Cornell University Library HD 1208.U58 Land title registration by certificate.T 3 1924 013 858 539 ' TREASURY DEPARTMENT FEDERAL FARM LOAN BUREAU Bulletin No. 1 LAND TITLE REGISTRATION Bt CERTIFICATE V THE TORRENS SYSTEM SIMPLIFIED ANP ADAPTED TO constitutional; requirements, along LINES APPROVED BY UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ISSUED BY THE Federal farm loan bureau April 18, 1918 UBRARV AUG 8 1947 name ■r ■;■' ! r - \ WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFRClE" Cornell University Library The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924013858539 TREASURY DEPARTMENT FEDERAL FARM LOAN BUREAU Bulletin No. LAND TITLE REGISTRATION BY CERTIFICATE V THE TORRENS SYSTEM SIMPLIFIED AND ADAPTED TO CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS, ALONG UNES APPROVED BY UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ISSUED BY THE FEDERAL FARM LOAN BUREAU April 18. 1918 WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1918 CONTENTS. BRIEF. Page. Initial proceedings 1-10 Subsequent proceedings 10-20 Legal conclusions 21-22 REPORT. Historical 22-24 Validity of procedure 24-26 Conclusiveness of initial registration ' 26 Indefeasibility of registered title 26-27 Practicability of acts 27-29 Time required in proceedings 29-30 Cost of proceedings 30-31 Legal objections 31 Suggestions for reduction of cost of initial proceedings 32-34 Suggestions for meeting legal objections 34-37 Essential provisions of a suggested statute 37-39 Results of suggested statutory provisions 39-40 Economic effect of statute on Federal farm loans 40 Economic effect on realty transactions in United States 40-41 Insm-ance 41^3 Advantages of title registration 43-44 List of States having title registration statute ^ 44 i Summary -• 44-45 COMPARATIVE .STUDY. Prefatory 46-47 Legal procedure 47-50 Provisions as to wMch statutes vary 50-5() Miscellaneous pro\ isions common to all statutes 56-57 Provisions which draw in question concliisi 'eness of certificates 57-83 LAND TITLE REGISTRATION BY CERTIFICATE. BRIEF. It is stated in the accompanying comparative study that — n judicial proceeding which ends in a decree quieting the title ugainst all persons is the initial step in all land title registration provided by statutes in the United States. The plan is that the decree shall serve as a new starting point in determining the title; that it shall declare absolutely the only rights which exist in tlie land and be conclusive against " the whole world." The scheme further contemplates that, the title having thus been conclusively adjudicated, the substance ot the decree shall be entered in a " register of titles," containing a description of the property affected, and that no sub- sequent transaction shall affect the title unless the writing evidencing such be filed with the registrar and a memorandum thereof be entered in the register of titles, along with the decree ; that the record of such entries shall be known as a certificate of title and shall be conclusive evidence of the title. A single page, therefore, is presumed to show conclusively the actual state of the title at all times. INITIAL PROCEEDINGS. The objection has been made that those provisions of statutes which relate to initial proceedings are unconstitutional. It will be well to keep in mind that a statute providing for the quieting of title against all persons must satisfy not only the State court of last resort but also the United States Supreme Court, for while it is true that, if a State court of last resort declares a statute of the State unconstitutional, there is no right of appeal to the United States Supreme Court, at the same time, if the State court declares a statute constitutional, there remains the right of appeal to the United States Supreme Court on the question of the constitu- tionality of the law. Under section 709, Revised Statutes, the final decree of a State court may be examined into by the United States Supreme Court — where is drawn in question the validity of or an authority exercised under a statute of any State on the ground of their. being repugnant to the Constitu- tion, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of their validity. (Columbia Water Power Company v. Street Railway Company, 372 U. S., 475; 43 L. Ed., 525.) It is to be kept in mind also that the constitutionality of statutes will be tested by what may be done under them and not by what (5) has been done in a specific case ; if a statute authorizes in any man- ner a procedure which does not constitute due process of law, it is to that extent at least unconstitutional. It was said by Judge Earl in Stuart v. Palmer (74 N. Y., 183), that " the constitutional validity of a law is to be tested, not by what has been done under it, but by what may by its authority be done." The specific objection made is that the statutes do not provide for " due process of law." In Ballard v. Hunter (204 U. S., 241) it is said: • A precise definition of " due process of law " has liever been rittempted. It does not always mean proceedings in court. Its fundamental requirement is an opportunity for a hearing and defense, but no fixed procedure is demanded. The process or proceedings may be adapted to the nature of the case. In quiet- title suits against all persons, four classes of persons are affected as defendants and are entitled to due process of law in order that they may be brought before the court and be bound by its decree. They are : (1) Known residents of the State. (2) Known residents of the State who can not be found. (3) Known nonresidents of the State. (4) Unknown persons, whether in being or not, whether minors or under other disability, and whether residents or nonresidents of the State. Mr. Justice Moody in Twining v. New Jersey (211 U. S., 78 ;- 53 L. Ed., 97), said: Due process requires that the court which assumes to determine the rights of parties shall have jurisdiction ; and that there shall be notice and, oppor- tunity for hearing given the parties. Subject to these two fundamental condi- tions, which seem to be universally prescribed in all systems of law established by civilized countries, this court has, up to this time, sustained all State laws, statutory or judicially declared, regulating procedure, evidence, and methods of trials, and held them to be consistent with due process of law. In Arndt v. Griggs (134 U. S., 316; 33 L. Ed., 918), the court, speaking through the then Mr. Justice Brewer, said: The vi'ell-being of every community requires that the title to real estate therein shall be secured, and that there be convenient and certain methods of determining any unsettled questions respecting it. The duty of accomplishing this is local in its nature ; it is not a matter of national concern or vested in the General Government ; it remains with the State ; and as this duty is one of the State, the manner of discharging it must be determined by the State, and no proceeding which it provides can be declared invalid, unless in conflict with some special inhibitions of the Constitution or against natural justice. The notice and manner of service required by the several title registration statutes in initial proceedings have been set out in the accompanying comparative study. While the manner of service is found to differ, it is at least required in all statutes that notice of the proceeding be served upon all resident and nonresident known de- fendants in a manner customary in other civil actions in the State and held to be sufficient by the supreme court of the State involved ; the same is true of all known resident defendants who can not be found. Therefore, the only remaining question is, Can binding service be made upon the fourth class — unknown persons, whether resident or nonresident, and whether minors or under other disability ? All statutes providing for registration of iitle require that notice be given to the fourth class by publication. In Ballard v. Hunter, supra, Mr. Justice McKenna said : It should be kept in miud that the laws of a State come under the prohibi- tion of the fourteenth amendment only when they infringe fundamental rights. A law must be framed and judged of in consideration of the practical affairs of man. The law can not give personal notice of Its provisions or proceedings to everyone. It charges everyone with knowledge of its provisions ; of its proceedings it must, at times, adopt some form of indirect notice, and indirect notice is usually efficient notice when the proceedings affect real estate. Of what concerns or may concern their real estate, men usually keep informed, and on that probability the law may frame its proceedings; indeed, must frame them, and assume the care of property to be universal if it would give efficiency to many of its exercises. This was pointed ovit in Huling v. K!aw Valley R. & Improvement Co. (130 U. S., 559; 32 L. Ed., 1045; 9 Sup. Ct. Rep., 603), where it was declared to be the duty of the ou-n-cr of real estate, loho is a nonresident, to take measures that in some way he shall 6e represented when his property is called into requi- sition; and if he fails to get notice bii the ordinary publications ivhich have been usually reqnired in such cases it is his misfortune, and he must abide the consequences. In Arndt v. Griggs, supra, it is said : It (the State) can not bring the person of a- nonresident within its limits, but it may determine the extent of his title to real estate within its limits ; and for the purpose of such determination may provide any reasonable method of im- parting notice. The court further said : The various decisions of this court estalilish that, in its judgment, a State has power by statutes to provide for the adjudication of titles to real estate within its limits as against nonresidents who are brought into court only by publication. In American Land Company v. Zeiss (219, U. S. 47; 55 L. Ed., 95, 1910) Mr. Chief Justice White quoted with approval the following language from Title and Document Restoration Company v. Ker- rigan (150 Cal., 289) : Applying the principles which have led the courts in cases like Arndt v. Grigss and Perkins v. Wakeham (86 Cal., 580 ; 21 Am. St. Rep., 67 ; 25 Pac, 51) to sustain judgments quieting titles against nonresidents upon substituted service, why should not the legislature have power to give similar effect to such judgments against unknown claimants where the notice is reasonably full and complete? The validity of such judgments against known residents is 8 based upon the grounds that the State has power to provide for the determina- tion of titles to real estate within its borders, and that, as against nonresident defendants or others, who can not be served in the State, a substituted service is permissible, as being the only service possible. These grounds apply with equal force to unkrvown claimants. The power of the State as to titles should not be limited to settling them against persons named. In order to exercise this power to its fullest extent, it is necessary that it should be made to operate on all interests, known and unknown. The case of American Land Company v. Zeiss, supra, involved the identical questions inyolved in land title registration statutes in so far as they relate to the power of the State to deal with the sub- ject matter and the sufficiency of the service of notice of the initial proceeding. That case brings into question the validity of a Cali- fornia statute providing for the establishment .of titles in cases where the records have been destroyed by fire or earthquake. Notice and service in all respects similar to that under land title registration statutes are provided for in the California statute considered in the Ajnerican Land Company case. The statute was held to be suffi- cient in all of its requirements. In the opinion Mr. Chief Justice White said : As no complaint is made concerning the provisions of the statute relating to the designation of and notice to known claimants, we put that subject out of view and address ourselves to the provisions relating to unknown claimants or claims. The action which the statute authorizes may be brought by " any person who claims an estate of inheritance or for life in, and who is by himself or his tenant or other person holding under him, in the actual and peaceable possession of any real property " situated in a county where " the public records in the office of a county recorder have been lost or destroyed, in whole or in any material part, by flood, fire, or earthquake." In the cap- tion of the complaint the statute requires that the defendants shall be de- scribed as " all persons claiming any interest in or lien upon the real property herein described, or any part thereof." The summons is required to contain a description of the property affected by the suit, and to be directed to " all persons claiming an interest in or lien upon the real property herein described, or any part thereof." The summons is to be published at least once a week for two months, and the defendants are commanded to appear and answer within three months after the first publication of the summons. A copy of the sum- mons is required to be posted in a conspicuous place on each separate parcel of the property described in the complaint within 15 days after tlie first publi- cation of the summons. At the time of filing the complaint a notice of the pendency of the action, giving, among other things, a particular description of the property affected thereby, must be recorded in the office of the recorder of the county in which the property is situated, and it is made the duty of the recorder to enter, "upon a map or plat of the parcels of laud, to be kept by him for that purpose, on that part of the map or plat representing the parcel or parcels so described, a reference to the date of the filing of such notice, and, when recorded, to the book and page of the record thereof." In considering the statute we are bound by the construction affixed to it by the supreme court of the State, and therefore treat as embraced within its terms that which the highest court of the State has declared the statute exacts, either expressly or by necessary implication. In the Kerrigan case, supra, it was held that the result of the provisions of the statute was " to require the complainant to designate and to serve as known claimants all whom, with reasonable diligence, he could ascertain to be claimants " — a construction which in effect declared that the statute prohibited the omission of a known claim or claimant, upon the conception that the rights of such claim or claimant would be foreclosed by the general designation and notice prescribed for unknown claimants. And in- Hoffman v. Superior Court (151 Cal., 386; 90 Pac, 930), where the doctrine of the Kerrigan case was reiterated and applied the court, after holding that the statute requires the plaintiff in his affidavit to allege in terms " that he does not know and has never been informed " of any adverse claimants whom he has not specifically named, pointed out that failure of the plaintiff to make inquiry or to avail himself of knowledge which would be Imputed to him because of facts sufficient to put him on inquiry as to the exist- ence of adverse claims would be available " in any subsequent attack upon the decree, upon the ground that there was extraneous fraud of the plaintiff in making a false affidavit to obtain jurisdiction." It is to be borne in mind that it has been settled (Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 U. S., 563; 54 L. Ed. 1161; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep., 132, and cases cited) that the fourteenth amendment does not operate to deprive the States of their lawful power, and of the right, in the exercise of such power, to resort to reasonable methods inherently belonging to the power exerted. On the contrary, the pro- visions of the due process clause only restrain those arbitrary and unreasonable exertions of power which are not really within lawful State power, since they are so unreasonable and unjust as to impair or destroy fundamental rights. It is to be observed that the statute not only requires a disclosure by the plaintiff of all known claimants, but, moreover, at the very outset, contains words of limitation that no one not in the actual and peaceable possession of property can maintain the action which it authorizes. No person can therefore be deprived of his property under the statute unless he had not only gone out of possession of such property and allowed another to acquire possession, or, if he had a claim to such property or an interest therein, had so entirely failed to disclose that fact as to enable a possessor to truthfully make the affidavit which the statute exacts of a want of all knowledge of the existence of other claimants than as disclosed in his affidavit. Besides, it is to be considered that the statute, as construed by the California court, imposed upon the one in, posses- sion seeking the establishment of an alleged title the duty to make diligent inquiry to ascertain the names of all claimants. Instead, therefore, of the statute amounting to the exertion of a purely unreasonable and arbitrary power. Its provisions leave no room for that contention. On the contrary, we think the statute manifests the careful purpose of the legislature to provide every reasonable safeguard for the protection of the rights of unknown claim- ants, and to give such notice as, under the circumstances, would be reasonably likely to bring the fact of the pendency and the purpose of the proceeding to the attention of those interested. To argue that the provisions of the statute are repugnant to the due process clause because a case may be conceived where rights in and to property would be adversely affected without notice being actually conveyed by the proceedings is in effect to deny the power of the State to deal with the subject. While we are of opinion that the view just stated demonstrates the want of merit in the contention that the statute, because of the insufficiency of its requirements, was repugnant to the fourteenth amendment, a consideration of a provision of the general law of California, which, by the construction of the Supreme Court of California, is incorporated into the statute under consid- 10 eration, would lead to the same result. Thus, In the Hoffman case, the court said: " In this connection it is proper to say that, in determining whether or not due process of law is afforded, other statutes applicable to the proceeding may be considered. The provisions of section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure apply in such cases. Any person interested in the property, and having no actual notice of the decree, may come in at any time within a year after its rendition, and by showing that he has not been personally served with process, and stating facts constituting a good defense to the proceeding— that Is, facts sufficient to show that he has a valid adverse intei-est in the property — he may have the decree vacated as to him, and be allowed to answer to the merits." The right conferred by section 473 of the code, it is to be observed. Is an absolute right, although the section declares that the court may impose " such terms as may be just." (Holiness Church v. Metropolitan Church Assoclatlen, 12 Cal. App., 445 ; 107 Pac, 635. Gray v. Lawlor, 151 Cal., 352 ; 90 Pac, 691 ; 12 A. and E., Ann. Gas., 990.) Under this construction It might well be held, if It were necessary to do so, as establishing a rule of limitation which it was in the power of the State to prescribe, in view of the circumstances to which the limitation was made applicable. All registration statutes expressly provide that a decree entered in pursuance of their provisions shall bind all classes of persons enu- merated hereinabove and that it shall be no exception that any one served, as provided, is under a disability. It is vs^ithin the legislative power to except minors and others under disability from the effect of a statute or to include them; if included, a decree becomes as binding upon such as if the disability did not exist. It is urged that because the plaintiff in error was a minor when this law went Into operation, it can not affect her rights. But the Constitution of the United States, to which appeal is made in this case, gives to minors no special rights beyond others, and it was within the legislative competency of the State of Louisiana to make exceptions In their favor or not. The exemptions from the operation of statutes of limitation, usually accorded to infants and married women, do not rest upon any general doctrine of the law that they can not be subjected to their action, but in every instance upon express language in those statutes giving them time tifter majority, or after cessation of coverture, to assert their rights. (Vance v. Vance, 108 U. S., 514; 27 L. Ed., 808.) In vievif of the foregoing authorities there appears no ground for reasonable doubt as to the validity of the initial proceeding for registration of title. and the conclusive and binding quality of the decree upon " all persons," provided the statute is reasonable, has been followed in the case, and all persons entitled to actual notice have been ser^■ed. TRANSACTIONS SUBSEQUENT TO ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS. The statutes provide that no transaction subsequent to original registration shall affect the title unless a memorandum thereof be entered upon the register of titles upon the page (continuation) 11 upon which the decree quieting the title and ordering registration is entered. All entries are to be made by an official, designated " registrar," to whom are presented for filing all writings purporting to affect registered titles and whose duty it is to note upon the register the effect of the writing presented. It is not required that notice be given by registrars before making an entry upon the register of titles except in a few instances of minor concern here. This course of procedure has been attacked upon the ground that it attempts to bestow upon registrars, who are admit- tedly ministerial officers only, powers which are judicial, and also upon the ground that the procedure is unconstitutional in that it at- tempts to deprive of property without due process of law. The two grounds of attack seem to be correlated. If the duties imposed upon registrars by the statutes be the exercise of judicial powers, then both grounds of objection to the procedure would ap- pear to be good, for clearly a ministerial officer can not exercise func- tions which are wholly judicial, nor can judicial power be exercised in the premises without due process of law. There is no contention on the part of those accepting the statutes as valid that, in proceedings after original registration, there is " due process of law," except in a few specified instances in some of the statutes wherein judicial pro- ceedings are required but which are not determinative of the ques- tion here considered; on the contrary, the claim is that the proceed- ings are not judicial but ministerial only and consequently no notice (or " due process ") is required. It is true also that it is in no way unconstitutional that a statute does not require any notice whatsoever as a condition precedent to the exercise of a ministerial act, yet such duties must be performed in an orderly manner in which the citizen has an opportunity to protect his rights. (Turpin v. Lemon, 187 U. S., 51-57.) 7s the exercise of the powers and duties of registrars ministerial or judicial f The State of Illinois was the first of the States to pass a land- title registration act; that act made no provision for conduct of the initial proceeding in court, but provided for the submission of the original petition to the registrar, committing to him the determina- tion of ownership upon an application for initial registration. The Supreme Court of Illinois held the act unconstitutional upon the ground that its provisions in this regard attempted to commit to the registrar the question of determination of ownership and thereby sought to confer upon that officer judicial power. (People v. Chase, 165 111., 527.) Thereafter a new statute was passed in Illinois (1897) in which provision was made for an initial proceeding to be conducted by a court as the basis for initial registration of title, leaving to the 12 registrar the duty of issuing the certificate of title after decree and the reissuing of certificates upon transfers made subsequent and the entry of all transactions subsequent to initial registration. The constitutionality of the statute of 1897 was regularly contested and upon appeal the provisions giving to registrars the power to issue certificates and enter transactions subsequent to initial registration were held to be constitutional (People v. Simon, 176 111., 165), the court holding that the exercise of such functions was ministerial, and, at most, only quasi judicial. In the opinion the following lan- guage is used: From these authorities, it is apparent that the mere fact that the registrar is required by this act to inquire into the existence of certain facts, and to apply tlie law thereto, in order to determine what his official conduct shall be, and that his action may affect private rights, does not constitute the exercise of judicial power, strictly speaking. It is not the intention of these two sections (60 and 47) to provide a tribunal for the adjudication of disputes concerning land titles. The primary purpose is the issuing of the certificate, and the exercise of the judgment of the registrar is incidental. The prohibition in question " has never been held to apply to those cases where judgment is exercised as incident to the execution of a ministerial power." (Owners of Lands v. People, supra.) The powers exercised by the registrar under this law are analogous to those exercised by the Commissioner of Patents. A power of decision is given to that officer in many matters, not only between the Government and the patentee, but also between different claimants, as to priority, patentability, and like matters, and in the performance of these duties it has never been considered that he was encroaching upon the judicial domain.' They are also, in a measure, lilie the duties performed by officers of the Land Office. Duties of a similar nature, involving judgment or discretion, and the application of the law to the facts, are devolved both under the State and Federal laws upon many other executive officers, legally. In some instances it is even held that in the exercise of such judgment the officer is free from judicial interference. But in the case of the registrar this act provides that any person feeling himself aggrieved by the act or neglect of this officer, in any matter pertaining to the duties required of him, may file a petition in equity in the proper court, making the registrar and' other persons interested parties defendant, and that the court may proceed therein as in other cases in equity, and may make such order or decree as shall be according to equity in the premises and purport of the act. This, vnth the tueU-knowti jurisdiction of the courts in niandaunis, injunction, rescission, can- cellation, bills of relief, and the like, will effectually protect the citizen against arbitrary conduct on the part of the officer. Ohio was the second State to pass such a law. It is conceded every- where that the act was crudely drawn and undoubtedly unconstitu- tional because of failure to provide adequate notice to claimants in initial proceedings and the granting of excessive powers to registrars. It was held to be unconstitutional in State v. Guilhert (56 Ohio St., 'As in regard to patents for land, however, so In regard to patents (or Inventions, the proper olHcer Issues the grant when he has evidence satisfactory to his own mind that the claimant is entitled to receive it ; but that adjudges nothing as to the real right. (Wilder 11. McCormick (U. S.), 29 Fed. Cas., 1220-1221.) 13 575). In that case it is said with reference to the powers of regis- trars here under consideration : It is further urged that the act is void because it attempts to confer judicial power on the recorder. Counsel agree that power of that character can not lie conferred upon a ministerial officer, but in support of the act it is urged that the powers indicated are ministerial, and not judicial. The principal powers conferred are to take proof after notice to the holder that a mortgage has been discharged, and after a hearing, to enter a discharge upon the register; to make an entry that a lien has become Inoperative in law by reason of limitation of time when application has been made therefor, the person inter- ested notified, and he is satisfied that such is the fact; to correct memorials made or issued by mistake, if the rights of bona fide purchasers or lien holders for value have not Intervened. It is true that the power to ascertain and decide is not necessarily a judicial power, and it is frequently exercised by ministerial officers and legislative bodies. AA'hether the power to hear and determine is judicial depends upon the nature of the subject of the inquiry, the parties to be affected, and the effect of the determination. While it is not supposed that any definition of judicial power, sufficient for all conceivable cases, has ever been attempted, it is clear that " to adjudicate upon and protect the rights and interests of individual citizens, and to that end to construe and apply the laws is the peculiar province of the judicial department." (Cooley, Const. Lim., 109.) Recurring to the duties of the recorder under the act, he Is not merely to enter the evidence furnished by the agreement of the parties that a lien has been discharged, or that it has become void by the lapse of time, or that a mistake has interevened touching their rights, hut he is to apply the rules of evidence to the ascertainment of disputed facts ; to apply the rules of law concerning payment ; to interpret and apply the statute of limitations as it may affect the enforcement of liens, including such questions of disability as may arise ; to decide the questions of fact and law that may arise in determin- ing whether mistakes have intervened, and who are bona fide purchasers; and that to make an entry which is to have the same effect in concluding the rights of the adversary parties as would a decree in equity. That these are judicial powers is entirely clear. They seem to have been so regarded by the general assembly, for there is a provision for appeal from the decisions of the recorder. This is not supposed to include all the judicial powers which the act assumes to confer on the recorder, but it is sufficient for present purposes. Nor is this objection to the act avoided by -the provisions which contemplate a review of or appeal from the action of the recorder. It would, perhaps, be found upon a careful consideration of his powers that they are not all embraced within the provisions for review or appeal. But the assumption that they are so embraced would not validate the act in this respect. The recorder, as a ministerial officer, is incompetent to receive a grant of power from the legis- lature. His acts in the attempted exercise of such powers are necessarily nullities. They can not be effective to impose any obligation or burden upon a citizen, or to deprive him of any right. The act plainly contemplates that the person against whom the recorder decides in the exercise of any of the powers sought to be conferred must either submit to the adverse decision, or take upon himself the burden of an appeal. In view of the constitutional provision on the subject, he can not be forced to this alternative. If these are judicial powers, it is admitted that they can not be vested in the recorder. If they are not judicial, the provisions of an appeal are void, since as was said by this court in Ex parte Logan Branch Bank (1 Ohio St., 432) "we have no 14 idea of an appeal, except from one court to another." An examination of People V. Chase ( (111. Sup.) 46 N. E., 454) will show that in some of its aspects the act under consideration, though difEering from the act passed by the Legis- lature of Illinois to accomplish the same purpose, is within the principles upon which that act was held void. The Illinois case, supra, and the Ohio case are commonly said to conflict. The Illinois case holds merely that the registrar has the power to make entries; by inference at least it clearly implies that such entries are not conclusive ; it states that " this, with the well- known jurisdiction of the courts in mandamus, injunction, rescission, cancellation, Mils of relief, and the like, will effectvalZy protect the citisen against arbitrary conduct on the part of the officer." The Ohio case is directed to the question of conclusiveness of acts of registrars rather than the power as conferred by the Illinois statute. Both cases are of the same import in that they hold that the powers of registrars can not be judicial and hence their acts can not be conclusive. Massachusetts took up consideration of land title registration law about the same time as did Illinois, both States having given official attention to the subject in 1891, The Massachusetts act, however, was slower in passage and did not become a law until 1898. The question of the constitutionality of the provisions bestowing upon registrars their powers has been tested before the supreme court of that State and upheld. In Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration (175 Mass., 71) , Chief Justice Holmes, now a member of the United States Supreme Court, wrote the opinion. In it he said : The other objection to the constitutionality of the statute is with regard to the powers and duties of the recorder and assistant recorder. It is said that they are given judicial powers after the original registration, although not judicial officers under the constitution. The act of registration is the operative act to convey title (sec. 50), and by the act of 1898 the assistant recorder does it, unless in doubt (sees. 53, 55, 57, 61, 62, 63). It is said that, as his decision affects title, it must be judicial. But here again it is necessary to use a certain largeness in interpreting broad constitutional provisions. The ordinary business of registration is very nearly ministerial. There is no question to be raised, or which can be raised. If there is a question, either raised by any party In Inter- est or occurring to the assistant recorder, it is to be referred to the judge for decision (sec. 52). But whatever may be thought of the original act, by amend- ment even the ordinary business is to be done only " in accordance with the rules and instruction of the court." (St. 1899, c. 131, sec. 8.) Under this amendment registration is the act of the court. The fact that it may be done by the assistant recorder under general orders when there is no question is not different from the power of the clerk to enter judgment in cases ripe for judgment' under a general order or rule of the superior court. It should be observed by section 55 the production of the owner's duplicate certificate, when- ever any voluntary instrument is presented for registration, is conclusive au- thority from the registered owner for the entry of a new certificate or the making of a memorandum of registration, and that a registration procured l>y presenting a forged certificate, etc., is void. 15 Finally, It Is said that there Is no provision for notice before registration of transfers or dealings subsequent to the original registration. It must be re- membered that at all later states no one can have a claim which does not appear on the face of the registry. The only rights are registered rights, and when land is brought Into tlie registry system there seems to be nothing to hinder the legislature from fixing the conditions upon which It shall be held under that system. (People v. Simon, 176 111., 165, 176.) By section 45 the obtaining of a decree of registration, which is a voluntary act, is an agreement running with the land that the land shall be and remain registered land and subject to the provisions of the act. Furthermore, in deciding whether substantial justice is done, it is to be borne in mind that ordinai-y cases will present no question at all. It is contemplated, as we have said, that, if there is a question to 6e discerned, it sltall be referred to the court, and of course that the court will order notipe to any party interested. The act shows throughout the intent that no one shall be concluded without having a chance to be heard; and although some of its methods are new to this Commonwealth, we can not say that the precautions as to notice are Insufficient In substance or form. Likewise the courts of last resort of other States have considered the constitutionality of the provisions in statutes bestowing similar powers and duties upon registrars and upheld them. In Robinson v. Kerrigan (151 Cal., 49) is is said: The point is that the registrar is required to determine the legal effect of these instruments, and that this is a judicial function which can be given only to a judicial officer. There is no force to the objection. Every administrative officer is frequently called upon, in the discharge of his duties, to decide ques- tions of law relating thereto. The recorder is required to determine whether an instrument presented for record is a deed, a mortgage, a lease, a notice of ac- tion, or what not, so as to record it in its proper book. The sheriff must often determine, for his own guidance in making a levy, the ownership of property. The clerk must determine the nature and legal effect of papers filed with him, and perform the appropriate duty respecting them. The duties required of the registrar by these sections are of the same nature. His decision in the matter is not conclusive. If he decides wrongfully and refuses to perform the appro- priate duty in the premises, he may be compelled to act properly by means of a writ of mandamus, the same as any other ministerial officer who mistakes his duty under the law and refuses to perform it. The exercise of such powers by ministerial officers is a necessary function of the executive department, and although it may require similar deliberation to that involved in the exercise of judicial power, the bestowal of such powers upon the executive department does not violate the provisions of the constitution forbidding that department to exercise the functions of any other department. (People v. Simon, 176 111., 165 (68 Am. St. Rep., 175 ; 52 N. B., 910) ; Owners v. People, 113 111., 296 ; 1 Story on Constitution, 5th Ed., sec. 525.) The principle involved is stated by the Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of Railway Company v. Simonson (57 L. R. A., 765), as follows : A statute which declares what shall be taken as conclusive evidence of a fact is one which, of course, precludes investigation into the fact, and itself determines the matter in advance of all judicial inquiry. If such statutes can be uphel'd there is then little use of courts, and small room, indeed, for the exercise of their functions. 16 The existence of certain facts creating a condition which holds for a stated period of time, however, may conclude all rights in the subject matter. Of such is possession which ripens into title; or a holding under such circumstances as may start running a statute of limitations which bars any proceeding to recover or establish any interest in the property. With reference to such it is said in Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, fifth edition, 453, that : Except in those cases which fall within the familiar doctrine of estoppel at the common law, or other cases resting upon like reasons, it would not, we apprehend, be in the power of the legislature to declare that a particular item of evidence should preclude a party from establishing his rights in opposition to it. Unquestionably the weight of authority favors the constitution- ality of the provisions relating to powers and duties of registrars. It is equally clear that decisions of registrars are not conclusive but may be reviewed by court in an appropriate proceeding in " man- damus, injunction, rescission, cancellation, bills of relief, and the like;" if such entries are not conclusive but are the subject of judicial review, a certificate of title issued upon the strength of the entries can not, of course, become immediately available as conclusive evi- dence of an indefeasible title. In addition to lack of conclusiveness of certificates of title under the system due to the foregoing ground other reasons exist why such certificates are not conchisive. Failure to follow the statute in initial proceedings or in probate and other judicial proceedings after original registration may result in lack of jurisdiction or in such, irregularity as to render a decree inconclusive. Such defects can be overcome only by retention of possession or the running of a statute of limitations providing for title by adverse possession or barring the right to maintain an action to recover the land. Such is true, however, of all initial registration proceedings as well as of subsequent transfers based upon court pro- ceedings. But there may be in legal proceedings defects which are not mere infor- malities or irregularities, but so vital in their character as to be beyond the help of retrospective legislation; such defects are called jurisdictional. (Sara- nac Land and Timber Co. v. Roberts, 177 U. S., 318 ; 44 L. Ed., 792. ) Upon this point the New York commission which drafted the stat- ute in that State said : It is admitted, of course, that in a case in which because of the court's failure to follow the statute an interested party was not duly served, possession by the registered owner might be necessary to cause the running of a statute of limitations. (People v. Ladew, 189 N. Y., 355; People i;. Golding, 55 Misc., 425. 440.) 17 The acts of all States either rest upon an assumption of regularity in probate and other judicial proceedings affecting a registered title and authorize a transfer, upon presentation of a final decree entered m such proceedings, as conveying an indefeasible title or require a hearing before issuance of a new certificate, but leave publication of notice optional with the clerk or court. The Minnesota act (sec. 66) is typical of those which assume regu- larity in probate proceedings through which title passes. It is as follows : When the owner of registered land, or of any estate or interest therein, dies, having devised the same by will, the persons entitled thereto may file' with the registrar a certified copy of such will, together with a certified copy of the order of the probate court, admitting it to probate, and of the final decree of the probate court assigning the same, together with the duplicate certificate issued to the testator, and thereupon the registrar shall cancel the duplicate certificate issued to the testator and issue a new duplicate certificate or certificates to the persons designated in such final decree. The Massachusetts act (sec. 91) is typical of those which require a petition but leave publication of notice 'to unknown claimants dis- cretionary with the court. The section is as follows :" Upon the death of a registered owner his heirs at law or devisees, upon the expiration of thirty days after the entry of a decree of the probate court granting letters testamentary or of administration, or in case of an appeal from such decree, at any time after the entry of a final decree, may file a cer- tified copy of the final decree of the probate court and of the will, if any, with the assistant recorder, and make application for the entry of a new certificate. The court shall issue notice to the executor or administrator and to all other persons in interest, and may also give notice by publication in such newspaper or newspapers as it may consider proper, to all whom it may concern, and after a hearing, may direct the entry of a new certificate or certificates to the person or persons entitled as heirs or devisees. Any new certificate so en- tered before the final settlement of the estate of the deceased owner in the probate court shall state expressly that It is entered by transfer from the last certificate by descent or devise, and that the estate is in process of settlement. After the final settlement of the estate in the probate court, or after the expi- ration of the time allowed by law for bringing an action against an executor or administrator by creditors of the deceased, the heirs at law or devisees may petition the court for an order to cancel the memorandum upon their certificate, stating that the estate is in course of settlement, and the court, after notice and a hearing, may grant the petition ; but the liability of heirs or devisees of regis- tered land for claims against the estate of the deceased shall not in any way be diminished or changed. Such a provision would be ample in ordinary transactions under the customary manner of determining titles, for probate proceed- ings would be examined into before passing a title; but the very object of registration is to obviate the necessity of examination. A careful judge would always require notice by publication before ordering registration if after examining into the probate proceed- • 50874°— 18 2 18 ings any reasonable necessity therefor were found to exist; yet should such publication be not made, the order of registration could not bind persons whom the decree of distribution did not bind by reason of lack of notice. The exceptional character arid object of a registration proceeding appear to have been overlooked in this regard, unless the statutes be based upon a theory of assumptions of regularity in judicial proceedings and conclusiveness thereof when registered. In those acts which provide for accepting decrees of distribution as conclusive, clearly, if for lack of regularity the probate court should not have jurisdiction to make such decree of distribution the decree would not be conclusive ; a title registered upon the strength of the decree could be no stronger than the decree itself, nor could it be made indefeasible by legislative declaration. The same is true in all cases where title is transferred through judicial proceedings upon presentation of decree merely. The assumftion of regularity in frohate and, other judioidl pro- ceedings seems to put a burden upon the system which maJces impos- sible the vmmediate acceptance of certificates, issued under any act, as concltisive, or of any title, evidenced by such certificate, as inde- feasible. Such assumptions cloud all certificates of title under the system. Instances of actual loss would no doubt be few, but a cloud of uncertainty is cast over all.^ Does it follow that the title certificate plan cam, not be given prac- tical effect in the United States? In Tyler v. Judges, supra, Judge Holmes said : Prescription or a statute of limitations may give a title good against the world, and destroy all manner of outstanding claims without any notice or judicial proceeding at all. Time and the chance which it gives the owner to find out that he is In danger of losing rights are due process of law in that case. In Turner v. New York (168 U. S., 90; 42 L. Ed., 392) the de- cision establishes: (1) That statutes of limitations are within the constitutional power of the legislature of the State to enact. (2) That a limitation of two years is not unreasonable. In the opinion Mr. Justice Gray said : It is well recognized that a statute shortening the period of limitation is within the constitutional po\ver of the legislature provided a reasonable time, taking into ccinsideration the nature of the case, is allowed for bringing an action after the passage of the statute and before the bar takes effect. * * * The statute now in question relates to land sold and conveyed to the State for nonpayment of taxes ; it applies to those cases only in which' the conveyance has iln the accompanying study of all statutes the extent of the existence of such pro- visions in the stveral acts Is pointed out under the heading of " Pi'ovislous in the several statutes which draw in question the conclusiveness of certificates." 19 been of record for two years In the office where all conveyances of lands within the county are recorded, and it does not bar any action begun within six months after its passage. In Saranac Land & Timber Co. v. Roberts (177 U. S., 318; 44 L. Ed., 792) there is the following language: A curative act in the ordinary sen.se of that term is a retrospective law, acting on past cases and existing rights. The power of the legislature to enact such laws is therefore confined within comparatively narrow limits, and they are usually passed to validate irregularities in legal proceedings, or to give effect to contracts between parties which might otherwise fall for failure to comply with technical legal requirements. (Cooley, Const. Lim., p. 454.) A very full enumeration of the cases in which the legislature may properly exercise this power is to be found in Forster v. Forstfer (129 Mass., 559). But there may be in legal proceedings defects which are not mere informalities or irregularities, but so vital in their character as to be beyond the help of retrospect ire legislation ; such defects are called jurisdictional. This principle does not apply to a statute of limitations, for such a statute will bar any right, however high the source from, which it may be deduced, provided that a reasonable time is given : A certificate of title, therefore-, though properly registered and authenticated, Is only conclusive until it is shown to fall within one of the recognized ex- ceptions. Exception 5 in section 24 of the Minnesota act above quoted is broad in its terms. In order to determine the extent of its applica- tion as well as of similar exceptions contained in other statutes and the application of statutes of limitations in the States providing for such, a review of all statutes has been made. It appears therefrom that certificates of title, issued under the statutes in the following- named States, are subject to the exceptions set under the State name, either by reason of expressed terms or by necessary implication. EXCEPTIONS TO ALL CERTIFICATES OF TITLE OTHER THAN SUCH AS APPEAR THEREON. ILLINOIS. (Laws of 1897, pp. 13-16.5.) 1. Any subsisting lease or agreement for a lease for a period not exceeding five years where there is actual occupation of the land under lease. The term lease shall include a verbal letting. (Sec 40.) 59 • ^" ^T^''^l *''''^' ^'''' *^'® ''""■''''* '"^ ^'^^^ y^'^i" in which certificate IS issued and special taxes or assessments which have not been con- firmed. (Sec. 40.) 3. Such right of appeal, writ of error, right to appear and contest the application, and action to make counter claim as is allowed by this act. (Sec. 40.) The registered owner of any estate or interest in land brouglit under this act* shall, except in cases of fraud to which he is a party, or of the party through whom he claims without valuable consideration paid in good faith, hold the same subject only to such estate, mortgage, liens, charges, and interests as may be noted in the last certificate of title in the registrar's office and free from all others except: (1) Any subsisting lease or agreement for a lease for a period not exceeding five years, where there is actual occupation of the land under lease. The term " lease " shall include a verbal letting. (2) General taxes for the current or fiscal year in which certificate is issued and special taxes or assessments which have not been confirmed. (3) Such right of appeal, writ of error, right to appear and contest the application, and action to make counter claim as is allowed by this act (Sec. 40.) 4. The right of persons, not bound by the initial decree because of some irregularity, insufficiency or other cause, to open or set aside the decree of registration within two years after entry. (Sec. 27.) No person shall commence any action at law or in equity for the recovery of lands or assert any interest or right in or lien or demand upon the same, or make entry thereon adversely to the title or Interest as found, ordered or de- creed by the court, unless within two years after the entry of the order or de- cree. This section shall be construed as giving such right of action to such persons only as shall not, because of some irregularity, insufficiency, or for some other cause, be bound and concliided by such order or decree. — (Sec. 27.) 5. The ^ght of persons not appearing upon the certificate to set up claims to the land, since the statute does not make valid provision by a statute of limitations for barring claims which may arise in cases wherein the title passes through judicial proceedings subsequent to original registration, such claims surviving by reason of the statute in such proceedings (probate, foreclosure, etc.) not having been fol- lowed or other irregularity. (Sec. 92.) Any person making any claim to or asserting any lien upon registered land not existing at the initial registry of the same and not shown upon the register, or adverse to the title of the registered owner, and no other provision is herein made for asserting the same in the registrar's office, may make affidavit thereof, setting forth his interest, right, title, lien or demand, and how and under whom derived and tlie character and nature thereof. The affidavit shall state his place of residence and also his place of business, if he has one, and 1 It has been held in the State of Illinois that all certificates of title are issued subject to mechanic's liens. 60 designate a place at which all notices relating thereto may be served. Upon the filing of such affidavit in the office of the registrar, the latter shall enter a memorial thereof, as in the case of a charge. — {Sec. 92.) 6. The right to question the action, decision or entry of registrars, since the statute makes no provision by a statute of limitations for barring claims arising by reason of misconstruction, or other error on the part of registrars in making entries, but accepts the same as conclusive in certificates in the hands of innocent purchasers and en- cumbrancers,^ contrary to the decisions and principle. (See brief.) (Sees. 94-95.) Any person feeling himself aggrieved by the action of the registrar or by his refusal to act in any matter pertaining to the first registration of land or any estate or interest therein, after the first registration or any transfer of or charge upon the same, the filing, or neglect or refusal to file any instrument, or to enter or cancel any memorial or notation, or to do any other thing required of him by this act, may file his bill or petition in equity in any court of com- petent jurisdiction, making the registrar and other persons, whose interest may be affected, parties defendant, and the court may proceed therein as in other cases in equity and make such order or decree as *hall be according to equity in the premises and the purport of this act. Nothing in this section contained shall bar such person from filing an original bill or petition In such cases in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction. — {Sec. 94.) It will be observed that the eifect of the foregoing provision is to put " an opinion of registrars " on parity with " an order of court." It is clear that the latter, by reason of its being the result of a judicial proceeding, may be conclusive, whereas the former, an ex parte opinion, can not be. Nothing contained in either of the two preceding sections shall be so con- strued as to remove the bar of any order or decree, or extend the time of limi- tation hereinbefore provided," nor to affect the right of any bona fide purchaser or incumbrancer without notice filed with the registrar and noted as in case of other memorials. — {Sec. 95.) CALIFORNIA. (Statutes, 1915, pp. 1932-1951.) 1. Any subsisting lease or agreement for a lease for a period not exceeding one year, where there is actual occupation of the land under lease. The term " lease " shall include a verbal letting. ( Sec. 34. ) 1 Section 69, foUowing, Illustrates the theory upon which It Is sought to make entries conclusive when certificates pass into the hands of " bona fide purchasers or encum- brancers without notice." " Upon the filing with the registrar of an order of court or opinion of two examiners, as provided In the last section, and In the latter event upon the registrar also being satisfied that the proposed transfer, charge, or other dealing is in accordance with the true intent and meaning of the trust, condition, or limitation, he shall proceed to register the same, and such registration shall be conclusive evidence in favor of the person taking such transfer, charge, or other right, and those claiming under him, in good faith and for a valuable consideration, that such transfer, charge, or other dealing is In accordance with the true intent add meaning of the trust, condition, or limitation." (Sec. 69.) ' Sec. 27, supra. 61 2. All land embraced in the description contained in the certificate which has theretofore been legally dedicated as or declared by a com- petent court to be a public highway. (Sec. 34.) 3. Any subsisting right of way or other easement, created within one year before issue of the certificate upon, over, or in respect of the land. (Sec. 34.) 4. Any tax or special assessment for which a sale of the land has not been had at the date of the certificate of title. (Sec. 34.) 5. Such right of action or claim as is allowed by this act. (Sec. 34.) 6. Liens, claims, or rights arising under the laws of the United States, which the statutes of California can not require to appear of record upon the register. (Sec. 34.) The registered owner of any estate interest in land brought under this act shall, except in case of fraud to which he is a party, or of the person through whom he claims without valuable consideration paid in good faith, hold the same subject only to such estates, mortgages, liens, charges, and interests as may be noted in the last certificate of title in the registrar's oflBce, and free from all others, except: 1. Any subsisting lease or agreement for a lease for a period not exceeding one year, where there is actual occupation of the land under lease. The term " lease " shall include a verbal letting. 2. All land embraced in the description contained in the certificate which has theretofore been legally dedicated as or declared by a competent court to be a public highway. 3. Any subsisting right of way or other easement, created within one year before issue of the certificate upon, over, or in respect of the land. 4. Any tax or special assessment for which a sale of the land has not been had at the date of the certificate of title. 5. Such right of action or claim as is allowed by this act. 6. Liens, claims, or rights arising under the laws of the United States, which the statutes of California can not require to appear of record upon the register. — (Sec. S4-) 7. The right of persons, not bound by the initial decree because of some irregularity, insufficiency or other cause, to open or set aside the decree of registration within one year after entry. (Sec. 45.) No person shall commence any action at law or in equity for the recovery of land, or assert any Interest or right in, or lien or demand upon the same, or make entry thereon adversely to the title or interest certified in the first certifi- cate bringing the land under the operation of this act after one year following the first registration. It shall not be an exception to this rule that the person entitled to bring the action or make the entry is deceased, an infant, lunatic, or is under any disability, but action may be brought by such person by his next friend or guardian or by the administrator or the executor of a deceased person. It shall be the duty of the guardian, if there is any, to bring action in the name of his ward wlienever it is necessary to preserve or enforce the ward's rights in registered land ; provided, however, before such action shall proceed, it must be made to appear to the court th-at the person bringing such action or those under whom he claims, had no actual notice of the proceedings to register such lands in time to appear and file his objections or assert his claim. The 62 provisions of this section shall In no way affect or disturb the rights of any person in said land, acquired subsequent to the registration thereof, bona fide and without knowledge and for a valuable consideration.' — (Sec. 4-5.) Since the statute of limitations provided in the first paragraph of section 45, supra, is deemed necessary in order to satisfy consti- tutional demands, it seems unlikely that the provisions of the para- graph may be emasculated by the legislative declaration in the latter part of section 45 and in section 36, supra. The comments in this footnote and in the foregoing footnotes under " Illinois " are applicable to the theory upon which all statutes move excepting those in Ohio, "Virginia, and Georgia. 8. The right of persons not appearing upon the certificate to set up claims to the land, since the statute does not make valid provision by a statute of limitations for barring claims which may arise in cases wherein the title passes through judicial proceedings subse- quent to original registration, such claims surviving by reason of the statute in such proceedings (probate, foreclosure, etc.) not having been followed or other irregularity. (Sec. 98.) A registered owner or other person in interest or tlie registrar may at any time apply by petition to the court, upon the ground that registered interests of any description,, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased or that new interests liave arisen or been created which do not appear upon the certificates or that there is an error or omission in any certificate or memorial, or that any certificate or memorial has been made, entered, indorsed, issued, or canceled by mlstaice, or that the name of any person on tlie certificate has been changed by divorce, adoption, or other than by marriage as provided for in section 28 of this act, or that an owner, registered as mar- ried, has ceased to be such, or that a corporation which owned registered land has been dissolved and lias not legally conveyed the same after its dissolution, or, upon any other reasonable ground, for an order correcting or altering any certificate to comply with the true facts as shown by the petition and proof adduced, and the court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest. — (Sec. 98.) 9. The right to question the action, decision, or entry of registrars, since the statute makes no provision by a statute of limitations for barring claims arising by reason of misconstruction or other error on the part of registrars in making entries but accepts the same as conclusive in certificates in the hands of innocent purchasers and encumbrancers, contrary to the decisions and principle. (See brief.) (Sec. 33.) ' Section 36, following, illustrates tlio tlieory upon which certificates or original entry are sought to be made concltisive immediately upon entry ; " Except in case ot fraud, and except as herein otherwise provided, no person taking a transfer of registered land, or any estate or interest therein, or of any charge upon the same, from the registered owner, shall be held to inquire into the circumstances under which, or the consideration for which, such owner or any previous registered owner was registered, or be affected with notice, actual or constructive, of any unregistered trust, lien, claim, demand, or interest ; and the knowledge that any unregistered trust, lien, claim, demand, or Interest is la existence sliall not of itself be imputed as fraud." 63 Any person feeling himself aggrieved by the action of the registrar, or by his refusal to act in any manner pertaining to the first registration of land, or any subsequent transfer, or charge upon the same, or failing or neglecting, or refusing to file any instrument, or to enter or cancel any memorial or notation, or to do any other thing required of him by this act, may file a com- plaint in the superior court making the registrar and other persons, whose interest may be affected, parties defendant, and the court may proceed therein as in other cases, and make such order or decree as shall be according to equity and the purport of this act. A certified copy of such order or decree shall be presented to the registrar, who shall file the same and make such entry thereof as by this act required. — (Sec. 33.) MASSACHUSETTS. (Acts 1898, ch. 562. Revised Laws, 1911, ch. 128.) 1. Liens, claims, or rights arising or existing under the laws or Con- stitution of the United States which the statutes of this Common- wealth can not require to appear of record in the registry. (Sec. 38.) 2. Taxes, within two yeai's after they have been committed to the collector. (Sec. 38.) 3. Any highway, town way, or any private way laid out under the provisions of section 65 of chapter 48 if the certificate of title does not state that the boundary of such way has been determined. (Sec. 38.) 4. Any lease for a term not exceeding seven years. (Sec. 38.) 5. Any liability to assessment for betterments, or other statutory liability which may attach to land in this Commonwealth as a lien prior to, or independent of, the recording or registering of any paper; but if there are easements or other rights appurtenant to a parcel of registered land which for any reason have failed to be registered, such easements or rights shall remain so appurtenant notwithstanding such failure, and shall be held to pass with the land until cut off or extinguished by the registration of the servient estate, or in any other manner. (Sec. 38.) Every applicant who receives a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a certifiqate of title for value and In good faith, shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those noted on the certificate, and any of the follow- ing encumbrances which may be existing : First. Ijiens, claims, or rights arising or existing under the laws or Consti- tution of the United States which the statutes of this Commonwealth can not require to appear of record in the registry. Second. Taxes, within two years after they have been committed to the collector. Third. Any highway, town way, or any private way laid out under the pro- visions of section sixty-five of chapter forty-eight If the certificate of title does not state that the boundary of such way has been determined. 64 Fourth. Any lease for a term not exceeding seven years. Fifth. Any liability to assessment for betterments, or other statutory lia- bility which may attach to land in this Commonwealth as a lien prior to. or independent of, the recording or registering of any paper ; but if there are ease- ments or other rights appurtenant to a parcel of registered land which for any reason have failed to be registered, such easements or rights shall remain so appurtenant notwithstanding such failure, and shall be held to pass with the land until cut off or extinguished by the registration of the servient estate, or in any other manner. — (Sec. 38.) 6. The statute does not make valid provision by a statute of limita- tion^ for barring claims which survive an initial decree because of the statute not having been followed or other irregularity in the initial proceeding to quiet title. (Sec. 13.) Every order, decision, and decree of the court whereby any party is ag- grieved shall be subject to appeal to the superior court for the county in which the land lies, to which such order, decision, or decree relates as to any ques- tions involved therein. The appeal shall be claimed and entered and issues framed therefor in the land court within thirty days after the date of such order, decision, or decree, and upon the entry of the appeal the appellant shall file in the superior court copies of all material papers in the case, certified by the recorder ; but no matters shall be tried in the superior court except those specified in the appeal. Appearances and answers shall be filed in the superior court within thirty days after the appeal has been entered, unless for good cause further time is allowed. Upon the motion of either party the cause shall be advanced for speedy hearing, and shall be tried by the court, unless either party within the time -allowed for entering appearance claims a trial by jury. Questions of law arising in the superior court may be taken to the supreme judicial court for revision by any party aggrieved by any opinion, ruling, direc- tion, or judgment of the court, in the same manner as in proceedings at law in said court. Questions of law arising in the land court on any decision or decree may be taken by any party direct to the supreme judicial court for revisions, in the same manner as questions of law are taken to that court from the superior court. The land court, after any decision or decree dependent upon a ques- tion of law, may report such decisions or decree, with so much of the case as is necessary for understanding such questions of law, for the determination of the supreme judicial court.^(S'ec. 13.) 7. The right of persons not appearing upon the certificate to set up claims to the land, since the statute does not make valid provision by a statute of limitations for barring claims which may arise in cases wherein the title passes tlirough judicial procedings subsequent to original registration, such claims surviving by reason of the statute in such proceedings (probate, foreclosure, etc.) not having been followed or other irregularity. (Sec. 105.) Whoever, claims any right or interest in registered land adverse to the regis- tered owner which arises subsequent to the date of original registration may, 1 It is claimed by the author of the Virginia act that section 13 operates as a statute of limitations. If such be true, exception 6 ceases upon expiration of 30 days after entry of decree of initial proceedings. It seems that while the section might be sufficient to har claims surviving by reason of some trivial Irregularity, it is not sufficiently explicit . to bar in more serious cases of jurisdictional defects. 65 If no other provision is made In this chapter for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom it was acquired, and a reference to the volume and page of the certificate of title of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed. The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant's residence, and designate a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim, and the court, npon the petition of any party in interest, shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim, and shall enter such decree thereon as jusUce and equity may require. If the claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registi-atlon shall be canceled. If the court, after notice and a hearing, fimLs that a claim thus registered was frivolous or vexatious, it may tax the adverse claimant double costs. — (See. 105.) 8. The right to question the action, decision, or entry of registrars, since the statute makes no provision by a statute of limitations for barring claims arising by reason of misconsruction, or other error on the part of registrars in making entries, but accepts the same as conclusive in certificates in the hands of innocent purcliasers and encumbrancers, contrary to the decisions and principle. (See brief.) MINNESOTA. (General Laws, 1905, ch. 305.) 1. Liens, claims, or rights arising or existing under the laws or the Constitution of the United States which this State can not re- quire to appear of record. (Sec. 24.) 2. The lien of any tax or special assessment for which the land has not been sold at the date of the certificate of title. (Sec. 24.) 3. Any lease for a period not exceeding three years when there is actual occupation of the premises thereunder. (Sec. 24.) 4. All rights in public highways upon the land. (Sec. 24.) 5. Such right of appeal or right to appear and contest the appli- cation as is allowed by this act. (Sec. 24.) Every person receiving a certificate of title pursuant to a decree of registra- tion, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land who receives a cer- tificate of title In good faith and for a valuable consideration, shall hold the same free from all encumbrances and adverse claims, excepting only such estates, mortgages, liens, charges, and interests as may be noted In the last certificate of title In the ofiice of the registrar, and also excepting any of the following rights or encumbrances subsisting against the same. If any, namely : 1. Liens, claims, or rights arising or existing under the laws or the Con- stitution of the United States which this State can not require to appear of record. 2. The lien of any tax or special assessment for which the land has not been sold at the date of the certificate of title. 3. Any lease for a period not exceeding three years when there Is actual occupation of the premises thereunder. 50874°— 18 5 66 4. All rights In public highways upon the land. 5. Such right of appeal, or right to appear and contest the application, as is allowed by this act. — {Sec. 2^.) C. The right of persons, not bound by the initial decree because of some irregularity, insuflSciency, or other cause, to open or set aside the decree of registration witliin six months after entry. (Sec. 27.) Statute of limitation : No decree of registration heretofore entered, and no original certificate of title heretofore issued pursuant thereto, shall be adjudged invalid or set asid* unless the action in which the validity of such decree of registration, or original certificate of title issued pursuant thereto, is called in question, be commenced, or the defense alleging the invalidity thereof be inter- posed within six (6) months from the date when this law takes effect No decree of registration hereafter entered, and no original certificate of title hereafter issued pursuant thereto, shall be adjudged invalid or set aside, unless the action in which the validity of such decree, or of the original certificate of title issued pursuant thereto, is called in question, be commenced, or tiie defense alleging the invalidity thereof be interposed, within sis (6) montlis from the date of such decree. No action or proceeding either at law or in equity for the recovery of any right, title, interest, or estate in registered land adverse to the title established and adjudicated by any original decree of registration heretofore entered shall be maintained unless such action is co"ramenced within six months from the date when this law talies effect, and no actioij or proceeding for the recovery of any right, title, interest, or estate in registered land adverse to the title established by any original decree of registration hereafter entered shall be maintained, unless such action is commenced within six months from the date of such original decree. No action or proceeding for the enforcement or foreclosure of any lien or charge upon or against registered land, which existed at the date when any original decree of registration was heretofore entered and which was not recog- nized and established by such decree, shall be maintained, unless such action or proceeding is commenced within six months from the date when this law takes effect. No action or proceeding for the enforcement or foreclosure of any lien or charge upon or against registered land, in existence at the date of any original decree of registration hereafter entered, and which is not recog- nized and established by such decree, shall be maintained, unless such action or proceeding is commenced within six months from the date of such original decree.— (Sec. 27.) 7. The right of persons not appearing upon the certificate to set up claims to the land, since the statute does not make valid provision by a statute of limitations for barring claims which may arise in cases wherein the title passes through judicial proceedings sub- sequent to original registration, such claims surviving by reason of the statute in such proceedings (probate, foreclosure, etc.) not having been followed or other irregularity. (Sec. 68.) Any person claiming any right, title, or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner thereof arising subsequent to the date of tlie original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this act for registering the same, file with tlie registrar his verified statement in writing, setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or from whom it was acquired, and 67 a reference to the volume and page of the certificate of title of the registered owner, together with a description of the land, the adverse claimant's resi- dence, and designating a place at which all notices may be served upon him. Such statem^it shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim, and the court, upon the petition of any party in interest, shaU gi-ant a speedy hearing upon the validity of such adverse claim, and shall enter such decision and decree therein as justice and equity may require. If the adverse claim is adjudgefl to be invalid, the registration thereof shall be canceled. The court may, in any case, award such costs and damages, including a reasonable at- torney's fee, as it may deem just. — {Sec. 68.) 8. The right to question the action, decision or entry of registrars, since the statute makes no provision by a statute of limitations for barring claims arising by reason of misconstruction, of other error on the part of registrars in making entries, but accepts the same as conclusive in certificates in the hands of innocent purchasers and encumbrancers, contrary to the decisions and principle. (Sec. 69.) No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be made upon the register of titles after the entry- of a certificate of title, or of any memorial thereon, and the attestation of the same by the registrar, except by order of the court. A registered owner or other person in interest may at any time apply by peti- tion to the court, upon the grounds that registered interests of any descrip- tion, whether vested, contingent, expectant or Inchoate, have terminated and ceased ; or that new interests have ai-isen or been created which do not appear upon tlie certificate; or that any error or omission was made in entering a certificate or any memorial thereon, or on any duplicate certificate ; or that the name of any person on the certificate has been changed ; or that the registered owner has married, or, if registered as married, that the marriage has been tenuinated; or that a corporation which owned registered land and has been dissolved has not conveyed the same within three years after its dissolution ; or upon any other reasonable ground ; and the court may hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry of a new certificate or grant any other relief upon such terms, requiring security if necessary, as it may consider proper ; but the provisions of this section shall not give the court authority to open the original decree of registration, and nothing shall be done or ordered by the court wliich shall impair the title or other interest of a purchaser who holds a cretiflcate for value and in good faith, or of his heirs or assigns, without his or their written consent. — (Sec. 69.) OEEGOjr. (General Laws, 1901, pp. 438-457.) 1. Any subsisting lease or agreement for a lease, for a period not exceeding five years, where there is actual occupation of the land under the lease. The term "lease" shall include a verbal letting. (Sec. 39.) 2. All public highways embraced in the description of the lands in tlie certificate shall be deemed to be excluded from tlie certificate. (See. B9.) 68 3. Any subsisting right of way or other easement, however created, upon, over or in respect of the land. (Sec. 39.) 4. Any tax or special assessment for which a sale of the land has not been had at the date of the certificate of title. (Sec. 39.) 5. Such right of appeal, right to appear and contest the applica- tion, and of such action, or to make counterclaims, as is allowed by this act. (Sec. 39.) The registered owner of any estate or interest in land brouglit under this act, shall, except in cases of fraud to which he is a party, or of the person through whom he claims without valuable consideration paid in good faith, hold the same subject only to such estates, mortgages, liens, charges and in- terests as may be noted in the last certificate of title in the registrar's office and free from all others except : 1. Any subsisting lease or agreement for a lease, for a period not exceeding five years, where there is actual occupation of the land under the lease. The term " lease " shall include a verbal letting. 2. All public highways embraced in the description of the lands in the cer- tificate shall be deemed to be excluded from the certificate. 3. Any subsisting right of way or other easement, however created, upon, over, or in respect of the land. 4. Any tax or special assessment for which a sale of the land has not been had at the date of the certificate of title. 5. Such right of appeal, right to appear and contest the application, and of such action, or to make counterclaim, as is allowed by this act. — (Sec. 39.) 6. The right of persons, not bound by the initial decree because of some irregularity, insufficiency, or other cause, to open or set aside the decree of registration within two years after entry. (Sec. 26; same as sec. 27, 111., supra.) 7. The right of persons not appearing upon the certificate to set up claims to the land, since the statute does not make valid provision by a statute of limitations for barring claims which may arise in cases wherein the title passes through judicial proceedings subsequent to original registration, such claims surviving by reason of the statute in such proceedings (probate, foreclosure, etc.) not having been followed or other irregularity. (Sec. 91; same as sec. 92, 111., supra.) 8. The right to question the action, decision, or entry of registrars, since the statute makes no provision by a statute of limitations for barring claims arising by reason of misconstruction, of other error on the part of registrars in making entries, but accepts the same as conclusive in certificates in the hands of innocent purchasers and en- cumbrancers, contrary to the decisions and principle. (See brief.) (Sec. 93.) Any person feeling himself aggrieved by the action of the registrar, or by his refusal to act. In any manner pertaining to the first registration of land, or any estate or interest therein, after the first registraion or any transfer of or charge upon the same, the filing or neglect or refusal to file any instru- 69 ment, or to enter or cancel any memorial or notation, or to do any other thing required by him by this act, may file his bill or petition in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, malilng the registrar and other persons whose inter- ests may be affected, parties defendant, and the court may proceed therein as in other cases in equity, and make such order or decree as shall be according to equity in the premises and the purport of tins act— (Sec. 93.) COLORADO. (Session Laws, 1903, ch. 139. Revised Statutes, 190S, pp. 334-335.) 1. Liens, claims, or rights arising or existing under the laws or the Constitution of the United States, which this State can not require to appear of record. (Sec. 30.) 2. The lien of any tax or special assessment for which the land hiis not been sold at the date of the certificate of title. (Sec. 30.) 3. Any lease for a period not exceeding three years when there is actual occupation of the premises thereunder. (Sec. 30.) 4. All rights in public highways upon the land. (Sec. 30.) 5. Such right of appeal, or right to appear and contest the appli- cation as is allowed by this act. (Sec. 30; same as sec. 24, Minn., supra. ) 6. The right of persons, not bound by the initial decree because of some irregularity, insufficiency or other cause, to open or set aside the decree of registration within 90 days after entry. (Sec. 29.) No person shall commence any action at law or in equity for the recovery of lands or assert any interest or right in or lien or demand upon the same, or make entry thereon adversely to the title or interest as found, ordered, or de- creed by the court, unless Avitliin ninety days after the entry of the order or decree. This section shall be construed as giving such right of action to such persons only as shall not, because of some irregularity, insufficiency, or for some other cause, be found and concluded by such order or decree. — (.S'ec. 29.) 7. The right of persons not appearing upon the certificate to set up claims to the land, since the statute does not make valid provi- sion by a statute of limitations for barring claims which may arise in cases wherein the title passes through judicial proceedings sub- sequent to original registration, such claims surviving by reason of the statute in such proceedings (probate, foreclosure, etc.) not hav- ing been followed or other irregularity. (Sec. 82.) Any person claiming any right or interest in registered land, adverse to the registered owner arising subsequent to the date of the original registration may if no other provision is made in this act for registering the same, make statement in writing, setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, and a reference to the volume or page of the certificate of title of the registered owner, and a description of the land to which the right or interest is claimed. The statement shall be signed and sworn to and shall state the adverse claimant's residence and designate a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled 70 to r^istration as an adverse claiia, and the court, upon the petition of any party in interest, shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim, and shall enter such decree thereon as equity and justice may require. If the claim is adjudged to be invalid, its registration shall be canceled. The court may, in any case, award such costs and damages, including reasonable attorney's fees, as it may deem Just in the premises. — (Sec. 82.) 8. The right to question the action, decision, or entry of regis- trars, since the statute makes no provision by a statute of limitations for barring claims arising by reason of misconstruction, or other error on the part of registrars in making entries, but accepts the same as conclusive in certificates in the hands of innocent purchasers and encumbrancers, contrary to the decisions and principle. (Sea brief.) (Sec. 89.) No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be made upon the register of title after the entry of a certificate of title or a memorial thereon and the alteration of the same by the registrar of titles, except by order of the court. Any registered owner or other person in interest may at any time apply by petition to the court, upon the ground that registered interests of any descrip- tion, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased; or that new interests have arisen or been created which do not appear upon the- certificate, or that an error, omission, or mistake was made in enter- ing a certificate; or any memorial thereon; or any duplicate certificate; or that the name of any person upon the cei'tiflcate has been changed; or that the registered owner has been married, or if registered as married, that tlie marriage has been terminated, or that a corporation that owned registered hind has been dissolved and has not convej^ed the same within tliree years after its dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground; and the court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition, after such notice as it may order to all parties in interest, and may order tlie entry of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorial upon a certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security if necessary, as it may deem proper ; provided, however, that this section shall not be construed to give the court authority to open the original decree of registration, and that nothing shall be done or ordered by the court which shall impair the title or other interest of a purchaser holding a certificate for value and in good faith or his heirs or assignees, without his or their consent. — (Sec 89.) WASHINGTON. (Session Laws, 1907, pp. C93-738.) 1. Liens, claims, or rights arising or existing under the laws or the Constitution of the United States, which this State can not require to appear of record. (Sec. 30.) 2. The lien of any tax or special assessment for which the land has not been sold at the date of the certificate of title. (Sec. 30.) 3. Any lease for a period not exceeding three years when there is actual occupation of the premises thereunder. (Sea 30.) 4. All rights in public highways upon the land. (Sec. 30.) 71 5. Such right of appeal, or right to appear and contest the appli- cation as IS allowed bj this act. (Sec. 30; same as sec. 24, Minne- sota, supra.) ^ 6. The right of persons, not bound by the initial decree because ot some irregularity, insufficiency, or other cause, to open or set aside the decree of registration witliin 90 days after entry. (Sec 29; same as sec. 29, Colorado, supra.) 7. The right of persons not appearmg upon the certificate to set up claims to the land, since the statute does not make valid provision by a staute of limitations for barring claims which may arise in cases wherein the title passes through judicial proceedings subse(juent to original registration, such claims surviving by reason of the statute in such proceedings (probate, foreclosure, etc.) not having been followed or other irregularity. (Sec. 81; same as sec 82, Coio- rado, supra.) 8. The right to question the action, decision or entry of regis- trars, since the statute makes no provision by a statute of limitations for barring claims arising by reason of misconstruction or otlier error on the part of registrars in making entries, bnt accepts the same as conclusive in certificates in the hands of innocent purchasers and encumbrancers, contrary to the decisions and principle. (See briei) (Sec. 88; same as sec. 89, Colorado, supra.) NEW YOEK. (Consolidated Laws, 1909, ch. 52. Laws, 1916, eh. 547.) 1. Liens, claims, or rights arising or existing under the laws or Constitution of the United States, which the statutes of this Stdte do not require to appear of record. (Sec. 400.) 2. Any tax, water rate, or assessment wliich becomes a lien on the property after initial registration and for wliich a sale has not been made. (Sec. 400.) 3. Any lease or agreement for a lease, made after or pending registration, for a period not exceeding one year, where there is actual occupation of the land under the lease or agreement. (Sec. 400.) 4. Easements or servitudes which accrue against the property after initial registration in such manner as not to require their reg- istration. (Sec. 400.) A pei-soB who receives a -certificate of title pursuant to a judgment of r«gis- 1 ration -except in case of fraud to which he is a party, and a pm-chaser of i<>sistered real property, wlwj takes a certificate of title for value and in good faitli. shall hold the same free from all encumbrances, charges, trusts, liens, and transfei's, except those noted on the certificate in the registrar's office, and any of the following which may exist: 72 First. Liens, claims, or rights arising or existing under the laws of Oon- stitution of the United States, which the statutes of this State do not require to appear of record. Second. Any tax, water rate, or assessment which becomes a lien on tlie property after initial registration and for which a sale has not been made. Third. Any lease or agreement for a lease, made after or pending registra- tion, for a period not exceeding one year, where there is actual occupation of the land under the lease or agreement. Fourth. Easements or servitudes which accrue against the property after initial registration in such manner as not to require their registration. Except as specified in the foregoing statement of exceptions, no encum- brnnce, charge, trust, lien, or transfer shall take effect upon or over real prop- (']-ty the title to which has been registered, imless the instrument creating and setting forth such encumbrance, charge, trust, lien, or transfer has been filed.— (Sec. iOO-) 5. The right of persons, not bound by the initial decree because of some irregularity, insuiBciency, or other cause, to open or set aside the decree of registration within six months after entry. (Sec. 392.) Any title registration procured by or as a result of fraud may be set aside in the same manner and by the same proceedings as in case of a deed obtained by fraud, provided that such proceeding for setting aside the registration shall not injuriously affect the rights of an innocent purchaser or encumbrancer of the property after such registration, for value and without actual knowledge of fraud, and provided further that the action or other proceeding to set Aside such registration be commenced within ten years from the time when the final judgment of registration was entered. No action or proceeding shall lie or be commenced except on the ground of fraud as above stated, to set aside any judgment of registration or to modify or affect the same or for the recovery of registered property or any estate, right, or interest in or lien upon the same, or any part thereof, or make any entry thereon, adversely to the title or interest registered therein, as directed by a final judgment of the court unless such action or proceeding is commenced within six months after such judgment of registration is entered. — (Seo. S92.) 6. The right of persons not appearing upon the certificate to set up claims to the land, since the statute does not make valid provision by a statute of limitations for barring claims which may arise in cases wherein the title passes through judicial proceedings subsequent to original registration, such claims surviving by reason of the statute in such proceedings (probate, foreclosure, etc.) not having been fol- lowed or other irregularity. (Sec. 422.) Reference of doubtful matter to the court: When the registrar is in doubt, nnrt the parties in interest fail to agree as to the proper memorial to be made ill the title book of any deed, mortgage, or other voluntary Instrument presented for registration, the question shall be referred to the court for decision,' either on the certificate of the registrar stating the question, or upon the suggestion in writing of any party or parties in interest; and the court, after due notice to all the parties in interest, and a hearing, If necessary or proper, shall enter an order prescribing the form of the memorial to be made by the registrar, who shall make the memorial accordingly. In any judicial proceeding affecting property, the title to which is then a registered title, the court upon the appli- cation in writing of any party or parties in interest, after due notice to all 73 other parties in interest, and a hearing, if necessary or proper, shall enter an order prescribing the form of any memorial that should be made by the regis- trar in the title book because of or as the result of such proceeding; and the registrar, upon the production of a certified copy of such order, shall make the proper memorial in accordance with such order. After making such memorial m the title book the registrar shall also make all other memorials on existing certificates or make and deliver any new certificate according to the circum- stances and in the manner required herein. — (Sec. Jf22.) NOETH CAROLINA. (Acts, 1913, Oh. 90.) 1. Liens, claims, or rights arising or existing under the laws or Constitution of the United States which the statutes of this State can not require to appear of record undei" registry laws. (Sec. 25.) 2. Taxes and assessments thereon due the State or any county, city, or town therein, but not delinquent. (Sec. 25.) 3. Any lease for a time not exceeding three years, under which the land is actually occupied. (Sec. 25.) E^-ery registered owner of any estate or Interest in land brought under this act shall, except in cases of fraud, to which he is a party or in which he is a privy without valuable consideration paid in good faith, and escept when registration has been procured through forgery, hold the land, free from any and all adverse claims, rights, or encumbrances not noted on the certificate except (1) liens, claims, or rights arising or existing under the laws or Consti- tution of the United States which the statutes of this State can not require to appear of record under registry laws; (2) taxes and assessments thereon due the State or any county, city, or town therein, but not delinquent; (3) any lease for a time not exceeding three years, under which the land is actually occupied. Any person making any claim to or asserting any lien or charge upon registered land existing at the initial registry of the same and not shown upon the register, or adverse to the title of the registered owner, and for which no other provision is herein made for asserting the same in the registry of titles may make affidavit thereof setting forth his interest, right, title, lien, or demand and how and under whom derived, and the character and nature thereof. The affidavit shall state his place of residence and designate a place at which all notices relating thereto may be served. Upon the filing of such affidavit in the office of the clerk of the superior court the latter shall order a note thereof as in the case of charges or encumbrances, and the same shall be entered by the register of deeds. Action shall be brought upon such claim within six months after the entry of such note, unless for cause shown the clerk shall extend the time. Upon the failure to commence such action within the time prescribed therefor the clerk shall order a cancellation of such note. If any person shall wantonly or maliciously or without reasonable cause procure such notation to be entered upon the registry of titles, having the affect of a cloud upon the registered owner's title, he shall be liable for all damages the owner may suffer thereby.— (Sec. 25.) Section 25 shows the intention of the statute to be to fix no statute of limitations. Certificates of title issued thereunder, therefore, are subject to the further exceptions. 74 4. The statute does not make valid provision by a statute of limi- tations for barring claims which survive an initial decree because of the statute not having been followed or other irregularity in the initial proceeding to quiet title. (Sec. 23, supra.) 5. The right of persons not appearing upon the certificate to set up claims to the land, since the statute does not make valid provision by a statute of limitations for barring claims which may arise in eases wherein the title passes through judicial proceedings subsequent to original registration, such claims surviving by reason of the statute in such proceedings (probate, foreclosure, etc.) not having been fol- lowed or other irregularity. 6. The right to question the action, decision or entry of registrars, since the statute makes no provision by a statute of limitations for barring claims arising by reason of misconstruction, or other error on the part of registrars in making entries, but accepts the same as conclusive in certificates in the hands of innocent purchasers and en- cumbrancers, contrary to the decisions and principle. SOUTH CAROLINA. (Acts, 1916.) (In all respects here under consideration the South Carolina stat- ute is similar to that of North Carolina, supra.) MISSISSIPPI. (Laws, 1914, ch. 131.) (In all respects here under consideration the Mississippi statute is similar to that of North Carolina, supra.) OHIO. (Laws, 1913, pp. 914-960.) 1. Liens, claims, or rights arising or existing under the laws or Constitution of the United States which the statutes of this State can not require to appear of record in the recorder's office. (Sec. 25.) 2. Taxes, within six years after they have been entered upon the tax duplicates and become due and payable. (See. 25.) 3. Any highway, public way, or private way laid out or acquired under provisions of law or otherwise, unless the certificate of title states that the nonexistence of such way, or the boundaries thereof, if the same exists, have been determined by the court. (Sec. 25.) 4. Any lease for a term not oxceedirtg three years, when there is actual possession under the lease. (Sec. 26.) 75 5. Eight of appeal and. to prosecute error within 30 days after de- cree of registration. (Sec. 26.) 6. (Expressly specified in sec. 25 below, but a favorable exception.) If there are easements or other rights appurtenant to a parcel of registered land which for any reason have failed to be registered, such easements or rights shall remain so appurtenant notwithstand- ing such failure, and shall be held to have passed with the land. (Sec. 25.) Every applicant who without fraucl on his part receives a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value and In good faith, shail hold the same free from all estates and encumbrances except those noted on the certificate and any of the following estates and encumbrances which may be existing : First. Liens, claims, or rights arising or existing under the laws or Constitu- tion of the United States which the statutes of this State can not require to appear of record in the recorder's office. Second. Taxes, within six years after they have been entered upon the tax duplicates and become due and payable. Third. Any highvcay, public way, or private way laid out or acquired under provisions of law or otherwise, unless the certificates of title state that the nonexistence of such way, or the boundaries thereof, if the same exists, have been determined by the court. Fourth. Any lease for a term not exceeding three years, when there is actual possession under the lease. Fifth. Eight of appeal and to prosecute error within thirty days after decree of registration. Sixth. If there are easements or other rights appurtenant to a parcel of registered land which for any reason have failed to be registered, such ease- ments or rights shall remain so appurtenant notwithstanding such failure, and shall be held to have passed with the land. This section shall be printed or vsritten on all duplicate certificates of title before delivery by the recorder. — (Sec. go.) 7. The right of persons, not bound by the initial decree because of some irregularity, insufficiency, or other cause, to open or set aside the decree of registration within 30 days after entry. (Sec. 25.) If the court after hearing finds that the applicant has title in whole or in part as stated in his application, and proper for registration, then to the ex- tent of the title so found a decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered, which shall have the effect of a decree in rem and, subject only to the exceptions stated In section 25 shall bind the land and all interests, rights and estates therein and liens and charges thereon and, after the expiration of tiie time to prosecute error or appeal and except as otherwise provided in this act, shall be absolutely conclusive upon and against all persons, In- eluding the State or any political subdivision thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice or other papers in the case, or as unknown heirs or devisees, or included in the general descriptions "all other persons, if any, having any right or interest in or lien upon the land or any part thereof," and whether under disability, not in being, unknown or unascer- tained; and after the expiration of the time for prosecuting error or appeal, except as otherwise provided in this act, no such person shall in any of the courts of this State assert by suit or otherwise any claim to an interest or estate In or lien or charge upon registered land In derogation of or contrary to the purport of such decree. Such decree shall not, after the expiration of the time for prosecuting error or appeal, he opened by reason of the absence, in- fancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any suit or proceeding at law or in equity for opening up judgments or decrees by reason of a party not having had actual notice of the suit or proceeding; hut any person deprived of land or any estate or interest therein or lien or charge thereon by a decree of registration obtained by fraud may file a petition in the case to open up and review the same within one year after the entry of the decree, providing any innocent purchaser of value, mortgagee, or other lien holder has acquired an interest. If there is any such purchaser, mortgagee, or lien holder the decree of registration shall not as to them or any person holding under them be opened, but shall remain in force and effect forever, subject only to the right of appeal and to prosecute error. But any person who is aggrieved by such decree In any case may pursue his remedy by action of tort against the applicant or against any other person for fraud in pro- curing the decree. Every decree of registration shall bear date of the year, month, day, hour, and minute of its entry and shall be signed by the clerk. It shall give the residence and address of the owner of the land registered, state whether he or she is married or unmarried, and if married, the name of the husband or wife ; if such owner is under disability it shall state the nature of the dis- ability, and if a minor, shall state his age. It shall contain an accurate de- scription and plat of each separate parcel of the land as finally determined and adopted by the court, shall set forth the estate of the owner and also, in such manner as to show the relative priority, or particular estates, mortgages, easements, liens, attachments, and other encumbrances, including rights of husband or wife, if any, to which the land or the owner's estate is subject and all suits pending by or against the owner or any of his predecessors in title in any court of record In the county the judgments in which might affect the land or the owner's title thereto and also all such suits elsewhere pending if the same were brought to the attention of the court by the pleadings or evi- dence in the case, and may contain any other matter properly to be determined by the court in pursuance of this act. The decree shall be stated in a form convenient for transcription upon or binding in the register or certificates of title hereafter mentioned and in a form suitable to constitute it a certificate of title and shall so far as possible give the full name, residence, and post- office address of each owner and holder of any estate or interest in or lien or charge upon the land or any part thereof. The clerli, under the direction of the court, shall make and keep indexes of all applications and all decrees of registration. — (Sec. 22.) 8. The right of persons not appearing upon the certificate to set up claims to the land, since the statute does not make valid provision by a statute of limitations for barring claims which may arise in cases wherein the title passes through judicial proceedings subse- quent to original registration, such claims surviving by reason of the statute in such proceedings (probate, foreclosure* etc.) not hav- ing been followed or other irregularity. (Sec. 68.) Any person desiring to assert any interest In or lien or claim a-ainst regis- tered land adverse to the title of any registered owner, and not shown upon 77 the register when no provision is by this act made for registering the same in the recorder's office, may make affidavit thereto, setting forth his interest, right, title, claim, lien, charge or demand, and how and under whom derived! and the character and nature thereof. The affiant shall state his full name! place of residence and post-office address and shall designate a place within the State at which all notices relating thereto may be served upon him; or if he be a nonresident of the State, the name, residence, and post-office address of some person residing within the State upon whom service may be made as his agent and by which service he will be bound the same as If made upon the claimant within the State. Upon the filing of such affidavit in the recorder's oflice the recorder shall enter forthwith a memorial thereof, upon the registered certificate of title, stating the exact time when said affidavit was filed and the purport and nature thereof. — (Sco. G8.) 9. The right of any person in interest to question the action, find- ing, or decision of registrars with respect to entries within three (3) days after making of the entry questioned. Should the three-day period be held to be unreasonably short as a statute of limitations, the right attempted to be barred by this section would be a continu- ing right, or at least subject to general statutes. (Sec 79.) Any person feeling himself aggrieved by the action, finding, or decision of the recorder, or by his refusal to act, in any matter pertaining to the first registra- tion of land, or any subsequent transfer, or charge, lien, interest, or estate in or vipon the same, or by his filing, or failing, neglecting, or refusing to file, any instrument, or entering or canceling, or failing, neglecting, or refusing to enter or cancel, any memorial or notation, or by Ills wrongfully doing, or by his falling, neglecting, or refusing to do, any other thing required of him by this act, may within three days thereafter file with the recorder a written notice of intention to appeal, and shall within ten days thereafter file in the common pleas court a petition setting forth the matter complained of and making the recorder and other persons whose interests may be affected parties defendant, who shall be notified by summons or other process as provided by law in civil actions or by registered mall and other process as provided in cases of original registration. Such person shall also file with this petition a bond with sureties to the approval of the clerk in such sum as may be fixed by a judge of said court or of the probate court conditioned for the due prosecution of such pro- ceeding and payment of all costs and of all damages which any person in interest may suffer in case the judgment of the court should be against the appellant. The recorder shall forthwith after the filing of sucli bond file with the clerk of the court a statement or transcript of his doing in the matter com- plained of. The court shall proceed therein as In other cases and make such order or decree as shall be according to law aud equity in the premises and the provisions of this act. The eJerk of the court making such order shall, under the seal of the court, make and deliver to the recorder a certified copy thereof who shall file and make entry of the same and otherwise act in pur- suance of and according to the terras and directions of such order. Such order shall be final and conclusive. — (Sec. 7.9.) NEBRASKA. (Acts of 1915, ch. 225.) 1. Any subsisting lease or agreement for a lease for a period not exceeding five years, where there is actual occupation of the land 78 Huder lease. Tke term " lease " shall include a verbal letting. (Sec. 40.) 2. General taxes for the current or fiscal year in whieli certificate is issued and g)ecial taxes or assessments which have not been con- fiimed, (Sec 40.) S. Such right of appeal, writ of error, right to appear and contest the application, and ax:tion to make counter claim as is allowed bj this act. (Sec. 40; same as sec. 40, Illinois, snpra.) 4. The right of persons, not bound by the initial decree because of some irregularity, insufficiency, or other cause, to open or set aside the decree of registration within two years after entry. (Sec. 27; same as sec. 27, Illinois, supra.) 5. The right of persons not appearing upon the certificate to set up claims to the land, since the statute does not make valid provision by a statute of limitations for barring claims which may arise in cases T,- herein the title passes through judicial proceedings subsequent to original registration, such claims surviving by reason of the statute ill such proceedings (probate, foreclosure, etc.) not having been fol- lowed or other irregularity. (Sec. 85 ; same as sec. 92, Illinois, supra.) 6. The right to question the action, decision, or entry of registrars, since the statute mak^ no provision by a statute of limitations for barring claims arising by reason of misoonstrmd;ion, or other error on the part of registrars in making entries, but accepts the same as con- clusive in certificate in the hands of innocent purchasers and encum- brancers, contrary to the decisions and principle. (See brief.) (Sec. 87; same as sec. 93, Oregon, supra.) ■UTAH. (1917.) VlfiXSINIA. (1916.) (The statutes of these two States are identical in so far as they coirer tU« matters here considered). 1. Liens, claims, or rights arising or existing under the laws or Constitution of the United States which the statute of this Statp can not require to appear of record under registry laws. (Sec. 73.) 2. Taxes and levies assessed thereon but not delinquent. (Sec 73.) 3. Any lease for a term not exceeding one year under which the land is actually occupied. (Sec. 73.) Kvcry ireglstered owner of any estate or interest in land brought under this act shall hold the land free from any and all adverse claims, rights, or eu- ciimbranees not noted on the certificate of title, except: First. Liens, claims, or rights arising or existing under the laws or Con- stitntion of the United States which are the statutes of this State can not requira tn appear of record under registry laws. Second. Taxes and levies assessed thereon but not delinquent. Third. Any lease for a term not exceeding one year under wliich the land is aetoallj wcupled. — (Sec, tS.) 79 4. The statute does not make valid provision by a statute of limi- tations tor barring claims wliich survive an initial decree because ot the statute not having been followed or other irregularity in the initial proceeding to quiet title. (Sec. 11.) .\ petition for rehearing of an appeal may be taken, or a bill of review or bill of exceptions, or writ of certiorari may be filed, within ninety days, ami not afterwards, from any decree of tlie court, under- the same circumstances, in the same manner and on the same condition as if such decree had been ren- dered by a circuit court. Said period may not be extended by any disability.— (See. 11.) 5. The right of persons not bound by judicial proceedings through which title passes or asserting other claims arising since original registration to set up such claims within 90 days " after entry and registration of decree in pursuance of such proceeding or aftei- the arising of such other claim. (Sec. 68.) Any registered owner of any estate or interest In land, or any person having any claim against registered land arising from any other cause than fraud or forgery since the land was registered, may, within ninety days after the claim cr cause of complaint shall have arisen, petition the court for relief in any mat- ter witliin its jurisdiction; and it shall be tlie duty of the proper rogistre.r, upon the request of any such person, to register a memorial that such petition has been or will be filed, which memorial shall serve as a caveat and be notice to all persons. (2) And whenever any registrar is in doubt as to the ni-oper registration to be made in any case, or when any person Is aggrieved by any act or refusal to act by the registrar, the question may be likewise submitted by petition.— .S'ec. 68. 6. The right of persons in interest to question the action, finding, cr decision of registrars within 90 days of date of entry. (Sec. 68.-) GEORGIA. 1917. 1. Liens, claims, or rights arising or existing under the laws or Constitution of the United States which 'the statutes of this State can not require to appear of record under registry laws. (Sec. 63.) 2. Taxes and levies assessed thereon for the current calendar year. (Sec. 63.) 1 It Is claimed by the author of the Virginia act that section 11 operates as a gonoi-nl statute o£ Umitations. If such be true, exception 4 ceases upon expiration of 90 days after entry of decree in Initial proceedings. It seems that while the section might be sufEci-ent to bar claims survlvins by reason of some trivial irregularity, it is not sufli- ci.^ntly explicit to bar in more serious cases of jurisdictional defects. 2 If section 68 be good as a statute of limitations, the right stated in 5 and G as being b.irred by the section expires with the 90-day limitation, otherwise it remains open sub- ject to whatever general statute of limitation may control. Since section 68 seeks to abridge the general statute, the safer wording would seem to be, not " may within 90 days,"' but " may not, unless within 90 days," admittedly an extremely narrow and tech- nical view, yet the subject of the statute is ruled by technicalities. 80 3. Any lease for a term not exceeding three years, under which the land is actually occupied. (Sec. 63.) 4. Highways in public use and railroads in actual operation. (Sec. 63.) 5. The right of an interested person to attack or to set aside any transaction for fraud or forgery to which he is not a party within seven years from the date of the transaction or of the registration to which the same relates. (Sec. 63.) Every registered owner of any estate or interest in land brouglit under this iict shall, except in eases of fraud or forgery to which he is a party, or to which he is a privy without valuable consideration paid in good faith, hold the land free from any and all adverse claims, rights, or encumbrances not noted on the certificate of title in the Title Register, except : First. Liens, claims, or rights arising or existing under the laws or Constitu- tion of the United States which the statutes of this State can not require to appear of record under registry laws. Second. Taxes and levies assessed thereon for the current calendar year. Third. Any lease for a term not exceeding three years, under which the land is actually occupied. Fourth. Highways in public use and railroads in actual operation. No proceedings to attack or to set aside any transaction for such fraud or such forgery as is referred to in this section shall be brought or be entertained by any court, unless the same shall have been brought within seven years from the date of the transaction or of the registration to which the same relates. Nothing herein shall conflict with the provisions of this act allowing attack for good cause to be made upon, a registration made by the clerk at any time within twelve months from the date of such registration. — {Sec. 63.) 6. The right of persons not served who are, under the statute, entitled to actual notice and the right of all persons in cases wherein the initial proceedings have not followed the statute with the result that jurisdiction was not acquired are sought to be foreclosed by sec- tion 13, quoted below. It seems that if there should be such irregu- larity in proceedings that the court does not acquire jurisdiction, recitals in a decree would be nullities and the rights of such persons to maintain an action of I'ecovery would remain open, since there is no statute of limitations provided. (Sec. 13.) * * * The recital of service of process and of the giving and publishing of notices, contained in the decree or final judgment In the cause, shall he con- clusive evidence that siicU service, publication and notice have ieen legaUy ylven; provided, however, that nothing herein shall prevent any person ag- grieved from having his right of action against any sheriff who makes a false leturn of service, or against any clerk or examiner who falsely attests a waiver or acknowledgment of service, or any clerk who fails to publish the notice or to mail the notices as required by this act.— (Sec. IS.) 7. The right of persons not appearing upon the certificate to set up claims to the land, since the statute does not make valid provision by a statute of limitations for barring claims which may arise in cases wherein the title passes through judicial proceedings subsequent to 81 original registration, such claims surviving by reason of the statute in such proceedings (probate, foreclosure, etc.) not having been fol- lowed or other irregularity. 8. The right of persons at interest to question the correctness of any entry, notation, or registration within 12 months from the date of the making of the same. (Sec. 59.) The clerk of the superior court is charged with the primary duty of deter- mining whether any instrument, writing, or record or other matter is in proper shape for registration, and with the duty of correctly and legally making the registration, including all formal incidents thereto, and shall be liable to any injured person for any failure of duty in this respect. All registrations of title and all entries and notations made by him upon the title register of transfers or of the cancellation or discharge of liens or encumbrances, shall be prima facie conclusive ; and unless a caveat be filed, as provided for in this act, seeking to set aside, modify or otherwise effect such entry, notation or registration within twelve months from the date of the making of the same upon the title register the same shall become absolutely conclusive upon all persons ; this to be considered and construed as a statute of limitations against the questioning of the correctness of the clerk's action, and is to be without exception on account of disabilities but shall not operate as a limitation in favor of the clerk as to anjjr action against him for wrongdoing or neglect of duty. In the event appli- cation is made to a clerk to have any transfer or other transaction registered or noted, and .he shall be in doubt as to whether the same should be registered, entered or noted, or shall be in doubt in regard to any detail thereof, either the clerk or any party at interest may petition the judge of the court for direction, and such judge, after it shall have appeared that the parties at interest have had reasonable notice, may proceed to hear the matter and to give directions and instructions to the clerk, whose duty it shall be to follow the directions and instructions of the court. In all matters required of the clerk under this act, he shall be subject to the direction and orders of the court. — (Sec. 59.) NORTH DAKOTA. (1917.) SOUTH DAKOTA. (1917.) (The statutes of these two States are identical in so far as they cover the matters here being considered.) 1. Liens, claims, or rights, arising or existing under the laws or Constitution of the United States, which the State can not require to appear of record. (Sec. 24.) 2. The lien of any tax or special assessment for which the land has not been sold at the date of the certificate of title. (Sec. 24.) 3. Any lease for a period not exceeding three years, where is actual occupation of the premises thereunder. (Sec. 24.) 4. All rights in public highways upon the land. (Sec. 24.) 5. Such right of appeal or right to appear and contest the appli- cation as is allowed by this chapter. (Sec. 24.) 50874°— 18 6 82 6. The right of persons, not bound by the initial decree because of some irregularity, insufficiency or other cause, to open or set aside the decree of registration within six months after entry. (Sec. 27.) 7. The right of persons not appearing upon the certificate to set up claims to the land, since the statute does not make valid pro- vision by a statute of limitation for barring claims which may arise in cases wherein the title passes through judicial proceedings sub- sequent to original registration, such claims surviving by reason of the statute in such proceedings (probate, foreclosure, etc.) not having been followed or other irregularity. 8. The right to question the action, decision, or entry of registrars, since the statute makes no provision by a statute of limitations for barring claims arising by reason of misconstruction or other error on the part of registrars in making entries, but accepts the same as conclusive in certificates in the hands of innocent purchasers and encumbrancers, contrary to the decisions and principle. TENNESSEE. (Public Acts, 1917, p. 139.) 1. Any subsisting lease or agreement for a lease for a period not exceeding five years, where there is actual occupation of the land under the lease. The term "lease" shall include a verbal letting. (Sec. 15.) 2. General taxes for the current or fiscal year in which certificate is issued and special taxes or assessments which have not been con- firmed. (Sec. 15.) 3. Such right of appeal, writ of error, right to appear and contest the application, and action to make counterclaim as is allowed by the act. (Sec. 15.) 4. Liens, claims, or rights arising or existing under the laws or Constitution of the United States which the statutes of the Common- wealth can not require to appear of record in the registry. (Sec. 15.) 5. Any public highway if the certificate of title does not state that the boundary of such way has been determined. (Sec. 15.) 6. The right of persons, not bound by the initial decree because of some irregularity, insufficiency, or other cause, to open or set aside the decree of registration within one year after entry. (Sec. 12.) 7. The right of persons not appearing upon the certificate to set up claims to the land, since the statute does not make valid provi- sion by a statute of limitations for barring claims which may arise in cases wherein the title passes through judicial proceedings sub- seciuent to original registration, such claims surviving by reason of the statute in such proceedings (probate, foreclosure, etc) not hav- ing been followed or other irregularity. 83 8. The right to question the action, decision, or entry of registrars, since the statute makes no provision by a statute of limitations for barring claims arising by reason of misconstruction or other error on the part of registrars in making entries, but accepts the same as conclusive in certificates in the hands of innocent purchasers and encumbrancers, contrary to the decisions and principle. 9. In any action or proceeding brought for ejectment, partition. or possession of land, the title to which has been registered, the gen- eral statutes of limitations of the State are to control. (Sec. IS.) The evident purpose of the one year statute of limitations provided for in section 12 of the act appears defeated by section 18, and the acceptance of original certificates of registration after one year from date of entry is thereby rendered inadvisable. INDEX. tBeferences are to pages.] Abstract of ttHe, 32, 88, 68. Answer, 48. Appeal, 5, 49. Australia, 22. Brief, 5. California, 15, 23, 26, 44, 60. Certificate of title, 5, 16, 24, 25, 46. Claimants, 6, 8. Claim of ownership, 33, 38. Colorado, 23, 26, 44, 69. Conclusions, 20. ConcluslTeness of certificates, 5, 26. Constitutionality of law, 5, 6. Cost of proceedings, 28, 30, 44. Decree, 5, 24, 26, 44, 49. Defendants, 6. Due process, what is, 6. Duplicate certificates of title, 24. Economic saving, 40. Exceptions to certificates, 45, 58. Georgia, 27, 44, 79. Guardian, 49. Hawaii, 22. Illinois, 11, 23, 26, 27, 44, 58. Indefeasibility of title, 25. Indices, 33. Initial proceedings, 5, 10, 24, 25. Insurance, 41. Involuntary transactions, 50, 56. Items of expense, 32. Judicial proceedings, 18. Jurisdiction, 47. Jurisdictional defects, 16. Jury, 54. Legal objections, 6, 31. Limitation, rule of, 10, 16, 18, 19, 20, 27, 44, 45. Massachusetts, 14, 17, 26, 44, 63. Minnesota, 17, 23, 26, 44, 65. Minors, exemption of, 10, 23. Mississippi, 44, 74. Name indices, 33. Nebraska, 26, 44, 77. New York, 16, 2.3, 26, 44, 71. North Carolina, 23, 44, 73. North Dakota, 26, 44, 81. Notice, 6, 7, 33, 88, 54. 26, o Objections to title registration, 29, 30, 31. Objects of title registration, 28, 24. Ohio, 12, 26, 27, 44, 74. Oregon, 26, 44, 67. Owner, duty of, 7. Petition, 47. Philippine Islands, 22. Porto Rico, 22. Possession, 33. Posting, 55. Probate proceedings, 16, 18. Procedure, 24, 46, 47. Property indices, 33. Provisions suggested, 37. Publication, notice by, 7. Quiet-title suits, 6, 24, 44. Reduction of cost, 32. Register of titles, 5, 24. Registrar, 5, 11, 24, 26. Ministerial or judicial, 11. Duties of, 12. Registration, irrevocable, 56. South Carolina, 44, 74. South Dakota, 26, 44, 81. State, power over titles, 6, 7. Statute of limitations, 16, 18, 19, 20, 26, 27, 35, 44, 45. Subsequent transactions, 5, 24, 27. Su^estions, 32, 34, 36, 37. Summons, 8, 48. Tennessee, 26, 44, 82. Time required in original proceedings, 20. Title examiners, 32, 48. Title by prescription, 18. 01 registration acts, 23. I'orrens, 22, 24. System, 23. 31. Transactions, subsequent, 10. Voluntary, 50, 56. Involuntary, 50, 56. Trial, 49. Unknown claimants, 8. Utah, 44, 78. Virginia, 26, 27, 48. Voluntary transactions, 50, 56. Washington, 26, 44, 70. 85 •