or gravel and his work of ex- 
 cavation itself breaks up the particles of earth or gravel and 
 sets in force the law of gravitation. In such case there can 
 be ,no recovery.®* 
 
 § 146. When competency of employee a question of law. — 
 
 Where the evidence of the precautions taken by an employer 
 in the employment of his employees is all one way, or is not 
 disputed, the court should give such evidence the same legal 
 effect as that establishing any other fact and if the evidence 
 is such as to show a total absence of negligence on the em- 
 ployer's part, in the employment of the alleged incompetent 
 employee, th^ jury should be so instructed. In a Michigan 
 case, an employer was held to have exercised due care in the 
 employment of a brakeman, where, before employment, he 
 made inquiry of one competent to judge of the applicant's 
 knowledge and experience and after his employment he had 
 him watched by a competent engineer and instructed, if he 
 required instruction.®® 
 
 "3 Watson V. Coal & Coke Co., 52 Mo. App. 366; Olsen v. Maple 
 Grove, etc., M. Co. (Iowa), 87 N. W. Rep. 736; Moon Anchor Con., etc., 
 Co. Y. Hopkins, 111 Fed. Rep. 298; 49 C. C. A. 347. 
 
 5* Bradley v. Chicago, etc., R.' Co., 138 Mo. 293; 39 S. W. Rep. 763; 
 Brown v. Chattanooga Co., 101 Tenn. 252; 47 S. W. Rep. 415; Olsen 
 V. McMullen, 34 Minn. 95; Aldrich v. Furnace Co., 78 Mo. 559; 
 Peterson v. Rushford, 41 Minn. 290; Swanson v. Great Northern R. 
 Co., 68 Minni 184; 70 N. W. Rep. 978; Hughes v. Maiden, etc., R. 
 Co., 168 Mass. 396. 
 
 BBWalkowski v. Penokee, etc.. Con. Mines, 115 Mich. 629; 73 N. W. 
 Rep. 895; 41 L. R. A. 33; Acme Coal Min. Co. v. Mclver, 5 Colo. 267. 
 
 185 
 
§§147,14:8 ISSUES FOE THE COtTET. 
 
 § 147. When injury from collision a question for the court. 
 — Under the rule of demonstrative evidence, heretofore dis- 
 cussed in a separate chapter,^* it is frequently a question for 
 the court to tell the jury that a derailment or collision is or 
 is not negligence, as matter of law, according to the relation 
 of the party plaintiff toward the defendant and the duty 
 springing from that relation. 
 
 In an injury to an employee from a collision, the duty 
 may or may not, devolve upon the court to decide the ques- 
 tion of the defendant's negligence or want of responsibility 
 for the collision, according to the cause thereof. In a Wash- 
 ington case,^^ it was. held to be a question properly for the 
 court, where the evidence showed that plaintiff and others 
 were engaged in surfacing the defendant's roadbed and 
 while being conducted to their place of work on a gravel 
 train, a collision with a wild train occurred, which resulted 
 in injury to the plaintiff. The gravel train was on tinoje and 
 the wild train had orders to flag it, but instead of the flag- 
 man going three-quarters of a mile ahead to flag it, as the 
 rules required, he was only four hundred feet ahead and 
 could not see the gravel train until it was upon them. 
 
 § 148. Where evidence disputes physical facts. — Although 
 there may be evidence that would ordinarily entitle a plain- 
 tiff in a personal injury action to have his cause submitted 
 to a jury, upon the different issues in the case, tending to es- 
 tablish the negligence of the defendant and its accountability 
 for the injury sued for, where such evidence is directly in 
 
 The fact that on some occasions an alleged incompetent employee 
 might have been negligent, would not charge an employer, where no 
 injury had resulted from said acts of negligence and there was nothing 
 to show notice thereof, on the employer's part. Wabash & C. R. Co. 
 v. McDaniels, 107 U. S. 454; 27 L. Ed. 905; Molaskee v. Ohio, etc., Co., 
 86 Wis. 22; Kansas & Texas Co. v. Brownlie, 60 Ark. 582. 
 
 56 See Chapter VI. 
 
 6T Northern Pacific R. Co. v. O'Brien, 1 Wash. 599 ; 21 Pac. Rep. 32. 
 186 
 
ISSUES FOE THE COUET. § 148 
 
 conflict with physical facts, which preclude any liability on 
 the defendant's part, some courts hold that it is the duty of 
 the trial court to take the case from the jury. 
 
 In a New York case,^^ the plaintiff was injured by the 
 falling of a scaffold, on which he was at work, just as an en- 
 gine passed. He testified that the engine struck»the scaffold 
 and caused it to fall, but other witnesses had worked on the 
 same scaffold 'when the same engine passed, without striking 
 it and it was held, in the absence of proof of the width of the 
 engine or tender and the distance of such scaffold from the 
 track, it was error to submit the issues to the jury. 
 
 In a Missouri case,^® where a plaintiff, in a crossing acci- 
 dent, testified that her vision was good and although there 
 were no obstructions, that she could not see an approaching 
 train, while looking in that direction, the Supreme Court 
 held that such evidence should not be held to make a prima 
 facie case on her part because inconsistent with the physical 
 facts, and in another case,*" in the same State, where the 
 explanation by plaintiff of an injury by having his hand 
 crushed by visible rollers, was inconsistent with the physical 
 facts in the case, the court disregarded this testimony and, 
 speaking through Eobinson,. J., Ihe Supreme Court said : 
 " The statements by a witness of the existence or nonexist- 
 ence, the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a given thing as a 
 fact that, contravenes all laws of mechanics and philosophy 
 that are so generally recognized that courts cannot ignore 
 them, cannot be said to be matters of fact that must go to a 
 jury for their consideration as to their credibility, on the 
 
 ssHayden v. Brooklyn Electric R. Co., 44 N. Y. S. R, 377; 17 N. Y. 
 Supp. 352, distinguishing German v. Suburban Tr. Co., 37 N. Y. S. R. 
 360. 
 
 so Macfarlane, J., in Kelsay v. Railroad, 129 Mo. 376; 30 S. W. 
 Rep. 239. 
 
 60 Nugent v. Milling Co., 131 Mo. 253; 33 S. W. Rep. 428. 
 
 187 
 
§ 149 ISSUES FOE THE COUET. 
 
 proposition that the jury are the triers of all facts in a suit 
 at law." 
 
 § 149. Questions of variance for the court. — As it is the 
 province of the court to determine whether, in the first in- 
 stance, thera is any evidence sufficient to. warrant the sub- 
 mission of any issues of fact to the jury, for their determina- 
 tion,"^ the determination of the legal question whether or not 
 the evidence adduced by the plaintiff tends to establish, or is 
 sufficient, as matter of law, to establish the particular grounds 
 of negligence alleged, is also an issue properly for the court. 
 It is therefore an issue for the conrt to. determine whether 
 or not there is a fatal variance between the pleading and the 
 proof.*^ 
 
 61 Hillman v. Gray's Point Ter. Ry. Co., 09 Mo. App. 271 ; 73 S. W. 
 Kep. 220. 
 
 62 Birch V. Benton, 26 Mo. 153; Roundtree v. Charleston, etc., R. 
 Co., 72 S. C. 474; 52 S. E. Rep. 231. 
 
 188 
 
CHAPTEE VIII. 
 
 JUEY ISSUES IN EAILEOAD ACCIDENTS^ 
 
 § 150. Should pass upon disputed issues of fact. 
 
 151. Weight of evidence determined by. 
 
 152. Question of defendant's negligence. 
 
 153. Specific issues in determining defendant's negligence. * 
 
 154. Nature and cause of injury. 
 
 155. As to reasonable safety of appliances. 
 
 156. Reasonable safety of place. 
 
 157. When plaintiff's negligence a jury issue. 
 
 158. Whether injury due to negligence of vice-principal. 
 
 159. Capacity in which vice-principal acted. 
 
 160. Issue as to agent's competency. . 
 
 161. Issues as to who are coemployees. 
 
 162. Assumption of risk jury issue, when. 
 
 163. Promulgation and enforcement of rule. 
 
 164. Discretion in assessing damages. 
 
 165. Conclusiveness of verdict. 
 
 § 150. Should pass upon disputed issues of fact. — In the 
 
 trial of personal injury actions, whenever the evidence is con- 
 flicting upon any of the material issues, to he determined in 
 connection with the liability of the defendant, then such is- 
 sues should be submitted to the jury, as the triers of the facts, 
 where the case is tried with a jury.-' 
 
 Wherever the material issues, upon which the liability of 
 the defendant rests, are affirmed and disaffirmed, by disputed 
 
 I Tennessee, etc., Co. v. Currier, 108 Fed. Hep. 19 ; 47 C. C. A. 161 ; 
 Roddy V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 104 Mo. 234; 15 S. W. Rep. 1112; 12 
 L. R. A. 746; 24 Am. St. Rep. 333; Miller v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 62 
 Mo. App. 252; Cook v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 63 Mo. 397; Schultz v. 
 Missouri Pac. R. Co., 32 Mo. App. 438; Bender v. St. Louis, etc., R. 
 Co., 137 Mo. 240; 37 S. W. Rep. 132; Baird v.- Citizens Ry. Co., 146 
 Mo. 265; 48 S. W. Rep. 7.8. 
 
 189 
 
§§ 151, 152 JUEV ISSUES. 
 
 evidence, then it is ordinarily lield to be error to refuse to 
 submit the determination of such issues to the jury, since it 
 is their peculiar province to settle all such disputed issues of 
 fact.^ For this reason all disputed questions of fact are 
 submitted to the jury for determination and their finding 
 thereon, if in accord with the law, as given to them by the 
 court, is generally held to be conclusive upon the trial and 
 appellate courts,^ subject to the supervisory power of the 
 former to set aside such verdicts as may be against the weight 
 of the evidence.* 
 
 § 151. Weight of evidence determined by. — Where the tes- 
 timony of witnesses is conflicting as to the cause of a given 
 injury, and the issue is submitted to the jury for their deter- 
 mination, as to whether or not the negligence of the defendant 
 occasioned the injury, or some cause for which it would not 
 be responsible, the weight of the testimony is usually held 
 to be for the determination of the jury.® 
 
 § 152. Question of defendant's negligence. — Where the 
 evidence of the acts_ on the defendant's part, alleged to con- 
 stitute the wrongful act or omission sued for, is such as to 
 admit of more than one construction and reasonable minds 
 
 • 
 
 would differ as to whether or not such acts would constitute 
 negligence, the decision of the issue ought to be submitted to 
 
 2 Annas v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 67 Wis. 46; Wood v. Georgia, 
 etc., R. Co., 84 Ga. 363; 10 S. E. Rep. 967; Central, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Bateman, 75 Fed. Rep. 1021. 
 
 8 Coudy V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 85 Mo. 79; Hunt v. Missouri R. 
 Co., 14 Mo. App. 160; Roddy v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 104 Mo. 234; 
 15 S. W. Rep. 1112; 12 L. R. A. 746. 
 
 iMtzjohn V. St. Louis Tr. Co., 183 Mo. 74; 81 S. W. Rep. 907; 
 Payne v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 129 Mo. 405; 31 S. W. Rop. 885; Roman 
 V. Boston, etc., Co., 87 Mo. App. 186. 
 
 BMcDade v. Washington, etc., R. Co., 5 Mackey (D. C), 144; 26 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 325 ; Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Wynant, 134 Ind. 
 681; 55 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 80; 34 N. E. Rep. 569. 
 190 
 
JURY ISSUES. § 152 
 
 the jury for their verdict.® This is the general rule wherever 
 the conclusion from the facts shown by the parties to the 
 cause is left in doubt, or whenever it does not clearly appear, 
 from the evidence, that this or that act did or did not con- 
 stitute actionable negligence. 
 
 It is not for the court to charge that this or that state of 
 facts raises an inference of negligence, against defendant, 
 but it is an issue for the jury to determine whether the cir- 
 cumstances all taken together show such an unusual occur- 
 rence as that negligence could be inferred therefrom, in the 
 face of the legal presumption that the employer had furnishd 
 proper tools and appliances and competent employees.'^ 
 
 The existence of negligence is a mixed question of law and 
 fact and depends upon the proper solution- of the issues, 
 whether a particular act has been performed or omitted, and 
 whether the performance or omission to perform such act 
 "was the violation of legal duty. The first question is purely 
 one of fact, for the jury, while the second is one of law, for 
 the court.* 
 
 sLeduo V. Northern Pac. E. Co. (Minn.), 100 N. W. Rep. 108; 
 Cecil V. American Steel Co., 129 Fed. Rep. 542; Sloss-Sheffield Co. v. 
 Mobley, 139 Ala. 425; 36 So. Rep. 181. 
 
 7 Palmer Brick Co. v. Chenall (Ga.), 47 S. E. Rep. 329. 
 
 8 Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. McKenzie, 81 Va. 7^1; 24 Am. & Eng. 
 E. Cas. 395; Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Dillon, 17 111. App. 355. 
 
 Where the facts are disputed, or, if not disputed, if the existence 
 of negligence is an inference which, as mere matter of discretion and 
 judgment, may, or may not, be drawn from them, the issue should be 
 submitted to the jury. Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Jones, 71 Ala. 487; 
 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 549; Wilson v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 85 Ala. 
 269; 4 So. Rep. 701; Nolan v. New York, etc., E. Co., 53 Conn. 461; 
 4 Atl. Rep. 106; 25 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 342; Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. 
 Ostrander, 116 Ind. 259; 32 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. "361; 15 N. E. Rep. 
 227; Greenleaf v. Illinois C. R. Co., 29 Iowa 14; Needham v. Louis- 
 ville & N. R. Co., 85 Ky. 423; 3 S. W. Rep. 797; Newport, etc., Co. v. 
 Dentz'el, 91 Ky, 42; 14 S. W. Rep. 958; Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Miller, 25 Mich. 274; 5 Am. Ry. Rep. 478; Dunn v. Saeboard, etc., 
 E. Co., 78 Va. 645; 16 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 363; Nash v. Richmond, 
 
 191 
 
§ 153 JUBY ISSUES. 
 
 § 153. Same — Specific issues determinii^ defendant's neg- 
 ligence, — Upon the ultimate issue of the defendant's negli- 
 gence, or freedom from blame for the consequences of a given 
 accident, resulting in a personal injury,- the following have 
 been held proper issues to submit to the determination of the 
 jury, i. e., whether particular means or measures employed 
 to prevent the accident, were appropriate for the purpose ; ® 
 whether it was negligence for the defendant to back a loco- 
 motive at night, across a public street, without a light ; '" 
 whether a plan adopted for the movement of a train was a 
 proper plan for the purpose ; ^^ whether there were lights, 
 and, if so, if they were in a proper, place to be seen, after 
 night ; ^^ whether a platform was kept in proper repair to 
 prevent injury to passengers; ^* to determine whether or not 
 due care was used in the stopping of a train; ^* whether or 
 not an employee causing the injury, acted within the scope 
 of his authority, in so doing; ^® whether an act was inten- 
 tionally or willfully and maliciously done ; ^^ whether the 
 excessive speed of a tram was the proximate cause of an in- 
 jury ; ^'^ whether the plaintiff was a passenger or a tres- 
 passer ; ^® whether an appliance is a proper one ; ^® whether it 
 
 etc., E. Co., 82 Va. 55; Pool v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 56 Wis. 227; 
 8 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 360; 14 N. W. Rep. 46; Hogan v. Chicago, etc., 
 R. Co., 59 Wis. 139; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 439; 17 N. W. Eep. 632. 
 
 9 Smith V. Savannah, etc., E. Co., 84 Ga. 698; 42 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 105; 11 S. E. Eep. 455. 
 
 10 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Stubs, 15 111. App. 39. 
 
 11 Illinois Central E. Co. v. Neer, 31 111. App. 126. 
 
 12 Powers V. Boston, 154 Mass. 60; 27 N. E. Eep. 995. 
 
 18 Bateman v. New York, etc., E. Co., 47 Hun 429 ; 14 N. Y. S. E. 
 454. 
 
 "Clark V. Wilmington, etc., E. Co., 109 N. Car. 430; 14 S. E. Eep. 
 43; 48 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 546. 
 
 IB Eedding v. South Carolina E. Co., 3 So. Car. 1. 
 
 16 Eounds V. Delaware, etc., E. Co., 64 N. Y. 129 ; 21 Am. Eep. 597. 
 
 iTTobin V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 18 S. W. Rep. 996. 
 
 18 Meyer v. Second Ave. R. Co., 8 Bosw. (N. Y.) 305. 
 
 19 Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Weems, 97 Ala. 270; 12 So. Rep. 186. 
 
 192 
 
JUEY iSStJES. 1 154 
 
 had been duly and properly inspected ; ^^ these are all held 
 proper issues for the jury, as well as the ultimate fact 
 ■whether or not the defendant was negligent, from all the 
 facts and circumstances in evidence.^ ^ 
 
 § 154. Nature and cause of injury. — The nature and cause 
 of the injury to the plaintiff, where the evidence thereof is 
 not all one way, or undisputed, and the bearing and effect 
 of the negligence of the defendant, if any, and whether or not 
 it was the direct cause of the injury, are, primarily, jury 
 issues.^^ 
 
 When the facts as to the exact cause of the injury are in 
 dispute and the court could not say, as matter of law, that 
 the negligence of the plaintiff or that of defendant was re- 
 sponsible for the injury, the question of the proximate cause 
 thereof is properly submitted to the jury.^^ And where the 
 evidence of plaintiff furnishes one cause for the injury, due 
 to the negligence of defendant, and the defendant's evidence 
 shows another cause, for which it is not responsible, this will 
 not justify a peremptory instruction for the defendant, under 
 
 20 Moon V. Northern Pae. R. Co., 46 Minn. 106; 48 N. W. Eep. 679; 
 48 Am. & Eng. K. Cas. 195. 
 
 2iPaducah, etc., R. Co. v. Letcher (Ky.), 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 61. 
 
 Where the evidence shows that a turntable was too small to use 
 conveniently to turn large engines, the question of the defendant's 
 negligence in furnishing an unsafe track or turntable, as well as 
 plaintiff's negligence in using same, are for the jury. Lake Shore, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Fitzpatrick, 31 Ohio St. 479. 
 
 22 Franklin v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co., 97 Mo. App. 473; 71 S. W. 
 Rep. 540; Schultz y. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (Wis.), 92 N. W. Rep. 377; 
 Roberts v. Port siakely, etc., Co., 30 Wash. 25; 70 Pac. Rep. Ill; 
 Allison V. Tap Rock, etc., Co., 78 N. Y. S. 69; 75 App. Div. 2G7; 
 Olson V. Boston, etc., R. Co., 71 N. H. 427; 52 Atl. Rep. 1097; Parsons 
 V. Hammond Co., 96 Mo. App. 372; 70 S. W. Rep. 519; Sinclair, etc., 
 Co. V. Waddle, 200 111. 17; 65 N. E. Rep. 437; Chenall v. Palmer 
 Brick Co., 117 Ga. 106; 43 S. E. Rep. 443; Houston, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Dial, 135 Ala. 168: 33 So. Rep. 268. 
 
 28 Gila Valley, etc., R. Co. v. Lyon (Ariz.), 71 Pac. Rep. 957. 
 1—13 193 
 
§§ 155, 156 JUEY ISSUES. 
 
 the rule that where the undisputed evidence shows a case 
 where the injury may have resulted from one of two or more 
 causes, for one of which the defendant would be liable and 
 for the others not, there can be no recovery, as the testimony, 
 in the case referred to, would present a mere conflict in the 
 evidence and it would remain a jury question as to which 
 of the causes named occasioned the injury.^* 
 
 § 155. As to reasonable safety of appliances. — Whenever 
 there is substantial evidence of a dangerous or defective 
 appliance, or tool, causing an injury to an employee, it is 
 always a jury question, not only as to the cause of the in- 
 jury, but also as to the dangerous or defective condition of 
 the appliance.*^ 
 
 The dangerous or defective condition of the appliance may 
 always be shown, either by direct or circumstantial evidence, 
 or inferred from other facts given in evidence; and, when 
 once it is shown, by substantial testimony, the weight and 
 sufficiency of such evidence is for the jury.^" 
 
 § 156. Reasonable safety of place. — In an action for an 
 injury from a failure to provide a reasonably safe place in 
 which to work, the issue is for the jury, where the evidence 
 is conflicting as to the reasonable safety of the place where 
 the work was being done.^'' 
 
 But if the facts in regard to the place where the em- 
 ployee was injured are not in conflict, then there would be no 
 issue in regard to the place of work, to submit to the jury, 
 
 2* Peters v. McKay & Co., 136 Cal. 73; 68 Pac. Rep. 478; Donk Bros., 
 etc., Co. V. Peters, 95 111. App. 193; 61 N. E. Rep. 830. 
 25Robbins v. Big Circle Co. (Mo.), 79 S. W. Rep. 480. 
 ««Towle V. Stimson Co. (Wash.), 74 Pac. Rep. 471. 
 27 Hamilton v. Mendota, etc., Co. (Iowa), 94 N. W. Rep. 282. 
 
 194 
 
JUBT ISSUES. §§ 157, 158 
 
 and the court, as matter of law, should pass upon the reason- 
 able safety of the place of work.^* • 
 
 § 157. When plaintiff's negligence a jury issue. — Unless 
 the plaintiff's contributory negligence is shown by undisputed 
 evidence, or is so clearly established that reasonable minds 
 would not differ as to the conclusion to be drawn therefrom, 
 the question should be submitted to the jury, as an issue of 
 fact.^' If, from the evidence of his negligence, it cannot be 
 said, without doubt, that his own negligence contributed to 
 produce the plaintiff's injury, but reasonable men would be 
 inclined to differ as to whether the injury was caused by the 
 plaintiff's negligence or that of defendant, then the court 
 should submit this issue to the jury. 
 
 But if the facts are not disputed and all reasonable men 
 would reach the same conclusion, then the court should decide 
 the question as a matter of law and withhold the case from 
 the jury where the facts show that plaintiff's injury was due 
 to his own neglect.^" 
 
 § 158. Whether injury due to negligence of vice-principal. 
 — Where the ground of recovery is the negligent order or 
 omission of a vice-principal, or other representative of the 
 employer and the evidence of his authority and supervision 
 as well as of his neglect is conflicting, the issue as to the 
 
 28Wendall v. Chicago & Alton E. Co., 100 Mo, App. 556; 75 S. W. 
 Rep. 689. 
 
 aoOlsen v. Cook. Inlet, etc., Co., 121 Fed. Rep. 726; 58 C. C. A. 146; 
 Hempstock v. Lackawanna, etc., Co., 90 N. Y. S. 663; 98 App. Div. 
 332; Hamilton v. Mendota, etc., Co. (Iowa), 94 N. W. Eep. 282; 
 Jancko v. West Coast, etc., Co. (Wash.), 76 Pac. Eep. 78; Currans v. 
 Seattle & S. F. Ry. Co., 76 Pac. Rep. 87; Curtis v. McNair, 173 Mo. 
 270; 73 S. W. Eep. 167. 
 
 soNeal v. Eailroad Co., 57 Minn. 365; 59 N. W. Eep. 312; Illinois, 
 etc., Co. V. Coffee, 205 111. 206; 63 N. E. Eep. 751. 
 
 195 
 
§ 159 JURY ISSUES. 
 
 responsibility of the employer, because of bis act or omission, 
 is a jury issue.^^ 
 
 Wbere tbe ground of recovery is a negligent act of the vice- 
 principal, done in his capacity of a workman, ■whether or not 
 the issue should be submitted to the jury, depends upon the 
 doctrine of the jurisdiction where the cause of action is 
 tried. In a recent Texas case, the issue was held to be 
 properly submitted to the jury where the facts were dis- 
 puted,^^ but in Missouri, and other States where the dual 
 capacity doctrine obtains, if the evidence shows that the 
 injury was due to an act of the vice-principal, as dis- 
 tinguished from an order made while acting within the 
 scope of his capacity as a representative of the employer, 
 and the act is performed while acting as a coemployee of 
 the injured employee, there is no resulting liability and the 
 cause should not be submitted to the jury.*® 
 
 § 159. Capacity in which vice-principal acted. — Where the 
 evidence is conflicting as to the capacity of an alleged vice- 
 
 31 Foster v. Missouri PaK:. E. Co., 115 Mo. 165; 21 S. W. Rep. 916; 
 Schroeder v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 108 Mo. 322; 18 S. W. Rep. 1094; 
 18 L. R. A. 827; York v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 117 Mo. 405; 22 
 S. W. Rep. 1081; Dayharsh v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 103 Mo. 570; 
 15 S. W. Rep. 554; 23 Am. St. Rep. 900. 
 
 82 Roberts v. Fielder Salt Works, 72 S. W. Rep. 618. 
 
 ssFogerty v. St. Louis Tr. Co., 180 Mo. 490; 79 S. W. Rep. 664; 
 Railroad Co. v. May, 108 111. 298; Gall v. Beckstem, 173 111. 187; 
 Harper v. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co., 47 Mo. 580; Lee v. Detroit, etc., 
 Co., 62 Mo. 565; Moore v. Wabash, etc., R. Co., 85 Mo. 580; Miller v. 
 Missouri Pac. R. Co., 109 Mo. 356; 19 S. W. Rep. 58; 32 Am. St. 
 Rep. 673; Grattis v. Kansas City, etc., E. Co., 153 Mo. 380; 55 S. W. 
 Rep. 108; 48 L. E. A. 399; 77 Am. St. Rep. 721. 
 
 The nonliability of the employer for the act of the vice-principal, 
 where he was acting as a coemployee of the injured one, is recognized 
 in the following cases: Hanna v. Granger, 18 R. I. 507; Gann v. 
 Railroad, 101 Tenn. 380; Northern Pac. E. Co. v. Charless, 162 U. S. 
 359; 40 L. Ed. 999; Barnical v. Connor, 110 Iowa 240; Crispin v. 
 Babbitt, 81 N. Y. 516; Eeed v. Stockmeyer, 74 Fed. Eep. 186; Eailroad 
 v. Torrey, 58 Ark. 217; Clay v. Eailroad, 56 111. App. 235; Soutar v. 
 196 
 
JUBT ISSUES. §§ 160, 161 
 
 principal, in the performance of a given act, as such, the issue 
 as to whether or not the act was done in the capacity of a 
 vice-principal or that of a coemployee, is usually' for the 
 jury.** 
 
 But where there is no dispute in the evidence as to the char- 
 acter in which the given act was performed, then the ques- 
 tion of the capacity of the vice-principal to do such an act 
 as would bind the employer, is a question of law for the 
 court, and a peremptory instruction is proper in all cases 
 where the evidence is not conflicting.*' 
 
 § 160. Issue as to agent's competency. — Where the action 
 is for damages resulting from the retention in its employ of 
 a known incompetent employee, whose act caused the injury 
 sued for, if the evidence upon this issue is conflicting, it 
 would be an issue for the jury to determine whether or not 
 the given employee was competent or incompetent, and, if 
 found to be incompetent, they should also find whether the 
 company used reasonable care to discover his incompetency, 
 and was deceived by his fraudulent practices, or whether it 
 was negligent in failing to discover the same.*^ 
 
 § 161. Issues as to who are co-employees. — The existence 
 of the relation of coemployees, where the evidence is con- 
 flicting, is a question of fact for the jury,*^ but where the 
 
 Electric R. Co., 68 Minn. 18; Holtz v. Railroad Co., 69 Minn. 524; 
 Dwyer v. Express Co., 82 Wis. 312. 
 
 atRenlund v. Commodore, etc., Co., 89 Minn. 41; 93 N. W. Rep. 
 1057; Maxwell v. Zdariski, 93 111. App. 334. 
 
 35Fogerty v. St. Louis, etc., Tr. Co., 180 Mo. 490; 79 S. W. Rep. 
 664; Miller v. Missouri Pae. R. Co., 109 Mo. 356; 19 S. W. Rep. 58; 
 32 Am. St. Rep. 673; Grattis v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 153 Mo. 
 380; 55 S. W. Rep. 108; 48 L. R. A. 399; 77 Am. St. Rep. 721. 
 
 38 Taylor v. Western Pae. R. Co., 45 Cal. 323. 
 
 37 Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Wise, 106 111. App. 174; 206 111. 453; 
 69 N. E. Rep. 500; Consolidated C. Co. v. Fleishbein, 109 III. App. 
 
 197 
 
§ 162 JUEY ISSUES. 
 
 essential facts for determining who are coemployees are not 
 controverted, the issue as to whether or not the injured em- 
 ployee is, or is not, a coemployee with the person causing 
 the injury, is one of law for the court.** 
 
 Where the employee causing the injury occupies the dual 
 position of vice-principal and coemployee, it is generally 
 held to be a question for the jury to determine whether the 
 act which occasioned the injury was an act done in the rela- 
 tion of vice-principal or that of coemployee.*® In some 
 States the existence of the relation of coemployees is held 
 to be a mixed question of law and fact, the declaration of 
 what constitutes the relation being a question of law for the 
 court, and the ascertainmesnt of the conclusion, from the 
 facts, whether that relation, as defined, exists, being an issue 
 for the jury.*" 
 
 § 162. Assumption of risk jury issue, when. — In some of 
 the States the rule is announced that the question of assumed 
 risk is usually one of fact for the jury, and to authorize the 
 court to hold, as a matter of law, that the risk was assumed, 
 the evidence must be all one way and to the effect that the 
 danger was so glaring that it could not have escaped the 
 observation of an ordinarily prudent man of the skill or ex- 
 
 509; 207 111. 593; 69 N. E. Rep.. 963; Supple v. Agnew, 191 111. 439; 
 61 N. E. Rep. 392; Pagels v. Myers, 193 111. 172; 61 N. E. Eep. 1111; 
 Spring Valley Co. v. Robias, 207 111. 226; 69 N. E. Eep. 925; Gayle v. 
 Missouri, etc., Co., 177 Mo. 427; 76 S. W. Rep. 987. 
 
 38 Shaw V. Bambriek Bates Co., 102 Mo. App. 666; 77 S. W. Rep. 
 96; Neal v. Railroad, 57 Minn. 365; 59 N. W. Rep. 312; O'Leary v. 
 Railroad, 52 111. App. 641; Illinois Steel Co. v. CoSee, 205 111. 206; 
 63 N. E. Rep. 751. 
 
 30 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. DriscoU, 107 111. App. 615; 207 111. 432; 
 69 N. E. Rep. 620; Gayle v. Missouri, etc., Co., 177 Mo, 427; 76 S. W. 
 Eep. 987. 
 
 *» Gruendahl v. Consolidated, etc., Co., 108 111. App. 644 ; Missouri, 
 etc., Co. V. Dillon, 206 111. 145; 69 N. E. Rep. 12, 
 
 198 
 
JURY ISSUES. § 162 
 
 perience of die injured employee.*^ This is the rule an- 
 nounced by many cases in Missouri,*^ as well as other 
 States,*^ but the Supreme Court of Missouri, in a recent case, 
 refused to approve an instruction which told the jury that 
 only dangers that threatened " immediate injury " were as- 
 sumed, holding that such a limitation of the doctrine was 
 a denial of the common-law rule, which included not only 
 perils that threatened immediate injury, but also those which 
 are not so glaring, if ordinarily incidental to the employ- 
 ment.** 
 
 The author has elsewhere *^ noted the objections to such 
 qualifications of tbe doctrine of assumed risk, as those which 
 limit the risks assumed to those which threaten " immediate 
 injury," Or those only which an ordinarily prudent man 
 would avoid, if he could readily have appreciated the danger, 
 as improper standards to submit the is'sue on, to a jury. 
 Such qualifications of the common-law rule practically deny 
 to the employer the benefit of the doctrine. 
 
 The better rule is that which holds that when the evidence 
 is without conflict in establishing a state of facts from which 
 the law would charge the employee with an assumption of the 
 risk, then the issue should not be submitted to the jury ;..*® but 
 if the evidence is conflicting as to whether or not the danger 
 was one incidental to the work, or whether it threatened im- 
 mediate injury, or was such a peril as ought to have been 
 appreciated and understood by a reasonably prudent man 
 
 *i Carter v. Baldwin (Mo. App.), 81 S. W. Rep. 204; Sinberg v. 
 Talk Co., 98 Mo. App. 546; 72 S. W. Rep. 947; Hamman v. Coal, 
 etc., Co., 156 Mo. 232; 56 S. W. Rep. 1091. 
 
 43 Dean v. Woodenware Co., 107 Mo. App. 167. 
 
 43 Harwich v. Hawes, 202 111. 334; 67 N. E. Rep. 13. 
 
 **Minnier v. Sedalia, etc., R. Co., 167 Mo. 94; 66 S. W. Rep. 1092. 
 
 *5 White, Per. Inj. in Mines, § 108, p. 114. 
 
 *oMinnier v. Sedalia, etc., R. Co., 167 Mo. 99; 66 S. W. Rep. 1092. 
 
 199 
 
§§ 163, 164 JUEY ISSUES. 
 
 and the employer's negligence was not the occasion thereof, 
 then the issue should be submitted to the jury.*'' 
 
 § 163. Promulgation and enforcement of nile.-r- While the 
 reasonableness of a given rule is usually held to be a question 
 of law for the court, where the evidence is conflicting as to 
 the promulgation and enforcement of a rule, the question is 
 properly submitted to the jury, under appropriate instruc- 
 tions as to what would constitute a proper promulgation and 
 enforcement of the rule.** 
 
 But if the evidence on the issue was not disputed, as where 
 there was no evidence on the negative to dispute the due 
 promulgation and enforcement of the rule, there would be no 
 error in the court assuming that the rule was duly promul- 
 gated or enforced, or in instructing the jury that the rule 
 was in effect at the time of the occurrence of the injury.*' 
 
 § 164. Discretion in assessing damages. — Necessarily the 
 estimate of damages for personal injury and physical suffer- 
 ing must depend upon the judgment of the jury. There can 
 be no direct proof in regard to it and no witness can be al- 
 lowed to express his opinion upon the point.'* There is no 
 measure of sums or value fixed by custom, market or law and 
 so the law makes it the exclusive province of the jury, within 
 
 iTHamman v. Coal & Coke Co., 156 Mo. 232; 56 S. W. Rep. 1091. 
 
 48 Memphis R. Co. v. Graham, 94 Ala. 545; 10 So. Rep. 283; 53 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 396. 
 
 io Quick V. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co., 130 111. 334 ; 22 N. E. Rep. 709. 
 
 50 Colorado Midland R. Co. v. O'Brien, 16 Colo. 219; 48 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 235; 27 Pac. Rep. 701; Hawes v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 103 
 Mo. 60; 15 S. W. Rep. 751; Choppin v. New Orleans, etc., R. Co., .17 
 La. Ann. 19; Waldhier v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 87 Mo. 37; Chicago, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Warner, 108 111. 538; 18 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 100 
 Reading v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 52 N. J. L. 264; 19 Atl. Rep. 321 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Mackie, 71 Texas 491; 9 S, 'W, Eep, 451 
 37 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 94; 1 L. R. A. 667, 
 
 200 
 
JUEY ISSUES.. § 165 
 
 reasonable bounds, in their discretion, to name the amount. ^^ 
 As to damages due for permanent injury and future pain 
 and anguish, the judgment of the jury, within reasonable 
 bounds, is the only standard of measurement, for while the 
 court should advise the jury of the different items to be con- 
 sidered in their verdict, the fixing of the amount is peculiarly 
 within their sound discretion. ^^ 
 
 But the discretion of the jury as to damages due for physi- 
 cal pain and suffering does not apply to special damages, 
 such as nursing, physician's bill, for medicines, and such mat- 
 ters, for these items have a fixed, ascertainable value and no 
 more than a reasonable value therefor can be allowed and the 
 rule of assessment according to the enlightened consciences 
 of impartial jurors is not applicable. ^^ 
 
 § 165. Conclusiveness of verdict. — Where there is no fixed 
 rule by which damages may be computed, as in the case of 
 physical injury, the court should instruct the jury as to the 
 proper subject-matter and leave the question to them, and 
 their verdict will not, ordinarily, be disturbed, unless so ex- 
 cessive as to demand interference by the court.^* Unless 
 
 51 Brown v. Union E. Co., 51 Mo. App. 192. 
 
 62 Bigelow V. Metropolitan, etc., R. Co., 48 Mo. App. 367. 
 
 53 Augusta, etc., R. Co. v. Randall, 85 Ga. 297 ; 11 S. E. Rep. 706. 
 
 There is no fixed rule for determining the compensation due for 
 death where no rule for the computation thereof is fixed by statute. 
 Each case must stand on its own peculiar facts and the jury may 
 give such damages for the death as they may think are fairly pro- 
 portionate to the injury resulting therefrom. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. 
 V. Peregoy, 36 Kansas 424; 14 Pac. Rep. 7; Houston & G. N. R. Co. v. 
 Randall, 50 Texas 261. 
 
 A jury cannot be left with a roaming commission, but are confined 
 to damages, capable of being measured by a pecuniary standard. 
 Baleh v. Railroad, 67 Mich. 394 ; 34 N. W. Rep. 884. 
 
 5* International & G. N. R. Co. v. Gilbert, 64 Texas 536; 22 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 405; International & G. N. R. Co. v. Wilkes, 68 Texas 
 617; 34 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 331; Nashville, etc/, R. Co. v. Stevens, 
 9 Heisk, (Tenn.) 12; 19 Am. Ry. Rep. 363; Brown v. Memphis, etc., 
 
 201 
 
§ 165 JURY ISSUES. 
 
 outside influences have excited their passion or prejudice, or 
 the verdict is so excessive as to be disproportionate to the 
 injury established, the judgment will not, on appeal, be set 
 aside. ®^ 
 
 The jury, however, are not at liberty to give a verdict for 
 any sum they please, regardless of the items that should af- 
 fect their verdict, and where the verdict is disproportionate 
 to the injury established, or the court is satisfied fhat the 
 verdict is the result of passion or prejudice, it should be set 
 aside. ^* 
 
 E. Co., 7 Fed. Rep. 51; 1 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 247; SavannaV etc., 
 R. Co. V. Harper, 70 Ga. 119. 
 
 65 Central R. Co. v. Crosby, 74 Ga. 737. 
 
 68 Norton v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 40 Mo. App. 642. 
 
 202 
 
OHAPTEK IX. 
 
 elemelnts and computatioit of damages. 
 
 166. Eight to damages, generally. 
 
 167. Province of court and jury in assessing. 
 
 168. Duty to prevent or keep damages down. 
 
 169. Only damages proximately resulting are recoverable. 
 
 170. What damages are proximate. 
 
 171. Mental anguish alone not basis for damages. 
 
 172. When nominal and substantial damages recoverable. 
 
 173. Compensatory damages only allowed, when. 
 
 174. Elements included in compensatory damages. 
 
 175. Expenses resulting from injury. 
 
 176. Exemplary or punitive damages. 
 
 177. When exemplary damages are recoverable. 
 
 178. When punitive damages should not be allowed. 
 
 179. Pleading exemplary damages. 
 
 180. Evidence to establish exemplary damages. 
 
 181. Prospective damages for permanent injuries. 
 
 182. Permanent disability must be reasonably certain. 
 
 183. Damages for future pain and suffering. 
 
 184. Loss of earnings in the future. 
 
 185. Special damages must be specially pleaded. 
 
 186. Evidence of plaintiff's condition, circumstances and pursuit 
 
 proper, when. 
 
 187. Evidence in mitigation of damages. 
 
 188. Damages for pecuniary loss to beneficiaries. 
 
 189. What evidence of pecuniary loss competent. 
 
 190. Necessity of dependence upon deceased, for support. 
 
 191. Competent to show habits, character and capacity of deceased. 
 
 192. Competency of mortality tables to show expectancy of life. 
 
 193. Ill health and habits competent in mitigation of damages. 
 
 194. Nothing allowed as a solatium. 
 
 195. Damages for death of parent. 
 
 196. Recovery for death of husband. 
 
 197. For death of wife. 
 
 198. For death of child. 
 
 199. Medical and funeral expenses. 
 
 203 
 
§ 166 COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES. 
 
 § 200. Exemplary damages for death. 
 
 201. When nominal damages only recovered for death. 
 
 202. Excessive damages in death actions. 
 
 203. Same — For death of father. 
 
 204. Same — Death of husband. , 
 
 205. Same — For death of wife. 
 
 206. Same — For death of child. 
 
 § 166. Right to damages, generally. — The damages for 
 which compensation can be allowed are settled by jurispru- 
 dence. Courts of justice are not institutions for the distribu- 
 tion of charity and unless damages are proved, by competent 
 evidence, -they cannot be allowed.^ The basis of the right 
 to damages is the breach of a legal duty, or some negligent 
 act, by the party against whom such damages are claimed. 
 The rightful exercise of a lawful power or authority can 
 never afford the basis of an action for damages, but if the 
 power or right is exercised carelessly, negligently, wrong- 
 fully, improperly, or maliciously, the party or corporation so 
 exercising the power is liable to respond in damages for an 
 injury directly resulting to another from such an exercise of 
 the authority so wrongfully exerted. The liability -to dam- 
 ages does not depend upon the doing of the act, itself, causing 
 the injury, but such liability can only arise upon and for the 
 manner of doing the act causing the damage.^ 
 
 And the right to damages, being dependent upon the 
 wrongful act of the party causing the injury, in the absence 
 of a statute giving the right to another person, only the one 
 sustaining the injury can sue for the result of such wrongful 
 act,* but unlike an action for damages on contract — wherein 
 only such damages as may reasonably be supposed to have 
 been contemplated as likely to result from the breach can be 
 
 1 Hamilton v. Morgan's L. R. & S. Co., 42 La. Ann. 824; 8 So. Rep. 
 586. 
 
 2 Slatten v. Des Moines, etc., R. Co., 29 Iowa 148 ; Mexican, etc., 
 Con. Co. V. Meddlegge, 75 Texas 634; 13 S. W. Rep. 257. 
 
 3 Gulfs etc., R. Co. v. Levy, 59 Texas 563, • 
 
 304 
 
COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES. § 167 
 
 recovered — in an action for damages for a tort, by the per- 
 son sustaining the injury,' all damages resulting directly 
 from the wrongful act, "whether they could, or could not, 
 have been foreseen or contemplated by the wrongdoer, as the 
 probable result of his act, can' be recovered.* The award of 
 damages, however, must be founded upon a fair and reason- 
 able construction of the evidence, in view of all the facts 
 and circumstances disclosed at the trial,^ and since the right 
 to damages, in all cases, depends upon the existence of a 
 wrongful act, if the injury complained of is the result of an 
 inevitable accident, no compensation can be legally allowed.® 
 
 § 167. Province of court and jury in assessing. — In a suit 
 for personal injuries, it is the province of the court to deter- 
 mine the proper elements of damages,'^ but it is the peculiar 
 function of the jury to estimate and determine the amount 
 of such damages as shall be assessed.® 
 
 In suits instituted in the courts of the United States, the 
 assessment of damages being a matter of practice, is usually 
 made according to the practice of the courts of the State 
 
 4 Brown v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 54 Wis. 342; 11 N. W. Rep. 356, 
 911; 41 Am. Rep. 41; 3 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 444; Shumaker v. St. 
 Paul, etc., R. Co., 46 Minn. 39; 48 N. W. Rep. 559. 
 
 Cooper v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., 66 Mich. 261; 33 N. W. Rep. 
 306; Siefke v. Manhattan R. Co., 27 J. & S. (N. Y.) 444; 14 N. Y. 
 Supp. 763; 39 N. Y. S. R. 355; Balch v. Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co., 
 67 Mich. 394; 34 N. W. Rep. 884. 
 
 e Lewis v. Flint,' etc., R. Co.,' 54 Mich. 55; 19 N. W. Rep. 744; 52 
 Am. Rep. 790; 18 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 263; Tucker v. Duncan, 9 Fed. 
 Rep. 867; 6 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 268. 
 
 Damages is the legal term used to signify the indemnity recoverable 
 by a person sustaining an injury to either his personal or property 
 rights, through the act or default of another. Collins v. East Tenn., 
 etc., E. Co., 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 841; 20 Am. Ry. Rep. 46. 
 
 'Hawes v. Kansas City Stockyards Co., 103 Mo. 60; 15 S. W. Rep. 
 751. 
 
 8 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Watkins, 43 Kansas 50; 22 Pac. Rep. 985; 
 Bradwell v. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co., 139 Pa. St. 404; 20 Atl. Rep. 1046. 
 
 205 
 
§ 168 . COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES. 
 
 where the federal court is held.^ In the federal, as in the 
 State courts, the amount of damages recoverable is provable 
 as an issue of fact for the jury, but the rule for ascertaining 
 the damagee is a question of law for the court. ^^ It is the 
 duty of the court to give defiiiite instructions to the jury as to 
 the true measure of damages which they are called upon to 
 ascertain,^ ^ and with this measure before them it is the pree- 
 rogative of the jury to assess damages in any personal injury 
 action, other than where the damages are fixed by statute, at 
 such a reasonable sum as their judgment and discretion shall 
 dictate,^ ^ subject to the power of the court to cut down or set 
 aside their verdict, if it is so excessive. as to show that it was 
 based on passion or prejudice, or that it was out of all propor- 
 tion to the injuries sustained.-^* 
 \' . 
 
 § 168. Duty to prevent or keep damages down. — Where 
 one is injured by the wrongful act of another he is bound 
 to use ordinary care and reasonable exertion and expense to 
 keep the damages down and to render the injury as light as 
 possible.-'* After the injury is received, the injured person 
 must act as a prudent man would under all the circumstances 
 
 9 Raymond v. Danbury, etc., R. Co., 14 Blatchf. (U. S.) 133. 
 
 10 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Sullivan (III.), 17 N. E. Rep. 460; Galves- 
 ton, etc., R. Co. V. Gierse, 51 Texas 189; Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Peyton, 106 111. 534; 46 Am. Rep. 705; 18 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 1. 
 
 U Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Moran, 66 Texas 133; 25 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 539. 
 
 12 Colorado, etc., E. Co. v. O'Brien, 16 Colo. 219;* 48 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 235; 27 Pae. Rep. 701; Brown v. Union R. Co., 51 Mo. App. 192. 
 
 13 Waldhier v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 87 Mo. 37. 
 
 '" In a personal injury case, an instruction authorizing recovery on 
 the basis of what the .jurors would ' want,' if standing in plaintiff's 
 place, was erroneous," Greer v. Union Ry Co., 103 N. Y. S. 88. 
 
 " Where plaintiif, in an action for personal injuries, presents him- 
 self and such evidence as he had before a jury, it is their province, 
 under proper instructions, to say what sum would compensate plaintiff." 
 Cleaver v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (Ky. 1907), 100 S. W. Rep. 223. 
 
 1* Austin, etc., R. Co. v. Anderson, 85 Texas 88; 19 S. W. Rep. 1025. 
 206 
 
COMPUTATION OP DAMAGES. § 168 
 
 and he must use due diligence to know whether medical aid 
 is required and to use reasonable effort to cure himself.^® If 
 he fails to do this, he forfeits his right to recover damages 
 that might have been saved, which resulted from his own 
 negligence in failing to adopt means to be cured. ^® But the 
 injured person is only bound to use reasonable diligence to 
 procure medical aid,'^ and if, while suffering with pain, 
 caused by his injuries, he neglects to do that which is most 
 prudent for his recovery, he will not be held negligent, so as 
 to prevent a recovery, if he was constrained to such neglect 
 to alleviate his suffering.^® It may be stated that one is 
 not unqualifiedly bound to engage medical attention for such 
 Iraigth of time as his injuries makes it necessary, but his - 
 neglect to do all in this regard, that a man of ordinary pm- 
 dence would under like circumstances, have done, may be 
 taken into consideration by the court or jury, and no com- 
 pensation should be allowed for any damages that mights 
 have been averted by engaging medical aid more promptly.^® 
 
 15 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Eddy, 72 111. 138. 
 
 16 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Coon, 69 Texas 730; 7 S. W. Rep. 492; Gulf, 
 etc., R. Co. V. McMannewitz, 70 Texas 73 ; 8 S. W. Rep. 66 ; 34- Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 428. 
 
 17 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Falvey, 104 Ind. 409; 3 N. E. Rep. 389; 
 4 id. 908; 23 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 522. ' 
 
 18 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. McMannewitz, 70 Texas 73; 8 S. W. Rep. 
 66; 34 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 428. 
 
 isVallo V. United States Express Co., 147 Pa. St. 404; 23 Atl. Rep. 
 594. 
 
 While unskilled medical treatment should be considered as affecting 
 the recovery of damages, or as aggravating the injuries, it is not a 
 complete defense where the injuries originally were due to the neg- 
 ligence of the defendant. Nagle v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 75 Mo. 
 653; 42 Am. Rep. 418; 10 Am. Eng. R. Cas. 702; Goshen v. England, 
 119 Ind. 368; 21 N. E. Rep. 977. 
 
 "Unskillful treatmetat of an ailment is regarded as a direct result 
 of the injury complained of, if ordinary care was employed in selecting 
 the physician who so unskillfully treated such ailment." Village of 
 Bethany v. Lee, 124 111. App. 397. 
 
 " In an action for personal injuries, the court properly instructed 
 
 207 
 
§ 169 COMPUTATIOi^ OF DAMAGES. 
 
 § 169. Only damages proximately resulting are recoverable. 
 
 — The law refuses to take into consideration the damages 
 remotely resulting from the breacsh of duty or wrongful act, 
 on the part of the one occasioning the injury. The maxim 
 is, Causa proxima, non remota spectatur.^° A party guilty 
 of negligence, by which another sustains injury, is only liable 
 for the proximate consequences of his act, not for remote, 
 speculative and contingent results, which might have been 
 avoided by the injured party. ^^ Proximate, in this connec- 
 tion, means closeness of casual connection, and not nearness 
 in time or distance, and, as held by the New Jersey court, 
 the term is intended to qualify the generality of the idea, ex- 
 pressed by the word " natural." ^^ 
 
 Damages traceable -to the act of negligence, but not to its 
 legal or natural consequences, are too remote and contin- 
 gent.^* But lawful damages must be both the natural and 
 /proximate consequence arising from the wrong complained 
 
 that plaintiff must do all that a reasonable person would do to reduce 
 her injuries, and, if she has failed or refused to do this, defendant 
 would not be liable for the increase of injury due to her negligence, but, 
 if she puts herself into the hands of the physicians and follows their 
 advice, defendant would be liable, even though the physicians lack in 
 skill or err in judgment." O'Donnell v. Rhode Island Co., 66 Atl. Rep. 
 578; 28 R. I., 245. 
 
 In case the neglect of the injured party to employ competent medical 
 aid, or use proper care to cure the injury, has aggravated it, no re- 
 covery for the aj^ravated condition of the injury can be had. Glasgow 
 V. Metropolitan Ry. Co., 191 Mo. 374; 89 S. W. Rep. 915. 
 
 20 Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. v. Kellogg, a leading case, 94 U. S. 475; 
 Pullman Car Co. v. Barker, 4 Colo. 344. But see for criticism of this 
 doctrine, Brown v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 54 Wis. 342; 41 Am. Rep. 41; 
 3 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 444; Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. v. Buck, 96 Ind. 
 346; 49 Am. Rep. 168; 18 Am. &, Eng. R. Cas. 234. 
 
 21 Perry v. Central R. Co., 66 Ga. 746; Corrister v. Kansas City, etc., 
 R. Co., 25 Mo. App. 619; Kankakee, etc., R. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 17 111. 
 App. 525. 
 
 22Kuhn V. Jewett, N. J. Eq. 647. 
 
 23 Montgomery, etc., R. Co. v. Boring, 51 Ga. 582. 
 
 208 
 
COMPOTATIOI^ 01? DAMAGES. § 170 
 
 of and not from the -wrongful act of a third party, remotely 
 induced thereby. The intervention of the independent act 
 of a third party, between the negligence complained of and 
 the injury sustained, which was the proximate cause of the 
 injury, is regarded as the proper test of that remoteness of 
 damages which the law for.bids.^* 
 
 § 170. What damages are proximate.— Proximate damages 
 are said to be such as ordinarily and naturally result from 
 the particular negligence charged to have caused the injury 
 and therefore such as might have been expected.^^ The 
 proximate consequences of a negligent act are necessarily 
 those which occur without any intervening cause, and if an 
 " efficient, adequate cause " for the injury has been found, 
 it will generally be considered as the true cause thereof, un- 
 less it appears that there is another cause, not incident to the 
 original wrongful act, but independent of it, which has in- 
 tervened to occasion the injury. This is practically the 
 language of the court, in a well-considered Minnesota case.^" 
 
 If a disease causing suffering or permanent injury results 
 proximately from injuries inflicted by the negligence of a 
 railroad company, such suffering is a proper element of dam- 
 ages to be taken into consideration, regardless of the fact 
 that such a disease would not ordinarily result from the 
 
 24 Cuff V. Newark, etc., E. Co., 35 N. J. L. 17, 574. 
 
 " In an action for injuries,, an instruction stating that plaintiff's 
 measure of damages is compensation for all the injuries, temporary and 
 permanent, sustained by him, is erroneous, in authorizing a verdict, 
 based in part on mentsil suffering, not the direct result of physical pain, 
 but caused by bodily defects which are the result of the accident." 
 Chicago City Ky. Co. v. Schaefer, 121 111. App. 334. 
 
 2« Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Fleming, 14 Lea. (Tenii.) 128; 18 Am. 
 & Eng. E. Cas. 347; Billman v. Indianapolis, etc., E. Co., 76 Ind. 166; 
 40 Am. Eep. 230; 6 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 41. 
 
 28Shumaker v. St. Paul, etc., E. Co., 46 Minn. 39; 48 N. W. Eep. 
 559. 
 
 1—14 209 
 
§ 170 COMPUTATION OP DAMAGES. 
 
 character of injury inflicted.^'^ If an injury is the direct 
 cause of a diseased condition which results in paralysis, such 
 paralysis may be ascribed to the injury, as the proximate 
 cause ;^® if the injury received superinduced the develop- 
 ment of a cancer, the party whose n^ligence caused the in- 
 jury would be responsible therefor and the cancer would not 
 be treated as an independent cause of the ultimate disease 
 or suffering.^" But if the independent act of a third party 
 intervened between the wrong complained of and the injury 
 sustained, and the injury was caused by such independent 
 act, rather than by the original wrongful act of the defend- 
 ant, then the damages resulting from such injury would be 
 too remote to connect with such original wrongful act.^" 
 Hence, although the negligence of the defendant may have 
 caused the derailment of an engine, from its track, if the 
 injury sued for resulted from the acts of a crowd that gath- 
 ered around the derailed engine, damages therefor could not 
 be recovered, in an action for the negligence causing the de- 
 railment of the engine.^' 
 
 27 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Leslie, 57 Texas 83; 9 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 407. 
 
 28 Bishop V. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 48 Minn. 26; 50 N. W. Rep. 927. 
 
 29 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Kemp, 61 Md. 619; 48 Am. Rep. 134. 
 
 30 Cuff V. Newark, etc., R. Co., 35 N. J. L. 17, 574. 
 
 31 Scholes V. North London R. Co., 21 L. T. 835. 
 
 " In an action for injuries caused by being thrown from a street 
 car, evidence that plaintiff's suffering from rheumatism was occasioned 
 by the injury examined, and held sufficient to go to the jury on the ques- 
 tion of damages." Detrich v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co. (Mo. App. 1907), 
 102 S. W. Rep. 1044. 
 
 " A person injured by the negligence of another may recover the re- 
 sulting damages, though it would not have resulted, or would have 
 been much less, but for his diseased condition at the time of the ac- 
 cident." Ross V. Great Northern Ry. Co. (Minn. 1907), 111 N. W. 
 Rep. 951. 
 
 "Plaintiff's deafness, resulting from a nervous shock received when 
 injured, is a-proper element of damages." Dreyfus v. St. Louis & S. 
 Ry. Co. (Mo. App. 1907), 102 S. W. Rep. 53. , 
 
 210 
 
eoM:PUTATioiJ' oi* bamAgeS. § 171- 
 
 § 171. Mental anguisli alone not basis for damages. — As a 
 
 general rule mental anguish must be accompanied by some 
 physical injury before it can be admitted as part of the 
 measure of damages, and, in the absence of -willful or ma- 
 licious conduct on the defendant's part, unless some physical 
 injury resulted from the wrongful act, damages cannot be 
 assessed for nervous shock, or mental anguish alone.*^ 
 
 Mere fright occasioned by a collision, producing perma- 
 nent injury to the nervous system, is held to be a result too 
 remote to be actionable.** No well-considered case has held 
 that fright alone, not resulting from, or accompanied by some 
 physical injury to the person, v^ill sustain an action for the 
 wrongful act, alleged to have caused the nervous shock. In 
 one case,** where the defendant's gatekeeper had negligently 
 invited the plaintiff to cross a railroad track on a grade 
 crossing and an approaching train frightened the plaintiff 
 and his horses, but occasioned no other injuries, a verdict 
 for both physical and mental pain was held not to be sup- 
 ported by the evidence and the judgment was reversed in the 
 higher court. This is in accord with the weight of authority, 
 and damages resulting from nervous shock alone, unaccom- 
 panied by any physical injury, are held too remote to enter 
 into the estimate in ^assessing damages.*^ But if the act 
 producing the mental anguish is accompanied by willful, 
 malicious or insulting conduct, mental anguish or nervous 
 
 82 Smith V. Atchison, etc., E. Co., 122 Mo. App. 85. 
 
 " In an action for personal injuries, the mental anguish which can be 
 proved is such only as is endured by the plaintiff as the direct conse- 
 quence of the injury to himself." Bahr v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (Minn. 
 1907), 112 N. W. Rep. 267. 
 
 ssEwing V. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co., 147 Pa. St. 40; 23 Atl. Rep. 340; 
 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 506. 
 
 3* Victorian Ry. Co. v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222 ; 6 Ry. & C. T. Cas. 
 68. 
 
 30 Gereke v. Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co., 57 Mich. 589 ; 24 N. W. Rep. 
 675; 22 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 551; Grand Trunk -R. Co. v. Sibbald, 20 
 Can. Sup. Ct. 259. 
 
 211 
 
§ 172 COMPUTATION OP DAMAGES. 
 
 shock may then enter into the assessment of damages, for 
 the malicious or insulting conduct, in such case, is held to 
 be an equivalent for actual physical injury, resulting from 
 the wrongful act.^" 
 
 § 172. When nominal and substantial damages recoverable. 
 — The law places the burden upon the party claiming dam- 
 ages from another as a compensation for pecuniary loss, to 
 establish facts sufficient to ascertain, with reasonable cer- 
 tainty, the extent of his loss and if he fails to show the 
 amount of damages to which he is entitled, then he is given 
 only nominal damages.®^ 
 
 Where loss of time is claimed as an element of damages, 
 in an action for personal injury, due to the negligence of 
 the defendant, only nominal damages for this item can bs 
 
 86 Smith V. Atchison, etc., R. Co., 122 Mo. App. 85 j Dawson v. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. (Ky.), 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 134. 
 
 " It is not error to submit to the jury the issue of mental suffering, 
 on evidence that plaintiff's injuries were serious and permanent, that 
 three ribs were broken, and that he had lost greatly in flesh, had a 
 cough, suffered from a rapid heart, and could not do the ordinary 
 labor of a working man; the injuries being of such a nature that 
 mental pain can be inferred therefrom.'' Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. 
 V. Garcia (Tex. Civ. App. 1907), 100 S. W. Rep. 198. 
 
 " In a personal injury action, where the evidence proved serious in- 
 jury, great pain, and the fear of death for many days, also that plain- 
 tiff was disfigured in the face for a time, and that tw9 years after- 
 wards he still suffered pain, there was no error in including the ele- 
 ment of mental pain in an instruction on the subject of damages." St. 
 Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Leamons (Ark. 1907), 102 S. W. Rep. 363. 
 
 Fright from nervous shock, distinct from a physical injury, is not a 
 proper element of damages, in New York. Newton v. New York, etc., 
 R. Co., 94 N. Y. S. R. 825; 106 App. Div. 415. 
 
 Mental suffering, when connected with physical injury, is a proper ele- 
 ment of damage. Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Heter, 135 Fed. Rep. 272; 
 68 C. C. A. 26; Waeohter v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (Mo.), 88 S. W. 
 Rep. 147; Haxton v. Kansas City, 190 Mo. 53; 88 S. W. Rep. 714. 
 
 37 Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Fite, 67 Miss. 373 ; 7 So. Rep. 223 ; Sea- 
 board, etc., Co. V. WocJdson, 98 Ala. 378; 11 So. Rep. 733. 
 
 212 
 
COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES. § 173 
 
 given, if the plaintiff fails to prove the value of the time lost, 
 or facts from which the value thereof can be ascertained, 
 with reasonable certainty ; ®® nominal damages only can be 
 given for loss of salary, where tlie salary is not established 
 by the evidence *® nor can more than nominal damages be- 
 allowed, for medical attention and treatment, on the mere 
 proof of the fact that medical services were rendered, with- 
 out evidence going to show the amount paid therefor.*" 
 
 But it is held sufficient to justify the recovery of substan- 
 tial damages, if the plaintiff establishes the nature, extent 
 and probable duration of his injury, without other proof go- 
 ing to show the exact amount of damages sustained.*^ 
 Where the evidence showed that prior to sustaining an in- 
 jury, the plaintiff had received a salary of one hundred dol- 
 lars per month and that since the injury he had been unable 
 to do any work at all, he is entitled to recover substantial 
 damages for the loss of time resulting from the injury *^ and 
 even if the exact salary lost is not shown by the evidence, if 
 sufficient facts are established, from which it can be reason- 
 ably ascertained that the time lost is worth more than mere 
 nominal damages, then substantial damages may be recov- 
 ered.*^ 
 
 § 173. Compensatory damages only allowed, when. — Ac- 
 tual compensation is the measure of recovery allowed in 
 
 38 gtaal V. Grand Street, etc., R. Co., 107 N. Y. 625 ; 13 N. E. Eep. 
 624 ; 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 21. 
 
 3» Baker v. Manhattan, etc., E. Co., 118 2Sr. Y. 533; 23 N. E. Rep. 885; 
 29 N. Y. S. E. 936. 
 
 40 Feeney v. Long Island, etc., E. Co., 116 N. Y. 375; 22 N. E. Eep. 
 402; 26 N. Y. S. E. 729; 42 Hun 657; 5 L. R. A. 544; 39 Am. & Eng. 
 E. Cas. 639. 
 
 *i Winkler v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ey. Co., 21 Mo. App. 99. 
 
 *2 Kansas City, etc., E. Co. v. Phillips, 98 Ala. 159 ; 13 So. Rep. 65. 
 
 4s Lincoln v. Saratoga, etc., E. Co., 23 Wend. 425; Looram v. Second 
 Avenue, etc., E. Co., 11 N. Y. S. E. 652. 
 
 213 
 
§ 173 COMPUTATIOIT OF DAMAGES. 
 
 every instance where the nature of the case -will admit such 
 a rule ** and the damages to one who has been injured by the 
 negligence of a railroad coinpany are generally restricted 
 to those that are actual.*® Punitive damages cannot be given 
 -for mere negligent injuries,*® and where there is no testi- 
 mony showing that the negligence is so gross as to amount 
 to wantonness, and no willful or malicious acts are proven, 
 actual or compensatory damages alone are recoverable.*'^ 
 
 The mere failure to light depot grounds, as a result of 
 which an injury occurs, gives the injured person a right to 
 mere compensatory damages ; ** punitive damages cannot be 
 recovered for negligent injuries resulting from the negligence 
 of an employee, unaccompanied by the negligence of the em- 
 ployer ; *® nor can other than compensatory damages be re- 
 
 *4 Louisville, etc., R. Oo. v. Guinan, 11 Lea. (Tenn.) 98; 13 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 37; Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Smith, 6 Heisk. (Tenn.) 
 174. 
 
 45 Troy V. Cape Uear, etc., R. Co., 99 N. Car. 298 ; 6 S. E. Rep. 77 ; 6 
 Am. St. Rep. 521; 34 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 13. 
 
 48 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Shanks, 94 Ind. 598; 19 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 28; Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Vance, 93 Ala. 144; 9 So. Rep. 
 574; Purcell v. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 108 N. Car. 414; 12 S. E. Rep. 
 954; Patterson v. South & N. Ala. R. Co., 89 Ala. 318; 7 So. Rep. 437; 
 Philadelphia Tr. Co. v. Orbann, 119 Pa. St. 37; 12 Atl. Rep. 816; 34 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 432; Columbus, etc., R. Co. v. Bridges, 86 Ala. 
 448; 5 So. Rep. 864; 38 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 136; Batterson v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. Co., 49 Mieh. 184; 13 N. W. Rep. 508; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 123; Keep v. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co., 3 McCrary (U. S.)'208; 9 
 Fed. Rep. 625; Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. McGinnis, 46 Kansas 109; 26 
 Pac. Rep. 453; Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Kier, 41 Kansas 671; 
 21 Pac. Rep. 770; Belknap v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 49 N. H. 358; Hurt v. 
 St. Louis, I. M. & 8. Ry. Co., 94 Mo. 255; 7 S. W. Rep. 1; 34 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 422. 
 
 47 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. McGinnis, 46 Kansas 109; 26 Pac. Rep. 
 453. 
 
 48 Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Arnold, 84 Ala. 159; 4 So. Rep. 359; 5 
 Am. St. Rep. 354; 35 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 466. 
 
 48McKeon v. Citizens R. Co., 42 Mo. 79. But see, Perkins v. Citi- 
 zens R. Co., 55 Mo. 201; Potts v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 33 Fed. Rep. 
 610; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Fleming, 14 Lea (Tenn.) 128; 18 Am. & 
 214 
 
COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES. § 174 
 
 covered for an injury unintentionally inflicted,^" or one 
 resulting solely from an error in judgment. ^^ 
 
 § 174. Elements included in compensatory dama^fes. — No 
 
 fixed rule exists for estimating the amount of damages that 
 are recoverable for personal injuries, resulting in permanent 
 disability. The amount should be reasonable and just to 
 both parties and should include reasonable compensation for 
 the bodily pain and suffering attendant upon the injury com- 
 plained of, together with a repayment for the loss of money 
 which the injured person would have earned, bad the injury 
 not occurred.®^ Compensatory damages are generally con- 
 fined to the expenses incurred, the value of time lost, a fair 
 compensation for the physical and mental suffering caused 
 by the injury and damages for any permanent reduction of 
 the power to earn money.®* 
 
 Where a disease exists at the time of the injury and is 
 aggravated by it, the injured person is entitled to full com- 
 pensatory damages, for the measure of damages is based 
 
 Eng. E. Cas. 347; Illinois, etc., E. Co. v. Hammer, 72 111. 353; Cleghorn 
 V. New York, etc., E. Co., 56 N. Y. 44. 
 
 BO Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Siekings, 5 Bush. (Ky.) 1; Griffith v. Bal- 
 timore, etc., E. Co., 44 Fed. Rep. 574 ; Green v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 36 
 Fed. Eep. 66. 
 
 "Kansas Pac. E. Co. v. Miller, 2 Colo, 442; 20 Am. Ry. Rep. 245. 
 
 " Where there is no evidence in an action for wrongful death, of 
 pecuniary loss, it is not error to instruct the jury to that effect, 
 and that they should consider all the elements of compensatory dam- 
 ages, except that based on pecuniary loss." Barksdale v. Seaboard Air 
 Line Ey. (S. C. 1907), 56 S. B. Eep. 906. 
 
 Compensation is made the basis of damages for negligence in Mis- 
 souri. Waechter v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 88 S. W. Rep. 147. 
 
 02 Richmond, etc., fe. Ce. v. Allison, 86 Ga. 145 ; 12 S. E. Rep. 352 ; 
 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 101; Vicksburg, etc., R. Co. v. Putnam, 118 
 U. S. 554; Ohio, fete, R. Co. v. Dickerson, 59 Ind. 317. 
 
 53 Kentucky, etc., R. Co. v. Ackley, 87 Ky. 278; 8 S. W. Rep. 691; 12 
 Am. St. Rep. 480. 
 
 215. 
 
5 175 COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES. 
 
 1 
 
 upon the plaintiff's condition, without regard to whether he 
 already had a predisposition to disease or not.^* 
 
 Mental suffering is proper to be taken into consideration 
 when it is connected with physical pain Or when it is ac- 
 companied by malice, insult, inhumanity or oppression, on 
 the part of the defendant,^^ but otherwise not.®® And where 
 only the fact of an injury and a resulting death, are shown, 
 together with the age of the deceased, without any showing 
 of the habits, earning power, probable duration of the life, 
 or other facts, to base a verdict upon, no compensatory dam- 
 ages could be allowed, but only a judgment for nominal 
 damages.®'' 
 
 § 175. Expenses resulting from injury. — In a personal in- 
 jury action against a railroad company, the plaintiff is en- 
 titled to recover, as a part of his damages, his reasonable and 
 necessary outlays in an attempt to be cured of the injuries 
 due to the defendant's negligence.®* And expenses for med- 
 ical attention, ®® such as would be reasonable and necessary, 
 considering the situation of the injured person and medi- 
 
 54 Louisville, etc., B. Co. v. Miller (Ind.), 37 N. E. Eep. 343; 58 Am. 
 
 6 Eng. R. Gas. 304; Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. HeeM, 115 Ind. 443; 17 N. E. 
 Rep. 297 ; 34 Am. & Eng. H. Caa. 447 ; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Snyder, 
 117 Ind. 435; 20 N. E. Rep. 284; 3 L. E. A. 434; 37 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 137; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Falvey, 104 Ind. 409; 3 N. B. Rep. 389; 
 23 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 522. 
 
 B5 Dawson v. Louisville, etc., E. Co. (Ky.), 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 134. 
 
 88 Smith V. Atclxison, etc., R. Co., 122 Mo. App. 85. 
 
 B7 Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Orr, 91 Ala. 548; 8 So. Eep. 360. 
 
 58 Sherwood v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 82 Mich. 374; 46 N. W. Rep. 
 773; 44 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 337; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Falvey, 104 
 Ind. 409; 3 N. E. Rep. 389; 23 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 522; Stephens v. 
 Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 96 Mo. 207 ; 9 S. W. Eep. 589 ; 38 Am. & Eng. 
 E. Cas. 110; Baker v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 142 Pa. St. 503; 21 Atl. 
 Eep. 979; Davidson v. Southern Pac. E. Co., 44 Fed. Eep. 476. 
 
 59Hulehan v. Green Bay, etc., E. Co., 68 Wis. 520; 32 N. W. Eep. 
 529; 31 Am. & Eng.-R. Cas. 322; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Holland, 
 122 111. 461; 13 N. B, Kep. 145; 30 Am. & Bng. R. Cas. 590; Indiana 
 216 
 
COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES. § 176 
 
 ciB€s ®° and nurse hire,®^ are all proper elements of damage 
 to be silbmitted to the jury, as well as the probable cost of 
 future treatment and nursing, when the injury is shown to 
 have been permanent.*^ 
 
 But one cannot, in an action for personal injuries, re- 
 cover for expenses incurred for professional services of phy- 
 sicians, and for nurse hire and drugs, in the absence of evi- 
 dence showing the amount of*such expenses, or that any were 
 ever paid, or any liability therefor actually incurred.®^ To 
 justify an instruction to the jury allowing damages by way 
 of expenses for medical attention or treatment, there must 
 be some evidence of a payment or a liability therefor, .on 
 the plaintiff's part,"* and: where there is no evidence of the 
 amount of medicines used or the value of the medical atten- 
 tion rendered, it is error to instruct the jury that they may 
 allow for medicines and medical treatment reasonably and 
 necessarily employed.®^ 
 
 Car Co. V. Parker, 100 Ind. 181 ; Wallace v. Western, etc., E. Co., 104 
 N. Car. 442; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 212; 10 S. E. Rep. 552. 
 
 eoTrotten v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 11 Fed. Rep. 564; Central R. Co. 
 V. Wood, 51 Ga. 515; 8 Am. Ry. Rep. 9. 
 
 61 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Holland, 122 HI. 461 ; 13 N. E. Rep. 145 ; 
 30 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 590; Wallace v. Western R. Co., 104 N. Car. 
 442; 10 S. E. Rep. 552; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 212. 
 
 62 South & N. R. Co. V. McLendon, 63 Ala. 266. 
 
 63 Duke v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 99 Mo. 347; 12 S. W. Rep. 636; 
 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 221; Reed v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 57 Iowa 23; 
 10 N. W. Rep. 285; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 180; Smith v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. Co., 108 Mo. 243; 18 S. W. Rep. 971; 52 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 483 ; Madden v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 50 Mo. App. 666. 
 
 64 Minster v. Citizens R. Co., 53 Mo. App. 276. 
 
 ssEckard v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 70 Iowa 353; 30 N. W. Rep. 
 615; 27 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 114; Fordyee v. Beecher, 2 Texas Civ. App. 
 29 ; 21 S. W. Rep. 179. 
 
 " In an action for personal injuries, it is error to authorize a re- 
 covery for the expenses of medical treatment where there is no evi- 
 dence of the amount of such expenses'." St. Louis, I. M. . & S. Ry. Co. 
 V. Leamons (Ark. 1907), 102 S. W. Rep. 363. 
 
 "In an action for personal injuries, where plaintifif was nursed 
 
 217 
 
§176 COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES. 
 
 § 176. Exemplary or punitive damages. — In an action for 
 personal injuries from accidents on railroads, exemplary or 
 vindictive damages should not be allowed, except in extreme 
 cases.®® To justify exemplary damages for a personal in- 
 jury, the negligence of the defendant must have been such 
 as to have amoim.ted to wantonness, willfulness or malicious- 
 ness.®^ If the tort was willful, or committed under such 
 circumstances as to show gross negligence, then punitive dam- 
 ages may be given.®* When torts are committed with fraud, 
 actual malice, or deliberate violence or oppression, or when 
 the defendant acts willfully, or with such gross negligence 
 , as to indicate a wanton disregard of the rights of others, then 
 
 only by members of her family, and there was no express contract to 
 pay them, expenses incurred for nursing was not a proper element of 
 damages." Gibney v. St. Louis Transit Co. (Mo. 1907), 103 S. W. 
 Rep. 43. 
 
 " Where, in an action by a husband for expenses for medical at- 
 tendance for his wife and for loss of services, in consequence of a per- 
 sonal injury sustained by the wife, there was no evidence of the value 
 of the loss of services, and the testimony .showed the value of the medi- 
 cal attendance at a specified sum, the verdict should be limited to the 
 specified sum." Friedman v. Horn (N. Y. Sup. 1907), 104 N. Y. S. 
 745. 
 
 Expenses for medical services cannot be recovered, in the absence of 
 proof of the reasonableness of the charges therefor. Dallas, etc., Ey. 
 Co. V. McAlister (Texas Civ.. App.), 90 8. W. Kep. 933. 
 
 The reasonable value of physicians' services is alone recoverable, un- 
 less the amount is less than a reasonable sum, when this is the limit 
 of the recovery, in such case. Nelson v. Metropolitan Ky. Co., 88 S. 
 W. Rep. 781. 
 
 And expenses for medical bills and nurse hire must be specially 
 pleaded always. Stowe v. LeConnor Trans. Co., 39 Wash. 27; 80 Pac. 
 Eep. 856. 
 
 Recovery for medical bills are not proper, on mere proof of an in- 
 debtedness therefor, unless the bills were actually paid. Stanley v. 
 Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 112 Mo. App. 601; 87 S. W. Rep. 112. 
 
 68 Union Pacific E. Co. v. Hause, 1 Wyo. 27. 
 
 87 Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Kier, 41 Kansas 671; 21 Pac. Rep. 
 770. 
 
 68 Purcell V. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 108 N. Car. 414 ; 12 S. E. Rep. 
 954 ; New Orleans, etc., R. Co. v. Hurst, 36 Miss. 660. 
 218 
 
COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES. § 176 
 
 exemplary damages are allowed, not only to compensate the 
 injured person, but to punish the wrongdoer, as well.®^ 
 
 But the negligence established must be wanton, willful, 
 or malicious, to justify punitive damages^" Mere neglect 
 is never considered willfulness, but the intention with which 
 the act is done 'is always essential. '^^ The mere fact that 
 an act was wrongful and injurious does not justify exem- 
 plary damages, in the absence of actual malice, an evil in- 
 tent, or such -oppression as to indicate wanton indifference as 
 to the rights invaded. '^^ Such damages are imposed, not 
 simply for every wrongful act, but for the willfulness or 
 wantonness which characterizes the conduct of the wrongdoer, 
 and therefore such damages cannot be inflicted regardless of 
 the intent, whether good or bad.'^^ The turpitude of the 
 defendant's conduct is alone considered and there must be 
 ,a wrong intent on his part, or the wrongful execution of a 
 bona fide intent. If the wrongful act is not characterized 
 by a bad motive, or there is no recklessness such as to imply 
 a disregard of social obligations or no negligence so gross as 
 to amount to positive misconduct, then exemplary damages 
 cannot be allowed. ''* 
 
 oo Samuels v. Richmond, etc., E. Co., 35 So. Car. 493; 14 S. E. Kep. 
 943; 52 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 315; Consolidated, etc., Co. v. Hannei, 
 146 HI. 614; 35 N. E. Rep. 162. 
 
 70 Atchison, etc.y- R. Co. v. McGinnis, 46 Kansas 109; 26 Pac. Rep. 
 453. 
 
 71 Peoria, etc.. Association v. Loomis, 20 111. 235. 
 
 72 Hoffman v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 45 Minn. 53; 47 N. W. Rep. 312; 
 Edmunds v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 3 Mo. App. 603; McFee v. Vicks- 
 burg, etc., R. Co., 42 L . Ann. 790; 7 So. Rep. 720. 
 
 73 Donovan v. Manhattan R. Co., 1 Misc. 368; 49 N. Y. S. R. 722; 21 
 N. Y. Supp. 457; Jacobs v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 10 Bush. (Ky) 263. 
 
 7* Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Hoeflich, 62 Md. 300; 50 Am. Rep. 
 223; 18 Am."& Eng. R. das. 373; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Guinan, 11 
 Lea. (Tenn.) 98; 47 Am. Rep. 279; 13 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 37. 
 
 Punitive damages are not recoverable in a negligence case, in Kan- 
 sas, unless the negligence is so gross as to amount to wantonness. 
 Atchison, etc., Ry. Co. v. Ringle, 80 Pac. Rep. 43. 
 
 219 
 
§ 177 COMPUTATION 01' DAMAGES. 
 
 § 177. When exemplary damages are recoverable. — Ex- 
 emplary damages have been held properly recoverable, in the 
 following cases, i. e., where a personal injury was caused by 
 the gross carelessness of a railroad company, in the manage- 
 ment of trains; ''^ where the evidence showed a grossly care- 
 less disregard of the safety of the traveling public; ''^ where 
 the injury was inflicted under circumstances accompanied 
 by particularly aggravating circumstances ; '''' where the de- 
 fendant's negligence evinces utter recklessness ; '^^ for gross 
 negligence in failing to keep a bridge over a highway, in re- 
 pair ; ''^ where the employees of a company willfully and reck- 
 lessly fail to stop a train at a signal station, on being sig- 
 naled ; *" the principal, although a corporation, for the 
 reckless acts of its employees, done within the scope of their 
 employment.*^ But the employee of a company may be liable 
 for exemplary damages, because of his own conduct, when 
 his employer would only be liable for compensatory dam- 
 ages ; *^ an employer can be held for such damages, gen- 
 erally, when the employee causing the injury could be so 
 
 iWhere a willful, wanton, or reckless act is done with a reckless de- 
 sign, punitive damages are recoverable, without proof of malice. 
 Thomason v. Southern Ry Co., 72 S. C. 1; 51 S. E. Rep. 443. 
 
 75 Hopkins v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co., 36 N. H. 9. 
 
 76 Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Vance, 93 Ala. 144; 9 So. Rep. 574; 
 Jacobs v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 10 Bush. (Ky.) 263. 
 
 77 Western, etc., R. Co., v. Drysdale, 51 Ga. 644; 7 Am. Ry. Rep. 343. 
 
 78 Caldwell v. New Jersey Steamboat Co., 47 N. Y. 282. 
 
 79 South & North Ala. R. Co. v. McLendon, 63 Ala. 266 ; Vicksburg, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Fatten, 31 Miss. 156; Maysville, etc., R. Co. v. Herrick, 
 13 Bush. (Ky.) 122; 17 Am. Ry. Rep. 53. 
 
 80 Wilson V. New Orleans, etc., R. Co., 63 Miss. 352. 
 
 81 New Orleans, etc., R. Co. v. Bailey, 40 Miss. 395; Goddard v. 
 Grand Trunk R. Co., 2 Am. Rep. 39; Haley v. Mobile, etc., R. Co., 7 
 Baxt. (Tenn.) 239; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 541. 
 
 82 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Fleming, 14 Lea (Tenn.) 128; 18 Am. 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 347; Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Stearns, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 
 52. 
 
 220 
 
COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES. § 178 
 
 held, if the act was in the scope of his employment ; *^ a com- 
 pany can be held, if it authorized or ratified the wrongful act 
 of its agent and he could be held for punitive damages ; ^* 
 a railway company is liable for a reckless injury to a passen- 
 ger, caused by its employees, acting within the scope of their 
 employment,*® and an employee of one railroad, defending 
 its property, who is shot and dangerously injured by an 
 employee of another company, trying to take forcible pos- 
 session of the property of the employing company, is entitled 
 to punitive damages from the company employing the wrohg- 
 doer.®® 
 
 § 178. When punitive damages should not be allowed. — 
 
 Punitive or exemplary damages are not properly recover- 
 able, for an injuTy caused to one on a railroad track, by the 
 mere failure of the company to build a platform or erect a 
 
 83 Lake Shore, etc., E. Co. v. Eosenweig, 113 Pa. St. 519; 6 Atl. Eep. 
 545; 26 Am. &, Eng. E. Cas. 489; Atlantic, etc., E. Co. v. Dunn, 19 Ohio 
 St. 162; Pittsburg, etc., E. Co. v. Slusser, 19 Ohio St. 157; Gasway v. 
 Atlanta, etc., E. Co., 58 Ga. 216; 16 Am^ Ey. Eep. 99. 
 
 84 Bass V. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 42 Wis. 654; 15 Am. Ey. Eep. 45; 
 Philadelphia Tr. Co. v. Orbann, 199 Pa. St. 37; 12 Atl. Eep. 816; 34 
 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 432. 
 
 85 Quinn v. South Carolina R. Co., 29 So. Car. 381; 7 S. E. Eep. 614; 
 1 L. R. A. 682; 37 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 166. 
 
 86 Denver, etc., E. Co. v. Harris, 122 U, S. 597 ; 31 Am. & Eng. E. 
 Cas. 592. 
 
 " An employee of a railroad company was sent into a pit under an 
 engine to clean the ashes from the engine, and the engineer promised 
 not to move the engine while he was there, but did move it. Held, that 
 the employee could recover punitive damages for the resulting injuries; 
 the engineer's conduct being wanton and reckless negligence." Chesa- 
 peake & 0. Ey. Co. V. Satterfield (Ky. 1907), 100 S. W. Eep. 844. 
 
 " Exemplary damages are properly awarded where a motorman run- 
 ning his car at high speed fails to lessen it until too late to prevent 
 collision with one driving near the track, and the motorman sees, or 
 could see, the person in time to check his car or stop it, thereby 
 avoiding the injury." South Covington & C. St. Ey. Co. v. Cleveland 
 (Ky. 1907), 100 S. W. Eep. 283. 
 
 '221 
 
§ 178 COMf UTATlOif 01* DAMAGES. 
 
 light at a point where a branch road connects with its 
 track ; *'' punitive damages cannot b6 allowed, in Mississippi, 
 in the absence of a showing of gross negligence ; *^ exemplary- 
 damages cannot be allowed for an injury on a railroad 
 bridge, caused by the ignorance of the bridge tender ; ®* such 
 damages cannot be allowed for an injury due to the negli- 
 gence of an employee, unless it is shown that the employer 
 authorized or ratified the wrongful act ; ^° the discharge and 
 repudiation of the act of an employee, not previously author- 
 ized, would prevent punitive damages for an injury due 
 to his act ; ®^ an employer cannot be held for punitive dam- 
 ages for an injury due to the recklessness of an employee, 
 unless it is shown that his recklessness was known to the 
 employer ; ®^ the malicious misconduct of an employee caus- 
 ing an injury, will not justify vindictive damages against 
 the employer, unless the act was within the scope of the 
 employee's agency ; ®^ a company is not liable unless it in 
 some way participates in the negligence of its employee caus- 
 ing the injury;®* the employer cannot be held for punitive 
 damages, unless the act of its agent, occasioning the injury, 
 was a malicious or wanton act ; ®® and if the act of the em- 
 ployee was wanton or malicious, the employer is not liable, 
 unless it expressly or impliedly authorized or ratified the 
 
 sTBnsley E. Co. v. Chewing, 93 Ala. 24; 9 So. Rep. 458; 50 Am. 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 46; Glass v. Memphis, etc., E. Co., 94 Ala. 581; Sa- 
 vannah, etc., R. Co. V. Meadows, 95 Ala. 137. 
 
 88 New Orleans, etc., R. Co. v. Statham, 42 Miss. 608. 
 
 8» Brooks V. New York, etc., R. Co., 30 Hun (N. Y.) 47. 
 
 90 Hagan v. Providence, etc., R. Co., 3 R. I. 88. 
 
 9.1 Western, etc., R. Co. v. Turner, 72 Ga. 292; 53 Am. Rep. 842; 28 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 455. 
 
 »2 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Hammer, 72 111. 347. 
 
 03 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Slusser, 19 Ohio St. 157; Goddard v. 
 Grand Tr. R. Co., 57 Me. 202. 
 
 91 Fisher v. Metropolitan R. Co., 34 Hun (N. Y.) 433. 
 
 96 Doss V. Missouri, etc., R. Co., 59 Mo. 27 ; 8 Am. Ry. Rep. 462. 
 
 222 
 
COMPUTATION Ol? DAMAGES. § 179 
 
 ■wrongful act ; ®® a railroad company is not liable for puni- 
 tive damages for the "wanton or illegal act of a conductor 
 of one of its trains, toward a passenger,®'^ and under the 
 Texas death statute, punitive damages cannot be recovered 
 for the mere negligence of an employee, as distinguished 
 from a negligent act of the railroad company itself.^* 
 
 § 179. Pleading exemplary damages. — To entitle the plain- 
 tiff in a personal injury action to exemplary or punitive dam- 
 ages, such damages must be set forth in the complaint.®' A 
 tort, causing a personal injury, which will give punitive 
 damages, must be one accompanied by malice, wantonness, 
 violence or recklessness, and to recover such damages the 
 plaintifF must allege the elements of such a tort.^ The peti- 
 tion should set forth the facts going to show the fraud, ma- 
 lice, gross negligence or oppression on the defendant's part, 
 and if a corporation is sued, it should be alleged that the 
 fraud, gross negligence or oppression of the company's agents, 
 were done by direction of the employer or that it ratified 
 such acts, after their commission.^ Where actual and ex- 
 emplary damages both are set forth, in the same petition, 
 
 00 Eicketts v. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co., 33 W. Va. 433 ; 35 L. R. A. 
 354 ; 10 S. E. Rep. 801 ; 41 Am. & Bng. R. Cas. 42. 
 
 »7 Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Prentiss, 147 U. S. 101 ; 58 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 436. 
 
 88 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Cowser, 57 Texas 293. 
 
 "Exemplary damages cannot be awarded, in an action for injuries, 
 unless there is gross negligence or wanton disregard of the safety of 
 others." Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Lence (Ky. 1907), 100 S. W. Rep. 
 215. 
 
 »9 Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Arnold, 84 Ala. 159 ; 4 So. Rep. 359 ; 5 Am. 
 St. Rep. 354; 35 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 466; Houston, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Baker, 57 Texas 419; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 667. 
 
 1 Samuels y. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 35 Car. 493 ; 14 S. E. Kep. 
 943; 52 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 315; Sullivan v. Oregon, etc., R. Co., 12 
 Oregon 392; 7 Pac. Rep. 508; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 391. 
 
 2 International, etc., R. Co. v. Garcia, 70 Texas 207; 7 S. W. Rep. 
 802. ^ 
 
 223 
 
§ 180 COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES. 
 
 they should properly be set forth in distinct counts, under 
 separate causes of action,^ But it is not essential that ex- 
 emplary damages should be claimed, eo nomine, in the peti- 
 tion, but it is generally held to be sufficient if the? facts al- 
 leged and proved are .such as to warrant the assessment of 
 such damages.* 
 
 § 180. Evidence to establish exemplary damages. — It is er- 
 ror to leave the question of punitive damages to a jury when 
 no evidence has been introduced that would authorize a ver- 
 dict for more than compensatory damages.^ 
 
 Where the evidence is such as to authorize exemplary dam- 
 .ages, the jury may properly consider as elements thereof, 
 the probable expenses of the litigation to the plaintiff, and 
 evidence is admissible to show what a reasonable and proper 
 charge for counsel fees would be.* It is not improper, in 
 such cases, to allow proof of the pecuniary ability of the de- 
 fendant,'^ for what would be sufficient damages, by way of 
 example and punishment, for a day laborer, with no estate, 
 would be inconsequential, by way of punishment or example, 
 for a wealthy corporation. * 
 
 But the jury cannot take into consideration the ability 
 of the defendant to respond in damages, in order to justify 
 an increase of damages, in the absence of bad motive, or 
 some other fact sufficient of itself to justify punitive dam- 
 ages,® nor is tbe poverty or lack of wealth, on the part of the 
 
 a Galveston, etc., E. Co. v. Le Gierse, 51 Texas 189. 
 
 * Savannah, etc., E. Co. v. Holland, 82 Ga. 257; 10 S. E. Rep. 200; 
 41 Am. &_Eng. R. Cas. 196. 
 
 B Pittsburg Southern R. Co. v. Taylor, 104 Pa. St. 306; 49 Am. Rep. 
 580. 
 
 New Orleans, etc., R. Co. v. Allbritton, 38 Miss. 242. 
 
 T Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Mahoney, 7 Bush. (Ky.) 235. 
 
 8 Belknap v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 49 N. H. 358. 
 
 Hunt V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 26 Iowa 363 ; Hayes v. St. Louis, etc., 
 R. Co., 15 Mo. App. 583. 
 
 224 
 
COMSUtATIOir OF DAMAGES. §§ 18l, 182 
 
 plaintiff material, in such a case, as the damages to which 
 he may be entitled are not at all affected by the wealth or 
 poverty of the plaintiff.^" 
 
 § 181. Prospective damages for permanent injuries. — 
 
 Where there is a permanent injury to the person, prospec- 
 tive damages resulting therefrom are recoverable, by way 
 of compensation,^^ but to justify the allowance of damages 
 for future or permanent disability, it must be shown that 
 permanent disability is reasonably certain to result from the 
 injtiries complained of.^^ Claims for permanent internal 
 injuries should never be. allowed, unless they are clearly es- 
 tablished by evidence as necessarily arising from the injuries 
 resulting proximately from the negligence of the defendant.-'^ 
 ' But where the evidence shows an injury resulting from the 
 accident that is permanent in its nature, a recovery may be 
 had for the disabling effects of the injury, both past and 
 prospective; and in estimating such damages, loss of time 
 and incapacity to do as profitable labor after, as before the 
 injury, as well as mental and physical suffering, are held to 
 be proper elements for the jury to consider.^* 
 
 § 182. Same — Permanent disability must be reasonably 
 certain. — Damages for the probable future result of personal 
 
 10 Shea v. Potrero, etc., R. Co., 44 Cal. 414; 5 Am. Ey. Rep. 448. 
 
 iiGorham v. Kansas City, etc., E. Co., 113 Mo. 408; 20 S. W. Eep. 
 1060. 
 
 13 Ohio, etc., E. Co. v. Cosby, 107 Ind. 32; 7 N. E. Eep. 373; 27 Am. 
 & Eng. E. Cas. 339; Cleveland, etc., E. Co. v. Newell, 104 Ind. 264; 
 White V. Milwaukee, etc., E. Co., 61 Wis. 536; 21 N. W. Eep. 524; 50 
 Am. Eep. 154; Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 213. 
 
 18 Dunn V. Pennsylvania E. Co., 20 Phila. (Pa.) 258; Texas Trunk E. 
 Co. V. Ayers, 83 Texas 268; 18 S, W. Eep. 684. 
 
 1* Mobile, etc., E. Co. v. George, 94 Ala. 199; 10 So. Rep. 145. 
 
 "A verdict for personal injuries should be for such a sum as will 
 reasonably compensate plaintiff for the injuries he has proved, including 
 therein his loss of time and wages, his pain and suffering in the. past, 
 1—15 225 
 
§ IBS' COMPtTTATlOK OP DAMAGES. 
 
 injuries, to be recoverable, must depend upon tbe reasonable 
 certainty and probability of the future result of such in- 
 jury.i^ If not reasonably certain to result from the injury, 
 it would be speculative to allovs^ damages for the permanent 
 nature of the disability.^® A mere probability of the future 
 occurrence of the disability is not enough, but to entitle plain- 
 tiff to damages for future disability the evidence must es- 
 tablish, vrith reasonable certainty, • that such disability will 
 result.^ '^ Reasonable certainty, however, is all that- can be 
 entertained in regard to the future, and hence it is correct to 
 instruct the jury that the plaintiff is entitled to such future 
 damages as it is shown by the evidence will be reasonably 
 certain to result from the injury.^* 
 
 In estimating future damages, evidence tending to show 
 the character and extent of the injury and its probable re- 
 sult, as well as the probability of a return of the disease or 
 disability resulting from the injury in the ordinary course 
 of events, is admissible to show what future damages may 
 reasonably be expected to follow the condition induced by the 
 
 and such as may come to him in the future as a result of the injury, 
 and also for any permanent injuries.'' Simeone v. Lindsay (Del. Sup. 
 1907), 65 Atl. Eep. 778. 
 
 " The verdict in favor of plaintiff in a personal injury action should 
 be for such an amount as will reasonably compensate him for the 
 injury sustained, including therein pain and suffering and all dis- 
 ability that may result therefrom." Eeiss v. Wilmington City Ey. Co. 
 (Del. Sup. 1907), 67 Atl. Rep. 153. 
 
 IB Gregory v. New York, etc., E. Co., 8 N. Y. Supp. 525; 28 N. Y. 
 S. R. 726. 
 
 16 Missouri Pacific By. Co. v. Mitchell, 75 Texas 77; 12 S. W. Eep. 
 810; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 224; Bateman v. New York, etc., E. Co., 
 47 Hun (N. Y.) 429; 14 N. Y. S. E. 454. 
 
 IT Filer v. New York, etc., E. Co., 49 N. Y. 42; 3 Am. Ey. Eep. 460; 
 Feeney v. Long Island, etc., B. Co., 116 N. Y. 375; 22 N. E. Rep. 402; 
 26 N. Y. S. R. 729 ; 5 L. R. A. 544 ; 39 Am. & Eng.' R. Cas. 639. 
 
 IS Feeney v. Long Island, etc., E. Co., 116 N. Y. 375; 22 N. E. Eep. 
 402; 39 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 639. 
 
 226 
 
eoMfUTATIOif OF DAMAGES. § l83 
 
 injury.^® But the jury should not allow damages for fu- 
 ture effects of an injury where the testimony only shows that 
 the injury may likely prove permanent and there is not a 
 reasonable certainty that it will be so, for otherwise the 
 permanency of such injury is a mere contingency likely to 
 occur and the allowance of damages for such contingent re- 
 sult would be purely speculation.^" 
 
 § 183. Damages for future pain and suffering. — Pain and 
 
 physical suffering that may reasonably be expected in the 
 future may be considered in giving damages for injuries to 
 the person, where the evidence shows that they will be ex- 
 perienced as a result of the injury sustained.^^ But while 
 physical pain is a proper element of damages, where it will 
 result in the future from the injury, the damages therefor 
 should be limited to such future pain and suffering as will 
 ^e reasonably certain, to result from the injury and where 
 the existence of such future pain is a matter of mere con- 
 jecture, no damages therefor should be allowed.^^ 
 
 19 Wallace v. Western N. Car. E. Co., 104 N. Car. 442; 10 S. E. Eep. 
 552; 41 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 212; South & N. E. Co. v. MeLendon, 63 
 Ala. 266 ; Bay Shore E. Co. v. Harris, 67 Ala. 6. 
 
 20Meeteer v. Manhattan E. Co., 63 Hun 533; 45 N. Y. S. E. 704; 18 
 N. Y. Supp. 561. 
 
 " In an action for a personal injury, the plaintiff is entitled to re- 
 cover damages for future consequences of the injury only with respect 
 to such consequences as the evidence shows are reasonably certain to 
 ensue." Daigneau v. Grand Trunk Ey. Co. (U. S. C. C, Mass. 1906), 
 153 Fed. Eep. 593. 
 
 Damages for inability to bear children, canjiot be recovered. Len- 
 nox V. Interurban Ey. Co., 93 N. Y. S. 230; 104 App. Div. 110. 
 
 2iFeeney v. Long Island E. Co., tie N. Y. 375; 22 N. E. Eep. 402; 
 26 N. Y. S. E. 729; 5 L. E. A. 544; 39 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 639; Gris- 
 wold V. New York, etc., E. Co., 44 Hun 236; 115 N. Y. 61; Metteson v. 
 New York, etc., E. Co., 62 Barb. (N. Y.) 364. 
 
 22 Fry V. Dubuque, etc., E. Co., 45 Iowa 416; Waterman v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. Co., 82 Wis. 613; 52 N. W. Eep. 247; 52 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 
 592. 
 
 22Y 
 
§ 183 COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES. 
 
 Evidence of an incurable spinal disease, as a result of the 
 injury, will support a verdict for future damages for pain 
 and suffering; ^^ where one of the plaintiff's feet was so 
 injured as to require amputation and the other foot had 
 evidences that it was diseased, it is proper to allow damages 
 for future pain ; ^* a broken arm that had not recovered a 
 yealr after the injury, where the physician testified that in 
 his opinion it would not recover, entitled the plaintiff to 
 damages for a permanent injury; ^^ the opinion of a physi- 
 cian that permanent disability will result from the injury is 
 generally held sufficient to justify damages for future dis- 
 ability,^* and where a recovery is not shown at the time of the 
 trial, future damages for physical disability were allowed, 
 in one case.^'^ 
 
 However, in the absence of evidence th^ the injury is rea- 
 sonably certain to cause future pain and suffering, it is error 
 to charge the jury that they may allow damages for future 
 pain,^^ and to justify an instruction for damages for future 
 suffering, in any case, it must be shown that permanent dis- 
 ability or future suffering is reasonably certain to follow 
 the injury. ^^ 
 
 23 Weiler v. Manhattan, etc., E,. Co., 6 N. Y. Supp. 320. 
 2* Lake Shore, etc., E. Co. v. Johnson, 135 111. 641; 26 N. E. Eep. 
 510; Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Gomes, 46 111. App. 255. 
 
 25 Bigelow V. Metropolitan, etc., E. Co., 48 Mo. App. 367. 
 
 26 Kane v. New York, etc., E. Co., 132 N. Y. 160; 30 N. E. Eep. 2S6; 
 43 N.-Y. S. E. 494; "56 Hun. 648; Crank v. Forty-second St. E. Co., 6 
 N. Y. Supp. 229. 
 
 27 Stutz y. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 73 Wis. 147 ; 40 N. W. Eep. 653 ; 
 37 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 187. 
 
 28 Bloom V. Manhattan E. Co., 48 N. Y. S. E. 378; 63 Hun. 629; 17 
 N. Y. Supp. 812; Crawford v. Delaware, etc., E. Co., 23 J. & S. (N. Y.) 
 255. 
 
 29 Atlanta, etc., E. Co. v. Johnson, 66 Ga. 259; Union Pac. R. Co. v. 
 Jones, 49 Fed. Eep. 343; 4 U. S. App. 115. 
 
 "In an action for injuries, an allegation that plaintiff was reason- 
 a:bly certain to suffer in the future great physical pain and mental 
 anguish was not insufficient to raise such issue, because it did not 
 228 
 
COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES. § 184: 
 
 § 184. loss of earnings in the future. — Damages are prop- 
 erly allowable for future loss or suffering due to personal 
 injuries, where the evidence shows that the plaintiff has not 
 recovered at the date of the trial,^" and the fact that the 
 injury more or less incapacitated the plaintiff for the per- 
 formance of labor, or the pursuit of his ordinary avocation, 
 is a proper element to be considered by the jury.*^ Pros- 
 pective damages to an adult, on account of impairment or 
 loss of earning capacity in the future is a proper element 
 of damage and it is even held, in one case, that a jury could 
 take into consideration the loss of earnings of an infant four 
 ye,ars old, after he shall have attained his majority,*^ but 
 as he might never earn anything, it would seem to be very 
 •uncertain what his earning capacity might be and would be 
 next to speculation to base a verdict for damages on such 
 ground. An instruction should not assume an impairment 
 of earning capacity, however, where the evidence on this 
 point is conflicting or not all one way ; ^^ but where the evi- 
 dence shows a loss of earning capacity, it is proper to advise 
 the jury that if they believe, from the evidence, the plaintiff 
 has sustained such loss, in case the verdict is for the plain- 
 tiff, then damages should be assessed for such 'sum as the 
 evidence shows plaintiff will sustain, in the future, by reason 
 of the injury.^* 
 
 charge in terms that she 'would' suffer future pain." Bell v. 
 Central Electric Ey. Co. (Mo. App. 1907), 103 S. W. Rep. 144. 
 
 Damages for future suffering must be such as are reasonable only and 
 certain to occur and not merely speculative, remote or probable to 
 happen. Waddell v. Metropolitan E. Co. (Mo.), 88 S. W. Eep. 765. 
 
 30 Eddy V. Wallace, 49 Fed. Bep. 801; 4 U..S. App. 264; 1 C. C. A. 
 435; 52 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 265. 
 
 31 Howard, etc., Co. v. Davis, 76 Texas 630; 13 S. W. Rep. 665. 
 82Rosenkranz v. Lindell R. Co., 108 Mo. 9; 18 S. W. Rep. 890. 
 ssFordyee, Receiver, v. Withers (Texas), 20 S. W. Rep. 766. 
 
 84 Pill V. Brooklyn, etc., E. Co., 27 N. Y. Supp. 230; 57 N. Y. S. R. 
 783; Richmond, etc., E. Co. v. Norment, 84 Va. 167; 4 S. E. Eep. 211. 
 
 229 
 
§ 184 COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES. 
 
 However, to justify an instruction for loss of earning ca- 
 pacity, it is essential that the evidence on the part of the 
 plaintiff should show what the earnings of the plaintiff were, 
 prior to the injury, for without such evidence, it cannot be 
 ascertained, with any degree of certainty, that there has been 
 a loss in earning capacity, when the earnings prior to the 
 injury are not shown.^^ 
 
 35 Gulf, etc., E. Co. V. Gordon, 70 Texas 80 ; 7 S. W. Kep. 695. 
 
 " In an action for injuries to a person employed a part of the time as 
 a brakeman and a part of the time as an extra conductor, he was 
 entitled, with reference to the question of his earning capacity, to 
 show how much time he was called upon to work as conductor, what 
 he received as suehj and what he received as a brakeman." Galveston, 
 H. & S. A. Ey. Co. v. Still (Tex. Civ. App. 1907), 100 S. W. Eep. 176. 
 
 " In a personal injury action, evidence considered, and held to take 
 the question of decreased earning capacity to the jury." St. Louis, I. 
 M. & S. Ey. Co. v. Leamons (Ark. 1907), 102 S. W. Eep. 363. 
 
 " In an action for personal injuries, where the petition had no allega- 
 tion as to loss of time or expense of cure, and the evidence did not 
 show any permanent impairment of plaintifif's power to earn money, 
 an instruction, authorizing an award of such damages as would reason- 
 ably compensate him, for the injury, including his suffering, not ex- 
 ceeding the amount claimed in the petition, was erroneous." Louis- 
 ville & N. E. Co. V. Farris (Ky. 1907), 100 S. W. Eep. 870. 
 
 Loss of earnings are never recoverable, unless they are specially 
 pleaded and proved. Zongker v. Peoples Ey. Co., 110 Mo. App. 382; 
 86 S. W. Eep. 486. 
 
 Damages for loss of time, or interference with the business of the 
 injured person, are special darciages and must be specially pleaded. 
 Union Traction Co. v. Sullivan (Ind.), 76 N. E. Eep. 116. 
 
 There must be evidence upon which to base a verdict for loss of 
 future earnings. St. Louis, etc., Ey. Co. v. Smith (Texas), 86 S. W. 
 Eep. 943. 
 
 On issue of loss of earning capacity, it is always competent to 
 show what the injured, person's earnings were. Macon Ey. Co. v. 
 Mason, 123 Ga. 773; 51 S. E. Eep. 569; Andrews v. Chicago, etc., E. 
 Co. (Iowa), 105 N. W. Eep. 404; Lewes v. Crane & Sons, 78 Vt. 216; 
 62 Atl. Eep. 60. 
 
 Plaintiff is not limited in his recovery to his earnings in the particu- 
 lar calling that he was in at the time of his injury. Dallas Ey. Co. v. 
 Hardy (Texas), 86 S. W. Eep. 1053. 
 
 The wages the deceased was earning at the time of hig death was 
 230 
 
COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES. § 185 
 
 § 18S. Special damages must be specially pleaded. — Dam- 
 ages not the necessary result of the injury complained of and 
 not consequently implied by law, must be specially pleaded.^® 
 Special damages are such as really took place, but are not 
 implied by law. They may be either such as were super- 
 added to the general damages, from an act injurious in it- 
 self, or are such as arise from an act, not actionable in itself, 
 but injurious only in its consequences ; they must be set up 
 in the petition with a reasonable degree of particularity and 
 it must appear that the damage claimed is the natural, though 
 not necessary consequence of the wrong complained of.*^ 
 
 Money expended or a debt assumed, on account of the 
 injury ; ^* wages paid to one to work in the absence of the 
 plaintiff ; ^® loss of time resulting from the injury ; *" ag- 
 gravation of existing physical ailments, by reason of the 
 injury complained of,*^ are all held to be special elements of 
 damage that must be alleged in the petition, in order to fur- 
 nish the basis of a verdict, and it is error to instruct that 
 damages for such elements may be allowed, when not so 
 alleged in the petition.*^ But the rule is satisfied, when 
 from the facts alleged, the law will infer other facts; for 
 
 held competent to be shown, in the following cases: Eeiter-Conley Co. 
 V. Hamlin, 144 Ala. 192; 40 So. Rep. 280; Central of Georgia R. Co. 
 V. Alexander, 144 Ala. 257 ; 40 So. Rep. 424. 
 
 36 Speneer v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 21 Minn. 362 ; Brown v. Hannibal, 
 etc., R. Co., 99 Mo. 310; 12 S. W. Rep. 655; 42 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 87. 
 
 37 Brown v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 99 Mo. 310, supra. 
 
 38 South Covington R. Co. v. Ware, 84 Ky. 267; 1 S. W. Rep. 493; 
 27 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 206. 
 
 38Gumb V. Twenty-third St. R. Co., 114 N. Y. 411; 21 N. E. Rep.. 
 993; 43 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. ^15. 
 
 « Slaughter v. Metropolitan R. Co., 116 Mo. 269; 23 S. W. Rep. 760; 
 58 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 604; Coontz v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 115 Mo. 
 669; 22 S. W. Rep. 572. 
 
 *i Fuller V. Jackson, 92 Mich. 197 ; 52 N. W. Rep. 1075. 
 
 *2 Slaughter v. Metropolitan R. Co., 116 Mo. 269; 23 S. W. Rep. 780; 
 58 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 604. 
 
 231 
 
§ 186 COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES. 
 
 ■whatsoever the law will infer, the opposite party is pre- 
 sumed to know, whether it is pleaded or not,*^ and where 
 mental worry or suffering would naturally result from the 
 physical injury inflicted, evidence of this fact will justify an 
 instruction for damages on this ground, although it was not 
 specially pleaded.*^ 
 
 § 186. Evidence of plaintiff's condition, circumstances and 
 pursuit proper. — Evidence is competent to show the plain- 
 tiff's earnings at the time of the injury sued for,*® as well 
 as the condition of his health, his aptitude and qualifications 
 
 43 Texas, etc., K. Co. v. Curry, 64 Texas 85; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 US. 
 
 44 Chicago V. McLean, 133 111. 148; 24 N. E. Rep. 527; 8 L. E. A. 
 765. 
 
 In an action for personal injuries, an allegation in the petition, 
 which, after stating the injuries, concluded with the words, " and 
 
 by reason thereof he has be^p compelled" to expend $ for medicine 
 
 and medical attention" — is a sufficient allegation that expenditures 
 were made. Detrich v. Metropolitan St. Ey. Co. (Mo. App. 1907), 102 
 S. W. Eep. 1044. 
 
 " Where the petition in an action for personal injuries alleges an 
 injury to the head, eyes, spinal cord, and muscles and ligaments sur- 
 rounding the same, the extent of which could not be known, evidence 
 of plaintiff's loss of memory and injury to his eyes was admissible." 
 Young V. Metropolitan St. Ey. Co. (Mo. App. 1907), 103 S. W. Eep. 
 135. 
 
 " Where, in an action for personal injuries, the petition alleged that 
 plaintiff incurred expenses for medicine, medical care, and attention, 
 and there was proof of application of medicine and of medical care 
 and attention, with the charge therefor, an instruction submitting the 
 question of expenditure for medicine was proper." Young v. Metropoli- 
 tan St. Ey. Co. (Mo. App. 1907), 103 S. W. Eep. 135. 
 
 In a personal injury action, damages for loss of time must be spe- 
 cially pleaded in order to be recovered. Zongker v. Peoples Ey. Co., 
 110 Mo. App. 382; 86 S. W. Eep. 486. 
 
 Damages for physical suffering may be recovered, though not spe- 
 cially alleged. Louisville & N. E. Co. v. Dickey (Court of Appeals of 
 Kentucky 1907), 104 S. W. Eep. 329. 
 
 45 Alabama, etc., E. Co. v. Frazier, 93 Ala. 45 ; 9 So. Eep. 303 ; Simon- 
 ton V. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 49 Iowa 87; New Jersey, etc., Co., v, 
 
 232 
 
•COMMUTATION OF DAMAGES. § 187 
 
 for business and his habits of industry, or anything else 
 concerning his prospective earnings.*** The nature of his 
 employment and his dependence thereon for support; *^ the 
 value of his personal services in conducting his business ; ** 
 the state of his health before the injury,** and his condition 
 in life ^^ are all held competent to be considered by the 
 
 juiy. 
 
 But the fact that the plaintiff has a family dependent upon 
 him for support is not material or revelant upon any issue 
 in the ascertainment of damages ; ^^ it is not proper fo» the 
 plaintiff to show the number and ages of his children,®^ nor 
 is it a proper item of evidence, upon the question of the 
 plaintiff's damages, to show his relative wealth or poverty, 
 as compared to the defendant.®* 
 
 § 187. Evidence in mitigation of damages. — In estimating 
 
 Nichols, 33 N. J. L. .434; Staal v. Grand St., etc., R. Co., 107 N. Y. 
 625; 13 N. E. Rep. 624; 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 21. 
 
 «McLain v. Brooklyn, etc., R. Co., TIB N. Y. 459; 22 N. E. Rep. 
 1062; 40 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 254. 
 
 47 Moore v. Central R. Co., 47 Iowa 688 ; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Falvey, 104 Ind., 409; 3 N. E.' Rep. 389; 23 Am. & Eng'. R. Cas. 522; 
 Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co. v. Martin, 41 Mich. 667. 
 
 48 Lincoln v. Saratoga, etc., R. Co., 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 425. 
 49Reardon v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 114 Mo. 384; 21 S. W. Rep. 
 
 731; Stephens v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 96 Mo. 207; 9 S. W. Rep. 
 589; 38 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 110. 
 
 60 Dayharsh v. Hannibal, etc., R.' Co., 103 Mo. 570. 
 
 61 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Keane, 143 HI. 172; 32 N". E. Rep. 260; 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Few, 15 HI. App. 125; Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Homer, 73 Ga. 251 ; 27 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 186. 
 
 62Mahaney v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 108 Mo. 191; 18 S. W. Rep. 
 895; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Roy, 102 U. S. 451; 1 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 225; Kreuziger v. Chicago, etc., R. CO'., 73 Wis. 158; Pittsburg, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Powers, 74 111. 341. 
 
 53 Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Lyde, 57 Texas, 505; 11 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 188; Howard, etc., Co. v. Davis, 76 Texas 630; 13 S. W. Rep. 665; 
 Wallace v. Western, etc., R. Co., 104 N. Car. 442; 10 S. E. Rep. 552; 41 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas, 313, 
 
 233 
 
§ 187 COMPUTATIOIir OF DAMAGES. 
 
 the expectancy of the plaintiff, with a view of compensating 
 him for a loss of earning power, in the future, it is proper 
 for the jury to take into consideration that plaintiff was suf- 
 fering with a disease of the kidneys, known as Bright's 
 Disease, at the time of the injury ; ®* where special damages 
 are claimed for loss of husiness, it is competent to show the 
 unlawful character of the business,®^ and, with a view of 
 showing that the injury was aggravated by the neglect of 
 the plaintiff, it is proper to permit evidence of the manner 
 of Ijreatment and conduct of the plaintiff after the injury 
 was received. ®® But in a personal injury action, the moral 
 character of the plaintiff is not relevant, except as affecting 
 his credibility as a witness, and the fact that plaintiff, at 
 the time of her injury, kept a house of ill fame, is immate- 
 rial to any issue in the case.^^ Nor is it admissible to show 
 that plaintiff was a man of intemperate habits and had abused 
 himself, so that he could not readily recover from disease ; ^* 
 the average cost of living in a town such as that where plain- 
 tiff resided, would not be competent evidence, as affecting the 
 
 " In an action for injuries to a married woman, her testimony that 
 her family consisted of herself, husband, and five children, and that 
 she took care of the house and family prior to the accident, but had not 
 been able to do so since, was properly admitted for the purpose of 
 showing that she was a healthy woman before her injuries and there- 
 after incapacitated." Latimer v. Metropolitan! St. Ry. Co. (Mo. App. 
 1907), 103 8. W. Rep. 1102. 
 
 "A plaintiff in an action on the. ease for personal injuries should 
 not be permitted to testify as to the number of his children." Chicago, 
 R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Steckman, 125 111. App. 299, judgment affirmed, 79 
 If. E. -Rep. 602; 224 111. 500. 
 
 B4 Bunting v. Hogsett, 139 Pa. St. 363; 21 Atl. Rep. 31; 48 Am. & 
 Bng. R. Cas. 87. 
 
 5B Jacques v. Bridgeport, etc., R. Co., 41 Conn. 61; 6 Am. Ry. Rep. 1. 
 
 BBMalloy V. New York, etc., R. Co., 58 Barb. (N. Y.) 182. 
 
 B' Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Bush, 101 Ind. 582. 
 
 Bs Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Botelar, 38 Md. 568; 10 Am. Ry. Rep. 
 606. 
 
 234 
 
COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES. § 188 
 
 measure of damages,®* nor would the aggravation of the dis- 
 ease by the mistake of a competent surgeon, employed in 
 good faith, be competent as affecting the recovery.®" 
 
 § 188. Damages for pecuniary loss to beneficiaries. — Where 
 the object of a statute giving damages for wrongful death, 
 is compensatory merely and the damages are given by way 
 of compensation to the beneficiaries of the decedent and not 
 as a penalty for the wrongful act, it is generally necessary 
 for the beneficiaries to show some pecuniary loss resulting 
 to them from the death of the decedent, or no recovery can 
 be had. Proof of the death and relationship of the plaintiff 
 to the deceased, does not, of itself, give a right to damages, 
 but the plaintiff must go further and show an actual pecuni- 
 ary loss to himself.*^ Under Lord Campbell's Act, in an ac- 
 tion by a father for the wrongful death of his son, the de- 
 fendant is entitled to judgment, in the absence of evidence 
 showing reasonable probability of pecuniary benefit to the 
 father from the continued life of the son.*^ And under 
 statutes similar to the act referred to, such as the statute of 
 Arkansas, in an action by the father of an unmarried adult 
 son, against a railroad company, for his son's death, sub- 
 stantial damages can be recovered only by showing that de- 
 ceased gave assistance to his father, contributed money to his 
 support, or that the father had reasonable expectation of pe- 
 cuniary benefit from the continued life of his son and in 
 the absence of such a showing no such damages can be re- 
 covered.*^ 
 
 But under the New York statute, the fact that the children 
 
 58 Simonton v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 49 Iowa 87. 
 60 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. HoUis, 2 Texas Civ. App. 169. 
 81 Duckworth v. Johnson, 4 H. & N. 653; 5 Jur. N. S. 630; 29 L. J. 
 Ex. 25. 
 
 82Bourke v. Cork & M. E. Co., 4 Ir. L. R. 682. 
 OsFgrdyce v. McCants, 51 Ark. 509; 11 S. W. Rep. 694. 
 
 235 
 
§ 189 COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES. 
 
 of one killed by the wrongful act, of the defendant were all 
 of full age and were not living with the deceased parent, 
 but were supporting themselves, would not, of itself, show 
 that they had sustained no pecuniary loss,®* and in an action, 
 •in the same State, for wrongfully causing the death of a 
 child, the absence of proof of special pecuniary damage to 
 the next of kin is not a ground for ordering a nonsuit and 
 directing a verdict for nominal damages only."^ 
 
 § 189. What evidence of pecuniary loss competent. — Where 
 there is some evidence, although of an uncertain character, 
 showing- a pecuniary loss to the next of kin of the deceased, 
 from his death, the question is properly for the determina- 
 tion of the jury,®^ nor is it essential to show that the deceased 
 contributed pecuniary assistance up to the time of his death. 
 Under Lord Campbell's Act,*'' in an action for the benefit 
 of the father of the deceased, where the evidence showed that 
 the father was fifty-nine years old and worked when he could, 
 but was so injured that he could not work regularly; that 
 his deceased son had contributed to his support at various 
 times, but not later than five or six years previous to his 
 death, it was held that there was sufficient evidence of pe- 
 
 61 Lookwood V. New York, etc., K. Co., 98 N. Y. 523 ; Lustig v. New 
 York, etc., R. Co., 48 N. Y. S. R. 916. 
 
 86 Ihl V. Forty-second Street R. Co., 47 N. Y. 317 ; 2 Am. Ry. Rep. 
 409; Houghkirk v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 92 N. Y. 219; 44 Am. Rep. 
 370; Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Barker, 39 Ark. 491. 
 
 " In an action for wrongful death, proof of decedent's earning ca- 
 pacity, his age, probable duration of life, habits of industry, business, 
 etc., constituted sufficient proof from which pecuniary compensation 
 might be awarded." Woodstock Iron Works v. Kline (Ala. 1907), 43 
 So. Rep. 362. 
 
 00 Davis V. Columbia, etc., R. Co., 21 So. Car. 93 ; 28 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 440. 
 
 07 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93. 
 
 236 
 
COMPUTAtlOlsr on? DAMAGES. § 190 
 
 cuniary loss to the father, to justify a suhmission of the cause 
 to the jury.*^ • \ 
 
 Evidence of the condition and circumstances of the dece- 
 dent's family, his business qualifications and the amount of 
 his earnings, are all competent facts to go to the jury ; "^ evi- 
 dence of the ill health and poverty of the plaintiffs and their 
 dependency upon their deceased son's wages for support ; ""^ 
 evidence that some of the younger children of the plaintiff's 
 intestate were in poor health is competent to show the pe- 
 cuniary loss sustained by -their mother's death '^^ and it is 
 not error to permit plaintiff to prove that deceased had been 
 in the habit of turning his wages over to his wife and per- 
 mitting same to be expended for the support of the 'family, 
 as such evidence is competent to show the pecuniary loss 
 sustained by the family because of the death of the de- 
 ceased.''^ 
 
 § 190. Necessity of dependence upon deceased for support.— 
 
 In many of the statutes giving a right of action for damages 
 
 for death by wrongful act, for the benefit of the next of kin, 
 
 it is held ^competent for the plaintiff to show that he was 
 
 dependent upon the deceased for support.'''^ Evidence of 
 
 the physical condition of the deceased and his ability to labor 
 
 and support the plaintiff,''* is not only admissible, but highly 
 
 I 
 
 «8 Hetherington v. North Eastern E. Co., L.' R. 9, Q. B. D. 160; 6 
 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 490. 
 
 60 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Wightman, 29 Gratt. (Va.) 431; 17 Am. 
 Ey. Rep. 351. 
 
 '0 Johnson v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 64, Wis. 425; 25 N. W. Rep. 223; 
 25 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 338. 
 
 TiMcKeigue y. Janesville, 68 Wis. 50; 31 N. W. Rep. 298. ' 
 
 72 Lake Erie, etc., R. Co. v. Mugg, 132 Ind. 168; 31 N. E. Rep. 564; 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Adams, 55 Pa. St. 499. 
 
 73 Little Rock, etc., R. Co, v. Leaveritt, 48 Ark. 333; 3 S. W. Rep. 
 50; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 459. 
 
 7* Augusta, etc., R. Co. v. Glover (Ga.), 18 S. E. Rep. 406; 58 Am. 
 & Eng. E. Cas. 269. 
 
 237 
 
§ 190 COMPUTATIOit OK DAMAGES. 
 
 proper, if not absolutely necessary,'"' and the plaintiff's health, 
 prospects and pecuniary condition is competent testimony, 
 as well as the ability and willingness of the deceased to sup- 
 port the plaintiff,'^® or any other facts tending to show that 
 the plaintiff needed the services of the deceased, or that he 
 or she will suffer pecuniary loss from his death J'' 
 
 The evidence will generally .be held sufficient to show pe- 
 cuniary damage to the plaintiff, where it shows that there 
 has either been an actual donation for the purpose of sup- 
 port,''* or that there was a reasonable ground for expecting 
 such a donation in the future.'^' Subject to the statutory 
 limitation that the damages for death must be " fair and 
 just," as it is usually provided, the jury are the sole judges 
 of what pecuniary loss has been sustained by the benefici- 
 ary.*" It is not necessary to show the donation of any actual 
 sum for the support of the plaintiff, to justify a verdict for 
 damages for loss of pecuniary aid,*' and while it is compe- 
 tent to show that the widow, children or next of kin were 
 dependent upon the deceased for support, it is not competent 
 to show what their pecuniary circumstances have been, since 
 the death of their intestate, for this could only appeal to the 
 passions of the jury and is not relevant to any issue in the 
 
 75 Chicago, etc., K. Co. v. May, 108 111. 288; 15 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 
 320; Pennsylvania tl. Co. v. Keane, 143 111. 172; 32 N. E. Rep. 260. 
 
 '"Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Peregoy, 36 Kansas 424; 1,4 Pao. Rep. 
 7. 
 
 7T Ewen V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 38 Wis. 613. 
 
 78 Southern Pacific E. Co. v. Lefferty, 57 Fed. Rep. 536. 
 
 79 Hetherington v. North Eastern R. Co., 51 L. J. Q. D. 495; 4 Ry. 
 & C. T. Cas. 15. 
 
 80 Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Wangelin, 43 111. App. 324; Chicago v. Keefe, 
 114 111. 230. 
 
 81 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Shannon, 43 111. 346; Ohio, etc., R. Co. 
 V. Wangelin, 43 111. App. 324. 
 
 82 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Keane, 143 111. 172; 32 N. E. Rep. 260; 
 Chicago & C. R. Co. v. May, 108 111. 288. 
 
 238 
 
COMPUTATION O]? DAMAGES. | 19l 
 
 § 191. Competent to show habits, character and capacity of 
 deceased.— ^ With a view of determining the- value of his 
 life to the next of kin, or representatives, it is generally held 
 competent to show the age, strength, health, skill, industry, 
 habits and character of the deceased.** The. jury may take 
 into consideration the income of the decedent, his personal 
 habits, his station in life, his means and his manner of liv- 
 ing, with a view of ascertaining the value of his life to his 
 next of kin.** It is competent\for the jury to also consider 
 the domestic relations of the deceased ; that he was a dutiful 
 husband and father or otherwise and his care or neglect of 
 his family.®^ And on the question of damages, while evi- 
 dence of the fact that the deceased was or was not a good 
 brakeman, would be immaterial, on the question of contrihu- 
 tory negligence, it would be pertinent on the issue of the 
 quantum of damages sustained by his death,*® and to ascer- 
 tain the value of his life to his estate, the probable duration 
 of his life, his health, habits of industry or sobriety, his 
 skill and earnings in his business would all be proper items ■ 
 of evidence to go to the jury.*'' 
 
 But it would not be competent for witnesses to give their 
 opinions of the value of the services of the decedent in a 
 business in which he had never engaged,** nor would it be 
 proper to show that the deceased was in the line of promo- 
 tion in his employment and would have received greater 
 
 83Kesler v. Smith, 66 N. Car. 154; ChicagQ, etc., E. Co. v. Travis, 
 44 111. App. 466; Van Gerit v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 80 Iowa 526; 45 
 N. W. Rep. 913. . • 
 
 8*Killian v. Augusta, etc., R. Co., 79 Ga. 234; 4 S. E. Rep. 165. 
 
 SB Cook V. Clay Hill R. Co., 60 Cal. 604; 6 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 175; 
 Munro v. Pacific Coast R. Co., 84 Cal. 515; 24 Pac. Rep. 303. 
 
 88 Wells y. Denver, etc., R. Co., 7 Utah 482 ; 27 Pac. Rep. 688. 
 
 STWheelan v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 85 Iowa 167; 52 N. W. Rep. 
 119; 49 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 693. 
 
 8S Atlanta, etc., R. Co. v. Newton, 85 Ga. 517; 11 S. E. Rep. 776; 
 Mansfield, etc., Co. v. McEnry, 36 Am. Rep. 664. 
 
 239 
 
§ 1&3 COMPUTATION 01* DAMAGES. 
 
 wages if he had lived and been promoted,*® for such items 
 are mere speculations and not proper elements of damage to 
 go to the jury. 
 
 § 192. Competency of mortality tables to show expectancy 
 of life. — "Where the plaintiff has established the age, health, 
 occupation and earning power of the deceased, it is 'compe- 
 tent to show the expectancy of life of such a man by ap- 
 proved tables of mortality.*" Being based upon general 
 population and not upon selected or insurable lives, the Car- 
 lisle Tables of Mortality are held admissible as some evidence 
 of the probable expectation of the life of the deceased *^ and 
 the IsTorthampton Tables of Mortality®^ and the Haswell 
 Tables,®* have also been held competent for this purpose. 
 The Encyclopedia Britannica, being a familiar work of sci- 
 ence and an unquestioned authority, it is proper to let it be 
 introduced in evidence, to show these tables, or other ap- 
 proved life tables.®* 
 
 The value of such tables, however, when introduced in 
 evidence, will depend very much upon other matters, such 
 as the state of health, habits, social condition and life of the 
 
 80 Brown v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 64 Iowa 652; 21 N. W. Rep. 193; 
 Chase v. Burlington, etc., R. Co., 76 Iowa 675; 39 N. W. Rep. 196; 38 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 148. 
 
 90 Steinbruner v. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co., 146 Pa. St. 580; 23 Atl. Rep. 
 239 ; Denver, etc., R. Co. v. Woodward, 4 Colo. 1 ; Kansas Pacific R. Co. 
 V. Lundin, 3 Colo. 94; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Mahoney (Ky.), 7 
 Bush. 234; San Antonio, etc., R. Co. v. Bennett, 76 Texas 151; 13 
 S. W. Rep. 319'; McKeigue v. Janesville, 68 Wis. 50; 31 N. W. Rep. 
 298. 
 
 81 Steinbruner v. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co., 146 Pa. St. 504; 23 Atl. Rep. 
 239. 
 
 02 Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. Oakes, 52 Ga. 410; 7 Am. Ry. Rep. 143; 
 Sauter v. New York, etc., R. Co., 66 N. Y. 50; 23 Am. Rep. 18. ' 
 
 93Klanowski v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 57 Mich. 525; 24 N. W. Rep. 
 801; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 648. 
 
 9*Worden v. Humeston, etc., R. Co., 76 Iowa 310; 41 N. W. Rep. 26. 
 
 240 
 
COMPUTATloiJ OF DAMAGES. § l93 
 
 deceased and the jury should be advised of these qualifying 
 circumstances, if justified by the evidence.®^ The computa- 
 tion should be made from the date of decedent's death, if 
 an infant, and not from the majority of the decedent ; ®^ and 
 where the father sues for the death of his son, it is error to 
 permit tables of mortality to be introduced in evidence, to 
 show the probable length of life of the deceased son, for in 
 the ordinary course of events, considering the age of the 
 plaintiff, he would not survive the son and the expectation 
 of the father's life being presumably shorter than that cJf 
 the son, as it is the expectation of life of him who would 
 soonest die that furnishes the proper basis of damages, the 
 expectancy of the father and not that of the son, should have 
 been shown.*^ 
 
 § 193. Ill health and habits competent in miti^^ation of 
 damages. — To offset the result of the plaintiff's evidence as 
 
 05 Steinbruner v. Pittsburg, etc., E. Co., 146 Pa. St. 504; 23 Atl. 
 Eep. 239. 
 
 98 Walters v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 41 Iowa 71; Wheelen v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. Co., 85 Iowa 167; 52 N. W. Eep. 119; 49 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 693. 
 ■ 6T Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Crudup, 63 Miss. 291. 
 
 ".In an action for personal injuries, the Carlisle Tables of Expectancy 
 may be given in evidence after the introduction of credible evidence 
 to show the permanent character of the injury." Howard v. McCabe 
 (Neb. 1907), 112 N. W. Rep. 305. 
 
 " In an action for a permanent personal injury, mortality tables 
 in the Code Supplement, prepared pursuant to section 1471a thereof, are 
 admissible to show the expectancy of the life of the person injured." 
 Clark V. Van Vleck (Iowa 1907), 112 N. W. Rep. 648. 
 
 Where the medical expert testimony shows permanent disability, 
 tables of mortality are competent to show the probable length of plain- 
 tiff's life. Illinois Central R. Co. v. Morris, 28 Ky. L. E. 956; 90 S. 
 W. Eep. 979. 
 
 Carlisle Tables of Mortality are held competent, in Washington, to 
 show the probable duration of the impairment of plaintiff's health. 
 Brown v. Blaine, 41 Wash. 287; 83 Pac. Rep. 310. 
 
 1-16 241 
 
§ 194 COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES. - 
 
 to the probable duration of the decedent's life and the value 
 of his life to the beneficiaries or next of kin, it is competent 
 for the court to permit the defendant to show the fact that 
 at the time of his death the deceased was suffering from an 
 incurable disease which affected the probable continuance of 
 his life,^® or that the deceased was a drunken, worthless man, 
 making no provision for his family, but that he was a bur- 
 den upon them for his support,®* as these are proper matters 
 to be proved in mitigation of damages. 
 
 ■And it is held competent, in Tennessee, to permit the de- 
 fendant to show that the deceased was a wreckless, careless 
 and imprudent person,^ for these habits are competent to go 
 before the jury as affecting the probable duration of his life 
 and the value of that life to the plaintiff. 
 
 § 194. Nothing allowed as a solatium. — Under compen- 
 satory death statutes the compensation is limited to the loss 
 of the value of the services of the deceased as a supporter of 
 the family, and it does not include anything as a solace for 
 wounded feelings.* Sorrow and mental anguish caused by 
 the death are not elements of damage, and nothing can be 
 recovered as a solatium for wounded feelings, and the loss of. 
 society can only be referred to and considered for the purpose 
 of estimating the pecuniary loss.^ 
 
 08 Columbus, etc., R. Co. v. Bridges, 86 Ala. 448; 5 So. Rep. 864; 38 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 136. 
 
 »9 Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Prince, 2 Heisk. (Tenn.) 580; Nashville, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Stevens, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 12; East Tenn., etc., R. Co. 
 V. Mitchell, 11 Heisk. (Tenn.) 400. 
 
 1 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Conner, 2 Baxt. (Tenn.) 382; 21 Am. Ry. 
 Rep. 194; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Fleming, 14 Lea (Tenn.) 128. 
 
 2Au V. New York, etc., R. Co., 29 Fed. Rep. 72; Atkyn v. Wabash 
 R. Co., 41 Fed. Rep. 193; 22 Ohio L. J. 151. 
 
 3 Morgan v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 95 Cal. 510; 30 Pac. Rep. 603; 
 
 54 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 101; Southern Pacific R. Co. v. Lafferty, 57 
 
 Fed. Rep. 536; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Orr, 91 Ala. 548; 8 So. Rep. 
 
 360; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Trammel, 93 Ala. 350; Kansas Pacific 
 
 242 
 
COMPUTATIOlif OP DAMAGES. § 195 
 
 The damages are purely compensatory, for pecuniary loss. 
 The basis on which the damages are to he estimated is the 
 probable pecuniary loss of the widow or next of kin, by. 
 reason of the death of the deceased, and no compensation 
 can be given for wounded feelings or for the loss of the com- 
 fort and society of the relative, nor for the pain and suffering 
 of the deceased. If the verdict is greatly in excess of such 
 sum as would reasonably compensate the plaintiff, according 
 to the evidence based upon the pecuniary loss sustained) the 
 court should set it aside.* 
 
 • 
 
 § 195. Damages for death of parent. — The measure and 
 elements of damages recoverable by children for the death 
 of a parent, depends upon the peculiar language of the act, 
 giving the right of action and whether or not the damages are 
 given by way of a penalty or forfeiture, or by Way of com- 
 pensation. If given as a forfeiture, the fixed sum named in 
 the statute is recoverable, but if the damages named- are 
 compensatory in their nature, a sum is usually allowed, which 
 would be equivalent to the pecuniary benefit which the chil- 
 dren might reasonably have expected from the continuance 
 
 R. Co. V. Miller, 2 Colo. 442; 20 Am. Ry. Rep. 245; Chicago, etc., R. 
 Co. V. Harwood, 80 111. 88; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. State, 63 Md. 
 135; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 202; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. State, 
 71 Md. 573; 18 Atl. Rep. 884; Parsons v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 94 
 Mo. 286; 6 S. W. Rep. 464; Carlson v. Oregon, etc., R. Co., 21 Oregon 
 450; 28 Pac. Rep. 497; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 135; Pennsylvania R.' 
 Co. V. Butler, 57 Pa. St. 335; McGowan v. 'International, etc., R. Co., 
 85 Texas 289; 20 S. W. Rep. 80. 
 
 iHutchins v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., i4 Minn. 5; 46 N. W. Rep. 79. 
 
 " In an action to recover damages for the death of a child, the court 
 charged that the jury might give such damages, not exceeding $5,000.00, 
 as they deemed fair and just with reference to the necessary injury 
 resulting to plaintiffs, and having regard also to the mitigating or 
 aggravating circumstances attending the neglect complained of. Held, 
 that the instruction, though following in substance the language of 
 the statutes, is erroneous as likely to be interpreted to allow damages 
 
 243 
 
§ 195 COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES. 
 
 of the life of the deceased,'' In estimating the pecuniary 
 loss sustained by the children, the jury are generally allowed 
 .to take into consideration, the nurture, instruction, physical 
 and moral, as well as the intellectual training which they 
 would have received from their deceased parent,'' but in an 
 action by infants, for the death of their parent, a fair and 
 reasonable compensation is usually held to be the loss of the 
 value of the services of the deceased, during the minority of 
 the children, reckoned from the death of the parent and not 
 from the injury,'^ although in Texas, an infant was permitted 
 to recover, for the death of his father, what he could reason- 
 ably expect to have received from the father, during the 
 probable duration of his life.® It is error to charge for an 
 allowance such as would reasonably compensate the surviv- 
 ing widow and children, in an action by the children and 
 then deduct from this the amount going to the widow, as she 
 
 for sorrow, or for benefits that might have accrued during the child's 
 life." Caleaterra v. lovaldi (Mo. App. 1906), 100 S. W. Eep. 675. 
 
 " In an action for the wrongful death of a minor child, the recovery 
 must be confined to the pecuniary loss sustained by the death of the 
 child, and damages for loss of companionship are not recoverable." 
 Dando v. Home Telephone Co. (Mo. App. 1907), 103 S. W. Rep. 103. 
 
 " In an action for death of plaintiff's husband, plaintiff is entitled 
 to recover for loss of deceased's society.'' Evarls v. Santa Barbara 
 Consol. Ry. Co. (Cal. App. 1906), 86 Pac. Rep. 830. 
 
 " In assessing damages claimed by a widow for the negligent killing 
 of her husband, her distress and mental suffering are elements to 
 be considered." Dobyns v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. (La. 1907), 43 So. 
 Rep. 934. 
 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. State, 60 Md. 449 ; Stoher v. St. Louis, 
 etc., R. Co., 91 Mo. 509 ; 4 S. W. Rep. 389 ; 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 229. 
 
 Searle v. Kanawha, etc., E. Co., 32 W. Va. 370 ; 9 S. E. Rep. 248 j 
 37 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 179; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Madry, 57 Ark. 
 306; 21 S. W. Rep. 472; 58 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 327. 
 
 7 Atlanta, etc., R. Co. v. Venable, 67 Ga. 697; McPherson v. St. 
 Louis, etc., E. Co., 97 Mo. 253; 10 S. W. Rep. 846. 
 
 8 International, etc., R. Co. v. Kuehn, 2 Texas Civil App., 210; 21 
 S. W. Rep. 58. 
 
 244 
 
COMPUTATIOlSr OF DAMAGES. 
 
 il96 
 
 has nothing to do with the recovery by the children ; " it 
 is also error to charge for the allowance of such a sum as 
 would be fair and just, under the evidence in the case, as this 
 furnishes no basis for the legal assessment of damages, but 
 the jury should be told the proper elements to enter into their 
 computation. ^° But in an action by an infant for death of 
 its parent the jury are not confined to any definite mathe- 
 matical calculation, in the assessment of damages, but are 
 vested with a discretion, with which the courts will not in- 
 terfere, unless it is clearly abused. ^^ 
 
 § 196. Recovery for death of husband. — Under compen- 
 satory death statutes, damages to a widow include the value 
 of her support and protection by the husband during the time 
 he would probably have lived and supported her, but for 
 the accident, and it is not improper to permit the jury to con- 
 sider the addition that the earnings of the husband would 
 probably have made to his estate and the reasonable expecta- 
 tion of the wife to ultimately share in a portion of such es- 
 tate, as the heir of her husband.^* The federal court, in a 
 well-considered case, held that the life of an honest, indus- 
 trious man, had, for his wife, a value in addition to the 
 earnings of his labor,^* and for this reason it was held error, 
 in another case, to limit the recovery of the widow to a mere 
 money equivalent of the earning power of the husband, based 
 upon an investment paying an annuity to the wife.^* 
 
 » Taylor v. Western, etc., R. Co., 45 Cal. 323. 
 
 loGoss V. Missouri Pacific Ey. Co., 50 Mo. App. 614; Parsons v. 
 Missouri Pacific Ey. Co., 94 Mo. 286; Schaub v. Hannibal, etc., R. 
 Co., 106 Mo. 74. 
 
 "Stoher v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 91 Mo. 509; 4 S. W. Rep. 389; 
 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 229. 
 
 i2Lawson v. Chicago, etc., R.. Co., 64 Wis. 447; 24 N. W. Rep. 618; 
 64 Am. Rep. 634; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 249. 
 
 13 Harkins v. Pullman Co., 52 Fed. Rep. 724. 
 
 1* St. Louis, etc., R. Go. v. Needham, 52 Fed. Rep. 371 ; 10 U. S. App. 
 
 245 
 
§ 196 COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES. 
 
 The correct rule of damages is the actual pecuniary dam- 
 age, to be ascertained by inquiring what would be a reason- 
 able support for the wife, considering the habits, occupation 
 and prospects of the husband and taking the present worth of 
 such support to be ascertained by reliable tables of mortal- 
 ity.^® In other words, the value of a husband's life, to his 
 wife, is to be ascertained by determining how much better 
 off she would be with him, than without him.^® The loss 
 sustained by the children, in an action by the widow, is not 
 allowable/'' unless she sues as administratrix, or the repre- 
 sentative of the children also.'^ 
 
 In Missouri, no allowance is recoverable by way of loss 
 of companionship or society of the husband,^® but in Cali- 
 fornia, the loss of society of the husband is properly to be 
 considered.*" The probable length of life of the husband 
 is an essential fact to be shown and in the absence of any 
 evidence on this point, it is held, in Georgia, that the judg- 
 ment should be for the defendant, as there would be no legal 
 evidence upon which a verdict could be supported.*^ 
 
 339; 3 C. C. A. 129; 54 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 88; St. I/ouis, etc., R. 
 Co. V. Fair, 56 Fed. Rep. 994. 
 
 15 Macon, etc., R. Co. v. Johnson, 38 Ga. 409; Central, etc., R. Co. 
 V. Roach, 64 Ga. 635; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 79. 
 
 isCatawissa, etc., E. Co. v. Armstrong, 52 Pa. St. 282; Kansas Pac. 
 R. Co. V. Cutter, 19 Kansas 83. 
 
 i' Macon, etc., R. Co. v. Johnson, 38 Ga. 409; Schadewald v. 
 Milwaukee, etc., E. Co., 55 Wis. 569; 13 N. W. Rep. 458; Lierman v. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co., 82 Wis. 286; 52 N. W. Rep. 91. 
 
 18 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Trammell, 93 Ala. 350; 9 So. Rep. 870. 
 
 10 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Wilson, 48 Fed. Rep. 57 ; 4 U. S. App. 25 ; 
 Schaub V. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 106 Mo. 74; 16 S. W. Rep. 924; 
 Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. Pittman, 73 Ga. 325; 26 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 474. 
 
 20 Season v. Green Mountain, etc., Co., 57 Cal. 20; Munro v. Paciflo 
 Coast R. Co., 84 Cal. 515; 24 Pac. Rep. 303; Morgen v. Southern 
 Pacific R. Co., 95 Cal. 510. 
 
 21 Savannah, etc., R. Co. v. Stewart, 71 Ga. 427. 
 
 246 
 
COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES. |§ 197,198 
 
 § 19Y. For death of wife. — Under some death statutes, 
 giving the husband a right of action for death of his wife, 
 the damages recoverable are such as will compensate him 
 for the loss sustained and none other.^^ It is proper to con- 
 sider the relation of husbajid and wife, in estimating the 
 value of the wife's services and companionship,^* and while 
 damages of a sentimental nature are not allowed, the loss of 
 household services ordinarily performed by the wife is such 
 a substantial loss as will support a verdict for damages there- 
 for.^* It is proper for the jury to consider the fact that 
 the wife was an educated and amiable woman,^^ but under 
 statutes giving damages of a strictly pecuniary, nature, it is 
 not competent to allow a recovery for a loss of society,^® nor 
 is it legitimate, in an action by the husband, for the death 
 of his wife, to allow the jury to take into consideration the 
 loss of the earnings on the part of the vdfe, as affecting, the 
 children surviving, for such earnings would go to the husband 
 himself and the contingency of his continuing in possession of 
 the earnings and dying intestate, during the lifetime of the 
 children is too speculative and remote to be considered.^*^ 
 
 § 198. For death of child. — The damages recoverable for 
 the wrongful death of a child depend upon the language of 
 the statute and whether the damages are compensatory or 
 
 22 Galveston, etc., E. Co. v. Matula, 79 Texas 577; 15 S. W. Rep. 573. 
 
 23 Pennsylvania \Il. Co. v. Goodman, 62 Pa. St. 329. 
 
 2* St. Lawrence, etc., R. Co. v. Lett, 11 Can. Sup. Ct. 422; 26 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 454; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Adams, 55 Pa. St. 503; 
 Tilley v. Hudson River R. Co., 24 N. Y. 474; Mclntire v. New York, 
 etc., R. Co., 37 N. Y. 295. 
 
 25 Green v. Hudson River R. Co., 32 Barb. 25; 30 How. Pr. 593; 
 Bolinger v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 36 Minn. 418; 31 N. W. Rep. 656; 
 29 Am. & Eng. R. Caa. 408. 
 
 28 Green v. Hudson River R. Co., 32 Barb. (N. Y.) 25. 
 
 27 Tilley v. Hudson River R. Co., 24 N. Y. 471; 23 How. Pr. 363; 
 Kansas Pacific E. Co. v. Cutter, 19 Kansas 83. 
 
 247 
 
§ 198 COMPUTATION OP DAMAGES. 
 
 punitive.^® In an action by a parent for the death of his 
 minor child the jury is not limited to the actual pecuniary 
 injury sustained by reason of the loss of services of the 
 child/* but the damages given must be determined by the 
 jury, in the exercise of their discretion, subject to the review 
 of the court of original jurisdiction. Pecuniary loss is not 
 construed in the strict sense of limiting the recovery to a 
 present loss in money, but prospective advantages of a pe- 
 cuniary nature may also be considered,^" along v?ith the fact 
 that the chances of health and life are to be considered in 
 connection with the value of services.*'- 
 
 Under compensatory statutes the main element of damages 
 for death of a child is the probable value of the services of 
 the deceased, until its majority only, considering the cost and 
 expense of supporting the child during the early years of its 
 life.*^ If the injury to the child would not have proven 
 fatal, but for the want of reasonable care on the parent's part, 
 after the injury was sustained, the parent could not aggra- 
 
 28 Williams v. South & N. Ala. R. Co., 91 Ala. 635; 9 So. Kep. 77. 
 
 29Nehrbas v. Central Pacific K. Co., 62 Cal. 320; 14 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 670; Parsons v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 94 Mo. 286; 6 S. W. 
 Rep. 464; Birkett v. Knickerbocker Co., 110 N. Y, 504; 18 N. B. 
 Rep. 108; Houston City R. Co. v. Sciacca, 80 Texas 350; 16 S. W. 
 Rep. 31; Heusner v. Hudson, etc., R. Co., 27 N. Y. Supp. 365; 57 
 N. Y. S. R. 528. 
 
 soVicksburg v. McLain, 67 Miss. 4; 6 So. Rep. 774. 
 
 31 Telfer v. Northern R. Co., 30 N. J. L. 188. 
 
 32 Parsons v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 94 Mo. 286; 6 S. W. Rep. 464; 
 Goss V. Missouri Pacific JEly- Co., 50 Mo. App. 614; Morgan v. Southern 
 Pacific -R. Co., 95 Cal. 510; 30 Pac. Rep. 603; 54 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 101; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Freeman, 36 Ark. 41; 4 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 608; Rockford, etc., R. Co. v. Delaney, 82 111. 198; Louisville, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Rush, 127 Ind. 545; 26 N. E. Rep. 1010; Benton v. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co., 55 Iowa 496; 8 N. W. Rep. 330; Hurst v. Detroit, 
 etc., R. Co., 84 Mich. 539; 48 N. W. Rep. 44; Fordyce v. McCants, 51 
 Ark. 509; 11 S. W. Rep. 694; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Needham, 
 52 Fed. Rep. 371; 10 U. S. App. 339; 3 C. C. A. 129; 54 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 88. 
 
 248 
 
COMPUTATIOlir OF DAMAGES. § 199 
 
 vate the damages beyond those actually resulting from the 
 injury,^^ nor would it be competent to show that the parent 
 was too poor to employ domestics to take care of his children, 
 for the poverty or wealth of the plaintiff would be immate- 
 rial to the issues in«the case.** Under some statutes, how- 
 ever, giving damages to parents dependent for support upon 
 their children, the dependency of the parent is a material 
 element of the case and damages are given, based upon the , 
 contributions of the child, even after its majority.*® 
 
 The loss of the child's society and the comfort of the par- 
 ent in raising it are not proper elements of damage,*® nor is 
 it generally held competent to show the mental anguish and 
 suffering either of the child or the parent.*'^ 
 
 § 199. Same ^ Medical and funeral expenses. — A parent 
 * is entitled to the services of an infant child during minority 
 and being entitled to its services is legally liable for the sup- 
 port and maintenance of the child and is therefore liable 
 for medical and fuileral expenses incurred in the last illness 
 and coijsequently is entitled to recover such expenses, as a 
 p'art of the damages due for the wrongful death of the child. *^ 
 Such damages would not be recoverable under a punitive 
 statute, giving a fixed sum for the death of a person wrong- 
 fully killed, but expenses incurred for medical treatment and 
 
 53 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Freeman, 36 Ark. 41 ; 4 Am. & Eng. R., 
 Cas. 608. 
 
 54 Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Pitzer, 109 Ind. 179; 58 Am. Rep. 387; 
 10 N. E. Rep. 70; 25 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 313. 
 
 36 Potter V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 21 Wis. 372; St.. Louis, etc., R. 
 Co. V. Davis, 55 Ark. 462; 18 S. W. Rep. 628; Walters v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. Co., 41 Iowa 71; Bowles v. Rome, etc., R. Co., 46 Hun 324; 
 113 N. Y. 643; 21 N. E. Rep. 414; North Pennsylvania R. Co. v. 
 Kirk, 90 Pa. St. 15; 1 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 45. 
 
 80 Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. Walty, 69 Miss. 145; 13 So. Rep. 825. 
 
 "Dorman v. Broadway, etc., R. Co., 16 N. Y. S. R. 753; 1 N. Y. 
 Supp. 334; Morgan v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 95 Cal. 510. 
 
 88 Kennedy v. New York, etc., R. Co., 35 Hun (N. Y.) 186. . 
 
 249 
 
§ 200 COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES. 
 
 funeral expenses are given, by way of compensation,^' -when- 
 ever the plaintiff has paid and discharged such legitimate ex- 
 penses,*" or vyhen he is legally obligated to pay the same.*^ 
 
 But when damages are given to an administrator of the 
 deceased, and when recovered, the damages constitute a part 
 of the assets of his estate, no damages would be allowed, ex- 
 cept* such as were consequent upon the death and therefore 
 no allowance could be made for expenses of the illness at- 
 tendant upon the injury causing the death, or for the funeral 
 expenses of the deceased,*^ and no deduction could be allowed 
 the defendant for advancements for such items, nor could it 
 be shown that such expenses had been paid, either in bar, 
 or in abatement of the action.*^ 
 
 § 200. Exemplary damages for death. — Exemplary dam- 
 ages for death by wrongful act were unknown at the common 
 
 30 Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Rowan, 66 Pa. St. 393. 
 
 40Petrie v. Columbia, etc., R. Co., 29 So. Car. 303; 7 S. B. Rep. 
 515; 35 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 430. 
 
 41 Murphy v. New York, etc., R. Co., 88 N. Y. 445 ; 8 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 490; 25 Hun. 311; Brassel v. New York, etc., R.* Co., 84 
 N. Y. 241; Houghkirk v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 92 N. Y. 219; 44 
 Am. Rep. 370. 
 
 42 Holland v. Brown, 13 Saw. (U. S.) 284; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. 
 McClosky, 23 Pa. St. 526; Illinois Central R. Qo. v. Brown, 5 Wall. 
 (U. S.) 90. 
 
 43 Murray v. Usher, 117 N. Y. 542; 23 N. E. Rep. 564; 27 N. Y. S. R. 
 "528. 
 
 " In an action for the death of plaintiff's minor son through the 
 negligence of defendant, it was proper to allow plafntiff.the sum of 
 $178 for burial expenses and for transporting the body of decedent to 
 plaintiff's home in Arkansas." Dean v. Oregon R. & Nav. Co. (Wash. 
 1906), 87 Pac. Rep. 824. 
 
 "A husband can recover for funeral expenses resulting directly from 
 the wrongful death of his wife." Philby v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. 
 (Wash. 1907), 89 Pac. Rep. 468. 
 
 " A husband can recover for loss of time resulting directly from 
 the wrongful death of his wife." Philby v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. 
 (Wash. 1907), 89 Pac. Rep. 468. 
 
 250 
 
COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES. § 200 ' 
 
 law and originated in the idea of punishment for the of- 
 fender, rather than compensation for the sufferer by the 
 death.** In some States, the damages recoverable for wrong- 
 ful death are not confined to compensation, but punitive dam- 
 ages are given in all cases.*^ In some States punitive or 
 compensatory damages or both may be given, as the jury 
 shall deem fair and just,*® while in some other States ex- 
 emplary damages for death will only be allowed, when the 
 killing is attendant by circumstances showing gross negli- 
 gence or such an element of willfulness or malice, as would 
 authorize punitive damages, if death had not ensued.*^ 
 
 Generally, where the death is not accompanied by any ag- 
 gravating circumstances, but the injury is the result of the 
 want of ordinary care only, exemplary damages cannot be 
 recovered,** and while compensatory damages may be recov- 
 ered, on failure to show a case for punitive damages, pro- 
 vided the statute under which the suit is filed authorizes 
 such recovery,** exemplary damages will not be allowed, in 
 any case, unless the statute giving the right of action, ex- 
 pressly provides therefor.®" 
 
 " Southern, etc., Co. v. Bradley, 52 Texas 587. 
 
 *5 Savannah, etc., K. Co. v. Shearer, 58 Ala. 672; 20 Am. Ry. 
 Eep. 451. 
 
 48 Myers v. San Fra-nciseo, 42 Cal. 215; Murphy v. New York, etc., 
 K. Co., 29 Conn. 496 ; Sherman v. Stage Co., 24 Iowa 515. 
 
 47 Haley v. Mobile, etc., E. Co., 7 Baxt. (Tenn.) 239; 8 Am. & Bng.. 
 E. Cas. 541 ; Kansas City, etc.,- E. Co. v. Daughtry, 88 Tenn. 721 ; 
 13 S. W. Eep. 698; 45 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 69; International, etc., 
 E. Co. V. McDonald, 75 Texas 41; 12 S. W. Rep. 860; 42 Am. & Eng. 
 E. Cas. 211; Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Ogier, 35 Pa. St. 60; Hutchins v. 
 St. Paul, etc., E. Co., 44 Minn. 5; 46 N. W. Rep. 7.9; Kansas Pacific 
 E. Co. V. Cutter, 19 Kansas 83. 
 
 48 Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Chaffin, 84 Ga. 519; 11 S. E. Rep. 891; 
 Hamilton v. Morgan's, etc., R. Co., 42 La. Ann. 824; 8 So. Eep. 586; 
 Parsons v. Missouri Pacific Ey. Co., 94 Mo. 286 ; 6 S. W. Eep. 464 ; 
 niinois Central R. Co. v. Crudup, 63 Miss. 291. 
 
 4»CIaxton V. Lexington, etc., R. Co., 13 Bush. (Ky.) 636; 17 Am. 
 
 Ey. Rep. 12. But see, Cincinnati, etc., E. Co. v. Privitt, 92 Ky. 223. 
 
 60 Illinois Central E. Co. v. Crudup, 63 Miss. 291; Cincinnati, etc., 
 
 251 
 
§ 201 COMPTJTATIOIT OF DAMAGfES. 
 
 I 
 
 § 201. When nominal damages only recovered for death. — 
 
 In the absence of a showing of any special damages, in an 
 action for death by wrongful act, the recovery may, or may 
 not be limited to the recovery of nominal damages only, ac- 
 cording to the peculiar phraseology of the act.^^ It was 
 
 E. Co. V. Privitt, 92 Ky. 223; 17 S. W. Rep. 484; Houston, etc., E. 
 Co. V. Baker, 57 Texas 419; 11 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 667. 
 
 "Under act (April 4, 1868) limiting the amount to be recovered 
 for wrongful death to compensation for loss and damages pecuniarily 
 suffered, no exemplary damages can be recovered for injuries resulting 
 in death in an action by a parent." Palmer v. Philadelphia, B. & W. 
 E. Co. (Pa. 1907), 66 Atl. Eep. 1127. 
 
 " In an action for wrongful death, the measure of plaintiff's dam- 
 ages is such 3, sum as the deceased would probably have accumulated 
 during life, and which would have gone to his next of kin, considering 
 deceased's age, ability and disposition to labor, and habits of living 
 and expenditure." Coughlan v. Philadelphia, B. & W. E. Co. (Del. 
 Sup. 1907), 67 Atl. Eep. 148. 
 
 " Under Eev. St. 1898, § 2912, providing that the damages recover- 
 able in an action for wrongful death shall be such as under all the 
 circumstances of the ease may be just, the damages in an action by 
 parents for the negligent death of an adult child are not limited to the 
 probable contributions of money which the parents would have re- 
 ceived during the child's lifetime, but may also consist of the elements 
 entering into the domestic relations of parent and child living in one 
 family, or otherwise." Rogers v. Eio Grande Western Ey.'Co. (Utah 
 1907), 90 Pao. Eep. 1075. 
 
 In an action for death under what is known as the penalty section 
 of the Missouri death statute (E. S. 1899, § 2864), if different acts 
 of negligence are alleged and proved, some of which are for common- 
 law violations of duty, or other acts of negligence than acts of the 
 employees in charge of the engine and cars of the defendant, which 
 would furnish a basis for compensatory damages only, under another 
 section of the same statute (§ 2866), it is error to instruct the jury 
 that damages in a lump sum can be given, as is authorized only where 
 the action is undet- the penalty section of the statute alone. Crumpley 
 v. Hannibal, etc., B. Co., 98 Mo. 34; 11 S. W. Eep. 244; 111 Mo. 152 
 19 S. W. Eep. 820; Culbertson v. Metropolitan St. Ey. Co., 140 Mo. 
 35; 36 S. W. Rep. 834; King v. Missouri Pacific Ey. Co., 98 Mo. 235 
 11 S. W. Eep. 563; Rapp v. St. Joseph, etc., E. Co., 106 Mo. 423 
 17 S. W. Eep. 487; Casey v. Transit Co. (Mo.). 103 S. W. Eep. 1146, 
 
 51 Corliss V. Worcester, etc., E. Co., 63 N. H. 404; 21 Am. & Eng. 
 R, Cas. 208. 
 
 252 
 
Computation dip damages. § 202 
 
 held, under the Kansas statute, in an action by the personal 
 representative in behalf of the next of kin, that nominal dam- 
 ages were recoverable, if the death was shown to have re- 
 sulted by the wrongful act of the defendant and there were no 
 actual pecuniary damages shown.^^ And in an action, by 
 the administrator, for the next of kin, only damages nominal 
 in amount can be recovered, where the evidence shows that 
 the next of kin were not dependent upon the deceased for 
 support. ^^ The husband has been held entitled to only 
 nominal damages for the death of his wife, where no special 
 damages were shown,^* and only nominal damages can be 
 recovered, in a suit by an administrator, if there are not 
 shown to be any distributees, named in the statute, as en- 
 titled to substantial damages.®^ But under some of the 
 death statutes, the recovery will not be limited to nominal 
 damages only, although there is a total absence of evidence 
 going to show actual pecuniary loss to the next of kin, or 
 party entitled to sue for the death. ^^ 
 
 § 202. Excessive damages in death actions. — Even in a 
 State where the recovery in actions for wrongful death is 
 without limit, a» to amount, the jury is not without some re- 
 straint, and if its assessment of damages be so great as to 
 shock the sense of justice, and to indicate that the verdict is 
 
 52 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Weber, 33 Kansas 543; 6 Pac. Rep. 877; 
 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 418. 
 
 53 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Swett, 45 111. 197; Howard v. Delaware, 
 etc.. Canal Co., 40 Fed. Rep. 195; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 473. 
 
 54 Mitchell v. New York, etc., R. Co., 2 Hun. (N. Y.) 535; 5 T. & C. 
 122; 64 N. Y. 655; Parsons v. New York, etc., R. Co. 37 Hun. 128. 
 
 56 James v. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 92 Ala. 231; 9 So. R«p. 335; 
 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 522; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Trammell, 93 
 Ala. 3S0. 
 
 58 Dickens v. New York, et;;., R. Co., 1 Abb. App. Dec. (N. Y.) 504; 
 Tilley v. Hudson River R. Co., 29 N. Y. 252. 
 
 253 
 
§ 202 COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES. 
 
 the result of passion and prejudice, the trial court ought toi 
 set it aside, and failing in this duty, the appellate court will 
 reverse the judgment, because of the excessive amount.^^ So 
 where the earning capacity of the deceased, considering his 
 age ,and prospcts in life, was such that an annuity for the 
 aggregate annual earnings could be purchased for much less 
 than the amount of the verdict, and there was no evidence of 
 any probable increase in the earning capacity of the decedent, 
 it was held that a verdict largely in excess of such sum as 
 would render an annuity of the amount earned, should be 
 set aside, on appeal, as it evidenced that the jury arrived at 
 their verdict by the wrong process of calculating the dam- 
 
 But when no amount or limit of damages is fixed by law, 
 in a death action, the recovery is not necessarily limited to 
 the amount of the earnings of the, person killed and a finding 
 should not be disturbed, ou appeal, where it does not appear 
 that the jury were infiuenced by passion or prejudice and had 
 given due regard to the facts existing at the time of the 
 death. S9 
 
 B7 Little Eock, etc., E. Co. v. Barker, 39 Ark. 491; 19 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 195; Ihl v. Forty-second street, etc., R. Co., 47 N. Y. 317; 
 Oldfield V. New York, etc., R. Co., 14 N. Y. 310; Drew v. Sixth Ave. 
 R. Co., 26 N. Y. 49; Mclntyre v. New York, etc., R. Co., 37 N. Y. 
 287; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Bantom, 54 Pa. St. 495; Louisville &, 
 N. R. Co. V. Connor, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 19; Houghkirk v. Delaware & 
 H. Canal Co., 92 N. Y. 219; 44 Am. Rep. 370; Morley v. Great Western 
 E. Co., 16 U. C. Q. B. 504. 
 
 58 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Robbins, 57 Ark. 377; 21 S. W. Rep. 886; 
 Rose V. Des Moines Valley E. Co., 39 Iowa 246; 9 Am. Ey. Eep. 7; 20 
 Am. Ey. Rep. 326; Locke v. Sioux City, etc., R. Co., 46 Iowa 109; 
 Balch V. Grand Rapids & L R. Co., 67 Mich. 394; 11 West Eep. 476; 
 34 N. W. Eep. 884; Serensen v. Northern Pacific E. Co., 45 Fed. Eep. 
 407. 
 
 08 Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Lehmberg, 75 Texas 61; 12 S. W. 
 
 Eep. 838; Kelly v. Twenty-third Street R. Co., 14 Daily (N. Y.) 418; 
 
 14 N. Y. S. E. 699; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Bonafield, 104 111. 223; 
 
 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 493; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Robbins, 57 
 
 254 
 
COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES. § 203 
 
 § 203. Same — For death of father. — While no fixed 
 amount can be given beyond which a jury cannot give a ver- 
 dict for the death of a father, under a statute authorizing 
 compensatory damages, but each case' must depend upon the 
 peculiar circumstances and conditions existing, as a ground 
 for the recovery, the courts have announced that certain 
 sums will not be held excessive, for the death of an ordina- 
 rily industrious, sober and thrifty man of medium age, in 
 the absence of anything to show passion or prejudice as the 
 basis for the verdict. A number of cases have held that the 
 sum of five thousand dollars would not be deemed excessive 
 for the death of a father of medium age, who provided 
 fairly well for his family and was possessed of ordinary 
 earning capacity and education.^" The Arkansas court holds 
 that the sum of seven thousand five hundred dollars cannot 
 be held excessive, for the death of a man fifty-two years old, 
 of ordinary earning capacity and industrious habits and 
 whose services in educating his minor children would have 
 a pecuniary value.® ^ The California court held that the 
 sum of eight thousand dollars could not be held excessive 
 
 Ark. 377; 21 S. W. Rep. 886; Jeffersonville M. & R. Co. v. Riley, 39 
 Ind. 568; 10 Am. Ry. Rep. 325; Annas v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 67 
 Wis. 46; 27 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 102; 30 N. W. Rep. 282; 58 Am. 
 Rep. 848; Walter v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 39 Iowa 33; Wabash, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Schevers, 18 111. App. 52; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Snyder, 18 
 111. App. 640; Bierbauer v. New York, etc., R. Co., 15 Hun. (N. Y.) 
 559; 77 N. Y. 588; Webb v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 7 Utah 363; 26 
 Pac. Rep. 981; Wells v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 7 Utah 482; Dimmey 
 V. Wheeling, etc., R. Co., 27 W. Va. 32; McDermott v. Iowa Falls, 
 etc., R. Co. (Iowa), 47 N. W. Rep. 1037; East Line, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Smith, 65 Texas ,16t 
 
 eostaal v. Grand Rapids etc., R. Co., 57 Mich. 239; 23 N. W. Rep. 
 795; Howard County Com. v. Legg, 110 Ind. 479; 11 N. E. Rep. 612; 
 Bolinger v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 36 Minn. 418; 31 N. W. Rep. 856; 
 29 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 408; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Johnson, 78 
 Texas 536; 15 S. W. Rep. 104. 
 
 "St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Madry, 57 Ark. 306; 21 S. W. Rep. 472; 
 58 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 327. 
 
 255 
 
§ 204 COMPUTATION 01" DAMAGES. 
 
 for the death of a father fifty yeara old, who was a merchant 
 of medium means; ®* ten thousand dollars was held, by the 
 Texas court, not to be an excessive verdict, for the death of 
 a father thirty-five years old, who was earning fifty dollars 
 a month and was stout, healthy and sober,** and the same 
 court held that A verdict of twelve thousand dollars was not 
 excessive for the death of a parent of middle age, who was 
 earning one hundred dollars a month,** On the other hand, 
 in Illinois, it was held that a verdict for five thousand dol- 
 lars, for the death of a father, a common laborer, whose 
 earnings or education did not -appear, was excessive;*^ and 
 the Texas court held a verdict of eighteen thousand dollars 
 excessive, for the death of a brakeman, earning sixty-five 
 dollars a month.** The decisions in cases where this ground 
 has been urged, as a reason for a new trial are almost as 
 numerous as the sands of the seashore and a few of the cases 
 that have come to the attention, of the author, will be found 
 in the footnote. 
 
 § 204. Same — Death of husband. — Only a few of the 
 
 many decisions on the limitation placed by the courts upon 
 the amount of the recovery that will be allowed by the wife 
 for the death of the husband, can be given in this section, as 
 space will not permit an elaboration or presentation of the 
 grounds of the decisions in detail. 
 
 Where the deceased was thirty years old, was temperate 
 
 02 Cook V. Clay Hill, etc., R. Co., 60 Cal. 604; 6 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 175. 
 
 83 Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Lehmberg, 75 Texas 61; 12 S. W. Rep. 
 838. 
 
 04 International, etc., R. Co. v. Ormond, 64 Texas 485; 27 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 139. 
 
 00 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. We'ldon, 52 111. 290; Peoria, etc., R. Co. 
 V. O'Brien, 18 111. App. 28. 
 
 08 Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Johnson, 1 Texas Civ. App. 103; 20 S. W. 
 Rep. 1123. 
 
 256 
 
eoM:etJTA*iOiif oi' IjaMAgES. I 204 
 
 and industrious and, had earned fifty-five dollars a month, a 
 verdict for four thousand dollars, in favor of- his widow, was 
 held not to be excessive.®^ A verdict for five thousand dol- 
 lars was held not excessive, for the death of a man who 
 earned about a thousand dollars a year and had an expec- 
 tancy of twenty years.®® A verdict for six thousand cannot 
 be held excessive, for the death of a young man twenty-six 
 years of age, who was earning over a hundred dollars a 
 month.®* A verdict for seven thousand for the death of a 
 laborer thirty years of age, who was stout and able-bodied 
 and was earning about four hundred dollars a year, was held 
 not to be excessive.'^* It was held to be no abuse of the dis- 
 cretion of the jury to give a verdict in the sum of eight thou- 
 sand dollars, for the death of a husband fifty-nine years old, 
 who left an invalid wife and had always made a comfortable 
 living for his family,''^ and a verdict for ten thousand dol- 
 lars, in Texas, was held not excessive, for the de^th of an 
 engineer, twenty-nine years old, who was earning one hun- 
 dred and twenty-five dollars a month and was sober and 
 
 healthy." 
 
 I 
 
 67 Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, etc., E. Co., 34 Fed. Hep. 616. 
 
 68 Georgia E. Co. v. Pittman, 73 Ga. 325 ; 26 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 474. 
 
 69 Cleveland v. Central E. Co., 73 Ga. 793; Taylor v. Central E. Co., 
 79 Ga. 330. 
 
 'OHarkins v. Pullman Palace Car Co., 62 Fed. Eep. 724. 
 
 71 Cook V. Clay Hill E. Co., 60 Cal. 604; 6 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 175. 
 
 '2 Texas, etc., E. Co. v. Geiger, 79 Texas 13; 15 S. W. Eep. 214. 
 
 " In an action for death of a strong, healthy man thirty-two years 
 of age, employed as a teamster, a verdict held excessive above the sum 
 of ten thousand dollars." Gorman v. Hand Brewing Co. (E. I. 1907), 
 66 Atl. Eep. 209; 28 E. I. 180. 
 
 " In an action for wrongful death of deceased, a strong, vigorous 
 man about thirty-five years of age, earning, when employed, from ten 
 dollars to fifteen dollars a week, a verdict for two thousand dollars 
 was not excessive." Sipple v. Laclede Gaslight Co. (Mo. App. 1907), 
 102 S. W. Eep. 608. 
 
 " In an action for negligent death, a verdict of two thousand dollars 
 to decedent's wife, who was twenty-nine years old, and to each of his 
 1-17 25Y 
 
§ 205 COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES. 
 
 § 205. Same — For death of wife. — In Wisconsin, in an 
 action for the death of a wife, the testimony bearing upon 
 the amount of damages was very indefinite, but it appeared 
 that the deceased was a superior woman, as a wife, mother 
 and member of society. The verdict was for five thousand 
 dollars, and it was held by the Supreme Court that there 
 was nothing in the amount of the verdict calling for the in- 
 terference of the court.''* 
 
 In the absence of any evidence of mistake, misconduct or 
 prejudice on the part of the jury, other than as gathered from 
 the verdict for a sum of five thousand dollars for the death 
 of a wife," it was held, in Maine, in a well-considered case, 
 that as there was no standard by which the value of a human 
 life can be determined, such a verdict could not be held to be 
 a clear abuse of the discretion of the jury ''* and this is the 
 tr^d of the decisions. 
 
 However, in an Iowa case,'^ a verdict for eight thousand 
 
 seven children, was not excessive; decedent being thirty-six years old 
 at his death, and earning from seven hundred dollars to eight hundred 
 dollars a year." Galveston, H. & S. A. Ey. Co. v. Murray (Tex. Civ. 
 App. 1907), 99 S. W. Eep. 144. 
 
 " A verdict for five thousand dollars in an action for damages for 
 causing the death of a man twenty-one years old, in good health, and 
 capable of earning good wagesj held not excessive." Williams v. Alaska 
 Commercial Co. (Alaska 1903), 2 Alaska 43. 
 
 " In an action for the wrongful death of a regular practicing physi- 
 cian forty-four years of age, a verdict in favor of plaintiff for twelve 
 thousand dollars held not excessive." Bvarts v. Santa Barbara Consol. 
 Ry. Co. (Cal. App. 1906), 80 Pac. Eep. 830. 
 
 " In an action by a wife for the death of her husband, thirty-five 
 years of age, she showed that at the time of his death he earned 
 seventy-flve dollars a month and gave practically all of it to her. Ac- 
 cording to the mortuary tables he had a life expectancy of twenty-five 
 years. Held, that a verdict for fifteen thousand dollars would not be 
 set aside as excessive." Texas Mexican Ry. Co. v. Higgins (Tex. Civ. 
 App. 1907), 99 S. W. Rep. 200. 
 
 T3Whiton V. Chicago, etc., R. Co.,_^ Biss. (U. S.) 282. 
 
 T4Hobbs V. Eastern R. Co., 66 Me. 572; 19 Am. Ry. Rep. 210. 
 
 70 Sherman v. Western Stage Co., 24 Iowa 515. 
 258 
 
OOMtlTTATlOIf OS* DAMAGES. § 206 
 
 dollars for the death of a wife and infant child was held to 
 be "excessive and a reversal was ordered, unless the plaintiff 
 would remit the sum of three thousand dollars therefrom. 
 
 § 206. Same — Tor death of child. — As the basis of the 
 parents' recovery for the death of a minor child, under com- 
 pensatory death statutes, is the value of the earnings of the 
 child during its minority, less the expense of its support, as 
 the earnings, at the child's majority, belong to the child it- 
 self, a verdict in excess of this amount is generally held to 
 be excessive by the courts.''® Accordingly, a verdict in the 
 sum of three thousand seven hundred and seventy-five dol- 
 lars, for the death of a daughter ten years old, who was earn- 
 ing nothing, was held to be excessive ; '^^ a verdict for five 
 thousand dollars for death of a daughter seventeen years 
 old, who was earning but eleveii dollars a week, was exces- 
 sive ; ''^ four thousand dollars for the death of a son eight 
 years old, was held excessive ; '^ a verdict for two thousand" 
 two hundred and fifty dollars,' for the death of a son eigh- 
 teen years old, who was earning fifty dollars a month, was 
 held excessive ; ^^ four thousand five hundred was held ex- 
 cessive for death 'of a child five years old ; ** a verdict for 
 twenty thousand dollars was set aside, as excessive, in Cali- 
 fornia, in the absence of any evidence of special damages, 
 for death of an infant child, in a suit by the mother ; ^^ ten 
 
 78 Parsons v. Missouri Pacific Ey. Co., 94 Mo. 286 and eases cited. 
 
 77 Potter V. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 22 Wis. 615. 
 
 78 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Adamick, 33 111. App. 412. 
 7» Vickshurg v. MoLain, 67 Miss. 4; 6 So. Eep. 774. 
 
 80 Hickman v. Missouri Pacific Ey. Co., 22 Mo. App. 344; State v. 
 Baltimore, etc., E. Co., 24 Md. 107; North Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Kirk, 
 90 Pa. St. 15. 
 
 81 Little Eock, etc., E. Co. v. Barkerj 33 Ark. 350; Hurt v. St. Louis, 
 etc., E. Co., 94 Mo. 255; 34 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 422; 7 S. W. Eep. 1. 
 
 82 Morgan v. Southern Pacific E. Co., 95 CaL 510; 54 Am. & Eng. 
 E. Cas. 101; 30 Pac. Eep. 603. 
 
 259 
 
§ 206 COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES. 
 
 thousand dollars was held to be excessive, for the death of 
 a switchman, in an action by his mother, where it did not 
 appear what he had contributed to her support,** and three 
 thousand dollars was held to be excessive damages for the 
 death of a son nineteen years old.** 
 
 On the other hand, it was held that a verdict for one th(jji- 
 sand five hundred dollars for the services of a boy from 
 eleven to twenty-one years could not be held to be exces- 
 sive ; *® two thousand dollars was held not to be excessive for 
 the death of a boy five years old ; *® a verdict for four thou- 
 sand two hundred dollars was held not to be excessive for the 
 death of an only adult son, who supported his mother, in 
 Texas ; ®^ three thousand five hundred dollars was held not 
 to be excessive damages to give for the death of a girl thir- 
 teen years old ; *® five thousand dollars was held not to be 
 excessive for the death of a bright only daughter, six years 
 old*®, and for the wrongful killing of his five infant chil- 
 dren, a verdict for ten thousand eight hundred dollars was 
 held not to be excessive, in California.®* Of course on this 
 question of excessive verdicts there is a hopeless lack of 
 
 S3 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Brown, 26 Kansas 443; 6 Am. & Eng. E. 
 Cas. 228. 
 
 84 Paulmier v. Erie E. Co., 34 N. J. L. 151. 
 
 85 0'Meara v. Hudson Eiver E. Co., 38 N. Y. 445; Ilil v. Forty- 
 second St., etc., R. Co., 47 N. Y. 317. 
 
 soMoskovitz v. Lighte, 68 Hun. (N. Y.) 102; Fordyce v. McCants, 
 .55 Ark. 384; 18 S. W. Rep. 371. 
 
 87 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Lester, 75 Texas 56; 12 S. W. Rep. 955. 
 
 sspineo v. New York, etc., R. Co., 34 Hun. (N. Y.) 80. 
 
 soHoughkirk v. Delaware, etc.. Canal Co., 63 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 328. 
 
 ooNehrbas v. Central Pacific R. Co., 62 Cal. 320; 14 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 670. 
 
 " Where the mother and next of kin of decedent had an expectancy 
 of life of 17.4 years, and he contributed as much as five dollars a 
 month for her support, and sometimes more, an award of five hundred 
 and seventy-two dollars for his wrongful death was not excessive.'' 
 St. Louis, 1 M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Block (Ark. 1906), 95 S. W. Rep. 155. 
 
 " In an action by a father for the death of a child about seven years 
 260 
 
COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES. § 206 
 
 harraony in the decisions and no fixed rule or sum can be laid 
 down as a test to govern, in any case, but the facts and con- 
 ditions existing must alone determine the result, with the 
 peculiar training or inclination of the judge writing the 
 final decision, as an element also affecting the determination 
 of the question. 
 
 old, a verdict for $1,000 is not excessive." Indianapolis Traction & 
 Terminal Co. v. Beckham (Ind. App. 1907), 81 N. E. Rep. 82. 
 
 " In an action for the wrongful death of plaintiff's son, aged seven 
 years and one month, it appearing that the child was healthy and 
 intelligent, and of excellent disposition, a verdict for $1,500 was not 
 excessive." Black v. Michigan Cent. R. Co. (Mich. 1906), 109 N. W. 
 Rep. 1052; 13 Detroit Leg. N. 863. 
 
 "A verdict for $2,160.20 for the death of a one-year-old child was 
 not excessive, in the absence of anything indicating prejudice or pas- 
 sion." Abby v. Wood (Wash. 1906), 86 Pac. Rep. 558. 
 
 " Where intestate, a girl fifteen years of age, of average health, in- 
 telligence, an3 capacity, was killed by an explosion due to defendant's 
 negligence, a judgment for $3,000 was not excessive." Ellis v. Republic 
 Oil Co. (Iowa 1906), 110 N. W. Rep. 20. 
 
 "An award of $3,500 to parents sixty-one and fifty-two years old 
 respectively, in poor health and depending on their son for support, 
 for his death at the age of eighteen or nineteen years, was not exces- 
 sive." Hayes v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (Wis. 1907), 111 Ni W. 
 Rep. 471. 
 
 " In an action for the death of a young man of twenty-five years, who 
 resided with his father, who was forty-nine years of age, and earned 
 about $12 a week, and was in good health and good habits, a verdict 
 for $6,QD0 was. not excessive." Sembler v. Cowperthwait (N. Y. Sup. 
 1907), 103 N. y. S. 979; 53 Misc. Rep. 28. 
 
 "A mjn twenty-two years of age, and earning from $50 to $100 per 
 month, most of which sums were given to his mother, fifty-four years 
 of age, was killed. His expenses were from $10 to $12 per month. 
 Held, that a verdict, in an action for his death, for $6,000 was not 
 excessive." International & G. N. R. Co. v. Hays (Tex. Civ. App. 
 1907), 98 S. W. Rep. 911. 
 
 " Decedent, a railroad engineer, twenty-five years of age, in good 
 health, industrious, and of good habits* was killed through defendant's 
 negligence. Decedent was earning from $100 to $130 a month, most of 
 which he gave to plaintiff, his mother, who was about fifty-four years 
 of age. There was also evidence that decedent was thrifty and careful 
 in matters of expenditure. Held, that a verdict awarding plaintiff 
 
 261' 
 
§ 206 COMPUTATION OF DAMAGES. 
 
 $7,500 was not excessive. Baker v. Philadelphia, etc., Ry. Co-. -(U. S. 
 0. C, Pa., 1907), 149 Fed. Rep. 882. 
 
 " For the death of a mail carrier drawing $50 a month, thirty-five 
 years of age, and in good health, a verdict for $8,000 wsis not excessive." 
 Louisville & N. E. Co. v. Lucas' Admr. (Ky. 1906), 98 S. W. Rep. 308. 
 
 2G2 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 
 GENERALLY OF EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYEE, IN PEBSONAL. IN" 
 JUKY ACTIONS. 
 
 § 207. Terms applicable to what class. 
 
 208. Pleading relationship of employer and employee. 
 
 209. Injury should result from acts of employees charged. 
 
 210. Person causing injury must be employee of company. 
 
 211. Who generally regarded as an employee. 
 
 212. When relation of employer and employee a jury question. 
 
 213. Generally, no liability for neglect or malpractice of physician 
 
 or surgeon. 
 
 214. Same — The rule in the federal court. 
 
 215. Same — The rule in Florida. 
 
 216. The Indiana rule. 
 
 217. The law in Iowa. 
 
 218. No liability, in Kansas. 
 
 219. Rule the same in Maryland. 
 
 220. No liability, in Nebraska. 
 
 221. Tennessee rule the same. 
 
 222. Washington rule. 
 
 223. Status of volunteers and substitutejl employees. 
 
 224. Postal clerks and express messengers not employees. 
 
 225. News agents and others carried under contract. 
 
 226. Substituted employer — Train and crew controlled by another. 
 
 227. Injury must occur in course of employment. 
 
 228. When one deemed employee of two or more companies. 
 
 229. Different companies using same track or train. 
 
 230. Joint or several liability of companies jointly operating road. 
 
 231. Liability of connecting and joining roads. 
 
 232. Liability under joint-traffic arrangement. 
 
 233. Agent causing injury and company both liable. 
 
 234. Employer not liable when negligent employee discharged. 
 
 235. Lessor's liability for injuries to employees of lessee. 
 
 236. Mortgagor not liable for negligence of mortgagee. 
 
 237. Negligence of trustees for bondholders. 
 
 238. Road operated by receiver, 
 
 263 
 
§ 207 EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYEE. GENEJIALLY. 
 
 § 239. Liability of reorganized company. 
 
 240. Liability of consolidated company. 
 
 24 L Purchasing company not generally liable. 
 
 242. Holding companies liable for negligence of companies held. 
 
 § 207. Terms applicable to what class. — Under the terms 
 employer and employee, the author -will treat all classes of 
 persons in the service of railroad companies, from the highest 
 to the lowest grade of the service. These terms may be used 
 interchangeably with their legal synonyms, master and serv- 
 ant, which are no doubt found in more general use than those 
 of employer and employee. The retention of such terms, 
 by the legal profession, is an evidence of the fact that the 
 bench and bar are partial to the use of words with which they 
 have become familiar, or that have been put to a general use 
 for a long period of time and that they are slow to give up 
 the use of such terms, even though others may be used to 
 express the meaning better, or may be really more consistent 
 with American civilization and institutions. Artificial en- 
 tities which are incapable of exercising any control or direc- 
 tion, except through their agents or employees, come within 
 the definition of the term " master " and the individuals ex- 
 ercising the greatest power of control and direction, in the 
 maintenance of personal injury actions, are classed as mere 
 " servants " and so generally are these terms employed, in 
 the law, that it may be doubted if they are ever to be dis- 
 carded for those more nearly expressing the relation occupied 
 by those engaging and the persons who enter the service of 
 another, in the performance of other than mere menial labor.' 
 
 1 Notwithstanding every trial lawyer is loath to refer to his own 
 or his opponent's client, in the presence of a representative jury, as 
 a " servant," and trial courts will find the use of these terms in 
 instructions rather grating upon the ears of the average American 
 citizen, text books and lawyers and courts, year after year, continue 
 to use the terms, more fi'om force of habit than because they are 
 more apt definitions of the parties and the relation in which they 
 are used. The term " servant " is never applied to the lowest menial, 
 
 264r 
 
BMPLOYEB AND EMPLOYEE! GENEKALLT. § 208 
 
 § 208. Pleading relationship of employer and employee. — 
 As explained in a previous section, since tlie liability for 
 personal injuries is based upon the breach of a specific duty 
 owing to the injured person by the one charged with the re- 
 sponsibility therefor, it is necessary, in all cases, to set 
 forth the specific relation from which the correlative duty 
 and responsibility would follow. Under this general rule, 
 where the plaintiff sues as an employee, he must allege the 
 specific relation going to show the employment, from which 
 
 by those considerate of the feelings of their fellows, yet it is applied, 
 in the law, to those independent citizens, free and equal under our 
 constitution, who labor for their sustenance, if they are so unfortunate 
 as to maintain a personal injury action. The use of the term "mas- 
 ter," in itself, will prejudice an average jury against the employer. 
 " Master and servant " suggests master and slaTve ; such a relation is 
 impossible under the law, in the United States, and such terms should 
 be dropped by courts and lawyers, for others equally as expressive 
 and more in keeping with our civilization and institutions. 
 
 In Parkes v. Seasongood (152 Fed. Rep. 583), Judge Brown, sitting 
 in the Federal Circuit Court for Rhode Island, held that a, trained 
 nurse performing her usual duties and exercising the skill which is 
 the result of training in that profession, does not come within the 
 definition of a servant, but rather is one who renders personal service 
 to an employer in the pursuit of an independent calling, and the 
 employer is not liable as master for her acts. 
 
 The' great Paul of Tarsus said: "Art thus called, being a 
 servant? Care not for it; but if thou mayst be made free, use it 
 rather. For he that is called in the Lord, being a servant, is the 
 Lord's freeman; likewise, also, he that is called, being free, is Christ's 
 servant. Ye are bought with a price; be not ye the servants of men." 
 (I Cor. vii, 21-23.) 
 
 Historians of the future, judging the present American wage-worker, 
 by the terms applied to him by modern economic writers and the 
 language of the courts, are apt to regard him much as we of the 
 present day do the " slaves " and " bondmen " of preceding ages. 
 Terms that so illy befit American citizens should be discarded. It is 
 no discredit to those designating the humblest wage-earner, to speak 
 of him as an employee, and if all persons engaged in the service of 
 others, regarded those for whom they labored, rather as an employer, 
 than a master — which smacks of the Eyptian taskmasters, of old — a 
 better feeling might to-day exist between employer and employee. ' 
 
 265 
 
§ 208 EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYEE GENEEALLY. 
 
 the court will determine whether or not the liability for the 
 injury exists. Generally, in setting forth the relation, it 
 is sufficient to allege that " the defendant was a railroad com- 
 pany and, at the time- of the casualty complained of, was en- 
 gaged in the operation of a railroad; that the plaintiff was 
 then in the service of the defendant" — setting forth in 
 what capacity employed — " and that, while in the actual 
 discharge of his duties, as such, he received the injuries," * 
 for the recovery of damages for the infliction of which the 
 action is prosecuted. Upon the sufficiency of a petition con- 
 taining practically the allegations above set forth, the Su- 
 preme Court of Alabama, in a comparatively recent case, 
 said : " These averments set forth a relationship between 
 the defendant and the plaintiff, at the moment of receiving 
 the injuries * * * and were, we think, sufficient state- 
 ments of the duty, which the defendant owed the plaintiff in 
 the premises." ^ In this case, it was objected that the com- 
 plaint alleged a mere conclusion of the pleader, without set- 
 ting out the facts showing the employment; the court held 
 that in stating the employment this was permissible, but it 
 was not denied that facts showing the relation must be al- 
 leged, and, if not, that the complaint would be objectionable 
 for this reason. This is the general rule.* 
 
 2 Kansas City, M. & B. R. Co. v. Burton, 53 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 115. 
 
 A failure to specify the duties performed, so that the defendant and 
 the court can be advised of the nature and cause of the injury, will 
 be subject to a motion to make the complaint more definite and certain 
 in this particular. White, Per. Inj. in Mines, § 50, p. 58, and cases 
 cited. See, also, Diamond Block Coal Co. v. Cuthbertson (Ind.), 67 
 N. E. Rep. 558. 
 
 s Kansas City, Memphis & B. R. Co. v. Burton, supra. It is error 
 to strike out the only paragraph of a petition alleging that the em- 
 ployee who caused the injury was an employee of defendant. Schneider 
 V. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (Mo.), 94 S. W. Rep. 130. 
 
 * Railway Co. v. Chewning, 93 Ala. 24; 50 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 46; 
 Railway Co. v. Davis, 92 Ala. 300; Railway Co. v. Hawkins, 92 Ala. 
 241. 
 
 266 
 
EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYEE GENERALLY. § 209 
 
 § 209. Injury should result from acts of employees 
 charged. — Since it is not only essential for the plaintiff to 
 allege and show a connection between the negligence of the 
 defendant and the injury to the plaintiff, but also to estab- 
 lish that the specific negligence alleged occasioned the in- 
 jury,® where certain employees of the defendant are charged 
 with having occasioned the injury, it is not held to meet this 
 allegation of negligence to establish that other employees, in 
 a separate department of the business, by their acts, caused 
 the injury. Illustrative of this doctrine and principle, where 
 it was alleged, in a late Missouri case, that the employees 
 on a certain car, by their acts, caused the injury and the 
 evidence developed that they had, in fact, done nothing, but 
 the injury was occasioned by the employees of another car, 
 in no way connected with thenar described, it was held to 
 be a fatal variance.® But in other cases, in the same State, 
 where it was alleged that an injury had resulted from the 
 negligence of employees in charge of a train, and the evi- 
 dence developed that the collision causing the injury was 
 due to the negligence of a train dispatcher, ^ho, in fact, was 
 in charge of the train, this was held to bear out the allega- 
 tions of the petition and a recovery was permitted as for the 
 negligence charged in the j)0tition.'' The reason for this 
 ruling was on account of the fact that the evidence was really 
 that charged and not the negligence of other employees. 
 The defendant is entitled to a definite allegation and to rely 
 upon this charge alone being established, as a basis of his 
 liability and if other than the charge alleged is relied on for 
 
 6 International & G. N. R. Co. v. Wray (Tex.), 96 S. W. Rep. 74; 
 McGrath v. St. Louis Tr. Co. (Mo.), 94 S. W. Rep. 872; Van Horn v. 
 St. Louis Transit Co. (Mo.), 95 S. W. Rep. 326. 
 
 'Coyne v. United Ry, Cos. (Mo. App.), per Goode, J., 98 S. W. Rep. 
 110. 
 
 TMalloy V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 173 Mo. 75; 73 S. W. Rep. 159; 
 Hennessy v. St. Louis, etc., R, Co., 173 Mo. 86; 73 S. W. Rep. 162. 
 
 267 
 
§ 210 EMPLOYEE AETD EMPLOYEE GENEEALLY. 
 
 a recovery, the defendant is entitled to have this charge 
 definitely alleged and to defend as to the specific charge, with- 
 out reference to any others. 
 
 § 210. Person causing injury must be employee of com- 
 pany. — ISTot only is it essential that the injured person, when 
 he sues, must establish the relation of an employee of the 
 company, in order for him to show the resulting duty toward 
 himself, which would render the company liable, but if his 
 injury was due to an act of another, he must establish that 
 this other person, was, in fact, an employee of the company, 
 for whose acts it would be responsible.® 
 
 A railway company is not liable for an injury to an em- 
 ployee, at work on its station platform, from a mail sack, 
 thrown from a moving tpain by a railway postal clerk, in 
 the employment of the Government ; ' the postal clerks are 
 not agents or employees of the railway company, or subject 
 to its direction or control, but are in the service of the Gov- 
 ernment alone. •''' Likewise, it has been held that a com- 
 pany would not be responsible, for the act of a mere volun- 
 teer, assisting one of its regular employees, without its knowl- 
 edge or consent, ^^ nor for an assistant of one of its em- 
 ployees, who had no power to engage an assistant.^'* In 
 other words, the company itself, being the one sought to be 
 charged, must have the dominion or power to control the acts 
 
 8 Patterson, Ry. Ace. Law, p. 102; Seott v. London Dock Co., 3 
 H. & C. 596; Bard v. Yohn, 26 Pa. St. 482; Coleman v. Riches, 16 
 C. B. 104; 81 E. C. L. 478; Stevens v. Woodward, 6 Q. B. D. 318. 
 
 "Muster v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 61 Wis. 325; 18 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 113. 
 
 10 Snow V. ritchburg R. R. Co., 136 Mass. 552; 18 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 161; Carpenter v. Boston & Albany R. Co., 97 N. Y. 494; 21 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 331. . 
 
 11 Burrows v. Erie Ry. Co., 63 N. Y. 556 ; Morrison v. Erie Ry. Co., 
 56 N. Y. 302 ; Patterson on Ry. Ace. Law, p. 103. 
 
 12 Jewell V. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 55 N, H, 84, 
 
 263 
 
EM^LOYllK ASSB EMftOYEfi GENEEALtY. § 2ll 
 
 of the one causing the injiary, for otherwise, it would be un- 
 just to hold it liable for his acts.^^ 
 
 But this rule does not obtain as to passengers, in all its 
 strictness, for if the company, by reasonable care, could pre- 
 vent an injury to a passenger, by preventing or having cor- 
 rected, the acts of third persons, such as other passengers, or 
 persons not in its service, and it fails to do so, it will be held 
 liable, in case of a resulting injury, based upon the obliga- 
 tion of its special contract to safely carry the passenger, or 
 afford him reasonably safe surroundings and facilities.^* 
 
 § 211. Who generally regarded as an employee. — The 
 
 question of who is and who is not, an employee, within the 
 meaning of the law, so as to subject an alleged employer to 
 damages for an injury to the one claiming to be in his ser- 
 vice, is often a difficult question to decide. The right to 
 employ and discharge the alleged employee is a centroUing 
 element in solving such a question, but not necessarily de- 
 termining, or so important as the duty or obligation to con- 
 trol and protect the injured person.^® 
 
 The United States Supreme Court holds that the right to 
 employ and discharge a given employee will not even decide 
 the question of vice-principalship,'^* but, in all cases, the vital 
 question is not so much the right to discharge or employ, as 
 the duty owing to the injured person by the one sued for 
 
 isReedie v. L. & N. W. R. Co., 4 Ex. 243; Quarman v. Bennett, 6 
 M. & W. 499; Hughes v. Boyer, 9 Watts 556. Company not liable 
 for act of stranger, throwing switch, by which employee injured. 
 Bennett v. Long Island Co., 21 App. Div. 25; 47 N. Y. Supp. 258; 
 163 N. Y. 1 ; 57 N. E. Rep. 79. But see, contra, Houston, etc., R. Co. 
 V. Gaither (Tex.), 43 S. W. Rep. 266. 
 
 "Snow V. Fitchburg R. Co., 136 Mass. 552; 18 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 161; Carpenter v. Boston & Albany R. Co., 97 N. Y. 494; 21 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 331; Putnam v. Broadway R. R. Co., 5^ N. Y. 113. 
 
 15 Roe V. Winston, 86 Minn. 77 ; 90 N. W. Rep. 122. 
 
 18 Alaska Treadwell Gold M., etc., Co. v. Whelen, 168 U. S. 85. 
 
 269 
 
§ 212 EMPLOYEE AND EMI>LOYEE, GENEEALLY. 
 
 the breach of the duty, forming the basis of the liability. 
 This is generally stated to be the test for determining the 
 existence of the relation," and, in every case, since the re- 
 sponsibility depends solely upon the establishment of a duty 
 and the breach of that duty, to hold one as an employer, it 
 ■would seem to be required to at least show a duty to control, 
 or right of control, and a corresponding duty to protect the 
 injured person. 
 
 Under the Ohio statute making a railroad company liable 
 to its employees, for failure to block guard rails on its line 
 of road, the question is 'said to be, was the injured person, 
 under the authority of the company, rightfully on the track, 
 at the time of his injury ? If he was, he is held to be an em- 
 ployee, although paid by another than the owner of the 
 track. ^^ 
 
 § 212. When relation of employer and employee a jury 
 question. — Where the facts are disputed,- upon the question 
 whether or not the injured person was ih the service of the 
 one causing the injury, at the time when he was injured, 
 the issue is one for the jury, like any other issue of 
 fact, where the evidence is in conflict. In a Wisconsin case, 
 the injured person was in the employment of the alleged em- 
 ployer, a railroad company, with others, and had been, for 
 a long time, at work on a pile driver. At the time of the 
 injury, the plaintiff and his coemployees had been placed 
 under the care of a third person, the owner of a bridge and 
 
 17 4 Thompson on Neg., § 3721, p. 7. 
 
 isAtkyn v. Wabash E. Co., 41 Fed. Eep. 193; 23 Ohio L. J. 151; 
 4 Thompson on Neg., § 3743, p. 22. 
 
 It is said in Patterson, on Railway Accident Law. "The test of 
 the existence of the relation of master and servant is to be found, not 
 in the payment of the servant's wages by the railway, but in the exer- 
 cise by the railway of authority in appointing the servant, in directing 
 his acts, in receiving the benefit of those acts, and in reserving the 
 power of dismissing the servant." Patterson, Ey. Ace. Law, p. 103. 
 210 
 
EMPLOYEE Ann EMPLOYEE GENEBALLY. § 213 
 
 transfer business, under a contract with his employer, the 
 railroad company, to furnish its engine, track layers and 
 pile driver and employees and cause them to be loaned, as it 
 were, to the bridge owner, during the construction of the 
 bridge and tracks, necessary for the transfer of the business 
 of the railroad company to the transfer owner. The plain- 
 tiff contended that when injured he was in the service 
 of the railroad company only, but this was denied and it 
 was shown that when injured the plaintiff and his coem- 
 ployees were not under the direction or control of the rail^ 
 road company at all, but were being paid by and were sub- 
 ject to the control only of the owner of the bridge and trans- 
 fer business. On this conflicting testimony, upon the issue 
 of the employment by the defendant, the court held that it 
 was a question for the jury.^* 
 
 § 213. Generally, no liability for neglect or malpractice of 
 physician or surgeon.— The rule is very generally announced 
 by the different State and federal courts, that a railroad 
 company is not liable for an injury to an employee or third 
 party, due to the negligence or malpractice of a physician or 
 surgeon employed by it, of reputable skill, and professional 
 standing.^" 
 
 For the convenience of the practitioner, some of the hold- 
 ings by the federal and State courts are given in the sub- 
 sequent sections. 
 
 i9Sehultz V. Chicago, etc., Ey. Co., 40 Wis. 589. 
 
 20 Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Sullivan, 141 Ind. 83; 50 Am. St. Rep. 
 313, and note, 40 N. E. Rep. 138; 27 L. R. A. 840; Quinn v. Kansas 
 City, etc., R. Co., 95 Tenn. (10 Pickle) 713; 45 Am. St. Rep. 767; 
 30 S. W. Rep. 1036; 28 L. R. A. 552; Laubheim v. Royal Netherland, 
 etc., Co., 107 N. Y. 228; 13 N. E. Rep. 781; 1 Thompson on Neg., 
 § 633, p. 582, and cases cited. 
 
 The effect of unskillful treatment of a physician or surgeon, em- 
 ployed by the injured person, as affecting his recovery, is discussed in 
 chapter on Elements and Computation of Damages. 
 
 271 
 
§§ 2l4r-216 EMPLOYEE AlfD EMPL0YE£ QENEEULLY. 
 
 § 214. Same — The rule in the federal court. — The hold- 
 ing of the federal courts is in accordance with that of a ma- 
 jority -of the States and territories, v/here the courts have 
 had occasion to pass upon this question and it is held that 
 a railroad company that sends its employed for treatment to 
 a hospital, maintained by the company for charitable pur- 
 poses, is not responsible for injuries caused to the employee 
 by the negligence of the hospital attendants, where the com- 
 pany had exercised ordinary care in the selection of such 
 attendants.^ ^ 
 
 § 215. Same — The rule in Florida. — The courts of Flor- 
 ida hold that an employer performs his entire duty in respect 
 to furnishing surgical aid for an injured employee, where he 
 employs a physician or surgeon of ordinary skill in his pro- 
 fession, and, having thus discharged his duty, in this regard, 
 to his employee, he is not responsible for the negligence of the 
 physician or surgeon, in the performance of bis professional 
 duties.*^ 
 
 § 216. The Indiana rulej— The holding is the same in In- 
 diana and where a railroad company volimtarily employs a 
 physician for its injured employee, it is only bound to exer- 
 cise ordinary care in selecting a competent person and it is 
 not liable for the physician's negligence or tortious acts while 
 attending the injured employee. ^^ 
 
 21 Union Pacific Ey. Co. v. Artist, 60 Fed. Eep. 365; 9 C. C. A. 14; 
 19 U. S. App. 612; Pierce's Admr. v. Union Pacific Ky. Co., 66 Fed. 
 Eep. 44; 13 C. C. A. 323; 32 U. S. App. 48. 
 
 The physician or surgeon is generally regarded as any other inde- 
 pendent contractor, over whom the employer reserves no control or 
 supervision. 1 Thompson on Neg., §§ 632, 633, pp. 581, 582, and 
 cases cited. 
 
 22 South Florida E. Co. v. Price, 32 Fla. 46 ; 13 So. Eep. 638. 
 
 23 Pittsburg, C, C. & St. L. Ey. Co. v. Sullivan, 141 Ind. 83; 40 
 N. E. Eep. 138; 50 Am. St. Eep. 313; 27 L. E. A. 840; Ohio & 
 
 272 
 
EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYEE GENEEALLY. §§ 217-220 
 
 § 217. The law in Iowa. — A railway company voluntarily 
 furnishing a hospital for the treatment of its employees, is 
 not liable for the malpractice or negligence of its surgeons,, 
 provided it exercised reasonable care in their employment,^* 
 nor would it be lia,ble for an additional injury to its employee 
 caused by the negligence of its physicians in having such in- 
 jured employee removed from one place to another.^^ 
 
 § 218. No liability, in Kansas. — The rule as announced 
 in Kansas is in accord with the great weight of judicial 
 authority upon this question, and in that State, it is held, 
 where an employer employs a competent physician to attend 
 upon an injured employee, the employer cannot be held liable 
 for the death of such employee,*® caused by a mistake of the 
 physician. 
 
 § 219. Rule the same in Maryland, — The same rule, as to 
 the nonliability of a railroad company for injuries from the 
 negligence of its physicians, is announced, in an early case, 
 in Maryland. The duty of the company was held to cease 
 when the injured employee was placed under the care of a 
 reputable physician and surgeon and it was not liable for 
 the result of his neglect.*'' 
 
 § 220. No liability, in Nebraska. — Upon this question, the 
 Nebraska courts follow the trend of the decisions in other 
 States, and in that State, an employer who calls- a surgeon to 
 
 • 
 
 M. Ry. Co. V. Early, 141 Ind. 73; 40 N. E. Eep. 257; 28 L. E. A. 546. 
 
 2*Eighing v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 93 Iowa 538; 61 N. W. Eep. 
 1056; 27 L. E. A. 296. 
 
 2BYork V. ,Chicago, M. & St. P. Ey. Co., 98 Iowa 544; 67 N. W. 
 Eep. 574. 
 
 26 Atchison, T. & S. P. Ey. Co. v. Zeiler, 54 Kan. 340; 38 Pac. Eep. 
 282. 
 
 27 Baltimore & 0. E. Co. v. State, 41 Md. 268. 
 
 1—18 273 
 
§§ 221-223 EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE GENE.EALLY, 
 
 aid an injured employee is not liable for the negligence or 
 malpractice of the surgeon, provided the surgeon was ordi- 
 narily skilled in his profession and the employer had no 
 reason to believe that he would not properly discharge his 
 duty toward the employee. ^^ 
 
 § 221. Tennessee rule the same. — In Tennessee, the rela- 
 tion of employer and employee does not exist between a rail- 
 road company and a physician employed by it to take care of 
 its injured employees. The railroad company is bound to 
 exercise only reasonable care in the employment of a physi- 
 cian and surgeon to care for its injured employees and there 
 is no liability, on the part of the company, for the negligence 
 of its physicians^ or surgeons.^ ^ 
 
 § 222. Washington rule — No liability. — In a case which 
 arose in Washington, the injured employee worked for a 
 mining company which assessed its employees for the main- 
 tenance of a hospital and the employment of surgeons. Upon 
 the issue as to the employer's liability for the want of skill 
 on the part of the surgeon, the court held that the company 
 was not liable to the employee for the negligence or mal- 
 practice of the physician, as he was employed, without profit 
 to the company, for the treatment of its employees and pos- 
 sessed ordinary skill in his profession and it was held to be 
 immaterial that the employee had contributed to the fund 
 out of which he was paid.'"' 
 
 § 223. Status of volunteers and substituted employees. — 
 
 28 Chicago, B. & Q. E. Co. v. Howard, 45 Neb. 570; 63 N. W. Rep. 
 872. 
 
 20Quinn v. Kansas City, M. & B. R. Co., 94 Tenn. (10 Pickle), 
 713; 30 S. W. Rep. 1036; 45 Amer. St. Rep. 767; 28 L. R. A. 552. 
 
 30 Richardson v. Corlean Hill Coal Co., 10 Wash. 648 ; 39 Pac. Rep.' 
 95. 
 
 274 
 
EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYEE GENEBALLT. § 22$ 
 
 Since the existence of the relation of employer and employee 
 depends rather upon the appointment of the employee and 
 the direction of his acts, in receiving the benefit of his acts, 
 the payment for his services and 'the reserved power of dis- 
 missal,^^ than upon the nature or character of the duties per- 
 formed, one who is not engaged or under the direction of the 
 employer, whose services do not enure to his benefit and 
 whom the employer cannot dismiss and does not pay for his 
 services, is not generally deemed to be in his employment to 
 the extent of rendering him liable for an injury to such a 
 person_, through the negligence of those regularly in his serv- 
 ice.*^ 
 
 The duty of furnishing a reasonably safe place in which 
 to work, which extends to all regular employees, is held not 
 to apply to one who volunteers, for the employee's benefit, 
 to assist him in his work, without the knowledge or consent 
 of the employer; *^ nor would the employer be held liable for 
 the negligence of such a volunteer, in case his other em- 
 ployees were injured as a result of his negligence.^* But if 
 the negligence of a mere volunteer has occasioned a defect in 
 an appliance, which would have been disclosed by a proper 
 and timely inspection^ the employer will be responsible, if 
 no proper inspection has been had, in case an injury results 
 to an employee, for in such case, the negligence is not that 
 alone of such stranger or volunteer, but it is his, combined 
 with that of the employer himself.^^ 
 
 81 Patterson, Ey. Ace. Law, p. 103. 
 
 82 4 Thompson, Neg., § 3756, and cases cited. 
 
 s3Langan v. Tyler, 114 Fed. Rep. 716; Craven v. Myers, 165 Mass. 
 271; 42 N. E. Eep. 1131; 
 
 3* Bennett v. Long Island B. Co., 163 N. Y. 1 ; 57 N. E. Rep. 79. 
 
 8B In Texas, where an engineer was killed as a result of the dis- 
 placement of a switch, caused by a bolt having been removed by a 
 stranger, but which could have been discovered, by a proper inspection, 
 the employer was held liable. Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Gaither, 43 
 S. W. Eep. 266. But see, Bennett v. Long Island R. Co., supra. 
 
 275 
 
§ 224 EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYEE GENEEALLY. 
 
 § 224. Postal clerks and express messengers not employees. 
 
 — In accordance with the customary legal tests for deter- 
 mining the existence of the relation of employer and em- 
 ployee, postal clerks and express messengers are not usually 
 regarded as the railway company's employees,^® for the com- 
 pany does not employ them ; does not pay their wages or ex- 
 ercise any authority, either in appointing or directing their 
 acts, nor does it receive the benefit of their service, or have 
 the power to dismiss them. 
 
 But it does not follow that the railway company may not 
 owe these persons some duty, if not that of an employer, and 
 while it was held, in Wisconsin, that a postal clerk was not 
 such an employee of the railway company, as to render the 
 company liabje for an injury resulting from his negligence,^'' 
 it has been held in New York *® and some other States, that 
 such persons can recover for an injury from the negligence 
 
 Where, at the time plaintiif was injured while riding on a freight 
 train under an invalid employment by the conductor, he' was neither 
 an employee nor a passenger, the fact that the carrier, several months 
 after the injury, issued plaintiff a pass to enable him to return to 
 his home, in which he was described as an " injured employee," was 
 inadmissible to show a ratification of the conductor's attempted em- 
 ployment. Vassar v. Atlantic Coast Line E. Co. (N. C. 1906), 54 
 S. E. Eep. 849. 
 
 An apprentice, engaged in studying the business of railroading and 
 helping, as flagman, with the consent of the railroad's trainmaster, 
 is held to be an employee, in Illinois, and the company is liable for 
 his death, through a collision, caused by his ooemployees' negligence, 
 under the statute. Huntzicker v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 129 Fed. Eep. 
 548. 
 
 38 Muster v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ey. Co., 61 Wis. 325; 18 Am. & 
 Eng. E. Cas. 113; Patterson on Ey. Ace. Law, pp. 102, 103. 
 
 37 Muster v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., supra. 
 
 ssNolton V. Western E. E. Co., 15 N. Y. 444; Blair v. Erie E. E. 
 Co., 66 N. Y. 313; Putnam v. Broadway E. E. Co., 55 N. Y. 113; 
 Carpenter v. Boston & Albany R. Co., 97 N. Y. 494; 21 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 331. See, also. Snow v. Fitchburg R. Co., 136 Mass. 552; 
 18 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 161. 
 
 276 
 
EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYEE GENEEAILY, §225 
 
 of the company, or its employees, while this is denied in 
 Pennsylvania ^® and other States. 
 
 § 225. News agents and others carried under contract.-^ 
 
 Analogous to the position occupied by mail and express 
 agents is that of news agents or those carried, under a con- 
 tract with their employer, to sell refreshments or render 
 other services for other than the railroad company, on its 
 trains. 
 
 In these and similar relations, while the relation of em- 
 ployer and employee does not exist between the railroad com- 
 pany and such persons, rightfully on its trains, it does not 
 follow that it would be free from a duty toward them, for 
 being rightfully on the train, the railroad owes them the 
 obligation to prevent injuring them, through its own negli- 
 gence, and if an injury is sustained by such a person, al- 
 though no relation of employer or employee could be held 
 to exist, the railroad would none the less be liable for the 
 result of its own negligence.*" But the liability would not 
 extend to those who might be invited upon the train of a 
 railroad company, by such persons, as express agents, news- 
 boys or mail clerks, for as to these parties, the company 
 would owe them no duty aside from that which it would owe 
 
 3» Pennsylvania R. E. Co. v. Price, 96 Pa. St. 256; 1 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 234. But an express messenger, who also acted as baggage 
 man, with the knowledge of the employer, although he had no contract 
 as such, was held to be an employee, in 'fexas. Missouri, etc., E. Co. 
 V. Reasor, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 302; 68 S. W. Rep. 332. 
 
 40 Yeomana v. Railroad, 44 Cal. 71 ; Commonwealth v. Vermont, etc., 
 E. Co., 108 Mass. 7; Hammond v. Northeastern R. Co., 6 S. C. 130; 
 Houston & Texas Central R. Co. v. Hampton, 64 Texas 427; 22 Am. 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 291; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Price, 96 Pa. 256; 
 Seybold v. New York, etc., R. Co., 95 N. Y. 562; Pennsylvania R. 
 Co. V. Woodworth, 26 Ohio St. 585; Blair v. Erie E. Co., 66 N. Y. 
 313; Chamberlain v. Minneapolis.'etc, E. Co., 11 Wis. 238. 
 
 277 
 
§§226,227 EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYEE GENEEALLY, 
 
 any other trespasser, for their- position is no different from 
 that of a mere trespasser.*^ 
 
 § 226. Substituted employer — Train and crew controlled by 
 another. — So material in the determination of the relation, 
 is the right or duty of control over the injured employee, that 
 it has heen held that if a railroad company loans or hires its 
 train and train crew to another person or corporation, and, 
 while under the control and subject to the direction of this 
 other, an injury happens to another by one of the crew, the 
 person exercising the right of control, at the time of the in- 
 jury, will be regarded as the employer, for the purposes of 
 the damage suit and not the original employer, who, at the 
 time, retained no control or supervision over the employee 
 causing the injury.*^ 
 
 But it is not true that an employer could relieve himself 
 from liability, by substituting another for himself, without 
 an express renunciation of his claim against him, by the 
 employee, and for an injury to his own employees, caused 
 by the negligence of the substituted employer, it has been 
 held that the original employer would remain liable.*^ 
 
 § 227. Injury must occur in course of employment. — For 
 the employer to be held liable, in damages, for an injury to 
 
 41 Duff V. Eailroad, 91 Pa. St. 458; Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. 
 Nichols, 8 Kan. 505; Patterson, Ry. Ace. Law, p. 217. 
 
 A sleeping car porter is not an employee of the railroad company 
 where the car in which he worked is operated by the sleeping car 
 company and it is paid by the railroad company to run it over its 
 road. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Hamlin, 215 111. 525; 74 N. E. 
 Rep. 705. 
 
 ■izCoughlan v. Cambridge, 166 Mass. 268; 44 N. E. Rep. 218. In 
 this case, the injured person was another original employee of the 
 defendant. 
 
 43 Rook V. N. J., etc., Co., 76 Hun (N. Y.) 54; 148 N. Y. 758; 43 
 N. E. Rep. 989; Murray v. Dwight, 161 N. Y. 301; 55 N. E. Rep. 901. 
 
 278 
 
EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYEE GENEBALLY, § 227 
 
 an employee, the injury must not only arise out of, but it 
 must also occur " in the course of " the employment.** If 
 the efliployee, instead of attending to the business of the em- 
 ployer, at the time of the injury, was engaged upon some 
 business of his own, or if the work done by him was outside 
 the scope of his employment, and as a result of the perform- 
 ance of such outside duties, he was injured, then the em- 
 ployer is not responsible, for in the performance of such du- 
 ties, the relation of employer and employee did not exist, 
 since he Was not employed to perform any such service.*® 
 And not only is an employee himself precluded from recover- 
 ing for an injury, where he had voluntarily abandoned the 
 service of his employer and engaged himself upon some in- 
 dependent business, but his employer is not responsible for 
 any injury that he Aay occasion other employees, while so 
 engaged upon such outside business, for to render the em- 
 ployer liable for injuries caused by his employees, the act 
 that caused the injury must have been done in the scope of 
 the employee's duties for the employer.*^ Injuries received 
 before the day's work for the employer is commenced,*'^ or 
 after it is over,** are not held to be received in the course 
 of the employment ; nor would an injury during a temporary 
 cessation of the work, where the employee had turned aside 
 from the business of the employer,*® but if, during a tem- 
 
 " Smith V. Lancashire, etc., R. Co., 1 Q. B. Ul; 79 L. T. (N. S.) 
 633; 68 L. J, Q. B. 51; 47 Wkly. Eep. 146; Hartford v. Northern Bac. 
 E. Co., 91 Wis. 374; 64 N. W. Eep. 1033; Southern R. Co. v. Guyton, 
 122 Ala. 231; 25 So. Eep. 34. 
 
 iBReeid V. Missouri Pac. E. Co., 94 Mo. App. 371; 68 S. W. Rep. 
 364; Nashville, etc., E. Co. v. McDaniel, 12 Lea. (Tenn.) 386. 
 
 "Hartford v. Northern Pac. E. Co.; 91 Wis. 374; 64 N. W. Eep. 1033. 
 
 *7 Davis V. Atlanta, etc., E. Co., 63 S. C. 370, 577; 41 S. E. Rep. 
 468, 892. 
 
 *8 International, etc., E. Co. v. Ryan, 82 Texas 565; 18 S. W. Rep. 
 219. 
 
 "Ellsworth V. Metheny, 104 Fed. Rep. 119; 44 C. C. A. 484; 51 
 
 279. 
 
§ 228 EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYEE GENEEALLY. 
 
 porary absence from his place of work, an employee is in a 
 place provided by the employer for the purpose, or under 
 the direction or control of his agents,®" or even before com- 
 mencing or after finishing his day's vs^ork, if he is going to, 
 or returning from his place of vyofrk, on appliances provided 
 by the employer, the relation is so far held to continue to 
 exist, as to render the employer liable for any injury re- 
 ceived in such cases, on account of his ovpn negligence, the 
 same as though the injury had been received in the regular 
 course of the employer's business.®^ 
 
 § 228. When one deemed employee of two or more com- 
 panies. — It not infrequently happens, under the multiform 
 transactions of commerce, that tv/o or more railroad compa- 
 nies, at the same time, may occupy sudh a relation toward a 
 given individual, as to enable him, in case of an injury, to 
 hold them jointly or severally, at his election, liable for such 
 injuisy. 
 
 This effect would logically follow the engagement of two 
 or more companies to perform a given duty toward one, as 
 an employee, for in case of a breach of such duty, they would 
 be jointly and severally liable for a failure to perform it, or 
 for a negligent performance of such duty.°^ This principle, 
 
 L. E. A. 389; Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Hooker, 111 Ky. 707; 64 
 S. W. Eep. 638. 
 
 50 Heldmaier v. Cobbs, 195 111. 172; 62 N. B. Eep. 853. 
 
 Bi Jensen v. Omaha, etc., E. Co., 115 Iowa 404; 88 N. W. Rep. 952; 
 Bowles V. Indiana R. Co., 27 Ind. App. 672; 62 N. E. Rep. 94. 
 
 52 Machine Co. v. Keifer, 134 111. 481; Story, Part. (7 ed.), §§ 166, 
 167; Champion v. Bostick, 18 Wend. 174; Wood v. Luscomb, 23 Wis. 
 287; Wood, Mas. & Serv. (2 ed.), § 357, p. 735; Vary v. Burlington, 
 etc., R. Co., 42 Iowa 246; Wisconsin Cent. R. Co. v. Ross, 142 111. 9; 
 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas., p. 73. 
 
 A railroad company operating a road jointly with another corpo- 
 ration is responsible for an injury to its employees, the same as a 
 natural person would be for liabilities of a firm, of which he is a 
 
 280 
 
EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYEE GENEKALLY. § 229 
 
 upon grounds of public policy, is applied to the engagement 
 of two or more railroad companies, the same as it is against 
 two or more individuals, and however numerous the associa- 
 tion of companies may be, if there is a joint assumption of a 
 duty toward one, as an employee, he has his election, in case 
 of an injury, whether he will proceed against them all, or 
 sue them separately for the breach of this joint obligation.®* 
 If a train is controlled by the agents of two companies 
 jointly, at the time, of an injury to an employee, regardless 
 whose track is being used, both companies will be liable for 
 the injury ; but if the agents of one company alone cause the 
 injury, by their negligence, then the employer of those agents 
 will alone be responsible, whether it was caused by the agents 
 of the owner of the train, or those of the owner of the track.®* 
 
 § 229. Different companies using same track or trains. — 
 
 Where different companies use the same track, depots, or 
 yards, each company will be held liable for a failure to use 
 ordinary care for the protection, not only of its own employees 
 but also of those of the other company, rightfully on the 
 premises, in the discharge of their various duties. The 
 measure of care due from the different companies toward 
 the employees of the other company is not essentially differ- 
 ent from that due to its own employees, and for a breach of 
 this duty, and a resulting injury, a liability will result.®® 
 
 member. Harrill v. South Carolina & G. R. Co., 135 N. C. 601; 47 
 S. E. Eep. 730. 
 
 53 This is practically the language of the court, in Railway Co. v. 
 Shacklet, 105 111. 364; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 166; Vary v. Burlington, 
 etc., R. Co., supra. 
 
 5*Stetler v. Railway Co., 46 Wis. 497; Railroad Co. v. Kanouse, 39 
 111. 272; Snow V. Railroad Co., 8 Allen, 441; Wood, Mas. & Serv. (2 
 ed.), § 357, p 735; Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Carroll,. 6 Heisk. (Tenn.) 
 347; Harper v. Newport News, etc., R. Co. (Ky_.), 13 S. W. Rep. 346; 44 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas 653; 4 Thompson, on Neg., § 3723; Wisconsin 
 Central R Co. v. Ross, 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 73. 
 
 BB The use of a railroad track, by two roads, in Pennsylvania, is held 
 
 281 
 
§ 229 EMPLOYEB AND EMPLOYEE GENEBAILY. 
 
 The employing company will be liable for an injury to its 
 own employees from a defect in the track or premises of the 
 other company, the same as it would be, had it owned the 
 premises,^® but the company owning the property is not with- 
 out obligation toward the employees of the other company 
 and if an injury results from a defective condition of its 
 premises it may also be held responsible therefor.^'' A 
 member of a train crew on a through run over connecting 
 lines of different companies can hold the company liable, on 
 whose road he is injured, if the injury results by reason of 
 a defective condition of the track or roadbed ; ®® but where 
 the train or engine is that of one company and a rental is paid 
 for the use of it by the connecting carrier, for an injury Ho 
 its own employee, by reason of a defect in the engine, the 
 owner thereof will alone be held liable.®® 
 
 A company, using the track of another company, as licen- 
 see, would not be liable to one of its own employees, for an 
 injury caused by the negligence of the licensor company,*" 
 
 to be the track of the company using it, at time of an injury, re- 
 gardless of the terms of the contract under which it is being used. 
 Keck V. Philadelphia, etc., E. Co., 206 Pa. 501 ; 56 Atl. Kep. 47. And 
 see, O'Sullivan v; Chicago, etc., R. Co., 23 111. App. 646; McMarshall 
 V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 80 Iowa 757 ; 45 N. W. Eep. 1065 ; Omaha, etc., 
 E. Co. V. Morgan, 40 Neb. 604; 59 N. W. Eep. 81; Wisconsin Cent. R. 
 Co. V. Boss, 142 111. 9; 31 N. E. Eep. 412; 53 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 73. 
 
 Company permitting use of its road and franchises by another com- 
 pany is liable for negligence of the other company, as it will be 
 viewed as the agent of the owner. West Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Anderson, 200 111. 329; 65 N. E. Rep. 717. 
 
 56 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Frelka, 110 111. 498; Brady v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. Co., 114 Fed. Rep. 100; 52 C, C. A. 48; 57 L. R. A. 712; 
 4 Thompson on Neg., § 3730. 
 
 BT Nugent V. Boston, etc., R. Co., 80 Me. 62; 12 Atl. Rep. 797. 
 
 58 Goodrich v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 152 Mo. 222; 53 S. W. Rep. 
 917. 
 
 BoHurlburt v. Wabash R. Co., 130 Mo. 657; 31 S. W. Rep. 1051. ' 
 
 CO Brady v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 114 Fed. Rep. 100; 52 C. C. A, 
 48; 57 L. R. A. 712. 
 
 282 
 
EMPLOYEE AND- EMPLOYEE GENERALLY. § 229 
 
 and if the licensor company was sued for an injury to an 
 employee of the licensee company, it could avail itself of the 
 rules or regulations of the employer of the injured employee, 
 if the violation of the rules contributed to bring about the 
 injury, the same as it could set up any other act of contribu- 
 tory negligence, to avoid the action."^ 
 
 61 Texas, etc., E. Co. v. Moore, 8 Tex. Civ, App. 289 ; 27 S. W. Rep. 
 962. 
 
 A fireman of one company, wljile running on "his engine over the 
 track of another company, is not deprived of his right of action 
 against his own employer, because the injury was due to the defective 
 condition of the track of the other company, over which his employer 
 had no right of repair or control. The employer could not dele- 
 gate the duty to furnish its own employees a reasonably safe place to 
 work, and the owner of the track would be held the agent of the 
 owner of the train, for the purpose of making the repairs. 
 ■ Story V. Concord, etc., R. Co., 70 N. H. 364; 48 Atl. Rep. 288. 
 
 The owner of a track was held liable to an employee of another 
 company using it, for an injury due to a negligent condition of the 
 track, in Southern Kansas, etc., R. Co. v. Sage, 80 S. W. Rep. 1038. 
 
 A company merely using the track of another company to run its 
 cars over, will not be liable for an injury from the unsafe condition 
 of the track, to others than its own employees. Collier v. Great 
 Northern Ry. Co., 40 Wash. 639 ; 82 Pac. Rep. 935. 
 
 For joint liability for an injury to one of the company's em- 
 ployees, from a collision, caused by a negligent use of the same 
 track by both companies, see Chicago & W. I. R. Co. v. Marshall (Ind.), 
 75 N. E. Rep. 973. 
 
 A company jointly using a railroad yard, with another company, 
 is liable for an injury to one of its brakemen from a negligently located 
 telegraph pole, in close proximity, to a moving train, although it 
 had no interest in the yard or control of the premises. Illinois Ter- 
 minal R. Co. V. Thompson, 210 111. 226; 71 N. E. Rep. 328. 
 
 But the owner of a, . roadbed and track, used by another company, 
 will not be liable for an injury to an employee of the other com- 
 pany, due wholly to the negligence of its own employees. Ederle v. 
 Vieksburgh, etc., Co., 112 La. 728; 36 So. Rep. 664. 
 
 A railroad company owning a track is liable for an injury to a 
 person on the track, although the train which struck him was oper- 
 ated by another company, with its consent. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. 
 Miller (Texas), 79 S. W. Rep. 1109; 83 S. W. Rep. 182; Ray v. 
 Pecos & N. T. R. Co., 80 S. W. Rep. 112; Aycock v. Ry. Co., 89 N. C. 
 
 283 
 
§ 230 EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYEE GENERALLY, 
 
 § 230. Joint or several liability of companies jointly operat- 
 ing road. — There is a marked distinction between the lia- 
 bility of a railroad company, for the acts of an independent 
 contractor, engaged in the construction of the railroad, prior 
 to its completion and the liability of such company for the 
 acts of another company, subsequent to the completion of the 
 road, that is jointly engaged in operating trains over its 
 tracks. In the one case, the construction company is not 
 assuming the exercise of the fr^anchises delegated by the leg- 
 islature to the railroad company, while in the other the rail- 
 road company jointly using the tracks of the other company, 
 is presumed to be doing so under the franchise of the com- 
 pany owning the road. Where the cars, machinery or ap- 
 pliances/^ or the track,*® or yards ** of one company is 
 jointly used by two or more companies, each will he liable 
 for an injury to an employee of any one of such companies, 
 
 321. But see, Clymer v. R. R., 5 Blatchf. 317; Harper v. E. R., 90 
 Ky. 359; 14 S. W. Rep. 346. 
 
 Where cars of connecting roads are transferred from one road to 
 another, under agreement, an employee of the receiving road, injured by 
 a, defective car, can sue either railroad company. Hoye v. Great 
 Northern Ry. Co., 120 Fed. Rep. 712; Teal v. American Mining Co. 
 (Minn.), 87 N. W. Rep. 837; Moon v. Northern Pae. E. Co., 46 Minn. 
 106; 48 N. W. Rep. 679; 24 Am. St. Eep. 194. 
 
 62 Central R. Co. v. Passmore, 90 Ga. 203; 15 S. E. Eep. 760; 
 Lockhart v. Little Rock, etc., R. Co., 40 Fed. Eep. 631; Cincinnati, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Long, 112 Ind. 166; 13 N. E. Rep. 659; 31 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 138 ; Kain v. Smith, 80 N. Y. 458 ; 2 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 545. 
 
 83 Wisconsin, etc., R. Co. v. Ross, 142 111. 9; 31 N. E. Eep. 412; 53 
 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 73; Gulf, etc., E. Co. v. Dorsey, 66 Texas, 148; 
 25 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 446; McMarshall v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 80 
 Iowa 757; 45 N. W. Rep. 1065; Ilinois, etc., R. Co. v. Frelka, 110 111. 
 498; 18 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 7; Roll v. Northern C. R. Co., 15 Hun 
 (N. Y.) 496. 
 
 6* Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Jones, 75 Texas 151; 12 S. W. Rep. 
 972; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 363; McMarshall v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 
 80 Jowa 757; 45 N. W. Rep. 1065; Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Shelton 
 (Teixas), 72 S. W. Eep. 165. 
 
 284: 
 
SmI'LoYee And emploYeSI geneeally, § 231 
 
 sustaining injury because of the negligence of any one of such 
 companies. But where two or more companies jointly use 
 the same track, while the owner of the track would be liable 
 to the employees of the other company, for any injury caused 
 by the negligent condition of its own track,®® it would, not be 
 liable to one of its own employees due to the negligence of 
 an employee of the other company, but the company whose 
 employee caused the injury would alone be liable for the re- 
 sult of such wrongful act.*® 
 
 § 231. Liability of connecting and joining roads. — It is 
 held, in Massachusetts, where two railroad companies are 
 created by concurrent legislation of two or more States and 
 they have a joint interest in the operation and management 
 of the road throiigh such States, that they are jointly liable 
 for a tort committed in either State through which the road 
 extends.®'' But if the roads are not created by the same or 
 joint legislative acts, and are not jointly interested in the 
 business of the other, it is doubtful if this result would fol- 
 low. The rule, where cars of one road are handled on a con- 
 necting road, is that the company owning the car is liable, if 
 its duty is so stipulated, for an injury from the delivery of 
 a defective car, to the connecting carrier ; ®* but not if the car 
 has passed an inspection of the connecting road, generally,®® 
 and not for injuries to employees of the consignee of the con- 
 necting road.'"' 
 
 85 Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Dorsey, 66 Texas, 148 ; 25 Am. & Eng. E. 
 Cas. 446. 
 
 «o Georgia, etc., E. Co. v. Friddell, 70 Ga. 489; 7 S. E. Eep. 214; Cin- 
 cinnati, etc., E. Co. V. Long, 112 Ind. 166; 13 N. E. Eep. 659; 31 Am. 
 & Eng. E. Cas. 138. 
 
 «7 Smith V. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 96 Fed. Eep. 504. 
 
 «8 Moon V. Northern Pac. E. Go., 46 Minn. 106 ; 48 N. W. Eep. 679. 
 
 6» Glynn v. Central R. Co. (Mass.), 56 N. E. Eep. 698. 
 
 ToSykes v. St. Louis & San Francisco R. R. Co., 178 Mo. 693. 
 
 285 
 
§§232, 2S3 EMPLOYEE -AND EMPLOYEE GENEEALL'T. 
 
 § 232. liability under joint-traffic arrangement.— ■ Where 
 
 the use of one road by the trains and crews of two companies 
 is regulated under a joint-traffic arrangement, as is fre- 
 quently done, the liability for injuries from negligence of 
 the agents of either company, attaches to both alike. In a 
 recent Kentucky case,'^^ two companies had agreed to jointly 
 maintain the roadbed owned by one of them and the en- 
 gines and cars of the other company, though used and man- 
 aged by its employees, were to be subject to the direction of 
 the officers of the owner of the roadbed and track and the 
 tickets sold by the agents of that company were to be hon- 
 ored by the employees of the other company on its trains, 
 and it received one-fourth the proceeds of tickets. The 
 company operating the trains also agreed to pay its part of 
 the cost of maintenance and a track" rental and proportionate 
 part of the taxes. The court held that the contract was a 
 joint traffic arrangement between the two roads and the 
 trains were to be considered as though operated by both 
 companies and both were liable for injuries from negligence 
 in the operation of such trains. 
 
 § 233. Agent causing injury and company both liable. — 
 
 Under the rule of joint and several liability of tort feasors, 
 not only different companies operating a railroad together 
 will be jointly and severally liable to an injured employee 
 for the result of the negligence of the employees of any one 
 
 71 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Breeden's Admr., 23 Ky. L. R. 1021, 
 1763; 64 S. W. Rep. 667. 
 
 In Illinois, no matter under what arrangement the use is had, the 
 owner of a railroad is liable for damages for negligence of another 
 road using its track. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Schmitz, 211 111. 406; 71 
 N. E. Rep. 1050. 
 
 If an employer deals with and adopts an instrumentality as his 
 own, the fact that he did not own it is immaterial, in case of an in- 
 jury to one of his employees. Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. McClifford, 
 120 Ga. 90; 47 S. E. Rep. 590. 
 286 
 
EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYEE GENEBALLT. § 234 
 
 of them,''^ but the employee whose negligence occasioned 
 the injury may also be sued jointly with the principal or 
 employer,''^ or he may be sued alone.''* It has accordingly 
 been held that an engineer who negligently caused an injury 
 icy another employee, would be jointly liable for such injury, 
 together with the railroad company, '^^ or he could be sued 
 alone for the damages resulting to the injured party from 
 his negligence, and it would be no defense that he did not 
 own the engine, or was not running it on his own account.''® 
 But in case of a suit against, a company and an employee 
 who caused the injury, it is always essential to establish' 
 that the employee sued did, in fact, commit some overt act 
 which would connect him individually with the injury, or 
 it will be error to hold him personally liable with the em- 
 ploying company therefor. Accordingly, in a Missouri 
 case, where the engineer who managed tlie engine which in- 
 jured the plaintiff and the conductor who operated the 
 train, were both joined in a suit against the company, and 
 there was no evidence that the conductor even knew of the 
 accident to the plaintiff, but the verdict and judgment was 
 rendered against all three, it was held that the judgment 
 would have to be reversed as to the conductor ."^ 
 
 § 234. Employer not liable when negligent employee dis- 
 chai^d. — Where the right of the plaintiff to recover is de- 
 
 '2Harrill v. South Carolina & G. R. Co., 13S N. C. 601; 47 S. E. 
 Eep. 730. 
 
 73 Illinois Central R. Co. v. Houehins, 28 Ky. L. R. 49?; 89 S. W. 
 Rep. 530; 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 375. ■ 
 
 '* Illinois Central R. Co. v. Coley, 28 Ky. L. R. 336 ; 89 S. W. Rep. 
 234; 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 370. 
 
 76 Illinois Central R. Co. v. Houehins, supra. 
 
 76 Illinois Central R. Co. v. Coley, supra. 
 
 77 But under a special statute (R. S. Mo. 1899, § 866), it was af- 
 firmed as to the engineer and company. Stotler v. Chicago & A. R. 
 Co., 98 S. W. Rep. 509. 
 
 287 
 
§ 234 EMPLOYEE AJTD EMPLOYEE GENEEALLY. 
 
 pendent solely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, 
 and the plaintiff has sued both the negligent employee caus- 
 ing the injury and the employer, if there is a finding that 
 the employee, through whose negligence the employer is at- 
 tempted to be held liable, has not himself been negligent, 
 then a judgment against the employer is improper, ''* The 
 jury cannot say, by their verdict, that the employee, whose 
 act alone caused the injury, was not negligent, and at the 
 same time hold his employer negligent, when nothing further 
 was done by it than what it did through its employee. Such 
 a verdict would be both inconsistent and unreasonable. But 
 if the employer, through other agents, has directed or rati- 
 fied a trespass or committed other wrongful act, wherein 
 one of its employees is not alone to blame, the mere dis- 
 charge of such an employee would not alone relieve it from 
 all liability to the injured person, for in such case the rule 
 applying to joint tort feasors would obtain, between whom 
 there is no right to contribution.''® 
 
 78 Stevick V. Northern Pac. R. Oo., 39 Wash. 501; 81 Pac. Rep. 
 1001; Doremus v. Root, 23 Wash. 1. c. 715; 63 Pac. Rep. 574; 54 L. R. 
 A. 649; Oceanic, etc., R. Co. v. Compania Translantique, etc., Co., 134 
 N. Y. 461; 31 N. E. Rep. 987; 30 Am. St. Rep. 685. See, also, able 
 opinion of Graves, J., in McGinnis v. Chicago, R. I., etc., R. Co. (Mo.), 
 98 S. W. Rep. 590. 
 
 ToBerkson v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 144 Mo. 211; 45 S. W. Rep. 
 1119. This case is distinguished, in McGinnis v. Chicago, etc., R. 
 Co. (98 S. W. Rep. 590), supra. 
 
 " There are two parallel cases by the Supreme Court of Washington, 
 wherein, in our judgment, the true rule is announced. In case of 
 Doremus v. Root et al. (23 Wash. 1. c. 715; 63 Pac. Rep. 574; 54 L. R. A. 
 649), the court says: 'Joint tort feasors are liable to the Injured 
 person (other than that he may have but one satisfaction) as if 
 the act of causing the injury was the separate act of each of them, 
 and they have, except In certain special cases, no right of contribu- 
 tion among themselves. But the defendants in this character of 
 action are in n» sense joint tort feasors, nor does their liability to 
 the plaintiff rest upon the same or like grounds. The act of an em- 
 
 288 
 
EMfLOYEB AND EMPLOYEE GENERALLY, § 235 
 
 § 235. Lessor's liability for injuries to employees of lessee. 
 — Except as to defects in the track or roadbed, or other 
 
 ployee even in legal intendment is not the act of his employer, unless 
 the employer either previously directs the- act to be done or subse- 
 quently ratifies it. For the injuries caused by the negligent act of 
 an employee not directed or ratified by the employer, the employee is 
 liable because he committed the act which caused the injury, while 
 the employer is liable, not as if the act was done by himself, but 
 because of the doctrine of respondeat superior, the rule of law which 
 holds the master responsible for the negligent act of his servant, 
 committed while the servant is acting within the general scope of 
 his employment and engaged in his master's business. The primary 
 liability to answer for such an act, therefore, rests upon the em- 
 ployee, and, when the employer is compelled to answer in damages 
 therefor, he can recover over against the employee.' Oceanic Steamer 
 Nav. Co. V. Compania Translantic Espanola, 134 N. Y. 461; 31 N. 
 E. 987; 30 Am. St. Eep. 685; note to Village of Carterville v. Cook, 
 16 Am. St. Eep. 248; 1 Shearman & Eedfield, Negligence (5 ed.), 
 par. 242; 2 Van Fleet, Former Adjudication, p. 1162. Again, on page 
 716 of 23 Wash.; 63 Pac. Eep, (54 L. R. A. 649) FuUerton, J., in 
 that case, further says : ' So, also, in such an action, whether 
 brought against the employer severally or jointly with the employee, 
 the gravamen of the charge is, and niust be, the negligence of the em- 
 ployee, and no recovery can be had unless it be proved, and found 
 by the jury, that the employee was negligent. Stated in another way, 
 if the employee who causes the injury is free from liability therefor, 
 his employer must also be free from liability,' This was held in New 
 Orleans & N. B. E. K. Co. v. Jopes, 142 U. S. 18; 12 Sup. Ct, 109; 35 
 L. Ed. 919, In the Doremus case, supra, the verdict was against 
 defendant railway company, but said nothing as to defendant Eoot, 
 By the judgment, Eoot, a conductor of the railway company, was 
 exonerated of negligence, and the railroad company found liable, and 
 it appealed. The court reversed the judgment and remanded the 
 case, with directions to the lower court to enter judgment for the 
 defendant. In case of Stevick v. Northern Pacific R. Co. et al., 39 
 Wash., I. c. 506, 81 Pac. Eep. 1001, the court through Mount, C. J., 
 says: 'The only negligence alleged or attempted to be proven was 
 that the engine was out of repair and was leaking steam, and that 
 Gregg, the agent of the company, had notice to repair it. The de- 
 fendant Gregg was joined in the action by reason of the fact that 
 he was the master mechanic in charge of the engine, knew its 
 condition, and, it is alleged, neglected to make the necessary repairs. 
 The fact was admitted that the defendant Gregg was the master 
 mechanic in charge of the engine, and that it was his duty to keep it 
 1-19 289 
 
§ 235 EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYEE GENEBALLY. 
 
 premises leased,^" a railroad company leasing its road and 
 property to another company would not be liable for per- 
 sonal injuries inflicted by the lessee company, in the ab- 
 sence of a statute imposing such liability. This is the gen- 
 eral rule, but it is not followed in all the different States,*^ 
 where the lease is made in pursuance to law. 
 
 in repair. When the jury found that defendant Gregg was not 
 negligent, then it necessarily followed that the railway company was 
 not negligent, because the negligence of the railway company, as 
 stated in the complaint, is based upon the negligence of Gregg. It 
 is true that the complaint states 'that defendants, and both of them, 
 negligently failed to repair said locomotive,' but the complaint, taken 
 as a whole, shows that the negligence of the company is based en- 
 tirely upon the alleged negligence of its servant Gregg in charge 
 of its locomotives. The jury, having found that defendant Gregg was 
 not negligent, and having returned a verdict in his favor, necessarily 
 exonerated the railway company. Doremus v. Root, 23 Wash. 719; 
 63 Pac. 572; 54 L. E. A. 649. In this case the verdict was practically 
 in form of the verdict in case at bar. It found for the defendant 
 Gregg, the employee, and against the railway company. The court re- 
 versed the judgment and ordered the action dismissed.' 
 
 " In the case of Delaplain v. Kansas City et al., 109 Mo. App. 1, c. 
 113; 83 S. W. 72, the Kansas City Court of Appeals has touched upon 
 the question herein involved." 
 
 Above is taken from the opinion of Graves, J., in McGinnis v. 
 Chicago, etc., E. Co., 98 S. W. Rep., p. 593. 
 
 80 In Kentucky, an employee of the lessee, injured as a result of 
 his employer's negligence alone, has no remedy against the lessor. 
 Lewis v. Mayesville, etc., E. Co., 25 Ky. L. E. 948; 76 S. W. Eep. 
 526. i 
 
 The duty due the general public is held to be entirely separate 
 and distinct from the duty owing to an employee of its lessee, by 
 a railroad company, and it is held not liable for an injury to such 
 employee, on account of his employer's negligence, without a spe- 
 cial contract therefor. Williard v. Spartanburg, etc., R. C, 124 
 Fed. Rep. 796; Southern Ry. Co. v. Sittasen (Ind. App.), 74 N. E. 
 Rep. 898; Muntz v. Algiers & G. E. Co., 115 La. 437; 38 So. Rep. 
 410. 
 
 81 If the lease is not made in pursuance to statutory authority, 
 the lessor remains liable always, since it cannot delegate its fran- 
 chises and avoid liability. Washington A. & G. R. Co. v. Brown, 
 84 U. S. 453; 17 Wall. 445; 21 L. Ed. 675; Ingersol v. R. R. Co., 8 
 
 290 
 
EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYEE GENEBALLY. § 235 
 
 Where there is a statute, however, the rule is' otherwise, 
 and the lessor company may he rendered liable for injuries 
 from the negligence of the lessee, if the statute imposes such 
 responsibility. Under the Missouri statute,*^ authorizing 
 foreign railroad companies to lease or purchase lines of rail- 
 road within the State, but making a domestic corporation 
 that leases its line "'liable as if it operated the road itself," 
 it is held that a domestic company, which leases its line of 
 road to a foreign company is responsible for injuries to its 
 employees, incurred in the operation of the road, by the 
 leasing company.®* But the Ohio statute,®* which makes 
 both lessor and lessee liable for any injuries from the negli- 
 gence of the lessee in the operation of the road, is held to 
 apply to injuries to those sustained in the relation of a car- 
 rier and not to employees, and an employee injured by the 
 lessee's negligence must look alone to his employer for re- 
 covery and cannot hold the lessor company responsible for 
 
 Unless the lease is made in accordance with the provisions 
 of a given statute, the lessor remains liable in all cases, for 
 the negligence of the lessee company, for the reason that it 
 could not delegate to another its franchises or responsibili- 
 ties and thus avoid liability for the use thereof by an- 
 other.®" 
 
 Allen, 438; Langley v. R. E. Co., 10 Gray 103; Eedf. on Railways 
 (5 ed.), p. 616. 
 
 82 Rev. St. Missouri, 1899, § 1060. 
 
 88 Keller v. Kansas City, St. L., etc., R. Co., 135 Fed. Rep. 202. 
 
 8* Rev. St. Ohio, 1892, § 3305. 
 
 SBAxline v. Toledo, W. & V. 0. R. Co., 138 Fed. Rep. 169; Beltz v. 
 Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 137 Fed. Rep. 1016. 
 
 80 Thomas v. W. J. Ry. Co., 101 U. S. 71; U Otto 71; 25 L. Ed. 
 950; Railroad v. Winans, 17 How. 30; 58 U. S. 27; Blaelc v B. & R. 
 Canal Co., 22 N. J. Eq. 130; Speed v. Atl. & Pao. r; R. Co., 71 Mo. 
 303; 2 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 77; Freeman v. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 28 
 Minn. 443; 7 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 410. 
 
 291 
 
§ 236 EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYEE GENEBALLY. 
 
 § 236. Mortgagor not liable for negligence of mortgagee.— 
 It is very generally held that a railroad company is not 
 liable, either at common law, or under statutes imposing 
 a liability for injuries resulting in death, for the negligence 
 of mortgagees of the railroad company, while they are op- 
 erating the road, under a possession taken and held adversely 
 to the mortgagor railroad company.*'' The reason for hold- 
 ing that there is no liability on the part of the mortgagor, 
 lies at the basis of all liability for personal injuries through 
 negligence, which is that the personal negligence of the one 
 alleged to have caused the injury must have been the cause 
 of the injury, before a liability will result. A railroad com- 
 pany, like any other corporation, is only liable for the neg- 
 ligence of its employees or authorized agents, for acts done 
 within the real oy apparent scope of their authority and 
 never <£or the acts of third persons, who could not be said to 
 be its agents. " A mortgagor, out of possession of property, 
 real or personal, ought not to be liable for the acts of the 
 
 Where no statutory authority for a lease is shown, the company 
 owning the tracks, is liable for an injury through the negligence 
 of the lessee's employees, in Texas. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. 
 Owens, 75 S. W. Rep. 579. 
 
 By virtue of Illinois statute (3 Starr, etc., Ann. St. 1896, ch. 
 114, p. 3247), a railroad company leasing its line of road to an- 
 other company, is liable for an injury to an employee of the lessee 
 company by the negligence of the lessee alone. Chicago & G. T. R. 
 Co. V. Hart, 209 111. 414; 70 N. E. Rep. 654; 66 L. R. A. 75; Bals- 
 ley V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 119 111. 68; 8 N. E. Rep. 859; 59 
 Am. Rep. 784; West v. St. Louis, etc., Co., 63 111. 545. 
 
 The Missouri statute (Laws 1870, p. 89), is held to hold the 
 lessor company liable for damages for an injury to an employee 
 of its lessee, in Markey v. Louisiana & M. R. Co., 185 Mo. 348; 
 84 S, W. Rep. 61. 
 
 Lessor company liable for tort of lessee company, in operation of 
 road, in North and South Carolina. Smith v. Atlanta, etc., R. Co., 
 130 N. C. 344; 42 S. E. Rep. 139; Davis v. Atlanta, etc., Co., 63 S. C. 
 370, 577; 41 S. E. Rep. 468, 892. 
 
 87 Pierce, R. R., p. 285; State v. Railway Co., 67 Me. 479. 
 
 292 
 
EMPLOTEB AND EMPLOYEE GENEEALLT. §§237,238 
 
 mortgagee, who is in possession of sueli property and has an 
 independent and adverse control of it.®** The possession 
 and operation of the road, by the mortgagee, is not as the 
 agent of the mortgagor, but in the right of the mortgagee, 
 adversely to the mortgagor." 
 
 § 237. Negligence of trustees for bondholders — Company 
 
 liable.— Notwithstanding a railroad company is not liable 
 for the negligence of its mortgagee, in possession, it is held, 
 in several cases, that where the road is placed in possession 
 of trustees for the bondholders, since they are the agents of 
 the company itself, as well as the bondholders, that it would 
 be liable for their negligence from the operation of the road. 
 In an Illinois case, the court held the company liable, 
 because of the following facts and reasoning : " These trus- 
 tees seem to have been exercising the same functions the cor- 
 poration was formed to exercise. The character of the trust 
 is not spBcifically shown by the proofs, but the fair inference 
 would seem to be, that the trustees were the trustees for the 
 corporation, of its ovsti selection, as well as of the bond- 
 holders, and were running the road to earn money to be 
 applied in the payment of the debts of the corporation." ®^ 
 And this language is quoted with approval in a later case, 
 in the- same State.®" 
 
 § 238.- Road operated by receiver.— Analogous to the posi- 
 tion of a mortgagee of a railroad, in possession, is that of a 
 
 8S Wisconsin Central E. Co, v. Ross (111.), 53 Am. & Eng. B. Cas. 
 73. 
 
 After u, sale under a mortgage, a mortgagor railroad company 
 cannot be held liable for an injury to an employee of a lessee of 
 the purchaser. Williard v. Spartanburg, etc., R. Co., 124 Fed. Rep. 
 > 796. 
 
 8» Transportation Co. v. Ullman, 89 111. 244. 
 
 8» Wisconsin Central R, Co", v. Ross, 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 73. 
 
 293 
 
§ 239 EMPLOYEB AND EMPLOYEE GENEBALLT. 
 
 receiver for the creditors, appointed by the court to operate 
 the road for the benefit of its creditors. He is so far re- 
 garded as in possession and control of the operation of the 
 road as to render him liable, in case of an injury due to 
 the negligence of his employees, to one in his employment.'^ 
 He cannot defend upon the ground that he was but an agent 
 or trustee of the company, or that he was a public officer 
 of the court, or of the State, engaged in the prosecution of 
 his duties, for this would render him immune from the re- 
 sult of his own negligence. It is therefore very generally 
 held that for injuries due to his own or his employees' n^li- 
 gence, a receiver, by consent of the court making his ap- 
 pointment, may be sued, the same as the company owning 
 the road could have been sued, had it been operating it at 
 the time of the injury.®^ 
 
 But under the Georgia statute, making a railroad company 
 liable for an injury resulting from the negligence of the in- 
 jured employee's coemployee, it is held that this would 
 not render a receiver liable for an injury to one of his em- 
 ployees, caused by the negligence of a coemployee.®^ 
 
 § 239. Liability of reorganized company. — It frequently 
 happens, in the reorganization of railroad companies, that 
 
 01 Murphy v. Holbrook, 20 Ohio St. 137; 4 Thompson, on Neg., § 
 3726. 
 
 Company is not liable for an injury due to the negligence of re- 
 ceivers, while they were in possession. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. 
 Bricker (Kan.), 69 Pac. Rep. 328; McGhee v. Willis (Ala.), 32 So. 
 Rep. 301. 
 
 92 4 Thompson on Negligence, § 3726. 
 
 83 Central Trust Co. v. East Tenn., etc., R. Co., 69 Fed. Rep. 
 353. 
 
 A legal discharge of receivers of a railroad company, by order 
 of the court, releases them from a claim for injuries to a fireman, 
 while the road was being operated by them. Tobin v. Cent. Vt. Ry. 
 Co., 185 Mass. 337; 70 N. E. Rep. 431; McGhee v. Willis, 134 Ala. 
 281; 32 So. Rep. 301; Missouri K. & T. R. Co. v. Wylie (Texas), 
 33 S. W. Rep. 771. 
 
 294 
 
EMPLOTEE AND EMPLOYEE GENEEAiLY. § 240 
 
 provision is either made by express contract, or by statutory 
 enactment, for the responsibility, on the part of the reor- 
 ganized company, for the torts of the old company, and 
 where this is true, the latter company can be sued, instead 
 of the former, for a personal injury due to the negligence 
 of the old company. 
 
 In a New York case, during the pendency of a damage 
 suit for personal injuries, caused by the negligence of the 
 agents of the receivers of the road, the company was reor- 
 ganized and the receivers discharged, on the agreement of 
 the reorganized company to protect them from any judgment 
 obtained in the pending suit. This agreement was held 
 sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to a personal judgment 
 against the reorganized company and it was held liable, re- 
 gardless of the fact that the reorganization committee would 
 not have been liable to the plaintiff, nor could it plead limi- 
 tation to avoid the claim, after the plaintiff's judgment had 
 been reversed on appeal.®* 
 
 § 240. liability of consolidated company. — Analogous to 
 the position of a reorganized company, where, by statute or 
 contract the liability for torts of the old companies is as- 
 sumed by the new company, is that of a consolidated com- 
 pany, and it is held, under the South Carolina statute,®^ 
 that such a company is liable for a tort committed by one 
 of the constituent companies before the consolidation, the 
 same as if the liability, instead of being placed upon the 
 consolidated company by the law, had been assumed by an 
 express contract.®* 
 
 s* Baer v. Erie R. E. Co., 95 N. Y. S. 486. 
 
 05 Act Feb. 19, 23 St. at Large, p. 1152. 
 
 »6 Pickett V. Southern Ey. Co., 69 S. G. 445; 48 S. E. Rep. 466. 
 
 A consolidated company is liable for tort of old companies, by 
 statute in South Carolina (R. S. 1615-18). Stewart v. Walterboro & 
 W, R. Co., 64 S. C. 92; 41 S. E. Rep. 827. 
 
 295 
 
§ 241 EMPLOYEE AND EMPliOYEE GENEEALLT. 
 
 § 241. Purchasing company not generally liable. — In the 
 
 absence of statute, or an express contract, imposing such a 
 liability, a railroad company purchasing the track and prop- 
 erty of another company would not be liable for damages 
 resulting from the torts of the selling company, any more 
 than an individual would be responsible, in purchasing the 
 property or business of another individual, for the preceding 
 vyrongful acts of his seller. 
 
 It was accordingly held, in Missouri, that where a rail- 
 road company 4)urcbased the property of another company, 
 which had caused an injury to the plaintiff, if the purchas- 
 ing company, in the contract of purchase, did not assume 
 liability for the torts of the selling company, it would not 
 be liable therefor.^'' And if a company purchases the rail- 
 road-track and property of another company, at receiver's 
 sale, unless there is an express provisioij. of the contract, or 
 some statute law making it liable, it would not be held to 
 assume responsibility for the torts of the preceding com- 
 pany, in the operation of the road.®* 
 
 Where the defendant railroad company purchased the property of 
 the company which caused the injury to the plaintiff and did not 
 assume liability for torts committed by the selling company, it is 
 not liable therefor. Karn v. Illinois Southern Ey. Co., 114 Mo. App. 
 162; 89 S. W. Eep. 346. 
 
 In Georgia, without exemption of its duty to public, a rail- 
 road remains liable therefor, even after a sale or lease. Hawkins 
 V. Central of Georgia Ey. Co., 119 6a. 159; 46 S. E. Eep. 82. 
 
 87 Where a purchasing company assumes the liabilities of the 
 selling company, it is not liable for an injury to an employee, be- 
 fore the sale. Hawkins v. Central of Georgia E. Co., 119 Ga, 159; 
 46 S. E. Eep. 82. 
 
 88 A company that purchases at receiver's sale is not liable for 
 an injuiy to an employee of the receiver, in Massachusetts. Tobin 
 V. Central Vt. Ey. Co., 185 Mass. 337; 70 N. E. Eep. 431. 
 
 In Louisiana, the seller of a railroad track will not be liable for 
 an injury due to the negligence of the purchaser's employees, in 
 charge of an engine, although the sale was not registered, as re- 
 quired by law. Goodwin v. Bodcaw, etc., Co., 109 La. 1050; 34 &<), 
 Eop. 74. 
 
EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYEE GENERALLY. § 242 
 
 j 
 
 § 242. Holding companies liable for negligence of companies 
 held. — It is not an infrequent occurrence, at the present day, 
 in the United States, for one railroad company to hold the 
 stock of several other companies, which are managed and 
 operated as separate and independent companies, by separate 
 and distinct managements. The Federal Court of Appeals, 
 of New York, recently had the question before it of the lia- 
 bility of such a company for the negligence of some of its 
 companies, whose stock it held, where they were managed 
 and operated as separate and distinct companies. It was 
 held that where one railroad company controls others, through 
 the ownership of their stocks and operates the lines of all, 
 as a single system, although the general management of each 
 road is retained by the company owning it, the relation be- 
 tween the dominant company and its subordinates, with re- 
 ference to business originating upon its own line, is that of 
 principal and agent and the holding company would be 
 directly liable to one injured while unloading one of its own 
 cars on the track of one of its subordinate companies, though 
 the injury result solely through the negligence of the em- 
 ployees of such company.®® 
 
 »» Lehigh Valley K. Co. v. Delachesa, 145 "Fed. Kep. 617. 
 
 297 
 
CHAPTER XI. 
 
 THE VAKIOUS DUTIES OF THE EMPLOYEK. 
 
 § 243. Created by the law as incidents to relation. 
 
 244. Liability based upon breach of duty. 
 , 245. General duties of the employer. 
 
 246. None of these duties can be delegated. 
 
 247. Same — Protection of employees and charter powers. 
 
 248. Employer held to no greater degree of care than employee. 
 
 249. Reasonable and ordinary care alone required. 
 
 250. Jury cannot set up higher standard than that of ordinary 
 
 use. 
 
 251. Employer not an insurer of his employees. 
 
 252. Reasonably safe machinery and appliances should be fur- 
 
 nished. 
 
 253. Newest and safest appliances not essential. 
 
 254. Same — Engines and cars. 
 
 255. Same — ScaflFolds, lights and ladders. 
 
 256. Injuries from hidden defects in appliances. 
 
 257. Must provide reasonably safe place. 
 
 258. Same — Railroad tracks, bridges and similar structures-. 
 
 259. Injuries from defective bridges. 
 
 260. Obstructions on or near track. 
 
 261. Fit and competent employees must be employed. 
 
 262. Duty to employ a suflSeient number of employees. 
 
 263. Duty to promulgate rules. 
 
 264. What railway duties require rules and what do not. 
 
 265. Effect of violation of rule by employee. 
 
 266. Duty of inspection. 
 
 267. Same — Hidden defects — Ordinary tools. 
 
 268. Inspection of foreign cars. 
 
 269. Warning to inexperienced employees. 
 
 270. Warnings of cars and tracks to be given, when. 
 
 271. Obligation to repair appliances. 
 
 272. Duty to provide a reasonably safe system. 
 
 273. Necessity for some system to prevent collisions. 
 
 274. Duty to protect employee from weather. 
 
 275. Duty as to employment of infants, 
 
 298 
 
DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE. § 243 
 
 § 243. Created by law as incidents to relation. — Since the 
 relation of employer and employee is usually created by gen- 
 eral contract, under which the one engages the other to labor 
 for him, or in his interest, and the details or terms of such 
 contracts are not customarily reduced to specific shape, but 
 the details are left to the future engagements or service to 
 determine, the general duties of the different parties to such 
 an engagement, because of a failure on the part of the par- 
 ties to express the same, are implied by the law, as general 
 incidents growing out of the relation.^ 
 
 The basis of such duties rests, also, upon the concern the 
 law has for the lives and limbs of its citizens and hence, 
 rests in a large measure upon an enlightened public policy, 
 as well as the necessity of the undertaking, for even in those 
 cases where the parties have attempted to regulate the recip- 
 rocal rights and duties of the respective parties to such an 
 agreement, if the terms of such specific undertakings are 
 opposed to the general interests of the State, as where the 
 protection of a statute, enacted for the benefit of the employee 
 is expressly waived, the courts will hold such contracts void 
 and still enforce the duty implied by the law, upon the part 
 of the employer for the protection of his employee, the same 
 as though no such contract had been made.^ 
 
 1 Bailey, Mas. Liab. Inj. Serv., p. 2; Naylor v. Ry. Co., 53 Wis., 661; 
 11 N. W. Eep. 24; Holden v. Fitchburg E. E. Co., 129 Mass. 268; 
 Cincinnati, etc., E. Co. v. Eoesch, 126 Ind. 445; 26 N. E. Eep. 171; 
 Ferren v. Ey. Co., 143 Mass. 197; 9 N. E. Eep. 608. 
 
 2 Contracts releasing a railroad company from all liability for in- 
 juries from its negligence are not generally enforced. Tarball v. 
 Rutland, etc., K. Co., 73 Vt. 347; 51 Atl. Eep. 6; but see, Peterson 
 V. Traction Co., contra, 23 Wash. 615; 63 Pac. Rep. 539; 4 Thomp- 
 son, Neg., § 3850 and cases cited. Nor are contracts imposing cer- 
 tain risks of the service upon the employee. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. 
 V. Ryan, 70 111. App. 45, such as an assumption of risks of injuries 
 from structures near the track, or waiver of notice as to unsafe 
 track and such things, Gulf, etc., E. Co. V. Darby, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 
 413; 67 S, W. Eep. 446, as such contracts are held to be against 
 
 399 
 
§ 244 DtTTIES OF EMPLOYER. 
 
 § 244. Liability based upon breach of duty. — In every ac- 
 tion for personal injuries, where a recovery is sought, in 
 damages, against the one who is alleged to have caused such 
 injury, a breach of legal duty must always be shown by the 
 injured party, on the part of the one claimed to have caused 
 such injury. A liability cannot be predicated without a vio- 
 
 public policy, in permitting the railroad company to delegate its 
 duty to furnish a reasonably safe place, etc., 4 Thompson on Neg., 
 §§ 3848, 4634 and cases cited. 
 
 A contract releasing a railroad company from all damages from 
 accidents, in consideration of its subscription to the benefits of 
 a relief association, for its employees, is enforced. Ferguson v. 
 Grand Trunk E. Co., Rap. Jud Que., 20 C. S. 54; Harrison v. Ala- 
 bama Mid. R. Co., 144 Ala. 246; 40 So. Rep. 394; Pennsylvania E. 
 Co. V. Chapman, 220 111. 428; 77 N. E. Rep. 248; Oyster v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. Co. (Neb.), 91 N. W. Rep. 699; 59 L. E. A. 291. 
 
 An employee injured on a Pullman car is held bound by the 
 rule of the company brought to his notice, when he engaged in the 
 service, that he assumed the risks of injury incident to travel in 
 its cars, and the fact that he did not read the rule, is immaterial, in 
 the Federal Court. New York, etc., Co. v. DiffendaSer, 125 Fed. Rep. 
 893. See, also, Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Hamler, 215 111. 525; 
 74 N. E. Rep. 705. 
 
 A contract releasing an employer from liability for injuries from 
 his own negligence, is generally held to be void, as against sound 
 public policy. Wagner v. Elevated R. Co., 188 Mass. 437; 74 N. E. 
 Rep. 919; Tarbell v. Rutland R. Co., 73 Vt. 347; 51 Atl. Rep. 6; 
 Coley V. North Car. R. Co., 129 N. Car. 407; 40 S. E. Rep. 195; 
 Mexican Nat. R. Co. v. Jackson, 118 Fed. Rep. 549; 55 C. C. A. 315. 
 
 A contract that a failure to give notice to the company within 
 thirty days after an injury, will relieve the railroad from liability to 
 brakemen and other employees for injuries received is in conflict 
 with Iowa Code. Mumford v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 128 Iowa 685; 
 104 N. W. Rep. 1135. 
 
 Under Gen. St. 1901, § 5858, a contract entered into by a rail- 
 road employee, exempting the company from all liability for dam- 
 ages by the negligence of the company, is against public policy and 
 void. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Fronk (Kan. 1906), 87 Pac. 
 Rep. 698. 
 
 A contract exempting a railroad company in advance from liability 
 to an employee for negligence is void. Cannaday v. Atlantic Coast 
 Line R. Co. (N. C. 1906), 55 S. E. Rep. 836, 
 
 300 
 
DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE, § 24& 
 
 lation'of the right of the injured party, whether the right 
 arises out of a contractual relation or belongs to the indi- 
 vidual as a member of society, in the absence of a contract, 
 and hence it is, that the basis of a liability for personal 
 injuries is always the violation of a right of the injured 
 party. This infraction of the rights of the injured person, 
 by the act causing the injury, is generally termed a breach 
 of duty, by the one whose act causes such injury, which 
 breach of duty, neglect or negligence is always the primary 
 fact upon which the right of a recovery depends.* 
 
 § 245. General duties of the employer. — The obligations 
 imposed by law upon the employer are usually said to be 
 the exercise of ordinary or reasonable care in furnishing a 
 reasonably safe place to work ; * the employment of compe- 
 tent and a sufficient number of employees ; ® reasonably safe 
 machinery and appliances ; ® the promulgation of reasonable 
 rules and regulations ; '' warnings or instruction to inexperi- 
 
 3 Kennedy v. Chase, 119 Cal. 637; Buswell Per. Inj., § 3, p. 2; 
 Armour v. Golkewska, 95 111. App. 494. 
 
 *Palilan v. Detroit, etc., E. Co., 122 Mich. 232; 81 N. W. Eep. 
 103; Nadau v. White River, etc., Co., 76 Wis. 120; 43 N. W. Eep. 
 1135; Middle Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. Bamett, 104 Ga. 582; 30 S. E. 
 Eep. 771; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 532. 
 
 B Craig V. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 54 Mo. App. 523, -where in- 
 sufficient number of employees were furnished. Incompetent or un- 
 skilled employees was the ground of complaint in the following eases: 
 St. Louis, etc., E. Co. v. Hackett, 58 Ark. 581; 24 S. W. Eep. 881; 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Madden, 134 Ind. 462; 34 N. B. Eep. 227; 
 Union Pa<;. E. Co. v. Young, 19 Kan. 488; Sweat v. Boston, etc., 
 R. Co., 156 Mass. 284; 31 N. E. Rep. 296; Coppins v. N. Y., etc., E. 
 Co., 122 N. Y. 557; 44 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 618; 25 N. E. Eep. 915; 
 Norfolk, etc., E. Co. v. Thomas, 90 Va. 205; 17 S. E. Eep. 884. 
 
 8 This duty includes the duty of inspection and repair. Hill v. 
 Southern Pac. E. Co., 23 Utah 94; 63 Pac. Eep. 814; Atchison etc., 
 E. Co. V. King§.cott, 65 Kan. 131; 69 Pac. Eep. 184; 4 Thompson, on 
 Neg., § 3986, et sub. 
 
 'Regan v. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 93 Mo. 348; 6 S. W. Eep. 371; > 
 
 301 
 
§ 246 DUTIES OP EMPLOYEE, 
 
 enced or youthful employees ^ and, -where the business is suf- 
 ficiently extensive to require it, the establishment and main- 
 tenance of a system for the conduct of the business, so as to 
 safeguard, in a reasonably safe manner, the services per- 
 formed by the employees.® 
 
 In the absence of a statute imposing other specific duties 
 these general duties are all those imposed by the law upon 
 the employer and although there is perhaps a growing tend- 
 ency of legislatures and the courts in some of the States to 
 create a liability, where none otherwise existed at common 
 law,'" and some of the text writers complain at the common- 
 law limitations upon the liability of the employer, under 
 the growing tendency toward damage suit litigation,' ' it may 
 be safely stated that when the employer has used reasonable 
 care, or such as an ordinarily careful man, engaged in the 
 same business, customarily employs in the performance of 
 the same duties, or if he has complied with all the general 
 duties above enumerated, he has, as stated, in the absence of 
 legislative act, or art extension, by judicial interpretation, 
 of the general duties of the employer, in the jurisdiction 
 where the right is attempted to be enforced, complied, sub- 
 stantially, with the general duties imposed by the common 
 law, upon the employer of men.'^ 
 
 § 246. None of these duties can be delegated. — As the 
 
 various duties imposed by the law upon the employer are im- 
 
 Missouri, Pac. E. Co. v. McElyea, 71 Tex. 386; 9 S. W. Rep. 313; 
 Norfolk, etc., E. Co. v. Graham, 96 Va. 430; 31 S. E. Eep. 604. 
 
 8 Grannis v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 81 Iowa 444 ; 46 N. W. Eep. 1067 ; 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Garrett, 73 Tex. 262; 13 S. W. Eep. 62. 
 
 !> Lockwood V. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 55 Wis. 50. 
 
 10 For comment on this growing tendency, see opinion of Judge 
 Marshall, in Grattis v. Kansas City, etc., E. Co., 155 Mo. 493. 
 
 11 See 4 Thompson on Neg., § 3760, et sub. 
 
 12 This common-law rule is clearly stated by Judge Bailey, in his 
 excellent work on Mas. Liab. Inj. Serv., p. 24. 
 
 302 
 
DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE. § 246 
 
 plied for tlie protection of the employee, upon grounds of 
 public policy, it is very generally held that the performance 
 of these dutie^ cannot be delegated by the employer, since this 
 ■would be tantamount to permitting him to take the law into 
 his own hands,'* 
 
 As distinguished, therefore, from the duties arising as 
 mere incidents of the details of the service, which may prop- 
 erly be performed by a coemployee, as such, the primary, or 
 inalienable duties of the employer, enumerated above, must 
 always be borne in mind.'* Eegardless of the grade of the 
 service, or the character of the employee, any one empowered 
 by the employer with the duty of performing any of these 
 duties imposed by the law upon the employer, in order to 
 protect his employee from injuries, will be held to be a vice- 
 principal, in the performance of such duties and for a failure 
 to perform the duties imposed, the employer will be liable, 
 in case of a resulting injury, to the same extent as if he 
 had personally been guilty of a breach of duty.'^ 
 
 IS The neglect Of a car inspector in failing to discover that a car 
 furnished was defecuve, was held the negligence of the employer, in 
 International & G. N. R. Co. v. Kernan, 78 Tex. 294; 9 L. E. A. 703; 
 Harrison v. Detroit, etc., R. Co., 79 Mich. 409; 7 L. R. A. 623. 
 
 1* Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Scanlan, 170 111. 106; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Eaton, 194 111. 441; 62 N. E. Rep. 784; 4 Thompson on Neg., §§ 
 3874, 39S0, and oases cited; also § 3988, and cases cited. 
 
 15 International & G. N. R. Co. v. Kernan, 78 Texas 294 ; Chicago, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Eaton, 194 111. 441; 62 N. E. Rep. 784; 4 Thompson on 
 Neg., §§ 3874, 3950, 3988, and cases cited. 
 
 An employer cannot, by rules, dispose of a "nondelegable duty, 
 such as providing appliances or safe place to work. Chicago T. Co. 
 V. Sawusch, 119 lU. App. 349; 218 111. 130; 75 N. E. Rep. 797; I 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 670. 
 
 The duty to furnish reasonably safe appliances cannot be dele- 
 gated. English V. Amidon, 72 N. H. 301; 56 Atl. Rep. 548; Neeley 
 V. Southwestern, etc., Co., 13 Okl. 356; 75 Pac. Rep. 537; 64 L. R. 
 A. 145. 
 
 There can be no delegation of the duty to keep appliances in a 
 reasonably safe condition for use. Meehan v. Great North. R. Co. 
 
 303 
 
§ 247 1>UTIES OP EMPLOYEE, 
 
 § 247. Same — Protection of employees and charter pow- 
 ers. — If an employer were permitted to delegate to an em- 
 ployee, or agent, the performance of the duties that the law 
 imposes upon him, for the protection of his employees, he 
 could, by such delegation, avoid the consequences of his own 
 neglect and so the law does not permit a delegation, by the 
 employer, of the duties imposed upon him, for the protection 
 of his employees,^® and the rule that where an employer dele- 
 gates to an agent the performance of duties he owes his em- 
 ployees, he remains liable for the manner in which such 
 duties are performed, is applicable as well to corporations, as 
 to individuals.^ '^ 
 
 After the relation of employer and employee is established 
 by a contractual relation, the employer cannot escape liability 
 for an injury to his employee from negligence which would 
 render him liable, by relegating his employee to the service 
 of another, and especially would this be true, where the em- 
 ployee was continued in his original employment, without 
 notice of any change in the relation between himself and 
 his employer.^* 
 
 But the rule that a railroad company cann.ot delegate to a 
 
 (N, T).), 101 N. W. Rep. 183; Wood v, Eio Grande E. Co. (Utah), 
 79 Pac. Rep. 182. 
 
 The duty of inspection cannot be delegated to a coemployee, so 
 as to relieve the employer of the duty. Union Traction Co. v. Sa- 
 wusch, 218 111. 130; 75 N. E. Rep. 797; 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 670. 
 
 A railroad cannot delegate to its employees the duty of inspecting 
 its appliances, as where it required all engineers to inspect their 
 engines and provided no inspector therefor and an Injury resulted 
 from an accumulation of grease on the engine step. Bookrum v. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co., 57 S. W. Rep. 919. 
 
 The duty of employing an adequate number of employees can- 
 not be delegated. Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Vail (Ala.), 38 So. Rep. 
 124. 
 
 leKillien v. Hyde, 63 Fed. Rep. 172. 
 
 "Corcoran v. Holbrook, 59 N. Y. 517; 17 Am. Rep. 369. 
 
 "Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Feroh (Texas Civ. App.), 
 36 S. W. Rep. 487. 
 
 304 
 
BUTIES OF EMPLOYER. §§ 248, 249^ 
 
 contractor its charter right to construct its road, so as to ex- 
 empt it from liability, does not apply to the ordinary means 
 used for its construction, but to the extraordinary corporate 
 powers which the company itself could not exercise, without 
 a compliance with the conditions of its charter.^® 
 
 § 248. Employer held to no greater degree of care than em- 
 ployee. — In a leading early English case,^" the reasonable rule 
 was announced that an employer would be held to no greater 
 degree of care, for the protection of his employee, than the 
 latter, if a man of ordinary experience, would be held to 
 exert, for his own protection. The doctrine of this well- 
 considered case has become a part of the law of personal 
 injury actions, alleged to be due to negligence and it is 
 now well settled that while an employer owes to his em- 
 ployee the duty to provide for his safety, as far as can reason- 
 ably be expected, under the circumstances, he is not bound 
 to take greater care of the employee than he would be reason- 
 ably expected to take of himself, as a prudent man.^* 
 
 § 249. Reasonable and ordinary care alone required. — In 
 the performance of the implied duties placed upon him, for 
 the protection of his employees, the employer is required only 
 to exercise reasonable and ordinary care and is not liable, 
 although an injury may result to an employee, if he has dis- 
 charged any of the specified duties in a reasonably careful 
 manner, or in such a manner as ordinarily prudent men in 
 the same business use.^^ 
 
 As said in an Iowa case,^* " It may be and doubtless is, 
 
 19 Sanford v. Pawtucket St. Ry. Co., 19 R. I. 537 ; 35 Atl. Rep. 67 ; 
 33 L. R. A. 564. 
 
 20 Priestley v. Fowler, 3 M. & W. 1. 
 
 aiBerns v. Gaston <J. C. Co., 27 W. Va. 285; 55 Amer. Rep. 304. 
 22 Bailey, Mas. Liab. Inj. Serv., pp. 3 to 12, and cases cited. 
 23Willoughby v. Railway Co., 37 Iowa 432. 
 
 1—20 305 
 
§ 249 DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE. 
 
 true, that Tinder circumstances of great peril, more prompt 
 efforts should be put forth to avoid a threatened injury, than 
 are required under circumstances when the danger is less im- 
 minent," As noted, in the same case, however, " this is 
 only the exercise of ordinary and reasonable diligence." The 
 most generally recognized test for determining the existence 
 of negligence, on the part of the employer, when a breach of 
 duty in any of these particulars is charged, is, therefore, 
 " the ordinary usages of the business," ^* or, what is the 
 same thing, the diligence or care required is that only of 
 ordinarily prudent men in the same kind of business.^' 
 
 The standard of ordinary usage of the business has been 
 quite severely arraigned by some text writers ^® and the high- 
 est court in the United States, in one opinion, rather at- 
 tempted to establish a different test,^'^ as did the Supreme 
 Court of Texas, in one opinion, lay down a special rule as to 
 the duty owed by railway companies to their employees, dif- 
 ferent from that of other employers.^* Ordinary care is 
 generally defined, however, to be that degree of care which an 
 ordinarily prudent man in the same business uses for the 
 
 24 Titu^ V. Railway Co. (Pa.), 20 Atl. Eep. 517; International & 
 G. N. E. Co. V. Bell, 75 Tex. 50; 12 S. W. Rep. 321; Burlington, 
 etc., E. Co. V. Liehe, 17 Colo. 280; 29 Pac. Rep. 175; Texas & Pao. 
 E. Co. V. HoflFman, 83 Texas 286; 18 S. W. Rep. 741. See, also, 4 
 Thompson on Neg., § 3776, and cases cited. 
 
 25 Ernst V. Hudson River R. Co., 35 N. Y. 9; Ward v. Railway Co., 29 
 Wis. 148; Mad River, etc., E. Co. v. Barber, 5 Ohio St. 541; Aerkfetz 
 V. Humphries, 145 U. S. 418; 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 835; Warden v. Rail- 
 way Co., 137 Mass. 204; Cooper V; Railway Co., 44 Iowa, 134; 
 Brymer v. Railwaj^ Co., 90 Cal. 497 ; 27 Pac. Rep. 371 ; Cleveland, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Selsor, 55 in. App. 685; Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Harnett 
 (Texas), 48 S. W. Rep. 773. 
 
 28 4 Thompson on Neg. § 3770. 
 
 27 Wabash R. Co. v. McDaniels, 107 U. S. 454; 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 932. 
 
 28 International, etc., R. Co. v. Williams, 82 Texas 342; 18 S. W. 
 Rep. 700. 
 
 306 
 
DUTIES OB' EMPLOVES. § 250 
 
 protection of his employees ; ^® there is no distinction to be 
 recognized, in the application of the rule, between different 
 classes of employers and in a later case than that above re- 
 ferred to, by the Supreme Court, it is recognized that there 
 is no better test than that of the ordinary or customary usage 
 of the business, for determining what is proper care, in a 
 given case.^** 
 
 § 250. iTury cannot set up higher standard than that of 
 ordinary use. — As the legal standard of reasonable care is 
 
 29 Bailey, Mas. Liab. Inj. Serv., pp. 3 to 12, and cases cited; 4 
 Thompson on Neg., § 3769, and cases cited. 
 
 30 Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 417; 12 Sup. Ct. Hep. 
 679. 
 
 A railroad company is not an insurer, or bound to furnish the very 
 best or latest appliances, but it dischaTges its full duty, if it 
 furnishes reasonably safe machinery, roadway, structures and in- 
 strumentalities. McCabe v. Montana Cent. E. Co. (Mont.), 76 Pac. 
 Rep. 701; Wabash R. Co. v. Burris, 111 111. App. 258; Weed v. Chi- 
 cago, etc., R. Co. (Neb.), 99 N. W. Rep. 827; Southern Pac. R. Co. 
 V. Gloyd, 138 Fed. Rep. 388; Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Snow (Ind.), 
 74 N. E. Rep. 908; Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Hemphill (Texas), 86 S. 
 W. Rep. 350; Smith v. Fordyce, 190 Mo. 1; 88 S. W. Rep. 679; Butt- 
 ner v. Baltimore, Car, etc., Co. (Md.), 60 Alt. Rep. 597; Post v. Chi- 
 cago, B. & Q. R. Co. (Mo.), 97 S. W. Rep. 233. 
 
 Ordinary care is such as reasonably prudent men use under like 
 circumstances, whether it is in the furnishing of appliances, tools, 
 machinery, place or employees, and, in every case, regard is to be 
 had as to the nature of the work and the difficulties and dangers at- 
 tending it. Fisher's Admr. v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. (Va.), 52 
 S. E. Rep. 373. 
 
 Slight negligence is not incompatible with the exercise of ordinary 
 care. Mallett v. Schlosser, 119 111. ■App. 259. 
 
 The degree of care due from an employer to Ws employee does not 
 vary with the increase or diminution of the danger, but the quantum 
 of diligence to be used does differ, under different conditions. Gal- 
 veston, etc., R. Co. V. Gormley, 91 Texas 393; 43 S. W. Rep. 877. 
 
 None of the duties due toward an employee are due to a mere 
 volunteer, for as to such person, the only duty owing is not to 
 injure him, after discovery of his danger. Atlanta, etc., Ry. Co. v. 
 West, 121 Ga. 641; 49 S. E. Rep. 711; 67 L. R. A. 701. 
 
 307 
 
§ 251 DUTIES OF EMPLOlTEE. 
 
 that of ordinary use or custom of the reasonably prudent 
 men in the same business, it is not permitted to juries to set 
 up a different standard of their own, or to base a verdict 
 upon a liability dependent upon a dangerous service or a 
 method or appliance that did not prove absolutely safe. To 
 establish that a business, as customarily conducted, is danger- 
 ous, does not prove that it was necessarily negligent. Many 
 trades, as carried on by reasonably prudent men, are most 
 dangerous vocations, but this does. not argue that they are 
 carelessly pursued. Absolute safety is hardly attainable in 
 any business and as it is very easy to judge of any course 
 or method as careless, after an accident has happened, such 
 standards could not be followed, with justice, by the courts. 
 Such standards would not be reliable, but nothing short of 
 ordinary or customary use, could be held a just standard. 
 However strongly a jury may believe that there was a better 
 or safer way to carry on the business, tberefore, than the 
 employer bas pursued, if the way used was a usual or ordi- 
 nary method, since it was not a negligent way, according to 
 law, it cannot be made such by any jury, where the law con- 
 trols them. They can only determine the responsibility of 
 individual conduct; not the standards that shall control the 
 methods of a given business, when judged according to legal 
 rules. ®^ 
 
 § 251. Employer not an insurer of his employees. — While 
 the duties imposed upon the employer by the law, for the 
 protection of his employees, are absolute in the sense that he 
 cannot avoid them by delegating them to an employee, they 
 are not absolute in the sense that he insures his appliances, 
 
 SI This is, practically, the reasoning of the Supreme Court of 
 Pennsylvania, in a well-considered case, by one of its strongest 
 judges. Titus v. Railway Co., 136 Pa. St. 618; 20 Atl. Rep. 517; 
 Northern Cent. Ry. Co. v. Husson, 101 Pa. St. 1; cited and quoted by 
 Bailey, in Mas. Liab. Inj. Serv., pp. 23, 24. 
 
 308 
 
DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE. § 252 
 
 places, warnings or other things made necessary by the law, 
 nor can he be held liable, as an insurer, in 'case of an injury 
 to an employee, by reason of a failure to provide absolutely 
 safe or sound appliances, places, or instrumentalities, or ab- 
 solutely competent or skillful employees,*^ He discharges 
 his duty, fully, when he uses such care or diligence, in the 
 performance of his various duties, as ordinarily careful men 
 in the same business customarily use and when he does this, 
 he Cannot be held for a resulting injury to his employees.*^ 
 Any higher degree of care than that^of ordinary care, or the 
 ordinary usage of the business, whether that of railroading, 
 mining, or other hazardous or less hazardous vocations, is 
 erroneous, and, if made the» basis of a charge to the jury, 
 is reversible error.** 
 
 § 252. Reasonably safe machlneiy and appliances should be 
 furnished. — As in the performance of the other duties im- 
 posed upon him by the law, the employer is bound to furnish 
 machinery and appliances reasonably safe and suitable for 
 the use to which they are adapted. If the employer fails in 
 the performance of this duty he will be liable to an employee 
 
 32 Bailey, Mas. Liab. Inj. Serv., p. 14; 4 Thompson, Neg., § 3767, 
 and cases cited; Lawless v. Eailway Co., 136 Mass. 1; Cincinnati, etc., 
 E. Co. V. Roesoh, 126 Ind. 445; 26 N. B. Rep. 171; Chica,go, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Avery, 109 111. 314; Washington, etc., R. Co. v. McDade, 
 135 U. S. 571; 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1044. 
 
 33 Central, etc., E. Co. v. Lanier, 83 Ga.' 587; 10 S. B. Rep. 279; 
 Gutridge v. Mo. Pac. Ey. Co., 105 Mo. 520; Covey v. Hannibal, etc., 
 E. Co., 86 Mo. 635; Atchison, etc., E; Co. v. Winston, 56 Kan. 456; 
 43 Pac. Eep. 777; Whalen v. Michigan, etc., E. Co., 114 Mich. 512; 
 72 N. W. Rep. 323; Hough v. Texas & Pac. E. Co., 100 U. S. 213; 
 Mason, eta, E. Co. v. Yoekey, 103 Fed. Eep. 265; 43 C. C. A. 228; 
 Oliver v. Ohio Eiver R. Co., 42 W. Va. 703; 26 S. E. Rep. 444; Gal- 
 veston, etc., E. Co. V. Garrett, 73 Texas, 262; 13 S. W. Eep. 62. 
 
 3* Nolan V. Montana, etc., E. Co., 25 Mont. 107; 63 Pac. Rep. 926; 
 Galveston, etc., E. Co. v. Gormley, 91 Texas SQS; 27 S. W. Eep. 1051; 
 4 Thompson on Neg., § 3736, and cases cited; Bailey, Mas. Liab. 
 Inj. Serv., pp. 16 and 17, and cases cited. 
 
 '309 
 
§ 252 DUTIES OF EMPLOTEft. 
 
 for an injury from a defect in the machinery or tools in use, 
 which may have "occasioned the injury, provided such defect 
 causing the injury was known to him, or had existed for a 
 length of time sufficient to charge him with constructive no- 
 tice thereof, if such defect was unknown to the employee.^ ^ 
 The test of' performance of the employer's duty is general 
 use and although a given appliance or attachment may have 
 prevented the injury, as viewed in the light of transactions 
 subsequent to the injury, this will not be evidence upon 
 which a verdict can be rendered against the employer,^^ for 
 when a tool or appliance has stood the test of general or cus- 
 
 35 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Avery, 109 111. 314; Indianapolis, etc., 
 Ey. Co. V. Toy, 91 111. 474; Ellis v. Ey. Co., 95 N. Y. 546; Lawless 
 V. Eailway Co., 136 Mass. 1; Hough v. Ey. Co., 100 U. 8. 213; Wash- 
 ington, etc., E. Co. V. McDade, 135 U. S. 571 ; Cincinnati, etc., Ey. 
 Co. V. Eoesch, 126 Ind. 445; 26 N. E. Eep. 171; McCombs v. Ey. Co., 
 130 Pa. St. 182; 18 Atl. Rep. 613. 
 
 A flogging hammer, in Minnesota, is held to come within the rule re- 
 quiring the employer to furnish a reasonably safe tool. Vant Hul 
 V. Great Northern E. Co., 90 Minn. 329 ; 96 N. W. Eep. 789. 
 
 36 Delaware Eiver, etc., Co. v. Nuttall, 119 Pa. St. 149; 13 Atl. Eep. 
 65; Northern Cent. Ey. Co. v. Husson, 101 Pa. St. 1; Laflin v, Ey. 
 Co., 106 N. Y. 136; 12 N. E. Eep. 599. 
 
 "A railroad company is bound to provide suitable material and 
 structures in the construction of its road, and if from a defective 
 construction an injury happens to an employee, the company is liable." 
 McCabe & Steen Const. Co. v. Wilson (Okl. 1906), 87 Pac. Eep. 320. 
 
 Duty as to reasonably safe appliances. Armour v. Hahn, 111 U. 
 S. 313; 28 L. Ed. 440; Railroad Co. v. Jackson, 65 Fed. Eep. 48; 
 27 U. S. App. 519; 12 C. C. A. 507; Carlson v. Railroad Co. 21 Or. 
 450; 28 Pac. Rep. 497; Gaulden v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 106 La. 
 409; 30 So. Rep. 889; Haas v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., 97 111. App. 
 624; Covey v. Railroad Co. 86 Mo. 635; Bowen v. Railroad Co., 95 
 Mo. 268; 8 S. W. Rep. 230; Eriel v. Railroad Co., 115 Mp. 503; 22 
 S. W. Rep. 498; Railroad Co. v. Doyle, 49 Tex. 190; Coley'v. North 
 Car. R. Co., 129 N. Car. 407; 40 S. E. Rep. 195; Moore v. Southern 
 Ry. Co. (N. C), 53 S. E. Rep. 745; Healy v. Buffalo, etc., R. Co., 
 97 N. Y. S. 801; 111 App. Div. 618; Wood v. Rio Grande, etc., Ry., 
 Co. (Utah), 79 Pac. Rep. 183; Illinois Ter. R. Co. v. Thompson, 210 
 lU. 226; 71 N. E. Rep. 328; Franklin v. Missouri K. & T. R. Co., 97 
 Mo. App. 473; 71 S. W. Rep. 540; O'Neill v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. 
 310 
 
DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE. § 253 
 
 tomary use and no accident or injury has resulted, it is not 
 to be anticipated that such will result, and what could not 
 reasonably be anticipated, can never be held to be n^ligence, 
 because it was not foreseen. 
 
 § 253. Same — Newest or safest appliances not essential. — 
 
 The absolute safety or suitability of appliances is not guar- 
 anteed by the employer, but such only as are reasonably safe 
 for the business in which they are used ; employers are neither 
 insurers of their employees nor of the absolute safety of 
 their own appliances. The duty of furnishing reasonably 
 safe appliances is implied by the law-, as before stated, but 
 the law will not imply a contract of insurance, where no 
 premium is paid therefor. No employer could long remain 
 in the business if such a high standard were erected and hence, 
 he is not bound to guard against every possible contingency, 
 through which an accident may result; he is not bound to 
 
 (Neb.), 92 N. W. Rep. 731; 60 L. E. A. 443 j Atlantic, etc., Ey. Co. 
 V. West (Va.), 42 S. E. Eep. 914. 
 
 Automatic signals in a switch yard are not essential, in the ab- 
 sence of evidence that the signal in use is dangerous. McGregor v. 
 Pennsylvania E. Co., 212 Pa. 482; 61 Atl. Eep. 1017. 
 
 It is not negligence for a railroad company to use unblocked 
 frogs in its freight yard, in the absence of evidence that they are 
 not ordinarily used in the business. Kilpatrick v. Choctaw, etc., E. 
 Co., 195 U. S. 624; 49 L. Ed. 349. 
 
 For liability of company for injury from unsafe hand-hold on 
 tender of engine, see Woods' Admr. v. Southern Ey. Co. (Va.), 52 
 S. E. Eep. 371. 
 
 In an action. for an injury to an unskilled employee in the use of 
 a machine, the issue is not whether the use of the machine was a 
 customary use, for that purpose, but whether it was reasonably safe 
 for an employee to use, with such experience as the injured one had. 
 Chicago E. I. & P. E. Co. v. Daugaard, 118 111. App. 67. 
 
 Negligence cannot be predicated upon mere failure to provide 
 automatic switch signals in yard, in absence of proof that they are 
 the only kind that would be reasonably safe. McGregor v. Pa. E. 
 Co. (Pa.), 212 Pa. 482; 61 Atl. Eep. 1017. 
 
 311 
 
§ 253 DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE. 
 
 furnish either the newest, safest or best appliances,^'' but only 
 such as are generally or customarily used in the business and 
 such as general use has deinonstrated to be reasonably safe 
 for the business, as customarily carried on.^^ 
 
 The Supreme Court of Alabama,*® while recognizing the 
 general rule stated above, holds that railroads should keep 
 themselves reasonably abreast with improved methods, so as 
 to lessen the dangers attendant upon the service, resulting 
 from the hazardous nature of the business. It may be stated 
 as perhaps the general rule that while it is not incumbent 
 upon the employer to adopt every new invention useful in 
 the business, which might serve to lessen the danger, it is 
 his duty to discontinue old methods which have been found 
 unsafe and to adopt such improvements as are in ordinary 
 use by reasonably prudent men or companies in the same 
 business, for this is really the test, i. e., customary use by 
 those of ordinary care in the same line of business.*" 
 
 37 Wonder v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co., 32 Md. 418; Washington, 
 etc., R. Co. V. McDade, 135 U. S. 574. 
 
 38 Bailey's ' Mas. Liab. Inj. Serv., pp. 14, 19, 26, 30, and cases cited. 
 
 39 Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Jones, 92 Ala. 218; 9 So. Rep. 276; 
 Georgia Pac. Ry. Co. v. Propst,. 83 Ala. 518; 3 So. Rep. 764. 
 
 *o Bailey's Mas. Liab. Inj. Serv., p. 30, and cases cited. 
 
 Reasonably safe appliances, tools and machinery, is all the law 
 holds the employer to. The Chico, 140 Fed. Rep. 568; Drake v. 
 San Antonio, etc., Ry. Co. (Texas), 89 S. W. Rep. 407; Bryan v. 
 International, etc., Ry. Co. (Texas), 90 S. W. Rep. 693; DeMase 
 V. Oregon, etc., Ry. Co., 40 Wash. 108; 82 Pac. Rep. 170. 
 
 Epiployer is not bound to furnish the best appliances, or those 
 in use by some other man in the same business. Norfolk, etc., Ry. 
 Co. V. Bell, 52 S. B. Rep. 700. 
 
 The employer is only required to use ordinary care to furnish a, 
 tool or appliance or machinery that is reasonably safe, according 
 to the circumstances under which it is being used. San Antonio, 
 etc., Ry. Co. v. Drake (Texas), 85 S. W. Eep. 447; 89 S. W. Rep. 
 407; Bryan v. International, etc., Ry. Co., 90 S. W. Rep. 693. And 
 the same applies as to furnishing a reasonably safe place to work. 
 Fisher's Admr. v. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. (Va.), 52 S. E. Rep. 373. 
 
 In selection of instrumentalities, etc., it is sufficient if the employer 
 
 312 
 
DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE. § 254 
 
 § 254. Same — Engines and cars. — Gars and engines come 
 ■within the definition and meaning of the term appliances *^ 
 and under the rules of law applicable thereto a railroad com- 
 pany that fails to furnish engines and cars that are reason- 
 ably safe for the use to which they are to be put, is guilty 
 of negligence and a cause of action will accrue to an in- 
 jured employee for an injury from a defect in,, or an 
 inherently dangerous car or engine.*^ 
 
 The duty obtains not only as to cars used in passenger 
 and freight service, but also to cars used by hand, on section 
 or track work and for a defective car used by employees who 
 were not familiar with the defect a liability will generally 
 accrue, in case of an injury.*^ If the car or engine is not 
 equipped with the appliances required by a statute or special 
 rule of law appertaining thereto, it is held to be negligence, 
 as a matter of law, against the employer ; ** but before a 
 liability would result, the defect in the car or engine, must, 
 
 keeps Teasonably abreast with improved methods and appliances; 
 he is not bound to furnish the best known or those used by some 
 other employer in the same business. Norfolk & W. E. Co. v. Bell 
 (Va.), 52 S. E. Rep. 700. 
 
 <i A car is an appliance, not a place, within the employer's duty 
 to keep it reasonably safe. Wagner v. New York, etc., E. Co., 78 
 N. Y. S. 696; 76 App. Div. 552. 
 
 *2 The use of a car too light to hold the load required to be placed 
 on it, is negligence. Mitchell v. Wabash R. Co., 97 Mo. App. 411; 
 76 S. W. Rep. 647. 
 
 *3A section foreman, as well as the laborers under him, is entitled 
 to be supplied "with reasonably safe derrick cars and appliances and 
 if not so furnished, if he is injured, can maintain an action therefor. 
 Texas Central R. Co. v. George, 89 S. W. Rep. 1091. 
 
 A section foreman cannot recover for an injury from an obviously 
 defective hand , car which employees, under his orders, ran too fast. 
 Atlantic Coast, etc., R. Co. v. Ryland (Fla.), 40 So. Rep. 24. 
 
 **A failure to comply with the safety appliance act, of Congress, 
 is negligence, per se. Winkler v. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. (Del.), 
 53 Atl. Rep. 90; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Tynan, 119 Fed. Rep. 288; 
 Johnson v. iSouthern Pac. R. Co., 117 Fed. Rep. 462; 54 C. C. A. 508; 
 Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. v. Winkler, 56 Atl. Rep. 112. 
 
 313 
 
§ 254 " DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE. 
 
 of course, have teen the proximate cause of the injury and. 
 although not the safest or most improved cars or engines in 
 the market, if they are such as is reasonably safe, or, if not, 
 if the defects therein are obvious, the employer will not, 
 generally, be held liable for an injury therefrom.*^ 
 
 *5A railroad company is not liable for a defect in a hand car 
 which would deceive human judgment. Atlantic Coast Line E. Co. 
 V. Ryland (Fla.), 40 So. Eep. 24. 
 
 Negligence in maintaining a wheel and brake staff, without a nut, 
 as a result of which an employee is injured, although negligence, 
 is assumed, when the absence of the nut was apparent. Missouri, 
 K. & T. R. Co. V. Hansom (Tex.), 90 S. W. Rep. 1122. 
 
 In Georgia, where a petition disclosed equal means of knowledge 
 of a defect in appliances, on the employee's part, as on the employer's, 
 a demurrer thereto was held properly sustained. Lee v. Atlantic 
 Coast Line R. Co., 54 S. E. Rep. 678. 
 
 An employee who knowingly uses defective machinery, is held, 
 in Florida, to be without a right of action. Atlantic Coast, etc., R. 
 Co. V. Ryland, 40 So. Rep. 24. 
 
 A short or " stub pilot " for an engine, is not, in itself, such a 
 defective appliance, as to give a cause of action to an employee 
 injured by the overturning of the engine running into stock. Briggs 
 V. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 125 Fed. Rep. 745; 60 C. C. A. 513. 
 
 A step on a caboose, which protruded fifteen inches from the 
 car, is not necessarily a defective car step. Turner v. Detroit South- 
 em R. Co. (Mich.), 100 N. W. Rep. 268. 
 
 Nor is a, car without bumpers necessarily a defective car. Filbert 
 V. New York, etc., Ry. Co., 88 N. Y. S. 438; 95 App. Div. 199. 
 
 The mere fact that a negligent manner of loading cars is customary 
 with railroads, is not a legal excuse, so as to relieve a company 
 from liability to an employee injured as result of such negligence. 
 Hosic V. C. R. I. & P. R. Co., 75 Iowa 683; 37 N; W. Eep. 963. 
 
 But the mere fact that a car by which a brakeman was killed, 
 was improperly loaded, by reason of the fact that lumber projected 
 over the end thereof so as to interfere with the space where he had 
 to stand in making the coupling, or even the fact that the conductor 
 knew that the car was improperly loaded does not, of itself, show 
 willful neglect; but to constitute such neglect it must, appear that 
 the conductor or other person in charge of the car had knowledge, 
 or by exercising usual care, could have known that the improper 
 loading of the car would endanger the life of the deceased. Louis- 
 ville & N. R. Co. v. Brioe, 84 Ky. 298; 1 S. W. Rep. 483. 
 
 314r 
 
DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE. § 255 
 
 § 255. Same — Scaffolds, lights and ladders. — In the ab- 
 sence of a specific duty, imposed by statute, it is the duty of 
 the employer to furnish reasonably safe scaffolds and lad- 
 ders, where the business requires the use of such appliances 
 and for a failure so to do and a resulting injury, the em- 
 ployer is responsible.*® By statute in some of the States,*'' 
 the same duty is imposed by express enactment, but such 
 statutes are held, generally, to apply only to completed struc- 
 tures, not those in process of construction, for the manifest 
 reason that while being constructed, they could not be kept 
 safe, at all times.** If the defects in ladders or scaffolds, 
 however, are known to the injured employee, or are apparent, 
 no liability will result; *® there is no responsibility, if the 
 defect causing the injury could not be ascertained by a care- 
 ful inspection,^" and if the selection of the material was 
 made by the injured employee or his coemployees and the 
 employer had furnished proper material, he would not be 
 liable for the result of the negligent construction of the scaf- 
 fold or ladder by his employees,®^ nor would he be responsible 
 
 Loading a car so that lumber protrudes over the end is not, per se, 
 negligence, and in the absence of a showing of other facts going to 
 show negligence, on the defendant's part, the employee injured by- 
 reason of such cause, cannot recover. Louisville & N. E. Co. v. Gower, 
 85 Tenn. 465; 3 S. W. Kep. 824. 
 
 16 Flynn v. Bridge Co., 42 Mo. App. 529 ; Missouri, etc., E. Co. v. 
 Miller (Tex.), 61 S. W. Eep. 978; Thompson v. Great North. E. 
 Co., 79 Minn. 291; 82 N. W. Eep. 637; Flanigan v. Smelting Co., 
 63 N. J. L. 647; 44 Atl. Eep 762; Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Scanlon, 
 170 111. 106; Vosburg v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., 94 N. Y. 378. 
 
 It is negligence to permit a hole to remain in a floor which em- 
 ployees are required to pass over. Burke v. Manhattan Ey. Co., 96 
 N. y. S. 516; 109 App. Div. 722. 
 
 «Laws N. Y. 1897, ch. 415, § 18. 
 
 ispursley v. Bridge Works, 67 N. Y. S. 719; 56 App. Div. 71; 
 168 N. Y. 589; 60 N. E. Eep. 1119. 
 
 *9Lee V. Atlantic Coast Line Co. (Ga.), 54 S. E. Eep. 678; 
 Atlantic Coast E. Co. v. Eyland (Fla.), 40 So. Eep. 24. 
 
 00 McCarthy v. Muir, 50 111. App. 510 ; 4 Thompson on Neg., § 3952. 
 
 eiBenn v. Null, 65 Iowa 407; Devlin v. Smith, 89 N. Y. 470. 
 
 315 
 
§ 255 DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE. 
 
 for an unauthorized or negligent use of a reasonably safe 
 scaffold or ladder. ^^ It is also held to be negligence, on the 
 employer's part, to fail to furnish sufficient lights to enable 
 his employees to perform their work with reasonable 
 safety ; ®* but it is not generally held to be negligence to fail 
 to maintain light at a certain place on a railroad track, to 
 indicate to employees, by way of warning, that it is a place 
 in the track where the speed should be slowed down.^* 
 
 These two cases are criticised by Judge Thompson, in his bulky and 
 diffuse work on negligence, but it seems to the author that they are 
 both based upon well-considered precedents and salutary principles. See 
 note to 4 Thompson, on Neg., § 3950. See, also, Mauer v. Ferguson, 
 44 N. Y. St. Eep. 372; Garrow v. Miller, 72 Vt. 284; 47 Atl. Eep. 
 1087; Lambert v. Pulp Co., 72 Vt. 278; 47 Atl. Rep. 1085. 
 
 B2 Young V. Burlington, etc., Co., 79 Iowa 415; 44 N. W. Kep. 693; 
 Eraser v. Lumber Co., 42 Minn. 520; 44 N. W. Rep. 878; Crebarry 
 V. Transit Co., 28 N. Y. S. 291; 77 Hun 74. 
 
 63 It is negligence not to provide sufficient lights to enable an 
 employee to perform his work with reasonable safety. Stewart v. 
 Texas & Pac. E. Co. (La.), 37 So. Rep. 129. 
 
 64: But lights are not necessary to indicate where speed of cars 
 should be reduced. Godfrey v. St. Louis Tr. Co. (Mo.), 81 S. W. 
 Rep. 1230. 
 
 For dangerous or defective scaffolds or platforms negligently built, 
 in case of an injury, the employer is liable. Chaffee v. Erie R. Co., 
 73 N. Y. S. 908; 66 App. Div. 578; Nugent v. Brooklyn El. E. Co., 
 72 N. Y. S. 67; 64 App. Div. 351. But see, Hayes v. New York, 
 etc., Ey. Co., 187 Mass. 182; 72 N. E. Eep. 841. 
 
 " A scaffold may be reasonably safe notwithstanding it may not 
 have been provided with a railing." Chicago Union Traction Co. v. 
 Theorell, 120 111. App- 490. 
 
 "A railroad company is not bound as a matter of law to furnish 
 a stationary ladder or one with hooks for the use of a fireman in 
 climbing to the top of one of its engines, but was only bound to 
 exercise reasonable care to see that the ladders furnished were safe 
 and proper for 'the use for which they were intended." McDonnell v. 
 New York, N. H. & H. R. R. (Mass. 1906), 78 N. E. Rep. 548. 
 
 " In an action by an employee for injuries sustained while de- 
 scending a ladder, the fact that the two bottom steps had been worn 
 off was not sufficient to warrant the inference that the other parts 
 of the ladder were defective, so as to render He employer guilty 
 
 316 
 
D-tJTlES OI* EMPLOYEfe. | 256 
 
 § 256. Same — Injuries from hidden defects in appliances. 
 — As a general rule the employer is not responsible for' in- 
 juries- to his employees through hidden defects in his ap- 
 pliances, of which he had no knowledge at the time of the in- 
 jury and of which notice of the defect could not have been 
 discovered by the exercise of ordinary care on his part.^^ To 
 hold him liable for such an injury would be to hold him 
 to a greater degree of care than the law exacts and would 
 be to make of him, a practical insurer of his employees, or a 
 guarantor of the safety of his appliances. 
 
 The mere fact, therefore, that machinery causing an in- 
 jury is found to possess a latent defect, through which an 
 injury has resulted, is not ordinarily sufficient to constitute 
 negligence, on the part of the employer, nor is the fact, that, 
 after the injury, the defect was discovered and remedied, any 
 evidence of negligence. ^^ If proper and careful inspections 
 were made before the injury, no negligence could be predi- 
 cated upon the fact of a defect discovered subsequently 
 thereto,®^ for it is not the knowledge which comes to the. 
 employer after the injury, that determines his liability, but 
 that he possessed before the injury, that determines his lia- 
 bility. Where there is doubt, however, under the facts of a 
 given case, whether or not the employer was remiss in his 
 
 of negligence in failing to discover the defect." St. Louis, I. M. S. 
 Ry. Co. V. Andrews (Ark. 1906), 96 S. W. Eep. 183. 
 
 " Deceased was killed by being thrown from a hanging scaffold 
 under an elevated railroad structure, by a collision between a truck 
 and the scaffold. The scaffold was suspended from the elevated 
 structure only a short distance above the tops of the surface cars, 
 and it was impossible for men to work thereon and keep watch for 
 approaching vehicles. Held, that the elevated railroad company was 
 guilty of negligence in failing to provide a watchman to warn ap- 
 proaching vehicles of the scaffold." Sheridan v. Interborough Rapid 
 Transit Co., 100 N. Y. S. 821. 
 
 OS Bailey's Mas. Liab. Inj. Serv., p. 22. 
 
 "BO'Donnell v. Baum, 38 Mo. App. 245. 
 
 BTHart V. Naumberg, 123 N. Y. 641; 25 N. E. Rep. 385. 
 
§ 257 DifTlES OP EMPLOf EE. 
 
 duty of inspection, or of using ordinary care to discover a 
 given latent defect in bis appliances, as where, from the facts 
 in evidence it is disputed whether or not a hand-hold on a 
 hand car, although not apparent to the eye to be defective, 
 ought to have been discovered to be a dangerous appliance, by 
 the exercise of ordinary care, it will be a question for the 
 jury, whether by ordinary care, the defect could have been 
 discovered by the employer,^* 
 
 § 257. Must provide reasonably safe place. — Analogous to 
 the duty on the part of the employer to furnish reasonably 
 safe machinery and appliances for the use of his employees, 
 in the given duties of their service, is that to furnish a suit- 
 able and reasonably safe place for the performance of the 
 work.^® The same measure of care as that which determines 
 the liability for failure to provide reasonably safe machinery 
 and appliances, governs the responsibility of the employer as 
 to the place of work, and if he uses such care as reasonably 
 ■ prudent men in the same business use, he cannot be held 
 liable for an injury due to the defective condition of the 
 place of work.®" 
 
 The same care as to supervision and inspection of the 
 place of work, where the nature of the place demands it, 
 should be bestowed by the employer as obtains in the case 
 of machinery and appliances apt to get out of repair by 
 continued use, ®^ and if the employer permits his employees 
 
 ssGartridge v. Railway Co., 105 Mo. 520; 16 S. W. Eep. 943. 
 
 60 Gibson v. Railway Co., 46 Mo. 163; Russell v. Railway Co., 32 
 Minn. 230; 20 N. W. Rep. 147. 
 
 Ordinary care as to place of work is such as reasonably prudent 
 men in the same business employ. Fisher's Admr. v. Chesapeake & 
 Ohio Co. (Va), 52 S. E. Rep. 373. 
 
 <"> Bailey, Mas. Ldab. Inj. Serv., p. 34; 4 Thompson on Neg., § 3814, 
 and cases cited. 
 
 81 Ante idem, Gibson v. Railway Co., 46 Mo. 163 ; Cook v. Railway 
 Co., 34 Minn. 47; 24 N. W. Rep. 311. 
 
 318 
 
DUTIES OE* EMPLOfEE. § 257 
 
 to labor in a place he knows to be dangerous, or in a place 
 where such knowledge could be obtained, by reasonable care 
 on his part, he will be liable to an injured employee, in case 
 of an injury.**^ 
 
 But where the nature of the employee's work, as it pro- 
 gresses, is such as to continuously change the character of the 
 place and nothing short of a continuous inspection by the 
 employer would advise him of the different changes, as 
 where the service is that of excavating for cuts or other sim- 
 ilar work, such as ditches and the like, the rule as to a reason- 
 ably safe place does not apply, and for an injury in such a 
 place, there is no liability on the employer's part, for it is 
 the duty of the employee, in such case, to look out for the 
 safety of >the place he himself makes for his work, and to. 
 h9ld the employer liable for a want of discretion on his part, 
 in such a case, would be to make of him an absolute insurer. ®^ 
 
 "An employee should be furnished a safe place to do the work 
 to which he is assigned." Godfrey v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. (La. 1906),. 
 42 So. Rep. 571. 
 
 62 4 Thompson on Neg., § 3814; Bailey, Mas. Liab. Inj. Serv., p. 36. 
 
 83 Bradley v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 138 Mo. 293. 
 
 " Where the work which the - employees are employed to perform 
 is to make a reasonably safe place dangerous or an obviously danger- 
 ous place safe, the duty to care for the safety of the place is the 
 employee's and not the employer's." American Bridge Co. v. Seeds, 144 
 Fed. Rep. 605. 
 
 "An employee is not bound to anticipate that a safe working place 
 will be suddenly changed, without his knowledge, into an unsafe 
 place by the employer setting in motion a defective and dangerous 
 method of operation without giving the employee warning." Ball v. 
 Megrath (Wash. 1906), 86 Pac. Rep. 382. 
 
 Removal of earth, from a railroad track or embankment, is generally 
 held to be work which changes the place, within the rule holding that 
 employees assume the risk of injuries therefrom. Van Derhoff v. New 
 York Cent. R. Co., 84 N. Y. S. 650; 88 App. Div. 418; Griffin v. Rail- 
 way Co., 124 Ind. 326; Naylor v. Railway Co., 53 Wis. 664; Simmons 
 V. Ry. Co., 110 111. 344; Rasmussen v. Railway Co., 65 Iowa 236; 
 Cully V. Northern Pac. R. Co., 35 Wash. 241; 77 Pac. Rep. 202. 
 
 Employees ' engaged in clearing away a wrecked train are engaged 
 
 319 
 
§ 258 D-UTIES OF EMPLOYEE. 
 
 § 258. Same — Railroad tracks, bridges and similar struc- 
 tures. — A railroad company owes its employees the same 
 duty of maintaining a reasonably safe track,®* and to keep 
 it free from obstructions,® ® or dangerous agencies,®® that it 
 does to furnish reasonably safe appliances or tools "witb whicli 
 its employees are required to work, and for an injury from a 
 failure to perform this duty a liability will result. It is 
 accordingly held, in some jurisdictions, that a railroad com- 
 pany is liable for a failure to so construct its overhead 
 structures and appendages, as to permit its employees on the 
 track to perform the duties required of them with reason- 
 in making a dangerous place safe, and the rule as to a reasonably 
 safe place does not apply. Baltimore & Ohio E. Co. v. Hunsucker 
 (Ind.), 70 N. E. Eep. 556; Galow v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 131 Fed. 
 Bep. 242. 
 
 The work of laying a railroad track is such work as constantly 
 changes the place, and hence the rule requiring a reasonably safe 
 place does not apply to this kind of work. Meehan v. St. Louis, etc., 
 Ry. Co., 114 Mo. App. 396; 90 S. W. Rep. 102. 
 
 The failure, by a railroad company, to provide a reasonably safe 
 placei for work, was held to give a cause of action, in the following 
 late cases: Roche v. Denver, etc., R. Co. (Colo. App.), 73 Pac. Rep. 
 880; Hamilton v. Michigan Cent. R. Co. (Mich.), 97 N. W. Rep. 392; 
 Richey v. Southern Ry. Co., 69 S. C. 387; 48 S. E. Rep. 285; Texas 
 & N. O. R. Co. V. Kelly (Texas), 80 S. W. Rep. 1073. 
 
 For injury to an employee from falling in a hole in floor he was 
 required to pass over while at work, and resulting liabilty of com- 
 pany, see Burke v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 96 N. Y. S. 516; 109 App. 
 Div. 722. 
 
 64 Baltimore, etc., Ry. Co. v. Rowan, 104 Ind. 88; 3 N. E. Rep. 627; 
 Bessex v. Railway Co., 45 Wis. 482. 
 
 The duty as to reasonably safe tracks does not apply to tracks in 
 a railroad yard. St. Louis Nat. Stock Yards v. Burns, 97 111. App. 
 175. 
 
 05 Georgia, etc., Ry. Co. v. Davis, 92 Ala. 300; 9 So. Rep. 252; Ross 
 V. North. Pac. Ry. Co., 5 Dak. 308; 40 N. W. Rep. 590. 
 
 88 Snow and ice permitted to accumulate along the track is held 
 to be negligence on the part of the company. McClaren v. Chicago, 
 etc., Ry. Co., 80 Wis. 280; 49 N. W. Rep. 963. 
 
 320 
 
DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE, § 258 
 
 able safety;®^ tlie same rule is held to apply to structures 
 or erections placed near the track, by -which employees are 
 apt to be struck in passing on cars or engines, in the perform- 
 ance of their duties, such as switch stands, cattle pens, sheds 
 and the like, and in many States a liability will result for 
 an injury from such a cause.®® 
 
 But it is very generally held that an employee cannot 
 recover for an injury from a low bridge, with which he is 
 familiar and used to pass under, as the knowledge or oppor- 
 tunity for acquiring knowledge by the employee, will prevent 
 his recovery for an injury from a cause open and obvious 
 to him ®® and the same rule is held to apply to structures 
 near the track, unless they are in such proximity as to be 
 denominated negligence, on the employer's part, to maintain 
 them at such place,''" 
 
 67 Houston, etc., Ry. Co. v. Oram, 49 Texas 341. 
 
 68 Eoss V. North Pac. Ry. Co., supra; Georgia, etc., Ry. Co. v. 
 Davis, supra. 
 
 The United States Supreme Court held it negligence, as a matter 
 of law, for a company to maintain a spout, attached to a tank, so 
 near the track as to be a menace to the employees, when it might 
 have been maintained at a safe distance. Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co. v. 
 McDade, 191 U. S. 64; 48 L. Ed. 96. 
 
 69 Baylor v. Railroad Co., 40 N. J. L. 23 ; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Striekler, 51 Md. 47; Wallace v. Central, etc., Ry. Co., 63 Hun 632 f. 
 18 N. Y. S. 280; Brossman v. Railroad Co., 113 Pa. St. 49i); 6 Atl. 
 Rep. 226; Illick v. Railway Co., 67 Mich. 632; 35 N. W. Rep. 708; 
 Howard v. Railroad Co., 24 Am. & Eng. Ry. Cas. 458. 
 
 Where reasonable care has been bestowed upon a bridge and rail- 
 road track, the company will not be liable for an injury to a brakeman 
 from a train going through the trestle. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Hill, 94 S. W. Rep. 914; Dolan v. Sierra Ry. Co., 135 Cal. 435; 
 67 Pac. Rep. 686. But see, Galveston H. N. R. Co. v. Newport (Texas), 
 65 S. W. Rep. 657. 
 
 70 Gould V. Railway Co., 66 Iowa 590; 24 N. W. Rep. 227; Flanders 
 V. Ry. Co., 51 Minn. 193; 53 N. W. Rep. 544. 
 
 There is, generally, no liability for maintaining necessary erections 
 near the track, if due warning or notice thereof has been given. 
 Mobile & Ohio R. Co. v. Vallowe, 214 111. 124; 73 N. E. Rep. 416; 
 1—21 321 
 
§ 259 DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE. 
 
 § 259. Same — Injuries from defective bridges. — While a 
 railroad company is not generally held responsible for an 
 injury from a low bridge, properly constructed/^ or for ice 
 
 Chattanooga El. Ry. Co. v. Moore (Tenn.), 82 S. W. Eep. 478; Fearns 
 V. New York, etc., K. Co., 186 Mass. 529; 72 N. E. Eep. 68. 
 
 The duty to furnish a reasonably safe track and roadbed cannot 
 be delegated, and the employer is liable for an unsafe track, regard- 
 less of the employment of competent track men. Chicago & A. Ry. 
 Co. V. Eaton, 194 111. 441; 62 N. E. Rep. 784; St. Louis, S. W. Ry. 
 Co. V. Kelton (Texas), 66 S. W. Rep. 887; Jefferson & N. W. Ey. Co. 
 V. Woods (Texas), 64 S. W. Rep. 830; Anderson v. Northern Pac. R. 
 Co. (Mont.), 85 Pac. Rep. 884; Newton v. New York Cent., etc., R. 
 Co., 183 N. Y. 556; 76 N. E. Rep. 1102; Mississippi Cent. R. Co. v. 
 Hardy (Miss.), 41 So. Eep. 505; Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Manns 
 (Texas), 84 S. W. Eep. 354. 
 
 In the absence of notice employees have a right to assume that 
 the track is safe. Western Ey. Co. v. Eussell (Ala.), 39 So. Eep. 311. 
 
 The duty to furnish a reasonably safe track cannot be delegated by 
 u, railroad company. Mississippi Central R. Co. v. Hardy (Miss.), 
 41 So. Rep. 505; Jemnienski v. Lobdell Car Wheel Co. (Del-.), 63 Atl. 
 Eep. 935. 
 
 A company owes an employee the duty of maintaining its track 
 in a reasonably safe condition for one loading cylinders into a derrick 
 car and this is a different duty from that due those running trains 
 on the track. Texas Central E. Co. v. George, 89 S. W. Eep. 1091. 
 
 An instruction which holds the railroad company to more than 
 reasonable care, in the maintenance of its track and roadbed, is 
 error. Norfolk & W. E. Co. v. Cromer's Exec, 99 Va. 763; 40 S. E. 
 Rep. 54; Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Poole's Admr., 40 S. E. Rep. 627; 
 Van Blarcom v. Central E. Co. (N. J.), 64 Atl. Eep. 111. It is not 
 bound to maintain a reasonably safe track, but only to use care to 
 do so. Culver v. South Haven, etc., E. Co. (Mich.), 101 N. W. Rep. 
 663. 
 
 Although a track or roadbed is unsafe, if the company gives 
 notice thereof, or ceases to use it, no liability will result for a subse- 
 quent injury thereon, although no repair thereof is made. St. Louis, 
 I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Mize (Ark.), 95 S. W. Rep. 488; McAuley v. 
 New York Cent. R. Co., 97 N. Y. S. 631; 111 App. Div. 117. 
 
 The duty of the employer as to furnishing a reasonably safe place, 
 does not apply to laying of a railroad track, since the work is con- 
 tinuously changing the place. Meehan v. St. L. M. & S. E. Ry. Co., 
 114 Mo. App. 396; 90 S. W. Eep. 102. 
 
 Ti To give a cause of action for an injury therefrom, a low bridge 
 322 
 
bUtlES 09 EMPLOYER. § 25$ 
 
 that the season of the year would naturally give warning 
 jnight be hanging therefrom,''^ because of the open, obvious 
 nature of the construction, with which the law would charge 
 its employees, as well as all men with unimpaired means of 
 observation, this rule does not obtain in the case of a de- 
 fectively constructed bridge, which could have been ascer- 
 tained to be defective by a reasonably careful inspection/* 
 But to be responsible for an injury from the giving way of 
 a bridge, the inherent weakness of the bridge must be shown 
 to be the proximate cause of the injury ''* and if the bridge 
 had been regularly inspected, before the railroad company 
 will be held liable for an injury caused by the giving way 
 of the bridge, it must be shown that the inspections made 
 were not reasonably careful inspections, or, otherwise the 
 falling of the bridge is not traced to any act of negligence on 
 the defendant's part.^' 
 
 must be shown to have been improperly constructed. Louisville & 
 N. E. Co. V. Thomas, 87 Miss. 600; 40 So. Eep. 257. 
 
 A low bridge, in some of the eases, is held to constitute negligence, 
 on the railroad company's part. Louisville & N. E,. Co. v. Tucker's 
 Admr. (Ky.), 65 S. W. Eep. 453; 23 Ky. L. E. 1929. 
 
 72 A brakeman on a railroad is held in Johnson v. Boston & M. 
 E. Co. (Vt.), 4 L. E. A. (N. S.) 856, to assume the risk of injury 
 from a, low bridge and ice hanging therefrom, which, to his knowledge, 
 is a usual condition. 
 
 73 Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Tucker's Admr. (Ky.), 65 S. W. Eep. 
 453; St. Louis & S. E. Co. v. Hill (Ark.), 94 S. W. Eep. 914; Central 
 E. Co. V. Alexander, 144 Ala. 257; 40 So. Eep. 424. 
 
 Ti " A railroad company was liable for the death of an engineer, killed 
 in a wreck by the giving way of a bridge after the derailment of the 
 train from another cause, only in case the bridge was so defective 
 as not to be reasonably sufficient to support the train if it had re- 
 mained upon the track." St. Louis & S. F. E. Co. v. Hill, 94 S. W. 
 Eep. 914. 
 
 '5 No liability results from the giving way of a bridge, regularly 
 inspected, unless such inspections can be shown to have been neg- 
 ligently conducted. St. Louis & S. F. E. Co. v. Hill (Ark.), 94 S. W. 
 Eep. 914; Hamilton v. Louisiana, etc., Ey. Co. (La.), 41 So. Eep. 560. 
 
 A defective overhead bridge is a part of the defendant's "ways," 
 
 323 
 
I 260 DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE. 
 
 § 260. Same — Obstructions on or near track. — A quite 
 frequent cause of injury to railroad employees is the pres- 
 ence, on or near the track, of such necessary structures or 
 obstructions as the business of railroading require," as inci- 
 dents to the operation of trains, or the business conducted 
 by the railroads. These structures can properly be treated 
 under the head of the appliances furnished by the employer, 
 yet, as they are more frequently fixed parts of permanent 
 structures, they are more generally considered as affecting 
 the place of the employee's work. The duty to maintain a 
 reasonably safe track is held to apply to obstructions placed 
 by the railroad, on or near the track and unless due warning 
 is given thereof, it is held negligence to erect spouts, posts 
 or other obstructions in such proximity to the track as to 
 cause injury to brakemen, in the ordinary discharge of the 
 duties of the service.''® ' But there would generally not be 
 held to be a duty to warn employees of obstructions placed 
 at a usually safe distance from- the track;''' if the erection 
 
 within the meaning of a statute regulating the " ways, works," etc., 
 in Alabama. Central Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 144 Ala. 257; 40 So. 
 Rep. 424. 
 
 78 The company must keep its track in a reasonably safe condition, 
 or warn its employees of dangers from obstructions it has placed on 
 the track. Illinois Cent. K. Co. v. Leisure's Admr., 90 S. W. Rep. 
 269; 28 Ky. L. R. 768. 
 
 Spouts or posts or other obstructions, in such proximity to track 
 as to cause injury to brakemen, are generally held to be negligence 
 on the company's part. Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co. v. McDade, 112 
 Fed. Rep. 888; 50 C. C. A. 591; Pittsburg, etc., Ry. Co. v. Parish 
 (Ind.), 62 N. E. Rep. 514; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Riley, 145 Fed. 
 Rep. 137; Norfolk & West. Ry. Co. v. Cheatwood's Admr., 103 Va.. 
 356; 49 S. E.,Rep. 489; Lindsay v. Norfolk & S. R. Co. (N. C), 
 43 S. E. Rep. 511. 
 
 The U. S. Supreme Court holds that it is negligence, as matter of 
 law, for a railroad company to maintain an iron spout attached to 
 a water tank, so near the track as to be dangerous to employees, when 
 it could be so hung as to be reasonably safe. Choctaw, etc., R. Co. 
 V. McDade, 191 U. S. 64; 48 L. Ed. 96; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 24. 
 
 77 " If a mail crane was not located unnecessarily near defendant's 
 324 
 
DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE. § 260 
 
 is maintained at a distance ordinarily sufficient to permit the 
 easy passage of a man on the cars of ordinary size, it would 
 be held a reasonably safe distance from the track/* for this- 
 would be exercising reasonable care under the circumstances, 
 as it could not be anticipated by the employer that a brake- 
 man would happen to be on the side of a car of unusual size, 
 just when it happened to be passing such a place and if the 
 injury could not reasonably have been anticipated, a failure 
 
 railroad track, defendant was not negligent in failing to warn its 
 employees of its location and the danger incident thereto." Denver 
 & R. G. R. Co. V. Burchard (Colo. 1906), 86 Pac. Eep. 749. 
 
 " The location of a switch stand in a railroad yard by a railroad 
 company between two tracks, so close to one of them that the switch 
 handle would strike the steps of passenger cars on another track, was 
 a part of an engineering scheme in the construction of the railroad, 
 and, in the absence of manifest errors in constructions patent to an 
 ordinary observer, did not involve a question of negligence, to be 
 passed on by a jury in an action for injuries to a switchman while 
 . using the switch." Chicago, M. & St. P. Ey. Co. v. Riley (U. S. C. C. 
 A., 111., 1906), 145 Fed. Rep, 137. 
 
 A switch stand, being constructed so close to a railroad track, that 
 its handle may strike the steps of a passenger coach, is not necessarily 
 negligehce on the company's part, but as it is a part of the engineering 
 features of the railroad, a jury is not ordinarily permitted to say 
 such construction is negligence, when engineers swear that it is the 
 same as usually constructed. Chicago, etc., Ey. Co. v. Riley, 145 
 Fed. Rep. 137. 
 
 '8 " It cannot be said as a matter of law that a water crane main- 
 tained to supply passenger engines with water at a station, placed so 
 near the track as to be from eighteen and one-half to twenty-three 
 and one-half inches from the side of a freight car operated on the 
 track, is a safe distance from the track." Charlton v. St. Louis & S. F. 
 E. Co. (Mo. 1906), 98 S. W. Rep. 529. 
 » A brakeman who knows that his employer customarily kept a pile 
 of rattan near the track, in its yard, and also knew the extra width 
 of a car he was on and saw the pile of rattan ahead of him and the 
 car was running slowly, is guilty of such negligence in failing to 
 step oflf the car, as will preclude his recovery for a resulting injury. 
 Flansberg v. Heuwood, etc., Co., 190 Mass. 125; 76 N. E. Eep. 599. 
 
 A railroad company is not required to place lights on mail cranes, 
 where the engineers know of the cranes. Kenney v. Meddaugh, 118 
 Fed. Eep. 209; 55 C. C, A. 115, 
 
 325 
 
§ 261 DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE. 
 
 to provide against it could not be held to be negligence.''* 
 But not only is the railroad company bound to protect its 
 employees from dangers caused by obstructions erected by it, 
 but it is also under the duty of keeping the track reasonably 
 free from obstructions placed thereon by others, or by natural 
 forCes, such as rock slides, caused by rains or other natural 
 causes,*" stock *^ and similar animate and inanimate obstruc- 
 tions so frequently causing the derailment of trains. 
 
 § 261. Fit and competent employees must be employed. — 
 
 It is just as essential for the employer to engage fit and com- 
 
 79 A railroad company is not liable for an injury to a brakeman 
 from striking a projection, or a bridge, while descending the side of 
 a car, as the employer could not foresee that he would descend at this 
 place. Krebbs v. Oregon, etc., Ry. Co., 40 Wash. 183; 82 Pac. Rep. 
 130. 
 
 80 A railroad owes its employees the duty of keeping its track free 
 from rock slides and landslides. Fisher's Admr. v. Chesapeake & 
 Ohio R. Co., 52 S. E. Rep. 373. 
 
 " In an action by a brakeman for injuries received in switching 
 cars by being struck by a chute, projecting from a warehouse, the 
 evidence did not show by whom the chute was placed, or when it was 
 so placed, or how long it had been there. It could have been there 
 but a short time. Held insuflBeient as a matter of law to show neg- 
 ligence on the part of the company." Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. 
 Hayes, 99 S. W. Rep. 362. 
 
 81 Under the employer's duty to keep the railroad track reasonably 
 free from obstructions, it is held, in Missouri and New York, that 
 ij. company is liable for the derailment of a train, by cattle or other 
 stock, regardless of the duty to fence, required by law. Mendizabal 
 V. New York Cent. R. Co., 85 N. Y. S. 896; 89 App. Div. 386; 
 Donnegan v. Erhardt, 119 N. Y. 468; 23 N. E. Rep. 1051; 7 L. R. A. 
 527; Dickson v. Railroad Co., 124 Mo. 140; 27 S. W. Rep. 476; 25 
 L. R. A. 320; 46 Am. St. Rep. 429. 
 
 In Pennsylvania, Minnesota and other jurisdictions, the requirement 
 of fences to prevent stock, is held not to be available, in case of an 
 injury from a derailment, caused by stock on the track, in the absence 
 of fences, by an employee of the company. Snyder v. Pennsylvania 
 R. Co., 205 Pa. 619; 55 Atl. Rep. 778; Fleming v. Railroad Co., 27 
 Minn. Ill; 6 N. W. Rep. 448; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Reesman, 
 60 Fed. Rep. 370; 19 U. S. App. 596; 9 C. C. A. 20; 23 L. R. A. 768. 
 
 326 
 
DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE. § 261 
 
 petent employiees and to use reasonable care in the employ- 
 ment of his employees, as it is thai he use such care in the 
 selection of his appliances and places for work, and for an in- 
 jury to an employee from a failure in the discharge of this 
 duty, the employer can be held answerable in damages.*^ 
 Before negligence can be held to result from a breach of duty 
 in this regard, however, it must appear that the incom- 
 petency of the employee was known, or ought to have been 
 discovered, by reasonable care on the employer's part.*^ 
 This may appear from proof of a series of incompetent acts, 
 but one careless act alone is not usually sufficient to prove 
 negligence in .this particular.** The same may be true of 
 acts or a series of acts of intoxication.*® Where a series of 
 such acts are shown it is usually held to be a question for the 
 jury whether or not the » employer had sufficient knowledge 
 of the alleged incompetency,*® provided notice is had by an 
 agent of sufficient authority to make it equivalent to that of 
 the employer himself.*'^ For instance, proof of' notice 
 of the habitual drunkenness of an engineer, by the foreman of 
 the employer's round house, was held to be notice to the em- 
 ployer himself ; ** notice tO the employer of an engineer's 
 
 82 Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Moranda, 108 111. 576; McDermott v. 
 Railway Co., 73 Mo. 516; Wabasli Ey. Co. v. McDaniels, 107 U. S. 
 454; Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Herbert, 116 U. S. 655; Peaslee v. 
 Railway Co., 152 Mass. 158; 25 N. E. Rep. 71; Blake v. Maine Cent. 
 Ey. Co., 70 Me. 63; Mayes v. Railway Co., 63 Iowa 562; 14 N. W. 
 Rep. 340,- Keith v. Railway Co., 140 Mass. 175; 3 N. E. ?,ep. 28; 
 Evanaville, etc., Ry. Co. v. Guyton, 115 Ind. 450; 17 N. E. Rep. 101. 
 
 83 Moss V. Railroad Co., 49 Mo. 167; Blake v. Maine Cent. Ry. Co., 
 70 Me. 63. 
 
 84 Melville v. Railway Co., 48 Fed. Rep. 820; Huffman v. Railway 
 Co., 78 Mo. 50; Baltimore, etc., Co. v. Neall, 65 Md. 438; 5 Atl. Rep. 
 338. 
 
 85 Williams v. Railway Co., 109 Mo. 475;. 18 S. W. Rep. 1098. 
 
 86 Michigan Cent. Ry. Co. v. Gilbert, 46 Mich. 179; 9 N. W. Rep. 
 243; Bailey, Mas. Liab. Inj. Serv., p. 57. 
 
 87 Reiser v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 152 Pa. St. 38; 25 Atl. Rep. 175. 
 
 88 Williams v. Railway Co., 109 Mo. 475; 18 S. W. Rep. 1098. 
 
 327 
 
§ 262 DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE. 
 
 continiaed breach of his rules, by giving control of his engine 
 to his fireman ; *® and notice to a master mechanic of the 
 incompetency of an employee under his control, is held to be 
 notice to the employer of such incompetency.®'* 
 
 But before the employer will be held to have had notice 
 of an employee's incompetency, it must generally be brought 
 home to him, or to one who stands in his place. Notice to a 
 train dispatcher of the incompetency of a station agent, who 
 was not under his control, or subject to his orders, is not 
 notice to the employer.®^ Before an employer can be held 
 for negligence in failing to employ competent employees, the 
 incompetency of the alleged employee must have been the 
 approximate cause of the injury *^ and if the injured em- 
 ployee had known of such incompetency and continued in 
 the service without complaint, he waived any recourse against 
 the employer on this account and will be held, in law, to 
 have assumed the risk of such incompetency.®^ 
 
 § 262. Duty to employ a sufficient number of employees. — 
 In the proper discharge of his duty toward his employees it 
 is just as essential for the employer to engage a sufficient 
 number of employees, as it is for him to employ competent 
 employees or supply reasonably safe tools and appliances. 
 The rule is therefore firmly established that for an injury 
 due to a failure on the employer's part to engage a sufficient 
 number of employees, he will be responsible, as for a breach 
 
 88 Ohio, etc., Ry. Co. v. Collern, 73 Ind. 261. 
 
 90 Ante idem. 
 
 siRieser v. Pennsylvania Ey. Co., 152 Pa. St. 38; 25 Atl. Rep. 175. 
 
 92 Kersey v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 79 Mo. 362; Johnson v. 
 Pittsburg, etc., Co., 114 Pa. St. 443; 7 Atl. Rep. 184; Gulf, etc., Ry. 
 Co. V. Schwab (Texas), 21 S. W. Rep. 706. 
 
 93 Jackson v. Railway Co., 31 Kan. 761; 3 Pae. Rep. 501; Lake 
 Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Knittal, 33 Ohio St. 468; Kansas Pae. Ry. Co. 
 V. Peavey, 34 Kan. 472; 8 Pae. Rep. 780; United States, etc., Co. v. 
 Wilder, 116 III. 109; 5 N. E. Rep. 92, 
 
 328 
 
DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE. § 262 
 
 of his duty toward the injured employee the same as though 
 he were remiss in any other particular duty imposed by the 
 law.®* Just what number of employees would be suflScient 
 for a particular service, is determined in precisely the same 
 way as the discharge of the employer's duty in other particu- 
 lars, i. e., the usual and customary number of the given 
 employment by reasonably prudent men in the same busi- 
 ness.®^ Ordinary care is the same in all such duties and 
 ordinary custom of the particular business is the test, vary- 
 ing, of course, according to the service to be performed. 
 After employment of a sufficient number of competent em- 
 ployees and installing them in the proper places, the em- 
 ployer discharges his full duty toward his employees, so far 
 as the employment of other employees is concerned and for 
 any subsequent injury, due to the negligence of any such 
 employees, he will not be held responsible, ®® but where the 
 evidence is conflicting as to whether or not the force of men 
 employed were adequate for the given service, it is usually 
 held to be a question for the jury to determine, under proper 
 instructions from the court.® ^ 
 
 »* Booth V. Boston, etc., R. Co., 73 N. Y, 38. 
 
 »5 Titus V. Railway Co., 136 Pa. St. 618; 20 Atl. Rep. 517; Wash- 
 ington, etc., Ry. Co. v. McDade, 135 U. S. 554; Laflin v. Railway Co., 
 106 N. Y. 136; 12 N. E. Rep. 599. 
 
 ooFlike v. Boston, etc., Ry. Co., 53 N. Y. 650; Bailey, Mas. Liab. 
 Inj. Serv., p. 70. 
 
 07 In the recent case of Bokamp v. Chicago & A. Ry. Co. ( 100 S. W. 
 Rep. 689), Judge Bland, for the Court of Appeals of Missouri, was 
 considering the question of whether or not* it was a question for the 
 court or for the jury to determine if the force of men was adequate to 
 assist in turning a heavy girder, by which the plaintiff was injured. 
 He said: • 
 
 "There is evidence tending to show the girder could have been 
 prevented from turning over by placing two men at the opposite end 
 to hold it while the men at the other end were raising it with bars. 
 All the men present were engaged in raising the girder except 
 McAlister, who, on Dent's order, stood in front ready to push out the 
 gl4 blocks and insert the new Qnes as soon as th^ girder should be 
 
 329 
 
§ 263 DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE. 
 
 § 263. Duty to promulgate rules. — The duty to adopt and 
 promulgate reasonable rules for the control and conduct of 
 the employer's business exists, in all cases where the business 
 has become sufficiently extensive to demand it, in the exer- 
 cise of reasonable care, for the protection of the employee.®® 
 
 raised high enough to permit him to do so. On this evidence, we 
 cannot say, as a matter of law, defendant furnished an adequate 
 number of colaborers to assist in the performance of the work. The 
 question was peculiarly one for the jury." Suppard v. Agnew, 191 
 111. 439; 61 N. E. Rep. 392. 
 
 In Kentucky, an employer is held liable for failure to employ a 
 sufficient number of men to help unload steel shafts. Illinois Central 
 K. Co. V. Langan, 76 S. W. Rep. 32; 25 Ky. L. R. 500. See, also. 
 Smith V. Railway Co., 48 L. R. A. 392. But when inadequacy of 
 help employed does not give cause of action, for unloading steel rails, 
 see Haviland v. Railroad Co., 172 Mo. 115; Coyne v. Union Pac. R. 
 CA, 133 U. S. 370; 33 L. Ed. 651; Texas & N. 0. R. Co. v. Sherman 
 (Texas), 87 S. W. Rep. 887. 
 
 98 Corcoran v. Delaware, etc., Ry. Co., 126 N. Y. 673; 27 N. E. 
 Rep. 1022; Morgan v. Hudson River, etc., Co., 133 N. Y. 666; 31 N. E. 
 Rep. 234; Wolsey v. Railway Co., 33 Ohio St. 227; Lake Shore, etc., 
 Ry. Co. V. Lavellay, 36 Ohio St. 221; Lewis v. Seifert, 116 Pa. St. 
 628; 11 Atl. Rep. 514; New York, etc., R. Co. v. Lyons, 119 Pa. St. 
 324; 13 Atl. Rep. 205; Luebke v. Railway Co., 63 Wis. 91; 23 N. W. 
 Rep. 136; Hannibal, etc., R. R. Co. v. Kanaley, 39 Kan. 1; 17 Pac. 
 Rep. 324; Ford v. Fitchburg, etc., Co., 110 Mass. 240; Hough v. 
 Railway Co., 100 U. S. 213; Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Henderson, 37 
 Ohio St. 549. 
 
 "While a railroad company is bound to promulgate rules for the 
 government of its employees and to enforce their obedience, it is not 
 absolutely required to adopt and promulgate a code of rules for the 
 education of beginners prior to inducting them into its service." 
 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Vincent (Tenn. 1906), 95 S. W. Rep. 179. 
 
 " It is the duty of a railroad company to establish and enforce 
 definite rules and regulations for the protection of its employees, and 
 of employees to obey such rules, which, when known to them, are as 
 law in the regulation of their conduct; but whefe oral instructions 
 given as a rule of conduct are relied on in an action for the injury or 
 death of an employee, and have a vital bearing on the rights of the 
 litigants, their existence, meaning and import are matters for proof." 
 Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Shanklin (U. S. C. C. A., Ga., 1906), 
 148 Fed. Rep. 342. 
 
 330 
 
DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE. § 263 
 
 The plaintiff must show that such necessity exists, before 
 negligence in this particular can be held to be shown, either 
 by proof of what other men in the same business or in a busi- 
 ness as extensive as that of the defendant, have done^® and 
 the defendant may meet this proof by evidence that he has 
 pursued the same degree of care in promulgating rules as 
 those of reasonable prudence in the same business have done.-^ 
 It may be a question for the jury whether the business was of 
 sufficient extent to demand a rule,^ but the reasonableness 
 of the rule is always a question of law for the court. ^ It is 
 just as much the duty of the employer to promulgate a rule 
 so that his employees will have notice thereof, as it is to 
 make such a rule and in the absence of a promulgation 
 thereof, the rule will not be effective.* But after proof of a 
 proper promulgation, it will not be necessary to bring actual 
 notice home to a given employee ; ® he is presumed to have 
 
 soBerrigan v. New York, etc., E. E. Co., 131 N. Y. 582; 30 N. E.- 
 Eep. 57. 
 
 ^ Ante idem; Bailey, Mas. Liab. Inj. Serv., p. 74. 
 
 zMcGovern v. Eailway Co., 123 N. Y. 289; 25 N. E. Eep. 373. 
 
 sLarow v. New York, etc., E. Co., 61 Hun 11; 15 N. Y. S. 384; 
 Old Colony E. Co. v. Tripp, 147 Mass. 35; 17 N. E. Eep. 89; 33 
 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 497; Bass v. Ey. Co., 36 Wis. 459; Hoflfbauer v. 
 Eailway Co., 52 Iowa 342; 3 N. W. Eep. 121; Illinois Central E. Co. 
 V. Whittemore, 43 111. 420. 
 
 For construction, by the court, of a rule providing for train orders, 
 and how to be given, see Wallace v. Boston, etc., E. Co., 72 N. H. 504; 
 57 Atl. Eep. 913. 
 
 In Georgia (Prather v. Eailway Co., 80 Ga. 427; 9 S. E. Eep. 530), 
 it is held to be a jury issue, and the same is held, in New Jersey. 
 State V. Overton; 24 N. J. L. 435. 
 
 * Bailey, Mas. Liab. Inj. Serv., p. 77, and cases cited; Parker v. 
 Georgia, etc., Ey. Co., 83 Ga. 539; 10 S. E. Eep. 233; Central E. E., 
 etc., Co. v. Eyles, 84 Ga. 420;, 11 S. E. Rep. 499; Covey v. Hannibal, 
 etc., Ey. Co., 27 Mo. App. 170. 
 
 A rule, not duly promulgated, is no rule, in Georgia. Little v. 
 Southern Ey. Co., 120 Ga. 347; 47 S. E. Eep. 953. 
 
 B Alcorn v. Chicago, etc.. By. Co., 108 Mo. 395; 16 S. W. Eep. 229; 
 Parker v. Georgia, etc., Ey. Co., 83 Ga. 539; 10 S. E. Eep. 233. 
 
 331 
 
§ 263 DUTIES OF EMPLOTEB. 
 
 notice of all rules shown to be effective and duly promul- 
 gated.® 
 
 But evidence of the effectiveness of a rule is just as 
 essential as the original adoption of the rule'^ and if the 
 employer has customarily permitted his employees to neglect 
 the rule he invokes, he- will be held to have himself abandoned 
 the rule and waived the performance thereof by his. em- 
 ployees. ® 
 
 8 Shenandoah Valley, etc., E. Co. v. Lucado's Admr., 86 Va. 390; 
 10 S. E. Kep. 423; La Croy v. New York, etc., R. Co., 132 N. Y. 570; 
 30 N. E. Eep. 391; Pilkington v. Railway Co., 70 Texas 226; 7 S. W. 
 Rep. 805; Alexander v. Railroad Co., 83 K.y. 598. But see, contra, 
 Atchison, etc., E. Co. v. Plunkett, 26 Kansas 188. 
 
 7 Byrnes v. New York, etc., R. Co., 71 Hun 209; 24 N. Y. S. 517; 
 Covey V. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 27 Mo. App. 170; Atchison, etc., R. 
 Co. V. Plunkett, 25 Kan. 188. 
 
 8 Barry v. Hannibal, etc., Ry. Co., 98 Mo. 62; 11 S. W. Rep. 308; 
 Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Kier, 41 Kan. 661-; 21 Pac. Rep. 770; 
 Union Pac. R. Co. v. Springsten, 41 Kan. 724; 21 Pac. Rep. 774; 
 Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Nichols, 50 Fed. Rep. 718; 4 U. S. App. 369; 
 Whittaker v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 126 N. Y. 544; 27 N. E. Rep. 
 1042. 
 
 But the mere fact that other employees have violated rules, will 
 not excuse the injured employee for his violation, unless the employer 
 had acquiesced in the other violations, so as to abrogate it. Sloan v. 
 Georgia, etc., R. Co., 86 Ga. 15; 12 S. E. Rep. 179. 
 
 The company waives a rule that it has permitted to be customarily 
 violated for a length of time that it ought to have known of such 
 violation. Biles v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 139 N. C. 528; 52 
 S. E. Rep. 129. 
 
 It can have no effect if the employer has abandoned it, or failed 
 to enforce it. Leduo v. Northern Pac. R. Co. (Minn.), 100 N. W. Rep. 
 108. 
 
 A conductor's knowledge that a rule is habitually violated, is held, 
 in Arkansas, to be notice to the company. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. 
 Co. V. Caraway, 91 S. W. Rep. 749. But see Huggins v. Southern 
 Ry. Co. (Ala.), 41 So. Rep. 856. 
 
 "Where it was contrary to the rules of a railroad for employees 
 to go between ears in order to make couplings, a custom among the 
 employees violative of the rule was not binding upon the road, unless 
 it was known to the road, and acquiesced in, or had prevailed for so 
 
 332 
 
DUTIES OP EMPLOYEE, § 264 
 
 § 264. Same — What railway duties require rules and what 
 do not. — It may be stated as a general rule that whenever 
 the employer could have foreseen that an injury in any de- 
 partment of railway service, by the exercise of reasonable 
 care on his part, in the adoption and promulgation of a rule, 
 could have been avoided, then he will be held negligent in 
 not adopting a rule governing the conduct of his employees 
 in such department of the service.® In this connection, if it 
 could have been anticipated, by reasonable diligence, that a 
 rule would have prevented a given injury, the law will im- 
 pose a duty, in such case, to frame and promulgate a rule, 
 and it is immaterial whether the conditions making a rule 
 necessary are old or new, it will be held negligence to fail to 
 adopt the necessary rule.^" As a failure to inspect cars or 
 engines must inevitably bring about an accident, it is held 
 
 long a time that the road was bound to know it." Euggins jr. 
 Southern Ky. Co. (Ala. 1906), 41 So. Kep. 856. 
 
 A rule of an employer established for the safety of employees which 
 is habitually violated to the knowledge of the employer, or vice-prin- 
 cipals, or which has been frequently and openly violated for such 
 length of time that the employer could by the exercise of ordinary care 
 have known the facts, will be deemed abrogated in determining the 
 question of negligence on the part of an employee violating it. Biles 
 V. Seaboard Air Line Ey. Co., 55 S. E. Eep. 512. 
 
 " Where a rule is made by a railroad company for the furtherance 
 of its own ends, and is persistently and generally ignored or violated 
 without reprimand, it may be considered as having been abandoned, 
 but not so as to rules designed solely for the safety of employees, which 
 will be enforced, unless it is shown that the railroad company has 
 insisted on a disregard of the rule in order to hasten the work." 
 Texas & N. 0. Ey. Co. v. Conway (Tex. Civ. App. 1907), 98 8. W. 
 Eep. 1070. 
 
 » Bailey, Mas. Liab. Inj. Serv., pp. 72, 74; 4 Thompson on Neg., 
 § 4135, et mh. 
 
 10 Although the conditions are new to the employers, which require 
 rules, if the conditions of the business require rules, to make it 
 reasonably safe, they should be adopted. Hill v. Lake Shore, etc., 
 Ey. Co., 22 Ohio Cir. Ct. E. 291; 12 O. C. D. 241; Louisville & N. E. 
 Co. V. York, 128 Ala. 305; 30 So. Rep. 676. 
 
 333 
 
§ 264 DtJTIES OB' EMPLOtEfi, 
 
 negligence to fail to adopt a rule providing for inspection of 
 such appliances/^ and, as the coupling of cars is attendant 
 with more or less risk, it is held to be negligence, in some 
 States, to fail to adopt rules governing the method of coup- 
 ling cars.^^ 
 
 But it is never held to be necessary to adopt rules to pre- 
 vent causes not likely to produce an injury, or which, after 
 adoption, would not afford reasonable protection to the em- 
 ployee. ^^ Accordingly, it is, held that rules are not neces- 
 sary to prevent employees from leaving tools at a place not 
 likely to cause injury; ^* to control the conduct of employees, 
 beyond the scope of their authority; ^® to provide watchmen 
 
 11 The absence of rules providing for the inspection or repair of 
 cars, was held negligence in New Hampshire. Hill v. Boston, etc., 
 R. Co., 72 N. H. 518; 57 Atl. Rep. 924; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Bell, 
 111 111. App. 280; Moran v. Rockland, etc., R. Co., 99 Me. 127; 58 
 AJ;1. Rep. 676; Lane v. New York, etc., R. Co., 94 N. Y. S. 988; 107 
 App. Div. 166. 
 
 12 It is held, in New York, to be negligence to fail to provide rules 
 governing the coupling of cars in a railroad yard, where switching 
 is constantly being done. Freemont v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 98 N. Y. 
 S. 179; HI App. Div. 831; Ryan v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 99 N. Y. S. 
 794; 114 App. Div. 268. But if a rule is adopted, governing the 
 running of engines in switch yards and the compliance therewith 
 would have prevented the injury, no recovery can be had because 
 additional rules were not adopted. Keating v. Manhattan R. Co., 
 97 N. Y. S. 137; 110 App. Div. 108; Huggins v. Southern Pac. R. 
 Co. (Ala.), 41 So. Rep. 856; Southern Ry. Co. v. Holbrook, 124 Ga. 
 679; 53 S. B. Rep. 203. 
 
 13 Rules are not required as to causes not likely to cause an injury, 
 or which would not afford reasonable protection, when adopted. Kos- 
 zlowski v. American Locomotive Co., 89 N. Y. S. 55; 96 App. Div. 40. 
 
 1* As it is not to be anticipated that an engine hostler will leave 
 an oil can on the foot board of an engine, it is not negligence to fail 
 to have a rule against it. Wise Terminal Co. v. McCormick (Va.), 
 51 S. E. Rep. 731. 
 
 15 There is no duty, on the employer's part, to adopt rules to 
 control employees acting beyond the scope of their authority. Moran 
 v. Rockland, etc., R. Co., 99 Me. 127; 58 Atl. Rep. 676. 
 
 334 
 
DUTIES OF Employee. § 264 
 
 to give warning of moving cars in railroad yards ; ^® to pre- 
 vent the starting of engines while cleaners are under same ; ^'' 
 to regulate making of flying switches ; ^* to provide the part 
 of a train that a 'crippled car shall be carried in/® or to 
 ■prevent car inspectors from riding to the place of work on 
 cars to be inspected by them,^* for the reason that in none 
 of the instances cited could the employer, by the exercise of 
 reasonable care, on his part, foresee that an accident and 
 injury would result froni a failure to provide a rule therefor. 
 
 10 " Plaintiff was employed as a member of a yard gang of de- 
 fendant's railroad, and at the time of his injury was picking up coal 
 from between the traqks, when, as his Mick was turned, he was struck 
 by a coal car in charge of a brakeman, which was being ' kicked ' onto 
 the siding. Held, that defendant was not guilty of negligence in failing 
 to promulgate and enforce a rule requiring brakeman in charge of 
 such cars, when approaching workmen in the yards, to have them 
 under such control that they could be stopped in case a collision be- 
 came imminent, or a rule requiring that some person be provided to 
 watch for approaching cars and warn the yard gang of the danger; 
 no evidence being offered as to the custom in other yards or as to the 
 probable efficiency of such rules." Kascsak v. Central R. Co. of 
 New Jersey, 101 N. Y. S. 211. 
 
 17 No rule is required to prevent the starting of an engine, while 
 a hostler is under it cleaning out the ash pans, as the mere presence 
 of the man is sufficient, in itself, to prevent the starting of the 
 engine, while he is under it. Lane v. New York Cent. E. Co., 86 
 N. Y. S. 947; 93 App. Div. 40. 
 
 18 "The failure of a railroad company to make a rule regulating 
 the making of flying switches was not negligence rendering it liable for 
 the death of an employee caused by cars on the switch track at a 
 point where its employees were not bound to anticipate his presence." 
 Lord V. Boston & M. E. Co. (N. H. 1906), 65 Atl. Eep. 111. 
 
 19 Negligence cannot be predicated upon the absence of a special 
 rule providing for the part of a train that a " crippled " car ought 
 to be carried in. Shuster v. Philadelphia B. & W. R. Co. (Del.), 
 62 Atl. Rep. 689. 
 
 20 The failure of a company to provide a rule preventing ear in- 
 spectors from riding to the inspection track on the cars to be inspected 
 by them, is not negligence on the part of the company, so -as to give 
 a cause of action, in case of an injury to an inspector, while so riding. 
 Shuster v. Philadelphia & B. W. E. Co. (Del.), 62 Atl. Rep. 689. 
 
 335 
 
§ 265 DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE. 
 
 § 265. Same — Effect of violation of rule by employees. — 
 
 Where a given rule of the employer, regularly adopted and 
 enforced, is violated by an employee, the effect of such vio- 
 lation of tlie rule, upon the right of recovery of an injured 
 employee, depends largely upon the question of the material- 
 ity of the violation of the rule in producing the injury com- 
 plained of. If the violation of the rule was the proximate 
 cause of the injury and the injured employee himself was 
 violating the rule, when injured, he is generally held to be 
 guilty of contributory negligence, preventing a recovery.** 
 Just what effect a violation of a rule of the employer, by a 
 coemployee of the injured one, will have, is differently de- 
 cided in different States. In some States, where the common 
 law has been abrogated and the employer is liable for the neg- 
 ligence of coemployees of the injured employee, an injury 
 from a violation of a rule of the employer, by a coemployee, 
 will not relieve him from liability.** But in States where 
 no such rule obtains, or where the common-law rule of lia- 
 bility exists, under which the employer is not liable for in- 
 juries due to negligent acts of coemployees of the injured 
 employee, an injury due to a violation of a rule by a coem- 
 ployee would give no cause of action against the employer.** 
 
 21 Schwab V. Railway Co., 106 Mo. 368. 
 
 A switchman who knows of a rule that he must be provided with 
 a lantern, while .working in the yard, at night, is negligent if he 
 fails to get a lantern from the supply at the wareroom of the 
 employer and cannot shift the responsibility to his foreman. Howard 
 V. Chesapeake & O. E. Co., 28 Ky. L. E.. 891; 90 S. W. Eep. 950. 
 
 22 The fact that a collision with a work train, by a special train, 
 occurred because of the violation of a rule on the part of the brake- 
 man, in flagging the special, will not relieve the company, in Texas. 
 Gulf Colorado & S. F. E.'Co. v. Hays, 89 S. W. Eep. 29. But see, 
 contra, Spangler'v. B. & 0. E. Co., 213 Pa. 320; 62 Atl. Eep. 919. 
 
 Violation of a rule preventing placing of torpedoes near stations, 
 was held to give a coemployee of the one violating the rule a cause 
 of action, in Kentucky. Hlinois Cent. E. Co. v. Burton, 79 S. W. 
 Eep. 502; 25 Ky. L. R. 1916. 
 
 23 No recovery can be had, in Pennsylvania, for an injury to an 
 
 336 
 
DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE § 266 
 
 § 266. Duty of inspection.— While it is generally held, by 
 the best-considered cases, that the employer is not required 
 to inspect new appliances, bought from reputable manufac- 
 
 employee, by a collision, caused by the negligence of other employees, 
 and while violating company rules. Spangler v. B. & 0. E. Co., 213 
 Pa. 320; 60 Atl. Eep. 919. 
 
 "Where two trains are running close together, and under the rules 
 of the company, requiring ten minutes between trains, and according 
 to their interpretation by trainmen, it is not the duty of those in 
 charge of the first train to send back a flagman until it is ten minutes 
 late, an accident occurring by the rear train running into the first train 
 within such time is not attributable to the negligence of those in 
 charge of the first train, aside from any question of contributory neg- 
 ligence of the engineer of the rear train." Judgment (Civ. App.), 95 
 S. W. 660, reversed. International & G. N. R. Co. v. Brice (Texas), 
 97 S. W. Eep. 461. 
 
 "A rule provided for the protection of a train by a flagman going 
 back a distance of thirteen telegraph poles, where he shall place one 
 torpedo on the rail, and then continue at least fifteen telegraph poles 
 from the rear of the train and place two more torpedoes on the rail, 
 when he may return to within thirteen telegraph poles, and . remain 
 there until recalled; that when he comes in he will remove the torpedo 
 nearest the train, but the two must be left on the rail as a caution to 
 any following train. Held that, though such rule required the flagman 
 to remain where he had placed the first torpedo until called in, the 
 failure of the conductor of a freight train, who had put out torpedoes, 
 to remain with them, did not constitute negligence, rendering the rail- 
 road company liable for injuries to a trackman by the explosion of a, 
 torpedo by a hand car on which he was riding; he having assumed, 
 without reasonable grounds for so doing, when he saw the train 
 standing, but did not see a flagman, that no torpedoes had been set." 
 Murphy v. Galveston, H. & N. Ey. Co. (Tex. Civ. App. 1906), 96 S. W. 
 Eep. 940. 
 
 In the following cases, the violation of a rule, requiring flag, by a 
 car repairer, or other employee working on the track, around stationary 
 cars, without exposing flag, or adopting other safeguard for pro- 
 tection, was held to preclude a recovery for an injury consequent 
 upon such negligence. Eenfro v. Chicago, etc., Ey. Co., 86 Mo. 302; 
 Whitley v. Chicago, etc., Ey. Co., 109 Mo. App. 123 ; Harris v. Missouri 
 Pacific Ey. Co., 40 Mo. App. 255; Harlan v. Railroad Co., 64 Mo. 480; 
 Hallihan v. Hannibal, etc., Ey. Co., 71 Mo. 113; New York, etc., R. 
 Co. V. Rapp (Ohio), 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 413; Devoe v. New York, 
 etc., R. Co., 75 N. Y. S. 136; 70 App. Div. 495; Snellen v. Kansas 
 1—22 337 
 
§ 266 DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE. 
 
 turers,^* this is not the rule as to tools, machinery or ap- 
 pliances subjected to continuous use in the business of the 
 employer, where such use and the friction they are subjected 
 to and the wear consequent upon such use is liable to render 
 them unsafe, but as to all such, the duty is implied by the 
 law that the employer will cause them to be properly in- 
 spected, in order to see that the proper repairs may be 
 made.^^ The duty, of course, necessarily varies, according 
 to the nature of the business and the character of the ap- 
 pliances used,^® so that it is always necessary for the plain- 
 City, etc., R. Co. (Ark.), 102 S. W. Kep. 193; Southern Pacific E. 
 Co. V. Pool, 160 U. S. 438; Aerkfetz v. Humphreys, 145 U. S. 418; 
 Canadian Pacific E. Co. v. Elliott, 137 Fed. Eep. 904; State v. South 
 Baltimore Car Co. (Md.), 58 Atl. Eep. 447; Latremoulle v. Eailroad 
 Co., 63 Vt. 336; 22 Atl. Eep. 656; 48 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 265; 
 Campbell v. Eailroad Co. (Pa.), 2 Atl. Eep. 489; 24 Am. & Eng. E. 
 Cas. 427; Cincinnati, etc., E. Co. v. Long, 112 Ind. 166; 13 N. E. 
 Eep. 659; 31 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 138; Lynch v. Boston, etc., E. Co., 
 159 Mass. 536; 34 N. E. Eep. 1072; Sahaibe v. Lake Shore, etc., E. 
 Co., 97 Mich. 318; 56 N. W. Eep. 565; Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. McGraw, 
 22 Colo. 363; 45 Pac. Eep. 383; Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Haning, 
 131 Ind. 528; 31 N. E. Eep. 187; 53 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 452; Cypher 
 V. Eailroad Co., 149 Pa. St. 359; 24 Atl. Eep. 225; Sweeney v. Eailroad 
 Co., 11 Mont. 523; 29 Pac. Eep. 15; Peterson v. Chicago, etc., Ey. Co. 
 (Mich.), 34 N. W. Eep. 260; Crowe v. New York, etc., E. Co., 23 
 N. Y. S. 1100. 
 
 2*Eichmond, etc., R. Co. v. Elliott, 149 U. S. 266; DeGraflf v. Eail- 
 way Co., 76 N. Y. 125; Ardesco Oil Co. v. Gilson, 63 Pa. St. 150; 
 Smith V. Eailway Co., 42 Wis. 520. 
 
 There is no obligation on the part of an employee to inspect the 
 appliances furnished him by his employer. Texas Short Line- E. Co. 
 V. Waymire, 89 S. W. Rep. 452; Missouri, K. & T. E. Co. v. Lynch, 
 90 S. W. Rep. 511. 
 
 2BBessex v. Railway Co., 45 Wis. 481; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. 
 Herbert, 116 U. 8. 652; Brann v. Eailway Co., 53 Iowa 595. 
 
 The duty of inspection is incidental to that to furnish a reasonably 
 safe place and appliances and cannot be delegated, by rules, adopted 
 with this object in view. Chicago Tr. Co. v. Sawusch, 119 111. App. 
 349; 218 111. 130; 75 N. E. Eep. 797; 1 L. E. A. (N. S.) 670. 
 
 20 « For instance the wheels upon railroad cars, require more f re- 
 
 338 
 
DUOriES OF EMPLOYES. | 266 
 
 tiff to establish that the character of the appliance was such 
 as to require timely inspections, or no such duty will be im- 
 plied, but the presumption will obtain that the employer has 
 properly discharged his duty toward his employee.^'' The 
 duty of inspection, however, applies to the place where the 
 employer keeps his employees at work,^* as well as to the 
 appliances used and for a failure to inspect either, if an 
 injury results therefrom, there will be a liability upon the 
 employers' part. After proper inspection, there is usually 
 no liability, if the defect causing the injury was one which 
 a proper inspection would not have disclosed,^® but before 
 an inspection is a sufficient avoidance of the charge of notice 
 of a defective condition or state, where it has continued 
 a length of time sufficient to imply notice thereof, in law, the 
 employer must show a proper or reasonably careful inspec- 
 tion, for if an inspection was not made in such a way as to 
 discover defects that might by reasonable care have been 
 disclosed, it is the same as if none at all had been made.^" 
 
 quent inspection, than the frame work, and also different in character." 
 Bailey, Mas. Liab. Inj. Serv., p. 102. 
 
 27Laflin v. Buffalo, etc., R. Co., 106 N. Y. 140; 12 N. E. Rep. 599. 
 
 28 Bessex v. Railway Co., 45 Wis. 482. 
 
 As to measure of care required of company towards its employees 
 to prevent landslides and rocks from slipping upon roadbed, see 
 Fisher's Adtor. v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. (Va.), 52 S. E. Rep. 373. 
 
 20 Baldwin v. Railway Co., 68 Iowa 37; 25 N. W. Rep. 918; Bailey, 
 Mas. Liab. Inj. Serv., p. 108. 
 
 soDeGraff v. Railway Co., 76 N. Y. 125; Grand Rapids, etc., R. 
 Co. V. Huntley, 38 Mich. 546. 
 
 The fact of an inspection, by a competent inspector, was held not to 
 relieve the company from liability for an injury to a brakeman, from 
 a defective hand-hold, unless it is shown that it was a reasonably 
 careful inspection. International, etc., R. Co. v. Hawes (Texas), 64 
 S. W. Rep. 325; Egan v. Dry Dock, etc., R. Co., 12 N. Y. App. Div. 
 556; 42 N. Y. S. 188. See, also, Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Ward, 147 
 Ind. 256; 45 N. E. Rep. 325. 
 
 It is negligence to fail to make such an inspection of appliances 
 
 339 
 
§ 26Y butiES ot" i;Mi>LOtES. 
 
 § 267. Same — Hidden defects — Ordinary tools. — While 
 an inspection that is not made in a reasonably careful man- 
 ner is the same as though no inspection at all had been made, 
 where a given tool or a place is inspected in an approved 
 or usual manner, it is generally held to be sufficient and no 
 liability will result for an injury from a cause which was not 
 disclosed by such inspection.^^ It is not generally required 
 that simple, ordinary tools, such as hammers or mauls, should 
 be inspected, ^^ but wooden ladders and such appliances as 
 
 as a reasonably prudent person in the same business would make. 
 Texas Short Line E. Co. v. Waymire (Texas), 89 S. W. Rep. 452. 
 
 The liability for an insuflScient inspection is not affected by the fact 
 that it was made by a coemployee of the injured one, for it is one of 
 the nondelegable duties of the employer. Newton v. New York, etc., 
 E. Co., 89 N. Y. S. 23; 96 App. Div. 81; Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Larkin 
 (Texas), 80 S. W. Rep. 94; Belt Ry. Co. v. Confrey, 111 111. App. 
 473; Leduc v. Northern Pac. R. Co. (Minn.), 100 N. W. Rep. 108; 
 Lee V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 112 Mo. App. 372; 87 S. W. Rep. 12; 
 Crawford v. United Ry. Co. (Md.), 61Atl. Rep. 287. 
 
 The duty of inspection of appliances cannot be delegated, so as to 
 avoid liability for an injury for an unsafe car or engine. Galveston, 
 etc., Ry. Co. v. Busch (Tex.), 65 S. W. Rep. 681; Southern Pac. R. 
 Co. V. Winton (Texas), 66 S. W. Rep. 477; Martin v. Wabash R. Co., 
 142 Fed. Rep. 650; 73 C. C. A. 646; Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Smith 
 (Texas), 93 S. W. Rep. 184; 98 S. W. Rep. 240; Missouri, K. & T. 
 Ry. Co. V. Hagan (Texas), 93 S. W. Rep. 1014. But see Chicago & 
 A. R. Co. V. Merriam, 95 111. App. 628. 
 
 Evidence that only one car wheel out of fifty was tested, or in- 
 spected, does not make a case of negligence, for failure to inspect, 
 in the absence of proof that additional tests were necessary or usual, 
 or that the wheel that caused the injury was not inspected or tested. 
 Hoover v. Chicago R. I. & C. E. Co. (Texas), 89 S. W. Rep. 1084. 
 
 31 Where an inspection is made in an approved and usual manner, 
 it is generally held to be sufficient. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Coughlin, 
 132 Fed. Rep. 801; 65 C. C. A. 101; Gerstner v. New York, etc., R. 
 Co., 178 N. Y. 627; 71 N. E. Rep. 1131. 
 
 An inspection on only one out of iifty car wheels is not negligence, 
 in absence of evidence that the wheel causing the Injury was not 
 inspected. Hoover v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 89 S. W. Rep. 1084. 
 
 22 A simple, ordinary tool, or appliance, such as a hammer, or a 
 
 340 
 
DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE. ,§267 
 
 wear will make dangerous, are ordinarily required to be in- 
 spected,^* in order tliat defects therein may be discovered 
 and such repairs made as may be necessary to keep such tools 
 or appliances in a reasonably safe condition for use. 
 
 Where there is shown to have been a defect in an appliance 
 responsible for an injury, which a reasonably careful in- 
 spection would have disclosed, in the absence of evidence of 
 a proper inspection, it will be presumed that no such inspec- 
 tion was made, or, if an inspection is shown to have been 
 made of the appliance, that it was not an ordinarily careful 
 inspection.** But there is no liability for an injury due to 
 a latent defect or flaw in the material from which a given 
 appliance is constructed, which was not discoverable by a 
 reasonably careful inspection and in case of an injury from 
 such a cause, it is generally held a sufficient defense for the 
 employer to show that he ^caused a reasonably careful in- 
 spection of the appliance to be made and that the defect was 
 
 lantern globe, need not be inspected. Gulf, etc., Ry. Co. v. Larkin 
 (Texas), 82 S. W. Rep. 1026; O'Brien v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. 
 (Texas), 82 S. W. Rep. 319. But see as to a maul and hammer; 
 Morris v. Eastern Ry. Co., 88 Minn. 112; 92 N. W. Rep. 535; Franklin 
 V. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co., 97 Mo. App. 473; 71 S. W. Rep. 540. 
 
 "A machinist's hammer is a simple tool, which the employer is not 
 required to inspect." Meyer v. Ladewig (Wis. 1907), 110 N. W. Rep. 
 419. 
 
 53 " A thirty-five foot wooden ladder attached to a railroad water 
 tank and only occasionally used by an employee, is not a common tool 
 or appliance, within the meaning of the rule exempting the employer 
 from the, duty to inspect such appliances, on the presumption that 
 those using them will, and should, first discover defects." Nichols v. 
 Pere Marquette R. Co. (Mich. 1906), 108 N. W. Rep. 1016. 
 
 s* An' appliance which is found to, be unsafe, where the defect therein 
 would be shown by a careful inspection, it will be presumed that no 
 such inspection was made, if it was not discovered. San Antonio, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Lindsay (Texas), 65 S. W. Rep. 668; Southern Pac. R. Co. 
 V. Winton (Texas), 66 S. W. Rep. 477. But see Healey v. Buffalo, 
 etc., R. Co., 97 N. Y. S. 801; 111 App. Div. 618. 
 
 341 
 
§ 268 DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE. 
 
 due to a latent, hidden cause, not apparent by a careful in- 
 spection.^^ 
 
 § 268. Same — Inspection of foreign cars. — The risk of 
 injury from foreign railroad cars, received by one railroad 
 company, in the ordinary, course of its business, from an- 
 other, is one of the ordinary risks of the business of rail- 
 roading, which employees of the receiving road assume.*" 
 " A railroad company receiving a loaded car from another 
 is not under the obligation to make critical tests as to its 
 safety or condition, with a view of being chargeable with neg- 
 ligence if all parts of such car, which appear, upon examina- . 
 tion, to be in good condition, are not in such condition." ^'' 
 The basis of the employer's liability, as to foreign cars, rests 
 upon the failure of his inspectors or agents to inspect such 
 cars ; not upon his implied duty to provide reasonably safe ap- 
 se For an injury from a defective brake rod, or other appliance, due 
 to a latent flaw in the metal or material, which could not be discovered 
 by a reasonably careful inspection, there is no liability. Alexander v. 
 Pennsylvania Co., 201 Pa. 252; 50 Atl. Rep. 991; Chestnut v. Southern 
 Ind. R. Co., 157 Ind. 509; 62 N. E. Rep. 32; Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Busch (Texas), 65 S. W. Rep. 681; Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Davis 
 (Texas), 65 S. W. Rep. 217. 
 
 No liability results to an employee for an injury from a derailment, 
 due to a rotten tie, unless negligent inspections can be shown. Hach 
 V. St. Xouis I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 117 Mo. App. 11; 93 S. W. Rep. 825. 
 " An employee cannot recover from a railroad company for injuries 
 caused by the breaking of the handle of a hand car by reason of 
 defects in that portion of the handle which is fastened in an iron socket, 
 and which cannot be discovered without removing it from the socket, 
 in the absence of proof of actual knowledge of the defect." Alves v. 
 New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. (R. I. 1906), 65 Atl. Rep. 261; 27 R. 
 I. 581. 
 
 38 Thomas v. Railway Co., 109 Mo. 187; 18 S. W. Rep. 980; Kahn 
 V. McNulta, 147 U. S. 238; Hathaway v. Railway Co., 51 Mich. 253; 
 16 N. W. Rep. 634; Baldwin v. Railway Co., 50 Iowa 680; Toledo, etc., 
 Ry. Co. V. Black, 88 111. 112; Smith v. Potter, 46 Mich. 258; 9 N. W. 
 Rep. 273; Kelly v. Abbott, 63 Wis. 309; 23 N. W. Rep. 890, 
 87 Bailey, Mas. Liab. Inj. Serv., pp. 105, 106. 
 
 342 
 
DUTIES OF E.MPLOTEE. § 269 
 
 pliances for the service ; ^* and, as in the case of his own cars, 
 the employer siofficiently shows a compliance with his duty, as 
 to foreign cars, when he shows proper inspections by a rea- 
 sonably competent inspector.*'* 
 
 But while it is not incumbent upon the receiving company, 
 on receipt of a car, to make expert tests to discover hidden 
 defects in the construction, mechanism or materials of such 
 car, still, it is bound to inspect foreign cars, just as it would 
 and is required to inspect its own, after they have been in 
 use. The duty devolves upon the company in the one case 
 as much as in the other.*" 
 
 § 269. Warning to inexperienced employees. — While the 
 employer is not bound to subject his employees, whom he 
 knows to possess the ordinary experience of the business, to 
 
 88 Kelly V. Abbott, supra; Keith v. New Haven, etc., Ey. Co., 140 
 Mass. 1758; 3 N. E. Eep. 28. 
 
 so Keith v. New Haven, etc., Ry. Co., supra; Macklin v. Railway 
 Co., 135 Mass. 201. 
 
 «> This is practically the language of the Supreme Court of Missouri, 
 in Gutridge v. Railway Co., 94 Mo. 468; 7 S. W. Rep. 476. 
 
 The only duty toward a foreign car is a reasonable inspection, to . 
 ascertain if it is reasonably safe. Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Parish 
 (Texas), 93 S. W. Eep. 682. 
 
 A defective foreign car will give a cause of action, generally, when- 
 ever the defective car would have given a cause of action, if it be- 
 longed to the employer. Strauss v. New York, etc., E, Co., 87 N. Y. S. 
 67; 91 App. Div. 583; St. Louis S. W. Ey. Co. v. Corrigan (Texas), 
 81 S. W. Eep. 554. 
 
 An intermediate carrier is bound to inspect a car to ascertain that 
 it is reasonably safe for delivery to such carrier, but it owes no duty 
 to an employee of the ultimate consignee, in Missouri. Sykes v. St. 
 Louis & S. F. E. Co., 178 Mo. 693; 77 S. W. Eep. 723. 
 
 "Where plaintiff, a railroad brakeman, on arriving at a station, 
 was required to couple certain foreign cars on a track of another 
 company, plaintiff's employer owed him a duty of exercising reasonable 
 care to see that such foreign cars were not defective, and, if they 
 were, to warn plaintiff of the danger." Texas & N. 0. Ey. v. ConWay 
 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907), 98 S. W. Eep. 1070. 
 
 343 
 
§ 269 DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE, 
 
 critical tests, to discover their knowledge of the dangers of 
 the business, any more than he would be those who represent 
 themselves, when employed, to possess such knowledge,*^ he 
 is bound to disclose to inexperienced employees, or those 
 whom he knows, or ought to know do not possess the req- 
 uisite knowledge, the dangers of the business in which they 
 have be6n, or are about to engage.*^ The rule applies par- 
 ticularly to children or minors, employed about dangerous 
 machinery or places, when they have not the requisite ex- 
 perience to understand the danger of their situation.*^ If 
 the minor is one of experience, however, the rule would not 
 apply, but he would be held to assume, the same as an adult, 
 the risk of dangers ordinarily incidental to the business ** 
 and the same is true as to obvious, open dangers,*® for as 
 to all such, the situation itself is sufficient warning, speaking 
 as it would, a continuous warning to all. 
 
 No warning is generally required as to causes which it 
 
 "Pittsburg, etc., Ry. Co. v. Adams, 105 Ind. 152; 5 N. E. Rep. 187. 
 
 42Lyttle V. Chicago, etc., Ey. Co., 84 Mich. 289; 47 N. W. Rep. 
 573; Tagg v. McGeorge, 155 Pa. St. 368; 26 Atl. Rep. 671; DeGraff 
 V. Railway Co., 76 N. Y. 132; Wynne v. Conlclin, 86 Ga. 40; 12 S. E. 
 Rep. 183. 
 
 *3 Crowley v. Pacific Mills, 148 Mass. 228; 19 N. E. Rep. 344; 
 Railroad Co. v. Fort, 84 U. S. 555; McGowan v. LaPlata Min. & 
 Sm. Co., 9 Fed. Rep. 861; Fox v. Peninsular Lead Works, 84 Mich. 
 676; 48 N. W. Rep. 203; Parkhurst v. Johnson, 50 Mich. 70; 15 
 N. W. Rep. 107. 
 
 ** Alexander v. Railway Co., 83 Ky. 589; Mayes v. Railway Co., 
 63 Iowa 568; 14 N. W. Rep. 340; Dysinger v. Railway Co., 93 Mich. 
 646; 53 N. W. Rep. 825. 
 
 *o Bailey, Mas. Liab. Inj. Serv., p. 126. 
 
 If the dangers and the means of avoiding them are apparent, there 
 is no duty to warn, even an inexperienced employee. Chicago, R. I. 
 & P. R. Co. V. Dauguard, 118 111. App. 67. 
 
 There is no duty to warn any class of employees, regardless of 
 age, of those things which are apparent, or which they already know 
 Blair V. Heible (Mo.), 77 S. W. Rep. 1017; Trakal v. Heuaner Co., 
 204 111. 179; 68 N. E. Rep. 399; Clark v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co., 
 
 344 
 
DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE. § 269 
 
 could not have been foreseen would cause an injury ; *® -where 
 employees are familiar with the movement of trains, no 
 warning thereof, is required,*'' but where the employees are 
 so situated that the movement of trains cannot be observed 
 by them, then notice ought to be given. *^ Whether employees 
 
 179 Mo. 66; 77 S. W. Rep. 882; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Bouldin, 121 
 Ala. 197; 25 So. Rep. 903; Seery v. Gulf, etc., E. Co. (Texas), 77 
 S. W. Rep. 950; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Bell, 209 111. 25; 70 N. E. 
 Rep. 754; Keith v. Wisconsin Cent. R. Co. (Wis.), 99 N. W. Rep. 
 217; Hofnauer v. White, etc., Co., 186 Mass. 47; 70 N. E. Rep. 1038; 
 Cleveland, etc., Ry. Co. v. Haas (Ind.), 74 N. E. Rep. 1003. 
 
 48 Before a failure tw warn will justify a conclusion of negligence, 
 the facts must show a condition where a warning was necessary. 
 Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Kimmel, 221 111. 547; 77 N. E. Rep. 936. 
 
 There is no obligation to warn employees of the danger of chipping 
 steel, as it is an obvious risk of the business of hammering it. Atchi- 
 son, etc., R. Co. V. Weikal (Kansas), 84 Pac. Rep. 720; Illinois Cent. 
 R. Co. V. Young, 97 S. W. Rep. 1115. 
 
 And this is the rule as to unguarded machinery, in the absence of 
 statute requiring it to be guarded. Smith v. Box Co., 193 Mo. 715; 
 92 S. W. Rep. 394. 
 
 *'No warning is generally required of the movement of a train 
 in a yard, where employees are familiar therewith. Southern Pac. R. 
 Co. v. Pool, 160 U. S. 438; 40 L. Ed. 485; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 338; 
 Aerkfetz v. Humphrey, 145 U. S. 418; Canadian Pac. R. Co. v. Elliott, 
 137 Fed. Rep. 904; Evans v. Wabash Ry. Co., 178 Mo. 514; Loring v. 
 Railway Co., 128 Mo. 328; Campbell v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. (Iowa), 
 100 N. W. Rep. 30; Cardwell v. Gulf, etc., R. Co. (Texas), 88 S. W. 
 Rep. 422. 
 
 48 Where operatives of engine cannot see the conditions, a foreman 
 of section or switching crew is negligent if he fails to give engineer 
 or fireman warning. Kennedy v. Kansas City, St. J. & C. B. E. Co., 
 190 Mo. 424; 89 S. W. Rep. 370. 
 
 The backing of a freight train, on a siding, on which an employee 
 was at work, without warning, was held negligence, in Kentucky. 
 Southern Ry. Co. v. Otis' Admr., 78 S. W. Rep. 480; 25 Ky. L. R. 
 1686. See, also, Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Cooper (Texas), 77 S. W. Rep. 
 263; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Lowe, 80 S. W. Rep. 768. 
 
 The starting of a train, without warning to a brakeman coupling 
 ears therein, is negligence, in Kentucky. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. 
 Jones' Admr., 80 S. W. Rep. 484. 
 
 " Where the superintendent of an employee working on a track saw 
 the employee looking out for a train and told him it was ail right, and 
 
 345 
 
§ 269 DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE. 
 
 are entitled to take advantage of a failure to sound the 
 whistle or bell, at public crossings, is decided differently, in 
 different jurisdictions, some States holding that they are en- 
 titled to presume a compliance with the law by the em- 
 ployer,^® while others hold that such provisions are not for 
 the benefit of employees at all, but that they are charged 
 with a knowledge of the movement of trains upon the em- 
 ployer's track, irrespective of statutory signals.^" 
 
 the superintendent saw a train approaching one hundred and fifty feet 
 away and gave no wariyng, he was guilty of negligence." Dunphy v. 
 Boston Elevated Ey. Co. (Mass. 1906), 78 N. E. Kep. 479. 
 
 " Where a brakeman was subject to the orders of a railroad yard 
 foreman, and was inexperienced and not supposed to be acquainted 
 with the dangers of the situation, the mere fact that he showed a 
 willingness to undertake a particular work by offering to do it did not 
 relieve the foreman from the duty of not directing him to do. it if 
 ignorant of the manner of doing it and of the dangers." King v. 
 Woodstock Iron Co. (Ala. 1904), 42 So. Eep. 27. 
 
 48 A statute, requiring a whistle and bell, on approaching a road 
 crossing, is held, in Kentucky, to give a right of action to a section- 
 man, where it was not given, when such warning, if given, would 
 have prevented the injury. Illinois Gent. E. Co. v. Mcintosh, 80 
 S. W. Eep. 494; Cahill v. Cincinnati, etc., E. Co., 92 Ky. 345; 18 
 S. W. Eep. 2; Louisville & N. E. Co. v. Survant, 44 S. W. Eep. 88; 
 Louisville & N. E. Co. v. Bodine, 59 S. W. Eep. 740; Wilmuth's Admr. 
 V. Illinois Cent. E. Co., 76 S. W. Eep. 193. 
 
 Where pedestrians are to be expected at the point where a track 
 is used by foot men, it is incumbent upon the operatives of the engine 
 to give timely warning. Cincinnati, etc., E. Co. v. Hill's Admr. (Ky.), 
 89 S. W. Eep. 523; 28 Ky. Eep. 530. 
 
 60 A trackman, killed near a crossing, is held not entitled to take 
 advantage of the statutory warning by whistle or bell, in Ohio. Nor- 
 folk & W. E. Co. V. Gesswine, 144 Fed. Eep. 56. 
 
 Failure to give warning by ringing bell or sounding whistle, is not 
 negligence as to an employee, who knew a train was due. Fore v. 
 Chicago & Alton R. Co., 114 Mo. App. 551; 89 S. W. Rep. 1034. 
 
 An employee in a yard, shoveling snow, has no right to rely upon 
 warning of the approach of trains and he cannot recover if. he is 
 injured by an engine running without whistle or bell being sounded. 
 Eicoio V. New York, N. H., etc., E. Co., 189 Mass. 358; 75 N. B. Rep. 
 704. 
 
 346 
 
DXTTIES OF EMPLOYER. § 2Y0 
 
 § 2Y0. Same — Warnings of cars and tracks to be given,, 
 when. — As a warning is not usually required as to causes 
 which could not be anticipated as likely to produce an in- 
 jury, it is not required that the employer give notice of the 
 things with which the employees are familiar, or can see for 
 themselves, such as switch stands, or obvious obstructions 
 near or adjoining the railroad track. Such things being ob- 
 vious, it is not to be presumed that an employee will come 
 in contact therewith, or receive an injury therefrom and 
 hence no duty of warning as to such things is required.®* 
 Where, however, the employer has reason to know that such 
 obstructions may cause injury; that his employees are not 
 familiar therewith, or, if familiar, where the duties of the 
 service are such as to require constant attention and an in- 
 jury from such cause is reasonably to the apprehended, then 
 warning ought to be given and a failure to give such warn- 
 ing, will be held negligence.®^ 
 
 And the same rule applies as to defects in or movements 
 of cars ; if the employees are familiar therewith, or* the move- 
 ment of th'e cars or trains are such that they can readily 
 be seen and appreciated, no duty of warning exists,®* but as 
 
 81 No warning is ordinarily due from a cause not likely to be 
 anticipated. Parish v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. (Texas), 76 S. W. 
 Eep. 234; St. Louis, S. W. Ey. Co. v. Spivey (Texas), 76 S. W. Rep. 
 748; Clark v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co., 179 Mo. 66; 77 S. W. Eep. 8,82. 
 
 No duty to instruct or warn employees of switch stands, culverts 
 or obstructions, with which they are familiar. Denver & R. G. Co. 
 V. Burchard (Colo.), 86 Pac. Rep. 749; Price v. Central of Ga. Ry. 
 Co., 124 Ga. 899; 49 S. B. Eep. 683; 53 S. E. Rep. 455. 
 
 62 For negligence in failing to warn train crews of lumber piles 
 or similar obstructions, near railroad track, of which they are igno- 
 rant, see Bradburn v. Wabash R. Co. (Mich.), 96 N. W. Rep. 929; 
 Illinois Ter. R. Co. v. Thompson, 210 111. 226; 71 N. E. Rep. 328; 
 Northern Ala. R. Co. v. Mansell, 138 Ala. 548; 36 So. Rep. 459. 
 
 As. to insuflScient warning of obstructions near track, where the 
 warning would not sufficiently advise employee of the exact location 
 of the danger, see Bradburn v. Wabash E. Co. (Mich.), 96 N. W. 
 Rep. 929. 
 
 63 The mere fact of minority does not impose any greater degree 
 
 347 
 
§ 210 DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE. 
 
 ,to youthful or inexperienced employees, or such as the em- 
 ployer should reasonably apprehend are unfamiliar with the 
 dangers to be anticipated in the servicBj a warning reasonably 
 sufficient to inform them of the probable danger should be 
 given.°* 
 
 of care upon the employer than would be imposed were the employee 
 of full age. Decatur Car Mfg. Co. v. Terry (Ala.), 41 So. Rep. 839. 
 
 "A railroad company was not bound to notify an employee of the 
 danger of being struck by cars as he was walking along its track, 
 unless it ought to have anticipated that he would be there at the 
 time he was struck and killed." Lord v. Boston & M. K. Co. (N. H. 
 1906), 65 Atl. Kep. 111. 
 
 B4 The employer is bound to warn youthful or inexperienced employees 
 of the danger of handling engines or cars and the risks incident 
 thereto. Gulf, etc., E. Co. v. Newman (Texas), 64 S. W. Eep. 790; 
 Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Utley, 66 8. W. Rep. 311. 
 
 A card, placed on either side of a crippled car, is usually the only 
 notice thereof required. Shuster v. Philadelphia, etc., Ry. Co. (Del.), 
 62 Atl. Rep. 689. 
 
 As to an experienced employee, there is no duty on the part of a 
 railroad company, moving cars in its railroad yards, to keep a watch- 
 man to give»notice to its employees of such movement, or to give other 
 warning by bell or whistle, for this is the object of constructing the 
 tracks and this is the duty of the employees to so opef ate the cars 
 and locomotives thereon. 
 
 Considering the existence of any such duty, on the part of railroad 
 companies, the Supreme Court of the United States, in Aerkfetz v. 
 Humphries (145 U. S. 418; 36 L. Ed. 758), Mr. Justice Brewer deliver- 
 ing the opinion, said : " We observe that the plaintiff was an em- 
 ployee and, therefore, the measure of duty to. him was not such as 
 to passengers or strangers. * » * There were no strangers whose 
 presence was to be guarded against. The ringing of bells and the 
 sounding of whistles on trains going and coming and switch engines 
 moving forward and backward, would have simply tended to confusion. 
 The person in direct charge had a right to act on the belief that the 
 various employees in the yard, familiar with the continuously recurring 
 movement of cars, would take reasonable precautions against their 
 approach. * * * It cannot be said, under these circumstances, the 
 defendants were compelled to send some man in front of the cars for 
 the mere sake of giving notice to employees who had all the time 
 knowledge of what was to be expected." 
 
 This decision is cited with approval, by the Missouri court, in the 
 oft cited case of Loring v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (128 Mo., p. 359), 
 348 
 
DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE. § 271 
 
 § 211. Obligation to repair appliances. — To prevent in- 
 juries to employees from tools, machinery or appliances, 
 made defective by the continuous friction and deterioration 
 incident to the use in the given business, the employer is 
 held, in law, to the duty of repairing appliances or machinery 
 that have become defective by use.®^ In case of an injury 
 due to a failure to repair a known defective appliance, or due 
 
 where Judge Gantt, for the court said : " If the law exacts of a 
 traveler upon a highway the duty of looking and listening, o fortiori, 
 it demands of an employee, familiar with the usages and dangers 
 of a switch yard, that he look before he steps upon the track upon 
 which his daily experience teaches him a train, or an engine, may 
 pass at any moment." 
 
 An employee -at work elsewhere than at a street crossing cannot 
 complain of the engineer's failure to sound the bell or whistle at 
 the crossing. Fore v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 114 Mo. App. 551; 89 
 S. W. Rep. 1034. 
 
 If the operatives of a train have reason to expect the presence 
 of persons on the track, notice by whistle or bell ought to be 
 given. Cincinnati & N. 0. Ry. Co. v. Hill's Admr., 89 S. W. Rep. 
 523; 28 Ky. L. R. 530. 
 
 Where it is the established practice of a railroad company to 
 run special trains without notice, sending out an engine with a snow- 
 plow, without notice, in a storm, is not negligence, as to a trackman, 
 injured by the engine. Olsen v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co., 38 Minn. 
 117; 35 N. W. Rep. 866. 
 
 A person who has rightfully entered a pay car, on the stopping of 
 the train to which it is attached, is entitled to a reasonable time 
 for the transaction of his business before the train is started and 
 of a proper warning of the purpose or intent to start the train, to 
 enable him to leave the car in safety, and for a failure to furnish 
 him such opportunity, in case of injury, the company will be held 
 liable, in damages. New York P. & N. R. Co. v. Coulbourn, 69 Md. 
 360; 18 Md. L. J. 823; 1 L. R. A. 541; 16 Atl. Rep. 208. 
 
 Where men are rightfully at work on a trestle, over which a 
 railroad is operated, with a knowledge of the persons operating the 
 railroad, who knew that the men are thereby placed in great danger, 
 it is the duty of the company to operate and run its trains with 
 care proportionate to the danger; and if it does not do so, it is 
 negligent. Interstate T. R. C. R. Co. v. Fox (Kan.), 21 Pac. Rep. 797. 
 
 B5 Bailey, Mas. Liab. Inj. Serv., p. 33; St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. 
 Co. V. Andrews (Ark.), 96 S. W. Rep. 183. 
 
 349 
 
§ 2Yl DUTIES OF EMPLOYES. 
 
 to an appliance so defective that in the exercise of ordinary 
 care, by proper inspections, the defect could have been dis- 
 covered, the employer will be answerable to the employee.^® 
 
 But if the employee injured by a known defective appli- 
 ance, at the time of his injury was engaged to place the ap- 
 pliance or tool in a proper condition for use, as where he 
 was employed to repair it, the employer will not ordinarily 
 be answerable for such an injury, for having undertaken the 
 duty of repair, the employee will be held, in law, to assume 
 the incidental risks attendant upon the duties to be per- 
 formed, and if he is injured while making the repairs, he 
 cannot generally recover for such an injury.®'' 
 
 The duty of repairing the appliances and places where the 
 employees are required to work, however, is only ordinary 
 care, and it is wrong to instruct the jury that it is the em- 
 ployer's duty to exert a high degree of diligence to keep a 
 railroad track in repair,®® as there is no greater degree of 
 care required in this particular than in other specific duties 
 imposed by the law upon the employer for the protection 
 of his employees. Where, with knowledge of the railroad 
 company, or its officers, however, a. track has been permitted 
 to accumulate cinders and clinkers, discharged from the en- 
 gine, until it is in a dangerous condition for brakemen going 
 between freight cars to make couplings, the employer will 
 be responsible for an injury to a brakeman from stumbling 
 over cinders, because of the failure to repair the track, or 
 remove the cinders. ®® And where the track bolster, holding 
 the circle of the crane to a steam shovel, had sunk, on account 
 
 B8 Baker v. Eailroad Co., 95 Pa. St. 211. 
 
 57 Bryant v. Railway Co., 66 Iowa 305; 23 N. W. Rep. 678; Carl- 
 son V. Railway Co., 21 Or. 450; 28 Pac. Rep. 497. 
 
 08 Van Blarcom v. Central R. Co. (N. J.), 64 Atl. Rep. 111. 
 
 BO St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Ames (Texas), 94 S. W. Rep. 1112. 
 
 This decision does not commend itself as in accord with the weight 
 of authority, but seems to have been rendered by a court, anxious to 
 recognize a liability. 
 
 350 
 
DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE. § 2^2 
 
 of the rotten condition of the timber supporting it, and the . 
 employer's roadmaster, on discovering the defective timber, 
 had only tightened certain bolts and continued to use the de- 
 fective appliance, instead of repairing the machine, an em- 
 ployee, injured by the slipping of the chain from the circle, 
 on account of the rotten condition of the timber thereof, was 
 held entitled to recover.®** 
 
 § 272. Duty to provide a reasonably safe system. — The 
 business of railroading being a more or less dangerous busi- 
 ness, and complicated in its various details, it has been held, 
 by some courts, that it is also an implied duty on the part 
 of such employers to so systematize the business that it may 
 be carried on in a reasonably safe manner, as distinguished 
 from a mode or m«thod of doing the business which would 
 be held negligent.®^ 
 
 This duty is denied by eminent authority and it is some- 
 times stated that the employer can conduct his business in 
 
 eo Southern R. Co. v. Wiley (Miss.), 41 So. Rep. 511. 
 
 The duty to repair appliances is just as imperative as the duty 
 to inspect. Meehan v. Great North. Ry. Co., 101 N. W. Rep. 183; 
 San Antonio, etc., Ry. Co. v. Hahl (Texas), 83 S. W. Rep. 27. 
 
 If a defect would have been apparent from a reasonably care- 
 ful inspection, it is immaterial that the employer did not have 
 actual notice thereof. Elliot v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 67 Mo. 272. 
 
 A failure, on the part of a railroad company, to keep its appli- 
 ances in proper repair, was held to give a cause of action, in the 
 following cases: Southern Ry. Co. v. Carson, 194 U. S. 136; 48 L. 
 Ed. 907; Voelker v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (a defective automatic 
 coupler), 129 Fed. Rep. 522. 
 
 The company must keep its engines in repair and this duty ex- 
 tends to a step between the fireman's seat and the deck of the 
 cab. Fry v. Great Northern Ry. Co. (Minn.), 103 N. W. Rep. 733; 
 Smith v. Electric Co., 188 Mass. 371; 74 N. E.' Rep. 664. 
 
 oiLockwood V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 55 Wis. 50; 4 Thompson 
 on Neg., § 4175, and cases cited; Austin v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 93 
 Iowa 236; 61 N. W. Rep. 849; Hosic v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 75 Iowa 
 683; 37 N. W. Eep. 963. 
 
 351 - 
 
§ 2l2 DtJl?I^ O]? EMtLOTEB. 
 
 any manner that commends itself to him, so long as he is not 
 negligent in the selection of appliances, places to work, em- 
 ployees or in some of the other specific matters detailed in 
 preceding pages,^^ but since the employee in one department 
 of a service as extensive as railroading cannot know or ob- 
 serve all the details of other departments of the business and 
 to charge him with an assumption, of the risk of injuries in 
 such service would be sometimes unjust, it is perhaps the 
 better rule to recognize a duty upon the part of the employer 
 to use such reasonable care to systematize his business as is 
 used by other employers in the same business.®* 
 
 This does not mean that one company can be held negligent 
 for not using the same system as some other company, where 
 the business as conducted is reasonably safe, or that a com- 
 pany is held to the employment of the latest methods of the 
 service, but only that reasonable care shall be used by the 
 employer, or such system or method employed as is used by 
 reasonably prudent employers.®* For instance, if a com- 
 pany has a reasonably safe system of signaling in its switch 
 yards, it cannot be held negligent for a failure to use a sys- 
 tem of automatic signals,® ® nor can a tracklayer successfully 
 complain of the method of laying a track, where a pinch- 
 bar is used to push the track into position, as this is a rea- 
 sonably safe method of doing the business and one usually 
 employed, although there may be safer methods of doing the 
 same work.®® 
 
 62 Bailey, Mas. Liab. Inj. Serv., pp. 14, 15, and cases cited. 
 
 esKeiley v. The Alliance, 44 Fed. Rep. 97; Breen v. St. Louis, 
 etc., Co., 50 Mo. App. 202; Gassaway v. Georgia Southern Ry. Co., 
 69 Ga. 347; 4 Thompson on Neg., § 4176; Baxter v. Chicago, etc., 
 R. Co., 104 Wis. 307; 80 N. W. Rep. 644. 
 
 64 4 Thompson on Neg., § 4175. 
 
 65 McGregor v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 212 Pa. 482; 61 Atl. Rep. 
 1017. 
 
 66 Gassaway v. Georgia Southern Ry. Co., 69 Ga. 347. 
 
 352 
 
DUTIES OF EMPLOYJIE. § 273 
 
 § 2Y3. Same —^ Necessity for some system to prevent colli- 
 sions. — Railroading is such a hazardous business, in all its 
 details, and the employees of one train, from the very nature 
 of their service, can know so little about the movements of 
 other trains on the tracks of their employer, that it is very 
 generally held that the employer should adopt some system 
 to avoid collisions between cars and engines and that trains 
 should only be operated according to a fixed custom or sys- 
 tem, which should be brought home to the knowledge of the 
 operatives of the various trains,®'^ It is, of course, not es- 
 sential that any particular system should be adopted, or that 
 of any particular company, or section, but only that a rea- 
 sonably safe system be used to avoid collisions between 
 trains ®® and to prevent trains or cars from striking em- 
 ployees otherwise engaged than in the operation of trains.®® 
 
 67 It is held to be negligence for a railroad company to fail 
 to adopt some system or method to prevent collisions between its 
 trains where one train is ahead of time and disobeys orders and 
 notice of its disobedience is brought home to the dispatcher, in 
 time for him to have prevented the collision. Sante Fe Pac. E. 
 Co. V. Holmes, 136 Fed. Rep. 66; 68 C. C. A. 634; 202 U. S. 438; 
 26 Sup. Ct. Eep. 676; 50 L. Ed. 1094. 
 
 68 Some method should be provided by the employer, a railroad 
 company, to prevent the collision of cars being set out on both a 
 side track and the main track, by waiting a, sufficient time for those 
 on the main track to get far enough away, before shunting cars 
 in on the side track. Struble y. Burlington, etc., R. Co. (Iowa), 
 103 N. W. Rep. 142; Smith v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 73 N. H. 325; 61 
 Atl. Eep. 359; Rosne v. Erie R. Co., 135 Fed. Eep. 311; 68 C. C. A. 
 155. 
 
 The method of having one of the brakemen on a train, used in a 
 freight yard, to keep a 'lookout for employees on the track, is not 
 essential, where other reasonably safe precautions are employed. 
 Lewis V. Vicksburg, etc., E. Co., 114 La. 161; 38 So. Eep. 92. 
 
 6» Where employees are seen walking on the track, or they are 
 accustomed to use the track, it would be negligence for the em- 
 ployer to fail to adopt some means of avoiding striking them, or 
 to have its trains slow down in such places. Martin v. Chicago & 
 N. W. R. Co., 194 111. 138; 62 N. E. Rep. 599; Louisville & N. R. 
 1—23 . 353 
 
§ 273 DUTIES OP EMPLOTEE. 
 
 It is held that it is not negligence to adopt a block sys- 
 tem '''' or any particular number of telegraphic stations, at 
 fixed distance from each other to regulate the running of 
 trains ; '^^ it is generally sufficient to regulate the operation 
 of trains by telegraphic orders, from a chief dispatcher, who 
 bases his orders on information from local agents,''^ and, 
 
 Co. V. Simpson's Admr., 23 Ky. L. E. 1075; 64 S. W. Rep. 750; 
 St. Louis, S. W. E. Coy v. Jacobson (Texas), 66 S. W. Eep. Ill; 
 Southern Ey. Co. v. Craig, 113 Fed. Eep. 76; Louisville & N. E. 
 Co. V. Lowe (Ky.), 6 S. W. Rep. 736; Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Ma- 
 roney, 22 Ohio Cir. Ct. 469; 12 0. C. D. 366; Galveston, etc., R. 
 Co. y. Quay (Texas), 66 S. W. Rep. 219; Houston, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Turner (Texas), 91 S. W. Rep. 562; Cason's Admr. v. Coviiigton, 
 etc., R. Co. (Ky.), 93 S. W. Rep. 19; 98 S. W. Rep. 304; Dunphy 
 v. Boston El. Ey. Co. (Mass.), 78 N. E. Rep. 479; Mills v. Missouri 
 Pac. R. Co. (Mo.), 94 S. W. Rep. 973; Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Fan- 
 ning (Texas), 93 S. W. Rep. 344; Alecson v. Erie R. Co., 91 N. 
 Y. S. 1029; 101 App. Div. 395; Peoples v. North Car. R. Co. (N. C), 
 49 S. E. Rep. 87; International & G. N. R. Co. v. Jacobs (Texas), 
 84 S. W. Rep. 288. 
 
 to " Where, in an action for injuries to a brakeman by his foot 
 becoming caught in an unblocked frog, there was undisputed proof 
 that on some of the railroad systems in -the State and elsewhere it 
 was customary- to leave frogs unblocked, and on others to block 
 them, and the frogs on some parts of defendant's lines were blocked 
 and on others not, and also that there was a fair difference of 
 opinion among practical railroad men as to which was the safer 
 practice, defendant's failure to block the frog in question did not 
 constitute actionable negligence." Wabash R. Co. v. Kithcart (U. 
 S. C. C. A., Iowa, 1906), 149 Fed. Rep. 108. 
 
 "A street railroad does not fail to furnish a sufficient block- 
 light system, so as to be liable for injury to a motorman from col- 
 lision with another car on the block, where it appears that the 
 accident could not have happened had the motorman and conductor 
 of the other car performed their duty of turning on the light be- 
 fore entering on the block." Berg v. Seattle, R. & S. Ey. Co. 
 (Wash. 1906), 87 Pac. Rep. 34. 
 
 71 A system of maintaining telegraph stations at such distances 
 as is ordinarily safe for the proper running of its trains, Is suffic- 
 ient. Stewart v. Raleigh, etc., R. Co. (N. C), 53 S. E. Rep. 877. 
 
 73 The regulation of freight and passenger trains by telegraphic 
 orders from a chief dispatcher, based on information reported by 
 354 
 
generally, any system -will be held sufficient which is in 
 general vogue in railroading, or which is reasonably safe, if , 
 not the best or most approved system known to those skilled 
 in the business, or, what is the same thing, if a negligent 
 custom or system is discarded^* 
 
 § 274. Duty to protect employee from weather. — It may 
 
 well be doubted if there is any implied duty on the part 
 of an employer to protect his employees from severe or in- 
 clement weather, in the absence of an assurance or promise 
 so to do, as such obligation, to protect employees from in- 
 juries from natural causes, beyond the control of the em- 
 ployer, practically would make of him an insurer of the 
 safety of his employees. Not only would the employee be 
 held to assume the risk of injuries from inclement weather, 
 because no negligence could be charged to the employer for 
 a failure to control forces beyond his power, or a lack of 
 knowledge of facts which the employee did' not and could 
 not, himself possess, but no liability would ordinarily re- 
 sult in such case, because the contributory negligence of the 
 employee, in any case where negligence could properly be 
 brought home to the employer, would also prevent a recovery 
 by the employee.''* 
 
 The general rule of nonliability for injuries from in- 
 clement weather, would not obtain, however, in a case where 
 the severe condition of the weather was known by the em- 
 ployer and the exposure thereto was incurred by the em- 
 ployee upon an express promise or assurance of protection. 
 
 local agents of the movement of trains, is held to be a proper 
 system for the regulation of trains. Northern Pao. Ey. Co. v. Dixon, 
 139 Fed. Rep. 737. 
 
 7! Every railroad company must see to it that "a negligent custom 
 is not established in the conduct of its business. Pittsburg C. C, . 
 etc., R. Co. V. Nicholas, 165 Ind. 679; 76 N. E. Rep. 522. 
 
 "Crowley v. Appleton, 148 Mass. 98; 18 N. E. Rep. 675. 
 
 355 
 
§ 2Y5 DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE. 
 
 Accordingly in a Missouri case, where an employee was in- 
 duced to shovel snow, in the night time, from a badly drifted 
 track, upon the assurance that a warm car would be provided^ 
 near by, to enable him to warm in and the car was not pro- 
 vided and his feet were frozen, as a result of the exposure, 
 he was held to have a cause of action. sounding in tort.'^® 
 
 And in a Minnesota case, where an employee was sent 
 out on the line of the defendant's road, in severe cold 
 weather, to repair a wrecked caboose, nine miles from the 
 nearest station, and the defendant knew that the plaintiff 
 was illy provided with food, clothes or shelter and that he 
 expected the defendant to send for him, a failure to do so 
 as a result of which he was compelled to walk to the nearest 
 station, and the exposure caused him to contract rheumatism, 
 was held to render the defendant liable, for its negligence.^® 
 But before the employee could claim compensation from the 
 employer for sickness, resulting from exposure, increasing 
 a malady to which the employee was subject, his ignorance 
 of the malady and the affect of the exposure would not alone 
 entitle him to a verdict, but he would also have to show that 
 the fact of the malady and the affect of the exposure thereon, 
 was known to the employer, as well as the ignorance of the 
 employee thereof. '''' 
 
 § 2Y5. Duty in the employment of infants. — In the absence 
 of a statute preventing such employment, the mere employ- 
 ment of a minor, about dangerous work, without the par- 
 ents's consent, is not negligence per se, so as to render the 
 employer liable to the parent of such infant, in case of his 
 injury or death. '^® Nor is it negligence per se for the em- 
 ployer to have a minor employee do a more dangerous 
 
 76 Hyatt V. Hannibal & St. Joe R. Co., 19 Mo. App. 287. 
 
 76 Schumaker v. St. Paul & D. R. Co., 46 Minn. 39 ; 48 N. W. Rep. 
 559; 12 L. R. A. 257. 
 
 77 Crowley v. Appleton, 148 Mass. 98; 18 N. E. Rep. 675. 
 
 78 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Long, 94 Ind. 250; Texas & Pacific R. 
 
 356 
 
DUTIES, OF EMPLOYEE, ' § 2Y5 
 
 class of work than that for which he was employed/® and 
 in many States, even where there is a statute preventing the 
 employment of infants of a certain age; the mere fact of 
 such employment is not negligence sufficient to render the 
 employer liable for an injury to an infant so employed. ^'^ 
 But the federal court has held that it is an act of negli- 
 gence for a railroad company to employ, as a brakeman, an 
 infant of such tender years as to be unable to understand 
 the risks of the business, if his infancy is known to the 
 company when he is employed and the contract is made with- 
 out the consent of the parent.®^ A company that changes 
 a minor employee from the business of shoveling to that of 
 braking on the railroad, is prevented from setting up the 
 lack of skill of such infant, as a defense to an action for an 
 injury,*^ and, in some States, where a statute prevents the 
 employment of infants, an injury to one employed in viola- 
 tion of the statute, is sufficient evidence of negligence to 
 support a recovery for such injury.** 
 
 Co. v. Carlton, 60 Tex. 397; Texas & N. 0. Ry. Co. v. Crowderj 61 
 Tex. 262. 
 
 79 Anderson v. Morrison, 22 Minn. 274. 
 
 so Belles v. Jackson, 4 Pa. Dist. R. 194; Ash v. Verlenden, 154 
 Pa. St. 246; 26 Atl. Rep. 374; White v. Whitman Co., 58 Hun 381; 
 12 N. Y. Supp. 188; 131 N. Y. 631; 30 N. E. Rep. 236. 
 
 A railroad company that employs a minor, knowing him to be 
 such, and of years not suflScient to enable him to understand the 
 nature of the hazards to which he is exposed, will be liable for - 
 injuries to him received in such service; but if the company be- 
 lieved him to be of age, when employed, it would not be liable for 
 his injury, or lack of experience in the business, although his 
 parents had not consented to the employment. Goff v. Norfolk & 
 Western R. Co. (C. C. W. D. Va.), 36 Fed. Rep. 299. 
 
 81 Golf's Admr. v. Norfolk & Western R. Co., 36 Fed. Rep. 299. 
 
 s2Goins v. Chicago R. I. & Pac. R. Co. 37 Mo. App. 221. But 
 where railroad company was ignorant of infancy or there were facts to 
 put it on inquiry see YeuU v. Sioux City & Pac. R. Co., 66 Iowa 346; 
 23 N. W. Rep. 736. 
 
 ssHieke v. Taffe, 99 N. Y. 204; 1 N. E. Rep. 685; 52 Am. Rep. 
 19; Cooke v. Lorance Co., 33 Hun 351; Flynn v. Erie Co., 12 N. Y. 
 St. Rep. 88, 
 
 .357 
 
CHAPTEK XII. 
 
 NEGLIGtENCE, OF INDEPENDENT CONTEACTOES. 
 
 § 276. Who considered independent contractor. 
 
 277. Contractors distinguished from employees. 
 
 278. Owner not liable for negligence of contractor. 
 
 279. Acts of contractor's employees. 
 
 280. How existence of relation determined. 
 
 281. Franchise cannot be devolved upon contractor. 
 
 282. Where contractor performs nondelegable duty. 
 
 283. Railway company retaining control or supervision of work. 
 
 284. Where work is inherently dangerous. 
 
 285. Contract for performance of unlawful acts. 
 
 286. Where injury is caused by defective plans. 
 
 287. Acceptance of defective work by eontractee. 
 
 288. Appliances furnished by railroad company. 
 
 289. Joint undertaking renders either party liable. 
 
 290. Status of contractor and subcontractor. 
 
 291. Tortious acts of contractoE, generally. 
 
 292. Contract between construction company and railroad com- 
 pany. 
 
 293. Management of trains by construction company. 
 
 294. Injuries from frightening teams. 
 
 295. Injuries to passengers by independent contractor. 
 
 296. Injuries to travelers in streets. 
 
 297. Injuries to employees of contractor. 
 
 298. Negligence of railway surgeons. 
 
 299. Railroad hospital — Physicians company agents, when. 
 
 300. Contracts exempting railroad company from liability. 
 
 § 276. Who considered independent contractor. — An em- 
 ployment is regarded as independent when the person ren- 
 ders service in the course of an occupation representing the 
 will of an employer only as to the result of the work and 
 not as to the means by which it is accomplished.^ The reser- 
 
 1 Chicago, etc., K. Co. v. Ferguson, 3 Colo. App. 414; Knk V. 
 358 
 
HTDEPENDENT CONTKACTOES. § 2T6 
 
 vation to the employer of the privilege of supervising and 
 inspecting the work of the contractor does not destroy or im- 
 pair his character as an independent contractor, if the ap- 
 pliances and means of performing the work are furnished by 
 the contractor,^ and one to whom a railroad company has let 
 a contract for the performance of certain work, without re- 
 serving any control over the persons employed in the work, 
 is held to be an independent contractor and not an employee 
 of the railroad company.' 
 
 As recently defined by the Missouri Supreme Court, an 
 independent contractor is one who " undertakes to do a 
 specific piece of work for anothgr, without submitting him- 
 self to such other's control in the details of the work, save 
 as to the result of the work." * 
 
 This is the definition usually given and from this it will 
 be seen that if a person contracts to do a specific piece of 
 work, furnishing his own employees and assistants and exe- 
 cuting the contract in the performance of the labor, either 
 entirely according to his own ideas, or in accordance with 
 a plan furnished by the one for whose benefit the work is 
 done, without being under the latter's supervision, as to 
 the details of the contract, he is generally held to be a con- 
 tractor and not an employee.® 
 
 Missouri, etc., Co., 82 Mo. 276; reversing 10 Mo. App. 61; Gayle v. 
 Missouri Car, etc., Co., 177 Mo. ,427; 76 S. W. Rep. 987; Bibb v. 
 Norfolk, etc., E. Co., 87 Va. 711; 14 S. E. Rep. 163; 47 Am. & Bng. 
 E. Cas. 651; Cunningham v. International, etc., R. Co., 51 Texas 
 503; Powell V. Virginia, etc., Co., 88 Tenn. 692; 13 S. W. Eep. 
 691. 
 
 2 Bibb V. Norfolk, etc.,' E. Co., 87 Va; 711; 14 S. E. Eep. 163; 47 
 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 651. 
 
 3 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Yonley, 3 Ark. 503; 14 S. W. Eep. 
 800; 45 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 578. 
 
 * Gayle v. Missouri Car, etc., Co., 177 Mo. 427; 76 S. W. Eep. 
 987. 
 
 5 Pink V. Missouri, etc., Co., 82 Mo. 276; Long v. Moon, 107 
 Mo. 334; 17 S. W. Eep. 810; Miller v. Minnesota, etc., E. Co., 76 
 Iowa 655, 
 
 359 
 
§ 276 INDEPENDENT CONTKACTOES. 
 
 But if, instead of working under a separate contract for 
 the performance of the work, the employer either reserves 
 the employment of the assistants, or the furnishing of the 
 appliances, or otherwise interferes with the accomplishment 
 of the details of the work, instead of leaving same to the 
 judgment and discretion of the contractor, in performing the 
 details of the work, the relation of employer and employee 
 and not that of owner and contractor will be held to exist, 
 for otherwise the nondelegable duties of the employer, in the 
 duty of furnishing reasonably safe appliances and places of 
 work, and a sufficient number of competent employees, could 
 always be avoided by the delegation of work, by the piece, to 
 an independent contractor." If a contractor, therefore, is 
 but exercising the usual corporate powers of a railroad com- 
 pany, as where a contractor undertakes to reconstruct a piece 
 of the railroad track of a railroad company, and the details 
 of the work and other matters are reserved to the railroad 
 company, in part, he must be regarded as the agent and not 
 the contractor of such company and the railroad company 
 will be liable, so far as the general public is concerned, for 
 his acts.'^ 
 
 sFell V. Rich Hill, etc., Co., 23 Mo. App. 216; Rice v. Smith, 171 
 Mo. 331; 71 S. W. Rep. 123. 
 
 7 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Conroy, 39 111. App. 351. 
 
 A contract to pay by the job ia usually held to be strong evidence 
 that the relation of employer and employee does not exist. Gayle 
 V. Missouri Car, etc., Co., 177 Mo. 427; 76 S. W. Rep. 987. 
 
 The method of payment is always a circumstance to be con- 
 sidered in determining the exact relation existing. And where the 
 work is paid for, in a lump sum, on completion, the fact that the 
 work was to be performed to the satisfaction of the owner, will 
 not make him liable for the injuries due to negligence of the con- 
 tractor. Indiana, etc., Co. v. Gray, 19 Ind. App. 565; 48 N. E. Rep. 
 803; Miller v. Minnesota, etc., R. Co., 76 Iowa 655. 
 
 The proper inquiry always, is, "Who had control of the execution 
 of the work being performed?" Charlock v. Freel, 125 N. Y. 357; 
 26 N. E. Rep. 262. 
 
 360 
 
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOES. § 277 
 
 § 277. Contractors distinguished from employees. — The 
 absence of the rule of agency, which renders the principal 
 responsible for the act of the agent, within the scope of his 
 employment) is the distinguishing feature between a con- 
 tractor and an employee of a railroad company. 
 
 If a railroad company contracts for the construction of 
 its road in such a manner that the contractor has a right to 
 direct the details of the construction, and to control the mode 
 in which the work is to be done, as well as the agencies em- 
 ployed, the company only reserving the right to insist that 
 the work, when completed, shall conform to the terms of 
 
 The test for determining the character of the relation is not 
 the method of payment alone, but whether the employee or con- 
 tractor used his own means or methods for accomplishing the work, 
 or that of the owner. Morgan v. Smith, 159 Mass. 570; 35 N. E. 
 Rep. 101; Klages v. Gillett-Herzog Co., 86 Minn, 458; 90 N. W. Rep. 
 1116. See, also, Loehring v. Westlake Const. Co., 118 Mo. App. 
 163; 94 S. W. Rep. 747; Scharf v. Southern 111., etc., Co., 115 Mo. 
 App. 157; 92 S. W. Rep. 126. 
 
 The following is the definition given in the interesting article in 
 Cyc, of an Independent Contractor : " An independent contractor 
 is one who, carrying on an independent business, contracts to do a 
 piece of work according to his own methods, and without being 
 subject to the control of his employer, as to the means by which the 
 result is to be accomplished, but only as to the result of the work." 
 26 Cyc. Law & Proc, pp. 1546, 1547, and cases cited. See, also; 
 Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Stevens, 97 Va. 631; 34 S. E. Rep. 525; 46 
 L. R. A. 367; Smith v. Simmons, 103 Pa. St. 32; 49 Am. Rep. 113. 
 
 " Where an employer assumes the relation of employer to the em- 
 ployees of one whom he has engaged to produce a given result, the 
 duties and responsibilities which the law imposes on such a rela- 
 tion attach." Kansas City & O. Ry. Co. v. Loosley (Kan, 1907), 90 
 Pac. Rep. 990. 
 
 The mode of payment by itself is not a reliable test of the ex- 
 istence' of the relation, as a man may be an independent contractor, 
 although paid by the day or week, or a given profit, above the actual 
 cost of the work or structure. 26 Enc. Law & Proc, p. 1551 ; Morgan v. 
 Smith, 159 Mass. 570; 35 N. E. Rep. 101; "Wabash, etc., R. Co.,. 
 V. Farver, 111 Ind. 195; 12 N. E. Rep. 296; 6P Am. Rep. 696; Karl 
 V. Juniata County, 206 Pa. St. 633; 56 Atl. Rep. 78; New Orleans, 
 ftc, R. Co. V. Reese, 61 Miss. 581. 
 
 36J 
 
§ 278 INDEPENDE]>}T CONTBACTOKS. 
 
 the contract, the railroad company would not be liable for an 
 injury resulting from the negligence of such contractor or 
 his employees, for he would lack the status of an agent, in 
 the performance of the work, and would be engaged in his 
 own behalf.® For the same reason, a person who contracts 
 to grade the roadbed for a railroad, at, a stipulated price, the 
 work to be done entirely by himself and those employed by 
 him, is an independent contractor and not an agent of the 
 railroad company, although the contract may provide that 
 the work shall be finally completed to the satisfaction of 
 the company's engineer.® 
 
 But when the details of the contract are to be completed 
 under the orders of the railroad company employing the 
 person to do the work and according to the direction of the 
 railroad company, and the contractor only undertakes, in 
 general terms, to perform the work, and the railroad com- 
 pany reserves the right and power, not only to direct what 
 shall be done, but how it shall be done, and to control the 
 doing of- it, while it is being done, then the contractor is 
 held not to be an independent contractor, in a Texas case,^* 
 but is held to be the agent or employee of the railroad com- 
 pany, so as to bind it for the negligence of the contractor or 
 his employees. 
 
 § 278. Owner not liable for negligence of contractor. — The 
 rule was firmly established, at common law, that an owner 
 or employer was not liable for an injury due to the negli- 
 gence of an independent contractor. 
 
 In a carefully considered case, decided over half a cen- 
 
 sEome, etc., R. Co. v. Chasteen, 88 Ala. 591; 7 So. Eep. 94; 40 
 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 559; Arasmitti v. Temple, 11 111. App. 39. 
 
 »Eogers v. Florenoa, etc., E. Co., 31 So. Car. 378; 9 S. E. Eep. 
 1059; 39 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 348. 
 
 "Texas, etc., E. Co., v. Dudley, 1 Texas Civ. App. 271. 
 
 362 
 
INDEPENDENT CONTEACTOES. § 278 
 
 tury.ago in England, ^^ the doctrine of respondeat superior 
 ■whicli holds the employer responsible for the wrongful acts 
 of his employees, performed within the usual scope of the 
 employment, was denied as to the employer of a contractor or 
 subcontractor, where the relation of employer and employee 
 did not exist and this rule is now firmly established. In 
 this case,^^ a railway company had entered into an inde- 
 
 11 Knight V. Fox, 1 E. L. & E. K. 477; 20 L. J. (N. S.) Exch. 65 j 
 14 Jur. 963, decided November 5, 1850. 
 
 12 In Knight v. Fox, supra. Alderson B., said : " On the evidence, 
 it appears that Cochran, when he did that negligent act, was act- 
 ing as a subcontractor and did it on his own account. The de- 
 fendants were not concerned in the matter and the plaintiff's action, 
 should therefore, have been brought against him." And Pollock, 0. 
 J., also said : " No doubt, taking the case as it stands, you may, 
 by rejecting some of the evidence, and perverting the rest, make 
 out enough to persuade a jury to find for the plaintiff, sooner than 
 let her go uncompensated for the injury she received. But it is 
 otherwise, when you examine all the evidence; and here I may re- 
 mark, that when compensation is to come from the pockets of others, 
 people are extremely liberal in awarding it." Human nature was 
 the same in England, a half century ago, as evidenced by this ex- 
 |)ression of the learned Chief Justice, in this case, as it is in the 
 United States to-day, and juries were then as prone to alleviate 
 distress, in the guise of dispensing justice, as they are to-day. See, 
 
 ■ also, Quarnam v. Barnett, 6 M. & W. 499; Allen v. Hayward, 7 Q. 
 B. 960; Eapson v. Cubitt, 9 M. & W. 710. 
 
 " A proprietor is not exonerated from liability for negligence in 
 the doing of work let out to an independent contractor, unless he 
 has used care to select a competent person as contractor." MuUich 
 V. Brocker (Mo. App. 1906), 97 S. W. Eep. 549. 
 
 The owner, using due diligence in the employmeW of a reasonably 
 careful contractor, who undertook to perform certain work in his 
 own way, without being subject to the control of the owner, was - 
 held not liable for the negligence of the 'contractor, in the follow- 
 ing cases: Steele v. Southeastern R. Co., 16 C. B. 550; 81 E. C. L. 
 550; Hobbitt v. London, etc., R. Co., 4 Exch. 254; Hole v. Sitting- 
 bourne, etc., R. Co., 6 H. & N. 488; 30 L. J. Exch. 81; 3 L. T. Rep. 
 N. S. 750; Salliott v. King Bridge Co., 122 Fed. Rep. 378; 58 C. 0. 
 A. 466; 65 L. R. A. 620; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Ferguson, 3 Colo. 
 App. 414; 33 Pac. Rep. 684; Leavitt v. Bangor, etc., R. Co., 89 Me. 
 
 363 
 
§ 278 INDEPENDENT CONTBACTOES. 
 
 pendent contract with A to construct a branch line of rail- 
 road for it. A contracted with B to erect a tubular bridge, 
 as a parcel of the work. B had a surveyor, 0, to whoih he 
 paid a fixed salary, by the year, to attend to his business, and 
 after obtaining the contract for the bridge, B contracted with 
 C to provide the necessary scaffolding, for which he was to 
 receive the sum of 40£, irrespective of his salary, B to fur- 
 nish the requisite materials, including lights. One of the 
 poles of the scaffold rested on the highway, and owing to the 
 want of sufficient light, to warn passers-by,. D stumbled over 
 the pole and was injured and subsequently additional lights 
 were placed on the spot and B paid for them, but the court 
 held that B was not liable for the injury to D, but that his 
 remedy was against the contractor, 0. 
 
 This decision, according to modern rules of law, would 
 no doubt be decided the -other way, as the liability of B 
 would rest upon the neglect to furnish the lights, which he 
 was obliged to furnish under the contract and to permit him 
 to avoid liability, on the ground that C was an independent 
 contractor, was equivalent to letting him set up his own 
 wrong, in failing to do what he had agreed to do, in further- 
 ance of his contract with 0, as a result of which D sustained 
 the injury sued for. In other words, the injury was due 
 
 509; 36 Atl. Rep. 998; 36 L. K. A. 382; Charlebois v. Gogebic, etc., 
 K. Co., 91 Mich. 59; 51 N. W. Rep. 812; King v. New York, etc., 
 R. Co., 66 N. Y. 181; 23 Am. Rep. 37; Stewart v. California, etc., 
 Co., 131 Cal. 125; 63 Pac. Rep. 177; 52 L. R. A. 205; Nortli Chicago 
 R. Co. V. Dudgeon, 69 111. App. 67. 
 
 In Bush V. Steinman (1 B. & P. 404), and Sly v. Edgley (6 Esp. 
 6), which were followed by a few decisions in this country, the 
 owner was held liable for the negligence of the contractor, but these 
 decisions were subsequently overruled and this is not now the law 
 in, either England or America. Boswell v. Laird, 8 Cal. 469; 68 
 Am. Dec. 345; Morgan v. Bowman, 22 Mo. 538; Hoflf v. Shockley, 
 122 Iowa 720; 98 N. W. Rep. 573; 101 Am. St. Rep. 289; 64 L. R. 
 A. 538; Reedie v. London, etc., R. Co., 4 Exch. 244; 20 L. J. Exch. 
 65j 26 Enc. Law & Proc. (Cyc.) 1553, 
 
INDEPENDENT CONTEACTOES. § 279 
 
 proximately to the neglect of B, not to that of 0, in some 
 detail of the contract which he was to perform.- 
 
 § 2Y9. Acts of contractor's employees. — The rule of re- 
 spondeat superior applies only to cases where the relation of 
 employer and employee exists and it does not apply as be- 
 tween an owner and the employees of an independent con- 
 tractor.^* In the absence of some authority to bind the 
 owner, the employees of an independent contractor would 
 not be held to possess such authority, as matter of law, any 
 more than any other third parties, for as to such owner, with 
 whom there is no privity wjiatever, it would be doing vio- 
 lence to legal principles to recognize any implied. power to 
 bind one who is not in any way responsible for their actSi 
 
 One is therefore not responsible for -injuries occasioned 
 by the acts of employees of one who has cbntracted to do a 
 piece of work by the job.** A railroad company is not lia- 
 ble for an injury to a passenger due to a negligent act of the 
 employees of an independent contractor,*® and if a company 
 by contract ' engages one to perform certain work, without 
 reserving any control over the details of the work, the mere 
 fact that an employee of such company assists in the work of 
 the contractor, where he is subject to the control of the con- 
 tractor and not of the company, in the performance of such 
 work, will not be sufficient to render the company liable for 
 an injury due to the, negligence of the contractor, for the 
 contractor and not the general employer is responsible for the 
 acts of such employee, while he is acting for him and the 
 relation of employer and employee would be held to exist be- 
 tween them.*® 
 
 13 Bibb V. Norfolk, etc., E. Co., 87 Va. 711; 14 S. E. Eep. 163; 
 47 Am. & Eng. K. Cas. 651; Carter v. Berlin, etc., Co., 58 N. H. 52. 
 
 "Clark V. Vermont, etc., R. Co., 28 Vt. 103. 
 
 "Daniel v. Metropolitan, etc., R. Co., 3 C. P. 591; 37 L. J. C. P. 
 280. 
 
 "Powell V. Virginia Const. Co., 88 Tenn. 692; 13 S. W. Rep. 691., 
 
 365 
 
§ 280 IWDEtENDEiSfT CONTEACTOE^. 
 
 § 280. How existence of relation determined. — If all the 
 
 facts necessary for the determination of the relation of the 
 parties are undisputed, or are conceded hy the parties to 
 the cause, it is the duty of the court, as matter of law, to 
 determine whether one is an independent contractor, or an 
 employee of a railroad company. ■''' But where the facts are 
 disputed, or are not conceded by the parties to the cause, 
 the court should leave it to the jury, under proper instruc- 
 tions, to determine the issue and say whether one occupied 
 the relation of a contractor or that of an employee.^* This 
 rule was applied, in a Missouri case,^® where there was a 
 conflict in the evidence of the owner's power to discharge 
 the alleged contractor, and the Supreme Court held that 
 where the evidence upon the right of the employer to dis- 
 charge the employee was disputed, the court should leave 
 it to the jury to -find whether or not the employee was the 
 agent of the owner, or an independent contractor. 
 
 A mere reservation by the employer of the right to demand the 
 discharge of the contractor's employees, without a right to employ 
 employees for the contractor, or a right to demand the employment 
 of a sufficient force in kind and quantity to speedily accomplish the 
 work, will not render the employer liable. 26 Enc. Law & Proc. 
 1552; McKinley v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 40 Mo. App. 449; Cuff 
 V. Newark, etc., R. Co., 35 N. J. L. 17; 10 Am. Rep. 205; Thomas v. 
 Altoona, etc., R. Co., 191 Pa. St. 361; 43 Atl. Rep. 215. 
 
 But if the oontractee reserves the right to discharge aSiy of the 
 contractor's employees, this will make him an employer, in Missouri. 
 Larson v. Metropolitan, etc., R. Co., 110 Mo. 234; 19 S. W. Rep. 
 416; 16 L. R. A. 330; 33 Am. St. Rep. 439. 
 
 iTGayle v. Missouri Car, etc., Co., 177 Mo. 427; 76 S. W. Rep. 
 987; White, Personal Injuries in Mines, 539, and cases cited. 
 
 When an issue is raised and there is any dispute in the evidence, 
 the issue should be submitted to the jury. Sacker v. Waddell (Md.), 
 56 Atl. Rep. 399; Cratt v. Albemarle, etc., Co., 132 No. Car. 151; 
 43 S. E. Rep. 597; Brennan v. Merchant, etc., Co., 205 Pa. 258; 54 
 Atl. Rep. 891. 
 
 isQayle v. Missouri Car, etc., Co., 177 Mo. 427; 76 S. W. Rep. 
 987, and cases cited, supra. 
 
 19 Gayle v. Missouri Car, etc., Co. supra. 
 366 
 
IJifDEPENDEI^T COK^TKACTOES. § 281 
 
 However, the question whether or not a person is an in- 
 dependent contractor is a question of law for the court, 
 where the duties and relation of the parties is evidenced by 
 a written contract and the 'determination of the relation 
 existing depends upon a mere construction of such contract, 
 for the construction of a written instrument, as a general 
 rule, is always a duty of the court, not of a jury.*" 
 
 § 281, FrancMse cannot be devolved upon contractor. — A 
 
 railway company cannot devolve upon an independent con- 
 tractor the exercise of its franchise granted to it by the 
 State, and if it attempts to do so, as where it undertook to 
 permit a construction company to carry passengers generally 
 for hire,^^ it remains liable for the acts of the contractor, 
 in the exercise of its franchise rights, to the same extent as 
 if it had itself occasioned the injuries sustained, by its own 
 negligence. 
 
 It is held to be against the public policy of the State grant- 
 ing the charter to a railroad company, to permit it to devolve 
 the important rights and duties upon another, not standing 
 in such relation to the State as to make him responsible to 
 it for a misuse of the charter privileges granted to the rail- 
 road company.^* 
 
 But if the act causing the injury is one that does not 
 
 20 Rogers V. Florence, etc., E. Co., 31 So. Car. 378; 9 S. E. Eep. 
 1059; 39 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 348. 
 
 The issue whether or not one was an independent contractor or 
 an employer, was held to be one of law for the court, subject to the 
 existence of disputed facts, to be determined by the jury, in Em- 
 merson v. Fay, 94 Va. 60; 26 S. E. Rep. 386. 
 
 21 Chattanooga, etc., E. Co.* v. Whitehead, 89 Ga. 190; 15 S. E. 
 Rep. 44; Wisconsin, etc., E. Co. v. Ross, 142 111. 8; 31 N. E. Rep. 
 412; Lowell V. Boston, etc., R. Co. (by Shaw, C. J.), 23 Pick. 
 (Mass.) 24. 
 
 22Balsley v. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 119 111. 68; 5 Thompson on 
 Cor., §§ 5584, 5585, 6293, and cases cited. 
 
 36Y 
 
§ 281 INDEPENDENT CONTEACTOES. 
 
 require the performance of the important charter rights 
 granted to the railroad company by the State, for the non- 
 exercise or wrongful exercise of which the charter -of the 
 company could be forfeited by the State, the railroad com- 
 pany will not be responsible for the wrongful acts of the 
 contractor.^* 
 
 And where the injury is to an employee of a railroad 
 company, that has leased the roadbed, track and rolling stock 
 of another railroad, the current of authority, in the absence 
 of a statute imposing such liability on the lessor, is to. the 
 effect that the lessee alone will be responsible to the einployee 
 for such an injury, for the employee is required to look to his 
 own employer for compensation for his injuries, as no duty 
 would be implied by laM', on the part of the lessor company, 
 which has assumed no duties toward him at all.^* 
 
 23 Alabama, etc., E. Co. v. Williams, 92 Ala. 277; 9 So. Rep. 203; 
 Sanford v. Pawtucket, etd., R. Co., 19 R. I. 537; 35 Atl. Rep. 67; 
 33 L. R. A. 564; 4 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 318. 
 
 2*Buckner v. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 72 Miss. 873; 18 So. Rep. 
 449; East Line, etc., R. Co. v. Culberson, 72 Texas 375; Virginia, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Washington, 86 Va. 629; 43 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 688. 
 
 " Where an injury to a third person results from the failure of 
 the employer to perform a duty which he owes to such party, he 
 cannot avoid his liability by letting the performance of the work 
 to another." St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Madden (Kan. 1908), 93 Pac. 
 Rep. 586. 
 
 Railroad companies have been held incapable of delegating their 
 franchises and consequently liable for the acts of a contractor or 
 lessee, arising from an attempt to exercise franchise rights, in the 
 following cases: Boyd v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 217 111. 332; 75 N. E. 
 Rep. 496; 108 Am. St. Rep. 253; Metropolitan R. Co. v. Dick, 87 
 111. App. 40; North Chicago E. Co. v. Dudgeon, 184 111. 476; 56 N. 
 E. Rep. 796; Solomon R. Co. v. Jones, 30 Kansas 601; 2 Pac. Rep. 
 657. * 
 
 But this rule is not without cases denying its application. Kan- 
 sas Central R. Co. v. Fitzsimmons, 18 Kansas 34. And if the con- 
 tract is for the contractor to construct a railroad and not to operate 
 it, it is not an exercise of the franchise rights of the company. 
 Boyd v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 217 111. 332; 75 N. E. Rep. 496; 
 368 
 
INDEPENDENT OONTBACTOES. § 282 
 
 § 282. Where contractor performs nondelegable duty. — It 
 
 may be .confidently stated, as a general proposition, that 
 wliere the law devolves a specific duty upon the railroad 
 company, either in the capacity of a carrier, or as an em- 
 ployer, it cannot avoid a liability for a failure to discharge 
 this duty in the capacity where the law imposes it, by dele- 
 gating the performance of such a duty to an independent con- 
 tractor, for to permit it to do so would be to let it take ad- 
 vantage of its own illegal aet,^^ 
 
 The law places upon the carrier of passengers, for hire, 
 the highest degree of care to provide safe appliances and ve- 
 hicles for the transportation of passengers received by it 
 and it cannot avoid thi« duty by delegating these public du- 
 ties to an irresponsible independent contractor.^* 
 
 A railroad company owes the duty to the public to keep 
 its tracks and roadbed free from obstructions caused by stand- 
 ing cars, or other objects, likely to effect collisions, resulting 
 in the injury of its passengers or employees and if it fails to 
 do so, and permits stationary cars to stand where a collision 
 is caused and injuries consequently effected, it cannot avoid 
 the liability therefor, by the defense that the work of un- 
 loading the cars was delegated by it to an independent con- 
 tractor, or lessee, whose employees' negligence was directly 
 responsible for the injuries sustained.^'' 
 
 108 Am. St. Eep. 253; Atlanta, etc., R. Co. v. Emberly, 87 Ga. 161; 
 13 S. E. Eep. 277; 27 Am. St. Kep. 231; Sanford v. Pawtucket E. 
 Co., 19 R. I. 537; 36 Atl. Eep. 67; 33 L. E. A. 564; OuEningham 
 V. International, etc., E. Co., 51 Texas 503; 52 Am. Eep. 632. 
 
 2B Fowler v. Sacks, 7 Mackey (D. C.) 507; 7 L. E. A. 649. 
 
 20 1 Thompson on Neg., § 665, and cases cited; Texas Midland 
 E. Co. T. Griggs (Texas), 106 S. W. Eep. 411. A carrier that 
 uses a station under the control of its lessee, impliedly agrees with 
 its passengers that it is reasonably safe for the purpose and it can- 
 not escape liability for an injury from the defective condition of 
 the station, because of the terms or conditions of such a lease. Kuh- 
 len v. Boston, etc., E. Co. (Mass.), 79 N. E. Eep. 815. 
 
 27 Montgomery Gas Co. v. Montgomery, etc., E. Co., 86 Ala. 372; 
 1—24 369 
 
§ 283 INDEPENDENT CONTEACTOES. 
 
 § 283. Railway company retaining control or supervision of 
 work. — A railroad company is responsible for the negligence 
 of workmen, although they are actually employed by an in- 
 dividual -who has contracted to construct a portion of the 
 railroad for a stipulated sum, where the work is being done, 
 under the direction and supervision of the railroad company 
 itself.^* Where the railroad company retains control over 
 
 5 So. Rep. 735. See, also, Texas, etc., E. Co. v. Juneman, 71 Fed. 
 Rep. 939; 30 U. S. App. 541; 18 C. C. A. 349; Sanford v. Pawtucket 
 R. Co., 19 R. I. 537; 35 Atl. Rep. 67; 33 L. R. A. 564; 4 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 318. 
 
 In an action for injuries sustained in falling into an excavation 
 on depot grounds, evidence held insufficient to show that the relation 
 of independent contractor occupied by the contractors to the rail- 
 road company under the contract for doing the work was changed 
 by a practical construction of the contract so as to constitute the 
 contractors employees of the railroad company. Louisville & N. R. 
 Co. V. Cheatham (Tenn. 1907), 100 S. W. Rep. 902. 
 
 For the violation of a statutory duty to construct stock guards on 
 railroad right of way and a liability resulting therefrom, although 
 the performance was delegated to an independent contractor, see 
 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Meador, 50 Texas, 77. 
 
 But where the statutory duty is imposed upon the company " or " 
 a contractor and the neglect to perform it is that of the contractor; 
 the owner could not be held liable. Koch v. Fox, 71 N. Y. App. 
 Div. 288; 75 N. Y. Supp. 913. 
 
 A railroad company has been held incapable of avoiding liability by 
 the delegation of nondelegable, duties to an independent contractor, 
 in the following cases: Lowell v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 23 Pick. 
 (Mass.) 24; 34 Am. Dec. 33; Southern Ohio R. Co. v. Morey, 47 
 Ohio St. 207; 24 N. E. Rep. 269; City, etc., R. Co. v. Moore, 80 
 Md. 348; 30 Atl. Rep. 643; 45 Am. St. Rep. 345; Montgomery, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Smith (Ala.), 39 So. Rep. 575; Taylor, etc., E. Co. v. 
 Warner, 88 Texas 642; 32 S. W. Rep. 868; Carrico v. West Virginia 
 R. Co., 39 W. Va. 86; 19 S. E. Rep. 571; 24 L. R. A. 50; Texas, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Juneman, 71 Fed. Rep. 939; 18 C. C. A. 394. 
 
 Nor is it essential that the duty be imposed by statute, for if the 
 law imposes the duty, it cannot be delegated, whether it is imposed 
 by statute or not. Covington, etc., Co. v. Steinbrock, 61 Ohio St. 
 215; 55 N. E. Rep. 618; 76 Am. St. Rep. 375. 
 
 28 Lowell V. Boston, etc., R. Co., 23 Pick. (Mass.) 24; Eaton v. 
 European, etc., R. Co., 59 Me. 520. But see, Clark v. Hannibal, etc., 
 3Y0 
 
INDEPENDENT OONTEACTOBS. § 283 
 
 the mode and manner of doing the work, the relation of in- 
 dependent contractor does not exist, and the employer is lia- 
 ble for an injury to a third person, due to the carelessness 
 or wrongful act of the contractor, while he is engaged in the 
 performance of the work for the railroad company.*® If 
 the railroad company undertakes to direct the manner of 
 performing the work, or provides any of the instrumentali- 
 ties, it then owes to the contractor and to his employees, the 
 exercise of ordinary care in selecting such appliances and 
 will be liable for an injury resulting from a failure to use 
 such care.®** And where the railroad company had em- 
 ployed another company to construct its railroad for it, un- 
 der the terms of a contract which would not render it liable 
 for the negligence of the contractor, but after abandonment 
 of the contract by the contracting company, it took charge 
 of the work and supervised it to completion, it would be 
 liable for an injury due to the negligent manner of con- 
 structing the track or roadbed.^^ And the same result would 
 follow an injury to an employee of the contractor, on a train, 
 operated by the railroad company, for the use of the con- 
 tractor's employees, for in operating the train and manning 
 it with its own employees and agents the railroad company 
 would assume the corresponding obligation of seeing that 
 reasonable care was used to make it safe, as it would be the 
 only one who could be legally held for injuries due to the 
 negligent management of such train. ^* 
 
 E. Co., 36 Mo. 202; Stone v. Chesire, etc., E. Co., 19 N. H. 427. 
 
 29 Hughes V. Cincinnati, etc., E. Co., 39 Ohio St. 461; 15 Am. & 
 Eng. E. Cas. 100; McMasters v. Pennsylvania E. Co., 3 Pittsh. (Pa.) 
 1. 
 
 s»Eoddy v. Missouri Paeifle Ey. Co., 104 Mo. 234; 15' S. W. Eep. 
 1112. 
 
 31 Savannah, etc., E. Co. v. Phillips, 90 Ga. 829 ; 17 S. E. Eep. 
 82; Atlanta, etc., R. Co. v. Kimberly, 87 Ga. 161. 
 
 32 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Clark, 26 Neb. 645; 42 N. W. Eep. 703; 
 38 Am. it, Eng. E. Cas. 192. 
 
 371 
 
§ 283 INDEPENDENT OONTBAOTOES, 
 
 But the retention of supervision of the work of a con- 
 tractor, of itself, would not render the railroad company 
 liable for an injury resulting from the negligence of the 
 contractor, where the railroad company had not in any way 
 interfered with the independent action of the contractor 
 in the doing of the Mjork.*' Nor would the railroad com- 
 pany be liable for an injury to a third person, due to the 
 negligence of the contractor, where it had retained control 
 over the manner of doing a specified portion of the work 
 only and the injury resulted in the manner that the contrac- 
 tor had performed some other portion of the work.®* And 
 the mere right to insist that the work shall be completed sub- 
 ject to the satisfaction of the railroad company's engineer, 
 will not render the railroad company liable for an injury 
 due to the negligence of the contractor, although the engineer 
 retains the right to insist upon the discharge of the objec- 
 tionable employees of the contractor, for this would not 
 amount to a retention of general supervision or control of 
 the work being done, by the railroftd company, or its 
 agent.®" 
 
 ss Larson v. Metropolitan E. Co., 110 Mo. 234; 19 S. W. Eep. 416. 
 
 31 Hughes V. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., 39 Ohio ^t. 461; 15 Am. & 
 Eng. E. Cas. 100. 
 
 soMcKinley v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 40 Mo. App. 449; Cuff v. 
 Newark, etc., E. Co., 35 N. J. L. 17; Burmeister v. New York, etc., 
 E. Co., 15 J. & S. (N. Y.) 264. 
 
 The right to control, as distinguished from the actual control 
 of the contractor, is the test generally recognized in determining 
 the relation of the parties. Hedge v. Williams, 131 Cal. 455; 63 
 Pac. Eep. 721; 32 Am. St. Eep. 366; Linnehan v. Eollins, 137 Mass. 
 123; 50 Am. Eep. 287. If the contractee retains the right of control 
 it is immaterial that he left some of the details to the contractor, 
 hut if the method of attaining the result is left to the contractor, 
 and only the result is to be in accordance with the stipulated plans 
 of the contractee, the contractor is alone liable. Pickens v. Decker, 
 21 Ohio St. 212; 8 Am. Rep. 55; Parrott v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 
 127 Iowa 419; 103 N. W. Bep. 352; Miller v. Merrift, 211 Pa. St. 
 127; 60 Atl.' Rep. 508; O'Neill v. Blase, 94 Mo. App. 648; 68 S. 
 3Y2 
 
INDEPEITDENT CONTEACTOES. § 284 
 
 § 284. Where work is inherently dangerous. — The general 
 rule that a railroad company is not liable for the negligence 
 of an independent contractor, does not apply where the re- 
 sulting injury is one that might have been anticipated, as 
 a direct or probable consequence of the performance of the 
 work contracted for.*^ In a well-considered Arkansas case,*'' 
 Judge Hemingway states this rule as follows : " If one 
 employs another to perform a work which, from its nature, 
 
 W. Rep. 764; Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Tow (Ky.), 63 S. W. Eep. 
 27; 66 L. E. A. 941. 
 
 The liability of an employer for the acts of his employees grows 
 out of and is measured by the control of the former over the latter; 
 and for the want of such control, the principal will not ordinarily 
 be liable for the acts or neglect of the employees of a contractor or 
 subcontractor. Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Flake, 1 Texas Civ. App. 99; 
 Pawlett v. Rutland, etc., R. Co., 28 Vt. 297; Reedy v. London, etc., 
 R. Co., 4 Exch. 244. 
 
 It is not necessary that one who engages a contractor should take 
 control over all features of the work to render him liable as em- 
 ployer to the contractor's employees, but the fact that he possesses 
 a limited control will not entail such a liability if the contractor 
 is left free to exercise his own will as to the means of accomplishing 
 the result. Kansas City & O. Ry. Co. v. Loosley (Kan. 1907), 90 
 Pac. Rep. 990. 
 
 A right to supervise as to the result of the contractor's work, as 
 distinguished from- a right of control of the details of the work 
 will not render the contractee liable. Hughes v. Cincinnati, etc., 
 R. Co., 39 Ohio St. 461; McKinley v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 40 Mo. 
 App. 449; Omaha, etc., R. Co. v. Hargadine, 5 Neb. 418; 98 N. W. 
 Rep. 1071; Eaton v. European R. Co., 59 Me. 520; 8 Am. Rep. 430; 
 Boyd V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 217 111. 332; 75 N. E. Rep. 496; 
 108 Am. St. Rep. 253; Pearl v. West End R. Co., 176 Mass. 177; 
 57 N. E. Rep. 339; 49 L. R. A. 826; 79 Am. St. Rep. 330; St. 
 Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Knott, 54 Ark. 424; 16 S. W. Rep. 9. 
 
 so Southern Ohio R. Co. v. Morey, 47 Ohio St. 207; 24 N. B. Eep. 
 269; 7 L. R. A. 701; 43 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 97. 
 
 3' St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Yonley, 53 Ark. 503; 14 S. W. Rep. 
 800; 45 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 578; Cooley, Torts, p. 646; Bower v. 
 Peate, 16 Moak's Eng. R. 374; Callahan v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 23 
 Iowa 562. 
 
 3Y3 
 
§ 285 IH'DEPENDEWT CONTKACTOES. 
 
 is necessarily dangerous * * * the employer cannot 
 escape liability fpr the injury thereby done. In such cases, 
 the injury flows from th6 doing of the act, as its natural 
 consequence, and not from the manner in which the act is 
 done." 
 
 This rule is based upon the interest of the general public 
 and the concern of the State over the lives and limbs of its 
 citizens, when the business of the contractor is likely to re- 
 sult in an injury to any considerable number of people. In 
 such cases, the owner is not permitted to exempt himself 
 from liability for injuries to the public, by employing an 
 independent contractor, but will remain liable for such in- 
 juries as result, if inherently dangerous work is permitted 
 to be proceeded with, in a manner likely to cause such injury, 
 to the same extent as though the owner did the dangerous 
 work himself.** 
 
 § 285, Contract for performance of unlawful acts. — Where 
 a contractor is employed to do an unlawful act, a person in- 
 jured by such unlawful act or by any result of it, may re- 
 cover damages from either the contractor or the employer, 
 for the injuries sustained.** 
 
 38 White, Per. Inj. in Mines, § 546, and cases cited. But see. 
 Smith V. Benick, 87 Md. 610; 41 Atl. Rep. 59; 42 L. R. A. 277. 
 
 Where the work contracted for itself creates the danger, owner 
 held liable, in Downey v. Low, 22 App. Div. 460; 48 N. Y. S. 207 
 Clowdis V. Fresno, etc., Co., 118 Cal. 315; 50 Pac. Eep. 373; Wil 
 Hams v. Fresno, etc., Co., 96 Cal. 14; 30 Pac. Eep. 961; 31 Am. St. 
 Kep. 172; Wertheimer v. Saunders, 95 Wis. 573; 70 N. W. Rep. 824 
 37 L. E. A. 146; Chicago, etc., Co. v. Meyers, 168 111. 139; 48 N. E 
 Eep. 66. 
 
 The running of frequent railroad trains over a grade crossing 
 in a crowded street is a business fraught with such danger to trav- 
 elers that the railroad company cannot delegate to an independent 
 contractor the operation of gates thereat and so escape liability for 
 negligence of the gate tender. Boucher v. New York & R. Co. 
 (Mass. 1907), 82 N. B. Rep. 15. 
 
 88 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Van Bayless, 1 Texas Civ. App. 247. 
 374 
 
INDEPENBENT CONTRACTOKS. § 285 
 
 When the laying of a railroad track necessitates the dig- 
 ging np of a highway and the obstruction of it with earth 
 and materials, the obstruction so formed is a public nuisance, 
 unless properly guarded and the railroad company will 'be 
 liable for the injuries «caused thereby, when the work is done 
 under a permit issued to it, although the work is actually 
 done by an independent contractor.*" 
 
 But, as a general rule, a railroad company will not be 
 liable for an injury resulting from a nuisance, created by 
 the negligence of an independent contractor, in constructing 
 its railroad, where it retains no control over the contractor, 
 except to see that the railroad is built according to contract.*^ 
 In a Vermont case,*^ a horse was frightened at a steam shovel, 
 being operated near a highway and ran away, throwing the 
 plaintiff out of the buggy and injuring him. In the trial of 
 the case, it appeared that the railroad company had con- 
 tracted for the loading of certain ballast and that an inde- 
 pendent contractor was operating the steam shovel at the 
 time of the injury to the plaintiff. The trial court instructed 
 
 *o Woodman v. Metropolitan E. Co., 149 Mass. 335; 21 N. E. 
 Eep. 482; 38 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 484; Taylor v. Dunn, 80 Texas 
 652; 16 S. W. Eep. 732. 
 
 ^1 Atlanta, etc., E. Co. v. Kimberly, 87 Ga. 161; 13 S. E. Eep. 
 277; 47 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 307. 
 
 42 Bailey v. Troy, etc., E. Co., 57 Vt. 252. 
 
 Where the work is of an unlawful character or is so inherently 
 dangerous as to amount to a nuisance, in case of a resulting injury, 
 the employer of the contractor is held liable in the following cases: 
 Woodman v. Metropolitan, etc., E. Co., 149 Mass. 335; 21 N. E. 
 Eep. 482; 14 Am. St. Eep. 427; 4 L. E. A. 213; Wiggin v. St. Louis, 
 135. Mo. 558; 37 S. W. Eep. 528; St. Paul, etc., Co. v. Ware, 16 
 Wall. 566; 21 L. Ed. 485; Mullins v. Siegel, etc., Co., 183 N. Y. 129; 
 75 N. E. Eep. 1112; Williams v. Fresno, etc., Co., 96 Cal. 14; 30 Pac. 
 Eep. 961; 31 Am. St. Eep. 172; Braisted v. Brooklyn, etc., E. Co., 
 46 N. Y. App. Div. 204; 61 N. Y. S. E. 674; Johnston v. Phoenix 
 Bridge Co., 169 N. Y. 581; 62 N. E. Eep. 1096; Berg v. Parsons, 
 156 N. Y. 109; 50 N. E. Eep. 957; 41 L. E. A. 391; 66 Am. St. Eep. 
 542; Burbank v. Bethel, etc., Co., ,75 Me. 373; 46 Am. Eep. 400. 
 
 375 
 
§ 286 INDEPENDENT CONTEACTOKS. 
 
 the jury that a verdict might be returned against the rail- 
 road company, on account of the illegal nature of the work 
 being donej but this was held to be error by the higher court, 
 and it was decided that it was not an unlawful ,work, in 
 itself, but only became so, when negligently done by the con- 
 tractor and that the railroad company was not liable, unless 
 it directed the work and retained supervision of the man- 
 ner in which it was performed. 
 
 § 286. Where injury is caused by defective plans. — An- 
 other exception to the rule of nonliability of a railroad com- 
 pany, for an injury resulting from the work of an independ- 
 ent contractor, in which the railroad company does not re- 
 serve the right to interfere and does not interfere or control 
 the contractor, is in the case of an injury occurring through 
 a defective plan or method prescribed or furnished by the 
 railroad company itself and which the independent con- 
 tractor has simply carried out, in the performance of the 
 work under the contract. It is accordingly held that where 
 the work of the contractor was in accord with plans and 
 specifications of the employer and that the adherence to these 
 plans so furnished, was the proximate cause of the injury, 
 the railroad company would be liable therefor and could 
 not avoid responsibility by the defense that the work was 
 doae by an independent contractor.** 
 
 But even when the work was carried out according to 
 plans or methods prescribed by a railroad company, and this 
 is the cause of the injury to an employee or third person, 
 while the contractor is engaged in performing the work un- 
 der the contract, if the plans were prepared by a skillful 
 
 *a Jones v. Philadelphia Traction Co., 185 Pa. St. 75; 39 Atl. Rep. 
 889; Lancaster v. Connecticut, etc., Co., 92 Mo. 460; 5 S. W. Rep. 
 23; 1 Am. St. Rep. 739; Atlanta, etc., R. Co. v. Kimberly, 87 Ga'. 
 161; 13 S. E. Rep. 277; 26 Am. St. Rep. 231; Koch v. Sackmann, 
 etc., Co., 9 Wash, 405; 37 Pac. Rep. 703. 
 
 376 
 
IHDEPENDElirT COIfTEACTOES. § 287 
 
 engineer or expert and due care was used in the selection of 
 such expert to prepare the plans, then there would be no 
 liability on the part of the employer, unless there was some 
 interference in the plans on his part or in the work being 
 done, as a result of which the injury was occasioned.** 
 
 § 287. Acceptance of defective work by contractee. — Al- 
 though a railroad company would not be responsible for an 
 injury growing out of the original inherent dangerous na- 
 ture of the work, plant or roadbed, constructed by an inde- 
 pendent contractor, if it could not be regarded as a nuisance to 
 the public, as this is essential to hold the contractee liable for 
 an injury to a third person thereon, yet if, when finally com- 
 pleted, the work contracted for is so dangerous as to threaten 
 injury to all who may come in contact with it and the railroad 
 company, with knowledge of the fact, accepts the dangerous 
 construction or work of the contractor, it will thereby be held 
 to ratify and adopt the wrongful act of the contractor, to 
 the extent of rendering it liable for an injury caused by such 
 a nuisance.*'' 
 
 Hence it is, that where a dangerous railroad crossing over 
 a highway is constructed by an independent contractor for 
 the railroad company whose track crosses such highway, al- 
 though it had nothing to do Avith the original construction 
 of such a dangerous road crossing, yet if, after it adopts it 
 and accepts it from the contractor, it continues to use it and 
 because of the inherently dangerous nature of the crossing a 
 third person, rightfully using the crossing, sustains a fatal 
 injury thereon, the railroad company cannot avoid liability 
 
 44 White V. Green (Texas), 82 S. W. Eep. 329; Burke v. Ireland, 
 26 N. Y. App. Div. 487; 50 N. Y. Supp. 369; 26 Cyc. Law & Proc. 
 (Cyc.) 1559. 
 
 *5Berberich v. Ebaeh, 131 Pa. St. 165; 18 Atl. Eep. 1008; Khron 
 V. Brock, 144 Mass. 516; 11 N. B. Eep. 748; 1 Thompson on Neg., § 
 664, and cases cited. 
 
 377' 
 
§ 288 INDEPENDENT CONTEACTOES. 
 
 for such an injury, by reason of the defense of an independent 
 contract, under which such crossing was contructed, but by 
 acceptance and user of the crossing in its dangerous condition, 
 it will so far be held to adopt and ratify the wrongful act of 
 the contractor, as to render it liable therefor.*® 
 
 § 288. Appliances furnished by railroad company. — The 
 
 relation of employer and employee continues, not only so 
 long as the employer reserves any control or supervision over 
 the manner of doing the work, but also when he agrees to 
 furnish the agencies or instrumentalities by which it is ef- 
 fected.*^ 
 
 The proposition is illustrated by a Missouri case,*^ where 
 a railroad company had contracted for the movement of all 
 its freight from a certain station, by the ton, and it agreed 
 to furnish the cars and engines to be used and to keep them 
 in repair. The plaintiff, at the time of his injury, was en- 
 gaged in unloading and removing cars at an elevator and 
 the injury was caused by running cars against those in which 
 he was at work, without warning to him of the movement of 
 the cars. Although the cars moved were under the control 
 of the contractor's employees, it was held that they were em- > 
 ployees of the railroad company, on account of the peculiar 
 wording of the contract under which the work was being 
 done, and the railroad company was liable for the injury. 
 
 A similar holding obtained, in a Massachusetts case,** 
 where a railroad company furnished a defective derrick, 
 
 i^Ante idem; Taylor, etc., R. Co. v. Warner, 88 Texas 642; 32 
 S. W. Kep. 868. 
 
 But see, contra, Atlanta, etc., K. Co. v. Kimberly, 87 Ga. 161; 13 
 S. E. Rep. 188. 
 
 47Shearm & Redf. on Neg., §§ 76, 77; Wood on Mas. & Serv. 
 § 281; Fell V. Rich Hill, etc., Co., 23 Mo. App. 216. 
 
 48 Speed V. Atlantic, etc., R. Co., 71 Mo. 303, 308. 
 
 ^oConlon v. Eastern R. Co., 135 Mass. 196; 15 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 99. 
 
 378 
 
IWDEPENDENT CONTKACTOES. § 289 
 
 for use by a contractor and the plaintiff sustained injuries 
 by the falling of the derrick. 
 
 But where a railroad company makes a contract for the 
 construction of its road, or the performance of other work, 
 and it is left entirely to the contractor to furnish the machin- 
 ery or appliances to be used, the railroad company would not 
 be liable for an injury to a person from the use of appliances 
 furnished by the contractor,^" and even though the railroad 
 company itself furnished the appliances which caused the 
 injury, if the injury was due to a failure to repair the appli- 
 ances and this duty and the entire control thereof devolved 
 upon the contractor, the railroad company would not be liable 
 for an injury caused from a failure to repair the given appli- 
 ances on the part of the contractor or its employees. °^ 
 
 § 289. Joint undertaking renders either party liable. — Un- 
 der the familiar rule that either of two joint wrongdoers 
 can be held liable for an injury resulting from the wrongful 
 acts of the two "while engaged in some joint enterprise, a 
 railroad company that enters into an arrangement whereby 
 it jointly londertakes to carry out a piece of work, in con- 
 nection with a contractor, is held liable for an injury to 
 an employee of such contractor while engaged in furtherance 
 of the joint undertaking, provided the injury results from 
 the negligence of either of the two while engaged in the 
 joint undertaking.^^ 
 
 60 Chicago City R. Co. v. Hennessy, 16 111. App. 153. 
 
 BiKing V. New York, etc., E. Co., 66 N. Y. 181; 23 Am. Rep. 
 37. See, also. White, Per. Inj. in Mines, § 543, and cases cited. 
 Omaha, etc., Co. v. Hargadine (Neb.), 98 N. W. Rep. 1071. 
 
 The mere fact that -an employer furnishes some of the materials 
 or appliances for the use of the employee or contractor, will not, of 
 itself, make such contractor an employee, or render the employer 
 liable for his negligence. Carter v. Berlin, etc., Co., 58 N. H. 52; 
 42 Am. Rep. 572; Smith v. Simmons, 103 Pa. St. 32; 49 Am. Rep. 
 113; Emmerson v. Fay, 94 Va. 60; 26 S. E. Rep. 386. 
 
 62Gayle v. Missouri Car, etc., Co., 177 Mo. 427; 76 S. W. Rep. 987. 
 
 379 
 
§ 290 INDEPENDENT CONTEACTOES. 
 
 In a Missouri case,^* a railroad company furnished cars 
 to be used by a quarry company that owned a switch con- 
 necting with the railroad track of the railroad company. 
 The railroad company furnished a car with a defective brake 
 and while using it on the switch of his employer, an em- 
 ployee of the quarry company sustained an injury for which 
 suit was instituted. At the trial the railroad company con- 
 tended that it owed such employee no duty at all, but the 
 Supreme Court of the State said, on this contention : " We 
 think each of these contracting parties owed to the other 
 and his employees, the duty of properly discharging his part 
 of the joint undertaking, in respect to any matter exclusively 
 devolving upon him. Pickle had nothing to do with select- 
 ing and providing the cars. That duty was entrusted en- 
 tirely to the defendant. They were intended for the use of 
 Pickle and his servants, in discharging his part of the con- 
 tract, and we think the obligation rested upon the defendant 
 to use ordinary care to provide such as would be reasonably 
 safe for such use." 
 
 § 290. Status of contractor and subcontractor. — A contract 
 between a contractor and a person undertaking the perform- 
 ance of a part of the work under a subcontract, may or may 
 not establish the relation of independent contractor or em- 
 ployer and employee between the original contractor and 
 such subcontractor, according to the terms and conditions of 
 the contract. 
 
 The same tests for determining the existence of the rela- 
 tion apply between such original contractor and subcon- 
 tractor that apply between the owner and the independent 
 contractor and if the subcontractor undertakes to accomplish 
 
 esRoddy v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 104 Mo. 235; 15 S. W. Rep. 
 1112; 24 Am. St. Rep. 333; 12 L. R. A. 746. See, for criticism of 
 this rule, as applied to the peculiar facts of this case, White, Per. 
 Inj. in Mines, § 540, note and citations. 
 380 
 
rSrDEI>ENDEisrT CONTEACtOfiS. § 291 
 
 tte given result, by means of his. own appliances and meth- 
 ods and by the work of his own employees, without regard 
 to the control or supervision of the contractor such subcon- 
 tractor alone and not the contractor, would be responsible for 
 personal injuries resulting from the neglect of the employees 
 engaged in the work.^* 
 
 But if from the evidence showing the exact relation ex- 
 isting between the parties, it appears that the contract be^ 
 tween the original and the subcontractor was not entered 
 into in good faith, but to avoid the liability for neglect of 
 the employees engaged in the work being carried on, or if 
 the work was controlled in the details or the appliances fur- 
 nished by the original contractor, then the contractor would 
 be personally liable for the injuries resulting from the neg- 
 lect of the employees of the subcontractor and he would not 
 be held to occupy the status of an independent contractor to 
 such original contractor. ^^ 
 
 § 291. Tortious acts of contractor generally. — Where no 
 duty is imposed by contract or statute upon a railroad com- 
 pany, to build its railroad in any particular manner, it may 
 contract for the construction of its road and the contract 
 will not be held to be a delegation of its charter privileges, 
 so as to render it liable for the unauthorized wrongs commit- 
 ted by the contractor or his employees, while engaged in the 
 
 "Green v. Soule, 145 Cal. 96; 78 Pac. Rep. 337; Powell v. 
 Virginia, etc., Co., 88 Tenn. 692; 13 S. W. Rep. 691; 17 Am. St. 
 Rep. 925; Larson v. American, etc., Co., 40 Wash. 224; 82 Pac. 
 Eep. 294; 111 Am. St. Rep. 904; Richmond v. Sitterling, 101 Va. 
 354; 43 S. E. Eep. 562; 65 L. R. A. 445. 
 
 BBKlages V. Gillett-Herzog Mfg. Co., 86 Minn. 458; 90 N. W. 
 Rep. 1116; 26 Ene. Law & Proc. (Cye.) 1552. 
 
 A construction company, under contract to construct a railroad 
 roadbed, let a contract for grading a part of the road to a con- 
 tractor, who sublet a part of it to a third person under a contract 
 requiring the work to be performed under the supervision of the en- 
 
 381 
 
§ 291 INDEPEKDENT CONTBACTOES. 
 
 work.^® Where a company lets a contract to another to do a 
 particular piece of work for it, reserving no control over the 
 vs'ork, except the right to require it to conform to a particu- 
 lar standard when completed, the company will not be liable 
 for the negligence of the party to whom the contract is let ^'' 
 and it is under no duty to take precautions against his pos- 
 sible negligence.^* 
 
 When a competent contractor is selected and the work of 
 constructing a railroad is entrusted to him, without the reser- 
 vation of any control except as to the final result, the con- 
 tractor being at liberty to select his own means and methods 
 for doing the work, the contract does not create the rela- 
 tion of employer and employee, so as to render the railroad 
 company liable for the neglect of the contractor, or his em- 
 
 gineer of the construction company, who was empowered to dis- 
 charge employees of the third person, and to notify him to increase 
 the force of men if necessary, and authorizing the contractor to 
 concel the contract, and requiring the third person to save the 
 contractor harmless from all damages that might be caused to the 
 third person during the prosecution of the work, and giving the 
 option to the contractor to pay directly to_the laborers employed by 
 the third person the wages due them. Held, that the contract be- 
 tween the contractor and the third person did not create the re- 
 lation of employer and employee, but the third person was an 
 independent contractor, and his employees could not, on receiving 
 injuries, sue the contractor therefor. Good v. Johnson (Colo. 1907), 
 88 Pac. Rep. 439. 
 
 08 Atlanta, etc., R. Co. v. Kimberly, 87 Ga. 161; 13 S. E. Rep. 
 277; 47 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 307; Murtfelt v. New York, etc., R. Co., 
 102 N. Y. 703; 7 N. E. Rep. 404; 34 Hun 632; 26 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 144. 
 
 oTNew Albany, etc., Co. v. Cooper, 131 Ind. 363; 80 N. E. Rep. 
 294; Hughes v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., 39 Ohio ^t. 461; 15 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 100; Southern Ohio R. Co. v. Morey, 47 Ohio St. 207; 
 McCafferty v. Spuyton-Duville, etc., R. Co., 61 N. Y. 178; Wabash, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Farver, 111 Ind. 195; 12 N. E. Rep. 296; 31 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 134; Roddy v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 104 Mo. 234; 
 15 S. W. Rep. 1112. 
 
 58 Daniel v. Metropolitan, etc., R. Co., 5 H. L. Cas. 45; 20 W. R. 
 37; 40 L. J. C. P. 121; 24 L. T. 815. 
 
 382 
 
INDEPENDENT CONTEACTOES. § 292 
 
 ployees, for resulting injuries either to third parties, or em- 
 ployees or passengers of the railroad company.^® 
 
 But the courts will not permit a railroad company to dele- 
 gate to a contractor any of the chartered rights or privileges 
 granted to it by the legislature, as a corporation, so as to ex- 
 empt it from liability for an injury that would otherwise 
 accrue, from the ordinary exercise of its chartered powers, 
 as a railroad corporation, the exercise of which, by the rail- 
 road company itself, are essential to its existence.®" And if 
 the company, after its line of road is finally constructed, en- 
 ters into a contract for the movement of its cars or trains, 
 by a contractor, with the right to employ his own motive 
 power and employees necessary to move such cars, it will 
 nevertheless remain liable for an injury due to the negligent 
 manner in which such cars are moved by the contractor, al- 
 though such contractor reserves the independent control over 
 such cars.®* 
 
 § 292. Contract between construction company and railroad 
 company. — In a well considered decision in the State of 
 Kansas,®^ the Supreme Court of that State determined the 
 
 69 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Ferguson-, 3 Colo. App. 414; 33 Pae. 
 Rep. 684; Bibb v. Norfolk, etc., E. Co., 87 Va. 711; 14 S. E. Eep. 
 163; 47 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 651; Powell v. Virginia Const. Co., 88 
 Tenn. 692; 13 S. W. Eep. 691. 
 
 «» Cunningham v. International, etc., E. Co., 51 Texas 503. 
 
 61 Philadelphia, etc., E. Co. v. Hahn (Pa.), 12 Atl. Eep. 479; 
 32 Am. & Eng. E. Cas 24. 
 
 east. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Willis, 38 Kansas 330; 16 Pao. Eep. 
 728; 33 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 397. In deciding this case, Simpson, 
 C, for the court, said : " The contractual relation between the 
 Ellsworth Eailroa'd Company and the construction company excludes 
 all consideration of the question of the one being the agent of the 
 other. The status of the construction company is fixed by positive 
 and express agreement as that of an independent contractor." See, 
 also, Atchison, etc., E. Co. v. Davis, 34 Kansas 202; 25 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 305; Hittie v. Republican Valley R. Co., 19 Neb. 620; 
 29 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 586; Kansas Central E. Co. v. Fitzsimmons, 
 
 383 
 
§ 292 INDEPENDENT CONTEACTOES. 
 
 status occupied by a construction company and a railroad 
 company, and the liability of the railroad company for an 
 injury due to the negligence of the construction company. 
 
 The railroad company had contracted with the construc- 
 tion company for the survey and location of its line of rail- 
 road and the construction company had obligated itself to 
 survey and locate the line of railroad, to procure the right of 
 way, build the railroad roadbed, tracks, bridges, side tracks, 
 and to equip the same with engines and cars, in accordance 
 with the plans and specifications attached to the contract. 
 This contract was held to render the construction company 
 an independent contractor, and the railroad company was 
 held not to be liable for an injury occasioned by a defective 
 track, or for injuries due to the negligence of employees on 
 a train laden with construction materials, on a part of the 
 line constructed by the construction company and being run 
 by it, and which had not yet been inspected or accepted by 
 the railroad company, in accordance with its contract with 
 the construction company before its liability should attach. 
 ISTor would the fact that some of the same persons were offi- 
 cers and agents in both the construction company and in the 
 railroad company, be a circumstance of sufficient weight to 
 change the rule of nonliability of the railroad company for 
 an injury due to the negligence of the construction company, 
 under such- a contract.** 
 
 18 Kansas 34; Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Eahn, 32 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 24; Murfeld v. New Yorlc, etc., R. Co., 25 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 144; Hughes v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 100; 
 Cunningham v. International, etc., R. Co., 51 Texas 503; West 
 V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 63 111. 545; Salter v. Merscreau, 64 N. Y. 
 138; Eaton v. European, etc., R. Co., 59 Me. 520; Carman v. Steel- 
 ville, etc., R. Co., 4 Ohio St. 399; Hunt v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 51 
 Pa. St. 475; Burke v. Norwich, etc., R. Co., 34 Conn. 474; Edmund- 
 ston V. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co., 23 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 423. 
 
 83 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Ritz (Kansas), 11 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 35. 
 
 384 
 
INDEPENDENT CONTEACTOES. § 293 
 
 § 293. Management of trains by construction company. — 
 While a railroad is being constructed and is in the exclusive 
 possession of and operated by the contractor for the construc- 
 tion of the road, the railroad company would not be liable 
 for injuries inflicted by the contractor, in the management 
 of the road, if it took no part in the operation of the trains 
 thereon,®* A railroad company, it has been decided, is not 
 liable for an injury sustained while its road is being built 
 and operated by contractors, if the contractors themselves 
 own the engine and cars jon which the accident happened, knd 
 the railroad company at the time had no control thereof.*^ 
 
 A railroad company which has entered into an agreement 
 with a contractor to build a portion of its railroad, and whose 
 engines, cars and other equipment used in construction work, 
 are handled exclusively, under the direction and control of 
 the contractor, will not be liable for damages sustained prior 
 to the completion of the railroad, where the injury is due to 
 the negligence of the contractor in the management and op- 
 eration of such cars and engine.®" 
 
 A c&mpany, calling for bids for the construction of a road, ac- 
 cepted a bid, and a contract, fixing a price for ,the work and provid- 
 ing for payment of employees by the company's check, was executed. 
 The contractor had formerly been the company's foreman on other 
 roads, and a third person, as foreman of the company, visited the 
 road while the work was being done, and made suggestions, wij^hout 
 attempting to control any of the contractor's .employees. Pel.d, that 
 the contractor was as a matter of law an .independent contractor 
 and the company was not liable for any negligence of which he 
 might be guilty in the course of his employment. Houghton v. 
 Loma Prieta Co. (Gal. 1908), 93 Pac. Eep. 377. 
 
 8* Kansas, etc., Co. v. Fitzsimmons, 18 Kansas 34; 15 Am. Ey. 
 Rep. 220. 
 
 65 Meyer v. Midland Pacific E. Co., 2 Neb. 319. 
 
 66Hittie V. Eepubliean Valley E. Co., 19 Neb. 620; 28 N. W. 
 Eep. 284; 29 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 586; Miller v. Minnesota, etc., E. 
 Co., 76 Iowa 655; 39 N. W. Eep. 188; 38 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 234; 
 Cunningham v. International E. Co., 51 Texas 503; Union Pacific E. 
 Co. v. Hause, 1 Wyom. 27. 
 
 1—25 385 
 
§294 INDEPENDENT CONTEACTOES. 
 
 And this rule would apply, although the contractor is an 
 incorporated company and operating the railroad, in its own 
 behalf for traflSc, since the liability of the railroad company 
 would not attach until it came into the possession and control 
 of the road.^'' 
 
 § 294. Injuries from frightening teams. — Where an inde- 
 pendent contractor, in charge of an engine or other appliance, 
 so uses the same as to frighten a team, as a result of which 
 the party in charge of it sustains an injury, the person or 
 corporation employing such contractor will not be liable for 
 the injury sustained, but the injured person will be compelled, 
 to look to the contractor alone for compensation for the in- 
 jury. 
 
 In an Indiana case,®* it was held that a railway company 
 was not liable for an injury to a traveler on a highway, 
 caused by the frightening of his horse, due to the negligence 
 of a contractor in charge of a steam engine, in operating it 
 near the highway, under a contract with the railway com- 
 pany, for the completion of certain work by the contractor, 
 where the contractor had exclusive control of the engine and 
 the manner in which it was being used. 
 
 And this is in accord with other cases, where it is held 
 that a railway company is not liable for an injury, due to 
 the frightening of horses, when the contractor is in exclusive 
 control of the appliance or agency which causes the fright 
 of the horses, and the railway company has no control 
 thereof.«» 
 
 87 Kansas, etc., R. Co. v. Fitzsimmons, 18 Kansas 34; St. Louis, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Willis, 38 Kansas 330; 16 Pac. Rep. 728; 33 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 397. 
 
 68 Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Farver, 111 Ind. 195; 12 N. E. Rep. 
 296; 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 134. 
 
 «!iMcCann v. Kings County R. Co., 46 N. Y. S. R. 327; 19 N. 
 Y. Supp. 668. 
 
 In considering the liability of the railroad company, in the case 
 386 
 
iMDEPENDElifT OOiSTTEACTOfiS. § 29S 
 
 § 295. Injuries to passengers by independent contractor. — 
 
 A person who had been at work for an independent contrac- 
 tor and was riding on a pass furnished by the contractor, 
 who had the control of a train and engine on a portion of a 
 railroad not yet turned over to the railroad company, could 
 not hold the railroad company liable for an injury due to a 
 collision between the train on which he was riding and an- 
 other train, but must look solely to the contractor who had 
 the control and management of the train in charge, for dam- 
 ages resulting from such an injury. ''° 
 
 But in an Oregon case,'^^ it was held that if a railroad com- 
 pany permits an independent contractor who had a portion 
 of the road in course of construction, to use the same for 
 
 of Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Farver, supra, the court said: " It would 
 hot do to say that the operation of a portable engine, near a pub- 
 lic highway, necessarily resulted in creating a nuisance, when it 
 is according to daily experience during, certain seasons of the year, 
 to see steam threshing engines in operation on every hand and 
 often necessarily close to public highways. Road engines propelled 
 by steam and portable engines operated by steam have become 
 familiar in every agricultural community. To declare that their 
 use near, or their passage over a public highway, constituted a nui- 
 sance, would be practically to prohibit their use in the manner 
 in which they are customarily employed and moved from place to 
 place. It must be supposed that horses of ordinary gentleness have 
 become so familiar with these objects as to be safe, when under 
 careful guidance. It is nowhere denied that Williams was employed 
 to furnish and superintend the running of his engine, to the end that 
 the water might be pumped out of the way, so as to admit of the 
 prosecution of the work in which the railway company was en- 
 gaged. * * * In respect to his engine and its control, and his 
 liability for its negligent use, the latter was as much an independent 
 contractor when pumping water for the railway company, as when 
 sawing wood and threshing wheat for persons in the neighbor- 
 hood." 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas., pp. 137, 138. 
 
 70 Scarborough v. Alabama Midland R. Co., 94 Ala. 497; 10 So. 
 Rep. 316. 
 
 'iLarkin v. Williamette Valley R. Co., 13 Oregon 436; 11 Pac. 
 Rep. 68; 57 Am. Itep. 25; 26 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 611. But see, 
 Cunningham v. International, etc., R. Co., 51 Texas 503. 
 
 387 
 
§ 296 INDEPENDEiifT OOITTEACTOKS. 
 
 purposes of general traffic, this is such a use of the franchise 
 of the railroad company as would render it liable for an in- 
 jury to a passenger riding on such portion of the road and 
 injured as a result of the negligence of the employees of the 
 construction company. 
 
 And if a railroad company enters into an arrangement 
 with some other carrier, although each is to use its own 
 appliances, for the continuous transportation of persons for 
 hire, it is held that the railroad company would be liable, by 
 reason of this joint traffic arrangement, for an injury to a 
 passenger on the portion of the road operated by the con- 
 necting carrier. '^^ 
 
 § 296. Injuries to travelers in streets. — Where a railroad 
 company, with authority to construct a railroad track in a 
 public street or highway, does the work by an independent 
 contractor, in case of an injury to a traveler on the highway, 
 -caused by the negligence of an employee of such contractor, 
 in laying down loose iron rails, in advance of the workmen 
 engaged in constructing the track, the independent contrac- 
 tor would be liable for the result of such negligence, but in 
 the absence of some control over the means of laying the 
 track, the railway company would not be responsible for such 
 an injury.''* 
 
 A like result will follow upon an injury to a traveler on a 
 public street, caused by a rock negligently left in the high- 
 way by the employees of a subcontractor of a railway com- 
 pany, building abutments in the street for the use of the 
 railroad track, and as there is no privity of contract between 
 
 T2Kes8ler v. New York, etc., E. Co., 61 N. Y. 538; Isaacson v. 
 New York, etc., R. Co., 94 N. Y. 278; Buxton v. Northeastern R. Co., 
 3 Q. B. 549. But see, Poole v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 35 Hun (N. 
 Y.) 29. 
 
 T3 Fulton County R. Co. v. McConnell, 87 Ga. 756; 13 S. E. Kep. 
 828. 
 
 388 
 
INDEPENDENT CONTKACTOES. § 297 
 
 the railroad company and the subcontractor, there would be 
 no liability on the part of such railroad company for the 
 injury, but the contractor whose employees negligently 
 caused the injury would alone be answerable, therefor.'"* 
 
 § 29T. Injuries to employees o^ contractor. — In the ab- 
 sence of some one or more of the exceptions to the general 
 rule that there is no liability on the part of the contractee, 
 for injuries to employees of the contractor, due to the lat- 
 ter's negligence, a railroad company cannot be held liable 
 for an injury to employees of a contractor, injured as a re- 
 sult of the negligence of such contractor or by that of his 
 coemployees. 
 
 In a well-considered Virginia case,''® an employee of an 
 independent contractor was at work on a bridge over which 
 trains were being operated by the railroad company, during 
 the repairs thereon by the independent contractor. An en- 
 gine of the railroad company, (jp. proper signal from the 
 foreman of the contractor, in passing over the bridge, broke 
 down a span of the bridge on which the plaintiff's intestate, 
 an employee of the contractor, was at work and killed him, 
 and in the suit to recover for his death from the railroad 
 company, the coiirt held that there was no liability. 
 
 A similar rule was announced in a Pennsylvania case,''® 
 and because of the absence of any contractual relation exist- 
 ing between the' employee of the contractor and the railroad 
 company employing such contractor, this may be stated as 
 the general rule. 
 
 A railroad company was held exempt from liability for an 
 
 'iPawlet V. Rutland R. Co., 28 Vt. 297. -See, also, Hackett v. 
 Western Union Tel. Co., 80 Wis. 187; 49 N. W. Rep. 822. 
 
 75 Bibb V. Norfolk, etc., R. Co., 87 Va. 711; 14 S. E. Rep. 163; 
 47 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 651. 
 
 78 Hunt V, Pennsylvania R. Co., 51 Pa. St. 475. 
 
 389 
 
§ 298 INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOES. 
 
 injury to an employee of a contractor, in a Georgia case/'' 
 where the employee was injured on an embankment which 
 his employer was filling in, by the negligent running of a 
 car over a track furnished by the railroad company. But 
 of course if the car which caused the injury had been run 
 by the employees or agents of the railroad company, instead 
 of by those of the contractor, then the railroad company 
 could not have avoided the liability, for the negligence would 
 have been that of the company itself, by or through the wrong 
 ful act of its ovm. employees, acting within the scope of their 
 duties.'^ 
 
 § 298. Negligence of railway surgeons. — As a general rule, 
 where a railway company furnishes a physician or surgeon 
 or a staff of surgeons, at a hospital, supplied with medicines 
 and surgical instruments and nurses, for the medical care 
 and treatment of passengers and employees, although such 
 surgeons may be upon the^pay roll of the railway company 
 and the medical assistants and medicines are furnished by 
 the company, such surgeons or physicians are so far regarded 
 as independent contractors, in the care and treatment of the 
 sick or injured passengers or employees placed in their care, 
 as to be alone responsible for their negligence or malpractice, 
 where reasonable care and caution has been exercised in 
 their employment and the railroad company will not be lia- 
 
 T7 Central, etc., R. Co. v. Grajit, 46 Ga. 417; 11 Am. Ky. Rep. 
 427. 
 
 78 McNeil V. Crucible Steele Co., 207 Pa. St. 493; 56 Atl. Rep. 
 1067; White, Per. Inj. in Mines § 541, and cases cited. 
 
 A contractor for the construction of a freight house, for a rail- 
 way company, used corrosive sublimate to preserve the timbers used. 
 An employee using such preservative sustained injuries by an in- 
 halation of the poisonous gases exhaled and it was held that his 
 action must be against his employer and not against the railroad 
 company. West v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 63 111. 545. 
 
 The owner or contractee was held not to be liable for injuries to 
 390 
 
INDEPENDENT OONTKACTOES. § 298 
 
 ble for damages resulting from the negligent treatment of 
 patients entrusted to their care.''* 
 
 Of course the rule would be different if the employer, 
 instead of employing a reasonably skillful or careful prac- 
 titioner, employed a known incompetent, negligent or 
 drunken physician or- surgeon, for under the rule of nonlia- 
 bility for the acts of an independent contractor, the em- 
 ployer is relieved only where he exercises reasonable care 
 in the employment of an ordinarily careful or competent 
 contractor.** 
 
 And if the injury to the injured employee or passenger 
 is augmented by the negligence of a physician or surgeon, 
 furnished by the employer or carrier, unless the passenger 
 or employee was negligent in contributing to the increase ^ 
 the injuries sued for, the railroad company could not take 
 advantage of the negligence of its own physician or surgeon, 
 to avoid liability for the original injury, thus augmented or 
 increased by the intervening negligence of such a contractor, 
 acting under its orders or employment.®^ 
 
 the employees of the contractor, in the following cases: Burke v. 
 Korwich, etc., E. Co., 34 Conn. 474; Central, etc., R. Co., v; Grant, 
 46 Ga. 417; Boyd v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 217 111. 332; 75 N. E. 
 Eep. 496; 108 Am. St. Eep. 253; Hedge v. Williams, 131 Cal. 455; 
 63 Pac. Rep. 721; 82 Am. St. Eep. 366; Hunt v. Pennsylvania E. 
 Co., 51 Pa. St. 475; Young v. New York, etc., E. Co., 30 Barb. 
 229; St. Louis, etc., E. Co. v. Willis, 38 Kansas 330; 16 Pac. Eep. 
 728. 
 
 79 Pittsburg, etc., E. Co. v. Sullivan, 141 Ind. 83 ; 50 Am. St. Eep. 
 313; Quinn v. Nashville, etc., E. Co., 74 Tenn. 713; 45 Am. St. Rep. 
 767; Laubheim v. Royal Netherland Co., 107 N. Y. 228; 13 N. E. Rep. 
 781; 1 Thompson on Neg., § 633, p. 582, and cases cited. 
 
 soBrannock v. Elmore, 114 Mo. 55; 21 S. W. Rep. 451; 1 Thompson 
 on Neg., § 677, and cases cited. 
 
 81 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Doyle (Texas), 25 S. W. Eep. 461; 
 Thompson v. Louisville, etc., E. Co., 91 Ala. 496; 8 So. Eep. 406; 
 11 L. E. A. 146. 
 
 In St. Louis, etc., .R. Co. v. Doyle, supra, the railway company was 
 held not entitled to take advantage of the fact of a negligent amputa- 
 
 391 
 
§ 299 INDEPENDENT CONTHACTOES. 
 
 § 299. Railroad hospital — Physicians company agents, 
 when. — A railroad hospital association, which is organized 
 by the officers of the railroad company to furnish medical 
 and surgical treatment to the employees of the latter, in con- 
 sideration of certain monthly payments made by them, is 
 held, in a recent Missouri case,*^ not to be a charitable in- 
 stitution, -within the rule of law which exempts such com- 
 panies for the acts of its agents, in due course of their em- 
 ployment by the association. 
 
 In the case referred to, where the rules governing the 
 management of the hospital association, made the chief sur- 
 geon of such association and his assistants, the chief surgeon 
 and local division surgeons of the railroad company, which 
 latter company retained stipulated sums from the wages of 
 its employees, to cover treatment received in the ' hospital, it 
 was held that the hospital association and all its physicians 
 and surgeons were employees and agents of the railroad com- 
 pany, and that the latter company was liable for a failure of 
 the physicians of the hospital association, to properly treat 
 the patients submitted to their care, by the railroad com- 
 pany.^* 
 
 tion of the leg of the injured person, where the employee was himself 
 guilty of no negligence in submitting to the operation. 
 
 saPhillipps v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (Mo.), Ill S. W. Rep. 109. 
 
 83 In the above case, an employee of the railroad company, placed 
 in its hospital for treatment, for mental alienation, was permitted to 
 escape and his undressed lifeless body was found on a railroad track, 
 where he had been struck by the cars. The railroad company was 
 held liable for the death of the deceased, and in the course of the 
 opinion, in passing on the liability of the railroad company for the 
 neglect of the hospital assistants in allowing the deceased to escape, 
 Judge Graves, for the court, said: 
 
 "The relationship between these two corporations is an important 
 one, and not confined to this case alone. To our mind it is imma- 
 terial as to the true character of the hospital association as indicated 
 by its charter provisions. It has, however, but few, if any, of the 
 earmarks of a voluntary benevolent association. Nor are there any 
 earmarks of a public charity. What is received is paid for by the 
 393 
 
INDEPENDENT CONTEACTOKS. § 300 
 
 § 300. Contracts exempting railroad company from liabil- 
 ity. — The subject of tie right of a railroad company to ex- 
 empt itself from liability is the cause of a great many stat- 
 utes in the United States, which are elsewhere discussed, and 
 the courts of the different States, in the absence of such 
 statutes hold to divergent views, as to the right of a railroad 
 
 recipients. Under the weight of authority it cannot be held to be 
 a charitable institution. Haggerty v. Railway Co., 100 Mo. App. 424; 
 74 S. W. Rep. 456; Coe v. Washington Mills et al.,. 149 Mass. 543; 
 21 N. E. Rep. 966; Brown v. La Societe Francaise, 138 Cal. 475; 
 71 Pae. Rep. 516; Miller v. Railway Co. (C. C), 65 Fed. Rep. 305; 
 Texas & Pae. Coal Co. v. Connaughton, 20 Tex, Civ. App. 642; 50 S. 
 W. Rep. 173. So that the rule that exempts such institutions from 
 liability, as announced in Murtaugh v. St. Louis, 44 Mo. 480, does not 
 apply. Nor are institutions of the character of the one disclosed by 
 this record exempted from liability by the mere employment of com- 
 petent servants. They must go further and competently treat the 
 patients received. In such case they occupy the position of ordinary 
 physicians and surgeons and are bound by the same rules, which 
 are too familiar for repetition . here. If they undertake to furnish 
 the treatment, not as a charity, they stand in no different light iiora the 
 ordinary physician. But this question is really beside the issues in 
 this case. No one can read this record without concluding that, if 
 the thin corporate shell of the hospital association is broken, the yolk 
 therein contained is the defendant. * * * So that it becomes un- 
 necessary in this case to break the extremely thin and attenuated 
 corporate shell of the hospital association,, and expose to open view 
 the yolk therein contained. The hospital association, whether it in 
 fact be a separate corporate entity, or in fact the defendant itself, 
 masquerading under an assumed name, is at least the agent and 
 employee of the defendant to perfo^ these particular services. The 
 defendant pays its said agent $500 annually, and in addition it re- 
 quires of its employees that they pay to it the remainder, and by it 
 such sum is paid to the agent for these services. To say the least, 
 this hospita,! association, together with all its surgeons and physicians, 
 are but agents of defendant, and made so by express words in rule 
 13, supra. The negligence of these agents is the negligence of the 
 defendant. As said in the ease of Orcutt v. Century Bldg. Co., 201 Mo. 
 424; 99 S. W. Rep, 1062; 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 929, the defendant holds 
 the purse strings of the hospital association. Not a dollar does it 
 get, save through defendant. Defendant pays for itself $500, and the 
 remainder is paid by the tribute which defendant levies upon its 
 
 393 
 
§ 300 INDEPENDENT CONTEACTOES. 
 
 company to exempt itself from liability for the negligence of 
 its employees, by special contract.** 
 
 Where the duty owing by the railroad company is to the 
 general public, since it would not be permitted to avoid the 
 performance of such a duty directly, it could not do so by 
 delegating it to some third party or independent contractor 
 and a contract exempting it from liability for the negligent 
 performance of such a duty, will not be enforced by the courts 
 where the rights of third persons are involved.*® 
 
 But ordinarily the contractor and not the contractee is the 
 one held liable in law for injuries to the employees of the 
 contractor, since there is no privity of contract between the 
 contractor's employees and the contractee and in the absence 
 of a statute changing this common-law rule, a railroad com- 
 pany would not be responsible for an injury to an employee 
 of the contractor, when the contract specified for the exemp- 
 tion of the railroad company from liability and the act 
 causing the injury could be chargeable to the personal negli- 
 gence of the railroad company.*" 
 
 employees, which is collected and paid through defendant. The hos- 
 pital system is a, worthy one, and a well-taken, advance step; but, 
 under the record in this case, such hospital association is but the agent 
 of the defendant." Phillipps v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 211 Mo. 419; 111 
 8. W. Rep. 112, 113. 
 
 84 See Chapter, Statutes Airogating Common Law. 
 
 SB St. Paul, etc., Co. v. Ware, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 566; 21 L. Ed. 485; 
 Tibbett v. Knox, etc., R. O)., 62 Me. 437; Ominger v. New York, etc., 
 R. Co., 4 Hun (N. Y.) 159; Erie v. Caulkins, 85 Pa. St. 247; 27 Am. 
 Rep. 642. 
 
 80 Central, etc., R. Co. v. Grant, 46 Ga. 417; Boyd v. Chicago, etc., 
 R. Co., 217 111. 332; 75 N. E. Rep. 496; 108 Am. St. Rep. 253; Bibb v. 
 Norfolk, etc., R. Co., 87 Va. 711; 14 S. E. Rep. 163. 
 
 394 
 
CHAPTEE XIIL 
 
 INJURIES TO INFANT EMPLOYEES. 
 
 § 301. How minority affects right of recovery. 
 
 302. Infant representing himself of age. 
 
 303. Employment in violation of parent's instruction. 
 
 304. Damages for death of infant. 
 
 305. Measure of parent's recovery for injury or death of. 
 
 306. Infant's recovery for death of parent. 
 
 307. Employment about dangerous machinery. 
 
 308. When warning is required. 
 
 309. What warning sufficient. 
 
 310. What risks are assumed by infants. 
 
 311. Same — Risks beyond scope of employment. 
 
 312. Injuries from negligence of coeraployees. 
 
 313. Contributory negligence of infants. 
 
 314. Releases by infa^jt employees. 
 
 § 301. How minority affects right of recovery. — An. infant 
 is often more capable of understanding the risks of his em- 
 ployment than a man older in years, hut of less experience, 
 and the mere fact of an employee's infancy, without more, 
 unless the infant is of such tender years as to render him 
 unable to appreciate the risks of the business, will not ex- 
 empt the infant from the effect of his own negligent conduct, 
 or relieve him from an appreciation and assumption of the 
 ordinary risks of the business, with which he is familiar.^ 
 The mere fact of infancy, therefore, does not affect the duty 
 of the employer, where it is not such as to render him incom- 
 petent to appreciate and understand the dangers of the 
 service. Of course, if thie infant, because of his infancy, does 
 not understand the risk of the business, or if his experience is 
 
 1 Alabama M. R. Co. v. Marcus, 115 Ala. 389; 22 So. Rep. 135. 
 
 395 
 
§ 301 INFANT EMPLOYEES. 
 
 such that he ought to be warned, or informed, this duty 
 obtains on the part of the employer, but further than this the 
 same obligations obtain toward an infant employee that obtain 
 toward those of more mature years. ^ 
 
 2 Carter v. Baldwin, 107 Mo. App. 229 j 81 S. W. Eep. 204 j Smith v. 
 Irwin, 51 N. J. L. 507; 18 Atl. Kep. 852. 
 
 But if an infant is employed in violation ol parent's instructions 
 the parent can recover, even if he was injured by the negligence of 
 another fellow employee. Texas, etc,,- R. Co. v. Hervey (Tex.), 89 S. 
 W. Rep. 1095. 
 
 Infancy can never take the place, of negligence or supply the neces- 
 sity for a relation from which a duty would spring. Atlanta, etc., Ry. 
 Co. V. West, 121 Ga. 641; 49 S. E. Rep. 711; 67 L, R. A. 701, 
 
 Infancy alone will not give a cause of action, if the infant under- 
 stood the dangers of the work and unless negligence can be predicated 
 against the employer, no liability is shown. McGinnis v. Canadian 
 So. R. Co., 49 Mich. 466; 13. N. W. Eep. 819; 8 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 
 135; Viets V. Toledo, etc., R. Co., 55 Mich. 120; 20 N. W. Eep. 818; 
 18 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 11. 
 
 A railroad company is held liable, if it knowingly employs an infant 
 and he is injured, through its negligence, but not if it had no notice 
 of his infancy and it was not negligent. Goflf v. Norfolk & W. E. Co., 
 36 Fed. Eep. 299; Grand Eapida, etc., E. Co. v. Showers, 71 Ind. 451; 
 2 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 9; Gulf, etc., E. Co. v. Eedekcr, 75 Texas 310; 
 12 8. W. Eep. 855; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 296; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. 
 Long, 94 Ind. 250; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 345; Gulf, etc., E. Co. v. 
 Jones, 76 Texas 350; 13 S. W. Eep. 374. 
 
 The contract <rf an infant employee, agreeing to be bound by the 
 rules of the employer, was supported and enforced, in Texas. Texas, 
 etc., E. Co. V. Carlton, 60 Texas 397; 15 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 350; 
 Texas, etc., E. Co. v. Crowder, 61 Texas 262. See, also, Pennsylvania 
 E. Co. V. Yost, 104 Pa. St. 26; Houston, etc., E. Co. v. Miller, 51 
 Texas 270. 
 
 A minor who has arrived at years of discretion may make a valid 
 contract of employment, without his parent's consent, and the right 
 of the parent to recover for his injury will depend upon the duties 
 that exist by reason of the relation of employer and employee. Texas, 
 etc., E. Co. V. Carlton, 60 Texas 397; 15 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 350; 
 Texas, etc., E. Co. v. Crowder, 61 Texas 262; Pennsylvania E. Co. 
 V. Yost, 104 Pa. St. 26; Houston, etc., E. Co. v. Miller, 51 Texas 270. 
 But if the employee had not reached years of discretion, so as to 
 understand and guard against the dangers of the employment, the 
 relation of employer and employee would not exist, so as to deny a 
 
 396 
 
iNi'AIifT EMPLOYEES. § 302 
 
 § 302. Infant representing himself of age. — A minor, who, 
 ■with, knowledge of a rule preventing the employment of in- 
 fants in such a hazardous business as railroading, falsely 
 represents that he is of age in order to obtain employment, 
 is held to be judged, in law, by the same rules as would ap- 
 ply to an adult employee, and this is especially true if his 
 age and appearance are such as to indicate that he had reached 
 his majority, for his own fraud, having brought about his 
 employment, the employer ought not to be charged with the 
 same degree of care as if he had knowingly employed an in- 
 fant, in the first instance.^ 
 
 But the fact that a minor misrepresented his age, in his 
 application for employment, would not render him a mere 
 trespasser, or deny to him the same care and protection that 
 any other employee would be entitled to receive, but the em- 
 ployer would be held to the same degree of care and no more, 
 than he would owe to an adult employee.* 
 
 recovery for his death due to the negligence of his coemployees. Ham- 
 ilton V. Galveston, etc., E. Co., 54 Texas 556; 4 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 528. 
 
 If the employer knovrs of the infant's minority, it is his duty to ob- 
 tain the consent of the parent to the employment. Gulf, etc., E. Co. v. 
 Redeker, 75 Texas 310; 12 S. W. Eep. 855; 41 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 296; 
 Missouri Pacific Ey. Co. v. King, 2 Texas Civ. App. 122; 20 S. W. 
 Rep. 1014; 23 S. W. Rep. 917; Goflf v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co., 36 Fed. 
 Rep. 299; Grand Eapids, etc., E. Co. v. Showers, 71 Ind. 451; 2 Am. 
 & Eng. E. Cas. 9; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Long, 94 Ind. 250; 15 Am. 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 345; Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Jones, 76 Texas 350; 13 S. W. 
 Rep. 374; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Willis, 83 ^Ky. 57; Soldanels v. 
 Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 23 Mo. App. 516. 
 
 3 Lake Shore, etc., Co. v. Baldwin, 10 O. C. D. 333; Brown v. Ry. 
 Co., 68 N. H. 518. 
 
 *Marbury, etc., Co. v. Westbrook, 121 Ala. 179. 
 
 Where the infant has misrepresented his age, the employer is not 
 liable for an injury occasioned by such lack of lAajority. McDermott 
 v. Iowa Falls R. Co. (Iowa), 47 N. W. Rep. 1037, 
 
 In the case of young and inexperienced employees it is the duty of 
 the employer to take notice of the age and inexperience of the em- 
 ployees and to use ordinary care to protect them from risks they cannot 
 properly appreciate. Fisher v. Delaware, etc., Co., 153 Pa. St. 379; 
 
 397 
 
§ 303 1N]?AK-T EMPLOYEES. 
 
 § 303. Employment in violation of parent's instruction. — 
 If an employer engages the services of a minor in a danger- 
 ous business, in violation of the parent's instructions and 
 the infant is injured in the course of his service, the em- 
 ployer would be liable in damages, M^ithout proof of other 
 act of negligence than the employment of the child in the 
 forbidden service, unless it could be shown that the infant 
 was injured as a result of his own wrongful act.'' In Texas, 
 in a recent case, it is even held, that for an injury to a minor, 
 in a forbidden employment, sudh as railroading, the company 
 would be liable for an amount corresponding to the parent's 
 loss of service, regardless of the contributory negligence of 
 the minor or the act of his coemployees.® This rule, how- 
 ever, would hold the employer responsible for something he 
 had not done, and recognizes a liability, on the ground of 
 negligence, regardless of the rule of proximate and remote 
 cause. It would seem that the sounder rule would only per- 
 mit a recovery in cases where the injury was not due to the 
 negligence of the injured employee himself. Of course, if 
 the parent consents to the employment of his child in a haz- 
 ardous business, he assumes all the risks reasonably incident 
 thereto, including that of the child's own rashness or care- 
 
 26 Atl. Rep. 18; Kehler v. Schwenk, 151 Pa. St. 505; 25 Atl. Rep. 130. 
 
 But if the employer has no notice of the nonage of the employee 
 and there is nothing in his appearance to indicate that he is an infant, 
 there is no especial duty to protect him. YouU v. Sioux City, etc., R. 
 Co., 66 Iowa 346; 23 N. W. Rep. 736; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 589; 
 McGinnis v. Canada Southern Co., 49 Mich. 466; Houston, etc., R. 
 Co. V. Miller, 51 Texas 270; Curran v. Merchants, etc., Co., 130 Mass. 
 374. 
 
 Carter v. Baldwin, 107 Mo. App. 229; 81 S. W. Rep. 204; Parsons 
 V. Mo. Pac. Ry: Co., 94 Mo. 287. 
 
 8 Texas & Pac. R. Co.- v. Brick (Texas), 18 S. W. Rep. 947; Texas 
 & Pao. R. Co. V. Hervey, 89 S. W. Rep. 1095. 
 
 The mere fact of employing an infant as brakeman, without consent 
 of parent, will not establish a liability, in case of an injury in the 
 course of the employment. Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Crowder, 61 Texas 
 262. 
 
 398 
 
INFANT EMPLOYEES. § 304 
 
 ],essness, and he could not recover for a loss of services for 
 injury to his child, where the injury vras sustained about a 
 dangerous service and the infant knew of a safer way to do 
 the work.'' 
 
 § 304. Damages for death of infant. — The English stat> 
 ute,® providing for the survival of actions for death, through 
 negligence, has been adopted, or similar legislation enacted, 
 in most of the United States, and by these statutes, generally, 
 the right of action is given to the wife, parent or child. The 
 party or parties competent to sue for the death of an infant, 
 depends wholly upon the particular provisions of the statute 
 of the State where the death occurred and if no right of ac- 
 tion is given by the statute of the State in which the death 
 or injury causing death, occurred, no cause of action will gen- 
 erally be held to have survived. , 
 
 In most of the United States, however, the right of action 
 is given to the parents of a minor child ® and in many of the 
 States statutes have been passed, applying especially to death 
 caused by the negligence of carriers, which give an action, 
 independently of general damage acts.^** The parties com- 
 
 TEast & W. R. Co. V. Sims, 80 Ga. 807; 6 S. E. Rep. 595; McCool 
 V. Lucas, etc., Co., 30 W. N. C. 251; 24 Atl. Rep. 350. 
 
 If notice of infancy is had, then the employer should obtain the 
 consent of the parent or guardian, before placing an infant in a 
 dangerous business. Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Redeker, 75 Texas 310; 12 
 S. W. Rep. 855; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 296; Missouri Pae. R. Co. v. 
 King, 2 Texas Civ. App. 122; 20 S. W. Rep. 1014; Hamilton v. 
 Galveston, etc., R. Co., 54 Texas 556; 4 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 528. 
 
 But if infant is. employed without notice of infancy, employer will 
 not be liable, in absence of negligence. Youll v. Sioux City, etc., R. 
 Co., 66 Iowa 346; 23 N, W. Rep. 736; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 589; 
 McGinnis v. Canadian Southern Co., 49 Mich. 466. 
 
 8 Lord Campbell's Act, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93, §§ 1 & 2. 
 
 "Ala. Code, 1896, § 25 (2587); Mass. Laws, 1897", ch. 565; Burns 
 Rev. St. Ind. 1901, § 7085; Sess. Laws Colo. 1903, ch. 77; R. S. Mo. 
 1899, § 2864; Sess. Laws Mo. 1905, pp. 136, 137. 
 , w Laws Mo. 1905, pp. 136, 137. 
 
 399 
 
§ 305 INFANT EMPLOYEES, 
 
 petent to sue for the death of an infant, are, generally, his 
 parents, or, if married, the wife or children.^ ^ Where the 
 statute gives a right of action, first, to the husband or wife, 
 next, to the minor child or children and lastly, to the parents 
 of a minor child, unless the infant is of such tender years 
 as to make it impossible for him to leave a wife or children 
 surviving him,^^ a petition by the parents, which did not 
 show that the deceased was unmarried and childless, would 
 be fatally defective.^ ^ 
 
 § 305. Measure of parent's recovery for injury or death 
 of. — The basis, in law, for the recovery by a parent, for the 
 death of a minor child, in the absence of a. different statutory 
 basis for damages, is his or her common-law right to the 
 services of the child during its minority. The law deals 
 not with the affections or sentiments of the human family, 
 
 11 See statutes cited above. 
 
 i2Baird v. Citizens R. Co., 146 Mo. 265; 48 S. W. Kep. 78; 
 Czezewzka v. Benton, etc., Ey. Co., 121 Mo. 201; 25 S. W. Rep. 911. 
 
 13 Parker v. R. R. Co., 91 Mo. 86; Dulaney v. R. R. Co., 21 Mo. 
 App. 597; Railroad v. Hine, 25 Ohio St. 629; Mcintosh v. Mo. Pac. 
 By. Co., 103 Mo. 131; Sparks v. Kansas City S; & M. R. Co., 31 Mo. 
 App. HI. 
 
 An action by the father for loss of services of the infant is not 
 defeated by the mere fact that he approved the employment. Soldanels 
 V. Missouri Pac. E. Co., 23 Mo. App. 516; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Willis, 83 Ky. 57. 
 
 Contributory' negligence of the infant will not affect the father's 
 right to recover for loss of service, unless the father consented to his 
 employment. If he did consent to ,his employment, however, the in- 
 fant's negligence will bar a recovery by the father. Coins v. Chicago, 
 etc., E. Co., 47 Mo. App. 173; Hunnicutt v. Georgia, etc., B. Co., 85 
 Ga. 195; 11 S. E. Eep. 580; Williams v. South & N. R. Co., 91 Ala. 
 635; 9 So. Rep. 77. 
 
 The measure of the parent's recovery, generally, is the loss of 
 services, during minority of the child. Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Brick, 
 83 Texas 526; 18 S. W. Rep. 947; Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Redeker, 67 
 Texas 190; 2 S. W. Rep. 527; Ft. Wayne, etc., R. Co. v. Beyerle, 110 
 Ind. 100; 11 N. E. Rep. 6; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 306. 
 
 400 
 
INFANT EMPLOYEES. § 306 
 
 but courts of justice, realizing the uncertainty of submitting 
 to juries the measure of compensation for loss of the affec- 
 tion and intellectual enjoyment sustained by the death of 
 the deceased, allow no money equivalent for the loss of other 
 than the value of the services of the child, during, its minor- 
 ity. A parent may have two sons, one past minority and 
 the other less than the age when the law would emancipate 
 him, and for the death or injury of the former, the courts 
 would allow the parent no compensation, while, for the in- 
 jury or death of the latter, a substantial remuneration would 
 be afforded, based upon the loss to the parent of the services 
 of the minor child. ^* This seeming inconsistency is based 
 upon the soundest principles, for to permit a jury to specu- 
 late, without limit, upon the value of the affection or serv- 
 ices which a child might render a parent during the prob- 
 able existence of the child, would be to base a verdict upon 
 speculative damages alone, for no accurate basis for the cal- 
 culation could be submitted to them. After the child ar- 
 rives at its majority, the law would give the child the pro- 
 ceeds of its own services, and beyond this period, the chances 
 of the parent surviving it, the child's willingness or unwill- 
 ingness to support or contribute to the parent, are mere mat- 
 ters of conjecture which are far too vague to enter into an 
 estimate that is merely compensatory.'^ 
 
 § 306. Infanf^s recovery for death of parent.— Where the 
 statute giving the right of action for the death of the parent 
 is only compensatory and not of a penal nature, giving a 
 fixed sum for every death resulting from a violation of its 
 provisions, the infant suitig for the death of his parent would 
 only be entitled to recover for such loss as the infant would 
 
 i*This is the illustration given by the Supreme Court of Missouri 
 in Parsons v. Mo. Pacific Ey. Co., 94 Mo. 1. c. 296. 
 
 16 This is the reasoning of the court in State v. Baltimore & Ohio 
 R. Co., 24 Md. 84. 
 
 1—26 401 
 
§ SOY INFANT EMPLOYEES. 
 
 sustain during his minority.^® The law only imposes the 
 burden upon the parent of sustaining and educating the 
 child until it reaches its legal majority and then it is en- 
 titled to its own services and is supposed to support and 
 maintain itself. Hence it is that a child suing for the 
 death of his parent is held only entitled to recover such 
 compensation as he would have received from the parent 
 during his minority, considering the ability of the parent to 
 render intellectual and moral training and his probable con- 
 tribution for the support, education and maintenance of the 
 child during its minority. ■''' Further than this, under stat- 
 utes which are merely compensatory, the law allows no re- 
 covery. 
 
 § 307. Employment about dangerous machinery. — At com- 
 mon law the employer is not compelled to guard dangerous 
 machinery,'® but independently of statute imposing ^uch a 
 duty, 'he might be held liable for permitting an employee 
 too young to understand the danger of such work, to be or 
 remain in his service about dangerous gearing or revolving 
 machinery or set screws, whereby an injury was sustained. -"^ 
 
 In many States statutes have been passed, making it un- 
 lawful to employ infants of tender years at work in close 
 proximity to dangerous machinery. Such legislation for the 
 
 18 3 Sutherland Dam. 283-284; 2 Sedgwick Dam. (8 ed.), § 577; 
 Railroad v. Weldon, 52 111. 290; Railroad v. Austin, 69 111. 426. 
 
 17 Kelly V. Railroad, 48 Fed. Rep. 663; Goss v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 
 50 Mo. App. 626; Schaub v. Ry. Co., 106 Mo. 74; McPherson v. Ry. 
 Co., 97 Mo. 259; Parsons v. Ry. Co., 94 Mo. 286; Railroad v. Wight- 
 man, 29 Gratt. 431. 
 
 18 Blair v. Heible (Mo.), 77 S. W. Rep. 1017. 
 
 19 Jancko v. West Coast, etc., Co., 34 Wash. 556 ; 76 Pac. Rep. 78 
 Chicago, etc., Co. v. Rainneger, 140 111. 334; 29 N. E. Rep. 1106 
 33 Amer. St. Rep, 249; Sachau v. Miller, etc., Co., 123 Iowa 387 
 98 N. W. Rep. 900; Carter v. Dubah, etc., Co. (La.), 36 So. Rep. 952 
 North. Ala., etc., Co. v. Beacham (Ala.),- 37 So. Rep. 227; Meehan 
 V. Atlas, etc., Co., 87 N. Y. S. 1031; 94 App. Div. 306. 
 
 402 
 
INFAKT EMPLOYEES. § 307 
 
 protection of children and for the protection and regulation 
 of child labor is most beneficent in its objects and the courts 
 usually hold the employer liable without specific proof of 
 other wron^ul conduct than the mere employment of an 
 infant and a consequent injury, in vi«lation of the statute.^" 
 In other words, proof of an unlawful employment and a re- 
 sulting injury is generally held prima facie evidence of neg- 
 ligence against the employer violating such a statute. 
 
 But in some of the States, the mere violation of such a 
 statute, preventing the employment of infants of certain 
 years, around dangerous machinery, will not, of itself, ren- 
 der the employer liable, unless his negligence was the ap- 
 proximate cause of such injury to the infant employee,^' 
 and, indeed, this is in accord with the general rule of plead- 
 ing and practice in such cases and any other rule would sub- 
 ject the employer to an additional penalty not named in the 
 
 20 Chicago, etc., Co. y. Eeinneger, supra. 
 
 aiKutchera v. Goodwillie, 93 Wis. 448; 67 N. W. Rep. 729; Belles 
 V. Jackson, 4 Pa. Dist. E. 194 ; Dunn v. McNamee, 59 N. J. L. 498 ; 37 
 Atl. Eep. 61; Higgins, etc., Co. v. O'Keefe, 79 Fed. Rep. 900; 51 U. S. 
 App. 74; 25 C. C. A. 220; Evans v. Iron, etc., Co., 42 Fed. Eep: 519. 
 
 An infant assumes open, obvious risks, the same as an adult, after 
 proper instruction, and also such risks as are ineideutal to the service, 
 for these are incidents of the employment. DeGrofif v. New York, etc., 
 E. Co., 76 N. Y. 125; King v. Boston, etc., Corp., 9 Cush. (Mass.) 112; 
 Evans v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., 12 Hun (N. Y.) 289; Goflf v. Norfolk, 
 etc., R. Co., 36 Fed. Rep. 299; Tillotson v. Texas, etc., R. Co., 44 La. 
 Ann. 95; 10 So. Rep. 400; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 104; Sanborn v. 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co., 35 Kansas 292; 10 Pac. Rep. 860; Goins v. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co., 37 Mo. App. 676. 
 
 But this rule does not apply to a child of tender years and the 
 issue, as to such a child, is whether or not his years were sufficient 
 for him to understand the danger of the employment, on the warning 
 or instruction given him. Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Miller, 51 Texas 270 ; 
 Fisk V. Central Pacific R. Co., 72 Cal. 38 ; 13 Pac. Rep. 144 ; Cook v. 
 St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 34 Minn. 45; 24 N. W. Rep. 311; Wutilla v. 
 Duluth Lumber Co., 37 Minn. 153; 33 N. W. Rep. 551; 5 Am. St. Rep. 
 832, a case which goes to the extreme. 
 
 403 
 
i 308 INFANT EMPLOYEES. 
 
 statute and the law, being penal in its nature, usually 
 ought to be strictly construed. 
 
 § 308. When warning is required. — An infant engaging 
 in a hazardous business, such as railroading, is entitled to 
 warning or instruction as to the daingers in the service, which, 
 on account of his youth or inexperience, he would not under- 
 stand, and if the employer fails to give him adequate warning 
 or instruction as to such dangers and he sustains an injury 
 because of a lack of understanding of the cause of his injury, 
 the employer would be liable to him in damages therefor. ^^ 
 The employer has a right to assume that his employees will do 
 their duty, however, and will not be negligent and for this 
 reason there is no duty to give warning as to the negligence 
 of an employee's coemployees,^* nor is he bound to give 
 warning as to open, obvious dangers,^* or those which he has 
 reason to believe the employee already understands,^® but 
 the danger must be such a one, when coupled with the experi- 
 ence the employer knows the employee to possess, would lead 
 him, as a reasonably prudent man, to believe that the em- 
 
 22 Evans, etc., Co. v. Crawford (Neb.), 93 N. W. Eep. 177; Illinois 
 Steel, etc., Co. v. Ruska, 200 111. 280; 65 N. E. Eep. 734; Waxahaehie 
 Oil, etc., Co. V. McLain (Texas), 66 S. W. Eep. 226; Orman v. Salvo, 
 117 Fed. Rep. 233; 54 C. C. A. 265; Bowling v. Allen, 102 Mo. 213; 
 14 S. W. Rep. 751. 
 
 2S Smith V. Thomas, etc., Co. (N. J.), 54 Atl. Eep. 562; Klos v. 
 Hudson Eiver, etc., Co., 79 N. Y. S. 156; 77 App. Div. 566. But see 
 Lindsay v. Tioga, etc., Co., 108 La. 468; 32 So. Eep. 464. 
 
 2* Herbert v. Mound City, etc., Co., 90 Mo. App. 305; Kopf v. 
 Monroe, etc., Co. (Mich.), 95 N. W. Eep. 72; Shine v. Cocheco Co., 
 173 Mass. 558; 54 N. E. Eep. 245; Worthington v. Goforth (Ala.), 
 26 So. Eep. 531; Ogle v. Mills, 130 N. Y. 458; Palmer v. Harrison, 57 
 Mich. 182; Tremantle v. North Star, etc., Co., 57 Minn. 52; Pratt v. 
 Prouty, 153 Mass. 333; Coullard v. Tecumseh, etc., Co., 151 Mass. 85; 
 Tankham v. Sawyer, 153 Mass. 485; Williamson v. Sheldon, etc., Co., 
 66 Vt, 427. 
 
 2BBrundige v. Dodge, etc., Co., 183 Mass. 100; 66 N. E. Eep. 604; 
 Gaudet v. Stansfleld, 182 Mass. 451; 65 N. E. Eep. 850. 
 404 
 
INFANT EMPLOYEES. § 309 
 
 ployee was ignorant of, before warning or instruction will be 
 required.*" 
 
 § 309. What warning sufficient. — To constitute a defense 
 to an action for an injury to an infant, inexperienced em- 
 ployee, based upon a failure to give sufficient warning or in- 
 struction of the surrounding dangers or perils of the service, 
 the warning or instruction must be of sufficient definiteness 
 to fully apprise the infant of the dangers in the service, for 
 otherwise it had as well not been given at all and would not 
 constitute a defense to the action.^'' In case of a change in 
 the service of an infant, from a department of the business 
 not dangerous, to one attendant with great danger, the same 
 instruction ought to be given as in the case of the original 
 
 2iAnte idem. 
 
 An infant should be protected, by warning or otherwise, from 
 dangers or risks that he does not appreciate. Fisher v. Delaware, 
 etc., Co., 153 Pa. St. 379; 26 Atl. Kep. 18. 
 
 Where the circumstances are such that the employer ought to have 
 known that the infant was not familiar with the hidden dangers of 
 the service, warning or instrviction should be given. Fisk v. Central 
 PaC. E. Co., 72 Cal. 38; 13 Pac. Rep. 144; New Albany, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Cooper, 131 Ind. 363; 30 N. E. Rep. 294; Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Adams, 105 Ind. 151; 5 N. E. Rep. 187; 23 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 408; 
 Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Jones, 76 Texas 350; 13 S. W. Rep. 374; Texas & 
 Pac. R. Co. V. Brick, 83 Texas 598; 20 S. W. Rep. 511; Sims v. East, 
 etc., R. Co., 84 Ga. 152; 10 S. E. Rep. 543. 
 
 Warning of dangerous character of place was held essential in the 
 following cases: Hill v. Gust, 55 Ind. 45; Thrall v. Carme, 24 N. Y. 
 S. R. 270; 5 N. Y. Supp. 244. 
 
 Instruction as to use of dangerous tools and appliances was held 
 essential, in the following cases: Whitelaw v. Memphis, etc., R. Co., 
 16 Lea (Tenn.) 391; 1 S. W. Rep. 37; Ross v. Walker, 139 Pa. St. 
 42; 21 Atl. Rep. 157; Melchert v. Smith, etc., Co., 140 Pa. St. 448; 
 21 Atl. Rep. 755. 
 
 The question whether proper warning was given, or infant under- 
 stood the dangers of his employment is for the jury. Pennsylvania R. 
 Co. V. Long, 94 Ind. 250; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 345; Texas, etc., R. 
 Co. V. Brick, 83 Texas 598; 20 S. W. Rep. 511. 
 
 2? Giordano v. Brandywine, etc., Co. (Del.), 52 Atl. Rep. 332. 
 
 405 
 
§ 309 INFANT EMPLOYEES. 
 
 employment, if the infant is not experienced in the more 
 dangerous department of the service, for the nature and 
 character of the new employment, if different from that -where 
 the infant was previously employed, is, to all intents, a new 
 employment, requiring additional instruction.^^ 
 
 For instance, in the handling of a dangerous machine or 
 agency, the infant should be advised of the proper way to 
 handle the machine or appliance and not only the safe man- 
 ner of performing the service should be made known to him, 
 but he should also be advised of the risk attendant upon the 
 service and the danger or additional risk of performing the 
 service in any other manner. If the service can be per- 
 formed in two or more ways, one of which is comparatively 
 safe and the other dangerous, the instruction should cover 
 the relative safety of these methods, for otherwise the infant 
 could not be held guilty of contributory negligence in per- 
 forming the service in the more dangerous manner, of which 
 he had not been advised.^® 
 
 28 Welsh V. Butts, 202 Pa. 59; 51 Atl. Hep. 591; Bibb Co. v. Taylor, 
 95 Ga. 615; 23 S. E. Rep. 188. 
 
 29 Alabama, Collinsville, etc., Co. v. Pitts, 13 So. Eep. 135; Fox°v. 
 White Lead Works, 84 Mich. 676; 48 N. W. Rep. 203. 
 
 It is the duty to warn an infant, inexperienced employee as to 
 dangers of place and appliances, that would be obvious to an adult, 
 if his youth and inexperience is such as to impart notice of his want 
 of knowledge thereof. And the instruction should include notice of 
 the means to avoid the injury. Fisk v. Central Pacific R. Co., 72 Cal. 
 38; 13 Pac. Rep. 144; Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Adams, 105 Ind. 151; 
 5 N. E. Rep. 187; 23 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 408; Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Jones, 76 Texas 350; 13 S. W. Rep. 374; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Brick, 
 83 Texas 598; 20 S. W. Rep. 511; Whitelaw v. Memphis, etc., R. Co., 
 16 Lea (Tenn.) 391; 1 S. W. Rep. 37; Ross v. Walker, 139 Pa. St. 
 42; 21 Atl. Rep. 157. 
 
 But in the absence of such youth or inexperience sufficient to charge 
 notice of an incapacity to appreciate obvious dangers, the duty of 
 warning only applies as to latent, unseen dangers incurred- in the 
 employment. Rummcl v. Dilworth, 131 Pa. St. 509; Melchert v. Smith 
 Co., 140 Pa. St. 448; 21 Atl. Rep. 755; Sims v. East, etc., R. Co., 
 
 406 
 
INFANT EMPLOYEES. § 310 
 
 § 310. What risks are assumed by infants. — If an in- 
 fant has sufficient experience and understanding to appre- 
 ciate and understand the risk from doing his work in a cer- 
 tain "way and the danger thereof is apparent, he will be held 
 to have assumed the risk, to the same extent that an adult 
 employee would do, even though there has been no warning 
 or instruction as to the given risk.^" The mere fact of in- 
 fancy will not prevent an assumption of obvious and appar- 
 ent dangers or risks in the service of the employer,^ ^ but 
 to exempt the infant employee from the rule that open, ob- 
 vious risks are assumed by all employees, it must appear that 
 he had not sufficient understanding or years to know or ap- 
 preciate what was thus obvious to him, or that, by the exercise 
 of ordinary care by one of his years or experience he would 
 not have discovered the peril that threatened him.*^ In the 
 absence of such a showing, there could be no recovery by an 
 infant of sufficient years and intelligence or capacity to per- 
 form the ordinary duties of a dangerous employment, because 
 of an injury from an open, obvious risk of the service. 
 
 But proof of the mere knowledge of danger is not always 
 held to defeat a recovery by an infant employee, of little or 
 no experience in the business. The defense ought to be able 
 to show not only that he knew of the danger of his employ- 
 ment, but also that he possessed sufficient intelligence and 
 capacity or experience to appreciate the liability of the re- 
 sulting injury. Hence, it is that a mere knowledge of a de- 
 
 84 Ga. 152; 10 S. E. Eep. 543; East, etc., R. Co. v. Sims, 80 Ga. 807; 
 6 S. E. Eep. 595. 
 
 80 Hesse v. National, etc., Co., 66 N. J. L. 652; 52 Atl. Rep. 384; 
 Jones V. Phillips, 39 Ark. 17; 43 Am. St. Rep. 264; Nugent v. 
 Milling Co., 131 Mo. 241; 33 S. W. Rep. 428; Stuart v. Ry. Co., 163 
 Mass. 391; 40 N. E. .Eep. 180; Railroad v. Frawley, 110 Ind. 18; 
 9 N. E. Rep. 594. 
 
 31 Manchester, etc., Co. v. Polk, 115 Ga. 542; 41 S. E. Rep. 1015; 
 Carter v. Baldwin, 107 Mo. App. 229 ; 81 S. W. Rep. 204. 
 
 82 Manchester, etc., Co. v. Polk, 115 Ga. 542; 41 S. E. Rep. 1015. 
 
 407 
 
§ 311 INFAJTT EMPLOYEES. 
 
 feet in an appliance will not defeat a recovery by an infant 
 on the ground of assumed risk, unless it is also shown that 
 he knew also of the danger or risk to which he was subjected, 
 by reason of such defect.*^ And as observed in a previous 
 section, infants of less than the statutory age are not gener- 
 ally held to have assumed the risk of injury from the duties 
 of their employment, because the age named in the statute 
 is generally taken by the courts as the age when the infant 
 will be held to have such intelligence or discretion to engage 
 in the given employment and perform the duties.** It is, 
 practically, a legislative determination that until he reaches 
 that age he does not possess sufiBcient intelligence to under- 
 stand the dangers of the obvious risks of the employment. 
 
 § 311. Same — Eisks beyond scope of employment. — The 
 rule that a minor is held to assume those risks ordinarily 
 incidental to his employment, and those which are obvious to 
 him, in the ordinary discharge of his work, does not apply 
 to dangers with which he is not familiar, or to those inci- 
 dental to duties he may be asked to perform, beyond the" 
 scope of the general duties he was originally engaged to 
 perform.^'' As to duties not incident to the usual employ- 
 
 88 Welsh V. Butts, 202 Pa. 59; 51 Atl. Rep. 591; Hill v. Southern 
 Pac. R. Co. (Utah), 63 Pac. Rep. 8U; Brazil, etc., Co. v. Gaflfney 
 (Ind.), 4 L. R. A. 850; 21 N. E. Rep. 1102. 
 
 s*Hickey v. Taafe, 32 Hun 7; Cooke v. LaLance, etc., Co., 33 Hun 
 351 ; Dresser, Emp. Liab., pp. 600, 601. 
 
 An infant, of proper years and discretion, assumes the risks of his 
 emploment, understood by him, the same as an adult. DeGraff v. 
 New York, etc., R. Co., 76 N. Y. 125; King v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 
 9 Cush. (Mass.) 112; Goif v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co., 36 Fed. Rep. 299; 
 Evans v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., 12 Hun (N. Y.) 289; Tillotson v. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co., 44 La. Ann. 95; 10 So. Rep. 400; 53 Am. & Bng. 
 R. Cas. 104; Sanborn v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., 35 Kansas 292; 10 Pac. 
 Rep, 860; Goins v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 37 Mo. App. 676. 
 
 SB Foley v. California, etc., Co., 115 Cal. 184; 49 Pac. Rep. 42; 
 - Adolflf v. Columbia, etc., Co., 100 Mo. App. 199, an able decision, by 
 408 
 
INFANT EMPLOYEES. § 311 
 
 ment of an infant, lie is generally held to assume such dan- 
 gers only as he may thoroughly understand, or those he 
 would have derived knowledge concerning in the performance 
 of his customary duties, and as to dangers arising from the 
 increased hazards of the employment, about which he has 
 'received no instructions, he would iiot he held to have as- 
 sumed the risk,*® But of course there is no duty of instruc- 
 tion or warning as to dajigers ahout which a minor is thor- 
 oughly conversant, and although asked to perform duties be- 
 yond the usual employment, if the increased dangers arising 
 therein are thoroughly known to a minor and he knowingly 
 engages in the performance of such additional service, he 
 will he held to the same standard as if the dangers were inci- 
 dent to the service as customarily performed,*'' In the ab- 
 sence of evidence that plaintiff assented to the increased risk, 
 by contract, either express or implied,** and, especially if the 
 performance of the additional duties wherein the increased 
 danger was incurred, was begun under a command or threat 
 of discharge, it is generally left to the jury to determine 
 whether or not, in obeying the command, the extra danger 
 was assurcied.*^ 
 
 Judge Goode; Roland v. Railroad, 20 Mo. App. 463; Devitt v. Railroad, 
 50 Mo. 302; Railway Co. v. Fort, 17 Wall. (U. S.) 553; Gardner v. 
 Ry. Co., 150 U. S. 349; Railway v. Babcoelc, 152 U. S. 190; Railroad 
 Co. V. Young, 49 Fed. Rep. 723 ; Farwell v. Railroad Co., 8 Allen. 441 ; 
 Brewer v. Railroad, 124 N. Y. 59; Miner v. Railroad, 153 Mass. 398; 
 Railroad v. Barber, 5 Ohio St. 541; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Conroy, 
 63 Miss. 562; Fogus v. Railroad, 50 Mo. App. 250; ■ Patterson v. 
 Railroad, 76 Pa. St. 412; Goldwaithe v. R. R., 160 Mass. 564; Rich- 
 mond, etc., R. Co. V. Norment, 84 Va. 172; Railroad v. Adams, 105 
 Ind. 151. 
 
 36 Brewer v. Tenn., etc., Co., 97 Tenn. 615; 37 S. W. Rep. 549; Rail- 
 road Co. V. Smith, 9 Lea 685; Telephone Co. v. Loomis, 87 Tenn. 504; 
 11 S. W. Rep. 356; Bailey's Mas. Liab. Inj. Serv., p. 208. 
 
 «7Massie v. Peel Splint, etc., Co., 41 W. Va. 620; 24 S. E. Rep. 644. 
 
 38 Miner v. R. R., 153 Mass. 398; Brewer v. R. R., 124 N. Y. 59. 
 
 soAdolfiF V. Columbia, etc., Co., 100 Mo. App. 209; Goldwaithe v. 
 
 409 
 
§ 312 INFANT EMPLOYEES. 
 
 § 312. Injuries from negligence of coemployees. — The 
 
 common-law doctrine that an employer was not responsible 
 for the negligence of his competent employees, in case of an 
 injury to a coemployee, as a fixed rule of law, in the absence 
 of a statute erecting a different rule of liability, exempts the 
 employer from liability" for injuries to infants, as a result 
 of the negligence of their coemployees, the same as to adult 
 employees, for the implied contract of the common law, by 
 which certain risks of the service are assumed by the em- 
 ployee, on entering into the contract of employment, applies 
 to all who become employees, whether they have all reached 
 their legal majority or not.** To hold otherwise would be 
 manifestly inconsistent, for frequently employees less than 
 their legal majprity are often more competent and skilled in 
 a given service than older men of less experience or ability 
 
 By. Co., 160 Mass. 564;. Patterson v. E. E., 76 Pa. St. 412; Eailway 
 Co. V. Adams, 105 Ind. 151. 
 
 A railroad company is generally held liable to an infant for an 
 injury received while obeying orders of a superior, without fault of 
 the infant, as the risk in such cases is not assumed by the infant. 
 Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Frawley, 110 Ind. 18; 9 N. E. Rep. 594; 
 28 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 308; Michigan Central E. Co. v. Smithson, 45 
 Mich. 212; 1 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 101; Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Bayfield, 
 37 Mich. 205; Galveston, etc., Co. v. Thompson, 76 Texas 235; 13 S. W. 
 Eep. 60; Tennessee, etc., E. Co. v. Hayes, 97 Ala. 201; 12 So. Eep. 98. 
 
 A boy of tender years is not held to assume the risk of any other 
 than obvious or known dangers. Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Miller, 51 
 Texas 270; Fisk v. Central P. E. Co., 72 Cal. 38; 13 Pac. Rep. 144. 
 
 Nor are risks assumed, while obeying orders outside scope of em- 
 ployment. Cook V. St. Paul, etc., E. Co., 34 Minn. 157; 24 N. W. Eep. 
 311; Woutilla V. Duluth, etc., Co., 37 Minn. 153; 33 N. W. Rep. 551; 
 5 Am. St. Rep. 832. 
 
 But' merely placing a minor in a different position and employment 
 is not such evidence of "negligence as to render a company liable, in 
 case of injury to such infant. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Carlton, 60 Texas 
 397; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 350. 
 
 40 King V. Boston, etc., R. Co., 9 Cush. (Mass.) 112; Woodward 
 Iron, etc., Co. v. Cook, 124 Ala. 343; Dresser, Emp. Liab., § 89, p. 400. 
 
 410 
 
INFANT EMPLOYEES. § 313 
 
 in the same employment would be.*^ But of course if the 
 infant is employed in violation of a statute, or if his inex- 
 perience or lack of years is such that he would not under- 
 stand the nature of the service or the ordinary risks of the 
 business, he would not, as matter of law, be held to assume 
 the dangers from the negligence of even competent employees, 
 and where there were such, mitigating circumstances, it would 
 usually be left to the jury to determine whether, under the 
 facts of a given case, the infant should be charged with the 
 assumption of such a risk.*^ 
 
 § 313. Contributory negligence of infants. — The rule is 
 well established that the same standards do not apply in 
 the case of an infant of tender years and an adult, so far as 
 the doctrine of contributory negligence is concerned, for, 
 as said' by the Georgia Supreme Court : " No court can 
 hold that childhood and manhood are bound to observe the 
 same degree of diligence." *^ In the case of an infant, where 
 the contributory negligence of the plaintiff is interposed, 
 the test is, was the act such as might have been expected 
 from a child of the knowledge, age and discretion of the 
 plaintiff, considering his experience and other facts and cir- 
 
 *i White, Per. Inj. in Mines, § 516, p. 570, and cases cited. 
 
 *2Adolir V. Columbia, etc., Co., 100 Mo. App. 209; Goldwaithe v. 
 Railroad Co., 160 Massl 564; Patterson v. Railroad, 76 Pa. St. 412. 
 
 For liability of employer, for injuries to infants, while they were 
 obeying specific orders, see Carter v. Baldwin, 107 Mo. App. 217; CI 
 S. W. Rep. 204; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Frawley, 110 Ind. 18; 9 
 N. E. Rep. 594; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 308; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Bayfield, 37 Mich; 205; Jones v. Lalce Shore, etc., R. Co., 49 Mich. 
 573; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 221; Galveston Co. v. Thompson, 76 Texas 
 235; 13 S. W. Rep. 60. But see, contra, Hogan v. Northern Pacific R. 
 Co., 53 Fed. Repi 519; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 384; Capper v. Louisville, 
 etc., R. Co., 103 Ind. 305; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 525; Cole v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. Co;, 71 Wis. 114; 33 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 274. 
 
 43 Railway Co. v. Young, 81 Ga. 416. 
 
 411 
 
§ 313 INFAITT EMPLOYEES, 
 
 cumstances in connection with the injury.** To hold an 
 infant to the same degree of care or diligence that an ordi- 
 narily prudent person of mature years would exercise, would 
 be manifestly improper, 
 
 The mere infancy of the plaintiff, however, will not ex- 
 cuse him from the result of his own want of care, and where 
 an infant is capable or experienced in the business wherein 
 he received the injury and for this reason is chargeable with 
 contributory negligence at all, it is held in some States that 
 the same degree of care will be exacted from him as would, 
 under the same circumstances, be required of an adult em- 
 ployee.*® But generally, where the age of the infant is such 
 as to make it a debatable question whether or not he pos- 
 sessed sufficient intelligence or experience to know or appre- 
 ciate the danger he encountered, as a result of his own act, 
 the question would be held a jury issue, to be determined 
 with reference to his age, capacity and experience and knowl- 
 edge of the particular danger.*® 
 
 *4 Gardner v. Ey. Co., 150 U. S. 349; Railway Co. v. Babcock, 152 
 U. S. 190; Brewer v. Railroad, 124 N. Y. 59; Fogus v. Railroad, 50 
 Mo. App. 250; Goldwaithe v. Railroad, 160 Mass. 564; Railroad v. 
 Adams, 105 Ind: 151; Adolff v. Columbia, etc., Co., 100 Mo. App. 209; 
 Patterson v. Railroad, 76 Pa. 412; Miner v. Railroad, 153 Mass. 398; 
 Day V. Citizens, etc., Co., 81 Mo. App. 471; Pueschell v. K. C, etc., 
 Co., 79 Mo. App. 459; Foley v, Cal. etc., Co., 115 Cal. 184; 49 Pac. 
 Rep. 42. 
 
 45Graney v. St. L. I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 140 Mo. 89; Spillane v. 
 Railroad Co., 135 Mo. 414; Payne v. Railway Co., 136 Mo. 562; 
 Ridenhour v. Railroad, 102 Mo. 270. 
 
 46 Adolff V. Columbia, etc., Co., 100 Mo. App. 209; Railroad v. 
 Adams, 105 Ind. 151; Goldwaithe v. Railroad, 160 Mass, 564; Fogus 
 V. Railroad, 50 Mo. App. 250; Brewer v. Railroad, 124 N. Y. 59; Miner 
 V. Railroad, 153 Mass. 398. 
 
 Contributory negligence by an infant is equally as good a defense 
 as if he were an adult, but his actions are to be gauged according 
 to his years and not judged as if he were an adult. St. Louis, etc., R. 
 Co. V. Valarius, 56 Ind. 511; 18 Am. Ry. Rep. 116; Umback v. Lake 
 Shore, etc., R. Co., 83 Ind. 191; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 98. 
 
 412 
 
INPAIfT EMPLOYEES. § 314 
 
 § 314. Releases by infant employees. — A release executed 
 by an infant for damages for personal injuries sustained by 
 him, while engaged in the service of another is not different 
 from any other contract entered into by him, but as in the 
 case of any other contract or agreement made by a person not 
 sui juris, a release by an infant is voidable and may be set 
 aside by him, at any time, after he arrives at his majority.'*' 
 Nor 'is a compromise or settlement entered into by his next 
 friend sufficient to estop him from proceeding -with his dam- 
 age suit, unless such compromise or settlement is effected 
 with the consent and endorsement of the court. ^* In a Mas- 
 sachusetts case,*® the next friend, who had been appointed 
 by the court, to prosecute an action for an infant, attempted, 
 without the concurrence of the court, to effect a settlement of 
 "the cause, by accepting less than the amount claimed in the 
 petition. The settlement was held of no effect by the court, 
 because it was not brought to the attention of the court, or 
 approved by an entry of record. A similar holding was an- 
 nounced in an Alabama case,^** wherein it was held that a 
 
 Whether or not an infant has been guilty of contributory negligence 
 defeating an action for an injury received by him, is, ordinarily, a 
 question for the jury, as it is to be determined by the evidence and 
 inferences therefrom, measured in the Ijght of the employee's age and 
 capacity to appreciate his surroundings and the dangers of his em- 
 ployment. Flynn v. Erie, etc., Co., 12 N. Y. S. E. 88; International, 
 etc., E. Co. V. Hinzie, 82 Texas 623; 18 S. W. Eep. 681; St. Louis, etc., 
 E. Co. V. Valarius, 56 Ind. 511; 18 Am. Ey. Eep. 116; Umback v. 
 Lake Shore, etc., E. Co., 83 Ind. 191; 8 Am. & Eng. E. Cas, 98; 
 Williams v. South, etc., E. Co., 91 Ala. 635; 9 So. Eep. 77; Hunnicutt 
 V. Georgia, etc., E. Co., 8 Ga. 195; 11 S. E. Eep. 580; Goins v. 
 Chicago, etc., E. Co., 37 Mo. App. 676; 47 Mo. App. 173; Hamilton v. 
 Galveston, etc., E. Co., 54 Texas 556; 4 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 528; 
 Texas, etc., E. Co. V. Bricks, 83 Texas 598; 20 S. W. Eep. 511; 
 Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Long, 94 Ind. 250; 15 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 345; 
 Kehler v. Schwenk, 144 Pa. St. 348; 22 Atl. Eep. 910. 
 
 *7 Dresser, Emp. Liab., p. 138. 
 
 *8 Tripp V. Gifford, 155 Mass. 108. 
 
 *» Tripp V. Gifford, 155 Mass. 108. 
 
 BO Tennessee, etc., E. Co. v. Hays, 97 Ala. 201. 
 
 413 
 
§ 314 INFANT EMPLOYEES. 
 
 confession of judgment even, by the next friend, would not 
 be legal, unless approved by the court. But if the court con- 
 curs in the settlement made by either a guardian or next 
 friend, such settlement will generally be upheld. ''^ 
 
 Bi Burke v. Burke, 170 Mass. 499. 
 
 A release, by a parent, of all sums to which the minor may be 
 entitled in case of injury, only operates to release the parent's damages 
 during the minority of the child and not the infant's right for the 
 injury to himself. International, etc., R. Co. v. Hinzie, 82 Texas 623; 
 18 S. W. Rep. 681. 
 
 414 
 
CHAPTEE XIV. 
 
 BISKS ASSUMED BY EMPLOYEES. 
 
 I 315. Basis of rule of assumption of risks. 
 
 316. Volunteers generally held to assume risks. 
 
 317. Dangers from employer's negligence assumed in some States. 
 
 318. Risks assumed by minors. 
 
 319. Risks from destructive natural sources assumed. 
 
 320. Where work changes the place. 
 
 321. Risks incident to employment are assumed. 
 
 322. Scope and extent of rule. 
 
 323. Illustrations of incidental risks assumed^ 
 
 324. Injuries from low bridges, when assumed. 
 
 325. Injuries from properly constructed tracks, switches and cattle 
 
 guards. 
 
 326. Risks from structures near track, assumed, when. 
 
 327. Risks from handling machinery, assumed, when. 
 
 328. Risks from movement of trains in company yards assumed. 
 
 329. Risks from excessive speed assumed, in some States. 
 
 330. Flying switch — Shunting cars. ^ 
 
 331. Jerks from taking up slack assumed. 
 
 332. Risks from improperly loaded cars. 
 
 333. Collisions with cattle or teams. 
 
 334. Injuries from use of snow plows — Bucking snow. 
 
 335. Dangers in coupling cars. 
 
 336. Known and obvious risks. 
 
 337. Presumed to know what could be observed. 
 
 338. Risks from open defects in cars assumed, when. 
 
 339. Injuries from lifting ears, rails, etc., assumed. 
 
 340. Working after notice of defect and knowledge of danger. 
 
 341. Notice with dangers connected with place of work, assumed, 
 
 when. 
 
 342. Dangers from open culverts assumed, when. 
 
 343. Notice of defects in machinery and appliances, assumed, when. 
 
 344. Employee with equal knowledge assumes risks. 
 
 345. Extra risks assumed, when. 
 
 346. Extra risks from defective bridges, assumed, when. 
 
 347. Extra risks from operation of cars, assumed, when. 
 
 415 
 
§ 315 ASSUMED EISKS. 
 
 § 348. Extra dangers in use of defective cars, assumed, when. 
 
 349. Dangers outside scope of employment, assumed, when. 
 
 350. Dangers from obeying orders of coemployees, assumed, when. 
 
 351. Risks assumed, notwithstanding promise of repair. 
 
 352. Risks assumed by car and track repairers. 
 
 353. Various injuries due to caving earth banks assumed. • 
 
 354. Risks from negligence of coemployees, assumed, at common 
 
 law. 
 
 355. Additional risks from inclement weather assumed. 
 
 356. Obvious dangers from violation of statutes, assumed, in some 
 
 States. 
 
 357. Risks of accidents are assumed. 
 
 358. Selecting more dangerous way. 
 
 § 315. Basis of rule of assumption of risks. — The rule 
 that an employee is held, in law, to assume the risk of dan- 
 gers incident to his employment and those ■which arise from 
 the acts of those not under the immediate control or supervi- 
 sion of the employer, is said to he based upon the particular 
 status of the relation and also to depend upon the implied 
 contract of employment, that the employee will assume such 
 incidental risks as arise out of the service to be performed, 
 as ordinarily conducted by reasonably careful men in the 
 same business.^ This doctrine is no exception to the rule 
 of respondeat superior, for as to risks assumed by the em- 
 ployee, there is lacking the essential of a breach of duty ow- 
 ing by the employer, which must obtain in the ease of a lia- 
 bility under the rule respondeat superior, and hence the rule 
 of assumption of known or incidental risks, not dependent 
 upon the employer's negligence, is rather a rule of law, based 
 upon the relations of the parties and having for its object 
 the protection of property rights, than a mere rule of policy 
 or expediency, adopted by the courts, for the protection of 
 
 1 Priestley v. Fowler (3 Mees & W. 1), decided in 1837, is the 
 first reported case wherein an employee — then called a servant — at- 
 tempted to hold his employer — master — for damages for a personal 
 injury, received in the course of the employment. The liability in 
 personal injury actions has been so extended and distorted, since this 
 416 
 
ASSUMED RISKS. § 316 
 
 the employer.^ The mere demand of a large class engaged 
 in in&ustrial pursuits, for the repeal of this beneficent rule 
 of the common law, or the enactment of laws in accordance 
 with such demands, in popular Governments, by the law- 
 making power, always subservient to public sentiment, does 
 not militate against the justness or wisdom of the rule, or de- 
 mand any defense for the existence of the law, but rather 
 indicates the digression of law-making bodies from the 
 ideals of the courts, the protection of individual and prop- 
 erty rights, for the demands for more popular laws, or laws 
 more consistent with the interests of the larger classes. A 
 just rule of law should be enforced to protect the rights of 
 the most unpopular citizens equally with those enjoying the 
 largest share of the public confidence, not only because such 
 citizens are frequently more deserving, but because the law 
 is no respecter of persons. The rule that an employee as- 
 sumes, in law, the dangers that are known to him, or those 
 that are apparent or incidental to the business, as ordinarily 
 and carefully conducted, is a rule of the common law, based 
 upon the wisdom and precedents of the ages. It is therefore 
 a property right of the employer that should not be frittered 
 away, either by legislatures or the courts.^ 
 
 able decision was rendered, that a perusal of the case is interesting in 
 the extreme, to modern lawyers. Dresser's Emp. Liab., p. 2. 
 
 2 Dresser, in his work on Employer's Liability, says the rule is 
 based upon "policy." Dresser's Emp. Liab., p. 7. It is rather based 
 upon a sound principle, which has been sacrificed and set aside by one 
 of policy, or expediency, growing out of modern industrial evils and 
 issues. 
 
 s Judge Bailey, -in his excellent work on "Master's Liability," 
 recognizes the rule of assumption of risk as a property right, that 
 ought to be enforced by the courts, the same as any other well settled 
 rule of law, based upon principle. Bailey's Mas. Liab. Inj. Serv., p. 
 27. See Justice Shaw's great opinion in the leading and early 
 ease, Parwell v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 4 Mete. (Mass.) 49, 55. 
 
 The doctrine of assumption of risk is that the contract of employ- 
 ment expressly or impliedly undertakes that the employer shall only 
 1—27 417 
 
§§ 316, 317 ASSUMED RISKS. 
 
 § 316. Volunteers generally teld to assume risks.— Where 
 one Has no interest in the work of a railroad employee, but 
 volunteers to assist in the duties of the employee, he is gen- 
 • erally held to have assumed all the risks incident to the work 
 he has so undertaken and cannot hold the railroad company 
 liable if he' is injured while so doing.* In Minnesota, a by- 
 stander, called by a brakeman, to assist in switching cars and 
 injured while so engaged, was held to assume the risk ; ^ one 
 trying to signal a train to stop, at the request of a watchman, 
 was held to assume the risk of injury while so engaged, in 
 Michigan,® and a boy, getting on an engine at the request of a 
 fireman, in Pennsylvania,'^ was held to be a mere volunteer 
 in the work of taking watery so that he would assume the risk 
 of injury, while so engaged, whether he should be regarded as 
 a mere stranger or an employee. 
 
 § 317. Dangers from employer's negligence assumed in some 
 States. — It is held, in some States,^ that where the employer 
 
 be responsible for personal injuries to his employees, where his negli- 
 gence causes such injuries, and the employees assume the open, obvious 
 dangers of their employment. Narramoore v. Cleveland, etc., Ey. Co., 
 96 Fed. Rep. 298; 37 C. C. A. 499; 48 L. E. A. 68. 
 
 The basis of the doctrine of assumption of risks is discussed, by 
 the Supreme' Court of Kansas, in the recent case of Atchison, etc., 
 Ey. Co. V. Bancord, 71 Pac. Eep. 253. 
 " 4 Bason v. Sabine, etc., E. Co., 65 Texas 577. 
 
 5 Church V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 50 Minn. 218; 52 N. W. Eep. 647. 
 
 = Blair V. Grand Eapids, etc., E. Co., 60 JVlich. 124; 26 N. W. Eep. 
 855; 24 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 430. 
 
 T Flower v. Pennsylvania E. Co., 69 Pa. St. 210. 
 
 8 Where a railroad company is habitually negligent in a certain 
 respect, an employee who remains in -the service, with notice of such 
 negligence, assumes the risk thereof. Arensehield v. Chicago E. I. & 
 P. E. Co., 128 Iowa 677; 105 N. W. Eep. 200. 
 
 An injury from the employer's negligence is held assumed, in Texas, 
 on proof that the employer was customarily negligent and that the 
 employee knew it, but failed to complain thereof. Gulf, etc., E. Co. v. 
 Hulett, 92 S. W. Rep. 454. 
 
 418 
 
ASSUMED msKS. § 318 
 
 is customarily negligent in the selection of dangerous or un- 
 safe appliances or places for work, and the employee injured 
 as a result thereof had worked with such appliances, or in 
 such place, without complaint, after notice of the danger, the 
 employee would be held to assume the risk, notwithstanding 
 the negligence, as the producing cause of the danger occa- 
 sioning the injury. 
 
 And the same rule would apply in the case of the em- 
 ployment of incompetent or customarily n^ligent employees, 
 and if an employee is injured because of the employment of 
 incompetent employees, or because of a failure to employ a 
 siifficient number of employees to carry on the business, if the 
 injured employee, after notice of the negligence in this par- 
 ticular, remained in the service without complaint, he will be 
 held to have assumed the risk.® 
 
 § 318. Risks assumed by minors. — Where a minor was in- 
 structed and cautioned about a danger incident to his em- 
 ployment,^*^ or he understood the danger,^^ or it was so open 
 and obvious that one of his years and experience could not 
 but see and appreciate the danger,^^ he is held to assume the 
 risk, the same as an adult. The law presumes that an infant 
 will notice patent and obvious dangers, such as one of his 
 years could not fail to discern,^* but if the risk is such a one 
 
 9 The danger of an injury from working with an insufficient force 
 of men, was held assumed, in Slavena v. Northern Pac. E. Co., 97 
 Fed. Eep. 255; 38 C. C. A. 151; Tuttle v. Railway Co., 122 U. S. 189; 
 Southern Pac. E. Co. v. Seley, 152 U. S. 145. 
 
 A known risk from failure to employ sufficient men was held 
 assumed, in, Seery v. Gulf, etc., Ey. Co. (Texas), 77 S. W. Eep. 950. 
 
 But see, contra, Illinois Central E. Co. v. Langan (Ky.), 76 S. W. 
 Eep. 32. 
 
 10 Williams v. Belmont, etc., Co., 55 W. Va. 84; 46 S. E. Eep. 802;- 
 Carter v. Baldwin; 107 Mo. App. 217; 81 S. W. Eep. 204. 
 
 "Cohen v. Hamblin, etc., Co., 186 Mass. 544; 71 N. E. Eep. 948. 
 12 Carter v. Baldwin, 107 Mo. App. 217; 81 S. W. Eep. 204. 
 18 Bender v. New York, etc., Co. (N. J.), 61 Atl. Eep. 388; Merrifield 
 V. Maryland, etc., Co., 143 Cal. 54; 76 Pac. Rep. 710. 
 
 419 
 
§ 319 ASSUMED RISES. 
 
 that a person of his immature years or experience would not 
 appreciate the danger, then he will not be held to have as- 
 sumed the risk thereof.^* And if there is a statute in force 
 in the jurisdiction where the injury occurred, preventing the 
 employment of infants of the age of the injured employee 
 in the business in which he received the injury, this is gen- 
 erally held to be a legislative determination that a person of 
 his age could not appreciate the risk of the employment and 
 he will not be held to have assumed the risk.^® 
 
 § 819. Bisks from destructive natural sources assumed. — 
 
 The risk from injuries from natural destructive sources is 
 presumed to be known by all men and the consequent dangers 
 from such sources are so far held to be chargeable to all per- 
 sons of ordinary intelligence, that if an employee in the 
 possession of his faculties is injured from such causes, he 
 is without a remedy against his employer.^' One author 
 illustrates this proposition, with the expression that, " all 
 men are taken to understand that fire will burn and water 
 drown." ^'^ Eisks naturally arising from the work being 
 done are generally held to be assumed by the employee, as 
 a matter of law, whether they are visible or invisible, known 
 
 14 Henderson v. Kansas City, 177 Mo. 477; 76 S. W. Rep. 1045; 
 Babb V. Oxford, etc., Co., 99 Me. 298; 59 Atl. Rep. 290. 
 
 15 Merino v. Lehmaier, 173 N. Y. 530; 66 N. E. Rep. 572; 4 Thomp- 
 son on Neg., § 4686, and cases cited. 
 
 A minor, capable of understanding the dangers surrounding his 
 employment, assumes the risk, the same as an adult does. Decatur 
 Car Wheel Co. v. Terry (Ala.), 41 So. Rep. 839; Evans, etc., Co. v. 
 Crawford (Neb.), 94 N. W. Rep. 814. 
 
 i« Bailey's Mas. Liab. Inj. Serv., p. 152; Buswell's Per. Inj., § 204, 
 p. 341; Minnier v. Sedalia, etc., R. Co., 167 Mo. 99; Bradley v. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co., 138 Mo. 293; Swanson v. Ry. Co. (Minn.), 70 
 N. W. Rep. 978; Reiter v. Winona, etc., Co. (Minn.), 75 N. W. Rep. 
 219; Watson v. Coal, etc., Co., 52' Mo. App. 361. 
 
 iTBuswell, Per. Inj., § 204, p. 341. 
 
 420 
 
ASSUMED KISKS. § 320 
 
 or unknown.^® For instance, an injury from a body sub- 
 ject to the natural law of gravitation, which the employee or 
 his coemployees had subjected to such a force, would be a 
 risk^of the service with which he would be chargeable in 
 law with knowledge and he could not hold his employer re- 
 sponsible for such an injury.^® It is therefore held, very 
 generally, that if an employee is injured by the caving of a 
 railroad cut or ditch in which he is at work with his coem- 
 ployees, that he cannot recover for such an injury, in the 
 absence of some specific act of negligence on the part of his 
 employer ; '^ but one decision of the courts of Illinois would 
 seem to base a liability upon an injury from such a natural 
 cause and thus hold the employer for damages caused by 
 natural forces alone. *^ This is not the general rule govern- 
 ing the employer's liability in such cases.^^ 
 
 § 320. Where work changes the place. — The rule requir- 
 ing the employer to furnish a reasonably safe place for the 
 employee to work does not apply, where the nature of the 
 work is such as to continuously change the place and make 
 a new place for the work, but, in such case, the employee as- 
 sumes the risk of injury from any change in the place of 
 
 18 Linton Coal, etc., Co. v. Persons, 15 Ind. App. 69; 43 N. E. Rep. 
 651; Pennsylvania, etc., E. Co. v. Witte, 15 Ind. App. 583; 43 N. E. 
 Rep. 319. 
 
 18 See White, Pers. Inj. in Mines, § 185, p. 198, and cases cited. 
 
 20 Deceased stood between the steam shovel and the gravel wall of 
 a railroad out; there was no evidence that his duties required him at 
 this point and his death from caving in of the pit was held to be an 
 assumed risk of his service. Beker's Admr. v. Lexington, etc., R. Co. 
 (Ky.), 89 S. W. Rep. 149. 
 
 2iLasalle v. Kostka, 190 111. 130; 60 N. E. Rep. 72. 
 
 22 White, Per. Inj. in Mines, § 185, p. 198, and cases cited. 
 
 An employee engaged to shore up a bank of earth, which was 
 obviously unsafe, until properly shored, assumed the risk of the work, 
 from the bank falling on him, Henson v. Armour, etc., Co. (Mo.), 88 
 S. W. Rep. 166, 
 
 421 
 
§ 321 ASSUMED EISKS. 
 
 work, arising from the prosecution of the work.^* Where 
 an employee i'n a railroad cut undermines the bank of earth 
 and thereby puts in operation the familiar law of gravita- 
 tion, and the earth bank, subjected to such natural law, by 
 the breaking of the particles that hold the earth in place, 
 falls and injures the employee, it could not be said that the 
 employer should respond in damages for such an injury, as 
 this would be to make of him an absolute insurer of the judg- 
 ment of his employees.^* 
 
 But if the injury is due to the defective condition of the 
 earth bank and could be traced to the wrongful act or negli- 
 gence of the employer, then the rule of nonliability would 
 not apply, and the employee could recover damages for such 
 an injury.^^ 
 
 § 321. Bisks incident to employment are assumed. — The 
 
 rule of law is well established that one capable of contracting, 
 
 by entering into a contract of employment with a railroad 
 
 company, thereby assumes, as a condition of his contract, all 
 
 the risks and hazards ordinarily and usually incident to such 
 
 employment, and he will be presumed to have contracted with 
 
 reference to such risks and hazards.^® Another way of stat- 
 es Bradley V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 138 Mo. 293; 39 S. W. Rep. 763; 
 
 Reiter v. Winona, etc., Co. (Wis.), 75 N. W. Rep. 219; Allan v. 
 
 Logan, 37 Pac. Rep. 496. 
 
 2*Rasmussen v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 21 N. W. Rep. 583; Watson v. 
 
 Kansas, etc., Co., 52 Mo. App. 366; Olsen v. McMullen, 24 N. W. Rep. 
 
 318; Brown v. Chattanooga, etc., R. Co. (Tenn.), 47 S. W. Rep. 415; 
 
 Bradley v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 138 Mo. 293; 39 S. W. Rep. 763. 
 
 25 Larson v. Pittsburg, etc., Co., 71 Mo. App. 512; Carter v. Baldwin, 
 
 107 Mo. App. 217; 81 S. W. Rep. 204. 
 28 O'Neal V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 3 McCrary (U. S.), 423; 9 Fed. 
 
 Rep. 337; Woodworth v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 5 McCrary (U. S.), 574; 
 
 18 Fed. Rep. 282; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Orr, 91 Ala. 548; 8 So. 
 
 Rep. 360; Southwestern, etc., Co. v. Woughter, 56 Ark. 206; 19 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 575; Brown v. Central Pac. R. Co. (Cal.), 12 Pac. Rep. 512; 
 
 Herbert v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 3 Dak. 38; 13 N. W. Rep. 349; 8 
 422 
 
ASSUMED EISKS § 321 
 
 ing the same rule, with a possible legal exception, is, that 
 unless it is otherwise stipulated in the contract,^'^ one who 
 enters into an employment, from its nature hazardous, is 
 presumed to do so with a knowledge of the dangers incident 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 85; East Tenn., etc., Co. v. Perkins, 88 Ga. 1; 
 13 S. E. Rep. 952; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Lonergan, 118 111. 41; 7 
 N. E. Eep. 55; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 491; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Corgan, 49 111. App. 229; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Hanning, 131 Ind. 
 528; 31 N. E. Rep. 187; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 452; St. Louis, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Irwin, 37 Kansas 701; 16 Pac. Eep. 146; Dandie v. Southern 
 Pac. R. Co., 42 La. Ann. 686; 7 So. Rep. 792; Coolbroth v. Maine C. E. 
 Co., 77 Me. 165; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 599; Cumberland, etc., R. Co. 
 V. State, 44 Md. 283; Yeaton y. Boston, etc., R. Co., 135 Mass. 418; 
 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 253; Irvine v. Flint, etc., R. Co., 89 Mich. 416; 
 50 N. W. Rep. 1008; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 210; Bengston v. Chicago, 
 etc., E. Co., 47 Minn. 486; 50 N. W. Rep. 531; New Orleans, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Hughes, 49 Miss. 258; Schroeder v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 
 108 Mo. 322; 18 S. W. Eep. 1094; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 436; €raig 
 V. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 54 Mo. App. 523; Hanley v. Grand Trunk E. 
 Co., 62 N. H. 274; Disher v. New York, etc., R. Co., 41 Hun (N. Y.) 
 637; 114 N. Y. 619; 21 N. E. Rep. 415; McNeil v. New York, etc., E. 
 Co., 71 Hun (N. Y.) 24; Wild v. Oregon, etc., R. Co., 21 Oregon 159; 
 27 Pac. Eep. 954; Galveston, etc., E. Co. v. Garrett, 73 Texas 262; 
 13 S. W. Rep. 62; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Watts, 63 Texas 549; 22 
 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 277; Norfolk, etc., E. Co. v. Cottrell, 83 Va. 512; 
 3 S. E. Eep. 123; 31 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 235; Eiley v. West Virginia 
 R. Co., 27 W. Va. 145; Steffen v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 46 Wis. 259; 
 50 N. W. Rep. 348. 
 
 Incidental risks, in a recent case, in Illinois, were said to be such 
 as were " usual," or common, frequent, or customary. " Ordinary " 
 risks were said to be such as frequently recurred. Chicago, etc., R. Co. 
 V. Leach, 104 111. App. 30. 
 
 Injuries from sparks and cinders are incidental risks assumed by 
 railroad employees. Duree v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (Iowa), 92 N. W. 
 Rep. 890. 
 
 An incidental risk may include extraordinary dangers, if arising in 
 the regular or ordinary course of the business. Chicago, etc., R. Co. 
 V. Wild, 109 111. App. 38; Weed v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (Neb.), 99 
 N. W. Rep. 827; Ryan v. Third Ave. E. Co., 86 N. Y. S. R. 1070; 92 
 App. Div. 306. 
 
 27 Cumberland, etc., R. Co. v. State, 44 Md. 283 ; 45 id. 229. 
 
 423 
 
§ 322 ASSUMED EISKS. 
 
 to such service and he assumes the risks of its ordinary haz- 
 ards.^* 
 
 This rule is applied, without exception, so far as adult 
 employees are concerned, for the presumption is that they 
 have sufficient intelligence to comprehend the dangers inci- 
 dent to the service in which they engage,*® but in the case 
 of young or inexperienced employees, the rule is subject to 
 the exception that it is the employer's duty to instruct or 
 warn such employees of the dangers of the employment, when- 
 ever he may know or ought to know that the employee was 
 ignorant of them.^° 
 
 § 322. Scope and extent of rule. — AH ordinary and inci- 
 dental risks are assumed by employees and it is error to limit 
 the risks assumed to such only as threaten " immediate dan- 
 ger," *^ or such as are " necessarily incident " to the em- 
 ployment.'^ To give a cause of action, in any case, the em- 
 ployer must have violated some one of the duties due from 
 him to the employee and the violation of this duty must be 
 the proximate cause of the injury.®* Perils attendant upon 
 the performance of the employer's business and the machin- 
 ery or appliances necessarily employed to perform his work, 
 
 28 Louisville, etc., R. CO. v. Frawley, 110 Ind. 18; 9 N. E. Rep. 594; 
 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 308; Williams v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 116 
 N. Y. 628; 22 N. E. Rep. 1117; 27 N. Y. S. R. 760; 41 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 254; Hawk v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (Pa.), 11 Atl. Rep. 459; 
 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 268; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Lonergan, 118 
 111. 41; 7 N. E. Rep. 55; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas: 491; Griffin v. Ohio, 
 etc., R. Co., 124 Ind. 326; 24 N. E. Rep. 888. 
 
 29 Gibson v. Oregon, etc., R. Co., 23 Oregon 493; 32 Pac. Rep. 295. 
 so Gibson v. Oregon, etc., R. Co., supra. 
 
 siMinnier v. Sedalia, etc., R. Co., 167 Mo. 99; 66 S. W. Rep. 1072. 
 
 32 Southwestern, etc., Co. v. Woughter, 56 Ark. 206; 19 S. W. Rep. 
 575. 
 
 S3 Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Townsend, 41 Ark. 382; 21 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 619; Mensch v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 150 Pa, St, 598; 
 25 Atl. Rep. 31 ; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 198, 
 424 
 
ASSUMED BISKS. § 322 ' 
 
 or at the place where they are used, cannot be considered 
 dangers due to his breach of duty and there can generally be 
 no recovery due to such dangers.^* Dangers connected with 
 machinery, or the use of mechanical power necessary in the 
 movement of such large and powerful bodies as railroad 
 trains, are necessarily unavoidable, even after the exercise 
 of due care by the employer, and such risks are consequently 
 incident to the business, as ordinarily conducted and are as- 
 sumed by persons engaging therein.^® 
 
 A company is allowed to employ such reasonably safe tools 
 and appliances as it 'may see fit, having regard to improve- 
 ments in the methods of its business and no breach of duty 
 can be charged to a failure to adopt the newest or latest in- 
 ventions, or appliances of a particular kind or pattern.*® An 
 injury from the use of an old coupling device, used concur- 
 rently with a newer device, is a danger assumed by a brake- 
 man ; ^'' a section man assumes the risk of injuries from the 
 operation of trains in foggy weather, as well as in clear 
 weather ; ** a company cannot be charged with negligence 
 in using green Switch targets, instead of red targets ; ** an 
 injury due to a cause that could not have been reasonably 
 anticipated is assumed,*" for railroad employees are not in- 
 sured, by the employer, against accidents,*^ by reason of 
 the employment simply, nor can a breach of duty ever be 
 predicated on the simple employment of a person, subject to 
 
 stHoosier, etc., Co. v. McCain, 133 Ind. 231; 31 N. E. Rep. 956. 
 35McGovern v. Central, etc., E. Co., 123 N. P. 280; 25 N. E. Rep. 
 373; 33 N. Y. S. R. 416, reversing 53 Hun 635. 
 so Bailey's Mas. Liab. Inj. Serv., p. 146. 
 
 87 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Henly, 48 Ohio St. 608; 29 N. E. Rep. 
 575; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 194. 
 
 88 International, etc., R. Co. v. Hester, 64 Texas 401; 21 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 535. 
 
 39 Naylor v. New York, etc., E. Co., 33 Fed. Rep. 801. 
 40Beasley v. Transfer Co., 148 Mo. 413; 50 S. W. Eep. 87. 
 *i Bradbury v. Kingston, etc., Co., 157 Pa. St. 231; 27 Atl. Eep. 400; 
 Melvill? V, Missouri Eiver, etc., E. Co., 48 Fed. Eep. 820. 
 
 420 
 
§ 323 ASSUMED RISKS. 
 
 the ordinary risks of the business, if the employee is himself 
 aware of the risks and consents to encounter them.*'-' 
 
 § 323. Illustrations of incidental risks assumed. — Illustra- 
 tive of the rule laid down in the foregoing section, it may not 
 be inappropriate to name, from the great array of adjudi- 
 cated cases, a few from the different departments of railroad 
 service, where incidental risks have been held to be assumed. 
 An express man assumes the risk of injury in moving a train 
 box, from one car to another, with a rope; *® an injury while 
 throwing mail bags into moving cars is assumed ; ** a car in- 
 spector assumes the. risk of injury from moving cars;*® a 
 brakeman assumes the risk of injury in coupling cars ; *" 
 an engineer assumes the risk of rounding a curve and being 
 thrown from his engine ; ^'' a section hand assumes the dan- 
 
 *zMc6iiinis v. Canada Southern Co., 49 Mich. 466; 13 N. W. Rep. 
 819; 8 Am. & Bng. R. Cas. 135. 
 
 *3 Gowen v. Harley, 56 Fed. Rep. 973. This is a very clear and able 
 decision by Judge Sanborn. In the course of the opinion, the court 
 said: 
 
 " The errand boy whose duty it is to climb the stairs of a high 
 building daily, cannot recover from the employer for a fall down the 
 stairs, on the ground that the latter had just promised to furnish him 
 an elevator for his convenience or for hia safety, when the stairs them- 
 selves were reasonably safe. The mason who is placing heavy stones 
 upon a wall by hand cannot recover of his employer if he takes up one 
 that is too heavy for him and it falls upon his feet, on the ground 
 that his employer had just promised to furnish him an incline plane, 
 upon which he could roll the stones upon the wall. Nor can the 
 plaintiff, who was employed to carry this train box, without tools 
 or machinery, from one ear to the other, recover here, because the 
 defendant had promised to provide him with planks or a skid on which 
 he could slide it across." 
 
 4«Coolbroth v. Maine Central R. Co., 77 Me. 165; 21 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 599. 
 
 is Cruty V. Erie, etc., R. Co., 3 T. & C. (N. Y.) 244. 
 
 46 Jacksonville, etc., R. Co. v. Galvin, 29 Fla. 636; 11 So. Rep. 2^1; 
 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 341. 
 
 ^fKnapp v. Sioux City R. Co., 71 Iowa 41; 32 N. W. Rep. 18, 
 426 
 
ASSUMED RISKS. § 324 
 
 ger of falling into water ways,** as well as injuries from 
 moving trains ; *® a shoveler, the danger of a falling earth ^° 
 or gravel bank; ^^ a track walker, the chance of being caught 
 on a trestle, by a train of cars ; °^ and a traveling auditor 
 of the company assumes the risk of all dangers that are open 
 or ought to have been known to him, along the track of the 
 defendant company. ''^ 
 
 § 324. Injuries from low bridges, when assumed. — As the 
 
 48 Couch V. Charlotte, etc., R. Co., 22 So. Car. 557; 28 Am. & Eng. 
 E. Cas. 331. 
 
 "Evans v. Wabash E. Co., 178 Mo. 508; 77 S. W. Rep. 515. 
 
 50 Bradley v. Chicigo, etc., E. Co., 138 Mo. 293; 39 S. W. Eep. 763. 
 
 BiSongstad v. Burlington, etc., E. Co., 5 Dak. 517; 41 N. W. Eep. 
 755; 38 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 211. 
 
 B2 Gibson v. Oregon, etc., R. Co., 23 Oregon 493; 32 Pac. Rep. 295. 
 
 63 Minty v. Union Pac. R. Co., 2 Idaho 437j 21 Pac. Rep. 660. 
 
 An employee was held to assume the risk of jerks and jolts, in a, 
 freight train, in the following cases: Lee v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. 
 (Wash.), 81 Pac. Eep. 834; Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Smith, 129 Ala. 
 53; 30 So. Eep. ,571; Shields v. Kansas City, etc., Ey. Co., 87 Mo. 
 App. 637; Branco v. Illinois Central E. Co. (Iowa), 93 N. W. Rep. 97. 
 
 A section hand injured by a lining block falling from the front end 
 of a. hand car, where it had been placed without order from the 
 foreman, but which was obvious and was caused to fall by the mo- 
 tion of the car, assumed the risk. St. Louis, S. W. Ry. Co. v. Dempsey 
 (Texas), 89 S. W. Rep. 789. 
 
 A brakeman who stands so close to a passing train of cars as to 
 have his clothing caught by the door irons of a freight car, as a 
 result of which he is thrown down and crushed, was held to assume 
 the risk, in Indiana. Chicago, I. & L. R. Co. v. Bryan, 75 N. E. Rep. 
 678. ' 
 
 The operator of an engine or car, who knows the use of sand and 
 the necessity of providing himself with it, fails to do so, as a result of 
 which his car runs away, down a steep grade, causing his injury, 
 assumes the risk and his employer is not liable. Meyer v. Detroit, 
 etc., Ry. Co. (Mich.), 105 N. W. Rep. 888; 12 Det. Leg. N. 843. 
 
 A lineman climbing telegraph poles is held to assume the risk in 
 the following cases: Ewald v. Michigan Cent. E. Co., 107 111. App. 
 294; Epperson v. Postal Tel., etc., Co., 155 Mo. 346; 50 S. W. Rep. 
 795; 55 S. W. Rep. 1050; Meehan v. Holyoke Ry. Co., 186 Mass. 
 511; 72 N. E. Eep. 61. 
 
 427 
 
§ 325 ASSUMED KISKS. 
 
 employer is permitted to construct his plant or premises in 
 his own way, so long as same are not negligently built, and 
 it is a frequent occurrence for bridges along railroad tracks 
 to be too low to accommodate unusually high cars, it is quite 
 generally held that all employees who know, or ought by 
 their experience to have known of a low bridge, assume the 
 risk of injury received while standing on cars which cannot 
 pass under the bridge, with sufficient height above the car 
 to permit a person to safely stand upon the car without stoop- 
 ing, as such dangers are ordinary risks of the business of 
 railroading and are so understood by experienced em- 
 ployees.^* But if the employee is so young or inexperienced 
 that he would not appreciate the danger of such risks, or if 
 actual notice of such bridge is not had by him, then the risk 
 of injury therefrom is not assumed as an incident of the em- 
 ployment, but warning or instruction should be given of the 
 risk.^® 
 
 § 325. Injuries from properly constructed tracks, switches 
 and cattle guards, — While injuries from improperly or de- 
 fectively constructed tracks, switches or cattle guards, are not 
 generally held to be assumed by employees of a railroad 
 company,^® injuries due to tracks, switches or cattle guards 
 that are properly constructed and installed are generally held 
 to be risks assumed by employees, as all such constructions 
 
 54 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Strickler, 51 Md. 47; Carbine v. Ben- 
 nington, etc., K. Co., 61 Vt. 348; 17 Atl. Kep. 491; 38 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 45; Clark v. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 78 Va. 709; 18 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 78; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. State, 74 Md. 152. See note, p. 
 431. 
 
 55 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Wright, 115 Ind. 378; 16 N. B. Rep. 
 145; 38 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 41. 
 
 58 Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. State, 58 Md. 372; 10 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 792; Ft. Worth, etc., R. Co. y. Thompson, 2 Texas Civil 
 App. 170; 21 S. W. Rep. 137; Clapp v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co., 
 36 Minn. 6; 29 N. W. Rep. 340; Trask v. California, etc., R. Co., 
 63 Cal. 96; 11 Am. & Eng. R, Cas. 192, 
 
 428 
 
ASSUMED EISKS. § 325 
 
 are necessary in the operation of railroads and contact there- 
 with by employees cannot be avoided by the employer. 
 
 Hence, an injury from stepping into an unblocked guard 
 rail, that was properly constracted ; ^'^ injury to a brakeman 
 from stepping into a cattle guard, on a public highway, near 
 a switch ; ®* an injury from stepping upon a rolling clinker, 
 in alighting from a moving car; ^® an injury from stepping 
 between a guard rail and a switch frog®" and an injury 
 from a car drifting on a side track, properly constructed,"^ 
 
 57 McNeil V. New York, etc., E". Co., 71 Hun 24; 24 N. Y. Supp. 
 616; Appel v. Buffalo, etc., R. Go., Ill N. Y. 550; Michigan, etc., 
 E. Co. V. Austin, 40 Mich. 247; Batterson v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 
 53 Mich. 125; Little Rock, etc., E. Co. v. Eubanks, 48 Ark. 460; 3 
 S. W. Eep. 808; 31 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 176. 
 
 58 Henderson v. Coons, 31 lU. App. 75. 
 
 B9Lee V. Central & R. Co., 86 Ga. 231; 12 S. E. Eep. 307. 
 
 eoBourgeault v. Grand Trunk E. Co., 5 Mont. Super. 249; Appel 
 y. Buffalo, etc., E. Co., Ill N. Y. 550; 19 N. E. Eep. 93; 20 N. Y. 
 Supp. 90; reversing 40 Hun 632; DeForrest v. Jewett, 88 N. Y. 264; 
 Finnell v. Delaware, etc., E. Co., 42 N. Y. S. E. 354. 
 
 eiTwitchell v. Grand Trunk E. Co., 39 Fed. Eep. 419; Tuttle v. 
 Detroit, etc., E. Co., 122 U. S. 189; 7 Sup. Ct. Eep. 1166. 
 
 Experienced employees were held to have assumed the risk aris- 
 ing from the use of an unblocked switch, in the following cases: 
 Hynson v. St. Louis, etc., Ey. Co. (Texas), 86 S. W. Eep. 928; Lou- 
 shay V. Erie E. Co.,. 88 N. Y. S. E. 446; 95 App. Ddv. 102; Riley v. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co., 133 Fed. Rep. 904; Shannon's Admr. v. 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. (Ky,), 70 S. W. Rep. 626; Johns v. Cleve- 
 land, etc., E. Co., 23 Ohio Cir. Ct. Eep. 442; Narramore v. Cleve- 
 land, etc., E. Co., 96 Fed. Eep. 298; 37 C. C. A. 499; 48 L. E. A. 
 68; Southern Pac. E. Co. v. Seley, 152 U. S. 145; 38 L. Ed. 391; 
 Sherman v. Eailroad Co., 34 Minn. 259; 25 N. W. Eep. 59'3; Gillin 
 V. Patten, etc., E. Co., 93 Me. 80; 44 Atl. Eep. 361. 
 
 An injury from stepping into a guard rail of a switch that is 
 not blocked, is held to be assumed, in the following cases: Haas 
 V. Buffalo, etc., E. Co., 40 Hun (N. Y.) 145; Mayes v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. Co., 63 Iowa 562; 14 N. W. Eep. 340; 8 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 
 527; Gleason v. New York, etc., E. Co., 159 Mass. 68; 34 N. E. 
 Eep. 79; Eichmond, etc., E. Co. v. Eisdon, 87 Va. 335; 12 S. E. Eep. 
 786; 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 244. 
 
 429 
 
§ 326 ASSUMED EISKS. 
 
 are all instances whereiii the risk' was held to be assumed by 
 the employees sustaining the several injuries noted. 
 
 § 326. Risks from structures near track, assumed, when. — 
 
 An employee does not assume the risk of injury from the 
 nearness of temporary structures, negligently permitted to 
 be erected near the track, and especially if no notice of 4he 
 erection of such structures is had by the injured employee.*'' 
 But where permanent structures are erected nfear the track 
 and no negligence can be predicated on the nearness of such 
 structures to the track, the employee assumes the risk of in- 
 juries therefrom, as such erections are made necessary in 
 the business of railroading and employees are bound to as- 
 sume the danger of contact therewith, as incidental risks 
 of the business.®* Accordingly, a brakeman is held to as- 
 sumie the risk of injury fr-om being caught between a moving 
 freight car and an oil house, built so near the track that the 
 cars clear it only by. a few inches. It was an obvious open 
 risk, which all employees are charged with notice of.®* A 
 brakeman assumes the risk of injury from contact with a 
 pile of stone, beside the track; ®^ an engineer takes the risk 
 of being struck by a signal post, in leaning from his engine 
 and looking back at the train ; ** a. brakeman takes the risk 
 of striking a projecting awning at a station, while climbing 
 the side of a car ; *'' a conductor of a freight train cannot 
 
 82 Murphy v. Wabash R. Co., 115 Mo. Ill; 21 S. W. Eep. 862 
 
 Bean v. Western, etc., R. Co., 107 N. Car. 731; 12 S. E. Eep. 600 
 
 Johnston v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 43 Minn. 53; 44 N. W. Rep. 884 
 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 293; Seanlon v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 147 Mass. 
 484; 18 N. E. Rep. 209; 38 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 48. 
 
 63 Kelly V. Baltimore, etc., E. Co. (Pa.), 11 Atl. Rep. 659. 
 
 64 Kelly V. Baltimore, etc., E. Co., supra. 
 
 05 Smith V. Winona, etc., E. Co., 42 Minn. 87 ; 43 N. W. Eep. 
 968; 41 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 289. 
 
 66Lovejoy v. Boston, etc., E. Co., 125 Mass. 79. 
 
 6TFisk V. Eitchburg, etc., E. Co., 158 Mass. 238; 33 N. E. Eep. 
 510. 
 
 430 
 
ASSUMED ElSKS. § 326 
 
 recover for an injury from coming in contact "with a pro- 
 jecting roof of a station ; ®* nor can a brakeman, for being 
 struck by a pile of lumber, -near the track, while mounting 
 the side of a freight car ; ®^ as all such risks are open, obvious 
 risks that must be appreciated by all men. 
 
 68 Gibson v. Erie, etc., E. Co., 63 N. Y. 449 ; 20 Am. Eep. 552. 
 
 ssGaffney v. New York, etc., R. Co., 15 R. I. 456; 7 Atl. Eep. 
 284; 31 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 265. 
 
 Where the employee knows the character and position of struc- 
 tures likely to cause injury, he cannot . require the removal of such 
 structures, or hold the employer, in case of injury, for damages. 
 Gibson v. Erie, etc., E. Co., 63 N. Y. 449; 20 Am. Rep. 552; Car- 
 bine V. Beiinington, etc., R. Co., 61 Vt. 348; Ryan v. Long Island R. 
 Co., 51 Hun (N. Y.) 607; DeForrest v. Jewett, 88 N. Y. 264; 8 Am. 
 & Eng. E. Cas. 495. 
 
 An experienced employee who knows, or ought to know, of the 
 presence of obstructions, near the track, was held to assume the 
 risk thereof, in the following eases: Nugent v. Brooklyn, etc., Ey. 
 Co., 72 N. Y. S. E. 67; 64 App. Div. 351; Ladd v. Brocton St. Ey. 
 Co. (Mass.), 62 N. E. Eep. 730; a low bridge, Erie R. Co. v. Mc- 
 Cormick, 69 Ohio St. 45; 68 N. E. Rep. 571; McLoed v. New York, 
 etc., R. Co., 191 Mass. 389; 77 N. E. Rep. 715; Mobile & Ohio R. 
 Co. V. Vallowe, 214 111. 124; 73 N. E. Eep. 416; Quinn v. New 
 York, etc., E. Co., 175 Mass. 150; 55 N. E. Rep. 891; Phelps v. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. (Mich.), 81 N. W. Eep. 101; Illick v. Eail- 
 road Co., 67 Mich. 632; 35 N. W.'Eep. 708; Pennington v. Railroad 
 Co., 90 Mich. 505; 51 N. W. ' Rep. 634; Manning v. Railroad Co., 
 105 Mich. 260; 63 N. W. Rep. 312; Goodes v. Railroad Co., 162 
 Mass, 287; 38 N. E. Rep. 500; Content v. Railroad Co., 165 Mass. 
 267; 43 N. E. Eep. 94; Eyan v. Eailroad Co., 169 Mass. 267; 47 N. 
 E. Eep. 877; Brown v. Eailroad Co., 69 Iowa 162; 28 N. W. Eep. 
 478. 
 
 In Hagar v. Terminal R. Ass'n (105 S. W. Rep. 744), the Su- 
 preme Court of Missouri, in an able opinion by Judge Graves, held 
 that a switchman assumed the risk, as matter of law, in riding a 
 defective car which collided with a post or bridge across the track, 
 although he was acting under the order of the conductor in riding 
 the car, the court saying: 
 
 " The question is whether a servant, who by reason of his em- 
 ployment, is required to handle both defective and sound ears, and 
 being (admittedly) advised of the condition of the ear being handled, 
 can he recover? We think not. If there was danger in this par- 
 
 431 
 
§ 32T ASSUMED EISKS, 
 
 § 327. Risks from handling machinery, assumed, when.— 
 
 The danger of handling machinery pernaitted to get out of 
 repair by the negligence of the employer, is not one of the 
 incidental risks of the employment, assumed hy the em- 
 ployee,'" but where the employer has used due care in the 
 selection and providing of machinery and appliances, the risk 
 incident to the handling qf such machinery must be taken to 
 be assumed by the employee to whom the duty of operating 
 the machinery is intrusted.''^ An employer is not liable to 
 an employee for injuries in the use of an appliance, although 
 it is different and more dangerous than those generally em- 
 ployed in similar service, if the use of such appliance was 
 one of the incidents of the employment of the injured em- 
 ployee, voluntarily assumed by him.''^ 
 
 tioular car, the servant was as fully advised as was the master. 
 In handling cars of this character, he, as well as the master, un- 
 derstood that such, in the business performed by the master, had to 
 be handled. The servant, a man of experience, knew the dangers 
 of his employment, and had personal knowledge of the apparent 
 dangers accompanying the handling of this particular car. If the 
 car had been run in upon him without knowledge of its condition, 
 the case might be different. But here we have an admitted knowl- 
 edge of the condition. Plaintiff knew that the car ' was off center,' 
 and by his experience must have known the dangers incident to 
 the handling thereof. Knowing that the master was bound to handle 
 defective cars, he was obligated to look, out for such cars. But, not 
 placing this opinion upon that ground, the plaintiff in this case 
 was fully advised as to the character of the car which he was han- 
 dling, at least as much as the master, and under no theory of the 
 law can recover." Hagar v. Ter. R. Assn., 105 S. W. Rep. 747. 
 
 70 Brown v. Sullivan, 71 Texas 470; 10 S. W. Rep. 288. 
 
 7iFraker v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 32 Minn. 54; 19 N. W. Rep. 
 349; 15 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 256. 
 
 T2 Hatter v. Illinois C. R. Co., 69 Miss. 642 ; 13 So. Rep. 827. 
 
 An employee by continuing the use of known defective appliances, 
 without complaint, assumes the risk of all dangers that he knew 
 or ought to have known would result therefrom. Lee v. St. Louis, 
 etc., R. Co., 112 Mo. App. 372; 87 S. W. Rep. 12; Merrill v. Oregon 
 Short Line R. Co. (Utah), 81 Pae. Rep. 85; Leach v. Oregon Short 
 Line R. Co. (Utah), 81 Pac. Rep. 90. 
 
 432 
 
ASSUMED EISKS. § 327 
 
 Nor is the employer liable to an eniployee ior an injury 
 from an openly defective tool or appliance, for where the 
 employee knows of a defect and still uses the appliance, the 
 law infers that he assumes the risk incident to such use.''^ 
 The danger of an insufficient stick breaking, is a danger as 
 well known to the employee as to the employer ''* and the 
 danger from coming in contact with a rapidly revolving shaft, 
 or wheel, is a risk carrying notice of the danger to all men.'^^ 
 
 But an employee does not assume the risk of injury from 
 defective machinery, unless he also knows the danger from 
 the use, or the experience of the employee, or the open nature 
 of the defect is such as to charge him with notice of the 
 danger.'® 
 
 The risk of an injury from a defective handle bar is assumed by 
 an experienced brakeman, where he knew of the defect. Mobile & 
 0. K. Co. V. Beasley, 119 111. App. 18. 
 
 '3 Cumberland, etc., R. Co. v. State, 44 Md. 283 ; Anderson v. 
 Minnesota, etc.,. R. Co., 39 Minn. 523; 41 N. W. Rep. 104; 38 Am. 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 206; Heflferman v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 45 Minn. 471; 
 48 N. W. Rep. 1; Stoeckman v. Terre Haute, etc., R. Co., 15 Mo. 
 App. 503; Porter v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 71 Mo. 66; Ragon v. 
 Toledo, etc., R. Co., 97 Mich. 265; 56 N. W. Rep. 612; Cagney v. Hanni- 
 bal, etc., R. Co., 69 Mo. 416; Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Johnston, 83 Texas 
 628; 19 S. W. Rep. 151. 
 
 TiBohn V. Chicago, etc., R. Co,, 106 Mo. 429; 17 S. W. Rep. 580. 
 
 70 Van Horn v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 42 Hun (N. Y.) 654; 113 N. Y. 
 634; 20 N. E. Rep. 878; 22 N. Y. S. R. 994. 
 
 76Scanlon v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 147 Mass. 484; 18 N. E. Rep. 
 209 ; 38 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 48. 
 
 The danger of one's clothing catching on a revolving shaft is very 
 generally held to be an open, obvious risk, assumed. Muenchow v. 
 Zsohetzache, etc., Co., Il3 Wis. 8; 88 N. W. Rep. 909; Nugent v. 
 Milling Co., 131 Mo. 241; 33 S. W. Rep. 428; Demers v. Marshall, 
 172 Mass. 548; 52 N. B. Rep. 1066; Detroit, etc., Co. v. Grable, 94 
 Fed. Rep. 73. 
 
 In a recent case, in the federal court, where the employer's duty 
 to furnish reasonably safe appliances was recognised by the court, 
 it was none the less held that if the appliances were glaringly de- 
 fective or dangerous the risk of injury therefrom would be assumed 
 
 1—28 433 
 
§ 328 ASSUMED EISKS. 
 
 § 328. Risks from movement of trains in company yards as- 
 sumed. — A marked distinction is recognized by the best con- 
 sidered cases, between the obligation of the railroad company 
 toward third parties and that existing toward its own em- 
 ployees, with reference to the necessity of giving warning or 
 notice of the movement of its trains in its own yards, or at 
 places where the business of railroading requires the constant 
 or frequent movement of trains or engines. Where the pub- 
 lic are expected to be using the track or right of way, due 
 care requires notice of the movement of trains, for strangers 
 may be present who do not know of the perils of the situa- 
 tion; with the company's employees, however, there is held 
 to be no duty to give warning of the movement of trains, 
 as this is the very object of the employment in which the < 
 employee is engaged and a risk incident to the service, which 
 he is held to assume, under his contract of employment.''^ 
 Employees about railroad yards are not like strangers or 
 third parties ; they understand the situation ; they know the 
 manner of doing the business and that cars frequently pass, 
 without notice of their approach and the danger of being 
 struck by a backing engine ^* or car ''^ is a risk incident to 
 
 by the plaintiflf. Cincinnati, etc., Co. v. Robertson, 139 Fed. Eep. 
 519. 
 
 An employee assumes the risk of latent defects in the place and 
 machinery with which he works, which the ordinary care of the 
 employer fails to discover and remove. Cryder v. Chicago, E. I. & 
 P. Ey. Co. (U. S. C. C. A., Kan., 1907), 152 Fed. Rep. 417. 
 
 T7 Crowe v. New York, etc., R. Co., 70 Hun 37; -53 N. Y. S. E. 
 558; 23 N. Y. Supp. 1100; Loring v. Kansas City, etc., E. Co., 128 
 Mo. 349; 31 S. W. Eep. 6; Evans v. Wabash R. Co., 178 Mo. 508; 
 77 S. W. Rep. 515; Aerkfetz v. Humphries, 145 U. S. 418, 421; 36 
 L. Ed. 758. 
 
 The danger to an engine cleaner, from the collision apt to re- 
 sult from his stationery engine being struck by moving cars or 
 engines, was held~ assumed, in New York. Lane v. New York, etc., 
 R. Co., 94 N. Y. S. E. 988; 107 App. Div. 166. 
 
 78 Wabash, etc., E. Co. v. Conkling, 15 111. App. 157, where a 
 fireman, killed while cleaning an engine, by a backing train, was 
 held to have assumed the risk. 
 
 .70 Galveston, etc., E. Co. v. Arispe, 81 Texas 517; 17 S. W. Eep. 
 434 
 
ASSUMED RISKS. § 329 
 
 the busiHess, as carefully conducted and a peril of tlie em- 
 ployment, 
 
 § 329. Risks from excessive speed assumed in some States. — 
 The mere fact that a train was running at a high rate of 
 speed, at the time of an injury to an employee, does not, of it- 
 self, show negligence on the part of the employer,®" so as 
 to render him liable in. damages for an injury to an em- 
 ployee, and the violation of a speed limit for trains, at the 
 time of an injury, would not render the railroad company 
 liable, unless the excessive speed was the proximate cause of 
 the injury complained of.*^ 
 
 47; 48 AiQ. & Eng. K. Cas. 350; Goodrich v. New York, etc., K. Co., 
 116 N. Y. 398; 22 N. E. Rep. 397; 26 N. Y. S. R. 767; 5 L. E. A. 
 750. 
 
 The movement of cars or engines in a railroad yard, or on main 
 track, without notice, was held an assumed risk, in the following 
 cases: St. Louis Stock Yards Co. v. Burns, 97 111. App. 175; 
 Sanker v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 205 Pa. St. 609; 55 Atl. Eep. 833; 
 Nelson v. Oil City R. Co., 207 Pa. St. 363; 56 Atl. Rep. 933; Sim- 
 mons V. Southern Tr. Co., 207 Pa. St. 589; 57 Atl. Rep. 45; Mobile, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Healy, 100 111. App. 586. 
 
 An employee injured by the sudden stopping of a car, when he 
 knew where it would stop, is held to have assumed the risk. Sim- 
 mons V. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (Ky.), 18 S. W. Rep. 1024. 
 
 A brakeman turijing a switch and struck by a rapidly moving 
 car, is held to have assumed the risk of such an injury. Coombs 
 V. Pitohburg, etc., R. Co., 156 Mass. 200; 30 N. B. Rep. 1140; 53 
 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 353. 
 
 And an employee in a company's yard at night assumes the risk 
 of being struck by a moving car, without a, light or any warning. 
 Crowe V. New York, etc., R. Co., 53 N. Y. S. R. 558; 23 N. Y. Supp. 
 1100; 70 Hun 37. 
 
 An employee who, for his own convenience, uses the track as a 
 foot way, assumes the risk of being struck by a passing train. 
 Morehead v. Yazoo, etc., Ry. Co. (Miss.), 36 So. Rep. 151. 
 
 80 Southern, etc., R. Co. v. Cook, 121 Ga. 416; 49 S. E. Rep. 287; 
 Galveston, etc., E. Co. v. Cassinelli (Texas), 78 S. W. Rep. 247; St. 
 Loui% etc., R. Co. v. Carlisle, 75 Ark. 560; 88 S. W. Rep. 584. 
 
 81 San Antonio, etc., R. Co. v. Clark (Texas), 62 S. W. Rep. 
 546. 
 
 435 
 
§ 330 ASSUMED KISKS. 
 
 An injury to employees on the train ®^ or on the track,*^ 
 due to an excessive rate of speed, is held assumed in some 
 States, but where the speed of the train is such as to-be 
 denominated negligence, in States where there is a statute 
 making the railroad company liable for injuries to its em- 
 ployees, caused by the negligence of c'oemployees, engaged 
 in the operation of the railroad, it is doubtful if such a con- 
 struction of the statute would be allowed. 
 
 § 330. Flying switch — "Shunting" cars. — An employee 
 of a railroad cannot recover for injuries received while 
 " shunting " cars upon its tracks, in the absence of evidence 
 of negligence or the breach of some duty toward him, by the 
 company.** In an Iowa case,®^ a brakeman, in pursuance 
 of his duties, was standing on top of a freight car, while 
 a flying' switch was being made. He signaled the engineer 
 to back and when the impact between the engine and the 
 freight car, on which the brakeman was standing, occurred, 
 he was thrown from the car and, injured, but it was held 
 that he had assumed the risk. Nor would the result be dif- 
 ferent, if it be Conceded that the employer was negligent in 
 permitting flying switches to be made, for by participating 
 therein, the employee would be held to have waived the 
 negligence of the employer and assumed the risk of the dan- 
 gerous employment.*^ 
 
 82 The dangers from running a train at an exceasive rate of speed, 
 ■were held assumed risks, in Iowa, in Martin v. Chicago, etc., Ey. 
 Co., 91 N. W. Rep. 1034; 59 L. R. A. 698. 
 
 83 The risk of an injury from excessive speed of a train, is held 
 to be assumed, in Wisconsin, by a sectionman. Ives v. Wisconsin, 
 etc., Ry. Co., 128 Wis. 357; 107 N. W. Rep. 452. 
 
 84]VIembery v. Great Western R. Co., 14 App. Cas. 179. 
 86Youll V. Sioux City, etc., R. Co., 66 Iowa 346; 23 N. W. Rep. 
 736; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 589. 
 seYoull V. Sioux City, etc., R. Co., supra. 
 
 Where it was the custom to kick cars down to a fleldman without 
 436 
 
ASSUMED KISIiS. §§ 331, 332 
 
 § 331. Jerks from taking up slack assumed. — It is one of 
 the ordinary incidents of railroading for trains of freight 
 cars, coupled with the ordinary appliances, to be subject to 
 more or less " slack," resulting in jerks or jolts, in\!ident to 
 the starting or stopping of cars in such a train. Such cars 
 are usually coupled with long links ; the engine starting first, 
 by the time the slack is taken out of the different links, 
 between the cars, the engine has reached such momentum 
 as to occasion a sudden jerk, when the rear of the train is 
 started and the same jolt results on stopping, as the engine 
 stops first and the slack of the couplings brings the cars to a 
 sudden stop.*'' Where a freight train is managed in the 
 usual manner and the jerk or jolt complained of is only such 
 as would ordinarily be expected on a train of such character, 
 the employees engaged on it are very generally held to take 
 the risk of injury from such jerks or jolts, as an incident to 
 the employment and cannot recover for an injury due to an 
 ordinary jerk or jolt.^* 
 
 § 332. Risks from improperly loaded cars. — As it would 
 be impossible for the managing agents of a railroad company 
 
 warning to hinij he assumed the risk of injury from cars so operated. 
 Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Voelker, 129 Fed. Rep. 522. 
 
 A brakeman, making a flying switch, who fell from the car, on 
 account of the siding bein^ steep and uneven, was held to assume 
 the risk, in Vermont. Skinner v. Central Vt. Ry. Co., 73 Vt. 336; 
 50 Atl. Rep. 1099. 
 
 87 The causes of such jerks in freight trains is explained by the 
 witnesses and the court in Guffey v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 53 Mo. 
 App., 466, 467. 
 
 88 Davis V. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 152 Pa. St. 314; 25 Atl. Rep. 
 498; Rutledge v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 110 Mo. 312; 19 S. W. 
 Rep. 38; Central, etc., R. Co. v. Sims, 80 Ga. 749; 7 S. E. Rep. 176; 
 Hedrick v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 195 Mo. 104; 93 S. W. Rep. 
 268; Erwin v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 94 Mo. App. 289; Chicago, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Arnold, 144 111. 261; 19 L. R. A. 313; Olds v. New 
 York, etc., R. Co., 172 Mass. 73; Wait v. Omaha, etc., R. Co., 165' 
 Mo. 612; 65 S. W.,Rep. 1028. 
 
 437 
 
§ 332 ASSUMED EISKS. 
 
 to personally see to the proper loading of freight cars, but 
 it is an ordinary incident of the business of railroading for 
 freight cars to be improperly loaded, employees are generally 
 charged with notice of this fact, and it is generally held that 
 an employee assumes the risk of an injury from an improp- 
 erly loaded car, where no direct negligence can be charged 
 to other than the coemployees of the injured person and such 
 improperly loaded car has not been brought to the attention 
 of the employer, or sufficient time existed for it to have 
 been properly loaded.^* The risk of an injury due to strik- 
 ing the ends of steel rails improperly loaded in a flat car, so 
 that the ends protruded over the end of the car, was held to 
 be a risk, assumed by a brakeman, in Missouri,®" and a track 
 walker was held to have assumed the risk of an injury 
 caused by a piece of coal falling from an improperly loaded 
 tender, in Wisconsin,®' as such risks were' held to be ordi- 
 narily incident to the employment of railroading. And 
 
 88 Northern, etc., R. Co. v. Husson, 101 Pa. St. 1; 12 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Gas. 244; Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Plunkett, 25 Kansas 188; 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Gower, 85 Tenn. 465; 3 S. W. Rep. 824; 31 
 Am. & Eng. Rt Cas. 168. See, for injury from improperly loaded 
 car of lumber, where risk held assumed, Brice v. Louisville, etc., 
 R. Co. (Ky.), 9 S. W. Rep. 288; 38 Am. & Eng.. R. Cas. 38. 
 
 80 Jackson v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 104 Mo. 448; 16 S. W. 
 Rep. 413; 14 S. W. Rep. 54. See, also, Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Deard- 
 rufif, 14 111. App. 401; Scott v. Oregon, etc., R. -Co., 14 Oregon 211; 
 13 Pac. Rep. 98; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 414; Mexican C. R. Co. v. 
 Shean (Texas), 18 S. W. Rep. 151; Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Lempe, 59 Texas 19. 
 
 siSchultz V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 67 Wis. 616; 31 N. W. Rep. 
 321; 58 Am. Rep. 881; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 404. 
 
 Injuries from improperly loaded ears were held to be risks as- 
 sumed in the following cases: Williams v. Northern, etc., Co. 
 (Minn.), 113 Fed. Rep. 382; Grecii v. Brainard, etc., Ry. Co., 85 
 Minn. 318; 88 N. W. Rep. 974; Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Somers, 
 24 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 67; St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Barrett (Texas), 
 72 S. W. Rep. 884; Tucker v. Northern Pac. Ter. Co., 41 Oregon 
 82; 68 Pac. Rep. 426. 
 
 438 
 
ASSUMED EISKS. §§ 333, 334 
 
 these are but illustrations of the trend of the decisions on this 
 subject. 
 
 § 333. Collisions with cattle or teams. — The risk" of 
 
 injuries to train employees, by coming in contact with ani- 
 mals trespassing on the right of way, or with teams and 
 wagons, -at public road crossings, is one of the dangers inci- 
 dent to the operation of railroads, encountered by employees, 
 among the ordinary dangers assumed by them, in the absence 
 of negligence on the part of the employer.®^ • 
 
 In Pennsylvania,®* a freight conductor, riding on the pilot 
 of a switch engine, who was killed by the collision of the 
 engine with a team and wagon, at a public crossing, was 
 held to have assumed the risk, as an incident of his employ- 
 ment. And, in Texas,®* an engineer, injured as a result 
 of the derailment of his engine, caused by a cow fastened 
 in a bridge, was held to have assumed the risk, as an accident 
 that could not have been foreseen by'the employer. 
 
 § 334. Injury from use of snow-plow — "Bucking snow." 
 
 — Dangers from snowbanks are inseparable from the opera- 
 tion of railroads, in climates where heavy snows prevail, and 
 it is removed from the track by the use of snowplows, or 
 similar appliances and when employees enter the service in 
 such climates, they are held to assume the risk of injuries 
 from such causes, where the danger in the use of the appli- 
 ance or the condition of the place is not made more danger- 
 ous by reason of the employer's negligence.®^ 
 
 »2Ward V. Bonner, 80 Texas 168; 15 S. W. Eep. 805. 
 
 osRumsey v. Delaware, etc., E. Co., 1^'Pa. St. 74; 25 Atl. Kep. 
 37. 
 
 »* Hansen v. Eddy, 3 Texas Civil App. 148; 22 S. W. Rep. 66. 
 
 »B Brown v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 69 Iowa 161; 28 N. W. Rep. 
 487; Dowell v. Burlington, etc., R. Co., 62 Iowa" 629; Bryant v. 
 Burlington, etc.,' R. Co., 66 Iowa 305; 23 N, W. Rep. 678; 55 Am. 
 
 439 
 
§ 335 ASSUMED EISKS. 
 
 And where the manner of removing the snow is to couple 
 two or more engines together and run them over the track — 
 as was done in a case reported in Pennsylvania — ^^ an en- 
 gineer injured by his engine running into a snow-drift, in a 
 deep cut, was held to have intelligently assumed the risk and 
 a recovery was denied. This same rule is followed in other 
 •States, where a similar practice obtains.®'^ 
 
 § 335. Dangers in coupling cars. — Eaiboad employees 
 who are required to couple and uncouple cars, are presumed 
 to know the risk of this detail of the service and to assume 
 it. They understand that cars of different constructions and 
 manner of couplings are constantly passing over the track 
 and must be coupled and handled by them and they neces- 
 sarily take upon themselves the obligation of ascertaining the 
 kind of cars that must be handled and to use the necessary 
 care and caution to avoid injury therefrom.®^ Not only the 
 risk of injury, in coupliifg cars with different heights of draw- 
 heads, is held to be assumed,®® but the danger of coupling 
 
 Eep. 275; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 593; Naylor v. Chicago, etc., R. 
 Co., 53 Wis. 661 ; Howland v.' Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 54 Wis. 226. 
 
 06 Deer v. Lehigh Valley E. Co., 158 Pa. St. 365; 27 Atl. Rep. 
 1002. 
 
 07 Morse v. Minneapolis, etc., E. Co., 30 Minn. 465; 16 N. W. Eep. 
 358; 11 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 168; Bryant v. Burlington, etc., E. Co., 
 66 Iowa 305; 23 N. W. Eep. 678; 55 Am. Rep. 275; 21 Am. & Eng. 
 E. Cas. 593. 
 
 OS Thomas V. Missouri Pacific Ey. Co., 109 Mo. 187 ; 18 S. W. Eep. 
 980; 53 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 146; Henry v. Bond, 34 Fed. Rep. 101; 
 Dysinger v. Cincinnati, etc., E. Co., 93 Mich. 646; 53 N. W. Eep. 
 825; Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. Black, 88 111. 112; Michigan, etc., R. 
 Co. V. Smithson, 45 Mich. 212; Sims v. South Carolina R. Co., 26 
 So. Car. 490; 2 S. E. Eep. 486; 31 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 199; Nash- 
 ville, etc., E. Co. V. Wheeler (Tenn.), 4 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 633; 
 Kelly V. Abbot, 63 Wis. 307; 23 N. W. Eep. 890; 53 Am. Eep. 292; 
 21 Am. & Eng.E. Cas. 633. 
 
 09 Thomas v. Missouri Pacific Ey. Co., 109 Mo. 187; 18 S. W. Rep. 
 
 440 
 
ASSUMED BISKS. § 336 
 
 cars with loads projecting over the ends of the cars, is also 
 held to be a risk of the service, that an employee assumes.^ 
 The danger of using couplings of different makes or pat- 
 terns, is also a risk assumed, in the absence of a negligent- 
 or defective coupling ^ and an injury from falling in a cul- 
 vert while making a coupling, is a risk incident to the em- 
 ployment, where no negligent condition of the culvert is 
 shown to exist,^ but an injury received while using a defective 
 coupling, not shown to have been known to the employee, is 
 not necessarily a risk incident to the employment.* 
 
 § 336. Known and obvious risks. — An employee, entering 
 into the service of a railroad company, which is necessarily 
 hazardous, who knows the condition of the appliances or 
 place, in connection with which he is employed, or who, in 
 the exercise of ordinary observation, ought to know the con- 
 ditions surrounding him, as well as the danger to which 
 he may be thereby exposed, is very generally held to have 
 taken upon himself the risk of injury from such condi- 
 
 980; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 146; Woodworth v. St. Paul, etc., R. 
 Co., 5 MeCrary (U. S.) 574; 18 Fed. Rep. 282. 
 
 1 Boyle V. New York, etc., R. Co., 151 Mass. 102; 23 N. E. Rep. 
 827; Lathrop v. Fitchburg R. Co., 150 Mass. 423. 
 
 2 Hatter v. Illinois Central R. Co., 69 Miss. 642; 13 So. Rep. 
 827. 
 
 3 Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. TownBend, 41 Ark. 382 ; 21 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 619. 
 
 * Taylor v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 86 Mo. 457; 16 S. W. Rep. 
 206. 
 
 Injuries received while coupling- cars of different makes or coup- 
 lings were held to be assumed, in the following cases: Louisville, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Boland, 96 Ala. 626; 11 So. Rep. 667; 53 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 169; Holland v. Tennessee, etc., R. Co., 91 Ala. 444; 8 
 So. Rep. 524; Kohn v. McNulta, 147 U. S. 238; 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 298; Darracott v. ■ Chesapeake & O. U. Co., 83 Va. 288; 31 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 157; Clark v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 48 Kansas 
 654; 29 Pac. Rep. 1138; Brewer v. Flint, etc., R. Co., 56 Mich. 620; 
 23 N. W. Rep. 440. 
 
 ^ 441 
 
§ 336 ASSUMED EISKS. 
 
 tion.® Where he is injured in the use of an implement or 
 machine, which does not result from any latent defect, but 
 when the danger of using it is apparent and the machine it- 
 self is in general use and is easy to understand and requires 
 
 An employee coupling cars with different kinds of drawheads, of 
 different heights, was held to assume the risk, in Texas, in Rio 
 Grande, etc., E. Co. v. Lynch, 66 S. W. Eep. 712. Sec, also, Zahn 
 V. Milwaukee, etc., Ey. Co. (Wis.), 89 N. W, Eep. 889. 
 
 A brakeman going between moving cars to make a coupling, was 
 held to assume the risk of injury in the following .cases : Moore v. 
 St. Louis, etc., Ey. Co. (La. Ann.), 38 So. Eep. 913; Campbell v. 
 Illinois Central E. Co., 100 N. W. Eep. 30. 
 
 A brakeman assumes the risk incident to chasing and coupling 
 cars. Kennedy v. Kansas City, St. J. & C. B. E. Co., 190 Mo. 424; 
 89 S. W. Eep. 370. 
 
 It is held, by the Massachusetts Supreme Court, that the tender 
 of a locomotive is not a car, within the terms of the statute of 
 that State (St. 1895, p. 412c, 362, § 2 E. L. ch. Ill, § 203, and U. 
 S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3176), requiring automatic couplers on loco- 
 motives, cars and trains, and that the defense of assumed risk ap- 
 plies as to a defective coupler, causing an injury, on the tender. 
 Larabee v. New York, etc., R. Co., 182 Mass. 348; 66 N. E. Eep. 
 1032. 
 
 A ear loaded with steel rails, shipped from one State to another 
 and there side-tracked, to await further orders, is not a car en- 
 gaged in interstate commerce, so as to deprive the railroad com- 
 pany of the defense of assumed risk, for a defective coupler, under 
 the federal safety appliance act. Coley v. Kansas City So. Ey. Co. 
 (Texas), 95 S. W. Rep. 96. 
 
 5 Doyle V. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 42 Minn. 79; 43 N. W. Rep. 787; 
 41 Am. & Eng. E. Gas. 376; Drake v. Union Pac. R. Co.,- 2 Idaho 
 453; 21 Pac. Eep. 560; Louisville, etc., E, Co. v. Banning, 131 Ind. 
 528; 31 N. E. Eep. 187; 53 Am. & Eng. E. Gas. 452; Michigan, etc., 
 E. Co. V, Smithson, 45 Mich. 212; 7 N. W. Eep. 791; 1 Am. & Eng. 
 E. Cas. 101; Gaffney v. New York, etc., E. Co., 15 E. I. 456; 7 Atl. 
 Eep. 284; 31 Am. & Eng. R. Gas. 265; Latremouille v. Bennington, 
 .etc., R. Gd., 63 Vt. 33i6; 22 Atl. Rep. 656; 48 Am. & Eng. R. Gas. 
 265; Gibson v. Erie R. Co., 63 N. Y. 449; 20 Am. Eep. 552; O'Neal 
 V. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 132 Ind. 110; 31 N. E. Eep. 669; St. Louis, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Irwin, 37 Kansas 701; le Pac. Rep. 146; Melzer v. 
 Peninsular Car Co., 76 Mich. 94; 42 N. W. Eep. 1078; Fisher v. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co., 77 Mich. 546; 43 N. W. Rep. 926; Williams 
 v. Delaware, etc., "R. Co., 116 N. Y. 628; 22 N. E. Rep. 1117; 42 
 442 
 
ASSUMED RISKS. § 337 
 
 no particular skill to operate it, the employee is not entitled 
 to warning or instruction as to its proper use.® 
 
 The employer is allowed to conduct his business in the 
 manner which most commends itself to him, so long as it is 
 not negligently conducted, and the employee assumes the 
 risk of working under such methods as the employer sees fit 
 to employ, and the employer cannot be held to damages, be- 
 cause, in the opinion of the injured employee and his wit- 
 nesses, there was a safer method that might have been em- 
 ployed, that would have prevented the injury.'' 
 
 § 337. Presumed to know what could be observed. — An 
 
 employee of a railroad company ifi presumed to know of 
 dangers that he has an opportunity to observe and unless he 
 informs himself of open, obvious risks he cannot recover for 
 resulting injuries therefrom.* He is bound to see patent 
 and obvious defects in appliances furnished him and assumes 
 all patent and obvious risks in machinery and appliances 
 furnished him by the employer.* And while notice or ap- 
 preciation of the danger, as well as the conditions that pro- 
 duce such danger, is generally required, before the risk 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 254; Bailey v. Rome, etc., R. Co., 49 Hun 377;- 
 19 N. Y. S. R. 656; Spencer v. New York, etc., R. Co., 51 N. Y. S. 
 R. 386; 67 Hun 196; Johnston v. Oregon, etc., R. Co., 23 Oregon 94; 
 31 Pac. Rep. 283; Sweeney v. Central Pae. R. Co., 57 Cal. 15; 8 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 151. 
 
 6 International, etc., R. Co. v. McCarthy, 64 Texas 632. 
 
 TBengston v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 47 Minn. 486; 50 N. W. Rep. 
 531; Simmons v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 110 111. 340; 18 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 50; Naylor v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 53 Wis. 661; Pennsyl- 
 vania R. Co. V. Baehs, 133 III. 255; 24 N. E. Rep. 563. 
 
 8 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Marker, 41 Ark. 542; Derby v. Kentucky, 
 etc., R. Co. (Ky.), 4 S. W. Rep. 303,. where a conductor of a freight 
 train was held chargeable with notice of the risk from a car higher 
 than other cars in a train. 
 
 'Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Rogers, 57 Fed.. Rep. 378; Davidson v. 
 Southern Pacific R. Co., 44 Fed. Rep. 476. 
 
 443 
 
§ 338 ASSUMED BISKS. 
 
 therefrom is held to be assumed/" this exception to the rule 
 does not apply, as to defects so glaring or open that a simple 
 notice of the defect would imply a knowledge of the danger 
 arising therefrom, for in such case it will be presumed that 
 notice of the danger was also brought home to the em- 
 ployee. ^^ 
 
 9 
 
 § 338. Risks from open defects in cars, assumed when. — 
 
 An employee who accepts employment by a railroad company, 
 in any particular department of the business, is presumed to 
 know the dangers from any peculiarities in the construction 
 of engines or cars, used by him, as well as the employer-'^ 
 and he is generally held- to assume the risk of injury from 
 peculiarly constructed cars or engines, as well as from open 
 obvious defects in cars or engines, that have not been brought 
 to the attention of the employer, or when there has been no 
 opportunity to repair the same, that could be denominated 
 negligence on the company's part.-'* A yard switchman has 
 been held to assume the risk of injury from such a visible 
 defect as a drawhead on a locomotive, which is too short to 
 allow sufficient space to stand, in coupling the engine to 
 cars;^* an injury traceable to an unsuitable car was held 
 assumed, as an open, obvious risk, in California ; ^^ an ex- 
 perienced employee cannot recover for an injury caused by 
 the lightness of a hand car, with which he was familiar, caus- 
 ing it to leave the track,^* nor can an employee recover for 
 
 loWaldhier v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 87 Mo. 37. 
 iiWaldhier v. Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 87 Mo. 37; Worheide v. 
 Missouri, etc., Co., 32 Mo. App. 367. 
 
 12 Texas, etc., E. Co. v. Minnick, 57 Fed. Eep. 362. 
 
 13 Texas, etc., E. Co. v. Minnick, 57 Fed. Eep. 362. 
 1* Brooks V. Northern Pac. E. Co., 47 Fed. Eep. 687. 
 
 i5.Long V. Coronado, etc., E. Co., 96 Cal. 269; 31 Pac. Rep. 170; 
 Martin v. California, etc., E. Co., 94 Cal. 326. 
 
 18 Gulf, etc., E. Co. V. Williams, 72 Texas 159; 12 S. W, Rep. 
 172; 39 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 292. 
 
 444 
 
ASSUMED EISKS. § 339 
 
 an injury from his clothing catching on a 'threaded screw, 
 projecting from the handle of a hand car, beyond the end of 
 the nut,^^ as all such risks are apparent, from the open, 
 obvious nature of the defect itself. 
 
 § 339. Injuries from lifting cars, rails, etc., assumed. — 
 It is quite generally held that when an employee is injured 
 from lifting at a car,^* or a steel rail,^* or any similarly heavy 
 substance,^" where the weight of the object attempted to be 
 lifted is a matter of common knowledge and the number of 
 men that it takes to handle it is well known by the em- 
 
 17 Carey v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 158 Mass. 228; 33 N. E. Kep. 512. 
 An employee who knew or ought to have known, of defects in 
 
 cars, engines and other appliances, was held to assume the risk, in 
 the following cases: Denver, etc., E. Co. v. Scott (Colo.), 81 Pac. 
 Rep. 763;. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Rea (Texas), 87 S. W. Rep. 
 324j Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Tackett (Ind.), 71 N. E. Rep. 524; 
 Crane v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (Iowa), 99 N. W. Rep. 169; Lou- 
 shay V. Erie R. Co., 88 N. Y. S. E. 446; 95 App. Div. 102; 
 Montgomery, etc., Co. v. Barringer, 109 111. App. 185; Crane v. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. (Iowa), 99 N. W. Rep. 169; Loushay v. Erie 
 R. Co., 184 N. Y. 583; 77 N. E. Rep. 1191; Graham v. Chicago, etc., 
 R. Co. (Texas), 91 S. W. Rep. 1081; Johnston v. Southern Pac. R. 
 Co., 117 Fed. Rep. 462; 54 C. C. A. 508; Bryce v. Burlington, etc., 
 R. Co. (Iowa), 93 N. W. Rep. 275; Western, etc., R. Co. v. Moran, 
 116 Ga. 441; 42 S. E. Rep. 737; Gerstner v. New York, etc., R. Co., 
 80 N. Y. S. E. 1063; 81 App. Div. 562; Texas Central E. Co. v. Ben- 
 der (Texas), 75 S. W. Rep. 561; Albrecht v. Chicago & N. W. R. 
 Co., 108 Wis. 530; 84 N. W. Rep. 882. 
 
 The risk of using a wide gauge car on' narrow gauge truck was 
 held to be an incidental risk, in Missouri, in Minnier v. Sedalia, etc., 
 R. Co., 167 Mo. 99; 66 S. W. Rep. 1072. 
 
 18 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Lemon, 83 Texas 143; 18 S. W. Eep. 
 331. 
 
 i» Coyne v. Union Pac. R. Co., 133 U. S. 370; 33 L. Ed. 651; Havi- 
 land V. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 172 Mo. 106; 72 S. W. Rep. 515. 
 
 20 Lee V. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. (Ky.)^ 1 Am. Neg., Rep. 60; 
 Harrington v. Wabash R. Co., 104 Mo. App. 663; 78 S. W. Rep. 662; 
 Leitner v. Grieb, 104 Mo. App. 173; 77 S. W. Rep. 764; Texas, etc., 
 E. Co. V. Sherman (Texas), 87 S. W. Rep, 887. 
 
 445 
 
§ 339 ASSUMED EISKS. 
 
 ployee, that the' risk of such an injury is assumed as an in- 
 cident of the employment. 
 
 The United States Supreme Court has held : ^^ " Where 
 the method of loading a rail was by lifting it and walking 
 with it to the car, halting, dressing, and then in concert lift- 
 ing the rail, at the word of command from the boss, and 
 throwing it on the floor of a flat car, * * * and in the 
 course of such loading the injury to the plaintiff occurred," 
 that no negligence could be complained of, on the employer's 
 part, but the injury was received from a risk assumed by the 
 employee. And similar injuries from strains, due to lifting 
 at cross-ties,^^ rocks,^* and other heavy substances, have been 
 held, by different courts of the various States, to be risks 
 assumed, as open- and obvious dangers, known to the em- 
 ployee as well as all men. 
 
 21 Coyne v. Union Pacific R. Co., 133 U. S. 370; 33 L. Ed. 651. 
 
 22 Lee V. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., supra. 
 23Leitner v. Grieb, 104 Mo. App. 173; 77 S. W. Eep. 764. 
 
 In a case, in Misso\iri, upon a similar injury, from carrying a 
 steel rail, the court said: 
 
 " The physical facts and plaintiff's own testimony completely null- 
 ify all such expert testimony and show that it is unreliable, and, in 
 addition, they show that if the plaintiff strained his back, he did 
 so without being compelled, ordered or expected to do so by anyone, 
 and without any apparent reason for doing so, and, therefore, he 
 did not make out a prima facie case." Haviland v. Kansas City, etc., 
 E. Co., 172 Mo. 115; 72 S. W. Rep. 575. 
 
 Upon a very similar injury, in a Kentucky case, the court held: 
 
 "Where plaintiff and two other employees of defendant were mov- 
 ing a cross-tie and one of the men stumbled, causing the tie to 
 fall on plaintiff, there was nothing to render the defendant liable 
 for plaintiff's injuries." Lee v. R. R. Co., 1 Amer. Neg. Rep. 60. 
 
 In Harrington v. Railroad (104 Mo. App. 663), the facts were 
 alleged by the plaintiff as follows: 
 
 " Plaintiff was in the employ of defendant, working in its said shops, 
 as a laborer in the repair of cars and of oar trucks * * * That 
 at the date aforesaid, plaintiff, with two other workmen, was ordered 
 by defendant's foreman in charge of said work and over said work- 
 men, to carry some of the aforesaid cylinders from one of said shops 
 to the other, across said pit and tracks laid therein, and was negli- 
 446 
 
ASSUMED KISKS. § 340 
 
 § 340. Working after notice of defects and knowledge of 
 danger. — The rule is very generally recognized, that if an 
 employee, knowing the hazards of the business in which he 
 is engaged, voluntarily continues therein, without protest 
 or complaint, and without a promise, on the part of the em- 
 ployer to remedy the defect causing the danger, he will 
 thereafter be held to have voluntarily assumed the risk, in 
 
 gently and carelessly ordered to carry same over on a stick, instead 
 of using the table provided for such purpose. * * * Plaintiff 
 was holding the back end of said cylinder. The cylinder was taper- 
 ipg from one end to the other, the large end being in front and 
 plaintiff holding the rear or smaller end, endeavoring to balance 
 said cylinder on said stick, which by great exertion he succeeded in 
 doing from one edge of the pit down into and across said pit and 
 tracks therein, until said colaborers stepped across the railroad 
 tracks at the far edge of said pit and up out of said pit to the 
 ground level, when, by reason of the raise caused by said colaborers 
 stepping up on to said ground level, it became impossible for plain- 
 tiff to keep said cylinder on an exact balance * » * and, by 
 reason of the smoothness of said stick and cylinder, it rolled, tilted 
 and slipped on said stick and fell back onto plaintiff, greatly in- 
 juring him." 
 
 But upon this state of facts, with the foreman present, directing 
 the manner of doing the work and giving such negligent order, there 
 was held to be no liability, in the Appellate Court. 
 
 And for a similar holding of nonliability, from assumption of 
 risk, for an injury from moving a heavy rock, see Leitner v. Grieb, 
 104 Mo. App. 173; 77 S. W. Eep. 764. See, also, Texas & N. 0. R. 
 Co. V. Sherman (Texas), 87 S. W. Eep. 887. 
 
 An employee assisting to load ties by sliding them up an incline, 
 was held to assume the risk of the tie sliding back against him, in 
 Dunn V. Oregon Short Line E. Co., 28 Utah 478; 80 Pac. Eep. 311. 
 And see, where insufficient force is used, where risk was held as- 
 sumed, Texas, etc., Ey. Co. v. Miller (Texas), 81 S. W. Eep. 535; 
 Webb v. Gulf, etc., E. Co. (Texas), 65 S. W. Rep. 684; Haviland v. 
 Kansas City, etc., Ey. Co., 172 Mo. 106; 72 S. W. Eep. 515; Cleve- 
 land, etc., Ey. Co. v. Carr, 95 111. App. 576. 
 
 The risk of an injury from carrying steel rails is a risk assumed 
 by the employee. Coyne v. Union Pac. E. Co., 133 U. S. 370; 33 L. 
 Ed. 651; Haviland v, Eailroad Co., 172 Mo, 115; Lee v. E. E. Co., 1 
 Am. Neg. Eep. 60; International & G. N. E. Co. r. Figures (Tex.), 
 89 S. W. Rep. 780. 
 
 447 
 
§ 340 ASSUMED RISKS. 
 
 the absence of some specific act of negligence on the em- 
 ployer's part.2* If the employee knows that what has been 
 provided for him to use is unfit for the purpose, he should 
 quit the employment; and if he does not, but continues in it, 
 he is deemed to have assumed the risk of all known defects, 
 where he has not been induced by the promise or acts of the 
 employer to remain in the service, relying upon such defects 
 being remedied.^^ 
 
 But knowledge of a defect, or facts from which the law 
 would imply notice thereof, and a failure to complain, are 
 both held to be essential, before the employee is held to havfe 
 assumed the risk ^* and although he possesses notice of the de- 
 fect, if he does not also understand, or ought not, in the 
 exercise of ordinary prudence, understand the risks to which 
 such defect will expose him, he is not held to have assumed 
 the risk thereof, ^'^ nor will the risk be held assumed, where 
 
 24 Stafford v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 114 111. 244; 2 N. B. Rep. 185; 
 South Florida R. Co. v. Weese, 32 Fla. 212; 13 So. Rep. 436; Umbach 
 V. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., 83 Ind. 191; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 98; 
 Muldowney v. Illinois, etc., R. Co., 39 Iowa 615; 8 Am. Ry. Rep. 
 487; Wells v. Turlington, etc., R. Co., 56 Iowa 520; McKee v. Chi- 
 cago, etc., R. Co., 83 Iowa 616; 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 154; Indianap- 
 olis, etc., R. Co. V. Watson, 114 Ind. 20; 14 N. E. Rep. 721; 33 Am. 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 334; Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Schroeder, 47 Kansas 
 315; 27 Pac. Rep. E65; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. State, 75 Md. 152; 
 23 Atl. Rep. 310; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 379; Price v. Hannibal,, 
 etc., R. Co., 77 Mo. 508; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 168; Rumsey v. 
 Delaware, etc., R. Co., 151 Pa. St. 74; 25 Atl. Rep. 27; Westcott v. 
 New York, etc., R. Co., 153 Mass. 460; 27 N. E. Rep. 10; Galveston, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Drew, 59 Texas 10; 46 Am. Rep. 261; Pennsylvania R. 
 Co. V. Lynch, 90 111. 333; Worthington v. Central, etc., R. Co., 64 
 Vt. 107. 
 
 20 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Jones, 11 111. App. 324. 
 
 ^0 Greenleaf v. Dubuque, etc., R. Co., 33 Iowa 52 ; Indianapolis, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Watson, 114 Ind. 20; 14 N. E. Rep. 721; 33 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 334; East Tenn., etc., E. Co. v. Gurley, 12 Lea (Tenn.) 
 46; 17 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 568; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Hines, 132 
 111. 161; 23 N. E. Rep. 1021. 
 
 27Wuotilla V. Duluth, etc., Co., 37 Minn. 153; 33 N. W. Rep. 551; 
 448 
 
AssuM-iD Eisfcs. § 34l 
 
 tlie defect is traceable to the employer's negligence and the 
 employee had reason to believe that he could safely use the 
 appliance, by due care on his part, without resulting injury, 
 and the continued use of such appliance was induced by the 
 act or promise of the employer.^® 
 
 § 341. Notice of dangers connected with place of work as- 
 sumed, when. — Where an employee not only knows of a 
 defect in his place of work, but also understands, or ought by 
 the exercise of reasonable care, to have understood the danger 
 therefrom, he is held to assume the risk of an injury from 
 such a place. ■ 
 
 Illustrative of the dangers, in the place of work, which 
 an employee knows or ought to understand and assume the 
 risk of injury from, is that of excavating a bank of earth, 
 liable, by the operation of natural laws, to fall on him;^* 
 a section hand, passing over a known defective track, with 
 a hand ear, assumes the risk of injury therefrom ; ^° a 
 projecting roof of an elevator, over a side track, is a known 
 danger, which a brakeman on a freight car will assume; ^^ a 
 telephone wire ^^ and cattle chute ^* are also known dangerous 
 
 5 Am. St. Eep. 832; Cook T. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 34 Minn. 45; 24 
 N. E. Rep. 311. 
 
 2sriynn v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 78 Mo. 195; 18 Am. & Eng. 
 E. Cas. 23; Snow v. Housatonic .E. Co., 8 Allen (Mass.) 447; Rich- 
 mond, etc., R. Co. V. Noiment, 84 Va. 167; 4 S. E. Eep. 211. 
 
 29Easmussen v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 65 Iowa 236; 21 N. W. Eep. 
 583; 18 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 54; Naylor v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 53 
 Wis. 661; 11 N. W. Eep. 24; 5 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 460; Bradley v. 
 Chicago, etc., E. Co., 138 Mo. 293; 39 S. W. Eep. 763; Schadewald 
 V. Milwaukee, etc., E. Co., 55 Wis. 569; 13 N. W. Eep. 458. 
 
 so Green v. Cross, 79 Texas 130; 15 S. W. Eep. 220. 
 
 31 Clark V. St. Paul, etc., E. Co., 28 Minn. 128; 9 N. W. Eep. 581; 
 2 Am. & Bug. E. Cas. 240; Illinois, etc., E. Co. v. Welsh, 52 111. 
 183. 
 
 32.Dalton V. Atlantic, etc., E. Co., 4 Hughes (U. S.) 180. 
 
 ssDorsey v. Phillips Const. Co., 42 Wis. 583; 15 Am. Ey. Rep. 
 1—29 449 
 
§ 341 ASSUMED RISKS. 
 
 obstructions imparting notice of the danger; the danger of 
 stepping into excavations near the track, are open dangers, 
 which brakemen assume ; ** as are also perils from platforms 
 near the track ; *^ unblocked frogs and guard rails ; ^® obvi- 
 ously defective fences ; ^' or the absence of fences ; ■ 
 guarded highv?ay crossing,®® and defective bridges ' 
 head bridges.*^ 
 
 148; Hulehan v. Green Bay, etc., R. Co., 58 Wis. 319; 12 Am. &, 
 Eng. K. Cas. 208. 
 
 siRagon v. Toledo, etc., R. Co., 97 Mich. 265; 56 N. W. Eep. 612; 
 Needham v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 85 Ky. 423; 3 S. W. Rep. 797; 
 11 S. W. Eep. 306. 
 
 35 Perigo V. Cliieago, etc., R. Co., 52 Iowa 276 ; 3 N. W. Rep. 43. 
 
 seEusli V. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 36 Kansas 129; 12 Pac. Eep. 
 582; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 484; Clark v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 
 48 Kansas 654; Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mondon, 50 Kansas 539; 
 Atkyn v. Wabash R. Co., 41 Fed. Rep. 193; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. 
 V. Davis, 54 Ark. 389; 15 S. W. Rep. 895;'Appel v. Buffalo, etc., R. 
 Co., Ill N. Y. 550; 19 N. E. Rep. 93. 
 
 STMcKee v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 33 Iowa 616; 50 N. W. Eep. 209; 48 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 154. 
 
 88 Sweeney v. Central Pac. R. Co., 57 Cal. 15; Fleming v. St. 
 Paul, etc., R. Co., 27 Minn, ill; 6 N. W. Rep. 448; Patton v. 
 Central, etc., E. Co., 73 Iowa 306; 35 N. W. Rep. 149. 
 
 soRumsey v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 6 Kulp (Pa.) 359; 53 Am. & 
 Eng. E. Cas. 376. 
 
 40 Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Sandford, 117 Ind. 265; 19 N. E. Eep. 
 770. Eunning into a burning bridge is a risk assumed by an en- 
 gineer. Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Minnick, 57 Fed. Eep. 362. 
 
 "Wells v. Burlington, etc., R. Co., 56 Iowa 520; 9 N. W. Rep. 
 364; 2 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 243; Coates v. Burlington, etc., R. Co., 
 62 Iowa 486; 15 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 265; Eains v. St. Louis, etc., R. 
 Co., 71 Mo. 164; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 610; Williams v. Delaware, 
 etc., R. Co., 116 N. Y. 628; 22 N. E. Rep. 1117; 41 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 254; Carbine v. Bennington, etc., R. Co., 61 Vt. 348; 17 Atl. 
 Rep. 491; 38 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 45; Ryan v. Long Island, etc., R. 
 Co., 51 Hun. 607; 22 N. Y. S. R. 655; 4 N. Y. Supp. 381. 
 
 An employee continuing to work in a known dangerous place, with- 
 out complaint, was held to assume the risk in the following cases: 
 Purkey v. Southern Tr. Co. (W. Va.), 50 S. E. Rep. 755; Chicago, 
 etc., Ry. Co. v. Wild, 109 111. App. 38; Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Whidden, 23 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 85; Lindsay v. New York, etc., Ry. Co., 112 
 450 
 
ASsuMiiD RISKS. §§ 342, 343 
 
 § 342. Dangers from open culverts, assumed, when. — As ia 
 the case of obstructions on or near the track, which have been 
 maintained for such a length of time that employees ought to 
 know and appreciate the danger therefrom, on account of the 
 obvious nature of the danger threatening .them, it is held, in a 
 great many cases, that where a railroad company has, cus- 
 tomarily, maintained open culverts or ditches, near its track, 
 that its employees will assume the risk of falling into such 
 culverts while discharging their duties in operating the rail- 
 road." 
 
 § 343. Dangers from defects in machinery and appliances, 
 assumed, when. — An employee who knowingly continues the 
 use of a defective and dangerous tool or appliance, without 
 
 t'ed. Eep. 384; 50 C. C. A. 298; Bradburn v. Wabash R. Co. (Mich.), 
 96 N. W. Kep. 929; Wrightsville, etc., E. Co. v. Lattimore, 118 Ga. 
 581; 45 S. E. Rep. 453; Christensen v. Rio Grande, etc., R. Co. 
 (Utah), 74 Pac. Rep. 876; Wagner v. New York, etc., R. Co., 86 N. 
 Y. S. R. 921; 93 App. Div. 14; Moster v. Terminal R. Ass'n, 106 
 111. App.. 494; Harrington v. JVabash R. Co. (Mo.), 78 S. W;. Rep. 
 662; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Brown, 107 III. App. 512; Simmons v. 
 Southern Tr. Co., 207 Pa. St. 589; 57 Atl. Rep. 45; Illinois Central 
 R. Co. V. Satkowski, 107 111. App. 524; Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. 
 V. Gesswine, 144 Fed. Rep. 56; Marshall v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. 
 Co. (Ark.), 94 S. W. Rep. 56; Saxe v. Wolworth, etc., Co., 191 
 Mass. 338; 77 N. E. Eep. 883; Illinois Central R. Co. v. Emerson 
 (Miss.), 40 So. Rep. 818; Anderson v. Northern Pac. R. Co. (Mont.), 
 65 Pac. Rep. 884; Johnston v. Boston, etc., E. Co., 78 Vt. 344; 62 Atl. 
 Rep. 1021. 
 
 42 Kirkpatrick v. Choctaw, etc., E. Co., 195 U. S. 624; 49 L, Ed. 
 349, affirming 121 Fed. Eep. 11; 57 C. C. A. 253. 
 
 Where it has been the general custom of a railroad company to 
 maintain open culverts, a brakeman assumes the risk of falling in a 
 culvert, while coupling cars. Southern Pac. E. Co. v. Gloyd (Utah), 
 138 Fed. Eep. 388; Williams v. Louisville, etc., E. Co., 23 Ky. L. E. 
 1124; 64 S. W. Eep. 738; Lindsay v. New York, etc., Ey. Co., 112 
 Fed. Rep. 384; 50 C. C. A. 298; Haggerty v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 141 
 Fed. Rep. 966; 73 C. C. A, 282; Miller v. Detroit, etc., Ry. Co. (Mich), 
 95 N. W. Eep. 718; and of falling in open pits in round house; 
 Galveston, etc., E. Co. v. Walker (Texas), 76 S. W. Eep. 228. 
 
 451 
 
§ 343 . ASSUMED RISKS. 
 
 complaint, on his part and without a promise of repair, on 
 the employer's part, assumes the risk of an injury incident 
 to the use of such an appliance and cannot hold the employer 
 liable for such an injury.*^ 
 
 A section hand who knowingly uses, under the direction of 
 the section boss, a defective hammer and cleaver, assumes the 
 risk ; ** a freight conductor assumes the known risk of using 
 a defective engine step ; *® a s'tvitchman using a slanting foot- 
 board, to an engine, and killed thereby, will be held to as- 
 sume the risk, unless he supposed that he could use it and 
 avoid injury, by due care on his part ; *® a brakeman assumes 
 the risk of injury from using a box car for a caboose ; *^ the 
 danger from a defective car platform is assumed by an em- 
 ployee who knowingly uses it without objection; ** a section 
 man who knowingly uses a defective dump car, without coii;i- 
 plaint, cannot recover for an injury therefrom ; ** use of a 
 defective brake after notice of the defect and without com- 
 plaint, will bar a recovery for an injury therefrom ; ^^ an 
 
 *3 Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Allen, 47 III. App. 465 ; Davidson v. 
 Southern Pac. E. Co., 44 Fed. Kep. 476; Baker v. Western, etc., E. 
 Co., 68 Ga. 699 ; Needham v. Louisville, etc., E. Co., 85 Ky. 423 ; 3 
 S. W. Eep. 797; Hick v. Flint, etc, E. Co., 67 Mieh. 632; 35 N. W. 
 Eep. 708; Heffernen v. North Pac. E. Co., 45 Minn. 471; 48 N. W. Eep. 
 1; New York, etc., E. Co. v. Lyon, 119 Pa. St. 324; 13 Atl. Eep. 205; 
 Houston, etc., E. Co. v. Myers, 55 Texas 110; 8 Am. & Eng. B. Cas. 
 Il4; Missouri Pacific Ey. Co. v. Somers, 71 Texas 700; Central E. 
 .Co. V. Haslett, 74 Ga. 59; Ballon v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 54 Wis. 257; 
 11 N. W. Rep. 559; 41 Am. Eep. 31; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 480. 
 
 *i Baker v. Western, etc., E. Co., 68 Ga. 699. 
 
 *5 Jackson v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 31 Kansas 761; 3 Pac. Rep. 
 501; 15 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 178. 
 
 *8 0'Mellia v. Kansas City, etc., E. Co., 115 Mo. 205; 21 S. W. Rep. 
 503. 
 
 *7 Davis V. Baltimore, etc., E. Co., 152 Pa. St. 314; 25 Atl. Rep. 498. 
 
 48 Sogers V. Galveston, etc., R. Co., 76 Texas 502; 13 S. W. Rep. 540. 
 
 49 Pleasants v. Raleigh, etc., R. Co., 95 N. Car. 195. 
 
 50 St. Louis, etc., E. Co. v. Britz, 72 111. 256; Burns v. Chicago, etc., 
 R. Co., 69 Iowa 450; 30 N. W. Rep. 25; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 409. 
 
 452 
 
ASSUMED EISKS. § 344 
 
 employee cannot hold his employer liable for an injury from 
 the use of a known defective hand car; ^* the risk from a 
 dangerous manner of running trains is assumed, in the ab- 
 sence of a complaint ; ®^ the absence of a turntable, requir- 
 ing the running of trains backwards, is a known assumed 
 danger ; ^^ as is the absence of a switch niarker.^* Nor could 
 the employee hold the employer responsible for an injury 
 resulting from an insufficient number of employees on a train, 
 where the injured employee, with full knowledge of the way 
 the train was manned, had worked without complaint on this 
 score, with full appreciation of the risk in doing so.^® 
 
 § 344. Employee with equal knowledge assumes risk. — In 
 the absence of a promise or assurance of safety,®* where the 
 employee is under the same obligations as his employer to 
 know the condition of his tool or appliance or the place of 
 work,®'^ and the risk of his employment is apparent, or is 
 as well known to the employee as it is to the employer,"® and 
 
 61 Johnston v. Western, etc., E. Co., 55 Ga. 133; Central, etc., R. 
 Co. V. Kenney, 58 Ga. 485; 16 Am. Ey. Eep. 131. 
 
 52 Larson/ v. St. Paul, etc., E. Co., 43 Minn. 423 ; 45 N. W. Eep. 
 722; 44 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 529; lake Shore, etc., E. Co. v. Knittel, 
 33 Ohio St. 468. 
 
 osKuhns V. Wisconsin, etc., E. Co., 70 Iowa 561; 31 N. W. Rip. 868. 
 
 5* Union Pacific R. Co. v. Monden, 50 Kansas 539; 31 Pac. Rep. 
 1002; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 363. 
 
 65 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Donehue, 75 111. 106; Chicago, etc., R. Co. 
 V. Geary, 110 111. 383; 17 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 606; Baltimore, etc., 
 R. Co. V. State, 41 Md. 268; 6 Am. Ry. Rep. 276. 
 
 66Laning v. New York, etc., R. Co., 49 N. Y. 521; Chapman v. 
 Erie R. Co., 55 N. Y. 579; Stewart v. New York, etc., R. Co., 8 N. Y. 
 Supp. 19. 
 
 6TMuirhead v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 19 Mo. App. 634; Porter v. 
 Hannihal, etc., R. Co., 71 Mo. 66; 36 Am. Rep. 454; 2 Am. & Eng. .R. 
 Cas. 44; Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Berry, 2 Ind. App. 427; 28 N. E. 
 Eep. 714. 
 
 68 Thompson v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 4 McCrary (U. S.) 629; 14 
 Fed. Rep. 564, 
 
 453 
 
§ 346 ASSUMED EISKS. 
 
 the employee continues in the service, he will assume the risk 
 of injuries from his surroundings, in the absence of special 
 instructions or directions by the employer.®" 
 
 An employee with equal ki;iowledg-e that his employer pos- 
 sessed, of the condition of the roadbed and track, was held to 
 assume the risk thereof, in a Kansas case f° where the em- 
 ployee, was shown to have had equal means of knowledge with 
 his employer, about the defects in a machine he was op- 
 erating; he was held in Colorado, to have assumed the risk, 
 in the absence of a promise of repair; ®^ an employee with 
 equal notice of a defective car, was held to take the risk 
 of an injury in mounting it, in Wisconsin,®^ and these cases 
 are in accord with the weight of authority on this question, 
 for it is very generally held, that where the employee has 
 equal or better information of the dangers surrounding him, 
 than his employer has, he cannot recover for a subsequent 
 injury, in the absence of a promise to repair, or an assurance 
 of safety.®* 
 
 § 345. Extra risks assumed, when. — An employee is held, 
 in law, to assume the risk of all extraordinary dangers that 
 
 are obvious Jo him and which he voluntarily undertakes,®* 
 
 « 
 
 B» Davis V. Detroit, etc., R. Co., 26 Mich. 105; Crutchfield v. Rich- 
 mond, etc., R. Co., 78 N. Car. 300; 16 Am. Ry. Rep. 212. 
 
 00 Clark v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 48 Kansas 654; 29 Pac. Rep. 
 1138. 
 
 81 Burlington, etc., R. Co. v. Liehe, 17 Colo. 280; 29 Pac. Rep. 175. 
 
 «2Flannagan v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 50 Wis. 462; 7 N. W. Rep. 
 337. 
 
 83 Week V. Fremont, etc., Co., 3 Wash. 629; 29 Pac. Rep. 215. 
 
 81 Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Adams, 105 Ind. 151; 5 N. E. Rep. 187; 
 23 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 408; Downey v. Sawyer, 157 Mass. 418; 32 
 N. E. Rep. 654; Smith v. Winona, etc., R. Co., 42 Minn. 87; 43 N. W. 
 Rep. 968; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 289; Consolidated, etc., Co. v. 
 Hannei, 146 111. 614; 35 N. E. Rep. 162; International, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Turner, 3 Texas Civ. App. 487; 23 S. W- Kep. 146; Pittsburg, etc., R. 
 Co. V. Sentmeyer, 92 Pa. St. 276. 
 
 454 
 
ASSUMED EISKS. § 345 
 
 and all risks incident to the work; that are equally open to 
 observation of himself and the employer, although the work 
 is temporarily more hazardous than that for which he was 
 employed.®^ A party has a right to contract to perform 
 any lawful business, however hazardous it may be, and al- 
 though it is rendered more dangerous than it otherwise would 
 be, by the peculiar manner of the employer, the employee, in 
 remaining in the service after discovering the dangers, or 
 after reasonable opportunity so to do, is held to assume the 
 risk,®® nor would it be material that he only remained in the 
 employment at the urgent request of the employer,®'' or that 
 he was unwilling to remain in the service and only did so, for 
 fear of losing his employment.®* The result of his volun- 
 tary, act is the same, whatever may be the reason that 
 prompted it, and where having sufficient intelligence to ap- 
 preciate the danger to which he is exposed, he knowingly 
 consents to occupy the place set apart for him, he assumes 
 the risk incident thereto and dispenses with the obligation 
 of the employer to furnish him a better place.®® 
 
 But of course this result would not follow, if the dan- 
 gerous condition of the place or appliance was unknown to 
 the employee, or could not have been discovered by reason- 
 able care, on his part,''" or if the condition was superinduced 
 
 65 Consolidated, etc., Co. v. Hannei, 146 111. 614; 35 N. B. Eep. 162. 
 
 66 Scott V. Oregon, etc., R. Co., 14 Oregon 211; 13 Pac. Eep. 98; 28 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 414; Pollich v. Sellers, 42 La. Ann. 623; 7 So. 
 Rep. 786. 
 
 67Diehl V. Lehigh, etc., Co., 140 Pa. St. 487; 21 Atl. Rep, 430. 
 
 68Leary v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 139 Mass. 580; 2 N. E. Eep. 115; 
 52 Am. Eep. 733; 23 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 383; Southern Kansas R. Co. 
 V. Moore, 49 Kansas 616; 31 Pac. Eep. 138. 
 
 60 Emma Cotton, etc., Co. v. Hale, 56 Ark. 232; 19 S. W. Rep. 
 600; Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Wells (Texas), 16 S. W. Rep. 1025. 
 
 70 Taylor, etc., R. Co. v. Taylor, 79 Texas 104; 14 S. W. Eep. 918; 
 Irvine v. Flint, etc., R. Co., 89 Mich. 416; 50 N. W. Eep. 1008; 53 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 210; Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. McCormick, 74 
 
 455 
 
§ 346 ASSUMED EISKS. 
 
 by the employer's negligence/^ or the employee, becaus^ of his 
 youth or inexperience, did not appreciate the dangers of the 
 extra risks to which he was exposed.'^* 
 
 § 346. Extra risks from defective bridges, assumed, when. 
 
 — In a well-considered case that has come to the author's 
 attention, from Alabama,''^ the plaintiff's intestate was act- 
 ing as both engineer and conductor of a construction train 
 and was killed, in attempting to cross a river, by the falling 
 of a bridge, during a great flood. The evidence showed that 
 deceased controlled the movements of the train and had no 
 orders to cross the river at that time and his only motive 
 for crossing appeared to be to get home. He had examined 
 the bridge, during the day of his death and knew, or ought 
 to have known, that the waters were rapidly rising, and'knew 
 or ought to have known of the danger of the trestles approach- 
 ing the bridge, being washed away. The court held that he as- 
 sumed the risk of crossing the bridge, with this information 
 before him and that there could be no recovery for his-death.'''* 
 And in another case, the death of a brakeman, caused by a 
 low bridge, was held to be remediless, where his attention 
 had been called to the low bridge and the extra peril of 
 passing under it.'^* The negligence of the employer was 
 waived in this case and the waiver could not be affected by 
 the rapidity or promptness with which the employee was re- ■ 
 quired to act at the time of the accident.'^* 
 
 Ind. 440; 5 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 474; Riley v. West Virginia, etc., H. 
 Co., 27 W. Va. 145. 
 
 71 Peoria, etc., R. Co. v. Puckett, 42 111. App. 642. 
 
 72 Emma Cotton, etc., Co. v. Hale, 56 Ark. 232; 19 S. W. Rep. 600. 
 
 73 Columbia, etc., E. Co. v. Bridges, 86 Ala. 448; 5 So. Rep. 864; 
 38 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 136. 
 
 74 Columbus, etc., R. Co. v. Bridges, 86 Ala. 448; 5 So. Rep. 864; 
 38 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 136. 
 
 75 Fitzgerald v. New York, etc., R. Co., 36 N. Y. S. R. 755. 
 70Brossman v. Lehigh Valley H. Co., 113 Pa. St, 490; 6 Atl. Rep. 
 
 226; 57 Am. Eep. 479, 
 
 456 
 
ASSUMED RISKS. § 347 
 
 § 347. Extra risks from operation of cars assumed. — The 
 
 following extra hazards, knowingly undertaken by railroad 
 employees, in the management of engines, cars and trains, 
 have been held to be assumed, i. e., a brakeman riding a flat 
 car, in front of an engine, was held to have knowingly uii- 
 dertaken the extra perils ; '''' an engineer in a railroad yard, at 
 night, takes the risk of being struck by a backing engine 
 that has no light; '^* the use of narrow-gauge trucks to carry 
 a broad-gauge car upon, is a known extra peril of the em- 
 ployment of a brakeman ; ™ the increased risk a fireman takes 
 in remaining on his engine with a sleepy engineer is as- 
 sumed ; *" a section man takes the risk of a collision with an 
 extra or special train, without notice ; *^ a switchman takes 
 the risk of moving a car loaded with nitroglycerin, over the 
 tracks of the receiving company and of its explosion ; *^ a sec- 
 tion man takes the risk of running a hand car, around a curve 
 and in a deep cut, in front of an approaching freight train,*^ 
 and a section man, running a hand car, at night, is charge- 
 able with the risk of running it into a stationary train on the 
 same track.** These and similar risks, although extra- 
 hazardous, are assumed, because the employee knows as much 
 about them as the employer ; there is nothing unseen in the 
 
 77 Fordyce v. Lowman, 57 Ark. 160; 20 S. W. Rep. 1090. 
 7S Williams v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 2 N. Y. Supp. 435; 18 N. Y. 
 S. R. 857; 50 Hun 600. 
 
 79 Titus V. Bradford, etc., R. Co., 136 Pa. St. 618; 20 Atl. Rep. 517. 
 
 80 Carroll v. East Tennessee, etc., R. Co., 82 Ga. 452; 10 S. E. Rep. 
 163; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 307. 
 
 81 Olson V. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 38 Minn. 117; 35 N. W. Rep. 866; 
 33 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 386; Larson v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 43 Minn. 
 423; 44 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 529. 
 
 82 Foley v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 48 Mich. 622; 12 N. W. Rep. 879; 
 42 Am. Rep. 481; 6 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 161. 
 
 83 Hammond v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 38 Mich. 334; 47 N. W. Rep. 
 965; 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 377. 
 
 84Sliney V. Duluth, etc., R. Co., 46 Minn. 384; 49 N. W. Rep. 187. 
 
 407 
 
§ 348 ASSUMED KISKS. 
 
 surroundings and the dangerous condition is not due to the 
 employer's n^ligence. 
 
 § 348. Extra dangers in use of defective cars, assumed.— 
 
 The following extra risks have been held to be assumed, by 
 railroad employees, incurred- in coupling dangerous and de- 
 fective cars, viz., a brakeman assumes the risk of an injury 
 in coupling and uncoupling a car, while attached to a mov- 
 ing engine ; ®^ the danger of coupling a car from the inside 
 curve of a track in a yard, is assumed ; ^® the danger of 
 coupling moving cars is always assumed ; ^'^ the risk of coup- 
 ling a higher and lower car together, is assumed ; *® a brake- 
 man cannot recover for an injury in coupling to an im- 
 properly loaded car ; ®* striking an obstruction in the act of 
 coupling a car, is a danger that is voluntarily undertaken, by 
 a brakeman ; ^^ injuries in coupling cars with double buffers, 
 although the peril is increased over ordinary couplings, is a 
 risk assumed; ®^ the danger of coupling to a known broken 
 car, is assumed ; ®^ no recovery can be had for an injury in 
 coupling cars without bumpers ; ®* the risk of coupling cars 
 
 sBKroy v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 32 Iowa 357; 10 Am. Ey. Rep. 48. 
 
 seTuttle v. Detroit, etc., R. Co., 122 U. S. 189; 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 1166; 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 217. And see Randall v. Baltimore, etc., 
 R. Co., 109 U. S. 478. 
 
 87 Henry v. Sioux City, etc., R. Co., 66 Iowa 52; 23 N. W. Rep. 
 260; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 644. 
 
 88 Thomas v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 109 Mo. 187 ; 18 S. W. Rep. 
 980; Wayne, etc., R. Co. v. Gildersleeve, 33 Mich. 133. 
 
 8»Day V. Toledo, etc., R. Co., 42 Mich. 523; 4 N. W. Rep. 203; 
 2 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 126. 
 
 90 Pennington v. Detroit, etc., R. Co., 90 Mich. 505; 51 N. W. Rep. 
 634. 
 
 »i Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Flanigan, 77 111. 365 ; Louisville, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Roland, 96 Ala. 626 ; 11 So. JRep. 667 ; 53 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 169. 
 
 szRarkdall v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (Pa.), 13 Atl. Rep. 82. 
 
 «3 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Barranger (Texas), 14 S. W. Rep. 242, 
 
 458 
 
ASSUMED RISKS. § 34-9 
 
 ■with mismatched couplings, is one that is assumed ; "* the 
 danger of coupling engines and cars of different heights with 
 straight links, is assumed,®® as is the danger of making a 
 " three link coupling " in a moving train.*® 
 
 § 349. Danglers outside scope of employment assumed, 
 when. — An employee is not bound under all circumstances 
 and at all hazards, to obey the orders of his employer. He 
 cannot recover damages- for injuries received, while obeying 
 the latter's orders, if he had time to deliberate and volun- 
 tarily and with knowledge of the peril, placed himself in a 
 position in which he was more than likely to be injured.® '^ 
 Damages cannot be recovered, although the result of a risk 
 outside the scope of the employee's duties, if his opportunity 
 
 94 Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. McDonald, 88 Va. 352; 13 S. E. Rep. 706; 
 McLaren v. Williston, 48 Minn. 299; 51 N. W. Rep. 373. 
 
 96 Welch V. New York, etc., R. Co., 43 N. Y. S. R. 958; 63 Hun 
 625; Thomas v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 109 Mo. 187; 18 S. W. Rep. 
 980. 
 
 96Darracott V; Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 83 Va. 288; 2 S. B. Rep. 
 511; 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 157; Bennett v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 
 2 N. Dak. 112. 
 
 Switchmen and brakemen were held to assume the risk of handling 
 disabled cars, in the " following cases : International, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Story (Texas), 62 8. W. Rep. 130; Railroad Co. v. Hennessey, 96 
 Fed. Rep. 713; 38 C. C. A. 307; Brown v. Railroad Co., 59 Kansas 70; 
 52 Pac. Rep. 65 ;" Yeaton v. Railroad Corp., 145 Mass. 418 ; Kelley v. 
 Railroad Co., 35 Minn. 490; 29 N. W. Rep. 173; Arnold v. Canal Co., 
 125 N. Y. 15; 25 N. E. Rep. 1064; Watson v. Railroad Co., 58 Texas 
 434; Flannagan v. Railroad Co., 50 Wis. 462; 7 N. W. Rep. 337. 
 
 An employe was held to assume the risk of injury from defects in 
 foreign cars, in Woods v. Northern Pac. Ey. Co., 36 Wash. 658; 
 79 Pac. Rep. 309; Cleary v. Long Island R. Co., 66 N. Y. S. R. 568; 
 54 App. Div. 284; Leazott v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 70 N. H. 5; 45 
 Atl. Rep. 1084. 
 
 The lisk of using a remodeled freight car for a caboose was held 
 assumed, in Ohio, in Crawford v. New York, etc., R. Co., 23 Ohio 
 Cir. Ct. 207. 
 
 97McDermott v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 87 Mo. 285; 28 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 528. 
 
 459 
 
§ 349 ASSUMED EISKSi 
 
 for observing the danger was equal to that of his employer, 
 nor would the employer be guilty of negligence, in requiring 
 such 'additional duty, if good reason existed therefor, such as 
 the safety of passengers, in an unusual storm,^* if ordinarily 
 safe track, culverts and roadway were provided. 
 
 Under this rule of law, an employee in a railroad yard, for 
 three months, was held to assume the risk of obeying an order 
 to couple a car with projecting lumber over the end ; ®^ an 
 employee in a railroad shop, accustomed to wheel scrap iron, 
 to have assumed the open risk of running the hammer, al- 
 though the work was done for the first time the day of the 
 injury ; ^ a foreman of bridge builders, was held to assume 
 the known risk of obeying an order to use an engine to do 
 switching; ^ an employee undertaking the use of a known 
 defective tool, although under the immediate supervision of 
 his f oremaji, was held not entitled to recover ; * an order to 
 use a knovyn defective hand car, will not give a right of 
 action therefor,* nor will an order to work in a tunnel, likely 
 to cave in because of shots which loosened the walls, give a 
 right of action,^ as this is a risk due to natural forces, which 
 one man ought to be held to assume the same as another. 
 
 S8 Houston, etc., E. Co. v. Fowler, 56 Texas 452; 8 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 504; English v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 24 Fed. Rep. 906. 
 
 »» Atchison, etc., E. Co. v. Plunkett, 25 Kansas 188; 2 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 127. 
 
 1 Hanrathy v. Northern C. R. Co., 46 Md. 280 ; 18 Am. Ry. Rep. 188. 
 
 2 Cole V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 71 Wis. 114; 37 N. W. Rep. 84; 
 5 Am. St. Rep. 201; 33 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 274. 
 
 3 Baker v. Western, etc., R. Co., 68 Ga. 699. 
 i Bell V. Western, etc., R. Co., 70 Ga. 566. 
 5 Anderson v. Winston, 31 Fed. Rep. 528. 
 
 An employee performing voluntary services outside the line of his 
 employment is held to assume the risk, in the following cases : Central, 
 etc., R. Co. V. McWhorter, 115 Ga. 476; 42 S. E. Rep. 82; Devoe v. 
 New York, etc., R. Co., 75 N. Y. S. R. 136; 70 App. Div. 495; Cleve- 
 land, etc., R. Co. v. Workman, 66 Ohio St. 509; 64 N. E. Rep. 582; 
 Martin v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 77 Miss. 720; 27 So. Rep. 64§; 
 
 460 
 
ASSUMED EISES. §§ 350,. 351 
 
 § 350. Dangers from obeying orders of coemployee as- 
 sumed. — While the employee is not held to assume the risk 
 of injuries due to negligent orders of vice-principals, or those 
 who stand in the place of the employer, in the giving of such 
 orders,^ as none but those delegated by the employer to so 
 act for him, are held, in law, to be able to bind him by the 
 result of orders or assumption of powers not delegated to < 
 them, the employer is not generally held to be liable for in- 
 juries received by his employees, due to risks encountered 
 while obeying the orders of coemployees of the injured em- 
 ployee, for it is optional with the employee to either obey 
 or refuse- such orders.'^ 
 
 Under this rule, it was held, in Teoinesaee, in a well-con- 
 sidered case,* that a yard man, in a railroad yard, who was 
 not under the duty to obey the orders of an engineer, assumed 
 the risk of making a coupling, at the request of the engineer, 
 when he was killed,, as a result of the negligent manner in 
 which the cars were brought together, by the engineer. 
 
 § 351. Risks assumed, notwithstanding promise of repair, 
 when. — If an employee knows and appreciates the danger of 
 a given act, which he undertakes, he is held to have assumed 
 the risk of injury in so doing, although he undertakes the 
 accomplishment of the act under an order of his employer or 
 a vice-principal.^ It is only where he has not equal means 
 
 Warden v. Railroad Co., 94 Ala. 277; 10 So. Rep. 276; 14 L. R. A. 
 552; Beyer v. Railroad Co., 114 Ala. 424; 21 So. Rep. 952. 
 
 Greenleaf v. Illinois, etc., R. Co., 29 Iowa 14 ; Thompson v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. Co., 4 MeCrary (U. S.) 629; 14 Fed. Rep. 564; Chicago, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Harney, 28 Ind. 28. 
 
 'Watts V. Hart, 7 Wash. 178; 34 Pao. Rep. 423, 771; Pittsburg, 
 etc., R. Go. V. Adams, 105 Ind. 151; 5 N. E. Rep. 187; 23 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 408. 
 
 8 Bradley v. Nashville, etc., R. Co., 14 Lea (Tenn.) 374r 
 
 Obeying the order of a coemployee was held assumed, in Van 
 DerhofiF v. New York Cent. R. Co., 84 N. Y. S. R. 650; 88 App. Div. 
 
 » Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Crotty (C. C. A. 8 Cir.), 4 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 832. 
 
 461 
 
§ 352 ASSUMED kiskS. 
 
 of information with his employer and does not understand 
 the danger of his obeying the order of his vice-principal or 
 employer, that- he can claim to be exempt from the risk of his 
 work, because of an order of his employer, for where he 
 knows and appreciates the danger, the mere fact of an order 
 on the employer's part, would not alter his acceptance of the 
 risk, by virtue of his contract of employment.^" 
 
 And the same rule applies as to a promise to repair simple, 
 common tools or appliances, of which the promise could not 
 be said to have been the essential inducement for the con- 
 tinued use of such tools, but where the danger of the use 
 was apparent to all men and the promise was reli«d O^n, only 
 after an injury, to excuse an otherwise voluntary act on the 
 part of the employee, resulting in his injury.^ ^ 
 
 § 352. Risks assumed by car and track repairers.*^- It is 
 
 very generally held, by the best considered cases, that a car 
 repairer, who knowingly goes under or about a crippled or 
 damaged car, in a railroad yard where trains or cars are apt, 
 at any minute, to be backed into or against such car, without 
 placing a flag or other danger signal, assumes the risk of 
 receiving an injury, while so «ngaged and cannot recover 
 therefor; ^^ an employee who accepts employment on a con- 
 
 10 An employee, although acting under an order of a superior, where 
 he had full notice of the dangers of his surroundings, was held to 
 assume the risk, in Southern Ey. Co. v. Logan (S. C), 138 Fed. Rep. 
 725; Weed v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (Neb.), 99 N. W. Rep. 827; 
 Chicago & Gr. West Ry. Co. v. Crotty, 141 Fed. Rep. 913; 73. C. C. A. 
 147; Huggins v. Southern Ry. Co. (Ala.), 41 So. Rep. 856; Haywood 
 V. Galveston, etc., R. Co. (Texas), 85 S. W. Rep. 433. 
 
 11 The rule that a promise to repair waives the defense of assump- 
 tion of the risk does not apply to the use of simple every-day tools or 
 appliances. Bowen v. Chicago & N. E. Ry. Co., 117 111. App. 9. 
 
 i2Renfiy V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 86 Mo. 302; Latremouille v. 
 
 Bennington, etc., R. Co., 63 Vt. 336; 22 Atl. Rep. 656; 48 Am. & 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 265; Campbell v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (Pa.), 2 Atl. Rep. 
 
 489; 24 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 427; Crowe v. New York, etc., R. Co., 
 
 462 
 
ASSUMED eisk:s. § 352 
 
 Struction train, for the purpose of finding and repairing wash- 
 outs, is also chargeable with notice of the dangers of the serv- 
 ice and assumes the- risk; ^* risks and dangers due to de- 
 fective tracks are kno\vn and assumed by those engaged in 
 the repair of such tracks ; ^* a brakeman assumes the risk of 
 handliiig a known broken car ; ^^ coupling a crippled car, with 
 a broken drawhead is a risk assumed by brakemen who know 
 of the defect in the car; ^^ an employee taking a defective 
 engine to the inachine shop, for repair, assumes the risk of 
 an injury while so engaged ; ^ ^ a track repairer knows that 
 he must repair the tracks between passing trains and takes 
 the risk of injury therefrom; ^® they take the risk, while pro- 
 ceeding to their work, on hand cars, of being run into by 
 special trains, running Avithout schedule time; ^® the risk of 
 clearing away a wrecked train is a known dangerous employ- 
 ment, which the employee assumes ^° and the danger of coup- 
 ling or working on a train that has broken in two is a risk 
 known to employees and no lecovery can be had for an in- 
 jury from the detached portion of such train running back 
 
 23 N. Y. Supp. 1100; Cincmnati, etc., R. Co. v. Long (iJid.), 13 N. E, 
 Rep. 659 ; Peterson v. Chicago, etc., B,. Co., 34 N. W. Rep. 260. 
 "Vaughan v. California, etc., R. Co., 83 Cal. 18; 23 Pae. Rep. 215. 
 
 14 Colorado Midland R. Co. v. O'Erien, 16 Colo. 219; 27 Pac. Rep. 
 701 ; 48 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 235 ; Brick v. Rochester, etc., R. Co., 98 
 N. Y. 211; 31 Hun 453; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Gas. 605. 
 
 15 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Ward, 61 111. 130; 12 Am.Ry. Rep. 434; 
 Watson V. Houston, etc., H. Co., 58 Texas 434; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Oas. 
 313; Fraker v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 32 Minn. 54; 19 N. W. Rep. 349; 
 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 256; Arnold v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 125 
 >f. Y. 15; 25 N. B. Rep. 1064. 
 
 16 Arnold v. Delaware, etc., E. Co., 125 N. Y. 15; 25 N. E. Rep. 
 1064. 
 
 IT Houston, etc., R. Co. v. O'Hara, 64 Texas 600. 
 
 IS Coyne v. Union Pacific R. Co., 138 U. S. 370; 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 382; Kennedy v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (Pa.), 17 Atl. Rep. 7. 
 
 19 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Wachter, 60 Md. 395; 15 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 187. 
 
 20Slatterly v. New York, etc., R. Co., 21 N. Y. S. R. 552; 51 Hun 
 638; 4 N. Y. Supp. 910. 
 
 463 
 
§ 353 ASSUMED EISKS. 
 
 and injuring employees working on the stationary portion 
 of the train.^^ 
 
 § 353. Various injuries due to caving earth banks as- 
 sumed. — Injuries to employees on railroads are of quite fre- 
 quent origin, where the labor is in cuts or ditches, due to 
 the caving in of the banks of earth, near which the work is 
 being done. As all men are chargeable with a knowledge 
 of the operation of natural laws, if the cave-in is the result 
 of natural forces, or the progress of the work, there is gen- 
 erally held to be no liability in this class of cases. ^^ 
 
 Accordingly, it is held that an employee wheeling earth, 
 near a bank fifteen feet high, which by the frost and thaws 
 was cracked and fell on him, assumed the risk and could not 
 recover for a resulting injury ; ** an employee working in a 
 
 21 Course v. New York, etc., B. Co., 17 N. Y. S. R. 715; 49 Hun 
 609; 2 N. Y. Supp. 312. 
 
 Injuries on a known defective track were held assumed risks, in 
 Arnold v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 22 Ky. L. R. 511; 58 S. W. Rep. 370. 
 
 An employee engaged in laying a track assumes the risk of an injury 
 from the unevenness of the track, which was hardly noticeable. Mee- 
 han V. St. Louis, M. & S. E. R. Co., 114 Mo. App. 396; 90 S. W. Rep. 
 102. 
 
 An employee engaged in clearing a railroad track, after a wreck, 
 is not entitled to rely upon an inspection of the track, by his em- 
 ployer, but assumes the risk of a dangerous track. Florence, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Whipps (Colo.)^ 138 Fed. Rep. 13. 
 
 An employee engaged in dismantling a bridge, where the work per- 
 formed continuously changes the place and makes it more insecure, 
 assumes the risk of injury therefrom. Grayson, ete., Co. v. Carter 
 (Ark.), 88 S. W. Rep. 597. 
 
 A car repairer engaged at work on a car, without a flag, where 
 the employer's rules provided for a flag, was held tO' have assumed 
 the risk, in the following cases: Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. v. Elliott, 
 137 Fed. Rep. 904; Sauls v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (Texas), 81 S. W. 
 Rep. 89; State v. South Baltimore Car Works (Md.), 58 Atl. Rep. 
 447. 
 
 22 White, Personal Inj. in Mines, §§ 185, 200, 229, and cases cited. 
 
 23 Olson V. McMullen (Minn.), 24 N. W. Rep. 318. 
 
 464 
 
ASSUMED EISKS. § 353 
 
 railroad cut, was denied a recovery, where the cave-in of the 
 cut was due to the progress of the work ; ^* the danger of loos- 
 ened rock, in- clay seams, to fall on a workman below, is a 
 risk assumed by an employee ; ^^ an employee in a gravel pit, 
 at work with a steam shovel, assumes the risk of the gravel 
 caving in on him ; ^® a shoveler near an earth bank, engaged 
 in loading dirt cars, is held to assume the risk of the earth 
 bank caving on him ; ^'^ an employee excavating sand and 
 gravel knows as much about the liability of the bank near 
 which he works, to cave as his employer and assumes the 
 risk of an injury therefrom;^® the danger of excavating a 
 frozen gravel bank, with cracks from the frost and blasts, is 
 a known risk, assumed by a laborer thereon ; ^^ the danger of 
 a cinder and earth bank caving in is assumed by even an il- 
 literate employee near such bank ; *° one excavating gravel, 
 covered with earth, assumes the risk of the earth giving 
 way;*^ the risk of rock breaking and fallirig and injuring 
 an eqiployee working near a ledge of rock is known as well 
 to the employee, as to the employer,*^ nor would an order 
 of the employer or his representative, in such case, change 
 the rule of nonliability,®* for in all such cases, there is an 
 
 21 Bradley v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 138 Mo. 294; 39 S. W. Kep. 763. 
 
 26Mielke v. Chicago, etc., K. Co. (Wis.), 79 N. W. Eep. 22. 
 
 28Eeiter v. Witiona, etc., E. Co. (Minn.), 75 N. W. Eep. 219; 
 Swanson v. Eailway Co. (Minn.), 70 N. W. Eep. 978. 
 
 zfRasmussen v. Chicago, etc., E. Co. (Iowa), 21 N. W. Eep. 581. 
 
 28Vincennes, etc., Co. v. White (Ind.), 24 N. E. Eep. 745. 
 
 2» Allan V. Logan (Utah), 37 Pac. Eep. 496; Aldrich v. Furnace 
 Co., 78 Mo. 559. 
 
 30 Brown v. Chattanooga, etc., E. Co. (Tenn.), 47 S. W. Eep. 415. 
 
 31 Griffin v. Ohio, etc., Ey. Co. (Ind.), 24 N. E. Eep. 888; Naylor 
 V. Chicago, etc., Ey. Co. (Wis.), 2 N. W. Eep. 24. 
 
 32 Kane v. St. Louis, etc., E. Co. (Mo. App.), 87 S. W. Eep. 571. 
 ssSkidmore v West Virginia, etc., E. Co. (W. Va.), 23 S. E. Eep. 
 713; Aldrich v. Furnace, Co., 78 Mo. 559. 
 
 1—30 465 
 
§ 354 ASSUMED EISKS. 
 
 absence of negligence on the employer's part and all the ele- 
 ments of an assumed risk, on the part of the employee.^* 
 
 § 354. Risks from negligence of coemployees assumed at 
 common law. — By the common law, an employee was held 
 to assume all the risks of his employment, including the risk 
 of injuries due to the negligence of his coemployees, pro- 
 vided they were selected by the employer with due care and 
 not retained in his employment after he had knowledge of 
 their unfitness or habitual negligence.*® And, at common 
 law, the employee assumed the risk of the negligence of a 
 coemployee, even though the latter was in a position of 
 greater responsibility or a different line of employment, so 
 long as both were engaged in the same general business, 
 where the negligence of the one contributed to the danger of 
 the other.*® The negligence of an employee in one grade of 
 the service was as much one of the risks of the business as 
 
 34 White, Personal Inj. in Mines, §§ 185, 200, 229, and cases- cited. 
 
 35Hunn V. Michigan Central E. Co., 78 Mich. 513; Harrison v. 
 Detroit, etc., E. Co., 79 Mich. 409; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Gas. 398; Taylor 
 V. Evansville, etc., E. Co., 121 Ind. 124; 22 N. E. Eep. 876; 6 L. E. A. 
 584; 41 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 437; Kelly v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 35 
 Minn. 490; 29 N. W. Eep. 173; Hudson v. Ocean Steamship Co., 110 
 N. Y. 625; 17 N. E. Eep. 342; Gardner v. Michigan Central E. Co., 
 58 Mich. 584; 26 N. W. Rep. 301; Baltimore, etc., E. Co. v. McKenzie, 
 81 Va. 71; 24 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 395; Pullman Car Co. v. Laack, 
 143 111. 242; 32 N. E. Eep. 285; Howd v. Mississippi C. R. Co., 50 
 Miss. 178; Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Petty, 67 Miss. 255; 7 So. Rep. 
 351; 41 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 441; Bordeau v. Valley Falls Co., 16 
 E. I. 448; 17 Atl. Eep. 54; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Whitmore, 58 Texas 
 276; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 195; Grattis v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 
 153 Mo. 380; 55 S. W. Rep. 108; 48 L. R. A. 399; 77 Am. St. Rep. 721; 
 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Durkin, 76 111. 395; Craig v. Chicago, etc., E. 
 Co., 54 Mo. App. 523. 
 
 36 Grattis v. Kansas City, etc., E. Co., 153 Mo. 380; 55 S. W. Rep. 
 108; 48 L. R. A. 399; 77 Am. St. Rep. 721; Robinson v. Houston, etc., 
 R. Co., 46 Texas 540; 13 Am. Ry. Rep. 3T)3; Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Blohn, 73 Texas 637; 11 S. W. Eep. 867; 4 L. R. A. 764; Dallas v. 
 Gulf, etc., E. Co., 61 Texas 196; 21 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 575. 
 466 
 
Assumed fiisks. § 354 
 
 that of another, in a different grade, and as it is impractical 
 to hold that an employee by his implied contract of employ- 
 ment assumes the risk of the negligence of one class of em- 
 ployees and not that of another, hence, at common law, the 
 negligence of all classes of employees was assumed ^'^ whether 
 the injured employee was an adult or a minor,^® and if it 
 was known that the employee causing the injury was incom- 
 petent and the injured employee had worked with him, with- 
 out objection, he would also be held to have assumed, by his 
 failure to make known the fact of such incompetency to his 
 employer, the risk of the known incompetency of such co- 
 employee/* 
 
 Of course this rule of nonliability does not obtain in 
 States where the common-law rule upon the subject has been 
 abrogated by statute and the rule under the statutes, with 
 
 37 Robinson v. Houston, etc., R. Co., siipra. 
 
 asHeffernen v. Northern Pac. E. Co., 45 Minn. 471; 48 N. W. Eep. 
 1, 526. 
 
 39 Latremouille v. Bennington, etc., E. Co., 63 Vt. 336 j 22 Atl. Eep. 
 656; 48 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 265. 
 
 The risk of injury due to the negligence of competent coemployees 
 was held to be a risk assumed, in the following late cases: Louisville, 
 etc., E. Co. V. Dillard, 114 Tenn. 240; 86 S. W. Eep. 313; Weeks v. 
 Scharer, 111 Fed. Eep. 330; 49 C. C. A. 372; Miniter v. Chicago, etc., 
 Ey. Co. (Iowa), 96 N. W. Eep. 1108; American Bridge Co. v. Seeds, 
 144 Fed. Eep.- 605; Grandin v. Southern Pac. E. Co. (Utah), 85 Pac. 
 Eep. 357; Eoseman v. Southern Ey. Co., 66 S. C. 91; 44 S. E.^ Eep. 
 574; Benignia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 197 Pa. St. 384; 47 Atl.' Eep. 
 359. 
 
 An employee working with known incompetent employees, without 
 objection, was held to have assumed the risk of an injury therefrom, 
 in Hull v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (Wash.), 136 Fed. Eep. 153; 69 
 C. C. A. 151. 
 
 The Iowa Code, 1897 (§ 2071), is held, by the federal court, to 
 only abrogate the defense of assumed risk, so far as the risks of the 
 negligence of coemployees is concerned, leaving intact the defense 
 as to risks obvious and inherent in the act itself, although the danger 
 may have arisen through the prior negligence of a abemployee. 
 Chicago, etc., Ey. Co. v. Crotty, 141 Fed. Eep. 913; 73 C. C. A. 147. 
 
 467 
 
§ 355 ASSUMED RiStCS. 
 
 reference to the liability of the employer, for the negligence 
 of coemployeesj engaged in the operation of trains, will be 
 treated of elsewhere. 
 
 § 355. Additional risks from inclement weather assumed. — 
 
 Employees, as well as the employer, are chargeable with no- 
 tice of the action of the elements and as all employments 
 are subject to the risk of such uncontrolled forces as the 
 wind, fire and water, employees are generally held to assume 
 the increased hazards of their employment, due to the opera- 
 tion of such natural elements, and, in the absence of negli- 
 gence combining therewith to produce the injury, the em- 
 ployer is not liable for an injury caused thereby.*" 
 
 In a Kentucky case,*^ which illustrates the proposition in 
 the title, a brakeman was killed by slipping from the top of 
 a car, by snow and ice formed by the weather on the car, 
 and his administrator charged that the company was negli- 
 gent in failing to remove the ice, or to provide sand or salt 
 "to cover it with. Considering the liability of the employer, 
 Tjnder the doctrine of assumed risk, the court said : " Con- 
 ceding that at that season of the year (December) and in 
 that locality where the accident happened, that it was the 
 duty of the appellee to provide its trains with a sufficient 
 supply of salt or sand to be used in times of snow or ice, 
 yet this action presents no complaint upon this score ; and we 
 do not, tiierefore, decide that any such duty rested upon the 
 company. The failure complained of is that the ice was 
 not removed, or sand or salt put upon it. Certainly in the 
 absence of averment, we will not assume that in this latitude 
 it was the duty of the company to provide other servants 
 than the brakemen themselves to accompany the train, in 
 
 *oFrangoise v. Horton & Hemenway, 26 E. I. 291; 58 Atl. Rep. 
 949; White, Personal Inj. in Mines, § 221, and cases cited. 
 
 *iO'Bannon'8 Admr. v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 9 Ky. L. R. 706; 
 6 S. W. Rep. 434. 
 
 468 
 
ASSUMED KISKS. § 356 
 
 anticipation of unusual weather and remove the ice or sleet 
 from their pathway, or strew it with salt or sand. One en- 
 tering the employment assumes all the risks incident to it. 
 The increased dangers of railroading, arising from rain, 
 snow and ice, or the weather; are a part of the ordinary risks 
 incident to the business. To hold railroads liable to their 
 employees on account of danger arising from the elements, 
 would lead to the running of trains in good weather only, 
 thus seriously interfering with the travel and business of the 
 country." And this is the trend of the decisions, on this 
 proposition.*^ 
 
 § 356. Obvious dangers from violations of statutes, assumed 
 in some States. — The courts of different States have ex- 
 pressed divergent views upon the proposition whether or not 
 an obvious risk, due to a violation of a statute, is assumed. 
 Text writers have taken the position that such obvious dan- 
 gers should be held to be assumed, under the employee's im- 
 plied contract of the common law, the same as other known 
 risks,*^ for the reason that any other construction is an im- 
 pairment and unjust limitation upon the rights of the em- 
 ployer, under the well established doctrine of the common 
 law.** The courts which deny that risks resulting from a 
 breach of statutory duty, are assumed, however, place their 
 conclusion upon the ground that any other construction of 
 
 12 Martin v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (Iowa), 87 N. W. Rep. 654; Eail- 
 
 "road Co. v. Smith, 82 Ga. 236; 8 S. E. Rep. 311; Piquegno v. Railroad 
 
 Co., 52 Mich. 40; 17 N. W. Rep. 232; 50 Am. Rep. 243; Harding v. 
 
 Transfer Co., 80 Minn. 504; 83 N.- W. Rep. 395; Railroad Co. v. 
 
 Hester, 64 Texas 401. 
 
 A brakeman was held to assume the risk of slipping from the top 
 of a freight car, on account of snow and ice on the car, in New York, 
 in Kilken v. New York Central R. Co., 177 N. Y. 566; 69 N. E. Rep. 
 1125; 78 N. Y, S. R. 568; 76 App.'Div. 529. 
 
 43 Dresser's Emp. Liab., § 51, et sub. 
 
 ** Bailey's Mas. Liab, Inj. Serv;, p. 181. 
 
 469 
 
§ 356 ASSUMED KISKS. 
 
 the statute -will practically deny the employee the benefit of a 
 statute passed for his protection.*^ Hence, it is, that the 
 one construction denies the employee the benefit of the 
 statute, which he has consented to waive, while the other 
 denies the employer the benefit of a well established common- 
 law defense, that he is urging he has not waived. An em- 
 ployee not protesting against the failure to comply with a 
 statute or ordinance, passed for his protection, is held in 
 many States, to waive the protection of the statute *® or 
 ordinance,*'^ while in others, it is held that public enact- 
 ments, adopted by the State or municipalities, on grounds 
 of public policy, cannot thus be set aside by the mere ac- 
 quiescence of those for whose protection the same were passed, 
 and that such dangers are not assumed.*®- 
 
 45 Springside, etc., Co. v. Patting (111.), 71 N. £. Rep. 371; Mt. 
 Olive, etc., Co. v. Herb^k, 92 111. App. 441; 60 N. E. Eep. 105; 
 Mosgrove v. Coal Co. (Iowa),. 81 N. W. Rep. 227. 
 
 40 Spiva V. Osage, etc., Co., 88 Mo. 68 ; Adams v. Kansas, etc., Co., 
 85 Mo. App. 486; Victor, etc., Co. v. Muir, 20 Colo. 320; 38 Pac. Rep. 
 378; 26 L. R. A. 435; O'Maley v. Gaslight Co., 158 Mass. 135; 32 
 N. E. Rep. 1119; 47 L. R. A. 161; Grand v. Railroad Co., 83 Mich. 
 564; 47 N. W. Rep. 837; 11 L. R. A. 402; Fitzgerald v. Railroad Co., 
 59 Hun 225; 25 N. Y. S. R. 205; Knisley v. Pratt, 148 N. Y. 372; 
 42 N. E. Rep. 986; 32 L. E. A.' 367. 
 
 47 A brakeman, who knows that trains are run at a rate of speed 
 in excess of that provided by an ordinance, is held to assume the 
 risk, where he fails to protest. Martin v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (Iowa), 
 87 N. W. Rep. 654. 
 
 48Durant v. Coal Co., 97 Mo. 62; 10 S. W. Rep. 484; Railroad Co. 
 V. Peterson, 156 Ind. 364; 59 N. E. Rep. 1044; Springside Coal Co. v. 
 Patting (111.), 71 N. E. Rep. 371. For discussion of this subject and 
 other eases, see White, Personal Inj. in Mines, § 205. 
 
 An obvious danger, resulting from a, violation of a statutory duty, 
 was held to be a risk assumed, in the following cases: Gillan v. 
 Railroad Co., 93 Me. 80; 44 Atl. Rep. 363; Fitzgerald v. Paper Co., 
 30 Misc. Rep. 438; 62 N. Y. S. R. 597; Powell v. Steele Co., 98 Wis. 
 35; 73 N. W. Rep. 573. 
 
 The federal court, for Colorado, holds that the statutes of that 
 State, requiring block switches, does not deprive a railroad company 
 4Y0 
 
ASSUMED RISKS. § 357 
 
 § 357. Bisk of accidents are assumed. — The Missouri Su- 
 preme Court has held an occurrence which an experienced 
 man in the business could not have foreseen "would happen, 
 or guarded against, as a hazard incident to the business to 
 be an accident, which every man engaged in the business as- 
 sumed,** since no negligence' could be predicated upon such 
 an event and all men must show negligence, or a breach of 
 duty, to recover from another for an injury. 
 
 Those jinforeseen and unexpected events, generally called 
 accidents, that frequently result so disastrously to men en- 
 gaged in such hazardous business as railroading, are some of 
 the dangers assumed by employfees, as a part of their contract 
 of employment,®" and although none the less disastrous be- 
 cause the injured employee is without redress, because lack- 
 ing in the essential element of prior negligence, on the 
 employer's part, no redress is given for such unfortunate 
 occurrences. 
 
 But if the injury result both from causes accidental and 
 also from the negligence of the employer, and the casualty 
 would not have taken place, but for the employer's negli- 
 gence, then the employee will not be held to have assumed 
 
 of the defence of assumed risk, where the statute was knowingly- 
 violated, by the employer. Denver, etc., R. Co. v. Norgate, 141 Fed. 
 Rep. 247; 72 C. C. A. 365. 
 
 The Ohio statute requires a. railroad company to block its guard 
 rails to switches, but a failure to do so was held to be a risk assumed, 
 in Johns v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co., 23 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 442. 
 
 A failure to guard cog wheels, as required by statute,- in New York, 
 does not absolve the employee from an assumption of the risk of 
 injury therefrom. Stevens v.. Gair, 96 N. Y. S. 303; 109 App. Div. 
 621. 
 
 49Beasley v. Transfer Co., 148 Mo. 413; 50 S. W. Rep. 87. 
 
 soBuswell, Per. Inj., § 111; Alabama, etc., Co. v. Marcus, 115 Ala. 
 389; Diehl v. Iron, etc., Co., 140 Pa. St. 487; Bailey, Mas. Liab. Inj. 
 Serv., pp. 44, 445; 20 Amer, & Eng. Enc. Law <2 ed.), 110, 111. 
 
 471 
 
358 , ASSUMED RISKS. 
 
 the risk, but the employer will be answerable, as in other 
 cases, for the result of his negligent act. 
 
 51 
 
 § 358. Selecting more dangerous way. — If there are two 
 or more ways or appliances to use to perform a given duty, 
 and the employee selects, voluntarily, the more dangerous 
 way or appliance, in case of a resulting injury, the employee 
 
 Bi Alabama, etc., Co. v. Marcus, 115 Ala. 319; White, Personal Inj. 
 in Mines, § 200, and cases cited. » 
 
 An injury from a piece of steel, from a punch, flying into the eye 
 of an employee, was held, assumed, in Cincinnati, etc., Ey. Co. v. 
 Phinney (Ind.), 77 N. B. Rep. 296. 
 
 An injury from a piece of steel striking an employee using a chisel, 
 was held to be assumed, in Texas. Ft. Worth, etc., R. Co. v. Ramp, 
 70 S. W. Rep. 508. 
 
 The danger of the head of a spike pulling off and letting a section 
 man fall backwards, as a result of which he was injured, is held to 
 be a risk assumed, in Parish v. Missouri, etc., R. Co. (Texas), 76 
 S. W. Rep. 234. 
 
 In a recent decision by the federal court, in Tennessee, an engineer 
 was killed, as a result of a landslide in the mountains, by which 
 the track and his engine was borne into the river. The track was 
 considered Unsafe, but was patroled and a crew of men acocmpanied 
 the train to which the engine was attached, to clear the track. He 
 had objected to proceeding, on account of the danger, but was ordered 
 to proceed slowly and carefully, looking out for slides. It was held 
 that his death was the result of a mere accident, and that he had 
 assumed the risk. Kinzel v. Atlanta, etc., Ry. Co., 137 Fed. Rep. 489. 
 
 A railroad employee attempting to round up a Texas steer, or other 
 vicious animal, assumes the risk of injury therefrom. Clark v. Mis- 
 souri, etc., R. Co., 179 Mo. 66; 77 S. W. Rep. 882. 
 
 A fireman who, while ringing the bell, by a sudden lurch of the 
 train, in rounding a curve, is thrown from his seat and is injured, 
 assumes the risk of the injury, as an incident to his employment, 
 nor is the company liable for failing to furnish a bell cord of sufficient 
 strength to support him. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Mercer, 28 Ky. L. R. 
 3; 88 S. W. Rep. 1054. 
 
 An employee who gets outside of a lighted, beaten way, furnished 
 , by the employer, and falls into a pit and is injured, assumed the 
 risk and cannot recover for such an injury. Geis v. Tennessee Coal 
 Iron, etc., R. Co. (Ala.), 39 So, Rep. 301. 
 
 472 
 
ASSUMED KISKS. § 358 
 
 •will be held to have assumed the risk and there will be no 
 liability on the employer's part,^^ because where the em- 
 ployer has provided a safer way or appliance to use to per- 
 form the work, it could not be said he was negligent in that 
 the employee voluntarily selected the more dangerous way to 
 attain his object, but the law only places the result of his 
 acts upon the employee in holding that no one shall be held 
 in damages for his lack of judgment or discretion in per- 
 forming his work in the more dangerous manner.** 
 
 52 Moore v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 146 Mo. 572; 48 S. W. Eep. 
 487; Acme, etc., Co. v. Mclleer, 5 Colo. App. 267; Wabash R. Co. v. 
 Probst, 92 111. App. 485; Bigelow v. Danielsoii, 102 Wis. 470; 78 
 N. W. Rep. 599; Gilbert v. Burlington, etc., R. Co., 128 Fed. Rep. 
 529; Lepalla v. Cleveland, etc., Co. (Mich.), 81 N. W. Rep. 553; 
 White, Personal Inj. in Mines, § 189, and eases cited. 
 
 53 White, Personal Injuries in Mines, § 189, and cases cited. 
 
 An employee selecting the more dangerous way to perform his work 
 is held to assume the risk, in Foster v. Lake, etc., R. Co., 108 111. 
 App. 113; Moore v. Kansas City, etc., Ry. Co., 146 Mo. 572; 48 
 S. W. Rep. 587; Buttle v. Choctaw, etc., Ry. Co., 144. Fed. Rep. 668 
 Griffith V. Lexington Ter. R. Co., 124 Ga. 553; 53 S. E. Rep. 97 
 Duflfy V. New York, etc., R. Co. (Mass.), 77 N. E. Rep, 1031 
 McDonald v. New York, etc., R. Co. (Mass.), 78 N. E. Rep. 548 
 Huggins V. Southern Ry. Co. (Ala.), 41 So. Rep. 856; Chicago Grt. 
 West. R. Co. V. Crotty, 141 Fed. Rep. 913; 73 C. C. A. 147; Hayzel 
 V. Columbia Ry. Co. (D. C), 19 App. D. 'C. 359; Morris v. Duluth, 
 etc, R. Co., 108 Fed Rep. 747; 47 C. C. A. 661; Wabash R. Co. v. 
 Probst, 92 111. App. 485; Weed v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (Neb.), 99 
 N. W. Rep. 827; Moore v. Kansas City, etc., Ry. Co., 146 Mo. 572; 
 48 S. W. Rep. 487. 
 
 An employee who abandons the ordinary safe way of getting on a car, 
 and instead gets on in a diflferent way, as a result of which he is 
 injured, assumes the risk, in Illinois. Southern Ry. Co. v. Lambert, 
 116 111. App. 52. 
 
 A switchman was held to assume the risk of injury, while climbing 
 from the foot board of a moving engine to the top of the tank, in 
 Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Barr, 204 111. 163; 68 N. B. Rep. 54^. 
 
 473 
 
CHAPTER XV. 
 
 BISKS NOT ASSUMED BY EMPLOYEES. 
 
 359. Limitations and exceptions to rule. 
 
 360. Risks from negligence not assumed. 
 
 361. Injury in negligent collision not assumed. 
 
 362. Section man working in cut does not assume risks, when. 
 
 363. Injury to brakeman from wild engine, not assumed, when. 
 
 364. Injuries to brakemen and others, handling cars, not assumed, 
 
 when. 
 
 365. Dangerous working place — Caving earth bank. 
 
 366. When risk of injury from low bridges not assumed. 
 
 367. Injury from defective track, not assumed, when. 
 
 368. Injuries from running into open switches. 
 
 369. Injuries from obstructions near track, not assumed, when. 
 
 370. Eisks from defective cars, not assumed, when. 
 
 371. Eisks from too great speed, not assumed. 
 
 372. Danger must be appreciated, before risk assumed. 
 
 373. Dangers not appreciated or understood, generally not assumed. 
 
 374. Injuries from latent, unknown defects, not generally assumed. 
 
 375. Eisks not assumed after promise to repair, when. 
 
 376. Various risks not assumed, after promise to repair. 
 
 377. Extra risks not generally assumed. 
 
 378. Eisks outside scope of employment, not generally assumed. 
 
 379. Dangers from orders of vice-principal not assumed. 
 
 380. Eisks not assumed by ear and track repairers. 
 
 381. Eisks of injuries due to incompetency of emproyees not as- 
 
 sumed. 
 
 382. Statutes denying defense of assumed risk. 
 
 383. Statutes regulating defense of assumed risk. 
 
 384. Injuries from flying particles of brittle substances not as- 
 
 sumed, when. 
 
 385. Federal statutes exempting employees of inter-state carriers 
 
 from defense of assumed risks. 
 
 386. Statutes exempting employees from risks of negligence of 
 
 coemployees. 
 
 387. Assumption of risk jury issue, when. 
 474 
 
BISKS NOT ASSUMED. § 359 
 
 § 359. Limitations and exceptions to rule. — An employee 
 assumes such risks as he knew existed, or those which he 
 might have discovered hy the exercise of ordinary care.^ It 
 is error to charge that only such risks as existed at the com- 
 mencement of the employment and such as were subsequently 
 incidental .thereto are assumed, as the employee assumes all 
 such as subsequently arise, in the course of the employment, 
 of which he has knowledge or ought to have known, by the 
 exercise of ordinary care on his part.^ But an employee 
 does not assume unknown perils of the service in which he is 
 engaged, due to the negligent direction of the work, for they 
 are not usual or ordinary risks of the business.^ As to in- 
 juries arising from other than the ordinary or usual hazards 
 of the busipess, the employee stands toward the employer 
 in the same attitude as a stranger.* If the employer knew or 
 ought to have known that the employee was ignorant of a 
 given peril of his employment, or being without experience 
 or youthful, that there were dangers of the service that he 
 could not or did not appreciate or understand, without in- 
 struction or warning, the rule would not embrace such risks, 
 but the failure to give instruction or warning to the employee, 
 in such a case, would be negligence on the part of the em- 
 ployer.^ 
 
 1 Galveston, etc., E. Co. v. Garrett, 73 Texas 272; 13 S. W. Eep. 62. 
 
 2Sowden v. Idaho, etc., Co., 55 Cal. 443. 
 
 sSchroeder v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 108 Mo. 322; 18 S. W. Eep. 
 1094; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 436; Taylor v. Evansville, etc., R. Co., 
 121 Ind. 124; 22 N. E. Rep. 876; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 437; 6 L. R. 
 A. 584. 
 
 *Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Hammersley, 28 Ind. 371; Cole v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. Co., -71 Wis. 114; 33 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 274; Chicago, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Bayfield, 37 Mich. 205; Chamberlain v. Milwaukee, etc., E. 
 Co., 11 Wis. 238. But see 18 Wis. 700. 
 
 B Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Frawley, 110 Ind. 18; 9 N. E. Rep. 594; 
 28 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 308; Bauer v. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 46 Ark. 
 388. 
 
 475 
 
§ 360 RISKS WOT ASSUMED. 
 
 § 360. Risks from negligence not assumed. — When one en- 
 ters into the service of another he assumes to run all the 
 ordinary risks pertaining to such service, but this means 
 only that he cannot recover for any injury that his employer, 
 by the exercise of ordinary care and prudence, could not 
 provide against.^ The neglect of a railroad company to 
 perform the duties imposed upon it, by either the common 
 law or by statute, is not a peril which an employee of such 
 company assumes in entering into its employment.''^ An 
 employee does not assume or contract to waive the liability 
 of the employer for his own negligence, whether committed 
 in person, or by agents authorized by the employer to perform 
 a duty resting upon the employer, as such, but as to all such 
 breaches of duty, in case of a resulting injury, there is a 
 liability, if the injury results proximately from such breach 
 of duty.* 
 
 6 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Cavena, 9 Bush. (Ky.) S59; McGovern v. 
 Central, etc., K. Co., 123 N. Y. 280; 25 N. E. Rep. 373, reversing 
 53 Hun 635; Ford v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., 124 N. Y. 493; 26 
 N. E. Rep. 1101; 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 201. 
 
 7 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Avery, 109 111. 314; 17 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 649; Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Silliphant, 70 Texas 623; 8 S. W. Rep. 673; 
 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Crenshaw, 71 Texas 340; 9 S. W. Rep. 262. 
 
 s Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Laack, 143 111. 242; 32 N. E. Rep. 285." 
 The law does not recognize the employer's negligence as a risk 
 incident to the employment, but, however dangerous the business may 
 be, the employee only assumes such risks as remain after the em- 
 ployer has exercised reasonable care for his safety. Mobile, etc., R. 
 Co. V. Vallowe, 115 111. App. 621; 214 111. 124; 73 N. B. Rep. 416; 
 Hansell, etc., Co. v. Clark, 214 111. 399; 73 N. E. Rep. 787; Blundell 
 V. Miller, etc., Co., 189 Mo. 552; 88 S. W. Rep. 103; Warren v. \ 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co., 113 Mo. App. 498; 87 S. W. Rep. 585; St. Louis, 
 etc., Ry. Co. v. Rea (Texas), 87 S. W. Rep. 324; St. Louis, etc., Ry. 
 Co. V. Vestal (Texas), 86 S. W. Rep. 790; Shore v. Bridge Co. (Mo.), 
 86 S. W. Rep. 905; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Howell, 109 111. App. 546; 
 70 N. E. Rep. 15; Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Heirath, 110 111. App. 596; 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Bell, 111 111. App. 280; Cole v. St. Louis Tr. 
 Co., 183 Mo. 81; 81 S. W. Eep. 1138; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Kelly 
 (Texas), 80 S. W. Rep. 79; San Antonio, etc., R. Co. v. Waller 
 476 
 
IIISKS NOT ASSUMED. §§ 361, 362 
 
 § 361. Injury in negligent collision not assumed.— It is 
 held, in Georgia,® that an employee, in the service of a rail- 
 road company, does not take upon himseK the risk of being 
 killed in a collision between railroad trains, caused by the 
 • negligence of agents of the railroad, as such danger is not an 
 ordinary incident to his employment. 
 
 § 362. Section man working in cut, does not assume risk, 
 when. — While the danger of injuries from moving trains on 
 a railroad track is one of the ordinary perils of the business 
 of railroading "and it is not incumbent on the railroad com- 
 
 ( Texas), 65 S. W. Eep. 210; Smith v. Gulf, etc.^Kjr. Co. (Texas), 65 
 S. W. Eep. 83; Missouri, etc., Ey. Co. v. Walden (Texas), 66 S. W. 
 Eep. 584; St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ey. Co. v. Touhey, 67 Ark. 209; 54 
 S. W. Eep. 577 ; 77 ^.m. St. Eep. 109 ; Dobbin v. Eailroad Co., 81 
 N. C. 446; 31 Am. Eep. 512; Cleveland, etc., Ey. Co. v. Keary, 3 Ohio 
 St. 201 ; Mahoney v. Bay State Co., 184 Mass. 287 ; 68 N. B. Eep. 234 ; 
 Houston, etc., E. Co. v. Turner (Texas), 91 S. W. Eep. 56?; Chicago, 
 etc., Ey. Co. v. Eiley, 145 Fed. Eep. 137; Illinois Ter. E. Co. v. 
 Thompson, 112 111. App. 463; 210 111. 226; 71 N. E. Eep. 328; 
 Foster v. New York, etc., Ey. Co., 187 Mass. 21; 72 N. E. Eep. 331; 
 Depuy V. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 110 Mo. App. 110; 84 S. W. Eep. 103; 
 Northern Ala. E. Co. v. Shea (Ala.), 37 So. Eep. 796; Montgomery v. 
 Chicago, etc., Ey. Co., 109 Mo. App. 88; 83 S. W. Eep. 66; Hill v. 
 Southern Pac. E. Co. (Utah), 63 Pac. Eep. 814; St. Louis, etc., Ey. 
 Co. V. Touhoy, 67 Ark. 209; 54 S. W. Eep. 577. 
 
 An employee does not, in Texas, assume risks arising from the em- 
 ployer's negligence, but only such as are incidental to the business, when 
 conducted with reasonable care and such as are open and obvious. 
 St. Louis, S. W. Ey. Co. v. Dempsey, 89 S. W. Eep. 786. 
 
 Assupiption of the risk is not ii defense, in Alabama, if there is 
 evidence of a wanton or reckless course, on the part of defendant's 
 engineer. Tennessee, C. I. & E. Co. v. Bridges, 39 So. Eep. 902. 
 
 The negligence of his foreman is not a risk assumed by a railroad 
 brakeman. Kennedy v. Kansas City, etc., Ey. Co., 190 Mo. 424; 89 
 . S. W. Eep. 370. 
 
 » Georgia, etc., E. Co. v. Ehodes, 56 Ga. 645. 
 
 A bridge watchman, employed to ride his velocipede over a bridge 
 and inspect it, does not assume the risk of the failure of the engineer 
 of a train to keep a lookout for hiin, or to give him timely warning. 
 San Antonio, etc., Ey. Co. v. Brock (Texas), 80 S. W. Sep. 422. 
 
 477' 
 
§§363,364 RISKS NOT ASSUME. 
 
 pany, in places where trains are momentarily expedted, to 
 give warning thereof, to the company's employees,^" it is 
 quite generally recognized as a duty incumbent on the op- 
 eratives of a train, at a place where employees are at work 
 on the track and where the presence of a train is not to be 
 expected, or its approach is obscured, to give some warning of 
 the approach of such train, to employees whose vision is ob- 
 scured^ or who may not reasonably expect such train. Where 
 a section man is at work in a cut, therefore, where he cannot 
 see an approaching train, he will not be held, in law, to as- 
 sume the danger of being struck by a train run very fast 
 into such cut, when no warning of its approach is given. ^' 
 
 § 363. Injury to brakeman from wild engine, not assumed, 
 when. — As the carelessness on the employer's part is never 
 assumed by an employee,, when two engines are negligently 
 allowed to escape from a railroad yard and run uncontrolled 
 until they collide with a freight train, killing a brakeman 
 thereon, the risk is not one which the brakeman will be held 
 to assume, as an ordinary incident of his employment, where 
 the collision is caused by a failure on the employer's part, 
 to adopt reasonable precautions to prevent the escape of en- 
 gines from its yard.^^ 
 
 § 364. Injuries to brakemen and others handling cars not 
 assumed, when. — A brakeman, or other employee who is in- 
 jured in the coupling or handling of a defective car or en- 
 gine, where he has full notice of the defects that may exist 
 in the car and without complaint voluntarily proceeds with 
 
 loAerkfetz v. Htimphriea, 145 U. S. 418; Elliott v. Railroad Co., 
 150 U. S. 245; Evans v. Wabash Ry. Co., 178 Mo. 508; 77 S. W. Rep. 
 516. 
 
 "Northern Paciflo R. Co. v. Charles, 51 Fed. Rep. 562; 7 U. S. 
 App. 359; 2 C. C. A. 380; 51 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 198. 
 
 12 Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Lafferty, 57 Fed. Rep. 536. 
 478 
 
BISKS NOT ASSUMED. § 364 
 
 his work, until he is injured, is generally held to have as- 
 sumed the risk,^^ but a brakeman, or other employee, will 
 not be held to have assumed the risk in handling a defective 
 car or engine, where he did not know or appreciate the danger 
 he incurred, in so doing, and the defect was not of a char- 
 acter to be openly observed by one of his experience and 
 skill. ^* While acting under an order to go between moving 
 cars, or between standing cars, a brakeman or other employee 
 is held entitled to rely upon the assumption that he can 
 safely make the coupling, or perform his work, unless the 
 danger of so doing is imminent,-'^ and while making a coup- 
 ling, between cars of his own train, a brakeman does not as- 
 sume the risk of an injury by the train of another company, 
 that he had no reason to expect at that place, bumping into 
 the cars he was engaged in working between.-^® 
 
 isHayzel v. Columbia, etc., R. Co., 19 App. Cas. (D. C.) 359; 4 
 Thompson on Neg., § 4718. 
 
 i*Brinkmeier v. Missouri Pacific Ey. Co., 69 Kansas 738; 77 Pac. 
 Eep". 586. 
 
 "Pittsburg, etc., E. Co. v. Hewitt, 202 111. 28; 66 N. E. Eep. 829. 
 
 10 Holmes v. Chicago, etc., E. Co. (Neb.), 103 N. W. Eep. 77. , 
 
 A brakeman, between the cars of a standing train, on a track where 
 it was not customary for cars to be shunted, was- held not to assume 
 the risk of an 'injury from a collision, in Chicago, «tc., Ey. Co. v. 
 White, 209 m. 124; 70 N. E. Eep. 588. 
 
 The sudden stopping of a train by a'pplication of the emergency 
 brake, instead of the service stop, by which a brakeman is injured, 
 is not assumed, in Missouri. Benedict v. Chicago, etc., Ey. Co., 78 
 S. W. Eep. 60. 
 
 A brakeman, in Missouri, was held not to have assumed the risk 
 of injury from going between cars, where his duty required him to 
 do so. McManus v. Oregon Short Line E. Co., 94 S. W. Eep. 743. 
 
 A brakeman was held not to assume the risk of coupling tourist 
 sleepers with other cars, with mismatched couplers, when he was not 
 familiar with or advised of the danger incurred in so doing. Southern 
 Pac. E. Co. v. Winton (Texas), 66 S. ,W. Eep. 477. 
 
 An injury from falling on icy steps, not known by the employee to 
 be icy, was held not to be a risk assumed, in Harding v. Eailway Tr. 
 Co. (Minn.), 83 N. W. Tfep. 395. 
 
 479 
 
§§365,366 KisKs not assumesd. 
 
 § 365. Dangerous working place — Caving earth bank. — 
 
 JVhile an employee is very generally held to assume the risk 
 of injury from a caving earth or gravel bank, when the 
 falling of the hank is caused by natural forces, or is due to 
 the progress of the work of excavation, as an ordinary inci- 
 dent to the work,^^ an injury from a falling gravel or earth 
 bank, not due to natural causes, but to the negligent construc- 
 tion of the bank or trench, by other than the injured em- 
 ployee, who had nothing to do with the work of excavation, 
 would not generally be held to be assumed as an incident of 
 the employment in which he was engaged. 
 
 In Xew York,^* it was held that an employee going in a 
 trench to remove a water pipe, where the trench had been 
 constructed for the purpose, by other than the injured em- 
 ployee, did not assume the risk of injury from the earth 
 caving in on him, while at work removing the water pipe. 
 And in another case,^* iu the same State, where a laborer 
 in a cut, alongside a building, was killed by a falling brace 
 from such building 'and the evidence failed to show that he 
 knew of such brace, or had anything to do with placing it, 
 the defense of assumed risk was held not made out. 
 
 § 366. When risk of injury from low bridges not assumed. 
 
 — While an experienced employee, with notice of a low 
 bridge, is very generally held to assume the risk of injury 
 therefrom,^" dangers from a low overhead bridge, not known 
 
 "DeVitto V. Craig, 165 N. Y. 378; 59 N. E. Kep. 141; Buswell, 
 Per. Inj., § 204; White, Per. Inj. in Mines, §§ 185, 229; Reiter v. 
 Winona, etc., R. Co. (Minn.), 75 N. W. Rep. 219; Swanson v. Railway 
 Co., 70 N. W. Rep. 978; Bradley v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 138 Mo. 
 293; 39 S. W. Rep. 763; Murphy v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 88 N. Y. 152; 
 Cook V. New York, etc., R. Co., 119 N. Y. 653; 29 N. Y. S. R. 994. 
 
 "Kranz v. Long Island, etc., R. Co., 33 K Y. S. R. 46; Lasalle v. 
 Kostka, 190 111. 130; 60 N. E. Rep. 72. 
 
 loMickee v. Wood, etc., R. Co., 70 Hun (N. Y.) 456; 53 N. Y. S R. 
 689. 
 
 20 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Strickler, 51 Md. 47; Carbine v. Benning- 
 480 
 
EISKS NOT ASSUMED. § 367 
 
 to an employee, are not generally held to be among the risks 
 assumed by him, especially where no warning has been given 
 and the injury therefrom occurs on a dark night, or at a time 
 and place where notice of the bridge could not and had not 
 been received.* "^ 
 
 § 367. Injury from defective track, not assumed, when. — 
 Eailroad employees, regardless of their experience, are not 
 ordinarily held to have assumed the risk of injuries from a 
 defective track or roadbed, due to the employer's negligence. 
 Where an employee is injured, therefore, by reason of an 
 imperfect track, or a defective roadbed, due to the employer's 
 negligence, the railroad company is not entitled to an in- 
 struction that such employee will be held to have assumed 
 the risk of injury, if he knew, or ought to have known of 
 such defective track or roadbed.** 
 
 An engineer killed because of a broken and defective 
 switch rail; ** an employee riding to work, injured by reason 
 
 ton, etc., R. Co., 61 Vt. 348; 17 Atl. Rep. 491; 38 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 45; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. State, 75 Md. 152. 
 
 Where a railroad company has failed to erect "telltales," at the 
 distance required by statute, near a low bridge, the risk of being 
 struck by such bridge is- not assumed. Hailey v. Texas, etc., Ry. Co. 
 (La. Ann.), 37 So. Rep. 131. 
 
 21 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Wright, 115 Ind. 378; 16 N. E. Rep. 145; 
 38 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 41. 
 
 An employee not familiar nor advised of the danger of a low or 
 defective bridge was held not to have assumed the risk of an injury 
 therefrom, in the following cases: Miller v. Boston, etc., R. Co. 
 (N. H.), 61 Atl. Rep. 360; Leach v. Oregon Short Line R. Co. (Utah), 
 81 Pac. Rep. 90; Dolan v. Sierra Ry. Co., 135 Cal. 435; 67 Pae. Rep. 
 686; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Tucker's Admr., 23 Ky. L. R. 1929; 
 65 S. W. Rep. 453. 
 
 22 Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. State, 58 Md. 372; 10 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 792; Ft. Worth, etc., R. Co. v. Thompson, 2 Texas Civil App. 
 170; 21 S. W. Rep. 137. 
 
 23Clapp r. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co., 36 Minn. 6; 29 N. W. Rep. ,340. 
 
 r-31 481 
 
§ 368 EISKS NOT ASSUMED. 
 
 of a derailment due to a defective roadbed ; ^* an engineer 
 killed by a derailment caused by a -washout in a mountainous 
 section, where no culvert had been constructed; *® an injury 
 to an employee due to a low joint of track, not shown to be 
 customary,^® and an injury to a brakeman, caused by catch- 
 ing his foot in a defective place in the track,^^ are instances 
 of such risks held not to be assumed by the employee. 
 
 § 368. Injuries from running into open switches. — It has 
 
 2*Trask v. California, etc., E. Co., 63 Cal. 96; 11 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 192; Meloy v. Chicago, etc., K. Co. (Iowa), 37 N'. W. Rep. 335; 
 33 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 3S8. 
 
 25 Union Pacific R; Co. v. O'Brien, 49 Fed. Rep. 538; 4 U. S. App. 
 221; 1 C. C. A. 354. 
 
 28 Ft. Worth, etc., E. Co. v. Thompson, 2 Texas Civil App. 170; 
 21 S. W. Rep. 137. 
 
 2T Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. State, 58 Md. 372; 10 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 792. 
 
 Knowledge of defects in one place, in a track, is not sufficient to 
 charge a brakeman with defects in another place in the track,, but 
 notice of the defect that occasioned the injury is essential to an 
 assumption of the risk. Mumford v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 128 
 Iowa 685; 104 N. W. Rep. 1135. 
 
 Injuries due to a defective track were held not to be assumed 
 in the following cases-: Northern' Ala. R. Co. v. Shea (Ala.), 37 So. 
 Rep. 796; Pierson v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (Iowa), 102 N. W. Rep. 
 149 ; Montgomery v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 109 Mo. App. 88 ; 83 S. W. 
 R«p. 66; Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Keefe (Texas), 84 S. W. Rep. 679; 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Jones (Pa.), 123 Fed. Rep. 753; Smith v. 
 Erie R. Co., 67 N. J. L. 636; 52 Atl. Rep. 634; Arkansas Central R. 
 Co. V. Jackson, 70 Ark. 295; 67 S. W. Rep. 757; Hurst v. Kansas 
 City, etc., R. Co., 163 Mo. 309; 63 S. W. Rep. 695; Story v. Concord 
 R. Co. (N. H.), 48 Atl. Rep. 288; Madole v. Denver, etc., R. Co. 
 (Colo.), 62 Pac. Rep. 964; International, etc., R. Co. v. Johnston 
 (Texas), 55 S. W. Rep. 772; Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Warner, 22 Texas 
 Civ. App. 167; 54 S. W. Rep. 1064. 
 
 The danger from a defective roadbed, in the absence of w'arning, 
 is not assumed by an engineer, if it is not open. Western R. Co. v. 
 Russell (Ala.), 39 So. Rep. 311. 
 
 Defects in a railroad track are not risks assumed by a fireman, in 
 New York. Neagle v. Syracuse, etc., R. Co., 95 N. Y. S. 884; 109 
 App. Div. 339. 
 
 482 
 
EISKS NOT ASSUMED. § 368 
 
 been held, in a number of cases, that an employee on a rail- 
 road does not assume the risk of injury frbm running a train 
 into an open switch.^* This holding would seem perfectly 
 proper, in States where the employer is held responsible for 
 an injury due to the negligence of coemployees, in the op- 
 eration of the railroad, where the switch was negligently left 
 open, 'but where the switch was wrongfully set by some third 
 party, or was accidentally left open by an employee of the 
 employer, since the intervening agency of the third party or 
 the accidental means occasioning the injury, in such a case 
 would be the proximate cause of the injury, instead of the 
 negligence of the employer, it would seem that he ought not 
 be held, in such a case, but the Supreme Court of Texas,''* 
 and the Appellate Court of Illinois,^" have held the railroad 
 company liable for such an injury^ And the Appellate Court 
 of Missouri, in a recent case,^^ held that the railroad com- 
 pany's negligence was properly a jury issue, where it ap- 
 peared that the injury resulted from running a train into an 
 open switch and there was some evidence that an employee 
 of another train, operated by the defendant, had left the 
 switch open, after his train had picked up cars from the side- 
 track. 
 
 28 Injuries received from running a train into an open switch, were 
 held not to be assumed risks, in International, etc., E. Co. v. Johnson, 
 23 Texas Civ. App. 160; 55 S. W. Rep. 772; Seldomridge v. Railway 
 Co., 46 W. Va. 569; Consolidated, etc., Ref. Co. v. Peterson, 8 Kansas 
 App. 316; Young v. Railroad Co., 69 N.- H. 356; Allen v. Railroad 
 Co., 69 N. H. 271. 
 
 29 An injury from a misplaced switch is held not to be a risk 
 assumed, in Texas. International, etc., R. Co. v. Moneyhan, 76 S. W. 
 Rep. 803. 
 
 3" The risk of danger from a switch being accidentally left open, 
 was held, in Illinois, not to be an assumed risk, in Wabash R. Co. v. 
 Thomas, 117 111. App. 110. 
 
 31 Dover v. Mississippi River, etc., R. Co., 100 Mo. App. 330; 73 
 S. W. Rep. 298. 
 
 483 
 
§ 369 EISKS NOT ASSUMED. 
 
 § 369. Injuries from obstructions near track, not assumed, 
 when. — An employee assumes the risk of injuries from 
 coming in contact with suck permanent structures near the 
 railroad track, as the business of railroading makes it neces- 
 sary to maintain, when the maintenance of such structures 
 could not be denominated negligence by the company.*^ 
 
 But in the absence of notice of such structures, employees 
 are not held to have assumed the risk of injury from such 
 temporary structures as sign posts, erected too near the 
 track.*® An employee, without notice of the nearness to the 
 track of a fence, is not held to have assumed the risk of in- 
 jury therefrom ; ®* an injury from striking a switch stand too 
 near the track was held not to be assumed in one case ; *® 
 the fall of a ledge of rock, so as to strike an employee on a 
 train, where the falling is caused by the jar of the train, is 
 not a risk assumed/® nor is the fall of a tree, dangerously 
 near the track, a risk assumed by the employment,*^ as all 
 
 32 Kelly V. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. (Pa.), 11 Atl. Rep. 659. 
 
 33 Johnston v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 43 Minn. 53; 44 N. W. Rep. 
 884; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 293; Seanlon v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 147 
 Mass. 484; 18 N. B. Rep. 209; 38 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 48. 
 
 34 Murphy v. Wabash, etc., R. Co., 115 Mo. Ill; 21 S. W. Rep. 862. 
 
 35Pidcock V. Union Pac. R. Co., 5 Utah 612; 19 Pac. Rep. 191; 
 1 L. R. A. 131. See, also, - Hulehan v. Green Bay, etc., R. Co., 68 
 Wis. 520; 32 N. W. Rep. 529; Boas v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 2 N. 
 Dak. 128; 49 N. W. Rep. 655. 
 
 36 Bean v. Western, etc., R. Co., 107 N. Car. 731; 12 S. E. Rep. 600. 
 
 87 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Vallie, 60 Texas 481. 
 
 The danger of an injury from a cattle chute, near the track, was 
 held to be a risk not assumed by a brakeman, in Coles v. Union 
 Ter. Ry. Co. (Iowa), 99 N. W. Rep. 108. 
 
 The risk of being injured by obstructions on the track, or near 
 thereto, was held not assumed, in the following cases: Texas, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Kelly (Texas), 80 S. W. Rep. 79; McLean v. Pere Marquette 
 R. Co. (Mich.), 100 N. W. Rep. 748; 11 Detroit Leg. News 358; 
 Pittsburg, etc., Ry. Co. v. Parish (Ind.), 62 N. E. Rep. 514; Choctaw, 
 etc., Ry. Co. v. McDade, 112 Fed. Rep. 888; 50 C. C. A. 591; 191 U. S. 
 64; 48 L. Ed. 96; Bradbum v. Wabash R. Co. (Mich.), 96 N. W. Rep. 
 929; Wright v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (Ind.), 66 N. E. Rep. 454; Gulf, 
 484 
 
EISKS NOT ASSUMED. § 370 
 
 such risks are dependent more upon the want of care on the 
 part of the employer, than as mere incidents of the employ- 
 ment, after the'bestowal of due care. 
 
 § 3Y0. Eisks from defective cars, not asstimed, when. — As 
 
 it -would be permitting the employer to take advantage of his 
 own neglect or wrongful act to hold that he could, by failure 
 to inspect or repair an engine or car, permit it to become de- 
 fective or dangerous and that his employees assumed the risk 
 of injury therefrom, it is quite generally held that an em- 
 ployee does not assume the risk of injuries from a defective 
 •car or engine, where negligence could be chargeable to the 
 employer as the cause of such defective or dangerous condi-r 
 tion.^* A laborer on the track does not assume the risk of 
 an injury caused by a defective engine, because the engineer 
 may haveneglected to report its condition to the employer ; ^^ 
 a switchman does not necessarily assume the risk of an injury 
 from a defective footboard on an engine ; *" the danger from 
 making a coupling with a car without a bumper, is not a risk 
 
 etc., R. Co. V. Darby (Texas), 67 S. W. Rep. ii6; Morrissette v. Cana- 
 dian Pac. R. Co., 74 Vt. 232; 52 Atl. Rep. 520; Chicago, etc., R. Co. Vi 
 Stevens, 189 111. 226; 59 N. E. Rep. 577; Donohue v. Boston, etc., R. 
 Co. (Mass.), 59 N. E. Rep. 663; International, etc., R. Co. v. Stephen- 
 son, 22 Texas Civ. App. 220; 54 S. W. Rep. 1086; Highland Ave. R. 
 Co. V. Miller, 120 Ala. 535; Plunkett v. Railway Co., 105 Ga. 203; 
 Potter V. Detroit, etc., R. Co. (Mich.), 81 N. W. Rep. 80; 82 N. W. 
 Rep. 245; Johnson v. Railroad Co., 43 Minn. 53; 44 N. W. Rep. 884; 
 Scanlon v. Railroad Co., 147 Mass. 484; 18 N. E. Rep. 209; Sweet v. 
 Railroad Co., 87 Mich. 559; 49 N. W. Rep. 882; Kelleher v. Railroad 
 Co., 80 Wis. 586; 50 N. W. Rep. 943; Seidmore v. Railroad Co., 89 
 Wis. 188; 61 N. W. Rep. 765. 
 
 38 0'Mellia v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 115 Mo. 205; 21 S. W. Rep. 
 503; Gotlieb v. New York, etc., R. Co., 100 N. Y. 462; 3 N. E. Rep. 
 344; 24 Am. & Elig. R. Cas. 421. 
 
 39 Peoria, etc., R. Co. v. Johns, 43 111. App. 83. 
 
 "O'Mellia v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 115 Mo. 205; 21 S. W. 
 Rep. 503. 
 
 485 
 
§ 371 BISKS WOT ASSUMED. 
 
 assumed by a brakeman,*' nor is the defective condition of a 
 brake step a risk assumed by bim,*^ although the dangerous 
 condition of foreign cars or engines, not received a sufficient 
 time for the employer to have repaired the same, is generally 
 held to be a risk assumed by the employees.*^ 
 
 § 371. Risks from too great speed not assumed. — An em- 
 ployee, in entering the service of a railroad company, only 
 assumes the risks of perils that are incident to the operation 
 of the road in a reasonably prudent and careful manner 
 and he does not assume the risk of dangers arising from rim- 
 ning trains at too great a speed.** This is especially tfue, if. 
 there is a defective condition of the track, coupled with too 
 great speed, and if the employer has failed to keep the track 
 in a proper condition for such speed, or the track is new 
 and unballasted, or other negligent condition of the track 
 exists, the negligence in permitting too great speed would 
 be aggravated more than a high rate of speed on a good 
 track and in such case the employee injured as a result of 
 such speed would not be held to have assumed the danger, 
 caused by the employer's negligence, in this particular.*® 
 
 *iMalioney v. New York, etc., E. Co., 60 Hun 586; 30 N. Y. S. R. 
 911; 131 N. Y. 623. 
 
 *2Van Tassell v. New York, etc., E. Co., 1 Misc. 299; 48 N. Y. S. R. 
 767; 20 N. Y. Supp. 708. 
 
 43 Baldwin v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 50 Iowa 680 ; Ballou v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. Co., 54 Wis. 257; 41 Am. Rep. 31; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 480; 
 Watson V. Houston, etc., R. Co., 58 Texas 434; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 213. 
 
 An engineer does not assume the risk of injury from a defective 
 engine or its appliances, but if he is not careful in the discharge of 
 his duties and his injury is a result of his own want of care, no 
 recovery can be had by him. Biles v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 139 
 N. C. 528; 52 S. E. Rep. 129. 
 
 4* Conner v. Burlington, etc., R. Co., 74 Iowa 383; 37 N. W. Rep. 
 966. 
 
 45Meloy V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 77 Iowa 743; 42 N. W. Rep. 563; 
 38 Am. & Eng. R. Ca* 130. But see, Carlson v. Oregon, etc., R. Co., 
 21 Oregon 450. 
 
 486 
 
EISKS NOT ASSUMED. 
 
 ^72 
 
 § 372, Danger must be appreciated, before risk assumed. — 
 An employee does not necessarily assume the risk of using 
 unsafe machinery or appliances, because he knows of their 
 character and condition ; it is also necessary that he should 
 appreciate, or by common observation ought to have known 
 of the danger attending upon the use of such appliances.*" 
 Ajp. open visible risk has been held to be such a one as would 
 instantly ^peal to any one of ordinary intelligence, or such 
 a one as would be recognized art" once by one familiar with the 
 business. As to such a risk there could be no difference! 
 ^ of opinion, between persons accustomed to the business.*^ 
 But where, although the defect is apparent, it would require 
 skill and judgment not possessed by ordinary persons, or not 
 possessed especially by the injured employee, to understand 
 the hazard that' might be apprehended therefrom, then he wilt 
 not be held to have assumed such hazards.** For this rea- 
 son no presumption of familiarity with the risk or danger of 
 a defect will be indulged in, as against an employee, with 
 reference to appliances outside his particular line of duty *® 
 and while an engineer would be chargeable with a knowledge 
 of the dangers from apparent defects in his engine or ap- 
 pliances that he came in contact with, in the regular course 
 of his employment, he would not be held chargeable with 
 notice of the dangers resulting from rotten ties or defective 
 rails in the track, as these would not be within his general 
 
 *8 Russell V. Minneapolis, etc., E. Co., 32 Minn. 230; 20 N. W. Rep. 
 147; Hungerford v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 41 Minn. 444; 43 N. W. 
 Eep. 324; 41 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 269; Anderson v. Clark, 155 Mass. 
 368; 29 N. E. Eep. 589. 
 
 No assumption of the risk will result if there is no appreciation of 
 the danger. Chicago, I. & L. E. Co. v. Bryan (Ind.), 75 N. E. Eep. 
 678. 
 
 *7 Johnston v. Oregon, etc., E. Co., 23 Oregon 94; 31 Pac. Eep. 283. 
 
 *8 Davidson v. Cornell, 132 N. Y. 228; 30 N. E. Eep. 573; 43 N. Y. 
 S. E. 887. 
 
 *» Houston, etc., E. Co. v. McNamara, 59 Texas 255. 
 
 487 
 
§ 373 KISKS NOT ASSUMED. 
 
 duties or so apt to be noticed by bim as appliances bandied by 
 bim.*" 
 
 § 373. Dangers not appreciated or understood, not generally 
 assumed. — Unless it affirmatively appears, from tbe evidenxse 
 in a case, tbat an injured employee bad notice of tbe danger 
 of a defective appliance it will not be presumed on bis part,**^ 
 
 50 Houston, etc., K. Co. v. McNamara, 59 Texas 255. A baggage 
 man is not chargeable with notice of the risk of a defective schedule 
 for running of trains. Georgia, etc., K. Co. v. Rhodes, 56 Ga. 645, nor 
 is a brakeman chargeable with notice of a defective track or roadbed. 
 Houston, etc., E. Co. v. McNamara, 59 Texas 265 j Colorado, etc., K. Co. 
 V. O'Brien, 16 Colo. 219; 27 Pac. Rep.- 701; 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 235. 
 
 Mere notice of a defect was held not to charge an employee with an 
 assumption of the risk, in the absence of an appreciation of the danger, 
 in the following cases: El Paso, etc., Ry. Co. v. Vizard (Texas), 88 
 S. W. Kep. 457; Shepard v. St. Louis Tr. Co., 189 Mo. 362; 87 S. W. 
 Rep. 1007; International, etc., R. Co. v. Reeves (Texas), 79 S. W. Rep. 
 1099; Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Hutchens (Texas), 80 S. W. Rep. 415; 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Gearheart (Texas), 81 S. W. Eep. 325; 
 Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Bell, 111 111. App. 280; Brinkmeyer v. Missouri 
 Pac. Ry. Co. (Kansas), 77 Pac. Rep. 586; Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. 
 Crum (Texas), 81 S. W. Rep. 72; Cole v. St. Louis Transit Co., 183 
 Mo. 81; 81 S. W. Rep. 1138; Gulf, etc., Ry. Co. v. Davis (Texas), 80 
 S. W. Rep. 253; Ryker v. New York, etc., R. Co., 72 N. Y. S. R. 168; 
 64 App. Div. 357; Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Winton (Texas), 66 S. W. 
 Rep. 477; Gaulden v. Kansas City So. Ry. Co., 106 La. Ann. 409; 
 30 So. Rep. 889; San Antonio, etc., R. Co. v. Waller (Texas), 65 
 S. W. Rep. 210; San Antonio, etc., Ry. Co. v. Lindsay (Texas), 65 
 S. W. Rep. 668; Carson v. Southern Ry. Co., 68 S. C. 55; 46 S. B. 
 Rep. 525; Dowd v. Erie R. Co. (N. J.), 57 Atl. Rep. 248; Root v. 
 Kansas City So. Ry. Co., 195 Mo. 348; 92 S. W. Rep. 621; Missouri, 
 etc., Ry. Co. v. Dumas (Texas), 93 S. W. Rep. 493; St. Louis, etc., R. 
 Co. V. Ames (Texas), 94 S. W. Rep. 1112; Pierson v. Chicago, etc., 
 Ey. Co. (Iowa), 102 N. W. Rep. 149; Seley v. Railway Co., 6 Utah 
 319; 23 Pac. Rep. 751; Meehan v. Great Northern Ry. Co. (N. D.), 
 101 N. W. Rep. 183; Atchison, etc., Ry. Co. v. Bancord (Kansas), 
 71 Pac. Rep. 253; Franklyn v. Missouri, etc., Ry. Co., 97 Mo. App. 
 473; 71 S. W. Eep. 540. 
 
 61 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Hines, 132 111. 161; 23 N. E. Rep. 1021. 
 
 488 
 
EISKS NOT ASSUMED. § 374 
 
 and the fact that he knew of a defect ■will not work an as- 
 sumption of the risk therefrom, unless he also understood or 
 ought to have understood the danger resulting therefrom. ^^ 
 Knowledge of a defect and a failure to complain thereof will 
 not always work an assumption of the risk/-'* for the em- 
 ployee may have had reasonable ground to believe, by the 
 exercise of due care on his part, that he could use the de- 
 fective appliance, without resulting injury.^* And although 
 the defect is visible, yet, if by reason of the youth or in- 
 experience of the employee, he did not understand the danger 
 therefrom, ®^ or if, notwithstanding a knowledge of the de- 
 fects, a person of ordinary prudence would not have consid- 
 ered them dangerous, he may disregard them, without losing 
 his right to complain, if he suffers an injury therefrom, 
 while in the exercise of due care on his part.®® 
 
 § 374. Injuries from latent, unknown defects not gener- 
 ally assumed. — It is the duty of the employer to search for 
 latent defects in appliances furnished his employees, so as 
 to render them reasonably safe for the purpose for which they 
 are used, but the employee is required to notice only such 
 defects as are patent to ordinary observation and he is not 
 required to search for latent defects.^'' The employee as- 
 
 02Wuoutilla V. Duluth, etc., Co., 37 Minn. 153; 33 N. W. Eep. 551; 
 5 Am. St. fiep. 832. * 
 
 53 East Tenn., etc., R. Co. v. Gurley, 12 Xea (Tenn,), 46; 17 Am. & 
 Eng. E. Cas. 568; Greenleaf v. Dubuque, etc., R. Co., 33 Iowa 52. 
 
 5*Flynn v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 78 Mo. 195; 18 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 23; Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Norment, 84 Va. 167; 4 S. E. Rep. 
 211. 
 
 6B Coins V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 37 Mo. App. 221. 
 
 56 Colorado, etc., R. Co. v. Ogden, 3 Colo. 499 ; Burlington, etc., R. 
 Co. V. Liehe, 17 Colo. 280; Hosic v. Chicago, etc.,»E. Co., 75 Iowa 683; 
 37 N. W. Rep. 963. 
 
 B7 Little Eock, etc., R. Co. v. Leverett, 48 Ark. 333; 3 S. W. Rep. 
 
 489 
 
§ 374 EISKS NOT ASSUMED. 
 
 sumes the risk* of injuries from defects observable in the 
 ordinary course of his employment, by the exercise of due 
 care on his part, but there is no presumption of knowledge, 
 on his part, of special dangers, arising from exceptional or 
 peculiar conditions.®* 
 
 An jnexperienced employee has been held not to assume 
 the risk of getting his foot caught in an unblocked guard 
 rail, where he did not know of such a risk ; ®* latent defects 
 in machinery or appliances are not a part of the ordinary 
 risks that an employee is held to assume ; ®" nor are defects 
 in the track *^ or cars,"* that are not observable by the exer- 
 cise of ordinary care, in the performance of the duties of 
 the employee. 
 
 But while employees are not required to search for latent 
 defects in the appliances furnished them,®* the employee 
 assumes the risk of injury from defects that could not be 
 
 50; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 459; Gutridge v. Missouri Pacific Ey. Co., 
 105 Mo. 520; 16 S. W. Eep. 943; Missouri Pacific Ey. Co. v. Lehmberg, 
 75 Texas 61; 12 S. W. Eep. 838. 
 
 S8 Whalen v. Illinois, etc., E. Co., 16 111. App. 320. 
 
 s» Davis V. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 53 Ark. 117; 13 S. W. Eep. 801; 
 44 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 690. 
 
 80 Glowers v. Wabash, etc., E. Co., 21 Mo. App. 213; Carpenter v. 
 Mexican, etc., E. Co., 39 Fed. Eep. 315; Songstadt v. Burlington, etc., 
 E. Co., 5 Dakota 517; 38 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 211; McDonald v. Chicago, 
 etc., E. Co., 41 Minn. 439; 43 N. W. Eep. 380. The bursting of an 
 emery wheel, tliat was apparently safe, was held to give- a cause of 
 action, in Murtaugh v. New York, etc., E. Co., 23 N. Y. S. E. 636; 
 3 N. Y. Supp. 483. 
 
 81 Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Zink, 126 Pa. St. 288 ; 17 Atl. Eep. 614. 
 »2A defect in a brake on a car, that could only be discovered by 
 
 stooping down to examine it, is not so open as to be a risk assumed. 
 Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Buck, 116 Ind. 566; 19 N. E. Eep. 453; 
 2 L. E. A. 520; 38 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 152; Wooden v. Western, etc., 
 E. Co., 46 N. Y. S. E. 77; 43 N. Y. S. E. 218; Little Eock, etc., E Co. 
 V. Mosely, 56 Fed. Eep. 1009. 
 
 «3 Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Allen, 78 Ala. 494 ; 28 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 
 514; Porter v. Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 71 Mo. 66; 36 Am. Eep. 454; 
 490 
 
EISKS NOT ASSUMED. § 375 
 
 discovered by the employer, by the exercise of due care on his 
 part and if the defect would not have been discoverable by 
 a reasonably safe and careful inspection, then it could not 
 have been foreseen by the employer and is held to be an 
 accident for which the employer would not be liable.®* 
 
 § 375. Risk not assumed, after promise to repair, when. — 
 
 An employee does not assume the risk of a peril by remain- 
 ing in the service of his employer and using a defective tool 
 or appliance, or continuing at work in a dangerous place, 
 after notice of the danger, if the employer, on his complaint, 
 has given him an assurance of the safety of the appliance or 
 the place, or has promised to remove the danger.® ® 
 
 In such case, the employer takes upon himself the re- 
 sponsibility for any accident that may occur, before the ex- 
 piration of a reasonable time, after the promise is made ®® 
 and for an injury within a reasonable time after the giving 
 of the promise^ or within a period that would not preclude 
 
 2 Am. & Eng. E. Oas. 44; Burton v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 32 Mo. 
 App. 455; Goodrich v. New York, etc., R. Co., 116 N. Y. 398; 22 N. E. 
 Rep. 397; Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Crenshaw, 71 Texas 340; 9 
 S. W. Rep. 262. 
 
 8* Racine V. New York, etc., R. Co., 70 Hun 453; 53 N. Y. S. R. 680; 
 24 N. Y. Supp. 388; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Campbell, 97 Ala. 147; 
 12 So. Rep. 574; Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Arnold, 84 Ala. 159; Atchison, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Wagner, 33 Kansas 660; 7 Pae. Rep. 204; 21 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 637; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Allen, 78 Ala. 494; 28 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 514. 
 
 An employee was held not to have assumed the risk of concealed 
 hidden dangers, in the following cases : Wagner v. Boston, etc., Ry. Co., 
 188 Mass. 437; 74 N. E. Rep. 919; Vartanian v. New York, etc., Ry. 
 Co., 25 R. I. 398; 56 Atl. Rep. 184. 
 
 05 New Jersey, etc., R. Co. v. Young, 49 Fed. Rep. 723 ; Chicago, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Travis, 44 111. App. 466; Blair v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 43 
 Iowa 662; 14 Am. Ry. Rep. 575; Roux v. Blodgett, etc., Co., 85 Mich. 
 519; 48 N. E. Rep. 1092. 
 
 eo Joliet, etc., E. Co. v. Velie (111.), 26 N. E. Rep. 1086. 
 
 491 
 
§ 375 EISKS NOT ASSUMED. 
 
 all reasonable expectation of the keeping of the promise, the 
 employee can recover the same as if he had not had notice 
 of the danger.®^ 
 
 But if the employee knows that the danger is great and 
 immediate, such as a reasonably prudent man would not 
 assume, he cannot recover even though he remain in the 
 service after the employer's promise to repair,*® for even 
 after a promise to repair a known defective appliance, if the 
 employee knows the danger as well as the employer, a prom- 
 ise to repair will not relieve him from the effects of his own 
 negligence in the continued use of a known defective tool, 
 and he will be denied a recovery, notwithstanding such 
 promise.®^ 
 
 6T Parody v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 5 McCrary (U. S.) 38; 15 Fed. Rep. 
 205; Hough v. Texas & Pacific Ky. Co., 100 U. S. 213. 
 
 68 Indianapolis, etc., E. Co. v. Watson, 114 Ind. 20; 14 N. E. Eep. 
 721; 33 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 334; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Kelton, 
 55 Ark. 483; 18 S. W. Eep. 933; Missouri, etc., Co. v. Abend, 107 
 111. 44. 
 
 69 Gulf, etc., E. Co. V. Brentford, 79*rexa8 619; 15 S. W. Eep. 
 501. 
 
 An employee injured within a reasonable time, after a promise to 
 repair a known defective appliance, was held not to assume the risk 
 in the following cases: Anderson v. Fielding (Minn.), 99 N. W. Rep. 
 357; Studenroth v. Hammond, etc., Co., 106 Mo. App. 480; 81 S. W. 
 Eep. 487; Dunkerley v. Webemdorfer, etc., Co. (N. J.), 58 Atl. Rep. 94; 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Baker (Texas), 81 S. W. Rep. 67; Illinois 
 Central R. Co. v. North, 97 111. App. 124; Yerkes v. Northern Pac. R. 
 Co., 112 Wis. 184; 88 N. W. Rep. 33; Atchison, etc., Ry. Co. v. 
 Sledge (Kansas), 74 Pac. Rep. 1111; Shemwell v. Owensboro, etc., 
 Ry. Co. (Ky.), 78 S. W. Rep. 448; Dowd v. Erie Co. (N. J.), 57 Atl. 
 Rep. 248; Foster v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (Iowa), 102 N. W. Rep. 
 422. 
 
 The defense of assumption of the risk, being based upon an implied 
 contract on the employee's part, it is held, in Indiana, that if there 
 is an express contract that an employer is to keep an engine in repair, 
 assumed risk is not a defense to an action for an injury from a failure 
 so to do. Cleveland, etc., Co. v. Patterson, 75 N. E. Rep. 857. 
 
 After a promise to repair or replace shields about an oil tube 
 to an engine, the engineer will not assume the risk of injury until 
 493 
 
EISKS NOT ASSUMED. § 376 
 
 § 376. Various risks not assumed, after promise to repair. — 
 Where the superintendent of a machine shop repaired a de- 
 fective tool and told the operator it was all right, the subse- 
 quent risk of using it was not assumed ; ''" a promise to a 
 section hand to use a defective appliance, until others can 
 be procured,'^^ or to use a tool until it can be repaired or 
 replaced with another one, will not subject the employee to 
 the subsequent risk of using .such defective tool ; ''^ the 
 promise of a yardmaster to place running boards^on an engine 
 will not prevent the representatives of a switchman, who 
 used it after such promise, from recovering ; '^* a car repairer 
 is justified in remaining in his employment, after a promise 
 to make additional rules, to protect him from moving trains, 
 in the yard ; ^* a promise to provide a car for an employee 
 to warm in, will justify his working at shoveling snow and 
 enable a recovery for injuries therefrom ; ''^ a promise to fix 
 a defective side track, waives the defense of assumption of 
 the risk from the use thereof,' by an engineer ; ''' and a prom- 
 ise by a conductor or trainmaster, to repair or replace a 
 defective car'''' or hand c&tf^ will justify an employee in 
 Using it, ioi a reasonable time, to await the promised re- 
 pairs, or substituted car. 
 
 after a reasonable time in -which they might have been furnished. 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Robertson, 139 Fed. Rep. 519. See, also, 
 Burch V. Southern Pac. R. Co., 140 Fed. Rep. 270. 
 
 '0 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. MoKee, 37 Kansas 592; l5 Pac. Rep. 
 484. 
 
 71 Southern Kansas E. Co. v. Crocker, 41 Kansas 747 ; 21 Pac. Rep. 
 785; 38 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 203. 
 
 T2Gulf, etc., R. Co. V. Brentford, 79 Texas 619; 15 S. W. Rep. 
 561; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Lemon, 83 Texas 143. 
 
 TsPieart v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 82 Iowa 148; 47 N. W. Rep. 1017. 
 
 '^St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Trjplett, 54 Ark. 289; 15 S. W. Rep. 
 831; 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 283. 
 
 70 Hyatt V. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 19 Mo. App. 287. 
 
 T6 Patterson v. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co., 76 Pa. St. 389. 
 
 7T Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Henley, 92 Tenn. 208; 721 S. W. Rep. 326. 
 
 »8 Texas, etc., R. <Jo. v. Kane, 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 218. 
 
 493 
 
§ 377 BISKS NOT ASSUMED. 
 
 . § 377. Extra risks not generally assumed. — It is a part 
 of the implied obligation, on the part of the employer, that 
 he will not subject his employees through his owa. fraud, 
 negligence or malice, to any greater or additional risks than 
 those which fairly and properly belong to the particular serv- 
 ice in which the employee is engaged.'^® A risk made haz- 
 ardous by the negligence of the employer is not one which 
 could not have been prevented, by reasonable care, on his 
 part, nor is it one that an employee assumes on entering into 
 the employment.*" Where the employer fails to furnish 
 suitable or safe machinery or appliances,*^ or to employ 
 careful and prudent employees in the service he is engaged 
 in,*^ the risks resulting from such failure on his part, are 
 extra-hazardous and are not assumed by his employees. Em- 
 ployees do not assume the extra hazards that arise from the 
 employer's failure to adopt reasonable rules for the regula- 
 tion of his business ; *^ or by a failure to inspect or repair 
 machinery or appliances,** or to inspect or repair the road- 
 bed and track,*^ and for injuries resulting from such extra 
 hazards of the employment, an action generally will lie. 
 
 7»Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. McCormick, 74 Ind. 440; 5 Am. & Eng. 
 E. Cas. 474; Biley v. West Virginia, etc., R. Co., 27 W. Va., 145. 
 soCregg V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 91 Mich. 624; 52 N. W. Rep. 62. 
 
 81 Consolidated, etc., Co. v. Haenni, 146 III. 614; 35 N. E. Rep. 
 162. 
 
 82 Consolidated, etc., Co. v. Haenni, supra. 
 
 8» Irvine v. Flint, etc., R. Co., 89 Mich. 416; 50 N. W. Rep. 1008; 
 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 210. 
 
 8* Bridges v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 6 Mo. App. 389. 
 
 85 Taylor, etc., R. Co. v. Taylor, 79 Texas 104; 14 S. W. Rep. 918. 
 
 Extraordinary risks of the employment are not assumed, unless the 
 employee knowingly remains in the employment after notice thereof. 
 Illinois Ter. R. Co. v. Thompson, 112 III. App. 463; 210 111. 226; 71 
 N. E. Rep. 328; American Car, etc., Co. v. Clark, 32 Ind. App. 644 
 70 N. E. Rep. 82S; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Merriam, 95 111. App. 628 
 Yerkes v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 112 Wis. 184; 88 N. W. Rep. 33 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. York, 128 Ala. 305; 30 So. Rep. 676; Gulf, 
 etc., Ry. Co. v. Newman (Texas), 64 S. W. Rep. 790. 
 494 
 
BISKS NOT ASSUMED. § 378 
 
 § 378. Bisks outside scope of employment not assumed, 
 when. — Where an employer orders his employee to perform 
 work not contemplated by his employment, and in doing so 
 an extra risk is encountered, although the additional risk 
 is equally apparent to both employer and employee, it does 
 not follow that the employee assumes the risk, unless the 
 danger is such, that no man of ordinary prudence would un- 
 dertake to perform the work in the face of such a danger. 
 If the danger is not so threatening, but the employee had a 
 right to assume, that by ordinary care, he could perform 
 the work, without resulting damage, the law does not com- 
 pel him to abandon the service or assume the additional risk, 
 not contemplated by his employment, but he has a right to 
 obey the order and look to his employer for protection, if 
 he uses due care.** Although the danger was known to the 
 employee, the rule volenti fnxm -fit injuria would not apply, 
 as the order of the employer and the fact that the work was 
 outside the regular duties of the employment, would prevent 
 an assumption of the risk.®'' But where the extra duties 
 have been performed for a time sufficient for the employee to 
 have become familiar with the additional risks arising there- 
 from,** or where the extra hazards were assumed voluntarily 
 
 88 Nail V. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 129 Ind. 260; 28 N. E. Rep. 183; 
 611; 48 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 309; Jones v. Lake Shore, etc., E. Co., 
 49 Mich. 573; 14 N. W. Eep. 551; 8 Anft & Eng. E. Cas. 221; Stephens 
 V. Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 86 Mo. 221; 28 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 538; 
 Ballard v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 51 Mo. App. 453; Louisville, etc., 
 E. Co. V. Hanning,''l31 Ind. 528; 31 N. E. Eep. 187; 53 Am. & Eng. 
 E. Cas. 452; Harrison v. Denver, etc., R. Co., 7 Utah 523; 27 Pac. 
 Eep. 728. ^ 
 
 STThrussell v. Handyside, 20 Q. B. D. 359; Hungerford v. Chicago, 
 etc., E. Co., 41 Minn. 444; 43 N. W. Eep. 324; 41 Am. & Eng. E. 
 Cas. 269. 
 
 S8 An employee in freight house was asked to act as engine cleaner 
 and fireman and had so acted about twenty times when he was injured 
 by being jolted off of the foot Ijoard of the engine, while it was 
 backing, but was held to have assumed the risk of such injury. Leary 
 
 495 
 
§ 379 EISKS WOT ASSUMED. 
 
 ' by the employee and without an order of his employer,*** he 
 could not hold his employer liable for an injury so received, 
 but would be held to have assumed such additional risk. 
 
 § 379. Dangers from orders of vice-piincipal not assumed. — 
 
 Where the employer places one employee in his service under 
 the orders of another employee and the latter, in the exercise 
 of the authority conferred upon him by the employer, orders 
 the former into a place of unusual danger, and thus exposes 
 him to extraordinary perils, of which he is not advised and 
 the employee so ordered receives an injury, as a result of 
 obeying such negligent order, he can, recover from the em- 
 ployer therefor,*® 
 
 Under ^this rule exempting employees from perils while 
 obeying the orders of their superiors, a person employed to 
 load and unload cars about a depot, was held not to have £is- 
 sumed thexisk of injury in obeying an order of the superin- 
 • tendent of the depot, to couple cars, and his representative 
 was held entitled to recover damages for his death due to an 
 injury, while so engaged,®" And, in JSTew York, it was held 
 that a brakeman did not assume the risk of injury while 
 
 V. Boston, etc., E. Co., 139 Mass. 580; 2 N. E. Rep. 115; 52 Am. Rep. 
 733 ; 23 Am. & Epg. R. Cas. 383. 
 
 ssoln this case, a freight conductor voluntarily uncoupled cars 
 outside his duties and was wjured while so doing. It was held he 
 assumed the risk. Kane v. Savannah, etc., E. Co., 85 Ga. 858; 11 S. E. 
 Rep. 493. 
 
 8» Thompson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 4 McCrai<y (U. S.) 629; 14 
 Fed. Rep. 564; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Harbey, 28 Ind. 28; Fitzgerald v. 
 Honkomp, 44 111. App. 365; Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. May. 108 111. 
 288; Creenleaf v. Illinois Central R. Co., 29 Iowa 14; Krow v. Chicago, 
 etc., E. Co. 32 Iowa 357. 
 
 Attempting dangerous work in obedience to'orders is held, in Choctaw, 
 0. & G. E. Co. V. Jones (Ark.), 4 L. E. A. (N. S.) 837, not to involve 
 an assumption of the risk if it was not fully appreciated, 
 
 ooLalor v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 52 111. 401. 
 
 496 
 
EISKS NOT ASSUMED. § 380 
 
 running a train, under the orders of the conductor, down a 
 grade, without detaching portions of the train, and without 
 help in handling it.*^ 
 
 § 380. Risks not assumed by car and track repairers. — 
 Whenever an injury to a car repairer or track repairer can 
 be held to have resulted from the negligence of the employer, 
 rather than from a risk incident to the service, the employee 
 will not be held to have assumed the risk, but the employer 
 will be liable for the result of his negligent act. 
 
 Accordingly, it is held, that where a car repairer had been 
 
 »i Wooden v. Western, etc., E. Co., 25 N. Y. Supp. 977; 5 Misc. 
 537. 
 
 An employee injured while obeying orders of the employer, where 
 the danger was not so imminent that no prudent man would! assume 
 the risk, was held entitled to recover, in the following cases: Pressed 
 Steel Car Co. v. Herath, 110 111. App. 596; Wurtenberger v. Metropoli- 
 tan St. Ey. Co. (Kansas), 75 Pac. Eep. 1049; Stewart v. Texas, 
 & P. E. Co. (Iia. Ann.), 37 So. Eep. 129; American Car, etc., Co. v. 
 Clark, 32 Ind. App. 644; 70 N. E. Eep. 828; Illinois Cent. E. Co. v. 
 Johnson, 95 111. App. 54; 61 N. E. Eep. 334; Terra Haute, etc., E. 
 Co. V. Eittenhouse (Ind.), 62 N. E. Eep. 295; Bowes v. New York, 
 etc., E. Co. (Mass.), 62- N. E. Eep. 949; Smith v. Wilmington, etc., 
 E. Co., 129 N. C. 173; 39 S. E. Eep. 805; Galveston, etc., Ey. Co. v. 
 Hitzf elder (Texas), 66 S. W. Eep. 707; Gulf, etc., Ey. Co. v. New- 
 man (Texas), 64 S. W. Eep. 790; Haas v. Chicago, etc., Ey. Co., 
 97 111. App. 624; Southern Ey. Co. v. Hart, 23 Ky. L. E. 1054; 64 
 S. W. Eep. 650; Allison v. Southern Ey. Co., 129 N. C. 336; 40 S. E. 
 Eep. 91; Choctaw, etc., Ey. Co. v. Jones (Ark.), 92 S. W. Eep. 244; 
 North Chicago, etc., Ey. Co. v. Aufmann, 221 111. 614; 77 N. E. Eep. 
 1120; Murphy v. New York, etc., E. Co., 187 Mass. 18; 72 N. E. Eep. 
 330; Pittsburg, etc., E. Co. v. Nicholas (Ind.), 73 N. E. Eep. 195; 
 74 N. E. Eep. 626; Mitchell v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 108 Mo. App. 142; 
 83 S. W. Eep. 289; Kansas City, etc., E. Co. v. Thornhill (Ala.), 37 
 So. Eep. 412; Wabash, etc., Co. v. Hawk, 12^1 111. 259; 2 Am. St. Eep. 
 82; 12 N. E. Eep. 253; Misouri, etc., E. Co. v. Crane, 13 Texas Civ. 
 App. 426; 35 S. W. Eep. ^97; Pittsburg, etc., E. Co. v. Hewitt, 102 
 m. App. 428; 66 N. E. Eep. 829; Long's Admr. v. Illinois Cent. E. Co., 
 24 Ky. L. E. 567; 58 L. R. A. 237; 68 S. W. Rep. 1095. 
 
 1—32 497 
 
§ 380 RISKS WOT ASSUMED. 
 
 accustomed to repair cars on a certain repair track, where 
 he was always protected, while so engaged, and he was or- 
 dered to repair a car on another track, where he had a right 
 to expect the same protection, but he was injured by a back- 
 ing train colliding with the car on which he worked, and 
 it was shown that no precautions at all had been taken for 
 his protection, he did not assume the risk of such negligence 
 on the employer's part.®^ Nor do track repairers assume 
 the risks arising from the neglect of the employer to 
 provide a reasonably safe working place or reasonably safe 
 appliances to work with, when the true conditions are un- 
 known to the employees and cannot be discovered by rea- 
 sonable care on their part, but the employer will be liable 
 for an injury caused by such neglect.*^ The single spiking 
 of three ties, coupled with an omission to spike the fourth, 
 upon a curve of five or six degrees curvature, is negligence 
 which an employee does not assume the responsibility for ; ^* 
 the employee has the right to expect such reasonable care as 
 is ordinarily bestowed by prudent men in the same busi- 
 ness ; ^^ nor would a track repairer or other employee, in the 
 absence of notice of the defective condition thereof, assume 
 the danger from the unknown defective condition of the 
 roadbed ®® or a bridge thereon,®^ but for an injury from such 
 uiiknown defects, a recovery could be had. 
 
 »2Luebke v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 59 Wis. 127; 17 N. W. Eep. 870; 48 
 Am. Rep. 483; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Gas. 183. 
 
 93 Carlson v. Oregon, etc., E. Co., 21 Oregon 450; 28 Pac. Rep. 497; 53 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 135. 
 
 84 Colorado Midland R. Co. v. Naylor, 17 Colo. 501; 30 Pac. Eep. 
 249. 
 
 9s Ante idem. 
 
 »6 Carlson v. Oregon, etc., E. Co., 21 Oregon 450; 28 Pac. Eep. 497; 
 53 Am. vfc Eng. E. Cas. 135. 
 
 »7Conlon V. Oregon, etc., R. Co., 23 Oregon 499; 32 Pac. Rep. 397; 
 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 356. 
 
 A car repairer, engaged in repairing a car on a side track, was 
 held, in Missouri, not to assume the risk of an injury from a car 
 498 
 
RISKS NOT ASSUMEB. § 381 
 
 § 381. Risks of injuries due to incompetency of employees 
 not assumed. — The rule that the employee assumes the risks 
 of injuries due to the negligence of his coemployees, obtains 
 only, as to tiie negligence of competent employees and of such 
 of the incompetent employees in the employer's service, wher.e 
 he could not have discovered their incompetency by the ex- 
 ercise of reasonable care on his part. If the employer know- 
 ingly employs or retains incompetent or habitually negli- 
 gent employees, the extra hazards due to injuries from the 
 incompetency of such employee so employed or retained, do 
 not come within the risks which the employee assumes and 
 for an injury resulting therefrom, if the employee was not 
 conscious of such incompetency, or it was not obvious, the 
 employer is liable.*® The employee is not bound to enquire 
 as to the competency of his coemployees, but has the same 
 right to infer the discharge of the employer's duty in this 
 I'egard, as he has in the selection of fit and appropriate tools 
 or appliances and if he is injured by the incompetency or 
 
 escaping from the main track and colliding with the car he was 
 at work on, where there was no derailing switch to prevent such an 
 accident. Smith v. Fordyce, 190 Mo. 1; 88 S. W. Kep. 679. See, 
 also, St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Pope (Texas), 86 S. W. Rep. 5; Ft. 
 Worth, etc., -Ry, Co. v. Smith (Texas), 87 S. W. Rep. 371. 
 
 Car repairers, and others, working on cars on tracks known as re- 
 pair track, were held," in following cases, not to assume risk of in- 
 jury by cars set in on such track, without notice to them! Street's 
 Western Car, etc., Co. v. Bonander, 97 111. App. 601; 63 N. E. Rep. 
 688; Bowes v. New York, etc., R. Co. (Mas.), 62 *N. E. Rep. 949; 
 Morbly v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (Iowa), 89 N. W. Rep. 105; Jones 
 V. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 178 Mo. 528; 77 S. W. Rep. 890; Cin- 
 cinnati, etc., Ry. Co. v. Maley's Admr., 25 Ky. L. R. 690; 76 S. W. 
 Rep. 334; Carroll v. New York, etc., R. Co., 182 Mass. 237; 65 N. E. 
 Hep. 69. 
 
 An employee in a railroad yard, of not sufficient experience to 
 know that it was not customary to give notice of the running ' or 
 kicking of cars, is held not to assume the risk of injury, as a matter 
 of law, in Illinois. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Chapman, 118 111. App. 
 201 ; 77 N. E. Rep. 248. 
 
 08 Hough V. Texas, etc., R. Co., 100 U. S. 213; 21 Am. Ry. Rep. 
 451; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Charless, 51 Fed. Rep. 562; 7 U. S. App. 
 
 499 
 
§ 382 . BISKS NOT ASSUMED. 
 
 unfitness of a coemployee, lie is generally entitled to recover 
 therefor.®* But if an employee knows that another employee 
 is habitually negligent or incompetent and h^ remains in the 
 service without complaint, and without being induced to be- 
 lieve that a change will be made^ then he assumes the risk 
 of the incompetency of such known unfit employee, to the 
 same extent that he would assume the risk of working with 
 a known defective tool without complaint.^ 
 
 § 382, Statutes denying defense of assumed risk. — In 
 some of the States in the United States, the demand by the 
 citizens for more stringent laws against the employers, has 
 reached the stage that to satisfy the employees, politicians 
 in the legislature have gone to the extreme of enacting that 
 
 359; 2 C. C. A. 380; 51 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 198; United States, etc., 
 Co. V. Wilder, 116 111. 100; 5 N. E. Rep. 92; 25 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 414; Craig v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 54 Mo. App. 523; Taylor v. 
 Evansville, etc., E. Co., 121 Ind. 124; 22 N. B. Rep. 876; 6 L. E. A. 
 584; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 437; Lake Shore, etc., E. Co. v. Knittal, 
 33 Ohio St. 468. 
 
 09 St. Louis, etc., E. Co. v. Corgan, 49 111. App. 229; Sweeny v. 
 New York, etc., Co., 25 N. Y. S. E. 598; 6 N. Y. Supp. 528; 117 
 N. Y. 642; 22 N. E. Rep. 1131. 
 
 iKroy V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 32 Iowa 357; 10 Am. Ry. Rep. 
 48; Wells, v. Burlington, etc., R. Co., 56 Iowa 520; Indianapolis, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Watson, 114 Ind. 20; 14 N. W. Rep. 721; 33 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 334. 
 
 The employee y^as held not to have assumed the risk of ignorant 
 or incompetent employees, in the following cases: Anderson v. South- 
 ern Ry. Co., 70 S. C. 490; 50 S. E. Rep. 202; Morbly v. Chicago, 
 etc., Ry. Co. (Iowa), 89 N. W. Eep. 105; Metropolitan, etc.. By. 
 Co. V. Fortin, 107 111. App. 157; Southern Ey. Co. r. Harrell, 161 
 Ind. 689; 63 L. E. A. 460; 68 N. E. Rep. 262; Galveston, etc., R. 
 Co. V. Fitzpatrick (Texas), 83 S. W. Rep. 406; Illinois Central R. 
 Co. V. Smiesni, 104 111. App. 194; Boyer v. Eastern Ry. Co., 87 
 Minn. 367; 92 N. W. Rep. 326; Metropolitan, etc., Ry. Co. v. Fortin, 
 203 111. 454; 67 N. E. Rep. 977; Hicks v. Southern Ry. Co., 63 S. C. 
 559; 41 S. E. Rep. 753. 
 
 500 
 
ElSkS NOT ASSUMED. § 382 
 
 the defense of assumed risk shall not be available, as a defense' 
 by railroad corporations. 
 
 The statute of North Carolina ^ is an illustration of this' 
 class of legislation, where it was enacted that railroad com- 
 panies should not be permitted to set up the defense of as- 
 sumed risk. The Supreme Court of the State enforced this 
 statute, against a company that defended a suit for damages 
 for an injury to an employee from the use of a known defec- 
 tive sand driver, but the benefit of the defense was denied 
 it and the statute was enforced.^ Such, l^islation is on a 
 par with that making raiboad companies pay their employees 
 at stated intervals, but permitting other employers to pay 
 their employees or not, at their pleasure, and all such dis- 
 criminating legislation ou^t generally to be held unconsti- 
 tutional by the courts.* 
 
 2 Priv. Laws, 1897, p. 83, ch. 56. 
 
 3 Walker v. Carolina Central E. Co., 135 N. C. 738; 45 S. E. 
 Eep. 675. • 
 
 1 State V. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307; 22 S. W. iRep. 350; State v. Missouri 
 Tie, etc., Co., 181 Mo. 636; 80 S. W. Kep. 933; State v. Julow, 
 129 Mo. 163; 31 S. W. Kep. 781; 29 L. R. A. 257; 50 Am. St. Rep. 
 443; San Antonio, etc., Co. v. Wilson (Texas), 19 S. W. Eep. 
 910; Gulf, Colo., etc., Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 154; Brace- 
 ville, etc., Co. v. People, 147 111. 66; Grand Rapids Chair Co. v. Run- 
 nells, 77 Mich. 104; 35 Cent. Law J. 242. 
 
 Constitution of South Carolina (aift. 9, § 15), prevents railroad 
 company from setting up assumption of risk, as a defense. Bodie 
 V. Charleston, etc., R. Co., 61 S. C. 468; 39 S. E Rep. 715. 
 
 By Constitution 1895 (art. 9, § 15), of South Carolina, knowlege 
 of a defect in machinery or appliances and the continued use thereof, 
 does not make a case of assumed risk. Southern Ry. Co. v. Carson, 194 
 U. S. 136; 48 L. Ed. 907; Youngblood v. South Car. R. Co. 60 S. C. 
 9; 38 S. E. Rep. 232. And for construction of North Carolina statute 
 (Priv. Laws, 1897, ch. 56, §§ 1, 2), to same effect, see Coley v. 
 North Carolina R. Co., 39 S. E. Eep. 43; 40 S. E. Eep. 195. 
 
 The North Carolina statute (Priv. Laws 1897, ch. 56, §§ 1 and 2), 
 .prevents the defense of assumed risk, whether arising from express 
 or implied contract and whether pleaded directly or ' under the doc- 
 trine of coenjployees. Coley v. North Carolina E. Co., 129 N. C. 407 ; 
 40 S. E. Eep. 195; Thomas v. Ealeigh, etc., R. Co., 129 N. C. 392; 
 
 501 
 
§ 383 EISKS NOT ASSUMED, 
 
 § 383. Statutes regulating defense of assumed risk. — In 
 
 some of the United States, statutes have been enacted regu- 
 lating the defense of assumed risk, as in JSTew York, where 
 it is made a jury issue, by statute, whether or not a given 
 risk is assumed.® The statute provides that the employee 
 shall be presumed to have consented to the necessary risks 
 and no others, that arise in his employment ; it defines what 
 such risks shall include and makes the issue as to the em- 
 ployee's understanding of the danger, a jury issue.^ It is 
 held' by the courts of that State, construing the statute, that 
 since it is a general statute, applicable alike to all employees 
 in the State, it applies to an action by an employee against 
 
 40 S. E. Rep. 201; Cogdell v. Southern Ey. Co., 129 N. C. 398; 40 
 S. E. Eep. 202. 
 
 Assumption of the risk is held not to be a defense in an action in 
 North Carolina, for the violation of ch. 56, Priv. Laws. 1897, giving 
 u, right of action for an injury from defective ways, works, or ap- 
 pliances of a railroad and providing that the terms of the act cannot 
 be waived.* Biles v. Seaboard Air Line Ey. Co., 139 N. C. 528; 52 
 S. E. Rep. 129. 
 
 The Vermont statute, regulating railroad cars and providing for 
 the recovery of damages by employees injured by reason of a, violation 
 of the statute, does not deprive employees of the right of contract, in 
 depriving them of the assumption of the risk, but the statute is held 
 valid, as a police regulation, for the protection of the poor and the 
 helpless. Kirkpatrick v. Grand Trunk R. Co. (Vt.), 52 Atl. Rep. 
 531. 
 
 The federal court of Ohio held that statutory negligence could 
 not be a risk assumed, for to hold this would be to set aside the 
 act of the legislature, because of the violation of the statute by the 
 employer. Narramore v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co., 96 Fed. Rep. 298; 37 
 C C. A. 499; 48 L. E. A. 68. 
 
 It is held, in Indiana, that where the action is based upon a- 
 violation of a statutory duty, assumed risk is not a defense. Ameri- 
 can Car, etc., Co. v. Clark, 32 Ind. App. 644; 70 N. E. Eep. 828. 
 
 The risk of an injury from unguarded machinery, which is re- 
 quired by statute to be guarded, is held not to be assumed in Washing- 
 ton (Laws 1903, p. 40). Hoveland v. Marine, etc., Co., 41 Wash, 
 164; 82 Pac. Eep. 1090. 
 
 5 Employer's Liab. Act, Laws 1902, p. 1750, ch. 600, §3, 
 
 « Ante idem. 
 502 
 
KISKS NOT ASSUMED. § 384 
 
 a railroad company, for a failure to adopt such rules as are 
 reasonably sufficient to render the empldj^ment reasonably 
 safe, apd the question of whether or not the risk was assumed, 
 was a jury issue, under the statuteJ Without such a statute, 
 the Missouri Supreme Court adopted the same legislative 
 standard and held that the question of whether or not a risk 
 was one assumed by an employee was for the jury.® 
 
 § 384. Injuries from flying particles of brittle substances 
 not assumed, when. — To avoid the natural conclusion that it 
 is a mere chance or accident that a given employee happens 
 to be at the particular place, where a flying particle of steel 
 or brass may penetrate his eye, some courts have reasoned 
 so as to reach the conclusion that while it may be a mere 
 accident that the employee happened to be so situated as to 
 bfc injured from such a substance, yet, if the negligence of 
 the employer was the force that set the cause of the injury 
 in motion such negligence was none the less the proximate 
 cause of the injury and he was liable for such an injury.® 
 
 In a Texas case,^** where an ordinary laborer, not familiar 
 or advised as to the liability of brass to chip off, was called 
 to assist in driving brasses from the boxes of certain cars, 
 with a piece of brass for a punch, and a piece flew off and 
 struck him in the eye, it was held that he did not assume 
 the risk, and a similar result was reached by the Indiana 
 court, in a case^^ where an ordinary laborer was holding a 
 steel rod \being' hammered by other employees and a particle 
 of the rod struck him in the eye. The conclusion in these 
 cases, however, was reached, because the risk was not an in- 
 
 TWard V. Ma^hattan Ey. Co., 88 N. Y. S. E. 758; 95 App. Div. 437. 
 sHamman v. Central, etc., Co., 156 Mo. 245. 
 
 9 See White, Personal Inj. in Mines, for list of cases on this sub- 
 ject, § 242, p. 246. 
 
 10 Gulf, etc., Ey. Co. v. Whisenhunt, 81 S. W. Eep. 332. 
 n Eepublic, etc., Co. v. Ohler,. 68 N. E. Eep. 901. 
 
 503 
 
§ 385 EISKS NOT ASSUMED. 
 
 cident or ordinary risk of the employment of the given em- 
 ployee, but an exfraordinary risk, as to which the employee 
 had not been properly advised, and it is to be supposed that 
 if it had been an employee accustomed to such work, the ele- 
 ment of chance governing the injury would have been held 
 to preclude a recovery. 
 
 § "385. Federal statute exempting employees of interstate 
 carriers from assumption of risk.— By the federal statute, 
 requiring automatic couplers on cars and engines,** so as to 
 obviate the necessity of employees going between cars to make 
 couplings, it is provided that an employee of an interstate 
 carrier who may be injured by any car in use, contrary to 
 the provision requiring automatic couplers, shall not be 
 deemed thereby to have assumed the risk, although he con- 
 tinues in the employment of the carrier after the unlawful 
 use of such car has been brought to his knowledge. 
 
 Under this statute, it was held *^ that a switchman who 
 was engaged in handling a freight car with a defective coup- 
 ler, on a track used principally for handling freight trains, 
 though sometimes used to handle cars needing repairs, did 
 not assume the risk arising from the defect in the coupler, 
 
 12 Act March 2, 1893, ch. 196, § 8; 27 Stat. 532; 3 U. S. Comp. St. 
 1901, p. 3176. 
 
 The safety appliance act of Congress Is held to be within the 
 power of Congress to pass, although it deprives the employer of his 
 defense of assumed risk. Kansas City, etc., E. Co. v. Flippo, 138 Ala. 
 787; 35 So. Rep. 457; Southern Ey. Co. v. Carson, 68 S. C. 55; 46 
 S. E. Eep. 525; 194 U. S. 136; 48 L. Ed. 907. 
 
 13 Chicago, etc., Ey. Co. v. Voelker, 129 Fed. Eep. 522. 
 
 But the tender of a, locomotive is not a " car," within the terms 
 of the Massachusetts statute requiring automatic couplers on " locomo- 
 tives, ears and trains." Larabee v. New York, etc., R. Co. (182 Mass. 
 348; 66 N. E. Eep. 1032), and a car shipped from one stop to an- 
 other and then side tracked, to await further orders, is not a car 
 " engaged in " interstate commerce, so as to take away the defense of 
 assumed risk, upder the federal safety appliance act. 
 504 
 
EISKS NOT ASSUMED. § 386 
 
 as the car had not been marked or isolated as one in bad re- 
 pair, and its movement at the time of the injury was not 
 with a view to its repair. 
 
 § 386. Statutes exempting employees from risks of negli- 
 gence of coemployees.— In many of the United States, stat- 
 utes have been passed making railroad companies responsible 
 for injuries to employees, caused by the negligence of co- 
 employees, engaged in the operation of the railroad where 
 the employee was injured.** These statutes differ in their 
 details, but the effect of all such statutes is substantially the 
 same and under such statutes the common-law doctrine of 
 assumption of risks from the negligence of coemployees is 
 abolished.*^ In States where such statutes have been adopted 
 an employee of a railroad company does not assume the risk 
 of an injury caused by the neglect of other employees of the 
 company in the operation and control of trains, but the com- 
 pany is held liable in damages for an injury so resulting.** 
 
 1* Session Laws Missouri, 1897, p. 96; Rev. St. Mo. for 1899, § 
 2873. 
 
 A brakeman, under the Iowa statute. Is held not to assume the risk 
 of a negligent order to stop by a train dispatcher. Phinney v. Illi- 
 nois Cent. R. Co., 98 N. W. Rep. 358. 
 
 15 Session Laws Mo. for 1897, p. 96; Rev. St. Mo. 1899, § 2873. 
 
 " The risk of injury attending the removal from the track of a hand 
 car used for the transportation of a section crew and materials is 
 peculiar to the 'operation of railroads,' (within Rev. St. 1898, § 1816, 
 as amended by Laws 1903, p. 741, ch. 448), providing that every 
 railroad shall be liable for damages to its employees, provided the 
 same shall arise from a risk peculiar to the ' operation of railroads.' " 
 Hardt v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ey. Co., Ill N. W. Rep. 427. 
 
 i« International, etc., Ry. Co. v. McVey (Texas), 81 S. W. Rep. 
 991; 83 8. W. Rep. 34; Callahan v. St. Louis, etc., Ter. R. Co., 170 Mo. 
 473; 71 S. W. Rep. 208; 60 L. R. A. 249; 94 Am. St. Rep. 746; 
 194 U. S. 628; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 857; 48 L. Ed. 1157; Pearl v. Omaha, 
 etc., R. Co. (Iowa), 88 N. W. Rep. 1078. 
 
 The risk of negligence of coemployees, obtaining at common law, 
 was held to be abolished by statutes, as to railroads, in the follow- 
 ing cases: St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Boyles (Ark.), 95 S. W. Rep. 783; 
 
 505 
 
§ 387 RISKS NOT ASSUMED. 
 
 § 387. Assumption of risk jury issue, when. — If an em- 
 ployee is acquainted with the. conditions likely to cause an 
 injury, in the course of his employment, and he is also aware 
 of the resulting danger therefrom, or if the conditions were 
 open and obvious and the danger apparent or he knew as 
 much about the risk as his employer, or ought to have equal 
 knowledge, then he is generally held to have assumed the 
 risk, as matter of law." 
 
 But where the employee is not acquainted with the condi- 
 tions that threaten danger to him, in the course of his em- 
 ployment, or, although aware of the condition, if he was igno- 
 rant of the danger, and the danger is not such as he ought 
 to have appreciated, in the exercise of reasonable care, on 
 his part, then the issue should be , submitted . to the jury, 
 whether or not, under the particular facts in evidence, the 
 employee could be held to have appreciated the danger and 
 assumed the risk.^* 
 
 It was held to be a jury issue whether or not the deceased, 
 an experienced brakeman, had notice of the dangerous prox- , 
 imity near the track, of a water spout, by which he was struck 
 and killed; ^® whether the danger of obeying an order was 
 
 Phippin V. Missouri Pacific Ey. Co., 196 Mo. 321; 93 S. W. Rep. 
 410; Houston, etc., E. Co. v. Turner, 92 S. W. Eep. (Texas) 1074; 
 Worcester v. Galveston, etc., E. Co. (Texas), 91 S. W. Rep. 339; 
 Mott V. Southern Ey. Co., 131 N. C. 234; 42 S. E. Rep. 601; Thomp- 
 son V. Chappell, 91 Mo. App. 297; Texas, etc., Ry. Co. v. Putnam, 120 
 Fed. Eep. 754; 57 C. C. A. 58; Mexican Cent. R. Co. v. Knox, 114 
 Fed. Eep. 73; 52 C. C A. 21. 
 
 17 Bailey, Mas. Liab. Inj. Serv., pp. 180, 181; Watson v. Coal Co., 
 52 Mo. App. 366; Aldrich v. Furnace Co., 78 Mo. 559; Minnier v. 
 Sedalia, etc., Ey. Co., 167 Mo. 99; 66 S. W. Eep. 1072; White, Personal 
 Inj. in Mines, § 206, p. 219. 
 
 18 Bailey, Mas. Liab. Inj. Serv., p. 181 ; Springside, etc., Co. v. 
 Patting (111.), 71 N. E. Eep. 371; Hamman v. Central, etc., Co., 156 
 Mo. 232; 56 S. W. Eep. 1091. 
 
 19 Choctaw, etc., E. Co. v. McDade, 112 Fed. Rep. 888; 50 C. C. A. 
 591; 191 U. S. 64. 
 
 506 
 
EISKS NOT ASSUMED. ' § 387 
 
 sufiBciently obrious for the employee to assume the risk ; ^^ 
 whether or not a sufficient time had elapsed after a promise 
 to repair, for an employee to assume the risk ; ^^ whether 
 the obedience to a command instantly obeyed, was such as 
 to give the employee notice of the danger ; ^^ whether or not 
 the plaintiff had entered a protest to the continuance ojf the 
 employment with a known defective tool, where the evidence 
 was conflicting.^® These and similar issues of fact are held 
 proper issue for the jtiry, but if the evidence is all one way, 
 as to the knowledge on the part of the employee of a given 
 risk, it is proper for the court to decide the question, as a 
 matter of law.^* 
 
 20lde V. Fratcher, 194 111. 552; 62 N. E. Eep. 814; Illinois Cent. 
 E. Co. V. North, 97 111. App. 124; Haas v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 97 
 III. App. 624; Bodie v. Charleston,' etc., R. Co., 61 S. C. 468; 39 
 S. E. Eep. 715. - 
 
 21 Geilveston, etc., E. Co. v. Sanchez (Texas), 65 S. W. Eep. 893. 
 
 22 Galveston, etc., E. Co. v. Sanchez (Texas), 65 S. W, Rep. 893. 
 
 asYerkes v. Northern Pac. E. Co., 112 Wis. 184; 88 N. W. Eep. 33. 
 
 2* Bailey, Mas. Liab. Inj. Serv., p. 181. 
 
 607 
 
CHAPTEE XVI. 
 
 COITTEIBUTOKY NEGLIGEITCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 388. Explanation of the defense. 
 
 389. N'ot confined to parties occupying special relations. 
 
 390. Mutual negligence bars recovery. ' 
 
 391. Reason for rule denying recovery in such case. 
 
 392. Limits and exceptions to the rule. 
 
 393. Concurrent causes never relieve negligent party. 
 
 394. Ordinary care the test.. 
 
 395. Any negligence, contributing to injury, bars recovery. 
 
 396. Negligence must contribute proximately to injury. 
 
 397. Illustration of proximate and remote negligence. 
 
 398. Doctrine of last clear chance. 
 
 399. Employee must use ordinary prudence. 
 
 400. Voluntarily selecting more' dangerous way. 
 
 401. Effect of employee's negligence. 
 
 402. Contributory negligence of volunteer. 
 
 403. Effect of plaintiff's lack of skill. 
 
 404. As a defense to statutory negligence. 
 
 405. When intoxication bars recovery. 
 
 406. Remaining in service involving danger. 
 
 407. Employee may assume employer's performance of duty. 
 
 408. Duty to look and listen for trains. 
 
 409. Failure to guard against known dangers. 
 
 410. Voluntarily assuming position of peril. 
 
 411. Crossing track in front of train. 
 
 412. Standing or walking upon track. 
 
 413. Walking or standing near the track. 
 
 414. Climbing over stationary cars. 
 
 415. Under cars or locomotives. 
 
 416. Crossing bridge in front of_ train. 
 
 417. Sleeping upon or near railroad track. 
 
 418. Walking in dangerous place in dark. 
 
 419. Failure to discover defects in appliances. 
 
 420. Failure to keep appliances under employee's car, in repair. 
 
 421. Unauthorized use of appliances. 
 
 422. Acts in emergencies or situations of peril. 
 
 508 
 
CONTKIBUTOKY BrEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. § 388 
 
 § 423. Collisions due to engineer's negligence. 
 
 424. Injuries from obstructions near the track. 
 
 425. Striking overhead bridge. 
 
 426. Running at immoderate rate of speed. 
 
 427. Injuries from observance or nonobservance of signals. 
 
 428. Biding in dangerous places. 
 
 429. Boarding moving cars or engines. 
 
 430. Jumping from moving car or engine. 
 
 431. Injuries from loading and unloading cars. 
 
 432. Negligence in operation of hand cars or tricycles. 
 
 433. Negligence in coupling and uncoupling cars. 
 
 434. Violation of rules in coupling cars. 
 
 435. Injuries in making couplings, while violating orders. 
 
 436. Employee falling from moving car or engine. 
 
 437. Negligence in disobedience of rules, generally. 
 
 438. Violation of particular rules. 
 
 439. Disobedience of special orders. 
 
 440. Contributory negligence of infant employees. 
 
 441. Pleading contributory negligeitqe. 
 
 442. Contributory negligence as question of law or fact. 
 
 § 388. Explanation of the defense. — The defense of con- 
 tributory negligence is perhaps the most general defense 
 urged in personal injury actions. It is very generally held 
 to apply as well to actions based upon statutory negligence/ 
 as to actions based upon common-law negligence, and while 
 
 1" Employers' Liability Act (Laws, N. Y. 1902, p. 1748, ch. 600), 
 increasing the rights of employees to recover for injuries sustained in 
 the course of their employment, does not change the general law with 
 respect to contributory negligence; the modification of the doctrine 
 provided by § 3, p. 1750, being applicable only to a continuance in 
 the employment after knowledge of defects in the ways, works, or 
 machinery provided by the employer." Chisholm v. Manhattan Ey. 
 Co., 101 N. y. S. 622. 
 
 Schlemmer v. Buffalo, etc., R. Co., 27 U. S. Sup. 407; 51 L. Ed. 
 689. 
 
 Schlemmer v. Buffalo, etc., E. Co., 207 Pa. 198; 56 Atl. Eep. 417, 
 reversed. 
 
 McGinnis v. Eigby, etc., Co. (Mo.), 99 S. W. Rep. 4. 
 
 Spiva V. Osage, etc., Co., 97 Mo. 62; Adams v. Coal Co., 85 Mo. 
 App. 320. Contributory negligence is not a defense to statutory negli- 
 gence) in Illinois. Wilmington Star Mining Co. v. Fulton, 27 U. S. 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 412; 51 L. Ed. 689. 
 
 509 
 
§ 388 CONTKIBUTOEY ITEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 the defense of assumj>tion of the risk, in many States, has 
 been limited by different statutory enactments, since it is 
 but just that no man should be held for the result of the 
 wrongful act of another, in no way his agent, both by the 
 legislative and judicial branch of government, the defense of 
 contributory negligence has been left intact. 
 
 The defense is thus explained, in a recent case,^ by the 
 United States Supreme Court: "Although the defendant's 
 negligence may have been the primary cause of the injury 
 complained of, yet an action for such injury cannot be main- 
 tained, if the proximate and immediate cause of the injury 
 can be traced to the want of ordinary care and caution in 
 the person injured, subject to this qualification, which has 
 grown up in recent years, that the" contributing negligence 
 of the party injured will not defeat the action, if it be shown 
 that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care 
 and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the injured 
 party's negligence." The reason for the rule is manifest^ 
 for it would be clearly unjust to permit a person who, by his 
 own negligence has caused an injury to himself, to recover 
 damages from another, upon the assumption that if it had 
 not been for the wrongful act of the other, no injury would 
 have resulted.' In jurisdictions where the doctrine of com- 
 parative negligence does not exist, therefore, the rule is gen- 
 erally recognized to be that " if the party injured, by the 
 exercise of ordinary care, under the circumstances, might 
 have avoided the consequences of the defendant's negligence, 
 but did not, the case is one of mutual fault and the law 
 
 2 Grand Trunk Ey. Co. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 429. See, also, Terre 
 Haute, etc., R. Co. v. Graham, 95 Ind. 291. 
 
 "An instruction that, if plaintifiF contributed to the injury as the 
 immediate cause of it, then he could not recover, though defendant 
 company was negligent, was not an improper definition of contributory 
 negligence." Cole v. Blue Ridge Ey. Co. (S. C. 1906), 55 S. E. Rep. 
 126. 
 
 » Wharton on Neg., § 130; Bailey's Mas. Liab. Inj. Serv., p. 395. 
 510 
 
CONTKIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. § 389 
 
 will neither cast all tlie consequences upon the defendant, nor 
 will it attempt any apportionment thereof." * 
 
 § 389. Not confined to parties occupying special relations. — 
 
 The absence of ordinary care on the part of the plaintiff, 
 which can be denominated contributory negligence is suffi- 
 
 *Cooley, on Torts, p. 368; 4 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law 17; Shearm. 
 & Eedf. on Neg., § 25; Tuff v. Warman, 5 C. B. (N. S.) 573. 
 
 Both under the civil and' the common law, the defense of contributory 
 negligence could be urged. Kichmond, etc., R. Co. v. Morris, 31 
 Gratt. (Va.) 200; Snyder v. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co., 11 W. Va. 14; 
 18 Amer. Ry. Rep. 154; Central E. Co. v. T)eBray, 71 Ga. 406; Hawk 
 V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 147 111. 399; 35 N. E. Rep. 139; Rogers v. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co., 117 111. 116; Milbur v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 
 86 MO.-104; 29 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 244; Rome v. Southern California 
 R. Co. (Cal.), 87 Pac. Rep. 220. 
 
 Definitions of contributory negligence, in substantial conformity to 
 those given in the text, are given in the following cases: Montgomery 
 Co. V. Montgomery, etc., R. Co., 86 Ala. 372; 5 So. Rep. 735; Vicks- 
 burg, & M. R. Co. v. McGowan, 62 Miss. 682; Bomar v. Louisiana, 
 etc., E. Co., 42 La. Ann. 983; 8 So. Eep. 478; Paland v. Chicago, etc., 
 "E. Co., 44 La. Ann. 1003; 11 So. Rep, 707; Houston, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Smith, 52 Texas 178; International, etc., R. Co. v. Garcia, 75 Texas 
 583; 13 S. W. Rep. 223; Riley v. West Virginia, etp., R. Co., 27 W. Va. 
 145; Cawley v. Winnifred, etc., R. Cp., 31 W. Va. 116; Smith v. 
 Union Ey. Co., 61 Mo. 588; Meyers v, Chicago, etc., R. Co., 103 Mo. 
 App. 268; 77 S. W. Rep. 149; Hanheide v. Transit Co., 104 Mo. App. 
 323; 78 S. W. Rep. 820; Zumault v. Kansas City, etc., Ry. Co., 175 
 Mo. 288; 74 S. W. Rep. 1015; Moore v. Lindell Ry. Co., 176 Mo. 
 528; 75 S. W. Rep. 672; Hogan V. Citizens Ry. Co., 150 Mo. 36; 51 
 S. W. Eep. 473. 
 
 " Contributory negligence is such negligence on the part of the 
 injured party as materially contributes to his injury." Cleveland, C, 
 C. & St. L. Ey. Co. V. Henry (Ind. App. 1907), 80 N. E. Rep. 636. 
 
 " Where plaintiff and defendant were negligent, and the negligence 
 of both contributed to the injury, plaintiff cannot recover." Brown v. 
 Northern Ohio Traction Co. (Ohio 1907), 81 N. E. Rep. 326. 
 
 " An employee cannot recover damages for an injury to which he has 
 directly contributed, whether his participation is the direct cause of 
 the injury, or whether his omission of duties would, if performed, 
 have prevented the injury.'' Elmgren v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. 
 (Minn. 1907), 112 N. W. Eep. 1067. 
 
 511 
 
§ 390 CONTEIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 cient to defeat a recovery, no matter what particular relation 
 the injured party may occupy, upon which the breach of duty 
 is charged to have occurred, and the defense is not confined 
 to those occupying any particular status or relation toward 
 the defendant ; if the carelessness of a third party contributes 
 to his own injury, he is denied a recovery, the same as the 
 want of ordinary care will bar an employee who is injured 
 thereby from recovering. So the defense is not confined to 
 employers only, but exists in all cases where an injury is 
 charged to have resulted from the wrongful act of another." 
 The essential element of the defense is the want of ordinary 
 care, on the part of the injured person, which contributed to 
 cause the injury, and ivhere this absence of care is found, 
 since all persons are alike subject to a just rule of law, when 
 similarly situated, the individuality of the plaintiff, or the ■ 
 existence of his legal or business status or relation toward 
 the defendant, are wholly immaterial, as the defense obtains, 
 in all cases, when this absence of ordinary care is found, 
 contributing to cause the injury complained of.® 
 
 § 390. Mutual negligence bars recovery. — The general 
 
 5 Southern Ey. Co. v. Stutts (Ala.), 144 Fed. Eep. 948. 
 
 6 Bailey, Mas. Liab. Inj. Serv., p. 413, and cases cited. 
 
 All plaintiffs, in actions for injuries resulting from negligence, who 
 are adults, and all persons mentally and physically incapable of taking 
 care of themselves, stand on the same level and cannot recover, if 
 they, or those under whose care they are, have been guilty of negligence 
 contributing to the injury. Murray v. Central City E. Co., 66 Barb. 
 (N. Y.) 43; 51 N. Y. 666; Willetts v. Buffalo, etc., E. Co., 14 
 Barb. (N. Y.) 585; Maher v. Atlantic, etc., E. Co., 64 Mo. 267; 
 Fletcher v. Atlantic, etc., E. Co., 64 Mo. 484; Kelly v. Hannibal, etc., 
 E. Co., 75 Mo. 138; Zimmerman v. Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 71 Mo. 476; 
 Bell V. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 72 Mo. 168; Turner v. Hannibal, etc., 
 E. Co., 74 Mo. 602; Powell v. Missouri Pacific Ey. Co., 76 Mo. 80; 
 Lennix v. Missouri Pacific Ey. Co., 76 Mo. 86; Dlauhi v. St. Louis, 
 etc., E. Co., 105 Mo. 645; 16 S. W. Eep. 281; 139 Mo. 291; 40 S. W. 
 Eep. 890; 37 L. E. A. 406; 60 Am. St. Eep. 576; White v. Wabash 
 E. Co., 34 Mo. App. 57. 
 512 
 
CONTEIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. § 390 
 
 rule in regiard to contributory negligence is that. if the negli- 
 gence be mutual and concurring, on the part of the plaintiff 
 and defendant, there can be no recovery.'^ This is true, be- 
 cause, where negligence is the issue, it must be a case of un- 
 mixed n^ligence to justify a recovery.* It rests upon the 
 plaintiff to trace the cause of his injury to the defendant, and 
 for this purpose he must show the circumstances under which 
 the injury occurred; and if, in proving these circumstances, 
 it also appears that the fault was mutual, he has, by estab- 
 lishing the circumstances of his injury, disproved his right 
 of recovery.^ Where the negligence of both parties con- 
 tributes to the injury of either, the common law gives neither 
 party damages for his injury.-'** 
 
 But the plaintiff's negligence, to be contributory and ef- 
 fectual as a defense, must be concurrent, simultaneous and 
 connected with the defendant's negligence,^* and if the in- 
 jury is disconnected from the plaintiff's act of contributory 
 
 TOverby v. Chesapeake, etc., E. Co., 37 W. Va. 524; 16 8. E. Rep. 
 813-; 53 Am. & Bng. R. Cas. 417; Carrico v. West Virginia, etc., R. 
 Co., 35 W. Va. 389; 14 S. E. Rep. 12; 52 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 393; 
 Colorado, etc., R. Co. v. Holmes, 5 Colo. 197; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 410; Kellny v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 101 Mo. 67; 13 S. W. Rep. 
 806; 43 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 186; Doggett v. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 
 •78 N. Car. 305; 16 Am. Ry. Rep. 193. 
 
 8 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Goddard, 25 Ind. 185; Belief ontaine, etb., 
 E. Co. V. Hunter, 33 Ind. 335; Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Hedges, 118 
 Ind. 5; 20 N. E. Rep. 530; 37 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 516. 
 
 9 Butcher v. West Virginia, etc., R. Co., 37 W. Va. 180; 16 S. E. 
 Eep. 457. 
 
 10 Allen V. Maine, etc., R. Co., 82 Me. Ill; 19 Atl. Eep. 105. 
 
 11 Montgomery Co. v. Montgomery, etc., R. Co., 86 Ala. 372; 5 So. 
 Rep. 735; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Sullivan, 81 Ky. 624; 16 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 390; Rains v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 71 Mo. 164; 5 Am. 
 ■ & Eng. R. Cas. 610; Duncan v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 46 Mo. -App. 
 198; Farmer v. Wilmington, etc., R. Co., 88 N. Car. 564; 20 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 481; International, etc., R. Co. t. Garcia, 75 Texas 583; 
 13 S. W. Rep. 223. 
 
 1—33 513 
 
§ 391 CONTEIBUTOET KEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 negligence, by an independent cause, then there is no legal 
 contribution to the injury, on his part.*'' 
 
 § 391. Reason for rule denying recovery in such case. — 
 
 The' reasons for the rule of law, that where a person is in- 
 jured by the joint fault of himself and another he is denied 
 a recovery, is stated by the Ohio court to be (1) the mutual- 
 ity of the wrong, entitling each party alike, where both are 
 injured, to his action against the other, if it entitles either; 
 (2) the impolicy of allowing a person to recover for his own 
 wrong; and (3), the policy of making the personal interest 
 of the parties dependent upon their own prudence and care.** 
 The reason for the rule rests not upon the idea that one 
 wrong offsets the other, or that one justifies the other, but 
 on the broader ground that when the negligence of the plain- 
 tiff has contributed proximately to the injury, the damage 
 resulting therefrom is of his own causing and it is difficult, 
 if not impossible, to determine the quantum of injury which 
 resulted from the defendant's tortious act.** 
 
 One who, in any circumstances, contributes directly to 
 his own injury, by a failure to exercise the ordinary care 
 which would have prevented injury from the negligence of 
 the other, is denied a recovery from the other, because the law" 
 will not undertake to apportion the blame between the two 
 wrongdoers, and in such case the negligence of each party 
 must be regarded as the proximate cause of the injury." 
 
 12 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Righter, 42 N. J. L. 180; 2 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 220. 
 
 13 Bellefontaine, etc., R. Co. v. Snyder, 18 Ohio St. 399. 
 
 1* Memphis, etc., R. Co. v. Copeland, 61 Ala. 376; Tanner v. Louis- 
 ville, etc., R. Co., 60 Ala. 621; Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. Blakely, 59 Ala. 
 Eng. R. Cas. 481; International, etc., R. Co. v. Garcia, 75 Texas 583; 
 471; Manly v. Wilmington, etc., R. Co., 74 N. Car. 655; 13 Am. Ry. 
 Rep. 105; Murray v. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 93 N. Car. 92; McAdoo v.* 
 Richmond, etcr, R. Co., 105 N. Car. 140; 11 8. E. Rep. 316; 41 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 524. 
 
 loVicksburg, etc., R. Co. v. McGowan, 62 Miss. 682; Northern, etc., 
 514 
 
CONTKIBUTOBY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. § 392 
 
 § 392. limits and exceptions to the rule. — The doctrine 
 that in case of an injury by negligence, where the parties are 
 mutually in fault, the injured party is not entitled to re- 
 dress, is subject to the following qualifications, i. e., the age, 
 intelligence and capacity of the injured person must be looked 
 to, as well as the act or omission at the time of the injury,^" 
 and, where the negligence of the plaintiff was only remote 
 and consisted of some act or omission not occurring at the 
 time of the injury, but the negligence of the defendant was 
 the proximate cause thereof, the action is maintainable.^^ In 
 
 R. Co. V. State, 29 Md. 420; Colorado, etc., R. Co. v. Holmes, 5 Colo. 
 516; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 410; Northern C. K. Co. v. State, 31 Md. 
 357. 
 
 If the injury was occasioned in any degree by the plaintiff's own 
 carelessness, he is without redress, in the absence of willfulness or 
 intentional wrong, on defendant's part. New Jersey Express Co. v. 
 Nichols, 33 N. J. L. 434; St. Louis, etc., E. Co. v. Freeman, 36 Ark. 
 41; 4 Am. & Eng. B. Cas. 608. The question for the court to de- 
 termine is not whether the negligence of the plaintifl, or of the 
 defendant was the more proximate cause of the injury — where the 
 rule of comparative negligence does not obtain — but whether or not 
 the plaintiff's negligence proximately contributed to the injury. Mis- 
 souri Pacific R. Co. V. Moseley, 57 Eed. Rep. 921; Holwerson v. St. 
 Louis, etc., E. Co., 157 Mo. 216; 57 S. W. Rep. 770; 50 L. R. A. 850. 
 
 " That an employee was guilty of an error in judgment in attempting 
 to pass around a moving train, or in stepping out of his way, does 
 not relieve the employer from liability unless the conduct of the em- 
 ployee was the proximate cause of the injury." Betchman v. Seaboard 
 Air Line Ry. (S. C. 1906), 55 S. B. Rep. 140. 
 
 " Intestate's contributory negligence, and not the negligence of the 
 engineer in not bringing the train to a standstill when he first saw 
 deceased, was the proximate cause of the injury." Rowe v. Southern 
 California Ry. Co. (Cal. App. 1906), 87 Pae. Rep. 220. 
 
 16 Bellefontaine, etc., R. Co. v. Snyder, 18 Ohio St. 399; Internar 
 tional, etc., R. Co. v. Garcia, 75 Texas 583; 13 S. W. Rep. 223; 
 Government, etc., R. Co. v. Hanlon, 53 Ala. 70; Bay Shore R. Co. v. 
 Harris, 67 Ala. 6. 
 
 1' Longabaugh v. Virginia City E. Co., 9 Nev. 271 ; Kline v. Central 
 Pacific R. Co., 37 Cal. 400; Meeks v. Southern Pacific E. Co., 56 CaL 
 513; 38 Am. Rep. 67; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 314; Esrey v. Southern 
 Pacific R. Co., 88 Cal. 399; 26 Pae. Rep. 211; Isbell v. New York, 
 
 515 
 
§ 392 CONTEIBUTOEY NEOLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 other words, the strict letter of the rule, in. all cases, does 
 not apply to infants, or those under disability.^* and, in 
 every case, the want of ordinary care, on the plaintiff's part; 
 must have proximately contributed to produce the injury, 
 in some way.^® And if the negligence of the defendant is 
 so gross as to be denominated intentional or willfulness, the 
 absence of reasonable care on the plaintiff's part will not 
 constitute a defense,^* and, notwithstanding the negligence of 
 the injured person, if the defendant, after becoming aware 
 of his negligence, failed to use a proper degree of care to 
 avoid the accident, the plaintiff will be allowed a recovery.*^ 
 But while the negligence of the plaintiff must, in whole 
 
 etc, R. Co., 27 Conn. 393; Gates v. Burlington, etc., R. Co., 39 Iowa 
 45; Central R. Co. v. Moore, 24 N. J. L. 824; Cornwall v. Charlotte, 
 etc., R. Co., 97 N. Car. 11; 2 S. E. Rep. 659. 
 
 18 International, etc., R. Co. v. Smith, 62 Texas 252; 19 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 21; Hassenyer v. Michigan Central R. Co., 48 Mich. 205; 
 12 N, W. Rep. 155; 42 Am. Rep. 470; 6 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 59; 
 International, etc., R. Co.. v. Garcia, 75 Texas 583; 13 S. W. Rep. 223. 
 
 10 Cornwall v. Charlotte, etc., R. Co., 97 N. Car. 11; 2 8. E. Rep. 
 659; Gates v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 168 Mo. 535; 68 S. W. Rep. 
 906; 58 L. R. A. 447; Frank v. Transit Co., 99 Mo. App. 323; 73 
 S. W. Rep. 239; Kolb v. Transit Co., 102 Mo. App. 143; 76 S. W. 
 Rep. 1050. 
 
 20 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Sinclair, 62 Ind. 301 ; Darwin v. Charlotte, 
 etc., R. Co., 23 So. Car. 531; 55 Am. Rep. 32; Indianapolis, etc., R. 
 Co. y, Boettcher, 131 Ind. 82; 28 N. E. Rep. 551; Louisville, etc., R. 
 Co. V. Ader, 110 Ind. 376; 11 N. E. Rep. 437; Rowen v. New York, 
 etc., R. Co., 59 Conn, 364; 21 Atl. Rep. 1073; Korrady v. Lake Shore, 
 etc., R. Co., 131 Ind. 261; 29 N. B. Rep. 1069. 
 
 21 Cooper V. Central R. Co., 44 Iowa 134; Johnston v. Louisville, etc., 
 R. Co., 91 Ky. 651; 25 S. W. Rep. 754; Straus v. Kansas City, etc., 
 R. Co., 75 Mo. 185; 6 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 384; Hurt v. St. Louis, 
 etc., R. Co., 94 Mo. 255; 7 S. W. Rep. 1; 34 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 422; 
 Dun V. Seaboard, etc., R. Co., 78 Va. 645; 49 Am. Rep. 388; 16 Am. 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 363; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Kean, 65 Md. 394; 
 5 Atl. Rep. 325; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 580; Duncan v. Missouri 
 Pacific Ry. Co., 46 Mo. App. 198; Brown, Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 
 50 Mo. 461; 11 Am. Rep. 420; Cogan v. Cass Ave. R. Co., 101 Mo. 
 App. 179; 73 S. W. Rep. 738; Klockenbrink v. St. Louis, etc., R. 
 Co.. 17'2 Mo. 678; 72 S. W. Rep. 900; Shanks v. Traction So., 101 
 
 516 
 
CONTEIBTTTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. §393 
 
 or in part, contribute proximately to the injury, it is not 
 essential that it constitute the sole cause thereof, as contribu- 
 tory negligence is a complete defense, when it is one of two 
 or more efficient concurring causes and it is not necessary that 
 it should be the sole proximate cause of the injury .^^ 
 
 § 393. Concurrent causes never relieve negligent party. — 
 In a preceding chapter ^* a distinction is dra^n between in- 
 tervening and concurrent causes of personal injuries and it 
 is seen that while intervening or independent causes relieve 
 one charged with negligence, mere concurrent causes, whether 
 originating from the carelessness of another or from an ac- 
 cident, combined with a negligent act, will not relieve the 
 party guilty of the wrongful act, from the effects of such 
 negligence.** 
 
 The United States Supreme Court, in a leading case,*" 
 has drawn the distinction between concurrent and intervening 
 causes, or between contribution and cause and effect and it 
 is shown that the proper test is, did the accident or inter- 
 vening' cause break the sequence of events ? Unless it did, it 
 is a mere case of concurrent negligence or causes, which will 
 not relieve the negligent party, except in the sole case of the 
 negligence of the injured party concurring with that of the 
 defendant. 
 
 The consequence is, that if an injured party shall be shown 
 to have been negligent himself, it is no excuse for his negli- 
 gence, that the wrongful act of a coemployee also combined 
 
 Mo. App. 702; 74 S. W. Kep. 386; Ries v. Transit Co., 179 Mo. 1; 
 77 S. W. Eep. 734. 
 
 22Hanhei(ie v. Transit Co., 104 Mo. App. 323; 78 S. W. Rep. 820; 
 North Birmingham R. Co. v. Calderwood, 89 Ala. 247; 7 So. Rep. 
 360; Spencer v. Illinois Central R. Co., 29 Iowa 55. 
 
 23 See Chapter on Proximate Cause of Injury. 
 
 2* Austin V. New Jersey, etc., Co., 43 N. Y. 75. 
 
 21! Milwaulcee, etc., R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 474. 
 
 517 
 
§ 394 OOIfTKIBUTOET NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 to bring about the injury.** And, on the other hand, if the 
 defendant is shown to have been- negligent and the plaintiff 
 or injured party was free from blame, the fact that an ac- 
 cident *^ or the negligence of a coemployee with the injured 
 person, combined with the wrongful act of the employer," to 
 produce the injury, will constitute no defense to the action,** 
 as this would be a mere concurrent, as distinguished from 
 an intervening, cause of the injury.** 
 
 § 394. Ordinary care the test. — The law imposes upon 
 every person the duty to use ordinary care for his own pro- 
 tection and. security against accident.^" The negligence of 
 the plaintiff bars a recovery for personal injuries, where, by 
 
 28Bartlett v. Boston, etc., Co., 117 Mass. 536; Baltimore, etc., E. 
 Co. V. Eeaney, 42 Md. 117. 
 
 2T Hull V. Kansas City, 54 Mo. 598 ; Austin v. New Jersey, etc., Co., 
 43 N. Y. 75; Morse v. Richmond, 41 Vt. 435. 
 
 28 Pittsburg, etc., E. Co. v. Henderson, 37 Ohio St. 549; Whitwam 
 V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 58 Wis. 408; 17 N. W. Rep. 124; Clark v. 
 Seoul, 137 Mass. 380; Cowan v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 80 Wis. 284; 
 50 N. W. Rep. 180; Grand Trunk E. Co. v. Cummings, 106 U. S. 
 700; GriflSn v. Boston, etc., E. Co., 148 Mass. 143; 19 N. E. Rep. 166; 
 Atkinson v. Goodrich, etc., Co., 60 Wis. 141; 18 N. W. Eep. 764. 
 
 29 This distinction is clearly drawn, by Judge Bailey, in his excellent 
 work on Mas. Liab. Inj. Serv., pp. 434, 437. See, also, Wharton on 
 Neg., § 144. 
 
 " In an action for personal injuries, plaintiff cannot recover if he 
 was himself at the time of the accident guilty of concurrent negli- 
 gence." Garrett v. People's Ry. Co. (Del. Super. 1906), 64 Atl. 
 Eep. 254. 
 
 "Where the negligence -of a person injured, assuming it to exist, 
 continued up to the very moment of the accident, unbroken by any 
 new independent cause, and without which that event would not have 
 occurred, there could be no controversy as to whether his contributory 
 negligence was proximate or not, and an instruction omitting the 
 word ' proximate,' or its equivalent, was not error." Jansen v. South? 
 em Pac. Co. (Cal. App. 1907), 89 Pac. Eep. 616. 
 
 soparyis v. Philadelphia, etc., E. Co. (Del.), 17 Atl. Eep. 702; 
 Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Eves, 1 Ind. App. 224; 27 N. E. Eep. 580; 
 Allender v. Chicago, etc., E. Co.,' 37 Iowa 264; 8 Am. Ey. Eep. 115. 
 518 
 
COWTEIBtTTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. § 394 
 
 ordinary care, he could have avoided the injury.*' Ordi- 
 nary care, as a legal measure for the degree of diligence ig 
 invariable, but as the conduct of a prudent man varies with 
 the degree of danger , attending the vocation in which he is 
 engaged, and he is more or less cautious according to cir- 
 cumstances, those who are bound to conform their conduct 
 to his, must graduate it in like manner and this rule applies 
 both to one exposed to danger and to others not so exposed, 
 whose acts or omissions affect his safety.*^ 
 
 The test of contributory negligence is not always found 
 in the failure to exercise the best judgment or to use the 
 wisest precautions; the influences which ordinarily govern 
 human action are to be considered and what would, under 
 some circumstances, be considered a want of reasonable care, 
 may not be such, under other conditions.** The plaintiff 
 is not required to exercise more care than is usual under 
 similar circumstances, among careful persons, of the class 
 to which he belongs.** The exercise of ordinary caution, 
 by the injured person, to avoid the danger, is all that the 
 law requires in order that he may be protected against the 
 consequences of having contributory negligence imputed to 
 him.*® Hence, although a person injured by a railroad 
 train, may be in fault, to some extent, yet he can recover, if 
 the injury could not have been avoided by him, by the ex- 
 ercise of ordinary care, on his part.*® 
 
 at Kearney v. Lindell R. Co., 15 Mo. App. 576; Ohio, etc., E. Co. r. 
 Gullett, 15 Ind. 487; Kansaa Pacific B. Co. v. Pointer, 14 Kansas 
 37; Bowers v. Union Pacific E. Co., 4 Utah 215; 7 Pao. Eep. 251. 
 
 S2 Central E. & B. Co. v. Eyles, 84 Ga. 420; 11 S. E. Eep. 499. 
 
 33 Lent V. New York, etc., E. Co., 120 N. Y. 467; 24 N. E. Eep. 
 653; 44 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 373; Sherry v. New York, etc., R. Co., 
 104 N. Y. 652. 
 
 siDimniey v. Wheeling, etc., R. Co., 27 W. Va. 32. 
 
 35 Hays V. Gainesville, etc., E. Co., 70 Texas 602; 8 S. W. Eep. 491; 
 Kerwhacker v. Cleveland, etc., E. Co., 3 Ohio St. 172. 
 
 seRigler v. Charlotte, etc., E. Co., 94 N. Car. 604; 26 Am. & Eng. 
 
 519 
 
§ 396 .CONTKIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 § 395. Any negligence, contributing to injury, bars recov- 
 ery. — Where the injury is the result of the mutual fault of 
 the injured person and the defendant, as the law -will not 
 attempt any apportionment of the absence of ordinary care 
 between the respective parties, in jurisdictions where the docf 
 trine of comparative negfigence does not obtain, nor will it 
 cast all the consequences of the mutual wrongdoing upon the 
 defendant, the plaintiff is denied a recovery, upon a showing 
 of any want of ordinary care, however slight, contributing 
 to the injury, on the part of the injured person.^'' In a well- 
 considered Pennsylvania case,*® it is said: " Any degree of 
 negligence on the part of the plaintiff, contributing to the 
 injury, destroys his right of recovery. It is the kind of 
 action, not the quantity, on the part of the plaintiff, which 
 prevents the law from measuring between the plaintiff and 
 the defendant, their respective degrees of negligence, when 
 the former comes into a court of justice." If the term negli- 
 gence, or the absence of ordinary care, has any degrees, which 
 is denied by respectable authority,*® this case unquestionably 
 presents the general rule upon the subject, for while some 
 authors distinguish between " slight want of ordinary care " 
 . and " slight negligence," which latter term is used as a syno- 
 
 R. Cas. 386; Lewis v. Baltimore, etc., E. Co., 38 Md. 588; 10 Am. 
 Ry. Eep. 521; Omaha R. Co. v. Doolittle, 7 Neb. 481; Pennsylvania 
 R. Co. V. Righter, 42 N. J. L. 180; 2 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 220; Balti- 
 more, etc., R. Co. V. Whitacre, 35 Ohio St. 627. 
 , 87 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Dewees (Kan.), 153 Fed. Eep. 56. 
 
 " One cannot — nor can one standing in his stead — recover damages 
 for an injury to the commission of which he has directly contributed; 
 and it matters not whether that contribution consists in his participa- 
 tion in the direct cause of the injuiy, or in his omission of duties 
 which, if performed, would have prevented it. If his fault, whether 
 of omission or commission, has been a proximate cause of the injury, 
 he — as also one standing in his stead — is without remedy against 
 another, also in the wrong." St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Dewees 
 (U. S. C. C. A., Kan., 1907), 153 Fed. Rep. 56. 
 
 38 011 City Co. V. Boundy, 122 Pa. St. 449; 15 Atl. Rep. 865. 
 
 3» 1 Thompson on Negligence, § 18. 
 520 
 
CONTRIBUTOET NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. § 396 
 
 nym for tHe former, and the distinction — if any exists — is 
 not of practical importance, it is very generally agreed that 
 " any want of ordinary care, however slight, will preclude 
 a recovery," *° when it contributes to effect the injury com- 
 plained of. 
 
 § 396. Negligence must contribute proximately to injury.— > 
 If the evidence either of the plaintiff or the defendant clearly 
 shows that the plaintiff wa& guilty of contributory negligence, 
 which was the direct cause of the injury, there can be no 
 recovery against the defendant.*^ Though the employer be 
 guilty of negligence yet if the injury to an employee be the 
 
 *ii Bailey, Mas. Liab. Inj. Serv., p. 413. 
 
 That any degree of negligence, contributing to eflfeet an injury on 
 the part of the injured one, will bar an action therefor, has been 
 affirmed, in the following cases: Memphis, etc., R. Co. v. Copeland,- 
 61 Ala. 376; St. Louis, etc., K. Co. v. Freeman, 36 Ark. 41; 4 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 608; Long v. Coronado R. Co., 96 Cal. 269; 31 Pac. 
 Rep. 170; Korrady v. Lake Shore, etc., R, Co., 131 Ind. 261; 29 N. E. 
 Rep. 1069; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Ader, 110 Ind. 376; 11 N. E. 
 Rep. 437; Cooper v. Central R. Co., 44 Iowa 134; Allen v. Maine 
 Central R. Co., 82 Me. Ill; 19 Atl. Rep. 105; Lake Shore, etc., R. 
 Co. V. Bangs, 47 Mich. 470; 11 N. W. Rep; 276; 3 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 426; Memphis, etc., R. Co. v. Whitfield, 44 Miss. 466; Murray v. 
 Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 101 Mo. 236; 13 S. W. Rep. 817; Payne v. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co., 129 Mo. 405; 31 S. W. Rep. 885; Rigler v. 
 Charlotte, etc., R. Co., 94 N. Car. 604; 26 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 386; 
 Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Carroll, 6 Heisk. (Tenn.) 347; 12 Am. Ry. 
 Rep. 20; Carrico v. West Virginia, etc., R. Co., 35 W. Va. 389; 14 
 S. E. Rep. 12 ; 52 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 393 ; Murch v. Concord R. Co., 
 29 N. H. 9; 61 Am. Dec. 631. 
 
 Any negligence will bar a recovery, in Missouri, although the de- 
 fendant's negligence is negligence per se, such as statutory or ordinance 
 negligence. Payne v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 129 Mo. 405; 31 S. W. 
 Rep. 885. 
 
 See, also, State y. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 30 Md. 47, and, for 
 former rule, in Illinois, on contributory negligence as a defense to 
 statutory negligence, see St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Andrews, 16 111. 
 App. 292. 
 
 "Cawley v. Winifred, etc., R. Co., 31 W. Va. 116; 5 S. E. Rep. 
 318; Riley v. West Virginia R. Co., 27 W. Va. 145. 
 
 521 
 
§ 397 CONTKIBUTOEY NBGLIGElfCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 proximate reault of his own want of reasonable care for his 
 own proteetion or safety, he cannot recover,*^ 
 
 Where it appears that an employee could have averted an 
 accident by the exercise of ordinary care and he has failed 
 to do so, and an injury is the proximate result of such fail- 
 ure, on his part, it would be offering a premium for the n^li- 
 gence, to allow him to recover, as well as being oppressive 
 to the employer and detrimental to the public interests.** 
 
 But the contributory negligence of an employee or other 
 person will not prevent a recovery, where the proximate cause 
 of the injury is some act or omissioti of the employer or the 
 defendant, to which no act of the employee or injured person 
 has contributed.** If an employee receive an injury, by 
 reason of the negligent movement of a train, while he is en- 
 deavoring, in the line of his duty, to lift or place in shape, 
 a bumper, the fact that it was a defective bumper, will not 
 prevent his recovery,*® nor will the negligence in running a 
 train through a city at a rate of speed in excess of that pro- 
 vided by ordinance, prevent a recovery, by an employee, where 
 the speed of the train in no way contributes to effect the in- 
 jury complained of.** 
 
 § 397. Illustrations of proximate and remote negligence. — 
 In an Iowa case,*'' a brakeman, engaged in switching cars, 
 
 switched some cars on a side track and left them in such a 
 42 Sexton V. Turner, 89 Va. 341 j 15 S. B. Eep. 862; Colorado, etc., 
 
 E. Co. V. Ogden, 3 Colo. 499; Houston, etc., R. Co. v. O'Hara, 64 
 
 Texas 600; O'Neal v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 132 Ind. 110; 31 N. E. 
 
 Rep. 669. 
 
 *3 Callahan v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 11 Fed. Rep. 536. 
 ** Harvey v. New York, etc., R. Co., 19 Hun (N. Y.) 556. 
 
 45 Central, etc., R. Co. v. Lanier, 83 Ga. 587 ; 10 S. E. Rep. 279. 
 
 46 Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Parker, 131 111. 557 j 33 111. App. 
 405; 23 N. E. Rep. 237; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 339. 
 
 47 Newman v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 80 Iowa 672; 45 N. W. Rep. 
 1054; 44 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 555. 
 
 522 
 
COHTEIBUTOBT NEGLIGEITCE OF EMPIX>YEES. § 397 
 
 and who had control of all such work done by his train, 
 switched some cars on a side track and left them in such a 
 position that while ascending, by order of the conductor, the 
 ladder, at the side of another car, passing on the main track, 
 shortly afterwards, there was not sufficient space to permit 
 his body to pass safely between the cars and he was caught 
 and killed and the court held that his own contributory neg- 
 ligence was the proximate cause of his death. In a similar 
 case,** in Massachusetts, where the jury found that it was 
 negligence for an employee to leave a car which was standing 
 near another car which was moving, it was held that the act 
 of leaving the car in such a position, will be deemed the 
 proximate cause of an injury to an employee thereby. And 
 in a Texas case,*® where the conductor of a freight train, in 
 violation of the known rules of the company, boarded his 
 train while it was moving and while standing on top of a 
 box car, was knocked off and killed by a scaffold suspended 
 over a bridge, it was held that his negligence would preclude 
 a recovery for his death, although the evidence showed a con- 
 tinuous violation of the rule and the impossibility of boarding 
 the train, at the caboose, on account of obstructions near the 
 track at that point? 
 
 But the mere fact alone that injuries were received by an 
 employee while he was violating a known rule of the em- 
 ployer, will not prevent a recovery, unless the violation of the 
 rule in some way contributed to cause the injury.'"' Where 
 a section hand stood on the lower step of a car and was in- 
 jured by striking the lever of a switch, so constructed as to 
 rub the side of the car, it was held that the proximate cause 
 of the injury was the negligent construction of the switch 
 and not the employee's standing where he was, when iri- 
 
 *8Dacey v. Old Colony E. Co., 153 Mas. 112; 26 N. E. Rep. 437. 
 "San Antonio, etc., R. Co. v. Wallace, 76 Texas 636; 13 S. W. 
 Rep. 565; 44 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 564. 
 00 San Antonio, etc., R. Co. v. Wallace, supra. 
 
 623 
 
§ 397 CONTBIBUTOEY rTEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 jured.^^ And it is held in many cases that an employee's 
 act in being on the side of a moving car is not the proximate 
 cause of his injury, by a negligently constructed obstruction 
 too near the track, but the negligence of the employer in 
 maintaining such a structure, and not the act of the employee 
 in being at the place at the particular time when injured, is 
 the direct cause of the injury.''^ Other illustrations of acts 
 that have and acts that have not been held to be proximate 
 causes of injuries, will be found in the note. ^* 
 
 SI Boss V. Northern Pacific R. Co., 5 Dakota 308 ; 40 N. W. Rep. 590. 
 
 02 Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Burton, 97 Ala. ,240; 12 So. Rep. 88; 
 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 115; Choctaw, etc., R. Co. v. McDade, 191 
 U. S. 65; 48 L. Ed. 96. 
 
 B3 An employee walking so close to a track as to receive an injury 
 while so doing, is held to have been responsible therefor and the 
 employer not liable. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Long, 112 Ind. 166; 
 13 N. E. Rep. 659; 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 138. An employee injured 
 by the falling of a stack of lumber, which he and his coemployees had 
 helped to unload, was held responsible for the injury. Langlois v. 
 Maine C. R. Co., 84 Me. 161 ; 24 Atl. Rep. 804. An employee running 
 a, hand car, who worked until his feet froze, was held negligent so as 
 to preclude a recovery, in Iowa. Farmer v. Central Iowa R. Co., 67 
 Tlowa 136; 24 N. W. Rep. 895. A station master who went onto a 
 crossing, for which the engineer failed to sound the whistle or ring 
 the bell, as required by statute, was held negligent, proximately con- 
 tributing to his injury, in Missouri. Evans v. Atlantic, etc., R.. Co., 
 62 Mo. 49. 
 
 But the passive act of the fireman in not seeing that the engineer 
 complied with the rules of the employer, will not preclude a recovery 
 by the fireman, for an injury. New Jersey, etc., R. Co. v. Young, 
 49 Fed. Rep. 723; 1 U. S. App. 96; 1 C. C. A. 428. A delay of a 
 moment or so, by an employee, in putting on his gloves, is held, in 
 Alabama, not to be such negligence as' proximately causes a collision 
 with a projecting rock. Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. Davis, 92 Ala. 300; 
 9 So. Rep. 252. Negligence cannot be predicated on a mere dangerous 
 act, done in accordance with the employer's rules. Louisville, etc., R. 
 Co. v. Utz, 133 Ind. 265; 32 N. E. Rep. 881; Greenleaf v. Dubuque, 
 etc., R. Co., 33 Iowa 52. A hostler in an engine house was held not 
 negligent in the performance of duties outside the scope of his em- 
 ployment, when injured, in Grannis v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 81 Iowa 
 444; 46 N. W. Rep. 1067. The mere fact that a head brakeman was 
 524 
 
eONTKIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES, § 398 
 
 § 398. Doctrine of last clear chance. — From the distinc- 
 tions noted in the foregoing section, what is known as the 
 doctrine of last clear chance, or the humanitarian doe^ 
 trine, has had its Origin. This rule of last clear chance 
 is recognized by the courts, as an exception to the general 
 rule that the contributory negligence of the person injured 
 will bar a recovery, without reference to the degree of negli- 
 gence on his part, and under this exception to the rule it may 
 now be stated to be well established that the injured person^ 
 or his representative, may recover damages for an injury 
 resulting from the negligence of the defendant, although the 
 negligence of the injured person exposed him to the danger 
 of the injury sustained, if the injury w^s more immediately 
 caused by the want of care on the defendant's part, to avoid 
 the injury, after discovering the peril of the injured person.®* 
 
 riding on an engine, in violation of rules, when it was the custom 
 so to do, was held not to be the proximate cause of an injury while 
 so riding. Sprong v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 58 N. Y. 56; 9 Am. Ey. 
 Eep. 475; Booth v. Boston, etc., E. Co., 67 N. Y. 593. Nor would 
 the presence of an employee at a car that he was unloading, be held 
 the proximate cause of his death, by being struck by a ear which 
 was shoved against the car where he was at work, without warning 
 to him. Maguire v. Fitzburg, etc., E. Co., 146 Mass. 379; 15 N. E. 
 Eep. 904; 34 Am. & Eng. E. Oas. 146. 
 
 B4Shearm. & Eedf. on Neg. (5 ed), § 99; Prazer v. South & N. 
 Ala. E. Co., 81 Ala. 185; Green v. Los Angeles, etc., E. Co., 143 
 Cal. 31; Lee v. Market St. E. Co., 135 Cal. 293; Harrington v. Los 
 Angeles, etc., R. Co., 140 Cal. 514; Oliver v. Denver, etc., Tr. Co., 
 13 Colo. App. 543; Griffith v. Denver Con. Tr. Co., 14 Colo. App. 504; 
 Ishell V. New York, etc., E. Co., 27 Conn. 393; Bullard v. Southern 
 E. Co., 116 Ga. 644; Ashworth v. Southern E. Co., 116 Ga. 635; 
 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Eyan, 131 111. 474; Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. 
 V. Bodemer, 139 111. 596; Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Green, 93 111. App. 
 105; Cleveland, etc., E. Co. v. Lee, 154 Ind. 430; Neet v. Burlington, 
 etc., R. Co;, 106 Iowa 248; Crowley v. Louisville, etc., E. Co., 21 
 Ky. L. E. 1434; 55 S. W. Eep. 434; McClanahan v. Vicksburg, etc., 
 R. Co., HI La. Ann. 781; Baltimore, etc., E. Co. v. Rifowitz, 89 Md. 
 338; Aiken v. Holyoke, etc., E. Co., 184 Mass. 269; Snoniker v. 
 Great Northern E. Co., 76 Minn. 306; Fearons v. Kansas City, etc., 
 E. Co., 180 Mo. 208; 79 S. W. Eep. 394; Bunting v. Central Pacific 
 
 525 
 
§ 398 CONTEIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 In other words, the doctrine is, that where A, after discov- 
 ering that B has carelessly exposed himself to danger, neg- 
 lects to use ordinary care to avoid injuring him, and injury 
 is inflicted upon B, as a result of A's negligence, then A is 
 liable, notwithstanding the prior negligence of B.*"" This 
 rule is followed in some States where the rule of compara- 
 tive negligence is condemned,^* although it is, practically, a 
 species of comparative negligence, especially when the courts 
 fail to note the distinction that the doctrine presupposes the 
 preceding negligence of the injured person and apply the 
 doctrine in the case of contemporaneous negligence of both 
 parties.^^ This rule does not exempt the injured person from 
 the consequences of his own contemporaneous negligence, 
 which is an immediate, direct and proximate cause of the 
 injury. When the carelessness of both parties is contem- 
 poraneous and the injury results from the mutual want of 
 care on their part, then no recovery, can be had under the 
 humanitarian doctrine."^ 
 
 R. Co., 16 Nev. 277; Edgerly v. Union St. R. Co., 67 N. H. 312; Rider 
 V. Syracuse, etc., R. Co., 171 N. Y. 139; McDonald v. Metropolitan St. 
 R. Co., 93 App.. Div. (N. Y.) 238; Began v. Carolina Central R. Co., 
 129 N. C. 154; Erie R. Co. v. McCormick, 69 Ohio St. 45; Shaw v. 
 Salt Lake R. Co., 21 Utah 76; Virginia Midland R. Co. v. White, 
 84 Va. 498; Meeks v. Ohio River R. Co., 52 W. Va. 99; Dotta v. 
 Northern Pacific R. Co., 36 Wash. 506. 
 
 00 This is practically as Judge Bland states the illustration for 
 the St. Louis Court of Appeals, in Sims v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 116 
 Mo. App. 579. 
 
 06 This is true, of Missouri, Howlerson v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 
 157 Mo. 216; 57 S. W. Rep. 770. 
 
 07 The Kansas City Court of Appeals clearly failed to note this 
 distinction in Burde v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 100 S. W. Rep. 509, and 
 Mann v. Missouri, etc., R. Co., 100 S. W. Rep. 566. 
 
 08 This is, practically, the language of the Supreme Court of 
 Missouri, in Watson v. Mound City, etc., R. Co., 133 Mo. 246; 34 
 S. W. Rep. 573. See, also, Howlerson v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 157 
 Mo. 225; 57 S. W. Rep. 770, and cases cited; Beach Con. Neg., § 56 
 and citations; Sims v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 116 Mo. App. 578. 
 
 " The burden was on plaintiff to show that the trainmen discovered 
 526 
 
COKTBIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. § 399 
 
 § 399. Employee must use ordinary prudence. — An em- 
 ployee is bound to use ordinary care to avoid the dangers 
 
 him upon the trestle and his periloils condition in time to avoid in- 
 juring him and willfully and recklessly injured him." Adams v. St. 
 Louis, I. M. & S. Ey. Co. (Ark. 1907), 103 S. W. Rep. 725. 
 , " Where one who is guilty of negligence in being too near a railroad 
 track is not discovered by the engineer or fireman in time to prevent 
 striking him by a train running from station to station, there is no 
 actionable negligence." Texas & N. 0. R. Co. v. Scarborough (Tex. Civ. 
 App. 1907), 104 S. W. Rep. 408. 
 
 " No one will be relieved from liability for injury inflicted by him 
 on another by reason of the fact that such other negligently exposed 
 himself to the danger, if, when that situation was, or ought to have 
 been, apparent to him, he omitted such reasonable precautions aa 
 would, if taken, have prevented the injury." Judgment, Klutt v. 
 Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. (C. C), 145 F. 965, affirmed; Philadelphia 
 & R. R. Co. V. Klutt (U. S. C. C. A., Pa., 1906), 148 Fed. Rep. 818. 
 
 " A railroad company is liable where a watchman at a crossing is 
 seen by an engineer of a moving train on the crossing with a lantern 
 in his hand, if the engineer was carelessly inadvertent as to whether 
 he would get out of the way or not," Betchman v. Seaboard Air Line 
 Ry. (S. C. 1906), 55 S. E. Rep. 140. 
 
 The last chance or humanitarian doctrine, has been recognized in 
 the following cases: Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Ryan, 131 111. 474; 23 
 N. E. Rep. 385; 43 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 396; Spencer v. Baltimore, 
 etc., R. Co., 4 Maokey (D. C.) 138; 54 Am. Rep. 269; Cincinnati, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Kassen, 49 Ohio St. 230; 31 N. E. Rep. 282; 16 L. R. A. 
 674; 52 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 427; Cook v. Central R. Co., 67 Ala. 533; 
 Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Cavennesse, 48 Ark. 106; 2 S. W. Rep. 505; 
 Denver, etc., R. Co. v. Dwyer, 3 Colo. App. .408; Romiek v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. Co., 62 Iowa 167; 17 N. W. Rep. 458; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 288; Wooster v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 74 Iowa 593; 35 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Caa. 152; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Mulligan, 45 Md. 486; Swigert 
 V. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 75 Mo. 475; 9 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 322; 
 Dunkman v. Wabash R. Co., 95 Mo. 232; 4 S. W. Rep. 670; Union 
 Pacific R. Co. V. Mertes, 35 Neb. 204; 52 N. W. Rep. 1099; Sweeney 
 V. New York, etc., Co., 117 N. Y. 642; 22 N. E. Rep. 1131; 27 N. Y. 
 S. R. 977; Deans v. Wilmington, etc., R. Co., 107 N. Car. 686; 12 
 S. E. Rep. 77; 45 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 45; Troy v. Cape Fear, etc., R. 
 Co., 99 N. Car. 298; 6 S. E. Rep. 77; 6 Am. St. Rep. 521; 34 Am'. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 13; Hays v. Gainesville, etc., R. Co., 70 Texas 602j 
 8 S. W. Rep. 491; 34 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 97; Trow v. Vermont, etc., 
 R. Co., 24 Vt. 487; Virginia, etc., R. Co. v. .White, 84 Va. 498; 5 S. E. 
 
 52Y 
 
§ 399 CONTEIBUTOEY KEGLIGENCE OP EMPLOYEES, 
 
 that arise, whether usually incident to the service or not.**® 
 He is under the same obligation to provide for his own 
 safety from dangers of which he has notice, or which he 
 
 Eep. 573; 34 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 22; Downey v. Chesapeake, etc., K. 
 Co., 28 W. Va. 732; Eadley v. London, etc., R. Co., L. E. 1 App. Cas. 
 754; 46 L. J. Ex. D. 573; 35 L. T. 637; 25 W. R. 147; Duncan v. 
 Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 46 Mo. App. 198. 
 
 " Even if one was negligent in going on the track of a logging 
 railroad, yet there was no contributory negligence on his part, he 
 having been struck by lightning and rendered unconscious, and the 
 train which ran over him having been far enough away and going 
 slow enough to have allowed him to be seen and train to be stopped 
 in time to avoid the accident, had a lookout been kept." Sawyer v. 
 Roanoke R. & Lumber Co. (N. C. 1907), 58 S. E. Rep. 598. 
 
 " Where an injured person was negligent in assuming a position 
 of danger, he may nevertheless recover if the person charged with the 
 injury became aware of his peril in time to avoid injuring him by 
 the proper use of all preventive means at his command and negligently 
 failed to use such means, provided the injured person was himself 
 free from negligence after he became conscious of his danger." Duncan 
 V. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. (Ala. 1907), 44 So. Rep. 418. 
 
 But that the last chance doctrine, as properly applied, is limited 
 to cases of preceding negligence by the plaintiff and that it does 
 not apply in a case of contemporaneous negligence, is affirmed in 
 the following cases: Holmes v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 97 Cal. 161; 
 31 Pac. Rep. 834; Clark v. Wilmington, etc., R. Co., 109 N. Car. 430; 
 14 S. E. Rep. 43; 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 546; Lewis v. Baltimore, 
 etc., R. Co., 38 Md. 588; 10 Am. Ry. Rep. 521; Kellny v. Missouri 
 Pacific Ry. Co., 101 Mo. 67; 13 S. W. Rep. 806; 43 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 186; Howlerson v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 157 Mo. 216; 57 S. W. 
 Rep. 770; 50 L. R. A. 850; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Wallace, 90 
 Tenn. 53; 15 S. W. Rep. 921. 
 
 "Where plaintiff was injured on a track by the negligence of 
 defendant, but could have avoided it by the exercise of ordinary care, 
 he cannot recover, though defendant ought to have discovered, but did 
 not discover, his peril in time to prevent the accident, where plaintiff's 
 negligence continued up to the very moment he was hurt." Dyerson v. 
 Union Pac. R. Co. (Kan. 1906), 87 Pac. Rep. 680. 
 
 "Where plaintiff has been negligent and his negligence continues 
 and concurrently with the negligence of defendant directly contributes 
 to produce the injury, the doctrine of the last chance does not apply." 
 Drown v. Northern Ohio Traction Co. (Ohio 1907), 81 N. E. Rep. 326. 
 
 BoSchroeder v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 108 Mo. 322; 18 S. W. Rep. 
 1094; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 436; Alcorn v, Chicago, etc., E. Co', 
 528 
 
CONTEIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. § 399 
 
 might discover, by the use of ordinary care, that the em- 
 ployer is to provide it for him.*" 
 
 Where the employment sought and accepted is dangerous, 
 it is the duty of the employee to at least exercise reasonable 
 and ordinary care to avoid injury. If the employment is a 
 hazardous service, he is required to use very great precau- 
 tions to avoid injury,®^ for while there is an implied con- 
 tract between the employer and the employee tljat the former 
 will provide suitable and reasonably safe appliances and 
 means for the conduct of the business, and advise the em- 
 ployee of risks that the employee does not have notice of, yet, 
 if the employer fails in this duty, in either respect, this 
 would furnish no excuse for the employee to voluntarily en- 
 counter a known danger in the service.®^ 
 
 An employee of a railroad company, to recover for a per- 
 sonal injury growing out of the negligence of the employer, 
 must have used ordinary care on his part, that is, such care 
 as a man of ordinary prudence would usually exercise under 
 the same, or like circumstances.®* If, having notice of dan- 
 
 108 Mo. 81; 18 S. W. Eep. 188; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Caa. 87; Darracott 
 V. Chesapeake & 0. E. Co., 83 Va. 288; 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 157; 
 Crutohfield v. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 78 N. Car. 300; 16 Am. Ry. 
 Rep. 212. 
 
 eoWormell v. Maine C. R. Co., 79 Me. 397; 10 Atl. Rep. 49; 31 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 272; Johnson v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co., 38 W. 
 ^^,Va. 206; 18 S. E. Rep. 573; Hughes v. Winona, etc., R. Co., 27 Minn. 
 1S7; 6 N. W. Rep. 553. 
 
 eiTJnion Pacific R. Co. v. Estes, 37 Kansas 715; 16 Pac. Rep. 131; 
 Parker v. Georgia Pacific E. Co., 83 Ga. 539; 10 S. E. Rep. 233; 
 Deppe V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 36 Iowa 52; Taylor v. Missouri Pacific 
 Ry. Co., 86 Mo. 457; 16 S. W. Rep. 206; Shoner v. Pennsylvania R. 
 Co., 130 Ind.- 170; 28 N. E. Rep. 616; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. McClain, 
 80 Texas 85; 15 S. W. Eep. 789; Riley v. Connecticut River R. Co., 
 135 Mass. 292; 15 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 181; Corcoran v. Boston, etc., 
 B. Co., 133 Mass. 507; Maher v. Boston, etc., E. Co., 158 Mass. 36; 
 EoH V. Northern C. R. Co., 15 Hun (K Y.) 496; 80 N. Y. 647. 
 
 62 Simmons v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 110 111. 340; 18 Am. & Eng. 
 E. Cas. 50. 
 
 83 Wabash E. Co. v. Elliott, 98 111. 481; 4 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 651; 
 1—34 529 
 
§ 400 CONTEIBUTOET NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 ger in his employment, lie fails, from inattention, indiffer- 
 ence or forgetfulness, to inform himself of the particular 
 facts, or to take the steps necessary to avoid injury — in other 
 words, if he fails to exercise the care, watchfulness and cau- 
 tion which men of ordinary prudence would exercise under 
 the circumstances — he is guilty of contributory negligence.** 
 
 § 400. Voluntarily selecting more dangerous way, — In all 
 the multiform duties of employees on railroads, if the em- 
 ployee has the choice of two or more ways of performing his 
 duty open to him and he voluntarily selects the more danger- 
 ous way to do his work and, as a result thereof sustains in- 
 jury, he is guilty of such negligence as will bar an action for 
 damages, in failing to take the course attendant with the less 
 risk of injury ; and if the danger is so imminent and appar- 
 ent, in either or all the ways open to him, that a careful and 
 prudent man would not- incur the risk, he cannot recover, 
 unless the evidence shows that the injury to him resulted 
 from the reckless, wanton or willful act of the employer.®' 
 
 Bchultz V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 44 Wis. 638; 18 Am. Ry. Rep. 146. 
 
 8* Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Hall, 87 Ala. 708; 6 So. Rep. 277; 4 
 L. R. A. 710; 39 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 298. 
 
 "A switchman in full control of a switch, and with authority to 
 control by signal the movements of engines using it, who allowed an 
 engine to come so close to the switch that he did not have time to 
 complete the act of turning the lever before the engine had passed the 
 switch, and struck his hand which was upon the partly turned lever, 
 was guilty of contributory negligence." Eliot v, Kansas City, etc., R. 
 Co. (Mo. 1907), 102 S. W. Rep. 532. 
 
 An engineer who had neglected to see that his sand box contained 
 plenty of sand, got off his engine to gather sand and negligently placed 
 his hand on the rail and got it crushed. His own negligence was held 
 to preclude a recovery. Walker v. Louis Werner, etc., Co. (Ark.), 
 88 S. W. Rep. 988. 
 
 eo Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. George, 94 Ala. 199; 10 So. Rep. 145; 
 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Orr, 91 Ala. 548; 8 So. Rep. 3i60; Memphis, 
 
 etc., R. Co. V. Graham, 94 Ala. 545; 10 So. Rep. 283; 53 Am. & Eng. 
 
 R. Cas. 396; St. Louis, etc., R. Co, v. Brennen, 20 111. App. 555; 
 
 530 
 
CONTKIBTJTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES, § 401 
 
 But it is only "when it clearly appears, or the facts are un- 
 disputed, that the injured employee had voluntarily chosen a 
 dangerous method of doing his -work, a safer one having been 
 provided by his employer, that the court can say, as matter of 
 law, that his method of doing his work, or his selection of 
 the way in which to do it, was negligence on his part.®* 
 
 If the injury occurred, not from the way selected to do 
 the work, but from the defect in the appliances used, when, 
 but for such defect, the duty might have been safely per^ 
 formed, the method selected to do the work will not neces- 
 sarily bar the recovery, but it will be left to the jury to de- 
 termine whether the employee was guilty of negligence in 
 selecting the way adopted to do his work.®'^ 
 
 § 401. Effect of employee's negligence. — An employee of 
 a railroad company cannot recover for injuries received in 
 the service, if his own negligence contributed in part to the 
 
 Pennsylvama, etc., E. Co. v. O'Shaugbnessy, 122 Ind. 588; 23 N. B. 
 Eep. 675; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 479; Union Pacific R. Co. v. Estes, 
 37 Kansas 715; 16 Pac. Rep. 131; Dandie v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 
 42 La. Ann. 686; 7 So. Eep. 792; Schaub v. Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 
 106 Mo. 74; 16 S. W. Eep. 924; Moore v. Kansas City, etc., E. Co., 
 146 Mo. 358; 45 S. W. Eep. 896; Kehler v. Sehwenk, 144 Pa. St. 
 348; 22 Atl. Eep. 910; Gowen v. Harley (by Judge Sanborn), 56 
 Fed. Eep. 973; Kinney v. Corbin, 132 Pa. St. 341; 19 Atl. Eep. 141. 
 
 oeMisouri Pacific Ey. Co. v. McCally, 41 Kansas 639; 21 Pac. 
 Rep. 574. 
 
 er Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Pearson, 97 Ala. 211; 12 So. Eep. 176; 
 Schumaker v. St. Paul, etc., E. Co., 46 Minn. 39; 48 N. W. Eep. 559. 
 
 " It is the duty of a party imperiled by another's negligence, where 
 two ways of conduct are open, one safe and the other manifestly 
 dangerous, to adopt the course which is least dangerous." Atlantic 
 Coast Line E. Co. v. O'Neill, 56 S. E. Eep. 986; 127 Ga. 685. 
 
 " Where a plaintiff testified that a foreman did not order him to 
 get astride a tie to move it, but ordered him to get into a trench, which 
 would have been a safer method, but that he could not lift the tie 
 without getting astride it, there being hardly room in the trench for 
 him to stand in it, the defenses of contributory negligence or assumed 
 
 531 
 
§ 401 CONTEIBUTOEY- NEGLIGEIirCE 01" EMPLOYEES. 
 
 injury.®* If the employee and tHe company are equally to 
 blame for the injury, the employer is not liable.®* When em- 
 ployees, aware of the dangers of their employment, volun- 
 tarily use implements ■which they know, or by the exercise 
 of reasonable care might know, are not so well adapted to 
 the business as other implements, they cannot recover dam- 
 ages for injuries resulting therefrom, which might have been 
 avoided by the use of that ordinary care which it is the duty 
 of every person to use.''" There is no presumption of negli- 
 gence on the part of either plaintiff or defendant, but both 
 are presumed to do their duty ; where an employee is injured, 
 however, in consequence of a hand car leaving the track, 
 upon which he was riding and running at the time, sincg the 
 evidence showed that he was himself controlling the ear, in 
 order to recover, he must show, affirmatively, that ' he was 
 free from fault, or that the derailment of the car was due to 
 the negligence of his employer. ^^ 
 
 But the rule that mutual negligence of the plaintiff and 
 defendant will defeat the plaintiff's recovery, is subject to 
 the qualification that if the defendant might, by the exercise 
 of reasonable care and prudence, after discovery of the dan- 
 ger to the plaintiff, have avoided the injury, then the plea 
 
 risk were available to the employer." Reeves v. Galveston, H. & S. A. 
 Ey. Co. (Tex. Civ. App. 1907), 98 S. W. Rep. 929. 
 
 68 Daub V. Northern Pacific R. Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 625; Bauer v. St. 
 Louis, etc., R. Co., 46 Ark. 388; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Jones, 95 
 U. S. 439; Schofield v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 114 U. S. 617; Williams 
 V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 64 Wis. 1; 24 N. W. Rep. 423; Slavin v. 
 New York, etc., R. Co., 63 Conn. 573; Central, etc., R. Co. v. Kitchens, 
 83 Ga. 83; 9 S. E. Rep. 827; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Merekes, 36 111. 
 App. 195. 
 
 69 Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Love, 10 Ind. 554; Cornwall v. 
 Charlotte, etc., R. Co., 97 N. Car. 11; 2 S. E. Rep. 659. 
 
 TO Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Conrad, 62 Texas 627. 
 
 Ti Central, etc., R. Co. v. Kenney, 58 Ga. 485; 16 Am. Ry. Rep. 131. 
 
 532 
 
CONTEIBUTOEY NBGLI&ENCE OF EMPLOYEES. § 402 
 
 of contributory n^ligence will, not obtain/^ as already ex- 
 plained.''* 
 
 § 402. Contributory negligence of volunteer. — As the con- 
 tributory negligence of an employer's own employees will de- 
 feat a recovery of damages for an injury resulting therefrom 
 to such employee, a fortiori will the contributing negligence 
 of a mere voluijteer, who receives an injury while volunteer- 
 ing service to a railroad company, defeat a recovery for an 
 injury thereby received.''* 
 
 In a Massachusetts case/® a man volunteered to do a serv- 
 ice for a railroad company and he was killed while walking 
 on the track, in performance of the voluntary duties under- 
 taken. The evidence showed a want of ordinary care, on 
 his part, and it was held that no recovery could be had for 
 his death. A similar rule was applied in Mississippi,'''' 
 
 T2 Grand Trunk E. Co. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408; 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 679; 
 Southern Pacific R. Co. v. Lafferty, 57 Fed. Rep. 536; Northern 
 Pacific R. Co. V. Sullivan, 53 Fed. Rep. 219; 10 U. S. App. 473; 
 3 C. C. A. 506. 
 
 '3 See section " Doctrine of Last Clear Chance," sec. 398. 
 
 " Where an illegal act of plaintiff places him in a dangerous situa- 
 tion, and he is injured by defendant, the latter is liable for the injury, 
 if inflicted wantonly and recklessly." Black v. New York, etc., R. Co. 
 (Mass. 1907), 79 N. E. Rep.' 797. 
 
 " Where, in an action for the death of one struck by a train while 
 rescuing a third person from being struck by the same train, there was 
 evidence that a switchman saw the peril of the third person in tiiqe 
 to have stopped the train before reaching him, and that he saw the 
 efforts of decedent to rescue the third person, the negligence of the 
 switchman in failing to give the signal to stop the train was the 
 proximate cause of decedent's death." Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Scar- 
 borough (Tex. Civ. App. 1907), 104 S. W. Rep. 408. 
 
 '*New Orleans, etc., R. Co. v. Harrison, 48 Miss. 112; Everhart v. 
 Terre Haute, etc., R. Co., 78 Ind. 292; 41 Am. Rep. 567; 4 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 599; Barstow v. Old Colony, etc., R. Co., 143 Mass. 535; 
 10 N. E. Rep. 255; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 473. 
 
 75 Barstow v. Old Colony, etc., E. Co., 143 Mass. 535; 10 N. E. Rep. 
 255; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 473. 
 
 T6New Orleans, etc., E. Co. v. Harrison, 48 Miss. 112. 
 
 533 
 
§ 403 CONTRIBUTOEY WEGLIGEITCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 where it was held that a railroad company was not liable 
 , for injuries inflicted through the negligence of its employees, 
 upon a stranger to the company, while engaged in the volun- 
 tary service of uncoupling its cars, where, by his own negli- 
 gence he contributed to the injury received. 
 
 § 403. Effect of plaintiff's lack of skill. — Ordinarily, 
 when an adult person solicits employment in a, particular line 
 of work, the act of solicitation is held to be an assertion by 
 the employee that he is competent to perform the ordinary 
 duties of the service in which he engages. It is generally 
 regarded as an implied condition of all contracts of employ- 
 ment with an adult person that he is competent to discharge 
 the duties for which he is employed. It is, therefore, the 
 fault of the employee, if he undertakes, without sufficient 
 skill, the performance of hazardous duties, or if he applies 
 less skill than the given duties of his service demand.'^ 
 
 But where a railroad company has notice of the lack of 
 skill on the part of a given employee, it will not be permitted 
 to defend the action, upon the lack of skill possessed by him, 
 when he is injured by reason of the unskillful use of defec- 
 tive appliances.''® and where an inexperienced employee' is 
 injured while doing work marked out for him and which he 
 was directed to do by an experienced superintendent, and the 
 evidence showed that the plaintiff did not understand or ap- 
 preciate the danger of doing the work, it is a question for the 
 jury whether or not he was guilty of contributory negligence 
 in the performance of the duties assigned to him and the 
 court ought not to decide, as matter of law, that he was, or 
 was not negligent. ''* 
 
 T7 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Estes, 37 Kansas 715; 16 Pae. Rep. 131. 
 TsGoins V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 37 Mo. App. 221. 
 •i'o Texas, etc., R. Co. v. French (Texas Civ. App.), 22 S. W. Rep. 
 866. 
 
 534 
 
CONTKIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OE EMPLOYEES. § 404 
 
 § 404. As a defense to statutory negligence. — An action 
 for an injury from being struck hj a moving train, not oper- 
 ated as provided by statute/" is held, in Tennessee, not to 
 lie, on behalf of an employee of the railroad company, -whose 
 negligence caused, or contributed to the accident or collision 
 occasioning the injury.*^ In an action by an employee, '' 
 agaiost a railroad company, for a personal injury, alleged 
 to have been received while the employer was violating the 
 statute of Alabama,*^ the defense of contributory negligence 
 was held to be open to the employer.*^ And in Illinois, the 
 defense was formerly held to pbtain in an action, for personal 
 injury, received while a statute was being violated,** but of 
 recent years this rule has been abandoned and contributory 
 negligence is not a defense in that State in an action for an 
 injury based on statutory negligence.*^ The Constitution of 
 Mississippi,** which provides that " knowledge by an em- 
 ployee injured, of the defective or unsafe character or con- 
 dition of machinery, ways, or appliances, shall be no defense 
 to an action for injury caused thereby," is held to abolish 
 the defense of contributory negligence, except where the neg- 
 ligence of the employee is willfid or reckless,*'^ and, gener- 
 ally, to constitute a defense, there must be more than a mere 
 showing of notice of the noncompliance with the statute and 
 it must appear that the employee performed his work in a 
 
 soTenn. Code, § 1166, et seq. 
 
 81 East Tennessee, etc., B. Co. t. Bush, IS Lea (Tenn.) 143; Louis- 
 ville, etc., B. Co. V. Bobertson, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 276; Louisville, §tc., 
 E. Co. V. Burke, 6 Coldw. (Tenn.) 45. 
 
 82 Ala. Code, 1886, § 2590. 
 
 83 Mobile, etc., E. Co. v. Holborn, 84 Ala. 133; 4 So. Rep. 146. 
 8* Wabash E. Co. v. Thompson, 10 111. App. 271. 
 
 sBEiverton Co. v. Shepard, 207 111. 395; 69 N. E. Rep. 921; Western 
 C. Co. V. Beaver, 95 111. App. 95; 61 N. E. Bep. 33'5; Carterville Co. v. 
 Abbott, 81 111. App. 279; 55 N. E. Bep. 131; Fulton v. Wilmington 
 Star Co., 133 Fed. Rep. 193. 
 
 sslliss. Con. 1890, § 193. 
 
 87 Welsh V. Alabama, etc., B. Co., 70 Miss. 20; 11 So. Bep. 723. 
 
 535 
 
§ 405 CONTEIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 dangerous manner, or did some act, as distingnislied from a 
 mere passive acquiescence in the violation of the statute.®® 
 Contributory negligence, however, is held to be a defense in 
 most of the States, for actions for injuries based on statutory- 
 negligence.®® 
 
 § 405. When intoxication bars recovery. — 'Contributory 
 negligence resulting from the inebriation of the injured party 
 will exonerate the party inflicting the injury, if there is no 
 fault on his part.®" A man cannot voluntarily place himself 
 in an intoxicated condition, whereby he loses control of his 
 brain and muscles, and thereby contributes to an injury to 
 himself, and then require of one ignorant of his condition 
 to pay damages therefor.®^ One standing, in a state of in- 
 toxication, on a railroad track, at the usual time of the run- 
 ning of a train, in a position of peril, is guilty of negli- 
 gence ®^ and if one, while helpless from drunkenness, is run 
 over and injured by a passing train, he is held to be guilty 
 of such contributory negligence as will prevent a recovery, 
 
 88 Highland Ave. E. Co. v. Waters, 91 Ala. 435; 8 So. Rep. 357; 
 Spiva V. Osage C. & M. Co., 88 Mo. 68. 
 
 89 Dresser, Emp. Liab., §§ 51, 116; White, Per. Inj. Mines, § 254; 
 Taylor v. Carew Co., 142 Mass. 470; Krause v. Morgen, 52 Ohio St. 
 325; 40 N. E. Kep. 886; Western v. Lackawanna Co., 105 Mo. App. 
 702; Payne v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 129 Mo. 405; 31 S. W. Rep. 885; 
 Hogan V. Citizens Ry. Co., 150 Mo. 36; 51 S. W. Rep. 473. 
 
 Contributory negligence is held to bar a recovery by an employee, 
 under the Florida fellow-service statute. (Rev. St., § 2346 and Laws 
 1891, p. 113.) Atlantic Coast Line E. Co. v. Ryland, 40 So. Rep. 24. 
 
 90 Weeks v. New Orleans, etc., R. Co., 32 La. Ann. 615; Illinois, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Cragin, 71 111. 177; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Lewis, 5 
 111. App. 242; Southwestern R. Co. v. Hankerson, 61 Ga. 114. 
 
 91 Strand v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 67 Mich. 380; 34 N. W. Rep. 712; 
 31 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 54; Fisher v. West Virginia, etc., R. Co., 19 
 S. E. Rep. 578; 58 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 337. 
 
 92Whalen v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 60 Mo. 323; 9 Am. Ry. Rep. 
 224; Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Simpkins, 54 Texas 615; 6 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 11. 
 
 536 
 
CONTEIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPJLOTEES. § 406 
 
 unless his injuries were wantonly or willfully inflicted, after 
 his peril was discovered.®^ 
 
 But drunkenness is not a defense by way of contributory 
 negligence, unless it was the proximate cause of the injury. 
 If the person got drunk under circumstances that any rea- 
 sonably prudent man could foresee would place him in a po- 
 sition of- danger, then his drunkenness would be a defense.®* 
 Intoxication, however, is not a defense per se, but is only 
 evidence of contributory negligence on the part of the in- 
 jured one. It is only a complete defense when it contributes 
 to occasion the injury.®^ 
 
 § 406. Bemaining in service involving danger. — The em- 
 ployee is charged in law, with a knowledge of such defects 
 as he could have ascertained by the exercise of reasonable 
 care and diligence to inform himself,®® ~but unless the risks 
 are patent he is not under the same obligation to know the 
 nature and extent thereof as the employer is.*'' 
 
 The negligence on the part of the employee may consist and 
 often does, in failing to know, as well as in failing to do; 
 and such is always the case, where it is his duty to know 
 the conditions of his surroundings.®^ If the employee knows, 
 or could know, of the defects or dangers in appliances or his 
 surroundings, by the exercise of ordinary care, and still re- 
 mains in the employment and is injured, this fact would tend 
 to establish contributory negligence, but it would not be con- 
 
 »3 Houston, etc., E. Co. v. Simpkins,- supra. 
 
 0* Davis V. Oregon, etc., R. Co., 8 Oregon 172. 
 
 »5 Lynch v. Mayor, etc., 47 Hun (N. Y.) 524; 15 N. Y. S. R. 103. 
 
 98 Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Pearcy, 128 Ind. 197; 27 N. E. Rep. 479; 
 Hayden v. Sioux City, etc., R. Co. (Iowa), 48 N. W. Rep. 733. 
 
 07 McDonald v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 41 Minn. 439; 43 N. W. Rep. 
 380. 
 
 88 Hewitt V. Flint, etc., R. Co., 67 Mich. 61; 34 N. W. Rep. 659; 
 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 249. 
 
 537 
 
§ 407 CONTEIBUTOET NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 elusive evidence thereof,"* althougli so held in some States.* 
 ]Srotwithstanding his notice of the danger or the fact that it 
 could have been appreciated and understood, by due care, if 
 the employee has used an honest effort to perform his duty 
 and immediate danger was not obviously incurred by remain- 
 ing in the service, the opportunity to know of the danger will 
 not prevent a recovery, but the issue of his negligence should 
 be submitted to the jury.^ 
 
 § 407. Employee may assume employer's performance of 
 duty. — Negligence can never be predicated upon the assump- 
 tion, by the employee, that the employer has performed his 
 duty, as the employee has a legal right to rely upon this pre- 
 sumption.^ Where an employee, therefore, assumes a posi- 
 es Perigo V. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 55 Iowa 326; 7 N. W. Rep. 627; 
 Deppe V. Chicago, etc.-, R. Co., 38 Iowa 592; Kansas City, etc, R. 
 Co. V. Burton, 97 Ala. 240; 12 So. Rep. 88; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 115; Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Sullivan, 2 Texas Unrep. Cas. 315. 
 
 1 Kitteringham v. Sioux City, etc., R. Co., 62 Iowa 285; 17 JST. W. 
 Rep. 585; Olsen v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 38 Minn. 117; 35 N. W. Rep. 
 866; 33 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 386; Smith v. Memphis, etc., R. Co., 18 
 Fed. Rep. 304; McDade v. Washington, etc., R. Co., 5 Maokey (0.C.) 
 144; 26 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 325; Oiell v. New York, etc., R. Co., 120 
 N. y. 323; 24 N. E. Rep. 478; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Hall, 91 Ala. 
 112; 8 So. Rep. 371; 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 170; Smith v. Peninsular 
 Car Works, 60 Mich. 501; 27 N. W. Rep. 662; 1 Am. St. Rep. 542. 
 
 2Mero T. New York, etc., R. Co., 71 Hun (N. Y.) 213; Louisville, 
 etc., R. Co. v. McCoy, 81 Ky. 403; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 277; Thorpe 
 V. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 89 Mo. 650; 2 S. W. Rep. 3. A brakeman's 
 knowledge of an unsafe rail, in the track, was held, in Missouri, not 
 to defeat a recovery, if it did not threaten immediate injury. Seeder v. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 100 Mo. 673; 13 S. W- Rep. 714. See, also, 
 Mahaney v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 108 Mo. 191; 18 S. W. Rep. 895. 
 
 " An employee is guilty of contributory negligence in using a machine 
 which he knows to be dangerous, notwithstanding he has protested 
 against such use, if the danger is such that an ordinarily prudent man 
 under the circumstances would not have incurred it, or the employee 
 in performing his work by his own negligence increases the risk." St. 
 Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Kern (Tex. Civ. App. 1907), 100 S. W. 
 Rep. 971. 
 
 s Irvine v. Flint, etc., R. Co., 89 Mich. 416; 50 N. W. Rep. 1008; 
 
 538 
 
CONTEIBTJTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. § 408 
 
 tion which is not hazardous in itself, but is made so through 
 an act done by the employer, without notice to the employee, 
 the latter cannot be charged with contributory negligence, as 
 he has a right to assume that he will not be placed in danger 
 by some act of the employer, over which he has no control.* 
 Where a car repairer was under a car repairing it and his 
 foreman had delegated two coemployees to notify him of ap- 
 proaching trains and they failed in their duty to warn him, 
 it was held that he was not negligent, as he had a right to 
 expect notice, or a performance of this duty.® 
 
 It was likewise held, that an employee may assume that 
 signals he has properly given will be obeyed and if he goes 
 upon the track, after a proper signal to the employees in 
 charge of the engine to stop, he will not be precluded be- 
 cause of his negligence, if the signal was not obeyed, but 
 the engine was run upon him, as he has the right to assume 
 that his coemployees will obey his signals and perform their 
 duty.« 
 
 § 408. Duty to look and listen for trains. — Where the facts 
 show that if the plaintiff, or injured person, had looked, he 
 would have seen an approaching train, and that he had facul- 
 
 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 210. 
 
 * Wills V. Cape Girardeau, etc., R; €o., 44 Mo. App. 51. 
 
 s Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Williams, 75 Texas 4; 12 S. W. Rep. 
 835. 
 
 » Steele v. Central R. Co., 43 Iowa 109 ; Bueklew v. Central Iowa R. 
 Co., 64 Iowa 603; Pringle v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 64 Iowa 613; 21 
 N. W. Rep. 108; 18 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 91; Murphy v. New York, 
 etc., R. Co., 118 N. Y. 527; 23 N. B. Rep. 812. 
 
 " Where a railroad rule required cars left on a grade siding to be 
 coupled together, a brakeman walking over such cars in the perform- 
 ance of his duty was entitled to assume that the rule had been complied 
 with, and was not guilty of contributory negligence, either in failing 
 to inspect the cars to ascertain whether they were coupled or in 
 assuming that they were coupled." St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. 
 V. Pope (Tex. Civ. App. 1906), 97 S. W. Rep. 534. 
 
 539 
 
§ 408 CONTEIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 ties to understand the danger, he is charged with the knowl- 
 edge of such danger and is bound to act on that knowledge, 
 as a reasonably prudent man, and his failure to so act is neg- 
 ligence and will defeat his recovery, notwithstanding the 
 negligence of the defendant.'' A person in possession of his 
 faculties cannot be said to have exercised due care, who goes 
 upon a railroad track, in front of a moving train, where it 
 appears that the usual signals were given ; ^ a person who 
 steps against an approaching locomotive, which could have 
 been seen, if he had stopped, looked or listened, is held to be 
 negligent so as to prevent a recovery, for a resulting injury,* 
 nor would it furnish any excuse that the plaintiff was absent- 
 minded and did not stop to hear or look to see the approach- 
 ing cars,^" or that the defendant was negligent i© failing to 
 give the statutory signals.*^ 
 
 But the plaintiff need only use ordinary care and is not 
 required to keep a constant lookout for dangers and perils. ^^ 
 A person cannot be charged with danger, when, under the 
 existing conditions, he had no reason to anticipate danger 
 at the place where the injury occurred ; ^^ one is not neces- 
 sarily guilty of contributory negligence, because he might 
 possibly have perceived the danger, but did not,^* and the 
 mere fact that plaintiff while walking on a station platform, 
 did not look behind him for an approaching train, is not 
 such negligence as vdll preclude a recovery for an injury 
 
 T Glasscock v. Central Pacific R. Co., 73 Cal. 137; 14 Pac. Rep. 518. 
 
 8 Moore v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 159 Mass. 399; 34 N. E. Rep. 366. 
 
 BHauser v. Central R. Co., 147 Pa. St. 440; 23 Atl. Rep. 766. 
 
 10 Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Miller, 25 Mich. 274. 
 
 "McDonald v. International, etc., R. Co. (Texas), 22 S. W. Rep. 939. 
 
 12 Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co. v. Martin, 41 Mich. 667. 
 
 isLangan v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 72 Mo. 392; 3 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 355. 
 
 "Baldwin v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 63 Iowa 210; 18 N. W. Rep. 
 884; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 166. 
 
 540 
 
CONTKIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. § 4:0$ 
 
 from a train that approached from behind, without the cus- 
 tomary signals.^ ^ 
 
 iBLangan v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 72 Mo. a92; 3 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 335. 
 
 " Failure of a traveler approaching a railroad crossing to look both 
 ways and listen for trains is not excused by the negligence of the 
 railroad company in failing to give proper signals." Porter v. Mis- 
 souri Pac. Ry. Co. (Mo. 1906), 97 S. W. Rep. 880. 
 
 " It is the duty of a traveler approaching a railroad crossing to look 
 and listen in both directions for approaching trains, and to continue 
 his vigilance in that respect until the danger is passed; but, when the 
 circumstances are such that danger is more to be apprehended from 
 one direction, he may, to that extent, relax his vigilance in the 
 opposite direction." St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Dillard (Ark. 
 1906), 94 S. W. Rep. 617. 
 
 " A person approached a railroad track by a flight of steps down 
 an embankment, and stepped upon the track in front of a train, 
 whereby she was injured, without looking in either direction to see 
 that the way was clear, although the train which struck her would 
 have been in plain view from the time she started down the steps. 
 3eld, that she was negligent in going on the track." Duncan v. St. 
 Louis & S. F. R. Co. (Ala. 1907), 44 So. Rep. 418. 
 
 The rule exempting a railroad company from liability for an injury 
 to a traveler, injured as a result of crossing a railroad track, with- 
 out looking or listening for an approaching train, was held not to apply 
 to an employee whose duty placed him upon or near the track, in 
 the following cases: Shoner v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 130 Ind. 170; 
 28 N. E. Rep. 616; 29 N. E. Rep. 775; Crowley v. Burlington, etc., 
 R. Co., 65 Iowa 658; 20 N. W. Rep. 467; 22 N. W. Rep. 918; Good- 
 fellow v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 106 Mass. 461; McMarshall v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. Co., 80 Iowa 757; 45 N. W. Rep. 106'5; Steele v. Central R. Co., 
 43 Iowa 109; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Potts, 92 Ky. 30; 17 S. W. 
 Rep. 185; Erickson v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 41 Minn. 500; 43 N. W. 
 Rep. 332; 5 L. R. A. 786. 
 
 But the failure to look and listen for approaching trains, was held 
 to preclude a recovery by employees who had failed to discharge 
 such duty, while working upon or near the track, when a collision 
 occurred and the employees in charge of trains were not able to 
 avoid the Injury, by reasonable care, after discovery of their peril, 
 in the following cases: Clark v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 128 Mass. 
 1; l,Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 134; Holland v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 18 
 Fed. Rep. 243; 5 McCrary (U. S.) 549; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Hous- 
 ton, 95 U. S. 697; Bertleson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 5 Dakota 313; 40 
 N. W. Rep. 531; Bauer v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 46 Ark." 388; Elliott 
 
 541 
 
§ 408 CONTUIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 V. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 5 Dakota 523; 41 N. W. Efip. 758; 3 L. E. A. 
 363; 38 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 62; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Depew, 40 
 Ohio St. 121; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Jones, 95 U. S. 439; Lenix 
 v.- Missouri Pacific By. Co., 76 Mo. 86; Crowe v. New York, etc., 
 E. Co., 23 N. Y. Supp. 1100; 70 Hun 37; 53 N. Y. S. E. 558; 
 Haden v. Sioux City, etc., R. Co. (Iowa), 48 N. W. Rep. 733; Nave 
 V. Alabama, etc., E. Co., 96 Ala. 264; 11 So. Eep. 391; 54 Am. & Eng. 
 E. Cas. 151; Glass v. Memphis, etc., R. Co., 94 Ala. 581; Aerkfetz v. 
 Humphries, 145 U. S. 418; 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 835; 53 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 459; Schaible v. Lake Shore, etc., E. Co., 97 Mich. 318; 
 56 N. W. Rep. 565; Myers v. IndiSnapolis, etc, R. Co., 113 111. 386; 1 
 N. B. Eep. 899. 
 
 - " The fact that an employee working close to a track knows that it 
 had previously been the rule of the company to run trains only in 
 one direction, except under unusual circumstances, does not excuse him 
 for failing to look both ways before crossing the track." Dyerson v. 
 Union Pac. R. Co. (Kan. 1906), 87 Pac. Rep. 680. 
 
 " The ' look and listen ' rule, applicable to travelers at railroad cross- 
 ings, does not apply in all strictness to railroad employees required 
 to remain on or about the track." Pittsburgh, C, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. 
 Lightheiser (Ind. 1906), 78 N. E. Eep. 1033. 
 
 Any person, whether employee, licensee, trespasser, or passenger, 
 who steps upon a railroad track, at a place where trains are accustomed 
 to be run, without stopping, or looking or listening for a train, is 
 negligent as matter of law. Maxey v. Eailroad Co., 113 Mo. 1; Zim- 
 merman V. Eailroad Co., 71 Mo. 476; Harlan v. Eailroad Co., 64 Mo. 
 480; 65 Mo. 22; Hallihan v. Railroad Co., 71 Mo. 113; Taylor v. 
 Missouri Pacific R. Co., 86 Mo. 457. 
 
 And that this rule applies with particular force, to employees in 
 all character of employments, where their duties bring them on 
 or near the railroad track, is apparent from reading the eases. 
 
 In Harris v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co. (40 Mo. App. 255), the 
 decedent was engaged with others in building a fence along a rail- 
 road track, near a sharp curve. His business was to carry posts 
 from a place where they had been unloaded to the place where they 
 were needed for use in building the fence, and while so engaged, after 
 having deposited a load of posts, standing near the track, for a train 
 to pass, while on his way to get another load of posts, he was struck 
 by a passenger train rounding the curve without signal, and killed. 
 There was no watchman on the work and no precautions were taken 
 to avoid such an injury, but while it was held that this was negligence, 
 on the part of the decedent's foreman, it was also held, in a well- 
 written opinion by Judge Ellison, that the decedent was also* negli- 
 gent in stepping on the track, without looking for this train, and 
 his daughter was denied a recovery for his death. 
 
 542 
 
CONTKIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPIiOTEES. § 408 
 
 The Missouri court recently rendered an opinion, where the same rule 
 is applied, by Judge Fox, and all the cases bearing on this rule or the 
 leading decisions in this State are collated. In that case, decedent, who 
 had been working for defendant railroad company in its yards for about 
 two years, was required on the night he was killed to sweep snow 
 from the switches. In order to do this work it was necessary that he 
 go between the tracks. With knowledge of the time that an engine 
 would back out of the roundhouse to pull an incoming passenger train, 
 he allowed himself to be struck and killed thereby, when it was mak- 
 ing the ordinary noise of an engine operated by its own steam and 
 running at a speed not exceeding three miles an hour. Decedent's vision 
 or hearing was' unimpaired, and even when the engine was 10 feet away 
 from him he could have stepped aside and avoided the collision. Held, 
 that decedent was negligent as a matter of law. Cahill v. Chicago & 
 A. By. Co., 205 Mo. 393; 103 S. W. 532. 
 
 In Hallihan v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 71 Mo. 117; 11 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 117, a car repairer, in a switch yard, who knew the custom 
 of running trains in the yard, stooped down at the end of a car and 
 was struck by the car being pushed by another car shunted against it. 
 It was claimed that a tool house would obstruct the approach of 
 the car and that no notice was given the deceased. The court held, 
 however, that the deceased was himself guilty of negligence pre- 
 venting a recovery by his wife. 
 
 Judge Burgess applied the same rule in the recent case of Evans 
 V. Wabash Ry. Co. (178 Mo. 514), as to a section man, engaged in work 
 that required his constant attention, right on or adjoining the track. 
 It was held that the rule enforced as against strangers even, and 
 the general traveling public, on the highway, where they have a 
 right to be, that a railroad track is a place of danger and it is negli- 
 gence to go upon the track without stopping, or looking or listening 
 for a train, applied peculiarly to railroad employees, more familiar 
 Vith such surroundings and the uses of the track and that an employee 
 had no right to become so engrossed in his work as to forget the 
 danger of the track. See, also, Loring v. Memphis Ry. Co., 128 Mo. 
 328, 349; Loeffler v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 96 Mo. 270; Davis v. 
 Railroad Co., 159 Mo. 1 ; Sharp v. Railroad Co., 161 Mo. 241. 
 
 The Kansas City Court of Appeals recently decided a similar case, 
 where this rule was applied, in an opinion by Judge Smith. 
 
 " In an action against a railroad by one of its car inspectors for 
 personal injuries resulting from the shunting of a ear in on a side 
 track and striking one of two cars between which plaintiff was work- 
 ing, plaintiff testified that the head brakeman of the switching crew, 
 in answer to plaintiff's question, 'Are you done switching? ' answered, 
 'Yes,' and he also testified that he did not know whether the brake- 
 man understood his question, and plaintiff made no pretense that in 
 
 643 
 
§ 408 CONTEIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES, 
 
 this query to the brakeman he embraced the information that he de- 
 sired to go between the cars then standing on the side track to make 
 repairs, or that the brakeman's answer was made with any such knowl- 
 edge. It also appeared that the visible facts confronting the plaintiff 
 iat the time were sufficient to warn him that either the brakeman had 
 misimderstood him or vice versa, and that the switching was not 
 then completed. Held insufficient to show that the switching crew 
 knew, or ought to have known, when thy shunted the car in on the 
 side track that plaintiff was then between the cars, and hence the 
 proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries was his own negligence." Whit- 
 ney V. Chicago, B. & Q. Ey. Co., 109 Mo. App. .123; 83 S. W. 68. See 
 also, Renfro v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 86 Mo. 302. 
 
 Nor is the rule different in other States, but the same denial of 
 liability on the part of a railroad company, is applied to the case 
 of employees injured by getting on the track, where cars are ac- 
 custom to be run, without adopting precautions necessary to protect 
 themselves against this general manner of conducting the employer's 
 business, by the courts of different States. 
 
 In Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Arispe (81 Texas 517; 17 S. W. Rep. 
 47; 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 350), the backing of a construction train, 
 in the usual manner, was held not to give a track hand any right 
 of action for an injury resulting from such backing, as the movement 
 of trains in such manner was held to be a risk assumed, as an incident 
 to the employment which all employees understand. 
 
 In Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Conkling (15 111. App. 157), a fireman, 
 while cleaning the ash pan of an engine, on a side track, was run over 
 and killed by a, train backing in on the siding, in violation of a rule 
 of the company, but he was held to have assiimed the risk. 
 
 One moving cars with a crow-bar, standing at the end of a car 
 astride the rail, where he was struck by the car being hit by another 
 car, was held guilty of such negligence as precluded a recovery, in 
 Minnesota, in the case of Nordquist v. Great Northern R. Co., 95 N. W. 
 Rep. 322. ' 
 
 Sectionmen shoveling snow were chargeable with the duty of looking 
 out for approaching trains, in Massachusetts. Morris v. Boston, etc., 
 E. Co., 15 Am. Neg. Rep. 8. 
 
 A person standing on or near a railroad track, with his back to a 
 stationary freight ear, and who was run over and killed, was held 
 •negligent, precluding a recovery, in Zirkle v. Missouri Pacific Ey. Co., 
 14 Am. Neg. Rep. 51. 
 
 An employee engaged in pushing a car with a crow-bar, struck 
 and killed by the car, which was hit by other cars, was held guilty of 
 negligence denying a recovery to his representative, in Street v. 
 Railroad Co., 14' Am. Neg. Rep. 644. 
 
 A ear cleaner, hurt by being thrown from the car by other cars, 
 544 
 
CONTKIBTTTOET KEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES.' §§409,410 
 
 § 409. Failure to gpiard against known danger. — The law 
 
 requires a person, when approaching a known place of dan- 
 ger, to exercise such care for his safety as an ordinarily 
 prudent man would exercise under the circxunstances.^* 
 When a person knows that he is approaching a place of danger 
 and yet takes no precaution to avoid an injury, until it is too 
 late, he cannot escaipe the charge of contri-butory negligence.'^ 
 A failure, under ordinary circumstances, to make diligent 
 use of the ava;ilable means at one's command to avoid a 
 known and apprehended danger, where it is apparent that 
 such danger might have been avoided if such means had been 
 used, is to be regarded, generally, as concurring negligence, 
 on the part of the injured person.'* 
 
 But where danger is not actually known, nor apparent to 
 ordinary observation, nor reasonably to be apprehended, 
 proof of positive or special care to avoid it is not required, 
 as in the case where the danger is known or is apparent.'® 
 
 § 410. Voluntarily assuming position of peril. — If any 
 
 person voluntarily and unnecessarily puts himself into a 
 dangerous position, where there are other positions that he 
 may take, that are safer, he cannot recover damages for an 
 injury to which he has thus contributed, by his failure to 
 assume the safer course open to him.^" 
 
 where no precautions were adopted to prevent the collision, was de- 
 nied a right of recovery, in Setterstorm v. Railroad (Minn.), 14 Am. 
 Neg. Rep. 106. 
 
 18 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Hutchinson, 120 111. 589; 11 N. E. Rep. 
 855; 32 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 82; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Clough, 134 
 111. 586. 
 
 17 Nash V. New York, etc., R. Co., 125 N. Y. 715; 51 Hun 594. 
 
 18 Brown v. Milwaukee, etc., E. Co., 22 Minn. 165; 19 Am. Ry. 
 Rep. 298. 
 
 18 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Olsen, 12 111. App. 245; Snyder v. Pitts- 
 burg, etc., R. Co., 11 W. Va. 14; 18 Am. Ry. Rep. 154. 
 
 20 Cunningham v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 5 McCrary (U. S.) 465; 17 
 Fed. Rep. 882; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 217; Darracott v. Chesapeake, 
 1—35 545 
 
§ 410 CONTEIBUTOBY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 An employee wlio voluntarily puts himself in a position 
 of danger at a time and place "when and where he had no 
 right to be, and when he knew the employer did not require 
 his presence at that place, cannot recover for an injury from 
 the ordinary danger resulting from the movement of a train 
 or engine. ^^ 
 
 Eut a person, who, under sudden excitement rushes to 
 the rescue of a human being, is not chargeable with such 
 negligence, as matter of law, as will preclude a recovery, if 
 the circumstances are such that an ordinarily prudent per- 
 son would act in such manner, as where a mother attempts 
 to rescue her child from being crushed by a passing train, ^^ 
 nor will an employee be held guilty of such negligence as to 
 bar a recovery, although he voluntarily and without actual 
 necessity exposes himself to danger, if he incurs such danger 
 in the discharge of a specific duty of the employer and uses 
 due care to avoid injury in the discharge of such duty.*^ 
 
 etc., E. Co., 83 Va. 288; 31 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 157; Frazer v. South 
 & N. Alabama R. Co., 81 Ala. 185; 1 So. Rep. 85; 85 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 565; Schilling v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 71 Wis. 255; 34 
 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 60. Approaching a place of known danger, 
 in the dark, held negligence, in Pennsylvania, in Ingram v. Lehigh, etc., 
 R. Co., 148 Pa. St. 177; 23 Atl. Eep. 1001. 
 
 2iLoeffler v. Missouri Pacific Ey. Co., 96 Mo. 267; 9 S. W. Rep. 
 580; Mauerman v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 41 Mo. App. 348. 
 
 22 Donahue v. Wabash E. Co., 83 Mo. 560; 53 Am. Eep. 594; 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Langendorf, 48 Ohio St. 316; 28 N. E. Rep. 
 172; 49 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 317; Eckert v. Long Island R. Co., 57 
 Barb. (N. Y.) 555; 43 N. Y. 502. 
 
 23 Jeffrey v. Keokuk, etc., R. Co., 56 Iowa 546; 9 N. W. Rep. 884; 
 6 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 568. 
 
 Exposing one's self to danger to save life, was held not to be 
 necessarily negligent, if attempted within the scope of an employee's 
 duty, under circumstances which would not amount to rashness, in 
 the judgment of prudent persons, in the following cases: Condiff v. 
 Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 45 Kansas 256; 25 Pac. Eep. 562; 48 Am. 
 & Eng. E. Cas. 417; Schroeder v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 108 Mo. 322; 18 
 S. W. Rep. 1094; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 436. 
 
 And, see, as to attempt to save employer's property, as excusing 
 546 
 
CONTEIBUTOEY NEGLIGEN-CE OF EMPLbTEES. § 411 
 
 § 411. Crossing track in front of train. — It is contributory 
 negligence for one to attempt to cross a railroad track im- 
 mediately in front of a moving train and no recovery can be 
 had for an injury caused by suck a rasb act on the part of 
 the person injured, regardless of the speed of the train, 
 whether the injured person is an employee,^* or a third per- 
 son.^^ 
 
 In a Colorado case, ^® a railroad carpenter, desirous of 
 passing across a railroad track, went between two cars, to 
 
 otherwise culpable conduct, in the view of the Illinois court, Pull- 
 man Car Co. V. Laack, 143 111. 242; 32 N. E. Eep. 285. 
 
 24 Collins V. Burlington, -^etc, E. Co., 83 Iowa 346; 49 N. W. Rep. 
 848 ; Mahlen v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., 49 Mich. 585 ; 14 N. W. Rep. 
 556; 14 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 687; German v. Suburban Transit Co., 13 
 N. y. Supp. 897; 37 N. Y. S. R. 360. 
 
 "Where intestate, a railroad man of long experience and observa- 
 tion had habitually passed the crossing where he was killed, and was 
 familiar with defendant's habit in switching cars over the crossing, 
 and at the time of the accident the headlight of the engine could, have 
 been distinctly seen for some distance if- intestate had looked therefor, 
 he was legally charged with having seen the same." Chicago, M. & 
 St. P. Ey. Co. V. Clarkson (U. S. C. C. A., Iowa 1906), 147 Fed. 
 Rep. 397. 
 
 " Plaintiff's intestate drove an express wagon upon a street cross- 
 ing over the defendant's railroad in front of a, string of freight cars 
 which were being backed along a side track, and was struck by such 
 ears and killed. He was well acquainted with the crossing, where 
 there were six parallel tracks in quite constant use. The accident 
 occurred in the daytime, and from any point within 50 feet from the 
 tracks, he could have seen along them in the direction from which 
 the cars were coming for four hundred feet, yet he drove slowly and 
 went upon the tracks without stopping. The cars were moving at a 
 speed of from five to twelve miles an hour. Held, that conceding de- 
 fendant's negligence in respect to the speed of the cars, and the absence 
 of signals, deceased was guilty of negligence in failing to look or listen 
 before driving on the crossing which directly contributed to his death and 
 precluded a recovery therefor." Illinois Cent. E. Co. v. Ackerman (U. 
 S; C. C. A., Iowa 1906), 144 Fed. Rep. 959. 
 
 25 Memphis, etc., R. Co. v. Jobe, 69 Miss. 452; 10 So. Rep. 672; Crad- 
 doek V. Louisville, etc., E. Co. (Ky.), 16 S. W. Eep. 125. 
 
 26 Lord V. Pueblo, etc., E. Co., 12 Colo. 390; 21 Pac. Eep. 148. 
 
 547 
 
§ 411 CONTKIBUTOEY NEGJ-IGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 one of which, an engine was attached and in the act of back- 
 ing. He was crushed between the cars, but was held to have 
 caused his own death by his rash act of crossing in front of 
 the moving car. A brakeman ^^ or switchman ^^ who for- 
 gets himself or his surroundings and steps or walks in front 
 of a moving engine or car, is guilty of contributory negli- 
 gence, as matter of law, the same as a third person is guilty 
 of negligence who drives in front of an approaching engine 
 or car, taking his chances upon being able to cross the track 
 before the car or engine shall strike him.^® In none of these 
 
 2T Pennsylvania R. Co. v. O'Shaughnessy, 122 Ind. 588; 23 N. E. Eep. 
 675; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 479. 
 
 28 Bering v. New York,, etc., R. Co., 50 N. Y. S. E. 832; 67 Hun 
 650; 22 N. Y. Supp. 344. 
 
 29Prewitt V. Eddy, 115 Mo. 283; 21 S. W. Rep. 742; Guenther v. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 108 Mo. 18; 18 S. W. Rep. 846; Boyd v. Wabash 
 R. Co., 105 Mo. 371; 16 S. W. Rep. 909. 
 
 " To ignore the warning given by gates closed at a crossing tends to 
 show gross negligence." Weaver v. Southern Ey. Co. (S. C. 1907), 56 
 S. E. Rep. 675; 76 S. C. 49. " 
 
 " A traveler upon a highway crossing a railway track must exercise 
 that high degree of care the extreme danger of the place requires of 
 every person of ordinary prudence." Fitzhugh v. Boston & M. E. E. 
 (Mass. 1907), 80 N. E. 792. 
 
 ■ " A party cannot recover for injuries received at a crossing if 
 guilty of contributory negligence." Louisville & N. E. Co. v. Wilson 
 (Ky. 1907), 100 S. W. Rep. 302. 
 
 " The fact that a, railway employee works close to a track and has 
 frequent occasion to cross the same does not relieve him from the 
 requirement that in order to be deemed in the exercise of ordinary 
 prudence he must look in both directions for an approaching train 
 before crossing." Dyerson v. Union Pac. R. Co. (Kan. 1906), 87 Pac. 
 Rep. 680. 
 
 In a recent Arkansas case, it was held that a person who, on his way 
 to a depot, in attempting to cross the track in front of a moving 
 train, stumbles over a grade stake and falls on the track and is 
 killed by the train, which he knew was coming, is chargeable with con- 
 tributory negligence as matter of law. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Ferrell, 
 105 S. W. Rep. 263. See, also. Burns v. St. I^uis, etc., E. Co., 76 Ark. 
 10; 88 S. W. Rep. 8k.4. 
 
 In St. Louis, etc., E. Co. v. Ferrell (105 S. W. Rep. 263), Hill, C. J., 
 speaking for the Arkansas Supreme Court, said: 
 
 548 
 
CONTEIBUTOEY NEGLIGElirCE OF EMPLOYEES. § 411 
 
 "Butj even if the railroad company was guilty of negligence in any 
 of the particulars charged, yet the contributory negligence of Mr. 
 Ferrell would defeat the action. He was twelve inches from the ends 
 of the cross-ties when he stumbled and fell in front of the moving train. 
 He knew the train was coming. He had a good and safe place 
 to travel on the west track j but for some reason he left that route 
 and was either running too near the main track for safety, or else, 
 which is more probable, he was trying to follow his companion 
 across to the east side, on which the depot was located. He would 
 probably have safely crossed as his companion did had it not been 
 that he unfortunately stumbled and met his death. This is a stronger 
 case of contributory negligence than was before the court in Burns 
 V. Railroad, 76 Ark. 10; 88 S. W. Rep. 824, in which the court declared 
 the facts therein as a matter of law showed contributory negligence. 
 The court erred in submitting the case to the jury." 
 
 Where one driving on a country road approached a railroad crossing, 
 with an unobstructed view of the track for a mile or more, and', after 
 waiting for a freight train to pass, drove on the track, without either 
 stopping, looking, or listening, he was guilty of contributory negli- 
 gence, precluding recovery for injuries sustained in a collision with, a 
 train following the freight train, though no train was scheduled to 
 pass on the track at that place at that time, and though he acted on 
 the supposition that no other train would immediately follow the 
 freight. Jackson v. Mobile & O. R. Co., 42 So. Rep., 236. 
 
 " Where a train of cars partially blocks a street in such way as to 
 suggest that its position was likely to be changed at any moment, 
 it is contributory negligence for a person to attempt to d*ive behind it 
 when a slight backward movement would result in accident." Chicago 
 Terminal Transfer Co. v. Helberg, 124 HI. App. 113. 
 
 " Where decedent, when approaching a railroad crossing at which 
 he was killed, looked around before going on the track and saw the 
 train, but nevertheless drove directly on the crossing, and urged 
 his horses over the same, he was guilty of contributory negligence 
 as a matter of law." Porter v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (Mo. 1906), 
 97 S. W. Rep. 880. 
 
 " It was contributory negligence, barring recovery against an electric 
 railway company for injuries at a crossing, for one to attempt to 
 ride a horse across the track, where he could have seen the approaching 
 car in time to have avoided a collision, but failed to look." Phillips v. 
 Washington & R. Ry. Co. of Montgomery County (Md. 1906), 65 
 Atl. Rep. 422. 
 
 "Decedent was guilty of contributory negligence barring recovery 
 for her death in collision with a train at a railway crossing, where 
 in the daytime she attempted to drive across the track in a buggy 
 with the top down, and with an unobstructed view of the train's ap- 
 
 549 
 
§ 411 CONTEIBUTOEY WEGLIGENCE OF- EMPLOYEES. 
 
 proach at forty or^fty feet before reaching the crossing, driving in a 
 trot, making no stop, and apparently not looking up the track." 
 Stotler V. Chicago & A. Ey. Co. (Mo. 1907), 103 S. W. Rep. 1. 
 
 "A pedestrian, intending to take passage on a train at a station, 
 was struck by a train which did not stop there. No warning was 
 given that the train would not stop. Trains customarily stopped at 
 the station, which fact was known to the pedestrian. The pedestrian 
 first saw the train about seven hundred or eight hundred feet from the 
 station. She next saw it about one hundred and twenty feet from her 
 and instead of attempting to cross there, she walked a distance of 
 thirty-five or forty feet to a place at or near the center of a street and 
 without looking for the approaching train she stepped on the track, 
 and was injured. While walking the distance of thirty-five or forty 
 feet she was in a place of safety and could, at every instant; 
 have commanded a full view of the approaching train. Eeld, that she 
 was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law." Judgment, 
 95 N. Y. S. 169, 107 App. Div. 341, reversed; Cranch v. Brooklyn 
 Heights R. Co., 78 N. E. Eep. 1078; 186 N. Y. 310. 
 
 " Decedent, a man thirty-nine years old, possessed of unimpaired 
 senses of sight and hearing, undertook for his own purposes to cross de- 
 fendant's railroad tracks in a yard on a dark night when he knew 
 engines and cars were liable to be constantly moving on them. On 
 reaching one of the tracks on which a large road engine and tender 
 was backing at the rate of six miles an hour, he stepped on the 
 track and was run over and killed before he could escape. The engine 
 was necessarily making much noise and the bell was being con- 
 stantly rung,«though there was no light on the tender. Held, that the 
 physical facts conclusively established that he was guilty of con- 
 tributory negligence as a matter of law." Rich v. Chicago, M. & St. 
 P. Ey. Co. (U. S. C. C. A., Iowa 1906), 149 Fed. Rep. 79. 
 
 " Where deceased, with an unimpeded view of an oncoming train, 
 with hearing and sight not sufficiently impaired to palliate utter lack of 
 attention, while driving a team which were not uncontrollable, kept 
 his team trudging along, either entirely oblivious of his duty to him- 
 self or else deluded in the belief that he could pass a railroad cross- 
 ing safely ahead of an approaching train, he was guilty of contributory 
 negligence, precluding a, recovery for his death in a collision ensuing 
 between the train and his vehicle." Judgment (1905), 96 N. Y. S. 
 431; 109 App. Div. 418, affirmed. Hood v. Lehigh Valley E. Co., 78 
 N. E. Rep. 1105. 
 
 " The fact that the view of one approaching a railroad crossing was 
 obstructed, he being in a position to hear warning signals, and listen- 
 ing for them, did not require him to stop his horse, and go forward 
 on foot to a place where an unobstructed view could be obtained." 
 
 550 
 
CONTEIBUTOET NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. § 412 
 
 instances will the law absolve the injured person from the 
 result of his own contributory negligence or hold the railroad 
 company for the consequences of such rashness. 
 
 § 412. Standing or walking upon track. — On a railroad 
 track, where cars frequently pass, every one is bound to be 
 vigilant for his own protection, according to the common ex- 
 perience of men of ordinary prudence, and standing on a rail- 
 road track, with one's back to a train of cars, in the absence 
 of anything showing a necessity or excuse for such conduct, 
 is negligence.^" And the. rule obtains as well to an em- 
 ployee as to a third party, for, as said by Judge Gantt, speakr 
 ing for the Missouri Supreme Court, in a leading case : " If 
 the law exacts of a traveler upon a highway, the duty of look- 
 ing and listening, a fortiori it demands of an employee, 
 familiar with the usages and dangers of a switch yard, that 
 he look before he steps upon a track^ upon which his daily 
 experience teaches him a train, or an engine, may pass at 
 any moment." ^^ Unless an employee, therefore, is acting- 
 Mitchell V. St. Louis & S. F. E. Co. (Mo. App. 1906), 97 S. W. Rep. 
 552. 
 
 " A traveler approaching a railway crossing in a town has a right 
 to assume that the railway company will obey the speed ordinance of 
 the town, whether he sees or hears the train or not, unless his sight 
 or hearing inform him that the company is running its trains in vio- 
 lation of the ordinance." Southern Ry. Co. v. Stockdon (Va. 1907), 
 56 E. S. Rep. 713. 
 
 " One is not guilty of contributory negligence per se in attempting 
 to drive over a railroad crossing in front of an engine standing still,* 
 with no sign of an intention to move it." Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. V. 
 Wilkie (Kan. 1907), 90 Pac. Rep. 775. 
 
 30 Carroll v. Minnesota Valley R. Co., 13 Minn. 30; 14 Minn. 57; 
 Kansas Pacific R. Co. v. Twombly, 3 Colo. 125; 21 Am. Ry. Rep. 447. 
 
 " In an action against a railroad for injuries to a person walking 
 on the track, evidence held insufficient to show negligence on defend- 
 ant's part." St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. London (Ark. 1907), 102 
 S. W. Rep. 212. 
 
 aiLoring v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 128 Mo. 359; 31 S. W. 
 
 551 
 
§ 412' CONTEIEUTOBY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 under orders in remaining on a railroad track, he places him- 
 self there at his own peril and cannot recover for an injury 
 there received/^ nor would it alter the rule that he was en- 
 gaged in work upon the track, at the time of his injury, for 
 ordinary prudence would, compel him to leave the track in 
 time to avoid being injured by an approaching train and if 
 he failed to do so, he would be negligent.^' 
 
 But the want of vigilance arising from standing on a rail- 
 road track is always a matter of defense in an action for 
 damages for an injury occasioned thereby and in an Illinois 
 case it was held not to be conclusive proof of negligence, in 
 all cases.^* Of course, in States where the doctrine of last 
 clear chance has been announced, the company might be lia- 
 ble, notwithstanding such negligence on the part of an em- 
 ployee or third party, if the injury could have been avoided, 
 by reasonable care on the defendant's part, after the danger 
 to the injured person was discovered,^" and the circumstances 
 may be such as to make it negligence of the defendant to 
 
 Kep. 6; Elliott v. Railroad, 150 U. S. 245; Aerkfetz v. Humphries, 
 145 U. S. 418. 
 
 82 Moore v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co., 87 Va. 489; 12 S. E. Rep. 968; 
 Keyes v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (Pa.), 3 Atl. Rep. 15; Collins v. Burling- 
 ton, etc., R. Co., 83 Iowa 346; 49 N. W. Rep. 848; Chicago, etc., R. Co. 
 V. Davis, 53 Fed. Re{). 61; 10 U. S. App. 422; 3 C. C. A. 429; 53 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 461; Harris v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 40 Mo. 
 App. 255; Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. v. Lee, 84 Va. 642; 5 S. E. Rep. 
 579; Engleking v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 187 Mo, 158; 86 S. W. 
 Rep. 89; Brocksmidt v, St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (Mo.), 103 S. W. Rep. 
 964. 
 
 . 83 Evans v. Wabash R. Co., 178 Mo. 508; 77 S. W. Rep. 515; 
 Stephens v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 86 Mo. 221; Davies v. People's 
 Ry. Co., 159 Mo. 1; 67 Mo. App. 598; 59 S. W. Rep. 982; Kelly 
 v. Union, etc., R. Co., 11 Mo. App. 1; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Whit- 
 tington, 30 Grett (Va.), 805; Whitmore v. Boston, etc., R. Co. 150 
 Mass. 477; 23 N. E. Rep. 220; Sweat v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 156 Mass. 
 284; 31 N. E. Rep. 296. 
 
 84 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Nowickiki, 46 111. App. 566. 
 
 86 Sluder v. Transit Co., 189 Mo. 107, § 408, supra. 
 552 
 
CONTBIBUTOEY ITEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOTEES. § 412 
 
 fail to give warning of tlie movement of its trains, either as 
 to an employee *® or licensee ^"^ located on its track. 
 
 38 Lovell V. Kansas City, etc., E. Co., 97 S. W. Rep. 193. 
 
 37jacobsen v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 41 Minn. 206; 42 N. W. Eep. 
 932. 
 
 In Lovell v. Kansas City, etc., E. Co. (97 S. W. Eep. 193), the 
 Kansas City Court of Appeals, in discussing the question of notice 
 in such a case, said: 
 
 "In the operation of a railroad it frequently occurs that the dis- 
 turbance of cars placed for unloading is necessary while the un- 
 loading is being performed, but in all such cases it is the duty of the 
 cgmpany to warn those occupied in the work of unloading of the con- 
 templated movement in time for them to give heed to their safety. 
 Eailway v. Geobel, 119 111. 515,' 10 N. E; Eep. 369; Jacobson v. Eail- 
 road, 41 Minn. 206; 42 N. W. Rep. 932; Eyan v. Eailroad (C. C), 115 
 Fed. Eep. 197; Eailroad v. Shaw, 116 Fed'. Eep. 621; 54 C. C. A. 77; 
 Eailway v. Duncan, 88 TeX. 611, 32 S. W. Eep. 878; Eailway v. Brown's 
 Adm'r, 49 U. App. 101; 79 Fed. Eep. 257; 24 C. C. A. 559. Plaintiflf, 
 being in the car rightfully at the invitation of the consignee and en- 
 gaged in work connected with the process of unloading was entitled 
 to warning of what was coming, provided we find that defendant 
 should have considered the likelihood of his presence in the oar." 
 
 " Where the intestate stepped onto a railroad track in front of a 
 train and was killed, and the engineer did not see him at all,- the fact 
 that the railroad company was negligent in failing to equip the 
 engine with air brakes was not the proximate cause of the acci- 
 dent." Bookman v. Seaboard Air Line Ey. (U. S. C. C. A., S. C. 1907), 
 152 Fed. Eep. 686. 
 
 " In an action for the death of an employee who was killed by a car 
 while working at night repairing defendant's railroad track, the evi- 
 dence showed that the headlight of the car was burning; that deceased 
 was standing facing the car as it approached; that a workman who 
 was about ten feet behind deceased called to him to look out, and 
 that another workman, who was closer to the car than deceased was, 
 also warned him and himself escaped. Held, that as a matter of law 
 deceased was guilty of contributory negligence, causing the accident." 
 McGrath v. St. Louis -Transit Co. (Mo. 1906), 94 S. W. Eep. 872. 
 
 "A paragraph in a petition for the ideath of plaintiff's husband, 
 alleged to have been killed by the negligent running of the train of de- 
 fendant company, which failed to show by what right or in what ca- 
 pacity plaintiff's husband was at or on the defendant's railroad track at 
 the time he was killed, and whether the killing was at a publi« cross- 
 ing, and whether he was walking, standing, or lying upon the track, 
 is insufficient." Central of Georgia Ey. Co. v. Brandenburg (Ga. 1907), 
 58 S. E. Eep. 658. 
 
 553 
 
§ 412 CONTEIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 "Plaintiff, while endeavoring to get a fishing pole from under a 
 platform alongside of a railroad track, knelt beside the platform, 
 his feet extending over one rail of the track about fifty "feet from a 
 switch, and, while so engaged, a car was switched on the track and 
 approached him at the rate of three or four miles an hour. He was 
 not aware of the approaching car until an instant before it reached 
 him, and in endeavoring to escape was struck by the brakeman's 
 ladder. Held, to constitute contributory negligence." Burde v. Chi- 
 cago, B. & Q. Ey. Co. (Mo. App. 1907), 100 S. W. Rep. 509. 
 
 " Intestate was killed while walking as a licensee along defendant's 
 railroad track. He was aware of the approach of the train, and 
 stepped outside the rails to stand until it should pass him, not 
 appreciating the fact that a curve at the point where he was stand- 
 ing would cause the ' bucking-beam ' of the engine pilot to project 
 further than usual. He stood so cftse to the track that he was 
 hit by the beam, though a single step back would have placed him 
 in a position of safety. Held, that intestate was negligent as matter of 
 law." Delaware & H. E. Co. v. Wilkins (U. S. C. C. A., N. Y. 1907), 
 153 Fed. Eep. 845. 
 
 " As against a bare licensee a railroad company may run its trains 
 in the usual way, without special precautions, if the circumstances do 
 not of themselves give warning of his probable presence, and he is 
 not seen until it is too late to prevent injury." Delaware & H. E. 
 Co. V. Wilkins (U. S. C. C. A., N. Y. 1907), 153 Fed. 845. 
 
 " One standing on a railroad track and absorbed in watching the 
 passing of a train on another track was negligent." Eppstein v. Mis- 
 souri Pac. Ey. Co. (Mo. 1906), 94 S. W. Eep. 967. 
 
 " One who walks or stands on a railroad track in a street when 
 there is no necessity or occasion for doing so, is guilty of contributory 
 negligence, barring recovery for injury from a moving car not knowingly 
 or wantonly caused." Coy v. Missouri Pac. Ey. Co. (Ean. 1906), 86 
 Pac. Eep. 468. 
 
 " An injured person was not relieved of the duty to use reasonable 
 care for his own safety by the fact that the engineer in charge of 
 the engine that caiised the injury was negligent in failing to ring the 
 bell and keep a proper lookout." Byrnes v. New York, N. H. & H. K. 
 Co. (Mass. 1907), 81 N. _E. Eep. 187. 
 
 " Where an employee of a railway places himself on the track in a 
 position of danger, without any emergency or exigency therefor, he 
 is guilty of negligence, and cannot recover for Injuries received, even 
 if defendant were negligent." Caffi v. New York Cent. & H. R. E. Co., 
 102 N. Y. S. 633. 
 
 " It . is the duty of a railroad to operate its trains, and it is not 
 required to observe unreasonable precautions to prevent injury. People 
 walking on the tracks must exercise a prudence commensurate with 
 554 
 
CONTEIBUTOET NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. § 413 
 
 § 413. Walking or standing near the track. — Contributory 
 negligence "will prevent a recovery by an employee or other 
 person, for an injury sustained by him vphile walking or 
 standing in a notoriously dangerous place, near a railroad 
 track, without keeping a proper lookout for an approaching 
 
 the risk, and where the lack of prudence of the party injured was 
 the proximate cause of the injury, he cannot recover, however negligent 
 the railroad company may otherwise have been.'' Seaboard Air Line 
 Ey. V. Smith (Fla. 1907), 43 So. Eep. 235. 
 
 "A trespasser was lying down on the railroad track, and the en- 
 gineer and fireman saw him eighty or ninety yards from where he was 
 struck by the train. There was nothing to show that the train could 
 have been stopped in time to have saved him, or that the operators did 
 not attempt to stop it as soon as they discovered his position. Held, 
 that the railroad as a matter of law was not liable." Southern Ey. 
 Co. V. Gullatt (Ala. 1907), 43 So. Eep. 577. 
 
 " Where a railroad engineer was struck and injured while standing 
 between two main tracks at night, an instruction that he was re- 
 quired to exercise such care as persons of ordinary care and prudence 
 would exercise under like circumstances properly stated plaintiflf's 
 duty in the premises." Pittsburgh, C, C. & St. L. Ey. Co. v; Light- 
 heiser (Ind. 1906), 78 N. E. Eep. 1033. 
 
 " Where one of mature judgment, and good hearing and eyesight, 
 at a time when he knew engines and trains were in frequent passage 
 on a track, and when though it was not fully daylight he could 
 detect the presence of an engine at a distance, went on the track 
 from behind an obstruction, taking only a glance by which he saw 
 an engine, but failed to determine whether it was standing, or ap- 
 proaching,, he was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, 
 even if the engine was backing over the crossing without a bell rung or a: 
 whistle blown, and the engine was running at a speed denounced by 
 ordinance of the city, and the flagman was absent from his post of 
 duty; none of these things under the circumstances being the proxi- 
 mate cause of injury." Mackowik v. Kansas City, St. J. & C. B. R. 
 Co. (Mo. 1906), 94 S. W. Rep. 256. 
 
 "The operatives of a railroad train owed no duty to one walking 
 on the track in the nighttime at a place where the track was fenced 
 and in the vicinity of signs warning people to keep off the tracks, where 
 there was nothing to show that notice of any use of the track by 
 pedestrians in the nighttime had been brought to the attention of the 
 company." Frye v. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. (Mo.), "98 S. W. Rep. 
 566. 
 
 555 
 
§ 413 CONTEIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES, 
 
 train.^® An employee cannot recover for an injury received 
 by reason of his having placed himself between two railroad 
 tracks, at a place where he ought not to have been in the 
 proper discharge of his duty, and with his back toward an 
 approaching train, which strikes him, and it is immaterial 
 that the defendant was also negligent in failing to display 
 a light upon the train and that it was violating a municipal 
 ordinance, at the time of his injury.** 
 
 But where, either from the circiimstances of the case, or 
 by express promise of one in charge of an engine or train, 
 an employee has reason to rely upon the belief that no train 
 will overtake him, it may not be negligence, as matter of law, 
 for an employee to walk or stand near the track, without keep- 
 ing a lookout for an approaching train, as where an engineer 
 of a train promised that an engine would not start for fifteen 
 minutes and in seven minutes he was struck from behind by 
 the same engine, it was held, by the Supreme Court of Iowa, 
 that it could not be said, as matter of law, that he was negli- 
 gent in failing to keep a lookout for the engine, as he had 
 a right to repose some confidence in the promise of the party 
 in charge of it.*** 
 
 ssHeffinger v. Minneapolis, etc., E. Co., 43 Minn. 503; 45 N. W. 
 Rep. 1131; Moore v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co., 87 Va. 489; 12 S. E. Rep. 
 968; McKenna v. The Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 54 Mo. App. 161; 
 Mulherrin v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 81 Pa. St. 366; 15 Am. Ey. 
 Rep. 456; St. Louis, etc., E. Co. v. Monday, 49 Ark. 257; 4 S. W. 
 Rep. 782; 31 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 424; Tennis v. Inter-State, etc., R. 
 Co., 45 Kansas 503; Little John v. Central R. Co., 74 Ga. 396; Smith 
 V. New York, etc., R. Co., 44 N. Y. S. R. 55; 63 Hun 624; 137 N. Y. 
 562. See, also, Rigg v. Boston, etc., E. Co., 158 Mass. 309; 33 N. E. 
 Eep. 512. 
 
 sBEyall V. Central Pacific Ey. Co., 76 Cal. 474; 18 Pac. Eep. 430. 
 
 *i>Hawley v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 71 Iowa 717; 29 N. W. Rep. 
 787. See, also, Schlereth v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 115 Mo. 87; 21 
 S. W. Rep. 1110; Canada Southern R. Co. v. Jackson, 17 Can. Sup. 
 a. 316. 
 
 " The rule that a railroad employee whose work requires him to 
 be on or near the track need not watch for approaching trains in 
 556 
 
CONTEIBTJTOBY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. § 414 
 
 § 414. Climbing over stationary cars. — One who attempts 
 to cross between or climb over the cars of a stationary train, 
 which he knows, or might loiow, by using his natural facul- 
 ties, is likely to move at any moment, is guilty of negligence 
 and cannot recover for an injury received in such an at- 
 
 order to be deemed to be exercising reasonable care does not apply 
 to an employee injured while attempting to cross the track; the circum- 
 stances not requiring the crossing to be made at a particular time or 
 place." Dyerson v. Union Pac. R. Co. (Kan. 1906), 87 Pac. Rep. 
 680. 
 
 "A railroad employee, working constantly with an engine in the 
 yards, may not close his eyes to obvious and dangerous conditions 
 or defects therein, and recover for an injury resulting therefrom; 
 but, if an accident occurs, and he ' pleads ignorance, he must show 
 that his ignorance was not only actual, but excusable." Williams v. 
 Choctaw & E. Co. (U. S. C. C. A. Tenn. 1906), 149 Fed Kep. 104. 
 
 " Where an experienced employee was tamping ties on a railroad 
 track when the track became obscured by smoke from a passing train, 
 and, being apprehensive of danger, he stood in the middle of the track, 
 looking into the bank of smoke, when a train suddenly emerged and 
 struck him, he was guilty of contributory negligence." Cannon y. 
 New York, etc., R. Co. (Mass. 1907), 80 N. E. Rep. 450. 
 
 " Where plaintiff's intestate was killed by being run over by a 
 backing locomotive, when he went upon the track to fix the lights, 
 he was not guilty of contributory negligence in failing to signal the 
 hostler in charge of the locomotive to stop, where it was already 
 standing still." Northern Alabama Ry. Co. v. Key (Ala. 1907), 43 So. 
 Rep. 794. 
 
 " In an action for the death of a section hand who was run over 
 while sweeping snow from a frog, it appearing that the operatives of 
 the locomotive could have seeh decedent in his place of danger in 
 time to have averted it by stopping the train or blowing the whistle, 
 but that no efforts in such direction were made, the humanitarian doc- 
 trine applied, and, conceding contributory negligence on the part of 
 decedent, there might be a recovery irrespective of wantonness and 
 recklessness on the part of defendant." Johnson v. St. Joseph Terminal 
 Ry. Co. (Mo. 1907), 101 S. W. Rep. 641. 
 
 "The employee of a railroad company, who had worked all forenoon 
 near a track on which cars had been passing, and walked upon tne 
 track without ascertaining whether cars were approaching, was not in 
 the exercise of due care." Lord v. Boston, etc., R. Co. '(N. H. 1906), 65 
 Atl. Rep. 111. 
 
 55Y 
 
§ 414 CONTEIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 tempt. *^ In a well-consideTed Missouri case,*^ whidi pre- 
 sents the law on this question, a person reached a public 
 street of a city that was obstructed by a freight train and 
 no engine was visible at either end of the train. He at- 
 tempted to cross between two freight cars and placed a foot 
 on either side of the coupling pins, on the two draw bars of 
 the ears and just as he pulled his body up, the slack was let 
 out of the train and his foot was caught and mashed between 
 the draw heads of the cars. In denying a recovery, because 
 of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff. Judge Sher- 
 wood, delivering the opinion of the court, said : " If the 
 plaintiff, with full knowledge of its existence, had deliber- 
 ately placed his foot on the wire which fires a spring gun,- 
 his temerity and his danger would scarcely have been greater. 
 If such conduct does not constitute contributory negligence, 
 how shall it be christened and what shall be its baptismal 
 name ? It is no answer to this to say that the defendant was 
 giiilty of reprehensible conduct in obstructing the street with 
 its cars beyond the time allowed by ordinance." This deci- 
 sion was followed in a later case,*^ in the same State, and 
 may be stated as presenting the general rule on this subject, 
 as recognized by both courts ** and text writers.*^ Nor 
 
 *iLake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Pinchin, 112 Ind. 592; 13 N. E. Bep. 
 677; 31 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 428; Copeland v. Southern, etc., R. Co., 
 61 Ala. 376; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Hocker, 111 Ky. 707; 64 S. W. 
 Kep. 638; 65 S. W. Rep. 119; Southern R. Co. v. Thomas (Ky.), 92 S. 
 W. Rep. 578. 
 
 42 Hudson V. Wabash R. Co., 101 Mo. 13; 14 8. W. Rep. 15; 
 Hudson V. Wabash R. Co., 123 Mo. 445; 27 S. W. Rep. 717. 
 
 43 Corcoran v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 105 Mo. 399; 16 S. W. Rep. 411. 
 
 44 Lewis V. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 38 Md. 588; Gahagan v. New 
 York, etc., R. Co., 1 Allen 187; Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Pinchin, 
 112 Ind. 592; 13 N. E. Rep. 677; 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 428; Cope- 
 land V. Southern, etc., R. Co., 61 Ala. 376; O'Mara v. New York, etc., 
 E. Co., 18 Hun (N. Y.), 193; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Dewey, 26 111. 
 255; Southern iCy. Co. v. Clark (Ky.), 105 S. W. Rep. 385. 
 
 45 1 Thompson on Neg. 429; 2 Rorer on Railroads 1055; Beach on 
 Con. Neg., § 72. 
 
 558 
 
gONTEIBUTOKY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. § 415 
 
 would it be an excuse for such negligence on the part of a 
 person injured, while attempting to pass over stationary 
 cars, that he was invited to do so by a brakeman of the train, 
 for this would not be within the general scope of the duties 
 of such an employee, or excuse the otherwise wrongful act 
 on the part of the injured person.*® 
 
 § 415. Under car or locomotive. — Just as it is contribu- 
 tory negligence for a stranger to climb over stationary cars, 
 because of the great danger involved in the undertaking, it 
 is held contributory negligence for an employee or third per- 
 son to crawl under a car or locomotive, without first notify- 
 
 4« In passing on this question, the Supreme Court of Kentucky, in 
 Southern Hy. Co. v. Clark (105 S. W. Kep. 385), said: 
 
 " There is nothing in the evidence to show that any one in charge 
 of appellant's train knew, or by the" exercise of the highest degree of 
 care could have known, that appellee was between the cars when 
 the train was started. It is true that appellee says that the person 
 to whom he spoke was a brakeman; but he says, further, in his tes- 
 timony, that his reason for presuming that he was a brakeman was 
 because he carried a railroad lantern. He testified, further, however, 
 that at the time that he attempted to cross between the cars this In- 
 dividual had moved away toward the station and was not present; 
 nor does he state that he notified the man with the lantern that he 
 contemplated taking his advice and attempting to cross over. Giving 
 appellee the full benefit of his testimony, and conceding that the 
 person to whom he was talking was a brakeman, yet the company 
 would not be liable because of the invitation of the brakeman to 
 appellee to cross over; for it has been expressly held in the case of 
 Skirvin v. L. & N. E. E. (100 S. W. Eep. 308; 30 Ky. Law Rep. 
 1208), that a, brakeman has not the power by virtue simply of his 
 position to bind his employer, but that the conductor is the repre- 
 sentative agent of the company as to the train in his charge, so that, 
 when appellee undertook to pass over or between the cars, he was a 
 trespasser, and the company owed him no consideration until hig peril 
 was discovered." 
 
 " The negligence of a railroad company in obstructing a street by 
 a railroad train for a period of more than ,10 minutes may be the 
 proximate cause of an injury resulting to one seeking to climb over 
 such train." Atchison, etc., Ey. Co. v. Pitts, 123 111. App. 607. 
 
 559 
 
§ 416 .CONTEIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 ing the party in charge of it of such intention on his part.*'^ 
 In an Indiana case, an inexperienced employee, engaged to 
 clean a locomotive, was held to be guilty of negligence in go- 
 ing under the engine, without notifying the engineer, or fire- 
 man, in charge of the engine, of his intention so to do.*® 
 
 But an employee would not be held guilty of contributory 
 negligence in going under a car or locomotive, when the 
 proper discharge of his duties compels him to do so, in com- 
 pliance with the employer's rules, and if he should be injured 
 while so engaged, in the exercise of proper care, on his part, 
 the employer would be responsible in damages for such an 
 injury.** 
 
 § 416. Crossing bridge in front of train. — It is generally 
 held to be negligence either for an employee or a trespasser 
 or licensee to cross a bridge in front of an approaching train, 
 when, from the circumstances the injured person could have 
 seen or heard the train approaching and the agents in charge 
 of the train could not have avoided the injury after seeing 
 the peril to which the injured person was subjected. In 
 other words, the crossing, of the bridge, by the person injured, 
 under such circumstances would be negligence on his part, 
 and the company would not be liable, unless, notwithstanding 
 his negligence, the injury could have been avoided after his 
 peril was discovered.®" 
 
 In an Oregon case,®^ where a track walker saw a train 
 when a sufficient distance away to have avoided the collision, 
 but thought that be could make .it across the bridge before 
 he was overtaken by the train, and in an attempt so to do, he 
 
 47 Spencer v. Ohio, etc., R. Co., 130 Ind. 181; 29 N. E. Eep. 915. 
 
 48 Spencer v. Ohio, etc., E. Co., 130 Ind. 181; 29 N. E. Rep. 915. 
 
 49 Berry v. Central, etc., R. Co., 40 Iowa 564; Bucklew v. Central, 
 etc., E. Co., 64 Iowa 603. 
 
 BO Sweeny v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 128 Mass. 5; 1 Am. & Eng. E. 
 Cas. 138; Texas, etc., E. Co. v. Wagner, 2 Texas Civ. App. 291. 
 Bi Gibson v. Oregon, etc., R. Co., 23 Oregon 493 ; 32 Pac. Rep. 295. 
 560 
 
CONTKIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. § 417 
 
 fell and was injured, it was held that no recovery could be 
 had, on the ground of a failure to give sufficient notice of 
 the approach of the train to the bridge, as it appeared that 
 he could have turned back, after knowledge of the approach 
 of the train, without injury, but instead, continued his 
 course across the bridge. 
 
 Where, however, there is an assurance of time to cross a 
 trestle or bridge by a superior employee, before the arrival 
 of a train or engine and in reliance thereon, an employee at- 
 tempts to cross a bridge and is injured as a result of such 
 assurance or promise, on the part of his superior, if the evi- 
 dence of his contributory negligence is disputed, or is not 
 all one way, then the assurance of safety, notwithstanding his 
 own act in thus placing himself in a position of peril, will 
 make the issue, of his negligence a jury issue and the court' 
 would not be justified, as matter of law, in holding that he 
 was guilty of negligence. ^^ 
 
 § 417. Sleeping upon or near railroad track. — The com- 
 mon-law duty of the employer, with reference to the place of 
 work of his employee, has never yet been so extended by the 
 courts, as to recognize by implication, a duty upon his part 
 to furnish a reasonably safe place for his employees or licen- 
 sees to sleep, hence it is generally held negligence on the part 
 of an employee to sleep on or near a railroad track, where 
 he is apt to be struck by a passing tr^in, and no recovery can 
 be had for an injury sustained while an employee was asleep 
 on the track, unless the injury could have been avoided, by 
 reasonable care on the part of the employees in charge of the 
 
 BzAmato v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 46 Fed. Rep. 561. 
 
 " One struck by a train while walking on a railroad trestle was 
 guilty of contributory negligence precluding recovery, unless the train- 
 men either injured him wantonly, maliciously, or intentionally,, or 
 were guilty of negligence in avoiding injuring him after discovering 
 his peril." Adams v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ky. Co. (Ark. 1907), 103 
 S. W. Eep. 725. 
 
 1—36 561 
 
§ 417 CONTKIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE O]? EMPLOYEES, 
 
 engine, after the danger to the sleeper was discovered.®* 
 In a Missouri case/* a fireman on an engine lay down 
 between the tracks in a roundhouse and went to sleep, and 
 while asleep, threw one limb across a rail and was so injured 
 by an engine run into the roundhouse that he died. There 
 was no evidence that employees were required to sleep in 
 the roundhouse, and while it was not sufficiently lighted, this 
 fact was known by the employees accustomed to fall asleep 
 there and the contributory negligence of the employee was 
 held to preclude a recovery. And in a Pennsylvania case,^* 
 it is held to be immaterial that the employee had voluntarily 
 continued in the service imtil he was exhausted, whereby he 
 fell asleep and thereby sustained injury. But in an Ala- 
 bama case,®* distinction is recognized between a continuous 
 service until f aintness results and a mere wanton or negli- 
 gent act, in voluntarily falling asleep in such a place of. 
 danger and it is held that a brakeman, required to stand to 
 signal a train, would not be negligent if his sleep was forced 
 upon him by fatigue or failing physical endurance, but that 
 he would be negligent if he otherwise voluntarily fell asleep 
 at his post of duty. 
 
 The Appellate Court, of Missouri, in a recent case,®'' ap- 
 parently overlooking the rule established by the Supreme 
 Court,®® that no recovery could be had, under the last chance 
 
 03 Price v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 77 Mo. 508; 15 Am. & Bng. R. 
 Cas. 168; Nattress v. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co., 150 Pa. St. 527; 
 24 Atl. Rep. 753; East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. Rush, 15 Lea (Tenn.) 
 145; Helton v. Alabama, etc., R. Co., 97 Ala. 275; 12 So. Rep. 276. 
 
 6* Price v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 77 Mo. 508; 15 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 168. 
 
 B6 Nattress v. Philadelphia, etc., R, Co., 150 Pa. St. 527; 24 Atl. 
 Kep. 753. 
 
 Be Helton v. Alabama, etc., R. Co., 97 Ala. 275; 12 So. Rep. 276. 
 
 BTMann v. Missouri, etc., R. Co., 100 S. W. Rep. 566. See, also, 
 Burde v. Chicago, etc.,' R. Co., 100 S. W. Rep. 509. 
 
 ssHolwerson v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 157 Mo. 216; 57 S. W. 
 Rep. 770. 
 
 562 
 
CONTEIBUTOEY NEGLIGEJiTCE OF EMPLOYEES. § 418 
 
 doctrine, in a case of contemporaneous negligence on the part 
 of the employer and employee, went to the extreme of hold- 
 ing that it would be a jury issue whether or not the agents 
 in charge of an engine could have discovered a sleeping em- 
 ployee at the side of the track, in time to have avoided kill- 
 ing him, by the exercise of ordinary care, in a distance of a 
 few hundred f e6t> when the physical facts, in connection with 
 the distance shown by the evidence and the speed of the train, 
 would make it extremely improbable if the train could have 
 been stopped, when the sleeper could first have been discov- 
 ered by the engineer and fireman and there was a total ab- 
 sence of evidence that they did not da all in their power to 
 stop the train, after discovering the sleeper, as the opinion 
 of the court admits. This is, clearly, extending the doctrine 
 of last chance to the extent of holding that wanton conduct 
 on the part of an employee may be overcome by a presumption 
 of negligence on the part of the employer, and is applying 
 the doctrine of comparative negligence with a limit upon the 
 degree of negligence that an employee can be guilty of, and 
 this in a State where this rule is denied. 
 
 § 418. Walking in dangerous place in dark. — As a gen- 
 eral rule it is held to be such a violation of the rule that an 
 employee must not assume a known dangerous position, vol- 
 untarily, to expose oneself to injury by walking in a danger- 
 ous place, such as on a railroad track, or along an embank- 
 ment, in the dark, without a light, as to preclude a recovery, 
 in case of a resulting injury therefrom.^® 
 
 In a Georgia case,^" which illustrates the rule, a watchman 
 in a railroad yard used a platform appropriated for the 
 transfer of freight, to run along at night, without a lantern, 
 or light, and sustained an injury, and it was held that he 
 
 59 Hamilton v. Bichmond, etc., E. Co., 83 Ga. 346; 9 S. E. Eep. 670; 
 Harden v. New York, etc., R. Co., 17 J. & S. (N. Y.) 503. 
 80 Hamilton v. Richmond, etc., E. Co., 83 Ga. 346; 9 S. E. Eep. 670. 
 
 563 
 
§ 419 CONTEIBUTOET NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 could not recover therefor. In. another case,^^ an employee 
 sustained injuries as a result of walking along a path between 
 a turntable and a water tank, and falling into a pit excavated 
 alongside the path. It was night and he had no lantern, and 
 the court held that by ordinary care he might have avoided 
 the accident, and denied a recovery. 
 
 § 419. Failure to discover defects in appliances. — An em- 
 ployee, in the use of appliances and places furnished him by 
 the employer, is bound to take notice of those dangerous de- 
 fects of which he has knowledge, and those that are obvious 
 to his senses, but he is not bound to investigate for himself 
 a department of the service with which he has nothing to do, 
 and to set his judgment against that of his employer as to 
 the safety of his appliances, or places for work.®^ A switch- 
 man is not bound to make a careful inspection of switch 
 frogs ; *^ a freight conductor is under no obligation to inspect 
 the cars or machinery of his train,®* nor is a brakeman 
 chargeable with contributory negligence because he attempts 
 to couple cars before examining the coupling appliances, to 
 see if they are safe.®® 
 
 61 Countryman v. East Tennessee, etc., R. Co^ 89 Ga. 835 ; 16 S. E. 
 Rep. 84. 
 
 82 Devlin v. Wabash, etc., R. Co., 87 Mo. 545; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Caa. 
 524; Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Walter, 45 111. App. 642; McBride v. 
 Indianapolis, etc., R. Co., 5 Ind. App. 482; 32 N. E. Rep. 579; 
 Hungerford v. Chicago etc., R. Co., 41 Minn. 444; 43 N. W. Rep. 
 324 ; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Gas. 269 ; Cutridge v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 
 105 Mo. 520; 16 S. W. Rep. 943; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Mahoney, 
 4 111. App. 262. 
 
 oaWaldhier v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 87 Mo. 37. 
 
 64 Ransier v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co., 32 Minn. 331 ; 20' N. W. Rep. 
 332; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 601; Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. McMuUen, 
 117 Ind. 439; 20 N. E. Rep. 287; 38 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 165. But 
 see, contra, Mad River, etc., R. Co. v. Barker, 5 Ohio St. 541. 
 
 65 Mahoney v. New York, etc., R. Co., 39 N. Y. S. R. 911; 60 Hun 
 586; 131 N. Y. 623; Goodrich v. New York, etc., R. Co., 116 N. Y. 
 398; 26 N. Y. S. R. 767. 
 
 564 
 
CONTEIBUTOBT KEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. § 419 
 
 But if an employee of a railroad company is injured by 
 reason of a defect in a car transferred to his employer by 
 another railroad, and his employer's rules, known to him, 
 made it his duty to inspect all foreign cars, he cannot recover 
 for an injury caused simply by his failure to inspect.®® And 
 in any other case, where the defect in the car or appliance was 
 obvious, and the employee ought to have discovered it, by 
 reasonable care, and did not, or, after discovery, if he failed 
 to report it to his employer, but continued to use it, without 
 complaint, until he received an injury, he will be held negli- 
 gent in so doing.®^ 
 
 However, if the defect is one that would be disclosed only 
 by an expert in that department of the service, the employee 
 not shown to be an expert in such department, will not be 
 chargeable with contributory negligence in using the car or 
 appliance without discovering the existing defect,®^ and 
 where, from the nature of the service he is called upon to 
 perform, he has no reasonable opportunity or time for an 
 inspection sufficient to disclose the defect causing the injury, 
 the failure to discover such defect wil not preclude a re- 
 covery.®* 
 
 86 Ft. Wayne, etc., E. Co. v. Gruflf, 132 Ind. 13; 31 N. E. Eep. 460; 
 Roddy V. Missouri Paeiflo Ry. Co., 104 Mo. 234; 15 S. W. Rep. 1112; 
 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Bragomeir, 119 111. 51; 7 N. E. Eep. 688. 
 
 67 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Bragomeir, 119 111. 51; 7 N. E. Eep. 688 
 Atlanta, etc., E. Co. v. Eay, 70 Ga. 674; 22 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 281 
 Way V. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 76 Iowa 393; 41 N. W. Eep. 51 
 Jennings v. Tacoma, etc., E. Co., .7 Wash. 275; 34 Pac. Eep. 937. 
 
 68 Pratt V. Lake Shore, etc., E. Co., 45 N. Y. S. E. 715; 63 Hun 616; 
 18 N. Y. Supp. 682; 136 N. Y. 654; 32 N. E. Rep. 1016. 
 
 eoO'Malley v. New York, etc., R. Co., 51 N. Y. S. R. 366; 67 Hun 
 130; 22 N. Y. Supp. 48. 
 
 Using known defective appliances without complaint was held to 
 prevent a recovery, in the following cases: East St. Louis, etc., R. 
 Co. V. McElroy, 29 111. App. 504; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Bradford, 66 
 Texas 732; 2 S. W. Rep. 595; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 479; Shields v. 
 New York, etc., E. Co., ,4 Silv. App. 162; 30 N. E. Rep. 596; East 
 
 565 
 
§ 420 CONTBIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OP EMPLOYEES. 
 
 § 420. Failure to keep appliances under employee's charge 
 in repair. — As the failure to keep appliances in proper repair 
 is held to be a sufficient breach of duty, on the employer's 
 part, to subject him to a claim for damages, in case of a re- 
 sulting injury to an employee therefrom, the same failure, 
 where the duty of repair is placed upon the injured em- 
 ployee, will constitute negligence barring his recovery for 
 an injury Sustained in consequence thereof.'" 
 
 Where it is the duty of a brakeman to see that a brake 
 rod is in proper repair, an injury by reason of the absence 
 of a nut, which it was his duty to see was kept in place, will 
 bar his right of recovery; but of course, if the injury was 
 caused not by the defective brake rod, which it was his duty 
 to repair, but by another distinct cause, this would not pro- 
 vent a recovery, for an injury to which his negligence in no 
 way contributed. '^^ 
 
 Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. Toppins, 10 Lea (Tenn.) 58; 11 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 222. 
 
 But it is generally necessary that not only the defect, but the 
 danger must be known, to prevent an injury in such a case. Huhn v. 
 Missouri ►Pacific Ry. Co., 92 Mo. 440; 4 S. W. Rep. 937; 31 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 221. 
 
 Notice of a defectivp brake was held to preclude a recovery, in 
 Nelson v. Central, etc., R. Co., 88 Ga. 225; 14 S. E. Rep. 210. 
 
 But the use of a defective car was held not to bar an action for 
 resulting injury therefrom, in Kane v. Northern, etc., R. Co., 128 
 U. S. 91; 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 16; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. McClain, 80 
 Texas 85; 15 S. W. Rep. 789; Bridges v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 6 
 Mo. App. 389; Sioux City, etc., R. Co. v. Finlayson, 16 Neb. 578; 
 49 Am. Rep. 724. 
 
 '0 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Jewell, 46 III. 99 ; Harper v. Indianapolis, 
 etc., R. Co., 47 Mo. 567; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Bargomeir, 119 III. 51; 
 Stroble v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 70 Iowa 555; 31 N. W. Rep. 63; 
 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 510. 
 
 71 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Jewell, 46 111. 99. 
 
 In Stroble v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (70 Iowa 555), an employee was 
 
 injured by the giving way of certain steps, leading up to a platform 
 
 used to load coal from. The steps were used by him alone and were 
 
 under his control and it was held it was his. duty to see to their 
 
 566 
 
CONTBIBUTOET NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. §§421,422 
 
 § 421. TTnauthorized use of appliances.^ Where an em- 
 ployer furnishes tools or appliances to his employees, which 
 are reasonably safe, if used in a proper maimer, and an 
 employee sustains injury by the use of such a tool or ap- 
 pliance in an improper manner, or for purposes not author- 
 ized by the employer, as such wrongful use could not have 
 been foreseen by the employer, there will be no right of 
 recovery for such an injury.''^ 
 
 In the absence of evidence of a defect in an appliance 
 or machinery, therefore, which could have occasioned the 
 injury, or any other act or neglect, on the employer's part, 
 appearing as a cause for the injury, the fact that an im- 
 proper use was being made of the tool or appliance at the 
 time of the injury, is generally held sufficient to bar a re- 
 covery,''^ and even if the appliance is defective in some 
 particular, if the injured employee has failed to use such 
 reasonable care as would have prevented the accident, his 
 employer is thereby absolved from liability, although but for 
 the defect in the appliance the injury would not have oc- 
 curred.''* 
 
 § 422. Acts in emergencies or situations of peril. — Persons 
 who act under the impulse of fright, or persons who are 
 in imminent peril and feel obliged to act upon the spur of 
 the moment, are not necessarily to be charged with negligence 
 if they do not do the right thing, for one in a perilous posi- 
 tion is not to be held to the same care and prudence as if 
 he were in a place of security. The law makes allowance 
 for the fright and lack of coolness of judgment incident to 
 
 proper repair and for a failure of duty, in this respect, on his part, 
 no action would lie, for an injury traceable thereto. 
 
 T2 Central, etc., R. Co. v. Attaway, 90 6a. 656; 16 S. E. Eep. 956. 
 
 "Sparks v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 31 Mo. App. 111. 
 
 Ti Washington, etc., :S. Co. v. McDade, 135 U. S. 554; 10 Sup. Ct, 
 Rep. 1044; 44 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 505. 
 
 / 56Y 
 
§ 422 CONTEIBUTOBY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 such a peril and a person will be presumed to have used 
 that care and prudence which the law requires and to which 
 human instinct would. prompt him, in saving his life.''^ 
 
 In view of an impending collision, therefore, the fact that 
 it might have been safer if the engineer had jumped, in- 
 stead of holding on to and reversing his lever, will not pre- 
 vent his recovery for an injury sustained in the collision, by 
 remaining at his post; ''^ nor will the fact that two engines 
 stopped within a few feet of each other, prevent a recovery 
 by an engineer, who jumped from his engine, in view of the 
 threatened collision, sustaining injuries therefrom.'''^ And 
 a brakeman is held not to be precluded from a recovery 
 for an injury incurred in attempting to mount a rapidly 
 moving freight car, after his lantern had gone out, to avoid 
 being left by the train, although it would have been far safer 
 for him to have remained standing on the ground by the side 
 of the train.''* 
 
 But the courts recognize a distinction between acts in sit- 
 
 '5 Nichols V. Dubuque, etc., E. Co., 68 Iowa 732; 28 N. W. Rep. 44 j 
 27 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 183; Goodricli v. New Yofk, etc., R. Co., 116 
 N. Y. 398; 22 N. E. Rep. 397; 26 N. Y. S. R. 767; 41 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 259; 5 L. R. A. 750; Kelly v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 70 Wis. 
 335; 35 N. W. Rep. 538; Adams v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 74 Mo. 553; 
 7 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 414; Bunting v. Central Pacific E. Co., 14 
 Nevada 351; Schultz v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 44 Wis. 638; 18 Am. 
 Ry. Rep. 146; Fehnrich v. Michigan, etc., E. Co., 87 Mich. 606; 49 
 N. W. Eep. 890; Cook v. Central, etc., E. Co., 67 Ala. 533; Barry v. 
 Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 98 Mo. 62; 11 S. W. Eep. 308; Wynn v. Central 
 Park, etc., E. Co., 133 N. Y. 575; 30 N. E. Eep. 721; 44 N. Y. S. E. 
 673; Georgia, etc, E. Co. v. Ehodes, 56 Ga. 645; Eoll v. Northern, etc., 
 E. Co., 15 Hun (N. Y.) 496; 80 N. Y. 647. 
 
 7eCottrill v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 47 Wis. 634; 3 N. W. Eep. 376; 
 Smith V. Wrightsville, etc., E. Co., 83 Ga. 671; 10 S. E. Eep. 361; 
 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 320. 
 
 "Gross V. Pennsylvania, etc., R. Co., 42 N. Y. S. R. 808; 62 Hun 
 619; 16 N. Y. Supp. 616; Haney v. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co., 38 W. Va. 
 570; 18 S. E. Rep. 748. 
 
 '8 Fox V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 86 Iowa 368; 53 N. W. Rep. 259; 
 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 430. 
 
 568 
 
GONTEIBUTOBY NEGLIGBISrCE OF EMFLOTEES. § 422 
 
 nations of peril, where tlie danger is due to the act of the 
 injured person himself and situations or conditions due to the 
 fault of another, and while in the case of employer and 
 employee, an employee placed in a position of peril, by the 
 negligence of his employer, is not guilty of negligence in tak- 
 ing a mistakened course, through fear or fright, occasioned 
 by the peril,''* if the injured person, by his own wrongful 
 act, has placed himself in a position of peril, and being 
 called upon suddenly to act, mistakes his safest course, 
 /through an error in judgment, he is not thereby relieved from 
 the original negligence which occasioned the peril.®** 
 
 TO Eidimond, etc., E. Co. v. Brown, 89 Va. 749; 17 S. E. Rep. 132; 
 Kleiber v. People's Ey. Co., 107 Mo. 240; 17 S. W. Eep. 946; 52 Am. & 
 Eng. E. Cas. 531; Lynch v. St. Joseph, etc., E. Co., Ill Mo. 601; 
 Peoria, etc., E. Co. v. Eice, 144 111. 227; 33 N. B. Eep. 951; Clark v. 
 Pennsylvania E. Co., 132 Ind. 199; 31 N. E. Eep. 808; Lincoln 
 Transit Co. v. Nichols, 37 Neb. 332; 55 N. W. Eep. 872; 56 Am. & 
 Eng. E. Cas. 584. 
 
 80 Aiken v. Pennsylvania E. Co., 130 Pa. St. 380; 18 Atl. Eep. 619; 
 41 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 571; Schneider v. Second Ave. E. Co., 133 
 N. Y. 583; 30 N. E. Eep. 752; 44 N. Y. S. E. 680; Eobinson v. 
 Manhattan E. Co., 3 Misc. (N. Y.) 209; 54 N. Y. S. R. 792; 25 
 N. Y. Supp. 91. 
 
 The failure to jump from an engine, in the face of an impending 
 collision, was held not to constitute negligence, as matter of law, 
 in Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Eoney, 89 Ind. 453; 46 Am. Rep. 173; 
 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 223; Cottrill v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 47 Wis. 
 634; 3 N. W. Eep. 376; Central, etc., E. Co. v. Crosby, 74 6a. 737. 
 
 " The fact that a person caught on a bridge by a train attempted, 
 on the spur of the moment, to reach a platform by running in advance 
 of the train, when he might have reached safety by stepping out on 
 a girder running parallel with the track, does not render him as a 
 matter of law negligent in his choice, although he may have chosen 
 the more dangerous course." St. Louis, etc., Ey. Co. v. Stamps 
 (Ark. 1907), 104 S. W. Eep. 1114. 
 
 " Where defendant's negligence placed decedent in danger, decedent 
 was not bound to choose at his peril what ultimately would prove 
 the safer course, but was only required to use his best care and 
 judgment as the situation then presented itself to him." Sherwood v. 
 New York Cent., etc., E. Co. (N. Y. Supp. 1907), 105 N. Y. S. 547. 
 
 " In determining whether a person traveling on a street and who 
 
 569 
 
§ 423 COITTEIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OB" EMPLOYEES. 
 
 § 423. Collision due to engineer's negligence. — Where an 
 injury results to an engineer from a collision of his engine 
 with other cars on the same track, which he knew were there, 
 and not to any failure of duty on the part of the train dis- 
 patcher, it is generally held such contributory negligence on 
 the part of the engineer thus causing the collision, as will bar 
 
 has lost his life by an accident at a railway crossing was guilty of 
 contributory negligence, the natural instincts of self-preservation may 
 be considered." Elgin, etc., R. Co. v. Hoadley, 122 111. App. 165, 
 judgment affirmed; 77 N. E. Rep. 151; 220 IH. 462. 
 
 " Where decedent was assisting in loading a flat car with poles for 
 shipment by his employer, and some one nearby shouted an alarm 
 to stop an approaching train, and decedent left his place, and went 
 around the car to a point where he could see the train, and while there 
 was killed, the jury could presume, in the absence of evidence as to 
 why he went around the car, that he did so through a sense of duty 
 to assist in any emergency that might arise.'' Chicago, etc., R. Co. 
 V. Pritchard (Ind. 1906), 79 N. E. Rep. 508, transferred from appel- 
 late court, 78 N. E. Rep. 1044. 
 
 " A person who, in an effort to avoid immediate danger, in the 
 exigency of the moment, suddenly, and without time for reflection, puts 
 himself in the way of other perils without fault, is not guilty of 
 contributory negligence." Simeone v. Lindsay (Del. Super. 1907), 65 
 Atl. Rep. 778. 
 
 " Persons in position of great peril are not required to exercise all 
 of the presence of mind and care of a prudent and careful man; the 
 law makes allowances for them and leaves the circumstances of their 
 conduct to the jury." Chicago & A. Ry. Co. v. O'Leary, 126 111 App. 
 311. 
 
 " It is not contributory negligence, as a matter of law, for one 
 placed in a dangerous position by another's negligence to adopt in a 
 sudden emergency a perilous alternative in an endeavor to avoid 
 danger to himself or others, though it may turn out that he should 
 have acted diflFerently." McCallion v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (Kan. 
 1906), 88 Pac. Rep. 50. 
 
 " Where plaintiflf, a railroad switchman, was injured in a collision 
 between a switch engine and a road engine, plaintiflf was not negligent 
 while acting in an emergency in jumping from the footboard of the 
 tender of the switch engine to a station platform, instead of employ- 
 ing the emergency air brakes by means within his reach." Brantner v. 
 Chicago, B & Q. Ry. Co. (Iowa 1907), 112 N. W. Rep. 790. 
 
 5Y0 
 
COlfTKIBUTOEY NEGLIGEITCE OF EMPLOYEES. § 423 
 
 an action for damages for an injury sustained by him in 
 the collision.** 
 
 Where the engineer knows that cars are ahead of him on 
 the track it is negligence on his part to round a sharp curve 
 •without keeping any lookout for such cars and without 
 slacking the speed of his engine.*^ And the rule in regard 
 to cars upon the track, applies as well to a collision with any 
 other object or substance, of which he has notice, or ought 
 to know, by the exercise of reasonable care, on his part.** 
 Accordingly, if a rock falls from a mountain side and is 
 seen, or could have been seen, a sufficient distance ahead, 
 to have enabled the engineer to stop his engine, before strik- 
 ing it, with the means at his command, a failure to stop his 
 engine, before the collision occurs, will prevent an action 
 for damages on his part.** 
 
 However, mere opportunity to know of the condition of 
 the track, in the absence of actual knowledge thereof and the 
 mere possibility that the engine might have been stopped, 
 after discovery of the obstruction, will not justify the court, 
 as matter of law, in holding the engineer guilty of contrib- 
 utory negligence, in such a case, but the issue should be sub- 
 mitted to the jury, where any such doubt exists.*^ 
 
 And, of course, if the collision is due to the negligence of 
 the train dispatcher, instead of that of the engineer, since 
 his neglect would not be the proximate cause of his injury, 
 in States where the common-law rule of coemployees has been 
 abolished, the engineer would not be denied a recovery.*® 
 
 81 Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Eoss (Ark), 18 S. W. Rep. 172; 
 Blessing v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., .7 Mo. App. 594; 77 Mo. 410; 
 Moules V. Delaware, etc., Co., 141 Pa. St. 632; 21 Atl. Rep. 753; 
 Norfolk, etc., E. Co. v. Williams, 89 Va. 165; 15 S. E. Rep. 522. 
 
 82 Blessing v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 77 Mo. 410; Moules v. Delaware, 
 etc., R. Co., 141 Pa. St. 632; 21 Atl. Rep. 733. 
 
 83 Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Voss (Ark.), 18 8. W. Rep. 172. 
 8* Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Voss, supra. 
 86 Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Voss, supra. 
 
 «6 Santa Fe Pacific R. Co. v. Holmes, 202 U. S. 438; 50 L. Ed. 1094. 
 
 571 
 
§ 424 CONTRIBUTOEY NEGLIGEKTCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 § 424. Injuries from obstractiojis near the track. — As a 
 general rule, as to obstructions known to an employee, or 
 those plainly observable by him, if he fails to use such ordi- 
 nary care as will protect himself from a collision with such 
 known danger, he will be denied a recovery, because of his 
 own contributory negligence, for an injury from striking any 
 object near the track.*'' Upon this question the true test is 
 not in the exercise of care to discover the danger, but whether 
 the obstruction is known, or is plainly observable.*® 
 
 As employees, in the discharge of their duties on trains, 
 often find it necessary to extend their persons beyond the 
 surface of cars, an employee is not guilty of contributory 
 negligence, as matter of law, because his person, at the mo- 
 ment of collision, unnecessarily protruded beyond the outer 
 surface of the car, but for which fact he would not have been 
 
 "An engineer on a train, following another train, is guilty of con- 
 tributory negligence in running into a station without keeping a proper 
 lookout, though he did not know that the preceding train was standing 
 at the station." Judgment (Civ. App.), 95 S. W. Eep. 660, reversed. — 
 International, etc., E. Co. v. Brice (Tex. 1906), 97 S. W. Rep. 461. 
 
 The negligence of a railroad company in allowing two trains to run 
 upon the same track, without giving orders, will not excuse the con- 
 tributory negligence of an operative, whose duty it was to look at the 
 bulletin board and know the exact location of the other train, for 
 failing to do so. Vinson v. Los Angeles, etc., R. Co., 147 Cal. 479; 
 82 Pac. Rep. 53. 
 
 A railway engineer, who was killed as a result of running into 
 a washout on the track, is not guilty of such contributory negligence, 
 as to preclude a recovery for his death, although informed of the 
 unusual rain, because he did not discover the exaqt washout, or 
 avoid the injury. Western Ry. Co. v. Russell (Ala.), 39 So. Rep. 311. 
 
 sTDevitt V. Paciflc, etc., R. Co., 50 Mo. 302; 3 Am. Ry. Rep. 533; 
 Owen V. New York, etc., R. Co., 1 Lans. (N. T.) 108; Norfolk, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Williams, 89 Va. 165; 15 S. E. Rep. 522; Choctaw, etc., R. 
 Co. V. McDade, 191 U. S. 64; 48 L. Ed. 96. 
 
 88 Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Archibald, 170 U. S. 665; 42 L. Ed. 1118; 
 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 777; Choetaw, etc., R. Co. v. McDade, 191 U. S. 64; 
 48 L. Ed. 96; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Swearingen, 196 U. 8. 51; 49 
 L. Ed. 382. 
 
 572 
 
CONTEIBTTTOET NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. § 425 
 
 injured.®* Accordingly, an injury from striking a bridge,*" 
 standing cars,*^ switch stand,*^ water spout,*^ telegraph 
 pole,** or other obstruction, maintained by the railroad com- 
 pany near the track, may or may not constitute contributory 
 negligence, on the part of the injured employee, according 
 to the facts and circumstances in connection with the particu- 
 lar injury and the length of service of the given employee 
 and the notice or means of knowledge of the given obstruc- 
 tion. 
 
 § 425. Striking overhead bridge. — As in the case of ob- 
 structions near the track, the question of an employee's negli- 
 gence in striking an overhead bridge, or other structure, will 
 depend upon the notice or means of notice of the employee 
 
 89 Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Burton, 97 Ala. 240; 12 So. Rep. 
 88; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Gas. 115. 
 
 oolUick V. Mint, etc., R. Co., 67 Mich. 632; 35 N. W. Rep. 708. 
 
 »i Kansas City, fete., R. Co. v. Burton, 97 Ala. 240; 12 So. Rep. 88; 
 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 115. 
 
 »2 Johnston v. Oregon, etc., R. Co., 23 Oregon 94; 31 Pae. Rep. 283; 
 Johnson v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 43 Minn. 53 ; 44 N. W. Rep. 884. 
 
 03 Choctaw, etc., R" Co. v. McDade, 191 U. S. 64; 48 L. Ed. 96. 
 
 »* Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Russell, 91 111. 298; Boss v. Northern 
 Pacific R. Co., 2 N. Dakota 128. 
 
 For injury from striking a fence and contributory negligence of 
 engineer, see Murphy v. Wabash R. Co., 115 Mo. Ill; 21 S. W. 
 Rep. 862. 
 
 If a brakeman climbs over the bumpers at the end of the car to use 
 an end ladder to ascend to the top of the car, instead of using the side 
 ladder, and as a result sutains injury, his contributory negligence 
 will bar a recovery. Wilson v. Michigan, etc., R. Co., 94 Mich. 20; 
 53 N. W. Rep. 797. 
 
 But where the employee, a car catcher, had to act promptly and 
 ascended by a side ladder, instead of an end ladder and, as a result, 
 was struck and injured by a stationary ear, near the track, on a, side 
 track, he was not held negligent as matter of law, in Chase v. Burling- 
 ton, etc., R. Co., 76 Iowa 675; 39 N. W. Rep. 196; 38 Am. & Eng. R.- 
 Cas. 148. 
 
 A railroad company is not liable to a brakeman, injured while 
 descending a car, on account of a projection on a, bridge the train 
 
 573 
 
§ 425 CONTEIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 of the structure, the length of time he has been in the service 
 and the character of his duties at the time of the injury.'® 
 
 A brakeman, on top of a moving train, is not, as matter 
 of law, charged with contributory negligence, simply because 
 he does not constantly bear in mind the precise location, where 
 his train is and where every bridge is along the line of road. 
 The law makes some allowances for the frailty of human 
 memory, in such cases.*® 
 
 But a brakeman cannot recover for injuries sustained by 
 a collision with an overhead bridge, while necessarily on the 
 roof of a freight car, if he knew the bridge was a low one, 
 where he might have avoided it by stooping,*'' nor would the 
 failure to maintain a warning si^al at such bridge alter the 
 result, if the injured employee knew the location of the 
 bridge, for this would simply amount to concurrent negli- 
 gence upon his part and his employer.** And where the 
 brakeman had been cautioned about the presence of an over- 
 head bridge and knew its location and knew that he could 
 
 •was crossing, where he was not required to be in this position at time 
 of injury. Krebbs v. Oregon, etc., R. Co., 40 Wash. 138; 82 Pac. Rep. 
 130; 84 Pac. Rep. 609. 
 
 " A brakeman on a freight train, injured by coining in contact with 
 a, water crane maintained near the track, while climbing the ladder 
 of a box car in the train, cannot be charged with negligence on the 
 theory that he mounted the train on the wrong side of the crane, for, 
 having an eye to mount the car, there could be no wrong and right 
 side to the crane." Charlton v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (Mo. 1906), 
 98 S. W. Rep. 529. 
 
 85 Barton v. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 52 Mo. 253; Devitt v. Pacific R. 
 Co., 50 Mo. 302; Dale v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 63 Mo. 435; Elliott v. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 67 Mo. 272; Clark v. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 
 78 Va. 709; 49 Am. Rep. 394; 18 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 78; Rains v. 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 71 Mo. 164; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 610. 
 
 98 Wallace v. Central, etc., R. Co., 138 N. Y. 302; 52 N. Y. S. E. 351; 
 33 N. E. Rep. 1069, reversing 63 Hun 632. - 
 
 »7 0wen v. New York, etc., R. Co., 1 Lans (N. Y.) 108; 47 N. Y. 
 670. 
 
 «8 Fitzgerald v. New York, etc., R. Co., 59 Hun 225 ; 36 N. Y S. R. 
 755. 
 
 514: 
 
CONTEIBTTTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. § 426 
 
 not stand upright and pass under it safely, on top of a 
 freight car, but when injured was seated on a brake, which 
 elevated him higher than he would otherwise have stood, 
 his negligence was held to preclude his recovery for an injury 
 so sustained.®^ 
 
 However, if the employer has failed to maintain a telltale 
 or warning near the bridge or overhead structure, to an- 
 nounce its presence, if the injury occurs at night and the em- 
 ployee's knowledge of the structure is not sufficient to charge 
 him with negligence in failing to note its presence, or that 
 it was too low, or there are other facts or circumstances 
 from which it can be said that his injury was not due to 
 his own carelessness, but to the neglect of the employer, the 
 question of the negligence of an injured employee, in such 
 case, from being struck by an overhead structure, will be for 
 the jury.^ 
 
 § 426. Running at immoderate rate of speed. — While a 
 railroad company is bound to maintain its track and road- 
 bed in a reasonably safe condition for use, yet, where an in- 
 jury to an employee who had a right to regulate the speed of 
 a train, is due not so much to the bad condition of the track 
 
 »»Devitt V. Pacific E. Co., 50 Mo. 302; 3 Am. Ry. Eep. 533. 
 
 1 McLaughlin v. Grand Trunk E. Co., 1-2 Ont. 418. 
 
 A brakeman, killed while on top of a box car, in daylight, by striking 
 an overhead bridge, who had passed under the bridge daily for three 
 months and had always stooped to avoid it, was held not entitled to 
 recover, although no telltale was maintained by the company near the 
 bridge. Hooper v. Columbia, etc., E. Co., 21 So. Car. 541; 53 Am. 
 Eep. 691; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 433. See, also, Simms v. South 
 Carolina E. Co., 26 So. Car. 490; 2 S. E. Eep. 486; 31 Am. & Eng. 
 E. Cas. 199. But, see Cleveland, etc., E. Co. v. Walter, 45 111. App. 642. 
 
 It was held to be contributory negligence for an jemployee to climb 
 up a freight car higher and wider than ordinary freight cars usually 
 are, without looking to see how near the car will come to the roof 
 of a station, in Piatt v. Chicago, etc., B. Co., 84 Iowa 694; 51 N. W. 
 Eep. 254. 
 
 575 
 
§ 426 CONTEIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 as to the immoderate rate of speed at which the train was 
 being run at the time of the injury, this is held to constitute 
 contributory negligence on his part.^ A brakeman, with the 
 right, by ordinary care, to regulate the speed of approaching 
 cars, cannot recover damages for an injury to which the 
 rate of speed of the cars, contributed ; * a battered rail, 
 which concurred to cause an injury to an engineer who ran 
 his train faster than allowed to make up lost time, and in 
 consequence of which a wreck occurred, was held not to en- 
 able him to recover damages, but his own negligence would 
 prevent a recovery,* and a freight conductor will be denied 
 a recovery for an injury due to a reckless rate of speed at 
 which the train was being run, under his direction or con- 
 trol.^ Just what rate of speed will be held negligence, under 
 the circumstances, of course will depend upon the facts of 
 each case and where the evidence is conflicting or reasonable 
 minds would not agree as to the conclusion from the facts in 
 proof, the issue would be one for the jury. It has been held 
 negligence to approach a bridge in process of construction, 
 at a rate of twenty-five miles an hour ; * running over a 
 switch, in a dense fog, at fifteen or twenty miles an hour, 
 was held negligence, in one case,'' and running over a switch 
 at a rate of ten miles an hour in the face of a rule restricting 
 the speed to six miles, was held negligence in another case.* 
 
 2 Smith V. Memphis, etc., R. Co., 18 Fed. Eep. 304; So. Louis, etc, 
 E. Co. V. Morgart, 45 Ark. 318; Little Eock, etc., R. Co. v. Voss (Ark.), 
 18 S. W. Rep. 172; Sweeny v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co., 33 Minn. 153; 
 22 N. W. Rep. 289; 22 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 302; Mantel v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. Co., 33 Minn. 62. 
 
 sMuldowney v. Illinois, etc., R. Co., 39 Iowa 615; 8 Am. Ey. Rep. 
 487. 
 
 * Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Patterson, 69 111. 650. 
 
 sGorham v. Kansas City, etc., E. Co., 113 Mo. 408; 20 S. W. Rep. 
 1060. 
 
 8 Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Williams, 89 Va. 165; 15 S. E. Rep. 522. 
 
 TWert V. Keim (Pa.), 13 Atl. Rep. 548. 
 
 s Memphis, etc., R. Co. v. Thomas, 51 Miss. 637. 
 5Y6 
 
CONTEIBrTOEY KEGLlGENCE 01? EMPLOYEES. § 427 
 
 But of course no rule can be applied to determine the facts 
 of each case, but the conclusion must necessarily differ, with 
 the different elements that go to make up the substantial 
 proof of each case. 
 
 § 427. Injuries from observance or nonobservance of sig- 
 nals. — An injury from a failure to heed an authorized signal, 
 or a compliance "with an unauthorized signal, may, in con- 
 nection with the circumstances connected with an injury to a 
 railroad employee, amount to contributory negligence, on his 
 part. 
 
 Where the rules of the company required a train to wait 
 at a crossing, until a signal was given to cross another rail- 
 road track, and in reliance on a proper signal, a train on 
 the other road was crossing when the conductor of the train 
 on the defendant's road gave a signal for his train to also 
 cross, it was held that his contributory negligence would pre- 
 vent a recovery for his death, which resulted from the colli- 
 sion." When an engineer is warned by a danger signal not 
 to proceed with his train, and immediately thereafter another 
 signal is given, which indicates that he might proceed with 
 safety, but both signals are continuously displayed together, 
 so as to leave it in doubt which signal to obey, it is negli- 
 gence for him to go on with his train, and if he does so and 
 a collision ensues in which he loses his life, his widow will 
 not be permitted to recover for his death.^" 
 
 And the consequences of relying on a signal not au- 
 thorized by the rules of the company is not essentially 
 different from the failure to observe a signal authorized 
 by the rules, and if an employee relies on a signal not 
 authorized by a rule of the company, and in relying 
 
 8 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Snyder, 117 111. 376; 7 N. E. Rep. 664; 
 28 Am. &^Eng. E. Cas. 611, reversing 18 111. App. 640. 
 lODevine v. Savannah, etc., E. Co., 89 Ga. 541; 15 S. E. Rep. 781. 
 
 1—37 577 
 
§ 428 CONTEIBTJTOEY NEGLIGENCfi 03? EMtLOYEEg. 
 
 thereon, sustains an injury, no recovery can be had therefor.^' 
 Of course, as in other cases, if the giving of the signal 
 or the reliance thereon, or the question of the existence of a 
 rule in derogation of the signal, is in doubt, the issue would 
 be properly left to a jury, as triers of the facts. ^^ And if the 
 order or signal is given by a superior employee, vphose orders 
 the injured employee is bound to obey, his obedience to the 
 signal would not be held to amount to contributory negli- 
 gence on his part, unless the danger was so glaring as to 
 have deterred any ordinarily prudent man from assuming 
 it, in pursuance of the signal, or order.^* 
 
 § 428. Biding in dangerous places. — The employee of a 
 railroad' company, who voluntarily leaves his post and is in- 
 jured while upon another part of the train, where the ex- 
 posure is greater, is presumably guilty of negligence con- 
 
 11 Columbus, etc., E. Co. v. Bridges, 86 Ala. 448; 5 So. Rep. 864; 
 38 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 136. 
 
 12 Central, etc., R. Co. v. DeBray, 71 Ga. 406. 
 
 13 Colorado Midland R. Co. v. O'Brien, 16 Colo. 219; 27 Pac. Rep. 
 701; Miller v. Union Pacific R. Co., 12 Fed. Rep. 600; 4 MeCrary 629. 
 
 Where an engineer had a right to assume that signals of the brake- 
 man would be given him, when the engine was to be moved, the 
 brakeman had a right to assume that the engine would not be moved, 
 unless signals were given by him. Illinois Central R. Co. v. Cane's 
 Admr., 28 Ky. L. R. 1018; 90 S. W. Rep. 1061. 
 
 If a brakeman, repeating signals, stands so close to an approaching 
 train, that the operatives, with due care, cannot stop the train after 
 discovering him, he cannot recover, in Kentucky. Cincinnati, etc., R. 
 Co. V. Hill's Admr., 28 Ky. L. E. 530; 89 S. W. Rep. 523. 
 
 A brakeman who is injured because of his own want of care in 
 watching for an approaching train, from the rear, while he is en- 
 gaged in giving signals, cannot recover. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Hill's Admr., 28 Ky. L. R. 530; 89 S. W. Rep. 523. 
 
 " A fireman on defendant's "train not calling the engineer's attention 
 to a signal set against the train which the engineer had failed to 
 observe, held guilty of contributory negligence preventing recovery for 
 injuries received." Elmgren v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (Minn. 
 1907), 112 N. W. Rep. 1067. 
 5Y8 
 
CONTEIBUTOET NEGLIGENCE 03? EMPLOYEES. § 428 
 
 tributing to an injury received while so situated and no 
 recovery can be had for such an injury.-'* 
 
 Riding on the pilot of the engine, instead of in a car 
 where the plaintiff belonged, has been held negligence on the 
 part of an employee;-'® riding on a known defective foot- 
 board of an engine, when other safer places were open tcr 
 the injured employee to ride; '® riding in a sitting position 
 upon the cowcatcher of a road engine ; ^'^ riding upon the 
 tender of an engine, when the employee ought to have been 
 in a caboose ; ^* riding in a dangerous position on a moving 
 car, when no duty required the employee's presence, at such 
 a place; ^® riding on a brake wheel, on the platform of a car, 
 when the employee ought to have been in the car ; ^^ riding 
 on the side of a flat car, with his feet hanging over the edge 
 of the car, after warning not to do so; *^ a passenger volun- 
 tarily riding upon the platform of a passenger coach, un- 
 necessarily, instead of in the coach, have all been held negli- 
 gent acts defeating, a recovery in case of an injury. ^^ 
 
 " O'Neill V. Keokuk, etc., E. Co., 45 Iowa 546. 
 
 " Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Jones, 95 U. S. 439 ; Eliot v. Chicago, etc., 
 E. Co., 5 Dakota 523; 41 N. W. Eep. 758; 38 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 62; 
 Alabama, etc., E. Co. v. Hawk, 72 Ala. 112; 47 Am. Eep. 403; 18 
 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 194; Griggs v. Houston, etc., E. Co., 104 U. S. 
 553; 8 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 359; Atchison, etc., E. Co. v. Lindley, 42 
 Kansas 14; 22-Pac. Eep. 703; 41 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 72. 
 
 18 Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, etc., E. Co., 26 Fed. Eep. 897. 
 
 17 Glover v. Scotten, 82 Mich. 369; 46 N. W. Eep. 936. 
 
 "Daggett V. Illinois Central E. Co., 34 Iowa 284; 5 Am. Ey. Eep. 
 389; Lehigh Valley E. Co. v. Greiner, 113 Pa. St. 600; 6 Atl. Eep. 246; 
 28 Am. & Eng. B. Cas. 397. 
 
 lOMartensen v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 60 Iowa 705; 15 N. W. Eep. 569; 
 11 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 233. 
 
 20 Martin v. Baltimore, etc., E. Co., 41 Fed. Eep. 125. 
 
 21 St. Louis, etc., E. Co. v. Marker, 41 Ark. 542. 
 
 22Hiekey v. Boston, etc., E. Co., 14 AJlen (Mass.) 429; Worthington 
 V. Central, etc., E. Co., 64 Vt. 107; Bon v. Eailway Assurance Co., 56 
 Iowa 664; Houston, etc., E. Co. v. Clemmons, 55 Texas 88; 8 Am. & 
 Eng. E. Cas. 396; Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Eeilly, 40 111. App. 416. 
 
 579 
 
§ 428 CONTKIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OP EMPLOYEES. 
 
 But the presumption of negligence in such cases, may be 
 overcome by evidence that such employee or passenger occu- 
 pied such a dangerous position in performance of a specific 
 duty on his part, or through no fault of his.^* A switchman 
 Avas held not necessarily negligent in riding on the foot- 
 board of an engine, where his duties could be easier dis- 
 charged, while so riding; ^* it is not negligence, as matter 
 of law, that a switchman rode on the front footboard, in- 
 stead of on the rear board ;^^ a middle brakeman is not neces- 
 sarily negligent, because at time of his injury, he did not 
 happen to be exactly in the middle of the train ; *® a brake- 
 man riding on top of a car, sitting at the side, instead of 
 in the middle, is not necessarily negligent, as matter of law,*'^ 
 nor will the negligence of the employee in riding in a dan- 
 gerous place, ever defeat his recovery for an injury incurred 
 while so riding, if the defendant, after notice of his danger, 
 could have avoided the injury, by reasonable care,^* and 
 whether or not an employee is negligent, in riding in a dan- 
 gerous place, where the facts are disputed, or his duty is 
 not plain, is an issue properly left to the jury to determine. ^^ 
 
 23 Boss V. Northern Pacific R. Co., 2 N. Dakota 128; 49 N. W. Bep. 
 655. 
 2*Lockhart v. Little Rock, etc., R. Co., 40 Fed. Rep. 631. 
 
 25 James v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 46 Minn. 168; 48 N. W. Rep. 783. 
 
 26 Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Walter, 45 111. App. 642. 
 s^Shumaker v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 39 Fed. Rep. 174; 17 Wash. 
 
 L. R. 550. 
 
 28 Au V. New York, etc., R. Co., 29 Fed. Rep. 72. 
 
 2SMeIoy v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (Iowa), 37 N. W. Rep. 335; 33 Am. 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 358. 
 
 "Where plaintiff was riding on the pilot of an engine at the time 
 he was injured, in accordance with the custom and by the directions 
 of his superior ofllcers, whether he was guilty of contributory negli' 
 gence in assuming such position was for the jury." Barsehow v. Lake 
 Shore, etc., Ry. Co. (Mich. 1907), 110 N. W. Rep. 1057; 13 Detroit 
 Leg. N. 1060. 
 
 "Where an employee of a railway company, voluntarily and un- 
 necessarily takes an exposed position on a train, where the risk was 
 580 
 
CmilTfilBUTOET NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. § 429 
 
 § 429. Boarding moving car or engine. — An employee of 
 a railroad company cannot recover, in a suit against the com- 
 pany, for injuries received while recklessly attempting to 
 board a moving train, although the train may have been 
 improperly equipped and some of its appliances are de- 
 fective, ^^ nor would the fact that the plaintiff had been in 
 the habit of boarding moving trains, or that he had been seen 
 to do so on previous occasions, aVail him, in such a case.^^ 
 
 A switchman was held guilty of negligence in attempting 
 to get on a moving engine, by stepping on the front foot- 
 so obviously dangerous that a prudent man would not think of incur- 
 ring it, he is guilty of contributory negligence, and there can be no 
 recovery against the railroad company for the injuries he received." 
 State V. Western Maryland E. Co. (Md. 1907), 65 Atl. Rep. 635. 
 
 " Where a brakeman of a log train, riding on a bumper over the 
 trucks of one of the cars in accordance with his duty, was thrown 
 from the train and injured by a sudden acceleration of speed, and he 
 was neither warned nor had any reasonable cause to anticipate such 
 acceleration of speed, he was not negligent." Gulf, etc., Ey. Co. v. 
 Harrison (Tex. Civ. App. 1907), 104 S. W. Eep. 399. 
 
 " Where a switchman was injured while riding on the footboard at 
 the rear of the tender of a switch engine as it was backing along a 
 y before daylight in the morning by its colliding with a road engine, 
 he was not negligent as a matter of law in temporarily turning and 
 looking backward to see if his foreman was on the front end of the 
 engine, in the absence of any reason to believe that there was any 
 immediate danger in proceeding along the Y; the crew having been 
 assured by the yardmaster that the Y was clear." Brantner v. Chicago, 
 etc., Ey. Co. (Iowa 1907), 112 N. W. Eep. 790. 
 
 Eiding an engine pilot, without a rod to hold to, may be a risk 
 assumed, but it is not contributory negligence, as a matter of law, in 
 North Carolina. Biles v. Seaboard Air Line Co., 139 N. C. 528; 52 
 S. E. Eep. 129. 
 
 soDowell V. Vicksburg, etc., R. Co., 61 Miss. 519; 18 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 42; McMurtry v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 67 Miss. 601; 7 So. Eep. 
 401; Chambers v. Western, etc., E. Co., 91 N. Car. 471; Timmonds v. 
 Central, etc., E. Co., 6 Ohio St. 105; Kerwhacker v. Cleveland, etc., E. 
 Co., 3 Ohio St. 172. 
 
 aiDowell v. Vicksburg, etc., E. Co., 61 Miss. 519; 18 Am. & Eng. E. 
 Cas, 42, 
 
 581 
 
§ 429 CONTMBUTOEY ITEGLIGENCE OF EMPIX)TEES. 
 
 board, in violation of a rule of the employer; ^^ there is a 
 want of ordinary care in the voluntary attempt of an engine 
 hostler's assistant to get on the rear step of a moving en- 
 gine ; ^* a flagman who knew of a defective engine step and 
 yet tried to get on the engine by means of this step, when 
 the engine was in motion, is negligent.^* A brakeman can- 
 not recover for injuries received while attempting to get on 
 the pilot of a moving engine, even when acting in pursuance 
 of orders of a superior employee,*® nor would a railroad 
 company be liable for an injury to a switchman, who at- 
 tempts to mount a defective engine step, while the engine is 
 in motion, by standing in the center of the track, in viola- 
 tion of the employer's rules.*® 
 
 But it is not necessarily negligence for a switchman, ac- 
 customed to the work, to step upon the footboard of a slowly 
 moving engine, especially where there is no rule forbidding 
 such conduct.*' And it may properly be left to the jury to 
 determine whether or not a brakeman is negligent, in attempt- 
 ing to mount a rapidly moving freight train, where his 
 lantern had gone out and he was acting under the orders 
 of the conductor of his train, in so doing.*^ 
 
 32 Lake Shore, etc., K. Co. v. Eoy, 5 111. App. 82. 
 83 Union Pacific E. Co. v. Estes, 37 Kansas 715; 16 Pac. Rep. 131. 
 .34 New York, etc., E. Co. v. Lyons, 119 Pa. St. 324; 13 Atl. Rep. 
 20S; 21 W. N. C. 277; 11 Cent. Rep. 834. 
 
 35 Cornwall v. Charlotte, etc., E. Co., 97 N. Car. 11; 2 S. E. Eep. 659. 
 
 36 0'Mellia v. Kansas City, etc., E. Co., 115 Mo. 205; 21 S. W. Rep. 
 503. 
 
 37 0'Mellia v. Kansas City, etc., E. Co., 115 Mo. 205; 21 S. W. Rep. 
 503. 
 
 38 Fox V. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 86 Iowa 368; 53 N. W. Rep. 259; 53 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 430. 
 
 An employee who attempts to board a moving engine when off duty, 
 and is injured by an oil can left on the running board, cannot recover 
 upon the ground of such obstruction, or the absence of a rule regulating 
 it. Wise Ter. R. Co. v. McCormick (Va.), 51 S. E. Rep. 731. 
 
 " It is not negligence for a freight brakeman to mount his train 
 when in motion to resume his duties after he had left the train to 
 
 582 
 
CONTKIBtTTOET KEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. § 430 
 
 § 430. Jumping from moving car or engine. — One who is 
 
 injured by jumping from a moving train, whether employee 
 or passenger, is generally barred of recovery, by reason of 
 his contributory negligence, in the absence of an invitation 
 or order to jump, on the part of the railroad company's em- 
 ployees in control of the train. ^^ 
 
 An employee is generally held negligent barring a recov- 
 ery, if he jumps from a moving train, at such time as to 
 strike an obstruction near the track, which he could have 
 seen, by looking before -he leaped ; *" a brakeman cannot re- 
 cover for an injury received while stepping from a moving 
 engine, at night, at a place he was not familiar with, with- 
 out his lantern ; *^ getting off a moving car or engine, by step- 
 ping in the opposite direction from that in which the car or 
 engine is moving, is generally held negligence,*^ and it is 
 such recklessness to step from a moving engine or car, onto 
 the track, directly in front of the oncoming car or engine, 
 
 procure a lunch." Charlton v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (Mo. 1906), 98 
 S. W. Eep. 529. 
 
 " It is not, under all circumstances, as a matter of law, negligence 
 for a brakeman to dismount from a moving train and attempt to 
 board the locomotive, though the act of dismounting is unnecessary." 
 Creola Lumber Co. v. Mills (Ala. 1906), 42 So. Rep. 1019. 
 
 " Where it was negligence for a brakeman to attempt to board a 
 car at the tiine, in the manner, and under the circumstances under 
 which he did, and his negligence proximately caused or contributed 
 to cause the accident, he is not entitled to recover." Galveston, etc., 
 Ey. Co. V. Worcester (Tex. Civ. App. 1907), 100 S. W. Rep. 990. 
 
 39 Fatten V. Western, etc., R. Co., 96 N. Car. 455 ; 1 S. E. Rep. 863 ; 
 31 Am. &. Eng. R. Cas. 298. A lady passenger, alighting from a, moving 
 train with her baby in her arms, was held negligent, barring a recovery 
 for a resulting injury, in Young v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 93 Mo. 
 App. 267, 276. 
 
 40Gaffney v. New York, etc., R. Co., 15 R. I. 456; 7 Atl. Eep. 284; 
 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 265; Thompson v. Boston, etc., R. Co.,' 153 Mass. 
 391; 26 N. E. Rep. 1170. 
 
 41 Burgin v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 97 Ala. 274 ; 12 So. R=p. 395. 
 
 *2 Magee v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 82 Iowa 249 ; 48 N. W. Rep. 92. 
 
 583 
 
§ 431 CONTEIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 as will bar a recovery, in case of an injury therefrom.*' 
 But where a passenger or employee is invited by the em- 
 ployees of the defendant, or ordered by a superior employee, 
 to alight from a moving train, it not appearing that obedience 
 to the invitation or order at the time would certainly cause 
 injury, it is not usually held to be such contributory negli- 
 gence as will prevent a recovery.** So, if a railroad com- 
 pany invites an employee to board a train to receive his 
 wages and he attempts to alight from the train, which moves 
 off, before he has finished receiving his wages and is injured 
 in consequence of the way he alights and his infirmities, he 
 will not be held negligent, as matter of law,*^ nor would it 
 be held negligence for one to jump from a moving train, to 
 avoid an impending collision, under the sudden fright re- 
 sultiag from the emergency, if the employee had not himself 
 occasioned the collision, by his own want of care.*® 
 
 § 431. Injuries while loading and unloading cars. — An 
 employee familiar with the movement of trains, employed to 
 load or unload cars, who sustains injury, while in or on the 
 car, when he knew the train was apt to be moved at any time, 
 is generally held guilty of negligence barring a recovery for 
 an injury so sustained,*^ and the same result flows from an 
 injury sustained while voluntarily attempting to move a car 
 
 *3 Gibbons v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 66 Iowa 231; 23 N. W. Rep. 644. 
 
 **Patton V. Western, etc., R. Co., 96 N. Car. 455; 1 S. E. Rep. 863; 
 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 298; 2 Wood, Ry. Law 1130, 1131, 1132. 
 
 45 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Stacker, 86 Tenn. 343; 6 S. W. Rep. 737; 
 6 Am. St. Rep. 840. 
 
 *6 Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. Rhodes, 56 Ga. 645; Central, etc., R. Co. 
 V. Crosby, 74 Ga. 737; Cottrill v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 47 Wis. 634; 
 Haney v. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co., 38 W. Va. 570; 18 S. E. Rep. 748. 
 
 47 In Forey v. Syracuse, etc., R. Co. (122 N. Y. 667; 12 N. T. S. R. 
 198; 46 Hun 678), an employee engaged as shoveler on a gravel train, 
 was held guilty of negligence in standing where he was thrown off the 
 car by the shock caused by the stopping of the train, 
 
 584 
 
CONTKIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. § 431 
 
 • 
 
 he is engaged in loading or unloading, in the absence of some 
 defects in the car or track, or a specific order so to move it.*® 
 
 In a Georgia case,*® plaintiff was engaged to load and un- 
 load cars on a side track and was cautioned not to attempt 
 to move them himself; but notwithstanding his orders, he 
 was attempting to move the car he was unloading, with a 
 crowbar, when it was struck by a passing train and he was 
 injured. It was held that his 'own negligence prevented a 
 recovery. So, an employee voluntarily selecting a board or 
 skid, known to be defective, when safer appliances might 
 have been used, to unload a car with, is generally held to be 
 guilty of such want of care, as will bar a recovery for an 
 injury so sustained.®** 
 
 But of course, as in other cases, if the evidence is disputed 
 as to the defective appliance or as to his notice of the 
 defects therein, or he was acting under a special order in 
 the moving of the car or its contents, the issue as to his 
 negligence, would generally be one for a jury and not for 
 the court, as matter of law.®* 
 
 «Quibell V. Union Pacific R. Co., 7 Utah 122; 25 Pac. Rep. 734; 
 Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. Mapp, 80 Ga. 631 ; 6 S. E. Rep. 24. 
 
 *8 Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. Mapp, 80 Ga. 631 ; 6 S. E. Rep. 24. 
 
 60 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Lynch, 90 111. 333; Gowen v. Harley, 56 
 Fed. Rep. 973, by Judge Sanborn. 
 
 "Chase v. Burlington, etc., R. Co., 76 Iowa 675; 39 N. W. Rep. 196; 
 38 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 148. 
 
 An employee engaged in loading or unloading cars, is held to be 
 engaged in the "operation of a, railroad," within the meaning of 
 statutes making the company liable when so engaged, if injured by 
 the negligence of a coemployee. Orenderfl v. Terminal Ass'n, 116 Mo. 
 App 348, 353; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Pontius, 157 U. S. 209; 39 L. Ed. 
 675. 
 
 Plaintiff selected a known defective board in loading a car, as a 
 gang plank, and was injured by striking it and knocking it down with 
 his truck. It was held he could not recover, as the negligence was 
 that of himself and his fellow workmen. Fewell v. Southern Ry. Co. 
 (Va.), 52 8. E. Rep. 689. 
 
 "Though it wa? customary for persons unloading cars standing on 
 
 585 
 
§ 432 CONTEIBUTOKY NEGLIGENCE OF EM:^0YEES. 
 
 § 432, Negligence in operation of hand cars or tricycles, — 
 
 Where an employee on a hand car, or other similar convey- 
 ance, in pursuance to orders, or in the discharge of his duties, 
 as such employee, is injured" by a defect in the car or tracks 
 he will not be denied a recovery for such an injury, in the 
 absence of notice to him of such defect or unless it was such 
 as to be plainly discernable, or one that he ought to have 
 known of, in the proper discharge of his duty to his em- 
 ployer. ^^ The duty to furnish a reasonably safe appliance 
 runs- with a car the moment a defect is discovered, and repair 
 or warning thereof is the only way this duty can be dis- 
 charged.®^ This duty, however, is not to furnish the newest 
 or best appliances or cars, but only to furnish those reason- 
 ably safe for the use to which they are put, and where this 
 measure of duty is discharged, there is no resulting liability 
 for an improper use of a hand car or tricycle, by which a 
 resulting injury is sustained by an employee.®* 
 
 Although a push car is known not to have a brake, an em- 
 ployee injured by riding it down grade, at a rapid rate of 
 
 a railway side track to quit, work and get out of the car when cars 
 were being switched on the track, whether plaintiff was guilty of 
 contributory negligence while working in a car through other cars col- 
 liding with it must be determined by what a. man of ordinary prudence 
 would have done in like circumstances." Missouri, etc., Ey. Co. of 
 Texas v. Smith (Tex. Civ. App. 1907), 101 S. W. Eep. 453. 
 
 62 Banks v. Wabash, etc., R. Co., 40 Mo. App. 458 ; Lee v. St. Louis, 
 etc., E. Ccr, 112 Mo. App. 372, an exhaustive opinion, by Judge Nortoni; 
 Smith V. Wrightsville, etc., E. Co., 83 Ga. 671; 10 S. E. Eep. 361; 
 41 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 320. 
 
 BsEodney v. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 127 Mo. 676; 28 S. W. Rep. 887; 
 30 S. W. Eep. 150; McKune v. California Southern E. Co., 66 Cal. 302; 
 5 Pac. Eep. 482; 17 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 589. 
 
 5* Gardner v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 135 Mo. 90; 36 S. W. Rep. 214. 
 In propelling a hand car with a crowbar, instead of the handle, an 
 employee was held negligent, in Powers v. New York, etc., R. Co., 98 
 N. Y. 274; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 609. 
 
 536 
 
CONTKIBUTOKY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. § 432 
 
 speed, is negligent as matter of law ; ®^ so, it has been held 
 reckless to ride a push car down a steep grade, without seeing 
 whether or not the switch at the foot of the grade is properly 
 set ; ®® section men riding a hand car around a curve, where 
 a regular train at any time is apt to be encountered, are 
 negligent, if they ride at an excessive rate of speed ; ^'^ a 
 derailment of a hand car caused by dropping off the appli- 
 ances carried on the car, is negligence on the part of the 
 operatives of the car; ®^ injuries sustained while attempting 
 to out-run an approaching train, furnish no cause of ac- 
 tion : ^® although it is negligence for a railroad company to 
 run a train without a headlight on the engine at night, no 
 recovery can be had for an injury from a collision by a hand 
 car and such an engine, at night, when the time of the train 
 was known to the operator of the hand car ; ^° an operator of a 
 hand car, injured by a collision with a special train, run 
 without notice, cannot recover ; ®^ the death of a section 
 man on a hand car, resulting from a 'collision with a belated 
 regular train, furnishes no cause of action for his representa- 
 tives, where no effort had been made to ascertain the time 
 for arrival of such regular train ; ^^ it is error to approach a 
 standing train, on a hand car, or tricycle, unless it is known 
 that the train is not likely to move ; ?^ nor can a section fore- 
 man, or other employee, not authorized to ride a tricycle, 
 recover for an injury from a collision from striking an extra 
 
 66 Miller v. Union Pacific R. Co., 2 McCrary (U. S.) 87; 4 Fed. Rep. 
 768. 
 
 68 York V. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 117 Mo. 405; 22 S. W. Rep. 1081. 
 
 67 Shepard v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 158 Mass. 174; 33 N. E. Rep. 508. 
 
 68 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Mara (Ark.), 16 S. W. Rep. 196. 
 60 Pittsburg, etc., R; Co. v. Gosa, 13 111. App. 619. 
 
 80 Burling v. Illinois, ietc, R. Co., 85 111. 18; Hawley v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. Co., 71 Iowa 717; 29 N. W. Rep. 787. 
 
 «i Pennsylvania, etc., R. Co. v. Wachter, 60 Md. 395; 15 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 187. 
 
 «2 Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Leech, 41 Ohio St. 388. 
 
 «3 Catawissa R, Co. v. Armstrong, 49 Fa. St. 186. 
 
 587 
 
§ 432 COWTKIBUTOET NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 or regular train, where no proper lookout was kept for 
 trains.** 
 
 However, the compliance or noncompliance with the com- 
 pany's rules or the orders of superior employees is always 
 material in such injuries and if the custom of the service 
 has not been violated, or some rule of the employer, the ques- 
 tion of the negligence of the employee in an action for an 
 injury from such a cause, may be a jury issue, instead of 
 one for the court, as matter of law.®® 
 
 0* Jolly V. Detroit, etc., R. Co., 93 Mich. 370; 53 N. W. Rep. 526. 
 An employee not required by the railroad company, to use a " speeder," 
 but who is permitted to use it, without objection, is a mere licensee, 
 and must operate such a conveyance at his own peril, and must look out 
 for wild trains and is negligent if he does not, in Ohio. Cleveland, 
 etc., R. Co. v. Workman, 12 Am. Neg. Kep. 162. See, also, Chicago, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Healey (Nebraska), 15 Am. Neg. Rep. 385j McGahan v. 
 Transit Co. (Mo.), 100 S. W. Rep. 601; Vaudray v. Chicago, etc., R. 
 Co. (Wis.), 109 N. W. Rep. 926; Hafiord v. Illinois, etc., R. Co. (Iowa), 
 110 N. W. Rep. 446; International, etc., R. Co. v. McCarthy, 64 
 (Texas) 632; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Jolly's Admx. (Ky.), 90 S. W. 
 Rep. 977. 
 
 oBSlette V. Great Northern R. Co., 53 Minn. 341; 55 N. W. Rep. 
 137; McKune v. California Southern R. Co., 66 Cal. 302; 5 Pac. Rep. 
 482; 17 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 589; Pool v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 56 Wis. 
 277; 14 N. W. Rep. 46; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 360. 
 
 In Mack v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (123 Mo. App. 531), the Kansas 
 City Court of Appeals held that it was a jury issue whether or not a 
 section man, under orders of his foreman, was negligent, in remaining 
 on a hand car, without knowing of the time a regular train was due, 
 because belated, where he was injured by the sudden application of 
 the brake, to avoid a collision with the train, as a result of which 
 he was thrown from the car. 
 
 An employee engaged in running a hand car, is engaged in the 
 "operation of a railroad," within the meaning a statute making the 
 railroad company liable for the negligence of a coemployee with one 
 so engaged. Stanley v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 112 Mo. App. 601, 609. 
 But it is error to instruct the jury as matter of law, this is true, if the 
 facts are disputed. Callahan v. Bridge Co., 170 Mo. 482; 71 S. W. Rep. 
 208; 60 L. R. A. 249; 94 Am. St. Rep. 746. 
 
 A section hand, directed by the section foreman, to work a handle bar 
 of a hand car, with his back toward an approaching train, is not, as 
 
 588 
 
CONTEIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. § 433 
 
 § 433. Negligence in coupling and uncoupling cars. — An 
 experienced brakeman is presumed to have knowledge of 
 such matters pertaining to the business in which he is en- 
 gaged, as are of common information, and if his acts in 
 coupling or uncoupling a car or engine are dangerous or 
 reckless as judged by such general information in the busi- 
 ness, he will be held negligent barring a recovery for such 
 an injury.*® He is presumed to know that a train of cars 
 will move a distance after detached from a moving engine 
 propelling them and if he deliberately steps in front of. such 
 cars, after the engine is disconnected, he is negligent.*^ In 
 handling foreign cars, he is charged with notice of all de- 
 fects that are apparent in the car and if he attempts to couple 
 a lower drawhead onto a higher one, without a crooked link, 
 and sustains an injury, while so engaged, he is generally held 
 negligent.** An employee is negligent in coupling an old 
 car with a lower link than other cars ordinarily have, if he 
 does not provide a crooked link to make the connection ; *^ 
 it is negligence not to observe a disparity in the heights of 
 
 matter of law, n^ligent. Louisville & N. K. Co. v. Helm, 28 Ky. L. R. 
 603; 89 S. W. Eep. 709. 
 
 "Where plaintiff was injured while working on a hand ear, the 
 court properly charged that, if plaintiff could reasonably have used a 
 less dangerous way of working the car, this will not bar his right to re- 
 cover, unless it appe^ir that he knew he was using a more dangerous 
 way, and that such use was negligent, and that this negligence was 
 the proximate cause of his injuries." Southern Ey. Co. v. McGowan 
 (Ala. 1907), 43 So. Rep. 378. 
 
 86 Gorman v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co., 78 Iowa 509 ; 43 N. W. Eep. 
 303; Savannah, etc., E. Co. v. Barber, 71 Ga. 644. 
 
 6TBums V. Boston, etc., R. Co., 101 Mass. 50; Arnold v. Delaware, 
 etc., R. Co., 6 N. Y. S. R. 368. 
 
 88 Kelly V. Abbott, 63 Wis. 307; 23 N. W. Rep. 890; 53 Am. Rep. 
 292 ; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 633. 
 
 89 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Higgins, 44 Ark. 293; 21 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 629; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Warner, 108 111. 538; 18 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 100. 
 
 589 
 
§ 433 CONTBIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 drawheads to cars to be coupled together ; '^'' an employee in- 
 jured by projecting loads on cars he is coupling, which could 
 have been avoided by stooping, is negligent, vs^here he knew 
 of the projecting loads; ^^ a brakeman who knows that coup- 
 lings are defective and apt to slip past each other, is negli: 
 gent in going between the cars to make such a coupling; ^* 
 an injury received while coupling cars of different patterns 
 and makes, which were apparent when an observance of the 
 difference between the cars would have avoided the injury, is 
 negligence ; ''^ riding on a flat car to make a coupling with 
 a combination car, attached, is held negligence ; "^^ a brake- 
 man who signals the engineer to move ahead, in making a 
 flying switch, before he has extricated the coupling pin, as a 
 result of which he is injured, is negligent ; ''^ a brakeman, 
 who knowing that two couplings are mismatched, places the 
 pin in the moving car, instead of in the standing car and 
 remains between the cars, to shake the pin in position, 
 instead of letting the concussion place it in position, is negli- 
 gent ; ''^ and if a brakeman sees that a train is not going to 
 stop for him to nncouple the cars, and while it is in rapid 
 
 70 Norfolk, etc., E. Co. v. Emmert, 83 Va. 6'40; 3 S. E. Rep. 145 j 
 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 194; Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Asbury, 84 111. 429; 
 Goulin V. Canada Southern Co., 64 Mich. 190; 31 N. W. Rep.. 44. 
 ' Ti Toledo, etc., K. Co. v. Black, 88 111. 112; 21 Am. Ry. Rep. 290; 
 Lothrop V. Fitchburg, etc., R. Co., 150 Mass. 423; 23 N. E. Rep. 227; 
 41 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 327 ; Brennan v. Michigan, etc., R. Co., 93 Mich. 
 156; 53 N. W. Rep. 358; Briee v^ Louisville, etc., R. Co. (Ky.), 9 S. 
 W. Eep. 288; Northern, etc., E. Co. v. Husson, 101 Pa. St. 1; 12 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 241. 
 
 '2 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Asbury, 84 111. 429. 
 
 TsHulett V. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 67 Mo. 239; Thomas v. Missouri 
 Pacific Ey. Co., 109 Mo. 187; 18 S. W. Eep. 980. 
 
 7* Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Eush, 84 111. 570. 
 
 75 Browne v. New York, etc., E. Co., 158 Mass. 247; 33 N. E. Rep. 
 650. 
 
 76 Norfolk, etc., E. Co. v. McDonald, 88 Va. 352; 13 S. E. Rep. 706; 
 Towner v. Missouri Pacific Ey. Co., 52 "Mo. App. 648. 
 
 590 
 
Contributory negligence oi? employees. § 433 
 
 • 
 
 motion rushes in to make the coupling, as a result of which 
 he is injured, he cannot recover. '''' 
 
 But the fact that an employee undertook to uncouple cars 
 under circumstances which rendered the service more dan- 
 gerous than usual, is not always negligence as matter of law. 
 The issue is whether or not an ordinarily prudent person, 
 under the circumstances, would have made the attempt.'^* In 
 the absence of evidence that it was not customary for switch- 
 men to mount cars to couple them, it cannot be held negli- 
 gence to do so; '^^ it is not always negligence for one not 
 regularly employed to couple cars, to attempt to do so, in 
 exchanging work with a coemployee ; *" it is not negligence, 
 usually, for one not so employed, to attempt to make a 
 coupling, under orders of a superior employee; *^ it is not 
 n^ligence to attempt to couple a car loaded with a project- 
 ing load, in the absence of information of the projecting 
 load ; *^ a brakeman has a right to presume that cars he is 
 required to couple are in proper repair, without inspecting 
 them; ^^ he has a right to presume that a rule -preventing the 
 moving of cars while employees are between them, will be ad- 
 hered to ; ®* he is not negligent in attempting to couple a de- 
 
 77 Marsh v. South Carolina R. Co., 56 Ga. 274; Henry v. Sioux City 
 E. Co., 66 Iowa 52; 23 N. W. Rep. 260; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 644 
 Ferguson v. Central Iowa R. Co., 58 Iowa 293; 12 N. W. Rep. 293 
 5 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 614; Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Bass, 36 111. App. 126 
 Grand v. Michigan, etc., R. Co., 83 Mich. 564; 47 N. W. Rep. 837; 48 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 383. 
 
 TSBaird v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 61 Iowa 359; 13 N. W. Rep. 731; 8 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 128. 
 
 'oRutledge v. Missouri Pacific R, Co., 110 Mo. 312; 19 S. W. Rep. 
 38. 
 
 80 Hudson V. Charleston, etc., R. Co.,. 55 Fed. Rep. 248. 
 
 81 Rahman v. Minnesota, etc., R. Co., 43 Minn. 42; 44 N. W. Rep. 
 522. 
 
 82 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Robinson (Ky.), 16 S. W. Rep. 707. 
 
 83 King V. Ohio, etc., R. Co., 14 Fed. Rep. 277; 11 Biss. (U. S.) 
 362; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 119. 
 
 8* Central, etc., v. Harrison, 73 Ga. 744. 
 
 591 
 
§ 433 CONTEIBUTOEY NEOLIGESTCE 03? EMPLOYEES. - 
 
 • 
 
 f ective car, when ignorant of the defect ; ®^ is not necessarily- 
 negligent in making a coupling on the inside of the curve, 
 when signals are given him on that side ; *® nor is it negli- 
 gence necessarily, for an employee to go in between moving 
 cars to couple them, in the absence of a rule preventing it; ^'' 
 and it is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury whether 
 or not a more dangerous method was used in making a coup- 
 ling and this ^ is especially true, when the facts are dis- 
 puted.** 
 
 85 Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Buck, 116 Ind. 566; 19 N. E. Rep. 543; 
 38 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 152. 
 
 86 Bennett v. Northern Pacific E. Co., 3 N. Dakota 91; 54 N. W. Eep. 
 314. 
 
 87 Memphis, etc., E. Co. v. Graham, 94 Ala. 545; 10 So. Eep. 283; 
 53 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 396. 
 
 88 Peoria, etc., E. Co. v. Puckett, 42 111. App. 642. 
 
 " Where a brakeman was negligent in going between cars while in 
 motion, he could not recover for injuries, though the engineer was 
 negligent in backing the car's at an unusual and excessive speed." 
 Huggins V. Southern Ey. Co. (Ala. 1906), 41 So. Eep. 856. 
 
 " Where a railroad employee had undertaken the business of coupling 
 and uncoupling cars, it was his duty to exercise such care as reasonably 
 prudent men would exercise under like circumstances, and, where he 
 knew, or by exercising such care as a reasonably prudent man would ex- 
 ercise under the circumstances could ■ have known, that engines were 
 backing cars on the track where he was about to couple cars, and he 
 went in between the cars, and his failure to exercise reasonable care 
 contributed to his injuries, he was guilty of contributory negligence." 
 Southern Ey. Co. v. Simmons (Va. 1906), 55 S. E. Eep. 459. 
 
 A common laborer in a construction crew is not guilty of negligence 
 in going between cars to couple them, on an order from his foreman, 
 without notice to train crew of so doing. Sorensen v. Power, etc., Co. 
 (Or.), 82 Pac. Eep. 10. 
 
 " PlaintiflF, an experienced switchman, having full knowledge of the 
 operation of cars in defendant's yards and control of the switch engine 
 with which he was employed, was injured while endeavoring to couple 
 certain cars, equipped with automatic couplers. Plaintiff, with knowl- 
 edge that it was dangerous so to do, attempted to open the coupler of 
 a moving car attached to the engine, by running in advance of it, 
 and while so doing was caught by a nail projecting from the brake beam, 
 thrown down, and run over. Plaintiff could have stopped the car 
 592 
 
CONTEIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. § 434 
 
 § 434. Violation of rules, in coupling cars. — Ordinarily, 
 a brakeman attempting to couple cars, in a manner con- 
 trary to the rules of his employer, if injured as a result of 
 such violation of the rules, is held guilty of contributory 
 negligence, preventing his recovery.®' Where a brakeman 
 was injured, by being throvm from a moving train, while 
 uncoupling the engine and tender and it was shown that 
 it was unnecessary to make such uncoupling while the train 
 was in motion, but that the rules of the company forbade 
 such attempt, this was held to be sufficient evidence of con- 
 tributory . negligence to compel a nonsuit, in an action to 
 recover for the injury received.*" 
 
 Using defective links, to make couplings,®^ or using draw- 
 opened the coupler on it and then signaled the engineer to back and 
 make the coupling, or he could have signaled for reduced speed and run 
 ahead of the car and opened the coupler of the standing car, either of 
 •which methods would have been safe. Held, that p'laintiflF's negligence 
 in selecting a dangerous method to do the work and not the nail pro- 
 truding from the brake beam, was the proximate cause of the accident, 
 which precluded a recovery." New York, C. & St. L. E. Co. v. Hamlin 
 (Ind. 1907), 79 N. E. Rep. 1040. 
 
 " The possibility that a railway employee,, while attempting to make 
 a coupling with a car not equipped with an automatic coupler, as 
 required by act March 2, i893, ch. 196, § 2, -27 Stat. 531 (U. S. 
 Comp. St. 1901, p. 3174), might miscalculate the height to which he 
 might safely raise his head, is so inevitably and clearly attached to 
 the risk which, under § 8 of that statute, he does not assume, as 
 to prevent a court from holding, as a matter of law, that he was 
 guilty of contributory negligence, which would defeat any recovery in 
 lifting Ms head a little too high after being warned of the danger." 
 Judgment, 56 Atl. Eep. 417, 207 Pa. 198, reversed. Sehlemmer v. 
 BuflFalo, etc., Ey. Co., 27 U. S. Sup. Ct. 407; 51 L. Ed. 856. 
 
 89 Louisville, etc., B. Co. v. Watson, 90 Ala. 68; 8 So. Rep. 249; 
 East Tennessee, etc., E. Co. v. Smith, 89 Tenn. 114; 14 S. W. Eep. 
 1077. 
 
 ooLockwood v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 55 Wis. 50; 12 N. W. Eep. 401; 
 6 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 151. 
 
 01 St. Louis, etc., E. Co. v. Rice, 51 Ark. 467; 11 S. W. Rep. 699; 
 4 L. E. A. 173; Bennett v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 2 N. Dakota 112; 
 49 N. W. Rep. 408; 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 182. 
 
 1—38 . 593 
 
§ 434 CONTEIBUTOEY KEGLIGENCE Ot EMPLOTEES. 
 
 heads of different makes or patterns, without inspection/^ in 
 violation of the employer's rules, is held negligence; going 
 between moving cars, to make couplings or to uncouple cars, 
 is negligence, when forbidden by a rule of the employer ** 
 and it is generally held negligence sufficient to prevent a re- 
 covery for an injury resulting from a failure to use a coup- 
 ling stick, instead of the hands, to couple cars with, when 
 the company rules provide for the use of sticks for such 
 purpose and they are furnished to be so used by the em- 
 ployees.®* 
 
 But, as in other cases, an employee is not bound by a rule 
 that has not been properly published, or brought to the at- 
 tention of the injured employee, prior to his injury, or which 
 is not generally enforced, even if properly published origi- 
 nally.^® If, when a coupling stick was delivered to an em- 
 
 82 Brooks V. Northern Pacific E. Co., 47 Fed. Rep. 687. 
 
 osPryor v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 90 Ala. 32; 8 So. Rep. 55; Schaub 
 V. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 106 Mo. 74; 16 S. W. Rep. 924; Northern 
 Pacific R. Co. V. Nickens, 50 Fed. Rep. 718; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Gas. 
 388; Johnson v. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co., 38 W. Va. 206; 18 S. E. Rep. 
 573; Sedgwick v. Illinois, etc., R. Co., 76 Iowa 340; 41 N. W. Rep. 35; 
 Gardner v. Michigan, etc., R. Co., 58 Mich. 584; 26 N. W. Rep. 301; 
 24 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 435. 
 
 »* Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Pannill, 89 Va. 552; 16 S. E. Rep. 748; 
 Russell V. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 47 Fed. Rep. 204; Richmond, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Free, 97 Ala. 231; 12 So. Rep. 294; Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Briggs (Van), 14 S. E. Rep. 753; Welsey v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., 
 33 Ohio St. 227; Sloan v. Georgia Pacific Ry. Co., 86 Ga. 15; 12 S. E. 
 Rep. 179; Rome, etc., Con. Co. v. Dempsey, 86 Ga. 499; 12 S. E. Rep. 
 882; Georgia Pacific R. Co. v. Propst, 83 Ala. 518; 3 So. Rep. 764; 
 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Whitman, 111 Ind. 212; 12 N. E. Rep. 380; 31 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 149; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Watson, 90 Ala. 
 68; 8 So. Rep. 249; Darracott v. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co., 83 Va. 288; 
 2 S. E. Rep. 511; 31 Am; & Eng. R. Cas. 157. 
 
 05 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Foley, 94 Ky. 220; 21 S. W. Rep. 866; 
 Fay V. Minneapolis, etc., E. Co., 30 Minn. 231; 15 N. W. Rep. 241; 
 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 193. 
 
 594 
 
CONTEIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. § 435 
 
 ployee to use, he was advised that it was a mere matter of 
 form, and he need not use it, he would not be held negligent 
 in making a coupling without using the stick ; ®® a rule 
 preventing going between cars, when in motion, to couple 
 them, is not violated by standing on the footboard of the 
 tender, to make a coupling,^'' nor would a rule apply to a 
 brakeman, unless especially made to include employees in 
 his class,^* and where the fact of the promulgation or en- 
 forcement of the rule, or the fact whether or not it was be- 
 ing violated or contributed to the cause of the injury, is in 
 doubt, it would Jje proper to submit such issues to a jury.®^ 
 
 § 435, Injuries in making couplings, while violating or- 
 ders. — If a brakeman has been cautioned to be careful and 
 not give a signal until he is in a safe place, before an engine 
 is moved, and not to pull the coupling pin until he had 
 hold of the handle of the car, and he is injured while vio- 
 lating this order from a superior employee, no recovery can 
 be had.^ And where a yardmaster ordered a brakeman to 
 uncouple cars that were standing still and then ride them 
 back on a switch, and, instead of obeying the order given 
 him, the brakeman signaled the engineer to back and step- 
 ping between the moving cars to uncouple them, got his foot 
 
 »s Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Foley, 94 Ky. 220; 21 S. W. Bep. 866. 
 
 97 Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Jones; 92 Ala. 218; 9 So. Rep. 276. 
 
 98 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Braggonier, 119 111. 51; 7 N. E. Rep. 688. 
 98 Carroll v. East Tennessee, etc., R. Co., 82 Ga. 452 ; 10 S. E. Rep. 
 
 163; 41 Atn. & Eng. R. Cas. 307; Mttle Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Leverett, 
 48 Ark. 333; 3 S. W. Rep. 50; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 459. 
 
 " Where a rule of a railroad prohibited employees from going be- 
 tween moving cars to couple them, a brakeman was guilty of contribu- 
 tory negligence in going between moving cars if the cars could have 
 been coupled without his so doing." Huggins v. Southern Ry. Co. 
 (Ala. 1906), 41 So. Rep. 856. 
 
 1 Gorman v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co., 78 Iowa 509 ; 43 N. W. Rep. 
 303. 
 
 595 
 
§ 436 CONTEIBUTOEY NEGLlGBiTCE Of EMPLOYEES. 
 
 fastened in an open frog and was run over and killed, it 
 was held that his disobedience of orders would prevent a 
 recovery for his death. ^ 
 
 But before the disobedience of an order will prevent a re- 
 covery for an injury in coupling or uncoupling cars, it must 
 be shown that the one giving the order has some power of 
 control or supervision over the injured employee and al- 
 though a yardmaster may have given a brakeman orders not 
 to go between the rails in making a coupling or in uncoup- 
 ling cars, where there was no evidence showing that the yard- 
 master had any authority over the injured brakeman, it 
 would be proper to refuse an instruction denying a recov- 
 ery on this ground.^ And neither can contributory negli- 
 gence be predicated on an obedience of an order of a superior 
 employee, although it might be found that obedience to the 
 order was negligence, unless' no reasonably prudent man 
 would have obeyed the order, under the circumstances.* 
 
 § 436. Employee falling from moving car or engine. — As 
 
 the mere fact that an employee is injured in the discharge 
 of his duties, does not, of itself, raise an inference of neg- 
 ligence, but the burden is always on the employee, or his 
 representative, to show a breach of duty on the employer's 
 part, directly contributing to effect the injury to the em- 
 ployee, in the case of a suit by an employee or his representa- 
 tive, the rule res ipsa loquitur is not generally held to entitle 
 the injured employee to recover damages, but he must show 
 negligence as the basis of his right of recovery, in all cases.® 
 
 2 Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Risdon, 87 Va. 355; 12 S. E. Rep. 786; 
 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 244. 
 
 3 Hannah v. Connecticut, etc., R. Co., 154 Mass. 529; 28 N. E. Rep. 
 682. 
 
 *Rome, etc., R. Co. v. Chasteen, 88 Ala. 591; 7 So. Rep. 94; 40 Am. 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 559. 
 
 B Kremer v. Mfg. Co., 120 Mo. App. 252. 
 596 
 
CONTBIBTJTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. § 437 
 
 This being true, a mere showing of an injury to an em- 
 ployee by falling from a moving car or engine, would not, 
 ordinarily, establish a prima fade case of negligence, on the 
 employer's part, but it would require, in addition to an in- 
 jury from such a cause, a showing that the employer was re- 
 miss in his duty toward the employee, directly causing such 
 injury. In a Kentucky case,® an employee fell from a car, 
 on account of a jerk of the train, but there was nothing to 
 show that it was an unusual jerk, or that the appliances or 
 employees had not used due care in the handling of the 
 train. The trial court had instructed the jury to find a 
 verdict for the railroad company, and this action was affirmed 
 by the Supreme Court, in the course of which it was said: 
 " There is no evidence whatever that the engineer knew that 
 Simmons had fallen off of the train. On the contrary, the 
 inference is clear, owing to the distance and his attention 
 being occupied by the duties appertaining to the management 
 of the engine and train, that he did not know that Simmons 
 had fallen off the car." 
 
 § 437. Negligence in disobedience of rules, generally. — 
 
 Where an employee of a railroad company receives an in- 
 jury which is caused by his acting in direct violation of a 
 reasonable rule, made by the company for the safety of its 
 employees, of which rule he has notice and has promised to 
 obey, he must be deemed guilty of contributory negligence 
 and cannot recover damages from the company for such 
 injury.'' 
 
 « Simmons' Admr. v. Louisville, etc., B. Co., 18 S. W. Rep. 1024. 
 
 'Overby V. Chesapeake, etc., E. Co., 37 W. Va. 524; 16 S. E. Rep. 
 813; 53 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 417; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Watson, 90 
 Ala. 68; 8 So. Rep. 249; Cincinnati, e'tc, E. Co. v. Lang, 118 Ind 
 579; 21 N. E. Rep. 317; 38 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 25; Francis y. Kansas 
 City, etc., E. Co., 110 Mo. 387; 19 S. W. Eep. 935; 53 Am. & Eng. E. 
 Cas. 410; Zumwalt v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 35 Mo. App.. 661; Pennsyl- 
 vania E. Co. V. Whitcomb, 111 Ind. 212; 12 N. B. Eep. 380; 31 Am. & 
 
 597 
 
§ 437 CONTEIBUTOEY iS'EGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES, 
 
 The mere fact that an employee was violating a known 
 rule of the employer, at the time of his injury, will not, 
 of itself, relieve the employer of liability for the injury, but 
 if the violation of the rule, in whole or in part cont;pibuted to 
 cause the injury, it will prevent a recovery therefor.* 
 
 But rules adopted which are not generally prescribed and 
 which are not required to be enforced, will not excuse the 
 employer for an injury due in part to its own negligence ; " 
 a company cannot avail- itself of a. rule which it has- not 
 properly published and which it has uniformly failed to en- 
 force; ^^ it is essential to show that knowledge of the rule 
 has beeiK brought home to the injured employee; ^^ a rule 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 149; Wilson v. Michigan, etc., R. Co., 94 Mich. 20; 53 
 N. .W. Rep. 797; International, etc., R. Co. v. Gray, 65 Texas 32; 27 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 318; Gordy v. New York, etc., R. Co., 75 Md. 
 297; 23 Atl. Rep. 607; Wolsey v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., 33 Ohio St. 
 227. 
 
 3 San Antonio, etc., R. Co. v. Wallace, 76 Texas 636; 13 S. W. Rep. 
 565; 44 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 564; LaCroy v. New York, etc., R. Co., 
 132 N. Y. 570; 30 N. E. Rep. 391; Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Ryan, 09 
 Texas 665; 7 S. W. Rep. 83; 33 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 289; Reed v. Bur- 
 lington, etc., R. Co., 72 Iowa 166; 33 N. W. Rep. 451; 31 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 190; Prather v. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 80 Ga. 427; 9 S. E. Rep. 
 530 ; Francis v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 1 10 Mo. 387 ; 19 S. W. Rep. 
 935; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 410; Central, etc., R. Co. v. Kitchens, 
 83 Ga. 83; 9 S. E. Rep. 827; PiMnton v. Gulf, etc., R. Co., 70 
 Texas 226; 7 S. W. Rep. 805; Sutherland v. Troy, etc., R. Co., 125 
 N. Y. 737; 26 N. E. Rep. 609; Lyon v. Detroit, etc., R. Co., 31 Mich. 
 429. 
 
 oRutledge v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 110 Mo. 312; 19 S. W. Rep. 
 38. 
 
 10 International, etc., R. Co. v. Hinzie, 82 Texas 623; 18 S. \V. 
 Rep. 681; Carroll v. East Tennessee, etc., R. Co., 82 Ga. 452; 10 S. 
 E. Rep. 163; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 307: Wooden v. Western, etc., 
 R. Co., 46 N. Y. S. R. 77; La Croy v. New York, etc., 132 N. Y. 570; 
 30 N. E. Rep. 391. 
 
 11 Standard, etc., Co. v. Jones, 94 Ala. 434 ; 10 So. Rep. 530 ; Gregory 
 V. Ohio River R. Co., 37 W. Va. 606; 16 S. E. Rep. 819; Memphis, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Graham, 94 Ala. 545; 10 So. Rep. 283; 53 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 396; Covey v. Hannibal, etc., 27 Mo. A^p. 170; Little Rock, 
 
 598 
 
CONTKIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. § 437 
 
 cannot be enforced -where it appears that such rule was 
 wholly and habitually disregarded by employees, with the 
 knowledge and consent of the employer/^ nor can negli- 
 gence be imputed to an employee in disregarding a rule 
 enacted for his protection, when, at the time of the injury, 
 the employee was acting under an inconsistent special 
 order given by a superior employee and which he was 
 called upon to obey.-*-^ 
 
 etc., E. Co. V. Leveritt, 48 Ark. 333; 3 S. W. Eep. 50; 28 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 459. - 
 
 12 Atkyn v. Wabash E. Co., 41 Fed. Rep. 193 ; Sloan v. Georgia, etc., 
 E. Co., 86 Ga. 15; 12 S. E. Eep. 179; 44 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 553; 
 Northern Pacific E. Co. v. Bickels, 50 Fe'd. Eep. 718; 53 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 388. 
 
 13 Hall V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 46 Minn. 439; 49 N. W. Rep. 239; 
 Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Lang, 118 Ind. 579; 21 N. B. Rep. 317; 
 38 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 250. 
 
 "An employee is bound to obey all the reasonable rules and in- 
 structions of the employer with reference to the conduct of the busi- 
 ness." Brown v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (Wash. 1906), 86 Pac. Eep. 
 1053. 
 
 " Where the duties of an employee are specified in reasonable rules of 
 which the employee has knowledge and to which he has assented, his 
 disobedience of them at a time when they are capable of observance is 
 negligence as a matter of law, and is not to be judged by the re- 
 quirements of ordinary care." Elmgren v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ey. Co. 
 (Minn. 1907), 112 N. W. Rep. 1067. 
 
 " A brakeman whose duty it was under the rules of the company and 
 the instructions of its conductor, when his train went onto a siding, 
 to lock a switch and remain within 10 feet of it, having violated 
 such duty by retiring into a caboose without locking the switch so 
 that another train ran onto the siding and into the caboose, killing 
 the brakeman, he was guilty of contributory negligence, and no re- 
 covery could be had for his death." Holland v. Seaboard Air Line 
 Ey. Co. (N. C. 1906), 55 S. E. Eep. 835. 
 
 " Where, under a railway rule, a north-bound extra train could not 
 enter a single track without orders or until the engineer and con- 
 ductor 'ascertained from a train register that all regularly scheduled 
 south-bound trains due to arrive and not more than 12 hours late had 
 arrived, it was contributory negligence for the engineer to proceed in 
 violation of the rule, barring recovery for his death in collision with a 
 
 599 
 
§ 438 CONTKIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 § 438. Violation of particular rules. — Illustrations cannot 
 be given from nearly all the adjudicated cases, where recov- 
 ery was denied, because of the violation of specific rules of 
 the employer, at the time of the injury to a railroad em- 
 ployee, but a few from the many cases on this subject will 
 be mentioned. 
 
 regular south-bound train." Cogbill v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (Ala. 
 1907), 44 So. Rep. 683. 
 
 " Where the duties of an employee in given circumstances are partic- 
 ularly specified in the unambiguous and reasonable rules of the em- 
 ployer, of which the employee has knowledge and to which he has 
 assented by entering and continuing in the service, his nonobservance 
 or disobedience of them, at a time when they are capable of observance 
 is negligence as matter of law, and is not to be judged by the undefined 
 and varying requirements of ordinary care." St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. 
 V. Dewees {U. S. C. C. A., Kan. 1907), 153 Fed. Rep. 56. 
 
 " Where a train rule is positive in its requirement that passenger 
 trains shall run at least 10 minutes apart, and, under the rules the first 
 of two passenger trains need not send out a rear flagman at a station 
 until the train is 10 minutes late, the engineer of the second train, 
 acquainted with the rule, with the time, and with the leaving time 
 of the preceding train, is guilty of contributory negligence in running 
 into the forward train standing at a station less than 10 minutes after 
 its leaving time." Judgment (Civ. App.) 95 S. W. Rep. 660, re- 
 versed. International & G. N. R. Co. v. Brice (Tex. 1906), 97 S. W. 
 Rep. 461. 
 
 " In an action for injuries to an employee of a railroad company, 
 plaintiff's violation of a rule of the company at the time he was injured 
 would not prevent a recovery, unless the violation of such rule proxi- 
 mately contributed to his injury." Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. 
 V. Lightheiser (Ind. 1906), 78 N. E. Rep. 1033. 
 
 " The breach of an employer's rule is not negligence per se unless it 
 is an act so opposed to the dictates of common prudence that no careful 
 person would commit it." Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Cherry 
 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907), 98 S. W. Rep. 898. 
 
 " In an action for injuries to an employee of a railway company, 
 the fact that plaintiff violated one of the railway company's rules did 
 not constitute negligence per se." Rehearing (Civ. App.), 94 S. W. 
 Rep. 1135, denied. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. f'arrott 
 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906), 96 S. W. Rep. 950. 
 
 " Failure to obey a rule of the company, requiring car repairers to see 
 that blue flags are displayed at each end of the car about which they 
 
 600 
 
COWTEIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES, § 438 
 
 An employee injured as a result of a violation of a known 
 rule, regulating the starting or running of trains, cannot 
 recover ; ^* an explosion of a boiler, caused by carrying more 
 stearfi. than the employer's rules permit, furnishes no cause 
 of action ; ^^ an injury sustained by one operating an engine, 
 in violation of a known rule, is without remedy therefor; ^^ 
 one riding on an engine, in violation of a rule, who would 
 not otherwise have been injured, cannot recover; ^'' a con- 
 ductor riding on top of a freight car, in violation of a known 
 rule of the employer, injured as a result thereof, is without 
 cause of action for an injury there received; ^® mounting a 
 
 are at work, is not excused by the presence of a superior employee of 
 the employer, where the car repairer had agreed with the employer to' 
 obey such rule, and failure to obey it is negligence per se." New 
 York, C. & St. L. E. Co. v. Eopp (Ohio, 1907), 81 N. E. Eep. 748. 
 
 " Where plaintiflf, a brakeman, was injured in a railroad collision, 
 resulting from a failure to flag an approaching train as required by 
 the ruleg, plaintiff having been ordered by his conductor, who was in 
 immediate charge of the train, to proceed on his train, was not neg- 
 ligent in failing to flag, which would have involved a. direct conflict 
 with the conductor's orders." Crow v. Northern Pae. Ey. Co. (Wash. 
 1907), 88 Pac. Eep. 1022. 
 
 " The violation by an employee of a known rule laid down by the 
 employer for the protection and safety of the employee does not bar 
 a recovery where the rule has been violated so openly and frequently 
 and for such a length of time that the employee could, by the exercise 
 of ordinary care, have ascertained its nonobservance." Haynes v. 
 North Carolina E. Co. (N. C. 1906), 55 S. E. Eep. 516. 
 
 i*Eose V. Boston, etc., E. Co., 58 N. Y. 217; 9 Am. Ey. Eep. 515; 
 Slater v. J^ett, 85 N. Y. 61 j 39 Am. Eep. 627; 5 Am. & Eng. B. 
 Cas. 515. 
 
 15 Hughes V. New Orleans, etc., E. Co., 6 La. Ann. 495 ; Herman v. 
 New Orleans, etc., E. Co., 11 La. Ann. 5. 
 
 16 Ohio, etc., E. Co. v. CoUarn, 73 Ind. 261; 38 Am. Eep. 134; 5 
 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 554. 
 
 IT Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Wilson, 88 Tenn. 316; 12 S. W. Eep. 
 720; Abend v. Terre Haute, etc., E. Co., Ill 111. 202; 17 Am. & Eng. 
 E. Cas. 614; Shenandoah Valley, etc., E. Co. v. Lucade, 86 "Va. 390; 
 10 8. E. Eep. 422. 
 
 18 San Antonio, etc., E. Co. v. Wallace, 76 Texas 636; 13 8. W. Eep. 
 
 601 
 
§ 438 CONTEIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE 01' EMPLOYEES. 
 
 side ladder, on the side of a known obstruction, in violation 
 of a rule, prevents a recovery for an injury therefrom; ^^ a 
 switchman, or other employee who attempts to mount a mov- 
 ing engine, by standing in the middle of the track, to step on 
 the footboard, in violation ol a rule, is guilty of negligence 
 barring a recovery for an injury so received ; *" a fireman 
 who attempts to mount a moving engine, by catching the 
 tender, in violation of a rule, is without remedy if he sustains 
 an injury ; *^ an engineer, injured in a collision or derail- 
 ment, while violating a rule limiting the speed of his train, 
 is negligent ; ^^ a brakeman, injured in a collision, who, at 
 the time was away from his post of duty and asleep, in 
 violation of a rule, cannot recover therefor ; ^* an employee 
 injured as result of a defective appliance on the car, which 
 he had failed to examine, as required by a rule of the em- 
 ployer, is not entitled to recover therefor,^* nor can an em- 
 ployee while working upon or under ears, if injured by a 
 collision with an engine or other cars, when he has failed 
 to put up a flag or signal, as required by the employer's rules, 
 for his own protection, recover therefor.^^, 
 
 565; 44 Am. & Bng. R. Cas. 564; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Mathews, 
 39 111. App. 541. 
 
 18 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Crowder, 49 111. App. 154. 
 
 20 Francis v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 110 Mo. 387; 19 S. W. Rep. 
 935; 53 Am. &, Eng. R. Cas. 410. 
 
 21 Murray V. Gulf, etc., R. Co., 73 Texas 2; 11 S. W. Rep. 125; 38 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 177. 
 
 22 Savannah, etc., R. Co. v. Folks, 76 Ga. 527 ; Sutherland v. Troy, 
 etc., R. Co., 125 N. Y. 737; 26 N. E. Rep. 609; Norfolk, etc., R. Co. 
 V. Lindamood (Va.), 14 S. E. Rep. 694. 
 
 23Eastburn v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co., 34 W. Va. 681; 12 S. E. Rep. 
 819. 
 
 24 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Utz, 133 Ind. 265; 32 N. E. Rep. 881; 
 Badgerow v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 19 Ont. 191; Alexander v. Louis- 
 ville, etc., R. Co., 83 Ky. 589; -25 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 458; Kansas 
 City, etc.,.R. Co. v. Kier, 41 Kansas 661; 21 Pac. Rep. 770; 38 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 119. 
 
 25 Cypher v. Huntington, etc., R. Co., 149 Pa. St. 359 ; 24 Atl. Rep. 
 
 602 
 
COITTKIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. § 438 
 
 But where, notwithstanding a rule preventing firemen from 
 operating engines, it was a known custom that they did oc- 
 casionally do so, an engineer was held not negligent, as mat- 
 ter of law, in permitting his fireman to run the engine for 
 a short distance ; ^® a custom to permit other employees to 
 manage the engine when the engineer is sick, will control a 
 rule forbidding such a practice ; '^ the fact that a rule pre- 
 venting another engineer to ride on the engine was being 
 violated when a derailment occurred, will not prevent a recov- 
 ery, when this is shown not to have occasioned the wreck ; ^* 
 that a brakeman was riding in an engine cab, when killed 
 in a collision and was not on a freight car, as required by a 
 rule, will not bar a recovery, when it is shown that this did 
 not effect'the cause of the injury ; ^® where an overhead struc- 
 ture killed a brakeman and one rule required him to be on 
 top of the car and another forbade it, at such a time of night, 
 his presence on the car was held not to bar a recovery for 
 his death ; ^* a rule requiring a conductor of a freight train 
 to remain in the middle of his train, going down grade, 
 would not prevent a recovery for an injury, while he was at 
 the front of the train, when his duties required his presence 
 at that point, at time of the injury ; *^ the violation of a 
 rule requiring a stop before reaching a railroad crossing, 
 
 225; Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Hanning, 131 Ind. 528; 31 N. E. Rep. 
 187; 53 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 452. 
 
 26 Barry v. Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 98 Mo. 62; 11 S. W. Rep. 308. 
 
 27 East Line, etc., R. Co. v. Seott, 72 Texas 70; 10 S. W. Eep. 298; 
 38 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 16. 
 
 28 Central R. Co. v. Mitchell, 63 Ga. 173; 1 Cim. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 145. 
 
 29 Connors v. Burlington, etc., R. Co., 71 Iowa 490 ; 32 N. W. Rep. 
 465. 
 
 30 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Matthews, 39 111. App. 541. 
 
 31 Somerset, etc., R.,Co. v. Galbraith, 109 Pa. St. 32; 1 Atl. Rep. 371; 
 23 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 375. 
 
 603 
 
§ 438 CONTKIBUTOKY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 is not, in all cases, conclusive evidence of negligence; ^^ the 
 violation of a rule preventing brakemen from alighting from 
 freight cars, on the side vs^here obstructions are located, is 
 not negligence, in the absence of notice -of the presence of 
 obstructions by the brakeman injured in so /alighting; ®^ a 
 dense fog vyhich obstructed the vision and made it dangerous 
 to remain on top of a train, will excuse the violation of a rule 
 by staying below, when an injury occurred ; ** the failure to 
 examine the appliances on a train, as required by a rule, is 
 not negligence, when sufficient time to make such examina- 
 tion was not given ; ®® violation of a rule requiring a flag, 
 when repairing a car, will not bar a recovery, when this did 
 not cause the injury,^® nor will the negligence of the fore- 
 man in failing to post a flag, avail the railroad company, 
 when he was in charge of the injured car repairer, at time 
 of his injury.*^ 
 
 S2 Hanson v. Minneapolis, etc., E. Co., 37 Minn. 355; 34 N. W. Rep. 
 223; 32 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 13. 
 
 33 Chicago, etc'R. Co. v. Eussell, 91 111. 298. 
 
 3iPhillipps V. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 64 Wis. 475; 25 N. W. Rep. 
 544; 23 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 453. 
 
 30 0'MalIey v. New York, etc., E. Co., 51 N. Y. S. E. 366; 67 Hun 
 130; 22 N. Y. Supp. 48. 
 
 36 Texas, etc., E. Co. v. Wynne (Texas), 22 S. W. Rep. 1064. 
 
 37 Richmond, etc., E. Co. v. Hammond, 93 Ala. 181; 9 So. Eep. 
 577. 
 
 The violation of rules by car repairers is held negligence, as matter 
 of law, in an unbroken line of decisions and that such decisions are 
 based upon a sound policy, is just as true, in the case of injuries to 
 employees, from neglect of precautionary measures adopted by the em- 
 ployer, as it is to punish the employer for neglecting to adopt such pre- 
 cautions, in the first place, for the protection of the employees en- 
 gaged in hazardous employment. Public opinion, with little or no 
 understanding of the facts in such cases, has a constant tendency to 
 blame systems and managements. When a man violates a plain and 
 unmistakable rule, or runs a signal, with disastrous results, the gen- 
 eral demand is for additional rules or signals, instead of a compliance 
 with those existing. When it is clear that an existing rule has been 
 violated and an injury results, the employer should not be held 
 604 
 
C6liTRIBU*OEY NEGLtGENCfi OF EMPLOYEES. § 439 
 
 § 439. Disobedience of special orders. — An employee- of a 
 railroad company cannot recover for an injury which is the 
 direct result of his own disobedience of a specific order of 
 a superior employee, who has powel- to control his conduct 
 
 negligent, but the blame visited upon the negligent party, just as it 
 would be visited upon the employer, if no reasonable rule had been 
 adopted. That this is the reasoning of the cases, is evident from 
 a. perusal of the opinions. 
 
 In Schaub v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. (106 Mo., p. 92), a car coupler, 
 injured while violating a rule of the employer, sued for damages, and 
 the court, speaking by Judge Gantt, said : " The uncontradicted evi- 
 dence in the case is that there was a rule of the company prohibiting 
 employees from going between the cars to uncouple them while in 
 motion, and this rule had been in force for at least three years and 
 deceased was shown to have had a copy of these rules. Indeed, they 
 were printed on all the time cards. In the absence of all evidence that 
 defendant had knowingly permitted a violation of this rule, it is clear 
 that deceased was bound to observe it, and if he persisted in breaking 
 it, and was hurt in so doing, he could not ask the defendant to make 
 good to him the loss or injury his own recklessness had caused. The 
 court committed manifest error in refusing the defendant's third in- 
 struction. If the deceased violated said rule, he was guilty of con- 
 tributory negligence that will bar the recovery in this case." See, 
 also, Francis v. Kansas City, etc., Ey. Co., 110 Mo. 387; Alcorn v. 
 Chicago, etc., E. Co., 108 Mo. 81, 92, 95. 
 
 In Eenfro v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (86 Mo. 302), a car repairer 
 was killed, while at work, under a stationary car. The rules required 
 a flag or personal notice to the operators of engines or cars, but no flag 
 was posted or no notice given. The, facts are Very similar to those in 
 above case and in denying a recovery for the death of plaintiff's husband. 
 Judge Black, for the court, said : " Reasonable rules were prescribed 
 for the safety of the men, which were not obeyed. It is contended that 
 there is no evidence that deceased knew of these rules, but this is 
 clearly untenable. Express evidence is that there was a general order 
 when two went to work and it took both to do the work, to call for a 
 third. The witnesses all speak of these rules and the deceased did 
 watch so long as there was any immediate danger from the south 
 end of the track. » « * Giving to the evidence every intendment 
 which it will bear, in favor of the plaintiff, we are all agreed that the 
 accident must be attributed to the risks incident to the business in 
 which deceased was engaged, coupled with a want of care on the part of 
 himself and Winters, who, was, beyond doubt, a fellow servant." 
 
 Where a carpenter was engaged in repairing a stationary car, and 
 
 605 
 
§ 439 CONTEIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 it was struck by a switch engine, causing his injury, and he knew that 
 the engine was liable at any time, to run in on the switch track, 
 ?,nd no flag was posted, to warn the train crew not to strike the ear, 
 the contributory negligence of the repairer was held to bar a recov- 
 ery, in Cypher v. Railroad Co., 149 Pa. St. 359; 24 Atl. Rep. 225. 
 
 And where a decedent knew of a rule requiring a flag and he failed 
 to place a flag, so as to warn the train crews not to hit the car 
 where the work was in progress, his negligence was held to prevent 
 a recovery for his death, notwithstanding the negligence of his fore- 
 man in failing to provide the flag, in Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Hauing, 131 Ind. 528; 31 N. E. Rep. 187; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 452. 
 
 Under a similar rule to that of the defendant in above case, in a 
 New York case, there was held to be no negligence on the part of the 
 employer and no responsibility for an injury to a. car repairer, caused 
 by a failure to post a flag, in Corcoran v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 126 
 N. Y. 673; 27 N. E. Rep. 1022. 
 
 In Peterson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (Mich. 34 N. W. Rep. 260), the 
 plaintiff was injured while repairing a car and sued for damages 
 for the injuries. The defendant had a rule, like that of the defendant 
 in above case, requiring a flag, but no flag was posted and the Circuit 
 Court denied a recovery, and this judgment was afiirmed in the Supreme 
 Court. The causes of action were set forth by the plaintiff substan- 
 tially, as the plaintiff in that case set up her case, the Supreme Court, 
 on this subject saying: 
 
 " In the plaintiff's declaration the causes of negligence upon the part 
 of the defendant were alleged as follows: (1) That defendant should 
 have provided a watchman to warn plaintiff of the movement "of the- 
 cars, and notify other employees of his whereabouts; (2) that a proper 
 signal flag should have been used to give notice of his presence under 
 the cars; (3) that the cars under which he was working should 
 have been 'locked' or placed against a bumper or stationary post; (4) 
 that defendant neglected to provide such watchman, flag, or ' bumper ' ; 
 (5) that defendant neglected all reasonable means to prevent the move- 
 ment of the cars while plaintiff was at work under them; (6) defendant 
 negligently required the cars to be repaired on an open track, upon 
 which engines or cars might be run while plaintiff was at work; 
 (7) and negligently exposed plaintiff to the risk from the movement 
 of the cars; (8) that while plaintiff was under the cars, and in the 
 absence of such precautions, without any warning to him, defendant 
 wrongfully caused a number of cars to be pushed in upon the track 
 when plaintiff was at work, by locomotive power, at a high rate of 
 speed, unattached to the locomotive, and insufficiently provided with 
 brakeman. The proof showed that no watchman or ' bumpers ' were 
 provided, and no signal used except the red flag, which would undoubt- 
 edly have answered the purposes of a sufficient signal had it been re- 
 606 
 
CONTEIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE 01" EMPLOYEES. § 439 
 
 moved to fhe front end of the section last run upon the track.'' 
 
 And because the flag was not removed from the end of the ear, 
 away from the approaching train, to that end, a recovery was denied, 
 because of such violation of the rule, the court saying : 
 
 " I think it must be considered that this rule, if enforced, was ade- 
 quately sufficient for the protection of plaintiff, and the men working 
 at the same employment. A similar metlod of protection is adopted 
 by other roads, and has in one case been judicially determined to be 
 ' a very efficient rule, and, if carefully and faithfully observed, would 
 give reasonable protection to repairmen.' Abel v. President, etc., 103 
 N. Y., at page 586; 9 N. E. Eep. 325. With this rule in existence, 
 and with instructions to all employees to observe it, it was not, in my 
 opinion, negligence on the part of the defendant in not having a 
 watchman or ' bumpers ' ; nor was it negligent to run other cars upon 
 the same track where ears were being repaired, when space was left 
 between them, and the red flag was respected according to the rule. 
 While the negligence of Farnum, in detaching the engine from the 
 cars used in 'kicking' the B. O. car upon the main track, had some- 
 thing to do with causing the accident, the real neglect which was the 
 main cause of the injury was the failure of the foremen, or one of 
 them, to remove the flag, and place it at the head of the front section 
 of the cars upon the rear track. If this had been done, none of the cars 
 would have been moved while plaintiff or any of the men were at 
 work repairing the cars, if the rules of the defendant had been obeyed." 
 
 In Crowe v. New York, etc., E. Co. (23 N. Y. S. 1100), a, track 
 repairer was at work, at night, in a yard where trains were moved and 
 he based his right of recovery for an injury from being struck by 
 a moving car, in the absence of a light on such car, but the court Held 
 this was not necessary and in the course of the opinion it was said : 
 
 " It is suggested by the plaintiff that there should have been a 
 light placed upon the car. This contention would require a light to 
 be placed upon each and every car being moved in such yard as this. 
 The time consumed in handling such a large number of lamps, and the 
 number of men that would be required to do the work, would make 
 such a rule obviously impracticable. There is no suggestion that any 
 railroad company ever attempted to adopt such a rule, or that it 
 would be practicable if adopted. To require the company to have a 
 man upon each car, or a man to precede each car to announce its 
 approach, in such a yard as this, would be impracticable. Great 
 care and precaution are required on the part of the railroad compa- 
 nies when they are moving cars in places where the general public 
 have a right to pass to in some manner announce their approach, but 
 a different rule obtains in the companies' yards where cars are being 
 distributed and trains made up. The employees about such yards 
 understand the situation. They know the manner of doing the busi- 
 
 60Y 
 
§ 439 CONTEIB0TOEY NEGLIGENCE OV EMPLOYEES. 
 
 ness therein; that cars frequently pass along without notice of their 
 approach; and they assume the risks incident to the business as thus 
 conducted." 
 
 A regulation of a railroad company requiring car repairers, when 
 at work imder or about a car, to see that a blue signal is displayed 
 at each end of the car to protect it from being coupled to or moved, 
 is held, in New York C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Kopp (Ohio), 11 L. E. A. 
 (N. S.) 413, to be a reasonable rule, and binding upon a car repairer 
 who at the time of his employment agreed that he understood the rule 
 and would obey it. 
 
 In State v. South Baltimore Car Works (Md. 58 Atl. Rep. 447), a 
 car repairer working under a car, was held to have assumed the risk 
 of an injury from another car being set in on the track where he 
 was at work, where the custom had been to give personal notice of 
 the approach of cars, and no notice was given, at the time of the 
 injury. 
 
 " Where a oar inspector was required by the company's rules to in- 
 spect cars upon a certain track, unless allowed to inspect them else- 
 where by the foreman or chief inspectors, and to display a blue flag 
 upon the car, he was guilty of contributory negligence in attempting 
 to repair the car without permission of the foreman or chief inspector, 
 while on another track, and attempting to do so without displaying tne 
 flag." Snellen v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. (Ark. 1907), 102 S. W. 
 Rep. 193. 
 
 " A car inspector who goes between two cars without stationing a man 
 outside for his protection, as required by the company's rules, is 
 guilty of contributory negligence, especially where, if he had looked, he 
 would have seen an engine fifteen feet away backing down on him." 
 Devoe v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 75 N. Y. S. 136; 70 App. Div. 
 495. 
 
 " Where a dar repairer was killed while working on a oar which he 
 failed to protect by signals, as required by a "rule of his employer, he 
 assumed the risk precluding a recovery for his death." Canadian Pac. 
 Ey. Co. V. Elliott (U. S. C. C. of App., Second Circuit), 137 Fed. 
 Rep. 904. 
 
 And it was held that a car repairer could not recover for injuries 
 due wholely to a failure to put out a blue flag, while repairing a car, 
 as required by the rules of his employer, in Coutlett v. Grand Trunk 
 Co., 23 C. S. 242. 
 
 And similar holdings were announced in the following cases, upon 
 similar rules, viz.: Latromouille v. Eailroad Co., 63 Vt. 336; 22 Atl. 
 Rep. 656; 48 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 265; Campbell v. Railroad (Pa.), 
 2 Atl. Rep. 489; 24 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 427; Southern Pacific R. Co. v. 
 Pool, 160 U. S. 438; Cincinnati, etc., E. Co. v. Long, 112 Ind. 166; 13 
 N. E. Rep. 659; 31 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 138; Muller v. Eailroad Co., 
 608 
 
CONTEIBUTOET NEGLIGEIfCE OF EMf LOYEES. § 439 
 
 in the employment.^® Nor is an employee entitled in all 
 cases to recover for an injury received Avhile obeying a spe- 
 cial order of a superior, unless, in the giving of the order, 
 it could successfully be charged that the 'order was negli- 
 gently given.^® 
 
 But for an injury received while obeying an order of a 
 superior, the law will not charge the injured employee with 
 contributory negligence, unless the danger was so glaring 
 that no prudent man would have attempted the service, 
 even under an order by one with authority to give orders, 
 in the particulars to which the duty referred.*" An em- 
 ployer is generally held estopped to insist that an employee 
 was negligent in refusing to obey a negligent or unauthor- 
 ized order of an authorized superior ; *^ it is no defense that 
 an employee was violating an unauthorized order, when in- 
 jured, as this is the same as no order at all,** nor is it com- 
 
 1 Am. Neg. Eep. 503; Lynch y. Boston, etc., E. Co., 159 Mass. 536; 
 34 K E. Rep. 1072; Schaibe v. Lake Shore, etc., E. Co., 97 Mich. 318; 
 56 N. W. Eep. 565. 
 
 38 Knight V. Cooper, 36 W. Va. 232; 14 S. E. Eep. 999.; Prather 
 T. Eichmond, etc., E. Co., 80 Ga. 427; 9 S. E. Eep. 530; Simmons v. 
 Chicago, etc., E. Co., 110 111. 340; 18 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 50; Carney 
 V. Caraquey, etc., E. Co., 29 New Brun. 425. 
 
 89 Lasky v. Canadian Pacific E. Co., 83 Me. 461 ; 22 Atl. Eep. 367 ; 
 Smith V. St. Paul, etc., E. Co., 51 Minn. 86; 52 N. W. Eep. 1068. 
 
 <o Miller v. Union Pacific E. Co., 4 McCrary (U. S.) 115; 12 Fed. Eep. 
 600; Colorado Midland E. Co. v. O'Brien, 16 Colo. 219;/ 27 Pac. Eep. 
 701; 48 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 235; Davis v. Louisville, etc., E. Co., 69 
 Miss. 136; 10 So. Eep. 450; Stephens v. Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 96 Mo. 
 207; Lofrano v. New York, etc., E. Co., 29 N. Y. S. R. 557; 8 N. Y. 
 Supp. 717; Pennsylvania E. Co. v. O'Shaughnessy, 122 Ind. 588; 23 
 N. E. Eep. 675; 41 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 479; Stackman v. Chicago, 
 etc., E. Co., 80 Wis. 428; 50 N. W. Eep. 404. 
 
 *i Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Bayfield, 37 Mich. 205 ; Galloway' v. 
 Western, etc., E. Co., 57 Ga. 512; Keenan v. New York, etc., R. Co., 
 49 N. Y. S. R. 513 ; 21 N. Y. Supp. 445. 
 
 *2 Georgia, etc., E. Co. v. Ehodes, 56 Ga. 645; Jones v. Lake Shore 
 etc., E. Co., 49 Mich. 573; 14 N. W. Eep. 551; 8 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 
 221. 
 
 1—39 609 
 
§ 440 COUf HlBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 petent to establish the disobedience of an order accompanied 
 by a threat, as this is an order the employee is not bound 
 to obey,** although it would not avail the employee that an 
 order being obeyed, at the time of an injury, was accompa- 
 nied with a threat, as this would constitute no defense, if the 
 employee was nevertheless obeying the improper order. ^^ 
 
 § 440. Contributory negligence of infant employee. — Neg- 
 ligence upon the part of an infant employee contributing to 
 the injury sustained by him, is as effectual by way of defense, 
 as though he were an adult. What may constitute negli- 
 gence, however, upon his part, is to be determined by the 
 evidence and the inferences that arise therefrom, measured 
 and graduated by his age and his capacity to appreciate his 
 surroundings.*^ 
 
 An infant employee can be held to no higher degree of in- 
 telligence and capacity than his youth, inexperience and 
 want of judgment, as known to the employer, would war- 
 rant.*« 
 
 43 Capper v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 103 Ind. 305; 2 N. E. Rep. 
 749; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Gas. 525; East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Duffield, 12 Lea. (Tenn.) 63; 47 Am. Rep. 319; 18 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 35; Westcott V. New York, etc., R. Co., 153 Mass. 460; 27 N. E. Rep. 
 10. 
 
 4* East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. Duffield, supra. 
 
 " Where plaintiff has been ordered not to dump a slate ear until he 
 got orders to do so from the engineer, but violated such instructions 
 and dumped the car while it was moving at some speed one thousand 
 four hundred feet before the dump was reached, resulting in the car 
 being derailed and plaintiff being injured, plaintiff was guilty of con- 
 tributory negligence as a. matter of law." Redus v. Milner Coal & R. 
 Co. (Ala. 1906), 41 So. Rep. 634. 
 
 *5 Flynn v. Erie, etc., R. Co., 12 N.-Y. S. R. 88; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. 
 Long, 94 Ind. 250; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 345; Kehler v. Schwenk, 144 
 Pa. St. 348; 22 Atl. Rep. 910. See Chapter on Injuries to Infant Em- 
 ployees. , 
 
 *8St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Valarius, 56 Ind. 511; 18 Am. Ry. Rep. 
 116. This case is criticised in. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. McCormiek, 
 610 
 
eONTEIEUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. § 440 
 
 Youth and inexperience are matters of fact to be consid- 
 ered by the jury, -when alleged and proved, with all the 
 other facts, in determining whether contributory negligence 
 was shown on the part of the employee and his employer's 
 obligation increases corresponding to^^he infancy and in- 
 experience of the employee.*^ 
 
 But as to an employee of years of discretion and intelli- 
 gence, who has had sufficient experience in the business to ap- 
 preciate the dangers of the service, as well as an adult em- 
 ployee, contributory n^ligence will prevent an action for 
 an injury, the same as in the case of an adult and if the 
 evidence of the negligence is without dispute or is all one 
 way, it will become a question for the court, as in other 
 
 74 Ind. 440; Umback v. Lake Shore, etc., E. Co., 83 Ind. 191; 8 Am. 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 98. 
 
 *7 International, etc., E. Co. v. Hinzie, 82 Texas 623; 18 S. W. 
 Eep. 681; Hamilton v. Galveston, etc., E. Co., 54 Texas 556; 4 Am. & 
 Eng. E. Cas. 528; Texas, etc., E. Co. v. Brick, 83 Texas 598; 20 S. W. 
 Eep. 511. "" 
 
 48 Nugent V. Milling Co., 131 Mo. 241; 33 S. W. Eep. 428, a strong 
 decision, by Judge Eobinson; Herbert v. Mound City Co., 90 Mo. App. 
 305, 316; Jackson v. Missouri Pacific Ey. Co., 104 Mo. 448, 456; 16 
 S. W. Eep. 413. 
 
 " A six-year-old child is only bound to exercise such care to avoid 
 danger as may be reasonably expected of one of his age, experience, and 
 discretion." Van Salvellergh v. Green Bay Traction Co. (Wis. 1907), 
 111 N. W. Eep 1120. 
 
 " Special findings held to show contributory negligence of a boy 
 thirteen years of age, of ordinary intelligence, injured in attempting to 
 pass in front of a moving freight train which he saw approaching." 
 Chicago, etc., Ey. Co. v. Laughlin (Kan. 1906), 87 Pac Eep. 749. 
 
 " Where a boy twelve years old, of average intelligence, who had been 
 employed for six months or more to perform minor duties in connec- 
 tion with his father's emplojrment as section foreman, and who was 
 familiar with the locality and the movement of trains, and knew that 
 the train which struck him was overdue and likely to appear at any 
 moment, went to sleep on a platform in a position where he knew a 
 passing train could strike him, hp v-q.'- legligent as a matter of law." 
 
 611 
 
§ 440 CONTRIBtTTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 Mann v. Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. (Mo. App. 1907), 100 S. W. Rep. 
 566. 
 
 " In an action by an infant of tender years, in its . own right, for 
 personal injuries arising from negligence of a railway company, the 
 fault or negligence of its mother or a third party, if any, contributory 
 to such injury, cannot be imputed to the child." Atchison, etc., Ry. Co. 
 V. Calhoun (Okl. 1907), '89 Pac. Rep. 207. 
 
 " In determining whether a brakeman was negligent, his age, intelli- 
 gence, and experience as a brakeman should be taken into account." 
 Hayes v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (Wis. 1907), 111 N. W. Rep., 471. 
 
 " A minor is only bound to use such care as children of his age, 
 capacity, and intelligence are capable of exercising." Illinois Cent. R. 
 Co. V. Johnson, 123 111. App. 300, judgment affirmed (1906) 77 N. E. 
 Rep. 592, 221 111. 42. 
 
 An instruction as follows: "The court instructs the jury that a 
 child is not required by law to exercise the same degree of care and 
 caution to avoid injury as is a person of mature years, and 'that a 
 child is only held to the exercise of such degree of care and caution as 
 children of his age, capacity, and intelligence are capable of exercising " 
 — helcl, erroneous, as the jury may have inferred that a child is never 
 required to exercise the same degree of care as an adult. Wabash R. 
 Co. v. Jones, 121 111. App. 390. 
 
 A child between the age of five and six years cannot be guilty of con- 
 tributory negligence. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Freeman, 125 III. App. 
 318. 
 
 A child of tender years is not required to exercise the same degree of 
 care and prudence in the presence of danger required of an adult 
 under like circumstances, but is required to exercise such care and 
 prudence as is commensurate with one of his age and intelligence. 
 Kostenbaum v. New York City Ry. Co., 105 N. Y. S. 65. 
 
 " A boy of seventeen years, who apprehends the dangerous character 
 of a railroad yard and his duty in crossing it, will be held, to have con- 
 tributed to an accident due in part to his negligent performance of the 
 duty thus recognized by him." Cranbuck v. Delaware, L., etc., R. Co. 
 (N. J. 1907), 65 Atl. Rep. 1031. 
 
 " One's recovery for injury by negligence in the operation of a train 
 is barred by contributory negligence though he is only twelve years old, 
 his testimony showing a degree of intelligence, a knowledge of the 
 methods of operating trains, and an appreciation of the danger to 
 which his situation exposed him, such as might be looked for in a 
 person of full maturity." Coy v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (Kan. 1906), 
 86 Pac. Rep. 468. 
 
 " Only that degree of care and prudence is expected of a child that 
 a child of his age or degree of intelligence should exercise, so that 
 whdtt might be ordinary care for such child might be culpable neg- 
 612 
 
CONTKIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OE EMPLOYEES. § 441 
 
 § 441. Pleading contributory negligence. — In Illinois,*® 
 Indiana,^" Massachusetts ^^ and Michigan/^ it has been held 
 that a plaintiff in a personal injury action must both allege 
 and establish, in order to recover, that he was in the exer- 
 cise of due care, at the time of the injury. But contribu- 
 tory negligence is held to be an affixmative defense which 
 must be alleged and established by a preponderance of the 
 evidence, in Alabama,®^ California,®* Georgia,®^ Kentucky,®^ 
 
 ligence in an adult; and hence the question of contributory negligence 
 of a boy between 9 and 10 years of age, injured by a railroad train 
 backing down upon him, in not looking up and down the track as he 
 walked upon it, was one for the jury under proper instructions." St. 
 Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Sparks (Ark. 1906), 99 S. W. Rep. 73. 
 
 " In an action for injuries to an eleven-year-old child in a crossing 
 accident, evidence examined, and held, that whether the child was 
 guilty of contributory negligence was a question for the jury." St. 
 Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Tomlinson (Ark. 1906), 94 S. W. Rep. 613. 
 
 "Whether a boy nine years old, who is crossing a street and struck 
 by a team, is sui juris, and so capable of being guilty of contributory 
 negligence, is not a question of law, but one for the jury." Gerber v. 
 Boorstein, 99 N. Y. S. 1091. 
 
 " Whetlier a boy seven years of age, injured while walking on a, rail- 
 road track by being struck by a train, was guilty of contributory neg- 
 ligence, held, under the evidence, for the jury." Edwards v. Chicago, 
 etc., Ry. Co. (S. D. 1907), 110 N. W. Rep. 832. 
 
 *9 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Crowder, 49 111. App. 154. 
 
 BoSherfey v. Evansville, etc., R. Co., 121 Ind. 427; 23 N. E. Rep. 
 273. 
 
 61 Fuller V. Boston, etc., R. Co., 133 Mass. 491; 14 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 695. 
 
 B2 Thompson v. Flint, etc., R. Co., 57 Mich. 300; 23 N. W. Rep. 
 820; 23 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 289. 
 
 63 Mary Lee, etc., R. Co. v. Champbliss, 97 Ala. 171; 11 So. Rep. 
 897; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 254. 
 
 B* Robinson v. Western Pacific R. Co., 48 Cal. 409; 7 Am. Ry. Rep. 
 244. 
 
 55 Georgia Midland R. Co. v. Evans, 87' Ga. 673 ; 13 S. E. Rep. 
 580. 
 
 58Paducah, etc., R. Co, v. Hoehl, 12 Bush. (Ky.) 41; 18 Am. Ry. 
 Rep. 338, 
 
 613 
 
§ 441 CONTKIBUTOET NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOTEES. 
 
 Missouri,^^ Montana,®* New Hampshire/* New York,®" 
 North Carolina," Ohio,®^ Oregon,®* South Carolina,** 
 Texas,®® Virginia,®® Washington,®'^ West Virginia®^ and 
 Wisconsin.®* 
 
 Contributory negligence is a defense which implies negli- 
 gence on the part of the defendant and is therefor a plea in 
 the nature of confession and avoidance.'^® Generally, the 
 facts constituting contributory negligence must be set out 
 and it is not sufficient to allege negligence generally,''^ al- 
 though in some States this is not necessary.''^ When plain- 
 tiif alleges reasonable care on his part and the defendant 
 specifically denies this allegation, the issue is properly 
 framed, without further pleading^* If the petition shows 
 negligence of the plaintiff, on its face, no special plea is neces- 
 
 B7 Thorpe v. Missouri Pacific Ey. Co., 89 Mo. 650; 2 S. W. Rep. 3. 
 
 ssHigley v. Gilmer, 3 Mont. 90. 
 
 69 Smith V. Eastern E. Co., 35 N. H. 356. 
 
 eoLee v. Troy, etc., Co., 98 N. Y.,115. 
 
 61 Aycock V. Raleigh, etc., E. Co., 89 N. Car. 321. 
 
 62 Street Railroad Co. v. Nolthenius, 40 Ohio St. 376; 19 Am. & Eng. 
 E. Cas. 191. 
 
 68 Johnston v. Oregon, etc., R. Co., 23 Oregon 94; 31 Pac. Rep. 
 283. 
 
 «* Donahue v. Enterprise, etc., R. Co., 32 So. Car. 299; 11 S. E. 
 Rep. 95. 
 
 65 Murray v. Gulf, etc., E. Co., 73 Texas 2; 11 S. W. Eep. 125; 38 
 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 177. 
 
 69 Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Gilman, 88 Va. 239; 13 S. E. Eep. 475. 
 er Northern Pacific E. Co. v. Hess, 2 Wash. 383; 26 Pac. Rep. 866; 
 
 48 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 91. 
 
 ssCarrico v. West Virginia E. Co., 35 W. Va. 389; 14 S. E. Rep. 
 12 ; 52 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 393. 
 
 68 Potter V. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 20 Wis. 533. 
 
 TOWatkinds v. Southern Pacific E. Co., 14 Sawy. (U. S.) 30; 
 Kaminski v. Tudor Iron Works, 167 Mo. 462; 67 S. W. Eep. 221. 
 
 71 Harrison v. Missouri Pacific E. Co., 74 Mo. 364; 41 Am. Eep. 318; 
 7 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 382; Murray v. Gulf, etc., E. Co., 73 Texas 2; 
 11 S. W. Rep. 125; 38 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 177. 
 
 T2 Evansville, etc., E. Co. v. Hiatt, 17 Ind. 103. 
 
 TsWatkinds v. Southern Pacific E. Co., 38 Fed. Eep. 711, 
 614 
 
CONTEIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. § 441 
 
 sary, but a demurrer should be interposed ''^ and if the evi- 
 dence of the plaintiff shows his own negligence, it can be 
 taken advantage of, although not specially pleaded as a de- 
 fense.''^ 
 
 7* Peterson v. Central, etc., E. Co., 85 Ga. 653; 11 S. E. Eep. 872. 
 
 T6 Schultz V. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co.,- 32 Mo. App. 438. 
 
 " Contributory negligence is an aflBrmative defense." Mississippi Cent. 
 E. Co. V. Hardy, 41 So. Eep. 505. 
 
 " Contributory negligence is an affirmative defense which must be 
 pleaded." Cook v. Chicago, etc., Ey. Co. (Neb! 1907), 110 N. W. Eep. 
 718. 
 
 " Contributory negligence is a matter of defense, and should be 
 pleaded." Carr v. Minneapolis, etc., Ey. Co. (N. D. 1907). 112 N. W. 
 Eep. 972. 
 
 " In an action for damages in negligence cases, the plaintiff is not re- 
 quired to negative his own negligence, but such negligence is a matter 
 to be pleaded by the defendant." Moore v. Lanier (Fla. 1906), 42 
 So. Eep. 462. 
 
 "The burden of the issue on the question of contributory negligence, 
 raised by a general denial in an action for injuries, is on the defendant." 
 Stephens v. American Car & Foundry Co. (Ind. App. 1906), 78 N. E. 
 Eep. 335. 
 
 " Contributory negligence is an affirmative defense ; the bui'den of 
 proving which is on the defendant." Stotler v. Chicago, etc., . Ey. Co. 
 (Mo. 1906), 98 S. W. Eep. 509. 
 
 " In an action for damages, resulting from defendant's negligence, 
 the burden does not rest on plaintiff to prove that he was not guilty 
 of contributory negligence." Houston, etc., E. Co. v. Anglin (Tex. 
 Civ. App. 1907), 99 S. W. Rep. 897. 
 
 " The burden of showing contributory negligence is on defendant." 
 Judgment, 76 N. E. Eep. 1117, reversed; City of Indianapolis v. 
 Keeley (Ind. 1906), 79 N. E. Eep. 499. 
 
 " Contributory negligence in an action for injuries is an affirmative 
 defense which must be specially pleaded." Goodloe v. Metropolitan 
 Ry. Co. (Mo. App. 1906), 96 S. W. Rep. 482. 
 
 " The question of contributory negligence may be raised by demurrer 
 to the complaint." Mangan v. Hudson River Co., 100 N. Y. S. 539; 
 50 Misc. Rep. 388. 
 
 " In order to recover damages for personal injuries caused by negli- 
 gence, the plaintiff must prove affirmatively that he was in the exercise 
 of ordinary care for his own safety at and prior to the injury com- 
 plained of." Cleveland, etc., Ry. Co. v. Sparks, 122 111. App. 400. 
 
 " The burden of establishing the defense of contributory negligence 
 
 6J5 
 
§ 442 CONTEIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 § 442. Contributory negligence as question of law or fact. 
 
 — The law only defines what will constitute contributory 
 negligence and the question whether the circumstances exist, 
 suificient to bring a case within the legal definition of the 
 term is usually for the jury to decide, ^^ Except in cases 
 where the facts going to show negligence on the part of the 
 plaintiff are undisputed/^ or reasonable minds ought to draw 
 no other conclusion than that the plaintiff was negligent/" 
 
 is on the defendant, except where plaintiff's evidence convicts him 
 prima facie of contributory negligence." Texas, etc., Ry. Co. v. Conway 
 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907), 98 S. W. Rep. 1070. 
 
 " A complaint, in an action against a street railway company for 
 injuries in- a collision with a car, which alleges that the company's 
 servants, while running a car " recklessly and wantonly or intention- 
 ally," ran it against the wagon on which plaintiff was driving, is not 
 demurrable on the grounds that it is uncertain whether simple or 
 wanton negligence is charged and that it joins disjunctively in the 
 same count simple negligence and wanton negligence." Garth v. North 
 Alabama Traction Co. (Ala. 1906), 42 So. Rep. 627. 
 
 " Where, in an action for negligence, the only answer remaining 
 in the record after the issues were made up consisted of a general 
 denial, plaintiff's contributory negligence was no defense, unless the 
 testimony he introduced so clearly showed that he was negligent in a 
 manner contributing to the accident that the court would have been war- 
 ranted in denying him relief." Fechley v. Springfield Traction Co. 
 (Mo. App. 1900), 96 8. W. Rep. 421. 
 
 78 Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Johnson, 135 111. 641; 26 N. E. Rep. 
 510; Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Haagland, 66 Md. 149; 7 Atl. Rep. 
 105; Chaffee v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 104 Mass. 108; Dickson v. Mis- 
 souri Pacific Ry. Co., 104 Mo. 491; 16 S. W. Rep. 381; Halsey v. 
 Rome, etc., R. Co., 113 N. Y. 622; Fisher v. Monongahela, etc., R. Co., 
 131 Pa. St. 292; 18 Atl. Rep. 1016; McGill v. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co., 
 152 Pa. St. 331; 25 Atl. Rep. 540; Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Moore, 69 
 Texas 157; 6 S. W. Rep. pij Smith v. Rio Grande, etc., R. Co., 9 
 Utah 141; 33 Pao. Rep. 626. 
 
 77 Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Arnold, 80 Ala. 600 ; 2 So. Rep. 337 ; 30 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 546; MacDougall v. Central R. Co., 63 Cal. 431; 
 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 143. 
 
 78 Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Harrington, 131 Ind. 426; 30 N. E. Rep. 
 37; 49 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 358; Wood v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 68 
 Iowa 491; 27 N. W. Rep. 473; 24 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 91. 
 
 6ie 
 
CONTKIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. § 442 
 
 and in all cases where the facts are disputed or the conclusion 
 is in doubt, the issue should be submitted to the jury.™ 
 
 But if it clearly appears, from the undisputed facts, judged 
 in the light of that common knowledge and experience of 
 which courts are bound to take notice, that a party has not 
 exercised such care as men of common prudence usually ex- 
 ercise in positions of like exposure and danger, the issue is 
 one of law to be decided by the court and should not be sub- 
 mitted to the jury.*" 
 
 79 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Hedges, 105 Ind. 398; 7 N. E. Rep. 801; 
 25 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 550; New York, etc., R. Co. v. Steinbrenner, 
 47 N. J. L. 161; 23 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 330. 
 
 soNehrbas v. Central Pacific R. Co., 62 Cal. 320; 14 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 670; Orcott v. Pacific Coast E. Co., 85 Cal. 291; 24 Pac. Rep. 
 661; Central R. Co. v. Moore, 24 N. J. L. 824; Collins v. Burlington, 
 etc., R. Co., 83 Iowa 346; 49 N. W. Rep. 848; Apsey v. Detroit, etc., 
 E. Co., 83 Mich. 440; 47 N. W. Rep. 513; Hudson v. Wabash R. Co., 
 101 Mo. 13; 14 S. W. Rep. 15; Ecliif v. Wabash, etc., R. Co., 64 Mich. 
 196; 31 N. W. Rep. 180. 
 
 " Diligence of the person injured, and negligence of the person in- 
 juring him, are questions peculiarly for the jury," Western, etc., R. 
 Co. V. York (Ga. 1907), 58 S. B. Rep. 183. 
 
 " Contributory negligence involves questions of fact for the determina- 
 tion of the jury." Cook v. Chicago, etc., Ey. Co. (Neb. 1907), 110 N. 
 W. Rep. 718. 
 
 " The issue of contributory negligence is for the jury, where the 
 minds of reasonable men may differ as to whether such negligence 
 existed." Thomson v. Issaquah Shingle. Co. (Wash. 1906), 86 Pac. Rep. 
 588. 
 
 " Where the facts are such that reasonable men of fair intelligence 
 may draw different conclusions from them, the question of negligence 
 must be submitted to the jury." McLean v. Dow, 125 111. App. 174. 
 
 " Contributory negligence as well as negligence is a question for 
 the jury, unless the facts admit of but one conclusion." Carr v. 
 Minneapolis, etc., Ry. Co. (N. D. 1907), 112 N. W. Rep. 972. 
 
 " The question of negligence depending on evidence should not be 
 withdrawn from the jury, except where there is no material conflict, 
 and where there is no room for different minds to form different con- 
 clusions." Texas Mexican Ey. Co. v. Higgins (.Tex. Civ. App. 1907), 
 99 S. W. Rep. 200. 
 
 " In an action for injuries, held that the negligence of the defendant 
 and whether such negligence caused or contributed to the injury, were 
 
 61Y 
 
§ 442 OONTEIBUTOBY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 questions of fact." Illinois Southern Ey. Co. v. Hayner, 80 N. E. 
 Eep. 316; 225 111. 613. 
 
 " There is no fixed standard in the law by which a court can arbi- 
 trarily say in all cases what conduct shall be considered reasonable 
 and prudent, or what shall constitute ordinary care, and the jury are 
 free to fix the standard for reasonable, prudent, and careful men 
 under the circumstances of the case as they find them according to 
 their judgment and experience of what that class of men do under 
 such circumstances, and to test the conduct involved in - the issues 
 by that standard." Southern Ry. Co. v. Stutts (U. S. C. C. A., Ala. 
 1906), 144 Fed. Eep. 948. 
 
 " The question of contributory negligence is a question of fact for 
 the jury, except when all the material facts touching the negligence 
 of the, person injured are undisputed, and admit of no rational infer- 
 ence but that of his negligence." Guild v. Pringle (U. S. C. C. A., 
 S. C, 1906), X45 Fed. Eep. 312. 
 
 " When there is no room for difference of opinion in the minds of 
 reasonable men as to the existence of contributory negligence, the 
 case should be taken from the jury." Brown v. Northern Pac. Ey. 
 Co. (Wash. 1906), 86 Pac. Eep. 1053. 
 
 " Negligence becomes a question of law only when the act com- 
 plained of is in violation of the statute, or when the undisputed evi- 
 dence only admits of the inference that the commission of the act in 
 question was negligence." International & G. N. E. Co. v. Wray 
 (Texas), 96 S. W. Eep. 74. 
 
 " Where averments of the petition present issues relating to the 
 negligence of the defendant and the diligence of the plaintiff appropri- 
 ate for the determination of a jury, it was not error to overrule a 
 demurrer to the same." Seaboard Air Line Ey. v. Hood (Ga. 1906), 
 56 S. B. Eep. 303. 
 
 " Whether one injured by an engine on a railroad track was guilty 
 of contributory negligence was a question for the jury, if, from all 
 the evidence favorable to him, whether controverted or not, there could 
 be two views of his conduct entertained by clear-minded men, and 
 a question for the court, if but one view could be so entertained." 
 Markowitz v. Kansas City, etc., E. Co. (Mo. 1906), 94 S. W. Eep. 256. 
 
 " In an action for injuries, it is for the court to say whether there 
 is any evidence from which negligence or contributory negligence can 
 be reasonably and legitimately inferred; but it is for the jury to say 
 whether, from the evidence adduced, when submitted to them, any 
 negligence, and whose, ought to be inferred." Wilmington City Ey. 
 Co. V. White (Del. 1907), 66 Atl. Eep. 1009. 
 
 " In an action against a railroad for injuries sustained in a crossing 
 accident, held, that the question whether plaintiff was guilty of con- 
 
 618 
 
CONTKIBUTOEY NEGLIGEKTCE OF EMPLOYEES. § 442 
 
 tiibutory negligence was for the jury." Wilbur v. Michigan Cent. R. 
 Co. (Mich. 1906), 108 N. W. Eep. 713. 
 
 " Whether it was negligence for a brakeman, because of a defective 
 coupling apparatus, to go in between moving cars in order to couple 
 them, was a question for the jury." Choctaw, etc., R. Co. v. Thompson 
 (Ark. 1907), 100 S. W. Rep. 83. 
 
 " It is only where the material facts are clearly established, and 
 from such facts all reasonable men would draw the same conclusion, 
 that the question of negligence should be withdrawn from the jury." 
 Sealey v. Southern Ry. Co. (U. S. C. C. A., S. C, 1907), 151 Fed. 
 Rep. 736. 
 
 " Where the nature and attributes of an act relied on to show con- 
 tributory negligence can only be determined correctly by considering 
 all the circumstances of the transaction, it is within the province of 
 the jury to pass upon and characterize it." Baltimore, etc., E. Co. v. 
 State (Md. 1906), 64 Atl. Eep. 304. 
 
 " Under Revisal N. C. 1905, § 483, which provides that ' contributory 
 negligence must be pleaded and proved by the defendant,' as construed 
 by the Supreme Court of the State, the trial judge cannot direct a 
 verdict on a plea of contributory negligence, but must submit the issue 
 to the jury." United States Leather Co. v. Howell (U. S. C. C. A., 
 N. C, 1907), 151 Fed. Rep. 444. 
 
 " On a motion for nonsuit for contributory negligence, which must 
 be deduced from facts in evidence, the question is usually for the 
 jury, and the motion will be refused unless it is established beyond 
 fair debate that plaintiff was negligent and that his negligence con- 
 tributed to the injury." Turner v. Hall (N. J. Sup. 1906), 64 Atl. 
 Rep. 1060. 
 
 " The question of contributory negligence is for the jury, on a con- 
 sideration of all the evidence relating thereto." Indianapolis St. Ry. 
 Co. V. Demaree (Ind. App. 1907), 80 N. E. Rep. 687. 
 
 " Whether the operators of an engine and cars discovered the peril 
 of a person near the track in time to have avoided injury to him by 
 the exercise of proper care, authorizing a recovery, notwithstanding 
 the latter's negligence, held, under the facts, for the jury." Texas, 
 etc., R. Co. v. Scarborough (Tex. Civ. App. 1907), 104 S. W. Eep. 408. 
 " In order to justify a conclusion that plaintiff was guilty of con- 
 tributory negligence as a matter of law, the evidence must be such 
 as to require a finding that all reasonable men in the exercise of an 
 honest and impartial judgment must draw the conclusion under the 
 facts that he did not exercise ordinary care." Laclede Gaslight Co. v. 
 Cottone (U. S. C. C. A., Mo., 1907), 152 Fed. Eep. 629. ' 
 
 " It is generally held that contributory negligence is a question for 
 the jury, and is one that should never be taken from the jury, unless 
 the case is so clear that in case of a verdict against the defendant it 
 
 619 
 
§ 442 CONTEIBUTOEY NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES. 
 
 could not be sustained by the court." Seitten v. Alaska Treadwell 
 Gold Min. Co., 2 Alaska 8. '' 
 
 " FlaintifT, a child, was attracted to a railroad's right of way by 
 clay piled along the track, and while playing thereon in safety his 
 attention was attracted by a passing train, and he began touching, 
 playing with, and running alongside the cars, and finally fell under 
 them. Held, that the question as to what was the proximate cause 
 of the injury was not for the jury, as the court properly decided, as a 
 matter of law, that there was no evidence tending to show that the 
 negligence charged was, the proximate cause." Seymour v. Union 
 Stockyards, etc., Co., 79'N. E. Rep. 950; 224 111. 579. 
 
 620 
 
CHAPTEE XVII. 
 
 COMPABATIVE NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 § 443. Doctrine not generally recognized. 
 
 444. The rule stated. 
 
 445. Origin of the doctrine. 
 
 446. Kule generally denied in the United States. 
 
 447. Burden of proof on the plaintiff. 
 
 448. Act of Congress establishing, as to interstate carriers. 
 
 449. Conflicting decisions concerning, by federal courts. 
 
 450. Held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. 
 
 451. The rule in Georgia, Illinois, Tennessee and other States. 
 
 452. Doctrine limited by late case, in Georgia. 
 
 453. Plaintiff must have exercised ordinary care, in Illinois. 
 
 454. Bule formerly obtained in Kansas. 
 
 455. Plaintiff's negligence " slight " and defendant's " gross.' 
 
 456. When both parties equally negligent. 
 
 457. In case of injuries to passengers. 
 
 458. Injuries at highway crossings. 
 
 459. Instructions on comparative negligence. 
 
 460. Comparative negligence generally a jury issue. 
 
 § 443. Doctrine not generally recognized. — Courts and 
 text writers generally discourage all attempts to refine or 
 distinguish between different degrees of negligence. One 
 author of many bulky and diffuse books upon the subject ad- 
 mits that he was always " careless, ignorant and indifferent 
 upon this whole subject of the degrees of negligence," be- 
 cause, as he says, " it is .plain that such refinements can 
 have no useful place in the practical administration of jus- 
 tice." ^ An able English jurist said, in one case, that 
 " gross negligence " was only simple negligence, with the 
 addition of a " vituperative epithet," ^ and other courts have 
 
 1 Thompson on Negligence, § 18, p. 18. 
 
 2 Baron Eolfe, in Wilson v. Brett, II Mees & W. 113. 
 
 621 
 
§ 443 COMPAEATIVE NEGLIGEiNCEk 
 
 made similar observations, since all such terms but indicate 
 the absence of the care that was necessary, under the cir- 
 cumstances of a particular case.^ The United States Su- 
 preme Court voiced the expression of many State courts, 
 when it said, in a well-considered decision,^ that " It may be 
 doubted if these terms can be usefully applied in practice. 
 Their meaning is not fixed, or capable of being so. One 
 degree thus described not only may be confounded with an- 
 other, but it is quite impracticable exactly to distinguish 
 them." 
 
 When it is so diificult for the judges of the higher courts, 
 with their trained legal minds, to differentiate between de- 
 grees of negligence and, in tracing the sequence of events 
 and looking for the proper causation, to determine, with 
 nicety, the cause of a particular effect, how much more dif- 
 ficult it must of necessity be for the average jury to under- 
 stand such refinements and to ascertain, with any degree of 
 precision, which of two negligent persons contributed, more 
 directly, to produce an injury.'' Any want of ordinary 
 care, on the part of an injured person, contributing to pro- 
 duce the injury, is generally held sufficient to deny a recovery, 
 unless the defendant, after discovery of his peril, could, by 
 reasonable care, have avoided the injury, as the law will not 
 undertake to apportion the degrees of negligence between 
 them.® But in a few of the States in the United States, 
 that wholesome general rule is not followed, but the courts 
 and juries are permitted to indulge in the refinements of at- 
 tempting to ascertain which of the two negligent parties was 
 
 8 Beal V. South Devon E. Co., 3 H. & D. 337 ; McAdoo v. Richmond, 
 etc., R. Co., 105 N. C. 14fff^mith v. New York, etc., R. Co., 24 N. Y. 
 241; Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. v. Arms, 91 U. S. 495. 
 
 4 New World v. King, 16 How. (U. S.) 469. 
 
 5 1 Thompson on Negligence, § 18, p. 18; Wharton on Negligence 
 (2 ed.), §§ 59, 63, and cases cited. 
 
 « See preceding chapter on Contributory Negligence. 
 
 622 
 
COMPAEATIVE NEGLIGElirCE.. § 444 
 
 the more careless, considering all the circumstances of the 
 accident, along with the sympathies and prejudices of the 
 jury box, and if the defendant is found to have been guilty 
 of gross negligence, while the plaintiff was only slightly neg- 
 ligent, as is generally found to he the case, when the de- 
 fendant is an unpopular litigant, then a recovery is allowed, 
 according to this theory, notwithstanding the negligence of 
 the plaintiff.'' 
 
 § 444. The rule stated. — In jurisdictions where the doc- 
 trine of comparative negligence obtains, it is held that negli- 
 gence, resulting in an injury, is the subject of comparison 
 and it is not required that the plaintiff shall himself be free 
 from all negligence, or that he shall exercise the highest 
 degree of care or foresight to avoid the injury, in order for 
 him to recover damages, if the evidence shows that the de- 
 fendant was guilty of a greater degree of negligence than 
 the plaintiff.® 
 
 But in cases of mutual negligence, to authorize a recovery 
 by the plaintiff, it is generally held that the negligence on 
 the part of the defendant must be so much greater than that 
 of the plaintiff as to clearly preponderate,® or, in other words, 
 where the plaintiff has been guilty of negligence contribut- 
 ing to the injury, he cannot recover, unless the negligence 
 of the defendant could be properly denominated " gross " 
 negligence, while that of the plaintiff was but " slight," in 
 comparison.^" 
 
 T 1 Thompson on Negligence, § 259, and eases cited. 
 
 8 Galena, etc., R. Co. v. JacobSj 20 111. 478; Chicago, etc., R. Co. 
 V. Payne, 49 111. 499; 59 111. 534; 11 Am. Ry. Rep. 157. 
 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Payne, 49 111. 499; 59 111. 534, criticised 
 in Joliet v. Seward, 86 111. 402. 
 
 10 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Lewis, 5 111. App. 242; Pittsburg, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Shannon, 11 111. App. 222; Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Hammer, 
 B5 111. 526; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Dimick, 96 111. 42; 2 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 201. 
 
 623 
 
§ 445 COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 § 445. Origin of the doctrine. — One text writer,^ ^ who 
 took the pains to investigate the origin of the rule of compara- 
 tive negligence, as applied in Georgia and Illinois, traces the 
 rule to a misunderstanding of the terms used in the law, 
 or a failure to distinguish between the degree of care pre- 
 
 Comparative negligence has been defined as "that doctrine in the 
 law of negligence by which the negligence of the parties is compared 
 in the degree of slight, ordinary and gross, negligence, and a recovery 
 permitted, notwithstanding the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, 
 when the negligence of the plaintiff is slight and the negligence of 
 the defendant gross, but refused when the plaintiff has been guilty 
 of a want of ordinary oare contributing to his injury, or when the 
 negligence of the defendant is not gross, but only ordinary or slight, 
 when compared, under the circumstances of the case, with the con- 
 tributory negligence of the plaintiff." This is the rule, as applied in 
 Illinois, 4 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law 367; Bailey, Mas. Liab Inj. Serv., 
 p. 403, 410; Abend v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., Ill 111. 203; 53 Am. Rep. 
 616; Illinois Central R. Co. v. Hetherington, 83 111. 510; Chicago, etc., 
 K. Co. V. Dimick, 96 111. 42; Rockford, etc., R. Co. v. Delaney, 82 
 111. 198; 25 Am. Rep. 358; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Johnson, 103 111. 
 525. 
 
 The rule of comparative negligence will not be applied in the case 
 of an injury to a child seven years old, where the parents were not 
 negligent. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Welsh, 118 111. 572; 9 N. E. Rep. 
 197. 
 
 But otherwise, when the parents are negligent, contributing to the 
 child's injury. Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Grable, 88 111. 441; 21 Am. Ry. 
 Rep. 336. 
 
 In jurisdictions where comparative negligence is applied, it obtains 
 in actions by the representatives of a deceased person, killed by the 
 negligence of the defendant, as well as to personal injuries by the 
 injured person himself, and if the decedent was only slightly negligent 
 and the defendant was grossly negligent, by comparison of their acts, 
 a recovery may be had for the death. Rockford, etc., R. Co. v. Delaney, 
 82 111. 198; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Johnson, 103 111. 512; 8 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 225; Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Lee, 87 111. 454; 18 Am. 
 Ry. Rep. 378; Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Kuntson,.69 111. 103; Peoria, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Clayberg, 107 111. 644; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 356; 
 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. O'Connor, 77 111. 391; Illinois Central R. Co. 
 V. Hoffman, 67 111. 287. 
 
 11 1 Thompson on Negligence, | 270, p. 256. 
 
 624 
 
COMPABATIVE. NEGLIGENCE. § 445 
 
 ceding the injury and the effect thereof as occasioning the 
 injury. 
 
 Speaking of the origin of the rule, the late Judge Thomp- 
 son said : " It arose from the fact of the court mistaking 
 the distinction between the degrees of care or of negligence 
 in the act or omission which preceded the injury and the 
 propinquity of such act to the injury. It mistook causation 
 for negligence. It mistook the rule that the plaintiff may 
 recover where his negligence was but a remote cause of the 
 injury, and that of the defendant a proximate cause of it, 
 for a rule that he may recover, where his negligence was 
 slight and that of the defendant gross." ^^ 
 
 The first decision where the rule was announced in lUi- 
 nois,^^ seems to sustain the statement above quoted, as it 
 is said, in that case : " The question of liability does not 
 depend absolutely on the absence of all negligence on the 
 part of the plaintiff, but upon the relative degree of care, 
 or want of care, as manifested by both parties, for all care 
 or negligence is, at best, but relative — the absence of the 
 highest degree of care shovying the presence of some negli- 
 gence, slight as it may be. The true doctrine, therefore, we 
 think is, that in proportion to the negligence of the defendant 
 should be measured the degree of care required of the plain- 
 tiff ; that is to say, the more gross the negligence manifested 
 by the defendant, the less degree of care will be required 
 of the plaintiff to enable him to recover." This opinion 
 admits that the cases reviewed do not announce this doctrine, 
 but that there is an unexpressed view to the effect that it 
 ought to be announced, running through the cases. Ths 
 rule, as applied in Georgia,^* doubtless has the same origin 
 
 12 1 Thompson on Negligence, § 270, p. 257. 
 
 13 Galena, etc., R. Co. v. Jacobs, by Breese, J., 20 111. 478. 
 "Macon, etc., R. Co. v. Davis, 18 Ga. 679; Macon, etc., R. Co. v. 
 
 , Winn. 19 Ga. 440. For full discussion of the early cases in Georgia 
 and the error that the courts fell into in establishing this rule, see 
 1^40 625 
 
§ 446 COMPAHATIVE NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 as that administered in Illinois, that is, to an early error of 
 the court, which, when recorded, was followed as a precedeiit. 
 
 § 446. Rule generally denied in the United States. — The 
 doctrine of comparative negligence is denied in most of the 
 United States, because of the impracticability of enforcing 
 the rule in such a way as to mete out substantial justice and 
 having had its origin in an error of the court wherein the 
 rule was first announced, as already seen,, it has been gen- 
 erally condemned by courts and text writers, and aside from 
 three or four States where the adherence to precedent has been 
 regarded as of more importance than the establishment of 
 a more salutary rule than the precedents recognized, the 
 courts of the different States in the United States have re- 
 fused to compare the negligence of the parties to a suit for 
 personal injuries, as an unsatisfactory and unjust measure 
 of the rights of the parties litigant. ^^ 
 
 To maintain an action for personal injuries, as the law 
 is enforced in the great number of States, some degree of 
 negligence, on the part of the defendant, or those for whose 
 acts it is answerable, is essential, and the injured person must 
 have been free from negligence contributing to bring about 
 the injury. These essential elements of the action are-wholly 
 distinct and independent and do not depend upon the con- 
 duct of the other party to the cause, in any respect, but un- 
 less both are shown, by the evidence, no cause of action is 
 established on the part of the plaintiff. This rule is in 
 
 1 Thompson on Negligence, § 268, pp. 251, 255; Wharton on Negligence, 
 § 334. 
 
 15 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Henry, 57 Kansas 154; 45 Pac. Rep. 576; 
 Marean v. New York, etc., R. Co., 167 Pa. St. 220; 31 Atl. Rep. 562; 
 Xong V. Milford, 137 Pa. St. 122; 20 Atl. Rep. 425; O'Keefe v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. Co., 32 Iowa 467; Denver, etc., Co. v. Reid, 22 Colo. 349; 45 
 Pac. Rep. 378; Ivens v. Cincinnati, etc., E. Co., 103 Ind. 27; Frazier 
 V. South, etc., R. On. 81 Ala. 185. 
 
 626 
 
COMPAliATIVE NEGLlGElirCE. § 447 
 
 accord with approved precedents and principles, but when 
 the essentials of the action are attempted to be supplied, by 
 any comparison of the conduct of the parties to the cause, 
 all certainty in the enforcement of the law becomes a matter 
 of doubt and indecision, as it is impossible, in a personal 
 injury action, by comparison, to strike a balance by subtract- 
 ing the lesser from the greater negligence and reaching a 
 conclusion that is at all consistent with simple justice.^® 
 
 § 447. Burden of proof on the plaintiff. — The rule is not 
 different so far as the burden of proof is concerned, in cases 
 of comparative negligence and other cases where simple neg- 
 ligence on the defendant's part and an absence of all negli- 
 gence on plaintiff's part, must be established, to justify a 
 recovery. The affirmative is still on the plaintiff to make a 
 prima facie case, for whether the right to recover depends, 
 
 "Wilds V. Hudson, etc., R. Co., 24 N. Y. 430; Wells v. New York, 
 etc., R. Co., 24 N. Y. 181. 
 
 The rule of comparative negligence has been expressly repudiated 
 in the following cases: Cook v. Central, etc., R. Co., 67 Ala. 533; 
 Frazier v. South, etc., R. Co., 81 Ala. 185; 1 So. Rep. 85; 28 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 565; Birmingham, etc., R. Co. v. Jacobs (Ala.), 13 So. 
 Rep. 408; 55 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 299; Prescott, etc., R. Co. v. Regs 
 (Ariz.), 28 Pac. Rep. 1134; Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. v. Graham, 95 
 Ind. 286; 48 Am. Rep. 719; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 77; Artz v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. Co., 38 Iowa 293; Matta v. Chicago, etc.. R. Co., 69 Mich. 109; 
 37 N. W. Rep. 54; 32 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 71; Mynning v. Detroit, 
 etc., R. Co., 59 Mich. 257; 26 N. W. Rep. 514; 23 Am. & Eng. R... 
 Cas. 317; Hurt v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 94 Mo. 255; 7 S. W. Rep. 
 1; 34 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 422; Brooks v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 35 
 Mo. App. 571; Holwerson v. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co., 157 Mo. 216; 
 57 S. W. Rep. 770; 50 L. R. A. 850; Davies v. People's Ry. Co., 159 
 Mo. 1; 59 S. W. Rep. 982; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Righter, 42 N. J. 
 L. 180; 2 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 220; Catawissa, etc., R. Co. v. Arm- 
 strong, 49 Pa. St. 186; O'Donnell v. Allegheny, etc., R. Co., 59 Pa. 
 St. 239; Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Corbett, 49 Texas 573; McDonald 
 V. International, etc., R. Co., 22 S. W. Rep. 939; 86 Texas 1; 55 Am. 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 280. ' 
 
 627 
 
§ 448 COMPARATIVE NEOLlGBNCfi. 
 
 in the first instance upon the proof of a case of negligence on 
 the defendant's part, with an absence of all negligence on 
 plaintiff's part, or a case of slight neglect on plaintiff's part, 
 with gross negligence of the defendant, the affirmative being 
 on the plaintiff, he assumes the burden, in both cases. ^"^ 
 
 As stated in a decision in one State,^® where this imprac- 
 tical rule obtains : " Neither party, in the first instance, is 
 assumed to have been negligent. The negligence must be 
 proved ; and unless it appears from the proof that the plain- 
 tiff's case, under all the evidence, is proved as alleged, there 
 can be no recovery." 
 
 § 448. Act of Congress establishing, as to interstate car- 
 riers. — The Congress of the United States, after the division 
 of the term negligence into kinds or degrees had been gen- 
 erally condemned, by the courts of the different States and 
 general Government, established as to interstate carriers, the 
 doctrine of comparative negligence, in the United States, by 
 recent legislation.^® Under this act, the doctrine which has 
 for years obtained in some of the States was adopted and 
 a recovery was authorized for the gross negligence of the 
 carrier, although the plaintiff was himself guilty of a want 
 of care.^" This act was soon attacked as an infringement 
 upon the rights of the States to control and enforce within 
 
 17 Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Evans, 88 111. 62 ; 1 Thompson on 
 Negligence, § 284, p. 267. 
 
 18 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Harwood, 90 111. 425. 
 
 The burden of establishing the relative degrees of negligence suflBcient 
 to entitle a recovery, is upon the plaintiff. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Harwood, 90 111. 425; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Warner, 123 111. 38; 
 14 N. B. Rep. 206; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Dickson, 88 III. 431; 21 
 Am. Ry. Rep. 328. 
 
 19 Act Relating to Liability of Common Carriers, approved June 
 11, 1906 (Fed. St. Ann. Supp. 1907, p. 68.) 
 
 20 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Dunleavy (111.), 39 Amer. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 381; Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Cline (111.), 45 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 150. 
 
 628 
 
COMPAEATIVE NEGLIGENCE. § 448 
 
 their limits, the doctrines and procedure best suited to their 
 wants, as the law applied to all railroads " engaged in " inter- 
 state commerce, even though the injury sued for was not 
 occasioned by a train while so engaged. ^^ The constitution- 
 ality of the act may well be questioned, when it is given this 
 scope and effect. It is also to be doubted if any good can 
 come from this refinement and division of a term, by legis- 
 lation, when the administration of the same doctrine by the 
 courts has been found so unsatisfactory.^^ r 
 
 This law was held to be unconstitutional, by a federal 
 court, in Kentucky,^* in that it denied to the different 
 States, the rights guaranteed by the Constitution, and by a 
 federal court, in Tennessee,** because it was not " com- 
 
 21 See article of Gerrard B. Winston and Blackburn Esterline, in 
 Cent. Law Jour, for October 12, 1906. 
 
 22 East Tenn., etc., Co. v. Hull (Terin.), 41 Am.. & Eng. E. Cas. 495. 
 
 23 Brooks V. Southern Pacific E. Co., 64 Cent. Law Jour. 52. 
 
 24 Howard v. Illinois Cent. E. Co., 207 U. S. 463; 28 Sup. Ct. Kep. 
 141. 
 
 "Employers' Liability Act (Act Cong. June 11, J906, ch. 3073, 34 
 Stat. 232), regulating the liability of interstate carriers for injuries 
 to employees, etc., was prospective only in operation, and did not 
 apply to causes of action existing at the time of its sidoption." Hall v. 
 Chicago, E. L & P. Ey. Co. (U. S. C. C, Iowa, 1906), 149 Fed. Eep. 564. 
 
 Judge Evans, for the federal court, for the Western District of 
 Kentucky, held this act of Congress, known as the Federal Employers 
 Liability Act (Act Jime 11, 1906), unconstitutional, because it did 
 not come within the power of Congress, under the Commerce clause 
 of the Constitution, and if it did, it was an attempt to regulate such 
 Commerce wholly within the States. Upon these questions the court 
 said : 
 
 " Upon the legislation now under disoussiori two questions arise, 
 each of them of vital importance. The first is, whether the subject- 
 matter of the act, namely, the creation and enforcement' of liabilities 
 growing out of the negligence of certain common carriers to their 
 employees, is a regulation of commerce among the States within the 
 meaning of that phrase in the Constitution, and the second is, whether 
 the act, if it does regulate commerce among the States, does not also 
 regulate commerce that is exclusively within the several States, and 
 
 629 
 
§ 449 COMPAII.VTIVE NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 merce," to attempt to regulate the procedure in personal 
 injury actions and Congress was without power to regulate 
 such procedure. 
 
 § 449. Conflicting decisions concerning, by federal courts, 
 
 — About the same time that the two decisions ware rendered 
 
 whether the latter is not so inseparably combined with the former as 
 to condemn the whole act as unwarranted by the Constitution. In 
 the opinion delivered in the case of United States v. Scott, 148 Fed. Rep. 
 431, we recently had occasion to discuss similar questions, and need not 
 repeat now much of what was said then, though we have industriously 
 re-examined the whole subject." 
 
 " While the courts would be exceedingly slow to inquire into the 
 mere appropriateness of legislation, they cannot decline the duty of 
 inquiring whether legislation is within the constitutional power of 
 Congress when a proper case demands the investigation, and a most 
 patient consideration of the question in this instance has led us 
 to the conclusion — we think to the inevitable conclusion — that the 
 act of June 11, 1906, only creates and imposes a liability upon certain 
 common carriers to their employees, and in no way prescribes rules for 
 carrying on traffic or commerce among the States, and consequently 
 in no way regulates such commerce." 
 
 " An intelligent consideration of the authorities will lead, we think 
 necessarily, to the conclusions, first, that even if the act regulates 
 commerce in any possible constitutional sense it is too broad and applies 
 not only to interstate commerce, but also to that which is entirely 
 within the States respectively; and, second, that the provisions of the 
 act in these respects are single and altogether inseparable, the one 
 from the other." 
 
 " In short, the Constitution of the United States, which firmly 
 fixes our form of government, gives Congress the power to regulate 
 interstate commerce, but leaves to the States respectively the exclusive 
 power of regulating that commerce which is carried on altogether 
 within the limits of a State. Here the Congressional enactment 
 attempts, through the same provisions, to regulate commerce generally, 
 including both interstate commerce and that which is purely local 
 to the States. It consequently embraces matters which are within 
 and matters which are not within the reach of Congressional power, 
 and as the matters which are within Congressional competency are 
 630 
 
COMPAEATIVE NEGUGENCE. § 449 
 
 by the federal courts of Kentucky and Tennessee, holding 
 the Employer's Liability Act of Congress invalid, because not 
 authorized by the Constitution, under the interstate com- 
 merce clause, the federal court for the Eastern District of 
 the State of Arkansas rendered a decision diametrically op- 
 posed to the holdings referred to. 
 
 By this decision it was held to be within the power of 
 Congress, under the commerce clause of the Constitution, to 
 regulate the liability of a common carrier to its employees, 
 for personal injuries received while engaged in interstate 
 transportation; ^® the act was held to be a regulation of inter- 
 state commerce ; it was held to be remedial and not penal ^® 
 and not to be objectionable because it applied to both inter- 
 state and intrastate commerce, as its provisions were separa- 
 ble, so as to render it valid, when invoked by an employee 
 engaged on a train actually doing interstate business.^'' 
 
 Before the act was finally construed -by the Supreme 
 Court, a similar construction was announced by the federal 
 court in Iowa,** and it was held that the act was not retro- 
 active, but applied only to causes of action arising in the 
 future and not to causes already existing. 
 
 inseparably combined with those which are not, no part of the act 
 can be sustained." 
 
 For full text of above decision see Law Notes for February, 1907, 
 p. 208, et sub; 64 Cent. Law Jour. 52. 
 
 This is believed to be a proper determination of the questions pre- 
 sented in this case. 
 
 25 Spain V. St. Louis & San Francisco E. R. Co., 64 Cent. Law Jour. 
 269. 
 
 26 The Trade Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, were distinguished for this 
 reason. 
 
 27 In closing, the court said : 
 
 " So, in the case at bar, the injury suffered by the plaintiff, as \ 
 alleged in the complaint, wa,s while he was engaged in labor performed 
 on a train engaged in interstate commerce, and therefore brings this 
 case within the foregoing rules of law." 
 
 28 Hall V. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 149 Fed. Rep. 564. 
 
 631 
 
§ 450 OOMPAEATIVE NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 § 450. Held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.— 
 
 After constructions of the act of Congress by the federal 
 courts in the different jurisdictions above referred to, 
 -wherein directly opposite views as to the constitutionality of 
 the act were advanced, the United' States Supreme Court, 
 when the statute came before it for adjudication, held that 
 the act was unconstitutional, for practically the same reasons 
 as those advanced by the federal courts of Kentucky and 
 Tennessee.^® 
 
 The decision of the Supreme Court, in this instance, in the 
 construction of this act of Congress, but illustrates the fact 
 that the ideals of justice and equality have not ceased to 
 exist in the courts of our country, but however loud the 
 clamor for a given interpretation of the law, if it cannot 
 be reconciled with the express provisions of organic law, it 
 cannot stand the test. It is a source of regret that the 
 judiciary is perhaps the only branch of Government where 
 these ideals control and that in the legislative department, 
 a wrotight-up public sentiment too often prompts unequal 
 ajid unfair legislation.^" 
 
 The decision was by a divided court, but in the opinion 
 of a majority of the court, the statute was held unconstitu- 
 tional, in that it denied to the States certain rights guaran- 
 teed to them by the Constitution and because Congress ex- 
 ceeded its constitutional powers in attempting, under the 
 interstate commerce clause, to regulate the procedure in per- 
 sonal injury actions as attempted in this act. The majority 
 decision, in the course of the opinion, held that that provision 
 
 20 Howard v. Illinois Central R. Co., 207 U. S. 463; 28 Sup. Ct. 
 141; 11 Law Notes, p. 204; Brooks v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 207 
 U. S. 463; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141; 11 Law Notes, p. 204. 
 
 30 See paper of the author, before the Missouri Bar Ass'n, at meet- 
 ing held at St. Joseph, Missouri, September, 1906-, on " The Judiciary 
 and Public Sentiment." See, also, 1 Street on Foundations of Legal 
 Liab., p. 147. 
 032 
 
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE. § 450 
 
 of the statute*- which enabled the negligent sufferer or his 
 representative to recover, if his negligence was slight, while 
 that of the employer was gross, in comparison, discriminated 
 against the employer, and while authorizing damages in all 
 cases, regardless of the negligence of the employee, attempted 
 to make the employer more careful, by subjecting him to a 
 liability for the negligence of his employees, without limit 
 as to amount, and at the same time proceeded upon the 
 theory that it was immaterial how negligent the employees 
 might be, so long as their negligence was not so great as 
 that of the employer, thus discriminating against the em- 
 ployer and causing confusion and uncertainty in the rules 
 of law applying in the different States. ^^ The majority 
 
 31 See paper of Mr. T. H. Calvert, in 11 Law Notes, p. 205, wherein 
 the decision is commented on, as follows : " Moreover, it was said, 
 the statute would create confusion and uncertainty as to the rights 
 of those dwelling within the States; that it would operate injuriously 
 upon all who chose to engage in interstate commerce as common 
 carriers, since those who did so would have become subject to the 
 liability which the statute created, to be tested by the rules of neg- 
 ligence which the statute embodied, although such rules be unknown 
 to the laws of the several States. Besides, the statute, it was urged, 
 discriminated against all who engaged as common carriers in interstate 
 commerce, since it made them responsible, without limit as to the 
 amount, to one servant for an injury suffered by the acts of a 
 coservant, even in a case where the negligence of the injured had 
 contributed to the result, hence placing all employers who were 
 common carriers in a disfavored, and all their employees in a favored 
 class. Indeed, it was insisted the statute proceeded upon contradictory 
 principles, since it imposed the increased responsibility just stated 
 upon the master, presumably in order to make him more careful in 
 the selection of his servants, and yet minimized the necessity for 
 care on the part of the servant by allowing recovery although he may 
 have been negligent. Especially has the wisdom of the provision 
 declaring the doctrine of comparative negligence been questioned." 
 
 Justice White intimated that the statute contained some provisions 
 that were constitutional and others which were not, but held that 
 they could not very well be separated, and thought the court could 
 not be expected to rewrite legislation. He pointed out that a law 
 
 633 
 
§ 451 COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 opinion of the Supreme Court certainly, reflects the preva- 
 lent sense of right and justice on the part of the bar of the 
 country. 
 
 § 451. The rule as applied in Illinois, Georgia, Tennessee 
 and other States. — In Illinois, if the plaintiff's negligence is 
 •what is characterized as slight, v^hile that of the railway 
 company, as compared to the negligence of the plaintiff, is 
 considered gross, a recovery can still be had by the plaintiff, 
 notwithstanding his negligence.®^ 
 
 covering all the employees of a railroad doing interstate business would 
 touch many clerks, shop hands, and others whose work is a, matter 
 of State concern and wholly independent of interstate commerce, and 
 he further said of the law in question: 
 
 " It assumes that because one engages in interstate commerce he 
 thereby endows Congress with power not delegated to it by the 
 Constitution; in other words, with the right to legislate concerning 
 matters of purely State concern. It rests upon the conception that 
 the Constitution destroyed 'that freedom of commerce which it was 
 its purpose to preserve, since it treats the right to engage in inter- 
 state commerce as a privilege which can not be availed of except 
 upon such conditions as Congress may prescribe, even although the 
 conditions would be otherwise beyond the power of Congress. It 
 is apparent that if the contention were well founded it would ex- 
 tend the power of Congress to every conceivable subject, however 
 inherently local; would obliterate all the limitations of power im- 
 posed by the Constitution, and would destroy the authority of the 
 States as to all conceivable matters which from the beginning have 
 been and must continue to be under their control so long as the 
 Constitution endures. 
 
 " Concluding as we do, the statute, while it embraces subjects 
 within the authority of Congress to regulate commerce, also includes 
 subjects not within its constitutional power and that the two are 
 so interblended in the statute that they are incapable of separation, 
 we are of the opinion that the courts below rightly held the statute 
 to be repugnant to the Constitution and nonenforceable, and the judg- 
 ments below are therefore affirmed." 
 
 32 Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Wallace, 110 111. 114; 19 Am. & Eng. 
 
 E. Cas. 359; Louisville, New Albany & Chicago R. Co. v. Shires, Admr., 
 
 108 111. 617; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Van Patten, 74 111. 91; Chicago 
 
 & N. W. Ry. Co. V. Sweeney, 52 111. 330; Chicago, etc, R. Co. v. 
 
 634 
 
COMPAEATIVE NEGLIGEBTCE. § 451 
 
 This is practically the same rule as that applied in Geor- 
 gia and Tennessee, except that in the latter States, the extent 
 of the negligence of the plaintiff may be considered as af- 
 fecting the measure of recovery.^* The practical effect of 
 this doctrine is to permit a recovery by the plaintiff for the 
 effect of his own want of care for his protection and to render 
 the defendant responsible for his lack of discretion or care 
 for his own safety. " The law has no scales to determine, in 
 such cases, whose wrongdoing weighed most, in the compound 
 that occasioned the mischief," ^* and when those trained in 
 the law, by the use of its standards, for determining right 
 and wrong, are unable from a given state of facts, to say 
 which of two persons was the more negligent, or which act 
 was the more directly connected with the resulting injury, it 
 is not to be supposed that those wholly ignorant of such 
 standards can reach a more accurate conclusion. Hence, it 
 is the consensus of judicial opinion that this is a bad rule 
 of law, in tha|; it fails to attain the object of all law, which 
 is justice.^^ 
 
 McKean, 40 111. 218; Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Moffitt, 67 111. 431; jOliicago, 
 etc., E. Co. V. Fears, 53 111. 115; Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Lea, 68 111. 
 576; Illinois Cent. E. Co. v. Goddard, 72 111. 567; Illinois Cent. E. Co. 
 V. Benton, 69 111. 174; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Hatch, 79 111. 137; 
 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Hanimar, 85 111. 526; Chicago, B. & Q. Co. v." 
 Lee, 87 111. 454; Wabash R. R. Co. v. Hencks, 91 111. 406; Chicago & 
 Alton R. Co. V. Bonifield, 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 493; Peoria & P. U. 
 R. Co. V. Clayberg, 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 356. 
 
 33 Augusta, etc., R. Co. v. McElmurry, 24 Ga. 75 ; Macon, etc., R. 
 Co. V. Davis, 27 Ga. 113; Central R. R. v. Gleason, 69 Ga. 200; 
 Campbell v. Railroad, 53 Ga. 488; Hendricks v. W. & A. E. Co., 52 
 Ga. 467; Louisville & Nashville E. E. Co. v. Fleming, 14 Lea (Tenn.) 
 128; 18 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 347; Railroad v. Walker, 11 Heisk. 383; 
 Beach, Con. Neg., p. 97. 
 
 84 Woodward, J., in Lake Shore & Northern E. R. v. Norton, 24 
 Pa. St. 465, 469. 
 
 36 Reeves v. Delaware, Lackawanna & W. R. Co., 30 Pa. St. 464 ; 
 Wilds V. Hudson River R. Co., 24 N. Y. 432; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. 
 Roney, 89 Ind. 453; Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Eighter, 42 N. J. L. 180; 
 
 635 
 
§ 452 COMPAKATIVE NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 § 452. Doctrine limited by late case in Georgia. — The 
 
 later decisions of the Supreme Court, in Georgia, seem to 
 indicate that the courts of that State have also found the 
 doctrine of comparative negligence impracticable, even as 
 administered in the qualified form in which they applied it. 
 In a recent case,*® wherein an employee of a railroad com- 
 pany sought to recover from his employer for an injury 
 
 Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Peavey, 29 Kan. 170; 11 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 
 260; Gothard v. E. E., 67 Ala. 114. 
 
 The rule, obtaining in Georgia, which allows a partial recovery 
 against a railroad company, notwithstanding the contributory negli- 
 gence of the plaintiff, or person injured, was held not to apply to 
 the case of an injury sustained by an employee, in East Tennessee 
 E. Co. y. Maloy, 77 Ga. 237; 2 S. E. Eep. 941; 31 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 352. 
 
 In Illinois, if a railroad employee sues for an injury, and it appears 
 that his own negligence contributed to effect the injury, he cannot 
 recover, unless his negligence was slight and that of defendant, gross, 
 in comparison. Illinois Central R. Co. v. Brookshire, 3 111. App. 225. 
 
 The rule of comparative negligence has also been recognized in 
 Oregon, in two eases, at least. Bequette v. People's Transportation 
 Co., 2 Oregon 200; Holstine v. Oregon, etc., E. Co., 8 Oregon 164. 
 
 " In an action for negligence causing death, contributory negligence 
 of deceased is no defense, if defendant was guilty of wanton or willful 
 misconduct, and he may be guilty of such misconduct without any 
 actual intention to inflict injury." Birmingham Ey., Light & Power 
 Co. V. Eyan (Ala. 1906), 41 So. Eep. 616. 
 
 "Rev. St. Fla. 1892 (§ 2345), provides that no person shall recover 
 damages from a railroad company for injury to himself or his property 
 where the same is done by his consent or is caused by his own negli- 
 gence; but if the complainant and the agents of the company are 
 both at fault, the former may recover, the damages to be diminised 
 by the jury in proportion to the amount of default attributable to 
 complainant. Beld that, while such section practically eliminates the 
 doctrine of contributory negligence, it does not entitle a complainant to 
 recover without proof that the particular negligence of which defend- 
 ant was at the time guilty was the proximate cause of the injury." 
 Bookman v. Seaboard Air Line Ey. (U. S. C. C. A., S. C, 1907), 152 
 Fed. Rep. 686. 
 
 38 Sanders v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co., 123 Ga. 763; 51 S. E. 
 Eep. 728. 
 
 636 
 
OOMPASATIVE IfEGLlGEliJ-CE. § 453 
 
 alleged to have been, received because of a breach of duty 
 toward him, on the part of the company, the court laid 
 down the rule that if the plaintiff was not free from fault 
 he could not recover, but to enable him to recover, the em- 
 ployer must have been guilty of negligence directly produc- 
 ing the injury and that if both parties were negligent, or if 
 both were free from fault, there would be no liability in the 
 case. This rule is more nearly in accord with the principles 
 which have been found most salutary, by the courts of both 
 England and America. 
 
 § 453. Plaintiff nrnst have exercised ordinary care, in Illi- 
 nois. — In Illinois, where the doctrine of comparative negli- 
 gence obtains, it is held that the rule cannot apply except 
 in cases where the injured person observed ordinary care 
 for his own safety and protection, with reference to the 
 particular circumstances involved.^'' 
 
 ■ If the plaintiff has sustained injury because of tie want 
 of ordinary care on his part, as this is held to be equiva- 
 lent to gross negligence, no recovery could be had, unless 
 the defendant had willfully inflicted the injury, since it is 
 an essential element to the right of action for injuries due 
 to the negligence of defendant, that the plaintiff must have 
 exercised ordinary care.^* 
 
 If a person voluntarily and unnecessarily places himself in 
 
 37 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Krueger, 23 III. App. 639; 124 111. 457; 
 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Daugherty, 12 111. App. 181; Illinois, etc., E. 
 Co. V. Neer, 26 111. App. 356; Gaj-dner v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 17 
 111. App. 262; Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Moran, 13 lU. App. 72; Chicago, 
 etc., E. Co. V. Thorston, 11 111. App. 631; Toledo, etc., E. Co. v. 
 Cline, 135 111. 41; 25 N. E. Eep. 846; 45 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 150; 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Johnson, 44 111. App. 56. 
 
 38 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Lee, 68 111. 576; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Colwell, 3 111. App. 545; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Johnson, 103 111. 513; 
 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 225; Union, etc., R. Co. v. Kallahr, 12 111. App. 
 400. 
 
 637 
 
§ 454 OOMPAEATlVi; NEGLlaENOE. 
 
 a well-known, place of danger and as a result sustains injury, 
 there can be no recovery, even for gross negligence on the 
 part of the defendant, in the absence of a willful or wanton 
 act, on the defendant's part.^" 
 
 The mere fact of running a train at a rate of speed for- 
 bidden by an ordinance, is usually held to constitute negli- 
 gence, yet if the injured party is himself at fault, he* 
 could not recover, unless, all the circumstances considered, 
 the defendant could be held guilty of a willful or wanton 
 act and the rate of speed alone would not be sufficient to 
 constitute such willfulness or wantonness,*" for to enable 
 the plaintiff to recover, oil the ground of mere negligence, as 
 distinct from the willful tort of the defendant, it must 
 appear that plaintiff himself exercised ordinary care and 
 if there is a want of ordinary care, on plaintiff's part, the 
 doctrine of comparative negligence does not apply. '^^ 
 
 § 454. Rule formerly obtained in Kansas. — In an early 
 
 decision in the State of Kansas,*^ the Supreme Court dis- 
 cussed the question of the different degrees of negligence at 
 some length and adopted the rule of comparative negli- 
 gence. The court held that it was not essential, for a party 
 to recover for an injury, that he should be entirely free 
 from negligence himself, but that if his own negligence 
 was slight and that of the defendant was gross, in com- 
 parison, he might recover, and that it would be a proper 
 issue of fact for the jury to determine the relative degree 
 of negligence or care that characterized the action of the 
 different parties to the cause.*® 
 
 89 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Beard, 49 111. App, 232. 
 
 *o Wabash, etc., E. Co. v. Weisbeck, 14 111. App. 525; Illinois, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Hetherington, 83 111. 516; Schmidt v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 
 83 111. 410; Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Henks, 91 111. 413. 
 
 *i Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Rogers, 17 111. App. 638. 
 
 *2 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Rollins, 5 Kansafe 167. 
 
 48 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Rollins, 5 Kansas 167. 
 
 638 
 
COmPaeative negligence. § 455 
 
 This rule, however, is not followed at the present day, in 
 that State, but the courts of Kansas, in common with the 
 courts of most of the other, States in the United States, 
 refuse to apply the doctrine of comparative negligence, but 
 hold that any degree of negligence on the part of the plain- 
 tiff will bar his recovery and that the essential elements of 
 the cause of action, must be shown to exist, as independent 
 entities, and not by any process of comparison of degrees, 
 on the part of the respective parties to the cause of action.** 
 
 § 455. Plaintiff's negligence " slight " and defendant's 
 " gross." — Under the rule of comparative negligence, al- 
 though both parties are at fault, the plaintiff may recover, 
 where it appears that his negligence is " slight " only, while 
 that of the defendant is " gross," *® as partial or slight neg- 
 ligence or inattention of the injured person will not defeat 
 a recovery, when the defendant was palpably negligent.*® 
 The words " gross " and " slight," as applied to the acts 
 constituting negligence, in such case's, are to a great degree 
 but relative terms and the determination of the question of 
 which of the two persons was the more negligent often de- 
 pends largely upon the acts of the other, as the comparison 
 of the negligence of the plaintiff, with that of the defendant, 
 is of the very essence of the rule.*"^ If the negligence of 
 
 ** Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Henry, 57 Kansas 154; 45 Pac. Rep. 576. 
 
 *5 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Gretzner, 46 111. 74; Illinois, etc., R. Co. 
 V. Simmons, 38 111. 242; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Lee, 68 111. 576; 
 Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Evans, 88 111. 63; 21 Am. Ry. Rep. 284; 
 Stratton v. Central City R. Co., 95 111. 25; 1 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 115. 
 
 lo Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Sullivan, 63 111. 293; Lake Shore, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Berlink, 2 111. App. 427. 
 
 *T Moody V. Peterson, 11 111. App. 180; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. 
 O'Connor, 13 111. App. 62; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Mason, 27 111. App. 
 450; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Krueger, 124 111. 457; Chicago, etc., R. 
 Co. V. Clark, 70 111. 276; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Harwood, 90 111. 
 425; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Johnson. 116 111. 206; 4 N. E. Rep. 381. 
 
 639 
 
§ 456 COMPABATIVE NEGLIGENCE. 
 
 the injured party has contributed to the injury, he cannot 
 recover, unless his negligence was no greater than that de- 
 fined by the law as " slight " negligence, while that of the 
 defendant was " gross." ** It is not sufficient that the de- 
 fendant was guilty of a greater degree of negligence than 
 that of the plaintiff as a mere preponderance of negligence, 
 on defendant's part, will not authorize a recovery.*® Plain- 
 tiff cannot recover, unless his negligence is " slight," as com- 
 pared with that of the defendant, or unless the negligence 
 of the defendant clearly exceeds that of the plaintiff."" 
 
 § 456. When both parties equally negligent. — If the mu- 
 tual negligence producing the injury is equal or nearly so, or 
 that of the plaintiff is greater than that of the defendant, 
 the plaintiff cannot recover of the defendant for the injury 
 sustained by him,"^ for in order to entitle a negligent 
 person to recover of another for an injury that his negli- 
 gence in part contributed to produce, there must be a dis- 
 parity between his own wrongful act and that of the de- 
 fendant."^ 
 
 Where both the plaintiff and the defendant are guilty of 
 gross negligence, no recovery can be had, and it is error 
 for the court to modify this rule where there are no circum- 
 stances sufficient to justify such modification, for in cases of 
 
 *8 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Avery, 8 111. App. 133; Chicago, etc., E. Co. 
 V. Dillon, 17 111. App. 355; Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Spencer, 66 III. 528. 
 
 *» Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Van Patten, 64 111. 510; Schmidt v. 
 Chicago, etc., E. Co., 83 111. 405; Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Goddard 72 
 111. 567. 
 
 so Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Clark, 70 111. 276 ; Chicago etc., E. Co. v. 
 Dunn, 52 111. 451; St. Louis, etc., E. Co. v. Britz, 72 111. 256. 
 
 51 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Murray, 62 111. 326 ; 7 Am. Ey. Eep. 308 ; 
 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Payne, 49 111. 499; Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. 
 Lee, 68 111. 576. 
 
 oaParmelee v. Farro, 22 111. App. 467; Chicago, etc., B. Co. v. 
 Payne, 49 111. 499. 
 640 
 
OOMfAEATiVE NEGLIGENCE. §§457,458 
 
 mutual negligence the plaintiff cannot recover, merely be- 
 cause there may have been a greater degree of negligence 
 on the defendant's part.®* 
 
 § 457. In case of injuries to passengers. — In jurisdictions 
 ■where the rule of comparative negligence is applied, it is 
 applicable to a suit for damages by a passenger, against 
 the carrier, and if the negligence of the passenger was slight, 
 as compared with that of the carrier, he is held entitled to 
 recover for such an injury. ^'^ 
 
 In one case, where a passenger permitted his arm to rest 
 on the base of the window and protrude out of the window 
 and his arm was broken by striking stationary freight cars, 
 passed by the coach in which he was riding, it was held that 
 as his negligence was slight as compared with that of the 
 railroad company in leaving the cars, where they were apt 
 to be struck by the coach, or by passengers thereon, a 
 verdict for the plaintiff was sustained, under this rule of 
 comparative negligence. ®® And it is held, in Illinois, where 
 a jury has found, from the evidence in a case, that the negli- 
 gence of the passenger was slight and that of the company 
 was gross, the Appellate Court will not look into the evi- 
 dence, to see if this result was properly arrived at, as the 
 finding of the jury is held to be conclusive on the Appellate 
 Court, on issues of fact.®® 
 
 § 458. Injuries at highway crossings. — In States where 
 
 B3 Illinois, etc., E. Co. v. Baches, 55 111. 379; 1 Am. Ey. Eep. 585; 
 South, etc., Alabama E. Co. v. Sullivan, 59 Ala. 272; Indianapolis, etc., 
 E. Co. V. Evans, 88 111. 63; Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Mock, 72 111. 141. 
 
 64 Galena, etc., E. Co. v. Fay, 16 111. 558 ; Lake Shore, etc., E. Co. v. 
 Brown, 123 111.. 162; 14 N. E. Eep. 197; 31 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 61. 
 
 B5 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Pondrom, 51 111. 333, distinguished in 
 Georgia, etc., E. Co. v. Underwood, 90 Ala. 49; Manly v. Wilmington, 
 etc., E. Co., 74 N. Car. 655. 
 
 B6 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Bonafleld, 104 111. 223; 8 Am. & Eng. B. 
 Cas. 493. 
 
 1-41 641 
 
§ 459 COMPARATIVE JSTEGLlGENCE. 
 
 the rule of comparative negligence obtains, if a person, in- 
 jured at a highway crossing by a train, has failed to adopt 
 some slight precautions for his safety in approaching the 
 crossing, and the railroad company has omitted all care on 
 its part, to avoid the collision, the plaintiff vyill not be denied 
 a recovery.^'' 
 
 Accordingly, if a person approaches a crossing without 
 looking for a train, but the crossing is in plain sight of the 
 operators of the engine for a distance sufficient for them 
 to have stopped the train and avoid the collision, but the 
 train approaches the crossing at a high rate of speed, a find- 
 ing that plaintiff was only slightly negligent, while de- 
 fendant was grossly negligent, will not be interfered with, 
 on appeal.^* 
 
 Of course this rule would not be countenanced in a State 
 where such an inconsistent rule does not obtain, because it is 
 held to be as much the imperative duty of the traveler to look 
 out for the train, as it is for the operatives of the train to 
 watch for travelers at crossings, and it is placing a premium 
 upon negligence of the traveler to permit a recovery for his 
 negligence, because he could not see a train, approaching 
 on the fixed rails of the track, itself a signal of danger, and 
 yet hold that the railroad employees ought to have seen the 
 individual who happened to be at the crossing ^hen the 
 train arrived there, in time to have avoided the injury, not- 
 . withstanding his negligence. 
 
 § 459. Instructions as to comparative negli|^ence. — The 
 
 basic principle of the rule of comparative negligence being 
 the comparison of the negligence of the injured person with 
 
 BT Wabash E. Co. v. Wallace, 110 111. 114; 19 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 359. 
 
 68 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Still, 19 111. 499 ; disapproved in South, 
 etc., E. Co. V. Sullivan, 59 Ala. 272; Wabash, etc., E. Co. v. Henks, 
 91 111.. 406. 
 
 642 
 
eOMiPAEATtVE NEGLIqeNCE. | 459 
 
 that of the alleged wrongdoer, the court should advise the 
 jury, by appropriate instruction, that although the plaintiff 
 was guilty of some negligence, yet, if the defendant was 
 grossly negligent and if the plaintiff's negligence was slight, 
 as compared with that of the defendant, a verdict for the 
 plaintiff should be returned. ®® It is erroneous to omit the 
 element of comparison and to simply advise the jury .that if 
 the defendant was more negligent than the plaintiff, the 
 latter is entitled to recover, or that the plaintiff may recover, 
 if his negligence was slight, in comparison with that of the 
 defendant, as the charge should advise the jury that the 
 plaintiff is only entitled to recover, if the negligence of the 
 plaintiff was slight and that of the defendant was gross, 
 in comparison therewith.^" 
 
 Both of the essentials of the action, under the rule of com- 
 parative negligence, i. e., the slightness of the plaintiff's 
 negligence aUd the grossness of the defendant's negligence, 
 as ascertained by comparison, should be embraced in the 
 charge to the jury,®^ and if either element is omitted, it is 
 error, as where the jury were told that a verdict for the plain- 
 tiff should be returned, if the defendant, after discovery of 
 the plaintiff's child, in a position of danger, although placed 
 in such position by the negligence of the plaintiff, might 
 have avoided the injury, by the exercise of ordinary care, 
 as this permitted a recovery, although plaintiff was negligent 
 if the defendant was guilty of a lack of ordinary care only, 
 instead of a gross act of negligence.®^ 
 
 Bs Chicago v. Stearns, 105 111. 554. 
 
 CO Wabash R. Co. v. Jones, 5 111. App. 607 ; Indianapolis, etc., R. 
 Co. V. Evans, 88 111. 63; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Mason, 27 111. App. 
 450i 
 
 «i Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Harwood, 90 111. 425. 
 
 62 Moody V. Peterson, 11 111. App. 180; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Avery, 8 111. App. 133; 1 Thompson on Negligence, § 282, pp. 265, 266. 
 
 The trial court cannot be held guilty of error for a failure to instruct 
 
 643 
 
§ 460 .COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, 
 
 § 460. Comparative negligence generally a juiy issue. — 
 In tte few States where the confusing doctrine of compara- 
 tive negligence obtains, it is generally held to be an issue 
 of fact, for the jury to decide, after comparison of the acts 
 of the injured person and those of the defendant, whether 
 the injured person was guilty of slight negligence and the 
 defendant of gross negligence, in comparison.®^ This would 
 necessarily be the true rule, for while the definition of neg- 
 ligence is a function for the court, whether in States where 
 degrees are recognized or in those jurisdictions where all 
 degrees of negligence is discarded, the ascertainment of the 
 ultimate fact of whether or not the acts of the defendant 
 are such as to come within the definition of the term, is an 
 issuable fact, and the rule is not different where the theory 
 of comparison and striking a balance by deducting the neg- 
 ligence of the injured person from that of the defendant, 
 obtains, for in both instances, the existence of the original 
 or remaining quantity depends upon the facts in evidence. 
 
 upon the rule of eomparative negligence, in the absence of a request 
 for such an instruction. Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. O'Connor, 119 111. 
 586; 9 N. E. Eep. 263. 
 
 03 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Warner, 123 111. 38 1 14 N. E. Rep. 206; 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Pietsahxn, 123 111. 518; 15 N. B. Eep. 169; 
 1 Thompson on Negligence, § 283, p. 267. 
 
 644 
 
OHAPTEE XVIII. 
 
 COEMPLOYEES AT COMMOIT LAW. 
 
 461. Rule of nonliability for negligence of. 
 
 462. Reason for the rule. 
 
 463. Conflict of laws regarding. 
 
 464. Negligence of coemployee an assumed risk. 
 
 465. Scope and extent of the rule. 
 
 466. Volunteer subject to rule. 
 
 467. Illustrations of rule — Erecting seaflfolds, repairing bridges, etc. 
 
 468. Negligent operation of engine. 
 
 469. Collisions between trains and cars. 
 
 470. Limitations upon rule of nonliability for- ooemployee's neglect. 
 
 471. Company's negligence concurring to produce injury. 
 
 472. Vice-principal's negligence not assumed. 
 
 473. Character of act determines employer's liability. 
 
 474. Promises or assurances of vice-principal. 
 
 475. Notice to vice-principal, notice to employer. 
 
 476. Dual capacity doctrine. 
 
 477. The department doctrine. 
 
 478. Objections to the department doetrins. 
 
 479. Employees in separate departments. 
 
 480. Employees in Same department. 
 
 481. Employees of different companies. 
 
 482. Injuries due to incompetency of employees. 
 
 483. Liability for retraition of incompetent or intemperate employees. 
 
 484. Who generally deemed coemployees. 
 
 485. Nature of service the proper test. 
 
 486. Division superintendent, road-master and other division officers. 
 
 487. Employees upon different railroad trains. 
 
 488. Train despatcher and other employees. 
 
 489. Local telegraph operator and other trainmen. 
 
 490. Switchmen, track repairers and trainmen. 
 
 491. Condiactors and other employees. 
 
 492. Engineer and other employees on same train. 
 
 493. Yardmen, switchmen and other employees. 
 
 494. Statu? of car inspectors and repairers. 
 
 645 
 
§ 461 COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. 
 
 § 495. Section foreman and section men. 
 
 496. Flagman and trainmen. 
 
 497. Pullman conductor and porter. 
 
 498. Track repairers and trainmen. 
 
 499. Station agent and other railway employees. 
 
 500. Status of various other employees, in different departments. 
 
 § 461. Rule of nonliability for negligence of. — By a very 
 well considered and generally followed English decision/ 
 the salutary rule of the common law was early recognized 
 to be that where an employer has used due diligence in the 
 selection of competent employees and has furnished them 
 with a reasonably safe means and place to perform the service 
 for which they are engaged, he has performed the full meas- 
 ure of his legal obligations toward them and is not answerable 
 to one of his employees for a subsequent injury received by 
 him, in consequence of the carelessness of another employee, 
 when both are engaged in the same service. 
 
 Wherever the English common law obtains, this rule has 
 followed as a part of the common law and in the absence of 
 a statute changing the rule of nonliability for an injury due 
 to the negligence of a coemployee, the employer is very gen- 
 erally held not to be liable for such an injury. In jurisdic- 
 tions where the common law obtains, therefore, in an ac- 
 tion against a railroad company, for personal injuries, the 
 plaintiff is not entitled to recover, where the only evidence 
 of the injury is of one resulting from the negligence of the 
 plaintiff's fellow employee, not representing the corporation 
 at the time.* 
 
 This rule has been followed and applied in actions by 
 
 1 Priestley v. Fowler, 3 M. & W. 1. 
 
 zHanley v. Grand Trunk E. Co., 62 N. H. 274; Crispin v. Babbitt, 
 81 N. y. 516; Warner v. Erie R. Co., 39 N. Y. 468; Hard v. Vermont 
 R. Co., 32 Vt. 473; Neubauer v. New York, etc., R. Co., 101 N. Y. 
 607; 4 N. E. Rep. 125; Grattis v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 153 Mo. 380; 
 55 S. -W. Rep. 108; 77 Am. St. Rep. 721; 48 L. R. A. 399. 
 646 
 
CSOEMPLOTEES AT. COMMON LAW. § 461 
 
 employees against railroad companies, for injuries sustained 
 through the negligence of a coemployee, in! England ^ and 
 both in the Federal * and State courts ^ in the United 
 States. 
 
 3 Vose V. Lancashire, etc., K. Co., 2 H. & N. 728; 4 Jur. N. S. 364; 
 24 L. J. Ex. 249; Hutchinson v. York, etc., E. Co., 5 Ex. 343; 19 
 L. J. Ex. 296; 6 Ry. Cas. 580. 
 
 * Gravelle v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co., 3 McCrary 352 ; 10 Fed. Rep. 
 711; Dillon v. Union Pacific H. Co., 3 Dill. (U. S.) 319; Maryland v. 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 1 Hughes (U. S.) 337; Toten v. Pennsylvania 
 E. Co., 11 Fed. Rep. 564; Crews v. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 20 Fed. Rep. 
 87; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v.' Ross, 112 U. S. 377; 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 184; 
 28 L. Ed. 787; Randall v. Bp,ltimore, etc., R. Co., 1.09 U. S. 478; 3 Sup. 
 Ct. Rep. 322; 27 L. Ed. 1003; Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Herbert, 116 
 U. S. 642; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 590; 29 L. Ed. 755; Baltimore, etc., R. 
 Co. V. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368; 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 9,14; 37 L. Ed. 772; 
 Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Hambly, 154 U. S. 349; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 983; 38 L. Ed. 1009; Central R. Co. v. Keegan, 160 U. S. 259; 16 
 Sup. Ct. Eep. 269; 40 L. Ed. 418; Northern Pacific E. Co. v. Peterson, 
 162 U. S. 346; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 843; 40 L. Ed. 994; Northern Pacific 
 R. Co. V. Porter, 167 U. S. 48; 17 Sup. Ct. Eep. 741; 42 L. Ed. 72; 
 New England E. Co. v. Conroy, 175 U. S. 323; 44 L. Ed. 181. 
 
 "Alabama, etc., E. Co. t. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126; 11 So. Rep. 803; 
 Smoot V. Mobile, etc., R. Co., 67 Ala. 13; Mobile, etc., E. Co. v. Smith, 
 59 Ala. 245; St. Louis, etc., E. Co. v. Triplett, 54 Ark. 289; 15 S. W. 
 Eep. 831; 48 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 283; Little Eoek, etc., E. Co. v. 
 Duffey, 35 Ark. 602; 4 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 637; Long v. Coronado 
 E. Co., 96 Cal. 269; 31 Pac. Eep. 170; Congrave v. Southern Pacific 
 R. Co., 88 Cal. 360; 26 Pac. Rep. 175; 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 337; 
 Colorado, etc., R. Co. v. Ogden, 3 Colo. 499; Summerhays v. Kansas 
 Pacific R. Co., 2 Colo. 484; 20 Am. Ry. Rep. 359; Herbert v. Northern 
 Pacific E. Co., 3 Dakota 38 ; 13 N. W. Eep. 349 ; 8 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 
 85; Parrish v. Pensacola, etc., E. Co., 28 Fla. 251; 9 So. Eep. 696; 
 Stafford v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 114 111. 244; 2 N. E. Eep. 185; 
 Justice V. Pennsylvania E. Co., 130 Ind. 321; 30 N. E. Rep. 303; 53 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 604; Bogard v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 100 Ind. 
 ■491; Hunt v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 26 Iowa 363; Theleman v. Mueller, 
 73 Iowa 108; 34 N. W. Rep. 765; Kansas Pacific R. Co. v. Salmon, 
 11 Kansas 83; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Collins, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 114; 
 Coffman v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 18 S. W. Rep. 1012; Cassidy v. 
 Maine Central R. Co., 76 Me. 488; 17 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 519; 
 Shauck V, Northern Central R. Co., 25 Md. 462; Fitzgerald v. Boston, 
 
§ 462! COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. 
 
 § 4:62. Reason for the rule. — The rule respondeat superior 
 only applies to actions sounding in tort, not to those arising 
 from the relation of employer and employee, as this is a con- 
 tractual relation. In actions by third persons, for injuries 
 due to the negligence of an employee, acting within the scope 
 of his employment, the employer is liable, if at all, upon the 
 theory of an implied agency on the part of the negligent em- 
 ployee, but this rule does not obtain, in the case of an injury 
 to another employee in the common service.^ 
 
 etc., R. Co., 156 Mass. 293; 31 N. B. Eep. 7; O'Brien v. Boston, etc., 
 E. Co., 138 Mass.. 387; 52 Am. Eep. 279; Hunn v. Michigan, etc., E. 
 Co., 78 Mich. 513; 44 N. W. Eep. 502; 7* L. E. A. 500; Peterson v. 
 Chicago, etc., E. Co., 67 Mich. 102; 34 N. W. Eep. 260; 31 Am. & 
 Bng. R. Cas. 292; Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Petty, 67 Miss. 255; 7 
 So. Eep. 351; 41 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 444; Thorpe v. Missouri Pacific 
 Ey. Co., 89 Mo. 650; 2 S. W. Eep. 3; Dixon v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 
 104 Mo. 413; 16 S. W. Eep. 409; 109 Mo. 413; 19 S. W. Eep. 412; " 
 53 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 589; Grattis v. Kansas City, etc., E. Co., 153 
 Mo. 380; 55 S. W. Eep. 108; 77 Am. St. Rep. 721; 48 L. E. A. 399; 
 Harrison v. Central E. Co., 31 N. J. L. 293; Lutz v. Atlantic, etc., E. 
 Co. (N. M.), 30 Pac. Eep. 912; 53 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 478; Donnelly 
 V. Brooklyn, etc., E. Co., 109 N. Y. 16; 16 N. E. Rep. 733; 34 Am. & 
 Bng. E. Cas. 103; Hobbs v. Atlantic, etc., E. Co., 107 N. C. 1; 12 
 S. E. Eep. 124; Ell v. Northern Pacific E. Co., 1 N. Dakota 336; 
 48 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 318; Little Miami E. Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 42 
 Ohio St. 318; Anderson v. Bennett, 16 Oregon 515; 19 Pac. Rep. 765; 
 8 Am. St. Rep. 311; 38 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 87; Johnston v. Pittsburg, 
 etc., E. Co., 114 Pa. St. 443; 7 Atl. Eep. 184; Boatright v. North- 
 eastern E. Co., 25 So. Car. 128; Gates v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 2 S. 
 Dakota 422; 50 N. W. Eep. 907; 53 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 245; Gulf, 
 etc., E. Co. V. Blohn, 73 Texas 637; 11 S. W. Eep. 867; 4 L. R. A. 
 764; Beuhring v. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co., 37 W. Va. 502; 16 S. E. 
 Rep. 435; Dwyer v. American Express Co., 82 Wis. 307; 52 N. W. 
 Rep. 304; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 612; Peschel v. Chicago, etc., R. 
 Co., 62 Wis. 338; 21 N. W. Eep. 269; 17 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 545. 
 
 " The fellow-servant rule is recognized and enforced as a part of 
 the common law." Southern Ey. Co. v. Elliott (Ind.), 82 N. E. Eep. 
 1051; transferred from Appellate Court, 81 N. E. Eep. 1180. 
 
 « Ohio, etc., E. Co. v. Hammersley, 28 Ind. 371 ; Chicago, etc., R. 
 Co. V. Hoyt, 16 111. App. 237, 
 
 643 
 
COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. § 463 
 
 Among employees of the same class, no one of them, as 
 between himself and his equals, is the employer's agent and 
 the employer is not liable to one employee for injuries aris- 
 ing from the wrongful acts or omissions of another employee 
 of the same class, although each of the given employees 
 would be held to be the agent of the employer, were the 
 action by a third party.'' The different employees are rather 
 regarded as the agents of each other, in the work of ac- 
 complishing the common service and the negligence of one, 
 because of this implied agency, will be imputed to the 
 injured employee, so to speak, so that no. responsibility for 
 the unauthorized wrongful act -exists on the part of the em- 
 ployer.® 
 
 Hence, it is that in an action by an employee against his 
 employer, for an injury due to the act of a coemployee, the 
 suit must be based on the actual negligence of the employer 
 or of some employee representing him who is held in law 
 to personate him in the doing of the wrongful act. And 
 where the business of the employer requires the services 
 of a large number of employees, beyond the possible constant 
 supervision of either the employer or his representative, he 
 cannot be held negligent unless in the failure to use rea- ■ 
 sonable care in choosing his employees or representatives, or 
 in failing to use reasonable care to guard against such 
 perils of the employment as he might reasonably have appre- 
 hended would occur. ^ 
 
 § 463. Conflict of laws regarding. — It may be stated as 
 
 7 Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Collins (Ky.), 2 Duv. 114; Chicago, etc., 
 E. Co. V. Eoss, 112 U. S. 377; Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Biooks, 83 
 Ky. 129; Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Cavens, 9 Bush. (Ky.) 5*59. 
 
 8 Casey v. Louisville, etc., E. Co., 84 Ky. 79; Louisville, etc., E. Co. 
 V. Cavens, 9 Bush. (Ky.) 559. 
 
 9 Smith v. Potter, 46 Mich. 258; 9 N. W. Eep. 273; 2 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Qas. 140, 
 
 649 
 
§ 463 COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. 
 
 a generally accepted proposition, sustained both by principle 
 and authority, that the common-law rule, as interpreted by 
 the courts of a State, in which a given transaction had. its 
 situs, will be applied in another State, where the cause of 
 action is pending, although the rule of law may be differently 
 applied in the forum, as to causes of action -having their 
 origin in that State, unless the enforcement of the lex loci 
 is opposed to the public policy of the forum. ^" The reason 
 for this rule is manifest, for if the courts of the different 
 States are to give force to their own precedents in determin- 
 ing what the rule of the common law is, then it operates to 
 subject the transaction to a rule other than that which ob- 
 tained at its situs, and hence, the substantive rights of the 
 parties may vary according to the jurisdiction where the 
 action happens to be brought. ■* ^ 
 
 In accordance with this rule, the courts have very gen- 
 erally agreed that precedents established by the decisions 
 of the courts in a State where an injury happened, upon 
 questions of who are coemployees, will be followed, although 
 the issue turned upon the rules of the common law, as inter- 
 preted in the given States.-** Of course this rule does not 
 
 loForepaugli v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 128 Pa. St. 217; 18 Atl. 
 Eep. 503; 15 Am. St. Rep. 672; 5 L. R. A. 508; Limerick Bank v. 
 Howard, 71 N. H. 13; 51 Atl. Rep. 641; 93 Am. St. Rep. 489; Roe 
 V. Jerome, 18 Conn. 158; Tollman Co. v. Reed, 115 Mich. 71; 72 N. W. 
 Rep. 1104; Inge v. Murphy, 10 Ala. 885; Fogarty v. St. Louis Transfer 
 Co., 180 Mo. 490; 79 S. W. Rep. 664; Lee v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 
 195 Mo. 400; 92 S. W. Rep. 614; Walsh v. New York, etc., R. Co., 
 160 Mass. 571; 36 N. E. Rep. 584; 39 Am. St. Rep. 514; Brewster v. 
 Chicago, etc., E. Co., 114 Iowa 144; 86 N. W. Rep. 221; 89 Am. St. 
 Rep. 348; Helton v. Alabama Midland R. Co., 97 Ala. 275; 12 So. Rep. 
 276; Alexander v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 48 Ohio St. 623; 30 N. E. 
 Rep. 69; 'Turner v. St. Clair Tunnel Co., Ill Mich. 578; 70 N. W. 
 Eep. 146; 66 Am. St. Rep. 397; 36 L. R. A. 134. 
 
 11 Limerick Bank v. Howard, 71 N, H. 13; 51 Atl. Rep. 641; 93 
 Am. St. Rep. 489; Forepaugh v. Delaware, etc., E. Co., 128 Pa. Pt. 217; 
 18 Atl. Eep. 503; 15 Am. St. Eep. 672; 5 L. R. A. 508. 
 
 12 Walsh V. New York, etc., R. Co., 160 Mass. 571; 36 N. E. Rep. 
 
 650 
 
COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. § 463 
 
 ottam in the federal courts, as to Cases falling within their 
 original jurisdiction, for in the federal courts, regardless 
 of the rules in the States as to who are coemployees, the rule 
 of the common law, as applied in the federal courts, is ap- 
 plied.^* Nor is the rule, as stated above, of universal ap- 
 plication, even in the State courts, as the court of Missouri, 
 in a recent opinion,^* and the Supreme Court of Georgia,^® 
 refused to follow this generally accepted rule, as to who 
 are coemployees, according to the law of the place of the 
 accident, but determined the question according to the law 
 of the State where the action was tried. These cases, how- 
 ever, admit that the rule prescribed by statute law of the 
 State of the accident, would control, in all other jurisdic- 
 tions, although this is but "the written law, in another form, 
 and that it would defer in other matters to the rules of law 
 of the States where the transaction had its situs,; but pushed 
 to its legitimate extreme, if the rules followed in the two 
 States noted were to be generally followed, it would cause 
 untold confusion in the decisions and as stated by the New 
 Hampshire court, in a well-considered case,^® " while it is 
 doubtless competent for the Supreme Court of the United 
 States to determine the law governing the interpretation of 
 
 584; 39 Am. St. Rep. 514; Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Tuite, 44 111. App. 
 535; Voshefsky v. Hillside Coal Co., 21 App. Div. 168; 47 N. Y. Supp. 
 386; Alexander v. Pennsylvania K. Co., 48 Ohio St. 623; 30 N. E. 
 Eep. 69; Nashville, etc., E. Co. v. Foster, 10 Lea (Tenn.) 351; Bingarten 
 V. Illinois, etc., Co., 94 Wis. 70; 68 N. W. Eep. 664; 59 Am. St. Eep. 
 859; 34 L. E. A. 503. 
 
 13 Hough V. Texas, etc., E. Co., 100 U. S. 213, 226; 25 L.^Ed. 618. 
 
 iiEoot V. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 195 Mo. 348; 92 S. W. Rep. 
 621; 6 L. E. A. (N. S.) 212. But see, to contrary, in same State, 
 Fogarty v. St. Louis Transfer Co., 180 Mo. 490; 79 S. W. Eep. 664. 
 
 iBKrogg V. Atlanta, etc., E. Co., 77 Ga. 207; 4 Am. St. Eep. 79. 
 But to contrary, in same State, see the earlier well-considered case 
 of Atlanta, etc., E. Co. v. Tanner, 68 Ga. 384. 
 
 "Limerick Bank v. Howard, 71 N. H. 13; 51 Atl. Eep. 641; '93 
 Am. St. Rep. 489. 
 
 651 
 
§ 463 - COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. 
 
 Vermont contracts, without regard to the decisions applica- 
 ble in that State, it would be little less than usurpation for 
 a court of New Hampshire to decide what, in its opinion, 
 ought to be the commercial law of Vermont." It is to be 
 regretted that the courts of any State would depart from 
 such a well settled rule of law as that established by the 
 
 For learned discussion of the cases opposed to the decision in that 
 case, the note by the editor to Root v. Kansas City, etc, R. Co. (195 
 Mo. 348 J 92 8. W. Rep. 621), as reported in 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) may be 
 profitably read. 
 
 In the still more recent case of Rahm v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. 
 (108 S. W. Rep. 370), a well-considered case by the Kansas City Court 
 of Appeals, Judge Johnson, said: 
 
 " The rule is settled in this State that ' in a transitory common-law 
 action, where suit is brought in a State other than where the injury 
 happened, the interpretation of the common law obtaining in the 
 State where the cause of action accrued, the lex loci will govern.' 
 Root V. Railway, 195 Mo. 348; 92 S. W. 621; 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 212. 
 Recently, in the case of Chandler v. Railway (Mo. App.), 106 8. W. 
 Rep. 553, we had this precise question before us. 
 
 " In our discussion of the subject now under consideration, we said, 
 in part : ' The vital question is, did plaintiff have a cause of action 
 in the Indian Territory which the courts of that jurisdiction, under 
 their view of the law, would enforce? If he had no cause of action 
 there, certainly he could not acquire one by entering this State. If 
 naked when Ke came to our border, the mere act of stepping over an 
 imaginary line would not clothe him. His cause of action must be 
 measured not by' our own standard, but by that fixed by the rules 
 and principles recognized by the courts of the place where he was 
 injured. If there is no law giving him a right of action in the 
 place where the alleged wrongful act was committed, no action 
 can be maintained here, though the laws of this State would have 
 given him a right of action had the same acts been committed 
 without our boundaries. To hold otherwise would be to say that 
 one State could prescribe rules, no matter how arbitrary, to govern 
 persons and things in another State, and thus contravene the funda- 
 mental principles maintained by all nations that every independent 
 State has an exclusive right to regulate persons and things within its 
 own territorial limits, and that the laws of the State or country ' can 
 have no intrinsic force propria vigore except within the territprjal 
 limits and jurisdiction of that country.' " 
 
 652 
 
COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. § 464 
 
 precedents of the best considered cases of the different State 
 courts, upon this subject. 
 
 § 464. N^ligence of coemployee an assumed risk.— An 
 employer is not liable to his employee for injuries occa?» 
 sioned by the negligence of a coemployee, in the course of 
 their common employment, provided the employer exercised 
 reasonable care in the employment and retention of the 
 n^ligent employee and he is a person of competent skill and 
 care, because when the injured employee engaged in the 
 service of the employer he undertook, as between himself and 
 the employer, to incur all the ordinary and incidental risks 
 of the service, which includes, in law, the negligence of his 
 coemployees in the same employment.^ "^ 
 
 As between the employer and his employees, there is no 
 implied contract of guaranty of the care and diligence that 
 the different employees shall observe toward each other, but 
 each must observe for himself the risks of the business re- 
 sulting from the negligence of ordinarily careful employees 
 and guard himself accordingly.^^ 
 
 Employees standing in the relation to each other as co- 
 employees are alone »responsible for injuries occasioned by 
 one to the other ^^ and if an employee of mature years and 
 ordinary intelligence and experience, on being directed to do 
 
 f Smoot V. Mobile, ete., R. Co., 67 Ala. 13 ; St. Louis, etc., E. Co. 
 V. Triplett, 54 Ark. 289; 15 S. W. Rep. 831^.48 Anj. & Bag. R. Cas. 
 283; Brodeur v. Valley Falls E. Co., 16 E. I. 448; 17 Atl. Rep. 55; 
 Schaub V. Hannibal, ete., E. Co., 106 Mo. 74; 16 S. W. Eep, 924; 
 Darrigan v. New York, etc., E. Co., 52 Conn. 285; Carlson v. Oregon, 
 etc., E. Co., 21 Oregon 450; Miller v. Southern Pacific E. Co., 20 
 Oregon 285; 26 Pac. Eep. 70; 48 Am. & Eag. E. Cas. 294. 
 
 18 Moss V. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 49 Mo. 167; 1 Am. Ry. Eep. 
 576; Sizer v. Syracuse, etc., E. Co., 7 Lans. (N. Y.) 67, 
 
 19 Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Keary, 3 Ohio St. 201 ; Pullman Palace 
 Car Co. v. Laack, 143 111. 242; 32 N. E. Rep. 285*; O'Couneli v. Balti- 
 more, etc., R. Co., 20 Md. 212. 
 
 653 
 
§465 COEMl*LOYEES A* COMMON LAW. 
 
 a temporary piece of work outside the scope of the regular 
 duties he was engaged to perform, and while obeying the or- 
 der, without objection on his part, is injured, because of his 
 own want of knowledge, skill or experience in the given serv- 
 ice, by the negligent act of a coemployee, there is no resulting 
 liability on the part of the employer, but the risk was one 
 assumed by the injured employee.^" 
 
 § 465. Scope and extent of the rule. — The rule of non- 
 liability for the acts of an employee, by which a coemployee 
 sustains injury, is not extended beyond acts received while 
 the negligent employee was in the performance of some duty 
 or his omission to perform some act, made his duty to per- 
 form, by the employer.^^ Where an employee of a railroad 
 company is injured by the negligence of another employee 
 in running a train, the employer is only liable for a failure 
 to exercise ordinary care in the employment of such em- 
 ployee,^^ and if the negligence of the injured employee con- 
 
 20 Cole V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 71 Wis. 114; 37 N. W. Rep. 84; 
 5 Am: St. Rep. 201; 33 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 271; Hogan v. Northern 
 Pacific R. Co., 53 Fed. Rep. 519; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 384. 
 
 The slipping of a maul from the hand of a fellow-workman, by 
 which the plaintiff is struck and injured, is an inevitable accident, for 
 which the employer is not liable. Wright v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 
 119 111. App. 132. 
 
 The common-law rule obtains in Oklahoma and an employee cannot 
 recover from the employer for an injury due solely to the negligence 
 of a coemployee. Mollhofif v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 82 Pac. 
 Rep. 733. 
 
 " A common-law employer was not responsible to an employee for 
 the negligent acts of another employee exercising superintendence in 
 the management and detail of the work, such person being deemed 
 a fellow .workman.'' Chisholm v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 101 N. Y. S. 622. 
 
 aiSlatterly v. New York, etc., R. Co., 21 N. Y. S. R. 552; 51 Hun 
 638; 4 N. Y. Supp. 910; Yeamans v. Contra Costa Steam, etc., Co., 
 44 Cai. 71; Gates v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 2 S. Dakota 422; 50 N. W. 
 Rep. 907; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 245. 
 
 22 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Ruby, 38 Ind. 294 ; 10 Am. Ey. Rep. 199. 
 654 
 
ooEMPLoifEts AT Common law. ^ 1 466 
 
 curred to produce thie injury, the rule would not be differ- 
 ent.^* The rule is not affected by the fact of the minority 
 of the injured employee, and where tlie injured person, was, 
 at the time of his injury, in the employment of a railroad 
 company and his injury resulted from his own and~ the 
 negligence of a coemployee, his employer is not liable for the 
 injury.^* Nor is the relation affected by the fact that the 
 duties being performed, at the time of the injury, were in 
 violation of a Sunday law of the State where the labor was 
 rendered, as this would not affect the employee's common-law 
 contract of assumption of the risk of a competent employee's 
 negligence.^® 
 
 § 466. Volunteer subject to rule. — If a person undertakes 
 voluntarily to perform services for a railroad company, and 
 an agent of the company assents to the performance of the 
 labor-, the volunteer stands in the relation of an employee 
 while so engaged and the rule of nonliability on the employ- 
 er's part, for an injury occasioned by the negligence of a 
 fellow employee in the course of the common employment, 
 applies to such volunteer.^® 
 
 23Eenfro v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 86 Mo. 302; Chicago, etc., E. Co. 
 V. Snyder, 117 111. 376; 18 111. App. 640; 7 N. E. Rep. 604; 28 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 611; Capper v. Louisville, etc., E. Co., 103 Ind. 305; 
 2 N. E. Rep. 749; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 525. 
 
 21 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Harney, 28 Ind. 28; Fisk v. Central Pacific 
 R. Co., 72 Cal. 38; 13 Pac. Rep. 144; Johnson v. Richmond, etc., R. 
 Co., 84 Va. 713; 5 S. E. Rep. 707; Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Miller, 
 51 Texas 270; Gaftland v. Toledo, etc., R. Co., 67 HI. 498; King 
 V. Boston, etc., R. Co., 9 Gush. (Mass.) 1,12. 
 
 25 Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Rider, 67 Texas 267. 
 
 "The fact that one employee receives injuries by the act of a fellow 
 workman does not necessarily relieve the employer from legal responsi- 
 bility for the accident." Smith v. Rock Island, etc., R. Co. (La. 
 1907), 44 So. Rep. 290. 
 
 26Barstow v. Old Colony R. Co., 143 Mass. 535; 10 N. E. Rep. 255; 
 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 473; Degg v. Midland R. Co., 1 H. & N. 773; 
 
 655 
 
§ 467 eoEM:PLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. 
 
 In an Indiana case,^^ the plaintiff was requested by a 
 brakeman to ascend a moving car of the defendant's and set 
 a brake and while engaged on this voluntary service, he was 
 injured by other employees of the defendant, negligently 
 running other cars against the car he was upon, but it was 
 held that the employer was not responsible for the injury 
 so received, as he occupied the same relation as if he had been 
 a regular employee, in the rendition of the voluntary service, 
 so far as the resulting liability of the company was con- 
 cerned. And this would seem to be the reasonable rule, 
 under such circumstances, for whether the volunteer is ren- 
 dering services in pursuance to an unauthorized invitation 
 of the employees of the company, or his presence is not 
 known by them, his status toward the employer would be 
 the same and he ought not to occupy a stronger position 
 than a regular employee or be entitled to any more protec- 
 tion, for as toward a mere volunteer there is no contractual 
 relation, out of which the correlative duty would arise.** 
 
 § 467. Illustrations of rule — Erecting scaffolds, repairing 
 bridges, etc. — Where a railroad company employs compe- 
 tent men to erect scaffolds or temporary staging, without 
 selecting the material itself, or through its own delegated 
 representatives selects the materials therefor, but intrusts 
 the duty of erecting the scaffold or staging to such employees, 
 as a part of their services, the company would not be liable 
 for an injury to one of the workmen from the falling of the 
 scaffold, but his injury would be held an assumed risk.** 
 
 3 Jur. N. S. 395; 26 L. J. Ex. 171; Flower v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 
 69 Pa. St. 210; New Orleans, etc., E. Co. v. Harrison, 48 Miss. 112. 
 
 sTEverhart v. Terre Haute, etc., R. Co., 78 Ind. 292; 41 Am. Rep. 
 567; 4 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 599. 
 
 28 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Lammert, 12 III. App. 408. 
 
 aoBowen v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 95 Mo. 268; 8 S. W. Rep. 230; 
 Peschel v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 62 Wis. 338; 21 N. W. Rep. 269; 17 
 656 
 
COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. § 467 
 
 The same result follows, for an injury to a bridge builder, 
 from the falling of a portion of the bridge, due to the negli- 
 gence of his foreman and coemployees,*" and an employee 
 engaged in carrying a steel rail, or other heavy substance, 
 injured as a result of the negligence of his coemployee in 
 failing to properly carry his part of such substance, or in 
 dropping it too soon, is an assumed risk within this rule,^'^ 
 as is, likewise, an injury to an employee from an improper 
 use of an appliance in reasonably safe condition for proper 
 use,*^ for in such case the only negligence is that of the em- 
 ployee using the appliance and not that of the employer. 
 
 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 54.5; Holden v. Fitchburg, etc., R. Co., 129 Mass. 
 268; 37 Am. Kep. 343; 2 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 94; Elliott v. Chicago, 
 etc., E. Co., 5 Dakota 523; 41 N. W. Eep. 758; 3 L. R. A. 363; 38 
 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 62. 
 
 80 Yager V. Receivers, 4 Hughes (U. S.) 192; Texas & Pacific E. 
 Co. V. Eogers, 57 Fed. Eep. 378; Johnson v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 43 
 Minn. 222; 45 N. W. Rep. 156. 
 
 siCoffman v. Louisville, etc., E. Co. (Ky.), 18 S. W. Eep. 1012; 
 Coyne v. Union Pacific R. Co., 133 U. S. 370; 33 L. Ed. 651; American 
 Bridge Co. v. Seeds, 144 Fed. Rep. 605; Haviland v. Kansas City, etc., 
 R. Co., i72 Mo. 115; 72 S. W. Rep. 515. 
 
 32 Ling V. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 50 Minn. 160; 52 N. W. Rep. 378; 
 Worheide v. Missouri, etc., Co., 32 Mo. App. 367; Collyer v. Pennsyl- 
 vania R. Co., 49 N. J. L. 59; 6 Atl. Rep. 437; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Scott, 64 Texas 549; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. McLain, 80 Texas 85; 
 15 S. W. Eep. 789. 
 
 In Coyne v. Union Pacific Company (133 U. S. 370; 33 L. Ed. 651), 
 it was "held by the court, through Mr. Justice Blatchford: 
 
 " Where the method of loading a rail was by lifting it and walking 
 with it to the car, halting, dressing and then in concert lifting the rail, 
 at the word of command from the boss, and throwing it on the floor 
 of a fiat car, * * » and in the course^ of such loading the injury 
 to the plaintiff occurred, no negligence can be complained of." 
 
 For, as said by the learned justice, in the conclusion of his opinion : 
 
 " Whatever negligence there was, was the negligence either of the 
 plaintiff himself or of his fellow servants who, with him, had hold 
 of the rail." 
 
 In a similar case, in Missouri, upon a similar injury, from carrying 
 a steel rail, the court said: 
 
 1—42 657 
 
§ 468 COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. 
 
 § 468. Negligent operation of engine. — Where the em- 
 ployer has used reasonable care in the employment of com- 
 petent employees and in supplying and keeping in repair, 
 suitable engines and structures, and giving proper direc- 
 tions and adoption of precautions for their use, he is gen- 
 erally held not liable for an injury to one of his employees 
 for the negligent manner in which the engines or cars are 
 handled by other employees.*^ 
 
 Eailroad companies have therefore been held not to be 
 liable for an injury to an employee resulting from the negli- 
 gence of a fireman while handling the engine ; ** for an in- 
 jury resulting from a stick being thrown from the engine ; *' 
 for a boiler explosion due to the neglect of the engineer ; *® 
 for an injury due to a failure to expose the headlight of 
 the engine on a foggy night ; ^'^ for a failure to properly 
 sand the engine; ^* for the negligent compliance with orders, 
 
 " The physical facts and plaintifif's own testimony completely nullify 
 all such expert testimony and show that it is unreliable, and, in addi- 
 tion, they show that if the plaintiff strained his back, he did so without 
 being compelled, ordered or expected to do so by anyone, and without 
 any apparent reason for doing so, and, therefore, he did Hot make out a 
 prima facie case." Haviland v. Kansas City etc., R. Co., 172 Mo. 115. 
 
 Upon a very similar injury, in a Kentucky Case, the court held: 
 
 " Where plaintiff and two other employees of defendant were moving 
 a cross-tie and one of the men stumbled, causing the tie to fall on 
 plaintiff, there was nothing to render the defendant liable for plain- 
 tiff's injuries." Lee v. R. R. Co., 1 Amer. Neg. Rep. 60. 
 
 33Holden v. Fitchburg, etc., R. Co., 129 Mass. 268; 37 Atl. Rep. 
 343; 2 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 94. 
 
 34 Parrish v. Pensacola, etc., R. Co., 28 fla. 251 ; 9 So. Rep. 696. 
 
 3B Whalen v. Mad River R. Co., 8 Ohio St. 249. 
 
 86 Nashville, etc., R.Co. v. Handman, 13 Lea (Tenn.) 423; Murphy 
 V. Boston, etc., R. Co., 88 N. Y. 146; 24 Hun 142; 59 How. Pr. 197; 
 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 510. 
 
 37 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Wachter, 60 Md. 395; 15 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 187. 
 
 38 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Petty, 67 Miss. 255; 7 So. Rep. 351; 41 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 444. 
 
 658 
 
COEMfLOYEES AH COMMON- lAW. § 460 
 
 in running the engine ; ^* for the negligent moving of the 
 engine, without eignals,** or in disobedience of signals; *^ 
 for running at too high a rate of speed ; *^ for negligently 
 backing the engine against an employee,** or against other 
 cars,** causing an injury, or for running the engine in viola- 
 tion of the company's rules or orders,*® for in all such 
 instances, according to the rule of the common law, the 
 engineer, or person operating the engine, is a coemployee 
 with the injured employee and the risk is one assumed. 
 
 § 469. Collisions between trains and cars. — Where the 
 common-law rule is applied, there is no liability on the part 
 of a railroad company for an injury to an employee result- 
 ing from a collision between trains or cars, due to the negli- 
 gent management or operation of a coemployee of the injured 
 person.*® 
 
 In the absence of n^ligence in the employment of the 
 
 38 Baltimore, etc., E. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368; 13 Sup. Ot. Eep. 
 914; 54 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 328; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Mogart, 45 
 Ark. 318. 
 
 *0Long V. Coronado E, Co., 96 Cal. 269; 31 Pac. Eep. 170. 
 
 *i Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Rush, 84 111. 570; Whitman v. Wisconsin, 
 etc., R. Co., 58 Wis. 408; 17 N. W. Rep. 124; 12 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 214. 
 
 *2Stetler v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 46 Wis. 497; 21 Am. Ry. Rep. 402; 
 Van Wickle v. Manhattan R. Co., 23 Blatchf. (U. S.) 422; 32 Fed. 
 Rep. 278. 
 
 43 New York, etc., R. Co. v. Hyde, 56 Fed. Rep. 188. 
 
 **Toms V. Buffalo Creek R. Co., 70 Hun 84; 53 N. Y. S. R. 640; 23 
 N. Y. Supp. 1112. 
 
 *5 Henry v. I^ke Shore, etc., R. Co., 49 Mich. 495; 13 N. W. Rep. 
 832; 8 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 110; Enright v. Toledo, etc., E. Co., 93 Mich. 
 409; 53 N. W. Eep. 536. 
 
 *6 Texas, etc., E. Co. v. Berry, 67 Texas 238; S S. W. Eep. 817; 
 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 147; Slater v. Jewett, 85 N. Y. 61; 39 Am. Eep. 
 627; 5 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 515; Lyon v. Cumberland Valley R. 
 Co., 23 Pa. St. 384; Relyea v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 112 Mo. 86; 
 20 S. W. Rep. 480; 53 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 578. 
 
 659 
 
§ 46i& COSafPLO't^EES At COMMON LAW. 
 
 engineer, therefore, no recovery can be had for the wreck- 
 ing of a train, by collision with other cars or a train, properly 
 equipped and manned, as a result of which an injury is sus- 
 tained by an employee on the wrecked train.*'' 'f he result is 
 the same, so far as the right of a coemployee injured by 
 the act of an engineer is concerned, whether the collision is 
 due to a neglect to comply witli specific orders,** or the fail- 
 ure to wait for orders,*® for in either case, it is_the neglect 
 of the coemployee bringing about the injury. If the de- 
 railment results from the excessive speed of the engine, it 
 is but another form of negligence on his part, for which his 
 employer is not responsible,^" and whether the collision 
 occurs between other cars or engines,^^ or with a hand car,^^ 
 or similar appliance, the result is the same and no recovery 
 can be had. 
 
 "Parker v. Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 109 Mo. 362; 19 S. W. Rep. 1119; 
 50 Am. & Eng. K. Cas. 521; Boldt v. New York, etc., R. Co., 18 N. 
 Y. 432; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Wachter, 60 Md. 395; 15 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 187; St. Louis, etc., E. Co. v. Welsh, 72 Texas 298; 10 S. 
 W. Rep. 529; 2 L. R. A. 839; 38 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. ^1; Sullivan 
 V. Toledo, etc., E. Co., 58 Ind. 26 ; Prather v. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 
 80 Ga. 427; 9 S. E. Rep. 530; Becker v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 57 
 Fed. Rep. 188; Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Martin, 87 Tenn. 398; 10 
 S. W. Rep. 772; 3 L. R. A. 282; EwSld v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 70 Wis. 
 420; 36 N. W. Eep. 12; 33 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 336; Collins v. St. Paul, 
 etc., R. Co., 30 Minn. 31; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 150. 
 
 48 Bull v. Mobile, etc., R. Co., 67 Ala. 206. 
 
 49 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Doyle, 60 Miss. 977; 8 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 171. 
 
 60 Van Wickle v. Manhattan R. Co., 23 Blatchf. (U. S.) 422; 32 Fed. 
 Rep. 278; Smith v. Memphis, etc., E. Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 304; Hovvland 
 V. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 54 Wis. 226; II N. W. Rep. 529; 5 Am. & 
 EngK R. Cas. 578. 
 
 01 Besel v. New York, etc., R. Co., 70 N. Y. 171 ; Casey v. Louisville, 
 etc., R. Co., 87 Ky. 79; Harvey v. New York, etc., R. Co., 32 N. Y. S. R. 
 817; 57 Hun 589. 
 
 B2 Easton v. Houston, etc., R. Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 893 ; Weger v. Penn- 
 sylvania E. Co., 55 Pa. St. 460; Sherrin v. St. Joseph, etc., R. Co., 
 103 Mo. 378; 15 S. W. Rep. 442. 
 
 660 
 
COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. § 470 
 
 § 470. Limitations upon, rule of nonliability for coem- 
 ployee's neglect. — The rule of nonliability for the injuries 
 due to the carelessness of a coemployee of the injured per- 
 son, applies only where the action is brought for an injury 
 to an employee against the principal, by whom such employee 
 was employed.®^ The negligence of a coemployee must have 
 been the approximate cause of an injury, before the em- 
 ployer will be exempted from responsibility to an injured 
 employee, on this ground,®* and where the action is against 
 a third person for an injury to an employee, if the negli- 
 gence of such person concurred to produce the injury, it is 
 immaterial, so far as his defense is concerned, that the neg- 
 ligence of a coemployee of the injured one concurred to pro- 
 duce the injury.^® 
 
 And in States where the " conassocialtion or department 
 doctrine " obtains, it is also essential that the injured em- 
 ployee and the negligent one were both employed in the 
 same general employment or department of the company's 
 service, and the rule of nonliability in such States does not 
 apply, where the respective situations of the employees al- 
 low no opportunity for the exertion of a mutual influence 
 upon each others' carefulness. ®® And it is very generally 
 held that in order for the employer to avoid liability for an 
 injury done to another employee's carelessness, the two em- 
 ployees must have been engaged in the same general employ- 
 ment and employed by the same common employer. ^^ 
 
 53 Nary v. New York, etc., E. Co., 29 N. Y. S. E. 630; 9 N. Y. Supp. 
 153; 55 Hun 612; 125 N. Y. 759; 27 N. E. Eep. 408. 
 
 5* Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Eush, 84 HI. 570. 
 
 B5Ft. Worth, etc., E. Co. v. Mackey, 83 Texas 410; 18 S. W. Eep. 
 949. 
 
 5» Western, etc., E. Co. v. Drysdale, 51 Ga. 644; North Chicago Co. 
 V. Johnson, 114 111. 57. 
 
 STSadowski v. Michigan Car Co., 84 Mich. 100; 47 N. W. Eep. 598; 
 Dow V. Kansas Pacific E. Co., 8 Kansas 642; 5 Am. Ey. Eep. 401; 
 
 661 
 
§ 471 COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. 
 
 § 471. Company's negligence concurring to produce injury. 
 
 — The rule as to tte nonliability of a company to its em- 
 ployees for injuries resulting from the negligence of co- 
 employees does not apply where the railroad company is 
 itself guilty of negligence concurring to produce the injury.^* 
 If the negligence of the employer is the proximate cause 
 of the injury,®^ or if such negligence, combined with that 
 of a coemployee of the injured person, produces the injury, 
 the employer is liable therefor, and the concurring negligence 
 of the coemployee would not affect the question of the em- 
 ployer's liability.**" If the injury would not have resulted, 
 if the employer had performed his duty toward the injured 
 person, the concurring negligence of a coemployee is im- 
 material.®^ 
 
 Mobile, etc., K. Co. v. Thomas, 42 Ala. 672; Alabama, etc., E. Co. v. 
 Waller, 48 Ala. 459. 
 
 B8 Smoot V. Mobile, etc., E. Co., 67 Ala. 13 ; Pittsburg, etc., E. Co. 
 V. Lewis, 33 Ohio St. 196; Houston, etc., E. Co. v. Gilmore, 62 Texas 
 391; Harrison v. Central E. Co., 31 N. J. L. 293; Hanley v. Grand 
 Trunk E. Co., 62 N. H. 274; Wormington v. Atchison, etc., E. Co., 46 
 Mo. App. 159; Colorado, etc., E. Co. v. Ogden, 3 Colo. 499; Crew v. St. 
 Louis, etc., E. Co., 20 Fed. Eep. 87. 
 
 59 Grand Trunk E. Co. v. Cummings, 106 U. S. 700; Cincinnati, etc., 
 E. Co. V. Lang, 118 Ind. 579; 21 N. E. Eep. 317; 38 Am. & Eng. E. 
 Cas. 25; Whittaker v. Delaware, etc., E. Co., 49 Hun 400; 22 N. Y. 
 S. E. 405. 
 
 60 Grand Trunk E. Co. v. Cummings, 106 U. S. 700; 12 Am. & Eng. 
 E. Cas. 204; Fisk v. Central Pacific E. Co., 72 Cal. 38; 13 Pac. Eep. 
 144; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Laack, 143 111. 242; 32 N. E. Eep. 285; 
 Hunn V. Michigan, etc., R. Co., 78 Mich. 513; 44 N. W. Rep. 502; 7 
 L. E. A. 500; 41 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 452; Franklin v. Winona, etc., 
 E. Co., 37 Minn. 409; 34 N. W. Rep. 898; 5 Am. St. Rep. 856; 31 Am. 
 & Eng. E. Cas. 211; Bluedorn v. Missouri Pacific Ey. Co., 108 Mo. 
 439 ; 18 S. W. Eep. 1103 ; Stetler v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 46 Wis. 497 ; 
 21 Am. Ey. Eep. 402; Cowan v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 80 Wis. 284; 50 
 N. W. Eep. 180; Gulf, etc., E. Co. v. Johnson, 83 Texas 628; 19 S. W. 
 Eep. 151. 
 
 BiCoppins V. New York, etc., E. Co., 122 N. Y. 557; 25 N. E. Rep. 
 915; Knathla v. Oregon, etc., R. Co., 21 Oregon 136; 27 Pac. Rep. 91. 
 662 
 
COEMPLOYEES AT COMMOM^ LAW. § 471 
 
 And whenever the injury is caused in whole or in part, 
 because of the failure on the part of the employer to perform 
 some one of the nondelegable duties imposed upon him by 
 law, that the negligence of an employee combined with such 
 cause, to produce the injury, is not a defense.®^ Hence, it 
 is that a railroad company is liable for injuries from a 
 failure to provide reasonably safe roadbed, appliances or 
 cars ; ®* a reasonably safe track ; ®* a defective bridge or tres- 
 tle;®^ reasonably safe machinery,^* engines,*'^ or cars,*® or 
 other materials or structures,*® and for a failure to properly 
 man and operate its trains,''" although the negligence of a 
 coemployee with the injured person, may, in part, contribute 
 to produce the injury complained of. 
 
 82 Warner v. Erie R. Co., 39 N. Y. 468; Dyer v. American Ex- 
 press Co., 82 Wis. 307; 52 N. W. Rep. 304;. 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 612. 
 
 63 Ellis V. New York, etc., R. Co., 95 N. Y. 546; Trask v. "California, 
 etc., R. Co., 63 Cal. 96; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 192; McDermott v. 
 Pacific R. Co., 30 Mo. 115; Davis v. Central R. Co., 55 Vt. 84; 45 Am. 
 Rep. 590; Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Wilson, 48 Fed. Rep. 57. 
 
 6* Lewis V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 59 Mo. 495; Texas, etc., R. Co. 
 V. Kirk, 62 Texas 227. 
 
 65 Paulmeier v. Erie R. Co., 34 N. J. L. 151. 
 
 66 Young V. New Jersey R. Co., 46 Fed. .Rep. 160 ; Northern Pacific 
 R. Co. V. Charless, 51 Fed. Rep. 562; 51 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 198; 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Harper, 44 Ark. 524; Harper v. Indianapolis, 
 etc., R. Co., 47 Mo. 567; Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Holt, 29 Kansas 149; 
 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 206; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Harkins, 55 
 Fed. Rep. 932. 
 
 67'Cone V. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 81 N. Y. 206; 37 Am. Rep. 491; 2 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 57 ; Crutchfleld v. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 76 N. Car. 
 320. 
 
 esMacy v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 35 Minn. 200; 28 N. W. Rep. 249; 
 Henry v. Wabash R. Co., 109 Mo. 488; 19 S. W. Rep. 239. 
 
 69 Dillon V. Union Pacific R. Co., 3 Dill (U. S.) 319; Brickner v. 
 New York, etc., R. Co., 2 Lans. (N. Y.) 506. 
 
 70 Booth V. Boston, etc., R. Co., 73 N. Y. 38; Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. 
 V. Henderson, 37 Ohio St. 549 ; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 529. 
 
 Employer is liable for injury resulting from combined negligence 
 
 663 
 
§ 472. COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. 
 
 § 472. Vice-principal's negligence not assumed. — When an 
 employer places one person in his employ, under the direc- 
 tion or control of another person, also in his employ, such 
 employer is liable for injuries to the person placed in the 
 subordinate position, caused by the negligence of the superior 
 employee, the same as he would be for injuries resulting 
 from his own want of care.'^^ ' 
 
 The negligence of the vice-principal in the service of a 
 railroad company is regarded in the law as the negligence 
 of the company.''^ And a marked change in the rule that 
 obtained at common law, has taken place, in regard to em- 
 ployees clothed with partial authority only, such as a fore- 
 man or superior employees; and the principle upon which 
 
 of vice-principal and fellow workman. Chicago Tr. Co. v. Sawusch, 
 218 111. 130; 75 N. B. Rep. 797; 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 670. 
 
 " Where the negligence of an employer and that of a fellow work- 
 man concur to produce an injury to an employee, the employer is liable 
 for the injury sustained." Stone v. Union Pae. R. Co. (Utah, 1907), 
 89 Pac. Rep. 715, 723. 
 
 Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Wise (Tex. Civ. App. 1908), 106 S. W. 
 Rep. 465. 
 
 " The rule that, where an employee is injured by the concurrent 
 negligence of an employer and fellow workmen, no action will lie against 
 the employer, is not recognized by the courts of the United States." 
 chandler v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. (Mo.), 106 S. W. Rep. 553. 
 
 71 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. May, 108 111. 288 ; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 320; Mad River R. Co. v. Barber, 5 Ohio St. 541; Palmer v. Utah, etc., 
 R. Co., 2 Idaho 290; 13 Pac. Rep. 425; Pittsburg, etc.,' R. Co. v. 
 Lewis, 33 Ohio St. 196; Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Ranney, 37 Ohio 
 St. 666; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 533. 
 
 72Fagundes v. Central Pacific R. Co., 79 Cal. 97; 21 Pac. Rep. 
 437; 3 L. R. A. 824; McMasters v. Illinois, etc., R. Co., 65 Miss. 264; 
 4 So. Rep. 59; 7 Am. St. Rep. 653; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 486; Denver, 
 etc., R. Co. v. Driscoll, 12 Colo. 520; 21 Pac. Rep. 708; 38 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas 105; Miller v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 109 Mo. 350; 19 
 S. W. Rep. 58; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 598; Russ v. Wabash R. Co., 
 112 Mo. 45; 20 S. W. Rep. 472; Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Hawk, 121 
 111. 259; 12 N. E. Rep. 253; 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 306; O'Brien v. 
 American, etc., Co., 53 N. J. L. 291; 21 Atl, Rep. 294. 
 
 664 
 
coemployiTes at common law. § 473 
 
 such change is based is that when the employer delegates 
 any duty which he owes to his employees, he remains liable 
 for its improper performance, the same as if he himself 
 personally performed the given dutyJ^ 
 
 When a superintendent, or other agent, is empowered to 
 Select, employ and discharge such employees as operate under 
 him, he is bound to use the same care in protecting such 
 employee from injury, as is imposed upon the employer; 
 and for any failure in this respect, resulting injuriously to 
 the employees under his control, the employer may be called 
 upon to respond in damages, ''* as the law views the act of 
 the employer's representative in the same light as if the em- 
 ployer had been himself personally present, directing the 
 service.''^ 
 
 This rule of law is founded upon the wisest considerations 
 of public policy,'® for while just that the employee should 
 assume the ordinary and incidental risks of his employment, 
 he ought not to be held to assume a risk created by the negli- 
 gent act of the employer's representative in. making unsafe 
 the work which he orders the employee to perform. ''' 
 
 § 4:13. Character of act determines employer's liability. — 
 
 The employer is liable for the carelessness of a vice-principal, 
 regardless of the department of the service in which he is at 
 work,''* and the vice-principal is bound to use the same 
 
 73 Flike V. Boston, etc., E. Co., 53 N. Y. 553 ; Anderson v. Bennett, 
 16 Oregon, 515; 19 Pac. Rep. 765; 8 Am. St. Rep. 311; 38 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 87. 
 
 74 Douglas V. Texas, etcr, R. Co., 33 Texas 564; Chicago, etc., R. 
 Co. V. Blank, 24 111. App. 438. 
 
 75 Sweeney v. Gulf, etc., R. Co., 84 Texas 433; 19 S. W. Rep. 555. ^ 
 TsLake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Spangler, 44 Ohio St. 471; 8 N. E. Rep. 
 
 467 ; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 319. 
 
 77 Taylor v. Evansville, etc., R. Co., 121 Ind. 124; 22 N. E. Rep. 876; 
 6 L. R. A. 584; 41 Alb. L. J. 173; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 437. 
 
 78 Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Smith, 76 Texas 611; 13 S. W. Rep. 562; 
 44 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 598. 
 
 665 
 
§ 473 COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON liAW. 
 
 degree of care, in protecting his subordinates as is imposed 
 upon the employer himself, by the law.'^* 
 
 The true test for determining whether or not an employer 
 is liable to one employee for an injury received through 
 the negligence of another, depends upon the character of the 
 act performed, which causes the injury and not upon the 
 rank or grade of the person performing the alleged negli- 
 gent act. If the act amounts to a neglect of one of the 
 duties the employer has impliedly contracted to perform, he 
 is liable, no matter what the rank or grade of the person 
 he has designated to perform it, because the person so dele- 
 gated is the employer's agent, in the performance of the 
 delegated duties and the employer, by delegating the duty 
 to another, cannot avoid responsibility therefor,*'' The 
 question to be determined therefore, in all cases, is, were the 
 person performing, the act complained of and the injured 
 employee, coemployees, or not? If they were, there can be 
 no recovery against the employer, for an injury caused by 
 the neglect of a coemployee, in the absence of a statute 
 abolishing the common-law rule.*"- If the employee guilty 
 of the wrongful act was the employer's representative in the 
 doing of the act, or it was one of the nondelegable duties of 
 the employer, the latter remains liable, the same as if he 
 personally did the act.^^ If the ^ct performed is one of the 
 duties of the employer toward his employees, it is the same 
 as if it were his own misfeasance, irrespective of whether the 
 act is performed by a superior or inferior officer or agent to 
 whom the performance of the act has been committed.®* 
 
 78 Douglas V. Texas, etc., E. Co., 63 Texas 564. 
 
 80 Galveston, etc., R. Co, v. Smith, supra; Colorado, etc., K. Co. v. 
 Naylor, 17 Colo. 501; 30 Pac. Rep. 249. 
 
 81 Taylor v. Evansville, etc., E. Co., 121 Ind. 124; 22 N. E. Rep. 
 876; 6 L, E. A. 584. 
 
 82Gilmore v. Northern Paciflo R. Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 866; 9 Sawy. 
 558; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Oas. 304. 
 
 S3 Fuller v. Jewett, 80 N. Y. 46; 1 Am. & Eng. R. Cag. 109; Pike 
 
COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. § 4Y3 
 
 But, on the other hand, the negligence of a superior officer 
 or agent, would not, in all cases, render the employer re- 
 sponsible, for it is only where the law would recognize a 
 duty on the part of the employer to perform the act for the 
 protection of his employees, that he could be held liable 
 for the misfeasance of a superior agent, and if the act com- 
 plained of related to the work of a coemployee of the injured 
 person, there would be no liability, regardless of the grade 
 of the agent performing the act.^* 
 
 V. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 41 Fed, Rep. 95; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Triplett, 54 Ark. 289; 15 S. W. Rep. 831; 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 283; 
 Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Laack, 143 111. 242; 32 N. E. Rep. 285; 
 Capper v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 103 Ind. 305; 2 N. E. Rep. 749; 21 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 525. 
 
 84Stockmeyer v. Reed, 55 Fed. Rep. 259; Fones v. Phillipps, 39 
 Ark. 17. 
 
 " Whether a person by whose negligence an employee is injured ia a 
 vice-principal or a fellow workman does not depend on a difference of 
 grade, rank, or authority, but on the character of the act performed 
 by the offending employee, as to whether it is the performance of a 
 duty which the employer, owed to the injured employee and intrusted 
 to the offending employee to perform." Pagan v. Southern Ry. Co., 
 59 S. B. Rep. 32. 
 
 " If an employer has conferred on one member of a class of work- 
 men carrying on a particular branch of his business authority to 
 control the movements of the men under his charge, the employee, 
 while in the exercise of such authority, stands in the place of the em- 
 ployer, and is not a fellow workman to those under his direction." 
 Chicago Terminal R. Co. v. Reddick, 82 N. E. Rep. 598; 230 111. 105. 
 
 " In the absence of some statute defining fellow workmen, the test 
 to be applied is whether the negligent act, which caused the injury, 
 was a breach of a positive duty owing by the employer to his employee, 
 in which case the person performing the act is a vice-principal." Mor^ 
 rison v. San Pedro, etc., R. Co. (Utah 1907), 88 Pac. Rep. 998. 
 
 "Employees charged with the duty of keeping a place to work and 
 machinery in a safe condition, and of inspecting the same, are vice- 
 principals of the employer, regardless of their rank." Missouri, K. 
 & T. Ry. Co. v. Wise (Tex. Civ. App. 1908), 106 S. W. Rep. 465. 
 
 A vice-principal is one who is placed in a position of performing a 
 positive duty of the employer, or who has general control of the entire 
 
 66Y 
 
§ 4^4 COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. 
 
 § 474, Promises or assurances of vice-principal. — A rail- 
 road company is responsible for the promises and assurances 
 of its vice-principal, with reference to repairing defects in 
 machinery or appliances or the safety of the place of work 
 
 business or some department of it. MoUhoflf v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. 
 Co. (Ok.), 82 Pac. Rep. 733. 
 
 The duty which the foreman of a bridge gang owes to see that 
 there is a clear track, is a duty due from him as vice-principal, and for 
 a breach of this duty, In case of an injury, the company will be liable. 
 Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Carlin, 189 U. S. 354; 47 L. Ed. 849. 
 
 " A railroad company cannot delegate to its section men the duty 
 of furnishing a brakeman a reasonably safe place in which to work, 
 including a reasonably safe track, and using ordinary care to keep the 
 same in repair." Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Wise, 106 S. W. Rep. 
 465. 
 
 " An employee designated by a vice-principal p> perform a particular 
 service which has been delegated to him by his employer in turn be- 
 comes a vice-principal." Cleveland & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Austin, 127 111. 
 App. 281. 
 
 " A mere foreman or gang boss is a fellow workman of those working 
 with or under him, and for his defaults by which a fellow employee is 
 injured the employer is not responsible, unless the duty as to which 
 the default is made is an absolute duty of the employer and the per- 
 formance of which has been delegated to such foreman." Brown v. 
 Baltimore & O. R. Co. (C. C), 142 Fed. Rep. 911, reversed. Baltimore 
 & O. R. Co. V. Brown (U. S., C. C. A., Pa. 1906), 146 Fed. Rep. 24. 
 
 " An employee, whose duty is to direct and control workmen under 
 him, is a vice-principal as to the work intrusted to him.'' Smith v. 
 American Car & Founary Co. (Mo. App. 1907), 99 S. W. Rep. 790. ^ 
 
 "The boss of a repair train is not a vice-principal." Peterson v. 
 Philadelphia, B & W. R. Co. (Pa. 1907), 66 Atl. Rep. 660. 
 
 " A person is not a vice-principal, unless he has entire charge of the 
 business, or a distinct branch thereof, having authority to superin- 
 tend the work and exercising control of such business, or imless 
 the employer has delegated to him a duty of his own, which is an 
 absolute obligation, from which nothing but performance can relieve 
 him." Vant v. Roelofs, 66 Atl. Rep. 749. 
 
 " An employee assumes the risk of the negligence of his superior 
 fellow employees in the latter's direction of the men, of the machinery, 
 and of the work to the same extent that he assumes the risk of the 
 negligence of the fellow laborer by his side who is engaged in perform- 
 ing the work." American Bridge Co. v. Seeds. 144 Fed. Rep. 605. 
 668 
 
COEMtLOVEES AT COMMON IAW. § 474 
 
 or the appliance causing an injury to a subordinate em- 
 ployee.^^ 
 
 ' An assurance from one representing the employer that 
 the machinery or appliance being used by an employee is 
 all right and an order from him to the employee to use it, 
 notwithstanding a complaint of such employee as to its suf- 
 ficiency, amounts to a guaranty of the safety and the em- 
 ployer will then be liable for any injury resulting from its 
 prudent use.*" 
 
 An employee of a railroad has the right to rely upon the 
 promise or assurance of the vice-principal that he will protect 
 him while he is at work on the side track, notwithstanding 
 the existence of a rule of the company requiring employees 
 to protect themselves by putting out flags while engaged in 
 such work.* ^ 
 
 But in order that an assurance of safety or a promise 
 from an employee shall be given the effect of a guaranty on 
 the part of the employer, the employee making the promise 
 or giving the assurance, must be representing the employer 
 in authority and although he is a superior employee to the 
 injured person and has given an assurance or made a 
 promise, this will not bind the employer, unless in making 
 such promise or giving such assurance he had superin- 
 tendence or control over the men or the place, or power to 
 replace or provide the machinery or appliances as to which 
 the given promise or assurance was made.** 
 
 8B Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Kenley, 92 Tenn. 207; 21 S. W. Rep. 
 326; Lyttle v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 84 Mich. 289; 47 N. W. Rep. 
 671. 
 
 88 Rowland v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 20 Mo. App. 463 ; McGowan 
 V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 61 Mo. 532. 
 
 87 Moore v. Wabash, etc., R. Co., 85 Mo. 588; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 509; Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Williams, 75 Texas 4; 12 S. W. 
 Rep. 835. 
 
 88 McGowan v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 61 Mo. 528. 
 
 669 
 
§ 4:15 COEMfLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. 
 
 § 475. Notice to vice-principal notice to employer. — Notice 
 to a superintendent of a defect in machinery or appliances 
 or a dangerous place where employees are placed at work, is 
 notice to the railroad company, where he is engaged to su- 
 perintend, such machinery or place of work,®® and any knowl- 
 edge of such vice-principal, as to matters within his depart- 
 ment of the business, is notice to the railroad company he 
 represents.^" And notice to a temporary vice-principal, 
 when so acting, is the same as notice to one regularly occu- 
 pying such a place and will be notice to the company, as to 
 all matters wherein he is representing the company.®-' 
 
 Thus, it is held that knowledge on the part of a vice- 
 principal that an incompetent fireman is handling an engine, 
 while switching is being done, is knowledge of such fact, to 
 his employer ; ®* and the carelessness of a section foreman 
 and his notice of an obstruction in the path of a switchman, 
 are held to be imputable to the railroad company.®^ 
 
 But an injured employee who seeks to recover from a 
 railroad company for an injury due to the negligence of a 
 superior employee, has the burden of establishing that the 
 relation of ooemployees did not exist; and in order to es- 
 tablish negligence he must also show that the superior em- 
 ployee knew of the danger, or by the exercise of ordinary 
 care might have known of it, and that the danger could not 
 
 88 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Jackson, 55 111. 492 ; Lyttle v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. Co., 84 Mich. 289; 47 N. W. Rep. 571; Davis v. Central Vermont 
 R. Co., 55 Vt. 84; 45 Am. Rep. 590. 
 
 90 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Kenley, 92 Tenn. 207; 21 S. W. Rep. 
 326. 
 
 91 Baldwin v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 75 Iowa 297; 39 N. W. Rep. 
 507. 
 
 92 Lyttle V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 84 Mich. 289; 47 N. W. Rep. 
 571. 
 
 93 Hall V. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 74 Mo. 289; 8 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 106. 
 
 6Y0 
 
COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. § 476 
 
 have been known to the plaintiff by the exercise of such 
 care.** 
 
 § 476. Dual capacity doctrine.— Kailroad companies are 
 not liable to one employee for injuries occasioned by another, 
 where both are engaged in the same general undertaking; 
 
 94 Thompson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 5 McCrary (U. S.) 542; 18 
 Fed. Rep. 239. 
 
 For liability of railroad company for act of vice-principal in failure 
 to promulgate rules, see Fraker v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 32 Minn. 54; 
 Anderson v. Rennett, 16 Oregon 515; 19 Rac. Rep. 765; 8 Am. St. Rep. 
 311; 38 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 87. 
 
 For a failure to give proper command or order, or giving negligent 
 order or command: Cowles v. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 84 N. C. 309; 
 37 Am. Rep. 620; 2 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 90; Taylor v. Evansville, etc., 
 R. Co., 121 Ind. 124; 22 N. E. Rep. 876; 6 L. R. A. 584; 41 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 437 ; East St. Louis, etc., R. Co., V. Enright, 47 111. App. 
 494; Miller v. Union Pacific R. Co., 5 MeCrary (U. S.) 300; 17 
 Fed. Rep. 67; Gilmore v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 9 Sawy. (U. S.) 558; 
 18 Fed. Rep. 866; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 304; Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. 
 V. Henderson, 37 Ohio St. 549 ; 5 Am. & Ehg. R. Cas. 529 ; Union Pacific 
 R. Co. V. Fort, 17 Wall. (U. S.) 553: 
 
 For failure to provide reasonably safe working place, see Louisville, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Graham, 124 Ind. 89; 24 N. E. Rep. 668; Kansas Pacific 
 R. Co. V. Little, 19 Kansas 267; 17 Am. Ry. Rep. 455; Luebke v. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co., 59 Wis. 127; 17 N. W. Rep. 870; 48 Am. Rep. 
 483; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 183. 
 
 Failure to inspect and repair machinery or appliances: Hough v. 
 Texas, etc., R. Co., 100 U. S. 213; 21 Am. Ry. Rep. 451; Schultz v. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co., 48 Wis. 375; 4 N. W. Rep, 399; Condon v. Mis- 
 souri Pacific Ry. Co., 78 Mo. 567; Brann v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 53 
 Iowa 595; 6 N. W. Rep. 5. 
 
 For negligence in causing collisions: Sheehan v. New York, etc, R. 
 Co., 91 N. Y. 332; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 235; Daniel v. Chesapeake, 
 etc., R. Co., 36 W. Va. 397; 15 S. E. Rep. 162; 16 L. R. A. 383; 53 Am. 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 503. 
 
 Negligence in selection of incompetent employees: Rowland v. Mis- 
 souri Pacific Ry. Co., 20 Mo. App. 463; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Whit- 
 more, 58 Texas 276; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 195. 
 
 In operating hand car: Hoben v. Burlington R. Co., 20 Iowa, 562; 
 Sleete v. Great Northern R. Co., 53 Minn. 341 ; 55 N. W. Rep. 137 ; Rusa 
 V. Wabash R. Co., 112 Mo. 45; 20 S. W. Rep. 472. 
 
 671 
 
§ 476 COEKtPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. 
 
 nor does it make any difference that the injury in the par- 
 ticular case happens to one employee by the negligence of an 
 employee of higher authority, to whom the injured employee 
 is subject and from the consequences of whose negligeU'Ce 
 he cannot guard.® ° The rule is general in its application 
 that an employee may be a vice-principal of his employer 
 and also a colaborer of the person injured and whether he 
 is the one or the other depends entirely upon the relation 
 he assumes and sustains to the employer, in the doing of the 
 act which causes the injury. If the negligent act arises out 
 of and is the direct result of the authority conferred by the 
 employer, on the superior employee over his colaborers, he 
 is a vice-principal and the employer is liable for injuries 
 resulting from his neglect.®® But if his negligent act was 
 not done in his representative capacity, but while he was 
 acting as a colaborer with those subject to his authority, his 
 act is that of a coemployee.®'' 
 
 05 Thayer v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 22 Ind. 26; Columbus, etc., E. 
 Co. V. Arnold, 31 Ind. 174; Lawler v. Androscoggin E. Co., 62 Me. 
 463; Blake v. Maine E. Co., 70 Me. 60; Holden v. Fitchburg E. Co., 
 129 Mass. 268; 37 Am. Eep. 343; 2 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 94; Brown 
 V. Winona, etc., E. Co., 27 Minn. 162; 6 N. W. Rep. 484; 38 Am. Rep. 
 285; Hard v. Vermont, etc., R. Co., 32 Vt. 473. 
 
 o?Fogarty v. St. Louis Transfer Co., 180 Mo. 490; 79 S. W. Eep. 
 664; Hollweg v. Telephone Co., 195 Mo. 149, 157; 93 S. W. Eep. 262; 
 Harper v. Indianapolis, etc., E. Co., 47 Mo. 567; Moore v. Wabash R. 
 ■Co., 85 Mo. 588; Bane v. Irwin, 172 Mo. 306; 62 S. W. Rep. 522; 
 Hofnagle v. New York, etc., R. Co., 55 N. Y. 608; Hobbs v. Atlantic, 
 etc., E. Co., 107 N. Car. 1; 12 S. E. Eep. 124; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Touhy, 26 III. App. 99. 
 
 sTFogarty v. Transit Co., 180 Mo. 490; 79 S. W. Rep. 664; Kreuger 
 V. Louisville, etc., R. Co., Ill Ind. 51; 11 N. ^. Eep. 957; 31 Am. & 
 Eng. E. Cas. 329; Cullen v. Norton, 126 N. Y. 1; 26 N. E. Eep. 905. 
 
 " Where a vice-principal does the work of an ordinary laborer, 
 and is negligent therein, his employer is not liable for injuries to 
 another employee from such negligence.'' Miller v. American Bridge 
 Co., 65 Atl. Eep. 1109; 216 Pa. St. 559. 
 
 " In so far as a ' working foreman ' is performing the work of a 
 672 
 
COE.MPLOYEES AT COMMON EAW. § 4Y6 
 
 For instance, the duty to close a switch which has been 
 opened by a section foreman, to let a hand car in on the side 
 track, is a duty belonging to the ordinary laborer and not 
 one of the nondelegable duties of the employer to its em- 
 ployees, and the railroad company would not be liable for the 
 death of one of its employees, caused by the negligence of the 
 foreman in so leaving the switch, open.®* The negligence of 
 a foreman of a pile driver, in failing to block a pile, which 
 was shoved against the plaintiff, because it was not blocked, 
 is also held to be the negligence of a coemployee, although 
 the foreman had authority to employ and discharge the plain- 
 tiff and the plaintiff was under his superintendence and con- 
 trol in doing the work he was engaged in performing, when 
 injured, and the employer is not liable for such an injury.®^ 
 And so, the assurance of a foreman of bridge work, to an 
 employee that a rope attached to a girder was fastened 
 securely, as' a result of which the employee used the rope, 
 which was not so secured, and sustained an injury, was held, 
 in Tennessee, not to be an act for the employer, personally, 
 but a mere assurance of a coemployee, for which the em- 
 ployer was not liable.^ This case would seem to be reaching 
 somewhat across the border line, for since it is one of the 
 nodelegable duties of the employer to furnish reasonably 
 safe appliances, an assurance from his foreman of the safety 
 of an appliance is, in fact, or ought to be, an assurance from 
 the employer, whom the foreman is representing on the work, 
 about which, the representation is made. But the above rule 
 
 laborer, he is, under the laws of Illindis, the fellow workman of an- 
 other laborer, so the employer is' not liable for his negligence in such 
 respect causing injury to the other laborer." Bokamp v. Chicago & 
 A. By. Co. (Mo. App. 1907), 100 S. W. Rep. 689. 
 
 08 Davies v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 98 Cal. 19 ; 32 Pae. Rep. 708. 
 
 09 Ell V. Northern Pacific E. Co., 1 N. Dak. 336; 48 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 318, 
 
 iLouisvile, etc., R. Co. v. Lahr, 86 Tenn. 335; 6 S. W. Rep. 663. 
 
 1—43 .673 
 
§ 47^ COE.MPLOYEES AT COMMOIil- LAW. 
 
 is quite generally accepted and the courts look rather to the 
 act and not the ranh of the vice-principal, in determining 
 whether two employees are colaborers or not.^ 
 
 § 477. The department doctrine. — The rule of the com- 
 mon law reports that an employer who has exercised due care 
 in the employment and retention of his employees is not 
 responsible for an injury sustained by one of them in the 
 course of his employment, by the negligence of another, how- 
 ever distinct the grade of the service or different the labor 
 performed, or however widely separated the localities of their 
 respective employments may be, has been modified, by the 
 course of judicial opinions, in many of the States in the 
 United States, so as to meet what is sometimes thought the 
 ends of justice, in a more enlightened manner.* 
 
 In such jurisdictions it is not the law that an employer is 
 released from liability in all cases in which one employee is 
 injured by the negligence of another, but the employer's im- 
 munity is^limited to cases where the employees are engaged 
 
 2 BaBe V. Irwin, 172 Mo. 306; 62 S. W. Hep. 522. In this case Judge 
 Gantt said : " We agree with counsel for defendant, ' it is the act and 
 not the rank 6f the vice-principal "which determines whether two em- 
 ployees are fellow servants.' " But see Dayharsh v. Hannibal, etc., B. 
 Co., 103 Mo. 570; 15 S. W. Rep. 554, where a negligent act of a " boss " 
 was not distinguished from a negligent order, when such act was done, 
 in the general scope of the "boss's" duty as vice-principal. This case 
 was distinguished, in Ring v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. (112 Mo. 220), 
 and Fogarty v. Transfer Co. (180 Mo. 505; 79 S. W. Rep. 669), where 
 it ought to have been overruled. 
 
 sGilmore v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 9 Sawy. (U. S.) 558; 18 Fed. 
 Rep. 866. For common-law rule, see Priestley v. Fowler, 3 M. & W. 
 1; King v. Ohio, etc., R. Co. 11 Biss. (U. S.) 362; 14 Fed. Repj 277; 
 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 119; Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Powers, 74 111. 
 341; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Sheets (Ky.), 13 S. W. Rep. 248; 41 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 470 ; Union Pacific R. Co. v. Billeter, 28 Neb. 422 ; 
 44 N. W. Rep. 483; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 431; Richmond, etc., R. 
 Co. V. Noemend, 84 Va. 167; 4 S. E. Rep. 211; Madden v. Chesapeake, 
 etc., R. Co., 28 W. Va. 610; 57 Am. Rep-. 695. 
 674 
 
COEMPLOTEES AT COMMON LAW. § 477 
 
 in tbe same common service, or in the same department of 
 duty; it does not extend to cases where the -employees are 
 engaged in departments of the service essentially foreign 
 to each other.* 
 
 The reasons given by the courts in States where this rule 
 obtains are said to be that an employee cannot justly be held 
 to have contemplated, in tbe adjustment of his wages, those 
 dangers which ^rise from the careless^ness -of coemployees 
 without any reference whatever to the nature of their em- 
 ployment or duties.^ Uader such rule, employees of a r-ail- 
 road company controlling and directing the movements of one 
 train, are, with reference to those in the same company upon 
 another train, to be held the agents of the company and not 
 coemployees, and where an employee on one train is injured 
 through the negligence of an employee on another traiii, the 
 maxim respondeat superior applies, and the company is lia- 
 ble.* This rule has been applied in Indiana,'' Tennessee,* 
 Kentucky,® Illinois,^* Wisconsin,^ ^ Missouri ^^ and some 
 other States, but the later cases, in Missouri, have refused 
 to follow this rule and have returned to the common-law 
 
 *Kiiig V. OMo, etc., R. Co., supm. 
 
 5 King V. Ohio, etc., R. Co., 11 Biss. (U. S.) 362; 14 Fed. Rep. 
 277; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 119. 
 
 « Kentucky, etc., R. Co. v. Ackley, 87 Ky. 278; 8 S. W. Rep. 691; 
 12 Am. St. Rep. 480. 
 
 I Gillenwater v. Madison, etc., R. Co., 5 Ind. 339 ; Fitzpatrick v. New 
 Albany, etc., R. Co., 7 Ind. 436. 
 
 8 East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. UeArfflond, 86 TeBn. 73; 5. S. W. 
 Rep. 600; 6 Am. St. Rep. 816, but this rule is applied only as to rail- 
 roads; Coal Creek Mining €o. v. Davis, 90 Tenn. 711; 18 S. W. Rep. 
 387. 
 
 oMcLoed V. GintTier, 80 Ky. 399; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 162, 
 
 10 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. O'Connor, 77 111. 391. 
 
 II Chamberlain v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 11 Wis. 238. 
 
 12 Sullivan v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 97 Mo. 113; 10 S. W. Rep. 
 852; Tabler v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 93 Mo. 79; 5 S. W. Rep. 810. 
 
 675 
 
§ 478 COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. 
 
 rule, as the safer guide to follow, in the adjustment of the 
 rights of employer and employee,^* 
 
 § 478. Objections to the department doctrine. — That the 
 common-law rule of exemption from liability for injuries 
 due to the negligence of coemployees made no distinction as 
 to the departments of the service in which the employees 
 were engaged, is well settled. It seems that in many States 
 where the common law" has been adopted by statute, this 
 rule of the law has been refined away and another rule 
 substituted in its place, which the courts thought more in 
 harmony with the institutions or spirit of the age. As a mat- 
 ter of fact this salutary rule of the common law has been 
 deviated from, largely to meet the demands of a growing 
 public sentiment for its change and the rights of the em- 
 ployer have been sacrificed upon the altar of public senti- 
 ment. This common-law rule rests for its support on rea- 
 soning which commends itself to the judgment and it was 
 dictated by the highest motives of public policy, as evidenced 
 by the decisions upon the subject and it has been so univer- 
 sally sanctioned by the highest authorities that a departure 
 from it ought not be allowed, unless warranted by a plain 
 legislative act.^* 
 
 The basis of the liability of the employer, whether popu- 
 lar or unpopular, is the same in all cases, and rests upon the 
 breach of a legal duty owing to the employee. If the em- 
 ployer is not personally negligent, because some of his em- 
 ployees are negligent, but the employees in his service 
 assume the risk of injuries from such negligence, there is 
 no good reason for limiting the rule to employees in the 
 
 isGrattis v. Kansas City, etc., E. Co., 153 Mo. 380; 55 S. W. Rep, 
 108; 48 L. E. A. 399; 77 Am. St. Eep. 721. 
 
 i*Tliis is substantially the language of Judge Norton, in Proctor v. 
 Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 64 Mo. 118. 
 
 676 
 
COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW, §'478 
 
 same department only of the service. An employer, guilty 
 of no personal negligence, should not be liable for an injury 
 to one employee due to the negligence of another, even 
 though they are engaged in different departments of the 
 business. Kegardless of the department wherein the negli- 
 gent employee is at work, unless he actfe for the employer 
 in the doing of the act, or in the performance of some of 
 the nondelegable duties due the employees, his negligence 
 is not that of the employer and should not be so held.'® 
 
 It should make no difference, therefore, whether a brake- 
 man is injured by the carelessness of another brakeman^, or 
 by that of an engineer or conductor; or whether a fireman 
 is injured by the negligence of the engineer, or by that of a 
 machinist who is charged with fitting the engine for the 
 road. The company's obligation should be the same in all 
 cases, and it ought to be held liable for the negligence of all 
 employees, or not liable for that of any of its employees, 
 without regard to grade or department of the service. There 
 is no certainty in the decisions unless this rule does obtain 
 and otherwise it is basing a liability upon no reason, con- 
 sistent with the common-law rule, which has stood the test of 
 ages of criticism and has never been improved upon.'" 
 
 15 Foster v. Minnesota, etc., E. Co., 14 Minn. 360; Faulkner v. 
 Erie E. Co., 49 Barb. (N. Y.) 324. 
 
 16 Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. Thomas, 42 Ala. 672; Smoot v. Mobile, etc., 
 R. Co., 67 Ala. 13; Corbett v. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 26 Mo. App. 621; 
 Lewis V. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 59 Mo. 495; Porter v. Hannibal, etc., 
 E. Co., 71 Mo. 78; Hall v. Missouri Pacific Ey. Co., 74 Mo. 298; 
 Schultz V. Pacific R. Co., 36 Mo. 29; Blake v. Maine Central E. Co., 
 70 Me. 60; Brodeur v. Valley Falls R. Co., 16 E. I. "448; 17 Atl. Rep. 
 54; New York, etc., R. Co. v. Bell, 112 Pa. St. 400; 4 Atl. Rep. 50; 
 28 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 338; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Harrington, 62 Texas 
 597; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 571; Grattis v. Kansas City, etc., E. Co., 
 153 Mo. 380; 55 S. W. Rep. 108; 48 L. R. A. 399; 77 Am. St. Rep. 
 721; Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Peterson, 162 U. S. 346; Oakes v. Mase, 
 165 U. S. 363, 
 
 677 
 
§ 479' OOEMPLOYEEd AT COMMON LAW. 
 
 § 479. Employees in separate departments. — In those 
 States where the eonassoeiation idea or department doctrine 
 prevails, the following employees have been held to be in dif- 
 ferent departments of the business, i. e., two employees work- 
 ing for the same employer, but in different employments; ^'' 
 a car loader and a switch tender; ^* an engineer and car in- 
 spector; ^® an express messenger and an engineer; ^^ a mas- 
 ter mechanic and a watchman; ^^ one erecting mail-catchers 
 and the fireman of an engine ; ^^ a person installing new 
 machinery and an employee of the owner thereof; ^* a train 
 dispatcher and an engineer running on his orders ; ^* one 
 repairing the place or appliance and an employee using such 
 place or appliance; ^® a section foreman and train hands; *® 
 a car inspector and a brakeman ; ^'^ an express clerk and the 
 operator of the engine pulling his express car; ^® the fore- 
 man of one switching crew and employees in another crew ; ^® 
 a section foreman and an engineer;*"* a section boss and a 
 
 IT Washburn v. Nashville, etc., E. Co., 3 Head. (Tenn.) 638; Eelyea 
 V. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 112 Mo. 86; 20 S. W. Rep. 480; 53 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Gas. S78. 
 
 18 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Henry, 7 111. App. 322. 
 
 19 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Hoyt, 122 111. 369; 12 N. E. Rep. 225; 31 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 309. 
 
 20 Chamberlain v. Milwaukee, etc., E. Co., 11 Wis. 238. 
 
 21 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Harper, 44 Ark. 524. 
 
 22 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Gregory, 58 111. 272. 
 
 23 Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Laack, 143 111. 242; 32 N. E. Rep. 285. 
 2* Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Young, 26 111. App. 115. 
 
 25Sadowski v. Michigan Car Co., 84 Mich. 100; 47 N. W. Rep. 598. 
 26Drymala y. Thompson, 26 Minn. 40; IN. W. Eep. 255. 
 
 27 Daniels v. Union Pacific R. Co., 6 Utah 357; 23 Pac. Rep. 762. 
 
 28 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. McKenzie, 81 Va. 71 ; 24 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 395. 
 
 29 Armstrong v. Oregon, etc., E. Co., 8 Utah 420; 32 Pac. Eep. 693. 
 aoCalvo v. Charlotte, etc., R. Co., 23 So. Car. 526; 55 Am. Eep. 28; 
 
 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 327; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Weaver, 35 
 Kansas 412; 11 Pac. Eep. 408; 28 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 341, 
 
 678 
 
COEMPLOYEES- AT COMMON LAW. § 479 
 
 brakeman ; ^^ section men and car coupler ; ®* train men on 
 different trains ; ^^ train men of a wild train and employees 
 on a gravel train ; ** engineers in charge of engines belong- 
 ing to different railroads; ^^ train men and car cleaners; ®® 
 train men and quarry laborers ; ®^ train men and employees 
 being transported to tbeir work ; ^* a mechanic and the op- 
 erators of an engine ; ^® the employees on a train and a shop- 
 man ; *" train men and a telegraph operator ; *^ train men and 
 track men ; ^^ a section foreman riding on a freight train 
 and the employees of such train ; *^ a laborer distributing 
 steel rails and the engineer of an engine ; ** a teamster haul- 
 ing ties and an iengineer ; *® an engineer and a trackman, 
 repairing the track ; *® an engineer and a fence builder ; *'' 
 a sub' contractor, for the erection of bridges, and the opera- 
 si Hulehan V. Green Bay, etc., K. Co., 68 Wis. 520; 32 N. W. Rep. 
 529; 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 322. 
 
 32Vautrain v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 8 Mo. App. 538; 78 Mo. 44. 
 
 S3 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Cavens (Ky.), 9 Bush. 559. 
 
 s* Northern Pacific R. Co. v. O'Brien, 1 Wash. 599; 21 Pac. Rep. 32. 
 
 35 Texas, etc., R..Co. v. Baston 2; Texas Civ. App. 378; 21 S. W. 
 Rep. 575. 
 
 36 Devine v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 159 Mass. 348 ; 34 N. E. Rep. 539. 
 
 3T Dixon V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 109 Mo. 413; 19 S. W. Rep. 412; 53 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 589. 
 
 38 Fitzpatrick v. New Albany, etc., R. Co., 7 Ind. 436. 
 
 39 O'Donnell v. Allegheny Valley E. Co., 59 Pa. St. 239. 
 
 *oRyan v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 60 111. 171; 12 Am. Ry. Rep. 327. 
 
 41 East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. DeArmond, 86 Tenn. 73; 5 S. W. 
 Rep. 600; 6 Am. St. Rep. 816. 
 
 42 Parker v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 109 Mo. 362; 19 S. W. Rep. 
 1119, overruled in Grattis v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 153 Mo. 380; 
 55 S. W. Rep. 108; 48 L. R. A. 399; 77 Am. St. Rep. 721. 
 
 43 Peoria, etc., R. Co. v. Rice, 144 IlL 227; 33 N. E. Rep. 951. 
 4*Garrahy v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 25 Fed. Rep. 258. 
 45Hobson v. New Mexico, etc., R. Co. (Ariz.), 11 Pac. Rep. 545; 28 
 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 360. 
 
 « Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Bliss, 6 111. App. 411. 
 iTLpuisville, etc., R. Co. v, Hawthorne, 46 III. App. 635. 
 
I 480 COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. 
 
 tors of a train ; ** a track walker and engineer,*® and a sec- 
 tion hand and an engineer.^" And for an injury to an 
 employee in one of these several departments of the busi- 
 ness, caused by an employee in the other department, in 
 those States where the department idea prevails, the em- 
 ployer is not exempted under the rule of the common law, 
 already discussed. 
 
 § 480. Employees in same department. — Even in those 
 States where the department doctrine prevails, the courts 
 do not agree as to what employees are in the same or distinct 
 departments of the service, but the cases are hopelessly ir- 
 reconcilable on this, as upon other phases of the law of co- 
 employees, as it was administered at common law.®^ It 
 will not be attempted in the small space available for this 
 section, to present all the inconsistent holdings on this rule, 
 
 18 Donaldson v. Mississippi, etc., E. Co., 18 Iowa 280. 
 
 *9 Sullivan v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 97 Mo. 113; 10 S. W. Rep. 
 852; Howard v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 40 Fed. Rep. 195; 41 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 473. 
 
 50 McKenna v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 54 Mo. App. 161. 
 
 A skilled workman employed in a separate room from a common 
 laborer is not the fellow workman of such common laborer where they 
 were not at the time of the accident in a position to exercise an 
 influence over each other promotive of caution for their common 
 safety. Schneider & Co. v. Carlin, 120 111. App. 538. 
 
 The negligence of -a. train crew, in failing to watch out for a brake-, 
 man on the track, who was struck by the train from the rear, is held 
 to be the company's negligence, in Kentucky. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co, 
 V. Hill's Admr., 28 Ky. L. R. 530; 89 S. W. Rep. 523. 
 
 Members of a different crew from that on which the deceased 
 was employed, in charge of a different train, were not fellow workmen 
 with him, in Kentucky. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Hill's Admr., 28 Ky. 
 L. E. 530; 29 S. W. Rep. 523. 
 
 51 For a list of a few of the inconsistent holdings in one State, where 
 the department doctrine was followed for a short time, see Grattis 
 v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 153 Mo. 380; 55 S. W. Rep. 108; 48 
 L. R. A. 399; 77 Am. St. Rep. 721, 
 
 680 
 
COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. § 480 
 
 announced by any one of the States where the doctrine pre- 
 vails, but only a few of the cases will be represented. 
 
 A master machinist, though acting in a distinct depart- 
 ment in making the selection of an engine, has been held to 
 be a coemployee with the operator of the engine ; °^ all of the 
 different employees engaged in the work of constructing a 
 railroad trestle, have been held to be coemployees ; °^ a sec- 
 tion hand under one boss has been held to be in the same 
 department of the service with a section foreman of another 
 crew of men, working for the same company ; ^* a brake- 
 man of one train c];ew, working a switch for his engine, has 
 been held in the same department with the engineer of an- 
 other engine ; ®® one employed to unload cars, was held to be 
 a coemployee with an engineer, who moved his engine and 
 caused an injury to such employee,®^ and in direct opposition 
 to the rule announced in some cases, a tunnel repairer, being 
 transported to his work by a train, has been held to be a co- 
 employee with the operatives of the engine pulling the train 
 on which he was riding.®'^ These inconsistent holdings but 
 illustrate the confusion resulting from the application of 
 the department doctrine, which is noted in a recent Missouri 
 case, which restores the common-law rule in that State and 
 overrules the inconsistent holdings announcing the depart- 
 ment doctrine.^* 
 
 ■52 Cumberland, etc., K. Co. v. State, 44 Mdr 283; 45 Md. 229; Nash- 
 ville, etc., R. Co. V. Jones, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 27; 19 Am. Ry. Rep. 261. 
 
 53Lindvall v. Woods, 41 Minn. 212; 4 L. R. A. 793; 42 N. W. Rep. 
 1020; 39 Am. & Eng. R. Gas. 339. 
 
 04 Clarke v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 132 Ind. 199; 31 N. E. Rep. 808. 
 
 66 Randall v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 109 U. S. 478; 3 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 222; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 243. 
 
 «8 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Keefe, 47 III. 108. 
 
 67 Capper v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 103 Ind. 305; 2 N. E. Rep. 749; 
 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 525. 
 
 68Grattis v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 153 Mo. 380; 55 S. W. Rep. 
 108 J 48 L. R. A. 399; 77 Am." St. Rep. 721. 
 
 681 
 
§ 481 COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. 
 
 § 481. Employees of different companies. — As a general 
 rule, the law applying to coemployees in the same employ- 
 ment does not apply to employees in the service of distinct 
 employments, by separate and distinct companies. 
 
 Accordingly, the porter of one railroad company was held 
 entitled to recover damages for an injury due to the negli- 
 gence of employees in a station of another company ; ®* the 
 right of a fireman, injured by a collision at a railroad cross- 
 ing was held not to be affected by the concurrent negligence 
 of his own engineer, combining with that of the employees of 
 the other railroad company ; ^^ an employee of one company, 
 injured by a defective track of another company, does not 
 assume the risk of such an injury ; ®^ where two companies 
 occupy the same station, the employees of each company 
 are not coemployees ; ^'^ a railroad company was held liable 
 for an injury to an employee by the train of another com- 
 pany running into a hand car, under the charge of its own 
 section foreman,** and a track laborer killed by the negli- 
 gence of employees on the engine of another company, using 
 
 The crews of two different trains on the same road are fellow 
 workmen, in Illinois. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Ring, 119 111. App. 
 294. 
 
 soWarburton v. Great Western E. Co., 2 Ejc 30; 36 L. J. Ex. 9; 
 4 H. & C. 695; 15 W. E. 108; 15 L. T. 361; Philadelphia, etc,, E. 
 Co. V. State, 58 Md. 372; 10 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 792. 
 
 60 Gray v. Philadelphia, etc., E. Co., 24 Fed. Rep. 168; 23 Blatohf. 
 (U. S.) 264; 22 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 351; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. 
 O'Connor, 119 111. 586; 9 N. B. Rep. 263; 19 111. App. 591; Chesapeake, 
 etc., R. Co. V. McMiehael (Ky.), 15 S. W. Rep. 878. 
 
 61 Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. State, 58 Md. 372; 10 Am. & Eng. 
 E. Cas. 792; Vannata v. Central, etc., E. Co., 154 Pa. St. 262; 26 Atl. 
 Rep. 384. 
 
 62Vose V. Lancashire, etc., R. Co., 2 H. & N. 728; 4 Jur. N. S. 364; 
 27 L. J. Ex. 249. 
 
 63 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Kirk, 102 Ind. 399; 1 N. E. Rep. 849; 
 52 Am. Eep. 675. 
 
 663 
 
COEMPLOTEES AT COMMON LAW. § 481 
 
 the track, was held not to be a coemployee of the operators 
 of such engirie.®* 
 
 And the same general rule applies as to employees of a 
 lessor railroad company and the employees of a lessee com- 
 pany, using its track or yards, and such employees are not 
 affected by the rule of fellow service, as it obtained at com- 
 mon law, since the same employer was necessary to consti- 
 tute the two classes of employees coemployees.®^ Neither 
 are the employees of two separate independent contractors, 
 coemployees, within the rule stated ; ®^ or the employees of a 
 railroad company and those of an independent contractor, 
 working for such company,*'^ or the employees of a railroad 
 company, and those of a coal company, or other distinct em- 
 ployer,®* for in all such cases the essential of a common 
 employment is lacking. 
 
 64Noonan v. New -York, etc., K. Co., 131 N. Y. 594; 62 Hun 618; 42 
 N. Y. S. E. 949. 
 
 65Phillipps V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 64 Wis. 475; 25 N. W. Rep. 544; 
 23 Am. & Bng. R. Cas. 453; Zeigler v. Danbury, etc., R. Co., 52 Conn. 
 543; 23 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 400; Catawissa, etc., R. Co. v. Armstrong, 
 49 Pa. St. 186; Sawyer v. Rutland R. Co., 27 Vt. 370; Pennsylvania R. 
 Co. V. Price, 96 Pa. St. 256; 1 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 234; Sullivan v. 
 Tioga, etc., E. Co., 112 N. Y. 634; 20 N. E. Rep. 569; 8 Am. St. Rep. 
 793. 
 
 66 Dixon V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 109 Mo. 413; 19 S. W. Rep. 412; 
 53 Am. &"Eng. R. Cas. 589. 
 
 67 Turner v. Great Eastern R. Co., 33 L. T. 431. 
 
 68 Central R. Co. v. Stoermer, 51 Fed. Rep. 518; 1 U. S. App. 276; 
 2 C. C. A. 360. 
 
 "An arrangement between two railroad companies whereby both uses 
 the tracks owned by one of them, the train employees of both, when 
 running on the tracks, being subject to the train and signal rules and 
 orders of the company owning the tracks, does not make the employees 
 of the owner and licensee fellow workmen, so as to bring them under 
 the rule of law applicable to such relation." Jennings v. Philadelphia 
 & W. Ry. Co. (D. C. 1907), 29 App. (D. C.) 219. 
 
 Employees of an independent contractor and those of the principal, 
 are not fellow workmen. Lookout Mt., etc., Co. v. Lea (Ala.), 39 So. 
 Kep. 1017. 
 
 683 
 
§ 482 COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. 
 
 § 482. Injuries due to incompetency of employees. — A 
 
 railroad company owes its employees the duty of employing, 
 so far as it can, with reasonable care, only competent men, 
 in the management of its road, and those that can be relied 
 upon to execute the rules of the employment, and for a 
 breach of this duty toward its employees, in case of an 
 injury, due to the incompetency of a eoemployee, the em- 
 ployer can be held liable in damages.*® 
 
 This rule does not mean that every neglect, either in the 
 method of doing the work or in the manner of its execu- 
 tion, shall be evidence of fault on the employer's part,''" but 
 the employer is only bound to use the same care in the se- 
 
 " The C. railroad, by which decedent was employed as engineer, used 
 the tracks of defendant company for a certain distance entering Phila- 
 delphia, and decedent, on approaching the junction with a, fast freight, 
 found the tower signal turned against him. He waited six minutes, 
 when a white light was displayed from the tower, signaling his train 
 to proceed, which signal indicated that decedent had the right of way, 
 and that the track to the south was unobstructed. When decedent's 
 train arrived at a point somewhat south of the signal station, it struck 
 the engine and tender of a local freight train belonging to defendant 
 company, which was crossing from the south to the north-bound track, 
 and the engineer of such freight testified that, in violation of the 
 rules, he had been on the south-bound track after cars, without 
 having a man out either ahead or behind Ms train to guard against 
 accidents. Held, that neither the operatives of defendant's train nor 
 the signal man in the tower, all of whom were employed and paid by 
 defendant company, could be regarded as decedent's fellow workmen." 
 Baker v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. (U. S. C. C, Pa. 1907), 149 Fed. 
 Rep. 882. 
 
 69 Coppings V. New York, etc., R. Co., 122 N. Y. 557 ; 25 N. E. Rep. 
 915; 44 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 618; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Petty, 67 
 Miss. 255; 7 So. Rep. 351; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 444; Totten v. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co., 11 J?ed. Rep. 504; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Morgert, 45 Ark. 318; Stafford v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 114 111. 244; 2 
 N. E. Rep. 185; Miller, v. Southern R. Co. 20 Oregon, 285; 26 Pac. Rep. 
 70 ; Dwyer v. American Epress Co., 82 Wis. 307 ; 52 N. W. Rep. 304 ; 
 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 612; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Berry, 67 Texas 238; 
 5 S. W. Rep. 817; 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 147. 
 
 '0 Burns v. Staten Island R. Co., 10 N. Y. S. R. 352; 45 Hun 592, 
 684 
 
COKMPLOYEES AT' COMMON LAW. § 482 
 
 lection of its employees that it uses in the selection of its 
 appliances, and when the company uses due care, in this 
 respect, or when it is reasonably prudent, or uses the same 
 care that reasonably prudent men in the same business use 
 in selecting their employees,''^ it performs the full measure 
 of its duty toward its employees in this regard.''^ 
 
 The company does not warrant the competency of its em- 
 ployees, but the extent of the undertaking is that it will 
 exercise reasonable care in the selection of its employees 
 and if the incompetency of an employee is discovered thi t 
 he will be discharged.''^ If the negligent employee is no 
 shown to have been incompetent,, the company is not liabh 
 for his negligence^ resulting in injury to a coemployee ; '' 
 the selection of the incompetent employee must have been 
 due to the employer's negligence,''* and the incompetency of 
 such employee must then have been the proximate cause of 
 the injury complained of.''® 
 
 Ti Wabash E. Co. v. McDaniels, 107 U. S. 454; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 158; Holden v. FitchbUrg, etc., E. Co., 129 Mass. 268; 37 Am. Eep. 
 343; 2 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 94; Trinity, etc., R. Co. v. Mitchell, 72 Texas 
 609; 10 S. W. Rep. 698; Memphis, etc., R. Co. v. Thomas, 51 Miss. 
 637; Mobile, etc., E. Co. v. Smith, 50 Ala. 245; Williams v. Missouri 
 Pacific E. Co., 109 Mo. 475; 18 S. W. Eep. 1098; Langlois v. Maine 
 Central R. Co., 84 Me. 161; 24 Atl. Rep. 804; Louisville, etc., E. Co. 
 V. Kenley, 92 Tenn. 207; 21 S. W. Rep. 326; Craig v. Chicago, etc., 
 R. Co., 54 Mo. App. 523; Harper v. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co., 47 
 Mo. 567. 
 
 72Evansville, etc., R, Co. v. Guyton, 115 Ind. 450; 17 N. E. Rep. 
 101; 33 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 311; Schauk v. Northern C. R. Co., 25 Md. 
 462; Wonder v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 32 Md. 411. 
 
 73 Columbus, etc., R. Co. v. Troesch, 68 111. 545; Holland v. Ten- 
 nessee, etc., E. Co., 91 Ala. 444; 8 So. Eep. 524; Deppe v. Chicago, etc., 
 E. Co., 36 Iowa 52 ; Moss v. Missouri Pacific Ey. Co., 49 Mo. 167. 
 
 74 Toner v.. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 69 Wis. 188; 31 N. W. Eep. 104; 
 28 Am. & Eng. E, Cas. 449. 
 
 75 Union Pacific E. Co. v. Milliken, 8 Kansas 647 ; Proctor v. Hanni- 
 bal, etc., E. Co., 64 Mo. 112; 9 Am. Ey. Eep. 440. 
 
 76 Gibson v. Pacific R. Co., 46 Mo. 163. 
 
 685 
 
§ 483 COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON lAW. 
 
 § 183. Liability for retention of incompetent or intemperate 
 employee; — A railroad company must exercise the same de- 
 gree of care in the discharge of incompetent or intemperate 
 employees that it exercises in the first instance to prevent the 
 
 For an injury due to thfe neglect of an incompetent conductor, see 
 Zeigler v. Danbury, etc., R. Co., 52 Conn. 543; 23 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 400; Frazier v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 38 Pa. St. 104; Huntington, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Decker, 82 Pa. St. 119; 15 Am. Ry. Rep. 425. 
 
 Company engaging or promoting a conductor tnthout examining him, 
 held negligent, in Evaasville, etc., R. Co. v. Guyton, 110 Ind. 450; 
 17 N. E. Rep. 101; 33 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 311. 
 
 For liability for injury to apprentice in machine shop, for injury 
 by habitually negligent employee, see Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Pere- 
 goy, 36 Kansas 424 ; 14 Pa<!. Rep. 1. 
 
 For injuries due to the placing of an incompetent fireman in Charge 
 of an engine, see Core v. Ohio River R. Co., 38 W. Va. 456; 18 S. E. 
 Rep. 596. 
 
 But employee injured as result of act of an alleged incompetent em- 
 ployee, must always show, either negligence in the original employment 
 of such employee, or that he was retained aiter notice of his in- 
 competency. Cooper V. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 23 Wis. 668. 
 
 " Where an employer neglects to use ordinary care in the selection 
 of his employees, he is answerable for his negligence." Tucker v. 
 American Car & "Foundry Co. (Pa. 1907), 67 Atl. Rep. 616. 
 
 "An employer is only required to exerwse due care in selectang his 
 employees, and is not liable for injuries caused to an employee by 
 reason of the incompetency or inefficiency of a fellow workmen where 
 he exercised such care." Jackson v. Southern Ry. (S. C. 1907), 58 S. 
 E, Rep. 605; 77 S. C. 550. 
 
 " An employee, seeking to recover for injuries sustained in conse- 
 quence of the incompetency of a fellow workman retained by the 
 employer with knowledge Of the facts, must not only prove prior in- 
 competency of the fellow workman of which the employer could have 
 had knowledge, as well ^s the retention by the employer of an in- 
 competent employee, but also that the accident resulting in the injury 
 complained of was occasioned by such incompetency." Cooney v. Com- 
 monwealth Ave. Ry. Co. (Mass. 1907), 81 N. E. Rep. 905. 
 
 " Where a defendant ordered plaintiff to repair an engine, it was 
 defendant's duty to furnish plaintiff competent assistants, who would 
 exercise ordinary care in performing the work." Horton v. Seaboard 
 Air Line Ry. (N. C. 1907), 58 S. E. Rep. 993. 
 
 " If an employer employs competent employees for inspection, and 
 ^ives them reasonable facilities for the work, he will not be liable for 
 686 
 
COemploYees at coMMoiJ law. § 483 
 
 employment of such employees.'''' Where the officers of a 
 railroad company have had their attention 'directed to the in- 
 competency or intemperance of an employee, it is their duty 
 to make careful or frequent im^'estigation as to the fact 
 if he is retained in the service of the company/* and if an 
 iac©mpetent or intemperate employee is knowingly retained 
 in the service and another employee sustains injury as a 
 result thereof, the railroad company is liable for the injury 
 so sustained.''^ The company must not retain in its service 
 employees of such intemperance or incompetency as may 
 likely r^ult in injury to other employees and after Jiotice of 
 such £a,<St, or of facts from which such notice could be had, 
 a liability w-ill result, in case an injury^ is due to such a 
 cause.®" 
 
 the negligent performance of such labor to a fellow workman, unless 
 he knew of the defective manner in which the inspection was eon- 
 ducted." Sage V. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. (Pa. 1907), 67 Atl. Rep. 
 985; 219 .Pa. 129. 
 
 The failure of a railfoad compaMy to have three brakemen, instead 
 of two, on a train Which b*oke in two, is not the proximate cause of an 
 injury to a deceased brakeman from being run over by the backing of 
 the train, which he had gone between. Keefe v. New York Cent., etc., 
 R. Co., 95 N. Y. S. 828; 109 App. Div. 180. 
 
 77 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Wachter, 60 Md. 395; 15 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 187; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Mogart, 45 Ark. 318; Louisville, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Petty, 67 Miss. 255; 7 So. Rep. 351; 41 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 444. 
 
 78 Michigan, etc., R. Co. v. Gilbert, 46 Mick 1765 9 N. W. Rep. 
 243 ; 2 Am. & Eng. R. €as. 230. 
 
 79 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Rice, 51 Ark. 467; 11 S. W. Rep. 699; 
 4 L. R. A. 173; Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Sttipak, 123 Ind. 210; 23 
 N. E. Rep. 246; 41 Am. & Eng, R. Cas. 382; Neilon v. Kansas City, 
 etc., R. Co., 85 Mo. 599; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Gas. 386; Weger v. TPennsyl- 
 vania R. Co., 55 Pa. St. 460. 
 
 so Hobbs V. Atlantic, «tc, R. Co., 107 N. C. -1 ; 12 S. E. Rep. 124 ; 
 Higgins V. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 104 Mo. 413; 16 S. W. ^ep. 409; 
 Coppons V. New York, etc, R. Co., 122 N. Y. 557; 25 N. E. Rep. 915; j 
 44 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 618; Crew v. St. -Louis, etc., R. Co., 20 Eed. 
 Rep. 87. 
 
 687 
 
§ 483 COEMPLOTEES AT COMMON LAW. 
 
 An intemperate person has been held incompetent as a 
 freight conductor and a company is liable for an injury sus- 
 tained by reason of his intemperance and consequent incom- 
 petency after notice of the fact, or of conditions that ought 
 to have led to such knowledge.^^ And it is not essential 
 that actual notice of such incompetency be brought home to 
 the railroad company, if the existence of such fact has con- 
 tinued for a time to enable it, by due care, to have known 
 of the fact of the employee's incompetency.*^ But an em- 
 ployee, competent when employed, is presumed to continue 
 competent until the contrary appears, and the employer is not 
 bound to discharge a former competent employee until notice 
 of the incompetency is derived, or until it has continued for 
 a length of time sufficient to enable him to have acquired 
 such notice, by the exercise of reasonable care on the em- 
 ployer's part.*^ JSTotice to a vice-principal, however, is the 
 same as notice to the employer,** and notice to the injured 
 employee of the incompetency or intemperance of his co- 
 employee will defeat his right of recovery, or constitute 
 negligence on his part, in working with a known incompcr 
 tent employee, to the same extent that it will constitute neg- 
 
 81 Crew V. St. Louis, etc., E. Co. 20 Fed. Rep. 87. 
 
 S2Whittakcr v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 126 N. Y. 544; 27 N. E. Rep. 
 1042. 
 
 S3 Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Stupak, 123 Ind. 210; 23 N. E. Rep. 
 246; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 382; Bonner v. Whitcomb, 80 Texas 178; 
 15 S. W. Rep. 899; Zumwalt v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 35 Mo. App. 661; 
 Lee V. Michigan, etc., R. Co., 87 Mich. 574; 49 N. W. Rep. 909; 48 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 356. 
 
 8*McDermott v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 87 Mo. 285; 28 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 528; id., 73 Mo. 516; 2 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 85; 39 Am. Rep. 
 526; Kidwell v. Houston, etc., R. Co., 3 Woods (U. S.) 313; Frazier v. 
 Pennsylvania R. Co., 38 Pa. St. 104. But notice to a train dispatcher 
 is held not to be notice to the railroad company, of the incompetency 
 of a telegraph operator, in Pennsylvania, in the absence of power to 
 discharge such operator. Reiser v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 152 Pa. St. 
 38; 25 Atl. Rep. 175. 
 
coe:m::plotees at "common law. § 484 
 
 ligence on the employer's part in retaining a known in- 
 competent employee in his service and if an employee know- 
 ingly continues to work with an incompetent employee and 
 the employer had made no promise or assurance in reference 
 thereto, no right of action will accrue for an injury so sus- 
 tained.®^ 
 
 § 484. Who generally deemed coemployees. — According to 
 the rules of the common law, all train men, engaged in the 
 service of a railroad company and at work in the same gen- 
 eral department of the business, or to attain the same com- 
 mon end, such as employees upon the same train, engaged in 
 operating the train, are regarded as coemployees.®* The rule 
 of common service is not generally affected by the fact that 
 some of the employees are actually engaged in the operation 
 
 85 Missouri Furnace Co. v. Abend, 107 111. 44; Kansas Pacific E. Co. 
 V. Peavey, 34 Kansas, 472; 8 Pac. Rep. 780; Dillon v. Union Pacific 
 E. Co., 3 Dill. (U. S.) 319; United States KolUng Stock Co. v. 
 Wilder, 116 111. 100; 5 N. E. Rep. 92; 25 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 414; 
 Wormington v. Atchison, etc., E. Co., 46 Mo. App. 159; Porter v. 
 Western, etc., E. Co., 97 N. C. 66; 2 Am. St. Rep. 272; 2 S. E. Rep. 
 580. And the rule is the same where the Tiegligence is that of a vice- 
 principal. McDermott v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 87 Mo. 285 ; 28 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 528. In New York, an employee injured as a result of the 
 incompetency of a coemployee is denied a recovery, if he had the 
 same or equal means of knowledge as the employer and continued in 
 the service without complaint. Haskin v. New York, etc., R. Co., 
 65 Barb. 129; 56 N. Y. 608. 
 
 The employer's duty about discharging incompetent employees when 
 their incompetency is known, or ought to be, is the same as his duty 
 to employ competent employees, in the first instance. Gulf, C. & S. F. 
 R. Co. V. Hays (Texas), 89 S. W. Rep. 29. 
 
 " Where an employer, after knowledge of incompetency of his em- 
 ployees retains them, he is answerable to a fellow workman for his 
 negligence." Tucker v. American Car & Foundry Co. (Pa. 1907), 67 
 Atl. Eep. 616. 
 
 86Eobinson v. Houston, etc., R. Co., 46 Texas 540; Pease v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. Co., 61 Wis. 163 ; 20 N. W. Rep. 508 ; LePierre v. Chicago, etc., 
 R. Co., 99 Mich. 212; Hoover v. Beach Creek R. Co., 154 Pa. St. 362. 
 1-44 689 
 
§ 485 COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. 
 
 of the train, while others are not so engaged, but are upon 
 the train to render services of a different character,**'^ or by 
 the fact that' some are given superintendence or power of con- 
 trol over the others, unless the injury to one of the subor- 
 dinate employees is occasioned by the superior employee in 
 the doing or failure to do some one of the nondelegable duties 
 of the employer ; ** but in some of the States this rule does 
 not obtain and the employer is held liable for an injury to a 
 subordinate employee, when the injury results from the neg- 
 lect of some one of the employees entrusted with power of 
 supervision, regardless of the character of the act causing 
 the injury,^^ and upon the nature of the wrongful acts for 
 which the employer is responsible and also upon the propo- 
 sition who will be regarded as employees and who as repre- 
 sentatives of the employer, the authorities are in most ir- 
 reconcilable conflict, in the different States.*-" 
 
 § 485. Nature of service the proper test. — Under various 
 modifications, the list of modern text writers, without excep- 
 tion, confine themselves to the indefinite statement that all 
 are coemployees who " engage in the same common pur- 
 suit, under the same general control," or use similar 
 
 87 Heine v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 58 Wis. 525; 17 N. W. Eep. 420; 
 Howland v. Milwaukee, etc., E. Co., 54 Wis. 226; Sullivan v. Toledo, 
 etc., E. Co., 58 Ind. 26; Cassidy v. Maine, etc., E. Co., 76 Me. 488. 
 
 88 Green v. Louisville, etc., E. Co., 94 Ky. 169; Patton v. Western, 
 etc., E. Co., 96 N. Car. 455; Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Lelir, 86 
 Tenn. 335. 
 
 89 Lake Shore, etc., E. Co. v. Spangler, 44 Ohio St. 471 ; Chicago, etc., 
 E. Co. V. Snyder, 117 111. 376. 
 
 ooGrattis v. Kansas City, etc., E. Co., 153 Mo. 380; 55 S. W. Rep. 
 108; 77 Am. St. Eep. 721; 48 L. E. A. 399. 
 
 " All serving a common employer, working under the same control, 
 deriving authority and compensation from the same source, and en- 
 gaged in the same general business, though in diiJerent grades or de- 
 partments, are fellow workmen." Southern Ey. Co. v. Smith (Va. 
 1907), 59 S. E. Eep. 372. 
 
 690' 
 
COEMPLOYEES Af COMMOiT LAW. §485 
 
 indefinite expressions to indicate just who will be and 
 who will not be regarded as coemployees.®^ These defini- 
 tions are so general that they are not found of practical serv- 
 ice by the practitioner. Confusion arises in determining 
 what is the " same common pursuit," etc., and the definitions 
 do not define this unknown term. While it is said that it is 
 not the rank of the employee or his authority over others, 
 which determines whether or not he is an employee or vice- 
 principal, but that the nature of the service is the proper 
 test for solving this vexed question, it is not often intimated 
 what service will determine when a given employee is a vice- 
 principal or when he is a coemployee.®^ 
 
 The acts of service which make him a representative of the 
 employer are those acts which the employer has agreed, or the 
 law compells him to perform for the safety of his employees. 
 Among these acts may be mentioned those of furnishing 
 reasonably safe places, machinery and appliances; the exer- 
 cise of reasonable care to keep the machinery or appliances 
 or place of work, in repair ; ®^ the exercise of reasonable care 
 
 oiCooley on Torts, p. 541, and note; 2 Thompson on Neg., § 31, p. 
 1026; 3 Wood's Ey. Law, § 338; Beach, Con. Neg., § 115, p. 338; 
 Howard v. Denver, etc., E. Co., 24 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 448, and note. 
 
 02Krogg V. Atlanta, etc., E. Co., 77 Ga. 202; 4 Am. St. Eep. 79; 
 Sullivan v. New York, etc., E. Co., 62 Conn. 209; 25 Atl. Eep. 711; 
 Webb V. Denver, etc., E. Co., 7 Utah 363; 26 Pac. Eep. 981; Wellman 
 V. Oregon, etc., E. Co., 21 Oregon 530; 28 Pac. Eep. 625; Chicago, etc., 
 E. Co. V. May, 108 111. 288; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 320; Hofnagle v. 
 New York, etc., E. Co., 55 N. Y. 608 ; Krueger v. Louisville, etc., E. Co., 
 Ill Ind. 51; 11 N. E. Eep. 957; 31 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 329; Justice 
 V. Pennsylvania E. Co., 130 Ind. 321; 30 N. E. Eep. 303; 53 Am. & 
 Eng. E. Cas. 604; Davis v. Southern Pacific^ E. Co., 98 Cal. 19; 32 
 Pac. Eep. 708. 
 
 93 6eoghehan v. Atlas, etc., Co., 51 N. Y. S. E. 868; 22 N. Y. Supp." 
 749; Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. May, 108 III. 288; 15 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 
 320; Nail v. Louisville, etc., E. Co., 129 Ind. 260; 28 N. E. Eep. 183; 
 48 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 309; Kirk v. Atlanta, etc., E. Co. (N. C), 25 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 507, and monographic note, on criterion of fellow- 
 
 691 
 
§485 ' COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. 
 
 to employ and retain sufficient careful and competent em- 
 ployees to properly perform tke 'work of the employer; ** 
 
 workmen in 25 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 513, to 522, and 44 Am. & Eng. E. 
 Cas. 606, and 54 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 364, and cases cited. 
 
 9* Nix V. Texas, etc., B. Co,, 82 Texas 473; 18 S. W. Eep. 571; Core 
 V. Ohio Eiver E. Co., 38 W. Va. 456; 18 S. E. Eep. 596; Anderson v. 
 Bennett, 16 Oregon 515; 19 Pac. Eep. 765; 8 Am. St. Eep. 311; 38 Am. 
 & Eng. E. Cas. 87; Pullman Car Co. v. Laack, 143 111. 242; 32 N. E. 
 Eep. 285; Lewis v. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 59 Mo. 495; Colorado Midland 
 E. Co. V. Naylon, 17 Colo. 501; 30 Pac. Eep. 248; EUedge v. National 
 City E, Co., 100 Cal. 282; 34 Pac. Eep. 720. 
 
 In the following cases, where the employer had delegated to an agent, 
 the performance of some of the nondelegable duties imposed upon the 
 employer by law, it was held that the injured employee could re- 
 cover for breach of the duty so imposed. Indiana Car Co. v. 
 Parker, 100 Ind. 181; Hannibal, etc., E. Co. v. Fox, 31 Kansas 586; 
 3 Pac. Eep. 320; 15 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 325; Atchison, etc., E. Co. 
 V. McKee, 37 Kansas 592; 15 Pac. Eep. 484; Fisher v. Oregon, etc., 
 E. Co., '22 Oregon 533; 30 Pac. Eep. 425; 16 L. E. A. 519; 53 Am. & 
 Eng. E. Cas. 539. 
 
 The duty of providing safe track and roadbed was held'to be a non- 
 delegable duty, in Mobile, etc., E. Co. v. Smith, 59 Ala. 245; Fisher 
 V. Oregon, etc., E. Co., 22 Oregon 533; 30 Pac. Eep. 425; 16 L. E. A. 
 519; 53 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 539. 
 
 The duty of furnishing reasonably safe machinery and appliances, 
 was likewise held to be nondelegable, in Pennsylvania E. Co. v. 
 Whitman, 111 Ind. 212; 12 N. E. Eep. 380; 31 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 149; 
 Brown V. Minneapolis, etc., E. Co., 31 Minn. 553; 18 N. W. Eep. 834; 
 Atchison, etc., E. Co. v. McKee, 37 Kansas 592 ; 15 Pac. Eep. 484. 
 
 Agents, exercising power of discharging and 'hiring employees were 
 herd to be vice-principals, in Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. May, 108 111. 
 288; 15 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 320; Colorado Midland E. Co. v. O'Brien, 
 16 Colo. 219; 27 Pac. Eep. 701; 48 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 235; Baldwin 
 V. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 75 Iowa 297; 39 N. W. Eep. 507; St. Louis, 
 etc., E. Co. V. Lemon, 83 Texas 148; 18 S. W. Eep. 331; Eriekson v. 
 Milwaukee, etc., E. Co., 93 Mich. 414 ; 53 N. W. Eep. 393 ; Hamilton v. 
 Iron Mountain E. Co., 4 Mo. App. 564 ; Webb v. Eichmond, etc., E. Co., 
 ■97 N. C. 387; ^ S. E. ^ep. 440; Palmer v. Michigan, etc., E. Co., 93 
 Mich. 363; 53 N. W. Eep. 397; Criswell -v. Pittsburg, etc., E. Co., 
 30 W. Va. 798; 6 S. E. Eep. 31; 33 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 232; Euss v. 
 Wabash E. Co., 112 Mo. 45; 20 S. W. Eep. 472; Smith v. Sioux City 
 E. Co., 15 Neb. 583; 19 N. W. Eep. 638; 17 Am. & Eng. B. Cas. 561. 
 
 Employees in full charge and control of other employees were held 
 692 
 
COEMELOYEES AT COMMOlSr XA.W. § 486 
 
 the promulgation of reasonable and proper rtdea and regula- 
 tions ta carry on the busineas of the employer and, the exer- 
 cise of reasonable care to warn or instruct a known youthful 
 or iQ«xpeiieiiced employe in the perila of the business-, of 
 which he is ignorant, but liiEly to sustain injury. It may 
 be quite definitely stated that in the performance of any of 
 these specific duties, according to the maxims qui facit per 
 aliwn facit per se and respondeat superior^ the employee is 
 held to act as the agent of the employer and will be held to 
 be a vice-principal, but as to all other duties in the common 
 service, an employee is to be regarded as a coemployee and 
 not the agent of the employer. 
 
 § 486. Division superintendent, roadmaster and other di- 
 vision officers. — As the superintendents of divisions of a 
 railroad are generaEy the ranking ofiicers of such division 
 and the other employees on such division are subject to their 
 orders, such superintendents are generally held to be vice- 
 principals and not coemployees with the men under their 
 control.®^ 
 
 The same rule applies to roadmasters, who are generally 
 in charge of the track and roadbed within their respective, 
 divisions, and as to such officers and agents, those working 
 upon the roadbed or track are subject to the orders and con- 
 to be acting for the employer, in Gravelle v. Minneapolis, etc., E. Co., 
 
 3 McCrary (U. S.) 352; 10 Fed. Eep. 711; Northern Pacific E. Co. 
 V. Peterson, 51 Fed. Eep. 182^ Hunn v. Michigan, etc., E. Co., 78 
 Mich. 513; 44 N. W. Eep. 502; 7 L. E. A. 500; 41 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 
 452; Wabash E. Co. v. Hawk, 121 111. 259; 12 N. E. Eep. 253; 31 
 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 306; Kansas City, etc., E. Co. v. Bmrton, 97 Ala. 
 240; 12 So. Eep. 82; 53 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 115; Moore v. Wabash 
 E. Co., 85 Mo. 588; 21 Am. & Eng; E. Cas. 509; Miller v. Missouri 
 Pacific Ey. Co., 109 Mo. 350; 19 S. W. Eep; 58; 53 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 
 5!j8. 
 
 85 Louiaviile, etc., E. Co. v. Heck,. 151. Ind, 292; 50 N. E. Eep. 988; 
 
 4 Thompson, on Negligence, § 5120. 
 
 693 
 
§ 486 COEMPLOTEES AT COMMON LAW. 
 
 trol of the roadmasters ; the subordinates are not generally 
 held to be coem'ployees, but subordinates of such roadmas- 
 ters.»« 
 
 But while the roadmaster is generally held to be a vice- 
 principal as toward the men subject to his orders in the re- 
 pair of the track or roadbed, this rule is not of universal 
 application. In a Texas case ^"^ the roadmaster is regarded 
 merely as a superior employee, engaged in the same common 
 service, which w^uld leave the men working under him, co- 
 employees, and not subordinates pf such roadmaster and a 
 similar holding was announced in a ]\finnesota case.®® The 
 roadmaster's act in misplacing a switch, whereby an engineer 
 and fireman were injured, is held to be the act of a coem- 
 ployee, in a Massachusetts case,®® and in Texas, the road- 
 master was so far regarded as a coemployee of the engineer 
 and fireman of a train, as to relieve the railroad company 
 from liability for an injury due tp the negligence of such 
 engineer and fireman.^ 
 
 86 Browning v. Wabash E. Co., 124 Mo. 55; 27 S. W. Rep. 644; Atchi- 
 son, etc., E. Co. V. Moore, 31 Kansas 197. 
 
 »7 Galveston, etc. E. Co. v. Smith, 76 Texas 611; 13 S. W. Eep. 562. 
 
 88 Brown v. Winona, etc., R. Co., 27 Minn. 162. 
 
 9» Walker v. Boston, etc., E. Co., 128 Mass. 8. 
 
 1 Gulf, etc., E. Co. V. Ryan, 69 Texas 665; 7 S. W. Eiep. 83. 
 
 A division superintendent is not a coemployee of a car inspector, but 
 is a, vice-principal. Shuster v. Philadelphia, etc., Co. (Del.), 62 Atl. 
 Eep. 689. 
 
 A superintendent of a division of a railroad was held to be a vice- 
 principal as to employees subject to his orders, in Galveston, etc., 
 E. Co. Co. V. Arispe, 81 Texas 517; 17 S. W. Eep. 47; 48 Am. & Eng. 
 E. Cas. 350; Denver, etc., E. Co. v. Driscoll, 12 Colo. 520; 21 Pae. 
 Eep. 708; 38 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 105; Dobbin v. Richmond, etc., R. 
 Co., 81 N. Car. 446; Cook v. Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 63 Mo. 397; 
 Kansas Pacific E. Co. v. Little, 19 Kansas 267; 17 Am. Ey. Rep. 455; 
 Colorado Midland R. Co. v. Naylon, 17 Colo. 501; 30 Pac. Eep. 249; 
 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. McLallen, 84 111. 109. 
 
 " A roadmaster of a railroad in discharging his duty of seeing that 
 a portion of the track was in good and safe condition was not a fellow 
 694 
 
COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. § 487 
 
 § 48Y. Employees upon different railway trains. — Under 
 the common-law definition of the term coemployees, it would 
 seem that there could be no difference in the views entertained 
 by the various courts, upon the proposition that all employees 
 upon the same railroad and in the same service would be held 
 to be coemployees, so that the employer would not be respon- 
 sible for an injury caused by one of such employees, to an- 
 other, although the employee causing the injury and the in- 
 jured person are at work upon different trains, as all are 
 engaged in ^attaining the same common object, for the same 
 employer. And perhaps a majority of the courts hold this 
 view of the nonliability of the railroad company for an injury 
 to one employee upon a train or engine, caused by another 
 employee on a different engine or train of cars.^ But some 
 
 workman with a locomotive fireman." Chicago, R. I. & P. Ey. Co. v. 
 Birk (Tex, Civ. App. 1907), 99 S. W. Eep. 753. 
 
 " Plaintiffs' intestates, their foremen, and defendant's roadmaster. 
 were all engaged in removing debris from defendant's track, caused by 
 a landslide into a cut. During the afternoon one of the section fore- 
 men had been warned that the adjoining mountain side was dangerous, 
 and in the evening the roadmaster stated, in the hearing of those 
 present, that he had examined the mountain side before dark and that 
 it was all right. Thereafter several of the employees were killed by a 
 rock which rolled down the side of the mountain during the night. 
 Eeld, that all engaged in the work were fellow workmen." Maloney v. 
 Florence, etc., R. Co. (Colo. 1907), 89 Pac. Rep. 649; Allen v. Same, id. 
 
 Although a roadmaster is placed in charge of all work in handling 
 gravel on a, railroad, this would not make him a vice-principal as to 
 those handling the train that hauled the gravel, as it is generally 
 understood that the operatives of the train would have control thereof 
 and the roadmaster only supervise the loading of gravel and such 
 matters. Vinson v. Los Angeles & Pac. R. Co., 147 Cal. 479; 82 Pac. 
 Rep. 53. 
 
 2Schaub V. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 106 Mo. 74; 16 S. W. Rep. 924; 
 Relyea v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 112 Mo. 86; 20 S. W. Eep. 480; 
 18 L. R. A. 817; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 578; Maher v. Union Pacific 
 R. Co., 106 Fed. Rep. 309^ 45 C. C. A. 301; Beaumont v. Northern 
 Pacific E. Co., 109 Fed. Eep. 532; 48 C. C. A. 529; Eandall v. Balti- 
 more, etc., E. Co., 109 U. S. 478; Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Donnelly, 
 
 695 • 
 
§ 488 COEMPLOtEES A-T COMMON LA.W. 
 
 of the courts that adhere to the modern refinements of the 
 common-law doctrine of coservice, or enforce what is com- 
 monly known, as the department or conassociation theory, do 
 not follow this rule and in such States the railroad company 
 is held responsible for an injury to one employee, although 
 engaged to a,ttain the same common object as another em- 
 ployee, causing his injury, if the two employees, at the tims 
 of the accident, were engaged upon separate trains or enr 
 gines.* 
 
 § 488. Train despatcher and other employees. — As a gen- 
 eral rule a train despatcher, who. gives orders for the move- 
 ment of trains, is not' regarded as a coemployee with the 
 employees in the other department of the service whose duties 
 are to obey the orders given and operate the trains in ac- 
 cordance with the despatcher's orders.* Prescribing the. 
 
 88 Va. 853; 14 S. E. Eep. 692; Swisher v. lUinofs, etc., R. Co., 182 
 111. 533; 55 N. E. Eep. 555; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Thompson, 99 111. 
 App. 277; Pleasants v. Raleigh, etc., R. Co., 121 N. Car. 492; 28 S. E. 
 Rep. 267; 61 Am. St. Rep. 674; McMaster v. Illinois, etc., E. Co., 65 
 Miss. 264; 4 So. Rep. 59; 7 Am. St. Rep. 653; Peaslee v. Fitchburg, 
 etc., R. Co., 152 Mass. 155; 25 N. E. Rep. 71; Jarman v. Chicago, etc., 
 R. Co., 98 Mich. 135; 57 N. W. Rep. 32; MacCarthy v. Whitcomb, 110 
 Wis. 113; 85 N. W. Rep. 707. 
 
 3 Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Mase, 63 Fed. Rep. 113; 11 C. C. A. 63; 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. House, 172 111. 601; 50 N. E. Rep. 151; San 
 Antonio, etc., R. Co. v. Harding, 11 Texas Civ. App. 497; 33 S. W. Rep. 
 373; 3 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 389; Gktodman v. Deleware, etc., 
 Co., 167 Pa. St. 332; 31 Atl. Rep. 670; Freeman v. Illinois, etc., R. 
 Co., 107 Tenn. 340; 64 S. W. Rep. 1. 
 
 4 Smith V. Wabash R. Co., 92 Mo. 359; Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Elliott, 102 Fed. Rep. 96; 42 C. C. A. 188; Clyde v. Richmond, etc., 
 R. Co., 69 Fed. Rep. 673; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Ross, 112 U. S. 
 377; 28 L. Ed. 787; Sheehan v. New York, etc., R. Co., 91 N. Y. 332; 
 Hankins v. New York, etc., R. Co., 142 N. Y. 416; 37 N. E. Rep. 
 466; 59 N. Y. S. R. 802; 25 L. R. A. 396; Hannibal, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Kinealy, 39 Kansas 1; Hunn v. Michigan, etc., R. Co., 78 Mich. 513; 
 44 N. W. Rep. 502; 7 L. R. A. 500; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 452; Little 
 Rock, etc., R. Cp, v, Barry, 68 Ark. 198; 23 S. W. Rep. 1097; 25 L. 
 
 696 
 
COEMPLOYEJBS AT COMMON LAW. § 488 
 
 movements of trains in the various classes of the service ; the 
 indication to the operatives of the trains at which stations 
 they shall stop and the length of the stops and the schedule 
 time upon which the various trains shall run, is so far within 
 the nondelegable duty of the employer to adopt a reasonably 
 safe method or system to his business, when so complicated 
 as the running of different trains, manned by many different 
 employees, upon the same railroad, as to make these func- 
 tions peculiarly those of a nondelegable character, for a neg- 
 lect of which the employer ought to be held answerable.^ 
 
 But as all employees, at common law, engaged in the same 
 common undertaking, in the service of the same employer, 
 without regard to the department or station occupied, were 
 regarded as coemployees, according to the common-law rule, 
 it would seem that a train despatcher, who gives orders for 
 the movement of trains and the employees who move the 
 trains in pursuance to such orders, are so far engaged to at- 
 tain the same object, as to make them fellow employees, 
 within the rule that the employer is not responsible for an 
 injury, resulting from the neglect of the train despatcher 
 and this rule is followed in many States,® where the prinei- 
 
 R. A. 396; Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. McLain, 94 111.. 109; McKune v. Cali- 
 fornia, etc., E. Co., 66 CaL 302; Louisville, etc., E. Co.. v. Heck, 
 151 Ind. 292; 50 N. B. Rep. 988; 11 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. (N. S.) 
 382. 
 
 8 4 Thompson oil Negligeneei § 5020, and cases cited. 
 
 6 Price V. Detroit, etc., E. Co., 145 U. S. 651 ; Evans v. Atlantic, etc., 
 E. Co., 62 Mo. 49; Blessing v. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 77 Mo. 410 
 Millsap v. Louisville, etc., E. Co., 69 Miss. 423; 13 So. Eep. 696 
 Houston, etc., E. Co. v. Stewart, 92 Texas 540; 50 S. W. Eep. 333 
 Norfolk, etc., E. Co. v. Hoover, 79 Md. 253; 29 Atl. Rep. 994; 25 L. E. 
 A. 710. 
 
 "A train despatcher, whose duty it is to issue telegraphic orders for 
 movements of trains in the name of the superintendent, and to see that 
 they are transmitted, is not a fellow workman of a fireman on one 
 of the locomotives." Eieker v. Central E. Co. (N. J. 1906), 64 AtL 
 Eep. 1068. 
 
 697 
 
§ 489 COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. 
 
 pies of the common law have not been set aside by modern 
 refinements and theories. 
 
 § 489. Local telegraph operator and trainmen. — The fed- 
 eral courts, which follow the common-law, quite generally 
 hold that a local telegraph operator, who receives and de- 
 livers the orders of the train despatcher, with reference to 
 
 "A car dispatcher, having not only control of the motormen and 
 conductors of an interurban electric railway, but also control of the 
 cars and their operation, is not a fellow workman of the motormen 
 and conductors, but is a vice-principal." Edge v. Southwest Missouri 
 Electric Ey. Co. (Mo. 1907), 104 S. W. Rep. 90. 
 
 " The plaintiff, a fireman, was injured in an accident and the question 
 arose whether if the cause of the accident was the negligence of a train 
 despatcher in giving orders which made the accident possible, the plain- 
 tiff was precluded from recovering. The court holds that the duties 
 of the train despatcher come within that class which the employer 
 is required to perform, and for which he cannot avoid responsibility 
 by delegation to an employee; that, therefore, the train despatcher 
 is not a fellow workman of the plaintiff, within the rule. The court 
 points out that the decisions of the federal courts and a large number 
 of the States are in accordance with this decision, while in Maryland 
 and Mississippi decisions are the other way." Eicker v. Central Rail- 
 road Co. (N. J.), 64 Atl. Rep. 1068. 
 
 " Defendant railroad company was engaged in constructing a railroad 
 on which trains west of C. were operated under bulletin orders issued 
 by defendant's trainmaster. An order was issued that all east-bound 
 work trains should have right of way over west-bound trains between 
 12 o'clock noon and 12 o'clock midnight and vice versa between 12 
 o'clock midnight and 12 o'clock noon. On the day of the accident 
 plaintiff, as engineer, was running an extra east-bound train about 
 60 miles west of C, and at 1 o'clock p. m. his train, having the right 
 of way under such orders, was run into by a west-bound train in charge 
 of the trainmaster as foreman in charge of a crew of laborers. The 
 latter train was run at a high rate of speed on a crooked track through 
 a rough and mountainous country, and no flagman was put out or 
 any steps taken to protect plaintiff's east-bound train. Held, that the 
 negligence of the trainmaster in permitting his train to be run in 
 violation of the bulletin was negligence in his capacity as vice-principal, 
 and not as plaintiff's fellow workman, for which the railroad com- 
 pany was responsible." Morrison v. San Pedro & S. L. R. Co. (Utah 
 1907), 88 Pac. Eep. 998. 
 
 698 
 
COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. § 489 
 
 the stops to be made by a given train and the schedule time 
 upon which the train shall be run, to the persons in charge 
 of the train and engine, is a coemployee of the train men in 
 charge of the train and other employees on the train, so that 
 the railroad company is not responsible for an injury to an 
 engineer or other employees on the train, due to the collision 
 of the train with another train or engine on the same track, 
 caused by the negligence of the local telegraph operator in 
 the failure to repeat the orders, or in giving the wrong order 
 with reference to the "movement of the train.'' This rule is 
 
 A railroad company will not be relieved of the charge of negligence 
 for an injury in a head-on collision, by the mere promulgation by the 
 dispatcher, of proper orders, if he learned of the failure to comply 
 with such orders in time to have issued new orders and thus have 
 avoided the collision. Santa Fe Pac. E. Co. v. Holmes, 202 U. S. 438; 
 50 L. Ed. 1094. 
 
 But no charge of negligence can be sustained on the fact that a 
 train dispatcher acted upon the information he received by telegram, 
 from local operators. Northern Pac. Ey. Co. v. Dixon (Minn.), 139 
 Fed. Eep. 737. 
 
 A train dispatcher was held to be a vice-principal, in Lewis v. 
 Seifert, 116 Pa. St. 628; 11 Atl. Eep. 514; McKune v. California, etc., 
 R. Co., 66 Cal. 302; 17 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 589; Hunn v. Michigan, 
 etc., E. Co., 78 Mich. 513; 44 N. W. Eep. 502; 7 L. E. A. 500; 41 
 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 452; McChesney v. Panama E. Co., 49 N. Y. S. E. 
 148; 21 N. Y. Supp. 207; Lasky v. Canadian Pacific E. Co., 83 Me. 
 461; 22 Atl. Eep. 367; Smith v. Wabash E. Co., 92 Mo. 359; 4 S. W. 
 Eep. 129; 31 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 331; Darrigan v. New York, etc., R. 
 Co., 52 Conn. 285; 52 Am. Eep. 590; 23 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 438; 
 Phillipps V. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 64 Wis. 475; 25 N. W. Eep. 544; 23 
 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 453. 
 
 But a train dispatcher was held to be a coemployee with trainmen, 
 in Blessing v. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 77 Mo. 410; 7 Mo. App. 594; 
 15 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 298; Hankins v. New York, etc., E. Co., 55 
 Hun 51; 28 N. Y. S.E. 59; 8 N. Y. Supp. 272; Eobertson v. Terre 
 Haute, etc., E. Co., 78 Ind. 77 ; 41 Am. Eep. 552 ; 8 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 
 175; Slater v. Jewett, 85 N. Y. 61; 39 Am. Eep. 627; 5 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 515. 
 
 7 Illinois Central E. Co. v. Bentz, 99 Fed. Eep. 657; 40 C. C. A. 56; 
 Oregon, etc., E. Co. v. Ffpst, 74 Fed. Eep. 965; 21 C. C. A. 186; 44 
 U. S. Appl 606; Baltimore, etc., E. Co. v. Camp, 65 Fed. Eep. 952; 
 
§ 490 COEMPLOYEES AT COMMOM' LAW. 
 
 also followed in a great many of the States in the United 
 States.* 
 
 But in some other jurisdictions, a telegraph operator is held 
 to occupy the same position as a train despatcher and is re- 
 garded as so far in a distinct department of the service and 
 exercising such power of supervision or control over the 
 train men, as to render the railroad company liable for an 
 injury to any of the train men,, caused by a collision, result- 
 ing from the neglect of the telegraph operator.® 
 
 § 490. Switchmen, track repairers and trainmen.-^— In ju- 
 risdictions where the common-law rule of common service 
 has been modified by the department doctrine or the conasso- 
 
 13 C. C. A. 233; McKaig v. Northern Pacific E. Co., 42 Eed. Kep. 288; 
 Price V. Detroit, etc., R. Co., 145 U. S. 651. 
 
 A local operator is a feUow workman with train crew and company 
 not liable for his failure to report a train to dispatcher, in the 
 federal courts. Northern Pac. E. Co. v. Dixon, 139 Fed. Eep. 737. 
 
 s Eeiser v. Pennsylvania E. Co., 152 Pa. St. 38; Blessing v. St. Louis, 
 etc., E. Co., 77 Mo. 410; Evans v. Atlantic, etc., B. Co., 62 Mo. 49; 
 Monaghan v. New York, etc., R. Co., 9 N. Y, S. E. 672; 45 Hun 113. 
 
 The negligence of a local agent and telegraph operator, in reporting, 
 a dispatch, properly delivered to him, is the negligence of a fellow 
 workman of a fireman, who is killed by a. collision, as a result of 
 Buch negligence- and no recovery for such death can be had, in. the 
 federal court. Northern Pac. E. Co. v. Dixon, 194 U. S. 338; 48 L.. 
 Ed. 1006. 
 
 » Flannegan v. Chesapeake, etc., E. Co., 40 W. Va. 436 ; 2L S. B. Eep. 
 1028; East Tennessee, etc., E. Co. v. DeAnnond, 86 Tenn. 73; 5 S. W. 
 Eep. 600; 6 Am. St. Eep. 816. 
 
 A telegraph operator was held to be a coemployee with men operat- 
 ing a train, in Dana v. New York, etc., E. Co., 23 Hun (N. Y.) 473; 
 Monaghan v. New York, etc., B. Co., 45 Hun 113; 9 N. Y. S. E. 672; 
 McKaig V. Northern Pacific E. Co., 42 Fed. Rep. 288; Cincinnati, etc., 
 E. Co. v. Clark, 57 Fed. Eep. 125; Reiser v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 
 152 Pa. St. 38; 25 Atl. Rep. 175. 
 
 But a telegraph operator was held not to be a fellow workman with 
 train crew, in Illinois, etc., R. Cd. v. Hunter, 70 Miss. 471; 12 So. 
 Rep. 482; Sheehan v. New York, etc., R. Co., 91 N. Y. 332; 12 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 235; Hall v. Galveston, etc., R. Co., 39 Fed. Rep. 18. 
 TOO 
 
COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. | 490 
 
 ciation id^a, those engaged in other departments of the busi- 
 ness, such as -repairing the tracks,^" tending the switches ^^ 
 and such like work,^^ would not be held to be coemployees 
 with the train men, engaged in the management and operation 
 of the trains, because not so situated as to enable the train- 
 men to observe their work and avoid the consequences of 
 their negligence. 
 
 In States where the eommon-law rule of coemployees ob- 
 tains, however, as the track men,'^ switch tenders,^* bridge 
 builders or repairers ^^ and baggage men,^® are all engaged 
 
 10 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Swan, 176 111. 424; 52 N. E. Eep. 916; 
 12 Am. & Bng. E. Caa. (N. S.) 674; Missouri, etc., E. Co. t. Hines 
 (Texas), 40 8. W. Rep. 152. 
 
 11 Missouri, etc., E. Co. v. Hines, supra; Davis v. Central Vermont, 
 etc., R. Co., 55 Vt. 84; 45 Am. Rep. 590; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Swan, 176 HI. 424; 52 N. E. Rep. 916; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 
 674. 
 
 12 Bridge buihieis and trainmen are held not to be fellow employees, 
 in Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Hines (Texas), 40 S. W. Eep. 152. See, 
 also, Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Pontius, 157 U. S. 209; 39 L. Ed. 675. 
 
 13 St. Xouis, etc., R. Co. v. Henson, 61 Ark. 302; 32 S. W. Rep. 1079. 
 1* Roberts v. Ciicago, etc., JR. Co., 33 Minn. 218. 
 
 15 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Welsh, 72 Texas 298; 10 S. W. Rep. 529; 
 2 L. R. A. 839. 
 
 16 San Antonio, etc., E. Co. v. "Taylor (Texas), 35 S. W. Rep. 855. 
 
 A switchman and Tarakeman are heli to be fellow workmen, in Wash- 
 ington. Stevick V. Northern Pae. R. Co., 39 Wash. 501; 81 Pac. 
 Eep. 999. 
 
 A track repairer xind trainmen were held to be coemployees, in the 
 following cases: Heine v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 58 Wis. 525; Howland 
 V. Milwaukee, etc., E. Co., 54 Wis. 226; Slavens v. Northern Pacific 
 R. Co., 97 Fed. Eep. 255; 38 C. D. A. 151; Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Martin, 7 N. M. 158; 34 Pac. Rep. 536. But see, contra, Miller v. 
 Missouri, etc., E. Co., 109 Mo. 350; 19 S. W. Rep. 58; Chicago, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Lundstrom, 16 Neb. 354; 49 Atn. Rep. 718; Haney v. Pitts- 
 hurg, etc., E. Co., 38 W. Va. 570; 18 S. E. Rep. 748. 
 
 And a car repairer and trainmen are held to be coemployees, in 
 Ohio, in Johnson v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co., 11 Ohio C. C. 553. 
 
 A yard master, in Charge of a yard, and a brakeman and conductor, 
 are fellow workmen of a car inspector, whose duty it is to examine 
 
 701 
 
§ 491 COEMPLOYEES AT COMMOIT LAW. 
 
 in the same common object of the employer's service, there 
 is held to be no liability on the employer's part, for an in- 
 jury to a train man because of the neglect of any of these 
 other employees, because, by the contract of employment, 
 the neglect of such employees as are competent, is assumed, 
 as one of the ordinary risks of the business. 
 
 § 491. Conductors and other employees. — The Supreme 
 Court of the United States has held that a conductor of a 
 railway train is not, because of his control of the train, to 
 be regarded as a vice-principal, but being engaged in the 
 same common object as the other employees of the company 
 on the same train, he is, under the common-law rule, a co- 
 employee of the other train men, and that for an injury due 
 to his negligent act, the railroad company is not responsible 
 to another of the employees on the same train.^'' This rule 
 is followed in a majority of the States, where the common- 
 law rule has not been modified by statutory enactments, or 
 by refinements introduced by the courts themselves, and the 
 
 cars and see if they are safe for use. Shuster v. Philadelphia, etc., E. 
 Co. (Del.), 62 Atl. Rep. 689. 
 
 A railroad yard foreman is held not to be a fellow workman of a 
 switchman, in Kentucky. Howard v. Chesapeake & 0. K. Co., 28 
 Ky. L. R. 891; 90 S. W. Rep. 950. 
 
 A switchman was held to be a coemployee with men upon trains, in 
 Farwell v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 4 Mete. (Mass.) 49; Miller v. Southern 
 Pacific R. Co., 20 Oregon 285; 26 Pac. Rep. 70; 48 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 
 294; Roberts v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 33 Minn. 218; 22 N. W. Rep. 
 389; Pool -. Southern Pacific R. Co., 7 Utah 303; 26 Pac. Rep. 654. 
 
 17 Randall v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 109 U. S. 478 ; 27 L. Ed. 1003 ; 
 Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Herbert, 116 U. S. 642; 29 L. Ed. 755; 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. y. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368; 37 L. Ed. 772; Northern 
 Pacific R. Co. V. Hamby, 154 U. S. 349; 38 L. Ed. 1009; Central R. 
 Co. V. Keegan, 160 U. S. 259; 40 L. Ed. 418; Northern Pacific R. Co. 
 V. Peterson, 162 U. S. 346; 40 L. Ed. 994; Northern Pacific R. Co. v. 
 Porter, 167 U. S. 48; 42 L. Ed. 72; New England R. Co. v. Conroy, 
 175 U. S. 323; 44 L. Bd. 181. 
 
 Y02 
 
OOISMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. § 491 
 
 conductor and engineer ; ^^ the conductor and fireman ; ^^ the 
 conductor and brakeman/" and the conductor and other em- 
 ployees working under his orders, on the same train,^^ have 
 all been held to be so far engaged in the same common serv- 
 ice as to make of them coemployees, within the rule of the 
 common law. 
 
 But this rule is not of general application in the United 
 States, for in some jurisdictions, instead of adhering to the 
 common-law rule, that all employees engaged in the same 
 common service, are coemployees, regardless of the grade of 
 the service, a distinction is made between those in different 
 departments and those empowered with authority of the oth- 
 ers, and under these distinctions a train conductor is held to 
 be a vice-principal, who, in the control of the train, repre- 
 sents the employer and for'his negligence, another employee 
 of the same train, sustaining injury, is held entitled to re- 
 cover from the railroad company.^ ^ He is held, in Georgia,*^ 
 not to be a coemployee of an engineer, fireman or brakeman, 
 
 18 New England, etc., R. Co. v. Conroy, 175 U. S. 323; 44 L. Ed. 
 181; Hoover v. Beeet Creek R. Co., 154 Pa. St. 362; 26 Atl. Rep. 315; 
 Grattis v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 153 Mo. 380; 55 S. W. Rep. 108; 
 48 L, R- A. 399; 77 Am. St. Rep. 721. 
 
 19 Grattis v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 153 Mo. 380; 55 S. W. Rep. 
 108; 48 L. R. A. 399; 77 Am. St. Rep. 721. 
 
 20 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Southwick, 16 Ind. A.pp. 486; 44 N. E. 
 Rep. 263; Wooden v. Western, etc., R. Co., 147 N. Y. 508; 70 N. Y. 
 S. R. 83; 42 N. E. Rep. 199; Ott v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., 18 Ohio 
 C. C. 395; Sherman v. Rochester, etc., R. Co., 17 N. Y. 153; Hayes v. 
 Western, etc., R. Co., 3 Cush. (Mass.) 270;, Dow v. Kansas Pacific 
 R. Co., 8 Kansas 642. 
 
 21 Martin v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., 166 U. S. 399; 41 L. Ed. 1051. 
 zzPurcell v. Southern R. Co., 119 N. Car. 728; 26 S. E. Rep. 161 
 
 Culpepper v. Northeastern R. Co., 90 Texas 627; 40 S. W. Rep. 386 
 Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Williams, 86 Va. 165; 9 S. E. Rep. 990 
 Walker v. Gillett, 59 Kansas 214; 52 Pac. Rep. 442; 10 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. (N. S.) 140. 
 
 23 Spencer v. Brooks, 97 Ga. 681; 25 S. E. Rep. 480; 5 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. (N. S.) 202. 
 
 703 
 
§ 491 COEilPLOVEfiS At COMMON TAVf. 
 
 ■working under his orders, and this holding is followed in a 
 great many States."* 
 
 24Haltoin V. Southern K. Co., 127 N. C. 255; 37 S. E. Rep. 262; 
 Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Mitchell, 87 Ky. 327; Daniel v. Chesapeake, 
 etc., E. Co., 36 W. Va. 397. 
 
 A conductor was held to be a coemployee with a brakeman on his 
 train, in Smith v. Potter, 46 Mich. 258; 9 N. W. Eep. 273; 2 Am. & 
 Eng. E. Cas. 140; Lawless v. Connecticut, etc., E. Co., 136 Mass. 1; 
 18 Am. & Eng. K. Cas. 96; Hoover v. Beech Creek R. Co., 154 Pa. St. 
 362; 26 Atl. Eep. 315; Pease v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 61 Wis. 163; 20 
 N. W. Eep. 908; 17 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 527. 
 
 But he was held not to be a fellow workman with a brakeman on 
 his train, in Newport News, etc., R. Co. v. Dentzel, 91 Ky. 42; 14 
 S. W. Eep. 958; Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Spangler, 44 Ohio St. 471; 
 8 N. B. Rep. 467; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 319; Openshaw v. Utah, etc., 
 R. Co., 6 Utah 132; Ayers v. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 84 Va. 679; 
 5 S. E. Rep. 582; 33 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 269; Northern Pacific R. Co. 
 v. Kavanaugh, 51 Fed. Rep. 517; Georgia Pacific R. Co. v. Propst, 83 
 Ala. 518; 3 So. Rep. 764; Central R. Co. v. DeBray, 71 Ga. 406; Louis- 
 ville, etc., R. Co. V. Kenley, 92 Tenn. 207; 21 S. W. Rep. 326. 
 
 He was likewise held to be a coemployee of a brakeman on another 
 train, in Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Andrews, 50 Fed. Rep. 728; 53 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 523; Becker v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 57 Fed. 
 Eep. 188; Pittsburg, etc., E. Co. v. Devjnney, 17 Ohio St. 197; McMaster 
 V. Illinois, etc., E. Co., 65 Miss. 264; 4 So. Eep. 59; 7 Am. St. Rep. 
 653; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 486. 
 
 But, on the contrary, he was held to be a vice-principal of a brake- 
 man on another train, in Daniel v. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co., 36 W. Va. 
 397; 15 S. E. Eep. 162; 16 L. E. A. 383; 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 503; 
 Au V. New York, etc., E. Co., 29 Fed. Eep. 72. 
 
 Conductor was held to be a coemployee of baggage master on another 
 train, in Kerlin v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 50 Fed. Eep. 185; 53 Am. & 
 Eng. E. Cas. 530. 
 
 But he was held to be a vice-principal of a baggage man or express- 
 man on another train, in Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, etc., R. Co., 
 34 Fed. Eep. 616. 
 
 Conductor was also held to be a coemployee with a car coupler, in 
 Wilson v.- Madison, etc., E. Co., 18 Ind. 226. 
 
 But he was held not to be a coemployee with a person employed 
 in coupling cars, in Mason v. Eichmond, etc., R. Co., Ill N. C. 482; 
 16 S. E. Rep. 698; 53 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 183. 
 
 He was also held to be a coemployee with car inspector, in Whitmore 
 V. Boston, etc., E. Co., 150 Mass. 477; 23 N. E. Rep. 220. 
 
 Y04 
 
OOEMPLOYEES AT COMMOl^ LAW. § 492 
 
 § 492. Engineer and other employees on same train. — The 
 engineer in charge of the engine operating a train of cars, 
 is quite generally deemed the coemployee of the other agents 
 
 But a vice-principal as to construction hands and track repairers, 
 under his control, in Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Lundstrum, 16 Neb. 254 
 20 N. W. Eep. 198; 49 Am. Rep. 718; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 528 
 Miller v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 109 Mo. 350; 19 S. W. Eep. 58 
 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 598. 
 
 The conductor was held to be a vice-principal with the engineer 
 on same train, in Van Amburg v. Vieksburg, etc., R. Co., 37 La. Ann. 
 650; 55 Am. Rep. 517; Mase v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 57 Fed. Rep, 
 283; Little Miami R. Co. v. Stevens, 20 Ohio St. 415; Chicago, etc., R, 
 Co. V. Ross, 112 U. S. 377; 17 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 501. 
 
 But he was held to be a coemployee with engineer on same train, in 
 Harris v. Norfolk, etc., E. Co., 88 Va. 560; 14 S. E. Eep. 535; Grattig 
 V. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 153 Mo. 380; 55 S. W. Eep. 108; 77 Am. 
 St. Eep. 721; 48 L. E. A. 399; Oaks v. Mase, 165 U. S. 363. 
 
 He was held to be a vice-principal of an engineer on another train, 
 in Madden v. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co., 28 W. Va. 610; 57 Am. Eep. 695. 
 
 But was held, to be a coemployee with an engineer on another 
 train, in Oaks v. Mase, 165 U. S. 363. 
 
 He was held to be a coemployee of fllteman on same train, in Slater 
 V. Jewett, 85 N. Y. 61 ; 39 Am. Eep. 627 ; 5 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 515. 
 
 But not of fixeman, on another train, in Eagsdale v. Northern Pacific 
 E. Co., 42 Fed. Eep. 383. 
 
 He was held to be the vice-principal of a train porter, in Haney v, 
 Pittsburg, etc., E. Co., 38 W. Va. 570; 18 S. E. Rep. 748; Missouri 
 Pacific Ey. Co. v. Texas, etc., E. Co., 38 Fed. Eep. 81*6. 
 
 The conductor was also held to be a coemployee with a section 
 foreman, in Elliott v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 5 Dakota 523; 41 N. W. 
 Eep. 758; 3 L. E. A. 363; 38 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 62. 
 
 Where a conductor handles a crippled car in a way to cause injury 
 to a car inspector and the conductor was infotmed by telegram how 
 to handle the car properly, his negligence in so handling it is that 
 of a fellow workman of the car inspector, in Delaware. Shuster v. 
 Philadelphia, etc., R. Co., 62 Atl. Rep. 689. 
 
 " An employee, engaged in construction work on a railway roadbed, 
 does not assume th?' risk of the negligence of the conductor in charge 
 of the construction train in failing to properly adjust the switches on 
 moving the train from a side track to the main line." St. Louis, etc., 
 Ry. Co. V. Beyles (Ark. 1906), 95 S. W. Eep. 783. 
 
 1—45 705 
 
;§ 49'S OOEHPLGYEES AT COMMON LAW, 
 
 and employees: of the same train, in the service of the same 
 company.^® 
 
 Because the engineer and the conductor on the same train, 
 are jointly co-operating to attain the same result, a conduc- 
 tor, injured through the negligence of the engineer was held 
 to have no right of action, in a recent case; ^* a like conclu- 
 sion was reached as to the status of the engineer and fire- 
 man, on the same train ; ^"^ laborers on a construction train 
 are also held to be coemployees of the engineer, running the 
 -engine that pulls the train ; *® the engine hostler^ or engine 
 wiper and his engineer are coemployees ; ^® a switchman, 
 ,actingin conjunction with an engineer in placing cars, is a 
 jcoeniployee.; ^° a section hand on the same train that an en- 
 gine is pulling, is a fellow employee of the engineer; ^^ an" 
 engineer and flagnian at a crossing are held coemployees, in 
 a New York case ; *^ a torpedo man, or one whose duty it is 
 to display danger signals, is held to be a coemployee of the 
 engineer, in Tennessee ; ^* .an engineer and another employee 
 riding on the same train, as a passenger, are held to be co- 
 employees, in Indiana,^* and the engineers onJ;wo different 
 
 2B Watts v. Hart,. 7 Wash. 178; 34 Pac. Rep. 423; Brewster v. 
 Chicago, etc;, E. Co., 114 Iowa 144; 86 N. W. Rep. 221; Wormington 
 V. Atchison, etc., R. Co., 46 Mo. App. 159; Dysart v. Kansas City, 
 etc., R. Co., 145 ilo. 83; 46 S. W. Rep. 751; Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Lewis, 33 Ohio St. 196; -Fowler v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 61 Wis. 159. 
 
 20 Link V. Louisville, etc., fe. Co., 107 Ky. 37d; 54 S. W. Rep. 184. 
 
 27 Chicago, etc., R. Co., v. Brandau, 65 111. App, 150. 
 
 28 Miller v. (Dhio, etc., R. Co., 24 111. App. 326. 
 
 29 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Richardson, 100 Ala. 232; 14, So. Rep. 
 209. 
 
 30 Eutledge v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 123 Mo. 121 ; 24 S. W. Rep. 
 1053. 
 
 31 Houston, eta, R. Co. v. Rider, 62 Texas 267. 
 
 32 MacDonald v. New York, etc., R. Co., 63 Hun 587 ; 45 N. Y. S. R. 
 '■li- 
 as East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. Rush, 15 Lea (Tenn.) 145. 
 
 3* Evansville, etc., R. Co. v. Henderson, 134 Ind. 636; 33 N. E. 
 Rep. 1021. 
 
 706 
 
eOEMF-LOYEES AT COMMON LAW. § 492 
 
 engines, drawing the same train, are coemployees, under the 
 holding in a Kentucky case.^® 
 
 But the question of whether the engineer of one train will 
 be deemed a coemployee, or superior agent of other employees 
 engaged in other departments of the service, is usually de- 
 termined by the peculiar ideas of the courts of the State 
 where the question is raised and whether or not the conasso- 
 ciation doctrine or the departmental theory obtains. If the 
 other employee can be held to be acting for the railroad com- 
 pany, in the performance of its nondelegable duties, he is 
 of course a vice-principal of an engineer, and not a coem- 
 ployee.*® In lUinois,^'^ a member of a fencing crew is held 
 not to be a fellow employee of an engineer, because they are 
 in different departments of the service; in a Texas case,** 
 the cook on a construction train was held not to be a coem- 
 ployee of the engineer, as they are in Separate departments of 
 the business, and, in a South Carolina case,*® a section fore- 
 
 3B Cincinnati, etc., E. Co. v. Roberts, 110 Ky. 856; 62 S. W. Rep. 901.' 
 3«Cliicago, etc., R. Co. v. Flynn, 154 III. 448; 40 N. E. Rep; 332; 
 
 St. Louis, etc., R. Co., v. Kelton, 28 Texas Civ. App. 137; 66 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 887. 
 
 37 Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Hawthorne, 147 111. 226; 35 N. E. 
 Rep. 534. 
 
 38 Brown v. Sullivan, 71 Texas 470; 10 S. W. Rep. 288. 
 39Calvo V. Charlotte, etc., E. Co., 23 S. C. 526; 55 Am. Rep. 28. 
 
 An engineer was held to be a coemployee of a brakeman on the 
 same train, in Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Texas, etc., Ry. Co., 31 
 Fed. Rep. 527; Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Keene, 72 III. 512; Louisville, 
 etc., R. Co. V. Petty, 67 Miss. 255; 7 So. Rep. 351; 41 Am. & Eng. E. 
 Cas. 444; Moran v. New York, etc., E. Co., 67 Barb. (N. Y.) 96; 
 Pittsburg, etc., E. Co. v. Eanney, 37, Ohio St. 665; 5 Am. & Eng. E. 
 Cas. 533; Miller v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 90 Mich. 230; 51 N. W. 
 Eep. 370; Hobbs v Atlantic, etc., E. Co., 107 N. C. 1; 12 S.E. Eep. 
 124; 44 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 592; Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Kenley, 
 92 Tenn. 207; 21 S. W. Eep. 326; Wormington v. Atchison, etc., E. 
 Co., 46 Mo. App. 159. 
 
 And he was held also to be a coemployee of a brakeman on another 
 train, in Eandall v. Baltimore, etc., E. Co., 109 U. S. 478; 15 Am. & 
 
 707 
 
§ 492 COEMPLOYifiES AT COMMON LAW, 
 
 man, whose duty it is to keep in repair a section of the rail- 
 road track, is held not to be a eoemployee of the engineer, 
 running an engine over the road, as the latter has a right to 
 anticipate a reasonably safe track and roadbed and the former 
 
 Eng. R. Cas. 243 ; , Baltimore, etc., K. Co. v. Andrews, 50 Fed. Eep. 
 728; 53 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 523; East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. Rush, 
 15 Lea (Tenn.) 145. 
 
 But the engineer was held to be a vice-principal of a brakeman, in 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Brooks, 83 Ky. 129; East Tennessee, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Collins, 85 Tenn. 227; 1 S. W. Rep. 883; Illinois, etc., R. 
 Co. V. Pirtle, 47 111. App. 498; Brown v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 7 
 Utah 288; 26 Pac. Rep. 579. 
 
 An engineer and car coupler were held to be coemployees, in Boat- 
 right V. Northeastern R. Co., 25 So. Car. 128; Thompson v. Lake 
 Shore, etc., R. Co., 84 Mich. 281 ; 47 N. W. Rep. 584. 
 
 But an engineer and ear inspector were held not to be coemployees, 
 in Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Hoyt, 122 111. 369; 12 N. E. Rep. 225; 31 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas, 309, 
 
 He was held to be a eoemployee of construction hands, riding on 
 a gravel train, in Miller v. Ohio, etc., R. Co., 24 111. App. 326; 
 Higgins V. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 104 Mo. 413; 16 S. W. Rep. 409; 
 Henry v. Staten Island R. Co., 81 N. Y. 373; 2 Am. & Eng. R, Cas. 60; 
 Russell V. Hudson River R. Co., 17 N. Y. 134. 
 
 But he was held not to be a eoemployee of an express messenger, 
 in Chamberlain v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 11 Wis. 238. 
 
 An engineer and fireman were held to be fellow workmen, in Balti- 
 more, etc., E. Co. V. Baugh, 140 U. S. 368; 54 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 
 328; Howard v. Denver, etc., E. Co., 26 Fed. Eep. 837; 24 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 448; Hobbs v. Atlantic, etc., E. Co., 107 N. C. 1; 12 S. 
 E. Eep. 124; Bull v. Mobile, etc., E, Co., 67 Ala. 206; Illinois, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Hosier, 45 111. App. 205. 
 
 But he was held to be the vice-principal of the fireman, in Cooper 
 V. Central R. Co., 44 Iowa 134; Sabine, etc., R, Co. v, Ewing, 1 Texas 
 Civ. App. 531; 21 8. W. Rep. 700. 
 
 An engineer was held not to be a eoemployee of a section foreman, 
 in Peoria, etc., R. Co. v. Rice, 144 111. 227; 33 N. E. Eep. 951. 
 
 But, on the contrary, was held a coworkman with roadmaster, in 
 Holland v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 100 Cal. 240; 34 Pac. Rep. 666. 
 
 He was held to be a fellow workman with section men, in Easton v. 
 Houston, etc., E, Co., 32 Fed. Eep. 893; Clifford v. Old Colony R. 
 Co., 141 Mass. 564; 6 N. E. Eep. 751; Connolly v. Minneapolis, etc., 
 E. Co., 38 Minn. 80; 35 N. W. Rep. 582; Eohback v. Pacific R. Co., 
 43 Mo. 187. 
 708 
 
COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. § 493 
 
 in the exercise of his duty, acts for. the employer, in the per- 
 formance of one of the nondelegable duties that is imposed 
 upon him, hy law. ' 
 
 § 493. Yard men, switchmen and other employees. — As a 
 
 Was held to be a coemployee with a switchman, in Chicago, etc., 
 
 .E. Co. V. Touhy, 26 111. App. 99; Toms v. Buffalo Creek E. Co., 70 
 
 Hun (N. y.) 84; Smith v. Memphis, etc., E. Co., 18 Fed. Eep. 304. 
 
 But he was held not to be a coemployee of yard switchman, in 
 Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Sheets (Ky.), 13 S. W. Eep. 248; 41 Am. & 
 Eng. E. Cas. 470. 
 
 Different engineers, of same employer, are coemployees. Van Avery 
 V. Union Pacific E. Co., 35 Fed. Eep. 40; Ohio, etc., E. Co. v. Eobb, 
 36 111. App. 627; Norfolk, etc., E. Co. v. Donnelly, 88 Va. 853; 14 
 S. E. Eep. 692; 53 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 671; Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. 
 Doyle, 60 Miss. 977; 8 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 171. 
 
 But not of engineers of another employer. Texas, etc., E. Co. v. 
 Easton, 2 Texas Civ. App. 378; 21 S. W. Eep. 575. 
 
 Engineer was held to be coemployee of laborers unloading ears, in 
 Lake Shore, etc., E. Co. v. Stupak, 123 Ind. 210; 23 N. E. Eep. 246; 
 41 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 382; Kumler v. Junction E. Co., 33 Ohio St. 
 150. 
 
 But engineer and laborers unloading cars were held not to be co- 
 employees, in Peoria, etc., E. Co. v. Johns, 43 111. App. 83; Union 
 Pacific, etc., R. Co. v. Billiter, 28 Neb. 422; 44 N. W. Rep. 483; 41 
 Am. & Eng. E. Cas„ 431. 
 
 " When a fireman is injured by a collision between his engine and 
 another through the negligence of the switch tender in failing to 
 change the semaphore signal, or by want of due care on the part of 
 the engineer in failing to observe the danger signal, it must, in each 
 instance, be deemed the result of the negligence of a fellow workman." 
 Tillson V. Maine Cent. E. Co. (Me. 1907), 67 Atl. Eep. 407. 
 
 " Where plaintiff, a brakeman on a freight train, was injured by 
 the alleged negligence of the engineer in backing his engine against 
 a defective car, plaintiff and the engineer were prima facie fellow 
 workmen." Southern Ry. Co. v. Elliott (Ind. 1907), 82 N. E. Rep. 
 1051, transferred from Appellate- Court, 81 N. E. Rep. 1180. 
 
 " Where the engineer and conductor of a train on which decedent 
 was fireman received orders to pass a certain other train on a, specified 
 siding, and those in charge of decedent's train saw a locomotive thereon, 
 and taking it for granted that it was the locomotive of the other train, 
 ran by and collided with the other train just beyond the siding, no 
 
 709 
 
§ 493 COEMPXOYEES AT COMMOIir LAW. 
 
 general rule, switchmen *" or yard men,*^ working in the 
 same^yaTd, are regarded as coemployees. The different mem- 
 bers of two separate switching squads are held to be coem- 
 ployees, in Illinois ; *^ a night watcher is a fellow employee 
 of a foreman of a switching crew, in a yard ; ** an engine 
 hostler and his helper, in care of the engine, are coem- 
 ployees ; *^ a yard clerk and the members of a switching crew , 
 are also coemployees,*^ as are such yard clerk and the engineer 
 
 recovery could be had for the death of decedent." Hayes v. New York, 
 etc., R. Co., 105 N. Y. S. 592. 
 
 " Where an engineer and fireman saw an employee on the track 
 ' riding on a railroad velocipede, and observed that he was ignorant of 
 the approach of the engine, it -was their duty to warn him, and to 
 slow down the engine, and stop, if necessary to save his life, even 
 though he may have been guilty of contributory negligence in running 
 his velocipede as he did." Lynch v. Chicago & A. Ey. Co. (Mo. 1907), 
 106 S. W. Eep. 68. 
 
 The engineer of a steam shovel, who has control of the men, with 
 power to hire and discharge them, is a fellow workman with a pitman, 
 whose duty it is to help to move a six-foot track in front of the 
 shovel, where the engineer controls the movement of the crane himself 
 and the injury to the pitman results from being hit by the bucket 
 attached thereto. Jemming v. Great Northern Ey. Co., 96 Minn. 302; 
 104 N. W. Rep. 1079; 1 L. E. A. (N. S.) 696. 
 
 An engineer who negligently runs his engine against another em- 
 ployee and injures him, is personally liable for such injury, although 
 he does not own the engine and is running it for the company. Illinois 
 Cent. E. Co. v. Coley, 28 Ky. L. E. 336; 89 S. W. Eep. 234; 1 L. E. A. 
 (N. S.) 370. 
 
 An engineer, whose negligence causes injury to a mail clerk, is 
 jointly liable, with the railroad company, for such injury. Illinois 
 Cent. E. Co. v. Houchins, 28 Ky. L. E. 499; 89 S. W. Eep. 530; 1 
 L. E. A. (N. S.) 375. 
 
 40 Gulf, etc., E. Co. v. Warner, 89 Texas 475; 35 S. W. Sep. 364. 
 
 41 Illinois, etc., E. Co. v. Stewart (Ky.), 53 S. W. Eep. 596. 
 
 42 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Driscoll, 176 111. 330; 52 N. E. Eep. 921; 
 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 644. 
 
 43 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Geary, 110 111. 383. 
 
 44 Smith V. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 151 Mo. 391; 52 S. W. Eep. 378; 
 14 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 609. 
 
 46 East St. Louis, etc., E. Co. v. O'Hara, 59 111. App, 649, 
 
 no 
 
COBMPLOTEES 4T COMMON LAW. § 493 
 
 of a freight train, entering the yard ; *" the yard conductor 
 or foreman and a fireman, or engineer, operating an engine, 
 in the yard are coemployees,*^ as is such yard foreman and 
 the foreman of a switching gang, working under his orders ; *® 
 a laborer, sweeping snow, in a railroad yard, is a coemployee 
 of an engineer or fireman, operating an engine in the yard ; *® 
 a yard man, assisting an engine repairer, is a coemployee of 
 such repairer, so that he assumes the risk of an injury due to 
 his neglect,®" and in many cases a switch tender and the 
 agents in charge of an engine or car, are employees engaged 
 to attain the same result, within the common-law doctrine of 
 coservice, so that the railroad company is relieved from lia- 
 bility due to the negligence of either of such class of em- 
 ployees to the other.®^ 
 
 But in some States the foreman of a crew of switchmen, 
 with power to control such laborers under him, is held to be 
 a vice-principal and not a coemployee ; ^^ a roundhouse fore- 
 man, delegated with the duty of keeping engines in repair, 
 is not a coemployee with a brakeman on the train, by which 
 an engine is used to draw the train, which is lacking in re- 
 pair, due to the neglect of such roundhouse foreman; ®* an 
 employee of an inside roundhouse foreman and an employee 
 of an outside switching crew, are not coemployees, where the 
 
 46 New York, etc., R. Co. v. Hyde, 56 Fed. Rep. 188; 5 C. C. A. 461.. 
 
 *7 Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Gray, 101 Fed. Rep. 623; 41 C. C. A. 
 535; 50 L. R. A." 47; Parker v. New York, etc., R. Co., 18 R. I. 773; 
 30 Atl. -Rep. -849. 
 
 *8 Thomas v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., 97 Fed. Rep. 245. 
 
 49 Corcoran v. New York, etc., R. Co., 46 App. Div. 201 ; 61 N. Y. 
 Supp. 672. 
 
 50 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Csceuring, 4 111. App. 533. 
 
 01 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Needham, 63 Fed. Rep. 107; 11 C. C. A. 
 56; 25 L. R. A. 833. 
 
 B2Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. v. Eittenhouse, 28 Ind. App. 633; 62 
 N. E. Rep..<295. 
 
 63 Ohio, etc., R. Co, V, Stein, 140 Ind. 61 ; 39 N. E. Rep. 246. 
 
 711. 
 
§ 494: COEMPLOTEES AT COMMON LAW. 
 
 department doctrine obtains ; ^* the like rule obtains in such 
 jurisdictions, as to switchmen, operating different switches 
 and riding on different engines ; °^ a switching crew foreman, 
 in such States as have adopted the same rule, is held to be 
 a vice-principal of the men working under his orders ; ^® the 
 same rule obtains, in such jurisdictions, as to the status of 
 roundhouse employees and switching crews ; ^^ a carpenter at 
 work in a railroad yard is not a coemployee of an engineer, 
 running an engine in the same yard, in such States, as ad- 
 here to the conassociation theory ; ®* a yard superintendent is 
 held to be the vice-principal of a yard foreman, who takes or- 
 ders from such superintendent,®® and this is also held to be 
 the status of a car inspector and the yard foreman, who negli- 
 gently gives an order to back a train into a car that the in- 
 spector is inspecting, as a result of which injury is sustained.®" 
 
 § 494. Status of car inspectors and repairers. — As a gen- 
 
 54 Texas, etc., E. Co. v. Scruggs (Tracas), 58 S. W. Rep. 186. 
 
 55 Galveston, etc., E. Co. v. Masterson, 91 Texas 385; 51 S. W. 
 Eep. 1091. 
 
 56 Missouri Pacific E. Co. v. Lyons, 54 Neb. 633 ; 75 N. W. Eep. 31. 
 57 Houston, etc., E. Co. v. Talley (Texas), 39 S. W. Eep. 206. 
 
 58 Egmann v. St. Louis, etc., K. Co., 65 111. App. 345. 
 
 59 Texas, etc., E. Co. v. Tattman (Texas), 31 S. W. Eep. 333. 
 eoDriscoll v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 97 111. App. 668; 176 111. SSOj 
 
 52 N. E. Eep. 921; 12 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. (N. S.) 644. 
 
 " Where a railroad company was doing certain switching with an 
 engine and caboose in the railroad yards of another railroad company, 
 and deceased was employed by the latter company to work in the yards 
 and was injured by . the caboose being kicked down a track, the 
 deceased and the persons handling the caboose were not fellow work- 
 men." Pittsburgh, C. C, & St. L. Ey. Co. v. Bovard, 121 111. App. 49. 
 
 " A locomotive engineer is a coemployee of the fireman and of an 
 employee in charge of a switch and semaphore signals, and the em- 
 ployer is not liable in a common-law action for injuries received by 
 the engineer in consequence of the negligence of the fireman or em- 
 ployee." Judgment (1906), 97 N. Y. S. 1143; 112 App". Div. 904, 
 reversed; Pearsall v. New York Cent, etc., E. Co., 82 N. E. Rep. 752; 
 189 N. Y. 474. 
 
 712 
 
COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. § 494 
 
 eral rule, a car repairer, who repairs cars in a railroad yard, 
 is held to be a coemployee with those employees engaged in 
 the operation of engines or cars in the yard, and for an in- 
 jury to such repairer, by the shunting or backing of cars 
 against the car he is engaged in repairing, there is no liabil- 
 ity, as the injury is due to the negligence of a fellow em- 
 ployee.**^ In an Arkansas case,*^ a car repairer is held to 
 be a coemployee with the car inspector who, as foreman of 
 the work the repairer is engaged in doing, directs his work 
 and controls his actions. 
 
 In Massachusetts ®^ and many other States,^* a car inspec- 
 tor is held to be a coemployee, also, of the agents of the rail- 
 road company, engaged in the use of the cars or engines he in- 
 spects, so that the railroad company is exempted from lia- 
 bility for injuries due to a neglect of the duty of inspection 
 by such inspector. But as the duty of inspection, like that 
 of furnishing reasonably safe appliances, is one of the non- 
 delegable duties of the employer, this holding is seemingly 
 opposed to the principle of the law ; has been condemned by 
 text writers ®® and is not generally followed, but in perhaps 
 a majority of the States the rule obtains that a car inspector 
 is a vice-prhicipal and not a coemployee with those using the 
 cars or engines which he inspects.®® A car builder and a 
 
 61 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Triplett, 54 Ark. 289 ; 15 8. W. Kep. 831 ; 
 Eenfro v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 86 Mo. 302; Corcoran v. Delaware, etc., 
 E. Co., 126 N. Y. 673; 38 N. Y. S. R. 251; Kirk v. Atlanta, etc., R. 
 Co., 94 N. C. 625; 55 Am. Rep. 621; Smith v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 
 91 Wis. 503; 65 N. W. Rep. 183; Peterson V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 
 67 Mich. 102; 34 N. W. Rep. 260. 
 
 62 Fordyce v. Brinley, 58 Ark. 206 ; 24 S. W. Rep. 250. 
 ssWhitmore v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 150 Mass. 477; 23 N. E. Rep. 220. 
 e* Potter v. New York, etc., R. Co., 136 N. Y. 77; 48 N. Y. S. R. 
 
 843; 32 N. E. Rep. 603; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Rice, 51 Ark. 467; 
 11 S. W. Rep. 699; 4 L. R. A. 173; Little Miami R. Co. v. Pitzpatrick, 
 42 Ohio St. 318; Wonder v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 32 Md. 418. 
 
 65 4 Thompson on Negligence, §§ 5089, 5090, and citations. 
 
 66 Long V. Pacific Ry. Co., 65 Mo. 225; Condon v. Missouri Pacific 
 
 713 
 
§ 495 COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON Jjtw. 
 
 car repairer are held to be employees in difEerent depart- 
 ments, in Illinois ; ®'' a brakeman and a car inspector are 
 held to be vice-principal and subordinate, not coemployeeis, in 
 Kansas,*^ and a station agent is not held to be a coemployee 
 with a car inspector, in Nebraska.*® 
 
 § 495. Section foremen and section men. — The courts of 
 the dijfferent States in the United States have reached diver- 
 gent conclusions as to the legal status of the section foreman 
 
 Ry. Co., 78 Mo. 567; Cincinnati, etc., E. Co. v. McMuIlen, 117 Ind. 
 439; Columbus, etc., R. Co. v. Friek, 51 Ohio St. 146; 37 N. E. Rep. 
 128; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Hoyt, 122 111. 369; 12 N. E. Rep. 225; 
 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Bates, 146 Ind. 564; 45 N. E. Rep. 108; 
 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Hilliard, 99 Ky. 684; 37 S. W. Rep. 75; 
 International, etc., R. Co. v. Kernan, 78 Texas 294; Kastle v. Wabash 
 R. Co., 114 Mich. 43; 72 N. W. Rep. 28. 
 
 67 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Holman, 155 III. 21; 39 N. E. Rep. 573. 
 
 68 Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Dwyer, 36 Kansas 58. 
 
 89 Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Kellogg, 54 Neb. 127; 74 N. W. Rep. 454. 
 
 In the following cases, a, car inspector or repairer, in failing to 
 inspect or repair cars, was held to be a vice-principal. Johnson v. 
 Chesapeake, etc., R. Co., 36 W. Va. 73; 14 S. E. Rep. 432; Condon v. 
 Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 78 Mo. 567; Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Mosley, 5i Fed. Rep. 1009; Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. McMuUen, 117 
 Ind. 439; 20 N. E. Rep. 287; 38 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 165 ; 'Chicago, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Jackson, 55 111. 492; Daniels v. Union Pacific R. Co., 6 
 Utah 357; 23 Pac. Rep. 762. 
 
 While he was held to be a coemployee in the following eases: 
 Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126; 11 So. Rep. 803; 53 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 556; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Gaines, 46 Ark. 655; 
 Gibson v. Northern, etc., R. Co., 22 Hun (N. Y.) 289; Little Miami 
 R. Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 42 Ohio St. 318; 17 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 578; 
 Dewey v. Detroit, etc., R. Co., 97 Mich. 329; 56 N. W. Rep. 756, 
 reversing on rehearing 52 N. W. Rep. 942; 16 L. R. A. 342; 53 Am. 
 & Eng. R. Cas. 550. 
 
 A car inspector was held to be a coemployee of a car coupler, in 
 Tierney v. Minneapolis, etc., E. Co., 33 Minn. 311; 23 N. W. Rep. 229; 
 53 Am. Rep. 35; 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 545. 
 
 A car repairer, in so far as he represents the railroad company, in 
 the repairing of cars, was held to be a vice-principal, in Northern 
 Pacific R. Co. v. Herbert, 116 U. S. 642; 24 Am, & Eng. E. Cas, 407, 
 
COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. § 495 
 
 and the men subject to his orders, whose duty is to keep the 
 track in repair. The weight of authority is no doubt in con- 
 sonance with the common-law rule that mere grade of the 
 service will not affect the question of who are to be regarded 
 as coemployees and the section foreman in a majority of the 
 States, is held to be a coemployee with the men working on 
 his section.™ In other States, however, even where statute? 
 have not made such a rule essential,''^ the courts hold that 
 the section foreman is empowered with supervision or con- 
 trol to such an extent as to make the men under his. orders 
 his subordinates and not his coemployees, and that the em- 
 ployer is responsible for his negligence as for the careless- 
 ness of a vice-principal.''^ In most instances the section fore- 
 man works with the men subject to his orders and if his 
 negligent act, as distinguished from a negligent order, should 
 occasion an injury, then, in jurisdictions where the dual ca- 
 pacity doctrine obtains, the employer would not be liable for 
 an injury resulting from his wrongful act.''* The men work- 
 ing right along with the foreman, there is nothing in the 
 relation to change the legal status of the foreman as a coem- 
 
 TO Kenney v. Central R. Co., 61 6a. 590; Thacher v. Chicago, etc., R. 
 Co., 159 Ind. 82; 64 N. E. Rep. 605; Shepard v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 
 158 Mass. 174; Gavigan v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., 110 Mich. 71; 
 67 N. W. Rep. 1097; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 523; Goodwell v. 
 Montana, etc., E. Co., 18 Mont. 293; 45 Pac. Rep. 210; 4 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 419; Spanake v. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co., 148 
 Pa. St. 184; 23 Atl. Rep. 1006; Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Peterson, 
 162 U. S. 346; 40 L. Ed. 994; Lochbaum v. Oregon, etc., R. Co., 104 
 Fed. Rep. 852;. 44 C. C, A. 220. 
 
 71 St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Rickman, 65 Ark. 138; 45 S. W. Rep. 56. 
 
 T2Euss V. Wabash R. Co., 112 Mo. 45; Haworth v. Kansas City, etc., 
 E. Co., 94 Mo. App. 215; 68 S. W. Rep. Ill; Justice v. Pennsylvania 
 R. Co., 130 Ind. 321; Allison v. Southern R. Co., 129 N. Car. 336; 
 40 S. E. Rep. 91; Chattanooga, etc., R. Co. v. Lawson, 101 Tenn. 406; 
 47 S. W. Rep. 489; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 669; Atchison, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Vincent, 56 Kansas 344; 43 Pac. Rep. 251. 
 
 73 Nashville, etc., R, Co. v. Ganns, 101 Tenn. 380; 47 S. W. Rep. 493. 
 
 n5 
 
§ 495 COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. 
 
 ployee, even in States where the " conassociation " idea ob- 
 tains ; ''* but as to men in other departments of the service, 
 such as employees in a steel mill, in States where the de- 
 partment doctrine finds countenance, the common-law rule of 
 fellow service would not obtain between such men and the 
 section men, engaged in work on the track,''® Nor would the 
 employer be relieved from responsibility for the acts of the 
 section men in so far as they could be said to be engaged in 
 the performance of the nondelegable duties of the employer, 
 such as to furnish a reasonably safe track or roadbed for his 
 other employees, or for third persons.''® 
 
 71 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Goltz, 71 111. App. 414. 
 
 75 Joliet Steel Co. v. Shields, 146 III. 603; 34 N. E. Kep. 1108. 
 
 78 Banks v. Wabash E. Co., 40 Mo. App. 458; Babcock v. Old Colony 
 R. Co., 150 Mass. 467; 23 N. B. Eep. 325. 
 
 " In the courts of the United States, a section foreman, in the opera- 
 tion of his hand car, stands to the section hands, not as vice-principal, 
 but as a fellow workman." Chandler v. St. Louis, etc., E. Co. (Mo. 
 App. 1907), 106 S. W. Eep. 553. 
 
 " Where a section foreman allowed his men to place hand cars on 
 the track in order to go to camp, without warning the men that a, 
 train might overtake them, or taking any precautions to ascertain if a 
 train was approaching, or to give warning in case one should approach, 
 when he knew that a passenger train was past due, and that the sharp 
 curves in the track and the topographical obstructions made the risk 
 of being run down very great, his acts constituted negligence." Mack 
 V. Chicago, etc.. By. Co. (Mo. App. 1907), 101 S. W. Eep. 142. 
 
 A section foreman, as to the duties delegated him by the railroad 
 company, of providing a reasonably safe track or roadbed, was held 
 to be a vice-principal, in Babcock v. Old Colony E. Co., 150 Mass. 
 467; 23 N. E. Eep. 325; Hall v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 74 Mo. 
 298; 8 Am. & Eng. E. Cas.. 106; Justice v. Pennsylvania E. Co., 130 
 Ind. 321; 30 N. B. Eep. 303; 53 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 604; Eowland v. 
 Missouri Pacific Ey. Co., 20 Mo. App. 463; Couch v. Charlotte, etc., 
 E. Co., 22 So. Car. 557; 28 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 331. 
 
 He was held to be a vice-principal as to hands subject to his control, 
 in Euss V. Wabash E. Co., 112 Mo. 451; 20 S. W. Eep. 472; Sweeney v. 
 Gulf, etc., E. Co., 84 Texas 433; 19 S. W. Eep, 555; Patton v. Western, 
 etc., E. Co., 96 N. Car. 455; 1 S. E. Eep. 863; 31 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 
 298; McDermott v. Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 87 Mo. 285; 28 Am. & Eng. 
 
 Y16 
 
COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. § 496 
 
 § 496. Flagman and trainmen.— A flagman employed to 
 obey the orders of the conductors and engineers, while the 
 conductors or engineers are engaged in the operation of a 
 train, in the giving and transmission of signals, is held fo 
 be a coemployee of the other train men while so engaged. '''' 
 
 But a flagman, employed at a place where the track was ob- 
 structed, to give warning to approaching trains, of the dan- 
 ger to be incurred by the obstruction, the place being a cross- 
 
 K. Cas. 52'8; Banks v. Wabash R. Co., 40 Mo. App. 458; Hutson v. 
 Missouri Pacific Ey. Co., 50 Mo. App. 300. 
 
 But was held to be a coworkman as to hands working with liim, in 
 Cliflford V. Old Colony E. Co., 141 -Mass. 564; 6 N. E. Eep. 751; 
 Shepard v. Boston, etc., E. Co., 158 Mass. 174; 33 N. E. Eep. 508'; 
 Olson V. St. Paul, etc., E. Co., 38 Minn. 117; 35 N. W. Rep. 866; 
 33 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 336; Spancake v. Pennsylvania, etc., E. Co., 
 148 Pa. St. 184 ; 23 Atl. Eep. 1006 ; Coyne v. Union Pacific E. Co., 133 
 U. S. 370; Lagrone v. Mobile, etc., E. Co., 67 Miss. 592; 7 So. Eep. 432. 
 
 A section foreman was held to be a coemployee with another section 
 foreman, in Sherrin v. St. Joseph, etc., E. Co., 103 Mo. 378; 15 S. W. 
 Sep. 442. 
 
 But he was held not to be the coworkman of train crew, in Lewis v. 
 St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 59 Mo. 495; 8 Am. Ey. Eep. 450; Hulehan v. 
 Green Bay, etc., E. Co., 68 Wis. 520; 32 N. W. Eep. 529; 31 Am. & 
 Eng. E. Cas. 322; Mobile, etc., E. Co. v. Smith, 59 Ala. 245; Hall v. 
 Missouri Pacific Ey. Co., 74 Mo. 298; 8 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 106; 
 St. Louis,. etc., E. Co. v. Weaver, 35 Kansas 412; 11 Pac. Eep. 408; 
 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 341; Calvo v. Charlotte, etc., R. Co., 23 So. 
 Car. 526; 55 Am. Eep. 28; 28 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 327. 
 
 It is held to be gross negligence for a section boss to take his men 
 on a hand car at a place and time when he knows a freight train is 
 due. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Helm, 89 S. W. Rep. 709; 28 Ky. 
 L. R. 603. 
 
 Foreman's negligence in not sooner ordering the removal of a hand 
 car, to prevent collision with approaching train, cannot be said to be 
 cause of coemployee stumbling and falling against car, causing injury. 
 Andrews v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (Iowa), 105 N. W. Rep. 404. 
 
 T7 "A flagman who had been instructed to obey the orders of con- 
 ductors and engineers while the conductors are in charge of trains, 
 while obeying the orders of such conductors is a coemployee of the 
 engineers." Lyon v. Charleston, etc., Ry. Co., 58 S. E. Rep. 12; 77 
 S. C. 328. 
 
 717 
 
§ i 49*7, 498 coeicPloyees a* coMMoiif law.- 
 
 ing of a railroad and a highway, at grade, -was held to be 
 discharging the personal nondelegable duty of the employer, 
 in giving such warning of the danger arid hence, not to be 
 a coemployee of the fireman on the engine, injured by a neg- 
 lect of duty on the part of such flagman.''* 
 
 § 497. Pullman conductor and porter. — Even in those 
 States where the conassociation idea, or department doctrine 
 finds recognition, as the porter of a Pullman sleeping car 
 and the conductor of the car, are thrown in each other's so- 
 ciety and have the opportunity to watch each other's actions 
 and observe the conduct of each, there could be no reason 
 why these employees should not be held to be coemployees, 
 although the conductor ranks the porter in the service, as both 
 are employees in the same common employment, engaged to 
 attain the same result. 
 
 Hence, it is that in Illinois, where the department doctrine 
 is held to obtain, the conductor and porter of a sleeping car 
 are held to be coemployees, in so far as their respective du- 
 ties require that they shall during certain hours of the night, 
 keep watch over the car where they are both employed, one 
 serving during one portion of the night and the other dur- 
 ing the remainder thereof. ''* 
 
 § 498. Track-repairers and train-men. — The courts of the 
 different States have arrived at directly opposite views as to 
 
 '8 " Under the laws of Pennsylvania, a ilagman employed at a place 
 where the track was obstructed to give warning to approaching trains, 
 the place being a crossing of the railroad by a highway at grade, 
 was not a coemployee of a fireman on the engine." Ferguson v. Central 
 E. Co. (N. J. 1907), 67 Atl. Eep. 602. 
 
 T» Pullman Car Co. v. Woodfolk, 121 111. App. 321. 
 
 A porter on a railroad was held to be a coemployee with a carpenter 
 on a, scaflfold, injured by the negligent shifting of an engine by such 
 porter, in Morgen v. Vale of Neath R. Co.. 5 B. & S. 736; 35 L. J. Q. 
 B. 23; 13 L. T. 564. 
 
 718 
 
CpSMPLO-YEES AT COMMOIJ LAW. § 49'8 
 
 .the legal status of section men, or track repairers and train 
 men, as they have as to employees occupying other relations 
 in railroad service, and in some States section men are held 
 to be coemployees with train men,*" while in others, they are 
 held to occupy no such relation, but the employer is rendered 
 liable for an injury to an employee in one department, by 
 the negligent act of one in the other branch of tiie, service.®* 
 
 Upon. principle, it would seem, as to an injury to a train- 
 man, due to a failure on the part of section men to. maintain 
 a reasonably safe track or roadbed, the employer ought to 
 be chargeable, in law, for the effects of such neglect, as this 
 comes within the nondelegable duties of the employer ; ®^ but 
 in the case of an injury to a section man, because of the neg- 
 lect of a train man, there is apparently no good reason why 
 the section man ought not to be held to assume the risk, as 
 an incident of his employment,** unless it is a risk that would 
 come within the class of duties of the employer, above re- 
 ferred to, in States where the " conassociation " or depart- 
 ment doctrine does not obtain.®* 
 
 80 Parker v. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 109 Mo. 362; 19 S. W. Rep. 1119; 
 18 L. R. A. 802; 50 Ani,.& Eng. R. Cas. 521; Harrison v. Detroit, etc., 
 E. Co., 79 Mich. 409; 44 N. W. Rep. 1034; Filbert v. Delaware, etc., 
 Co., l21 N. Y. 207;. 23 N. E. Rep. 1104; Northern Pacific E. Co. v. 
 Charless, 162 U. S. 359; 40 L. Ed. 999. 
 
 81. Chicago, eto., R.Co. v. Eaton, 194 111. 441; 62 N. E. Rep. 784; 
 Swaddle v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 118 Mo. 268; 24 S. W. Rep. 140; 
 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Greary, 52 Kansas 308; 34 Pac. Rep. 887. 
 
 82 Kansas City, etc!, R. Co. v. Webb, 97 Ala. 157; 11 So. Rep. 888; 
 Anderson v. Michigan, etc., R, Co., 107 Mich. 591; 65 N. W. Rep. S85; 
 Wellpan v. Oregpn, etc., E. Co., 21 Oregon 530; 28 Pac. Rep. 625; 
 Wright V. Southern R. Co,, 123 N. Car. 280; 31 S. E. Rep. 652; 12 
 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N.S.j 717. .. 
 
 83 "a track walker, riding a railroad velocipede, is held to assume 
 the risk of being. struck by a- train, in Utah, in Stephani v. Southern, 
 etc., E, Co., 19 Utah .196; 57 Pac. Eep. 34; 14 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 
 ■(N. S.) 575. But see, Schelerth v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 115 Ma. 
 87; 218. W. Rep. 1110. 
 
 84 Peoria, etc., R. Co. v. Eice, 144 111. 227; 33 N. E. Eep. 951. But 
 
 Y19 
 
§ 499 COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. 
 
 § 499, Station a^rent and other railway employees. — A sta- 
 tion agent has been held to be a coemployee with an engi- 
 neer/^ a brakeman,^® and a section foreman,*'' so that in 
 case of an injury to any of these, due to the negligence of 
 the station agent, in the absence of a statute changing the 
 common-law rule of nonliability, the railroad company would 
 not be responsible for such injury. 
 
 But as in almost all other relations where the rule of co- 
 employees is applied in the different States, there are widely 
 divergent views as to the legal status of the various employees 
 in different departments of the service, so there is a contrari- 
 ety of judicial opinion as to the exact status of a station 
 agent. In Kansas a station agent was held not to be a coem- 
 ployee with a brakeman;^* the conductor of a freight train, 
 in a Tennessee case,®* was held not to be a coemployee with 
 a station agent, so as to deny him a cause of action, for an 
 injury due to such agent's negligence; a station agent, in 
 Illinois,*" was held not to be in the same service with a sec- 
 tion hand, injured by a collision due to such agent's neglect, 
 so as to deny a recovery, because of the fellow service of the 
 two employees, and under the Texas statute a station agent 
 was held not to be a fellow employee with a train crew, em- 
 ployed near the station in coupling cars.*^ 
 
 see, Card v, Eddy, 129 Mo. 510; 28 S. W. Rep. 979, for contrary rule, 
 in Missouri. 
 
 85 Brown v. Minneapolis, etc., E. Co., 31 Minn, 553. 
 
 88 Galveston, etc., E. Co. v. Farmer, 73 Texas 85; 11 S, W. Eep. 156; 
 Toner v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 69 Wis. 188; 31 N. W. Rep. 104. 
 
 87 Miller v. Michigan, etc., E. Co., 123 Mich. 374; 82 N. W. Eep. 58. 
 
 88 Atchison, etc., E. Co. v, Seeley, 54 Kansas 21; 37 Pao. Eep. 104. 
 
 89 Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Jackson, 106 Tenn. 438; 61 S. W. 
 Eep. 771. 
 
 00 St. Louis, etc., E. Co. v. Biggs, 53 111. App. 550, 
 
 »iGulf, etc., R. Co. V. Calvert, 11 Texas Civ. App. 297; 32 S. W. 
 
 Eep. 246. But, in the absence of such a statute, see Gralveston, etc., 
 
 R. Co. V. Farmer, 73 Texas 85; 11 S. W. Eep. 156. 
 
 720 
 
COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. § 500 
 
 § 500. Status of various other employees in different de- 
 partments. — It is quite generally held that hrakemen and 
 other employees on the same train are coemployees ; ®^ a 
 brakeman and fireman are generally regarded as coem- 
 ployees, when employed upon the same train ; ®* a car- loader 
 and brakeman or car coupler are also coemployees ; ^* a 
 brakeman and the engineer of the train on which he is brak- 
 ing are also in the same general service;*^ a bridge tender 
 and a section man are held to be similarly engaged, so that 
 the employer is not responsible for an injury due to the 
 former's negligence ; ®* a train master is held to be the coem- 
 ^loyee and not the superior of a brakeman ; ®'^ a sand man, or 
 
 Station agent was held to be a coemployee with brakeman, in the 
 following cases: Gaflfney v. New York, etc., E. Co., 15 R. I. 456; 
 7 Atl. Rep. 284; 31 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 265; Toner v. Chicago, etc., 
 R. Co., 69 Wis. 188; 31 N. W. Rep. 104; 33 N. W. Rep. 433; 28 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 449; Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Farmer, 73 Texas 85; 11 
 S. W. Rep. 156; 38 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 75. 
 
 He was also held to be coworkman with engineer, in Dealey v. 
 Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. (PaO, 4 Atl. Rep. 170; Brown v. Minneapolis, 
 etc., R. Co., 31 Minn. 553; 18 N. W. Rep. 834. 
 
 And likewise a coemployee with fireman, in Reiser v. Pennsylvania 
 R. Co., 152 Pa. St. 38; 25 Atl. Rep. 175. 
 
 And a coemployee with train crew, even though inspecting loaded 
 cars, in Byrnes v. New York, etc., R. Co., 113 N. Y. 251; 21 N. E. 
 Rep. 50; 4 L. R. A. 151. 
 
 And a station hand, who helps make up trains, under the station 
 master, is also held to be a coemployee with brakemen of the train, 
 in Hodgkins v. Eastern R. Co., 119 Mass. 419; 9 Am. Ry. Rep. 271. 
 
 82Whalen v. Michigan, etc., R. Co., 114 Mich. 512; .72 N. W. Rep. 
 323; Ward v. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co., 39 W. Va. 46; 19 S. E. Rep. 
 389; Casey v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 84 Ky. 79. 
 
 BSLoranger v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., 104 Mich. 80; 62 N. W. 
 Rep. 137; Southern R. Co. v. Clifford, 110 Ky. 727; 62 S. W. Rep. 514. 
 
 ?* Bailey v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 27 App. Div. (N. Y.) 305; 50 
 N. Y. Supp. 87. 
 
 9B Kersey v. Kansas City, etc., E. Co., 79 Mo. 362 ; Ekles v. Norfolk, 
 etc., E. Co., 96 Va. 69; 25 S. E. Eep. 545. 
 
 »8 Illinois, etc., R. Co. v. Bishop, 76 Miss. 758 ; 25 So. Rep. 867. 
 
 »7 Martin v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 65 Fed. Rep. 384. 
 
 1—46 721 
 
§ 500 COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. 
 
 one whose duty it is to provide sand in the sand box of the 
 engine, is a coemployee of the train men operating the en- 
 gine ; ^® a track walker and track repairer and conductor are 
 all coemployees,®® as are the train men operating a train and 
 other employees being hauled to work, on the same train/ 
 so that for an injury due to the negligence of any such, there 
 is no liability on the railroad company's part, in most of the 
 States where the questions have been presented. 
 
 But the above rules of law would not be applicable in 
 States where the " conassociation " theory, or department doc- 
 trine obtains, for as to such States there must be an identity 
 of employment and service, to constitute two or more em- 
 ployees coemployees, within the common-law rule of nonlia- 
 bility for the negligence of the employees. Hence, it is, that 
 in Illinois, a car loader and switchman are held not to be 
 coemployees ; ^ an express man employed by an express com- 
 pany and a railway employee are not coemployees as they 
 have different employers ; * an express messenger and a bag- 
 gage man are not coemployees ; * a porter upon a sleeper and 
 railway employees are not engaged in the same service ; ^ a 
 quarry man and railway employees are engaged in distinct 
 employments ; ^ a telegraph operator is not the coemployee 
 of a squad of men engaged in work on the section,'' nor is 
 
 98 Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Petty, 67 Miss. 255; 7 So. Rep. 351; 
 41 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 444. 
 
 asFagundes v. Central Pacifle E. Co., 79 Cal. 97; 21 Pae. Eep. 437. 
 iManville v. Cleveland, etc., E. Co., 11 Ohio St. 417. 
 
 2 Winona, etc., Co. v. Hohlquist, 51 111. App. 507. 
 
 3 Cobb V. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 149 Mo. 609; 50 S. W. Eep. 894; 
 13 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. (N. S.) 632. 
 
 4 Union Pacific E. Co. v. Kelly, 4 Colo. App. 325; 35 Pac. Eep. 923. 
 
 5 Jones V. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 125 Mo. 666; 28 S. W. Eep. 883; 
 26 L. E. A. 718. 
 
 Church v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 119 Mo. 203; 23 S. W. Eep. 1056; 
 Dixon V. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 109 Mo. 413 ; 19 S. W. Eep. 412. 
 
 T Savage v. Nassau, etc., E. Co., 168 N. Y. 680; 61 N. E. Eep. 1134. 
 
 722 
 
COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW. . § 500 
 
 the -watchmaii at a bridge the coemployee of an engineer, op- 
 erating a locomotive, so as to deprive him of a cause of ac- 
 tion, for an injury due to his neglect.* 
 
 8 Pike V. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 41 Fed. Rep. 95 ; 4 Thompson on 
 Negligence, § 5147. 
 
 " Where a railroad company delegated its duty of loading a car to 
 a lumber company; making a shipment, it is liable for any injury to 
 its own employee caused by negligence of the employees of the lumber 
 company in loading the car." Britt v. Carolina Northern K. Co. 
 (N. C. 1907), 56 S. E. Eep. 910. 
 
 " One employed in unloading rails from a train was a fellow work- 
 man of the" engineer." De Santes v. New York, N. H. & H. E. Co. 
 (N. Y. Supp. 1907), 103 N. Y. S. 849. 
 
 " An employee directing a gang engaged in loading iron rails on 
 a flat car and controlling the manner of performing the work is a vice- 
 principal and not a fellow workman, though he has no power to 
 employ or discharge the men." Chicago, etc., Ey. Co. v. Eathneau, 80 
 N. E. Eep. 119; 225 111. 278. 
 
 " Where a railroad company and a news company enter into a contract 
 by which an agent of the news company, employed to sell papers and 
 fruit on trains, is permitted to ride thereon, he is employed on the 
 train, and is not a passenger, within act April 4, 1868, § 1 (P. L. 58), 
 and when killed by the negligence of an employee of the railroad 
 company, no recovery can be had for his death." Smallwood v. Balti- 
 more & O. E. Co., 64 Atl. Eep. 732; 215 Pa. 540. 
 
 " The employee of a railroad company employed in working about 
 a coal dock, and under the direction of a foreman, was not a fellow 
 workman of a locomotive engineer who worked under the direction 
 of a yard master, and who had nothing to do with the work on the 
 coal dock except to push cars on the dock and pull them out with his 
 locomotive." Lanning v. Chicago Great Western Ey. Co. (Mo. 1906), 
 94 S. W. Rep. 491. 
 
 " Where a workman excavating the roadbed of a railway was injured 
 by the explosion of dynamite caused by the negligence of a coemployee 
 who was helping plaintiff in lighting the fuse, he cannot recover from 
 the railway company employing him." Vito v. West Chester, etc., 
 Electric Ry. Co. (Pa. 1907), 66 Atl. Eep. 659. 
 
 "A locomotive wiper while holding a piece of machinery in order 
 to assist a mechanic engaged in repairing a locomotive was a fellow 
 workman with the mechanic." Schneider v. Missouri Pac. Ey. Co. 
 (Mo. App. 1906), 94 S. W. Eep. 730. 
 
 "A person employed to clean the cinders out of engines in a cinder 
 
 Y23 
 
g 500 COEMPLOYEES AT COMMON LAW, 
 
 pit is a fellow workman of an assistant hostler employed to move 
 engines from one part of the yards to another." Atchison, etc., Ry. 
 Co. V. Dickens (Ind. T. 1907), 103 S. W. Rep. 750. 
 
 " Neither a roundhouse inspector charged with the duty of inspecting 
 the pilot of an engine, nor a section foreman and his men, required 
 to keep the track in safe condition, are fellow workmen of a brakeman." 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Wise (Tex. Civ. App. 1908), 106 S. W. 
 Rep. 465. 
 
 " Where a semaphore was seasonably set red so that it must have 
 sent the danger signal down the line, which the engineer in the exercise 
 of proper vigilance could not have failed to distinguish, and the 
 collision resulted either from his failure of duty in this behalf or from 
 the failure of the semaphore tender to change the signal from green 
 to red until too late for the engineer to stop the train, the resulting 
 injury to a fireman on an engine was caused by the negligence of a, 
 fellow workman." Tillson v. Maine Cent. R. Co. (Me. 1907), 67 Atl. 
 Rep. 407. 
 
 " Where the inspection of cars and the discovery of defects therein 
 were confided by a railway company to ear inspectors, a rule of the 
 company that flying switches should not be made without testing the 
 brakes of the cars did not make employees engaged in switching agents 
 for the inspection of the cars and the discovery of defects, and it was 
 not liable to an employee for the negligence of a fellow employee 
 violating the rule." Fogarty v. Southern Pac. Co. (Cal. 1907), 91 
 Pac. Rep. 650. 
 
 " A railroad employee does not assume the risk arising from the 
 failure of another employee to use ordinary care in uncoupling cars." 
 Missouri, etc., Ry. Co. v. Barnes (Tex. Civ. App. 1906), 95 S. W. 
 Rep. 714. 
 
 A physician who agrees to wait upon railroad employees and pas- 
 sengers, when sick or injured, is not a fellow employee with a train 
 crew, by whose negligencj|. he is killed, while on the track going to 
 the station to take a train, in order to pay a visit to one of his own 
 patients. Tingle v. Long Island R. Co., 96 N. Y. S. 865; 109 App. 
 Div. 793. 
 
 A student brakeman, learning the business, is held to be a fellow 
 workman of the regular train crew, in California, though he receives 
 no remuneration for his services. Weisser v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 
 83 Pac. Rep. 439. 
 
 A master mechanic was held to represent the company, in Taylor v. 
 Evansville, etc., R. Co., 121 Ind. 124; 22 N. E. Rep. 876; 6 L. R. A. 
 584; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 437; Cooper v. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co., 
 24 W. Va. 37; Hough v. Texas, etc., R. Co., 100 U. S. 213; 21 Am. 
 
 724 
 
coSmplotees at common law. § 500 
 
 Ey. Eep. 451; Tabler v. Hannibal, etc., E. Co., 93 Mo. 79; 5 S. W. 
 Eep. 810; 31 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 185. 
 
 An assistant road master was held to be vice-principal, in Harrison 
 V. Detroit, etc., E. Co., 79 Mich. 409; 44 N. W. Eep. 1034; 41 Am. & 
 Eng. E. Cas. 398. 
 
 A boss of railroad shops is a vice-principal of a helper in the 
 shops. Union Pacific E. Co. v. Fort, 17 Wall. (U. S.) 553; Proctor v. 
 Missouri, etc., E. Co., 42 Mo. App. 124. 
 
 A brakeman is held to be a coemployee with his conductor, in 
 Wonder v. Baltimore, etc., E. Co., 32 Md. 411; Henry v. Staten Island 
 E. Co., 81 N. Y. 373; 2 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 60; Brown v. Central 
 Pacific E. Co., 72 Cal. 523; 14 Pac. Eep. 138. 
 
 He is held to be a, coemployee with a fireman of another train on 
 the same railroad, in Eelye> v. Kansas City, etc., E. Co., 112 Mo. 86; 
 20 S. W. Eep. 480; 53 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 578. 
 
 And also of switchmen, or other brakemen operating switch, in 
 Slattery v. Toledo, etc., E. Co., 23 Ind. 81; Connelly v. Minneapolis, 
 etc., E. Co., 38 Minn. 80; 35 N. W. Eep. 582; Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. 
 Eush, 84 111. 570. 
 
 Bridge builder was held to be representing company, in Davis v. 
 Concord, etc., E. Co., 55 Vt. 84; 11 Am. & Eng. E. Cas, i73. 
 
 A railroad manager is a, vice-principal of the men under his orders. 
 Galveston, etc., B. Co. v. Arispe, 81 Texas 517; 17 S. W. Eep. 47; 
 48 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 350; Phillipps v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 64 Wis. 
 475; 25 N. W. Eep. 544; 23 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 453. 
 
 Fireman was held to be coemployee of brakeman, in Kersey v. Kansas 
 City, etc., E. Co., 79 Mo. 362; 17 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 638; Greenwald 
 V. Marquette, etc., B. Co., 49 Mich. 197; 13 N. W. Eep. 513; 8 Am. & 
 Eng. E. Cas. 133. 
 
 725 
 
CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 STATUTES ABOLISHma THE COMMOU LAW. 
 
 § 501. Objects and reasons for legislation affecting employers and 
 employees. 
 
 502. Objectipna to such legislation. 
 
 503. History of legislation regarding. 
 
 504. Constitutionality of such statutes. 
 
 505. Extraterritorial effect of such statutes. 
 
 506. Contracts in contravention of statutes. 
 
 507. Actions for death, due to eoemployee's negligence. 
 
 508. Injuries received while obeying employer's rules. 
 
 509. Injuries due to negligence of superintendent. 
 
 510. Person controlling car, train, or locomotive. 
 
 511. Negligence of employee controlling any signal, point, or switch. 
 
 512. Liability for defects in "ways, works, machinery, or plant." 
 
 513. Statute of Alabama. 
 
 514. The statute of Arkansas. 
 
 515. The civil code of California. 
 
 516. Colorado laws. 
 
 5X7. Statute of Connecticut 
 
 518. Florida statute. 
 
 519. The Georgia code. 
 
 520. The safety appliance act of Illinois. 
 
 521. The Indiana statute. 
 
 522. The statute of Iowa. 
 
 523. The general statutes of Kansas. 
 
 524. Kentucky statutes. 
 
 525. The code of Louisiana. 
 
 526. The revised laws of Massachusetts. 
 
 527. Laws of Minnesota. 
 
 528. Laws of Mississippi. 
 
 529. The statute of Missouri. 
 
 530. The Montana code and constitution. 
 
 531. The statute in Nebraska. 
 632. The legislation in Nevada. 
 
 533. The laws of New Mexico. 
 
 534. The New York statute. 
 726 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. § 501 
 
 § 535. The North Carolina laws. 
 
 536. The North Dakota code. 
 
 537. The annotated statutes of Ohio. 
 
 538. Constitution of Olclahoma. 
 
 539. Legislation of Oregon. 
 
 540. Legislation of Pennsylvania. 
 
 541. The Constitution of South Carolina. 
 
 542. South Dakota legislation. 
 
 543. The laws of Texas. 
 
 544. The Federal Eqiployer's Liability Act. 
 
 545. The United States Safety Appliance Act. 
 
 546. The law of Vermont. 
 
 547. The Virginia Constitution. 
 
 548. The statute of Washington. 
 
 549. The statute of Wisconsin. 
 
 550. The Constitution of Wyoming. 
 
 § 501. Objects and reasons for legislation, affecting em- 
 ployers and employees.— Eegardless of the wisdom of the 
 common-law rule exempting the employer from liability for 
 injuries to his employees from the negligence of other work- 
 men with the injured person, that there has been a growing 
 demand for the change or abolition of this rule, is abundantly 
 evidenced by the statutory enactments in the United States 
 and other countries, with reference to the more hazardous 
 occupations, such as railroading. Much of this legislation 
 is found to be unwise or ill-considered, by the courts and text 
 writers, and too often, instead of being prompted by the in- 
 terests of the employees, or the large industrial class in 
 whose name such legislation is proclaimed to be enacted, it 
 is prompted by those who expect to prey upon this class by 
 the enforcement of otherwise illegal claims for personal in- 
 jury actions, out of which a large proportion of the recovery 
 goes to the representative of the injured employee and but 
 a small portion to th.e party entitled thereto. But whether 
 the growing public sentiment favorable to the repeal of the 
 common-law rule obtaining in actions for injuries to em- 
 ployees, is due in any degree to the demands of politicians, 
 
 727 
 
§ 501 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. 
 
 or to the restlessness of the individual citizen and the grow- 
 ing desire for greater individual rights and the further lim- 
 itation upon the rights of the corporations, fostered as such 
 demand is, by the modern growth of the idea that change 
 alone can bring relief for industrial and civil evils, the in- 
 creasing demand for the extension of the rights of the em- 
 ployee and the recognition of a liability on the employer's 
 part, where none heretofore existed, has culminated\ in much 
 legislation subjecting the employer to a liability for injuries 
 to his employees, growing out of the carelessness of other 
 workmen. 
 
 The general object of such legislation is to change the com- 
 :non-law rule of nonliability of employers of labor, particu- 
 larly in the occupation of railroading, for personal injuries 
 received by employees in the service^ occasioned by the neg- 
 ligence of a coemployee. Frequently legislatures go even so 
 far as to relax the salutary rule of the common law which 
 makes contributory negligence a defense to claims for such 
 injuries and enables a recovery by an employee, for an in- 
 jury caused by the negligence of a coemployee, even though 
 the injured one contributed by his own negligence, to his 
 own injury.^ To effectuate such legislation, it is also gen- 
 erally provided that any contract, rule or regulation, seek- 
 ing to relieve the employer from the liability created, shall 
 be void. 
 
 It is unquestionably true, that in. modem times personal 
 injuries have become a" tremendous burdeii to the large class 
 of employees engaged in such hazardous occupations as rail- 
 roading. As a partial relief for this burden, it is urged that 
 whatever reason existed for the common-law rule, when it 
 was first announced, can no longer exist, under modern meth- 
 
 1 See Report of Mr. Sterling, for the majority of Com. on Jud., 
 H. E. U. S., No. 1386, accompanying H. R. 20,310, on Liability of 
 Employers, April 4, 1908. 
 
 728 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. § 502 
 
 ods of commerce by railroad. That while coemployees then 
 had some influence over each other, tending to their personal 
 safety, that this is not true, under present industrial meth- 
 ods. It is also urged that such legislation is conducive to 
 greater care in the operation of railroads, because, by the 
 common-law rule, the employee is not held to such strict 
 rules of caution, for the safety of his coemployees, since the 
 employer is not liable for his want of care.^ 
 
 § 502. Objections to such legislation. — Among the objec- 
 tions urged to such legislation, it is stated, in reply to the 
 suggestion that greater care ought to be taken by the em- 
 ployer in the employment of competent and careful em- 
 ployees, that the common-law rule renders the employer lia- 
 ble for the employment or retention in his service of any but 
 competent and skilled workmen, in case of an injury by an 
 incompetent or habitually* careless employee.* The basis of 
 every personal injury action is a breach of duty on the part 
 of the one charged with causing the injury and unless such 
 breach of duty, or negligence is shown, whether by decision 
 of the court, or by legislative act, it is wrong to compel char- 
 itable contributions under the guise of legal formulas, from 
 one not morally responsible for the injury sustained. The 
 contract of employment does not, as such, imply a contract 
 of insurance and it is wrong to make of the employer, an in- 
 surer of his employees, but they should be left to carry in- 
 surance or not, as they deem it wise or unwise for their inter- 
 •ests so to do. 
 
 In morals each person is responsible for his own acts or 
 
 2 Rep. Com. Jud. H. E. U. S., No. 1386, on H. R. 20,310, page 3. 
 
 3 Wabash E. Co. v. McDaniels, 107 U. S. 454; 11 Am. & Eng. E. 
 Cas. 158; Holden v. Fitchburg, etc., R. Co., 129 Mass. 268; 37 Am. 
 Eep. 343; 2 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 94; Stafford v, Chicago, etc., E. Co., 
 114 111. 244; 2 N. E. Rep. 185; Dillon v. Union Pacific R. Co., 3 Dill. 
 (U. S.) 319; Harper v. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co., 44 Mo. 488. 
 
 729 
 
§ 502- STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. 
 
 omissions but not for those of another person. It is only 
 by the fiction or implication of the law, for the protection of 
 society, that the rule respondeat superior exists. Within the 
 contract of employment and between employer and employee, 
 as in all other relations of life, eyery one assumes all the 
 ordinary hazards, not due to the negligence of another, and 
 is answerable for what he himself does or fails to do. It 
 is generally found to be a dangerous experiment to modify 
 or abolish such salutary rules of the common law, founded 
 upon the interests of humanity and the rights of litigants, as 
 settled by the best legal minds of the ages, during a period 
 the most progressive that the world has ever witnessed. 
 
 The wisdom of such statutes is also questioned, because it 
 is contended that they proceed upon contradictory principles, 
 in imposing an increased responsibility upon the employer, 
 presumably in order to make him more careful in the selec- 
 tion of his employees, and at the same time they minimize 
 the necessity for care on the part of the employees^ by allow- 
 ing a recovery for their negligence. Such laws indeed seem 
 counter to natural justice, in thus placing a reward upon the 
 wrongful act of one person and penalizing another, not other- 
 wise responsible therefor, for the effect of such carelessness.* 
 
 It is also urged against such legislation and the equality 
 and fairness of such laws, that they discriminate against the 
 companies engaged as common carriers, since they are made 
 responsible to one employee for an injury suffered by the 
 act of a coemployee, thus placing all employers who are com- 
 mon carriers, in a disfavored class, and all of their employees • 
 in a favored class to themselves.®'- 
 
 But with legislatures, equality and justness does not al- 
 ways furnish the proper guides, but far too often popular 
 
 *See H. E. No. 1386, on Liability of Emp., Min. Kep. Com. Jud., 
 on H. E. 20,310, p. 95, April 4, 1908. 
 
 B Howard v. Illinois Central R. Co., 207 U. S. 463. 
 
 730 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON lAW. § 503 
 
 enactments, whether just or unjust, furnish the motive that 
 crystallizes into written laws, which the courts and lawyers, 
 in their strict adherence to these ideals, are called upon to 
 set aside or construe, so as best to subserve the interests and 
 rights of the citizen. Industrial evils are too often due to 
 an excess of legislation, than the contrary and a cessation of 
 the wholesale flood of statutory enactments against unpopular 
 classes will do much to relieve the social evils.® 
 
 § 503. History of legislation regarding. — The common-law 
 rule that an employer was not responsible for injuries to 
 his employees, caused by the negligence of competent co- 
 employees, was first announced in England in 1837, since 
 which time this rule has been generally followed both in 
 England and the United States, except where abrogated or 
 modified by statute. 
 
 The common-law rules, governing the liability of employ- 
 ers for injuries to their employees, still prevail in many of 
 the United States, but in many of the States and also 
 in many of the European countries, new rules of liability 
 have been adopted, which generally extend the responsibili^ 
 of the employer, as it was recognized at common law. 
 
 England, in 1880,'' passed an act which abolished the 
 common-law rule governing the employer's liability to his 
 employees, engaged in the operation of railroad trains. 
 
 Germany, for many years, has been enacting statutes of 
 difFerent character, making inroads upon the common-law 
 rule. 
 
 Austria, in 1869, passed a law making all railroad com- 
 
 8 See Paper Before Mo. Bar Ass'n, Sept., 1907, at St. Joseph, Mo., 
 entitled, The Judiciary and Public Sentiment. 
 
 TEmp. Liab. Act 1880, § 1; Cox. v. Great Western K. Co., L. E. 9 
 Q. B. 106; 6 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 485; 43 & 44 Vict. 42. 
 
 731 
 
• § 503 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. 
 
 panies responsible for injuries to their employees, not due 
 to the contributory negligence of the injured employee. 
 
 The Code Napoleon, which is still in force in Belgium 
 and Holland, made the employer liable for all injuries re- 
 ceived by the workmen in his service. 
 
 In the United States, Georgia, in 1856, abolished the 
 common-law rule, as to railroad employees; Iowa abrogated 
 the rule as to train operatives, in 1862 ; Kansas enacted a 
 statute abolishing the rule as to railroad companies, in 1874 ; 
 Alabama eliminated the rule in so far as it applied to rail- 
 road companies, in 1885; Minnesota passed a similar act, 
 in 1887; Missouri, North Carolina, North Dakota, and 
 Massachusetts, have practically abolished the common-law 
 rule, in so far as it applied to railroad employees, actually 
 operating trains; Wisconsin has passed a similar law, and 
 Florida, Ohio, Mississippi and Texas have greatly modified 
 the common-law rule, to the material advantage of the em- 
 ployees of railroad companies, while Colorado, in 1901, 
 abolished the common-law rule entirely. 
 
 Nor has this legislation been confined entirely to the dif- 
 ferent States, in the United States, but in 1906, the Con- 
 gress of the United States passed a similar act, abolishing 
 the common-law rule as to railroad companies and pjacti- 
 cally establishing, as to this favored class of employees, the 
 rule of comparative negligence, permitting recovery by em- 
 ployees of railroad companies, even though the injured em- 
 ployee was bimself guilty of negligence, contributing to 
 cause his injury. This act was held to be violative of the 
 Constitution by the Supreme Court,® and immediately after 
 
 s Howard v. Illinois Central E. Co., 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141 ; 207 U. S. 
 463. 
 
 For history of the legislation in the United States and foreign 
 countries, upon employer's liability, see Report to Congress, by Jud. 
 Com., on H. E. 20,310, Rep. No. 1,386, filed April 4, 1908, in Cong. 
 
 732 
 
STATUTES ABOiiSHJiirG COMMON LAW. § 504 
 
 the rendition of this decision, another act was passed of 
 similar import, in the year 1908. 
 
 § 504. Constitutionality of such statutes. — In the first few 
 States, in the United States, where statutes were en-acted 
 that abrogated the common-law rule, exempting the em- 
 ployer from liahility for injuries to his employees, caused 
 by the negligence of competent . coemployees, the constitu- 
 tionality of such acts was drawn in question and the courts 
 of both the State and Federal Government passed upon the 
 constitutionality of these statutes. 
 
 The Iowa Code, of 1873, was assailed, because it was in 
 conflict with the 14th Amendment to the United States 
 Constitution, guaranteeing the equal protection and benefit 
 of the law, but both the Supreme Court of Iowa ® and the 
 Supreme Court of the United States ^^ upheld the statute. 
 
 The statute of Kansas, of 18Y4, was claimed to deprive 
 railroad companies of their property, without due process 
 of law, and to deny to them the equal protection of the laws, 
 but both the Supreme Court of Kansas ^^ and the Supreme 
 Court of the United States ^^ likewise upheld this statute. 
 
 U. S., at Washington, D. C. In this report, it is stated that the first 
 legislation in England on this subject, was in 1888, instead of in 
 1880, which was the date of the Employer's Liability Act, as to 
 operation of Railroads, in England. (43 & 44 Vict. 42.) 
 
 9 Pierce v. Central R. Co., 73 Iowa 140; 34 N. W. Rep. 783; 
 Bucklew V. Central R. Co., 64 Iowa 603; Rayburn v. Central R. Co., 
 74 Iowa 637; 35 N". W. Rep. 606; 38 N. W. Rep. 520; Deppe v. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co., 36 Iowa 52; McAunich v. Mississippi, etc., R. 
 Co., 20 Iowa 338. 
 
 10 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. McLaughlin, 119 U. S. 566; 7 Sup. Ct. 
 Rep. 1366. 
 
 "Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Mackey, 33 Kansas 298; 6 Pac. Rep. 
 291; 22 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 306; Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Haley, 
 25 Kansas 35; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 594; Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Koehler, 37 Kansas 463; 15 Pac. Rep. 567; 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 312. 
 
 12 Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205; 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 
 733 
 
§ 504 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. 
 
 The Missouri Act of 1897 was assailed upon similar con- 
 stitutional grounds, but was likewise upheld by the Supreme 
 Court of that State/^ as well as by the United States Su- 
 preme Court.^* And the statutes of Georgia ^® and Wis- 
 consin,^" as well as other State laws on this subject, have 
 been upheld as constitutional laws. 
 
 The Act of Congress of 1906 was held to be unconstitu- 
 tional by the Supreme Court, because it embraced subjects 
 within the authority of Congress to regulate and also in- 
 cluded subjects not within the constitutional power of that 
 body to regulate and the two were so interblended as not to 
 be capable of separation.^'' 
 
 The act was also assailed because it discriminated against 
 those engaged in interstate commerce, as common carriers, 
 in that it made them responsible to employees for injuries 
 due to the negligence of coemployees, thus placing all em- 
 ployers, who were common carriers, in a disfavored class 
 and all their employees in a favored class, but upon these 
 contentions, the court observed: "It must not be implied 
 that we question the correctness of previous decisions, noted 
 in the margin,^* wherein State statutes were held not to 
 
 1161; 33 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 390; Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Herrick, 
 127 U. S. 210. 
 
 13 Powell V. Sherwood, 162 Mo. 605; 63 S. W. Rep. 485; Callahan v. 
 St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co., 170 Mo. 473; 71 S. W. Rep. 208; 94 Am. St, 
 Rep. 746; 60 L. R. A. 249. 
 
 11 St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Callahan, 194 U. S. 628; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
 857; 48 L. Ed. 1157. 
 
 16 Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. Ivey, 73 Ga. 499; 28 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 392. 
 
 isDitberner v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 47 Wis. 138; 2 N. W. Eep. 69. 
 
 17 Howard v. Illinois Central R. Co., 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141 ; 207 U. S. 
 463. 
 
 18 The cases cited in the margin of the opinion, were, Missouri 
 Pacific Ry.-Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205; Minneapolis, etc., Ry. Co. v. 
 Herrick, 127 U. S. 210, and Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. Pontius, 157 
 U. 8. 209. 
 
 734 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. § 504 
 
 be repugnant to the 14th Amendment, although they 
 classified steam railroads in one class for the purpose of 
 applying a rule of master and servant." ^® 
 
 19 Howard v. Illinois Central E. Co., 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141; 207 U. S. 
 463. ' ,-- 
 
 In some jurisdictions, these statutes abolishing the common-law rule 
 as to fellow service, have been attacked as unconstitutional because 
 they are class legislation, but where they only abrogate the rule as 
 to those employees actually engaged in the operation of a railroad, they 
 have been, upheld, on this ground. O'Brien v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 
 116 Fed. Rep. 502 j Indianapolis, etc., E. Co. v. Houlihan, 157 Ind. 
 494; 60 N. E. Rep. 913. 
 
 But where such statutes attempt to impose a liability upon railroads 
 - specially, as to injuries received by all classes of employes, by the 
 negligence of fellow workmen, regardless of the grade of the service 
 or -whether such injury is received in the operation of the railroad 
 or otherwise, they have been held unconstitutional, in Schroeder v. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co., 41 Iowa 344; 47 Iowa 375; Chicago, etc., R. 
 Co. V. Pontius, 52 Kansas 264; 34 Pac. Rep. 739; Johnson v. St. Paul, 
 etc., R. Co., 43 Minn. 222; 45 N. W. Rep. 156; 8 L. R. A. 419. 
 
 But in North Carolina, and Wisconsin, it was held that the statutes 
 are not unconstitutional, although not applicable only to employees 
 engaged in the work of operating a railroad. Hancock v. Norfolk, etc., 
 E. Co., 124 N. Car. 222; 32 S. E. Rep. 679; Ditberner v. Chicago, etc., 
 R. Co., 47 Wis. 138. 
 
 These decisions seem counter to the best settled principles, for, as 
 observed by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in an early case, 
 " It is manifestly contrary to the first principles of civil liberty and 
 natural justice and of the spirit of our constitution and laws that 
 any 'one citizen should enjoy privileges and advantages Which are 
 denied to all others, under like circumstances, or that anyone should 
 be subjected to losses, damages, suits, or actions from which all others, 
 under like circumstances are exempted." Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 
 404. 
 
 Upon other questions than that of abolition of the common-law 
 fellow service rule, this fundamental rule has been announced by 
 the United States Supreme Court, as to railroad companies, for it 
 was held, in Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Ellis (165 U. S. 150) that a statute 
 which arbitrarily classified railroad companies, exclusively, was void, 
 because in conflict with the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of 
 the United States. 
 
 In Akerson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., the Iowa statute of 1862 was 
 
 735 
 
§ 504 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. 
 
 considered by the Iowa Supreme Court, vith reference to its applica- 
 tion to all employees in the service of railroad work, and in the course 
 of its opinion, the court said: 
 
 " The peculiarity of the railroad business which distinguishes it from 
 any other is the movement of vehicles or machinery of great weight on 
 the track by steam or other power, and the dangers incident to such 
 movements are those the statute was intended ta guard against. If, 
 then, the injury is received by an employee whose work exposes him 
 to the hazards of moving trains, cars, engines, or machinery on the 
 track, and is caused by the negligence of a coemployee in the actual 
 movement thereof, or in any manner directly connected therewith, the 
 statute applies, and recovery may be had. Beyond this the statute 
 aflFords no protection. The purpose of the lawmakers was evidently 
 not to make men, because employed, by railroad companies, favorites 
 of the law, but to afford protection owing to the peculiar hazards of 
 their situation." Ackerson v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 75 N. W. Rep. 676. 
 See, also, Stroble v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 70 Iowa 555; 31 N. W. Rep. 
 63; Luce v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co., 67 Iowa 75; 24 N. W. Rep. 600; 
 Reddington v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 78 N. W. Rep. 800; Foley v. 
 Chicago, etc., E. Co., 64 Iowa 644; 21 N. W. Eep. 124. 
 
 A similar construction of the Minnesota statute was adopted by the 
 Supreme Court of that State: Lavelle v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 40 
 Minn. 249; 41 N. W. Eep. 974; Johnson v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 43 
 Minn. 222; 45 N. W. Rep. 156; 8 L. R. A. 419; Jemming v. Great 
 Northern R. Co., 104 N. W. Rep. 1079. In the Lavelle case, supra, 
 in discussing this feature of the statute and the reason for the rule 
 adopted, the court said: 
 
 " Therefore, after mature consideration, our conclusion is that, if any 
 limitation is to be placed by the courts upon the application of this 
 statute (and on constitutional grounds there must be) the only one 
 which will furnish any definite or logical rule is to hold that it only 
 applies to those employees who are escposed to the peculiar hazards inci- 
 dent to the use and operation of railroads, and whose injuries are the 
 result of such dangers. We do not mean to say that there may be 
 reasons suggested by some differences in the nature of the employment 
 which would warrant the legislature in placing some other hazards 
 within the provisions of such a law; but if the courts should attempt 
 to impose upon the general language of this statute any other limita- 
 tion than the one suggested, they would be all at sea, without either 
 rudder or compass. Applying the test suggested, it is plain that plain- 
 tiff's case is not within the provisions of the act.'' 
 
 The best judicial thought upon this question seems to be that such 
 statutes niust not make the liability depend upon the fact of the 
 character of the employer, but upon the nature of the employment, or 
 
 Y36 
 
STATtffES ASOLigHlKG COMMON tAw. § 504 
 
 the statute making a special class of employers liable, cannot be up- 
 held. Bedford Quarries Co. v. Baugh, 80 N. E. Rep. 529; Ballard v. 
 Mississippi Oil Co.; 81 Miss. 507; 34 So. Rep. 533; 95 Am. St. Rep. 
 476; 62 L. R. A. 407; Tullis v. Lake Erie, etc., R. Co., 175 U. S. 348; 
 Connolly v. Union Sewer, etc., Co., 184 U. S. 540; South Indiana R. 
 Co. V. Harrell (Ind.), 68 N. E. Rep. 262; Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Forman, 69 N. E. Rep. 669; Pittsburg, etc., Ry. Co. v. Lightheiser, 78 
 N. B. Rep. 1033; Indianapolis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Houlihan, 157 Ind, 
 494; 60 N. E. Rep. 543; 54 L. R. A. 787. 
 
 The Indiana statute making railroad companies liable for injuries 
 to employees due to the negligence of other employees, was held not 
 to deprive the railroad company of the equal benefit of the law or to 
 impair the obligations of any contract, in Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Light- 
 heiser, 78 N. B. Rep. 1033. 
 
 The Pennsylvania Act of 1868 was held not to deny to employees 
 of railroad companies the equal protection or benefit of the law or 
 deny them due process of law, in Martin v. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co., 203 
 U. S. 284; 51 L. Ed. 184; 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 100. . 
 
 The Mississippi Constitution of 1890, § 193, is held not to be violative 
 of the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution, in Bradford Con. 
 Co. V. Heflin, 88 Miss. 314; 42 So. Rep. 174. 
 
 The act of the 27th General Assembly of Iowa, making all contracts 
 of insurance or for indemnity previously entered into void, in case of 
 a resulting personal injury, does not deny the railroad company the 
 equal protection of the laws, or impair contracts. MeGuire v. Chicago, 
 etc., R. Co., 108 N. W. Rep. 902. 
 
 The Colorado Laws of 1901, p. ^61, regarding liability of em- 
 ployers for acts of coemployees, does not deny the employer his property 
 without due process of law. Vindicator Consolidated, etc., Co. v. First- 
 brook, 86 Pac. Eep. 313. 
 
 The equal protection of the laws was held not to be denied the rail- 
 road company, under Minnesota laws (1894, § 2701), by construing the 
 proviso excepting cases of injuries to employees on new railroads in 
 process of construction, from the provisions of the general laws, in 
 Minnesota, etc., Co. v. Kline, 199 U. S. 593; 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 159. 
 
 The Texas statute was held to be constitutional, in International, etc., 
 E. Co. V. Still, 88 S. W. Eep. 257. 
 
 And the Minnesota statute was held to be constitutional, in Kibbe 
 V. Stevenson Iron Mining Co., 136 Fed. Eep. 147 ; 69 C. 0. A. 145. ' 
 
 And the Missouri statute was upheld, on same grounds, in St. 
 Louis Merchant's Bridge Terminal Ey. Co. v. Callahan, 194 U. S. 628; 
 48 L. Ed. 1157; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 857; 170 Mo. 476; 71 S. W. Rep. 
 208; 60 L. R. A. 249; 94 Am. St. Rep. 746. 
 
 r— 47 Y37 
 
§ 505 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMOlir LAW. 
 
 § 505. Extraterritorial effect of such statutes. — In accord- 
 ance with, the rule discussed in a previous section/" that the 
 courts of a State where an action is brought will defer to the 
 rule of law obtaining in the State where the cause of action 
 arose, in the adjudication of the rights of the parties, and if 
 the plaintiff has a cause of action under the statutes of the 
 State where the cause arose, he will be permitted a recovery 
 in the State where the suit is filed, but otherwise not, re- 
 gardless of the law of the forum, it is generally held that 
 where the statutes of a State give a right of action . for 
 injuries due to the negligence of coemployees, a cause ac- 
 cruing in such a State will be enforced in another State, 
 where the right of recovery would not be opposed to the 
 settled policy of the State where the cause of action is tried. 
 
 Accordingly, it is held that the Alabama law, regarding 
 fellow service, will be applied in a Tennessee court, in an 
 action involving negligence, based on an Alabama statute, 
 notwithstanding the law in Tennessee is different.^^ 
 
 But this rule is not of universal application, in actions 
 tried in other than the State where the cause of action arose, 
 in the absence of a statute in such State, giving a right of 
 action. It is held that an action will not lie in Wisconsin, 
 prior to the fellow-service law of that State by an employee 
 
 The Ohio statute was held to be constitutional, in Baltimore, etc., 
 R. Co. V. Hottman, ,25 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 140. 
 
 The equal protection of the laws is held, in Bradford Construction 
 Co. V. Heflin (Miss.), 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1040, not to be denied 
 to railroad companies by a constitutional provision repealing the 
 fellow-service doctrine in favor of employees of corSmercial rail- 
 roads, but not as to logging, lumber, and other like roads. 
 
 20 See Section 463, Conflict of Laws, in Chapter, Coemployees at Com- 
 mon Law. 
 
 21 Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Foster, 10 Lea (Tenn.) 351 j H Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 180. See, also, Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Moore, 29 
 Kansas 632; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 243; Alexander v. Pennsylvania 
 R. Co., 48 Ohio St. 623; 30 N. E. Rep. 69. 
 
 Y38 
 
STATtJTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. § 505 
 
 against an employer, for injuries received through the negli- 
 gence 'of a coemployee, in the State. of Iowa, although the 
 statute of that State gave a right of action therefor, as the 
 lex fori, and not the lex loci, was applied.^" In a case tried 
 in a federal court, in Minnesota, for an injury to a track 
 repairer, hurt by the negligence of his superintendent, in 
 Iowa, according to the law of the State where the cause of 
 action was tried, the plaintiff and the employee causing the 
 injury, were held to be coemployees, but according to the 
 federal decisions, they were not, and it was held that the 
 court would not follow the State decisions, as the question 
 did not involve a construction of a State statute.^* 
 
 Of course a statute of one State, making employers liable 
 for injuries to their employees by the negligence of coem- 
 ployees, will not apply to an injury received outside of such 
 State, in the absence of an express provision that it should 
 so apply.^* 
 
 22 Anderson v. Milwaukee, etc., E. Co., 37 Wis. 321. 
 
 23 Northern Pacific E. Co. v. Peterson, 51 Fed. Eep. 182; 4 U. S. 
 App. 574; 2 C. C. A. 157. In Hough v. Texas, etc.. By. Co. (100 U. S. 
 213-226; 25 L. Ed. 612-618), replying to the contention that two 
 Texas decisions recognized a right of recovery for an injury due to the 
 negligence of a coemployee. Justice Harlan, ^aid: "Be this as it may, 
 the question before us, in the absence of positive statute, depends 
 upon principles of general law, and in their determination, we are 
 not required to follow the decisions of the State courts." 
 
 21 Alabama, etc., E. Co. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126; 11 So. Eep. 803; 
 Kahl V. Memphis, etc., E. Co., 95 Ala. 337; 10 So. Eep. 661; Davis v. 
 New York, etc., E. Co., 143 Mass. 301 ; 9 N. E. Eep. 815. 
 
 The parents of a railroad brakeman, of legal age, killed in Kansas, 
 authorized by the statute of that State to sue for his death, while in- 
 defendant's employment, were held competent to sue in Missouri, for 
 the death of their son, in Charlton v. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 200 Mo. 
 413; 98 8. W. Eep. 529. See, also, Lee v. Missouri Pacific Ey. Co., 195 
 Mo. 400, 416; 92 S. W. Eep. 614. 
 
 But an administrator is not permitted to recover, in Missouri, on 
 a cause of action originating, for the death of an employee, in Kansas, 
 although he would have been competent to sue, in the latter State, 
 
 739 
 
§ 506' STATTTTES ABOLISHING OOMMON tAW. 
 
 § 506. Contracts in contravention of statutes. — Of course 
 to permit railroad companies to provide for the vraiver of 
 statutes enacted for the benefit of employees, upon grounds 
 of the police power of the State, because of its concern" in the 
 lives and limbs of its citizens, V70uld practically put it in 
 the power of employers to nullify the statute, at will, and 
 for this reason, where the statute contains a provision to the 
 effect that contracts in violation of the act shall be held 
 void, the courts generally give this effect to all such con- 
 tracts.*® 
 
 It was accordingly held, in a Kansas case,*® that a rail- 
 road company could not contract in advance, with its em- 
 ployees, for a waiver or release of the statutory liability 
 imposed upon every railroad company in the State, for in- 
 juries to its employees, from the negligence of coemployees,^'' 
 and a contract in contravention of the statute was held to be 
 void and to constitute no defense to an action brought by 
 an employee for damages resulting from an injury inflicted 
 by a coemployee. 
 
 And construing a similar contract, under the Iowa statute, 
 the federal court, in a recent casCj*® also held that a con- 
 as such recovery is contrary to the Missouri statute, on the right of re- 
 covery for death by negligence. Vawter v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. 84 
 Mo. 679 ; 54 Am. Rep. 105. See, also, Gates v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 104 
 Mo. 514; 24 Am. St. Rep. 348; 16 S. W. Rep. 487; McGinnis v. Mis- 
 souri Car, etc., Co., 174 Mo. 225; 73 S. W. Eep. 586; 97 Am. St. Rep. 
 653. , 
 
 The Indiana statute, giving a right of action for injuries received by 
 an employee outside the State of Indiana, was held unconstitutional, 
 in Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Read, 158 Ind. 25; 62 N". E. Rep. 488; 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Jones, 158 Ind. 87; 62 N. E. Rep. 994. See, 
 also, McGinnis v. Missouri Car, etc., R. Co., 174 Mo. 225; 73 S. W. Rep. 
 588; 97 Am. St. Rep. 553. 
 
 25 Kansas Pacific R. Co. v. Peavey, 34 Kansas 472. 
 
 20 Kansas Pacific R. Co. v. Peavey, 29 Kansas 169; 44 Am. Rep. 630; 
 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 260. 
 
 27 Laws Kansas, 1874, ch. 93. 
 
 28 O'Brien v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 116 Fed. Rep. 502. 
 
 740 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. § 506 
 
 tract made in violation of the statute would constitute no 
 defense to the action for injury or death of an employee 
 injured by the negligence of a coemployee, on a railroad, the 
 court, on this phase of the case, observing : " While such 
 contracts would be effective to protect the railroad company 
 from liability at common law, under such statutory provi- 
 sions, declaratory of the public policy of the State, they 
 were invalid and constituted no defense against it for the 
 death of the messenger, occurring in the State of Iowa, by 
 reason of the wrecking of the express, car in which he was 
 employed, through the negligence and want of ordinary care 
 of the defendant or its servants (employees)." 
 
 In the absence of a provision of the statute, however, that 
 contracts waiving the statute shall be invalid, such con- 
 tracts will be upheld by the courts, as a general rule. In a 
 case which came before the United States Supreme Court,^* 
 
 2» In this case, in speaking of the contract of the employee, the 
 court said: 
 
 " He was not constrained to enter into the contract whereby the rail- 
 road company was exonerated from liability to him, but entered into the 
 same freely and voluntarily, and obtained the benefit of it by securing 
 his appointment as such messenger; and such a contract did not contra- 
 vene public policy.'' Voigt v. Baltimore, etc., Ey. Co., 176 U. S. 498. 
 
 This is not the same rule that is applied in all the States, on 
 this same subject, for it is sometimes held, that irrespective of a 
 statute on the subject, a contract will not be enforced, which attempts 
 to relieve one of the parties thereto from damages sustained by reason 
 o'f its own negligence. Carroll v. Missouri Pacific Ey. Co., 88 Mo. 239; 
 57 Am. Eep. 382; Boyd v. Coal Co., 50 N. E. Eep. 368; Catlett v. 
 Young, 143 111. 74; 32 N. E. Eep. 447; Sunnyside Coal Co. v. Perry 
 Center, 100 111. App. 546; Green v. Western, etc., Co., 30 Wash. 87; 
 70 Pac. Eep. 310; Western, etc., Co. v. Beaver, 192 111. 333; 61 N. E. 
 Eep. 335; Spring Valley Co. v. Patting (111.), 71 N. E. Eep. 371. . 
 
 But a contract between a railroad company and its employees, who 
 voluntarily become members of its relief department, that in case of an 
 injury, the receipt of relief shall constitute a waiver of the right to sue 
 for damages, is held not to be affected by the Missouri fellow-service 
 law and contracts made in violation thereof. Hamilton v. St.. Louis, 
 etc., Ey. Co., 118 Fed. Eep. 92. 
 
 741 
 
§ 507 STATUTES ABOLISHING COifMOH' LAW. 
 
 where an express company had agreed to save harmless a 
 railroad company, for injuries to its employees, a contract 
 between an express messenger and the express company, 
 whereby such employee waived expressly all claims for 
 damages, whether resulting from negligence or otherwise, on 
 the part of the railroad company, was upheld and the plain- 
 tiff was held to have no cause of action for an injury due to 
 the negligence of the Tailroad company. 
 
 § 507. Actions for death due to coemployee's uefllgence. — 
 
 Since there waa no right of action for injury or death of 
 an employee due to the negligence of a coemployee, at com- 
 mon law, it is very generally held, under statutes giving a 
 right of action for death, even though the act is broad enough 
 to cover the death of " any person," that no action can be 
 maintained for the death of an employee, caused by the 
 negligence of a coemployee, unless the statute giving the 
 right of action expressly creates a right of action for an in- 
 
 A contract of a railroad company, whereby it was exempted from 
 damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of a vice-principal, 
 was held to be opposed to public policy, in Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. 
 V. Spangler (Ohio), 8 N. E. Rep. 467; Little Rock, etc., E. Co. v. Eu- 
 banks, 48 Ark. 460; 3 S. W. Rep. 808; Johnson's Admx. v. Richmond, 
 etc., R. Co., 86 Va. 975; 11 S. E. Rep. 829; Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Jones, 92 Ala. 218; 9 So. Rep. 276; Purdy v. Rome, etc., R. Co., 125 
 N. Y. Rep. 255. 
 
 That a liability imposed by statute, could not be relieved by con- 
 tract, was expressly ruled, in Kansas Pacific Ry. Co. v. Peavey, 29 Kan- 
 sas 169; 44 Am. Rep. 630; Tarbell v. Rutland R. Co. (Vt.), 51 Atl. 
 Rep. 6. 
 
 An implied waiver of a statute requiring frogs on railroads to be 
 blocked, cannot be based upon a mere continuance in the service, 
 with knowledge of the violation of the statute. Narramore v. Cleve- 
 land, etc., R. Co., 96 Fed. Rep. 298; Coal Co. v. Polland, 62 N. E. Rep. 
 492. 
 
 But in the absence of a statute declaring such contracts void, 
 they have been upheld, in Western, etc., E. Co. v. Bishop, 50 Ga. 465; 
 Mitchell V. Pennsylvania R. Co. (Pa.), 1 Am. Law Reg. 717, 
 
 743 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. § 50Y 
 
 jury resulting in the death of an employee, from such a 
 cause.*" 
 
 As an illustration of this rule, it was formerly held, in 
 Missouri,*^ in accordance with the well-known, common-law 
 rule, that the death statute, giving a right of action for 
 death due to the negligence of the employer, did not cover 
 a case where the death of the employee occurred through the 
 negligence of a competent employee, and although by statute, 
 in that State in 189Y, this rule of the common law, as to 
 a right of action for negligence resulting in the injury of 
 an employee on a railroad, engaged in the operation of the 
 road, M'as changed and a cause of action was given for such 
 an injury, as this act did not provide for the survival of 
 such a cause of action, but only provided for actions by 
 injured employees, it was held that as to such a cause of 
 action, occurring prior to the enactment of the law of 1905, 
 giving a right of action for the death of an employee, from 
 such a cause, that no right of action survived.*^ And this 
 is in accord with the general rule of law on this subject.** 
 
 30 4 Thompson on Neg., § 5317, and cases cited; Proctor v. Hannibal, 
 etc., R. Co., 64 Mo. 112, overruling Schultz v. Pacific E. Co., 36 Mo. 
 13. 
 
 31 Proctor V. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 64 Mo. 112. 
 
 32 8trottman v. St. Louis, etc., E. Co. (Mo.), 109 S. W. Rep. 798. 
 In this case, the court, in banc, were divided. The majority opinion, 
 by Judge Burgess, presents the authorities in accordaijce with the 
 rule in the text, supplemented by an able opinion by Judge Woodson. 
 Judge Lamm dissents, and rather invokes the rules set forth in the 
 Schultz case (36 Mo. 13), which, since the Proctor decision, that is 
 manifestly in accord with the weight of authority in, other jurisdic- 
 tions — has ceased to be the law in Missouri. 
 
 33 Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Farrow, 6 Colo. 498; Carle v. Bangor, 
 etc., R. Co., 43 Me. 269; Laughlin v. State, 105 N. Y. 159; Proctor 
 V. Hannibal, etc., R. Co., 64 Mo. 112; Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Davis, 
 4 Texas Civ. App. 468; 45 S. W. Rep. 956; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. 
 S.), 832, and cases cited. But, see, contra, Quackenbush v. Wisconsin, 
 etc., R. Co., 62 Wis. 411; cited 4 Thompson on Neg., § 5317. 
 
§ 508 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. 
 
 § 508. Injuries received while obeying employer's rules. — 
 
 Act8 done in obedience to the rules or instructions or orders 
 of the employer, resulting in injury to his employees, where 
 the instructions or orders are given by one representing the 
 employer, in some of the States, are made the basis of an 
 action for damages by statute.^* Such a statute exists in 
 
 In Strottman v. St. Louis, etc., E. Co. (109 S. W. Eep. 776), Judge 
 Burgess, in the majority opinion of the court, said: "We are unable 
 to- agree that this section has the eflfeet of transmitting a right of action 
 created by § 1, of the act of 1897, as it has been ruled by this court that 
 that section does not include a claim for damages for injuries occasioned 
 by the negligence of a feliow-servant." Proctor v. Hannibal, etc., R.. 
 Co., 64 Mo. 112; Miller v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 109 Mo. 350; 
 19 8. W. Eep. 58; 32 Am. St. Eep. 673; Sherrin v. St. Joseph, etc., E. 
 Co., 103 Mo. 378; 15 S. W. Eep. 442; 23 Am. St. Eep. 881. 
 
 And in the concurring opinion, in same case. Judge Woodson, ob- 
 served "As neither the act of 1897, nor § 2865, transfers such a 
 cause of action to the widow and children, I feel constrained to hold 
 that the cause of action, created by the act of 1897, in favor of a 
 fellow servant, did not survive his death, nor was it transmitted to 
 his widow and children, after his death." Strottman v. St. Louis, 
 etc., E. Co., 109 S. W. Eep. 781. 
 
 Of course this rule does not obtain as to causes of action created 
 in favor of third persons, against the employer, for injuries re- 
 ceived through the negligence of employees, for as to such rights of 
 action, the cause is held to survive, in favor of the widow and chil- 
 dren, in the following cases, in Missouri: Keeney v. Hannibal & St. Jo- 
 seph Ey. Co., 105 Mo. 270; 15 S. W. Eep. 983; 16 S. W. Eep. 837; 
 Crumpley v. Hannibal & St. Joseph Ey. Co., 98 Mo. 34; 11 S. W. Eep. 
 244; King v. Eailroad, 98 Mo. 235; 11 S. W. Eep. 563; McQuade v. 
 Suburban Ey. Co., 200 Mo. 157; 98 S. W. Eep. 552; Higgins v. St. Louis 
 & Sub. Ey Co., 197 Mo. 301; 95 S. W. Eep. 863; Jackson v. Eailroad, 
 157 Mo. 623; 58 S. W. Eep. 32; 80 Am. St. Eep. 650; Eiska v. Union 
 Depot Ey. Co., 180 Mo. 168; 79 S. W. Eep. 445. 
 
 84 Alabama Code, 1897, §§ 1749, 1750, 1751; Deering's Code & Statute 
 of California, 1885, as amended by ch. 97, Acts 1907; General Statute 
 Connecticut, 1902, § 4702; Annotated St. Indiana, 1894, Eevision of 
 1901, § 7803; Code & Statutes of Montana, 1895, §§ 2242, 2260 and Acts 
 1905, ch. 1; Constitution, art. 15, § 16; Oklahoma Constitution, 1907, 
 art. 9 § 36; Acts Oregon, 1903, p. 20; Pennsylvania Acts, 1907, 
 Act No. 329, §§ 1, 2; Code Virginia, 1904, §| 1294k, i294d en}}- 
 section 36. 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHING CaMMOW LAW. § 508 
 
 Indiana, and in that State, where a foreman was present 
 giving orders in connection with the moving of certain car 
 trucks and an employee was injured by the fall of the trucks, 
 which his coemployees, under the direction of the foreman, 
 permitted to strike him, it was held that he was entitled to 
 recover, under the statute.^^ 
 
 In one case, in the federal court, construing the statute 
 of Indiana, it was held that it was not essential to a re- 
 covery that the employee, af the time of the injury, must 
 have been obeying any special order or instruction, but it was 
 sufficient. to bring an engineer within the protection of the 
 statute, if he was running his engine, under the telegraphic 
 orders customary on his division, when he sustained the in- 
 jury by collision with another train.*® But the Appellate 
 Court of Indiana did not give this construction to the 
 -statute, but held that it was necessary, to bring the case of an 
 employee within the statute, that such employee, at the time" 
 of his injury, must not only have been conforming to the 
 orders or direction of an agent of the employer, to whose 
 orders he was bound, to conform, but that he must also have 
 been obeying, a special, as distinguished from a mere general 
 order, at the time of the injury.*'^ 
 
 It is likewise held that the employer is not responsible 
 under such a statute for the negligent, performance of a 
 proper order by a representative of the employer,** nor for 
 the disobedience of a reasonable rule, by a coemployefe of the 
 injured person, which has directly effected the injury.*® 
 
 35 Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Wagner, 153 Ind. 420; 53 N. B. Rep. 927; 
 14 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. (N. S.) 706. 
 
 36 Cincinnati, etc. R. v. Thiebaud, 114 Fed. Rep. 918; 52 C. C. A. 
 538. 
 
 37 Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co. v. Petite, 27 Ind. App. 120; 60 N. E. 
 Rep. 1000. See, also, Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. George, 94 Ala. 199; 10 So. 
 Rep. 145. 
 
 BsThacher v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 159 Ind. 82; 64 N. E. Rep. 605. 
 
 3»Ijaughran v. Brewer, 113 Ala, 509; 21 So. Rep. 415. " 
 
 745 
 
§ 509 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW, 
 
 § 509. Injuries due to negligence of superintendent. — The 
 Englisli Employer's Liability Act/" and several of the stat- 
 utes in the United States,*^ make the employer liable for an 
 injury to his employee, due in whole or in part to the neg- 
 ligence of any agent, entrusted with superintendence, while 
 in the exercise of such superintendence. 
 
 The foreman of a section gang, whose duty it was to give 
 warning of the approach of trains, was held to be engaged 
 in superintendence, within the meaning of the Massachusetts 
 statute ; *^ a yard master, directing the engineer of a loco- 
 In the absence of rules requiring section men to guard against the 
 running of irregular trains, proof of the death of a section man, while 
 going with a hand car on a special mission, by a collision with a wild 
 train, creates a prima faoie case of negligence on the part of the em- 
 ployer. Cincinnati, St. L. & C. R. Co. v. Lang, 118 Ind. 579; 21 
 N. E. Rep. 317. 
 
 A rule that meeting orders must not be sent to trains of superior 
 .right, at the place of execution of the order, but that at least one 
 station should intervene, between the receipt and execution of the 
 order, is not a peremptory command, but it is to be construed in a 
 reasonable way and if the dispatcher, in view of his experience, as a 
 reasonably prudent man, thinks it not unsafe to send the meeting order 
 to the train at the place of meeting, this, of itself, will not be held 
 such negligent violation of the rule, as to constitute negligence on the 
 part of the dispatcher^ Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Dixon, 139 Fed. Rep. 
 737. 
 
 In the absence of some rule or ordinance limiting the speed of 
 trains, no rate of speed will be held negligence as toward an employee 
 of the company on the track. Cincinnati & N. 0., etc., Co., v. Hill's 
 Admr., 89 S. W. Rep. 523 j 28 Ky. L. R. 530. 
 40 43 and 44 Victoria, ch. 42, § 1. 
 
 *i Alabama Code, 1897, §§ 1749, 1750; Digest Arkansas, 1904, § 
 6658 and Acts 1907, ch. 69; Acts California, 1907, ch. 97; Mill's 
 Ann. St. Colo. 1891, and Supp. of 1905, §§ 1511a et sub.; Revised Laws 
 Massachusetts, 1902, ch. 106, as amended by Laws 1906, ch. 370; 
 Code Mississippi, 1906, §§ 1985, 4056; Acts New York, 1906, ch. 657; 
 Pennsylvania Acts, 1907, Act No. 329; Code Virginia, 1904, § 1294k, 
 et sub.; Acts Wisconsin, 1905, ch. 348. 
 
 *2 Davis V. New York, etc., E. Co., 159 Mass. 532; 34 N. E. Rep. 
 1070. *^ 
 
 746' 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. § 510 
 
 motive, as to its movements, v?as held to be so engaged, 
 ■within the intention of the Alabama statute ; *^ an employer 
 was held liable for defective appliances furnished, by direc- 
 tion of his superintendent, in New York,** and, in Alabama, 
 if the employee was engaged in giving directions or in the 
 duties of superintendence, it is immaterial that he was not 
 regularly so engaged,** or that he was assisting the labor be- 
 ing performed, when the employee was injured.*® 
 
 But an engineer, not regularly endowed with power of su- 
 pervision or control, who assumes such authority, in connec- 
 tion with the operation of his engine, in consequence of 
 which an employee is injured, cannot bind the employer, 
 within such statutes ; *'' a section hand, injured by the act of 
 his foreman, in running a hand car, is not entitled to claim 
 the benefit of such statutes ; *® a car shifter, who starts cars, 
 by his orders, thus injuring an employee thereon, is not en- 
 trusted with superintendence, within the meaning of such 
 acts,*® nor generally, can a recovery be had for any act of 
 supervision by an ordinary employee not authorized to give 
 orders or control other employees in the common service.*" 
 
 § 510. Person controlling " car, tr-ain or locomotive." — The 
 negligence of any person controlling a " car, train, or loco- 
 motive," under some of the statutes, gives a right of action 
 
 *3 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Mothershead, 97 Ala. 261; 12 So. Rep. 
 714. 
 
 ** Illinois Car Co. v. Walsh, 132 111. 490; 31 So. Rep. 470. 
 
 *5 Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Hammond, 93 Ala. 181; 9 So. Rep. 577. 
 
 48 Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Burton, 97 Ala. 240; 12 So. Rep. 88; 
 53 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 115. 
 
 " Cashman v. Chase, 156 Mass. 342 ; 31 N. E. Rep. 4. 
 
 *8Shepard v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 158 Mass. 174; 33 N. E. Rep. 508. 
 
 *» Whelton v. West End R. Co., 172 Mass. 555; 52 N. E. Rep. 1072. 
 
 soMcPhee v. Scully, 163 Mass. 216; 39 N. E. Rep. 1007; McCoy v. 
 Westborough, 172 Mass. 504; 52 N. E. Rep. 1064. 
 
 747 
 
§ 610 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. 
 
 for an injury resulting from such negligent control.^^ To 
 constitute a cause of action, under suck statutes, it is gen- 
 erally essential to allege and establisli that the person caus- 
 ing the injury by the use of the car, engine, or train, was 
 in charge or control of the car, train or engine occasioning 
 the injury, for, if not, the protection of the statute does 
 not apply.®^ It is accordingly held, in Massachusetts, that a 
 brakeman in temporary charge of a train, under the general 
 control of the conductor, while it is being switched onto a 
 side track, is not in charge or control of the train, so as to 
 render the employer liable to an employee injured as a result 
 of such brakeman's negligence.^* 
 
 But under many statutes a person, even though tempo- 
 rarily, who is in physical charge or control of an engine, car 
 or train, and while so controlling it, causes an injury, is 
 held to be in charge of the same, so as to render the employer 
 responsible.®* Under other decisions, the statute is held to 
 include those employees only whose duties relate to the con- 
 tinuous charge or control of the train, or car, and an em- 
 ployee in temporary charge thereof Was incapable of render- 
 ing the employer liable for his negligent acts.®® 
 
 tinder the Massachusetts act, a train is defined to be one 
 or more cars in motion, whether attached to an engine or 
 not.®® A hand car is held to be a car, under the Alabama 
 
 51 Alabama Code, 1897, §| 1749, et sub.; Mill's Ann. Stat. Colo. 
 1891, and Supplement of 1905, 1511a, et sub.; General Stat. Florida, 
 1906, §§ 3148, 3149; Ann. Stat. Ind. 1894, Revision of 1901, and § 14, 
 ch. 118, Acts 1907; Revised Laws Massachusetts, 902, ch. 106, as 
 amended by Law, 1906, ch. 370; Acts Oregon, 1903, p. 20; Code Virginia, 
 1904, § 1294k. 
 
 52 Central, etc., R. Co. v. Lamb, 124 Ala. 172; 26 So. Rep. 969. 
 63Caron v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 164 Mass. 523; 42 N. E. Rep. 112. 
 5* Davis V. New York, etc., R. Co., 159 Mass. 532 ; 34 N. E. Rep. 1070. 
 65Thyng v. Fitehburg, etc., R. Co., 156 Mass. 13; 30 N. E. Rep. 
 
 169. 
 58 Shea V. New York, etc., R. Co., 173 Mass. 177; 53 N, E. Rep, 396. 
 
 748 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. ' § 511 
 
 statute,®' so as to render the railroad company liable for a|i 
 injury received by an employee on account of the negligence 
 of the person in, charge thereof and different constructions of 
 these various acta are adopted in the different States, both 
 as regards the appliance named by the statute, and the person 
 who will be considered in charge thereof, as will be seen 
 by the cases cited in the footnote.®* 
 
 § 511. Negligence of employee controlling any "signal, 
 point, switch." — Generally an employee whose duty it is to 
 give signals, or to control or operate any switch, will be held 
 to be in charge or control thereof, so as to charge the railroad 
 company, in case of an injury to a coemployee, in States 
 where the railroad is answerable for the neglect of any per- 
 son in charge or control of any switch, signal, etc. 
 
 It is accordingly held, in Indiana,®® that a brakeman 
 whose duties require him to place a red light at the rear 
 of the last car in a train, to warn trains or engines approach- 
 ing from the rear, of the presence of the train, is a person 
 in charge of a signal, so that in case of his neglect to per-^ 
 form this duty, devolved upon him by the rules, and regula- 
 tions of the employer, the railroad company will be responsi- 
 ble for an injury to an employee, from a resulting collision, 
 under such a statute. 
 
 An employee whose duties require him to watch the 
 switches on a given portion of a railroad from a tower and 
 
 BT Richmond, etc., E. Co. v. Hammond, 93 Ala. 181; 9 So. Rep. 577; 
 Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Crocker, 95 Ala. 412; 11 So. Rep. 2C2. 
 
 08 A conductor was held to be " in charge " of a train, although 
 temporarily absent, in Donahue v. Old Colony R. Co., 153 Mass. 356; 
 26 N. E. Rep. 868 ; an engineer, was held to be " in charge " under 
 the Alabama act, in moving a train and injuring a, brakeman. His- 
 song V. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 91 Ala. 514; 8 So. Rep. 776. 
 
 B» Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Wisker, 71 N. E. Rep. 223; 72 N. E. Rep. 
 614. 
 
 749 
 
§ 512 ' STATUtfig ABdLlSHllifG COMMON LAW. 
 
 to throw the switches by means of a lever, on signals from 
 the employees on the track, is in charge of the switches, so as 
 to charge a railroad company that he is working for in case 
 of an injury to an employee resulting from his throwing the 
 wrong switch track.*" 
 
 Conductors or other employees who carry switch keys and 
 open and close them for the entry or exit of grains, are 
 employees in charge of such switches, so as to charge the 
 employer in case of a breach of duty on their part®^ 
 
 But an employee in charge of a " switch," is not within 
 the class of employees for whose neglect the railroad com- 
 pany would be responsible, under the Indiana statute,*'^ as 
 the act of that State refers to persons in charge of any 
 " switch yard " and not to those who may be in control of 
 the " switches " on the railroad.** 
 
 § 512. liability for defects in the "Ways, works, machin- 
 ery or plant." — Under the Employer's Liability Acts of sev- 
 eral States, the liability is predicated on an injury resulting 
 from some defect in the " Ways, works, machinery, or 
 plant," of the employer.** 
 
 60 Welsh V. New York, etc., E. Co., 176 Mass. 393;. 57 N. E. Eep. 668. 
 
 oiAlbrecht v. Milwaukee, etc., E. Co., 94 Wis. 397; 69 N. W. Eep. 
 63; Birmingham, etc., E. Co. v. Baylor, 101 Ala. 488; 13 So. Eep. 
 793. 
 
 02 Annotated Statutes Indiana, 1894, Eevision of 1901, § 7083. 
 
 83 Baltimore, etc., B. Co. v. Little, 149 Ind. 167; 48 N. E. Eep. 862; 
 9 Am. & Bng. E. Cas. (N. S.) 427; Charman v. Lake Erie, etc., E. Co., 
 105 Fed. Eep. 449. 
 
 C4 Alabama Code, 1897, §§ 1749, et sub.; Mills Ann. Stat. Colorado, 
 1891 and Supplement of 1905, §§ 1511a et sub.; Annotated Stat. 
 Indiana, 1894, Eevision of 1901, § 7083; Eevised Laws Massachusetts 
 1902, ch. 106, as amended by Laws 1906, ch. 370; Acts Nebraska, 1907, 
 ch. 48; Acts Nevada, 1907, ch. 214; Acts New York, 1902, ch. 600; 
 Acts 1906, ch. 657; Eevised Laws North Carolina, 1905, § 2646; Penn- 
 sylvania Acts 1907, Act No. 329. 
 
 Y50 
 
STAOnjfES ABOi-iSHlifG COMMON LAW. § 512 
 
 Foreign freight cars, used by a railroad company,®^ or 
 trucks of a domestic car, used by employees, in a repair 
 shop,®® have been held to be part of the machinery of the em- 
 ployer, within the meaning of the Massachusetts statute.' 
 
 But a defect in a common ordinary tool, such as a crowbar, 
 used by an employee at work on aligning the track on a 
 bridge, is held not to come within the definition of "ma- 
 chinery of the employer," for such a tool requires mere 
 muscular strength to use it and if such an employee, while 
 exerting his strength, falls from the bridge because of a defect 
 in the bar, he is not within the protection of such a statute.®'' 
 The defects in the place of work, which is undergoing a 
 change to fit it for the use to be made of it by the employer, 
 is not generally held to be " ways or works " of the employer, 
 within the meaning of such statutes as they apply to " ways 
 or works " as regularly conducted and not tO works in the 
 process of construction, which, in the very nature of things 
 cannot be made safe.®® 
 
 A railroad track used by a railroad under a license merely, 
 for the delivery of freight to the owner, is not a part of the 
 " ways " of the railroad company, so as to protect an em- 
 ployee of such company for an injury due to a defect in such 
 a place, as it had no control thereover, hence would not be 
 charged with a duty in regard to such a track.®® 
 
 60 Bowers v. Connecticut Eiver R. Co., 162 Mass. 312; 38 N. E. 
 Eep. 508. 
 
 86Gunn V. New York, etc., R. Co., 171 Mass. 417; 50 N. E. Eep. 
 1031. 
 
 87 Clements v. Alabama, etc. R. Co., 127 Ala. 166 ; 28 So. Rep. 643. 
 And for same reason an employee injured by the slipping of a hammer, 
 is held to be injured by a defect in the employer's " works or ma- 
 chinery" within such a statute. Georgia, etc., R. Co. v. Brooks, 84 
 Ala. 138; 4 So. Rep. 289. 
 
 OS This is the rule adopted under the English statute. Howe v. Finch, 
 17 Q. B. Div. 187. 
 
 «»Engle V. New York, etc., R. Co., 160 Mass. 260; 35 N. E. Rep. 
 547; 22 L. R. A. 283. 
 
 751 
 
§ 513 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW, 
 
 § 513. Statute of Alabama.— The Alabama Code ^^ pro- 
 vides: 
 
 When a personal injury is received by an employee in the 
 service or business of the employer, the employer is liable to 
 ansvi^er in damages to such employee as if he was a stranger 
 and not engaged in such service or employment, in the cases 
 following: 
 
 Cotton, negligently piled, so as to fall and injure an employee in a 
 railroad warehouse, is not a part of the employer's " ways, works or 
 machinery," within the Massachusetts Employer's IJiability Act. Ca- 
 hill V. Boston & M. R. Co., 190 Mass. 421; 76 N. E. Rep. 911. 
 
 70 Alabama Code, 1897, §§ 1749, 1750, 1751. 
 
 "The Employer's Liability Act (Code 1896, § 1749, subd. 5), making 
 railway companies liable for injury to an employee caused by the negli- 
 gence of any person in charge of any ' signal, points,' etc., is a literal 
 copy of the English statute using the words ' signal points,' designating 
 an apparatus for giving signals, called ' points.' In the original Ala- 
 bama statute (Acts 1884-85, p. 116) the word 'signal' was used, 
 without 'points.' Held, that the present statute covers cases of neg- 
 ligence of persons having charge of signals generally; 'points' re- 
 ferring to apparatus used in giving signals, and not merely localities." 
 Cogbill v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (Ala. 1907), 44 So. Rep. 683. 
 
 "The Employer's Liability Act (Code 1896, § 1749, subd. 5), making 
 an employer liable for injuries to an employee caused by the negligence 
 of an employee having control of any engine or train, embraces only 
 those employed in and about a railroad; and one seeking a recovery 
 under the statute must plead and prove that at the time of the in- 
 jury he was employed in and about the railroad, and it is not sufficient 
 that he was employed at the plant of an employer who also owned 
 a railroad operated in furtherance of the business of the plant." Ala- 
 bama Steel & Wire Co. v. Griffin (Ala. 1907), 42 So. Rep. 1034. 
 
 Under the Alabama statute, it is held that the statute changed the 
 rule of the common law, as to liability of railroad company, for in- 
 juries from the negligence of coemployees. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Allen, 78 Ala. 494; 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 514. 
 
 The railroad company is not only liable for the negligence of superin- 
 tendents, but also for the negligence of an employee having in charge 
 signal points, cars, etc., although assisting in the work. Kansas City, 
 etc., Ey. Co. v. Burton, 97 Ala. 240; 12 So. Rep. 88; 53 Am. & Eng. 
 R. Cas. 115. 
 
 Action must be based on the statute, and not on common-law negli- 
 
 752 
 
Statutes A-fiOLleHiNG Common law. I 513 
 
 1. When the injury is caused by reason of any defect in 
 the condition of- the ways, works, machinery, or plant con- 
 nected with, or used in the business of, the employer. 
 
 2. When the injury is caused by reason of the negligence 
 of any person in the service or employment of the employer 
 who has any superintendence intrusted to him, whilst in the 
 exercise of such superintendence. 
 
 3. When such injury is caused by reason of the negli- 
 gence of any person in the service or employment of the 
 employer, to whose orders or directions the employee at the 
 time of the injury was bound to conform, and did conform, 
 if such injuries resulted from his having so conformed. 
 
 4. When such injury is caused by reason of the act. or 
 omission of any person in the service or employment of the 
 employer, done or made in obedience to the rules and regu- 
 lations or by-laws of the employer, or in obedience to par- 
 ticular instructions given by any person delegated with the 
 authority of the employer in that behalf. 
 
 5. When such injury is caused by reason of the negligence 
 
 genee, to give a right of action, for the negligence of a coemployee. 
 Holland v. Tennessee, etc., R. Co., 91 Ala. 444; 8 So. Eep. 524. 
 
 Under statute employer liable for negligence of fireman in improperly 
 transmitting signals of switchman to engineer. Kichmond, etc., R. Co. 
 V. Jones, 92 Aia. 218; 9 So. Eep. 276. 
 
 A hand car is such a car, as gives a right of action, for an injury 
 for the negligent handling thereof. Kansas City, etc., Ey. Co. v. 
 Crocker, 95 Ala. 412; 11- So. Eep. 262. 
 
 Proof of an intent to injure the injured employee is not essential, 
 under the Alabama Code (1896, § 1749), but a conscious failure of an 
 employee in chare of an engine to use reasonable care to avoid injuring 
 the plaintiff, after discovery of his danger, is held to give a right of ac- 
 tion. Alabama Great Southern E. Co. v. Williams, 37 So. Eep. 255. 
 
 Ar fireman, at the command of an engineer, who was under the en- 
 gine, intending to move the reverse lever back three feet, moved the 
 wrong lever and thus injured the engineer, but it was held that the 
 fireman was not in charge of the engine so as to render the employer 
 liable, under the statute. Louisville, etc., E. Co. v. Goss, 137 Ala. 319; 
 34 So. Rep. 1007. 
 
 1-4? ' 753 
 
§ 514 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. 
 
 of any person in the service or employment of the employer, 
 who has the charge or control of any signal, points, locomo- 
 tive, engine, switch, car, or train upon a railway, or of 
 any part of the track of a railway. 
 
 But the employer is not liable under this section if the 
 employee knew of the defect or negligence causing the injury 
 and failed in a reasonable time to give information thereof 
 to the employer, or to some person superior to himself en- 
 gaged in the service or employment of the employer, unless 
 he was aware that the employer or such superior already 
 knew of such defect or negligence ; nor is the employer liable 
 under . subdivision one, unless the defect therein mentioned 
 arose from or had not been discovered or remedied owing 
 to the negligence of the employer, or of some person in -the 
 service of the employer, and intrusted by him with the duty 
 of seeing that the ways, works, machinery, or plant were in 
 proper condition. 
 
 Damages recovered by the employee, of and from the em- 
 ployer, are not subject to the payment of debts, or any legal 
 liabilities incurred by him. 
 
 If such injury results in the death of the employee, his 
 personal representative is entitled to maintain an action 
 therefor, and the damages recovered are not subject to the 
 payment of debts, but must be distributed according to the 
 statute of distributions, ' 
 
 § 514. The Statute of Arkansas.— The most recent statutes 
 of Arkansas "^^ enact that, 
 
 Ti Digest of Arkansas statutes, 1904, §§ 6658, 6659, 6660, and acts 
 of 1907, ch. 69, §1. 
 
 The Supreme Court of Arkansas has held that the practical effect 
 of these sections is to limit the defense of assumed risk, as to negli- 
 gent acts of other employees of railroad company, to the neglect 
 of those alone who are coemployees within the meaning of the statute 
 and to make the railroad company liable for the acts of all other co- 
 754 
 
&l?ATtJ!rES ABOLISHING COI^MO^ LAW. § 514: 
 
 All persons engaged in the service of any railway cor- 
 poration, foreign or domestic, doing business in this State, 
 who are intrusted by such corporation with the authority of 
 superintendence, control, or command of other persons in the 
 employ or service of such corporation, or with the authority 
 to direct any other employee in the performance of any duty 
 of such employee, are vice-principals of such corporation and 
 are not coemployees with such employee. 
 
 All persons who are engaged in the common service of such 
 railway corporations, and who, while so engaged, are work- 
 ing together to a common purpose, of same grade, neither 
 of such persons being intrusted by such corporations with 
 any superintendence or control over their fellow employees, 
 are coemployees with each other: Provided, Nothing 
 herein contained shall be so construed as to make employees 
 of such corporation in the service of such corporation fellow 
 employees with other employees of such corporation engaged- 
 in any other department or service of such corporation. Em- 
 ^ployees who. do not come within the provisions of this section 
 shall not be considered coemployees. 
 
 No contract made between the employer and employee 
 based upon the contingency of the injury or death of the em- 
 ployee limiting the liability of the employer under this 
 
 employees in the discharge of their several duties. Kansas City, 
 etc., E. Co. V. Becker, 53 S. W. Rep. 406. 
 
 A car inspector and an engine foreman in charge of a switch engine, 
 not working together for a common purpose, but engaged in different 
 departments of the service, are not fellow workmen within Kirby's 
 Dig. §§ 6658-6660, providing that all persons engaged in the common 
 service of a railroad, and who are working together to a common pur- 
 pose, are fellow employees, etc. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ey. Co. v. Du- 
 pree (Ark. 1907), 105 S. W. Eep. 878. 
 
 Under the Arkansas statute (Sand. & H. Digest, § 6248), making all 
 railroad companies responsible for the act of any employee entrusted 
 with superintendence, a train dispatcher is held to be so intrusted and 
 the conductor of a train is not a coemployee with such dispatcher. 
 Choctow, etc., Ey. Co. v. Doughty, 91 S. W. Rep. 768. 
 
 755 
 
§515 STATIJTES. ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. 
 
 act, or fixing damages to be recovered, shall be valid and 
 binding. 
 
 All railroad companies operating within this State, 
 whether incorporated or not, and all corporations of every 
 kind and character, and every company whether incorporated 
 or not, engaged in the mining of coal, who may employ 
 agents, or employees, such agents, or employees being in 
 the exercise of due care, shall be liable to respond in dam- 
 ages for injuries or death sustained by any such agent, or 
 employee, resulting from the careless omission of duty or 
 negligence of such employer, or which may result from the 
 carelessness, omission of duty, or negligence of any other 
 agent, or employee of the said employer, in the same manner 
 and to the same extent as if the carelessness, omission of 
 duty, or negligence causing the injury or death was that of 
 the employer. 
 
 § 515. The Civil Code of California,'^^ provides that: An 
 employer is not bound to indemnify his employee for losses 
 suffered by the latter on account of the ordinary risks of 
 
 TzDeering's Code and, Statute of California, 1885, as amended by 
 ch. 97, Acts 1907. 
 
 The California Code does not recognize any distinction growing 
 out of the grade of the service of the negligent employee. Davis v. 
 Southern Pacific Ey. Co., 98 Cal. 19; 32 Pac. Rep. 708. 
 
 A conductor and a brakeman are in the same common service, so 
 that the latter assumed a risk on account of the negligence of the 
 former, under Code of 1873, in the absence of negligence of the em- 
 ployer in selecting the culpable employee. Congrave v. Southern Pa- 
 cific B. Co., 88 Cal. 360; 26 Pac. Rep. 175. 
 
 Under the California statute, exempting the employer from liability 
 for injuries, except vfhen the injury was sustained by the breach of one 
 of the nonassignable duties of the employer, or his neglect in re- 
 taining an incompetent employee in his service, there can be no liabil- 
 ity for an injury due to the act of a coemployee, regardless of the 
 grade of the service or the different departments in which jthe em- 
 ployees are engaged in working. Leishman v. Union Iron Works, 8'3 
 Pac. Rep. 30. 
 
 Y56 
 
STATTTTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. , § 515 
 
 the business, nor on account 'of the negligence of another per- 
 son employed by the same employer, in the same general 
 business, unless the negligence causing the injury was com- 
 mitted in the performance of a duty the employer owes by 
 law to the employee, or unless the employer has failed to use 
 ordinary care in the selection of the culpable employee : Pro- 
 vided, That the employer shall be liable for such injury, 
 when the same results from the wrongful act, neglect, or 
 default of any agent or officer of such employer, superior 
 to the employee injured, or of a person employed by the 
 employer, having the right to control or direct the services 
 of such employee injured, and also when such injury results 
 from the wrongful act, neglect or default of a coemployee 
 engaged in another department of labor from that of the 
 employee injured, upon a machine, railroad train, switch, 
 signal point, locomotive engine, or other appliance than that 
 upon which the injurfed employee is employed, or who is 
 charged with the dispatching of trains^ or transmitting tele- 
 graphic or telephonic orders, upon any railroad, etc. 
 
 Knowledge by an employee injured, of the defective or un- 
 safe character or condition of any machinery, ways, appli- 
 ances or structures of such employer shall not be a bar. to 
 recovery for any injury or death caused thereby, unless it 
 shall also appear that such employee fully understood, com- 
 prehended and appreciated the dangers incident to the use 
 of such defective machinery, ways, appliances or structures 
 and thereafter consented to use the same, or continued in 
 the use thereof. 
 
 When death, whether instantaneous or otherwise, results 
 from an injury to an employee received as aforesaid, the 
 personal representative of such employee shall have a right 
 of action therefor against such employer and may recover 
 damages in respect therefor, for and on behalf and for the 
 benefit of the widow, children, dependent parents and de- 
 
 757 
 
§ 516 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMOlf LAW, 
 
 pendent brothers and sisters, in order of precedence as herein * 
 stated, but. no more than one action shall be brought for such 
 recovery. 
 
 Any contract or agreement expressed or implied, made by 
 any such employee to waive the benefits of this section, or 
 any part thereof, shall be void and this act shall not be con- 
 strued to deprive any such employee or his representative 
 of any right or remedy to which he is entitled under the laws 
 of the State. 
 
 The rules and principles of the law of contributory negli- 
 gence which apply to other cases shall apply to cases arising 
 under this statute except in so far as modified or changed by 
 the statute. 
 
 An employer must, in all cases, indemnify his employees 
 for losses caused by the former's want of ordinary care. 
 
 § 516, Colorado Laws.— The Constitution ''^ and statute ''* 
 of Colorado, declare: 
 
 It shall be unlawful for any person, company, or corpora- 
 tion ti require of its employees, as a condition of their em- 
 ployment or otherwise, any contract or agreement whereby 
 such person, company, or corporation shall be released or dis- 
 charged from liability or responsibility on account of per- 
 sonal injuries received by such employees while in the service 
 of such person, company, or corporation by reason of the 
 negligence of such person, company, or corporation, or the 
 agents or employees thereof, and such contract shall be ab- 
 solutely null and void. 
 
 Where, after the passage of this act, personal injury is 
 caused to an employee, who is himself in the exercise of dv^ 
 care and diligence at the time — 
 
 Ts Constitution Colorado, art. Ij5. 
 
 7* Mill's Ann. Stat., 1891, and Supplement of 1905, §§ 1511a, 1511b, 
 1511c, 1511d, 1511e, 1511f, 1511g. 
 
 758 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. § 516 
 
 (1) By reason of any defect in the condition of the ways, 
 works or machinery connected with or used in the business 
 of the employer, which arose from or had not been discovered 
 or remedied owing to the negligence of the employer or of 
 any person in the service of the employer, and intrusted by 
 him with the duty of seeing that the ways, works, and ma- 
 chinery were in proper condition; or 
 
 (2) By reason of the negligence of any persbn in the serv- 
 ice of the employer, intrusted with or exercising superin- 
 tendence, whose sole or principal duty is that of superin- 
 tendence ; 
 
 (3) By reason of the negligence of any person in the 
 service of the employer who has the charge or control of any 
 switch,' signal, locomotive engine, or train upon a railroad, 
 the employee, or in case the injury results in death, the 
 parties entitled by law to sue and recover for such damages, 
 shall have the same right of c&mpensation and remedy 
 against the employer as if the employee had not been an 
 employee of or in the service of the employer or engaged 
 in his or its work. 
 
 The amount of compensation recoverable under this act, in 
 case of a personal injury resulting solely from the negligence 
 of a coemployee, shall not exceed the sum of five thousand 
 dollars. ISTo action for the recovery of compensation for in- 
 jury or death under this act shall be maintained unless writ- 
 ten notice of the time, place, and cause of the injury is 
 given to the employer within sixty days, and the action is 
 commenced within two years from the occurrence of the acci- 
 dent causing the injury or death. But no notice given under 
 the provisions of this section shall be deemed invalid or in- 
 sufficient solely by reason of any inaccuracy in stating the 
 time, place, or cause 9,f injury: Provided, It is shown that 
 there was no intention to mislead, and that the party en- 
 titled to notice was not in fact misled thereby. 
 
 759 
 
§ 516 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. 
 
 Whenever an employee enters into a contract, either 
 written or verbal, with an independent contractor to do part 
 of such employer's work, or whenever such contractor enters 
 into a contract with a subcontractor to do all or a part of 
 the work comprised in such contract or contracts with the 
 employer, such contract or subcontract shalj not bar the lia- 
 bility of the employer for injuries to the employees of such 
 contractor or subcontractor by reason of any defect in the 
 condition of the ways, works, machinery, or plant, if they 
 are the property of the employer or furnished by him, and 
 if such defect arose or had not been discovered or remedied 
 through the negligence of the employer or of some person 
 intrusted by him with the duty of seeing that they were in 
 proper condition. 
 
 An employee or those entitled by law to sue and recover, 
 under the provisions of this act, shall not be entitled under 
 this act to any right of compensation or remedy against his 
 employer in any case where such employee knew of the defect 
 or negligence which caused the injury, and failed within a 
 reasonable time to give or cause to be given informatioii 
 thereof to the employer or to some person superior to him- 
 self in the service of his employer, who had intrusted to him 
 some general superintendence. 
 
 If injury sustained by the employee is clearly the result 
 of the negligence, carelessness, or misconduct of a coemployee 
 the coemployee shall be equally liable, under the provisions 
 of this act, with the employer, and may be made a .party 
 defendant in all actions brought to recover damages for such 
 injury. Upon the trial of such action, the court may submit 
 to and require the jury to find a special verdict upon the 
 question as to whether the employer or his vice-principal was 
 or was not guilty of negligence proximately causing the in- 
 jury complained of; or whether such injury resulted solely 
 from the negligence of the coemployee, and in case the jury 
 760 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. § 517 
 
 by their special verdict find that the injury was solely the 
 result of the negligence of the employer or vice-principal, 
 then and in that case the jury shall assess the full amount 
 of plaintiff's damages against the employer, and the suit 
 shall be dismissed as against the employee; but in case the 
 jury by their special verdict find that the injury resulted 
 solely from the negligence of the coemployee, the jury may. 
 assess damages both against the employer .and employee. , 
 
 Every corporation, company, or individual who may em- 
 ploy agents or employees, such agents or employees being 
 in the exercise of due care, shall be liable to respond in dam- 
 ages for injuries or death sustained by any such agent or em- 
 ployee, resiilting from the carelessness, omission of duty, 
 or negligentje of such employer, or which may have resulted 
 from the carelessness, omission of duty, or negligence of 
 any other agent, or employee of the said employer, in the 
 same manner and to the same extent as if th6 carelessness, 
 omission of duty, or n^ligence causing the injury or death 
 was that of the employer. 
 
 All acts and parts of acts in conflict herewith are hereby 
 repealed: Provided, however. That this act shall not be 
 construed to repeal or change the existing laws relating to the 
 right of the person injured, or in case of death, the right of 
 the husband or wife, or other relatives of a deceased person, 
 to maintain an action against the employer. 
 
 The statute also requires railroad switch rails to be blocked 
 and makes a failure to do so prima facie evidence of negli- 
 gence, where employees or others are injured as a result 
 of such failure. 
 
 § 517. Statute of Connecticut.— The General Statutes of 
 Connecticut ''^ make it the duty of the employer to exer^ 
 
 T6 General Statutes, Connecticut, 1902, § 4702. This statute is only 
 
 761 
 
§ 518 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. 
 
 cise reasonable care to provide for his employee a reasonably 
 safe place in which to work; to furnish reasonably safe ap- 
 pliances and instrumentalities for his work and fit and com- 
 petent persons as his colaborers; to also exercise reasonable 
 care in the appointment or designation of vice-principals and 
 to appoint as vice-principals only fit and competent persons. 
 The default of a vice-principal in the performance of any 
 duty imposed by law on the employer shall be the default 
 of the employer. 
 
 § 518. Florida Statute.— The General Statutes of Flor- 
 ida ^® provide that a railroad company shall" be liable for any 
 damage done to persons, stock, or other property, by the 
 running of the locomotives, or cars, or other machinery of 
 such company, or for damage done by any person, in the 
 employ or service of such company, unless the company 
 shall make it appear that their agents have exercised- all 
 
 declaratory of the common-law rule, which obtains in the absence 
 of such a statute. 
 
 76 General Statute of Florida for 1906, §§ 3148, 3149, 3150. This 
 act changes the rule as to the burden of proof, in accident or negligence 
 cases; establishes the rule of comparative negligence in a qualified form 
 and abolishes the fellow-service rule of the common law. As the 
 statute is not limited to the hazardous service only of railroad 
 companies, but extends to all character of injuries, it is doubted if it 
 could be upheld by those eases which regard such statutes as uncon- 
 stitutional if they discriminate against the employer,, rather than 
 the character of the- service. 
 
 The Florida statute of 1887, making railroad companies liable for 
 the negligence of their employees, was taken from the Georgia statute, 
 on same subject. Duval v. Hunt, 34 Fla. 85; 15 So. Rep. 876. 
 
 The Acts of Florida (1891, p. 114), in regard to employees on 
 railroad work, is held to limit the rule that an employee cannot recover . 
 for an injury due to the negligence of a coemployee to cases where 
 the injured person is guilty of contributory negligence and the term 
 " employee " is as broad as the word " fellow-servant," at common 
 law. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Wade, 35 So. Rep. 863. 
 
 762 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. § 519 
 
 ordinary and reasonable care and diligence, tlie presumption 
 in all cases being against the company. 
 
 IsTo person shall recover damages against a railroad com- 
 pany for injuries ■where the same is done by his consent 
 or is caused by his n^ligence. If the complainant and the 
 agents of the company are both at fault, the former may re- 
 cover, but the damages shall be diminished or increased by 
 the jury, in proportion to the amount of default attributable 
 to him. 
 
 If any person is injured by a railroad conipany by the 
 running of the locomotives or cars, or other machinery, he 
 being at the time of such injury an employee of the company, 
 if the damage was caused by the negligence of another em- 
 ployee, and without fault or negligence on the part of the 
 person injured, his employment by the company is no bar 
 to his recovery. No contract which restricts such liability 
 shall be binding or valid. 
 
 § 519. The Georgia Code,''^ providfes that railroad com- 
 
 'TCode of Georgia of 1895, §§ 2297, 2321, 2322, 2324, as amended 
 by Act No. 102, p. 63; Acts 1896, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 3830 
 
 As it was originally enacted, the statute of Georgia did not give 
 a right of action to an employee who was himself negligent in any way 
 contributing to his injury, caused by the negligence of a coemployee, 
 in part. East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. Duggan, 51 Ga. 212; 6 
 Am. Ry. Rep. 195; Baker v. Western R. Co., 68 Ga. 699; Central R. 
 Co. V. Lanier, 83 Ga. 587; 10 S. E. Rep. 279. 
 
 An employee free from fault, was permitted a recovery, when in- 
 jured by the negligence of a coemployee, whether in the operation of a 
 train or not. Georgia R. Co. v. Ivey, 73 Ga. 499 ; 28 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Co., 392; Central R. Co. v. Henderson, 69 Ga. 715; Central R. Co. v. 
 DeBray, 71 Ga. 406. 
 
 A trackman, while being carried to his work, is within the protection 
 of the act, if injured while free from fault, by the negligence of a co- 
 employee. Atlanta, etc., R. Co. v. Ayers, 53 Ga. 12. 
 
 One employed by the receivers of a railroad is not in the employ- 
 ment of the railroad company, within the contemplation of the code. 
 Henderson v. Walker, 55 Ga. 481. 
 
 763 
 
§ 519 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMOBT LAW. 
 
 panies are common carriers and are liable as such. As such 
 companies necessarily have many employees who cannot 
 possibly control those who should exercise care and diligence 
 in the running of trains, such companies shall be liable 
 to such employees the same as to passengers, for injuries 
 arising from the want of such care and diligence. 
 
 A railroad company shall be liable for any damage done 
 to persons, stock, or other property, by the running of loco- 
 motives, or cars, or other machinery of such company, or for 
 damage done by any person in the employment and service 
 of such company, unless the company shall make it appear 
 that their agents have exercised all ordinary and reasonable 
 care and diligence, the presumption in all cases being against 
 the company. 
 
 No person shall recover damages from a railroad com- 
 pany for injury to himself or his property, where the same 
 is done by his consent or is caused by his own negligence. If 
 the complainant and the agents of the company are both at 
 fault, the former may "recover, but the damages shall be di- 
 minished by the jury, in proportion to the amount of default 
 attributable to him. 
 
 If the person injured is himself an employee of the com- 
 pany, and the damage was Caused by another employee, and 
 without fault or negligence on the part of the person injured, 
 his employment by the company is no bar to a recovery. 
 
 The liabilities of receivers, assignees, and other like officers 
 operating railroads in this State, or partially in the State, for 
 injuries and damages to persons in their employ, caused by 
 the negligence of coemployees, shall be the same as the liabil- 
 ity now fixed by law governing the operation of railroad 
 
 A street railroad company is held to be a railroad within the con- 
 templation of the Georgia statute, changing the rule of the common 
 law as to the employees of railroad companies. Savannah, etc., R. Co. 
 V. Williams, 117 Ga. 414; 43 S. E. Rep. 751; 61 L. R, A, 249, s 
 
 Y64 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. § 519 
 
 corporations in this State, for like injuries and damages, 
 and a lien is hereby created on the gross income of any' such 
 railroad, while in the hands of any such receiver, assignee 
 or trustee, in favor of such injured employee or plaintiff, 
 superior to all other liens against the defendant under the 
 laws of this State. 
 
 Except in case of railroad companies, the employer 
 is not liable to one employee for injuries arising from the 
 negligence or misconduct of other employees about the same 
 business. 
 
 The employer is bound to exercise ordinary care in the 
 selection of employees, and not to retain them after knowl- 
 edge of incompetency; he must use like care in furnishing 
 "machinery equal in kind to that in general use, and reason- 
 ably safe for all persons who operate it with ordinary care 
 and diligence. If there are latent defects in machinery, 
 or dangers incident to an employment unknown to the em- 
 ployee, of which the employer knows, or ought to know, he 
 must give the employee warning in respect thereto. 
 
 Employee assumes the ordinary risks of his employment, 
 and is bound to exercise his own skill and diligence to protect 
 himself. In suits for injuries arising from the negligence 
 of the employer in failing to comply with the duties imposed 
 by the preceding section, it mijst appear that the employer 
 knew or ought to have known of the incompetency of the 
 other employee, or of the defects or danger in the machinery 
 supplied ; and it must also appear that the employee injured 
 did not know and had not equal means of knowing such fact, 
 and by the exercise of ordinary care could not have known 
 thereof. 
 
 All contracts between employer and employee, made in con- 
 sideration of employment, whereby the employer is exempted 
 from liability to the employee arising from the negligence 
 of the employer or his employees, as such liability is now 
 
 765 
 
§ 520 STATUTISg ABOLlSHmO OOMMOS LAW. 
 
 fixed by law, shall be null and void, as against public 
 policy. 
 
 If the plaintiff by ordinary care could have avoided the 
 consequences to himself caused by the defendant's negligence, 
 he is not entitled to recover. But in other cases the de- 
 fendant is not relieved, although the plaintiff may in some 
 way have contributed to the injury sustained, 
 
 § 520. The safety appliance act of Illinois. — The railroad 
 
 safety appliance law of Illinois takes away the defenses of 
 assumed risk and contributory negligence, where an employee 
 is injured because. of the railroad company's noncompliance 
 with the law, although the injured employee knew when he 
 entered into the employment that the statute was not com- 
 plied with. 
 
 The statute''* provides that: Any employee of any such 
 common carrier, who may be injured by any train, locomo- 
 tive, tender, car, or similar vehicle in use, contrary to the 
 provisions of this act, shall not be deemed to have assumed 
 the risks thereby occasioned, nor to have been guilty of con- 
 tributory negligence, because of continuing . in the employ- 
 ment of such common carrier or in the performance of his 
 duties as such employee after the unlawful use of such train, 
 locomotive, tender, car or similar vehicle had been brought 
 to his knowledge. 
 
 TsLaws Illinois, 1905, § 9, p. 550. Violations of the Coal Mines 
 statute, prescribing certain safeguards for the safety and lives of the 
 miners, is construed by the courts of Illinois so as to take away the 
 defenses of assumed risk and contributory negligences in actions for 
 breach of this statutory duty, too. See Spring Valley Coal Co. v. 
 Rowatt, 196 111. 156; 63 N. E. Hep. 649; Spring Valley Coal Co. v. 
 Patting, 71 N. E. Rep. 371; Sunnyside Coal Co. v. Perry Center, 100 
 111. App. 546; Fulton v. Wilmington Star Mining Co., 133 Fed. Rep. 
 193; White, Personal Injuries in Mines, § 354, pp. 390, 391, and 
 cases cited. 
 
 766 
 
STATtlTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. § 521 
 
 § 521. The Indiana statutes.— The Indiana statutes ''» 
 are as follows : 
 
 79 Annotated Statutes of 1894, Revision of 1901, §§ 359a, 7082a, 
 7082b, 7082c, 7083, and § 14 ch, 118, Acts 1907. 
 
 Under the Indiana statute, giving a right of action for an injury 
 due to the negligence of an employee entrusted with the control of 
 any " signal, telegraph office, switch yard," etc., no liability is created 
 for the negligence of an employee in' charge of a " switch." Indianap- 
 olis, etc.. Transit Co. v. Andis, 72 N. E. Rep. 145. 
 
 But a railroad company is liable for an injury to an inexperienced 
 track hand, who, under the orders of a foreman, broke the bolt that 
 held a buckled rail in place, when it flew back and struck him. South- 
 ern Ry. Co. V. Blevins, 130 Fed. Rep. 688. 
 
 And a member of a wrecking crew, while acting under the orders 
 of a foreman and sustaining injuries, is held entitled to recover, in 
 Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Hunsucker, 70 N. E. Rep. 556. 
 
 A brakeman required to place a red light at the rear of a train 
 is an employee in charge of a signal, under the statute. Chicago, 
 etc., Ry. Co. v. WicSer, 71 N. E. Rep. 223 j 72 N. E. Rep. 614. 
 
 An idle bridge hand, who is struck by a stone being raised by a, 
 derrick, under the supervision of a superintendent, is not within the 
 statute. Southern Indiana Ry. Co. v. Harrell, 161 Ind. 689; 68 
 N. E. Rep. 262; 63 L. R. A. 460. 
 
 A fireman, injured while taking on coal, by the engineer starting 
 the engine, is entitled to recover under the statute. Cleveland, etc., 
 Ry. Co. V. Bergschicker, 69 N. E. Rep. 1000. 
 
 "Employer's Liability Act (Burns' Ann. St. 1901, § 7083, subd. 2) 
 makes an employer liable for injuries to its employee caused by the 
 negligence of a person in its service to whose order or direction the 
 injured employee was bound to and did conform. Eeld, that the words 
 ' order or direction,' as used in the statute, apply to special orders 
 as distinguished from general orders, and the protection of the statute 
 does not extend to an employee injured from the negligence of the 
 foreman while working under general directions." Indianapolis Street 
 Ry. Co. V. Kane (Ind. 1907), 80 N. E. Rep. 841. 
 
 "Under Burns' Ann. St. 1901, § 7083 (employer's liability statute), 
 making railroads liable for damages for personal injuries suffered 
 by employee^ while in their service in certain cases, where the injured 
 employee is in the exercise of due care, a liability may arise for an 
 injury to the conductor of a railroad train througli the negligence of 
 the engineer of the train, notwithstanding a rule of the road makes 
 the conductor in some respects the superior." Pittsburgh Ry. Co. v. 
 Collins (Ind. 1907), 80 N. E. Rep. 415. 
 
 767 
 
§ 521 STATUTES ABOLlSHiNQ COMMOJf LAW. 
 
 Hereafter in all actions for damages brought on account 
 of the alleged negligence of any person, copartnership, or 
 corporation for causing personal injuries, or the death of any 
 person, it shall not be necessary for the plaintiff in such 
 action to allege or prove the want of contributory negligence 
 on the part of the plaintiff, or on the part of the person for 
 whose injury or death the action may be brought. Con- 
 tributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff or such other 
 person shall be a matter of defense, and such defense may be 
 proved under the answer or general denial. * * * 
 
 All contracts between employer and employee releasing 
 the employer from liability for damages arising out of the 
 negligence of the employer by which the employee is in- 
 jured, or, in case of the employee's death, to his representa- 
 tives, are against public policy, and hereby declared null and 
 void. 
 
 All contracts between employer and employee releasing 
 third persons, copartnerships or corporations from liability 
 for damages arising out of the negligence of such third per- 
 sons, copartnerships or corporations by which the employee 
 of such employer's injured, or in ease of the death of such 
 employee, to his representatives, are against public policy 
 and are hereby declared null and void. 
 
 All contracts between an employee and a third person, co- 
 partnership or corporation in which it is agreed that the em- 
 ployer of such employee shall be released from liability for 
 
 " Where a foreman ordered a railway employee to go upon a bridge 
 pier and remove woodwork therefrom, directing the specific manner in 
 which the removal should be made, and the foreman, in an attempt to 
 further the work, without warning the employee, pried down a timber, 
 breaking off the footing upon which the employee stood, causing his 
 injury, there was an order, within Burns' Ann. St. 1901, § 7083, subd. 2, 
 making corporations liable for injuries to employees from the neg- 
 ligence of persons in its service to whose order the employees are 
 bound to and do conform." Toledo & W. R. Co. v. Pavey (Ind. App. 
 1906), 79 N. E. Rep. 529. 
 
 768 
 
STATTTTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. § 521 
 
 damages of such eauployee arising out of the negligence of 
 the employer, or in case of the death of such employee, to his 
 representatives, are against public policy and are hereby de- 
 clared null and void: Provided, That nothing in this act 
 shall apply to voluntary relief departments, or associations 
 organized for the purpose of insuring employees. Nothing 
 in this act shall be construed to revert back to contracts made 
 prior to the passage of this act. Nor shall this act affect 
 pending litigation: Provided, That nothing in any section 
 of this act shall be so construed as to affect or apply to any 
 contract or agreement that may be made between the em- 
 ployer and employee, or in case of death, his next of kin or 
 his representative after an injury to the employee has oc- 
 curred, but the provisions of this act shall apply solely to 
 contracts made prior to any injury. 
 
 Every railroad or other corporation, except municipal, 
 operating in this State, shall be liable for damages for 
 personal injury suffered by any employee while in its service, 
 the employee so injured being in the exercise of due care 
 and diligence, in the following cases : 
 
 First. When such injury is suffered by reason of any 
 defect in the condition of ways, works, plant, tools, and ma- 
 chinery, connected with or in use in the business of such 
 corporation, when such defect was the result of negligence 
 on the part of the corporation, or some person intrusted by it 
 with the duty of keeping such ways, works, plant, tools, 
 or machinery in proper condition. 
 
 Second. Where such injury resulted from the negligence 
 of any person in the service of such corporation, to whose 
 order or direction the injured employee at the time of the' in- 
 jury was bound to conform, and did conform. 
 
 Third. Where such injury resulted from the act or omis- 
 sion of any person done or made in obedience to any rule, 
 
 1—49 - Y69 
 
§ 521 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. 
 
 regulation, or by-law of such corporation, or in obedience 
 to the particular instructions given by any person delegated 
 with the authority of the corporation in that behalf. 
 
 Fourth. Where such injury was caused by the negligence 
 of any person in the service of such corporation who has 
 charge of any signal, telegraph office, switch yard, shop, 
 roundhouse, locomotive engine, or train upon a railway, or 
 where such injury was caused by the negligence of any per- 
 son, or coemployee, engaged in the same common service in 
 any of the several departments of the service of any such 
 corporation, the said person, or coemployee, at the time act- 
 ing in the place, and performing the duty of the corporation 
 in that behalf, and the person so injured, obeying or con- 
 forming to the order of some superior at the time of such 
 injury, having authority to direct ; but nothing herein shall 
 be construed to abridge the liability of the corporation under 
 existing laws. 
 
 Any employee of any such common carrier who may be 
 killed or injured by any locomotive, tender, car, similar 
 vehicle, or train in use contrary to the provisions of this act, 
 or who shall be killed or injured on account of any structures 
 forbidden by sections eleven and twelve of this act shall not 
 be deemed thereby to have assumed the risk occasioned, al- 
 though continuing in the employment of such carrier after 
 the unlawful use of such locomotive, tender, car, similar 
 vehicle, or train, or the maintenance of such unlawful struc- 
 tures named in sections eleven and twelve of this act, had 
 been brought to his knowledge, nor shall any such employee 
 be held as having contributed to his injury in any case where 
 the carrier shall have violated any of the provisions of this 
 act when such violation contributed to the death or injury 
 of any such employee. 
 
 110 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. § 522 
 
 § 522. The statute of Iowa.— The Iowa Code ^» provides 
 that, 
 
 Every corporation operating a railway shall be liable 
 for all damages sustained by any person, including em- 
 ployees of sueh corporation, in consequence of the neglect 
 of the agents, or by any mismanagement of the engineers or 
 other employees thereof, and in consequence of the willful 
 wrongs, whether of commission or omission, of such agents, 
 engineers or other employees, when sUch wrongs are in any 
 manner connected with the use and operation of any rail- 
 way on or about which they shall be employed, and no con- 
 tract which restricts such liability shall be legal or binding. 
 
 Nor shall any contract of insurance, relief, benefit, or 
 indemnity in case of injury or death, entered into prior to 
 the injury, between the person so injured and such corpora- 
 tion, or any other person or association acting for such cor- 
 poration, nor shall the acceptance of any such insurance, 
 relief, benefit, or indemnity by the person, injured, his 
 widow, heirs, or legal representatives after the injury, from 
 such corporation, person, or association, constitute any bar 
 or defense to any cause of action brought under the provi- 
 sions of this section, but nothing contained herein shall be 
 construed to prevent or invalidate any settlement far damages 
 between the parties subsequent to injuries received. 
 
 In all cases where the property, works, machinery, or ap- 
 pliances of an employer are defective or out of repair, and 
 the employee has knowledge thereof, and has given written 
 notice to the employer, or to any person authorized to receive 
 and accept such notice, or to any person in the service of the 
 employer and entrusted by him with the duty of seeing that 
 the property, works, machinery, or appliances are in proper 
 condition, of the particular defect or want of repair, or 
 
 80 Code of Iowa of 1897 and Supplement of 1902, § 2071, and § 1, 
 ch..l81, acts of 1907. 
 
 Y71 
 
§ 522 STATUTES ABOLISHIH'G COMMON LAW. 
 
 when the employer or such other person has been notified 
 in writing of such defect or want of repair by any person 
 whose duty it is under the rules of the employer or the laws 
 of the State to inspect such works, machinery, or appliances. 
 
 The Iowa law of 1862 applies only to employees engaged in the 
 hazardous duty of operating trains, yet it applies to one injured by 
 a falling bank, while loading a dirt ear. Deppe v. Chicago, etc., E. 
 Co., 36 Iowa 52. 
 
 A section hand is within the protection of the statute. Frandsen 
 V. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 36 'Iowa 372. 
 
 All employees exposed to the hazards of moving trains, although 
 not actually operating them, are protected by the law. Smith v.. 
 Humeston, etc., E. Co., 78 Iowa 583; 43 N. W. Eep. 545; 41 Am. & 
 Eng. E. Cas. 278; Eaybum v. Central E. Co., 74 Iowa 637; 35 N. W. 
 Eep. 606. 
 
 A vice-principal is held entitled to recover for an injury received 
 by the negligence of men he employed, in Houser v. Chicago, etc., E. 
 Co., 60 Iowa 230; 14 N. W. Eep. 778; 46 Am. Eep. 65; 8 Am. & 
 Eng. E. Cas. 500. 
 
 The working of a ditching machine is held to be eoimected with the 
 " use and operation " of the railroad, in Nelson v. Chicago, etc., E. 
 Co., 73 Iowa 576; 35 N. W. Eep. 611. 
 
 An engine " wiper " operating an engine and injuring a brakeman, 
 is such an employee as to render the company liable. Whalen v. 
 Chicago, etc., E. Co., 75 Iowa 563; 39 N. W. Eep. 894; 38 Am. & 
 Eng. E. Cas. 141. 
 
 A section hand injured by his foreman while operating a hand car, 
 is entitled to an action under the statute. Chicago, etc., E. Co. v. 
 Artery, 137 U. S. 507; 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 129; 44 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 
 573. • 
 
 A bridge man, while riding a train, is protected by the law. 
 Sehroeder v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 47 Iowa 375; 14 Am. Ey. Eep. 359. 
 
 A private detective, injured while walking the track, by the neg- 
 ligence of the engineer of an engine, is held to be engaged in the 
 " use and operation " of a railroad, within the statute. Pyne v. 
 Chicago, etc., E. Co., 54 Iowa 223 ; 6 N. W. Eep. 281 ; 37 Am. Eep. 198. 
 
 So is an employee shoveling gravel. McKnight v. Iowa, etc., E. 
 Co., 43 Iowa 406; 14 Am. Ey. Eep. 465; Handelum v. Burlington 
 etc., E. Co., 72 Iowa 709; 32 N. W. Eep. 4. 
 
 An employee riding a hand car and injured by a negligent collision 
 with another hand car. Lombard v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 47 Iowa 494. 
 
 An employee of car shops, removing screens from car windows, 
 
 772 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHIlirG COMMON LAW. § 522 
 
 or any person who is subject to the risk incident to such 
 defect or want of repair, no employee after such notice shall, 
 by reason of remaining in the employment with such knowl- 
 edge, be deemed to have assumed the risk incident to the 
 danger arising from such defect or want of repair. 
 
 injured by the sudden starting of the train. Pierce v. Central E. Co., 
 73 Iowa 140; 34 N. W. Rep. 783. 
 
 A " clinkerman," employed in a roundhouse, is also within the 
 protection of the statute. Butler v. Chicago, Tetc, E. Co., 87 Iowa 
 206; 54 N. W. Eep. 208; Nijus v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 47 Minn. 92; 
 49 N. W. Eep. 527. 
 
 And so is a snow shoveler, riding to work on a work train. Smith 
 V. Humeston, etc., E. Co., 78 Iowa 583; 43 N. W. Eep. 545; 41 Am. 
 & Eng. E. Oas. 278. 
 
 But the statute was held not to apply to employees engaged in 
 other work than the operation of the railroad, such as car shop 
 employees, in Potter v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 46 Iowa 399; 16 Am. 
 Ey. Eep. 57; Manning v. Burlington, etc., E. Co., 64 Iowa 240; 20 
 N. W. Eep. 169. 
 
 A section hand, engaged in loading a stationary car, was held 
 not within the statute, in Smith v. Burlington, etc., E. Co., 59 Iowa 
 73; 12 N. W. Eep. 763; 6 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 149. 
 
 Nor does the statute protect an employee, injured by his associates 
 in an effort to close a door to the engine house. Malone v. Burlington, 
 etc., E. Co., 61 Iowa 326; 16 N. W. Eep. 203; 47 Am. Eep. 813; 11 
 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 165. 
 
 Nor to a sweeper, in a roundhouse, who fell in a hole negligently 
 left open by a fellow workman. Manning v. Burlington, etc., E. Co., 
 64 Iowa 240; 20 N. W. Eep. 169. 
 
 Nor does the act protect the repairer of stationary cars, on a 
 side track. Foley v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 64 Iowa 644; 21 N. W. 
 Eep. 124. 
 
 Nor to an employee of a construction gang, injured by a stone set 
 in, motion by a coemployee. Matson v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 68 Iowa 
 22; 25 N. W. Eep. 911. 
 
 Nor can an employee claim to be " operating a railroad," in the 
 act of elevating coal up to a platform, where it is to be hauled away 
 by engines and trains of cars. Stroble v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 70 
 Iowa 555; 31 N. W. Eep. 63; 28 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 510. 
 
 Under tSe Iowa statute, the ordinary work of a section gang, along 
 the railroad track, disconnected from any control of trainsj does not 
 
 113 
 
§ 523 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. 
 
 § 623. The General Statutes of Kansas,*^ with, reference 
 to the liability of railroad companies for injuries to their 
 employees, provide: 
 
 constitute such employees operators of the railroad, within the meaning 
 of the law. Dunn v. Chicago, etc., Ky. Co., 107 N. W. Rep. 616. 
 
 The Iowa statute was held not to apply to street railroads, in 
 McLeod V. Chicago, etc., Ey. Co., 125 Iowa 270; 101 N. W. Rep. 77. 
 
 But an employee engaged in unloading steel rails, was held to 
 be operating a railroad, in Williams v. Iowa Central E. Co., 96 N. W. 
 Rep. 774. 
 
 Railroad companies entering the State are not guaranteed that the 
 common-law rule as to coemployees will not be changed, when it is 
 found to the interest of the inhabitants of the State to change it and 
 they cannot complain of such statutes. O'Brien v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 
 116 Fed. Rep. 502. 
 
 81 General Statutes Kansas 1901, § 5858, as amended by ch. 281, 
 Acts of 1907. 
 
 " Laws Kan. 1874, p. 143, ch. 93, providing that a railroad company 
 shall be liable for all damages done to an employee from any negligence 
 of its agents or by any mismanagement of any employees, while re- 
 stricted to hazards peculiar to railroading, applies to the case of a 
 track repairer injured while being taken from his work in a caboose, 
 and while still in the company's employ, by collision of that and 
 another train of the company." larussi v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. 
 (U. S. C. C, 111., 1907), 155 Fed. Rep. 654. 
 
 " In an action for injuries to a railroad employee because another 
 employee had negligently selected an insufficient block for the raising 
 of an engine and had negligently adjusted it, the railroad company held 
 liable under Laws 1903, p. 599, ch. 393, § 1, providing that every 
 railroad company should be liable for damages to an employee caused 
 by the negligence of its agents or otheiT employees." Missouri, K. & T. 
 Ry. Co. v. Green (Kan. 1907), 89 Pac. Rep. 1042. 
 
 The Kansas " statute, of 1874, was held not to dispense with the 
 strict proof of negligence on the part of the coemployees. Missouri 
 Pacific Ry. Co. v. Haley, 25 Kansas 35 ; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 594. 
 
 . Under this statute it was held a right of action only accrued for 
 the neglect of some agent having authority or duty in or about the 
 particular act causing the injury. Solomon R. Co. v. Jones, 30 
 Kansas 601; 2 Pac. Rep. 657; 15 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 201. 
 
 This act was held not to affect the defense of contributory negligence. 
 Kansas Pacific R. Co. v. Peavey, 34 Kansas 472; 8 Pac. Rep. 780. 
 
 A person employed to carry water on construction work, is held 
 
 Y74 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. § 523 
 
 Every railroad company organized or doing business in the 
 State of Kansas shall be liable for all damages done to any 
 employee of said company in consequence of any negKgence 
 of its agents, or by any mismanagement of its engineers or 
 other employees, to any person sustaining' such damage : 
 Provided, That notice in writing that an injury has been 
 sustained, stating the time and place thereof, shall have been 
 given by or. on behalf of the person injured to suchi railroad 
 company within eight months after the occurrence of the 
 injury: Provided, however. That where an action is com- 
 menced by the injured person within said eight months, 
 it shall not be necessary to give said notice : And provided 
 further. That where any person injured is in the hospital of 
 or under the charge of the railroad company causing the in- 
 jury, or is prevented by the effects of said injury, the said 
 eight months shall not begin to run until such injured person 
 is discharged from said hospital or care of said railroad 
 company or until such disability be removed: Provided, 
 
 entitled to the protection of the stfitute, in Missouri Pacific Hy. Co. 
 V. Haley, 25 Kansas 35; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 594. 
 
 An employee injured while assisting to load steel rails, by his 
 associates permitting a. rail to fall upon him, was held entitled to 
 recover, in Atchison, etc., E. Co. v. Koehler, 37 Kansas 463; 15 Pac. 
 Rep. 567; 31 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 312; Union Pacific R. Co. v. Harris 33. 
 
 A section man, riding. a hand car and injured by another car running 
 into him, is entitled to recover, under the statute. Union Trust Co. v. 
 Thomason, 25 Kansas 1; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 589. 
 
 A fireman injured by the negligent collision of a switch engine, 
 with his engine, was held entitled to recover, in Missouri Pacific R. 
 Co. V. Mackey, 33 Kansas 298; 6 Pac. Rep. 291; 22 Am. & Eng. R. 
 Cas. 306. 
 
 A brakeman throwing a switch, injured by falling under the train 
 was held entitled to recover, in the absence of negligence on his part, 
 in Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Kier, 41 Kansas 661; 21 Pac. Rep. 770; 
 38 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 119. 
 
 Nor will the fact of a receivership, at the time of an injury to an 
 employee, affect the right of recovery, under the statute. Hornsby v. 
 Eddy, 56 Fed. Rep. 461. • 
 
 775 
 
§ 524 STATtTTES ABOLISHING COMMOK LAW. 
 
 further^ That in case said injured person shall die, as a result 
 of said injuries, within said eight months, it shall not be 
 necessary to give said notice: Provided further. That said 
 notice need not state whether or not suit is intended to be 
 , brought. 
 
 The service mentioned in section one hereof may be served 
 by a written copy thereof, by the person injured or anyone 
 on his behalf, upon any person designated by the railroad 
 in any county in which the action might be brought, as pro- 
 vided by the General Statutes of Kansas of 1901, or if 
 no such person has been designated or appointed, as in said 
 section provided, then upon any local superintendent of 
 affairs, freight agent, agent to sell tickets, or station keeper 
 of such company or corporation in such county, or such 
 service may be made by leaving a copy thereof at any depot 
 or station of such company or corporation in such county 
 with the person in charge thereof or in the employ of 
 such company or corporation, and such service shall be 
 held and deemed complete and effectual. Proof of such 
 service shall be made by the affidavit of the party making 
 the same, or other persons knowing the facts. 
 
 § 524. Kentucky statutes,— The statutes of Kentucky ^^ 
 regulate the construction of railroad bridges and tunnels 
 and direct the use of air brakes on railroad cars and trains 
 and require railroad companies to block all frogs to switches. 
 And for an injury resulting from a violation of the statute, 
 the railroad company is rendered liable. 
 
 82 statutes Kentucky 1903, § 793. 
 
 Under the Kentucky statute, before a brakeman can recover for a 
 personal injury, caused by the negligent moving of a train, he must 
 be able to show that the employees engaged in operating the train, 
 were his superiors in authority. Greer v. Louisville, etc., E. Co., 94 
 Ky. 169; 21 S. W. Eep. 649. '^ 
 
 776 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMOIf XA-yV. §§ 525, 526 
 
 § 525. The Code of Louisiana ^^ enacts that every person 
 is itesponsible for the damage he occasions, not merely by 
 his act, but by his negligence, his imprudence or his want 
 of skill. 
 
 That employers are responsible n.ot only for the damages 
 occasioned by their own acts, but for that caused by the acts 
 of persons for whom they are answerable, or of the things 
 in their custody, and that employers are responsible for the 
 damages occasioned by their employees or overseers, in the 
 exercise of the functions in which they are employed. 
 
 But responsibility only attaches to the employer when he 
 might have anticipated or prevented the act and failed to 
 do it. 
 
 § 526. The Eevised Laws of Massachusetts,^^ governing the 
 
 83 Revised Civil Code, Louisiana 1887, art. 2316, 2317, 2320. 
 
 8* Eevised Laws, Massachusetts 1902, oh. 106, §§ 16, 71, 72, 73, 74, 
 75, 76, 77, 78 as amended by Laws 1906, eh. 370, and § 209, oh. 111. 
 
 Under the Massachusetts statute, as before, no action can be main- 
 tained, based upon the negligence of a coemployee of a railroad com- 
 pany, as the law of 1887 gives no such right. Dacey v. Old Colony 
 E. Co., 153 Mass. 112; 26 N. E. Eep. 437. 
 
 An incompetent engineer operating an engine and causing an injury 
 is not shown by the one act only of incompetency. Peaslee v. Fitch- 
 burg, etc., E. Co., 152 Mass. 155; 25 N. E. Eep. 71. 
 
 Under the statute of 1887, a railroad company is liable for an 
 injury caused by any person operating any " signal, switch, locomotive 
 engine, or train, upon a railroad," and this means some one having 
 control or charge of such appliances. Steffe v. Old Colony E. Co., 
 156 Mass. 262; 30 N. E. Eep. 1137. 
 
 If the negligence of a superintendent is relied upon, under the 
 statute, it must be alleged and proven, in the exercise of the duty 
 of superintendence. Fitzgerald v. Boston, etc., E. Co., 156 Mass. 293; 
 31 N. E. Eep. 7. 
 
 A trackman, injured while stooping at his work, because of the 
 negligence of his foreman in failing to warn him of an approaching 
 train, is within the protection of the act of 1887, ch. 270. Davis v. 
 New Yo'rk, etc., R. Co., 1.59 Mass. 532; 34 N. E. Eep. 1070. 
 
 Under the Massachusetts statute a coemployee, although engaged 
 
§ 526 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. 
 
 liability of employers for injuries to their employees, pre- 
 scribe tbat: 
 
 No person shall, by a special contract with his employees, 
 exempt himself from liability which he may be under to 
 them for injuries suffered by them in their employment, and 
 resulting from the negligence of the employer or of a person 
 in his employ. 
 
 If personal injury is caused to an employee who, at the 
 time of the injury, is in the exercise of due care by reason 
 of— 
 
 First. A defect in the condition of the ways, works, or 
 machinery connected with or used in the business of the 
 employer, which arose from, or had not been discovered or 
 remedied in consequence of, the negligence of the employer, 
 or of a person in his service who had been entrusted by 
 him with the duty of seeing that the ways. Works, or machin- 
 ery were in proper condition ; or. 
 
 Second. The negligence of a person in the service of the 
 employer who was entrusted with and was exercising super- 
 intendence and whose sole or principal duty was that of su- 
 perintendence, or, in the absence of such superintendent, of a 
 person acting as superintendent with the. authority or con- 
 sent of such employer; or. 
 
 Third. The negligence of a person in the service of the 
 
 in superintendence, cannot subject the railroad company .to a liability, 
 as it was not intended to render the company liable for the acts of 
 other than regular superintendents. Vecchioni v. New York, etc., Ey. 
 Co., 191 Mass. 9; 77 N. E. Rep. 306; Piermerini v. New York, etc., 
 Ry. Co., 191 Mass. 9; 77 N. E. Rep. 306. 
 
 A section foreman, in charge of men engaged, in loading a car, was 
 held to be an employee, entrusted with -power of superintendence, in 
 Murphy v. New York, etc., R. Co., 187 Mass. 18; 72 N. E. Rep. 330. 
 
 A railroad company is held liable for the act of a yard master in 
 injuring a car inspector, by causing a car to be moved against the 
 car he is inspecting, in Brady v. New York, etc., R. Co., 184 Mass. 
 225; 68 N. E. Rep. 227. 
 
 Y78 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. § 526 
 
 employer who was in charge or control of a signal, switch, 
 locomotive engine or train upon a railroad ; 
 
 The employee, or his legal representatives, shall, subject 
 to the provisions of the eight following sections, have the 
 same rights to compensation and of action against the em- 
 ployer as if he had not heen an employee, nor in the service, 
 nor engaged in the work, of the employer. 
 
 A car which is in use by, or which is in possession of, a 
 railroad corporation shall be considered as a part of the ways, 
 works, or machinery, of the corporation which uses or has 
 it in possession, within the meaning of clause one of this sec- 
 tion, whether it is owned by such corporation or by some 
 other company or person. One or more cars which are in 
 motion, whether attached to an engine or not, shall constitute 
 a train within the meaning of clause three of this section, 
 and whoever, as a part of his duty for the time being, physi- 
 cally controls or directs the movements of a signal, switch, 
 locomotive engine, or train shall be deemed to be a person 
 in charge or control of a signal, switch, locomotive engine, 
 or train within the meaning of said clause. 
 
 If the injury described in the preceding section results in 
 the death of the employee, and such death is not instantaneous 
 or is preceded by conscious suffering, and if there is any 
 person who is entitled to bring an action under the following 
 section, the legal representatives of said employee may, in an 
 action brought under the provisions of the preceding sec- 
 tion, recover damages for the death, in addition to those 
 for the injury; and in the same action, under a separate 
 count, at common law, may recover damages for conscious 
 suffering resulting from the same injury. 
 
 If, as a result of the negligence of an employer himself, 
 or of a person for whose negligence the employer is liable, 
 under the provision of section seventy-one an employee is in- 
 stantly killed, or dies without conscious suffering, his widow, 
 
 779 
 
§ 526 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. 
 
 or if he leaves no widow, his next of kin, who, at the time of 
 his death, were dependent upon his wages for support, shall 
 have a rigbt of action for damages against the employer. 
 
 If, under the provisions of either of the two preceding 
 sections, damages are awarded for the death, they shall be 
 assessed with reference to the degree of culpability of the 
 employer or of the person for whose negligence the employer 
 is liable. 
 
 The amount of damages which may be awarded in an ac- 
 tion under the provisions of section seventy-one for a per- 
 sonal injury to an employee, in which no damages for his 
 death are awarded under the provisions of section seventy- 
 two, shall not exceed four thousand dollars. 
 
 The amount of damages which may be awarded in such 
 action, if damages for his death are awarded under the 
 provisions of sfection seventy-two, shall not exceed five thou- 
 sand dollars for both the injury and the death, and shall be 
 apportioned by the jury between the legal representatives of 
 the employee and the persons who would have been entitled, 
 under the provisions of section seventy-three, to bring an 
 action for his death if it had been instantaneous or without 
 conscious suffering. 
 
 The amount of damages which may be awarded in an ac- 
 tion brought under the provisions of section seventy-three 
 shall not be less than five hundred nor more than five thou- 
 sand dollars. 
 
 1^0 action for recovery of damages for injury or 
 death under the provisions of sections seventy-one to seventy- 
 four, inclusive, shall be maintained unless notice of the time, 
 place, and cause of the injury is given to the employer with- 
 in sixty days, and the action is commenced within one year 
 after the accident which caused the injury or death. Such 
 notice shall be in writing, signed by the person injured or by 
 a person in his behalf ; but if from physical or mental inca- 
 780 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. § 526 
 
 pacity it is impossible for the person injured to give the no- 
 tice within the time provided in this section, he may give it 
 within ten days after such incapacity has been removed, and 
 if he dies without having given the notice and without hav- 
 ing been for ten days at any time after his injury of suffi- 
 cient capacity to give it, his executor or administrator may 
 give such notice within sixty days after his appointment. A 
 notice given under the provisions of this section shall not be 
 held invalid or insufficient solely by reason of an inaccuracy 
 in stating the time, place, or cause of the injury, if it is 
 shown that there was no intention to mislead, and that the 
 employer was not in fact misled thereby. The provisions 
 of section twenty-two of chapter fifty-one shall apply to no- 
 tices under the. provisions of this section. 
 
 If an employer enters into a contract, written or verbal, 
 with an independent contractor to do part of such employer's 
 work, or if such contractor enters into a contract vnth a 
 subcontractor to do all or any part of the work comprised in 
 such contractor's contract with the employer, such contract 
 or subcontract shall not bar the liability of the employer for 
 injuries to the employees of such contractor or subcontractor, 
 caused by any defect in the condition of the ways, works, 
 machinery, or plant, if they are the property of the em- 
 ployer or are furnished by him and if such defect .arose, 
 or had not been discovered or remedied, through the negli- 
 gence cf the employer or of some person entrusted by him 
 with the duty of seeing that they were in proper condition. 
 
 An employee or his legal representative shall not be en- 
 titled to any right of action for damages against his em- 
 ployer, if such employee knew of the defect or negligence 
 which caused the injury and failed within a reasonable time 
 to give, or cause to give information to the employer, or to 
 some person superior to himself, in the service of the em- 
 ployer, who was entrusted with general superintendence. 
 
 Y81 
 
§ 527 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON J.A,MT. 
 
 An employer who shall have contributed to an insurance 
 fund created and maintained for the mutual purpose of in- 
 demnifying an employee for personal injuries for which 
 compensation may be recovered, or to any relief society 
 formed as provided by law, may prove in mitigation of the 
 damages recovered by an employee, such proportion of the 
 pecuniary benefit which has been received by such employee 
 from any such fund or society, on account of such contribu- 
 tion, as the contribution of such employer to such fund or 
 society bears to the whole contribution thereto. 
 
 The statute directing the installation and use of safety ap- 
 pliances on railroads takes away from the negligent railroad 
 company the defense of assumed risk, where injury results 
 from a violation of the act, even though the injured employee 
 knew of the violation. 
 
 § 527. laws of Minnesota, — By statute in Minnesota,*^ 
 every company, owning or operating, as common carrier, or 
 
 85 Revised Laws Minnesota 1905, § 2042. 
 
 Under the Minnesota law of 1887, a railroad company is made 
 liable for an injury to its employee, caused by the negligence of a 
 coemployee. Northern Pacific R. Co. y. Behling, 57 Fed. Rep. 1037. 
 
 The law embraces only those employees exposed to the peculiar 
 hazards of using or operating the railroad. Johnson v. St. Paul, etc., 
 R. Co.,. 43 Minn. 222; 45 N. W. Rep. 156; Lavelle v. St. Paul, etc., R. 
 Co., 40 Minn. 249; 41 jST. W. Rep. 974; 38 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 115. 
 
 A section man injured while at work on the road, by the negligence 
 of an engineer, is entitled to the protection of the statute. Smith v. 
 St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 44 Minn. 17; 46 N. W. Rep. 149. 
 
 A section hand, injured by an employee while operating a hand car, 
 was entitled to recover, in Steffensen v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 45 Minn. 
 355; 48 Minn. 285; 47 N. W. Rep. 1068, and 51 N. W. Rep. 610. 
 
 But a section man injured by the falling of an iron rail, which his 
 coemployees let fall upon him, is not engaged in the operation of a 
 railroad, within this statute. Pearson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 47 
 Minn. 9; 49 N. W. Rep. 302; 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 364. 
 
 Under the Minnesota statute, an employee working in a gravel pit 
 and injured by the act of the engineer, in swinging the bucket in a 
 782 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. § 528 
 
 otherwise, a railroad, is liable for 'all damages sustained, 
 within the State, by any agent or employee thereof, without 
 contributory negligence on his part, by reason of the negli- 
 gence of any other employee thereof, and no contract or any 
 rule or regulation of such company shall impair or limit such 
 liability. 
 
 But this statute does not render any railroad company lia- 
 ble for damages sustained by any such agent or employee 
 while engaged in the construction of a new road, or any part 
 ■ thereof, not open to public travel or use. 
 
 § 528, The laws of Mississippi.— The Constitution ^« and 
 Code of Mississippi,*' with reference to the liability of the 
 
 negligent manner, from the ballast ear, into the pit, was not engaged 
 in the operation of the railroad, within the statute and not entitled 
 to recover for such an injury. Jemming v. Great Northern Ey. Co., 
 96 Minn. 302; 104 N. W. Eep. 1079; 1 L. R. A. (N.-S.) 696. 
 
 Contractors for the straightening of a railroad track, who are fur- 
 nished work trains by the railroad company, to further the work, 
 are within the protection of the statute, so that an employee injured 
 by the negligent operation of the train, may recover. Roe v. Winston, 
 90 N. W. Rep. 122. 
 
 86 Constitution of Mississippi, art. 7, § 193. 
 
 87 Code of Mississippi, of 1906, §§ 1985, 4056, 4051. 
 
 The Mississippi Constitution and statute is held to apply only to 
 the hazardous business of operating railroads, in Bradford Construc- 
 tion Co. V. Heflin, 88 Miss. 314; 42 So. Rep. 174. 
 
 The Constitution of Mississippi 1890, and Code of 1892, § 3559, 
 were held to entitle a brakeman to recover, who was injured by the 
 sudden backing of ' an engine, while coupling cars. Moore v. Illinois 
 Central E. Co., 135 Fed. Rep. 67; 67 C. C. A. 541. 
 
 It is not necessary that an employee, to recover, must have been 
 , performing specific duties of the superior, at the exact time of his 
 injury, but he may recover, if acting under the general control of 
 the superior, although not specially performing specific orders. South- 
 em Ry. Co. V. Cheaves, 36 So. Rep. 691. 
 
 Under the Mississippi Constitution of 1890, making the railroad 
 company liable for an injury due to the negligence of an employee 
 in a different department of the work, a fireman on an engine and 
 
 .T83 
 
§ 528 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. 
 
 employer, for injuries to the employee, in that State, establish 
 that every employee of any railroad corporatign shall have 
 the same right and remedies, for any injuries suffered by 
 him, from the act or omission of said corporation or its em- 
 ployees, as are allowed by law to other persons, not employees, 
 where the injury results from the negligence of a superior 
 
 a telegraph operator, are engaged in " different pieces of work," bo 
 as to render the railroad company liable for a collision resulting from 
 the telegrapher's negligence. Illinois Central K. Co. v. Hunter, 70 
 Miss. 471; 12 So. Eep. 482. 
 
 But a railroad company under this provision is not liable for an 
 injury to a brakeman, resulting from the negligence of the engineer, 
 who after signaling for brakes, caused a sudden starting of the 
 train, while the brakeman was obeying the signal, as the engineer 
 is not in a different department of the work, nor is he a " superior 
 agent or officer," within the meaning of the Constitution. Evans v. 
 Louisville, etc., E. Co., 70 Miss. 527 j 12 So. Eep. 581. 
 
 " A construction company, with the usual powers of a construction 
 company, and authorized to own, but not to operate, a railroad, is 
 not a ' railroad corporation ' proper, so as to fall within the wording 
 of Const. 1890, § 193, partially abrogating the fellow-servant rule as 
 to employees of ' any railroad corporation.' " Bradford Construction 
 Co. V. Heflin, 42 So. Eep. 174. 
 
 In Bradford Construction Co. v. Heflin (42 So: Eep. 174), the 
 Mississippi Supreme Court holds that the provision of the State 
 Constitution partly abrogating the fellow-service rule as to em- 
 ployees of '• any railroad corporation," applies only to railroad cor- 
 porations properly engaged in the business of common carriers, and 
 not to a railroad owned and operated as an adjunct to the main 
 business of its owner. Therefore an employee of a construction com- 
 pany operating a train in the building of a railroad cannot claim 
 the benefit of such constitutional provision. 
 
 Under the Mississippi Constitution (1890, § 193), providing that 
 railroad companies shall be liable to all employees injured as a result 
 of the negligence of any employee having supervision or control of 
 injured employees, a company is not liable for the loss of a fireman's 
 eye, caused by sparks of steel flying from a steel pin, struck by the 
 engineer, as it is a mere accident. Gulf, etc., E. Co. v. Blockman, 39 
 So. Eep. 479. See, also, Fasini v. N. Y. Cent., etc., R. Co., 96 N. Y, S. 
 415; 109 App. Div. 404. 
 
 784 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMOIT LAW. § 528 
 
 agent or officer, or of a person having the right to control 
 or direct the -services of the party injured, and also when 
 the injury results from the negligence of a coemployee en- 
 gaged in another department of labor from that of the party 
 injured, or of a coemployee on another train of cars, or one 
 engaged about a different piece of work. Knowledge of any 
 employee injured, of the unsafe or defective character or 
 condition of any machinery, ways or appliances, shall be no 
 defense to an action for an injury caused thereby, except 
 as to conductors or engineers, in charge of dangerous or un- 
 safe cars, or engines voluntarily operated by them. Where 
 death ensues from any injury to employees, the legal or per- 
 sonal representative of the person injured shall have the 
 same rights and remedies ^as are allowed by law to such rep- 
 resentatives of other persons. Any contract or agreement 
 express or implied, made by any employee, to waive the bene- 
 fit of this section, shall be null and void; and this section 
 shall not be construed to deprive any employee of a corpora- 
 tion or his legal or personal representative, of any right or 
 remedy that he now has by the law of the land. The legis- 
 lature may extend the 'remedies herein provided for to any 
 other class of employees. 
 
 In all actions against railroad companies for damages done 
 to persons or property, proof of injury inflicted by the run- 
 ning of the locomotives or cars of such company shall be 
 prima facie evidence of the want of reasonable skill and care 
 on the part of the employees of the company in reference to 
 such injury. This section shall also apply to passengers aind 
 employees of railroad companies. 
 
 Every employee of a railroad corporation shall have the 
 same rights and remedies for an injury suffered by him from 
 the act or omission of the corporation or its employees as are 
 allowed by law to other persons not employees, where the in- 
 jury results from the negligence of a superior agent or officer, 
 1—50 Y85 
 
§ 528 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. 
 
 or of a person having the right to control or direct the serv- 
 ices of the party injured, and also when the injury results 
 from the negligence of a fellow workman engaged in another 
 department of labor from that of the party injured, or of a 
 fellow employee on another train of cars, or one engaged about 
 a different piece of work. Knowledge by an employee in- 
 jured of the defective or unsafe character or condition of any 
 machinery, ways, or appliances, or of the improper loading 
 of cars, shall not be a defense to an action for injury caused 
 thereby, except as to conductors or engineers in charge of 
 dangerous or unsafe cars or engines voluntarily operated by 
 them. When death ensues from an injury to an employee an 
 action may be brought in the name of the widow of such em- 
 ployee for the death of the husband, or by the husband for the 
 death of his wife, or for the death of a child, or in the 
 name of the child for the death of an only parent,' for such 
 damages as may be suffered by them, respectively, by reason 
 of such death, the damages to be for the use of such widow, 
 husband, or child, except that in case the widow should have 
 children, the damages shall be distributed as personal prop- 
 erty of the husband. The legal or personal representative of 
 the person injured shall have the same rights and remedies as 
 are allowed by law to such representatives of other persons. 
 In every such action the jury may give such damages as shall 
 be fair and just, with reference to the injury resulting from 
 such death to the person suing. Any contract or agreement, 
 expressed or implied, made by an employee to waive the 
 benefit of this section shall be null and void ; and this section 
 shall not deprive an employee of a person, natural or artifi- 
 cial, or the legal or personal representatives of such person, 
 of any right or remedy they now have by law. 
 
 A statute that requires telltales or warning strings to be 
 placed over railroad tracks at approaches to overhead bridges 
 or other overhanging objects makes negligent companies liable 
 786 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. § 529 
 
 -for the injury or death of a person caused by striking such 
 bridge, etc., even though the person so killed or injured was 
 guilty of contributory negligence. 
 
 § 529. The statutes of Missouri ss create a liability on the 
 part of railroad companies, for injuries to their employees, 
 as follows : 
 
 88 Session Laws, Missouri 1897, p. 96 ; Revised Statutes of Missouri 
 of 1899, §§ 2864, 2873, 2874, 2875, 2876, 2876a, as amended by Acts 
 1905, page 138. 
 
 There is strong reason to construe this statute as simply declaratory 
 of the common-law rule, which with some inconsistencies and confusion, 
 had been applied in Missouri, prior to the adoption of this statute. 
 As pertinently asl^ed, in a recent case before the Supreme Court : 
 
 " What business have §§ 2 and 3 in the act, unless it is to furnish 
 a key for the interpretation of the other section 7 They relate to it 
 and would seem to prescribe the conditions upon which that section 
 is to become effective." 
 
 Again, if the first section of the act stood alone, it is clear that 
 the doctrine of fellow service, in so far as persons engaged in the 
 work of operating a railroad are concerned, would not be recognized 
 in this State. Taken by itself, it would be construed as abolishing all 
 distinctions as to the employees for whose acts a railroad company 
 might be held liable. 
 
 If the purpose of the legislature was to make the first section 
 a complete enactment, wholly independent of the other sections, there 
 is no reason why " vice-principals " should be defined and no reason for 
 declaring that they are not " fellow servants." They are described 
 in order that they may not be confounded with " fellow servants " 
 mentioned in the next section. For their acts towards other employees, 
 the seetio", in effect, declares railroad corporations shall be responsible. 
 
 If all distinctions between employees are destroyed by the first 
 section, the office of the third section is not apparent. It is not 
 fair to conclude that the legislature meant to give to the people of 
 the State simply some useless academic learning on the subject of 
 coemployees. There could have been no purpose in describing the 
 persons engaged in railroad service who are to be regarded as fellow 
 workmen, if it intended that there should be no more " fellow servants " 
 engaged in "operating a railroad in this State." 
 
 And this construction seems borne out by the silence of the act, 
 with reference to the right of recovery by the representatives of a 
 
 787 
 
§ 529 STATITTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. 
 
 Every railroad corporation owning or operating a railroad 
 in this State shall be liable for all damages sustained by any 
 agent thereof while engaged in the work of operating such 
 railroad by reason of the negligence of any other agent or 
 
 deceased employee. It has been doubted whether the legislature intended 
 to give an employee a right of action for injuries due to the negligence 
 of his fellow workmen, for if so, why was not the right also extended 
 to the representatives of employees who suffered injuries resulting 
 in death by the act of their fellow employees? 
 
 Of course, in construing such an act, it is not what the legislature 
 might or ought to have done, but what it actually did. See Strottman 
 V. St. Louis, etc., Ey. Co. (Mo.), 109 S. W. Eep. 769, holding that 
 the widow of an employee, who met his death because of the negligence 
 of a coemployee — a telegraph operator — could not recover from the 
 employer. 
 
 The Missouri statute (Laws 1897, p. 96), making railroads liable 
 for injuries due to the negligence of coemployees, was held not to 
 apply to street railroads, in Sams v. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 174 Mo. 
 53; 73 S. W. Eep. 686; 61 L. E. A. 475. 
 
 But it was held to apply to receivers of railroads, as well as to 
 railroads, in Powell v. Sherwood, 162 Mo. 605; 63 S. W. Rep. 485. 
 
 The terms " operating a railroad " was held to include all work 
 that is necessary for running trains over the ttack, hence including 
 men engaged in repairing the track, roadbed, bridges, etc. Callahan 
 V. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 170 Mo. 473; 71 S. W. Eep. 208; 60 L. E. A. 
 249; 94 Am. St. Eep. 746; St. Louis, etc., E. Co. v. Callahan, 194 
 U. S. 628; 24 Sup. Ct. Eep. 857; 48 L. Ed. 1157; Stubbs v. Omaha, 
 etc., E. Co., 85 Mo. App. 192; Thompson v. Chappel, 91 Mo. App. 297; 
 Bice V. Wabash E. Co., 92 Mo, App. 35. 
 
 By the use of the word " agent or servant " in defining who must 
 be the author of the injury, to give a' cause of action, the legislature 
 necessarily meant coemployees acting in the course of their employ- 
 ment. Bequette v. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 86 Mo. App. 601. 
 
 An employee in a machine shop is not so engaged in the work of 
 "operating a railroad" as to bring him within the protection of the 
 statute. Stubbs v. Omaha, etc., E. Co., 85 Mo. App. 192. 
 
 An employee trucking freight from a freight car to a warehouse 
 was held to be within the statute, in Orendorff v. Terminal E. Ass'n 
 (Mo. App.), 92 S. W. Eep. 148. 
 
 A switchman, injured by the cornering of cars, due to the negligence 
 of a switch tender, was also held within the statute, in Phippin v. 
 Missouri Pacific Ey. Co. (Mo. Sup.), 93 S. W. Eep. 410. 
 
 788 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. § 529 
 
 employee thereof: Provided, That it may be shown in de- 
 fense that the person injured was guilty of negligence con- 
 tributing as a proximate cause to produce the injury. 
 
 All persons engaged in the service of any such railroad 
 corporation doing business in this State, who are intrusted 
 
 The statute raises no presumption of negligence against the railroad 
 company, by the mere happening of an accident. Caldwell v. Missouri 
 Pacific Ey. Co., 181 Mo. 455; 80 S. W. Eep. 897. 
 
 Contributory negligence is a complete defense. Hammet v. Chicago, 
 etc., E. Co., 89 Mo. App. 354. 
 
 But an employee in a collision, is held to have established a prima 
 facie case, under the statute, in establishing the fact of an injury 
 due to a collision, in Shuler v. Omaha, etc., E. Co., 87 Mo. App. 618. 
 
 The statute avoiding all contracts does not apply to a contract 
 entered into between a Pullman car porter and his company, which 
 provides that it may also be assigned to the railroad company, and 
 constitute a defense to all actions based on negligence. McDermon v. 
 Southern Pacific E. Co., 122 Fed. Eep. 669. 
 
 Nor is a contract between a railroad company and its employees, 
 by which they agree to release all damages, if relief benefits are 
 claimed, within the statute. Hamilton v. St. Louis, etc., E. Co., 118 
 Fed. Eep. 92. 
 
 Under the Missouri statute, a railroad switchman, injured by the 
 cornering of cars, on account of the neglect of the switch tender, was 
 held to be entitled to recover, as he was injured by the act of a co- 
 employee, within the meaning of Eevised Statutes 1899, § 2873, Laws 
 1897, p. 96. Phippin v. Missouri Pacific Ey. Co., 196 Mo. 321; 93 
 S. W. Eep. 410. 
 
 The Texas court held that a brakeman, in lighting lamps in his 
 caboose, when he was injured by a collision, was engaged in operating 
 a railroad, within the Missouri statute, in St. Louis, etc., E. Co. v. 
 Smith, 90 S. W. Eep. 926. 
 
 The Missouri statute was held not to apply to street railroads, in 
 Godfrey v. St. Louis Transit Co., 81 S. W. Eep. 1230. 
 
 The statute was held not to apply to a member of a bridge gang, 
 in Williams v. Chicago, etc., E. Co., 106 Mo. App. 61; 79 S. W. 
 Eep. 1167. 
 
 But it was held to apply to a member of a section gang, struck by 
 a tie thrown by ooemployees, while he was helping to remove a child 
 from the street, in Callahan v. St. Louis, etc., Ey. Co., 170 Mo. 473; 
 71 S. W. Eep. 208; 60 L. E. A. 249; 94 Am. St. Rep. 746; 194 
 U. S. 628. 
 
 789 
 
§ 529 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. 
 
 by such corporation with the authority of superintendence, 
 control, or command of other persons in the employ or service 
 of such corporation, or with the authority to direct any other 
 employee in the performance of any duty of such employee, 
 or with the duty of inspection or other duty owing by the 
 employer to the employee, are vice-principals of such corpora- 
 tion, and are not fellow workmen with such employees. 
 
 All persons who are engaged in the common service of such 
 railroad corporation, and who, while so engaged, are working 
 together at the same time and place, to a common purpose of 
 same grade, neither of such persons being intrusted by such 
 corporation with any superintendence or control over their 
 fellow employees, are fellow employees with each other : Pro- 
 vided, That nothing herein contained shall be construed as 
 to make any agent of such corporation in the service of such 
 corporation a fellow workman with any other agent of such 
 corporation engaged in any other- department or service of 
 such corporation. 
 
 ~So contract made between any railroad corporation and 
 any of its agents based upon the contingency of the injury 
 or death of any agent or employee, limiting the liability of 
 such railroad corporation for any damages under the provi- 
 sions of this act, shall be valid or binding, but all such con- 
 tracts or agreements shall be null and' void. 
 
 Whenever the words " railroad companies " or " railroad 
 corporations " shall be found in any section of this chapter 
 it shall be taken and construed to include all companies, cor- 
 porations, person or persons operating any railroad in this 
 State, and wherever the word " railroad " occurs in any sec- 
 tion of this chapter it shall be taken and construed to include 
 all railroads operated in this State by whatever motive or 
 power propelled, and shall include all railroads or railways 
 commonly known as street railways, and all railroads op- 
 erated by terminal companies or associations known as " ter- 
 Y90 
 
STATTTTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. § 530 
 
 minal railroads " or " railways " as well as all railways or 
 railroads operated anywhere in the State commonly known as 
 electric railroads, whether they be wholly or in part in the 
 city or country districts. Also all railroads within the coun- 
 try or city operated by what is commonly known as cable or 
 motor power, or by horse power. 
 
 § 530. The ]l![ontaiia Code and Constitution. — Under the 
 Code *® and Constitution *" of Montana, it is made unlawful 
 for any person, company or corporation, to require of its em- 
 ployees, as a condition of their employment, or otherwise, any 
 contract or agreement, whereby such persons, company or cor- 
 poration shall be released or discharged from liability or re- 
 
 88 Code and Statutes of 1895, §§ 2242, 905, 2660, 2661, 2662, and 
 Acts of 1905, ch. 1, §§ 1, 2. 
 
 90 Constitution of Montana, art. 15, § 16. 
 
 Under the Montana statute, a conductor on one train is held to 
 be the " superior " of a fireman on another train, so as to give a 
 right of action under the statute. Eagsdale v. Northern Pacific E. Co., 
 42 Fed. Rep. 383. 
 
 The Montana statute (Laws 1903, p. 156), making the railroad 
 company liable for the negligence of an engineer, while in charge ^f 
 an engine, applies only to a movable locomotive and not to a stationary 
 engine, used to draw a plow along the floor of flat ears, to unload 
 gravel with. Beinke v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 145 Fed. Rep. 988. 
 
 "Act Mont. March 5, 1903 (Laws 1903, p. 156, ch. 83), provides 
 that every railroad corporation within the State shall be liable for all 
 damages sustained by an employee thereof within the State, without 
 contributory negligence on his part, when such damage is caused by 
 the negligence of any train dispatcher, telegraph operator, superintend- 
 ent, engineer, or any other employee who has superintendence of any 
 stationary or hand signal. Eeld, that the word " engineer," as used in 
 such section, had reference only to employees in charge of locomotives, 
 and that the statute did not cover an injury sustained by an em- 
 ployee of a railroad caused by the negligence of the operator of a 
 stationary engine used to draw a plow along the floor of flat cars for 
 the unloading of gravel." Reinke v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co,, 145 Fed. 
 Rep. 988. 
 
 791 
 
§ 530 STATTJTES ABOLISHmO COMMON LAW* 
 
 sponsibility on account of personal injuries received by such 
 employees by reason of the negligence of such person, com- 
 pany or corporation, or the agents or employees thereof and 
 all such contracts are null and void. 
 
 In every case, the liability of a corporation to an employee, 
 acting under the orders of a superior, shall be the same, in 
 case of injury, sustained by the default or vyrongful act of 
 his superior, or to an employee not appointed or controlled 
 by him, as if such employee were a passenger. 
 
 An employer must indemnify his employees for all that 
 they expend in direct consequence of the discharge of their 
 duties, or of obedience to the direction of the employer, even 
 though unlawful, unless the employee at the time of obeying 
 the direction, believed it to be unlawful. 
 
 An employer is not bound to indemnify his employee for 
 loss suffered by the latter, in consequence of the ordinary risks 
 of the business, in which he is employed, but an employer 
 must, in all cases, indemnify his employee for losses sustained 
 by the former's want of ordinary care. 
 
 Every person or corporation operating a railroad in the 
 State is liable for all damages sustained by any employee of 
 such person or corporation, in consequence of the neglect of 
 any other employee or employees, or by the mismanagement 
 of any other employee or employees, and in consequence of 
 the willful wrongs, whether of commission or omission, or 
 any other employee, or employees, when such neglect, mis- 
 management or wrongs, are in any manner connected with 
 the use and operation of a railway on or about which they 
 shall be employed. And in case of the death of any such 
 employee, in consequence of any injury or damages so sus- 
 tained, the right of action shall survive and may be prose- 
 cuted and maintained by his heirs or personal representa- 
 tives. 
 
 792 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. § 531 
 
 § 531. By statute of Nebraska ^i every railway company 
 operating a railway engine, car, or train in the State of Ne- 
 braska shall, be liable to any of its employees who at the time 
 of injury are engaged in construction or repair work or in 
 the use and operation of any engine, car, or train for said 
 company, or in the case of his death to his personal repre- 
 sentative for the benefit of his widow and children, if any ; 
 if none, then to his parents ; if none, then to his next of kin 
 dependent upon him, for all damages which may result from 
 negligence of any of its officers, agents, or employees, or by 
 reason of any defects or insufficiency due to its negligence in 
 its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, ways 
 or works. 
 
 In all actions hereafter brought against any railway com- 
 pany to recover damages for personal injuries to an employee, 
 or when such injuries have resulted in his death, the fact 
 that the employee may have been guilty of contributory neg- 
 ligence shall not bar a recovery when his contributory negli- 
 gence was slight and that of the employer was gross in com- 
 parison, but damages shall be diminished by the jury in 
 proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such 
 employee. All questions of negligence and contributory neg- 
 ligence shall be for the jury. 
 
 No contract of employment, insurance, relief benefit, or 
 indemnity for injury or death hereafter entered into by or 
 on behalf of any employee nor the acceptance of any such in- 
 surance, relief benefit, or indemnity by the person entitled 
 -thereto, shall constitute any bar- or defense to any action 
 brought to recover damages for personal injuries to or death 
 of such employees: Provided, however. That upon the trial 
 of such action against any railway company the defendant 
 may set off any sum it has contributed toward any such in- 
 
 »iActs Nebraska 1907, ch. 48, §§ 1, 2, 3, and Compiled Statutes 
 1881, 10th ed., § 1799. 
 
 793 
 
§ 533 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. 
 
 surance, relief benefit, or indemnity that may have been paid 
 to the injured employee or, in case of his death, to his per- 
 sonal representative. 
 
 The statute directing the use of automatic couplers and 
 power brakes on railroad trains provides that employees in- 
 jured because of violation of the law shall not be considered 
 as waiving the right to recover damages by continuing in the 
 service of the company. 
 
 § 532. The legislature of Nevada,. by a recent act,®^ made 
 Every common carrier engaged in trade or commerce in the 
 State of Nevada, liable to any of its employees, or in case of 
 death of such employee, to his personal representative, for 
 the benefit of his widow and children, if any, and if none, 
 then for his next of kin, for all damages which may result 
 from the negligence of the officers, agents or employees, of 
 said common carrier * * * or by reason of any defect 
 or insufficiency, due to their negligence, in its cars, engines, 
 appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, ways or work, or to 
 their negligent handling or storing of explosives. 
 
 In all actions brought against any common carrier * * * 
 to recover damages for personal injuries or death of an em- 
 ployee, the fact that an employee may have been guilty of 
 contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, where his 
 contributory negligence was slight, and the n^ligence of the 
 employer or its officers, agents or employees, was gross in 
 comparison. All questions of negligence or contributory neg- 
 ligence shall be for the jury. 
 
 No contract of employment, insurance, relief benefit or 
 indemnity for injury or death, entered into by or on behalf 
 of any employee, nor the acceptance of any insurance, relief 
 benefit, or indemnity by the person entitled, thereto, shall 
 constitute any bar or defense to any action brought to re- 
 
 92 Acts Nevada 1907, ch. 214, §§ 1, 2, 3. 
 794 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. § 533 
 
 cover damages for personal injuries to or for the death of 
 such employee, but upon the trial of such action, the defend- 
 ant is permitted to set off any sum paid for any such insur- 
 ance, relief benefit, or indemnity, that may have been paid 
 to the person entitled thereto. 
 
 § 5337 The Laws of New MexicOj^s with reference to the 
 liability of railroad companies, for injuries to their em- 
 ployees, enact that every corporation operating a railroad 
 shall be liable in a sum sufficient to compensate its employees 
 for all damages sustained by any such employee, if the per- 
 son injured or damaged is without fault on his part, where 
 the injury is sustained or occurs in consequence of the mis- 
 management, carelessnesSj neglect, default, or wrongful act) 
 of any agent or employee of such corporation, while in the 
 exercise of their several duties, when such mismanagement, 
 carelessness, neglect, default, or wrongful act of such em- 
 ployee or agent could have been avoided by such corporation 
 through the exercise of reasonable care or diligence in the 
 selection of competent employees or agents, or by not over- 
 working said employees or requiring or allowing them to work 
 an unusual or unreasonable number of hours; and any con- 
 tract restricting such liability shall be deemed to be contrary 
 to public policy and therefore void. 
 
 It shall be unlawful for any such corporation knowingly 
 and willfully to use or operate any car or locomotive that is 
 defective, or any car or locomotive upon which the machinery 
 or attachments thereto belonging are in any manner defective, 
 or shops or machinery and attachments thereof which are in 
 any manner defective, which defects might have been pre- 
 viously ascertained by ordinary care and diligence by said 
 corporation. 
 
 If the employee of any such corporation shall receive any 
 
 »3 Compiled Laws New Mexico 1897, §§ 3216, 3217, 3218. 
 
 795 
 
§ 534 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. 
 
 injury by reason of such defect in any car or locomotive or 
 machinery or attachments thereto belonging, or shops or ma- 
 chinery and attachments thereof, owned and operated, or be- 
 ing run and operated by such corporation, through no fault 
 of his own, such corporation shall be liable for such injury, 
 and upon proof of the same in an action brought by such 
 employee or his legal representatives, in any court of proper 
 jurisdiction, against such railroad corporation for damages 
 on account of such injury so received, shall be entitled to re- 
 cover against such corporation any sum commensurate with 
 the injuries sustained: Provided, That it shall be the duty of 
 all the employees of railroad corporations to promptly report 
 all defects coming to their knowledge in any such car or loco- 
 9iotive or shops or machinery and attachments thereof to the 
 proper officer or agent of such corporation and after such re- 
 port the doctrine of contributory negligence shall not apply 
 to such employees. 
 
 Whenever the death of an employee shall be caused ander 
 circumstances from which a cause of action would have ac- 
 crued imder the provisions of the two preceding sections, if 
 death had not ensued, an action therefor shall be brought in 
 the manner provided by section three thousand, two hundred 
 and fifteen, and any sum recovered therein shall be subject 
 to all the provisions of said section three thousand, two hun- 
 dred and fifteen. 
 
 § 534. The New York Statutes,** with reference to the lia- 
 bility of railroad companies for injuries to their employees, 
 are as follows: 
 
 »4Acts New York 1902, ch. 600, §§ 1, 2, 3 and Acts 1906, ch. 657, 
 § 42a. 
 
 Under the New York statute (Laws 1902, p. 1748), giving an em- 
 ployee, injured as a result of the negligence of one entrusted with 
 superintendence, whose sole duty is superintendence, a right of action, 
 . 796 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. § 534 
 
 Where, after this act takes effect, personal injury is caused 
 to an employee who is himself in the exercise of due care and 
 diligence at the time : 
 
 1. By reason of any defect in the condition of the ways, 
 works, or machinery connected with or used in the business 
 of the employer which arose from or had not been discovered 
 or remedied owing to the negligence of the employer or of 
 any person in the service of the employer and entrusted by 
 him with the duty of seeing that the ways, works, or ma- 
 chinery were in proper condition. 
 
 a foreman of a roundhouse, although under a superintendent, is held 
 to be an employe entrusted with superintendence, within the mean- 
 ing of the law, so as to render a railroad company liable for an injury 
 due to the negligence of such foreman while directing boiler repairing. 
 Faith V. New York Central, etc., K. Co., 185 N. Y. 556; 77 N. E. Eep.- 
 1186; 95 N. Y. S. 774; 109 App. Div. 222. But, see in same State, 
 apparently opposed to this rule, Bannon v. New York, etc., R. Co., 
 98 N. Y. S. 770; 112 App. Div. 552; Abrahamson v. General Supply, 
 etc., Co., 98 N. Y. S. 596; 112 App. Div. 318. 
 
 A train dispatcher, or one who had acted in this capacity for a 
 period of three years, was held to be entrusted with authority of 
 superintendence, in McHugh v. Manhattan E. Co., 179 N. Y. 378; 
 72 N. E. Rep. 312. 
 
 The statute does not apply if the injured employee was himself 
 guilty of contributory negligence. Sievers v. Eyre, 122 Fed. Rep. 734. 
 
 "Labor Law (Laws 1897, p. 467, ch. 415, § 18), making the em- 
 ployer liable for unsafe scaffolds, hoists, stays, ladders, or other 
 mechanical contrivances, even though they be negligently put up by 
 fellow workmen of the plaintiff as part of their work, does not give 
 a new cause of action, but only makes evidence competent to show 
 an employer's negligence which before was not competent." Haggblad 
 V. Brooklyn Heights R. Co. (N. Y. Supp. 1907), 102 N. Y. S. 1039. 
 
 " One employed by a railroad, and having charge of the work of 
 cleaning ashes from locomotives in the absence of the regular super- 
 intendent or foreman, and who had control of the men and directed 
 them in the work of handling the engines, was acting as a superintend- 
 ent, within Employer's Liability Act, La*s 1902, p. 1748, ch. 600, 
 making the employer liable for injuries to an employee arising from 
 the negligence of any person exercising superintendence." Mikos v. 
 New York. Cent, etc., R. Co., 102 N. Y. S. 995. 
 
 79T 
 
§ 534 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. 
 
 2. By reason of the negligence of any person in the serv- 
 ice of the employer entrusted with and exercising superin- 
 tendence whose sole or principal duty is that of superin- 
 tendence, or in the absence of such superintendent, of any 
 person acting as superintendent with the authority or con- 
 sent of such employer; the employee, or in case the injury 
 results in death, the executor or administrator of a deceased 
 employee who has left him surviving a husband, wife, or 
 next of kin, shall have the same right of compensation and 
 remedies against the employer as if the employee had not 
 been an employee of nor in the service of the employer nor 
 engaged in his work. The provisions of law relating to ac- 
 tions for causing death by negligence, so far as the same are 
 consistent with this act, shall apply to an action brought by 
 an executor or administrator of a deceased employee suing 
 under the provisions of this act. 
 
 All rights of action are limited to one year and notice of 
 the injury must be given within one hundred and twenty days 
 after the injury, in the maimer prescribed by the statute. 
 
 The employee does not assume the risk of injury for fail- 
 ure to comply with the statute, but his failure to report any 
 defects or failures to the employer, or a vice-principal, may 
 amount to an assumption of the risk. 
 
 . In all actions against a railroad corporation, foreign or 
 domestic, doing business in this State, or against a receiver 
 thereof, for personal injury to, or death resulting from per- 
 sonal injury of any person, while in the employment of such 
 corporation or receiver, arising from the negligence of such 
 corporation or receiver or of any of its or his officers or em- 
 ployees, every employee, or his legal representatives, shall 
 have the same rights and remedies for an injury, or for deatti, 
 suffered by him from the act or omission of such corporation 
 or receiver or of its or his officers or employees, as are now 
 allowed by law, and in addition to the liability now existing 
 Y98 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. § 534 
 
 by law, it shall be held in such actions that persons engaged 
 in the service of any railroad corporation, foreign or domestic, 
 doing business in this State, or in. the service of a receiver 
 thereof, who are intrusted by Such corporation or receiver, 
 with the authority of superintendence, control or command 
 of other persons in the employment of such corporation or 
 receiver, or with the authority to direct or control any other 
 employee in the performance of the duty of such employee, or 
 who have, as a part of their duty, for the time being, phys- 
 ical control or direction of the movement of a signal, switch, 
 locomotive engine, car, train or telegraph office, are vice-prin- 
 cipals of such corporation or receiver, and are not fellow 
 workmen of such injured or deceased employee. If an em- 
 ployee, engaged in the service of any such railroad corpora- 
 tion, or of a receiver thereof, shall receive any injury by- 
 reason of any defect in the condition of the ways, works, ma- 
 chinery, plant, tools or implements, or of any car, train, loco- 
 motive or attachment thereto belonging, owned, or operated, 
 or being run and operated by such corporation or receiver, 
 when such defect could have been discovered by such corpora- 
 tion or receiver, by reasonable and proper care, tests or in- 
 spection, such corporation or receiver shall be deemed to 
 have had knowledge of such defect before and at the time 
 such injury is sustained; and when the fact of such defect 
 shall be proved upon the trial of any action in the courts of 
 this State, brought by such employee or his legal representa- 
 tives, against any such railroad corporation or receiver, on 
 accouirt of such injuries so received, the same shall be prima 
 facie evidence of negligence on the part of such corporation 
 or receiver. This section shall not affect actions or causes 
 of action now existing ; and no contract, receipt, rule, or reg- 
 ulation, between an employee and a railroad corporation or 
 receiver, shall exempt or limit the liability of such corpora- 
 tion or receiver from, the provisions of this section. 
 
 799 
 
§§ 635, 536 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. 
 
 § 535. The North Carolina law.— The legislature of North 
 Carolina ®® has provided that any employee of any railroad 
 company operating in the State, who shall suffer injury to 
 his person, or the personal representative of any employee 
 who shall have suffered death, in the course of his services 
 or employment with such company, by the negligence, care- 
 lessness or incompetency of any other employee or agent of 
 the employer, or by any defect in the machinery, ways or ap- 
 pliances, of the company, shall be entitled to maintain an ac- 
 tion against the employer therefor. 
 
 Any contract or agreement, expressed or implied, made by 
 any employee of such company to waive the benefit of this 
 law, shall be null and void. 
 
 § 536. The North Dakota Revised Code,9» renders every 
 
 05 Laws North Carolina, Eevisal of 1905, § 2646. 
 
 " Under the express provisions of Revisal 1905, § 2646, any servant 
 of a railroad company suffering injury by the negligence of any other 
 employee of the company is entitled to maintain his action against 
 the company." Britt v. Carolina Northern E. Co. (N. C. 1907), 56 
 S. E. Kep. 910. 
 
 Under Const, art. 9, § 15, providing .that an employee of a railroad 
 company shall have the same right to recover for injuries received 
 from the negligence of employees as is allowed to persons not em- 
 ployees when the injury results from the negligence of a fellow 
 workman engaged in another department of labor, a watchman at a 
 railroad crossing is engaged in another department of labor from his 
 fellow employee running a. train across the crossing. Betchman v. 
 Seaboard Air Line Ey., 55 S. E. Rep. 140. 
 
 The common-law rule as to coemployees is held to be abolished in 
 North Carolina, as to railroads, in Mabry v. North Carolina, E. Co., 
 139 N. C. 388; 52 S. E. Rep. 124. 
 
 But the statute does not apply to an employee injured at a place 
 several miles from the completed portion of a railroad. Nicholson v. 
 Transylvania E. Co., 138 N. C. 516; 51 S. E. Rep. 40. 
 
 A workman injured while repairing a bridge, is held to be within 
 the protection of the statute, in Sigman v. Southern Ry. Co., 135 N. C. 
 181 ; 47 S. E. Rep. 420. 
 
 OS North Dakota Revised Code, 1905, §§ 4400, 5392, 5544, 5545, and 
 Acts 1907, ch. 203, §§ 1, 2, 3, 4. 
 800 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. § 536 
 
 railroad company doing business in the State liable for all 
 damages done to any employee of such company, in conse- 
 quence of any negligence of its agents, or by any mismanage- 
 ment of its engineers or other employees, to any person sus- 
 taining such damage; and no contract which restricts such 
 liability shall be legal or binding. 
 
 Every one is responsible not only for the result of his 
 ■ willful acts, but also for injury occasioned to another by his 
 want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his prop- 
 erty, or person, except so far as the latter has by willful act 
 or want of ordinary care, brought the injury on him- 
 self. 
 
 An employer is not bound to indemnify his employee for 
 losses suffered by the latter in consequence of the ordinary 
 risks of the business in which he is employed, nor in conse- 
 quence of the negligence of employees employed by the same 
 employer, in the same general business, unless be has neg- 
 lected to use ordinary care in selecting the culpable em- 
 ployee. 
 
 An employer must, in all cases, indemnify his employee for 
 losses caused by- the former's want of ordinary care. 
 
 Every common carrier shall be liable to any of its em- 
 ployees or in case of the death of an employee to his personal 
 representatives, for the benefit of his widow, children, or 
 next of kin, for all damages which may result from the negli- 
 gence of any of its officers or agents or by reason of any de- 
 fect or insufficiency due to its negligence in its cars, engines, 
 appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, ways or works. 
 
 In all actions hereinafter brought against any common 
 carrier to recover damages for personal injuries to an em- 
 
 "Laws 1903, p. 178, ch. 131, making railroad companies liable to 
 an employee for injuries caused by the negligence of a ooemployee 
 applies only to those employees engaged in operating the railroad and 
 so exposed to the peculiar dangers attending their business." Beleal 
 V. Northern Pac. Ey. Co. (N. D. 1906), 108 N. W. Rep. 33. 
 1—51 801 
 
§ 537 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. 
 
 ployee, or where such injuries have resulted in his death, the 
 fact that the employee may have been guilty of contributory 
 negligence, shall not bar a recovery, where his contributory 
 negligence was slight and that of the employer was gross, in 
 coiriparison, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury 
 in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such 
 employee. All questions of negligence and contributory neg- 
 ligence shall be for the jury, 
 
 No contract of employment, insurance, relief benefit, or 
 indemnity for injury or death entered into by or on behalf of 
 any employee, nor the acceptance of any such insurance, re- 
 lief benefit, or indemnity by the person entitled thereto, shall 
 constitute a bar or defense to any action brought to recover 
 damages for personal injuries to or death of such employee : 
 Provided, however. That upon the trial of said action against 
 any common carrier, the defendant may set off therein any 
 sum it has contributed toward any such insurance, relief 
 benefit, or indemnity that may have been made to the injured 
 employee, or, in case of his death, to his personal represent- 
 ative. 
 
 'So action shall be maintained under this act unless com- 
 menced within one year from the time the cause of action 
 accrued. 
 
 § 537. The Annotated Statutes of Ohio^^ and subsequent 
 acts,®* render railroad companies liable for injuries to their 
 
 »T Bates' Annotated Statutes of Ohio, Third Section, §§ 3365-20, 
 3365-21. 
 
 88 Acts Ohio 1902, p. 114; Acts 1904, p. 547; Acts 1908, entitled 
 "An act to qualify the liability of railroad companies for injuries to 
 their employees," approved February 28, 1908. 
 
 Under the Ohio statute, making railroad companies responsible 
 for the acts of employees in other departments of the business, a, 
 company is held liable for the injury of », fireman due to the neglect 
 of an engineer a,nd fireman of another train, although they were subject 
 
 802 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. § 537 
 
 employees in the following cases, i. e., for injuries resulting 
 from the known or negligent use of any car or locomotive 
 that is" defective or any car or locomotive upon which the 
 machinery or attachments are defective. 
 
 It is unlawful for any railroad or railway corporation or 
 company ovraing and operating * * * a railroad in 
 whole or in part in this State, to adopt or promulgate any 
 rule or regulation for the government of its employees, to 
 make or enter into any contract or agreement with any per- 
 son engaged in or about to engage in its service, in which, 
 or i)y the terms of which, such employee in any manner, di- 
 rectly or indirectly, promises or agrees to hold such corpora- 
 tion or company hai^nless, on account of any injury he may 
 receive by reason of an accident to, breakage, defect, or in- 
 sufficiency in the cars or machinery and attachments thereto 
 belonging, upon any cars so owned and operated, or being 
 run and operated by such corporation or company, being de- 
 fective, and any such rule, regulation, contract, or agreement 
 shall be of no effect. It shall be unlawful for any corporation 
 to compel or require directly or indirectly an employee to join 
 any company or association whatsoever, or to withhold any 
 part of an employee's wages or his salary for the payment of 
 dues or assessments in any society or organization whatso- 
 ever, or demand or require either as a condition precedent to . 
 securing employment or being employed, and said railroad 
 or railway company shall not discharge any employee because 
 he refuses or neglects to become a member of any society or 
 
 to the orders of the conductor, in the operation of the train. Kane v.- 
 Erie E. Co., 142 Fed. Eep. 682; 73 C. C. A. 672. 
 
 "The Ohio Act of April 2, 1890 (87 Ohio Laws, p. 150), providing 
 that, in an action for injuries to a railroad employee, it shall be no 
 defense that the injury was caused by the.negligeitce or default of a 
 fellow employee, is a valid law under the Constitution of Ohio, and is- 
 not repugnant to the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution."' 
 Erie R. Co. v. Kane (U. S. C. C. A., Ohio, 1907), 155 Fed. Eep. 118. 
 
 803 
 
§ 537 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. 
 
 organization. And if any employee is discharged he may, 
 at any time within ten days after receiving a notice of his 
 discharge, demand the reason of said discharge;, and said rail- 
 way or railroad company thereupon shall furnish said reason 
 to said discharged employee in writing. And no railroad 
 company, insurance society or association, or other person 
 shall demand, accept, require, or enter into any contract, 
 agreement, stipulation with any person about to enter, or in 
 the employ of any railroad company whereby such person 
 stipulates or agrees to surrender or waive any right to dam- 
 ages against any railroad company, thereafter arising for 
 personal injury or death, or whereby he agrees to surrender 
 or waive in case he asserts the same, any other right what- 
 soever, and all such stipulations and agreements shall be void, 
 and every corporation, association, or person violating or aid- 
 ing or abetting in the violation of this section shall for each 
 offense forfeit and pay to the person wronged or deprived 
 of his rights hereunder the sum not less than fifty dollars 
 nor more than five hundred dollars to be recovered in a 
 civil action. 
 
 Every railroad company operating any railroad which is 
 in whole or in part within this State is liable for all damages 
 sustained by any of its employees by reason of personal in- 
 jury or death of such employee : 
 
 1. When such injury or death is caused by a defect in any 
 locomotive, engine, car, hand car, rail, track, machinery or 
 appliance required by such company to be used by its em- 
 ployees in and about the business of their employment, if such 
 'defect could have been discovered by reasonable and proper 
 care, tests or inspection; and proof of such defect shall be 
 presumptive evidence of knowledge thereof on the part of 
 such company ; and any such employee of such railroad com- 
 pany who may be injured or killed as a result of any such 
 defect shall not be deemed to have assumed the risk occa- 
 804 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMOK LAW. § 538 
 
 sioned by such defect, although continuiug in the employ- 
 ment of such railroad company after knowledge of such de- 
 fect ; nor shall continuance in employment after such knowl- 
 edge by any employee be deemed an act of contributory neg- 
 ligence. 
 
 2. While any such employee is engaged in operating, run- 
 ning, riding upon or switching passenger, freight or other 
 trains, engines or cars, and while engaged in the performance 
 of his duties as such employee, and when such injury or death 
 shall have been caused by the carelessness or negligence of 
 any other employee, officer or agent of such company, in the 
 discharge of or for failure to discharge his duties as such. 
 
 In all actions hereafter brought against any railroad com- 
 pany operating any railroad in whole or in part within this 
 State, for personal injury to an employee or where such in- 
 juries have resulted in his death, the fact that the employee 
 may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar 
 a recovery where his contributory negligence was slight and 
 that of the employer was greater in comparison. But the 
 damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the 
 amount of negligence attributable to such employee. All 
 questions of negligence and contributory negligence shall be 
 for the jury. 
 
 § 538. The Constitution of Oklahoina,^^ among the other 
 subjects extensively covered, contains a provision that: 
 
 The common-law doctrine of fellow employees, so far 
 as it affects the liability of the employer for injuries to his 
 employee resulting from the acts or omissions of any other 
 employee of the common employer is abrogated as to every 
 employee of every railroad company and every street railway 
 company or interurban railway company, and of every per- 
 son, firm, or corporation engaged in mining in this State; 
 
 »» Oklahoma Constitution of 1907, art. 9, § 36. 
 
 805 
 
§ 539 STATUTES ABOXISHING COMMON LAW, 
 
 and every such employee shall have the same right to recover 
 for every injury suffered by him for the acts or omissions of 
 any other employee or employees of the common employer 
 that an employee would have if such acts or omissions were 
 those of the employer himseK in the performance of a non- 
 assignable duty; and when death, whether instantaneous or 
 not, results to such employee from any injury for which he 
 could have recovered under the above provisions, had not 
 death occurred, ihen his legal or personal representative, sur- 
 viving consort or relatives, or any trustee, curator, committee, 
 or guardian of such consort or relatives, shall have the same 
 rights and remedies with respect thereto as if death had been 
 caused by the negligence of the employer. And every rail- 
 road company and every street railway company or inter- 
 urban railway company and every person, firm, or corpora- 
 tion engaged in underground mining is liable under this sec- 
 tion for the acts of his or its receivers. 
 
 Nothing contained in this section shall restrict the power 
 of the legislature to extend to the employees of any person, 
 firm, or corporation the rights and remedies herein provided 
 for. 
 
 § 539. The legislature ef Oregon,^ upon the subject of the 
 liability of railroad companies for injuries to employees, en- 
 acted that: 
 
 Every corporation operating a railroad in this State, 
 whether such corporation be created under the laws of this 
 State, or otherwise, shall be liable in damages for any and 
 all injury sustained by any employee of such corporation as 
 follows: When such injury results from the vsTongful act, 
 neglect, or default of an agent or officer of such cor- 
 poration, superior to the employee injured, or of a per- 
 son employed by such corporation having the right 
 
 lActs Oregon 1903, p. 20. 
 806 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMOlir LAW. § 540 
 
 to control or direct the services of such, employee in- 
 jured, or the services of the employee by whom he is 
 injured; and also when such injury results from the wrong- 
 ful act, neglect, or default of a coemployee engaged in an- 
 other department of labor from that of the employee injured, 
 or of a coemployee on another train of cars, or of a coem- 
 ployee who has charge of any switch, signal point, or loco- 
 motive engine, or who is charged with dispatching trains or 
 transmitting telegraphic or telephonic orders. Knowledge by 
 an employee injured of the defective or unsafe character or 
 condition of any machinery, ways, appliances, or structures 
 of such corporation shall not of itself be a bar to recovery 
 for any injury or death caused thereby. When death, 
 whether instantaneous or otherwise, results from an injury 
 to any employee of such corporation received as aforesaid, the 
 personal representative of such employee shall have a right 
 of action therefor against such corporation, and may recover 
 damages in respect "thereof. Any contract or agreement, ex- 
 press or implied, made by any suQh employee to waive the 
 benefit of this section, or any part thereof, shall be null and 
 void, and this section shall not be construed to deprive any 
 such employee, or his personal representative, of any right or 
 remedy to which he is now entitled under the laws of this 
 State. 
 
 The rules and principles of law as to contributory negli- 
 gence which apply to other cases shall apply to cases arising 
 under this act, except in so far as the same are herein modi- 
 fied or changed. 
 
 § 540. The legislature of Pennsylvania, by a recent act,^ 
 provided that in all actions brought to recover damages from 
 
 2 Pennsylvania Acts 1907, Act No. 329, §§ 1, 2. 
 Under the Pennsylvania statute of 1868, if the place of an accident 
 is clearly used for general purposes as the " roads, works, depots or 
 
 807 
 
§ 641 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. 
 
 an employer for injury suffered by his employee, the negli- 
 gence of a coemployee of the injured employee shall not be 
 a defense, where the injury was caused, or it was contributed 
 to, by any of the following causes, viz: 
 
 Any defect in the works, plant, or machinery of which the 
 employer could have had knowledge, by the exercise of ordi- 
 nary care ; the neglect of any person engaged as superintend- 
 ent, manager, foreman, or any other person in charge or 
 control of the works, plant, or machinery ; the negligence of 
 any person in charge of or directing the particular work in 
 which the employee was engaged, at the time of the injury 
 or death; the negligence of any person to whose orders the 
 employee was bound to conform, and did conform, and, by 
 reason of his having conformed thereto, the injury or death 
 resulted; the act of any coemployee, done in obedience to 
 the rules, instructions or orders given by the employer or any 
 other person who had authority to direct the doing of the 
 act causing the injury. 
 
 The manager, superintendent, foreman, or other person, 
 in charge or control of the works, or any part of the works, 
 shall, under this act, be held as the agent of the employer, in 
 all suits for damages for death or injury suffered by em- 
 ployees. 
 
 § 541. The Constitution of South Carolina ^ regulates the 
 
 premises " of the railroad company, the injured person is a coemployee 
 of the persons working at such a place, where he is also working near 
 them and he is not a passenger. Spisak v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 
 152 Pa. St. 281; 25 Atl. Rep. 497. 
 
 A person who is employed by the owner of a side track to switch 
 cars on a private siding is not in the employment of the railroad 
 company so as to recover under this statute, for an injury sustained 
 while engaged in such duties. Stone v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 132 
 Pa. St. 206; 19 Atl. Rep. 67; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 522. 
 
 3 Constitution South Carolina, art. 9, § 15. 
 
 808 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHIIirG COMMON LAW. § 541 
 
 liability of railroad companies for injuries to employees, as 
 follows : 
 
 Every employee of any railroad corporation shall have the 
 same rights and remedies for any injury suffered by him from 
 the acts or omissions of said corporations or its employees as 
 are allowed by law to other persons not employees, when the 
 injury results from the negligence of a superior agent or offi- 
 cer, or of a person having a right to control or direct the 
 services of a party injured, and also when the injury results 
 fro$a the negligence of a fellow employee engaged in another 
 department of labor from that of the party injured, or of a 
 fellow workman on another train of cars, or one engaged 
 about a different piece of work. Knowledge by any em- 
 ployee injured of the defective or unsafe character or condi- 
 tion of any machinery, ways, or appliances shall be no defense 
 to an action for injury caused thereby, except as to conduc- 
 tors or engineers in charge of dangerous or unsafe cars or 
 engines voluntarily operated by them. When death ensues 
 from any injury to employees, the legal or personal repre- 
 sentatives of the person injured shall have the same right 
 and remedies as are allowed. by law to such representatives 
 of other persons. Any contract or agreement, expressed or 
 implied, made by any employee to waive the benefit of this 
 section shall be null and void ; and this section shall not be 
 construed to deprive any employee of a corporation, or his 
 legal or personal representative, of any remedy or right that 
 he now has by the law of the land. The General Assembly 
 may extend the remedies herein provided for to any other 
 class of employees. 
 
 And by Civil Code,* every employee of a street railroad 
 
 * Civil Code, South Carolina 1902, § 2848. 
 
 "Const, art. 9, § 15, provides that every employee of a railroad 
 company shall have the same right of action against an employer for 
 an injury suffered by the negligence of a railroad corporation or its 
 
 809 
 
§ 54r2 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. 
 
 company, is given the same rights and remedies for an injury 
 suffered by the acts or omissions of the employer or its em- 
 ployees, as are provided by the above section of the Constitu- 
 tion for employees of railroad companies. 
 
 § 542. The South Dakota legislature, by a recent statute,^ 
 enacted that every common carrier, engaged in trade or com- 
 merce in the State shall be liable to any of its employees, or 
 in case of their death, to the personal representative of such 
 employee, for the benefit of his widow and children, if any ; 
 if none, then for his parents ; if none, then for the next of 
 kin dependent upon him, for all damages which may result 
 from the n^ligence of any of its officers or agents or by rea- 
 son of any defect or insufficiency due to its negligence in its 
 
 employees as is allowed other persons not employees, when the injury 
 results from the negligence of a superior officer or a person having 
 a right to control the party injured. Held that, where an injury to 
 an employee of a railroad was the result of negligence on the part of 
 the conductor, the legal representative of the person injured was 
 entitled to the same remedies as are allowed to other persons not 
 employees." Keed v. 'Southern Ey., 55 S. E. Rep. 218; 75 S. C. 162. 
 
 " An engineer is a vice-principal and not a fellow employee of his 
 fireman, within Const. 1895, art. 9, § 15, giving to railroad employees 
 the right to recover for injuries sustained by the negligence of a 
 superior having the right to control or direct the services of the party 
 injured." Pagan v. Southern Ey. Co. (S. C. 1907), 59 S. E. Eep. 32. 
 
 " Prior to the adoption of Const. 1895 the fellow-service rule was 
 applicable to railroads." Pagan v. Southern Ey. Co. (S. 0. 1907), 
 59 S. E. Eep. 32. 
 
 "Under Civ. Code Ga. 1895, § 2610, providing that, except in 
 case of railroad companies, the employer is not liable to one employee 
 for injuries from the Tiegligence of other employees about the same 
 business, a railroad company is liable for injury to an employee from 
 negligence of his fellow employees." Bussey v. Charleston & W. C 
 Ey. Co. (S. C. 1907), 58 S. E. Eep. 1015. 
 
 " The change in the fellow-servant law made by the Constitution 
 of 1895 affects only the employees of railroad corporations." Wilson 
 V. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co., 58 S. E. Rep. 1019. 
 
 5 Acts South Dakota 1907, eh. 219, §§ 1, 2, 3, 4. 
 
 810 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. § 543 
 
 cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, ways, 
 or works. 
 
 In all actions hereafter brought against any common car- 
 rier to recover damages for personal injuries to an employee, 
 or where such injuries have resulted in his death, the fact 
 that the employee may have been guilty of contributory neg- 
 ligence shall not, bar a recovery, where his contributory neg- 
 ligence was less than the negligence of the employer, but the 
 damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to 
 the amount of negligence attributable to such employee. All 
 questions of negligence and contributory negligence shall be 
 for the jury. 
 
 No contract of employment, insurance, relief benefit or 
 indemnity for injury or death entered into by or on be- 
 half of any employee, nor the acceptance of any such insur- 
 ance, relief benefit, or indemnity by the person entitled 
 thereto shall constitute any bar or defense to any action 
 brought to recover damages for personal injuries to or death 
 of such employee : Provided^ however. That upon the trial of 
 such action against any common carrier the defendant may 
 set off therein any sum it has contributed toward any insur- 
 ance, relief benefit or indemnity that may have been paid to 
 the injured employee, or in case of his death, to his personal 
 representative. 
 
 No action shall be maintained under this act, unless com- 
 menced within two years from the time the cause of action 
 accrued. 
 
 § 543. The laws of Texas,® governing the liability of rail- 
 road companies for injuries to their employees, are as fol- 
 lows: 
 
 8 Acts Texas 1897, Special Session, ch. 6, §§ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and Acts 
 1905, ch. 163, § 1; Sayles' Civ. St., § 4560h. 
 Hand cars are cars within the meaning of this statute and a member 
 
 811 
 
§ 543 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. 
 
 Every person, receiver, or corporation operating a railroad 
 or street railway the line of which shall be situated in whole 
 or in part in this State, shall be liable for all damages sus- 
 tained by any employee thereof while engagfed in the work 
 of operating the cars, locomotives, or trains of such person, 
 receiver, or corporation by reason of the negligence of any 
 other employee of such person, receiver, or corporation, and 
 the fact that such employees were fellow workmen with each 
 other shall not impair or destroy such liability. 
 
 of a section gang, carrying tools on foot and others using a hand car, 
 for same purpose, were held not to be coemployees, in Long v. Chicago, 
 etc., Ry. Co., 57 S. W. Rep. 802. 
 
 " Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1897, art. 4560f, provides that every person 
 or corporation operating a railroad shall be liable for all damages sus- 
 tained by any employee thereof while engaged in the work of operating 
 cars of such railroad by reason of the negligence of a fellow workman. 
 Held, that where plaintiff, a workman of a railroad company, was 
 injured while unloading ties from a box car in a train used for 
 distributing the ties along the track, by the negligence of a fellow 
 workman, he was engaged in work proximately and necessarily connected 
 with the operation of the cars at the time of his injury, and was 
 entitled to the protection of the statute." St. Louis Southwestern Ey. 
 Co. V. Thornton (Tex. Civ. App. 1907), 103 S. W. Rep. 437. 
 
 " An employee of a railroad, assisting in replacing on a tram railroad 
 track, constructed as an ordinary railroad track, a derailed tram 
 car used in the transportation of cross-ties from the main line to the 
 railroad's creosote plant, is engaged in the operation of a car within 
 the statutes, and the railroad cannot escape liability for injuries to him 
 occasioned through the negligence of fellow workman." Missouri, K. 
 & T. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 99 S. W. Rep. 743. 
 
 " An engineer in charge of a switching engine and a fireman are, 
 while the engineer is engaged in oiling the parts of the engine and 
 the fireman in filling the tank with water after the engine has been 
 stopped for the purpose of taking water, engaged in operating the 
 engine, within Rev. St. 1895, art. 4560g, exempting the operatives of a 
 railroad engine from the coemployee rule while engaged in their work." 
 Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Walton, 104 S. W. Rep. 415. 
 
 The Texas statute (Sayles' Ann. Civ. Code 1897, art. 4560f), giving 
 a. right of action for an injury to an employee, received while operating 
 cars, covers the case of an employee of a, private railroad, helping to 
 string telephone poles along the railroad track, as he is then engaged 
 
 812 
 
STATUTES ABOLtSHHiTG COMMON LAW. § 543 
 
 AH persons engaged in the service of any person, receiver, 
 or corporation controlling or operating a railroad or street 
 railway the line of which shall be situated in whole or in 
 part in this State, who are intrusted by such person, receiver, 
 or corporation with the authority of superintendence, control, 
 or command of other employees of such person, receiver, or 
 corporation or with the authority to direct any other em- 
 
 in operating a car, within the meaning of the statute, as held by the 
 court, in Mounce v. Lodwick Lumber Co., 91 S. W. Rep. 240. 
 
 Men operating a hand car are held to be within the protection of 
 the statute, in Texas, etc., Ey. Co. v. McCraw, 95 S. W. Kep. 82; 
 Texas, etc., Ey. Co. v. Hervey, 89 S. W. Eep. 1095. 
 
 A fireman, walking on the track, when he was struck by projecting 
 lumber was even held to be " operating a railroad," within the meaning 
 of the Texas statute, in St. Louis, etc., E, Co. v. Bussong, 90 jS. W. 
 Eep. 73. 
 
 An employee engaged in loading a car was held to be operating a 
 railroad, in Texas Central R. Co. v. Pelfrey, 80 S. W. Rep. 1036. 
 
 The employer was held liable for the failure of the engineer to keep 
 a lookout for obstructions on the track, as a result of which a fireman 
 was injured, in Missouri, etc., E. Co. v. Keaveney,, 80 S. W. Rep. 387. 
 
 A section foreman was held to be as much within the protection 
 of the statute, as one of his men would be, in Texas, etc., Ry. Co. v. 
 Smith, 114 Fed. Eep. 728; 52 C. C. A. 360. 
 
 A foreman of men in a railway yard who, under the Texas statute 
 (Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1897, art. 4560g), is a vice-principal, because 
 endowed with power of control, does not become a eoemployee by 
 the mere act of assisting to move a tool box. Missouri, K. & T. E. 
 Co. v. Dean, 89 S. W. Eep. 797, 
 
 The Texas court holds that a fireman, standing by the side of the 
 track, after lighting the headlight in his engine, is so far engaged 
 in the " operation of a railroad," as to enable him to recover for an 
 injury from being struck by projecting lumber on a flat car. St. 
 Louis & S. F. E. Co. v. Bussong, 90 S.- W. Eep. 73. 
 
 Eemoving a hand car from the track, was held to be the operation 
 of a car, within the Texas fellow-service law (Eev. St. 1895, art. 
 4560f.) Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Hervey, 89 S. W. Eep. 1095. 
 
 A brakeman, lighting a lamp in a caboose, on a side track, when 
 injured by a collision with another car, was held to be engaged in 
 "operating a railroad," within the Missouri fellow-service law, in 
 St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Smith, 90 S. W. Eep. 926. 
 
 813 
 
§ 544 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW, 
 
 ployee in the performance of any duty of such employee, are 
 vice-principals of such person, receiver, or corporation and 
 are not fellow workmen with their coemployees. 
 
 All persons who are engaged in the common service of such 
 person, receiver, or corporation, controlling or operating a 
 railroad or street railway, and who while so employed are 
 in the same grade of employment and are doing the same 
 character of work or service and are working together at the 
 same time and place and at the same piece of work and to 
 a common purpose, are coemployees with each other. Em- 
 ployees who do not come within the provisions of this section 
 shall not be considered coemployees. 
 
 No contract made between the employer and employee 
 based upon the contingency of death or injury of the em- 
 ployee and limiting the liability of the employer under this 
 act of fixing damages to be recovered shall be valid or binding.. 
 
 Nothing in this act shall be held to impair or diminish the 
 defense of contributory negligence when the injury of the 
 employee is caused proximately by his own contributory neg- 
 ligence. 
 
 The plea of assumed risk will not obtain, if the injured 
 employee had an opportunity for knowledge of the defect in 
 the machinery or appliances, and notified the employer 
 thereof, or if a person of ordinary care would have contin- 
 ued the use of the appliance or machinery, after notice of 
 the defect or imperfection therein. 
 
 § 544. The Federal Employer's liability Act. — After the 
 Federal Employer's Liability Act, of 1906, was held to be 
 unconstitutional, by the Supreme Court,'^ the Congress of 
 the United States, in 1908, passed the following act, upon 
 
 7 Howard v. Illinois Central R. Co., 28 U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep. 411} 207 
 U. S. 46a 
 
 814 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON lAW. § 544 
 
 the same subject, to meet the objeetions sustained against the 
 similar law of 1906. 
 
 Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in com- 
 merce between any of the several States or Territories, or be- 
 tween any of the States and Territories, or between the Dis- 
 trict of Columbia and any of the States or Territories, or 
 between the District of Columbia or any of the States or 
 Territories and any foreign nation or nations, shall be liable 
 in damages to any person suffering injury while he is em- 
 ployed by such carrier in such commerce, or, in case of the 
 death of such employee, to his or her personal representative, 
 for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and chil- 
 dren of such employee ; and, if none, then of such employee's 
 parents ; and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon 
 such employee, for such injury or death resulting in whole 
 or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, 
 or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or 
 insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, ap- 
 pliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, 
 or other equipment. 
 
 Every common carrier by railroad in the Territories, the 
 District of Columbia, the Panama Canal Zone, or other pos- 
 sessions of the United States shall be liable in damages to any 
 person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier 
 in any of said jurisdictions, or, in case of the death of such 
 employee, to his or her personal representative, for the bene- 
 fit of the surviving widow or husband and children of such 
 employee; and, if none, then of such employee's parents; 
 and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such 
 employee, for such injury or death resulting in whole or in 
 part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or 
 employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or in- 
 sufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appli- 
 
 815 
 
§ 544 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. 
 
 ances, machinery, track, roadbed, -works, boats, wharves, or 
 other equipment. 
 
 In all actions hereafter brought against any such common 
 carrier by railroad under or by virtue of any of the provi- 
 sions of this act to recover- damages for personal injuries to 
 an employee where such injuries have resulted in his death, 
 the fact that the employee may have been guilty of contribu- 
 tory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages 
 shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount 
 of negligence attributable to such employee : Provided, That 
 no such employee who may be injured or killed shall be held 
 to have been guilty of contributory negligence in any case 
 where the violation by such common carrier of any statute 
 enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury 
 or death of such employee. 
 
 In any action brought against any common carrier under 
 or by virtue of any of the provisions of this act to recover 
 damages for injuries to, or the death of, any of its employees, 
 such employee shall not be held to have assumed the risks 
 of his employment in any case where the violation by such 
 common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of em- 
 ployees contributed to the injury or death of such employee. 
 
 Any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the 
 purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any common 
 carrier to exempt itself from any liability created by this act, 
 shall, to. that exent be void : Provided, That in any action 
 brought against any such common carrier under or by virtue 
 of any of the provisions of this act, such common carrier may 
 set off therein, any sum it has contributed or paid to any 
 insurance, relief benefit, or indemnity that may have been 
 paid to the injured employee or the person entitled thereto, 
 on account of the injury or death for which said action was 
 brought. 
 
 No action shall be maintained under this act unless com- 
 816 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHIIfG COMMON LAW. § 544 
 
 menced within two years from the day the cause of action 
 accrued. 
 
 The term common carrier as used in this act shall include 
 the receiver or receivers or other, person or corporation 
 charged with the duty of the management and operation of 
 the business of a common carrier. 
 
 ITothing in this act shall be held to limit the duty or lia- 
 bility of common carriers or to impair the rights of their em- 
 ployees under any other act or acts of Congress, or to affect 
 the prosecution of any pending proceeding or right of action 
 under the Act of Congress approved June 11, 1906.® 
 
 s This act was approved April 22j 1908. The minority report of the 
 Committee on the Judiciary^ on the report of this biU, recommended 
 that the act be amended by inserting the words, "in service directly 
 connected with the operation of the road," in order to make th« law 
 apply only to the extra hazardous duties of the employment and take 
 the proposed law out of the rule announced by the various State tri- 
 bunals that such legislation, to withstand the charge of unjust discrim- 
 ination, must be leveled at the hazardous nature of the busiaess, rather 
 than at the character of the employer, but this suggestion was not 
 adopted by the majority of the committee. , On this interesting phase 
 of the present act, the minority of the Committee of the Judiciary said: 
 
 " The 5th Amendment is well imderstood to be applicable only to the 
 Federal Government. That the proposed legislation, unless confined 
 either by legislative language or judicial construction to the extra 
 hazardous part of the commerce, would be a draiial of the equal pro- 
 tection of the law, is clear. Whether' at the same time, the carrier 
 would, by reason of such denial of equal protection of the law, be 
 deprived of " property without due process of law," it must be ad- 
 mitted is not so clear. Does the citizen get the benefit of due proc- 
 ess of law under the 5th Amendment when he is deprived of the equal 
 protection t3f the law! The most obvious suggestion that occurs with 
 reference to these two constitutional provisions is that inasmuch as 
 the language of the 5th and the. 14th Amendments is identical 
 in this respect, until the equal protection clause is reached, that evi- 
 dently the authors of the 14th Amendment, believing that under 
 the ' due process- of law ' clause equal protection was not guaranteed, 
 found it necessary to add the specific clause guaranteeing it so far as 
 the States are concerned. It is clear that if this clause was necessary 
 to guarantee that result, then 'due process of law' does not include 
 1-52 81t 
 
§ 544 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. 
 
 the equal protection of the law, and if it was not necessary, the addi-- 
 tion of the clause relative to due protection of law would be entirely 
 unnecessary and mere rhetoric — a conclusion that would not be hastily 
 assumed." 
 
 See Eeport No. 1386, April 4, 1908, 60th Congress of U. S. accom- 
 panying H. E. 20310, p. 88. 
 
 Commenting on the eflfects the different sections of this act would 
 have in attaining the objects had in view by the Congress of the United 
 States, in adopting the bill, Mr. T. Megaarden, in Law Notes, for 
 June, 1908 (12 Law Notes, p. 45), observed: 
 
 " The first section of this act, like the first section of the former 
 act, does away with the fellow-servant doctrine, but unlike that act,- 
 which applied to all common carriers, the new statute applies only 
 to common carriers by railroad. And to meet the constitutional ob- 
 jection which was successfully urged against the first enactment, which 
 applied to every common carrier engaged in interstate commerce with- 
 out being restricted in its application to such carriers while actually 
 engaged in interstate commerce, the new statute applies only to every 
 common carrier by railroad while engaged in interstate commerce, and 
 makes them liable only to persons suffering injury while employed by 
 the carriers in such commerce. 
 
 " This undoubtedly -makes the act constitutional within the decisions 
 in the Employer's Liability Cases. But, obviously, the act will be pro- 
 lific of litigation, for it will often be no easy matter to determine 
 whether at the time of an injury to an employee the railroad com- 
 pany was engaged and the servant was employed in interstate commerce. 
 Sonie light may occasionally be thrown upon these questions by the 
 decisions under the Safety. Appliance Act. For example, if the ques- 
 tion should arise whether an employee who was engaged at the time of 
 the injury in making up a train for the purpose of moving interstate 
 commerce is within the application of the act, an answer in the 
 affirmative may be deduced by analogy from the case of Mobile, etc., 
 R. Co. v. Bromberg, 141 Ala. 258, construing the federal statute re- 
 lating to safety appliances. But for the most part questions relating 
 to when a railroad is engaged and a servant employed in interstate 
 commerce will have to be decided without the aid of previously ex- 
 pressed judicial opinions, and the courts will have a pretty time 
 deciding them. It will be far from an enviable task for a court to 
 have to decide whether a yard switchman who is engaged in attaching 
 a, car which is to go to a place within the State, to other ears which 
 are to go into another State, is employed in interstate trade or com- 
 merce. And is a railroad company, whose road is wholly within the 
 boundaries of one State, engaged in interstate commerce when it hauls 
 to the State border a train of cars which are billed to a distant 
 
 818 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMOIT LAW. § 54^ 
 
 § 545. The United States Safety Appliance Act. — By act 
 of Congress,® all cars and engines used by railroads in inters 
 state commerce, are required to be equipped with couplers, 
 coupling automatically, by impact, so tbat they can be un- 
 coupled without the necessity of men going between the cars. 
 
 State? Similar questions might be multiplied indefinitely, but it is 
 hardly worth while, for we shall soon have real cases enough. It is 
 a curious circumstance, that while the able statesmen at Washington 
 discoursed at length on the difficulty of apportioning damages, under the 
 comparative negligence rule, they did not once, so far as the Con- 
 gressional Record shows, advert to the equally perplexing question 
 as to when an interstate carrier is, and when it is not, engaged in 
 interstate commerce. 
 
 " The third section of the new statute contains, with other matter, a, 
 provision recognizing the comparative negligence doctrine. It pro- 
 vides that contributory negligence on the part of the injured employee 
 ' shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by 
 the jury in .proportion, to the amount of negligence attributable, to 
 such employee.' The corresponding provision of the former act pro- 
 vided that contributory negligence on the part of the employee ' shall 
 not bar a recovery inhere his contributory negligence was slight and 
 that of the employer ^vas gross in comparison, but the damages shall 
 be diminished,' etc. The elimination of the words in italic makes it 
 clear that by the present statute the comparative negligence rule 
 for the assessment of damages is to be followed in all cases, a,nd- 
 not only in cases in which it appears that the employee's negligence 
 was slight and that of the defendant gross in comparison. Since the 
 comparative negligence feature of the statute has been discussed by 
 the writer in a former article in this magazine (10 Law Notes, p. 145), 
 no further attention need be given it here. , It should, however, be 
 noted in this connection that the present act goes farther, than the. 
 former one by providing that the employee shall not be held to have 
 been guilty of contributory negligence in any case where the violation 
 by the carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees 
 contributed to the injury or death of the employees." 
 
 9 Act Congress, March 2, 1893, § 2, ch. 190; 27 Stat. 531; U. S. 
 Comp. St. 1901, p. 3174; M., § 8. ,: 
 
 This statute is highly penal and is strictly construed, and a merer 
 failure of the company's inspector to notice that a, chain was broken, 
 attached to the lever of the coupler, before delivery of the car to a 
 connecting carrier, was not a violation of the act. United States v. 
 Atchison, etc., R. Co., 150 Fed. Rep. 442. ' ., 
 
 819 " 
 
§§ 546^ 547 STATUTES ABOLISHINO COMMON LAW. 
 
 This act also provides that employees injured by the use 
 of any locomotive, car or train, in violation of the act, shall 
 not be deemed to have assumed the risk of injury from the 
 use of such car,, locomotive or train, even though they knew 
 of the unlawful use. 
 
 § 546. The law of Vermont, ^o has so far modified the com- 
 mon-law right of the employer, to use the kind of appliances 
 or machinery that he may see fit, so long as he is not negli- 
 gent, by providing, as to railroad companies, for the installa- 
 tion* of safety appliances and such railroad companies as may 
 fail to coinply with the statute, are rendered liable for all 
 injuries to their "employees, arising from violations of the 
 law. 
 
 § 647, tte Virginia constitution i* and code ^2 abolishes the 
 common-law fellow service doctrine, as to all employees of 
 railroad companies engaged in the physical construction, re- 
 pair or maintenance of the roadway, track, or any of its struc- 
 
 But the receipt ist a defective car by an interstate connecting carrier, 
 is a violation of the law. United States v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 149 
 Fed. Rep. 486. 
 
 It is no defense to a violation of the law that Mie automatic coupler 
 was simply oirt of repair. United States v. Great Northern R. Co., 
 150 Fed. Rep. 229. 
 
 The law requires the use of couplers which can be coupled as well 
 as uneoupled, without men going between the ends of cars, etc. South- 
 ern Railway Company v. Simmons, 105 Va. 651 ; 55 S. E. Rep. 459. 
 
 10 Statutes Vermont, 1S94, §§ 3887, 3911. 
 
 11 Constitution Virginia, art. 12, § 162. 
 
 12 Code 1904, § 1294k, 1294d, subsec. 36. 
 
 The Virginia Constitution relaxing the stringency of the common- 
 law rule as to coemployees, in the interests of those employed by 
 railroads, is not to be strictly construed, but so as to carry out the 
 intent of the framers of the Constitution. Virginia, etc., R. Co. v. 
 Clower's Admr., 102 Va. 867; 47 S. E. Rep. 1003. 
 
 820 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. § 54:7 
 
 tures eonneeted therewith, or in any work eonnected with a 
 car or engine standing on the track, or in the phjsieal opera- 
 tion of a traiii, car, engine or switch, or in any service re- 
 quiring the presence of sneh employee upon^ a train, car or 
 engine, and such employees are given the same right of re- 
 covery for injuries so received, as if received by the nonper- 
 formance of the employer himself, provided that the injured 
 employee receives his injuries by the neglect of an officer, or 
 agent of the railroad company of a higher gra<le of service 
 than the injured employee, or of a person charged with the 
 duty of controlling him, or that his injury result from the 
 negligence of a eoemployee in another department of the busi- 
 ness, or engaged upon a car, or train, on which the injured 
 employe© is iiot engaged, or by an employee who is at the 
 time in charge of a switch, signal point, or locomotive, or 
 is charged with dispatching trains or transmitting telegraphic 
 or telephonic orders therefor; and whether such negligence 
 be in the performance of an assi^able or nonassignable duty. 
 The physical construction, repair, or maintenance of the road- 
 way, track, or any of the^truetures connected therewith, and 
 the physical construction, repair, maintenance, cleaning, or 
 operation of trains, cars, or sigines shall be regarded as dif- 
 ferent departments of labor within the meaning of this sec- 
 tion. Knowledge, by any such railroad employee injured, 
 of the defective or unsafe character or condition of any ma- 
 chinery, ways, appliances, or structures shall be no defense 
 to an action for injury caused thereby. When death, whether 
 instantaneous or not, results to such an employee from any 
 injury for which he coul^ have recovered, under the above 
 provisions, had death not occurred, then his legal or personal 
 r^resentative, surviving consort, and relatives (and any trus- 
 tee, curator, committee, or guardian of such consort or rela- 
 tives) shall, respectively, have the same rights and remedies 
 with respect thereto as if his death had been catised by the 
 
 821 
 
§ 547 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. 
 
 negligence of a coemployee while in the performance as vice- 
 principal of a nonassignable duty of the employer. Every 
 contract or agreement, express or implied, made by an em- 
 ployee to' waive the benefit of this section shall be null and 
 void. This section shall not be construed to deprive any em- 
 ployee, or his legal or personal representative, surviving con- 
 sort, ■ or relatives (or any trustee, curator, committee, or 
 guardian of such consort or relatives) of any rights or reme- 
 dies that he or they may have by the law of the land, at the 
 time this constitution goes into effect. Il^othing contained in 
 this section shall restrict the power of the general assembly 
 to further enlarge, for the above-named class of employees, 
 the rights and remedies hereinbefore provided for, or to ex- 
 tend such rights and remedies to, or otherwise enlarge the 
 present rights and remedies of, any other class of employees 
 of railroads or of employees of any person, firm or corpora- 
 tion. 
 
 Every corporation operating a railroad in this State, 
 whether such corporation be created under the laws of this 
 State or otherwise, shall be liable in damages for any and 
 all injury sustained by any employee of such corporation as 
 follows: When such injury results from the wrongful act, 
 neglect, or default of an agent or officer of such corporation 
 superior to the employee injured, or of a person employed 
 by such corporation having the right to control or direct the 
 services of such employee injured, or the services of the em- 
 ployee by whom he is injured ; and also when such injury re- 
 sults from the wrongful act, neglect, or default of a coem- 
 ployee engaged in another department 'Of labor from that of 
 the employee injured, or of a coemployee on another train 
 of cars, or of a coemployee who has charge of any switeh,- 
 signal point, or locomotive engine, or who is charged with 
 dispatching trains "or transmitting telegraphic or telephonic 
 orders.' Knowledge by 'any employee injured, of the defec7 
 . 82.2 .. 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. §§548,549 
 
 tive or unsafe character or condition of any machinery, ways, 
 appliances, or structures of such corporation shall not of it- 
 self be a bar to recovery for any injury or death caused 
 thereby, When death, whether instantaneous or otherwise, 
 results from any injury to any employee of such corporation 
 received as aforesaid, the personal representative of such em- 
 ployee shall have a right of action therefor against such cor- 
 poration, and may recover damages in respect thereof. Any 
 contract or agreement, express or implied, made by any such 
 employee to waive the benefit of this section or any part 
 thereof shall be null and void, and this section shall not be 
 construed to deprive any such employee, or his personal rep- 
 resentative, of any right or remedy to which he is now entitled 
 imder the laws of this State. The rules and principles of law 
 as to contributory negligence, which apply to other cases, 
 shall apply to cases arising under this act, except in so far as 
 the same are herein modified or changed. 
 
 An act directing the erection of telltales or danger signals ' 
 at the approaches to bridges over railroads, tunnels, etc., 
 makes failure to provide such devices ground for a right of 
 action" where injury or death results from such failure. 
 
 § 548. The Statute of Washington i* requires all railroad 
 companies operating railroads in the State to block and guard 
 all frogs, switches and guard rails, and for an injury to an 
 employee for a failure to comply with this statute, the rail- 
 road company so failing to comply with the law is liable to 
 a suit for damages by the person injured as a result of such 
 negligence. 
 
 § 549. The Statutes of Wisconsin. — With reference to the 
 liability of railroad companies for injuries to their employees, 
 the legislature of Wisconsin^* has enacted that: 
 
 13 Acts Washington, 1899, ch. 35, § 2. 
 
 1* Annotated Statutes Wisconsin, 1898, §§ 1816, §§ 1 to 9, as amended 
 
 823 
 
§ 549 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. 
 
 Every railroad company shall be liable for damages for all 
 injuries whether resulting in death or not, sustained by any 
 of its employees, subject to the provisions hereinafter con- 
 tained regarding contributory negligence on the part of the 
 injured employee, 
 
 1. When such injury is caused by a defect in any locomo- 
 tive, engine, car, rail, track, roadbed, machinery, or appliance 
 used by its employees in and about the business of their em- 
 ployment. 
 
 2. When such injury shall have been sustained by any 
 oflBcer, agent, or employee of such company, while engaged in 
 the line of his duty as such, and which such injury shall have 
 been caused in whole or in greater part by the negligence of 
 any other officer, agent, or employee of such company, in 
 the discharge of, or by reason of failure to discharge his du- 
 ties as such. 
 
 3. In every action to recover for such injury the court 
 shall submit to the jury the following questions: First, 
 whether the company, or any officer, agent, or employee other 
 than the person injured was guilty of negligence directly 
 contributing to the injury; second, if that question is an- 
 
 by eh. 245, Acts 1907. Also § 1809b, and Acts 1905, ch. 348, § 5. 
 
 Under the Wisconsin statute, a railroad company is liable for an 
 injury to an employee caused by the negligence of another employee, 
 while the injured person was in the performance of his duty. Gumz 
 V. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 52 Wis. 672; 10 N. W. Rep. 11; 5 Am. & 
 Eng. R. Cas. 583. 
 
 Nor is this statute (1875) unconstitutional, because it does not 
 impose a similar liability upon all other employers. Ditberner v. 
 Chicago, etc., R. Co., 47 Wis. 138; 2 N. W. Rep. 69. 
 
 The Wisconsin statute (R. S. 1898, § 1816) does not apply to a private 
 railroad, operated in connection with a logging and lumber business, 
 but applies only to railroads engaged in a general railroad business. 
 McKivergan v. Alexander, etc.. Lumber Co., 102 N. W. Rep. 332. 
 
 An employee woricing on a warehouse and injured, while standing 
 by the warehouse, near a railroad track, by a moving train, was held 
 to be subjected to the hazard of the operation of the railroad and 
 within the protection of the statute, in Bain v. Northern Pacific Ry. 
 Co., 98 N. W. Rep. 241. 
 
 824 
 
STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. §549 
 
 swered in the affirmative, -whether the person injured was 
 guilty of any negligence which contributed directly to the 
 injury ; third, if that question is answered in iiie affirmative, 
 whether the negligence of the party so injured was slighter 
 or greater as a contributing cause io the injury than that of 
 the company, or any officer, agent, or employee o-ther than 
 the person injured ; and such other questions as may be nec- 
 essary, 
 
 4. In all cases -vdiere the jury shall find that the negligence 
 of the company, or any officer, agent, or employee of such 
 company, was greater than the negligence of the employee 
 so injured, and contributing in a greater degree to such in- 
 jury, then the plaintiff shall be entitled to recover, and the 
 negligence, if any, of the employee so injured shall be no bar 
 to such recovery. 
 
 6. In all cases under this act the question of negligence 
 and contributory negligence shall be for the jury. 
 
 6. No contract or receipts between any employee and a 
 railroad company; no rule or regulation promulgated or 
 adopted by such company, and no contract, rule, or regula- 
 tion in regard to any notice to be given by such employee 
 shall exempt such corporattion from the full liability imposed 
 by this act. 
 
 7. The phrase " railroad company," as used in this act, 
 shall be taken to embrace any company, association, corpora- 
 tion, or person managing, maintaining, operating, or in pos- 
 session of a railroad in whole or in part within this State, 
 whether as owner, contractor, lessee, mortgagee, trustee, as- 
 signee, or receiver. 
 
 8. in any action Tsrought in the courts of this State by a 
 resident thereof, or the representative of a deceased resident, 
 to recover damages in accordance with this act, where the 
 employee of any railroad company owning or operating a rail- 
 road extending into or through this State and into or through 
 any other State or States shall have received his injuries in 
 
 825 
 
§ 550 STATUTES ABOLISHING COMMON LAW. 
 
 any other State where such railroad is owned or operatedj 
 and the contract of employmeiit shall have been made in this 
 State, it shall not be competent for suCh railroad company to 
 plead or prove the decisions or statutes of the State where 
 such person shall have been injured as a defense to the action 
 brought in this State. 
 
 But the provisions of this statute do not apply to employ- 
 ees working in shops or offices. 
 
 There is also a section requiring all railroad companies to 
 block all frogs and guard rails in their tracks and a failure to 
 comply with the law, in this respect, is a ground for an action 
 for damages, in all cases where injury to an employee re- 
 sults from such failure, even though the failure or violation 
 results from the negligence of some other agent or employee. 
 
 Railroad companies are also required to erect telltales to 
 the approaches of bridges over railroad tracks and an em- 
 ployee does not assume the risk by continuing in the service 
 with notice of the absence of such telltales. 
 
 § 550. The constitution of Wyoming. — By organie law, in 
 Wyoming, ^^ it is provided that no law shall be enacted lim-, 
 iting the amount of damages to be recovered for causing the 
 injury or death of any person. Any contract or agreement 
 with any employee, waiving any right to recover damages, 
 for causing the death or injury of any employee, is made 
 void and of no effect. 
 
 It is also made unlawful for any company or corporation 
 to require of its employees as a condition of their employ- 
 ment, or otherwise, a contract or agreement whereby such 
 employer shall be released or discharged from liability on 
 account of personal injuries received by its employees, while 
 in' the service of the employer, by reason of the negligence of 
 the employer or the agents or employees thereof and all such 
 contracts are, made null and void. 
 
 16 Constitution Wyoming, art. 10, § 4; art. 19, § 1. 
 826 
 
KF 2375 W58 I 
 
 1 
 
 Author 
 
 White, Edward Joseph 
 
 Vol. 
 
 Title 
 
 ?ailr§ads^ personal injuries 
 
 Copy 
 
 on 
 
 
 
 Date 
 
 Borrower's Name