^■■^ 
 

"SSaS^S^SrS^P-tsofcasesargu 
 
Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of tiiis book is in 
 tine Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924017172036 
 
REGISTRATION CASES. 
 
 REPORTS OF CASES 
 
 AEGUED AND DETERMINED 
 
 ON APPEAL FEOM THE DECISIONS OF THE 
 EEYISING BAEEISTERS 
 
 IN THE 
 
 QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION 
 
 OP 
 
 THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, 
 
 AND ON APPEAL THEEEFROM IN 
 
 THE COURT OE APPEAL. 
 
 PROM MICHAELMAS SITTINGS, 1886, TO EASTER SITTINGS, 1895, 
 
 BOTH INCLUSIVE. 
 
 BT 
 
 JOHN SCOTT FOX and C. LACEY SMITH, 
 
 ESOUIBES, EABBISIEBB-AT-LAW. 
 
 LONDON : 
 
 STEVENS AND SONS, LIMITED, 
 
 119 & 120, OHANOEET LANE, 
 
 Isfo '§viblxsTim mil ^eoladlm, 
 1895 
 
lONBON : 
 PEIMTED BY 0. F. BOWOETH, QEEAT NEW SIEEET, FETTEE LAKE, E.G. 
 
JUDGES 
 
 TBfft Court of ^jpjpeal 
 
 DTJEING THE PEEIOD COMPEISED IN THESE EEPOETS, 
 
 Lord Heescheli,, Lord Chancellor. 
 
 Lord Halsbttry, Lo7'd Chancellor. 
 
 Lord CoLEEiDGE,- Lord Chief Justice of England. 
 
 Lord Etjssell of KiiLOWEif, Lord Chief Justice of England. 
 
 Lord EsHEE, Master of the Rolls. 
 
 Sir James Hannen, President of the Probate, Divorce, and 
 Admiralty Division. 
 
 Sir Charles Pabkee Btjtt, President of the Prolate, Divorce, 
 and Admiralty Division. 
 
 Sir Eeancis Henet Jeunb, President of the Prolate, Divorce, 
 and Admiralty Division. 
 
 Sir Henet Cotton 
 
 Sir Nathaniel Lindlet 
 
 Sir Chaeles S. C. Bowen 
 
 Sir Edwaed Pet 
 
 Sir Heney Chaeles Lopes 
 
 Sir E. E. Kay 
 
 Sir Aechibald Levin Smith 
 
 Sir HoEACB Davey 
 
 Sir John Eigby 
 
 Ordinary Judges of Court of 
 Appeal. 
 
JUDGES 
 
 OF 
 
 or 
 
 ®6« jB^iSfi ©ourt of ^n&titt 
 
 DURING THE PEEIOD COMPEISED IN THESE EEPOETS. 
 
 The Eight Hon. John Dxtee Lord CoLEEiDaB, Lord Chief Justice 
 
 of England, President. 
 The Eight Hon. Lord Etjssell of Killo-w^en, Lord Chief Justice 
 
 of England, President. 
 
 The Hon. Sir "William Egbert Gbove, Knt. 
 The Hon. Geobge Dbnman. 
 The Hon. Sir Charles Ed-waed Pollock, Knt. 
 The Hon. Sir William Ventris Field, Knt. 
 The Hon. Sir John Walter Httddleston, Knt. 
 The Hon. Sir Henry Manistt, Knt. 
 The Hon. Sir Henry Hawkins, Knt. 
 The Hon. Sir James Eitzjames Stephen, Knt. 
 The Hon. Sir James Charles Mathe-w, Knt. 
 The Hon. Sir Lewis William Cave, Knt. 
 The Hon. Sir John Charles Day, Knt. 
 The Hon. Sir Archibald Levin Smith, Knt. 
 The Hon. Sir Alfred Wills, Knt. 
 
Vi JUDGES OF THE QUEEN's BENCH DIVISION. 
 
 The Hon. Sir "William: GbJiUtham, Knt. 
 
 The Hon. Sir Abthitr Chaeles, EJnt. 
 
 The Hon. Sir Eoland Vaughan Williams, Knt. 
 
 The Hon. Sir John Compton Lawkanoe, Knt. 
 
 The Hon. Sir E. S. Weight, Knt. 
 
 The Hon. Sir Eichaed Henn OoLLiifs, Knt. 
 
 The Hon. Sir Gainsfoed Beuoe, Knt. 
 
 The Hon. Sir William Eann Kennedy, Knt. 
 
 ATTORNEYS-GENERAL :— 
 
 Sir Charles Etjssell, Knt. 
 Sir Eichaed E. Webster, Knt- 
 Sir John Eigby, Knt. 
 Sir EoBEET Threshle Eeid, Knt. 
 
 SOLICITORS-GENERAL :— 
 
 Sir Horace Davey, Knt. 
 
 Sir Edvard Clarke, Knt. 
 
 Sir John Eigby, Knt. 
 
 Sir EoBERT Theeshie Eeid, Knt. 
 
 Sir Prank Lock-vtood, Knt. 
 
TABLE 
 
 CASES EEPORTED IN THIS VOLUME. 
 
 A. 
 
 PAOE 
 
 E. 
 
 
 PAOB 
 
 Ainsley v. Nicholson 
 
 , 146 
 
 Edwards v. Lloyd . 
 
 . 
 
 . 64 
 
 Arnold v. Sha,rpe 
 
 . 252 
 
 
 
 
 Atkin's Case 
 
 . 360 
 
 E. 
 
 
 
 B. 
 
 
 Fenning v. Halse . 
 
 • 
 
 . 243 
 
 Barlow v. Smith . 
 
 . 293 
 
 G. 
 
 
 
 Bamett v. Evans . 
 
 . 291 
 
 
 
 Barnett v. Hickmott 
 
 . 412 
 
 Gale V. Over end . 
 
 . 
 
 . 174 
 
 Beal V. Town Clerk of Exeter 31 
 Body V. Halse . . .240 
 Bridges v. Miller ... 47 
 
 GifEord v. Overseers 
 Luke's 
 
 Guise V. Dilke 
 
 of St 
 
 . 139 
 . 283 
 
 Brown v. Tombs . 
 
 . 196 
 
 H. 
 
 
 
 0. 
 
 
 HaU V. Metcalfe . 
 
 
 227 
 
 ChUds V. Cox 
 
 . 84 
 
 Harris v. Phillips . 
 Hartley v. Halse . 
 
 
 223 
 118 
 
 D. 
 
 
 Hersant v. Halse . 
 
 
 12 
 
 Daniels v. Allard . ' . 
 
 . 70 
 
 Hicks V. Stokes 
 
 
 303 
 
 Dix V. Kent . 
 
 . 186 
 
 Honeybone v. Hambidge 
 
 26 
 
 Donoghue v. Brook 
 
 . 100 
 
 Humphrey v. Earle 
 
 . 
 
 39 
 
 DoTilon V. Halse . 
 
 1 
 
 Hunt V. Halse 
 
 . 
 
 242 
 
 Drxiitt V. Gossling . 
 
 . 123 
 
 Hurcum v. Hilleary 
 
 . 
 
 345 
 
vm 
 
 TABLE OF CASES KEPORTED. 
 
 J. 
 
 
 PAOE 
 
 Jones V. Kent 
 
 . 109 
 
 Jones V. Pritchard 
 
 . 259 
 
 K. 
 
 
 Kemp V. Wanklyn 
 
 . 360 
 
 L. 
 
 
 Lord V. Fox . 
 
 . 266 
 
 M. 
 
 Mackay v. McGuire . .201 
 
 Maclean v. Prichard . . 94 
 
 Mann v. Johnson . . . 345 
 
 Marsh jj.Estcouit. . .157 
 
 Moor? V. A,tkinspn . .179 
 
 N. 
 
 Nicholson v. Yeoman . .150 
 
 0. 
 
 O'Connor v. Nicholson . . 250 
 
 P. 
 
 Palmer v. "Wade . . . 323 
 Pease v. Town Clerk of Mid- 
 dlesbrough . . .286 
 
 
 FAOB 
 
 Plant V. Potts 
 
 . 206 
 
 Prentice v. Markham . 
 
 . 301 
 
 E. 
 
 
 Eeg. V. McConnell 
 
 . 375 
 
 Eeg. V. Mackellar 
 
 . 276 
 
 Eobinson v. Potts . 
 
 . 206 
 
 Eowland v. Pritchard . 
 
 . 310 
 
 S. 
 
 
 Shaw V. Mackellar 
 
 . 275 
 
 Skinn v. Phillips . 
 
 . 386 
 
 Smith V. Chandler 
 
 . 129 
 
 SpittaU V. Brook . 
 
 . 22 
 
 Sutton V. Wade . 
 
 . 169 
 
 ; T. 
 
 
 Timmis v. Albiston 
 
 . 426 
 
 Tranior v. Starbuck 
 
 . 340 
 
 Treadgold v. The Town Clerk 
 of Grantham 
 
 402 
 
 W. 
 
 "Wade V. Perkins . . . 338 
 
 "Warren v. Maule . . . 400 
 
 "Whitwell li. Clerk of the Peace 
 
 for the North Eiding. . 152 
 
 "Wood V. Chandler . . 61 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 AcLAND V, Lewis, K. & Q. 334; 30 L. J. 0. P. 29 - - - 224 
 
 Adams v. Bostock, Colt. 275 ; 8 Q. B. D. 259 - - - 44, 306 
 
 Adams v. Buctanan, 18 L. E. Ir. 292 ----- 365 
 Ainsley v. Nicholson, Fox & Smith, 146 ; 24 Q,. B. D. 144 - 278, 356 
 
 AUchurch v. Assessment Commissioners of West Hampstead, (1891) 
 
 2 Q. B. 436 - - . _. . . . 421 
 
 Allen V. Greensill, 1 Lutw. 692 ; 4 0. B. 100 - - - - 144 
 
 Arnold v. Sharpe, Fox & Smith, 252 ;• 65 L. T. 618 - - 379 
 
 AttenboroTigh v. Thompson, 2 H. & N. 559 ; 27 L. J. Ex. 23 - - 295 
 
 B. 
 
 Baine, In re, W. N. (1879) 200 - - . - 277, 284 
 
 Baker v. Town Clerk of Monmouth, 53 L. T. 668 - 60, 79, 194 
 
 Barr v. Chambers, 22 L. E. Ir. 265 - - - - '- 290 
 
 Bartlett v. Gibbs, 1 Lutw. 73; 5 M.'& G. 81 - - - 352, 358 
 
 Barton v. Ashley, 1 Lutw. 307 ; 15 L. J. 0. P. 36 - - 121 
 
 Beal V. Eord, 2 Hopw. & Colt. 374; 3 0. P. D. 73 - - - 298 
 
 Bendle v. Watson, 1 Hopw. & Colt. 591 ; L. E. 7 0. P. 163 - 210 
 
 BlackweU v. England, 8 E. & B. 541 ; 27 L. J. Q. B. 124 - - - 295 
 
 BoUen v. SouthaH, Colt. 368; 15 Q. B. D. 461 - - - 66, 120 
 
 Boon V. Howard, 2 Hopw. & Colt. 208 ; L. E. 9 C. P. 277 - - - 419 
 
 Bradley v. BayUs, Colt. 163 ; 8 Q. B. D. 231 - 338, 424 
 
 Bridges v. Miller, Pox & Smith, 47 ; 20 Q. B. D. 287 - 121 
 
 Bridgwater v. Durant, K. & G. 377 ; 11 C. B. N. S. 7 - - - 318 
 
 0. 
 
 Childs«. Cox, Fox&Smith, 84; 20Q. B. D. 290 - - 360,369 
 
 Cooke V. Humbei-, K. & G. 413 ; 31 L. J. C. P. 73 - - - 125 
 
 Cooper V. Harris, 7 M. & G. 97 - - - - - 8 
 
 Cowper V. Fletcher, 6 B. & S. 464 ; 34 L. J. Q,. B. 187 - - - 317 
 
 Orowther v. Bradbury, Hopw. & Philb. 63 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 70 - - 64 
 
 CuUen V. Patterson, 18 L. E. If. 274 - - - - 21 
 
X TABLE OF OASES CITED. 
 
 D, 
 
 FAOE 
 
 Dashwoodw. Eyles, Colt. 486; lea B. D. 295 "- - - - 211 
 
 Daviesw. Hopkins, K. &a. 118; 27L. J. 0. P. 6 - - 12,116 
 
 Dipstale's Case, L. E. 4 Q. B. 114 299 
 
 Doe d. HuU v. Wood, 14 M. & W. 682 203 
 
 Doe d. Palmer v. Andrews, 4 Bing. 348 - - - - - 203 
 
 Doogan v. Oolqulioim, 20 L. E. Ir. 361 - - - - 366 
 
 Doulon V. Halse, Pox & Smith, 1, 9; 18 a. B. D. 4:21 - - - 20 
 
 Diirant v. Carter, 2 Hopw. & Colt. 142 ; L. E. 9 C. P. 261 - 262, 321 
 
 E. 
 
 Eadenv. Cooper, 2Liitw. 183; 21L. J. C. P. 32 - - - 134 
 
 Edwards v, Lang, Ir. E. 1 E. & L. App. 22 - - - - 19 
 
 Ed-wards v. Lloyd, Pox & Smith, 34 - - - - 76, 194 
 
 Eidsforthi;. Parrer, ILntw. 617; 4C. B. 9 - - - - 307 
 
 EUis V. Buroh, 1 Hopw. & Colt. 537; L. E. 6 C. P. 327 - - 419 
 Emo V, Mortimer, Lawson's Notes of Decisions (DuhUn, 1894), pp. 207 
 
 et sqq, --------- 430 
 
 P. 
 
 Parrer v. Edsworth, 16 L. J. 0. P. 132; 8. 0. suh mm. Eidsforth v. 
 
 Parrer, 1 Lutw. 527 - . . - 67 
 
 Pord V. Barnes, Colt. 396; 16 Q. B. D. 254 - - 24, 33, 100, 316 
 
 Ford V. Drew, Colt. 1 ; 5 C. P. D. 59 - - - - - 37 
 
 Pordi). Elmsley, Colt. 396; 16Q. B. D. 254 ... 35,103 
 
 Pord V. Harrington, 1 Hopw. & Colt. 331 ; L. E. 5 C. P. 282 - - 225 
 
 Pord V. Hart, 2 Hopw. & Colt. 167 ; L. E. 9 C. P. 273 - - . 33 
 
 Pord V. Hoar, Colt. 351 ; 14 Q. B. D. 507 - . 213, 272, 353 
 
 Pord V. Pye, 2 Hopw. & Colt. 157 ; L. E. 9 C. P. 269 - . . 315 
 
 Poskett V. Kaufmann,' Colt. 466 ; 16 Q. B. D. 279 - 206, 216, 282, 353, 
 
 354, 358 
 Fryer v. Bodenham, 1 Hopw. & Colt. 204 ; L. E. 4 0. P. 529 . - 80 
 
 G. 
 
 Ghcayson v. Atkinson, 2 Ves. Sen. 454 ..... 244 
 Greenway v. Bachelor, Colt. 322 ; 12 Q. B. D. 376 - - . 271 
 
 H. 
 
 Hall V. Metcalfe, Fox & Smith, 227 ; (1892) 1 Q. B. 208 - - 421 
 
 Hanbridge v. Beveridge, 26 L. E. Ir. 423 - . . . . 241 
 
 Hargreayes v. Hopper, 2 Hopw. & Colt. 304 ; 1 C. P. D. 195 - -5 
 
 Harrison v. Carter, 2 Hopw. & Colt. 324 ; 2 C. P. D. 26 - 60, 78, 193 
 
 Hasson v. Chambers, 18 L. E. Ir. 68 . •. . . _ 421 
 
 Hayward v. Scott, Colt. 76 ; 5 C. P. D. 231 . . . . 10 
 
 Heathv. Haynes, K. &G. 99; 3C. B. N. S. 389 - . - 263 
 

 PASS 
 
 - 109, 
 
 ,404 
 
 . 
 
 248 
 
 . 
 
 352 
 
 . 
 
 88 
 
 - 
 
 365 
 
 - 
 
 122 
 
 - 
 
 161 
 
 173, 
 
 ,308 
 
 TABLE OF CASES CITED. XI 
 
 Hersant v. Halse, Fox & Smith, 12 ; 18 Q. B. D. 412 
 
 Hixidmarsli v. Charlton, 8 H. L. Oa. 160 
 
 Hitohins v. Brown, 1 Lutw. 328 ; 2 0. B. 25 
 
 Hornsby v. Eobson, K. & a. 66 ; 26 L. J. 0. P. 55 
 
 Hudson V. Louth, 8 L. E. Ir. 69 - 
 
 Huggett V. Lewis, K. & Q-. 1 ; 24 L. J. 0. P. 38 
 
 Hughes V. Overseers of Chatham, 1 Lutw. 51 ; 5 M. & Q-. 54 
 
 Humphrey v. Earle, Fox & Smith, 39 ; 20 Q. B. D. 294 
 
 J. 
 
 James v, Howarth, Colt. 87 ; 5 C. P. D. 225 - - - - 66 
 
 Jones V. Jones, Hopw. & PhUb. 320 ; L. E. 1 C. P. 140 - 135, 179 
 
 Jones V. Kent, Fox & Smith, 109 ; 22 Q,. B. D. 204 - - 129, 410 
 
 Jones V. Pritohard, 1 Hopw. & Colt. 91 ; L. E. 4 C. P. 414 - - 43 
 
 Jones V. Pritohard, Fox & Smith, 259 - - ... 310 
 
 Lancaster Canal Navigation Co., Ex parte, 1 Deacon & Chitty, 411 - 224 
 
 Leonard v. AHoways, 2 Hopw. & Colt. 411 ; 48 L. J. 0. P. 81 - 18, 111 
 
 Lewis V. Evans, 2 Hopw. & Colt. 279; L. E. 10 C. P. 297 - 90, 368 
 
 Lynch v. Wheatley, Colt. 364; 14 Q, B. D. 504 - - - 214, 353 
 
 M. 
 
 McConnell v. Graham, 22 L. E. L:. 465 - - - - 222 
 
 MoGaffigan v. EiddaU, 28 L. E. &. 257 - - - - - 323 
 
 Macleans. Prichard, Fox & Smith, 94; 20 Q. B.D. 285 - - 157 
 
 Mathew v. Magrath, Ir. E. 1 E. & L. App. 14 - - - - 19 
 
 Meade v. Cooper, Tx. E. 1 E. & L. App. 12 - - - - 19 
 
 Medwin v, Streeter, 1 Hopw. & Colt. 157; L. E. 4 0. P. 488 - - 333 
 
 Moger V. Escott, 1 Hopw. & Colt. 645; L. E. 7 0. P. 158 - - 332 
 
 N. 
 
 NichoUs V. Bulwer, 1 Hopw. & Colt. 472; L. E. 6 0. P. 281 - - 213 
 
 Nicholson v. Yeoman, Fox & Smith, 150 ; 24 Q. B. D. 145 - - 429 
 
 Norrisr. Pilcher, IHopw. &Colt. 173; L. E. 4C. P. 417 - - 40 
 Noseworthy v. Overseers of Buckland-in-the-Moor, 2 Hopw. & Colt. 
 
 127 ; L. E. 9 0. P. 233 145 
 
 0. 
 Oram v. Cole, Hopw. & Philb. 87 ; 34 L. J. C. P. 52 - - - 64 
 
XU TABLE OF CASES CITED. 
 
 FAQB 
 
 Parker v. Campion, Ir. E. 1 E. & L. App. 76 - - - - 292 
 
 Piokard v. BayHs, Colt. 98 ; 5 0. P. D. 235 - - - 351, 411 
 
 Plant V. Potts, Fox & Smith, 206 ; (1891) 1 Q,. B. 256 - - - 354 
 
 PoweU V. Ghiest, Hopw. & Philb. 149 ; 34 L. J. C. P. 69 - 35, 296, 416 
 
 E. 
 
 E. V. MackeUar, Pox & Smith, 206 ; (1891) 1 Q. B. 256 - - 347 
 
 E. V. Mayor of Exeter, L. E. 4 Q. B. 110, 114 - - - - 299 
 
 E. v, MitcheU, 10 East, 611 35, 106 
 
 E. 1). Stevens, 12 L. T. N. S. 491 234 
 
 Eendlesham (Lord) v. Hayward, 2 Hopw. & Colt. 175; L. E. 9 C. P. 
 
 252 - -.,-,- - - - - - 
 
 Eichardson v. Langridge, 4 Taunt. 128 ----- 203 
 
 Eoberts v. Churchwardens of Ayleshury, 1 El. & Bl. 423 - - - 235 
 
 Eoherts v. Peroival, Hopw. & Philb. 121 ; 34 L. J. 0. P- 84 - - 81 
 Eodden v. Stewart, Lawson's Notes of Decisions (Dubhn, 1894), pp. 207 
 
 et sqq. - - - . _ . . _ 430 
 
 Eogers!;. Harvey, K &G. 169; 5 0. B. N. S. 3 - - - 203 
 
 Sogers «. Lewis, K. &G. 279; .7 C.B.N. S. 29 - - - - 333 
 
 S. 
 
 Sale, In re, Colt. 152 ; 50 L. J. C. P. 113 - - - - - 198 
 
 Samuel v. Hitchmough, K. & Gr. 522 ; 32 L. J. 0. P. 55 - - 64 
 
 Sheldon v. Platcher, 2 Lutw. 11 ; 17 L. J. C. P. 34 - - 40, 308 
 
 Simpson v. "Wilkinson, 1 Lutw. 168, 178 ; 7 M. & G. 50, 60 - - 185 
 
 Smith V. Chandler, Fox & Smith, 129 ; 22 Q,. B. D. 208 410 
 
 Smith V. HoU, Hopw. & Philb. 11 ; 33 L. J. C. P. 59 - - 78, 192 
 
 Smith V. Hoiloway, Hopw. & Philb. 281 ; L. E. 1 0. P. 145 - 173 
 
 Smith V. Overseers of SeghiU, L. E. 10 Q. B. 422 - - - 157 
 
 ■ Smith V. Woolston, 2 Hopw. & Colt. 421; 4 0. P. D. 73 - 113, 429 
 
 Spear v. Bodmin Union, 43 L. T. N. S. 127 ; 49 L. J. M. C. 69 - 235 
 
 Spittall V. Brook, Fox & Smith, 22; 18 Q,. B. D. 426 - - 33, loo 
 
 Stowe V. JoEifle, L. E. 9 C. P. 734 - - . . - ' 8 
 
 Stribling v. Halse, Colt. 409 ; 16 Q. B. D. 246 - - 415, 423 
 
 L 
 
 T. 
 
 Thompson v. Ward, 1 Hopw. & Colt. 537; L. E. 6 C. P. 327 - - 421 
 
 Toms V. Cuming, 1 Lutw. 200; 7 M. & G. 88 - - - - 173 
 
 Torish v. Clark (Monaghan's Case), 18 L. E. Ir. 285 - - - igi 
 
 Townshend v. St. Marylebone, L. E. 7 0. P. 143 - - - - 338 
 
 - Trotter v. Walker, K. & G. 534 ; 13 C. B. N. S. 30 - - - 180 
 
TABLE OF CASES CITED. XIU 
 
 V. 
 
 PAOE 
 
 Vioar of Hereford, Heywood's County Elections, p. 117 - - - 224 
 
 W. 
 
 Watson V. Pitt, 2 Lutw. 73 ; 5 0. B. 77 - - - 144 
 
 WeUsu. Stanforth, Colt. 451; leU. B. D. 244 - - 66,133,155 
 
 WMte V. Trustees ofBritish Museum, 6 Bing. 310 - - - 244 
 
 WMtliom V. Tiomas, 1 Lut-w. 125 ; 7 M. & G. 1 - - - - 297 
 
 Wilson V. Buchanan, 20 L. E. Ir. 213 - - - - - 222 
 
 Wood V. Chandler, Fox & Smith 61 ; 20 Q. B. D. 297 - - 136, 173 
 
 Wood V. Leadbitter, 13 M. & W. 838 235 
 
 Woollett V. Davis, 1 Lutw. 607 ; 4 0. B. 115 - - - 39, 306 
 
TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. 
 
 PAOE 
 
 10 Geo. 4, c. 44, s. 18 1 
 
 2 & 3 Wm. 4, c. 45, s. 27 125, 227, 293, 310, 338 
 
 s. 28 327, 338 
 
 s. 29 263 
 
 s. 30 166 
 
 s. 31 36 
 
 B. 32 52 
 
 s. 36 7, 64, 70, 186 
 
 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26 248 
 
 evict. 0. 18, s. 7 40 
 
 B. 13 289 
 
 s. 15 266 
 
 B. 17 63, 91, 142, 287, 303, 368, 373 
 
 B. 39 380 
 
 s. 41 250 
 
 B. 42 250, 252, 283, 381 
 
 B. 100 u 84, 142, 360 
 
 30 & 31 Vict. 0. 102, s. 3 4, 103, 123, 271, 331, 422 
 
 s. 4 19, 115 
 
 s. 26 151, 327 
 
 B. 30(2) 115, 155, 402 
 
 B. 30 (3) 13 
 
 8. 59 327 
 
 32 4 33 Vict. 0. 41, s. 19 96, 157, 327 
 
 41 &42 Vict. 0. 26, s. 5 412 
 
 s. 14 157, 327 
 
 s. 22 12, 289, 409 
 
 s. 23 14B, 241 
 
 B. 24 266, 340, 345 
 
 s. 25 148, 241 
 
 B. 28 (1) (2) 47, 118, 146, 281, 306, 357, 375, 402 
 
 B.28(7) 1 
 
 s. 28 (10) 16 
 
 s. 28 (12) .273, 357 
 
 s. 28 (13) 206, 273, 281, 367 
 
 a. 28 (U) 264, 377 
 
XYl TABLE OF STATUTES CITED. 
 
 PAQIi 
 
 45 & 46 Viot. 0. 60, s. 9 96, 161, 323 
 
 s. 9 (2) (b) 426 
 
 s.9{2)(d) 327 
 
 s. 32 157 
 
 s. 33 (2) .'328 
 
 ' d. 147 , 164 
 
 48 Viot. 0. 3, 8. 3 22, 94, 160, 162, 422 
 
 n. 6 125, 227, 338 
 
 s. 7(7) 238 
 
 8. 9 (9) 327 
 
 B. 10 320 
 
 48 Viot. 0. 15, s. 6 (2) 382 
 
 8. 18 , 41,47, 61, 134, 152 
 
 Soh. III., Part II., ol. 36 (e) 18 
 
 48 & 49 Vict. c. 23, 88. 9, 18, 23 386 
 
 48 & 49 Viot. u. 46, S8. 1, 4 26 
 
 51 Vict. 0. 10, s. 2 161 
 
 s. 3 126, 338 
 
 8.7(5) 252 
 
 61 & 62 Viot. 0. 41, s. 2 161 
 
 EEEATA. 
 
 Page 28, luiTSv&om top : For " sec. 6," read " sec. 4." 
 
 Page 67, note (a), rechi^ 16 Z. J. C. P. 132 ; S.C. sub nm. Eidaforth v. Fan-», . 
 1 iMtw. 617." 
 
 Page 227 (Headnote), line 1 fronKi^om •.For"Z&i Will, i," read "2 & 3 Will. 4." 
 
 Page 278, line 8 from bottom: For "^^ks^ read "Fox & Smith." 
 
 Page 340 (Headnote), line 8 from top : For "'?«k,& 41 Viot.," read " 41 & 42 Viet." 
 
 Page 360 (Headnote), line 25 : For "cap. 8," read "htQ, 18.' 
 
CASES 
 
 ARGUED AND DETERMINED 
 
 IN THE 
 
 QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION 
 
 OF 
 
 THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, 
 
 UNDER STATS. 6 & 7 VICT. c. 18, 
 
 AND 
 
 41 & 42 VICT. G. 26, 
 
 DURING 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS, 1886. 
 
 IN THE 
 
 FIFTIETH YEAR OF QUEEN VICTORIA. 
 
 DouLON, Appellant; Halse, Respondent, 
 A T a Court held on the 22nd of October, 1886, for the 1836. 
 
 "^ . . Sec 4 
 
 purpose of revising the lists of voters for the borough 
 
 of St. Panffi'as within the county of Middlesex by one stableappoiut- 
 of the Barristers appointed to revise the lists of parlia- Qg^'^^}? ■ 
 mentary voters for the said county and the boroughs i°<=apaoit»'ed 
 
 •' JO from voting at 
 
 therein, the name of the appellant appeared in the *" election for 
 
 a borough 
 
 occupiers' list for the South Division of the said borough within the 
 
 ,.» , , . p 1 Ti- 1 Metropolitan 
 
 as qualified by the occupation of a dwelling-house. Police Dis- 
 
 It was then proved to the Revising Barrister and where such 
 
 admitted by the appellant that he tlie appellant was on ^S°on the 
 
 the last day of July, 1886, a constable in the Metro- j^iy^^y^e! 
 
 oomeBtheduty 
 of the Revising Barrister under 41 & 42 Vict, c. 26, sec. 28, sub-s. (7) to expunge the 
 constable's name from the list, whether notice of objection has been given or not. 
 
 roL. J. B 
 
MlCHAiaMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1886. politan Police Force, appointed by virtue of the Act 
 
 DoPLo^ 10 Geo. 4, c. 44. By the 18th section of that Act if is 
 
 „ ■'• enacted that '' no Justice of the Peace or Receiver 
 
 Halse. 
 
 appointed by virtue of this Act shall, during the con- 
 tinuance of such appointment, be capable of being 
 elected or of sitting as a member of the House of 
 Commons; and no Justice, Receiver, or person belong- 
 ing to the Police Force appointed by virtue of this Act 
 shall, during the time that he shall continue in any 
 such office, or within six calendar months after ho shall 
 have quitted the same, be capable of giving his vote for 
 the election of a member to serve in Parliament for the 
 counties of Middlesex, Surrey, Hereford, Essex, or 
 Kent, or for any city or borough within the Metropoli- 
 tan Police District; . . . and if any such Justice, 
 Receiver, or person belonging to the Police Force 
 shall offend therein, he shall forfeit the sum of one 
 hundred pounds, to be recovered by any person who 
 will sue for the^ same " in manner in the said section 
 provided. 
 
 The borough of St. Panoras is within the Metro- 
 politan Police District. 
 
 No objection had been made to the appellant's name 
 being retained in the said list on the ground of his 
 being such constable as aforesaid, though an objection 
 liad been made on other grounds, which was not 
 sustained. 
 
 It was contended on behalf of the appellant that, not- 
 withstanding the provisions of 10 Geo. 4, c. 44, s. 18, 
 he was entitled to have his name retained on the said 
 list for the following reasons : — 
 
 1. That the incapacity (if any) imposed by that 
 section was merely an incapacity to vote and did not 
 extend to registration. In support of this contention 
 
V. 
 
 Halsb. 
 
 L VICTORIA. 
 
 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 45, s. 36, and 48 & 49 Vict. c. 3, s. 4, i886. 
 were referred to as showing that where the Legislature p^^J^^ 
 intended to disqualify from registration it did so in 
 express terms. 
 
 2. That by imposing a penalty of £100 on police 
 constables voting at parliamentary elections the Legis- 
 lature had shown an intention that such persons should 
 be placed on the register, since unless registered they 
 could not vote, and therefore could not incur the 
 penalty. 
 
 3. That although the earlier part of 10 Geo. 4i, c. 44, 
 s. 18, did in terms render Metropolitan Police constables 
 incapable of voting within the Metropolitan Police 
 District, the true construction of the whole section was 
 that they were entitled to vote subject to a liability to 
 the prescribed penalty. 
 
 4. That to exclude a police constable from the 
 register would indirectly create an incapacity to vote, 
 or at all events would extend such incapacity beyond 
 the time fixed for its termination, namely, six months 
 after retirement from the force. 
 
 5. That even if the appellant was as a Metropolitan 
 Police constable incapable both of voting and of being 
 registered as a voter for the said borough, his incapacity 
 was of a temporary and casual nature, and not such as 
 to justify the Revising Barrister in expunging his name 
 without objection duly made on the ground of such 
 incapacity. 
 
 The Revising Barrister decided against the appel- 
 lant's contention for the following reasons : — 
 
 1. That the distinction between an incapacity to vote 
 and an incapacity to be registered as a voter had no 
 existence in law. That most incapacities to vote arose 
 either at common law or, as in the present instance, 
 
 B 2 
 
V. 
 
 HaLiSE. 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1886. under statutes passed before any system of registration 
 Pqjji^qj, was in force. That the " legal incapacity " mentioned 
 in sec. 3 of the Representation of the People Act, 1867 
 (under which the appellant claimed), and in other 
 enactments conferring the franchise, meant an inca- 
 pacity to vote, and that those enactments themselves 
 made the absence of such legal incapacity a condition 
 of the right to be registered. That this view was 
 confirmed by the language of 41 & 42 Vict. c. 26, s. 28, 
 sub-s. 7, which required a Revising Barrister to expunge 
 the name of every person " incapacitated by any law or 
 statute from voting.'' 
 
 2. That there was nothing in the latter part of 
 10 Geo. 4, c. 44, s. 18, to cut down the incapacity to 
 vote expressly enacted by the earlier part. That the 
 imposition of a penalty on voting was in no way incon- 
 sistent with an intention to disfranchise, but was at a 
 time when no register existed a useful provision for 
 securing the observance of the law by persons whose 
 incapacity could not be discovered or suspected from 
 outward signs, as that of peers, women, infants, or 
 aliens could be from their titles, names, appearance, 
 or language. That since the establishment of a 
 register, conclusive at the time of election, the reten- 
 tion of the provision was still necessary to prevent 
 the voting of persons who had been registered by 
 nlistake or had become incapable after the lists were 
 made. 
 
 3. That for the purpose of registration the incapacity 
 of the appellant was to be ascertained on the last day 
 of July preceding the revision, and that it was immaterial 
 that he might cease to be incapable before or during 
 the currency of the register settled at such revision, the 
 case being in that respect undistinguishable from 
 
L VICTOlilA. 
 
 Lord Rendlesham v. Haward (a), and Hargreavefi v. 188G. 
 Hopper (6). Doulon 
 
 4. That the case fell within 41 & 42 Vict, c. 26, halsk. 
 s. 28, sub-s. 7 (as appeared from Stowe v. Joliffe (c), 
 followed as a binding authority with regard to this 
 sub-section in flayward v. Scott (d), and that the Re- 
 vising Barrister was bound to expunge the appellant's 
 name, though no objection had been made to him on the 
 ground of his being such police constable. 
 
 The appellant's name was accordingly expunged from 
 the said occupiers' list, and, notice of appeal having 
 been given, the Revising Bamster stated a case for the 
 decision of the Court whereby the foregoing facts 
 appeared. 
 
 The questions for the decision of the Court were : — 
 
 1. Whether the appellant, as a constable in the 
 Metropolitan Police Force, was incapacitated from being 
 registered as a voter in the said borough. 
 
 2. If he was so incapacitated, whether the Revising 
 Barrister was right in expunging his name, though not 
 objected to on the ground of such incapacity. 
 
 If either of these questions was answered in the 
 negative the register was to be amended by restoring 
 the name of the appellant in the said occupiers' list. 
 
 Beddall for the appellant. The Revising Barrister 
 was wrong in expunging the appellant's name from 
 the register, on the ground that he was a con- 
 stable in the Metropolitan Police Force, no notice 
 of objection upon that ground having been given. 
 
 (a) 2 Hopw. <fc Colt. 176 ; L. R. (c) L R. S> C. P. 734. 
 
 9 a. P. 252. (rf) Coll. 76 ; L. R. h C. P. 
 
 (6) 2 Hopw <fc GuU. 304 ; L. R. D. 231. 
 1 a P. D. 196. 
 
MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1886. The Barrister intended to act under the 7th siib- 
 DouLON section of the 28th section of 41 & 42 Vict. c. 26. 
 Halsb, That section imposes certain duties and bestows certain 
 powers upon Revising Barristers, and by the 7th sub- 
 section it is enacted that the Revising Barrister " shall 
 expunge the name of every person, whether objected to 
 or not, where it is proved to the Revising Barrister that 
 such person was on the last day of July then next 
 preceding incapacitated by any law or statute from 
 voting at an election for the parliamentary borough or 
 an election for the municipal borough as the case may 
 be to which the list relates." The word " incapacitated " 
 in that sub-section cannot mean incapacitated in the 
 widest sense, or there would never be any reason to 
 give notice of objection to any person objected to, and 
 all the provisions inserted in the Acts of Parliament for 
 that purpose would be futile. It is a hardship for a 
 man to be struck off the register without an opportunity 
 of being heard to defend his vote. The word points 
 to some permanent incapacity such as is mentioned 
 in Stoiue v. Joliffe (a) — to such cases as peers and 
 women. 
 
 [Pollock B. Some inherent incapacity.] 
 
 In Hayward v. Scott (b), following Stozve v. Joliffe 
 and decided on the present sub-section, it was held that 
 the receipt of parochial relief within the qualifying 
 period did not create such an incapacity as to make it 
 the duty of the Revising Barrister to expunge the 
 voter's name in the absence of a notice of objection, 
 but was a temporary disqualification not amounting to 
 
 (a) i. S. 9 0. P. 734. (6) Colt. 76; L. R. 5 C. P. D. 231. 
 
L VICTORIA, 
 incapacity within the meaning of this sub-section. The 1886. 
 
 incapacity referred to must be some general and endur- Dodlon 
 ing incapacity to vote. A policeman's incapacity to Ha^lse. 
 vote is only temporary. 
 
 The cases of policemen and paupers are exactly 
 analogous ; a temporary incapacity to vote arises in the 
 one case by the acceptance of the office, in the other 
 by the acceptance of parochial relief. If there is a 
 distinction, it is in favour of the right of the policeman 
 to remain on the register; for, if he leaves the force, 
 he is entitled to vote at the expiration of six months ; 
 the receipt of parochial relief incapacitates for twelve 
 months. 
 
 [Pollock, B. The receipt of parochial relief creates 
 a disqualification — not an incapacity.] 
 
 There is no general incapacity in the case of a 
 policeman ; he is temporarily prohibited from voting. 
 There is less inconvenience in leaving a policeman on 
 the register than in leaving a pauper on the register . 
 for the policeman is liable to a penalty if he votes 
 within the jirohibited time, and will be deterred ac- 
 cordingly : there is no penalty on a pauper voting. 
 
 [Pollock, B. By the 36th section of the Reform 
 Act of 1832, a person who has received parochial relief 
 within the qualifying period is "not entitled to be 
 registered : " by the Metropolitan Police Act, the con- 
 stable is " not capable of giving his vote." The words 
 are quite dififerent.j 
 
 It is submitted that their effect is the same. 
 
MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1883. [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. In the first case the name 
 
 DouLON of the person is not to be put on the register ; but the 
 Halse. name of a person incapacitated by statute from voting 
 is to be expunged from the register.] 
 
 It is admitted that if notice of objection had 
 been given, the appellant would not have been en- 
 titled to be registered. Cooper y. Harris; Austens 
 Case (a) 
 
 R. M. Bray, for the respondent, was not called 
 upon. 
 
 Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. We are all of opinion that 
 the decision of the Revising Barrister was right, and 
 must be affirmed. By the Act of 10 Geo. 4, c. 44, s. 18, 
 police constables and other persons belonging to the 
 Metropolitan Police Force are rendered incapable of 
 voting at any parliamentary election for a borougli 
 within the Metropolitan Police District. To use the 
 words of Stowe v. Joliffe (b), they are persons who from 
 a quality in themselves, "for the time irremoveable " — 
 the time, that is to say, to which the revision of the 
 register relates — are by the prohibition of the statute 
 incapacitated from voting. Then the Eegistration Act 
 of 1878, s. 28, sub-s. 7, directs the Revising Barrister to 
 expunge the name of every person, whether objected to 
 or not, where it is proved to him that such person was 
 on the last day of July by law or statute incapacitated 
 from voting for the borough to which the list relates. 
 The appellant is a police constable, and incapacitated 
 by statute from voting for the borough of St. Pancras ; 
 
 (a) "i M.dcG. 97. (6) L. R. 9 C. P. 734. 
 
V. 
 
 H&L8E. 
 
 h VICTORIA. 
 
 therefore, though he was not objected to, he was very 1886. 
 properly struck off the list. It has been suggested doulon 
 that it is a hardship for a man to be struck off without 
 notice of objection. In this particular case there is no 
 ground for the suggestion, for the appellant was ob- 
 jected to on other grounds, and had, in fact, the oppor- 
 tunity of contesting the present objection to his vote 
 if it had not been well founded ; but he admitted that 
 he was a police constable. If there had been any doubt 
 of the fact, the next sub-section to the one under con- 
 sideration shows that it would have been the duty of 
 the Revising Barrister to have caused notice of the 
 proposal to expunge the name to be given to the voter, 
 or left at his place of abode ; and I am confident that 
 any Revising Banister would under proper circum- 
 stances cause such notice to be given, and adjourn 
 the decision of the case until any such doubt was 
 removed. But even had there been hardbhip, which 
 there is not, the words of the Act are plain. Both 
 on the ground of the construction of the statutes, and 
 of the authorities to which we have been referred, 
 I am of opinion that this name was rightly struck out, 
 and that the appeal must be dismissed. 
 
 Pollock, B. Notwithstanding the arguments that 
 have been addressed to us by Mr. Beddall, I think it is 
 quite clear that the Revising Barrister was right, and 
 the appellant's name was properly struck out. [The 
 learned Judge read the 7th sub-section of the Registra- 
 tion Act, 1878]. The question is, was the person, on 
 the last day of July, 1886, incapacitated by any law or 
 statute from voting at an election for the parlia- 
 mentary borough of St. Pancras, to which the list 
 under revision . related. The Act of 10 Geo. 4, c. 44, 
 
10 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1886. s. 18, enacts that no person belonging to the Metropo- 
 DoDLON ^itan Police Force shall, while he shall continue in such 
 Halse office, be capable of giving his vote for the election of 
 a member of Parliament .for any borough within the 
 Metropolitan Police District. The appellant was on 
 the last day of July, 1886, a constable in the Metropo- 
 litan Police Force, and the borough of St. Pancras is 
 within the Metropolitan Police District. As far as 
 words can be the same, not being absolutely identical, 
 the words in these two statutes are the same. We are 
 asked to give them a different meaning, on the autho- 
 rity of Hayward v. Scott (a), a case decided on other 
 words in another statute, whereby persons who have 
 received parochial relief within the qualifying period, 
 are disqualified and declared " not entitled to be regis- 
 tered." It is manifest that these words are entirely 
 different from those in the statute of Geo. 4. To yield 
 to such an argument in the face of the plain words of 
 the statutes which we have to interpret would be a 
 violation of every sound rule of construction. I agree 
 that the appeal must be dismissed. 
 
 A. L. Smith, J. I am entirely of the same opinion, 
 and I confess that when the statutes are looked at, the 
 question seems to me unarguable. [The learned Judge 
 read the words of the 18 th section of the Act of Geo- 4, 
 before set out]. What is the meaning of that ? Is that 
 being " incapacitated from voting ? " Of course it is, 
 and as soon as the fact that the appellant was a Metro- 
 politan Police constable was established before the 
 Revising Barrister, it became his duty under the 
 
 (o) Colt. 76 ; L. R.5 C. P. D. 231. 
 
L VICTORIA. 11 
 
 28th section of the Registration Act, 1878, sub-s. 7, 1886. 
 to expunge the name from the register. The decision dohlon 
 was right and must be affirmed. Halsk 
 
 Appeal dismissed. 
 
 Solicitors — For the Appellant, G. B. Crook. 
 
 For the Respondent, Halse, Trustram & Go. 
 
12 MICHAELMAS SITTIN(;S. 
 
 Hersant, Appellant ; Halse, Eespondent. 
 
 1886. AT a Court held on the 25th of October, 1886, for 
 
 Dec. 4. 
 
 the purpose of revising the lists of voters for the borough 
 
 tialpartof the °f ^^- Pcmcras, -within the county of Middlesex, by one 
 ?orVhe'lodeer °^ *^® Barristers appointed to revise the lists of parlia- 
 frauchiseto mentarv voters for the said county and the boroughs 
 
 nave claimed ■' j o 
 
 to be regis- therein, the name of William Henry Humphrey 
 
 tared. Where J r ^ 
 
 no such claim appeared in the old lodgers' list for the South Division 
 
 has, in fact, 
 
 been maHe, of the said boroug'a, the entry relating to him being 
 
 the overseers . . . it mi 
 
 eannothypub- in the ordinary lorm oi the entries m such list. Ihe 
 on the old*™^ appellant duly objected to the said name being retained 
 wai^T-thi^re- ^"^ *'^® ^^^^ ^^^^ upon the ground that the said William 
 quisite. Henry Humphrey had not claimed to be registered in 
 
 /fames v. Hop- a l o o 
 
 *ms,J'.<fcG. manner provided by sec. 22 of 41 & 42 Vict. c. 26. 
 
 118 J £il L. J» 
 
 a p. 6, distin- The evidence showed that the said Williain Henry 
 
 gjiished. 
 
 Hum.fhrey had made no claim of any kind ; but his 
 name had been inserted in the said list by a mistake, 
 which had arisen under the following circumstances. 
 
 The overseers, in making out the said list, instead of 
 causing it to be printed de novo from the old lodger 
 claims served upon them, had caused it to be printed 
 from a copy of the lodgers' list contained in the current 
 register for the said division, from which copy they had 
 erased, or intended to erase, those names in respect of 
 vi^hich no claims had been received. They had, how- 
 ever, omitted to erase the name of the said William 
 
L VICTORIA. 13 
 
 Henry Humphrey, which was on the said register, and 1886. 
 failed to discover their mistake before the said old HERSA^T 
 lodgers' list had been signed and published. HjIbk. 
 
 It was contended, on behalf of the appellant, that 
 the principle established by Davies v. Hopkins (a), and 
 Leonard v. Alloways (b), did not apply to lodgers^ — (1) 
 because by 30 & 31 Vict. c. 102, sec. 4, the making of a 
 claim was an indispensable part of the qualification for 
 the lodger franchise, see Cullen v. Patterson (a) ; (2) 
 because by sec. 30, sub-see. 3 of the same Act, lodger 
 claimants were placed in the same position, as to proof 
 of claims, as claimants omitted from the overseers' lists 
 of voters, and consequently they were subject to the 
 law laid down in Re Sale (d) ; and (3) because the de- 
 cisions in Meade v. Cooper (e), Mathew v. Magrath (/), 
 and Edivards v. Lang (g), were inconsistent with Re 
 Sale (d), and ought not to be followed ; and that the 
 Revising Barrister ought to admit the evidence and 
 expuiige the name of the said William Henry 
 Humphrey. 
 
 The Revising Barrister held that it was not com- 
 petent for him to require proof of the making of a 
 claim by the said William Henry Humphrey on the 
 grounds — (1) That though it might be admitted that 
 Re Sale (d) applied to the lodgers' list, as existing 
 before the Act 41 & 42 Vict. c. 26, and to the new 
 lodgers' list as existing since, yet that the old lodgers' 
 list was,- by sec. 22 of the last-cited Act, to be deemed 
 a list of voters, and was thereby brought within the 
 principle of Davies v. Hopkins (a) and Leonard v. 
 
 {a)K.Jia.nS;2lL.J.C.P.6. (d) Colt. 152 ; 50 L. J. C. P. US. 
 
 (b) 2 ffopw. <fe CoU. 411 ; 48 L.J. (e) Ir. JJ. 1 iJ. <fc L. A. App. 12. 
 C.P. 81. (/) Ihid. 14. 
 
 (c) 18 L. R. (Ir.) 274. ig) Ibid. 22. 
 
14 MICHAELMAS SITTINfiS. 
 
 1886. Alloways (a) ; (2) that besides the reasons given in 
 Hbrsant JDavies v. Hopkins, there was an additional reason for 
 Ha'lse. refusing to go behind the list in the case of an old 
 lodger — ^namely, that he might, by seeing his name in 
 the list, have been deterred from making a valid claim 
 in time to be entered on the register as a new lodger. 
 The evidence was accordingly rejected, and the name 
 of the said Willmm Henry Humphrey retained on the 
 said old lodgers' list. 
 
 Notice of appeal having been given, the Kevising 
 Barrister stated a case for the opinion of the Court, 
 whereby the foregoing facts appeared. The question 
 for the decision of the Court was, whether the Revising 
 Barrister ought to have required proof of the making of 
 a claim by the said William Henry Hwmphrey. If 
 this question was answered in the affirmative, the 
 register was to be amended by erasing the name of the 
 said William Henry Hurnphrey from the said old 
 lodgers' list. 
 
 Bompas, Q.C., for the appellant. 
 
 The question in this case is whether the sending in 
 of a claim is part of the qualification of a lodger, or 
 whether it is only a means of getting on to the over- 
 seers' list. The Revising Barrister has held, on the 
 supposed authority of Bavies v. Hopkins (b), that since 
 the name of William Henry Humphrey appeared on 
 the list, though by a mistake, the overseers had waived 
 the necessity for a claim, and that, therefore, no evidence 
 of a claim having been made could be called for before' 
 the Revising Barrister. This cannot be right if the 
 making of a claim is part of the qualification for the 
 
 (a) 2 ITopw. & CoU. 411 ; 48 L. J. (b) K. & 0. US ; 27 L. J. O. P. 6. 
 a P. 81. 
 
L VICTOlilA. 
 
 lodger franchise. The lodger franchise is created by 1886. 
 
 the 4th section of the Representation of the People Heesant 
 
 V. 
 
 Act, 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 102). That section enacts halse. 
 that every man shall be entitled to be registered as a 
 voter, and to vote " who is qualified as follows (that is 
 to say) (1) Is of full age and not subject to any legal 
 incapacity. (2) As a lodger has occupied lodgings '' of 
 the specified value under the specified conditions. "(.S) 
 Has resided in such lodgings during the twelve months 
 immediately preceding the last day of July, and has 
 claimed to be registered as a voter at the next ensuing 
 registration of voters." This enactment makes the 
 sending in of a claim an integral part of the qualifica- 
 tion, and the Court of Appeal in Ireland has so decided 
 in Cullen v. Patterson (a), where it was held that the 
 Revising Barrister had no power, under 48 Vict. c. 17, 
 sec. 4, to transfer a name which appeared on the occu- 
 piers' list to the lodgers' list, although it was proved 
 that the true qualification of the applicant was (if he 
 had sent in a proper claim) a lodger qualification, and 
 not an occupation qualification. That case overrules 
 the other Irish cases of Meade v. Cooper (b), Mathew v. 
 Magrath (c), and Edwards v. Lang {d). 
 
 The way in which a lodger claim is to be made is 
 given in the 1867 Act, and that makes no distinction 
 between the claims to be made by old lodgers and by 
 new lodgers. This, no doubt, is altered by 41 & 42 
 Vict. c. 26, which, by sec. 22, permits lodgers on the 
 existing register who desire to be entered on the next 
 register in respect of the same lodgings to claim to be 
 so entered by sending notice to the overseers on or 
 before the 25th of July. The overseers are, on or 
 
 (a) 18 L. R. {Ir.) 274. (c) Ibid. 14. 
 
 (6) Ir. F.IR. d! L. A. Xip^. 12. (d) lUd. 22. 
 
16 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1886. before the last day of July, to make out a list of all 
 HteKiANT persons so claiming, and these li.its, when published, are 
 Halse. *° ^^ '' deemed to be lists of voters '' as distinguished 
 from lists of claimants. But the enactment does not 
 render it any the less necessary for a kdger, old or new, 
 to send in a claim. The old lodgers' list is a list of 
 persons '" so claiming," and if the overseers insert in 
 such a list the name of a person who has not so 
 claimed, they cannot thereby waive a condition which 
 by the 1867 Act is made a necessary part of the lodger 
 voter's qualification. In the case of other voters, the 
 making of a claim is not made by Parlianient a part of 
 the qualification, but only a means of getting on to the 
 list ; and if the man has the qualification and is on the 
 list, the question of claim becomes immaterial. That 
 is the distinction between this case and Davies v. 
 Hopkins (a) and Leonard v. Alloways (b). The appel- 
 lant satisfied the conditions of objection set out in 41 & 
 42 Vict. c. 26, sec. 28, sub-sec. 10 ; and, thereupon, it was 
 for William Henry Humphrey to prove his qualifica- 
 tion according to sub-sec. 11 of the same statute. 
 This he has not done, for he has failed to 
 prove that he made any claim as a lodger ; and 
 it was the duty of the Revising Barrister to 
 expunge the name. 
 
 R. M. Bray, for the respondent. 
 
 Under the Representation of the People Act, 1867, 
 it was necessary for all persons claiming the franchise 
 as lodgers, whether they had been on the register before 
 or not, to make a fresh claim in each year, under the 
 
 (a) K. & a. 118 ; 27 L. J. C. (5) 2 Ifopw. i Colt. 411 ■ 48 
 
 P. 6. Z. /. C. P. 81, 
 
L VICTORIA. 17 
 
 provisions of sec. 30, sub-sec. 2, of that Act, and there 1886. 
 was to be only one list of such claimants. The Parlia- Hebsant 
 mentary and Municipal Eegistration Act of 1878 Halse. 
 altered this, and by sec. 22 gave an advantage to 
 old lodgers by enabling them to claim on or before the 
 25th of July in any year, and in that case directing the 
 overseers to make out a separate list of such old lodgers, 
 which, for the pui-pose of registration, is to be deemed a 
 list of voters, and not merely a list of claimants., 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. That list is only to be a 
 list of persons " so claiming." In the present case there 
 is no claim at all.] 
 
 In the case of Davies v. Hopkins (a) there was no 
 claim; but the overseers having entered the voter's 
 name on the list, the omission of a proper claim was 
 held to be waived. 
 
 [A. L. Smith, J. In the case of ownership voters the 
 making of a claim is not imported into the definition of 
 the actual qualification.] 
 
 [Pollock, B. The overseers included this name in 
 the list by pure accident, and without intending to 
 waive anything. Do you contend that overseers may 
 waive an objection that goes to the qualification ?] 
 
 It is dangerous to go into the motives of the overseers 
 in putting the name into the list. The name was pub- 
 lished, and the voter was entitled to rely on that. 
 Parliament has said that in every case to entitle a man 
 
 {a)K.&G.n8; 27L.J.C.P.6. 
 
18 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 ^^^^- to be registered he must make a claim ; but in Davies 
 Hersant v. Hopkins (a) and Leonard v. AUoways (b), the name 
 
 y, 
 
 Hamb. being actually in the list, the existence of the claim or 
 the propriety of its form were considered immaterial. 
 
 [A. L. Smith, J. Here the objection is not simply 
 "30U have not claimed properly;" but, "you are not 
 qualified because you have made no claim, a claim 
 being part of a lodger's qualification."] 
 
 If that be so, the Act of 1878 does not give any 
 advantage to the old lodgers. 
 
 [Pollock, B. Yes, it does ; because if the}' send in 
 their claim in proper time, and are put on the list, they 
 cannot be objected to without notice. It is an advan- 
 tage qua registration, and not qua qualification.] 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.CJ. Moreover, the advantage 
 is only given to old lodgers on the list " so made out."] 
 
 Seeing his name in the old lodgers' list, William 
 Henry Humphrey would naturally think it unneces- 
 sary to send in a claim to be inserted in the lodger 
 claimants' list ; he has been misled by the act of the 
 overseers, and it is a hardship upon him that he should 
 be disfranchised. Even if HuTnphrey had sent in a 
 new claim before the 20th of August, it would not 
 (according to the terms of the instructions to over- 
 seers contained in 48 Vict. c. 15, Schedule 3, Part II., 
 clause 35, (c),) be the duty of the overseers to insert his 
 
 (a) K. Jj 0. 118; 27 L. J. 0. (6) 2 Mopw. & Colt. 411 : 48 
 
 P. 6. L. J. G. P. 81. 
 
L VICTORIA. 19 
 
 name in the new lodger claimants' list, which is only to 1886. 
 include "persons claiming to be inserted in a list of Heesant 
 Parliamentary voters as lodgers, but not comprised in halse. 
 the old lodgers' list ;" so that there is no list for a person 
 whose name is inserted in the old lodgers' list by error 
 to go into at all, even if he claims, unless his name is 
 to remain in that old lodgers' list. 
 
 [Per Curiam. If overseers refused to insert such a 
 claimant's name in the claimants' list on such a ground, 
 we think their refusal would be overscrupulous.] 
 
 In three Irish cases, Meade v. Cooper {a), Mathew 
 V. Magrath (b), and Edwards v. Lang (c), it has been 
 held that the principle of Davies v. Hopkins (d) applies 
 to lodger claims as well as to other claims ; and iii 
 Cullen V. Patterson (e), where these cases were not 
 cited, and the point was not argued, the claimant had 
 neither sent in a claim, nor had he been published on 
 any lodgers' list, which distinguishes that decision from 
 this case. It is submitted that Davies v. Hopkins (/) 
 is exactly in point, and that the appeal ought to be 
 dismissed. 
 
 Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. In this case we are of 
 opinion that the decision of the Revising Barrister was 
 wrong. It appears to me that it is an essential part of 
 the qualification of a lodger that he should, according 
 to the words of 30 & 31 Vict. c. 102, s. 4, have 
 " claimed to be registered as a voter." That is part of 
 the qualification of the voter in the Statute which 
 
 (a) Ir. R.\ R.Jb L. A. App. 12. (d) K. & G. 118 ; 27 L. J. 0. P. 6. 
 
 (h)Ibid.\i. {e) 18 L. R (/r.) 27 i, 
 
 [c) Ibid. 22. (/) S.d; G. 118 ; 27 L. J.C. P. 6. 
 
 2 
 
20 MICIIAULMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1886. defines the franchise. The Act of 41 & 42 Vict. c. 2(5, 
 HEB9AHT s. 22, points out the way of making the claim where 
 Halbe. *^^ voter is on the register for the past year as a 
 lodger, and desires to be entered on the next register in 
 respect of the same lodgings. When such a voter has 
 made his claim, the overseers are to publish his name 
 in the list as directed by the section. Though the 
 claim is made in one form in the case of old lodgers, 
 and in another in the case of new claimants, yet in 
 each case to have made the claim is part of the lodger's 
 qualification. William Henry Humphreys has made 
 no claim in either form. The making of a claim is one 
 of the elements of the qualification which neither the 
 overseers, nor the Court, nor any other power short of 
 the authority of Parliament can excuse, being, as it is, a 
 necessary constituent of the qualification. It has been 
 urged upon us that the voter may have been misled by 
 seeing his name in the list as published, and may have 
 therefore neglected to send in a claim. The answer is, 
 that the voter was aware that he had made no claim, 
 and so it is his own fault if he was misled. And as I 
 pointed out in the last case we had before us (a), hard- 
 ship on a voter, even if it existed, cannot be permitted 
 to induce the Court to do away with the clear words of 
 an Act of Parliament. The case of Bavies v. Hop- 
 kins (b), which has been pressed upon us, is distinguish- 
 able. Tha,t is one of the cases which deal with the 
 machinery of registration. It decides that where all 
 the elements of the qualification exist, there may be 
 circumstances under which the conditions precedent to 
 gettin_g the voter's name upon the list may be dispensed 
 with, when the name is actually on the list. If the 
 
 (a) Ante, p. 9. (J) K. * Q, 118 ; 27 L. J. C. P. 6. 
 
L ViCTORIA, 21 
 
 name is on the list, the condition of getting it on the 1886. 
 list is passed by. But, as Mr. Justice Williavis himself Hebsant 
 pointed out in the case cited, this can only apply where Halsf. 
 the complete qualification exists in the voter. In the 
 case of lodgers, a complete qualification does not exist 
 unless a claim has been made. That is expressly de- 
 cided in Gullen v. Patterson (a), by the Court of 
 Appeal in Ireland, and with that decision I entirely 
 concur. The appeal must therefore be allowed. 
 
 Pollock, B. I have come to the same conclusion, 
 and for the same reasons. To decide otherwise would 
 be to create a qualification for the franchise which does 
 not exist under the terms of the Act of Parliament. In 
 Bavies v. Hopkins (b), the question of the voter's 
 qualification was never raised or interfered with. All 
 that was waived was matter of form. The name in 
 that case being upon the list, and the voter possessing 
 the legal qualification, the Court refused to inquire into 
 the regularity of the method by which the name got 
 upon the list ; and applied the maxim, factum valet 
 quod fieri non debuit. I agree that this appeal must 
 be allowed. 
 
 A. L. Smith, J. I am of the same opinion, and I 
 have nothing to add. 
 
 Appeal allowed. 
 
 Solicitors — For Appellant, James M. McDonnell. 
 
 For Respondent, Halse, Trustram, & Go. 
 
 (a) 18 L. R. (Ir.) 274. (6) K. ds Q. 118; 27 L. J. C. P. 6. 
 
MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 Spittall, Appellant ; Bkook, Eespondent. 
 
 1886. AT a Court held for the revision of the lists of voters 
 
 !__! for the borough of Warrington the name of the appellant 
 
 SbL*a'"™ appeared in Division 2 of the occupiers' list for the 
 ^''^^1J°s^''™=nownship of Warrington. The appellant was duly 
 military ser- objected to as not being; an inhabitant occupier within 
 
 vice, and the ■' ° 
 
 rules of Buch the meaning of sec. 3 of the Representation of the 
 
 scrvicG 
 
 compel his People Act, 1884 (48 Vict. c. 3), and in support of the 
 such dwelling- objection the following facts were proved before the 
 
 house durini' a -d ■ - -n • i 
 peri,.d of Revising Barrister :— 
 
 twenty-seven -pj^g appellant was a married non-commissioned officer 
 
 days within '^ '^ 
 
 the qualifying residing with his wife and family in the Orford Barracks, 
 
 year, the in- '^ •' '' 
 
 habitanoy is Warrington, in separate rooms allotted him by the 
 
 broken and 
 
 the man is not military authorities, such rooms constituting a dwelling- 
 entitled to the ip-iiii'ici -1 
 franchise houss partly furnished by himself. The rooms occupied 
 
 c. 3, sec. 3. t)y him had been assigned by the quartermaster, and 
 
 reasonable ^ might be changed at his (the quartermaster's) dis- 
 
 leavetore- cretion, but had been retained by the appellant during 
 
 from time to jj^g qualifying year. The appellant had been com- 
 
 the said period pulsorily absent on duty at Altcar, in the conntv of 
 
 of twenty- r- j j ' ^ j 
 
 seven days, Lancaster, for twenty-seven days during the qualifying 
 
 usually . -I J o 
 
 granted, year, but while so absent on duty his name was retained 
 
 held, to make , i p i Tir • 
 
 no difference, on the Strength 01 the Warrington regimental depot 
 in the monthly return of the forces made by the 
 Commanding Officer to the War Office, and the rooms 
 continued to be occupied by his furniture and family. 
 
L VICTORIA. 23 
 
 It was not denied that the quartermaster could resume 1 886. 
 possession of the rooms at any time by allotting the spittall 
 appellant other premises, but, in fact, no such resump- brook 
 tion had taken place. 
 
 The appellant could not, while compulsorily absent 
 on duty at Altcar or elsewhere, return to personal in- 
 habitancy of his rooms without a written permission or 
 pass signed by the Colonel or Commanding Officer pre- 
 scribing the number of hours and the purpose for which 
 it was granted, as well as the hours between which the 
 pass could be used. Reasonable leave was usually 
 granted to persons in the position of the appellant as 
 of course, and the appellant had, in fact, availed him- 
 self of the privilege accorded and returned to Warrington 
 for one or more days during the period of compulsory 
 absence aforesaid. 
 
 The objection taken to the name of the appellant 
 being on the said occupiers' list was that he had not 
 occupied the qualifying premises for the qualifying 
 period. 
 
 The Eevising Barrister found that the appellant had 
 not occupied during the qualifying period, as he could 
 not return except by leave as aforesaid without a breach 
 of duty, and without subjecting himself to a trial by 
 court-martial, and struck out his name accordingly. 
 
 The appellant gave notice of appeal from this de- 
 cision, and if the Court should be of opinion that the 
 constructive inhabitancy of the appellant had been on 
 the above-stated facts made out, his name was to be 
 reinstated in the said list. 
 
 The names of nineteen other persons were included 
 in a schedule appended to the case stated by the Re- 
 vising Barrister. The facts with regard to each of 
 these persons were similar to the facts stated with 
 
24 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1886. regard to the appellant, except that for Jmnes Logan 
 Sputall (a warrant oflScer), one of the nineteen, a verbal per- 
 Beo'ok. mission to return to the personal inhabitancy of his 
 rooms was deemed by the military authorities sufficient 
 in place of the written permission or pass above reT 
 ferred to. These nineteen persons also appealed against 
 the decision of the Revising Barrister in striking out 
 their names respectively, and, all the appeals being con- 
 solidated, the Revising Barrister named the present 
 appellant and respondent to be appellant and respondent 
 in the consolidated appeal. 
 
 Pierpoint, for the appellant. It is submitted that 
 this case is distinguishable from the case of Ford v. 
 Barnes (a), which the Revising Barrister intended to 
 follow. Here it is found as a fact that reasonable leave 
 to return to Warrington from Altcar was usually, and 
 as of course, granted by the military authorities to the 
 appellant and others in his posititm. The appellant 
 could therefore return to his quarters from time to 
 time without breach of any legal obligation, and his 
 inhabitancy of his rooms was continuous and un- 
 broken. 
 
 Henn Collins, Q.C., for the respondent, was not 
 called upon to argue. 
 
 Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. This appeal must be dis- 
 missed, with costs. The case is substantially identical 
 with Ford v. Barnes (a), and we should have to over- 
 rule that case to decide this differently. " Reasonable 
 leave " does not mean that the appellant could have 
 
 {a) Colt. 396 ; i. R. 16 Q. B. D. 254, 268. 
 
Tu VICTORIA. 25 
 
 returned at his pleasure or every night to Warrington. 1886. 
 
 The appellant's inhabitancy was compulsorily broken Spittali, 
 by the rules of the service which gave him the bbook. 
 inhabitancy. 
 
 Pollock, B., and A. L. Smith, J., concurred. 
 
 Appeal dismissed. 
 
 Solicitors — For Appellant, Nicholson, White, & 
 Nicholson, Warrington. 
 
 For Respondent, Patterson, Snow, & 
 Bloxham, for W. &. G. Brook, 
 Warrington. 
 
26 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 HoNEYBONE, Appellant ; Hambidoe and an- 
 other, Respondents. 
 
 1886. 
 
 Dec. i. 
 
 The words 
 
 A T a Court held by the Barrister appointed to revise 
 
 the list of voters for the Banbury or Northern Division 
 "medical or of ^i^e county of Oxford. Thovias Honeybone, the 
 
 surgical assist- 
 ance," as used appellant, duly claimed to be inserted on the list of 
 
 in the Medical 
 
 Relief Dia- occuption voters as an inhabitant householder. 
 
 Kemoval Act, It was proved that the appellant had duly given 
 
 1885, include i.--ri.-i-j.j.i ri.- -i. j 
 
 all assistance notice 01 his claim to the oversecrs oi his parish, and 
 surgical ^n its *^^* ^® '^^ ^° ^^^ respects entitled to be registered as a 
 th*"'^hth" voter for the said division unless disqualified by the 
 person afford- matters hereinafter stated. 
 
 ingsuch assist- 
 ance is not a On or about the 20th of November, 1885, Naomi 
 qualifiedmedi- 
 
 cal or surgical Honeybone, the wife of the appellant, made an'applica- 
 The services tion to the relieving officer for the Chipping Norton 
 ti6cated mid- Union in which the said parish is situate that she might 
 at thrrapense ^^ attended during her then approaching confinement 
 ofthepansh ^ly a medical man. The said application was laid 
 
 to a voter 3 ■' ^'^ 
 
 wife, held, _ before the board of guardians for the said union on the 
 
 under the cir- 
 
 oumstances of 25th of November, 1885, and the guardians passed a 
 
 the case to . ..,,.. 
 
 create no dis- resolution permitting the relieving officer to give the 
 
 said Naomi Honeybone an order for the medical man to 
 
 attend her during her confinement. The said Naomi 
 
 Honeybone made no further application to the relieving 
 
 officer; and at her confinement, which took place in 
 
 January, 1886, she was attended, not by a medical man. 
 
L VXCTOKIA. 27 
 
 but by a midwife named Mrs. Large. Mrs. Large held 1886. 
 no certificate as a midwife, and she attended the honbybonb 
 appellant's wife at the instance of the relieving officer jjambidqe 
 and not at the request or apparently with the know- ■*'"' 
 ledge of the medical officer. On or about the 15th of 
 January, 1886, the said relieving officer, on the applica- 
 tion of the said midwife, paid her the sum of 4s. in 
 respect of her said attendance on the wife of the appel- 
 lant. Neither the appellant nor his wife asked the 
 relieving officer to pay the said sum of 4s. or any other 
 sum to the midwife as aforesaid. The usual practice in 
 the district of the said relieving officer was for the 
 guardians to pay the sum of 10s. 6d. to the medical 
 man for attendance at a confinement under an order, 
 and if a midwife attended in place of a medical man 
 the relieving officer was authorised by the guardians to 
 pay such midwife the sum of 4s. in respect of her 
 attendance. 
 
 Upon these facts it was objected that the appellant 
 was not entitled to be registered as a voter by reason of 
 his having during the qualifying year received parochial 
 relief. 
 
 It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the 
 relief proved to have been given to his wife was 
 " medical or surgical attendance," within the meaning of 
 the Medical Relief Disqualification Removal Act, 1885 
 (48 & 49 Vict. c. 46), and that by virtue of that Act its 
 receipt did not disqualify him from being so registered. 
 
 The Revising Barrister was of opinion — (1) that 
 inasmuch as the relief given was afforded by an uncerti- 
 ficated midwife, and might well be something very 
 different from assistance at all, it could not be said to 
 be either " medical or surgical attendance " within the 
 meaning of those terms as employed in the Medical 
 
28 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1885. Belief Disqualification Removal Act, 1885 ; (2) that as 
 
 HoNKTBONE ^^^ evidencB showed that the midwife attended at the 
 
 Hambedge ^stance only of the relieving oflBcer, and that the 
 
 AND medical officer had no voice in the matter, the relief 
 
 ANOTHEE. 
 
 affijrded could not be said to be a " matter or thing '' 
 supplied on the recommendation of the medical officer, 
 so as to bring it within the further definition of medical 
 or surgical assistance as set out in sec. ■» of the 
 Medical Relief Disqualification Removal Act, 1885 ; 
 (3) that the right of the appellant to be registered 
 must depend not on the nature of the request made by 
 his wife to the relieving officer, but on the quality of 
 the relief which she actually received, and which by 
 the circumstances of the case she must be taken to have 
 acquiesced in. 
 
 The Revising Barrister accordingly decided in favour 
 of the objection, and disallowed the claim of the appel- 
 lant. Notice of appeal was duly given, and a case was 
 stated for the decision of the Court whereby the fore- 
 going facts appeared. If the Court should be of 
 opinion that the decision of the Revising Barrister was 
 wrong, the register was to be amended by inserting the 
 name of Thomas Honeybone in the list of occupation 
 voters. 
 
 Asquith, for the appellant. 
 
 The Revising Barrister has been astute to defeat 
 the operation of a remedial and enfranchising statute. 
 The Medical Relief Disqualification Removal Act, 1885, 
 prevents medical assistance received at the expense of 
 the poor-rate from causing any disqualification. The 
 assistance rendered in this case was medical assistance. 
 The appellant's wife had requested to be attended by a 
 medical man, and the services rendered were the same 
 
L VICTORIA. 29 
 
 as a medical man would have rendered. The question 1886. 
 
 does not depend upon the qualification of the person honetbone 
 
 rendering the services, but on the nature of the services hambidge 
 
 themselves. . ■*'"' „ 
 
 ANOTHER. 
 
 No counsel appeared for the respondent. 
 
 Lord Coleridge, L.O.J. I have come to the conclu- 
 sion that in this case the Revising Barrister was wrong. 
 The intention of the Medical Relief Disqualification 
 Removal Act, 1885, is to prevent persons from being 
 disqualified as parliamentary or municipal voters be- 
 cause they have occasionally received assistance of a 
 medical or surgical kind at the expense of the poor-rate. 
 That means assistance such as is ordinarily rendered by 
 a physician or surgeon, and which, if rendered by 
 anyone else, would still be assistance of a medical or 
 surgical kind. If the relieving officer had followed the 
 resolution of the guardians, and had sent a medical 
 man to attend Mrs. Honeybone in her confinement, no 
 question would have arisen. Instead of a medical 
 man, the relieving officer sends a midwife. It is 
 suggested that exactly the same relief and help which, 
 if rendered by a surgeon, would not have disqualified, 
 is to disqualify because it is paid for at the price of 4s. 
 instead of 10s. 6d., and rendered by a midwife instfead 
 of by a medical man. I am of opinion that the assist- 
 ance given was of the kind which Parliament has said 
 is not to disqualify, and that the appeal must be 
 allowed. 
 
 Pollock, B. After some doubt, I have come to the 
 same conclusion. I have no doubt that the intention 
 of this Act of Parliament is to prevent medical or 
 
30 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1886. surgical relief, by whomsoever administered, from 
 
 HoNETBONB causiug a disqualification, and that the question de- 
 
 Hamb'idse pends on the character of the services rendered. The 
 
 ANOTHER hesitation I felt at the opening of the case was because 
 
 I doubted whether the assistance given to Mrs. 
 
 Honeybone was medical in its nature — that is, whether 
 
 it was more than the assistance which one woman may 
 
 naturally give to ajiother at such a time without the 
 
 exercise of special medical or surgical skill or training. 
 
 But on the facts stated, I think we may conclude that 
 
 the assistance was medical, though given by a woman. 
 
 The resolution of the guardians directs the grant of 
 
 medical assistance, and this assistance was sent in 
 
 pursuance of that resolution. I agree that the appeal 
 
 should be allowed. 
 
 A. L. Smith, J., concurred. 
 
 Appeal allowed. 
 
 Solicitors — For Appellant, MacJceson, Taylor & 
 Arnould, for Kilhy & Aface, 
 Chipping Norton. 
 
OASES 
 
 ABGUED AND DETERMINED 
 
 IN THE 
 
 QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION 
 
 or 
 
 THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, 
 
 UNDER STATS. 6 & 7 VICT. c. 18, 
 
 AND 
 
 41 & 42 VICT. c. 26. 
 
 DCBING 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS, 1887, 
 
 IN THE 
 
 FIFTY-FIEST YEAR OF QUEEN VICTORIA. 
 
 Beal, Appellant; The Town Clerk of 
 Exeter, Respondent. 
 
 AT a Court held by the Barrister appointed to revise 1887. 
 •^ _ -^^ Nov. 28. 
 
 the Lists of Voters for the city and county and borough 
 
 iJ. was absent 
 
 of the city of Exeter the appellant duly objected to the from Exeter 
 n&vixeoi Louis S.Bohins h&ing retained on the list of in temporary 
 persons entitled to vote on the election of a member for ^^^^^ 
 the borough of Exeter in respect of his freehold house ^^^^^ ^^^ 
 in Ware's Buildings, St. Thomas, on the ground that * g^y'f^about 
 
 May he left 
 Exeter again, and sought and found permanent employment in London. Although 
 he retained during all this time a right to the exclusive use of a bedroom at Exeter, 
 and did in fact use the bedroom when he wss not in London, held, that he was not 
 resident in Exeter for the six months preceding July 15th, 1887. Per Lord 
 CoLEBlDGB, L.C.J. : Mere intention to return to a place at a future time is not 
 su£Bcient to sustain a constructive residence therein. 
 
 D 2 
 
32 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1887. the said Louis S. Robins had not resided for six 
 
 Beal calendar months next previous to the 15th of July, 
 
 Tow/clekk 1887, within the said borough or within seven miles 
 
 01? BsEiEK. t]^greof, pursuant to the statute 2 & 3 Will. 4 c. 45, 
 
 sec. 31. The qualification of the said Louis 8. Robins 
 
 in all other respects vs^as admitted. The facts found by 
 
 the Kevising Barrister as to residence were stated as 
 
 follows : — 
 
 For a long time previously to the month of January, 
 1887, Louis S. Robins had continuously resided at his 
 father's house, 73, Gowick Street, within the borough of 
 Exeter, as a member of his father's family ; and a 
 separate bedroom was set apart for his exclusive use in 
 the said house. The right by his father's permission to 
 use this bedroom continued up to the time of the hear- 
 ing of the objection. No rent was paid by Louis 8. 
 Robins to his father for such room. 
 
 Sometime during the month of January, 1887, Louis 
 8. Robins left his father's house and went to London 
 for the purpose of seeking employment there as a 
 draper's assistant. In a short time after his arrival in 
 London he succeeded in obtaining employment under a 
 verbal arrangement as an indoor assistant in a whole- 
 sale draper's establishment for certain work which 
 required his being in London while so engaged. It 
 was understood that when the particular work for 
 which he was engaged was completed his employment 
 would cease. The said work took two months to 
 complete, and he then left and sought other employ- 
 ment in London, but being unsuccessful, returned to 
 his father's house at Exeter, and again occupied the 
 said bedroom therein, and was there so residing at 
 Easter, 1887. 
 
 During the two months he was so as aforesaid em- 
 
LI VICTORIA. 33 
 
 ployed in London he could not conveniently be in his 1887. 
 father's house at Exeter. bj.al 
 
 After his return to Exeter, Louis S. Robins remained town^Clekk 
 at his father's house for the period of three weeks or "^ Exkebe. 
 more, when he left (during the month uf May) and 
 went again to London for the purpose, and with the 
 intention, of seeking employment there. Within a 
 short time after his arrival he succeeded in obtaining 
 employment as an indoor assistant in a draper's estab- 
 lishment, and from that time until after the 15th of 
 July he continued in such service and occupation, and 
 to be in London, and did not at any time within such 
 period return to his father's house at Exeter. The 
 employment on which he was engaged required his 
 being in London, and he might not during the working 
 days (although he could from Saturday night to Monday 
 morning) have returned to his father's house at Exeter. 
 
 Louis 8. Robins was a single man, and had no other 
 home but the house of his father and the said room therein 
 during the whole time aforesaid, except under the circum- 
 stances before stated when he was employed in London. 
 
 The appellant contended that Louis 8. Robins was 
 not a free agent to return to or reside at his father's 
 liouse in Exeter when he was engaged in working for 
 his employers in London ; and that consistently with 
 the obligations which he had undertaken he was not at 
 liberty to return to Eoceter when he pleased ; and 
 further, that he had no legal right to reside at his 
 father's house, his only right (if any) to use it being 
 subject to his father's permission. The cases oi Ford v. 
 Drew (a), Ford v. Hart (6), Ford v. Barnes (c), and 
 Spittal V. Brook (d) were cited by the appellant. 
 
 (a) Colt. 1;L.S.5C. P. D. 59. (c) Colt. 396 ; L. R. 16 Q. B. D. 254. 
 (6) 2 H<rpw. & Colt. 167 ; L. R. {.d) Ante,p.22; L. R. 18 Q. B. I). iid. 
 9 C. P. 273. 
 
34 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1887. On behalf of Louis S. Bohvna it was contended that 
 
 Bbal notwithstanding his employment in London he had a 
 
 Town^Clbhk I'fisidence actual or constructive at his father's house at 
 
 OF ExBTBR. Exeter, which was set apart for him there, and which 
 
 he occupied and intended to • occupy whenever he 
 
 returned to Exeter. 
 
 The Revising Barrister decided that Louis 8. Robins' 
 residence at his father's house was a constructive 
 residence in Exeter and sufficient to satisfy the 
 requirements of the statute 2 & 3 Williai/n, c. 45, s. 31, 
 and retained his name on the list of voters for the city 
 of Exeter. 
 
 Notice of appeal from the decision was given ; and 
 the appellant having so required, the Revising Barrister 
 named the Town Clerk of the city of Exeter to be 
 respondent in the appeal. 
 
 If the Court should be of opinion that the decision 
 was wrong, the register was to be amended by erasing 
 the name of the said Louis S- Robins from the said list. 
 
 J. Alder son Foote, for the appellant. 
 
 The question for the opinion of the Court is whether 
 the facts stated by the Revising Barrister are consistent 
 with such a residence of Louis S. Robins within seven 
 miles of Exeter during the whole of the six months 
 prior to July 15th as is required by the statute. That 
 Louis S. Robins did not actually reside in Exeter is 
 undoubted. For a great part of the six months he was 
 in fact living in London. Nevertheless, if Louis S. 
 Robins had during all the time the liberty of returning 
 to Exeter as and when he pleased, and had not 
 abandoned the intention of so returning, it might be 
 considered that he was constructively resident in 
 Exeter. See the judgment of Erie, C.J. in Powell v. 
 
' LI VICTOKIA. 36 
 
 Guest (a). But the facts stated show that he had not 1887. 
 this liberty. He had accepted employment in London Beal 
 which prevented his returning as he pleased to Exeter town Cleek 
 without a breach of contract. °' ^^''''™- 
 
 In Ford v. Drew (b) it was held that a clerk living 
 in London, under articles to a solicitor there, and who 
 could not therefore return to Exeter whenever he 
 pleased without the leave of the solicitor, had not such 
 liberty to return as to sustain a constructive residence 
 in Exeter, although in that case as in this the father of 
 the claimant kept a bedroom in Exeter continually at 
 the disposal of his son. Nor does it appear that Louis 
 S. Robins had, in fact, any intention to return to 
 Exeter at all as a resident. 
 
 [Hawkins, J. The evidence points rather to the 
 contrary inference. He was all the time seeking 
 employment which would keep him resident in London 
 for an indefinite period. He must have had a home 
 and address in London.] 
 
 The only case that might be cited against me is B. v. 
 Mitchell (c); but that case, in so far as it is inconsistent 
 with Ford v. Hart (d) ought no longer to be followed ; 
 see the judgment of the Court in Ford v. Barnes (e), 
 Ford V, Ehmley (/). 
 
 Louis S. Bobins has entered into a contract incon- 
 sistent with the continuance of his residence within the 
 limits prescribed by the statute. The authority of 
 Ford V. Brew (b), which was also a case of contract, is, it 
 
 (o) Hopw. & Ph. 149 ; 34 L. J. (e) Colt. 396 ; L. R. 16 Q. B. D. 
 
 a p. 69. 254. 
 
 (6) CoU. 1; L.Jt.5 C. P. D. 59. (/) CoU. 396, 397 ; L. S. 16 Q. 
 
 (c) 10 East, 511. B. D. 254. 
 
 (d) 2 Hopm. A CoU. 167 ; L. B. 
 9 a P. 273. 
 
36 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1887. is submitted, expressly in point, and the appeal ought 
 Bbal to be allowed. 
 
 V. 
 
 Town Clekk 
 OF ExETEE. -^Q counsel appeared for the respondent. 
 
 Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. In this case we have to put 
 a construction on the word " resided " as it occurs in the 
 statute 2 & 3 Will, 4 c. 45, sec. 31, which provides that 
 in every city or town being a county of itself in the 
 election for which freeholders have a right to vote, no 
 such freeholder shall be registered in any year in 
 respect of any freehold tenement unless (among other 
 things) he shall have resided for six calendar months 
 next previous to the last day of July in such year 
 w^ithin such city or town or within seven statute miles 
 thereof. The last day of July is now altered to the 15th 
 of July, and the question for our decision is whether 
 upon the facts stated by the Revising Barrister with 
 regard to Louis S. Robins, he can by any reasonable 
 construction be said within the meaning of the statute 
 to have resided in his father's house in Exeter during 
 the six months previous to the 15th of last July. I am 
 of opinion that he cannot be said to have so resided. 
 It is no doubt very difficult to lay down a complete 
 definition of what will constitute residence. It is a 
 question to be determined by the good sense of the 
 Court applied to the circumstances of each particular 
 case. The mere power to return to a place will not by 
 itself be sufficient to constitute residence. The mere 
 intention to return is not sufficient. If such arguments 
 were to prevail, a man might be away for four or five 
 years, with some vague intention to return at some 
 future time, and yet claim all the time to be resident at 
 the place he had left. No one would say that such a 
 
LI VICTOIUA. 37 
 
 vague intention to return ought to constitute residence. 1887. 
 In some cases the breach of actual residence may be bbal 
 small. The man may retain a constructive residence by town Clerk 
 his wife and children, to whom he means to return when 
 some short absence is over. I am thinking, of course, 
 of a case in which he has not put it' out of his power 
 to return. In such cases there may well be constructive 
 residence. But I fail to see any of the elements of con- 
 structive residence here. Louis S. Robins was an 
 unmarried man, with a single room in his father's 
 house in Exeter, occupied by his father's permission. 
 He left his father's house to seek employment in 
 London. That employment he has found, and by 
 its conditions he- is and will be kept absent from 
 Exeter for a time of quite indefinite duration. It is 
 in my view perfectly impossible to say that he was 
 residing at Exeter for the six months immediately 
 previous to the 15th of last July: The decision of the 
 Revising Barrister must be reversed and the appeal 
 allowed with costs. 
 
 Pollock, B. I am of the same opinion for the 
 reasons expressed by my Lord. I think this case is to 
 be decided on the principles laid down in Ford v. Drew 
 (a), and that the engagements entered into in London 
 by Louis S. Rohi/ns prevented him from retaining a 
 residence in Exeter suificient to satisfy the requirements 
 of the statute. 
 
 Hawkins, J. I am of the same opinion. Louis S. 
 Robins was not in a position to return to Exeter be- 
 cause of the contract into which he had entered in 
 
 (a) Colt. 1; Z.R.5 0. P. D. 59. 
 
38 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1887. London. And I can see no evidence that he had any 
 
 Beal intention to return. 
 
 Appeal allowed. 
 Solicitor for the Appellant, 8. Hamilton. 
 
 V 
 
 Town Clbbk 
 of exkceb. 
 
IJ VICTORIA. 39 
 
 HiTMPHEEY, Appellant ; Earle, Eespondent. 
 
 AT a Court held at Hamhledon for the purpose of re- 1887. 
 vising the list of voters for the Eastern or Petersfield '^' ' 
 
 In a notice of 
 
 Division of the county of Hants, obiection was made by ?.* ^. 
 
 ■' ' •' •' objection 
 
 Oeorge Chapman to the name of WilUa/m Humphrey, referring to a 
 
 the appellant, being retained on the Hamhledon occu- tte objector 
 
 described 
 piers' list for the said Division of the said county, himself aa " of 
 
 TIT p 1 . Chmrchya/rd 
 
 A document purporting to be a duplicate of the notice on the list of 
 of objection was produced which had been posted in voters for the 
 proper time. In it the place of abode of the objector p*^^s^.» 
 was described thus : — ^h ^^^ j 
 
 address, and 
 ee /ci' i\ his address 
 
 "(Signed), as stated on 
 
 "Gecyrge Chapman, It'^w^- 
 
 " Oi Churchyard. fm^^'EM 
 
 " On the List of Parliamentary Voters for the Parish *''*' l"'^ 
 
 address was 
 of Petersfield." insufficiently 
 
 stated in the 
 
 On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the "pt'ce of 
 
 ^ '■ objection, and 
 
 above notice of objection was bad, on the ground that *'^***'>e notice 
 
 of objection 
 
 "Ghv/rchya/rd" was an insuflScient address of the objector, was therefore 
 
 bad. 
 
 and the authority of Woollett v. Davis (a) was cited in 
 support of this contention. The objector lived in a 
 house in Petersfield churchyard, and his address as 
 given in the occupiers' list for the parish of Petersfield 
 was "Churchyard, Petersfield." No evidence was given 
 
 (a) 1 lutw. 607 ; i 0. £. 115. 
 
40 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1887. that the a^jpellant had been misled or deceived by the 
 Humphrey above mentioned form of notice of objection. 
 Eab'ls. '^^^ Revising Barrister held that the notice of objec- 
 
 tion was good on the authority of Sheldon v. Flatcher (a) 
 and Norris v. Pilcher (b) and expunged the name of 
 the appellant from the list. 
 
 Sixteen other persons were objected to and their 
 names expunged under similar circumstances. 
 
 Notice of appeal from these decisions was given, and 
 the Revising Barrister ordered the appeals in all the 
 cases to be consolidated, and named Thomas Hughes 
 Earle, the Clerk of the Peace for the county of Hants, 
 to be the respondent in the consolidated appeal. 
 
 If the Court should be of opinion that the decision of 
 the Revising Barrister as to the sufficiency of the 
 notice of objection was wrong, the register was to 
 be amended by inserting the name of the appellant 
 and the names of the said sixteen other persons 
 therein. 
 
 If the Court should be of opinion that the decision 
 was right, the register was to remain as signed by the 
 Revising Barrister. 
 
 J. Alderson Foote, for the appellant. The notice of 
 objection given by the objector in this case is bad, 
 because it does not comply with the conditions of the 
 7th section of the statute 6 Vict. c. 18, the Parliamen- 
 tary Registration Act, 1843. By that section every 
 objector must give to the person objected to, or leave at 
 his place of abode, a notice signed by himself, and 
 according to the form numbered (5) in schedule (A) to 
 that statute, or to the like effect. The form of notice of 
 
 (a) 2 Lutw. 11 ; 17 L. J. 0. (6) 1 Mopw. & Colt. 173 ; L. R. 
 P. 34. 4 C. P. 417. 
 
LI VICTORIA. 41 
 
 objection given in the schedule referred to concludes as 1887. 
 follows :— Humphrey 
 
 " (Signed) A. B., of [place of abode] on Eable. 
 
 the register of voters for the parish of ." 
 
 By the 18th section of the Registration Act, 1885 
 (48 Vict. c. 15), the forms and instructions contained 
 in the second and third schedules to that Act are to be 
 used in all cases to which they apply, and are substi- 
 tuted (amongst other things) for the forms, instructions 
 and directions contained in the schedules to the 
 Parliamentary Registration Act, 1843. The form of 
 notice of objection to be given to a county voter so 
 substituted concludes as follows : — 
 
 " (Signed) A. B., of [place of abode] on 
 
 the list of parliamentary voters for the 
 parish [or township] of ." 
 
 So that under the 1885 statute, as well as under the 
 1843 statute, it is necessary for an objector to set out in 
 his notice of objection his own place of abode, and the 
 decisions with regard to this requisite under the 1843 
 statute apply to the present case. 
 
 In Woollett V. Davis (a) the notice of objection was 
 signed by the objector, and he was described in the 
 notice as of the Oaks on the register of voters for the 
 parish of St. Woolos. The objector, in fact, lived at a 
 house called the Oaks, situate in the parish of St. 
 Woolos ; but the Court there held that from the 
 fact that the objector stated that he was on the 
 register of voters for the parish of St. Woolos, it was 
 not reasonably necessary to conclude that his place of 
 abode was in St. Woolos, because it was a register of 
 voters for a county (namely, Monmouth), and the 
 
 (a) 1 Lutw. 607 ; i 0. B. 115. 
 
42 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1887. voter's place of abode might be very diiFerent from 
 HuMPHBET the place where his qualification was situate. This 
 Eaelb. is specially pointed out in the judgment of Wilde, 
 C.J. The notice of objection did not, therefore, con- 
 tain in itself the necessary information as to the 
 objector's address, and was held insufficient. I submit 
 that the present case is governed by that decision. 
 This also is a county list, and in looking at the notice 
 of objection there is nothing to indicate that the 
 objector lived in Peter sfield, though his qualification 
 was situate there. The simple address "Churchyard," 
 which is all that appears, would be quite insufficient to 
 find the objector, if, for example, a letter was posted in 
 London with his name and that address on the enve- 
 lope. 
 
 The cases relied on in support of the decision of 
 the Eevising Barrister are distinguishable. The first 
 of them is Sheldon v. Flatcher (a), where the objector 
 had described himself as " of 5, Sherborne Street, on 
 the list of voters for the parish of Cheltenham." But 
 in that case the list was a borough list, and all voters 
 for boroughs must reside in or near the borough for 
 which they are voters. The decision in that case was 
 that the voter might reasonably have concluded that 
 the Sherborne Street mentioned was Sherborne Street 
 in Cheltenham,, without referring to anything beyond 
 the notice of objection, and therefore that the Revising 
 Barrister was not wrong in finding that the address 
 was given with sufficient particularity. Again, in 
 Norris v. Pilcher (b) the objector gave two addresses 
 in the following form : " Place of abode, as described 
 on the register, 22, Southampton Street, Bloomshury, 
 
 (a) 2 Lutm. 11 ; 17 L. J. 0. P. (5) 1 jffopw. & Colt. 173 ■ i R 
 34. iC.P.il7. ' 
 
LI VICTOKIA. 43 
 
 London, W.C. Present place of abode, 110, Guildford 1887. 
 Street, Russell Street, W.C," and it was held that the hdmphkey 
 ordinary understanding on reading those words would eable 
 be that the second address, like the first, was in London, 
 and therefore that the address was sufficiently stated. 
 And in Jones v. Pritchard (a), where the objector de- 
 scribed himself as " of Bronygraig, on the register of 
 voters for the parish of Corwen," it was held that 
 evidence was admissible to show that Bronygraig was 
 in fact a well-known address in the localitj', and would 
 give the voter suffi.cient information as to the objector's 
 abode. In both those cases it was held competent for 
 the Revising Barrister to decide as a fact that the 
 address stated as address did under the circumstances 
 give sufficient information. They are not decisions that 
 the statement of the list on which the objector's name 
 appeared could be craved in aid to eke out an insuffi- 
 ciently stated address. 
 
 [Hawkins, J. In the present case the objector's 
 address is stated simply as Ohurchyard, not The 
 Ghurchya/rd. It looks as though Ohurchyard might 
 be the name of the hamlet or place where the objector 
 lived, and might be his complete address. In the 
 Cheltenham case the address given was "5, Sherborne 
 Street," which would naturally mean 5, Sherborne 
 Street in some town or place, and the Court thought 
 that the voter would naturally understand it as 
 5, Sherborne Street, Cheltenham. I think also some 
 weight must be attached to the distinction pointed out 
 between borough lists and coutity lists. The area of 
 residence for county voters is quite unrestricted ; and 
 
 (a) 1 Hopw. & Colt. 91 ; L. R. 4 O. P. Hi. 
 
44 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1887. the objector, in stating that he was on the list of 
 
 HuMPHBET parliamentary voters for the parish of Petersfield, is 
 
 Eame. satisfying the last part of the requirement of the 
 
 statutory form, which is quite independent of and 
 
 additional to the statement of his address.] 
 
 That statement only, implies that the objector's 
 qualification is in Petersfield, not that his place of 
 abode is there. 
 
 Perhaps the Revising Barrister might have amended 
 this notice of objection ; Adams v. Bostock (a). But 
 in fact no amendment was made or asked for. I 
 submit that the objector has not satisfied the statutory 
 conditions in adequately stating his address, and that 
 the objections must therefore be disallowed, and the 
 names of the voters reinstated in the list. 
 
 No counsel appeared for the respondent. 
 
 Lord OoLEEiDQE, L.C.J. According to the provisions 
 of the Acts of Parliament to which we have been 
 referred, it is necessary for a person who objects to the 
 name of any other person being retained on a list of 
 voters to state in his notice of objection his own address, 
 as well as to point out the list of parliamentary voters 
 on which his own name appears. If people do not 
 comply with the conditions of the law they cannot take 
 advantage of the provisions which depend on the 
 observance of those conditions. In this case the 
 objector has stated his address as "Churchyard," and 
 has also stated that he is on the list of parliamentary 
 voters for the parish of PetersHeld. The question we 
 
 (a) OoU. 275 ; L. R. 8 Q. B. D. 259. 
 
LI VICTORIA. 45 
 
 have to decide is whether this is a sufficient compliance 1887. 
 with the requirements of the statute. No doubt there Humphrbt 
 
 V. 
 
 IS a churchyard at Petersjield where the objector Eablb. 
 resides. But he does not state his address as "The 
 Churchyard," but merely as " Churchyard." That does 
 not seem to me to be sufficient. This appears at first 
 sight to be a technical point, and if I could I would 
 defeat it. But to decide that the statement of address 
 given in the notice is sufficient would open the door to 
 a vagueness which it was the object of the Act of 
 Parliament to avoid. I am of opinion that the appeal 
 must be allowed. 
 
 Pollock, B. I am of the same opinion. So far as 
 the words " of Churchyard " are concerned, they might 
 apply to any parish in England, adjacent to or distant 
 from the parish of Petersfield where the objector's qua- 
 lification is situate, and where in fact his place of abode 
 is. I think there is no compliance with the conditions 
 of objection prescribed in the form and directed by the 
 Act of Parliament to be observed. One always feels a 
 reluctance to uphold what appear to be technical ob- 
 jections. But on the other hand we have here a plain 
 Act of Parliament to read and to act upon. It is re- 
 quired for the benefit of the people at large that these 
 notices should be given in an intelligible form. The ob- 
 jector has no excuse for not following the clear directions 
 laid down for his guidance. He has failed to do so, and 
 his notice of objection must therefore be held to be bad, 
 and the appeal allowed with costs. 
 
 Hawkins, J. I am prepared to hold this notice of 
 objection bad without feeling either joy or sorrow on 
 the matter. The Act of Parliament requires an ob- 
 
46 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1887. jector to state in his notice of objection (1) his 
 Hdmpheet name; (2) his place of abode; (3) the hst of 
 
 Eaele. voters on which his name appears. The objector in 
 this case has stated his name, and the list of voters on 
 which his name appears. He has also stated what 
 purports to be his place of abode simply as 
 " Churchyard." If it had appeared that he must 
 necessarily have been resident in the parish on whose 
 list his name is stated to be included — that is to 
 say, Petersjield — I should have been prepared to hold 
 that the notice did in effect state his full address as 
 " Churchyard, Petersjield." But that is not the case. 
 The statement as to the list of voters does not purport 
 to have anything to do with the description of the 
 address. The objector has stated his address in the 
 shortest possible form, and in what I hold to be an in- 
 sufficient form ; and I am therefore of opinion that the 
 appeal must be allowed. 
 
 Appeal allowed. 
 
 Solicitors for the Appellant, Lambert, Fetch & 
 Shaliespear, for F. I. d; J. C. Warner, 
 Winchester. 
 
U VICTORIA, 47 
 
 Bribges, Appellant ; Miller, Respondent. 
 
 AT a Court held before one of the Revising Barristers j^ggy 
 for the parliamentary city of Norwich, at Norwich, for ^<^-^^- 
 the purpose of revising the list of persons entitled to The notice of 
 
 objection 
 
 be registered as freemen on the freemen's list of parlia- served on a 
 
 freeman of the 
 
 mentary voters for the parliamentary city of Norwich dtyoiNormeh 
 and the county of the same city, it was proved that ground of 
 William Arthur Wade (hereafter called the objector) these terms : 
 duly signed and served a notice of objection to the name ^^^ reside' srt" 
 of Henry Bridges, the appellant, being retained on the '^j^^"™, . 
 said freemen's list of voters. \^> OUfton St., 
 
 Normch). 
 
 The appellant was entered on the said freemen's list, The real 
 
 ground of 
 
 and his entry and abode were stated in the said list as objection 
 
 urged before 
 follows : — the Revising 
 
 Barrister was 
 
 that the person 
 Place of Abode. objected to 
 hadnotresided 
 
 Name of Voter. 
 
 Henry Bridges. 
 
 , „, , „ anywhere 
 
 12, Ohfton Street. jn jsforwich 
 
 or within 
 seven miles 
 
 The said notice of objection was as follows : — thereof during 
 
 the six months 
 " Notice of objection. previous to 
 
 " To Mr. Henry Bridges, of 12, aifton Street, in the hamlet of ^^^ n^otw^th" 
 North Heigham in the city of Normch and county of the same standing the 
 
 concluding 
 ""^^ words of 48 
 
 " I hereby give you notice that I object to your name being Vict. c. 15, sec. 
 
 18, that the 
 notice of 
 objection did not cover the real objection, and that the Revising Barrister had no 
 power to amend the notice so as to cover the real objection. Such an amendment is not 
 a correction of a "mistake" within the meaning of 41 & 42 Viet. c. 26, s. 28 (2). 
 
 E 2 
 
48 
 
 Miller. 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1887. retained in the list of persons entitled as freemen to vote in the 
 Bridqes slsction of members for the city of- Norwich and county of the same 
 cify on the following grounds, viz : — 
 
 " That you do not reside at the above address, 
 
 " Dated this twelfth day of August, 1887. 
 
 "Signed William Arthur Wade, of No. 45, Peacock 
 Street, in the parish of St. Pwul, in the city of Nor- 
 mch, on the list of voters for the pariah of St. Paid 
 in the said city as a freeman," 
 
 The appellant did not for six calendar months 
 next preceding the loth day of July, 1887, reside 
 at 12, Clifton Street, or within the city of Norwich, 
 or within seven miles thereof, and was therefore not 
 entitled under the statute 2 & .3 Will. 4, c. 4.5, s. 32, 
 or otherwise, to have his name on the freemen's list of 
 voters. 
 
 It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the 
 notice of objection was bad because it did not point to 
 non-residence of the appellant at 12, Clifton Street, 
 during the qualifying period, but only to his non-resi- 
 dence at the date of the notice, as the ground of objection. 
 
 On behalf of the objector the Revising Barrister was 
 then asked to amend the notice of objection so as to 
 raise the objection of non-residence within Norwich or 
 seven miles thereof during the qualifying period. 
 
 On behalf of the appellant it was urged that the 
 Revising Barrister had no power to amend the notice of 
 objection in the manner asked by the objector. 
 
 The Revising Barrister considered that the notice 
 was informal on the grounds urged by the appellant, 
 btit that it gave sufficient information to the appellant 
 that objection would be taken that he did not reside at 
 12, Clifton Street, or elsewhere in Norwich, or within 
 seven mibs thereof, during the qualifying period, and 
 that the Revising Barrister had power under statute 41 
 
LI VICTOKIA. 49 
 
 &, 42 Vict. c. 26, s. 28 (2), to make the amendment 1887. 
 asked. The Eevising Barrister accordingly amended bbidqes 
 the notice of objection by inserting the following grounds millee. 
 of objection : — 
 
 " That you have not resided at the above address for 
 "six calendar months next preceding the 15th day of 
 " July last, and that you have not throughout that period 
 '■ resided within the city of Norwich or within seven 
 " miles thereof," 
 
 and allowed the objection, and expunged the name of 
 the appellant from the list, but stated a case for the 
 opinion of the Court. 
 
 If the Court should be of opinion that the notice of 
 objection in its original form was good, or that the 
 Revising Barrister had power to make the amendment 
 made, or any other amendment sufficient to raise the 
 objection arising from the above-mentioned facts, the 
 list was to remain as revised; if the Court should 
 be of opinion that the notice of objection was bad, 
 and that the Revising Barrister had not power to 
 make the amendment made, or such other amend- 
 ment, the name of the appellant was to be restored to 
 the list. 
 
 Decisions in the case of notices of objections against 
 seven other persons in the said list of freemen were 
 given on the same grounds and in the same manner as 
 in the case of the notice of objection against the apel- 
 lant, and the appeals against all the said decisions were 
 consolidated. 
 
 The objector having declined to be respondent in the 
 appeal, the Revising BaiTister named Henry Blake 
 Miller, the town clerk of Norwich, as respondent 
 therein. 
 
50 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1887. Asquith, for the appellant. The notice of objection 
 
 Bridges in its original form was clearly bad. The 26th section 
 MiLLBB, of 41 & 42 Vict. c. 26 provides that the notice to be 
 given to persons objected to in boroughs for the pur- 
 pose of the revision of the lists of voters shall state 
 specifically the ground or grounds of objection. The 
 ground of objection stated in this case was that Henry 
 Bridges did not reside at 12, Clifton Street, at the time 
 the objection was made. That was not the true ground 
 of objection at all. The real objection urged before 
 the Revising Barrister was that Henry Bridges had 
 not resided anywhere in Norwich or within seven miles 
 thereof for the six calendar months next previous to 
 July 15th, 1887, as is required by the 32nd section 
 of the Reform Act, 1832. The two objections are en- 
 tirely different. The present residence of Henry Bridges 
 may be truly stated as 12, Clifton Street, although he 
 has not resided in Norwich for the requisite six months, 
 and conversely, he may have resided in Norwich for 
 the six months, although his present address is not 12, 
 Clifton Street. The Revising Barrister had no power 
 to make such an amendment as he has purported to 
 make. The only power of amendment given by 41 & 
 42 Vict. c. 26, sec. 28 (2), on which the Barrister relied, 
 is to correct a mistake. This is not a mistake at all in 
 the sense intended by the Act. The Revising Barrister 
 has entirely altered the nature of the objection as stated 
 by the objector, and this he had no power to do. I 
 ask that the appeal be allowed and the names of the 
 voters reinstated. 
 
 R. S. Wright, for the respondent. The only 
 possible objection that could have been intended 
 by the objector on the score of the appellant's 
 
LI VICTORIA. 61 
 
 non-residence must have been founded on the provision 1887. 
 of the Reform Act, 1832, requiring freemen to reside Bbidges 
 within seven miles of their boroughs in order to be Miller. 
 registered as electors. 
 
 The Revising Barrister finds expressly that he 
 considered the notice informal, but that it gave 
 sufiicient notice to the appellant of the real ground of 
 objection. If a mistake in a notice of objection is such 
 that notwithstanding the mistake anyone would under- 
 stand what it refers to, the provision of the Act of 
 Parliament enabling the Revising Barrister to correct 
 mistakes comes in. 
 
 By the Registration Act, 1885 (48 Vict. c. ] -5), section 
 18, the forms and instructions contained in the second 
 and third schedules to that Act are to be used and 
 observed. The forms in the schedules include a 
 form of notice of objection (Schedule 3, Form (I), No. 2). 
 The section concludes, " but a disregard of any form or 
 instruction shall not of itself invalidate any list, notice 
 or other thing." 
 
 [Hawkins, J. In this case it is not the form of the 
 notice but the substance of the ground of objection 
 stated in it that was defective.] 
 
 The Revising Barrister has amended, because he 
 thought the notice did in fact indicate the substance of 
 the objection. 
 
 [Hawkins, J. Is it not a very liberal exercise of the 
 power of amendment, and a strained inference to draw 
 from the terms of the notice ?] 
 
 [Pollock, B. Every one may not know the law of 
 
52 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1887. freemen's registration, and the appellant may have 
 Bbidgeb thought the real objection to his vote was what the 
 Miller, objector stated — namely, that he did not then live at 
 12, Clifton Street. What the Barrister for himself con- 
 sidered was that the notice gave sufficient information 
 of the real objection intended. I do not think he finds 
 that the voter knew as a fact that the objection had the 
 meaning alleged.] 
 
 It is submitted that there was a mistake in the 
 notice of objection, and that the Revising Barrister had 
 power to make the amendment. That is the real 
 question before the Court. 
 
 Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. In order that a freeman 
 of the city of Norwich may be entitled to be registered 
 as a voter for the parliamentary constituency, he must, 
 by section 32 of the Reform Act, 1832, have resided 
 in Norwich or within seven miles thereof for the six 
 calendar months next previous to the last day of July, 
 a date now altered to the 15th of July. The ob- 
 jection now taken to the appellant's vote is that he 
 has not in fact so resided for the six months previous 
 to the 15th of July, 1887. In his notice of objection, 
 dated the 12th August, 1887, the objector onl^' says that 
 he objects because the appellant " does not reside '' at 
 12, Clifton Street, which I suppose is a street in 
 Norwich. That might be so, and yet the vote be 
 perfectly good. Whereupon the objector asks to have 
 his notice of objection amended, so as to cover the more 
 complicated objection which he now says he intended 
 to make. But any amendment of the notice of objection 
 must be -within the parliamentary power of amendment 
 conferred on the Revising Barrister. That power is 
 
LI VICTORIA. S3 
 
 limited to the correction of mistakes. I do not think 1887. 
 
 there is anything mistaken in the original objection here. Bbidgkb 
 There is nothing incorrectly expressed in the objection millek. 
 itself or in the mode of stating it. It may be the voter 
 did not live at 12, Clifton Street, when the notice was 
 served, and that the objector intended to rely on that fact 
 as an objection to the vote. To go beyond the correction 
 of mistakes, and thereby to turn a bad objection into a 
 good one, is going far beyond the limits of the power of 
 amendment given by the statute. The appeal must be 
 allowed with costs. 
 
 Pollock, B. I am of the same opinion. I think 
 the amendment which the Revising Barrister has made 
 in this notice of objection is not within either the 
 words or the spirit of the Act of Parliament. We 
 should be doing what might lead to great inconvenience, 
 and in some cases to gross injustice, if we hesitated to 
 disallow this amendment. 
 
 Hawkins, J. In my opinion this was not a case of 
 mistake at all. The objector stated what he meant to 
 state in his notice of objection. It may be that he did 
 not know the law, and that he was surprised to find 
 the ground of objection he had stated insufficient. But 
 however that may be, if there was a-mistake, it was a 
 mistake of a kind which the Revising Barrister had 
 not power to amend. I agree that the appeal must 
 be allowed. 
 
 Appeal allowed. 
 
 Solicitors — For the Appellant, Charles S. Gover, for 
 
 L. W. English, Norwich. 
 
 For the Respondent, Sharpe, Parkers, 
 Pritchard & Sharpe. 
 
O'i fflCI-IAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 Edwards, Appellant ; Lloyd, Eespondent. 
 
 1887. AT a Court held on the 22Dd of September, 1887, for 
 the purpose of revising the h'sts of voters for the 
 
 of Christ 3,t parliamentary and municipal borough of Ruthin, the 
 
 chari^ for names of John Evans, of 11, Church Yard, Ruthin, 
 
 alms'^e^^k"' and of four other persons mentioned in a schedule 
 
 who must be annexed to the case afterwards stated by the Revising 
 
 not less than •' ° 
 
 fifty years of Barrister, appeared on Division 1 of the parliamentary 
 
 age, and who 
 
 from age, and municipal list of voters for the borough of 
 
 aooident or Ruthin as the names of persons qualified as being 
 
 unable to inhabitants of dwelling houses in the said borough, 
 
 themselves by These names were duly objected to by the appellant, 
 
 exertion" Thomas Edwards, upon the ground that the said 
 
 Each ahna- persons had been during the qualifying year in receipt 
 
 pies an alms- of alms which by law of Parliament disqualified them 
 
 house, and 
 
 receives a from being registered as voters for a parliamentary 
 ance from the borough, or as burgesses of a municipal borough, 
 charity. Hdd, I* appeared that each of the said persons, under the 
 persons^are benefit of a charitable endowment known as the 
 thereby dis- Hospital of Christ in the said borough, lived in an alms- 
 being regis- house belonging to the said hospital, and received an 
 voters by allowance of six shillings a week out of the funds of the 
 
 reason of 2 & 
 
 3 Will, i, c. 45, said hospital. It was in respect of their inhabitancy of 
 these almshouses that the said persons claimed to be 
 qualified as voters. 
 
 The almshouses and charitable endowment in question 
 were managed, and all arrangements connected with 
 them were carried out under a scheme of the Charity 
 
 sec. 
 
LI VICTORIA. 55 
 
 Commissioners, confirmed by an Act of Parliament 1887. 
 
 26 & 27 Vict. cap. 59, a copy of which was annexed to Edwabds 
 
 the case. The most material sections of the scheme Llosd. 
 were as follows: — 
 
 "18. The establishment of the Hospital shall consist of a waid^n 
 " and twelve almspeople, of whom ten shall be poor men, to be called 
 " ' Brethren,' and two shall be poor women, to be called ' Sisters.' " 
 
 " 22. The Hospital building shall be appropriated and used for the 
 " occupation of the almspeople in such a manner and subject to such 
 " reasonable regulations as the Governors may from time to time 
 " prescribe consistently with the provisions of this scheme." 
 
 " 23. The almspeople respectively shall be poor persons, not less 
 " than fifty years of age, of good character, and not having a wife or 
 " husband living, who shall have resided within the borough of Ruthin 
 " without receiving parish relief for not less than three years next 
 " preceding the time of their appointment, and who from age, ill- 
 " health, accident, or infirmity, shall be unable to maintain themselves 
 " by their own exertions, with a preference for those persons Who, 
 " being otherwise qualified as aforesaid, shall have become reduced by 
 " misfortune from better circumstances. Whenever there shall be no 
 " proper candidate for a vacancy in the Hospital from the borough of 
 " Euthim, poor persons from the deanery of Syffryn Clwyd having the 
 " like qualifications shall be eligible for the appointment." 
 
 " 21. There shall be paid to each almsperson out of the income of 
 " the Hospital Endowment a weekly sum of not leas than six 
 " shillings, and the Governors in lieu of paying the whole amount of 
 " such weekly sums in money may, from time to time, expend any 
 " suitable portions thereof in providing the almspeople respectively 
 " with futl, clothing, or other necessaries or comforts, as the'Governors 
 " in their discretion shall think fit." 
 
 " 25. Every vacancy in the Hospital shall be filled up by the 
 " Governors, by the appointment of some duly qualified person at their 
 " next half-yearly meeting which shall be held after the lapse of one 
 " calendar month from the occurrence of such vacancy." 
 
 " 26. No appointment shall be made by the Governors to fill any 
 " vacancy in the Hospital, until a notice of such vacancy, specifying 
 " the qualification required from candidates, shall have been affixed to 
 " or near the principal enter door or entrance gate of the Hospital, and 
 " of the parish church of Ruthin, respectively, for the period of 15 days 
 " at the least. Such notice shall be given in every case before the ex- 
 "piration of one calendar month from the occurrence of the vacancy, 
 " and may be in the form inserted in the Schedule No. 5i" (See below). 
 
 " 28. Application for admission to the Hospital shall be made to the 
 " Governors or their clerk, either personally or in writing, and every 
 " applicant must be prepared with sufficient testimonials and other evi- 
 ;' dence of (his) or (her) qualification for the appointment." 
 
 " 29. The Governors may, if they shall so think fit, and whenever 
 " the income and resources of the Charity shall suffice for the purpose, 
 
66 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1887. 
 
 Edwards 
 
 V. 
 liLOlD. 
 
 " appoint a medical ofiBoer to attend upon the almspeople, and to supply 
 " them with medicineH, and such medical appliances as may be nece^- 
 " sary, at a yearly salary not exceeding ten pounds, such salary to 
 " include the cost of such medicines and appliances ; and they may also 
 " provide the almspeople with any necessary attendance in case of ill- 
 " ness, at the cost of the Charity." 
 
 " 30. If any almsperson shall be guilty of insobriety, insubordina- 
 "tion, breach of rules, or immoral or unbecominp; conduct, or shall 
 " become disqualified from retaining (his) or (her) appointment, or if in 
 " any case it should appear that any almsperson has been appointed 
 " without having the required qualifications, the Governors, upon proof 
 " thereof to their satisfaction, may remove such almsperson, and take 
 " possession of the tenement or room occupied by (him) or (her), and 
 " may proceed to appoint another almsperson in (his) or (her) place, or 
 "in any such case (except that of disqualification) the Governors may, 
 " if they so think fit, suspend the payment of the stipend to the alms- 
 " person, either wholly or in part, during such time as they shall think 
 " fit and expedient." 
 
 "31. No almsperson shall be permitted to let or part with the 
 •■ possession of the room or rooms allotted to (him) or (her), or to suffer 
 " any stranger to occupy the same, or any part thereof." 
 
 " 32. The Governors may from time to time prescribe such reasonable 
 " regulations as they may consider expedient for the government of the 
 " almshouses and the inmates thereof, provided that no such regulation 
 "be at variance or inconsistent with any of the provisions of this 
 " Scheme." 
 
 The Schedule No. 5 referred to in the 26th section 
 of the scheme is as follows: — 
 
 Schedule 5. 
 In the matter of the Hospital Charity of Ruthin. 
 The Governors of this Charity give notice that they will, on 
 the day of , 18 , proceed to elect an alms 
 
 to fill a vacancy in the Hospital which has been occasioned by the 
 of . The election will 
 
 take place at o'clock on that day^ at poor 
 
 of good character, who have been resident in the parish 
 of for three years at least, and who, from age, ill- 
 
 health, accident, or infirmity, are unable to maintain themselves by their 
 own exertions, are eligible for the appointment, those persons who have 
 become reduced by misfortune from better circumstances being entitled 
 to a preference. 
 
 Application for the appointment must be made either personally or in 
 writing to the Governors, or their clerk, at 
 
 fourteen days at least previously to the election. Every applicant must 
 state his or her name, address, age, and occupation, and must be pre- 
 pared with sufficient testimonials and other evidence of his or her 
 qualification for the appointment. 
 
 By order, (Signed) Clerk. 
 
LI VICTORIA.. 57 
 
 The form of application which has to be filled up by 1887. 
 every applicant contains a number of questions which edwabds 
 have to be answered by the applicant. The seventh of Llo'yd. 
 such questions is as follows : " (7) Is the applicant 
 through age, ill-health, accident, or infirmity, unable to 
 maintain himself ? " 
 
 It was stated to the Revising Barrister by the clerk 
 of the governors of the charity that question (7) above 
 set out is in fact invariably answered by applicants in 
 the affirmative, but that persons applying for election 
 to the charity were not of the class who, but for the 
 benefits of the charity, would have necessarily become 
 dependent upon the poor law ; and it was proved to 
 the Barrister's satisfaction that four of the said persons 
 objected to were earning money (in addition to what 
 they received from the charity) varying in amount from 
 an average of three shillings a week to an average of 
 nine shillings a week ; and they appeared to him (as 
 he stated) to be well-to-do people of their class, although 
 advanced in years. 
 
 It was also proved that one of the said persons ob- 
 jected to was on the parliamentary list of voters for 
 one of the divisions of the borough of Ruthin in respect 
 of a tenement which he occupied for the purposes of 
 his trade as a shoemaker, and which he had continuously 
 occupied for forty years. 
 
 It was a disputed point between the parties whether 
 or not, assuming the non-existence of the charity, some 
 or all of the persons objected to would be obliged to 
 rely upon the poor law for the means of subsistence, 
 and the Revising Barrister came to the conclusion upon 
 the evidence that they would not. 
 
 It was contended on the part of the appellant that 
 the 23rd and 24th sections of the scheme taken in con- 
 junction with question No. 7 on the printed form of 
 
58 MICHAELMAS SITTINGa. 
 
 1887. application brought the whole of the persons objected 
 Edwabds to within the prohibition contained in 2 & 3 Will. 4, 
 Llotd. "^^P- '^^' section 36, and that their names ought to be re- 
 moved from the parliamentary and municipal list of voters 
 for the said borough of Ruthin. The appellant relied 
 upon the cases of Harrison v. Carter (a) and of Baker v. 
 The Town Clerk of Monmouth (b) in support of his view. 
 
 The Revising Barrister held that the house-room and 
 allowance received by the said persons under the said 
 scheme did not amount to the receipt of parochial relief or 
 other alms which by law of Parliament would disqualify 
 tViem from being registered as voters for the said borough, 
 and retained their names upon the said lists accordingly. 
 
 Due notice of appeal was given, and the Revising 
 Barrister directed Mr. William Lloyd, town clerk of 
 the borough of Ruthin, to be respondent in the. appeal. 
 
 If the Court should be of opinion that the decision 
 was wrong, the register was to be amended by expunging 
 the names of the persons objected to from the parliamen- 
 tary and municipal list of voters for the said borough. 
 
 Asquith, for the appellant. The question in 
 this case is whether the five persons objected to 
 have, by reason of their acceptance of the benefits of 
 this charity, received alms which at the time of the 
 passing of the Reform Act, 1832, would have then by 
 the law of Parliament disqualified them from voting. 
 If so, they are now disqualified from being registered 
 under the 36th section of that statute. These persons 
 are occupants of almshouses, for which they pay no rent ; 
 they are in receipt of an allowance of six shillings a 
 week ; they have accepted a position for which only 
 persons " who from age, ill-health, accident, or infirmity 
 are unable .to maintain themselves by their own 
 
 (a) 2 IIopw. & Colt. 324 ; L. R. (b) 53 L. T. 668. 
 2 G. P. D. 26. 
 
LI VICTORIA. 59 
 
 exertions " are eligible; and in their application they 1887. 
 must have each of them formally stated that they came edwauds 
 within that description. The Eevising Barrister finds hotd. 
 certain facts with regard to them which it is submitted 
 are quite immaterial, namely : that they would not 
 necessarily but for this charity have become dependent 
 upon the poor law ; and that they earn some money by 
 their own exertions. The old cases need not now be 
 cited, for they were considered in Harrison v. Carter (a), 
 and the principles upon which the Court would act in 
 deciding whether in any case the alms received are such 
 as to disqualify were stated. In Harrison v. Carter (a) 
 the amount received was a single donation of 12s. Qd.j 
 which could not have been sufiScient in itself to maintain 
 the recipient, who was earning other sums by his own 
 ex.ertions, and yet he was held to be disqualified. The 
 present is a much stronger case. The question to 
 be asked is, are these persons so placed by their 
 indigence as to be presumably subservient and destitute 
 of freedom of mind. They are on the verge of the 
 necessity of coming on the parish. They are likely to 
 be susceptible of manipulation. The three elements of 
 poverty, the receipt of alms, and the absence of that 
 independence which is essential to the qualification of a 
 voter, all exist in this case as they did in Harrison v. 
 Carter (a), and these were the discriminating tests 
 applied in that case. Harrison v. Garter (a) was 
 approved and followed in Baker v. The Town Cleric of 
 MoTvmouth (b). Those are the two authorities on 
 which I rely. It is not necessary to show that these 
 persons, if not relieved by this charity, would otherwise 
 have been thrown on the rates. The only finding 
 against me is that these persons were earning money ; 
 but that must have also been so in Harrison v. 
 (a) 2 ffopw. A Colt. 324 ; i. i2. 2 C. P. D. 26. (b) 53 L. T. 668. 
 
60 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1887. Garter (a). These persons are avowedly indigent, and 
 Edwards presumably depeadent, and I submit that they are 
 
 V. . 
 
 Lloyd. 1^0* entitled to be registered. 
 
 No counsel appeared for the respondent. 
 
 Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. I am of opinion that in 
 this case the Revising Barrister was wrong. The 23rd 
 section of the scheme for the management of this 
 charity at Ruthin provides that the almspeople shall 
 be poor persons, who from age, ill-health, accident or 
 infirmity shall be unable to maintain themselves by 
 their own exertions. The five persons objected to have 
 declared themselves to be such persons, and if we are 
 to maintain the judgments of Harrison v. Garter (a) 
 and Baker v. The Town Glerk of Monmouth (h), this 
 case is concluded by the principles laid down in those 
 judgments. The appeal must be allowed with costs. 
 
 Pollock, B. I entirely agree. This case is clearly 
 within the dividing line. It is a case of some import- 
 ance, because there are maiiy almshouses in this 
 country not sufiiciently endowed to provide entirely for 
 the maintenance of the occupants, and it would be a 
 mistake to suppose that for that reason those who 
 accept their benefits, as indigent and dependent persons, 
 retain their right to be registered as voters. The facts 
 here seem to me to bring these persons within the 
 category of disqualified persons, and their names must 
 be struck off the register. 
 
 Hawkins, J., concurred. 
 
 Appeal allowed. 
 
 Solicitors — For the Appellant, Kennedy, Hughes & 
 Kennedy, for E. Humphreys Roberts, Denbigh. 
 
 (a) 2 Hopw. iSs Colt. 324 ; L. R. 2 C. P. D. 26. (5) 53 L, T. 668. 
 
U VICTORIA. tU 
 
 Wood, Appellant ; Chandler, Respondent. 
 
 AT a Court held by the Revising Barrister appointed 1887. 
 Nov. 29. 
 
 to revise the lists of voters for the borough of Battersea 
 
 and ClapJiam, Raymond Batchelor objected to the stated in his 
 name of John Wood, the appellant, being retained on objection that 
 the Glapham occupiers' list of parliamentary voters q^ tte'ustTf' 
 for the parliamentary borough of Battersea and pafiJamtntary 
 
 '^ JO voters for the 
 
 Glapham. parliamentary 
 
 borough of 
 . ii- . p,.. Battersea and 
 
 The said objector signed his notice oi objection cia^ham, but 
 
 did not more 
 thus : — particularly 
 
 " Raymond Baichder, of 624, Wandsworth Hood, on the list ijg(._ ijij^g 
 " of parliamentary voters for the parliamentary borough of parliamentary 
 " Battersea and Glapham." borough is 
 
 divided into 
 
 Exception was taken to the said notice of objection ^^° parlia- 
 mentary 
 on the ground that the description of the objector was Divisions, and 
 
 not in literal compliance with Form (I), No. 2, schedule prised in a 
 
 3, to 48 Vict. c. 15. The following facts were estab- md^not^th- 
 
 lished by the evidence : — coEcludmg ^ 
 
 The borough of Battersea and Glapham contains '^^^o°l5^ 
 
 two distinct parishes, — one, the parish of Saint Mary, J^°- ^^[^^^^f 
 
 Battersea, and the other, the parish of Glapham, — and objection was 
 
 ' . ^"'^ °° ^^° 
 
 is divided into two Divisions, viz. : the Battersea ground that 
 
 , , ~, , TN- ■ ■ it did not give 
 Division of the said borough and the Glapham Division the informa- 
 
 of the said borough, which Divisions consist of fourteen by the form of 
 
 polling districts ; numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 consti- ouUn'the"" 
 
 tuting the Battersea Division, all of which are in the fh^ ^ct.^ *° 
 
62 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1887. parish of Saint Mary, Battersea, and numbers 7, 8, 
 
 Wood 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 constituting the Glapham 
 
 Chandler. Division, of which numbers 7, 8, 9 and 10 are in the 
 
 parish of Saint Mary, Battersea, and numbers 11, 12» 
 
 13 and 14 are in the parish of Clapham. 
 
 The said objector Raymond Batchelor's name 
 appeared on the occupiers' list of the parish of 
 Glapham, Glapham Division of the said borough. 
 The names of twenty-five persons other than the 
 said appellant were objected to under similar circum- 
 stances. 
 
 The Revising Barrister decided that the description 
 • of the said objector was a sufficient compliance with 
 the said form in the said schedule of the said Act, and, 
 the objections having been established, expunged the 
 name of John Wood and of the said twenty-five other 
 persons from the said list.- Due notice of appeal from 
 this decision was given, and the appeals in all the 
 cases were consolidated. 
 
 If the Court should be of opinion that the decision 
 was wrong, the register was to be amended by inserting 
 the name of John Wood and the names of the said 
 twenty-five other persons in the said list. 
 
 Macaskie, for the appellant. The objector in this 
 case has failed to state in his notice of objection the 
 particular list on which his own name appears. He 
 has only stated that his name is on the list of parlia- 
 rnentary voters for the parliamentary borough of 
 Battersea and Glapham. There may be, and are, 
 many lists of voters in that borough, which consists of 
 two Divisions broken into fourteen polling districts. 
 The form of objection set out in the schedule to the 
 Ret;istrivtion Act of 1843 (Schedule B, No. 11, referred 
 
LI VICTORIA. 63 
 
 to in the I7th section of 6 Vict. c. 18) concludes as 1887. 
 
 follows : Wood 
 
 " (Signed) A. B. of [place of abodel, on the Ust of voters for „ ^- 
 
 "the Parish of ." Chand.ee. 
 
 And under the present Registration Act of 1885, 48 
 
 Vict. c. 15, sec. 18, the substituted form, which is set 
 
 out in Schedule 3, Form I., No. 2 to that Act, concludes 
 
 in similar terms : 
 
 "(Signed) A. B. of [place of abode], on the list of parlia- 
 " ment^ry roters for the parish [or township] 
 " of 
 
 So that under both statutes, unless the constituency 
 consist of a single parish or township with a single list, 
 it is necessary to state the particular list on which the 
 objector's name appears. In the present case the ob- 
 jector, though he has stated his place of abode, has not 
 stated the parish list where his name is to be found, 
 and the objection is therefore bad. The case is covered 
 by authority. In Farrer v. Edsworth (a), decided in 
 1847, the objector had described himself as " on the 
 list of voters for the borough of Lancaster" — where, in 
 fact, there were four lists, one of freemen for the whole 
 borough, and one of occupiers for each of the three 
 townships comprised in the borough. The Court held 
 that the notice of objection was insufficient. Wilde, 
 C.J., in his judgment, says : " The object clearly is that 
 the particular list, and not the general list, should be 
 pointed out," and the question is, "Does this notice 
 give equivalent information ? " 
 
 [Hawkins, J. Could not this notice of objection 
 have been amended ?] 
 
 It was not amended, and the Revising Barrister was 
 
 (a) 1 Lutw. 517 ; 16 L. J. 0. P. 132. 
 
 F 2 
 
64 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1887 not asked to amend it. This Court has no power to 
 Wood amend. Strict compliance with the forms is at least as 
 Chandlbr necessary under the Act of 1885 as under the earlier 
 Act. The earlier Act says the notices must be " accord- 
 ing to the form" prescribed in the schedule. The 
 present Act says the forms " shall be used and observed 
 in all cases to which they apply." It is not a question 
 of mere form, but of substance. There may be many 
 parishes and many parish lists in a large constituency 
 such as Birmingham for example, and the person 
 objected to might have to search twenty or thirty lists 
 in as many different places in order to find out the ob- 
 jector's quaKfication. In some county constituencies 
 there are over two hundred parishes with separate lists. 
 Following Farrer v. Edsworth (a) the case of Crowther 
 V. Bradbury (6) again decided that the particular Hst 
 must be specified, though in Kidderminster (the 
 borough there in question) there were only two parish 
 lists, and the whole borough was comprised in one 
 ancient parish of Kiddei^minster. Samuel v. Hitch- 
 mough (c) is distinguishable, for there the objector did 
 specify the parish list on which his name was, and the 
 Court held that sufficient, although the parish list was 
 in two parts. The only case that might be cited 
 against me is Oram v. Cole (d), where the objector 
 described himself as " on the list of voters for the 
 borough of Bevonport and township of East Stonehouse," 
 and it was held sufficient. But there the township was 
 indicated as well as the constituency, whereas in the 
 present case there is no mention of any parish or town- 
 ship whatever. 
 
 (o) 1 Lwtw. 517 ; 16 L. J. C. P. (c) K. <{■ G. 522 ; 32 i. Z C. P. 
 
 132. 55. 
 
 (ft) IIopw. <£■ Ph. 63 ; 33 L. J. C. [d) Hopw. & Ph. 87 ; ZiL.J G. 
 
 P. 70. P. 52. 
 
LI VICTORIA. 65 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. The 18th section of the 1887. 
 
 Registration Act of 1885 says that a disregard of any wood 
 
 form or instruction shall not of itself invalidate any ohantilbr. 
 list, notice, or other thing. Those words are very wide.] 
 
 The only decision that has reference to those words 
 is Wells V. Stanforth (a), where the omission of the 
 overseers to sign the list of claims in due time was 
 held not to invalidate the whole of the lists. That was 
 not a case of disregard of a form by omitting informa- 
 tion from it. It is submitted that it is not lawful for 
 parties to disregard the forms in essential particulars — 
 that is, by neglecting to give the information which the 
 Act of Parliament intended to be given. This is 
 matter of substance, not of mere form. 
 
 [Pollock, B. You mean that it is substantial in the 
 sense of affecting the conduct of the person objected to.] 
 
 One statute after another has required the parish 
 list to be stated, which shows that Parliament regarded 
 the matter as one of importance. It would cause the 
 greatest inconvenience and uncertainty if the person 
 objected to had to search through an indefinite number 
 of lists in an indefinite number of places — and this in- 
 convenience Parliament did not intend to have imposed 
 on the vote]'. 
 
 [Hawkins, J. You say the object of Parliament 
 was to make the notice of objection so certain as to 
 give information to the voter as to where and in what 
 list he would find the name of the objector, and that in 
 the present notice there is nothing equivalent to this.] 
 
 {a) Coltman, 451 ; L. R. 16 Q. B. D 244. 
 
66 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1887. It is not the form, but the absence of substance in 
 
 -^QQj, this notice that the appellant complains of. It is so 
 Ch ''lkb ^^®y *° comply with the form. There does not exist 
 any list such as is described in the notice of objection 
 as the list of parliamentary voters for the parliamentary 
 borough of Battersea and Glaphim. There are, I am 
 informed, ten lists for different parts of the borough. 
 l^He also cited James v. Howarth (a) and Bollen v. 
 Southall (b).] 
 
 No counsel appeared for the respondent. 
 
 Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. This is not a case in which 
 we have to determine anything about the power of 
 amendment possessed by Revising Barristers, or the 
 propriety of its exercise. The Revising Barrister did 
 not make any amendment, and I express no opinion as 
 to whether it would have been in his power to make 
 any amendment if he had been asked to do so. It is 
 the unamended notice in its existing form which the 
 Revising Barrister has held to be a good notice of objec- 
 tion. The notice does not follow accurately the form 
 set out in the schedule to the Registration Act, 1885. 
 The 18th section of the statute enacts that the forms 
 given in the schedules shall be observed. It is true 
 that at the end of the section it is further enacted that 
 a disregard of any form or instruction shall not of itself 
 invalidate any list, notice, or other thing. These words 
 were considered in the case of Wells v. Stanforth (c), 
 which came before this Court in 1885, but no judicial 
 decision as to the limits of their interpretation is 
 laid down in that case. Whatever those limits may 
 
 (a) Coltman, 87 ; L. B. 5 C. P. D. 461. 
 ■O. 225. (c) Coltman, 451 ; L. R. 16 Q. B. 
 
 (*) Coltman, 368 ; L. R. 15 'Q. B. D. 244. 
 
V. 
 
 Chandlbr. 
 
 LI VICTORIA. 67 
 
 be, the words cannot mean that a total and absolute 1887. 
 disregard of the forms and instructions directed by the Wood 
 Act to be followed and observed is protected by the 
 terms of the Act itself There must be some limita- 
 tion. In the present case the form prescribed for 
 notices of objection is disregarded, not merely in point of 
 form but in point of substance. This notice does not 
 give the information as to the status of the objector 
 which the Act of Parliament has said the person 
 objected to ought to have. The absence of that infor- 
 mation might cause both expense and inconvenience to 
 the voter. The objector has not merely not followed 
 the form, but he has not complied with the substance 
 of the enactment which the forms were intended to give 
 effect to. I am of opinion that there has not been suffi- 
 cient compliance with the requirements of the Act of 
 Parliament, and that this notice of objection is bad in 
 consequence. The decision of the Revising Barrister 
 must therefore be reversed, and the names restored to 
 the register. 
 
 Pollock, B. I am of the same opinion, and, in coming 
 to this conclusion, I do not think that the Court is act- 
 ing on a mere technical rule, but is carrying out the 
 principles laid down in the case of Farrer v. Eds- 
 worth (a), to which we have been referred. The reasons 
 given in that decision are of still greater weight now 
 that a parish may be partly in one parliamentary 
 Division and partly in another. By omitting to state 
 the parish, the objector has put upon the voter the 
 burden of finding out within what parish and within 
 what parliamentary Division the objector's qualifica- 
 tion is, and on what list his name appears. A great 
 
 (o) 1 filial: SI 7-; 16 I. J. C. P. 132j S- C. 
 
 t:-'U.A^/.;ti^ M-^iL,.rxA^, ine^.jtCu.S'/'], 
 
68 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1887. many omissions of this kind might entail enormous 
 Wood trouble and expense on the persons objected to. This 
 Chahdleb. ^® ^'^^ ^ '^s^s disregard of form, it is a material defect 
 in the substance of the notice. I do not discuss the 
 question of possible amendment. In some cases it 
 might be proper for the Revising Barrister to exercise 
 his power to amend such a defect, and in other cases it 
 might not. I express no opinion on the matter. But 
 in this case no amendment was in fact made, and, in 
 my judgment, the notice of objection as it stands is de- 
 fective and insufficient. The appeal must be allowed 
 with costs. 
 
 Hawkins, J. I am of opinion that the decision ot 
 the Revising Barrister in this case is wrong, and must 
 be reversed. No one is entitled to object to any voter 
 on the list unless his own name is on the list of voters, 
 and unless he has served a notice of objection upon the 
 voter to whom he is objecting. The form of notice of 
 objection prescribed by the Registration Act, 1885 (48 
 Vict. c. 15), is an indication that the legislatxire in- 
 tended that the person objected to should have the 
 means of ascertaining whether the person objecting has 
 the qualification which entitles him to give that notice. 
 The form requires the objector to state the parish or 
 township on the list for which his name is to be found. 
 Many parliamentary constituencies contain a large 
 number of parishes and townships, each with separate 
 lists of voters. Unless the parish or township is pointed 
 out by the objector in his notice of objection, the person 
 objected to may have to search many lists and make 
 many journeys before he can ascertain whether or not 
 the person objecting to him has the necessary qualifica- 
 tion to make the objection. In the notice before us all 
 
LI VICTORIA. C9 
 
 that is stated is the name of the objector, and that he is 1 887. 
 on the list of parliamentary voters for the parliamentary Wood 
 borough of Battersea and Glapham — with no statement chamdler. 
 of any parish list on which is name is to be found. There 
 is here not merely an omission to comply with the strict 
 form of the notice as set out in the schedule to the Act 
 of Parliament, but an omission to comply with the sub- 
 stance of its requirements. Our attention was called to 
 the concluding words of the 18th section of the Act. 
 [His Lordship read the words.] But those words could 
 never mean that an objector may totally disregard all 
 the substantial requirements of the Act, as evidenced 
 by the forms, which very requirements have been in- 
 stituted for the public benefit. An objector may not 
 simply write to a voter — " Dear Sir, I object to your 
 name being retained on the register. Yours truly, 
 J. Brown'' That would never do. If a total neglect 
 of the forms provided is not to vitiate a notice of 
 objection, it was idle for the legislature to specify care- 
 fully the information those forms should contain, and 
 to direct that those forms should be used. T say 
 nothing about amendment. That question is not raised 
 before us. 
 
 Appeal allowed. 
 
 Solicitor for the Appellant, Horace W. Chatterton. 
 
70 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 Daniels, Appellant; Allard, Eeapondent. 
 
 1887. A T a Court held on the 18th of October, 1887, for the 
 . pui-pose of revising the lists of parliamentary voters for 
 
 Nov. 29. 
 
 VictuaUers^ the Peclcham Division of the borough of GaTnberwell, 
 Asylum IS an jgf^^ Allard, the respondent, who was an inmate of 
 incorporated the Licensed Victuallers' Asylum in the said borough, 
 
 under Royal 
 
 Charter. The duly claimed to have his name inserted in the list of 
 
 design of the 
 
 Institution is occupiers for the said Division. The said claim was 
 
 to receive and iiiccr t -r\ • i ^ 
 
 maintain objected to on behalt oi Joseph, JJameLs, the appellant. 
 Licensed vfo- Fifty-two other persons, whose names were set out in 
 their^wivM ^ Schedule annexed to the case afterwards stated by the 
 o"i^th°^^" Revising Barrister, and who were likewise inmates of 
 who have con- ^^e said Asvlum, made similar claims, and their claims 
 
 tributed to . 
 
 the funds of were also objected to on behalf of the appellant. 
 
 the Institution 
 
 as subscribers A copy of the rules of the said Asylum was annexed 
 
 or donors are i i i. i • n i ^ , 
 
 eligible to be to the case, and such ot the said rules as were referred 
 inmates of the to in the argument are set out below, 
 fuifd^f the * -^t "^^^ proved before the Revising Barrister that the 
 Institution g^j^jj John Allard, and the said fifty- two other persons, 
 augmented by Y^g^^ been persons who had either been subscribers or 
 
 private bene- 
 volence. The donors to the funds of the Institution, 
 inmates are 
 subject to 
 
 various rules of discipline, which may be altered from time to time by the Board of 
 Ma.nagement. No person having an income exceeding a certain limit is qualified to be 
 elected, or to remain an inmate of the Asylum. The funds of the Institution are 
 applied, amongst other things, in augmentation of the incomes of the inmates up to 
 a limit fixed from time to time by the Board. Held, that the Rules of the Institution 
 do not necessarily show that the inmates are in receipt of alms such as to disqualify 
 them from the franchise under the provisions of 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 45, s. 36. Semite, 
 per Lord CoiEMDQE, L.CJ., that the inmates have not a freehold in their houses, 
 
LI VICTORIA. 71 
 
 Upon vacancies occuring in the Asylum, applicants are 1887. 
 elected by the members and subscribers under regula- Daniels 
 tions made by the Chairman and Board of Management, allard. 
 
 To be eligible for election it is necessary that the 
 applicant must have held a victualler's licence 
 for a period of seven years, and have paid an annual 
 subscription of at least £1 Is. for seven years, or 
 have given a donation of £o 5s. or upwards, which 
 donation constitutes the donor a life member of the 
 Institution. 
 
 Only decayed licensed victuallers being donors or 
 subscribers are eligible for election, and upon election 
 the person so elected is entitled to a house free of rent 
 and a weekly allowance. 
 
 The inmates are subject to regulations for the good 
 government of the Institution. One of such regulations 
 is that the outer gates are closed at ten o'clock in the 
 evening and re-opened at seven o'clock in the morning. 
 
 The income of the Institution is derived from the 
 subscriptions and donations of the members themselves, 
 and is also largely augmented by the benevolence of 
 persons not themselves licensed victuallers. 
 
 The Institution was incorporated by Koyal Charter, 
 6 Vict. 1842. 
 
 It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the 
 facts so proved constituted a receipt of alms of a 
 disqualifying nature under the statute 2 & 3 Will. 4, 
 cap. 45, sec. 36. 
 
 The Revising Barrister held that John Allard and 
 the fifty-two other persons objected to were not so dis- 
 qualified, and inserted their names in the list. 
 
 Due notice of appeal from this decision . was given, 
 and the Revising Barrister stated a case, setting forth 
 the above facts. 
 
72 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1887. 
 
 Daniels 
 
 All&bd. 
 
 If the Court should be of opinion that the decision 
 was wrong, the register was to be amended by erasing 
 the names of John Allard and of the said fifty-two 
 other persons from the said list. 
 
 The following Rules and Ordinances of the Institution 
 
 were referred to during the argument : — 
 
 ' ' I. That the de»gu of the Institution be to receive and maintain 
 " Decayed Aged Licensed "Victuallers and their Wives or Widows." 
 
 ' II. That the affairs of the Institution be conducted by a Chair- 
 " man, six Trustees, sixteen Governors, five Auditors, a Secretary and 
 " Clerk ; and that the Chairman and Trustees for the time being, shall 
 " be considered Governors by virtue of such their appointments." 
 
 " IV, That a Committee of not less than fifty members (being licensed 
 " victuallers) be annually appointed at the half-yearly court in January, 
 " who shall be styled the ' Auxiliary Committee ' to receive subscrip- 
 " tions and donations, and that the Chairman and Board of Manage- 
 " ment for the time being shall be added to such Committee^ and form 
 " a. component part of such body ; and it shall be lawful for such 
 " Committee to refuse the subscription or donation of any person who 
 " shall appear to the Chairman and Board of Management, or the 
 "major part of them present at any meeting, to be unfit and improper 
 " to be admitted a member of the Institution," 
 
 " XXXI. That all persons who previously to the first day of May, 
 " 1 829, shall have subscribed towards the funds of the Institution 
 " the sum of two guineas or upwards, at one or separate times, shall be 
 " members for life, and shall be entitled to vote at every election for 
 " inmates, and all persons who previously to the first day of January, 
 " 1832, shall have subscribed two guineas in one payment, and shall on 
 " or before the first day of January, 1839, have increased the same to 
 "five guineas, shall be considered members for life. That all persons 
 " who shall have already contributed five guineas or upwards in one 
 "payment shall be members for life. That all persons who shall 
 " already, or may hereafter contribute one or more guineas in one or 
 "more payments, and shall during the same year in which such pay- 
 " ment or payments were made, increase the came to five guineas, shall 
 " be members for life, and that all persons other than licensed victuallers, 
 " who shall make such contributions as aforesaid, shall be considered 
 " subscribers for life, and shall be entitled to an equal right of 
 " voting with the members being licensed victuallers in all elections of 
 " inmates.^' 
 
 " XXXIII. That the executors, administrators, or trustees of any 
 " person who shall heretofore have bequeathed, or shall hereafter bequeath 
 " a legacy to the Institution amounting to £50 or upwards, shall, upon 
 "payment thereof into the funds of the Society, become Governors for 
 "life, with the privilege of voting according to the rules of the 
 " Institution, at every ballot for the election of inmates, calculating at 
 " the rate of £50 to each executor, and in case any legacy so bequeathed 
 
LI VICTORIA, 
 
 73 
 
 " shall not exceed £50, then the preference shall be given to the 6r3t 
 "named executor, administrator, or trustee ; and that all public bodies _ 
 " and companies which shall contribute to the funds of the Institution 
 " shall be thenceforth entitled, for every £50, to the privilege of voting 
 "according to the rules of the Institution, at every ballot for the 
 " election of inmates, and that such privilege be vested in the head of 
 "such body or company for the time being." 
 
 " XXXIX. That the Chairman and Board of Management for 
 " the time being shall have full power to enter into, enforce, rescind or 
 " vary contracts or agreements relating to the Institution, and shall 
 " cause the several houses, offices, and other buildings, jards, and 
 " grounds suitable for the purposes of the Institution, to be upheld 
 " and repaired as they shall see occasion, and shall have the exclusive 
 " management, direction, superintendence and control over the same, 
 " and the concerns of the Institution in all respects whatsoever! 
 ■' together with the custody of the books of account and other books, 
 " deeds and papers relating thereto, or belonging to the same ; and 
 " shall have the power to direct the investment, calling in, laying out, 
 <' sale and disposition of the effects, funds, moneys, and securities of 
 " the Institution, and to call general and other Courts, and generally to 
 '' do all other things necessary or deemed by them proper or expedient 
 " for carrying on the concerns of the Institution, subject to no other 
 " interference than the acts of members in General or Special General 
 " Courts." 
 
 " XL. That the Chairman and Board of Management for the time 
 " being shall frame rules and regulations and prescribe orders and 
 " directions for the observance of the inmates of the Institution, and 
 " in all other respects whatsoever for carrying on the concerns of the 
 " Institution, and from time to time alter and vary the same, or the 
 " rules and regulations established by them, as they shall think proper- 
 " And all such rules and regulations, alterations and variations, re 
 " speetively, shall be binding and conclusive on all persons interested 
 " or concerned therein for the time being. Provided that all such 
 " rules, regulations, and orders, alterations, and variations, as far as 
 " they partake of the nature of ' Bye Laws,' shall receive the sanction of 
 " a General or Special General Court before they shall have any force 
 " or authority." 
 
 " XLIX. That the Chairman and Board of Management for the 
 " time being shall be empowered to accept gifts and endowments, for 
 " promoting particular objects of the Institution, or otherwise in aid of 
 " the general and other purposes of the Institution, on such terms and 
 " conditions as may be agreed on for the purpose between the Chairman 
 " and Board of Management for the time being, and the person or 
 " persons bestowing any such gift or endowment ; and all legacies and 
 " bequests bequeathed or given to the Society from time to time shall 
 " be considered as part of the ' Endowment Fund,' and added thereto, 
 ' ' unless otherwise stipulated for by the Donor.'' 
 
 " LII. That in case the members of the said Society shall, at any 
 "time hereafter, conclude and agree to dissolve and determine the 
 
 1887. 
 
 Daniels 
 
 Allard. 
 
74 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 ]887. 
 
 Baniels 
 
 T. 
 AliLARD. 
 
 " said Society, then, and in such case, it is hereby declared that such 
 . " dissolution and determination shall not be carried into effect except 
 " at a Special General Court to be called for that purpose only, whereof 
 " public notice shall have been previously given to the said members 
 " in the ' Morning Advertiser ' newspaper, if such paper shall be in exist- 
 "ence, and likewise in two other morning newspapers, and if such 
 "paper shall not be then in existence, then three times in three other 
 " leading morning journals of the day, within the City of London, in 
 " the manner hereinafter directed for the calling of General and Special 
 " General Courts of this Society, and except the consent and approba- 
 " tion of a majority of the then existing members of the said Society, 
 " and of the inmates of the said Society, shall have been obtained to 
 " such dissolution and determination thereof." 
 
 " LTV. That a donation of ten guineas in one payment shall entitle 
 " the member to become eligible for the benefits of the Institution in 
 *' two years, provided such member shall have been in business as a 
 " licensed victualler three years altogether, and have made that pay- 
 "ment before or while in business. That a member contributing five 
 " guineas, either in one, two or more payments within the year, shall 
 " be entitled to become eligible for the same benefits in three years 
 " provided he shall have been in business as a licensed victualler five 
 " years altogether, under the same restriction. That an annual sub- 
 " scription of one guinea for seven successive years shall entitle the 
 " party to the same benefit in two years, provided such subscriber shall 
 " have been in business as a licensed victualler seven years, under the 
 " same restriction ; and provided that every such of the said seven 
 " annual subscriptions shall have been paid at the periods when, and 
 " as the same shall under the rules of the Institution in existence at 
 " the time have become due." 
 
 " LVI. That no greater allowance to the inmates than the present, 
 " which is that of making up in money the incomes of all couples to 
 " thirteen shillings and sixpence per week, and those of single persons 
 " to nine shillings per week, shall be made until the annual income to 
 " arise from the funded or other property of the Institution shall exceed 
 " the amount so at present paid to the'inmates ; uijless they be members 
 " of the Incorporated Society of Licensed Victuallers, in which case 
 " the Board shall be empowered to grant to such members out of the 
 " funds of the Institution (if the Board shall consider the finances 
 "adequate thereto) the sum of one shilling and sixpence per week 
 " extra, say, to make up to couples a weekly allowance of fifteen ahil- 
 " lings, and to single persons, a weekly allowance of ten shillings and 
 " sixpence. And it shall be within the power of the Board of Manage- 
 " ment to allow inmates to receive allowances from other sources, save 
 " and except the Incorporated Society, to the extent of five shillings 
 " per week to married couples, and three shillings single persons. Pro- 
 " vided always, that if in the opinion of the Chairman and Board of 
 " Management, the ' Endowment Fund,' together with the surplus of 
 " the general receipts of the Institution, over and above the expenses 
 " of the management of the Institution, shall not be equivalent to meet 
 
LI VICTOKIA. 
 
 75 
 
 " such present allowances of tbe inmates, then, and in such case, the 
 ' Chairman and Board of Management for the time being shall reduce - 
 " and apportion the payments to the iqmatea to such extent as they 
 " may see fit." 
 
 " LVIL That any unmarried person possessing a clear annual 
 "income exceeding thirty- five pounds, or any married couple possessing 
 "a clear annual income exceeding fifty pounds, shall be ineligible 
 "respectively to become candidates for admission. And any un- 
 " married person who, after being admitted by eleetion to the benefits 
 " of the Institution, shall by any means become entitled to a clear 
 " annual income for his or her life exceeding forty-five pounds, exclusive 
 " of the benefits of the Institution, and any married couple, of whom 
 " both or either, after being admitted by election to the benefits of the 
 " Institution, shall by any means become entitled to » dear annual 
 " mcome for both or either of their lives exceeding sixty pounds, ex- 
 " clusively of the benefits of the Institution, shall immediately there- 
 " upon cease to participate in the benefits thereof, and shall accordingly 
 " surrender and yield up to the Chairman and Board of Management 
 " for the time being, or to whom they shall appoint, at any time the 
 " Chairman and Board of Management may fix, the occupation and 
 " possession of any tenement or rooms which he, she, or they may 
 " hold or possess under the bounty of the Institution." 
 
 " LIX. That no male member shall be eligible for admission into 
 "the Institution who shall not have attuned the ^ge of fifty-five 
 " years, nor shall any female member or widow of a member be so 
 " eligible until she shall have attained the age of fifty years, unless in 
 " either case incapacitated by lameness, blindness, or bodily infirmity, 
 " the same being satisfactorily attested or certified in writing to the 
 " Chairman and Board of Management by two or more medical gentle- 
 "men, and approved in writing by the medical officer of the 
 " Institution.'' 
 
 " LXIV. That no inmate shall injure, disfigure, or break any of 
 " the walls or timbers of the dwellings which they occupy, or make 
 " any alteration whatsoever in the structure of their dwellings, or in 
 " any manner disfigure the papering of the same, or erect against the 
 '* walls of the same, any dressers, cupboards, or shelves, without the 
 ''consent of the Chairman and Board of Management certified on 
 " tJieir behalf, under tlie hwd of the Secretary, for that purpose, fir^t 
 " had and obtained ; and in the event of such consent being given 
 " such dressers, cupboards, shelves, or other matters that shall be so 
 " put up, shall on the death or relinquishment Qf the habitation, by the 
 " inmate putting up the same, become the property of the Institution, 
 " and be not on any account taken awiiy therefrom. That no inmate 
 " sh^U injure, disfigure, or break down any of the walls, fences, trees, 
 •' plants, or shrubs of the Institution. That every inmate shall keep 
 " his or her dwelling, with the yard and appurtenances thereto belong- 
 " ing cle$ui, aiid in nice ^nd good order, and shall carefully preserve the 
 " walls, papering, boards, glass windows, and all other matters and 
 " things thereto belonging ; and shall sweep up, and remove the dirt 
 
 1887 
 
 Daniels 
 
 V. 
 
 Allabd. 
 
76 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1887. 
 
 Daniels 
 
 V. 
 
 Allard. 
 
 "from the pavement before their respective houaes, every morning 
 " before ten o'clock. That to guard against any abuse of the Institu- 
 " tion, or any injury arising in its domestic management, no inmate 
 " shall after admission into the Asylum, marry another inmate therein, 
 " or any other person whomsoever without the consent of the Chairman 
 " and Board of Management, in writing, under the hand of the Secre- 
 " tary, on their behalf, being first had and obtained, which consent shall 
 " be recorded on the minutes of the Chairman and Board of Manage- 
 " ment of that day's proceedings, at which the same shall be so given. 
 "That in the event of any inmate of the Asylum getting intoxicated, 
 " using Ul language, or otherwise misbehaving himself or herself 
 " towards any other inmate, or towards any individual connected with 
 " the Institution either as a member, subscriber, or otherwise, or in 
 "the event of any inmate directly or indirectly interfering in the 
 " election of inmates, or in the event of any inmate breaking, disobey - 
 " ing, or infringing in any manner, or degree whatsoever, any of the 
 '■ present Rules or any Bye-Kules already or hereafter to be laid down 
 " by the Chairman and Board of Management for their observance, the 
 " Chairman and Board of Management may visit such offence, either by 
 " the withdrawal from the offender of all, or some of the pecuniary 
 " allowance, or other benefits or advantages, which such party at the 
 " time of such offence may have been in receipt of for ever ; or for 
 " such shorter period of time as the Chairman and Board of Manage- 
 " ment may think a sufficient punishment for such offence, and the 
 " Chairman and Board of Management shall have the power, if they 
 " shall see fit, immediately to expel the party or parties so misbehaving 
 "themselves from their habitations in the Asylum. That any inmate, 
 " who shall have been once dismissed from the Asylum, notwithstanding 
 " he or she may possess the qualifications for admission, prescribed by 
 " the foregoing rules, sbaU not be eligible to become a candidate for 
 "re-election into the Institution, unless the Chairman and Board of 
 " Management shall see fit to approve of such party as a candidate.'' 
 
 Asqmth. for the appellant. The questioii in this case 
 raises again the point which was before your Lordships 
 yesterday (a), as to what is sufficient receipt of alms to 
 disqualify for the franchise. I submit that the inmates 
 of this Asylum are disqualified, and that the Eules of 
 the Institution show that this is so. By Rule I. the 
 inmates are to be Decayed Aged Licensed Victuallers 
 and their wives or widows. Rules IL, IV., XXXI. and 
 XXXIII. have to do with the management and con- 
 stituency of the Institution and do not directly relate 
 
 (a) See Edwards v. Lloyd, ante, p. 54. 
 
Allard. 
 
 LI VICTORIA. 77 
 
 to the inmates of the Asylum, except in providing rules 1887, 
 for their election. Rule XL. is important, because it Daniels 
 shews the disciplinary authority to which the inmates 
 are subject after their election. Rule XLIX. invites 
 gifts and endowments. Rule LII. will be relied on by 
 the respondent as shewing that the inmates have an 
 interest in the continuance of the Societv, and that it 
 cannot be dissolved without their consent ; but it is 
 submitted that this is a reasonable provision, because 
 the inmates have necessarily been subscribers in the 
 past, and ought to have a voice along with the other sub- 
 scribers when any question of dissolution is to be discussed. 
 Rule LIV. shews the conditions of subscription which 
 make a member of the Society eligible for the benefits 
 of the Institution — ^that is capable of being elected as 
 an inmate of the Asylum. Rule LVI. shews that the 
 allowance to the inmates is not only limited in amount, 
 but liable under certain circumstances to be reduced by 
 the Board of Management. Rule LVII. may be relied 
 on by the respondent as shewing that the inmates are 
 not necessarily in a condition of extreme indigence, 
 because they may be in possession of an income not 
 exceeding £35 a year without becoming ineligible for the 
 benefits of the Asylum ; but it is submitted that such 
 a fact is not incompatible with the condition of depen- 
 dence which the acceptance of the benefits offered 
 does under the other rules involve. Rule LIX. deals 
 with the age of the candidates for admission. Rule 
 LXIV. shews that the inmates have no complete control 
 over their houses, and is minute in its requirements 
 with regard to alterations, cleanliness and the like.^ 
 Then come further restrictions on liberty. The inmates 
 are not to marry without the consent, of the Board ; 
 and not only misbehaviour, but interference with the 
 
78 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1887. election of inmates or any breach of Rules or Bye 
 Daniels Rules made or to be made by the Board of Management 
 Allard. ^*y ^^ visited with various penalties, culminating in 
 absolute expulsion and perpetual exclusion from the 
 Asylum. It is submitted that the three elements of 
 disqualification mentioned by Lord Justice Lindley in 
 Harrison v. Carter (a) all concur in the present case : 
 that is to say, " poverty, the receipt of alms, and the 
 absence of that independence which is essential to the 
 qualification of a voter." That case was followed in 
 Baker v. The Town Clerk of Monmouth (b), and was 
 again approved by your Lordships in Edwards v- 
 Lloyd (c). 
 
 [Pollock, B. The degree of poverty which appeared 
 in those cases was more extreme than in this case. In 
 Harrison v. Carter {a) the recipients were to be " the 
 poorest inhabitants of the tything." In Smith v. Hall{d), 
 the candidates for admission were persons "having 
 no competent means to live," and yet they were not 
 disfranchised.] 
 
 The candidates here must be "decayed" licensed 
 victuallers. They accept a position of dependence and 
 use their indigence as a claim to the benefits of the 
 Asylum. 
 
 [Hawkins, J. An income of £35 a year — fourteen 
 or fifteen shillings a week — removes a man some dis- 
 tance from the position of a pauper.] 
 
 It is not to be presumed that these inmates have 
 
 (a) 2 Bopw. & Oolt. 324 ; L. R. (c) AnU, p. 54. 
 2 C. P. D. 26. (d) Hopw. & Ph. 11 J 33 L. J. 
 
 (6) 53 L. T. 668. C. P. 59. 
 
LI VICTORIA. 79 
 
 such an iaconie. They may be quite penniless and 1887. 
 entirely dependent on the funds of the Society. Daniels 
 
 [Hawkins, J. But they have themselves contributed 
 to those funds. The moneys contributed might be quite 
 sufficient to support the Asylum. It is in the nature 
 of a mutual insurance society.] 
 
 The Revising Barrister finds that the funds are largely 
 augmented by the benevolence of persons other than 
 licensed victuallers. 
 
 [Hawkins, J. Some of these men in happier days 
 may have made generous contributions to the funds. 
 The provision is that if a man subscribes and if he 
 suffers reverses of fortune and if he is elected he gets 
 certain benefits. But when once elected, has he not a 
 right to his cottage and his allowance ?] 
 
 He has not a right to be elected. His election is 
 itself matter of charity. In the Mowmouih case {a), when 
 once elected, the occupiers were entitled for life. 
 
 [Hawkins, J. There was no subscription.] 
 
 And here the subscriptions are supplemented by 
 private benevolence. The rules and byelaws of this insti- 
 tution interfere with liberty and independence. 
 
 [Pollock, B. Every residentiary club has rules 
 which interfere with absolute personal liberty. I am in- 
 formed that in the Bachelors' Club a member may not 
 marry, even with the consent of the committee.] 
 
 There were no such rules as these in the Sandwich 
 
 (a) 53 L. T. 668. 
 
 Q 2 
 
 V. 
 
 Allabd. 
 
80 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1887. case (a). I submit that the inmates of this Asylum must 
 Daniels confessedly be in a state of poverty in order to be 
 Ali,akd. eligible for admission ; they have no right to admission ; 
 and after admission, the discipline to which they have 
 to submit themselves deprives them of that indepen- 
 dence which is essential for the proper exercise of the 
 parliamentary franchise. 
 
 William Grahaon, {H. G. Richards with him), for the 
 respondent. These occupiers, when once elected, have 
 a freehold in their houses. Fryer v. Bodenham (b) ; 
 Roberts v. Percival (c). They hold during life and good 
 behaviour, as appears from the rules which have been 
 cited. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C. J. Suppose someone gave one 
 of these inmates £10,000 : the man would have to resign 
 his almshouse under the rules.] 
 
 That would be like a condition subsequent. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. All these rules may be 
 altered without any consent of the inmates. Suppose a 
 new rule were established, making the possession of £1 
 a cause of vacancy, or setting up some other conditions of 
 forfeiture ?] 
 
 So long as there are no such conditions, I say that the 
 cases cited shew that a tenancy for life or during good 
 behaviour does amount to a freehold. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.O.J. In Fryer v. BodenJiam (b) 
 
 (a) SmUh v. Hall, Hopm. & Ph. 4 0. P. 529. 
 
 11 ; 33 L. J. G. P. 59. (c) Hapw. & Ph. 121 ; 34 L. J. 
 
 (b) 1 ffopw. & Colt. 204 ; L. R. O. P. 84. 
 
LI VICTORIA. 81 
 
 there was an actual finding by the Revising Barrister 1887. 
 that the inmates of Lord Conningby's Hospital when 
 
 Daniels 
 appointed hold for life, and cannot be disturbed except v- 
 
 . Allabd. 
 
 tor murder or felony ; and in Roberts v. Per(yival (a) 
 
 the whole management of the property was vested in 
 
 the bedesmen. That is not the case here.J 
 
 [Hawkins, J., referred to Rule XXXIX.] 
 
 At any rate these inmates are not sustained by 
 charity. The subscriptions and donations are made to 
 the Corporation, and a fund thereby created. When 
 the fund is created, the members of the Society have 
 rights of property in it, even before they are elected as 
 inmates of the Asylum. And when they are elected 
 these rights become definite and immediate in posses- 
 sion. 
 
 [Hawkins, J. It does not appear that the inmates 
 are each of them entitled as of right to any definite 
 sum. The Board makes up their incomes, so that some 
 of them may receive more from the fund than others. 
 Some may receive nothing.] 
 
 It is submitted that whatever the fund is, these in- 
 mates have a right to enjoy it so far as it will extend. 
 They are in no sense paupers or supported by charity. 
 [He was stopped.] 
 
 Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. In this case the only ob- 
 jection taken to the qualification of these voters is that 
 by reason of their position in the Licensed Victuallers' 
 Asylum, and their acceptance of certain benefits from 
 
 (a) Hopw. & Ph. 121 ; 34 L. J. 0. P. 84. 
 
82 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1887. the funds of that Institution, they are in receipt of alms 
 Daniels which by the 36th section of the Keform Act, 2 and 3 
 Allaed. 1^*^^- 4, c. 45, disqualify them from the enjoyment of the 
 franchise. That is the only objection raised, and we 
 must take it as found by the case that in other respects 
 the persons objected to are entitled to be on the register. 
 The objection is raised against these inmates as a body, 
 and the objector cannot succeed unless the mere fact of 
 the tenancy of a house and the receipt of any sum of 
 money whatever under the Rules of this Institution 
 necessarily and in every case amounts to the receipt of 
 alms. We are all of opinion that that is not necessarily 
 the fact, and that we cannot hold that all these inmates 
 are by reason of their position as inmates in receipt of 
 such alms as to disqualify them. I am myself disposed 
 to think that in many cases the receipt of sums of money 
 from the fund would be a disqualification, but not in 
 every possible and conceivable case. In the result, the 
 matter, in my opinion, depends on circumstances varying 
 indefinitely in the fifty-three different cases. As to some 
 of these voters, a valid objection might perhaps be sus- 
 tained, and as to others, the objection might fail. The 
 only evidence of disqualification put forward by the 
 present objector is the circumstance common to all the 
 cases that these persons are inmates of the Asylum, and 
 uadet the Rules of the Institution. We do not think 
 that fact in itself sufficient evidence of the disqualification 
 alleged, and the appeal must accordingly be dismissed. 
 Speaking for myself, I see no ground for holding that 
 these persons are freeholders. I think there are cir- 
 cumstances which distinguish the present case from 
 both the cases which have been cited by Mr. 
 Graham, and circumstances which would lead me 
 to determine this case in the contrary sense. But 
 
LI VICTORIA. 83 
 
 the ground of our decision is that the objector has loo7. 
 not made out sufficient with regard to all these fifty- Daniels 
 three persons to establish his objection, and we cannot, Allaed 
 as the case is presented to us, draw any distinction 
 between them. 
 
 Pollock, B., and Hawkins, J., concurred. 
 
 Appeal dismissed. 
 Solicitors — For the Appellant, /. M. McDonnell. 
 
 For the Respondent, Dubois, Reid <& Williams. 
 
84 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 Childs, Appellant; Cox, Eespondent. 
 
 A T a Court held for the revision of the lists of voters 
 for the borough of Woolvnch, William Henry Childs, 
 the appellant, objected to the names of Robert Dendy 
 and Frederick Francis Johnson being retained on the 
 general occupiers' list of voters for the parish of Wool- 
 wich, in the said borough. 
 
 The names and places of abode of the said Robert 
 Bendy and Frederick Francis Johnson, hereinafter 
 called the said voters, appeared in the said list as 
 follows : — 
 
 1887. 
 
 Nov. 29. 
 
 Unless an 
 ordinary 
 course of post 
 whereby 
 letters would 
 be delivered 
 at the address 
 mentioned on 
 the notice of 
 objection and 
 duplicate 
 thereof within 
 the necessary 
 time does in 
 in fact exist, 
 the production 
 of the dupli- 
 cate is no 
 evidence, 
 within the 
 provisions of 6 
 Vict. c. 18, sec. 
 100, of the due 
 delivery of the 
 notice of objec- 
 tion. Notices 
 of objection 
 addressed to 
 persons within 
 the barracks 
 at Woolijoich 
 were posted 
 on August 20, 
 1887, about 6 
 o'clock in the 
 evening. 
 
 Letters then posted addressed to places in Woolwich other than the barracks would 
 in ordinary course of post have been delivered the same evening. Letters addressed 
 to the barracks are not delivered by postmen, but an orderly from the barracks calls 
 for them. It did not appear to be the duty of the orderly who did call for the letters 
 posted at six o'clock to deliver them all to their various addresses inside the barracks 
 the same evening. The duplicates of the notices posted were tendered as evidence 
 of delivery of the notices on August 20. Held, no proof of such delivery. 
 
 Name. 
 
 Place of Abode. 
 
 Nature 
 
 of 
 
 Qualification. 
 
 Description of Qualifying 
 Property. 
 
 Bendy, 
 Robert 
 
 Johnson, 
 Fred'rick 
 Francis 
 
 43, Staff Sergeants 
 
 Quarters, K.A. 
 
 Barrsicks. 
 
 C. Field Officers' 
 Quarters, 0. and 
 T.O. Barracks. 
 
 House 
 House 
 
 14, Staff Sergeants' 
 Quarters, K. A. 
 Barracks. 
 
 C. Field Officers' 
 
 Quarters, 0. and T. 0. 
 
 Barracks. 
 
 The said Robert Dendy is a non-commissioned officer 
 inhabiting the Eoyal Artillery Barracks, Woolwich, and 
 
LI VICTORIA. 85 
 
 the said Frederick Francis Johnson is an officer inhabit- ^°°'' 
 ing the Commissariat and Transport Corps Barracks. Childs 
 
 The following facts with reference to the giving notice Cox. 
 of objection to the said voters were proved before the 
 Revising Barrister. 
 
 On the evening of August 20th, 1887, at about three 
 minutes to six o'clock, a notice of objection addressed to 
 each of the said voters at his place of abode as above 
 mentioned was delivered at the Post Office at Woolwich 
 pursuant to the regulations for the purpose prescribed 
 by the Post Office. The stanaped duplicates were by 
 arrangement with the objector called for and delivered 
 to him at the Post Office at about 7.30 p.m. Such 
 stamped duplicates were produced in evidence to prove 
 that in each case the necessary notice of objection was 
 given. 
 
 Letters posted at the time of day at which the said 
 notices were posted would in the ordinary course of 
 post be delivered to places in Woolwich other than the 
 barracks on the evening of the same day by a delivery 
 commencing not earlier than a quarter to nine in the 
 evening. 
 
 There is no postal delivery or course, of post into the 
 barracks respectively inhabited by the said voters. An 
 orderly is sent down from the said barracks to call at 
 the Post Office for letters addressed to persons in the 
 said barracks, and letters addressed to persons in the 
 barracks are delivered to such orderly pursuant to mili- 
 tary regulations and directions given to the postmaster 
 for carrying out the same. If on any day or at any 
 time the orderly did not come the letters would wait at 
 the Post Office till called for. Telegrams addressed to 
 persons in the barracks are delivered there by Post 
 Office carriers. 
 
MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1887. On the said evening of the 20th of August, 1887, an 
 
 Childs orderly from the Royal Artillery Barracks called at the 
 qqj_ Post OfEce and received across the counter the letters 
 for the said barracks. The orderly when he returned 
 to the barracks distributed the letters for the officers the 
 same evening, but he did not distribute the letters for 
 the non-commissioned officers and men until the follow- 
 ing morning (August 21st, 1887). An orderly from the 
 Commissariat and Transport Corps Barracks also called 
 at the Post Office the same evening and received across 
 the counter the letters for such barracks. At the Commis- 
 sariat and Transport Corps Barracks letters for the officers 
 were distributed by the orderly the same evening, but 
 there was no precise evidence as to when the letters were 
 distributed to the non-commissioned officers and men. 
 
 The Revising Barrister held that in each case there 
 was no evidence that the objector had given the notice 
 of objection required by law to be given by him, as it 
 did not appear that there was any ordinary course of 
 post by which the notices would have been delivered 
 by post to the persons objected to on the 20th of 
 August, 1887, and retained the names of the said voters 
 on the said lists. 
 
 The names of forty-three other persons which ap- 
 peared in the said list, and whose places of abode as 
 stated in the said list were in each case at some address 
 within one or other of the said barracks were also 
 objected to at the same Court under similar circum- 
 stances ; and the Revising Barrister in like manner de- 
 cided to retain the names of these forty-three persons on 
 the list. 
 
 Notice of appeal having been given, the Revising 
 Barrister stated a case for the opinion of the Court^ 
 whereby the foregoing facts appeared, and further stated 
 
LI VICTORIA. 
 
 that the appeal in the cases of the said forty-three 1887. 
 persons other than Robert Bendy and Frederick Francis childs 
 Johnson (whose names and places of abode were all set cox. 
 out in a schedule) depended on the same material facts 
 as were set out with regard to the said Robert Bendy 
 and Frederick Francis Johnson, and that the said 
 appeals ought to be consolidated; and he named the 
 said William Henry Ghilds to be appellant, and Henry 
 Oeorge Cox, the returning officer of the said borough, to 
 be respondent in the consolidated appeal. 
 
 It did not appear from the facts stated by the Revising 
 Barrister whether the forty- three persons mentioned in 
 the said schedule were officers, or non-commissioned 
 officers, or private soldiers. 
 
 If the Court should be of opinion that the Eevising 
 Barrister was wrong in holding that notice of objection 
 had in each case not been given as required by law, the 
 names of the said Robert Bend/y, Frederick Framcis 
 Johnson, and of the forty-three other persons mentioned ' 
 in the schedule as aforesaid were to be erased from the 
 said list. 
 
 Asquith, for the appellant. The question in this case 
 depends upon two sections of the Parliamentary Regis- 
 tration Act, 1843, which regulate the methods in which 
 notice of objection must be given by persons who intend 
 to object to the insertion or retention of any name in a 
 voters' list. By Section 17 of that Act every person so 
 objecting shall (besides giving notice to the overseers) 
 also give, or cause to be left at the place of abode of the 
 person objected to, as stated in the list, a notice accord- 
 ing to the form given in the schedule to the Act, and " 
 every notice of objection shall be signed by the person 
 objecting. This notice of objection had under that 
 
 87 
 
8'8 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1887. section to be given, or caused to be left as prescribed, on 
 Childs 0^ before the 25 th of August ; but that date is now, by 
 Qpj 48 Vict, cap 15, sec. 3, altered to the 20th of August. 
 If the I7th section of the 1843 statute stood alone, it 
 would be necessary to prove that the notice of objection 
 was actually given to or left at the place of abode of the 
 person objected to within the prescribed time. But by 
 section 100 of this same statute it is enacted that it 
 shall be sufificient in every case of notice to any person 
 objected to if the notice so required to be given shall be 
 sent by post, free of postage, or the sum chargeable as 
 postage for the same being first paid, directed to the 
 person to whom the same shall be sent, at his place of 
 abode as described in the list of voters ; and the section, 
 after providing that under certain conditions postmasters 
 shall accept and examine such notices with duplicates 
 thereof, and forward each notice to its address, and re- 
 turn the duplicate of such notice to the party bringing 
 the same, duly stamped with the stamp of the post-office, 
 proceeds as follows : — " And the production by the party 
 who posted such notice of such stamped duplicate shall 
 be evidence of the notice having been given to the 
 person at the place mentioned in such duplicate on the 
 day on which such notice would in the ordinary course 
 of post have been delivered to such place." In the 
 present case the objector adopted the method of service 
 of his notice of objection provided by the 100th section, 
 and produced the stamped duplicate of his notice of 
 objection before the Revising Barrister. This stamped 
 duplicate is made by the statute not merely evidence, 
 but conclusive evidence of the service of the notice, as 
 was decided in Hornsbyv. Robson (a). No question is 
 raised in this case as to the form of the notices. The 
 (a) K. & e. 66 ; 26 L. J. 0. P. 56. 
 
LI VICTORIA. 89 
 
 1887. 
 
 only c[uestion is, were they given in time ? They were 
 posted before six o'clock on the 20th of August, and it is Childs 
 found as a fact by the Revising Barrister that in the Cox. 
 ordinary course of post these notices, if addressed to any- 
 one else in Woolwich, not in barracks, would have been 
 delivered the same evening, which would have been in 
 time. With regard to the barracks, delivery of the 
 letters is taken by the orderly who comes for them' 
 Such an arrangement is reasonable, and a similar 
 arrangement is made by many large houses of business, 
 who send a servant or messenger for their letters. It 
 could not have been intended that in such cases the 
 delivery by post should be held insufficient. 
 
 [Hawkins, J. The case states that in one of the 
 barracks the letters were not distributed to the non- 
 commissioned officers and men till August 21.] 
 
 The duty of the objector is satisfied if he hands in the 
 notices to the postmaster in due time. He is not 
 responsible for delays in delivery caused by the lack of 
 diligence of the distributing agent. 
 
 [Pollock, B. Where the ordinary course of post is 
 superseded by some other arrangement, do the pro- 
 visions of the 100th section apply ?] 
 
 [Hawkins, J. Here there was no ordinary course of 
 post making delivery into the barracks.] 
 
 It is contended that the delivery to the orderly accord- 
 ing to the standing arrangement of the post-office for 
 the delivery of letters addressed to the barracks, was 
 delivery in ordinary course of post to the barracks. 
 
90 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1887. [Hawkins, J. Do not the clauses taken together 
 
 Childb mean this ? The objector may himself deliver his 
 
 Cox. notice to the voter or at the voter's house on the 20th 
 of August, or if he chooses to send it hy post, he may 
 do so in the manner prescribed ; and it shall be deemed 
 good service, provided in the ordinary cause of post it 
 would be delivered by the post-oflBce authorities at the 
 voter's place of abode on that day.J 
 
 Not necessarily by the post-office authorities. 
 
 [Hawkins, J. The words are " delivered in the or- 
 dinary course of post." Here the post-office did not 
 deliver.] 
 
 [Pollock, B. I do not think a man has a right to 
 assume that there is a delivery to every house by ordi- 
 nary course of post. If there is in fact no such deli- 
 very, the objector runs the risk.] 
 
 In Lewis v. Evans {a) the notice was addressed to 
 Wern, to which place there was no regular method of 
 postal delivery, and unless by some accidental convey- 
 ance, the notice might never have been delivered at all. 
 Brett L.J. in his judgment says " there is no evidence 
 that anyone goes to the post town to receive letters for 
 Wern." Here there is evidence that the letters were regu- 
 larly transmitted to the barracks. If the matter is not 
 left to accident, but a course of practice is shewn, it is 
 submitted that the requirements of the statute are 
 complied with, and that an arrangement of this kind is 
 equivalent to delivery by the post-office. 
 
 At any rate there has been good service of these 
 
 (a) 2 Bopw. <fc OoU. 279 ; L. R. 10 C. P. 297. 
 
LI VICTORIA. 91 
 
 notices under section 17. They were left at the place 1887. 
 
 of abode of the voters, for the orderly had them at the Childs 
 
 barracks in his possession. It is not necessary to serve coy. 
 the notices personally. 
 
 [Hawkins, J. The notices appear to have been in 
 the private custody of the orderly — not to have been 
 left generally for the inhabitants of the barracks to 
 get.] 
 
 Some of the officers actually got their letters that 
 night, as is found by the Revising Barrister, and yet 
 officers' names have been retained on the list. It a notice 
 had been found in the road and picked up and delivered 
 at the voters' place of abode that vrould have been suffi- 
 cient as soon as it was proved it actually reached its 
 destination. 
 
 Ghannell,Q.G., (with him Rentoul), for the respondent. 
 This is a consolidated appeal, and if cases depending on 
 different circumstances are included in it, it should be 
 struck out. But there is no finding that any particular 
 notice of objection in fact reached any one of the voters 
 objected to on the 20th of August. [He was stopped.] 
 
 Pollock, B. The only question for our consideration 
 is whether these notices were properly delivered. The 
 statute, 6 Vict., cap. 18, provides two modes of delivery. 
 Under section 17 delivery may be effected by the 
 objector himself or his agent leaving the notice at the 
 place of abode of the person objected to, or delivering it 
 into such person's hands. Under section 100 delivery 
 may be made by post, and if certain steps indicated in 
 the section are taken, the objector niay rely on the 
 
92 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1887. stamped duplicate notice he gets from the postmaste 
 Childs as evidence that the original notice has been given t< 
 Cox. the person to whom it was addressed on the day or 
 which such notice would in the ordinary course of posi 
 have been delivered at the place to which it is 
 addressed. It appears to me that this provision throws 
 on the person who desires to avail himself of the 
 machinery provided in the section the risk of finding 
 that there is no " ordinary course of post " by which the 
 notice would be delivered vrithin the time limited for the 
 delivery of these notices. It turns out that there was 
 no ordinary course of post by which letters would be 
 delivered at the barracks in Woolwich on the evening 
 of August 20. An orderly was sent from the barracks 
 to the post-of&ce who received the letters and delivered 
 some of them to the officers that evening, late enough 
 no doubt, and others to the men next day. That is not 
 a delivery to the barracks in the ordinary course of post 
 on August 20. Even if the orderly might be regarded 
 as the objector's agent to deliver the notices, the dupli- 
 cates are not evidence of delivery by such an agent, but 
 only of delivery in the ordinary course of post. It is 
 only of such delivery that the duplicates are made 
 evidence by section 100. Actual delivery under section 
 17, if such in fact took place, should have been proved 
 in the regular way. I think the Revising Barrister 
 was right, and that the appeal must be dismissed with 
 costs. 
 
 Hawkins, J. I am of the same opinion. If the 
 orderly is to be treated as the agent of the objector, 
 there is no finding that he in fact delivered these notices 
 to the persons objected to on the evening of August 
 20th. With regard to some of them at any rate the 
 
LI VICTORIA. 93 
 
 evidence is that there was no delivery till August 21st. 1887. 
 
 The other question is whether there was sufficient 0hild3 
 delivery through the post-office, under the provisions q^^ 
 of section 100. To invoke the aid of that section, it 
 must be shown that the notices were posted so that in 
 the ordinary course of post they would be delivered at 
 the voters' addresses — which were within these barracks 
 — on the 20th of August. It is found in the case that 
 there was no postal delivery or course of post into the 
 barracks. Even if the orderly could be considered an 
 agent of the post-office to distribute the letters, or of 
 the inhabitants of the barracks to receive them, there 
 is nothing in the case to shew that it was his duty to 
 distribute them the same evening to the various 
 addresses in the barracks. He certainly did not so 
 distribute them all, and there is no suggestion that in 
 failing to distribute them he failed in his duty. I agree 
 that the appeal must be dismissed. 
 
 Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. I am of the same opinion. 
 
 Appeal dismissed. 
 
 Solicitors — For the Appellant, /. M. McDonnell. 
 
 For the Respondent, E. T. Hughes. 
 
94 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 Maclean, Appellant; pHlcflARD, Bespondent. 
 
 1887. 
 
 Nov. 29. 
 
 The 3rd 
 Bection of the 
 Eepresenta- 
 tion of the 
 People Act, 
 1884, does not 
 operate to 
 extend the 
 municipal 
 franchise. 
 
 AT a Court held on the 23rd of September, 1887, for 
 the revision of the lists of parliamentary and municipal 
 voters for the borough of Brighton, the following facts 
 appeared. 
 
 Certain premises in Brighton known as 22, Carlton 
 Hill, were let by the owner to an association or com- 
 mittee of gentlemen as tenants, who had taken tht 
 premises for the purpose of a coffee house. The 
 premises consisted of a single house with entrance ir 
 front and rear. 
 
 The appellant, Matthew Maclean, was placed in the 
 premises 22, Carlton Hill, by the committee as manager 
 and he, with the assistance of his wife and daughter 
 was in charge of the premises, served the customers 
 took payment for the articles supplied, and accountec 
 weekly with the committee for the receipts. For thes^ 
 services he received food, coals, lighting, and fou 
 shillings a week. He also inhabited with his family ; 
 portion of the premises. He paid no rent, but th 
 furniture in the part inhabited by him was his owr 
 The rent and rates for the whole of the premises wer 
 paid by the committee. 
 
 There was no separate rating for the part of th 
 premises 22, Carlton Hill, inhabited by the appellari 
 and his family, but the whole of the premises were rate 
 
Lt VICTORIA. 95 
 
 ill his name as occupier, and the receipts for the rates 1887. 
 were made out in his name. Maclean 
 
 The appellant claimed to be entitled to both the pjuchakd 
 parliamentary and municipa' franchise for the borough 
 of Brighton in respect of his occupancy of the said 
 premises. 
 
 The Revising Barrister decided that the appellant 
 was entitled to have his name retained on the occupiers' 
 list of parliamentary voters for the said borough, but 
 that he was not entitled to be enrolled as a municipal 
 voter on the burgess list, and therefore removed his 
 name from Division 1 and inserted his name in Division 
 2 of the occupiers' list for the said borough. 
 
 Matthew Maclean appealed, and the question for the 
 opinion of the Court was whether under the said cir- 
 cumstances the appellant was entitled to the municipal 
 as well as the parliamentary vote or not. If the Court 
 should be of opinion that the appellant was entitled to 
 the municipal vote, the register was to be amended by 
 removing Matthew Maclean's name from Division 2 to 
 Division 1 of the said occupiers' list. Otherwise the regibter 
 was to remain as settled by the Revising Barrister. 
 
 Clough, for the appellant. I contend that Matthew 
 Maclean is entitled, on th« facts stated by the Revising 
 Barrister, to the municipal as well as to the parlia- 
 mentary vote. By the Municipal Corporations Act, 
 1882, 45 and 46 Vict. cap. 50, sec. 9, it is required as 
 the qualification for a person- to be enrolled as a burgess, 
 among other things, that he shall have been during the 
 whole of the twelve months preceding the 15th of July 
 in occupation joint or several of any house, warehouse, 
 oountinghouse, shop, or other building in the borough ; 
 that he shall during the whole of those twelve months 
 
 H 2 
 
9G 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1887. have resided in the borough or within seven mile 
 Maclkan thereof; and that he shall have been rated in respect o 
 Pkiohabd. the qualifying property to all poor rates made durinj 
 those twelve months. 
 
 The appellant in this case satisfies all these require 
 ments. He is an occupier, though he does not occupy 
 as owner or tenant ; but that species of occupatior 
 is only required under the Reform Act of 1867 for the 
 parliamentary franchise. The appellant is in physica 
 occupation of the premises, he has resided, he is rated 
 and he has paid the rates : therefore he is entitled tc 
 the municipal franchise. 
 
 [Pollock, B. The question is, what does the word 
 " occupation " mean in the 9th section of the Municipal 
 Corporations Act 1882? "Occupation" has a legal 
 meaning, settled by decisions well known at the date oJ 
 that Act, and you must interpret the word according to 
 its meaning as so settled.] 
 
 I contend that the appellant, being in physical occu- 
 pation, is entitled to be rated under section 19 of 32 & 
 33 Vict. cap. 41, and thereupon, in the words of that 
 section, " is entitled to every franchise and qualification 
 depending upon rating." The municipal franchise 
 depends on rating, and the appellant being rated is 
 entitled to it. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. You must make out that 
 the appellant is the occupier in the sense intended by 
 the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882.] 
 
 The Representation of the People Act, 1884, section 
 3, enacts that a man inhabiting a dwelling-house undei 
 
V. 
 
 Pkichard. 
 
 LI VICTORIA. 97 
 
 the circumstances under which the appellant inhabits 1887. 
 shall be deemed, for the pui-poses of that Act and of maolkan 
 the Representation of the People Acts, to be an inhabi- 
 tant occupier of such dwelling-house as a tenant. Then 
 by section 8, sub-section (1) of the same Act, the ex^ 
 pression " the Representation of the People Acts " is 
 to mean the enactments for the time being in force in 
 England, Scotland, and Ireland respectively, relating to 
 the representation of the people, inclusive of the 
 Registration Acts as defined by the same Act. By 
 sub-section (2) of the same section the expression " the 
 Registration Acts" is to mean the enactments for 
 the time being in force in England, Ireland, and Scot- 
 land respectively relating to the registration of persons 
 entitled to vote at elections for counties and boroughs 
 inclusive of the Rating Acts as defined by the same 
 Act. By section 9, sub-section (1) of the same Act, 
 the expression " the Rating Acts " is to mean the 
 enactments for the time being in force in England, 
 Scotland, and Ireland respectively relating to the 
 placing of the names of occupiers on the rate-book or 
 other enactments relating to rating in so far as they 
 are auxiliary to or deal with the registration of persons 
 entitled to vote at elections. Therefore the meaning 
 of the word " occupier " in 32 & 33 Vict. cap. 41, sec- 
 tion 19, which is a " Eating Act," is, by virtue of these 
 sections, enlarged so as to include the persons described 
 in section 3 of the Representation of the People Act 
 1884, of whom the appellant is one. And since the 
 municipal franchise depends upon rating, I contend 
 that the municipal franchise is thereby extended. 
 
 [Lord CoLEEiDGE, L.C.J. The Municipal Acts are 
 not among tho?e mentioned in the Representation of 
 
98 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1887. the People Act, 1884. Its purpose is confined to th 
 Maclean representation of the people in Parliament.] 
 
 Pkiohabd. 
 
 It is contended that section 3 of that Act does nc 
 create a new franchise, but extends the old by a fictitioi 
 extension of the meaning of the word tenant for th 
 purposes of all franchises depending on occupation an 
 rating. 
 
 Newson, for the respondent, was not called upon 1 
 argue. 
 
 Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. I am of opinion that i 
 this case the decision of the Revising Barrister ws 
 right, and must be affirmed. He has put the name ( 
 this gentleman on Division 2 of the list of occupatio 
 voters for the borough of Brighton as being entitled i 
 vote at any election of a Member of Parliament to serv 
 for that borough, and has refused to insert his name o 
 Division 1 of the list, which includes those voters wh 
 are entitled not only to the parliamentary, but also t 
 the municipal franchise. The facts stated by th 
 Barrister with regard to Mr. Maclean bring his cas 
 exactly within the requirements of section 3 of th 
 Eepresentation of the People Act, 1884, Before tht 
 Act those facts would not have been enough to entit. 
 Mr. Maclean to either the parliamentary or the mun 
 cipal vote. The Legislature wished to alter that stal 
 of things, and passed the statute I have mentioned f( 
 the purpose of altering the conditions of parliamentai 
 representation, and of giving a vote for representativi 
 in Pai-liament to persons in the position of Mr. Moiclta. 
 It is now suggested that though the municipal franchii 
 is not dealt with in that Act, yet the meaning of tl 
 language of the old Municipal Corporation Acts hi 
 
LI VICTORIA. 99 
 
 been enlarged thereby. The effect of the 1884 Act is 1887. 
 to extend the meaning of the word " occupation " in maolhan 
 certain cases and for certain purposes, which have to pkicbabd. 
 do with parliamentary representation. That leaves the 
 word to continue to bear its old meaning in the cases 
 and for the purposes not contemplated by the Act. 
 Mr. Maclean was not an occupier within the meaning 
 of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882, or within the 
 meaning of the Representation of the People Acts until 
 the 1884 Act was passed, and but for section 3 of that 
 Act he would have had neither the municipal nor the 
 parliamentary vote. Under that section he is now 
 entitled to the parliamentary vote, but his position 
 with regard to the municipal vote is left where it was 
 — that is to say, he is not entitled to it, and his case 
 has been rightly dealt with by the Revising Barrister. 
 
 Pollock, B. I am of the same opinion. The 3rd 
 section of the Representation of the People Act 1884, 
 which creates what has been called the service fran- 
 chise, enlarges the meaning of the word "occupier" 
 for the purposes of that Act, which has to do with the 
 representation of the people in Parliament, but it does 
 not enlarge the meaning of the word at common law or 
 for the purposes of other Acts not referred to in the Act 
 itself. So that the argument which has been addressed 
 to us fails, and the appeal must be dismissed with costs. 
 
 Hawkins, J., concurred. 
 
 Appeal dismissed. 
 
 Solicitors — For the Appellant, Ballard & Go. 
 
 For the Respondent, BoooaU & Boxall, 
 for Freeman, Oell & Co., 
 Brighton. 
 
100 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 DoNOGHUE, Appellant; Brook, Respondent. 
 
 1887. AT a Conrt held for the revision of the lists of voters 
 
 ^"^^ ^Q- for the borough of Warrington the names of George 
 
 Militiamen, Brown and William Jolley appeared on the occupiers' 
 
 occupiers o£ • ■ i -u • 
 
 dwelling- list division 1 as the names of resident inhabitant occu- 
 
 a borough, piers in the township of Warrington, within the said 
 
 residence by borough. These names were duly objected to by the 
 
 fnc"mpou^ appellant, John Patrick Donoghue. The grounds .of 
 
 borough dur- objection were stated in similar terms in the notices of 
 
 ing training obiection served upon each of the said persons, and 
 
 under the j t. 
 
 ordinary -^q^q as foUoWS : — 
 
 military regu- 
 lations. 1st. That you have not for twelve months to 1.5th 
 Ford V.Barnes 
 
 (Colt. 396 ; L. July last occupied the qualifying premises. 
 254) and 2nd. That for the six months preceding the 15th day 
 
 Srootc [Ante, p. of July last you have not resided within seven miles of 
 22) owe . ^he parliamentary boundary of the borough of Warring- 
 ton. 
 
 The following were the facts established in support of 
 the objections in each of these cases respectively : — 
 
 George Brown, married, with a family, had rented a 
 dwelling-house situated at 157, Orford Lane, as a weekly 
 tenant, and had by his wife, family, and furniture occu- 
 pied the said house during the full qualifying year. 
 Was Quartermaster- Sergeant of the Liverpool regiment 
 of militia stationed at Warrington. Was away from 
 Warrington with the regiment duving the annual train- 
 
LI VICTOEIA. 101 
 
 ing at Altcar In the same county or a period of 26 1887. 
 
 in all, viz. — from July 1st to July 3rd and from DoNoeHue 
 July 7th to August 1st, all inclusive. Returned on ^^^ 
 July 3rd on duty to Warrington, and remained until 
 the 7th, when he went back to the camp at Altcar 
 aforesaid, which is within 25 or 26 miles of Wcfrring- 
 ton. Returned on August 1st on duty, and subse- 
 quently went to sleep at his house at Warrington upon 
 verbal leave given him by his superior officer. Had 
 never returned without leave. Reasonable leave was 
 always given as of course and he had never been refused 
 such leave. Believed that leave to return to Wari'ing- 
 ton would be granted every night upon personal appli- 
 cation if he needed it, and that no leave would be 
 required to enable him to return home from Altcar to 
 Warrington if he were ready at Altcar in the morning 
 to do his duty. Was never required at the camp, and 
 had no duties to perform at night, nor offices of any 
 kind in reference to the men's quarters or picquet duty 
 more in Altcar than in Warrington. When in War- 
 ring/ton and not on the annual training slept at liis 
 own house nightly and required no leave. If Altcar 
 had been nearer would have returned home to sleep 
 each night without leave, because no leave would be 
 required, as he was not wanted for any purpose in 
 camp as a non-commissioned non-combatant officer. 
 Wife, family, and furniture remained in the same house 
 at Warrington during his entire absence and were 
 still there. 
 
 William Jolley, by trade a file cutter, occupied a 
 dwelling-bouse 1 5, Birchall Street, Warrington, with 
 wife and family as weekly tenant during the whole 
 qualifying year. Was a drummer in the band of the 
 Liverpool Militia regiment and on the permanent staff. 
 
102 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1€87. Was away at Altcar for twenty-seven days. Returned 
 DoNOGHOB home during that time to wife and &mily at Warring- 
 Bbo'ok. ^on on three occasions — once with written twice with 
 verbal leave and twice in one week. Never was refused 
 leave. Had no duties to perform in camp after twelve 
 noon parade. Neither on picquet nor on guard. Some- 
 times on Tuesday and Friday played, at officers' mess 
 dinner. Band did not play every eveuing. Bfad no 
 quarters in barracks and received lodging money all the 
 year round. Paid rent same as other house-holders 
 from his own earnings. Could remove to any other 
 house he chose. The military authorities exercised 
 no superintendence over his choice, and he was not 
 bound to reside within any given distance, and unless 
 he received special instructions to the contrary having 
 no duties to perform would return home to his house from 
 Altcar if it were convenient or practicable every night. 
 Had no intention to give up his house or remove while 
 at Altcar, but to return when it suited him and at the 
 end of training. Had always so returned to his own 
 residence since he first went with the regiment to 
 Altcar. Believed that leave to return would be granted 
 him as of course every night if he required it and upon 
 application, there being no reason to the contrary and 
 if he could return to camp in time to perform his duties 
 in the morning. If Altcar had been in or near War- 
 rington, knew no reason why leave would be required 
 to enable him to return home every night as usual if he 
 ■wished to do so. 
 
 The objector drew attention to the Army Act, 1881, 
 sections 15, 175, and 176, as amended by the Acts of 
 1885, 1886, 1887, and to the Queen's Regulations, sec. 8, 
 par. 87. 
 
 Upon the facts in evidence and above stated the Re- 
 
LI VICTORIA. 103 
 
 vising Barrister found that the' persons so objected to 1887. 
 were absent from their homes under no compulsion of donoghue 
 law and were in no sense domiciled at or resident in- bbook. 
 habitants of Altcar, and their presence at Altear was 
 not enforced by the necessity of performing any duty 
 and was voluntary subject to the requirements of mili- 
 tary discipline and the discretion of the said superior 
 officers as expressed in Her Majesty's Regulations, and 
 that at no period had they waived their intention to 
 return, as they returned in fact, and that the cases did 
 not fall within either the authority of Ford v. Barneti (a) 
 or Ford v. Elmsky {b), and that the names of the 
 said persons ought to stand on the list as placed there 
 by the overseers. 
 
 The objector gave notice of appeal, and the Revising 
 Barrister stated the facts as above for the information 
 of the Court. 
 
 If the Revising Barrister was wrong in allowing the 
 claims of these persons respectively, and the Court 
 should be of opinion that they wei-e not duly qualified 
 inhabitant occupiers under the Representation of the 
 People Act, 1867, sec. 3, and the enactments amending 
 or affecting the same, their names were to be struck 
 from the register, as not entitled to vote in respect of 
 the necessary household qualification. 
 
 Appeals in fifteen other cases depending on similar 
 facts were consolidated with the appeals in the cases of 
 George Brown and William Jolley, and the appellant 
 and respondent were named by the Revising Barrister 
 to be appellant and respondent respectively in the 
 consolidated appeal. 
 
 (a) Coltman, 396 ; L. R. 16 Q. (6) Coltman, 396, 397 ; L. R. 
 B.D.25i. 16 Q. B. D. i5i. 
 
104 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1887. Henn Collvns, Q.C., for the appellant. It is sub- 
 
 DoNOGHUE naitted that this case cannot be distinguished from the 
 Bbook. cases of Spittal v. Brook (a) and Ford v. Barnes (b). 
 [He was stopped.] 
 
 Mattinson, for the respondent. The cases are dis- 
 tinguishable. The Revising Barrister has found that 
 the voters were not absent from their homes under any 
 compulsion of law, and that their presence at Altcar 
 was voluntary. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J, This Court has twice de- 
 cided that absence from home in camp for militia 
 training breaks the residence of the militiaman. These 
 men go into camp at Altcar knowing that the colonel 
 can keep. them there. The Revising Barrister cannot, 
 by refusing to draw the inference from the facts which 
 this Court has said ought to be drawn, turn a question 
 of law into a question of fact. This Court has said 
 that under these circumstances there is legal compul- 
 sion of absence : the Revising Barrister cannot be 
 permitted, in the face of that decision, to record a 
 finding that legal compulsion does not exist.] 
 
 The only authority of the colonel to keep these men 
 in camp arises under the Army Acts of 1881 and 
 following years, and under section viii. of the Queen's 
 Regulations for the Army, paragraph 87 : " In ordinary 
 camps in time of peace certain limits are to be fixed 
 at the discretion of the general or other officers com- 
 manding in camp, beyond which soldiers are not to 
 go without permission." 
 
 (a) Anie, p. 22 ; L. R. 18 Q. B. (b) CoUman, 396 : L. R. 16 Q 
 D. 426. B. D. 254. 
 
V. 
 
 Bbook. 
 
 LI VICTORIA. 105 
 
 [Pollock, B. An order prescribing the limits was 1887. 
 no doubt made at Altcar.'] Donoohue 
 
 That is no doubt to be presumed. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. Ts Wa7'rington within 
 those limits ?] 
 
 There is no finding to the contrary. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. The late Mr. Justice 
 Maule once said that common sense still lingered in 
 the precincts of Westminster Hall. Do you ask us 
 to think it possible that a rational commanding officer 
 would include a place five- and-t wen ty miles ofiF within 
 the limits of his camp ?] 
 
 These men had continual opportunities of returning 
 to Warrington throughout the training, and were never 
 refused leave. They are ordinary householders in 
 Warrington, and in continual occupation of their 
 houses by their wives and families. It is not a case of 
 the service franchise, and the cases since the Act of 
 1884 have been decided with reference to that franchise 
 only. If the men had no duties in camp after noon in 
 the day, it is not unreasonable that they should return 
 to WarriTigton. They had no other home. 
 
 [Hawkins, J. You have the finding that the men 
 never returned to WarriTigton without leave. Leave 
 was necessary, which shews that Warrington must 
 have been outside the limits of the camp.] 
 
 This case is a militia case like R. v. Mitchell (a); it 
 is not a soldier case. 
 
 (4 10 East, 511. 
 
106 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1887. [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. We had the case of R. v. 
 
 DoNOQHCK Mitchell (a) pressed on us in Firrd v. Barnes (b) and 
 Bhook dealt with it there.] 
 
 The Queen's Regulations are by section 176 of the 
 Army Act 1881 applied to volunteers under many cii"- 
 cumstances. Every volunteer going into camp at Wim- 
 bledon, or out on an Easter march will under this 
 decision lose his vote. 
 
 [Pollock, B. No doubt special regulations as to 
 leave are made in such cases.] 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. When the case of a volun- 
 teer is brought before us, we will deal with it. We 
 are now dealing with the case of militiamen.] 
 
 I submit that these militiamen under the circum- 
 stances stated had practical liberty to return at all 
 reasonable times to Warrington, and that their votes 
 ought not to be disallowed. 
 
 Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. I am of opinion that 
 this case is covered by the authority of this Court, 
 and that the appeal must be allowed with costs. There 
 is no distinction between the facts stated here and 
 the facts of the cases to which I have referred. 
 These militiamen when they go into camp submit 
 themselves to the Queen's Regulations, one of which 
 provides that they cannot, without leave, return to 
 their homes during the 27 days they are under train- 
 ing. We have decided three times already that under 
 these circumstances their residence at their homes is 
 
 (a) 10 Eatt, 511. (b) Cdtman, 396; L. R. 16 
 
 Q. B. D. 254. 
 
LI VICTORIA. 107 
 
 broken. This is the fourth time the question has been 1887. 
 argued before us. I trust we shall not have to decide donoghce 
 
 V. 
 
 it a fifth time. ' Bbook. 
 
 Pollock, B. The case comes clearly within the 
 authority of Ford v. Barnes (a.) referred to with ap- 
 proval last year in Spittal v. Brook (b). The Revising 
 Barrister has not found any facts taking the case of 
 these men out of the rigour of the Queen's Regulations 
 so as to shew any ability in them to return to their 
 homes without breach of a legal obligation. 
 
 Hawkins, J. I also think the case is covered by 
 authority, and agree that the appeal mixst be allowed. 
 
 Appeal allowed. 
 
 Solicitors — For the Appellant, H. Flulcer. 
 
 For the Respondent, Rowcliffes, Rawle & Go., 
 for Nicholson, Warrington. 
 
 (a) Ooltman, 396 ; L. R. 16 Q. (b) Ante, p. 22 ; L. R. 18 Q. B. 
 B. D. 254. D. 426. 
 
CASES 
 
 ARGUED AND DETERMINED 
 
 IN THK 
 
 QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION 
 
 OP 
 
 THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, 
 
 UNDER STATS. 6 & 7 VICT. c. 18, 
 
 AND 
 
 41 & 42 VICT. c. 26, 
 AND THE ACTS AMENDING THE SAME, 
 
 DURING 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS, 1888, 
 
 IN THE 
 
 EIFTY-SECOND YEAR OF QUEEN VICTORIA. 
 
 Jones, Appellant ; Kent, Respondent. 
 
 oters 
 
 Nov. 27. 
 
 A T a Court held for the revision of the lists of voters 1888. 
 for the parliamentary borough of the city of Gloucester 
 
 It is an essen- 
 
 the name of the appellant, Alfred William Cass Jones, tial part of 
 
 the qualifica- 
 
 appeared on the old lodger list as published by the tion for the 
 overseers of the parish of St. John the Baptist within chise to have 
 the said borough and city. w^hVde^^a- 
 
 The respondent, George James Kent, gave notice of attestation 
 obiection to the name of the appellant being retained annexedthere- 
 
 ■' ^'^ " to in accord- 
 
 ance with the 
 statute. Hersant v. HaUe (Ante, p. 12) followed. Where the declaration and attes- 
 tation were dated before the close of the qualifying year, hdd, that the document 
 was self- contradictor; and the claim useless. It is sufficient to state as the ground 
 of objection in such a case " that you have not complied with the statutory require- 
 ments in making your claim." Meaning of the word " claim " discussed. 
 
 I 2 
 
110 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1888. upon the said list, and the ground of objection stated in 
 
 Jones the said notice was : — 
 
 Kent, "That you have not complied with the statutory 
 
 requirements in making your claim." 
 
 The appellant had been entered in respect of lodgings 
 on the register of voters for the said parish in force in 
 1888. After the 15th day of July, 1888, and before the 
 25th day of July, 1888, he sent to the overseers of the 
 said parish in which his lodgings were situate notice 
 of his claim to be registered in the words and figures 
 following : — 
 
 " Old Lodger Claim. No. 3 Polling District. 
 
 ' ' To the Overseers of the Parish of St. John the Baplist. 
 
 " I claim to have ray name inserted in the list of persons entitled 
 to vote at the election of Member to serve in Parliament for the 
 Parliamentary Borough of Oloucester in respect of the qualification 
 named below : — 
 
 Name of 
 
 Claimant in 
 
 full, surname 
 
 being first. 
 
 Jones, Alfred 
 William Cass 
 
 Description of 
 rooms occu- 
 pied, and 
 whether fur- 
 nished or not. 
 
 Purnished 
 Bedroom on 
 second floor. 
 
 Street, Lane, 
 
 
 or other place, 
 
 
 and number, 
 
 Amount 
 
 if any, of 
 
 of rent 
 
 [lousein which 
 
 paid. 
 
 Lodgings 
 
 
 situate. 
 
 
 38, Worcester 
 
 11- 
 
 Street 
 
 weekly. 
 
 Name and address 
 of Landlord or 
 other person to 
 
 whom rent is paid. 
 
 William Jones, 
 Senr., 38, Wor- 
 cester Street. 
 
 " I hereby declare that I have during the twelve calendar months 
 ' immediately preceding the fifteenth day of July in this year occupied 
 ' as sole tenant and resided in the above-mentioned lodgings, and that 
 ' those lodgings, are of a clear yearly value it let unfurnished of ten 
 
 ■ pounds or upwards, and I hereby declare that I am on the Register of 
 
 ■ Parliamentary Voters for the said Parliamentary borough in respect 
 ' of the same lodgings as above mentiuned, and I desire to have my 
 
 ■ name inserted in the List of Lodger Voters published on or before 
 
 ■ the Ist day of August. 
 
 " Dated the 9th day of July, 1888. 
 
 " (Signed) Alfred William Cass Jones." 
 
LII VICTORIA. Ill 
 
 "I the undersigned hereby declare that I have witnessed the 1888. 
 ' above signature of the above named claimant at the date stated 
 
 ' above, and that I believe the above claim to be correct. Junes 
 
 v. 
 " Dated the 9th day of July, 1888. Kent. 
 
 " (Signed) James Jenkins, 
 
 " Of Fwnchall Honyatt Road, Oloucester." 
 
 The overseers accordingly entered the name of the 
 appellant on the old lodger list to be submitted to the 
 Revising Barrister for the ensuing year, and did not 
 add the words " objected to " opposite to his name. 
 The list on which the appellant's name was so entered 
 was duly signed, published, and otherwise dealt with 
 in accordance with the statutory provisions in that 
 behalf. 
 
 The objector contended in support of his objection 
 that the notice of claim being dated on the 9th July, 
 six days before the expiration of the qualifying period, 
 disclosed no sufficient qualification, and that the ap- 
 pellant was not entitled to have his name retained on 
 the lodger list for the year 1889. 
 
 It was submitted on behalf of the appellant : 
 
 1. That being an old lodger, as his name had been 
 inserted on the list by the overseers, the Revising 
 Barrister had no power to inquire into the sufficiency 
 of the notice of claim, and that the case was governed 
 by Davies v. Hopkins (a) and Leonard v. Alloways (6). 
 
 2. That the notice of objection did not sufficiently 
 state the ground of objection. 
 
 3. That the date of the claim was immaterial, as it 
 was in fact sent to the overseers after the 15th July 
 
 (a) K. <t a. 118 ; 27 L. J. C. (h) 2 Ilopw. & Colt. 411 ; 48 L. 
 
 P. 6. /. a. p. 81. 
 
112 MICIIAKLMAS SITTINGS, 
 
 1888. and not later than the 25th July, and that the pnblica- 
 jo^j,;, tion of the list by the overseers cured any irregularity 
 Kknt. ^" *^® original claim. 
 
 4. That the Revising Bairister ought to amend the 
 date of the claim if necessary by substituting some 
 date subsequent to the 1 5th July for the date appear- 
 ing on the said notice of claim. 
 
 The Revising Barrister held that the notice of objec- 
 tion was sufficiently specific, and that the case was 
 governed by Hersant v. Halse (a). That a notice of 
 claim disclosing a sufticient qualification was a condition 
 of the appellant's right to have his name entered or 
 retained on the lodger list. That his notice of claim 
 disclosed no sufficient qualification and was therefore 
 invalid and ineffectual. That the date of the notice of 
 claim was not a mistake which the Revising Barrister 
 had power to amend. 
 
 The Revising Barrister therefore declined to make 
 any amendment, and erased the name of the appellant 
 from the lodger list. 
 
 The names of thirty-nine other persons who were 
 entered upon the old lodgers' lists for several parishes 
 in the said city were objected to under circumstances 
 and upon grounds similar to those stated in regard to 
 J l/red WiUiam Gass Jones. The Revising Barrister 
 erased the names of all the said persons from the 
 respective lists. 
 
 Notice of appeal against these decisions was duly 
 given and the appeals were consolidated. 
 
 If the decision was wrong in point of law the name 
 of the appellant and the names of the said thii-ty-nine 
 
 («) Ante, p. 12 ; L. R. 18 Q. B. D. 412. 
 
LII VICTORIA. 113 
 
 other persons were to be re-instated in the lodjers' lists 1888. 
 of parliamentary voters for the respective parishes of Jonks 
 the said city. Kent. 
 
 Bompas, Q.G., for the appellant. First, this notice 
 of objection is not sufficiently specific. By 41 & 42 
 
 Vict. cap. 26, sec. 26, notices of objection mvist " state 
 specifically " the ground or grounds of objection. Here 
 the ground of objection is stated to be that "the appel- 
 lant had not complied with the statutory requirements " 
 in making his claim. That is too vague, and does not 
 give the claimant sufficient notice of the nature of the 
 objection to enable him to meet it. It might refer to 
 the form of the claim, or the time it was made out, or 
 the sufficiency of its delivery — as for example that it 
 was sent by post and not delivered by the postman till 
 too late. The claimant might throw away costs in 
 preparing to meet a false point, [He cited Smith v 
 
 Woolston (a).] 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. The notice of objection 
 seems to point to the form of the claim — the " making " 
 of the claim sent in. It is an objection that the claim 
 on the face of it does not comply with the requirements 
 of the statute,] 
 
 Secondly, the claim in this case is good, and is in 
 the statutory form. It was not delivered to the over- 
 seers till after July 15th, when the qualifying year 
 was in fact complete, and the overseers by publishing 
 the name on the old lodgers' list — which is now a 
 list of voters — see 41 & 42 Vict. cap. 26,sec. 22 — waived 
 
 (a) 2 iropw. rf; Colt. 421 ; L. R. i 0. P. D. 73. 
 
114 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1888. any objection to the informality of the claim, if the 
 JoNBs misdating of the declaration is an informality. Bavies 
 Kent. '^^ Hopkins (a). 
 
 [Manisty, J. How do you distinguish Hersant v. 
 Halse ? (6).] 
 
 In that case there was no claim at all. Here the 
 claim is good enough, it is only the declaration annexed 
 to it that is erroneous. The declaration is for the pur- 
 poses of evidence, which may be otherwise supplied. 
 The claim might be good, even if no declaration at all 
 were attached to it. 
 
 [Hawkins, J. The claimant has chosen to incor- 
 porate with his claim a declaration which shows on the 
 face of it that at the date he made his claim he had no 
 title to cliiim — a declaration which on the face of it is 
 a falsehood. And if you strike out the declaration, the 
 claim is unsigned.] 
 
 It is submitted that it is only the claim which it* an 
 essential part of the lodger qualification. And the 
 declaration can be no part of the claim, because in 
 section 30, sub-section (2) of 30 & 31 Vict. cap. 102, 
 which gives the regulations for lodger claimants, the 
 declaration is spoken of as " annexed " to the claim. 
 So also the 23rd section of 41 & 42 Vict, cap, 26. The 
 claimant had in fact a complete qualification, and made 
 a claim by virtue of which his name was inserted on 
 the overseers' list, though the declaration attached to 
 the claim was unfortunately dated a few days before, 
 but not delivered or intended to be operative until 
 
 (a) K. & a. 118 ; 27 L. J. C. (6) AnU, p. 12 ; L. R. \% Q B 
 
 P. 6. D. 412. 
 
LII VICTORIA. 115 
 
 after, the expiration of the qualifying year. At the 1888. 
 time the claim was delivered it was an honest one, and jones 
 the claimant has fulfilled all the essential statutory kent. 
 requirements entitling him to have his name retained 
 on the list. 
 
 A. T. Lawrence, for the respondent, was not called 
 upon to argue. 
 
 Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. I am of opinion, notwith- 
 standing the very ingenious argument that has been 
 addressed to us, that this claim is a bad one, and that 
 the decision of the Revising Barrister was right. The 
 case of Hersant v. Halse (a) decided that under the 
 4th section of 30 & 31 Vict. cap. 102, the making of a 
 claim is a necessary part of a lodger qualification. The 
 requisites for the making of a claim are pointed out in 
 section 30, sub-sec. (2) of the same statute, and un- 
 fortunately the word which has led to the whole of 
 this argument does not seem to be used in accurately 
 the same sense throughout the sub-section. The Act 
 of Parliament says, first,- that the " claim,'' that is the 
 words by which the man asserts his right to be regis- 
 tered, shall be in a particular form set out in the 
 schedule (which remains substantially the same, 
 though 48 Vict. cap. 15 has since been passed) : and, 
 secondly, shall have annexed thereto a declaration and 
 shall be certified in the form and in the manner in the 
 same schedule mentioned : and, thirdly, every " such 
 claim " — that is, such form of assertion of right with 
 the additions made necessary to be so annexed — the 
 whole form — must be sent to the overseers as there 
 
 (a) Ante, p. 12 ; L. S. 18 Q. B. D. 412. 
 
116 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1888. provided. If the argument for the appellant were to 
 Jones prevail, both the declaration and the attestation might 
 Kent. ^® ^^^^ °^^ ^^^*'^ impunity, thougli the statute in man- 
 datory terms enacts that they " shall be annexed " to 
 the claim or application to be registered. Both declara- 
 tion and attestation form part of " such claim " as is 
 to be sent to the overseers. That seems to me the 
 plain meaning of the Act of Parliament when examined, 
 not astutely, but strictly and accurately. Is the cliim 
 before us such a claim ? Plainly not one that can be 
 stood upon. A document is sent in which is absurd. 
 The declaration, which is an essential part of it and a 
 condition precedent to the right to registration, pur- 
 ports to state that on the 9th of July, six days before 
 the residence necessary for the franchise can be com- 
 pleted, the residence has been completed, and alleges 
 on the 9th that the man has resided in the lodgings up 
 to the 15th of July. Such a claim is self-contradictory 
 and absurd on the face of it, and the name of the 
 claimant was rightly expunged by the Revising 
 Barrister. 
 
 With regard to Dames v. Hopkins (a), that case was 
 explained and distinguished last year in Hersant v. 
 Hcdse (h). In Davies v. Hopkins (a) something had 
 been omitted from the claim which was no part of the 
 qualification. The name being on the list, the Eevisinu; 
 Barrister could not go behind it, if he was satisfied the 
 voter had the proper qualification. Davies v. Hopkins (a) 
 is no authority in the revision of lodger lists where 
 . the claim is not merely part of the machinery of regis- 
 tration, but an integral part of the necessary qualifi- 
 cation. 
 
 (o) K. <{• a. 118 ; 27 L. J. a P. 6. (i) AnU, p. 12 ; />. ff. 18 Q. B. 
 
 D. 412. 
 
LII VICTORIA. 117 
 
 Manisty, J. I am of the same opinion. The case 1888. 
 is governed by Hersant v. Halse {a), which Mr. Bompas jones 
 has not succeeded in distinguishing. For the reasons kent. 
 there given and for those now stated by the Lord Chief 
 Justice, the decision of the Eevising Barrister must be 
 affirmed. 
 
 Hawkins, J., concurred. 
 
 Appeal dismissed. 
 
 Solicitors — For the Appellant, Windybank & 
 Samuell, for J. Hollis Yates, Olou- 
 cester. 
 
 For the Respondent, F. A. & A. G. 
 Doyle, for Taynton, Sons & Siveter, 
 Gloucester. 
 
 (o) Ante, p. 12 ; L. R. 18 Q. B. D. 412. 
 
118 
 
 MICHABLMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 Hartley, Appellant ; Halse, Respondent. 
 
 1888. 
 
 Nov. 27. 
 
 A notice of 
 objection 
 omitted to 
 state the 
 numbered 
 division of the 
 occupiers' list 
 to which the 
 objection 
 referred, but 
 its language 
 in the opinion 
 of the Court 
 indicated 
 clearly that 
 division 1 of 
 the occupiers' 
 list was the 
 list intended. 
 Held, that the 
 Revising 
 Barrister bad 
 power to 
 amend the 
 notice by 
 inserting in it 
 the words 
 " divifion 1," 
 and was right 
 in exercising 
 the power. 
 Qucere, 
 whether any 
 amendment 
 w as requisite. 
 
 A T a Court held by the Revising Barrister appointed 
 to revise the lists of voters for the borough of St. 
 Pancras, the name of the appellant, Robert John 
 Hartley, appeared on division 1 of the occupiers' 
 list for the South Division of the said borough. 
 Alfred Lakeman, a duly qualified objector, appeared 
 to object to the name of the appellant being retained 
 on the said list. Alfred Lakeman had given due notice 
 of objection to the overseers of the parish, and had also 
 served on the appellant a notice of objection, which, so 
 far as is material, was in the following words : — 
 
 " I hereby give you notice that I object to your name being retained 
 " on the occupiers' list of parliamentary voters for the Southern Division 
 " of the parliamentary borough of St. Pamcras and as a county eh ctor 
 " for the county of London on the following grounds " (stating them). 
 
 The occupiers' list for the Southern Division of the 
 said borough was in fact made out (according to the 
 provisions of the County Electors Act, 1888) in three 
 divisions, division 1 containing the names of occupiers 
 qualified both as parliamentary voters and as county 
 electors, division 2 containing the names of occupiers 
 qualified as parliamentary voters only, and division 3 
 containing the names of occupiers qualified as county 
 electors only. 
 
LII VICTOKIA. 119 
 
 The appellant contended that the notice of objection 1888. 
 served on him was invalid, because it omitted to specify Haktley 
 which of the last-mentioned divisions the objector halse. 
 referred to. 
 
 The Revising Barrister was of opinion that the notice 
 of objection was bad as it stood, but that he had power 
 to amend it, and that he might properly do so on the 
 ground (amongst others) that the notice, being in 
 terms an objection to the appellant both as a parlia- 
 mentary voter and as a county elector, indicated 
 division 1 as that to which the objection referred, and 
 was therefore unlikely to mislead. The notice of 
 objection was accordingly amended by the insertion of 
 the words " division ] " after the word " list," and the 
 ground of objection having been proved the name of 
 the appellant was expunged from the said list. 
 
 Notice of appeal was given in this and 507 other 
 cases depending on similar facts, and the appeals were 
 consolidated. 
 
 The questions for the opinion of the Court were : 
 (1.) Whether the omission to specify the division of 
 the list to which the notices of objection referred was 
 an immaterial defect, and if not 
 
 (2.) Whether the Revising Barrister had power to 
 amend the notices by supplying the omission. 
 
 Cyril Dodd, for the appellant. This notice of objec- 
 tion is defective and invalid, and the Revising Barrister 
 exceeded his pawers in undertaking to amend it as he 
 has done. 
 
 By the 13th section of the County Electors Act, 
 1888, " all precepts, notices and forms required for the 
 purposes of the Registration of Electors Acts shall be 
 
120 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1888. altered in such manner as may be declared by Her 
 Hartley Majesty in Council to be necessary " for carrying the 
 Halsb. ^^^ ^'^*'0 effect. An Order in Council has been made, 
 slightly altering the old forms, but leaving their sub- 
 stance unaffected. To the new "form of objection " as 
 to the old form, there is appended a " note " to the effect 
 that " the notice of objection should, if there be more 
 than one list, specify the list, and if the list referred 
 to is made out in divisions, should specify the division 
 to which the objection refers." The present notice of 
 objection does not specify the division of the occupiers' 
 list to which it refers. It is a substantial non-compli- 
 ance with the requirements of the form, and is mis- 
 leading, for the voter would have to look at division 
 2 and division 3 as well as division 1, or perhaps 
 instead of division 1. It is not a mere mistake, for 
 the objector has done in his notice what he meant 
 to do — that is, he has made an objection to the voter's 
 name being retained on the occupiers'- list of parlia- 
 mentary voters^-which ought to mean division 2. of 
 the occupiers' list — and has added an objection to him 
 as a county elector — which ought to point to division 
 3. Ho now says that in reality he meant division 1. 
 Bridges v. Miller (a) shows that such a mistake 
 as that — if it was a mistake — is not a mere slip or 
 clerical error, or the sort of mistake which a Re- 
 vising Barrister has power to amend. [He also cited 
 Bollen V. Southall (b) and Barton v. Ashley (c.)] 
 
 R. M. Bray, for the respondent, was not called upon 
 to argue. 
 
 {a) Ante, p. 47 ; L. R. 20 Q. B. D. 461. 
 -D. 287. (c) 1 Lutw. 307 ; 15 L. J. C. P. 36. 
 
 (6) Coltman, 368 ; L. R. 15 Q. B. 
 
LII VICTORIA. 121 
 
 Lord Coleridge, L.J.C. The decision of the Re- 1888. 
 
 vising Barrister in this case must be affirmed, hartley 
 Whether or not the notice of objection would have halsb. 
 been good without amendment I will not decide, 
 but it is at any rate sufficiently good to make the 
 power of amendment clear. There is nothing in the 
 form of the notice calculated to mislead anyone. Tiie 
 objection is not to two lists, but to one 'list, and there 
 is only one list — that is the occupiers' list, division 1 — 
 which comprises both parliamentary voters and county 
 electors, and it is against the qualification of the 
 appellant in both these capacities that the objection is 
 in terms directed. I think the objection as it stands 
 even without amendment clearly indicates the list, and 
 the only list, to which it could relate. In this respect 
 the case is distinguishable from Barton v. Ashley {a). 
 The objection does not exactly follow the statutory 
 form, but in substance it gives the information required 
 by the form, and the formal defect arising from the 
 omission of the words "division 1" in the notice was cured 
 by the power of amendment rightly exercised by the 
 Revising Barrister. I think the omission of those 
 words was a "mistake"' within the meaning of the 
 Act of Parliament, and that the Revising Barrister had 
 the power to amend it. This is not like the case of 
 Bridges v. Miller (6). There the notice of objection was 
 perfectly intelligible and clear, and directed the atten- 
 tion of the voter to a special point. The Court held 
 that it was not competent for the Revising Barrister to 
 introduce the real objection, which was of a totally 
 different sort and much larger in its terms, by amend- 
 
 (a) 1 iMtw. 307 ; 15 L. J. 0. P. (b) Ante, p. 47 ; L. R. 20 q. B. 
 
 36. D. m. 
 
122 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1888. ment of the original objection. This appeal must be 
 Habtlet dismissed. 
 
 V. 
 
 Halse. 
 
 Manisty, J. I should myself be inclined to hold 
 
 this notice of objection good even without amendment. 
 It seems to me to fall within the principle of the 
 decision in Huggett v. Lewis (a) rather than Barton v. 
 Ashley (b). If, however, amendment was necessary, it 
 was competent for the Revising Barrister to make the 
 amendment, and he has properly exercised- his dis- 
 cretion in doing so. 
 
 Hawkins, J. I think the notice of objection set out 
 in the case sufficiently describes a list which is in fact 
 "division 1," and is not a misleading notice. The 
 objector intended to comply with the form, but he has 
 made a mistake in omitting to add the number of the 
 ■list. It was an omission by mistake. The amendment 
 was properly made — if, indeed, the objection was in 
 itself a bad one, which I am by no means satisfied 
 it was. 
 
 Appeal dismissed. 
 
 Solicitors— For the Appellant, J. M. McDonnell. 
 
 For the Respondent, Halse, Trustram & Go. 
 
 (a) K.Ji0.1;2i L. J. 0. P. (6) 1 Lutw. 307 ; 15 L. J. C. P. 
 
 38. 36. 
 
LII VICTORIA. 
 
 ]23 
 
 Druitt, Appellant ; Gossling, Respondent. 
 
 A T a Court held for the revision of the lists of voters 
 for the New Forest Division of the county of Hants 
 and for the parliamentary borough of Ghristchurch, 
 Lewis Francis Hake and Edwin Denys Hake claimed 
 to have their names inserted among the parliamentary 
 voters of the parish of Holdenhurst for the parliamen- 
 tary borough of Ghristchurch and county electors for 
 the county of Southampton in respect of the quali- 
 fications stated below : — 
 
 Name of 
 
 claunajit in 
 
 full, surname 
 
 being first . 
 
 Hake, Lewit 
 Framcis 
 
 Hake, Edmin 
 Denys 
 
 Place of abode. 
 
 St. Michael's Vica/r- 
 age, West Hill 
 Road, Bourne- 
 mouth. 
 
 St. Michael's Vicar- 
 age, West Hill 
 Soad, Bourne- 
 mouth. 
 
 Nature of 
 qualification. 
 
 House and garden 
 joint. 
 
 House and land 
 joint. 
 
 Description of 
 qualify ing 
 property. 
 
 St. Michael's 
 
 Vicarage, West 
 
 Hill Koad. 
 
 St. Michael's 
 
 Vicarage, West 
 
 Hill Eood. 
 
 1888. 
 
 JFov. 27. 
 » 
 
 The proviso in 
 30 & 31 Vict. 
 c. 102, s. 3, 
 does not 
 operate to 
 prevent two 
 persons in 
 joint occupa- 
 tion of a 
 dwelling- 
 house of the 
 annual value 
 of £20 from 
 being each 
 entitled to the 
 franchise. It 
 is no objection 
 to a claim 
 made in re- 
 spect of a 
 qualification 
 to which 
 claimant is 
 entitled, that 
 he is already 
 on the register 
 in respect of 
 another 
 qualification. 
 
 These claims were opposed, and the following facts 
 were proved : — 
 
 Lewis Francis Hake was curate to the Vicar of 
 St. Michael's (the Eev. F. E. Toyne). The Vicar did 
 not reside in the vicarage, but let it to Lewis Francis 
 
 VOL. I. 
 
]24 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1888. 
 
 Dboitt 
 
 V. 
 GOSSLING. 
 
 Hahe and his brother Edwin Denys Hake, ihe two 
 claimants. The vicarage was a dwelling-house, and 
 was used by the two brothers as a residence, and not 
 for any trade or business purpose. There was no land 
 forming part of the occupation, except only the garden 
 in which the house stands. 
 
 In the rate-book for the parish the name of Lewis 
 F. Halce only appeared as occupier, and the description 
 of the property was " house and garden, 8t. Michael's 
 Vicarage, gross estimated rental £90, rateable value 
 £72." The rates in respect of the property had all 
 been duly paid, and the two brothers had resided in 
 the house during the full qualifying period. 
 
 The name of the claimant Lewis Francis Hake was 
 already on division 1 of the occupiers' list for the said 
 parish as published by the overseers, as under : — 
 
 Name of 
 
 voters in full, 
 
 surname 
 
 being first. 
 
 Place of abode. 
 
 Nature of 
 qualification. 
 
 Description of 
 qualifying 
 property. 
 
 Sake, Lewis F. 
 
 St. MichaeVs Vicar- 
 age, Bournemouth. 
 
 Dwelling-house. 
 
 St. Michael's 
 Vicarage. 
 
 No objection had been taken to the said name, and 
 it had accordingly been retained by the Revising 
 Barrister on the said list. The qualifying property 
 described in the last-mentioned entry was the same as 
 the St. Michael's Vicarage described in the claims 
 aforesaid. 
 
 In support of the claims it was contended that 
 notwithstanding the fact that Lewis Francis HaJce 
 was already on the occupiers' list in respect of the 
 
LII VICTOEIA. ] 25 
 
 " dwelling-house '' qualification above stated, he and 1888. 
 his brother the said E. D. Hake were entitled to have Dkuitt 
 their names inserted in the same list iu respect of the GossLire. 
 joint occupation stated in their claims on the following 
 grounds : — 
 
 That the case came within the deiinition of a £10 
 occupation qualification given in the schedule to the 
 County Electors' Act, 1888. 
 
 That the word " tenement " includes " house." 
 
 That the claimants would have been entitled to vote 
 under sec. 27 of 2 & 3 William, 4, cap. 45, and that 
 there is nothing in 30 «Ss 31 Vict. cap. 102 to restrict 
 or take away this qualification, the proviso to sec. 3 of 
 the last-mentioned Act being restricted to the qualifi- 
 cation created by that section, and that 30 & 31 Vict. 
 cap. 102 does not take away or limit any pre-existing 
 qualification, but creates new ones. That sec. 5 of 48 
 Vict. cap. 3 re-enacts and extends sec. 27 of 2 & 3 
 Williavi 4, cap. 45, and sec. 3 of the County 
 Electors' Act, 1888, and the. schedule thereto define 
 the nature of the qualification, and recognise distinctly 
 "joint occupation." 
 
 On the part of the objector it was contended that as 
 regards a £10 occupation qualification, although it 
 must be founded on sec. 5 of 48 Vict. cap. 3, the 
 definition of the "borough occupation franchise" is 
 still contained in sec. 27 of 2 & 3 William 4, cap. 45. 
 As to what C(mstitutes a " house " within sec. 27 the 
 judgment of Erie, C.J. in Cook v. Humher (a) was 
 referred to ; also 41 & 42 Vict. cap. 26, sec. 5, 48 Vict. 
 cap. 3, sec. 7, sub-sec. (7), and sees. 11 and 12. That 
 the residential qualification referred to by Erie, C.J. is 
 
 (a) K. di G. 413 ; 31 L. J. 0. P. 73. 
 
 K 2 
 
126 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS, 
 
 1888. now practically merged in the household qualification 
 DnniiT given by sec. 3 of 30 & 31 Vict. cap. 102. That 
 GoBBUNG. ^^^ qualifications stated in the claims were a mis- 
 description of the qualifying property ; that the 
 alleged joint qualification of the claimants was in 
 respect of one and the same house, for which one of 
 them (Lewis Francis Halce) was already on the- 
 occupiers' list unobjected to ; that the claimants could 
 not, by describing the premises in the third column in 
 the manner set forth in their claims, turn a " household 
 qualification " into a " £10 occupation qualification " 
 and so get two persons on the list of parliamentary 
 voters in respect of one and the same dwelling-house 
 contrary to the proviso to sec. 3 of 30 & 31 Vict. 
 cap. 102, and the instructions contained in the 3rd 
 schedule, part 1, paragraph 5 to the Registration Act, 
 1886. 
 
 The Revising Barrister was of opinion that the 
 objections above stated were well founded, and dis- 
 allowed both the claims. Due notice of appeal was 
 given, and the Revising Barrister stated a case, setting 
 forth the above facts and contentions. 
 
 If the Court should be of opinion that the decision 
 was wrong as to both or either of the said claims 
 the register was to be amended by the insertion of 
 one or both of the said names, as the Court should 
 determine. 
 
 Druitt, for the appellant. St. Michael's Vicarage is 
 rightly described as a " house " within the meaning of 
 2 & 3 Will. 4, cap. 45, sections 27 and 29, although it 
 may also be a ^' dwelling-house." Though section 27 
 of that Act is in terms repealed by 48 Vict. cap. 3, 
 section 12, and the schedule there referred to, section 29 
 
LII VICTORIA. 127 
 
 is not repealed at all, and all the provisions of section 1888. 
 27 are re-enacted by section 5 and section 7, sub-sec- Dbuitt 
 tion (7) of the last mentioned Act. And the proviso qosJuns. 
 in 30 & 31 Vict. cap. 102, sec. 3, is not meant in aiiy 
 way to cut down or affect the £10 occupation franchise 
 created by 2 & 3 Will. 4, cap. 45. 
 
 He was stopped.] 
 
 Robson, for the respondent. I cannot contend that 
 the £10 occupation franchise created by 2 & 3 Will. 4, 
 cap. 45, does not still survive. But Edwin Denys Hake 
 is not rated, which is a necessary part of the £10 occu- 
 pation franchise. 
 
 [Lord CoLEEiDGE, L.C.J. That is not one of the 
 objections dealt with by the Revising Barrister.] 
 
 Bruitt, continuing, for the appellant. The other 
 objection allowed by the Revising Barrister depends on 
 the fact that Lewis Francis HaJce is already on the 
 list for another qualification without objection. That 
 cannot affect the claim of Edwin Denys Hake. And 
 Lewis Francis Hake is entitled to be put on for his 
 true qualification if he properly claims for it, notwith- 
 standing the overseers' entry. He is quite content to 
 have the " dwelling-house " entry struck out. 
 
 Robson did not argue further. 
 
 Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. We are all of opinion that 
 there is nothing in any of the objections allowed by 
 the Revising Barrister to prevail against these claims. 
 
128 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1888. The appeal must be allowed with costs, and the names 
 Deuitt inserted in the register. 
 
 V. 
 GOSSLING. 
 
 Manisty and Hawkins, JJ. concurred. 
 
 Appeal allowed. 
 
 Solicitors — For the Appellant, Lovell, Son & Pitfield, 
 for J. & W. H. Druitt, Bournemouth. 
 
 For the Respondent, Gosslin^, Bourne- 
 mouth. 
 
LII VXCTOHIA. 
 
 129 
 
 Smith, Appellant ; Chandler, Kespondent. 
 
 AT a Court held by the Revising Barrister appointed 
 to revise the lists of voters for the borough of Battersea 
 and Glaphavn, John Henry Sviith, the appellant, 
 claimed to have his name inserted on the lodgers' 
 list of voters for the parish of Clapham. The notice 
 of claim served by the said John Henry Smith upon 
 the overseers for the said parish and duly published 
 by them was in the following form : — 
 
 CLAIM OF LODGER NOT ALREADY ON THE REGISTER. 
 
 To the Overseers of the Parish of Olapham. 
 
 " I claim to have my name inserted as a Lodger among the Farlia- 
 " mentaiy voters for the Borough of Battersea and Clapham 
 " {Clapham Division) in respect of the qualification named 
 " below : — 
 
 1888. 
 
 Dee. 1. 
 
 It is essentia) 
 to the validity 
 of a lodger 
 claim that the 
 attestation 
 clause annexed 
 thereto should 
 be dated. 
 Jones V. Kent 
 {Ante, p. 109) 
 followed. 
 Revising 
 Barrister's 
 duty as to the 
 correction of 
 mistakes 
 discussed 
 
 Name of 
 Claimant in 
 full, surname 
 being first. 
 
 Smith, 
 John Henry 
 
 Description of 
 rooms occupied, 
 
 and whether 
 
 furnished or not 
 
 (number of 
 
 rooms and on 
 
 , which floors.) 
 
 Two Rooms, 
 ground Sitting, 
 first floor Bed- 
 room, furnished 
 
 Street, Lane or 
 
 other place, and 
 
 number (if any) 
 
 of the house 
 
 in which the 
 
 Lodgings are 
 
 situate. 
 
 25, Union Road, 
 Clapham 
 
 Amount 
 of 
 
 rent 
 paid. 
 
 10s, 
 per week. 
 
 Name and ad- 
 dress of Land- 
 lord or other 
 person to 
 whom rent is 
 paid. 
 
 Mrs. Taylor, 
 25, Union 
 
 Road, Clap- 
 ham, S.W. 
 
 " I hereby declare that I have, during the twelve calendar months 
 " immediately preceding the fifteenth day of July in this year, occu- 
 
130 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1888. "pied as sole tenant, and resided in the above-mentioned lodgings, 
 
 " and that those lodgings are of a clear yearly value, if let unfurnished, 
 
 Smith h ^j jgj, pounds or upvfards. 
 
 Chandlee. 
 
 " Dated the ISth day of August, 1888. 
 
 "Signature of Claimant^!- "John Senry Smith." 
 
 " I, the undersigned, hereby declare that I have witnessed the above 
 " signature of the above-named /. ff. Smith, at the date stated above, 
 " and that I believe the above claim to be correct. 
 
 " Signature of Witness — " Slim Jwne Tai/lor, 
 
 " Residence— " 25, Union Road, Olapham Rise, S. W. 
 
 " Occupation or calling — " Costumier." 
 
 John Young duly objected to the said notice of 
 claim on the groimd that the declaration of the attest- 
 ing witness was not dated in accordance with Form H. 
 No. 2, Schedule 3, to 48 Vict. cap. 15. 
 
 The Eevising Barrister decided that the date of the 
 declaration by the attesting witness was an essential 
 part of the said declaration, and that its omission 
 invalidated the said notice of claim. 
 
 No evidence was given at the time the said notice of 
 claim was objected to as to the date when the said 
 Miza Jane Taylor made the declaration as attesting 
 witness, but application was made to the Revising 
 Barrister to adjourn the Court to a subsequent day 
 in order that such evidence might be given. 
 
 There were 260 other persons whose notices of 
 claim were in a similar form, and similar applications 
 for adjournment were made in respect of these 260 
 other persons. 
 
 The Revising Barrister refused the applications, 
 stating his opinion that the omission of the date of the 
 
LII VICTOfilA. 131 
 
 Witnesses' declarations was not a mistake in a claim 1888. 
 which he was empowered to correct under 41 & 42 o^^ 
 Vict cap. 26, sec. 28, sub-sec. (2), and disallowed the „ "• 
 claims of John Henry Smith and of the 260 other 
 persons. 
 
 In all respects other than the aforesaid , omission 
 it was proved that the said John Henry Smith and 
 the said 260 other persons were entitled to be placed 
 on the lodgers' list for the said Division. 
 
 Due notice of appeal was given, and the appeals were 
 consolidated. 
 
 If the Court should be of opinion that the decision 
 was wrong the register was to be amended by inserting 
 the names of John Henry Smith and the 260 other 
 persons in the lodgers' list for the said Division. 
 
 William Graham (H G. Richards with him), for the 
 appellant. The objection taken to this claim is that 
 the attestation clause is not dated. But the attestation 
 is no part of the claim, and the claim is sufficient with- 
 out the attestation. 
 
 [Lord CoLEKiDGE, L.C.J. I do not think we can 
 allow you to raise that contention with any prospect of 
 success after our decision in Jones v. Kent (a).] 
 
 Accepting your Lordships' judgment on that point, 
 it is submitted that the omission to date the attestation 
 clause is not a material departure from the form. The 
 declaration is dated, and the witness attests that she 
 
 (os) Anie, p. 109. 
 
132 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1888. witnessed the signature of the claimant at the date 
 
 Smith 
 
 stated above in the declaration, that is on the 13th of 
 August. The omission to add the date a i 
 at the foot of the attestation is immaterial. 
 
 ■^- August. The omission to add the date a second time 
 
 Chasdlek. ° 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. The words of the attesta- 
 tion may only mean that the 13th of August was the 
 date of the claimant's signature. They state nothing 
 as to the date of the signature of' the attestation 
 clause itself by the witness. Why could not the 
 statutory form be followed ?] 
 
 I am told that the political agents on both sides 
 adopted the form employed in this case by agreement 
 between themselves. 
 
 [Hawkins, J. Why did they agree not to pnt the 
 date in ? ] 
 
 It would not strike anyone but a lawyer that there 
 could be any difference between the date of the declara- 
 tion and of the attestation. 
 
 [Manisty, J. What right had they to strike out 
 what the Act of Parliament had put in ? ] 
 
 No doubt a mistake has been made. 
 
 [Manisty, J. You tell us it was deliberately done, 
 and not by mistake.] 
 
 It was deliberate on the part of the agents, but a 
 mistake on the part of the claimant. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. If the man was a lawyer, 
 he ought to have seen the importance of the date : if 
 
LIT VICTOEIA. 133 
 
 he was not a lawyer, he might have had some respect 1888. 
 for the Act of Parliament.] Smith 
 
 V. 
 
 Chandmb. 
 It is submitted that the date of the attestation is 
 
 sufficiently shewn. It must have been before the 20th 
 
 of August, for the claim was sent in to the overseers on 
 
 that day with the attestation clause signed, and it 
 
 cannot have been before the 13th of August, for the 
 
 witness attests in the body of the clause that she 
 
 witnessed the signature of the claimant on that day. 
 
 And Jones v. Jones (a) is an authority to shew that 
 
 the date on which the pen is put to paper is immaterial 
 
 if it is on any day within the statutory limits. 
 
 [Hawkins, J. In Jones v. Jones (a) the document 
 was good on the face of it. Does not the statutory 
 form reqiure that the date of the attestation should 
 appear on the face of the claim ? ] 
 
 It is submitted that it does appear from the docu- 
 ment, and the Act of Parliament, and Jones v. Jones (a) 
 taken together. The proviso at the end of the 18th 
 section of the Kegistration Act, 1885, is meant to meet 
 just such a case as this — Wells v. Stanforth (b). 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. That was a case where 
 the overseers had made a mistake, and the parties were 
 innocent.] 
 
 At any rate the Revising Barrister had the power 
 to amend, by adding the real date of the signature of 
 
 (a) Hmw. & Ph. 340 ; L. R. 1 (6) Coltmcm, 451 ; L. B. 16 Q 
 C.P. 110. B. D. Ui. 
 
V. 
 
 Chandler. 
 
 134 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1888. the attestation clause by the witness. [He also cited 
 Smith Eaden v. Cooper (a).] 
 
 No counsel appeared for the respondent. 
 
 Lord CoLEKiDGE, L.C.J. The decision of the Ke vising 
 Barrister was correct and must be upheld. Our judg- 
 ment in this case really follows from our decision in 
 Jones V. Kent (6). We there held that the whole of 
 the paper, including the assertion of the right to vote 
 (which is the claim in one sense), the declaration of the 
 truth of the assertion, and the attestation clause, goes 
 to make up the claim in the wider sense in which it is 
 required by the Act of Parliament that a lodger should 
 make a claim in order to entitle him to the lodger 
 franchise. The Registration Act, 1885, section 18, 
 says that certain forms are to be " used and observed." ' 
 This claim does not follow the form given in the Act, 
 because it omits the date of the attestation. The 
 Revising Barrister was asked to say that though the 
 Act requires the date to be stated, the date is mere 
 form, and the requirement may be neglected with 
 impunity. The whole of the requirements of the 
 Act as to forms might one by one be dealt with in 
 the same way, and rejected as " mere form." The 
 Revising Barrister has decided that the omission of 
 the date is a fatal omission, and I agree with his deci- 
 sion. 
 
 It has been argued by Mr. Graham that all that is 
 necessary does appear on the face of the attestation 
 But in my opinion it is not possible to gather with any 
 
 (a) 2 Lutw. 183 ; 21 L. J. C. P. 32. (6) Ante, p. 109. 
 
LII VICTORIA. 135 
 
 certainty from the attestation clause the actual date 1888. 
 when the witness signed, and so to supply the absence smith 
 of the date. Mr. Graham has argued in the second chanuleb. 
 place that the date is not material. In my opinion it 
 is extremely material, and the Act of Parliament 
 requires that it should be stated. The attestation is a 
 part of the document on which the claimant's right to 
 the franchise depends, and the claimant is responsible if 
 it is not properly made and stated. In Jones v. Jones (a) 
 the document was a notice of objection, and the date 
 of its delivery, not of its signature, was the impor- 
 tant thing. Two notices had been delivered differently 
 dated. Both dates were given, and inasmuch as the 
 date which was mistaken in fact would have been good 
 in point of law, as well as the real date, the mistake 
 was not held fatal. It was a case of pure mistake 
 without the least legal bearing on the effect of the 
 "document in question. When the facts are compared 
 and the documents compared, it is apparent that 
 the case of JoTies v. Jones (a), whether rightly deci- 
 ded or not, is not an authority to govern the present 
 case. 
 
 Then it is said the Revising Barrister might have 
 amended. But this omission was not due to mistake. 
 It was a deliberate omission, as we have been informed, 
 and as no doubt the Eevising Barrister was informed. 
 It was a correction of the Act of Parliament agreed 
 upon by agents who thereby induced the appellant to 
 make a claim on a form which was a wilful violation 
 of the requirements of the statute. It was not a 
 mistake — it was done on purpose. And it was not in 
 respect of a mere matter of form. If analogous cases 
 
 (a) ffopw. <t- Ph. 340 ; L. S. 1 O. P. 140. 
 
136 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1888. are to be taken, it has always been held that the date 
 Smith of an aflSdavit is an essential part of it, and the affidavit 
 CHANijLBE. cannot be used if it is not dated, although other 
 evidence may be at hand to shew the true date. It is 
 essential that the true date of the act of attestation 
 should appear on the face of the attestation itself. In 
 this claim there is a material omission not due to any 
 mistake, and in my judgment the claim is a bad one, 
 and was rightly rejected by the Revising Barrister. 
 
 Manisty, J. I am of the same opinion. The judg- 
 ment of the Lord Chief Justice in Wood v. Chandler (a) 
 shews that notwithstanding the concluding words of 
 the 18th section of the Registration Act, 1885, it is' 
 incumbent on the parties to give in their claims and 
 notices the substantial information required by the 
 statutory forms. It is not any answer to say that the 
 information required may be supplied by evidence to 
 be called before the Revising Barrister. To enter into 
 such an enquiry on the case of 260 persons — which is 
 the number to which this appeal relates — would be a 
 source of intolerable expense and inconvenience. The 
 political agents in this constituency have agreed to 
 disregard the statutory form, and there has been a 
 learned argument before us to shew that they may 
 legitimately do this, notwithstanding the expense and 
 inconvenience to which it leads. The fact that this 
 was deliberately done would have been enough to 
 justify the Court in declining to listen to any such 
 argument. But having heard that argument I am 
 of opinion, for the reasons given by my Lord, that 
 
 (a) Ante, pp. 61, 66 ; L. R. 20 Q. B. D. 297. 
 
LII VICTORIA. 137 
 
 this appeal fails and that the claims were rightly jggg 
 rejected. S5Si — 
 
 V. 
 
 Chandler. 
 
 Hawkins, J., concurred. 
 
 Appeal dismissed : leave to appeal to 
 the Court of Appeal refused. 
 
 Solicitors for the Appellant — Dubois, Reid & 
 
 Willia/nis. 
 
CASES 
 
 ARGUED AND DETERMINED 
 
 IN THE 
 
 QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION 
 
 OP 
 
 THE HIGH COUET OE JUSTICE, 
 
 UNDEE STATS. 6 & 7 VICT. c. 18, 
 
 AM) 
 
 41 & 42 YICT. c. 26, 
 AND THE ACTS AMENDINa THE SAME, 
 
 DUBINO 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS, 1889, 
 
 IN THE 
 
 FrPTY-THIRD TEAR OP QUEEN VICTORIA. 
 
 GriFFORD, Appellant; The Overseers of the 
 Parish of St. Luke's, Chelsea, Re- 
 spondents. 
 
 AT a Oomi lield on September 27th, 1889, for the i889. 
 purpose of revising the lists of parliamentary ^"' ^^' 
 
 electors for the horough of Chelsea, and of county it is not a 
 
 electors for the electoral diTision of the administrative s^^?'™* 
 
 service oi a 
 
 county of London comprised within the said horough, "otioe of 
 
 ■' -^ " ' oDjeotion to 
 
 the name of John Sorner appeared upon Division I. leave it at the 
 
 place stated in 
 the list as the 
 place of abode of the person objected to, if that is not his true place of abode, and if 
 there is no reasonable probability of the notice coming to his knowledge. 
 
 Semble, the sufficiency of the service of the notice of objection is a question of 
 fact for the Revising Barrister. 
 
 VOL. I, L 
 
140 
 
 MIOHABLMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1889. of the occupiers' list for the said borough, as published 
 
 OiFFOKD by the overseers, as follows : — 
 The Otee- 
 
 BBERS OF THE 
 
 Paeish of ^^^^ of jjig^tor 
 St. Ltjze s, Jj, f^ Bumame 
 Chelsea. ^^^^ ^^^.^ 
 
 Sorner, John . . 
 
 Place of abode. 
 
 19, Denyer street 
 
 Nature of 
 Qualification. 
 
 Dwelling-house 
 
 Description of 
 qualifying 
 property. 
 
 19, Dem/er Street. 
 
 The appellant, Isaac GHfford, who was duly qualified 
 in that behalf, objected to the said John Horner as not 
 having been entitled to have his name inserted in the 
 said list; and the ground of the objection was duly 
 stated in a notice of objection addressed to the said 
 John Horner, which, so far as material, was in the fol- 
 lowing words and figures : — 
 
 " To Mr. John Horner. I hereby give you notice 
 that I object to your name being retained on Division I. 
 of the occupiers' list as a parliamentary elector for the 
 parliamentary borough of Cliehea, and as a county 
 elector for the administrative county of London, on the 
 following grounds, viz. : That you have not occupied, 
 as owner or servant, the premises described in the over- 
 seers' list for twelve months to July 15th, 1889." 
 
 Service of the said notice of objection, which was 
 addressed to the said John Horner at 19, Denyer Street 
 aforesaid, was effected by the appellant at the said 
 premises in the following manner, namely, by deposit- 
 ing and leaving the said notice in the opening of the 
 letter-box attached to the front door of the house. 
 
 In support of the objection, it was proved that the 
 said John Horner had formerly had his place of abode 
 at 19, Denyer Street aforesaid, but that two years pre- 
 viously he had left the said house and had never since 
 
LlII VICTORIA. 141 
 
 resided there, and that his present place of abode was 1889. 
 not kn,own to the objector. No evidence was given to Gtiffobd 
 prove that the said John Horner had received the said The Oveb- 
 notice, or that it was probable that a notice left at the Paeish of 
 said house would be received by him. Ohe^..^' 
 
 It was contended upon the part of the appellant that 
 there had been a sufficient service of the said notice of 
 objection by so leaving it at the former place of abode 
 of the said John Horner, and that the appellant had 
 complied with the requirements of the statute, 6 Viot. 
 cap. 18, sec. 17, in causing the said notice of objection 
 to be left at the place of abode of the said John Horner, 
 as stated in the said list. 
 
 The Revising Barrister found, as a fact, that 19, 
 JDenyer Street aforesaid, was not at the time of the 
 service of the said notice of objection the said John 
 Horner's true place of abode, but that it was his place 
 of abode as stated in the said list ; that the said John 
 Horner would not receive, and that the appellant had 
 no reasonable ground for presuming that the said John 
 Horner would receive, a notice of objection left at the 
 said house. Upon these grounds, and upon the ground 
 that the appellant might have effected a sufficient ser- 
 vice of the said notice of objection by sending it by the 
 post, under the provisions of section 100 of the statute 
 6 Yict. cap. 18, the Eevising Barrister decided that 
 there had not been a sufficient service of the said notice, 
 and retained the name of the said John Horner upon 
 the said list. 
 
 Similar objections were made by the appellant to 
 other persons, whose names and places of abode, and the 
 nature and description of whose qualifying properties, 
 as stated in the said list, were set forth in a schedule to 
 the case stated by the Revising Barrister, and the like 
 
 12 
 
142 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1889. facts, or facts not materially differing therefrom, were 
 
 GiFFOED proved in support of such objections. The Eevising 
 
 The Oveb- Barrister retained the names of all such persons upon 
 
 Paeish of the said list, on the ground that none of the notices of 
 
 Chelsea. ' objection had been duly served. 
 
 Due notice of appeal was given, and the appeals were 
 consolidated. 
 
 If the Court should be of opinion that the said notices 
 of objection were duly served, then the names of the 
 said John Sorner, and of the persons whose names were 
 set forth in the schedule, were to be erased from the 
 said list. 
 
 Costelloe, for the appellant. These notices of objec- 
 tion were duly served within the provisions of section 
 17 of 6 Vict. cap. 18, relating to objections to borough 
 voters. The -words are, " each person objecting shall 
 give or cause to be left at the place of abode of the 
 person objected to, as stated in the said list, a notice 
 according to the form," &c. These words differ from 
 the words of section 7, which relates to objections to 
 county voters. The words of section 17 do not point 
 to, or indeed permit, the giving of notice of objection to 
 the person objected to except at his place of abode as 
 stated in the list. Personal service effected elsewhere 
 would not be good service. The objector need not 
 prove that the person objected to actually received or 
 probably received the notice of objection. If the notice 
 of objection had been sentTsy post, under the provisions 
 of section 100 of the Act, it would have been deposited 
 in the same physical letter-box, and the fact that the 
 postman deposited it there would not have materially 
 increased the probability of the voter receiving it. 
 That would have been good service, and why should 
 
LIII VICTORIA. 143 
 
 not this be equally good service? It is the place of 1889. 
 ahode stated in the official Kst that must be regarded, Giffoed 
 and a notice addressed to the true place of abode of the The Otee- 
 voter, if it differed from the place stated in the official Pabish op 
 list, would not be sufficient : Noseworthy v. Overseers of chelsea. ' 
 Buckhnd-in-the-Moor (ci). If actual notice is necessary, 
 it mil be impossible to clear the lists of unqualified 
 persons if they migrate sufficiently far to escape the 
 vigilance of the poKtical agents. The procedure under 
 section 100 is not a preferable method, but an additional 
 privilege granted to objectors. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.O.J. Surely the cases of Allen 
 V. Greensill (b) and Watson v. Fiit (c) are decisive 
 against your present contention, and decide the ques- 
 tion?] 
 
 The iaterlocutory observation of Maule, J., in Watson 
 V. Pitt (c) is rather in my favour. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. The considered judgment 
 of the Court in Allen v. Greensill (b) is the other way— 
 and no interlocutory observation of a judge, even so 
 eminent as Mr. Justice Maule, can prevail against it. j 
 
 There is no provision ia section 17 for personal 
 service. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. Except the good sense of 
 the Act, as explained by the Court more than 40 years 
 ago.J 
 
 (a) 2 Sopu!. %.CoU. 127 ; L. B. (i) 1 Lutw. 592 ; i 0. B. 100. 
 
 9 C. P. 233. (c) 2 Lutw. 73 ; 5 C. B. 11. 
 
144 MICHAELMAS Sl'TTlNGS. 
 
 1889. It is submitted that tlie objector has complied with 
 
 GriFFOED the literal requirements of section 17. 
 
 V. 
 
 The Ovbe- 
 
 Paeish 01' Chapman, for the respondents, was not called upon to 
 St. LtTKE's, 
 Chelsba. argue. 
 
 Lord Coleridge, L.O.J. The decision of the Revis- 
 ing Barrister is correct, and must he affirmed. There 
 are three modes in which an objector may serve a 
 notice of objection, and the obj"ect of each method is to 
 give the person obj'ected to actual knowledge of the 
 fact of the objection. The objector may effect personal 
 service ; then he is quite sure that the person served 
 knows of the fact. Or secondly, service may be effected 
 through the post-office, in the manner pointed out by 
 section 100 of the Act we are considering; that 
 throws the responsibility on the post-office authorities, 
 and we all know the care which those authorities take 
 to deliver letters to the persons addressed, even if they 
 have changed their addresses. Or thirdly, the objector 
 may leave the notice at the place of abode of the person 
 objected to as stated in the list ; but if the objector 
 chooses that method, he must take care that the place 
 is the place of abode of the person in fact : otherwise 
 an objector might go to a place which he knows the 
 man does not inhabit for the very purpose of serving an 
 iUusory notice, which the person objected to wiU never 
 get. It is decided in Allen v. Oreensill {a) and Watson 
 V. Pitt [1) that this will not do, and that if the ob- 
 jector chooses the third method of service there must 
 appear to be a reasonable chance that the person ob- 
 jected to will get the notice. The decision in Noseworthy 
 
 (a) \ lutw. 592 ; i C. JB. 100. {h) 2 Lutw. 73 ; 5 C. B. 77, 
 
till VICTORIA. 145 
 
 V. Overseers of Bucldand-in-the-Moor (a) deals wlt^i 1889. 
 another section of the statute, and is in no way in- Giffoed 
 consistent with the other two cases. The present case The Ovbb- 
 
 . 1 . ., n •! 1. ji 1 • • SEEES OF THE 
 
 IS directly within the authority oi those decisions, Pamsh of 
 which put a reasonable and just interpretation on the Chelsea. ' 
 terms of the Act of Parliament, and are not to be over- 
 ruled. 
 
 It is further to be observed that Mr. Justice Maule, in 
 Watson V. Pitt (h), indicates his opinion that the suffi- 
 ciency of the service of a notice of objection is a ques- 
 tion of fact for the Eevisiag Barrister, and that there 
 is no appeal to this Court from the Barrister's conclu- 
 sion on such a matter. If it were necessary to decide 
 the point, I should hesitate to difier from Mr. Justice 
 Maule. The appeal must be dismissed. 
 
 Mathew and Wills, JJ., concurred. 
 
 Appeal dismissed. 
 
 Solicitors — For the Appellant, Tathams and Procter. 
 
 For the Eespondent, T. J. Robinson. 
 
 (a) 2 Sopu). ^ Colt. 127 ; i. JJ. (*) 2 Zutw. 73 ; 6 C. B. 77. 
 
 9 C. P. 233. 
 
146 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1889. 
 Nov. II. 
 
 The power of 
 amendment 
 conferred on 
 Eevisingf 
 Barristers by 
 41 & 42 Vict. 
 0. 26, s. 28, 
 sub-s. 2, 
 enables them 
 to correct 
 mistakes in 
 the declara- 
 tion attached 
 to a lodger's 
 claim. The 
 claim and 
 declaration 
 are parts of 
 an integral 
 whole. 
 
 AiNSLEY, Appellant; Nicholson, Respondent. 
 
 A T a Court held for the revision of the lists of voters 
 for the Hornsey division of the county of Middlesex, 
 Frederic Matthew Ainsky, the appellant, had claimed to 
 have his name inserted in the lodger list, as follows : — 
 
 Name of 
 
 Claimant in 
 
 full, surname 
 
 being first. 
 
 Description of 
 rooms occu- 
 pied, and 
 whether fur- 
 nished or not. 
 
 AimUy, Fre- 
 derio Matthew. 
 
 Bedroom, first 
 fioor, fur- 
 nished. 
 
 Street, and 
 number of 
 house in 
 ■which lodg- 
 ings are 
 situate. 
 
 Amount 
 of rent 
 paid. 
 
 Soad. 
 
 Name and address 
 of landlord, or 
 other person to 
 
 whom rent paid. 
 
 £13. 
 
 J. Amaley, of 6, 
 Dagmar Soad. 
 
 The declaration appended to the claim was on a 
 printed form in the words following : — 
 
 ' ' I hereby declare that I have during the twelve [calendar months 
 " immediately preceding the 15th day of July in this year 
 " occupied as sole tenant (or as joint tenant with ,) 
 
 ' ' and resided in the above-mentioned lodgings, and that those 
 " lodgings are of a clear yearly value, if let unfurnished, often 
 " pounds or upwards." 
 
 The claim and declaration was duly signed and attested. 
 The words " or as joint tenant with " were not erased or 
 effaced, nor was tjie blank after such words Med up. 
 
 The Eevising Barrister disallowed the claim, on the 
 ground that the declaration was insufficient, as not 
 
mi VICTORIA. 147 
 
 stating whether the claimant was a sole tenant or a 1889. 
 joint tenant. Ainslbt 
 
 A large numher of other persons besides the appellant Niohoibon. 
 had claimed to have their names inserted on the same 
 lodger list, and had signed duly attested claims and 
 declarations. The Eevising Barrister disallowed all 
 these claims, for the same reason for which the appel- 
 lant's claim was disallowed, but set out the names of the 
 claimants in seven schedules annexed to the case stated 
 by him fcfr the purpose of a consoKdated appeal. 
 
 In the cases contained in Schedule I. the words and 
 blank in the declaration were the same and in the same 
 condition as in the appellant's case. 
 
 In the cases contained in Schedule II. the words and 
 blank in the declaration were the same and in the same 
 condition as ia the appellant's case, except that the 
 value was stated in printed words as " ten (or twenty) 
 pounds or upwards." 
 
 In the cases contained in Schedule III. the words in 
 the declaration were the same as in the appellant's case, 
 but a line had been drawn in ink through the blank. 
 
 In the cases contained in Schedule lY. the words in 
 the declaration were the same as in the appellant's case, 
 except that a name had been written ia the blank and 
 afterwards crossed out. 
 
 In the case contained in Schedule V. the same printed 
 form of declaration had been used as in the appellant's 
 case, but aU the words " occupied as sole tenant or as 
 joint tenant with," had been crossed out in ink. 
 
 In the cases contained in Schedule VI. the same 
 printed form of declaration had been used as in the 
 appellant's case, and a name had been inserted in ink 
 in the blank after the words " as joint tenant with," 
 but no other alteration had been made. 
 
148 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1889. In the cases contained in Schedule VII. the same 
 
 AiNSLEY printed form of declaration had been employed as in 
 
 Nicholson, the cases contained in Schedule II., and a name had 
 
 been inserted in ink in the blank, but the words " as 
 
 sole tenant or " had not been erased or crossed out. 
 
 The Revising Barrister was asked to amend the 
 declaration in each case, but refused, on the ground 
 that he had no power to amend, a lodger's declaration 
 being, in his opinion, not a " claim " within 41 & 42 
 Vict. cap. 26, sec. 28 (2), and the existence of a power 
 to amend lodgers' declarations being inconsistent with 
 sections 23 and 25 of the same Act. 
 
 The questions for the opinion of the Court were : — 
 
 (1) Were the declarations as described in the several 
 
 schedules sufficient without amendment ? 
 
 (2) Had the Revising Barrister the power to amend 
 
 the declarations ? 
 If either of these questions should be answered in the 
 affirmative, the names of the claimants set out in the 
 several schedules were to be inserted in the register of 
 lodger voters. 
 
 Macmorran, for the appellant. The declaration is a 
 part of a lodger's claim, and the Revising Barrister had 
 power to correct mistakes therein. The defect, if any, 
 in these declarations clearly arose through " mistake," 
 and not by intention. 
 
 [Mathevf, J. You say the error must have been 
 either a mistake or a misdemeanour.] 
 
 No counsel appeared for the respondent. 
 
 Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. This appeal must be 
 allowed. The claim and the declaration attached 
 
LIII VICT&RIA. 149 
 
 thereto are parts of an integral whole, and the power 1889. 
 of amendment extends to the whole. The Eevising Ainblet 
 Barrister was wrong in thinking he had no power to Nicholson. 
 amend. The names of the claimants must be inserted 
 in the register. 
 
 Mathew and "Wills, JJ., concnrred. 
 
 Appeal allowed. 
 
 Solicitors for the Appellant — Jennings and Forbes. 
 
150 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITl'INGS. 
 
 Nicholson, Appellant; Yeoman, Respondent. 
 
 1889. 
 
 Nov. n. 
 
 A person who 
 •has been an 
 inhabitant 
 occupier of 
 two dwelling- 
 houses ia 
 immediate 
 succession 
 during the 
 qualifying 
 period within 
 a parlia- 
 mentary 
 division is 
 entitled to the 
 parUameutary 
 franchise, 
 though he 
 occupied one 
 dwelling- 
 house by 
 virtue of 
 service, and 
 the other 
 dwelling- 
 house as an 
 ordinary 
 tenant. 
 
 A T a Court held at Whithy, on the 13th of September, 
 1889, for revising the lists of voters for the Whithy 
 •division of the North Riding of Yorkshire, William 
 Henry Estill claimed to be placed on Division II. of 
 the occupiers' Hst as the occupier of two dweUing-houses 
 in immediate succession to one another. His occupation 
 of the first house was in the capacity of servant, and 
 was such that, if he had completed the qualifying 
 period in the same occupation, his claim- to the parlia- 
 mentary franchise would have been unobjectionable. 
 But at the end of seven months he terminated his 
 occupation of that house, and removed immediately 
 into the second house, and occupied it during the 
 remainder of the qualifying period as an ordinary 
 tenant householder. 
 
 The Revising Barrister held that, in consequence of 
 the different nature of his occupation of the two houses, 
 William Henry Estill had not satisfied the statutes, and 
 struck out his name. 
 
 Another case depended on similar facts, and the 
 appeals in each case were consolidated. 
 
 R. A. Qermaine, for the appellant. 
 
 By section 3 of 48 Vict. cap. 3 (the Eepresentation 
 of the People Act, 1884), a person who iuhabits a 
 dwelling-house by virtue of any service shall be deemed, 
 for the purposes of the Eepresentation of the People 
 
LIII VICTORIA. 151 
 
 Acts, to be an inhabitant occupier of such dwelling- 1889. 
 house as a tenant. Therefore, for the purpose of the Nicholson 
 
 V. 
 
 parUamentary franchise created by section 26 of 30 & 31 Tbomau. 
 Vict. cap. 102 (the Representation of the People Act, 
 1867), William Henry Estill is to be deemed to have 
 occupied these two dwelling-houses in immediate suc- 
 cession as a tenant, and is entitled to that franchise. 
 [He was stopped.] 
 
 Meel<, for the respondent, did not argue, and men- 
 tioned the Irish case of Torish v. Clark {Monaghan's 
 case) (a). 
 
 Lord Coleridge, L.O.J. The learned Eevising 
 Barrister was wrong. The fact of successive occupancy 
 of these two dwelling-houses being established, the 
 different character of the occupancy is immaterial for 
 the purpose of the parliamentary franchise. The same 
 conclusion at which we have arrived had already been 
 arrived at by the Irish Court of Appeal in Torish v. 
 Clark (a). 
 
 Mathew and Wills, JJ., concurred. 
 
 Appeal allowed. 
 
 Solicitors — For the Appellant, S. W. Chatterton. 
 
 For the Eespondent, Lowe ^ Co. for W. C. 
 Trevor, Ouisborough. 
 
 («) 18 L. S. {I.) 285. 
 
152 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS, 
 
 "Whitwell, Appellant; The Clerk of the 
 Peace foe the North Riding op York- 
 shire, Respondent. 
 
 1889. 
 Nov. 11. 
 
 rpHE facts of the case, as stated by tlie Eevising 
 
 Barrister, were as follows : — 
 
 Banister has Andrew Pirie Mitchell occupied lodgings in Ouis- 
 tion™der " horougJi, in the Cleveland division of the North Riding of 
 E°iistration Yorkshire, for more than two years preceding the 15th 
 Act, 1885, OT qI July, 1889. The lodgings were of such value, and 
 admit the were Occupied under such circumstances, as to entitle 
 
 claim of a • 
 
 lodger which Mr. Mitchell to be placed upon the lodgers' list of voters 
 
 has not been „ , . . « , , i • j i 
 
 sent to the for the ensumg year if he made a proper claim to Joe 
 
 overseers till • l -x • j. ±1. j? tt- j.1. 
 
 after the date registered m respect thereof. His name was on the 
 statute for the lodgcrs' list for the current year in respect of his occu- 
 loaffCT^^iM P^^io^ of the same lodgings for the twelve months 
 preceding July 15th, 1888. 
 
 On the 25th of July, 1889, Mr. Mitchell filled up and 
 signed a properly attested claim in the exact form 
 prescribed for a lodger already on the register. This 
 claim was addressed " To the Overseers of the parish or 
 township of Gnisborough," and was, on the same 25th 
 of July, sent by Mr. Mitchell to an agent, for the purpose 
 of being transmitted by him to the said overseers. 
 
 This claim was received by the agent by the morning 
 post of the 26th of July. It was not forwarded to the 
 overseers till the 16th of September, Mr, Mitchell's 
 
LIU VICTORIA. 153 
 
 name was not published by the overseers on any list of 1889. 
 claimants or voters for the purpose of the revision. Whitwell 
 
 At a Court held by the Eevising Barrister at Ouis- thb Clbbk of 
 borough, on September 12th, 1889, for the revision of ™oj, ^^ 
 the Guishorough lists, Mr. Mitchell appeared in person, g,^^™ j, 
 and applied to have his name inserted in the lodgers' Tobkshibb. 
 list, on a statement of the above facts. Mr. Alfred 
 Mills, not being himself a duly qualified objector, 
 opposed the claim, on the grounds that it had been made 
 too late, that it had never reached the overseers, and 
 that the Revising Barrister had therefore no jurisdic- 
 tion to recognize it. It was proved to the Revising 
 Barrister, and Mr. Mills admitted, that if the claim had 
 been delivered to the overseers on July 25th no objec- 
 tion could have been maiatained against the vote, and 
 that the facts hereinbefore stated were true. No other 
 person objected to the claim. 
 
 The Revising Barrister adjourned the decision of the 
 ease to a subsequent Court, in order that the claim 
 might in the meantime be actually delivered to the 
 Guishorough overseer, and by him transmitted to the 
 Revising Barrister, and that any other objector might 
 have an opportunity of opposing the claim at such 
 subsequent Court. 
 
 At the adjourned Court, held at Middlesbrough in the 
 samie parliamentary division, on September 18th, 1889, 
 the said claim was deKvered to the Revising Barrister 
 by the Guisborough overseer (to whom it had in the 
 meantime been sent), and the Revising Barrister again 
 asked whether any person objected. Mr. Mills, stating 
 that he appeared on behalf of Mr. William Whitwell, 
 a duly qualified objector, who was not present in Court, 
 repeated his objection, on the ground that the claim had 
 i;ot been delivered to the overseer at the proper time. 
 
154 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1889. No other person objected, and Mr. Mills again admitted 
 WHirwELi, that in every other respect the claimant was duly 
 TheCleekop qualified. 
 
 poETHE The Eevising Barrister decided that he had juris- 
 
 EiDiNo^p diction to admit the claim, and inserted the name of 
 ToBESHiBE. j^,^^g^ pj-„g Mitchell in the Guisborough lodgers' Hst. 
 The ground of the decision was, that although it is an 
 essential part of a lodger's qualification that he should 
 have made a claim in the statutory form, it is not indis- 
 pensaMe that the claim should actually reach the over- 
 seer on the day prescribed by the directions contained 
 in the Eegistration Acts and the schedules thereto. 
 See especially 48 Vict. cap. 15, sec. 18. 
 
 In the judgment of the Eevising Barrister the 
 publicity given to the proceedings at the Guisborough 
 Eevision Court was sufficient to ensure the presentation 
 either there or at Middlesbrough of any objection which 
 might conceivably have been mada and sustained by 
 any person to the claim upon its merits. In so far as 
 the matter might be within his discretion, the Eevising 
 Barrister exercised such discretion in favour of the 
 voter, and held that no injustice was done to anyone 
 by the admission of the claim. 
 
 The question for the opinion of the Court was 
 whether, under the circumstances stated in the case, 
 the Eevising Barrister had jurisdiction to admit the 
 said claim : if not, the register was to be amended by 
 striking the name of Andrew Pirie Mitchell out of the 
 lodgers' list for Guisborough. 
 
 Bosliill, for the appellant, was stopped by the Court. 
 
 Meeh, for the respondent. The claim of an old 
 lodger and of a new lodger is the same in form, and 
 
LllI VICTORIA. 155 
 
 this claim might be dealt with as the claim of a new 1889. 
 dodger. WmiwELi 
 
 V. 
 
 The Cleek op 
 [Mathew, J. But the claim was not sent to the the Peace 
 
 FOE THE 
 
 overseer within the time limited for either class of Noeth 
 
 , . . ElDINO OF 
 
 Olaim.J TOEKSHIBE. 
 
 The time for sending in the claim is one of the 
 matters dealt with in the schedules to the Eegistration 
 Acts, and by section 18 of 48 Vict. cap. 15, a disregard 
 of any form or instruction contained in the schedules 
 shall not of itself invalidate any list, notice, or other 
 thing. 
 
 [Mathew, J. But the time of sending in the claim 
 is one of the matters prescribed in the Act itself, 
 and not merely in the schedules.] 
 
 In Wells V. Stanforth (a) the overseers had failed to 
 publish the lists within the time required by the statute, 
 and the objection was not held to be fatal. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.O.J. There the irregularity was 
 not the fault of the voter.] 
 
 It is submitted that the provisions as to time of claim 
 contained in section 30 of the Representation of the 
 People Act, 1867, are directory only, and may be dis- 
 pensed with in cases where no injustice has resulted or 
 would residt from disregarding them. 
 
 Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. The Eevising Barrister in 
 this case has exceeded his jurisdiction. It is not a 
 
 («) Cottman, 451 ; X. E. 16 Q. S. D. 244. 
 VOL. I, M 
 
156 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1889. question of justice, but of jurisdiction. The Act of 
 
 Whitwell Parliament prescribes a particular day for the sending 
 
 The Cmbk op in oi. claims, and Mr. Mitchell failed to comply with 
 
 ™E T^ *^i^ condition. It is a matter of substance, and not of 
 
 NoETH form, and I am of opinion that section 18 of the Regis- 
 
 ToEKSHiBE. tration Act, 1885, does not enable the Eevising Barrister 
 
 to dispense with the condition. The appeal must be 
 
 allowed, with costs. 
 
 Mathew, J. I am of the same opinion. The Act 
 of Parliament does confer on Eevising Barristers a 
 discretion in certain cases to extricate unwary voters 
 from the perilous technicalities in which they may 
 become involved, and I am not astonished that the 
 Revising Barrister endeavoured to exercise such a dis- 
 cretion in the present instance. But I think the 
 Eevising Barrister had no jurisdiction to assist the 
 claimant in this case, and that his decision must be 
 reversed. 
 
 Wills, J., concurred. 
 
 Appeal allowed. 
 
 Solicitors — For the Appellant, Morse and Simpson, 
 Agents for Jackson and Jackson, Middles- 
 brough. 
 
 For the Eespondent, Lowe 8f Co., Agents 
 for W. C. Trevor, Quisborouah. 
 
nil VICTORIA, 157 
 
 Maksh, Appellant; Estcotjet, Respondent. 
 
 A 
 
 T a Court held for the purpose of revising the list of 1889. 
 voters for the parish of Newchurch, in the Isle of '^°''" ^^' ^^" 
 
 Wight, Charles Chiverton, Charles Pike, William Quy, Where 
 
 claimants 
 
 Charles New, and Frank Ralph, together with the several occupy 
 
 d-wefliag- 
 
 other persons whose names were set forth m a schedule houses in a 
 
 annexed to the case afterwards stated by the Eevising of the con- ' 
 Barrister, claimed each as the occupier of a dwelling- their i 
 
 ' services, 
 
 house to have their names inserted in Division I. of the necess°ary^ ^ 
 
 occupiers' list for the said parish, as being persons the^ue per-"^ 
 
 entitled to be registered both as parliamentary electors ^^^^^°^ ?* 
 ° '■ •/ those services, 
 
 for the parliamentary county of the Isle of Wight, and *liey are 
 
 •^ •' •' _ _ " t T entitled to be 
 
 as county electors for the administrative county of registered as 
 
 county 
 Southampton. electors, and 
 
 The following facts were established by the evi- parliamentary 
 , voters ; 
 
 deuce : — although the 
 
 The claimants were all agricultural labourers, occupy- hou^eTare ^ 
 
 ing cottages on the farms of their employers. theTrates^ and 
 
 The employment of the claimant, Charles Chiverton, f^^ claimants 
 
 •^ ■' have made no 
 
 was that of a carter, at a verbal hiring of fifteen shillings claim to be 
 
 rated. 
 
 per week wages and the option of occupying during The 
 such his employment as carter a cottage on his em- Corporations 
 ployer's farm at a rent of one shilling per week; the s^\q yi^t. 
 termination of the employment by either party to gee!' 3^2',''does 
 terminate the occupation of the cottage. He was not ^j^^^^g^^ °'" 
 compelled to occupy the cottage, but was at liberty, if operation of 
 
 Poor Eate 
 Assessment and Collection Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. cap. 41), as declared by see. 14 
 of the Parliamentary and Municipal Eegistratiou Act, 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. cap. 26). 
 
 Smith T. Overseers of Seghill {L. S. 10 Q. B. 422), followed. 
 
 Maclem v. Frichard (ante, p. 94 ; 20 Q. B. D. 285), distinguished. 
 
 M 3 
 
158 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1889. SO disposed, to live elsewhere. As a fact he elected to 
 Maesh occupy, and did occupy, the cottage during the fuU 
 
 V. 
 
 EsTcoTiET. qualifying period on the terms and conditions ahove 
 stated. The rent of the cottage to a person not in the 
 farmer's employ would be two shillings or two shillings 
 and sixpence per week. 
 
 In the case of Charles Pike, the claimant was in the 
 employ of a farmer, as a shepherd, at fourteen shillings 
 per week wages, upon a similar verhal agreement, 
 namely, that he should be permitted to occupy the 
 cottage during his employment and as part payment 
 of his wages, and that if he left the farmer's service, or 
 was dismissed therefrom, he would have to give up the 
 cottage or pay two shillings per week rent for it. Had 
 he elected not to occupy the cottage his wages would 
 have been two shillings per week more. In this case 
 also the claimant occupied the cottage during the full 
 qualifying period upon the terms above stated. 
 
 In the case of the claimants William Guy, Charles 
 New, and Frank Ralph, there was a similar verbal agree- 
 ment between each of the claimants and their employer, 
 that, as part payment of wages, each of them should be 
 permitted to occupy during his employment a cottage 
 on his employer's farm ; the employment being subject 
 to termination by either party on a month's notice, and 
 the termination of the employment to terminate the 
 occupation of the cottage. As a fact they each occupied 
 during the full qualifying period a cottage on the 
 employer's farm on those terms. 
 
 In the case of all the other claimants, they each 
 occupied a cottage upon the employer's farm under a 
 similar verbal agreement, in some cases on a weekly 
 engagement, in others, monthly ; but in every case the 
 termination of the employment was to terminate the 
 occupation of the cottage. 
 
LIII VICTORIA. 159 
 
 All the claimants had occupied during the full quali- 1889. 
 fying period, but none of them paid any rates. The Mabsh 
 cottages occupied hy the claimants, respectively, were Estoouet. 
 in each case rated with the farm, and the rates paid as 
 a whole hy the farmer ; hut' the names of the claimants, ' 
 
 respectively, were stated in the rate-hook (hy the over- 
 seer) as occupiers of the cottages on the farms : in some 
 cases from a return in writing furnished to the overseer 
 by the farmer himself ; in other cases from information 
 otherwise obtained by the overseer. 
 
 The claims of the several persons mentioned were 
 opposed on the ground that they were not entitled to 
 havetheir names inserted in the occupiers' list Division I. ; 
 and that they were not entitled to be registered as 
 county electors, their occupation being a service franchise 
 within the meaning of section 3 of 48 Vict. cap. 3. 
 
 On behalf of the appellants, it was contended that the 
 claimants were each entitled to be registered on the 
 occupiers' list Division I., as parliamentary voters and 
 also as county electors : as possessing, by virtue of 
 section 2 of the Eepresentation of the People Act, 1884 
 (48 Vici. cap. 3), a household qualification; they not 
 being required to inhabit, by virtue of their service or 
 employment, the dwelling-houses in which they resided; 
 and that being possessed of such household qualifica- 
 tion they were entitled under section 2 of the County 
 Electors Act, 1888 (51 Vict. cap. 10), to be registered 
 as county electors. 
 
 Being of opinion that there was no authority for 
 the 'contention that the service franchise conferred by 
 section 3 of the Representation of the People Act, 
 1884, was restricted to persons who were " required " 
 to occupy, by virtue of their employment, as dis- 
 tinguished from being "permitted" to occupy, and 
 
160 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1889. that such an argument could not be sustained without 
 TVTabsh importing into the statute words which were not in the 
 EsTootJET. section referred to : that the question was whether or 
 not the claimants occupied their cottages hy virtue of 
 their employment, and as a true test of this whether or 
 not the occupation was or was not dependent on or 
 suhservient to the employment : and seeing that in each 
 case the termination of the employment of the claimant 
 terminated his occupation of the cottage, the Revising 
 Barrister held : — 
 
 1st. That each of the claimants was entitled to be 
 registered on the occupiers' list Division II. 
 as an inhabitant occupier within the meaning 
 of section 3 of the Representation of the 
 People Act, 1884. 
 2ndly. That neither section 2 nor section 3 of the 
 Representation of the People Act, 1884, con- 
 fers any but a parliamentary franchise, and 
 does not operate so as to confer a qualification 
 to persons to vote as burgesses or as coimty 
 electors, and that the County Electors Act, 
 1888, does not extend the service franchise to 
 coxmty electors. 
 3rdly. That none of the cla,imants were entitled to 
 be registered as eoimty electors, as they did 
 not possess a burgess qualification within the 
 meaning of the County Electors Act, 1888, 
 and that the case of each claimant was 
 governed by the decision of the Divisional 
 Court in the case of Maclean v. Prichard{a). 
 The Revising Barrister therefore disallowed the 
 claims of the several persons before mentioned to be 
 inserted in Division I. of the occupiers' list, and trans- 
 (a) Ante, p. 94 ; 20 Q. S. D. 285. 
 
LITI VICTORIA. 161 
 
 ferred their names to Division 11. as persons entitled to 1889. 
 be registered as parliamentary voters tut not as county Maesh 
 
 V. 
 
 electors. Estootjet. 
 
 Due notice of appeal was given. 
 
 If the Court should be of opinion that this decision 
 was wrong the register was to be amended by insertiag 
 the names of the said Charks Chiverton, Charles Pike, 
 William Guy, Charles New, and Prank Ralph, and of 
 the said other persons, iu Division I. of the said list, and 
 by expunging their names from Division II. 
 
 R. 8. Wright, for the appellant. The Revising 
 Barrister has come to a wrong conclusion, and the 
 claimants are entitled to be registered as county electors 
 as well as parliamentary voters. By the Local Grovem- 
 ment Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. cap. 41), section 2, and 
 the County Electors Act, 1888 (51 Vict. cap. 10), 
 section 2, persons possessing in any part of a county 
 outside the limits of a borough a qualification which, if 
 it had been inside a borough, would have been a 
 burgess qualification within the meaning of section 9 
 of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. 
 cap. 50), are entitled to be registered and to vote as 
 county electors. The present claimants possess such 
 burgess qualification. They have been in actual " oc- 
 cupation " within the meaning of section 9, sub-sec. (2), 
 of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882. That is 
 decided by Smith v. Overseers of Seghill{a), which 
 followed 5«<(/Aes V. Overseers of Chatham {b). There is 
 no necessity that the claimants should occupy these 
 particular cottages for the due performance of their 
 services. They are at liberty to live elsewhere if they 
 choose to do so. 
 
 {a) L. B. 10 Q. B. 422. (i) 1 lutw. 61 ; 5 M. ^ G. 34. 
 
162 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1889. The Eepresentation of the People Act, 1884 (48 Vict. 
 
 Maush cap. 3), is not a disfranchising statute, and the fact that 
 EsToo'uET. these persons inhabit their houses hy virtue of service, 
 within the meaning of section 3 of that statute, if it 
 be so, does not destroy the burgess qualification which 
 they possess as " occupiers " independently of that Act. 
 In Maclean v. Prichard (a), to which the Eevising 
 Barrister refers, the claimant was not in occupation at 
 all. He was a mere servant, and his employers were 
 the occupiers of the house. That decision does not 
 govern the present case. 
 
 William Graham, for the respondents. Besides the 
 fact that these claimants only occupied by virtue of 
 service, there is another objection to their qualification. 
 They are not rated within the provisions of section 9, 
 sub-sec. (2) id) and (e), of the Municipal Corporations 
 Act, 1882 ; nor can they be deemed to be rated within 
 the meaning of that section, because section 32, sub- 
 section (2), of the same Act refers to the conditions on 
 which alone for the purposes of that Act a person not 
 actually rated is to be deemed to be rated. Those con- 
 ditions are stated in sub-section (1) of the same section, 
 and necessitate a claim to be rated on the part of the 
 occupier, whether the landlord is or is not liable to be 
 rated. These express provisions supersede and repeal 
 any former provisions vsdth regard to compound house- 
 holders, under which it had been held that if the land- 
 lord was rated and paid the rates it did not matter 
 about the tenant. Therefore, since 1882, an occupier 
 claiming a burgess qualification must either be actually 
 rated or have claimed to be rated, otherwise there is no 
 meaning in section 82 at all. 
 
 [a) Ante, p. 94 ; 20 Q. B. H. 285. 
 
LIIl ViCtOElA. 163 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. Might it not apply to 1889. 
 
 cases where the landlord is not actually rated ? Why Maesh 
 
 should we imply an intention to reverse a course of Estcoubt. 
 salutary legislation without an express repeal ?] 
 
 The section specially defines the persons who, for the 
 purposes of the Act, are to he deemed to he rated, and 
 those who do not satisfy the terms cannot be deemed to 
 he rated for the purpose of the qualification. 
 
 Besides this question of rating, there is the other 
 objection to these claimants, which the Eevising Bar- 
 rister rightly held to be a good objection. These 
 cottages were occupied for the purposes of the employ- 
 ment. It is practically necessary that the shepherds 
 and farm labourers should live on the farm and close to 
 the homestead, and it was part of the terms of their 
 employment that they should do so. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. The Eevising Barrister 
 finds that the claimants exercised the option of living in 
 these cottages. They were permitted, but not com- 
 pelled to live there.] 
 
 It is submitted that Parliament has not conferred the 
 municipal franchise on persons whose tenure of their 
 dwellings is so dependent as it is shown to be in these 
 cases, and that Maclean v. Prichard (a) really decides the 
 present question. 
 
 B. 8. Wright, in reply as to the rating point. This 
 is not the point on which the Revising Barrister pro- 
 ceeded, and is a false point. The 32nd section of the 
 Act of 1882 was not intended to repeal the series of 
 
 {a) Ante, p. 94 ; 20 Q. B. D. 285. 
 
164 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1889. provisions as to the rating of owners instead of oocu- 
 Maesh piers, and its effect on the franchise of the occupiers, 
 EsToouET. which have been in force since 1869. By the Poor 
 Rate Assessment and Collection Act, 1869, section 3, 
 owners might agree with the overseers in certain cases 
 to become liable for the rates, and, by section 4, the 
 vestry might, in similar cases, order that owners should 
 be rated instead of occupiers. By section 19 the over- 
 seers are in -every case to enter the occupier's name in 
 the occupiers' column of the rate-book, whether the rate 
 is collected from the owner or the occupier, or the 
 owner is liable to the payment of the rate instead of the 
 occupier, and such occupier is to be deemed to be duly 
 rated for any qualification or franchise, which, as re- 
 gards rating, depends upon the payment of the poor 
 rate, and the omission of the occupier's name by the 
 overseers is to make no difference for this purpose, 
 although the occupier has made no claim to be rated. 
 In Smith v. Overseers of Seghill{a), it was decided, and 
 by section 14 of the Parliamentary and Municipal Re- 
 gistration Act, 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. cap. 26), it was 
 expressly enacted, that section 19 of the 1869 Act shall 
 not be deemed to apply exclusively to cases where an 
 agreement has been made under section 3 or where an 
 order has been made under section 4 of that Act, but 
 shaU. be of general application. The Municipal Cor- 
 porations Act of 1882 does not repeal these enactments, 
 on the contrary, by section 147, it applies the machinery 
 of the 1869 Act to the borough rate, with the same 
 incidents, conditions, powers, and liabilities, as if the 
 borough rate were a poor rate. The County Electors 
 Act, 1888, by section 1 and section 4, applies the 
 Registration of Electors Acts as there defined (and 
 
 (a) i. E. 10 Q. £. 422. 
 
Lni VICTORIA. 165 
 
 including tke Parliamentary and Municipal Eegis- 1889. 
 tration Act, 1878) to the registration of county electors. Maess 
 It follows that these occupiers by the sections of the Estoouet. 
 1869 and 1878 Acts above referred to are for the 
 purpose of the county franchise to be deemed to be 
 rated. The landlords of these cottagers have been rated, 
 and have paid the rates. The 32nd section of the 1882 
 Act enables an occupier to claim to be rated where no 
 owner is in fact rated, and so far is an addition to the 
 provisions of section 19 of the 1869 Act ; but it is in 
 no sense a repeal of that section. 
 
 Wills, J. I am desired by my Lord to give judg- 
 ment first in this case, and I am of opinion that the 
 appeal must succeed. No doubt it is the duty of the 
 Courts in construing Acts of Parliament to give effect 
 to every part of the enactment and not to hold without 
 the strongest necessity that any provisions are super- 
 fluous or have been inserted per incuriam. But if it were 
 necessaiy to choose between holding the 32nd section of 
 the Municipal Corporations Act of 1882 to be a super- 
 fluous repetition of existing "law, or to adopt the con- 
 struction of it contended for by Mr. Graham, I think 
 it would be right to adopt the former alternative. It is 
 impossible to shut one's eyes to the current of legisla- 
 tion on the subject of rating in connection with the 
 franchise. It has been perceived that the person in 
 occupation of the land really bears the burden of the 
 rates, either directly if he himself pays them, or in- 
 directly in the form of iaoreased rent or diminished 
 wages if his landlord pays them ; and the object of the 
 legislature has been to secure to the person who so 
 bears the burden the means of getting his name upon 
 the rate-book, and the enjoyment of the franchise, so far 
 
166 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1889. as rating is a requisite part of the qualification. Now, 
 Maesh the Municipal Corporations Act of 1882 is mainly a 
 EsTooTOT. consolidation Act. It is not directed specially to the 
 conditions of the right of voting, hut deals generally 
 with the organisation and regulation of Municipal Cor- 
 porations. It would he a startling conclusion that a 
 section of such an Act, hy inserting a provision which 
 had existed in an earlier Act (2 & 3 Will. 4, cap. 45, 
 sect. 30) — the first Reform Act — hut which provision 
 had hy the course of subsequent legislation heen 
 rendered superfluous, was meant incidentally to repeal 
 a series of provisions and a course of legislation which 
 had heen extended to all descriptions of the franchise ; 
 and to repeal those provisions with reference to the 
 municipal franchise alone. If Parliament had intended 
 so serious a change and reversal of policy, the intention 
 would, I think, have heen plainly expressed, and would 
 not have to he gathered from such an implication as is 
 suggested. It would, in my opiaion, he a far more 
 natural interpretation to say that this section was a 
 hasty and superfluous provision, re-introduced from 
 earlier legislation without due consideration of the 
 altered state of the law which rendered it unnecessary, 
 than to give it the effect of tacitly effecting such an 
 important constitutional change. 
 
 But we are not driven to regard the section as super- 
 fluous or meaningless. Mr. It. 8. Wright has pointed 
 out that if the owner is not rated in fact, whether liable 
 or not, and the occupier is not rated, the occupier 
 will or may lose the franchise, unless he takes advan- 
 tage of the section and claims himself to be rated. 
 There is therefore something for the section to operate 
 on. If Parliament had by this 32nd section of the Act 
 of 1882 expressed the intention to restrict the franchise 
 
LIU VICTORIA. 167 
 
 the Court would have heen bound to give effect to that 1889. 
 intention : but in my opinion the section has another Mabbh 
 and useful operation; and although it had no such Estoouet. 
 operation I should still prefer to construe the section as 
 a superfluous provision which had crept into the Act of 
 ParHament through inadvertence, and should refuse to 
 put upon it the interpretation contended for on behalf 
 of the respondent. 
 
 On the other point I feel no doubt. In the case of 
 Muclean v. Prichard {a) the claimant was admittedly a 
 servant whose duties to his employers rendered it neces- 
 sary that he should reside on the premises. In the 
 cases before us none of the claimants are obliged to re- 
 side in these cottages. They choose to occupy the cot- 
 tages as a privilege incident to their service but not 
 recjuisite for its due performance. The names of the 
 claimants must be transferred to Division I. of the occu- 
 piers' list. 
 
 Lord Colemdgt;, L.C.J., and Mathew, J., concurred. 
 
 Appeal allowed. 
 
 Solicitors — For the Appellant, Frith, Needham. 
 
 For the Eespondent, Woolridge, 8andown, 
 I. W. 
 
 (a) Ante, p. 94 , 20 Q. B. D. 285. 
 
CASES 
 
 ABaUED AND DETERMINED 
 
 IK THE 
 
 QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION 
 
 OP 
 
 THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, 
 
 AND ON APPEAL THEEEFEOM 
 UNDEE STATS. 6 & 7 YIOT. c. 18, 
 
 Ann 
 
 41 & 42 VIOT. c. 26, 
 
 AND THE ACTS AMENDING THE SAME 
 DUEma 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS, 1890, 
 
 IN THE 
 
 FrPTT-FOTJRTH TEAR OF QUEEN VICTORIA. 
 
 Sutton,' Appellant ; Wade, Eespondent. 
 Gale, Appellant ; Oveeend, Respondent. 
 Moore, Appellant ; Atkinson, Respondent. 
 
 rrHESE tixee appeals were heard together. Each of 1890. 
 
 the appeals raised the question whether, having " 
 
 regard to the Registration Order, 1889, Sched. 2, fatal Tariation 
 Form I., No. 1, a notice of objection given to over- of°notioe of"™ 
 seers is sufficient, where the names of several persons yoter*to'be'' ^ 
 obiected to are set out in a list or schedule following ^'^^ to over- 
 
 ■" ° seers under 
 
 the ' signature of the objector and referred to in the *^^ Registra- 
 
 notice. Electors Acts 
 
 and the 
 Registration 
 
 Order, 1889, that the signature of the ohjeotor precedes the names of the persons 
 
 objected to and referred to in the notice. 
 
 VOL. I. i» 
 
170 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 . Sutton y. Wade. . 
 
 ^^^^- AT a Court held at Norwich iov the revision of the 
 Sutton jjgj; q£ persons entitled to be registered as parlia- 
 
 Wade. mentary electors for the parliamentary city and county 
 of the city of Norwich, and persons entitled to be en- 
 rolled as citizens for the municipal city and county of 
 the city of 'Norwich, the name of the appellant, Senry 
 Sutton, appeared on Division 1 of the said list. 
 
 It was proved that William Arthur Wade, the re- 
 spondent, had duly\signed and served on the appellant 
 a notice of objection to his name being retained on the 
 said Hst. 
 
 The respondent had also duly served on the guardians 
 of the poor of the Norwich incorporation, who, under 
 the Norwich Corporation Act, 1889, sec. 88 (3), perform 
 the duties of overseers of the parish of Norwich, a 
 notice as follows : — 
 
 " Polling District, No. 1. 
 
 " Notice of Objection to be given to Overseers. 
 
 " (Parliamentary and Local Grovernment.) 
 
 " To the Guardians of the Poor of the Norwich 
 Incorporation, acting as and being Overseers 
 of the Parish of Norwich. 
 
 " I hereby give you notice that I object to the names, 
 of the persons mentioned and described below being 
 retained on the List No. 1, Division No. 1, as Parlia- 
 mentary Electors for the Parliamentary City and' 
 
LIV VICTORIA. 
 
 171 
 
 " Name of Person objected to 
 as described in the List. 
 
 Place of Abode as described." 
 
 [Here followed seventeen names and addresses, in- 
 cluding the name and address of the appellant.] 
 
 The whole of the notice was written and printed on 
 the same side of a sheet of paper. The name of William 
 Arthur Wade therein appearing was the signature of 
 the respondent. The notice was not otherwise signed 
 by him. 
 
 The name of the appellant was duly puhlished hy 
 the guardians in the list of persons to whose names 
 objection was made as not being entitled to have their 
 names retained on the said list of voters. 
 
 It was contended by the appellant that the notice to 
 the guardians was not a good notice of objection to his 
 name, on the ground that the name did not appear in 
 the body of the notice, and that, as the signature of the 
 respondent thereto preceded the names of the appellant 
 and of the other persons to whose names objection was 
 made as not being entitled to have their names retained 
 
 n2 
 
 County of the City of Norwich, and as Citizens for the 1890. 
 Municipal City and County of the same City. Sutton 
 
 " Dated this 18th day of August, 1890. WAi.E. 
 
 " (Signed) William Arthur Wade, 
 
 " of No. 136, Bull Close Road, 
 " Saint James, in the City of Norwich, 
 "on Division No. 1, of List No. 1, of Parlia- 
 mentary Electors and Citizens for Polling 
 District No. 24 of the Parish of Norwich, in 
 the City and County of the City of Norwich. 
 
172 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1890. on the said list, the notice was not signed at the foot 
 Stjtto-^t thereof as required hy the statutory form. 
 Wabb. The Revising Barrister decided that the name of the 
 
 appellant was sufficiently incorporated hy reference in 
 the body of the said notice, and that, having regard to 
 the provisions of section 18 of the Eegistration Act, 
 1885, the notice , in question was a good notice of 
 objection, and, as it was proved that the appellant was 
 not qualified to be on the Hst of electors, allowed the 
 objection, and expunged the name of the appellant 
 from the list. 
 
 The names of more than 200 other persons were 
 expunged under similar circumstances. Due notice of 
 appeal was given, and the appeals were consolidated. 
 If the Court should be of opinion that the notice of 
 objection was good, the list was to remain as revised. 
 If the Court should be of opinion that the notice of 
 objection was not a good notice, all the names were to 
 be restored to the list. 
 
 B. 8. JFngfA^, for the appellant. The notice of objec- 
 tion in this ease does not comply with the requirements 
 of the statute, and is a bad notice. The Registration 
 Order, 1889, issued under the authority of the Local 
 Government Act, 1888, sec. 76, sub-sec. (7), provides a 
 form of notice of objection to be given to overseers in 
 Schedule 2, Form I., No. 1, and this form must not 
 be substantially departed from. In the prescribed 
 form the name of the person objected to appears in the 
 body of the notice of objection, and the signatui-e of 
 the objector appears at the foot of such notice. It is of 
 the essence of the form that the signature should be at 
 the foot of the notice, to authenticate the whole. A 
 notice signed in blank, leaving the names of the per- 
 
LIV VICTORIA. 
 
 173 
 
 sons objected to in uncertainty, to be appended after- 1890- 
 ■wards, is no notice at all. The form adopted by tbe Sotton 
 respondent invites inquiry as to "wbat names were on Wade. 
 the schedule when the notice was signed — an inquiry 
 which involves uneertaiaty, and is against the policy 
 of the statute. There is no finding by the Eevising 
 Barrister as to when the names were inserted in the 
 schedule, nor as to the person by whom they were 
 inserted. 
 
 In Toms v. Cuming {a), Mr. Justice Maule says that 
 the signature of the objector should be at the foot of 
 the notice. In Smith v. Holloway (b), the signature 
 was at the foot of the schedule, and the decision was 
 only to the effect that more names than one might be 
 included in the body of the notice, before the signature. 
 The form then prescribed was exactly followed. The 
 form now prescribed has not been followed. The 
 necessity for adhering to the form is shown in Humphrey 
 Y. ^ark (c) and Wood v. Chandler (d), 
 
 Mattimon, for the respondent. The respondent has 
 served two notices with respect to each person objected 
 to^ — one on the person objected to himself, the other on 
 the overseers. The statute 6 Vict, cap. 18, sec. 17, 
 provides for these two notices. The first is the material 
 notice, the second is supplemental only. The material 
 notice, it is adnaitted, has been duly served on the 
 appellant. That notice was in the proper form. The 
 notice served on the overseers is required to be " accord- 
 ing to the prescribed form, or to the like effect." The 
 notice now in question is identical in effect with the 
 
 (a) 1 Lutw. 200 ;'! M. ^ G. 88. [e) Ante, p. 39 ; L. E. 20 Q. B. 
 
 [h) Sopw. # FMl. 281 ; i. iS. 1 B. 294. 
 C. P. 145. M Ante, p. 61 ; L. S- 20 Q. B. 
 
 p. 297, 
 
174 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1890. 
 
 Stjtton 
 
 V. 
 
 Wabb. 
 
 form prescribed. In Smith v. noUoway{a), the names 
 were in a schedule. It is immaterial whether the 
 schedule precedes or follows the signature, so long as it 
 is properly referred to in the hody of the notice, and 
 BO long as the signature duly authenticates the whole. 
 A document is properly signed withia the meaning of 
 the Statute of Eranids, although the signature is not at 
 the foot of the document; and the same principle 
 applies to the requirement of signature ia the Registra- 
 tion Acts. The place of the signature is a mere question 
 of form, and, even if it is misplaced, such a variation 
 is not to invalidate the notice according to the express 
 provision of 48 Vict. cap. 16, sec. 18. [He was 
 stopped.] 
 
 1890. 
 
 GrAIyB 
 V. 
 
 OVEEBMD. 
 
 GrALE V. OVEEEND. 
 
 AT a Court held for the revision of the lists for the 
 borough of Leeds, the appellant, George Gale, 
 objected to the name of Thomas Wahnsley being re- 
 taiaed on Division I. of the occupation list as a par- 
 liamentary elector for the central division of the said 
 borough, and as a burgess for the municipal borough of 
 Leeds. 
 
 It was admitted that a notice of objection had been 
 duly served on the said Thomas Wahmley, but the only 
 notice of objection which had been served on the over- 
 seers of the township of Leeds was, so far as is material, 
 in the words and figures following : — 
 
 " To the Overseers of the Township of Leeds. I hereby 
 
 («) Sopw. # Phil. 281 ; L. n.l G. P. 145. 
 
LIV VICTORIA. 176 
 
 give you notice that I object to the names of the 1890. 
 following persons being retained on Division -I. of the CJalb 
 Oooupation List as Parliamentary Electors for the Ovbbbnii. 
 Central Division of the Parliamentary Borough of 
 Leeds, and as Burgesses for the Municipal Borough of 
 Leeds. 
 
 "Dated the 18th day of August, 1890. 
 " (Signed) George Gale, 
 
 "of Clayton Wood, 
 " Morsforth Lane, Headingley-vsamrBurJey, 
 " on the list of parliamentary electors and bur- 
 gesses for the township df Headingley-cxaa-Burley, 
 Division I., No. 36 polling district." 
 
 [Here follow 34 names and addresses, including the 
 name of Thomas JFalmsley.'] 
 
 The notice was on a printed form, and was wholly 
 printed, except the signature " George Gale," and the 
 list of persons objected to, with their addresses. 
 
 It was admitted that the appellant, George Gale, had 
 signed the notice where his signature appeared. 
 
 It was also admitted that the overseers had duly 
 published the name of the said Thomas Walmsley on 
 the objection list as well as the names of the said 33 
 other persons. There was nothing above the signature 
 of the said George Gale to indicate the number of 
 persons the said George Gale intended to object to. 
 
 There were twenty-one similar forms of notice of 
 objection, signed in a similar manner by the said George 
 Gale, and similarly served. 
 
 The number of names objected to in the whole of 
 these notices amounted to 228. 
 
 As regards fourteen out of the twenty- one notices, 
 none of the names objected to were in George Gale's 
 handwriting. In one case relating to polling district 
 
176 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1890. No. 7 the names were written on a sheet of paper, 
 GrAtE wHoli was pasted or gummed at the foot of and below 
 
 y. 
 
 OvEBBND. the signature of George Gale. In many cases the lists 
 of names showed alterations, erasures, interlineations, 
 gaps and blanks. 
 
 The Eevising Barrister held that the form of all these 
 notices of objection was invalid, and declined to amend, 
 and retained on the list the name of Thomas Walmsky 
 and the names of the 227 other persons objected to. 
 
 George Gale gave due notice of appeal in all the cases. 
 The appeals were consolidated, and Joshua Overend was 
 made the respondent in the consolidated appeal. . 
 
 The question for the opinion of the Court was, 
 whether the notices of objection were valid in form. If 
 that question should be answered in the affirmative, all 
 the names objected to were to be expunged from the 
 register. 
 
 Asquith, Q.C, for the appellant. 
 
 The Court called on 
 
 Maeaskie, for the respondent. The schedules ap- 
 pended to the notices in this case are obviously un- 
 trustworthy. They are full of erasures and inter- 
 lineations, and one of the notices has a slip of 
 paper containing names gummed over the original 
 document. This may have been done before or after 
 the notice was signed. In aU the forms of notices of 
 objection which have been prescribed by authority 
 since 6 Vict. cap. 18 was passed, the place for the objec- 
 , tor's signature appears at the foot of the notice. There' 
 is no precedent to be found during the forty-five years 
 which have gone by since that statute was passed for 
 an innovation like this. The words ^'or to the like 
 
LIV VICTOEIA. 177 
 
 efEeot," whioh are contained in section 17 of that statute, 1890. 
 are not repeated in the present regulations as to forms. Gaie 
 Even under the old statute, variations from the form Oveeemd. 
 which had not misled anyone have been held fatal. 
 Freeman v. Newman (a) ; so also in Smith v. Chandler (i). 
 
 [Grantham, J. The date is a material element in a 
 notice v^here a date is required.] 
 
 The place of the signature is an essential matter, to 
 prevent alteration and fraud. In Smith v. Holloway (c) 
 a schedule of names befolte the signature was permitted 
 because the form prescribed by section 7 of 6 Vict. cap. 18 
 shows a schedule in that place. That section relates to 
 county voters. The form prescribed by section 17, relat- 
 ing to borough voters, shows no schedule. The decisions 
 on the Statute of Frauds are not appKcable. In those 
 cases, if the signature is not in the proper place, it is a 
 question for the jury whether the person signing in^ 
 tended to authenticate the whole document. It is 
 inconvenient that such an inquiry should have to be 
 entered into before the Eevising Barrister. There is a 
 practical reason against permitting this appended sche- 
 dule. Names may be added or names cut ofE without 
 the sanction of the objector. 
 
 [GrRANTHAM, J. Docs uot the notice served on the 
 person objected to prevent any danger ?] 
 
 That may have been served by post, and have never 
 reached the voter. The notices to the overseers cannot 
 be regarded as immaterial. The overseers are directed 
 
 (if) Coltman, 342 ; L. S. 12 Q. B. JD. 208. 
 Q. B. D. 373. (c) Hopw. ^ Mil. 281 ; i. JJ. 1 
 
 (i) Ante, p. 129 ; I. S. 22 G. P. 145. 
 
178 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1890. to publish on the church doors a list of persons ohjected 
 Gale to, and to re-puhlish that list if it is removed or def atjed. 
 OvBBEND. One of the ohjects of this list is to protect the voter 
 against the lack of actual notice to himself, in eases 
 where that notice has been served hy post and has mis- 
 carried. And though it may be that in the present 
 case the persons objected to had actual notice, your 
 Lordships' decision wOl cover cases where there may 
 have been no actual notice. 
 
 Another object of the overseers' list is to give notice 
 to possible witnesses, and to enable a fresh objector to 
 adopt the objection if the original objector dies. I 
 admit that disregard of a mere form, where no practical 
 mischief can ensue^ may not be important. But sche- 
 dules of names appended to such" notices as these may 
 be tampered with more easily than if the statutory form 
 is followed — and mischief may result. Suppose a name 
 is added after the objector has signed. The voter sees 
 his name in the list of persons objected to, and attends 
 the Court. The objector disclaims the objection as 
 made without his authority — and the voter gets no 
 costs. Or a name might be cut off, and the voter 
 objected to lose one of the safeguards which Parliament 
 intended he should have by way of notice. It is easy 
 to follow the form prescribed, and the form adopted in 
 the present case raises possible questions of fact which 
 could not arise if the names appeared in the body of the 
 notice above the signature. 
 
 Asquith, Q.C, in reply. 
 
 No question can be raised on these notices which 
 could not equally be raised if the signature was placed 
 at the end of the list of names. Smith v. Solloway (a) 
 
 (a) Bopw. i Fhil. 281 ; i. iJ. 1 C. P. 145. 
 
LIV VICTORIA. 
 
 shows that a list of names is admissible. Names may 
 conceivably be inserted in such a list after it has been 
 signed ; but that may occur whether the list is before 
 or after the signature. It did not occur in the present 
 cases. The appellant has given a notice " to the like 
 effect " with the form prescribed, and he has signed it. 
 That is all that is requisite. [He also cited Jones v. 
 Jones (a). J 
 
 179 
 
 1890. 
 
 GrAXE 
 
 V. 
 
 OVEEEND. 
 
 MooEE V. Atkinson. 
 
 TIHE notice of objection given to the overseers in this 
 case was in a similar form to the notices discussed in 
 Sutton V. Wade (b). The list on which the voter's name 
 appeared was the occupation list of parliamentary 
 electors for the parliamentary borough of Whitehaven 
 and county electors for the administrative county of 
 Omnherland. 
 
 The Revising Barrister held the notice of objection 
 bad, and the objector appealed. 
 
 Mattinson, for the appellant. 
 
 Warr, for the respondent. 
 
 1890. 
 
 MoOBE 
 V. 
 
 Atkinson. 
 
 GrRANTHAM, J. We 3X6 all of opinion that the form 
 of objection used in each of these cases was a sufficient 
 compliance with the form set out in the Registration 
 Order of 1889, and that the notices of objection were 
 
 Stttton 
 
 V. 
 
 Wade. 
 Eto. 
 
 (ffi) Hopw. # Phil. 320; L. R. 1 C. P. 140 (4) Ante, p. 170. 
 
180 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1890. 
 
 Sutton 
 
 T. 
 
 Wade. 
 
 GrXLS 
 
 V. 
 
 OVEKENB, 
 
 MOOEE 
 
 V. 
 
 Atkinson. 
 
 good. It follows from this that we hold the decision 
 of the Revising Barrister in the first ease (Sutton v. 
 Wade) to have heen correct, and in the other two cases 
 to have been wrong. The eases are of some importance, 
 because the Registration Orders regulating procedure 
 ought to be observed, and all notices should be properly 
 given in order to carry out the purposes of the legis- 
 lature. We have to remember that in all these cases 
 notice has to be given to the person objected to. Un- 
 less the objector -has done aU that the statute requires 
 in order to inform that person of the objection, the ob- 
 jection must fail. It is necessary, further, that notice 
 of the objection should be given to the overseers. This 
 is desirable, because the overseers have to prepare the 
 lists, and ought to know what objections have been 
 given, and may themselves object iu such eases as they 
 think proper. The statute therefore requires that 
 notices of objection must be given to the overseers, 
 and must be signed by the objector. In Trotter v. 
 Walker (a), a signature almost unintelligible to a per- 
 son who did not know the handwriting was held suf- 
 ficient to authenticate the document. The object of the 
 signature is to authenticate the document sent in to the 
 overseers containing the names of the persons objected 
 to, which document the overseers use in compiling the 
 list of such persons, which they publish. I)oes the 
 document as signed make it clear who the persons are 
 who are objected to, and authenticate that list of per- 
 sons ? I am at a loss to see any analogy between the 
 purposes of these Registration Orders and the purposes 
 of the Wills Act. The importance of the signature to 
 a will is beyond comparison greater than the import- 
 ance of the signature to a notice of objection sent to 
 
 (») JT. # G. 634 ; 13 C. Ji. {N. S.) 30, 
 
HV VICTORIA. 
 
 181 
 
 the overseers. The latter merely informs the overseers 
 that the objector has given notice of ohjeotion to par- 
 ticular persons. Of course the statute must be complied 
 ■with ; but if its requirements are substantially followed, 
 the 18th section of 48 Vict. cap. 15, is a positive enact- 
 ment that in such cases technical objections resting on 
 mere variations of form are not to be allowed to invali- 
 date " any list, notice, or other thing." That section 
 is a positive direction biuding upon us. But even with- 
 out that, looking at the whole of these notices, I think 
 no real doubt as to the names of the persons the 
 objector intends to object to can arise. The prescribed 
 form is framed as an objection to one individual only, 
 but as the overseer is to compile a list from these notices 
 of objection, I can see nothing improper in putting 
 such a list into the body of the notice, supposing it to 
 be duly authenticated by signature. Then what diffe- 
 rence can it make whether the objector says in his 
 notice that he objects to the " names of the following 
 persons," or to " the names above written" ? Whether 
 the signature is at the bottom of the document or not, it 
 is possible to suggest that interlineations or alterations 
 might be made in the list, but such danger is, in my 
 opinion, no greater in the one case than in the other. 
 I think the object of the legislature was to provide the 
 overseers with the means of making a correct list of the 
 persons upon whom individual notices of objection had 
 been served, and that the notices now before us are 
 reasonably sufficient to enable the overseers to compile 
 such a list. I thiak we are bound to hold these notices 
 of objection to be good, or else to disregard altogether 
 the provisions of section 18 of 48 Vict. cap. 15. 
 
 In many cases in which the Courts in years gone by 
 have felt themselves constrained to invalidate claims or 
 
 1890. 
 
 SUTTOK 
 V. 
 
 Wade. 
 GtaiiE 
 
 T. 
 
 OVEEBND. 
 
 MOOBE 
 
 V. 
 
 Atkinson. 
 
182 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1890. 
 
 Sutton 
 
 T. 
 
 Wade. 
 Gaxe 
 
 T. 
 
 OVEBEND. 
 
 HOOBE 
 
 ■7. 
 
 AlKINSOir. 
 
 notices on the ground of some teolinical flaw, I observe 
 that the judges profess to have come to such decision 
 •with regret. In the present ease I may say that I feel 
 glad that it is not necessary, and that, in my opinion, 
 it would be wrong, to give effect to the technicality 
 which has been relied on before us for the purpose of 
 showing that these notices of objection are insufficient. 
 
 Vaughan Williams, J. I am of the same opinion ; 
 but as our decision is one that may be of importance 
 in guiding future practice, I prefer to state my own 
 reasons in my own words. The objection taken to 
 these notices is that they are not in the form which 
 has been provided by the Order in Council issued in 
 pursuance of the provisions of the statute. If the 
 departure from that form which these notices exhibit 
 is a matter which is a mere departure from form, then, 
 by the very terms of section 18 of 48 Vict. cap. 15, we 
 ought not to give any effect to that departure, because 
 the words of that section are that " the disregard of 
 any form or instruction shall not of itself invalidate 
 any Hst, notice, or other thing." The real question we 
 have to decide is whether or not the signature by the 
 objector of these notices of objection above the names 
 referred to is in these particular cases a mere departure 
 affecting form only, or a substantial departure making 
 the notice of objection a substantially different thing 
 from the one prescribed by the Order in Council. 
 One thing is plain, the prescribed form requires that 
 the person giving the notice of objection should authen-. 
 ticate it by his signature. The objection taken to these 
 notices is that they are not properly authenticated. If 
 I thought these notices were not properly authenticated, 
 I should hold that to be matter of substance, and I say 
 
LIV VICTORIA. 
 
 183 
 
 that in every case in whioh the notice of ohjeotioh 
 is not properly authenticated it is, in iny opinion, bad... 
 On this question of the authentication of the notices 
 of objection given to the overseers, I think it quite 
 unimportant to inquire whether or not notice has been 
 given to the voter. The fact that such a notice has been 
 given does not in any way avoid the necessity for a 
 properly authenticated notice to be served upon the 
 overseers. Something has been said as to the purposes 
 for which this notice to the overseers is required by the 
 statute. Whatever other purposes may have been in 
 view, I cannot doubt that one was that the overseers 
 diould put up a list of the persons objected to on the 
 church doors, and that that list should serve to give 
 information both to the voter objected to and to all 
 other persons interested in the registration. The pre- 
 sent system of registration, requiring notices of objec- 
 tion to be given both tO the overseers and to the 
 individual voter, was established in the Reform Act, 
 and it will be found that the very section of that Act 
 which requires these two notice to be given provides 
 that the overseer, on receiving the notices, shall publish, 
 it on the church doors. I think, therefore, that, in 
 determining whether or not a properly authenticated 
 notice has been giveil to the overseers, we should dis- 
 regard altogether the notice which may have been 
 given to the individual voter. 
 
 Now, if, on looking at the notice itself, I could con- 
 clude that any question might a,rise as to its authenticity 
 whioh could not have arisen if the form had been followed, 
 I should have held that, though under the circumstances 
 the balance of my opinion might have been that tiie notice 
 was in fact a good notice, yet I should, on that ground, 
 have held -it to be a bad notice. For example, if tjie 
 
 1890. 
 
 SuTTON' 
 V. 
 
 Wadb. 
 
 V. 
 
 OVEBBND. 
 
 MOOBB 
 
 T. 
 
 Atkinson. 
 
184 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1890. 
 
 Svnos 
 
 V. 
 
 ■Wade. 
 
 GXLE 
 
 V. 
 
 OVEEEND. 
 
 MoOBB 
 
 V. 
 
 Atkinson. 
 
 signature were by initials or by indorsement, I think 
 a question of fact might be raised on which evidence 
 would have to be taken which could never have been 
 raised if the form had been followed. I look at the 
 present notices to see i£ any such question is raised by 
 their form. It is said, Yes ; for the words of the 
 several notices are that the objector objects to the 
 names of " the following persons," and that, because 
 the signature precedes the names, there is not that 
 authentication which there would be if the signature 
 followed the names. If I thought that were so I 
 should hold the notices bad ; but on looking at the 
 notices I think that no further or other question as to 
 the notices referring to the particular names set out 
 in the lists can arise which could not have arisen if the 
 signature had followed the names. In these parti- 
 cular cases, therefore, I agree in the decision that 
 these notices are good; but my judgment must not 
 be taken as in any way to be laying down the proposi- 
 tion that where the signature is such as to render the 
 authentication of the whole document doubtful or diffi- 
 cult the notice of objection would be good. 
 
 Laweance, J. I agree with the judgment of my 
 brother Grantham. I think there has been a sub- 
 stantial compliance with the form prescribed under the 
 authority of the Act of Parliament. 
 
 Appeal in Sutton v. Wade dismissed. 
 Appeals in Gale v. Overend and Mooi'e v. 
 
 Atkinson allowed. 
 Leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal 
 
 refused. 
 
 Mattimon and Asquith asked for their costs. 
 
LIV VICTORIA. 
 
 185 
 
 Maoaskie invited the Court to say that there was a 
 reasonable case for argument, and that the unsuccessful 
 respondents ought not to have to pay costs for sup- 
 porting the decisions of the Eevising Barristers. He 
 cited Simpson v. Wilkinson {a). 
 
 Gkantham, J. That case was decided some time 
 ago. We think that in this Court, as in others, the 
 proper rule of practice is for costs to follow the event. 
 
 Solicitors — In Sutton v. Wade : 
 
 For the Appellant, C. S. Gover, for 
 L. W. English, Norwich. 
 
 For the Eespondent, Oldman and 
 Clabburn, for Daniel Harris, Nor- 
 wich. 
 
 In Gale v. Overend : 
 
 For the Appellant, Paterson, Snoto, 
 Bhxam, and Kinder, for Harrison, 
 Lupton and Fawcett, Leeds. 
 
 For the Eespondent, Ford and 
 Warren, Leeds. 
 
 In Moore v. Atkinson : 
 
 For the Appellant, /. F. Shaw. 
 
 For the Eespondent, Helder and 
 Roberts, for Edward Alter, White- 
 haven. 
 
 1890. 
 
 Sutton 
 
 V. 
 
 Wabb. 
 
 GAiB 
 
 V. 
 
 OVEEEND. 
 
 MOOEB 
 
 7. 
 
 Atkqisok. 
 
 (a) 1 Lutw. 168, 178 ; 1 M. f G. 50, 65. 
 
186 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 Dix, Appellant ; Kent, Respondent. 
 
 1890. 
 
 mv. 7. 
 
 The scheme 
 for the 
 management 
 and reg^a- 
 tiou of St. 
 JBartholomeiv^ s 
 Hospital, in 
 the city of 
 Gloucester, 
 leaves the ad- 
 ministration 
 and allotment 
 of many of 
 the benefits of 
 the charity in 
 the discretion 
 of the trus- 
 tees. Meld, 
 that the in- 
 mates of the 
 hospital are 
 not in a posi- 
 tion of in- 
 dependence, 
 and are dis- 
 qualified from 
 heing regis- 
 tered as voters 
 by reason of 
 2 & 3 "Will, i, 
 0. 45, 6. 36. 
 
 A T a Court held for the revision of the list of freemen 
 entitled to vote in the election of a member to 
 serve in Parliament for the city of Gloucester, the name 
 of the appellant, Menry i)«a;, appeared in the said list.' 
 The place of abode of the voter was stated to be St. Bar- 
 tholomew's Hospital. 
 
 Notice of objection to this name had been duly given 
 by the respondent, George James Kent, on the ground 
 that Henry Bix had received disqualifying alms during 
 the twelve months ending July 15th, 1890. 
 
 It was proved that Henry Bix had been for thirteen 
 years an almsperson of St. Bartholomew's Hospital, in 
 the said city, and had during the whole of that time 
 occupied gratuitously and resided in a room in the 
 hospital assigned to him by the trustees, and had 
 received from them a weekly allowance of ten shillings 
 and half a ton of coals every Christmas. He had also 
 occupied a separate plot of garden ground behind the 
 hospital assigned to him by the trustees. Henry Bix 
 had no means of subsistence other than the allowance 
 from the hospital. 
 
 The scheme, under the provisions of which Henry Bix 
 had been elected as an almsperson and had enjoyed 
 the benefits of the hospital, contained the following 
 clauses. 
 
 " 5. The clear yearly income of the cha,rity which shall 
 
LIV VICTORIA. 18? 
 
 remain after the payment thereout of all necessary and 1890. 
 proper outgoings and expenses of management, shall be Dix 
 expended and applied by the trustees, in accordance Kent. 
 with the provisions of this scheme, in the maintenance 
 and support of the almshouses and the payment of the 
 respective aUowanoes and stipends of the almspeople, 
 pensioners, and other persons hereinafter mentioned. 
 
 " 6. The almshouse or hospital buildings belonging to 
 the charity shall be repaired and kept insured against 
 fire by the trustees, out of the income of the charity ; 
 and the same shall be appropriated and used for the 
 occupation of almspeople, to be appointed from time to 
 time by the trustees as hereinafter mentioned, in such 
 manner, and subject to such reasonable regulations, as 
 the trustees may from time to time prescribe, con- 
 sistently with the provisions of this scheme. 
 
 " 8. The said almspeople respectively shall be selected- 
 from poor deserving men or women (as the case may 
 be) of good character, either widowers or widows, or 
 unmarried, who shall not be less than sixty years of 
 age at the time of appointment, and shall have resided 
 within the municipal boundary for the time being of 
 the city of Oloucester for the immediately preceding 
 period of five years, and shall not during the period of 
 three years next preceding their appointment have been 
 in the receipt of parochial relief. Married men, having 
 the qualifications aforesaid, whose wives shall be not 
 less than sixty years of age, shall also be eligible for 
 appointment, and poor and deserving widows, whose' 
 husbands had up to the time of their respective deaths 
 been almsmen of any one of the hospitals of St. Bar- 
 tholomew, the united hospital of 8t. Margaret and St. 
 Mary Magdalen, or the Kimrose hospital, all in or near 
 the city of Oloucester, shall also be eligible for appoint- 
 
 02 
 
188- MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1890. ment, provided that they shall have resided with their 
 Dix respective hushands during the time that they were 
 Kent. such almsmen. A preference shall always be given to 
 candidates having the qualifications aforesaid who shall 
 have become reduced by accident or misfortune from 
 better circumstances, or who shall have become incapa- 
 citated by illness or otherwise from maintainiug them- 
 selves by their own exertions ; and in any special cases 
 of the latter class the trustees shall be at liberty to elect 
 a candidate exceptionally imder the age of sixty years, 
 provided that ia the resolution for any such appointment 
 the special grounds on which it shall be made shall be 
 stated. 
 
 " 9. The said almspeople and pensioners respectively 
 shall be elected and appointed from time to time by the 
 trustees, at a meeting of their body, which every trustee 
 shall have been summoned to attend by a notice in 
 writiug, delivered or sent to him through the post, by 
 the clerk, at least seven clear days previously, in which 
 notice the particulars and number of the vacancies to be 
 filled up shall be specified. The trustees before making 
 any appointment shall take into due consideration the 
 relative circumstances and claims of the several candi- 
 dates, with a view to the selection of the person or 
 persons who, in the result of such consideration, shall 
 appear to be the most eligible for the appointment. 
 
 " 10. The trustees shall cause to be paid out of ihe 
 annual income of the charity an allowance at the rate 
 of not less than seven shiUings or more than ten 
 shillings per week to each almsperson, and of not less 
 than eight shillings or more than twelve shilliugs per 
 week to each pensioner to be appointed as aforesaid, as 
 they the said trustees shall from time to time determine 
 and direct, having regard to the amount of the income 
 
LIV VICl'OEIA. 189 
 
 and resources of the charity, provided, nevertheless, and 1890. 
 it is hereby declared, that if and so often as the clear Des 
 yearly income of the charity shall, from any cause, be Kbht, 
 insufficient for the payment of the aforesaid minimum 
 allowances to the said ahnspersons and pensioners (if 
 any), it shall be lawful for the trustees to suspend the 
 filling up of any vacancy or vacancies which may occur 
 amongst the almspeople or pensioners respectively, so 
 long as they may think necessary or proper, and to 
 apply the amount of income so becoming available in or 
 towards making good the deficiency. 
 
 " 11. The trustees shall be at liberty to provide each 
 almsperson, in addition to his or her pecuniary allow- 
 ance, with a reasonable amount of washing, and alsp 
 with a gift of coals or other necessaries annually, at 
 Christmas, to the value of not more than twenty shillings, 
 and also to allow to each almsperson the use and occupa- 
 tion of a separate plot of garden ground behind the 
 hospital, so long as it shall be properly, cultivated and 
 kept in neat order at his or her own expense. 
 
 " 12. The trustees may, as the present number of the 
 almspeople of the hospital shall become diminished, 
 assign the rooms so becoming vacant to such of the 
 almspeople as may appear to them to stand in greatest 
 need of such additional accommodation ; and they may 
 make such immediate alterations and arrangements as 
 they may consider to be now necessary or desirable for 
 improving the sanitary condition of the hospital and 
 securing the comfort and well-being of the almspeople ; 
 provided that no expenditure exceeding the sum of 300^. 
 shall be made by them for that purpose out of the 
 funds of the charity, except with the sanction and 
 approval of the Charity Commissioners. 
 
 " 13. Applications for appointment, either as an alms-' 
 
190 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1890. person or pensioner, tinder this scheme, shall be made 
 
 Drs to the trustees or to their clerk, either personally or in 
 
 Kent. Writing, as may he prescribed by, the trustees, and every 
 
 appUeant must be prepared with sufficient testimonials 
 
 and other evidence of his or her qualification for the 
 
 appointment. 
 
 "18. No almsperson shaU be absent from the alms- 
 house for a period exceeding twenty-four hours without 
 the consent in writing of the trustees, or some two or 
 more of them, but in special oases such consent may for 
 any sufficient reason be given retrospectively after the 
 absence has occurred. 
 
 " 19. If any almsperson or any pensioner appointed 
 under this scheme shall be guilty of insobriety, insubordi- 
 nation, breach of rules, or immoral or unbecoming con- 
 duct, or shall become disqualified from retaining his or 
 her appointment, or if in any case it should appear that 
 any such almsperson or pensioner has been appointed 
 without having the required qualifications, the trustees, 
 upon proof thereof to their satisfaction, may remove 
 such almsperson or pensioner, and in the case of an 
 almsperson take possession of the tenement or room 
 occupied by him or her, and may proceed to appoint 
 another almsperson or pensioner in his or her place, or 
 in any such case (except that of disqualification) the 
 trustees may, if they so think fit, suspend the payment 
 of the stipend to the almsperson or pensioner, either 
 wholly or in part, during such time as they shall think 
 fit and expedient. 
 
 " 20. No almsperson shaU be permitted to let or part 
 with the possession of the room or rooms allotted to hiTin 
 or her, or to suffer any stranger, other than the wife of 
 any married almsman, to occupy the same or any part 
 thereof. 
 
LIV VICTORIA. 191 
 
 " 22. The trustees shall be at liberty to appoint from 1890. 
 time to time a master and a matron of the hospital, Dix 
 who shall respectively be removable by them at their ejsnt. 
 pleasure. The master and matron respectively shall be 
 deserving persons of good character, either a widower 
 or widow or unmarried in decayed ciroumstances who 
 shall have become reduced by misfortune from a superior 
 condition of life. They shall respectively receive out 
 of the annual income of the charity such a stipend or 
 payment, not exceeding for the master twenty shillings 
 per week, and for the matron fifteen shillings per week, 
 as the trustees shall from time to time determine. The 
 master and matron respectively shall reside in the 
 hospital, in rooms to be provided for and assigned to 
 them by the trustees, rent free, and shall not absent 
 themselves from residence except with the permission 
 of the trustees. Subject to the authority and directions 
 of the trustees, the master shall have the immediate 
 superintendence and control of the almsmen, and the 
 matron of the almswomen, and they respectively shall 
 report to the trustees any case of misconduct or breach 
 of rule on the part of any almsperson, and shall dis- 
 charge such other duties with relation to the hospital 
 and its establishment as may be prescribed from time to 
 time by the trustees. 
 
 "24. The trustees may from time to time prescribe 
 such reasonable regulations as they may consider 
 expedient for the government of the almspeople and 
 the pensioners appointed under this scheme, and the 
 general conduct of the charity and the officers thereof, 
 provided that no such regulation be at variance or 
 inconsistent with any of the provisions of this scheme. 
 
 " 25. The ultimate residue or surplus of the income 
 (if any) which shall not be expended or applied for the 
 
192 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1890. objects aforesaid shall be invested from time to time by 
 Dix the trustees, in the name of the Official Trustees of 
 
 V. 
 
 Keht. Charitable Funds, in the Government funds, until a 
 farther scheme shall be established by the order of the 
 said commissioners, or other competent tribunal, pro- 
 viding for the mode of disposing of or administering 
 the same in furtherance of the substantial objects of the 
 foundation." 
 
 The Revising Barrister held that imder the above 
 circumstances the objection was sustained, and expiinged 
 the name of the voter. 
 
 Henry Bix appealed, and his appeal was consolidated 
 with the appeals of three other persons whose names 
 were expunged for similar reasons. 
 
 The question for the opinion of the Court was 
 whether the Revising Barrister was wrong in deciding 
 that the appellant had received alms such as to dis- 
 qualify him from being registered as a voter. 
 
 Ashton Cross, for the appellant. The position of the 
 appellant is not one of such indigence and abject de- 
 pendence as that he ought to be disqualified from being 
 on the register. The case is governed by Smith v. 
 Hall (a). The qualification for election is stated in the 
 8th clause of the scheme. It is not a condition of 
 election that the applicant should be incapacitated from 
 maintaining himself by his own exertions. It is true 
 tha;t a preference is to be given to such persons — but it 
 is not a condition. In Edwards v. Lloyd (b), the benefits 
 of the charity were limited to such persons — and that 
 is said by Lord Coleridge to be " the key of the case." 
 
 (ffl) Mopw. # Fhil. 11 ; 15 0. S. (iV. S.) 485. (4) Ante, p. 54. 
 
LIV VICTOKIA. 193 
 
 Bo, also, ia Baker Y. Town ClerkqfMonmouth{a). There 1890. 
 are regulations m tlie rules of this hospital for the Dix 
 maintenance of good order, but nothing to induce suh- Kent. 
 servience or lack of independence. Smith v. Hall{b) 
 shows that persons may be " poor and deserving " and 
 still entitled to vote. In the other cases, the alms- 
 persons were estopped from denying that they were 
 unable to maintain themselves by the condition of their 
 election. That is not so here, 
 
 Stroud, for the respondent. All the elements of dis- 
 qualification mentioned in Harrison v. Carter (c) exist 
 here — poverty, the receipt of alms, and the absence of 
 that independence which is essential to the qualification 
 of a voter. The candidates for the charity must be 
 " poor," by clause 8 ; and, when elected, they receive a 
 dole of seven to ten shillings a week. This may vary 
 from time to time, and for other benefits coming under 
 clauses 11 and 12 the ahnspersons depend altogether 
 on the favour of the trustees. The rooms and the 
 garden plots may differ much in size and convenience, 
 and may be altered and allotted as the trustees think 
 fit. Such conditions must tend to subservience and 
 lack of independence. The smaller details of the 
 scheme as to absence without leave (clause 18), as to 
 allowing strangers (clause 20), and as to the general 
 control exercised by the master of the hospital and the 
 trustees (clauses 22 and 24), aU poiat in the same 
 direction. Moreover, the almspeople may be removed 
 altogether if certain charges shall be proved " to the 
 satisfaction of the trustees" (clause 19). From every 
 
 {a) 53 L. T. 668. (c) 2 Sopw. % Colt. 324 ; X. M. 
 
 (i) Sopw. % Phil 11 ; 15 C. B. 2 C. P. B. 26. 
 {N. 8.) 485. 
 
194 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1890. point of view the appellant is disqualified — (1) by the 
 iJix poverty he had to profess ia order to be elected ; (2) by 
 
 Kent. the precarious and uncertain tenure on v^hich he holds 
 -the varying benefits of the charity ; (3) by the nature 
 of the supervision to which he from day to day submits. 
 
 Ashton Cross, ia reply. The appellant, until he gives 
 cause for expidsion, is sure of seven shillings a week at 
 least. That in itself removes him from abject poverty. 
 
 GrEANTHAM, J'. TMs appeal must be dismissed. I 
 feel constrained to agree with the decision of the 
 Revising Barrister. I think the Court should lean in 
 favour of the franchise, and against a disqualifieation if 
 possible, and I have been trying to find reasons for per- 
 mitting these persons to remain on the register. But 
 there are clauses in the regulations of the charity which 
 leave the inmates of the hospital in considerable 
 dependence on the goodwill of the trustees. The cases 
 of Edwards v. Lloyd {a), and Baker v. The Town Clerk of 
 Monmouth (h), have rather gone on a principle of exclu- 
 siveness, and the claimants in those cases were dis- 
 franchised on the ground that, in order to be eligible 
 for election, they had to profess to be unable to maintain 
 themselves by their own exertions. I cannot help 
 thinking that after their election such candidates might 
 be really in a position of independence, and that it 
 seems hard to disfranchise them on the ground of their 
 past poverty. However that may be, those cases differ 
 from the present, because there the lack of ability was 
 a necessary qualification for election. In the present 
 case such candidates have a preference, but the condition 
 is not necessary as a qualification. Therefore I do not 
 
 (a) Ante, p. 54. (i) 53 L. T. 668. 
 
LIV VICTORIA. 195 
 
 think the clauses in this scheme which relate to the 1890. 
 
 qualification of poverty would he sufficient to compel us Dix 
 to hold that the inmates are for that reason disentitled Kent. 
 to the franchise. But when I pass on to clauses 10 
 and 11, 1 cannot ignore the weight of the authorities 
 which have heen cited. I cannot say that these alms- 
 people are in a position of ahsolute independence. The 
 provisions of the scheme make the goodwill of the 
 trustees a matter of great importance to the individuals. 
 Under this particular scheme I feel hound to hold the 
 appellant excluded from the franchise. In cases not 
 very dissimilar we might find it possihle to come to a 
 different conclusion. 
 
 Vaughan Williams and Lawrance, J J., concurred. 
 
 Appeal dismissed. 
 
 Solicitors — ^For the Appellant, C. T. Courtney Lewis, 
 for W. B. Smith, Gloucester. 
 
 For the Eespondent, Wyatt Bighy. 
 
196 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 Beown, Appellant ; Tombs, Respondent. 
 
 1890. 
 
 mv. 7, 8. 
 
 A notice of 
 claim may be 
 signed in the 
 claimant's 
 name by a 
 clerk to a 
 person autho- 
 rized by the 
 claimant to 
 make and 
 sign a claim 
 on his behalf, 
 if the clerk in 
 signing the 
 name is acting 
 tmder the 
 express direc- 
 tion of the 
 person so 
 authorized. 
 
 A T a Court held at Leicester for the revision of the 
 lists of parliamentary electors for the Harhorough 
 diyision of the county of Leicester and county electors 
 for the administrative county of Leicester, the appellant, 
 Thomas Brown, claimed to be placed on the occupation 
 list, Division I., for the parish of Newfound Fool. 
 
 The respondent, Frederick Tombs, objected to this 
 claim, on the ground that the notice of claim which had 
 been delivered to the overseers of the said parish bearing 
 the name of Thomas Broivn, and purporting to be signed 
 by him, and on receipt of which the overseers had pub- 
 lished the said name on the list of claimants, had not 
 been signed by the said Thomas Brown, the appellant, 
 and that the claim was therefore invalid. 
 
 It was admitted that the said claim had not been 
 signed by the said Thomas Brown personally, but that 
 his name had been written as a signature to the said 
 claim by one John William Fearce under the following 
 circumstances. 
 
 A document in the form set out below, with the 
 blanks on the left-hand side wholly or partly fiUed in, 
 had, prior to the 20th of August, been signed and dated 
 by the said Thomas Brown, and returned by him to the 
 Charles Goppack therein mentioned. 
 
LIV VICTOKIA. 
 
 197 
 
 FORM. 
 
 1890. 
 
 Parish of 
 
 Name in full 
 
 Street, road, or lane in which the 
 
 qualifying property is situate. 
 Say whether land, tenement, or 
 
 dwelling house. 
 
 If the claimant has occupied 
 more than one house or piece of 
 land during the twelve months 
 ending July 15, give fuU parti- 
 oulais of each place occupied so 
 as to make up a full year. If he 
 has come out of another Parlia- 
 mentary Division he is stiU quali- 
 fied to he registered in Division 3 
 if the same particulars are given. 
 
 [Claimant to sign attached form.] 
 
 HAEBOBOtraH DlYISION". 
 
 Revision of Lists of Voters. 
 
 I hereby give authority to 
 Charles Ooppack, of Bishop 
 Street, Leicester, to make and 
 sign on my behalf a, claim to 
 vote in the Harborough Parlia- 
 mentary Division of Leicester- 
 shire, or in the administrative 
 County of Leicester, or both, as 
 I may seem to him to be qualified, 
 and to appear on my behalf in 
 support of the said claim. 
 
 Bbown 
 v. 
 
 TOMSS. 
 
 Signed 
 
 Date 
 
 After receiTing this document the formal notice of 
 claim, which was afterwards delivered to the overseers 
 as above stated, was filled up by or by the authority of 
 the said Charles Coffpach ; and by direction of the said 
 Charles Coppack the said John William Pearce (who 
 was a clerk occasionally employed in Coppack^ s office) 
 signed the name of the appellant, Thomas Broim, to the 
 said notice of claim. 
 
 It was contended, on behalf of the respondent, that 
 Charles Coppack had no power to delegate to a third 
 person his authority to sign the said claim on behalf of 
 the appellant, Thomas Brown, and that the Eevising 
 Barrister had jurisdiction to inquire into the authen- 
 ticity of the claim after it had been duly published 
 by the overseers. 
 
 The Eevising Barrister held that the signature to the 
 notice of claim was invalid, and expunged the name of 
 the said Thomas Brown from the list of claims. 
 
 Claims made by eighteen other persons wore dis- 
 
198 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1890. allowed on similar grounds. Due notice of appeal was 
 Bbown given, and the appeals were consolidated. 
 Tombs. If the Court should be of opinion that the claim was 
 
 duly made, or that the EeTising Barrister had no juris- 
 diction to inquire into the authenticity of the said 
 claim, the register was to be amended by inserting 
 therein the name of the appellant, Thomas Brown, and 
 the names of the eighteen other persons above referred to. 
 
 R, 8. Wright, for the appellant. Due notice of 
 this claim has been given by the appellant. The 
 appellant authorized Coppacli to make his claim for him, 
 and this Coppack has done. There was no necessity for 
 the appellant to sign the claim himself, and the signa- 
 ture to the claim being aflSxed by Pearce, under the 
 immediate direction of Coppack, who had authority from 
 the appellant to act for him in the matter, is sufficient. 
 
 [He also argued that the Revising Barrister ought not 
 to have entertained any question as to the signature of 
 the claim, but the Court delivered no judgment on this 
 point.] 
 
 J. V. Austin, for the respondent. Under section 38 
 of 6 Vict. cap. 18, it was necessary for the appellant to 
 prove "to the satisfaction of the Revising Barrister" 
 that he had given due notice of his claim. : In re Sale [a) . 
 The second schedule to the Registration Order of 1889 
 provides a form for such notice, and according to that _ 
 form the notice.has to be authenticated by the claimant's 
 signature. The Revising Barrister was right in holding 
 that the present claim is not authenticated by a proper 
 signature. It may be admitted that a claim signed by 
 a duly authorized agent of the claimant would be suffi- 
 
 (a) Ooltman, 162 ; 60 L. J. C. P. D. 113. 
 
LIV VICTORIA. 
 
 199 
 
 oient. But here the only person authorized by the 1890. 
 appellant to aot for him was Coppach. The appellant Beottw 
 trusted to Coppach's personal discretion, and gave him Tombs. 
 no authority to delegate that discretion to any one 
 else. 
 
 [Q-RANTHAM, J. Coppaclc did exercise his own dis- 
 cretion in making the claim, and merely employed 
 Pearce'a hand instead of his own to write the applicant's 
 name. Pearce acted under Coppack's express direction 
 in performing that simple manual act.] 
 
 If the claim had been frivolous, the appellant might 
 have escaped the liability to pay costs imposed by 
 section 46 of 6 Vict. cap. 18, by showing that Pearce had 
 no authority from him to sign. 
 
 [Q-RANTHAM, J. The appellant was responsible for 
 any claim made by Coppack on his behalf.] 
 
 I submit that an authority to sign a claim of this 
 kind for a public and important purpose cannot be 
 passed on from agent to agent in this indefinite manner. 
 
 Grantham, J. I entertain no doubt as to what 
 our judgment should be in this case. When once it is 
 admitted that personal signature is not necessary, and 
 that Coppack had authority from Thomas Brown to sign 
 his name to this claim, the fact that Brown's name was 
 written by Coppack's clerk under Coppack's direction 
 cannot invalidate the claim. The decision of the Ee- 
 vising Barrister must be reversed. 
 
 Vaughan Williams and Lawrance, JJ., concurred. 
 
 Appeal allowed. 
 
200 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1890. Austin asked for leave to appeal to the Court of 
 
 BaowH Appeal, on .the ground that it was important to have a 
 ToHBs. decision whether personal signature to the notice of 
 claim was not necessary. 
 
 [Vaughan "Williams, J. You expressly admitted 
 that personal signature was not necessary, and now 
 that our judgment is given you ask leave to appeal 
 from it on a point you did not think worthy of argument 
 before us.J 
 
 Leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal refused. 
 
 Solicitors — For the Appellant, Field, Roscoe 8f Co., 
 for A. S. Burgess, Leicester. 
 
 For the Eespondent, Croicders 8f Vizard, 
 for S. A. Owston, Leicester. 
 
LIV VICTORIA. 201 
 
 Macicay, Appellant ; McGuire, Respondent, 
 
 AT a Court held by the Eeyising Barrister for the city 1890. 
 
 of Torh, for the purpose of revising the parlia- '- — '- — 
 
 ... , To be adju- 
 
 mentary and municipal lists for that city, the name of dioated a 
 
 William Britton appeared in Division I. of the occupiers' not of itself 
 
 list in respect of a dwelling-house in Walmgate. tvAe^^^a, 
 
 Objection was duly made to this name on the ground patioif of"a"' 
 
 that William Britton had not occupied as tenant the ^"^elling- 
 
 •■■ house aa 
 
 house in question throughout the qualifying period tenant where 
 
 \iiXQ "trusuBB in 
 
 down to the 15th July, 1890. bankruptcy 
 
 does not 
 The facts found by the Revising Barrister were as interfere, and 
 
 follows. William Britton was a yearly tenant ; he was of the house 
 adjudicated bankrupt on the 17th October, 1889 ; his treat Aevoter 
 occupation of the house never was disturbed by the toraoSver^ent 
 landlord or anyone else, so that from end to end of the ^F"™ ^™ 
 qualifying period it was continuous. For the residue the qualifying 
 of the period after the adjudication the landlord, on 
 the usual quarter days, accepted the rent from William 
 Britton. No act of any kind in relation to the bank- 
 rupt and his dweUing-house was ever done or signified 
 by anyone oEBcially connected with the bankruptcy. 
 The Eevising Barrister held that under these circum- 
 stances the occupation of the dwelling-house had always 
 been clothed with the legal character of tenancy, and 
 that the objection failed. The question for the opinion 
 of the Court was whether the Eevising Barrister was 
 right in so holding. 
 
202 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1890. Other appeals raising a similar question were eon- 
 
 Maokat solidated, and the appellant and respondent appointed 
 McGuiBB. as the parties to the consolidated appeal. 
 
 Scott Fox, for the appellant. There was a break in 
 the tenancy of the voter, and the objection is valid. 
 By section 20 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, the pro- 
 perty of the appellant at the moment of adjudication 
 was divested from him and vested in a trustee. Under 
 section 168 of the same Act the term " property" would 
 include the tenancy. The appellant therefore ceased to 
 occupy " as tenant" within the meaning of section 3 of 
 the Representation of the People Act, 1867. The 
 trustee became tenant by force of the statute, and the 
 appellant, if not a mere trespasser, contiuued to occupy 
 not as tenant to the landlord, but as a mere licensee of 
 the trustee. The landlord had no right to re-let the 
 premises to the appellant without the assent of the 
 trustee. The trustee has not disclaimed the tenancy, 
 which vested in him quite independently of any act of 
 acceptance on his part. Under the old law the assig- 
 nees of an insolvent did not become assignees of a term 
 of years belonging to the estate without some act of 
 acceptance on their part ; but that is no longer so, and 
 the old cases on that subject do not apply. 
 
 T. Willes Chitty, for the respondent. This is an 
 endeavour to make bankruptcy an incidental disqualifi- 
 cation for the franchise, although Parliament has care- 
 fully abstained from creating any such disqualification 
 directly. The property in the term may have passed 
 to the trustee, but this franchise depends not on pro- 
 perty, but on occupation. The voter never lost his 
 occupation of this dwelling-house. He has paid rent 
 for the whole period, and has occupied as " tenant " 
 within the meaning of the statute. I am not concerned 
 
LIV VICTORIA. 203 
 
 to say who he was tenant to, or what the nature of his 1890. 
 tenancy was. A tenancy at will is suflBoient, and the Maokat 
 voter was not disturbed by anyope. He was recognized MoGuieb. 
 as in lawful possession and occupancy as tenant when 
 the landlord accepted the rent. [He cited Doe d. Hull 
 V-. Wood (a) and Doe d. Palmer v. Andrews (i).J 
 
 Scott Fox, in reply. The trustee, and not the voter, 
 was the landlord's tenant after the adjudication. 
 Admitting that the trustee's interest in the house 
 might be lost by his acquiescence, there is nothing in 
 the case to show that the trustee assented to any new 
 tenancy between the landlord and the voter. Until 
 the acquiescence had lasted some time, it could have no 
 effect on the legal relations of the parties. And during 
 that interval, however short, the voter was not the land- 
 lord's tenant. There is no pretence for saying, and 
 the case does not suggest, that the voter ever became, 
 or agreed to become, the trustee's tenant. There can 
 be no tenancy without an agreement, express or im- 
 plied. [He cited Richardson v. Langridge (c) and Rogers 
 V. Sarcey {d).'\ 
 
 Grantham, J. I am of opinion, though not with- 
 out some doubt, that the decision of the Revising 
 Barrister should be upheld. The voter remained in 
 physical occupancy of these premises during the whole 
 of the qualifying period, and paid rent to the same 
 landlord throughout. It is true that he became a 
 bankrupt, and it is said that thereupon his tenancy 
 of the house vested in the trustee. But his occu- 
 pancy of the house did not vest in the trustee. It 
 
 (a) 14 M. % W. 682. . (<«) X ^ G. 169 \ b C. B. 
 
 (i) 4 Bing. 348. {N. S.) 3. 
 
 (a). 4 Taunt. 128. 
 
 p2 
 
204 MlCHAELMAg SITTINGS. 
 
 '1890. may he assumed either that the trustee did not know 
 Maokat what his rights in the tenancy were, or treated them 
 MoGuiBE. ^ °^ ^° Yalue. The landlord disregarded the trustee, 
 and continued to acknowledge the voter as his tenant 
 by receipt of the rent. As between the landlord and 
 the voter, there was at least a tenancy by estoppel 
 covering the whole period. It is said that there must 
 have been a hiatus during which the voter was a mere 
 licensee of the trustee. Even if there were so, de mini- 
 mis non curat lex. I think we are entitled to assume 
 that the voter at once elected to remain in as tenant 
 to his old landlord, and the trustee did not interfere. 
 The appeal must be dismissed. 
 
 Vaughan "Williams, J. I assent, but with consider- 
 able misgiviag. The statute requires not merely occu- 
 pation, but occupation as owner or tenant. And the 
 occupation must be continuous in point of time and 
 without interruption during the qualifying period. To 
 give judgment in favour of the voter in this case we 
 must satisfy ourselves that there was a continuous 
 tenancy during the whole statutory period. On the 
 17th of October, 1889, the original tenancy vested in 
 the trustee in bankruptcy without any election on his 
 part. After that, was the occupation of the house by 
 William Britton an occupation as tenant, and, if so, as 
 tenant to whom? "We cannot properly decide this 
 appeal without answering both questions. I have per- 
 suaded myself that William Britton was in as tenant, 
 and as tenant to the original landlord. Suppose the 
 case of a tenancy which had been determined by a 
 notice to quit, where the tenant holds over wrongfully. 
 At first such a tenant is a disseisor, if the landlord 
 choose to treat him as such — or a tenant on sufferance, 
 
LIV VICTORIA. 
 
 205 
 1890. 
 
 if the landlord permit him to stay. But if the 
 landlord accept rent, he becomes a tenant at will. In Maokay 
 this case the landlord accepted rent for a period which MoaTHEB. 
 covered the whole time from October 17th onwards. It 
 is said that, although the receipt of the rent may create 
 a tenancy by estoppel as between the parties, that is not 
 effectual to prevent a break in the tenancy because the 
 right of a third party — the trustee — had intervened. I 
 confess that fact seemed to me of considerable import- 
 ance. If anything affirmative of the slightest nature 
 in exercise of his right had been done by the trustee — 
 if the trustee had in any way asserted his right — ^I 
 should conclude that nothing that took place between 
 the landlord and the voter could have got rid of the 
 affirmative fact that the rightful tenancy was in some- 
 body else, creating a hiatus in the voter's tenancy. But 
 in this case the Revising Barrister finds expressly that 
 no act of any kind in relation to the bankrupt and his 
 dwelling-house was ever done or signified by the trus- 
 tee. That statement enables us to deal with the case 
 as analogous to a holding over — wrongful at first, but 
 ultimately taking the character of tenancy by the pay- 
 ment and acceptance of rent. I therefore agree that 
 the appeal should be dismissed. 
 
 Lawrance, J., concurred. 
 
 Appeal dismissed. 
 
 Solicitors — For the Appellant, Miffe, Senley 8f Sweet, 
 for Russell 8f Mdckay, York. 
 
 For the Eespbndent, Sharpe, Parkers 8f 
 Co., for McGiiire, York. 
 
206 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 PlanTj Appellant ; Potts, Respondent. 
 Robinson, Appellant ; Potts, Respondent. 
 
 1890. AT a Oourt held for the revision of the list of persons 
 
 C. A. " entitled to vote at parHamentary elections for the 
 
 ! — '. , AUrincham Division of Cheshire, in respect of the 
 
 BarriaterTas Ownership of property in that division, the appellant, 
 
 amend^the '^''^'* Plant, objected to the name of Friestky Aked 
 
 third column ^[jeing retained on the said list. 
 
 01 the owner- ^ 
 
 ship list so as TJie nature of Priestley Aked's qualification, as stated 
 
 to introduoe a ./ « i 7 
 
 qualification in the third colnmn of the list, was " freehold house." 
 
 of a nature 
 
 difierent from The objection Was grounded on that column, and related 
 
 the qualifica- 
 tion stated in to the nature of his interest in the qualifying property. 
 
 the list. 
 
 "Freehold" It was proved that the house in question was lease- 
 changed into hold, and not freehold, and that Priestley Aked's interest 
 FosTcettY. ' ill the premises was sufficient in law to constitute a 
 {CoUman, i66; qualification of a leasehold nature. It was admitted 
 q'.£I).279) ^^^^ *^® objection must succeed if the list were not 
 foLowed^ ^^ amended, and the Revising Barrister was asked to 
 
 amend the list by altering the word "freehold" into 
 
 "leasehold" in the third colimm. 
 
 It was contended, on behalf of the appellant, John 
 
 Plant, that the Eevising Barrister had no power to 
 
 make that alteration. 
 
 The Revising Barrister held, that under sub-sec. (12) 
 
 of section 28 of the Parliamentary and Municipal 
 
LIV VICTORIA. 
 
 207 
 
 Registration Act, 1878, he had such power, and that 
 this power was not taken away by the operation of the 
 13th sub-seotion. The Revising Barrister aoeordingly 
 made the alteration in the third column, and retained 
 the name- of Priestley Aked in the said list. 
 
 At another Court held for the same division similar 
 objection was made by the appellant, William Rohinson, 
 to the name of William Brooks, and a similar amend- 
 ment imder similar circumstances was allowed. 
 
 Due notice of appeal was given, and two cases were 
 stated raising the question whether the Revising 
 Barrister had exceeded his powers. 
 
 The appeals came on for hearing together. 
 
 Lindsell, for the appellants. The Revising Barrister , 
 had no power to make this amendment. The freehold 
 and leasehold qualifications are entirely distinct one 
 from the other. The freehold qualification dates from 
 8 Sen. 6, cap. 7, while the leasehold . qualification was 
 introduced by the Reform Act of 1832. The value 
 requisite is different, and other conditions are different. 
 Whatever other power of amendment a Revising 
 Barrister has under section 28 of the Parliamentary and 
 Municipal Registration Act, 1878, applied to ownership 
 lists by the Registration Act, 1885, it is clear that he 
 cannot substitute one kind of qualification for another 
 in the third column of the list. This case is really con- 
 cluded by the judgment of the Court of Appeal in 
 Fosketf v. Kaufman (a), and the interpretation there put 
 upon sub-see. (13) of that section, and by the judg- 
 ment of the same Court in Dashwood v. Ayles (b). The 
 whole question discussed in Bashwood v. Ayles (6) would 
 
 («) Coltmm, 466; L. B. 16 (J) CoUman, 486; £. ij. 16 
 
 Q. S. D. 279. Q- S. -0. 295. 
 
 1890. 
 
 Plamt 
 
 V. 
 
 Potts. 
 
 bobinson 
 
 v. 
 
 Potts. 
 
?08 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1890, have been immaterial if the Eevising Barrister had 
 
 Pi.iira possessed suoh a power. 
 Potts. 
 
 BoBINSOIt 
 V. 
 
 Potts. 
 
 [Grantham, J. May not the words " except as herein 
 provided," appearing in suh-seo. (13), refer to sub* 
 sec. (12) ?] 
 
 It is decided by the Court of Appeal in the cases I 
 have cited that those words refer to 'section 24. Seci 
 tion 24 gives the voter who wishes to substitute a new 
 q^ualification the privilege of making a declaration to 
 be received by the Eevising Barrister. Section 28, 
 sub-sec. (12), enables the Barrister to give effect to 
 that declaration, and amend the list in accordance 
 with it. Sub-sec. (13) limits the power which the 
 general words of sub-sec. (12) might have otherwise 
 , conferred on him to that particular case. 
 
 [Grantham, J. Why may not the Eevising Bar- 
 rister amend on the personal application of the voter 
 as well as on a declaration ?] 
 
 The privilege is only given where the safeguards of 
 section 24 have been observed. 
 
 F. Marshall, for the respondents. The Judgment in 
 Foshett V. Kaufman {a) only dealt with the effect of 
 sub-sec. (13) upon sub-sec. (1), and Cotton, L.J., ex- 
 pressly refused to determine the question whether the 
 words " except as herein provided " may not apply to 
 sub-sec. (12) as well as to section 24, so as to leave 
 the Eevising Bairister with the general power of 
 
 [a) Coltman, 466 ; L. E. 16 Q. B. D. 279. 
 
LIV VICTORIA. 
 
 209 
 
 amendment 'oofff erred on him by sub-sec. (13), un- 
 fettered by sub-seo. (13) so far as the statement of 
 the nature of the qualification goes, if the premises in 
 respect of which the qualification is claimed remain the 
 same. If a mistake has been made in stating the 
 nature of the interest the voter has in the qualifying 
 premises (which may depend on intricate legal con- 
 sideraitions, as to the effect of which mistake is easy) , 
 the Eevising Barrister has power, by sub-sec. (12), to 
 put the matter right and amend the statement of the 
 qualification. If it is a mistake of fact, the Eevising 
 Barrister may not have the same power. If this con- 
 struction is not correct, sub-seo. (12) can have no 
 operation at all in the revision of ownership lists, 
 although, with the rest of section 28, it is applied to 
 that revision by the Eegistration Act, 1885, section 1, 
 sub-seo. (2). Eor since section 24 is not one of the 
 sections of the Act of 1878 applied to ownership regis- 
 tration by the Act of 1885, there is no power to make 
 a declaration under that section, and the words " except 
 as herein provided " in sub-sec. (13), have nothing to 
 which they can refer, except to sub-sec. (12). The 
 effect of sub-see. (12) was not brought under the con- 
 sideration of the judges in Foskett v. Kaufman {a), 
 or Dashwood v. Ayles (b). [He also cited Li/nch v. 
 Wheatky (c), and Ford v. Soar (d).] 
 
 1890. 
 
 Flanx 
 
 V. 
 
 Potts. 
 
 bobinsok 
 
 v. 
 
 Potts. 
 
 lAndsell, in reply. The franchises are distinct, though 
 the premises may be the same ; Nicholk v. Buhcer (e). 
 
 {a) CoUman, 466; i. S. 16 
 Q. B. J). 279. 
 
 (4) CoUmm, 486; L. B. 16 
 Q. S. J). 295. 
 
 {c) Coltman, 364 {aui mm. Blosse 
 V. Wheatley) ; L. £. 14 Q; B. D, 
 
 504. 
 
 (rf) CoUmm, 351 ; Z. S. 14 
 Q. B. D. 507. 
 
 (e) 1 Eopw. ^ Colt. 472 ; Z. B. 
 6 G. F. 281. 
 
21.0 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1890. The fourtli column jnight he amended, while the third 
 PiiAifT might not ; per Keating, J., in Bendle v. Watson (a). 
 
 T. 
 
 Potts. 
 
 Potts. And this remains law, even since the Act of 1878, 
 V. except in cases where there has been a declaration 
 
 under section 24. Foskett v. Kaufman (b) at any rate 
 decided that the Act of 1878 did not give power to the 
 Revising Barrister to make the amendment there at- 
 tempted ; and the Act of 1885, in applying section 28 
 without section 24 of the Act of 1878 to ownership 
 registration, certainly did not, by omitting section 24, 
 extend the power of amendment conferred by sec- 
 tion 28. 
 
 Vaughan "Williams, J. In my opinion the Eevis- 
 ing Barrister ought not to have made the amendment 
 he did, and this appeal must be allowed. The nature 
 of the qualification, as stated in the third column of the 
 list under revision, was " freehold house." It turned 
 out that the claimant was not the owner of a freehold 
 house, but that his title was leasehold, and it cannot be 
 disputed that the qualification as it originally stood was 
 not supported. The Revising Barrister was asked to 
 amend the statement of the nature of the qualification 
 from " freehold house" into " leasehold house," and to 
 allow the claim as so altered. I am of opinion that, as 
 the Acts of Parliament now stand, the Revising Bar- 
 rister has no power to make such an alteration. His 
 power to alter the statement of one qualification into 
 the statement of another quaHfieation in the third 
 column is, in my opinion, limited to eases where a de- 
 claration has been made by the claimant or voter under 
 the provisions of the 24th section of the Parliamentary 
 
 (a) \ Sopw. S; Colt. 591, 601; (S) CoUman, 466; Z. iil. 16 
 
 L. B. 7 C. P. 163, 169. Q. B. B. 279. 
 
Pons. 
 
 LIV VICTORIA. 211 
 
 and Municipal Eegistration Act, 1878. There can be 1890- 
 no doubt that, prior to 1878, suoh an amendment as is Plaht 
 pow suggested oould not have been made unless a new Poms. 
 
 ROBINSOIT 
 
 olaim had been duly sent in and published under the _ v. 
 provisions of the Act of 1843. The question here is 
 whether, under the law as it now stands, such an 
 amendment can be made in the absence both of a claim 
 under the Act of 1843, and of a declaration under 
 section 24 of the Act of 1878. In my opinion the 
 answer to that question is in the negative. I cannot 
 readily believe that the legislature intended to enable 
 a voter to have a bad qualification expunged and a new 
 qualification inserted by way of amendment without 
 anything being done in the nature of or equivalent to a 
 new claim. The law had always required a new claim 
 to be made if a new qualification was relied on, and 
 in my opinion the Act of 1878 did not alter the prin- 
 ciple of this rule ; though by section 24 it enables 
 the voter to make a declaration which is to be treated 
 as at the same time a new claim, and evidence 
 in support of suoh claim, as is pointed out by Lord 
 Esher in his judgment in Foskett v. Kaufman (a). I am 
 fortified in this conclusion by the further observations 
 of Lord JSsIwr in Bashwood v. Ayles {b), in which, as I 
 think, he treats the decision in Foskett v. Kaufman as 
 conclusive that if the amendment made amounted to 
 the .statement of a different qualification it exceeded the 
 Eevising Barrister's .powers. I think his words assume 
 that the Eevising Barrister's power to amend the de- 
 scription of the nature of the qualification remains un- 
 altered from what it was under the Act of 1843, except 
 
 (o) CoUman, 466, 477; X. 2J. (A) Ooltmnn, 486, 490; Z. M. 
 
 16 Q. B. D. 279, 288. 16 Q. B. D. 295, 299. 
 
POITS. 
 
 313 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1890. that by section 24 of the Act of 1878 facility is given 
 Pi.ANT to a claimant to make his claim in the new form of a 
 Potts. declaration, and the claimant need not come himself, 
 V. but his declaration is prima facie evidence that he pos- 
 
 sesses the new qualification he wishes to rely on. I 
 think it is really unnecessary to go further than to say 
 that I believe the law on this point as it stood in 1843 
 is tmaltered, except as to the facility which has been 
 added in making and proving a new claim imder the 
 provisions of section 24 of the Act of 1878. 
 
 I do not like to pass by altogether the observations 
 which have been made with regard to sub-sec. (12). 
 My view is that, if we were to read sub-sec. (12) as 
 Mr. Marshall invited us to read it, precisely the same 
 objection and difficulty arises as was discussed in Foskett 
 V. Kaufman (a) with regard to sub-sec. (1). The effect 
 would be to make sub-sec. (13) futile and inoperative. 
 Sub-sec. (12), as well as sub-sec. (1), must be taken to 
 be limited by sub-sec. (13), and I think we are follow- 
 ing the real meaning of Foskett v. Kaufman (a) if we 
 apply the same limitation to the generality of sub- 
 sec. (12) as was there applied to the generality of sub- 
 sec. (1) ; namely, by reference to the provisions of 
 section 24. Here there has been no new claim and no 
 declaration imder section 24, and the Eevising Barrister 
 has exceeded his powers in allowing this amendment. 
 
 Lawkanoe, J. I am entirely of the same opinion, 
 and agree with the Judgment of my learned brother. 
 
 Grantham, J. I regret I have the misfortune to 
 difier from the conclusion of my learned brothers. I 
 think the Eevising Barrister was right in making the 
 
 {a) CoUman, 466 ; L. R. 16 Q. B. D. 279. 
 
LIV VICa'OlllA. 
 
 213 
 
 amendment. Under the Abt of 1843 the amendment 
 applied for here could not have heen made. The third 
 column of the list of voters was regarded as a sacred 
 part of the constitution, although it is to be remarked 
 that in NichoUs v. Bulwer {a) Mr. Justice Willes was 
 inclined to hold, even under that Act, that the third 
 column might be altered by the Revising Barrister,' 
 although the opinion of that very learned judge was 
 overruled by the majority of the Court. Nothing could 
 have been narrower than the interpretation then put 
 upon the law, and if the present case had to be argued • 
 on that law I should have been of the same opinion as 
 my learned brothers. But it was felt that the decisions 
 given under such conditions were bound to be extremely 
 technical, and that persons were frequently put to ex- 
 pense and deprived of the right of voting on narrow 
 and technical objections which would not have been 
 allowed to prevail if Eevising Barristers had possessed 
 a reasonable power of amendment. Under these cir- 
 cumstances the Act of 1878 was passed. If the prin- 
 ciples laid down to-day are right, the provisions of that 
 Act are, in my opinion, greatly hampered, and will not 
 prove to be of so much value as was intended. I think 
 the provisions of section 28 were intended to be of 
 general application, and that the operation of the sub- 
 sections ought not to be practically nullified by confining 
 their operation to the special circumstances dealt with 
 under section 24. Mr. Lindsell has argued that, except 
 where the machinery of section 24 has been employed, 
 the. Eevising Barrister has no power to touch the third 
 column. But we have the cases of Ford v. Hoar (b) and. 
 
 1890. 
 
 V. 
 
 Potts, 
 eobinson 
 
 V. 
 
 Potts. 
 
 (a) I Sopw. ^ Cole. 472 ; Z. H. 
 6 C. P. 281. 
 
 (4) CoUman, 351 ; X. S. U 
 Q. B. D. 507. 
 
214 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1890; 
 
 Plant 
 
 V, 
 
 Potts; 
 bobinsoh 
 
 V. 
 
 Potts. 
 
 Lynch v. Whedtley (a) wHoh involTed tKe alterafion of 
 flie third column, although no declaration had been 
 raade Tinder section 24. I think, therefore, that the old 
 frinciple has gone, and that the third column may be 
 amended in eases where the parties bring themselyes 
 within the operation of the various sub-sections of sec- 
 tion 28. 
 
 Mr. Lindsell argues that we are precluded from 
 coming to this conclusion by the case of Foshett v. 
 Kaufman {b). I think that was a different case. The 
 judges scarcely refer to sub-sec. (12) at all. They do 
 give some indication of an opinion that the words, 
 " except as herein provided," in sub-sec. (13), refer to 
 section 24. My own interpretation would be, that 
 although those words refer to section 24, they may also, 
 and do also, refer to all the previous sub-sections, unless 
 I ana precluded by the decision of the Court of Appeal' 
 from maintaining that interpretation. I do not think 
 I am precluded from holding that the words niay apply 
 to sub-sec. (12). In Foskeit \. Kiati/man{b) the altera- 
 tion suggested was one which, if it had been allowed, 
 would not have been fair to the objector. The appli- 
 cation was to substitute the successive occupation of 
 two dwelling-houses for the occupation of a single 
 dweUing-house. The objector, it may be supposed, 
 had made inquiry, and had found that the claimant 
 was not entitled in respect of the house stated in his 
 claim, and if he were suddenly told at the Eevision 
 Court that the claim intended was for two houses, he 
 would have no opportunity of examining or verifying 
 the truth of the statements as to the second house. 
 
 (a) CoUman, 364 {sttb mm. Slosse 
 T. Whmthy) ; L. S. 14 Q. B. D. 
 fi04. 
 
 [b) CoUman, 466; L. S. 16 
 Q. B. D. 279. 
 
LTV VICTORIA. 
 
 21§ 
 
 But in the present cases there is only one house in- 
 volved. By mistake it has been described as "free- 
 iiold," and it turns out to be " leasehold " of sufficient 
 value to support the vote. The objector has had the 
 opportunity of informing himself about the house, and 
 I do not think he is prejudiced by the amendment' 
 I think it is the kind of mistake which may be altered,- 
 and to which sub-sec. (12) applies. I think the effect 
 of sub-sec. (13) is to prevent an amendment which 
 would alter the description of the qualifying premises 
 in such a way as to become an entirely different pro- 
 perty and qualification, and I appreciate the decision 
 in Foshett v. Kaufman {a) as applicable to such a set of 
 circumstances. I agree that, except under tl^e provi- 
 sions of section 24, the voter is not entitled to bring 
 forward an entirely new claim by way of amendment, 
 but I do not thiuk that this rule prevents the amend- 
 ment which has been made in the present case. In 
 my opinion, therefore, the appeal ought to be dismissed; 
 but, as the majority of the Court are of the contrary 
 opinion, the appeal will be allowed. 
 
 1890'. 
 
 Plant 
 
 V. 
 
 POITS.- 
 
 EoBDtSOH 
 
 V. 
 
 PoiISi- 
 
 Appeal allowed. Leave to appeal to 
 the Court of Appeal granted. 
 
 The respondents appealed. The appeal came on for 
 hearing on December 17th, 1890. 
 
 F. Marshall, for the appealing respondents. 
 
 Lindsell, for the original appellants. 
 
 (a) Coltmm, 466 ; J. S. 16 Q. B. D. 279. 
 
216 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1890. 
 
 Plant 
 
 V. 
 
 Potts, 
 bobinson 
 
 V. 
 
 Potts. 
 
 Lord EsHEE, M.E. The question in the present 
 case is confined to a consideration of the power of a 
 Eevising Barrister to make amendments in the list of 
 ownership voters in parliamentary counties, and arises 
 as follows. By the Eegistration Act, 1885, section 1, 
 suh-sec. (2) (48 Vict. cap. 15), section 28 of the Parlia- 
 mentary and Municipal Eegistration Act, 1878 (41 & 
 42 Vict., cap. 26), is applied to the registration of 
 ownership voters in parliamentary counties. We have 
 to determine what is the true construction of that 
 section, and especially of sub-sees. (12) and (13), with 
 regard to the powers of a Eevising Barrister in revising 
 the ownership lists. 
 
 The difficulty has heen mainly caused by the modern 
 method of drafting Acts of Parliament by bringing 
 sections or provisions of former Acts by reference into 
 a later Act. It is quite clear that section 28 of th6 
 Act of 1878 has been brought into the Act of 1885, 
 and we must construe the latter Act as though that 
 section, as modified thereby, was written into that Act. 
 The construction to be placed upon that section as it 
 stood in the Act of 1878 was determined in Foskett v. 
 Kaufman {a), and in that case, as I understand the 
 decision, it was held that if sub-sec. (1) had stood 
 alone without any limitation of the powers thereby con- 
 ferred that sub-section would have given the Eevising 
 Barrister power to make the amendment in question ; 
 but it was further held that sub-sees. (1) and (13) were 
 to be read together, and that sub-sec. (13) was a proviso 
 by way of exception upon the earlier sub-sections, and 
 that, therefore, the words of the proviso in effect pre- 
 vented the Eevising Barrister from having a power 
 
 («) Cullman, 466 ; Z. M. 16 Q. B. D. 279. 
 
POITS. 
 
 tlV VICTOKIA. 217 
 
 ■which would otherwise have been conferred upon him 1890. 
 by sub-sec. (1). I think sub-sec. (13) has a similar Plani 
 effect upon sub-sec. (12). For though by sub-sec. (12) Pons. 
 the Eevising Barrister can amend an insuflBoient des- _ v. 
 oription of the qualification stated in the third column, 
 yet if the qualification as there stated does describe 
 clearly and accurately a qualification known to the law, 
 the effect of the proviso is that the Eevising Barrister 
 would have no power to alter that clear and accurate 
 description into a description of another qualification ; 
 that is to say, the Barrister may amend an insufficient 
 description of a qualification, but he cannot alter an 
 inaccurate description of one qualification into a descrip- 
 tion of another qualification. That I take to be the 
 true result of the decision in that case. The Court did 
 
 y 
 
 proceed to point out, although it was not strictly neces- 
 sary for their decision, that the words " except as herein 
 provided " occurring in sub-sec. (13), might, as they 
 stood in the Act of 1878, apply to section 24 of that 
 Act. So that according to that decision, even in 
 boroughs where the lists were being revised under the 
 Act of 1878, the Revising Barrister had not power to 
 alter a sufficient description of one qualification into a 
 description of another qualification, and a voter who 
 found that the description of his qualification appearing 
 in the third column was a description of a qualification 
 which he did not really possess, might make a statutory 
 declaration under section 24 so as to enable the Barrister 
 to alter the list by inserting the true qualification, 
 though the Eevising Barrister would have had no 
 power to do so by his ordinary powers of amendment 
 in the absence of such a statutory declaration. The 
 power which Eevising Barristers possess to amend the 
 description of a qualification stated in the third column 
 VOL. I. a 
 
Potts. 
 
 218 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1890. is still a limited power, though larger than it was 
 Plant before the Act of 1878. Before that Act the Barrister 
 
 V, 
 
 Poira. could not have altered one qualification into another at 
 
 KOBINSON , -J J 
 
 T, all. Now he can do so in occupation hsts, provided a 
 
 declaration has been made under section 24 of that 
 Act. If this case had arisen under the Act of 1878 
 itself,, the Eevising Barrister would not have had power 
 to make the amendment. 
 
 We must now consider the result of reading these 
 two suh-sections as though they were written into the 
 Act of 1885. They are brought into that Act by sec- 
 tion 1, sub-sec. (2), of the Act, which provides that sec- 
 tions 9, 27, 28, and 29 of the Act of 1878 shall apply to 
 the registration of ownership voters in parliamentary 
 counties in like manner as to the registration of occupa- 
 tion voters. Section 24 is not one of the sections speci- 
 fied, and is not, therefore, to be read into the Act of 
 1885. "We have then to interpret sub-sees. (12) and 
 (13) of section 28 as read into the Act of 1885, without 
 reference to section 24. Sub-sec. (12) will be read in 
 the same manner as in the former Act, and as giving a 
 certain power of amendment. Then sub-sec. (13) 
 begins with the words "except as herein provided," 
 which, when written into the Act of 1885, must mean 
 " except as provided in the Act of 1885 ; " and as sec- 
 tion 24 is not brought into that Act, those words, so far 
 as regards the registration of ownership voters, cannot 
 have reference to section 24. I cannot accept the con- 
 tention that, because the words " except as herein pro- 
 vided," when they stood in the Act of 1878, meant 
 " except as provided in the Act of 1878," therefore the 
 same words, when read into the Act of 1885, mean 
 " except as provided in the Act of 1878," and that so 
 section, 24 of the Act of 1878 is indirectly brought into 
 
UV VICTORIA. 
 
 219 
 
 the Aot of 1885. Section 24 of the Act of 1878 is 
 omitted from the section which expressly and in terms 
 brings section 28 into the Act of 1885, and I do not 
 think it can be brought in in the indirect manner 
 suggested in argument. What effect, then, is to be 
 given to the words " except as herein provided " when 
 brought into the Aot of 1885 ? If they apply only to 
 sub-sec. (12), they do not enlarge the Eevising Barrister's 
 power of amendment, and if they have no application at 
 all they must be rejected. I think it is possible that 
 the words may be applicable to the revision of owner- 
 ship lists in the following way. I think that under the 
 Act of 1843, which is one of the Registration Acts 
 within the meaning of the Act of 1885, and which has, 
 so far as may be, to be read along with that Act, an 
 ownership voter who is abeady upon the register, or 
 who has sent in a claim to the overseers, and who dis- 
 covers that there is a mistake in the description of his 
 qualification as it appears in the register or in his first 
 claim, may, if he discovers the mistake in time, send in 
 a new claim stating his right qualification. In that 
 event the Eevising Barrister wiU have both claims 
 before him, and will allow the one which is right. But 
 whatever the meaning of those words may be, or whether 
 they have any meaning at all as imported iuto the Act 
 of 1885, it is not essential for us in the present case to 
 decide. The construction of sub-sees. (12) and (13), 
 when read together, was decided by the reasoning of 
 the judgments in the Court of Appeal in Foskett v. 
 Kaufman (a). That case really determines the present 
 case, and I hold that the Eevising Barrister had no 
 power to make the amendment which he made. The 
 
 1890. 
 
 Plant 
 
 V. 
 
 Potts. 
 
 eobinbon 
 
 V. 
 
 Potts. 
 
 (a) Coltman, 466 ; L. R. 16 Q. B. D. 279. 
 «2 
 
220 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1890. result of our decision is that, in the case of occupation 
 
 -PLAOT ' lists, a Revising Barrister has no power to change the 
 
 Po™. description of the qualification stated in the third 
 
 Robinson (jQ]^yjj^jj [^^q t];ie description of another qualification, in 
 
 ^°™- the ahsence of a declaration under section 24 ; and with 
 
 regard to ownership lists, the Eevising Barrister cannot 
 
 alter the nature of the qualification stated in the third 
 
 column &t all. Though he may allow a fresh claim by 
 
 the voter if made' in due time, the Barrister cannot, in 
 
 professed exercise of a power of amendment, insert the 
 
 statement of a new qualification in the third column. I 
 
 am of opinion that the decision of the Divisional Court 
 
 was right, and must be afiSrmed. 
 
 LoPES, L.J. We have to decide an important 
 question as to the power of amendment possessed by a 
 Eevising Barrister under section 28 of 41 & 42 Vict. 
 cap. 26, when revising the ownership lists. For the 
 purpose of such revision that section is incorporated in 
 the Act of 1885, and we have to determine the true 
 construction of sub-sees. (12) and (13) as so incor- 
 porated. I think the result of the two sub-sections is to 
 give the Eevising Barrister power to correct an insuffi- 
 cient or inaccurate statement of a qualification in the 
 third column, provided such correction does not involve 
 a change or alteration in the nature of the qualification 
 as it appears in the list, and I think that conclusion is 
 in accordance with the decision of this Court in Foskett 
 V. Kaufman (a). If a voter finds that he has mis- 
 described his qualification in the third column he must 
 make a new claim, for the Act of 1885 does not incor- 
 porate section 24 of the Act of 1878, so as to apply it 
 to the registration of ownership voters, and the Eevising 
 
 {a) Coltman, 466 ; L. S. 16 Q. B. D. 279. 
 
LIV VICTORIA. 
 
 221 
 
 Barrister cannot, therefore, receive a declaration made 
 under that section, which seems still to apply to occupa- 
 tion voters only. The amendment made hy the Revising 
 Barrister in this case is such as to alter entirely the 
 qualification stated in the third column. In my opinion 
 he had no power to do so, and the decision of the 
 Divisional Court was right. 
 
 1890. 
 
 Plant 
 
 V. 
 
 Potts, 
 eobinson 
 
 V. 
 
 Potts. 
 
 Kay, L.J. In this case the Revising Barrister has 
 altered the words "freehold house," appearing in the 
 third column, which is headed "nature of qualification," 
 into the words "leasehold house." The question is 
 whether he had the power to make such an alteration, 
 and the answer depends on the construction of two 
 statutes, 41 & 42 Vici. cap. 26 (the Parliamentary and 
 Municipal Registration Act, 1878), and 48 Vict. cap. 15 
 (the Registration Act, 1885). I think it was decided in 
 Foskett V. Kaufman (a), that, under section 28 of the Act 
 of 1878, reading all the sub-sections together, a Revising 
 Barrister had no power to alter the description of the 
 nature of the qualification by inserting an entirely 
 different qualification in the third column of the list 
 unless a declaration had been made by the voter under 
 the provisions of section 24. In the present case 
 arising under the Act of 1885, since section 24 is not 
 applied by that Act to the registration of ownership 
 voters, the voter did not and could not make a declara- 
 tion under the provisions of that section. It follows 
 that the power of amendment of the Revising Barrister 
 as regards the third column is still more limited than it 
 would have been if the case had arisen in respect of an 
 occupation list under the Act of 1878. I am of opinion 
 
 (a) CoUimn, 466 ; L. R. 16 Q. S. D. 279. 
 
222 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1890. that the Eevising Barrister had no power to make the 
 Plant amendment. 
 
 V. 
 
 Potts. 
 
 Potts. If the olamiant had made a second and proper clami 
 
 EOBIKSON . i-r... -i-.-i. 
 
 m due tmie, the Eevismg Barrister, havmg the two 
 claims hefore him, might have allowed the proper claim 
 and rejected the improper claim. Such a course would 
 have involved no alteration in the third column, and 
 the present question would not have arisen. 
 
 Judgment of the Divisional Court affirmed. 
 
 Solicitors — For the Appellants, Philpot 8[ 8on, for 
 Potts <§r Roberts, Chester. 
 
 For the Eespondents, Rollins, Billing 
 8f Co., for Nicholls, Harris ^ Co., 
 Altrincham. 
 
 [NoTE.^-See also the cases of Wilson v. Buchanan, 20 
 L. R. {Ireland) 213 ; M'Connell v. Graham, 22 L. R. 
 {Ireland) 465.] 
 
LIV VICTORIA. 223 
 
 Habeis, Appellant; Phillips, Respondent. 
 
 A T a Court held for the revision of the ownership list 1890 
 for the Skaford Division of Lincolnshire, the appeL 
 
 Nov. 10. 
 
 lant, William Bilton Harris, objected to the names of oaft.edrai are 
 the following voters:— The Yenerable William Frede- totote"^^^ 
 rick John Kaye, Archdeacon of Lincoln, the Eeverend ^espeot of 
 
 ■' ' ' their snare 
 
 Edward Tucker Leeke, Chancellor of Lincoln, and the incorporate 
 
 revenues 
 
 Reverend Edmund Venables, Precentor of Lincoln, derived from 
 
 . ■ . land beloug- 
 
 Bach of the said voters were described on the list as ing to the 
 
 possessing a freehold qualification in respect of a house 
 and land situate at Wellingore in the said Division. 
 The voters were members of the Dean and Chapter of 
 Lincoln, and were canons residentiary of the Cathedral 
 of Lincoln. The Dean and Chapter were nominally the 
 owners of the house and land in question. By 4 & 5 
 Vict. cap. 39, sec. 25, the revenues derived from the 
 said house and land, and from other properties, are 
 divided into six shares, of which two are to be paid to 
 the dean, and one to each canon. It was objected on 
 the part of the appellant that the said house and land 
 belonged to the Dean and Chapter as a corporation 
 aggregate, and that the canons, as members of that 
 corporation aggregate, weje not entitled to vote in 
 respect of their shares in the property. 
 
 The Revising Barrister held that the voters were 
 respectively corporations sole as well as members of a 
 corporation aggregate; that the Dean and Chapter 
 
 chapter. 
 
224 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1890. were only bare trustees of the house and land, and that 
 HAEKia the three voters in question were cestuis que trusteni in 
 
 V. 
 
 Phillifs. actual receipt of the rents and profits, and that, by 
 virtue of section 74 of 6 Vtct. cap. 18, they were entitled 
 to vote for the said house and land. The objection was 
 accordingly disallowed. It was not disputed that the 
 value of the said house and land was sufficient. The 
 objector appealed, and a case was stated. 
 
 The questions for the opinion of the Court, as stated 
 by the Revising Barrister, were — (1) Whether the 
 voters are respectively corporations sole. (2) Whether 
 they respectively have such an interest in the house' 
 and land as corporations sole as to be entitled to vote. 
 
 Asquith, Q.O. {R. 8. Wright with him), for the ap- 
 pellants. The decision of the Revising Barrister is at 
 variance with a long and unbroken series of authorities. 
 The freehold is in the Dean and Chapter as a corpora- 
 tion aggregate, and the canons enjoy a share in the 
 corporate revenues as members of that corporation 
 aggregate. This does not give theni an equitable 
 estate in every farm in every county in England where 
 the corporate property happens to lie. It was so de- 
 cided in the case of the Vicars of Hereford {a). Sir 
 Edward Sugden, in Ex parte the Lancaster Canal and 
 Navigation Company (b), puts the contrary suggestion as 
 a reductio ad absurdum in argument. The point was 
 finally settled in Acland v. Lewis (c). 
 
 The Court called on , 
 
 J. C. Carter, for the respondent. It is not disputed 
 
 (a) fl"eywi)0(?'s County Elections, (c) K. % G. 334 ; 30 L. J. 
 
 p. 117. ^ [G. P.) 29. 
 
 {*) 1 Deacon i Chitty, 411, 431. 
 
LIV VICTORIA. 225 
 
 that the members of the chapter cannot claim to vote 1890. 
 for the corporate property in their character of memhers Haeeis 
 
 V. 
 
 of a corporation aggregate. But the canons have an Phillips. 
 independent position as separate corporations sole in 
 addition to their position as memhers of the corporation 
 aggregate. The lands in question are vested in the 
 eorporation aggregate, in trust as to one-sixth for each 
 of the canons. In respect of this individual right 
 which each canon has, he is a " cestui que trust in actual 
 possession or in receipt of the rents and profits" of the 
 land, " though he receive the same through the hands 
 of" the corporation as "trustee," within the express 
 words of 6 Vict. cap. 18, sec. 74. The separate rights 
 of canons as corporations sole are recognized in Ford v. 
 Sarrington{a). 
 
 Gkantham, J. In our judgment these votes must 
 he struck out. The interest of the voters in this pro- 
 perty as memhers of a chapter is not a legal qualifica- 
 tion for the franchise. Otherwise every fellow of a 
 college, as well as every member of a chapter, might be 
 entitled to a vot« in every county division ia England 
 in which the college or the chapter possessed corporate 
 property. The learned counselfor the respondent cited 
 the case of Ford -v.Sarrington [a), but, in my opinion, 
 that case is a strong authority against his contention. 
 In that case, members of a chapter were held entitled 
 to vote in respect of the particular houses which they 
 individually owned and occupied not as members of the 
 chapter, but in their separate character as corporations 
 sole. In the present case the claimants had no interest 
 in the property except as members of the corporation 
 aggregate. The appeal must be allowed. 
 
 {«) 1 Sopw. ^ Colt. 331 ; L. S.5 0. P. 282. 
 VOL. I. E 
 
226 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1890. Vaughan Williams, J. I am of the same opinion. 
 
 Haems The claimants have no such interest in the land as to 
 
 •p mT.T.T Pa entitle them to vote. Indeed, I think they have no 
 
 interest at all in the land, but only in the fund which 
 
 arises after the rents have been received. 
 
 Lawkance, J., concurred. 
 
 Appeal allowed. 
 
 Solicitors — For the Appellant, Hextall. 
 
 For the Respondent, Peacock and Goddard. 
 
CASES 
 
 ARGUED AND DETERMINED 
 
 IN THE 
 
 QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION 
 
 OF 
 
 THE HIGH COUET OE JUSTICE, 
 
 UNDER STATS. 6 & 7 VIOT. c. 18, 
 
 41 & 42 VICT. c. 26, 
 
 AND THE ACTS AMENDING THE SAME 
 
 DUBHua 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINaS, 1891, 
 
 IN THE 
 
 FrETY-FIFTH YEAR 0^ QUEEN VICTORIA. 
 
 A' 
 
 Hall, Appellant ; Metcalfe, Respondent. 
 
 T a Court held for the revision of the Hsts of voters 1891. 
 for the borough of the Toioer Samlets, John Sail, ""■ ' 
 
 the appellant, who was duly qualified in that behalf, SpUaifieUs 
 objected to . the names of Charles Allen and Jdbez in separate ' 
 Charles Abbott, and other persons whose names were P.'^stands^Uo 
 
 set out in a schedule to the case afterwards stated by oooupiers at a 
 
 , •' nxed rent of 
 
 the Revising Barrister, being retained on the Occupiers' more than £io 
 
 , per annum, 
 
 List of Voters^for the said borough. subject to 
 
 notice to quit, 
 wMch miglit 
 be verjial. Suob stands were not inclosed, nor numbered, nor distinguisbed by any 
 marks. The occupiers came to the market in the morning and left at night. 
 Held, that the occupation of a stand during the qualifying period entitled the 
 occupier to a vote under 48 Vict. cap. 3, sec. 5. Per Wright, J. Qucsre, whether 
 the words "as owner or tenant" of seotioa 27 of %,& ^WilL i, cap. 45, are to be 
 read into section 5 of 48 Vict. cap. 3. 
 
 TOL. 1. S 
 
228 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1891. 
 
 Hah 
 
 V. 
 
 Metoalpe. 
 
 The names of the said Charks Allen and Jahez Charles 
 Abbott appeared in the said Kst as follows : — 
 
 Name of Elector in full, 
 surname being first. 
 
 Pla^eof 
 Abode. 
 
 Nature of 
 Qualification. 
 
 Description of 
 Property. 
 
 Allen, Charles 
 
 Spitalfields 
 Market. 
 
 Spitalfields 
 Market. 
 
 Stand .... 
 Stand .... 
 
 Spitalfields 
 Market. 
 
 Spitalfields 
 Market. 
 
 Abbott, Jabez Charles .... 
 
 The objections made by the appellant in each case 
 were : — 
 
 (1.) That the person objected to had not occupied as 
 tenant the premises described on the said list for 
 twelve months to July 15, 1891. 
 (2.) That the said premises were not of the clear 
 
 yearly value of £10. 
 (3.) That the nature of the qualification described in 
 the said list was incorrect and otherwise in- 
 sufficient. 
 (4.) That the person objected to had no "land or 
 tenement " within the meaning of section 5 of 
 the Eepresentation of the People Act, 1884. 
 The foHowiag facts were proved by the evidence : — 
 Spitalfields Market comprises a considerable area of 
 land situate on the west side -of Commercial Street, and 
 is owned by Mr. Morner as lessee from the freeholder, 
 and is used for the sale of vegetables and fruit. The 
 market is bounded on the east side thereof by the back 
 walls of the houses in Commercial Street, and is covered 
 with a glass roof supported by columns to protect it 
 from the weather, and, except on the east side thereof, 
 there are no walls or other erections beyond iron rail- 
 ings separating the market from the adjoining streets 
 
LV VICTORIA. 229 
 
 or property. The site of the market is let by Mr. Horner 1891. 
 
 in separate plots or pieces of land known as, and com- Hail 
 
 monly called, " stands," to numerous persons, and two Heioalfb. 
 
 of these stands, which are respeotiTely of more than 
 
 £10 annual value, were let by him, as to one of them, 
 
 to the said Charles Allen, and as to the other, to the 
 
 said JaJez Charles Abbott, who had, for more than the 
 
 qualLfying period, occupied the same stands. The 
 
 market is rated as one property, and the rates ha,ve 
 
 been duly paid, by Mr. Horner. The practice is to let 
 
 these stands to the occupiers for specified periods 
 
 arranged between them and the owner of the market, 
 
 according to the requirements of the occupiers, and for 
 
 the tenancies to continue until determined by notice to 
 
 quit. There is no fixed time for which such notice 
 
 must be given, but it is usual for Mr. Horner, when he 
 
 desires to remove a tenant, to give a notice, which is 
 
 generally in writing, but may be, and sometimes is, 
 
 given verbally. The stands are not numbered, nor 
 
 have they any distinguishiag marks on them, but the 
 
 precise position in the market of the stand or piece of 
 
 land which each occupier is entitled to, though not 
 
 enclosed by Mr. Horner, is defined and well-known to 
 
 Tn'm and to the occupier of such stand, and to the 
 
 occupiers of aU the other stands in the market, and any 
 
 person desiring to find the stand of a particular occupier 
 
 can readily do so by inquiring of any of the porters at 
 
 the market or of any person acquainted with it. Each 
 
 stand occupier pays a fixed rent for his stand, which is, 
 
 in the case of every person objected to, more than £10 
 
 per annum, and this rent is payable by the occupier, 
 
 whether the stand be actually used by him or not. In 
 
 addition to the fixed rent, each stand occupier has to 
 
 pay toU to the owner in respect of the goods sold by 
 
 b2 
 
230 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1891. him. There is a difference hetween the manner in 
 
 Hail wHch the stands in the market let to the persons 
 
 Y, 
 
 MbtoIlse. occupying the same are used by the occupiers thereof. 
 In a considerable part of the market the stands are 
 boarded over or paved, and stalls are placed thereon by 
 the occupiers for the purpose of exposing their goods for 
 view and sale, and these stalls are, in almost every 
 instance, separated from the adjoining stands by wooden 
 or other movable partitions, and in most cases the 
 name of the occupier is placed by him. on a board 
 within the stall, and the goods often remain in the 
 stalls during the night. The said Charles Allen occu- 
 pied a stall of this description. The remaining part of 
 the market consists of an open space paved with stone, 
 and each occupier of a stand or piece of land on this 
 part of the market occupies and uses the same for the 
 purpose of bringing thereon his carts and waggons, 
 from which, and from the piece of ground occupied by 
 him, his goods are offered for sale. The said Jabez 
 Charles Abbott occupied a stand of this description. If 
 the occupier of any of the last-mentioned stands is late 
 for market, his stand is often used by another person, 
 who pays a toll to the owner, but no rent, but the 
 occupier is entitled, if he afterwards brings his carts to 
 the market, to cause the said person to vacate the stand, 
 and to occupy the same himself. This right is, how- 
 ever, seldom exercised, inasmuch as an occupier, if he 
 comes to market at all, generally arrives before it is 
 open. 
 
 Upon the facts so proved, the Eevising Barrister 
 overruled the objections 1, 2, and 4, and as to the 3rd 
 objection, was of opinion that the nature of the qualifi- 
 cation was described as correctly and sufficiently as was 
 possible under the circumstances of the case. It was 
 
LV VICTORIA. 
 
 231 
 
 argued before him, on behalf of the appellant, that the 1891. 
 
 nature of the alleged qualification was not correctly or Ham, 
 
 otherwise sufficiently described in the third column, and Metoaipb. 
 
 further it was insisted that the persons objected to had 
 
 no " land or tenement " within the meaning of the 
 
 Eepresentation of the People Act, 1864, and further 
 
 that the stands ought to have been numbered or 
 
 otherwise distinguished by marks ; but he held that, 
 
 as this had not, at the time when the Overseers' 
 
 List was made out, been done, it was impossible 
 
 for the overseers to have thus distinguished them, 
 
 and it was not suggested that they could, in preparing 
 
 the list, have distinguished them in the list in any 
 
 other manner. 
 
 The Eevising Barrister disallowed all the objections, 
 and retained on the list the names of the said Charles 
 Allen and Jabe% Charles Abbott, and of the other per- 
 sons to whom similar objections were made, and which 
 were set forth in the first and second parts of the 
 schedule to the case afterwards stated by him. 
 
 The like facts were proved, as to the names in the 
 first part of the said schedule, to those above stated in 
 reference to the said Charles Allen, and as to the names 
 in the second part thereof, to those stated in reference 
 to the said Jabez Charles Abbott. 
 
 Due notice of appeal was given, and the appeals 
 were consolidated. 
 
 If the Court should be of opinion that the Eevising 
 Barrister was wrong in retaining on the list the names 
 of the said Charles Allen and Jabez Charles Abbott, or 
 either of them, the said name or names, and the names 
 of the other persons which were set forth in the first 
 and second parts of the said schedule respectively, were 
 to be erased from the said list. 
 
232 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1891. Asquith, Q.O. {G. J. T. Sechham with Mm), for tlie 
 
 Hat t. appellant. The question is whether the holders of 
 Metoalfe. stands and stalls in a market, tinder the circumstances 
 stated by the Eevising Barrister, are entitled to an 
 occupation vote. By 2 §• 3 WUl. 4, cap. 45, sec. 27, as 
 extended by 48 Vict. cap. 3, sec. 6, and sec. 7, sub- 
 sec. 7, an occupation in a borough as owner or tenant 
 by the year of any rateable land or tenement of the 
 clear yearly value of not less than £10, entitles the . 
 occupier to a vote for such borough. No question 
 arises here of occupation as owner, but it is submitted 
 that these persons are not " tenants," that the thing 
 they occupy is not " any land or tenement," and that 
 their occupation was not continuous during the year of 
 qualification. The stands and stalls upon them, which 
 they occupy, are not inclosed nor numbered, nor 
 limited by metes and bounds, and are therefore in no 
 way marked out or openly defined. The case stated 
 by the Barrister only finds that the position of each 
 stand is defined and well-known to the owner of the , 
 market, and to the occupier and his neighbours, and 
 can be ascertained by any person upon inquiry of the 
 market porters. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. Suppose a field of, say, 
 3,000 acres — I myself know of such — in the occupation 
 of several persons, without hedges or other boundaries, 
 would not the occupiers of the several portions have 
 the franchise in respect of them ?] 
 
 Hedges or inclosure may not be necessary, but there 
 must be some definition or demarcation, as by metes 
 and bounds. Here the position only is known to the 
 owner and the occupiers. 
 
LV VICTOKIA. 
 
 233 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. Why will not that do ? 1891. 
 the absence of houndaries is not alone an ohjeotion.J Hai^ 
 
 In the case of such a field, used prohahly for agri- 
 cultural purposes, there must of necessity he taken to he 
 some continuous occupation of the same part. In the 
 case of these stands and stalls to which the occupiers 
 only come in the morning for the purpose of selling 
 goods, and leave at night, it is different. 
 
 [Collins, J. The stalls are separated.] 
 
 Tes ; but the stands are not. 
 
 Again, the ordinary conditions of the market, as 
 shown by the facts stated, must be considered. The 
 payments made by the occupiers for their stands and 
 stalls are really " stallage," This is not a payment of 
 rent nor does it constitute the relation of landlord and 
 tenant. It is merely a payment for a license to use a 
 place for a stand or stall. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. May not there be a de- 
 mise of the piece of land and stallage payable in respect 
 of the stalls upon it ? Or may not the stallage be 
 considered severable as pickage would be ? The Ee- 
 vising Barrister has found that each occupier pays 
 more than £10 rent.] 
 
 The Eevising Barrister has so found, but the facts are 
 suflBciently stated by him to admit of my interpretation 
 of this payment, and therefore the Court is not bound 
 to accept his finding that it is rent. Stallage is not 
 rent, any more than tolls paid upon the goods are 
 rent. 
 
 V. 
 
 METOAliPE. 
 
234 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1891. ['Weig ht, J. Suppose a Kcense to occupy the ground 
 
 Hall exclusively for twelve months, is not that a tenancy ?] 
 
 T. 
 
 Mbtoalfb. 
 
 No; the incidents are not the same. A licensor 
 
 could not distrain. 
 
 [Wright, J. In the Aldershot Gas Case (a), where 
 an agreement expressly declared that the occupier was 
 a licensee and not tenant of the premises, there was 
 held to be a tenancy for the purpose of rating.] 
 
 No doubt in many cases the line is thin, and it is 
 difficult to distinguish a license from a tenancy at will, 
 but there are certain incidents of a tenancy which a 
 license does not possess. Moreover a license is revocable ; 
 Wood V. Leadbitter [b). These persons are only licen- 
 sees. The case states that they may be turned out by 
 a verbal notice to quit. Whatever right they may 
 have had, it was revocable at any moment. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.O.J. A license may be coupled 
 with an interest.] 
 
 This it is submitted is a bare license. There is 
 another fact in the case. If the occupier of a stand is 
 late, his stand may be used by another person. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. That is subject to the right 
 of the real occupier when he comes to cause him to 
 vacate it.] 
 
 The facts it is submitted only amount to this : that 
 the occupier, if and so long only as he requires to use 
 the stand for himself, has a preferential right. 
 
 (a) R. V. Stevens, 12 L. T. N. S. (b) 13 M. # W. 838. 
 
 491 ; 29 /. P. 597. 
 
LV VICTOB.TA. 
 
 235 
 
 [Wright, J, In the judgment in Wood v. Lead- 1891. 
 bitter (a) it is stated that a license for years gives a Haii, 
 
 V. 
 
 tenancy.] MBioAiiFB. 
 
 [Lord OoLERiBGE, L.O.J. In Roberts v. The Church- 
 wardens of Aylesbury (b) it was held that stallage was 
 rateable within the Statute of Elizabeth (c).J 
 
 The person rated there was the owner of the market 
 in respect of the profit he derived from it, not the 
 occupiers of the stalls. 
 
 [Lord OoLEKiDGE, L.O.J. Wightman, J., there says 
 " Stallage is a kind of rent."] 
 
 Yes ; " kind of rent," i. e., not rent. It is not 
 suggested in that case that the relation of landlord and 
 tenant existed. 
 
 [Collins, J. Would the owner in that case have 
 been liable to be rated if the payment had been for a 
 mere privilege or easement ?] 
 
 Probably he would. 
 
 In Spear v. Bodmin Union (d) the occupation of stalls 
 in a market house, not upon fixed spots, and only on 
 certain days and between certain hours, was held not 
 rateable. 
 
 [Lord OotERiDGE, L.O.J. That is like the case of 
 railway bookstalls, which are fixed in a sense but subject 
 to be moved at any moment.] 
 
 (a) 13 M. J W. 838. (c) 43 Mk. cap. 2. 
 
 (i) 1 m. § Bl. 423 ; 22 L. J. (i) 43 L. T. N. 8. 127 ; 49 L. J. 
 
 M. C 34. , M. C. 69. 
 
?S& MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 ^891. Then it is d fortiori here, where the owner of the market 
 
 Hail may by a verhal notice put the occupier out of his stand 
 MBTOAiEB. or stall, or even shut the whole place up. 
 
 [Weight, J. But the case states a letting of par- 
 ticular plots or places — ^is not that a tenancy P] 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. The moment you have 
 that you have a tenancy, though it may be at wiU.] 
 
 They are not let by the year. 
 
 [Lord CoLEEiDGE, L.C. J. That is not necessary. A 
 tenancy at wiU at the rate of so much a year is sufiB.-^ 
 cient. The Eevising Barrister has found a tenancy 
 and has stated the facts upon which he has so found. 
 If the facts were contrary to his finding we should not 
 adopt it. But is it not sufficient that they may bear 
 his deduction ?] 
 
 I submit he has stated the facts for the purpose of a 
 decision by the Court upon them. 
 
 [Wright, J. Lord St. Leonards is of opinion that 
 an exclusive license is not distinguishable from a 
 tenancy (a). J 
 
 At any rate the stands upon which there are no" 
 stalls cannot, I submit, be in occupation for the pux- ' 
 pose either of rating or of the franchise. The case 
 states that the piece of land or stand is, though not 
 inclosed, defined and well-known. But I submit the 
 occupation of these is precarious and not in the way 
 of a tenancy. 
 
 {a) Sugdm's V. % P., 9th Ed. p. 81 
 
LV VICTORIA. 237 
 
 [Wkight, J. Need we consider the question of 1891. 
 tenancy? (see 48 Viot. cap. 3, sec. 5).] Hail 
 
 V, 
 
 JJIbtoalpb. 
 Tes ; the qualification there given is " subject to the 
 
 like conditions as a man is entitled to he registered and 
 
 vote in respect of the borough occupation franchise," 
 
 which by section 7, sub-sec. (7) of the same Act is 
 
 defined to mean the franchise conferred by 2 & 3 
 
 Will. 4, cap. 45, sec. 27. That section requires the 
 
 occupation to be as " owner or tenant." 
 
 [Weight, J. Those words do not appear in section 6 
 of 48 Vici. cap. 3, and I doubt whether the words 
 " subject to the like conditions " in that section mean 
 more than that the occupation must be in respect of 
 rateable property — for a year — &o.] 
 
 It has not been so understood in the instructions 
 contained in the Registration Order of 1889, made 
 under the powers of the Local Government Act, 1888, 
 which provide, Sohed. 3, sec. 5, that the ten pounds 
 occupation qualification can only be acquired by an 
 occupation as owner or tenant. I submit that it is 
 necessary here to show an occupation as tenant and 
 that has not been done. 
 
 J. Gray, for the respondents, was not called upon. 
 
 Lord CoLBRiDGB, L.O.J. The question in this case 
 has been properly raised by the Revising Barrister. 
 He has stated the facts and the conclusion he has drawn 
 from them. Mr. Asquith says that upon those facts 
 another conclusion ought to have been drawn. I am 
 not prepared to say that another might not have been 
 drawn. But the facts as stated are not inconsistent 
 with that conclusion. 
 
238 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1891. The ultimate owners of the land upon which the 
 
 HAii Spitalfields Market stands are the Corporation of London. 
 Metoaifb. It is demised by them to Mr. Horner. He is, as between 
 himself and the persons who are claiming to vote in re- 
 spect of their occupation of stands and stalls in the market, 
 in the position of owner and lessor. These persons 
 occupy under him fixed areas of the market at a fixed 
 rent. The area is fixed, as the Eevising Barrister says, 
 in this sense, that the exact limits and position of each 
 stand or stall are known to the occupier himself, to his 
 neighbours, and to his landlord or lessor. I ought not 
 perhaps to caU him lessor. That would be to assume 
 the question we have to decide. 
 
 Now everyone must know of cases where large areas 
 of ground are in fact divided for purposes of occupation 
 but not separated by hedges or other visible means of 
 demarcation — but where by metes and bounds or by 
 acreage the limits of the several portions are perfectly 
 well-known to the occupiers and owners. So here the 
 same kind of definition of areas has been found in the 
 case stated by the Eevisiag Barrister. It is not necessary 
 that all the world should know it, nor that everybody 
 passing by should be able to observe it. It is found here 
 that the place is divided up into fixed plots, and that per- 
 sons take and occupy the plots so divided and know them. 
 It is also found that these fixed plots are taken and 
 held at a fixed rent. Rent does not necessarily mean 
 much. I will take it to be at a fixed payment. He 
 has found that these persons have a right to come in 
 and occupy at a fixed payment. At least and lowest, 
 this is a holdiag at the wiU of the landlord. That is a 
 tenancy within section 27 of 2 & 3 WiU. 4, cap. 45, 
 which is retaiaed by 48 Vict. cap. 3, sec. 7, sub-sec. (7), 
 for this express purpose. "We have only to ascertain 
 
LV VICTORIA. 
 
 239 
 
 whether the person claiming the vote is an occupier as ^891. 
 owner or tenant with a rent of not less than £10. In Hail 
 all these eases involved in this appeal that is so found. Mbtoalfb. 
 There is a person to be called the owner who lets. 
 There is a person who occupies. Is he a tenant ? In 
 my opinion yes, at least at will — and so the Revising 
 Barrister has found. The appeal must be dismissed. 
 
 Wright, J. I am of the same opinion for the same 
 reasons. But I wish to guard myself agaiast being held 
 to say the words " as owner or tenant," in section 27 
 of 2 & 3 Will. 4, cap. 45, even if they have there the 
 meaning which has been ascribed to them, are to be 
 read into the Act of 1884, so as to make an occupation 
 as tenant necessary by a person who is not owner. But 
 it is not necessary to decide that. 
 
 Collins, J. I am of the same opinion. 
 
 Appeal dismissed with costs. 
 
 Solicitors — For the Appellant, H. T. Hargraves. 
 
 For the Respondent, Gasquet and Metcalfe. 
 
240 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1891. 
 Nov. 10. 
 
 The attesta- 
 tion of the 
 declaration 
 in a lodger 
 claim by a 
 person wlio 
 was not pre- 
 sent when the 
 claimant 
 signed is not 
 a oompUanoe 
 with the 
 Kegistratioii 
 Order, 1889, 
 Schedule 3, 
 Form H. 
 No. 2, and 
 invalidates 
 the claim. 
 
 Body, Appellant ; Halse, Respondent. 
 Hunt, Appellant; Halse, Respondent. 
 Fenning, Appellant; Halse, Respondent. 
 
 rjlHESE three appeals were heard together. Each of 
 the appeals raised the same question, upon slightly 
 different facts, whether, having regard to the Eegistra- 
 tion Order, 1889, Sched. 3, Form H. No. 2, the attesta- 
 tion of a declaration in a lodger claim by a witness who 
 was not present when the claimant signed, is sufficient. 
 
 Body, Appellant ; Halse, Respondent. 
 
 A T a Court held for the revision of the lists of voters 
 for the borough of St. Fanaras, the name of John 
 Body, the appellant, appeared on the old lodger list for 
 the west division of the said borough. 
 
 Notice of objection to the name of the appellant 
 being retained upon the said list, was duly served upon 
 the overseers and the appellant. 
 
 The ground of objection was stated as follows : — 
 
 " That your lodger claim has not been legally 
 attested." 
 
 The appellant had made and signed a claim bearing 
 date the 16th day of July, 1891. The attestation (in 
 accordance with the form given in the Eegistration 
 Order, 1889) was as follows : — " I, the undersigned, 
 
LV VICTORIA. 
 
 241 
 
 hereby declare that I have witnessed the above signa- ^891. 
 ture of the above-named claimant at the date stated Body 
 
 T. 
 
 above, and that I believe the above claim to be correct." Hat,be. 
 
 The signature of the witness, which was dated the same 
 
 day as the claim, followed. Evidence was given in 
 
 support of the objection, from which it appeared that at 
 
 the time when the appellant signed the claim, the witness 
 
 (a person who well knew the claimant, and was acquainted 
 
 with the facts stated in the claim) was not present, but 
 
 that the appellaint himself subsequently on the s'atne 
 
 day handed the claim to the witness, who then, at the 
 
 request of the appellant, subscribed the attestation. It 
 
 was contended for the appellant that, upon the ifaots as 
 
 proved, the claim was duly attested. The Eevisinig 
 
 Barrister held that in view of (a) the importance 
 
 attached by the Legislature to the declaration in a 
 
 lodger claim (41 & 42 Vict. cap. 26, sees. 23, 25) ; 
 
 (b) the decision {EanUdge v. Beveridge, 26 lu E*. Ir. 
 
 423) that personal signature of such a claim by* the 
 
 claimant is essential to its validity; (o) the form of 
 
 attestation required to be used (and in fact used in the 
 
 present case), whereby it is particularly expressed that 
 
 the witness has witnessed the signature of the claimant 
 
 " at the date stated above," it was a necessary condition 
 
 to the validity of a lodger claim that the witness should 
 
 be present at the time of signature by the claimant, 
 
 and that, this condition not having been fulfilled, the 
 
 appellant's claim was invalid, and accordingly expunged 
 
 from the list the name of the appellant, and the names 
 
 of twenty-nine other persons to whom like objections 
 
 were made. The names of such other persons were set 
 
 out in the schedule annexed to the case afterwards 
 
 stated by the Eevising Barrister for the opinion of the 
 
 Court. 
 
242 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 ^^91. Due notice of appeal was given in all the above 
 
 BoDT cases, and the appeals ordered to be consolidated. 
 
 V 
 
 Haibe 
 
 HtJOT 
 V. 
 
 Halse. 
 
 1891. Hunt, Appellant ; Halse, Respondent. 
 
 AT the same Court a similar objection was made to 
 the name of Charles Sunt (the appellant), and the 
 facts were as follows : — 
 
 The claim bore date 17th July, 1891. The attesta- 
 tion (which was similar to that in Body v. Sake, ante, 
 p. 241) was dated the 18th July, 1891. 
 
 It was proved that at the time when the appellant 
 signed the claim, the witness (a person who well knew 
 the claimant, and was acquainted with the facts stated 
 in the claim) was not present, but that the appellant 
 himself subsequently on the following day handed the 
 claim to the witness, who then, at the request of the 
 appellant, subscribed the attestation. Upon the same 
 contention, and for the same reasons as in the preced- 
 ing case of Body v. Sake, ante, p. 241, the Revising 
 Barrister expunged from the list the names of the 
 appellant, and of two other persons to whom like 
 objections were made, and whose names were set out 
 in the schedule to the case afterwards stated by him, 
 for the purpose of a consolidated appeal. 
 
LV VICTOKIA. 
 
 243 
 
 Fenning, Appellant ; Halse, Respondent. 
 
 A T the same Court a similar objection was made to 
 the name of William Penning, and the facts were 
 as follows : — 
 
 The claim bore date the 22nd day of July, 1891. 
 The attestation (which was similar to that ia Sodi/ v. 
 Sake, ante, p. 241) was dated the same day, the 22nd 
 July, 1891. 
 
 It was proved that at the time when the appellant 
 signed the claim, the witness (a person who well knew 
 the claimant, and was acquainted with the facts stated 
 in the claim) was not present, but that after the claim 
 had been signed by the appellant, his wife on the same 
 day carried the claim to the witness, who, at her 
 request, and without any direct communication with 
 the appellant, subscribed the attestation. Upon the 
 same contention, and for the same reasons as in the 
 two preceding cases, the Revising Barrister expunged 
 from the list the names of the appellant and three 
 other persons to whom like objections were made, and 
 whose names were set out in a schedule to the case 
 afterwards stated by him for the purpose of a consoli- 
 dated appeal. 
 
 1891. 
 
 Ebnninq 
 
 V. 
 
 Haxse. 
 
 The question for the Court in each of the above 
 appeals was, whether on the facts stated in them 
 respectively, the claims of the appellants, or either of 
 them, were invalid for want of due attestation. 
 
 If this question should, in any of the said appeals, 
 be answered in the negative, the register was to be 
 amended by restoring to the list the names of the 
 successful appellants and the other persons respectively 
 included in the consolidated appeals. 
 
 Body 
 
 V. 
 
 Haise. 
 
 HUNI 
 T. 
 
 Haisb. 
 
 FENNINa 
 V. 
 
 Halbe. 
 
244 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1891. 
 
 Body 
 
 V. 
 
 Haise. 
 Httnt 
 
 V. 
 
 Halsb. 
 
 FEKKINa 
 V. 
 
 Hai,se. 
 
 Asquith, Q,.C. (with Mm J. Roskill), for the ap- 
 pellants in all the said appeals. 
 
 The appellants seek to be retained upon what is 
 known as the old lodger list under the provisions of 
 41 8f 42 Vict. cap. 26, sees. 22, 23. 
 
 For this purpose a claim, is an essential part of the 
 qualification. The form in which the claim is to be 
 made is prescribed in the Registration Order, 1889, 
 Sohed. 3, Form H., No. 2. 
 
 The question in these cases is. What is the meaning 
 of the words in the declaration required to be made by 
 the witness in accordance with the said form, " I have 
 witnessed the signature of the above-named at the 
 date stated above " ? It is submitted that they are 
 satisfied by the declaration of a witness who, though 
 not present when the claim was signed, knows the 
 claimant and is well aware of his qualification, and to 
 whom the claim was brought for signature at the time 
 and in the manner stated in the several cases. 
 
 [Lord OoLEEiDGE, L.O.J. In the case of a will, the 
 acknowledgment of his signature by a witness is not 
 enough. He must actually sign in the presence of the 
 other witness.] 
 
 The language of the Wills Act is relied on to show 
 that, under words such as are found in this Act, the 
 presence of a witness is not necessary. It has been 
 held in the case of a will of lands under section 5 of 
 the Statute of Frauds, that the acknowledgment of his 
 signature by the testator before the witness was suffi- 
 cient. Grayson v. Atkinson [a), and the later case of 
 White V. Trustees of the British Museum (b). 
 
 {a) 2 Ves. Sen. 464. 
 
 (i) 6 mn^. 310. 
 
LV VICTORIA. 
 
 245 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.O.J. Under that statute, it 
 was the will, not the signature, that was attested. If a 
 testator said, " That is my will," that is \^hat the wit- 
 nesses attested, viz., what he declared to be his wiU. 
 Somebody else might sign it for him. j 
 
 That argument applies here. The witness attests 
 what the claimant declares to he his signature. 
 
 1891. 
 
 EODT 
 V. 
 
 Halse. 
 Hunt 
 
 T. 
 
 Haxse. 
 Fennino 
 
 V. 
 
 Hai.se. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. That might be so apart 
 from statutory enactment. But in the statutory pro- 
 visions that govern these claims, there is this difference 
 of words, " I have witnessed the signature."] 
 
 Lord Hardwicke in the case cited lays it down as 
 a general rule of evidence that an attestation of the 
 acknowledgment of a signature is sufficient attestation 
 of the signature. Under the present Wills Act, 7 Will. 
 4 (^ 1 Vict. cap. 26, the words are " made or acknow- 
 ledged." 
 
 It is not contended that the words here are the same 
 as in the Statute of Frauds or the Wills Act, but it is 
 submitted that the general rule of evidence laid down 
 by Lord Hardmcke ia the decision under the old Act 
 is applicable here, and that the witnesses in these cases 
 have done all that was required. 
 
 [Collins, J. In Runfs case, the attestation was 
 not made until the day following the date of the sig- 
 nature.] 
 
 That raises a different question, upon the words " at 
 the date stated above," In the other two cases, it was 
 upon the same day. It is to be noticed that there are 
 
 t2 
 
246 MICHAELMAS SITTIKGS. 
 
 1891. two dates to be filled up in tlie form, perhaps one for 
 Body the declaration and one for the certificate. 
 
 V. 
 
 HUKT 
 
 V. [Weight, J. Can a person attest merely upon 
 
 FENKiNa knowledge P] 
 
 Probably not without an acknowledgment. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. Jjori Sardwicke's decision 
 only anticipated the Wills Act.j 
 
 The Wills Act requires the attestation to be in the 
 presence of the testator. Here that is not required, and 
 therefore the legislature has not thought the presence of 
 the witness necessary. 
 
 [Collins, J. Suppose the claimant inserts the hour 
 and minute ia the date, do not these form part of the 
 " date stated above ? "] 
 
 It is submitted the date of the day is all that is 
 necessary, that is, of the day of attestation. 
 
 [Wright, J. Is not the past tense against you, does 
 not that mean " I saw it signed " ?] 
 
 [Collins, J. Would it not be more correct according 
 to your contention if the words "date stated above" 
 read " date stated below."] 
 
 a. M. Bray and D. Warde, for the respondent, were 
 not called upon. 
 
LV VICTORIA. 
 
 247 
 
 Lord Coleridge, L.O.J. I am of opinion that tlie 
 Eevieing Barrister was right and properly expunged 
 the names of the appellants ftom the list. The point 
 we have to decide is a narrow one, upon the words of 
 the statute, and the Registration Order, 1889. There 
 are three cases stated, raising slightly different ques- 
 tions. I will take the second and third first. In the 
 second the claimant signed the claim in the ahsence of 
 the witness, but took it himself on the next day to the 
 witness who then signed it, after the claimant had stated 
 that the signature to the claim was his. The attestation 
 clause declares that the witness " has witnessed the ahove 
 signature" at the "date stated ahove," but the "date 
 stated above " was the day before the attestation. It is 
 admitted in fact that he did not attest the signature, 
 though he states that he did so on the day before. It 
 is plaia that this will not do, and this goes strongly 
 to show that the acts of signing and attesting must be 
 contemporaneous. 
 
 The third case is slightly difEerent. The attestation 
 was on the same day as the signature, but the claim 
 was taken to the witness not by the appellant himself, 
 but by his wife ; that, of course, is only the same as if 
 any other person had taken it. She probably stated 
 that it was her husband's signature. This also it is 
 impossible to call an attestation. There is neither a 
 witnessing of the signature at the moment, nor even 
 what is stated by Lord Hardwicke to be a witnessing of 
 the acknowledgment of a signature. There is nothing 
 here even equivalent to an acknowledgment by the 
 claimant. In these two cases, therefore, it is clear 
 that the words of the statute are not satisfied, and they 
 serve to throw great light on the first ease. In that 
 case the acts of signing and attesting were on the. same 
 
 1891. 
 
 Body 
 
 V. 
 
 Haisb. 
 Hunt 
 
 V. 
 
 Hai.se. 
 
 FENNItja 
 V. 
 
 Halse. 
 
248 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1891. 
 
 Body 
 
 V. 
 
 Halse. 
 Hunt 
 
 T. 
 
 ELaxbe. 
 
 J^NHINa 
 V. 
 
 Halbe. 
 
 day, and there was an acknowledgment by the claimant 
 that the signature was his. The " date stated above " 
 is also no doubt the date of the same day. But the 
 attestation of the witness is "I have witnessed the 
 signature at the date stated above." WOl that do ? I 
 am of opinion it wUl not. Test it by the case put by 
 Collins, J. If the claimant had put the hour and the 
 minute to the date of his claim, the " date stated above " 
 would have included all that. Now does not that show 
 that the words " witnessed " and " date stated above " 
 must refer to contemporaneous acts ? That is, the attes- 
 tation must be made at the time when the claimant 
 signs the claim. "Witness" here means what it is 
 intended to mean in popular language. I was witness 
 to the transaction, means I saw it. A great number of 
 instances will readily occur to show that witness means 
 eye witness. That seems to be the conclusion one would 
 come to upon this Act if it stood alone. But the House 
 of Lords, in the case of Hindmarsh v. Charlton («), has 
 decided the same point under the Wills Act of 1837 {h). 
 There a testator executed his will in the presence of two 
 witnesses. One of them wrote his name in the morning 
 when the other was not present, the other signed in the 
 afternoon when both were present, and the first then 
 made a slight correction in the signature he had pre- 
 viously made. That was held not to be an attestation 
 by two witnesses present at the same time. With- 
 out the least hesitation, but with great reluctance, there 
 being no imputation of bona fides, it was held that upon 
 the true construction of the words of the Act the signa- 
 ture of the witnesses must be contemporaneous, and the 
 intervention of even a small portion of time between 
 
 («) 8 H. L. Ca. 160. 
 
 (b) 7 Will, i ^ 1 Vict. cap. 26. 
 
LV VICTORIA. 
 
 their signatures would prevent its being a witnessing 
 in each other's presence in spite of that acknowledgment 
 of handwriting. If the words of this enactment had 
 been before the Court which decided that case it cannot 
 be doubted that upon them these attestations would 
 have been held not suiHoient. The law is clear, and the 
 Revising Barrister was right. The appeals must be 
 dismissed. 
 
 249 
 
 1891. 
 
 BOET 
 
 V. 
 
 Halse. 
 Hunt 
 
 V. 
 
 Halbe. 
 
 rENNINO 
 
 V. 
 
 HAIiSE. 
 
 Wkight, J. I am of the same opinion. These 
 words "I have witnessed the above signature at the 
 date stated above" must be taken in their popular 
 sense, viz., that the witness had seen the signature 
 made, and at the time stated. The claim to be made 
 by a lodger could only be made during the period of 
 ten days between the 15th and the 25th of July, so 
 that the date of the signature and attestation was very 
 material. There were two requisites to the claim ; first, 
 a declaration ; secondly, an attestation. The conditions 
 of the latter requirement were not satisfied by such a 
 form of attestation as these. 
 
 Collins, J. I am of the same opinion. 
 
 Appeals dismissed. 
 Solicitors — For the Appellants, Rexworthy. 
 
 For the Eespondent, Raise, Trmtram 
 8fCo. 
 
250 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 O'Connor, Appellant; Nicholson, Respondent. 
 
 1891. AT a Court held on the 15th day of Septemher, 1891, 
 for the revision of the lists of voters for the Harrow 
 
 a Eevising division of the County of Middlesex, Dr. Bernard O'Con- 
 
 hear a person **"'"> ^^ appellant, appeared, as in two preceding years, 
 
 before Mm is °^ hehalf of the Liheral Association of the said division, 
 
 of a^ ^\^^ °^ which he was president, and claimed to be heard in 
 
 ■within sec- support of all claims put forward by or made in the 
 
 tion 42 of _ ^-^ ... 
 
 6 Vict. cap. 18. interests of the said association. 
 
 A barrister mi . • t i i 
 
 who appears The said Dr. 0^ Connor was a Barrister-at-Law, duly 
 party or other Called to the Bar in November, 1890. 
 thou^ not as He contended that, inasmuch as he appeared for an 
 witMa se'o- association, he did not appear for any " party or other 
 that Act* A P®rs°'^!" ^^"ij ^s ^6 received no fee or payment of any 
 
 association is kind, he was therefore not " counsel " within the mean- 
 a "party" 
 
 within the ing of Section 41 of 6 Vict. cap. 18. 
 
 meaning of 
 
 the section. The Eevising Barrister held that he was precluded 
 
 by the provisions of the said section from hearing the 
 
 appellant, and decided against both the above con- 
 
 . tentions, but agreed to state a case for the opinion of the 
 
 High Court upon which he might act in the future. 
 
 Notice of appeal was duly given. 
 
 The appellant in person — 
 
 He attended the Revision Court at the request of the 
 Political Association, of which he was president, simply 
 as an honorary and volunteer representative, as he had 
 
LV VICTOEIA. 
 
 251 
 
 done in the two preceding years. It was true he was 1891. 
 called to the bar in Novemher, 1890, but not with a O'Conkob 
 
 V. 
 
 view to practising. He was in practice as a medical Niohomon. 
 man. The question was, did the mere fact of his having 
 been called to the bar disable him from appearing as in 
 previous years. He submitted that the words of the 
 section meant counsel retained and briefed as such. 
 He appeared not as counsel, but as a ratepayer and 
 president of the association. The association was not a 
 " party " within the meaning of the Act, the words of 
 the section being "party or other person," and an 
 association was not a person. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.O.J. The association was cer- 
 tainly a " party." You were " counsel " and you ap- 
 peared for a " party." It is perfectly clear upon the 
 plain words of the Act that you could not appear. But 
 this is not a point of law material to the result of any 
 case upon which a right of appeal is granted by sec- 
 tion 42 of 6 Vict. cap. 18. The Revising Barrister had 
 no power to state a case. Even if he was wrong in 
 refusing to hear you, which I do not think, this is not 
 the proper mode of redress.] 
 
 The Hon. £. Coleridge, for the respondent, was not 
 called upon. 
 
 The Court (Lord Colbeidgb, L.C.J., Wright, and 
 Collins, JJ.) dismissed the appeal. 
 
 Appeal dismissed. 
 
 Solicitor for the Eespondent, Sir Richard Nicholson. 
 
252 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 Arnold, Appellant; Shaepe, Respondent. 
 
 1891. fTlHIS was an appeal from a decision of the Eevising 
 Barrister for the Kesfeven division of the County 
 
 the EeTising of Lincoln by which he refused, in revising the lists of 
 mark^he ° Toters in the said division for the purposes of the 
 voter ^der ^ounty Council under the Local Government Act, 1888, 
 the provisions ^q apply the provisions of section 7, sub-section 5 of the 
 sub-sec. 5 of County Electors Act, 1888 (a), and to mark the name of 
 
 the County "^ . . 
 
 Electors Act, a voter who appeared on the register iu respect of quali- 
 
 1888, is not a .- . ... „ 
 
 matter as to fications in two divisions of the same electoral County, 
 appeal lies The f acts and the question raised as stated by the 
 
 under sec- Tt • • -o • l j; n 
 
 tion 42 of Kevismg isamster were as follows : — 
 Fie*, cap. 18. Charles Sharpe of Sleqford yf&s registered to vote for 
 the County Council purposes in two electoral divisions 
 of the County of Lincoln, Kesteven division, that is to 
 say, iu Quarrington and Hecldngton. There was no 
 objection to him, and he was duly qualified to vote for 
 each qualification. The Revising Barrister was asked 
 by the appellant ( Walter Jabez Arnold) to place against 
 the name of the said Charles Sharpe in respect of one of 
 the said qualifications a note to the effect that he was 
 not entitled to vote in respect of that qualification, in 
 the same way as is done in boroughs under 41 <^ 42 
 Vict. cap. 26. 
 
 The Revising Barrister refused to so note the name 
 for the reasons stated by him, viz. : — 
 
 (a) The procedure affectiag boroughs is quite different 
 from the procedure affecting county registration. 
 
 (a) 51 ^ 62 Vict. cap. 10. 
 
LV VICTORIA. 
 
 253 
 
 In boroughs the Revising Barrister has all the over- 1891. 
 seers and lists before him and can find out duplicates. Abnoid 
 
 V. 
 
 In counties the Eevising Barrister only sits at such Shaepb. 
 courts and revises there such parishes as he is directed 
 to do by the justices. 
 
 The Revising Barrister has no power to compel the 
 overseers to attend at any other time or place, but unless 
 they were aU present it would be impossible to find out 
 duplicates. 
 
 (b) It would be almost impossible in the many 
 parishes comprising an electoral division. to find out 
 who are duplicate voters. 
 
 He considered that this difficulty probably caused the 
 legislature to use the language contained in section 7, 
 sub-sections 4 and 5, of the County Electors Act, 1888, 
 which appeared quite inconsistent with a supposed 
 power in a Revising Barrister to disfranchise a voter 
 in respect of any qualification for County Council 
 purposes. 
 
 The question of law for the opinion of the Court was 
 whether a Revising Barrister is, under the Local Govern- 
 ment Act, 1888, bound to find out duplicate voters and 
 to place against their names a note to the efEect that 
 such voter is not to vote in respect of any qualification 
 but one. 
 
 If he is so bound then such note was to be written 
 against the name of the said Charles Sharpe in respect 
 of his vote for the said HecUngton division. 
 
 The objector appealed. 
 
 Beavmont Morice, for the appellant. 
 
 J. C. Carter, for the respondent, raised a preliminary 
 
254 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1891. objection to the hearing of the appeal. The power of 
 Aenold appeal is conferred by section 42 of 6 Vict. cap. 18, and 
 Shaepb. is limited to the matters there mentioned. This ease 
 is not within any of the provisions of that section. 
 
 [Lord OoLEEiDGE, L.O.J. Why is it not within the 
 second provision, viz., " any objection to any other per- 
 son as not entitled to have his name inserted in any 
 Hst"?] 
 
 This is not an objection to the insertion of a name 
 on the list. It is simply a reqtdsition to have a name 
 which is actually on the list marked for the purpose of 
 voting. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.O.J. But that amounts to a 
 disfranchisement in respect of all votes but one.] 
 
 [Collins, J. Is putting the asterisk to the name 
 the same as striking it out of the list altogether ?] 
 
 No ; although starred, the voter's name remains for 
 some purposes, though not, it may be, for elective 
 purposes. 
 
 [Collins, J. If it were not for the provisions of 
 section 7 of the County Electors Act, 1888, the name 
 would be struck ofE altogether under section 28 (14) of 
 41 8f 42 Vict. cap. 26, but now the name in fact remains 
 on the register.] 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. Has the voter a choice in 
 respect of which qualification he shall vote ?] 
 
 Yes ; and it is admitted he has both qualifications. 
 
LV VICTOKIA. 255 
 
 Beaumont Morice. It is sutmitted that the case 1891. 
 comes within the second head of the matters as to which Abnold 
 
 V. 
 
 an appeal is allowed by section 42 of 6 Vict. cap. 18. Shabpe. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.O.J. The qualifications are 
 found to be right, and the voter has a right to be on the 
 register, and is in fact inserted.] 
 
 That is admitted. But the right to be registered is 
 subject to the liability to have his name marked. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. That is not enacted as to 
 county council electors.] 
 
 [Wright, J. Does not sub-section 4 of section 7 of 
 the County Electors Act, 1888, conclude you? That 
 expressly provides that a county council elector may be 
 registered in more than one division.] 
 
 It is the next sub-section, (5), that deals with this 
 point. 
 
 [Wright, J. That seems to deal with the power to 
 erase in the case of parliamentary electors, for which it 
 substitutes the marking.] 
 
 Further, the Revising Barrister ought to have inquired 
 whether the entries related to the same voter. 
 
 [Weight, J. That is not a ground of appeal. It 
 is not a question of law.] 
 
 [Collins, J. Has the appellant claimed to have a 
 
256 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 ^891. name inserted? No. Has he objected to the inser- 
 Aenou) tion of a name ? Surely not. It is admitted the name 
 
 V. 
 
 Shaepb. is inserted.] 
 
 It is submitted that the request to have the name 
 marked is tantamount to an objection to the insertion 
 of it for voting purposes, notwithstanding that it 
 appears on the register for other purposes. 
 
 [Weight, J. Tour contention is that " insertion " 
 means operative insertion for the purpose of voting ?] 
 
 Tes. 
 
 [Weight, J. Is there any section of any Act 
 which extends section 42 of 6 Vict. cap. 18, so as to 
 cover your contention ?] 
 
 No. 
 
 Lord CoLEEiDGE, L.O.J. In this case a prelimi- 
 nary objection is taken to the hearing this appeal, on 
 the ground that it does not come within the provisions 
 of section 42 of 6 Vict. cap. 18, which defines the 
 matters as to which an appeal will lie from a decision 
 of a Eevising Barrister. These are — (1) where a 
 person shall have claimed to have his name inserted in 
 any list ; (2) where an objection is made to the inser- 
 tion of the name of any person on the list ; (3) where a 
 name shall have been expunged from any Hst. This 
 case clearly does not come under the first or third of 
 these heads. Nor does it come under the second. It 
 is not an objection to any other person as not entitled 
 to have his name inserted in any Hst, for it is admitted 
 
LV YICl'ORIA. 
 
 267 
 
 tliat the qualification exists, and that the name is 1891. 
 entitled to he inserted, and it is in fact inserted; and Abnouj 
 
 V. 
 
 even though it were marked for voting purposes, it Shaepb. 
 would still be there for other purposes. 
 
 If it he the duty of the Revising Barrister to mark 
 the name, as to which I give no opinion, the omission 
 may or may not he a breach of duty, but that is not a 
 matter for which an appeal lies under the Act of 1843, 
 which still remains the only enactment empowering an 
 appeal from his decision. The appeal must be dis- 
 missed. 
 
 Weight, J. I am of the same opinion. This is 
 not an objection to the insertion of a name on the list, 
 but it is merely a requisition to the Revising Barrister 
 to mark a name that is already there. 
 
 Collins, J. By the former practice as to registra- 
 tion the Revising Barrister made a new list upon the 
 claims brought before him, and then the question in 
 each case was as to the right to have the claimant's 
 name inserted in such list. But by the new procedure 
 the claims form part of a subsisting list in which they 
 are already inserted. Probably, therefore, an objection 
 to a name being inserted within section 42 of 6 Vict. 
 cap. 18, must be taken to mean an objection to a name 
 having been inserted, otherwise the application of that 
 section to such a case might be impossible. But in this 
 case the Revising Barrister was only required to mark a 
 name under the provisions of section 7, sub-section 5 
 of 51 8f 52 Vict. cap. 10, which had been inserted in 
 the list by persons bound to put it there. That is 
 not within the words or meaning of section 42 of the 
 
258 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1891. Eegistration Act, 1843. I agree that the appeal must 
 
 V. 
 
 Shabje, 
 
 Abkoiid be dismissed. 
 
 Appeal dismissed. 
 Leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal refused. 
 
 Solicitors — For the Appellant, J. Hextall for A. G. 
 Fletcher, Bonington, 
 
 For the Respondent, Peacock and Qoddard, 
 
LV VICTORIA. 
 
 259 
 
 Jones, Appellant ; Peitchaed, Respondent. 
 
 AT a Court held at Bangor for the revision of the par- 1891 
 liamentary and municipal lists for the contributory 
 
 Nov. 10. 
 
 borough of Bangor, the appellant, Edward Jones, ob- q^^o^iA 
 jeoted to the name of John Pryce being retained on the ^^fhy ar-^' 
 list as a parliamentary elector for the said borough, and rangement 
 
 s: J a ' Between 
 
 as a burgess for the municipal borough of Bangor, on themselves, 
 the following grounds, viz. : — for three 
 
 months in the 
 
 (1.) That he was not, on the 15th day of July last, year in the 
 an inhabitant occupier of the qualifying pre- residence set - 
 
 , -I , 1 ji 1 . 1 1 .J J apart for their 
 
 mises, and had not then been an inhabitant joint oooupa- 
 oecupier of the qualifying premises for the -yaSieofthe 
 whole of the twelve months immediately pre- ^e^^ad- 
 ceding that day. mittedto 
 
 o •> be sufficient, 
 
 (2.) That he did not, during such period, occupy as ■H*^^ 
 
 owner or tenant of the qualifying premises. to the neoea- 
 
 . . sity of resi- 
 
 The said Edward Jones also at the said Court ob- denceinor 
 
 jeoted in like form to the name of Ekazar Williams miles of the 
 
 being retained upon the said list. dSrin^ six 
 
 The names and qualifications of the said John Pryce ^ediatelT' 
 
 and Eleazar Williams stood upon the said list in the J^^^^tf this 
 
 following form, viz. : — constituted an 
 
 ° occupation by 
 
 Pryce, John 
 
 WilHams, Uleazar 
 
 The Canonry. 
 The Canonry. 
 
 House (joint). 
 House (joint). 
 
 each during 
 
 The Canonry. the qualifjing 
 m, „ period for the 
 
 TheCanomy. purpose of the 
 franchise. 
 
 It was proved by evidence that the said premises 
 were occupied by the said Canons, John Pryce and 
 Eleazar Williams, and two other Canons, and that each 
 
260 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1891. of such four Canons usually occupied the said premises 
 Jones as a resident Canon for three months in every year by 
 PwroHiED. voluntary agreement between themselves according to 
 their convenience respectively, and that in ease of need, 
 or according to such agreement and their convenience 
 respectively, each and every of them, the said four 
 Canons, might and would himself alone occupy the 
 whole of the said premises for more than three months 
 iu any year or for the whole of any year : and that the 
 said premises were in the exclusive personal occupation 
 of the said Canon John Pryce during the months of 
 January, February, and March in the present year, and 
 that he did not actually personally occupy the qualify- 
 ing premises during any other part of the qualifying 
 period: and that Canon Ekazar Williams and two 
 other Canons occupied the said premises during the 
 other nine months of the qualifying period, each 
 occupying for three months ; and that the said Canons, 
 when in residence, had their own servants in attendance 
 upon them respectively: and also that the said pre- 
 mises were from time to time, between the going out 
 of one Canon and the coming in of another, in the care 
 of a servant employed by the said four Canons as the 
 servant of each and every of them, and that such servant 
 did not reside on the 'qualifying premises: and also 
 that furniture which was at all times on the said 
 premises belonged to the said 'four Canons jointly : 
 and that they, the said four Canons, were jointly rated 
 for the said premises. 
 
 The Revising Barrister disallowed the said objec- 
 tions, and decided that the said John Pryee and Elea%ar 
 Williams respectively, were, and had been for the whole 
 of the twelve months aforesaid, inhabitant occupiers of 
 the said qualifying premises, and did during such 
 
LV VICTORIA. 
 
 261 
 
 period occupy tlie same as owners or tenants respec- 1891. 
 tively, and retained the names of the said John Pryce Jones 
 and Eleazar Williams on the said list. It was not dis- Pphohabd. 
 puted that the value of the said premises was sufficient. 
 
 The said Edward Jones appealed. 
 
 There was no distinction between the cases of the 
 said John Pryce and Eleazar Williams, and they were 
 ordered to be consolidated. 
 
 If the Court should reverse the decision of the 
 Eevising Barrister, the names of the said John Pryce 
 and Eleazar Williams were to be omitted from the 
 said list. 
 
 Bryn Roberts, for the appellant. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. The substance of the case 
 seems to be this. In Bangor, as in the case of many 
 other Cathedrals, there is a large house for the resi- 
 dence of the Canons, and by mutual arrangement they 
 reside there each for three months in the year. The 
 finding of the Eevising Barrister is that such residence 
 for three months amounts to a constructive occupation 
 for twelve.] 
 
 Tes. He seems to have founded himself upon the 
 fact that by agreement they might have arranged that 
 one or more should occupy for twelve months. But we 
 must take the facts as they are. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. Could all four occupy at 
 the same time ?] 
 
 Perhaps by arrangement they might, but they did 
 not in fact. Moreover, as holders of benefices, they 
 are subject to the requirement that, except when they 
 
 v2 
 
262 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1891. are in residence as Canons, they must reside in their 
 Jones own benefices, and on these grounds the arrangement 
 Peitohabd. amounts in fact only to a severs,! occupation hy each 
 for three months. The facts hring it within the deci- 
 sion of Ford V. P«/e (a), and there is a break of the 
 necessary continuous occupation for twelve months. 
 
 [Wright, J. Is it conceded here that there has 
 been a residence for six months to July 15th, in or 
 within seven miles of the borough ?] 
 
 Oermaine, for the respondent. Tes ; no question is 
 raised as to that. 
 
 Bryn Roberts. The case does not find it, and as a 
 fact there was no such residence. 
 
 [Weight, J. Then the ease is imperfect.] 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. In Durant v. Carter (b), 
 where a rector was absent under a licence of non- 
 residence from the Bishop, and the rectory house was 
 assigned by the Bishop as a residence for a stipendiary 
 curate during such absence, it was held that there was 
 no residence by the rector within the last six months, 
 and no continuous occupation for the qualifying year.] 
 
 [Collins, J. As a matter of fact this arrangement 
 did endure for the whole year.] 
 
 Yes, that is the point; apart from the question of 
 their being required to be in their own benefices, the 
 
 {a) 2 Sop. # 0. 167 ; Z. S. 9 (J) 2 Sop. # 0. U2 -,1.11.9 
 C. F. 269. C. P. 261. 
 
LV VICTORIA. 
 
 263 
 
 Canons had each given up the right of joint occupation 1891. 
 for twelve months in exchange for exclusive occupation Jones 
 for three. One of them could not come in at any other Peitohaed. 
 time than his own period of three months, and there- 
 fore there was no constructive occupation. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.O.J. Tour contention is that 
 this gentleman did not reside bodily except during 
 three months, that he did not intend to return, or in 
 fact return duriag nine months, and that this was by 
 an arrangement which was not altered ?] 
 
 That is my point. Further, this being a joiat 
 occupation, it is under the old £10 franchise, and 
 must be as owner or tenant (2 (§• 3 Wiil. IV. cap. 45, 
 sec. 29 ; Heath v. Maynes {a)). These Canons do not 
 so occupy. Therefore it is submitted there was no 
 occupation for twelve months, and no residence in or 
 within seven miles of the borough for six months. 
 
 Germaine, for the respondent. 
 
 It is not one of the objections here that there was not 
 a six months' residence to July 15th, as required by the 
 Schedule to the County Electors Act of 1888 (51 8( 52 
 Vict. cap. 10), and there is nothing in the facts to show 
 that there was not a continuous joiut occupation for the 
 whole twelve months, 
 
 [Wright, J. If this was a joint occupation the 
 objections are bad.J 
 
 [Collins, J. The objector is debarred from going 
 outside his objections.] 
 
 [a) K.%G.^%; 3 C. B. N. S. 389. 
 
264 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1891. [Wright, J. Then the only question here is, whether 
 
 Jones there is an occupation, actual or constructive, for twelve 
 
 V. 
 
 Peitohabd. months.] 
 
 As to that the case states that the arrangement was 
 by voluntary agreement, and " that in case of need, or 
 according to such agreement and their convenience, 
 each and every of them might and would himself alone 
 occupy the whole of the said premises for more than 
 three months or for the whole of any year," showing a 
 clear power and possihle intention on their part of 
 returning. 
 
 [Weight, J. Did the Eevising Barrister deal with 
 the objections ?] 
 
 He considered them bad. But it was agreed to 
 waive any question on the objections as made, in order 
 to obtain a decision on the merits. The omission to 
 make an objection on the ground of non-residence in 
 or within seven miles of the borough was not waived. 
 I am willing to have the case sent back to have that 
 fact stated, but I do not agree to waive the point that 
 it was not made a ground of objection, 
 
 [Lord OoLEBiDGE, L.C.J. That is no use, as upon 
 the objections as they stand the appeal must fail. If 
 you like to waive that, we could send the case back, and 
 when that fact is found hear it on the merits.] 
 
 Germaine. I cannot agree to that. 
 
 Bryn Roberts. There is still the question as to a 
 twelve months' occupation. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. We are against you on 
 
 that.] 
 
LV VICTORIA. 
 
 265 
 
 [Weight, J. The occupation of any of several joint 1891. 
 
 occupiers would be sufficient.] Joras 
 
 V. 
 
 Peitohaed. 
 Lord CoLBKiDGE, L.O.J. Then, as there is a flaw in 
 the objections on the point of residence, which, if in- 
 sisted on, must destroy the appeal, we dismiss the 
 appeal, but without costs. 
 
 Appeal dismissed. 
 
 Solicitors — ^For the Appellant, Lloyd, George 8( Co., 
 for W. Huw Rowland, Bangor. 
 
 For the Respondent, H. W. Chatterton, 
 for O. W. Owen, Carnarvon. 
 
266 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 Lord, Appellant ; Fox, Respondent. 
 
 1891. ^ T a Court held for the revision of the list of voters 
 for the borough of Burnky, the nani,e of Richard 
 
 Nov. 11. A 
 
 Barrister has Sagar appeared upon Division III., viz., the list of 
 the'Seno™of persons entitled to be enrolled as burgesses for the 
 6 ytTc^/S, municipal borough of Burnley, but not to be registered 
 transfer ttie ^® parliamentary electors for the parliamentary borough 
 
 name of a oi Bumlev. 
 
 voter from 
 
 Div. III. to Objection was duly made to the appearance of the 
 
 name of Richard Sugar in Division III. 
 
 The name of the said Richard Sagar did not appear 
 on any list of persons entitled to vote at a parliamen- 
 tary election for the said borough. 
 
 The said Richard Sagar did not appear before the 
 Revising Barrister, but made a declaration pursuant to 
 41 8( 42 Vict. cap. 26, sec. 24, in the vrords and figures 
 following : — 
 
 " Declaration for Correcting Misdescription in 
 List. 
 
 " I, Richard Sagar, of No. 8, Thomas Street, in the 
 Parish (or Township) of Burnky, in the parliamentary 
 borough of Burnky, and in the municipal borough of 
 Burnley, do solemnly and sincerely declare as follows : 
 
 " 1. I am the person referred to in Division III. of 
 the list of burgesses, St. PauVs, No. 1 Ward Polling 
 
LV VICTOKIA. 
 
 267 
 
 District, made out in divisions for the parish (or town- 
 ship) of Burnley hy an entry as follows : — 
 
 1891. 
 
 •'Kameasdeaotibea 
 in List. 
 
 Place of Abode as 
 deaoribed in List. 
 
 Nature of 
 
 Qualifloation 
 
 as desoiibed 
 
 in List. 
 
 Description of 
 Qualifying Property. 
 
 Sagar, Binhard . 
 
 8, Thomas Street. 
 
 House (joint) 
 
 8, Thomas Street. 
 
 LOBD 
 T. 
 
 Fox. 
 
 " 2. My correot name and place of abode, and the 
 correct particulars respecting my qualification, are, and 
 ought to be stated, for the purposes of the register of 
 parliamentary electors, for the parliamentary borough 
 of Burnley, and the burgess roll for the municipal "Division 
 borough of Burnley, about to be made as foUows : — 
 
 " Correct Name. 
 
 Correct Place of 
 Abode. 
 
 Correct Nature 
 
 of QualidcEi- 
 
 tion. 
 
 Correct Description 
 
 of Qualifying 
 
 Properfy. 
 
 Sagar, Eiohard . 
 
 8, Thomas Street. 
 
 House .... 
 
 8, Thomas Street. 
 
 " Dated this first day of September, 1891. 
 
 " (Signed) Richard Sagar. 
 " Made and subscribed before me, 
 this first day of September, 1891, 
 " TfmrMs Hirst, 
 Justice of the Peace for Burnley." 
 
 One of the political agents who appeared before the 
 Revising Barrister requested him to transfer the name 
 of the said Richard Sagar from Division III. to Divi- 
 sion I. 
 
 The said Richard Sagar had not made any claim in 
 manner provided by 6 Vict. cap. 18, sec. 15, to have 
 his name inserted on Division I. of the register of 
 
268 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1891. parliamentary electors for the parliamentary borough, 
 LoED and of burgesses for the municipal borough of Burnley. 
 Fox. The appellant, a person duly qualified in that behalf, 
 
 appeared and objected to the Revising Barrister so 
 transferring the name of the said Richard Sugar from 
 Division III. to Division I. on the ground that he had 
 no power in law so to transfer it, the two lists being 
 entirely distinct, and contended that the said Richard 
 Sugar ought (as is usual in similar cases) to have made 
 a claim to have his name inserted on Division I. of the 
 register, pursuant to 6 Viet. cap. 18, sec. 15, in which 
 case the said Richard Sagar would have been struck off 
 the said list. Division III., on the said objection, and 
 would have had to attend in person and prove his said 
 claim, and the said objector could have cross-examined 
 the said Richard Sagar upon the validity of his said 
 claim. The Revising Barrister held that he had the 
 power to transfer the said name, and accordingly did so 
 transfer it. 
 
 The objector appealed. 
 
 The question for the Court was whether, upon the 
 facts stated, the Revising Barrister was right in trans- 
 ferring the said name from Division III. to Division I. 
 
 If the Court should hold that the Revising Barrister 
 was wrong, the register was to be amended by expung- 
 ing the name of the said Richard Sagar from Division I., 
 and inserting it in Division III. 
 
 J. V. Austin, for the appellant. 
 
 It is submitted that the only mode by which Sagar 
 could have been placed in Division I. — ^the Hst of parlia- 
 
LV VICTORIA. 269 
 
 mentary and municipal electors — was by making a claim 1891. 
 ■under section 16 of the Eeglstration Act, 1843, 6 Vict. Loed 
 cap. 18, in the form provided by the Eegistration Fox. 
 Order, 1889, Form H, No. 1, and it would then have 
 been the duty of the overseers to include his name in 
 the list as provided by that section. And it would have 
 been open to any person duly qualified to object to the 
 said name being retained on the said list. (6 Vict. 
 cap. 18, sees. 7, 17.) 
 
 Under section 38 of this Act, the Eevising Barrister 
 has power to insert ia any list of borough voters the 
 name of any person omitted from such list who has 
 given due notice of his claim ; and by section 39, objec- 
 tions may be made to the claim of any person who has 
 been so omitted. 
 
 The Eevising Barrister purported to act under 41 8f 
 42 Viot. cap. 26, sees. 24, 28. Section 24 provides 
 that when a person is entered on ^ny voters' list, he 
 may correct the description of his quaHfioation as stated 
 in that list by making and sending a declaration as 
 therein provided, which shall he primd facie proof of the 
 facts therein. 
 
 Section 28, sub-section 12, provides that where the 
 description is insufficient for the qualification stated or 
 claimed, but sufficient for another qualification, the 
 Eevising Barrister shall insert the name in the list 
 for which such qualification is appropriate, and expunge 
 it from that in which it is incorrectly entered. Sub- 
 section 13 of section 28 provides that, except as above pro- 
 vided, no evidence shall be given of any other qualifica- 
 tion than that which is described in the list or claim, 
 nor shall the Eevising Barrister be at liberty to change 
 the description of the qualification as it appears in the 
 list, except for the purpose of more clearly and aocu- 
 
270 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1891. rately defining the same. The effect of this is that the 
 LoED Revising Barrister can, in a case where the description 
 
 V. 
 
 Pox. is insufficient for a qualification in the list in which it 
 is stated, hut is sufficient for a qualification in another 
 list, transfer the name to such other list, as from 
 Division I. to Division III., the higher to the lower ; 
 but he cannot, where the description is a sufficient 
 qualification for the list ia which it is stated, transfer it 
 from that list to another, even though it may also he a 
 sufficient qualification for that other — as from Divi- 
 sion III. to Division I. This, however, is what the 
 Revising Barrister has done, taking as proof of the 
 qualification for this purpose a declaration under 
 section 24. This case does not fall within section 24 at 
 all, which only provides that a misdescription of an 
 entry may he corrected in the list in which it was origi- 
 nally stated. Moreover, the declaration made is essen- 
 tially at variance with the form given in the schedule 
 (Registration Order, 1889, Form M), viz., the words 
 " Division one" written ia the margin of paragraph 2 
 of the declaration. This is really an attempt to con- 
 vert a declaration which, by section 24, is available only 
 for the purpose of correcting a mistake as to the same 
 Hst, iato a claim, for a different franchise, so as to render 
 nugatory the regular procedure for making such claim 
 under 6 Vict. cap. 18, and evade the liability to appear 
 and be cross-examined, which the legislature has 
 provided to be the incidents of a claim for that 
 franchise. 
 
 [Wright, J. Section ' 28, sub-section 13, seems to 
 conclude it.] 
 
 Yes. 
 
LV VICTORIA. 
 
 271 
 
 [Collins, J. Test it this way. Shift the entry 1891. 
 from Division III. to Division I. Might not the Loed 
 
 V. 
 
 Revising Barrister upon proof find a sufficient qualifi- Pox. 
 cation ?] 
 
 That is not what he has done. He has not trans- 
 ferred the qualification "house (joint)," hut has struck 
 out "joint," which is a sufficient qualification for 
 Division III. (45 ^ 46 Vict. cap. 50, sec. 9), and has 
 made a qualification under another Act (30 Sf 31 Vict. 
 cap. 102, sec. 3) hy means of the declaration ; whereas 
 the only effect of the declaration was to "enable him to 
 correct the original entry as a sufficient qualification for 
 the list in which it was made. 
 
 [Collins, J. Is altering the qualification from what 
 is sufficient for the burgess franchise to one for the 
 parliamentary franchise within section 24 of 41 (§r 42 
 Vict. cap. 26 ?] 
 
 If the powers to transfer are, as it is submitted, 
 iLtnited to those conferred by sub-section 12 of section 28, 
 (see sub-section 13), then he cannot transfer unless he finds 
 a qualification insufficient for the list in which it stands. 
 Sub-section 15 of the same section does not enlarge his 
 powers ia this respect. In Qreenway v. Bachelor (a), 
 where an objection to the name of a voter on Divi- 
 sion I. of the Occupiers' List had been sustained, it was 
 held under section 15 that the Revising Barrister was 
 not bound to transfer the name to Division III. without 
 proof that the voter had a burgess qualification. It is 
 clear that there is power to transfer from Division I. 
 
 (a) Colt. 322 ; 12 Q. B. D. 376. 
 
272 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1891. to Division III. In Ford y. Roar (a), Lord Cole- 
 LoED " ridge, L.O.J., says, "Sub-section 12 of section 28 of 
 PoJ_ 41 8f 42 Vict gives a convenient mode of correcting an 
 entry of a matter whieli tlie Eevising Barrister may 
 think insufficient in law to constitute a qualification of 
 the nature or description stated in the list, but sufficient 
 in law to constitute a qualification of some other nature 
 or description, and I think that section 24 is limited to 
 such cases." 
 
 [Weight, J. Do you go the length of saying that, 
 if no alteration or correction of the entry were required, 
 the Eevising Barrister could not act under sub-section 12 ?] 
 
 Yes. 
 
 [Wright, J. You rest upon the word "insuffi- 
 cient " P] 
 
 Yes; and for a very good reason. As the entry 
 stands, no objection could be made to it, and therefore 
 there would be no chance of disputing it. 
 
 . [Wright, J. The Eevising Barrister has done two 
 things, (1) corrected the description, and (2) transferred 
 the name. He may be wrong, either because he has 
 changed the description for the purpose of transfer, or 
 because he has in fact transferred the name.] 
 
 That is the appellant's contention. 
 
 No counsel appeared for the respondeut. 
 
 Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. The question raised in this 
 case is a fine one. If aU the necessary ingredients of a 
 
 (a) Colt. 351, at p. 363 ; U Q. B. D. at p. 615. 
 
LV VICTORIA. 
 
 273 
 
 qualification for Division I. of the list appeared by the 1891. 
 entry as it stands in Division III., when corrected by Lobd 
 the declaration the voter has made, and if the only Fox. 
 application of the voter was to be transferred to the list 
 for which he is thus shown to be qualified, it seems 
 hard at first sight that he should not be allowed to have 
 his name so transferred. But the answer to this is that 
 aU these matters depend upon legislative enactment and 
 reasonable construction as to the powers thereby con- 
 ferred on the Eevising Barrister. The voter could 
 have prevented any hardship in the matter by duly 
 making a claim to be put on Division I. in the mode 
 provided by 6 Vict. cap. 18, in which case an objector 
 would have had a right to object to the claim and be 
 heard in support of his objections. What he has done 
 is to allow a claim to be made by means of a decla- 
 ration which showed a qualification sufficient for Divi- 
 sion III., in which it was stated, and then to ask the 
 Eevising Barrister to transfer the entry to Division I. 
 upon the ground that a qualification was also shown for 
 that division, thereby evading the incidents of a claim 
 duly made in the statutory method. 
 
 Again, is it within the powers of the Eevising 
 Barrister to make this transfer from Division III. to 
 Divisionl. ? These powers are contained in sub-section 12 
 of section 28 of 41 8f 42 Vict. cap. 26, and then comes 
 sub-section 13, which states, "except as herein provided, 
 and whether any person is objected to or not, no evi- 
 dence shall be given of any other qualification than 
 that which is described in the list or claim, as the case 
 may be, nor shaU. the Eevising Barrister be at liberty 
 to change the description of the qualification as it 
 appears in the list, that is, the list or claim as it 
 appears before him, " except for the purpose of more 
 clearly and accurately defining the same." Now he 
 
274 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1891. has certainly changed the description of the qualification 
 
 LoED for a purpose other than that permitted by this sub- 
 
 Pox. section, by transferring the entry from Division IH., 
 
 the burgess list, to Division I., the parliamentary and 
 
 burgess list. 
 
 I think, therefore, he had no power to do this under 
 these sub-sections. Nor does the general power of 
 amendment contained in sub-section 1 of section 28 enable 
 him. That sub-section must be construed subject to 
 the other sub-sections ; and, construed by the limitations 
 of sub-sections 12 and 13, it is plain it does not mean that 
 the Revising Barrister may change the list in a case 
 where he has a sufficient 'description of a qualification 
 for the list in which it is stated. 
 
 This appeal must be allowed, and the name expunged 
 from Division I. 
 
 Wright, J. I am of the same opinion. By 41 
 ^ 42 Vict. cap. 28, sec. 28, sub-sec. 13, the Eevising 
 Barrister is clearly prohibited from changing the 
 qualification as it appears in the list, except for the 
 purpose therein stated. Here he has done another 
 thing ; be has changed the description of the qualification 
 for the purpose of transferring it from Division III. to 
 Division I., although it was sufficient for Division III. 
 in which it was originally stated. This he had no 
 power to do. 
 
 Collins, J., concurred. 
 
 Appeal allowed. No costs. 
 
 Solicitors — For the Appellant, BoUmon, Preston and 
 Stow, for Waddington, Burnley. 
 
CASES 
 
 ARaxnSD AND DETERMINED 
 
 IN THE 
 
 QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION 
 
 OF 
 
 THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, 
 
 TJNDEE STATS. 6 & 7 VICT. c. 18, 
 
 AND 
 
 41 & 42 YICT. c. 26, 
 
 AND THE ACTS AMENDINa THE SAME 
 
 DUBINa 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS, 1892, 
 
 IN THE 
 
 FIETT-SIXTH TEAR OE QUEEN VICTORIA. 
 
 The Queen v. Mackellab. 
 
 rrHIS case, whicli came before a Divisional Court 1892. 
 
 on the argument of a rule nisi for a mandamus, ""' 
 
 calling upon tlie Eevising Barrister of the City of claim was 
 Exeter, and seven voters, whose names were objected to ^^jje sole use 
 on the revision of the lists by him, to show cause why ^it^'^g^t"™ 
 an appeal should not be entered, and a case stated by "se of dimng 
 him, raised a question as to the power of the Eevising room," and 
 
 ■*• -^ in the deda- 
 
 Bjarrister to amend. ration the 
 
 voter was 
 ' described as 
 
 " oooupying partly as sole tenant, and partly as joint tenant." The Eetising Bar- 
 rister f ound.that there was an occupation as sole tenant of a bedroom of the value of 
 £10 or upwards, and that the mention of joint occupation was a bond fide mistake. 
 He accordingly amended the claim and declaration by striking out all mention of 
 joint occupation, and allowed the claim. Seld, that the misdescription was a mistake 
 which the Eevising Barrister had power to amend, and that the claim was rightly 
 allowed. 
 
 VOL. I. X 
 
276 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1892. The facts were as follows : — At the revision of the 
 
 The Qtteen Usts for the City of Exeter, the voters named in the rule 
 
 Maokellae. nisi were objected to on the grounds that the qualifying 
 
 premises were of insufficient value, and the claims were 
 
 not made in the form prescribed. 
 
 The claims, which were to be upon the old Lodger 
 List, were in six of the cases in the following form, 
 viz. : for " the sole use of a bedroom and the joint 
 use of a dining and sitting room" ; and in the de- 
 claration the voters were described as " occupying 
 partly as sole tenant and partly as joint tenant." The 
 value in each ease was stated to be not less than £10. 
 
 The Revising Barrister foimd that the claims were 
 hona fide made, that there was a sole occupation of a 
 bedroom of the value of £10 or more, and that the 
 statement of the additional fact as to the joint use of 
 the dining and sitting room might be treated as sur- 
 plusage. He held that there was a good qualification 
 for a sole tenancy, and amended the claim and declara- 
 tion in each case by striking out the superfluous state- 
 ment. 
 
 In the seventh case the claim was for the joint occupa- 
 tion of a lodging, but happened to have been made on 
 a form for a sole occupation claim, and the value was 
 stated to be £10. In fact, as the Revising Barrister' 
 found on inquiry, the lodging was joint, but of a clear 
 yearly value which gave not less than £10 for each 
 lodger. This the Revising Barrister also treated as a' 
 bond, fide mistake which he had power to amend, and 
 amended accordingly (a). 
 
 The objector desired to appeal, but the Revising 
 Barrister deoliaed to allow appeals to be entered, or to 
 
 (a) The rule on this point was abandoned on the argument. 
 
LVI VIOTOKIA. 277 
 
 state a ease, and the objector applied for and obtained 1892. 
 the rule nisi. The Qoten 
 
 On the rule nisi coming on to be argued, the following Maokbli,ae. 
 statement by the Eeyising Barrister was submitted to 
 the Court, in pursuance of the course apparently sug- 
 gested by the Court in the ease of lie Bane (a). 
 
 1. Objection was taken to a large number of lodger 
 
 claims, on the ground that the value of the 
 lodgings was insufficient. The two solicitors, 
 representing the parties, agreed to accept the 
 evidence of an independent valuer, chosen by 
 themselves, who undertook to inspect the several 
 lodgings and report to me. This valuer in Court 
 satisfied me that he understood the principles 
 upon which his evidence was required. 
 
 2. The valuer reported that in eighteen only of the 
 
 oases referred to the value of the lodgings was 
 sufficient. Amongst these eighteen the foUowiug 
 five cases, mentioned in the rule nisi, were in- 
 cluded, viz. : — Stanley Courtney Mitchell, Charles 
 Searing, Charles Edward Shaw, Senry Muruse 
 Downing, and Frederick Laxton, It was estab- 
 lished by evidence or admission to my satis- 
 faction, that these five persons, as lodgers, had 
 occupied separately and as sole tenants for the 
 required time their respective lodgings, and that 
 each of the said lodgings was of the clear yearly 
 value, if let unfurnished, of £10 or upwards. 
 
 3. In the case of Frederick Edward Williams the same 
 
 facts are admitted. 
 
 4. In the case of Charles Frederick Cheeseworth (called 
 
 Frederick Cheeseworth in the rule nisi), it was 
 admitted that the lodgings mentioned in the 
 
 («) r. iV. (I879)p. 200.' 
 x2 
 
278 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1892. claim were jointly occupied by Charles Frederick 
 
 The Qtjebn Cheeseworth and John Senry Beedell, that the 
 
 Maokellae. clear yearly value of the lodgings, if let un- 
 
 furnished, was of an amount which, when divided 
 by the number of lodgers, gave a sum of not less 
 than £10 for each lodger, and that the said 
 Charles Frederick Cheeseworth was otherwise 
 qualified as a lodger. 
 
 5. Further objection was duly taken to these seven 
 
 claims on the groimd that the declaration was 
 not in the form required by the Eegistration 
 Order, 1889, schedule 3, Form H. No. 2, and that 
 I had no power to amend. 
 
 6. I overruled this further objection. I held that 
 
 the variance in each case was a mistake which I 
 had power to amend, and I consented to amend 
 the claims and declarations in accordance with 
 the facts. The amendment required in the first 
 six of these cases (as referred to in this Statement) 
 was to strike out all mention of joint occupation 
 in the claims and declarations, and in the seventh 
 case to alter £10 in the declaration to £20. I 
 allowed aU these seven claims. 
 
 7. Application was duly made to me to state a ease 
 
 upon this decision; but on the autiuprits^of 
 Ainsky, App., v. Nicholson, Eesp. (Fo2^l46; 24 
 Q. B. Div. 144), I refused. Due notice of desire 
 to appeal was served upon me. 
 
 J. A. Foote, for the seven persons whose names were 
 
 objected to, showed cause against the rule. He sub- 
 
 . mitted that both the amendments in fact made by the 
 
 Eevising Barrister were within the power given him by 
 
 sec. 28 of 41 & 42 Vict. c. 26. As to the first amend- 
 
LVI VICTORIA. 279 
 
 ment, viz., that of striking out all reference to joint 1892. 
 occupation from the claims and declarations, it could The Qubbk 
 not be said that the effect of this would he to substitute Maokbllab. 
 one qualification for another. The only qualification 
 shown was a sole occupation of a bedroom. The value 
 set forth in the declaration, viz. £10, made this clear. 
 This would not be a sufficient value for a joint qualifi- 
 cation ; and the Revising Barrister has found as a fact 
 that the reference to the joint use of a sitting-room was 
 a mistake, and that by'striking it out the true qualifi- 
 cation remained correctly stated in accordance with the 
 facts. 
 
 As to the second amendment, viz., the alteration of 
 the value stated in the declaration from £10 to £20, the 
 Revising Barrister, upon inquiry, found that the de- 
 claration, which was for a joint lodger occupation, was 
 in every way right, except that the value was stated to 
 be £10; and that, in fact, the claimant held the lodgings 
 jointly with one other person, and that they were of a 
 clear yearly value sufficient to give not less than £10 
 for each lodger. This was obviously a mistake. He so 
 found it, and amended accordingly. 
 
 J. V. Austin, for the objector, supported the rule. 
 This is not an appeal. All that is necessary to show is 
 that there is & prima facie case of an arguable question. 
 If there is, the rule for a case to be stated upon which 
 the question can be argued and decided should be made 
 absolute. It is submitted that there is here such a 
 question. 
 
 [Pollock, B. If , on the contrary, we consider there 
 is not an arguable point, we must discharge the 
 rule.] 
 
280 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1892. Confining my argument to the Eevising Barrister's 
 
 The QtTEBN. statement, I abandon the rule on the question raised in 
 MioEBiLAB. CheeseworWs case, which would not have been included 
 had that statement beeij seen when the rule was moved. 
 The amendment of the statement of value from £10 to 
 £20 was one which, of course, the Eevising Barrister 
 had power to make. 
 
 The amendment, however, of the claims and dedarar 
 tions in the other six cases by striking out the reference 
 to joint occupation was not within his power. His dis- 
 cretion, under sub-sect. 2 of sect. 28 of 41 & 42 Vict. 
 cap. 26, is controlled by sub-sect. 13 of the same section. 
 He may amend a mistake, but not so as to alter the nature 
 of the qualification. Foskett v. Kaufmann (a) . . The effect 
 of this amendment is to alter the nature of the qualifica- 
 tion stated in the claim. A person may claim as sole 
 lodger under sect. 4 of the Eepresentation of People 
 Act, 1867, or as joint lodger under sect. 6, sub-sect. 3 
 of the ParKamentary and Municipal Eegistration Act, 
 1878 (&) ; but these are different qualifications necessi- 
 tating a different inquiry. The claims in these six cases 
 appear to be a combination of the two, a hybrid claim 
 for a qualification not known to the law, and for which 
 there is no warrant in the statutes. It is a stronger 
 case than that of Foskett v. Kaufmann (a). 
 
 [Hawkins, J. But here you have aU the ingredients 
 of a correct sole lodger claim. The sole use of a bed- 
 room and a value of £10. The rest seems to be added 
 as surplusage.] 
 
 It is submitted that this is either a claim for an 
 
 {/!) Colt. 466 ; 16 Q. S. D. 279. (J) 41 & 42 Viet. cap. 26. 
 
LVI VICTORIA. 281 
 
 tuiknown qualification or an alternative claim, aad, 1892. 
 
 therefore, bad either way. The Queen 
 
 y. 
 
 [Hawkins, J. If you strike out the statement as 
 to joint use of dining and sitting-room you have th© 
 proper qualification correctly stated.] 
 
 But the claim goes on to say in the declaration that 
 the claimant has occupied partly as sole lodger and 
 partly as joint lodger. 
 
 This, it is submitted, is a novelty in the way of a 
 hybrid qualification, which the Eevising Barrister has 
 changed into a good qualification. 
 
 Again, how is it to be ascertained whether some, and 
 how much, of the value stated, viz., £10, is not attri- 
 butable to the joint use of the dining and sitting-room ? 
 If any portion of the £10 is paid in respect of that, 
 there is not sufficient to support the sole qualification. 
 
 Pollock, B. We think the rule must be discharged. 
 The Court must not be too astute in picking holes in 
 what the Eevising Barrister has done in the exercise of 
 his power of amendment. In so far as his correction 
 of a mistake under sect. 28, sub-sect. 2 of the Parlia- 
 mentary and Municipal Registration Act, 1878, is based 
 upon findings of fact, this Court cannot interfere, and 
 therefore, as the intention of a claim, whether it be to 
 mislead or be made by mistake, is a question of fact, it 
 is for the Eevising Barrister to determine ; and he has, 
 in these cases, found it to have been made by mistake. 
 Of course we fully recognize the effect of sub-sect. 13 
 of sect. 28 of that Act, which precludes any evidence 
 being given of any other qualification than that de- 
 scribed in the claim, that is to say, a man must not 
 
282 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1892. make his claim for one qualification, and then give in 
 The Queen evidence in support of his claim another qualification of 
 
 V. 
 
 Maokeilae. a different nature. This occurred in the case of Foshett 
 V. Kaufmann (a), when the description of the qualifica- 
 tion in the list was " dwelling-house," and evidence 
 was given of a qualification for " houses in succession." 
 We are not, in deciding as we do, clashing with that 
 decision. Here the voters have described and given 
 evidence of the same qualification, which had been by 
 mistake simply misdescribed. 
 
 Hawkins, J., concurred. 
 
 Eule discharged. 
 
 Solicitors — For the Applicant, Farman and Btmms, 
 for Dunn, Exeter. 
 
 For the Respondent, Rohimon, Preston and 
 Stow, for F'iend and Seal, Exeter. 
 
 («) Colt. 466 ; 16 Q. B. D. 279. 
 
LVI VICTORIA. 
 
 28a 
 
 Guise, Appellant ; Dilke, Respondent. 
 
 A' 
 
 T a Court lield for the revision of the lists of voters 1892. 
 for the Forest of Dean Division of the County of °"' ' 
 
 Glomester, John W. Guise, the appellant, objected to the appeal not 
 
 names of Charles Green and other persons, whose names ^X?? ^. 
 
 ■"■ ■wnting m 
 
 were set out in a schedule to the case afterwards stated aooordanoe 
 
 ■with the pro- 
 
 by the Revising Barrister, being retained in Division I. visions of 
 
 6 Vict, cap. 
 
 of the Occupiers' List as parliamentary electors for the 18, sec. 42, 
 
 Forest of Dean parliamentary division of the Coimty of notice. 
 Gloucester. 
 
 The Eevising Barrister held that the notice of ob- 
 jection was bad, upon the grounds set forth in the case 
 afterwards stated by him. 
 
 The objector appealed. 
 
 On the appeal coming on to be heard, 
 
 JSegd. McKenna, for the respondent, took a pre- 
 liminary objection that no valid notice of appeal had 
 been given by reason of non-compliance with the pro- 
 visions of section 42 of 6 Vict. cap. 18. 
 
284 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1892. The facts were, that the notice of appeal was not 
 
 Guise given in writing before the rising of the Oourt in 
 
 V. 
 
 DiLKB. accordance with the requirements of that section ; but 
 was, with the consent of the Eevising Barrister, 
 given orally, subject to formal notice in writing being 
 afterwards given, which was done on a subsequent 
 day. 
 
 The Court called on 
 
 e, for the appellant. The oral notice given 
 at the time, supplemented by the formal notice in 
 writing subsequently given, was sufficient. The Ee- 
 vising Barrister assented to that course and dispensed 
 with an immediately written notice, and this point 
 was not raised on behalf of the persons objected to. 
 This Court, at any rate, can dispense with the for- 
 malities, if satisfied that notice was in fact given. The 
 provisions of see. 42 of 6 Vict. cap. 18, are directory. 
 
 [Lord CoLEMDGE, L.C.J. No, the terms of that 
 section are positive, and the Court cannot dispense with 
 the provisions of a statutory regulation. The point 
 appears to be covered by the authority of In re 
 Bane (a). J 
 
 That case is distinguishable. Here there has been 
 acquiescence. 
 
 [Lord OoLEKiDG!E, L.C.J. You cannot acquiesce in 
 a breach of the provisions of the statute.] 
 
 (ff) W. Hr. 1879, p. 200. 
 
LVI VICTORIA. 
 
 285 
 
 The Court (Lord Coleridge, L.C.J., Hawkins and 1892. 
 Cave, J J.) dismissed the appeal. Guise 
 
 
 Appeal dismissed. 
 
 SoHoitors — For the AppeUant, Keighky, Arnold, cmd 
 as. 
 
 For the Eespondent, Fladgates. 
 
286 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 Pease, Appellant; The Town Cleek op the 
 BoEOUGH OF MiDDLESBEOUGH, Eespondent. 
 
 1892. 
 
 Sfov. 8. 
 
 A notice of 
 obieotion 
 given by a 
 person whose 
 name is on 
 the oooupiers' 
 list as pub- 
 lished by the 
 overseers at 
 the time such 
 notice is 
 given re- 
 mains a good 
 notice, and 
 the person 
 remains a 
 competent 
 objector, uot- 
 vrithstanding 
 that prior to 
 the hearing of 
 the objection 
 the objector's 
 name has 
 been struck 
 off the list of 
 voters by the 
 Revising 
 Barrister. 
 
 A T a Court held on the 21st day of September, 1892, 
 for the revision of the lists of voters for the parlia- 
 mentary and municipal borough of Middlesbrough, one 
 James Walton appeared to object to the name of Arthur 
 Pease, the appellant, being retained on the Occupiers' 
 List, Division I., for the township of Middlesbrough, 
 within the said borough. 
 
 Notices of this objection proper in form had been 
 given by James Walton to the appellant, and to the 
 overseers of the township of Middlesbrough, on August 
 20th, 1892. 
 
 On behalf of the appellant objection was taten that 
 the Revising Barrister had no jurisdiction to hear or 
 entertain the objection made by James Walton, upon 
 the ground that he was not a competent objector, inas- 
 much as his name was not on the existing register of 
 voters for Middlesbrough, nor (at the time his objection 
 came on to be heard) on any Hst of voters for Middles- 
 brough. 
 
 The fact was that James Walton's name had been 
 inserted by the Overseers of Linthorpe (another town- 
 ship in the borough of Middlesbrough), in the Occupiers' 
 
LVl VICTORIA. 
 
 287 
 
 List, Division I., signed and published by the said Over- 
 seers on July 30th and August 1st, 1892. 
 
 James Walton's name was on that list, as a person 
 entitled to be registered as a parliamentary voter, and 
 to be enrolled as a burgess, on August 20th, 1892, 
 when he gave the notices of objection before mentioned ; 
 but on the same date, August 20th, 1892, he received 
 from a duly qualified objector a notice of objection to 
 his name being retained on the said list, on the ground 
 that he had not occupied the qualifying property for 
 the qualifying period. 
 
 This objection to James Walton, and the objection 
 by James Walton to Arthur Pease, the appellant, came 
 before the Revising Barrister for hearing on the same 
 day, viz., at the Court held by him as before stated on 
 September 21st, 1892. 
 
 At such Court the objections made to the Linthorpe 
 township list were considered before the objections 
 made to the Middlesbrough township list. The objection 
 to James Walton's qualification was proved, and his 
 name struck out of the list in which it had appeared. 
 
 The objection by James Walton to the name of 
 Arthur Pease, the appellant, then came on to be heard. 
 
 On behalf of James Walton it was argued, that the 
 words, "in any list of voters," in section 17 of 6 Vict. 
 cap. 18, which describes the qualification of a person 
 entitled to object, do not mean the old register but 
 refer to the lists made and published by overseers under 
 the provisions of section 13, or by the town clerk under 
 the provisions of section 14, of the same statute, for the 
 purpose of forming a new register ;- that James Walton's 
 name had been inserted by the overseers of Linthorpe in 
 such a list, and that no other condition was necessary 
 in order to entitle James Walton, if he thought fit, to, 
 
 1892. 
 
 Pease 
 
 V. 
 
 TsuTo-wir 
 Clebe: of 
 
 BEoiraH. 
 
288 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1892. 
 
 Feabe 
 
 V. 
 
 The Town 
 Oleile op 
 Mjddlbs- 
 
 BEOUQH. 
 
 give notices of objection in accordance ■with section 17 
 of- the Act, and to be heard in support of such ob- 
 jection. 
 
 On behalf of the appellant it was argued, that the 
 said words mean a list of persons in fact entitled to vote, 
 and therefore must refer either to the old register or to 
 some list approved and' signed by the Revising Bar- 
 rister for the purpose of the new register ; and that 
 James Walton never had been and for the present had 
 no prospect of becoming a " voter " for the borough of 
 Middlesbrough. 
 
 The Revising Barrister decided that having regard 
 to the use of the words "lists of voters" in other sections 
 of 6 Vict. cap. 18, particularly in sections 6, 15, and 16, 
 James Walton, at the time he gave the notices of objec- 
 tion, satisfied the requirements of section 17, and that 
 he had jurisdiction to hear the objection of which the 
 said James Walton had given notice. He found the 
 objection proved on the merits, and struck the name of 
 Arthur Pease, the appellant, out of the Middlesbrough 
 Occupiers' List in which it appeared. 
 
 At the same Court, and upon the objection of the 
 same James Walton, made imder similar circumstances, 
 the Revising Barrister struck out the names of six other 
 persons whose names were set out in a schedule to the 
 case afterwards stated by him. Notice of appeal was 
 duly given in aU the above cases, and the appeals were 
 ordered to be consolidated ; the said Arthur Pease and 
 the Town Clerk of Middlesbrough being, at the request 
 of the parties, named by the Revising Barrister to be 
 appellant and respondent respectively in the consoli- 
 dated appeal. 
 
 If the Court should be of opinion that the Revising 
 Banister had not jurisdiction to hear and determine the 
 
L\'I VICTORIA. 
 
 289 
 
 objections of ■which notice had been given by James 
 Walton, the names of the appellant and the other persons 
 set out in the said schedule were to be restored to the 
 Occupiers' List, Division I., for the Middlesbrough town- 
 ship of the borough oi Middlesbrough. 
 
 1892. 
 
 V. 
 
 The Town 
 Cleek oe 
 
 MlDDLES- 
 BBQUQH. 
 
 Maeashie, for the appellant. 
 
 The qualification of an objector is that he must have 
 been inserted in a list of parliamentary voters, 6 Vict. 
 cap. 18, sect. 17 ; and by the form given in the Regis- 
 tration Order, 1889, Schedule 3, Form I, he must 
 describe himself as "on the list of parliamentary elec- 
 tors." By sect. 13 of the same Act, the overseers are 
 required to make out lists of persons (other than free- 
 rden) who may be entitled to vote. It is submitted 
 that these lists, until they have been revised by the 
 Revising Barrister, are of no effect, and do not consti- 
 tute lists of voters within the meaning of section 17, 
 and therefore, unless the objector's name is still on the 
 list when his objection comes to be dealt with, the 
 objection fails. It is to be observed, that as to coun- 
 ties the list of the overseers is, by section 6 of the Actj 
 to be deemed to be the list of voters, but there is no 
 corresponding section as to borough voters. The same 
 express provision is made as to the " old lodgers' " list 
 by section 22 of the Pari. & Mun. Reg. Act, 1878 (a). 
 
 [Cave, J. It seems clear what lists of voters are to be 
 made from the terms of section 13 of 6 Vict. cap. 18, and 
 then section 17 provides that " every person whose name 
 shall have been inserted in any list of voters " may 
 object. That is the case here. 
 
 (a) 41 & 42 riot. cap. : 
 
290 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1892. 
 Pease 
 
 V. 
 
 The Town 
 Clebe of 
 
 MtDBLES- 
 BEOUQH. 
 
 Hawkins, J. It must be that the notice should he 
 a good notice at the time it is given. Any other cri- 
 terion would he incouTenient.] 
 
 After the ohjector's name had been expunged he was 
 not in a position to support an objection. He was then 
 a stranger to the constituency. 
 
 [Hawkins, J. But there was the objection. Could 
 not the Eevisiag Barrister deal with it, and that at the 
 risk of costs to the person who had made it P] 
 
 No counsel appeared for the respondent. 
 
 J. Bighy, as amicus curice, mentioned an Irish case, 
 Barr v. Chambers (a), in which it was held, under 
 simUajr circumstances, that the person was entitled to 
 object. 
 
 Lord OoLEKiDGE, L.O.J. It is clear there is nothing 
 in this objection to the notice. The person who gave 
 the notice of objection was, at the time he gave it, 
 entered on the list as provided by the Act of ParKament, 
 and the notice was good. 
 
 Hawkins and Cave, JJ., concurred. 
 
 Appeal dismissed. 
 
 Solicitors — For the Appellant, Williamson, Hill 8f Co., 
 for F. Brewster, Middlesbrough. 
 
 (a) 22 /)•. Sep. C. L. 265. 
 
LVI VICTORIA. 291 
 
 Bennett, Appellant ; Evans, Respondent. 
 
 AT a Court held for the revision of the lists of voters 1892. 
 
 for the Northern or Abingdon division of the ' 
 
 County of Berks, the claim of the appellant, Walter ^^^^""^ 
 
 Lovegrove Bennett, to be inserted as a lodger in the list ?°°™ "f v^ 
 
 of voters for the said division was duly obiected to by employer 
 
 .rmder an 
 William Evans, the respondent. agreement to 
 
 mi i> 1 • • 1 p n pay rent, and 
 
 The facts and the question raised were as follows : — not as part of 
 The appellant was employed by one BichardJBennett, servant, is 
 
 , . , . . T . , . , entitled to be 
 
 a wme merchant, uving and carrying on busmess at registered as 
 Grove Street, Wantage, as an assistant in his said ^ ° ^^^' 
 business, at an agreed weekly wage. 
 
 By a separate agreement the appellant agreed to use 
 and occupy a room in the said premises at Grove Street, 
 Wantage, at a rent of 5s. a week. Such rent had in 
 fact been paid by deducting the agreed rent from the 
 agreed weekly wage. The appellant had had the sole 
 use of the said room during the qualifying period. The 
 said room was of a clear yearly value, if let unfur- 
 nished, of £10 and upwards. 
 
 The Eevising Barrister decided that, inasmuch as the 
 appellant was a servant living with his master on the 
 premises where the service was to be and was in fact 
 performed, his occupation was occupation as a servant, 
 and could not be made by the subsidiary agreement 
 into occupation as a lodger. He accordingly disallowed 
 the claim of the appellant, and also the claims of. three 
 
 VOL. I. Tf 
 
292 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1892. other persons to whom like objections under similar 
 Bennett circumstances were made, and whose names were set 
 
 "V. 
 
 Evans. Out in a schedule to the case afterwards stated hy him. 
 Due notice of appeal was given, and the appeals were 
 consolidated. 
 
 If the Court should be of opinion that the decision of 
 the Revising Barrister was wrong, the register was to 
 be amended by inserting the names of the said Walter 
 Lovegrove Bennett and the three other persons in the 
 said Hst. 
 
 William Graham, for the appellant, submitted that 
 the occupation under the circumstances above stated of 
 a room of sufficient rental afiorded a qualification for 
 the lodger franchise, and that the principle of the service 
 franchise did not apply. There was no dispute as to 
 the arrangement for the use of the room and payment 
 of rent being binding. 
 
 No counsel appeared for the Eespondent. 
 
 Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. I am of opinion the Ee- 
 vising Barrister was vsrrong. The occupation was 
 sufficient. It is not suggested that it was the duty of 
 the appellant to occupy that particular place as ser- 
 vant {a), nor that the agreement was not a binding 
 agreement. The decision must be reversed. 
 
 Hawkins and Cave, JJ., concurred. 
 
 Appeal allowed. 
 
 Solicitors — For the Appellant, Meredith. 
 
 (a) See Farlcer v. Campion, 1 Ir. (-ffi. f i. App.) 75. 
 
LVI VICTORIA. 293 
 
 Baelow, Appellant; Smith, Respondent. 
 
 AT a Court held for the revision of the lists of voters 1892. 
 
 for the borough of Wigan, James Whitehead, who — ; — — — 
 tvas duly qualified in that behalf, objected to the name Southport and 
 of Daniel Barlow, the appellant, being retained on ^^o^.^wLre 
 Division I. of the Occupiers' List as a parliamentary t^g°ne6Un°" 
 elector for the parliamentary borough of Wigan, and as P''s™¥«^ 
 a burgess for the municipal borouffh of Wiqan, on the ^™- ^^ '""^ 
 
 ° '■ ° no sleeping 
 
 ground that the said Daniel Barlow had not resided for acoommoda- 
 
 - . tion on his 
 
 SIX calendar months next previous to the 15th day of premises at 
 July, 1892, within the said borough or seven miles twice during 
 
 ,■■ n the qualify- 
 
 tnereOI. lug penod he 
 
 The facts as stated by the Eevising Barrister were as f temjomry" 
 
 follows:— , bed made up 
 
 on chairs. 
 
 The appellant was a draper carrying on business at ^'?«« is 
 
 No. 3, Market Place, Wigan, in a shop which he owned, seven miles 
 
 distant from 
 
 The shop was rated at £60 gross and £50 rateable Southport. 
 
 Held, that A. 
 value. was not quali- 
 
 The appellant had also a house at Southport, where of his pre- 
 he resided with his wife and family. He went from p^a„%ot 
 Southport to Wigan every morning at half-past eight, i^de™ttierefor 
 and remained at his shop there till eight o'clock at six mouths 
 
 '^ ° previous to 
 
 night, and on Saturdays tiU ten o'clock. His shop ^'"^y ^^^> 
 
 , . ^ 1892, within 
 
 served as his postal address for both business and private ^e meaning 
 
 «. ■ m, n 1 of 2 & 3 
 
 affairs. There was a kitchen attached to the shop, JFUi. i, c. 46, 
 where he took his meals. He had no sleeping apart-' 
 
 v2 
 
294 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1892. ment and no bed in Wigan. On two occasions during 
 Baelov the six months previous to the 15th July, 1892, he 
 Smith. passed the night and slept at his shop on a temporary 
 bed made on chairs. 
 
 Southport is situate more than seven statute miles 
 from the borough of Wigan or any part thereof. 
 
 The qualification of the appellant was complete in aU 
 other respects. 
 
 The Eevisiag Barrister decided that the appellant 
 had not resided for six calendar months next previous 
 to the 15th day of July, 1892, within the said borough 
 of Wigan or within seven statute miles thereof, and 
 expunged his name from the said list. 
 
 Due notice of appeal was given. 
 
 If the Court should be of opinion that the decision of 
 the Revising Barrister was wrong, the register was to 
 be amended by restoring the name of the appellant to 
 the said list. 
 
 W. Ambrose, Q.O., for the appellant. The ques- 
 tion is, was a sleeping apartment necessary ? There is 
 no doubt the appellant was a bond fide resident during 
 the day, and it is submitted that his qualification under 
 the circumstances stated was sufficient. It depends 
 upon the meaning to be given to the provisions of 
 section 27 of 2 & 3 Will. 4, cap. 45. No doubt, for the 
 purpose of the old common law franchise, a man was 
 supposed to inhabit or reside in the place where he 
 slept. So for the purpose of the frank-pledge. So for 
 the qualification of a constable or of an elector to that 
 office. In all these cases the place where the man slept 
 was the criterion. It is submitted, however, that this 
 is not the meaning of the word "residence" in this 
 section, and there seems to be no case which has so 
 
LVI VICTOEIA. 295 
 
 decided. If the other qualification for the franchise 1892. 
 
 exists, the possession of a bond fide occupation and Baelow 
 
 interest m the town satisfies the requirements of the Smith. 
 section. 
 
 [Lord OoLEEiDGE, L.O.J. The section distinguishes 
 between occupation and residence.] 
 
 No doubt. The way I put it is this. The whole 
 interest in the place necessary for the franchise may be 
 discharged by actual occupation as owner or tenant, 
 and the payment of rent, rates, and taxes. A person 
 may have two or more residences, and if a man spends 
 eleven hours every day in his premises actively occupied, 
 that amounts to a residence within the meaning of the 
 section. In the case of Blackwell v. England (a), it was 
 held a sufficient description of residence to state the 
 place of business. 
 
 [Hawkins, J. That was a, case under the Bills of 
 Sale Acts.] 
 
 Yes, under an Act which expressly provides that the 
 affidavit should state the description and residence of 
 the grantor and witness. The residence of the attesting 
 witness, who was a solicitor's clerk, was described as at 
 the office of his employer, where he passed all the active 
 hours of his life, but it was not the place where he 
 slept. It was held that it was not only a sufficient but 
 the best description of his residence. This was followed 
 in the case of Attenhorough v. Thompson (b). 
 
 (a) S K ^ £. 541 ; 27 I. J. («) 1 S. % N. 559 ; 27 L. J. 
 
 Q. B. 124. Ex. 23. 
 
296 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1892. [Lord Coleridge, L.O.J. Those cases were under 
 
 Baelow tte Bills of Sale Acts. But this section contains this 
 Smith. proviso, " No such person shall be so registered in any 
 year unless he shall have resided . . ."] 
 
 That meets the case of a person who occupies but is 
 never there. All the section requires is that he shall 
 have a personal interest in the place, and whether this 
 can be acquired apart from sleeping in the place is, it is 
 submitted, covered by the decisions under the Bills of 
 Sale Acts as to the meaning of residence. It is neces- 
 sary to bear in mind the object of the particular statute, 
 and to apply the distraction suggested as to the occupa- 
 tion or residence required for the purposes of frank- 
 pledge and office of constable, &c. 
 
 I find no case deciding residence to have its old 
 meaning of sleeping. In the case of Poivell v. G^iest (a), 
 Earle, C. J., says, " I entirely subscribe to the doctrine 
 so clearly laid down in Elliott on Eegistration, where 
 the learned author says that, in order to constitute resi- 
 dence, a party must possess at least a sleeping apartment, 
 but that an uninterrupted abiding at such dwelling is 
 not requisite. Absence, no matter how long, if there 
 be liberty of returning at any time, and no abandonment 
 of the intention to return whenever it may suit the 
 party's pleasure or convenience so to do, will not prevent 
 a constructive legal residence " ; and then he gives illus- 
 trations. There is no other case against the appellant's 
 contention under this section. There are two other 
 cases, R. v. Mayor of Exeter {Wescomb's case) (b), and 
 It. V. Mayor of Exeter (Dipstale's case) (c). In the 
 former Blackburn, J., says, " There is no strict or 
 
 («) E. # P. 149 ; 18 C. B. N. 8. [b) L. R. AQ.B.IW; 19 L. T. 
 
 72, at p. 80. 397. . 
 
 Ic) liiif. p. lU; 19 X. T. 432. 
 
LVI VICTORIA. 
 
 297 
 
 definite rule for ascertaining what is inhabitanoe or 1892. 
 residence," and at p. 115, " There is no precise line to Baelow 
 be drawn. A person may inhabit a place without Smith. 
 sleeping there> or he may sleep there without inhabiting 
 it. The fact that a person sleeps in a place is generally 
 a very important ingredient in deciding whether he 
 inhabits it, but it is not conclusive." 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.O.J. Are you going to deal 
 with the case of Whithorn v. Thomas {a) ? That case 
 was decided by Tindal, C.J., Cottman, Maule, and 
 Earle, JJ., on this very section.] 
 
 Not on the same facts as here. 
 
 [Hawkins, J. Must we not overrule that case to 
 decide in your favour ?] 
 
 I should not argue the point on the facts of that ease. 
 The residence was colourable, and he had no local 
 interest. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. The point is this. In 
 that case, as here, there was plenty of occupation, was 
 there residence ? That case was not decided upon the 
 ground that the man's residence was for the purpose of 
 acquiring a vote, which is immaterial, but upon the 
 simple question, as in this case, whether, having a bond 
 fide occupation, he was entitled to a vote upon such 
 residence as the facts disclosed. Why should we, when 
 there is this express proviso distinguishing between 
 occupying and residing, go back from the old and 
 
 [a) ILutw. 125; 1 M.^&.\. 
 
298. MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1892. universal definition of residence, namely, the place where 
 Bablo-w a man's home is and where he sleeps ?] 
 
 V. 
 
 Smith. 
 
 There is a suhstantial distinction between that case 
 
 and my view of residence in the sense of occupation. 
 
 It would he doing violence to language to call it either 
 
 occupation or residence on the facts in Whithorn^ 
 
 case {a). There is not a single statement that he had 
 
 any personal interest in the place. The question is 
 
 simply whether a man can reside where he does not 
 
 sleep. He referred to the judgment of Denman, J., in 
 
 Bealv. Ford{b). 
 
 [Cave, J. But there the man slept. Have you a 
 single case where there has been residence without 
 sleeping ?] 
 
 No. But there is none that says in terms it is re- 
 quired, and there is the dictum in Bipstale's case (c). 
 
 [Cave, J. There the vote was disallowed.] 
 
 C. A. Russell, for the Eespondent, was not called 
 upon. 
 
 Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. I am of opinion the Ee- 
 vising Barrister was right. The person claiming to be 
 a voter had a shop at Wigan, where during the business 
 hours of each day he spent his time. He had no sleep- 
 ing accommodation there, but on two occasions he slept 
 there on a bed made upon chairs. He lived at South- 
 port, which is more than seven miles distant from Wigan. 
 
 {a) 1 Lutw. 125 ; 1 M.^ G.\. (o) i. R. i Q. B. at pp. 115, 
 
 (i)2B'.*C. 374; 3C.P.i).73. 116. 
 
LVI VICTORIA. 
 
 299 
 
 The question is whether, though living at Southport, he 1892. 
 also resided at Wigan. We have to deal with an Act of Baelow 
 ParHament (a) which distinguishes between occupation Smith. 
 and residence, and lays down a distinct proviso that, 
 in order to be entitled to vote, a person who occupies 
 must also reside withia, or within seven miles of the city, 
 borough, or place of which he claims to be an elector. 
 The legislature meant to distinguish between occupation 
 and residence. Abundant occupation without residence 
 is not sufficient to confer a vote. What is residence ? 
 The case of Whithorn v. Thomas {h) is very like this 
 case. The claimant had a shop at Tewkesbury, and 
 abundant occupation, but it was held that he was not 
 entitled to a vote because he lived at Gloucester, more 
 than seven miles distant. Earle, J., in that case, says 
 a man's residence is where his home is. That case was 
 considered in Bipstale's case {R. v. Mayor of Exeter (c) ), 
 in which Blackburn, J., in his judgment, expressly 
 adopts the language of Maule, J., in Bipstale's case 
 with approbation. Both these cases are on section 27 of 
 2 & 3 Will. 4, cap. 45. We have therefore the autho- 
 rity of three judges that in this section " residence " 
 implies " home," the place where a man lives. Now, 
 for centuries past it has always been held that where a 
 man lives and sleeps and has his home is the place 
 where he resides. We have to do with an Act of Par- 
 liament which deals with a word which over and over 
 again has been the subject of judicial decision, and in 
 view of those decisions no one" now could say that when 
 a man comes every day to his house of business, and 
 returns at night to his home, the house of business is 
 the place where he lives. 
 
 (a) 2 & 3 WiU. i, cap. 45, sec. (J) 1 Zutw. 125; 7 M. ^ G. 1. 
 
 27. («) J. S. i Q. B. 114. 
 
300 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1892. No case has been cited in ■whioh a person has been 
 
 Baelow held to have resided where he has not slept. Sleeping 
 SmiH. 0^ ^ couple of chairs would not satisfy that requirement. 
 The claimant resided at Southjport, which is more than 
 seven miles from Wigan. The Act of Parliament says 
 that residence within or within seven miles of the place 
 is necessary. He was therefore not qualified, and the 
 appeal must be dismissed. 
 
 Hawkins and Cave, JJ., concurred. 
 
 Appeal dismissed. 
 
 Solicitors — For the Appellant, Sharpe, Parker, Pritch- 
 ard, 8f Barham, agents for Acherley 8f 
 Son, Wigan. 
 
 For the Eespondent, C. E. Bird, agent 
 for the Town ClerTt of Wigan. 
 
LVI VICTORIA. 301 
 
 Peentice, Appellant; Maekham, Respondent. 
 
 AT a Court held for the revision of the lists of voters 1892. 
 
 for the Eastern Division of the County of North- — — 
 
 anipton, George Prentice, the appellant, duly ohjected to of a married 
 
 the name of John Coates being retained on Division I. carried on 
 
 of the Wellingborough (South Ward) Occupiers' List, as wown^ame 
 
 a parliamentary elector for the Eastern Division of the ^^f"?"^^^* 
 
 County of Northampton, and as a county elector for the occupied as 
 
 administrative County of Northampton. for which she 
 
 paid the rates 
 The ground of the said objection was that the said and taxes, 
 T y^ iii-i- i-i.- -1 lired with her 
 
 John Coates had not durmg the qualifying period ocou- and assisted 
 
 pied the premises described in the said list as owner or ness. Held, 
 , , that the hus- 
 
 tenant. Ijand was not 
 
 It was proved that the qualifying premises con- ^^^tl^l,, 
 sisted of a dwelling-house and saddler's shop, and said premises, 
 that Sarah Elizabeth Coates, the wife of the said John 
 Coates, was the tenant of the qualifying premises, 
 and rated in respect thereof, and that she carried on 
 business there as a saddler in her own name, but that 
 the said John Coates lived with her and assisted in the 
 business. 
 
 It was contended on behalf of the objector, that the 
 said John Coates had not been, during the qualifying 
 period, the inhabitant occupier as owner or tenant of 
 the qualifying premises, and had not been rated in 
 respect of the said premises, but that by virtue of the 
 Married Women's Property Acts the said Sarah Eliza- 
 beth Coates was the real occupier as tenant, and that the 
 said John Coates was not occupier except as servant. 
 
302 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1892. The Eevising Barrister disallowed the objeotion, and 
 
 Pbentiob decided, upon the foregoing facts, that the said John 
 MiBKHAM. Coaies was entitled to have his name retained in the 
 said list of voters, and retained the same accordingly. 
 Due notice of appeal was given. 
 If the Court should he of opinion that the decision of 
 the Eevising Barrister was wrong, the register was to 
 be amended by erasing the name of the said John Coates 
 from the said list. 
 
 G. Sills, for the appellant, stated the facts and the 
 question raised. 
 
 No counsel appeared for the respondent. 
 
 Lord OoLEKiBGE, L.O.J. , forthwith gave judgment 
 for the appellant, and said, I am of opinion the 
 Revising Barrister was wrong. I cannot imagine on 
 what ground he decided as he did. The person whose 
 vote is objected to was neither landlord nor tenant, nor 
 was he rated, nor had he any qualification whatever. 
 It appears from the facts stated, that his wife had, and 
 would have had, even before the recent Acts as to 
 married women, the whole interest in the business, and 
 that she was the occupier of the premises, and was 
 rated in respect of them. The voter was clearly not 
 entitled to be registered, and the decision must be 
 reversed. 
 
 Hawkins and Gave, JJ., concurred. 
 
 Appeal allowed. 
 
 SoKoitors — For the Appellant, Nicholson, Ordham and 
 Graham, for James Heygate, Wellingborough. 
 
LVI VICTORIA. 303 
 
 Hicks, Appellant; Stokes, Respondent. 
 
 AT a Court held on the Slst day of Septemher, 1892, ^892. 
 for the revision of the lists of voters for the South ; ~ 
 
 In notices of 
 
 Eastern or Bodmin Division /of the County of Cormvall, objection 
 
 under 6 Vict. 
 William Henry Hicks, who was duly qualified in that c. 18, s. 17, 
 
 behalf, ohjected to all the notices of objection made by tim Order, 
 
 John Badgery, of Burnard's Terrace, and Thomas Brock, rig^t of per- 
 
 of St. Nicholas Street, respectively, throughout the registered for 
 
 whole of the said division, on the ground of the omis- ^}}^.^''^^'P,, 
 
 ' ° division of the 
 
 sion in the said notices of obiection of the name of the County of 
 
 Gornwall, the 
 
 town in which the said objectors respectively resided. objector 
 
 described 
 The Eevising Barrister, at the request of the agtot himself 
 
 on the other side, amended the said notices by adding oaseof owner- 
 in each instance the word " Bodmin" io the place of "j^b°, Bur- 
 abode of the said objectors. race, on the 
 The notices of objection served on the several persons Ei^g^tOT?fOT 
 objected to, were signed by the respective objectors' as the Township 
 
 follows, viz., in the case of ownership voters, " John Borough " ; 
 
 and in the case 
 Badgery (place of abode), Burnard's Terrace, on the of lodger or 
 
 occupier 
 
 Eegister of Electors for the Township of Bodmin voters, "J.b., 
 Borough," and " Thomas Brock (place -of abode), St. Terrace, on 
 Nicholas Street, on the Eegister of Electors for the ParHament- 
 
 ary Electors 
 or Burgesses 
 for the Township of Bodmin Borough." His place of abode was in fact 
 Burnard's Terrace, Bodmin. Held, that the place of abode of the objector 
 was sufficiently described. Semble, per Hawkins, J., the Revising Barrister, 
 finding as a fact that the omission in the notice was a mistake, and that 
 no one was misled, had power to amend. 
 
304 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 ^892. Township of Bodmin Borough ;" and in the case of 
 HioKs lodger and occupier voters, "John Badgery (place of 
 
 V. 
 
 SioKEs. ahode), Bumard's Terrace, on the List of Parliamentary 
 Electors or Burgesses for the Township of Bodmin 
 Borough," and " Thomas Brock (place of ahode), St. 
 Nicholas Street, on the List of Parliamentary Electors 
 and County Electors or Burgesses for the Township of 
 Bodmin Borough." 
 
 It was contended by the appellant that the notices of 
 objection were invalid, on the ground that the addresses 
 of the objectors at " Burnard's Terrace " and " St. 
 Nicholas Street " respectively were insufficient without 
 the addition of the name of the town ia which they 
 resided, in order to enable the person objected to to 
 communicate with the objector. 
 
 It was further contended by the appellant, that the 
 Revising Barrister had no power to amend. 
 
 No evidence was given before the Revising Barrister 
 that any one of the several persons on whom the notices 
 of objection were served had been misled or inconve- 
 nienced by the omission of the wovd" Bodmin" after 
 the words "Burnard Terrace" and "St. Nicholas 
 Street " respectively, and he found, as a matter of fact, 
 that no one had been misled or inconvenienced by such 
 omission. 
 
 He was further of opinion that the words in the 
 notices of objection describing the abode of the voters 
 as above stated, showed sufficiently that their place of 
 abode was at Bodmin, and held that he had therefore 
 power to amend by adding to the addresses the word 
 "Bodmin," 
 
 He also held that, even if the addresses were insuffi- 
 cient, he had, under the circumstances, power to amend, 
 
LVI VICTOKIA. 
 
 305 
 
 and did so amend, by adding in each instance the word 1892. 
 ^'Bodmin" as before mentioned. Hicza 
 
 He accordingly disallowed the objection to the Stokes. 
 notices of objection, and expunged from the respective 
 lists the names of the several persons mentioned in the 
 schedule to the case afterwards stated by him. 
 
 The objector to the notices of objection and the 
 several persons whose names were so expunged appealed, 
 and the appeals were ordered to be consolidated. 
 
 The question for the Court was whether under the 
 circumstances, and on the facts stated, the Revising 
 Barrister had power to amend the notices of objection 
 in the way in which he so amended them, and whether 
 such amendments rendered the . notices of objection 
 valid. If the Court should be of opinion that the 
 decision was wrong, then the names of the several 
 persons mentioned in the schedule were to be restored 
 to the several lists from which they had been respec- 
 tively expunged. 
 
 H. E. Duke, for the appellant, having stated the 
 facts, 
 
 E. U. Bullen, for the respondent, raised a preliminary 
 objection that the case stated by the Eevising Barrister 
 omitted to state that any notice of appeal was given. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. We wiU hear the appeal 
 on its merits before dealing with this objection.] 
 
 Dulce, for the appellant. The question is whether the 
 notices of objection are valid and in compliance with 
 the forms and instructions contained in the Registration 
 Order, 1889, which are substituted for the forms under 
 
306 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1892. the Eegistration Act, 6 Vict: c&-p. 18. The forms are 
 HioKs Form No. 5 (A.) and (B.) of Sohed. 1, and Form (I.) 
 SiozBs. No. 2 of Sched. 2. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.O.J. What do you say of the 
 
 case of Sheldon v. Flatcher (a) ?] 
 
 A later case relating to objections in counties makes 
 a distinction which, it is submitted, makes that case 
 inapplicable. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. But you see the case 
 states that the objector is "on the register of electors 
 for the township of Bodmin borough." Is he not a 
 Bodmin man ?] 
 
 The decisions show that in the case of objections to a 
 borough list the objector must be resident in the town ; 
 in the case of objections to a county list he may reside 
 anywhere in the county or division, Humphrey v. 
 'Earleip). In that ease both Sheldon v. Flatcher, a 
 borough case, and Woollett v. Bavies (c), a county case, 
 were cited, and Sheldon v. Flatcher was followed in 
 Adams v. Bostock [d), also a borough case. 
 
 Next as to the Eevising Barrister's power to amend. 
 The wide power given by section 28 of the Parliamen- 
 tary and Municipal Eegistration Act, 1878 (e), extended 
 to coimties by the Eegistration Act, 1885 (/), and the 
 County Electors Act, 1888 (g), necessitates some reason- 
 able limitation. 
 
 («) 2Zutw. 11; 5 C.S. 14. 259. 
 
 (J) SMt Mx, 39 ; 20 Q. B. D. (e) 41 & 42 Vict. c. 26. 
 
 294. (/) 48 Viet. c. IS. 
 
 (<!) 1 Zutu). 607 ; iC.£. 115. {g) 61 & 52 Vict. o. 10. 
 (d) 1 Colt. 276; 8 Q. £. D. 
 
LVI MCTOKIA. 307 
 
 [Hawkins, J. But the Eevising Barrister need not 1892. 
 amend. If he found that there was any misleading, he Hiora 
 would in his discretion, acting rightly, refuse to amend. Siokes. 
 On the other hand, finding that no one has been misled, 
 and that the omission has been merely accidental, why 
 should he not treat it as a mistake, and correct it by 
 amending ?] 
 
 When a man omits what the Act says he shall include, 
 that cannot, except it be a clerical error or something of 
 slight importance like that, be amended. Here it does 
 not appear that the objector did not live at Liverpool. 
 
 [Hawkins, J. Do you suggest that anyone thought 
 he lived at Liverpool ?'] 
 
 There is no evidence either way, and the facts here 
 require the same interpretation of the Act as was given 
 in the Petersfield case {Humphrey v. Earle) (a). Again, 
 even though the description might suffice for persons 
 living in Bodmin, how could it so serve persons living 
 at Looe or lAskeard as to enable them to communicate 
 with the objector ? 
 
 The Eevising Barrister's opinion that the statements 
 in the notice as to the objector's being on the register 
 for the township of the borough of Bodmin showed that 
 to be his place of abode is contrary to th? case of 
 Eidsforth v. Farrer (S). 
 
 [Cave, J. That ease was decided a year before 
 Sheldon v. Flatcher (c)]. 
 
 {a) Scott Fox, 39 ; 20 Q. B. B. (b) 1 Lutw. 517 ; i 0. S. 9. 
 
 94. {c) 2 Lutw. U; 5 C. B. 14. 
 
308 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1892. E. U. BuUen, for the respondent, was not called 
 
 HioKs upon. 
 
 T. 
 
 Lord Coleridge, L.O.J. We need not deal ■with the 
 preliminary ohjection, as we are against the appellant 
 on the suhstantial question raised hy him, viz., that the 
 notice of objection was not sufficient. We are concluded 
 by the case of Sheldon \. Flatcher (a) . There the obj ection 
 was exactly what it is in this ease. The objector's place 
 of abode was stated to be at a particular place, " 5, Sher- 
 borne Street," but the notice omitted to add " Chelteri' 
 ham." It was nevertheless held to be sufficient. 
 Maule, J., after laying down that the Eevising Bar- 
 rister must be taken to have formed his opinion as to 
 the sufficiency of the notice from the notice alone, said 
 it was clear that the true intendment of the notice was 
 an intimation by a Cheltenham man to a Cheltenham 
 man of a place in Cheltenham. Here all the votes 
 objected to are Bodmin votes or of the district, and the 
 Eevising Barrister has found that no one was misled. 
 The objector's abode is in fact in Bodmin, and well 
 known. The authority of the case decided by Lord 
 Truro and Maule, J., is precisely in point. We were 
 pressed with the Petersfield case {Humphrey v. Earle) (b). 
 That was a case of objection to a county vote, and the 
 notice of objection was signed " Q-eorge Chapman, of 
 Churchyard, on the list of parliamentary voters for the 
 parish of Petersfield." The objector lived in a house . 
 in Petersfield Churchyard, but the notice did not state - 
 that, nor even that it was " the Churchyard," and the 
 objection was sustained on the ground that the notice 
 might not give sufficient information and might mislead. 
 If this case comes within the decision of either the 
 
 [a) 2 Lutw. 11 ; 5C.B. 14. (J) Scott Fox, 39 ; 20 Q. B. D. 294. 
 
LVI TICTOKIA. 
 
 309 
 
 V. 
 
 Cheltenham case (a) or the Petersfield case (b), it is cer- ^^92. 
 tainly nearer the earlier case. The Revising Barrister has Hioks 
 foTind that no one was misled, and his decision that the 
 notice was sufficient was right, and must he upheld. It 
 is not necessary to say whether he had power to amend. 
 
 Hawkins and Cave, J J.,. concurred. 
 
 Appeal dismissed. 
 
 SoHoitors — For the Appellant, Law 8f Worsam, for 
 Bond, Pearce, 8f Sickle, Plymouth. 
 
 For the Eespondent, Busk 8f Co., for 
 S. S. Stokes, Bodmin. 
 
 (a) 2 Zutv). 11; n Z.J. 0. F. (i) Scott Fox, 39 ; 20 Q. B. B. 
 
 34. 294. 
 
 z2 
 
310 HILARY SITTINGS. 
 
 Rowland, Appellant; Pritchaed, Eespondent. 
 
 1893. 
 Feb. 13. 
 
 The four AT a Court held at Bangor on the 26th Septemher, 
 
 Bmgor Gath.6- 1892, foT the revision of the lists of voters 
 
 wTose joint for the election of a member of parliament for the 
 tSia'sTt contributory borough of Bangor, W. Hum Rowland, 
 sSent^^" *^« appellant, objected to the name of D. W. Thomas 
 house, the beiuff retained on Division I., West Ward List, as a 
 
 oanonry, by ° 
 
 an agreement parliamentary elector for the said borough, and as a 
 themselves in burgess for the municipal borough of Bangor, on the 
 
 force during 
 
 the qualifying foUowing grounds, viz. : — 
 
 changed their 1- That he was not, on the 15th day of July last, 
 ocf upation"' an occupier of the qualifying premises, and had 
 
 wSlf year ^°* ^GD. been an occupier of the qualifying 
 
 siToTccupi'^' premises for the whole of the twelve months 
 
 tion by each immediately preceding that day. 
 
 during three '' '^ ^ •' 
 
 months in the 2. That he did not during the qualifying period 
 
 two canons occupy as owner or tenant of the qualifying 
 
 for whom the . ± « ^ 
 
 vote in re- premises. 
 
 canonry was The appellant also, at the same Court, objected in 
 
 sided within ^^ form to the name of Eleazer Williams being re- 
 
 thl Wugh°' t^i^^d ^Pon the said list. 
 
 me^*?ng''of ^^^ '^^^^ ^^^ quaHfications of the said W. D. 
 
 ^ 7}'^' *<!, Thomas, and Eleazer Williams, stood upon the said list 
 c. 45, 8. 27. . ' r 
 
 Seid, that in the following form, viz, : — 
 
 they had not 
 
 tSZte,^^ WiUiams, Eleazer. 
 and were not 
 
 entitled to a It -^as proved by evidence before the Eevising Bar- 
 vote. Jones . 
 V. Fritohard, ristor that the qualifying premises were occupied by 
 
 explained. 
 
 St. Ann's Vioarage, Llandegai. 
 Rectory, Llangefni. 
 
 House (joint). 
 House (joint). 
 
LVI VICTORIA. 311 
 
 the said Z>. W. Thomas, and Eleazer Williams, canons 1893. 
 of Bangor, and by two other canons (there being four), Rowland 
 and that each of the four canons usually occupied the Prhohabd. 
 said premises as a resident canon for three months in 
 every year, by voluntary agreement between themselves, 
 according to their convenience respectively; and that 
 in ease of need, or according to such agreement and 
 their convenience respectively, each and every of them 
 the said four canons might and would himself alone 
 occupy the whole of the said premises for more than 
 three months in any year, or for the whole of any 
 year; and that the premises were, accordiug to the 
 agreement in force during the twelve months, in the 
 exclusive personal occupation of the said canon D. W. 
 Thomas during three months in the qualifying year, 
 and that he did not personally occupy the qualifying 
 premises during any other part of the qualifying period; 
 and that canon Eleazer Williams and the two other 
 canons in like manner occupied the said premises, each 
 occupying for three months; and that the preniises 
 were, from time to time, between the going out of one 
 canon and the coming in of another, in the care of a 
 servant, employed by the said four canons as the 
 servant of each and every of them; and that it was 
 the duty of such servant to cleanse the premises and 
 make them ready for the incoming canon ; and that 
 such serva'Ut did not reside on the qualifying premises ; 
 and that each canon when in residence had his own 
 servants in attendance upon him ; and that the furniture, 
 which 'was at all times on the said premises, belonged 
 to the four canons jointly, each canon when in resi- 
 dence having the exclusive use of such furniture ; and 
 that the said four canons were jointly rated for the said 
 premises. 
 
312 HILARY SITTINGS. 
 
 1893. The Eevising Barrister disallowed the objections, 
 
 EowiAHB and decided that the said D. W. Thomas and Eleazer 
 Pbittoaed. Williams respectively were, and had been, for the 
 whole of the twelve months aforesaid, occupiers of the 
 said qualifying premises, and did during such period 
 occupy the same as owners or tenants respectively ; and 
 retained the names of the said D. W. Thomas and 
 Eleazer Williams on the said list. 
 
 The said W. Huw Rowland appealed. 
 
 There was no distinction between the oases of the 
 said D. W. Thomas and Eleazer Williams, and they 
 were ordered to be consolidated. If the Court should 
 reverse the decision of the Eevising Barrister, the 
 names of the said D. W. Thomas and Eleazer Williams 
 were to be omitted from the said list. 
 
 Bryn Roberts, for the appellant. 
 
 The question in this case is as to the right of the 
 residentiary canons of Bangor to vote in respect of 
 their occupation of the oanonry; and it is submitted, 
 first, that there was no occupation, actual or construc- 
 tive, for the whole of the twelve months ; and secondly, 
 that even if there were such an occupation, it was not 
 as owner or tenant. As to the first point, was there a 
 constructive occupation by the several canons for the 
 nine months during which they did not occupy in fact, 
 on the ground put forward by the respondents, that 
 there was a joint tenancy? It is conceded for the 
 purpose of this argument that if there were here a 
 joint tenancy, the occupation of one would be an occu- 
 pation by aU. But, upon the facts stated, there is 
 here an agreement for the exclusive occupation by each 
 
LVI VICTORIA. 
 
 313 
 
 of the canons for three months. This rehuts the pre- 1893. 
 sumption of a constructive occupation for the other Eowlajstd 
 iune months. There is therefore no joint tenancy, hut, Pbitohaeb. 
 in fact, a partition and severance of the premises for 
 the purpose of occupation, not in point of area but in 
 point of time. There was no occupation by each or all 
 for twelve months. It is the same in principle as the 
 case of two fields held in joint tenancy, but of which 
 the joint tenants, by agreement, have each the ex- 
 clusive occupation of one. Neither could claim for the 
 whole. So here the joint right, if it existed, had been 
 surrendered for a right of exclusive occupation for three 
 months. 
 
 [Lord CoLERtDGE, L.O.J. I understand this case 
 has been previously decided.] 
 
 Germaine, for the respondent. 
 
 It is submitted that the same point was decided last 
 year, in the case of Jones v. Pritchard {a), by the same 
 Court. 
 
 Bryn Boberts. This poiat was not decided in that 
 case. There, the claim being for a joint occupation, 
 the notices of objection were (1) that the voter was not 
 an inhabitant occupier, and (2) that he did not occupy 
 as owner or tenant. The first objection was under the 
 wrong statute {b), and did not apply to a claim for a 
 joint tenancy, and was therefore bad; and as to the 
 second, it was held insufficient because it was not 
 objected, and the case did not state,, that the voter had 
 not resided within, or within seven miles of, the borough 
 
 («) Ante, p. 269. (*) 30 & 31 Vict. o. 102. 
 
314 HILAHY SITTINGS. 
 
 1893. for six months prior to July 15th. The appeal was 
 Eo-wiAiro accordiagly dismissed upon the technical grounds of 
 Peitohaed. the invalidity and insufficiency of the notices of oh- 
 jection, and no decision ■was given on the merits. The 
 question in this case is not as to inhabitancy or resi- 
 dence (residence within seven miles being admitted), 
 but as to occupation only. 
 
 [Lord CoLEEiDGE, L.C.J. That appears to be so. 
 The point that arises here was not decided. It now 
 comes to be dealt with on the merits. Formerly, in 
 cathedral cities, each canon had a separate house ; now 
 it is the ease in some, at York, I know, as at Bangor, 
 that there is only one house for the several canons, 
 and special arrangements, I suppose, are made as to 
 occupation.] 
 
 Again, the house does not belong to the canons, but 
 to the dean and canons as a corporate body. 
 
 [Lord CoLEEiDGE, L.O.J. Yes, the fee would be in 
 the dean and chapter — the corporation.] 
 
 Then the canons do not occupy as either owners or 
 tenants. 
 
 [Collins, J. It appears from the case that the 
 furniture is the joint property of the four canons.] 
 
 Yes. 
 
 [Collins, J. Can we gather from the case that, 
 except as to their respective three months, the rights 
 of the canons to return to occupy the house is ousted ?] 
 
LVI VICTORIA. 315 
 
 Yes, the provisions of the agreement as to this 1893, 
 appear from the following statements in the case : — Rowlastd 
 " Each of the four canons usually occupies the premises Pmtohaed. 
 as a resident canon for three months in every year, by 
 voluntary agreement between themselves according to 
 their convenience respectively"; and "that the pre- 
 mises were, according to the agreements in force during 
 the qualifying period, in the exclusive personal occu- 
 pation of canon D. W. Thomas during three months in 
 the qualifying year, and that he did not personally 
 occupy the qualifying premises during any other part 
 of the qualifying period" ; and it is submitted that 
 this amounts to a binding agreement in fact acted upon 
 for an occupation by one to the exclusion of the others. 
 
 Moreover, no definite term need be agreed upon. A 
 tenancy at will would be sufficient to create a break in 
 occupation for the period of occupation in fact by the 
 tenant at will. It is admitted that they might vary 
 the agreement, but the question here depends upon 
 what they, in fact, did. The occupation by the ser- 
 vant mentioned in the case does not amount to a con- 
 structive occupation by the absent canons, being only 
 an occasional occupation for requisite purposes on a 
 • change of residence, and that not residential. 
 
 [Collins, J. The case of Ford v. Pye (a) seems to 
 be an authority in your favour; Mr. Justice Keating 
 there says — " It appears to me clear that there was in 
 this case a break in the residence of two months. The 
 respondent had voluntarily given up the possession of his 
 house for good consideration to another person for that 
 period; but whether the transaction amounted to a 
 demise of the house seems to me to be immaterial. He 
 
 (a) 2 Sop. ^ C. 157 ; L. R.9 G. P. 269, 271. 
 
316 HILARY SITTINGS. 
 
 . 1893. had authorized another to occupy it for a certain de- 
 EowxAKD finite period, and he himself not only did not return or 
 Peitosabd. reside there during such period, hut he never contem- 
 plated doing so."] 
 
 Bur ant v. Carter (a), and Ford v. Barnes {b), are 
 also authorities in my favour on the same point. In 
 those cases there was held to be a break in the occu- 
 pancy. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.O.J. What do the canons 
 who are not in residence do on temporary occasions 
 when their presence is required ?] 
 
 It may be that they arrange to use the house for 
 temporary convenience, as, for instance, to go there 
 during the day ; but it could not be supposed that on 
 the occasion, for instance, of a week of a Diocesan 
 Conference they would have the right to invade the 
 house, for the time, with their wives and families. 
 
 [Collins, J. Is there any question of residence ?] 
 
 No. They reside within seven miles. The only 
 question is occupation. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. It has been decided, over 
 and over again, that if there is a break in the occu- 
 pation which arises from an impossibility of returning 
 there is no occupation.] 
 
 So here. Further, these canons are incumbents of 
 their respective livings, and they are bound, by statute, 
 
 (») 2 Sop. # 0. 142 ; i. if. 9 C. P. 261. 
 (4) OoU. 396 ; 16 Q. B. D. 254. 
 
LVI VICTORIA. 317 
 
 to reside in their benefices, except when they are in 1893. 
 residence as canons. Rowland 
 
 V. 
 
 Fbhohabd. 
 
 [Lord OoLEKiDGE, L.O.J. The cases are different. 
 A clergyman has, under ciroumstanoes, a right to he 
 away from his living, and residence there need not 
 comprise sleeping.] 
 
 [Wright, J. It is quite clear that if the other 
 canons were away the one would be in a position to 
 occupy, even though he were resident in his benefice.] 
 
 I will not press this point further. 
 
 [Collins, J. The only point is, whether there has 
 been here an exchange of a joint for an exclusive right 
 of occupation.] 
 
 In Cowper v. Fletcher {a), it was decided that a joint 
 tenant might demise. Here, then, is a demise at will, 
 
 [Collins, J. You need not go the length of a 
 demise, on the authority of Ford v. Pye (b). Is there 
 any difference between the case of two householders 
 exchanging houses for part of a year, each thus break- 
 ing his occupation, and the case, as here, of joint tenants, 
 assuming these are joint tenants, exchanging their right 
 of joint occupation for the whole year for an exclusive 
 occupation for part of the year ?] 
 
 It is submitted there is no difference in principle, and 
 it is not admitted that they are joint tenants. 
 
 (a) Q B.^8. 464 ; 34 Z. /. Q. B. 187. 
 (4) 2 Sop. i- C. 157; L. S. 9 C. P. 269. 
 
318 
 
 HILARY SITTINPS. 
 
 ^893. [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. Do tHese oanons occupy 
 
 Ko-wxAND as owners or tenants at all ?] 
 
 V, 
 
 Pbitchabd 
 
 It is"'sul)mitted they are not. The fee is in the dean 
 and chapter, who are the owners. The canons are 
 merely individual members of that corporation, not 
 its tenants. It was held in Bridgwater, v. Durant {a) 
 that a lay clerk of Windsor did not occupy as owner 
 or tenant. Therefore, even if there was an occupation, 
 actual or constructive, for the whole twelve months, 
 which, it is submitted, there was not, it was not an 
 occupation as " owner or tenant." 
 
 Germaine for the respondent. The facts of this case 
 are precisely the same as those of Jones v. Pritchard (6), 
 decided in this Court last year, and it is submitted it is 
 covered by that decision. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. The point was not decided 
 in that case ; it went on a technical objection.] 
 
 The point taken here rests upon a confusion of 
 residence and occupation. The authorities cited are 
 all cases as to residence, not as to occupation. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. So far as I know, there is 
 no case in which the precise point has been decided, 
 but the principle has. Tou must establish that where 
 four persons have agreed for the exclusive occupation 
 of the qualifying premises by each of them for a por- 
 tion of the twelve months, they nevertheless have a 
 constructive occupation for the rest of the period.] 
 
 (a) K. # G. m ; 11 C. S. {N. S.) 7. 
 (*) Ante, p. 259. 
 
LVI VICTORIA. 319 
 
 Eesldenoe here is not necessary for the qualification, 1893- 
 and occupation is a different thing. Moreover, the Eowland 
 voluntary agreement between the four canons did not Pbhohabd. 
 put an end to the legal right of each to occupy at other 
 times than their respective periods of residence. The 
 case states — " In case of need, or according to such 
 agreement and their convenience respectively, each and 
 every of them the said four canons might and would 
 himself alone occupy the whole of the said premises for 
 more than three months in any year, or for the whole 
 of any year." 
 
 [Lord OoLEEiDGE, L.O.J. That might be in the ease 
 of death or a vacancy.] 
 
 The phrase is general. 
 
 [Lord OoLERiDGE, L.C.J. It would apply to every one 
 of the cases in which the principle has been decided.] 
 
 Then as to the point that the occupation fails because 
 there has been a " break " in residence. The furni- 
 ture was the joint property of aU, and continued on 
 the premises the whole time. That, it is submitted, 
 satisfies the requirements of occupation. Moreover, 
 the occupation by the servant of the four, coming into 
 the premises at the end of each of the respective three 
 months, and looking after the goods and interests of 
 each and all of them, amounted to an occupation by 
 his masters. They aU resided within seven miles, and 
 therefore no residence on the premises was necessary. 
 They kept their furniture there, and their servant was 
 there from time to time. It is submitted that these 
 conditions are sufficient to constitute occupation, taken 
 
320 HILARY SITTINGS. 
 
 1893. in conjunction •witli tlie rigMs of each to come to the 
 EowLAUD canonry when he has occasion to he in the place at 
 Peiiohaed. times other than his period of residence. 
 
 [Collins, J. That is contrary to the facts stated in 
 the case.] 
 
 [Wkight, J. Upon the facts of this case it would 
 seem that none of these canons can have any qualifi- 
 cation at all unless he was registered before the Act of 
 1884 (a). It does not appear from the case that any of 
 them was so registered, and the qualification is not 
 saved. 
 
 [Collins, J. That is not one of the ohjections, 
 and we cannot go outside them I suppose.] 
 
 No. 
 
 Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. I am of opinion that the 
 Revising Barrister was wrong, and his decision must 
 he reversed and their votes disallowed. The ease stated 
 by liim is in respect of the right to vote of two of the 
 four canons of Bangor. The facts are these. There 
 is one house of residence called the canonry. By 
 statute it is required that each canon should reside in 
 his canonry for three months in every year. It might 
 be, if each canon had a house of his own, as formerly 
 was usual, that, though he resided for three months 
 only, he was qualified to vote by reason of an actual 
 or constructive occupation for twelve months. But at 
 Bangor, for perfectly good reasons, there has been 
 established one house of residence for the four canons, 
 
 (a) 48 Vict. cap. 3, sect. 10. 
 
LVI VICTORIA. 321 
 
 Tvliioli, by arrangement between themselves, tbey each 1893. 
 occupy in succession for a period of three months and Eowlaitd 
 
 "V. 
 
 no more. This arrangement is embodied in an agree- Pbitchaed. 
 ment, the substance of which is set out in the case 
 stated by the Revising Barrister. It is to the effect 
 that each of the four canons is to occupy the house 
 exclusively for three months in the year. By the 
 agreement they have denuded themselves of the right 
 to occupy except for three months, and they have in 
 fact occupied each for three months only. Therefore 
 they have not aU, nor has any of them, occupied for 
 twelve months. That seems to be an end of the case. 
 The arrangement is a reasonable one, and the case 
 appears to be concluded by authority. In the case of 
 Durant v. Carter (a) an incumbent under a license for 
 non-residence from the bishop was absent from his 
 rectory house for a portion of the qualifying year. 
 He had arranged with a curate to serve the cure during 
 his absence, to whom the rectory house was assigned 
 by the bishop as a residence. The curate occupied the 
 house during such absence, three rooms being retained 
 by the incumbent and kept locked, but he could not 
 have returned to reside in the house without providing 
 some other residence for the curate. Under these cir- 
 cumstances it was argued that Mr. Carter, the incum- 
 bent, although he had not resided, had retained an 
 occupation of the house. In some sense he had done 
 so, but it was held that he had not retained an occu- 
 pation sufficient to qualify him for the purpose of the 
 franchise. There had been a "break." He had put 
 the curate into possession and denuded himself of the 
 right to occupy. That case was decided by Lord 
 Esher, M.E. (then^re^^, J.), and Coleridge and Keating, 
 
 («) 2 Mop. ^ 0. 142 ; X. Jffi. 9 C. F. 261. 
 
322 hilarV sittings. 
 
 1893. JJ. The very point that arises here was' taken, and 
 Rowland it was held upon the' facts of that case that there was 
 Peitohabii. neither inhabitancy, residence, nor occupation. It is a 
 direct decision of the Court which was, and still is, 
 the jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas having 
 been transferred to this division of the High Court, 
 .the authority on these matters. The present ease is, 
 in substance, the same as that, and is covered by it. 
 On principle and authority the decision of the Revising 
 Barrister was wrong, and the appeal must be allowed. 
 It is not necessary to decide the point raised during 
 the argument by my brother, Wright, J., as we cannot 
 . go outside the notices of objection. 
 
 Wright and Collins, JJ., concurred. 
 
 Appeal allowed. 
 
 Solicitors — For the Appellant, Indermaur 8f Brawn 
 for W. Suw Rowland, Bangor. 
 
 Por the Respondent, H. W. Chatterton for 
 Q, H. M. Otven, Carnarvon. 
 
CASES 
 
 AEGUED AND DETERMINED 
 
 DJ THE 
 
 QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION 
 
 OP 
 
 THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, 
 
 AND ON APPEAL THEREFROM, 
 
 UNDEE STATS. 6 & 7 YIOT. c. 18, 
 
 Am] 
 
 41 & 42 YIOT. 0. 26, 
 
 AND THE ACTS AMENDING THE SAME 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS, 1893, AND 
 HILARY SITTINGS, 1894. 
 
 IN THE 
 
 FrETT-SEVENTH YEAR OF QUEEN yiGTOBIA. 
 
 Palmer, Appellant ; Wade, Respondent ; 
 
 and 
 Wade, Appellant ; Palmer, Respondent. 1893. 
 
 Dec. 5. 
 AT a Court held at Norwich on the 29th day of The inhaH- 
 
 September, 1893, for the revision of the lists of tant occupier 
 ■^ ' ' 01 a dwemng- 
 
 voters for the city and county of the city of Norwich, touse, from 
 
 July 15tli to 
 
 the ahove-named William Arthur Wade duly objected Deo. i5th, 
 
 __. _ , , . 1892, remored 
 
 to the name of the above-named Walter Palmer being on the latter 
 retained on Division I. of the list as a parhaimentary another 
 elector for the parliamentary city and county of the house ^Mch 
 
 he occupied 
 during the remainder of the qualifying period. The house so occupied in succession 
 was only of the value of £9 per annum. Being newly built it had never previously 
 been rated, nor was it, though then rateable, included in a rate which was made on 
 Feb. 8th, 1893, and during the period of its occupation.- SeU, that the occupier 
 was not entitled to the parliamentary franchise, following as to this McGaffigam v. 
 Hiddall, 28; X. E. Ir. 257 (C A.)i and that by reason of the provisions of sect. 9 of the 
 Municipal Corporations Act, 1882, he was not entitled to the municipal franchise. 
 
 VOL. I. A A 
 
324 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1893. 
 
 Palmee 
 
 T. 
 
 Wade; 
 
 and 
 "Wade 
 
 V. 
 
 Palmer. 
 
 city of Norwich, and as a burgess for the municipal 
 city and county of the city of Norwich. 
 
 The ground of the said objection was that the 
 qualifying property described in the fourth column of 
 the said list had not been rated to the poor or for other 
 purposes during the whole of the qualifying period. 
 
 The name and qualifications for the said Walter 
 Palmer stood upon the said list in the following form — 
 
 Name of Elector 
 
 in full, surname 
 
 being first. 
 
 Haoe of 
 Abode. 
 
 Nature of 
 Qualification. 
 
 Description of 
 Qualifying Property. 
 
 Palmer, Walter . . 
 
 Gloucester 
 
 St. 
 
 DwelliBg 
 
 houses, 
 
 suocessiTe. 
 
 i, Newmarket Street, 
 Grloucester Street. 
 
 The facts, as stated by the Eevising Barrister, were 
 as follows : — 
 
 By two local and personal statutes, viz., the Norwich 
 Poor Act, 1863 (26 & 27 Vict. cap. xciii), and the 
 Norwich Corporation Act, 1889 (52 & 53 Vici. 
 cap. clxxxvii), the Board of Guardians for the parish of 
 Norwich are incorporated by the name of " the 
 Guardians of the Poor of the Norwich Incorporation," 
 and invested with " all rights, powers, duties, liabilities, 
 obligations, privileges and immunities not exclusively 
 ecclesiastical" . . . "incident or attaching to the 
 of&ce of an overseer of the poor, assistant overseer of 
 the poor, vestry clerk, collector of poor rates, or other 
 parish officer," for and within the said parish. By 
 sect. 93 of the last-mentioned Act, aU municipal rates, 
 as well as poor rates in and for the said city and parish, 
 are to be levied by the said Board. By sect. 94 the 
 said Board " shall, once in every six months, and more 
 
LVII VICTORIA. 
 
 325 
 
 often if occasion requires, at meetings of the Board 
 called and held for the purpose, ascertain the amount 
 which they judge necessary to he raised for defraying 
 the expenditure, whether then already incurred or to he 
 thereafter incurred, or both, for the relief of the poor 
 within the parish of Norwich, and for raising that 
 amount, and the amount required for municipal rates, 
 they shall make an equal pound rate on all persons 
 liahle to be rated in the parish, and every such rate 
 shall be allowed and published in manner required by 
 the general poor law in respect of a poor rate made by 
 churchwardens and overseers of a parish not subject to 
 this Act, and the sums therein assessed shall be 
 collected, levied, and recovered accordingly." 
 
 On August 24th, 1892, the Board made a rate to 
 meet all the expenses for the relief of the poor and for 
 defraying other sums legally payable out of a poor's 
 rate which would be required before December 31st, 
 
 1892, and the said rate was allowed by two justices of 
 the said city on August 25th, 1892. On February 8th, 
 
 1893, the Board made another similar rate for the. 
 expenses required before June 30th, 1893, and the 
 said rate was allowed on February 9th, 1893. On 
 August 23rd, 1893, the Board made another similar 
 rate for the expenses required before December 31st, 
 1893, and the said rate was allowed on August 25th, 
 1893. 
 
 The said Walter Palmer was the inhabitant occupier 
 of the dwelling-house 4, Newmarket Street, named in 
 the list, from before July 15th, 1892, till December, 
 1892, when he removed to the dwelling-house described 
 as GHoucester Street in the said list, of which last- 
 mentioned dwelling-house he remained the inhabitant 
 occupier until after July 16th, 1893. 
 
 iLA2 
 
 1893. 
 
 Paimee 
 
 v. 
 Wade; 
 
 and 
 Wade 
 
 V. 
 
 Palmeb. 
 
326 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1893. 
 
 Falioib 
 
 V. 
 
 Wade ; 
 
 and 
 
 "Wade 
 
 v. 
 
 Palmbk. 
 
 The owner of the dwelling-house 4, Newmarket 
 Street compouhded for the rates of the said dwelling- 
 house, and was duly rated in respect of the same, as 
 owner, to all rates made during the occupation thereof 
 by the said Walter Palmer, and the owner paid such 
 rates. 
 
 The name of the said Walter Palmer appeared in the 
 rate hooks as occupier of the said house. 
 
 The dwelling-house, Q-loucester Street, had, when the 
 said Walter Palmer first removed thereto, been newly 
 built on a vacant building plot of land, of which the 
 owner thereof bad not previously had any beneficial 
 occupation, and the said plot was not, nor was the said 
 dwelling-house, comprised in any poor rate made prior 
 to that allowed on August 26th, 1893, nor was the said 
 Walter Palmer, nor was the owner of the said dwelling- 
 house, rated in respect of the same prior to the rate last 
 mentioned. 
 
 It is not the practice of the Board to insert a new 
 house into an existing rate, or to make a supplementary 
 rate for such house, and for this reason only the said 
 house, Grloucester Street, was not rated prior to 
 August 25th, 1893. The said Walter Palmer did not, 
 nor did the owner or any other person, make any claim 
 to be rated in respect of the said dwelling-house, 
 Grloucester Street, nor was any payment or tender made 
 of any rates in respect of the said dwelling-house prior 
 to the making of the rate of August 25th, 1893. 
 
 The dwelling-house, Grloucester Street, was only of 
 the value of £9 per annum, and the rates thereof would, 
 when made, have been compounded for by the owner 
 under the provisions of the Norwich Poor Act, 1863, 
 sect. 68. 
 
 It was contended on behalf of the said William 
 
LVIl VICTORIA. 
 
 327 
 
 Arthur Wade, the objector, that, hy reason of the 
 dwelling-house, G^loucester Street, not having been 
 rated from the time of the occupation thereof by the 
 said Walter Palmer until the rate of August 25th, 
 1893, he was not entitled to either the parliamentary 
 or the municipal franchise in respect of such his inhabit- 
 ant occupation of the two said dwelling-houses in succes- 
 sion. It was contended on behalf of the said Walter 
 Palmer that by reason of the proviso in the Poor Eate 
 Assessment Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 41), sect. 19, 
 extended by the Parliamentary and Municipal Eegis- 
 tration Act, 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 26), sect. 14, his 
 right to both franchises was preserved, although the 
 house, G-loucester Street, had not been rated, and also 
 that as no rate was made during his occupation thereof 
 until- August 25th, 1893, it was not necessary that the 
 said house should have been rated during the qualifying 
 period in order that the said Walter Palmer might 
 acquire both franchises. 
 
 The Revising Barrister decided, with respect to the 
 parliamentary franchise, that, under the provisions of 
 the Eeform Act, 1832 (2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 45), sect. 28, 
 and the Eepresentation of the People Act, 1867 (30 & 31 
 Vict. c. 102), sects. 26, 59 [see also the Eepresentation 
 of the People Act, 1884 (48 Vict. c. 3), sect. 9 (9)], it 
 was not necessary that the said Walter Palmer or the 
 owner of the said house should have been rated or have 
 claimed to be rated in respect of the dwelling-house, 
 Gloucester Street, occupied by him in succession, and so 
 far as the objection related to the right to vote at a 
 parliamentary election that the objection was bad ; but 
 he decided, with respect to the municipal franchise, that, 
 by reason of the provisions of the Municipal Corpora- 
 tions Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 50), sects. 9 (2) (d). 
 
 1893. 
 
 Palmeb 
 
 V. 
 
 Wade; 
 
 and 
 
 Wade 
 
 V. 
 
 Falmeb. 
 
328 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1893. 
 
 Palmee 
 
 T. 
 
 Wade ; 
 and 
 
 Wade 
 
 T. 
 
 Falueb. 
 
 33 (2), and, notwithstanding the proviso in the statute 
 ' 32 & 33 Vict. 0. 41, sect. 19, and the statute 41 & 42 
 Vict. c. 26, sect. 14, as the said Walter Palmer had not, 
 nor had any other person, been rated in respect of the 
 said dwelling-house, the said Walter Palmer was not 
 entitled to vote at a municipal election, and, so far as 
 the objection related to the right to vote at a uiunicipal 
 election, that the objection was good. The Eevising 
 Barrister therefore removed the name of the said Walter 
 Palmer from Division I. and inserted it in Division II. 
 of the said list. 
 
 The names of twenty-sis other persons on Division I. 
 of the said Hst, whose names and qualifications were set 
 out in the Schedule annexed to the case afterwards 
 stated by the Eevising Barrister, were obj.ected to on 
 the same grounds under similar circumstances, and were, 
 for the same reasons and in a similar manner, removed 
 from Division I. to Division II. of the said hst. 
 
 Due notices of appeal and cross appeal from the 
 above decisions were given by the several parties, and 
 the appeals and cross appeals were ordered to be 
 consolidated. 
 
 If the Court should be of opinion that the said 
 Walter Palmer was entitled to the parliamentary 
 franchise only, the list was to stand as revised. If 
 the Court should be of opinion that the said Walter 
 Palmar was entitled to the municipal franchise as well 
 as the parliamentary franchise the names of the said 
 Walter Palmer and of the said twenty-six other persons 
 were to be removed from Division II. and restored to 
 Division I. of the said list. If the Court should be of 
 opinion that the said Walter Palmer was entitled 
 neither to the parliamentary franchise nor to the 
 municipal franchise, then the names of the said Walter 
 
LVtl VtCTORtA. 
 
 329 
 
 Palmer and of the twenty-six other persons were to be 
 expunged entirely from the said list. 
 
 -B. Morten, for the appellant {Palmer). 
 
 The appellant claims to be entitled not only to the 
 parliamentary franchise, which the Eevising Barrister 
 has allowed, but also to the municipal franchise, which 
 he has disallowed, in respect of the successive occupa- 
 tion of two dwelling-houses during the qualifying 
 period. That is the point raised by the first appeal. 
 By the cross appeal it is contended that he is entitled 
 to neither vote, and that the Eevising Barrister was 
 wrong in allowing the parliamentary vote. The 
 question arises upon the interpretation of the Acts 
 requiring qualifying premises to have been rated. It 
 appears from the facts stated in the case that the second 
 house, occupied from December, 1892, to July the 25th, 
 1893, was not rated at all during the qualifying period, 
 although a rate was, in fact, made in February, 1893, 
 in which it might have been included. 
 
 1893. 
 
 Palmeb 
 
 V. 
 
 Wade ; 
 
 and 
 
 Wade 
 
 V. 
 
 Palmer. 
 
 [Collins, J. Is not that covered by section 19 of 
 32 & 33 Vict. cap. 41, which saves the franchise for. an 
 occupier who has been omitted where he should have 
 been included ?] 
 
 A difficulty arises as to whether that section applies 
 to an omission of the property or of the name of the 
 occupier only. 
 
 The point has been considered in the Irish Courts in 
 the case of McGaffigan v. Biddall(a), and Fitzgihbon, 
 L. J., takes the view that the section assumes that the 
 
 {a) 28 L. R. Ir. 2S7. 
 
330 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1893. 
 
 v. 
 
 Wade; 
 
 and 
 
 Wade 
 
 T. 
 
 Paimee. 
 
 premises are rated. The Revising Barrister relies on 
 section 28 of the Eeform Act, 1832 (a), and section 26 
 of the Eepresentation of the People Act, 1867 (b), as to 
 successive occupation, and section 3, suh-section 3, of 
 the same Act as to rating — "has, during the time of 
 such occupation, heen rated . . . to all rates (if any) 
 made ... in respect of such premises." Here, in a 
 sense, a rate is made diiring voter's occupation, but he 
 appears not to have been rated. 
 
 The other contention on behalf of the appellant 
 depends on the Parliamentary and Municipal Regis- 
 tration Act, 1878 (c), sect. 14, and the Municipal Cor- 
 porations Act, 1882 {(i), sects. 9 (2), (d.), and 32 (1), (2). 
 
 [Lord CoLERiBGE, L.O.J. Can you get further than 
 this, that as to the parliamentary franchise there is a 
 section expressly saving it ; as to the municipal franchise 
 there is not ?] 
 
 It is submitted that the effect of these statutes is the 
 same as that of those already cited in reference to the 
 parliamentary franchise. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.O.J. The appellant might have 
 claimed to be rated.] 
 
 He could not claim where there was not a " poor 
 rate last made in respect of the property " ; and there- 
 fore it is contended that where no rate in respect of the 
 property has been made, section 9, sub-section 2, does 
 not apply. If there has been a rate, section 32 applies 
 He referred, also, to section 33, sub-section 2. 
 
 (a) 2 & 3 Will, i, cap. 45. 
 (J) 30 & 31 Vict. cap. 102. 
 
 («) 41 & 42 Vict. cap. 26. 
 (d) 46 & 46 Vict. cap. SO. 
 
LVII VICTORIA. 
 
 331 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. The words of the Acts 
 are different, and we cannot treat them as the same.] 
 
 Germaine, for the ohjeotor, the respondent in the first 
 and appellant in the cross appeal. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. We think the Eevising 
 Barrister was right on both points.] 
 
 It is contended that for the parliamentary as well as 
 for the mnnioipal franchise a rate must have been made 
 and the occupier have been rated in respect of the 
 premises, unless he is within section 19 of 32 & 33 Vict. 
 cap. 41. 
 
 [Collins, J. I do not accept that. You ignore 
 section 3 of the Eepresentation of the People Act, 
 1867 (a), which only says, "all rates (if any) made in 
 respect of such premises," that is to say, if the premises 
 have in fact been rated. You are assuming that a 
 rate has been made in respect of this house.] 
 
 The Act of 1869, sect. 19 (J), enables the occupier to 
 get on the register, if his name is omitted, where the 
 premises are rated. Section 16 of that Act puts the 
 duty of entering in the register the names of successive 
 occupiers, and occupiers going' into unoccupied heredita- 
 ments, upon the overseers; but there is no reference to 
 the case of the premises being omitted. 
 
 [Collins, J. Is there any section other than this 
 quaHfying the occupier's right ? He has been rated to 
 all rates to which he could have been rated ; for none 
 was made in respect of this house.] 
 
 It is submitted that this construction would render 
 sections 16 and 19 of the Act of 1869 null and useless. 
 
 1893. 
 
 v. 
 
 Wade; 
 
 and 
 
 "Wabb 
 
 V. 
 
 Falueb. 
 
 [a) 30 & 31 Viet. cap. 102. 
 
 (J) 32 & 33 riot. cap. 41. 
 
332 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1893. 
 
 Falueb 
 
 V. 
 
 Wade; 
 
 and 
 Wabb 
 
 V. 
 
 Palmee. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. The Acts do not save the 
 franchise where words take it away, but where the 
 overseers have neglected their duty.] 
 
 It is the duty of the occupier to claim to be put on 
 the rate book when he finds the premises are omitted. 
 
 [Collins, J. He does not require to claim. He is 
 put on the list.] 
 
 This was an empty house. The presumption is that 
 he knew he would not get on the rate book unless he 
 took steps to secure it. If the name merely was 
 omitted, sect. 19 applies, but if neither name nor pre- 
 mises were on the rate book, the occupier could not 
 come under the definition of a person entitled to the 
 franchise .- 
 
 [Laweance, J. Why not ? Under sect. 28 of the 
 Reform Act (a) he might be entitled imder similar 
 circumstances.] 
 
 That section must be read with sect. 27. 
 
 [Lawrance, J. That only means that he must pay 
 all rates which he is liable to pay during the time he is 
 entitled ; but there may be no rate payable during part 
 of the time.] 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. How can a rate be pay- 
 able when it has not been made ?] 
 
 Certainly no rate was payable in respect of the second 
 house. But the case of Moger v. E&cott (b) shows that 
 
 (a) 2 & 3 Will, i, cap. 46. 
 
 (i) 1 Sop. # C. 646 ; 
 a F. 168. 
 
 X. S. 1 
 
LVII VICTORIA. 
 
 333 
 
 the voter must be rated and muBt pay rates for the first 
 house, and all rates must have been paid in respect of 
 the second house. 
 
 [Collins, J. Does not sect. 16 presuppose that the 
 premises themselves are in the rate ?] 
 
 1893. 
 
 Palueb 
 
 V. 
 
 Wade; 
 and 
 
 Wade 
 
 T. 
 
 Paimee. 
 
 It is submitted it is the same with regard to premises 
 that should be brought into the rate. 
 
 [Lawrance, J. Rogers v. Lewis (a) shows that it is 
 not necessary that the house should be rated.] 
 
 In Medwin v. 8treeter {h) it was held that the qualifi- 
 cation under sect. 3 of the Eepresentation of the People 
 Act must be completed by July 31st. This supports 
 the proposition that the premises must be rated and the 
 rates must be payable, and unless they are rated the 
 occupier cannot complete his qualification. 
 
 [Lawrance, J. That ease was decided upon the 
 ground that the claim was too late. Moreover, it was 
 not a case of successive occupation. It is not in point.] 
 
 It was cited for the general principle. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. Here, neither the house 
 nor the name is on the rate. 
 
 Lawrance, J. The distinction is pointed out in 
 Rogers v. Lems (a). J 
 
 (a) jr. !■ G. 279 ; 1 G. B. (b) 1 Sop. ^ 0. 167 ; L. R. i 
 
 {N.S.)19. C. P. 488. 
 
334 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1893. 
 
 Falmeb 
 
 V. 
 
 Wabh; 
 
 and 
 Wade 
 
 T. 
 
 Palmer, 
 
 There is no inference in that case that the premises 
 were not rated. If the Legislature had intended to 
 enahle persons to vote when premises were not on the 
 rate hook, it would have added to the proviso in section 19 
 of 32 & 33 Vict. 0. 41, words to secure this. 
 
 Morten, to the Court. Empty houses are not included 
 in the rate, but inserted in a list of empties which is not 
 signed hy the justices as a rate must be. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. We have examined the 
 case which has been cited and handed to us {McOaffigan 
 V. Riddall {a) ). It is a decision of the Court of Appeal 
 in Ireland, and is clearly in point, being upon the same 
 statute, and, unless it can be distinguished, decidedly 
 against the voter.] 
 
 Morten submits that, if no rate has in fact been made 
 during the voter's occupation, that case does not apply. 
 It is admitted that it must be shown that that part of 
 the judgment which deals with the English Poor Eate 
 Assessment Act, 1869 {b), is unsatisfactory. Section 16 
 of that Act was not taken into consideration in that 
 case, and it should be read with section 19. Taking 
 these sections together, it is submitted that section 19 
 applies only to rated premises, and therefore the voter 
 here is in the exemption. McGaffigan v. Riddall {a) 
 deals with the case where no rate at all had been made 
 during the qualifying period. In this case a rate has, 
 in fact, been made, but not including these premises. 
 Section 16 was overlooked in that judgment. It is 
 claimed that here the voter is within the proviso of 
 
 (b) 28 L. B. Jr. 263. 
 
 (i) 32&33 Vict. cap. 41. 
 
LVII VICTORIA. 
 
 335 
 
 section 19 wMch, it is submitted, includes an omission of 
 rating as well as of name. 
 
 Lord CoLEEiDGE, L.C. J. The questions raised in this 
 case are of considerable difficulty, and it was necessary 
 that it should be argued at some length. At first, I 
 was of opinion that the Revising Barrister was right 
 both as to keeping the voter on the parliamentary list 
 and as to removing him from the municipal list. On 
 looking, however, at the Irish case of McGaffigan v. 
 Biddall[a), which has been handed to us, it appears to 
 be directly in point as to the question raised with respect 
 to the parliamentary franchise. The learned judges of 
 the Court of Appeal in Ireland who decided it are dis- 
 tinct in holding that what the Revising Barrister has 
 done here as to the parliamentary franchise is wrong. 
 It has been argued that when the house is not rated, 
 and no rate has been made in respect of it, the voter is 
 entitled to keep his vote by reason of the proviso of 
 section 19 of 32 & 33 Vict. c. 41. But the ease before 
 us is directly the contrary of that. The head-note 
 of that case is : " The inhabitant occupier, during the 
 whole or part of the qualifying period, of a dwelling- 
 house which was rateable and ought to have been rated, 
 but was not rated for the relief of the poor, to a rate 
 which was made during the qualifying period and 
 during his occupation, is not entitled to the franchise," 
 and Fitzgibbon, L.J., expresses the opinion of the Court 
 in a very clear judgment, in the course of which he 
 says (b) : " The Representation of the People Act, 
 1884 (c), sect. 9, sub-sect. 9, enacts that the inhabitant 
 occupier of a dwelling-house ' in respect of which no 
 
 1893. 
 
 Palmeb 
 
 T. 
 
 Wake; 
 
 and 
 
 ■Wade 
 
 V. 
 
 Palheb. 
 
 (a) 28 J. S. Ir. 263. 
 \b) Ibid, at p. 264, 
 
 (c) 48 Vkt. cap. 3. 
 
336 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1893. 
 
 Paimee 
 
 T. 
 
 ■Wabe ; 
 
 and 
 Wade 
 
 V. 
 
 Pameee. 
 
 one is rated ... by reason of any ground of exemption 
 . . . shall not be disentitled to be registered ... by 
 reason only that no one is rated in respect of such 
 dwelling-house, and that no rates are paid in respect of 
 the same, and it shall be the duty of the persons making 
 out the rate book ... to enter any such dwelling-house 
 ... in the rate book . . . with the name of the inhabit- 
 ant occupiers thereof.' This enactment seems to me to 
 imply that, except in the case of exempt premises, no 
 one is entitled to be registered in respect of any dwelling- 
 house for which no one is rated and no rates are paid ; 
 and it would be unmeaning to require the names of the 
 ' inhabitant occupiers ' of ' exempt ' premises to be 
 entered on the rate book, if rating was not in all other 
 cases essential to that franchise." Those words directly 
 apply here. In that case no one was rated, and no rate 
 was paid, and the Irish Court of Appeal held that the 
 occupier was not entitled to a vote in respect of such 
 premises. It is a decision of the highest authority in 
 Ireland, and given by judges of very great ability ; and 
 without distinctly overruling it we cannot hold that a 
 person who occupies a house in respect of which no rate 
 is made, and no rate exists which he is liable to pay, is 
 entitled to the franchise. The case is directly in point, 
 and I must pay respect to it and hold that the Eevising 
 Barrister was wrong. With regard to the municipal 
 franchise the Revising Barrister was right. The facts 
 being the same, the right to a vote is lost by reason of 
 the operation of section 9 of the Municipal Corporations 
 Act, 1882 [a). 
 
 The appellant therefore is not entitled to the mimi- 
 cipal vote from which he was removed, nor is he entitled 
 
 (a) 46 & 46 Vict. cap. 50. 
 
LVII VICTORIA. 
 
 337 
 
 to the parliamentary franchise on which he was put by 1893. 
 the Eevising Barrister. Paimeb 
 
 V. 
 
 Wade; 
 
 and 
 
 Wade 
 
 V. 
 
 Lawkance, J. I am of the same opinion, in defer- 
 ence to the case of McGaffigan v. Riddall (a). But for p 
 this case I should have hesitated in coming to this 
 opinion. 
 
 Collins, J. I am of the same opinion. 
 
 Palmer's appeal dismissed. 
 Wade's appeal allowed. 
 
 Solicitors — For the Appellant, Gover and CMks. 
 
 For the Eespondent, L. W. English, 
 I{o}"mch. 
 
 («) 28 Z. S. Ir. 267. 
 
338 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 Wade, Appellant; Perkins, Respondent. 
 
 1893. JN this case it was stated that at the same Court the 
 Deo. 5. X 
 
 appellant, William Arthur Wade, ohi acted, upon 
 
 The decision -fJ:- ' _ > J > r 
 
 in the pre- the Same grounds as in the preceding case of Palmer v. 
 ceding^ case 
 
 oi Palmer Y. Wade, to the name of James Hugh Perkins heing 
 
 the parKa- retained on the same list, and that the facts were the 
 STise^plS" s^™^ ^s i^ ^^^ ^^^^ yntik the exception that the 
 to hoth the franchise in this case was the £10 occupation franchise. 
 
 parliamentary ^ 
 
 and miinioipal The Eevising Barrister, as appeared by the case 
 a similar case stated by him, decided that the respondent was entitled 
 
 where the . • i i. i 
 
 value of the to both the parliamentary and the municipal franchise 
 £10 or up- as a £10 occupier in succession under the Reform Act, 
 wards. jg32 (2 & 3 Will. 4, cap. 45), sects. 27, 28, the 
 
 Eepresentation of the People Act, 1884 (48 Vict. 
 cap. 3), sect. 5, and the County Electors Act, 1888 
 (51 & 52 Vict. cap. 10), sect. 3, even although the nature 
 of the quaHfioation was described as " dwelling-house," 
 (see Taumshend v. St. Marylebone, L. R. 7 C. P. 143; 
 and Bradley t. Baylis, 8 Q. B. B. 231, per Brett, L. J.) ; 
 and that under the provisions of the Eeform Act, 1832, 
 sect. 28, it was not necessary that the respondent or the 
 owner of the house should have been rated, or have 
 claimed to be rated, in respect of the dwelling-house 
 occupied by the respondent in succession, and disallowed 
 the objection, and allowed the name of the respondent 
 to remain on the said list. Division I. 
 
 Qermaine, for the appellant. 
 
 No counsel appeared for the respondent. 
 
IVII VICTORIA. 
 
 339 
 
 The Court (Lord Coleridge, L.C.J., Lawrance and 1893- 
 Collins, JJ.) held that the case was governed hy their Wade 
 decision as to the parliamentary franchise in the pre- Pebkins. 
 ceding case, and that the respondent was entitled to 
 neither the parliamentary nor the municipal franchise. 
 
 Appeal allowed. 
 
 Solicitors — For the Appellant, Gover and Chiles, for 
 L. W. English, Norwich. 
 
 VOL. I. 
 
340 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 Teanioe, Appellant; Staebuck, Eespondent. 
 
 1893. 
 
 Bee. 8. 
 
 Notwitli- 
 standing a 
 declaration 
 by a person 
 objected to, 
 made undef 
 sect. 24 of 
 41 & 4t 7ict. 
 cap. 26, 
 evidence is 
 admissible in 
 support of tbe 
 objection and 
 to contradict 
 the declara- 
 tion. 
 
 AT a Court held at Liverpool to revise the lists of 
 voters for the parliamentary borough and muni- 
 cipal city of Liverpool, the respondent duly objected 
 to the name of Hugh Tranior being retained in the 
 Occupiers' List, Division I.,' parish of Liverpool, as a 
 parKamentary elector for the city of Liverpool, and as a 
 burgess for the municipal city of Liverpool, on the 
 following grounds, viz. : — 
 
 " That he had not occupied as owner or tenant, for 
 twelve months previous to the 15th July last, the 
 qualifying premises described in the above-named hst." 
 
 The name and qualification of the said Sugh Tranior 
 then stood upon the said list in the following form : — 
 
 No. 
 
 Name of Voter in 
 
 full, sumame 
 
 being first. 
 
 Place of 
 Abode. 
 
 Nature of 
 Qualification. 
 
 Description of 
 Qualifying Property. 
 
 219 
 
 Traynor, Hugh . 
 
 6 in 6 Court, 
 Ford Street. 
 
 Dwelling- 
 house, 
 successive. 
 
 6 in 12 Court, 
 
 Gildarts' Gardens, 
 
 and 
 
 6 in 6 Court, 
 
 Ford Street. 
 
 The appellant, after having been objected to, made a 
 declaration, pursuant to 41 & 42 Vict. cap. 26, s. 24, in 
 the words and figures following : — 
 
 " Form, No. 
 " Declaration for correcting misdescription in list. 
 " I, Hugh Tranior, of No. 4 in 18 Court, Ford Street, 
 in the parish of Liverpool, in the parliamentary borough 
 
LVIl VICTORIA. 
 
 341 
 
 of Liverpool, and in the municipal borough of Liverpool, 
 do solemnly and sincerely declare as follows : — 
 
 " 1. I am the person referred to in Division I. of the 
 list of parliamentary electors and burgesses made out in 
 divisions for the parish of Liverpool 
 
 " (Polling District 24) by an entry as follows : — 
 
 1893. 
 
 Tkaniob 
 
 V. 
 
 Stabbitok. 
 
 " Name as de- 
 scribed in List. 
 
 Traynor, Hugh . 
 
 Place of Abode 
 
 as described 
 
 in List. 
 
 6 in 6 Court, 
 Pord Street. 
 
 Nature of UuaM- 
 
 cation as described 
 
 in List. 
 
 Dwelling-houee, 
 
 sucoessive. 
 
 Description of 
 Qualifying Property. 
 
 6 in 12 Court, 
 
 Grildarts' Gardens, 
 
 and 
 
 6 in 6 Court, 
 
 Ford Street. 
 
 " My correct name and place of abode, and the correct 
 particulars respecting my qualification, are and ought 
 to be stated for the purposes of the Eegister of Parlia- 
 mentary Electors for the parliamentary borough of 
 Liverpool, and the Burgess EoU for the municipal 
 borough of Liverpool, 
 
 " (Polling District 24) " as follows:— 
 
 " Correct Name. 
 
 Correct Place 
 of Abode. 
 
 Correct Nature of 
 Uualiiication, 
 
 Correct Description of 
 Qualifying Property. 
 
 Tranior, Hugli . 
 
 4 in 18 Court, 
 Ford Street. 
 
 Dwelling-house, 
 suooessive. 
 
 8 in 12 Court, 
 Gildarts' Gardens, 
 
 and 
 
 6 in 6 Court, and 
 
 4 in 18 Court, 
 
 Ford Street. 
 
 " Dated this 4th day of September, 1893. 
 " Made and subscribed be- \ 
 
 fore me, this 4th day of > (Signed) Hugh Tranior. 
 September, 1893, ) 
 
 "Henry J. Cook, 
 " Justice of the Peace for the City of Liverpool," 
 
 bp3 
 
342 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1893. The said declaration was in proper form, and was 
 
 Teaotoe duly indorsed by the Town Clerk and handed to the 
 
 V. 
 
 Staeettoz. Eevising Barrister in due time. 
 
 The respondent, after the making of this declaration, 
 gave to Mr. A. Gould Jones, who represented the 
 appellant, the foUowiug notice : — 
 
 " Take notice, that I object to the following declara- 
 tions, viz.: 'District 24, JIugh Tranior, 4/18 Ford 
 Street.'" 
 
 Other names were specified ia the said notice, but are 
 not the subject of this appeal. 
 
 The appellant did not appear on the objection, nor on 
 the notice in the last paragraph mentioned, nor was the 
 Eevising Barrister asked to adjourn the case for his 
 appearance. The respondent produced primd facie evi- 
 dence, not on oath, to the satisfaction of the Eevising 
 Barrister, that ]_ there was good ground for believing 
 that the declaration did not meet his objection, that it 
 was stiU well founded, that the premises occupied by 
 the appellant as a householder for the twelve months 
 previous to the 15th July last were incorrectly stated 
 in the said fourth column, and that he had also occupied 
 25, Gildarts' Gardens, which did not appear in the 
 fourth column of the declaration. The appellant not 
 appearing to meet the objection, the Eevising Barrister 
 held that he was bound to expunge, and thereupon did 
 expunge, from the said list the name of the appellant 
 and the name of one other person whose name and 
 qualification were set out in the schedule to the case 
 afterwards stated by him. 
 
 Notice of appeal was duly given by the appellant 
 and the said other person, and the appeals were ordered 
 to be consolidated, 
 
tVtl VICTORIA. 343 
 
 If the Court should be of opinion that the decision 1893. 
 of the Revising Barrister, in thus admitting evidence Teaotoe 
 m support of the objection, was wrong, the register Stabbfot. 
 was to be amended by inserting the name of the 
 appellant and the name of the said other person. 
 
 Preston, for the appellant. This appeal raises two 
 points. First, whether evidence is admissible after a 
 declaration has been made by the voter pursuant to 
 41 & 42 Vict. cap. 26, s. 24. Secondly, whether, if 
 such evidence is admissible, there was any given in this 
 case upon which the Revising Barrister was justified in 
 disregarding the declaration. 
 
 [Lawrance, J. That is, can the Revising Barrister 
 go behind the declaration P] 
 
 It is submitted that he has no power to admit any 
 evidence to impeach or contradict the declaration. 
 
 [Collins, J. Does not the declaration merely dis- 
 pense with the necessity of the presence at the revision 
 Court of the person who makes it ? 
 
 Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. The Revising Barrister 
 says : " I was satisfied that the declaration did not 
 meet the objection." He must have power to do this, 
 otherwise a person need only make a false claim and 
 amend that by a false declaration to preclude any 
 inquiry by the Revising Barrister. The Revising 
 Barrister was satisfied here, upon the evidence before 
 him, that there was good ground for the objection.] 
 
 Mattinson, for the respondent, was not called upon. 
 
344 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1893. Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. There is nothing in the 
 
 Teanioe questions raised loj this appeal. The Revising Barrister 
 Stabbuok. was right, and the appeal must be dismissed. 
 
 Lawrance and Collins, JJ., concurred. 
 
 Appeal dismissed. 
 
 Solicitors — ^For the Appellant, Crowders 8f Vizard, 
 for Lymkey, Liverpool. 
 
 For the Eespondent, Priichard, Englefield 
 Sf Co., for Barrett, Rodway 8f Co., 
 Liverpool. 
 
LVIT VICTORIA. 
 
 345 
 
 Mann, Appellant ; Johnson, Respondent. 
 HuECUM, Appellant ; Hilleaey, Respondent. 
 
 Mann v. Johnson. 
 
 A T a Court held for the revision of the lists of voters 
 for the horough of Nottingham, Arthur Joseph Mann 
 duly claimed to have his name inserted in Division I. 
 of the Occupiers' List for the parish of Radford in the 
 said horough, as a parliamentary voter for the parlia- 
 mentary horough of Nottingham, and as a burgess for 
 the municipal horough of Nottingham. 
 
 The particulars of the said claim were as follows : — 
 
 I^ame of Claimant 
 
 in fuU, surname 
 
 being first. 
 
 Place of Abode. 
 
 Nature of 
 Qualification. 
 
 Description of 
 QuaHfying 
 Property. 
 
 Mann, Arthur 
 Joseph. 
 
 125, Morton St. 
 
 Dwelling-houses 
 in succession. 
 
 Oliver Terrace, 
 
 Oliver Street, 
 
 and 
 
 11, Moorgate St. 
 
 The claimant proved that he had occupied 11, Moor- 
 gate Street as an inhabitant householder during the 
 whole of the qualifying period, and that he had not 
 occupied Oliver Terrace during any portion of the said 
 period. 
 
 The Revising Barrister was requested to amend the 
 claim to "dwelling-house," in the third column, and 
 was desirous of making the said amendment, but held 
 that he had no power so to do, and disallowed the said 
 claim ; and also, under like oiroumstanoes, the claim of 
 
 1893. 
 
 Deo. 6, 8. 
 C. A. 
 1894. 
 Feb. 8. 
 
 " Dwelling- 
 house" and 
 ' ' dwelling- 
 houses in 
 succession" 
 are distinct 
 and different 
 qualifications ; 
 and therefore, 
 where the 
 third and 
 fourth 
 columns of a 
 claim show 
 that the 
 qualification 
 intended is 
 one of "dwell- 
 ing-houses in 
 succession," 
 the Revising 
 Barrister has 
 no power, in 
 the absence of 
 a declaration 
 under sect. 24 
 of 41 & 42 
 Vict. 0. 26, 
 to amend the 
 claim by 
 striking out 
 words from 
 the third 
 and fourth 
 columns, so as 
 to alter the 
 qualification 
 to that of 
 " dwelling- 
 house." The 
 Act makes no 
 distinction 
 between 
 "claim" and 
 "list." 
 
346 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 ^893. Helah Hardy to have her name inscribed in Division III. 
 Maun of the Occupiers' List of the parish of Sneinton, in the 
 Johnson, said borough, as burgess for the municipal borough of 
 Nottingham. 
 
 Notice of appeal in each case was duly given, and 
 the appeals were ordered to he consolidated. 
 
 If the Oouit should be of opinion that the decision of 
 the Revising Barrister was wrong, the register was to 
 be amended by inserting the name of the said Arthur 
 Joseph Mann and the said Helah Hardy in the said lists. 
 
 Minion 8enhouse, for the appellant. The question is, 
 whether the Revising Barrister had power to amend 
 the third and fourth columns by striking out words 
 which the appellant says are unnecessary and super- 
 fluous. It is submitted that " house " and " houses in 
 succession" constitute the same qualification, and if 
 that is so, the amendment could be made. 
 
 [Collins, J. Is not the rule this: that, when more 
 than is necessary is stated in the particulars of qualifi- 
 cation, the mistake may be corrected by amendment, 
 but that you cannot add anything that is required to 
 complete a qualification that does not appear?] 
 
 That is the appellant's contention, and there is a 
 case, on all fours with this, so deciding the point — 
 Lynch v. Wheatley (a). The facts in that case were a 
 description of the nature of qualification, "offices, 
 successive occupation," and proof of the occupation of 
 one office only throughout the qualifying period. 
 
 That case seems never to have been discussed or 
 considered in the later oases bearing on the point. 
 
 (a) U Q. B. S. 604 ; 5. C, lub mm. Bhtie v. Wheatley, Chit. 364. 
 
LVII VICTORIA. 
 
 347 
 
 In Foskett v. Kavifman {a), and Plant v. Potts {b), the 1893. 
 facts were not the same as in the present, nor do the Mann 
 judgments deal with or touch the point raised in Lynch Johnson. 
 V. Wheatley (c). In Beg. v. Machellar {d), where a lodger 
 claim was made for " the sole use of a hedroom, with 
 joint use of sitting room," and in the declaration the 
 voter was descrihed as " occupying partly as sole tenant 
 and partly as joint tenant," and the Eevising Barrister 
 found that there was an occupation as sole tenant of a 
 bedroom of sufficient value, it was held that the mis- 
 description was a mistake which the Revising Barrister 
 had power to amend. 
 
 [Collins, J. The case of Foskett v. Kaufman does 
 not seem to touch Lynch v. Wheatley, but it did over- 
 rule Ford V. Soar (e), which had decided that there 
 was power to amend by adding a necessary part of a 
 qualification. That is, you cannot amend by adding an 
 essential part of a qualification which does not appear 
 in the description until that is done. But here you 
 are merely striking out a superfluous statement and 
 leaving a complete qualification which is foimd in the 
 description.] 
 
 That is the appellant's point. 
 
 [Lord CoLEEiDGE, L.O.J. Unless Lynch v. Wheatley 
 has been overruled, it is just in point.] 
 
 It has not been dealt with in any single case, 
 
 (a) Colt. 466 ; 16 Q. B. B. 279. {d) Ante, p. 275 ; (1893) 1 Q. B. 
 
 (*) Ante, p. 206 ; (1891) 1 0. B. 121. 
 
 266. (e) Colt. 351 ; U Q. B. D. 607. 
 (e) Colt. 364 ; 14 Q. B. D. 504. 
 
348 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 Mann 
 
 ^^^^- except by the dissenting judge {Grantham, J.) in Plant v. 
 Potts {a). 
 
 Appkton, for the respondent. It is submitted that 
 Lynch v. Wheatley {b) is overruled by impKcation in 
 Foskett V. Kaufman (c). 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. In Ford v. Hoar {d), which 
 was decided on the same day as Lynch v. Wheatley, the 
 decision, in which I did not concur, was that you might 
 add to make a qualification complete, and in Lynch v. 
 Wheatley, in which I agreed, that you might subtract 
 and leave the qualification as it stood.] 
 
 It is admitted that neither Lynch v. Wheatley nor 
 Ford V. Hoar is the same case as Foskett v. Kauf- 
 man, but the reasoning upon which the decision of the 
 Court of Appeal in that case was founded applies. It 
 is this, that the occupation of a dwelling-house is one 
 qualification, and the occupation of houses in succession is 
 another and distinct qualification. This is in accordance 
 with the case of Bartlett v. Gibbs (e). 
 
 If the respondent's contention be not correct, the 
 objector would be placed in great difficulty and incon- 
 venience ; for instead of being able to rely upon the 
 discovery of the non-occupation of one of the houses 
 as a valid objection when the claim is for " houses in 
 succession," he would be compelled to exhaust his 
 inquiries as to all the rest, lest he should be met at 
 the hearing by a good qualification for " dweHing- 
 
 (a) Ante, p. 206 ; (1891) 1 Q. {c) Colt. 466 ; 16 Q. B. D. 279. 
 
 S. 258. {0} Colt. 351 ; 14 Q. B. D. 507. 
 
 (*) Colt. 364 ; 14 Q. B. B. 604. (e) 1 Lutw. 73 ; 5 Jf. ^ ff. 81. 
 
LVIl VICTORIA. 
 
 349 
 
 house" founded on the occupation of one out of the ^893. 
 list given. Mann 
 
 [Collins, J. Suppose there are several houses 
 entered in the fourth column, but the claim is for 
 " dwelling-house," and it was found that the claimant 
 had in fact only resided in or occupied one, could not 
 the Eevising Barrister strike out all the others ?] 
 
 Yes. 
 
 [Collins, J. Then surely your argument ab incon- 
 venienti is gone. That point was decided in SitcMns v. 
 Broiim (a), and did not arise, and was not necessary to 
 the decision, in Foskett v. Kaufman (J). J 
 
 That is so ; but, nevertheless, the grounds of every 
 one of the judgments in Foskett v. Kaufman support 
 this contention. Plant v. Potts (c) concludes it, and 
 there Li/nch v. Wheatley {d), and Ford v. Soar (e), were 
 cited. 
 
 [Collins, J. Lynch v. Wheatley does not touch the 
 point decided in Foskett v. Kaufman. Do the judges 
 there purport to overrule Lynch v. Wheatley ?'] 
 
 In Foskett v. Kattfman, and Plant v. Potts, the Court 
 of Appeal has decided the point that you cannot 
 change a qualification by amendment. In thus uphold- 
 ing the view of the majority of the judges in the 
 Divisional Court, they must be taken to have impliedly 
 overruled Lynch v. Wheatley and Ford v. Hoar, which 
 
 [a) 1 Lutw. 328 ; 2 C. B. 25. 266. 
 
 (*) Colt. 466 ; 16 Q. B. J). 279. (rf) CoU. 364 ; 14 Q. B. D. 604. 
 
 (c) Ante, p. 206; (1891) 1 Q. B. (e) Colt. 361 ; 14 Q. B. D. 607. 
 
 V. 
 
 Johnson. 
 
350 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1893. were relied upon by Qrantham, J., who dissented, as the 
 Mann foundation of his judgment. 
 
 V. 
 
 Johnson. 
 
 [Lord OoLEEiBGE, L.C.J. The only question is 
 whether " houses " and " houses in succession " are the 
 same qualification. Bartktt v. Gibbs {a) has decided it 
 point-blank one way, and HUchim v. Brown (b) the 
 other.] 
 
 Foskett V. Kaufman (c) has now decided the point. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. The Master of the Rolls 
 has there said they are separate and distinct. But in 
 Plant V. Potts id), he said he went a little out of his 
 way in that case. Has Hitchins v. Brown ever been 
 questioned ?] 
 
 No. 
 
 [Lord Coleridge, L.O.J. There very eminent 
 judges have decided that "house" and "houses in suc- 
 cession " are the same qualification. They held that 
 Bartktt v. Gibbs was rightly decided, but distin- 
 guished it.] 
 
 («) 1 Zutw. 73 ; 5 Jf. ^ <?. 81. (d) Ante, p. 206 ; (1891) 1 Q. B. 
 
 (b) 1 Lutw. 328 ; 2G.B. 25. 256. 
 
 (c) Colt. 466 ; 16 Q. B. B. 279. 
 
I 
 
 LVII VICTORIA, 351 
 
 HURCUM V. HiLLEAEY. 
 N this case, in ■wliioli the facts were stated to be the 1893. 
 
 same as in the previous case of Mann v. Johnson — Hueoum 
 
 TTTT.T.KAB.V. 
 
 0. E. Jones, for the appellant, adopted the arguments 
 made on hehalf of the appellant in that case, and 
 further argued that a claim is not a list, and the 
 powers of the Revising Barrister in respect of these 
 are different, Pickard v. Baylis (a). Section 28, sub- 
 sect. (2), of 41 & 42 Vict. cap. 26, gives him full power 
 to amend a claim ; and sub-sects. (12) and (13) do not 
 apply. He may revise a claim as a list, though it is 
 not a list, but only a catalogue of claimants. In 
 Pickard v. Baylis, Lord Coleridge, L.C.J., says (J) : 
 " What we have here to deal with are new lodger 
 claims — the claims of persons who do not at present 
 form part of any list. They are not upon the old list 
 of voters; and they are not upon the list of lodger 
 voters who have claimed before and whose claims have 
 been allowed. What other list, then, has the Eevising 
 Barrister to deal with ? None. The claim is not a 
 list. The catalogue of new claims is not a list upon 
 which anyone can be retained, or from which anyone 
 can be expunged. ... It follows that, if this is 
 not a list, it must be a claim ; and, vrith regard to 
 these, sub-sect. 2 of sect. 28 of the Act of 1878 (c) 
 provides that the Eevising Barrister " may correct any 
 mistake which is proved to him to have been made 
 in any claim." It is submitted that the Eevising 
 
 (a) Colt. 98 ; 5 C. F. D. 236. (c) 41 & 42 Viet. cap. 26, 
 
 («) 6 0. F. D. at p. 241, 
 
352 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1893. 
 
 HUEOUM 
 V. 
 
 Hllleaet. 
 
 Barrister's power under this sut-section, with respect_ 
 to claims, is not limited by the latter part of the 
 proviso in sub-sect. 13. He is left, as regards claims, 
 absolutely unfettered by those words. Section 4, sub- 
 sect. 5, of the Begistration Act, 1885 [a), deals with 
 his power to revise claims as if they were a list, but 
 until he has signed it, it does not become a list ; and 
 it is submitted that until it becomes a list, sub-sects. 12 
 and 13 of sect. 28 of the Act of 1878 (6) do not apply. 
 
 [Lord OoLEEiDGE, L.O.J. Have you found any case 
 in which an amendment has been allowed of a claim 
 because it was not a list ?] 
 
 No. 
 
 RosMll, for the respondent. 
 
 Mann 
 
 V. 
 
 Johnson, 
 hueciuii 
 
 T. 
 
 HlLLEAET. 
 
 Lord Coleridge, L.O.J. Upon the question raised 
 by these cases, which is an important one, there is 
 authority both ways. There are two old decisions of 
 this Court. Bartlett v. Gibhs (c) decided that where 
 the nature of the qualification is stated in the third 
 column to be " house," but the party claiming has in 
 fact occupied houses in succession, you cannot amend 
 the fourth column by adding the premises omitted. 
 HitcUns V. Brown [d) assents to, and affirms, Bartlett v. 
 Oihhs, but distinguishes it. The substance of the 
 decision in Hitchins v. Brown is, that " house " is the 
 substantive qualification, and " houses in succession " a 
 sort of rider to it, which may appear in the fourth 
 
 (a) 48 Viot. cap. 15. 
 
 (J) 41 & 42 Viot. cap. 26. 
 
 [c] 1 Lutv). 73; 5 Jf. #(?. 81. 
 (i) ILutw. 328 ; 2 C. J5. 25. 
 
LVII VICTORIA. 
 
 353 
 
 column as a more particular exposition of it. That 
 being the state of the earlier decisions, there are two 
 recent decisions of this Court apparently conflicting with 
 Bartlett v. CHhbs (a). In the one, Ford v. Hoar {b), it 
 was held that the Revising Barrister could amend a 
 mistake in the parliamentary list by inserting an 
 additional house in the fourth column to make the 
 qualification " houses in succession " complete ; and in 
 Lynch V. Wheatley (c) it was held that the third and 
 fourth columns could be amended by striking out 
 as superfluous references to successive occupation. I 
 disagreed with the decision of Ford v. Hoar, but 
 thought the amendment in Lynch v. Wheatley could 
 be made. I understand the Court of Appeal, in Foshett 
 V. Kaufman {d), to have affirmed the view I expressed 
 in Ford v. Soar, and to have held that you cannot, by 
 amendment, enlarge the description of the qualification 
 from " house " to " houses in succession." That Court, 
 which is now the ultimate Court of Appeal in these cases, 
 went on to expound the law, and there are passages in 
 the judgments delivered by the Master of the Rolls and 
 the Lords Justices to the effect that "house" and 
 " houses in succession " are separate and distinct quali- 
 fications. If that is so, altering the description of the 
 qualification, whether by adding or striking out, is not 
 correcting, but putting a different qualification. Now, 
 it was not necessary to that case to decide that, and I 
 should have thought the decision of this Court in 
 Hitchim v. Brown (e), and Lynch v. Wheatley, right. 
 But in deference to the distinct opinion — not decision 
 — of the Court of Appeal in Foskeii v. Kaufman, I 
 
 1893. 
 
 Mann 
 
 V. 
 
 Johnson. 
 
 HUKCUM 
 
 V. 
 
 HiLLEABY. 
 
 (a) 1 iMtw. 73 ; 5 JT. # G*. 81. 
 (J) Colt. 361 ; 14 Q. B. D. 507. 
 {e) Colt. 364 ; 14 Q. B. D. 504. 
 
 {d) Colt. 466 ; 16 Q. B. D. 279. 
 {e) 1 ImIai}. 328 ■,1C.B. 26. 
 
354 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1893. 
 
 Mann 
 
 V. 
 
 Johnson. 
 
 HuBOTJM 
 
 V. 
 
 HlLI^ABT. 
 
 am of opinion that we must hold that the Eevising 
 Barrister had no power to make this amendment. The 
 appeals must therefore be dismissed. I hope, however, 
 that there will he an appeal from our decision. 
 
 Lawkance, J. I am of the same opinion. It has 
 been decided in this Court that " house " and " houses 
 in succession " are not different qualifications ; but in 
 Foskett V. Kaufman («), and Plant v. Potts (5), the 
 Master of the EqUs and the Lords Justices have time 
 after time said that they are separate and distinct. 
 The reasons upon which their judgments in those cases 
 are founded are irresistible. 
 
 Collins, J. If it were not for the dicta iu the 
 judgments delivered in the case of Foskett v. Kauf- 
 man, I should unhesitatingly have given my judg- 
 ment the other way, and not as I am about to pronounce 
 it. The case is this. We find the nature of the 
 qualification in the third column, " houses in succes- 
 sion," and in the fourth column two houses stated. It 
 appeared by the evidence that the claimant had a 
 qualification in respect of the occupation of one house 
 only. The question is, whether the Eevising Barrister 
 could make two amendments, viz., in the third and 
 fourth columns of the claim. Clearly, if there had 
 been no objection to the third column, the fourth 
 column could have been amended, e.g., had the third 
 column been " house," and several houses stated as the 
 qualifying property in the fourth column, the amend- 
 ment could have been made of striking out the super- 
 fluous houses. That does away with the argument 
 
 {a) Colt. 466 ; 16 Q. B. D. 279. 
 
 (i) Ante,-p. 206; (1891)1 Q.J. 
 256, 
 
LVn VICTOKIA. 
 
 355 
 
 ab inconvenienti in this case, and limits it to the ques- 
 tion whether " house " is a distinct qualification from 
 " houses in succession." 
 
 As I have said, hut for the dicta of the Court of Appeal, 
 I should have held that they were the same qualification, 
 " houses in succession " being merely a sub-division of 
 the qualification "house." In Hitchins v. Brown{a), it 
 was decided that the qualification "house" was the genus 
 of the qualification "and houses in succession," a branch 
 of the same qualification. That decision has stood for 
 fifty years. In Lynch v. Wheatley {b), where the qualifi- 
 cation was stated in the third column to be " ofiQces, 
 successive occupation," and in the fourth column "High 
 Street and Charles Street," it was held that the Revising 
 Barrister had power to amend the list by striking out the 
 words " successive occupation " and " Charles Street." 
 That case, so far as I know, has never been overruled. 
 It is said that Foskett v. Kaufman (c) must be taken to 
 have impliedly overruled it as being inconsistent with it. 
 I do not think it touches Lynch v. Wheatley. I assent 
 to Foskett V. Kaufman. All that that case held was 
 that it is not competent to add to the particulars in 
 order to make up for the omission of an essential portion 
 of the qualification; That case involved adding another 
 house to complete the qualification. It was held that 
 that made a new qualification. But in the course of 
 their judgments all the learned judges of the Court of 
 Appeal seem to have said that " houses " and " houses 
 in succession " are distinct qualifications. 
 
 If the claim were under the Representation of the 
 People Act {cC), and the person making it were asked 
 " what is your claim for," he would answer " dwelling- 
 
 1893. 
 
 Mjuin 
 
 V. 
 
 Johnson. 
 Htjeotjm 
 
 V. 
 HiLLBABT. 
 
 («) 1 Lutw. 328 ; 2 C. B. 26. 
 (*) Colt. 364 ; U Q. B. D. 604. 
 
 VOL. I. 
 
 («) Colt. 466 ; 16 Q. B. D. 279. 
 \d) SO & 31 Viet. cap. 102. 
 
 
356 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTIKGS. 
 
 1893. house." A fortiori would this he so under the Reform 
 
 Mann Act (ff). Section 27 gives the definition of the qualifica- 
 
 V. 
 
 V. 
 HllLEABI 
 
 JoHKsoN. tion " house, warehouse, shop, &c.," and sect. 28 gives 
 the privilege of successive occupation of such premises. 
 Upon the earlier authorities I feel that my view is 
 right ; but I must, as my Lord has done, adhere loyally 
 to the decision of Foskett v. Kaufman (b), believing that 
 it was founded upon the very reasons so frequently and 
 clearly expressed in all the judgments m that case. 
 This, however, is entirely against my own conviction. 
 
 Appeals dismissed in both cases, but without 
 costs, upon the ground that there was a 
 decision of this Court in the appellant's 
 favour. 
 
 HTTEOtni 
 
 V. 
 
 TTttt.p!A-r. t 
 
 1894. The appellant in Surcum v. Hilkary appealed to th'e 
 
 Court of Appeal. The appeal was heard on February 
 8th, 1894. 
 
 C. E. Jones, for the appellant, relied on Lynch v. 
 Wheatley (c) and Ford v. Soar {d), and contended that 
 a dwelling-house, qualification did, in fact, appear on 
 the face of the claim, and that to strike out the refer- 
 ence to successive occupation in the third and fourth 
 columns was not an alteration of the quaKfication, but 
 merely the amendment of a mistake by striking out 
 something that was unnecessary and superfluous. 
 
 There is a distinction between a list and a claim. 
 Plant V. Potts [e) was a case of a list. He referred also 
 to Ainsley v. Nicholson (/), and R. v. Mackellar{g), in 
 
 {a) 2 & 3 Will, i, cap. 45. 256. 
 
 (J) Colt. 466 ; 16 Q. B. D. 279. (/) Ante, p. 146 ; 24 Q. B. B. 
 
 (c) Colt. 364 ; 14 Q. B. B. 604. 144. 
 
 (d) Colt. 351 ; 14 Q. B. B. 607. (?) Ante, p. 276 ; (1893) 1 Q. 
 
 (e) Ante, p. 206; (1891) 1 Q. B. B. 121, 
 
LVII VICTOKIA. 
 
 3r,iT 
 ■J I 
 
 whioh amendment of lodger claims was allowed in cases 1894. 
 where the claims did not sufficiently show whether they Hueoum 
 were for joint or sole occupation. Hilleaby. 
 
 Suh-seotion 13 of sect. 28 of 41 & 42 Vict. cap. 26 is 
 the same as the old sect. 40 of 6 Vict. cap. 18. The 
 object of the enactments is that objectors shall have 
 every opportunity of finding out whether a person is 
 qualified or not. Here on the face of the claim is 
 information as to the whole qualification. The least 
 inquiry would have shown the true state of the facts, 
 and no one could be deceived. It is submitted that the 
 lodger cases show that in such circumstances there is 
 power to amend. 
 
 ^. Mo7'ten and Roskill, for the respondent, were not 
 called upon. 
 
 LiNULEY, L.J. The question raised by this appeal 
 is clearly concluded by decisions that are binding upon 
 this Court. Mr. Jones says that there is a distinction 
 between this case and those, on the ground that here 
 the amendment sought is of a claim — in those of a list ; 
 that under sect. 28 (2) of 41 & 42 Vict. cap. 26 the 
 Revising Barrister may correct any mistake in any 
 claim . . . and that though in sub-sect. 13 " no 
 evidence shall be given of any other qualification than 
 that which is described in the list or claim," the matter 
 is put right by assuming that the claim has been 
 already amended under sub-sect. 2. If we read the 
 Act so, sub-sect. 13 would be absolute nonsense. The 
 Revising Barrister may amend any claim, but against 
 the wide power apparently thus given is to be set 
 sub-sect. 12, which defines what he may do. To avoid 
 reducing sub- sect. 13 to a nullity, we must read the 
 
 002 
 
358 HILARY SITTINGS. 
 
 1894. statute as enabling him to amend under sub-sect. 12, 
 HuBouM but that in so doing he may not receive evidence of 
 HiLLEAEY. any other qualification than that described by the 
 claim. The appeal must be dismissed. 
 
 Kay, L.J. I am of the same opinion. The altera^ 
 tions asked for are, that there should be struck out 
 from column three of the claim the word " successive," 
 and from column four the premises in reference to it. 
 In Bartktt v. Gibhs (a), it was held that " successive 
 occupation " was a different and distinct qualification 
 from " continuous occupation." This was approved in 
 Foskett V. Kaufman {b). Sub-section 2 of sect. 28 of 
 41 & 42 Vict. cap. 26, provides that the Eevising 
 Barrister may correct a mistake in any claim on 
 receiving evidence thereof, but by sub-sect. 13 no 
 evidence is to be given of any other qualification than 
 that described in the claim. So that he can only 
 correct a mistake as to some point other than the 
 description of the qualification. The words of sub- 
 sect. 13, " except as herein provided," refer not to sub- 
 sect. 2, but to sub-sect. 12, which does allow a certain 
 power of altering the statement of the nature of the 
 qualification, and under that sub-section the Revising 
 Barrister may amend the qualification to some extent. 
 This amendment, however, cannot be made. 
 
 Smith, L.J. I am of the same opinion. The case 
 of Bartktt v. 6Ms decides, and it was affirmed in 
 Foskett V. Kaufman, that " houses in succession " is 
 a different qualification from "house," so that it can 
 make no difference whether you add to or subtract 
 from the description of the qualification. Mr. Jones 
 
 (a) 1 Lutw. 73 ; b M. ^ G. 81. (4) Colt. 466 ; 16 Q. B. D. 279. 
 
LVII VICTORIA. 369 
 
 endeavours to distinguisli those cases on the ground that 1894. 
 here we have to do with a " claim " made hy the occu- Hueoum 
 pier, and that in them it was a question as to the list of Hillbaet. 
 voters. The Act 41 & 42 Vict. cap. 26 makes no such 
 distinction. Section 28 relates to the duties and powers 
 of the Eevising Barrister in this behalf. He shall 
 correct any mistake in any list (sub-sect. 1), and he 
 may correct any mistake in any claim (sub-sect. 2). 
 Mr. Jones says " an)/ claim," but the rest of the section 
 imposes limitations on this power ; and in sub-sect. 13 
 " no evidence shall be given of any other qualification 
 than that which is described in the list or claim, as the 
 case may be." The amendment sought is to alter the 
 qualification described in the claim, and this the 
 Kevising Barrister had no power to do. 
 
 Appeal dismissed. 
 
 Solicitors — In Mann v. Johnson : 
 
 For the Appellant, 8. G. Warner, for 
 Johnstone, Nottingham. 
 
 For the Eespondent, Sharpe, Parker, 
 Pritchards ^ Barham, for Sir S. G. 
 Johnson, Nottingham. 
 
 In Hurcum v. Hilkary : 
 
 For the Appellant, Sedgwick 8f Sharman. 
 
 For the Eespondent, Hilleary, Town 
 Clerk of West Ham. 
 
360 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 Kemp, Appellant; Wanklyn, Respondent. 
 Atkins' Case. 
 
 1893. \T a Court held on the 19th September, 1893, for the 
 
 _1 ■ - revision of the lists of voters for the borough of 
 
 1894 Cokhester, Robert Kemp, the appellant, appeared to 
 
 Feb. 27 ;j obiect to the names of Moses Stockton Atkins and 
 
 March i. ' 
 
 forty-six other persons, whose names were set out in 
 
 If there is 
 
 an ordinary a Schedule to the case afterwards stated by the Revising 
 whereby Barrister, being retained on Division II. of the list as 
 
 letters would , . , j_ p ^i -in ^ 
 
 be delivered parliamentary voters for the said borough. 
 
 fl^^ughout ^^ ^^® contended on behalf of the voters that there 
 
 adistnot ^g^g ^q proof that notices of the said objections had 
 
 within the '■ ■> 
 
 necessary been Served upon them on or before August the 20th, 
 time, the pro- '- ° 
 
 duotion of the as required by the statute 6 Vict. cap. 18, sect. 17. 
 stamped du- 
 plicates of The facts of the case as stated by the Revising 
 
 objection Barrister were as follows : — 
 
 persons resi- The names of the said voters were upon the list in 
 
 the districTis respect of dwelling-house qualifications in the Cavalry 
 
 under'the ^^*^ Artillery Barracks of Colchester, and the places of 
 
 provisions of abode were given in the list as being in the said 
 
 6 Vict. cap.l8, ° ° 
 
 sect. 100, of barracks. 
 
 the due de- 
 livery of such Duplicates of the notices of objection, stamped in 
 
 notices, not- -11 
 
 withstanding accordance With the provisions of sect. 100 of the said 
 rangement for statute, and dated August 19th, were produced as evi- 
 
 the delivery 
 of the letters 
 
 of such persons which is in substitution of the ordinary delivery by the post-office, 
 and by which the receipt of the notices may be delayed. There is no duty upon an 
 objector to do more than ascertain that there is a general delivery for the place to 
 which he wishes to send, by which letters would in the ordinary course reach their 
 destination on or before August 20th. OhiUa v. Cox {ante, p. 84 ; 20 Q. JB. D. 290), 
 ovemiled. 
 
LVII VICTORIA. 
 
 361 
 
 dence that the notices were delivered in ordinary course 1893. 
 
 of post to such places of ahode. Atkins' 
 
 . . . . . Case. 
 
 It was proved that it is the universal practice, m 
 
 accordance with the military and postal regulations in 
 towns where soldiers are quartered, that letters ad- 
 dressed to soldiers in barracks are not delivered at the 
 barracks by the Post- Office authorities, but are delivered 
 at the post office in private bags to orderlies appointed 
 from each regiment for that purpose, and are taken to 
 the barracks by them and are delivered to the persons to 
 whom they are addressed. The notices of objection in 
 this case, which were registered in accordance with the 
 statute, were delivered to the orderly in the usual way, 
 but the orderly did not sign the receipts for the said 
 notices, but took them away in blank, and they were 
 afterwards returned to the post office signed by the 
 persons to whom the said notices were addressed. 
 The voters had left Colchester at some time between 
 July 15th and August 19th, and were, in fact, at the 
 latter date, at the Camp, at Aldershot. 
 
 It was proved that the notices of objection were 
 brought to the barracks by the post-orderly at about 
 1.45 p.m., on Saturday, August 19th, and that the 
 corporal in charge of the orderly room, believing from 
 their appearance that they were of the nature of 
 circulars, and having instructions to keep back circulars 
 on account of the expense of forwarding them, in 
 the exercise of his discretion, put them aside till he 
 could consult an officer. On Sunday, August 20th, he 
 saw an officer, who directed him to forward the notices, 
 and they were, in fact, forwarded to the voters on 
 Monday, August 21st. 
 
 If the voters had been still in the barracks at 
 Colchester at the places of abode stated in the list, the 
 
362 
 
 MICHAELMAS SIITINGS. 
 
 1893. notices would have been distributed by the post-orderly 
 Atkins' on the afternoon of August 19th, and if they had been 
 re- directed and posted on the afternoon of August 19th, 
 they would have been delivered at Aldershot on 
 August 20th. If the corporal in charge had thought 
 that they were of the nature of letters and not circulars, 
 he would have re-directed and posted them. 
 
 Upon these facts the Revising Barrister held that 
 the case could not be distinguished from the case of 
 Childs V. Cox (a), and that there was no delivery in 
 ordinary course of post in the said barracks within the 
 meaning of sect. 100 of 6 Vicf. cap. 18, and that 
 therefore the stamped duplicates were not available to 
 prove service of the said notices of objection, and that 
 the names of the said voters must be retained on the 
 said list; but he consented to state a case for the 
 opinion of the High Court, in order that the decision 
 in the said case of Childs v. Cox might be further 
 considered, as the question appears to be of considerable 
 importance in all garrison towns and places where 
 soldiers are quartered. 
 
 Due notice of appeal was given in all the cases, and 
 the appeals were ordered to be consolidated, and the 
 town clerk of the said borough was nominated to be the 
 respondent in the consolidated appeal. If the Court 
 should be of opinion that the decision of the Revising 
 Barrister was wrong, the register was to be amended 
 by erasing the name of the said Moses Stockton Atkins, 
 and the names of the said forty-six other persons from 
 the said list. 
 
 Lewis Thomas, for the appellant. The question turns 
 upon the application of Childs v. Cox (a) to the facts 
 
 («) Ante, p. 84 ; 20 Q. B. D. 290. 
 
LVU VICTORIA. 
 
 363 
 
 of this case. It is submitted that the facts here are 1893. 
 
 diEEerent from those in that case, and that " an ordinary Aikihs' 
 
 Case. 
 course of post " is shown within the meaning of the 
 
 statute (a). The notices would have been delivered had 
 
 not the corporal taken upon himself to do that which 
 
 was not regular, and detain the notices until he had 
 
 taken the advice of his officer. 
 
 Further, the Post Office may he said to have consti- 
 tuted the orderly their agent by not taking from him 
 signed receipts upon delivery of the notices to him, but 
 entrusting him with them, together with receipts in 
 blank, to be signed by the persons to whom the notices 
 were addressed upon delivery to them. There was 
 therefore "an ordinary course of post" within the 
 barracks. 
 
 In Childs v. Oox (b) the notices, though received by 
 the orderly at the post office on the evening of the 
 20th August, could not be delivered to the soldiers in 
 barracks on that day. The regulations of the barracks 
 prevented this from being possible, and it was this fact 
 that influenced the decision in that case (see the judg- 
 ment of JIawkins, J.) Here the soldiers might have 
 had their letters on August 20th if the corporal had 
 not interfered with the due delivery of them. If it 
 were otherwise any person to whom it was desired to 
 send an objection might frustrate the service of it by 
 instructions to his servants. In Childs v. Oox (b), it 
 was the last day and the letters oould not be delivered 
 in any case. 
 
 The fact that the soldiers had gone away to Aldershot 
 made it the duty of the objector to send the notices to 
 the last place of address, and if things had been regular 
 
 (a) 6 Vict. cap. 18, sect. 100. (i) Ante, p. 84 ; 20 Q. B. D. 290. 
 
364 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1893. they would, in the ordinary course of post, have been 
 Atkins' delivered in the barracks on the 19th of August. This 
 is very difierent from the case of Letms v. Evans (a), in 
 ■which it was found that there was no postal delivery at 
 Wern, where the voter lived, and that, unless by some 
 private accidental conveyance, the notice would not be 
 received at all. 
 
 Upon the facts of the present case, therefore, it is 
 submitted that there was a delivery " in the ordinary 
 course of post." 
 
 If, however, the orderly was not constitated the agent 
 of the Post OfEce for the purpose of delivery, he must 
 have been the agent of the persons objected to, who 
 were to be the recipients of the letters, in which case it 
 is contended that there must have been either a good 
 delivery at the post office, or a service within sect. 17. 
 
 W. Ch'aham, for the respondent. This is exactly the 
 same case as Ghilds v. Cox{b). Section 100 of 6 Vict. 
 cap. 18, enacts that the production of the duplicate shall 
 be evidence of the notice having been given at the place 
 mentioned in such duplicate {i.e., at "the place of abode 
 described in the list of voters), on the day on which 
 such- notice would, in the ordinary course of post, have 
 been delivered at such place. By the schedule to the 
 case it appears that every one of these voters had his 
 particular address, which was the place of destination. 
 But the only ordinary course of post here ended at the 
 post office. That is shown by the facts stated. In Childs 
 V. Cox{b), the whole argument and judgment were based 
 upon Lewis v. Evans {a), which has been cited on the 
 
 («) 2 Eopw. i Colt. 279 ; i. S. {i) Ante, p. 84 ; 20 Q. £. B. 
 
 10 C. P. 297. 290. 
 
LVII VICTORIA. 
 
 365 
 
 other side. Pollock, B., in his judgment {a), points 1893. 
 
 out that the person who desires to avail himself of the Atkins' 
 
 Case. 
 alternative mode of delivery provided in sect. 100 of the 
 
 statute 6 Vict. cap. 18, takes the risk of finding that 
 there is no " ordinary course of post " by which the 
 notice would be delivered within the time Hmited for 
 the delivery of these notices, and holds that the receipt 
 of the letters on August 20th by an orderly who was 
 sent from the barracks to the post office, and the delivery 
 of them by him to the men the next day is not a deli- 
 very to the barracks in the ordinary course of post on 
 August 20th. " Even if the orderly might be regarded 
 as the objector's agent to deliver the notices, the dupli- 
 cates are not evidence of delivery by such an agent, but 
 only of delivery in the ordinary course of post. It is 
 only of such delivery that the duplicates are made 
 evidence by sect. 100 " [b). 
 
 The facts of that case showed that there was no 
 ordinary course of post, and that the arrangement for 
 collection by an orderly was substituted for the ordinary 
 course of post, and the provisions of sect. 100 did not 
 apply. It was, therefore, the duty of the objector 
 to deliver the notices himself, or get them to the place 
 named in the register. The reason and foundation of 
 the judgment in Childs- v. Cox (c) is that the orderly 
 was not the agent of the Post Office, and that there was 
 therefore no delivery by the Post Office at all. 
 
 Lewis Thomas, in reply, cited two Irish cases, Sudson 
 v. Louth {d) and Adams v. Buchanan (e), as not in 
 accordance with the English decisions. 
 
 (a) AnU, p. 92. 290. 
 
 (J) Ibid. id) 8 X. E. Ir. 69. 
 
 (o) AnU, p. 84 ; 20 Q. B. D. («) 18 L. S. Ir. 292. 
 
366 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINtiS. 
 
 1893. Graham referred to another Irish case, Boogan v. 
 
 Atkins' Colquhoun {a), in which, without overruling the previous 
 Case. . . . 
 
 cases, it was held that evidence must be given by the 
 
 objector that in the " ordinary course " the notice would 
 
 reach its destination in time, and must include evidence 
 
 covering the transit from the nearest post office to the 
 
 place of abode mentioned in the address. 
 
 Lord Coleridge, L.O.J. In this case, which has 
 been stated and submitted to us for the express 
 purpose of reviewing the decision in Childs v. Cox (h), 
 the facts are practically the same as in that case. 
 Formerly, when there was no appeal, this Court did 
 not hesitate to overrule a case with which it did not 
 agree. That is not so now, and, therefore, it is better 
 that we should stand by the previous decision of this 
 Court. I am of opinion that if I did agree in the 
 judgment in that case, I was wrong. We think, 
 however, that we ought not to overrule it, but leave it 
 to be dealt with by the Court of Appeal. We there- 
 fore affirm the decision of the Revising Barrister. At 
 the same time, we intimate ovir wish that there should 
 be an appeal. 
 
 Graham asked for costs on behalf of the respondent. 
 
 Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. As we are giving judg- 
 ment in deference only to an authority with which we 
 do not agree, we cannot give costs. 
 
 Lawrance and Collins, JJ., concurred. 
 
 Appeal dismissed, without costs. 
 Leave to appeal granted. 
 
 («) 20 L. It. Jr. 361. (6) Ante, p. 84 ; 20 Q. B. D. 290. 
 
LVTI VICTORIA. 367 
 
 The appeal was heard on February 27th, 1894. The 1894. 
 objector appealed. Atkiks' 
 
 Cyril Bodd, Q.O., and Leiois Thomas, for the appel- 
 lant. It is submitted that the notices of objection were 
 properly served within the" meaning of sect. 100 of 
 6 Vict. cap. 18. There was an ordinary course of post, 
 generally, within the district of delivery in Colchester, 
 and as to the barracks, by delivery to the orderly. 
 The military regulations preclude delivery by postmen 
 in barracks as well as personal service, and, therefore, 
 if this is not to be held a delivery by " ordinary course 
 of post," there could not be a service of notice of 
 objections at all. 
 
 The Queen's regulations for the Post Office provide 
 for special arrangements for delivery to certain persons, 
 as, for example, by private box, or bag, or by delivery 
 at the post office, at any time to persons resident outside 
 the free delivery district. In the same way the ordi- 
 nary course of post to barracks is by delivery to an 
 orderly under the Post Office and military regulations. 
 
 [Lord BsHEK, M.E. There was no delivery at all 
 here by the Post Office " at such place," that is, at the 
 place of address, nor to the soldiers themselves. 
 
 Davey, L.J. Does sect. 100 require you to do more 
 than show that the notice posted under the circum- 
 stances would, if there were an ordinary course of post, 
 have been delivered in time? It does not matter 
 whether it is in fact delivered, if there is an ordinary 
 course of post. There is a delivery all over Colchester, 
 but, under the regulations, the commanding officer 
 takes delivery of letters addressed to barracks by an 
 
368 HILARY SITTINGS. 
 
 1894. orderly. His Lordship referred to Boogan v. Colqu- 
 
 Atkins' houn (a)]. 
 .Case. 
 
 That case is in the appellant's favour, being to the 
 effect that all he need show is the time when the notice 
 would he delivered if there was nothing to prevent it, and 
 that the transit is finished hy a regular carrier though 
 other than the postman. This is found in the ease here. 
 
 [Lopes, L.J. Have the words of the section any- 
 thing to do with the mode of transmission if there is 
 an ordinary course by which letters generally would be 
 delivered ?] 
 
 Then, if the case is not within sect. 100, it is con- 
 tended that the notices were served under sect. 17, by 
 being given to the orderly as the agent of the soldiers. 
 
 [Davet, L.J. The difficulty there is, that the 
 soldiers, having gone to Aldershot, had withdrawn or 
 never given the orderly authority to receive their 
 letters.] « 
 
 Hudson V. Louth (i) and Lewis v. Evans (c) were also 
 referred to. 
 
 E. Morten, for the respondents, submitted, that there 
 was no ordinary course of post to the place of abode, 
 and the objector takes the risk of this fact, whether he 
 knows it or not. If the ordinary course of post is 
 interrupted by special arrangements, he cannot shelter 
 himself under the statute. 
 
 c. A. r. 
 
 {a) 20 Z. S. Ir. 361. (c) 2 Hopw. f Colt. 279 ; I. E. 
 
 (i) 6 L. B. Ir. 69. 10 C. P. 297, 
 
LTII VICTORIA. 369 
 
 Lord Esher, M.R. The question before us is raised 1894, 
 
 upon a case stated by the Revising Barrister, in which — 
 
 the facts are precisely similar to those of Childs v. Case. 
 Cox {a), decided in 1887. , It arises in this way: 
 objection was taken to the names of certain voters 
 being on the list for the borough of Colchester, and 
 objection was in turn taken by the voters that they 
 had not been properly served with notice of the objec- 
 tion on or before August 20th. The facts are these. 
 Notices of objection were sent by post, addressed to 
 certain soldiers whose names were put on the list of 
 voters in respect of dwelling-house qualifications in the 
 barracks in Colchester. The objector had not served 
 the notices personally, but he relied upon their having 
 been posted under the provisions of sect. 100 of 6 Vict. 
 cap. 18. The Revising Barrister, in obedience to the 
 decision of Childs v. Cox [a), maintained the objection, 
 and held that the notices were not properly served. 
 It was proved that, in the course of an imiversal 
 practice in accordance with military and postal regula- 
 tions, letters intended for soldiers in barracks are not 
 deKvered to them by the Post Office authorities, but are 
 collected at the post office by orderlies appointed from 
 each regiment for that purpose, and are taken to the 
 barracks by them and delivered to the persons to whom 
 they are addressed. These notices were posted in 
 Colchester on August 19th, addressed to the persons 
 objected to at their places of abode, as described in the 
 overseers' lists, and were delivered to an orderly at the 
 post office and by him brought to the barracks at about 
 1.45 p.m. on the same day. It seems that, if they had 
 been delivered by the Post Office in the ordinary way at 
 
 («) Ante, p. 84 ; 20 Q. B. D. 290. 
 
370 
 
 HTI.ARY SITTINGS. 
 
 1894. the next postal delivery in Colchester, they would have 
 Atkins' heen delivered on the evening of August 19th. It appears 
 from the statement of the case that the persons objected 
 to were not at Colchester at this time, but for military 
 purposes had gone to Alder shot, and in point of fact 
 they did not, and could not, get the notices in question 
 at Colchester. The question is, whether, notwithstand- 
 ing that, they are to be considered as having received 
 them. The decision of the Revising Barrister is based 
 on the case of Childs v. Cox (a), in which it was held, 
 upon similar facts, that there was no ordinary course of 
 post, and, therefore, that letters 'posted as in this case 
 were not delivered in the ordinary course of post, and 
 that the notices were bad. In the present case, the 
 Lord Chief Justice has held that he must follow Childs 
 V. Cox (a), but says that, where there was no appeal 
 from the Court below, they did not hesitate to differ 
 from a previous decision, but that, now there is an 
 appeal, he adopts the course of following the previous 
 decision and leaving the case for the ultimate decision 
 of the Court of Appeal. He tells us that he has 
 changed his opinion, but he does not state his reasons. 
 The matter is one of general interest, and we have to 
 consider the question on its merits and say whether we 
 agree with Childs v. Cox (a). The circumstances of 
 both cases are precisely similar. The question turns 
 upon the words of certain sections of 6 Vict. cap. 18. 
 Section 17 provides for personal service. Section 100 
 provides .... [his Lordship reads sect. 100] ; this 
 obviously imports that, although in truth the notice 
 posted under the provisions of the section has never 
 been delivered at all, it is evidence "of the notice 
 
 (a) Ante, p. 84 ; 20 Q S. D. 290. 
 
LVII VICTORIA. 
 
 371 
 
 having been given to the person at the place mentioned 1894. 
 
 in such duplicate on the day on which such notice Atkins' 
 1 J • • Case, 
 
 would, in the ordinary course of post, have been 
 
 delivered to such place." We have to consider what is 
 the meaning of the words "would in the ordinary 
 course of post have been delivered at such place." 
 This is a provision in favour of the objector, and after 
 consideration, it seems to me that the proper construc- 
 tion depends upon the acts and regulations of the Post 
 Office. The Post Office determines how letters shaU 
 go and how be delivered by virtue of powers conferred 
 by Act of Parliament. " The ordinary course of post " 
 seems to me to mean this, that the Post Office has to 
 determine the district within which letters shall be 
 delivered to the general body of persons resident 
 therein, and the time at which such delivery to such 
 persons as a body shall be made. All, therefore, that 
 an objector need do is to ascertain what, in the ordinary 
 course, would be the delivery to the general body of 
 persons withia a district. If he were to inquire, and 
 find that, within the ambit of a certain distance from 
 the Post Office, letters would be delivered at certain 
 hours to all persons, other than exceptional cases, he 
 need not inquire further whether there were any 
 persons who, by special arrangement with the Post 
 ■Office, or by some agreement with the officials who, 
 perhaps, may not bind the Post Office, have their letters 
 •delivered in some other mode. Any such special 
 arrangement, whether it constitute a delivery by the 
 Post Office or by private arrangement, is, at any rate, 
 not an " ordinary," but an " extraordinary " delivery. 
 That being so, it follows that CMlds v. Cox (a) was 
 
 (a) AnU, p. 84 ; 20 Q. B. D. 290. 
 
 vol. I. D D 
 
372 
 
 HILARY SITTINGS. 
 
 1894. -wrongly decided. At Woolwich in tliat case, as at 
 
 Ateins' Colchester in this, there was an ordinary delivery for 
 the general postal district, replaced, as to the barracks, 
 by an extraordinary delivery. With that the objector 
 had nothing to do. 
 
 I am of opinion that the notices ought to have been 
 held proved by the production of the stamped duplicates, 
 both here and in Childs v. Cox {a). We must, there- 
 fore, overrule Childs v. Cox and the formal decision of 
 the Court below in this ease, and allow this appeal, 
 upon the ground that the single question for the 
 Revising Barrister was this : " Is there an ordinary 
 course of post for the district within which the voters 
 reside?" 
 
 LoPES, L.J. This case is important, as by it the 
 long standing decision of Childs v. Cox is questioned. 
 The Revising Barrister has held, on the authority of 
 that ease, that there was no delivery " in the ordinary 
 course of post" at the barracks within the meaning 
 of sect. 100 of 6 Vict. cap. 18, and that the stamped 
 duplicates were not available to prove the services of 
 the notices of objections. 
 
 It is necessary to consider what the words " in the 
 ordinary course of post " in sect. 100 mean. [His 
 Lordship read the section.] The object of the legisla- 
 ture was to make the stamped duplicate retained by 
 the objector evidence of the notice having been given. 
 The objector had to comply with the requirements of 
 sect. 100, and the notices must have been posted so 
 that, " in the ordinary course of post," they would be 
 delivered on or before the 20th of August. In this case 
 the objector had done aU that was required by sect. 100, 
 
 («) Ante, p. 84 ; 20 Q. B. D. 290. 
 
LVII VICTORIA. 
 
 373 
 
 and the only question was whether the notices were 1894. 
 
 posted so that, " in the ordinary course of post," they Amn^s' 
 
 Case. 
 would he delivered on or hefore the 20th of August. 
 
 There was an ordinary course of post in Colchester, and 
 it is clear that, if the ordinary course of post had heen 
 permitted to take its ordinary course, the notices would 
 have been delivered on the 19th of August at the bar- 
 racks. The reason why they were not delivered was 
 because, owing to some military regidation, the post was 
 not allowed to take its ordinary course. 
 
 In my judgment, this cannot prejudice the action of 
 the objector. He had done all required of him by the 
 statutes. It was no fault of his that the notices were 
 not delivered in the ordinary course of post. A person 
 with a private box or a private bag might give direc- 
 tions to the postmaster to retain his letters till called 
 for, or to forward them once a week. Could it be said 
 that an objector was to be prejudiced if, by reason of 
 such an arrangement, his notice was not delivered in 
 time ? He could know nothing of these private 
 arrangements. It would be sufficient for him that, if 
 nothing had been done to delay or intercept the notices, 
 they would, in the ordinary course of post, have been 
 delivered in time. 
 
 In my opinion, Childs v. Cox {a) was wrongly 
 decided and ought to be overruled. The Court there 
 says, " the case shows that on the 20th of August no 
 ordinary course of post existed." But that is not so. 
 There was an " ordinary course of post " by which the 
 notices would have been delivered in time if nothing 
 had been done to intercept it. I do not think sect. 17 
 applies. The appeal must be allowed. 
 
 (a) Ante, p. 84 ; 20 Q. B. D. 290. 
 
374 HILARY SITTINGS. 
 
 1894. Davey, L.J. I SO entirely agree with the jiidgments 
 
 Atkins' which have heen deliTered, that it is unneoessary for 
 me to add anythiag. 
 
 Appeal allowed. 
 
 Solicitors — ^For the Appellant, Speechly, Mumford, 
 Landon and Rogers for Asher Prior, 
 Colchester. 
 
 For the Eespondent, The Town Clerk of 
 Colchester. 
 
CASES 
 
 AHaUED AND DETERMINED 
 
 IN THE 
 
 QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION 
 
 OF 
 
 THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, 
 
 TJNDBE STATS. 6 & 7 YICT. c. 18, 
 
 AND 
 
 41 & 42 VICT. c. 26, 
 
 AND THE ACTS AMENDING THE SAME 
 
 DUEINO 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS, 1894, AND 
 HILAEY AND EASTER SITTINGS, 1895. 
 
 IN THE 
 
 EIFTT-EIGHTH TEAR OF QUEEN VICTORIA. 
 
 The Queen v. McConnell. 
 
 TN this case a rule nisi had heen granted for a 1894. 
 
 mandamus calling upon the Revising Barrister for '— — 
 
 the parliamentary and municipal borough oi Liverpool n^'^^^^^ 
 
 and Charles Chadwick, a voter, to show cause why an thrRevising 
 
 appeal should not be entered and a case stated by the ^e'^oienov 
 
 Revising Barrister. »*/ notice of 
 
 ° selection of 
 
 The facts were as follows : — *iie entry to 
 
 be retained 
 At the revision of the lists of voters for the borough for voting 
 
 given by a 
 of Liverpool, Charles Chadwick, who was entered more voter imder 
 
 than once as a parliamentary voter for the parliamentary the iParlia- 
 
 mentary and 
 Municipal 
 Registration Act, 1878 (41 & 42 Viet. cap. 26). The voter giving such a notice is 
 not a claimant within the meaning of sect. 39 of the Parliamentary Registration 
 Act, 1843 (6 Tict. cap. 18). 
 
376 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1894. torough of Liverpool, and in different parliamentary 
 Eeoina divisions, viz., in the Kirkdale Division (where he 
 MoCoNMELL. resided) and in the Ahercromby Division, gave to the 
 Revising Barrister a notice in ■writing of his selection 
 of the Ahercromby Division of the said horough for 
 parliamentary voting. It was objected at the hearing 
 that the notice given by the said Charles Chadwich was 
 not in accordance with Form " P " prescribed by the 
 Registration Act, 1885 (a), and the Registration Order, 
 1889, and was insufficient and invalid. 
 
 The Revising Barrister held that the said notice 
 complied with Form " P," and was sufficient, and ac- 
 cordingly gave effect thereto by retaining the name 
 of the said Charles Chadwick in the list as a voter 
 for the Ahercromby Division, and starred — that is, 
 marked with an asterisk — the entry in the list for the 
 Kirkdale Division. He was asked to state a case, but 
 refused. 
 
 Application was thereupon made to the judge in 
 chambers in vacation, who granted a rule nisi. 
 
 Sir Eenry James, Q.C, and W. F. Taylor showed 
 cause against the rule. 
 
 The application must fail on three grounds : — 
 
 (1.) No appeal lies as to the subject-matter of this 
 application. 
 
 (2.) The form of notice was sufficient. 
 
 (3.) Under section 18 of the Registration Act, 
 1885 {a), even if the prescribed form of notice was dis- 
 regarded, that of itself did not invalidate it. 
 
 The procedure as to the Selection or retention of one 
 out of several qualifications in the same borough is 
 
 (a) 48 Viot. cap. 15. 
 
LVIII VICTORIA. 
 
 377 
 
 governed by sub-section 14 of section 28 of the Par- 1894. 
 liamentary and Municipal Eegistration Act, 1878(a), -RsaisA. 
 section 5 of the Eegistration Act, 1885 {b), and the MoCoiweli,. 
 Eegistration Order, 1889, Form P., Form of Electors' 
 Notice of Selection in the case of Duplicate Entries. 
 
 If the voter being on the list in respect of several 
 qualifications desires to elect for which of them he shall 
 vote, he gives a notice under the Acts, and the Eevising 
 Barrister then " stars," or marks with an asterisk, the 
 other entries in the list. 
 
 The voter need not, however, select or give any 
 notice, and then the Eevising Barrister must retain the 
 entry in respect of the place of abode of the voter. Here 
 the voter gave a notice of selection, and the Eevising 
 Barrister has held that it is a sufficient compliance with 
 the prescribed form, and has given effect to it. 
 
 This is not a matter within section 42 of the Par- 
 liamentary Eegistration Act, 1843 (c), which alone 
 gives a right of appeal. The only words of that section 
 that could apply to this case are these^-" Any person 
 who, under the provisions hereinbefore contained, shall 
 have . . , made any objection to any other person as 
 not entitled to have his name inserted in any list." A 
 reference to the "provisions hereinbefore . contained " 
 shows that the objector here has no locus standi. Thus 
 section 17 of the Act shows what persons may object 
 and what persons may be objected to, and provides that 
 notices of objection are to be given to the overseers 
 and the persons objected to ; and, by section 18, the 
 overseers are to make a list of the persons objected to. 
 Section 39 enables objection to be made to the claim 
 
 (a) 41 & 42 Vict. cap. 26. (c) 6 Vict. cap. 18. 
 
 (4) 48 Vict. cap. 16. 
 
378' MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1894. of any person who has been omitted from the lists to 
 Eeqina ^^'"''s liis name inserted by the opponent's giving notice 
 MoCoraBLL. ^ writing to the Eevising Barrister. 
 
 None of these sections apply to this ease. All that 
 the statute requires ta be done by the person who 
 wishes to select the qualification in respect of which he 
 desires to vote is to give notice to that efPect to the 
 Revising Barrister. No notice need be given to any- 
 one else, nor is anyone else to be satisfied in the matter. 
 Even if others are allowed to see the notices of selection 
 which have been given, this is not a right, but a matter 
 of courtesy only, and no objection in respect of them is 
 possible. The persons making their selection are voters 
 already on the list, and it is not till the lists are com- 
 plete that the Revising Barrister gives effect to the 
 power of " starring." 
 
 The objector. has given no notice to the voter or the 
 overseers, but upon a mere statement to the Eevising 
 Barrister has objected to a notice of selection by the 
 voter, which he was not even entitled, but only enabled 
 by courtesy, to see. 
 
 The objector, therefore, cannot say that he was making 
 an objection under the "provisions hereinbefore con- 
 tained," viz., in sections 17 and 18 of the Act of 1843 (a). 
 
 Section 39 of the Act does not apply, as the voter 
 here was not a claimant. 
 
 This objection, therefore, is not within section 42 of 
 the Registration Act, 1843 (a), at all. It is not an ob- 
 jection to a voter's name remaining on any list. The 
 name is on the list in two divisions in respect of two 
 good qualifications. The voter has a right and ought 
 to be on both, and he can elect, without anybody's 
 
 (a) 6 Viet. cap. 18. 
 
T. 
 KoCoHlTELL. 
 
 Lvm vicTOKiA. 379 
 
 interrention, whioli entry shall be effectual for the 1394. 
 purpose of voting. The only limitation is that the :B,samA 
 entry for which he does not desire to vote is qualified 
 by " starring " it. 
 
 The only application of the words ia section 42 of the 
 Act, " as not entitled to have his name inserted in any 
 list," is to a case where a name is put on the list when 
 it ought not to have been put on (see Arnold v. 
 Sharpe (a) ) . The case is therefore not within the section 
 under which alone a right of appeal is given, and no 
 appeal lies. 
 
 If this contention on the first point is correct, no 
 mandamus can go, and it is unnecessary to argue the 
 other points. 
 
 The Court called upon Joseph Walton, Q,.0., and 
 W. S. Butler to answer the first point. 
 
 It is submitted that, reading section 42 of the Parlia- 
 mentary Eegistration Act, 1843 (S), in the light of the 
 later legislation into which it is incorporated, this is an 
 objection "to another person as not entitled to have 
 his name inserted in any list." The words are clearly 
 wider than their narrowest sense, for they include the 
 case of a claimant as well as a person who is already on 
 the list (see sections 17, 18, and 39 of the Act). The 
 essence of the words, therefore, is, — objection to a voter 
 whether claiming or already on the list. 
 
 The procedure as to selection of one out of several 
 entries for the purpose of. voting is regulated by the 
 Parliamentary and Municipal Registration Act, 1878 (c), 
 sect. 28, sub-sect. 14, and the Eegistration Act, 1885 {d), 
 
 [a) Ante, p. 252; 65 Z. T. 618, ifi) 6 Viet. cap. 18. 
 
 «mJ nom. Arnold v. Clerk of the (c) 41 & 42 Vict. cap. 26. 
 
 for Keateven. {d) 48 Vict. cap. 16. 
 
380 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1894. sect. 5. The earlier Act provided against personation 
 
 -RmisA. i"! t^® same constituency. Section 5 (2) of the Act of 
 
 - MoCoNNELL l^^^j became necessary when parliamentary boroughs 
 
 were divided into divisions which constituted different 
 
 constituencies. 
 
 Here the voter was resident in the Kirhdale Division, 
 and he had a business qualification in the Ahercromby 
 Division — a different constituency. As the list stood, 
 he was not entitled to vote for the Abereromby Division, 
 but he had a right to vote for Kirkdale — his place of 
 residence. Unless and until something is done, he has 
 . no right to vote for a qualification in any other division. 
 He may acquire a right to vote elsewhere if he oompKes 
 with certain prescribed formalities. - 
 
 .[Chables, J. Under what statute do you claim to 
 have power to object ?] 
 
 Under section 39 of the Parliamentary Eegistration 
 Act, 1843 (a). 
 
 [Charles, J. But you have not given the necessary 
 notice, and the Court cannot give the go-by to sec- 
 tion 39. At the same time, you must not suppose 
 I agree m. your contention that the voter here is a 
 claimant.] 
 
 [Sir H. James stated that he would prefer not to 
 deal with the formality of notice under section 39,- as 
 he wished to have the decision of the Court upon the 
 question whether the person was a " claimant."] 
 
 Surely, when at the Court the names are read out 
 for the purpose of the voter's selecting the qualification 
 he desires to retain for voting, any voter may object. 
 
 (a) 6 Viet. cap. 18. . . 
 
LVm VICTORIA. 381 
 
 [Charles, J. Where do you get that power ?] 1894. 
 
 The Eevising Barrister has to make an inquiry. 
 The person is not. a person entitled to vote except in 
 respect of his residence. This was not in the Aber- 
 cromby Division. He was not entitled to vote for that 
 division until he had adopted the procedure provided 
 for making his selection. 
 
 It is submitted, therefore, that in effect he had to 
 claim to be inserted effectively in the list for the Aber- 
 cromby Division. Until that was done, and done in 
 proper form, the entry was wholly inoperative. It was 
 open, therefore, to object to him as a claimant, and 
 an appeal will lie as to the sufficiency of his notice. 
 Arnold v. Sharps {a) may be distinguished on the 
 ground that there the refusal of the Eevising Barrister 
 left the voter in possession of the vote to which he was 
 in fact entitled. That was a case of a county division, 
 and a County CouncU elector may be registered in more 
 than one division. 
 
 Mathew, J. This is an important case, which raises 
 a question whether a voter's right of election as to 
 which of two or more qualifications he desires to retain 
 for the purpose of voting can be limited by an objeq- 
 tion taken to the' form of the notice of selection given 
 by him, and whether any appeal wUl lie from the 
 Eevising Barrister's ruling as to such notice at the 
 instance of the objector. I am clearly of opinion that 
 no such appeal will lie. Section 42 of the Parlia- 
 mentary Eegistration Act, 1843 {a), provides for the 
 
 («) Ante, p. 252 ; 65 L. T. 618, sub mm. Arnold v. Clerk of the 
 Peace for Keateven. 
 (*) 6 Viet. cap. 18. 
 
 Beqina 
 
 V. 
 
 McCOKNELL. 
 
382 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1894. cases in ■which alone an appeal may he made from the 
 ■Sxmsl Revising Barrister's decision. 
 MoOoNNELi. ^^® " provisions hereinhefore contained " referred to 
 in that section are to be found in sections 17, 18 and 
 39 of the Act. Section 17 provides for objections to 
 voters, that is, in the words of the section, " to any- 
 other person as not having been entitled ... to have 
 his name inserted in any list of voters," and section 18 
 provides that lists of the persons objected to shall be 
 made and published. Then section 39 provides that 
 objections may be made to the claims of persons who 
 have been omitted from the lists of voters. In my 
 opinion there is nothing in section 42, or the earlier 
 provisions thereiu referred to, which brings the question 
 raised in this case within the enactment of that section 
 as to the right to appeal. This is not a question as to 
 the right of a " person to have his name inserted in any 
 list." It is said, however, that subsequent legislation 
 has had that effect. The Parliamentary and Municipal 
 Eegistration Act, 1878 {a), and the Eegistration Act, 
 1885 (b), deal with the rights of a voter to select the 
 division of a borough for which he shall vote; but 
 those sections contain nothing as to any right of appeal, 
 and I am wholly unable to xmderstand that the pro- 
 visions as to appeal contained in section 42 of the Act 
 of 1843 (c) have been thereby altered or extended. 
 
 What occurred here was that no notice of objection 
 having been given under the 17th or the 39th sections 
 of the Act of 1843, an informal objection was made 
 before the Revising Barrister to the right of the voter 
 to make any selection of the qualification he desired to 
 retain, upon the ground that his notice of election was 
 
 (a) 41 & 42 Vict. cap. 26, (J) 48 Viet. cap. 15, sect. 5 (2). 
 
 sect. 28 (14). („) 6 Vict. cap. 18. 
 
iVIlI VICTOKIA. 
 
 383 
 
 not in accordance with the form prescribed by the 1394. 
 Eegistration Order, 1889. The Eevising Barrister, KEoml 
 however, held that there was no objection before him, mqc^Iuju,. 
 and that he was entitled to consider and give effect to 
 the form of notice of election given by the voter. He 
 found that the notice was a sufficient compliance with 
 the prescribed form, and marked the list accordingly. 
 I am of opinion that he was acting within his right, 
 and that there is no appeal from his decision. 
 
 Charles, J. I am of the same opinion. The legis- 
 lature has enacted that there shall be no appeal in a 
 case of this nature. The right of appeal against the 
 allowance of a vote is still governed by section 42 of the 
 Parliamentary Eegistration Act, 1843 (a). It exists 
 with regard to the several lists mentioned in the earlier 
 provisions of the Act, namely, the overseers' lists for 
 county and borough in sections 7 and 17, and the lists 
 of claimants in section 39. In these cases any other 
 voter may object, upon proper notice, to the name of 
 any other person as not entitled to have his name 
 inserted in any list. Under the former sections a 
 previous notice of objection must be served upon the 
 overseers and the party objected to, and under sec- 
 tion 39 a notice of objection can be given to the 
 Eevising Barrister in Court. No doubt, under sec- 
 tion 42 of the Act, an appeal lies in both these cases. 
 But I wholly fail to see that, by virtue of either section 5, 
 sub-section 2 of the Eegistration Act, 1885 (b), or any 
 other statute, the person whose vote is in question here 
 can in any sense be considered a claimant within the 
 meaning of section 39 of the Act of 1843 {a). He is a 
 
 (a) 6 Vict. cap. 18. (i) 48 Viet. cap. 15. 
 
58i MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 .1894. person wliose name is on the list made by the overseers 
 jjechiia ^^d puhlished on the church, doors, and he is entitled to 
 MoCossELL. assume, unless a notice of ohjection has been previously 
 received by him, that his right to a vote will be passed, 
 and that he wiU not be compelled to appear at the 
 Eevision Court armed with aU his proofs. Then 
 section 14 of the Parliamentary and Municipal Eegis- 
 tration Act, 1878 {a), provides that the Eevising Bar- 
 rister, finding the name of a voter on the list for two or 
 more divisions of a borough, is to inquire and retain the 
 name for voting in one division, and " star " or put a 
 mark against the name in respect of the entry for the 
 other division. And the Act has further empowered 
 the voter to give notice to the Revising Barrister of his 
 selection of the particular qualification which he desires 
 to be retained for voting purposes. The form of this 
 notice is prescribed by the Eegistration Order, 1889 (b). 
 This was done here. The voter was on the list for two 
 divisions of the borough of Liverpool, and gave notice 
 to the Eevising Barrister of his selection of one of the 
 entries for voting, and it was the duty of the Eevising 
 Barrister to give effect to that notice by what is known 
 as " starring " the other entry in the list. It is argued 
 that_ section 42 of the Act of 1843 (c) gives any voter 
 the right to come forward before the Eevising Barrister 
 and interpose and object to that notice of election. I do 
 not think section 42 applies to this case at all, the voter 
 being already on the list and entitled to remain on the 
 list. I do not see any section in any of the later Acts 
 which gives an objector this right, and he is still 
 restricted by the Act of 1843. Nor can he avail him- 
 
 (a) 41 & 42 Viet. cap. 26. (c) 6 Vict. cap. 18. 
 
 (*) Form <> P." 
 
Lvin VICTORIA. 385 
 
 self of section 39 of the Act for the reasons I have 1894. 
 abeady given. eeoina 
 
 T. 
 MoCONNEIi. 
 
 Eule discharged. 
 
 SoKcitors — ^For the Applicant, Crowders 8f Vizard, for 
 George J. Lynshey, Liverpool. 
 
 For the Eespondent, Pritchard, Englefield 
 8f Co., for Barrell, Rodway §• Co,, 
 Liverpool. 
 
,386 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 Skinn, Appellant ; Phillips, Respondeat. 
 
 1894. 
 Xfov. 14. 
 
 A voter had 
 a quaUficatiou 
 ia respect of 
 premises 
 occupied hy 
 him in that 
 part of the 
 parish of 
 Deeping St. 
 Nicholas 
 which is 
 locally in the 
 parts of 
 Kesteven, and 
 in what has 
 always been 
 known as 
 the Petty 
 Sessional 
 Division of 
 Bourne in 
 Linoolnshire. 
 Other part 
 of the said 
 parish is 
 locally in the 
 parts of 
 Sollamd and 
 in the Petty 
 Sessional 
 Division of 
 Mloe in the 
 same county. 
 The parish 
 
 was constituted hy the Deeping Fen Drainage Act, 1866 (19 & 20 Vict. cap. Ixv, 
 L. & P.), which, after reciting that it was expedient that provisions should be made 
 for constituting Deeping Fen into a parish for secular purposes, enacted, by sect. 52, 
 that Deeping Fen should form a parish by the name of Deeping St. Nicholas, and 
 should be deemed to be altogether in the parts of Holland in Lincolnshire for all poor 
 law purposes. From the year 1856 down to the present time, aU poor law business 
 (within the jurisdiction of justices) for the whole parish has been dealt with by the 
 justices of Holland, but the justices of Xesteven have always exercised the criminal 
 and licensing jurisdiction in that portion of the parish which is in Kesteven and in the 
 petty sessional division of Bourne. Held, (1) that the effect of the Deeping Fen 
 Drainage Act, 18S6, was to constitute Deeping St. Nicholas a separate parish for poor 
 law purposes only ; and (2) that, by virtue of sect. 9 and sched. 7 of the Redistri- 
 bution of Seats Act, 1885 (48 & 49 Vict. cap. 23), which control and override the 
 general provisions of sect. 18 of the same Act, that portion of the parish of Deeping 
 St. Nicholas, which is locally in Kesteven and in the petty sessional division of Bourne, 
 is in the South Xesteven or Stamford parliamentary division of Mneolnmire, and that 
 the voter's name was rightly retained on Division I. of the Occupiers' List for that 
 division. Semble, the matter should have been referred to the Local Govenunent 
 Board for their determination under sect. 23 of the Act of 1885. 
 
 A T a Court held for the revision of the lists of voters for 
 the South Kesteven or Stamford Division of Lincoln- 
 shire, Tom Stanton Skinn duly ohjected to the name 
 of Robert Allen heing retained on Division I. of the 
 Occupiers' List for the parish of Beeping St. Nicholas 
 (that part lying south of the North Drove Brain). 
 
 The grounds of objection were stated in the notice of 
 objection as follows : — 
 
 "That the house you occupy is not in the South 
 Kesteven or Stamford parliamentary division. 
 
 " That the whole of the parish of Beeping St. Nicholas 
 is in the parts of Holland, and for all poor law and 
 parliamentary purposes it is in the parts of Holland and 
 in the Holland or Spalding division of Lincolnshire. 
 
 " That you have not resided in the South Kesteven or 
 Stamford parliamentary division during the year ending 
 15th July, 1894." 
 
 No objection to the voter's county electors qualifica- 
 tion was made. 
 
LVIII VICTORIA. 
 
 387; 
 
 The facts, as set out in the case afterwards stated By 1894. 
 the Revising Barrister, were as follows r — Skinn 
 
 1. The parish of Deeping St. Nicholas was, prior to Phillips. 
 the passing of the Deeping Fen Drainage Act, 1856 
 
 (19 & 20 Vict. cap. Ixv, L. 8f P.), extra-parochial, and 
 partly situated in the parts of Kesteven in the petty 
 sessional division of Bourne, and partly situated in the 
 parts of Holland in the petty sessional division of Elloe. 
 
 2. The ahove-mentioned extra-parochial district was 
 formed into a parish by the name of Deeping St. 
 Nicholas by the Deeping Fen Drainage Act, 1856. 
 For the purposes of parliamentary and county council 
 registration that part of the parish of Deeping St. 
 Nicholas which is locally in the parts of Holland is a 
 polling district in the parts of Holland, and that part 
 of the parish which is in the parts of Kesteven has been 
 assigned to two polling districts — such part as is north 
 of the North Drove Drain being assigned to the Tongue 
 End polling district, and such part as is south of the 
 North Drove Drain being assigned to the Deeping St. 
 Nicholas polling district. 
 
 3. That part of the parish of Deeping St. Nicholas 
 which is locally within the parts of Kesteven is also 
 locally situated within the petty sessional division of 
 Bourne, and that part of the parish which is locally 
 within the parts of Holland is also locally situate within 
 the petty sessional division of Elloe. 
 
 4. The property in respect of which the appellant 
 Robert Allen was placed upon Division I. of the Occu- 
 piers' List of Yoters for the parish of Deeping St. 
 Nicholas is situated in that part of the parish lying 
 south of the North Drove Drain, and locally within the 
 pairts of Kesteven and the petty sessional division of 
 
388 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1894. 5. It was proved before the Eevising Barrister, and 
 
 Skinn found by him as a fact, that, prior to the year 1892, the 
 p ^^T.TP fi. general poor rate was laid over the whole parish and 
 included the county rates for Holland and Kesteven : 
 that since the year 1892 there have been three rates 
 laid in the parish of Beeping St. Nicholas : — (1) a 
 general poor rate over the whole parish ; (2) a county 
 and police rate on that portion of the parish wluch is 
 within the parts of Holland ; (3) a county and police 
 rate on that portion of the parish which is within the 
 parts of Kesteven. That the rates numbered (1) and (2) 
 have been allowed by the justices of Holland acting in 
 and for the petty sessional division of Elloe, and the 
 rate numbered (3) has been allowed by the justices of 
 Kesteven acting in and for the petty sessional division 
 of Bourne. 
 
 6. It was also proved, and found as a fact by the 
 Revising Barrister, that from the year 1856 down to 
 the present time, all poor law business (within the 
 jurisdiction of justices) for the whole parish of Beeping 
 St. Nicholas has been transacted or dealt with exclu- 
 sively by the justices of Holland, sitting at Spalding, 
 acting in and for the petty sessional division of Elloe : 
 that all criminal charges (within the jurisdiction of 
 justices) in that portion of the parish of Beeping 
 St. Nicholas which is locally within the parts of Holland, 
 have been dealt with by the justices of Holland sitting 
 at Spalding, acting in and for the petty sessional 
 division of Elloe, and in that portion of the parish 
 which is locally within the parts of Kesteven by the 
 justices of Kesteven sitting at Bourne, acting in and 
 for the petty sessional division of Bourne. 
 
 7. The Deeping Fen Drainage Act (which was made 
 part of the case stated by the Eevising Barrister), after 
 
LVIII VICTORIA. 389 
 
 reciting that it was expedient that provisions should he 1894". 
 made for the maintenance of the poor within Beeping Skinn 
 Fen, and for the repair of highways therein, and for -SBuLree. 
 constituting the same, exclusive of the parts situate 
 in the parish of Crowland, into a parish for secular 
 purposes, enacted, in section 52 (which was set out in a 
 schedule to the said case), that Deeping Fen should form 
 a parish by the name of Beeping St. Nicholas, and 
 should be deemed to be altogether in the parts of 
 Holland in Lincolnshire, and that the laws for the time 
 being in force for the relief and employment of the 
 poor in England, should be executed and put in force 
 within the said parish in like manner as in other 
 parishes in England. 
 
 It was contended on behalf of the appellant that 
 the qualifying premises were within the parliamentary 
 division of Holland (or Spalding), and not within the 
 parliamentary division of South Kesteven (or Stamford), 
 and that, therefore, the voter's name should be erased 
 from Division I. of the Occupier's List for the parish 
 of Beeping St. Nicholas (that part lying south of the 
 North Brove Brain), and placed in Division III. of the 
 same list, on the ground that by the Deeping Fen 
 Drainage Act, 1856, by the recited clause before 
 referred to, and by section 52, the parish of Beeping 
 St. Nicholas was in the parts of Holland for poor law 
 purposes, and that by the Redistribution of Seats Act, 
 1885 (48 & 49 Vict. cap. 23), sect. 18, any constitution 
 of new parishes made for poor law purposes, by or in 
 pursuance of any Act of Parliament on or before the 
 26th March, 1885, and any alteration of the boundary 
 of a county which is incidental, had effect also for all 
 purposes of the law relating to parliamentary elections 
 for any future parliament ; that, therefore, the whole 
 
390 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1894. of tlie parish of Deeping St. Nichohs was, for parlia- 
 Skdw mentary boundary purposes, as well as for poor law 
 Phillips, purposes, within the petty sessional division of Elloe ; 
 and consequently, hy the seventh schedule (county of 
 Lincoln, No. 7) of the Redistribution of Seats Act, 
 1885, in the parliamentary division of Holland (or 
 Spalding). 
 
 It was contended on behalf of the voter Robert Allen, 
 that the qualifying premises are situate in the So-uth 
 Kesteven or Stamford parliamentary division, and that, 
 therefore, he was entitled to have his name retained 
 on the list of voters on the ground that the Redistri- 
 bution of Seats Act, 1885 (48 & 49 Vict. cap. 23), 
 sect. 9 (2), provides that the contents and boundaries 
 of county parliamentary divisions shall be those 
 specified in schedule 7 to the Act ; that by sche- 
 dule 7 (county of Lincoln), the South Kesteven or 
 Stamford division includes the sessional division of 
 Bourne ; that the expression sessional division is defined 
 by section 23 of the same Act to mean the county petty 
 sessional division as existing on the 1st January, 1885 ; 
 that a " county petty sessional division " is defined as 
 any division of a county or part of a county in and 
 for which, petty sessions are usually held ; and that as 
 the qualifying premises are situate within the county 
 petty sessional division of Bourne, as existing on the 
 1st January, 1885, the voter was entitled to have his 
 name retained on Division I. of the Occupiers' List of 
 Yoters. 
 
 The Revising Barrister decided that the qualifying 
 premises were situate within the parliamentary division 
 of Kesteven or Stamford, and that the voter Robert 
 Allen was entitled to have his name retained on 
 Division I. of the Occupiers' List of Voters for the 
 
v. 
 
 FmTiTiTTfl: 
 
 LVm VICTORIA. 391 
 
 parisli of Beeping Sf. Nicholas (that part lying south of i894. 
 the North Drove Brain). He considered that section 18 Ssnsrs 
 of the Redistribution of Seats Act, 1885 (48 & 49 Viet, 
 cap. 23), does not apply to the definition of the contents 
 and boundaries of parliamentary diyisions as defined 
 by section 9 (2), and schedule 7 of the same Act. He 
 held that neither section 52 of the Deeping Fen 
 Drainage Act, 1856, nor section 18 of the Eedistribu- 
 tion of Seats Act, 1885, had the effect of altering the 
 boundary of the South Kesteven or Stamford parlia- 
 mentary division as defined by schedule 7 of the last- 
 mentioned Act, and that as the qualifying premises 
 were locally within the petty sessional division of 
 Bourne, which is included in the South Kesteven or 
 Stamford division as defined in schedule 7 to the Re- 
 distribution of Seats Act, 1885, the objection to the 
 voters' name being retained on Division I. of the 
 Occupiers' List could not be maintained. 
 
 The names of fifty-five other persons, whose names 
 were set out in schedules 1a and 1b annexed to the 
 said case, were objected to by the appellant under 
 similar circumstances. 
 
 The Revising Barrister retained the names of Robert 
 Allen and of the thirty-seven other persons, whose names 
 were set out in schedule 1a, in Division I. of the Occu- 
 piers' List of Yoters for the parish of Beeping St. Nicholas 
 (that part lying south of the North Brove Brain), and 
 he retained the names of the eighteen other persons, 
 whose names were set out in schedule 1b, in Division I. 
 of the Occupiers' List of Voters for the parish of Beeping 
 St. Nicholas (that part lying north of the North Brove 
 Brain). 
 
 Due notice of appeal from this decision was given, 
 and the appeals were ordered to be consolidated. 
 
392 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1894. If the Court should he of opinion that the decision 
 
 Ssms was wrong, the register was to be amended by erasing 
 Pmujps. ^^^ names of Robert Allen and the said fifty-five other 
 persons from Division I. and inserting them in Divi- 
 sion III. of the respective lists. 
 
 Oermaine, for the appellant. The question here is 
 whether the parish of Deeping St. Nicholas, in which 
 the quahfying premises are, is not to be deemed to be 
 in the Holland or Spalding division of Lincolnshire for 
 all purposes, or, if not for all purposes, at any rate, 
 inasmuch as it is there for poor law purposes, for 
 parliamentary purposes also. It is contended that the 
 real effect of the preamble and section 52 of the Deep- 
 ing Fen Drainage Act of 1856 (a) was to place the 
 parish of Beeping St. Nicholas in the parts of Holland 
 in Lincolnshire for all purposes. If this be so, then the 
 justices of Kesteven, sitting at Bourne, and acting in and 
 for the petty sessional division of Bourne, have, in exer- 
 cising criminal jurisdiction over the portion of the parish 
 which is locally within the parts of Kesteven, merely 
 usurped a jurisdiction that was taken from them by 
 the Act of 1856. Therefore, notwithstanding the exer- 
 cise of this jurisdiction by the justices of Kesteven, the 
 whole of the parish has been since 1856 in the petty 
 sessional division of Elloe, and none of it in the petty 
 sessional division of Bourne. 
 
 [Lord Etjssell of Killowen, L.O.J. By whom 
 have the licences been granted ?] 
 
 There is no finding as to that, but it is admitted that 
 they have been granted, as to this portion of the parish, 
 
 (a) 19 & 20 Viot. cap. Ixy. 
 
LVIII VICTORIA. l3^,8 
 
 by the justices of Kesteven. This would be another 1894. 
 usurpation of jurisdiction. The" justices of Kesteven skuw 
 have never acted for any poor law purposes. It is to j>sillips 
 be noticed that the only reference in section 52 of the 
 Act to Kesteven is to direct how the county rate when 
 raised is to be distributed. If, however, the parish is 
 not entirely in the parts of Holland for all purposes, 
 yet, inasmuch as the parliamentary franchise is based 
 upon the poor law and rating, it is within the limits of 
 the jurisdiction as to those matters that the franchise is 
 to be exercised. Holland has always had exclusive poor 
 law jurisdiction over the whole parish, including that 
 portion which is in Kesteven; the parliamentary franchise 
 therefore in respect of premises in that jurisdiction ought 
 to be exercised within it, that is, in the Holland or 
 Spalding Division. The overseers are the persons who 
 make up the lists. Therefore, it must be the overseers 
 of Holland who make up the lists of persons whose 
 qualifications are based on the poor law of Holland. 
 Next, section 18 of the Eedistribution of Seats Act, 
 1885 {a), supports this contention. That section enacts 
 that " Any such constitution of new parishes or division 
 or alteration of boundaries of parishes made for poor 
 law purposes by or in pursuance of any Act of Parlia- 
 ment, as has come into operation on or before the 26th 
 day of March, 1885, and any alteration of the boundary 
 of a county which is incidental to such constitution, 
 division, or alteration, shall have effect also for all 
 purposes of the law relating to parliamentary elections 
 for any future parliament." So that, even assuming 
 that section 52 of the Act of 1856 is limited to poor 
 law purposes, it is extended by this section of the Act 
 of 1885 ; the " law relating to parliamentary elections " 
 
 [a) 48 & 49 Tict, cap. 23. 
 rF2 
 
394 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1894. being defined by section 24 of the same Act to include 
 Seoot "all laws, customs, and enactments relating to parlia- 
 p ^T.T.T Pp. mentary elections, inclusive of the law respecting the 
 qualification and registration of voters." 
 
 [Lord Eussell of Killowen, L.O.J. But section 9 
 and schedule 7 of the Act of 1885 (a) seem to deal 
 with this particular case.J 
 
 It is submitted it is dealt with by the Act of 1856 (J), 
 and that this is recognized by section 18 of the Act of 
 1885 (a). Before 1886 no question ever arose, as all 
 these parts were in South Lincolnshire. Now the ques- 
 tion arises, what is the " sessional division of Bourne in 
 the parts of Kestemn?" " Sessional division" is defined 
 in section 23 of the Eedistribution of Seats Act, 
 1885 (a). 
 
 The proper interpretation of "sessional division in 
 the parts of Kesteven of Bourne" is ascertained by 
 showing what, in fact, is in the parts of Kesteven. 
 
 The Act of 1856 ih) has said the parish of Deeping 
 St. Nicholas is not. Then what is the object of sec- 
 tion 18 of the Eedistribution of Seats Act {a), except it 
 be to meet such a case as this? That section enacts 
 that if parishes shall have been constituted or altered 
 by any prior Act, such constitution or alteration shall 
 operate for purposes of the law relating to parlia- 
 mentary elections, and shall not be disturbed. 
 
 T. Terrell, for the respondent. The effect of sec- 
 tion 52, which is the enacting part, of the Deeping Fen 
 Drainage Act (S) is to out down the more general words 
 
 (a) 48 & 49 riot. cap. 23. (i) 19 & 20 Vict. cap. liv. 
 
LVm VICTOBIA. 
 
 395 
 
 of the preamble. "Altogether" in that section does 1894. 
 
 not mean for all purposes. This view is strengthened SKraH~ 
 
 by reference to section 53 of the same Act. The -psHhiFB. 
 
 Eedistribution of Seats Act, 1885 (a), has the same 
 
 effect. Section 9 enacts that schedule 7 shall regulate 
 
 and fix the boundaries of the divisions named there. 
 
 That is a direct enactment on this point. "The 
 
 sessional division in the parts of Kesteven of Bourne " 
 
 is in the South Kesteven or Stamford Division. Now 
 
 the case has found, as a fact, what is the "sessional 
 
 division in the parts of Kesteven of Bourne" and that 
 
 the claimant's qualifying premises are situate within it. 
 
 " Sessional division " is defined in section 23 of the 
 
 Act (a). 
 
 [Hawkins, J. The meaning of " sessional division " 
 is well known. For instance, for the purposes of 
 licensing, justices can only act in their sessional 
 division.] 
 
 Tes, and it is not suggested that there was no 
 evidence to support the finding of the Revising 
 Barrister. 
 
 [Hawkins, J. If you read the 7th schedule into 
 the 9th section of the Act of 1885 (a), you have your 
 case complete.] 
 
 Yes, and then there is the finding of fact. Sec- 
 tion 18 of the Act of 1885 (a) may be ambiguous, but 
 this is met by the express enactment of section 9. 
 
 Germaine, in reply. The definition of divisions given 
 in the schedule to the Act of 1885 («) diEEers in the 
 
 {a) 48 & 49 Viot. cap. 23. 
 
396 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1894. case of Lincolnshire from all the others. Why, if the 
 gjjj^ interpretation of the respondent is right, did not the 
 p^i^a Legislature say simply the "sessional division of 
 Bourne." The words, "in the parts of Kesteven," 
 must have some meaning. The appellant's contention 
 is that there is a sessional division of Bourne which is 
 in Kesteven, and a sessional division of Bourne which is 
 in Holland; that this is the result of the Deeping Fen 
 Drainage Act of 1856 {a), and recognized by sections 
 18 and 24 of the Eedistribution of Seats Act, 1885 (J) ; 
 and that the meaning of section 9 and schedule 7 of 
 the latter Act is only that the sessional division of 
 Bourne which is in the parts of Kesteven shall remain 
 in the Kesteven or Stamford Division, whereas the 
 sessional division of Bourne, which is in Holland, is 
 provided for by the terms of section 18 of the Act. 
 
 Lord EussBLL of Killowen, L.O.J. In this case, 
 although the facts appear at first sight very complicated, 
 the point involved is simple. Shortly, the point is this: 
 Whether the qualification in respect of which Robert 
 Allen claims to be registered as a voter on Division I. 
 of the Deeping St. Nicholas Occupiers' List for the Sotith 
 Kesteven or Stamford division of the county of Lincoln 
 is or is not situate within the sessional division in the 
 parts of Kesteven of Bourne ? If they are not so situate, 
 he is not entitled to be on that list ; i£ they are, he is. 
 The facts are these. Prior to the year 1856, what is 
 now the parish of Beeping St. Nicholas was partly in 
 Kesteven in the petty sessional division of Bourne and 
 parly in Holland in the petty sessional division of Elloe. 
 The locus in quo here was undoubtedly in what is known 
 
 {«) 19 & 20 Viet. cap. Ixv. ' (*) ^48 & 49 Vict. cap. 23. 
 
V. 
 
 Philliph. 
 
 IVIII VICTORIA. 397 
 
 as the petty sessional division of Bourne. For a long 1894, 
 time the magistrates of Bourne have exercised criminal imoni 
 jurisdiction in petty sessions over that part of what is 
 now the parish of Beeping Si. Nicholas, which was in 
 Kesteven. They also exercised this jurisdiction in 
 regard to licences, although that fact is not mentioned 
 in the case which has been stated. In 1856 a private 
 Act was passed, the Deeping Fen Drainage Act (a), 
 partly for main drainage and partly for poor law pur- 
 poses. The appellant's argument is mainly based upon 
 the preamble of that Act, which recites " that it was 
 expedient that provisions should be made for the main- 
 tenance of the poor within Beeping Fen, and for the 
 repair of highways therein, and for constituting the 
 same exclusively of the parts situate in the parish of 
 ■Crowkmd into a parish for secular purposes." Now 
 when the enacting, which is the governing, part of the 
 statute is looked at, it does not carry out what the 
 preamble suggests, namely, that it should be a parish 
 " for all purposes," for the enacting part shows that it 
 was intended to make it a separate parish for poor law 
 purposes and no other. It is the enacting clauses which 
 govern the Act, though the preamble is often useful 
 as a guide to interpretation. The next argument is 
 founded on the Eedistribution of Seats Act, 1885 {h), 
 and is this. By the 18th section of that Act it is pro- 
 vided that any constitution of new parishes made .for 
 poor law purposes by or in pursuance of any Act of 
 Parliament on or before March 26th, 1885, and any 
 alteration of the boundary of a county which is inci- 
 dental to such constitution, shall have effect for all pur- 
 poses of the law relating to parliamentary elections for 
 
 (a) 19 & 20 Vict. cap. Ixv. (i) 48 & 49 Viet. cap. 23. 
 
^98 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTIKGS. 
 
 1894. any future parliament.. If that section stood alone, it 
 Skinn would have considerahle force in supporting the argu- 
 p^l^p ment for the appellant ; but when we look at section 9, 
 suh-sections (1) and (2) of that Act and schedule 7, 
 which maps out the districts and divisions of the 
 counties, the argument founded on section 18 seems 
 to be disposed of. I am not able to give a meaning 
 entirely satisfactory to my own mind as to section 18, 
 but it is in general terms only ; and when we come to 
 consider section 9, which contains, with schedule 7, 
 specific descriptions of the various divisions, I cannot 
 assent to the argument that the general is to override 
 the specific enactment ; and, therefore, the question 
 depends upon what is the meaning of the words in 
 schedule 7, "the sessional division in the parts of 
 Kesteven of Bourne " ? If that is so, the Eevisiag 
 Barrister was right in finding that as a fact. I have 
 adverted to the contiauous user of the jurisdiction as 
 practised by the Justices of Kesteven acting in and for 
 Bourne ; and when we look at the definition of " ses- 
 sional division " given in section 23 of the Act of 
 1885 («), we find it to mean " any division of a county 
 . . . in and for which division petty sessions or 
 special sessions are usually held ... in accordance 
 with any Act of Parliament, custom, or otherwise." 
 I should therefore come to the conclusion that this 
 place was, upon that interpretation, within the " ses- 
 sional division in the parts of Kesteven of Bourne." 
 But the case has found that as a fact, and, in my view, 
 upon sufficient grounds. I see no reason to doubt the 
 conclusion at which the Eevising Barrister arrived, or 
 that it was upon adequate grounds, and his decision 
 must, therefore, be affirmed. 
 
 [a) 18 & 49 Vict. cap. 23. 
 
LVIII VICTOBIA. 
 
 399 
 
 I wish to add that tlie importance of the case is 1894. 
 only accidental, and I do not quite see why, instead of SKumt 
 coming to this Oouit, the matter was not referred to p^j^pg 
 the Local Government Board under section 23 of the " 
 Eedistrihution of Seats Act, 1885 (a). 
 
 Hawkins and Wright, JJ., concurred. 
 
 Appeal dismissed. 
 
 Solicitors. — ^For the Appellant, Joseph Crawshaw 8$ Co. 
 
 For the Eespondent, W. S. Norkdge, 
 Newark and London. 
 
 (a) 48 & 49 Viet. cap. 23. 
 
400 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 Waeeen, Appellant ; Maule, Eespondent. 
 
 1894. 
 Nov. 14. 
 
 It is no 
 ground of - 
 objection to 
 a voter -who 
 is on the list 
 in respect 
 of a good 
 qnal&cation 
 that some 
 other person 
 has heen 
 retained on 
 the list in 
 respect of 
 the same 
 premises. 
 
 A.T a Court held for the revision of the lists of voters 
 for the southern or Huntingdon Division of .the 
 county of Huntingdon, William Warren, the appellant, 
 duly ohjected to the name of Arthur Chapman heing 
 retained on Division I. of the Occupiers' List as a 
 parliamentary elector for the said division. 
 
 The sole ground of objection was that the said 
 Arthur Chapman was not the tenant of the qualifying 
 property. 
 
 The facts, as set out in the case afterwards stated by 
 the Revising Barrister, were as follows : — 
 
 The said Arthur Chapman was on the said list as a 
 voter in respect of a dwelling-house, and was entitled 
 in aU respects to be on such list, save as may appear 
 from the next paragraph. 
 
 In respect of the same dwelling-house another person, 
 William Chapman, was also entered in the said list as a 
 voter. No notice of objection had been given to the 
 retention of the name of the said William Chapman 
 upon the said list, and there was no evidence as to 
 whether the said William Chapman was or was not 
 entitled to be so entered. The names and qualifications 
 of the said Arthur Chapman and William Chapman 
 stood on the said list in the following form : — 
 
 Chapman, Arthur. 
 Chapman, 'William. 
 
 Leighton. 
 Leighton, 
 
 Dwelling-house. 
 Dwelling-house. 
 
 High Street. 
 High Street. 
 
 It was contended that two persons could not be 
 entered upon the said list in respect of the same 
 
LVIII VICTORIA. 
 
 401 
 
 dwelling-house, and that inasmuch as the said William 1894. 
 Chapman was on the said list in respect of the said Waeben 
 dwelling-house, and was not ohjeoted to, the said Maotb. 
 Arthur Chapman could not be tenant of the same, and 
 that the Revising Barrister had no power to retain the 
 name of the said Arthur Chapman. 
 
 The Revising Barrister disallowed the ohjection, and 
 retained the name of the said Arthur Chapman in the 
 list. 
 
 Due notice of appeal was given. 
 
 If the Court should he of opinion that the decision 
 was wrong, the register was to be amended by erasing 
 the name of Arthur Chapman from the list. 
 
 G. E, Tyrrell, for the appellant. 
 
 No counsel appeared for the respondent. 
 
 Lord EussELL of Killowen, L.C.J. This point 
 cannot be contested. ' The case finds that the person 
 whose vote is objected to has a good qualification and a 
 right to be on the list in respect of it. The only other 
 fact is that some other person whose name is also on 
 the list for the same premises, not having been objected 
 to, was, perhaps wrongfully, retained on the list. The 
 person who is entitled is not to be deprived of his vote • 
 
 merely because some other name is on the list in respect 
 of the same premises. The Revising Barrister was 
 right, and the appeal must be dismissed. 
 
 Hawkins and Weight, JJ., concurred. 
 
 Appeal dismissed. 
 
 Solicitor — For the Appellant, Walter Mashell, for 
 Cranfield §• Wheeler, 8t. Neots. 
 
403 
 
 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 Teeadgold, Appellant ; The Town Clerk of 
 Grantham and White, Respondents. 
 
 1894. 
 
 Nov. 14. 
 
 In a notice of 
 claim by a 
 voter to have 
 his name 
 inserted in 
 the old 
 lodgers' list, 
 the name of 
 the parlia- 
 mentary 
 
 oStt^ ^In claim was served on the overseers, who duly published 
 
 every other the Same, 
 respect the 
 notice of 
 claim, with 
 the accom- 
 panying 
 declaration, 
 was in 
 accordance 
 ■with the form 
 prescribed by 
 
 tl^e Registration Order, 1889 (Form H, No. 2). This notice was served on the 
 overseers and duly published by them. Meld: — (1) that the Revising Barrister has 
 power to examine the claim, notwithstanding there is no notice of objection ; and 
 (2) that the omission of the name of the borough was a mistake which the Revising 
 Barrister had power to amend, under 41 & 42 Vict. cap. 26, sect. 28 (2), and that, the 
 claim being good in substance and lionestly made, he ought to have exercised his 
 discretion by amending it. 
 
 A T a Court held for the revision of the list of voters 
 for the borough of Grantffam, Thomas George 
 Treadgold, the appellant, claimed under the Bepresen- 
 tation of the People Act, 1867, (30 & 31 Vict. cap. 102,) 
 sect. 30, sub-sect. 2, to have his name inserted in the 
 old lodgers' list. 
 
 On or before the 25th of July, 1894, the notice of 
 
 The notice of claim and the accompanying declara- 
 tion was in the Form H., No. 2, in the forms in the 
 precept to the overseers of a parish in a parliamentary 
 borough in the Eegistration Order, 1889. 
 
LVIII VICTOSIA. 
 
 403 
 
 II 
 
 § 
 
 
 
 bo 
 
 I 
 
404 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1894. There was no statutory or formal objection to the 
 
 Tebadoold claim in writing served on the appellant or the over- 
 
 TowN Cleek seers, hy or on behalf of any person whose name was 
 
 OF G^THAja QJ^ tl^g ligt J,f ^Q(.gJ^g f^^ ^j^g gg^j^ borOUgh. 
 
 Whitb. On the Revising Barrister's examining the claim, it 
 
 appeared that the name of the borough had not been 
 filled ia. In every other particular the claim was 
 according to the form. 
 
 It was contended on behalf of the appellant that, 
 in the absence of a notice of objection, the Eevising 
 Barrister had no power to examine the claim or to 
 expunge the appellant's name from the old lodgers' 
 list, and that if he had the right to examine the claim 
 he should amend it by inserting the name of the 
 borough {ChmntJiam) after the words "for the borough 
 of " in the claim. 
 
 The Revising Barrister decided, in accordance with 
 Hersaiit v. Kalse (a), that to have claimed to be regis- 
 tered is a necessary constituent of the qualification of a 
 lodger, whether old or new ; and that the necessitj'- for 
 so claiming could not be waived by the overseers' publi- 
 cation of a name in the " Old Lodgers' List." The 
 Eevising Barrister held that there was no claim duly 
 made by the appellant to be registered for the borough 
 of Grantham, as it was defective by reason of the 
 omission of the name of the borough, as required by 
 Form H., No. 2, in the Order in Council of 1889. He, 
 therefore, held that the claim was bad, and refused to 
 amend it under 41 & 42 Vict. cap. 26, sect. 28, sub- 
 sect. 2, (Parliamentary and Municipal Registration Act, 
 1878,) as he considered he had no power to make such 
 an amendment, and even if he had he would not have 
 
 («) Ante, p. 12 ; 18 Q. £. D. 412. 
 
LVIII VICTORIA. 
 
 405 
 
 done so, because, by inserting tlie name of the borough, 1894. 
 he would be creating a claim for a particular borough, tbeadgold 
 and would also be amending the declaration by import- ijown Ci.ebk 
 ing the word « Qrantham " into it. °^ ^l^^^ 
 
 He accordingly expunged the appellant's name from Whebb. 
 the list. 
 
 The names of seven other persons whose names were 
 set out in a schedule to the case afterwards stated by 
 the Revising Barrister were also expunged under similar 
 circumstances. 
 
 Due notice of appeal from the Eevising Barrister's 
 decision was given by all the said persons, on the 
 grounds that, in the absence of a notice of objection, 
 he had no power to expunge the said names from the 
 Old Lodgers' List, and that he should have amended 
 the notices of claim by inserting the name of the 
 borough therein. The said appeals were ordered to be 
 consolidated. 
 
 If the Court should be of opinion that the decision of 
 the Revising Barrister was wrong, the register was to 
 be amended by inserting the names of Thomas George 
 Treadgold and of the seven other persons in the Old 
 Lodgers' List of their respective parishes, as set forth 
 in the schedule to the said case. 
 
 T. Terrell, for the appellant. The question is 
 whether the Eevising Barrister had power to amend 
 the claim by inserting the name of the borough. It is 
 a case of a claim to be on the " Old Lodgers' List," and 
 the claim is made under section 22 of the Parliamentary 
 and Municipal Registration Act, 1878 (a). 
 
 In the absence of a notice of objection the Revising 
 Barrister [had no power to examine or deal with the 
 
 ifl) 41 & 42 Viot. cap. 26. 
 
406 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1894. claim. If, however, he could go into the matter, the 
 Tebadooid question is whether he should not have amended. 
 
 T. 
 
 Town Clbek 
 
 °^ ^^d™^ [Lord EussELL of Killowen, L.O.J., referred to 
 Whitb. section 28, suh-section 6 of the Act.J 
 
 That section deals with cases in which the Eevising 
 Barrister ought to amend. His duties and powers as 
 to amendment are contained in section 28, suh-sections 1 
 and 2 of the Act. 
 
 To support the decision of the Eevising Barrister here 
 the respondents must say that this is not a claim at all. 
 
 [Hawkins, J. It may be a claim, hut an informal 
 claim.] 
 
 Yes. The Eevising Barrister was wrong in holding 
 that it was a nullity, which he must have done to come 
 to this conclusion. If that is so, then it is submitted 
 that it is a bad reason for refusing to amend that the 
 amendment would make the claim a good one, since it 
 is a substantial claim, but imperfect owing to a mere 
 mistake. 
 
 The Court called upon 
 
 T. W. cutty, for the respondent. It is submitted 
 that the Eevising Barrister was right upon three 
 grounds : (1) that this was no claim at all ; (2) that 
 a claim is essential to the qualification, and a part of 
 the right to this franchise ; and (3) that the Eevising 
 Barrister, even if he had power to amend, had a dis- 
 cretion, with the exercise of which the Court wiU not 
 interfere. 
 
LVm VICTORIA. '407 
 
 [Hawkins, J. It must be a judicial discretion.] 1894. 
 
 Tebadooid 
 
 Section 22 of the Parliamentary and Municipal v. 
 
 . . '' Town Cmek 
 
 -Eegistration Act, 1878 (a), provides that in the case of Gbantham 
 
 of an old lodger a claim must he sent in. It is a White. 
 
 necessary part of the qualification : Hersant v. Sake (b) 
 
 fl,nd Jones Y. Kent\c). 
 
 [Lord Russell of Killowen, L.C.J. In Jones v. 
 Kent (c) there was no qualification shown. No amend- 
 ment would have made that claim good. Where a 
 person sends in a claim which shows on the facts stated 
 -no qualification for a vote, the claim cannot be 
 amended. In such a case, the only course would be 
 to make a new claim.] 
 
 In that case the claim was not delivered till after 
 July 15, and the date of attestation, which was July 9, 
 might have been altered. Therefore, but for that mistake, 
 there would have been a good claim. Lord Coleridge 
 there says (d) : " If this were not so, the lodger claimant 
 might with impunity omit both the declaration of 
 residence and the attestation ; though the statute say^ 
 that these shall be annexed to the application." 
 
 ' In Smith v. Chandler (e) the notice of claim differed ' 
 from the prescribed form, as it omitted the date of 
 attestation. It was held thalJ the omission was material 
 and the claim invalid. Upon the ground, therefore, 
 that the claim must be in the statutory form, this is no 
 claim. If some immaterial particular be omitted, it 
 may be that the Revising Barrister has power to 
 
 •' \a) 41 & 42 r»««. cap. 26. (S\ 22 Q. B. i). atp. 207. 
 
 (i) Ante, p. 12 ; 18 Q,. B. D. 412. (e) Ante, p. 129 ; 22 Q. S. I>. 
 
 io) Ante, p. loa ; 22 Q. £. D. 208. 
 204. 
 
408 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 1894. amend. Here, however, the omission is of the name 
 
 Teeabgold of the borough, the very essence and material of the 
 
 To-whCleek claim. The statutory form shows that this must be 
 
 01' EANiHAM gpg(3J£g^_ fjT^g omission is not supplied by any of the 
 
 Whitb. other statements in the claim. 
 
 [Lord EussELL of Killowen, L.O.J. "Was there 
 any application to amend in Jones v. Kent (a) ?] 
 
 There does not appear to have been any such appli- 
 cation, nor a suggestion that the Eevising Barrister 
 should have amended (&). 
 
 Next, assuming the Eevising Barrister had power to 
 amend, he has exercised his discretion. It is submitted 
 the reason he has given for not amending is not a bad 
 reason. The only amendment he could make would be 
 to insert the name of the borough, and thus make that 
 which was in effect no claim a good claim. But what- 
 ever was his reason, he was within his right in refusing 
 to make this amendment : Fickard v. Baylis (c). 
 
 [Lord Etjssell of Killowen, L.O.J. That was a 
 case of a new lodger claim.] 
 
 The Court held that it was a case purely for the 
 exercise of the Eevising Barrister's discretion, and that 
 he had exercised it. 
 
 Lord EussELL of Killowen, L.C.J. In this case 
 the appeal must be allowed. The facts are these :-— 
 Thomas George Treadgold, who was abeady on the list 
 
 (a) Ante, p. 109 ; 22 Q. S. J), the Eevising Barrister 'was asked 
 
 201. to amend, but declined. — Ed. 
 (J)Inthereportof/o««sT. JTeMi (c) (7oK. 98 ; 5 C. i*. i>. 235. 
 
 'e, at p. 112), it appears that 
 
LVIU VlCtOBlA. 409 
 
 as an old lodger for the borough of G-rantham, makes, • 1894. 
 in 1894, a claim to be continued upon the parliamentary Tkbaboold 
 register in respect of the same qualification. The form town Cieek 
 in which he makes his claim is this : (His Lordship °^ anF^^ 
 read the notice of claim set out above and continued.) Whitb. 
 He then sets out his name, the description of rooms, 
 the place, the amount of rent, and the name and 
 address of landlord, and proceeds to declare that he has 
 had the necessary twelve months' occupancy, and that 
 he is already on the register of parliamentary electors 
 for "the said parliamentary borough," in accordance with 
 Schedule III., Form H., No. 2, of the Eegistration 
 ■Act, 1885 (a). That is followed by the attestation of 
 ' the attesting witness, who subscribes his name and his 
 residence, 123, Dudley Road, Orantham. The overseers 
 duly receive this claim. They understand it, and enter 
 the claimant on the list as required by section 22 of 
 the Parliamentary and Municipal Eegistration Act, 
 1878 {b). When the claim comes before the Revising 
 Barrister, his attention is called to the matter, and it is 
 'objected that this is no claim, and that a claim is 
 necessary. He has held that a claim is a necessary 
 'constituent of the qualification, and that, although 
 there had been no notice of objection, he had power to 
 ' examine it. In this regard the Eevising Barrister was 
 right. A claim is a necessary part of the qualification, 
 and this claim as it stood was defective. 
 
 Secondly comes the question whether, if the claim as 
 ■ made was not a good claim, the Eevising Barrister had 
 power to amend it. He declined to amend, and gives 
 'his reasons. The reason is that, in his judgment, by 
 inserting the name of the borough he would be " creat- 
 ing a claim for a particular borough, and would also be 
 
 (a) 48 Vict. cap. 16. ' [i) 41 & 42 Vict. cSp. 26. 
 
 aa2 
 
-410 MICHAELMAS SITTINGS. 
 
 , 1894. amending the declaration by importiiig the word ' (?rfflre^- 
 Tbeadqold ^am, ' into it." That is, in efEeet, he would be creating 
 Town Cleek ^ iiew claim. We do not think it would be a new claim, 
 a^™^^ but an amendment of a mistake in an existing claim. 
 Whieb. There was an omission made, not deliberately, but 
 purely by mistake, and it did not mislead the overseers 
 nor any other person. That being so, ought he not to 
 have amended ? He has a discretion. It has not been 
 suggested that this is an absolute discretion which this 
 Court can in no case review. It is a judicial discretion. 
 It appears to us, having regard to decided cases, that in 
 such a case of mistake the Revising Barrister ought tp 
 have exercised his discretion and araended the claim. 
 I come to this conclusion for the reasons that the voter was 
 already on the register for the borough, and the over- 
 seers were not misled, but were cognizant of his qualifi- 
 cation and acted on his claim. The Revising Barrister 
 should, therefore, have made the necessary amendment 
 by inserting the word " Grantham" 
 
 It is not necessary to consider at length the cases that 
 have been cited, because they altogether differ from the 
 present in their facts. In Jones V. Kent (a) the claimant 
 sent in a claim with a declaration, dated July 9, stating 
 that he had occupied his residence up to July 15. That 
 was obviously wrong on the face of it. The Court there 
 seems to have thought that the Revising Barrister could 
 not have amended, but I should think that they must 
 have gone on the reason that this was not a valid claim. 
 There was no request to amend (6). In Smith v. 
 Cfiandkr {c) the attestation was not such as the Act 
 required. It was not a mistake, but an omission de- 
 
 (a) Ante, p. 109 ; 22 Q. B. D. p. 408. 
 204. (c) Ante, p. 129 ; 22 <2. S. S. 
 
 (i) See, however, note (J), ante, 208. 
 
"White. 
 
 liVm VICTOKIA. 411 
 
 liberately made, and the Court held that it was a material 1 894. 
 omission. Pickard v. Bay lis (a) was a case of a new lodger Teeabqold 
 claim. The claimant sent in a paper — a claim form — Town Clekk 
 which did not state the qualification on which the claim anij 
 must necessarily he hased. It omitted to show the amount 
 of rent or the name and address of the landlord. The 
 Court held there that they would not interfere with the 
 Revising Barrister's discretion. But that was a case in 
 which the claim was had from heginning to end. There 
 was no qualification, no right to a vote at all shown. 
 These cases differ widely from the present. The Court 
 should he vigilant to see that no technicality should he 
 allowed to defeat claims which are perfectly good in 
 Buhstance, and honestly made. 
 
 Hawkins and "Wright, JJ., concurred. 
 
 Appeal allowed. 
 
 t 
 
 Solicitors— For the Appellant, W. H, Norledge, Newark 
 and London. 
 
 For the Eespondent, Patersons, Snow, 
 Bhxam and Kinder, for B. F. M. White, 
 Grantham. 
 
 (a) Colt. 98 ; 5 <7. P. D. 235. 
 
412 
 
 HILARY SITTINGS. 
 
 Baenett, Appellant ; Hickmott, Respondent. 
 
 1895. 
 
 Jan. 24 ; 
 :Peh. 8. 
 
 A T a Court held for the revision of the list of voters 
 for the borough of Reading, Alfred Edwin Hickmott 
 duly objected to the name of George Burnett, the appel- 
 lant, being retained on the list of parliamentary voters 
 for the said borough of Reading on the following 
 
 A policeman 
 occupied, 
 during the 
 qualifying 
 period, a 
 
 cubicle in the ffjOUnds \ 
 
 police station, ° ' , . ,. 
 
 Heading, hy " That you have not been the inhabitant occupier of 
 service. This the premises described in the list from the 15th July, 
 cubicle held ig93^ to the I5th July, 1894, both inclusive." 
 
 his bed and 
 furniture, 
 and was one 
 of twelve 
 similar 
 cubicles in 
 the same 
 room, sepa- 
 rated from 
 each other 
 and from the . ^ _. i t> i 
 
 passage down a cubicle in the pouce station, London fetreet, Reading, 
 
 partitions by Virtue of his service. In this cubicle was his bed 
 
 Mgh! From and other furniture. The room, in which this cubicle 
 
 rarHtfn^^to^ was. Contained twelve similar cubicles, each of which 
 
 " That you have not been the inhabitant occupier of 
 a dwelling-house for twelve months to July 16th in this 
 year." 
 
 The facts of the case were as follows : — 
 
 George Barnett occupied, during the qualifying period, 
 
 partitions to 
 
 ^e room was was occupicd by a police constable. Each cubicle was 
 about 12 feet by 8 feet, and on three sides was inclosed 
 by a wooden partition about 7 feet high. The fourth 
 side was an outside wall of the building and had a 
 window in it. Each cubicle had a door entering into 
 a passage which passed down the main room, and each 
 
 the room was 
 
 a space of 
 
 about five 
 
 feet. Each 
 
 cubicle had a 
 
 lock and key, 
 
 and the 
 
 occupier was 
 
 entitled to 
 
 lock up his 
 
 cubicle at 
 
 any time. 
 
 The passage, the ventilation, and the atmosphere of the room were common to all the 
 
 cubicles. Seld, that such cubicle was not a ' ' part of a house separately occupied as 
 
 a dwelling," within the meaning of 41 & 42 Vict. cap. 26, sect. 6. 
 
LVIIl VICTORIA-. 413 
 
 door had a look. Each, man was entitled to lock up 1895. 
 his cuMcle at any time. From the top of the partition Baenbit 
 to the ceiling of the room was about 5 feet. The Hiokmoit. 
 passage, the ventilation, and the atmosphere of the 
 dormitory was common to aU the duhicles. 
 
 These were the only facts proved or relied on by the 
 objector in support of his notice of objection. 
 
 It was assumed that the dwelling-house was not 
 inhabited by any person under whom Barnett served in 
 his office, service, or employment, and the question was 
 argued by both sides before the Eevising Barrister on 
 this assumption. 
 
 It was not proved or suggested that any one of the 
 cubicles in the dormitory was occupied by any superior 
 officer. 
 
 It was contended on behalf of the objector that, not- 
 withstanding the possession of a key by Barnett and 
 the right to lock up his cubicle, the cubicle was not so 
 separated from the rest of the dormitory as to make it 
 " a part of a house separately occupied as a dwelling- 
 house " within the meaning of 41 & 42 Vict. cap. 26, 
 sect. 5, but that the dormitory was jointly occupied by 
 the holders of the twelve cubicles. 
 
 It was contended, on behalf of the person objected to, 
 that the cubicle was sufficiently separated to be " part 
 of .a house separately occupied as a dwelling." 
 
 The names of four other persons, whose names and 
 qualifications were set out in a schedule to the case 
 afterwards stated by the Eevising Barrister, were 
 objected to under similar circumstances. 
 
 The Eevising Barrister decided, and if and so far as 
 the question was one of fact for him he so found, that 
 the cubicle was not sufficiently separated from the rest 
 of the- doftnitory as to be part of a house separately 
 
414^ HILARY SITTINGS. 
 
 1895.- occupied as a -dwelling, and expunged the nanies of the- 
 "Babnett said George Burnett and the said four other persons 
 
 Hjo^oit. froi^ tlie list- 
 Due notice of appeal from the said decision was 
 given, and the eeveral appeals were ordered to be 
 consolidated. 
 
 If the Court should be of opinion that the decision of 
 the Revising Barrister was wrong, the register was to 
 be amended by retaining the names of the said George ■ 
 Barnett and the said four other persons in the said list,- 
 
 Germaine, for the appellant. 
 
 It is submitted, that the appellant was an inhabi- 
 tant occupier of a dwelling-house as tenant within 
 section 3 of the Eepresentation of the People Act, 
 1884 {a). For the purpose of the service franchise the 
 occupier is deemed to be a tenant, though he is not so 
 in fact. In section 5 of the Parliamentary and Muni- 
 cipal Eegistration Act, 1878 (J), "dwelling-house" is 
 defined as including " any part of a house where that ' 
 part is separately occupied as a dwelling," and " sepa- 
 rate occupation " is thus defined : " where an occupier is 
 entitled to the sole and exclusive use of any part of 
 a house, that part shall not be deemed to be occupied 
 otherwise than separately by reason only that the occu- 
 pier is entitled to the joint use of some other part." 
 The Eevising Barrister has found that the cubicle in 
 question is not sufficiently separated to be separately 
 occupied as a dwelling. 
 
 But the cases have decided that a man's dwelling is 
 where he sleeps ; therefore, had the partition here been 
 complete, the case would have been concluded by pre- 
 
 (a) 48 Vict. cap. 3. (J) 41 & 42 Viet. cap. 26. 
 
LVm VICTORIA. 
 
 im 
 
 vious decisit)ns, and the Kevising Barrister must have' 1895i 
 found that the cubicle was separately occupied as a. Baenktt ~ 
 dwelling. . Hiokmott,/ 
 
 [Lord EussELL of Killowen, L.O.J. Tes; it 
 would then have been within Stribling v. Halse (a).] 
 
 The right to a vote ought not, therefore, to be 
 destroyed by the mere fact that, for the purpose of 
 ventilation, convenience or economy, an open space such 
 as this is left above the partitions. 
 
 It is submitted that, as the Revising Barrister has 
 found that the constable has a key and separate control, 
 and that the height of the partitions is such that the 
 cubicle could only be entered by any other person by. 
 force or by climbing, it is a " dwelling " within the 
 meaning of the statute, which term the cases have 
 interpreted as the place where a man sleeps. Occu- 
 pation during the qualifying period has been found, 
 and the Eevising Barrister, but for his interpretation 
 of the words " separately occupied," must have left the 
 appellant his vote, 
 
 [Lord Russell' of Killowen, L.O.J, The place 
 where a man sleeps may be his dwelling, although he 
 has his meals elsewhere, as, perhaps, in the case of a 
 clerk, who occupies a bedroom in the suburbs, but 
 spends the day and takes his meals in the city. But 
 here it may be that this cubicle is not a " dwelling," 
 but merely a sleeping apartment,] 
 
 Any person who separately occupies an apartment in 
 which he takes no meals whatever, but sleeps only, 
 
 [a) Colt, m; 16 Q.S. D. 246.' 
 
418 HILAKY SITTINGS. 
 
 1895, is entitled to a vote. That, it is submitted, is the effect 
 
 Babnett of section 5 of the Parliamentary and Municipal Eegis- 
 
 HioKMOTT. tration Act, 1878 (a). The whole criterion of the right 
 
 to a vote in such a case is the question of sleeping, for 
 
 that is the criterion of " dwelling." 
 
 [Lord EussELL of Eillowen, L.O.J. . You are 
 entitled to say that Sfribling v. Hahe (b) is a strict 
 authority on that point ; hut there are other points of 
 difference in that case from this.J 
 
 It is submitted that, upon the facts, this is a room or 
 apartment carved out of a larger room. (He referred to 
 the Judgment of Erie, 0. J., in Powell v. Quest (c), in 
 which a passage from Mliot on Registration is cited 
 with approval, and to the dictum of Lord Coke {d), that 
 for the exercise of a personal franchise, a man can only 
 be said to be conversant where his bed is.) 
 
 As to the question that has been raised whether the 
 constable was liable to be removed at any time by any 
 superior officer, no objection has been taken on that 
 ground, and the Revising Barrister has found that he 
 has in fact had continuous occupation. 
 
 [Wills, J. Has the constable any right to occupy ? 
 A servant may have a right to his room as part of his 
 wages ?] 
 
 If he has in fact occupied during the period and- 
 escaped the incident of" removal, 'then it is a question of 
 f^etj and'this^has been found in his favour. . ~ . •; '.^ 
 
 {a) 41 & 42 Vict. cap. 26. (c) S. § F. 149 ; 18 0. B. N. 8. 
 
 {b) Colt. 409 ; 16 Q. B. D. 246. 72, at p. 80. 
 
 ■ 1 ..! ; \3) 2-J«s<. 122. 
 
LVin VICTORIA. 417 
 
 Soi'utfon, for the respondent. Assuming the appel- 1895. 
 lant to have occupied for the necessary period, the first BaeneIt 
 question is whether the cuhicle in question is a sufficient Hiokmoit. 
 " tenement," that is, such a part of a house within the 
 meaning of section 5 of the Parliamentary and 
 Municipal Eegistration Act, 1878 (a), as to entitle him 
 to a vote. Stribling v. Salse (J) does not touch that 
 point. There the occupation was of a separate room. 
 Here the Eevising Barrister has found as a fact that 
 the cuhicle was not separately occupied. 
 
 [Lord Russell of Killoaven, L.O.J. Here there 
 is the finding that there was a lock to the door, and the 
 constahle held the key and had exclusive use.] 
 
 Next, even if this cubicle be " a part of a house," 
 then the question arises whether it was separately, 
 occupied as a dwelling. This appears to be decided by 
 Strihling v. Sake [b), but that decision proceeds upon 
 the assumption of a decision of the Court of Appeal in 
 a case there referred to ; but no such case can be found. 
 Gfrove, J., there says (c) : " I have considerable doubt 
 
 whether a man who has es;clusive. use of one 
 
 room and the joint use of another can strictly be said 
 to dwell in the former as a separate dwelling house." 
 Subject, however, to that qualification of its authority, 
 Stribling v. Hake (b) does seem to conclude the question 
 that if this is a "part of a house" it is separately 
 occupied as a dwelling. 
 
 As to- the first point; — Is this a " tenement " P^this 
 is a question of fact — one of degree. If so, the finding 
 of the Eevising Barrister is in favour of the respondent.' 
 If, however, the Court qan pronounce upon the" fa,et3 
 
 (a) 41 & 42 Viet, etcp: 26. (c) \q Q. S. ^.at p. 25L 
 {b) Colt. i09; 16 Q. B.S.Ue. ' ' '" " *■" 
 
m 
 
 HILARY SITTINGS. 
 
 1895. found as a matter of law, then the legislation on the 
 " Baeneti subject must be considered. The necessary elements of 
 HioKMOTT. ^^is franchise are the occupation as owner or tenant of 
 a tenement, the occupier for the purpose of the service 
 franchise being deemed to be a tenant, though he is 
 not so in fact. It is submitted that, in this case, there 
 is no " tenement." It mu^t be a " part of a house," 
 not a mere space carved out of a house, but a part 
 capable of being rated. "What is the part here ? 
 Where does it begin or end ? There is no case which 
 gives a definition applicable to it. It is really the 
 question of the severance necessary to constitute a 
 tenement which has produced conflicting decisions since 
 the Reform Act. There is a series of cases in which, 
 the question was whether a part of a house was a house 
 within the meaning of sect. 27 of the Heform Act (a). 
 These were all reviewed in Cook v. Sumher {h), where- 
 the Court says, " We think the true question in the eases 
 cited and in the present case turns on the nature of the 
 tenement occupied" (c). The Court then say, "We 
 think they {i.e. the rooms occupied by the appellant) 
 were correctly decided by the Revising Barrister not to 
 be a house within the meaning of the statute, because- 
 they formed part of a house when they were let, and 
 there was no actual severance " {d). Then there came 
 the definition in the Eepresentation of the People Act, 
 1867 (e), 
 
 [Lord EussELL of Killowen, L.C.J. That defini- 
 tion, or rather description, does not say anything as to 
 the necessity for structural division or severance, but 
 puts it upon separate rating.] 
 
 . (a) 2 & 3 Will. 4, cap. 45. {d) Ibid, at p. 46, 
 
 \b) K.%0.i\Z ;n C.B.N. S. (e) 30 & 31 Viot. cap. 102, 
 
 33. SB. 8, 69, 61. 
 (c) llP.JB;iV.Sf.atp.44. 
 
Lvm vrcTdfiiA; 419 
 
 The question of rating has been disposed of By 18915. 
 subsequent Acts. Upon the definition given in sec- Babneit 
 tion 61 of the Representation of the People Act, .Hiokmoit. 
 1867 (a), there have been three eases decided in the 
 Court of Common Pleas, in each of •which the judges 
 were equally divided — Thompson v. Ward (b) ; Ellis v. 
 ' Burch (c) ; and Boon v. Soivard (d). 
 
 [Lord EussELL of Killov^en, L.C.J. The last part 
 of the judgment of Brett, J., in Ellis v. Burch (e) seems 
 to have been dealt with in the Parliamentary and Muni- 
 cipal Eegistration Act of 1878 (/).] ': 
 
 The judges have taken different views as to that; 
 some taking that view : see Bradley v. Baylis (g). 
 
 [Lord EussELL of Killowen, L.C.J. The judgment 
 of Willes, J., in Ellis v. Burch (e) goes a long way to 
 show that he would not have concurred in the judgment ' 
 of Stribling v. Hake (A). J 
 
 In the Parliamentary and Municipal Eegistration 
 Act, 1878 (/), the legislature purported to deal with 
 these suggestions of the judges in the earlier cases, with 
 the result that the judges have again been perplexed 
 and at variance as to the meaning of the legislature. 
 The definition is now contained in section 5 of that 
 statute, and "separate" has been transferred from 
 " dwelling " to " occupying." The dwelling, whatever 
 
 (a) 30 Sc 31 Vict. cap. 102, («) 1 Sop. ^ 0. 537 ; 1. S. 6 
 
 ss. 3, 69, 61. G. P. 327. 
 
 (h) 1 Bop. i 0. S40; £. S. 6 (/) 41 & 42 Vict. cap. 26. 
 
 C. P. 327. ' \g) Colt. 163 ; i(i.S. D. 1&5. 
 
 .• {c) Ibid. 5Z1 ; Ibid.- \h) Colt. 409; 16 Q. S.D. 
 
 (i) 2 Sop. i C. 208 ', I.n.9 246. • • 
 
 cp.^'ii. ' '" ■ '. ■•■.,: - • ■•■■•:,- (; 
 
420 HILARY S1TT1NC3S. 
 
 1895. tEat may he, must be " separately occupied." It must, 
 
 Baeneit however — and this is the poiat that is pressed — still he 
 
 HioaioiT. ^ " tenement," viz., such a part of a house that it can he 
 
 regarded as a tenement capable of being rated. An 
 
 undefined part "will not do. 
 
 [Wills, J. There is no diflBculty here about defini- 
 tion of the part.] 
 
 Some part is left to the imagination. It is not like a 
 -room, •which, according to the cases, will do, because it 
 is a tenement capable of being rated, and for that reason 
 only. The case of Bradley v. Baylis [a) is full of dis- 
 cussion upon the Act of 1878 {b). See the judgments 
 of Denman, J., Jessel, M.E., and Baggallay, L.J. (c). 
 
 [Lord EussELL of Killowbn, L.C.J. Tou are now 
 seeking to distinguish this case from Stribling v. 
 Ealse (<:?).] 
 
 -Tes. The Act of 1884 (e) only makes this difference. 
 It says that certain persons who have not, in fact, the 
 estate of tenant shall be deemed to have it in respect of 
 iheir service occupation. It is still, however, necessary 
 for the Court to see whether there is a " tenement " 
 occupation within the meaning of the Eepresentation 
 of the People Act, 1867 (/). 
 
 It is submitted that it is a question of fact found in 
 favour of the respondent. If, however, it is open to the 
 -Court to pronounce upon the facts found as a matter of 
 
 - («) CoU. 163 ; 8 Q. B. D. 195, 226. 
 .(C..A.)210. ; (<«) Co?i. 409 ; 16 Q. B. J). 246. 
 
 (J) 41 & 42 Vict. cap. 26. , («) 48 Yiet^ cap. 3. i 
 
 (c) 8 Q. B. D. at pp. 206, 216, (/) 30 & 31 Viet. oaj). 102. ^" 
 
LVIIt VICTORIA. 42^1 
 
 iaw, then, it is submitted, they are not sufficient to; bring 1895. 
 the case within the decision of Stribling v; Sake (a), baenett 
 even if that was correctly decided. This is very like hjoeJiott. 
 the position in the case of Thompson v. Ward (J), where 
 Willes, J., seemed to think it a question of fact, but 
 decided it as a question of law. 
 
 Germaine, in reply. As to this being a question 
 of ■ fact, it is the same as in Stribling v. Halse (a), 
 where Cave, J., stated that the Court was applying a 
 principle of law to the facts found by the Eevising 
 Barrister. 
 
 [Weight, J. If this was a distinct room it might 
 be a question of law whether it was separately occupied. ' 
 Whether it is a room or not seems to be merely a 
 question of fact.] 
 
 It does not seem necessary to find whether this is, in 
 fact, a room. " Eoom " is merely one illustration of 
 what is capable of separate occupation. There is ample 
 definition of the " part of a house " here to render it 
 capable of separate occupation. It is further capable of 
 being rated. There need not be structural severance : 
 Alhhurch v. Assessment Commissioners of West Samp- 
 stead (c) ; Sail v. Metcalfe (d). 
 
 Cu/r. adv. vult. 
 
 Lord Russell of Killowen, L.C.J. This is an Feb. 8 
 appeal from the Eevising Barrister for the borough of 
 Beading, who expunged the appellant's name from the 
 
 (a) Colt. 409 ; 16 Q. B. D. 246. («) (1891) 2 Q. S. 436. 
 
 \b) Bop. $ a. 537 ; i. iJ. 6 (i) AnU, p. 227 ; (1892) 1 Q. 
 C. P. 327. J. .208. . ■ • 
 
42^2 lifLAEY si:fTiN6s. 
 
 1895. list of parliamentary voters on the ground that he had 
 Baeneit not occupied during the qualifying period " a part of 
 .HioKMOTT. a house separately occupied as a dwelling " within the 
 iaeariing of section 5 of the Parliamentary and Muni- 
 cipal Eegistration Act,"' 1878 (a). 
 
 The facts of the case were stated by the Eevising 
 Barrister as follows : — (The judgment then set out the 
 "facts as above stated [b) and proceeded.) It will be 
 observed that it is not stated how these cubicles were 
 warmed, or how they were lighted at night; whether 
 or not there was separate lighting and warming for 
 each ; nor is it stated whether or not there was or were 
 some other room or rooms in the police station shared 
 in common for the purposes of meals, for the purposes 
 of recreation, or for other purposes. 
 
 TTpon the facts stated, the question we have to decide 
 is simply this: Whether the Revising Barrister was 
 'wroiig in holding that the appellant's cubicle is not a 
 "" part of a house separately occupied as a dwelling " 
 within the meaning of section 5 of 41 & 42 Vict 
 cap. 26,-r-the franchise claimed being the joint result 
 of that Act and 30 & 31 Fici. cap. 102, sect. 3, 
 sub-sect. 2, and 48 Vict. cap. 3, sect. 3. 
 , In my opinion, the appellant was occupying a part 
 of a room in a house, but, such part of a room was not 
 separately occupied by him as a dwelling-house. 
 
 The ventilation and atmosphere of the dormitory are 
 stated in the case to be common to all the cubicles, and 
 
 : " :. the window of each cubicle necessarily "helps the natiiral 
 lighting of the adjoining cubicle or cubicles. Thesfe 
 are, it appears to me, matters essential to consider when 
 the question is whether each cubicle can be regarded as 
 
 {a) 41 & 42 Viet. cap. 26.- (i) Ante, at p. 412. • 
 
JLVIIl VICTOKIA. 423 
 
 part of a house capable of being separately occupied 1895. 
 as a dwelling. Baenbti 
 
 As I have stated, we are not informed whether there Hiokmott. 
 are any and what arrangements for the artificial light- 
 ing and heating of the room in which these cubicles are 
 situate; but even assuming (against probabilities) that 
 each cubicle had a separate arrangement for warming 
 and lighting, it follows from the fact that the cubicles 
 were open at the top that each of the occupants would, 
 to some extent, share the warmth and light of the 
 dormitory as a whole. 
 
 Again, the arrangement of the cubicles precludes the 
 idea of that complete or secure privacy implied in the 
 separate occupation of a dwelling, and is probably 
 adopted partly with a view to supervision and the 
 maintenance of discipline generally in the iroom. 
 
 It seems to me, therefore, that these men, sharing, 
 as they do, so many things in the occupation of these 
 cubicles, cannot be said to be separately occupying them 
 as dwellings. 
 
 It was argued on behalf of the appellant that this 
 case was concluded by the case of Stribling v. Hake (a). 
 I cannot assent to that view, while recognizing that we 
 ought to be bound by that case so far as it extends. 
 
 In that case each shop assistant had a separate fur- 
 nished bedroom, structurally completely separate as a 
 room, and no one person, in his occupation of his 
 particular bedroom, shared light, air, warmth, or 
 ventilation with any other room. 
 
 I have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the 
 Eevising Barrister was right in the view he took. The 
 appeal will, therefore, be dismissed with costs. I wish 
 
 (a) Colt. 409 ; 16 Q. JB. D. 246. 
 
424 HILARY SITTINGS. 
 
 1895. to add that this judgment can have no general applica- 
 Baenett tion ; it is confined to the special lacts of this case. 
 HiomioTT. -^^ *° Stribling v. Halse (a), I "wish to say a word. 
 It is stated in the judgment in Strihling v. Halse (a), 
 that a doubt which had been expressed by the present 
 Master of the EoUs, when Lord Justice, was removed 
 by a decision of the Court of Appeal; but there is no,^ 
 reported case to this effect ; and a rigorous search made 
 at my instance has failed to discover any record of such 
 a ease. The doubt there referred to was, whether a 
 person could be said to separately occupy a bedroom as 
 a dwelling-house when he dwelt partly in the bed- 
 room and partly in other rooms. I share this doubt, 
 especially in a case in which other rooms for recreation, 
 for meals, and other purposes are shared in common. 
 I should not here have referred to this doubt but for 
 the facts (1) that the case which is said. to have removed 
 the doubt cannot be found ; and (2) because, in the Irish 
 case of Hasson v. Chambers {b), two of the five learned 
 judges in the Court of Appeal expressly dissented from 
 Stribling v. Hake (a), and the majority, while acquiescing 
 in it, can hardly be said to have approved of it. Nor, 
 in my opinion, is the doubt referred to removed by the 
 5th section of 41 & 42 Vict. cap. 26. 
 
 Wills, J. I have had the advantage of considering 
 the judgment which has been delivered by the Lord 
 Chief Justice, and I concur entirely in it and in the 
 reasons there given. As to Stribling v. Halse (a), that 
 case seems to me to have gone to the extreme limit. 
 Of the case which is said to have removed the doubts 
 expressed by the present Master of the Rolls, in Bradley 
 V. Baylis (c), there can be found no report, and there is 
 
 («) Colt. 409 ; 16 Q. S. D. 246. (c) Colt. 163 ; 8 Q. jB. D. 195. 
 
 (J) 18 L. R. Ir, 68. 
 
Lvm VICTORIA. 425 
 
 the Irish authority of Hasson v. Chambers (a), the judg- 1895. 
 ments in which show that the weight of the reasoning Babnett 
 is the other way. And in assenting to StriUing v. Hioemoit. 
 HaUe (b), without approving of it, the Court seems to 
 have considered the decision to apply only to the 
 particular facts of that case. 
 
 Weight, J. I concur. 
 
 Appeal dismissed. 
 
 Germaine asked that the Town Clerk of Reading, who 
 was made a respondent, might he ordered to pay the 
 costs. 
 
 Lord Etjssell of Killowen, L.C.J. No. The 
 appellant has failed, and must bear the costs. 
 
 Solicitors — For the Appellant, Torr, Gribble, Oddie, 
 and Sinclair, for C. E. Hewett, Reading. 
 
 For the Respondent, Rooke & Sons, for 
 Brain & Brain, Reading. 
 
 {a) 18 L. R. Ir. 68. (b) Colt. 409 ; 16 Q. S. D. 246. 
 
 bb2 
 
426 
 
 EASTER SITTINGS. 
 
 TiMMis, Appellant ; Albiston, Respondent. 
 
 1895. 
 
 A person was 
 in oooupation 
 of premises 
 where he 
 carried on 
 business from 
 July 15, 1893, 
 to May 24, 
 1894. On the 
 latter date he 
 assigned the 
 busiaess and 
 premises to 
 a limited 
 company, 
 and continued 
 to occupy 
 part of the 
 said premises 
 as tenant to 
 the company 
 for the re- 
 mainder of 
 the qualify- 
 ing period. 
 Seld, that 
 there was no 
 break of 
 occupation, 
 but that the 
 voter had a 
 continuous 
 occupation 
 of the part, 
 within sec. 9 
 of the 
 Municipal 
 Corporations 
 Act, 1882 
 (46 & 46 Viet. 
 0. 60). 
 
 A T a Court held for the revision of the lists of voters 
 for the municipal borough of Widnes, in the 
 Widnes Division of the county of Lancaster, George 
 Albiston duly ohjected to the names of Serhert Gossage 
 and Thomas Sutton Timmis (the appellant) being re- 
 tained on the Occupiers' Liist, Division 1, for the 
 borough of Widnes ("Waterloo Ward), in respect of the 
 occupation of a tenement, No. 115, Waterloo Road, 
 
 The entry was as follows :- 
 
 3525 
 
 3626 
 
 Gossage, Frederick 
 Herbert. 
 
 Timmis, Thomas 
 Sutton. 
 
 Campbell, Woolton. 
 
 Cleveley, Allerton 
 !Road, Woolton. 
 
 Tenement 
 (joint). 
 
 Tenement 
 (joint). 
 
 115, Waterloo 
 Road. 
 
 115, Waterloo 
 Boad. 
 
 The ground of the objection was that the said 
 claimants, Gossage and Timmis, had not, prior to the 
 15th July, 1894, occupied the said tenement as owners 
 or tenants for twelve months. 
 
 The following facts were proved or admitted. 
 
 The tenement in respect of which the said Gossage 
 and Timmis claimed to be retained on the register was 
 part of premises occupied by them in partnership as 
 soap manufacturers down to May 24th, 1894. 
 
 On May 24th, 1894, the business of Messrs. Gossage 
 and Timmis was converted into a limited liability com- 
 pany, and the said premises were conveyed by them to 
 the company and thereafter used by the company as 
 soap works. 
 
LVm VICTORIA- 1^27 
 
 ■ On the sanie day; May 24th, 1894, the company .1895. 
 demised to Messrs. Gossage and Timmis, as tenants, a Tnons 
 room or oflSce-, part of the said premises, heing the Aibisiok. 
 tenement in respect of which they were entered on the 
 said list. This room or oflBoe was at this date severed, 
 so far as internal communication was concerned, from 
 the rest of the said premises, and the door into 
 Waterloo Eoad had been opened out. 
 
 It was conceded by Gossage and Timmis that the right 
 to remain on Division 1 (of parliamentary and muni- 
 cipal voters) could not be sustained, and they claimed 
 to be inserted on Division 3 of municipal voters, for 
 which a claim, had been made. 
 
 On the 14th September (the Court Tiaving been 
 opened at Widnes on the 13th) the objector gave notice 
 to the overseers that he withdrew his objection to the 
 above names. 
 
 On the 15th September, on the hearing of the case, 
 the vote of Gossage, who acquiesced in the withdrawal, 
 was allowed, and at his request his name was inserted 
 on his claim on Division 3. 
 
 Timmis, ^6 appellant, refusing to accept the with- 
 drawal, his case was heard on its merits. 
 
 The Eevising Barrister decided that the same quali- 
 fying premises had not been occupied as a separate 
 tenement for twelve months preceding the 16th July, 
 1894, and accordingly that the appellant's claim to be 
 inserted on Division 3 had not been sustained. 
 
 Due notice of appeal was given. 
 
 If the Court should be of opinion that the Eevising 
 Barrister's decision was wrong, the register was to be 
 amended by inserting the name of ThonCas Sutton 
 Timmis on Division 3. 
 
428 
 
 EASTER SITTINGS. 
 
 1895. Joseph Walton, Q..0., and W. H. Butler, for the 
 
 Timns appellant. The question is as to the qualification of 
 AiaisioN. ^^® appellant to remain on the list of mXinicipal voters, 
 Division 3, for the borough of Widnes. 
 
 It is submitted that Oossage and the appellant were 
 in continuous occupation of the premises, viz., the offieCj 
 in respect of which the appellant claims to be entered 
 on Division 3 of the list, from July 15th, 1893, to ' 
 July 15th, 1894. If that is so, the appellant is within 
 sec. 9, sub-sec. 2 (b), of 45 & 46 Viet. o. 50, and entitled 
 to his vote. It is not stated in the case, but the fact is, 
 that prior to May 24th, 1894, Gossage and Timmis were 
 the owners of the premises. That, however, is imma- 
 terial, as occupation is all that is required under this 
 statute. 
 
 [Lord Eussell of Killowen, L.O.J. Surely there 
 must have been a moment of time between the con- 
 veyance of the premises to the company and the, demise 
 by the company to Gossage and Timmis when they were 
 not occupying as either owners or tenants. Could they 
 be said to be occupiers then ?] (a) 
 
 It is submitted they could. Their de facto occupation 
 never ceased, though there was a change in the character 
 of it. They were in occupation of the whole down to 
 May -24th, 1894, and then retained their occupation of 
 a portion though they parted with the rest. They re- 
 tained after May 24th as tenants the same premises 
 which they had occupied up to that time. The only 
 objection here is that there has not been occupation for 
 twelve months preceding July 15th, 1894. Occupation 
 
 (a) See La-wson's Notes of Decisions in Registration Cases (Dublin, 
 1894), i>p. 69— 80.— Ed. ... 
 
LVIII VICTORIA. 429 
 
 is all that is necessary for the municipal vote, and if 1895. 
 this has continued for the requisite period that is t ti>ottb - 
 sufficient, though the nature of it may have changed, aisision; 
 He referred to Nicholson v. Yeoman (a), and Smith v. 
 Woolston (b). 
 
 No counsel appeared for the respondent. 
 
 Lord Eussell of Killovp-en, L.O.J. The facts of 
 this case are shortly these. Oossage and the appellant 
 Timmis carried on busiaess in partnership as soap 
 manufacturers in the premises in Widnes down to May 
 24th, 1894. 
 
 It is now stated, though the case has not so "found the 
 fact, that up to this time they were the owners of these 
 premises. That, however, is not material. 
 
 On May 24th, 1894, Gossage and Timmis made over 
 their business and premises to a limited company, and 
 on the same day they took from the company a demise 
 of a portion of the premises and continued in occu- 
 pation of that portion down to July 15th, 1894. 
 
 The result of these facts is, that during the twelve 
 months from July 16th, 1893, to July 15th, 1894, 
 Gossage and Timmis were at first in possession of the 
 whole premises down to May 24th, 1894, and afterwards 
 continued in possession of a part of them down to July 
 15th, 1894. The short point is, whether these facts do 
 not show a qualification in respect of which each is 
 entitled to be registered as a municipal voter within 
 sect. 9 of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882(c). 
 It seems sufficiently clear upon principle, and from the 
 
 (a) Ante, p. 130 ; 24 Q. B. D. 145. 
 (4) 2 Uopw. ^ Colt, 421 ; 4 a P. DJIZ. 
 \o) 45 % 46 Viet. e. 60. 
 
430 EASTEK SITTINGS. 
 
 1895. cases which have been cited, that a change in the 
 Tnans character of the occupation does not constitute a break 
 AxBisTON. of occupation when the occupation has continued in 
 fact, The decision of the Eevising Barrister is 
 therefore wrong, and the appeal must be allowed. My 
 brother, Wright, J., points out that a similar question 
 has arisen in the Irish Courts, but there the cases («) 
 turned on questions of value and rating. The question 
 of value does not arise under the statute which governs 
 this case. 
 
 Chaeles, J. I am of the same opinion. It can be 
 gathered from the facts stated that the appellant has 
 had a continuous occupation during the qualifying 
 period. For the first part of the period he occupied the 
 whole premises. In the middle of it he ceased to occupy 
 a considerable portion of them, and continued to occupy 
 part only for the remainder of the time. That being 
 so, there was a continuous occupation of the portion 
 which constitutes the qualifying premises, and the case 
 appears to me to be within sect. 9, sub-sect. (2) (b), 
 of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882 (h). The 
 Eevising Barrister, therefore, was wrong, and the appeal 
 must be allowed. 
 
 Weight, J., concurred. 
 
 Appeal allowed. 
 
 SoKcitor — For the Appellant, George J. Z^mkey, 
 Liverpool. 
 
 («) Sodden t. Stewart, and Hmo v. Mortimer, Lawson's Notes of 
 Deeieions in Eegistration Cases (Dublin, 1894), pp. 207 sgg. 
 (i) 45 ^ 46 Vict. o. 60. 
 
AN 
 
 INDEX 
 
 TO 
 
 THE PEINCIPAL MATTBES 
 
 CONTAINED IN THIS VOLUME. 
 
 ABSENCE. 
 
 Break of residence. 
 
 j^ee Service Feanchise, 1. Occupa- 
 tion, 1. EESIDEKrCE, 2. 
 
 ADDEESS. 
 Address of objector, sufficiency of. 
 See Notice of Objection, I, 10, 
 
 AGENT. 
 
 Agent to make and sign claim, 
 signature by clerk of. 
 
 See Claim, 1. 
 
 ALMS. 
 
 Almshouse ; receipt of alms. 
 
 Muthin charities, disqualification 
 
 of inmates. 
 
 1. The Hospital of Christ &i Ruthin 
 is a cliarity for the benefit of 
 almspeople who must be not less 
 than fifty years of age, and who 
 from age, Hi-health, accident or 
 infirmity are unable to maintain 
 
 themselves by their own exer- 
 tions. Each almsperson occupies 
 an almshouse, and receives a 
 money allowance from the funds 
 of the charity. 
 Held, that these persons are thereby 
 disqualified from being registered 
 as voters by reason of 2 & 3 Will. 
 IV., c. 45, sec. 36. 
 Edwards v. Lloyd. 54 
 
 Licensed Victuallers' Asylum, 
 qualification of inmates. 
 
 2 . The Licensed Victuallers' Asylum 
 is an institution incorporated 
 under Eoyal Charter. The de- 
 sign of the institution is to re- 
 ceive and maintain decayed aged 
 licensed victuallers and their 
 wives and widows. Only those 
 who have contributed to the 
 funds of the institution as sub- 
 scribers or donors are eligible to 
 be elected as inmates of the 
 asylum. The funds of the insti- 
 tution are largely augmented by 
 
432 
 
 INDEX TO THE PEINOIPAL MATTEES. 
 
 private 'beiievolence. The in- 
 mates are subject to various 
 rules of discipline, which may 
 he altered from time to time hy 
 the Board of Management. No 
 person having an income exceed- 
 ing a certain limit is qualified to 
 be elected, or to remain an in- 
 mate of the asylum. The funds 
 of the institution are applied, 
 amongst other things, in aug- 
 mentation of the incomes of the 
 inmates up to a limit fixed from 
 time to time by the Board. 
 Held, that the rules of the institu- 
 tion do not necessarily show that 
 the inmates are in receipt of alms 
 such as to disqualify them from 
 the franchise under the pro- 
 visions of 2 & 3 Will. IV., c. 45, 
 s. 36. Semhle, per Lord Cole- 
 ridge, L.C.J., that the inmates 
 have not a freehold in their 
 houses. Daniels v. Allard. 70 
 
 St. Bartholomew's Hospital, 
 
 Gloucester, disqualification of 
 
 inmates. 
 
 3. The scheme for the management 
 and regulation of St. Bartholo- 
 mew's Hospital, in the City of 
 Gloucester, leaves the adminis- 
 tration and allotment of many of 
 the benefits of the charity in the 
 discretion of the trustees. 
 
 Held, that the inmates of the 
 hospital are not in a position of 
 independence, and are disquali- 
 fied from being registered as 
 voters by reason of 2 & 3 Will. 
 IV., c. 45, s. 36. 
 Dix V. Kent. 186 
 
 AMENDMENT. 
 
 Ground of objection, mistake in. 
 
 See Notice op Objection', 2. 
 
 Omission to state division in occu- 
 pier's list in which name objected to 
 appeared. 
 See Notice oe Objection, 6. 
 
 Description of abode of objector. 
 
 County vote. 
 See Notice oe Objection, 10, 
 
 Ownership list, no power to alter 
 
 nature of qualification as stated 
 
 therein. 
 
 See QuAIIlTCATION, 1. 
 
 Lodger claim, date of attestation. 
 
 See LoDGEE Ebanchise, 2, 3. 
 
 Lodger claim,, mistake in declaration. 
 
 See Lodger Ebaij-chise, 4, 7. 
 
 Borough franchise, division of list. 
 
 Transfer. 
 
 See Division of List. 
 
 Different qualifications ; " dwelling- 
 house" and " dwelling-houses 
 in succession." 
 See Qtjaiipication, 2. 
 
 Old lodger claim, omission of name 
 
 of borough. 
 
 See Claim:, 2. 
 
 APPEAL. 
 
 [/S'ee also Notice op Appeal.] 
 Refusal of Bevising Barrister to hear 
 person appearing before him, not a 
 ground of appeal. Counsel. 
 " Party." 
 1 . The refusal of a Eevising Barris- 
 ter to hear a person appearing 
 
INDEX TO THE PEINOIPAL MATTERS. 
 
 433 
 
 before Mm is not a matter of 
 appeal witHn sec. 42 of 6 Vict. 
 c. 18. , A barrister -who appears 
 on behaM of a party or other 
 person, though not as counsel, is 
 ■within sec. 41 of that Act. An 
 association is a "party" within 
 the meaning of the section. 
 0' Connor v. Nicholson. 250 
 
 Refusal of Revising Barrister to star 
 
 the name of a voter, not a ground 
 
 of appeal. 
 
 2. The refusal of the Eevising 
 Barrister to mark the name of a 
 voter under the provisions of 
 sec. 7, sub-sec. 5, of the County 
 Electors Act, 1888, is not a 
 matter as to which an appeal lies 
 under sec. 42 of 6 Vict. c. 18. 
 Arnold v. Sharpe. 252 
 
 3. No appeal from decision of Re- 
 vising Barrister as to sufficiency 
 of tiotice of selection under 41 ^ 
 42 Vict. c. 26, s. 28. 
 
 See Notice op Selection. 
 
 ATTESTATION. 
 
 Necessary part of lodger claim. 
 
 See LODGEB Peanohise, 2. 
 
 Lodger claim, date of attestation. 
 
 Amendment. 
 
 See Lodger Eeanchise, 2, 3. 
 
 Lodger claim, attesting witness not 
 present when lodger signed. 
 See LoDGEB Eeanchise, 6. 
 
 BANKEUPTCY. 
 
 Interruption of occupation. 
 To be adjudged a bankrupt does 
 not of itself necessarily interrupt 
 a voter's occupation of a dwelling- 
 house as tenant where the trustee 
 in bankruptcy does not interfere, 
 and the landlord of the house 
 continues to treat the voter as 
 tenant, and to receive rent from 
 him throughout the qualifying 
 period. 
 Mackay v. McGuire. 201 
 
 BAEEACKS. 
 
 Delivery of letters and notices in. 
 See Notice ov Objection, 4, 5. 
 
 BAEEISTEE. 
 
 See Appeai,, 1. 
 
 [ CANONS. 
 
 See CoEPOEATioN. Ocotjpation. 
 Joint Occupation. 
 
 CASE. 
 
 Refusal of Revising Barrister to 
 
 state. 
 
 See LODGEE Peanchise, 7. 
 
 CHAEITT. 
 
 See Alms. 
 
 CITY OE TOWN BEING A 
 COUNTY OP ITSELP. 
 
 Freehold vote. Qualification, 2^3 
 
 Will. IV. c. 45, «. 31. 
 
 See Eesidence, 2. 
 
,434 
 
 INDEX TO THE PEINOIPAL MATTEES. 
 
 CLAIM. 
 
 Notice of claim. Signature hy clerk 
 of authorized agent, 
 
 1. A notice of claim may be signed 
 in the claimant's name by a clerk 
 to a person antborized by the 
 claimant to make and sign a 
 claim on his behalf, if the clerk 
 in signing the name is acting 
 under the express direction of 
 the person so authorized. 
 Brown V. Tomls. 196 
 
 Old lodgers^ list. Omission of name of 
 parliamentary borough in claim. 
 No notice of objection. Power of 
 
 Revising Barrister to examine 
 claim. Mistake. Amendment. 
 
 2. In a notice of claim by a voter 
 to have his name inserted in the 
 old lodgers' list, the name of 
 the parKamentary borough was 
 omitted. In every other respect 
 the notice of claim, with the 
 accompanying declaration, was 
 in accordance with the Form 
 prescribed by the Registration 
 Order, 1889 (Form H., No. 2). 
 This notice was served on the 
 overseers and duly published by 
 them. 
 Held, (1) that the Eevising Barris- 
 ter has power to examine the 
 claim, notwithstanding there is 
 no notice of objection; and (2) 
 that the omission of the name of 
 the borough was a mistake which 
 the Eevising Barrister had power 
 to amend, under 41 «& 42 Vict. 
 c. 26, s. 28(2), and that the 
 claim being good in substance 
 and honestly made, he ought to 
 
 have exercised his discretion by 
 amending it. 
 
 Treadgold\. Town Clerk of Grant- 
 ham. 402 
 
 Necessary for the lodger franchise. 
 See Lodger Peaij chise, 1 . 
 
 Meaning of" claim," 
 See Lodges Prawchisb, 2. 
 
 Claim for good qualification not in- 
 validated by entry on list for another 
 qualification. 
 See Joint Occupation, 1, 
 
 Lodger franchise. Omission of date 
 
 to attestation clause. Amendment. 
 
 See Lodger FnAJsrCHiSE, 3. 
 
 Lodger franchise. Mistake in decla- 
 ration attached to claim,. Amend- 
 ment. 
 See Lodger Franchise, 4. 
 
 Lodger franchise. Claim sent after 
 
 date fixed by statute. 
 
 See Lodger Franchise, 5. 
 
 Lodger franchise. Attestation of 
 
 claim by witness not present when 
 
 claimant signed. Claim invalid. 
 
 See Lodger Franchise, 6. 
 
 Borough franchise. Divisions of list. 
 
 No power to transfer from Division 
 
 III. to Division I. without a claim 
 
 under 6 Vict. c. 18, s. 15. 
 
 See Division of List. 
 
 Declaration for correction of. Evi- 
 dence of objector in contradiction. 
 See Objection, 1. 
 
INDEX TO THE PEINOIPAL MATTEES. 
 
 435 
 
 N'o distinction letween " claim " and 
 
 " list," 41 ^ 42 Vict. c. 26. 
 
 See QtrALirioATiON, 2. 
 
 Notice of selection under 41 ^ 4:2 
 
 Vict. c. 26 is not a " claim." 
 
 See Notice op Selection. 
 
 CONSTABLE. 
 See Police Constable. 
 
 CONSTRUCTIVE EESIDENCE. 
 See Eesidence, 2. 
 
 CONTEOL. 
 
 Police barracks. 
 
 See DwELLiNa-HorsE, I. 
 
 COEPOEATION. 
 
 Share of corporate property. Canons 
 of a cathedral. Ownership quali- 
 fication. 
 
 Canons" of a cathedral are not en- 
 titled to vote in respect of their 
 share in corporate revenues de- 
 rived from land belonging to the 
 chapter. 
 Harris v. Phillips. 223 
 
 COSTS. 
 
 Hule as to costs— follow the event. 
 
 Sutton V. Wade, at page 185. 
 
 COUNSEL. 
 
 Not entitled to appear before the 
 
 Revising Barrister. 
 
 See Appeal, 1. 
 
 COUNTY. 
 
 Division of. Constitution of new 
 
 parish. 
 
 See Division oi" Counties. 
 
 City or town being county of itself. 
 
 Freehold vote. 3 Will. IV. 
 
 c. 45, s. 31. 
 
 See Eesidence, 2. 
 
 COUNTY VOTE. 
 
 Optional occupation of premises in 
 
 lieu of portion of ivages payable. 
 
 See Occupation, 2. 
 
 Description of place of abode of 
 
 objector. 
 
 See Notice of Objection, 1,10. 
 
 Parliamentary Division. 
 
 See Division of Counties. 
 
 CUBICLE. 
 
 "Part of a house separ'ately occupied 
 
 as a dwelling." 
 
 See Dwelling House, 1. 
 
 DATE. 
 
 Attestation, lodger claim, date of. 
 
 See Lodger Franchise, 3. 
 
 DECLARATION. 
 
 Part of lodger claim. 
 
 See Lodger Eranohisb, 2. 
 
 Mistake. Lodger claim^ 
 
 See Lodger Peanohise, 7. 
 
 Correction of claim. Evidence by 
 
 objector, 
 
 See Objection, 1 . 
 
436 
 
 INDEX TO THE PEINCIPAL MATTEES. 
 
 DISQUALIFICATION. 
 
 See Alms. Parochial EELrBF. 
 Police Constable. 
 
 DIVISION OF COUNTIES. 
 
 Redistribution of Seats Act, 1885. 
 
 Constitution of new parish. 
 
 Reference to LocalGovernment Board. 
 
 A voter had a qualification in re- 
 spect of premises occupied by 
 him in that part of the parish of 
 Deeping St. Nicholas which is 
 locally in the parts of Kesteven, 
 and in what has always been 
 known as the petty sessional di- 
 vision of Bourne, in Lincolnshire. 
 Other part of the said parish is 
 locally in the parts of Holland 
 and in the petty sessional division 
 of Elloe in the same county. The 
 parish was constituted by the 
 Deeping Fen Drainage Act, 1856 
 (19 & 20 Vict. c. Ixv., L. & P.), 
 which, after reciting that it was 
 expedient that provisions should 
 be made for constituting Deeping 
 Fen into a parish for seculax 
 purposes, enacted, by sec. 52, 
 that Deeping Fen should form a 
 parish by the name of Deeping St. 
 Nicholas, and should be deemed 
 to be altogether in the parts of 
 Holland, in Lincolnshire, for all 
 poor law purposes. From the 
 year 1856, down to the present 
 time, all poor law business 
 (within the jurisdiction of jus- 
 tices) for the whole parish has 
 been dealt with by the justices 
 for Holland, but the justices of 
 Kesteven have always exercised 
 
 the criminal and licensing juris- 
 diction in that portion of the 
 parish which is in Kesteven and 
 in the petty sessional division of 
 Bourne. 
 
 Held, (1) that the effect of the 
 Deeping Fen Drainage Act, 1856, 
 was to constitute Deeping St. 
 Nicholas a separate parish for 
 poor law purposes only ; and 
 (2) that, by virtue of sec. 9 and 
 Sch. 7 of the Eedistribution of 
 Seats Act, 1885 (48 & 49 Vict. 
 c. 23), which control and over- 
 ride the general provisions of 
 sec. 18 of the same Act, that por- 
 tion of the parish of Deeping St. 
 Nicholas, which is locally in Kest- 
 even, and in the petty sessional 
 division of Bourne, is in the South 
 Kesteven or Stamford parliamen- 
 tary division of Lincolnshire, and 
 that the voter's name was rightly 
 retained on Division I, of the 
 Occupiers' List for that division. 
 Semble, the matter should have 
 been referred to the Local Gov- 
 ernment Board for their determi- 
 nation under sec. 23 of the Act 
 of 1885. Skinn v. Phillips. 386 
 
 DIVISION OF LIST. 
 
 Borough franchise. Transfer from 
 Division III. to Division I. 
 
 A Eevising Barrister has no power, 
 in the absence of a claim under 
 6 Vict. c. 18, s. 15, to transfer 
 the name of a voter from Divi- 
 sion III. to Division I, 
 Lord V. Fox. 266 
 
INDEX TO THE PRINCIPAL MATTEES. 
 
 437 
 
 DWELLING HOUSE. 
 
 " Part of a house separately occupied 
 as a dwelling" 41 Sf 42 Vict. c. 26, 
 •«. 6. Cubicle occupied hy a police- 
 man. Service franchise, 
 
 1. A policeman occupied, during the 
 qualifying period, a cubicle in 
 tlie police station, Reading, by 
 virtue of his service. This cubicle 
 held his b.ed and furniture, and 
 was one of twelve similar cubicles 
 in the same room, separated from 
 each other and from the passage 
 down the room by partitions seven 
 feet high. Prom the top of the 
 partitions to the ceiling of the 
 room was a space of about five 
 feet. Each cubicle had a lock 
 and key, and the occupier was 
 entitled to lock up his cubicle 
 at any time. The passage, the 
 ventilation, and the atmosphere 
 of the room were common to aU 
 the cubicles. 
 
 Held, that such cubicle was not " a 
 part of a house separately occu- 
 pied as a dwelling," within the 
 meaning of 41 & 42 Vict. c. 26, 
 S. 5. Barnett v. Hickmott. 412 
 
 " Dwelling house." " Dwelling 
 
 houses in succession." Different 
 
 qualifications. 
 
 See QUALIFIOATION, 2. 
 
 tToint occupation of dwelling house. 
 See Joint Ocoupation, 1. 
 
 PEEEHOLDEE. 
 
 City or town being a county of itself. 
 
 (2^3 Will. IV. c. 45, s. 31). 
 Freehold qualification. Constructive 
 
 See Ebsedencb, 2. 
 
 Inmate of Charitable Asylum. 
 See Alms, 2. 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 See Objection, 1. 
 
 HOSPITAL. 
 See Alms. 
 
 HOUSE. 
 
 " Part of a house separately occupied 
 as a dwelling." Cubicle. 
 See Dwelling House, 1. 
 
 HOUSEHOLD PEANOHISE. 
 [See also Service Peanchisb.] 
 
 Occupation of rateable premises not 
 
 included in rate. Payment of rates. 
 
 See Eates, 1, 2, 
 
 HUSBAND AND WIPE. 
 
 Married wom,an tenant of premises 
 
 and carrying on business. Claim by 
 
 husband. 
 
 The husband of a married woman 
 who carried on business in her 
 own name in premises which she 
 occupied as tenant, and for which 
 she paid the rates and taxes, 
 lived with her and assisted in the 
 business. 
 
 Held, that the husband was not 
 qualified in respect of the said 
 premises. 
 Prentice v. Markham, 301 
 
438 
 
 INDEX TO THE PEINCIPAL MATTEES. 
 
 INCAPACITY. 
 
 See Police Constable. 
 
 JOINT OCCUPATION. 
 
 Occupation. Dwelling house of 2QI. 
 
 annual value. Claim to he registered. 
 
 Claimant already on register. 
 
 1. Tte proviso in 30 & 31 Vict. 
 c. 102, s. 3, does not operate to 
 prevent two persons in joint 
 occupation of a dwelling house 
 of the annual value of 20Z. from 
 being each entitled to the fran- 
 chise. It is no objection to a 
 claim made in respect of a quali- 
 fication to which claimant is 
 entitled, that he is already on 
 the register in respect of another 
 qualification. 
 
 Druitt V. Gossling. 123 
 
 Joint occupation. Canons^ residence, 
 Bangor Cathedral. 
 
 2. The four Canons of Bangor 
 Cathedral, by arrangement be- 
 tween themselves, resided each 
 for three months in the year in 
 the canonry, a residence set apart 
 for their joint occupation. The 
 value of the premises being ad- 
 mitted to be sufficient. 
 
 Held, that, subject to the necessity 
 of residence in or within seven 
 miles of the borough during six 
 months immediately preceding 
 July 15th, this constituted an 
 occupation by each during the 
 qualifying period for the purpose 
 of the franchise. 
 
 Jones V. Pritchard. 259 
 
 But see next case. 
 
 Joint or exclusive, " as owner or 
 
 tenant." Bangor Cathedral. Canons^ 
 Residence. 
 
 3. The four canons of Bangor 
 Cathedral, for whose joint occu- 
 pation there is set apart a 
 residentiary house, the canonry, 
 by agreement between them- 
 selves in force during the quaUfy- 
 ing period, exchanged their right 
 of joint occupation during the 
 whole year for an exclusive 
 occupation by each during three 
 months in the year. The two 
 canons for whom the vote in 
 respect of the canonry was 
 claimed resided within seven 
 miles of the borough within the 
 meaning of 2 & 3 Will. IV., c. 45, 
 s. 27. 
 
 Held, that they had not occupied 
 for twelve months as required by 
 the statute, and were not entitled 
 to a vote. Jones v. Pritchard 
 (p. 269) explained. 
 Rowland v. Pritchard. 310. 
 
 LIST. 
 
 Transfer from Division III, . to 
 
 Division I. 
 
 See Division of List. 
 
 Claimant entered on the same list 
 
 for different qualifications in respect 
 
 of the same premises. 
 
 See Joint Oooitpation, 1. 
 
 No distinction between " claim " and 
 
 " list." 41 & 42 Vict, 0. 26. 
 
 See QtrALirioATiON, 2. 
 
INDEX TO THE PEINCIPAL MATTEES. 
 
 439 
 
 , Voter on list in respect of good 
 qualification. Another person re- 
 tained on list in respect of the same 
 premises — no ground of objection. 
 See Objection, 2. 
 
 LODGER EEANCHISE. 
 Claim indispensable part of the 
 lodger qualification. 
 1. It is an essential part of the 
 qualification for the lodger fran- 
 chise to have claimed to be 
 registered. Where no such claim 
 has, in fact, been made, the 
 overseers cannot, by publishing 
 a name on the old lodgers' list, 
 waive this requisite. Davies v. 
 Hopkins {K.SfG.n%; 27 L. J. 
 C. P. 6) distinguished. 
 Hersant v. Halse. 12 
 
 Claim. Declaration and attestation 
 
 clause dated July 9th. Ground of 
 
 objection. 
 
 '2. It is an essential part of the 
 qualification for the lodger fran- 
 chise to have made a claim with 
 a declaration and attestation 
 annexed thereto in accordance 
 with the statute. Hersant v. 
 Halse (p. 12) followed. 
 
 Where the declaration and attesta- 
 tion were dated before the close 
 of the qualifying year. 
 
 Held, that the document was self- 
 contradictory, and the claim use- 
 less. It is sufla.cient to state as 
 the ground of objection in such 
 a case; "that you have not com- 
 plied with the statutory require- 
 ments iu making your claim." 
 Meaning of the word "claim" 
 4iscu8sed. Jones v. Kent. 109 
 
 VOIi. I. 
 
 Claim. Omission of date to attesta- 
 tion clause — amendment. 
 
 3. It is essential to the validity of 
 a lodger claim that the attestation, 
 clause annexed thereto should be 
 dated. Jones v. Kent (p. 109) 
 followed. Eevising Barrister's 
 duty as to the correction of 
 mistakes discussed. 
 
 Smith V. Chandler. 129 
 
 Claim. Mistake in the declaration. 
 Amendment. 
 
 4. The power of amendment con- 
 ferred on Eevising Barristers by 
 41 & 42 Vict. c. 26, s. 28, sub-s. 2, 
 enables them to correct mistakes 
 in the declaration attached to a 
 lodger's claim. The claim and 
 declaration are parts of anintegral 
 whole. 
 
 Airisley v. Nicholson, 146 
 
 Claim made after the date fixed hy 
 statute — inadmissible. 
 
 5. A Eevising Barrister has no 
 jurisdiction under sec. 18 of the 
 Eegistration Act, 1886, or other- 
 wise, to admit the claim of a 
 lodger which has not been sent 
 to the overseers tiU. after the date 
 fixed by statute for the sending 
 in of lodger claims. 
 
 Whitwell V. Clerh of the Peace 
 for the North Riding of York- 
 shire. 152 
 
 Claim. Attestation by witness not 
 present when claimant signed. 
 
 6. The attestation of the declaration 
 in a lodger claim by a person who 
 was not present when the claimant 
 
440 
 
 INDEX TO THE PEINCIPAL MATTEES. 
 
 signed is not a compliance with 
 tlie Eegistration Order, 1889, 
 Sch. III., Form H., No. 2, and 
 invalidates the claim. 
 
 Body V. Halse. \ 
 
 Hunt V. Halse. > 240 
 
 Penning v. Halse. ) 
 
 Claim. Declaration. ^' Partly as 
 sole tenant and partly as joint tenant." 
 Amendment. 
 
 Claim. Omission of name ofiorough. 
 See Claim, 2. 
 
 7. A lodger claim was made for 
 ' ' the sole use of a bedroom with 
 joint use of dining and sitting- 
 room," and in the decla]?ation the 
 voter was described as " occupy- 
 
 ' ing partly as sole tenant and 
 partly as joint tenant." The 
 Revising Barrister found that 
 there was an occupation as sole 
 tenant of a bedroom of the value 
 of £10 or upwards, and that the 
 mention of joint occupation was 
 a bond fide mistake. He accord- 
 ingly amended the claim and 
 declaration by striking out aU 
 mention of joint occupation, and 
 allowed the claim. Held, that 
 the misdescription was a mistake 
 which the Revising Barrister had 
 power to amend, and that the 
 claim was rightly allowed. 
 Reg. V. Machellar. 275 
 
 Claim. Servant residing in the 
 house of his master. 
 
 8. An assistant occupying a room 
 in the house of his employer 
 under an agreement to pay rent, 
 and not as part of his duty as 
 servant, is entitled to be regis- 
 tered as a lodger. 
 
 , Bennett Y. Evans. 291 
 
 MAEKET. 
 
 Stands in Spitalfields Market, 
 
 See OooTJPATioif, 3. 
 
 MAEEIED WOMAN. 
 See Husband aoti Wife. 
 
 MEDICAL EELIEF. 
 
 See Paboohtat. Eblief. 
 
 MILITAEY SEEVIOE. 
 
 Occupation of dwelling-house 
 
 hy virtue of. Compulsory absence. 
 
 Break of occupation. 
 
 See Sebvice Ebanchise, 1. 
 
 MILITIAMAN. 
 
 Break of Residence. Militiaman in 
 
 camp during training. 
 
 See OcoiTPATioiir, 1. 
 
 MISDESCEIPTION. 
 
 See Lodger Esanchisb, 7. 
 
 MISTAKE. 
 
 Ground of objection. 
 
 See Notice of Objection, 2. 
 
 Form of notice of objection. 
 See Notice op Objection, 3, 6, 
 
 Date of attestation. Lodger claim. 
 See Lodger Franchise, 2, 3, 
 
 Declaration to lodger claim. 
 See Lodger Franchise, 4, 7, 
 
INDEX TO THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS. 
 
 441 
 
 Jjodger claim. Omission of name of 
 
 borough. 
 
 See Claim, 2. 
 
 Alteration of qualif cation. 
 
 See Qualification, 1, 2. 
 
 Address of objector. 
 
 See Notice of Objection, 10. 
 
 MUNICIPAL FRANCHISE. 
 
 See Sebvice Franchise, 2 ; 
 Occupation, 4. 
 
 NOTICE OF APPEAL. 
 [_See also Appeal.] 
 Notice of appeal must he in writing. 
 Notice of appeal not given in writ- 
 ing in accordance witL. the pro- 
 visions of 6 Vict. c. 18, s. 42, is 
 not a valid notice. 
 Guise V. Dillie. 283 
 
 NOTICE OF CLAIM. 
 See Claim. 
 
 NOTICE OF OBJECTION. 
 
 \See also Objection.] 
 
 Address of objector. County list. 
 
 Statement of objector' s place of abode. 
 
 1'. In a notice of objection referring 
 to a county list, tlie objector 
 described Hmself as " of Church- 
 yard, on tbe list of parliamentary 
 votersfortheparishofPe^ers/Je^c?." 
 His real address, and his address 
 as stated on the register, was 
 " Churchyard, Petersfeld." Held, 
 
 ' that his address was insufficiently 
 
 stated in the notice of objection, 
 and that the notice of objection 
 was, therefore, bad. 
 Humphrey v. Earle. 39 
 
 Ground of objection. Mistake. 
 Amendment. 
 
 2. The notice of objection served on 
 a freeman of the city of Norwich 
 stated the ground of objection in 
 these terms : " that you do not 
 reside at the above address" 
 (viz., 12, Clifton Street, Norwich). 
 The real ground of objection 
 urged before the Revising Bar- 
 rister was that the person objected 
 to had not resided anywhere in 
 Norwich, or within seven miles 
 thereof, during the six months 
 previous to July 15th, 1887. 
 
 Held, notwithstanding the conclud- 
 ing words of 48 Vict. c. 16, s. 18, 
 that the notice of objection did 
 not cover the real objection, and 
 that the Revising Barrister had 
 no power to amend the notice so 
 as to cover the real objection. 
 Such an amendment is not a cor- 
 rection of a " mistake " within 
 the meaning of 41 & 42 Vict. 
 0. 26, s. 28 (2). 
 Bridges v. Miller. 47 
 
 Insufficient statement of list on which 
 obj'ector's name appears. 
 
 3. An objector stated in his notice 
 of objection that his name was on 
 the list of parliamentary voters 
 for the parliamentary borough of 
 Battersea and Clapham, but did 
 not more particularly describe the 
 list. The parliamentary borough 
 is divided into two parliamentary 
 Il2 
 
442 
 
 INDEX TO THE PEINOIPAL MATTEES: 
 
 divisions, and is not all comprised 
 in a single parisli. 
 Held, notwithstanding tlie conclud- 
 ing words of 48 Vict:c. 15, s. 18, 
 that the notice of objection was 
 bad, on the ground that it did not 
 give the information required by 
 the form of objection. set out in 
 the Schedule to the Act. 
 Wood V. Chandler. 61 
 
 Delivery and Service of. " Ordinary 
 course oj'post." 
 
 4. Unless an ordinary course of 
 post whereby letters would be 
 delivered at the address men- 
 tioned on the notice of objection 
 and duplicate thereof within the 
 necessary time does in fact exist, 
 the production of the duplicate is 
 no evidence within the provisions 
 of 6 Vict. 0. 18, s. 100, of the due 
 delivery of the objection. Notices 
 of objection addressed to persons 
 within the barracks at Woolwich 
 were posted on August 20, 1887, 
 about 6 o'clock in the evening. 
 Letters then posted addressed to 
 places in Woolwich other than 
 the barracks would, in ordinary 
 course of post, have been de- 
 livered the same evening. Ijetters 
 addressed to the barracks are not 
 delivered by postmen, but an 
 orderly from the barracks calls 
 for them. It did not appear to 
 be the duty of the orderly who 
 did call for the letters posted at 
 6 o'clock to deliver them all to 
 their various addresses inside the 
 barracks the same evening. The 
 duplicates of the notices posted 
 
 were tendered as evidence of 
 delivery of the notices on 
 August 20. 
 Held, no proof of such delivery. 
 Childs V. Cox. ' 84 
 
 Overruled ; see next case. 
 
 5. If there is an ordinary course of 
 post whereby letters would be 
 delivered generally throughout a 
 district within the necessary time, 
 the production of the stamped 
 duplicates of notices of objection 
 addressed to person's resident 
 within the district is evidence, 
 under the provisions of 6 Vict. 
 c. 18, s. 100, of the due delivery 
 of such notices, notwithstanding 
 a special arrangement for the 
 delivery of the letters of such 
 persons which is in substitution 
 of the ordinary delivery by the 
 
 ■ post office, and by which the 
 receipt of the notices may be 
 delayed. There is no duty upon 
 an objector to do more than 
 ascertain that there is a general 
 delivery for the place to which he 
 wishes to send, by which letters 
 would in the ordinary course 
 reach their destination, on or 
 before August 20. Childs v. Cox 
 (p. 84 ; 20 Q. B. D. 290) over- 
 ruled. 
 
 Kemp V. Wanklyn ; Atkins' Case. 
 
 360 
 
 Service of. Place of abode, 
 
 6. It is not a sufficient service of a 
 notice of objection to leave it at 
 the place stated in the list as the 
 place of abode of the person ob- 
 jected to, if that is not Ids true 
 place of abode, and if there is.no 
 
INDEX TO THE PEINCIPAL MATTEES. 
 
 443' 
 
 reasonaWe probability of the 
 notice coming to his knowledge. 
 Semhle, the sufficiency of the service 
 of the notice of objection is a 
 question of fact for the Eevising 
 Barrister. Gifford v. Overseers of 
 St. Luhe^s, Chelsea. 139 
 
 Omission to state the division in the 
 
 occupiers' list, in which the name 
 
 objected to appeared. Mistahe. 
 
 Amendment. 
 
 7. A notice of objection omitted to 
 state the numbered division of 
 the occupiers' list to which the 
 objection referred, but its lan- 
 guage, in the opinion of the 
 Court, indicated clearly that Divi- 
 sion I. of the occupiers' Hst was 
 the list intended. 
 
 Held, that the Eevising Barrister 
 had power to amend the notice 
 by inserting in it- the words 
 " Division I.," and was right in 
 exercising the power. 
 
 Queere, whether any amendment 
 was requisite. 
 Hartley v. Halse. 118 
 
 Form of. Place of signature of 
 objector. 
 
 8. It is not a fatal variation from 
 the form of notice of objection 
 to a voter to be given, to overseers 
 under the Eegistration of Elec- 
 tors Acts and the Eegistration 
 Order, 1889, that the signature 
 of the objector precedes the names 
 of the persons objected to and 
 referred to in the notice. 
 Sutton V. Wade. 
 
 Gale V. Over end. } 169 
 
 Moore v. Atkinson. 
 
 Objector's name struck out of list 
 after notice given, but before hear- 
 ing. Competency of objector. 
 
 9. A notice of objection given by a 
 person whose name is on the 
 occupiers' list as published by 
 the overseers at the time such 
 notice is given remains a good 
 notice, and the person remains a 
 competent ob j ector, notwithstand- 
 ing that prior to the hearing of 
 the objection the objector's name 
 has been struck off the list of 
 voters by the Eevising Barrister. 
 Pease v. Town Clerk of Middles-., 
 brough. 286 
 
 County vote. Description of place of 
 abode of objector. Amendment. 
 
 10. In notices of objection under 
 6 Vict. c. 18, s. 17, and Registra- 
 tion Order, 1889, to the right of 
 persons to be registered for the 
 Bodmin division of the county of 
 Cornwall, the objector described 
 himself thus : — In the case of 
 ownership voters, "J. B., Bur- 
 nard's Terrace, on the register of 
 electors for the township of Bod- 
 min borough"; and in the case 
 of lodger or occupier voters, 
 "J. B., Burnard's Terrace, on the 
 list of parliamentary electors or 
 burgesses for the township of 
 Bodmin borough." His place of 
 abode was, in fact, Burnard's 
 Terrace, Bodmin. 
 
 Held, that the place of abode of the 
 objector was sufficiently described. 
 Semble, per Hawkins, J., the 
 Eevising Barrister, finding as a 
 fact that the omission in the 
 notice was a mistake, and that 
 
444 
 
 INDEX TO THE PEINCrPAL MATTEES.. 
 
 no one was misled, had power to 
 amend. Hicks v. Stokes. 303 
 
 No notice of ohjection. Police con- 
 stable. Incapacity. Duty of 
 Revising Barrister to expunge 
 name of. 
 
 See Police Constable. 
 
 NOTICE OF SELECTION. 
 
 Not a " claim." No appeal from 
 
 decision of Revising Barrister as to 
 
 sufficiency of notice. 
 
 No appeal Ues from the decision of 
 the Eevising Barrister as to the 
 sufficiency of a notice of selection 
 of the entry to be retained for 
 voting given hy a voter under 
 sec. 28 of the Parliamentary and 
 Municipal Registration Act, 1878 
 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 26). The voter 
 giving such a notice is not a 
 claimant within the meaning of 
 sec. 39 of the Parliamentary 
 Eegistration Act, 1843 (6 Vict. 
 c. 18.) R. v. McConnell. 375 
 
 OBJECTION. 
 
 \See also Notiob of Objection. J 
 
 Declaration. Evidence in support of 
 ohjection. 
 
 1. Notwithstanding a declaration 
 by a person objected to, made 
 under sec. 24 of 41 & 42 Vict. 
 c. 26, evidence is admissible in 
 support of the objection and to 
 contradict the declaration. 
 Tranior v. Starbuclc. 340 
 
 More than one person retained on 
 
 list in respect of the same premises. 
 
 No ground of ohjection. 
 
 2. It is no ground of objection to a 
 voter who is on the list in respect 
 of a good qualification that some 
 other person has been retained 
 on the list in respect of the same 
 premises. Warrens. Maule. 400 
 
 Statement of ground of ohjection. 
 Lodger claim. 
 
 See LoDQEB, Eeanchise, 2. 
 
 Ohjection to a voter as not an inhabit- 
 ant occupier. Bad ohjection where 
 the occupation is joint under 3^4 
 Will. 4, c. 45, s. 29. 
 
 See Jones v. Pritchard, at page 263. 
 
 Objector limited to grounds of 
 objection. 
 
 See Jones v. Pritchard, at page 263. 
 
 OBJECTOE. 
 
 Statement of abode of. Notice of 
 
 ohjection. 
 See Notice of Objection, 1, 10. 
 
 Notice of ohjection sent to overseers. 
 Place of signature of objector. 
 See Notice oe Objection, 8. 
 
 Competency of. Name of, struck off 
 
 list after notice given. 
 
 See Notice of Objection, 9. 
 
 Statement of list on which objector's 
 
 name appears. 
 
 See Notice of Objection, 3. 
 
INDEX TO THE PEINCIPAL MATTEE8. 
 
 44S 
 
 OCCUPATION. 
 \_See also Joint Oooupation. Stjo- 
 
 CESSIVE OCCXJPATION.] 
 
 Dwelling house in horough. 
 
 Occupation as inhabitant occupier. 
 
 Militiaman in camp. Break of 
 
 residence. 
 
 1. Militiamen occupiers of dweUiag 
 houses within a borough hreak 
 their residence by going to live 
 in camp outside the borough 
 during training under the ordi- 
 nary military regulations. Ford 
 V. Barnes {Colt. 396; L. R. 16 
 Q. B. B. 254), and Spittall v. 
 Brooh {p. 22) followed. 
 Donoghue v. Brook. 100 
 
 Optional occupation of premises hy 
 
 servant in lieu, of wages. 
 Parliamentary and county franchise. 
 
 2. Where claimants occupy dwel- 
 ling houses in a county as part 
 of the consideration for their 
 services, but not as a necessary 
 condition for the due performance 
 of those services, they are entitled 
 to be registered as county electors, 
 and not merely as parliamentary 
 voters ; although the owners of 
 the houses are rated and pay the 
 rates, and the claimants have 
 
 . made no claim to be rated. The 
 Municipal Corporations Act, 1 882 
 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 50), s. 32, does 
 not repeal or limit the operation 
 of sec. 19 of the Poor Eate 
 Assessment and Collection Act, 
 1869 (32 & 33 Fict. c. 41), as 
 declared by sec. 14 of the Parlia- 
 mentary and Municipal Eegistra- 
 
 . tionAct, 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 26), 
 
 Smith V. Overseers of Seghill {L. 
 R. 10 Q. B. 422), followed; 
 Maclean v. Prichard {p. 94 ; 20 
 Q. B. D. 286), distinguished. 
 Marsh v. Estcourt. 157 
 
 Occupation " as owner or tenant." 
 
 Stands and stalls. Spitalfields 
 
 market. 
 
 3. The owner of Spitalfields market 
 let it in separate plots, called 
 " stands," to occupiers at a fixed 
 rent of more than £ 1 per annum, 
 subject to notice to quit, which 
 might be verbal. Such stands 
 were not closed, _nor numbered, 
 nor distinguished by any marks. 
 The occupiers came to the market 
 in the morning and left at night. 
 
 Held, that the occupation of a stand 
 during the qualifying period en- 
 titled the occupier to a vote under 
 48 Vict. c. 3, s. 5. Per Wright, J., 
 Queer e, whether the words " as 
 owner or tenant," of sec. 27 of 
 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 45, are to be 
 read into sec. 5 of 48 Vict. c. 3. 
 Hall Y. Metcalfe. 227 
 
 Change from possession of entire pre- 
 mises to tenancy of part. Continuous 
 occupation of part. Qualification. 
 
 4. A person was in occupation of 
 premises where he carried on 
 business from July 15th, 1893, to 
 May 24th, 1894. On the latter 
 date he assigned the . business 
 and premises to a limited com- 
 pany, and continued to occupy 
 part of the said premises as 
 tenant to the company for the re- 
 mainder of the qualifying period. 
 
 Held, that th«re was no break of 
 
446 
 
 INDEX TO THE PEINOIPAL MATTEE8. 
 
 occupation, but that the voter had 
 a continuous occupation of the 
 part, within sec. 9 of the Muni- 
 cipal Corporations Act, 1882 (45 
 & 46 Vict. c. 50). 
 Timmis v. Albiston. 426 
 
 Occupation hy virtue of office, 
 service or employment. 
 
 See Service Feanohise. 
 
 Occupation of dwelling house. 
 Military service. 
 
 See SbbVIOE FEAlfCHISE. 
 
 Interruption of occupation. 
 Bankruptcy. 
 
 See Bankk-ottoy. 
 
 Constructive occupation. 
 See JoiHT OccmPATioN, 2. 
 
 Occupation "partly as sole tenant 
 
 and partly as Joint tenant." Lodger 
 
 claim. 
 
 See Lodges- Ebaitcihise, 7. 
 
 Occupation. Residence more than . 
 seven miles from borough. 
 
 See Ebsidbnob, 2. 
 
 Occupation hy married woman as 
 tenant. Claim hy hushand. 
 
 See Htjsbaitd and Wife. 
 
 Occupation of rateable premises not 
 included in rate. 
 
 See Eates, 1,2. 
 
 Occupation as tenant — bankruptcy. 
 See Banketjptot. 
 
 OWNEE OE TENANT. 
 Occupation as " owner or tenant." 
 Canonry. 
 
 See Rowland v. Pritchard, at 
 page 318. 
 
 Occupation as " owner or tenant.^' 
 
 £10 occupation qualification in 
 
 boroughs. Quaere, whether these 
 
 words are to he read into sec. 5 of the 
 
 Representation of the People Act, 
 
 1884. 
 
 See Hall v. Metcalfe, at page 239. 
 
 Husband and wife — claim hy hushand. 
 See Husband and Wipe. 
 
 0WNEE8HIP LIST. 
 
 Qualification stated in — change of. 
 
 See Amendment, 206. 
 
 OWNEESHIP QUALIFICA- 
 TION. 
 Share in corporate property. 
 
 See OOEPOEATION. 
 
 PAEISH. 
 
 Constitution of new parish. 
 See Division of CouNTiBa. 
 
 PAELIAMENTAEY DIVISION. 
 
 See Division of Counties. Notice 
 
 OF Selection. 
 
 PAROCHIAL EELIEF. 
 
 Medical relief. Medical Relief 
 
 Disqualification Removal Act, 1885 
 
 (48 & 49 Vict. c. 46). Definition of 
 
 medical or surgical assistance. 
 
 Midwife. 
 
 The TTords "medical or surgical 
 
INDEX TO THE PEINOIPAL MATTEE8. 
 
 447 
 
 asBistance," as used in the Medical 
 Belief Disqualification Eemoval 
 Act, 1885, include all assistance, 
 medical or surgical in its nature, 
 although the person affording 
 such assistance is not a qualified 
 medical or surgical practitioner. 
 The services of an uncertified 
 midwife suppUed at the expense 
 of the parish to a voter's wife. 
 Held, under the circumstances of 
 the case, to create no disqualifica- 
 tion. 
 
 Honeyhone v. Hamhridge and 
 another. 26 
 
 PAET OF A HOUSE. 
 See Dwelling House, 1 ; Occupa- 
 tion, 4. 
 
 PAETY. 
 
 An association is a '^ party" within 
 
 sec. 41 o/6 Vict. c. 18. 
 
 See Appeal, 1. 
 
 PETTY SESSIONAL DIVISION. 
 See Division of Ooxtnties. 
 
 POLICE CONSTABLE. 
 Police constable appointed under 
 
 10 Geo. IV, c. 44. Incapacity to vote. 
 
 Name to he expunged hy the Revising 
 
 Barrister whether objected to or not. 
 
 A police constable appointed under 
 10 Oeo. IV. c. 44, is incapacitated 
 from voting at an election for a 
 borough within the Metropolitan 
 Police District ; and where such 
 incapacity existed on the last day 
 of July, it becomes the duty of 
 the Eevising Barrister under 
 41 &42 Vict.c.2&,B. 28,8ub-s. (7), 
 
 VOL. I. 
 
 to expunge the constable's name 
 from the list, whether notice of 
 objection has been given or not. 
 Doulon V. Halse. 1 
 
 Occupation of a cubicle at police 
 
 station. Part of house separately 
 
 occupied as a dwelling. 
 
 See Dwelling House, 1. 
 
 POST. 
 Notice of objection — service of by 
 
 post. ' 
 
 See Notice of Objection, 4, 5. 
 
 QUALIFICATION. 
 
 ■ Amendment of ownership list — no 
 
 power to alter nature of qualification 
 
 as there stated. 
 
 1. A Eevising Barrister has no power 
 to amend the third column of the 
 ownership list so as to introduce a 
 qualification of a nature different 
 from the qualification stated in 
 the list. " Freehold " cannot be 
 changed into "leasehold." FosJcett 
 V. Kaufman (Coltman, 66; Z. H., 
 16 Q. B. B. 276), explained and 
 followed. 
 
 Plant V. Potts. \ „ .„ . . 
 
 Robinson \. Potts. \ ^^^ y^-^-h 
 
 Description of qualification. 
 " Duelling housed' and " dwelling 
 houses in succession " — amendment. 
 
 2. "Dwelling house " and " dwell- 
 ing houses in succession " are 
 distinct and different qualifica- 
 tions ; and, therefore, where the 
 third and fourth columns of a 
 claim show that the qualification 
 intended is one of " dweUiag- 
 
448 
 
 INDEX TG THE PEINOIPAL MATTEES. 
 
 houses in succession," the Eevis- 
 ing Barrister has no power, in 
 the absence of a declaration 
 under sec. 24 of 41 & 42 Vici. 
 c. 26, to amend the claim by 
 striking out words from the third 
 and fourth columns, so as to alter 
 the qualification to that of 
 " dwelling-house." The Act 
 makes no distinction between 
 "claim" and "list." 
 Mann v. Johnson. 
 Hurcum v. Hilleary. 
 
 Change in nature of occupation — 
 giving up possession of part of 
 
 J 
 
 345 
 
 See OccrcPATioif, 4. 
 
 Description of qualification. 
 
 Declaration to amend, hut no claim. 
 
 Transfer from Division III. to 
 
 Division I. 
 
 See DrvisiON op List. 
 
 Selection of , for purpose of voting. 
 
 See Notice of Selection. 
 
 Voter on list in respect of good 
 qualification. Another person re- 
 tained on list in respect of the same 
 •premises. No ground of objection. 
 See Objeotiost, 2. 
 
 Rateable premises not rated. 
 See Eates, 1, 2. 
 
 EATES. 
 
 Household qualification. Occupation 
 
 of rateable premises not included in 
 
 rate. 30 ^ 31 Vict. c. 102, ss. 3, 
 
 26; 32 ^33 Vict. c. 41, s. 19; 
 
 46 Sf 46 Vict. c. 50, ss. 9, 32 ; 
 
 48 Vict. c. 8, s. 9 (9). 
 
 1. The inhabitant occupier of a 
 
 dwelling-house from July 15th 
 to December 15th, 1892, removed 
 on the latter date to another 
 dwelling-house, which he occu- 
 pied during the remainder of the 
 qualifying period. The house so 
 occupied in succession was only 
 of the value of £9 per annum. 
 Being newly built, it had never 
 previously been rated, nor was 
 it, though then rateable, included 
 in a rate which was made on 
 February 8th, 1893, during the 
 period of its occupation. 
 Held, that the occupier was not 
 entitled to the parliamentary 
 franchise, following as to this 
 McGafp.gan v. Riddall, 28 L. R. 
 Ir. 257 (C A.), and that by rea- 
 son of the provisions of sec. 9 
 of the Municipal Corporations 
 Act, 1882, he was not entitled to 
 the mxmicipal franchise. 
 Palmer v. Wade. 323 
 
 ^10 occupation qualification. 
 
 Occupation of rateable premises not 
 
 included in rate. 
 
 2. The decision of the previous case 
 of Palmer v. Wade as to the par- 
 liamentary franchise applies to 
 both the parliamentary and muni- 
 cipal franchises in a similar case 
 where the value of the premises 
 is £10 or upwards. 
 
 Wade v. Perkins. 338 
 
 Payment of, by owner instead of 
 occupier. 
 
 3. The Municipal Corporations Act, 
 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 50), s. 32, 
 does not repeal or limit the opera- 
 tion of sec. 19 of the Poor Eate 
 
INDEX TO THE PEINOIPAL MATTEE8. 
 
 449 
 
 AsHessment and Collection Act, 
 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 41), as de- 
 clared by sec. 14 ol the Parlia- 
 mentary and Municipal Registra- 
 tion Act, 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. 
 c. 26). Marsh v. Estcourt. 157 
 
 EEOEIPT OF ALMS. 
 
 iSee Aims. 
 
 EEDISTEIBUTION OF SEATS 
 ACT, 1885. 
 
 See Division or CoTmiiEs. 
 
 EEGISTEE. 
 
 More than one person retained on 
 
 register in respect of same premises. 
 
 No ground of objection. 
 
 See Objection, 2. 
 
 Good qualification. Claimant on 
 
 list for another qualification in 
 
 respect of the same premises. 
 
 See Joint Occupation, 1. 
 
 EEGISTEATION OEDEE, 1889. 
 
 Disregard of Form. 
 See Notice of Objection, 3, 8 ; and 
 
 Ol/AIM, 2. 
 
 EE8IDENCE. 
 
 Occupation (2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 45, 
 s. 27). Residence more than seven 
 
 tnilesfrom a horough. 
 1. A. lived at Southport and went 
 daily to Wigan, where he carried 
 on business in premises owned 
 ■ by him. He had no sleeping 
 accommodation on his premises 
 at Wigan, but twice during the 
 qualifying period he slept there 
 
 on a temporary bed made up on 
 chairs. Wigan is more than 
 seven mUes distant from South- 
 port. 
 Held, that A. was not qualified in 
 respect of his premises at Wigan, 
 not having resided there for six 
 months previous to July 15th, 
 1892, within the meaning of 
 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 45, s. 27. 
 Barlow v. Smith. 291 
 
 Constructive residence (2^3 Will. 4, 
 c. 45, s. 31). Break of residence. 
 
 2. E. was absent from -£;»«<«/• and en- 
 gaged in temporary employment 
 in London for two months prior 
 to Easter, 1887. About May he 
 left Exeter agfain, and sought and 
 found permanent employment in 
 London. Although he retained 
 during all this time a right to 
 the exclusive use of a bedroom 
 .at Exeter, and did, in fact, use 
 the bedroom when he was not in 
 London, 
 
 Held, that he was not resident in 
 Exeter for the six months pre- 
 ceding July 15thj 1887. Per 
 Lord Coleridge, L.C.J. : Mere 
 intention to return to a place at 
 a future time is not suj3B.cient to 
 sustain a constructive residence 
 therein. 
 Beale v. Town Clerk of Exeter. 31 
 
 Break of residence. See Service 
 Fbanchisb, 1 ; Occupation, 1. 
 
 EEVISING BAEEISTEE. 
 Duty to expunge. Incapacity of 
 voter. No notice of objection. 
 : See Police Constable, 
 
450 
 
 INDEX TO THE PEINOIPAL MATTEES. 
 
 Power to examine lodger claims. 
 iSeeLoDGEBFEANOHisB, 1; Claim, 2. 
 
 Powers with regard to amendment — 
 (a) Ground of objection. See 
 
 Notice op Objection, 2. 
 (h) Form of notice of objection. 
 See Notice op Objection, 8. 
 
 (c) Lodger claim. Date of attesta- 
 
 tion. See LoDGEB FiiAif- 
 
 CHISE, 3. 
 
 (d) Lodger claim. Declaration. 
 See Lodger ruANcmsE, 4, 7. 
 
 (e) Lodger claim. Omission of 
 
 name of borough. See Claim, 
 2. 
 
 (f) Cannot change nature of quali- 
 fication. See QrAiiPicATiON, 
 
 1,2. 
 
 (g) Description of abode of objector. 
 
 See Notice of Objection, 10. 
 
 No jurisdiction to admit lodger claim 
 sent in after date. 
 
 See LoDaBK Feanchise, 5. 
 
 No appeal from, as to sufficiency of 
 service of notice of objection. 
 
 See Notice oe Objection, 6. 
 
 No appeal from refusal to star name 
 of voter. 
 
 See Appeal, 2. 
 
 No appeal from, as to sufficiency of 
 
 notice of selection of qualification to 
 
 he retained for voting. 
 
 See Notice op Selection. 
 
 Refusal to state case. Mandamus. 
 See LoDGEE Feanchise, 7. 
 
 SELECTION. 
 
 Qualification to he retainedfar voting. 
 
 Sufficiency of Notice. 
 
 See Notice op Selection. 
 
 SEPAEATELY OCCUPIED. 
 See Dwelling Hoitsb, 1 . 
 
 SEEYANT. 
 
 Servant residing as lodger in his 
 
 master's house. 
 
 See LoDGEE Feahchise, 8. 
 
 SEEVICE FEANCHISE. 
 
 Occupation of dwelling house. Mili- 
 tary service. Compulsory absence. 
 Break of residence. 
 
 1. Where a man inhabits a dwell- 
 ing house by virtue of military 
 service, and the rules of such, 
 service compel his absence from 
 such dwelling house during a 
 period of 27 days within the 
 qualifying year, the inhabitancy 
 is broken, and the man is not 
 entitled to the franchise under 
 48 Vict. 0. 3, s. 3. The fact that 
 reasonable leave to return home 
 was from time to time, during 
 the said period of twenty-seven 
 days, usually granted, 
 
 Held to make no difference. 
 
 Spittall V. Brook. 22 
 
 Occupation by virtue of service. 
 Municipal franchise. 
 
 2. The 3rd section of the Eepre- 
 sentation of the People Act, 1884, 
 does not operate to extend the 
 municipal franchise. 
 
 Maclean v. Prichard. 94 
 
INDEX TO THE PEINOIPAL MATTEE8, 
 
 451, 
 
 Optional occupation of premises hy 
 
 servant in lieu 0/ portion of wages 
 
 payable. Parliamentary and county 
 
 franchise. 
 
 See OccrcPATiON, 2. 
 
 Occupation hy service followed by 
 ordinary occupation. Parliamen- 
 tary franchise. 
 See Successive Occupation. 
 
 SEEYICE OF NOTICE. 
 See Notice of Objection, 4, 5. 
 
 SEVEEANCE. 
 See Dwelling House. 
 
 SOLDIEE. 
 
 See Service Fkawchise, 1 ; Notice 
 of Objection, 4, 5. 
 
 STALLAGE. 
 
 Occupation as " owner or tenant." 
 
 Stands and stalls. Spitalfields 
 
 Market. 
 
 See Occupation, 3. 
 
 STAEEING. 
 
 See Notice op Selection ; 
 Appeal, 2. 
 
 STATUTE. 
 
 [See The Table op Statutes pre- 
 fixed to this Volume, pp. xv, xvi.] 
 
 Special provisions override general. 
 See DiYisioN op Counties. . 
 
 TOI. t. 
 
 No waiver hy Court of provisions of. 
 See p. 284. 
 
 SUCCESSIVE OCCUPATION. 
 
 Occupation by service followed by 
 ordinary occupation. Parliamen- 
 tary franchise. 
 A person who has teen an inhabit- 
 ant occupier of two dwelling 
 houses in immediate succession 
 during the qualifying period 
 within a parliamentary division 
 is entitled to the parliamentary 
 franchise, though he occupied one 
 dwelling house hy virtue of ser- 
 vice, and the other dwelling house 
 as an ordinary tenant. 
 Nicholson V. Yeoman. 150 
 
 Hating of premises occupied in 
 
 succession. 
 
 See Bates, 1, 2. 
 
 SUEGICAL ASSISTANCE. 
 See Paeochiaii Belief. 
 
 TENANT. 
 
 Tenant. Licensee. Stallage. 
 Spitalfields Market. 
 See Occupation, 3. 
 
 Husband and wife. Premises occu~ 
 
 pied hy wife. Claim by husband. 
 
 See Husband and Wife. 
 
 TEANSPEB. 
 See Division of List. 
 
45a 
 
 INDEX TO THE- EMNCIEAB MATTEM-. 
 
 WAIVES. 
 
 Lodger franchise. Notice of claim 
 
 cannot he waived hy overseers. 
 
 See LoBGBE Feanchise, 1. 
 
 No waiver hy Court of statutory 
 provisions. 
 See p. 284. 
 
 WITNESS. 
 Meaning of expression " 
 
 See LODGEE Fkakohise, 6. 
 
 WOEDS. 
 
 "As owner or tenant." See Occu- 
 pation, 3; Joint OccrPAXiON, 3. 
 " Claim." See Lodgbe Peanchise, 
 2 ; Qualification, 2, 
 
 " Dwelling." See Dtollhtg 
 
 House, 1. 
 " Hereditament" See OoouPA* 
 
 tion, 3. 
 
 '' Medical or surgical assistance." 
 
 See Paeoohial Eeliep. 
 
 " Ordinary course of post." See 
 
 Notice of Objection, 4, 5. 
 "Part of a house." See Dwell- 
 ing House, 1. 
 
 "Party."' /S'ae Appeal, 1. 
 
 "Petty sessional division." See 
 Division of Qounties.': 
 
 " Separately occupied as a dwelling." 
 See Dwelling House, 1. 
 
 " Starring." . See Notice or Selec- 
 tion'; Appeal, 2. 
 
 " Witnessed^ See Lodges Eean- 
 .CHISB, 6, : 
 
 LONDON: PEIHTED BY 0. P. BOWOETH, (MAT NHW STEBBT, FBTTBB IiAKB, BlO. 
 
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