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Cornell University Library 
 B1655 .R2 1871 
 
 Recent discussions in science philosoph 
 
 olln 
 
 3 1924 029 047 698 
 
The original of tliis book is in 
 tine Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924029047698 
 
EECENT DISCUSSIONS 
 
 SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY, AND MORALS. 
 
 BY 
 
 HERBERT SPENCER, 
 
 AUTHOB OP "riKST PRINOIPLBB," "THB PRINCIPLES OI" BIOIiOBT," "IHB 
 PBinCIFLES or FSTCHOLOOT," ETC. 
 
 NEW YORK : 
 
 D. APPLETON" AND COMPANY, 
 
 549 & 551 BEOADWAY. 
 
cornell\ 
 
 university 
 
 LIBRARY^ 
 
 Ehtebed, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1871, 
 
 By D. APPLETON & COMPANY, 
 
 In the OfSce of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 The present volume consists mainly of mattex* that is 
 new to the American public. Three of the essays have 
 not before appeared in this country, and two of the others, 
 issued as a pamphlet, have had so small a circulation as 
 to have been seen by but few readers. These several 
 discussions have been drawn from Mr. Spencer at various 
 times to correct misapprehensions and misrepresentations 
 that have been made regarding the doctrines of his system 
 of Philosophy. Some of them form valuable extensions 
 of these doctrines, and all will be useful in promoting their 
 right interpretation. Why the closing article has been 
 taken from another volume and appended to this collec- 
 tion, requires a few words of explanation. 
 
 Seventeen years ago, Mr. Spencer published an elabo- 
 rate Eeview article entitled "The Genesis of Science," in 
 which he objected to Comte's views of the classification 
 of the Sciences. Although Mr. Spencer's criticisms in- 
 volved a radical dissent from the peculiar views of M. 
 Comte, and what was held as fundamental in his philoso- 
 phy, yet upon the publication of his own philosophical 
 
* PEEFACE. 
 
 system Mr. Spencer found himself ranked as a positivist 
 and a follower of Comte. Against this he repeatedly pro- 
 tested in public letters ; but the charge was so continually 
 reiterated that at length he found himself compelled to 
 make a more formal statement of the differences between 
 himself and the French philosopher. The result of this 
 was a pamphlet published in 1864, in which he followed 
 the rejection of Comte's classification by the promulgation 
 of his own view, and appended a detailed statement of 
 the differences between his doctrine and the doctrines of 
 M. Comte. Some of his views of classification having 
 been adversely criticised by Mr. Bain and Mr. Mill, he 
 has replied to their strictures in a new article in the pres- 
 ent volume. The general question is one of great interest 
 to scientific students ; and, for the convenience of those 
 who desire to form an intelligent judgment of Mr. Spen- 
 cer's case, both as contrasted with that of Comte, and on 
 its own independent merits, it has been thought desirable 
 to incorporate the original article on " The Genesis of 
 Science " in this collection. Though placed last, it should 
 
 be read first by those not already familiar with the dis- 
 cussion. 
 
 New Yoek, Jfflsy, 1871. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 PAOB 
 
 I, — M0EAL3 AND MORAL SENTIMENTS, . . . ' . . 9 
 
 II. — OEIGIN OF ANIMAL ■WOESHTP, 33 
 
 III. — THE OLASaiTIOATIOM OF THE SOIENOES, .... 63 
 
 IT. — POSTSOEIPT — EEPLTINa TO OEITIOISMS, .... 89 
 
 T. — EBASONS FOE DISSKNTINa FEOM THE PHILOSOPHY OF OOMTB, 115 
 
 VI. — OF LAWS IN GENBEAL, AND THE OEDEE OF THEIE DISOOVEET, 139 
 
 Vll. — THE GENESIS OF SOIBNOB, 157 
 
I. 
 
 MORALS AND MORAL SENTLMENT8. 
 
 [FROM THE FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW, APMI., 1871.] 
 
MORALS AND MOEAL SENTIMENTS. 
 
 If a writer who discusses unsettled questions takes up 
 every gauntlet thrown down to him, polemical writing 
 will absorb much of his energy. Having a power of 
 work which unfortunately does not suffice for executing 
 with any thing like due rapidity the task I have under- 
 taken, I have made it a policy to avoid controversy as 
 much as possible, even at the cost of being seriously mis- 
 understood. Hence it happened that, when, in Macmil- 
 lan's Magazine for July, 1869, Mr. Kichard Hutton pub- 
 lished, under the title of " A Questionable Parentage for 
 Morals," a criticism upon a doctrine of mine, I decided 
 to let his misrepresentations remain unnoticed until, in 
 the course of my work, I arrived at the stage where, by a 
 full exposition of this doctrine, they would be set aside. 
 It did not occur to me that, in the mean time, these erro- 
 neous statements, accepted as true statements, would be 
 repeated by other writers, and my views commented upon 
 as untenable. This, however, has happened. In more 
 periodicals than one, I have seen it asserted that Mr. 
 Hutton has effectually disposed of my hypothesis. Sup- 
 posing that this hypothesis has been rightly expressed by 
 Mr. Hutton, Sir John Lubbock, in his " Origin of Civili- 
 zation," etc., has been led to express a partial dissent ; 
 which I think he would not have expressed had my own 
 exposition been before him. Mr. Mivart, too, in his 
 
10 MOEALS AND MOEAL SENTIMENTS. 
 
 recent " Genesis of Species," lias been similarly betrayed 
 into misapprehensions. And now Sir Alexander Grant, 
 following the same lead, has conveyed to the readers of 
 the Fortnightly Review another of these conceptions, 
 which is but very partially true. Thus I find myself 
 compelled to say as much as will serve to prevent further 
 spread of the mischief. 
 
 If a general doctrine concerning a highly-involved 
 class of phenomena could be adequately presented in a 
 single paragraph of a letter, the writing of books would 
 be superfluous. In the brief exposition of certain ethical 
 doctrines held by me, which is given in Prof. Bain's 
 " Mental and Moral Science," it is stated that they are — 
 
 "as yet nowhere fully expressed. They form part of the more gen- 
 eral doctrine of Evolution which he is engaged in working ont ; and 
 they are at present to be gathered only from scattered passages. It 
 is true that, in his first work, ' Social Statics,' he presented what he 
 then regarded as a tolerably complete view of one division of Morals. 
 But, without abandoning this view, he now regards it as inadequate 
 — more especially in respect of its basis." 
 
 Mr. Hutton, however, taking the bare enunciation of 
 one part of this basis, deals with it critically ; and, in the 
 absence of any exposition of it by me, sets forth what he 
 supposes to be my grounds for it, and proceeds to show 
 that they are unsatisfactory. 
 
 If, in his anxiety to suppress what he doubtless re- 
 gards as a pernicious doctrine, Mr. Hutton could not wait 
 until I had explained myself, it might have been expected 
 that he would use whatever information was to be had 
 for rightly construing it. So far from seeking out such 
 information, however, he has, in a way for which I can- 
 not account, ignored the information immediately before 
 him. 
 
PEIMAET BASIS Of MOEALS. " 11 
 
 The title which. Mr. Hutton has chosen for his 
 criticism is, "A Questionable Parentage for Morals." 
 Now, he has ample means of knowing that I allege a pri- 
 mary basis of Morals, quite independent of that which he 
 describes and rejects. I do not refer merely to the fact 
 that, having, when he reviewed " Social Statics," ' ex- 
 pressed his very decided dissent from this primary basis, 
 he must have been aware that I allege it ; for he may say 
 that in the long interval which has elapsed he had for- 
 gotten all about it. But I refer to the distinct enuncia- 
 tion of this primary basis in that letter to Mr. Mill from 
 which he quotes. In a preceding paragraph of the letter, 
 I have explained that, while I accept utilitarianism in the 
 abstract, I do not accept that current utilitarianism which 
 recognizes for the guidance of conduct nothing beyond 
 empirical generalizations ; and I have contended that — 
 
 " Morality, properly so called — ^the science of right conduct — has 
 for its object to determine how and wAy certain modes of conduct 
 are detrimental, and certain other modes beneficial. These good and 
 bad results cannot be accidental, but must be necessary consequences 
 of the constitution of things ; and I conceive it to be the business of 
 Moral Science to deduce, from the laws of life and the conditions of 
 existence, what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happi- 
 ness, and what kinds to produce unhappiness. Having done this, its 
 deductions are to be recognized as laws of conduct; and are to be 
 conformed to irrespective of a direct estimation of happiness or 
 misery." 
 
 Nor is this the only enunciation of what I conceive to 
 be the primary basis of morals, contained in this same 
 letter. A subsequent paragraph, separated by four lines 
 only from that which Mr. Hutton extracts, commences 
 thus : 
 
 " Progressing civilization, which is of necessity a succession of 
 compromises between old and new, requires a perpetual readjust- 
 
 ' See Prospective Beview for January, 1852. 
 
12 MOEALS AND MOEAL SENTIMENTS. 
 
 ment of the compromise between the ideal and the practicable in 
 social arrangements : to which end, both elements of the compro- 
 mise must be kept in view. If it is true that pure rectitude pre- 
 scribes a system of things far too good for men as they are, it is not 
 less true that mere expediency does not of itself tend to establish a 
 system of things any better than tliat which exists. While absolute 
 morality owes to expediency the checks which prevent it from rush- 
 ing into Utopian absurdities, expediency is indebted to absolute mo- 
 rality for all stimulus to improvement. Granted that we are chiefly 
 interested in ascertaining what is relativel/y right, it still follows that 
 we must first consider what is absolutely right ; since the one con- 
 ception presupposes the other." 
 
 I do not see how tliere could well be a more em- 
 phatic assertion that there exists a primary basis of mor- 
 als independent of, and in a sense antecedent to, that 
 which is furnished by experiences of utility ; and, conse- 
 quently, independent of, and in a sense antecedent to, 
 those moral sentiments which I conceive to be generated 
 by such experiences. Yet no one could gather from Mr. 
 Hutton's article that I assert this ; or would even find 
 reasons for a faint suspicion that I do so. From the 
 reference made to my further views, he would infer my 
 acceptance of that empirical utilitarianism which I have 
 expressly repudiated. And the title which Mr. Hutton 
 gives to his paper clearly asserts, by implication, that I 
 recognize no " parentage for morals " beyond that of the 
 accumulation and organization of the effects of experi- 
 ence. I cannot believe that Mr. Hutton intended to con- 
 vey this erroneous impression. He was, I suppose, too 
 much absorbed in contemplating the proposition he com- 
 bats to observe, or, at least, to attach any weight to, the 
 propositions which accompany it. But I regret that he 
 did not perceive the mischief he was likely to do me by 
 spreading this one-sided statement. 
 
 I pass now to the particular question at issue — not 
 
GENESIS OF MOEAL SENTIMENTS. 13 
 
 the " parentage for morals," but the parentage of moral 
 sentiments. In his version of my view on this more spe- 
 cial doctrine, Mr. Hntton has similarly, I regret to say, 
 neglected the data which would have helped him to draw 
 an approximately true outline of it. It cannot well be 
 that the existence of such data was unknown to him. 
 They are contained in the " Principles of Psychology ; " 
 and Mr. Hutton reviewed that work when it was first 
 published.' In the chapter on The Feelings, which occurs 
 near the end of that work, there is sketched out a pro- 
 cess of genesis by no means like that which Mr. Hutton 
 indicates ; and had*he turned to that chapter he would 
 have seen that his description of the genesis of the moral 
 sentiments out of organized experiences is not such a one 
 as I should have given. Let me quote a passage from 
 that chapter : 
 
 " Not only are those emotions wHch form the immediate stimuli 
 to actions thus explicable, but the lilie explanation, applies to the 
 emotions that leave the subject of them comparatively passive : as, 
 for instance, the emotion produced by beautifiil scenery. The grad- 
 ually increasing complexity in the groups of sensations and ideas co- 
 ordinated, ends in the coordination of those vast aggregations of 
 them vrhich a grand landscape excites and suggests. The infant 
 taken into the midst of mountains is totally unaffected by them ; 
 but is delighted with the small group of attributes and relations pre- 
 sented in a toy. The child can appreciate, and be pleased v^ith, the 
 more complicated relations of household objects and localities, the 
 garden, the field, and the street. But it is only in youth and mature 
 age, when individual things and small assemblages of them have 
 become familiar and automatically cognizable, that those immense 
 assemblages which landscapes present can be adequately grasped, 
 and the highly aggregated states of consciousness produced by them, 
 experienced. Then, however, the various minor groups of states, 
 that have been in earlier days severally produced by trees, by fields, 
 
 ' His oritioism will be found in the National Beview for January, 1856, 
 under the title " Atheism." 
 
14 MORALS AUD MOEAL SENTIMENTS. 
 
 by streams, by cascades, by rooks, by precipices, by mountains, by 
 clouds, are aroused togetlier. Along with the sensations immediate- 
 ly received, there are partially excited the myriads of sensations that 
 have been in times past received from objects such as those pre- 
 sented ; further, there are partially excited the various incidental 
 feelings that were experienced on all these countless past occasions ; 
 and there are probably also excited certain deeper, but now vague, 
 combinations of states, that were organized in the race during bar- 
 barous times, when its pleasurable activities were chiefly among the 
 woods and waters. And out of all these excitations, some of them 
 actual, but most of them nascent, is composed the emotion which a 
 fine landscape produces in us." 
 
 It is, I think, amply manifest tha* tlie processes liere 
 indicated are not to be taken as intellectual processes — 
 not as processes in which recognized relations between 
 pleasures and their antecedents, or intelligent adaptations 
 of means to ends, form the dominant elements. The state 
 of mind produced by an aggregate of picturesque objects 
 is not one resolvable into propositions. The sentiment 
 does not contain within itself any consciousness of causes 
 and consequences of happiness. The vague recollections 
 of other beautiful scenes and other delightful days which 
 it dimly rouses, are not aroused because of any rational 
 coordinations of ideas that have been formed in by-gone 
 days. Mr. Hutton, however, has assumed that in the 
 genesis of moral feelings as due to inherited experiences 
 of the pleasures and pains arising from certain modes of 
 conduct, I am speaking of reasoned-out experiences — 
 experiences consciously accumulated and generalized. He 
 altogether overlooks the fact that the genesis of emotions 
 is distinguished from the genesis of ideas in this : that 
 whereas the ideas are composed of elements that are 
 simple, definitely related, and (in the case of general 
 ideas) constantly related, emotions are composed of enor- 
 mously complex aggregates of elements which are never 
 
GENESIS OF EMOTIONS. 15 
 
 twice alike, and that stand in relations wMeh are never 
 twice alike. The difference in the resulting modes of 
 consciousness is this : In the genesis of an idea the suc- 
 cessive experiences, be they of sounds, colors, touches, 
 tastes, or be they of the special objects that combine many 
 of these into groups, have so much in common that each, 
 when it occurs, can be definitely thought of as like those 
 which preceded it. But in the genesis of an emotion the 
 successive experiences so far differ that each of them, 
 when it occurs, suggests past experiences which are not 
 specifically similar, but have only a general similarity ; 
 and, at the same time, it suggests benefits or evils in past 
 experience which likewise are various in their special 
 natures, though they have a certain community of general 
 nature. Hence it results that the consciousness aroused 
 is a multitudinous, confused consciousness, in which, along 
 with a certain kind of combination among the impressions 
 received from without, there is a vague cloud of ideal 
 combinations akin to them, and a vague mass of ideal 
 feelings of pleasure or pain that were associated with 
 these. We have abundant proof that feelings grow up 
 without reference to recognized causes and consequences, 
 and without the possessor of them being able to say why 
 they have grown up ; though analysis, nevertheless, shows 
 that they have been formed out of connected experiences. 
 The familiar fact to which, I suppose, almost every one 
 can testify, that a kind of jam which was, during child- 
 hood, repeatedly taken after medicine, may become by 
 simple association of sensations so nauseous that it cannot 
 be tolerated in after-life, illustrates clearly enough the 
 way in which repugnances may be established by habitual 
 association of feelings, without any idea of causal connec- 
 tion; or rather, in spite of the knowledge that there is no 
 causal connection. Similarly with pleasurable emotions. 
 
16 MOEAIS AND MOKAL SENTIMENTS. 
 
 The cawing of a rook is not ia itself an agreeable sound 
 — ^musically considered, it is very mucli the contrary. 
 Yet the cawing of rooks usually produces in people very 
 pleasurable feelings — feelings which most of them suppose 
 to result from the quality of the sound itself. Only the 
 few who are given to self-analysis are aware that the 
 cawing of rooks is agreeable to them because it has been 
 connected with countless of their greatest gratifications — 
 with the gathering of wild-flowers in childhood ; with 
 Saturday-afternoon excursions in school-boy days ; with 
 midsummer holidays in the country, when books were 
 thrown aside, and lessons were replaced by games and 
 adventures in the fields ; with fresh, sunny mornings in 
 after-years, when a walking-excursion was an immense 
 relief from toil. As it is, this sound, though not causally 
 related to all these multitudinous and varied past delights, 
 but only often associated with them, can no more be 
 heard without rousing a dim consciousness of these de- 
 lights, than the voi^ of an old friend unexpectedly coming 
 into the house can be heard without suddenly raising a 
 wave of that feeling that has resulted from the pleasures 
 of past companionship. If we are to understand the 
 genesis of emotions, either in the individual or in the 
 race, we must take account of this all-important process. 
 Mr. Hutton, however, apparently overlooking it, and not 
 having reminded himself, by referring to the " Principles 
 of Psychology," that I insist npon it, represents my hy- 
 pothesis to be that a certain sentiment results from the 
 consolidation of intellectual conclusions I He speaks of 
 me as believing that " what seems to us now the ' neces- 
 sary' intuitions and a priori assumptions of human 
 nature, are likely to prove, when scientifically analyzed, 
 nothing but a similar conglomeration of our ancestors' 
 hest observations and most useful envpirical rules.'''' He 
 
EXPEEIENCES OF UTILITY. IT 
 
 supposes me to think that men having, in past times, come 
 to see that truthfulness was useful, " the habit of approving 
 truth-speaking and fidelity to engagements, which was 
 first based on this ground of utility, became so rooted, 
 that the utilitarian ground of it was forgotten, and we find 
 ourselves springing to the belief in truth-speaking and 
 fidelity to engagements from an inherited tendency." 
 Similarly throughout, Mr. Hutton has so used the word 
 "utility,^' and so interpreted it on my behalf, as to make 
 me appear to mean that moral sentiment is formed out 
 of conscious generaUzations respecting what is beneficial 
 and what detrimental. Were such my hypothesis, his 
 criticisms would be veiy much to the point ; but as such 
 is not my hypothesis, they fall to the ground. The ex- 
 periences of utility I refer to are those which become 
 registered, not as distinctly-recognized connections be- 
 tween certain kinds of acts and certain kinds of remote 
 results, but those which become registered in the shape 
 of associations between groups of feelings that have often 
 recurred together, though the relation between them has 
 not been consciously generalized — associations the origin 
 of which may be as little perceived as is the origin 
 of the pleasure given by the sounds of a rookery; but 
 which, nevertheless, have arisen in the course of daily 
 converse with things, and serve as incentives or de- 
 terrents. 
 
 In the paragraph which Mr. Hutton has extracted 
 from my letter to Mr. MiU, I have indicated an analogy 
 between those effects of emotional experiences out of 
 which I believe moral sentiments have been developed, 
 and those effects of intellectual experiences out of which 
 I believe space-intuitions have been developed. Eightly 
 considering that the first of these hypotheses cannot stand 
 if the last is disproved, Mr. Hutton has directed part of 
 
18 M0EAI.8 AlTD MOEAIi SENTIMENTS. 
 
 his attack against this last. But would it not have been 
 well if he had referred to the " Principles of Psychology," 
 where this last hypothesis is set forth at length, before 
 criticising it? "Would it not have been well to have 
 given an abstract of my own description of the process, 
 instead of substituting what he supposes vaj description 
 must be ? Any one who turns to the " Principles of Psy- 
 chology " (first edition, pp. 218-245), and reads the two 
 chapters. The Perception of Body as presenting Statical 
 Attributes, and The Perception of Space, wiU find that 
 Mr. Hutton's account of my view on this matter has 
 given him no notion of the view as it is expressed by me ; 
 and will, perhaps, be less inclined to smile than he was 
 when he read Mr. Hutton's account. I cannot here do 
 more than thus imply the invalidity of such part of Mr. 
 Hutton's argument as proceeds upon this incorrect repre- 
 sentation. The pages that would be required for properly 
 explaining the doctrine that space-intuitions result from 
 organized experiences may be better used for explaining 
 this analogous doctrine at present before us. This I will 
 now endeavor to do ; not indirectly by correcting misap- 
 prehensions, but directly by an exposition which shall be 
 as brief as the extremely involved nature of the process 
 allows. - 
 
 An infant in arms, that is old enough to gaze at 
 objects around with some vague recognition, smiles in 
 response to the laughing face and soft, caressing voice of 
 its mother. Let there come some one who, with an angry 
 face, speaks to it in loud, harsh tones. The smile dis- 
 appears, the features contract into an expression of pain, 
 and, beginning to .cry, it turns away its head and makes 
 such movements of escape as are possible. What is the 
 meaning of these facts ? Why does not the frown make 
 it smile, and the mother's laugh make it weep ? There 
 
INFANT EMOTION AND EXPEESSION. 19 
 
 is but one answer. Already in its developing brain there 
 is coming into play the structure through -which one 
 cluster of visual and auditory impressions excites pleasur- 
 able feelings, and the structure through which another 
 cluster of visual and auditory impressions excites painful 
 feelings. The infant knows no more about the relation 
 existing between a ferocious expression of face, and the 
 evils that may follow the perception of it, than the young 
 bird just out of its nest knows of the possible pain and 
 death which may be inflicted by a man coming toward 
 it ; and as certainly in the one case as in the other, the 
 alarm felt is due to a partially-established nervous struct- 
 ure. "Why does this partially-established nervous struct- 
 ure betray its presence thns early in the human being ? 
 Simply because, in the past experiences of the human 
 race, smiles and gentle tones in those around have been 
 the habitual accompaniments of pleasurable feelings; 
 while pains of many kinds, immediate and more or less 
 remote, have been continually associated with the im- 
 pressions received from knit brows and set teeth and 
 grating voice. Much deeper dovm than the history of 
 the human race must we go to find the beginnings of 
 these connections. The appearances and sounds which 
 excite in the infant a vague dread, indicate dangen ; and 
 do BO because they are the physiological accompaniments 
 of destructive action — some of them common to man and 
 inferior mammals, and consequently understood by inferior 
 mammals, as every puppy shows us. What we call the 
 natural language of anger, is due to a partial contraction 
 of those muscles which actual combat would call into 
 play; and all marks of irritation, down to that passing 
 shade over the brow which accompanies slight annoyance, 
 are incipient stages of these same contractions. Conversely 
 with the natural language of pleasure, and of that state 
 
20 MOEALS AND MOEAL SENTrMEfTrS. 
 
 of mind whicli we call amicable feeling : this, too, has a 
 physiological interpretation.' 
 
 Let lis pass now from the infant in arms to the chil- 
 dren in the nursery. What have the experiences of each 
 one of these been doing in aid of the emotional develop- 
 ment we are considering? While its limbs have been 
 growing more agile by exercise, its manipulative skill 
 increasing by practice, its perceptions of objects growing 
 by use quicker, more accurate, more comprehensive ; the 
 associations between these two sets of impressions received 
 from those around, and the pleasures and pains received 
 along with them, or after them, have been by frequent 
 repetition made stronger, and their adjustments better. 
 The dim sense of pain and the vague glow of delight 
 which the infant felt, have, in the urchin, severally taken 
 shapes that are more definite. The angry voice of a 
 nurse-maid no longer arouses only a formless feeling of 
 dread, but also a specific idea of the slap that may follow. 
 The frown on the face of a bigger brother, along with the 
 primitive, indefinable sense of ill, brings the sense of ills 
 that are definable in thought as kicks, and ciijSs, and 
 pulKngs of hair, and losses of toys. The faces of parents, 
 looking now sunny, now gloomy, have grown to be re- 
 spectively associated with multitudinous forms of gratifi- 
 cation and multitudinous forms of discomfort or privation. 
 Hence these appearances and sounds, which imply amity 
 or emnity in those around, become symbolic of happiness 
 and misery ; so that eventually perception of the one set 
 or the other can scarcely occur without raising a wave of 
 pleasurable feeling or of painful feeling. The body of 
 this wave is still substantially of the same nature as it was 
 
 ' Hereafter I hope to elucidate at length these phenomena of expression. 
 jFor the present, I can refer only to such farther indications as are contsuned 
 in two essays on The Physiology of Laughter and the Origin and Function of 
 Music. 
 
EMOTIONS OF CHILDEEN AND BAVAGES. 21 
 
 at first; for tliougli in each of these multitudinous ex- 
 periences a special set of facial and vocal signs has been 
 connected with a special set of pleasures or pains, yet 
 since these pleasures or pains have been immensely varied 
 in their kinds and combinations, and since the signs that 
 preceded them were in no two cases quite alike, it results 
 that to the last the consciousness produced remains as 
 vague as it is voluminous. The myriads of partially- 
 aroused ideas resulting from past experiences are massed 
 together and superposed, so as to form an aggregate in 
 which nothing is distinct, but which has the character of 
 being pleasurable or painful according to the nature of 
 its original components ; the chief difference between this 
 developed feeling and the feeling aroused in the infant 
 being, that on bright or dark background forming the 
 body of it, may now be sketched out in thought the par- 
 ticular pleasures or pains which the particular circum- 
 stances suggest as likely. 
 
 "What must be the working of this process under the 
 conditions of aboriginal life ? The emotions given to the 
 young savage by the natural language of love and hate in 
 the members of his tribe, gain first a partial definiteness 
 in respect to his intercourse with his family and play- 
 mates ; and he learns by experience the utility, in so far 
 as his own ends are concerned, of avoiding courses which 
 call from others manifestations of anger, and taking courses 
 which call from them manifestations of pleasure. Not 
 that he consciously generalizes. He does not at that age, 
 probably not at any age, formulate his experiences in the 
 general principle that it is well for him to do things which 
 bring smiles from others, and to avoid doing things which 
 bring frowns. What happens is, that having, in the way 
 shown, inherited this connection between the perception 
 of anger in others and the feeling of dread, and having 
 
22 MOEAXS AlTD MOEAL SENTIMENTS. 
 
 discovered that particular acts of his bring on this anger, 
 he cannot subsequently think of committing one of these 
 acts without thinking of the resulting anger, and feeling 
 more or less of the resulting dread. He has no thought 
 of the utility or inutility of the act itself; the deterrent is 
 the mainly vague, but partially definite, fear of evil that 
 may follow. So understood, the deterring emotion is 
 one that has grown out of experiences of utility, using that 
 word in its ethical sense ; and if we ask why this dreaded 
 anger is called forth from others, we shall habitually find 
 that it is because the forbidden act entails pain some- 
 where — is negatived by utility. On passing from the 
 domestic injunctions to the injunctions current in the 
 tribe, we see no less clearly how these emotions produced 
 by approbation and reprobation come to be connected in 
 experience with actions that are beneficial to the tribe, 
 and actions that are detrimental to the tribe ; and how 
 there consequently grow up incentives to the one class of 
 actions and prejudices against the other class. From early 
 boyhood the young savage hears recounted the daring 
 deeds of his chief — hears them in words of praise, and sees 
 all faces glowing with admiration. From time to time 
 also he listens while some one's cowardice is described 
 in tones of scorn, and with contemptuous metaphors, and 
 sees him meet with derision and insult whenever he 
 appears. That is to say, one of the things that comes to 
 be strongly associated in his mind with smiling faces, 
 which are symbolical of pleasures in general, is courage ; 
 and one of the things that comes to be associated in his 
 mind with frowns and other marks of enmity, which form 
 his symbol of unhappiness, is cowardice. These feelings 
 are not formed in him because he has reasoned his way 
 to the truth that courage is useful to the tribe, and, by 
 implication, to himself, or to the truth that cowardice is a 
 
OTHEE FOEMS OF EESTEAINT. 23 
 
 cause of evil. In adult life he may, perhaps, see this ; but 
 he certainly does not see it at the time when bravery is 
 thus associated in his consciousness with all that is good, 
 and cowardice with all that is bad. Similarly there are 
 produced in him feelings of inclination or repugnance 
 toward other lines of conduct that have become estab- 
 lished or interdicted, because they are beneficial or inju- 
 rious to the tribe; though neither the young nor the 
 adults know why they have become established ' or 
 interdicted. Instance the praiseworthiness of wife-steal- 
 ing, and the vieiousness of marrying within the tribe. 
 
 We may now ascend a stage to an order of incentives 
 and restraints derived from these. The primitive belief 
 is that every dead man becomes a demon, who remains 
 somewhere at hand, may at any moment return, may give 
 aid or do mischief, and iS continually propitiated. Hence, 
 among other agents whose approbation or reprobation is 
 contemplated by the savage as a consequeiice of his con- 
 duct, are the spirits of his ancestors. When a child he is 
 told of their deeds, now in triumphant tones, now in whis- 
 pers of horror ; and the instilled belief that they may inflict 
 some vaguely-imagined but fearful evil, or give some great 
 help, becomes a powerful incentive or deterrent. Espe- 
 cially does this happen when the narrative is of a chief, 
 distinguished for his strength, his ferocity, his persistence 
 in that revenge which the experiences of the savage make 
 him regard as beneficial and virtuous. The conscious- 
 ness that such a chief, dreaded by neighboring tribes, and 
 dreaded, too, by members of his own tribe, may reappear 
 and punish those who have disregarded his injunctions, 
 becomes a powerful motive. But it is clear, in the first 
 place, that the imagined anger and the imagined satisfac- 
 tion of this deified chief are simply transfigured forms of 
 the anger and satisfaction displayed by those around ; and 
 
24 MOEALS AND MOEAL SENTIMENTS. 
 
 that the feelings accompanying such imaginations have the 
 same original root in the experiences which hare associated 
 an average of painful results with the manifestation of 
 another's anger, and an average of pleasurable results with 
 the manifestation of another's satisfaction. And it is 
 clear, in the second place, that the actions thus forbidden 
 and encouraged must be mostly actions that are respec- 
 tively detrimental and beneficial to the tribe ; since the 
 successful chief is usually a better judge than the rest, 
 and has the preservation of the tribe at heart. Hence 
 experiences of utility, consciously or unconsciously organ- 
 ized, underlie his injunctions ; and the sentiments which 
 prompt obedience are, though very indirectly and without 
 the knowledge of those who feel them, referable to expe- 
 riences of utility. 
 
 This transfigured form of restraint, differing at first 
 but little from the original form, admits of immense 
 development. Accumulating traditions, growing in 
 grandeur as they are repeated from generation to genera- 
 tion, make more and more superhuman the early-recorded 
 hero of the race. His powers of inflicting punishment 
 and giving happiness become ever greater, more multi- 
 tudinous and varied; so that the dread of divine dis- 
 pleasure, and the desire to obtain divine approbation, 
 acquire a certain largeness and generality. Still the con- 
 ceptions remain anthropomorphic. The revengeful deity 
 continues to be thought of in terms of human emotions, 
 and continues to be represented as displaying these emo- 
 tions in human ways. Moreover, the sentiments of right 
 and duty, so far as they have become developed, refer 
 mainly to divine commands and interdicts; and have 
 little reference to the natures of the acts commanded or 
 interdicted. In the intended offering up of Isaac, in the 
 sacrifice of Jephthah's daughter, and in the hewing to 
 
EAELT MEANING OF EIGHT AND -WEONG. 25 
 
 pieces of Agag, as much as in the countless atrocities com- 
 mitted from religious motives hj other . early historic 
 races, we see that the morality and immorality of actions, 
 as we understand them, are at first little recognized ; and 
 that the feelings, chiefly of dread, which serve in place of 
 them, are feelings felt toward the unseen beings supposed 
 to .issue the commands and interdicts. 
 
 Here it will be said that, as just admitted, these are 
 not the moral sentiments properly so called. This is true. 
 They are simply sentiments that precede and make 
 possible those highest sentiments which do not refer either 
 to personal benefits or evils to be expected from men, or 
 to more remote rewards and punishments. Several com- 
 ments are, however, called forth by this criticism. One 
 is, that if we glance back at past beliefs and their correla- 
 tive feelings, as shown in Dante's poem, in the mystery- 
 plays of the middle ages, in St. Bartholomew massacres, 
 in burnings for heresy, we get proof that in comparatively 
 modern times right and wrong meant little else than sub- 
 ordination or insubordination^-to a divine ruler primarily 
 and under him to a human ruler. Another is, that down 
 to our own day this conception largely prevails, and is 
 even embodied in elaborate ethical works — instance the 
 "Essays on the Principles of Morality," by Jonathan 
 Dymond, which recognizes no ground of moral obligation, 
 save the will of God as expressed in the current creed. 
 And yet a further is, that while in sermons the torments 
 of the damned and the joys of the blessed are set forth as 
 the dominant deterrents and incentives, and while we 
 have prepared for us printed instructions " how to make 
 the best of both worlds," it cannot be denied that the 
 feelings which impel and restrain men are still largely 
 composed of elements like those operative on the savage — 
 the dread, partly vague, partly specific, associated with 
 2 ' .... 
 
26 MOEALS AND MOEAL SENTtMEIilTS. 
 
 the idea of reprobation, human and divine, and the sense 
 of satisfaction, partly vague, partly specific, associated 
 with the idea of approbation, human and divine. 
 
 But during the growth of that civilization which has 
 been made possible by these ego-altruistic sentiments, 
 there have been slowly evolving the altruistic sentiments. 
 Development of these has gone on only as fast as society 
 has advanced to a state in which the activities are mainly 
 peaceful. The root of all the altruistic sentiments is 
 sympathy ; and sympathy could become dominant only 
 when the mode of life, instead of being one that habitually 
 inflicted direct pain, became one which conferred direct 
 and indirect benefits; the pains inflicted being mainly 
 incidental and indirect. Adam. Smith made a large step 
 toward this truth when he recognized sympathy as giving 
 rise to these superior controlling emotions. His "Theory 
 of Moral Sentiments," however, requires to be supple- 
 mented in two ways. The natural process by which 
 sympathy becomes developed into a more and more im- 
 portant element of human nature, has to be explained ; 
 and there has also to be explained the process by which 
 sympathy produces the highest and most complex of the 
 altruistic sentiments — that of justice. Respecting the 
 first process, I can here do no more than say that sym- 
 pathy may be proved, both inductively and deductively, 
 to be the concomitant of gregariousness ; the two having 
 all along increased by reciprocal aid. Multiplication has 
 ever tended to force into an association, more or less close 
 all creatures having kinds of food and supplies of food 
 that permit association; and established psychological 
 laws warrant the inference that some sympathy will 
 inevitably result from habitual nianifestations of feelings 
 in presence of one another, and that the gregariousness 
 being augmented by the increase of sympathy, further 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF SYMPATHY. 27 
 
 facilitates the development of sympathy. But there are 
 negative and positive checks upon this development — 
 negative, because sympathy cannot advance faster than 
 intelligence advances, since it presupposes the power of 
 interpreting the natural language of the various feelings, 
 and of mentally representing those feelings; positive, 
 because the immediate needs of self-preservation are often 
 at variance with its promptings, as, for example, during 
 the predatory stages of human progress. For explanations 
 of the second process, I must refer to " The Principles of 
 Psychology " (§ 202, first edition, and § 215, second edition) 
 and to " Social Statics," Part II., Chapter V.' Asking that 
 in default of space these explanations may be taken for 
 granted, let me here point out in what sense even sym- 
 pathy, and the sentiments that result from it, are due 
 to experiences of utility. If we suppose all thought of 
 rewards or punishments, immediate or remote, to be left 
 out of consideration, it is clear that any one who hesitates 
 to inflict a pain because of the vivid representation of that 
 pain which rises in his consciousness, is restrained, not by 
 any sense of obligation or by any formulated doctrine of 
 utility, but by the painful association established in him. 
 And it is clear that if, after repeated experiences of the 
 moral discomfort he has felt from witnessing the unhappi- 
 ness indirectly caused by some of his acts, he is led to check 
 himself when again tempted to those acts, the restraint is 
 of like nature. Conversely with the pleasure-giving acts : 
 repetitions of kind deeds, and experiences of the sympa- 
 thetic gratifications that follow, tend continually to make 
 stronger the association between such deeds and feelings 
 of happiness. 
 
 ' I may add that in " Social Statics," Cliapter X2X., 1 have indicated, in 
 a general way, the causes of the development of sympathy and the restraints 
 upon its development — confining the discussion, however, to the case of the 
 human race, my suhject limiting me to that. The accompanying teleology I 
 now disclaim. 
 
28 M0EAL8 AND -MOEAL SENTBIEITTS. 
 
 Eventually these experiences may be consciously gen- 
 eralized, and there may result a deliberate pursuit of the 
 sympathetic gratifications. There may also come to be 
 distinctly recognized the truths that the remoter results 
 are respectively detrimental and beneficial — that due 
 regard for others is conducive to ultimate personal welfare 
 and disregard of others to ultimate personal disaster ; and 
 then there may become current such summations of expe- 
 rience as " honesty is the best policy." But so far from 
 regarding these intellectual recognitions of utility as 
 preceding and causing the moral sentiment, I regard the 
 moral sentiment as preceding such recognitions of utility, 
 and making them possible. The pleasures and pains 
 directly resulting in experience from sympathetic and 
 unsympathetic actions, had first to be slowly associated 
 with such actions, and the resulting incentives and de- 
 terrents frequently obeyed, before there could arise the 
 perceptions that sympathetic and unsympathetic ac- 
 tions are remotely beneficial or detrimental to the actor ; 
 and they had to be obeyed still longer and more gen- 
 erally before there could arise the perceptions that they 
 are socially beneficial or detrimental. When, however, 
 the remote effects, personal and social, have gained 
 general recognition, are expressed in current maxims, 
 and lead to injunctions having the religious sanction, 
 the sentiments that prompt sympathetic actions and 
 cheek unsympathetic ones are immensely strengthened 
 by their alliances. Approbation and reprobation, divine 
 and human, come to be associated in thought with 
 the sympathetic and unsympathetic actions respectively. 
 The commands of the creed, the legal penalties, and 
 the code of social conduct, unitedly enforce them; 
 and every child as it grows up, daily has impressed 
 on it, by the words and faces and voices of those around, 
 
FUETHEE EVOLUTION OF SYMPATHY. 29 
 
 the autliority of these highest principles of conduct. And 
 now we may see why there arises a belief in the special 
 sacredness of these highest principles, and a sense of the 
 supreme authority of the altruistic sentiments answering 
 to them. Many of the actions which, in early social 
 states, received the religious sanction and gained public 
 approbation, had the drawback that such sympathies as 
 existed were outraged, and there was hence an imperfect 
 satisfaction. Whereas these altruistic actions, while simi- 
 larly having the religious sanction and gaining public 
 approbation, bring a sympathetic consciousness of pleas- 
 ure given or-of pain prevented ; and beyond this, bring 
 a sympathetic consciousness of human welfare at large, as 
 being furthered by making altruistic actions habitual. 
 Both this special and this general sympathetic conscious- 
 ness become stronger and wider in proportion as the 
 power of mental representation increases, and the imagi- 
 nation of consequences, immediate and remote, grows 
 more vivid and comprehensive. Until at length these 
 altruistic sentiments begin to call in question the au- 
 thority of those ego-altruistic sentiments which once ruled 
 unchallenged. They proihpt resistance to laws that do 
 not fulfil the conception of justice, encourage men to 
 brave the frowns of their fellows by pursuing a course at 
 variance with customs that are perceived to be socially 
 injurious, and even cause dissent from the current re- 
 ligion ; either to the extent of disbelief in those alleged 
 divine attributes and acts not appioved by this supreme 
 moral arbiter, or to the extent of entire rejection of a 
 creed which ascribes such attributes and acts. 
 
 Much that is required to make this hypothesis com- 
 plete must stand over until, at the close of the second 
 volume of " The Principles of Psychology," I have space 
 for a full' exposition. What I have said will make it 
 
30 MOEALS AND MOEAL SENTIMENTS. 
 
 sufficiently clear that two fundamental errors liave been 
 made in the interpretation put upon it. Both Utility and 
 Experience have been construed in senses much too nar- 
 row. Utility, convenient a word as it is from its com- 
 prehensiveness, has very inconvenient and misleading 
 implications. It vividly suggests uses and means and 
 proximate ends, but very faintly suggests the pleasures, 
 positive or negative, which are the ultimate ends, and 
 which, in the ethical meaning of the word, are alone con- 
 sidered ; and, further, it implies conscious recognition of 
 means and ends — implies the deliberate taking of some 
 course to gain a perceived benefit. Experience, too, in its 
 ordinary acceptation, connotes definite perceptions of 
 causes and consequences, as standing in observed relations, 
 and is not taken to include the connections formed in 
 consciousness between states that recur together, when 
 the relation between them, causal or other, is not per- 
 ceived. It is in their widest senses, however, that I 
 habitually use these words, as will be manifest to every 
 one who reads the " Principles of Psychology ; " and it is 
 in these widest senses that I have used them in the letter 
 to Mr. Mill. I think I have shown above that, when they 
 are so understood, the hypothesis briefly set forth in that 
 letter is by no means so indefensible as is supposed. At 
 any rate, I have shown — ^what seemed for the present 
 needful to show — that Mr. Hutton's versions of my views 
 must not be accepted as correct. 
 
 Hebbeet Spenoee. 
 
11. 
 
 THE ORIGIN OF ANIMAL -WOBSEIP. 
 
 [FROM THK FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW, MAY, 1870.] 
 
THE OKIGIN OF ANIMAL-WOESHIP. 
 
 Mk. McLEiinsrAN's recent essays on the "Worship of 
 Animals and Plants have done much to elucidate a very 
 obscure subject. By pursuing in this ease, as before in 
 another case, the truly scientific method of comparing the 
 phenomena presented by existing uncivilized races with 
 those which the early traditions of civilized races present, 
 he has rendered both more comprehensible than they were 
 before. 
 
 It seems to me, however, that Mr. McLennan gives 
 but an indefinite answer to the essential question — How 
 did the worship, of animals and plants arise ? Indeed, in 
 his concluding paper, he expressly leaves this problem 
 without a solution ; saying that his " is not an hypothesis 
 explanatory of the origin of Totemism, be it remembered, 
 but an hypothesis explanatory of the animal and plant 
 worship of the ancient nations." So that we have still to 
 ask — Why have savage tribes so generally taken animals 
 and plants and other things as their totems 1 "What can 
 have induced this tribe to ascribe special sacredness to one 
 creature, and that tribe to another ? And if to these ques- 
 tions the general reply is, that each tribe considers itself 
 to be descended from the object of its reverence, then 
 there presses for answer the further question — How came 
 so strange a notion into existence ? K this notion occurred 
 
34r THE OEIGIN OF ANIMAL-WORSHIP. 
 
 in one case only, we might set it down to some whim of 
 thought or some illusive occurrence. But appearing as it 
 does with multitudinous variations among so many un- 
 civilized races in different parts of the world, and having 
 left equally numerous traces in the superstitions of the. 
 extinct civilized races, we cannot assume any special or 
 exceptional cause. Moreover, the general cause, whatever 
 it may be, must be such as does not negative an aboriginal 
 intelligence essentially like our own. After studying the 
 grotesque beliefs of savages, we are apt to suppose that 
 their reason is not as our reason. But this supposition is 
 inadmissible. Given the amount of knowledge which 
 primitive men possess, and given the imperfect verbal 
 symbols used by them in speech and thought, and the con- 
 clusions they habituailly reach will be those that are rela- 
 fmely the most rational. This must be our postulate; 
 and, setting out with this postulate, we have to ask how 
 primitive men came so generally, if not universally, to be- 
 lieve themselves the progeny of animals or plants or inani- 
 mate bodies. There is, I believe, a satisfactory answer. 
 
 The proposition with which Mr. McLennan sets out, 
 that totem-worship preceded the worship of anthropomor- 
 phic gods, is one to which I can yield but a qualified as- 
 sent. It is true in a sense, but not wholly true. If the 
 words " gods " and " worship " carry with them their or- 
 dinary definite meanings, the statement is true ; but if 
 their meanings are widened so as to comprehend those 
 earliest vague notions out of which the definite. ideas of 
 gods and worship are evolved, I think it is not true. The 
 rudimentary form of all religion is the propitiation of dead 
 ancestors, who are supposed to be still existing, and to be 
 capable of working good or evil to their descendants. As 
 a preparation for dealing hereafter with the principles of 
 
ETTDIMENTAEY FOEM OF EELIGION. 35 
 
 sociology, I have, for some years past, directed much at- 
 tention to the modes of thought current in the simpler 
 human societies ; and evidence of many kinds, furnished 
 by all varieties of uncivilized men, has forced on me a 
 conclusion harmonizing with that lately expressed in this 
 Beview by Prof. Huxley — ^namely, that the savage, con- 
 ceiving a corpse to be deserted by the active personality 
 who dwelt in it, conceives this active personality to be 
 still existing, and that his feelings and ideas concerning 
 it form the basis of his superstitions. Everywhere we find 
 expressed or implied the belief that each person is double ; 
 and that when he dies, his other self, whether remaining 
 near at hand or gone far away, may return, and continues 
 capable of injuring his enemies and aiding his friends.' 
 
 1 A critical reader may raise an olijeotioii. If animal-Tforship is to be ra- 
 tionally interpreted, how can the interpretation set out by assuming a belief 
 in the spirits of dead ancestors — a belief which just as much reqjiires explana- 
 tion ? Doubtless there is here a wide gap in the argument. I hope eventually 
 to fill it up. Here, out of many experiences which conspire to generate this 
 belief, I can but briefly indicate the leading ones : 1. It is not impossible that 
 his shadow, following him everywhere, and moving as he moves, may have 
 some small share in giving to the savage a vague idea of his duality. It needs 
 but to watch a child's interest in the movements of its shadow, and to remem- 
 ber that at first a shadow cannot be interpreted as a negation of light, but is 
 looked upon as an entity, to perceive that the savage may very possibly con- 
 sider it as a specific sometliing which forms part of him. 2. A much more 
 decided suggestion of the same kind is likely to result from the reflection of 
 his face and figure in water : imitating him as it does in his form, colors, mo- 
 tions, grimaces. When we remember that not unfrequently a savage objects 
 to have his portrait taken, because he thinks whoever carries away a represen- 
 tation of him carries away some part of his being, wUl see how probable it is 
 that he thinks his double in the water is a reality in some way belonging to 
 him. 3. Echoes must greatly tend to confirm the idea of duality otherwise 
 arrived at. Incapable as he is of understanding their natural origin, the 
 primitive man necessarily ascribes them to living beings — ^beings who mock 
 him and elude his search, i. The suggestions resulting from these and other 
 physical phenomena are, however, secondary in importance. The root of this 
 belief in another self lies in the experience of di'cams. The distinction so 
 easily made by us between our life in dreams and our real life, is one which 
 the savage , recognizes in but a vague way ; and he cannot express even that 
 distinction which he perceives. When he awakes, and to those who have seen 
 
36 THE OEIGIN OF ANIMAL-WOESHIP. 
 
 But how out of the desire to propitiate this second per- 
 sonality of a deceased man (the words " ghost " or " spirit " 
 are somewhat misleading, since the savage believes that 
 the second personality reappears in a form equally tan- 
 gible with the first) does there grow up the worship of 
 
 liim lying quietly asleep, describes where he has been, and what ho has done, 
 his rude language fails to state the diiferenoe between seeing and dreaming 
 that he saw, doing and dreaming that he did. From this inadequacy of his 
 language it not only results that he cannot truly represent this diiferenoe to 
 others, but also that he cannot truly represent it to himself. Hence, in the 
 absence of an alternative interpretation, his belief, and that of those to whom 
 he tells his adventures, is that his other self has been away and came back 
 when he awoke. And this belief, which we find among various existing sav- 
 age tribes, we equally find in the traditions of the early civilized races. 
 5. The conception of another self capable of going away and returning, re- 
 ceives what to the savage must seem conclusive verifications from the abnor- 
 mal suspensions of consciousness, and derangements of consciousness, that 
 occasionally occur in members of his tribe. One who has fainted, and cannot 
 be immediately brought back to himself (note the significance of our own 
 phrases "returning to himself," etc.) as a sleeper can, shows him a state in 
 which the other self has been away for a time beyond recall. Still more is 
 this prolonged absence of the other self shown him in cases of apoplexy, cata- 
 lepsy, and other forms of suspended animation. Here for hours the other 
 self persists in remaining away, and on returning refuses to say where he has 
 been. Further verification is afforded by every epileptic subject, into whose 
 body, during the absence of the other self, some enemy has entered ; for how 
 else does it happen that the other self on returning denies all knowledge of 
 what his body has been doing 1 And this supposition that the body has been 
 "possessed" by some other being, is confirmed by the phenomena of som- 
 nambulism and insanity. 6. What, then, is the interpretation inevitably put 
 upon death ? The other self has habitually returned after sleep, which simu- 
 lates death. It has returned, too, after fainting, which simulates death much 
 more. It has even returned after the rigid state of catalepsy, which simulates 
 death very greatly. Will it not return also after this still more prolonged 
 quiescence and rigidity ? Clearly it is quite possible — quite probable even. 
 The deadmau's other self is gone away for a long time, but it still exists some- 
 where, far or near, and may at any moment come back to do all be said he 
 would do. Hence the various burial-rites — the placing of weapons and valu- 
 ables along with the body, the daily bringing of food to it, etc. I hope here- 
 after to show that, with such knowledge of the facts as he has, this interpreta- 
 tion is the most reasonable the savage can arrive at. Let me hero, however, 
 by way of showing how clearly the facts bear out this view, give one illustra- 
 tion out of many. " The ceremonies with which they [the Vcddahs] invoke 
 them [the shades of the dead] are few as they are simple. The most common 
 
INFLUENCE OF NICKNAMES. 37 
 
 animals, plants, and inanimate objects? Very simply. 
 Savages habitually distinguish individuals by names that 
 are either directly suggestive of some personal trait or fact 
 of personal history, or else express an observed community 
 of character with some well-known object. Such a gene- 
 sis of individual names, before surnames have arisen, is 
 inevitable ; and how easily it arises we shall see on re- 
 membering that it still goes on in its original form, even 
 when no longer needful. I do not refer only to the sig- 
 nificant fact that in some parts of England, as in the nail- 
 mating districts, nicknames are universal, and surnames 
 scarcely recognized; but I refer to the general usage 
 among both children and adults. The rude man is apt to 
 be known as " a bear ;" a. sly fellow, as an " old fox ; " a 
 hypocrite, as " the crocodile." I^ames of plants, too, are 
 used ; as when the red-haired boy is called " carrots " by 
 his school-fellows. ISTor do we lack nicknames derived 
 from inorganic objects and agents : instance that given by 
 Mr. Carlyle to the elder Sterling — " Captain "Whirlwind." 
 ISTow, in the earliest savage state, this metaphorical nam- 
 
 Ls the following : An arrow is fixed npriglit in the ground, and tlio Veddah 
 dances slowly round it, chanting this invocation, which is almost musical in 
 its rhythm : 
 
 " Mil miya, mi miy, mS, deya, 
 Topang Koyichetti mittigan yandah 1 " 
 
 " My departed one, my departed one, my God ! 
 Where art thou wandering 2 " 
 
 " This invocation appears to be used on all occasions when the intervention 
 of the guardian spirits is required in sickness, preparatory to hunting, etc. 
 Sometimes in the latter case, a portion of the flesh of the game is promised as 
 a votive offering, in the event of the chase being successful ; and they believe 
 that the spirits wiU appear to them in dreams and tell them where to hunt. 
 Sometimes they cook food and place it in the dry bed of a river, or some other 
 secluded spot, and then call on their deceased ancestors by name, ' Come aud 
 paitake of this ! Give us maintenance as you did when living! Come, where- 
 soever you may bo, on a tree, on a rook, in the forest, come ! ' And dance 
 round the food, half chanting half shouting the invocation." — Bailey, Trans. 
 Mh. Soc, London, N. S., ii., p. 301. 
 
38 THE OEIGIN OF ANIMAL-WOESHIP. 
 
 ing will in most, cases commence afresh in each generation 
 — must do so, indeed, imtil surnames of some kind have 
 been established. I say in most cases, because there will 
 occur exceptions in the cases of men who have distin- 
 guished themselves. If " the "Wolf," proving famous in 
 fight, becomes a terror to neighboring tribes, and a domi- 
 nant man in his own, his sons, proud of their parentage, 
 will not let fall the fact that they descended from the 
 "Wolf; nor will this fact be forgotten by the rest of the 
 tribe who held " the Wolf " in awe, and see some reason 
 to dread his sons. In proportion to the power and celeb- 
 rity of the Wolf will this pride and this fear conspire to 
 maintain among his grandchildren and great-grandchil- 
 dren, as well as among those over whom they dominate, 
 the remembrance of the fact that their ancestor was the 
 Wolf. And if, as will occasionally happen, this dominant 
 family becomes the root of a new tribe, the members of 
 this tribe will become known to themselves and others as 
 the Wolves. 
 
 We need not rest satisfied with the inference that this 
 inheritance of nicknames will take place : there is proof 
 that it does take place. As nicknaming after animals, 
 plants, and other objects, still goes on among ourselves, so 
 among ourselves does there go on the descent of nicknames. 
 An instance has come under my own notice on an estate 
 in the West Highlands, belonging to some friends with 
 whom I frequently have the pleasure of spending a few 
 weeks in the autumn. " Take a young Croshek," has 
 more than once been the reply of my host to the inquiry, 
 who should go with me when I was setting out salmon- 
 fishing. The elder Croshek I knew well; and supposed 
 that this name, borne by him and by all belonging to him, 
 was the family surname. Some years passed before I 
 learned that the real surname was Cameron ; that the 
 
OEIGUSr OF TEIBAL NAMES. 39 
 
 fafher was called Croshek, after the name of his cottage, 
 to distinguish him from other Camerons employed about 
 the premises ; and that his children had come to be simi- 
 larly distinguished. Though here, as very generally in 
 Scotland, the niclcname was derived from the place of 
 residence, yet had it been derived from an animal, the 
 process would have been the same — ^inheritance of it would 
 have occurred just as naturally. l^Tot even for this small 
 link in the argument, however, need we depend on infer- 
 ence : there is fact to bear us out. Mr. Bates, in his " Nat- 
 uralist on the Kiver Amazon " (2d ed., p. 376), describ- 
 ing three half-castes who accompanied him on a hunting 
 trip, says : " Two of them were brothers — namely, Joao 
 (John) and Zephyrino Jabuti ; Jabuti, or tortoise, being a 
 nickname which their father had earned for his slow gait, 
 and which, as is usual in this country, had descended as 
 the surname of the family." Let me add the statement 
 made by Mr. Wallace respecting this same region, that 
 " one of the tribes on the river Isdnna is called ' Jurupari ' 
 (Devils). Another is called ' Ducks ; ' a third, ' Stars ; ' 
 a fourth, ' Mandiocca.' " Putting these two statements 
 together, can there be any doubt about the genesis of these 
 tribal names ? Let the tortoise become sufficiently distin- 
 guished (not necessarily by superiority — great inferiority 
 may occasionally suffice) and the tradition of descent from 
 him, preserved by his descendants themselves if he was 
 superior, and by their contemptuous neighbors if he was 
 inferior, may become a tribal name.' 
 
 1 Since the foregoing pages were ■written, my attention has been drawn by 
 Sir John Lubbock to a passage in the appendix to the second edition of " Pre- 
 historic Times," in which he has indicated this derivation of tribal names. He 
 says : "In endeavoring to account for the worship of animals, we must remem- 
 ber that names are very frequently taken from them. The children and fol- 
 lowers of a man called the Bear or the Lion would make that a tribal name. 
 Hence the animal itself would be fli'st respected, at last worshipped," Of the 
 genesis of this worship, however. Sir John Lubbock does not give any specific 
 
40 THE OEIGIN OF ANISIAL-WOESHIP. 
 
 " But this," it will be said, " does not amount to an 
 explanation of animal-worsliip." True : a third factor 
 remains to be specified. Given a belief in the still-exist- 
 ing other self of the deceased ancestor, who must be pro- 
 pitiated; given this survival of his metaphorical name 
 among his grandchildren, great-grandchildren, etc. ; and 
 the further requisite is that the distinction between metar 
 phor and reality shall be forgotten. Let the tradition of 
 the ancestor fail to keep clearly in view the fact that he 
 was a man called the "Wolf — let him be habitually spoken 
 of as the Wolf, just as when alive ; and the natural mis- 
 take of taking the name literally will bring with it, firstly, 
 a belief in descent from the actual wolf, and, secondly, a 
 treatment of the wolf in a manner likely to propitiate 
 him — a manner appropriate to one who may be the other 
 self of the dead ancestor, or one of the kindred, and there- 
 fore a friend. 
 
 That a misunderstanding of this kind will naturally 
 grow up, becomes obvious when we bear in mind the great 
 indefiniteness of primitive language. As Prof. Max Miil- 
 ler says, respecting certain misinterpretations of an oppo- 
 site kind : " These metaphors .... would become mere 
 names handed down in the conversation of a family, un- 
 derstood perhaps by the grandfather, famOiar to the father, 
 but strange to the son, and misunderstood by the grand- 
 son." We have ample reason, then, for thinking that 
 such misinterpretations are likely to occur. Nay, we may 
 go further. We are justified in saying that they are cer- 
 tain to occur. For undeveloped languages contain no 
 words capable of indicating the distinction to be kept in 
 view. In the tongues of existing inferior races, only con- 
 
 explanatioii. Apparently he inclines to tlie telief, tacitly adopted also by 
 Mr. McLennan, that animal-worship is derived from an original Fetichism, 
 of which it is a more developed form. As wiU shortly he seen, I take a differ- 
 ent view of its origin. 
 
INDEFINITENESS OF PEIMITIVE LANGUAGE. 41 
 
 Crete objects and acts are expressible. The Australians 
 have a name for each kind of tree, but no name for tree 
 irrespective of kind. And though some witnesses allege 
 that their vocabulary is not absolutely destitute of generic 
 names, its extreme poverty in such is unquestionable. 
 Similarly with the Tasmanians. Dr. Milligan says thej'- 
 " had acquired very limited powers of abstraction or gen- 
 eralization. They possessed no words representing ab- 
 stract ideas ; for each variety of gum-tree and wattle-tree, 
 etc., etc., they had a name, but they had no equivalent for 
 the expression, ' a tree ; ' neither could they express ab- 
 stract qualities, such as hard, soft, warm, cold, long, short, 
 roimd, etc. ; for ' hard,' they would say ' like a stone,' for 
 ' tall,' they would say ' long legs,' etc., and for ' round,' 
 they said ' Hke a ball,' ' like the moon,' and so on, usually 
 suiting the action to the word, and confirming, by some 
 sign, the meaning to be understood." • !N"ow, even mak- 
 ing allowance for over-statement here (which seems need- 
 ful, since the word " long," said to be inexpressible in the 
 abstract, subsequently occurs as qualifying a concrete in 
 the expression, "long legs"), it is suflSciently manifest 
 that so imperfect a language must fail to convey the idea 
 of a name, as something separate from a thing ; and that 
 still less can it be capable of indicating the act of naming. 
 Familiar use of such partially abstract wordS as are appli- 
 cable to all objects of a class, is needful before there can 
 be reached the conception of a name — a word symbolizing 
 the symbolic character of other words ; and the conception 
 of a name, vdth its answering abstract term, must be long 
 current before the verb to name can arise. Hence, among 
 tribes with speech so rude, it will be impossible to trans- 
 mit the tradition of an ancestor named the Wolf, as dis- 
 tinguished from the actual wolf. The children and grand- 
 
 ' Proo. Eoyal Soc. Tasmania, iii., p. 280, 
 
42 THE OEIGIN OF ANIMAL-W0E8HIP. 
 
 children who saw him will not be led into error ; but in 
 later generations, descent from the "Wolf will inevitably 
 come to mean descent from the animal known by that 
 name. And the ideas and sentiments which, as above 
 shown, naturally grow up around the belief that the dead 
 parents and grandparents are still alive, and ready, if pro- 
 pitiated, to befriend their descendants, will be extended 
 to the wolf species. 
 
 Before passing to other developments of this general 
 view, let me point out how not simply animal-worship is 
 thus accounted for, but also the conception, so variously 
 illustrated in ancient legends, that animals are capable 
 of displaying human powers of speech and thought and 
 action. Mythologies are full of stories of beasts and birds 
 and fishes that have played intelligent parts in human 
 affairs — creatures that have befriended particular persons 
 by giving them information, by guiding them, by yielding 
 them help ; or else that have deceived them, verbally or 
 otherwise. Evidently all these traditions, as well as those 
 about abductions of women by animals and fostering of 
 children by them, fall naturally into their places as re- 
 sults of the habitual misinterpretation I have described. 
 
 The probability of the hypothesis will appear still 
 greater when we observe how readily it applies to the 
 worship of other orders of objects. Belief in actual de- 
 scent from an animal, strange as we may think it, is one 
 by no means incongruous with the unanalyzed experiences 
 of the savage ; for there come under his notice many 
 metamorphoses, vegetal and animal, which are apparently 
 of like character. But how could he possibly arrive at so 
 grotesq^ue a conception as that the progenitor of his tribe 
 was the sun, or the moon, or a particular star ? No ob- 
 servation of surrounding phenomena affords the slightest 
 
CONFUSION OF METAPHOE WITH FACT. 43 
 
 suggestion of any sucli possibility. But by the inheritance 
 of nicknames that are eventually mistaken for the names 
 of the objects from which they were derived, the belief 
 readily arises — is sure to arise. That the names of heav- 
 enly bodies will furnish metaphorical names to the un- 
 civilized, is manifest. Do we not ourselves call a distin- 
 guished singer or actor a star ? And have we not in poems 
 numerous comparisons of men and women to the sun and 
 moon ; as in " Love's Labour's Lost," where the princess 
 is called " a gracious moon," and as in " Henry VIII.," 
 where we read — " Those suns of glory, those two lights 
 of men ? " Clearly, primitive men will be not unlikely 
 thus to speak of the chief hero of a successful battle. 
 When we remember how the arrival of a triumphant war- 
 rior must affect the feelings of his tribe, dissipating clouds 
 of anxiety and irradiating all faces with joy, we shall see 
 that the comparison of him to the sun is exti^emely natural ; 
 and in early speech this comparison can be made only by 
 calling him the sun. As before, then, it will happen that, 
 through a confounding of the metaphorical name with the 
 actual name, his progeny, after a few generations, will be 
 regarded by themselves and others as descendants of the 
 sun. And, as a consequence, partly of actual inheritance 
 of the ancestral character, and partly of maintenance of 
 the traditions respecting the ancestor's achievements, it 
 will also naturally happen that the solar race will be con- 
 sidered a superior race, as we find it habitually is. 
 
 The origin of other totems, equally strange if not even 
 stranger, is similarly accounted for, though otherwise un- 
 accountable. One of the New-Zealand chiefs claimed as 
 his progenitor the neighboring great mountain, Tongariro. 
 This seemingly-whimsical belief becomes intelligible when 
 we observe how easily it may have arisen from a nick- 
 name. Do we not ourselves sometimes speak figuratively 
 
44 THE OEIGIN OF AinMAL-WOESHIP. 
 
 of a tall, fat man as a mountain of flesli ? And, among a 
 people prone to speak in still more concrete terms, would 
 it not happen tliat a chief, remarkable for his great bulk, 
 would be nicknamed after the highest mountain within 
 sight, because he towered above other men as this did 
 above surrounding hills?- Such an occurrence is not sim- 
 ply possible, but probable. And, if so, the confusion of 
 metaphor with fact would originate this surprising gene- 
 alogy. A notion perhaps yet more grotesque, thus re- 
 ceives a satisfactory interpretation. "What could have put 
 it into the imagination of any one that he was descended 
 from the dawn ? Given the extremest credulity, joined 
 with the wildest fancy, it would still seem requisite that 
 the ancestor should be conceived as an entity; and the 
 dawn is entirely without that definiteness and compara- 
 tive constancy which enter into the conception of an 
 entity. But when we remember that " the Dawn " is a 
 natural complimentary name for a beautiful girl opening 
 into womanhood, the genesis of the idea becomes, on the 
 above hypothesis, quite obvious. 
 
 Another indirect verification is that we thus get a 
 clear conception of Fetichisra in general. Under the feti- 
 chistic mode of thought, surrounding objects and agents 
 are regarded as having powers more or less definitely per- 
 sonal in their natures. And the current interpretation is, 
 that human intelligence, in its early stages, is obliged to 
 conceive of their powers under this form. I have myself 
 hitherto accepted this interpretation ; though always with 
 a sense of dissatisfaction. This dissatisfaction was, I 
 think, well grounded. The theory is scarcely a theory 
 properly so called; but rather, a restatement in other 
 words. Uncivilized men do habitually form anthropo- 
 morphic conceptions of surroimding things ; and this ob- 
 
OEIGIN OF FETIOHISM. 45 
 
 served general fact is transformed into the theory that at 
 first they must so conceive them — a theory for which the 
 psychological justification attempted, seems to me inade- 
 quate. From our present stand-point, it becomes mani- 
 fest that Fetichism is not primary but secondary. "What 
 has been said above almost of itself shovrs this. Let us, 
 however, follow out the steps of its genesis. Kespecting 
 the Tasmanians, Dr. Milligan says : " The names of men 
 and women were taken from natural objects and occur- 
 rences around, as, for instance, a kangaroo, a gum-tree, 
 snow, hail, thunder, the wind, flowers in blossom, etc." 
 Surrounding objects, then, giving origin to names of per- 
 sons, and being, in the way shown, eventually mistaken 
 for the actaal progenitors of those who descend from per- 
 sons nicknamed after them, it results that these surround- 
 ing objects come to be regarded as in some manner pos- 
 sessed of personalities like the human. He whose family 
 tradition is that his ancestor was " the Grab," will conceive 
 the crab as having a disguised inner power like his own ; 
 and alleged descent from "the palm-tree" will entail be- 
 lief in some kind of consciousness dwelling in the palm- 
 tree. Hence, in proportion as the animals, plants, and 
 inanimate objects or agents that originate names of per- 
 sons, become numerous (which they will do in proportion 
 as a tribe becomes large and the number of persons to bo 
 distinguished from one another increases), multitudinous 
 things around will acquire imaginary personalities. And 
 so it will happen that, as Mr. McLennan says of the Fee- 
 jeeans : " Vegetables and stones, nay, even tools and weap- 
 ons, pots and canoes, have souls that are immortal, and 
 that, like the souls of men, pass on at last to Mbulu, the 
 abode of departed spirits." Setting out, then, with a be- 
 lief in the still-living other self of the dead ancestor, the 
 alleged general cause of misapprehension affords us an 
 
46 THE OEIGIN OF ANIMAIi-WOESHIP. 
 
 intelligible origin of the fetiehistic conception ; and we 
 are enabled to see how it tends to become a general, if 
 not a universal, conception. 
 
 Other apparently inexplicable phenomena are at the 
 same time divested of their strangeness. I refer to the 
 beliefs in, and worship of, compound monsters — ^impossible 
 hybrid animals, and forms that are half human, half brutal. 
 The theory of a primordial Fetichism, supposing it other- 
 wise adequate, yields no feasible solution of these. Grant 
 the alleged original tendency to think of all natural agen- 
 cies as in some way personal. Grant, too, that hence may 
 arise a worship of animals, plants, and even inanimate 
 bodies. Still the obvious implication is that the worship 
 so derived will be limited to things that are, or have been, 
 perceived. "Why should this mode of thought lead the 
 savage to imagine a combination of bird and mammal ; 
 and not only to imagine it, but worship it as a god ? If 
 even we admit that some illusion may have suggested the 
 belief in a creature half man, half fish, we cannot thus 
 explain the prevalence among Eastern races of idols repre- 
 senting bird-headed men, men having their legs replaced 
 by the legs of a coct, and men with the heads of elephants. 
 
 Carrying with us the inferences above drawn, how- 
 ever, it is a manifest corollary that ideas and practices of 
 these kinds will arise. "When tradition preserves both 
 lines of ancestry — when a chief, nicknamed the "Wolf, car- 
 ries away from an adjacent tribe a wife who is remem- 
 bered either under the animal name of her tribe, or as a 
 woman ; it will happen that if a son distinguishes him- 
 self, the remembrance of him among his descendants will 
 be that he was born of a wolf and some other animal, or 
 of a wolf and a woman. Misinterpretation, arising in the 
 way described from defects of language, will entail belief 
 
MEAOTNGS OF ANCIENT MYTHS. 47 
 
 in a creature uijjtmg the attributes of the two ; and if the 
 tribe grows into a society, representations of such a crea- 
 ture will become objects of worship. One of the cases 
 cited by Mr. McLennan may here be repeated in illustra- 
 tion. " The story of the origin of the Dikokamenni Kir- 
 gheez," they say, " from a red greyhound and a certain 
 queen with her forty handmaidens, is of ancient date." 
 ISTow, if " the red greyhound " was the nickname of a man 
 extremely swift of foot (celebrated runners have been 
 similarly nicknamed among ourselves), a story of this 
 kind would naturally arise ; and if the metaphorical name 
 was mistaken for the actual name, there might result, as 
 the idol of the race, a compound form appropriate to the 
 story. We need not be surprised, then, at finding among 
 the Egyptians the goddess Pasht represented as a woman 
 with a lion's head, and the god Month as a man with the 
 head of a hawk. The Babylonian gods — one having the 
 form of a man with an eagle's tail, and another uniting a 
 human bust to a fish's body — no longer appear such un- 
 accountable conceptions. We get feasible explanations, 
 too, of sculptures representing sphinxes, winged human- 
 headed bulls, etc. ; as well as of the stories about centaurs, 
 satyrs, and the rest. 
 
 Ancient myths in general thus acquire meanings con- 
 siderably different from those ascribed to them by com- 
 parative mythologists. Though these last may be in part 
 correct, yet if the foregoing argument is valid, they can 
 scarcely be correct in their main outlines. Indeed, if we 
 read the iacts the other way upward, regarding as sec- 
 ondary or additional the elements that are said to be pri- 
 mary, while we regard as primary certain elements which 
 are considered as accretions of later times, we shall, I 
 think, be nearer the truth. 
 
48 THE OEIGIN OF ANIMAL-WOESHIP. 
 
 Tlie current theory of the myth is th|t it has grown 
 out of the habit of symbolizing natural agents and pro- 
 cesses, in terms of human personalities and actions. Now. 
 it may in the first place be remarked that, though sym- 
 bolization of this kind is common enough among civilized 
 races, it is not common among races that are the most 
 uncivilized. By existing savages, surrounding objects, 
 motions, and changes, are habitually used to convey ideas 
 respecting human transactions. It is by no means so 
 much the habit to express by the doings of men the course 
 of natural phenomena. It needs but to read the speech 
 of an Indian chief to see that just as primitive men name 
 one another metaphorically after surrounding objects, so 
 do they metaphorically describe one another's doings as 
 though they were the doings of natural objects. But as- 
 suming a contrary habit of thought to be the dominant 
 one, ancient myths are explained as results of the primi- 
 tive tendency to symbolize inanimate things and their 
 changes, by human beings and their doings. 
 
 A kindred difiBculty must be added. The change of 
 verbal meaning from which the myth is said to arise, is a 
 change opposite in kind to that which prevails in the 
 earlier stages of linguistic development. It implies a 
 derivation of the concrete from the abstract ; whereas at 
 first abstracts are derived only from concretes : the con- 
 creting of abstracts being a subsequent process. In the 
 words of Prof. Max MiiUer, there are " dialects spoken at 
 the present day which have no abstract nouns, and the 
 more we go back in the history of languages, the smaller 
 we find the number of these useful expressions " (" Chips," 
 vol. ii., p. 54); or, as he says more recently: '"Aneieiit 
 words and ancient thoughts, for both go together, have 
 not yet arrived at that stage of abstraction in which, for 
 instance, active powers, whether natural or supernatural. 
 
COHTEADIOXIONS OF THE CUEEENT HYPOTHESIS. 49 
 
 can be represented in any but a personal and more or less 
 human form." {Fraser's Magazine, April, 1870.) Here 
 the concrete is represented as original, and the abstract 
 as derivative. Immediately afterward, however, Prof. 
 Max Miiller, having given as examples of abstract nouns, 
 " day and night, spring and winter, dawn and twilight, 
 storm and thunder," goes on to argue that, " as long as 
 people thought in language, it was simply impossible to 
 speak of morning or evening, of spring and winter, with- 
 out giving to these conceptions something of an indi- 
 vidual, active, sexual, and at last personal character." 
 (" Chips," etc., vol. ii., p. 55.) Here the concrete is de- 
 rived from the abstract — the personal conception is repre- 
 sented as coming after the impersonal conception ; and 
 through such transformation of the impersonal into the 
 personal, Prof. Max Miiller considers ancient myths to 
 have arisen. How are these propositions reconcilable? 
 One of two things must be said : If originally there were 
 none of these abstract nouns, then the earliest statements 
 respecting the daily course of liTature were made in con- 
 crete terms — the personal elements of the myth were the 
 primitive elements, and the impersonal expressions which 
 are their equivalents came later. If this is not admitted, 
 then it must be held that, until after there arose these ab- 
 stract nouns, there were no current statements at all 
 respecting these most conspicuous objects and changes 
 which the heavens and the earth present ; and that the 
 abstract nouns having been somehow formed, and rightly 
 formed, and used without personal meanings, aftOTward 
 became personaliized — a process the reverse of that which 
 characterizes early linguistic progress. 
 
 !N"o such contradictions occur if we interpret myths 
 after the manner that has been indicated. 'E&j, besides 
 escaping contradictions, we meet with unexpected solu- 
 3 
 
50 THE OEIGUSr OF AMIMAX-WOESHIP. 
 
 tions. The moment we try it, the key xmloeks for us with 
 ease what seems a quite inexplicable fact, which the cur- 
 rent hypothesis takes as one of its postulates. Speaking 
 of such words as sky and earth, dew and rain, rivers and 
 mountains, as well as of the abstract nouns above named. 
 Prof. Max Miiller says : " Now, in ancient languages every 
 one of these words had necessarily a termination expres- 
 sive of gender, and this naturally produced in the mind 
 the corresponding idea of sex, so that these names received 
 not only an individual but a sexual character. There 
 was no substantive which was not either masculine or 
 feminine ; neuters being of later growth, and distinguish- 
 able chiefly in the nominative." (" Chips," etc., vol. ii., 
 p. 55.) And this alleged necessity for a masculine or 
 feminine implication is assigned as a part of the reason 
 why these abstract nouns and collective nouns became 
 personalized. But should not a true theory of these first 
 steps in the evolution of thought and language show us 
 how it happened that men acquired the seemingly-strange 
 habit of so framing their words for sky, earth, dew, rain, 
 etc., as to make them indicative of sex ? Or, at any rate, 
 must it not be admitted that an interpretation which, in- 
 stead of assuming this habit to be " necessary," shows us 
 how it results, thereby acquires an additional claim to 
 acceptance? The interpretation I have indicated does 
 this. If men and women are habitually nicknamed, and 
 if defects of language lead their descendants to regard 
 themselves as descendants of the things from which the 
 names were taken, then masculine or feminine genders 
 will be ascribed to these things according as the ancestors 
 named after them were men or women. If a beautiful 
 maiden known metaphorically as " the Dawn," afterward 
 becomes the mother of some distinguished chief called 
 " the North "Wind," it will result that when, in course of 
 
HXJTNTAN PAEENTAQE AND NON-HUMCAIT ATTEIBUTES. 51 
 
 time, the two have been mistaken for the actual dawn and 
 the actual north wind, these will, by implication, be re- 
 spectively considered as male and female. 
 
 Looking, now, at the ancient myths in general, their 
 seemingly most inexplicable trait is the habitual combi- 
 nation of alleged human ancestry and adventures, with 
 the possession of personalities otherwise figuring in the 
 heavens and on the earth, with totally non-human attri- 
 butes. This enormous incongruity, not the exception but 
 the rule, the current theory fails to explain. Suppose it 
 to be granted that the great terrestrial and celestial ob- 
 jects and agents naturally become personalized ; it does 
 not follow that each of them shall have a specific human 
 biography. To say of some star that he was the son of 
 this king or that hero, was born in a particular place, and 
 when grown up carried off the wife of a neighboring chief, 
 is a gratuitous multiplication of incongruities already 
 sufficiently great ; and is not accounted for by the alleged 
 necessary personalization of abstract and collective nouns. 
 As looked at from our present stand-point, however, such 
 traditions become quite natural — nay, it is clear that they 
 will necessarily arise. When a nickname has become a 
 tribal name, it thereby ceases to be individually distinc- 
 tive ; and, as already said, the process of nicknaming 
 incYitably continues. It commences afresh with each 
 child ; and the nickname of each child is both an individ- 
 ual name and a potential tribal name, which may become 
 an actual tribal name if the individual is sufficiently cele- 
 brated. Usually, then, there is a double system of distin- 
 guishing the individual ; under one of which, he is known 
 by his ancestral name, and under the other of which he is 
 known by a name suggestive of something peculiar to 
 himself : just as we have seen happens among the Scotch 
 clans. Consider, now, what will result when language 
 
52 THE OEIGIN OF ANIMAL WOESHIP. 
 
 has reached a stage of development such that it can con- 
 vey the notion of naming, and is able, therefore, to pre- 
 serve traditions of human ancestry : the preservation of 
 " such traditions being furthered by those corruptions of 
 ■ tribal names which render them no longer suggestive of 
 the things they were derived from. It will result that the 
 individual will be known both as the son of such and 
 such a man by a mother whose name was so-and-so, and 
 also as the Crab, or the Bear, or the Whirlwind— suppos- 
 ing one of these to be his nickname. Such joint use of 
 nicknames and proper names occurs in every school, l^ow, 
 clearly, in advancing from the early state in which ances- 
 tors become identiiied with the objects they are nick- 
 named after, to the state in which there are proper names 
 that have lost their metaphorical meanings, there must be 
 passed through a state in which proper names, partially 
 settled only, may or may not be preserved, and in which 
 the new nicknames are still liable to be mistaken for act- 
 ual names. Under such conditions there will arise (es- 
 pecially in the case of a distinguished man) this seeming- 
 ly-impossible combination of human parentage with the 
 possession of the non-human, or superhuman, attributes 
 of the thing which gave the nickname. Another anomaly 
 simultaneously disappears. The warrior may have, and 
 often will have, a variety of complimentary nicknames — 
 " the powerful one," " the destroyer," etc. Supposing 
 his leading nickname has been the Sun, then when he 
 comes to be identified by tradition with the sun, it will 
 happen that the sun will acquire his alternative descrip- 
 tive titles — the swift one, the lion, the wolf — titles not 
 obviously appropriate to the sun, but quite appropriate to 
 the warrior. Then there comes, too, an explanation of 
 the remaining trait of such myths. When this identifica- 
 tion of conspicuous persons, male and female, with con- 
 
ANTHEOPOMOEPHIO INTEEPEETATIONS. 53 
 
 spicuous natural agents, has become settled, there will in 
 due course arise interpretations of the actions of these 
 agents in anthropomorphic terms. Suppose, for instance, 
 that Endymion and Selene, metaphorically named, the 
 one after the setting sun, the other after the moon, have 
 had their human individualities merged in those of the 
 sun and moon, through misinterpretation of metaphors ; 
 what will happen ? The legend of their loves having to 
 be reconciled with their celestial appearances and motions, 
 these will be spoken of as results of feeling and will ; so 
 that when the sun is going down in the west, while the 
 moon in mid-heaven is following him, the fact will be ex- 
 pressed by saying : " Selene loves and watches Endym- 
 ion." Thus we obtain a consistent explanation of the 
 myth without distorting it ; and without assuming that 
 it contains gratuitous fictions. We are enabled to accept 
 the biographical part of it, if -not as literal fact, still as 
 having had fact for its root. We are helped to see how, 
 by an inevitable misinterpretation, there grew out of a 
 more or less true tradition, this strange identification of 
 its personages, with objects and powers totally non-human 
 in their aspects. And then we are shown how, from tlje 
 attempt to reconcile in thought these contradictory ele- 
 ments of the myth, there arose the habit of ascribing the 
 actions of these non-human things to human motives. 
 
 One further verification may be drawn from facts 
 which are obstacles to the converse hypothesis. These 
 objects and powers, celestial and terrestrial, which force 
 themselves most on men's attention, have some of them 
 several proper names, identified with those of different 
 individuals, born at different places, and having different 
 sets of adventures. Thus we have the sun variously 
 known as Apollo, Endymion, Helios, Tithonos, etc. — ^per- 
 sonages having irreconcilable genealogies. Such anoma- 
 
54: THE OEIGIN OF ANIMAL-WOESHIP. 
 
 lies Prof. Max Miiller apparently ascribes to the untrust- 
 worthiness of traditions, wliicli are " careless about con- 
 tradictions, or ready to solve them sometimes by the most 
 atrocious expedients." (" Chips," etc., vol. ii., p. 84.) But 
 if the evolution of the myth has been that above indicated, 
 there exist no anomalies to be got rid of: these diverse 
 genealogies become parts of the evidence. For we have 
 abundant proof that the same objects furnish metaphori- 
 cal names of men in different tribes. There are Duck 
 tribes in Australia, in South America, in IsTorth America. 
 The eagle is still a totem among the North Americans, as 
 Mr. McLennan shows reason to conclude that it was 
 among the Egyptians, among the Jpws, and among the 
 Romans. Obviously, for reasons that have been assigned, 
 it naturally happened in the early stages of the ancient 
 races, that complimentary comparisons of their heroes to 
 the sun were frequently. made. "WTiat resulted? The 
 sun having furnished names for sundry chiefs and early 
 founders of tribes, and local traditions having severally 
 identified them with the sun, these tribes, when they grew, 
 spread, conquered, or came otherwise into partial" union, 
 originated a combined mythology, which necessarily con- 
 tained conflicting stories about the sun-god, as about its 
 other leading personages. If the Ilforth-American tribes, 
 among several of which there are traditions of a sun-god, 
 had developed a combined civilization, there would simi- 
 larly have arisen among them a mythology which ascribed 
 to the sun several different proper names and genealogies. 
 
 Let me briefly set down the leading characters of this 
 hypothesis which give it probability. 
 
 True interpretations of all the natural processes, or- 
 ganic and inorganic, that have gone on in past times, 
 habitually trace them to causes still in action. It is thus 
 
EEASONS FOE ADOPTING THIS VIEW. 55 
 
 in Geology ; it is thus in Biology ; it is thus in Philology. 
 Here we find this characteristic repeated. Nicknaming, 
 the inheritance of nicknames, and, to some extent, the 
 misinterpretation of nicknames, go among us still ; and 
 were surnames absent, language imperfect, and knowledge 
 as rudimentary as of old, it is tolerably manifest that re- 
 sults would arise like those we have contemplated. 
 
 A further characteristic of a true cause is that it ac- 
 counts not only for the particular group. of phenomena to 
 be interpreted, but also for other groups. The cause here 
 alleged does this. It equally well explains the worship 
 of animals, of plants, of mountains, of winds, of celestial 
 bodies, and even of appearances too vague to be consid- 
 ered entities. It gives us an intelligible genesis of feti- 
 chistie conceptions in general. It furnishes us with a 
 reason for the practice, otherwise so unaccountable, of 
 moulding the words applied to inanimate objects in such 
 ways as to imply masculine and feminine genders. It 
 shows us how there naturally arose the worship of com- 
 pound animals, and of monsters half man half brute. And 
 it shows us why the worship of purely anthropomorphic 
 deities came later, when language had so far developed 
 that it could preserve in tradition the distinction between 
 proper names and nicknames. 
 
 A further verification of this view is, that it conforms 
 to the general law of evolution : showing us how, out of 
 one simple, vague, aboriginal form of belief, there have 
 arisen, by continuous differentiations, the many hetero- 
 geneous forms of belief which have existed and do exist. 
 The desire to propitiate the other self of the dead ances- 
 tor, displayed among savage tribes, dominantly manifested 
 by the early historic races, by the Peruvians and Mexi- 
 cans, by the Chinese at the present time, and to a consid- 
 erable degree by ourselves (for what else is the wish to do 
 
56 THE OEiam of animal-woeship. 
 
 that which a lately-deceased parent was known to have 
 desired ?), has been the universal first form of religious be- 
 lief ; and from it have grown up the many divergent be- 
 liefs that have been referred to. 
 
 Let me add, as a further reason for adopting this view, 
 that it immensely diminishes the apparently-great con- 
 trast between early modes of thought and our own mode 
 of thought. Doubtless the aboriginal man differs con- 
 siderably from us_, both in intellect and feeling. But such 
 an interpretatioa of the facts as helps us to bridge over the 
 gap, derives additional likelihood from doing this. The 
 hypothesis I have sketched out enables us to see that 
 primitive ideas are not so gratuitously absurd as we sup- 
 pose, and also enables us to rehabilitate the ancient myth 
 with far less distortion than at first sight appears possible. 
 
 These views I hope to develop in the first part of 
 " The Principles of Sociology." The large mass of evi- 
 dence which I shall be able to give in support of the hypoth- 
 esis, joined with the solutions it will be shown to yield 
 of many minor problems which I have passed over, will, 
 I think, then give to it a still greater probability than it 
 seems now to have. 
 
III. 
 
 THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 
 
PEEFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 The first edition of this Essay is not yet out of 
 print. But a proposal to translate it into Frencli 
 having been made by Professor Eethore, I have 
 decided- to prepare a new edition free from the im- 
 perfections which criticism and further thought have 
 disclosed, rather than allow these imperfections to be 
 reproduced. 
 
 The occasion has almost tempted me into some 
 amplification. Further arguments against the classi- 
 fication of M. Comte, and further arguments in sup- 
 port of the classification here set forth, have pleaded 
 for utterance. But reconsideration has convinced 
 me that it is both needless and useless to say more 
 — ^needless because those who are not committed will 
 think the case sufficiently strong as it stands, and 
 useless because to those who are committed additional 
 reasons will seem as inadequate as the original ones. 
 
 This last conclusion is thrust on me by seeing how 
 little M. Littre, the leading expositor of M. Comte, 
 is influenced, by fundamental objections the force of 
 which he admits. After quoting one of these, he 
 
60 PEEFACE. 
 
 says, with a candour equally rare and admirable, that 
 he has vainly searched M. Comte's works and his 
 own mind for an answer. Nevertheless, he adds — ^ 
 "j'ai reussi, je crois, a ecarter I'attaque de M. Her- 
 bert Spencer, et a sauver le fond par des sacrifices 
 indispensables mais accessoires." The sacrifices are 
 these. He abandons M. Comte's division of In- 
 organic Science into Celestial Physics and Ter- 
 restrial Physics — a division which, in M. Comte's 
 scheme, takes precedence of all the rest ; and he 
 admits that neither logically nor historically does 
 Astronomy come before Physics, as M. Comte alleges. 
 After making these sacrifices, which most will think 
 too lightly described as ^' sacrifices indispensables 
 mais accessoires," M. Littre proceeds to rehabilitate 
 the Comt^an classification in a way which he con- 
 siders satisfactory, but which I do not understand. 
 In short, the proof of these incongruities affects his 
 faith in the Positivist theory of the sciences, no 
 more than the faith of a Christian is affected by 
 proof that the Gospels contradict one another. 
 
 Here in England I have seen no attempt to meet 
 the criticisms with which M. Littre thus deals. 
 There has been no reply to the allegation, based on 
 examples, that the several sciences do not develop 
 in the order of their decreasing generality ; nor to 
 the- allegation, based on M. Comte's own admissions, 
 that within each science the progress is not, as he 
 says it is, from the genjeral to the special; nor to 
 
PREFACE. 61 
 
 the allegation that the seeming historical precedence 
 of Astronomy over Physics in M. Comte's pages, is 
 based on a verbal ambiguity — a mere sleight of 
 words ; nor to the allegation, abundantly illustrated, 
 that a progression in an order the reverse of that 
 asserted by M. Comte may be as -well substantiated ; 
 nor to various minor allegations equally irreooncile- 
 able with his scheme. I have met with nothing 
 more than iteration of the statement that the sciences 
 do conform, logically and historically, to the order in 
 which M. Comte places them ; regardless of the as- 
 signed evidence that they do not. 
 
 Under these circumstances it is unnecessary for mc 
 to say more ; and I think I am warranted in con- 
 tinuing to hold that the Comtean classification of the 
 sciences is demonstrably untenable. 
 
 While, however, I have not entered further into the 
 controversy, as I thought of doing, I have added at 
 the close an already-published discussion, no longer 
 easily accessible, which indirectly enforces the general 
 argument. 
 
 loNiioif, 23ed Ateil, 1869, 
 
PREFACE TO THE THIED EDITION. 
 
 In the preface to the second edition, I have de- 
 scribed myself as resisting the temptation to amplify, 
 which the occasion raised. Keasons have since arisen 
 for yielding to the desire which I then felt to add 
 justifications of the scheme set forth. 
 
 The immediate cause for this change of resolve, has 
 been the publication of several objections by Prof. 
 Bain in his Logic Permanently embodied, as these 
 objections are, in a work intended for the use of 
 students, they demand more attention than such as 
 have been made in the course of ordinary criticism; 
 since, if they remain unanswered, their prejudicial 
 eflfects will be more continuous. 
 
 "While to dispose of these I seize the opportunity 
 afforded by a break in my ordinary work, I have 
 thought it well at the same time to strengthen my 
 own argument, by a re-statement from a changed 
 point of view. 
 
 Feb., 1871. 
 
THE 
 
 CLASSIFICATION OE THE SCIENCES. 
 
 In an essay on "The Genesis of Science," originally 
 published in 1854*1 endeavoured to show that the 
 Sciences cannot be rationally . arranged in serial order. 
 Proof was giyeh that neither the succession in which 
 the Sciences are placed by M. Comte (to a criticism of 
 whose scheme the essay was in part devoted), nor any 
 other succession in which the Sciences can be placed, 
 represents either their logical dependence or their his- 
 torical dependence. To the question — How may their 
 relations be rightly expressed ? I did not then attempt 
 any answer. This question I propose now to con- 
 sider. 
 
 A true classification includes in each class, those 
 objects which have more characteristics in common 
 with one another, than any of them have in common 
 with any objects excluded from tlie class. Further, 
 the characteristics possessed iu common by the colli- 
 gated' objects, and not possessed by other objects, are 
 more radical than any cliaracteristics possessed in 
 common with other objects — involve more numerous 
 
 * Contained in the " Illustrations of TTniversal Progress." 
 
64: CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 
 
 dependent characteristics. These are two sides of the 
 same definition. For things possessing the greatest 
 number of attributes in common, are things that pos- 
 sess in common those essential attributes on which the 
 rest depend; and, conversely, the possession in com- 
 mon of the essential attributes, implies the possession 
 in common of the greatest number of attributes. Hence, 
 either test may be used as convenience dictates. 
 
 If, then, the Sciences admit of classification at all, it 
 must be by grouping together the like and separating 
 the unlike, as thus defined. Let us proceed to do this. 
 
 The broadest natural division among the Sciences, 
 is the division between those which deal with the ab- 
 stract relations under which phenomena are presented 
 to us, and those which deal with the phenomena them- 
 selves. Eelations of whatever orders, are nearer akin 
 to one another than they are to any objects. Objects 
 of whatever orders, are nearer akin to one another 
 than they are to any relations. Whether, as some 
 hold. Space and Time are forms of Thought; or 
 whether, as I hold myself, they are forms of Things, 
 that have become forms of Thought through organ- 
 ized and inherited experience of Things ; it is equally 
 true that Space and Time are contrasted absolutely 
 with the existences disclosed to us in Space and Time 
 and that the Sciences which deal exclusively with 
 Space and Time, are separated by the profoundest of 
 all distinctions from the Sciences which deal with the 
 
ALL PHENOMENA COMPOSITE. 65 
 
 existences that Space and Time contain. " Space is the 
 abstract of all relations of co-existence. Time is the 
 abstract of all relations of sequence. And dealing as 
 they do entirely with relations of co-existence and 
 sequence, in their general or special forms, Logic and 
 Mathematics form a class of the Sciences more widely 
 unlike the rest, than any of the rest can be from one 
 another. 
 
 The Sciences which deal with existences themselves, 
 instead of the blank forms in which existences are pre- 
 sented to us, admit of a sub-division less profound than 
 the division above made, but more profound than any 
 of the divisions among the Sciences individually con- 
 sidered. They fall into two classes, having quite dif- 
 ferent aspects, aims, and methods. Every phenomenon 
 is more or less composite — is a manifestation of force 
 under several distinct modes. Hence result two ob- 
 jects of inquiry. We may study the component modes 
 of force separately ; or we may study them in their 
 relations, as co-operative factors in this composite phe- 
 nomenon. On the one hand, neglecting all the inci- 
 dents of particular cases, we may aim to educe tlie 
 laws of each mode of force, when it is uninterfered 
 with. On the other hand, the incidents of the parti- 
 cular case being given, we may seek to interpret the 
 entire phenomenon, as a product of the several forces 
 simultaneously in action. The truths reached through 
 the first kind of inquiry, though concrete inasmuch as 
 they have actual existences for their subject-matters, 
 
66 
 
 CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 
 
 are abstract inasmuch as they refer to the modes of 
 existence apart from one another; while the truths 
 reached by the second kind of inquiry are properly 
 concrete, inasmuch as they formulate the facts in their 
 combined order, as they occur in Nature. 
 
 The Sciences, then, in their main divisions, stand 
 thus : — 
 
 SCIENCE is i 
 
 that whicli treats of tho fonns in ) Absteact / Logic and \ 
 which jihenomena are known to us ) Science \ Mathematics. / 
 
 thnt which treats of tho 
 phenomena themselves < 
 
 . ., . ) ABSTnACT- /Mechanics, \ 
 in their I Conokete ( Physics, \ 
 
 elements j g^^^^^ \Chemis[ry,ctc. / 
 
 (Astronomy, v 
 Geology,Biology,\ 
 Psychology, J 
 Sociology, etc. / 
 
 It is needful to define the words abstract and con- 
 crete as thus used'; since they are sometimes used 
 Avith other meanings. M. Comte divides Science into 
 abstract and concrete; but the divisions which he 
 distinguishes by these names are quite unlike those 
 above made. Instead of regarding some Sciences 
 as wholly abstract, and others as wholly concrete, he 
 regards each Science as having an abstract part, and 
 a concrete part. There is, according to him, an 
 abstract mathematics and a concrete mathematics — an 
 
THE ABSTRACT AND THE GENERAL. 67 
 
 abstract biology and concrete biology. He says: — 
 "II faut distinguer, par rapport a tous les ordres de 
 plieuomenes, deux genres de sciences naturelles: les 
 unes abstraites, generales, ont pour objet la decouverto 
 des lois qui regissent les diverses classes de pheno- 
 menes, en considerant tous les cas qu'on peut con- 
 cevior ; les autres concretes, particulieres, descriptives, 
 at qu'on designe quelquefois sous le nom de sciences 
 naturelles proprement dites, consistent dans I'applica- 
 tion de ces lois a I'histoire eifective de differens etres 
 existans." And to illustrate the distinction, he names 
 general physiology as abstract, and zoology and botany 
 as concrete. Here it is manifest that the words 
 abstract and general are used as synonymous. They 
 have, however, different meanings ; and confusion 
 results from not distinguishing their meanings. Ab- 
 stractness means detachment from the incidents of parti- 
 cular eases. Generality means manifestation in numerous 
 cases. On the one hand, the essential nature of soipe 
 phenomenon is considered, apart from disguising phe- 
 nomena. On the other hand, the frequency of the 
 phenomenon, with or without disguising phenomena, 
 is the thing considered. Among the ideal relations of 
 numbers the two coincide ; but excluding these, an 
 abstract truth is not realizable to perception in any 
 case in which it is asserted, whereas a general truth is 
 realizable to perception in every case of which it is 
 asserted. Some illustrations will make the distinction 
 clear. Thus it is an abstract truth that the angle contained 
 
68 
 
 CLASSIFICATIOIT OF THE SCIENCES^ 
 
 in a semi-circle is a right angle — abstract in the sense 
 that though it does not hold in actually-constructed 
 semi-circles and angles, which are always inexact, it 
 holds in the ideal semi-circles and angles abstracted 
 from real ones ; but this is not a general truth, either 
 in the sense that it is commonly manifested in Nature, 
 or in the sense that it is a space-relation that compre- 
 hends many minor space-relations : it is a quite 
 special space-relation. Again, that the momentum 
 of a body causes it to move in a straight line at a 
 uniform velocity, is an abstract-concrete truth — a 
 truth abstracted from certain experiences of concrete 
 phenomena ; but it is by no means a general truth : 
 so little generality has it, that no one fact in Nature 
 displays it. Conversely, surrounding things supply 
 us with hosts of general truths that are not in the 
 least abstract. It is a general truth that the planets 
 go round the Sun from "West to East — a truth which 
 holds good in something like a hundred cases (includ- 
 ing the cases of the planetoids) ; but this truth 
 is not at all abstract, since it is perfectly realized 
 as a concrete fact in every one of these cases. Every 
 vertebrate animal whatever, has a double nervous 
 system ; all birds and all mammals are warm- 
 blooded — these are general truths, but they are 
 concrete truths : that is to say, every vertebrate 
 animal individually presents an entire and unqualified 
 manifestation of this duality of the nervous system ; 
 every living bird exemplifies absolutely or completely 
 
WHAT IS A GENEEAL TEUTH. 69 
 
 the warm-bloodedness of birds. What we here call; 
 and rightly call, a general truth, is simply a pro- 
 position which stims tip a number of our actual expe- 
 riences J and not the expression of a truth drawn 
 from our actual exiieriences, but never presented to 
 us in any of them. In other words, a general truth 
 colligates a number of particular truths ; while an 
 abstract truth colligates no particular truths, but 
 formulates a truth which certain phenomena all in- 
 volve, though it is actually seen in none of them. 
 
 Limiting the words to their proper meanings as 
 thus defined, it becomes manifest that the three classes 
 of Sciences above separated, are not distinguishable 
 at all by differences in their degrees of generality. 
 They are all equally general ; or rather they are 
 all, considered as groups, universal. Every object 
 whatever presents at once the subject-matter for each 
 of them. In the smallest particle of substance we 
 have simultaneously illustrated the abstract truths 
 of relation in Time and Space ; the abstract-concrete 
 truths in conformity with -^v^hich the particle mani- 
 fests its several modes of force ; and the concrete 
 truths which are the laws of the joint manifestation 
 of these modes of force. Thus these three classes of 
 Sciences severally formulate different, but co-extensive, 
 classes of facts. Within each group there are truths of 
 greater and less generality : there are general abstract 
 truths, and special abstract truths ; general abstract- 
 concrete truths, and special abstract-concrete truths ' 
 
YO CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 
 
 general concrete truths, and special concrete truths. 
 But while within each class there are groups and 
 sub-groups and sub-sub-groups which differ in their 
 degrees of generality, the classes themselves differ 
 only in their degrees of abstractness.* 
 
 * Some propositions laid down by M. Littre, in his lately-published book — 
 Aur/uste Comte et la Fhilosophie Positive, may fitly be dealt ■with here. In the 
 candid and courteous reply he makes to my strictures on the Comtean classifica- 
 tion in " The Genesis of Science," he endeavours to clear up some of the incon- 
 sistencies I pointed out; and he does this by drawing a distinction between 
 objective generality and subjective generality. He says — " qu'il existe deux 
 ordres de generalite, I'une objective et dans Ics choses, I'autre subjective, abstraite 
 et dans I'esprit." This sentence, in which M. Littre makessubjective generality 
 synonymous with abstractness, led me at first to conclude that he had in view the 
 same distinction as that which I have above explained between generality and 
 abstractness. On re-reading the paragraph, however, I found this was not the 
 case. In a previous sentence he says — " La biologie a passe de la consideration 
 des organes 5, celles des tissus, plus generaux que les organes, et de la consideration 
 dcs tissus a celle des elements anatomiques, plus generaux que les tissus. Mais 
 cctte generalite croissante est subjective non objective, abstraite non concrete." 
 Here it is manifest that abstract and concrete, are used in senses analogous to 
 those in which they are used by M. Comte; who, as we have seen, regards 
 general physiology as abstract and zoology and botany as concrete. And it is 
 further manifest that the word abstract, as thus used, is not used in its proper 
 sense. J?or, as above shown, no such facts as those of anatomical structure can 
 be abstract facts ; but can only be more or less general facts . Nor do I under- 
 stand M. Littre's point of view when he regards these more general facts of 
 anatomical stiiicture, as subjectively general and not ohjectively general. The 
 structural phenomena presented by any tissue, such as mucous membrane, are 
 more general than the phenomena presented by any of the organs which mucous 
 membrane goes to form, simply in the sense that the phenomena peculiar to the 
 membrane are repeated in a greater number of instances than the phenomena 
 peculiar to any organ into the composition of which the membrane enters. And, 
 similarly, such facts as have •been established respecting the anatomical elements 
 of tissues, are more general than the facts established respecting any particular 
 tissue, in the sense that they are facts which organic bodies exhibit iu a greater 
 number of cases — they are ohjeetimly more general; and they can be called 
 subjectively more general only in the sense that the conception corresponds with 
 the phenomena. 
 
 Let me endeavour to clear up this point : — There is, as M. Littr^ truly savs, 
 a decreasing generality that is objective. If we omit the phenomena of Dissolu- 
 tion, which are changes from the special to the general, all changes which matter 
 •indcrgoes are from the general to the special — arc changes involving a decreasing 
 
ABSTRACT SCIENCE. 71 
 
 Passing to the sub-divisions of these classes, we find 
 that the first class is separable into two parts— the 
 one containing universal truths, the other non-uni- 
 versal truths. Dealing wholly with relations apart 
 from related things, Abstract Science considers first, 
 that which is common to all relations whatever ; and 
 second, that Avhich is common to each order of rela- 
 tions. Besides the indefinite and variable connexions 
 which exist among phenomena, as occurring together 
 in Space and Time, we find that there are also definite 
 
 generality in the united groups of attributes. This is the progress of things. 
 The progress of thought, is not only in the same direction, but also in the oppo- 
 site direction. The investigation of Nature discloses an increasing number of 
 specialities ; but it simultaneously discloses more and more the generalities within 
 which these specialities fall. Take a case. Zoology, while it goes on multiply- 
 ing the number of its species, and getting a more complete knowledge of each 
 species (decreasing generality) ; also goes on discovering the common characters by 
 which species are united into larger groups (increasing generality). Both these 
 are subjective processes ; and in this ease, both orders of truths reached are con- 
 crete — formulate the phenomena as actually manifested. 
 
 M. Littr^, recognizing the necessity for some modification of the hierarchy of 
 the Sciences, as enunciated by M. Comte, still regards it as substantially true ; 
 and for proof of its validity, he appeals mainly to the essential constitutions of the 
 Sciences. It is unnecessary for me here to meet, in detail, the arguments by 
 •which he supports the proposition, that the essential constitutions of the Sciences, 
 justify the order in which M. Comte places them. It will suffice to refer to the 
 foregoing pages, and to the pages which are to follow, as containing the defini- 
 • tions of those fundamental characteristics which demand the grouping of the 
 Sciences in the way pointed out. As already shown, and as ivill be shown still 
 more clearly by and bye, the radical differences of constitution among the 
 Sciences, necessitate the colligation of them into the three classes — Abstract, 
 Abstract-Concrete, and Concrete. How irreconcilable is M. Comte's classification 
 with these groups, will be at once apparent on inspection" It stands thus : — 
 
 Mathematics (including rational Mechanics), partly Abstract, partly 
 
 Abstract-Concrete. 
 
 Astronomy Concrete. 
 
 Physics Abstract-Concrete. 
 
 Chemistry Abstract-Concrete. 
 
 Biology Concrete. 
 
 Sociology. Concrete. 
 
72 CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 
 
 and invariable connexions — that between each kind of 
 phenomenon and certain other kinds of phenomena, 
 there exist uniform relations. This is a universal 
 abstract truth — that there is an unchanging order 
 among things in Space and Time. We come next 
 to the several kinds of unchanging order, which, 
 taken together, form the subjects of the second 
 division of Abstract Science. Of this second divi- 
 sion, the most general sub-division is that which 
 deals with the natures of the connexions in Space 
 and Time, irrespective of the terms connected. The 
 conditions under which we may predicate a rela- 
 tion of coincidence or proximity in Space and 
 Time (or of non-coincidence or non-proximity) form 
 the subject-matter of Logic. Here the natures and 
 amounts of the terms between which the relations are 
 asserted (or denied) are of no moment : the proposi- 
 tions of Logic are independent of any qualitative 
 or quantitative specification of the related things. 
 The other sub-division has for its subject-matter, the' 
 relations between terms which are specified quanti- 
 tatively but not qualitatively. The amounts of the 
 related terms, irrespective of their natures, are here 
 dealt with; and Mathematics is a statement of the 
 laws of quantity considered apart, from reality. Quan- 
 tity considered apart from reality, is occupancy of 
 Space or Time; and occupancy of Space or Time 
 is measured by the number of coexistent or sequent 
 positions occupied. That is to say, quantities can be 
 
MATHEMATICAL IDEAS, 73 
 
 compared and the relations between them established, 
 only by some direct or indirect enumeration of their 
 component units; and the ultimate units into which 
 all others are decomposable, are such occupied posi- 
 tions in Space as can^ by making impressions on 
 consciousness, produce occupied positions in Time. 
 Among units that are unspecified in their natures 
 (extensive, protensive, or intensive), but are ideally 
 endowed with existence considered apart from attri- 
 butes, the quantitative relations that arise, are those 
 most general relations expressed by numbers. Such 
 relations fall into either of two orders, according as 
 the units are considered simply as capable of filling 
 separate places in consciousness, or according as they 
 are considered as filling places that are not only sepa- 
 rate, but equal. In the one case, we have that inde- 
 finite calculus by which numbers of abstract existences, 
 but not sums of abstract existence, are predicable. In 
 the other case, we have that definite calculus by which 
 both numbers of abstract existences and sums of 
 abstract existence are predicable. Next comes that 
 division of Mathematics which deals with the quanti- 
 tative relations of magnitudes (or aggregates of units) 
 considered as coexistent, or as occupying Space — the 
 division called Geometry. And then we arrive at 
 relations, the terms of which include both quantities 
 of Time and quantities of Space — those in which 
 times are estimated by the units of space traversed 
 at a uniform velocity, and those in which equal 
 
T4 CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCISS. 
 
 units of time being given, tlie spaces traversed with 
 uniform or variable velocities are estimated. These 
 Abstract Sciences, which are concerned exclusively 
 with relations and with the relations of relations, may- 
 be grouped as shown in Table I. 
 
 Passing from the Sciences that treat of the ideal or 
 unoccupied forms of relations, and turning to the 
 Sciences that treat of real relations, or the relations 
 among realities, we come first to those Sciences which 
 deal with realities, not as they are habitually mani- 
 fested to us, but with realities as manifested in their 
 different modes, when these are artificially separated 
 from one another. In the same way that the Abstract 
 Sciences are ideal, relatively to the Abstract-Concrete 
 and Concrete Sciences ; so the Abstract-Concrete 
 Sciences are ideal, relatively to the Concrete Sciences. 
 Just as Logic and Mathematics have for their object 
 to generalize the laws of relation, qualitative and 
 quantitative, apart from related things; so, Mecha- 
 nics, Physics, Chemistry, etc., hate for their object 
 to generalize the laws of relation which different 
 modes of Matter and Motion conform to, when seve- 
 rally disentangled from those actual phenomena in 
 which they are mutually modified. Just as the 
 geometrician formulates the properties of lines and 
 surfaces, independently of the irregularities and thick- 
 nesses of lines and surfaces as they really exist; so, 
 the physicist and the chcmiKst formulate the moiii- 
 
Missing Page 
 
THE LAWS OF MOTION. To 
 
 festations of each, mode of force, independently of 
 the disturbances in its manifestations which other 
 modes of force cause in every actual case. In works 
 on Mechanics, the laws of motion are expressed with- 
 out reference to friction and resistance of. the medium. 
 Not what motion ever really is, but what it would 
 be if retarding forces were absent, is asserted. If any 
 retarding force is taken into account, then the effect 
 of this retarding force is alone contemplated : neglect- 
 ing the other retarding forces. Consider, again, the 
 generalizations of the physicist respecting molecular 
 motion. The law that light varies inversely as the 
 square of the distance, is absolutely true only 
 when the radiation goes on from a point without 
 dimensions, which it never does ; and it also assumes 
 that the rays are perfectly straight, which they cannot 
 be unless the medium differs from all actual media in 
 being perfectly homogeneous. If the disturbing 
 effects of changes of media are investigated, the 
 formulfB expressing the refractions take for granted 
 that the new media entered are homogeneous ; Avhich 
 they never really are. Even when a compound 
 disturbance is allowed for, as when the refraction 
 undergone by light in traversing a medium of in- 
 creasing density, like the atmosphere, is calculated, 
 the calculation still supposes conditions that are un- 
 naturally simple — it supposes that the atmosphere 
 is not pervaded by heterogeneous currents, which 
 it always is. Similarly with the inquiries of tho 
 
76 CLASSIFIOATION OF THE SCIENCES. 
 
 cliemist. He does not take Ms substances as Nature 
 supplies them. Before lie proceeds to specify their 
 respective properties, he purifies them — separates from 
 each all trace of every other. Before ascertaining the 
 specific gravity of a gas, he has to free this gas from 
 the vapour of Tvater, usually mixed with it. Before 
 describing the properties of a salt, he guards against 
 any error that may arise from the presence of an 
 uncombined portion of the acid or base. And when 
 he alleges of any element that it has a certain atomic 
 weight, and unites with such and such equivalents 
 of other ■ elements, he does not mean that the results 
 thus expressed are exactly the results of any one 
 experiment; but that they are the results which, 
 after averaging nany trials, he concludes would be 
 realized if absolute purity could be obtained, and 
 if the experiments could be conducted without 
 loss. His problem is to ascertain the laws of 
 combination of molecules, not as they are actually 
 displayed, but as they would be displayed in the 
 absence of those minute interferences which cannot 
 be altogether avoided. Thus all these Abstract-Con- 
 crete Sciences have for their object, analytical inter- 
 pretation. In every case it is the aim to decompose 
 the phenomenon, and formulate its components apart 
 from one another; or some two or three apart from 
 the rest. Wherever, throughout these Sciences, syn- 
 thesis is employed, it is for the verification of analysis.* 
 
 * 1 am indebted to Prof. Fr.inkland for reminding me of an objection tbat may be 
 
THE ABSTEACT-CONOEETE SCIENCES. 77 
 
 The truths elaborated are severally asserted, not as 
 truths exhibited by this or that particular object ; but 
 as truths universally holding of Matter and Motion in 
 their more general or more special forms, considered 
 apart from particular objects, and particular places in 
 space. 
 
 The sub-divisions of this group of Sciences, may be 
 drawn on the same principle as that on which the 
 sub-divisions of the preceding group were drawn. 
 Phenomena, considered as more or less involved 
 manifestations of force, yield on analysis, certain 
 laws of manifestation that are universal, and other 
 laws of manifestation, which, being dependent on 
 conditions, are not universal. Hence the Abstract- 
 Concrete Sciences are primarily divisible into — the 
 laws of force considered apart from its separate modes, 
 and laws of force considered under each of its sepa- 
 rate modes. And this second division of the Abstract- 
 Concrete group, is sub-divisible after a manner essen- 
 tially analogous. It is needless to occupy space by 
 
 made fo this statement. The production of new compounds by synthesis, has of 
 late become an important branch of chemistry. According to certain known laws 
 of composition, complex substances, which never before existed, are formed, and 
 fulfil anticipations both as to their general properties and as to the proportions of 
 their constituents — as proved by analysis. Here it may he said with truth, that 
 analysis is used to vemy synthesis. Nevertheless, the exception to the above 
 statement is apparent only — not real. In so far as the production of new com- 
 pounds is carried on merely for the obtainment of such new compounds, it is not 
 Science but Art— the application of pre-established knowledge to the achievement 
 of ends. The proceeding is a part of Science, only in so far as it is a means to 
 the better interpretation of the order of Natm'e. And how does it aid the inter- 
 pretation ? It does it only by verifying the pre-established conclusions respecting 
 the laws of molecular combination ; or by serving further to explain them. That 
 is to say, these syntheses, considered on their scientific side, have simply the pur- 
 pose of forwarding the analysis af the laws of chemical combination. 
 
<o CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 
 
 defining these several orders and genera of Sciences. 
 Table TI. will sufiiciently explain their relations. 
 
 We come now to the third great group. "We have 
 done with the Sciences which are concerned only with 
 the blank forms of relations under which Being is 
 manifested to us. We have left behind the Sciences 
 which, dealing. with Being under its universal mode, 
 and its several non-universal modes regarded as inde- 
 pendent, treats the terms of its relations as simple and 
 homogeneous, which they never are in Nature. There 
 remain the Sciences which, taking these modes of 
 Being as they are connected with one another, have for 
 the terms of their relations, those heterogeneous combi- 
 nations of forces that constitute actual phenomena. 
 The subject-matter of these Concrete-Sciences is the 
 real, as contrasted with the wholly or partially ideal. 
 It is their aim, not to separate and generalize apart 
 the components of all phenomena ; but to explain each 
 phenomenon as a product of these components. Their 
 relations are not, like those of the simplest Abstract- 
 Concrete ScienceSj relations between one antecedent 
 and one consequent, nor are they, like those of the 
 more involved Abstract-Concrete Sciences, relations 
 between some few antecedents, cut off in imagination 
 from all others, and some few consequents similarly 
 cut off; but they are relations each of which has for 
 its terms a complete plexus of antecedents and a com- 
 plete plexus of consequents. This is manifest in the 
 
Missing Page 
 
THE PKOBLEMS OF ASTEONOMT. Y9 
 
 least involved Concrete Sciences. The astronomer 
 seeks to explain the Solar System. He does not stop 
 short after generalizing the laws of planetary move- 
 ment, such as planetary movement "would be did only 
 a single planet exist ; but he solves this abstract-con- 
 crete problem, as a step towards solving the concrete 
 problem of the planetary movements as affecting one 
 another. In astronomical language, "the theory of 
 the Moon'' means an interpretation of the Moon's 
 motions, not as determined simply by centripetal and 
 centrifugal forces, but as perpetually modified by 
 gravitation towards the Earth's equatorial protuber- 
 ance, towards the Sun, and even towards Venus — 
 forces daily varying in their amounts and combina- 
 tions. Nor does the astronomer leave off when he has 
 calculated what will bo the position of a given body 
 at a given time, allowing for all perturbing influences ; 
 but he goes on to consider the effects produced by re- 
 actions on the perturbing masses. And he further 
 goes on to consider how these mutual perturbations 
 of the planets cause, during a long period, increasing 
 deviations from a mean state ; and then how compen- 
 sating perturbations cause continuous decrease in the 
 deviations. That is, the goal towards which he ever 
 strives, is a complete explanation of these complex 
 planetary motions in their totality. Similarly with 
 the geologist. Ho docs not take for his problem only 
 those irregularities of the Earth's crust that are 
 worked by denudation ; or only those wliich igneous 
 
80 CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 
 
 action causes. He does not seek simply to understand 
 how sedimentary strata were formed; or how faults 
 were produced; or how moraines originated; or how 
 the beds of Alpine lakes were scooped out. But taking 
 into account all agencies co-operating in endless and 
 ever-varying combinations, he aims to interpret the 
 entire structure of the Earth's crust. If he studies 
 separately the actions of rain, rivers, glaciers, icebergs, 
 tides, waves, volcanoes, earthquakes, etc.; he does so 
 that he may be better able to comprehend their joint 
 actions as factors in geological phenomena: the object 
 of his science being to generalize these phenomena in 
 all their involved connections, as parts of one whole. 
 In like manner Biology is the elaboration of a com- 
 plete theory of Life, in each and all of its involved 
 manifestations. If different aspects of its phenomena 
 are investigated apart — if one observer busies himself 
 in classing organisms, another in dissecting them, 
 another in ascertaining their chemical compositions, 
 another in studying functions, another in tracing laws 
 of modification; they are all, consciously or uncon- 
 sciously, helping to work out a solution of vital 
 phenomena in their entirety, both as displayed by 
 individual organisms and by organisms at large. 
 Thus, in these Concrete Sciences, the object is the 
 converse of that which the Abstract-Concrete Sciences 
 propose to themselves. In the one case we have 
 analytical interpretation; while in the other case we 
 have synthetical interpretation. Instead of synthesis 
 
MATTER AND MOTIOK. 81 
 
 being used merely to verify analysis ; analysis is here 
 used only to aid synthesis. Not to formulate the 
 factors of phenomena is now the object ; but to formu- 
 late the phenomena resulting from these factors, under 
 the various conditions which the Universe presents. 
 
 This third class of Sciences, like the other classes, is 
 divisible into the universal and the non-universal. As 
 there are truths which hold of all phenomena in their 
 elements ; so there are truths which hold of all pheno- 
 mena in their totalities. As force has certain ultimate 
 laws common to its separate modes of manifestation, 
 so in those combinations of its modes which constitute 
 actual phenomena, we find certain ultimate laws that 
 are conformed to in every case. These are the laws 
 of the re-distribution of force. Since we can become 
 conscious of a phenomenon only by some change 
 wrought in us, every phenom!enon necessarily implies 
 re-distribution of force — change in the arrangements 
 of matter and motion. Alike in molecular movements 
 and the movements of masses, one great uniformity 
 may be traced. A decreasing quantity of motion, 
 sensible or insensible, always has for its concomitant 
 an increasing aggregation of matter ; and, conversely, 
 an increasiag quantity of motion, sensible or insensible, 
 has for its concomitant a decreasing aggregation of 
 matter. Give to the molecules of any mass, more 
 of that insensible motion which we call heat, and the 
 parts of the mass become somewhat less closely aggre- 
 gated. Add a further quantity of insensible motion. 
 
82 CLASSIFICATION 01" THE SCIENCES. 
 
 and the mass so far disintegrates as tobe come liquid. 
 Add still more insensible motion, and the mass dis- 
 integrates so completely as to become gas ; which 
 occupies a greater space with every extra quantity 
 of insensible motion given to it. On the other hand, 
 every loss of insensible motion by a mass, gaseous, 
 liquid, or solid, is accompanied by a progressing 
 integration of the mass. Similarly with sensible 
 motions, be the bodies moved large or small. Aug- 
 ment the velocities of the planets, and their orbits 
 will enlarge — the Solar System would occupy a wider 
 space. Diminish their velocities, and their orbits will 
 lessen — the Solar System will contract, or become 
 more integrated. And in like manner we see that 
 every sensible motion on the Earth's surface involves 
 a partial disintegration of the moving body from 
 the Earth ; while the loss of its motion is accom- 
 panied by the body's re-integration with the Earth. 
 In all phenomena we have either an integration of 
 matter and concomitant dissipation of motion ; or 
 an absorption of motion and concomitant disintegra- 
 tion of matter. And where, as in living bodies, 
 these processes are going on simultaneously, there 
 is an integration of matter proportioned to the dis- 
 sipation of motion, and an absorption of motion 
 proportioned to the disintegration of matter. Such, 
 then, are the universal laws of that re-distribution 
 of matter and motion everywhere going on — a re- 
 distribution which results in Evolution so long as 
 
EE-DISTRnjDTIONS OF MATTEE AND MOTION. 83 
 
 the aggregation of matter and dispersion of motion 
 predominate ; but which results in Dissolution where 
 there is a predominant aggregation of motion and 
 dispersion of matter. Hence we have a division 
 of Concrete Science which bears towards the other 
 Concrete Sciences, a relation like that which Universal 
 Law of Eolation bears to Mathematics, and like that 
 which Universal Mechanics (composition and resolu- 
 tion of forces) bears to Physics. We have a division of 
 Concrete Science which generalizes those concomitants 
 of this re-distribution that hold good among all orders 
 of concrete objects — a division which explains why, 
 along with a predominating integration of matter and 
 dissipation of motion, there goes a change from 
 an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity, to a definite, 
 coherent heterogeneity ; and why a reverse re-dis- 
 tribution of matter and motion, is accoinpanied by 
 a reverse structural change. Passing from this uni- 
 versal Concrete Science, to the non-universal Concrete 
 Sciences; we find that these are primarily divisible 
 into the science which deals with the re-distributions 
 of matter and motion among the masses in space, con- 
 sequent on their mutual actions as wholes ; and the 
 science which deals with the re-distributions of matter 
 and motion consequent on the mutual actions of the 
 molecules in each mass. And of these equally general 
 Sciences, this last is re-divisible into the Science which 
 is limited to the concomitants of re-distribution among 
 the molecules of each mass when regarded as inde- 
 
St CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 
 
 pendent, and the Science which takes into account the 
 molecular motion received by radiation from other 
 masses. But these sub-divisions, and their sub-sub- 
 divisions, will be best seen in the annexed Table III. 
 
 That these great groups of Sciences and their re- 
 spective sub-groups, fulfil the definition of a true 
 classification given at the outset, is, I think, tolerably 
 manifest. The subjects of inquiry included in each 
 primary division, have essential attributes in common 
 with one another, which they have not in common 
 with any of the subjects contained in the other pri- 
 mary divisions; and they have, by consequence, a 
 greater number of common attributes in which they 
 severally agree with the colligated subjects, and dis- 
 agree with the subjects otherwise colligated. Between 
 Sciences which deal with relations apart from realities, 
 and Sciences which deal with realities, the distinc- 
 tion is the widest possible; since Being, in some or 
 all of its attributes, is common to all Sciences of the 
 second class, and excluded from all Sciences of the first 
 class. The distinction between the empty forms of 
 things and the things themselves, is a distinction 
 which cannot be exceeded in degree. And when 
 we divide the Sciences which treat of realities, into 
 those which deal with their separate components and 
 those which deal with their components as united, 
 we make a profounder distinction than can exist be- 
 tween the Sciences which deal with one or other order 
 
Missing Page 
 
THE THREE GBOUPS OF SCIENCES. 85 
 
 of the components, or than can exist between the 
 Sciences which deal with one or other order of the 
 things composed. The three groups of Sciences may 
 be briefly defined as — ^laws of the forms; laws of 
 the factors; laws of the products. And when thus 
 defined, it becomes manifest that the groups are 
 so radically unlike in their natures, that there can 
 be no transitions between them ; and that any' 
 Science belonging to one of the groups must be 
 quite incongruous with the Sciences belonging to 
 either of the other groups, if transferred. How 
 fundamental are the differences between them, will be 
 further seen on considering their functions. The first, 
 or abstract group, is instrumental with respect to both 
 the others ; and the second, or abstract-concrete group, 
 is instrumental with respect to the third or concrete 
 group. An endeavour to invert these functions will 
 at once show how essential is the difference of 
 character. The second and third groups supply 
 subject-matter to the first, and the third supplies 
 subject-matter to the second; but none of the truths 
 which constitute the third group are of any use as 
 solvents of the problems presented by the second 
 group ; and none of the truths which the second 
 group formulates can act as solvents of problems 
 contained in the first group. Concerning the sub- 
 divisions of these great groups, little remains to be 
 added. That each of the groups, being co-extensive 
 with all phenomena, contains truths that are universal 
 
so CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIEXCE3. 
 
 and others that are not universal, and that these niust 
 be classed apart, is obvious. And that the sub- 
 divisions of the non-universal truths, are to be made in 
 something like the manner shown in the tables, is 
 proved by the fact that when the descriptive words 
 are read from the root to the extremity of any branch, 
 they form a definition of the Science constituting that 
 branch. That the minor divisions might be other- 
 wise arranged, and that better definitions of them 
 might be given, is highly probable. They are here 
 set down merely for the purpose of showing how this 
 method of classification works out. 
 
 I will only further remark, that the relations of the 
 Sciences as thus represented, are still but imperfectly 
 represented : their relations cannot be truly shown 
 on a plane, but only in space of three dimensions. 
 The three groups cannot rightly be put in linear 
 order as they have here been. Since the first stands 
 related to the third, not only indirectly through the 
 second, but also directly — it is directly instrumental 
 with respect to the third, and the third supplies it 
 directly with subject-matter. Their relations can 
 thus only be truly shown by a divergence from a 
 common root on different sides, in such a way that 
 each stands in juxta-position to the other two. And 
 only by the like mode of arrangement, can the relations 
 among the sub-divisions of each group be correctly 
 represented. 
 
IV. 
 
 POSTSGRIPT-EEPLYING TO CRITICISMS. 
 
POSTSCEIPT, EEPLYING TO CRITICISMS. 
 
 Among objections made to any doctrine, those which come 
 from avowed supporters of an adverse doctrine must be con- 
 sidered, other things equal, as of less weight than those 
 which come from men uncommitted to an adverse doctrine, 
 or but partially committed to it. The element of preposses- 
 sion, distinctly present in the one case and in the other case 
 mainly or quite absent, is a well-recognized cause of differ- 
 ence in the values of the judgments : supposing the judg- 
 ments to be otherwise fairly comparable. Hence, when it is 
 needful to bring the replies within a restricted space, a fit 
 course is that of dealing rather with independent criticisms 
 than with criticisms which are really indirect arguments for 
 an opposite view, previously espoused. 
 
 For this reason I propose here to confine myself substanti- 
 ally, though not absolutely, to the demurrers entered against 
 the foregoing classification by Prof. Bain, in his recent work 
 on Logic. Before dealing with the more important of these, 
 let me clear the ground by disposing of the less important. 
 
 Incidentally, while commenting on the view I take re- 
 specting the position of Logic, Prof. Bain points out that 
 this,, which is the most abstract of the sciences, owes much 
 to Psychology, which I place among the Concrete Sciences; 
 and he alleges an incongruity between this fact and my 
 statement that the Concrete Sciences are not instrumental 
 
90 
 
 EEPMES TO CEITICISMS. 
 
 in disclosing the trutas of the Abstract Sciences. Subse- 
 quently he re-raises this apparent anomaly ■when saying — 
 
 "Nor is it possible to justify the placing of Psychology wholly 
 among Concrete Sciences. It is a highly analytic science, as Mr. 
 Spencer thoroughly knows." 
 
 For a full reply, given by Implication, I must refer Prof. 
 Bain to § 56 of The Principles of PsycJwTogy, where I 
 have contended that " while, under its objective aspect, 
 Psychology is to, be classed as one of the Concrete Sciences 
 which successively decrease in scope as they increase in 
 speciality; under its subjective aspect. Psychology is a 
 totally unique science, independent of, and antithetically 
 opposed to, all other sciences whatever." A pure idealist 
 will not, I suppose, recognize this distinction ; but to every 
 one else it must, I should think, be obvious that the science 
 of subjective existences is the correlative of all the sciences 
 of objective existences; and is as absolutely marked off from 
 them as subject is from object. Objective Psychology, which 
 I class among the Concrete Sciences, is purely synthetic, so 
 long as it is limited, like the other sciences, to objective 
 data ; though great aid in the interpretation of these data 
 is derived from the observed correspondence between the 
 phenomena of Objective Psychology as presented in other 
 beings and the phenomena of Subjective Psychology as pre- 
 sented in one's own consciousness. Now it is Subjective 
 Psychology only which is analytic, and which affords aid 
 in the development of Logic. This being explained, the 
 apparent incongruity disappears. 
 
 A difficulty raised respecting the manner in which I have 
 expressed the nature of Mathematics, may next be dealt 
 with. Prof. Bain writes : — 
 
 "In the first place, objection may be taken to his language, iu 
 discussing the extreme Abstract Sciences, when he speaks of the 
 empty forms therein considered. To call Space and Time empty 
 
COKCEPTIONS OF SPACE AND TIME. 91 
 
 forms, muBt mean that they can he thought of without any concrete 
 embodiment whatsoever; that one can think of Time,»a3 a pure 
 abstraction, without having in one's mind any concrete succession. 
 Now, this doctrine is in the last degree questionable." 
 
 I quite agree with Prof. Bain that "this doctrine is iu 
 the last degree questionable ; " but I do not admit that this 
 doctrine is implied by the definition of Abstract Science 
 which I have given. I speak of Space and Time as they 
 ai'e dealt with by mathematicians, and as it is alone possible 
 for pure Mathematics to deal with them. While Mathe- 
 matics habitually uses in its points, lines, and surfaces, 
 certain existences, it habitually deals with these as repre- 
 senting points, lines, and surfaces that are ideal; and its 
 conclusions are true only on condition that it does this. Points 
 having dimensions, lines having breadths, planes having 
 thicknesses, are negatived by its definitions. Using, though 
 it does, material representatives of extension, linear, super- 
 ficial, or solid. Geometry deliberately ignores their material- 
 ity ; and attends only to the truths of relation they present; 
 Holding with Prof. Bain, as I do, that our consciousness 
 of Space is disclosed by our experiences of Matter — argu- 
 ing, as I have done in The Principles of Tsychology, that it 
 is a consolidated aggregate of all relations of co-existence 
 that have been severally presented by Matter ; I never- 
 theless contend that it is possible to dissociate these re- 
 lations from Matter to the extent required for formulating 
 them, as abstract truths. I contend, too, that this separa- 
 tion is of the kind habitually made in other cases ; as, for 
 instance, when the general laws of motion are formulated 
 (as M. Comte's system, among others, formulates them) in 
 such way as to ignore all properties of the bodies dealt with 
 save their powers of taking up, and retaining, and giving 
 out, quantities of motion; though these powers are incon- 
 ceivable apart from the attribute of extension, which is 
 intentionally disregarded. 
 
92 EEPLIBS TO CEITICISMS. 
 
 Taking,otlier of Prof. Bain's objections, not in the order 
 in which they stand hut in the order in which they may be 
 most conveniently dealt with, I quote as follows : — 
 
 "The law of the radiation of light (the inverse square of the 
 distance) is said by Mr. Spencer to be Abstract-Concrete, while the 
 disturbing changes in the medium are not to be mentioned except 
 in a Concrete Science of Optics. "We need not remark that such 
 a separate handling is unknown to science." 
 
 It is perfectly true that " such a separate handling is un- 
 known to science." But, unfortunately for the objection, it 
 is also perfectly true that no such separate handling is pro- 
 posed by me, or is implied by my classification. How Prof. 
 Bain can have so missed the meaning of the word "concrete," 
 as I have used it, I do not understand. After pointing out 
 that "no one ever drew the line," between the Abstract- 
 Concrete and the Concrete Sciences, "as I have done it," 
 he alleges an anomaly which exists only supposing that 
 I have drawn it where it is ordinarily drawn. He appears 
 inadvertently to have carried with him M. Comte's concep- 
 tion of Optics as a Concrete Science, and, importing it into 
 my classification, debits me with the incongruity. If he 
 will re-read the definition of the Abstract-Concrete Sciences, 
 or study their sub-divisions as shown in Table II., he will, 
 I think, see that the most special laws of the redistribution 
 of light, equally with its most general laws, are included. 
 And if he will pass to the definition and the tabulation of 
 the Concrete Sciences, he will, I think, see no less clearly 
 that Optics cannot be included among them. 
 
 Prof. Bain considers that I am not justified in classing 
 Chemistry as an Abstract- Concrete Science, and excluding 
 from it all consideration of the crude forms of the various 
 substances dealt with ; and he enforces his dissent by saying 
 that chemists habitually describe the ores and impure mix- 
 tures in which the elements, etc., are naturally found. Un- 
 doubtedly chemists do this. But do they therefore intend 
 
LIHITS OF CHEMICAL SCIENCE. 93 
 
 to include an account of the ores of a substance, as a pari of 
 the science which, formulates its molecular constitution and 
 the constitutions of all the definite compounds it enters 
 into? I shall be very much surprised if I find that they 
 do. Chemists habitually prefix to their works a division 
 treating of Molecular Physics ; but they do not therefore 
 claim Molecular Physics as a part of Chemistry. If they 
 similarly prefix to the chemistry of each substance an out- 
 line of its mineralogy, I do not think they therefore mean to 
 assert that the last belongs to the first. Chemistry proper, 
 embraces nothing beyond an account of the constitutions 
 and modes of action and combining proportions of substances 
 that are taken as absolutely pure ; and its truths no more 
 recognize impure substances than the truths of Geometry 
 recognize crooked lines. 
 
 Immediately after, in criticizing the fundamental dis- 
 tinction I have made between Chemistry and Biology, as 
 Abstract-Concrete and Concrete respectively. Prof. Bain 
 says : — 
 
 "But the objects of Chemistry and the objects of Biology are 
 equally concrete; so far as they go ; the simple bodies of chemistry, 
 and their several compounds, are viewed by the Chemist as concrete 
 wholes, and are described by him, not with reference to one factor, 
 but to all their factors." 
 
 Issue is here raised in a form convenient for elucidation 
 of the general question. It is true that, for purposes oj 
 identification, a chemist gives an account of all the sensible 
 characters of a substance. He sets down its crystalline 
 form, its specific gravity, its power of refracting light, its 
 behaviour as magnetic or diamagnetic. But does he there- 
 by include these phenomena as part of the Science of 
 Chemistry ? It seems to me that the relation between the 
 weight of any portion of matter and its bulk, which is 
 ascertained on measuring its specific gravity, is a physical 
 and not a chemical fact. I think, too, that the phj'sicist 
 
94 EEPLIES TO CEITIOISMS. 
 
 will claim, as part of his science, all investigations toucliiug 
 the refraction of light : be the substance producing this 
 refraction what it may. And the circumstance that the 
 chemist may test the magnetic or diamagnetic property 
 of a body, as a means of ascertaining what it is, or as a 
 means of helping other chemists to determine whether they 
 have got before them the same body, will neither be held 
 by the chemist, nor allowed by the physicist, to imply a 
 transfer of magnetic phenomena from the domain of the 
 one to that of the other. In brief, though the chemist, in 
 his account of an element or a compound, may refer to 
 certain physical traits associated with its molecular consti- 
 tution and affinities, he does not by so doing change these 
 into chemical traits. Whatever chemists may put into 
 their books, Chemistry, considered as a science, includes 
 only the phenomena of molecular structures and changes — 
 of compositions and decompositions.* I contend, then, 
 that Chemistry does not give an account of anything 
 as a concrete whole, in the same way that Biology gives 
 an account of an organism as a concrete whole. This 
 wiU become even more manifest on observing the character 
 of the biological account. All the attributes of an organism 
 are comprehended, from the most general to the most special 
 — from its conspicuous structural traits to its hidden and faint 
 ones; from its outer actions that thrust themselves on the 
 attention, to the minutest sub-divisions of its multitudinous 
 
 * Perhaps Bome will say that such incidental phenomena as those of the heat 
 and light CTolved during chemical changes, are to be included among chemical 
 phenomena. I think, however, the physicist will hold that all phenomena of 
 re-distributcd molecular motion, no matter how arising, come witliin the range 
 of Physics. But whatever difficulty there may be in drawing the line between 
 Physics and Chemistry (and, as I have incidentally pointed out iu T/ie Principles 
 of JPsychologij, § 55, the two are closely linked by the phenomena of allotropy 
 and isomerism), applies equally to the Comtean classification, or to any other. 
 And I may fm'ther point out that no obstacle hence arises to the classification I 
 am defending. Physics and Chemistry being both grouped by me as Abstract- 
 Concrete Sciences, no difliculty in satisfactorily dividing them in the least aifects 
 the salisfactorincss of the division of the great group to which they both belong, 
 from the other two arrcat S'roniw. 
 
ELEMENTS OF BIOLOGICAL SCIENCE. 95 
 
 internal functions; from its ctaracter as a gorm, through tlie 
 many changes of size, form, organization, and habit, it goes 
 through until death ; from the physical characters of it as 
 a whole, to the physical characters of its microscopic cells, 
 and vessels, and fibres ; from the chemical characters of 
 its substance in general to the chemical characters of each 
 tissue and each secretion — all these, with many others. 
 And not only so, but there is comprehended as the ideal 
 goal of the science, the consensus of all these phenomena 
 in their co-existences and successions, as constituting a 
 coherent individualized group definitely combined in space 
 and in time. It is this recognition of individuality in its 
 subject-matter, that gives its concreteness to Biology, as 
 to every other Concrete Science. As Astronomy deals 
 with bodies that have their several proper names, or (as 
 with the smaller stars) are registered by their positions, 
 and considers each of them as a distinct individual — as 
 Geology, while dimly perceiving in the Moon and nearest 
 planets other groups of geological phenomena (which it would 
 deal with as independent wholes, did not distance forbid), 
 occupies itself with that individualized group presented by 
 the Earth ; so Biology treats either of an individual dis- 
 tinguished from all others, or of parts or products belonging 
 to such an individual, or of structural or functional traits 
 common to many such individuals that have been observed, 
 and supposed to be common to others that are like them 
 in most or all of their attributes. Every biological truth 
 connotes a specifically individualized object, or a number 
 of specifically individualized objects of the same kind, or 
 numbers of difierent kinds that are severally specific. See, 
 then, the contrast. The truths of the Abstract- Concrete 
 Sciences do not imply specific individuality. Neither Molar 
 Physics, nor Molecular Physics, nor Chemistry, concerns it- 
 self with this. The laws of motion are expressed without 
 any reference whatever to the sizes or shapes of the moving 
 
96 EEPLIES TO citmasMS. 
 
 masses; which may be taken indifferently to be suns or 
 atoms. The relations between contraction and the escape 
 of molecular motion, and between expansion and the ab- 
 sorption of molecular motion, are expressed in their general 
 forms without reference to the kind of matter; and, if 
 the degree of either that occurs in a particular kind of 
 matter is formulated, no note is taken of the quantity of 
 that matter, much less of its individuality. Similarly with 
 Chemistry. When it inquires into the atomic weight, the 
 molecular structure, the atomicity, the combining propor- 
 tions, etc., of a substance, it is indifferent whether a grain 
 or a ton be thought of — the conception of amount is abso- 
 lutely irrelevant. And so with more special attributes. 
 Sulphur, considered chemically, is not sulphur under its 
 crystalline form, or under its allotropic viscid form, or as 
 a liquid, or as a gas; but it is sulphur considered apart 
 from those attributes of quantity, and shape, and state, that 
 give individuality. 
 
 Prof. Bain objects to the division I have drawn between the 
 Concrete Science of Astronomy and that Abstract- Concrete 
 Science which deals with the mutually-modified motions of 
 hypothetical masses in space, as "not a little arbitrary." 
 He says : — 
 
 " We cau suppose a science to confine itself solely to the 'factors,' 
 or the separated elements, and never, on any occasion, to combine two 
 into a composite third. This position is intelligible, and possibly 
 defensible. For example, in Astronomy, the Law of Persistence of 
 Motion in a straight line might be discussed in pure ideal separation ; 
 and so, the Law of Gravity might be discussed in equally pure sepa- 
 ration — ^both under the Abstract-Concrete department of Mechanics. 
 It might then be reserved to a concrete department to unite these in 
 the explanation of a projectile or of a planet. Such, however, is 
 not Mr. Spencer's boundary line. He allows Theoretical Mechanics 
 to make this particular combination, and to arrive at the laws of 
 planetary movement, in the case of a single planet. What he does 
 not allow is, to proceed to the case of two planets, mutually dis- 
 turbing one another, or a planet and a satellite, commonly called 
 the 'problem of the Three Bodies.'" 
 
ABSTEACT-CONCEETE PEOBLEMS. 97 
 
 If I held what Prof. Bain supposes me to hold, my position 
 would be an absurd one; but he misapprehends me. The 
 misapprehension results in part from his having here, as 
 before, used the word "concrete" with the Comtean mean- 
 ing, as though it -were my meaning ; and in part from the 
 inadequacy of my explanation. I did not in the least mean 
 to imply that the Abstract-Concrete Science of Mechanics, 
 "when dealing with the motions of bodies in space, is limited 
 to the interpretation of planetary movement such as it would 
 be did only a single planet exist. It never occurred to me 
 that my words (see p. 19) might be so construed. Abstract- 
 Concrete problems admit, in fact, of being complicated in- 
 definitely, without going in the least beyond the definition. 
 I do not draw the line, as Prof. Bain alleges, between the 
 combination of two factors and the combination of three, or 
 between the combination of any number and any greater 
 number. I draw the line between the science which deals 
 with the theory of the factors, taken singly and in combina- 
 tions of two,. three, four, or more, and the science which, 
 giving to these factors the values derived from observations 0/ 
 actual objects, uses the theory to explain actual phenomena. 
 
 It is true that, in these departments of science, no radical 
 distinction is consistently recognized between theory and the 
 applications of theory. As Prof. Bain says : — 
 
 "Newton, in the Pirst Book of the Principia, took up tho 
 problem of the Three Bodies, as applied to the Moon, and worked 
 it to exhaustion. So writers on Theoretical Mechanics continue to 
 include the Three Bodies, Precession, and the Tides." 
 
 But, supreme though the authority of Newton may be as a 
 
 mathematician and astronomer, and weighty as are the names 
 
 of Laplace and Herschel, who in their works have similarly 
 
 mingled theorems and the explanations yielded by them, it 
 
 does not seem to me that these facts go for much ; unless it 
 
 can be shown that these writers intended thus to enunciate 
 
 the views at which they had arrived respecting the classifi- 
 5 
 
98 EEPLIES TO CEITICISMS. 
 
 cation of the sciences. Such a imion as that presented in 
 their works, adopted merely for the sake of convenience, is, 
 in fact, the indication of incomplete development; and has 
 been paralleled in simpler sciences which have afterwards 
 outgrown it. Two conclusive illustrations are at hand. The 
 name Geometry, utterly inapplicable by its meaning to the 
 science as it now exists, was applicable in that first stage 
 when its few truths were taught in preparation for land-' 
 measuring and the setting-out of buildings ; but, at a com- 
 paratively early date, these comparatively simple truths 
 became separated from their applications, and were embodied 
 by the Greek geometers into systems of theory.* A like puri- 
 fication is now taking place in another division of the science. 
 In the Geometrie Descriptive of Monge, theorems were mixed 
 with their applications to projection and plan-drawing. But, 
 since his time, the science and the art have been segregating ; 
 and Descriptive Geometry, or, as it may be better termed, 
 the Geometry of Position, is now recognized by mathemati- 
 cians as a far-reaching system of truths, parts of which are 
 already embodied in books that make no reference to derived 
 methods available by the architect or the engineer. To meet 
 a counter-illustration that will be cited, I may remark that 
 though, in works on Algebra intended for beginners, the 
 theories of quantitative relations, as treated algebraically, 
 are accompanied by groups of problems to be solved, the 
 subject-matters of these problems are not thereby made 
 parts of the Science of Algebra. To say that they are, is 
 to say that Algebra includes the conceptions of distances 
 and relative speeds and times, or of weights and bulks 
 and specific gravities, . or of areas ploughed and days and 
 wages ; since these, and endless others, may be the terms of 
 
 • It may be said that tlie mingling of problems and theorems in Euclid is not 
 quite consistent with this statement ; and it is true that we haye, in this mingling, 
 a trace of the earlier form of the science. But it is to be remarked that these 
 problems are all purely abstract, and, further, that each of them admits of being 
 expressed as a theorem, 
 
MR. mill's view. 99 
 
 its equations. And just in the same way that these concrete 
 problems, solved by its aid, cannot by any possibility be 
 incorporated with the Abstract Science of Algebra ; so I 
 contend that the concrete problems of Astronomy, cannot by 
 any possibility be incorporated with that division of Abstract- 
 Concrete Science which develops the theory of the inter- 
 actions of free bodies that attract one another. 
 
 On this point I find myself at issue, not only with Prof. 
 Bain, but also with Mr. Mill, who contends that : — 
 
 "There is aa abstract science of astronomy, namely, the theory 
 of gravitation, which would equally agree with and explain the 
 facts of a totally different solar system from the one of which our 
 earth forms a part. The actual facts of our own system, the di- 
 mensions, distances, velocities, temperatures, physical constitution, 
 etc., of the sun, earth, and planets, are properly the subject of a 
 concrete science, similar to natural history; but the concrete is 
 more inseparably united to the abstract science than in any other 
 case, since the few celestial facts really accessible to us are nearly 
 all required &r discovering and proving the law of gravitation as 
 an universal property of bodies, and have therefore an indispensable 
 place in the abstract science as its fundamental data." — AugusU 
 Comte and Positivism, p. 43. 
 
 In this explanation, Mr. Mill recognizes the fundamental 
 distinction between the Concrete Science of Astronomy, 
 dealing with the bodies actually distributed in space, and 
 a science dealing with hypothetical bodies hypothetically 
 distributed in space. Nevertheless, he regards these sciences 
 as not separable; because the second derives from the first 
 the data whence the law of inter-action is derived. But 
 the truth of this premiss, and the legitimacy of this infer- 
 ence, may alike be questioned. The discovery of the law of 
 inter-action was not due primarily, but only secondarily, to 
 observation of the heavenly bodies. The conception of an 
 inter-acting force that varies inversely as the square of the 
 distance, is an d priori conception rationally deducible from 
 mechanical and geometrical considerations. Though unlike 
 in derivation to the many empirical hypotheses of Kepler 
 
100 EEPLIES TO CEITICISMS. 
 
 respecting planetary orbits and planetary motions, yet it was 
 like the successful among these in its relation to astronomical 
 phenomena : it was one of many possible hypotheses, which 
 admitted of having their consequences worked out and 
 tested ; and one which, on having its implications compared 
 with the results of observation, was found to explain them. 
 In short, the theory of gravitation grew out of experiences 
 of terrestrial phenomena; but the verification of it was 
 reached through experiences of celestial phenomena. TPass- 
 ing now from premiss to inference, I do not see that, even 
 were the alleged parentage substantiated, it would necessitate 
 the supposed inseparability ; any more than the descent of 
 Geometry from land-measuring necessitates a persistent union 
 of the two. In the case of Algebra, as above indicated, 
 the disclosed laws of quantitative relations hold through- 
 out multitudinous orders of phenomena that are extremely 
 heterogeneous ; and this makes conspicuous the distinction 
 between the theory and its applications. Here the laws of 
 quantitative relations among masses, distances, velocities, and 
 momenta, being applied mainly (though not exclusively) to 
 the concrete cases presented by Astronomy, the distinction 
 between the theory and its applications is less conspicuous. 
 But, intrinsically, it is as great in the one case as in the 
 other. 
 
 How great it is, we shall see on taking an analogy. This 
 is a living man, of whom we may know little more than that 
 he is a visible, tangible person ; or of whom we may know 
 enough to form a voluminous biography. Again, this book 
 tells of a fictitious hero, who, like the heroes of old romance, 
 may be an impersonated virtue or vice, or, like a modern 
 hero, one of mixed nature, whose various motives and con- 
 sequent actions are elaborated into a semblance of reality. 
 But no accuracy and completeness of the picture makes this 
 fictitious personage an actual personage, or brings him any 
 nearer to one. Nor does any meagreness in our knowledge 
 
AITALOGY WITH FICTION AND BIOaKAPHT. 101 
 
 of a real man reduce him any nearer to the imaginary Leing 
 of a novel. To the last, the division between fiction and 
 biography remains an impassable gulf. So, too, remains the 
 division between the Science dealing with the inter-actions 
 of hypothetical bodies in space, and the Science dealing 
 with the inter-actions of existing bodies in space. We may 
 elaborate the first to any degree whatever by the intro- 
 duction of three, four, or any greater number of factors under 
 any number of assumed conditions, until we symbolize a 
 solar system ; but to the last an account of our symbolic 
 solar system is as far from an account of the actual solar 
 system as fiction is from biography. 
 
 Even more obvious, if it be possible, does the radical cha- 
 racter of this distinction become, on observing that from the 
 simplest proposition of General Mechanics we may pass to 
 the most complex proposition of Celestial Mechanics, with- 
 out a break. We take a body moving at a uniform velocity, 
 and commence with the proposition that it will continue so 
 to move for ever. Next, we state the law of its accelerated 
 motion in the same line, when subject to a uniform force. 
 We further complicate the proposition by supposing the 
 force to increase in consequence of approach towards an 
 attracting body ; and we may formulate a series of laws of 
 acceleration, resulting from so many assumed laws of in- 
 creasing attraction (of which the law of gravitation is one). 
 Another factor may now be added by supposing the body to 
 have motion in a direction other than that of the attracting 
 body ; and we may determine, according to the ratios of the 
 supposed forces, whether its course will be hyperbolic, para- 
 bolic, elliptical, or circular — we may begin with this hypo- 
 thetical additional force as infinitesimal, and formulate the 
 varying results as it is little by little increased. The problem 
 is complicated a degree more by taking into account the 
 effects of a third force, acting in some other direction ; and 
 beginning with an infinitesimal amount of this force we may 
 
102 EEPLIES TO CEinCISMS. 
 
 reach any amount. Similarly, by introducing factor after 
 factor, each at first insensible in proportion to the rest, we 
 arrive, through an infinity of gradations, at a combination 
 of any complexity. 
 
 Thus, then, the Science which deals with the inter-action 
 of hypothetical bodies in space, is absolutely continuous with 
 General Mechanics. "We have already seen that it is ah- 
 solutely discontinuous with that account of the heavenly 
 bodies which has been called Astronomy from the beginning. 
 When these facts are recognized, it seems to me that there 
 cannot remain a doubt respecting its true place in a classi- 
 fication of the Sciences. 
 
 Passing over minor criticisms, either as met by implication 
 or as demanding space that cannot be here afibrded, let me 
 say something by way of enforcing the general argument. 
 I will re-state the case in two ways : the first of them 
 adapted only to those who accept the general doctrine of 
 Evolution. 
 
 "We set out with concentrating nebulous matter. Trac- 
 ing the re-distributions of this as the rotating contracting 
 spheroid leaves behind successive annuli, and as these sever- 
 ally breaking up eventually form secondary rotating spheroids, 
 we come at length to planets in their early stages. Thus 
 far we consider the phenomena dealt with purely astro- 
 nomical; and so long as our Earth, regarded as one of 
 these spheroids, was made up of gaseous and molten 
 matters only, it presented no definite data for any more 
 complex Concrete Science. In the lapse of cosmical time 
 a solid film forms, which, in the course of millions of years, 
 thickens, and, in the course of further millions of years, 
 becomes cool enough to permit the precipitation, first of 
 various other gaseous compounds, and finally of water. 
 Presently, the varying exposure of difierent parts of the 
 spheroid to the Sun's rays, begins to produce appreciable 
 
coNTmriTT m evoltttion. 103 
 
 effects; until at length tliere have arisen meteorological 
 actions, and consequent geological actions, such as those we 
 now know : determined partly by the Sun's heat, partly hy 
 the still-retained internal heat of the Earth, and partly by 
 the action of the Moon on the ocean? How have we 
 reached these geological phenomena P When did the astro- 
 nomical changes end and the geological begin? It needs 
 but to ask this question to see that there is no real division 
 between the two. Putting pre-conceptions aside, we find 
 nothing more than a group of phenomena continually com- 
 plicating under the influence of the same original factors ; 
 and we see that our conventional division is defensible only 
 on grounds of convenience. Let us advance a stage. As 
 the Earth's surface continues to cool, passing through all 
 degrees of temperature by infinitesimal gradations, the for- 
 mation of more and more complex inorganic compounds 
 becomes possible ; later its surface sinks to that heat at 
 which the less complex compounds of the kinds called 
 organic can exist; and finally the formation of the more 
 complex organic compounds becomes possible. Chemists 
 now show us that these compounds may be built up synthe- 
 tically in the laboratory — each stage in ascending complexity 
 making possible the next higher stage. Hence it is inferable 
 that, in the myriads of laboratories, endlessly diversified in 
 their materials and conditions, which the Earth's surface 
 furnished during the myriads of years occupied in passing 
 through these stages of temperature, such successive syn- 
 theses were effected; and that the highly complex unstable 
 substance out of which all organisms are composed, was 
 eventually formed in iuicroscopic portions: from which, by 
 continuous integrations and differentiations, the evolution 
 of all organisms has proceeded. "Where then shall wc draw 
 the line between Geology and Biology? The synthesis of 
 this most complex compound, is but a continuation of the 
 syntheses by which all simpler compounds were formed. 
 
104 EBPLIES TO CRITICISMS. 
 
 The same primary factors have been co-operating with 
 those secondary factors, meteorologic and geologic, pre- 
 viously derived from them. Nowhere do we find a break 
 in the ever-complicating series ; for there is a manifest 
 connexion between those movements which various complex 
 compounds undergo during their isomeric transformations, 
 and those changes of form undergone by the protoplasm 
 which we distinguish as living. Strongly contrasted as they 
 eventually become, biological phenomena are at their root 
 inseparable from geological phenomena — inseparable from 
 the aggregate of transformations coutinually wrought in the 
 matters forming the Earth's surface by the physical forces 
 to which they are exposed. Further stages I need not par- 
 ticularize. The gradual development out of the biological 
 group of phenomena, of the more specialized group we 
 class as psychological, needs no illustration. And when we 
 come to the highest psychological phenomena, it is clear 
 that since aggregations of human beings may be traced 
 upwards from single wandering families to tribes and nations 
 of all sizes and complexities, we pass insensibly from the 
 phenomena of individual human action to those of corporate 
 human action. To resume, then, is it not manifest that in 
 the group of sciences — Astronomy, Geology, Biology, Psy- 
 chology, Sociology, we have a natural group that admits 
 neither of disruption nor change of order? Here there is 
 both a genetic dependence, and a dependence of interpre- 
 tations. The phenomena have arisen in this succession in 
 cosmical time ; and complete scientific interpretation of each 
 group depends on scientific interpretation of the preceding 
 groups. Ho other science can be thrust in anywhere with- 
 out destroying the continuity. To insert Physics between 
 Astronomy and Geology, would be to make a break in the 
 history of a continuous series of changes ; and a like break 
 would be produced by inserting Chemistry between Geology 
 and Biology. It is true that Physics and Chemistry are 
 
ELEMENTS OF STATICS ANB DTNAMIOS. 105 
 
 needful as interpreters of these successive assemblages of 
 facts; but it does not therefore follow that they are them- 
 selves to be placed among these assemblages. 
 
 Concrete Science, made up of these five concrete sub- 
 sciences, being thus coherent within itself, and separated 
 from all other science, there comes the question^ — Is all other 
 science similarly coherent within itself ? or is it traversed by 
 some second division that is equally decided? It is thus 
 traversed. A statical or dynamical theorem, however simple, 
 has always for its subject-matter something that is conceived 
 as extended, and as displaying force or forces — as being a 
 seat of resistance, or of tension, or of both, and as capable 
 of possessing more or less of vis viva. If we examine the 
 simplest proposition of Statics, we see that the conception of 
 Force must be joined with the conception of Space, before 
 the proposition can be framed in thought ; and if we simi- 
 larly examine the simplest proposition in Dynamics, we see 
 that Force, Space, and Time, are its essential elements. The 
 amounts of the terms are indiiferent ; and, by reduction of 
 its terms beyond the limits of perception, they are applied to 
 molecules : Molar Mechanics and Molecular Mechanics are 
 continuous. From questions concerning the relative motions 
 of two or more molecules, Molecular Mechanics passes to 
 changes of aggregation among many molecules, to changes 
 in the amounts and kinds of the motions possessed by them 
 as members of an aggregate, and to changes of the motions 
 transferred through aggregates of them (as those constituting 
 light). Daily extending its range of interpretations, it is 
 coming to deal even with the components of each compound 
 molecule on the same principles. And the unions and dis- 
 unions of such more or less compound molecules, which 
 constitute the phenomena of Chemistry, are also being con- 
 ceived as resultant phenomena of essentially kindred natures 
 — the affinities of molecules for one another, and their re- 
 actions in relation to light, heat, and other modes of force. 
 
106 EEPLIES TO CEinCISMS. 
 
 being regarded as consequent on the combinations of tbo 
 various mechanically-determined motions of their various 
 components. Without at all out- running, however, this pro- 
 gress in the mechanical interpretation of molecular phe- 
 nomena, it suffices to point out that the indispensable 
 elements in any chemical conception are units occupying 
 places in space, and exerting forces on one another. This, 
 then, is the common character of all these sciences which 
 we at present group under the names of Mechanics, 
 Physics, Chemistry. Leaving undiscussed the question 
 whether it is possible to conceive of force apart from ex- 
 tended somethings exerting it, we may assert, as beyond 
 dispute, that if the conception of force be expelled, no 
 science of Mechanics, Physics, or Chemistry remains. Made 
 coherent, as these sciences are, by this bond of union, it is 
 impossible to thrust among them any other science without 
 breaking their continuity. We cannot place Logic between 
 Molar Mechanics and Molecular Mechanics. We cannot place 
 Mathematics between the group of propositions concerning 
 the behaviour of homogeneous molecules to one another, and 
 the group of propositions concerning the behaviour of hetero- 
 geneous molecules to one another (which we call Chemistry). 
 Clearly these two sciences lie outside the coherent whole we 
 have contemplated : separated from it in some radical way. 
 
 By what are they radically separated ? By the absence of 
 the conception of force. However true it may be that so 
 long as Logic and Mathematics have any terms at all, these 
 must be capable of affecting consciousness, and, by impli- 
 cation, of exerting force ; yet it is the distinctive trait of 
 these sciences that not only do their propositions make no 
 reference to such force, but, as far as possible, they delibe- 
 rately ignore it. Instead of being, as in all the other 
 sciences, an element that is not only recognized but vital ; in 
 Mathematics and Logic, force is an element that is not only 
 not vital, but is studiously not recognized. The terms in 
 
SCIENCE A COLLECTION OF AGGEEGATB8. 107 
 
 which Logic expresses its propositions, are symbols that do 
 not profess to represent things, properties, or powers, of one 
 kind more than another ; and may equally well stand for the 
 attributes belonging to members of some connected series of 
 ideal curves which have never been drawn, as for so many 
 real objects. And the theorems of Geometry, so far from 
 contemplating perceptible lines and surfaces as elements in 
 the truths enunciated, consider these truths as becoming 
 absolute only when such lines and surfaces become ideal — 
 only when the conception of something exercising force is 
 extruded. 
 
 Let me now make a second re-statement, not Implying 
 acceptance of the doctrine of Evolution, but exhibiting with 
 a clearness almost if not quite as great, these fundamental 
 distinctions. 
 
 The concrete sciences, taken together or separately, con- 
 template as their subject-matters, aggregates — either the entire 
 aggregate of sensible existences, or some secondary aggre- 
 gate separable from this entire aggregate, or some tertiary 
 aggregate separable from this, and so on. Sidereal Astro- 
 nomy occupies itself with the totality of visible masses dis- 
 tributed through space; which it deals with as made up of 
 identifiable individuals occupying specified places, and seve- 
 rally standing towards one another, towards sub-groups, and 
 towards the entire group, in defined ways. Planetary Astro- 
 nomy, cutting out of this all-including aggregate that 
 relatively minute part constituting the Solar System, deals 
 with this as a whole — observes, measures, and calculates the 
 sizes, shapes, distances, motions, of its primary, secondary, 
 and tertiary members; and, taking for its larger inquiries 
 the mutual actions of all these members as parts of a co- 
 ordinated assemblage, takes for its smaller inquiries the 
 actions of each member considered as an individual, having 
 a set of intrinsic activities that are modified by a set of 
 
108 EEPLIES TO CEmOISMS. 
 
 extriusic activities. Eestricting itself to one of these aggre- 
 gates, -wliicli admits of close examination, Geology (using 
 this word in its comprehensive meaning) gives an account of 
 terrestrial actions and terrestrial structures, past and present; 
 and, taking for its narrower problems local formations and 
 the agencies to which they are due, takes for its larger 
 problems the serial transformations undergone by the entire 
 Earth. The geologist being occupied with this cosmically 
 small, but otherwise vast, aggregate, the biologist occupies 
 himseK with small aggregates formed out of parts of the 
 Earth's superficial substance, and treats each of these as a 
 coordinated whole in its structures and functions ; or, when 
 he treats of any particular organ, considers this as a whole 
 made up of parts held in a sub-coordination that refers to 
 the coordination of the entire organism. To the psycholo- 
 gist he leaves those specialized aggregates of functions which 
 adjust the actions of organisms to the complex activities 
 surrounding them : doing this, not simply because they are a 
 stage higher in speciality, but because they are the counter- 
 parts of those aggregated states of consciousness dealt with 
 by the science of Subjective Psychology, which stands 
 entirely apart from all other sciences. Finally, the sociolo- 
 gist considers each tribe and nation as an aggregate pre- 
 senting multitudinous phenomena, simultaneous and suc- 
 cessive, that are held together as parts of one combination. 
 Thus, in every case, a concrete science deals with a real 
 aggregate (or a plurality of such aggregates) ; and it in- 
 cludes as its subject-matter whatever is to be known of this 
 aggregate in respect of its size, shape, motions, density, 
 texture, general arrangement of parts, minute structure, 
 chemical composition, temperature, etc., together with all 
 the multitudinous changes, material and dynamical, gone 
 through by it from the time it begins to exist as an aggre- 
 gate to the time it ceases to exist as an aggregate. 
 No abstract-concrete science makes the remotest attempt 
 
GE0UP8 OF AGGEEGATES. 109 
 
 to do anything of this sort. Taken together, the ahstract- 
 concrete sciences give an account of the various kinds of 
 properties -which aggregates display ; and each abstract- 
 concrete science concerns itself with a certain order of those 
 properties. By thia,«the properties common to all aggregates 
 are studied and formulated; by that, the properties of ag- 
 gregates having special forms, special states of aggregation, 
 etc. ; and by others, the properties of particular components 
 of aggregates when dissociated from other components. But 
 by all these sciences the aggregate, considered as an indi- 
 vidual object, is tacitly ignored ; and a property, or a con- 
 nected set of properties, exclusively occupies attention. It 
 matters not to Mechanics whether the mioving mass it con- 
 siders is a planet or a molecule, a dead stick thrown into 
 the river or the living dog that leaps after it : in any 
 case the curve described by the moving mass conforms 
 to the same laws. Similarly when the physicist takes for 
 his subject the relation between the changing bulk of matter 
 and the changing quantity of molecular motion it contains. 
 Dealing with the subject generally, he leaves out of con- 
 sideration the kind of matter ; and dealing with the subject 
 specially in relation to this or that kind of matter, he 
 ignores the attributes of size and form : save in the still 
 more special cases where the effect on form is considered, 
 and even then size is ignored. So, too, is it with the 
 chemist. A substance he is investigating, never thought of 
 by him as distinguished in extension or amount, is not even 
 required to be perceptible. A portion of carbon on which 
 he is experimenting, may or may not have been visible under 
 its forms of diamond or graphite or charcoal — this is in- 
 different. He traces it through various disguises and various 
 combinations — now as united with oxygen to form an in- 
 visible gas; now as hidden with other elements in such 
 more complex compounds as ether, and sugar, and oil. By 
 sulphuric acid or other agent he precipitates it from these 
 
110 EEPLIES TO OEITIOISMS. 
 
 as a coherent cinder, or as a diffused impalpable powder; 
 and again, by applying heat, forces it to disclose itself as an 
 element of animal tissue. Evidently, while thus ascertain- 
 ing the affinities and atomic equivalence of carbon, the 
 chemist has nothing to do with any aggregate. He deals 
 with carbon in the abstract, as something considered apart 
 from quantity, form, appearance, or temporaiy state of com- 
 bination; and conceives it as the possessor of powers or 
 properties, whence the special phenomena he describes re- 
 sult : the ascertaining of all these powers or properties being 
 his sole aim. 
 
 Finally, the Abstract Sciences ignore alike aggregates and 
 the powers which aggregates or their components possess; 
 and occupy themselves with relations — either with the re- 
 lations among aggregates, or among their parts, or the 
 relations among aggregates and properties, or the relations 
 among properties, or the relations among relations. The 
 same logical formula applies equally well, whether its terms 
 are men and their deaths, crystals and their planes of cleav- 
 age, or letters and their sounds. And how entirely Mathe- 
 matics concerns itself with relations, we see on remembering 
 that it has just the same expression for the characters of an 
 infinitesimal triangle, as for those of the triangle which has 
 Sirius for its apex and the diameter of the Earth's orbit for 
 its base. 
 
 I cannot see how these definitions of these groups of 
 sciences can be questioned. It is undeniable that every 
 Concrete Science gives an account of an aggregate or of 
 aggregates, inorganic, organic, or super-organic (a society); 
 and that, not concerning itself with properties of this or that 
 order, it concerns itself with the co-ordination of the as- 
 sembled properties of all orders. It seems to me no less 
 certain that an Abstract- Concrete Science gives an account 
 of some order of properties, general or special; not caring 
 about the other traits of an aggregate displaying them, and not 
 
AGGEEGATES, PEOPEETIES, RELATIONS. Ill 
 
 recognizing aggregates at all further than is implied by- 
 discussion of 'the particular order of properties. And I 
 think it is equally clear that an Abstract Science, freeing 
 its propositions, so far as the nature of thought permits, 
 from aggregates and properties, occupies itself with the 
 relations of co-existence and sequence, as disentangled 
 from all particular forms of being and actien. If then 
 these three groups of sciences are, respectively, accounts of 
 aggregates, accounts of properties, accounts of relations, it is 
 manifest that the divisions between them are not simply 
 perfectly clear, but that the chasms between them are ab- 
 solute. 
 
 Here, perhaps more clearly than before, will be seen the 
 untenability of the classification made by M. Comte. Al- 
 ready (p. 11), after setting forth in a general way these 
 fundamental distinctions, I have pointed out the incongrui- 
 ties that arise when the sciences, conceived as Abstract, 
 Abstract-Concrete, and Concrete, are arranged in the order 
 proposed by him. Such incongruities become stiU more 
 conspicuous if for these general names of the groups wa 
 substitute the definitions given above. The series will then 
 stand thus : — 
 
 •I 
 
 Mathematics An account of relations 
 
 (including, under Mechanics, an account oi properties). 
 
 Astronomy An account of aggregates. 
 
 Physics An account of properties. 
 
 Chemistry An account of properties. 
 
 Biology An account of aggregates. 
 
 Sociology An account of aggregates. 
 
 That those who espouse opposite views see clearly the 
 defects in the propositions of their opponents and not those 
 in their own, is a trite remark that holds in philosophical 
 discussions as in all others : the parable of the mote and 
 
112 EEPLIES TO CEITICISMS. 
 
 the beam applies as well to men's appreciations of one 
 another's opinions as to their appreciations of one another's 
 natures. Possibly to my positivist friends I exemplify this 
 truth, — just as they exemplify it to me. Those uncom- 
 mitted to either view must decide where the mote exists and 
 where the beam. Meanwhile it is clear that one or other 
 of the two views is essentially erroneous ; and that no quali- 
 fications can bring them into harmony. Either the sciences 
 admit of no such grouping as that which I have described, 
 or they admit of no such serial order as that given by 
 M. Comte. 
 
 London, 
 Felriuiry, 1871. 
 
REASONS FOB DISSENTING FROM THE 
 PHIIOSOPRT OF M. COMTE. 
 
BEASONS rOE DISSENTING 
 
 peSm the 
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF M. COMTE. 
 
 "While the preceding pages were passing through the 
 press, there appeared in the Revue des Beux Mondes for 
 February 15th, an article on a late work of mine — First 
 Principles. To M. Auguste Laugel, the writer of this article, 
 I am much indebted for the careful exposition he has made of 
 some of the leading views set forth in that work ; and for the 
 catholic and sympathetic spirit in which he has dealt with 
 them. In one respect, however, M. Laugel conveys to his 
 readers an erroneous impression — an impression doubtless 
 derived from what appears to him adequate evidence, and 
 doubtless expressed in perfect sincerity. M. Laugel describes 
 me as being, in part, a follower of M, Comte. After describing 
 the influence of M. Comte as traceable in the works of some 
 other English writers, naming especially Mr. Mill and Mr. 
 Buckle, he goes on to say that this influence, though not 
 avowed, is easily recognizable in the work he is about to 
 make known ; and in several places throughout his review, 
 there are remarks having the same implication. I greatly 
 regret having to take exception to anything said by a critic 
 so candid and so able. But the Berne des Beux Mondes cir- 
 culates widely in England, as well as elsewhere ; and finding 
 that there exists in some minds, both here and in America, 
 an impression similar to that entertained by M. Laugel — 
 an impression likely to be confirmed by his statement — ^it 
 appears to me needful to meet it. 
 
116 EEASONS FOR DISSENTING FEOM COMTE. 
 
 Two causes of quite different kinds, have conspired to diffuse 
 the erroneous belief that M. Comte is an accepted exponent 
 of scientific opinion. His bitterest foes and his closest 
 friends, have unconsciously joined in propagating it. On the 
 one hand, M. Comte having designated by thfe term " Positive 
 Philosophy" all that definitely-established knowledge which 
 men of science have been gradually organizing into a cohe- 
 rent body of doctrine ; and having habitually placed this in 
 opposition to the incoherent body of doctrine defended by 
 theologians ; it has become the habit of the theological party 
 to think of the antagonist scientific party, imder the title 
 of " positivists." And thus, from the habit of calling 
 them "positivists," there has grown up the assumption 
 that they call themselves "positivists," and that they are 
 the disciples of M. Comte. On the other hand, those who 
 have accepted M. Comte's system, and believe it to be 
 the philosophy of the future, have naturally been prone 
 to see everywhere the signs of its progress ; and wherever 
 they have found opinions in harmony with it, have ascribed 
 these opinions to the influence of its originator. It is always 
 the tendency of discipleship to magnify the effects of the 
 master's teachings ; and to credit the master with all the 
 doctrines he teaches. In the minds of his followers, M. 
 Comte's name is associated with scientific thinking, which, 
 in many cases, they first understood from his exposition of it. 
 Influenced as they inevitably are by this association of ideas, 
 they are reminded of M. Comte wherever they meet with 
 thinking which corresponds, in some marked way, to M. 
 Comte's description of scientific thinking ; and hence are apt 
 to imagine him as introducing into other minds, the con- 
 ceptions which he introduced into their minds. Such im- 
 pressions are, however, in most cases quite unwarranted. 
 That M. Comte has given a general exposition of the doctrine 
 and method elaborated by Science, is true. But it is not true 
 that the holders of this doctrine and followers of this method, 
 
COMTE AND POSITIVISM. 
 
 IIY 
 
 arc disciples of M. Comte. Neither their modes of inquiry 
 nor their views concerning human knowledge in its nature 
 and limits, are appreciably different from what they were 
 before. If they are " positivists," it is in the sense that all men 
 of science have been more or less consistently "positivists;" 
 and the applicability of M. Comte's title to them, no more 
 makes them his disciples, than does its applicability to 
 men of science who lived and died before M. Comte wrote, 
 make these his disciples. M. Comte himself by no means 
 claims that which some of his adherents are apt, by impli- 
 cation, to claim for him. He says : — " II y a, sans doute, 
 beaucoup d'analogie entre ma philosophie positive et ce 
 que les savans anglais entendent, depuis Newton surtout, 
 par philosqpMe naturelle ;" (see Acerlissement) and further 
 on he indicates the " grand mouvement imprime a I'eSprit 
 humain, il y a deux siecles, par Taction combin^e des 
 pr^ceptes de Bacon, des conceptions de Descartes, et des d^- 
 couvertes de GalUe^, comme le moment ovl I'esprit de la 
 philosophie positive a commence k se prononcer dans 
 le monde." That is to say, the general mode of thought 
 and way of interpreting phenomena, which M. Comte calls 
 " Positive Philosophy," he recognizes as having been growing 
 for two centuries ; as having reached, when he wrote, a 
 marked development ; and as being the heritage of all men of 
 science. 
 
 That which M. Comte proposed to do, was to give scientific 
 thought and method a more definite embodiment and organi- 
 zation; and to apply it to the interpretation of classes 
 of phenomena not previously dealt with in a scientific 
 manner. The conception was a great one ; and the endea- 
 vour to work it out was worthy of sympathy and applause. 
 Some such conception was entertained by Bacon. He, too, 
 aimed at the organization of the sciences ; he, too, held that 
 "Physics is the mother of all the sciences ;" he, too, held, 
 that the sciences can be advanced only by combining them. 
 
118 EEASONS FOE DISSENTING FEOM COMTE. 
 
 and saw the nature of the required combination; he, too, 
 held that moral and civil philosophy could not flourish when 
 separated from their roots in natural philosophy ; and thus 
 he, too, had some idea of a social science growing out of 
 physical science. But the state of knowledge in his day pre- 
 vented any advance beyond the general conception : indeed, 
 it was marvellous that he should have advanced so far. In- 
 stead of a vague, undefined conception, M. Comte has pre- 
 sented the world with a defined and highly-elaborated 
 conception. In working out this conception he has shown 
 remarkable breadth of view, great originality, immense fer- 
 tility of thought, unusual powers of generalization. Con- 
 sidered apart from the question of its truth, his system of 
 Positive Philosophy is a vast achievement. But after ac- 
 cording to M. Comte high admiration for his conception, for 
 his effort to realize it, and for the faculty he has shown in 
 the effort to realize it, there remains the inquiry — Has he 
 succeeded ? A thinker who re-organizes the scientific method 
 and knowledge of his age, and whose re-organization is 
 accepted by his successors, may rightly be said to have such 
 successors for his disciples. But successors who accept this 
 method and knowledge of his age, minus his re-organization, 
 are certainly not his disciples. How then stands the case 
 with M. Comte ? There are some few who receive his 
 doctrines with but little reservation ; and these are his dis- 
 ciples truly so called. There are others who regard with 
 approval certain of his leading doctrines, but not the rest : 
 these we may distinguish as partial adherents. There 
 are others who reject aU his distinctive doctrines ; and these 
 must be classed as his antagonists. The members of this 
 class stand substantially in the same position as they would 
 have done had he not written. Declining his re-organ- 
 ization of scientific doctrine, they possess this scientific 
 doctrine in its pre-existing state, as the common heritage 
 bequeathed by the past to the present ; and their adhesion to 
 
POINTS OF AGEEEMEirr WITH COMTE. 119 
 
 this scientific doctrine in no sense implicates them with M, 
 Comte. In this class stand the great body of men of science. 
 And in this case I stand myself. 
 
 Coming thus to the personal part of the question, let me 
 first specify those great general principles on which M. 
 Comte is at one with preceding thinkers ; and on which I am 
 at one with M. Comte. 
 
 All knowledge is from experience, holds M. Comte ;' and 
 this I also hold — hold it, indeed, in a wider sense than M. 
 Comte : since, not only do I believe that all the ideas acquired 
 by individuals, and cpnsequently all the ideas transmitted by 
 past generations, are thus derived ; but I also contend that 
 the very faculties by which they are acquired, are the pro- 
 ducts of accimiulated and organized experiences received by 
 ancestral races of beings (see Principles of Psychology). But 
 the doctrine that all knowledge is from experience, is not 
 originated by M. Comte; nor is it claimed by him. He 
 himself says — " Tous les bons esprits rdpetent, depuis Bacon, 
 qu'il n'y a de connaissances r^elle que celles qui reposent sur 
 des faites observes." And the elaboration and definite esta- 
 blishment of this doctrine, has been the special characteristic 
 of the English school of Psychology. Nor am I aware that 
 M. Comte, accepting this doctrine, has done anything to 
 make it more certain, or give it greater definiteness. Indeed it 
 was impossible for him to do, so ; since he repudiates that part 
 of mental science by which alone this doctrine can be proved. 
 
 It is a further belief of M. Comte, that all knowledge is 
 phenomenal or relative ; and in this belief I entirely agree. 
 But no one alleges that the. relativity of all knowledge was 
 first enunciated by M. Comte. Among others who have 
 more or less consistently held this truth. Sir William Hamil- 
 ton enumerates, Protagoras, Aristotle, St. Augustin, Boethius, 
 Averroes, Albertus Magnus, Gerson, Leo Hebrseus, Melanc- 
 thon, Scaliger, Francis Piccolomini, Giordano Bruno, Cam- 
 
120 EEASONS FOE DISSENTINS FEOM COMTE. 
 
 panella, Bacon, Spinoza, Newton, Kant. And Sir "William 
 Hamilton, in his " Philosophy of the "Unconditioned," first 
 published in 1829, has given a scientific demonstration of this 
 belief. Receiving it in common with other thinkers, from 
 preceding thinkers, M. Comte has not, to my knowledge, 
 advanced this belief. Nor indeed could he advance it, for 
 the reason already given — he denies the possibility of that 
 analysis of thought which discloses the relativity of all 
 cogdition. 
 
 M. Comte reprobates the interpretation of different classes 
 of phenomena by assigning metaphysical entities as their 
 causes; and I coincide in the opinion that the assumption 
 of such separate entities, though convenient, if not indeed 
 necessary, for purposes of thought, is, scientifically con- 
 sidered, illegitimate. This opinion is, in fact, a corollary 
 from the last ; and must stand or fall with it. But like the 
 last it has been held with more or less consistency for gene- 
 rations. M. Comte himself quotes Newton's favorite saying 
 — " ! Physics, beware of Metaphysics !" Neither to this 
 doctrine, any more than to the preceding doctrines, has M. 
 Comte given a firmer basis. He has simply re-asserted it ; 
 and it was out of the question for him to do more. In this 
 case, as in the others, his denial of subjective psychology 
 debarred him from proving that these metaphysical entities are 
 mere symbolic conceptions which do not admit of verification. 
 ^ Lastly, M. Comte believes in invariable natural laws — 
 absolute uniformities ' of relation among phenomena. But 
 very many before him have believed in them too. Long 
 familiar even beyond the bounds of the scientific world, the 
 proposition that there is an unchanging order in things, has, 
 within the scientific world, held, for generations, the position 
 of an established postulate : by some men of science recog- 
 nized only as holding of inorganic phenomena ; but recog- 
 nized by other men of science, as universal. And M. Comte, 
 accepting this doctrine from the past, has left it substantially 
 
OVEE-OEEDIT BY ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS. 121 
 
 as it was. Though he has asserted new uniformities, I do 
 not think scientific men will admit that he has so demonstrated 
 them, as to make the induction more certain ; nor has he 
 deductively established the doctrine, by showing that uni- 
 formity of relation is a necessary corollary from the per- 
 sistence of force, as may readily be shown. 
 
 These, then, are the pre-established general truths with 
 which M. Comte sets out — truths which cannot be regarded 
 as distinctive of his philosophy. " But why," it will perhaps 
 be asked, " is it needful to point out this ; seeing that no 
 instructed reader supposes these truths to be peculiar to M. 
 Comte?" I reply that though ng disciple of M. Comte 
 would deliberately claim them for him ; and though no 
 theological antagonist at all familiar with science and philo- 
 phy, supposes M. Comte to be the first propounder of them ; 
 yet there is so strong a tendency to associate any doctrines 
 with the name of a conspicuous recent exponent of them, 
 that false impressions are produced, even in spite of better 
 knowledge. Of the need for making this reclamation, 
 definite proof is at hand. In the No. of the Eevue des Deux 
 Mondes named at the commencement, may be found, on p. 936, 
 the words^ — " Toute religion, comme toute philosophie, a la 
 pretention de donner une explication de I'univers. La 
 philosophie qui s'appeUe positive se distingue de toutgp les 
 philosophies et de toutes les religions en ce qu'elle a renonc^ 
 k cette ambition de 1' esprit humain ;" and the remainder of 
 the paragraph is devoted to explaining the doctrine of the 
 relativity of knowledge. The next paragraph begins — 
 " Tout imbu de ces idees, que nous exposons sans les discuter 
 pour le moment, M. Spencer divise, etc." If ow this is one 
 of those collocations of ideas which tends to create, or to 
 strengthen, the erroneous impression I would dissipate. I do 
 not for a moment suppose that M. Laugel intended to say 
 that these ideas which he describes as ideas of the " Positive 
 Philosophy," are peculiarly the ideas of M, Cpmte, Jut 
 
122 REASONS FOE DISSENTING FEOM COMTE. 
 
 little as lie probably intended it, his expressions suggest thia 
 conception. In the minds of both disciples and antagonists, 
 "the Positive Philosophy" means the philosophy of M. 
 Comte ; and to be imbued with the ideas of " the Positiye 
 Philosophy" means to be imbued with the ideas of M. Comte 
 — to have received these ideas from M. Comte. After what 
 has been said above, I need scarcely repeat that the con- 
 ception thus inadvertently suggested, is a wrong one. • M. 
 Comte's brief enunciations of these general truths, gave me 
 no clearer apprehensions of them than I had before. Such 
 clarifications of ideas on these ultimate questions, as I can 
 trace to any particular teacher, I owe to Sir "William 
 Hamilton. 
 
 From the principles which M. Comte held in common with 
 many preceding and contemporary thinkers, let us pass now 
 to the principles that are distinctive of his system. Just as 
 entirely as I agree with M. Comte on those cardinal doctrines 
 which we jointly inherit ; so entirely do I disagree with him 
 on those cardinal doctrines which he propounds, and which 
 determine the organization of his philosophy. The best way 
 of showing this will be to compare, side by side, the — 
 
 Propositions held hi „ •. • 7 • j. t- i 7 j 
 
 TIT C fp Fropositions iclnch I hold. 
 
 "...chacune de nos con- The progress of our conceptions, 
 
 captions principales, chaque and of each branch of knowledge, is 
 
 branche de nos connaissan- from beginning to end intrinsically 
 
 ces, passe successivement alike. There are not three methods 
 
 par trois 6tats theoriques of philosophizing radically opposed; 
 
 diffdrens: I'etattheologique, but one method of philosophizing 
 
 ou fictif; I'^tat mdtaphy- which remains, in essence, the same, 
 
 sique, ou abstrait ; I'etat At first, and to the last, the conceived 
 
 soientifique, ou positif. En causal agencies of phenomena, have a 
 
 d'autres termes, I'esprit hu- degree of generality corresponding to 
 
 main, par sa nature, em- the width of the generalizations 
 
 ploie successivement dans which experiences have determined ; 
 
 chacune de ses recherohes and they change just as gradually as 
 
 trois methodcs de philoso- experiences accumulate. The into- 
 
THE THEEE STAGES OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 123 
 
 pher, dont le caractere est 
 essentiellement different et 
 meme radicalement opposiS : 
 d'abord la methode thdolo- 
 gique, ensuite la methode 
 metaphysique, et enfin la 
 methode nositive." p. 3. 
 
 gration of causal agencies, originally 
 thought of as multitudinous and 
 local, but finally believed to be one 
 and universal, is a process which in- 
 volves the passing through all inter- 
 mediate steps between these extremes ; 
 and any appearance of stages can be 
 but superficial. Supposed concrete 
 and individual causal agencies, co- 
 alesce in the mind as fast as groups 
 of phenomena are assimilated, or seen 
 to be similarly caused. Along with 
 their coalescence, comes a greater ex- 
 tension of their individualities, and 
 a concomitant loss of distinctness in 
 their individualities. Gradually, by 
 continuance of such coalescences, 
 causal agencies become, in thought, 
 diffused and indefinite. And even- 
 tually, without any change in the 
 nature of the process, there is reached 
 the consciousness of a universal causal 
 agency, which cannot be conceived.* 
 
 As the progress of thought is one, 
 so is the end one. There are not 
 three possible terminal conceptions ; 
 but only a single terminal conception. 
 When the theological idea of the 
 providential action of one being, is 
 developed to its ultimate form, by the 
 absorption of all independent second- 
 ary agencies, it becomes the conception 
 of a being immanent in all pheno- 
 mena ; and the reduction of it to this 
 state, implies the fading-away, in 
 thought, of all those anthropomorphic 
 attributes by which the aboriginal 
 
 * A clear ilUistration of tliis pvooess, is furnished by the recent mental inte- 
 gration of Heat, Light, Electricity, etc., as modes of molecular motion. If wo 
 go a step back, we see that the modern conception of Electricity, resulted from 
 the integration in consciousness, of the two forms of it evolved in the galvanic 
 battery and in the electric-machine. And going back to a still earlier stage, wo 
 see how the conception of statical electricity, arose by the eoaleseenco in thought, 
 of the previously-separate forces manifested in rubbed ambei-, in rubbed glass, and 
 in lightning. With such illustrations before him, no one can, I think, doubt 
 that the process has been the same from the beginning. 
 
 " Le systemc theologiquo 
 est parvenu a la plus haute 
 perfection dont il soit sus- 
 ceptible, quand il a substi- 
 tu6 Taction providentielle 
 d'un etre unique au jeu 
 varie des nombreuses divi- 
 nites independantes qui a- 
 vaient ete imaginees primi- 
 tivement. De meme, lo 
 dernier terme du systeme 
 metaphysique consiste a 
 concovoir, au lieu des dif- 
 fe rentes entitesparticulieres, 
 
124 
 
 EEASONS FOE DISSENTING FEOM COMTE. 
 
 une seule grande cntite g^- 
 ndrale, la nature, envisagee 
 comme la source unique de 
 tons les phenomenes. Pa- 
 reillement, la perfection du 
 sysEeme positif, vers laquelle 
 il tend sans eesse, quoiqu'il 
 soit trfeS-probable qu'il ne 
 doive jamais I'atteindre, 
 serait de pouvoir se repr^- 
 senter tous les divers phd- 
 nomenes observables comme 
 des cas particuliers d'un 
 soul fait giineral, tel que 
 celui de la gravitation, par 
 cxemple." p. 5. 
 
 "..,1a perfection du b5-s- 
 teme positif, vers laquelle 
 il tend sans cesse, quoiqu'il 
 soit trds-probable qu'il ne 
 doive jamais I'atteindre, 
 serait de pouvoir se repr^- 
 senter tous les divers phe- 
 nomfenes observables comme 
 des cas particuliers d'un 
 soul fait general, p. 5 ... 
 . . . considerant comme ab- 
 solument inaccessible, et 
 vide de sens pour nous la 
 recherche de ce qu'on ap- 
 pelle les causes, soit pre- 
 mieres, soit finales." p. 14. 
 
 idea was distinguished. The alleged 
 last term of the metaphysical system 
 — the conception of a single great 
 general entity, nature, as the source 
 of all phenomena — is a conception 
 identical with the previous one : the 
 consciousness of a single source which, 
 in coming to be regarded as universal, 
 ceases to be regarded as conceivable, 
 differs in nothing but name from the 
 consciousness of one being, mani- 
 fested in all phenomena. And simi- 
 larly, that which is described as the 
 ideal state of science — the power to 
 represent all observable phenomena 
 as particular cases of a single general 
 fact, implies the postulating of some 
 ultimate existence of which this 
 single fact is alleged ; and the postu- 
 lating of this ultimate existence, 
 involves a state of consciousness in- 
 distinguishable from the other two. 
 
 Though along with the extension 
 of generalizations, and coneomitant 
 integration of conceived causal agen- 
 cies, the conceptions of causal agencies 
 grow more indefinite ; and though as 
 they gradually coalesce into a uni- 
 versal causal agency, they cease to be 
 representable in thought, and are 
 no longer supposed to be comprehen- 
 sible ; yet the consciousness of cause 
 remains as dominant to the last as it 
 was at first; and can never be got 
 rid of. The consciousness of cause 
 can be abolished only by abolishing 
 consciousness itself.* {First Princi- 
 ples, § 26.) 
 
 * Possibly it -will be said that M. Comte himself admits, that what he calls the 
 perfection of the positive system, will probably never be reached ; and that what 
 he condemns is the inquiry into the natures ot causes and not the general recog- 
 nition of cause. To the first of these allegations, I reply tnat, as I understand 
 M. Comte, the obstacle to the perfect realization of the positive philosophy is the 
 impossibility of carrying generalization so far as to reduce sUl particular facts to 
 
THK WOELD GOVEENED BY FEELINGS. 
 
 125 
 
 "Ce n'cst pas aux leo- 
 teurs de cet ouvrage que je 
 croirai jamais devoir prou- 
 ver que les idees gouvernont 
 et bouleversent le monde, 
 ou, en d'autres termes, que 
 tout le m^canisme social 
 repose flnalement sur des 
 opinions. lis savenl surtout 
 que la grande crise politique 
 et morale des soci^tds ao- 
 tuelles tient, en derniere 
 analyse, a I'anarcliie intel- 
 lectuelle." p. 48.* 
 
 Ideas do not govern and overthrow 
 the world : the world is governed or 
 overthrown by feelings, to which 
 ideas serve only as guides. The 
 social mechapism does not rest finally 
 upon opinions; but almost wholly up- 
 on character. Not intellectual anar- 
 chy, but moral antagonism, is the 
 cause of political crises. All social 
 phenomena are produced -by the to- 
 tality of human emotions and beliefs : 
 of which the emotions are mainly 
 pre-determined, while the beliefs are 
 mainly post-determined. Men's de- 
 sires are chiefly inherited ; but their 
 beliefs are chiefly acquired, and depfend 
 on surrounding conditions; and the 
 most important surrounding condi- 
 tions depend on the social state which 
 the prevalent desires have produced. 
 The social state at any time existing, 
 is the resultant of all the ambitions, 
 self-interests, fears, reverences, in- 
 dignations, sympathies, etc., of an- 
 cestral citizens and existing citizens. 
 The ideas current in this social state, 
 must, on the average, be congruous 
 with the feelings of citizens ; and 
 therefore, on the average, with the 
 social state these feelings have pro- 
 
 cascs of Qiie general fact — ^not the impossibility of excluding the consciousness of 
 cause. And to the second allegation I reply, that the essential principle of his 
 philosophy, is an avowed ignoring of cause altogether. For if it is not, what he- 
 cmnes of his alleged distinction between the perfection of the positive system and the 
 perfection of the metaphysical system ? And here let me point out that, by affirm- 
 ing exactly the opposite to that which M. Comte thus affirms, I am excluded 
 from the positive school. If his own definition of positivism is to be taken, 
 then, as I nold that what he deiines as positivism is an absolute impossibility, 
 , it is clear that I cannot be what he calls a positivist. 
 
 * A friendly critic alleges that M. Comte is not fairly represented by this 
 quotation, and that he is blamed by his biographer, M. Littre, for his too-great 
 insistanoe.on feeling as a motor of humanity. If in his "Positive Politics," 
 which I presume is here referred to, M. Comte abandons his original position, so 
 much the better. But I- am here dealing with what is known as "the Positive 
 Philosophy;" and that the passage above quoted docs not misrepresent it, is 
 proved by the fact that this doctrine is re-asserted at the commencement of the 
 Sociology. , 
 
126 
 
 EEASONS rOE DISSENTING FEOM COMTE. 
 
 " . . . je nc dois pae n^gliger 
 d'indiquer d'avance, comme 
 une propria t^ essentielle do 
 I'eolielle encyclop^diquo que 
 jo Tais proposer, sa con- 
 formity gln^rale arec I'en- 
 semble de I'histoire soien- 
 tifique; en ce sens, que, 
 malgre la simultaneity r^eUe 
 et continue du d^veloppe- 
 ment desdifferentes sciences, 
 celles qui seront classees 
 comme anterieures seront, 
 en effet, plus anciennes et 
 constamment plus avancdes 
 que celles presentees comme 
 
 post6rieures." p. 84 
 
 . . . . " Get ordre est de- 
 termine par le degre de sim- 
 plicity, ou, ce qui revient 
 au meme, par le degre de 
 g^neralite des plidaomSnes." 
 p. 87. 
 
 duoed. Ideas -wholly foreign to this 
 social state cannot be evolved, and if 
 introduced from -without, cannot get 
 accepted — or, if accepted, die out 
 -when the temporary phase of feeling 
 -which caused their acceptance, ends. 
 Hence, though advanced ideas -when 
 once estaJ)lished, act upon society 
 and aid its 'further advance ; yet the 
 establishment of such ideas depends 
 on the fitness of the society for re- 
 ceiving them. Practically, the popu- 
 lar character and the social state, 
 determine -what ideas shall , be cur- 
 rent; instead of the current ideas 
 determining the social state and the 
 character. The modification of men's 
 moral natures, caused by the continu- 
 ous discipline of social life, -which 
 adapts them more and more to social 
 relations, is therefore the chief proxi- 
 mate cause of social progress. {Social 
 Statics, chap, xxx.) 
 
 The order in -which the generaliza- 
 tions of science are established, is 
 determined by the frequency and im- 
 pressiveness -with -which difierent 
 classes of relations are repeated in 
 conscious experience ; and this de- 
 pends, partly on the directness with 
 which personal welfare is affected; 
 partly on the conspicuousness of one or 
 loth the phenomena letween which a 
 relation is to le perceived; partly on the 
 absolute frequency with which the re- 
 lations occur : partly on their relative 
 frequency of occurrence; partly on 
 their degree of simplicity ; and partly 
 on their degree of abstractness. \First 
 Principles, 1st ed., § 36j appended 
 to this pamphlet. 
 
SEEIAL AEEANGEMENT OF THE SCIENCES. 
 
 127 
 
 "En r^sultat definitif, la 
 matliematique, rastronomie, 
 1ft physique, la chimie, la 
 pKysiologie, et la physique 
 sociale ; telle est la formule 
 enclyopediquo qui, parmi le 
 trfes-grand nombre de clas- 
 sifications que comportent 
 les six sciences fondamen- 
 tales, est seule logiquement 
 conforme k la hi^rarchie 
 naturelle et invariable dea 
 phenomfenes." p. 115. 
 
 " On. congoit, en cffet, que 
 I'etude rationelle de chaque 
 science fondamentale exi- 
 geant la culture pr6alablo 
 de toutes celles qui la pre- 
 cedent dans notre hierarchie 
 enclyopddique, n'a pu fairo 
 de progr^s r^els et prendre 
 son veritable caraotere, qu' 
 apres un grand d^veloppe- 
 ment des sciences ante- 
 rieures relatives a des ■ph6- 
 nom^nes plus gen^raux, plus 
 abstraits, moins compliqu^s, 
 ct ind^pendans des autres. 
 C'est done dans cet ordre 
 que la progression, quoique 
 simultan^e, a du avoir lieu." 
 p. 100. 
 
 The sciences as arranged in this 
 succession specified by M. Comte, do 
 not logically conform, to. the natural 
 and invariable hierarchy of pheno- 
 mena; and there is no serial order 
 whatever in which they can be placed, 
 which represents either their logical 
 dependence or the dependence of phc- 
 noniena. (See Genesis of Science, 
 and foregoing Essay.) 
 
 The historical development of the 
 sciences Jias not taken place in this 
 serial order; nor in any other serial 
 order. There is no "true filiation 
 of the sciences." From the begin- 
 ning, the abstract sciences, the 
 abstract-concrete sciences, and the 
 concrete sciences, have progressed to- 
 gether : the first solving problems 
 which the second and third present- 
 ed, and growing only by the solution 
 of the problems ; and the second 
 similarly growing by joining the first 
 in solving the problems of the third. 
 AU along there has been a continuous 
 action and reaction between the three 
 great classes of sciences — an advance 
 from concrete facts to abstract facts, 
 and then an application of such ab- 
 stract facts to the analysis of new 
 orders of concrete facts. (See Genesis 
 of Science.) 
 
 Such tLen are the organizing principles of M. Comte's 
 philosophy. Leaving out of his "Exposition" those pre- 
 established general doctrines which are the common property 
 of modern thinkers ; these are the general doctrines which 
 remtiin — ^these are the doctrines which fundamentally dis- 
 tinguish his system. From every one of them I dissent. 
 To each proposition I oppose either a -widely-different pro- 
 
128 
 
 REASONS FOE DISSENTING FEOM COMTE. 
 
 position, or a direct negation ; and I not only do it now, but 
 have done it from the time when. I became acquainted with 
 his writings. This rejection of his cardinal principles should, 
 I think, alone suffice ; but there are sundry other views 
 of his, some of them largely characterizing his system, 
 which I equally reject. Let us glance at them. 
 
 How organic beings have 
 originated, is an inquiry 
 which M. Comte deprecates 
 as a useless speculation : as- 
 serting, as he does, that 
 species are immutable. 
 
 M. Comte contends that 
 cf what is commonly known 
 as mental science, all that 
 most important part which 
 consists of the subjective 
 analysis of our ideas, is an 
 impossibility. 
 
 M. Comte' s ideal of so- 
 ciety is one in which govern- 
 ment is developed to the 
 greatest extent — in which 
 class-functions are far more 
 under conscious public regu- 
 lation than now — ^in which 
 hierarchical organization 
 with unquestioned authority 
 shall guide everything — in 
 which the individual life 
 shall be subordinated in the 
 greatest degree to the social 
 life. 
 
 This inquiry, I believe, admits of 
 answer, and will be answered. That 
 division of Biology which concerns 
 itself with the origin of species, I 
 hold to be the supreme division, to 
 which all others are subsidiary. Por 
 on the verdict of Biology on this 
 matter, must wholly depend our con- 
 ception of human nature, past, pre- 
 sent, and future ; our theory of the 
 mind ; and our theory of society. 
 
 I have very emphatically expressed 
 my belief in a subjective science of 
 the mind, by writing a Prineipha oj 
 Psychology, one half of which is sub- 
 jective. 
 
 That form of society towards which 
 we are progressing, I hold to be one 
 in which government will be reduced 
 to the smallest amount possible, and 
 freedom increased to the greatest 
 amount possible — one in which 
 human nature will have become so 
 moulded by social discipline into fit- 
 ness for the social state, that it will 
 need little external restraint, but wiU 
 be self-restrained — one in which the 
 citizen will tolerate no interference 
 with his freedom, save that which 
 maintains the equal freedom of others 
 — one in which the spontaneous co- 
 operation which has developed our 
 industrial system, and is now develop- 
 
THE RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT. 
 
 129 
 
 ing it ■with increasing rapidity, will 
 produce agencies for the discharge of 
 nearly all social functions, and will 
 leave to the prinaary govermental 
 agency nothing beyond the function 
 of maintaining those conditions to 
 free action, which make such spon- 
 taneous co-operation possible — one in 
 which individual life will thus be 
 pushed to the greatest extent consis- 
 tent with social life; and in which 
 social life will have no other end than 
 to maintain the completest sphere for 
 individual life 
 
 I conceive, on the other hand, that 
 the object of religious sentiment will 
 ever continue to be, that which it has 
 ever been — the unknown source of 
 things. While the /orws under which 
 men are conscious of the unknown 
 source of things, may fade away, 
 the substance of the consciousness is 
 permanent. Beginning with causal 
 agents conceived as imperfectly 
 known ; progressing to causal agents 
 conceived as less known and less 
 knowable; and coming at last to a 
 universal causal agent posited as 
 not to be known at all ; the religious 
 sentiment must ever continue to oc- 
 cupy itself with this universal causal 
 agent. Having in the course of 
 evolution, come to have for its object 
 of contemplation, the Infinite Un- 
 knowable, the religious sentiment can 
 never again (unless by retrogression) 
 take a Finite Knowable, like Human- 
 ity, for its object of contemplation. 
 
 Here, tten, are sundry other points, all of them important, 
 and the last two supremely important, on which I am 
 diametrically opposed to M. Com to ; and did space permit, 
 I could add many others. Radically differing from him as I 
 thus do, in everything distinctive of his philosophy; and 
 
 IT. Comte, not including 
 in his philosophy the con- 
 sciousness of a cause mani- 
 fested to us in all phe- 
 nomena, and yet holding 
 that; there must be a reli- 
 gion, which must have an 
 object, takes for his object 
 —Humanity. "This Col- 
 lective Life (of Society), is 
 in Comte's systpm the i!tre 
 Supreme ; the only one we 
 can hiow, therefore the only 
 one we can worship." 
 
130 KEASONS FOK DISSENTING FEOM COMTE. 
 
 having invariably expressed my dissent, publicly and 
 privately, from, the time I became acquainted with his 
 writings; it may be imagined that I have been not a little 
 startled to find myself classed as one of the same school. 
 That those who have read First Principles only, may have 
 been betrayed into this error in the way above shown, by the 
 ambiguous use of the phrase "Positive Philosophy," I can 
 imderstand. But that any who are acquainted with my pre- 
 vious writings, should suppose I have any general sympathy 
 with M. Comte, save that implied by preferring proved facta 
 to superstitions, astonishes me. 
 
 It is true that, disagreeing with M. Comte, though I do, 
 in all those fundamental views that are peculiar to him, 
 I agree with him in sundry minor views. The doctrine that 
 the education of the individual should accord in mode and 
 arrangement with the education of mankind, considered 
 historically, I have cited from him ; and have endeavoured 
 to enforce it. I entirely concur in his opinion that there 
 requires a new order of scientific men, whose function shall 
 be that of co-ordinating the results arrived at by the rest. 
 To him I believe I am indebted for the conception of a 
 social consensus ; and when the time comes for dealing with 
 this conception, I shall state my indebtedness. And I also 
 adopt his word. Sociology. There are, I believe, in the part 
 of his writings which I have read, various incidental thoughts 
 of great depth and value ; and I doubt not that were I to 
 read more of his writings, I should find many others.* It 
 is very probable, too, that I have said (as I am told I have) 
 some things which M. Comte had already said. It would be 
 difficult, I believe, to find any two men who had no opinions 
 in common. And it would be extremely strange if two men, 
 
 * M. Comte's "Exposition"' I read in tlie original in 1853; and in two 
 or three other places have referred to the original to get his exact words. 
 The Inorganic Physics, and the first chapter of the Biology, I read in Miss 
 Martineau's condensed translation, whSn it appeared. The rest of M. Comte's 
 views I know only through Mr. Lewes's outline, and through incidental refci-oucoa. 
 
THE DISAGREEMENTS FUNDAMENTAL. 131 
 
 starting from the same general doctrines established by 
 modern science, should traverse some of the same fields of 
 inquiry, without their lines of thought having any points 
 of intersection. But none of these minor agreements can be 
 of much weight in comparison with the fundamental dis- 
 agreements above specified. Leaving out of view that general 
 community which we both have with the scientific thought 
 of the age, the difierences between us are essential, while 
 the correspondences are non-essential. And I venture to 
 think that kinship must be determined by essentials, and 
 not by non-essentials.* 
 
 Joined with the ambiguous use of the phrase "Positive 
 Philosophy," which has led to a classing with M. Comte 
 of many men who either ignore or reject his distinctive 
 principles, there has been one special circumstance that has 
 tended to originate and maintain this classing in my own 
 case. The assumption of some relationship between M. Comte 
 and myself, was unavoidably raised by the title of my first 
 book — Social Statics, ^hen that book was published, I was 
 unaware that this title had been before used : had I 
 known the fact, I should certainly have adopted an alternative 
 title which I had in view.f If, however, instead of the title, 
 
 * In his recent work, Augusts Comte et la PMlosopltie Positive, M. Littre, 
 defending the Comteau classification of the sciences from the criticism I made 
 upon it in the " Genesis of Science," deals with me wholly as an antagonist. 
 The chapter he devotes to his reply, opens by placing me in direct antithesis 
 to the English adherents of Comte, named in the preceding chapter. 
 
 t I believed at the time, and have never doubted until now, that the choice 
 of this title was absolutely independent of its previous use by M Comte. AVhile 
 writing these pages, I have found reason to think the contrary. On referring to Social 
 Statics, to see what were my views of social . evolution in 1850, when M. Comte 
 was to me but a name, I met with the following sentence : — " Social philosophy 
 may be aptly divided (as political economy, has been) into statics and dynamics." 
 (p. 409). . This I remembered to be a reference to a division which I had seen in 
 the Political Economy of Mr. Mill.' But why had I not mentioned Mr. Mill's name ? 
 On referring to the first edition of his work, I found, at the opening of Book iv., 
 this sentence : — "The three preceding parts include as detailed aviewas the limits 
 of this treatise permit, of what, by a happy generalization of a mathematical 
 phrase, has been called the Statics of the subject." Here was the solution of the ' 
 • question. ■ The division had not been made by Mr. Mill, but by some writer 
 (on Political Economy I supposed) who was not named by him ; and whom I did 
 not know. It is now manifest, however, that while X supposed I was giving 
 a more extended use to this division, I was but returning to the original use 
 
132 EEASONS FOE DISSENTDSTG FEOM COMTB. 
 
 the work itself be considered, its irrelation to the philosopny 
 of M. Comte, becomes abundantly manifest. There is decisive 
 testimony on this point. In the North British Review for 
 August, 1851, a reviewer of Social Statics says — 
 
 " The title of this work, however, is a complete misnomer. 
 According to all analogy, the phrase "Social Statics" should he 
 used only in some such sense as that in which, as we have already 
 explained, it is used by Comte, namely as designating a branch of 
 inquiry whose end it is to ascertain the laws of social equilibrium 
 or order, as distinct ideally from those of social movement or progress. 
 Of this Mr. Spencer does not seem to have had the slightest notion, 
 but to have chosen the name for his work only as a means of indi- 
 cating vaguely that it proposed to treat of social concerns in a 
 scientific manner." p. 321. 
 
 Respecting M. Comte's application of the words statics 
 and dynamics to social phenomena, now that I know what 
 it is, I will only say that while I perfectly imderstand how, 
 by a defensible extension of their mathematical meanings, 
 the one may be used to indicate social functions in lalaiice, 
 and the other &ocia\ functions out of balance, I am quite at a 
 loss to imderstand how the phenomena of structure can be 
 included in the one any more than in the other. But the 
 two things which here concern me, are, first, to point out that 
 I had not "the slightest notion" of giving Social Statics the 
 meaning which M. Comte gave it ; and, second, to explain 
 the meaning which I did give it. The units of any ag- 
 gregate of matter, are in equilibrium when they severally 
 act and re-act upon each other on all sides with equal forces. 
 A state of change among them implies that there are forces 
 exercised by some that are not counterbalanced by like 
 forces exercised by others ; and a state of rest implies the 
 absence of such uncounterbalanced forces — ^implies, if the 
 units are homogeneous, equal distances among them — 
 implies a maintenance of their respective spheres of molecular 
 
 ^vliicli Mr. Mill had limited to his special topic. Another thing is, I think, 
 tolerahly manifest. As I eridently wished to point out my obligation to some 
 unknown political economist, whose division I thought I was extending, I should 
 have named him had I kno^vn who he was. And in that case should not have 
 put this extension of the division as though it wore new 
 
THE SOCIOLOGICAL DISAGEEEMENT. 133 
 
 motion. Similarly among the units of a society, the funda- 
 mental condition to equilibrium, is, that the restraining forces 
 which the units exercise on each other, shall be balanced. 
 If the spheres of action of some units are diminished by 
 extension of the spheres of action of others, there necessarily 
 results an unbalanced force which tends to produce political 
 change in the relations of individuals ; and the tendency 
 to change can cease, only when individuals cease to aggress 
 on each other's spheres of action — only when there is 
 maintained that law of equal freedom, which it was the 
 purpose of Social Statics to enforce in all its consequences. 
 Besides this totally-unlike conception of what constitutes 
 Social Statics, the work to which I applied that title. Is 
 fundamentally at variance with M. Comte's teachings In 
 almost everything. So far from alleging, as M. Comte does, 
 that society Is to be re-organized by philosophy ; it alleges 
 that society Is to be re-organized only by the accumulated 
 effects of habit on character. Its aim is not the increase 
 of authoritative control over citizens, but the decrease of It. 
 A more pronounced Individualism, instead of a more pro- 
 nounced nationalism. Is Its Ideal. So profoundly Is my 
 political creed at variance with the creed of M. Comte, that, 
 unless I am misinformed. It has been instanced by a leading 
 English disciple of M. Comte, as the creed to which he has 
 the greatest aversion. One point of coincidence, however, 
 is recognizable. The analogy between an Individual organism 
 and a social organism, which was held by Plato and by 
 Hobbes, is asserted in Social Statics, as it is Iij the Sociology 
 of M. Comte. Very rightly, M. Comte has made this 
 analogy the cardinal idea of this division of his philosophy. 
 In Social Statics, the aim of which Is essentially ethical, 
 this analogy is pointed out Incidentally, to enforce certain 
 ethical considerations ; and Is there obviously suggested 
 partly by the definition of life which Coleridge derived from 
 Schelling, and partly by the generalizations of physiologists 
 there referred to (chap. xxx. §§. 12, 13, 16). Excepting 
 
I3i EEASONS FOE DISSENTESTG FKOII COMTE. 
 
 this incidental agreement, however, the contents of Social 
 Statics are so wholly antagonistic to the philosophy of 
 M. Comte, that, but for the title, the work would never, 
 I think, have raised the remembrance of him — unless, indeed, 
 by the association of opposites.* 
 
 And now let me point out that which really has exercised 
 a profound influence over my course of thought. The truth 
 which Harvey's embryological inquiries first dimly indicated, 
 which was afterwards more clearly perceived by Wolfi^ and 
 which was put into a definite shape by Von Baer — the truth 
 that all organic development is a change from a state of 
 homogeneity to a. state of heterogeneity — this it is from 
 which very many of the conclusions which I now hold, 
 have indirectly resulted. In Social Statics, there is every- 
 where manifested a dominant belief in the evolution of man 
 and of society. There is also manifested the belief that this 
 evolution is in both cases determined by the incidence of 
 conditions — the actions of circumstances. And there is 
 further, in the sections above referred to, a recognition of 
 the fact that organic and social evolutions, conform to the 
 same law. Falling amid beliefs in evolutions of various 
 orders, every vrhere determined by natural causes (beliefs again 
 displayed in the Theory of Pojndation and in the Principles 
 of Psychology) ; the formula of Von Baer acted as an 
 organizing principle. The extension of it to other kinds 
 of phenomena than those of individual and social organiza- 
 
 * Let me add that tlic conception developed in Social Sialics, dates tack to a 
 series of letters oir the " Proper Sphere of Government," published in the 
 Nonconformist newspaper, in the latter half of 1842, and repuhlished as a 
 pamphlet in 1843. In these letters will he found, along with many crude ideas, 
 the same belief in the conformity of social phenomena to unvaiiable laws ; the 
 same belief in human progression as determined by such laws ; the same belief 
 in the moral modification of men as caused by social discipline ; the same 
 belief in the tendency of social arrangements "of themselves to assume 
 a condition of slaUe equilibrium ;" the same repudiation of state-control over 
 various departments of social life; the same limitation of state-action to the 
 maintenance of equitable relations among citizens. The writing of Social Sialics 
 arose from a dissatisfaction with the basis on which the doctrines set forth in those 
 letters were placed : the second half of that work is an elaboration of these 
 doctrines ; and the fii'st half a statement of the principles from which they are 
 dcducible. 
 
OEIGIN OF THE DOOTEINE OF EVOLUTION. 135 
 
 tion, is traceable through successive stages. It may be seen 
 in the last paragraph of an essay on "The Philosophy of 
 Style," published in October, 1852; again in an essay on 
 "Manners and Fashion," published in April, 1854; and 
 then, in a comparatively advanced form, in an essay on 
 "Progess: its Law and Cause," published in April, 1857. 
 Afterwards, there came the recognition of the need for 
 further limitation of this formula ; next the inquiry into 
 those general laws of force from which this universal trans- 
 formation necessarily results ; next the deduction of these 
 from the ultimate law of the persistence of force ; next the 
 perception that there is everywhere a process of Dissolution 
 complementary to that of Evolution ; and, finally, the deter- 
 mination of the conditions (specified in the foregoir.g essay) 
 under which Evolution and Dissolution respectively occur. 
 The filiation of these results, is, I think, tolerably manifest. 
 The process has been one of continuous development, set up 
 by the addition of Von Baer's law to a number of ideas that 
 were in harmony with it. And I am not conscious of anv 
 other influences by which the process has been afiected. 
 
 It is possible, however, that there may have been influences 
 of which I am not conscious ; and my opposition to M. 
 Comte's system may have been one of them. The presenta- 
 tion of antagonistic thoughts, often produces greater definite- 
 ness and development of one's own thoughts. It is probable 
 that the doctrines set forth in the essay on " The Genesis of 
 Science," might never have been reached, had not my very 
 decided dissent from M. Comte's conception led me to work 
 them out ; and but for this, I might not have arrived at the 
 classification of the sciences exhibiteid in the foregoing essay. 
 Very possibly there are other cases in which the stimulus of 
 repugnance to M. Comte's views, may have aided in elaborat- 
 ing my own views ; though I cannot call to mind any other 
 cases. 
 
 Let it by no means be supposed from all I have said, that 
 I do not regard M. Comte's speculations as of great value. 
 
136 EEASOXS FOE DISSENTING FEOM COMTE. 
 
 True or untrue, tis system as a whole, has doubtless produced 
 important and salutary revolutions of thought in many 
 minds; and wiU doubtless do so in many more. Doubtless, 
 too, not a few of those who dissent from his general views, 
 have been heathfully stimulated by the consideration of them. 
 The presentation of scientific knowledge and method as a 
 whole, whether rightly or wrongly co-ordinated, cannot have 
 failed greatly to widen the conceptions of most of his readers. 
 And he has done especial service by familiarizing men with 
 the idea of a social science, based on the other sciences. 
 Beyond which benefits resulting from the general character 
 and scope of his philosophy, I believe that there are scattered 
 through his pages, many large ideas that are valuable not 
 only as stimuli, but for their actual truth. 
 
 It has been by no means an agreeable task to make these 
 personal explanations ; but it has seemed to me a task not to 
 be avoided. Difiering so profoundly as I do from M. Comte 
 on all fundamental doctrines, save those which we inherit in 
 common from the past ; it has become needful to dissipate 
 the impression that I agree with him — needful to show that 
 a large part of what is currently known as "positive 
 philosophy," is not "positive philosophy" in the sense of 
 being peculiarly M. Comte's philosophy; and to show that 
 beyond that portion of the so-called "positive philosophy" 
 which is not peculiar to him, I dissent from it. 
 
 And now at the close, as at the outset, let me express my 
 great regret that these explanations should have been called 
 forth by the statements of a critic who has treated me so liber- 
 ally. Nothing will, I fear, prevent the foregoing pages from 
 appearing like a very ungracious response to M. Laugel's 
 sympathetically-written review. I can only hope that the 
 gravity of the question at issue, in so far as it concerns 
 myself, may be taken in mitigation, if not as a sufficient 
 apology. 
 
 March 12th, 1864. 
 
VI. 
 
 OF LAWS IN GENERAL, AND THE ORDER 
 OF THEIR DISCOVERY. 
 
OF LAWS IN GENERAL, AND THE OEDEE 
 OF THEIE DISCOVEEY. 
 
 [The follo-uoing chapter was contained in the first edition of 'First 
 Principles, l omitted it from the re-organised second edition, ie- 
 canse it did not form an essential part of the new structure. As it is 
 referred to in the foregoing pages, and as its general argument is ger- 
 mane to the contents of those pages, I home thought well to append it 
 here. Moreover, though I hope eventually to incorporate it in that 
 division of the Principles of Sociology which treats of Intellectual 
 Progress, yet as it must he long hefore it can thus re-appea/r in its 
 permanent place, and as, should I not get so far in the execution of 
 my undertaking, it may never thus re-appear at all, it seems proper 
 to mahe it more accessible than it is at present. The first and last 
 sections, which served to link it into the argument of the work to 
 which it origirMlly belonged, are omitted. The rest has been carefully 
 revised, and in some parts considerably altered.l 
 
 The recognition of Law being the recognition of uni- 
 formity of relations among phenomena, it follows that the 
 order in which different groups of phenomena are reduced to 
 law, must depend on the frequency with which the uniform 
 relations they severally display are distinctly experienced. 
 At any given stage of progress, those uniformities will be 
 best known with which men's minds have been oftenest and 
 most strongly impressed. In proportion partly to the 
 number of times a relation has been presented to con- 
 sciousness (not merely to the senses), and in proportion 
 
140 OF LAWS m GENERAL. 
 
 partly to the vividness witli wticli the terms of the relation 
 have been, cognized, will be the degree in which the con- 
 stancy of connexion is perceived. 
 
 The succession in which relations are generalized being 
 thus determined, there result certain derivative principles 
 to which this succession must more immediately and ob- 
 viously conform. First is the directness with which 
 personal welfare is affected. WhUe, among surrounding 
 things, many do not appreciably influence us in any 
 way, some produce pleasures and some pains, in various 
 degrees ; and manifestly, those things whose actions on the 
 organism for good or evil are most decided, will, caeteris 
 paribus, be those whose laws of action are earliest ob- 
 served. Second comes the conspicuousness of one or both 
 phenomena between which a relation is to be perceived. On 
 every side are phenomena so concealed as to be detected only 
 by close observation ; others not obtrusive enough to attract 
 notice ; others which moderately solicit the attention ; others 
 so imposing or vivid as to force themselves on consciousness ; 
 and, supposing conditions to be the same, these last will of 
 course be among the first to have their relations general- 
 ized. In the third place, we have the absolute frequency 
 with which the relations occur. There are coexistences and 
 sequences of all degrees of commonness, from those which 
 are ever present to those which are extremely rare ; and 
 manifestly, the rare coexistences and sequences, as well 
 as the sequences which are very long in taking place, 
 will not be reduced to law so soon as those which are 
 familiar and rapid. Fourthly has to be added 
 the relative frequency of occurrence. Many events and ap- 
 pearances are limited to certain times or certain places, or 
 both; and, as a relation which does not exist within the 
 environment of an observer cannot be perceived by him, 
 however common it may be elsewhere or in another age, we 
 have to take account of the surrounding physical circum- 
 
SIMPLE EELATIONS OBSEEVED EAELIEST. 141 
 
 stances, as well -as of the state of society, of the arts, and of 
 the sciences — all of which affect the frequency with which 
 certain groups of facts are ohservable. The 
 
 fifth corollary to he noticed is, that the succession in 
 which different classes of relations are reduced to law, de- 
 pends in part on their simplicity. Phenomena presenting 
 great composition of causes or conditions, have their essential 
 relations so masked, that it requires accumulated experiences 
 to impress upon consciousness the true connexions of ante- 
 cedents and consequents they involve. Hence, other things 
 equal, the progress of generalization will be from the simple 
 to the complex ; and this it is which M. Comte has wrongly 
 asserted to be the sole regulative principle of the pro- 
 gress. Sixth comes the degree of abstractness. 
 Concrete relations are the earliest acquisitions. Such ana- 
 lyses of them as separate the essential connexions from their 
 disguising accompaniments, necessarily come later. The 
 analyses of the connexions, always more or less compound, 
 into their elements then becomes possible. And so on con- 
 tinually, until the highest and most abstract truths have 
 been reached. 
 
 These, then, are the several derivative principles. The 
 frequency and vividness with which uniform relations are 
 repeated in conscious experience, determining the recognition 
 of their uniformity, and this frequency and vividness depend- 
 ing on the above conditions, it follows that the order in 
 which different, classes of facts are generalized, must depend 
 on the extent to which the above conditions are fulfilled in 
 each class. Let us mark how the facts Tiarmonize with this 
 conclusion: taking first a few that elucidate the general 
 truth, and afterwards some that exemplify the special truths 
 which we here see follow from it. 
 
 The relations earliest known as uniformities, are those sub- 
 sisting between the common properties of matter — tangi- 
 
143 OF LAWS IN GENERAL. 
 
 bility, visibility, coliesioH, weight, etc. Wo liave no trace of 
 a time when the resistance offered by an object was regarded 
 as caused by the will of the object ; or when the pressure of 
 a body on the hand holding it, was ascribed, to the agency of a 
 living being. And accordingly, these are the relations of which 
 we are oftenest conscious ; being objectively frequent, conspi- 
 cuous, simple, concrete, and of immediate personal concern. 
 
 Similarly with the ordinary phenomena of motion. The 
 fall of a mass on the withdrawal of its support, is a sequence 
 which directly affects bodily welfare, is conspicuous, simple 
 concrete, and very often repeated. Hence it is one of the 
 uniformities recognized before the dawn of tradition. We 
 know of no era when movements due to terrestrial gravi- 
 tation were attributed to volition. Only when the relation 
 is obscured — only, as in the case of an aerolite, where the 
 antecedent of the deseent is unperceived, do we find the con- 
 ception of personal agency. On the other hand, mo- 
 tions of intrinsically the same order as that of a falKng stone 
 — those of the heavenly bodies — long remain ungeneraUzed ; 
 and until their uniformity is seen, are construed as results of 
 will. This difference is clearly not dependent on compara- 
 tive complexity or abstractness ; since the motion of a planet 
 in an ellipse, is as simple and concrete a phenomenon as the 
 motion of a projected arrow in a parabola. But the ante- 
 cedents are not conspicuous; the sequences are of long 
 duration ; and they are not often repeated. And that these 
 are the causes of their slow reduction to law, we see in the 
 fact that they are severally generalized in the order of their 
 frequency and consplcuousness — the moon's monthly cycle, 
 the svm's annual change, the periods of the inferior planets, 
 the periods of the superior planets. 
 
 While astronomical sequences were still ascribed to voli- 
 tion, certain terrestrial sequences of a different kind, but 
 some of them equally without complication, were interpreted 
 in like manner. The solidificotimi of water at a low temiic- 
 
UNIFOEMTTIES EAELT PEECEIVED. 143 
 
 rature, is a phenomenon that is simple, concrete, and of 
 mucK personal concern. But it is neither so frequent as 
 those which we see are earliest generalized, nor is the pre- 
 sence of the antecedent so manifest. Though in all hut 
 tropical climates, mid-winter displays the relation between 
 cold and freezing with tolerable constancy ; yet, during the 
 spring and autumn, the occasional appearance of ice in the 
 mornings has no very obvious connexion with coldness of 
 the weather. Sensation being so inaccurate a measure, it is 
 not possible for the savage to experience the definite relation 
 between a temperature of 32° and the congealing of water ; 
 and hence the long continued belief in personal agency. 
 Similarly, but still more clearly, with the winds. The ab- 
 Bence of regularity and the inconspicuousness of the ante- 
 cedents, allowed the mythological explanation to survive for 
 a great period. 
 
 During the era in which the uniformity of many quite 
 simple inorganic relations was still unrecognized, certain 
 organic relations, intrinsically very complex and special, 
 were generalized. The constant coexistence of feathers and 
 a beak, of four legs with an internal bony framework, are 
 facts "which were, and are, familiar to every savage. Did a 
 savage find a bird with teeth, or a mammal clothed with 
 feathers, he would be as much surprised as an instructed 
 naturalist. Now these uniformities of organic structure thus 
 early perceived, are of exactly the same kind as those more 
 numerous ones later established by biology. The constant 
 coexistence of mammary glands with two occipital condjdes 
 to the skull, of vertebraj with teeth lodged in sockets, of 
 frontal horns with the habit of rumination, are generaliza- 
 tions as purely empirical as those known to the aboriginal 
 hunter. The botanist cannot in the least understand the 
 complex relation between papilionaceous flowers and seeds 
 borne in flattened pods : he knows these and like connexions 
 simply in the same way that the barbarian knows the con- 
 
144 OF LAWS IN GENEEAL. 
 
 nexions between particular leaves and particular kinds of 
 wood. But the fact that sundry of the uniform relations 
 which chiefly make up the organic sciences, were very early 
 recognized, is due to the high degree of Tividness and fre- 
 quency with which they were presented to consciousness. 
 Though the connexion between the sounds characteristic of 
 a bird, and the possession of edible flesh, is extremely in- 
 volved ; yet the two terms of the relation are conspicuous, 
 often recur in experience, and a knowledge of their con- 
 nexion has a direct bearing on personal welfare. Meanwhile 
 innumerable relations of the same order, which are displayed 
 with even greater frequency by surrounding plants and 
 animals, remain for thousands of years imrecognised, if they 
 are unobtrusive or of no apparent moment. 
 
 When, passing from this primitive stage to a more ad- 
 vanced stage, we trace the discovery of those less familiar uni- 
 formities which mainly constitute what is distinguished as 
 Science, we find the succession in -which knowledge of them 
 is reached, to be still determined in the same manner. This 
 will become obvious on contemplating separately the in- 
 fluence of each derivative condition. 
 
 How relations that have immediate bearings on the 
 maintenance of life, are, other things equal, fixed in the 
 mind before those which have no immediate bearings, the 
 history of Science abundantly illustrates. The habits of 
 existing imcivilized races, who fix times by moons and barter 
 so many of one article for so many of another, show us that 
 conceptions of equality and number, which are the germs of 
 mathematical science, were developed under the immediate 
 pressure of personal wants ; and it can scarcely be doubted 
 that those laws of numerical relations which are embodied in 
 the rules of arithmetic, were first brought to light through 
 the practice of mercantile exchange. Similarly with geo- 
 metry. The derivation of the word shows us that it ori- 
 
THE USEFUL AND THE PEACTICAL. 145 
 
 ginally Included only certain methods of partitioning ground 
 and laying out buildings. The properties of the scales and 
 the lever, involving the first principle in mechanics, were 
 early generalized under the stimulus of commercial and 
 architectural needs. To fix the times of religious festivals 
 and agricultural operations, were the motives which led to 
 the establishment of the simpler astronomic periods. Such 
 small knowledge of chemical relations as was involved in 
 ancient metallurgy, .was manifestly obtained in seeking how 
 to improve tools and weapons. In the alchemy of later 
 times, we see how greatly an intense hope of private benefit 
 contributed to the disclosure of a certain class of uniformities. 
 Nor is our own age barren of illustrations. " Here," says 
 Humboldt, when in Guiana, " as in many parts in Europe, the 
 sciences are thought worthy to occupy the mind, only so far 
 as they confer some immediate and practical benefit on 
 society." "How is it possible to believe," said a missionary 
 to him, " that you have left your country to come to be de- 
 voured by mosquitoes on this river, and to measure lands 
 that are not your own." Our coasts furnish like instances. 
 Every sea-side naturalist knows how great is the contempt 
 ■with which fishermen regard the collection of objects for the 
 microscope or aquarium. Their incredulity as to the possible 
 value of such things is so great, that they can scarcely be 
 induced even by bribes to preserve the refuse of their nets. 
 jS[ay, we need not go for evidence beyond daily table-talk. 
 ' The demand for " practical science " — for a knowledge that 
 can be brought to bear on the business of life — joined to the 
 ridicule commonly vented on scientific pursuits having no 
 obvious uses, suffice to show that the order in which laws 
 are discovered greatly depends on the directness with which 
 they afiect our welfare. 
 
 That, when all other conditions are the same, obtrusive 
 relations will be generalized before unobtrusive ones, is so 
 nearly a truism that examples appear almost superfluous. If 
 
146 OF LAWS IN GENERAL. 
 
 it be admitted tliat by the aboriginal man, as by tbe child, 
 the co-existent properties of large surrounding objects are 
 noticed before those of minute objects, and that the external 
 relations which bodies present are generalized before their 
 internal relations, it must be admitted that in subsequent 
 stages of progress, the comparative conspicuousness of rela- 
 tions has greatly affected the order in which they were 
 recognized as uniform. Hence it happened that after the 
 establishment of those very manifest sequences constituting 
 a lunation, and those less manifest ones marking a year, and 
 those still less manifest ones marking the planetary periods, 
 astronomy occupied itself with such inconspicuous sequences 
 as those displayed in the repeating cycle of lunar eclipses, 
 and those which suggested the theorj' of epicycles and eccen- 
 trics ; while modern astronomy deals with still more incon- 
 spicuous sequences, some of which, as the planetary rotations, 
 are nevertheless the simplest which the heavens present. In 
 physics, the early use of canoes implied an empirical know- 
 ledge of certain hydrostatic relations that are intrinsically 
 more complex than sundry static relations not empirically 
 known; but these hydrostatic relations were thrust upon 
 observation. Or, if we compare the solution of the problem 
 of specific gravity by Archimedes with the discovery of at- 
 mospheric pressure by Torricelli (the two involving me- 
 chanical relations of exactly the same kind), we perceive that 
 the much earlier occurrence of the first than the last was 
 determined, neither by a difference in the irbearings on per- ■ 
 eonal welfare, nor by a difference in the frequency with 
 which illustrations of them came under observation, nor by 
 relative simplicity ; but by the greater obtrusiveness of the 
 connexion between antecedent and consequent in the one case 
 than in the other. Among miscellaneous illustrations, it 
 maybe pointed out that the connexions between lightning 
 and thunder, and between rain and clouds, were recognized 
 long before others of the same order, simply because they 
 
FEEQUENCY OF OBSERVED TINrFOEMlTIES. 147 
 
 « 
 
 thrust themselves on the attention. Or the long-delayed 
 discovery of the microscopic forms of life, with all the phe- 
 nomena they present, may be named as very clearly showing 
 how certain groups of relations not ordinarily perceptible, 
 though in other respects like long-familiar relations, have 
 to wait until changed conditions render them perceptible. 
 But, without further details, it needs only to consider the 
 inquiries which now occupy the electrician, the chemist, 
 the physiologist, to see that science has advanced, and is 
 advanciag, from the more conspicuous phenomena to the less 
 conspicuous ones. 
 
 How the. degree of absolute frequency of a relation affects 
 the recognition of its uniformity, we see in contrasting certain 
 biological facts. The connexion between death and bodily 
 injury, constantly displayed not only in men but in all in- 
 ferior creatures, was known as an instance of natural causa- 
 tion while yet deaths from diseases, were thought super- 
 natural. Among diseases themselves, it is observable that 
 unusual ones were regarded as of demoniacal origin during 
 ages when the more frequent were ascribed to ordinary 
 causes : a truth paralleled among our own peasantry, who by 
 the use of charms show a lingering superstition with respect 
 to rare disorders, which they do not show with respect to 
 common ones, such as colds. Passing to physical illustra- 
 tions, we may note that within the historic period whirl- 
 pools were accounted for by the agency of water-spirits ; but 
 we do not find that within the same period the disappearance 
 of water on exposure either to the sun or to artificial heat 
 was interpreted in an analogous way : though a more mar- 
 vellous occurrence, and a much more complex one, its great 
 frequency led to the early recognition of it as a natural uni- 
 formity. Rainbows and comets do not differ much in con- 
 spicuousness, and a rainbow is intrinsically the more involved 
 phenomenon ; but chiefly because of .their far greater com- 
 monness, rainbows were perceived to have a direct dependence 
 
148 OT LAWS IN GENERAL. 
 
 on sun and rain while yet comets were regarded as signs of 
 divine wrath. 
 
 That races living inland must long have remained ignorant 
 of the daily and m,onthly sequences of the tides, and that 
 tropical races could not early have comprehended the pheno- 
 mena of northern winters, are extreme illustrations of the 
 influence which relative frequency has on the recognition of 
 uniformities. Animals which, where they are indigenous, 
 call forth no surprise by their structures or hahits, because 
 these are so familiar, when taken to countries where they 
 have never been seen, are looked at with an astonishment 
 approaching to awe — are even thought supernatural : a fact 
 which will suggest numerous others that show how the local- 
 ization of phenomena in part controls the order in which they 
 are reduced to law. Not only however does their localization 
 in space affect the progression, but also their localization in 
 time. Facts which are rarely if ever manifested in one era, 
 are rendered very frequent in another, simply through the 
 changes wrought by civilization. The lever, of which the 
 properties are illustrated in the use of sticks and weapons, is 
 vaguely understood by every savage- — on applying it in a 
 certain way he rightly anticipates certain effects ; but the 
 wheel-and-axle, pulley, and screw, cannot have their powers 
 either empirically or rationally knovra till the advance of the 
 arts has more or less familiarized them. Through those 
 various means of exploration which we have inherited and 
 added to, we have become acquainted with a vast range of 
 chemical relations that were relatively non-existent to the 
 primitive man. To highly-developed industries we owe both 
 the substances and the appliances that have disclosed to us 
 countless uniformities which our ancestors had no oppor- 
 tunity of seeing. These and like instances that wiU occur 
 to the reader, show that the accumulated materials, and pro- 
 cesses, and products, which characterize the environments of 
 complex societies, greatly increase the accessibility of various 
 
PE0GEES8 OF GEOMETEY. 149 
 
 classes of relations ; and by so multiplying the experiences 
 of lliem, or making them relatively frequent, facilitate their 
 generalization. Moreover, various classes of phenomena 
 presented by society itself, as for instance those which 
 political economy formulates, become relatively frequent, and 
 therefore recognizable, in advanced social states ; while in 
 less advanced ones they are either too rarely displayed to 
 have their relations perceived, or, as in the least advanced 
 ones, are not displayed at all. 
 
 That, where no other circumstances interfere, the order in 
 which different uniformities are established varies as their 
 complexity, is manifest. The geometry of straight lines was 
 imderstood before the geometry of curved lines ; the proper- 
 ties of the circle before the properties of the ellipse, parabola, 
 and hyperbola ; and the equations of curves of single cur- 
 vature were ascertained before those of curves of double 
 curvature. Plane trigonometry comes in order of time and 
 simplicity before spherical trigonometry ; and the mensura- 
 tion of plane surfaces and solids before the mensuration of 
 curved surfaces and solids. Similarly with mechanics : the 
 laws of simple motion were generalized before those of com- 
 pound motion ; and those of rectilinear motion before those 
 of curvilinear motion. The properties of equal-armed levers 
 or scales, were understood before those of levers with un- 
 equal arms ; and the law of the inclined plane was formulated 
 earlier than that of the screw, which involves it. In chemis- 
 try, the progress has been from the simple inorganic com- 
 pounds to the more involved or organic compounds. And 
 where, as in the higher sciences, the conditions of the explo- 
 ration are more complicated, we still may clearly trace 
 relative complexity as determining the order of discovery 
 where other things are equal. 
 
 The progression from concrete relations to abstract ones, 
 and from the less abstract to the more abstract, is equally 
 obvious. ISTumeration, which in its primary form concerned 
 
150 OF LAWS m GENEKAL. 
 
 itself only with groups of actual objects, came earlier than 
 simple arithmetic ; the rules of which deal with numbers 
 apart from objects. Arithmetic, limited in its sphere to con- 
 crete numerical relations, is alike earlier and less abstract 
 than Algebra, which deals with the relations of these rela- 
 tions. And in like manner, the Calculus of Operations, comes 
 after Algebra, both in order of evolution and in order of ab- 
 stractness. In Mechanics, the more concrete relations of 
 forces exhibited in the lever, inclined plane, etc., were un- 
 derstood before the more abstract relations expressed in the 
 laws of resolution and composition of forces ; and later than 
 the three abstract laws of motion as formulated by Newton 
 came the stiU more abstract law of inertia. Similarly with 
 Physics and Chemistry, there has been an advance from 
 truths entangled in all the specialities of particular facta 
 and particular classes of facts, to truths disentangled from 
 the disguising incidents under which they are manifested — 
 to truths of a higher abstractness. 
 
 Brief and rude as is this sketch of a mental development 
 that has been long and complicated, I venture to think it 
 shows inductively what was deductively inferred, that the 
 order in which separate groups of uniformities are recog- 
 nized, depends not on one circumstance but on several cir- 
 cumstances. The various classes of relations are generalized 
 in a certain succession, not solely because of one particular 
 kind of difference in their natures ; but also because they 
 are variously placed in time and in space, variously open to 
 observation, and variously related to our own constitutions : 
 our perception of them being influenced by all these con- 
 ditions in endless combinations. The comparative degrees 
 of importance, of obtrusiveness, of absolute frequency, of 
 relative frequency, of simplicity, of concreteness, are every 
 one of them factors ; and from their unions in proportions 
 that are never twice alike, there results a highly complex 
 process of mental evolution. But, while it is thus manifest 
 
DI800TEET CONFOEMS TO LAW. 151 
 
 that the proximate causes of the succession in whicli relations 
 are reduced to law, are numerous and involved ; it is also 
 manifest that there is one ultimate cause to which these 
 proximate causes are subordinate. As the several circum- 
 stances that determine the early or late recognition of uni- 
 formities are circumstances that determine the number and 
 strength of the impressions which these uniformities make 
 on the mind, it follows that the progression conforms to a 
 certain fundamental principle of psychology. We see d 
 posteriori, what we concluded d priori, that the order in which 
 relations are generalized, depends on the frequency and 
 impressiveness with which they are repeated in conscious 
 experience. 
 
 Having roughly analyzed the progress of the past, let 
 us take advantage of the light thus thrown on the present, 
 and consider what is implied Respecting the future. 
 
 Note first that the likelihood of the universality of Law 
 has been ever growing greater. Out of the countless co- 
 existences and sequences with which mankind are environed, 
 they have been continually transferring some from the group 
 whose order was supposed to be arbitrary, to the group 
 whose order is known to be uniform. And manifestly, as 
 fast as the relations that are unreduced to law become 
 fewer, the probability that among them there are some that 
 do not conform to law, becomes less. To put the argument 
 numerically — It is clear that when out of surrounding phe- 
 nomena a hundred of several kinds have been found to occur 
 in constant connexions, there arises a slight presumption that 
 all phenomena occur in constant connexions. When uni- 
 formity has been established in a thousand eases, more varied 
 in their kinds, the presumption gains strength. And when 
 the known cases of uniformity amount to myriads, including 
 many of each variety, it becomes an ordinary induction that 
 uniformity exists everywhere. 
 
153 OF LAWS IN GENEEAL. 
 
 Silently and insensibly their experiences Lave been press- 
 ing men on towards the conclusion thus drawn. Not out of 
 a conscious regard for these reasons, but from a habit of 
 thought which these reasons formulate and justify, all minds 
 have been advancing towards a belief in the constancy of- 
 surrounding coexistences and sequences. Familiarity with 
 concrete uniformities has generated the abstract conception 
 of uniformity — the idea of Law ; and this idea has been in 
 successive generations slowly gaining fixity and clearness. 
 Especially has it been thus among those whose knowledge of 
 natural phenomena is the- most extensive — men of science. 
 The mathematician, the physicist, the astronomer, the che- 
 mist, severally acquainted with the vast accumulations of 
 uniformities established by their predecessors, and themselves 
 daily adding new ones as well as verifying the old, acquire a 
 far stronger faith in law than is ordinarily possessed. "With 
 them this faith, ceasing to be merely passive, becomes an 
 active stimulus to inquiry. Wherever there exist pheno- 
 mena of which the dependence is not yet ascertained, these 
 most cultivated intellects, impelled by the conviction that 
 here too there is some invariable connexion, proceed to ob- 
 serve, compare, and experiment ; and when, they discover 
 the law to which the phenomena conform, as they eventually 
 do, their general belief in the universality of law is further 
 strengthened. So overwhelming is the evidence, and such 
 the effect of this discipline, that to the advanced student of 
 nature, the proposition that there are lawless phenomena 
 has become not only incredible but almost inconceivable. 
 
 This habitual recognition of law which already distin- 
 guishes modern thought from ancient thought, must spread 
 among men at large. The fulfilment of predictions made 
 possible by every new step, and the further command gained 
 of nature's forces, prove to the uninitiated the validity of 
 scientific generalizations and the doctrine they illustrate. 
 Widening education is daily diffusing among the mass of 
 
UNIFOEMITIES TET TO BE DISCOVERED. 153 
 
 men that knowledge of these generalizations which has been 
 hitherto confined to the few. And as fast as this diffusion 
 goes on, must the belief of the scientific become the belief of 
 the world at large. 
 
 That law is universal, will become an irresistible con- 
 clusion when it is perceived that the progress in the dis- 
 covery of laws itself conforms to law ; and when this percep- 
 tion makes it clear why certain groups of phenomena have 
 been reduced to law, while other groups are still unreduced. 
 When it is seen that the order in which uniformities are 
 recognized, must depend upon the frequency and vividness 
 with which they are repeated in conscious experience ; when 
 it is seen that, as a matter of fact, the most common, impor- 
 tant, conspicuous, concrete, and simple, uniformities were the 
 earliest recognized, because they were experienced oftenest 
 and most distinctly ; it wUl by implication be seen that long 
 after the great mass of phenomena have been generalized, 
 there must remain phenomena which, from their rareness, 
 or unobtrusiveness, or seeming unimportance, or complexity, 
 or abstractness, are still ungeneralized. Thus will be 
 
 furnished a solution to a difiiculty sometimes raised. When 
 it is asked why the universality of law is not already fully 
 established, there will be the answer that the directions in 
 which it is not yet established are those in which its estab- 
 lishment must necessarily be latest. That state of things 
 which is inferable beforehand, is just the state which we find 
 to exist. If such coexistences and sequences as those of 
 Biology and Sociology are not yet reduced to law, the pre- 
 sumption is not that they are irreducible to law, but that their 
 laws elude our present means of analysis. Having long ago 
 proved uniformity throughout all the lower classes of rela- 
 tions, and having been step by step proving uniformity 
 throughout classes of relations successively higher and higher, 
 if we have not yet succeeded with the highest classes, it may 
 
154 OF LAWS IN GENEEAL. 
 
 be fairly concluded that our powers are at fault, rather 
 than that the uniformity does not exist. And unless we 
 make the absurd assumption that the process of generaliza- 
 tion, now going on with unexampled rapidity, has reached 
 its limit, and will suddenly cease, we must infer that ul- 
 timately mankind wiU discover a constant order of mani- 
 festation even in the most involyed and obscure phenomena. 
 
VII. 
 
 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 PTEOM THE ILLUSTRATIONS OF UKIVEESAL rKOQRESS.] 
 
III. 
 
 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 rr^HERE has ever prevailed among men a vague notion 
 1 that scientific knowledge differs in nature from ordinary 
 knowledge. By the Greeks, with whom Mathematics — 
 literally things learnt — was alone considered as knowledge 
 proper, the distinction must have heen strongly felt ; and 
 it has ever since maintained itself in the general mind. 
 Though, considering the contrast between the achievements 
 of science and those of daily unmethodio thinking, it is not 
 surprising that such a distinction has heen assumed ; yet it 
 needs but to rise a little above the common point of view, 
 to see that no such distinction can really exist : or that at 
 best, it is but a superficial distinction. The same faculties 
 are employed in both cases ; and in both cases their mode 
 of operation is fundamentally the same. 
 
 If we say that science is organized knowledge, we are 
 met by the truth that all knowledge is organized in a great- 
 er or less degree — ^that the commonest actions of the house- 
 hold and the field presuppose facts colligated, inferences 
 drawn, results expected ; and that the general success of 
 these actions proves the data by which they were guided 
 to have been correctly put together. If, again, we say 
 that science is prevision — is a seeing beforehand — is a know- 
 
158 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 ing iu what times, places, combinations, or sequences, spe- 
 cified phenomena will be found ; we are yet obliged to con 
 fess that the definition includes much that is utterly foreign 
 to science in its ordinary acceptation. For example, a child's 
 knowledge of an apple. This, as far as it goes consists iu 
 previsions. When a child sees a certain form and colours, 
 it knows that if it puts out its hand it will have certain im- 
 pressions of resistance, and roundness, and smoothness; 
 and if it bites, a certain taste. And manifestly its general 
 acquaintance with surrounding objects is of like nature — ^is 
 made up of facts concerning them, so grouped as that any 
 part of a group being perceived, the existence of the other 
 facts included in it is foreseen. 
 
 If, once more, we say that science is exact prevision, we 
 still fail to establish the supposed difference. Not only do 
 we find that much of what we call science is not exact, 
 and that some of it, as physiology, can never become exact ; 
 but we find further, that many of the previsions constitu- 
 ting the common stock alike of wise and ignorant, are ex- 
 act. That an unsupported body will fall ; that a lighted candle 
 will go out when immersed in water; that ice will melt 
 when thrown on the fire — these, and many like predictions 
 relating to the familiar properties of things have as high a 
 degree of accuracy as predictions are capable of. It is true 
 that the results predicated are of a very general character ; 
 but it is none the less true that they are rigorously correct 
 as far as they go : and this is aU that is requisite to fulfil 
 the definition. There is perfect accordance between the 
 anticipated phenomena and the actual ones ; and no more 
 than this can be said of the highest achievements of the 
 sciences specially characterised as exact. 
 
 Seeing thus that the assumed distinction between scien- 
 tific knowledge and common knowledge is not logically 
 justifiable ; and yet feeling, as we must, that however im- 
 possible it may be to draw a line between them, the two 
 
SCIENCE AND OEDINAEY KNOWLEDGE. 15& 
 
 are not practically identical ; there arises the question— 
 What is the relationship that exists between them ? j^ 
 partial answer to this question may he drawn from the il- 
 lustrations just given. On reconsidering them, it will be 
 observed that those portions of ordinary knowledge which 
 are identical in character with scientific knowledge, com- 
 prehend only such combinations of phenomena as are direct- 
 ly cognizable by the senses, and are of simple, invariable 
 nature. That the smoke from a fire which she is lighting 
 win ascend, and that the fire wiU presently boil water, are 
 previsions which the servant-giii makes equally well with 
 the most learned physicist; they are equally certain, 
 equally exact with his ; but they are previsions concerning 
 phenomena in constant and direct relation — ^phenomena 
 that follow visibly and immediately after their antecedents 
 — phenomena of which the causation is neither remote nor 
 obscure — ^phenomena which may be predicted by the sim- 
 Idlest possible act of reasoning. 
 
 If, now, we pass to the previsions constituting what is 
 commonly known as science — ^that an eclipse of the moon 
 will happen at a specified time ; and when a barometer is 
 taken to the top of a mountain of known height, the mer- 
 curial column will descend a stated number of inches ; that 
 the poles of a galvanic battery immersed in water will give 
 off, the one an inflammable and the other an inflaming gas, 
 in definite ratio — we perceive that the relations involved 
 are not of a kind habitually presented to our senses ; that 
 they depend, some of them, upon special combinations of 
 causes ; and that in some of them the connection between 
 antecedents and consequents is established only by an ela- 
 borate series of inferences. The broad distinction, there- 
 fore, between the two orders of knowledge, is not in their 
 nature, but in their remoteness from perception. 
 
 If we regard the cases in their most general aspect, wo 
 see that the labourer, who, on hearing certain notes in the 
 
160 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 adjacent hedge, can describe the particular fonn and col- 
 ours of the bird making them ; and the astronomer, who, 
 having calculated a transit of Venus, can deUneate the black 
 spot entering on the sun's disc, as it -will appear through 
 the telescope, at a specified hour ; do essentially the same 
 thing. Each knows that on fulfilling the requisite condi- 
 tions, he shall have a preconceived impression — ^that after a 
 definite'series of actions will come a group of sensations of 
 a foreknown kind. The difference, then, is not in the funda- 
 mental character of the mental acts ; or in the correctness 
 of the previsions accomplished by them ; but in the com- 
 plexity of the processes required to achieve the previsions. 
 Much of our commonest knowledge is, as far as it goes, rig- 
 orously precise. Science does not increase this precision ; 
 cannot transcend it. What then does it do ? It reduces 
 other knowledge to the same degree of precision. That 
 certainty which direct perception gives us respecting coex- 
 istences and sequences of the simplest and most accessi- 
 ble kind, science gives us respecting coexistences and se- 
 quences, complex in their dependencies or inaccessible to 
 immediate observation. In brief, regarded from this point 
 of view, science may be called an extension of the percep- 
 tions by means of reasoning. 
 
 On further considering the matter, however, it wiU per- 
 haps be felt that this definition does not express the whole 
 fact — that inseparable as science may be from common 
 knowledge, and completely as we may fill up the gap be- 
 tween the simplest previsions of the child and the most re- 
 condite ones of the natural philosopher, by interposing a 
 series of previsions in which the complexity of reasoning 
 involved is greater and greater, there is yet a difference 
 between the two beyond that which is here described. And 
 this is true. But the difference is still not such as enables 
 ns to draw the assumed line of demarcation. It is a differ- 
 ence not between common knowledge and scientific knowl- 
 
SCIENCE ADVANCES TO MEASUREMENT, 161 
 
 edge ; Lut between the successive phases of science itself, 
 or knowledge itself — whichever we choose to call it. In 
 its earlier phases science attains only to certainty of fore- 
 knowledge ; in its later phases it further attains to com- 
 pleteness. We begin by discovering a relation : we end 
 by discovering the relation. Our first achievement is to 
 foretell the kind of phenomenon which will occur under 
 specific conditions : our last achievement is to foretell not 
 only the kind but the amount. Or, to reduce the proposi- 
 tion to its most definite form — undeveloped science is qudl- 
 itative prevision : developed science is quantitative previ- 
 sion. 
 
 This will at once be perceived to express the remaining 
 distinction between the lower and the higher stages of posi- 
 tive knowledge. The prediction that a piece of lead wUl 
 take more force to lift it than a piece of wood of equal size, 
 exhibits certainty, but not completeness, of foresight. The 
 kind of eflfect in which the one body will exceed the other 
 is foreseen ; but not the amount by which it will exceed. 
 There is qualitative prevision only. On the other band, the 
 prediction that at a stated time two particular planets will 
 be in conjunction ; that by means of a lever having arms in 
 a given ratio, a known force will raise just so many pounds ; 
 that to decompose a specified quantity of sulphate of iron 
 by carbonate of soda will require so many grains — these 
 predictions exhibit foreknowledge, not only of the nature 
 of the effects to be produced, but of the magnitude, either 
 of the effects themselves, of the agencies producing them, 
 or of the distance in time or space at which they wiU be 
 produced. There is not only qualitative but quantitative 
 prevision. 
 
 And this is the unexpressed difference which leads us 
 to consider certain orders of knowledge as especially scien- 
 tific when contrasted with knowledge in general. Are the 
 phenomena measurable ? is the test which we unconsciously 
 
162 THE GENESIS OF BCIENCE. 
 
 employ. Space is measurable: hence Geometry. Force 
 and space are measurable : hence Statics. Time, force, and 
 space are measurable : hence Dynamics. The invention of 
 the barometer enabled men to extend the principles of me- 
 chanics to the atmosphere ; and Aerostatics existed. "When 
 a thermometer was devised there arose a science of heat, 
 which was before impossible. Such of our sensations as we 
 have not yet found modes of measuring do not originate 
 sciences. We have no science of smells ; nor have we one 
 of tastes. We have a science of the relations of sounds 
 differing in pitch, because we have discovered a way to 
 measure them ; but we have no science of sounds in respect 
 to their loudness or their timbre, because we have got no 
 measures of loudness and timbre. 
 
 Obviously it is this reduction of the sensible phenomena | 
 it represents, to relations of magnitude, which gives to any 
 division of knowledge its especially scientific character. 
 Originally men's knowledge of weights and forces was in 
 the same condition as their knowledge of smells and tastes 
 is now — a knowledge not extending beyond that given by 
 the unaided sensations ; and it remained so until weighing 
 instruments and dynamometers were invented. Before 
 there were hour-glasses and clepsydras, most phenomena 
 could be estimated as to their durations and intervals, with 
 no greater precision than degrees of hardness can be esti- 
 mated by the fingers. Until a thermometric scale was con- 
 trived, men's judgments respecting relative amounts of 
 heat stood on the same footing with their present judg- 
 ments respecting relative amounts of sound. And as in 
 these initial stages, with no aids to observation, only the 
 roughest comparisons of cases could be made, and only the 
 most marked difierenees perceived ; it is obvious that only 
 the most simple laws of dependence could be ascertained — 
 only those laws which being uncomplicated with others, 
 and not disturbed in their manifestations, required no nice" 
 
QUAIITITATIVE SCIENCE DEDUCTIVE. 163 
 
 ties of observation to disentangle them. Whence it ap- 
 pears not only that in proportion as knowledge becomes 
 quantitative do its previsions become complete as well as 
 certain, but that until its assumption of a quantitative char- 
 acter it is necessarily confined to the most elementary rela- 
 tions. 
 
 Moreover it is to be remarked that-while, on the one 
 hand, we can discover the laws of the greater proportion 
 of phenomena only by investigating them -quantitatively; 
 on the other hand we can extend the range of our quanti- 
 tative previsions only as fast as we detect the laws of the 
 results we predict. For clearly the ability to speciiy the 
 magnitude of a result inaccessible to direct measurement, 
 implies knowledge of its mode of dependence on something 
 which can be measured — ^implies that we know the particu- 
 lar fact dealt with to be an instance of some more general 
 fact. Thus the extent to which our quantitative previsions 
 have been carried in any direction, indicates the depth to 
 which our knowledge reaches in that direction. And here, 
 as another aspect of the same fact, we may further observe 
 that as we pass, from qualitative to quantitative prevision, 
 we pass from inductive science to deductive science. Sci- 
 ence while purely inductive is purely qualitative : when in- 
 accurately quantitative it usually consists of part induction, 
 part deduction: and it becomes accurately quantitative only 
 when wholly deductive. We do not mean that the deduct- 
 ive and the quantitative are coextensive ; for there is mani- 
 festly much deduction that is qualitative only. We mean 
 that all quantitative prevision is reached deductively ; and 
 that induction can achieve only qualitative prevision. 
 
 Still, however, it must not be supposed that these dis- 
 tinctions enable us to separate ordinary knowledge from 
 Bcience ; much as they seem to do so. While they show in 
 what consists the broad contrast betweei; the extreme forms 
 of the two, they yet lead us to recognise their essential iden- 
 
164 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 tity ; and once more prove the difference to be one of de- 
 gree only. For, on the one hand, the commonest positive 
 knowledge is to some extent quantitative; seeing that the 
 amount of the foreseen result is known within certain wide 
 limits. And, on the other hand, the highest quantitative 
 prevision does not reach the exact truth, but only a very 
 near approximation to it. Without clocks the savage 
 knows that the day is longer in the summer than in the 
 winter ; without scales he knows that stone is heavier than 
 flesh : that is, he can foresee respecting certain results that 
 their amounts will exceed these, and be less than those — ^he 
 knows about what they will be. And, with his most deli- 
 cate instruments and most elaborate calculations, all that 
 the man of science can do, is to reduce the difference be- 
 tween the foreseen and the actual results to an unimportant 
 quantity. 
 
 Moreover, it must be borne in mind not only that all 
 the sciences are qualitative in their first stages, — not only 
 that some of them, as Chemistry, have but recently reached 
 the quantitative stage — ^but that the most advanced sciences 
 have attained to their present power of determining quan- 
 tities not present to the senses, or not directly measurable, 
 by a slow process of improvement extending through thou- 
 sands of years. So that science and the knowledge of the 
 uncultured are alike in the nature of their previsions, widely 
 as they differ in range ; they possess a common imperfec- 
 tion, though this is immensely greater iu the last than in 
 the first ; and the transition from the one to the other has 
 been through a series of steps by which the imperfection 
 has been rendered continually less, and the range continu- 
 ally wider. 
 
 These facts, that science and the positive knowledge of 
 the uncultured cannot be separated in nature, and that the 
 one is but a perfected and extended form of the other, 
 must necessarily underlie the whole theory of science, its 
 
HOW SCIENCE SHOULD BE EEGAEDED. 165 
 
 progress, and the relations of its parts to each other. 
 There must be serious incompleteness in any history of the 
 sciences, which, leaving out of view the first steps of their 
 genesis, commences with them only when they assume defi- 
 nite forms. There must be grave defects, if not a general 
 untruth, in a philosophy of the sciences considered in their 
 interdependence and development, which neglects the in- 
 quiry how they came to be distinct sciences, and how they 
 were severally evolved out of the chaos of primitive ideas. 
 
 Not only a direct consideration of the matter, but all 
 analogy, goes to show that in the earlier and simpler stages 
 must be sought the key to all subsequent intricacies. The 
 time was when the anatomy and physiology of the human 
 being were studied by themselves — when the adult man 
 was analyzed and the relations of parts and of functions 
 investigated, without reference either to the relations ex- 
 hibited in the embryo or to the homologous relations exist- 
 ing in other creatures. Now, however, it has become 
 manifest that no true conceptions, no true generalizations, 
 are possible under such conditions. Anatomists and phys- 
 iologists now find that the real natures of organs and tis- 
 sues can be ascertained only by tracing their early evolu- 
 tion ; and that the affinities between existing genera can 
 be satisfactorily made out only by examining the fossil gen- 
 era to which they are allied. Well, is it not clear that the 
 like must be true concerning all things that undergo devel- 
 opment ? Is not science a growth ? Has not science, too, 
 its embryology ? And must not the neglect of its embry- 
 ology lead to a misunderstanding of the principles of its 
 evolution and of its existing organization ? 
 
 There are a priori reasons, therefore, for doubting the 
 truth of all philosophies of the sciences which tacitly pro- 
 ceed upon the common notion that scientific knowledge 
 and ordinary knowledge are separate ; instead of com- 
 mencing, as they should, by affiliating the one upon the 
 
166 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 Other, and showing how it gradually came to be distin- 
 guishable from the other. We may expect to find theii 
 generalizations essentially artificial ; and we shall not be 
 deceived. Some illustrations of this may here be fitly in- 
 troduced, by way of preliminary to a brief sketch of the 
 genesis of science from the point of view indicated. And 
 we cannot more readily find such illustrations than by 
 glancing at a few of the various classifications of the sci- 
 ences that have from time to time been proposed. To con- 
 sider all of them would take too much space : we must 
 content ourselves with some of the latest. 
 
 Commencing with those which may be soonest disposed 
 of, let us notice first the arrangement propounded by Oken 
 An abstract of it runs thus : — 
 
 Part I. Mathesis. — Pneumatogeny : Primary Ai-t, Primary 
 Consciousness, God, Primary Best, Time, Polarity, Mo- 
 tion, Man, Space, Point, Line, Surface, Globe, Rotation. 
 — Hylogeny : Gravity, Matter, Ether, Heavenly Bodies, 
 Light, Heat, Pire. 
 
 (He explains ttat Mathesis is the doctrine of the whole ; 
 Pneumatogeny being the doctrine of immaterial totalities, and 
 Hylogeny that of material totalities.) 
 
 Part n. Ontology. — Cosmogeny : Best, Centre, Motion, Line, 
 Planets, Perm, Planetary System, Comets. — StocTiio- 
 geny : Condensation, Simple Matter, Elements, Air, 
 "Water, Earth. — StocMology : Functions of the Elements, 
 &c. &o. — Kingdoms of Nature : Individuals. 
 
 (He says in explanation that " Ontology teaches us the 
 phenomena of matter. The first of these are the heavenly 
 bodies comprehended by Cosmogeny. These divide into ele- 
 ments — StSchiogeny. The earth element divides into miner- 
 als —JfincraZoyy. These unite into one collective body — 
 Geogeny. The whole in singulars is the living, or Organw, 
 
167 
 
 ■which again divides into plants and animals. Siology, there- 
 fore, divides into Organogeny, Phytosopliy, ZooiopliyP) 
 
 First Kingdom. — MmEEALS. Mineralogy, Oeology. 
 Part III. Biology. — Organoaophy, Phytogeny, Phyto-phy siology, 
 Phytology, Zoogeny, Physiology, Zoology, Psychology J 
 
 A glance over this confused scheme shows that it is an 
 attempt to classify knowledge, not after the order in which 
 it has been, or may be, buUt up in the human conscious- 
 ness ; but after an assumed order of creation. It is a 
 pseudo-scientific cosmogony, akin to those which men have 
 enunciated from the earliest times downwards ; and only a 
 little more respectable. As such it will not bo thought 
 worthy of much consideration by those who, like ourselves, 
 hold that experience is the sole origin of knowledge. Oth- 
 erwise, it might have been needful to dwell on the incon- 
 gruities of the arrangements — ^to ask how motion can be 
 treated of before space ? how there can be rotation with- 
 out matter to rotate ? how polarity can be dealt with with- 
 out involving points and lines ? But it wUl serve our pres- 
 ent purpose just to point out a few of the extreme absurdi- 
 ties resulting from the doctrine which Oken seems to hold 
 in common with Hegel, that " to philosophize on Nature is 
 to re-think the great thought of Creation." Here is a sam- 
 ple : — 
 
 " Mathematics is the universal science ; so also is Phys- 
 io-philosophy, although it is only a part, or rather but a 
 condition of the universe ; both are one, or mutually con- 
 gruent. 
 
 " Mathematics h, however, a science of mere forma 
 without substance. Physio-philosophy is, therefore, mathe- 
 matics endowed with substance." 
 
 From the English point of view it is sufficiently amus- 
 ing to find such a dogma not only gravely stated, but 
 stated as an unquestionable truth. Here we see the expe- 
 
168 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 riences of quantitative relations which men have gathered 
 from surrounding bodies and generalized (experiences 
 which had been scarcely at all generalized at the beginning 
 of the historic period) — we find these generalized expe- 
 riences, these intellectual abstractions, elevated into con 
 Crete actualities, projected bact into Nature, and consid- 
 ered as the internal frame-work of things — the skeleton by 
 which matter is sustained. But this new form of the old 
 realism, is by no means the most startling of the physio- 
 philosophic principles. We presently read that, 
 
 " The highest mathematical idea, or. the fundamental 
 principle of all mathematics is the zero = 0." * * * 
 
 " Zero is in itself nothing. Mathematics is based upon 
 nothing, and, consequently, arises out of nothing. 
 
 " Out of nothing, therefore, it is possible for somethmg 
 to arise ; for mathematics, consisting of propositions, is 
 something, in relation to 0." 
 
 By such " consequentlys" and " therefores " it is, that 
 men philosophize when they " re-think the great thought 
 of creation." By dogmas that pretend to be reasons, noth- 
 ing is made to generate mathematics ; and by clothing 
 mathematics with matter, we have the universe ! If now 
 we deny, as we do deny, that the highest mathematical idea 
 is the zero ; — if, on the other hand, we assert, as we do 
 assert, that the fundamental idea underlying all mathemat- 
 ics, is that of equality ; the whole of Oken's cosmogony 
 disappears. And here, indeed, we may see illustrated, the 
 distinctive peculiarity of the German method of procedure 
 in these matters — the bastard A, priori method, as it may 
 be termed. The legitimate a ^?«on method sets out with 
 propositions of which the negation is inconceivable ; the <i 
 priori method as illegitimately applied, sets out either with 
 propositions of which the negation is not inconceivable, or 
 with propositions like Oken's, of which the affirmation is 
 inconceivable. 
 
169 
 
 It is needless to proceed further with the analysis ; else 
 might we detail the steps by which Oken arrives at the 
 conclusions that " the planets are coagulated colours, for 
 they are coagulated light ; that the sphere is the expanded 
 nothing ; " that gravity is " a weighty nothing, a heavy es- 
 sence, striving towards a centre ; " that " the earth is the 
 identical, water the indifferent, air the different ; or the 
 first the centre, the second the radius, the last the peri- 
 phery of the general globe or of fire." To comment on 
 them would be nearly as absurd as are the propositions 
 themselves. Let us pass on to another of the German sys- 
 tems of knowledge — that of Hegel. 
 
 The simple fact that Hegel puts Jacob Boehme on a par 
 with Bacon, suffices alone to show that his stand-point is 
 far remote from the one usually regarded as scientific : so 
 far remote, indeed, that it is not easy to find any common 
 basis on which to found a criticism. Those who hold that 
 the mind is moulded into conformity with surrounding 
 things by the agency of surrounding things, are necessarily 
 at a loss how to deal with those, who, like Schelling and 
 Hegel, assert that surrounding things are solidified mind — 
 that Nature is "petrified intelligence." However, let uss 
 briefly glance at Hegel's classification. He divides philoso- 
 phy into three parts : — 
 
 1. IjogiCf or the science of the idea in itself, the purt- 
 idea. 
 
 2. The Philosophy of Nature, or the science of the idea 
 considered under its other form — of the idea as Nature. 
 
 3. The Philosophy of the Mind, or the science of the 
 idea m its return to itself. 
 
 Of these, the second is divided into the natural sciences, 
 commonly so called ; so that in its more detailed form the 
 series runs thus : — Logic, Mechanics, Physics, Organic Phy- 
 sics, Psychology. 
 
 Now', if we believe with Hegel, first, that thought is tho 
 8 
 
170 THE GENESIS OF feCIENCE. 
 
 true essence of man; second, that thought is the essence of 
 the world ; and that, therefore, there is nothing but thought ; 
 his classification, heginning with the science of pure thought, 
 may be acceptable. But otherwise, it is an obvious objec- 
 tion to his arrangement, that thought implies things thought 
 of — that there can be no logical forms without the substance 
 of experience — ^that the science of ideas and the science ol 
 things must have a simultaneous origin. Hegel, however, 
 anticipates this objection, and, in his obstinate idealism, re- 
 plies, that the contrary is true ; that all contained in the 
 forms, to become something, requires to be thought : and 
 that logical forms are the foundations of all things. 
 
 It is not surprising that, starting from such premises, and 
 reasoning after this fashion, Hegel finds his way to strange 
 conclusions. Out of space and time he proceeds to build up 
 motion, matter, repulsion, attraction, weight, and inertia. 
 He then goes on to logically evolve the solar system. In 
 doing this he widely diverges from the'N'ewtonian theory ; 
 reaches by syllogism the conviction that the planets are the 
 most perfect celestial bodies ; and, not being able to bring 
 the stars within his theory, says that they are mere formal 
 existences and not living matter, and that as compared with 
 the solar system they are as little admirable as a cutaneous 
 eruption or a swarm of flies.* 
 
 Results so outrageous might be left as self-disproved, 
 were it not that speculators of this class are not alarmed by 
 any amount of incongruity with established beliefs. The 
 only efficient mode of treating systems like this of Hegel, is 
 to show that they are self-destructive — ^that by their first 
 steps they ignore that authority on which all their subse- 
 quent steps depend. If Hegel professes, as he manifestly 
 does, to develop his scheme by reasoning — ^if he presents 
 
 * It ia someirhat curious that the author of " The Plurality of Worlds," 
 with quite other aims, should have persuaded himself into amilar condu 
 sioiis. • 
 
171 
 
 successive inferences as necessarily following from certain 
 premises ; he implies the postulate that a belief which ne- 
 cessarily follows after certain antecedents is a true belief: 
 and, did an opponent reply to one of his inferences, that, 
 though it was impossible to think the opposite, yet the 
 opposite was true, he would consider the reply irrational 
 The procedure, however, which he would thus condemn as 
 destructive of all thinking whatever, is just the procedure 
 exhibited in the enunciation of his own first principles. 
 
 Mankind find themselves unable to conceive that there 
 can be thought without things thought of. Hegel, how- 
 ever, asserts that there can be thought without things 
 thought of. That ultimate test of a true proposition — the 
 inability of the human mind to conceive the negation of it 
 — which in all other cases he considers valid, he considers 
 invalid where it suits his convenience to do so ; and yet at 
 the same time denies the right of an opponent to follow his 
 example. If it is competent for him to posit dogmas, which 
 are the direct negations of what human consciousness recog- 
 nises; then is it also competent for his antagonists to stop 
 him at every step in his argument by saying, that though 
 the particular inference he is drawing seems to his mind, 
 and to all minds, necessarily to foUow from the premises, 
 yet it is not true, but the contrary inference is true. Or, 
 to state the dilemma in another form : — If he sets out with 
 inconceivable propositions, then may he with equal propri- 
 ety make all his succeeding propositions inconceivable ones 
 — may at every step throughout his reasoning draw exactly 
 the opposite conclusion to that which seems involved. 
 
 Hegel's mode of procedure being thus essentially sui- 
 cidal, the Hegelian classification which depends upon 
 it, falls to the ground. Let us consider next that of 
 M. Comte. 
 
 As all his readers must admit, M. Comte presents us 
 with a scheme of the sciences which, unlike the foregoing 
 
172 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 cues, demands respectful consideration. Widely as wa 
 differ from him, we cheerfully bear witness to the largeness 
 of his views, the clearness of his reasoning, and the value 
 of his speculations as contributing to intellectual progress. 
 Did we believe a serial arrangement of the sciences to be 
 possible, that of M. Comte would certainly be the one we 
 should adopt. His fundamental propositions are thor- 
 oughly intelligible ; and if not true, have a great semblance 
 of truth. His successive steps are logically co-ordinated ; 
 and he supports his conclusions by a considerable amount of 
 evidence — evidence which, so long as it is not critically exam- 
 ined, or not met by counter evidence, seems to substantiate 
 his positions. But it only needs to assume that antagon- 
 istic attitude which ought to be assumed towards new 
 doctrines, in the belief that, if true, they will prosper by 
 conquering objectors — it needs but to test his leading 
 doctrines either by other facts than those he cites, or by 
 liis own facts differently applied, to at once show that they 
 will not stand. We will proceed thus to deal with the 
 general principle on which he bases his hierarchy of the 
 sciences. 
 
 In the second chapter of his Cows de JPhilosqphie Fosi- 
 tive, M. Comte says : — " Our problem is, then, to find 
 the one rational order, amongst a host of possible sys- 
 tems." ..." This order is determined by the degree 
 of simplicity, or, what comes to the same thing, of general- 
 ity of their phenomena." And the arrangement he de- 
 duces runs thus: Mathematics, Astronomy, Physics, Chem- 
 istry, Physiology, Social Physics. This he asserts to be 
 " the true filiation of the sciences." He asserts further, 
 that the principle of progression from a greater to a less 
 degree of generality, " which gives this order to the whole 
 body of science, arranges the parts of each science." And, 
 finally, he asserts that the gradations thus established d 
 priori among the sciences, and the parts of each science, "ia 
 
173 
 
 in essential conformity witli the order which has sponta 
 neously taken place among the branches of natural philoso 
 phy ; " or, in other words — corresponds with the order of 
 historic development. 
 
 Let us compare these assertions with the facts. That 
 there may be perfect fairness, let us make no choice, but 
 take as the field for our comparison, the succeeding section 
 treating of the first science — Mathematics ; and let us use 
 none but M. Comte's own facts, and his own admissions. 
 Confining ourselves to this one science, of course our com- 
 parisons must be between its several parts. M. Comte says, 
 that the parts of each science must be arranged in the 
 order of their decreasing generality ; and that this oider 
 of decreasing generality agrees with the order of historic 
 development. Our inquiry must be, then, whether the his- 
 tory of mathematics confirms this statement. 
 
 Carrying out his principle, M. Comte divides Mathe- 
 matics into " Abstract Mathematics, or the Calculus (tak- 
 ing the word in its most extended sense) and Concrete 
 Mathematics, which is composed of General Geometry and 
 of Rational Mechanics.'' The subject-matter of the first of 
 these is number ; the subject-matter of the second includes 
 space, time, miction, force. The one possesses the highest 
 possible degree of generality ; for all things whatever 
 admit of enumeration. The others are less general ; see- 
 ing that there are endless phenomena that are not cogniza- 
 ble either by general geometry or rational mechanics. In 
 conformity with the alleged law, therefore, the evolution 
 of the calculus must throughout have preceded the evolu- 
 tion of the concrete sub-sciences. Now somewhat awk- 
 wardly for him, the first remark M. Comte makes bearing 
 upon this point is, that " from an historical point of view, 
 mathematical analysis appears to have risen out of the con- 
 templation of geometrical and mechanical facts." True, 
 he goes on to say that, " it is not the less independent of 
 
174 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 these sciences logically speaking ; " for that " analytical 
 ideas are, above all others, universal, abstract, and simple • 
 and geometrical conceptions are necessarily founded on 
 them." 
 
 We will not take advantage of this last passage to 
 charge M. Comte with teaching, after the fashion of Hegel, 
 that there can be thought without things thought of. We 
 are content simply to compare the two assertions, that 
 analysis arose out of the contemplation of geometrical and 
 mechanical facts, and that geometrical conceptions are 
 founded upon analytical ones. Literally interpreted they 
 exactly cancel each other. Interpreted, however, in a 
 liberal sense, they imply, what we believe to be de- 
 monstrable, that the two had a simultaneous origin. The 
 passage is either nonsense, or it is an admission that 
 abstract and concrete mathematics are coeval. Thus, 
 at the very first step, the alleged congruity between the 
 order of generality and the order of evolution, does not 
 hold good. 
 
 But may it not be that though abstract and concrete 
 mathematics took their rise at the same time, the one 
 afterwards developed more rapidly than the other ; and 
 has ever since remained in advance of it ? iN'o : and again 
 we call M. Comte himself as witness. Fortunately for his 
 argument he has said nothing respecting the early stages 
 of the concrete and abstract divisions after their diver- 
 gence from a common root ; otherwise the advent of 
 Algebra long after the Greek geometry had reached a high 
 development, would have been an inconvenient fact for 
 him to deal with. But passing over this, and limiting 
 ourselves to his own statements, we find, at the opening of 
 the next chapter, the admission, that " the historical do- 
 relopment of the abstract portion of mathematical science 
 tas, since the time of Descartes, been for the most part 
 determimd by that of the concrete." Further on we read 
 
• 175 
 
 respecting algebraic functions that " most functions were 
 concrete in their origin — even those ■which are at present 
 the most purely abstract ; and the ancients discovered 
 only through geometrical definitions elementary algebraic 
 properties of functions to which a numerical value was not 
 attached till long afterwards, rendering abstract to us 
 what was concrete to the old geometers." How do these 
 statements tally with his doctrine ? Again, having divided 
 the calculus into algebraic and arithmetical, M. Comte 
 admits, as perforce he must, that the algebraic is more 
 general than the arithmetical ; yet he will not say that 
 algebra preceded arithmetic in point of time. And again, 
 having divided the calculus of functions into the calculus 
 of direct functions (common algebra) and the calculus of 
 indirect functions (transcendental analysis), he is obliged 
 to speak of this last as possessing a higher generality than 
 the first ; yet it is far more modern. Indeed, by implica- 
 tion, M. Comte himself confesses this incongruity ; for he 
 says : — " It might seem that the transcendental analysis 
 ought to be studied before the ordinary, as it provides the 
 equations which the other has to resolve ; but though the 
 transcendental is logically independent of the ordinary, it 
 is best to follow the usual method of study, taking the 
 ordinary first." In all these cases, then, as well as 'at the 
 close of the section where he predicts that mathematicians 
 will in time " create procedures of a wider generality,^'' M. 
 Comte makes admissions that are diametrically opposed to 
 the alleged law. 
 
 In the succeeding chapters treating of the concrete de- 
 partment of mathematics, we find similar contradictions. 
 M. Comte himself names the geometry of the ancients spe- 
 cial geometry, and that of moderns the genera? geometry. 
 lie admits that while " the ancients studied geometry with 
 reference to the todies under notice, or specially; the 
 moderns study it with reference to the phenomena to be 
 
176 . THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 considered, or generally." He admits that while " the an 
 cients extracted all they could out of one line or surface 
 before passing to another," " the moderns, since Descartes, 
 employ themselves on questions which relate to any figure 
 whatever." These facts are the reverse of what, according 
 to his theory, they should be. So, too, in mechanics. Be- 
 fore dividing it into statics and dynamics, M. Comte treats 
 of the three laws of motion, and is obliged to do so ; for 
 statics, the more general of the two divisions, tfiough it 
 does not mvolve motion, is impossible as a science xmtU the 
 laws of motion are ascertained. Yet the laws of motion 
 pertain to dynamics, the more special of the dividoos. 
 Further on he points out that after Archimedes, who dis- 
 covered the'law of equilibrium of the lever, statics made 
 no progress until the establishment of dynamics enabled us 
 to seek " the conditions of equilibrium through the laws of 
 the composition of forces." And he adds — " At this day 
 this is the method universally employed. At the first glance 
 it does not appear the most rational — dynamics being more 
 complicated than statics, and precedence being natural to the 
 simpler. It would, in fact, be more philosophical to refer 
 dynamics to statics, as has since been done. " Sundry dis- 
 coveries are afterwards detailed, showing how completely 
 the development of statics has been achieved by consider- 
 ing its problems dynamically ; and before the close of the 
 section M. Comte remarks that " before hydrostatics could 
 be comprehended under statics, it was necessary that the 
 abstract theory of equilibrium should be made so general 
 as to apply directly to fluids as well as solids. This was ac- 
 complished when Lagrange supplied, as the basis of the 
 whole of rational mechanics, the single principle of virtual 
 velocities." In which statement we have two facts directly 
 »t variance with M. Comte's doctrine ; — ^first, that the sim- 
 pler science, statics, reached its present development only 
 by the aid of the principle of virtual velocities, which be- 
 
COMTe's law of PKOGEE88ION. ' 111 
 
 longs to the more complex science, dynamics ; and that tins 
 " single principle " underlying all rational mechanics — this 
 most general form which includes alike the relations of stat- 
 ical, hydrostatical, and dynamical forces — was reached so 
 late as the time of Lagrange. 
 
 Thus it is not true that the historical succession of the 
 divisions of mathematics has corresponded with the order 
 of decreasing generality. It is not true that abstract math- 
 ematics was evolved antecedently to, and independently 
 of concrete mathematics. It is not true that of the sub- 
 divisions of abstract mathematics, the more general came 
 before the more special. And it is not true that concrete 
 mathematics, in either of its two sections, began with the 
 most abstract and advanced to the less abstract truths. 
 
 It may be well to mention, parenthetically, that in de- 
 fending his alleged law of progression from the general to 
 the special, M. Comte somewhere comments upon the two 
 meanings of the word general, and the resulting liability to 
 confusion. Without now discussing whether the asserted 
 distinction can be maintained in other cases, it is manifest 
 that it does not exist here. In sundry of the instances 
 above quoted, the endeavors made by M. Comte himself to 
 disguise, or to explain away, the precedence of the special 
 over the general, clearly indicate that the generality spoken 
 of, is of the kind meant by his formula. And it needs but 
 a brief consideration of the matter to show that, even did 
 he attempt it, he could not distinguish this generality, which, 
 as above proved, frequently comes last, from the generality 
 which he says always comes first. For what is the nature 
 of that mental process by which objects, dimensions, 
 weights, times, and the rest, are found capable of having 
 their relations expressed numerically ? It is the formation 
 of certain abstract conceptions of unity, duality and multi- 
 plicity, which are applicable to all things alike. It is the 
 invention of general symbols serving to express thenumer 
 
178 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 ical relations of entities, whatever be their special charac- 
 ters. And what is the nature of the mental process by 
 which numbers are found capable of having their relations 
 expressed algebraically ? It is just the same. It is the for- 
 mation of certain abstract conceptions of numerical func- 
 tions which are the same whatever be the magnitudes oi 
 the numbers. It is the invention of general symbols serv- 
 ing to express the relations between numbers, as numbers 
 express the relations between things. And transcendental 
 analysis stands to algebra in the same position that algebra 
 stands in to arithmetic. 
 
 To briefly illustrate their respective powers ; — arithme- 
 tic can express in one formula the value of a particular 
 tangent to a particular curve ; algebra can express in one 
 formula the values of all tangents to a particular curve ; 
 transcendental analysis can express in one formula the val- 
 ues of all tangents to all curves. Just as arithmetic deals 
 with the common properties of lines, areas, bulks, forces, 
 periods ; so does algebra deal with the common properties 
 of the numbers which arithmetic jDresents ; so does tran- 
 scendental analysis deal with the common properties of the 
 equations exhibited by algebra. Thus, the generality of 
 the higher branches of the calculus, when compared with 
 the lower, is the same kind of generality as that of the lower 
 branches when compared with geometry or mechanics. 
 And on examination it will be found that the like relation 
 exists in the various other cases above given. 
 
 Having shown that M. Comte's alleged law of progres- 
 sion does not hold among the several parts of the same 
 science, let us see how it agrees with the facts when applied 
 to separate sciences. " Astronomy," says M. Comte, at the 
 opening of Book HE., " was a positive science, in its geo- 
 metrical aspect, from the earliest days of the school of Alex- 
 andria ; but Physics, which we are now to consider, had nc 
 positive character at all till Galileo made his great discov 
 
TEEEESTEIAL PHYSICS PEECEDES CELESTIAL. 179 
 
 eiies ou the fall of heavy bodies." Oa this, our comment is 
 simply that it is a misrepresentatioE based upon an arbi- 
 trary misuse of words — a mere verbal artifice. By choosing 
 to exclude from terrestrial physics those laws of magnitude, 
 motion, and position, which he includes in celestial physics, 
 M. Comte makes it appear that the one owes nothing to 
 the other. Not only is this altogether unwarrantable, but 
 it is radically inconsistent with his own scheme of divisions. 
 At the outset he says — and as the point is important we 
 quote from the original — " Pour la physique inorganiqua 
 nous voyons d'abord, en nous conformant toujours ^ I'ordre 
 de generalit6 et de dependance des ph6nom6nes, qu'tUe doit 
 etre partagee en deux sections distinctes, suivant qu'elle 
 considfere les phenomenes generaux de I'univers, ou, en par- 
 ticulier, ceux que presentent les corps terrestres. D'oii la 
 physique celeste, ou I'astronomie, soit g6ometrique, soit 
 mechanique ; et la physique terrestre." 
 
 Here then we have inorganic physics clearly divided 
 into celestial physics and terrestrial physics — the pheno- 
 mena presented by the universe, and the phenomena pre- 
 sented by earthly bodies. K now celestial bodies and ter- 
 restrial bodies exhibit sundry leading phenomena in com- 
 mon, as they do, how can the generalization of these com- 
 mon phenomena be considered as pertaining to the one class 
 rather than to the other ? If inorganic physics includes 
 geometry (which M. Comte has made it do by comprehend- 
 ing geometrical astronomy in its sub-section — celestial phy- 
 sics) ; and if its sub-section — terrestrial physics, treats of 
 things having geometrical properties ; how can the laws of 
 geometrical relations be excluded from terrestrial physics ? 
 Clearly if celestial physics includes the geometry of ob- 
 jects in the heavens, terrestrial physics includes the geometry 
 of objects on the earth. And if terrestrial physics includes 
 terrestrial geometry, while celestial physics includes celestial 
 geometry, then the geometrical part of terrestrial physics 
 
180 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 precedes the geometrical part of celestial physics ; see- 
 ing that geometry gained its first ideas from surrounding 
 objects. Until men had learnt geometrical relations from 
 bodies on the earth, it was impossible for them to under- 
 stand the geometrical relations of bodies in the heavens. 
 
 So, too, with celestial mechanics, which had terrestrial 
 mechanics for its parent. The very conception of force, 
 which underlies the whole of mechanical astronomy, is bor- 
 rowed from our earthly experiences ; and the leading laws 
 of mechanical action as exhibited in scales, levers, projec- 
 tiles, &c., had to be ascertained before the dynamics of the 
 solar system could be entered upon. What were the laws 
 made use of by Newton in working out his grand discovery? 
 The law of falling bodies disclosed by Galileo ; that of the 
 composition of forces also disclosed by GalUeo ; and that 
 of centrifugal force found out by Huyghens — all of them 
 generalizations of terrestrial physics. Yet, with facts like 
 these before him, M. Comte places astronomy before phy- 
 sics in order of evolution ! He does not compare the geo- 
 metrical parts of the two together, and the mechanical 
 parts of the two together ; for this would by no means 
 suit his hypothesis. But he compares the geometrical part 
 of the one with the mechanical part of the other, and so 
 gives a semblance of truth to his position. He is led away 
 by a verbal delusion. Had he confined his attention to the 
 things and disregarded the words, he would have seen that 
 before mankind scientifically co-ordinated any one class of 
 phenomena displayed in the heavens, they had previously 
 co-ordinated a parallel class of phenomena displayed upon 
 the surface of the earth. 
 
 "Were it needful we could fiU a score pages with the in- 
 congruities of M. Gomte's scheme. But the foregoing sam- 
 ples will suffice. So tar is his law of evolution of the 
 sciences from being tenable, that, by following his exam- 
 ple, and arbitrarily ignoring one class of facts, it would be 
 
181 
 
 possible to present, with great plausibility, just the opposite 
 generalization to that which he enunciates. While he as- 
 serts that the rational order of the sciences, like the order 
 of their historic development, " is determined by the de- 
 gree of simplicity, or, what comes to the same thing, of 
 generality of their phenomena ; " it might contrariwise be 
 asserted, that, commencing with the complex and the spe- 
 cial, mankind have progressed step by step to a knowledge 
 of greater simplicity and wider generality. So much evi- 
 dence is there of this as to have drawn from WheweU, in 
 his Mistory of the Inductive Sciences, the general remark 
 that " the reader has already seen repeatedly in the course 
 of this history, complex and derivative principles present- 
 ing themselves to men's minds before simple and elemen- 
 tary ones." 
 
 Even from M. Comte's own work, numerous facts, ad- 
 missions, and arguments, might be picked out, tending to 
 show this. "We have already quoted his words in proof 
 that both abstract and concrete mathematics have pro- 
 gressed towards a higher degree of generality, and that he 
 looks forward to a higher generality stUl. Just to strength- 
 en this adverse hypothesis, let us take a further instance. 
 From the particular case of the scales, the law of equilibri- 
 um of which was familiar to the earliest nations known, Ar- 
 chimedes advanced to the more general case of the unequal 
 lever with unequal weights; the law of equilibrium of 
 which includes that of the scales. By the help of Galileo's 
 discovery concerning the composition of forces, D'Alembert 
 " estabhshed, for the first time, the equations of equilibrium 
 ' of any system of forces appUed to the different points of a 
 solid body " — equations which include all cases of levers 
 and an infinity of cases besides. Clearly this is progress 
 towards a higher generahty — ^towards a knowledgie more 
 independent of special circumstances — ^towards a study of 
 phenomena " the most disengaged from the incidents of 
 
182 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 particular cases ; " which is M. Comte's definition of " the 
 most simple phenomena." Does it not indeed follow from 
 the familiarly admitted fact, that mental advance is from 
 the concrete to the abstract, from the particular to the gen- 
 eral, that the universal and therefore most simple truths are 
 the last to be discovered ? Is not the government of the 
 solar system by a force varying inversely as the square of 
 the distance, a simpler conception than any that preceded 
 it ? Should we ever succeed in reducing all orders of phe- 
 nomena to some single lavr — say of atomic action, as M. 
 Comte suggests — must not that law answer to his test of 
 being independent of all others, and therefore most simple ? 
 And would not such a law generalize the phenomena of 
 gravity, cohesion, atomic affinity, and electric repulsion, just 
 as the laws of number generalize the quantitative phenom- 
 ena of space, time and force ? 
 
 The possibility of saying so much in .support of an hypo- 
 thesis the very reverse of M. Comte's, at once proves that 
 his generalization is only a half-truth. The fact is, that 
 neither proposition is correct by itself; and the actuality is 
 expressed only by putting the two together. The progress 
 of science is duplex : it is at once from the special to the 
 general, and from the general to the special: it is analytical 
 and synthetical at the same time. 
 
 M. Comte himself observes that the evolution of science 
 has been accomplished by the division of labour ; but he 
 quite misstates the mode in which this division of labour 
 has operated. As he describes it, it has simply been an ar- 
 rangement of phenomena into classes, and the study of each 
 class by itself. He does not recognise the constant effect 
 of progress in each class upon all other classes ; but only on 
 the class succeeding it in his hierarchical scale. Or if he 
 occasionally admits collateral influences and intercommuni- 
 cations, he does it so grudgingly, and so quickly puts the 
 admissions out of sight and forgets them, as to leave the 
 
HOW THE SCIENCES AID EACH OTHEE, 183 
 
 impression that, with but trifling exceptions, the sciences 
 aid each other only in the order of their alleged succession. 
 The fact is, however, that the division of labour in science, 
 like the division of labour in society, and like the " physio- 
 logical division of labour " in individual organisms, has been 
 not only a specialization of functions, but a continuous help- 
 ing of each division by aU the others, and of all by each. 
 Every particular class of inquirers has, as it were, secreted 
 its own particular order of truths from the general mass of 
 material which observation accumulates ; and aU other 
 classes of inquirers have made use of these truths as fast 
 as they were elaborated, with the effect of enabling them 
 the better to elaborate each its own order of truths. 
 
 It was thus in sundry of the cases we have quoted as at 
 variance with M. Comte's doctrine. It was thus with the 
 . application of Huyghens's optical discovery to astronomical 
 observation by Galileo. It was thus with the application 
 of the isochronism of the pendulum to the making of in- 
 struments for measuring intervals, astronomical and other. 
 It was thus when the discovery that the refraction and dis- 
 persion of light did not follow the same law of variation, 
 affected both astronomy and physiology by giving us achro- 
 matic telescopes and microscopes. It was thus when Brad- 
 ley's discovery of the aberration of light enabled him to 
 make the first step towards ascertaining the motions of the 
 stars. It was thus when Cavendish's torsion-balance ex- 
 periment determined the specific gravity of the earth, and 
 so gave a datum for calculating the specific gravities of the 
 sun and planets. It was thus when tables of atmospheric 
 refraction enabled observers to write down the real places 
 of the heavenly bodies instead of their apparent places. It 
 was thus when the discovery of the different expansibilities 
 of metals by heat, gave us the means of correcting our 
 chronometrical measurements of astronomical periods. It 
 was thus when the lines of the prismatic spectrum wera 
 
184 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 used to distinguish the heavenly hodies that are of like na- 
 ture with the sun from those which are not. It was thus 
 when, as recently, an electro-telegraphic instrument was in- 
 vented for the more accurate registration of meridional 
 transits. It was thus when the difference in the rates of a 
 clock at the equator, and nearer the poles, gave data for 
 calculating the oblateness of the earth, and accounting for 
 the precession of the equinoxes. It was thus — but it is 
 needless to continue. 
 
 Here, within our own limited knowledge of its history, we 
 have named ten additional cases in which, the single science 
 of astronomy has owed its advance to sciences coming after 
 it in M. Comte's series. Not only its secondary steps, but 
 its greatest revolutions have been thus determined. Kep- 
 ler could not have discovered his celebrated laws had it not 
 been for Tycho Brahe's accurate observations ; and it was 
 only after some progress in physical and chemical science 
 that the improved instruments with which those observa- 
 tions were made, became possible. The heliocentric theory 
 of the solar system had to wait until the invention of the 
 telescope before it could be finally established. Nay, even 
 the grand discovery of all — ^the law of gravitation — depend- 
 ed for its proof upon an operation of physical science, the 
 measurement of a degree on the Earth's surface. So complete- 
 ly indeed did it thus depend, that Newton had actually 
 abandoned his hypothesis because the length of a degree, 
 as then stated, brought out wrong results ; and it was only 
 after Picart's more exact measui-ement was published, that 
 he returned to his calculations and proved his great gener- 
 ahzation. Now this constant intercommunion, which, for 
 brevity's sake, we have illustrated in the case of one science 
 only, has been taking place with all the sciences. Through- 
 out the whole course of their evolution there has been a 
 contmuous consensus of the sciences — a consensus exhibit- 
 ing a general correspondence with the consensus of facul 
 
THE SEELA.L OEDEE EEEONEOUS. 185 
 
 ties in each phase of mental development ; the one being 
 an objective registry of the subjective state of the other. 
 
 From our present point of view, then, it becomes obvi- 
 ous that the conception of a serial arrangement of the sci- 
 ences is a vicious one. It is not simply that the schemes 
 we have examined are untenable ; but it is that the sciences 
 cannot be rightly placed in any linear order whatever. It 
 is not simply that, as M. Comte admits, a classification 
 " wiU always involve something, if not arbitrary, at least 
 artificial ; " it is not, as he would have us believe, that, 
 neglecting minor imperfections a classification may be sub- 
 stantially true ; but it is that any grouping of the sciences 
 in a succession gives a radically erroneous idea of their 
 genesis and their dependencies. There is no " one rational 
 order among a host of possible systems." There is no 
 " true filiation of the sciences." The whole hypothesis is 
 fundamentally false. Indeed, it needs but a glance at its 
 origin to see at once how baseless it is. Why a series ? 
 What reason have we to suppose that the sciences admit 
 of a linear arrangement? Where is our warrant for 
 assuming that there is some sticcession in which they can 
 be placed ? There is no reason ; no warrant. Whence 
 then has arisen the supposition ? To use M. Comte's own 
 phraseology, we should say, it is a metaphysical conception. 
 It adds another to the cases constantly occurring, of the 
 human mind being made the measure of Nature. We are 
 obliged to think in sequence ; it is the law of our minds 
 that we must consider subjects separately, one after 
 another : therefore Nature must be serial — therefore the 
 sciences must be classifiable in a succession. See here the 
 birth of the notion, and the sole evidence of its truth. 
 Men have been obliged when arranging in books their 
 schemes of education and systems of knowledge, to choose 
 some order or other. And from inquiring what is the best 
 
186 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 order, have naturally fallen into the belief that there is an 
 order which truly represents the facts — have persevered in 
 seeking such an order; quite overlooking the previous 
 question whether it is likely that Nature has consulted the 
 convenience of book-making. 
 
 For German philosophers, who hold that Nature is 
 " petrified intelligence," and that logical forms are the 
 foundations of aU things, it is a consistent hypothesis that 
 as thought is serial, Nature is serial ; but that M. Comte, 
 who is so bitter an opponent of all anthropomorphism, 
 even in its most evanescent shapes, should have committed 
 the mistake of imposing upon the external world an ar- 
 rangement which so obviously springs from a limitation of 
 the human consciousness, is somewhat strange. And it is 
 the more strange when we call to mind how, at the outset, 
 M. Comte remarks that in the beginning " toutes les sciences 
 sont cultwees simuUanement par les memes esprits ; " that 
 this is " mevitable et meme' mdispensable / " and how he 
 further remarks that the different sciences are "comme 
 les dwerses branches d'un tronc unique." Were it not 
 accounted for by the distorting influence of a cherished 
 hypothesis, it would be scarcely possible to understand 
 how, after recognising truths like these, M. Comte should 
 have persisted in attempting to construct " une echelle en- 
 cyclopedique." 
 
 The metaphor which M. Comte has here so inconsis- 
 tently used to express the relations of the sciences — 
 branches of one trunk — ^is an approximation to the truth, 
 though not the truth itself. It suggests the facts that the 
 sciences had a common origin ; that they have been de- 
 veloping simultaneously ; and that they have been from 
 time to time dividing and sub-dividing. But it does not 
 suggest the yet more important fact, that the divisions and 
 sub-divisions thus arising do not remain separate, but now 
 and again re-unite in direct and indirect ways. They 
 
INOSCULATION OF THE SCIENCES. 18Y 
 
 in(jsculate ; they severally send off and receive connecting 
 growths ; and the intercommunion has been ever becom- 
 ing more frequent, more intricate, more widely ramified. 
 There has aU along been higher specialization, that there 
 might be a larger generalization ; and a deeper analysis, 
 that there might be a better synthesis. Each larger gen- 
 eralization has lifted sundry specializations still higher ; and 
 each better synthesis has prepared the way for still deeper 
 analysis. 
 
 And here we may fitly enter upon the task awhile since 
 indicated — a sketch of the Genesis of Science, regarded as 
 a gradual outgrowth from common knowledge — an exten- 
 sion of the perceptions by the aid of the reason. We pro- 
 pose to treat it as a psychological process historically dis- 
 played ; tracing at the same time the advance from qualita- 
 tive to quantitative prevision ; the progress from concrete 
 facts to abstract facts, and the application of such abstract 
 facts to the analysis of new orders of concrete facts ; the 
 simultaneous advance in gereralization and specialization ; 
 the continually increasing subdivision and reunion of the 
 sciences ; and their constantly improving consensus. 
 
 To trace out scientific evolution from its deepest roots 
 would, of course, involve a complete analysis of the mind. 
 For as science is a development of that common knowledge 
 acquired by the unaided senses and uncultured reason, so 
 is that common knowledge itself gradually built up out of 
 the simplest perceptions. We must, therefore, begin 
 somewhere abruptly ; and the most appropriate stage 
 to take for our point of departure will be the adult mind 
 of the savage. 
 
 Commencing thus, without a proper preliminary analy- 
 sis,- we are naturally somewhat at a loss how to present, in 
 a satisfactory manner, those fundamental processes of 
 thought out of which science ultimately originates. Per' 
 
188 THE GENESIS OP SCIENCE. 
 
 haps our argument may be best initiated by the proposi 
 tion, that all intelligent action whatever depends upon the 
 discerning of distinctions among surrounding things. The 
 condition under -which only it is possible for any creature 
 to obtain food and avoid danger is, that it shall be differ- 
 ently affected by dififerent objects — that it shall be led to 
 act in one way by one object, and in another way by 
 another. In the lower orders of creatures this condition is 
 fulfilled by means of an apparatus which acts automatically. 
 In the higher orders the actions are partly automatic, 
 partly conscious. And in man they are almost wholly 
 conscious. 
 
 Throughout, however, there must necessarily exist a 
 certain classification of things according to their properties 
 — a classification which is either organically registered in 
 the system, as in the inferior creation, or is formed by 
 experience, as in ourselves. And it may be further re- 
 marked, that the extent to which this classification is 
 carried, roughly indicates the height of intelligence — that, 
 whUe the lowest organisms are able to do little more than 
 discriminate organic from inorganic matter ; while the 
 generality of animals carry their classifications no further 
 than to a limited number of plants or creatures serving 
 for food, a Umited number of beasts of prey, and a limited 
 number of places and materials ; the most degraded of the 
 human race possess a knowledge of the distinctive natures 
 of a great variety of substances, plants, animals, tools, per- 
 sons, &c, not only as classes but as individuals. 
 
 What now is the mental process by which classification 
 is effected ? Manifestly it is a recognition of the likeness 
 or unliJceness of things, either in respect of their sizes, 
 colours, forms, weights, textures, tastes, &c., or in respect 
 of their modes of action. By some special mark, sound, or 
 motion, the savage identifies a certain four-legged crea- 
 ture he sees, as one that is good for food, and to be caught 
 
BASIS OF CLASSIFICATION. 189 
 
 in a particular way ; or as one that is dangerous ; and acta 
 accordingly. He has classed together all the creatures 
 that are alike in this particular. And manifestly in choos- 
 ing the wood out of which to form his how, the plant with 
 which to poison his arrows, the bone from which to make 
 his fish-hooks, he identifies them through their chief sensi- 
 ble properties as belonging to the general classes, wood, 
 plant, and bone, but distinguishes them as belonging to 
 sub-classes by virtue of certain properties in which they are 
 unlilce the rest of the general classes they belong to ; and so 
 forms genera and species. 
 
 And here it becomes manifest that not only is classifica- 
 tion carried on by grouping together in the mind things 
 that are like ; but that classes and sub-classes are formed 
 and arranged according to the degrees ofunlikeness. Things 
 widely contrasted are alone distinguished in the lower 
 stages of mental evolution ; as may be any day observed in 
 an infant. And gradually as the powers of discrimination 
 increase, the widely contrasted classes at first distinguished, 
 come to be each divided into sub-classes, diflfering from 
 each other less than the classes differ ; and these sub-classes 
 are again divided after the same manner. By the continu- 
 ance of which process, things are gradually arranged into 
 groups, the members of which are less and less unlike ; 
 ending, finally, in groups whose members differ only as 
 individuals, and not specifically. And thus there tends 
 ultimately to arise the notion of complete likeness. For 
 manifestly, it is impossible that groups should continue to 
 be sub-divided in virtue of smaller and smaller differences, 
 without there being a simultaneous approximation to the 
 notion of no difference. 
 
 Let us next notice that the recognition of likeness and 
 unlikeness, which underlies classification, and out of which 
 continued classification evolves the idea of complete like- 
 ness — ^let us next notice that it also underlies the process 
 
190 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 of naming, and by consequence language. For all lan- 
 guage consists, at the beginning, of symbols which are as 
 like to the things symbolized as it is practicable to make 
 them. The language of signs is a means of conveying ideas 
 by mimicking the actions or peculiarities of the things re- 
 ferred to. Verbal language is also, at the beginning, a 
 mode of suggesting objects or acts by imitating the sounds 
 which the objects make, or with which the acts are accom- 
 panied. Originally these two languages were used simul- 
 taneously. It needs but to watch the gesticulations with 
 which the savage accompanies his speech — to see a Bush- 
 man or a Kaffir dramatizing before an audience his mode 
 of catching game — or to note the extreme paucity of 
 words in all primitive vocabularies ; to infer that at first, 
 attitudes, gestures, and sounds, were all combined tb pro- 
 duce as good a likeness as possible, of the things, animals, 
 persons, or events described ; and that as the sounds came 
 to be understood by themselves the gestures fell into dis- 
 use : leaving traces, however, in the manners of the more 
 excitable civilized races. But be this as it may, it suffices 
 simply to observe, how many of the words current among 
 barbarous peoples are like the sounds appertaining to the 
 things signified ; how many of our own oldest and simplest 
 words have the same peculiarity ; how children tend to in- 
 vent imitative words ; and how the sign-language sponta- 
 neously formed by deaf mutes is invariably based upon 
 imitative actions — ^to at once see that the notion of likeness 
 is that fi-om which the nomenclature of objects takes its 
 rise. 
 
 Were there space we might go on to point out how this 
 law of life is traceable, not only in the origin but in the de- 
 velopment of language ; how in primitive tongues the plu- 
 ral is made by a duplication of the singular, which is a 
 multiplication of the word to make it like the multiplicity 
 of the things ; how the use of metaphor — that prolific 
 
GENESIS OF LANGUAGE AND EBASONING. 191 
 
 source of new ■words — ^is a suggesting of ideas that are liJct 
 the ideas to be conveyed in some respect or other ; and 
 how, in the copious use of simile, fahle, and allegory among 
 uncivilized races, we see that complex conceptions, which 
 there is yet no direct language for, are rendered, by pre- 
 senting known conceptions more or less like them. 
 
 This view is further confirmed, and the predominance 
 of this notion of likeness in primitive times further illus- 
 trated, by the fact that our system of presenting ideas to 
 the eye originated after the same fashion. Writing and 
 printing have descended from picture-language. The ear- 
 liest mode of permanently registering a fact was by depict- 
 ing it on a wall ; that is — ^by exhibiting something as like to 
 the thing to be remembered as it could be made. Grad- 
 ually as the practice grew habitual and extensive, the most 
 frequently repeated forms became fixed, and presently ab- 
 breviated ; and, passing through the hieroglyphic and ideo- 
 graphic phases, the symbols lost all apparent relations to 
 the things signified : just as the majority of our spoken 
 words have done. 
 
 Observe again, that the same thing is true respecting 
 the genesis of reasoning. The likeness that is perceived to 
 exist between cases, is the essence of all early reasoning 
 and of much of our present reasoning. The savage, hav- 
 ing by experience discovered a relation between a certain 
 object and a certain act, infers that the like relation will be 
 found in future cases. And the expressions we constantly 
 use in our arguments — " analogy implies," " the cases are 
 not parallel," " hj parity of reasoning," " there is no simi- 
 larity," — show how constantly the idea of likeness under- 
 lies our ratiocinative processes. 
 
 StiU. more clearly wUl this be seen on recognising the 
 fact that there is a certain parallelism between reasoning 
 and classification ; that the two have a common root ; and 
 that neither can go on without the other. For on the one 
 
192 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 hand, it is a familiar truth that the attributing to a body iu 
 consequence of some of its properties, all those other prop- 
 erties in virtue of which it is referred to a particular class, 
 is an act of inference. And, on the other hand, the form- 
 ing of a generalization is the putting together in one class, 
 all those cases -which present like relations ; while the draw- 
 ing a deduction is essentially the perception that a particu- 
 lar case belongs to a certain class of cases previously gener- 
 alized. So that as classification is a grouping together of 
 like things ; reasoning is a grouping together of like rdor- 
 tions among things. Add to which, that while the perfec- 
 tion gradually achieved in classification consists in the form- 
 ation of groups of objects which are completely (dike; the 
 perfection gradually achieved in reasoning consists in the 
 formation of groups of cases which are completely alike. 
 
 Once more we may contemplate this dominant idea of 
 likeness as exhibited in art. All art, civilized as well as 
 savage, consists almost wholly in the making of objects like 
 other objects ; either as found in Nature, or as produced 
 by previous art. If we trace back the varied art-products 
 now existing, we find that at each stage the divergence 
 from previous patterns is but small when compared with 
 the agreement ; and in the earliest art the persistency of 
 imitation is yet more conspicuous. The old forms and 
 ornaments and symbols were held sacred, and perpetually 
 copied. Indeed, the strong imitative tendency notoriously 
 displayed by the lowest human races, ensures among them 
 a constant reproducing of likenesses of things, forms, signs, 
 sounds, actions, and whatever else is imitable ; and we may 
 even suspect that this aboriginal peculiarity is in some way 
 connected with the culture and development of this gen- 
 eral conception, which we have found so deep and wide- 
 spread in its applications. 
 
 And now let us go on to consider how, by a further 
 unfolding of this same fundamental notion, there is a grad- 
 
OEIGIN 03? IDEAS OF EQUALITY. 193 
 
 ual formation of the first germs of science. This idea ol 
 likeness ■which underlies classification, nomenclature, lan- 
 guage spoken and written, reasoning, and art ; and which 
 plays so important a part because all acts of intelligence 
 are made possible only by distinguishing among surround- 
 ing things, or grouping them into like and unlike ; — this 
 idea we shall find to be the one of which science is the es- 
 pecial product. Already during the stage we have been 
 describing, there has existed qualitative prevision in re- 
 spect to the commoner phenomena with which savage life 
 is familiar ; and we have now to inquire how the elements 
 of quantitative prevision are evolved. We shall find that 
 they originate by the perfecting of this same idea of like- 
 ness ; that they have their rise in that conception of com- 
 plete likeness which, as we have seen, necessarily results 
 from the, continued process of classification. 
 
 For when the process of classification has been carried 
 as far as it is possible for the uncivilized to carry it — when 
 the animal kingdom has been grouped not merely into 
 quadrupeds, birds, fishes, and insects, but each of these di- 
 vided into kinds — when there come to be sub-classes, in 
 each of which the members difier only as individuals, and 
 not specifically ; it is clear that there must occur a frequent 
 observation of objects which difier so little as to be indis- 
 tinguishable. Among several creatures which the savage 
 has killed and carried home, it must often happen that 
 some one, which he wished to identify, is so exactly like 
 another that he cannot tell which is which. Thus, then, 
 there originates the notion of equality. The things which 
 among ourselves are called equal — whether lines, angles, 
 weights, temperatures, sounds or colours — are things which 
 produce in us sensations that cannot be distinguished from 
 each other. It is true that we now apply the word equal 
 chiefly to the separate phenomena which objects exhibit, 
 and not to groups of phenomena ; but this limitation of the 
 9 
 
194 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 idea has evidently arisen hj subsequent analysis. And that 
 the notion of equality did thus originate, will, we think, 
 become obvious on remembering that as there were no ar- 
 tificial objects from which it could have been abstracted, it 
 must have been abstracted from natural objects ; and that 
 the various families of the animal kingdom chiefly furnish 
 those natural objects which display the requisite exactitude 
 of likeness. 
 
 The same order of experiences out of which this gene- 
 ral idea of equality is evolved, gives birth at the same time 
 to a more complex idea of equality ; or, rather, the process 
 just described generates an idea of equality which further 
 experience separates into two ideas — equality of things and 
 equality of relations. While organic, and more especially 
 animal forms, occasionally exhibit this perfection of likeness 
 out of which the notion of simple equality arises, they more 
 frequently exhibit only that kind of likeness which we call 
 similarity/ ; and which is really compound equality. For 
 the similarity of two creatures of the same species but of 
 different sizes, is of the same nature as the similarity of two 
 geometrical figures. In either case, any two parts of the 
 one bear the same ratio to one another, as the homologous 
 parts of the other. Given in any species, the proportions 
 found to exist among the bones, and we may, and zoologists 
 do, predict from any one, the dimensions of the rest ; just as, 
 when knowing the proportions subsisting among the parts 
 of a geometrical figure, we may, from the length of one, 
 calculate the others. And if, in the case of similar geome- 
 trical figures, the similarity can be established only by 
 proving exactness of proportion among the homologous 
 parts ; if we express this relation between two parts in the 
 one, and the corresponding parts in the other, by the for- 
 mula A is to B as a is to h ; if we otherwise write this, A 
 to B=a to h ; if, consequently, the fact we prove is that 
 the relation of A to B equals the relation of a to b ; then 
 
EQUALITY OF THINGS AST) EELATIONS. 195 
 
 it is manifest that the fundamental conception of similarity 
 is equality of relations. 
 
 With this explanation we shall be understood when we 
 say that the notion of equality of relations is the basis of 
 all exact reasoning. Already it has been shown that reasoning, 
 in general is a recognition of likeness of relations ; and 
 here we further find that while the notion of likeness of 
 things ultimately evolves the idea of simple equality, the 
 notion of likeness of relations evolves the idea of equalitj- 
 of relations : of which the one is the concrete germ of ex- 
 act science, while the other is its abstract germ. 
 
 Those who caifnot understand how the recognition of 
 similarity in creatures of the same kind, can have any alli- 
 ance with reasoning, will get over the difficulty on remem- 
 bering that the phenomena among which equality of rela- 
 tions is thus perceived, are phenomena of the same order 
 and are present to the senses at the same time ; while those 
 among which developed reason perceives relations, are gen- 
 erally neither of the same order, nor simultaneously present. 
 And if further, they will call to mind how Cuvier and Owen, 
 from a single part of a creature, as a tooth, construct the 
 rest by a process of reasoning based on this equality of re- 
 lations, they will see that the two things are intimately 
 connected, remote as they at first seem. But we anticipate. 
 What it concerns us here to observe is, that from familiari- 
 ty with organic forms there simultaneously arose the ideas 
 of simple equality, and equality of relations. 
 
 At the same time, too, and out of the same mental pro- 
 cesses, came the first distinct ideas of number. In the earli- 
 est stages, the presentation of several like objects produced 
 merely an indefinite conception of multiplicity ; as it still 
 does among Australians, and Bushmen, and Damaras, when 
 the number presented exceeds three or four. With such a 
 fact before us we may safely infer that the first clear numer. 
 ical conception was that of duality as contrasted v/ith uni- 
 
196 THE GENESIS OE SCIENCE. 
 
 ty. And this notion of duality must necessarily have grown 
 lip side by side with those of likeness and equality ; seeing 
 that it is impossible to recognise the likeness of two things 
 without also perceiving that there are two. From the 
 very beginning the conception of number must have been, 
 as it is still, associated with the likeness or equality of 
 the things numbered. If we analyze it, we find that sim- 
 ple enumeration is a registration of repeated impres- 
 sions of any kind. That these may be capable of enu- 
 meration it is needful that they be more or less alike ; and 
 before any absolutely true numerical results can be reach- 
 ed, it is requisite that the units be absdhctely equal. The 
 only way in which we can establish a numerical relation' 
 ship between things that do not yield us like impressions, 
 is to divide them into parts that do yield us like impres 
 sions. Two unlike magnitudes of extension, force, time, 
 weight, or what not, can have their relative amounts estl 
 mated, only by means of some small unit that is contained 
 many times in both ; and even if we finally write down the 
 greater one as a unit and the other as a fraction of it, we 
 state, in the denominator of the fraction, the number of 
 parts into which the unit must be divided to be compara- 
 ble with the fraction. 
 
 It is, indeed, true, that by an evidently modern process of 
 abstraction, we occasionally apply numbers to unequal units, 
 as the furniture at a sale or the various animals on a farm, 
 simply as so many separate entities ; but no true result can 
 be brought out by calculation with units of this order. 
 And, indeed, it is the distinctive peculiarity of the calculus 
 in general, that it proceeds on the hypothesis of that abso- 
 lute equality of its abstract units, which no real units pos- 
 sess ; and that the exactness of its results holds only in 
 virtue of this hypothesis. The first ideas of number must 
 necessarily then have been derived from like or equal mag- 
 nitudes as seen chiefly in organic objects ; and as the like 
 
EAULT NUMEEI0j4.L IDEAS. 197 
 
 magnitudes most frequently observed were magnitudes of 
 extension, it follows that geometry and arithmetic had a 
 simultaneous origin. 
 
 Not only are the first distinct ideas of numher co-ordin 
 ate with ideas of likeness and equality, hut the first efforts 
 at numeration displayed the same relationship. On read- 
 ing the accounts of various savage tribes, we find that the 
 method of counting by the fingers, still followed by many 
 children, is the aboriginal method. Neglecting the several 
 cases in which the ability to enumerate does not reach even 
 to the number of fingers on one hand, there are many cases 
 in which it does not extend beyond ten — ^the limit of the 
 simple finger notation. The fact that in so many instances, 
 remote, and seemingly unrelated nations, have adopted ten 
 as their basic number ; together with the fact that in the re- 
 maining instances the basic number is either_/?we (the fingers 
 of one hand) or twenty (the fingers and toes) ; almost of 
 themselves show that the fingers were the original units of 
 numeration. The still surviving use of the word diffit, as 
 the general name for a figure in arithmetic, is significant ; 
 and it is even said that our word ten (Sax. tyn ; Dutch, 
 tien ; German, zehn) means in its primitive expanded fonn 
 two hands. So that originally, to say there were ten things, 
 was to say there were two hands of them. 
 
 From all which evidence it is tolerably clear that the 
 earliest mode of conveying the idea of any number of 
 things, was by holding up as many fingers as there were 
 things ; that is — using a symbol which was equal, in respect 
 of multiplicity, to the group symbolized. For which infer- 
 ence there is, indeed, strong confirmation in the recent 
 statement that our own soldiers are even now spontaneous- 
 ly adopting this device in their dealings with the Turks. 
 And here it should be remarked that in this recombination 
 of the notion of equality with that of multiplicity, by which 
 the first steps in numeration are effected, we may sec one 
 
198 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 of the earliest of those inosculations between the diverging 
 branches of science, which are afterwards of perpetual occur- 
 rence. 
 
 Indeed, as this observation suggests, it will be well, be- 
 fore tracing the mode in which exact science finally emerges 
 from the merely approximate judgments of the senses, and 
 showing the non-serial evolution of its divisions, to note 
 the non-serial character of those preliminary processes of 
 which all after development is a continuation. On re-con- 
 sidering them it will be seen that not only are they diver- 
 gent growths from a common root, — ^not only arc they sim- 
 ultaneous in their progress ; but that they are mutual aids ; 
 and that none can advance without the rest. That com- 
 pleteness of classification for which the unfolding of the 
 perceptions paves the way, is impossible without a corre- 
 sponding progress in language, by which greater varieties 
 of objects are thinkable and expressible. 0;i the one hand 
 it is impossible to carry classification far without names by 
 which to designate the classes ; and on the other hand it 
 is impossible to make language faster than things are classi- 
 fied. 
 
 Again, the multiplication of classes and the consequent 
 narrowing of each class, itself involves a greater likeness 
 among the things classed together ; and the consequent ap- 
 proach towards the notion of complete likeness itself allows 
 classification to be carried higher. Moreover, classification 
 necessarily advances pari passu with rationality — ^tbe clas- 
 sification of things with the classification of relations. For 
 things that belong to the same class are, by implication, 
 things of which the properties and modes of behaviour — 
 the co-existences and sequences — are more or less the same ; 
 and the recognition of this sameness of co-existences and 
 sequences is reasoning. "Whence it follows that the advance 
 of classification is necessarily proportionate to the advance 
 of generalizations. Yet further, the notion of likeness, both 
 
QUA:5rTITATrVE EVOLUTION OP KNOWLEDGE. 199 
 
 in things and relations, simultaneously evolves by one pro- 
 cess of culture the ideas of equality of things and equality 
 of relations ; which are the respective bases of exact con- 
 crete reasoning and exact abstract reasoning — Mathematics 
 and Logic. And once more, this idea of equality, in the 
 very process of being formed, necessarily gives origin to 
 two series of relations — those of magnitude and those of 
 number: from which arise geometry and the calculus. Thus 
 the process throughout is one of perpetual subdivision and 
 perpetual intercommunication of the divisions. From the 
 very first there has been that consensus of difierent kinds of 
 knowledge, answering to the consensus of the intellectual 
 faculties, which, as already said, must exist among the sci- 
 ences. 
 
 Let us now go on to observe how, out of the notions of 
 equality and number, as arrived at in the manner described, 
 there gradually arose the elements of quantitative prevision. 
 
 Equality, once having come to be definitely conceived, 
 was readily applicable to other phenomena than those of 
 magnitude. Being predicable of all things producing indis- 
 tinguishable impressions, there naturally grew up ideas of 
 equality in weights, sounds, colours, &c. ; and indeed it can 
 scarcely be doubted that the occasional experience of equal 
 weights, sounds, and colours, had a share in developing the 
 abstract conception of equality — that the ideas of equality 
 in size, relations, forces, resistances, and sensible proper- 
 ties in general, were evolved during the same period. 
 But however this may be, it is clear that as fast as the no- 
 tion of equality gained definiteness, so fast did that lowest 
 kind of quantitative prevision which is achieved without 
 any instrumental aid, become possible. 
 
 The ability to estimate, however roughly, the amount 
 of a foreseen result, implies the conception that it wiU be 
 equal to a certain imagined quantity ; and the correctness 
 of the estimate will manifestly depend upon the accuracy at 
 
200 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 which the perceptions of sensible equality have arriyed. A 
 savage vrith a piece of stone in his hand, and another piece 
 lying before him of greater hulk but of the same kind (a 
 fact which he infers from the equality of the two in colour 
 and texture) knows about what effort he must put forth to 
 raise this other piece; and he judges accurately in propor- 
 tion to the accuracy with which he perceives that the one 
 is twice, three times, four times, &c. as large as the other ; 
 that is — in proportion to the precision of his ideas of equali- 
 ty and number. And here let us not omit to notice that 
 even in these vaguest of quantitative previsions, the concep- 
 tion oi equality of relations is also involved. For it is only 
 in virtue of an undefined perception that the relation be- 
 tween bulk and weight in the one stone is equal to the re- 
 lation between bulk and weight in the other, that even the 
 roughest approximation can be made. 
 
 But how came the transition from those uncertain per- 
 ceptions of equality which the unaided senses give, to the 
 certain ones with which science deals ? It came by placing 
 the things compared in juxtaposition. Equality being pre- 
 dicated of things which give us indistinguishable impres- 
 sions, and no accurate comparison of impressions being 
 possible unless they occur in immediate succession, it re- 
 sults that exactness of equality is ascertainable in propor- 
 tion to the closeness of the compared things. Hence the 
 fact that when we wish to judge of two shades of colour 
 whether they are alike or not, we place them side by side ; 
 hence the fact that we cannot, with any precision, say which 
 of two allied sounds is the louder, or the higher in pitch, 
 unless we hear the one immediately after the other ; hence 
 the fact that to estimate the ratio of weights, we take one 
 in each hand, that we may compare their pressures by rap- 
 idly alternating in thought from the one to the other ; hence 
 the fact, that in a piece of music, we can continue to make 
 equal beats when the first beat has been given, but cannot 
 
OEIGIN OF THE IDEA OF MEASrEE. 201 
 
 ensure commencing with the same length of beat •n a fu' 
 ture occasion ; and hence, lastly, the fact, that of all magni- 
 tudes, those of linear extension are those of which the 
 equality is most accurately ascertainable, and those to 
 which by consequence all others have to be reduced. For 
 it is the peculiarity of linear extension that it alone allows 
 its magnitudes to be placed in absolute juxtaposition, or, 
 rather, in coincident position ; it alone can test the equality 
 of two magnitudes by observing whether they will coalesce, 
 as two equal mathematical lines do, when placed between 
 the same points ; it alone can test equality by trying wheth- 
 er it will become identity. Hence, then, the fact, that all 
 exact science is reducible, by an ultimate analysis, to results 
 measured in equal units of linear extension. 
 
 Still it remains to be noticed in what manner this deter- 
 mination of equality by comparison of linear magnitudes 
 originated. Once more may we perceive that surrounding 
 natural objects supplied the needful lessons. From the be- 
 ginning there must have been a constant experience of like 
 things placed side by side — men standing and walking to- 
 gether ; animals from the same herd ; fish from the same 
 shoal. And the ceaseless repetition of these experiences 
 could not fail to suggest the observation, that the nearer 
 together any objects were, the more visible became any in- 
 equality between them. Hence the obvious device of put- 
 ting in apposition, things of which it was desired to ascer- 
 tain the relative magnitudes. Hence the idea of measure. 
 And here we suddenly come upon a group of facts which 
 afford a solid basis to the remainder of our argument; while 
 they also furnish strong evidence in support of the forego- 
 ing ■ speculations. Those who look sceptically on this at- 
 tempted rehabilitation of the earliest epochs of mental de- 
 velopment, and who more especially think that the derivation 
 of BO many primary notions from organic forms is somewhat 
 strai ed, will perhaps see more probability in the several 
 
202 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 Lypoth^es that have been ventured, on discovering that all 
 measures oi extension and force originated from the lengths 
 and weights of organic bodies ; and all measures of time 
 from the periodic phenomena of either organic or inorganic 
 bodies. 
 
 Thus, among linear measures, the cubit of the Hebrews 
 was the length of the forearm from the elbow to the end 
 of the middle finger ; and the smaller scriptural dimensions 
 are expressed in hand-breadths and spans. The Egyptian 
 cubit, which was similarly derived, was divided into digits, 
 which were finger-breadths ; and each finger-breadth was 
 more definitely expressed as being equal to four grains of 
 barley placed breadthwise. Other ancient measures were 
 the orgyia or stretch of tJie arms, the pace, and the palm. 
 So persistent has been the use of these natural units of 
 length in the East, that even now some of the Arabs mete 
 out cloth by the forearm. So, too, is it with European 
 measures. The foot prevails as a dimension throughout 
 Europe, and has done since the time of the Romans, by 
 whom, also, it was used : its lengths in difierent places va- 
 rying not much more than men's feet vary. The heights 
 of horses are still expressed in hands. The inch is the 
 length of the terminal joint of the thumb ; as is clearly 
 shown in France, where pouce means both thumb and inch. 
 Then we have the inch divided into three barley-corns. 
 
 So completely, indeed, have these organic diniensions 
 served as the substrata of all mensuration, that it is only 
 by means of them that we can form any estimate of some 
 of the ancient distances. For example, the length of a 
 degree on the Earth's surface, as determined by the Ara- 
 bian astronomers shortly after the death of Haroun-al-Ras- 
 chid, was fifty-six of their miles. We know nothing of 
 their mile further than that it was 4000 cubits ; and whether 
 these were sacred cubits or common cubits, would remain 
 ioubtful, but that the length of the cubit is given as twen* 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA OF MEASUEE. 203 
 
 ty-seveii inches, and each inch defined as the thickness of 
 six barley- grains. Thus one of the earliest measurements 
 of a degree comes down to us in harley-grains. Not only 
 did organic lengths furnish those approximate measures 
 which satisfied men's needs in ruder ages, but they fur- 
 nished also the standard measures required in later 
 times. One instance occurs in our own history. To 
 remedy the irregularities then prevailing, Henry I. com- 
 manded that the ulna,, or ancient ell, which answers to 
 the modern yard, should be made of the exact length of 
 his own arm. 
 
 Measures of weight again had a like derivation. Seeds 
 seem commonly to have supplied the unit. The original 
 of the carat used for weighing in India is a small bean. 
 Our own systems, both troy and avoirdupois, are derived 
 primarily from wheat-corns. Our smallest weight, the 
 grain, is a grain of wheat. This is not a speculation ; it is 
 an historically registered fact. Henry HI. enacted that an 
 ounce should be the weight of 640 dry grains Of wheat 
 from the middle of the ear. And as all the other weights 
 are multiples or sub-multiples of this, it follows that the 
 grain of wheat is the basis of our scale. So natural is it to 
 use organic bodies as weights, before artificial weights 
 have been established, or where they are not to be had, 
 that in some of the remoter parts of Ireland the people 
 are said to be in the habit, even now, of putting a man 
 into the scales to serve as a measure for heavy com- 
 modities. 
 
 SimQarly with time. Astronomical periodicity, and the 
 periodicity of animal and vegetable Ufe, are simultaneously 
 used in the first stages of progress for estimating epochs. 
 The simplest unit of time, the day, nature suppUes ready 
 made. The next simplest period, the mooneth or month, 
 is also thrust upon men's notice by the conspicuous changes 
 constituting a lunation. For larger divisions than these, 
 
204r THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 the phenomena of the seasons, and the chief events from 
 time to time occurring, hare been used by early and un- 
 civilized races. Among the Egyptians the rising of the 
 Nile served as a mark. The "New Zealanders were found 
 to begin their year from the reappearance of the Pleiades 
 above the sea. One of the uses ascribed to birds, by the 
 Greeks, was to indicate the seasons by their migrations. 
 Barrow describes the aboriginal Hottentot as denoting 
 periods by the number of moons before or after the ripen- 
 ing of one of his chief articles of food. He further states 
 that the Kaffir chronology is kept by the moon, and is 
 registered by notches on sticks — the death of a favourite 
 chief, or the gaining of a victory, serving for a new era. 
 By which last fact, we are at once reminded that in early 
 history, events are commonly recorded as occurring in cer- 
 tain reigns, and in certain years of certain reigns : a procee'Q- 
 ing which practically made a king's reign a measure of 
 duration. 
 
 And, as iurther illustrating the tendency to divide time 
 by natural phenomena and natural events, it may be no- 
 ticed that even by our own peasantry the definite divisions 
 of months and years are but httle used ; and that they 
 habitually refer to occurrences as " before sheep-shearing," 
 or " after harvest," or " about the time when the squire 
 died." It is manifest, therefore, that the more or less 
 equal periods perceived in Nature gave the first units of 
 measure for time ; as did Nature's more or less equal 
 lengths and weights give the first units of measure for space 
 and force. 
 
 It remains only to observe, as further illustrating the 
 evolution of quantitative ideas after this manner, that 
 measures of value were similarly derived. Barter, in one 
 form or other, is found among aU but the very lowest hu- 
 man races. It is obviously based upon the notion of 
 equality of worth. And as it gradually merges into trade 
 
PEIMITIVE MEASUREMENTS OF TIME. 205 
 
 by the introduction of some kind of currency, we find 
 that the measures of worth, constituting this currency, 
 are organic bodies ; in some cases cowries, in others 
 cocoa-nuts, in others cattle, in others pigs; among the 
 American Indians peltry or sTcins, and in Iceland dried 
 fish. 
 
 Notions of exact equality and of measure having been 
 reached, there came to be definite ideas of relative magni- 
 tudes as being multiples one of another ; whence the prac- 
 tice of measurement by direct apposition of a measure. 
 The determination of linear extensions by this process can 
 scarcely be called science, though it is a step towards it ; 
 but the determination of lengths of time by an analogous 
 process may be considered as one of the earliest samples of 
 quantitative prevision. For when it is first ascertained 
 that the moon completes the cycle of her changes in about 
 thirty days — a fact known to most uncivilized tribes that 
 can count beyond the number of their fingers — ^it is mani- 
 fest that it becomes possible to say in what number of days 
 any specified phase of the moon will recur ; and it is also 
 manifest that this prevision is effected by an opposition of 
 two times, after the same manner that linear space is meas- 
 ured by the opposition of two lines. For to express the 
 moon's period in days, is to say how many of these units 
 of measure are contained in the period to be measured — ^is 
 to ascertain the distance between two points in time by 
 means of a scale of days, just as we ascertain the distance 
 between two points in space by a scale of feet or inches : 
 and in each case the scale coincides with the thing meas- 
 ured — mentally in the one ; visibly in the other. * So that 
 in this simplest, and perhaps earliest case of quantitative 
 prevision, the phenomena are not only thrust daily upon 
 men's notice, but Nature is, as it were, perpetually repeat- 
 ing that process of measurement by observing which 
 the prevision is eflfected. And thus there may be signi- 
 
206 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 ficanoe in the remark which some have made, that alike 
 in Hebrew, Greek, and Latin, there is an affinity be- 
 tween the word meaning moon, and that meaning measure. 
 
 This fact, that in very early stages of social progress it 
 is known that the moon goes through her changes in about 
 thirty days, and that in about twelve moons the seasons 
 return — this fact that chronological astronomy assumes a 
 certain scientific character even before geometry does ; 
 while it is partly due to the circumstance that the astro- 
 nomical divisions, day, month, and year, are ready made 
 for us, is partly due to the further circumstances that 
 agricultural and other operations were at first regulated 
 astronomically, and that from the supposed divine nature 
 of the heavenly bodies their motions determined the 
 periodical religious festivals. As instances of the one we 
 have the observation of the Egyptians, that the rising of 
 the Nile corresponded with the heliacal rising of Sirius ; 
 the directions given by Hesiod for reaping and ploughing, 
 according to the positions of the Pleiades ; and his maxim 
 that " fifty days after the turning of the sun is a seasonable 
 time for beginning a voyage." As instances of the other, 
 we have the naming of the days after the sun, moon, and 
 planets; the early attempts among Eastern nations to 
 regulate the calendar so that the gods might not be ofiend- 
 ed by the displacement of their sacrifices ; and the fix- 
 ing of the great annual festival of the Peruvians by the 
 position of the sun. In all which facts wo see that, 
 at first, science was simply an appliance of religion and 
 industry. 
 
 After* the discoveries that a lunation occupies nearly 
 thirty days, and that some twelve lunations occupy a year 
 — discoveries of which there is no historical account, but 
 which may be inferred as the earliest, from the fact that 
 existing uncivilized races have made them — we come to 
 the first known astronomical records, which are those of 
 
EAELY ASTEONOMICAL PREVISIONS. 20Y 
 
 eclipses. The Chaldeans were aWe to predict these. 
 " This they did, probably," says Dr. Whewell in his useful 
 history, from which most of the materials we are about to 
 use will be drawn, " by means of their cycle of 223 months, 
 or about eighteen years ; for at the end of this time, the 
 eclipses of the moon begin to return, at the same intervals 
 and in the same order as at the beginning." 'Now this meth- 
 od of calculating eclipses by means of a recurring cycle, — 
 the Saros as they called it — ^is a more complex case of pre- 
 vision by means of coincidence of measures. For by what 
 observations must the Chaldeans have discovered this 
 cycle ? Obviously, as Delambre infers, by inspecting their 
 registers ; by comparing the successive intervals ; by find- 
 ing that some of the intervals were alike ; by seeing that 
 these equal intervals were eighteen years apart ; by discov- 
 ering that all the intervals that were eighteen years apart 
 were equal ; by ascertaining that the intervals formed a 
 series which repeated itself, so that if one of the cycles of 
 intervals were superposed on another the divisions would 
 fit. This once perceived, and it manifestly became possi- 
 ble to use the cycle as a scale of time by which to measure 
 out future periods. Seeing thus that the process of so pre- 
 dicting eclipses, is in essence the same as that of predicting 
 the moon's monthly changes by observing the number of 
 days after which they repeat — seeing that the two differ 
 only in the extent and irregularity of the intervals, it is not 
 difiicult to understand how such an amount of knowledge 
 should so early have been reached. And we shall be less 
 surprised, on remembering that the only things involved 
 in these previsions were time and number,' and that the 
 time was in a manner self-numbered. 
 
 Still, the ability to predict events recurring only after 
 so long a period as eighteen years, implies a considerable 
 advance in civilization — a considerable development of gen- 
 eral knowledge ; and we have now to inquire what progress 
 
208 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 in other sciences accompanied, and was necessary to, these 
 astronomical previsions. In the first place, there must 
 clearly have been a tolerably efficient system of calculation. 
 Mere finger-counting, mere head-reckoning, even with the 
 aid of a regular decimal notation, could not have sufficed 
 for numbering the days in a year ; much less the years, 
 months, and days between eclipses. Consequently there 
 must have been a mode of registering 'numbers ; probably 
 even a system of numerals. The earliest numerical rec- 
 ords, if we may judge by the practices of the less civilized 
 races now existing, were probably kept by notches cut on 
 sticks, or strokes marked on walls ; much as public-house 
 scores are kept now. And there seems reason to believe 
 that the first numerals used were simply groups of straight 
 strokes, as some of the stUl-extant Roman ones are ; lead- 
 ing us to suspect that these groups of strokes were used to 
 represent groups of fingers, as the groups of fingers ha^ 
 been used to represent groups of objects — a supposition 
 quite in conformity with the aboriginal system of picture 
 writing and its subsequent modifications. Be this so or 
 not, however, it is manifest that before the Chaldeans dis- 
 covered their Saros, there must have been both a set of 
 written symbols serving for an extensive numeration, and 
 a familiarity with the simpler rules of arithmetic. 
 
 Not only must abstract mathematics have made some 
 progress, but concrete mathematics also. It is scarcely 
 possible that the buildings belonging to this era should 
 have been laid out and erected without any knowledge of 
 geometry. At any rate, there must have existed that ele- 
 mentary geometry which deals with direct measurement — 
 with the apposition of lines ; and it seems that only after 
 the discovery of those simple proceedings, by which right 
 angles are drawn, and relative positions fixed, cotild so reg- 
 ular an architecture be executed. In the case of the other 
 division of concrete mathematics — mechanics, we have defi- 
 
KNOWLEDGE IMPLIED BY EAELY ASTEONOMY. 209 
 
 nite evidence of progress. We know that the lever and 
 the inclined plane were employed during this period : im- 
 plying that there was a qualitative prevision of their effects, 
 though not a quantitative one. But we know more. We 
 read of weights in the earliest records ; and we find weights 
 in ruins of the highest antiquity. Weights imply scales, 
 of which we have also mention ; and scales involve the 
 primary theorem of mechanics in its least complicated form 
 ■ — ^involve not a qualitative but a quantitative prevision of 
 mechanical effects. And here we may notice how mechan- 
 ics, in common with the other exact sciences, took its rise 
 from the simplest application of the idea of equality. For 
 the mechanical proposition which the scales involve, is, that 
 if a lever with equal arms, have equal weights suspended 
 from them, the weights will remain at equal altitudes. 
 And we may further notice, how, in this first step of ra- 
 tional mechanics, we see illustrated that truth awhile since 
 referred to, that as magnitudes of linear extension are the 
 only ones of which the equality is exactly ascertainable, the 
 equalities of other magnitudes have at the outset to be de- 
 termined by means of them. For the equality of the 
 weights which balance each other in scales, wholly depends 
 upon the equality of the arms : we can know that the 
 weights are equal only by proving that the arms are equal. 
 And when by this means we have obtained a system of 
 weights, — a set of equal units of force, then does a science 
 of mechanics become possible. Whence, indeed, it follows, 
 that rational mechanics could not po^ibly have any other 
 starting-point than the scales. 
 
 Let us further remember, that during this same period 
 there was a limited knowledge of chemistry. The many 
 arts which we know to have been carried on must have 
 been impossible without a generalized experience of the 
 modes in which certain bodies affect each other under spe- 
 cial conditions. In metallurgy, which was extensively 
 
210 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 practised, this is abundantly illustrated. And we even 
 have evidence that in some cases the knowledge possessed 
 was, in a sense, quantitative. For, as we find by analysis 
 that the hard alloy of which the Egyptians made their cut- 
 ting tools, was composed of copper and tin in fixed pro- 
 portions, there must have been an estabUshed prevision that 
 such an alloy was to be obtained only by mixing them in 
 these proportions. It is true, this was but a simple empiri- 
 cal generalization ; but so was the generalization respecting 
 the recurrence of eclipses ; so are the first generalizations 
 of every science. 
 
 Respecting the simultaneous advance of the sciences 
 during this early epoch, it only remains to remark that 
 even the most complex of them must have made some 
 progress — perhaps even a greater relative progress than 
 any of the rest. For under what conditions only were the 
 foregoing developments possible ? There first required an 
 estabhshed and organized social system. A long continued 
 registry of eclipses ; the building of palaces ; the use of 
 scales ; the practice of metallurgy — alike imply a fixed and 
 populous nation. The existence of such a nation not only 
 presupposes laws, and some administration of justice, which 
 we know existed, but it presupposes successful laws — ^laws 
 conforming in some degree to the conditions of social sta- 
 bility — ^laws enacted because it was seen that the actions 
 forbidden by them were dangerous to the State. We do 
 not by any means say that all, or even the greater part, of 
 the laws were of thi« nature ; but we do say, that the fun- 
 damental ones were. It cannot be denied that the laws 
 affecting life and property were such. It cannot be denied 
 that, however little these were enforced between class and 
 class, they were to a considerable extent enforced between 
 members of the same class. It can scarcely be questioned, 
 that the administration of them between members of the 
 same class was seen by rulers to be necessary for keeping 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF EAELT ASTEONOMT. 211 
 
 their subjects together. And knowing, as we do, that, 
 other things equal, nations prosper in proportion to the 
 justness of their arrangements, we may fairly infer that 
 the very cause of the advance of these earliest nations out 
 of aboriginal barbarism, was the greater recognition among 
 them of the claims to life and property. 
 
 But supposition aside, it is clear that the habitual recog- 
 nition of these claims in their laws, implied some prevision 
 of social phenomena. Even thus early there was a certain 
 amount of social science. Nay,- it may even be shown that 
 there was a vague recognition of that fundamental princi- 
 ple on which all the true social science is based — the equal 
 rights of all to the free exercise of their faculties. That 
 same idea of equality, which, as we have seen, underlies 
 all other science, underlies also morals and sociology. The 
 conception of justice, which is the primary one in morals ; 
 and the administration of justice, which is the vital condi- 
 tion of social existence ; are impossible, without the recog- 
 nition of a certain likeness in men's claims, in virtue of their 
 common humanity. Equity literally means equalness ; and 
 if it be admitted that there were even the vaguest ideas of 
 equity in these primitive eras, it must be admitted that 
 there was some appreciation of the equalness of men's lib- 
 erties to pursue the objects of life — some appreciation, 
 therefore, of the essential principle of national equihbrium. 
 
 Thus in this initial stage of the positive sciences, before 
 geometry had yet done more than evolve a few empirical 
 rules — ^before mechanics had passed beyond its first theo- 
 rem — ^before astronomy had advanced from its merely chro- 
 nological phase into the geometrical ; the most involved of 
 the sciences had reached a certain degree of development 
 — a development without which no progress in other sci- 
 ences was possible. 
 
 Only noting as we pass, how, thus early, we may see 
 that the progress of exact science was not only towards an 
 
212 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 increasing number of previsions, but towards previsions 
 more accurately quantitative — how, in astronomy, the re- 
 curring period of the moon's motions was by and by more 
 correctly ascertained to be nineteen years, or two hundred 
 and thirty-five lunations; how Callipus further corrected 
 this Metonic cycle, by leaving out a day at the end of every 
 seventy-six years ; and how these successive advances im 
 plied a longer continued registry of observations, and the 
 co-ordination of a greater number of facts — let us go on tc 
 inquire how geometrical astronomy took its rise. 
 
 The first astronomical instrument was the gnomon 
 This was not only early in use in the East, but it was found 
 also among the Mexicans ; the sole astronomical observa- 
 tions of the Peruvians were made by it ; and we read that 
 1100 B.C., the Chinese found that, at a certain place, the 
 length of the sun's shadow, at the summer solstice, was to 
 the height of the gnomon, as one and a half to eight. 
 Here again it is observable, not only that the instrument is 
 found ready made, but that Nature is perpetually perform- 
 ing the process of measurement. Any fixed, erect object 
 — a column, a dead palm, a pole, the angle of a building — 
 serves for a gnomon ; and it needs but to notice the chang- 
 ing position of the shadow it daily throws, to make the 
 fii-st step in geometrical astronomy. How small this first 
 step was, may be seen in the fact that the only things as- 
 certained at the outset were the periods of the summer 
 and winter solstices, which corresponded with the least and 
 greatest lengths of the mid-day shadow ; and to fix which, 
 it was needful merely to mark the point to which each 
 day's shadow reached. 
 
 And now let it not be overlooked that in the observing 
 at what time during the next year this extreme limit of the 
 shadow was again reached, and in the inference that the 
 sun had then arrived at the same turning point in his an- 
 oual course, we have one of the simplest instances of that 
 
PEOGEESS OF GEOMETEICAL ASTEONOMT. 213 
 
 combined use of equal magnitudes and egual relations, by 
 which all exact science, all quantitative prevision, is reached, 
 For the relation observed was between the length of the 
 sun's shadow and his position in the heavens ; and the in- 
 ference drawn was that when, next year, the extremity of 
 his shadow came to the same point, he occupied the same 
 place. That is, the ideas involved were, the equality of the 
 shadows, and the equality of the relations between shadow 
 and sun in successive years. As in the case of the scales, 
 the equality of relations here recognized is of the simplest 
 order. It is not as those habitually dealt with in the higher 
 kinds of scientific reasoning, which answer to the general 
 type — ^the relation between two and three equals the rela- 
 tion between six and nine ; but it follows the type — the re- 
 lation between two and three, equals the relation between 
 two and three ; it is a case of not simply equal relations, 
 but coinciding relations. And here, indeed, we may see 
 beautifully illustrated how the idea of equal relations takes 
 its rise after the same manner that that of equal magnitude 
 does. As already shown, the idea of equal magnitudes 
 arose from the observed coincidence of two lengths placed 
 together ; and in this case we have not only two coincident 
 lengths of shadows, but two coincident relations between 
 sun and shadows. 
 
 From the use of the gnomon there naturally grew up 
 the conception of angular measurements ; and with the 
 advance of geometrical conceptions there came the hemi- 
 sphere of Berosus, the equinoctial armil, the solstitial armil, 
 and the quadrant of Ptolemy — all of them employing shad- 
 ows as indices of the sun's position, but in combination 
 with angular divisions. It is obviously out of the question 
 for us here to trace these details of progress. It must suf- 
 fice to remark that in all of them we may see that notion 
 of equality of relations of a more complex kind, which is 
 best illustrated in the astrolabe, an instrument which con- 
 
214 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 Bisted " of circular rims, moveable one within the other, or 
 about poles, and contained circles which were to be brought 
 into the position of the ecliptic, and of a plane passing 
 through the sun and the poles of the ecliptic " — an instru- 
 ment, therefore, which represented, as by a model, the rel- 
 ative positions of certain imaginary lines and planes in the 
 heavens ; which was adjusted by putting these representa- 
 tive lines and planes into parallelism and coincidence with 
 the celestial ones ; and which depended for its use upon the 
 perception that the relations between these representative 
 lines and planes were equal to the relations between those 
 represented. 
 
 "Were there space, we might go on to point out how the 
 conception of the heavens as a revolving hollow sphere, 
 the discovery of the globular form of the earth, the expla- 
 nation of the moon's phases, and indeed all the successive 
 steps taken, involved this same mental process. But we 
 must content ourselves "with referring to the theory of ec- 
 centrics and epicycles, as a further marked illustration of 
 it. As first suggested, and as proved by Hipparchus to af- 
 ford an explanation of the leading irregularities in the ce- 
 lestial motions, this theory involved the perception that 
 the progressions, retrogressions, and variations of velocity 
 seen in the heavenly bodies, might be reconciled with their 
 assumed uniform movement in circles, by supposing that 
 the earth was not in the centre of their orbits ; or by sup- 
 posing that they revolved in circles whose centres revolved 
 round the earth ; or by both. The discovery that this 
 would account for the appearances, was the discovery that 
 in certain geometrical diagrams the relations were such, 
 that the uniform motion of a point would, when looked at 
 from a particular position, present analogous irregularities ; 
 and the calculations of Hipparchus involved the belief that the 
 relations subsisting among these geometrical curves were 
 equal to the relations subsisting among the celestial orbits. 
 
EEACTIONS OF ABSTRACT AND CONCEETE SCIENCE. 215 
 
 Leaving here these details of astronomical progress, and 
 the philosophy of it, let tis observe how the relatively con- 
 crete science of geometrical astronomy, having been thus 
 far helped forward by the development of geometry in gen- 
 eral, reacted upon geometry, caused it also to advance, and 
 was again assisted by it. Hipparchus, before making hi8 
 solar and lunar tables, had to discover rules for calculating 
 the relations between the sides and angles of triangles — 
 trigonometry a subdivision of pure mathematics. Further, 
 the reduction of the doctrine of the sphere to the quanti- 
 tative form needed for astronomical purposes, required the 
 formation of a spherical trigonometry, which was also 
 achieved by Hipparchus. Thus both plane and . spherical 
 trigonometry, which are parts of the highly abstract and 
 simple science of extension, remained undeveloped until 
 the less abstract and more complex science of the celestial 
 motions had need of them. The fact admitted by M. 
 Comte, that since Descartes the progress of the abstract 
 division of mathematics has been determined by that of 
 the concrete division, is paralleled by the still more signifi- 
 cant fact that even thus early the progress of mathematics 
 was determined by that of astronomy. 
 
 And here, indeed, we may see exemplified the truth, 
 which the subsequent history of science frequently illus- 
 trates, that before any more abstract division makes a fur- 
 ther advance, some more concrete division must suggest 
 the necessity for that advance — must present the new order 
 of questions to be solved. Before astronomy presented 
 Hipparchus with the problem of solar tables, there was 
 nothing to raise the question of the relations between lines 
 and angles; the subject-matter of trigonometry had not 
 been conceived. And as there must be subject-matter be- 
 fore there can be investigation, it follows that the progress 
 of the concrete divisions is as necessary to that of the ab- 
 stract, as the progress of the abstract to that of the concrete. 
 
216 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 Just incidentally noticing the circumstance that the 
 e2)och we are describing witnessed the evolution of algebra, 
 a comparatively abstract division of mathematics, by the 
 anion of its less abstract divisions, geometry and arithme- 
 tic — a fact proved by the earliest extant samples of alge- 
 bra, which are half algebraic, half geometric — we go on to 
 observe that during the era in which mathematics and 
 astronomy were thus advancing, rational mechanics made 
 its second step ; and something was done towards giving a 
 quantitative form to hydrostatics, optics, and harmonics. 
 In each case we shall see as before, how the idea of equal- 
 ity underlies all quantitative prevision ; aad Jn what simple 
 forms this idea is first applied. 
 
 As already shown, the first theorem established in me- 
 chanics was, that equal weights suspended from a lever with 
 equal arms would remain in equilibrium. Archimedes dis- 
 covered that a lever with unequal arms was in equilibrium 
 when one weight was to its arm as the other arm to its 
 weight ; that is — when the numerical relation between one 
 weight and its arm was equal to the numerical relation be- 
 tween the other arm and its weight. 
 
 The first advance made in hydrostatics, which we also 
 owe to Archimedes, was the discovery that fluids press 
 equally in all directions ; and from this, followed the solu- 
 tion of the problem of floating bodies : namely, that they 
 are in equilibrium when the upward and downward pres- 
 sures are equal. 
 
 In optics, again, the Greeks found that the angle of in- 
 cidence is equal to the angle of reflection ; and their knowl- 
 edge reached no further than to such simple deductions 
 from this as their geometry sufficed for. In harmonics 
 they ascertained the fact that three strings of equal lengths 
 would yield the octave, fifth and fourth, when strained by 
 weights having certain definite ratios ; and they did not 
 progress much beyond this. la the one of which cases we 
 
SOIENTIFIO NOTIONS OF THE ANCIENTS. 217 
 
 see geometry used in elucidation of the laws of light ; and 
 in the other, geometry and arithmetic made to measure the 
 phenomena of sound. 
 
 Did space permit, it would be desirahle here to de- 
 scribe the state of the less advanced sciences — to point out 
 how, while a few had thus reached the first stages of quan- 
 titative prevision, the rest were progressing in qualitative 
 prevision — ^how some small generalizations were made re- 
 specting evaporation, and heat, and electricity, and mag- 
 netism, which, empirical as they were, did not in that re- 
 spect differ from the first generalizations of every science — 
 how the Greek physicians had ma.de advances in physiology 
 and pathology, which, considering the great imperfection 
 of our present knowledge, are by no means to be despised 
 — how zoology had been so far systematized by Aristotle, 
 as, to some extent, enabled him from the presence of cer- 
 tain organs to predict the presence of others — ^how in Aris- 
 totle's Politics, there is some progress towards a scientific 
 conception of social phenomena, and sundry previsions re- 
 specting them — and how in the state of the Greek socie- 
 ties, as well as in the writings of Greek philosophers, we 
 may recognise not only an increasing clearness in that con- 
 ception of equity on which the social science is based, but 
 also some appreciation of the fact that social stability de- 
 pends upon the maintenance of equitable regulations. We 
 might dwell at length upon the causes which retarded the 
 development of some of the sciences, as for example, chemis- 
 try : showing that relativ.e complexity had nothing to do 
 with it — ^that the oxidation of a piece of iron is a simpler 
 phenomenon than the recurrence of eclipses, and the dis- 
 covery of carbonic acid less difficult than that of the pre- 
 cession of the equinoxes — ^but that the relatively slow ad- 
 vance of chemical knowledge was due, partly to the fact 
 that its phenomena were not daily thrust on men's nottce 
 as those of astronomy were ; partly to the fact that Nature 
 10 
 
218 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 does not habitually supply the means, and suggest thf 
 modes of investigation, as in the sciences dealing with time 
 extension, and force ; and partly to the fa6t that the great 
 majority of the materials with which chemistry deals, in 
 stead of being ready to hand, are made known only by the 
 arts in their slow growth ; and partly to the fact that even 
 when known, their chemical properties are not self-exhibit 
 ed, but have to be sought out by experiment. 
 
 Merely indicating all these considerations, however, let 
 us go on to contemplate the progress and mutual influence 
 of the sciences in modem days ; only parenthetically no- 
 ticing how, on the revival of the scientific spirit, the suc- 
 cessive stages achieved exhibit the dominance of the same 
 law hitherto traced — ^how the primary idea in dynamics, a 
 imiform force, was defined by Galileo to be a force which 
 generates equal velocities in equal successive times — ^how 
 the uniform action of gravity was first experimentally de- 
 termined by showing that the time elapsing before a body 
 thrown up, stopped, was equal to the time it took to fall — 
 how the first fact in compound motion which Galileo ascer- 
 tained was, that a body projected horissontally will have a 
 uniform motion onwards and a uniformly accelerated mo- 
 tion downwards ; that i^ will describe equal horizontal 
 spaces in equal times, compounded with equal vertical in- 
 crements in equal times — how his discovery respecting the 
 pendulum was, that its oscillations occupy equal intervals 
 of time whatever their length— how the principle of virtual 
 velocities which he established i% that in any tnachine the 
 weights that balance each other, are reciprocally as their 
 virtual velocities ; that is, the relation of one set of weights 
 to their velocities equals the relation of the other set of 
 relooities to their weights ; — and how thus his achieve- 
 ments consisted in showing the equalities of certain magni- 
 tudes and relations, whose equalities had not been pre- 
 viously recognised. 
 
OEIGm OF PHTSICAI- ASTEONOMT. 219 
 
 When mechanics had reached the point to which Galileo 
 brought it — ^when the simple laws of force had been dis- 
 entangled from the fiiction and atmospheric resistance by 
 which all their earthly manifestations are disguised — when 
 progressing knowledge of physics had given a due insight 
 into these disturbing causes— rwhen, by an effort of abstrac- 
 tion, it was perceived that all motion would be uniform 
 and rectilinear unless interfered with by external forces — 
 and when the various consequences of this perception had 
 been worked out ; then it became possible, by the union of 
 geometry and mechanics, to initiate physical astronomy. 
 Geometry and mechanics having diverged from a common 
 root in men's sensible experiences ; having, with occasional 
 inosculations, been separately developed, the one partly in 
 connexion with astronomy, the other solely by analyzing 
 terrestrial movements ; now join in the investigations of 
 Newton to create a true theory of the celestial motions. 
 And here, also, we have to notice the important fact that, 
 in the very process of being brought jointly to bear upon 
 astronomical problems, they are themselves raised to a 
 higher phase of development. For it was in dealing with 
 the questions raised by celestial dynamics that the then 
 incipient infinitesimal calculug-was unfolded by Newton and 
 his continental successors ; and it was from inquiries into 
 the mechanics of the solar system that the general theorems 
 of mechanics contained in the " Princifia," — ^many of them 
 of purely terrestrial application — took their rise. Thus, as 
 in the case of Hipparchus, the presentation of a new order 
 of concrete facts to be analyzed, led to the discovery of 
 new abstract facts; and these abstract facts having been 
 laid hold oij gave means of access to endless groups 
 of concrete facts before incapable of quantitative treat- 
 ment. 
 
 Meanwhile, physics had been carrymg furlhejr that pro- 
 gress without which, as just shown, ratioaal mechanics 
 
220 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 could not be disentangled. In hydrostatics, Btevinus had 
 extended and applied the discovery of Archimedes. Tor 
 ricelU had proved atmospheric pressure, " by showing that 
 this pressure sustained different liquids at heights inversely 
 proportional to their densities ; " and Pascal " established 
 the necessary diminution of this pressure at increasing 
 heights in the atmosphere : " discoveries which in part 
 reduced this branch of science to a quantitative form. 
 Something had been done by Daniel BernouiUi towards 
 the dynamics of fluids. The thermometer had been invent- 
 ed ; and a number of small generalizations reached by it. 
 Huyghens and Newton had made considerable progress in 
 optics ; Newton had approximately calculated the rate of 
 transmission of sound ; and the continental mathematicians 
 had succeeded in determining some of the laws of sonorous 
 vibrations. Magnetism and electricity had been consid- 
 erably advanced by Gilbert. Chemistry had got as far as 
 the mutual neutralization of acids and alkalies. And 
 Leonardo da Vinci had advanced in geology to the con- 
 ception of the deposition of marine strata as the origin 
 of fossils. Our present purpose does not require that 
 we should give particulars. All that it here concerns us 
 to do is to illustrate the consemus subsisting in this stage 
 of growth, and afterwards. Let as look at a few cases. 
 
 The theoretic law of the velocity of sound enunciated 
 by Newton on purely mechanical considerations, was found 
 wrong by one-sixth. The error remained unaccounted for 
 until the time of Laplace, who, suspecting that the heat 
 disengaged by the compression of the undulating strata of 
 the air, gave additional elasticity, and so produced the 
 difference, made the needful calculations and found he was 
 ight. Thus acoustics was arrested until thermology' over- 
 took and aided it. When Boyle and Harriot had discov- 
 ered the relation between the density of gases and the 
 pressures they are subject to ; and when it thus became 
 
MUTTJAL INFLUENCE OF THE SCIENCES. 221 
 
 possible to calculate the rate of decreasing density iu the 
 upper parts of the atmosphere ; it also became possible to 
 make approximate tables of the atmospheric refraction of 
 light. Thus optics, and with it astronomy, advanced witb 
 barology. After the discovery of atmospheric pressure 
 had led to the invention of the air-pump hy Otto Guericke; 
 and after it had become known that evaporation increases 
 in rapidity as atmospheric pressure decreases ; it became 
 possible for Leslie, by evaporation in a vacuum, to produce 
 the greatest cold known ; and so to extend our knowledge 
 of thermology hy showing that there is no zero within 
 reach of our researches. When Fourier had determined 
 the laws of conduction of heat, and when the Earth's tem- 
 perature had been found to increase below the surface 
 one degree in every forty yards, there were data for in- 
 ferring the past condition of our globe ; the vast period 
 it has taken to cool down to its present state; and the 
 immense age of the solar system — a purely astronomical 
 consideration. 
 
 Chemistry having advanced suflSciently to supply the 
 needful materials, and a physiological experiment having 
 furnished the requisite hint, there came the discovery of 
 galvanic electricity. Galvanism reacting on chemistry dis- 
 closed the metallic bases of the alkalies, and inaugurated 
 the electro-chemical theory ; in the hands of Oersted and 
 Ampere it led to the laws of magnetic action ; and hy its 
 aid Faraday has detected significant facts relative to the 
 constitution of light. Brewster's discoveries respecting 
 douhle refraction and dipolarization proved the essential 
 truth of the classification of crystalline forms according to 
 the number of axes, by showing that the molecular con- 
 stitution depends upon the axes. In these and in numer- 
 ous other cases, the mutual influence of the sciences has 
 been quite independent of any supposed hierarchical order. 
 Often, too, their inter-actions are more complex than as 
 
232 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 thus instanced — involve more sciences than two. One 
 illustration of this must suffice. We quote it in full from 
 the History of the Inductive Sciencea. In Book XL, chap. 
 II., on "The Progress of the Electrical Theory," Dr 
 Whewell writes : — 
 
 " Thus at that period, mathematics was hehind experiment, 
 and a problem was proposed, in which theoretical results were 
 wanted for comparison with ohservation, but could not be ac- 
 curately obtained ; as was the case in astronomy also, till the time 
 of the approximate solution of the problem of three bodies, and 
 the consequent formation of the tables of the moon and planets, 
 on the theory of universal gravitation. After some time, elec- 
 trical theory was relieved from this reproach, mainly in conse- 
 quence of the progress which astronomy had occasioned in pure 
 mathematics. About 1801 there appeared in the Bulletin des 
 Sciences, an exact solution of the problem of the distribution of 
 electric fluid on a spheroid, obtained by Biot, by the application 
 of the peculiar methods which Laplace had invented for the prob- 
 lem of the figure of the planets. And, in 1811, M. Poisson applied 
 Laplace's artifices to the case of two spheres acting upon one 
 another in contact, a case to which many of Coulomb's experi- 
 ments were referrible; and the agreement of the results of 
 theory and observation, thus extricated from Coulomb's num- 
 bers obtained above forty years previously, was very striking and 
 convincing." 
 
 Not only do the sciences affect each other ailer this 
 direct manner, but they affect each other indirectly. 
 Where there is no dependence, there is yet analogy — 
 equality of relations ; and the discovery of the relations 
 subsisting among one set of phenomena, constantly sug- 
 gests a search for the same relations among another set. 
 Thus the established fact that the force of gr9,vitation varies 
 inversely as the square of the distance, being recognized as 
 a necessary characteristic of all influences proceeding from 
 a centre, raised the suspicion that heat and light follow the 
 same law ; which proved to be the case — ^a suspicion and a 
 
ONE SCIENCE DEPENDS ON ANOTHER. 223 
 
 confirmation 'which were repeated in respect to the electric 
 and magnetic forces. Thus again the discovery of tho 
 polarization of light led to experiments which ended in the 
 discovery of the polarization of heat — a discovery that 
 could never have been made without the antecedent 
 one. Thus, too, the known refrangibility of light and 
 heat lately produced the inquiry whether sound also is not 
 refrangible ; which on tri^l it turns out to be. 
 
 In some cases, indeed, it is only by the aid of concep- 
 tions derived from one class of phenomena that hypoth- 
 eses respecting other classes can be formed. The theory, 
 at one time favoured, that evaporation is a solution of 
 water in air, was an assumption that the relation between 
 water and air is liJce the relation between salt and water ; 
 and could never have been conceived if the relation be- 
 tween salt and water had not been previously known. 
 Similarly the received theory of evaporation — ^that it is a 
 diffusion of the particles of the evaporating fluid in virtue 
 of their atomic repulsion — could not have been entertained 
 without a foregoing experience of magnetic and electric 
 repulsions. So complete in recent days has become this 
 consensus among the sciences, caused either by the natural 
 entanglement of their ph^omeua, or by analogies in the 
 relations of their phenomena, that scarcely any consider- 
 able discovery concerning one order of facts now takes 
 place, without very shortly leading to discoveries concern- 
 ing other orders. 
 
 To produce a tolerably complete conception of this pro- 
 cess of scientific evolution, it would be needful to go back 
 to the beginning, and trace in detail the growth of classifi- 
 cations and nomenclatures ; and to show how, as subsidiary 
 to science, they have acted upon it, and it has reacted npon 
 them. We can only now remark that, on the one hand, 
 classifications and nomenclatures have aided science by con- 
 tinually subdividing the subject-matter of research, and giv 
 
224 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 mg fixity and diffusion to the truths disclosed ; and that on 
 the other hand, they have caught from it that increasing 
 quantitativeuess, and that progress from considerations 
 touching single phenomena to considerations touching the 
 relations among many phenomena, which we have heen de 
 scribing. 
 
 Of this last influence a few illustrations must be given. 
 In chemistry it is seen in the facta, that the dividing of mat- 
 ter into the four elements was ostensibly based upon the 
 single property of weight ; that the first truly chemical di- 
 vision into acid and alkaline bodies, grouped together bod- 
 ies which had not simply one property in common, but in 
 which one property was constantly related to many others ; 
 and that the classification now current, places together in 
 groups supporters of combustion, metallic and non-metallic 
 bases, adds, salts, &c., bodies which are often quite unlike 
 in sensible qualities, but which are like in the majority of 
 their relations to other bodies. In mineralogy again, 
 the first classifications were based upon differences in as- 
 pect, texture, and other physical attributes. Berzelius 
 made two attempts at a classification based solely on chem- 
 ical constitution. That now current, recognises as far as 
 possible the relations between physical and chemical char- 
 acters. In botany the earliest classes formed were trees, 
 shrubs, and herbs : magnitude being the basis of distinction. 
 Dioscorides divided vegetables into aromatic, alimentary, 
 medicinal, and vinous : a division of chemical character. 
 Csesalpinus classified them by the seeds, and seed-vessels, 
 which he preferred because of the relations found to sub- 
 sist between the character of the fructification and the 
 general character of the other parts. 
 
 While the "natural system" since developed, carrying out 
 the doctrine of Linnaeus, that " natural orders must be formed 
 by attention not to one or two, but to all the parts of plants," 
 bases its divisions on like peculiarities which are found 
 
ITS DIVISIONS MUST ADVANCE TOGETHEK. 225 
 
 to be constantly related to the greatest number of other 
 like peculiarities. And similarly in zoology, the successive 
 classifications, from having been originally determined by 
 external and often subordinate characters not indicative of 
 the essential nature, have been gradually more and more 
 determined by those internal and fundamental differences, 
 which have vtmiovmrelations to the greatest number of other 
 differences. Nor shall we be surprised at this analogy between 
 the modes of progress of positive science and classification, 
 when we bear in mind that both proceed by making gener- 
 alizations ; that both enable us to make previsions differing 
 only in their precision ; and that while the one deals with 
 equal properties and relations, the other deals with proper- 
 ties and relations that approximate towards equality in var- 
 iable degrees. 
 
 Without further argument, it wUl, we think, be suiE- 
 ciently clear that the sciences are none of them separately 
 evolved — are none of them independent either logically or 
 historically ; but that all of them have, in a greater or less 
 degree, required aid and reciprocated it. Indeed, it needs 
 but to throw aside theses, and contemplate the mixed char- 
 acter of surrounding phenomena, to at once see that these 
 notions of division and succession in the kinds of knowledge 
 are none of them actually true, but are simple scientific 
 fictions - good, if regarded merely as aids to study ; bad, 
 if regarded as representing realities in !N"ature. Consider 
 them critically, and no facts whatever are presented to our 
 senses uncombined with other facts — no facts whatever but 
 are in some degree disguised by accompanying facts : 
 disguised in such a manner that all must be partially under- 
 stood before any one can be understood. If it be said, as 
 by M. Comte, that gravitating force should be treated of 
 before other forces, seeing that all things are subject to it, 
 it may on like grounds be said , that heat should be first 
 dealt with ; seeing that thermal forces are everywhere in 
 
226 THE GENESIS .OF SCIENCE. 
 
 action ; that the ability of any portion of mattev to mani 
 fest visible gravitative phenomena depends on its state of 
 aggregation, which is determined by heat ; that only by 
 the aid of thermology can we explain those apparent ex- 
 ceptions to the gravitating tendency which are presented 
 by steam and smoke, and so establish its ■universality, and 
 that, indeed, thevery existence of the solat system in a sol- 
 id form is jnst as much a question of heat as it is one of 
 gravitation. 
 
 Take other cases : — All phenomena recognised by the 
 eyes, through which only are the data of exact science as- 
 certainable, are complicated with optical phenomena ; and 
 cannot be exhaustively known until optical principles are 
 known. The burning of a candle cannot be explained 
 without involving chemistry, mechanics, thermology. 
 Every wind that blows is determined by influences partly 
 solar, partly lunar, partly hygrometric ; and implies con- 
 siderations of. fluid equilibrium and physical geography 
 The direction, dip, and variations of the magnetic needle, 
 are facts half terrestrial, half celestial — are caused by earth- 
 ly forces which have cycles of change corresponding with 
 astronomical periods. The flowing of the gulf-stream and the 
 annual migration of icebergs towards the equator, depend- 
 ing as they do on the balancing of the centripetal and centri- 
 fugal forces acting on the ocean, involve in their explana- 
 tion the Earth's rotation and spheroidal form, the laws of 
 hydrostatics, the relative densities of cold and warm water, 
 and the doctrines of evaporation. It is no doubt true, as 
 M. Comte says, that " our position in the solar system, and 
 the motions, form, size, equilibrium of the mass of our 
 world among the planets, must be known before we can un- 
 derstand the phenomena going on at its surface." But, fa- 
 tally for his hypothesis, it is also true that we must under- 
 stand a great part of the phenomena going on at its surface 
 before we can know its position, &c., in the solar system 
 
INTEKCONNEXION OF ITS BEAlfCIIES. 227 
 
 It is not simply that, as we have akeady shown, those geo. 
 metrical and mechanical principles by which celestial ap- 
 pearances are explained, were first generalized from terres- 
 trial experiences ; but it is that the very pbtainment of cor- 
 rect data, on which to base astronomical generalizations, 
 implies advanced terrestrial physics. 
 
 Until after optics had made considerable advance, the 
 Copernican system remained but a speculation. A single 
 modern observation on a star has to undergo a careful anal- 
 ysis by the combined aid of various sciences — ^has to be digest- 
 ed by the organism of the sciences / which have severally 
 to assimilate their respective parts of the observation, be- 
 fore the essential fact it contains is available for the further 
 development of astronomy. It has to be corrected not 
 only for nutation of the earth's axis and for precession of 
 the equinoxes, but for aberration and for refraction ; and 
 the formation of the tables by which refraction is calculat- 
 ed, presupposes knowledge of the law of decreasing density 
 in the upper atmospheric strata ; of the law of decreasing 
 temperature, and the influence of this on the density; and of 
 hygrometrie laws as also affecting density. So that, to get 
 materials for further advance, astronomy requires not only 
 the indirect aid of the sciences which have presided over 
 the making of its improved instruments, but the direct aid 
 of an advanced optics, of barology, of thermology, of hy- 
 grometry; and if we remember that these delicate obser- 
 vations are in some cases registered electrically, and that 
 they are further corrected for the " personal equation " — the 
 time elapsing between seeing and registering, which varies 
 with different observers — ^we may even add electricity and 
 psychology. If, then, so apparently simple a thing as as- 
 certaining the position of a star is (complicated with so 
 many phenomena, it is clear that this notion of the inde- 
 pendence of the sciences, or certain of them, will not hold. 
 
 Whether objectively independent or not, they cannot 
 
228 TnE GENESIS or science 
 
 be subjectively so — they cannot have independence as pre- 
 sented to our consciousness ; and this is the only kind of 
 independence with -which we are Concerned. And here, 
 before leaving these illustrations, and especially this last 
 one, let us not omit to notice how clearly they exhibit that 
 increasingly active consensus of the sciences which charac- 
 terizes their advancing development. Besides finding that 
 in these later times a discoveiy in one science commonly 
 causes progress in others ; besides finding that a great part 
 of the questions with which modern science deals are so mix- 
 ed as to require the co-operation of many sciences for their 
 solution ; we find in this last case that, to make a single good 
 observation in the purest of the natural sciences, requires 
 the combined assistance of half a dozen other sciences. 
 
 Perhaps the clearest comprehension of the interconnect- 
 ed growth of the sciences may be obtained by contemplat- 
 ing that of the arts, to which it is strictly analogous, and 
 with which it is inseparably bound up. Most intelligent 
 persons must have been, at one time or other, struck with 
 the vast array of antecedents pre-supposed by one of our 
 processes of manufacture. Let him trace the production 
 of a printed cotton, and consider all that is implied by it. 
 There are the many successive improvements through 
 which the power-looms reached their present perfection ; 
 there is the steam-engine that drives them, having its long 
 history from Papin downwards ; there are the lathes in 
 which its cylinder was bored, and the string of ancestral 
 lathes from, which those lathes proceeded ; there is the 
 steam-hammer under which its crank shaft was welded ; 
 there are the puddling-furnaces, the blast-furnaces, the coal- 
 mines and the iron-mines needful for producing the raw 
 material ; there are the slowly improved appliances by 
 which the factory was built, and lighted, and ventilated ; 
 there are the printing engme, and the die house, and the col- 
 our laboi-atory with its stock of materials from all parts of 
 
INTEEDEPENDENCE OF AETS AND SCIENCES. 229 
 
 the world, implying cochineal-culture, logwood-cutting, in- 
 digo-growing ; there are the implements used by the pro- 
 ducers of cotton, the gins by which it is cleaned, the elab- 
 orate machines by which it is spun : there are the vessels 
 in which cotton is imported, with the building-slips, the 
 rope-yards, the sail-cloth factories, the anchor-forges, need- 
 ful for making them ; and besides all these directly neces- 
 sary antecedents, each of them involving many others, 
 there are the institutions which have developed the requi- 
 site intelligence, the printing and publishing arrangements 
 which have spread the necessary information, the social or- 
 ganization which has rendered possible such a complex co- 
 operation of agencies. 
 
 Further analysis would show that the many arts thus 
 concerned in the economical production of a child's frock, 
 have each of them been brought to its present efficiency 
 by slow steps which the other arts have aided ; and that 
 from the beginning this reciprocity has been ever on the 
 increase. It needs but on the one hand to consider how 
 utterly impossible it is for the savage, even with ore and 
 coal ready, to produce so simple a thing as an iron hatchet ; 
 and then to consider, on the other hand, that it would have 
 been impracticable among ourselves, even a century ago, 
 to raise the tubes of the Britannia bridge from lack of the 
 hydraulic press ; to at once see how mutually dependent 
 are the arts, and how all must advance that each may ad- 
 vance. Well, the sciences are involved with each other 
 in just the same manner. They are, in fact, inextricably 
 woven into this same complex web of the arts ; and are 
 only conventionally independent of it. Originally the two 
 were one. How to fix the religious festivals ; when to sow : 
 how to weigh commodities ; and in what manner to meas- 
 ure ground; were the purely practical questions out of 
 which arose astronomy, mechanics, geometry. Since then 
 there has been a perpetual inosculation of the sciences and 
 
230 THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE. 
 
 the arts. Science has been supplying art with truer generali 
 zations and more completely quantitative previsions. Art has 
 been supplying science with better materials and more per- 
 fect instruments. And all along the interdependence has been 
 growing closer, not only between art and science, but among 
 the arts themselves, and among the sciences themselves. 
 
 How completely the analogy holds throughout, becomes 
 yet clearer when we recognise the fact that the sciences are 
 arts to each other. If, as occurs in almost every case, the 
 fact to be analyzed by any science, has first to be prepared 
 — ^to be disentangled from disturbing facts by the afore 
 discovered methods of other sciences ; the other sciences 
 so used, stand in the position of arts. If, in solving a dyna- 
 mical problem, a parallelogram is drawn, of which the sides 
 and diagonal^ represent forces, and by putting magnitudes 
 of extension for magnitudes of force a measurable relation 
 is established between quantities not else to be dealt with ; 
 it may be fairly said that geometry plays towards mechan- 
 ics much the same part that the fire of the founder plays 
 towards the metal he is going to cast. If, in analyzing the 
 phenomena of the coloured rings surrounding the point of 
 contact between two lenses, a Newton ascertains by calcu- 
 lation the amount of certain interposed spaces, fiir too mi- 
 nute for actual measurement ; he employs the science of 
 number for essentially the same purpose as that for which 
 the watchmaker employs tools. If, before writing down 
 his observation on a star, the astronomer has to separate 
 from it all the errors resulting from atmospheric and optical 
 laws, it is manifest that the refraction-tables, and logarithm- 
 books, and formulae, which he successively uses, serve him 
 much as retorts, and filters, and cupels serve the assayer 
 who wishes to separate the pure gold from all accompany- 
 ing ingredients. 
 
 So close, indeed, is the relationship, that it is impossi- 
 ble to say where science begins and art ends. All the in- 
 
AET AND SCIENCE. 23] 
 
 struments of the natural philosopher are the products of 
 art ; the adjusting one of them for use is an art ; there is 
 art in making an observation with one of them; it requires 
 art properly to treat the facts ascertained ; nay, even the 
 employing established generalizations 'to open the way to 
 new generalizations, may be considered as art. In each of 
 these cases previously organized knowledge becomes the 
 implement by which new knowledge is got at : and whether 
 that previously organized knowledge is embodied in a tan- 
 gible apparatus or in a formula, matters not in so far as its 
 essential relation to the new knowledge is concerned. If, 
 as no one will deny, art is applied knowledge, then such 
 portion of a scientific investigation as consists of applied 
 knowledge is art. So that we may even say that as soon 
 as any prevision in science passes out of its originally pas- 
 sive state, and is employed for reaching other previsions, 
 it passes from theory into practice — ^becomes science in ac- 
 tion — becomes art. And when we thus see how purely 
 conventional is the ordinary distinction, how impossible it 
 is to make any real separation — ^when we see not only that 
 science and art were originally one; that the arts have 
 perpetually assisted each other; that there has been a con- 
 stant reciprocation of aid between the sciences and arts ; 
 but that the sciences act as arts to each other, and that the 
 established part of each science becomes an art to the 
 growing part — when we recognize the closeness of these 
 associations, we shall the more clearly perceive that as the 
 connexion of the arts with each other has been ever be- 
 coming more intimate ; as the help given by sciences to 
 arts and by arts to sciences, has been age by age increas- 
 ing ; so the interdependence of the sciences themselves has 
 been ever growing greater, their mutual relations more in- 
 volved, their consensus more active. 
 
 In here ending our sketch of the Genesis of Science, we 
 
232 THE GENESIS OP SCIENCE. 
 
 are conscious of having done the subject but scant justice, 
 Two difficulties have stood in our way : one, the having to 
 touch on so many points in such small space ; the other, 
 the necessity of treating in serial arrangement a process 
 which is not serial — a difficulty which must ever attend all 
 attempts to delineate processes of development, whatever 
 their special nature. Add to which, that to present in any- 
 thing like completeness and proportion, even the outlines 
 of so vast and complex a history, demands years of study. 
 Nevertheless, we believe that the evidence ■which has been 
 assigned suffices to substantiate the leading propositions 
 with which we set out. Inquiry into the first stages of 
 science confirms the conclusion which we drew from the 
 analysis of science as now existing, that it is not distinct 
 from common knowledge, but an outgrowth from it — ^an 
 extension of the perception by means of the reason. 
 
 That which we further found by analysis to form the 
 more specific characteristic of scientific previsions, as con- 
 trasted with the previsions of uncultured intelhgence — their 
 quantitativeness — we also see to have been the character- 
 istic ahke in the initial steps in science, and of all the steps 
 succeeding them. The facts and admissions cited in dis- 
 proof of the assertion that the sciences foUow one another, 
 both logically and historically, in the order of their de- 
 creasing generality, have been enforced by the sundry in- 
 stances we have met with, in which the more general or 
 abstract sciences have been advanced only at the instiga- 
 tion of the more special or concrete — ^instances serving to 
 show that a more general science as much owes its progress 
 to the presentation of new problems by a more special 
 science, as the more special science owes its progress to 
 the solutions which the more general science is thus led to 
 attempt — instances therefore illustrating the position that 
 scientific advance is as much from the special to the general 
 as from the general to the special. 
 
IMPOBTANCE OF THE SUBJECT. 233 
 
 Quite in harmony with this position we find to be the 
 admissions that the sciences are as branches of one trunk, 
 and that they were at first cultivated simultaneously ; and 
 this harmony becomes the more marked on finding, as we 
 have done, not only that the sciences have a common root, 
 but that science in general has a common root with lan- 
 guage, classL&cation, reasoning, art ; that throughout civili- 
 zation these have advanced together, acting and reacting 
 upon each other just as the separate sciences have done; 
 and that thus the development of intelligence in aU its di- 
 visions and subdivisions has conformed to this same law 
 which we have shown that the sciences conform to. From 
 all which we may perceive that the sciences can with no 
 greater propriety be arranged in a succession, than language, 
 classification, reasoning, art, and science, can be arranged 
 in a succession ; that, however needful a succession may be 
 for the convenience of books and catalogues, it must be 
 recognized merely as a convention ; and that so far from its 
 being the function of a philosophy of the sciences to estab- 
 lish a hierarchy, it is its function to show that the linear 
 arrangements required for literary purposes, have none of 
 them any basis either in Nature or History. 
 
 There is one further remark we must not omit — a re- 
 mark toiiching the importance of the question that has been 
 discussed. Unfortunately it commonly happens that topics 
 of this abstract nature are slighted as of no practical mo- 
 ment ; and, we doubt not, that many will think it of very 
 little consequence what theory respecting the genesis of 
 science may be entertained. But the value of truths is of- 
 ten great, in proportion as their generality is wide. Re- 
 mote as they seem from practical application, the highest 
 generalizations are not unfrequently the most potent in 
 their effects, in virtue of their influence on all those subor 
 dinate generalizations which regulate practice. And it must 
 be so here. Whenever established, a correct theory of the 
 
234: THE GENESIS OP SCIENCE. 
 
 historical development of the sciences must have an immense 
 effect upon education ; and, through education, upon civili- 
 zation. Greatly as we differ from him in other respects, 
 we agree with M. Comte in the belief that, rightly conduct- 
 ed, the education of the individual must have a certain cor- 
 respondence with the evolution of the race. 
 
 No one can contemplate the' facts we have cited in illus- 
 tration of the early stages of science, without recognising 
 the necessity/ of the processes through which those stages 
 were reached— a necessity which, in respect, to the leading 
 truths, may likewise be traced in all after stages. This ne- 
 cessity, originating in the very nature of the phenomena to 
 be analyzed and the faculties to be employed, more or less 
 fully applies to the mind of the child as to that of the sav- 
 age. We say more or less fuUy, because the correspondence 
 is not special but general only. Were the environment the 
 same in both cases, the correspondence would be complete. 
 But though the surrounding material out of which science is 
 to be organized, is, in many cases, the same to the juvenile 
 mind and the aboriginal mind, it is not so throughout ; as, 
 for instance, in the case of chemistry, the phenomena of 
 which are accessible to the one, but were inaccessible to 
 the other. Hence, in proportion as the environment differs, 
 the course of evolution must differ. After admitting sun- 
 dry exceptions, however, there remains a substantial par- 
 allelism ; and, if so, it becomes of great moment to ascer- 
 tain what really has been the process of scientific evolution. 
 The establishment of an erroneous theory must be disas- 
 trous in its educational results ; while the establishment of 
 a true one must eventually be fertile ip school-reforms and 
 consequent social benefits. 
 
WOEKS OF HEEBEET SPENCEE. 
 
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 " This interesting work — ^for it is intensely so in its aim, scope, aud the 
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 dence Preas. 
 
 " A work which is most comprehensive in its aim, and most admirable in 
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 where apparent ; the mere list of authorities quoted giving evidence of wide 
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 count of the opinions it expresses, but it is also most serviceable as a book 
 of reference. It offers an able and exhaustive table of a vast array of facts, 
 which no single student could well obtain for himself, and it has not been 
 made the vehicle for any special pleading on the part of the author." — 
 LKidoti AiheruBum. 
 
 " The book is no cursory and superficial review ; it goes to the very heart 
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 and entertaining form." — Albany Eaening Joumal. 
 
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 theoiy amply sustained by fact." — Detroit Free Freaa. 
 
 " This interesting and valuable volume illustrates, to some extent, the 
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D. Appleton & Compawy's Piiblieationt. 
 
 LAY SEEMOI^rS, 
 ADDEESSES, AND REVIEWS, 
 
 By THOMAS HENKT HUXLEY. 
 Cloth, 12mo. 390 pages. Price, $1.7S 
 
 This is the latest and most popular of tlie works of this in- 
 trepid and accomplished English thinker. The American edition 
 of the work is the latest, and contains, in addition to the English 
 edition, Professor Huxley's recent masterly address on " Spon- 
 taneous Generation," delivered before the British Association for 
 the Advancement of Science, of which he was president. 
 
 The following is from an able article in the Independent : 
 
 The " Lay Sermons, Addresses, and Eeviewa " is a book to be read 
 by every one who would keep up with the advance of truth — as well by 
 those who are hostUe as those who are friendly to his conclusions. In 
 it, scientific and philosophical topics are handled with consummate abil- 
 ity. It is remarkable for purity of style and power of expression. No- 
 where, in any modern work^ is the advancement of the pursuit of that 
 natural knowledge, which is of vital importance to bodily and mental 
 well-being, so ably handled. 
 
 Professor Huxley is undoubtedly the representative scientific man of 
 the age. His reverence for the right and devotion to truth have estab- 
 lished his leadership of modern scientific thought. He leads the beliefs 
 and aspirations of tiie increasingly powerful body of the younger men of 
 science. His ability for research is marvellous. There is possible no more 
 equipoise of Judgment than that to which he brings the phenomena of 
 Nature. Besides, he is not a mere scientist. His is a popularized phi. 
 losophy ; social questions have been treated by his pen in a manner most 
 masterly. In his popular addresses, embracing the widest range of top- 
 ics, he treads on ground with which he seems thoroughly fami^r. 
 
 There are those who hold the name of Professor Huxley as synony- 
 mous with irreverence and atheism. Plato's was so held, and Galileo'u, 
 and Descartes's, and Newton's, and Faraday's. There can be no greater 
 mistake. No man has greater reverence for the Bible than Huxley. Nc 
 one more acquaintance with the text of Scripture. He believes there is 
 definite government of the universe ; that pleasures and pains are distrib- 
 uted in accordance with law ; and that the certain proportion of evil 
 woven up in the life even of worms will help Ihe mail who thinks to bear 
 his own share with courage. 
 
 In the estimate of Professor Huxley's future influence upon science, 
 his youth and health form a large element. He has just passed his forty, 
 fifth year. If God spare his hfe, truth can hardly fall to be the gainer 
 from a nund that is stored with knowledge of the laws of the Creator's 
 operations, and that has learned to love all beauty and hate «fl rilenegs of 
 Vature and art. 
 
SPENCEKa SYSTEM OF PEILOSOPST. 
 
 THE PHILOSOPHY OF EYOLUTIOK 
 
 By HERBERT SPENCER. 
 
 This great system of scientiflc thonght, the most original and important men- 
 tal undertaking of the age, to which Hr. Spencer has devoted his life, is now well 
 advanced, the published yolnmes heing : Mrst Frindplea, The I'rineipleg tf Si- 
 iHogy, two volnmes, and The jPrindples of JPsycTiolog!/, vol. L, which will be 
 shortly printed. 
 
 This philosophical system differs from all its predecessors In being solidly 
 biised on the sciences of observation and Indnction ;' in representing the order 
 and course of Katnre ; in bringing Nature and man, life, mind, and society, under 
 one great law of action ; and in developing a method of thought Which may serve 
 for practical guidance in dealing with the affairs of life. That Mr. Spencer is the 
 man for this great work will be evident from the following statements : 
 
 " The only complete and systematic statement of the doctrine of Evolution 
 with which I am acquainted is that contained in Mr. Herbert Spencer's ' System 
 of Philosophy ; ' a work which should be carefully studied by all who desire to 
 know whither scientific thought is tending."— T. H. Huzlet. 
 
 " Of all our thinkers, he is the one who has formed to himself the largest new 
 scheme of a systematic philosophy."— Prof. Mabsoit. 
 
 " If any individual inSnence is visibly encroaching on Mills in this coontry, it 
 Is his."— iW(?. 
 
 " Mr. Spencer is one of the most vigorous as well as boldest ttiinkers that 
 Bnglish speculation has yet produced." — John Stuart Mill. 
 
 ^* One of the acutest metaphysicians of modem times." — Ibid, 
 
 "Oneofourdeepestthlnkers."— Br. Joseph D. Hooebb. 
 
 It is questionable if any thinker of finer calibre has appeared in our conn- 
 try." — Geobqe HiantT Lewes. 
 
 "He alone, of all British thinkers, has organized a philosophy."— i}i<f. 
 
 " He is as keen an analyst as is known in the history of philosophy ; I do not 
 «cept either Aristotle or Kant."— Qeoeob Biplet. 
 
 " If we were to give our own judgment, we should say that, since Newton, 
 there has not in England been a philosopher of more remarkable speculative and 
 lystematizing talent than (in spite of some errors and some narrowness) Mr. Her- 
 bert Spencer."— i^ilon Saturday Bemiew. 
 
 " We cannot refrain ftom offering our tribute of respect to one who, whether 
 (br the extent of his positive knowledge, or for the profundity of his speculative 
 Insight, has already achieved a name second to none in the whole range of Eng- 
 lish philosophy, and whose works will worthily sustain the credit of Bnglloli 
 thosght In the present generation."- Westminsttr Sevieu. 
 
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 " His first point is to show that species are in many cases not -well 
 defined, and that the whole order of natural history seems to be in a 
 state of mutation, by reason of constant variations. Thus even under 
 domestication, important changes may be introduced by intercrossing, 
 by selection of thoTjest individuals for propagation, by crossing parents 
 marked by however slight, but favorable peculiarities. 
 
 "His second point is what he terms the universal and necessary 
 •truggle for existence. This follows from the high geometrical rati« 
 of increase common to all beings. If there were no catastrophes, 
 any one of the existing species would be sufficiently numerous in a 
 few thousand years to cover the whole earth, to the exclusion of every- 
 thing else. 
 
 " His third point is to prove that this struggle is directed by the 
 law of natural selection. Even the races of domestic animals may be 
 constantly improved and modified by choosing the best individuals 
 for propagation. Nature brings the same discipline to bear upon the 
 whole domain of animal and vegetable life. She seizes at once upon 
 any slight variation that is favorable, and perpetuates it ; in the imi- 
 rersal pressure, any variation that is injurious is immediately (xtin- 
 gnisbed." 
 

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